Sponsorship Appeals - Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

Immigration Appeal Division 

SPONSORSHIP APPEALS 

IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE 

PROTECTION ACT 

Legal Services 

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 

January 1, 2008

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Introduction 

Chapter One – Financial Refusals and Requirements for the Sponsor 

Chapter Two – Criminal Refusals 

Chapter Three – Health Grounds - Medical Inadmissibility - Section 38 of the 

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 

Chapter Four – Adoptions 

Chapter Five – Spouses, Common-Law Partners and Conjugal Partners 

Chapter Six – Bad Faith Family Relationships 

Chapter Seven – Relationship 

Chapter Eight – Misrepresentation 

Chapter Nine – Non-compliance with the Act or the Regulations 

Chapter Ten – Discretionary Jurisdiction 

Chapter Eleven – Fairness and Natural Justice under the IRPA 

Chapter Twelve – Consent to Return to Canada 

“T” – Transitional Provisions

Introduction 

Introduction 

This paper deals with the sponsorship provisions of the Immigration and Refugee 

Protection Act (IRPA) and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (IRP 

Regulations) as they pertain to the Immigration Appeal Division. 

The paper, within the sponsorship context, outlines the legislative purpose of the IRPA 

and discusses how the IRPA has been interpreted by the courts. 

This paper does not constitute legal opinion and should not be taken to represent the 

views of the Immigration and Refugee Board and its members. 

General 

A sponsorship appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division is a hearing de novo in a broad 

sense. 1 It is open to the Immigration Appeal Division to consider issues which were not before 

the visa officer. 2 The Immigration Appeal Division is not bound by legal or technical rules of 

evidence and it may receive and base its decision on any evidence considered necessary and 

credible or trustworthy. 3 

The Immigration Appeal Division is bound by the common law duty of fairness. A 

participant at a hearing must have sufficient knowledge of what is at issue to afford her an 

opportunity to participate in the hearing in a meaningful way. 4 

The Immigration Appeal Division may allow or dismiss a sponsorship appeal. It may 

allow in law or by granting special relief, or both. The Immigration Appeal Division must give 

1 

2 

3 

4 

Kahlon, Darshan Singh v. M.E.I (F.C.A., no. A-115-86), Mahoney, Stone, MacGuigan, February 6, 1989. 

Reported: Kahlon v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1989), 7 Imm. L.R. (2d) 91 (F.C.A.). 

The Immigration Appeal Division may make use of newly created evidence in sponsorship cases: Valdez, 

Enrico Villanueva v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5430-97), Reed, March 12, 1999; Nadon, Claude v. M.C.I. 

(F.C., no. IMM-2932-06), Beaudry, January 22, 2007; 2007 FC 59; Khera, Amarjit v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM- 

6375-06), Martineau, June 13, 2007; 2007 FC 632. 

Pabla, Dial v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1210-00), Blais, December 12, 2000. 

See section 175(1) of the IRPA. 

David, Solomon v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5599-06), Martineau, May 24, 2007; 2007 FC 546; M.C.I. v. Dang, 

Thi Kim Anh (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3113-99), Dawson, July 20, 2000. [Judicial review of IAD T98-03773, 

MacAdam, June 4, 1999]. Thus where the sponsor indicated she was not putting into issue the correctness of 

the visa officer’s decision, the Appeal Division came under an obligation to clearly advise the Minister of its 

decision to nevertheless inquire into the adequacy of that decision. 

Sponsorship Appeals 1 Legal Services 

January 1, 2008 

Introduction

easons for its decision. 5 If the Immigration Appeal Division allows an appeal by a sponsor, the 

matter goes back for further processing and an assessment of whether the requirements of the 

IRPA and the IRP Regulations, other than those requirements upon which the decision of the 

Immigration Appeal Division has been given, are met. 6 

If the Immigration Appeal Division dismisses an appeal and a new application for a 

permanent resident visa is filed, refused on the same ground and appealed again, and if no new 

evidence is adduced at the second appeal, the appeal may be dismissed as an abuse of process; 7 if 

new evidence is adduced, the second appeal may be dismissed using the doctrine of res judicata 

unless special circumstances apply. 8 A decision allowing the appeal on compassionate or 

humanitarian grounds has the effect of blanketing the ground of refusal that was appealed and 

that particular refusal ground cannot be used again 9 unless new material facts come to the 

attention of the visa officer. 10 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

See section 54 of the Immigration Appeal Division Rules, and section 169(b) of the IRPA. 

See section 70 of the IRPA. However, a visa officer is not precluded from refusing a sponsored application on 

the same statutory basis as was relieved against by the Appeal Division when new material facts arising after 

the Appeal Division hearing or discovered after the Appeal Division hearing and not before the Appeal 

Division, come to the attention of the visa officer: Au, Shu Foo v. M.C.I. [2002] F.C. 257 (C.A.). 

Kaloti, Yaspal Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-526-98), Décary, Sexton, Evans, March 13, 2000. Li, Wei Min v. 

M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5040-05), Lemieux, June 14, 2006; 2006 FC 757. See too Dhaliwal, Baljit Kaur v. 

M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1760-01), Campbell, December 21, 2001 where the Court found that evidence of 

continuing commitment was new and relevant evidence with respect to the parties’ intention at the time of 

marriage and thus the Immigration Appeal Division erred in finding abuse of process. See Rahman, Azizur v. 

M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1642-06), Noël, November 2, 2006; 2006 FC 1321 where Dhaliwal was distinguished. 

Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc. [2001] 2 S.C.R. 460; 2001 SCC 44. See Kaloti, Yaspal Singh v. M.C.I. 

(F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4932-97), Dubé, September 8, 1998; Bath, Ragbir Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-01993), Lam, 

December 8, 1997 (appeal dismissed on grounds of res judicata where ground of refusal, parties, law and 

factual matter to be determined were the same as on the first appeal); and Singh, Ahmar v. The Queen 

(F.C.T.D., no. T-1495-95), Muldoon, December 2, 1996; affirmed in Singh, Ahmar v. The Queen (F.C.A., no. 

A-1014-96), Strayer, Isaac, Linden, November 5, 1998. (res judicata applied regarding a challenge to the 

validity of regulations). For a contrary position, see Jhammat, Harjinder Kaur v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-1669- 

88), Muldoon, October 13, 1988, where res judicata was held to be inapplicable in public law, allowing the 

Minister to question the validity of a marriage on appeal from a second refusal despite having conceded the 

validity of the marriage in the appeal from the first refusal. A court order quashing a refusal on a limited basis 

does not have the effect of rendering the whole ground of refusal res judicata: Wong, Chun Fai v. M.E.I. 

(F.C.T.D., no. T-2871-90), Jerome, February 26, 1991. See also the in-depth discussion of res judicata and 

abuse of process at chapter 6, section 6.7 “Repeat Appeals”. 

The Immigration Appeal Division must allow the sponsor to present the alleged new evidence before deciding 

the abuse of process/res judicata issues: Kular, Jasmail v. M.C. I. (F.C.T.D., no., IMM-4990-99), Nadon, 

August 30, 2000. [Judicial review of IAD T98-00523, Maziarz, September 20, 1999.] But the Appeal Division 

is under no obligation to grant a full oral hearing, new evidence by way of affidavit is acceptable: Sekhon, 

Amrik Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1982-01), McKeown, December 10, 2001. 

Mangat, Parminder Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-153-85), Strayer, February 25, 1985. However, if a new 

ground of refusal is subsequently discovered, nothing would preclude a second refusal/appeal. 

Au, supra, footnote 6. 



Introduction

A decision of the Immigration Appeal Division may be challenged by way of judicial 

review to the Federal Court with leave of the Court. 11 

Sponsor 

Whether or not one qualifies as a "sponsor" is covered in Chapter 1. 

Member of the Family Class 

The issue of who is a "member of the family class" and thus can be sponsored is covered 

in Chapter 7. Topics that are discussed in greater detail within this issue include: adoptions (see 

Chapter 4), foreign marriages, common-law partners and conjugal partners (see Chapter 5), and 

bad faith family relationships (see Chapter 6). 

Grounds of Refusal 

A permanent resident visa may be refused for various reasons including: financial (see 

Chapter 1), criminality (see Chapter 2), health grounds (see Chapter 3), misrepresentations (see 

Chapter 8), and non-compliance with the Act including not an immigrant (see Chapter 9). 

Discretionary Relief (special relief) 

The Immigration Appeal Division has the power to allow an appeal using its discretionary 

jurisdiction (s. 67(1)(c) of the IRPA). This issue is discussed in detail in Chapter 10. 

Transitional Provisions 

The transitional provisions of IRPA and IRP Regulations that govern sponsorship appeals 

pending before the IAD are covered in Tab “T”. 

11 

See section 72(1) of the IRPA. 



Introduction

CASES 

Au, Shu Foo v. M.C.I. [2002] F.C. 257 (C.A.) ............................................................................................................... 2 

Bath, Ragbir Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-01993), Lam, December 8, 1997.................................................................... 2 

Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc. [2001] 2 S.C.R. 460; 2001 SCC 44 ............................................................... 2 

David, Solomon v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5599-06), Martineau, May 24, 2007; 2007 FC 546; 

M.C.I. v. Dang, Thi Kim Anh (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3113-99), Dawson, July 20, 2000.............................................. 1 

Dhaliwal, Baljit Kaur v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1760-01), Campbell, December 21, 2001 .................................. 2 

Jhammat, Harjinder Kaur v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-1669-88), Muldoon, October 13, 1988 ...................................... 2 

Kahlon, Darshan Singh v. M.E.I (F.C.A., no. A-115-86), Mahoney, Stone, MacGuigan, 

February 6, 1989. Reported: Kahlon v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) 

(1989), 7 Imm. L.R. (2d) 91 (F.C.A.)........................................................................................................................ 1 

Kaloti, Yaspal Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-526-98), Décary, Sexton, Evans, March 13, 2000................................. 2 

Kaloti, Yaspal Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4932-97), Dubé, September 8, 1998............................................. 2 

Khera, Amarjit v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6375-06), Martineau, June 13, 2007; 2007 FC 632...................................... 1 

Kular, Jasmail v. M.C. I. (F.C.T.D., no., IMM-4990-99), Nadon, August 30, 2000 ..................................................... 2 

Li, Wei Min v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5040-05), Lemieux, June 14, 2006; 2006 FC 757 ............................................. 2 

Mangat, Parminder Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-153-85), Strayer, February 25, 1985.......................................... 2 

Nadon, Claude v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2932-06), Beaudry, January 22, 2007; 2007 FC 59...................................... 1 

Pabla, Dial v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1210-00), Blais, December 12, 2000.......................................................... 1 

Rahman, Azizur v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1642-06), Noël, November 2, 2006; 2006 FC 1321.................................... 2 

Sekhon, Amrik Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1982-01), McKeown, December 10, 2001................................... 2 

Singh, Ahmar v. The Queen (F.C.A., no. A-1014-96), Strayer, Isaac, Linden, November 5, 1998 ............................... 2 

Singh, Ahmar v. The Queen (F.C.T.D., no. T-1495-95), Muldoon, December 2, 1996 ................................................. 2 

Valdez, Enrico Villanueva v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5430-97), Reed, March 12, 1999......................................... 1 

Wong, Chun Fai v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-2871-90), Jerome, February 26, 1991....................................................... 2 



Introduction

Chapter One 

Financial Refusals and Requirements for the Sponsor 

Introduction 

A Canadian citizen or permanent resident may sponsor a foreign national who is a 

member of the family class [IRPA, s. 13(1)]. 

General 

An undertaking is binding on the sponsor [IRPA, s. 13(3)]. 

The Act authorizes regulations on "sponsorships, undertakings, and penalties for failure to 

comply with undertakings" [IRPA, s. 14(2)(e)]. 

An officer is to apply the regulations on sponsorship in accordance with any instructions 

made by the Minister [IRPA, s. 13(4)]. 

Appeal Rights 

Sponsors who have filed an application to sponsor in the prescribed manner have a right 

to appeal a decision not to issue a member of the family class a permanent resident visa [IRPA, s. 

63(1)]. 1 A sponsorship application that is not in accordance with section 10(1) of the Immigration 

and Refugee Protection Regulations [IRP Regulations] is not "filed in the prescribed manner" 

[IRP Regulations, s. 10(6)]. 

Discretionary Jurisdiction 

The IAD cannot consider humanitarian and compassionate considerations on an appeal 

unless the sponsor is "a sponsor within the meaning of the regulations" [IRPA, s. 65]. "A sponsor 

within the meaning of the regulations" means as described in section 130 of the IRP Regulations. 

1 

Khera, Ramandeep Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA6-01433), Workun, May 9, 2007 (wife of deceased sponsor could 

not continue appeal in his place). 


January 1, 2008 Financial Refusals & Sponsors - Ch. 1

It is assumed that a sponsor is “a sponsor within the meaning of the regulations” unless a 

decision not to issue a permanent resident visa is made on this basis or the issue is raised on the 

evidence adduced by the parties at the hearing. 2 

Applications 

An application by a foreign national as a member of the family class must be preceded or 

accompanied by a sponsorship application [IRP Regulations, s. 10(4)]. 

A sponsor cannot file more than one sponsorship application in respect of the same 

member of the family class if a final decision has not been made on the other application [IRP 

Regulations, s. 10(5)]. 

The application must: 

(a) be made in writing using the form provided by the Department, if any; 

(b) be signed by the applicant; 

(c) include all information and documents required by the Regulations, as well as 

any other evidence required by the Act; 

(d) be accompanied by evidence of payment of the applicable fee, if any, set out in 

the Regulations; 

(e) if applicable, identify who is the principal applicant and who is the 

accompanying spouse or common-law partner [IRP Regulations, s. 10(1)]. 

A sponsorship application not made in accordance with section 10(1) of the IRP 

Regulations is considered not filed in the prescribed manner for purposes of an appeal to the IAD 

under section 63(1) of IRPA [IRP Regulations, s. 10(6)]. 

If the requirements of sections 10 and 11 of the IRP Regulations are not met, the 

application and all documents submitted in support shall be returned to the applicant [IRP 

Regulations, s. 12]. 

According to a CIC Instruction on "Minimal Necessary Requirements for a Submission to 

be Considered an Application" (RIM-02-032 dated June 27, 2002), very limited information is 

required for a submission to be considered an application satisfactory for section 10(1) of the IRP 

Regulations. Furthermore, the decision is to be taken up front and before any processing has 

begun. Once an application has been accepted, it is not to be returned for re-submission; rather, 

any missing information is to be requested during case processing. It would appear unlikely that 

the Immigration Appeal Division (IAD) will have before it applications that have not been filed 

as prescribed for these would have been returned by CIC for re-submission per section 12. As a 

result, the IAD will not be faced with the issue of whether to dismiss an appeal for lack of 

2 

Nandra, Rajwinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA3-00771), Borst, May 28, 2004. 



jurisdiction if the application was not filed as prescribed or to allow the sponsor to correct a 

minor deficiency in the application. 

A decision shall not be made on an application for a permanent resident visa by a member 

of the family class if the sponsor withdraws their sponsorship application [IRP Regulations, s. 

119]. 

Sponsor 

A sponsor must be a Canadian citizen or permanent resident who is at least 18 years of 

age; resides in Canada; and has filed a sponsorship application in accordance with section 10 of 

the IRP Regulations [IRP Regulations, s. 130(1)]. An exception is provided where the sponsor is 

a Canadian citizen and does not reside in Canada: they may sponsor their spouse, common-law 

partner, conjugal partner or dependent child who has no dependent children if the sponsor will 

reside in Canada when the applicant becomes a permanent resident [IRP Regulations, s. 130(2)]. 

A sponsor must satisfy section 130 of the IRP Regulations from the time of initiation of 

the sponsorship application until a decision is made on the application otherwise they will not be 

considered a sponsor. 3 

“Resides in Canada” for section 130(1)(b) of the Regulations can be established by 

evidence of presence on Canadian soil and involvement in day-to-day activities not requiring 

absence abroad. 4 Physical absence from Canada may not constitute an interruption of residence 

in Canada. 5 The question is whether a sponsor has centralized their mode of living in Canada. 6 

Humanitarian and compassionate consideration is not possible where the sponsor is less 

than 18 years of age as they are not a sponsor within the meaning of the regulations. 7 

For a sponsor who is a Canadian citizen not residing in Canada, a mere expression of 

intent to return and reside in Canada is insufficient to satisfy section 130(2) of the IRP 

Regulations. 8 A change in intent subsequent to the officer’s decision on the application is 

irrelevant. 9 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

See section 133(1)(a) of the IRP Regulations. 

Cook, Donald Charles v. M.C.I. (IAD MA5-01579), Hudon, August 10, 2006. 

Gritsan, Serguei v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-10556), D’Ignazio, October 5, 2004. 

Zhang, Tieshi v. M.C.I. (IAD MA3-02491), Patry, September 20, 2004. 

Chan, May Yee v. M.C.I. (IAD VA4-01434), Boscariol, March 23, 2005. 

Law, Peter Koi v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-11031), D'Ignazio, May 19, 2004 (reasons signed June 2, 2004). 

Cook, Donald Charles v. M.C.I. (IAD MA5-01579), Hudon, August 10, 2006. Compare Bobocel, Norman 

Dean v. M.C.I. (IAD WA5-00008), Munro, October 21, 2005 (reasons signed November 30, 2005) where a 

sponsor who misapprehended the legitimacy of his sponsorship was held to satisfy section 130(2). 



Undertaking 

The undertaking is given to the Minister or the competent authority of the province if the 

province has entered into an agreement referred to in section 8(1) of the IRPA [IRP Regulations, 

s. 131]. 

The undertaking obliges the sponsor to reimburse Canada or a province for every benefit 

provided as social assistance to the sponsored foreign national and their family members during 

the period beginning on the day the foreign national becomes a permanent resident. The 

undertaking ends in 10 years subject to exceptions: for a spouse, common-law or conjugal 

partner, three years; for a dependent child 10 less than 22 when they become a permanent resident, 

10 years later or when they reach 25, whichever is earlier; and for a dependent child 22 or older 

when they become a permanent resident, three years [IRP Regulations, s. 132(1)]. There are 

separate rules for undertakings to a province [IRP Regulations, s. 132(2), (3)]. 

A permanent resident visa shall not be issued to an applicant unless the sponsorship 

undertaking in respect of the applicant is in effect (i.e. has not been withdrawn) [IRP 

Regulations, s. 120(a)]. 

Agreement 

The sponsor, co-signer if any and member of the family class who is at least 22 or if less 

than 22 is the sponsor's spouse, common-law or conjugal partner must enter into a written 

agreement that includes: a statement to provide for the basic requirements of the member of the 

family class and their accompanying family members for the period of the undertaking; a 

declaration by the sponsor and co-signer that their financial obligations do not prevent them from 

honouring the agreement and undertaking; and a statement by the member of the family class that 

they will make every reasonable effort to provide for their and their accompanying family 

members' basic requirements [IRP Regulations, s. 132(4)]. 

Co-signers 

The sponsor's spouse or common-law partner may co-sign the undertaking if they are a 

permanent resident or Canadian citizen at least 18 years of age and residing in Canada and they 

meet the requirements for sponsoring in section 133(1) of the IRP Regulations (excluding section 

133(1)(a)). A co-signer is jointly and severally or solidarily liable for a breach of the undertaking 

[IRP Regulations, s. 132(5)]. A co-signer may continue an appeal following the death of the 

sponsor if the evidence indicates a joint sponsorship. 11 

10 

11 

For a full description see section 132(1)(b)(ii) of the IRP Regulations. 

Annor, Gladys v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-04677), Whist, September 28, 2005. 



Requirements for the Sponsor 

A sponsorship application shall only be approved by an officer if from the day the 

application was filed until a decision is made with respect to the application, the sponsor meets 

the requirements set out in section 133(1) of the IRP Regulations. These requirements are that 

the sponsor: 

(a) is a sponsor as described in section 130; 

(b) intends to fulfil the obligations in the undertaking; 

(c) is not subject to a removal order; 

(d) is not detained in a penitentiary, jail, reformatory or prison; 

(e) has not been convicted of an offence of a sexual nature against any person or 

an offence that results in bodily harm to a relative of the sponsor including a 

dependent child or other family member 12 , a relative of the sponsor's spouse, 

common-law or conjugal partner (unless acquitted or pardoned or at least 5 

years have elapsed since completion of the sentence 13 ); 14 

(f) has not been convicted outside Canada of an equivalent offence to (e) (unless 

acquitted or 5 years have elapsed since sentence and rehabilitation is shown) 15 ; 

(g) is not in default of any undertaking or any support payment obligations 

ordered by a court; 

(h) is not in default of repayment of a debt referred to in section 145(1) of the 

IRPA; 

(i) is not an undischarged bankrupt; 

(j) the sponsor's total income is at least equal to the minimum necessary income 

but this requirement does not apply if the sponsored person is the sponsor's 

spouse, common-law or conjugal partner with no dependent children; or with a 

dependent child who has no dependent children; or is a dependent child of the 

sponsor who has no dependent children or a person referred to in section 

117(1)(e) or (g) of the IRP Regulations 16 ; 

(k) the sponsor is not in receipt of social assistance other than for a disability 17 . 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

“Family member” includes a person who was the sponsor’s wife at the time the offence was committed 

although they were divorced when the sponsor was convicted: Joshi, Ajay v. M.C.I. (IAD WA3-00046), 

Wiebe, December 19, 2003. 

Section 133(2) of the IRP Regulations. 

This provision is not to be taken lightly: Gill, Amarjeet Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA3-02834), Borst, August 10, 

2004. 

Section 133(3) of the IRP Regulations. 

Section 133(4) of the IRP Regulations. See Chekole, Awoke v. M.C.I. (IAD WA2-00099), Wiebe, April 25, 

2003 (reasons signed June 5, 2003) where the sponsor of a dependent child was not required to meet the MNI. 

Section 133(1)(k) is not contrary to section 15 of the Charter: Velasquez Guzman, Neila Rosa v. M.C.I. (F.C., 

no. IMM-184-06), Noël, September 28, 2006; 2006 FC 1134 (appeal to FCA dismissed for mootness: 

Velasquez Guzman, Neila Rosa v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-467-06), Linden, Evans, Sharlow, November 5, 2007; 

2007 FCA 358. 



All the above requirements may be overcome by special relief 18 except for (a), "is a 

sponsor as described in section 130" since section 65 of the IRPA precludes an appeal on 

humanitarian and compassionate considerations if the sponsor is not a sponsor within the 

meaning of the regulations. 

An officer can approve a sponsorship application only if the sponsor satisfies the 

requirements continuously from the day the application was filed until the officer makes a 

decision on the application. 

If the officer made no error in concluding that a requirement of section 133(1) of the IRP 

Regulations was not met at any time between the filing of the application and the making of the 

decision on the application, the IAD must uphold the officer’s decision in law, even if the facts at 

the time of the hearing are such that the particular requirement is now met. 19 

There is a specified time frame for the minimum necessary income requirement whereby 

the income is calculated on the taxation year preceding the date of filing of the sponsorship 

application [IRP Regulations, s. 134(1)]. The IAD will make its determination using the same 

time period. Therefore if a sponsor meets the minimum necessary income at the time of the 

hearing before the IAD, that fact will be relevant to the discretionary jurisdiction of the IAD 

only. In these circumstances, a lower threshold for granting special relief will be appropriate 

given that the obstacle to admissibility has been overcome. 20 

The sponsor has to meet the requirements of section 133 of the IRP Regulations (section 

137 if in Quebec) up until the time the family members become permanent residents [IRP 

Regulations, s. 120(b)]. If a sponsor dies before that time the IAD may not consider 

humanitarian and compassionate considerations for the applicants. 21 

A sponsor who was adopted and whose adoption has been revoked may sponsor an 

application by a member of the family class provided the revocation was not obtained for the 

purpose of sponsoring the application [IRP Regulations, s. 133(5)]. 

Income Calculation Rules/Minimum Necessary Income 

The sponsor's income is to be calculated on the last notice of assessment or equivalent 

document issued by the Minister of National Revenue in respect of the most recent taxation year 

preceding the date of filing of the sponsorship application [IRP Regulations, s. 134(1)(a)]. The 

income calculation may be made solely from these source documents. If a sponsor proposes a 

18 

19 

20 

21 

Effat, Mansoora v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-20734), Hoare, June 24, 2004. 

Ganidagli, Mustafa Serhat v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-11913), Whist, February 16, 2004. 

Jugpall, Sukhjeewan Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD T98-00716), Aterman, Goodman, Townshend, April 12, 1999. 

Rahman, Mohammed Ataur v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-12830), Whist, May 24, 2006. 



different methodology and reliance on other source documents, the sponsor carries the burden of 

establishing the reliability of that evidence and how it applies to the calculation. 22 

The income is income earned as reported in that document less any provincial allowance 

for instruction or training; any social assistance 23 or financial assistance under a resettlement 

program; employment insurance, other than special benefits; Old Age Security Act income; and 

any child tax benefit [IRP Regulations, s. 134(1)(c)]. If there is a co-signer, their income as 

calculated in the same manner is included in the sponsor's income [IRP Regulations, s. 

134(1)(d)]. 

If the sponsor does not produce a notice of assessment or equivalent document or if their 

income is less than the minimum necessary income, the sponsor's Canadian income for the 12 

month period preceding the filing of the sponsorship application is the income earned by the 

sponsor not including the amounts mentioned in the preceding paragraph. 

In the case of business income, the relevant amount is net income (gross income less 

deductions). 24 Net income is to be calculated under section 134(1)(c) without deducting 

depreciation and amortization (which may have been deducted for tax purposes). 25 

If an officer receives information that a sponsor is no longer able to fulfil the undertaking, 

the Canadian income of the sponsor is calculated on the basis of the 12 month period preceding 

the day the officer receives the information rather than the 12 month period preceding the date of 

filing of the undertaking [IRP Regulations, s. 134(2)]. 

"Minimum necessary income" is defined in section 2 of the IRP Regulations. It is the low 

income cut-off figure published by Statistics Canada for urban areas of 500,000 or more. The 

number of persons includes the sponsor and their family members 26 ; the sponsored foreign 

national, their family members whether accompanying or not; and every other person and their 

family members in respect of whom the sponsor has given or co-signed an undertaking still in 

effect and in respect of whom the sponsor's spouse or common-law partner has given or cosigned 

an undertaking still in effect, if the sponsor's spouse or common-law partner has co-signed 

with the sponsor the undertaking in respect of the foreign national. 

Default in Undertaking 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

Singh Chahal, Balwinder v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1423-07), Barnes, September 24, 2007; 2007 FC 953. 

As defined in section 2 of the IRP Regulations. 

Warraich, Harpreet Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD TA6-12398), Ahlfeld, October 12, 2007. 

Braafhart, Gerrit v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-04251), Waters, January 31, 2005. 

As defined in section 1(3) of the IRP Regulations. “Family member” includes a separated spouse and the 

spouse’s dependent children: Boyd, Isabella Seabra v. M.C.I. (IAD VA6-01833), Miller, October 30, 2007. 



Default begins when the government makes a payment that the sponsor promised to repay 

in the undertaking or an obligation in the undertaking is breached and it ends when the sponsor 

reimburses the government in full or in accordance with an agreement with the government 27 or 

ceases to be in breach of the obligation [IRP Regulations, s. 135]. A sponsor’s conduct in regard 

to the outstanding debt is relevant to the exercise of discretionary relief. 28 

Suspension of Processing of Sponsorship Application 

If certain proceedings are brought against a sponsor or co-signer, the sponsorship 

application shall not be processed until final determination of the proceedings [IRP Regulations, 

s. 136]. 29 In a proceeding initiated by a report under section 44(1) of the IRPA, there is a final 

determination when the IAD stays the removal order. 30 

Province of Quebec 

A different scheme applies in the Province of Quebec [IRP Regulations, s. 137]. Under 

the agreement with the Province of Quebec, the initial selection falls under the responsibility of 

the Quebec authorities and consequently the financial evaluation is made by them. This division 

of responsibilities does not preclude CIC from refusing a foreign national under section 39 of the 

Act. An appeal of the Quebec refusal is possible before the TAQ (Tribunal administratif du 

Québec). An appeal before the IAD based on the Quebec refusal is limited to humanitarian and 

compassionate considerations. 

Inadmissibility for Financial Reasons 

A foreign national is inadmissible for financial reasons if they are or will be unable or 

unwilling to support themselves or any other person who is dependent on them, and they have not 

satisfied an officer that adequate arrangements for care and support other than those that involve 

social assistance have been made [IRPA, s. 39]. Section 39 of the IRPA may be used where the 

sponsor is on social assistance for a disability and is therefore not caught by section 133(1)(k) of 

the IRP Regulations. 31 The low-income cutoff figures can be used as a guide to determine if 

adequate arrangements have been made. 32 

27 

28 

29 

30 

31 

32 

This provision is more favourable to a sponsor than the former comparable provision: Aryan, Miajan v. M.C.I. 

(FC, no. IMM-6676-02), Lemieux, February 20, 2004; 2004 FC 254. 

Brar, Charanjit Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA5-00400), Workun, March 30, 2006. 

Section 136 of the IRP Regulations. Proceedings are revocation of citizenship; report under s. 44(1) of the 

IRPA; charges re an offence punishable by at least 10 years imprisonment. 

Dhillon, Rajbir Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-19586), Hoare, April 11, 2006. 

Amir, Shafqat v. M.C.I. (IAD MA6-08358), Gaetani, September 27, 2007. 

Debara, Sara v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-27021), D’Ignazio, November 13, 2003. 



Transitional Issues 

The transitional provisions of the IRP Regulations provide at section 351(1) that an 

undertaking under the former Act is governed by IRPA. However, there is an exception made to 

allow for recovery of social assistance payments as a result of a breach of an undertaking given 

under the former legislation [IRP Regulations, s. 351(2)]. Also the duration of an undertaking 

given under the former Act is not affected [IRP Regulations, s. 351(3)] 33 . 

Under section 320(8) of the IRP Regulations, a person is inadmissible for financial 

reasons if they had been determined to be inadmissible under section 19(1)(b) of the former Act. 

33 

Sharma: M.C.I. v. Sharma, Ashok Kumar (F.C., no. IMM-6517-03), von Finckenstein, August 18, 2004; 2004 

FC 1144. 



CASES 

Amir, Shafqat v. M.C.I. (IAD MA6-08358), Gaetani, September 27, 2007 .................................................................. 8 

Annor, Gladys v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-04677), Whist, September 28, 2005 ..................................................................... 4 

Aryan, Miajan v. M.C.I. (FC, no. IMM-6676-02), Lemieux, February 20, 2004; 2004 FC 254 ................................... 8 

Bobocel, Norman Dean v. M.C.I. (IAD WA5-00008), Munro, October 21, 2005 (reasons signed 

November 30, 2005).................................................................................................................................................. 3 

Boyd, Isabella Seabra v. M.C.I. (IAD VA6-01833), Miller, October 30, 2007 ............................................................ 7 

Braafhart, Gerrit v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-04251), Waters, January 31, 2005.................................................................... 7 

Brar, Charanjit Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA5-00400), Workun, March 30, 2006............................................................. 8 

Chan, May Yee v. M.C.I. (IAD VA4-01434), Boscariol, March 23, 2005 .................................................................... 3 

Chekole, Awoke v. M.C.I. (IAD WA2-00099), Wiebe, April 25, 2003 (reasons signed June 5, 

2003) ......................................................................................................................................................................... 5 

Cook, Donald Charles v. M.C.I. (IAD MA5-01579), Hudon, August 10, 2006 ........................................................... 3 

Debara, Sara v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-27021), D’Ignazio, November 13, 2003 ................................................................ 8 

Dhillon, Rajbir Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-19586), Hoare, April 11, 2006 .................................................................. 8 

Effat, Mansoora v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-20734), Hoare, June 24, 2004............................................................................ 6 

Ganidagli, Mustafa Serhat v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-11913), Whist, February 16, 2004 .................................................... 6 

Gill, Amarjeet Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA3-02834), Borst, August 10, 2004 ................................................................. 5 

Gritsan, Serguei v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-10556), D’Ignazio, October 5, 2004.................................................................. 3 

Joshi, Ajay v. M.C.I. (IAD WA3-00046), Wiebe, December 19, 2003 ......................................................................... 5 

Jugpall, Sukhjeewan Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD T98-00716), Aterman, Goodman, Townshend, April 

12, 1999..................................................................................................................................................................... 6 

Khera, Ramandeep Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA6-01433), Workun, May 9, 2007 ............................................................ 1 

Law, Peter Koi v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-11031), D'Ignazio, May 19, 2004 (reasons signed June 2, 

2004) ......................................................................................................................................................................... 3 

Nandra, Rajwinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA3-00771), Borst, May 28, 2004............................................................... 2 

Rahman, Mohammed Ataur v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-12830), Whist, May 24, 2006.......................................................... 6 

Sharma: M.C.I. v. Sharma, Ashok Kumar (F.C., no. IMM-6517-03), von Finckenstein, August 18, 

2004; 2004 FC 1144.................................................................................................................................................. 9 



Singh Chahal, Balwinder v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1423-07), Barnes, September 24, 2007; 2007 

FC 953....................................................................................................................................................................... 7 

Velasquez Guzman, Neila Rosa v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-184-06), Noël, September 28, 2006; 

2006 FC 1134 (appeal to FCA dismissed for mootness: Velasquez Guzman, Neila Rosa v. 

M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-467-06), Linden, Evans, Sharlow, November 5, 2007; 2007 FCA 358 ................................ 5 

Warraich, Harpreet Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD TA6-12398), Ahlfeld, October 12, 2007..................................................... 7 

Zhang, Tieshi v. M.C.I. (IAD MA3-02491), Patry, September 20, 2004....................................................................... 3 



Chapter Two 

Criminal Refusals 

Introduction 

An application for permanent residence made by a member of the family class can be 

refused if the member of the family class or a dependant is inadmissible to Canada on any of the 

following grounds related to matters of criminality: 

• “serious criminality” – IRPA, s. 36(1) 

• “criminality” – IRPA, s. 36(2) 

• “organized criminality” – IRPA, s. 37 

• “security” – IRPA, s. 34 

• “human or international rights violations” – IRPA, s. 35 

Section 64(1) and (2) of IRPA provides that no appeal may be made to Immigration 

Appeal Division (IAD), by either a foreign national or their sponsor, if the foreign national has 

been found to be inadmissible on the following grounds: 

• “serious criminality”, where the offence was punished in Canada by a term of 

imprisonment of at least two years – IRPA, s. 36(1) 

• “organized criminality” – IRPA, s. 37 

• “security” – IRPA, s. 34 

• “human or international rights violations” – IRPA, s. 35 

The Federal Court has held that the IAD has no jurisdiction to entertain appeals in such 

cases. The appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction if the visa officer has determined the 

foreign national to be inadmissible on one of the enumerated grounds; the IAD is not empowered 

to determine whether the foreign national is in fact inadmissible. 1 

1 

Kang, Sarabjeet Kaur v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2445-04), Mactavish, February 25, 2005; 2005 FC 297. The 

case in question also considered the effect of section 196 of the Transitional Provisions, which provides for the 

discontinuation of an appeal if the appeal could not have been made because of section 64 of IRPA. 



January 1, 2008 1 Criminal Refusals – Ch. 2

This chapter will therefore deal only with the grounds of serious criminality and 

criminality, as both of these can constitute proper grounds for the IAD to refuse a sponsorship 

appeal on the merits. 

The relevant sections of IRPA dealing with serious criminality and criminality can be 

broken down as follows: 2 

• “serious criminality” – conviction in Canada; punishable by maximum prison term of 

10 years or more or where a prison term of more than 6 months was imposed – IRPA, 

s. 36(1)(a) 

• “serious criminality” – equivalent conviction outside Canada; punishable in Canada 

by maximum prison term of 10 years or more – IRPA, s. 36(1)(b) 

• “serious criminality” – committed equivalent offence outside Canada; punishable in 

Canada by maximum prison term of 10 years or more – IRPA, s. 36(1)(c) 

• “criminality” – conviction in Canada; punishable by maximum prison term of less 

than 10 years – IRPA, s. 36(2)(a) 

• “criminality” – equivalent conviction outside Canada; punishable in Canada by 

maximum prison term of less than 10 years – IRPA, s. 36(2)(b) 

• criminality – committed equivalent offence outside Canada; punishable in Canada by 

maximum prison term of less than 10 years – IRPA, s. 36(1)(c) 

• “criminality” – two summary convictions in Canada (not arising out of a single 

occurrence) – IRPA, s. 36(2)(a) 

• “criminality” – equivalent of two summary convictions outside Canada (not arising 

out of a single occurrence) outside Canada – IRPA, s. 36(2)(b) 

The common point of reference for the grounds of serious criminality and criminality, 

whether for a Canadian conviction or a foreign conviction or crime, is that the underlying offence 

is or is equivalent to “an offence under an Act of Parliament”, that is an offence found in a 

Canadian federal statute. 

The most common basis for inadmissibility is the visa officer’s conclusion that the 

applicant for permanent residence or a dependant has been convicted of or has committed an 

offence outside Canada that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an offence in Canada. 

This ground of inadmissibility raises issues known as equivalency of foreign offences to 

Canadian ones. 

2 

For the full text of the inadmissibility provisions refer to the relevant sections of the Immigration and Refugee 

Protection Act. 




Standard of Proof 

Section 33 of IRPA provides that inadmissibility under section 36 includes facts arising 

from omissions and may be based on facts for which there are reasonable grounds to believe that 

they have occurred, are occurring or may occur. 

The meaning of the term “reasonable grounds to believe”, which was found as well in the 

former Immigration Act, was considered in Mugesera, 3 where the Supreme Court of Canada 

endorsed the following statements of the law: 

[114] The first issue raised by s. 19(1)(j) of the Immigration Act [i.e., the 

predecessor of IRPA, s. 35(1)(a)] is the meaning of the evidentiary standard that 

there be “reasonable grounds to believe” that a person has committed a crime 

against humanity. The FCA has found, and we agree, that the “reasonable 

grounds to believe” standard requires something more than mere suspicion, but 

less than the standard applicable in civil matters of proof on the balance of 

probabilities: Sivakumar v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 

[1994] 1 F.C. 433 (C.A.), at p. 445; Chiau v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 

Immigration), [2001] 2 F.C. 297 (C.A.), at para. 60. In essence, reasonable 

grounds will exist where there is an objective basis for the belief which is based 

on compelling and credible information: Sabour v. Canada (Minister of 

Citizenship & Immigration) (2000), 9 Imm. L.R. (3d) 61 (F.C.T.D.). 

The Court also noted, at para. 116, that the “reasonable grounds to believe” standard 

applies only to questions of fact: 

When applying the “reasonable grounds to believe” standard, it is important to 

distinguish between proof of questions of fact and the determination of questions 

of law. The “reasonable grounds to believe” standard of proof applies only to 

questions of fact: Moreno v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 

[1994] 1 F.C. 298 (C.A.), at p. 311. 

Thus the “reasonable grounds to believe” standard does not apply to conclusions of law, 

which are decided on the balance of probability and reviewed by the Federal Court on the 

correctness standard. 4 When dealing with a foreign conviction or crime outside Canada, it is a 

question of law whether the conviction or crime satisfies the requirements of an offence under an 

Act of Parliament, i.e., whether equivalency is established. 

Canadian convictions 

A foreign national applying for permanent residence may be inadmissible for having been 

convicted of a criminal offence during a previous period of residence or stay in Canada. Only 

3 

4 

Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 91, at para. 114; 2005 SCC 

40. 

Ibid., para 37. 




convictions under Canadian federal laws (“an offence under an Act of Parliament”) render a 

person inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality or criminality. 5 

Whether a Canadian conviction will render the person inadmissible on the ground of 

serious criminality or criminality depends on the nature of the offence, the possible punishment 

based on the maximum term of imprisonment the offence carries under law, and the actual 

sentence that was imposed on conviction for the offence. Inadmissibility on the grounds of 

serious criminality or criminality cannot be based on offences alleged to have been committed in 

Canada for which there has been no conviction registered by the courts. 

The relevant sections of IRPA dealing with serious criminality and criminality based on 

Canadian convictions can be broken down as follows: 6 

• “serious criminality” – conviction in Canada; punishable by maximum prison term of 

10 years or more – IRPA, s. 36(1)(a) 

• “criminality” – conviction in Canada; punishable by maximum prison term of less 

than 10 years (indictable or hybrid offence) – IRPA, s. 36(2)(a) 

• “criminality” – two summary convictions in Canada (not arising out of a single 

occurrence) – IRPA, s. 36(2)(a) 

Criminal offences are either indictable or summary conviction, depending on their 

seriousness. Certain criminal offences, known as “hybrid offences”, can be prosecuted either by 

way of indictment or summary conviction, at the election of the Crown. By virtue of paragraph 

34(1)(a) of the Interpretation Act, hybrid offences are indictable until the prosecution elects to 

proceed by summary conviction. However, section 36(3) of IRPA provides that for the purposes 

of IRPA, a “hybrid offence” is deemed to be indictable, even if it has been prosecuted 

summarily. 7 

Where an offence is prosecuted by way of summary conviction, section 787(1) of the 

Criminal Code states that the maximum term of imprisonment is six months, unless otherwise 

provided. The maximum possible sentence for an indictable offence is five years, unless 

otherwise specified (see section 743 of the Criminal Code). 

The validity of a Canadian conviction on the merits cannot be put in issue at a hearing 

before the IAD. A conviction under a wrong name is nonetheless a conviction. 8 Offences 

5 

6 

7 

8 

This was underscored in Massie, Pia Yona v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6345-98), Pinard, May 26, 2000, 

where the Court held that someone convicted of criminal contempt of court, an uncodified common law 

offence would not be caught. 



This provision was applied in Derbas, Rachid v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1923-07), Shore, November 15, 2007; 

2007 FC 1194, where the person was found described in section 36(2)(a) despite the fact that he was found 

guilty of a “hybrid” offence that was punished on summary conviction. 

Lampros, Michael George v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-434-05), Lemieux, February 18, 2005; 2005 FC 267. 




designated as contraventions under the Contraventions Act cannot be the basis for 

inadmissibility for serious criminality or criminality (see section 36(3)(e)). 

The words “term of imprisonment … imposed” found in section 36(1)(a) refer to the 

sentence imposed by the court and not the actual time served in prison. 9 The Federal Court has 

held that time spent in pre-trial or pre-sentence custody which is computed by the criminal court 

in arriving at the person’s sentence should be considered part of the “term of imprisonment” for 

the purposes of section 64(2) of IRPA. 10 The same rationale would apply to section 36(1)(a). 

The IAD has ruled that a conditional sentence constitutes a “term of imprisonment” under 

section 32(1)(a) of IRPA. The rationale is that a conditional sentence is not an alternative to 

imprisonment; it is a term of imprisonment served in the community. 11 This appears to be 

consistent with the dicta of the Supreme Court of Canada. 12 

The words “not arising out of a single occurrence” found in section 36(2)(a) were 

interpreted in two Federal Court cases decided in relation to the predecessor provision under the 

Immigration Act. It was held that an “occurrence” is synonymous with the terms “event” and 

“incident” and not with “a course of events”. Therefore, summary conviction offences which 

were committed on different dates arose out of different occurrences rather than a single 

occurrence. 13 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

Compare Martin, Claudette v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-126-05), Nadon, Sexton, Sharlow, October 25 2005; 2005 

FCA 347, where the Court interpreted the word “punished” used in section 64(2) of IRPA with respect to a 

term of imprisonment. 

M.C.I. v. Atwal, Iqbal Singh (F.C., no. IMM-3260-03), Pinard, January 8, 2004; 2004 FC 7; Cheddesingh 

(Jones), Nadine Karen v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2453-05), Beaudry, February 3, 2006; 2006 FC 124. However, 

in R. v. Mathieu, 2008 SCC 21, the Supreme Court of Canada held that “the term of imprisonment in each case 

is the term of imposed by the judge at the time of sentence. The offender’s prior detention is merely one factor 

taken into account by the judge in determining that sentence.” The Court also stated: “Although it is possible, 

on an exceptional basis, to treat the time spent in pre-sentence custody as part of the term of imprisonment 

imposed at the time of sentence — in the context of a minimum sentence, for example, or of a conditional 

sentence — these are exceptions that prove the rule. As to minimum sentences, see R. v. Wust, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 

455, 2000 SCC 18; regarding conditional sentences, see R. v. Fice, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 742, 2005 SCC 32.” 

Meerza, Rizwan Mohamed v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-21315), Hoare, September 15, 2003. An adjudicator came to 

the same conclusion with respect to a person described in section 27(1)(d) of the Immigration Act. See M.C.I. 

v. Santizo, Marco Antonio (Adjudication A1-00471), Nupponen, September 27, 2001. A member of the 

Immigration Division held to the contrary: M.C.I. v. Sahota, Ranjit Singh (ID A3-02512), Iozzo, March 11, 

2004. 

In R. v. Fice, 2005 SCC 32, Justice Bastarache, writing for the majority, stated at para 17: “in enacting s. 742.1 

[of the Criminal Code – Imposing of Conditional Sentence], Parliament intended to cast a small net and only 

capture conduct serious enough to attract a sentence of incarceration but not so severe as to warrant a 

penitentiary term.” (emphasis added). 

Alouache, Samir v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3397-94), Gibson, October 11, 1995. Reported: Alouache v. 

Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1995), 31 Imm. L.R. (2d) 68 (F.C.T.D.). Affirmed on other 

grounds by Alouache, Samir v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-681-95), Strayer, Linden, Robertson, April 26, 1996. In 

this case, the applicant was convicted of three offences that occurred on different dates. The applicant argued 

that these convictions arose out of a single occurrence, namely a marital dispute. The Court did not accept this 

argument as the breakdown of the applicant’s marriage was “a course of events” and not a single occurrence. 

Compare with Libby, Tena Dianna v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-1013-87), Urie, Rouleau, McQuaid, March 18, 




The Canadian criminal law provisions in place at the time of the appeal to the IAD are 

used to determine the criminal admissibility of the foreign national. Thus persons may become 

inadmissible or may no longer be inadmissible by virtue of changes to the Criminal Code or 

other statute occurring after a conviction. 14 

The use of the word “convicted” in section 36 of IRPA means a conviction that has not 

been expunged. 15 

Section 36(3)(b) of IRPA provides that inadmissibility on the grounds of serious 

criminality or criminality may not be based on a conviction in respect of which there has been a 

final determination of acquittal, for example, on appeal to a higher court. 

If a person pleads guilty to, or is found guilty of, an offence in Canada and is granted a 

conditional or absolute discharge, this will not constitute a conviction for the purposes of 

IRPA. 16 Section 730(3) of the Criminal Code, which establishes the effect of conditional and 

absolute discharges, provides that, in such cases as are specified, “the offender shall be deemed 

not to have been convicted of the offence”, subject to certain exceptions. 

Section 36(3)(b) of IRPA provides that inadmissibility on the grounds of serious 

criminality or criminality may not be based on a conviction in respect of which a pardon has 

been granted, and that pardon has not ceased to have effect or been revoked under the Criminal 

Records Act. Section 3 of the Criminal Records Act provides that a person who has been 

convicted of an offence under an Act of Parliament or a regulation made under an Act of 

Parliament can apply to the National Parole Board for a pardon of that offence. 

Generally, the concept of rehabilitation applies only to persons who have been convicted 

of or who committed crimes outside Canada. Section 18.1 of the Immigration and Refugee 

Protection Regulations, however, provides for the possibility of deemed rehabilitation for 

persons inadmissible solely on the basis of having been convicted in Canada of two or more 

14 

15 

16 

1988. Reported: Libby v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1988), 50 D.L.R. (4th) 573 

(F.C.A.), where the Court held that the applicant’s original charge of theft and his failure to report for 

fingerprinting in connection with that charge arose out of the same occurrence. 

Robertson v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1979] 1 F.C. 197 (C.A.); Ward, Patrick 

Francis v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-504-96), Heald, December 19, 1996. Reported: Ward v. Canada 

(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1996), 37 Imm. L.R. (2d) 102. The facts at the time of the offence 

must be assessed based on the Canadian law as it reads at the time of the admissibility hearing or appeal to the 

IAD. 

Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Burgon, [1991] 3 F.C. 44 (C.A.). 

See Lew v. Canada (Minister of Manpower and Immigration), [1974] 2 F.C. 700 (C.A.), where the appellant 

successfully appealed the conviction, and was granted an absolute discharge after he had been ordered 

deported, but before the matter was determined on appeal to the Immigration Appeal Board. The Court held 

that the Board ought to have considered the appeal in light of the circumstances existing at the time of the 

appeal (i.e., the absolute discharge). In Kalicharan v. Canada (Minister of Manpower and Immigration), [1976] 

2 F.C. 123 (T.D.), the Court held that a person convicted at trial is a convicted person notwithstanding that he 

may have an unexhausted right of appeal. However, when a court of appeal substitutes a conditional discharge 

for a sentence imposed by a trial court, then the conviction is deemed never to have been passed and the basis 

for making the removal order not only no longer exists in fact, but it is deemed, not to have existed at all. 




offences that may only be prosecuted summarily, as a prescribed class for the application of 

36(2)(a) of IRPA, provided that at least five years have elapsed since the completion of the 

imposed sentence. (See the section dealing with Rehabilitation below.) 

Section 36(3)(e) of IRPA provides that offences under the Young Offenders Act are not a 

basis for inadmissibility on the grounds of serious criminality or criminality. (A young offender 

is someone who is 12 years of age or older but less than 18 years of age.) However, if the 

proceedings were transferred to adult court, they may render the person inadmissible. 17 The 

Young Offenders Act was repealed on April 1, 2003 and replaced with the Youth Criminal 

Justice Act, 2002. However, IRPA has not been amended accordingly. Bill C-3 (An Act to 

amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (certificate and special advocate) and to 

make a consequential amendment to another Act), in clause 3, updates the reference to the Young 

Offenders Act in section 36(3)(e) of IRPA with a new reference to the Youth Criminal Justice 

Act. Under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, the transfer provision is eliminated. Instead, the 

youth court first determines whether or not the young person is guilty of the offence and then, 

under certain circumstances, the youth court may impose an adult sentence. Citizenship and 

Immigration Canada has publicly taken the position that a young offender convicted under the 

Youth Criminal Justice Act is not inadmissible, unless he or she received an adult sentence. 18 The 

Youth Criminal Justice Act is presently under legislative review. 

Foreign convictions and crimes 

A person may be inadmissible on the grounds of serious criminality or criminality either 

because of a conviction for an offence committed outside Canada that, if committed in Canada, 

would constitute an offence under an Act of Parliament or for having committed an act outside 

Canada that is an offence in the place where it was committed and that, if committed in Canada, 

would constitute an offence under an Act of Parliament. These grounds of inadmissibility raise 

issues known as equivalency of foreign offences to Canadian ones, a concept that is discussed in 

detail below. 

The relevant sections of IRPA dealing with serious criminality and criminality for foreign 

convictions or crimes committed outside Canada can be broken down as follows: 19 

17 

18 

19 

In Tessma (Ayele), Letwled Kasahun v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5652-02), Kelen, October 2, 2003; 2003 FC 

1126, the Court held that proceedings transferred from youth court to ordinary court under section 16 of the 

Young Offenders Act are not covered by the exemption in section 36(3)(e) of IRPA. Section 16(7) of the Young 

Offenders Act, provided that, after the youth court judge made an order transferring the proceedings to ordinary 

court, the proceedings under that Act were discontinued, and the proceedings with respect to the criminal 

charges were taken before the ordinary court. 

Citizenship and Immigration Canada website, Internet: 

. 






• “serious criminality” – equivalent conviction outside Canada; punishable in Canada 

by maximum prison term of 10 years or more – IRPA, s. 36(1)(b) 

• “serious criminality” – committed equivalent offence outside Canada; punishable in 

Canada by maximum prison term of 10 years or more – IRPA, s. 36(1)(c) 

• “criminality” – equivalent conviction outside Canada; punishable in Canada by 

maximum prison term of less than 10 years – IRPA, s. 36(2)(b) 

• criminality – committed equivalent offence outside Canada; punishable in Canada by 

maximum prison term of less than 10 years – IRPA, s. 36(1)(c) 

• “criminality” – equivalent of two summary convictions outside Canada (not arising 

out of a single occurrence) – IRPA, s. 36(2)(b) 

Foreign convictions 

Foreign dispositions in criminal matters may take forms unknown under Canadian law 

and their effect will have to be determined by the IAD. 20 The use of the word “convicted” in 

section 36 of IRPA means a conviction that has not been expunged. 21 Foreign convictions can 

also be expunged. 

In the case of a foreign jurisdiction, the legislation providing for the expunging of a 

conviction should be accorded respect where the laws and the legal system are similar to 

Canada’s. 22 The Federal Court of Appeal in Saini, 23 endorsed the following statement of the law 

with respect to the effect to be given to a foreign discharge or pardon: 

20 

21 

22 

See, for example, Drake, Michael Lawrence v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4050-98), Tremblay-Lamer, March 

11, 1999. Reported: Drake v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1999), 49 Imm. L.R. (2d) 218 

(F.C.T.D.), which considered the effect of an “Alford plea” in the State of Washington. 

Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Burgon, [1991] 3 F.C. 44 (C.A.). 

M.E.I. v. Burgon, David Ross (F.C.A., no. A-17-90), MacGuigan, Linden, Mahoney (concurring in the result), 

February 22, 1991. Reported: Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Burgon, [1991] 3 F.C. 44 

(C.A.). The Court had to consider the application to the definition of “convicted” in the former Immigration Act 

of the United Kingdom Powers of Criminal Courts Act, 1973, which legislation provided that a person who 

was convicted of an offence (like Burgon’s offence) and received a probation order was deemed not to be 

convicted of the offence. In the Court’s view, Burgon was not considered convicted under United Kingdom 

law; therefore, because the United Kingdom and Canadian legal systems were so similar, there was no 

conviction for purposes of the Immigration Act. See also Barnett, John v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4280-94), 

Jerome, March 22, 1996. Reported: Barnett v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1996), 

33 Imm. L.R. (2d) 1 (F.C.T.D.). The Court considered another piece of legislation, the United Kingdom 

Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, 1974, which provided that, where a person was convicted and sentenced for 

certain offences and was then rehabilitated, the conviction was expunged. The Court applied the rationale in 

Burgon and found that, although there were differences in the two pieces of legislation, the effect was the 

same: under both statutes, the person could not be said to have been convicted. Therefore, Barnett was not 

considered to have been convicted in the United Kingdom and he was not convicted for purposes of the 

Immigration Act. 




[24] To summarize, our jurisprudence requires that three elements must be 

established before a foreign discharge or pardon may be recognized: (1) the 

foreign legal system as a whole must be similar to that of Canada; (2) the aim, 

content and effect of the specific foreign law must be similar to Canadian 

law; and (3) there must be no valid reason not to recognize the effect of the 

foreign law. 

The Court in Saini also held that in the absence of evidence as to the motivating 

considerations which led to the grant of a pardon by another state jurisdiction, the Board is not 

bound by the pardon. 

The Federal Court had considered the application of these principles in several cases. 24 In 

one case, the Federal Court held that an acquittal based solely on a pardon by the victim of a 

crime is not similar to that of Canadian law and should not be recognized in Canada. 25 

The applicability of section 36(3)(e) of IRPA, dealing with the Young Offenders Act, to 

foreign convictions is not entirely clear. 26 

Equivalency of foreign convictions or crimes 

Paragraphs 36(1)(b) and (c) and 36(2)(b) and (c) of IRPA contain the equivalency 

provisions. Equivalencing is the equating of a foreign conviction or crime, whether an act or 

omission to a Canadian offence. 

23 

24 

25 

26 

M.C.I. v. Saini, Parminder Singh (F.C.A., no. A-121-00), Linden, Sharlow, Malone, October 19, 2001; 2001 

FCA 311. Reported: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Saini, [2002] 1 F.C. 200 (F.C.A.). 

The Court also held that the crime in question, hijacking, is so serious that it provided a solid rationale to depart 

from the principle that a pardon granted by another jurisdiction, whose laws are based on a similar foundation 

as in Canada, should be recognized in Canada. 

See, for example: Sicuro, Fortunato v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-695-02), Mosley, March 25, 2004; 2004 FC 461; 

S.A. v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3512-05), Gibson, April 27, 2006; 2006 FC 515. 

Magtibay, Brigida Cherly v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2701-04), Blais, March 24, 2005; 2005 FC 397. 

In a decision which considered the applicability of the former Immigration Act, where there was no provision 

dealing specifically with young offenders, the Court held that since the person convicted abroad for crimes 

committed as a minor was tried in adult court, that constituted a conviction under that Act: M.C.I. v. 

Dinaburgsky, Yuri (F.C., no. T-234-04), Kelen, September 29, 2006; 2006 FC 1161. For a different 

interpretation which made specific reference to the provisions of the Young Offenders Act, see Wong, Yuk Ying 

v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4464-98), Campbell, February 22, 2000. 

According to information posted on the Citizenship and Immigration Canada website, Internet: 

, a young offender is not 

inadmissible if he or she was treated as a young offender in a country which has special provisions for young 

offenders, or was convicted in a country which does not have special provisions for young offenders but the 

circumstances of the conviction are such that he or she would not have received an adult sentence in Canada. 

However, a young offender would be inadmissible if he or she was convicted in adult court in a country that 

has special provisions for young offenders, or was convicted was convicted in a country that does not have 

special provisions for young offenders but the circumstances of the conviction are such that he or she would 

have been treated as an adult in Canada. 




There is a distinction between paragraphs (b) and (c) in both sections 26 and 37. 

Paragraph (b) is used where there has been a conviction outside Canada, whereas paragraph (c) is 

used where it is alleged that the person has “committed” an offence. While the latter provision 

has been applied in cases where the person fled justice after being charged but before being tried 

or has never been charged in the jurisdiction where the crime was committed, it is not clear 

whether the provision was intended to apply to persons who were convicted for the crime 

committed in the foreign jurisdiction 27 or who were tried in that jurisdiction but court chose not 

to enter a conviction. 28 The Immigration Division has applied it in the former case, and the 

Federal Court appears to have accepted that it can apply in the latter case. 

To satisfy paragraph (b), there must have been a conviction outside Canada and this 

conviction must then be compared to a Canadian offence. Under section 36(1)(b), the 

determination to be made is whether the offence outside Canada would, if it had been committed 

in Canada, be an offence punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years. 

Under section 36(2)(b), the determination to be made is whether the offence outside Canada 

would, if it had been committed in Canada, be an indictable offence (which includes “hybrid” 

offences) punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of less than 10 years, or whether, in 

the case of two offences not arising out of a single occurrence, those offences would, if 

committed in Canada, be federal offences. 

To satisfy paragraph (c) in sections 36(1) and 36(2) the focus is on the commission of an 

offence. The first determination which must be made is whether the person has committed an act 

or omission which would be an offence in the place where it occurred. Once this determination 

has been made, there must be a determination as to whether that act or omission, if committed in 

Canada, would be an offence in Canada. 29 Under section 36(1)(c), the relevant Canadian offence 

must be punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years. Under section 

27 

28 

29 

In M.P.S.E.P v. Watson, Malcolm (ID A6-00450), Lasowski, December 18, 2006 (reasons signed January 22, 

2007), the subject of the admissibility hearing was convicted in New York State of the offences of sexual abuse 

in the third degree and endangering the welfare of a child. The Immigration Division found that the offence of 

sexual abuse in the third degree is equivalent to the offence of sexual exploitation under section 153 of the 

Canadian Criminal Code. The foreign offence is broader than the Canadian offence, as the latter contains the 

essential element that the accused be in a position of trust or authority towards the victim. Since the subject of 

the proceeding was the victim’s ninth grade English teacher, he was in a position of trust with respect to the 

victim. He was therefore found to be a person described in section 36(1)(b) of IRPA. He was also found to be 

described in section 36(1)(c) of the Act based on the same facts. 

In Magtibay, Brigida Cherly v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2701-04), Blais, March 24, 2005; 2005 FC 397, the 

Court in the Philippines found that although the applicant’s spouse had committed an offence, since the victim 

pardoned her aggressor, no conviction resulted. An immigration officer found the offence equivalent to sexual 

assault in Canada and gave no effect to the pardon. The Court held that the immigration officer was correct in 

not giving effect to the pardon and finding inadmissibility under s. 36(1)(c) of IRPA, since there was no need to 

prove a conviction; rather, certain acts must have been committed that render the person inadmissible. 

This approach was followed in decisions such as M.C.I. v. Legault, Alexander Henri (F.C.A., no. A-47-95), 

Marceau, MacGuigan, Desjardins, October 1, 1997. Reported: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 

Immigration) v. Legault (1997), 42 Imm. L.R. (2d) 192 (F.C.A.) and Zeon, Kyong-U v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM- 

7766-04), Campbell, September 29, 2005; 2005 FC 1338. However, in Pardhan, Wazir Ali v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. 

IMM-936-06), Blanchard, July 20, 2007; 2007 FC 756, the Court suggested that the essential elements of the 

foreign and Canadian offences must be compared to ascertain whether or not the evidence adduced was 

sufficient to establish equivalency. 




36(2)(c), the relevant Canadian offence must be an indictable offence (which includes “hybrid” 

offences) punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of less than 10 years. 

As mentioned earlier, there is the requirement that the offence be punishable in Canada 

“under an Act of Parliament”. This requirement is not met where the offence is punishable 

through the inherent jurisdiction of the court rather than through federal legislation. 30 

The standard of proof for the serious criminality and criminality provisions, including 

equivalency, is “reasonable grounds to believe,” which is less than a balance of probabilities. In 

determining whether there are “reasonable grounds to believe” a person has committed an 

offence abroad, the IAD should examine evidence pertaining to the offence. 31 In Legault, the 

Federal Court – Trial Division held that the contents of the warrant for arrest and the indictment 

did not constitute evidence of the commission of alleged criminal offences. 32 The Federal Court 

of Appeal overturned this decision and determined that the warrant for arrest and the indictment 

were appropriate pieces of evidence to consider. 33 

If the Canadian offence used for equivalencing is unconstitutional then there can be no 

equivalent Canadian offence. 34 However, there is no obligation to consider the constitutionality 

of foreign criminal law. 35 

The principles to be followed when determining equivalency have been set out in several 

Federal Court of Appeal decisions. 

In Brannson, 36 the Court said: 

Whatever the names given the offences or the words used in defining them, one 

must determine the essential elements of each and be satisfied that these essential 

30 

31 

32 

33 

34 

35 

36 

There is sentencing jurisdiction under the common law and under the Criminal Code. In Massie, Pia Yona v. 

M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6345-98), Pinard, May 26, 2000, the Court found that the powers available to a 

judge in imposing punishment for contempt of court was inherent from common law. Thus, the offence, 

criminal contempt, was not one “that may be punishable under any Act of Parliament.” 

Legault, Alexander Henri v. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-7485-93), McGillis, January 17, 1995. Reported: 

Legault v. Canada (Secretary of State) (1995), 26 Imm. L.R. (2d) 255 (F.C.T.D.). 

See Kiani, Raja Ishtiaq Asghar v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3433-94), Gibson, May 31, 1995. Reported: 

Kiani v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1995), 31 Imm. L.R. (2d) 269 (F.C.T.D.), which 

distinguishes Legault on its facts because in Kiani the adjudicator made an independent determination on the 

basis of the evidence adduced. 

Legault (F.C.A.), supra, footnote 31. 

Halm v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1995] 2 F.C. 331 (T.D.). The Federal Court – 

Trial Division, in Howard, Kenrick Kirk v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5252-94), Dubé, January 4, 1996, stated 

that the IAD does not have the jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of any legislation other than the 

Immigration Act (since replaced by IRPA). Challenges to the constitutionality of other federal legislation, as it 

may arise in an appeal before the IAD, must be brought in another forum. 

Li, Ronald Fook Shiu v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-329-95), Strayer, Robertson, Chevalier, August 7, 1996. 

Reported: Li v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1997] 1 F.C. 235 (C.A.). Affirming in part, 

Li, Ronald Fook Shiu v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4210-94), Cullen, May 11, 1995. 

Brannson v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1981] 2 F.C. 141 (C.A.), at 152-153. 




elements correspond. One must, of course expect differences in the wording of 

statutory offences in different countries. 

After Brannson, the Court in Hill 37 provided some further guidance and said that there 

were three ways to establish equivalency: 

1. by a comparison of the precise wording in each statute both through 

documents and, if available, through the evidence of an expert or experts in the 

foreign law and determining therefrom the essential ingredients of the respective 

offences; 

2. by examining the evidence adduced before the adjudicator, both oral and 

documentary, to ascertain whether or not that evidence was sufficient to establish 

that the essential ingredients of the offence in Canada had been proven in the 

foreign proceedings, whether precisely described in the initiating documents or in 

the statutory provisions in the same words or not; and 

3. by a combination of paragraph one and two. 

In Li, 38 the Court stated that the fundamental test of equivalency is whether the acts 

committed abroad and punished there would have been punishable in Canada? 

The visa officer is required to establish a prima facie case for equating the offence with a 

provision of the Canadian criminal law. 39 The visa officer, not a legal expert, must be satisfied 

that all the elements set out in the relevant provision have been met. 40 The onus, however, is 

always on the sponsor to show that the visa officer erred in determining that the applicant is 

criminally inadmissible to Canada. 

To determine equivalency between a foreign and a Canadian offence, it is not necessary 

for the Minister to present evidence of the criminal statutes of the foreign state; however, proof of 

foreign law ought to be made if the foreign statutory provisions exist. 41 Where there is no 

evidence of the foreign law, the evidence before the panel must be examined to determine 

whether the essential ingredients of the Canadian offence had to have been proven to have 

secured the foreign conviction. 42 

In some cases where the law of the foreign jurisdiction has not been adduced in evidence, 

use has been made of the legal concept of malum in se. Black’s Law Dictionary (6th edition) 

defines malum in se as follows (in part): 

37 

38 

39 

40 

41 

42 

Hill, Errol Stanley v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-514-86), Hugessen, Urie (concurring), MacGuigan, January 29, 

1987. Reported: Hill v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1987), 1 Imm. L.R. (2d) 1 

(F.C.A.), at 9. 

Li, Ronald Fook Shiu (F.C.A.), supra, footnote 35, 249. 

Tsang, Sau Lin v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-9587), D. Davey, Chu, Ahara, January 8, 1988. 

Choi, Min Su v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-975-99), Denault, May 8, 2000. 

Dayan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1987] 2 F.C. 569 (C.A.). 

Ibid. 




An act is said to be malum in se when it is inherently and essentially evil, that is, 

immoral in its nature and injurious in its consequences, without any regard to the 

fact of its being noticed or punished by the law of the state. Such are most or all 

of the offenses cognizable at common law (without the denouncement of a 

statute); as murder, larceny, etc. 

In Dayan, the concept of malum in se was used because there was no proof of the foreign 

law for the purposes of equivalencing. Justice Urie said the following about the use of this 

doctrine: 

Reliance on the concept of offences as malum in se to prove equivalency with 

provisions of our Criminal Code, is a device which should be resorted to by 

immigration authorities only when for very good reason, established to the 

Adjudicator’s satisfaction, proof of foreign law has been difficult to make and 

then only when the foreign law is that of a non-common law country. It is a 

concept to which resort need not be had in the case of common law countries. 43 

If the scope of the Canadian offence is narrower than the scope of the foreign offence, 

then it is necessary to ascertain the particulars of the offence of which the applicant was 

convicted. 44 It is necessary to “go beyond the wording of the statute in order to determine 

whether the essential ingredients of the offence in Canada had been proven in the foreign 

proceedings.” 45 

If the scope of the Canadian offence is wider than the scope of the foreign offence, it is 

not necessary to go beyond the wording of the statute in order to determine whether the essential 

ingredients of the offence in Canada had been proven in the foreign proceedings. 46 

There is no legal requirement to find the equivalent that is “most similar” and make the 

decision with respect to that provision only. 47 

Where neither a Canadian equivalent offence nor the essential ingredients of the foreign 

offence are identified in the record, it may be impossible to conclude that the visa officer had 

made a comparison between an offence under Canadian law and the foreign offence. 48 

43 

44 

45 

46 

47 

48 

Ibid., at 578. See also M.C.I. v. Obaseki, Eghe (IAD T99-07461), Kalvin, November 15, 2000, where the IAD 

noted that the doctrine of malum in se is to be used only where there is a very good reason why the foreign law 

was not adduced in evidence. Moreover, it held that it is not appropriate to extend the doctrine of malum in se 

to a case in which, not only was the law of the foreign jurisdiction not adduced, but the person concerned was 

not convicted of an offence. 

Brannson, supra, footnote 36. 

Lei, Alberto v. S.G.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5249-93), Nadon, February 21, 1994. Reported: Lei v. Canada 

(Solicitor General) (1994), 24 Imm. L.R. (2d) 82 (F.C.T.D.). 

Lam, Chun Wai v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4901-94), Tremblay-Lamer, November 16, 1995. 

M.C.I. v. Brar, Pinder Singh (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6313-98), Campbell, November 23, 1999. 

Jeworski, Dorothy Sau Yun v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. W86-4070), Eglington, Goodspeed, Vidal, September 17, 1986. 

Reported: Jeworski v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1986), 1 Imm. L.R. (2d) 59 

(I.A.B.). 




In a judicial review from a visa officer’s refusal based on section 19(2)(b)(ii) of the 

Immigration Act [i.e., the equivalent of two Canadian summary convictions, now IRPA, s. 

36(2)(a)], the applicant argued that the offences for which he was convicted were equivalent to 

municipal by-law infractions and not Criminal Code offences. The visa officer had no oral or 

documentary evidence as to the circumstances of the commission of the offences. In allowing the 

application, the Court noted that in order for an offence to be equivalent to a Criminal Code 

offence, it usually consists of the actus reus and mens rea. The Court held: 

In general, the essential elements of an offence are those components of an 

offence usually consisting of the actus reus and mens rea, which must be 

proven for a finding of guilt. 49 

An issue which has arisen on many occasions concerns the availability of defences and 

how defences fit into the evaluation of the essential elements of the offence for the purpose of 

equivalencing. The Federal Court of Appeal dealt with this issue in the case of Li. 50 In that case, 

the Federal Court – Trial Division had found that the availability of defences is not an essential 

element of the equivalency test. 51 The Court of Appeal disagreed and said as follows: 

A comparison of the “essential elements” of the respective offences requires a 

comparison of the definitions of those offences including defences particular to 

those offences or those classes of offences. 52 

In addition, the Court of Appeal concluded that the procedural or evidentiary rules of the 

two jurisdictions should not be compared, even if the Canadian rules are mandated by the 

Charter. The issue to be resolved in any equivalencing case is not whether the person would have 

been convicted in Canada, but whether there is a Canadian equivalent for the offence of which 

the person was convicted outside Canada. 

The Federal Court of Appeal has held that the validity of a foreign conviction on the 

merits cannot be put in issue. 53 However, in a decision of the Federal Court, it was held that the 

Adjudicator was required to consider the applicant’s allegation that the statements he made to the 

police that resulted in his conviction in India were given under torture. 54 

49 

50 

51 

52 

53 

54 

Popic, Bojan v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5727-98), Hansen, September 14, 2000. The Court held that the 

visa officer erred by importing into the analysis considerations which are not relevant to a determination of the 

essential elements of an offence, namely that like all residents of Germany, the applicant knew he must pay for 

public transit and that being caught three times is quite exceptional 

Li, Ronald Fook Shiu (F.C.A.), supra, footnote 35. 

Li, Ronald Fook Shiu (F.C.T.D.), supra, footnote 35. Li (F.C.T.D.) distinguished Steward, Charles Chadwick v. 

M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-962-87), Heald, Marceau, Lacombe, April 15, 1988. Reported: Steward v. Canada 

(Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1988] 3 F.C. 487 (C.A.) on the basis that “colour of right” in the 

Steward offence was an essential element of the offence and not a defence. 

Li, Ronald Fook Shiu (F.C.A.), supra, footnote 35, at 258. 

Brannson, supra, footnote 36, at 145; Li, Ronald Fook Shiu (F.C.A.), supra, footnote 35, at 256. 

Sian, Jasvir Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1673-02), O’Keefe, September 3, 2003; 2003 FC 1022. 




Equivalency decisions have been overturned because of inadequate analysis of the 

relevant statutes, the essential elements of the offences, and the evidence. 55 For a more detailed 

discussion of equivalency please see Chapter 8 of the Removal Order Appeals paper. 

Rehabilitation 

Section 36(3)(c) of IRPA provides that sections 36(1)(b) and (c) and 36(2)(b) and (c) – 

i.e., foreign convictions and crimes committed outside Canada – do not constitute inadmissibility 

for permanent residents or foreign nationals, if they: 

(i) satisfy the Minister that they have been rehabilitated after the prescribed period (5 

years after the completion of the sentence imposed or the commission of the 

offence), in accordance with section 17 of the Immigration and Refugee 

Protection Regulations; or 

(ii) 

are a member of a prescribed class that are deemed to have been rehabilitated, in 

accordance with section 18 of the Regulations. 

Section 17 of the Regulations provides that, after a period of 5 years from the completion 

of any sentence imposed or from the commission of an offence, a person will no longer be 

inadmissible if the person is able to satisfy the Minister that he or she has been rehabilitated, 

provided that the person has not been convicted of a subsequent offence other than a 

contravention under the Contraventions Act or an offence under the Young Offenders Act. 

Deemed rehabilitation under section 18 of the Regulations is triggered by the passage of a 

period of time after the completion of a sentence or the commission of an offence, as the case 

may be, without having to apply to the Minister. Deemed rehabilitation does not apply to persons 

who are inadmissible on the ground of serious criminality. Persons inadmissible on the ground of 

serious criminality, as well as others who do not qualify for deemed rehabilitation, can apply to 

the Minister for individual rehabilitation under Regulation 17. 

Section 18 of the Regulations sets out three prescribed classes of persons who can qualify 

for deemed rehabilitation: 

(a) persons convicted outside Canada of only one offence that, if committed in Canada, would 

constitute an indictable offence (including a “hybrid” offence) punishable in Canada by a 

sentence of less than 10 years, and they meet the following requirements: 

o at least 10 years have elapsed since the completion of their sentence 

o 

o 

they have not been convicted in Canada of an indictable offence 

they have not been convicted in Canada of any summary conviction offence in the last 

10 years or more than one summary conviction offence in the 10 years before that 

(other than a contravention under the Contraventions Act or an offence under the 

Youth Criminal Justice Act) 

55 

Pardhan, Wazir Ali v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-936-06), Blanchard, July 20, 2007; 2007 FC 756. 




o 

o 

o 

they have not in the last 10 years been convicted outside Canada of an offence that, if 

committed in Canada, would constitute a federal offence (other than a contravention 

under the Contraventions Act or an offence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act) 

they have not in the 10 years before that been convicted outside Canada of more than 

one offence that, if committed in Canada, would constitute a summary conviction 

offence 

they have not committed an act described in section 36(2)(c) 

(b) persons convicted outside Canada of two or more offences that, if committed in Canada, 

would constitute summary conviction offences, and they meet the following requirements: 

o at least 5 years have elapsed since completion of their sentences 

o they have not been convicted in Canada of an indictable offence 

o they have not been convicted in Canada of a federal offence in the last 5 years (other 

than a contravention under the Contraventions Act or an offence under the Youth 

Criminal Justice Act) 

o they have not in the 5 years before that been convicted in Canada of more than one 

summary conviction offences (other than a contravention under the Contraventions 

Act or an offence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act) 

o they have not in the last 5 years been convicted outside Canada of an offence that, if 



o they have been convicted outside Canada of an offence referred to in s. 36(2)(b) that, 

if committed in Canada, would constitute an indictable offence 

o they have not committed an act described in section 36(2)(c) 

(c) persons who have committed only one act outside Canada that is an offence in the place 

where it was committed and that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an indictable 

offence (including a “hybrid” offence), punishable in Canada by a maximum sentence of less 

than 10, and they meet the following requirements: 

o at least 10 years have elapsed since the commission of the offence 

o 

o 

o 

o 

o 

they have not been convicted in Canada of an indictable offence 

they have not been convicted in Canada of any summary conviction offence in the last 

10 years or more than one summary conviction offence in the 10 years before that 

(other than a contravention under the Contraventions Act or an offence under the 

Youth Criminal Justice Act) 

they have not in the last 10 years been convicted outside Canada of an offence that, if 



they have not in the 10 years before that been convicted outside Canada of more than 

one offence that, if committed in Canada, would constitute a summary conviction 

offence 

they have not been convicted outside Canada of an offence that, if committed in 

Canada, would constitute an indictable offence 

There is very little jurisprudence from the Federal Court interpreting the legislation 

providing for deemed rehabilitation. 56 Unlike individual rehabilitation (section 18 of the 

56 

See, for example, Driessen, Kenneth Leroy v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-9044-04), Snider, November 1, 2005; 

2005 FC 1480. 




Regulations), which is at the discretion of the Minister, it is arguable that the deemed 

rehabilitation provisions can be applied by the IAD. 

As under section 17 and 18 of the Regulations, one of the criteria for rehabilitation in the 

predecessor sections 19(1)(c.1) and 19(2)(a.1) of the Immigration Act, was that at least five years 

have elapsed “since the expiration of any sentence imposed for the offence.” For immigration 

purposes, the IAD held that “any sentence imposed” would include any period of incarceration, 

probation or the suspension of a privilege. 57 

The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness must decide the question of 

rehabilitation. Reasons are required to be provided for decisions of this nature. 58 The IAD held, 

with respect to the predecessor section 19(1)(c.1) or 19(2)(a.1) of the Immigration Act, that it did 

not have jurisdiction to determine whether a person has or has not been rehabilitated. 59 The same 

would appear to hold true for section 17 of the Regulations, which specifies that it is the Minister 

who must be satisfied. Rehabilitation is, however, a factor which the IAD can consider in the 

exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction. 60 

The Minister can delegate the power to determine rehabilitation. 61 The Court held, 

however, that the visa officer has no duty to question the reasonableness of the Minister’s 

decision on rehabilitation even where, on the face of the record, the decision may be 

unreasonable. 62 Conversely, the Court held that it is not necessary for the visa officer to consider 

pardons obtained under foreign legislation; rather the pardon could be one of the Minister’s 

considerations when determining whether or not the person has been rehabilitated. 63 

An issue which has arisen is whether there is a duty on the visa officer to inform the 

applicant of the existence of the rehabilitation provisions. The Federal Court has only dealt with 

this issue as it relates to earlier legislation which required, in the case of section 19(1)(c) of the 

Immigration Act, for the Governor in Council to be satisfied as to rehabilitation. In Wong, 64 the 

57 

58 

59 

60 

61 

62 

63 

64 

Shergill, Ram Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD W90-00010), Rayburn, Arpin, Verma, February 19, 1991. 

Thamber, Avtar Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2407-00), McKeown, March 12, 2001, in obiter, citing 

Baker v. M.C.I., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 (S.C.C.). The Court held that the Minister erred by not considering 

relevant evidence (the fact that the applicant had not reoffended for a period of ten years) and by coming to an 

unreasonable conclusion, given the totality of evidence. 

Crawford, Haslyn Boderick v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. T86-9309), Suppa, Arkin, Townshend (dissenting), May 29, 

1987. Reported: Crawford v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1987), 3 Imm. L.R. (2d) 12 

(I.A.B.). 

See chapter 9, Compassionate or Humanitarian Considerations, for a more detailed discussion. 

See section 6(2) of IRPA. This power was also found in section 121 of the former Immigration Act. 

In Leung, Chi Wah Anthony v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1061-97), Gibson, April 20, 1998, the Court 

certified the question: “Is a visa officer under a duty to question the reasonableness of the Minister’s decision 

made pursuant to section 19(1)(c.1)(i) of the Immigration Act where on the face of the record the decision may 

be unreasonable?” The Federal Court of Appeal answered in the negative: Leung, Chi Wah Anthony v. M.C.I. 

(F.C.A., no. A-283-98), Stone, Evans, Malone, May 3, 2000. 

Kan, Chow Cheung v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-728-00), Rouleau, November 21, 2000. 

Wong, Yuen-Lun v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2882-94), Gibson, September 29, 1995. 




applicant provided material to establish his rehabilitation to the visa officer instead of to the 

Governor in Council. The Court found it “unfortunate” that the visa officer did not assist the 

applicant in getting the material to the proper place, but did not find this to be a reviewable error 

as the burden to show that the Governor in Council was satisfied as to rehabilitation rests with 

the applicant. In addition, the cases of Mohammed, 65 Gill, 66 and Dance 67 indicated that the 

responsibility of the visa officer is to be satisfied that no decision by the Governor in Council has 

been made. 

The issue which has not been resolved is whether this applies to the situation where the 

Minister (rather than the Governor in Council) makes the decision as to rehabilitation, given the 

proximity of the visa officer to the Minister. Is there an obligation of fairness on the visa officer 

to advise the applicant about the rehabilitation provisions? 68 In a case involving an application 

for permanent residence within Canada on humanitarian and compassionate grounds, the Court 

held that since section 36(3)(c) of IRPA places the onus on the applicant to satisfy the Minister 

that she has been rehabilitated, it follows that she must be given an opportunity to discharge the 

onus by making submissions concerning the particular facts of her case which favour such a 

finding. 69 

Right of appeal – pre-sentence custody 

The IAD has no jurisdiction to entertain a sponsorship appeal (on the merits) based on 

refusal on the ground of serious criminality where the offence was punished in Canada by a term 

of at least two years. 

65 

66 

67 

68 

69 

Mohammed v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1989] 2 F.C. 363 (C.A.). 

M.E.I. v. Gill, Hardeep Kaur (F.C.A., no. A-219-90), Heald, Hugessen, Stone, December 31, 1991. Gill was 

applied in Dhaliwal, Jagdish Kaur v. M.E.I. (IAD V91-01669), MacLeod, Wlodyka, Singh, March 29, 1993. 

Dance, Neal John v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-366-95), MacKay, September 21, 1995. 

In Crawford, supra, footnote 59 at 3, the majority of the Immigration Appeal Board found that when the 

Minister was to determine rehabilitation, a duty existed to advise the applicant of the possibility of coming 

within the exception. The majority stated as follows: 

… the visa officer is responsible to act as a representative of the Minister on the issue of 

rehabilitation. Once the prohibition has been established under paragraph 19(2)(a) the visa 

officer has an obligation to inform the applicant of the possibility of coming within the exception 

from the general rule of criminal inadmissibility by showing rehabilitation to the Minister. 

Aviles, Martha Alcadia Gonzales v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1036-05), Rouleau, October 7, 2005; 2005 FC 

1369. The Court was perplexed why the applicant’s counsel’s letter, which set out all the factors demonstrating 

that the applicant has been rehabilitated, was not treated as an application for rehabilitation. Moreover, if it was 

not an application for rehabilitation, the applicant should be given an opportunity to make the application. For a 

related decision on an application for permanent residence abroad see Shum, Mei Wing v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. 

IMM-5527-06), Lutfy, July 5, 2007; 2007 FC 710, where the Court held that the applicant or spouse should 

have been given effective notice of the legal issues in play. 




The words “punished” found in section 64(2) refers to the sentence imposed by the court 

and not the actual time served in prison. 70 

Time spent in pre-trial or pre-sentence custody which is computed by the criminal court 

in arriving at the person’s sentence should be considered part of the “term of imprisonment” for 

the purposes of section 64(2) of IRPA. 71 

Compassionate or humanitarian considerations 

For a complete discussion of this subject in sponsorship appeals, see chapter 9, 

“Compassionate or Humanitarian Considerations”. 

Where the refusal is valid in law, the IAD may consider whether or not compassionate or 

humanitarian considerations exist to warrant the granting of special relief pursuant to section 

67(1)(c) of IRPA. 

In the situation of criminal refusals, the fact that the Minister is not satisfied that the 

applicant has been rehabilitated or that the five-year period has expired does not prevent a 

consideration of the applicant’s rehabilitation under compassionate or humanitarian 

considerations. 72 

70 

71 

72 

Martin, Claudette v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-126-05), Nadon, Sexton, Sharlow, October 25 2005; 2005 FCA 347. 

Cheddesingh (Jones), Nadine Karen v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2453-05), Beaudry, February 3, 2006; 2006 FC 

124. 

Perry, Ivelaw Barrington v. M.C.I. (IAD V94-01575), Ho, November 1, 1995. 




CASES 

Aguilar: M.C.I. v. Aguilar, Valentin Ogose, (ADQML-98-00476), Turmel, December 10, 1998 ............................. 10 

Alouache, Samir v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-681-95), Strayer, Linden, Robertson, April 26, 1996 ................................. 5 

Alouache, Samir v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3397-94), Gibson, October 11, 1995. Reported: 

Alouache v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1995), 31 Imm. L.R. (2d) 68 

(F.C.T.D.).................................................................................................................................................................. 5 

Atwal: M.C.I. v. Atwal, Iqbal Singh (F.C., no. IMM-3260-03), Pinard, January 8, 2004; 2004 FC 7........................... 5 

Aviles, Martha Alcadia Gonzales v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1036-05), Rouleau, October 7, 2005; 

2005 FC 1369.......................................................................................................................................................... 18 

Baker v. M.C.I., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 (S.C.C.)............................................................................................................. 17 

Barnett, John v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4280-94), Jerome, March 22, 1996. Reported: 

Barnett v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1996), 33 Imm. L.R. (2d) 1 

(F.C.T.D.).................................................................................................................................................................. 8 

Brannson v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1981] 2 F.C. 141 (C.A.)............................... 11, 13 

Brar: M.C.I. v. Brar, Pinder Singh (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6313-98), Campbell, November 23, 1999.......................... 13 

Burgon: M.E.I. v. Burgon, David Ross (F.C.A., no. A-17-90), MacGuigan, Linden, Mahoney 

(concurring in the result), February 22, 1991. Reported: Canada (Minister of Employment and 

Immigration) v. Burgon, [1991] 3 F.C. 44 (C.A.) ..................................................................................................... 8 

Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Saini, [2002] 1 F.C. 200 (F.C.A.)............................................. 8 

Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Burgon, [1991] 3 F.C. 44 (C.A.) ................................ 6, 7, 8, 9 

Cheddesingh (Jones), Nadine Karen v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2453-05), Beaudry, February 3, 

2006; 2006 FC 124.............................................................................................................................................. 5, 19 

Choi, Min Su v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-975-99), Denault, May 8, 2000 ............................................................. 12 

Crawford, Haslyn Boderick v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. T86-9309), Suppa, Arkin, Townshend (dissenting), 

May 29, 1987. Reported: Crawford v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) 

(1987), 3 Imm. L.R. (2d) 12 (I.A.B.) ...................................................................................................................... 17 

Dance, Neal John v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-366-95), MacKay, September 21, 1995 ......................................... 18 

Dayan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1987] 2 F.C. 569 (C.A.).......................................... 12 

Derbas, Rachid v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1923-07), Shore, November 15, 2007; 2007 FC 1194................................ 4 

Dhaliwal, Jagdish Kaur v. M.E.I. (IAD V91-01669), MacLeod, Wlodyka, Singh, March 29, 1993.......................... 18 

Dinaburgsky: M.C.I. v. Dinaburgsky, Yuri (F.C., no. T-234-04), Kelen, September 29, 2006; 2006 

FC 1161..................................................................................................................................................................... 9 

Drake, Michael Lawrence v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4050-98), Tremblay-Lamer, March 11, 

1999. Reported: Drake v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1999), 49 Imm. 

L.R. (2d) 218 (F.C.T.D.) ........................................................................................................................................... 8 

Driessen, Kenneth Leroy v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-9044-04), Snider, November 1, 2005; 2005 FC 

1480......................................................................................................................................................................... 16 

Gill: M.E.I. v. Gill, Hardeep Kaur (F.C.A., no. A-219-90), Heald, Hugessen, Stone, 

December 31, 1991 ................................................................................................................................................. 18 

Halm v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1995] 2 F.C. 331 (T.D.). The 

Federal Court – Trial Division, in Howard, Kenrick Kirk v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5252- 

94), Dubé, January 4, 1996 ..................................................................................................................................... 11 




Hill, Errol Stanley v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-514-86), Hugessen, Urie (concurring), MacGuigan, 

January 29, 1987. Reported: Hill v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1987), 

1 Imm. L.R. (2d) 1 (F.C.A.), at 9 ............................................................................................................................ 12 

Jeworski, Dorothy Sau Yun v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. W86-4070), Eglington, Goodspeed, Vidal, 

September 17, 1986. Reported: Jeworski v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) 

(1986), 1 Imm. L.R. (2d) 59 (I.A.B.) ...................................................................................................................... 13 

Kalicharan v. Canada (Minister of Manpower and Immigration), [1976] 2 F.C. 123 (T.D.) ....................................... 6 

Kan, Chow Cheung v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-728-00), Rouleau, November 21, 2000 ....................................... 17 

Kang, Sarabjeet Kaur v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2445-04), Mactavish, February 25, 2005; 2005 

FC 297....................................................................................................................................................................... 1 

Kiani, Raja Ishtiaq Asghar v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3433-94), Gibson, May 31, 1995. 

Reported: Kiani v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1995), 31 Imm. L.R. 

(2d) 269 (F.C.T.D.) ................................................................................................................................................. 11 

Lam, Chun Wai v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4901-94), Tremblay-Lamer, November 16, 1995.............................. 13 

Lampros, Michael George v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-434-05), Lemieux, February 18, 2005; 2005 

FC 267....................................................................................................................................................................... 4 

Legault, Alexander Henri v. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-7485-93), McGillis, January 17, 1995. 

Reported: Legault v. Canada (Secretary of State) (1995), 26 Imm. L.R. (2d) 255 (F.C.T.D.).............................. 11 

Legault: M.C.I. v. Legault, Alexander Henri (F.C.A., no. A-47-95), Marceau, MacGuigan, 

Desjardins, October 1, 1997. Reported: Legault v. Canada (Secretary of State) (1995), 26 

Imm. L.R. (2d) 255 (F.C.T.D.).......................................................................................................................... 10, 11 

Lei, Alberto v. S.G.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5249-93), Nadon, February 21, 1994. Reported: Lei v. 

Canada (Solicitor General) (1994), 24 Imm. L.R. (2d) 82 (F.C.T.D.) ................................................................... 13 

Leung, Chi Wah Anthony v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-283-98), Stone, Evans, Malone, May 3, 2002............................. 17 

Leung, Chi Wah Anthony v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1061-97), Gibson, April 20, 1998 ...................................... 17 

Lew v. Canada (Minister of Manpower and Immigration), [1974] 2 F.C. 700 (C.A.) .................................................. 6 

Li, Ronald Fook Shiu v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-329-95), Strayer, Robertson, Chevalier, August 7, 

1996. Reported: Li v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1997] 1 F.C. 235 

(C.A.) ...................................................................................................................................................................... 11 

Libby, Tena Dianna v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-1013-87), Urie, Rouleau, McQuaid, March 18, 1988. 

Reported: Libby v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1988), 50 D.L.R. (4th) 

573 (F.C.A.) .............................................................................................................................................................. 5 

Magtibay, Brigida Cherly v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2701-04), Blais, March 24, 2005; 2005 FC 

397....................................................................................................................................................................... 9, 10 

Martin, Claudette v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-126-05), Nadon, Sexton, Sharlow, October 25 2005; 

2005 FCA 347..................................................................................................................................................... 5, 19 

Massie, Pia Yona v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6345-98), Pinard, May 26, 2000................................................. 4, 11 

Meerza, Rizwan Mohamed v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-21315), Hoare, September 15, 2003.................................................. 5 

Mohammed v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1989] 2 F.C. 363 (C.A.) ................................. 18 

Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 91, at para. 114; 

2005 SCC 40 ............................................................................................................................................................. 3 

Obaseki: M.C.I. v. Obaseki, Eghe (IAD T99-07461), Kalvin, November 15, 2000................................................... 13 

Pardhan, Wazir Ali v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-936-06), Blanchard, July 20, 2007; 2007 FC 756......................... 10, 15 




Perry, Ivelaw Barrington v. M.C.I. (IAD V94-01575), Ho, November 1, 1995 ......................................................... 19 

Popic, Bojan v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5727-98), Hansen, September 14, 2000................................................. 14 

R. v. Fice, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 742, 2005 SCC 32 .............................................................................................................. 5 

R. v. Wust, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 455, 2000 SCC 18.............................................................................................................. 5 

Robertson v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1979] 1 F.C. 197 (C.A.)...................................... 6 

S.A. v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3512-05), Gibson, April 27, 2006; 2006 FC 515 .......................................................... 9 

Sahota: M.C.I. v. Sahota, Ranjit Singh (ID A3-02512), Iozzo, March 11, 2004........................................................... 5 

Saini: M.C.I. v. Saini, Parminder Singh (F.C.A., no. A-121-00), Linden, Sharlow, Malone, 

October 19, 2001; 2001 FCA 311............................................................................................................................. 8 

Santizo: M.C.I. v. Santizo, Marco Antonio (Adjudication A1-00471), Nupponen, September 27, 

2001........................................................................................................................................................................... 5 

Shergill, Ram Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD W90-00010), Rayburn, Arpin, Verma, February 19, 1991 ............................... 17 

Shum, Mei Wing v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5527-06), Lutfy, July 5, 2007; 2007 FC 710........................................... 18 

Sian, Jasvir Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1673-02), O’Keefe, September 3, 2003; 2003 FC 

1022......................................................................................................................................................................... 14 

Sicuro, Fortunato v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-695-02), Mosley, March 25, 2004; 2004 FC 461.................................... 9 

Steward, Charles Chadwick v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-962-87), Heald, Marceau, Lacombe, April 

15, 1988. Reported: Steward v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1988] 3 

F.C. 487 (C.A.)........................................................................................................................................................ 14 

Tessma (Ayele), Letwled Kasahun v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5652-02), Kelen, October 2, 2003; 

2003 FC 1126............................................................................................................................................................ 7 

Thamber, Avtar Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.C., no. Imm-2407-00), McKeown, March 12, 2001 ..................................... 17 

Tsang, Sau Lin v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-9587), D. Davey, Chu, Ahara, January 8, 1988.................................................. 12 

Ward, Patrick Francis v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-504-96), Heald, December 19, 1996. 

Reported: Ward v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1996), 37 Imm. L.R. 

(2d) 102..................................................................................................................................................................... 6 

Wong, Yuen-Lun v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2882-94), Gibson, September 29, 1995 ........................................... 18 

Zeon, Kyong-U v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7766-04) .................................................................................................... 10 




Chapter Three 

Health Grounds - Medical Inadmissibility 

Section 38 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 

Introduction 

The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) has changed the wording of the 

medical inadmissibility provision from that in the Immigration Act and has provided additional 

definitions of key terms such as "excessive demands" in the Regulations (IRPR) to the new Act. 

It has retained a requirement for medical examinations for all sponsored immigrants and their 

dependents. IRPA has however provided an exemption for prescribed close family members from 

the excessive demands part of the medical inadmissibility definition. Lastly IRPA preserves a 

discretionary power for members of the IAD to offer special relief from this ground of 

inadmissibility. 

A. LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS 

Medical Inadmissibility - Definition 

Section 38 of IRPA sets out the basis on which a foreign national may be determined to be 

inadmissible on medical grounds: 

s. 38 A foreign national is inadmissible on health grounds if their health condition 

(a) is likely to be a danger to public health; 

(b) is likely to be a danger to public safety; or 

(c) might reasonably be expected to cause excessive demand on health or 

social services. 

As the cases prior to IRPA are based on the Immigration Act, (now repealed), the medical 

inadmissibility provision is included below for comparative purposes: 

s. 19.(l) No person shall be granted admission who is a member of any of the 

following classes: 

(a) persons who are suffering from any disease, disorder, disability or 

other health impairment as a result of the nature, severity or probable 

duration of which, in the opinion of a medical officer concurred in by at 

least one other medical officer, 

(i) they are or are likely to be a danger to public health or to public 

safety, or 


January 1, 2008 Medical Inadmissibility - Ch. 3

(ii) their admission would cause or might reasonably be expected to 

cause excessive demands on health or social services. 

Definitions – foreign national 

A “foreign national” means a person who is not a Canadian Citizen or a permanent resident and 

includes a stateless person. 1 

Definition of “excessive demand” 

The term "excessive demand" means 

(a) a demand on health services or social services for which the anticipated 

costs would likely exceed average Canadian per capita health services and social 

services costs over a period of five consecutive years immediately following the most 

recent medical examination required by these regulations, unless there is evidence that 

significant costs are likely to be incurred beyond that period in which case the period 

is no more than 10 consecutive years; or 

(b) 

a demand on health services or social services that would add to existing 

waiting lists and would increase the rate of mortality and morbidity in Canada as a 

result of the denial or delay in the provision of those services to Canadian citizens or 

permanent residents. 2 

Definition of Health Services 

The term "health services" means any health services for which the majority of the funds 

are contributed by governments, including the services of a family physicians, medical 

specialists, nurses, chiropractors, and physiotherapists, laboratory services and the supply of 

pharmaceutical or hospital care. 3 

Definition of Social Services 

The term "social services" means any social service, such as home care, specialized 

residence and residential services, special education services, social and vocational rehabilitation 

services, personal support services and the provision of devices related to those services, 

1 

2 

3 

S. 2(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27. 

S. 1(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (IRPR), SOR/2002-227. 

S. 1(1) IRPR. 



(a) that are intended to assist a person in functioning physically, emotionally, socially, 

psychologically, or vocationally; and 

(b) for which the majority of the funding, including funding that provides direct or 

indirect financial support to an assisted person, is contributed by governments, either 

directly or through publicly-funded agencies. 4 

IRPA - Health Condition 

Note that IRPA no longer makes reference to "disease, disorder, disability or other health 

impairment" contained in the former Immigration Act and uses "health condition" instead. 

Means of proof 

The former means of proof was "in the opinion of a medical officer concurred in by at 

least one other medical officer". In s. 20 of the IRPR, it sets out that one officer designated to do 

that task must now make that assessment: 

s. 20 An officer shall determine that a foreign national is inadmissible on health 

grounds if an assessment of their health condition has been made by an officer 

who is responsible for the application of s. 29 to 34 and who concluded that the 

foreign national's health condition is likely to be a danger to public health or 

public safety or might reasonably be expected to cause excessive demand. 

It should be noted that under IRPA there continues to be two decisions on medical 

inadmissibility that take place for an application for permanent residence: the "medical" opinion 

and the visa officer's assessment of that opinion. 

Factors to be considered 

The terms "excessive demands", "health services" and "social services" are used in 

Regulations 31, 33 and 34 respectively which states that "before concluding whether a foreign 

national's health condition (a) is likely to be a danger to public health or (b) is likely to be a 

danger to public safety or (c) might reasonably be expected to cause excessive demand" the 

officer shall consider 

(a) any reports made by a health practitioner or medical laboratory with respect to the foreign 

national; and 

(b) in the case of excessive demand, "any condition identified by the medical examination" 

(c) in the case of public health, "the communicability of any disease that the foreign national 

is affected by or carries", 

4 

S. 1(1) IRPR. 



(d) in the case of public safety, "the risk of a sudden incapacity or of unpredictable or violent 

behavior of the foreign national that would create a danger to the health or safety of 

persons living in Canada." 

All Immigrants must undergo a medical examination 

All applicants for permanent resident status (and non-accompanying dependants) are 

required to undergo a medical examination. 5 When a holder of a permanent Resident visa seeks 

to enter Canada as an immigrant he or she must also hold a valid medical certificate indicating 

they are not medically inadmissible based on a medical examination within the prior 12 months. 6 

It should be noted that a failure to undergo a medical examination can form the basis for a refusal 

based on a separate ground of inadmissibility, i.e. non-compliance with the Act or Regulations, 

as per s. 41(a) of IRPA. Although an appeal can be granted to overcome this ground the applicant 

must still undergo a medical for further visa processing to continue. 

Classes of persons exempt from "excessive demands" 

Section 38(2) of the IRPA specifically states 

s. 38(2) (excessive demands) does not apply in the case of a foreign national who 

(a) has been determined to be a member of the family class and to be the 

spouse, common-law partner or child of a sponsor within the meaning of the 

regulations; 

(b) has applied for a permanent resident visa as a Convention refugee or a 

person in similar circumstances; 

(c) is a protected person; or 

(d) is, where prescribed by the regulations, the spouse, common-law partner, 

child or other family member of a foreign national referred to in any of paragraphs 

(a) to (c). 

It should be noted that the exemption set out above only applies to the ground of 

"excessive demand" and not to the inadmissibility based on "danger to public health" or "danger 

to public safety". The IRPA objective in s. 3(1)(h) of protecting the public from infectious 

diseases is not compromised by the family-based exemptions. 

See also s. 24 of the IRPR which provides an exemption for a "conjugal partner" and dependent 

child from the excessive demand inadmissibility. 

This exemption applies only to a "nuclear" family member and does not extend to parents 

of a sponsor or their dependent children or other sponsorable members of the family class. In 

5 

6 

. 30(1)(a) of IRPR. 

S. 30(4) of IRPR. 



those cases, the discretionary relief provision is available. See the reference below for more 

comment on that special relief. 

B. APPLICATION OF PROVISIONS IN A SPONSORSHIP APPEAL 

HEARING 

The vast majority of appeals at the IAD respecting medical inadmissibility are restricted 

solely to a request for discretionary relief. Should a member of the IAD be called on to assess 

whether a foreign national is inadmissible on health grounds, i.e. whether the refusal is valid in 

law, there will continue to be a requirement to determine if the officer has reached the conclusion 

properly. 

Legal validity of the refusal 

Historically the IAD and the Federal Court have framed many challenges to the refusal to 

issue permanent resident visas to family class applicants as a failure to follow proper prescribed 

procedure or a failure to employ proper technical language. Often there is an underlying but 

unstated breach of natural justice which has led to the decision being found to be unreasonable. 

Often these early cases involved a breach of the duty to act fairly or in a manner which would 

allow the applicant an opportunity to know the case to be met on appeal. Lastly, there can be an 

overlap of purely "technical defects" and natural justice issues. 

Technical defects 

Early decisions of the IAD which allowed appeals in law in medical refusal cases, and 

especially those which followed the Federal Court’s decision in Hiramen, 7 tended to do so on 

purely technical grounds based on deficiencies in the refusal letter or the Medical Notification 

form. However, later decisions of the Court generally emphasized a less technical and more 

purposive approach which looked at whether the sponsor was informed of the case to be met and 

whether there was an expression of the opinion required under the Immigration Act. 

The disadvantage to the sponsor of winning an appeal based on a technical defect is that 

the visa officer may again refuse the application on the medical ground, as the substantive ground 

did not form the basis for the IAD’s decision. 8 For example, where the appeal was allowed 

7 

8 

Hiramen, Sandra Cecilia v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-956-84), MacGuigan, Thurlow, Stone, February 4, 1986. In 

Hiramen, the Court held that the entries in the Medical Notification form were inconsistent to the point of 

incoherence. Refer to page 6, “Medical Notification Form,” for further details. 

Section 77(5) of the Immigration Act provides that where an appeal has been allowed by the IAD, processing 

of the application is to be resumed, and the visa officer is to approve the application, if “the requirements of 

[the] Act and regulations, other than those requirements on which the decision of the Appeal Division has been 

given,” have been met. 



ecause the medical reports had expired before the visa officer rejected the application, the visa 

officer could again consider the medical condition, as the Board’s decision did not relate to the 

medical condition. 9 Likewise, where the appeal was allowed because the reasons for refusal did 

not adequately inform the sponsor of the case to be met, the application could again be refused on 

the same ground, but this time with the reasons for the refusal adequately expressed. 10 The effect 

of section 77(5) of the Immigration Act was examined by the Federal Court in King. 11 The Court 

held that the applicant still had to establish her medical admissibility. The only issue that was res 

judicata was the medical issue found to be erroneous by the IAD. 12 

Defective Refusal Letter 

Pursuant to section 77(l) of the Immigration Act, the visa officer was required to inform 

the sponsor of the reasons for the refusal of the sponsored application for permanent residence. 

The purpose of this provision was to ensure that the sponsor was aware of the case that has to be 

met on appeal. 

It has been held that the nature of the medical condition must be disclosed where the 

refusal is based on medical inadmissibility. 13 However, the refusal letter should not be looked at 

in isolation from the record. 14 Section 77(1) of the Immigration Act can be complied with by 

setting out intelligible reasons in the record. 15 

Medical Notification Form 

After assessing an applicant’s medical condition, the medical officers prepare a Medical 

Notification form to notify the visa officer of their diagnosis, opinions, and the applicant’s 

medical profile. The visa officer relies on this information to determine the applicant’s 

admissibility. The Medical Notification form must contain an expression of the opinion required 

by section 19(1)(a) of the Immigration Act in order to support a refusal. Once there is a clear 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

Mangat, Parminder Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-153-85), Strayer, February 25, 1985. Nor had the Board 

taken a “[…] decision that the medical problem in question was to be ignored, e.g. on compassionate grounds.” 

(at 2). 

Dhami, Gurnam Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 84-6036), Chambers, Tremblay, Howard, January 8, 1987. 

King, Garvin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2623-95), Dubé, May 23, 1996. 

The IAD had found the Medical Notification form unreasonable because it was unclear as to whether the mass 

in question was in the lung or mediastinum. The appeal was allowed in law as a result. The appeal on 

compassionate or humanitarian grounds was dismissed. 

Shepherd, Tam Yue Philomena v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 82-6093), Davey, Benedetti, Suppa, November 18, 1982. 

M.E.I. v. Singh, Pal (F.C.A., no. A-197-85), Lacombe, Urie, Stone, February 4, 1987. Reported: Canada 

(Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Singh (1987), 35 D.L.R. (4th) 680 (F.C.A.). 

Tung, Nirmal Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-6021), Mawani, Singh, Anderson (dissenting), June 30, 1987. 



expression of the medical opinion required by section 19(1)(a), the evidentiary burden of proof 

shifts to the sponsor to show that the medical officers failed to take into consideration relevant 

factors, or took into consideration irrelevant factors in forming their opinion. 16 

Where the information in the Medical Notification form is inconsistent to the point of 

incoherence and is couched in terms of “possibility,” rather than “probability” as is required by 

section 19(1)(a)(ii) of the Immigration Act, the refusal based on that form is not valid. 17 

However, in assessing the Medical Notification form, the IAD should consider the form as a 

whole, to see if it contains on its face a clear expression of the medical opinion required. 18 

Further, the IAD should not find the refusal invalid because the word “possibility” rather than 

“probability” was used in the form without considering the rest of the document. 19 Nevertheless, 

where a probability regarding treatment was deduced from a mere possibility of health 

deterioration, the Federal Court has found the Medical Notification form to be defective. 20 In 

addition, the Federal Court has upheld the Immigration Appeal Board’s decision that the Medical 

Notification form only expressed a possibility of excessive demands, rather than a probability, 

where the medical officers indicated that the progression and prognosis were unknown. 21 

Some examples of situations in which the Medical Notification form has been found to be 

defective include notifications in which the concurring medical officer’s signature is missing; 22 

the date and name of the medical officers are not filled in and in which neither box is ticked off to 

indicate which subparagraph of section 19(1)(a) is being relied on. 23 

A refusal based on an expired Medical Notification form is invalid, 24 but Medical 

Notification forms with the “valid until” space left blank (as is usually the case in appeals before 

the IAD) have been held not to be subject to challenge. 25 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

M.E.I. v. Chong Alvarez, Maria Del Refugio (IAD V90-01411), Wlodyka, April 10, 1991. This case was a 

section 71 appeal by the Minister from the decision of an adjudicator not to issue a removal order. The onus of 

proof in a section 71 appeal and at an inquiry under section 27 of the Immigration Act lies with the Minister. 

Hiramen, supra, footnote 7. 

Parmar, Jaipal Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-836-87), Heald, Urie, Stone, May 16, 1988; M.E.I. v. Pattar, 

Sita Kaur (F.C.A., no. A-710-87), Marceau, Desjardins, Pratte (dissenting), October 28, 1988. Reported: 

Pattar v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1988), 8 Imm. L.R. (2d) 79 (F.C.A.); M.E.I. v. 

Sihota, Sukhminder Kaur (F.C.A., no. A-76-87), Mahoney, Stone, MacGuigan, January 25, 1989; Bola, 

Lakhvir Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-417-88), Marceau, Stone, Desjardins (dissenting), May 18, 1990. 

Reported: Bola v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1990), 11 Imm. L.R. (2d) 14 (F.C.A.). 

Bola, ibid. 

Badwal, Tripta v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-1193-88), MacGuigan, Urie, Mahoney, November 14, 1989. 

Reported: Badwal v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1989), 9 Imm. L.R. (2d) 85; 

64 D.L.R. (4th) 561 (F.C.A.). 

M.E.I. v. Sidhu, Satinder Singh (F.C.A., no. A-1250-88), Desjardins, Heald, Mahoney, January 12, 1990. 

Tang, Lai Keng v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 79-6093), Campbell, Glogowski, Loiselle, September 20, 1979. 

Khan, Mary Angela v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-9043), Tisshaw, Blumer, Ahara, October 6, 1986. See also 

Mohamed, Liaquat Ali v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-9648), Sherman, Chu, Eglington (dissenting), July 27, 1987, where 

the panel reached the opposite conclusion, relying on the narrative statement on the form. 

Jean Jacques, Soutien v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 80-1187), Scott, Houle, Tremblay, May 20, 1981. 



Where the Medical Notification form indicates that the condition is one of “unknown 

pathology,” the inability to determine the exact cause of the disorder or illness does not result in 

the Medical Notification form being deficient. 26 

Where the Medical Notification form outlines several health conditions, but does not 

indicate which medical profile category applies to which condition, the notification is not 

deficient where it contains enough information for the sponsor to know the case to be met. 27 

Further, as criteria in the Immigration Manual are mere guidelines, the failure to comply with 

these guidelines is not fatal where there is other evidence to support the opinion. 28 Similarly, 

where multiple health conditions are listed in the Medical Notification form, it is not always 

essential to identify which conditions form the basis of the medical opinion. 29 

Where the narrative on a Medical Notification form contained an erroneous and highly 

probative fact, and a reasonable possibility existed that conclusions reached in the narrative were 

based on this fact, the refusal was invalid as a result. 30 

Duty of fairness owed by Visa and Medical Officers 

There is a duty upon immigration officials to act fairly and to ensure that the medical 

officers’ opinion is reasonable. 31 What is necessary to comply with the duty of fairness will 

depend on the circumstances of each case. 

The Federal Court has recognized an immigration officer’s duty to act fairly. This duty of 

fairness was breached when an applicant was not given a fair opportunity to make submissions 

before the decision was made to refuse his son on medical grounds. 32 An immigration officer 

25 

26 

27 

28 

29 

30 

31 

32 

Fung, Alfred Wai To v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 83-6205), Hlady, Glogowski, Petryshyn, December 14, 1984; 

Shanker, Gurdev Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-535-86), Mahoney, Pratte, Heald, June 25, 1987. 

Pattar, supra, footnote 18. 

Parmar, supra, footnote 18. 

Ibid. 

Sihota, supra, footnote 18. 

Mahey, Gulshan v. M.C.I. (IAD V96-02119), Clark, July 20, 1998; upheld in M.C.I. v. Mahey, Gulshan 

(F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3989-98), Campbell, May 11, 1999. The narrative in question stated that the applicant, 

who suffered from coronary heart disease, was 42 years old when in fact he was 52. 

Gingiovvenanu, Marcel v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3875-93), Simpson, October 30, 1995. Reported: 

Gingiovvenanu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1995), 31 Imm. L.R. (2d) 55 

(F.C.T.D.); Ismaili, Zafar Iqbal v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3430-94), Cullen, August 17, 1995. Reported: 

Ismaili v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1995), 29 Imm. L.R. (2d) 1 (F.C.T.D.); Jaferi, Ali 

v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4039-93), Simpson, October 24, 1995. Reported: Jaferi v. Canada (Minister of 

Citizenship and Immigration) (1995), 35 Imm. L.R. (2d) 140 (F.C.T.D.). 

Gao, Yude v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-980-92), Dubé, February 8, 1993. Reported: Gao v. Canada (Minister of 

Employment and Immigration) (1993), 18 Imm. L.R. (2d) 306 (F.C.T.D.). Citizenship and Immigration 

Canada Manual OP 15 – Medical Procedures , dated 2007 – 04 - 23, requires visa officers to advise applicants 



may also be under a duty to undertake further investigation or call for an updated medical 

examination. 33 

Visa officers routinely send a “fairness letter” inviting further medical evidence from 

applicants before a final decision on medical admissibility is made. 34 The Federal Court has been 

critical of the wording of some of the letters 35 and has found in their use a breach of procedural 

fairness. For example, in one case, the letter did not disclose the criteria used by the medical 

officers in forming their opinion or the nature of the excessive demands. 36 Where the fairness 

letter was mistakenly sent to the applicant’s husband in the Philippines instead of to the applicant 

in Canada, she was denied an opportunity to respond to the medical inadmissibility finding 

respecting her son. 37 

Non-disclosure of information requested by an applicant’s counsel concerning the basis 

on which a medical opinion has been rendered is a breach of fairness. 38 

Where the medical officers requested a medical report and received it within two weeks, 

the Federal Court held that the medical officers had a duty to consider the report in forming their 

opinions. 39 The duty to consider the new medical evidence has been characterized by the 

Immigration Appeal Division as a legitimate expectation of the sponsor. 40 

33 

34 

35 

36 

37 

38 

39 

40 

of the medical officers’ opinion and give them an opportunity to present further medical evidence before 

refusing the application. Where such evidence is presented, medical officers are instructed to clearly state, in 

their statutory declarations, that they have considered such evidence. 

Ibid. See also Boateng, Dora Amoah v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2700-97), Lutfy, September 28, 1998 to 

the same effect. 

See the discussion in chapter 11, “Fairness and Natural Justice under the IRPA”, “Knowing Case to be Met 

and Opportunity to Respond.” Earlier case-law established that the duty of fairness did not oblige an 

immigration officer to communicate relevant medical information to an applicant before making a decision: 

Stefanska, Alicja Tunikowska v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-1738-87), Pinard, February 17, 1988. Reported: 

Stefanska v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1988), 6 Imm. L.R. (2d) 66 (F.C.T.D.). 

However, this case may be of doubtful authority in view of the current practices of immigration and medical 

officers. 

Fei, Wan Chen v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-741-96), Heald, June 30, 1997. See however Ma, Chiu Ming v. 

M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-812-97), Wetston, January 15, 1998. 

Li, Leung Lun v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-466-96), Tremblay-Lamer, September 30, 1998. 

Acosta, Mercedes v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4790-97), Reed, January 7, 1999. 

Wong, Ching Shin Henry v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3366-96), Reed, January 14, 1998. The Court 

subsequently ordered the medical officers to respond by a specified date to counsel’s questions: Wong, Ching 

Shin Henry v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3366-96), Reed, November 27, 1998. 

Lee, Sing v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-2459-85), Martin, May 1, 1986. 

Shah, Nikita v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-02633), D’Ignazio, June 23, 1998, followed in Singh, Narinder Pal v. M.C.I. 

(IAD T97-04679), D'Ignazio, September 27, 1999. 



The failure to avail oneself of the opportunity to make submissions (when given two 

months to do so) is not a breach of procedural fairness. 41 

The Federal Court in Parmar 42 held that its intervention was not warranted where the 

medical officers had failed to comply strictly with all the guidelines set out in the Immigration 

Manual and the non-compliance was minimal and non-prejudicial. It further held: “It is essential 

for those officials both in Canada and abroad to be meticulous in ensuring that applicants for 

admission to this country be made aware of the basis for refusing their application for admission 

to Canada.” 

Use of expert medical reports by IAD 

A member may receive expert reports as to the health condition of the foreign national but 

they must be assessed in conformity with the guidelines below and may not be used to disprove 

the diagnosis of the officer. They may however be useful in assessing the present condition as it 

impacts the issue of discretionary relief. 

What follows is a synopsis of the case law that developed under the Immigration Act 

respecting the medical officer’s decision (medical notification) as well as the visa officer’s 

consideration of that decision and the process by which such decisions are reached. 

The Diagnosis and Prognosis 

The Federal Court’s statement in Mohamed 43 that the applicant must have been suffering 

from the medical condition diagnosed by the medical officers may seem to indicate that the IAD 

is to consider the correctness of the medical diagnosis made by the medical officers. Likewise, 

the Federal Court’s statement in Uppal 44 that whether a diagnosis is correct is a question of fact 

on which the parties may lead evidence may have led to the same conclusion. However, in 

neither of these cases was the issue directly before the Court. In Mohamed, the issue was the 

reasonableness of the medical officers’ opinions and in Uppal, the issue was whether the 

diagnosis was vague. However, in Jiwanpuri, 45 the issue was squarely raised before the Federal 

Court. The IAD had found that the diagnosis was erroneous, based on the evidence before it. 

The Federal Court held that the IAD cannot question the correctness of a medical diagnosis as it 

does not have the necessary expertise to do so and should not do so even with the help of expert 

medical evidence. 

41 

42 

43 

44 

45 

Hussain,Amin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3419-95) Noël, September 26, 1996. Reported: Hussain v. 

Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1996), 35 Imm. L.R. (2d) 86 (F.C.T.D.) 

Parmar, supra, footnote 18, at 7. 

Mohamed, infra, footnote 51. 

Uppal v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1987] 3 F.C. 565. 

Jiwanpuri, infra, footnote 73. 



The IAD has interpreted the Federal Court cases as still allowing the IAD to determine 

whether or not the diagnosis is vague, ambiguous, uncertain or insufficient. If there has not been 

a definite diagnosis, it cannot support the opinion reached by the medical officers; 46 if there has 

been a definite diagnosis, its correctness cannot be challenged. 

Whether a diagnosis is vague, insufficient, uncertain or ambiguous is a question of fact 

rather than law that must be determined after examining the evidence presented. 47 

Certainty in prognosis is not required. The use of “long term” and “short term” in the 

prognosis is not vague. 48 

The medical officers must base their diagnosis and opinion on medical evidence. A 

diagnosis cannot be based only on an admission of a charge of conspiring to supply controlled 

drugs and of past drug addiction. 49 

Reasonableness of Medical Officers’ Opinion 

The IAD must decide whether the opinion expressed by the medical officers pursuant to 

section 19(1)(a) of the Immigration Act regarding danger to public health or safety or excessive 

demands is reasonable based on the circumstances of the particular case. 50 

In Mohamed, 51 the Federal Court set out the general rule as follows: 

46 

47 

48 

49 

50 

Nijjar, Ranjit Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD V89-00964), Wlodyka, Chambers, Verma, January 9, 1991. 

Uppal, supra, footnote 44; Shanker, supra, footnote 25. 

M.C.I. v. Ram, Venkat (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3381-95), McKeown, May 31, 1996. See also Pattar, supra, 

footnote 18, where a condition of “unknown pathology” did not render the Medical Notification form deficient. 

In Litt, Mohinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-01928), Jackson, June 11, 1998, the medical officer used “mild 

chronic renal failure” and “chronic renal failure” interchangeably and the medical report was not found to be 

inconsistent or vague. But in Phan, Hat v. M.C.I. (IAD W93-00090), Wiebe, September 4, 1996, the IAD 

found a diagnosis of “respiratory insufficiency” so vague as to be meaningless where the report cited no timeframes 

as to deterioration and there was no reference to functional disabilities that might impair the applicant. 

In Singh, Balbir Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-01550), Carver, May 8, 1998, the prognosis of deterioration was 

found to be not speculative merely because coronary angiogram procedures were not available (in Fiji) or used 

in forming the diagnosis of coronary artery disease. 

M.E.I. v. Burgon, David Ross (F.C.A., no. A-17-90), MacGuigan, Linden, Mahoney (concurring in the result), 

February 22, 1991. Reported: Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Burgon (1991), 13 Imm. 

L.R. (2d) 102 (F.C.A.). See also D’Costa Correia, Savio John v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-03318), Maziarz, 

February 27, 1998, in which the IAD held that the applicant’s admission, which he later denied, that he drank 

half a bottle of alcohol per day did not constitute a proper basis for a diagnosis of “chronic alcohol abuse” 

where the Medical Notification form did not mention the type of alcohol consumed or the medical 

consequences, if any, of such consumption. 

Ahir v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1984] 1 F.C. 1098 (C.A.). 



It is therefore open to an appellant to show that the medical officers’ opinion was 

unreasonable and this may be done by the production of evidence from medical 

witnesses other than “medical officers”. However, evidence that simply tends to 

show that the person concerned is no longer suffering from the medical condition 

which formed the basis of the medical officers’ opinion is clearly not enough; the 

medical officers may well have been wrong in their prognosis but so long as the 

person concerned was suffering from the medical condition and their opinion as to 

its consequences was reasonable at the time it was given and relied on by the visa 

officer, the latter’s refusal of the sponsored application was well founded. 52 

Reasonableness is a question of fact; thus it is incumbent on a sponsor to establish an 

evidentiary foundation to any such challenge. 53 

The IAD should not assume that the medical officers’ opinion is reasonable based only on 

an agreement that the medical condition exists. 54 

In assessing reasonableness, the IAD should consider whether the medical officers 

applied the correct criteria in assessing an applicant. 55 Medical officers may rely on the 

guidelines in the Medical Officer’s Handbook in making their assessment, but they must be 

flexible and look at individual circumstances. The guidelines are based on generally accepted 

medical experience. 56 The Handbook may be given a great deal of weight as it is similar to 

medical journals and textbooks. The issue is whether the medical officers fettered their 

discretion. 57 

“Tests of admissibility must be relevant to the purpose and duration for which admission 

is sought.” 58 It is unreasonable for the medical officers to assess a visitor based on the same 

criteria used to assess an immigrant. 59 Likewise, an applicant who is included in the principal 

applicant’s application as a dependant should not be assessed as an independent applicant and 

required to establish self-sufficiency. 60 The IAD has applied this reasoning in a number of 

51 

52 

53 

54 

55 

56 

57 

58 

59 

Mohamed v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1986] 3 F.C. 90 (C.A.). 

Ibid., at 98. 

Takhar, Manjit Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD V90-00588), Wlodyka, Chambers, Verma, March 4, 1991. 

Deol, Daljeet Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-280-90), MacGuigan, Linden, Robertson, November 27, 1992. 

Reported: Deol v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1992), 18 Imm. L.R. (2d) 1 (F.C.A.). 

Ibid. 

Ajanee, Gulbanoo Sadruddin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-1750-92), MacKay, March 29, 1996. Reported: Ajanee 

v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)(1996), 33 Imm. L.R. (2d) 165 (F.C.T.D.). 

Ludwig, James Bruce v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1135-95), Nadon, April 9, 1996. Reported: Ludwig v. 

Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1996) 33 Imm. L.R. (2d) 213 (F.C.T.D.). 

Adjudicator Leckie, quoted with approval by the Federal Court in Ahir, supra, footnote 50, at 1101. See also 

Deol, supra, footnote 54; Ng, Kam Fai Andrew v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2903-94), Jerome, January 16, 

1996; and Chu, Raymond Tak Wah v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-272-94), Jerome, January 16, 1996. 

Ahir, ibid. 



cases. 61 In Wong, 62 the Federal Court clarified the factors to be considered in the case of an 

applicant who was a dependant: 

The assessment of probable demands is to involve an analysis of whether, on the 

balance of probabilities having regard to all the circumstances, including, but not 

limited to, the severity of her condition, the degree and effectiveness of the support 

promised by her family, and her prospects for economic and personal physical self 

sufficiency, [she] will be cared for in her family home into the future. 63 

The grounds of unreasonableness include incoherence or inconsistency, absence of 

supporting evidence, failure to consider cogent evidence 64 and failure to consider the factors 

stipulated in section 22 of the Immigration Regulations. 65 Note, however, that the failure to 

consider the section 22 factors only applies to section 19(1)(a)(i) of the Immigration Act, not to 

section 19(1)(a)(ii). 66 

The duty to look at the reasonableness of the opinion arises where the notice is manifestly 

in error, e.g. where it relates to the wrong party or an irrelevant disease or if not all relevant 

medical reports had been considered. 67 The visa officer has no authority to review the diagnostic 

assessment made by the medical officers. Where the issue of reasonableness arises on the 

evidence before the visa officer, the officer may elect to seek further medical evidence. Where 

no such issue arises, the visa officer must rely on the opinion. The visa officer has no discretion 

but to refuse if the opinion is that the person is inadmissible. 68 

The IAD has held that where there are two different and contradictory medical 

notifications on file concerning an applicant the visa officer has a duty to forward them to the 

60 

61 

62 

63 

64 

65 

66 

67 

68 

Ng, supra, footnote 58; Chu, supra, footnote 58. See also Deol, supra, footnote 54, where the IAD failed to 

consider that the medical officers appeared to have assessed the applicant as a “new worker” instead of a 

sponsored dependant. See also Chun, Lam v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5208-97), Teitelbaum, October 29, 

1998, where the medical officers’ assessment should not have been limited to economic factors given that the 

applicant’s daughter was a dependant who was not expected to become independent in the immediate future. 

Tejobunarto, Lianggono v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-00565), Boire, July 28, 1998; Grewal, Parminder Singh v. M.C.I. 

(IAD V95-01266), Boscariol, November 21, 1997; Kaila, Harmandeep Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-02830), 

McIsaac, October 2, 1997; Nagra, Ajaib Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V94-00245), Bartley, July 14, 1997. 

Wong, Chan Shuk King v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2359-95), Simpson, May 24, 1996. Reported: Wong v. 

Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1996), 34 Imm. L.R. (2d) 18 (F.C.T.D.). 

Ibid., at 2-3. 

Ismaili, supra, footnote 31. 

Gao, supra, footnote 32. 

See discussion of Ismaili, supra, footnote 31. 

Hussain, Amin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3419-95), Noël, September 26, 1996. Reported: Hussain v. 

Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1996), 35 Imm. L.R. (2d) 86 (F.C.T.D.). 

Ajanee, Gulbanoo Sadruddin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-1750-92), MacKay, March 29, 1996. Reported: 

Ajanee v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1996), 33 Imm. L.R. (2d) 165 (F.C.T.D.). See 

also Ludwig, James Bruce v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1135-95), Nadon, April 9, 1996. Reported: Ludwig 

v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1996), 33 Imm. L.R. (2d) 213 (F.C.T.D.); and Tong, 

Kwan Wah v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2565-96), Heald, October 31, 1997. 



medical officer to re-consider. This situation should have raised a doubt in the mind of the visa 

officer as to the reasonableness of the medical notification. 69 

In a recent case decided under IRPA, Kim, a psychologist’s report had been filed detailing 

the extent of the applicant’s son’s disability and considering some aspects of long-term prognosis 

and care. The Respondent admitted that it had never been reviewed by the officer deciding this 

matter. It was sent to Ottawa’s Medical Services who sent a report that was in the record. Justice 

Phelan held that it is not sufficient for the officer to ignore the psychologist’s report on the basis 

that someone else (e.g. Medical Services) would deal or had dealt with it. 70 

The medical officers’ opinion that the applicant was not likely to respond to treatment 

was not unreasonable in light of the medical reports, one indicating the condition was likely to 

improve and two suggesting a potential for improvement. 71 

Where the medical officers ignore a report, indicating significant improvements in the 

abilities of the applicant's dependant children in one year and only a need for some educational 

support, their opinion is unreasonable. 72 

Following cases like Jiwanpuri, 73 it appears that the IAD can consider evidence other than 

strictly medical evidence to question the reasonableness of the medical opinion. 

Excessive demands 

“Excessive Demands” is now defined in section 1 of the IRPR. 

Where there is a lack of evidence before the medical officers as to the likelihood of the 

particular applicant's recourse to social services, the particular social services likely required 

should such recourse be required, the expense of such services (adjusting for any set-offs), and 

the quality of family support available, their conclusion as to excessive demands lacks an 

sufficient evidentiary basis. The medical officers have a duty to assess the circumstances of each 

individual that comes before them in his or her uniqueness. 74 This direction arose in the context 

69 

70 

71 

72 

73 

74 

Syal-Bharadwa, Bela v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-02011), Borst, November 30, 1999. 

Kim, Shin Ki v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-345-07), Phelan, January 29, 2008; 2008 FC 116. 

Hussain, supra, footnote 67. 

Ten, Luisa v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1606-97), Tremblay-Lamer, June 26, 1998. 

Jiwanpuri, Jasvir Kaur v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-333-89), Marceau, Stone, MacGuigan, May 17, 1990. 

Reported: Jiwanpuri v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1990), 10 Imm. L.R. (2d) 241 

(F.C.A.). 

Poste, John Russell v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4601-96), Cullen, December 22, 1997. Applied in Ho, Nam 

Van v. M.C.I. (IAD C97-00009), Wiebe, January 13, 2000. 



of a mental disability, but it may be applicable to other areas of medical refusals as well and has 

recently been found to be applicable to cases of physical disability. 75 

“Excessive demands” was held in Jim 76 to mean “more than what is normal or necessary.” 

The Federal Court accepted “excessive demands” as meaning “unreasonable” or “beyond what 

the system reasonably provides to everyone.” 77 The Federal Court applied this definition in 

Ludwig, 78 holding that 

[…] the necessity of monitoring the applicant’s health situation over a fiveyear 

period, the probability that the applicant’s cancer would recur, and the 

applicant’s reduced chances of a cure, would cause or might reasonably be 

expected to cause, demands on Canada’s health or social services that would 

be more than “normal or necessary”. 79 

There should be some evidentiary basis for determining that an applicant’s admission 

would cause or might reasonably be expected to cause excessive demands. 80 The fact that an 

applicant was found unfit, by reason of insanity, to stand trial for murder and had since, at all 

material times, been detained under a Lieutenant Governor’s warrant did not automatically 

support the conclusion that the applicant’s admission might reasonably be expected to cause 

excessive demands on health or social services. 81 Neither does the fact that someone had been 

75 

76 

77 

78 

79 

80 

81 

Cabaldon Jr., Antonio Quindipan v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3675-96), Wetston, January 15, 1998.. 

Jim, Yun Jing v. S.G.C. (F.C.T.D., no. T-1977-92), Gibson, October 25, 1993. Reported: Jim v. Canada 

(Solicitor General) (1993), 22 Imm. L.R. (2d) 261 (F.C.T.D.). Cited with approval in Choi, Hon Man v. M.C.I. 

(F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4399-94), Teitelbaum, July 18, 1995. Reported: Choi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship 

and Immigration) (1995), 29 Imm. L.R. (2d) 85 (F.C.T.D.). 

Jim, ibid. In Gill, Gurpal Kaur v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3082-98), Evans, July 16, 1999, the Court noted 

in obiter dicta that the fact that many Canadians of the applicant’s age require a particular operation (knee 

replacement) cannot justify in law a finding that the admission of a person who also needs this operation will 

impose excessive demands on the health system. In this situation, any “excessive demand” is caused by the 

devotion of resources that are inadequate to meet the demand from the present population, not by the admission 

of an otherwise qualified applicant for a visa. The IAD on the re-hearing of this appeal declined to follow this 

obiter dicta: Gill, Gurpal Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-02345), Whist, January 21, 2000. 

Ludwig, supra, footnote 57, at 14. 

See also Ajanee, supra, footnote 56, where the finding of excessive demands was also upheld. There was 

evidence that the applicant had undergone a mastectomy; there was no evidence of recurrence of the cancer 

after two years; and her examining physician indicated that her prognosis was excellent. However, relying on 

the medical guidelines, the medical officers were of the opinion that the applicant’s admission might cause 

excessive demands because a five-year period had not yet elapsed; it was probable she would suffer a 

significant recurrence; and there was only a 70 per cent chance of survival over a five-year period. 

Citizenship and Immigration Canada instructions OP 96-10, IP 96-13, EC 96-02, dated May 9, 1996, instruct 

medical officers to prepare statutory declarations routinely to support their opinions of excessive demands. 

The declarations are to refer to all medical evidence considered; any experts consulted and their qualifications; 

the reasons for forming their opinion; and the costs of required health or social services. It should be noted that 

the Appeal Division has rarely seen these statutory declarations in appeals. Please note: 2007 OP 15 has no 

reference to such a Stat Dec. See also Kumar, Varinder v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-03366), Boscariol, December 30, 

1998 where the panel comments on the sufficiency of the respondent's evidence. 

Seyoum, Zerom v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-412-90), Mahoney, Stone, Décary, November 15, 1990. 



addicted to drugs automatically bring the person within section 19(1)(a)(ii) of the Immigration 

Act. 82 

The IAD has dealt with an applicant’s physical disability and its impact on the validity of 

a refusal. In Rai, 83 the applicant suffered from post-polio paraparesis of her lower limbs. The 

applicant produced medical evidence that she had adapted remarkably to her infirmity and 

intended to forego recommended medical treatment to prevent deterioration of the condition. The 

panel found that the applicant’s willingness to forego recommended medical treatment did not go 

towards showing the unreasonableness of the opinion regarding excessive demands. The panel 

also held that eligibility for provincial income assistance programs for persons with disabilities 

did not constitute excessive demands. In Wahid, 84 the applicant who suffered from quadriplegia 

was entitled to attendant care services, but never used them as he preferred to be independent. 

The IAD considered the evidence that the sponsor had made his house physically accessible and 

that the applicant had the determination and the resources to ensure that he would not place 

excessive demands on services to conclude that the refusal was not valid in law. 

A Federal Court decision, has indirectly dealt with the notions of scarcity of services and 

cost. In Rabang 85 , a case involving an applicant with developmental delay with cerebral palsy, 

the Court found that a determination as to the reasonableness of the opinion of the medical 

officers with regard to excessive demands could not be made without evidence that the services 

in question are publicly funded and evidence as to availability, scarcity or cost of those services. 

The Court was not ready to accept that this was a matter within the special knowledge or 

expertise of the medical officer, nor was the Court ready to accept the argument that requiring 

such evidence would pose an undue administrative burden. The services in question were special 

education, physical therapy, occupational therapy, and speech therapy as well as ongoing 

specialist care. The Court was also not willing to accept that the onus is on the appellant to 

satisfy the medical officer that the applicant's demands on publicly funded health and social 

services would not be excessive. The Court stated that this was not the fundamental problem in 

the case, the problem being that the record disclosed no evidence at all on the critical question of 

excessive 

demand. 

Post-Hilewitz Law 

Since the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Hilewitz 86 the legal landscape has 

dramatically shifted for medical inadmissibility visa refusals based on excessive demands. It is 

important therefore to consider what changed and any potential impact those changes may have 

for appeals at the IAD. 

82 

83 

84 

85 

86 

Burgon, supra, footnote 49; D’Costa Correia, supra, footnote 49. 

Rai, Paramninder Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-00279), Carver, April 20, 1998. 

Wahid, Gurbax Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-04717), Kitchener, January 21, 1998. 

Rabang, Ricardo Pablo v M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4576-98), Sharlow, November 29, 1999. 

Hilewitz v. Canada (M.C.I.) and De Jong v. Canada (M.C.I.) were joined in Hilewitz and De Jong v. Canada 

[2005] SCC 57, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 706, decided October 21, 2005. 



Hilewitz and De Jong applied separately for permanent resident visas in the investor and 

self-employed categories respectively. Visa officers refused the applications, despite the 

applicant’s substantial financial resources, because the applicants’ children suffered from a 

intellectual disability, and were found to be medically inadmissible under the former Immigration 

Act, s. 19(1)(a)(ii). The officers concluded that they would require a variety of social services, 

e.g., special schooling, vocational training, etc., far in excess of the social services required by an 

average Canadian resident of his age. Their admission would cause excessive demands on social 

services. The issues in both of these cases are: of what relevance were the financial 

circumstances of the prospective immigrants? How should one view their willingness and ability 

to pay for social services once they reach Canada? 

The Supreme Court joined the two appeals and held that the term “excessive demands” is 

inherently evaluative and comparative so medical officers must assess likely demands on social 

services, not mere eligibility for them. They must necessarily take into account both medical and 

non-medical factors. This requires individualized assessments. The Court explained that the 

medical officer cannot ignore the very assets that qualify the applicant for admission to Canada 

when determining the admissibility of his disabled son. Given their financial resources, the 

applicants would likely be required to contribute substantially, if not entirely, to any costs for 

social services provided by the province of Ontario, where they wish to settle. 

How has this landmark decision been interpreted by the Federal Court and the IAD? 

Kelen J. held in both Airapetyan 87 and Ching-Chu 88 that one’s ability or intention to pay for 

social services should not be restricted to applicants in business immigration categories. The IAD 

has reached the same conclusion as well 89 . In Colaco 90 , the Court of Appeal held, in an 

application for permanent residence by a “skilled worker” class, that the Minister erred in not 

considering the applicant’s financial willingness and commitment to pay for social services for 

their mildly mentally retarded child. 

Of course “excessive demands” can apply to both social services as well as “medical 

services”. Campbell J. made this distinction in Lee where an applicant is the “entrepreneur 

category was refused for excessive demands as a result of his polycystic kidney disease. The 

Court held: 

(1) Although the Applicant is an entrepreneur with considerable net worth, the Officer did 

not err by failing to consider the Applicant’s ability to pay for his own health care for the 

following reasons: (i) Hilewitz (SCC) dealt specifically with “social services” and not 

“health services”; (ii) a permanent resident automatically has health insurance in Canada; 

(iii) paying for health care is contrary to Canadian public policy; (iv) charging patients for 

87 

88 

89 

90 

Airapetyan, Lidiya v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2570-06), Kelen, January 17, 2007; 2007 FC 42. 

Ching-Chu, Lai v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-694-07), Kelen, August 28, 2007; 2007 FC 855. 

Zhang, Jiang v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-10174), Tumir, February 7, 2006. 

Colaco, Peter Anthony v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-366-06), Linden, Létourneau, Sexton, September 12, 2007; 

2007 FCA 282. 



insured health services is expressly prohibited under the Canada Health Act. Based upon 

how Canada disseminates health services to permanent residents, a person’s financial 

ability to pay for health services would be irrelevant (Deol); and (v) excessive demands 

on health care are more than just financial demands, e.g., using up finite places in waiting 

lists (Gilani). 

(2) The Officer breached procedural fairness by not also considering the Applicant’s 

request for a temporary resident permit. 

In Kirec 91 the applicant’s daughter suffers from Althetoid Cerebral Palsy. The visa officer 

found she was medically inadmissible for excessive demand based on her need for social 

services. The applicant argued that he did not know the contents of the medical file and did not 

know the criteria applied to assess his daughter’s condition and therefore the fairness letter 

process was flawed. The Court disagreed as the fairness letter included the medical findings in 

the medical notification. The letter indicated the applicant’s daughter was non-verbal, completely 

dependent for all activities of self care, utilizes the services of occupational and speech therapy, 

physiotherapy and assistive technology for communication. Although there was not a dollar 

figure on the services utilized by the applicant’s daughter through the publicly funded Vancouver 

School Board, there was evidence that she required a full time special education assistant - this 

alone constitutes an excessive demand on social service as it clearly exceeds the threshold of $4, 

057. In addition, she required the services of physiotherapists, occupational therapists, speech 

language therapists and had utilized public funds for a wheelchair. It was reasonable for the visa 

officer to trust the findings of the medical officer that she would continue to use those services on 

return to Canada. The applicant failed to make any submissions regarding how family support 

would offset the excessive demands other than an expressed intention to utilize private services. 

The visa officer properly took into account the applicant’s daughter’s personal circumstances 

including her long history of using social services while in Canada. 

There have been some specific situations that have arisen worth noting. The Court 

commented 92 that the medical officer should compare the applicant’s situation to the average cost 

for Canadian citizens of the same age group. It should be noted that this interpretation is at odds 

with the actual definition of “excessive demands” in IRPA. The visa officer cannot be faulted for 

failing to conduct an individualized assessment when no plan for the daughter’s care in Canada 

and no submissions are put forward for consideration 93 . 

Intellectual Disability Cases 

Special mention must be made of cases involving intellectual disability or “mental 

retardation”. The concept of mental retardation cannot be used as a stereotype. The degree and 

91 

92 

93 

Kirec, Babur v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6272-05), Blais, June 23, 2006; 2006 FC 800 

Hossain, Ishtiaq v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4132-05), Gauthier, April 11, 2006; 2006 FC 475. 

Gau, Hui-Chun v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7127-05), Mactavish, October 23, 2006; 2006 FC 1258. 



probable consequences of the degree of mental retardation for excessive demands must be 

assessed by the IAD. It is an error for a medical officer to fail to specify the degree of mental 

retardation, thus making it difficult to assess the reasonableness of the finding. 94 The degree of 

mental retardation must be indicated by the medical officers, as there may be a higher level of 

proof required to establish excessive demands in the case of mild mental retardation. 95 

If a finding of excessive demands is based not on the medical condition as such, but on 

the potential failure of family support, there must be evidence as to the probability of such 

failure. 96 The Federal Court set aside a visa officer’s refusal where the record did not contain an 

estimation of the actual amount of specialized education required by the applicant’s daughter or 

any documentation concerning the availability of, or current access to, that specialized 

education. 97 

An opinion based on the need for special schooling, training and indefinite home care and 

supervision was found to be reasonable in Choi. 98 In Jaferi, 99 the daughter of an applicant was 

found to be developmentally handicapped and special schooling would cost 260 per cent more 

than schooling for a healthy child. The Federal Court found that the medical officers’ finding 

was not unreasonable. However, in Ismaili, 100 the Federal Court found that the visa officer did 

not properly consider the issue of excessive demands as the evidence was that the applicant’s son 

required a vitamin supplement at a cost of $12 per month and there was no waiting list at the 

special school he required. The cost of the special schooling was not canvassed as in Jaferi. 101 

In Ma, 102 it was held to be well established that specialized education is a “social service” 

within the meaning of the Act. In Sabater, 103 the Federal Court held that services provided by 

schools to the handicapped may be considered as social services. The Federal Court of Appeal in 

94 

95 

96 

97 

98 

99 

Deol, supra, footnote 54; Sabater, Llamado D. Jr. v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2519-93), McKeown, 

October 13, 1995. Reported: Sabater v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1995), 31 Imm. 

L.R. (2d) 59 (F.C.T.D.); Nagra, supra, footnote 61. 

Sabater, supra, footnote 94. See also Poste, John Russell v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4601-96), Cullen, 

December 22, 1997; Fei, supra, footnote 35; and Lau, Hing To v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4361-96), Pinard, 

April 17, 1998. 

Litt, Jasmail Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2296-94), Rothstein, February 17, 1995. Reported: Litt v. 

Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1995), 26 Imm. L.R. (2d) 153 (F.C.T.D.). See also Truong, 

Lien Phuong v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-00900), Kitchener, Bartley, Boire, April 7, 1997. 

Cabaldon Jr., supra, footnote 75. 

Choi, supra, footnote 76. 

Jaferi, supra, footnote 31. 

100 Ismaili, supra, footnote 31. 

101 Jaferi, supra, footnote 31. 

102 Ma, supra, footnote 35. 

103 Sabater, supra, footnote 94. 



Thangarajan 104 and in Yogeswaran 105 indicated that the education of mentally challenged 

students within the publicly funded provincial school system does constitute a “social service” 

within the meaning of section 19(1)(a)(ii) of the Act. The Court explained that since 

institutionalization of the mentally retarded is a social service, a substitute more modern program, 

special education, is also a social service. 

In deciding whether to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction the Appeal Division would 

fetter its discretion by not considering all factors relevant to its determination. For example, in 

Deol, 106 the Appeal Division focused on the refusal of the family to acknowledge the mental 

retardation of one of its members and the successful functioning of the two households. At the 

same time, the Appeal Division failed to consider, particularly, the nature of the medical 

condition of mental retardation, “the psychological dependencies it engenders and the close 

bonds of affection that may arise in such a family, all in light of the objective [...] of the 

Immigration Act of facilitating the reunion of close relatives in Canada.” 107 The Federal Court 

has observed that the Appeal Division should not use stereotyping or irrelevant considerations in 

deciding whether to grant special relief. 108 

Timing 

Generally, the reasonableness of a medical opinion is to be assessed at the time it was 

given and relied on by a visa officer. 109 Nevertheless, in making that assessment, the IAD may 

rely on any relevant evidence adduced before it. 110 Further, where the IAD is presented with a 

new opinion of a medical officer, concurred in by another medical officer, it is the reasonableness 

of that opinion that must be assessed. 111 

Evidence as to an applicant’s condition subsequent to the refusal has limited relevance to 

the legal validity of the refusal. In Shanker, 112 the Federal Court held that evidence of an 

applicant’s medical condition subsequent to the refusal is not relevant to the legality of the 

refusal. However, it may still be relevant to the extent that it can demonstrate that the medical 

104 M.C.I. v. Thangarajan, Rajadurai Samuel (F.C.A., no. A-486-98), Létourneau, Rothstein, McDonald, June 24, 

1999; reversing Thangarajan, Rajadurai Samuel v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3789-97), Reed, August 5, 

1998. 

105 Yogeswaran, Thiyagaraja v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1505-96), McKeown, April 17, 1997. 

106 Deol, supra, footnote 54. 

107 Ibid., at 7. 

108 Budhu, Pooran Deonaraine v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-272-97), Reed, March 20, 1998. 

109 See, for example, Jiwanpuri, supra, footnote 73; Gao, supra, footnote 32; and Mohamed, supra, footnote 51. 

110 Jiwanpuri, supra, footnote 73. 

111 Kahlon, Darshan Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-115-86), Mahoney, Stone, MacGuigan, February 6, 1989. 

Reported: Kahlon v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1989), 7 Imm.L.R. (2d) 91 (F.C.A.) 

112 Shanker, supra, footnote 25. 



officer’s opinion was unreasonable at the time it was given and relied on by the visa officer. 113 It 

is not enough to simply show that the applicant is no longer suffering from the medical 

condition. 114 

Discretionary Jurisdiction to grant special relief 

The IAD continues to have the power to grant relief to those sponsored members of the 

family class who are medically inadmissible. The member may grant their appeal if they are 

satisfied that at the time the appeal is disposed of "taking into account the best interests of a child 

directly affected by the decision, sufficient humanitarian and compassionate considerations 

warrant special relief in light of all the circumstances of the case" 115 . 

Of particular relevance when considering compassionate or humanitarian factors within 

the context of medical inadmissibility is evidence of an applicant’s current state of health. 116 

Improvement will be considered in favour of the sponsor (although a decision to grant special 

relief probably should not turn solely on this criterion), 117 while evidence that the condition is 

stable or has deteriorated may be considered against the sponsor. 118 

In Szulikowski, 119 the IAD allowed the appeal on discretionary grounds although the cost 

of open-heart surgery would exceed $25,000, given there was no waiting list in Alberta and 

appropriate post-operative care was not available in the Ukraine for the applicant, who was the 

sponsor’s adopted son. 

In Rai, 120 the efforts of a family to provide specialized transport and to adapt their house 

for wheelchair accessibility were positive humanitarian and compassionate factors to be 

considered. 

113 Jiwanpuri, supra, footnote 73. 

114 Mohamed, supra, footnote 51. 

115 S. 67(1)(c) IRPA. 

116 Kirpal is a now a historic footnote: Kirpal no longer applicable in the IRPA context. According to one decision 

of the Federal Court, the IAD errs if it “weighs” the legal impediment to admissibility against the strength of 

the humanitarian or compassionate factors present in an appeal: Kirpal v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 

Immigration), [1997] 1 F.C. 352 (T.D.). Further, the Court in Kirpal held that the IAD should consider 

separately whether the granting of special relief is warranted with respect to each applicant. However, as 

canvassed in Chauhan, Gurpreet K. v. M.C.I. (IAD T95-06533), Townshend, June 11, 1997, in decisions that 

pre-date Kirpal, the Federal Court of Appeal has sanctioned consideration of the legal impediment in the 

exercise of the IAD’s discretionary jurisdiction. In Chauhan, the panel also articulated its disagreement with 

the holding in Kirpal regarding the separate consideration of special relief for each applicant. 

117 Choi, Tommy Yuen Hung v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 84-9134), Weisdorf, Suppa, Teitelbaum, September 2, 1986. 

118 Zheng, Bi Quing v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-01428), Sherman, Weisdorf, Tisshaw, January 3, 1992; Tonnie v. M.E.I. 

(IAD T91-00202), Bell, Fatsis, Singh, March 30, 1992; Moledina, Narjis v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-02516), Ahara, 

Chu, Fatsis, May 8, 1992. 

119 Szulikowski, Myron Joseph (Mike) v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-03154), Nee, August 13, 1998. 

120 Rai, supra, footnote 83. 



IRPA now sets out the impact of an allowed appeal on the sponsorship process: "An 

officer, in examining a permanent resident or foreign national, is bound by the decision of the 

Immigration Appeal Division to allow an appeal in respect of a foreign national." 121 

121 S. 70(1) IRPA. 



CASES 

Acosta, Mercedes v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4790-97), Reed, January 7, 1999...................................................... 9 

Ahir v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1984] 1 F.C. 1098 (C.A.). .................................... 12, 13 

Airapetyan, Lidiya v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2570-06), Kelen, January 17, 2007; 2007 FC 42 ................................. 17 

Ajanee, Gulbanoo Sadruddin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-1750-92), MacKay, March 29, 1996. 

Reported: Ajanee v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1996), 33 Imm. L.R. 

(2d) 165 (F.C.T.D.). .......................................................................................................................................... 14, 15 

Ajanee, Gulbanoo Sadruddin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-1750-92), MacKay, March 29, 1996. 

Reported: Ajanee v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)(1996), 33 Imm. L.R. 

(2d) 165 (F.C.T.D.) ................................................................................................................................................. 12 

Badwal, Tripta v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-1193-88), MacGuigan, Urie, Mahoney, November 14, 

1989. Reported: Badwal v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1989), 

9 Imm. L.R. (2d) 85; 64 D.L.R. (4th) 561 (F.C.A.) .................................................................................................. 7 

Boateng, Dora Amoah v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2700-97), Lutfy, September 28, 1998....................................... 9 

Bola, Lakhvir Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-417-88), Marceau, Stone, Desjardins (dissenting), 

May 18, 1990. Reported: Bola v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1990), 

11 Imm. L.R. (2d) 14 (F.C.A.). ................................................................................................................................. 7 

Budhu, Pooran Deonaraine v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-272-97), Reed, March 20, 1998 ..................................... 20 



Immigration) v. Burgon (1991), 13 Imm. L.R. (2d) 102 (F.C.A.). ................................................................... 11, 16 

Cabaldon Jr., Antonio Quindipan v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3675-96), Wetston, January 15, 

1998................................................................................................................................................................... 15, 19 

Chauhan, Gurpreet K. v. M.C.I. (IAD T95-06533), Townshend, June 11, 1997........................................................ 21 

Ching-Chu, Lai v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-694-07), Kelen, August 28, 2007; 2007 FC 855....................................... 17 

Choi, Hon Man v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4399-94), Teitelbaum, July 18, 1995. Reported: 

Choi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1995), 29 Imm. L.R. (2d) 85 

(F.C.T.D.).......................................................................................................................................................... 15, 19 

Choi, Tommy Yuen Hung v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 84-9134), Weisdorf, Suppa, Teitelbaum, September 2, 

1986......................................................................................................................................................................... 21 

Chong Alvarez: M.E.I. v. Chong Alvarez, Maria Del Refugio (IAD V90-01411), Wlodyka, 

April 10, 1991. .......................................................................................................................................................... 7 

Chu, Raymond Tak Wah v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-272-94), Jerome, January 16, 1996...................................... 13 

Chun, Lam v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5208-97), Teitelbaum, October 29, 1998.................................................. 13 



Colaco, Peter Anthony v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-366-06), Linden, Létourneau, Sexton, September 

12, 2007; 2007 FCA 282......................................................................................................................................... 17 

D’Costa Correia, Savio John v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-03318), Maziarz, February 27, 1998............................................ 11 

Darshan Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-115-86), Mahoney, Stone, MacGuigan, February 6, 1989. 

Reported: Kahlon v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1989), 7 Imm.L.R. 

(2d) 91 (F.C.A.)....................................................................................................................................................... 21 

Deol, Daljeet Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-280-90), MacGuigan, Linden, Robertson, 

November 27, 1992. Reported: Deol v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) 

(1992), 18 Imm. L.R. (2d) 1 (F.C.A.). .................................................................................................. 12, 13, 19, 20 

Dhami, Gurnam Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 84-6036), Chambers, Tremblay, Howard, January 8, 

1987........................................................................................................................................................................... 6 

Fei, Wan Chen v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-741-96), Heald, June 30, 1997........................................................ 9, 19 

Fung, Alfred Wai To v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 83-6205), Hlady, Glogowski, Petryshyn, December 14, 

1984........................................................................................................................................................................... 8 

Gao, Yude v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-980-92), Dubé, February 8, 1993. Reported: Gao v. 

Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 18 Imm. L.R. (2d) 306 (F.C.T.D.). ............... 9, 13, 20 

Gau, Hui-Chun v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7127-05), Mactavish, October 23, 2006; 2006 FC 1258........................... 19 

Gill, Gurpal Kaur v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3082-98), Evans, July 16, 1999 ..................................................... 15 

Gill, Gurpal Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-02345), Whist, January 21, 2000 ................................................................... 15 

Gingiovvenanu, Marcel v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3875-93), Simpson, October 30, 1995. 

Reported: Gingiovvenanu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1995), 

31 Imm. L.R. (2d) 55 (F.C.T.D.)............................................................................................................................... 8 

Grewal, Parminder Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-01266), Boscariol, November 21, 1997 ............................................ 13 

Hilewitz and De Jong v. Canada [2005] SCC 57, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 706, decided October 21, 2005........................... 17 

Hiramen, Sandra Cecilia v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-956-84), MacGuigan, Thurlow, Stone, 

February 4, 1986 ................................................................................................................................................... 5, 7 

Ho, Nam Van v. M.C.I. (IAD C97-00009), Wiebe, January 13, 2000......................................................................... 15 

Hossain, Ishtiaq v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4132-05), Gauthier, April 11, 2006; 2006 FC 475 .................................. 18 

Hussain, Amin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3419-95), Noël, September 26, 1996. Reported: 

Hussain v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1996), 35 Imm. L.R. (2d) 86 

(F.C.T.D.).......................................................................................................................................................... 13, 14 

Ismaili, Zafar Iqbal v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3430-94), Cullen, August 17, 1995. Reported: 

Ismaili v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1995), 29 Imm. L.R. (2d) 1 

(F.C.T.D.)...................................................................................................................................................... 8, 13, 19 



Jaferi, Ali v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4039-93), Simpson, October 24, 1995. Reported: Jaferi 

v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1995), 35 Imm. L.R. (2d) 140 (F.C.T.D.)..................... 8, 19 

Jean Jacques, Soutien v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 80-1187), Scott, Houle, Tremblay, May 20, 1981.......................................... 8 

Jim, Yun Jing v. S.G.C. (F.C.T.D., no. T-1977-92), Gibson, October 25, 1993. Reported: Jim v. 

Canada (Solicitor General) (1993), 22 Imm. L.R. (2d) 261 (F.C.T.D.) ................................................................. 15 

Jiwanpuri, Jasvir Kaur v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-333-89), Marceau, Stone, MacGuigan, May 17, 

1990. Reported: Jiwanpuri v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1990), 

10 Imm. L.R. (2d) 241 (F.C.A.). ................................................................................................................. 14, 20, 21 

Kaila, Harmandeep Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-02830), McIsaac, October 2, 1997 .................................................... 13 

Khan, Mary Angela v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-9043), Tisshaw, Blumer, Ahara, October 6, 1986. ....................................... 7 

Kim, Shin Ki v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-345-07), Phelan, January 29, 2008; 2008 FC 116 ......................................... 14 

King, Garvin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2623-95), Dubé, May 23, 1996................................................................ 6 

King, Garvin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2623-95), Dubé, May 23, 1996................................................................ 6 

Kirec, Babur v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6272-05), Blais, June 23, 2006; 2006 FC 800............................................... 18 

Kirpal v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1997] 1 F.C. 352 (T.D.) ............................................ 21 

Kumar, Varinder v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-03366), Boscariol, December 30, 1998 .......................................................... 15 

Lau, Hing To v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4361-96), Pinard, April 17, 1998 .......................................................... 19 

Lee, Sing v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-2459-85), Martin, May 1, 1986.......................................................................... 10 

Li, Leung Lun v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-466-96), Tremblay-Lamer, September 30, 1998.................................... 9 

Ling, Simeon Tsan En v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-00173), Tisshaw, Weisdorf, Chu, September 26, 1991. ............................ 9 

Litt, Jasmail Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2296-94), Rothstein, February 17, 1995. 

Reported: Litt v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1995), 26 Imm. L.R. (2d) 

153 (F.C.T.D.)......................................................................................................................................................... 19 

Litt, Mohinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-01928), Jackson, June 11, 1998 ................................................................. 11 

Ludwig, James Bruce v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1135-95), Nadon, April 9, 1996. Reported: 

Ludwig v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1996), 33 Imm. L.R. (2d) 213 

(F.C.T.D.).......................................................................................................................................................... 14, 15 

Ludwig, James Bruce v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1135-95), Nadon, April 9, 1996. Reported: 

Ludwig v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1996) 33 Imm. L.R. (2d) 213 

(F.C.T.D.)................................................................................................................................................................ 12 

Ma, Chiu Ming v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-812-97), Wetston, January 15, 1998. ............................................. 9, 20 

Mahey, Gulshan v. M.C.I. (IAD V96-02119), Clark, July 20, 1998.............................................................................. 8 



Mahey: M.C.I. v. Mahey, Gulshan (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3989-98), Campbell, May 11, 1999 ...................................... 8 

Mangat, Parminder Singh v. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D., no. T-153-85), Strayer, February 25, 1985. ........................................ 6 

Mohamed v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1986] 3 F.C. 90 (C.A.) .......................... 12, 20, 21 

Mohamed, Liaquat Ali v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-9648), Sherman, Chu, Eglington (dissenting), July 27, 

1987........................................................................................................................................................................... 7 

Moledina, Narjis v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-02516), Ahara, Chu, Fatsis, May 8, 1992........................................................ 21 

Nagra, Ajaib Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V94-00245), Bartley, July 14, 1997 .................................................................... 13 

Ng, Kam Fai Andrew v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2903-94), Jerome, January 16, 1996......................................... 13 

Nijjar, Ranjit Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD V89-00964), Wlodyka, Chambers, Verma, January 9, 1991. ............................. 11 

Parmar, Jaipal Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-836-87), Heald, Urie, Stone, May 16, 1988 .............................. 7, 8, 10 

Pattar: M.E.I. v. Pattar, Sita Kaur (F.C.A., no. A-710-87), Marceau, Desjardins, Pratte 

(dissenting), October 28, 1988. Reported: Pattar v. Canada (Minister of Employment and 

Immigration) (1988), 8 Imm. L.R. (2d) 79 (F.C.A.). ...................................................................................... 7, 8, 11 

Phan, Hat v. M.C.I. (IAD W93-00090), Wiebe, September 4, 1996........................................................................... 11 

Poste, John Russell v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4601-96), Cullen, December 22, 1997 .................................. 15, 19 

Rabang, Ricardo Pablo v M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4576-98), Sharlow, November 29, 1999................................ 16 

Rai, Paramninder Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-00279), Carver, April 20, 1998. .................................................... 16, 22 

Ram: M.C.I. v. Ram, Venkat (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3381-95), McKeown, May 31, 1996. .......................................... 11 

Sabater, Llamado D. Jr. v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2519-93), McKeown, October 13, 1995. 

Reported: Sabater v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1995), 31 Imm. L.R. 

(2d) 59 (F.C.T.D.). ............................................................................................................................................ 19, 20 

Seyoum, Zerom v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-412-90), Mahoney, Stone, Décary, November 15, 1990. ........................... 16 

Shah, Nikita v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-02633), D’Ignazio, June 23, 1998........................................................................... 10 

Shanker, Gurdev Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-535-86), Mahoney, Pratte, Heald, June 25, 1987. ................ 8, 11, 21 

Shepherd, Tam Yue Philomena v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 82-6093), Davey, Benedetti, Suppa, 

November 18, 1982................................................................................................................................................... 6 

Sidhu: M.E.I. v. Sidhu, Satinder Singh (F.C.A., no. A-1250-88), Desjardins, Heald, Mahoney, 

January 12, 1990. ...................................................................................................................................................... 7 

Sihota: M.E.I. v. Sihota, Sukhminder Kaur (F.C.A., no. A-76-87), Mahoney, Stone, MacGuigan, 

January 25, 1989. .................................................................................................................................................. 7, 8 

Singh, Balbir Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-01550), Carver, May 8, 1998....................................................................... 11 



Singh, Narinder Pal v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-04679), D'Ignazio, September 27, 1999 ..................................................... 10 

Singh: M.E.I. v. Singh, Pal (F.C.A., no. A-197-85), Lacombe, Urie, Stone, February 4, 1987. 

Reported: Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Singh (1987), 35 D.L.R. (4th) 

680 (F.C.A.) .............................................................................................................................................................. 6 

Stefanska, Alicja Tunikowska v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-1738-87), Pinard, February 17, 1988. 

Reported: Stefanska v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1988), 6 Imm. 

L.R. (2d) 66 (F.C.T.D.). ............................................................................................................................................ 9 

Syal-Bharadwa, Bela v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-02011), Borst, November 30, 1999.......................................................... 14 

Szulikowski, Myron Joseph (Mike) v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-03154), Nee, August 13, 1998............................................. 22 

Takhar, Manjit Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD V90-00588), Wlodyka, Chambers, Verma, March 4, 1991. ............................ 12 

Tang, Lai Keng v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 79-6093), Campbell, Glogowski, Loiselle, September 20, 1979. ............................. 7 

Tejobunarto, Lianggono v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-00565), Boire, July 28, 1998 ............................................................... 13 

Ten, Luisa v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1606-97), Tremblay-Lamer, June 26, 1998. .............................................. 14 

Thangarajan, Rajadurai Samuel v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3789-97), Reed, August 5, 1998............................. 20 

Tong, Kwan Wah v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2565-96), Heald, October 31, 1997 ................................................ 14 

Tonnie v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-00202), Bell, Fatsis, Singh, March 30, 1992. .................................................................. 21 

Truong, Lien Phuong v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-00900), Kitchener, Bartley, Boire, April 7, 1997..................................... 19 

Tung, Nirmal Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-6021), Mawani, Singh, Anderson (dissenting), June 30, 

1987........................................................................................................................................................................... 6 

Uppal, Pal Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-771-86), Mahoney, Heald, Pratte (dissenting in part), 

June 25, 1987. Reported: Uppal v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 

[1987] 3 F.C. 565; 2 Imm. L.R. (2d) 143 (C.A.)..................................................................................................... 10 

Wahid, Gurbax Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-04717), Kitchener, January 21, 1998. ...................................................... 16 

Wong, Chan Shuk King v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2359-95), Simpson, May 24, 1995. 

Reported: Wong v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1996), 34 Imm. L.R. 

(2d) 18 (F.C.T.D.). .................................................................................................................................................. 13 

Wong, Ching Shin Henry v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3366-96), Reed, January 14, 1998........................................ 9 

Wong, Ching Shin Henry v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D.,no. IMM-3366-96), Reed, November 27, 1998 .................................... 9 

Yogeswaran, Thiyagaraja v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1505-96), McKeown, April 17, 1997................................ 20 

Zhang, Jiang v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-10174), Tumir, February 7, 2006.......................................................................... 17 

Zheng, Bi Quing v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-01428), Sherman, Weisdorf, Tisshaw, January 3, 1992................................... 21 



Chapter Four 

Adoptions 

A child who has been adopted by a permanent resident or a Canadian citizen may qualify 

as a member of the family class pursuant to paragraph 117(1)(b) of the Immigration and Refugee 

Protection Regulations (“IRP Regulations”) as a dependent child of the sponsor. The 

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) also allows for adoptions of persons 18 years of 

age or older 1 in prescribed circumstances. As well, a child whom the sponsor intends to adopt 

may also quality as a member of the family class. 2 

Section 4 of the IRP Regulations, the “bad faith” provision, applies to applicant spouses, 

common-law partners, conjugal partners and adopted children. With respect to an adopted child, 

the IRP Regulation states that a foreign national shall not be considered an adopted child if the 

adoption is “not genuine or was entered into primarily for the purpose of acquiring any status or 

privilege under the Act.” Under the former Regulations pursuant to the Immigration Act, in order 

to meet the definition of “adopted”, a person had to show that the adoption creates a “genuine 

parent-child relationship” and the adoption was not for an “immigration purpose”. 

Adoption of minors 

IRP Regulations 

3(2) For the purposes of these Regulations, “adoption”, for greater 

certainty, means an adoption that creates a legal parent-child relationship 

and severs the pre-existing legal parent-child relationship. 

117(2) A foreign national who is the adopted child of a sponsor and 

whose adoption took place when the child was under the age of 18 shall 

not be considered a member of the family class by virtue of that adoption 

unless it was in the best interests of the child within the meaning of the 

Hague Convention on Adoption. 

117(3) The adoption referred to in subsection (2) is considered to be in 

the best interests of a child if it took place under the following 

circumstances: 

(a) a competent authority has conducted or approved a home study of the 

adoptive parents; 

1 

2 

IRP Regulation 117(4). It should be noted that the adult adoptee must still meet the definition of “dependent 

child” at IRP Regulation 2, and IRP Regulation 117(1)(b). 

IRP Regulation 117(1)(g). 


January 1, 2008 Adoptions - Ch. 4

(b) before the adoption, the child's parents gave their free and informed 

consent to the child's adoption; 

(c) the adoption created a genuine parent-child relationship; 

(d) the adoption was in accordance with the laws of the place where the 

adoption took place; 

(e) the adoption was in accordance with the laws of the sponsor's place of 

residence and, if the sponsor resided in Canada at the time the adoption 

took place, the competent authority of the child's province of intended 

destination has stated in writing that it does not object to the adoption; 

(f) if the adoption is an international adoption and the country in which 

the adoption took place and the child's province of intended destination 

are parties to the Hague Convention on Adoption, the competent 

authority of the country and of the province have stated in writing that 

they approve the adoption as conforming to that Convention; and 

(g) if the adoption is an international adoption and either the country in 

which the adoption took place or the child's province of intended 

destination is not a party to the Hague Convention on Adoption, there is 

no evidence that the adoption is for the purpose of child trafficking or 

undue gain within the meaning of that Convention. 

In Sertovic, 3 the issue to be decided was whether the adoption had created a legal parentchild 

relationship and severed the pre-existing legal parent-child relationship, as required by 

section 3(2) of the IRP Regulations. According to the adoption laws of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 

adoption of the applicant was considered to be an “incomplete adoption” because the child was 

over the age of five at the time of the adoption. The effect of the law in that country is that the 

adoptive parents gain the full rights of parents but the natural parents’ rights are not affected. 

The legal relationship between the applicant child and her mother, the only surviving parent, had 

not been severed. Although the panel found that the appellant and her spouse had been actively 

involved in parenting the applicant, the appeal was dismissed because there was no severance of 

the legal parent-child relationship between the child and her natural parent. 

Regulation 117(3) sets out the criteria that must be met in order to demonstrate that an 

adoption of a child under 18 was in the best interests of the child in accordance with s. 117(2). 

The criteria are: a competent authority has conducted or approved a home study of the adoptive 

parents; the child’s parents must have given their free and informed consent to the child’s 

adoption; the adoption created a genuine parent-child relationship; the adoption was in 

accordance with the laws of the place where the adoption took place; the adoption was in 

accordance with the laws of the sponsor’s place of residence and, if the sponsor resided in 

Canada at the time of adoption, the competent authority of the child’s province of intended 

destination has issued a no-objection certificate; if the adoption is an international one and the 

3 

Sertovic, Safeta S. v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-16898), Collins, September 10, 2003. 



country in which the adoption takes place and the child’s province of intended destination are 

parties to the Hague Convention on Adoption, the competent authorities of each give written 

approval of the adoption as conforming to the Convention; and if the adoption is an international 

adoption and either the country in which the adoption took place or the child’s province of 

intended destination is not a party to the Hague Convention, there must be no evidence that the 

adoption is for the purpose of child trafficking or undue gain within the meaning of that 

Convention. 

Refusals under the IRPA are most often based on s. 117(2) and 117(3)(c) and 117(3)(d) of 

the IRP Regulations. The key issue in these appeals is whether the adoption created a genuine 

parent-child relationship. Whether the adoption was in accordance with the laws of the place 

where the adoption took place remains an important issue. The case law which developed under 

the old Immigration Act concerning genuine parent-child relationships continues to be relevant 

under the IRPA. Under the IRPA, even if the Immigration Appeal Division finds that there is a 

genuine parent-child relationship and the adoption was in accordance with the laws of the place 

where the adoption occurred, the panel will have to be satisfied that all of the other requirements 

in Regulation 117(3) have been met. If all of the requirements are not met, the child cannot be 

considered a member of the family class. 

Genuine Parent-Child Relationship 

The determination of whether or not a particular adoption creates a genuine parent-child 

relationship is a question of appreciation of all the facts and circumstances surrounding the 

adoption. 

The Immigration Appeal Division, in De Guzman, 4 

relationship of parent and child” as follows: 

examined the issue of “genuine 

The question then is, what constitutes a genuine relationship of parent and 

child? Or more appropriately, what are the factors that could be considered 

in assessing the genuineness of a parent-child relationship in respect of an 

adoption within the meaning of the Immigration Regulations, 1978? 

The answer to such a question may appear to be intuitive, however, upon 

reflection, like all considerations involving human conditions, the answer is 

inherently complex. Nonetheless, guidance may be found in the commonly 

accepted premise that generally parents act in the best interest of their 

children. 5 

De Guzman identified some of the factors used in assessing the genuineness of a 

relationship of parent and child as follows: 6 

4 

5 

6 

De Guzman, Leonor G. v. M.C.I. (IAD W95-00062), Ariemma, Bartley, Wiebe, August 16, 1995. 

Ibid., at 5. 

Ibid., at 6. 



7 

8 

9 

• motivation of the adopting parent(s); 7 

• to a lesser extent, the motivation and conditions of the natural parent(s); 

• authority and suasion of the adopting parent(s) over the adopted child; 

• supplanting of the authority of the natural parent(s) by that of the adoptive parent(s); 

• relationship of the adopted child with the natural parent(s) after adoption; 8 

• treatment of the adopted child versus natural children by the adopting parent(s); 

• relationship between the adopted child and the adopting parent(s) before the adoption; 

• changes flowing from the new status of the adopted child such as records, entitlements, 

etc., and including documentary acknowledgment that the child is the son or daughter of 

the adoptive parent(s); and 

• arrangements and actions taken by the adoptive parent(s) as they relate to caring, providing 

and planning for the adopted child. 

In other IAD decisions, the following additional factors have also been examined: 

• the nature and frequency of continued contact, if any, between 

the child and the natural parents; 

• the viability, stability and composition of the adoptive family; 

• the timing of the sponsorship of the adopted child’s application 

in the context of the particular facts; 9 

• the composition of the adopted child’s biological family, 

including the cultural context of the family (for example, 

In Dizon, Julieta Lacson v. M.C.I. (IAD V98-02115), Carver, September 1, 1999, the panel was of the view that 

in a case involving the unusual circumstance of grandparents adopting children from living and caring 

biological parents, it is extremely important that a credible motivation for the adoption be provided. See too 

Kwan, Man Tin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5527-00), Muldoon, August 30, 2001. The fact that the adoptive 

mother wanted a child in her home concerns her motivation to enter into an adoption, but does not establish that 

a genuine relationship existed. 

Visa officers sometimes express concern when the applicant continues to reside with the natural parents after 

the adoption. For a discussion of this issue, see Toor, Gurdarshan Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-00959), McIsaac, 

February 4, 1997; Gill, Gurmandeep Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD W95-00111), Wiebe, October 17, 1996, where the 

applicant had continued contact with his biological parents, although he did not reside with them; Molina, Rufo 

v. M.C.I. (IAD T98-04608), Kelley, November 8, 1999; Rajam, Daniel v. M.C.I. (IAD V98-02983), Carver, 

November 5, 1999; and Minhas, Surinder Pal Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD M98-10540), Colavecchio, December 15, 

1999. The relationship between the natural parents and the child after adoption is often relevant, although it is 

not determinative, Kwan, supra, footnote 7. See also Ly, Ngoc Lan v. M.C.I. (IAD T99-04453), Kelley, June 

22, 2000 which, in part, discusses the issue from the child’s perspective. In Sai, Jiqiu (Jacqueline) v. M.C.I. 

(IAD TA0-11403), Michnick, August 22, 2001, the panel found that evidence from the child’s perspective must 

be evaluated in light of the particular circumstances of the individual adoption. 

With regard to the timing of the sponsorship, while delay in sponsorship sometimes attracts a negative 

inference, there may be valid reasons for the delay: Sohal, Talwinder Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-00396), Clark, 

May 23, 1996. In addition, a prospective filial relationship is not sufficient; there must be evidence of a 

genuine parent and child relationship at the time of the hearing: Capiendo, Rosita v. M.C.I. (IAD W95-00108), 

Wiebe, August 18, 1997. 



whether or not the child is an only child or has siblings of the 

same sex); 

• the viability and stability of the biological family; 

• the age of the child at the time of the adoption; 

• depending on the age of the child, the extent of the child’s 

knowledge of the adoptive family; 

• the age difference between the child and the adoptive parents; 

• previous attempts by the biological family to immigrate to 

Canada; 

• that the child’s name had not been changed; 

• that the adoption was not generally known outside the child’s 

natural family; 

• the sending of money and gifts by the adoptive parent(s); 

• plans and arrangements for the child’s future. 

The Immigration Appeal Division must consider all the evidence in context. Where the 

Immigration Appeal Division failed to consider facts that were not contradicted and showed that 

a genuine parent-child relationship existed, the Court held that the Immigration Appeal Division 

ignored the evidence. “…[t]he Board in failing to consider the context, the distance and the 

separation, and particularly the way the applicant made efforts to create and sustain the parentchild 

relationship, made a reviewable error.” 10 

The Court found the visa officer’s conclusion that there was no genuine parent-child 

relationship unreasonable where it was not supported by the preponderance of the evidence and 

was based solely upon an inference which was equally consistent with another conclusion 11 . 

In assessing the genuineness of the relationship created by the adoption, no guidance is 

provided in the definition of “adopted” as to whose intentions should be looked at (those of the 

adoptive parents, the natural parents or the child. The Immigration Appeal Division generally 

considers all of the circumstances of the case, including the demonstrated intentions and 

declarations of the both natural and adoptive parents where available. In the case of young 

children, the Federal Court has found their intentions may not be a proper consideration. 12 

Testimony of other witnesses, both ordinary and expert may assist the Immigration Appeal 

Division in its assessment. 13 

10 

11 

12 

13 

Pabla, Dial v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1210-00), Blais, December 12, 2000. 

Sinniah, Sinnathamby v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5954-00), Dawson, July 25, 2002; 2002 FCT 822. 

See, by analogy, Bal, Sukhjinder Singh v. S.G.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1212-93), McKeown, October 19, 1993. 

In Dooprajh, Anthony v. M.C.I. (IAD M94-07504), Durand, November 27, 1995, the Appeal Division was 

favourably impressed by the testimony and the Adoption Home Study Report of a social worker for Quebec’s 

Secrétariat à l’adoption internationale. 



The Immigration Appeal Division has made findings in many cases that the sponsor and 

the applicant have a genuine relationship but that the relationship in not one of parent and child. 14 

Determining the Legal Validity of the Adoption 

Most adoption cases that come before the Immigration Appeal Division involve foreign 

adoptions. Where the refusal is based on the legal validity of the adoption, the sponsor must 

establish that the adoption is valid under the laws (sometimes under the customs) of the 

jurisdiction where the adoption took place. This involves presenting evidence of the content and 

effect of the foreign law or custom. 15 For example, in the case of Indian adoptions, that evidence 

is usually the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (HAMA). 

In addition to the actual foreign law, sponsors may also submit other forms of evidence 

such as expert evidence, doctrine, foreign case-law, declaratory judgments, decrees and deeds. 

In determining whether an adoption is legally valid as required by IRP Regulation 

117(3)(d), it is important to understand how foreign law is proved and it is necessary to identify 

and understand the principles of conflicts of laws which touch upon the effect of foreign laws and 

judgments on Canadian courts and tribunals. 16 

Foreign Law 

Glossary of terms 

The following terms are used in reference to foreign law: 

14 

15 

16 

In Reid, Eric v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1357-99), Reed, November 25, 1999, the Court noted that it is not 

unusual to see an older sibling provide support, love and care of a younger sibling but that this does not convert 

the relationship into one of parent and child. Another example is Brown, Josiah Lanville v. M.C.I. (IAD T89- 

02499), Buchanan, June 23, 1999, where the member concluded that the sponsors, the uncle and aunt of the 

applicant, had a well meaning intention to extend their financial support to their niece by sponsoring her to 

Canada but that the relationship between them was not that of parents and child. 

For an example of cases where the adoption in question was proven by custom, see Bilimoriya, Parviz v. M.C.I. 

(IAD T93-04633), Muzzi, September 18, 1996; and Vuong, Khan Duc v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3139-97), 

Dubé, July 21, 1998. However, in Seth, Kewal Krishan v. M.C.I. (IAD M94-05081), Angé, March 27, 1996, 

the sponsor failed to establish that there existed a custom in the Sikh community permitting simultaneous 

adoptions; and in Kalida, Malika v. M.C.I. (IAD M96-08010), Champoux, July 3, 1997, the sponsor failed to 

show that Moroccan law allowed adoption. 

In this regard, see Castel, J.-G., Introduction to Conflict of Laws (Toronto: Butterworths, 1986, at 6, where it is 

stated that “when the problem involves the recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment, the court must 

determine whether that judgment was properly rendered abroad.” 



*“declaratory judgment”: a judgment declaring the parties’ rights or expressing 

the court’s opinion on a question of law, without ordering that anything be 

done; 17 

*“in personam”: where the purpose of the action is only to affect the rights of the 

parties to the action inter se [between them]; 18 

*“in rem”: where the purpose of the action is to determine the interests or the 

rights of all persons with respect to a particular res [thing]; 19 

*“deed of adoption”: registered document purporting to establish the fact that an 

adoption has taken place. 

Proof of foreign law 

The usual rule in Canada is that foreign law is a fact which must be pleaded and proved. 20 

The Immigration Appeal Division cannot take judicial notice of it. In cases before the 

Immigration Appeal Division, the burden of proving the foreign law or custom lies on the party 

relying on it, in most cases, the sponsor. 21 

There are several ways in which foreign law can be proved, including statute, expert 

evidence, and agreement of the parties (consent). The foreign law ought to be proved in each 

case. The Immigration Appeal Division is not entitled to take judicial notice of the proof 

presented in other cases, 22 although it can adopt or follow the reasoning of other panels regarding 

their interpretation of the foreign law. The Immigration Appeal Division has also examined the 

text of the law itself and given it a reasonable interpretation where expert evidence respecting its 

meaning was lacking. 23 The Immigration Appeal Division has rejected arguments that it is not 

competent to interpret foreign law. 24 

Section 23 of the Canada Evidence Act 25 provides that evidence of judicial proceedings or 

records of any court of record of any foreign country may be given by a certified copy thereof, 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

Dukelow, D.A., and Nuse, B., The Dictionary of Canadian Law (Scarborough: Carswell, 1991), at 259. 

McLeod, J.G., The Conflict of Laws (Calgary: Carswell, 1983), at 60. 

Ibid. 

Castel, supra, footnote 16, at 44. For a case where the Appeal Division ruled that foreign law must be strictly 

proved, see Wang, Yan-Qiao v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-04690), Muzzi, October 6, 1997. Also, in Okafor- 

Ogbujiagba, Anthony Nwafor v. M.C.I. (IAD T94-05539), Aterman, April 14, 1997, the panel held that the 

evidence failed to establish that the adoption in question had been carried out in accordance with Nigerian law. 

Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Taggar, [1989] 3 F.C. 576; 8 Imm. L.R. (2d) 175 (C.A.). 

Kalair, Sohan Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-919-83), Stone, Heald, Urie, November 29, 1984. 

Gossal, Rajinder Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 87-9401), Sherman, Chu, Benedetti, February 15, 1988. Reported: 

Gossal v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1988), 5 Imm. L.R. (2d) 185 (I.A.B.). 

Gill, Ranjit Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V96-00797), Clark, April 7, 1999. 

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5. 



purported to be under the seal of the court, without further proof. However, the Immigration 

Appeal Division does not normally require strict proof in this manner although the failure to 

comply with section 23 has been relied on in weighing the evidence produced. 26 

The jurisdiction of the Immigration Appeal Division in an adoption case is to determine 

whether or not the adoption in question falls within the IRP Regulations, i.e. (i) it has been 

proven under the relevant law, (ii) is genuine and (iii) has not been entered into primarily for the 

purpose of acquiring any status or privilege under the Act. It is not to adjudicate the status of 

adoption generally. 27 The IRP Regulations require that the adoption be in accordance with the 

laws of the jurisdiction where the adoption took place. 

For example, in Siddiq, 28 the issue was whether the adoption in question was valid under 

the laws of Pakistan. The expert evidence submitted by the Minister was to the effect that in 

Pakistan, legal adoptions were not recognized and could not be enforced. The sponsor was 

unable to obtain evidence to the contrary and therefore, failed to establish that the adoption was 

valid. The absence of an adoption law in the foreign jurisdiction could not have the effect of 

allowing the Immigration Appeal Division to adjudicate the adoption under Canadian law. 

Another example is Alkana, 29 where the alleged adoption was challenged on the basis that 

there was no provision for Christian adoptions under Pakistani laws. The sponsor attempted to 

prove the adoption by means of a “Declaration of Adoption”, which was essentially an affidavit 

made by the natural parents giving their approval or consent to the adoption. In the absence of 

proof of a law in Pakistan allowing for adoption, the appeal was dismissed. The panel recognized 

the hardship created by the ruling and recommended that the Minister facilitate the admission of 

26 

27 

28 

29 

Brar, Kanwar Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD W89-00084), Goodspeed, Arpin, Vidal (concurring in part), December 29, 

1989. 

In Singh, Babu v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-210-85), Urie, Mahoney, Marceau, January 15, 1986, at 1, the Court 

indicated that the Immigration Appeal Board was entitled to conclude that the adoption in question had not 

been proven, but that it was not authorized to make a declaration that the adoption was “void as far as meeting 

the requirements of the Immigration Act, 1976”. In Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. 

Sidhu, [1993] 2 F.C. 483 (C.A.), at 490, the Court noted that “[the Appeal Division’s] jurisdiction is limited by 

the Act which, in turn, is subject to the Constitution Act, 1867. Parliament has not purported to legislate 

independently on the subject matter of adoption for immigration purposes. On the contrary, on that very point, 

it defers or it adopts by reference the foreign legislation.” The Court added in a footnote that “[t]he provision 

generally reflects the characterization made by English Canadian common law courts, i.e., that adoption relates 

to the recognition of the existence of a status and is governed by the lex domicilii [the law where a person is 

domiciled].” 

Siddiq, Mohammad v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 79-9088), Weselak, Davey, Teitelbaum, June 10, 1980. See also Addow, 

Ali Hussein v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-01171), D’Ignazio, October 15, 1997, for a case involving a purported 

Somalian adoption; and Zenati, Entissar v. M.C.I. (IAD M98-09459), Bourbonnais, September 17, 1999, for a 

case involving a purported Moroccan adoption. For a decision involving a case of guardianship in Morocco, 

see Demnati, Ahmed v. M.C.I. (M99-10260), di Pietro, April 3, 2001. 

Alkana, Robin John v. M.E.I. (IAD W89-00261), Goodspeed, Arpin, Rayburn, November 16, 1989. 



the child into Canada so that he could be adopted here “[...] to alleviate the hardship created by 

the statutory lacuna in Pakistan regarding Christian adoptions.” 30 

In a much earlier case, Lam, 31 the Immigration Appeal Board put it thus: 

No proof was adduced that the law of China prevailing in that part of 

Mainland China where the appellant and his alleged adopted mother resided 

at the time of the alleged adoption – the province of Kwangtung – recognized 

the status of adoption, or that if it did, how this status was established. This 

is not a situation where the lex fori may be applied in the absence of proof of 

foreign law. 32 

Declaratory judgments and deeds 

Sponsors before the Immigration Appeal Division often seek to establish the status of 

applicants for permanent residence through the production of foreign judgments declaring the 

applicants’ status in the foreign jurisdiction. 

The issue has been expressed as one of determining whether the Immigration Appeal 

Division ought to look behind the judgment to determine either its validity or its effect on the 

issues before the Immigration Appeal Division. 

As stated by Wlodyka, A. in Guide to Adoptions under the Hindu Adoptions and 

Maintenance Act, 1956: 33 

The starting point in any discussion of the legal effect of a declaratory 

judgment [...] is the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Taggar 34 . 

This case stands for the proposition that a declaratory judgment is a judgment 

“in personam” and not “in rem”. Therefore, it is binding only on the parties 

to the action. Nevertheless, the declaratory judgment is evidence and the 

weight to be accorded to the declaratory judgment depends on the particular 

circumstances of the case. 

30 

31 

32 

33 

34 

Ibid., at 7. However, in Jalal, Younas v. M.C.I. (IAD M93-06071), Blumer, August 16, 1995, reported: Jalal v. 

Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1995), 39 Imm. L.R. (2d) 146 (I.A.D.), the Immigration 

Appeal Division held that in the absence of legislation in Pakistan, the Shariat applies in personal and family 

law, and the prohibition against adoption does not apply to non-Muslims. The Immigration Appeal Division 

accepted the expert evidence that Christians in Pakistan may adopt. 

Lam, Wong Do v. M.M.I. (I.A.B.), October 2, 1972, referred to in Lit, Jaswant Singh v. M.M.I. (I.A.B. 76- 

6003), Scott, Benedetti, Legaré, August 13, 1976. 

Lit, ibid., at 4. 

25 Imm L.R. (2d) 8. 

Taggar, supra, footnote 21. 



In Sandhu, 35 a pre-Taggar decision, the Immigration Appeal Board was of the opinion 

that a foreign judgment, “even one in personam is final and conclusive on the merits [...] and can 

not be impeached for any error either of fact or of law.” 36 The declaratory judgment in question 

was issued in an action for a permanent injunction restraining interference with lawful custody of 

the applicant. The panel was of the view that the judgment would have to have been premised on 

a decision about the adoptive status of the applicant. The panel treated the judgment of the 

foreign court as a declaration as to status, conclusive and binding on the whole world (including 

Canadian authorities), and thus found the adoption was valid under Indian law. The panel did not 

feel required itself to examine whether the adoption was in accordance with Indian law. 37 

Sandhu was distinguished in Brar 38 as follows: 

[...] the decision in Sandhu was not intended to have universal application in 

cases where foreign judgments are presented as proof of the validity of 

adoptions and can be distinguished in this case. 

In Sandhu the judgment was accepted as part of the record and at no time 

was the authenticity of the document challenged by the respondent. The 

authenticity of the judgment referred to in Sandhu was not an issue. 

However, in the present case the Board has been presented with a document 

which contains discrepancies, has not been presented in accordance with 

section 23 of the Canada Evidence Act and purports to validate an adoption 

which clearly does not comply with the requirements of the foreign statute. 39 

The majority of the panel determined that the declaratory judgment had no weight. 40 The 

member who concurred in part was of the view that the reasoning in Sandhu applied and that the 

declaratory judgment was a declaration as to status and was binding on the Immigration Appeal 

Division. 

In Atwal, 41 the majority accepted the declaratory judgment but noted that 

35 

36 

37 

38 

39 

40 

41 

Sandhu, Bachhitar Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-10112), Eglington, Goodspeed, Chu, February 4, 1988. 

Ibid., at 14. 

Sandhu, Bachhitar Singh, supra, footnote 35 was followed in Patel, Ramesh Chandra v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85- 

9738), Jew, Arkin, Tisshaw, April 15, 1988. 

Brar, supra, footnote 26. 

Ibid., at 10. 

For other cases in which it has been held that declaratory judgments are not determinative, see Singh, Ajaib v. 

M.E.I. (I.A.B. 87-4063), Mawani, Wright, Petryshyn, April 26, 1988 (declaratory judgment disregarded where 

internally inconsistent, collusive, and did not result from fully argued case); Burmi, Joginder Singh v. M.E.I. 

(I.A.B. 88-35651), Sherman, Arkin, Weisdorf, February 14, 1989 (regarding a marriage); Badwal, Jasbir Singh 

v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 87-10977), Sherman, Bell, Ahara, May 29, 1989; and Atwal, Manjit Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86- 

4205), Petryshyn, Wright, Arpin (concurring), May 8, 1989, where the concurring member gave no weight to 

the declaratory judgment. In Pawar, Onkar Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD T98-04518), D’Ignazio, October 1, 1999, the 

panel held that notwithstanding the existence of a declaratory judgment, the evidence established that there was 

no mutual intention of either the birth parents or the adoptive parents to transfer the child and therefore, the 

adoption did not meet the requirements in HAMA. 

Atwal, ibid. 



[i]t is the opinion of the Board that a foreign judgment is not to be disturbed 

unless there is proof of collusion, fraud, lack of jurisdiction of the court and 

the like. No such evidence was presented to the Board. 42 

In Sran, 43 the Immigration Appeal Division expressed it thus: 

[...] a declaratory judgment [...] is merely evidence which must be considered 

along with other evidence in determining the validity of the adoption. By 

itself, it does not dispose of the issue. 

This decision appears to reflect the current decision making of the Immigration Appeal 

Division in light of Taggar. 44 

An adoption deed may be presented as proof of the validity of an adoption. In Aujla, 45 the 

panel ruled that: 

The Board accepts the Adoption Deed as prima facie evidence of an adoption 

having taken place. However, as to whether the adoption was in compliance 

with the requirements of the [Indian] Adoptions Act is a question of fact to 

be determined by the evidence in each case. In this connection, the Board 

also drew counsel’s attention to a recent Federal Court of Appeal 46 decision 

where the Court expressed the view that it was proper for the Board to 

determine whether the adoption had been made in accordance with the laws 

of India, and that the registered Deed of Adoption was not conclusive of a 

valid adoption. 47 

Presumption of Validity under Foreign Law 

The Immigration Appeal Division has dealt with the issue of adoption deeds in the context 

of section 16 of HAMA, which creates a presumption of validity. 48 In Dhillon, 49 the sponsor 

42 

43 

44 

45 

46 

47 

48 

49 

Ibid., at 4. 

Sran, Pritam Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD T93-10409), Townshend, May 10, 1995, at 6. 

Taggar, supra, footnote 21. 

Aujla, Surjit Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 87-6021), Mawani, November 10, 1987. 

Dhillon, Harnam Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-387-85), Pratte, Marceau, Lacombe, May 27, 1987. 

Aujla, supra, footnote 45, at 5. See also Chiu, Jacintha Chen v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-6123), Mawani, Gillanders, 

Singh, July 13, 1987; and Jaswal, Kaushaliya Devi v. M.E.I. (IAD W89-00087), Goodspeed, Wlodyka, 

Rayburn, September 27, 1990. 

Section 16 of HAMA provides that: 

16. Whenever any document registered under any law for the time being in force is produced 

before any court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the person giving and 

the person taking the child in adoption, the court shall presume that the adoption has been made 

in compliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until it is disproved. 

Dhillon, Harnam Singh, supra, footnote 46. The facts of the case are set out in Dhillon, Harnam Singh v. 

M.E.I. (I.A.B. 83-6551), Petryshyn, Glogowski, Voorhees, January 3, 1985. 



presented as evidence a registered deed of adoption and argued that section 16 of HAMA was 

substantive, and therefore the adoption in question had to be considered valid unless disproved by 

an Indian court. The Federal Court of Appeal rejected the argument: 

There is, in our view, no merit in that submission. Under subsection 2(1) of 

the Immigration Regulations, the Board had to determine whether the 

adoption had been made in accordance with the laws of India. If, as 

contended, the Board was required to apply section 16 of the Hindu 

Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 in making that determination, it was 

bound to apply it as it read, namely, as creating merely a rebuttable 

presumption regarding the validity of registered adoptions. As there was no 

doubt that the adoption here in question had not been made in accordance 

with Indian laws, it necessarily followed that the presumption was rebutted. 50 

In Singh, 51 the Federal Court of Appeal went further when it stated: 

Presumptions imposed by Indian law on Indian courts, which might be 

relevant if the issue were simply to know, in private international law terms, 

the status of the sponsorees in India, are of no assistance in determining 

whether either of them qualifies as an “adopted son” for the very special 

purposes of the Immigration Act [...] the presumption in section 16 is directed 

specifically to “the court”, it is difficult, in any event, to conceive of it as 

being other than procedural since it is unlikely to have been the intention of 

the Indian Parliament to bind a court over which it had no authority or 

jurisdiction. 52 

In Seth, 53 the Immigration Appeal Division followed Singh and added that it is not up to 

the Canadian High Commission in New Delhi to seek standing before an Indian court to have the 

adoption declared invalid. Instead, the visa officer is entitled to conclude that an alleged adoption 

has not been proven for immigration purposes. 

The Immigration Appeal Division has applied the reasoning of the Federal Court of 

Appeal in Singh to cases of adoptions in countries other than India. For example, in Persaud, 54 

the Immigration Appeal Division considered a final order of the Supreme Court of Guyana and 

held that the order is one piece of evidence but is not determinative of whether the adoption is in 

compliance with the Immigration Act. In Sinniah 55 , the Court held that it was patently 

unreasonable for the visa officer to ignore the effect at law of a final Court order and to decide, in 

50 

51 

52 

53 

54 

55 

Dhillon, Harnam Singh, supra, footnote 46, at 2. 

Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1990] 3 F.C. 37; 11 Imm. L.R. (2d) 1 (C.A.); 

leave to appeal to Supreme Court of Canada (Doc. 22136, Sopinka, McLachlin, Iacobucci) refused on 

February 28, 1991, Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1991), 13 Imm. L.R. (2d) 46 

[Appeal Note]. 

Ibid., at 44. 

Seth, supra, footnote 15. 

Persaud, Kowsilia v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-00912), Kalvin, July 13, 1998. 

Sinniah, supra, footnote 11. 



the absence of cogent evidence, that an order pronounced by a court in Sri Lanka was insufficient 

to establish that an adoption was made in accordance with the laws of Sri Lanka. 

Parent and child relationship created by operation of law 

This issue has arisen in the context of section 12 of HAMA, 56 which many Immigration 

Appeal Board decisions interpreted as having the effect of creating a parent and child relationship 

by operation of law. 57 

In Sharma, 58 the Federal Court – Trial Division indicated that 

[a] parent and child relationship is not automatically established once the 

requirements of a foreign adoption have been demonstrated. In other words, 

even if the adoption was within the provisions of HAMA, whether the 

adoption created a relationship of parent and child, thereby satisfying the 

requirements of the definition of “adoption” contained in subsection 2(1) of 

the Immigration Regulations, 1978, must still be examined. 59 

In Rai, 60 the applicant had been adopted under the Alberta Child Welfare Act. The 

Immigration Appeal Division rejected the argument that the granting of an adoption order under 

that Act was clear and incontrovertible proof that a genuine parent and child relationship was 

created. 

Power of attorney 

In cases where a sponsor, for one reason or another, does not travel to the country where 

the applicant resides in order to complete the adoption, the sponsor may give a power of 

attorney 61 to someone to act in his or her stead. The power of attorney gives the person named in 

56 

57 

58 

59 

60 

61 

Section 12 provides, in part, as follows: 

12. An adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for 

all purposes with effect from the date of the adoption and from such date all the ties of the child 

in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by those created by 

the adoption in the adoptive family [...] 

See, for example, Sandhu, Gurcharan Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 87-9066), Eglington, Teitelbaum, Sherman, 

November 13, 1987; and Shergill, Kundan Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-6108), Mawani, Gillanders, Singh, 

April 8, 1987. Reported: Shergill v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1987), 3 Imm. L.R. 

(2d) 126 (I.A.B.). 

M.C.I. v. Sharma, Chaman Jit (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-453-95), Wetson, August 28, 1995. 

Ibid., at 4. This two-stage process was followed in M.C.I. v. Edrada, Leonardo Lagmacy (F.C.T.D., no. IMM- 

5199-94), MacKay, February 29, 1996 and Gill, Banta Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-760-96), Gibson, 

October 22, 1996 (upheld by the Federal Court of Appeal in Gill, Banta Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-859-96), 

Marceau, Linden, Robertson, July 14, 1998. These cases indicate that the issue had already been determined by 

the Federal Court in Singh, supra, footnote 51. 

Rai, Suritam Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-02710), Major, Wiebe, Dossa, November 30, 1999. 

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “Power of Attorney” as “[...] an instrument authorizing another to act as one’s 

agent or attorney. The agent is attorney in fact and his power is revoked on the death of the principal by 



it the authority to do whatever is necessary in order to complete the adoption in accordance with 

the laws of the jurisdiction where the adoption is to take place. 

An issue that has arisen in this area with respect to Indian law is whether HAMA requires 

that a power of attorney be in writing and registered for an adoption to be valid. In a number of 

decisions, panels have ruled that neither is required. 62 

Another issue is whether a sponsor can give a power of attorney to the biological parent of 

the person to be adopted. In Poonia, 63 in dealing with the requirements of a giving and taking 

ceremony under Indian law, and after reviewing a number of Indian authorities, the Immigration 

Appeal Division held that the power of attorney must be given to a third party who cannot be the 

biological parent as that person is a party to the adoption. 

Revocation of adoption 

The concept of revocation of adoption is found in IRP Regulation 133(5). 64 This 

provision allows an officer (and the Immigration Appeal Division) to consider whether the 

revocation by a foreign authority or by a Canadian court was obtained for the purpose of 

sponsoring an application for permanent residence made by a member of the family class (of the 

biological family) and if it was, to rule that the intended sponsorship is not permissible. 

In the past, visa officers refused to recognize revocations by foreign authorities and in a 

number of cases involving the failed sponsorships of biological parents by their former children, 

the Immigration Appeal Division (and the Immigration Appeal Board) have had occasion to 

consider the matter. 

In Sharma, 65 the Immigration Appeal Division was presented with a declaratory judgment 

from an Indian court nullifying the adoption of the sponsor. The judgment was obtained by the 

62 

63 

64 

65 

operation of law [...].” The Canadian Law Dictionary gives the following definition: “An instrument in 

writing authorizing another to act as one’s agent or attorney. It confers upon the agent the authority to perform 

certain specified acts or kinds of acts on behalf of his principal. Its primary purpose is to evidence the authority 

of the agent to third parties with whom the agent deals.” 

See, for example, Gill, Balwinder Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD W89-00433), Goodspeed, Arpin, Rayburn, 

September 13, 1990; Paul, Satnam Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 87-6049), Howard, Anderson (dissenting), 

Gillanders, February 13, 1989; and Kler, Sukhdev Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 82-6350), Goodspeed, Vidal, Arpin, 

May 25, 1987. 

Poonia, Jagraj v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-02478), Arpin, Townshend, Fatsis, October 5, 1993. 

S.133(5) of the IRP Regulations reads: 

(5) A person who is adopted outside Canada and whose adoption is subsequently 

revoked by a foreign authority or by a court in Canada of competent jurisdiction 

may sponsor an application for a permanent resident visa that is made by a member 

of the family class only if the revocation of the adoption was not obtained for the 

purpose of sponsoring that application. 

Sharma, Sudhir Kumar v. M.E.I. (IAD V92-01628), Wlodyka, Singh, Verma, August 18, 1993. 



sponsor’s biological father in an uncontested proceeding. After considering the expert evidence 

presented by the parties, the Immigration Appeal Division concluded that the judgment was in 

personam and that the weight to be given to it would depend on the particular circumstances of 

the case. The Immigration Appeal Division inferred from the evidence that the Indian court had 

not been informed of the immigration purpose for the action and gave the judgment little weight. 

It also found that the only possible reason for nullifying an adoption under Indian law, 

misrepresentation, was not present in the case. 66 

In Chu, 67 the panel acknowledged that an adoption can be terminated in China with the 

agreement of the parties. However, because neither the sponsor nor her adoptive father had any 

real and substantial connection with China at the time the revocation was obtained, the panel 

ruled that the applicable law was not Chinese law but British Columbian law. Under this law, 

termination of adoption was not possible. 

In Purba, 68 the sponsor had been adopted by her grandparents, but when she was granted 

an immigrant visa, it was on the basis that she was their dependent daughter. The fact of the 

adoption was not disclosed to the visa officer. A few years later, she attempted to sponsor her 

biological mother but that application was refused. The evidence presented at the Immigration 

Appeal Division hearing showed that the adoption was void ab initio; 69 however, the appeal was 

dismissed on the basis of estoppel. As the panel put it: 

[The sponsor] was granted status in Canada as a landed immigrant 

and subsequently as a Canadian citizen based on a misrepresented 

status which was acted upon by Canadian immigration officials. In 

my view, she is estopped from claiming a change in status to enable 

her to sponsor her biological mother [...]. 70 

Bad faith relationships 

In Sahota, 71 the application for permanent residence was refused under section 4 of the 

IRP Regulations, as well as under subsections 117(2) and 117(3)(a), (c), (d) and (e) of the 

Regulations. The panel found that in most appeals of adoption refusals where there are a number 

of grounds of refusal, a determination should first be made in relation to section 4 of the IRP 

Regulations. If there is a determination that the foreign national is an “adopted child” pursuant to 

66 

67 

68 

69 

70 

71 

See also Heir, Surjit Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 80-6116), Howard, Campbell, Hlady, January 16, 1981. 

Chu, Si Gina v. M.E.I. (IAD V90-00836), Wlodyka, MacLeod, June 28, 1990. 

Purba, Surinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD T95-02315), Teitelbaum, September 10, 1996. 

The evidence included a judgment of a court in India declaring the adoption null and void. The grandfather 

already had three daughters and therefore did not have the legal capacity to adopt another daughter under 

HAMA. 

Purba, supra, footnote.68, at 8. 

Sahota, Gurdev Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-03374), Mattu, February 23, 2004. 



section 4 of the IRP Regulations, then a determination should be made in relation to all or some 

of the provisions of section 117 of the IRP Regulations, as necessary. 

Section 4 of the IRP Regulations states, among other things, that for purposes of the 

Regulations, no foreign national shall be considered an “adopted child” if the adoption is not 

genuine and was entered into primarily for the purpose of acquiring any status or privilege under 

the IRPA, whereas, subsection 117(2) of the IRP Regulations states that a foreign national “who 

is the adopted child” of a sponsor and whose adoption took place when the child was under the 

age of 18 shall not be considered a member of the family class by virtue of that adoption unless it 

was in the best interests of the child within the meaning of the Hague Convention on Adoption 

(emphasis added). In the words of the panel, 

“When the words of sections 4 and 117(2) of the Regulations are read 

in their ordinary and grammatical sense, in a manner to blend harmoniously 

with the scheme of the IRPA and its Regulations and the object and intention 

of Parliament, I am satisfied that there should be a determination under 

section 4 of the Regulations as to whether or not the foreign national is an 

“adopted child” before any determination is made under section 117(2) of the 

Regulations that the adoption is in the best interests of the child. I come to 

this conclusion because section 117(2) of the Regulations appears to only 

apply in cases where the foreign national has been determined to be an 

adopted child.” 72 

In Sahota, the panel found that a two-fold test must be applied in order to disqualify an 

adopted child under section 4 of the IRP Regulations. 73 The two elements are: that the adoption 

is not genuine and that the adoption was entered into primarily for the purpose of acquiring any 

status or privilege under the IRPA. The panel also found that in the circumstances of an adoption 

the status or privilege that can be acquired under IRPA is that the adopted child is granted 

permanent resident status in Canada through membership in the family class when the adopted 

child qualifies to be sponsored to Canada. 74 The panel noted that the term “genuine” has not 

been defined in IRPA or the IRP Regulations. 75 In the panel’s view, the fundamental nature of an 

adoption is the relationship between parent and child. Noting that Parliament specifically 

included the factor of a genuine parent-child relationship as one element in the determination of 

the best interests of the child in the context of section 117(3) of the IRP Regulations, the panel 

found the issue of a genuine parent-child relationship to be of primary relevance in the context of 

considering the genuineness of an adoption. While conceding that this factor is not the only 

factor that could be used to determine whether or not an adoption is “genuine” in the context of 

section 4 of the IRP Regulations, the panel found it to be a key factor to consider in the 

determination of the genuineness of an adoption. 

72 

73 

74 

75 

Ibid., paragraph 14. 






In Singh 76 the Immigration Appeal Division adopted the reasoning in Sahota 77 and held 

that it was appropriate to make a final determination under section 4 of the IRP Regulations with 

respect to whether the adoption was in bad faith before undertaking a consideration of whether or 

not the adoption was in the best interests of the child under section 117(3) of the IRP 

Regulations. 

In De Guia, 78 the panel found that the adoption fell within Regulation 4 of the IRP 

Regulations. The adoption took place in 1989 when the applicant was four years old and the 

appellant’s application to sponsor the applicant was submitted more than twelve years after the 

adoption was finalized. The appellant was unable to explain satisfactorily the delay in sponsoring 

the applicant. When the applicant was interviewed, he stated that the appellant adopted him 

because his parents were jobless and for his future. The appellant had not visited him since 1988, 

and she never provided for his physical and emotional needs on a daily basis. He continued to 

live with his biological father after the adoption. While the appellant provided financial support 

for the applicant’s education, she did not direct his education and was not advised within a 

reasonable timeframe of his decision to quit school. The Immigration Appeal Division found that 

a parent-child relationship did not exist between the appellant and the applicant at the time of the 

adoption, and that no such relationship had developed over the years. The adoption was not 

genuine and was primarily for the purpose of acquiring a status or privilege under the Act. 

In Hussein, 79 the sponsored application for permanent residence of the appellant’s 

adopted children (his sister’s children) was refused pursuant to s.4 of the IRP Regulations. There 

was evidence at the hearing of the appeal that was not before the visa officer to the effect that the 

appellant had been making major decisions for the applicants since their father died, including 

decisions that were contrary to their biological mother’s wishes. While the elder applicant had 

told the visa officer that she intended to continue to have a normal mother-daughter relationship 

with her biological mother after the adoption, it would be a denial of reality to expect teenage 

children to forget their biological mother. It was more important that the applicants had accepted 

the appellant as their father and regarded his counsel and authority as paramount to that of their 

biological mother. 

76 

77 

78 

79 

Singh, Jaspal v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-17789), Hoare, August 6. 2004. 

Sahota, supra, footnote 71. 

De Guia, Avelina Fernandez Quindipan v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-11030), Waters, December 14, 2005. 

Hussein, Mohammed Yassin v. M.C.I. (IAD WA5-00123), Ostrowski, December 15, 2006. 



Adult Adoptions 


117(4) A foreign national who is the adopted child of a sponsor and 

whose adoption took place when the child was 18 years of age or over 

shall not be considered a member of the family class by virtue of that 

adoption unless it took place under the following circumstances: 

(a) the adoption was in accordance with the laws of the place where the 

adoption took place and, if the sponsor resided in Canada at the time 

of the adoption, the adoption was in accordance with the laws of the 

province where the sponsor then resided; 

(b) a genuine parent-child relationship exists at the time of the adoption 

and existed before the child reached the age of 18; and 

(c) the adoption is not primarily for the purpose of acquiring a status or 

privilege under the Act. 

Adult adoptees were not previously sponsorable under Canadian immigration law as 

members of the family class; pursuant to the IRP Regulations they may be sponsored provided 

they also meet the definition of “dependent child” in the IRP Regulations. The Immigration 

Appeal Division has not yet had the occasion to decide an appeal from a refusal of a sponsored 

application for permanent residence based on section 117(4) of the IRP Regulations. 

Intent to adopt provisions 

Statutory Provision 


117(1) A foreign national is a member of the family class if, with respect 

to a sponsor, the foreign national is: 

(g) a person under 18 years of age whom the sponsor intends to adopt in 

Canada if 

(i) the adoption is not primarily for the purpose of acquiring any 

privilege or status under the Act, 

(ii) where the adoption is an international adoption and the 

country in which the person resides and their province of intended 

destination are parties to the Hague Convention on Adoption, the 

competent authority of the country and of the province have approved 

the adoption in writing as conforming to that Convention; and 



(iii) where the adoption is an international adoption and either the 

country in which the person resides or the person’s province of 

intended destination is not a party to the Hague Convention on 

Adoption 

(A) the person has been placed for adoption in the country in which 

they reside or is otherwise legally available in that country for 

adoption and there is no evidence that the intended adoption is 

for the purpose of child trafficking or undue gain within the 

meaning of the Hague Convention on Adoption, and 

(B) the competent authority of the person’s province of intended 

destination has stated in writing that it does not object to the 

adoption; 

In Vaganova, 80 the appellant appealed from the refusal of the sponsored application for 

permanent residence of her grandnephew, whom she intended to adopt. The issue was whether 

the intended adoption met the requirements of section 117(1)(g)(iii)(A) of the IRP Regulations. 

The IRP Regulations require that the applicant be placed for adoption in the country in which he 

or she resides or be otherwise legally available for adoption in that country. The panel held that 

whether an applicant is “otherwise legally available for adoption” is to be assessed against the 

country of the applicant’s residence rather than the province of his destination. The appellant 

produced two consents to adoption signed by the applicant’s biological mother, but no expert 

evidence was presented as to whether the signing of a consent to adopt by the biological mother 

placed the applicant for adoption in Russia or resulted in the applicant being otherwise legally 

available for adoption in Russia. The intended adoption did not meet the requirements of section 

117(1)(g)(iii)(A) of the IRP Regulations. 

It should be noted that in Vaganova, although a “no objection” letter from the province of 

intended destination was provided to the panel by the appellant, counsel did not rely on, nor did 

the panel turn its mind to, s.117(7)(b) of the IRP Regulations. 81 

In Al-Shikarchy, 82 another 117(1)(g)(iii) intent to adopt in Canada case, the panel 

commented that although neither party referred to s.117(7) of the IRP Regulations, the provision 

would appear to be relevant to the applicant’s circumstances. The appeal was decided on other 

grounds so the panel did not undertake an analysis of the impact of s.117(7) of the IRP 

80 

81 

82 

Vaganova, Ludmila v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-17969), Waters, May 18, 2006. 

This provision reads as follows: 

(7) If a statement referred to in clause (1)(g)(iii)(B) or paragraph (3) (c) or (f) has 

been provided to an officer by the foreign national’s province of intended 

destination, that statement is, except in the case of an adoption where the 

adoption is primarily for the purpose of acquiring a status or privilege under the 

Act, conclusive evidence that the foreign national meets the following applicable 

requirements: 

(b) in the case of a person referred to in paragraph (1)(g), the requirements 

set out in clause (1)(g)(iii)(A); 

Al-Shikarchy, Salam v. M.C.I. (IAD TA5-13169), Band, September 5, 2007. 



Regulations. The meaning to be given to the words “has been placed for adoption in the country 

in which they reside or is otherwise legally available in that country for adoption” interpreted in 

light of 117(7)(b) of the IRP Regulations thus remains an outstanding issue for the Immigration 

Appeal Division. 

The panel in Al-Shikarchy citing s.121 of the IRP Regulations, found that the applicant 

did not qualify as a member of the family class in light of the fact that she was over the age of 18 

when the immigration authorities received her application for a permanent resident visa and over 

18 years of age when her application for a permanent resident visa was determined. 83 

In Taylor 84 the question before the panel was at what point in time is an applicant’s age to 

be calculated in order to determine whether he or she is over or under 22 years of age and 

therefore a dependent child. In contrast to the findings of the panel in Al-Shikarchy, who found 

both the date of receipt of the application for permanent residence and the date of the 

determination of the application to be relevant, the panel in Taylor concluded that the only 

relevant date, when the issue is the applicant’s age, is the date of receipt of the application for 

permanent residence. 85 There appears to be conflicting jurisprudence in the Immigration Appeal 

Division as to whether or not there is a “lock-in” date with respect to the applicant’s age in light 

of s.121 of the IRP Regulations. Is an applicant a member of the family class as a “child to be 

adopted” if the applicant was under 18 years of age at the time his or her application was received 

by immigration authorities but over 18 when the application is being determined by a visa 

officer? 

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 

Sponsors have also argued that certain provisions in the foreign adoption legislation are 

discriminatory and thus contrary to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The 

Immigration Appeal Division (and the Immigration Appeal Board) have rejected these 

arguments. 86 

In a different context, the Federal Court of Appeal, in Li, 87 dealt with an argument that an 

adjudicator considering the issue of equivalency must have regard to whether the procedures 

83 

84 

85 

86 

87 

Ibid, at 21. See also Chandler, Lucy Mary v. M.C.I. (IAD VA4-01200), Boscariol, September 26, 2006. 

Taylor, Joan v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-00871), Whist, May 19, 2004. 

In Lidder, the court found that the effective (“lock-in”) date of a sponsored application for permanent residence 

is the date of the filing of the application for permanent residence. Canada (Minister of Employment and 

Immigration) v. Lidder, [1992] 2 F.C. 621; 16 Imm. L.R. (2d) 241 (C.A.). 

See, for example, Dhillon, Gurpal Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 83-9242), D. Davey, Benedetti, Suppa, July 30, 1985; 

Mattam, Mary John v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-10213), Arkin, Fatsis, Ahara, December 10, 1987; Magnet, Marc v. 

M.E.I. (IAD W89-00002), Arpin, Goodspeed, Rayburn, April 10, 1990; and Syed, Abul Maali v. M.E.I. (IAD 

T89-01164), Tisshaw, Spencer, Townshend, January 7, 1992. 

Li, Ronald Fook Shiu v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-329-95), Strayer, Robertson, Chevalier, August 7, 1996. 

Reported: Li v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1997] 1 F.C. 235 (C.A.). 



followed in the country of conviction would be acceptable under the Charter. The Court rejected 

the argument and noted that 

[...] the Supreme Court of Canada has held the Charter to be irrelevant 

abroad even where acts by foreign police officers inconsistent with the 

Charter have yielded evidence for use in a Canadian court. In Terry v. The 

Queen 88 [... a person] was given the warnings required by U.S. law but was 

not advised immediately of a right to counsel as would have been required 

by [...] the Charter had he been arrested in Canada. Nevertheless 

statements made by him to police [...] were held admissible at a subsequent 

trial in Canada. The Court held that the Charter could not govern the 

conduct of foreign police acting in their own country. The same must 

surely be true of a foreign court trying a person then subject to its 

jurisdiction. 89 

The other type of Charter challenge involves an attack on the constitutional validity of 

particular provisions of the Immigration Act or Regulations. For example, in Dular, 90 the 

Immigration Appeal Division found that the age 19 limitation in the definition of “son” in the 

Regulations was contrary to section 15 of the Charter and not saved by section 1 of the Charter. 

However, the Federal Court disagreed with the panel’s section 1 analysis and set aside its 

decision. 91 A different approach was followed in Daley, 92 where the Immigration Appeal 

Division held that if there was discrimination on the basis of age (in this case, the age limitation 

was 13), it was the applicant’s rights and not the sponsor’s which were being infringed. As the 

applicant was outside Canada, the Charter had no application. 

In Rai, 93 the Immigration Appeal Division held that the requirement that an adoption not 

be for immigration purposes does not violate the s.15 Charter rights of adoptive parents. 

In Chandler, 94 the appellant’s challenge to the constitutionality of s.117(1)(g) of IRPA 

failed. Counsel argued that limiting the sponsorship of children intended to be adopted in Canada 

to the age of under 18 years, when dependent biological or adopted children can be sponsored to 

the age of 22, contravened sections 12 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 

The distinction between biological and adopted children and children intended to be adopted in 

Canada violates section 15 of the Charter but was justified under section 1 of the Charter. The 

appellant was not subjected to cruel and unusual treatment contrary to section 12 of the Charter. 

88 

89 

90 

91 

92 

93 

94 

R. v. Terry, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 207. 

Li, supra, footnote 87, at 257. 

Dular, Shiu v. M.C.I. (IAD V93-02409), Ho, Lam, Verma, February 22, 1996. See also Bahadur, Ramdhami v. 

M.E.I. (IAD T89-01108), Ariemma, Tisshaw, Bell (dissenting), January 14, 1991 (re the age 13 limitation in the 

former Regulations). 

M.C.I. v. Dular, Shiu (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-984-96), Wetston, October 21, 1997. 

Daley, Joyce v. M.E.I. (IAD T89-01062), Sherman, Bell, Chu, February 3, 1992. 

Rai, supra, footnote 60. 

Chandler, supra, footnote 83. 



Repeat Appeals 

In adoption applications, there is no fluidity with respect to the point at which the 

determination is made as to whether the applicant is a member of the family class. That point in 

time is fixed by the IRPA. Therefore, in repeat appeals from adoption refusals, the evidence must 

always relate to the intention at the time the applicant was purported to become a member of the 

family class. 95 Repeat appeals from these refusals require a more restrictive approach. Where an 

appellant attempts to relitigate unsuccessful appeals, two doctrines may be applicable: res 

judicata and abuse of process 96 . The Immigration Appeal Division must allow the sponsor to 

present the alleged new evidence before finding either an abuse of process or res judicata. 97 . The 

Immigration Appeal Division is under no obligation to grant a full oral hearing; new evidence by 

way of affidavit is acceptable. 98 

If the evidence adduced is in fact new evidence, then the Immigration Appeal Division 

can decide whether the issues raised are res judicata. Even where all the criteria for the 

application of res judicata are met, a repeat appeal will only be res judicata if there exist no 

special circumstances that would bring the appeal within the exception of the application of the 

doctrine. Such special circumstances would include fraud or other misconduct in the previous 

proceedings which would raise natural justice issues, or where there is the discovery of decisive 

new evidence that could not have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence in the 

first proceeding. 99 Further, whether or not to apply the doctrine of res judicata in any case is a 

matter of discretion. 100 In Bhatti 101 , the Appeal Division dismissed the appeal on the basis of the 

doctrine of res judicata in that there was no “decisive new evidence” which could have altered 

the result of the first appeal. 

If the Immigration Appeal Division decides the evidence adduced does not constitute new 

evidence then it is open to it to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it is an abuse of process. 102 

In some cases, it may be appropriate to consider applying the doctrine of abuse of process instead 

of or in addition to res judicata. 103 See Chapter 6, (“Repeat Appeals”) for an in-depth discussion 

of these issues. 

95 

96 

97 

98 

99 

Singh, Gurmukh v. M.C.I. (IAD T98-08941), Wales, March 15, 2000. 

Hira, Chaman Lal v. M.C.I. (IAD V99-01877), Boscariol, Ross, Mattu, July 14, 2000. 

Kular, Jasmail v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4990-99), Nadon, August 30, 2000. 

Sekhon, Amrik Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1982-01), McKeown, December 10, 2001. 

Sangha, Amarjit v. M.C..I. (IAD VA1-04029), Boscariol, February 21, 2002. 

100 Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., [2001] S.C.R. 460; Raika, Labh Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA1-02630), 

Boscariol, June 6, 2002. 

101 Bhatti, Darshan Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA1-03848), Workun, April 19, 2002. 

102 Toor, Rajwant Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA0-00917), Clark, June 1,2001 (reasons signed June 8, 2001); Kaler, 

Gurdip Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V99-04536), Baker, October 10, 2000; Gill, Balvir Singh v. M.C.I. (V99-03132), 

Mattu, September 25, 2000; Punni, Pal Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V99-01483), Boscariol, June 30, 2000. 

103 Sangha, supra, footnote 99; Bagri, Sharinder Singh v. M.C.I. (VA1-00913), Boscariol, December 10, 2001. 



An issue that arose after the IRPA came into effect was whether or not res judicata 

continues to apply as a result of the change in wording of the test to be applied in section 4 of the 

IRP Regulations, including the change in timing of the assessment of the test. In Vuong 104 the 

Immigration Appeal Division panel held that the changes between section 4(3) of the former 

Regulations and section 4 of the IRP Regulations are not of sufficient legal significance to create 

an exception to res judicata and concluded that res judicata applied. 

The Federal Court has ruled 105 that the Vuong approach is correct and that except in unique 

or special circumstances that the principle of res judicata applies as it is not in the public interest 

to allow the re-litigation of failed marriage appeals unless there are special circumstances. 

104 Vuong, Phuoc v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-16835), Stein, December 22, 2003. 

105 Mohammed, Amina v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-1436-05), Shore, October, 27, 2005: 2005 FC 1442. 



CASES 

Addow, Ali Hussein v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-01171), D’Ignazio, October 15, 1997............................................................ 8 

Alkana, Robin John v. M.E.I. (IAD W89-00261), Goodspeed, Arpin, Rayburn, November 16, 

1989....................................................................................................................................................................... 8, 9 

Al-Shikarchy, Salam v. M.C.I. (IAD TA5-13169), Band, September 5, 2007 ............................................................. 19 

Atwal, Manjit Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-4205), Petryshyn, Wright, Arpin (concurring), May 8, 

1989................................................................................................................................................................... 10, 11 

Aujla, Surjit Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 87-6021), Mawani, November 10, 1987............................................................. 11 

Badwal, Jasbir Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 87-10977), Sherman, Bell, Ahara, May 29, 1989. ........................................ 10 

Bagri, Sharinder Singh v. M.C.I. (VA1-00913), Boscariol, December 10, 2001 ........................................................ 22 

Bahadur, Ramdhami v. M.E.I. (IAD T89-01108), Ariemma, Tisshaw, Bell (dissenting), 

January 14, 1991. .................................................................................................................................................... 21 

Bal, Sukhjinder Singh v. S.G.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1212-93), McKeown, October 19, 1993 .................................... 5 

Bhatti, Darshan Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA1-03848), Workun, April 19, 2002............................................................ 22 

Bilimoriya, Parviz v. M.C.I. (IAD T93-04633), Muzzi, September 18, 1996................................................................ 6 

Brar, Kanwar Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD W89-00084), Goodspeed, Arpin, Vidal (concurring in part), 

December 29, 1989. ............................................................................................................................................ 8, 10 

Brown, Josiah Lanville v. M.C.I. (IAD T89-02499), Buchanan, June 23, 1999 ............................................................ 6 

Burmi, Joginder Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 88-35651), Sherman, Arkin, Weisdorf, February 14, 1989.......................... 10 

Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Lidder, [1992] 2 F.C. 621; 16 Imm. L.R. 

(2d) 241 (C.A.)........................................................................................................................................................ 20 

Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Sidhu, [1993] 2 F.C. 483 (C.A.).............................................. 8 

Capiendo, Rosita v. M.C.I. (IAD W95-00108), Wiebe, August 18, 1997...................................................................... 4 

Chandler, Lucy Mary v. M.C.I. (IAD VA4-01200), Boscariol, September 26, 2006 ............................................ 20, 21 

Chiu, Jacintha Chen v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-6123), Mawani, Gillanders, Singh, July 13, 1987...................................... 11 

Chu, Si Gina v. M.E.I. (IAD V90-00836), Wlodyka, MacLeod, June 28, 1990 .......................................................... 15 

Daley, Joyce v. M.E.I. (IAD T89-01062), Sherman, Bell, Chu, February 3, 1992. ..................................................... 21 

Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., [2001] S.C.R. 460; Raika, Labh Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD 

VA1-02630), Boscariol, June 6, 2002..................................................................................................................... 22 

De Guia, Avewlina Fernandez Quindipan v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-11030), Waters, December 14, 

2005......................................................................................................................................................................... 17 

De Guzman, Leonor G. v. M.C.I. (IAD W95-00062), Ariemma, Bartley, Wiebe, August 16, 1995. ............................ 3 

Demnati, Ahmed v. M.C.I. (M99-10260), di Pietro, April 3, 2001................................................................................. 8 

Dhillon, Gurpal Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 83-9242), D. Davey, Benedetti, Suppa, July 30, 1985. ................................. 20 

Dhillon, Harnam Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-387-85), Pratte, Marceau, Lacombe, May 27, 

1987................................................................................................................................................................... 11, 12 

Dhillon, Harnam Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 83-6551), Petryshyn, Glogowski, Voorhees, January 3, 

1985......................................................................................................................................................................... 11 

Dizon, Julieta Lacson v. M.C.I. (IAD V98-02115), Carver, September 1, 1999 ........................................................... 4 



Dooprajh, Anthony v. M.C.I. (IAD M94-07504), Durand, November 27, 1995............................................................ 5 

Dular, Shiu v. M.C.I. (IAD V93-02409), Ho, Lam, Verma, February 22, 1996. ......................................................... 21 

Dular: M.C.I. v. Dular, Shiu (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-984-96), Wetston, October 21, 1997............................................ 21 

Edrada: M.C.I. v. Edrada, Leonardo Lagmacy (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5199-94), MacKay, February 

29, 1996................................................................................................................................................................... 13 

Gill, Balvir Singh v. M.C.I. (V99-03132), Mattu, September 25, 2000 ....................................................................... 22 

Gill, Balwinder Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD W89-00433), Goodspeed, Arpin, Rayburn, September 13, 

1990......................................................................................................................................................................... 14 

Gill, Banta Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-859-96), Marceau, Linden, Robertson, July 14, 1998.............................. 13 

Gill, Banta Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-760-96), Gibson, October 22, 1996................................................. 13 

Gill, Gurmandeep Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD W95-00111), Wiebe, October 17, 1996......................................................... 4 

Gill, Ranjit Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V96-00797), Clark, April 7, 1999............................................................................. 7 

Gossal, Rajinder Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 87-9401), Sherman, Chu, Benedetti, February 15, 1988. 

Reported: Gossal v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1988), 5 Imm. L.R. 

(2d) 185 (I.A.B.)........................................................................................................................................................ 7 

Heir, Surjit Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 80-6116), Howard, Campbell, Hlady, January 16, 1981...................................... 15 

Hira, Chaman Lal v. M.C.I. (IAD V99-01877), Boscariol, Ross, Mattu, July 14, 2000.............................................. 22 

Hussein, Mohammed Yassin v. M.C.I. (IAD WA5-00123), Ostrowski, December 15, 2006 ...................................... 17 

Jalal, Younas v. M.C.I. (IAD M93-06071), Blumer, August 16, 1995 reported: Jalal v. Canada 

(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1995), 39 Imm. L.R. (2d) 146 (I.A.D.)................................................. 9 

Jaswal, Kaushaliya Devi v. M.E.I. (IAD W89-00087), Goodspeed, Wlodyka, Rayburn, 

September 27, 1990................................................................................................................................................. 11 

Kalair, Sohan Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-919-83), Stone, Heald, Urie, November 29, 1984................................. 7 

Kalida, Malika v. M.C.I. (IAD M96-08010), Champoux, July 3, 1997. ........................................................................ 6 

Kler, Sukhdev Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 82-6350), Goodspeed, Vidal, Arpin, May 25, 1987......................................... 14 

Kular, Jasmail v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4990-99), Nadon, August 30, 2000 ..................................................... 22 

Kwan, Man Tin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5527-00), Muldoon, August 30, 2001 .................................................. 4 

Lam, Wong Do v. M.M.I. (I.A.B.), October 2, 1972. .....................................................................................................9 

Li, Ronald Fook Shiu v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-329-95), Strayer, Robertson, Chevalier, August 7, 

1996. Reported: Li v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1997] 1 F.C. 235 

(C.A.)................................................................................................................................................................. 20, 21 

Lit, Jaswant Singh v. M.M.I. (I.A.B. 76-6003), Scott, Benedetti, Legaré, August 13, 1976.......................................... 9 

Ly, Ngoc Lan v. M.C.I. (IAD T99-04453), Kelley, June 22, 2000................................................................................. 4 

M.C.I. v. Sharma, Chaman Jit (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-453-95), Wetson, August 28, 1995 ............................................ 13 

Magnet, Marc v. M.E.I. (IAD W89-00002), Arpin, Goodspeed, Rayburn, April 10, 1990. ........................................ 20 

Mattam, Mary John v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-10213), Arkin, Fatsis, Ahara, December 10, 1987...................................... 20 

Minhas, Surinder Pal Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD M98-10540), Colavecchio, December 15, 1999....................................... 4 

Mohammed, Amina v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-1436-05), Shore, October, 27, 2005: 2005 FC 1442 ............................ 23 

Molina, Rufo v. M.C.I. (IAD T98-04608), Kelley, November 8, 1999.......................................................................... 4 

Okafor-Ogbujiagba, Anthony Nwafor v. M.C.I. (IAD T94-05539), Aterman, April 14, 1997. ..................................... 7 



Pabla, Dial v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1210-00), Blais, December 12, 2000.......................................................... 5 

Patel, Ramesh Chandra v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-9738), Jew, Arkin, Tisshaw, April 15, 1988 ......................................... 10 

Paul, Satnam Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 87-6049), Howard, Anderson (dissenting), Gillanders, 

February 13, 1989. .................................................................................................................................................. 14 

Pawar, Onkar Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD T98-04518), D’Ignazio, October 1, 1999........................................................... 10 

Persaud, Kowsilia v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-00912), Kalvin, July 13, 1998........................................................................ 12 

Poonia, Jagraj v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-02478), Arpin, Townshend, Fatsis, October 5, 1993........................................... 14 

Punni, Pal Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V99-01483), Boscariol, June 30, 2000 .................................................................... 22 

Purba, Surinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD T95-02315), Teitelbaum, September 10, 1996. ............................................... 15 

Rai, Suritam Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-02710), Major, Wiebe, Dossa, November 30, 1999 ............................... 13, 21 

Rajam, Daniel v. M.C.I. (IAD V98-02983), Carver, November 5, 1999 ....................................................................... 4 

Reid, Eric v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1357-99), Reed, November 25, 1999............................................................ 6 

Sahota, Gurdev Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-03374), Mattu, February 23, 2004........................................................... 15 

Sai, Jiqiu (Jacqueline) v. M.C.I. (IAD TA0-11403), Michnick, August 22, 2001......................................................... 4 

Sandhu, Bachhitar Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-10112), Eglington, Goodspeed, Chu, February 4, 

1988......................................................................................................................................................................... 10 

Sandhu, Gurcharan Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 87-9066), Eglington, Teitelbaum, Sherman, 

November 13, 1987. ................................................................................................................................................ 13 

Sangha, Amarjit v. M.C..I. (IAD VA1-04029), Boscariol, February 21, 2002 ............................................................ 22 

Sekhon, Amrik Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1982-01), McKeown, December 10, 2001................................. 22 

Sertovic, Safeta S. v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-16898. Collins, September 10, 2003 .............................................................. 2 

Seth, Kewal Krishan v. M.C.I. (IAD M94-05081), Angé, March 27, 1996. ............................................................ 6, 12 

Sharma, Sudhir Kumar v. M.E.I. (IAD V92-01628), Wlodyka, Singh, Verma, August 18, 1993. .............................. 14 

Shergill, Kundan Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-6108), Mawani, Gillanders, Singh, April 8, 1987. 

Reported: Shergill v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1987), 3 Imm. L.R. 

(2d) 126 (I.A.B.)...................................................................................................................................................... 13 

Siddiq, Mohammad v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 79-9088), Weselak, Davey, Teitelbaum, June 10, 1980...................................... 8 

Singh (Ajaib): Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1990] 3 F.C. 37; 

11 Imm. L.R. (2d) 1 (C.A.); leave to appeal to Supreme Court of Canada (Doc. 22136, Sopinka, 

McLachlin, Iacobucci) refused on February 28, 1991, Singh v. Canada (Minister of 

Employment and Immigration) (1991), 13 Imm. L.R. (2d) 46 [Appeal Note]. ....................................................... 12 

Singh, Ajaib v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 87-4063), Mawani, Wright, Petryshyn, April 26, 1988. ............................................... 10 

Singh, Babu v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-210-85), Urie, Mahoney, Marceau, January 15, 1986. ....................................... 8 

Singh, Gurmukh v. M.C.I. (IAD T98-08941), Wales, March 15, 2000........................................................................ 22 

Singh, Jaspal v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-17789), Hoare, August 6. 2004............................................................................. 17 

Sinniah, Sinnathamby v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5954-00), Dawson, July 25, 2002; 2002 FCT 

822............................................................................................................................................................................. 5 

Sohal, Talwinder Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-00396), Clark, May 23, 1996. ................................................................. 4 

Sran, Pritam Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD T93-10409), Townshend, May 10, 1995............................................................... 11 

Syed, Abul Maali v. M.E.I. (IAD T89-01164), Tisshaw, Spencer, Townshend, January 7, 1992. ............................... 20 



Taggar: Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Taggar, [1989] 3 F.C. 576; 

8 Imm. L.R. (2d) 175 (C.A.). .......................................................................................................................... 7, 9, 11 

Taylor, Joan v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-00871), Whist, May 19, 2004 ................................................................................ 20 

Terry: R. v. Terry, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 207. ..................................................................................................................... 21 

Toor, Gurdarshan Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-00959), McIsaac, February 4, 1997....................................................... 4 

Toor, Rajwant Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA0-00917), Clark, June 1,2001 (reasons signed June 8, 

2001) ....................................................................................................................................................................... 22 

Vaganova, Ludmila v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-17969), Waters, May 18, 2006 ................................................................... 19 

Vuong, Khan Duc v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3139-97), Dubé, July 21, 1998 ......................................................... 6 

Vuong, Phuoc v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-16835), Stein, December 22, 2003 ...................................................................... 23 

Wang, Yan-Qiao v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-04690), Muzzi, October 6, 1997......................................................................... 7 

Zenati, Entissar v. M.C.I. (IAD M98-09459), Bourbonnais, September 17, 1999......................................................... 8 



Chapter Five 

Spouses, Common-Law Partners 

and Conjugal Partners 

Introduction 

The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (“IRPA”) 1 and the Immigration and Refugee 

Protection Regulations (“IRP Regulations”) 2 expanded the family class to include common-law 

partners and conjugal partners as well as spouses. 3 In addition, common-law partners are family 

members of members of the family class. 4 These changes, brought about by the implementation 

of the IRPA in 2002, are part of a legislative framework which sets out, for the first time, specific 

rules concerning the sponsorship of common-law partners and conjugal partners of the same or 

opposite sex as the sponsor. 5 

Modifications were also brought to the definition of “marriage.” 6 The IRP Regulations 

now require that a foreign marriage be valid under Canadian law. Furthermore, contrary to the 

former Immigration Regulations, 1978, the IRPA and IRP Regulations do not define “spouse.” 

The discussion that follows addresses the definitions of “common-law partner,” “conjugal 

partner,” and “marriage.” It also deals with excluded and bad faith relationships which disqualify 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

S.C. 2001, c. 27, entered into force on June 28, 2002 as amended. 

SOR/202-227, June 11, 2002 as amended. 

S. 12(1) of the IRPA and s. 116 and s. 117(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (“IRP 

Regulations”). “Common-law partner” is defined at s. 1(1) of the IRP Regulations as: “…in relation to a 

person, an individual who is cohabiting with the person in a conjugal relationship, having so cohabited for a 

period of at least one year.” “Conjugal partner” is defined at s. 2 of the IRP Regulations as: “…in relation to a 

sponsor, a foreign national residing outside Canada who is in a conjugal relationship with the sponsor and has 

been in that relationship for a period of at least one year.” 

S. 1(3)(a) of the IRP Regulations states: 

For the purposes of the Act, other than s. 12 and paragraph 38(2)(d), and these Regulations, “family member” 

in respect of a person means 

(a) the spouse or common-law partner of the person; 

Prior to the coming into force of the IRPA, common-law partners of Canadian citizens or permanent residents 

who wished to apply for permanent resident status to reunite with their partner were considered on 

humanitarian and compassionate grounds under s. 114(2) of the former Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2.. 

S. 2 of the IRP Regulations defines “marriage” as: 

…in respect of a marriage that took place outside Canada, means a marriage that is valid both 

under the laws of the jurisdiction where it took place and under Canadian law. 



Spouses, Common-law Partners & 

Conjugal Partners - Ch. 5

a foreign national from being considered a spouse, common-law partner, conjugal partner or 

member of the family class. 

Background to the Legislative Changes concerning Common-law Partners 

and Conjugal Partners 

Under the IRPA, common-law partners have a status equal to that of spouses. The 

relevant provisions of the IRPA and the IRP Regulations are intended to grant common-law 

partners the same benefits and obligations granted to spouses. 7 The provisions of the IRPA as 

they relate to common-law partners take into account case law such as Miron v. Trudel 8 and M. v. 

H. 9 in which the Supreme Court found that legislative provisions excluding same and opposite 

sex common-law partners from benefits afforded to married partners were discriminatory and 

violated the right to equality guaranteed by s. 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 10 In 

addition, the provisions of the IRPA keep in step with the Modernization of Benefits and 

Obligations Act, 11 which amended other federal acts following the decision in M. v. H. 12 in order 

to extend to same-sex partners the benefits and obligations afforded married and opposite-sex 

partners. 

Conjugal partners have a different status than that of spouses and common-law partners 

under the IRPA. The definition of “conjugal partner” is found in the IRP Regulations. The 

recognition of conjugal partners under the IRPA was meant to acknowledge the particular 

circumstances of the sponsorship context that are generally not present where partners reside in 

the same country. Hence, “conjugal partner” refers only to a person in a conjugal relationship 

with the sponsor for a period of at least one year. Whereas spouses and common-law partners are 

eligible for permanent residence by virtue of their relationship with the sponsor (qualifying them 

as members of the family class) or by virtue of their relationship with a member of the family 

class (qualifying them as a family members of a member of the family class), conjugal partners 

are only eligible for permanent residence by virtue of their relationship with the sponsor 

(qualifying them as a member of the family class) and not with any other person. A conjugal 

partner is therefore not a family member of a member of the family class. 13 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

See to this effect the comments concerning the changes to the family class in the Regulatory Impact and 

Analysis Statement (“RIAS”) published with the IRP Regulations. 

[1995] 2 S.C.R. 418. 

[1999] 2 S.C.R. 3. 

Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 

S.C. 2000, c.12, as amended. The definition of “common-law partner” in the Modernization of Benefits and 

Obligations Act is essentially the same as that in the IRP Regulations. It states: "common-law partner," in 

relation to an individual, means a person who is cohabiting with the individual in a conjugal relationship, 

having so cohabited for a period of at least one year.” 

Supra, footnote 9. See to this effect the comments on the changes to the family class in the RIAS. 

See the definition of “conjugal partner” at s. 2 of the IRP Regulations as well as s. 117(1)(a) and the definition 

of “family member” at s. 1(3) of the IRP Regulations. 





Relevant Legislative Provisions 

The relevant provisions are: 

• Section 11(1) of the IRPA provides that before entering Canada, a foreign national 

must apply for a visa which shall be issued if the officer is satisfied that the foreign 

national is not inadmissible and meets the requirement of the IRPA; 

• Section 6 of the IRP Regulations indicates that a foreign national may not enter and 

remain in Canada on a permanent basis without first obtaining a permanent resident 

visa; 

• Section 70 of the IRP Regulations sets out the requirements that must be met for a 

permanent resident visa to be issued to a member of an eligible class and to the 

accompanying family member of such a member; 

• Section 12(1) of the IRPA provides that a foreign national may be selected as a 

member of the family class on the basis of their relationship with a Canadian citizen 

or a permanent resident as a spouse, a common-law partner or other prescribed family 

member; 14 

• Section 13(1) of the IRPA provides that a Canadian citizen or permanent resident may 

sponsor a member of the family class; 

• Section 116 of the IRP Regulations prescribes the family class as a class of persons 

that may become permanent residents; 

• Section 117(1)(a) of the IRP Regulations indicates that a foreign national who is the 

sponsor’s spouse, common-law partner or conjugal partner is a member of the family 

class; 

• Sections 1(1) and 1(2) of the IRP Regulations set out respectively the definition of 

“common-law partner” and the exception to the requirement of cohabitation; 

• Section 2 of the IRP Regulations provides the definition for “marriage” and “conjugal 

partner;” 

• Section 1(3) of the IRP Regulations defines “family member,” other than for the 

purposes of s. 12 and s. 38(2)(d) of the IRPA; 

• Sections 5(a) and 5(b) of the IRP Regulations list circumstances in which a foreign 

national is not considered a “spouse” or “common-law partner;” 

• Sections 117(9)(a) to (d) of the IRP Regulations list circumstances in which a spouse, 

common-law partner or conjugal partner are not considered members of the family 

class. Sections 117(10) and (11), read together, create an exception to the 

exclusionary provision of section 117(9)(d). 

• Section 4 of the IRP Regulations indicates that a foreign national shall not be 

considered a spouse, common-law partner or conjugal partner if the marriage, 

common-law partnership or conjugal partnership is a bad faith relationship – that is, 

14 

The expression “prescribed family member” in s. 12 of the IRPA appears to refer to the members of the family 

class that are prescribed in s. 117(1) of the IRP Regulations. The definition of “family member” at s. 1(3) of the 

IRP Regulations specifically states that it is not applicable to s. 12 of the IRPA. 





the relationship is not genuine and was entered into primarily for the purpose of 

acquiring any status or privilege under the IRPA or IRP Regulations; 

• Section 4.1 of the IRP Regulations indicates that a foreign national shall not be 

considered a spouse, common-law partner or conjugal partner of a person if the 

foreign national has begun a new conjugal relationship with that person after a 

previous marriage, common-law partnership or conjugal relationship with that person 

was dissolved primarily so that the foreign national, another foreign national or the 

sponsor could acquire any status or privilege under the Act. 

• Section 121 of the IRP Regulations requires a member of the family class or family 

member of a member of the family class to be a family member of the applicant or 

sponsor at the time the application is made, and without taking into account whether 

the person has attained the age of 22 years, at the time of the determination of the 

application. 

• Section 122 of the IRP Regulations states that a foreign national who is an 

accompanying family member of a member of the family class shall become a 

permanent resident if the person who made the application becomes a permanent 

resident and the accompanying family member is not inadmissible. 

REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A PERMANENT RESIDENT VISA TO A 

SPOUSE, COMMON-LAW PARTNER AND A CONJUGAL PARTNER IN THE 

CONTEXT OF FAMILY CLASS SPONSORSHIPS 

A foreign national is issued a permanent resident visa if he or she meets the requirements 

of the IRPA including those pertaining to a member of the family class and is not inadmissible. 15 

A spouse, common-law partner or conjugal partner of a Canadian citizen or permanent resident is 

a member of the family class. 16 

Similarly, a foreign national accompanying a member of the family class who is issued a 

permanent resident visa shall in turn be issued a permanent resident visa where he or she meets 

the definition of “family member” and is not inadmissible. 17 A spouse or common-law partner of 

a member of the family class is a “family member.” Note, however, that a conjugal partner is not 

a “family member.” 18 

Spouse 

15 

16 

17 

18 

S. 11 of the IRPA and s. 70(1) and (2) of the IRP Regulations. 

S. 12(1) of the IRPA and s. 116 and s. 117(1)(a) of the IRP Regulations. 

S. 11 of the IRPA and s. 122 and s. 70(4) and (5) of the IRP Regulations. 

S. 1(3)(a) of the IRP Regulations. 





In order for a foreign national applying as a “spouse” to be considered a member of the 

family class or a family member, the foreign national’s marriage must meet the definition of 

marriage set out in s. 2 of the IRP Regulations and the marital relationship must not be excluded 

by virtue of s. 4, s. 4.1, or s. 5 of the IRP Regulations. In addition, a foreign national applying as 

a spouse and member of the family class must not be in an excluded relationship mentioned in s. 

117(9) of the IRP Regulations. 

The term spouse is not defined in the IRPA or the IRP Regulations. While in common usage, the 

term spouse may sometimes refer to common-law or conjugal partners, under the IRPA, it refers 

exclusively to individuals who are married. “Common-law partner” and “conjugal partner” are 

defined separately. 

Definition of Marriage 

The definition of marriage set out in s. 2 19 of the IRP Regulations requires that a foreign 

marriage be valid both under the law of the jurisdiction where it took place and under Canadian 

law. 

Prior to 2005, the definition of marriage was recognized as “the voluntary union for life 

of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others.” 20 This created some debate regarding 

whether same-sex couples who were legally married could be recognized as a spouse for the 

purpose of family class sponsorship. This question was settled with the passage of the Civil 

Marriage Act. 21 Section 2 of that Act defines marriage, for civil purposes, as “the lawful union 

of two persons to the exclusion of all others.” This definition is gender neutral and is further 

clarified by section 4 which stipulates that “for greater certainty, a marriage is not void or 

voidable by reason only that the spouses are of the same sex.” Presently the number of 

jurisdictions that allow same-sex marriage is small, 22 so the issue has not arisen before the IAD; 

however, it can be expected that over time the number of jurisdictions where same-sex couples 

can legally marry will increase as will the number of sponsorship applications from same-sex, 

married couples. 

Validity of the Marriage in the Jurisdiction Where it Took Place 

19 

20 

21 

22 

S.2 “marriage”, in respect of a marriage that took place outside Canada, means a marriage that is valid both 

under the laws of the jurisdiction where it took place and under Canadian law. (“marriage”) 

Payne, M. A., Canadian Family Law (2001), Ch. 2; Modernization of Benefits Act, S.C. 2000, c. 12, s. 1.1 [this 

section repealed S.C. 2005, c. 33, s. 15]. 

S.C. 2005, c. 33. 

For example, as at January 1, 2008, the Citizenship and Immigration Canada website lists five jurisdictions 

outside of Canada where same-sex partners can legally marry: Belgium, the Netherlands, South Africa, Spain, 

and the State of Massachusetts. 





The validity of a marriage in the jurisdiction where it took place is established by 

demonstrating that the formal and essential requirements of marriage have been respected. The 

formal validity refers to the formal requirements of the ceremony while essential validity refers 

to the state of being married and is concerned with such things as prohibited degrees of 

relationships as prescribed by law, fraud, duress, and capacity. 23 

Formal Validity 

In general, formal validity includes the nature of, and prerequisites for, a ceremony. 24 

Formal validity is determined in accordance with the law of the place where the marriage was 

celebrated. Where the law of the place is foreign law, it must be proved as any other fact by the 

party who is relying on it. 25 Therefore, when it is alleged, for example, that a marriage has not 

been duly solemnized, local marriage law applies and it must be decided whether the marriage in 

question complies with the formal requirements of that law. If it does not, then the effect of this 

defect must also be decided in accordance with that same law. 26 In the absence of evidence to the 

contrary, it must be presumed that the foreign law purports to be exhaustive as to the defects that 

invalidate a marriage. 27 Depending on the applicable law, as proved, the absence of a ceremony 

may 28 or may not invalidate the marriage. 29 If it is not proven that the marriage is valid, the 

applicant is not a “spouse” for purposes of the IRPA and therefore not a member of the family 

class. 

There are situations where what the appellant tries to establish is that a marriage is not 

valid. For example, an appellant may argue that a sibling who is included in the parents' 

sponsorship application is not married (even though the person appears to have gone through a 

marriage ceremony) and still a dependant, or an appellant in an appeal involving 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

29 

Virk, Sukhpal Kaur v. M.E.I. (IAD V91-01246), Wlodyka, Gillanders, Verma, February 9, 1993. 

McLeod, James G., The Conflict of Laws (Calgary: Carswell, 1983), at 253. 

Lit, Jaswant Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 76-6003), Scott, Benedetti, Legaré, May 30, 1978. For example, in El 

Salfiti, Dina Khalil Abdel Karim v. M.E.I. (IAD M93-08586), Durand, January 24, 1994, the Appeal Division 

found that the "marriage contract" was in fact a "preliminary" engagement contract under Kuwati law. For a 

discussion of whether marriages by telephone are valid, see Shaheen, Shahnaz v. M.C.I. (IAD T95-00090), 

Wright, February 20, 1997; Sobhan, Rumana v. M.C.I. (IAD T95-07352), Boire, February 3, 1998; Patel, 

Allarakha v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-24341), Sangmuah, May 5, 2005; Mahamat, Ali Saleh v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4- 

04059), Sangmuah, April 13, 2005; Akhtar, Waseem v M.C.I. (IAD VA6-00938), Ostrowski, June 5, 2007; and 

Sasani, Sam v. M.C.I. (IAD VA6-00727), Shahriari, September 5, 2007. 

Grewal, Ravinder v. M.C.I. (IAD MA3-00637), Beauchemin, May 4, 2004. 

Mann, Harnek Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-6199), Wlodyka, June 5, 1987. 

See, for example, Mann, ibid.; and Chiem, My Lien v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-838-98), Rothstein, January 

11, 1999. 

Mann, Kirpal Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-6008), Mawani, Gillanders, Wlodyka, April 14, 1987; Oucherif, 

Ichrak v. M.C.I. (IAD MA4-03183), Barazi, October 27, 2005. 





misrepresentation may argue that he or she was not married at the time of landing as a single 

dependant. 30 

Essential Validity 

Essential validity includes matters relating to consent to marry, existing prior marriage, 31 

prohibited degrees of relationship, 32 non-consummation of the marriage, 33 fraud, and duress. 

In cases that raise an issue of essential validity, there is conflicting authority regarding the 

law that governs the circumstances; that is, whether it is the foreign law (the law of prenuptial 

domicile of the purported spouses) or Canadian domestic law (the law of their intended 

matrimonial home). 

While the Federal Court of Appeal sanctioned the application of the law of the intended 

matrimonial home in Narwal, 34 it subsequently clarified that decision in Kaur, 35 indicating that 

the law of the intended matrimonial home is to be applied exceptionally, only in “very special 

circumstances” such as those that existed in Narwal, that is, where the marriage had been 

celebrated in a third country, there was no doubt about the good faith of the spouses, and the 

spouses had a “clear and indefeasible” intention “to live in Canada immediately and definitely.” 

The Court in Kaur was not prepared to apply the law of the intended matrimonial home where 

the marriage had been celebrated in India, the visa officer did not believe the marriage was bona 

fide, and no effect could be given to the intention of the spouses to live in Canada because the 

applicant had been previously deported and was prohibited from coming into Canada without a 

Minister’s permit. The law of the prenuptial domicile was the proper law to apply to such facts. 36 

30 

31 

32 

33 

34 

35 

Ramdai, Miss v. M.C.I. (IAD T95-01280), Townshend, October 22. 1997 (sponsored application of son); Li, 

Bing Qian v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4138-96), Reed, January 8, 1998 (misrepresentation); and Tran, My 

Ha v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-01139), Singh, March 9, 1998 (misrepresentation). 

For example, see Savehilaghi, Hasan v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-02047), Kalvin, June 4, 1998, which dealt with the 

issue of whether a Mullah in Iran is authorized to effect a divorce; Ratnasabapathy, Jeyarajan v. M.C.I. 

(F.C.T.D., no. IMM-382-98), Blais, September 27, 1999, where the Court noted that if the IAD concludes that 

the first marriage is still valid, it should not go on to consider the validity of a second marriage; and 

Nadesapillai, Sritharan v. M.C.I. (IAD T99-11883), Hoare, August 1, 2001, where the panel did not accept as 

credible the evidence regarding the applicant’s alleged belief that her first husband was dead. The applicant 

failed to establish that her first marriage was either invalid or dissolved. 

For example, see Grewal, Inderpal Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD T91-04831), Muzzi, Aterman, Leousis, February 23, 

1995; Badhan, Lyle Kishori v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-00432), Boscariol, September 3, 1997; and Saini, Jaswinder 

Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD T89-07659), D'Ignazio, August 26, 1999. These cases dealt with the issue of whether a 

woman can marry her husband's brother under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. 

McLeod, supra, footnote 24, at 256. 

M.E.I. v. Narwal, Surinder Kaur (F.C.A., no. A-63-89), Stone, Marceau, MacGuigan, April 6, 1990. 

Kaur, Narinder v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-405-89), Marceau, Desjardins, Linden, October 11, 1990, at 5. 

Reported: Kaur v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1990), 12 Imm. L.R. (2d) 1 (F.C.A.). 





The Immigration Appeal Division has generally applied the reasoning of Kaur to questions of the 

legality of a marriage, 37 although at least one decision has applied the reasoning in Narwal. 38 

Evidentiary Issues – foreign marriages 

Where the validity of a marriage is in issue and the marriage has been registered, it must 

be determined what effect registration has on the validity of the marriage. Registration creates a 

presumption that a marriage has met the requirements for formal validity. 39 In other words, 

registration constitutes prima facie evidence of the marriage and of the validity of the marriage 40 

until a court of competent jurisdiction rules otherwise 41 or “until compelling evidence is adduced 

to show that the marriage was not duly solemnized prior to its registration.” 42 Therefore, even if 

a marriage has been registered and a certificate presented, if other evidence on the record 

indicates that the persons are not validly married, it may be found that the sponsor has failed to 

prove that a valid marriage took place. 43 

36 

37 

38 

39 

40 

41 

42 

43 

Ibid. See also Donoso Palma, Sergio v. M.C.I. (IAD MA1-03349), di Pietro, July 9, 2002 where the panel 

applied the law of the country in which the first marriage was contracted (Chile) and held that there was “no 

proof” that the first marriage had been dissolved in accordance with Chilean laws, notwithstanding that it had 

been dissolved by a Canadian judgment. 

In Virk, supra, footnote 23, the appellant married her first husband’s brother in India, which was prohibited by 

Indian law but was not one of the prohibited relationships in Canadian law. The panel determined that the 

proper law to be applied was Indian law since the marriage took place in India. It rejected the submission that 

the essential validity of the marriage should be determined only based on Canadian law, as the definition of 

marriage as found in the former Immigration Act was clear that it applied to the place of marriage. The panel 

noted that this definition had not been considered in either Narwal or Kaur. In Khan v. M.C.I. (IAD) V93- 

02590), Lam, July 4, 1995, the panel distinguished Narwal on the basis that in Narwal the couple had been 

married in a third country. In Brar, Karen Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA0-02573), Workun, December 4, 2001, the 

panel applied the law of the prenuptial domicile. It found that the circumstances were distinguishable from 

those in Narwal as the parties in this case married in India notwithstanding that, as first cousins, the 

relationship came within the degrees of prohibited relationship under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. In Singh, 

Harpreet v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-01365), Stein, May 10, 2006 the panel examined the law of the place of 

marriage, India. 

In Xu, Yuan Fei v. M.C.I. (IAD M99-04636), Sivak, June 5, 2000 the panel applied the law of the parties’ 

intended matrimonial home (Canada). The sponsor and his wife were first cousins and the Chinese marriage 

law prohibited marriage between collateral relatives by blood up to the third degree of kinship. Therefore, the 

marriage was not valid in China. The panel allowed the appeal finding that the degrees of consanguinity which 

were a bar to the lawful solemnization of marriage in Ontario did not include first cousins. 

In Tran, supra, footnote 30, the evidence showed that in Vietnam, the recognition and recording of a marriage 

by the People's Committee is required for the marriage to be legally binding. 

Parmar, Ramesh Kumar v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-9772), Eglington, Weisdorf, Ahara, September 12, 1986. 

Kaur, Gurmit v. C.E.I.C. (F.C.T.D., no. T-2490-84), Jerome, May 8, 1985. 

Parmar, supra, footnote 40; Pye, Helen Leona v. M.C.I. (IAD MA5-00247), Beauchemin, September 21, 2006. 

Lotay, Harjit Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.D. T89-03205), Ariemma, Townshend, Bell, April 18, 1990; Bakridi, Faizal 

Abbas v. M.C.I. (IAD V99-03930), Baker, January 9, 2001. 





Little weight may be given to an ex parte judgment in personam 44 purporting to establish 

the marriage in question where the record shows that the evidence before the issuing court was 

incomplete and where the evidence on appeal indicates that the sponsor was married to another 

person and therefore lacked the capacity to marry his purported wife. 45 

Little weight may also be given to a declaratory judgment by a court where the judgment 

fails to refer to the date and place of the marriage in question and where the judgment is obtained 

after the applicant has received the letter of refusal. 46 

However, caution must be exercised in concluding that a marriage is not valid in the face 

of what appears to be a valid Court order. 47 

The appellant has the duty of providing objective evidence of a customary law of 

marriage. International, national or even customary law are not within the general knowledge of 

the Appeal Division. It is not the sort of information that the Appeal Division can be expected to 

know or take judicial notice of. 48 

In cases involving the application of foreign law such as the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, it 

may be alleged that custom or usage exempts the purported spouses, who fall within the 

prohibited degrees of relationship, from strict compliance with that Act. However, where the 

sponsor claims to be the spouse of the applicant by reason of an exemption to the law based on 

custom or usage, the sponsor has the onus of clearly proving its existence. 49 A declaratory in 

personam judgment, which rules on the existence of the custom or usage in issue, may be 

considered to be evidence of its existence. 50 The testimony of an expert witness, 51 even a 

transcript of the testimony of an expert witness in another hearing, 52 may be accepted as 

establishing the existence of a custom. 

Validity of the Marriage under Canadian Law 

44 

45 

46 

47 

48 

49 

50 

51 

52 

An in personam judgment is one that binds only the two persons to an action. 

Gill, Sakinder Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD V89-01124), Gillanders, Verma, Wlodyka, July 16, 1990. 

Burmi, Joginder Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 88-35,651), Sherman, Arkin, Weisdorf, February 14, 1989. 

Sinniah, Sinnathamby v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5954-00), Dawson, July 25, 2002; 2002 FCT 822. 

Quao, Daniel Essel v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5240-99), Blais, August 15, 2000. 

Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Taggar, [1989] 3 F.C. 576 (C.A.); Buttar, Amrit Kaur v. 

M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-1669-06), Blais, October 25, 2006; 2006 FC 1281; Patel, Sunil Jayantibhai v. M.C.I. 

(IAD TA3-19443), Band, September 28, 2006. For an in-depth analysis regarding the proof of the validity of a 

marriage between a Christian and a Hindu in India, see Pye, supra, footnote 42. 

Taggar, Ibid. 

Atwal, Jaswinder Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-4204), Petryshyn, Wright, Rayburn, January 30, 1989. 

Bhullar, Sawarnjit Kaur v. M.E.I. (IAD W89-00375), Goodspeed, Rayburn, Arpin (concurring), November 19, 

1991. 





The validity of the marriage “under Canadian law” is established by demonstrating that 

the foreign marriage is valid under the applicable Canadian law. The expression “Canadian law” 

may refer to Canadian rules pertaining to the conflict of laws 53 applicable to foreign marriages, to 

rules concerning the formal and essential validity of a marriage concluded in Canada and to 

federal legislation regulating certain aspects of marriage, namely the Marriage (Prohibited 

Degrees) Act 54 which prohibits marriage between certain individuals and the Criminal Code 55 

which criminalizes bigamy and polygamy. 

The issue that arises is whether all three sets of rules (common-law rules concerning 

conflict of laws, provincial rules pertaining to formal validity of marriage and the federal rules 

concerning essential validity of a marriage and those regulating certain aspects of marriage) 

should be applied when determining if a foreign marriage is valid “under Canadian law.” It 

would seem that only rules respecting essential aspects of marriage and federal legislation 

regulating certain aspects of marriage were intended to be applicable. 

The rules concerning conflict of laws in cases of foreign marriages applicable in Canada 

refer back to the rules of the place where the marriage was celebrated for questions of formal 

validity and to the rules of the spouses’ domicile prior to marriage for questions of essential 

validity. If these rules are applied, the result is the same as that obtained in applying the first part 

of the definition of “marriage” 56 thus making the second part of the definition of marriage in 

IRPA redundant. 

In Canada, the rules concerning the formal validity of marriage are a matter under 

provincial jurisdiction and vary from province to province. It is suggested that these rules were 

not intended to be applied in the context of the validity of a foreign “marriage” under the IRPA. 

It is difficult to see the merit, for immigration purposes, in requiring that foreign marriages 

accord with provincial rules concerning the solemnization of marriages. 57 

On the other hand, rules concerning the essential validity of marriage in Canada fall under 

federal jurisdiction and are relevant because they govern the substantial aspects of marriage. The 

same can be said of provisions in the Marriage (Prohibited Degrees) Act 58 and those concerning 

53 

54 

55 

56 

57 

58 

“Conflict of laws” generally refers to a situation where the laws of more than one jurisdiction may apply to the 

legal issue to be determined. For instance, in determining the validity of a foreign marriage, the laws of the 

jurisdiction where the partners celebrated their marriage, of their domicile prior to marriage as well as those of 

Canada may, at least initially, all appear applicable. In such cases, there are legal rules and common-law 

principles that assist in sorting out which jurisdiction’s rules actually apply. 

S.C. 1990, c. 46 as amended. 

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 as amended. 

Castel, J.-G., Canadian Conflict of Laws (Toronto: Butterworths, 1986). 

Note that the age at which a person may contract marriage in Canada is of provincial jurisdiction. This issue is 

addressed in the immigration context in s. 5(a) and s. 117(9)(a) of the IRP Regulations. 

Supra, footnote 54. 





igamy and polygamy in the Criminal Code. 59 These rules are interrelated with the definition of 

marriage as it is understood and applied in Canada. It is arguable therefore that interpreting the 

expression “under Canadian law” to refer to both the rules of essential validity of a marriage in 

Canada and to federal legislation regulating certain aspects of marriage best conforms to the 

intended purpose of the definition of marriage in the IRP Regulations. 

The rules concerning essential validity 60 of marriage and the provisions of federal 

legislation concerning certain aspects of marriage are as follows: 61 

‣ The Parties Must have the Capacity to Consent to Marriage 

The parties must have the capacity to consent freely to the marriage, understanding the nature 

and consequences of the act. 

‣ The Marriage must not be one Prohibited by Degrees of Consanguinity 

An individual may not marry a person to whom he or she is related lineally (for instance, 

grandfather, father, and daughter) or as the brother, sister, half-brother or half-sister, including by 

adoption. 62 Such marriages, if contracted, are void. 63 

Note that s. 155 of the Criminal Code, 64 concerning the offence of incest closely mirrors s. 2(2) of 

the Marriage (Prohibited Degrees) Act, 65 except for the specific provision in the latter concerning 

adoption. 

‣ The Marriage must be Monogamous 

Marriage is defined by the common-law 66 and by s. 2 of the Civil Marriage Act 67 as an exclusive 

relationship. In addition, bigamy and polygamy are considered criminal offences. 68 

59 

60 

61 

62 

63 

64 

65 

66 

67 


Conditions of essential validity that may be raised only by the spouses themselves are not considered here 

given that the sponsorship appeal process does not oppose one spouse against the other. 

Davies, C., Family Law in Canada (Calgary: Carswell Legal Publications, 1984). 

S. 2(2) of the Marriage (Prohibited Degrees) Act, supra, footnote 54 states: “no person shall marry another 

person if they are related lineally, or as the brother or sister or half-brother or half-sister, including by 

adoption.” 

S. 3(2) of the Marriage (Prohibited Degrees) Act, supra, footnote 54. 

S. 155(1) of the Criminal Code, supra, footnote 55 states: 

Every one commits incest who, knowing that another person is by blood relationship his or 

her parent, child, brother, sister, grandparent or grandchild, as the case may be, has sexual 

intercourse with that person. 

S. 155(4) of the Criminal Code states: In this section, “brother” and “sister” respectively include halfbrother 

and half-sister. 


See introduction. 

Supra, footnote 21 





A prior marriage is dissolved by divorce, annulment or by the death of one of the parties to the 

marriage. 69 The rules concerning the recognition of foreign divorce judgments in Canada are 

provided by the case law and s. 22 of the Divorce Act. 

COMMON-LAW PARTNER 

In order for a foreign national applying as a common-law partner to be considered a 

member of the family class or a family member, the foreign national must meet the definition of 

“common-law partner” set out in s. 1(1) as interpreted by s. 1(2) of the IRP Regulations, and the 

relationship must not be excluded by virtue of s. 4, s. 4.1, or s. 5 of the IRP Regulations. In 

addition, a foreign national applying as a common-law partner and member of the family class 

must not be in an excluded relationship mentioned at s. 117(9) of the IRP Regulations. 

Definition of “Common-law Partner” 

“Common-law partner” is defined at s. 1(1) of the IRP Regulations as: 

… in relation to a person, an individual who is cohabiting with the person, in a 

conjugal relationship, having so cohabited for a period of at least one year. 

Section 1(2) of the IRP Regulations complements the definition. It provides a rule 

of interpretation which states: 

For the purposes of the Act and these Regulations, an individual who has been in a 

conjugal relationship with a person for at least one year but is unable to cohabit 

with the person, due to persecution or any form of penal control, shall be 

considered a common-law partner of the person. 

The definition of common-law partner refers to “…in relation to a person, an individual 

who is cohabiting with the person, in a conjugal relationship…” without limiting the relationship 

to one between a male partner and a female partner. The definition is therefore gender-neutral 70 

and as such includes relationships between same-sex and opposite-sex partners. 

The evidence must establish that all the elements of the definition are met in order for a 

foreign national to be considered a “common-law partner.” The elements of the definition of 

“common-law partner” are discussed below. 

68 

69 

70 

S. 290(1) and s. 293 of the Criminal Code, supra footnote 55, respectively. 

For a more detailed discussion regarding the dissolution of a prior marriage, see the discussion regarding 

Regulation 117(9)(c)(i) later in this chapter. 

In comparison, the definition of "spouse" in s. 2(1) of the former Immigration Regulations, 1978 stated: 

"…means the party of the opposite sex to whom the person is joined in marriage." 





Conjugal Relationship 

As stated above, to be a common-law partner within the definition in IRPA, the couple 

must be in a conjugal relationship. Although the IRPA and IRP Regulations do not define 

“conjugal relationship,” the term conjugal is ordinarily defined 71 and interpreted in the case law 

as referring to a “marriage-like relationship.” 72 The jurisprudence has established several criteria 

that are useful in determining whether a conjugal relationship exists. The principal case is M. v. 

H., 73 wherein the Supreme Court of Canada stated the following in relation to a conjugal 

relationship: 

[59] Molodowich v. Penttinen (1980), 17 R.F.L. (2d) 376 (Ont. Dist. Ct.), sets out 

the generally accepted characteristics of a conjugal relationship. They include 

shared shelter, sexual and personal behaviour, services, social activities, 

economic support and children, as well as the societal perception of the couple. 

However, it was recognised that these elements may be present in varying degrees 

and not all are necessary for the relationship to be found to be conjugal. While it 

is true that there may not be any consensus as to the societal perception of samesex 

couples, there is agreement that same-sex couples share many other 

"conjugal" characteristics. In order to come within the definition, neither 

opposite-sex couples nor same-sex couples are required to fit precisely the 

traditional marital model to demonstrate that the relationship is "conjugal". 

[60] Certainly an opposite-sex couple may, after many years together, be considered to be 

in a conjugal relationship although they have neither children nor sexual relations. 

Obviously the weight to be accorded the various elements or factors to be considered in 

determining whether an opposite-sex couple is in a conjugal relationship will vary widely 

and almost infinitely. The same must hold true of same-sex couples. Courts have wisely 

determined that the approach to determining whether a relationship is conjugal must be 

flexible. This must be so, for the relationships of all couples will vary widely. 

In the immigration context, the court has stated that “it is clear that a conjugal relationship 

is one of some permanence, where individuals are interdependent – financially, socially, 

emotionally, and physically – where they share household and related responsibilities, and where 

they have made a serious commitment to one another. 74 

71 

72 

73 

74 

Conjugal is defined as “consort, spouse, to join together, join in marriage, of or relating to marriage, 

matrimonial.” The Oxford Concise Dictionary, 7 th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 

For instance, M. v. H., supra, footnote 9. 


Siev, Samuth v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2472-04), Rouleau, May 24, 2005; 2005 FC 736. 





The criteria enunciated in M. v. H. 75 have been refined and expanded in subsequent case 

law. The following factors have been considered when examining the issue of the existence of a 

conjugal relationship in the context of family class sponsorship applications. 76 

‣ Shelter: Whether the partners live together in the same home as a couple and whether there is 

evidence they intend to co-exist as a single family unit upon reunification in Canada. 77 

‣ Sexual and personal behavior: How the partners met, evidence of the development of their 

relationship, and whether the partners’ relationship is exclusive, committed, loving, intimate 

and evidenced by emotional, intellectual and physical interaction. Sexual relations are not an 

absolute requirement 78 although a conjugal relationship does imply that the couple has met 

face to face 79 and has engaged in a physical relationship. 80 The relationship should also be 

viewed as long-term and on-going. Note, also, that in Singh 81 , the court recognized that it is 

possible to have a valid common-law relationship while being legally married to another 

person, provided neither one of the legally married spouses continues the marital relationship. 

‣ Services: Whether household and other family–type responsibilities are shared and whether 

there is evidence of mutual assistance especially in time of need. 

‣ Social activities: Whether the partners share time together or participate in leisure activity 

together - Whether they have relationships or interaction with each other’s respective family. 

‣ Economic support: Whether the partners are financially interdependent or dependent; 

Whether the partners have joined, to some extent, their financial affairs (for instance, as in 

75 

76 

77 

78 

79 

80 

81 


See, for example, Siev, supra, footnote 74; Porteous, Robert William v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-22804), Hoare, 

October 27, 2004; McCullough, Robert Edmund v. M.C.I. (IAD WA3-00043), Boscariol, February 5, 2004; 

Kumar, Monika v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-10172), MacDonald, May 8, 2006; Dunham Audrey Pearl v. M.C.I. (IAD 

TA4-00144), Néron, August 24, 2004; Stephen, Ferdinand v. M.C.I. (IAD TA5-09330), MacLean, October 12, 

2007. 

This factor is replaced by the requirement to cohabit in the definition of “common-law partner.” 

Stephen, supra, footnote 76. 

Dunham, supra footnote 76; Naidu, Kamleshni Kanta v. M.C.I. (IAD VA5-00244), Sealy, February 1, 2006. 

Ursua, Erlinda Arellano v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-08587), Boire, September 12, 2005. 

Singh, Amarjit v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5641-02), Snider, May 4, 2006; 2006 FC 565. In that case the court 

accepted that a valid common-law relationship could exist even though the appellant was legally married to 

another woman in his country, but rejected that such a situation existed on the facts because there was evidence 

that the appellant had been sending money to his wife in India and that, if he returned to India, his wife would 

expect him to return to her. See also Cantin, Edmond v. M.C.I. (IAD MA4-06892), Néron, August 1, 2005 

wherein the panel found that the appellant had a genuine conjugal relationship with the applicant despite the 

fact that the appellant was still married, provided for his wife financially, and occasionally visited her. The 

appellant’s wife had had Alzheimer’s disease for several years and was in an advanced vegetative state in a 

special care facility. The panel was critical of the visa officer’s “restrictive definition” of the concept of 

exclusivity given the unique and unfortunate circumstances of the case. 





joint-ownership) or arranged them to reflect their ongoing relationship (for instance, naming 

the other partner beneficiary in an insurance policy or will). 

‣ Children: The existence of children and the partners’ attitude and conduct towards children 

in the context of their relationship. 

‣ Societal perception: Whether the partners are treated or perceived by the community as a 

couple. 

‣ Capacity to consent: The partners must be capable of freely consenting to a conjugal 

relationship as well as understand its nature and consequences. 

‣ Not prohibited by degrees of consanguinity: The relationship must not be one which falls 

within the prohibited degrees of marriage set out in s. 2(2) of the Marriage (Prohibited 

Degrees) Act. 82 

‣ The relationship must not be a “precursor” to a conjugal relationship: Where the 

relationship may be described as a precursor to a “marriage-like” relationship, it will not be 

considered a conjugal relationship. For instance, persons whose marriage has been arranged 

but who have not met each other or persons who are dating but have not established a 

marriage-like relationship, are not in a conjugal relationship. Note that fiancés are no longer 

members of the family class but may nevertheless be considered common-law partners or 

conjugal partners if they meet the requirements of the applicable definition including, being 

at the time of the application, in a marriage-like relationship. 83 

The interplay of these factors in the context of family class sponsorships has been 

considered in several cases. The jurisprudence clearly indicates that the importance of any of 

these characteristics will vary with the context and it is not necessary that all of them be present 

before a conjugal relationship is found to exist. The goal is to determine whether the relationship 

is conjugal and the criteria must be applied only insofar as they may assist in this determination. 84 

82 

83 

84 


S. 121(a) of the IRP Regulations. According to the RIAS, supra, footnote 7: 

The Regulations as pre-published have been modified to remove fiancés and intended commonlaw 

partners. The number of people who have been seeking permanent residence as fiancés has 

been steadily declining. With respect to the “intended common-law partners,” the assessment of 

the intention of couples to cohabit goes beyond the scope of a normal immigration assessment 

and would be extremely difficult to administer. The conjugal partner category is a more workable 

approach to accommodate persons in a conjugal relationship unable to cohabit. 

Lavoie v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue), [2000] F.C.J. No. 2124 (F.C.A.), (QL) at para. 13 (the 

dissenting reasons of Justice Décary) wherein it is mentioned: 

I would add, for the purposes of the rehearing, that the factors set out in Milot [case citing the 

factors in Molodowich v. Penttinen]… do not have absolute value. They are useful to be sure, 

but they must be adapted to the context in which they are used. If we look too closely at the 

trees, we may not see the forest. In this case the forest is the conjugal relationship, a concept that 





The question is essentially whether the evidence establishes a marriage-like relationship between 

the partners. 

When determining whether a conjugal relationship exists, it is important to consider the 

cultural realities of the relationship. This is particularly important in the immigration context 

where one or both of the partners often are coming from a cultural background quite different 

than the Canadian milieu. In Siev, the Federal Court stated that “…the case law indicates to us 

that the evidence should not be minutely scrutinized and that one should refrain from applying 

North American reasoning to an applicant’s conduct.” 85 Cultural factors are often particularly 

relevant in same-sex relationships. In Leroux, 86 the court stated that “it seems to me to be 

important to keep in mind the restrictions which apply because the partners live in different 

countries, some of which have different moral standards and customs which may have an impact 

on the degree of tolerance for conjugal relationships, especially where same-sex partners are 

concerned. Nevertheless, the alleged conjugal relationship must have a sufficient number of 

features of a marriage to show that it is more than just a means of entering Canada as a member 

of the family class.” 87 

Cohabitation 

The definition of common-law partner requires that an individual “… is cohabiting …in a 

conjugal relationship, having so cohabited for a period of at least one year.” The partners must 

therefore be cohabiting and have cohabited conjugally and for at least one year. It is necessary, 

therefore, to determine when the partners were cohabitating. 

In addition to being one of the factors indicative of a conjugal relationship, cohabitation is 

a mandatory requirement of the definition of common-law partner. Hence, for the purposes of 

the definition of common-law partner, the “shelter” criterion, which serves in the case law to 

establish whether the relationship is marriage-like, is replaced by the legislative requirement to 

cohabit in a conjugal relationship for at least one year. 

85 

86 

87 

evokes a common life, which presupposes that the couple are involved with each other, together 

and in a lasting way on the personal, sexual, family, social and financial levels.” 

For some other cases that have applied the criteria originally listed in Molodowich v. Penttinen, see the 

following: Baird v. Iaci, [1997] B.C.J. No. 1789 (S.C.)(QL); Roberts v. Clough, [2002] P.E.I.J. No. 37 (S.C. 

(T.D.)), (QL); Fraser v. Canadien National, [1999] J.Q. no. 2286, (S.C.)(QL) and Spracklin v. Kichton, [2000] 

A.J. No. 1329 (Q.B.), (QL). For recent cases from the IAD see: McCullough, supra, footnote 76; Macapagal, 

Rodolfo v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-25810), D’Ignazio, February 18, 2004. 

Siev, supra, footnote 74 at paragraph 16. See also McCullough, supra, footnote 76. 

Leroux, Jean-Stéphane v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IM-2819-06), Tremblay-Lamer, April 17, 2007; 2007 FC 403 at 

paragraph 23. 

Ibid. 





Cohabitation is not defined in the IRPA or the IRP Regulations but has been interpreted in 

the common law to mean “living together as husband and wife.” 88 The IAD has adopted this 

definition as well. 89 Case law interpreting the term cohabitation in the family law context 

indicates that it refers to persons living under the same roof in a conjugal relationship and also 

indicates that partners are not required to be divorced or legally separated from a former partner 

to cohabit. 90 Further, the common-law partners do not have to necessarily physically reside at the 

same location without interruption. 91 In the context of family and estate law, the courts have held 

that in certain circumstances, usually in cases involving shared custody arrangements or work 

related obligations, cohabitation is established even though the parties do not physically live 

together at the “conjugal home” throughout the week or for a period of the year. 92 

However, it is not clear whether the time the partners spend apart (not cohabiting 

conjugally) is automatically to be taken into account in calculating the one-year period of 

cohabitation. For instance, where a partner has cohabited in a conjugal relationship for nine 

months and, although the relationship is ongoing, he or she spends the remaining three months 

out of the one-year period in another city (away from his or her partner), will the partner be 

considered to have cohabited in a conjugal relationship for one year or for nine months? In 

calculating the period of cohabitation, it appears relevant to consider the reasons for which the 

partners were not residing together. 

Cohabitation does not come to an end if the partners live separately during a “cooling-off 

period” or during a time of reassessment; it ends when “either party regards it as being at an end 

and, by his or her conduct, has demonstrated in a convincing manner that this state of mind is a 

settled one.” 93 

Cohabitation alone does not necessarily signify a common-law relationship. There must 

also be a “mutual commitment to a shared life.” 94 

88 

89 

90 

91 

92 

93 

94 

Exception to the Requirement to Cohabit 

Cohabitation: To live together as husband and wife. The mutual assumption of those marital rights, duties and 

obligations which are usually manifested by married people, including but not necessarily dependent on sexual 

relations. Black’s Law Dictionary, 6 th ed. (St. Paul, West Publishing Co.). 

Do, Thi Thanh Thuy (IAD TA3-17390), D’Ignazio, September 3, 2004. 

Sullivan v. Letnik (1997), 27 R.F.L. (4 th ) 79 (Ont. C.A.). 

Do, supra, footnote 89. In this case, the applicant had been travelling back and forth to Vietnam over a period 

of 11 years, living with his partner during the times he was in Vietnam, and they had had a child together. The 

panel found that a common-law relationship existed. 

Thauvette v. Malyon [1996] O.J. No. 1356 (Gen. Div.)(QL), mentioned in: McCrea v. Bain Estate, [2004] 

B.C.J. No.290 (QL); See also Hazlewood v. Kent, [2000] O.J. No. 5263 (Sup. Ct.)(QL) and Craddock v. 

Glover Estate [2000] O.J. No. 680 (S.C.)(QL). 

Sanderson v. Russell (1979), 24 O.R. (2d) 429, (C.A.) and Feehan v. Attwells (1979), 24 O.R. (2d) 248 (Co. 

Ct). 

Cai, Changbin v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6729-06), Kelen, August 3, 2007; 2007 FC 816. 





Section 1(2) of the IRP Regulations states: 

For the purposes of the Act and these Regulations, an individual who has been in a conjugal 

relationship with a person for at least one year but is unable to cohabit with the person, due to 

persecution or any form of penal control, shall be considered a common-law partner of the person. 

This provision sets out the circumstances under which an individual in a conjugal 

relationship with another person for at least one year will be considered a common-law partner of 

that person even though the requirement of cohabitation in the definition of “common-law 

partner” has not been met. 

According to s. 1(2) of the IRP Regulations, a partner is excused from fulfilling the 

cohabitation requirement where he or she is unable to cohabit with the other due to persecution or 

any form of penal control. The comments on this provision in the RIAS suggest that the intent of 

this section is that the persecution or penal control must be due to the partners’ conjugal 

relationship. 95 

The IRPA and the IRP Regulations do not define persecution or penal control. 

Persecution has been characterized in Canadian case law pertaining to the Convention refugee 

definition as referring to repeated or systemic infliction of serious harm 96 or treatment which 

compromises or denies basic human rights. 97 Discrimination is not persecution but cumulative 

acts of discrimination may amount to persecution. 98 

Penal control is a form of punishment usually inflicted or sanctioned by the state. Given 

the use of the expression “due to … any for of penal control” in s. 1(2) of the IRP Regulations, 

“penal control” is arguably not limited to incarceration or detention but may include corporal 

punishment, house arrest and other significant measure taken to punish an individual. 99 Such 

control may be the result of civil or criminal action and may be extra-judicial. 

95 

96 

97 

98 

99 

See the comments at p. 261 of the RIAS, supra, footnote 7: 

It was suggested to expand the factors excusing common-law partners from cohabiting to 

include discrimination in addition to “persecution” and “penal control”. Considering that 

“persecution” or “any form of penal control” can mean strong social sanctions which result in 

ostracism, loss of employment, inability to find shelter or other forms of persecution as a 

result of the relationship, no change has been made to the pre-published provisions.” 

Rajudeen v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), (1984), 55 N.R. 129 (F.C.A.). 

Chan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 593. For instance, the following 

mistreatment has been considered to be persecution: torture, beatings, rape, death threats, trumped-up charges, 

arbitrary detention and denial of the right to work. See in general Chapter 3 entitled “Persecution” of the RPD 

Interpretation of the Convention Refugee Definition in the Case Law Paper, December 31, 2005. 

See the jurisprudence listed in section 3.1.2. of the Refugee Protection Division, Interpretation of the 

Convention Refugee Definition in the Case Law Paper, December 31, 2005. 

For instance, a same-sex conjugal relationship may be considered illegal and the partners subject to 

imprisonment or lashings. 





The persecution or penal control must be such that an individual is unable to cohabit with 

another. In cases where an individual may obtain relief from persecution or penal control, it may 

be relevant to assess whether such relief was sought so as to enable one partner to cohabit with 

the other. 

CONJUGAL PARTNER 100 

In order for a foreign national applying as a conjugal partner to be considered a member 

of the family class, the foreign national must meet the definition of “conjugal partner” at s. 2 of 

the IRP Regulations and the relationship must not be excluded by virtue of s. 4, s. 4.1 or by s. 

117(9) of the IRP Regulations. 

Definition of “Conjugal Partner” 

Conjugal partner is defined at s. 2 of the IRP Regulations as: 

… in relation to a sponsor, a foreign national residing outside of Canada who is in a conjugal 

relationship with the sponsor and has been in that relationship for a period of at least one year. 

The definition of conjugal partner refers to “…in relation to a sponsor, a foreign national 

… who is in a conjugal relationship…” without limiting the relationship to one between a male 

partner and a female partner. The definition is therefore considered gender-neutral and as such 

includes relationships between same-sex and opposite-sex partners. This has been confirmed by 

the Federal Court in Leroux. 101 

The elements of the definition of “conjugal partner” are considered below. 

Conjugal Relationship 

Subject to the following discussion, the comments earlier in this chapter concerning 

“conjugal relationship” in the context of the definition of “common-law partner” apply to the 

definition of “conjugal partner” because both definitions require that the partners be in a conjugal 

relationship. Although cohabitation is not required by the definition of “conjugal partner,” where 

the partners allege to have cohabited, the comments concerning cohabitation may be helpful. 

Given that cohabitation is one of the characteristics of a conjugal relationship according to the 

case law, the applicant and the sponsor may reasonably be required to indicate why they have not 

cohabited. 

100 Many of the concepts applicable to common-law partners are also applicable to conjugal partnerships, and are 

not repeated in this section. Please refer to the section on common-law partners. 

101 Leroux, supra, footnote 86. 





The relationship of “conjugal partners” may not be as developed as that of “common-law 

partners” because they may not have cohabited. The partners may not have the same depth of 

knowledge of one another. However, this does not change the fact that their relationship is 

required to be a conjugal one and not simply one that is anticipated to become conjugal. While 

there is no cohabitation requirement, in one case the IAD stated that in the context of a 

relationship that developed over the internet over a three-year period of time, it would have been 

expected that the partners met in person. 102 In another case the IAD panel stated that “persons 

whose marriage has been arranged but who have not met each other and have not established a 

marriage-like relationship are not in a conjugal relationship.” 103 Finally, in Ursua 104 the panel 

dismissed an appeal on the basis that the relationship had not been established within the oneyear 

requirement. In that case, the appellant indicated that the conjugal relationship had started 

when they had made love on the phone. The panel, however, rejected this argument indicating 

that a conjugal relationship implies a physical relationship. 

Conjugal partners may be reasonably asked to establish whether they intend to marry or 

live in a common-law relationship once reunited with their sponsor. “Conjugal partner” is not a 

legally recognized status in Canada. Conjugal partners do not have the same rights and benefits 

as spouses and common-law partners under Canadian law. It is therefore reasonable to expect 

that partners will convert their ongoing conjugal relationship to a common-law relationship or 

they will marry. However, prior to making the sponsorship application, the partners do not have 

to be married or live in a common-law relationship, even if that would have been possible. 105 

Duration of the Conjugal Relationship 

As when assessing common-law relationships, it is important to determine when the 

conjugal relationship began. Partners are required to be and to have been in a conjugal 

relationship for at least one year. 106 Although it is not necessary to determine the exact date on 

which the conjugal relationship began, evidence should establish that it began before the oneyear 

requirement. 107 There is no indication that the one-year relationship must necessarily have 

102 Dunham, supra, footnote 76. 

103 Naidu, supra, footnote 79. 

104 Ursua, supra, footnote 80. 

105 In Chartrand, Rita Malvina v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-18146), Collins, February 20, 2006, the visa officer had 

rejected the sponsorship application because “if couples can marry or cohabit, they are expected to do so before 

the immigration process takes place.” The panel rejected this notion, indicating that couples have a right to 

choose the type of relationship that suits them best as well as the right time to marry. The IAD found that there 

was no requirement to marry before the immigration process started even if the couple could have done so. 

106 See, for example, Bui, Binh Cong v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-18557), Whist, August 19, 2005 wherein the panel 

assessed the criteria for the existence of a conjugal relationship and concluded that while the partners may have 

been in a conjugal relationship at the time they made their sponsorship application, the indicia did not indicate 

that it had begun one year before the application was made. 

107 See, for example, Laforge, Robert v. M.C.I. (IAD MA3-08755), Beauchemin, July 20, 2004 wherein the panel 

stated that the conjugal relationship started in July or August 2002, but in any event it was within the one-year 

requirement. 





taken place in the year immediately preceding the application for permanent residence. 

However, the partners are required to be in a conjugal relationship at the time of the application 

and may be reasonably requested to explain the break in their conjugal relationship. The 

partnership between the partners may be said to begin when the characteristics of a conjugal 

relationship were first present and to end when such characteristics are no longer present. 108 

EXCLUDED RELATIONSHIPS 

Section 5 of the IRP Regulations 109 

A foreign national is not considered a spouse or a common-law partner where the foreign 

national is in an excluded relationship mentioned in s. 5 of the IRP Regulations. 

The excluded relationships are described below. 

Section 5(a): A foreign national shall not be considered the spouse or the 

common-law partner of a person if the foreign national is under the age of 16 

years; or 

A foreign national must be 16 years of age or older to be considered a spouse or commonlaw 

partner. The foreign national must meet the age requirement at the time the application for a 

permanent resident visa is made. 110 While this section applies only to spouses and common-law 

partners, note that IRP Regulation 117(9)(a) contains a similar restriction that applies to spouses, 

common-law partners, and conjugal partners who are being sponsored. 

Section 5(a) of the IRP Regulations does not impede a foreign national from marrying or 

cohabiting in a conjugal relationship prior to the age of 16 years. Consequently, it appears that a 

foreign national may cohabit in a conjugal relationship prior to the age of 16 years in order to 

fulfill the one-year requirement to so cohabit contained in the definition of “common-law 

partner” and thereby be in a position to apply for a permanent resident visa upon turning 16 years 

old. 

Note, however, that local legislation may regulate or prohibit marriage or common-law 

relationships where either or both parties are under a certain age. If the act of engaging in sexual 

activity with a minor under a certain age is considered an offence under local legislation and is 

108 See the case law concerning the duration of cohabitation, supra, footnote 93, which applies the same approach 

in determining the end of cohabitation. 

109 There is substantial overlap between section 5 of the IRP Regulations and section 117(9). Please refer to the 

discussion later in this chapter regarding regulation 117(9) for further discussion regarding some of these 

concepts. 

110 S. 121(a) of the IRP Regulations requires that the person be a family member (in this case, spouse or commonlaw 

partner) of the applicant or of the sponsor at the time the application is made. 





also considered an offence under Canadian law, the foreign national may be inadmissible for 

serious criminality or criminality by virtue of s. 36 of the IRPA. 

Section 5(b)(i): A foreign national shall not be considered the spouse of a 

person if the foreign national or the person was, at the time of their marriage, 

the spouse of another person; or 

The foreign national will not be considered a spouse where, at the time the foreign 

national and the sponsor or the member of the family class married, either or both, were the 

spouse of another person. 

The effect of this provision is to exclude foreign nationals in bigamous and polygamous 

relationships from being considered spouses. The marriage will not be considered an excluded 

relationship if it is a first marriage for both parties or, if it is not their first marriage, at the time 

they married, all prior marriages had been dissolved. 

Section 5(b)(ii): A foreign national shall not be considered the spouse of a 

person if the person has lived separate and apart from the foreign national 

for at least one year and is the common-law partner of another person. 

The foreign national will not be considered a spouse where the following two elements are 

present: first, the foreign national and the person have lived separate and apart for at least one 

year and second, the person is the common-law partner of another person. 

• “Separate and Apart”: This expression is used in the context of family law and more 

particularly in s. 8(2)(a) of the Divorce Act, to refer to spouses who are no longer in a 

conjugal relationship and are leading separate lives. 111 In cases where the spouses continue 

to live under the same roof, they are considered to be living separate and apart if they are 

not cohabiting in a conjugal manner. 

• Involvement with a common-law partner: The sponsor or the member of the family 

class must be involved in a common-law partnership with another person. In order to meet 

the definition of common-law partner, the parties must have been cohabiting in a conjugal 

relationship for at least one year. Where the sponsor or the member of the family class 

and the spouse have not been living separate and apart for a year, the relationship with the 

partner will not be considered a common-law relationship. These rules preclude a sponsor 

from sponsoring his spouse while at the same time having his or her relationship with 

another person qualify as a common-law partnership. Similarly, a member of the family 

class will not be able to name his or her spouse as an accompanying family member and 

have a relationship with another person qualify as a common-law partnership. 

111 Supra, footnote 61. 





Section 5(b)(ii) probably does not apply in the following situations because one or more of 

the elements of the provision is not met and the foreign national is considered a “spouse:” 

• The foreign national (spouse) and the person (sponsor or member of the family class) have 

been living separate and apart and the person is not the common-law partner of another 

person; 112 

• The foreign national (spouse) and the person (sponsor or member of the family class) have 

been living separate and apart for less than one year and the sponsor or the member of the 

family class is involved in a relationship of a conjugal nature. The relationship of a conjugal 

nature would not qualify as a common-law relationship because the partners have not 

cohabited in an exclusive conjugal relationship for at least one year. The person has lived in 

a marital relationship with the foreign national for part of the year. Hence, the sponsor or 

member of the family class is precluded from establishing a common-law relationship if he or 

she has not been living separate and apart from the foreign national for at least one year. 

Section 117(9) of the IRP Regulations 

Section 117(9) of the IRP Regulations provides that a foreign national is not considered a 

member of the family class by virtue of his or her relationship to the sponsor where the 

relationship is described in one or more of the provisions at s. 117(9)(a) to (d). 

The excluded relationships are discussed below. 

Section 117(9)(a): The foreign national is the sponsor’s spouse, common-law 

partner or conjugal partner and is under 16 years of age; or 

A foreign national applying for permanent residence as a sponsor’s spouse, common-law 

partner or conjugal partner must be 16 years of age or older to be considered a member of the 

family class. The foreign national must meet the age requirement at the time the application for a 

permanent resident visa is made. 113 

Section 117(9)(a) of the IRP Regulations does not impede a foreign national from 

marrying or entering into a conjugal relationship prior to the age of 16 years. Consequently, it 

appears that a foreign national may cohabit in a conjugal relationship prior to the age of 16 years 

in order to fulfill the one-year requirement to so cohabit contained in the definition of “commonlaw 

partner” and be in a position to apply for a permanent resident visa upon turning 16 years 

old. Similarly, a foreign national may enter into a conjugal relationship prior to the age of 16 

years in order to fulfill the requirement of being in a conjugal relationship for at least one year 

contained in the definition of “conjugal partner” and apply for a permanent resident visa at 16 

years old. 

112 Note, however, that s. 4 of the IRP Regulations (provision concerning bad faith relationships) may apply. 






Note, however, that local legislation may regulate or prohibit marriage, common-law 

relationships or conjugal relationships where either or both parties are under a certain age. If the 

act of engaging in sexual activity with a minor under a certain age is considered an offence under 

local legislation and is also considered an offence under Canadian law, the foreign national may 

be inadmissible for serious criminality or criminality by virtue of s. 36 of the IRPA. 

In addition, a foreign national applying as a sponsor’s spouse or common-law partner is 

not considered a “spouse” or a “common-law partner” prior to age 16 pursuant to s. 5(a) of the 

IRP Regulations and is consequently not a member of the family class. The purpose served by s. 

117(9)(a) in the case of a foreign national applying as a sponsor’s spouse or common-law partner 

is redundant. Section 117(9)(a) may serve to explicitly remove a foreign national applying as a 

sponsor’s spouse or common-law partner from the family class. 

Section 117(9)(b): The foreign national is the sponsor’s spouse, common-law 

partner or conjugal partner, the sponsor has an existing sponsorship 

undertaking in respect of a spouse, common-law partner or conjugal partner 

and the period referred to in subsection 132(1) in respect of that undertaking 

has not ended; or 

A spouse, common-law partner or conjugal partner is not considered a member of the 

family class where the sponsor’s previous undertaking with respect to a spouse, common-law 

partner or conjugal partner has not come to an end. In the case of a family class sponsorship, an 

undertaking begins, in accordance with s. 132(1)(a)(iii) of the IRP Regulations, on the day on 

which the foreign national becomes a permanent resident and ends pursuant to s. 132(1)(b)(i), on 

the last day of a period of three (3) years from the first day. Where the sponsor resides in a 

province which has entered into an agreement referred to in s. 8(1) of the IRPA, s. 132(3) sets the 

duration of the undertaking at ten (10) years unless a shorter duration 114 is provided by provincial 

legislation. In Quebec, s. 23(a)(i) of the Regulation respecting the selection of foreign 

nationals, 115 sets the duration of an undertaking in the case of the sponsorship of a spouse, de 

facto spouse and conjugal partner at three (3) years. 

For transitional cases, s. 351(3) of the IRP Regulations specifically provides that the 

duration of undertakings given under s. 118 the former Immigration Act, which include 

undertakings for sponsorships of members of the family class given before June 28 th 2002, is not 

affected by the IRP Regulations. The duration of an undertaking for the sponsorship of a spouse 

was ten (10) years pursuant to the definition of undertaking in s. 2(1) and s. 5(2) of the 

Immigration Regulations, 1978. For undertakings given by Quebec residents, s. 23(a)(i) of the 

Regulation respecting the selection of foreign nationals 116 provided that in the case of spouses, 

the duration of the undertaking was three (3) years. 

114 S. 132(3) of the IRP Regulations. 

115 R.R.Q., 1981, c. M-23.1, r. 2 as amended. 

116 Ibid. 





Section 117(9)(c)(i): The foreign national is the sponsor’s spouse and the 

sponsor or the foreign national was, at the time of their marriage, the spouse 

of another person; or 

The foreign national will not be considered a member of the family class where at the 

time the foreign national and the sponsor married, either or both, were the spouse of another 

person. 

There is some overlap between this regulation and s. 5(b)(i) of the IRP Regulations which 

stipulates that a foreign national is not to be considered the spouse of a person if either the 

foreign national or the spouse was, at the time of their marriage, the spouse of another person. 

The marriage will not be considered an excluded relationship if it is a first marriage for both 

parties or, if it is not their first marriage, at the time they married, all prior marriages had been 

dissolved. Note that this provision does not apply to common-law partners or conjugal partners. 

A prior marriage is dissolved by divorce, annulment or by the death of one of the parties 

to the marriage. Section 117(9)(c)(i) of the regulations is most commonly at issue when the 

validity of a previous divorce of either of the spouses is in question. 117 The rules concerning the 

recognition of foreign divorce judgments in Canada are provided by the case law and s. 22 of the 

Divorce Act. 118 

Section 22(1) of the Divorce Act stipulates that for a divorce to be recognized in Canada, 

one of the spouses must have been “ordinarily resident” in the place where the divorce was 

granted for at least a year before the divorce was granted. Ordinarily resident has been 

interpreted to carry “a restricted significance” and to mean “residence in the course of the 

customary mode of life of the person concerned, and it is contrasted with special or occasional or 

casual residence. The general mode of life is, therefore, relevant to the question of its 

application.” 119 

117 In this regard, the discussion earlier in this chapter regarding evidentiary issues of foreign marriages may be 

helpful. 

118 22. (1) A divorce granted, on or after the coming into force of this Act [editor’s note: this was July 1, 1986], 

pursuant to a law of a country or subdivision of a country other than Canada by a tribunal or other authority 

having jurisdiction to do so shall be recognized for all purposes of determining the marital status in Canada of 

any person, if either former spouse was ordinarily resident in that country or subdivision for at least one year 

immediately preceding the commencement of proceedings for the divorce. 

(2) A divorce granted, after July 1, 1968, pursuant to a law of a country or subdivision of a country other than 

Canada by a tribunal or other authority having jurisdiction to do so, on the basis of the domicile of the wife in 

that country or subdivision determined as if she were unmarried and, if she was a minor, as if she had attained 

the age of majority, shall be recognized for all purposes of determining the marital status in Canada of any 

person. 

(3) Nothing in this section abrogates or derogates from any other rule of law respecting the recognition of 

divorces granted otherwise than under this Act. 

119 Thomson v. M.N.R., [1946] S.C.R. 209 per Rand J. See also MacPherson v. MacPherson (1977), 13 O.R. (2d) 

233 (C.A.) at paragraph 8 per Evans J. dissenting in part, but not on this point. 





Note also that subsection 22(3) of the Divorce Act preserves the common-law with 

respect to the recognition of divorces. There were several common-law rules developed prior to 

the adoption of divorce legislation in Canada which are succinctly summarized in El Qaoud, 120 

quoting Payne on Divorce, 4 th ed. : 

. . . Section 22(3) of the Divorce Act expressly preserves pre-existing judge 

made rules of law pertaining to the recognition of foreign divorces. It may be 

appropriate to summarize these rules. Canadian courts will recognize a foreign 

divorce: (i) where jurisdiction was assumed on the basis of the domicile of the 

spouses; (ii) where the foreign divorce, though granted on a non-domiciliary 

jurisdictional basis, is recognized by the law of the domicile of the parties; (iii) 

where the foreign jurisdictional rule corresponds to the Canadian jurisdictional 

rule in divorce proceedings; (iv) where the circumstances in the foreign 

jurisdiction would have conferred jurisdiction on a Canadian court had they 

occurred in Canada; (v) where either the petitioner or respondent had a real and 

substantial connection with the foreign jurisdiction wherein the divorce was 

granted; and (vi) where the foreign divorce is recognized in another foreign 

jurisdiction with which the petitioner or respondent has a real and substantial 

connection. 

Thus, in Bhatti, 121 the applicant was refused an immigrant visa and the issue in the appeal 

was the validity of the appellant’s marriage to the applicant. The appellant had obtained a 

religious divorce in Pakistan. The panel recognized the divorce and allowed the appeal finding 

that the appellant had a real and substantial connection to Pakistan. However in Ghosn, 122 the 

panel rejected the argument that the appellant had legally divorced in Canada when he went 

through a form of religious divorce. 

Section 117(9)(c)(ii): The foreign national is the sponsor’s spouse and the 

sponsor has lived separate and apart from the foreign national for at least one 

year and (A) the sponsor is the common-law partner of another person or the 

conjugal partner of another foreign national; or (B) the foreign national is 

the common-law partner of another person or the conjugal partner of 

another sponsor; or 

The foreign national will not be considered a member of the family class where the 

following two elements are present: first, the sponsor and the foreign national must have been 

living separate and apart for at least one year and second, the sponsor is involved in a commonlaw 

partnership with another person or a conjugal partnership with another foreign national or the 

120 Orabi v. Qaoud, 2005 NSCA 28 at paragraph 14. 

121 Bhatti, Mukhtar Ahmad (IAD TA2-11254), MacPherson, July 10, 2003 followed in Amjad, Ali Saud v. M.C.I. 

(IAD TA3-09455), Hoare, February 11, 2005. 

122 Ghosn, Kassem Ata v. M.C.I. (IAD VA4-02673), Rozdilsky, March 27, 2006. 





foreign national is involved in a common-law partnership with another person or in a conjugal 

partnership with another sponsor. 

• “Separate and Apart”: This expression is used in the context of family law and more 

particularly in s. 8(2)(a) of the Divorce Act, to refer to spouses who are no longer in a 

conjugal relationship and are leading separate lives. 123 In cases where the spouses 

continue to live under the same roof, they are considered to be living separate and apart if 

they are not cohabiting in a conjugal manner. 

• Involvement with a common-law partner or conjugal partner: Where the sponsor and 

the spouse have not been living separate and apart for a year, the sponsor’s or the foreign 

national’s relationship with another partner will not be considered a common-law or 

conjugal relationship because the relationship has not been exclusive and ongoing for one 

year. These rules preclude a sponsor from sponsoring his spouse and having his or her 

relationship with another individual, or the spouse’s relationship with another individual, 

qualify as a common-law partnership or conjugal partnership. 

Note that s. 5(b)(ii) of the IRP Regulations may also apply to disqualify a foreign national 

from being considered a spouse or a common-law partner and hence a member of the family 

class. 

Section 117(9)(d): subject to subsection (10), the sponsor previously made an 

application for permanent residence and became a permanent resident and, 

at the time of that application, the foreign national was a non-accompanying 

family member of the sponsor and was not examined. 

This provision, which was amended in 2004 124 to its current form, excludes foreign 

nationals who, at the time the sponsor applied for permanent residence, were non-accompanying 

family members of the sponsor and were not examined. 

Sections 117(10) and (11) of the regulations were also added in 2004. Section 117(10) 

creates an exception to the exclusionary rule. It stipulates that regulation 117(9)(d) does not 

apply when the foreign national was not examined because an officer had determined that they 

were not required by the Act or the former Act to be examined. This exception is narrowed 

somewhat in subsection (11) which stipulates that the exception in subsection (10) does not apply 

if an officer determines that (a) the sponsor was informed that the foreign national could be 

examined and the sponsor was able to the make the foreign national available for examination but 

did not do so or the foreign national did not appear for the examination, or (b) the foreign 

national was the sponsor’s spouse, was living separate and apart from the sponsor and was not 

examined. 


124 SOR/2004-167, July 22, 2004. 





The constitutionality of s. 117(9)(d) has been confirmed by the Federal Court of 

Appeal. 125 Further, the Court of Appeal has interpreted the phrase “at the time of the 

application” in section 117(9)(d) to mean the life of the application from the time when it is 

initiated by the filing of the authorized form to the time when permanent resident status is 

granted at a port of entry. 126 Therefore, a foreign national who makes an application for 

permanent residence is under an obligation to disclose all non-accompanying family members at 

the time they make the application and the obligation continues up to the time they are granted 

landing at the port of entry. A foreign national will not be considered a member of the family 

class if they were a non-accompanying family member who was not declared by the sponsor at 

the time of the application even if the sponsor had not been aware of the foreign national’s 

existence at that time. 127 


For transitional cases, the IRP Regulations provide as follows: 

Section 352: A person is not required to include in an application a non-accompanying 

common-law partner if the application was made under the former Immigration Act; 

Section 353: Section 70(1)(e) of the IRP Regulations, which requires that nonaccompanying 

family members not be inadmissible in order for a permanent resident visa to be 

issued to a foreign national, is not applicable where the non-accompanying family member is a 

common-law partner and the application was made under the former Immigration Act; 

Section 354: The non-accompanying common-law partner of a person who made an 

application before June 28 th 2002 shall not be considered an inadmissible non-accompanying 

family member under s. 42(a) of the IRPA, shall not be subject to a medical examination under s. 

30(1)(a) of the IRP Regulations and will not be required to establish that they meet the 

requirements of the IRPA and the IRP Regulations upon examination at the port of entry in 

accordance with s. 51(b) of the IRP Regulations. 

Section 355: If a person who made an application under the former Act before June 28, 

2002 sponsors a non-accompanying dependent child, referred to in section 352, who makes an 

application as a member of the family class or the spouse or common-law partner in Canada 

class, or sponsors a non-accompanying common-law partner who makes such an application, 

paragraph 117(9)(d) does not apply in respect of that dependent child or common-law partner. 

125 De Guzman, Josephine Soliven v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-558-04), Evans, Desjardins, Malone, December 20, 

2005; 2005 FCA 436, leave to appeal to the SCC rejected with costs June 22, 2006 (De Guzman v. M.C.I., 

2006 S.C.C.A. No. 70 (Q.L.)). 

126 M.C.I. v. Fuente, Cleotilde Dela (F.C.A., no. A-446-05), Noël, Sharlow, Malone, May 18, 2006; 2006 FCA 

186. 

127 Adjani, Joshua Taiwo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2033-07), Blanchard, January 10, 2008; 2008 FC 32. [this case 

included in this paper despite the publishing deadline of January 1, 2008] 





Thus, in Kong 128 the IAD allowed an appeal where the appellant had immigrated to 

Canada with his then spouse and children. At the time, he had a girlfriend with whom he had a 

son. Neither the girlfriend nor son had been disclosed at the time of his first application. He 

later attempted to sponsor them after his marriage broke down and he had subsequently married 

his girlfriend. The IAD found that the transitional provision in section 352 applied to his new 

wife as there were no provisions to sponsor common-law partners under the former Immigration 

Act. Further, the IAD found that the transitional provision in section 355 applied to the son as 

he was being sponsored as a dependent child of his wife and not directly by the appellant. 

RELATIONSHIPS FOR THE PURPOSE OF ACQUIRING A STATUS OR PRIVILEGE 

UNDER THE ACT 

Bad Faith – Section 4 of the IRP Regulations 

Section 4 of the IRP Regulations states: 

For the purposes of these Regulations, no foreign national shall be 

considered a spouse, a common-law partner, a conjugal partner or an 

adopted child of a person if the marriage, common-law partnership, 

conjugal partnership or adoption is not genuine and was entered into 

primarily for the purpose of acquiring any status or privilege under the 

Act. 

In order for a foreign national to be considered a spouse, common-law partner or conjugal 

partner, the evidence must establish that the relationship in question, namely the marriage, the 

common-law partnership or the conjugal partnership, is not a bad faith relationship. The burden 

of establishing the bona fides of the marriage is on the appellant at the IAD 129 but the evidence 

should not be minutely scrutinized nor should North American reasoning necessarily be applied 

to partners coming from another culture. 130 Genuineness of a relationship should be examined 

through the eyes of the parties themselves against the cultural background in which they have 

lived. 131 

128 Kong, Wai Keung Michael v. M.C.I. (IAD TA6-08094), Ahlfeld, January 31, 2008. 

129 Morris, Lawrence v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-5045-04), Pinard, March 18, 2005; 2005 FC 369. 

130 Siev, supra, footnote 74. 

131 Therefore, in Khan, Mohammad Farid v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-2971-06), Hughes, December 13, 2006; 2006 

FC 1490 the court allowed an application for judicial review of an IAD decision wherein it had been found that 

the marriage between the appellant and the sister of his deceased brother was not genuine. Although the 

evidence indicated that the marriage was entered into to preserve the honour of the family, there was no reason 

why such a marriage cannot be genuine given the cultural factors. See also Owusu, Margaret v. M.C.I. (F.C. 

no. IMM-1402-06), Harrington, October 6, 2006; 2006 FC 1195. 





According to s. 4 of the IRP Regulations, a bad faith relationship is one for which it is 

established (1) the relationship is not genuine and (2) the relationship was entered into primarily 

for the purpose of acquiring any status or privilege under the Act. 132 To succeed in an appeal, the 

appellant must only demonstrate that one of the two prongs does not apply to the relationship. 133 

Some of the factors helpful in assessing the intention of and genuineness of the relationship are: 

the length of the relationship, whether it was an arranged marriage, the age difference, the 

partners’ former marital or civil status, their respective financial situation, their employment, 

their family background, their knowledge of one another’s histories, their language, their 

respective interests, and their immigration histories. 134 However, these factors are only useful 

guidelines that must be adapted to fit the circumstances. 135 

The genuineness branch of the bad faith test in s. 4 uses the present tense; therefore, the 

focus is on whether there is a continuing genuine relationship at the time of assessment. 136 Also, 

a relationship will not be considered genuine if, at the time of the hearing of the appeal, the 

evidence establishes that the partners do not intend to continue their relationship. 137 In assessing 

the genuineness of the relationship, it is not just the intention of the sponsored spouse, commonlaw 

partner, or conjugal partner that is relevant. The focus is on the overall genuineness of the 

relationship and its primary purpose, for which the evidence of both spouses is relevant. 138 When 

determining if a marriage is caught by the first prong of the test in section 4 of the IRP 

Regulations, genuine does not equate to legal. The test in section 4 is only applied to what has 

already been determined to be a legal marriage under section 2. 139 

A relationship that was entered into primarily for the purpose of acquiring any status or 

privilege under the IRPA is one that was entered into in order to obtain permanent residence in 

Canada or some other status or privilege. In the case of a marriage, the time at which the 

relationship was entered into refers to the date of the marriage. In the case of a common-law 

partnership, it refers to the date on which the partners began to cohabit in a conjugal relationship 

and in the case of a conjugal partnership, it refers to the date on which the foreign national and 

the sponsor began a conjugal relationship. While the focus of this branch of the test is the 

132 Sanichara, Omeshwar v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-5233-04), Beaudry, July 25, 2005; 2005 FC 1015; Froment, 

Danielle Marie v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-475-06), Shore, August 24, 2006; 2006 FC 1002. 

133 Ouk, Chanta v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-865-07), Mosley, September 7, 2007; 2007 FC 891. 

134 See, for example, Khera, Amarjit v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6375-06), Martineau, June 13, 2007; 2007 FC 632 

and Owusu, supra, footnote 131. 

135 Owusu, supra, footnote 131. 

136 Donkor, Sumaila v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-654-06), Mosley, September 12, 2006; 2006 FC 1089. The Court 

also recognized that s. 4 of the IRP Regulations may leave open the possibility that a relationship that was 

originally entered into for the purpose of acquiring a status or privilege under the Act may become genuine and 

therefore not be excluded by the regulation. 

137 Kang, Randip Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-02099), Clark, June 3, 2003. 

138 Gavino, Edwin Dorol v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-3249-05), Russell, March 9, 2006; 2006 FC 308; Mann, 

Jagdeep Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-19094), Stein, August 5, 2005. 

139 Ni, Zhi Qi v. M.C.I.,(F.C. no. IMM-4385-04), Pinard, February 17, 2005; 2005 FC 241. 





intention of the partners at the time they entered into the relationship, the IAD is entitled to 

examine the conduct of the couple after the relationship began in order to determine what their 

intention was when they entered into the relationship. 140 Only one of the partners in the 

relationship need have as their primary purpose the acquisition of any status or privilege under 

the Act. 141 Finally, the appeal may be allowed if immigration is a factor in the relationship, 

provided it is not the primary factor. 142 

The relationship need not be entered into for the purpose of acquiring a status or privilege 

for the sponsored foreign national. The relationship will be caught by the second prong of 

section 4 so long as the relationship was entered into primarily to ensure that some privilege 

under the Act would be conveyed to someone. Therefore, in Gavino, 143 the court held that even 

if the privilege accrued from the marriage would be conveyed to the appellant’s children, the 

second prong of the branch was satisfied. 

While many of the factors relevant in determining if a common-law or conjugal 

partnership exist are the same as the factors relevant in determining good faith, it is still a distinct 

two-step process wherein first the validity of the relationship is established, and then whether 

section 4 of the IRP regulations applies. 144 

New Relationships – Section 4.1 of the IRP Regulations 

The IRP Regulations were amended in 2004 with the addition of section 4.1 145 which 

added a new category of bad faith relationships. Section 4.1 reads as follows: 

For the purposes of these Regulations, a foreign national shall not 

be considered a spouse, a common-law partner or a conjugal 

partner of a person if the foreign national has begun a new 

conjugal relationship with that person after a previous marriage, 

common-law partnership or conjugal partnership with that person 

was dissolved primarily so that the foreign national, another 

foreign national or the sponsor could acquire any status or 

privilege under the Act. 

The intent of section 4.1 has been stated to be “to prevent persons in a conjugal 

relationship from dissolving the relationship to free them to gain admission to Canada only to 

140 Mohamed, Rodal Houssein v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6790-05), Beaudry, May 24, 2006; 2006 FC 696. 

141 See, for example, Brunelle, Sherry Lynn v. M.C.I. (IAD VA4-00937), Munro, January 28, 2005. 

142 Lorenz, Hubert Calvin v. M.C.I. (IAD VA6-00444), Nest, June 15, 2007. 

143 Gavino, supra, footnote 138. 

144 Macapagal, supra, footnote 84. 

145 SOR/2004-167, s. 4. 





turn around and resume their previous relationship. 146 Section 4.1 will apply even if the partners 

originally dissolved their relationship with the intent of facilitating their admission to another 

country, only to change their plans and come to Canada. 147 

In Wen, 148 the IAD set out a list of non-exhaustive factors to consider when assessing the 

applicability of section 4.1 of the Regulations. They are: when the relationship was dissolved, 

the reason for the dissolution of the relationship, the temporal relationship between the ending of 

the relationship and the forming of a new relationship with the subsequent partner, evidence that 

the former spouses or partners did not separate or end contact with each other, the intent of the 

spouses or partners upon reestablishing their relationship, the length of the subsequent 

relationship, the temporal connection between the dissolving of the subsequent relationship and 

the re-establishment of a new relationship with the previous spouse or partner, and the intentions 

of the parties to the new relationship in respect of immigration. 

TIMING – Section 121(a) of IRP Regulations 

Section 121(a) of the IRP Regulations requires that a person who makes an application 

for a permanent resident visa as a member of the family class or as a family member must be a 

family member of the applicant or of the sponsor both at the time of the application and at the 

time of its determination. Hence, the foreign national must be a spouse or meet the definition of 

common-law partner or of conjugal partner and not be in an excluded relationship or bad faith 

relationship both at the time of the application for a permanent residence visa and at the time a 

determination is made by the officer. 

It is arguable that a foreign national must also be a member of the family class or a family 

member at the time of the filing of the appeal and at the time of the hearing before the IAD since 

their interest in obtaining a permanent resident visa is premised on their continuing relationship 

with the sponsor or the applicant. Section 67(1)(a) of the IRPA 149 may be relied upon as support 

for this position. 

146 Harripersaud, Janet Rameena v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-11611), Sangmuah, June 30, 2005. See also Mariano, 

Edita Palacio v. M.C.I. (IAD WA5-00122), Lamont, September 20, 2006. 

147 Harripersaud, ibid. 

148 Wen, Chun Xiu v. M.C.I. (IAD TA5-14563), MacLean, May 29, 2007. See also Zheng, Wei Rong v. M.C.I. 

(IAD TA4-16616), MacLean, August 23, 2007. 

149 S. 67(1)(a) of the IRPA states: To allow an appeal, the Immigration Appeal Division must be satisfied that, at 

the time that the appeal is disposed of, the decision appealed is wrong in law or fact or mixed law and fact. 

[emphasis added] 





In some cases, where an application for permanent residence was based on marriage and 

the IAD has found that marriage not to be valid, they have examined whether or not the appeal 

could be allowed based upon a common-law or conjugal partnership. 150 

DISMISSAL IN LAW OF THE SPONSORSHIP APPEAL 

Where the IAD dismisses an appeal because the applicant is not a spouse or does not meet 

the definition of “common-law partner” or “conjugal partner” or due to the application of s. 4, s. 

4.1, s. 5 or s.117(9) of the IRP Regulations, the dismissal of the appeal is arguably based in law 

and not on a lack of jurisdiction, given the wording in s. 63(1) and s. 65 of the IRPA. Contrary 

to the former Immigration Act, the IRPA specifically provides in s. 65 of the IRPA that 

humanitarian and compassionate grounds may only be considered where the foreign national is a 

member of the family class. The absence of such a specific provision in the former Immigration 

Act was the basis, along with the wording in s. 77 of the former Act, for the jurisdictional 

dismissal of the appeal. 

150 Tabesh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA3-00941), Wiebe, January 7, 2004 followed in Ur-Rahman, Mohammed Ishtiaq v. 

M.C.I. (IAD TA3-04308), Collins, January 13, 2005. It must be noted that it is not common practice for the 

Immigration Appeal Division to amend refusal grounds without application from a party. 





CASES 

Adjani, Joshua Taiwo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2033-07), Blanchard, January 10, 2008; 2008 

FC 32....................................................................................................................................................................... 28 

Amjad, Ali Saud v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-09455), Hoare, February 11, 2005................................................................... 26 

Atwal, Jaswinder Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-4204), Petryshyn, Wright, Rayburn, January 30, 1989............................ 9 

Badhan, Lyle Kishori v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-00432), Boscariol, September 3, 1997....................................................... 7 

Baird v. Iaci, [1997] B.C.J. No. 1789 (S.C.)(QL) ....................................................................................................... 15 

Bakridi, Faizl Abbas v. M.C.I. (IAD V99-03930), Baker, January 9, 2001 .................................................................. 8 

Bhatti, Mukhtar Ahmad (IAD TA2-11254), MacPherson, July 10, 2003.................................................................... 26 

Bhullar, Sawarnjit Kaur v. M.E.I. (IAD W89-00375), Goodspeed, Rayburn, Arpin (concurring), 

November 19, 1991................................................................................................................................................... 9 

Brar, Karen Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA0-02573), Workun, December 4, 2001 .............................................................. 8 

Brunelle, Sherry Lynn v. M.C.I. (IAD VA4-00937), Munro, January 28, 2005.......................................................... 31 

Bui, Binh Cong v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-18557), Whist, August 19, 2005 ...................................................................... 21 

Burmi, Joginder Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 88-35,651), Sherman, Arkin, Weisdorf, February 14, 

1989........................................................................................................................................................................... 9 

Buttar, Amrit Kaur v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-1669-06), Blais, October 25, 2006; 2006 FC 1281 ................................ 9 

Cai, Changbin v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6729-06), Kelen, August 3, 2007; 2007 FC 816 ......................................... 18 

Cantin, Edmond v. M.C.I. (IAD MA4-06892), Néron, August 1, 2005 ...................................................................... 14 

Castel, J.-G., Canadian Conflict of Laws (Toronto: Butterworths, 1986) ................................................................... 10 

Chan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 593 ................................................... 18 

Chartrand, Rita Malvina v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-18146), Collins, February 20, 2006 ................................................... 20 

Chiem, My Lien v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-838-98), Rothstein, January 11, 1999 ................................................. 6 

Craddock v. Glover Estate [2000] O.J. No. 680 (S.C.)(QL) ....................................................................................... 17 

De Guzman v. M.C.I., 2006 S.C.C.A. No. 70 (Q.L.) ................................................................................................... 28 

De Guzman, Josephine Soliven v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-558-04), Evans, Desjardins, Malone, 

December 20, 2005; 2005 FCA 436........................................................................................................................ 28 

Do, Thi Thanh Thuy (IAD TA3-17390), D’Ignazio, September 3, 2004 .................................................................... 17 





Donkor, Sumaila v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-654-06), Mosley, September 12, 2006; 2006 FC 1089............................ 30 

Donoso Palma, Segio v. M.C.I. (IAD MA1-03349), di Pietro, July 9, 2002................................................................. 7 

Dunham Audrey Pearl v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-00144), Néron, August 24, 2004 ..................................................... 14, 20 

El Salfiti, Dina Khalil Abdel Karim v. M.E.I. (IAD M93-08586), Durand, January 24, 1994 ...................................... 6 

Feehan v. Attwells (1979), 24 O.R. (2d) 248 (Co. Ct)................................................................................................. 17 

Ferdinand v. M.C.I. (IAD TA5-09330), MacLean, October 12, 2007 ........................................................................ 14 

Fraser v. Canadien National, [1999] J.Q. no. 2286, (S.C.)(QL)................................................................................. 15 

Froment, Danielle Marie v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-475-06), Shore, August 24, 2006; 2006 FC 

1002......................................................................................................................................................................... 30 

Fuente: M.C.I. v. Fuente, Cleotilde Dela (F.C.A., no. A-446-05), Noël, Sharlow, Malone, May 18, 

2006; 2006 FCA 186............................................................................................................................................... 28 

Gavino, Edwin Dorol v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-3249-05), Russell, March 9, 2006; 2006 FC 308 ....................... 30, 31 

Ghosn, Kassem Ata v. M.C.I. (IAD VA4-02673), Rozdilsky, March 27, 2006........................................................... 26 

Gill, Sakinder Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD V89-01124), Gillanders, Verma, Wlodyka, July 16, 1990................................... 9 

Grewal, Inderpal Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD T91-04831), Muzzi, Aterman, Leousis, February 23, 1995 ........................... 7 

Grewal, Ravinder v. M.C.I. (IAD MA3-00637), Beauchemin, May 4, 2004 ................................................................ 6 

Harripersaud, Janet Rameena v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-11611), Sangmuah, June 30, 2005 ............................................ 32 

Hazlewood v. Kent, [2000] O.J. No. 5263 (Sup. Ct.)(QL)........................................................................................... 17 

Kang, Randip Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-02099), Clark, June 3, 2003 ...................................................................... 30 

Kaur, Gurmit v. C.E.I.C. (F.C.T.D., no. T-2490-84), Jerome, May 8, 1985 ................................................................. 8 

Kaur, Narjinder v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-405-89), Marceau, Desjardins, Linden, October 11, 

1990, at 5. Reported: Kaur v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1990), 

12 Imm. L.R. (2d) 1 (F.C.A.) .................................................................................................................................... 7 

Khan v. M.C.I. (IAD) V93-02590), Lam, July 4, 1995.................................................................................................. 8 

Khan, Mohammad Farid v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-2971-06), Hughes, December 13, 2006; 2006 

FC 1490................................................................................................................................................................... 30 

Khera, Amarjit v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6375-06), Martineau, June 13, 2007; 2007 FC 632 .................................... 30 

Kong, Wai Keung Michael v. M.C.I. (IAD TA6-08094), Ahlfeld, January 31, 2008.................................................. 29 

Kumar, Monika v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-10172), MacDonald, May 8, 2006.................................................................... 14 





Laforge, Robert v. M.C.I. (IAD MA3-08755), Beauchemin, July 20, 2004................................................................ 21 

Lavoie v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue), [2000] F.C.J. No. 2124 (F.C.A.), (QL) ....................................... 15 

Leroux, Jean-Stéphane v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IM-2819-06), Tremblay-Lamer, April 17, 2007; 2007 

FC 403............................................................................................................................................................... 16, 19 

Li, Bing Qian v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4138-96), Reed, January 8, 1998 ............................................................ 7 

Lit, Jaswant Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 76-6003), Scott, Benedetti, Legaré, May 30, 1978 .............................................. 6 

Lorenz, Hubert Calvin v. M.C.I. (IAD VA6-00444), Nest, June 15, 2007.................................................................. 31 

Lotay, Harjit Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.D. T89-03205), Ariemma, Townshend, Bell, April 18, 1990 .................................. 8 

Macapagal, Rodolfo v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-25810), D’Ignazio, February 18, 2004................................................ 15, 31 

Mahamat, Ali Saleh v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-04059), Sangmuah, April 13, 2005.............................................................. 6 

Mann, Harnek Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-6199), Wlodyka, June 5, 1987 .................................................................... 6 

Mann, Jagdeep Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-19094), Stein, August 5, 2005 ................................................................. 30 

Mann, Kirpal Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-6008), Mawani, Gillanders, Wlodyka, April 14, 1987 ................................. 6 

Mariano, Edita Palacio v. M.C.I. (IAD WA5-00122), Lamont, September 20, 2006 ................................................ 32 

McCrea v. Bain Estate, [2004] B.C.J. No.290 (QL).................................................................................................... 17 

McCullough, Robert Edmund v. M.C.I. (IAD WA3-00043), Boscariol, February 5, 2004............................. 14, 15, 16 

McLeod, James G., The Conflict of Laws (Calgary: Carswell, 1983)....................................................................... 6, 7 

Mohamed, Rodal Houssein v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6790-05), Beaudry, May 24, 2006; 2006 FC 

696........................................................................................................................................................................... 31 

Molodowich v. Penttinen (1980), 17 R.F.L. (2d) 376 (Ont. Dist. Ct.) ........................................................................ 13 

Morris, Lawrence v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-5045-04), Pinard, March 18, 2005; 2005 FC 369 .................................. 29 

Nadesapillai, Sritharan v. M.C.I. (IAD T99-11883), Hoare, August 1, 2001............................................................... 7 

Naidu, Kamleshni Kanta v. M.C.I. (IAD VA5-00244), Sealy, February 1, 2006.................................................. 14, 20 

Narwal: M.E.I. v. Narwal, Surinder Kaur (F.C.A., no. A-63-89), Stone, Marceau, MacGuigan, 

April 6, 1990.)........................................................................................................................................................... 7 

Ni, Zhi Qi v. M.C.I.,(F.C. no. IMM-4385-04), Pinard, February 17, 2005; 2005 FC 241........................................... 31 

Orabi v. Qaoud, 2005 NSCA 28 at paragraph 14........................................................................................................ 26 

Oucherif, Ichrak v. M.C.I. (IAD MA4-03183), Barazi, October 27, 2005 .................................................................... 6 





Ouk, Chanta v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-865-07), Mosley, September 7, 2007; 2007 FC 891....................................... 30 

Owusu, Margaret v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-1402-06), Harrington, October 6, 2006; 2006 FC 1195 ......................... 30 

Parmar, Ramesh Kumar v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-9772), Eglington, Weisdorf, Ahara, September 12, 

1986........................................................................................................................................................................... 8 

Patel, Allarakha v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-24341), Sangmuah, May 5, 2005....................................................................... 6 

Patel, Sunil Jayantibhai v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-19443), Band, September 28, 2006 ....................................................... 9 

Porteous, Robert William v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-22804), Hoare, October 27, 2004...................................................... 14 

Pye, Helen Leona v. M.C.I. (IAD MA5-00247), Beauchemin, September 21, 2006................................................. 8, 9 

Quao, Daniel Essel v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5240-99), Blais, August 15, 2000.................................................. 9 

Rajudeen v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), (1984), 55 N.R. 129 (F.C.A.) .............................. 18 

Ramdai, Miss v. M.C.I. (IAD T95-01280), Townshend, October 22. 1997 .................................................................. 7 

Ratnasabapathy, Jeyarajan v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-382-98), Blais, September 27, 1999 ................................. 7 

Roberts v. Clough, [2002] P.E.I.J. No. 37 (S.C. (T.D.)), (QL).................................................................................... 15 

Saini, Jaswinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD T89-07659), D'Ignazio, August 26, 1999 ......................................................... 7 

Sanderson v. Russell (1979), 24 O.R. (2d) 429, (C.A.)................................................................................................ 17 

Sanichara, Omeshwar v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-5233-04), Beaudry, July 25, 2005; 2005 FC 1015 .......................... 30 

Sasani, Sam v. M.C.I. (IAD VA6-00727), Shahriari, September 5, 2007 ..................................................................... 6 

Savehilaghi, Hasan v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-02047), Kalvin, June 4, 1998 ........................................................................ 7 

Shaheen, Shahnaz v. M.C.I. (IAD T95-00090), Wright, February 20, 1997 ................................................................. 6 

Siev, Samuth v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2472-04), Rouleau, May 24, 2005; 2005 FC 736........................ 13, 14, 16, 29 

Singh, Amarjit v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5641-02), Snider, May 4, 2006; 2006 FC 565............................................ 14 

Singh, Harpreet v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-01365), Stein, May 10, 2006.............................................................................. 8 

Sinniah, Sinnathamby v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5954-00), Dawson, July 25, 2002; 2002 FCT 

822............................................................................................................................................................................. 9 

Sobhan, Rumana v. M.C.I. (IAD T95-07352), Boire, February 3, 1998 ....................................................................... 6 

Spracklin v. Kichton, [2000] A.J. No. 1329 (Q.B.), (QL)............................................................................................ 15 

Sullivan v. Letnik (1997), 27 R.F.L. (4 th )(Ont. C.A.) 79.............................................................................................. 17 

Tabesh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA3-00941), Wiebe, January 7, 2004.................................................................................... 33 





Taggar: Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Taggar, [1989] 3 F.C. 576....................................... 9 

Thauvette v. Malyon [1996] O.J. No. 1356 (QL)......................................................................................................... 17 

Thomson v. M.N.R., [1946] S.C.R. 209 per Rand J ..................................................................................................... 26 

Tran, My Ha v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-01139), Singh, March 9, 1998............................................................................. 7, 8 

Ur-Rahman, Mohammed Ishtiaq v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-04308), Collins, January 13, 2005 ......................................... 33 

Ursua, Erlinda Arellano v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-08587), Boire, September 12, 2005 .............................................. 14, 20 

v. MacPherson (1977), 13 O.R. (2d) 233 (C.A.) ......................................................................................................... 26 

Virk, Sukhpal Kaur v. M.E.I. (IAD V91-01246), Wlodyka, Gillanders, Verma, February 9, 1993 .......................... 6, 8 

Wen, Chun Xiu v. M.C.I. (IAD TA5-14563), MacLean, May 29, 2007 ...................................................................... 32 

Xu, Yuan Fei v. M.C.I. (IAD M99-04636), Sivak, June 5, 2000 ................................................................................... 8 

Zheng, Wei Rong v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-16616), MacLean, August 23, 2007............................................................... 32 





Chapter Six 

Bad Faith Family Relationships 

THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 

Introduction 

A Canadian citizen or permanent resident may sponsor an application for permanent 

residence made by a member of the family class. Section 117(1) of the Immigration and Refugee 

Protection Regulations (the “IRP Regulations”) includes “the sponsor’s spouse, common-law 

partner or conjugal partner” as a member of the family class. 

The IRP Regulations have combined in one provision – “bad faith” – a test of relationship 

for a number of family relationships. Section 4 of the IRP Regulations provides a two-pronged 

test of relationship for marriage, common-law partnership, conjugal partnership and adoption. 

Section 4 relates to all applications not just family class applications. If both prongs of the test 

set out in section 4 of the IRP Regullations are met, the foreign national shall not be considered 

as within the particular family relationship. For family class sponsorships, if the foreign national 

is not within the specified family relationship, that person will not be a member of the family 

class in relation to their sponsor nor will that person be considered as within the specified family 

relationship to the person being sponsored. In this chapter, the scope of section 4 as well as other 

related provisions is reviewed. How these provisions are applied to a particular family 

relationship will be covered in chapter 5 of this paper (Spouses, Common-Law Partners and 

Conjugal Partners). 

Statutory Provisions 

Section 4 of the IRP Regulations 1 reads as follows: 

For the purposes of these Regulations, a foreign national shall not be 

considered a spouse, a common-law partner, a conjugal partner or an 

adopted child of a person if the marriage, common-law partnership, 

conjugal partnership or adoption is not genuine and was entered into 

primarily for the purpose of acquiring any status or privilege under the 

Act. 

1 

This section was amended in 2004 to clarify the wording of the section. Prior to amendment it read as follows: 

“For the purposes of these Regulations, no foreign national shall be considered a spouse, a common-law 

partner, a conjugal partner or an adopted child of a person if the marriage, common-law partnership, conjugal 

partnership or adoption is not genuine or was entered into primarily for the purpose of acquiring any status or 

privilege under the Act.” 

Sponsorship Appeals 

1 


January 1, 2008 Bad Faith Family Relationships - Ch. 6

In 2004 2 a new provision, Section 4.1, was added to the IRP Regulations to cover the 

situation of a new relationship where a prior relationship was dissolved primarily for immigration 

purposes. Section 4.1 reads as follows: 

For the purposes of these Regulations, a foreign national shall not be 

considered a spouse, a common-law partner or a conjugal partner of a 

person if the foreign national has begun a new conjugal relationship with 

that person after a previous marriage, common-law partnership or 

conjugal partnership with that person was dissolved primarily so that the 

foreign national, another foreign national or the sponsor could acquire 

any status or privilege under the Act. 

There are other IRP Regulations that deal with the bone fides of family relationships 3 in 

considering whether a person is a member of the family class as follows: 

• Section 117(1)(g)(i) that deals with persons under 18 whom a sponsor intends to adopt in 

Canada requires that “the adoption is not primarily for the purpose if acquiring any privilege 

or status under the Act”. 4 

• Section 117(4)(c) that deals with an adopted child who was adopted when the child was over 

age 18 requires that “the adoption is not primarily for the purpose if acquiring any privilege 

or status under the Act”. 

Section 63(1) of IRPA provides for the right of appeal against a decision not to issue a 

permanent resident visa to a member of the family class and reads as follows: 

A person who has filed in the prescribed manner an application to 

sponsor a foreign national as a member of the family class may appeal to 

the Immigration Appeal Division against a decision not to issue the 

foreign national a permanent resident visa. 

Pursuant to section 65 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (“IRPA”), the 

Immigration Appeal Division may not consider humanitarian and compassionate considerations 

unless the applicant is a member of the family class and their sponsor is a sponsor within the 

meaning of the IRP Regulations as: 

2 

3 

4 

SOR/2004-167, s. 3(E). 

A provision dealing with guardianship was never enacted. 

In addition, section 117(2) provides that where the child was adopted under the age of 18 years the adoption 

must be in the child’s best interests within the meaning of the Hague Convention on Adoption otherwise the 

adopted child shall not be considered a member of the family class. Under section 117(3), one of the 

requirements to determine whether the adoption is in the child’s best interests is that the adoption created a 

genuine parent-child relationship. For a discussion of this issue see the chapter in this paper on adoptions. 


2 



In an appeal under 63(1) or (2) respecting an application based on 

membership in the family class, the Immigration Appeal Division may 

not consider humanitarian and compassionate considerations unless it has 

decided that the foreign national is a member of the family class and their 

sponsor is a sponsor within the meaning of the regulations. 

In order to interpret section 4 and the related provisions in the IRP Regulations, it is 

helpful to consider the wording of similar provisions in the Immigration Regulations, 1978 (the 

“former Regulations”), as there is considerable case law in relation to those provisions. 

Section 4(3) of the former Regulations that dealt with marriages read as follows: 

The family class does not include a spouse who enters into the marriage 

primarily for the purpose of gaining admission to Canada as a member of 

the family class and not with the intention of residing permanently with 

the other spouse. 

Section 6(1)(d)(i) of the former Regulations that dealt with the sponsorship of fiancées 5 

read in part as follows: 

…where a member of the family class makes an application for an 

immigrant visa, a visa officer may issue an immigrant visa to the 

member, and the member’s accompanying dependants if … (d) in the 

case of a fiancée, … (i) the sponsor and the fiancée intend to reside 

together permanently after being married and have not become engaged 

primarily for the purpose of the fiancée gaining admission to Canada as a 

member of the family class… 

Sections 2(1) and 6(1)(e) of the former Regulations that dealt with adoptions read in part 

as follows: 

2(1) – “adopted” means a person who is adopted … but does not include 

a person who is adopted for the purpose of gaining admission to Canada 

or gaining the admission to Canada of any of the person’s relatives. 

6(1)(e) - …where a member of the family class makes an application for 

an immigrant visa, a visa officer may issue an immigrant visa to the 

member, and the member’s accompanying dependants if … (e) in the 

case of a person described in paragraph (b) of the definition of “member 

of the family class” in subsection 2(1), or a dependant of a member of the 

family class, who has been adopted, the person or dependant was 

5 

It must be noted that fiancées are not members of the family class under IRPA or IRP Regulations. Section 356 

of the IRP Regulations provides that where a fiancée application for a permanent resident visa was made before 

June 28, 2002, the application is governed by the former Act. See also the section in this chapter on the 

Transitional Provisions. 


3 



adopted before having attained 19 years of age and was not adopted for 

the purpose of gaining admission to Canada of the person or dependant, 

or gaining the admission to Canada of any of the person’s or dependant’s 

relatives. 

Type of Refusal: jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional 

Under the former Regulations, the onus was on the appellant to establish that the 

sponsored spouse was not excluded from membership in the family class by reason of the 

application of section 4(3) 6 or that an adopted child was not excluded from the definition of 

“adopted”. In either case, if membership in the family class was not established, the appeal 

would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Under the former Regulations, the Immigration 

Appeal Division had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal with respect to a sponsorship where the 

applicant was not a member of the family class in relation to the sponsor. 

Under IRPA, the same issue arises. If a foreign national is not considered a spouse, a 

common-law partner, a conjugal partner or an adopted child of the sponsor due to the application 

of section 4 of the IRP Regulations, then the foreign national is not a member of the family class 

with respect to his or her sponsor. 

Section 63(1) of IRPA provides that a person who has filed in prescribed manner an 

application to sponsor a foreign national as a member of family class may appeal to the 

Immigration Appeal Division against a decision not to issue the foreign national a permanent 

resident visa. Section 10(6) of the IRP Regulations provides that a sponsorship application not 

made in accordance with section 10(1) is considered not to be an application filed in a prescribed 

manner for the purposes of section 63(1) of IRPA in which case there would be no right of appeal 

to the Immigration Appeal Division. Section 10(1) of IRP Regulations sets out the form and 

content of an application. 7 

Section 65 of IRPA provides that in an appeal under subsection 63(1) or (2) respecting an 

application based on membership in the family class, the Immigration Appeal Division may not 

consider humanitarian and compassionate considerations unless it has decided that the foreign 

national is a member of the family class and that their sponsor is a sponsor within the meaning of 

the regulations. At issue is whether the appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division is 

jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional. 

Based on the wording of sections 63(1) and 65 of IRPA and subject to sections 10(1) and 

10(6) of the IRP Regulations, Immigration Appeal Division panels have treated family class 

sponsorship appeals as non-jurisdictional. 8 While the Immigration Appeal Division may not be 

6 

7 

8 

M.C.I. v. Heera, Lilloutie (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5316-93), Noël, October 27, 1994. 

Where the sponsorship application is not filed in a prescribed manner per s. 10(6) of the IRP Regulations, any 

refusal will be jurisdictional. 

See for example Zeng, Qing Wei v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-02640), Workun, April 22, 2003, where the appeal was 

dismissed as the refusal was valid in law and not dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 


4 



able to exercise discretionary relief in favour of the appellant, it still has jurisdiction to hear the 

appeal. Accordingly, if the appellant is successful, the appeal will be allowed based on the 

refusal being not valid in law. If the appellant is not successful, the appeal will be dismissed 

based on the refusal being valid in law. As noted above, this can be contrasted to the situation 

under the former Regulations, where the appeal would have been dismissed for lack of 

jurisdiction. Where the appellant is not successful, there will be no recourse to the discretionary 

jurisdiction of the Immigration Appeal Division due to the application of section 65 of IRPA as 

the applicant will have been determined not to be a member of the family class. 

THE JURISPRUDENCE 

The Test 

Under the former Regulations the test for marriages for immigration purposes was twopronged; 

the applicant had to be caught by both prongs of the test to be excluded from the family 

class. To successful challenge this type of refusal, an appellant had to establish that the applicant 

did not enter into the marriage primarily to gain admission to Canada or that the applicant 

intended to reside permanent with the appellant. 9 

The test for adoptions for immigration purposes under the former Regulations had only 

one prong, the child was not to be a person adopted for the purpose of gaining admission to 

Canada or gaining the admission to Canada of any of the person’s relatives. 

The Federal Court in a number of cases including Mohamed, 10 Donkar, 11 Ouk, 12 Khella, 13 

and Khera 14 has concluded that “section 4 of the Regulations must be read conjunctively, that is 

the questioned relationship must be both not genuine and entered into primarily for the purpose 

of acquiring any status or privilege under the Act” 15 for the section to apply to exclude the 

sponsored foreign national as a member of the family class. This means that section 4 of the IRP 

Regulations applies to a relationship described in section 4 only if both of the two prongs of the 

bad faith test apply to the relationship. Accordingly, to succeed in an appeal, the appellant need 

only show that one of the two prongs does not apply to the relationship. This is unchanged from 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

Horbas v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] 2 F.C. 359 (T.D.), at 369. In Sanitchar, 

Omeshwar v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-5233-04), Beaudry, July 25, 2005; 2005 FC 1015 the Court found that 

Horbas continues to be useful for the purpose of the immigration element of the bad faith test under the IRP 

Regulations. However, the Court noted that the element of the sponsored spouse’s intention of residing 

permanently with the sponsoring spouse is no longer present under section 4 of the IRP Regulations. 

Mohamed, Rodal Houssein v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6790-05), Beaudry, June 5, 2006; 2006 FC 696. 

Donkar, Sumaila v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-654-06), Mosley, September 12, 2006; 2006 FC 1089. 

Ouk, Chanta v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-865-07), Mosley, September 7, 2007; 2007 FC 891. 

Khella, Palwinder Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-1811-06), de Montingny, November 10, 2006; 2006 FC 

1357. 

Khera, Amarjit v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6375-06), Martineau, June 13, 2007; 2007 FC 632. 

Donkar, supra, footnote 11. 


5 



section 4(3) of the former Regulations where, as noted above, both prongs must apply for a 

spouse to be excluded from the family class. Therefore, there is no need to pursue an analysis 

with respect to the second prong when the first prong is not met. 16 

In Ni, 17 the Court held that the test in section 4 of the IRP Regulations can only be applied 

to a marriage defined in section 2 of the IRP Regulations, and to interpret “genuine” as meaning 

“legal” would render section 4 of the IRP Regulations redundant. 

In applying the new test, it will be necessary for the Immigration Appeal Division to 

consider the meaning of “genuine” and the phrase “was entered into primarily for the purpose of 

acquiring any status or privilege under the Act.” It appears that “genuine” encompasses factors 

relevant to the second prong of the test from the former Regulations (“intention of residing 

permanently with the other spouse”), although it appears to be broader and more flexible than 

that test. 18 In Kang 19 the panel agreed with the submissions of counsel for the Minister that a 

genuine marriage is “one in which both parties are committed to living with one another for the 

rest of their lives.” In Ouk, 20 the Court noted that the focus of the examination under section 4 is 

on the relation between the couple and that “while family connections may be seen as a 

consideration to be weighed, the genuineness of the marriage should be a separate question from 

concerns about familial connections.” 21 

In Khera, 22 the Court in reviewing the panel’s decision that a marriage was caught by 

section 4 noted as follows: “Indeed, the IAD was allowed to consider, and considered in its 

decision, the length of the parties’ prior relationship before their arranged marriage, their age 

difference, their former marital or civil status, their respective financial situation and 

employment, their family background, their knowledge of one another’s histories (including the 

applicant’s daughters’ ages and general situation), their language, their respective interests, the 

fact that the sponsoree’s mother, two of his brothers, as well as aunts and cousins were living in 

British Columbia, and the fact that the sponsoree had tried to come to Canada before.” 

Member Hoare in Chavez 23 had the following to say regarding genuineness: 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

M.C.I. v. Davydenko, Anna (F.C. no. IMM-1482-00), Pinard, March 30, 2001; 2001 FCT 257. 

Ni, Zhi Qi v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-4385-04), Pinard, February 17, 2005; 2005 FC 241. 

For a brief discussion of section 4 in relation to adoptions see chapter 4 of this paper, with that issue considered 

in relation to common-law partners and conjugal partners in chapter 5 of this paper. 

Kang, Randip Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-02099), Clark, June 3, 2003. 

Ouk, supra, footnote 12. 

In Ouk, supra, footnote 12, the Court noted at paragraph 17 that: “It was open to the appeal panel to find that 

the sponsoree is inadmissible for misrepresentation pursuant to s. 40 of the Act or that the marriage is not 

genuine, but the distinction between these two avenues of inquiry must be kept clearly separate.” 

Khera, supra, footnote 14 at paragraph 10. 

Chavez, Rodrigo v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-24409), Hoare, January 17, 2005 at paragraph 3. 


6 



The genuineness of the marriage is based on a number of factors. They are 

not identical in every appeal as the genuineness can be affected by any 

number of different factors in each appeal. They can include, but are not 

limited to, such factors as the intent of the parties to the marriage, the length 

of the relationship, the amount of time spent together, conduct at the time of 

meeting, at the time of an engagement and/or the wedding, behaviour 

subsequent to a wedding, the level of knowledge of each other’s relationship 

histories, level of continuing contact and communication, the provision of 

financial support, the knowledge of and sharing of responsibility for the care 

of children brought into the marriage, the knowledge of and contact with 

extended families of the parties, as well as the level of knowledge of each 

other’s daily lives. All these factors can be considered in determining the 

genuineness of a marriage. 

Member Hoare went on in the same paragraph to comment on the second prong of the test 

as follows; 

The second prong of the test - whether the relationship was entered into 

primarily for the purpose of acquiring any status of privilege under IRPA - 

is self-evident and self explanatory. The advantage sought in spousal 

appeals is generally entry to Canada and the granting to the applicant of 

permanent resident status as a member of the family class. 

Under the former Regulations, the word “primarily” in section 4(3) has been defined as 

“of the first importance, chief.” Thus, the objective of gaining admission to Canada must be “the 

dominant driving force” for the marriage before an applicant is caught by section 4(3) of the 

former Regulations. 24 A similar argument may be made under the current provision. In Lorenz 25 , 

the Immigration Appeal Division panel found that immigration was probably a factor in the 

applicant wanting to marry a Canadian, but that the evidence as a whole did not support a finding 

that it was the primary factor. 

The Court in Gavino 26 concluded that so long as the primary purpose of the marriage was 

to ensure that some privilege under IRPA would be conveyed to someone, the marriage fails the 

second prong of the bad faith test. Section 4 does not require a consideration of whether that 

primary purpose was achieved and a status or privilege was acquired. The privilege need not 

accrue to the person applying for permanent residence. In this case, the purpose of the marriage 

was to facilitate or permit the sponsorship of the person’s children. 

It will be necessary for the Immigration Appeal Division to differentiate between the two 

prongs of the test under the IRP Regulations. Is there an overlap between the first and the second 

24 

25 

26 

Singh, Ravinder Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-10228), Chu, Suppa, Eglington (dissenting), August 8, 1988, at 5. 

Lorenz, Hubert Calvin v. M.C.I. (IAD VA6-00444), Nest, June 15, 2007. 

Gavino, Edwin Dorol v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3249-05), Russell, March 9, 2006; 2006 FC 308. 


7 



prong of the new test? It will also be necessary for the Immigration Appeal Division to 

determine which prong would be emphasized in its decisions. As evident from the Immigration 

Appeal Division decision in Chavez 27 , it appears emphasis is being placed on the “genuineness” 

first prong of the test with that prong being the first prong to be analyzed by the panel. 

Onus 

Under the former Regulations, the Minister did not have the burden on an appeal to the 

Immigration Appeal Division to demonstrate that the visa officer’s refusal of an application for 

permanent residence was correct. 28 The onus was on the appellant to prove that the applicant was 

not caught by the excluding section (such as section 4(3)) 29 or met the requirements set out in the 

relevant provision within section 6 (for example fiancées). Additional evidence that was not 

before the immigration or visa officer could be taken into account by the Immigration Appeal 

Division on appeal. 30 

Section 4 of the IRP Regulations does not change the onus or evidence that may be 

presented at the appeal. The Federal Court has concluded that the onus is on the appellant to 

show that section 4 does not apply to the relationship. 31 In Thach, 32 the Court rejected the 

applicant’s submission that the Immigration Appeal Division erred in law by not finding that the 

burden shifted to the Minister once an appellant has adduced evidence in support ot the 

genuineness of the marriage as the onus was on the appellant to show his wife was a member of 

the family class. 

Intention 

Under the former Regulations, the intention of the foreign spouse was paramount for 

spousal sponsorship refusals for immigration purposes 33 and the intention of both fiancées was 

27 

28 

29 

30 

31 

32 

33 

Chavez, supra, footnote 23. 

Heera, supra, footnote 6. 

S.G.C. v. Bisla, Satvinder (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5690-93), Denault, November 28, 1994. 

Kahlon, Darshan Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-115-86), Mahoney, Stone, MacGuigan, February 6, 1989. 


See for example Morris, Lawrence v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-5045-04), Pinard, March 18, 2005; 2005 FC 369 

and Khera, supra, footnote 14. 

Thach,Phi Anne v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-5344-06), Heneghan, February 1, 2008; 2008 FC 133. 

Bisla, supra, footnote 29. 


8 



elevant for fiancée sponsorship refusals for immigration purposes. 34 For adoptions sponsorships 

refused for immigration purposes, no guidance was provided in the definition of “adopted” as to 

whose intentions should be looked at (those of the adoptive parents, the natural parents, or the 

child). 

Section 4 of the IRP Regulations requires the assessment of the appellant’s and 

applicant’s intention. In Gavino, 35 the Court noted that the evidence of both spouses was 

relevant to determining intention. An issue to be resolved is the relative weight to be given to the 

appellant’s intention – should equal weight be given or should the applicant’s intention be given 

greater weight. In Tran 36 the panel concluded: “while the intentions of both the appellant and the 

applicant must now be examined, it is the applicant’s intention that will remain a key 

determinant.” In Duong 37 the panel determined that it is the applicant’s intention that governs 

stating: “… it is the applicant who wishes to come to Canada and if the applicant’s intentions 

show that he/she is caught by the excluding provisions, then it is my view that this should take 

precedence over the intentions of the appellant, which must also be assessed.” 

FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED 

As noted in by the Federal Court and by the Immigration Appeal Division in Chavez, 38 

there are a number of factors that assist in determining whether a relationship is genuine or 

whether the primary purpose of the relationship was for immigration purposes. Case law under 

the IRP Regulations as well as from the former Regulations (which remains relevant in 

considering these factors) have dealt with the following factors: 

A) Inconsistent or contradictory statements 

Where there are significant discrepancies between the information that a sponsor provides 

to an immigration officer and the information that an applicant gives to the visa officer abroad 

about such matters as the origin and development of the relationship between the couple, this 

may result in a refusal. Allegations that an applicant’s lack of knowledge may have been caused 

by difficulty with the interpretation at the interview must be supported by the evidence. 39 

34 

35 

36 

37 

38 

39 

Sidhu, Kulwant Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 88-35458), Ahara, Rotman, Eglington (dissenting), August 25, 1988; 

Rasenthiram, Kugenthiraja v. M.C.I. (IAD T98-01452), Buchanan, February 17, 1999. 

Gavino, supra, footnote 26. 

Tran, Quoc An v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-16608), MacPherson, September 26, 2003. 

Duong, Nhon Hao v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-19528), D’Ignazio, November 12, 2003. 

Chavez, supra, footnote 23. 

M.C.I. v. Singh, Jagdip, (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2297-01), Tremblay-Lamer, March 22, 2002; 2002 FCT 313. 

[Judicial review of IAD VA0-00314, Mattu, April 26, 2001]. The Appeal Division found the applicant’s and 

sponsor’s testimony regarding the circumstances of the marriage consistent. In granting the judicial review, 

the Court concluded that “the evidence” did not support this finding in that the statement provided during the 

applicant’s immigration interview and the sponsor’s testimony were inconsistent. 


9 



As noted by the Court in Roopchand 40 : “The section [section 4 of the IRP Regulations] 

raises questions of fact with respect to the intent and purpose of the sponsored spouse. As a 

practical matter, a person’s intent is not likely to be successfully tested by a grilling crossexamination 

designed to elicit an admission of fraud or dishonesty. Rather, in the usual case, the 

trier of fact will draw inferences from such things as inconsistent or contradictory statements 

made by the parties, the knowledge the parties have about each other and their shared history, the 

nature, frequency and content of communications between the parties, any financial support, and 

any previous attempt by the applicant spouse to gain admission to Canada.” 

In Bhango, 41 the Court noted that there must be a link between credibility issues of an 

applicant and section 4 of the IRP Regulations. 42 

Procedural fairness does not require an immigration officer to give spouses the 

opportunity to respond to discrepancies in the evidence they have presented in their separate 

interviews. 43 

B) Previous attempts by applicant to gain admission to Canada 

Relevant, though not conclusive, 44 is the applicant’s history of previous attempts to gain 

admission to Canada. 45 A marriage contracted when removal from Canada is imminent, in and by 

itself, does not support a conclusion that the marriage is not bona fide. 46 

40 

41 

42 

43 

44 

45 

46 

Roopchand, Albert v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-1473-07), Dawson, October 26, 2007; 2007 FC 1108. 

Bhango, Gurpal Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-625-07), Dawson, October 5, 2007; 2007 FC 1028. 

The Court in overturning an Immigration Appeal Division decision noted that the contradictions relied upon 

have to be relevant to the point at hand which was whether or not the marriage was primarily for the purpose of 

acquiring a status or privilege under IRPA: Habib, Mussarat v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-5262-06), Harrington, 

May 16, 2007; 2007 FC 524. As noted by Justice Harrington in Owusu, Margaret v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM- 

1402-06), Harrington, October 6, 2006; 2006 FC 1195, the Immigration Appeal Division cannot engage in 

conjecture as an evidentiary basis for finding that a marriage is a bad faith marriage. 

M.C.I. v. Dasent, Maria Jackie (F.C.A., no. A-18-95), Strayer, Linden, McDonald, January 18, 1996. 

Sandhu, Corazon Dalmacio Campos v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-4082), Rayburn, Goodspeed, Arkin, April 7, 1987; 

Malik, Estelita v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-4271), Rayburn, Goodspeed, Petryshyn, April 11, 1988. A previous 

application for permanent residence may show an applicant has an interest in admission to Canada but that does 

not in itself establish that the applicant has become engaged primarily for that objective: Jung, Harry Kam v. 

M.E.I. (I.A.B. 84-6237), D. Davey, Chambers, Anderson, May 17, 1985. Similarly, the mere fact that an 

applicant has immigration problems does not necessarily lead to a conclusion that his marriage is for 

immigration purposes: Sau, Cecilia Mui Fong v. M.C.I. (IAD V96-00079), Boscariol, January 2, 1997. 

For example, marriage shortly after the refusal of a false refugee claim: Singh, Muriel v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86- 

1098), Angé, Cardinal, Lefebvre, January 8, 1987. The Immigration Appeal Division is allowed to consider 

that the sponsored spouse had tried to come to Canada before: Khera, supra footnote 14. In Akhlaq, Afshan v. 

M.C.I. (IAD VA4-01933), Boscariol, June 16, 2005, the panel noted that the mere fact that the applicant had 

made an effort to leave Pakistan in the past and had possibly made a false refugee claim in France did not 

preclude him from entering into a genuine relationship with the appellant. In Aujla (Sidhu), Jagwinder Kaur v. 

M.C.I. (IAD VA5-02812), Shahriari, April 17, 2007, no negative inference was drawn from the applicant's 

previous unsuccessful attempt to come to Canada as an adopted child. 

Maire, Beata Jolanta v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5420-98), Sharlow, July 28, 1999. 


10 



C) Previous marriages 

Evidence of a prior marriage for immigration purposes, in and of itself, does not generally 

provide a sufficient evidentiary basis for finding that a subsequent marriage is likewise one for 

immigration purposes. 47 

D) Arranged marriages 

The practice of arranged marriages does not in itself call into question the good faith of 

the spouses as long as the practice is customary in their culture. 48 

E) Cultural Context 

The Immigration Appeal Division in assessing the bona fides of a marriage must take into 

consideration the cultural context within which the marriage took place. 49 In Dhaliwal, 50 the 

Court held that the Immigration Appeal Division did take into consideration the cultural context 

and found that the arranged marriage did not conform to Sikh tradition. The main explanation for 

the marriage was destiny, with no evidence being provided as to the role of destiny in Sikh 

culture. In Khan, 51 the Court noted that the genuineness of a spousal relationship must be 

examined through the eyes of the parties themselves against the cultural backdrop in which they 

have lived. 52 

F) Mutual Interest 

i) Knowledge about the other 

One of the basic indicators of mutual interest between a sponsor and applicant is 

knowledge about each other. However, the application of this criterion tends to vary according to 

the nature of the marriage, that is, whether or not the marriage was arranged by the families of 

47 

48 

49 

50 

51 

52 

Devia, Zarish Norris v. M.C.I. (IAD T94-05862), Band, April 23, 1996. See also Martin, Juliee v. M.C.I. (IAD 

V95-00961), Lam, October 18, 1996. The Appeal Division’s decision was upheld on judicial review in M.C.I. 

v. Martin, Juliee Ida (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4068-96), Heald, August 13, 1997. In Martin, the applicant had been 

married twice before to Canadian women who had sponsored, but had later withdrawn, their sponsorship of his 

application. 

Brar, Baljit Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V93-02983), Clark, July 7,1995. Reported: Brar v. Canada (Minister of 

Citzenship and Immigration) (1995), 29 Imm. L.R. (2d) 186 (IAD). See also Cheng, Shawn v. M.C.I. (IAD 

V96-02631), Boscariol, April 27, 1998 (even though marriage arranged by sponsor’s mother had probably been 

for pragmatic reasons, it did not necessarily follow it was for immigration purposes). Contrast Cant, Bant 

Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-02643), Boscariol, January 12, 2000, where the arranged marriage defied important 

societal norms. 

Froment, Danielle Marie v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-475-06), Shore, August 24, 2006; 2006 FC 1002. 

Dhaliwal, Jaswinder v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-1314-07), de Montigny, October 15, 2007; 2007 FC 1051. 

Khan, Mohammed Farid v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-2971-06), Hughes, December 13, 2006; 2006 FC 1490. 

See also, Siev, Samuth v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-2472-04), Rouleau, May 24, 2005; 2005 FC 736 where the 

Court noted that case law has established that the evidence is not to be scrutinized and that North American 

reasoning should not be applied to the sponsor’s conduct. 


11 



the couple. 53 In Froment, 54 the Court found that the Immigration Appeal Division’s conclusion 

that the sponsored spouse knew little about his wife’s activities was justified, and the 

Immigration Appeal Division had the right to take this lack of knowledge into consideration. 

ii) Contact between the couple 

Of relevance in ascertaining intention is evidence suggesting that a sponsor and applicant 

keep in touch and avail themselves of opportunities to spend time together. This includes 

evidence of communication by telephone and mail; visits; cohabitation; consummation of the 

marriage; the sponsor’s willingness to emigrate to the applicant’s country in the event of an 

unsuccessful appeal; and expressions of love and affection. 55 

iii) Family ties 

Depending on the cultural or religious context, the Immigration Appeal Division will 

consider evidence regarding family ties, contact between the couple and their respective in-laws 56 

and the presence of members of both families at engagement and marriage ceremonies. 57 

However, as noted by the Court in Ouk, 58 the focus of the examination under 

section 4 of the IRP Regulations “is on the relation between the couple. While family 

connections may be seen as a consideration to be weighed, the genuineness of the marriage 

should be a separate question from the concerns about family connections.” 

iv) Financial support and exchange of gifts 

53 

54 

55 

56 

57 

58 

Sandhu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 4 Imm.L.R. (2d) 39; Bhangal, Baljit Singh v. 

M.E.I. (IAD W90-00173), Goodspeed, December 6, 1991. In Basi, Navjot Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-00664), 

Lam, July 4, 1996, an adverse inference was drawn from the applicant’s lack of knowledge of the sponsor’s 

education on the basis that in arranged marriages, the educational level of prospective spouses is an important 

criterion of compatibility. 

Froment, supra, footnote 49. 

In Coolen, Andrea Van v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 84-9741), D. Davey, Benedetti, Petryshyn, October 2, 1985, in 

ascertaining whether or not there was an intention to reside permanently with the other spouse, the panel took 

into consideration that neither the sponsor nor her spouse spent vacation or holiday time together. The panel in 

Chaikosky, Marianne v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 84-4156), Petryshyn, Hlady, Voorhees, June 7, 1985, took into account 

whether or not the sponsor would be willing to emigrate to join the applicant in the event of an unsuccessful 

sponsorship. See also Jassar, Surjit Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V94-01705), Lam, May 14, 1996 (sponsor at no time 

expressed any love or affection for the applicant). 

Sandhu, Corazon Dalmacio Campos, supra, footnote 44. 

Chaikosky, supra, footnote 55, where the panel noted that there were no members from either side of the family 

at the civil marriage ceremony even though some of them lived in the same city where the ceremony had taken 

place. 

Ouk, supra, footnote 12. 


12 



In relation to certain cultural contexts, the exchange of gifts 59 and financial support 60 have 

been viewed favourably by the Immigration Appeal Division as indicators of a genuine 

relationship. 

v) Delay in submission of sponsorship application 

Delay in submitting a sponsorship application may not be a significant factor in 

repudiating the genuineness of a spousal relationship because if the marriage was for immigration 

purposes, “the parties would not wish to delay the sponsorship application unduly, the ultimate 

aim presumably, in both instances, being to get the applicant into Canada as soon as possible.” 61 

However, if there is no satisfactory explanation for the delay, it may be significant. 62 

vi) Persistence in pursuing appeal 

A sponsor’s persistence in pursuing an appeal from a spouse’s refusal has been taken into 

account in considering the genuineness of their marriage. 63 

v) Birth of a child 

In Mansro, 64 the Immigration Appeal Division panel held that while typically the birth of 

a child is an important factor in considering whether a marriage is genuine, the existence of a 

child is not determinative, and in that appeal the lack of credible evidence from the appellant and 

applicant was so striking that it overwhelmed the fact that there was a child of the marriage. In 

Aujla (Sidhu) 65 the panel found that absent exceptional circumstances, a reasonable person 

accepts the existence of a child as proof of a genuine spousal relationship. 

G) “Compatibility” 

The Immigration Appeal Division has been critical of some visa officers’ practice of 

stereotyping a spousal relationship, as it is normally understood, based on the compatibility of 

two persons as marital partners. As the Immigration Appeal Division has stated: 66 

It almost goes without saying that individuals with differences in religious 

beliefs and backgrounds regularly marry in Canada, and are not normally 

deemed, by virtue of that factor alone, to be incompatible as a married 

59 

60 

61 

62 

63 

64 

65 

66 

Sandhu, Corazon Dalmacio Campos, supra, footnote 44. 

Virk, Raspal Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-9145), Fatsis, Arkin, Suppa, December 18, 1986. Reported: Virk v. 

Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1988), 2 Imm. L.R. (2d) 127 (I.A.B.). 

Sandhu, supra, footnote 53 at 7-8. 

Johal, Surinder Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD V87-6546), Wlodyka, Singh, Verma, February 15, 1989. 

Bahal, Vijay Kumar v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-02759), Townshend, August 4, 1998. 

Mansro, Gurmel Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA6-00931), Miller, July 18, 2007. 

Aujla (Sidhu), supra, footnote 45. 

Sandhu, Corazon Dalmacio Campos, supra, footnote 44 at 5-6. 


13 



couple. The conclusion reached by the visa officer that a permanent marital 

relationship was not contemplated appears to have been based solely on his 

questionable definition of a normal spousal relationship. 

In deciding upon the validity of refusals where incompatibility has been alleged, 

differences in religion, 67 education and language, 68 and age 69 have been examined. In Froment, 70 

the Court held that the Immigration Appeal Division could consider factors such as age and 

differences in customs or language. It is not contrary to the Canadian Charter of Rights and 

Freedoms to consider differences in age, education and marital status of the parties. 71 

H) Summary 

The case-law indicates that no single criterion is decisive. It is the interplay of several 

factors that leads the Immigration Appeal Division in any given case to make its finding as to the 

genuineness, the purpose for, and intentions in respect of, a marital relationship or a relationship 

between common law or conjugal partners. 72 

Timing 

67 

68 

69 

70 

71 

72 

See, for example, Sandhu, Corazon Dalmacio Campos, supra, footnote 44, where the panel took into 

consideration evidence that the sponsor and applicant did not perceive differences in their religions to be 

problematic as they respected each other’s religion and attended each other’s place of worship together. 

See, for example, Dhillon, Gurprit Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 89-00571), Sherman, Ariemma, Tisshaw, August 8, 

1989, where the panel acknowledged that incompatibility in education and language alone were generally 

insufficient to found a refusal, but took them into consideration, together with other factors such as the 

sponsor’s lack of knowledge about his spouse’s background, to conclude that the marriage was for immigration 

purposes. 

See, for example, Dhaliwal, Rup Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V96-00458), Jackson, September 5, 1997, where the 

panel accepted the evidence of the visa officer that an age difference of two to five years is considered 

reasonable for purposes of compatibility in an arranged marriage and concluded that the 14-year age gap 

between the sponsor and applicant was not reasonable. In Glaw, Gerhard Franz v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-02268), 

Townshend, July 21, 1998 but for the 40-year age difference between the sponsor and applicant, the panel 

would have had no difficulty in concluding the relationship to be genuine. The panel concluded that the age 

difference ought not to change the panel’s view as it was not for the panel to judge whether or not a man in his 

60s should marry a woman in her late 20s, a matter of individual choice. In Sangha (Mand), Narinder Kaur v. 

M.C.I. (IAD V97-01626), Carver, September 21, 1998, the sponsor’s astrological attributes were more 

important to the applicant than differences in age and marital background. In Judge, Mansoor Ali v. M.C.I. 

(IAD TA3-20841), Leonoff, July 25, 2005, the panel noted that while there was a considerable age difference 

between the parties; a finding of a bad faith relationship could not be based on the age disparity alone. 

Froment, supra, footnote 49. 

Parmar, Charanjit Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V98-04542), Boscariol, November 23, 1999. 

See, for example, Sidhu, Gurdip Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD W90-00023), Goodspeed, Arpin, Rayburn, 

September 12, 1990, where the panel gave little or no weight to evidence of differences in age and education in 

view of evidence of other important factors in arranging a traditional Sikh marriage. 


14 



Under the former Regulations, intention was considered as at the date of the marriage, 

engagement or adoption. 

Regarding the timing of the assessment of “genuineness’, section 4 inquires into whether 

or not the relationship is genuine or was entered into primarily to acquire status under IRPA. 

With respect to the “genuineness” prong of the test, the inquiry is phrased in the present tense 

“suggesting an on-going inquiry, not necessary fixed at the time of marriage.” 73 This would 

appear to require an assessment of the “genuineness” of the relationship as at the date of the 

hearing. 74 

The Court in Donkar noted that section 4 does not state that the time of the marriage is 

the time at which the genuineness of the relationship is to be assessed. The section “speaks in the 

present tense for a determination of the genuineness of the relationship and in the past tense for 

assessing the purpose for which it was created. This appears to be consistent with the practice 

followed by Immigration Officers in assessing spousal sponsorship applications. It appears, from 

the cases the Court has seen, that in interviews with claimants (sic) and their putative spouses the 

officers focus on whether there is a continuing relationship.” 75 In applying the second prong of 

the test, the time of assessment should be the date of entry of the relationship. 76 

It may be necessary to consider the impact of section 121 of the IRP Regulations and 

whether or not that section requires that the relationship be genuine from the date of application 

to the final determination of the application. 

Evidence 

Under the former Regulations, evidence on the first prong of the test of whether the 

relationship was primarily for immigration purposes for marriages and engagements could be 

used in connection with the second prong of that test 77 with the analysis of most panels being 

directed at the primary purpose of the marriage or engagement. 

In Gavino, the Court could not see why the evidence examined by the Immigration 

Appeal Division panel to decide the marriage was not genuine would not also have relevance 

when the panel turned its mind to motivation.” 78 There appears to be no reason why evidence 

from one prong of the new test cannot be used in any analysis of the second prong. 

73 

74 

75 

76 

77 

78 

Vuong, Phuoc v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-16835), Stein, December 22, 2003. 

Gill, Ranjit Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-03074), Kang, November 12, 2003. 

Donkar, supra, footnote 11, at paragraph 18. 

Donkar, supra ,footnote 11. 

Bisla, supra, footnote 29. 

Gavino, supra, footnote 26. 


15 



An issue that often arises in a section 4 appeal hearing is whether or not the applicant 

must testify, and if the applicant does not testify whether a negative inference should be drawn. 

In Mann, 79 a negative inference was not drawn by the Immigration Appeal Division from 

the applicant's failure to testify as the testimony of the appellant, combined with the 

documentary evidence, was sufficiently persuasive for the panel to decline to draw a negative 

inference from the failure of the applicant to testify. The panel noted that with respect to the 

second prong of the test under section 4 of the IRP Regulations, the intentions of the applicant 

are still important, as it is the applicant who typically has the most to gain from an immigration 

perspective. However, with respect to the first prong of the test - whether the marriage is 

genuine - it is the intentions of both the appellant and applicant that are significant. By focusing 

the inquiry on the broad question of whether the marriage is genuine, Parliament intended a shift 

away from a narrow focus on the applicant's intentions at the time of the marriage. The panel 

held that the testimony of the appellant alone can suffice to persuade the panel of the bona fides 

of the parties' intentions. 

The panel in Mann 80 went on to note that there are cases in which the testimony of the 

applicant will be necessary to successfully discharge the evidentiary burden. Appeals in which it 

might be advisable or even necessary to call the applicant as a witness include circumstances 

such as the following: 

Where there are specific and significant inconsistencies in the record – as between the 

appellant and the applicant or within the applicant’s own answers; 

Where the applicant has a questionable immigration history; 

Where there is an obvious reason to question the motivation of the applicant, such as 

where there is persuasive evidence that the applicant is using the appellant to acquire status in 

Canada; 

Where there is minimal or inadequate documentary evidence to corroborate the testimony 

of the appellant. 

The panel noted that: “these circumstances are not exhaustive. Nor are they mutually 

exclusive. However, in some cases, even where the above problems exist, the appellant alone 

may be able to persuasively explain the problem. The decision whether to call the applicant as a 

witness is individual to each appeal and in the view of the panel, should be based on the quality 

of the available other evidence in its entirety. As noted above, even where one of the above 

circumstances exists, the testimony of the appellant alone may suffice to discharge the 

evidentiary burden. In some appeals, it may be sufficient for the applicant to provide evidence 

via sworn Affidavit.” 81 

The Immigration Appeal Division has commented in another case as follows where the 

sponsored spouse was not called to testify by the appellant whom the panel had found to have 

provided credible testimony: “The appellant made a judgment decision in this regard and he 

79 

80 

81 

Mann, Jagdeep Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-19094), Stein, August 5, 2005. 

Mann, supra, footnote 79 at paragraph 14. 

Mann, supra, footnote 79 at paragraph 15. 


16 



concluded that the applicant was not needed, and that the panel had all the evidence it needed to 

make its decision, I draw no adverse inference from the applicant not giving her evidence at the 

hearing. Her evidence in detail was given to the visa officer and is contained on the CAIPS 

notes. Some of it is accurate and some of it is not, but on balance, the panel finds that the 

applicant’s evidence with respect to the core issues, where it overlaps with the appellant’s 

evidence, does confirm and corroborate the same.” 82 

CHANGE IN MARITAL STATUS 

Where a common law or conjugal partner marries a sponsor at some time during the 

processing of an application for permanent residence, the issue arises whether or not to continue 

to treat the application as that of a common law or conjugal partner. 83 

A) Marriage after filing of undertaking of assistance, but before filing of application for 

permanent residence 

The relevant date for determining marital status is the date an applicant swears to the truth 

of the contents of the application for permanent residence. 84 

B) Marriage after filing of undertaking of assistance and application for permanent 

residence, but before refusal of application 

The Federal Court has held that a marriage post-dating an application for permanent 

residence of a fiancé(e) is irrelevant in dealing with the application. 85 The Court added that any 

form of marriage must be considered a positive factor in resolving the issue of the sincerity of a 

sponsor and applicant to be married if the applicant is admitted to Canada. 

C) Marriage after refusal, but before hearing of appeal 

The general approach, based on Kaur, 86 a case involving a fiancé(e) application under the 

former Regulations, is that the initial application by the applicant is to be dealt with entirely 

without reference to a subsequent marriage. 87 

82 

83 

84 

85 

86 

Mann, Pitter Ali Ram v. M.C.I. (IAD TA6-13395), Band, December 21, 2007 at paragraphs 15 and 16. 

In a case involving a fiancé under the former Regulations, the visa office may treat an intervening marriage as 

indicative of a new application: Kaur, Amarjit v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-03654), Buchanan, June 24, 1999. 

Owens, Christine Janet v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-615-83), Urie, Le Dain, Marceau, March 27, 1984. Thus 

where a sponsor married her fiancé after the undertaking of assistance was filed but before the filing of the 

application for permanent residence, the application ought to have been assessed as a spousal one: Gill, Balbir 

Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 88-00074), Wlodyka, MacLeod, Verma, February 7, 1989. As previously noted, under 

the IRP Regulations a fiancé(e) is not a member of the family class unless the applicant is within the definition 

as a common law or conjugal partner. 

Kaur, Gurmit v. C.E.I.C. (F.C.T.D., no. T-2490-84), Jerome, May 8, 1985. Kaur was followed in Dhaliwal, 

Charanjit Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-6194), Ariemma, Mawani, Singh, May 7, 1987. 

Kaur, supra, footnote 85. 


17 



D) Marriage after commencement, but before completion of hearing of appeal 

Where an applicant marries a sponsor after the commencement of the appeal hearing, the 

appeal is heard as a common law partner or conjugal partner appeal. 88 

E) Summary of change in status 

The Immigration Appeal Division typically views the critical time for determining the 

status of an applicant (i.e. spouse, common law or conjugal partner) to be the date of the 

swearing of the application for permanent residence, takes as determinative the applicant’s status 

at that point in time, and considers a subsequent marriage as evidence in favour of the 

genuineness of the relationship if consistent with other evidence. 89 

As summarized by the Immigration Appeal Division in relation to a former Regulations 

fiancée appeal: 90 

[...] in the Board’s opinion, the decision in Kahlon 91 does not, without more, 

have the effect of converting the application from one of a fiancée to one of a 

spouse, nor consequently have the effect of automatically converting an 

appeal from a fiancée refusal to one from a spousal refusal. What it does is 

to enable the Board to take into account the subsequent marriage of the 

parties and the circumstances surrounding it and any other evidence which 

exists at the time of the hearing in reaching its decision. The issue 

nevertheless remains the inadmissibility of the applicant as a fiancée. 

F) Converting spousal application to a conjugal or common law partner 

application 

In unique circumstances, 92 and sometimes with the consent of counsel for the Minister (or 

on the panel’s own application), the Immigration Appeal Division has “converted” a spousal 

87 

88 

89 

90 

91 

92 

Khella, Kulwinder Kaur v. M.E.I. (IAD V89-00179), Singh, Angé, Verma, June 29, 1989. See also Bhandhal, 

Amanpreet Kaur v. M.E.I. (IAD T89-06326), Bell, Tisshaw, Townshend, April 4, 1990; and Su, Khang San v. 

S.S.C. (IAD T93-12061), Aterman, June 1, 1994. 

In a fiancé appeal under the former Regulations: Chow, Wing Ken v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-9800), Tisshaw, Jew, 

Bell (dissenting), July 8, 1988. Reported: Chow v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1988), 

6 Imm. L.R. (2d) 97 (I.A.B.). 

See, for example, Mann, Paramjit Kaur v. M.E.I. (IAD V89-00516), Chambers, Gillanders, Verma, March 20, 

1990; Bhandhal, supra, footnote 87; Ta, Suy Khuong v. M.C.I. (IAD W99-00121), D’Ignazio, November 21, 

2000. 

Gill, Manjeet Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD V87-6408), Mawani, MacLeod, Verma, August 16, 1989, at 3. 

Kahlon, supra, footnote 30, where it was held that a hearing of an appeal by the Immigration Appeal Board is a 

hearing de novo in a broad sense. 

Usually where a sponsor and applicant genuinely believe they are validly married but later discover there is a 

defect in regard to the marriage including an invalid proxy marriage. Under the former Immigration 

Regulations the conversion was to the status of a fiancé(e). 


18 



application to that of a conjugal or common law partner. 93 By treating an applicant as a conjugal 

or common law partner, the applicant continues to be a member of the family class and the 

sponsor is not required to recommence the immigration process with a new application. The 

Immigration Appeal Division panel in Tabesh 94 concluded that if a person applies as a member of 

the family class as a spouse and the refusal is based on the formal validity of the marriage, it is 

incumbent on the visa officer to consider as well whether the person could be either a conjugal or 

common-law partner. A failure to do so could give rise to multiple refusals and appeals on 

essentially the same facts. The determination of all categories within the one class of marital, 

conjugal or common-law partners could be made by the Immigration Appeal Division even in the 

absence of an application by a party to amend the grounds of refusal. 

REPEAT APPEALS – RES JUDICATA AND ISSUE ESTOPPEL 

A) Introduction 

IRPA contemplates that there may be re-applications in immigration matters and hence 

the possibility of repeat appeals to the Immigration Appeal Division. 

In some repeat appeals, for example, from financial or medical refusals, it is 

acknowledged that circumstances may change following the first appeal, and the Immigration 

Appeal Division may evaluate evidence of improved fiscal or physical health on a repeat appeal 

from a second refusal. 

However, in marriage and adoption applications, there is limited fluidity with respect to 

the point at which the determination is made as to whether the applicant is a member of the 

family class: that point in time is fixed by legislation. In repeat appeals from marriage or 

adoption refusals, the evidence must always relate to the intention at the time the applicant was 

purported to become a member of the family class. Repeat appeals from these refusals require a 

more restrictive approach. 

Two tools are available to the Immigration Appeal Division to deal with attempts to 

relitigate unsuccessful appeals: the doctrines of res judicata and abuse of process. The former 

has specific criteria which must be met before it can be applied, while the latter has developed as 

a more flexible doctrine meant to encompass situations that may not meet the stricter res judicata 

criteria. While res judicata will be the most appropriate doctrine to apply in most marriage and 

adoption repeat appeals, abuse of process is available in appropriate cases and may be used 

instead of, or in conjunction with, a finding of res judicata. 

93 

94 

Tabesh, Rita v. M.C.I. (IAD VA3-00941), Wiebe, January 7, 2004; See also, Ur-Rahman, Mohammed v. M.C.I. 

(IAD TA3-04308), Collins, January 13, 2005. 

ibid 


19 



B) Doctrine of Res Judicata 

Res Judicata has two forms: issue estoppel and cause of action estoppel. The form that is 

relevant to repeat appeals is issue estoppel and it is often referred to generically as res judicata. 

There are three requirements for issue estoppel/res judicata to apply; 

i. that the same question has been decided 

ii. that the judicial decision which is said to have created the estoppel was 

final; and 

iii. that the parties to the judicial decision or their privies 95 were the same 

persons as the parties to the proceedings in which the estoppel is raised or 

their privies. 96 

The doctrine avoids the potential to have inconsistent decisions in which a previous 

decision is undermined by a finding on a repeat appeal. 

Issue estoppel is a common law rule of public policy that balances the right 

of a plaintiff to litigate an issue against the court’s concern as to duplication 

of process, use of its limited facilities, concern for conflicting findings of 

fact, and for achieving justice between litigants. 97 

In the context of appeals before the Immigration Appeal Division, res judicata is always 

appropriate for consideration. This is because in the majority of repeat appeals all three criteria 

set out above are present. In the usual scenario the appellant has commenced a new sponsorship 

application following the dismissal of his first appeal. An immigration officer has refused the 

application and the appellant appeals the new refusal to the Immigration Appeal Division. The 

decision made by the Immigration Appeal Division on the first appeal was final and the parties 

(applicant, appellant and Minister) are the same. Most of the time, the remaining criterion – 

same question to be decided - is also met: for example, the immigration intention of the parties at 

the time of the marriage, the genuineness of the marriage or the genuineness of a parent/child 

relationship in an adoption. 98 

95 

96 

97 

98 

Black’s Law Dictionary defines privy as one who has acquired an interest in the subject matter affected by the 

judgment through or under one of the parties. 

Angle v. Minister of National Revenue (1974), 47 D.L.R. (3d) 544 (S.C.C.) at 555-56. See also, The Doctrine 

of Res Judicata in Canada, Donald J. Lange, (Butterworths, Toronto, 2000) at 23. 

Machin et al v. Tomlison (2000), 51 OR (3d) (OCA) 566 at 571. 

Sometimes the issue may be characterized as different on a second appeal, but it is really the same issue as in 

the first appeal because it involves an analysis of the same facts. What may be phrased as a separate issue may 

in fact be different facets of the same issue based on the same basic underlying facts. For example, a finding 

that the intention on an adoption was for immigration purposes cannot really be separated from a finding on the 

genuineness of the parent child relationship. The underlying facts are intertwined. Please see M.C.I. v. Sekhon, 

Amrik Singh (IAD T99-05069), Sangmuah, March 30, 2001, at 17, where the Immigration Appeal Division 

stated; “In my view, short of refusing an application or dismissing an appeal on the ground that the adoption 

did not comply with the laws of the jurisdiction in which it took place, a decision-maker cannot avoid an 

inquiry into the intent behind the adoption. A finding that it was entered into primarily for immigration 

purposes essentially determines the application against the applicant or the appeal against the appellant.” 


20 



The rules governing res judicata should not be mechanically applied. Once a 

determination is made that the criteria for res judicata are met the Immigration Appeal Division 

must still consider whether as a matter of discretion res judicata ought to be applied. 99 The 

Supreme Court of Canada in Danyluk 100 listed factors which may be considered in the exercise of 

that discretion. The factor relevant to the Appeal Division’s exercise of discretion in res judicata 

motions would be the potential for injustice if the doctrine is applied. In this regard the 

Immigration Appeal Division will balance the public interest in the finality of litigation with the 

public interest in ensuring that justice is done. 

C) Abuse of Process 

Even though repeat appeals at the Immigration Appeal Division will, due to the nature of 

the process, almost always meet the criteria for res judicata, in some cases the Appeal Division 

may find it more appropriate to consider applying the doctrine of abuse of process instead of or in 

addition to res judicata. 

Unlike res judicata, which requires that the same parties or their privies be involved in the 

earlier decision, abuse of process is not constrained by such formalities. It requires only that the 

same question be decided previously. 

Abuse of process is a discretionary principle that is not limited by any set 

number of categories. It is an intangible principle that is used to bar 

proceedings that are inconsistent with the objectives of public policy. 101 

In particular, it can be used to prevent the abuse of tribunal procedures by applicants who 

would otherwise re-apply ad infinitum. 102 

Rearguing a case in appeal for the sake of reargument offends public interest. 

It is well recognized that superior courts have the inherent jurisdiction to 

prevent an abuse of their process and there is some suggestion that 

administrative tribunals do too. …Clearly, therefore the Appeal Division has 

jurisdiction to control its process and to prevent its abuse. 103 

99 

Chadha, Neena v. M.C.I. (IAD VA0-01981), Boscariol, March 26, 2002; Bhinder, Satinder Kaur v. M.C.I. 

(IAD TA0-20537), MacAdam, June 13, 2002. 

100 Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc. [2001] S.C.J. No.46, Q.L. The Supreme Court noted that the 

underlying purpose of res judicata is to balance the public interest in the finality of litigation with the public 

interest in ensuring that justice be done on the facts of a particular case. It set out a non-exhaustive list of 

factors that a court may consider in deciding whether to exercise its discretion to apply res judicata. The factors 

are: the wording of the statute, the purpose of the legislation, the availability of an appeal, the safeguards 

available to the parties in the administrative procedure, the expertise of the administrative decision-maker, the 

circumstances giving rise to the prior administrative proceedings and the potential injustice. Of all theses 

factors, it would seem the last (potential for injustice) is the one that would be most relevant for the 

Immigration Appeal Division to consider before finding that an appeal is res judicata. See also Pillai, 

Rajkumar Vadugaiyah v. M.C.I., (F.C.T.D., Imm-6124-00), Gibson, December 21, 2001. 

101 Canam Enterprises Inc. v. Coles (2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 481 (O.C.A.). 

102 O’Brien v. Canada (1993), 153 N.R. 313 (FCA). 

103 Kaloti v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] 3 F.C. 390 (C.A.). 


21 



Abuse of process is a particularly powerful tool for preserving tribunal resources and for 

upholding the integrity of the process by avoiding inconsistent results. 104 It has been held that 

exposing a court to the risk of inconsistent decisions is an abuse of process. 105 

The doctrine may be applied, out of a concern for the integrity of the process, even in the 

absence of inappropriate behaviour by the parties. 106 The use of abuse of process ought to be 

reserved for cases where there is an additional serious element present, beyond the mere fact of 

relitigation, justifying the application of abuse of process 107 . 

D) Special Circumstances Exception to Res Judicata and Abuse of Process 

Even where all the criteria for the application of res judicata are met (same question, 

same parties, final decision) a repeat appeal can only be res judicata if there exist no special 

circumstances that would bring the appeal within the exception to the doctrine. 108 

The exception of special circumstances applies where in the previous proceedings there 

was fraud or other misconduct that raises natural justice issues. 109 In addition, the exception 

extends to decisive new evidence that could not have been discovered by exercise of reasonable 

diligence in the first proceeding. It also applies to changes in the law and public policy 

considerations. 110 

…subject to the exceptions I shall mention in a moment, no one can relitigate 

a cause of action or an issue that has previously been decided against him in 

the same court or in any equivalent court having jurisdiction in the matter 

where he has or could have participated in the previous proceedings unless 

some overriding question of fairness requires a rehearing. The exceptions to 

the forgoing include fraud or other misconduct in the earlier proceedings or 

the discovery of decisive fresh evidence which could not have been adduced 

at the earlier proceeding by the exercise of reasonable diligence. 111 

Even though the exception of special circumstances developed from the case law on res 

judicata, it also applies to abuse of process and each repeat appeal must be examined to ascertain 

if there exist special circumstances that would preclude the application of either res judicata or 

abuse of process. 

104 Lange text, supra, footnote 96 at 348. 

105 R. v. Duhamel (1984), 57 A.R. 204 (S.C.C.). 

106 Abacus Cities Ltd. (Bankrupt) v. Bank of Montreal (1987), 80 A.R 254 (C.A.) at 259. 

107 Dhaliwal, Baljit Kaur v. M.C.I., (F.C.T.D., IMM-1760-01), Campbell, December 21, 2001. 

108 The case law is clear that the existence of special circumstances such as fraud or new evidence are an exception 

to res judicata. See Cobb v. Holding Lumber Co. (1977), 79 D.L.R. (3d) 332 (B.C.S.C.) at 334. 

109 In Tut, Sukhbir Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V98-03881), Mattu, March 7, 2002 the panel found that the 

incompetence of previous counsel resulted in a denial of natural justice as the sponsor had been denied a full 

and fair hearing. 


111 Saskatoon Credit Union Ltd. v. Central Park Enterprises Ltd. (1998), 47 D.L.R. (4 th ) 431 at 438. 


22 



E) Are there Special Circumstances? Procedure for Assessment of Evidence in 

Repeat Claims 

The burden of proof rests upon the person alleging that special circumstances exist. 112 

Therefore the appellant would have to establish that the evidence proffered falls within the 

meaning of decisive new evidence or one of the other exceptions to the doctrines. 

A decision on whether either doctrine is applicable to a repeat appeal should be made 

without an oral hearing into the merits of the appeal. 113 Since the concept behind res judicata 

and abuse of process is to protect the limited resources of courts and tribunals and to prevent relitigation 

of issues already decided by a tribunal member, it would defeat that purpose if a full 

hearing were held on a repeat appeal just to determine if res judicata or abuse of process 

applies. 114 The Immigration Appeal Division therefore, should, by way of motion, review the 

evidence submitted in support of the second appeal and dismiss the appeal summarily if there 

exist no special circumstances. 115 

Only if special circumstances are found, and therefore res judicata and abuse of process 

do not apply, should the matter proceed to a full hearing where the decisive new evidence would 

be considered in the context of all the evidence. 

…the Appeal Division has jurisdiction to control its process and to prevent 

its abuse. It may entertain, as it did in this case, preliminary motions to 

summarily dispose of an appeal which is but an abusive attempt to re-litigate 

what had been litigated in a previous appeal. A full hearing on the merits of 

the appeal is not necessary. 116 

Submissions in writing from the Minister and the Appellant, together with supporting 

affidavits and other material, may be entertained on such a motion. The Immigration Appeal 

Division should be presented with a summary of the new evidence that the appellant feels 

supports a second appeal. 117 

The evaluation of the purported new evidence will be key on such motions. The nature of 

the evidence will determine whether, barring special circumstances, the repeat appeal should be 

considered res judicata, abuse of process, or both. 


113 Sekhon, Amrik Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D. IMM-1982-01), McKeown, December 12, 2001. The Federal Court 

approved the Immigration Appeal Division’s practice of considering evidence in writing, without an oral 

hearing, on res judicata motions. (The application for judicial review in the Sekhon case was allowed on other 

grounds.) 

114 Sekhon, supra, footnote 98, at 19. 

115 Sekhon, supra, footnote 98. See also, Kaloti , supra, footnote 103. 

116 Kaloti, supra, footnote 103, at 5. 

117 Sekhon, supra, footnote 98. 


23 



F) Using Res Judicata and Abuse of Process 

Recent case law appears to minimize the clear delineation that once existed between the 

doctrines of res judicata and abuse of process. Lange, in his text, The Doctrine of Res Judicata 

in Canada, makes the following statement with respect to the overlap between res judicata and 

abuse of process; 

The courts have stated that abuse of process is res judicata in the wider sense 

or a form of res judicata, and that abuse of process arguments are res judicata 

arguments in another form. To seek to litigate an issue that is barred by 

cause of action estoppel or issue estoppel is an abuse of process. The 

requirements of issue estoppel apply by analogy to the application of abuse 

of process and where the requirements of issue estoppel are met, it is an 

abuse of process by relitigation. 118 

It is open to the Immigration Appeal Division to apply either or both doctrines in 

appropriate cases. 119 In Kaloti, the Court acknowledged that res judicata may have been 

applicable, but on the particular facts of the case, where no new evidence was proffered to 

support the second appeal, the Court preferred to make a finding of abuse of process. 

The Court in Kaloti cautioned however, that one should remain aware of the distinction to 

be made between res judicata and abuse of process. 120 

The Court in Dhaliwal 121 offers some guidance in this area. It held that it is inappropriate 

to make a finding of abuse of process where new evidence exists which might be relevant to the 

intention of the applicant at the time of the marriage or adoption. It cautions that abuse of 

process ought to be used only in the exceptional cases. 

There are examples where courts have used the doctrine of abuse of process as a 

concurrent ground with res judicata 122 and situations where courts have declined to commit to 

the use of one over the other. 

I decline to decide whether the forgoing conclusion represents the application 

of a species of estoppel by res judicata or abuse of process as the result is the 

same. 123 

118 Lange text, supra, footnote 96 at 344-5. 

119 Sekhon, supra, footnote 98. 

120 In Kaloti, supra, footnote 103, the Court quoted from the judgment of Auld L.J. in Bradford & Bigley Society 

v. Seddon, [1999] 1 W.L.R. 1482 at 1490 (C.A.): In my judgment, it is important to distinguish clearly between 

res judicata and abuse of process not qualifying as res judicata, a distinction delayed by the blurring of the two 

in the court’s subsequent application of the above dictum, The former, in its cause of action estoppel form, is 

an absolute bar to re-litigation, and in its issue estoppel form also, save in “special cases” or “special 

circumstances” […] The latter, which may arise where there is no cause of action or issue estoppel, is not 

subject to the same test, the task of the court being to draw the balance between the competing claims of one 

party to put his case before the court and of the other not to be unjustly hounded given the earlier history of the 

matter. 

121 Dhaliwal, supra, footnote 69. 



24 



It is suggested that the nature of the purported new evidence put forward to support a 

repeat appeal will determine whether one or both of the doctrines should be applied. Where there 

is no new evidence proffered or the evidence is spurious, abuse of process may be applicable and 

appropriate. 124 In all other situations where new evidence is proffered that may not meet the 

standard of decisive new evidence, res judicata is the appropriate doctrine to apply. 

In all but exceptional circumstances, 125 the panel on the motion will not be able to make 

credibility assessments on the new evidence put forward to support a repeat appeal. In the 

absence of an opportunity to examine a witness on his or her statements, the statements must be 

assumed to be true. 

G) Evidentiary framework for the application of either res judicata or abuse of 

process: Examination of Decisive New Evidence 

Decisive new evidence has been described as evidence “demonstrably capable of altering 

the result” 126 of the first proceeding. 

1. Evidence that existed at the first appeal but was not reasonably available 

Where the appellant presents purported new evidence, the evidence must be examined to 

discern if it could not reasonably have been adduced at the first appeal. 127 If it passes this test it 

must be further examined to see if it is decisive new evidence. 

Following Kular, in order to justify a hearing of the merits of the second 

appeal, there must be evidence which is material to the matters in issue which 

was not heard at the first appeal. But it must also be evidence which could 

not have been available using due diligence at the time of the first hearing. 

In short more evidence does not necessarily justify a new hearing. It is 

123 Saskatoon Credit, supra, footnote 111 at 438. 

124 Litt, Gurdev Singh v. M.C.I. (V99-03351), Baker, December 18, 2000 where a child was purportedly born to 

the applicant after the first hearing but where no DNA evidence was submitted, the panel held that there was no 

new evidence given that the panel in the first appeal did not consider the evidence of the pregnancy credible. 

Further, the panel found that the failure to submit DNA evidence when an adjournment was granted for the 

purpose was in itself an abuse of process. 

125 In Melo, Eduardo Manuel v. M.C.I. (IAD T94-07953), Hoare, February 7, 2001, the panel found, on a motion 

to reopen, that statements in the applicant’s affidavit were not persuasive as they asserted facts on an issue on 

which the previous panel had made negative credibility findings. See too Nijjar (Mann), Gurtejpal Kaur v. 

M.C.I. (IAD V98-03483), Borst, December 8, 2000 where the panel found the new evidence not to be credible, 

the medical tests did not prove that the couple tried to conceive. In Bassi, Viyay Kamal Lata v. M.C.I. (IAD 

V99-02989), Borst, October 17, 2000 the panel found the evidence concerning the pregnancy and its 

termination manufactured. Where the applicant made no mention of the pregnancy at his interview, despite 

being asked for new evidence relating to the spousal relationship, the panel found the evidence of the 

pregnancy not credible: Sahota, Paramjit Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA0-00929), Baker, October 31, 2000. 

126 Lundrigan Group Ltd. v. Pilgrim (1989), 75 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 217 (Nfld. C.A.) at 223. 

127 In Alzaim (Sekala), Khadija v. M.C.I. (IAD TA1-05412), Sangmuah, April 23, 2002 the panel found statements 

from the applicant, the sponsor’s son and various friends and family members could have been adduced in the 

previous proceedings by the exercise of due diligence. 


25 



evidence justifying a new hearing if and only if it is material evidence which 

was not available at the time of the first hearing and could not have been 

obtained by due diligence at that time. 128 

If this new evidence is found to be capable of altering the result in the first appeal (i.e. 

“decisive”), res judicata and abuse of process do not apply. The matter then goes to a full 

hearing where the Immigration Appeal Division will determine if the evidence found to be 

capable of altering the result does in fact produce a different disposition. 129 

2. Evidence that came into existence following the first appeal 

Within the context of a repeat appeal, it will be rare that new evidence will surface that 

existed at the time of the first appeal, but was not reasonably available. The more likely scenario 

will involve evidence that relates specifically to activities that occurred in the time period 

between the dismissal of the first appeal and the repeat appeal. 

Such evidence is clearly new evidence in the sense that it did not exist at the time of the 

first hearing. 130 However, it does not fall within the special circumstances exception to res 

judicata and abuse of process unless it is decisive new evidence. 

Decisive new evidence is at a minimum that which would be probative to the intention 

fixed in time by the relevant definition in the legislation. For example, the Court in Kaloti set out 

that since under section 4(3) of the former Regulations the intention of an applicant in a marriage 

is fixed in time and cannot be changed, a new application would have to be based on new 

evidence pertaining to that point in time. 131 Evidence that stems from the period of time between 

the two appeals ought to be further examined. 132 The Immigration Appeal Division must 

differentiate between that which is decisive fresh evidence and that which is merely additional 

128 M.C.I v. Nirwan, Malkiat Singh (IAD VA0-01903), Clark, April 24, 2001, at 5. In Hamid, Abdul v. M.C.I. 

(F.C., no. IMM-872-06), Martineau, February 26, 2007; 2007 FC 220, the Court held that the subsequent birth 

of a child does not, on its own, suffice as special circumstances. In Anttal, Narinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. 

IMM-2179-07), Snider, January 9, 2008; 2008 FC 30 the pregnancy of the sponsored spouses was found not to 

be decisive new evidence. 

129 See Sukhchain, Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD TA5-14717), MacLean, November 15, 2007 for a discussion at 

paragraphs 31 and 32 on how the panel proceeded to deal with the repeat appeal after the preliminary ruling by 

another member that res judicata did not apply to the repeat appeal. 

130 While courts may only consider new evidence that was in existence at the time of the previous court decision, 

the Immigration Appeal Division is in a unique position. Under the former Immigration Act, a person may 

reapply so we may look at completely new evidence that did not exist at the time of the first appeal, however 

that new evidence must pass several tests including its relevance to the intention of an applicant at a fixed point 

in time in marriages and adoptions. 

131 Kaloti, supra, footnote 103 at 4. Also see Sekhon, supra, footnote 98, at 12, where the Immigration Appeal 

Division discusses the fixed point in time for determining the bona fides of a parent /child relationship. 

132 Dhillon, Manohar Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA0-01782), Boscariol, June 29, 2001. The panel allowed the appeal 

in finding that the new evidence of continuing communication between the appellant and the applicant 

confirmed a consistent pattern of regular telephone calls made since the marriage; whereas, in Alzaim, supra, 

footnote 127, the panel noted the evidence of contact between the appellant and the applicant after the first 

appeal was new but not decisive given the totality of the evidence. 


26 



evidence. The latter is evidence, which if brought at the first appeal, may have been given 

significant weight, but coming after the dismissal has less probative value. Decisive fresh 

evidence should genuinely affect an evaluation of the intention of the parties at the time the 

applicant purports to become a member of the family class while additional evidence simply tries 

to bolster or create the intention. 

In both cases a res judicata analysis is applied. In the former, where it is decisive new 

evidence capable of altering the result, special circumstances may be established and the matter 

goes on to a full oral hearing on the merits. 133 In the latter, where it is merely additional new 

evidence, the Immigration Appeal Division may find the appeal is res judicata. 134 In addition to 

a finding of res judicata, the Immigration Appeal Division may find that the second appeal is an 

abuse of process if the nature of the additional new evidence was spurious or without much 

merit/substance. 

There may also be new evidence that indicates a genuine relationship at the time of the 

second appeal but does not establish that the intention existed at the time the applicant purported 

to become a member of the family class. While the evidence shows that a relationship may have 

developed after the first appeal was dismissed, the matter may still be res judicata as the time 

requirement for establishing the intention was not met. In these circumstances the matter would 

be res judicata, however a finding of abuse of process is not recommended. 

3. No new evidence proffered to support the appeal 

Where the appellant presents no new evidence to support a second appeal, the attempt to 

re-litigate the issue may properly be characterized as an abuse of process without resorting to a 

res judicata analysis. This was the situation in Kaloti and the Court was clear that it was not 

necessary in that case to apply the doctrine of res judicata. 

H) Res Judicata under IRPA 

The case law that has developed with respect to the application of res judicata and issue 

estoppel is based on the timing determination under the former Regulations. 

An issue that arose with the new legislation was whether or not res judicata continues to 

apply as a result of the change in wording of the test to be applied in section 4 of the IRP 

Regulations including the change in timing of the assessment of the test. In Vuong 135 the 

133 Where the new evidence confirmed a continuing relationship after the first refusal and the conception of a child 

out of that relationship, the panel did not apply the doctrine of res judicata: Parmar, Kuljit Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD 

VA1-03015), Boscariol, May 13, 2002; Samra, Sukhwinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA1-01988), Boscariol, 

December 14, 2001. Similarly, in Sandhu, Randeep Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA0-04145), Boscariol, December 

14, 2001 and in Gill, Harjinder Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA1-00462), Boscariol, February 8, 2002 the birth of a 

child is held to be “decisive new evidence”. 

134 Samra, Kulwinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA0-01995), Baker, June 27, 2001; Chand, Rekha v. M.C.I. (V99- 

04372), Mattu, December 4, 2001; Dhaliwal, Kulwinder Kaur Nijjar v. M.C.I. (IAD V99-04535), Cochran, 

October 10, 2000 (reasons signed on October 31, 2000). 

135 Vuong, supra, footnote 73. 


27 



Immigration Appeal Division panel held that the changes between section 4(3) of the former 

Regulations and section 4 of the IRP Regulations are not of sufficient legal significance to create 

an exception to res judicata and concluded that res judicata applied. In Lu 136 the panel adopted a 

different position and concluded that res judicata does not apply as while the intent and nature of 

the inquiry into the genuineness of the relationship may be substantially the same as under the 

former Regulations, the broader language of section 4 of the IRP Regulations requires the 

decision-maker to decide a different question. 

The Federal Court has now ruled in a number of cases 137 that the Vuong approach is 

correct and that except in unique or special circumstances that the principle of res judicata 

applies as it is not in the public interest to allow the re-litigation of failed marriage appeals unless 

there are special circumstances. 

In Rahman, the Court noted that by definition, res judicata is a pre-hearing matter that, if 

applied, precludes a full hearing. The Immigration Appeal Division has the authority to 

summarily dismiss an appeal when the appellant seeks to re-litigate on essentially the same 

evidence and was not required to grant him an oral hearing. 138 

I) Summary 

Repeat appeals should not proceed to a full hearing until the evidence supporting the second 

appeal has been evaluated, in summary proceedings, to determine if res judicata or abuse of 

process do not apply. 

Unless the appellant can establish that there is evidence to bring the appeal within the 

special circumstances exception mentioned above, there will likely be no hearing on the merits. 

In most repeat appeals there will be new evidence presented in support of the second 

appeal that stems from the period of time between the first appeal and the second appeal. This 

additional evidence will usually not be decisive new evidence as it comes after a dismissal and 

therefore does not have as much probative value as evidence presented at the first appeal. In 

these situations res judicata may be applied. Where the new evidence appears to be spurious a 

finding of abuse of process in addition to res judicata may be made. However, where the panel 

finds that decisive new evidence has been presented, then the repeat appeal will go to a full 

hearing. 

136 Lu, Hung Xuong (Roy) v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-02237), Workun, March 24, 2004. 

137 See Mohammed, Amina v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-1436-05), Shore, October 27, 2005; 2005 FC 1442.; Li v. 

M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-5040-05), Lemieux, June 14, 2006; 2006 FC 757; Deuk, Chy v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM- 

1541-06), Pinard, December 19, 2006; 2006 FC 1495; Rahman, Azizur v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-1642-06), 

Noel, November 2, 2006; 2006 FC 1321. 

138 Rahman was applied in Hamid, Abdul v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-872-06), Martineau, February 26, 2007; 2007 

FC 220. For examples of Immigration Appeal Division cases which deal with res judicata see Klair, Paramjit 

v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-09098), Sangmuah, February 22, 2006; Singh, Amrik v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-14292), Waters, 

September 21, 2005; Bui, Ham Hung v. M.C.I. (IAD TA5-03192), Whist, September 1, 2005; Dhaliwal, Iqbal 

Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA4-01638), Workun, April 1, 2005. 


28 



Where no additional evidence is brought to support a repeat appeal, a finding of abuse of 

process is appropriate without the need to address res judicata. 

Prior Relationship Dissolved Primarily for Immigration Purposes – section 4.1 

As noted above, in 2004 a new provision, Section 4.1, was added to the IRP Regulations 

to cover the situation of a new relationship where a prior relationship was dissolved primarily for 

immigration purpose. 

In Mariano, 139 the appellant divorced her spouse who was medically inadmissible and 

removed him from her application for permanent residence. After becoming a Canadian citizen 

she remarried her spouse and sponsored him. The Immigration Appeal Division held that section 

4.1 applied as the panel found that the divorce was obtained solely to remove the applicant from 

the appellant’s application so that she could acquire permanent residence. The panel concluded 

that section 4.1 was enacted to prevent couples from dissolving their relationship to gain 

admission to Canada and then resuming it. In Wen, 140 the panel in examining the reasons for a 

divorce and subsequent remarriage after one spouse became a permanent resident came to an 

opposite conclusion as the panel accepted the explanations for the breakdown of the first and 

second marriages as well as the explanation for the appellant’s reconciliation and remarriage to 

her first husband. 

In Harripersaud, 141 the panel found that Section 4.1 applied in a situation where the 

appellant and applicant remarried after a separation of eight years. The panel rejected counsel’s 

argument that section 4.1 did not apply because the appellant would not have planned such a long 

separation from the applicant and held that: “The simple answer to this argument is that the 

immigration process takes time and even more time, where, as in this case, it involves, marriage, 

divorce, and a subsequent marriage.” In Zheng, 142 the panel found that section 4.1 applied even 

though there was an intervening marriage between the first marriage to the applicant and the 

marriage which facilitated the appellant’s immigration to Canada. The panel came to this 

conclusion as otherwise the intention of Parliament would be thwarted if the effect of section 4.1 

could be avoided by inserting an intervening marriage in the chain of causality. 

Prohibited Relationships 

Section 117(9) includes a number of family relationships that if applicable result in the 

foreign national not being considered a member of the family class by virtue of that relationship. 

There is some overlap with section 5 of the IRP Regulations that applies to all applications and 

139 Mariano, Edita Palacio v. M.C.I. (IAD WA5-00122), Lamont, September 20, 2006. 

140 Wen, Chu Xiu v. M.C.I. (IAD TA5-14563), MacLean, May 29, 2007. 

141 Harripersaud, Janet Rameena v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-11611), Sangmuah, June 30, 2005. 

142 Zheng, Wei Rong v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-16616), MacLean, August 23, 2007. 


29 



not just applications by foreign nationals who are members of the family class. This provision is 

discussed in detail in chapter 5 of this paper. 

Transition Provisions 

There is a transition provision for spousal and fiancée sponsorships that were refused 

under the former Act and Regulations for being relationships for immigration purposes. 

Generally these sponsorships were refused as the applicant was determined to be a member of an 

inadmissible class under section 19(2)(d) of the former Act. Section 320(10) of the IRP 

Regulations provides that: 

A person is inadmissible under the Immigration and Refugee Protection 

Act for failing to comply with that Act if, on the coming into force of this 

section, the person had been determined to be a member of an 

inadmissible class described in paragraph 19(1)(h) or (i) or 2(c) or (d) of 

the former Act,… 

There is a transition provision for sponsorship applications of fiancées made before June 

28, 2002. Section 356 of the IRP Regulations provides that: 

If a person referred to in paragraph (f) of the definition “member of the 

family class” in subsection 2(1) of the former Regulations made an 

application under those Regulations for a permanent resident visa before 

the day on which this section comes into force, the application is 

governed by the former Act. 


30 



CASES 

Abacus Cities Ltd. (Bankrupt) v. Bank of Montreal (1987), 80 A.R 254 (C.A.) ......................................................... 22 

Akhlaq, Afshan v. M.C.I. (IAD VA4-01933), Boscariol, June 16, 2005...................................................................... 10 

Alzaim (Sekala), Khadija v. M.C.I. (IAD TA1-05412), Sangmuah, April 23, 2002.............................................. 26, 27 

Angle v. Minister of National Revenue (1974), 47 D.L.R. (3d) 544 (S.C.C.)............................................................. 20 

Anttal, Narinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2179-07), Snider, January 9, 2008; 2008 FC 30............................. 26 

Aujla (Sidhu), Jagwinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA5-02812), Shahriari, April 17, 2007 ...................................... 10, 13 

Bahal, Vijay Kumar v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-02759), Townshend, August 4, 1998.......................................................... 13 

Basi, Navjot Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-00664), Lam, July 4, 1996............................................................................ 12 

Bassi, Viyay Kamal Lata v. M.C.I. (IAD V99-02989), Borst, October 17, 2000 ........................................................ 25 

Bhandhal, Amanpreet Kaur v. M.E.I. (IAD T89-06326), Bell, Tisshaw, Townshend, April 4, 1990......................... 18 

Bhangal, Baljit Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD W90-00173), Goodspeed, December 6, 1991.................................................. 12 

Bhango, Gurpal Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-625-07), Dawson, October 5, 2007; 2007 FC 

1028......................................................................................................................................................................... 10 

Bhinder, Satinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD TA0-20537), MacAdam, June 13, 2002 ....................................................... 21 

Bisla: S.G.C. v. Bisla, Satvinder (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5690-93), Denault, November 28, 1994......................... 8, 9, 16 

Bradford & Bigley Society v. Seddon, [1999] 1 W.L.R. 1482 at 1490 (C.A.) ............................................................. 25 

Brar, Baljit Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V93-02983), Clark, July 7,1995. Reported: Brar v. Canada 

(Minister of Citzenship and Immigration) (1995), 29 Imm. L.R. (2d) 186 (IAD) .................................................. 11 

Bui, Ham Hung v. M.C.I. (IAD TA5-03192), Whist, September 1, 2005 ................................................................... 29 

Canam Enterprises Inc. v. Coles (2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 481 (O.C.A.).......................................................................... 22 

Cant, Bant Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-02643), Boscariol, January 12, 2000 .............................................................. 11 

Chadha, Neena v. M.C.I. (IAD VA0-01981), Boscariol, March 26, 2002 .................................................................. 21 

Chaikosky, Marianne v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 84-4156), Petryshyn, Hlady, Voorhees, June 7, 1985 ................................... 12 

Chand, Rekha v. M.C.I. (V99-04372), Mattu, December 4, 2001 ............................................................................... 27 

Chavez, Rodrigo v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-24409), Hoare, January 17, 2005 .............................................................. 7, 8, 9 

Cheng, Shawn v. M.C.I. (IAD V96-02631), Boscariol, April 27, 1998....................................................................... 11 


31 



Chow, Wing Ken v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-9800), Tisshaw, Jew, Bell (dissenting), July 8, 1988. 

Reported: Chow v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1988), 6 Imm. L.R. 

(2d) 97 (I.A.B.) ....................................................................................................................................................... 18 

Cobb v. Holding Lumber Co. (1977), 79 D.L.R. (3d) 332 (B.C.S.C.)......................................................................... 22 

Coolen, Andrea Van v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 84-9741), D. Davey, Benedetti, Petryshyn, October 2, 1985.......................... 12 

Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc. [2001] S.C.J. No.46, Q.L ............................................................................ 21 

Dasent: M.C.I. v. Dasent, Maria Jackie (F.C.A., no. A-18-95), Strayer, Linden, McDonald, 

January 18, 1996 ..................................................................................................................................................... 10 

Davydenko: M.C.I. v. Davydenko, Anna (F.C. no. IMM-1482-00), Pinard, March 30, 2001; 2001 

FCT 257 .................................................................................................................................................................... 6 

Deuk, Chy v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-1541-06), Pinard, December 19, 2006; 2006 FC 1495 ...................................... 28 

Devia, Zarish Norris v. M.C.I. (IAD T94-05862), Band, April 23, 1996.................................................................... 11 

Dhaliwal, Baljit Kaur v. M.C.I., (F.C.T.D., IMM-1760-01), Campbell, December 21, 2001..................................... 22 

Dhaliwal, Charanjit Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-6194), Ariemma, Mawani, Singh, May 7, 1987................................ 17 

Dhaliwal, Iqbal Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA4-01638), Workun, April 1, 2005.............................................................. 29 

Dhaliwal, Jaswinder v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-1314-07), de Montigny, October 15, 2007; 2007 FC 

1051......................................................................................................................................................................... 11 

Dhaliwal, Kulwinder Kaur Nijjar v. M.C.I. (IAD V99-04535), Cochran, October 10, 2000 

(reasons signed on October 31, 2000)..................................................................................................................... 27 

Dhaliwal, Rup Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V96-00458), Jackson, September 5, 1997 .................................................. 14, 25 

Dhillon, Gurprit Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 89-00571), Sherman, Ariemma, Tisshaw, August 8, 1989 ......................... 14 

Dhillon, Manohar Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA0-01782), Boscariol, June 29, 2001....................................................... 27 

Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, Donald J. Lange, (Butterworths, Toronto, 2000) ............................................. 20 

Donkar, Sumaila v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-654-06), Mosley, September 12, 2006; 2006 FC 1089.................... 5, 6, 15 

Duong, Nhon Hao v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-19528), D’Ignazio, November 12, 2003......................................................... 9 

Froment, Danielle Marie v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-475-06), Shore, August 24, 2006; 2006 FC 

1002............................................................................................................................................................. 11, 12, 14 

Gavino, Edwin Dorol v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3249-05), Russell, March 9, 2006; 2006 FC 308 .................... 8, 9, 16 

Gill, Balbir Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 88-00074), Wlodyka, MacLeod, Verma, February 7, 1989 ................................. 17 

Gill, Harjinder Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA1-00462), Boscariol, February 8, 2002....................................................... 27 

Gill, Manjeet Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD V87-6408), Mawani, MacLeod, Verma, August 16, 1989.................................. 18 


32 



Gill, Ranjit Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-03074), Kang, November 12, 2003 ............................................................... 15 

Glaw, Gerhard Franz v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-02268), Townshend, July 21, 1998.......................................................... 14 

Habib, Mussarat v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-5262-06), Harrington, May 16, 2007; 2007 FC 524 ................................ 10 

Hamid, Abdul v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-872-06), Martineau, February 26, 2007; 2007 FC 220.......................... 26, 29 

Harripersaud, Janet Rameena v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-11611), Sangmuah, June 30, 2005 ............................................ 30 

Heera: M.C.I. v. Heera, Lilloutie (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5316-93), Noël, October 27, 1994. .................................... 4, 8 

Horbas v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] 2 F.C. 359 (T.D.)........................................... 5 

Jassar, Surjit Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V94-01705), Lam, May 14, 1996........................................................................ 12 

Johal, Surinder Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD V87-6546), Wlodyka, Singh, Verma, February 15, 1989................................ 13 

Judge, Mansoor Ali v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-20841), Leonoff, July 25, 2005 ................................................................... 14 

Jung, Harry Kam v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 84-6237), D. Davey, Chambers, Anderson, May 17, 1985.................................. 10 

Kahlon, Darshan Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-115-86), Mahoney, Stone, MacGuigan, 


(1989), 7 Imm. L.R. (2d) 91 (F.C.A.) ................................................................................................................. 8, 18 

Kaloti v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] 3 F.C. 390 (C.A.) ................................ 22, 24, 27 

Kang, Randip Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-02099), Clark, June 3, 2003 ........................................................................ 6 

Kaur, Amarjit v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-03654), Buchanan, June 24, 1999 ........................................................................ 17 

Kaur, Gurmit v. C.E.I.C. (F.C.T.D., no. T-2490-84), Jerome, May 8, 1985 ............................................................... 17 

Khan, Mohammed Farid v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-2971-06), Hughes, December 13, 2006; 2006 

FC 1490................................................................................................................................................................... 11 

Khella, Kulwinder Kaur v. M.E.I. (IAD V89-00179), Singh, Angé, Verma, June 29, 1989....................................... 18 

Khella, Palwinder Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-1811-06), de Montingny, November 10, 2006; 

2006 FC 1357............................................................................................................................................................ 5 

Khera, Amarjit v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6375-06), Martineau, June 13, 2007; 2007 FC 632 ........................ 5, 6, 8, 10 

Klair, Paramjit v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-09098), Sangmuah, February 22, 2006 ............................................................. 29 

Li v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-5040-05), Lemieux, June 14, 2006; 2006 FC 757 ........................................................... 28 

Litt, Gurdev Singh v. M.C.I. (V99-03351), Baker, December 18, 2000 ...................................................................... 25 

Lorenz, Hubert Calvin v. M.C.I. (IAD VA6-00444), Nest, June 15, 2007.................................................................... 7 

Lu, Hung Xuong (Roy) v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-02237), Workun, March 24, 2004......................................................... 28 


33 



Lundrigan Group Ltd. v. Pilgrim (1989), 75 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 217 (Nfld. C.A.)......................................................... 26 

Machin et al v. Tomlison (2000), 51 OR (3d) (OCA).................................................................................................. 20 

Maire, Beata Jolanta v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5420-98), Sharlow, July 28, 1999............................................. 10 

Malik, Estelita v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-4271), Rayburn, Goodspeed, Petryshyn, April 11, 1988 .................................... 10 

Mann, Jagdeep Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-19094), Stein, August 5, 2005 ................................................................. 16 

Mann, Paramjit Kaur v. M.E.I. (IAD V89-00516), Chambers, Gillanders, Verma, March 20, 1990 ......................... 18 

Mann, Pitter Ali Ram v. M.C.I. (IAD TA6-13395), Band, December 21, 2007 at paragraphs 15 

and 16...................................................................................................................................................................... 17 

Mansro, Gurmel Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA6-00931), Miller, July 18, 2007 ............................................................... 13 

Mariano, Edita Palacio v. M.C.I. (IAD WA5-00122), Lamont, September 20, 2006 ................................................ 29 

Martin, Juliee v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-00961), Lam, October 18, 1996........................................................................... 11 

Martin: M.C.I. v. Martin, Juliee Ida (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4068-96), Heald, August 13, 1997 .................................. 11 

Melo, Eduardo Manuel v. M.C.I. (IAD T94-07953), Hoare, February 7, 2001 .......................................................... 25 

Mohamed, Rodal Houssein v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6790-05), Beaudry, June 5, 2006; 2006 FC 

696............................................................................................................................................................................. 5 

Mohammed, Amina v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-1436-05), Shore, October 27, 2005; 2005 FC 1442 ............................ 28 

Morris, Lawrence v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-5045-04), Pinard, March 18, 2005; 2005 FC 369 .................................... 8 

Ni, Zhi Qi v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-4385-04), Pinard, February 17, 2005; 2005 FC 241............................................. 6 

Nijjar (Mann), Gurtejpal Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V98-03483), Borst, December 8, 2000 ............................................. 25 

Nirwan: M.C.I v. Nirwan, Malkiat Singh (IAD VA0-01903), Clark, April 24, 2001................................................. 26 

O’Brien v. Canada (1993), 153 N.R. 313 (FCA) ........................................................................................................ 22 

Ouk, Chanta v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-865-07), Mosley, September 7, 2007; 2007 FC 891............................... 5, 6, 13 

Owens, Christine Janet v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-615-83), Urie, Le Dain, Marceau, March 27, 1984 ........................ 17 

Owusu, Margaret v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-1402-06), Harrington, October 6, 2006; 2006 FC 1195 ......................... 10 

Parmar, Charanjit Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V98-04542), Boscariol, November 23, 1999 ............................................. 14 

Parmar, Kuljit Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA1-03015), Boscariol, May 13, 2002 ............................................................. 27 

Pillai, Rajkumar Vadugaiyah v. M.C.I., (F.C.T.D., Imm-6124-00), Gibson, December 21, 2001.............................. 21 

R. v. Duhamel (1984), 57 A.R. 204 (S.C.C.) ............................................................................................................... 22 


34 



Rahman, Azizur v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-1642-06), Noel, November 2, 2006; 2006 FC 1321.................................. 28 

Rasenthiram, Kugenthiraja v. M.C.I. (IAD T98-01452), Buchanan, February 17, 1999.............................................. 9 

Roopchand, Albert v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-1473-07), Dawson, October 26, 2007; 2007 FC 1108.......................... 10 

Sahota, Paramjit Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA0-00929), Baker, October 31, 2000.......................................................... 25 

Samra, Kulwinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA0-01995), Baker, June 27, 2001 ............................................................. 27 

Samra, Sukhwinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA1-01988), Boscariol, December 14, 2001 ............................................ 27 

Sandhu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 4 Imm.L.R. (2d) 39........................................... 12, 13 

Sandhu, Corazon Dalmacio Campos v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-4082), Rayburn, Goodspeed, Arkin, 

April 7, 1987 ......................................................................................................................................... 10, 12, 13, 14 

Sandhu, Randeep Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA0-04145), Boscariol, December 14, 2001................................................ 27 

Sangha (Mand), Narinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-01626), Carver, September 21, 1998....................................... 14 

Sanitchar, Omeshwar v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-5233-04), Beaudry, July 25, 2005; 2005 FC 1015............................. 5 

Saskatoon Credit Union Ltd. v. Central Park Enterprises Ltd. (1998), 47 D.L.R. (4 th )........................................ 23, 25 

Sau, Cecilia Mui Fong v. M.C.I. (IAD V96-00079), Boscariol, January 2, 1997 ....................................................... 10 

Sekhon, Amrik Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D. IMM-1982-01), McKeown, December 12, 2001................................. 23, 27 

Sekhon: M.C.I. v. Sekhon, Amrik Singh (IAD T99-05069), Sangmuah, March 30, 2001 .......................................... 21 

Sidhu, Gurdip Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD W90-00023), Goodspeed, Arpin, Rayburn, September 12, 

1990......................................................................................................................................................................... 15 

Sidhu, Kulwant Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 88-35458), Ahara, Rotman, Eglington (dissenting), 

August 25, 1988. ....................................................................................................................................................... 9 

Siev, Samuth v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-2472-04), Rouleau, May 24, 2005; 2005 FC 736........................................... 12 

Singh, Amrik v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-14292), Waters, September 21, 2005.................................................................... 29 

Singh, Muriel v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-1098), Angé, Cardinal, Lefebvre, January 8, 1987............................................... 10 

Singh, Ravinder Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-10228), Chu, Suppa, Eglington (dissenting), August 8, 

1988........................................................................................................................................................................... 7 

Singh: M.C.I. v. Singh, Jagdip, (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2297-01), Tremblay-Lamer, March 22, 2002; 

2002 FCT 313 ......................................................................................................................................................... 10 

Su, Khang San v. S.S.C. (IAD T93-12061), Aterman, June 1, 1994............................................................................ 18 

Sukhchain, Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD TA5-14717), MacLean, November 15, 2007 ......................................................... 26 

Ta, Suy Khuong v. M.C.I. (IAD W99-00121), D’Ignazio, November 21, 2000.......................................................... 18 


35 



Tabesh, Rita v. M.C.I. (IAD VA3-00941), Wiebe, January 7, 2004............................................................................ 19 

Thach,Phi Anne v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-5344-06), Heneghan, February 1, 2008; 2008 FC 133................................ 8 

Tran, Quoc An v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-16608), MacPherson, September 26, 2003 .......................................................... 9 

Tut, Sukhbir Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V98-03881), Mattu, March 7, 2002..................................................................... 22 

Ur-Rahman, Mohammed v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-04308), Collins, January 13, 2005 ..................................................... 19 

Virk, Raspal Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-9145), Fatsis, Arkin, Suppa, December 18, 1986. 

Reported: Virk v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1988), 2 Imm. L.R. (2d) 

127 (I.A.B.) ............................................................................................................................................................. 13 

Vuong, Phuoc v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-16835), Stein, December 22, 2003................................................................ 15, 28 

Wen, Chu Xiu v. M.C.I. (IAD TA5-14563), MacLean, May 29, 2007 ........................................................................ 30 

Zeng, Qing Wei v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-02640), Workun, April 22, 2003........................................................................ 5 

Zheng, Wei Rong v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-16616), MacLean, August 23, 2007............................................................... 30 


36 



Chapter Seven 

Relationship 

Generally 

A Canadian citizen 1 or a permanent resident 2 may sponsor the application for permanent 

residence of a foreign national 3 who is a member of the family class. 4 A sponsorship application 

must precede or accompany the application for permanent residence. 5 The application for 

permanent residence is considered to be an application made for the principal applicant and 

his/her accompanying family members. 6 

The visa shall be issued if the officer is satisfied that the foreign national is not 

inadmissible 7 and meets the requirements of the Act. 8 A foreign national is inadmissible for 

failing to comply with the Act through an act or omission that contravenes, directly or indirectly, 

a provision of the Act. 9 A foreign national is inadmissible on the grounds of an inadmissible 

accompanying family member and in prescribed circumstances, an inadmissible nonaccompanying 

family member. 10 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

Section 2 of the IRPR defines “Canadian citizen” as a citizen referred to in subsection 3(1) of the Citizenship 

Act. 

Section 2(1) of the IRPA defines “permanent resident” as a person who has acquired permanent resident status 

and has not subsequently lost that status under section 46. 

Section 2(1) of the IRPA defines “foreign national” as a person who is not a Canadian citizen or a permanent 

resident, and includes a stateless person. 

Section 13(1) of the IRPA. See Chapter 1 for a discussion of the requirements of a sponsor. 

Section 10(4) of the IRPR. Section 10 sets out the form and content of the application. Information regarding 

all family members, whether accompanying or not, must be provided. All family members are examined 

except in the circumstances outlined in section 23 of the IRPR. Unexamined family members are not members 

of the family class pursuant to section 117(9)(d) of the IRPR. Sections 352 to 355 of the IRPR contain the 

transitional provisions for applications that were made under the former Act. 

Section 10(3) of the IRPR. “Family member” is defined in section 1(3) of the IRPR as: 

(a) The spouse or common law partner of the person; 

(b) A dependent child of the person or of the person’s spouse or common-law partner; and 

(c) A dependent child of a dependent child referred to in paragraph (b). 

Sections 33 to 43 of the IRPA deal with inadmissibility. 

Section 11 of the IRPA. The sponsor must also meet the requirements of the Act, see again see Chapter 2. 

Section 25(1) of the IRPA gives the Minister humanitarian and compassionate jurisdiction where the 

requirements cannot be met. See also sections 66, 67 and 69 of the IRPR. 

Section 41 of the IRPR. 

Section 42 of the IRPA and Section 23 of the IRPR. 


January 1, 2008 Relationship - Ch. 7

Membership in the family class is determined by the relationship of the applicant to the 

sponsor 11 . 

The sponsor has the right to appeal against a decision not to issue the foreign national a 

permanent resident visa. 12 

Not a member of the Family Class 13 

The Definition 

(1) A foreign national is a member of the family class if, with respect to the sponsor, the foreign 

national is 

(a) the sponsor’s spouse, common-law partner or conjugal partner; 

(b) a dependent child of the sponsor; 

(c) the sponsor’s mother 14 or father; 

(d) the mother or father of the sponsor’s mother or father; 

(e) …. 15 

(f) a person whose parents are deceased, who is under 18 years of age, who is not a 

spouse or common-law partner and who is 

(i) a child of the sponsor’s mother or father, 

(ii) a child of a child of the sponsor’s mother or father, or 

(iii) a child of the sponsor’s child; 

(g) a person under 18 years of age whom the sponsor intends to adopt in Canada, if 

(i) the adoption is not primarily for the purpose of acquiring any privilege or 

status under the Act, 

(ii) where the adoption is an international adoption and the country in which 

the person resides and their province of intended destination are parties to the 

Hague Convention on Adoption, the competent authority of the country and of the 

province have approved the adoption in writing as conforming to that Convention, 

and 

(iii) where the adoption is an international adoption and either the country in 

which the person resides or the person’s province of intended destination is not a 

party to the Hague Convention on Adoption 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

Section 12(1) of the IRPA. See also section 117 of the IRPR. 

Section 63(1) of the IRPA. The right of appeal is restricted by section 64 of the IRPA. 

Section 117 of the IRPR. For a full discussion of adoptions and guardianships, see Chapter 4. For foreign 

marriages, common-law partners and conjugal partners, see Chapter 5. For bad faith family relationships, see 

Chapter 6. 

The term ‘mother’ (in the English version) and “parents” (in the French version) of the Regulations does not 

include “step-parents” as members of the family class. M.C.I. v. Vong, Chan Cam (F.C., no. IMM-1737-04), 

Heneghan, June 15, 2005; 2005 FC 855. 

Repealed, SOR/2005-61, s. 3. 



(A) the person has been placed for adoption in the country in which they 

reside or is otherwise legally available in the country for adoption 

and there is no evidence that the intended adoption is for the purpose 

of child trafficking or undue gain within the meaning of the Hague 

Convention on Adoption, and 

(B) the competent authority of the person’s province of intended 

destination has stated in writing that it does not object to the 

adoption; or 16 

(h) a relative 17 of the sponsor, regardless of age, if the sponsor does not have a spouse, 

a common-law partner, a conjugal partner, a child, a mother or father, a relative 

who is a child of that mother or father, a relative who is a child of a child of that 

mother or father, a mother or father of that mother or father or a relative who is a 

child of the mother or father of that mother or father 

(i) who is a Canadian citizen, Indian or permanent resident, or 

(ii) whose application to enter and remain in Canada as a permanent resident 

the sponsor may otherwise sponsor 

(2) A foreign national who is the adopted child of a sponsor and whose adoption took place 

when the child was under the age of 18 shall not be considered a member of the family class by 

virtue of that adoption unless it was in the best interests of the child within the meaning of the 

Hague Convention on Adoption. 18 

(3) .… 19 

(4) A foreign national who is the adopted child of a sponsor and whose adoption took place 

when the child was 18 years of age or older shall not be considered a member of the family 

class by virtue of that adoption unless it took place under the following circumstances: 

(a) the adoption was in accordance with the laws of the place where the adoption took 

place and, if the sponsor resided in Canada at the time of the adoption, the 

adoption was in accordance with the laws of the province where the sponsor then 

resided; 

16 

17 

18 

19 

See Chapter 4. 

“Relative” is defined in section 2 of the IRPR as “a person who is related to another person by blood or 

adoption”. This term was not defined under the former Act and Regulations and the Immigration Appeal 

Division had previously found that it should be broadly defined to include relatives by marriage. For example, 

see Dudecz, Ewa v. M.C.I. (IAD TA02446), Whist, December 6, 2002. That broad interpretation is no longer 

valid. However, the Immigration Appeal Division also considered the same section of the former Regulations 

in Sarmiento, Laura Victoria v. M.C.I. (IAD TA1-28226), Whist, November 1, 2002 and held that while 

sponsors can only sponsor one relative under a given sponsorship, it was open to sponsor a further relative on 

another occasion as long as the other conditions of the section were met at that specific time. “One” relative 

did not mean only one relative could ever be sponsored as the parliamentary intent of the section was to assist 

persons isolated in Canada without family. See also, supra, footnote 14 regarding the interpretation of 

“mother”. 


Defines “best interests of the child”. See Chapter 4. 



(b) a genuine parent-child relationship exists at the time of the adoption and existed 

before the child reached the age of 18; and 

(c) the adoption is not primarily for the purpose of acquiring a status or privilege 

under the Act. 20 

(5) …. 21 

(6) …. 22 

(7) …. 23 

(8) …. 24 

(9) No foreign national may be considered a member of the family class by virtue of their 

relationship to a sponsor if 

(a) the foreign national is the sponsor’s spouse, common-law partner or conjugal 

partner and is under 16 years of age; 

(b) the foreign national is the sponsor’s spouse, common-law partner or conjugal 

partner, the sponsor has an existing sponsorship undertaking in respect of a 

spouse, common-law partner or conjugal partner and the period referred to in 

subsection 132(1) in respect of that undertaking has not ended; 

(c) the foreign national is the sponsor’s spouse and 

(i) the sponsor or the foreign national was, at the time of their marriage, the 

spouse of another person, or 

(ii) the sponsor has lived separate and apart from the foreign national for at 

least one year and 

(A) the sponsor is the common-law partner of another person or the 

conjugal partner of another foreign national, or 

(B) the foreign national is the common-law partner of another person or the 

conjugal partner of another sponsor, or 

(d) subject to subsection (10), the sponsor previously made an application for 

permanent residence and became a permanent resident and, at the time of that 

application, the foreign national was a non-accompanying family member or a 

former spouse or common-law partner of the sponsor and was not examined. 25 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 




Deals with written statements of competent authority from province of intended destination. 

Deals with new evidence received after the written statement. 

See also sections 4 and 5 of the IRPR. Excluded family relationships and bad faith family relationships are 

dealt with fully in Chapter 6. 



(10) Subject to subsection (11), paragraph (9)(d) does not apply in respect of a foreign national 

referred to in that paragraph who was not examined because an officer determined that they 

were not required by the Act or the former Act, as applicable, to be examined. 

(11) Paragraph (9)(d) applies in respect of a foreign national referred to in subsection (10) if an 

officer determines that, at the time of the application referred to in that paragraph, 

(a) the sponsor was informed that the foreign national could be examined 

and the sponsor was able to make the foreign national available for 

examination but did not do so or the foreign national did not appear for 

examination; or 

(b) the foreign national was the sponsor’s spouse, was living separate and 

apart from the sponsor and was not examined. 

(12) In subsection (10), “former Act” has the same meaning as in section 187 of the Act. 

Section 117(9)(d) has been the subject of intense judicial scrutiny. 

The scope of the Regulation is not limited to deliberate or fraudulent non-disclosure, but 

to any non-disclosure which may prevent examination of a dependent. Non-disclosed, nonaccompanying 

family members cannot be admitted as members of the family class. 26 Whatever 

the motive, a failure to disclose which prevents the immigration officer from examining the 

dependent precludes future sponsorship of that person as a member of the family class. 27 

The Act and Regulations do not create a distinction between deliberate misrepresentations 

and innocent misrepresentations, including those made on faulty legal advice. 28 

“At the time of that application” in paragraph 117(9)(d) of the Regulations contemplates 

the life of the application from the time when it was initiated by the filing of the authorized form 

to the time when permanent resident status is granted at a port of entry. 29 

Paragraph 117(9)(d) is constitutionally valid. In De Guzman 30 

Appeal answered the following certified question in the negative: 

the Federal Court of 

“Is paragraph 117(9)(d) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations invalid 

or inoperative because it is unconstitutional as it deprives the applicant of her right to liberty 

26 

27 

28 

29 

30 

Adjani, Joshua Taiwo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2033-07), Blanchard, January 10, 2008; 2008 FC 32. 

Chen, Hong Mei v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-8979-04), Mosley, May 12, 2005; 2005 FC 678; see also De 

Guzman, Josephine Soliven v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-558-04), Desjardins,Evans, Malone, December 20, 2005; 

2005 FCA 436. 

Chen, supra, footnote 27. 

Dela Fuente, Cleotilde v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-446-05), Noel, Sharlow, Malone, May 18, 2006; 2006 FCA 

186. 

De Guzman, supra, footnote 27. 



and/or her right to security of person, in a manner not in accordance with the principle of 

fundamental justice, contrary to section 7 of the Charter?” 

Further, in Adjani 31 The Federal Court held that the paragraph does not infringe an 

applicant’s section 15 Charter rights as there is no deferential treatment as between a child born 

out of wedlock 32 versus legitimate children. In Azizi 33 the Federal Court of Appeal found the 

paragraph not to be ultra vires the IRPA as a bar to family reunification. The paragraph simply 

provides that non-accompanying family members who have not been examined for a reason other 

than a decision by a visa officer 34 will not be admitted as members of the family class. 

Jurisdiction 

The Immigration Appeal Division is the competent Division of the Immigration and 

Refugee Board to hear appeals by a sponsor against a decision not to issue a permanent resident 

visa. 35 It has sole and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions of law and fact, 

including questions of jurisdiction, in proceedings brought before it. 36 

The sponsor’s right of appeal is limited where the foreign national has been found to be 

inadmissible on the grounds of security, violating human or international rights, serious 

criminality or organized criminality. 37 Where the refusal is based on a finding of 

misrepresentation, there is no right of appeal unless the foreign national is the sponsor’s spouse, 

common-law partner or child. 38 The new provision dealing with inadmissibility for 

misrepresentation is very broad in scope. 39 It applies to both applicants and sponsors and there is 

seemingly no requirement that the misrepresentation actually impacted on the application. The 

Immigration Appeal Division may not consider humanitarian and compassionate considerations 

31 

32 

33 

34 

35 

36 

37 

38 

39 

Adjani, supra, footnote 26. 

Woldeselassie, Tesfalem Mekonen v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3084-06), Beaudry, December 21, 2006; 2006 FC 

1540 was a case of innocent non-disclosure which should be limited to the facts of that particular decision. In 

that case the Court held that the visa officer erred when he said the appellant was caught by the paragraph 

because he did not include an allegedly “unknown” child in his application for permanent residence filed prior 

to the birth of the child (an impossibility). 

Azizi, Ahmed Salem v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-151-05), Rothstein, Linden, Pelletier, December 5, 2005; 2005 

FCA 406. 

See paragraphs 117(10) and (11). Note that it is the officer who must make the decision not to examine. 

See sections 62 and 63(1) of the IRPA. 

Section 162(1) of the IRPA. 

Section 64 (1) and (2) of the IRPA. 

Section 64(3) of the IRPA. 

Section 40 of the IRPA provides that a permanent resident or foreign national is inadmissible for a two year 

period for directly or indirectly misrepresenting or withholding material facts relating to a relevant matter that 

induces or could induce an error in the administration of the Act. A permanent resident or foreign national can 

also be inadmissible for being sponsored or having been sponsored by someone determined to be inadmissible 

for misrepresentation if the Minister is satisfied that the facts of the case justify the inadmissibility. For a full 

discussion, see Chapter 8, Misrepresentation. 



unless it has decided that the foreign national is a member of the family class and their sponsor is 

a sponsor as defined. 40 

When a sponsored person is determined by the officer not eligible as a member of the 

family class, that person is split from the processing of the application: visas are issued to the 

principal applicant and other eligible family members. 41 There is no right of appeal to the 

Immigration Appeal Division as there is no family class refusal. 

In Pandhi, 42 the application for permanent residence of the appellant’s parents and two 

brothers was refused pursuant to sections 11(1) and 42(a) of the IRPA as false birth certificates 

had been provided for the brothers. The principal applicant was inadmissible for serious 

criminality and this rendered the other applicants inadmissible as well. As well, the son whose 

age was misrepresented did not fall within the definition of a “dependent child” and was therefore 

not a member of the family class. The other purported son was also not a member of the family 

class, as he did not have the necessary relationship. Neither of the sons was entitled to 

consideration of humanitarian or compassionate factors as a result. The parents were entitled to 

consideration but insufficient factors existed to warrant special relief. 

In Kang, 43 the Immigration Appeal Division considered the scope of its jurisdiction under 

section 64 of the IRPA, that is, whether it is to determine if a finding described in the provision 

has been made or whether it is required to conduct a de novo hearing to determine whether the 

finding made is correct. The panel looked at the similar wording used in section 70(5) in the 

former Act that the Courts have interpreted to mean there was no right of appeal to the 

Immigration Appeal Division. Given the wording of section 64(1), it is logical that the 

Immigration Appeal Division would simply determine whether the relevant finding has been 

made rather than contest the correctness of the finding. This interpretation is consistent with the 

objectives of the IRPA, one of which is to streamline the immigration appeal system to avoid 

lengthy litigation. 

Timing 

Since the processing of applications for permanent residence can take years, the relevant 

definitions must be ascertained. 

40 

41 

42 

43 

Section 65 of the IRPA. For a full discussion of whether the refusal is jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional, see 

Chapter 6, Bad Faith Family Relationships. 

Immigration Manuals, Overseas Processing (OP), Chapter OP 2 at page 50. 

Pandhi, Harinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-02813), Clark, June 27, 2003. 

Kang, Sarabjeet Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD TA1-13555), Sangmuah, February 24, 2004. In particular, see paragraph 

25: 

Given the wording of section 64(1), it is logical that the IAD would simply determine whether the 

relevant finding has been made and it is open to the appellant to dispute that no such finding has 

been made, as opposed to contesting the correctness of the finding. The appellant may dispute 

the correctness of the finding in another forum: the Federal Court. 



The transitional provisions 44 of the Act provide that if the notice of appeal has been filed 

with the Immigration Appeal Division before June 28, 2002, the appeal shall continue under the 

former Act, and therefore, the former definitions apply. 45 

In Sinkovits, 46 the panel considered the effect of the transitional provisions contained in 

sections 355, 352 and section 117(9)(d) of the IRPR and their effect on section 192 of the IRPA. 

It held that those provisions covered applicants who were refused under the former Act because 

they were over 19 years of age and therefore not dependent sons or daughters but are under 22 

years of age and now fit within the new definition of dependent child in the IRPR. No exception 

was created to the application of section 192. 

In Noun, 47 the panel considered whether to apply the definition of orphan in the former 

Act or the IRPR. The appellant argued that at the time the undertaking was submitted in May of 

2002, the applicant was under 19 years of age and acquired the right to be assessed under the 

former definition. The visa officer did not assess her application for permanent residence until 

after June 28, 2002 and applied the current definition. The panel held the only determination that 

was made before the IRPA came into force was that the appellant met the requirements for a 

sponsor and the undertaking would be forwarded for further processing. Therefore section 190 

did apply and there are no other transitional provisions that apply in these circumstances. The 

intent of the legislature is clear and unequivocal and the appellant cannot rely on accrued or 

vested rights. 

The Immigration Appeal Division has also had the opportunity to consider the effect of 

sections 196 and 64 of the IRPA and their applicability to sponsorship appeals. 

In Williams, 48 the appeal from the refusal of the sponsored application for permanent 

residence was filed on November 6, 2001. The Minister sought to have the appeal discontinued 

under section 196 of the IRPA. The two conditions precedent to the discontinuance are that the 

appellant has not been granted a stay under the former Act and that the appeal could not have 

been made because of section 64 of the IRPA. The panel was greatly influenced by the fact that 

section 196 refers to section 64 which on its face applies to sponsorship appeals. Looking at the 

44 

45 

46 

47 

48 

For a full discussion of the transitional provisions, see Chapter T. 

Section 192 of the IRPA. 

Sinkovits, Zoltan v. M.C.I. (IAD TA1-20320), Whist, August 29, 2002. 

Noun, Pho v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-03260), MacPherson, August 27, 2003. 

Williams, Sophia Laverne v. M.C.I. (IAD TA1-21446), Wales, November 29, 2002. In particular, see paragraph 

40: 

In reviewing section 196 in its ordinary and grammatical sense, and in a manner to blend 

harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of Parliament, and the intention of 

Parliament, I am satisfied the scope of section 196 is broad enough to include sponsorship 

appeals. If it were not, then Parliament’s intention, as set out in the guide distributed to the 

Parliamentary Committee, would not be achieved. 

An application for judicial review was dismissed: (F.C., no. IMM-6479-02), Phelan, May 6, 2004; 2004 FC 

662. 



scheme of the Act and the intention of Parliament, section 196 is broad enough to include 

sponsorship appeals. 

However, in Sohal, 49 the panel considered the same conditions precedent to the 

application of section 196. The panel found that if the intention of Parliament was to extinguish 

the appellant’s appeal rights under section 77(3) of the former Act, the language of section 196 

fails to do so. The section does not expressly state this intention and the reference to a stay 

makes no sense in the context of an appellant who, as a Canadian citizen, cannot be made subject 

to any proceedings that could lead to an immigration stay. It held that sections 196 and 197 are 

restricted to removal order appeals under the former Act. 

Specific Relationships 

“Dependent child” 

The Definition 

The definitions of “dependent son” and “dependent daughter” have been replaced with the 

single definition of “dependent child”. There is no definition of “child”. Dependent child is 

defined in section 2 of the Regulations as: 

“dependent child”, in respect of a parent, means a child who 

(a) has one of the following relationships with the parent, namely, 

(i) is the biological child of the parent, if the child has not been adopted by a person 

other than the spouse or common-law partner of the parent, or 

(ii) is the adopted child 50 of the parent; and 

(b) is in one of the following situations of dependency, namely, 

(i) is less than 22 years of age and not a spouse or common-law partner, 

(ii) has depended substantially on the financial support of the parent since before the 

age of 22 - or if the child became a spouse or common-law partner before the age of 22, 

since becoming a spouse or common-law partner – and, since before the age of 22 or 

since becoming a spouse or common-law partner, as the case may be, has been a student 

(A) continuously enrolled in and attending a post-secondary institution that is 

accredited by the relevant government authority, and 

(B) actively pursuing a course of academic, professional or vocational training 

on a full-time basis, or 

(iii) is 22 years of age or older and has depended substantially on the financial support 

of the parent since before the age of 22 and is unable to be financially self-supporting due 

to a physical or mental condition. 

49 

50 

Sohal, Manjit Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD TA1-28054), MacPherson, November 29, 2002. An application for judicial 

review by the Minister was dismissed: (F.C., no.IMM-6292-02), Lutfy, May 6, 2004; 2004 FC 660. 

For a full discussion see Chapter 4, Adoptions. 



The current definition refers to the biological child of the parent, rather than using the 

former term “issue”. This is not a change in substance as the Federal Court has held that “issue” 

required the children be biologically linked to their parents to come within the former definition 

of “daughter” or “son”. 51 

To come within the definition, the child has to establish dependency either by showing he 

or she is under 22 years of age and not a spouse or a common-law partner, 52 or by showing he or 

she is financially dependent due to student status or a physical or mental condition. 

Timing 

Section 121 of the Regulations sets at what time the requirements must be met: 

121. The requirements with respect to a person who is a member of the 

family class or a family member of a member of the family class who makes 

an application under Division 6 of Part 5 are the following; 

(a) the person is a family member of the applicant or of the sponsor both at 

the time the application is made and, without taking into account whether the 

person has attained 22 years of age, at the time of the determination of the 

application; and 

(b) …. 53 

Section 67(1) of the Act makes reference to the Immigration Appeal Division being 

satisfied at “the time that the appeal is disposed of”. Unfortunately, this does not seem to clarify 

whether the Immigration Appeal Division should consider the situation as at the time of the 

refusal or the date of the hearing. 

Under paragraph (b)(i), the child must be under 22 years of age and not a spouse or 

common-law partner when the application is made and without taking into account their age, they 

must continue not to be a spouse or a common-law partner when the visa is issued. Becoming a 

spouse or common law partner after turning 22 is a disqualifying characteristic. 54 

Under paragraph (b)(ii), the child must, since before the age of 22 or since becoming a 

spouse or common-law partner, be financially dependent and continuously enrolled, in attendance 

51 

52 

53 

54 

M.A.O. v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no IMM-459-02), Heneghan, December 12, 2003; 2003 FC 1406. 

CIC Immigration Manual, OP 2 page 16, s.5.13 states that “[a] dependent child who is single, divorced, 

widowed, or whose marriage has been annulled is not a spouse. Similarly, if the dependent child was involved 

in a common-law relationship but that relationship no longer exists, they may be considered to meet the 

definition.” 

Repealed, SOR/2004-167, s. 42. 

Dehar, Rupinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2281-06), de Montigny, May 28, 2007; 2007 FC 558. 



and actively pursuing a course of study at an accredited post-secondary school, both at the time 

the application is made and the visa issued. 55 

Under paragraph (b)(iii), the child must, since before the age of 22, have been financially 

dependent due to a physical or mental condition when the application was made and that 

dependency must continue at the date the visa is issued. 56 

Student Status 

Paragraph (b)(ii) of the definition of “dependent child” still has two requirements: one 

relates to student status, the other to financial dependency and both must be met to satisfy the 

definition. No substantive change has been made to the financial dependency requirement. Some 

of the older cases dealing with financial dependency are as follows: 

In Szikora-Rehak, 57 the Appeal Division considered whether sums collected by the 

applicant through employment associated with practicum assignments would be sufficient to 

finance studies or cover daily expenses and found the applicant continued to be financially 

dependent. 

The Appeal Division held in another decision, 58 when considering the issue of financial 

dependency, that the degree of financial support is to be determined by looking at the entire 

income of the applicant to see from where that income is derived. In that case, the applicant was 

married and her spouse was employed. The panel determined, on a balance of probabilities, the 

greater part of the applicant’s income was provided by the sponsor and the applicant was, 

therefore, a dependent. 

In Tiri, 59 the applicant worked from time to time as a nurse during the day and attended 

school at night. The applicant continued to attend school during the times he was not working and 

received regular financial assistance from the sponsor. The applicant was held to be a dependent. 

In Huang, 60 the applicant received his mother’s pension, lived rent free in the family 

home and occasionally received cash from his mother (the sponsor). His brother provided free 

meals and occasional pocket money. The Minister argued that since the sponsor was then 

dependent on her daughter, the applicant could not be dependent on the sponsor. The panel found 

the source of the sponsor’s income was irrelevant, subject to any evidence that this was merely a 

ruse to hide that the applicant had an independent source of income. 

55 

56 

57 

58 

59 

60 

Hamid; M.C.I. v. Hamid, Ali (F.C.A., no. A-632-05), Nadon, Sexton, Evans, June 12, 2006; 2006 FCA 217. 

See Gilani, infra, footnote 72 

Szikora-Rehak, Terezia v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-01559), Jackson, April 24, 1998. 

Popov, Oleg Zinovevich v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-05162), Aterman, November 26, 1998. 

Tiri, Felicitas v. M.C.I . (IAD T96-021480, Hoare, April 22, 1998. 

Huang, Su-Juan v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-02369), Carver, August 21, 1998. 



In Bains, 61 the issue was whether the sponsor’s brother was the dependent son of their 

father. The brother was a part-time farmer and received financial support from his parents. The 

sponsor testified that since his arrival in Canada, he was the sole financial support of the brother. 

The panel found the applicant was not wholly or substantially supported by his parents. 

Requirements to be “continuously enrolled in and attending” and “actively 

pursuing a course” 

There is no longer any provision dealing with interruptions in studies. Regular school 

vacation breaks should still be considered part of the course of studies and should not impact on 

the requirement to be “continuously enrolled and attending”. There may now be no way to give 

relief from situations where the failure to enroll or attend is due to a situation beyond the control 

of the applicant. 

Both enrolment and attendance must still be established. The change in wording of the 

definition has arguably maintained the qualitative and quantitative elements of “attending” 62 

(Sandhu). The wording used in the definition of “dependent child” in the Regulations expresses 

the intent to codify the test articulated by the Court of Appeal in Sandhu. Sub-part (A) of the 

definition carries forward the requirement of full-time enrolment and attendance in an 

educational program, while sub-part (B) articulates the requirement for a mental presence in the 

educational program in the form of a genuine, bona fide effort on the part of the student. 63 The 

burden is on the applicants to establish that they made a bona fide attempt to assimilate the 

material of the subjects in which they were enrolled for each year of academic study. 64 

In Sandhu the Court enumerated the following factors which should be considered in 

making such a determination and cautioned that this list may not be exhaustive. First is the record 

of the student’s actual attendance. Second is the grades the student achieved. Third is whether the 

student can discuss the subjects studied in, at the very least, a rudimentary fashion. Fourth is 

whether the student is progressing satisfactorily in an academic program. Fifth is whether the 

student has made a genuine and meaningful effort to assimilate the knowledge in the courses 

being studied. The factors might perhaps be summed up by asking whether the person is a bona 

fide student. 65 While one could be a bona fide student and still have a poor academic 

performance, in such cases visa officers ought to satisfy themselves that, students have made a 

genuine effort in their studies. 

61 

62 

63 

64 

65 

Bains, Sohan Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-01233), Singh, April 14, 1997. 

M.C.I. v. Sandhu, Jagwinder Singh (F.C.A., no. A-63-01), Sexton, Strayer, Sharlow, February 28, 2002; 2002 

FCA 79. 

Lee, Kuo Hsiung v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5273-03), Dawson, July 21, 2004; 2004 FC 1012. 

Dhillon, Jhalman Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C., IMM-2234-06), Lutfy, November 24, 2006; 2006 FC 1430. 

See too Sharma, Sukh Rajni v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-388-01), Rothstein, August 23, 2002; 2002 FCT 906 

where the Court followed Sandhu to identify the issue as whether the applicant was a full-time student in a 

genuine, meaningful and bona fide respect. 



Credibility can be an issue in assessing such cases as well. In one case, the Appeal Division held 

that it was not plausible that it took the applicant 20 years to reach grade 10. 66 In another, 67 the 

applicant had taken the same course and failed the exam for six years. The applicant was found to 

be a student in name only. 

The Educational Institution 

The institution attended must be a post-secondary one that is accredited by the relevant 

government authority. 68 

In Ahmed 69 , the Court considered if an institution was a post-secondary institution, in the 

context of a visa officer’s assessment of educational qualifications in an application for 

permanent residence. It held the question is whether or not the institution offers programs of 

study requiring a high school diploma as a condition of admission. In Shah 70 the Court adopted 

the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary definition of “accredited” as meaning “furnished with 

credentials; authoritatively sanctioned.” “It does not equate to “recognized” in some informal 

sense.” 

Physical or Mental Condition 

It is important to note the change of wording in the provision from “disability” to 

“condition”. It remains to be seen how this change will be interpreted though there appears to be 

no reason why the previous jurisprudence relating to what a “disability” is should be rejected. If 

anything, “condition” should be seen as broader than “disability.” 

It is more difficult to comment on the removal of the requirement of the former Act that a 

medical officer make a determination. Given the provisions dealing with medical 

examinations 71 , this may be a matter of drafting, rather than substance. 

The relevant portions of the definition “dependent child” do not require that an applicant 

demonstrate that a “physical or mental” condition causing an applicant child to be unable to be 

financially self-supporting, has existed at all times since the applicant became twenty-two (22) 

years of age and that the condition was diagnosed before the applicant reached that age. Whether 

66 

67 

68 

69 

70 

71 

Ali, Akram v. M.C.I. (IAD T93-12274) Teitelbaum, June 2, 1994. 

Sangha, Jaswinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-02919), Singh, February 24, 1998. 

Supra, footnote 52 sets out guidelines for officers where there is no relevant government authority or 

accreditation is in question. Some unlicensed institutions may be acceptable under the definition. Examples of 

institutions that do not fall within the definition are “on the job training”, “correspondence courses” and sham 

institutions. 

Ahmed, Syed Anjum v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4027-01), Hansen, July 30, 2003; 2003 FC 937. 

Shah,Mayuri Rameshchandra v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1461-06), Gibson, September 22, 2006; 2006 FC 1131. 

For a full discussion of medical refusals, see Chapter 3. 



or not the condition was diagnosed before the age of twenty-two (22) is irrelevant. A careful 

reading of subparagraph (b)(iii) of the definition “dependent child” discloses that an applicant 

must establish that “… he has depended substantially on the financial support of a parent since 

before the age of twenty-two (22) and that he is “… unable to be financially self-supporting due 

to a physical or mental condition.” 72 

Social dependence by the applicant child on his parents, which is to say continuous 

dependence on his parents for parenting support, is irrelevant. 73 

Lastly, it should also be noted that the spouse, common-law partner or child of a sponsor 

who has been determined to be a member of the family class is exempted from the application of 

inadmissibility on the ground of excessive demand on health and social services. 74 

Some of the older cases dealing with “physical or mental disability” are noted below. 

“Physical disability” includes a hearing disability. 75 Amputation of the left leg below the 

knee following a motor vehicle accident is a physical disability. 76 

The question is whether the applicant is able to support herself in the country in which she 

is currently residing, not whether she would become self-supporting in Canada. In this case, the 

applicant, who resided in Egypt, was found to be a dependent daughter. She suffered from mild 

mental retardation and epilepsy. 77 

In Khan, 78 the applicant was a deaf mute. The Appeal Division held that the applicant was 

required to meet the requirements of the definition of a “dependent daughter” during the entire 

period of processing the application for permanent residence. The applicant does not need to 

establish that she will be incapable of supporting herself in the future. The evidence established 

the applicant’s disability was an essential, determinative factor in her incapacity to support 

herself, though it may not have been the only factor. Not every physical or mental disability of 

dependants will lead to the result of medical inadmissibility. 

In contrast, in Arastehpour, 79 the principal applicant had asked that a medically 

inadmissible, 29 year old son be deleted from the application for permanent residence. The son 

suffered from muscular dystrophy and there was ample evidence to conclude he could not 

support himself. The visa officer was not required to consider the son’s future prospects in 

72 

73 

74 

75 

76 

77 

78 

79 

Gilani, Harakhji Zaver v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-9214-04), Gibson, November 9, 2005; 2005 FC 1522. 

Gilani, supra, footnote 72. 

Section 38(2)(a) of the IRPA and section 24 of the IRPR. 

Haroun,Stanley v. M.C.I. (IAD V94-00129), Singh, August 29, 1994. 

Huang, Wing Dang v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-03836), Baker, June 4, 1999. 

Arafat, Khaled v. M.C.I. (IAD T94-02413), Hopkins, January 17, 1995. 

Khan, Seema Aziz v. M.C.I. (IAD M97-03209), Lamarche, June 4, 1999. 

Arastehpour, Mohammad Ali v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4328-98), MacKay, August 31, 1999. 



Canada where no such evidence was provided to the officer. A dependant at the time an 

application is made may no longer be so as a result of changed circumstances before the 

application is determined. Here, the fact that he would be left to live with an aunt did not mean he 

was no longer a dependent son. It should be noted that if the matter had been an appeal before the 

Appeal Division. It would have been open to lead evidence regarding the son’s prospects in 

Canada. 

In Huang, 80 the applicant, an amputee, was responsible for farming the family’s 

government plot. He was unable to do the physical labour and hired people to do the farm work. 

After expenses, there was little, if any, money for the applicant’s support and the requirement of 

financial dependency was met. While willing to work, the documentary evidence establishes his 

physical disability limits his opportunities. Considering all the evidence, the Appeal Division 

held that the applicant was incapable of supporting himself due to his disability. 

In Teja, 81 the panel found the sponsor not to be credible. Medical evidence of epilepsy 

and dementia was before the panel but had not been provided to the visa officer. There was no 

evidence that a medical officer had determined that the applicant was suffering from a physical or 

mental disability. The applicant did not qualify as a dependent son. 

In Ramdhanie, 82 there was evidence that the applicants were suffering from posttraumatic 

stress disorder. The panel was prepared to conclude that a medical officer had made the 

necessary determination of a medical disability. The determination by an immigration officer as 

to whether the applicants were incapable of supporting themselves by reason of that disability 

was subject to a de novo review. The panel found the disability severely impaired the applicant’s 

ability to earn a living. They were reliant on the sponsor for financial support and were dependent 

daughters. 

80 

81 

82 

Huang, Wing Dang v. M.C.I.. (IAD V97-03836), Baker, June 4, 1999. 

Teja, Ajit Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V94-01205), Singh, June 30, 1997. 

Ramdhanie (Dipchand), Asha v. M.C.I. (IAD T95-06314), Townshend, September 18, 1998. 



CASES 

Adjani, Joshua Taiwo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2033-07), Blanchard, January 10, 2008; 2008 FC 

32........................................................................................................................................................................... 5, 6 

Ahmed, Syed Anjum v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4027-01), Hansen, July 30, 2003; 2003 FC 937.......................... 13 

Ali, Akram v. M.C.I. (IAD T93-12274) Teitelbaum, June 2, 1994 .............................................................................. 13 

Arafat, Khaled v. M.C.I. (IAD T94-02413), Hopkins, January 17, 1995.................................................................... 14 

Arastehpour, Mohammad Ali v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4328-98), MacKay, August 31, 1999 ........................... 14 

Azizi, Ahmed Salem v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-151-05), Rothstein, Linden, Pelletier, December 5, 

2005; 2005 FCA 406 ................................................................................................................................................. 6 

Bains, Sohan Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-01233), Singh, April 14, 1997..................................................................... 12 

Chen, Hong Mei v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-8979-04), Mosley, May 12, 2005; 2005 FC 678....................................... 5 

De Guzman, Josephine Soliven v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-558-04), Desjardins,Evans, Malone, 

December 20, 2005; 2005 FCA 436.......................................................................................................................... 5 

Dehar, Rupinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2281-06), de Montigny, May 28, 2007; 2007 FC 

558........................................................................................................................................................................... 10 

Dela Fuente, Cleotilde v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-446-05), Noel, Sharlow, Malone, May 18, 2006; 

2006 FCA 186 ........................................................................................................................................................... 5 

Dhillon, Jhalman Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C., IMM-2234-06), Lutfy, November 24, 2006; 2006 FC 

1430......................................................................................................................................................................... 12 

Dudecz, Ewa v. M.C.I. (IAD TA02446), Whist, December 6, 2002.............................................................................. 3 

Gilani, Harakhji Zaver v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-9214-04), Gibson, November 9, 2005; 2005 FC 

1522......................................................................................................................................................................... 14 

Hamid; M.C.I. v. Hamid, Ali (F.C.A., no. A-632-05), Nadon, Sexton, Evans, June 12, 2006; 2006 

FCA 217.................................................................................................................................................................. 11 

Haroun,Stanley v. M.C.I. (IAD V94-00129), Singh, August 29, 1994........................................................................ 14 

Huang, Su-Juan v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-02369), Carver, August 21, 1998...................................................................... 11 

Huang, Wing Dang v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-03836), Baker, June 4, 1999........................................................................ 14 

Huang, Wing Dang v. M.C.I.. (IAD V97-03836), Baker, June 4, 1999....................................................................... 15 

Jaca, Eugenia v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-13722), D’Ignazio, February 20, 2003 .................................................................. 8 

Kang, Sarabjeet Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD TA1-13555), Sangmuah, February 24, 2004 ................................................. 7, 8 

Khan, Seema Aziz v. M.C.I. (IAD M97-03209), Lamarche, June 4, 1999 ................................................................... 14 

Le, Thi Cam Ly v. M.C.I. (IAD MA1-06279), Beauchemin, May 15, 2003 .................................................................. 8 

Lee, Kuo Hsiung v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5273-03), Dawson, July 21, 2004; 2004 FC 1012................................... 12 

M.A.O. v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no IMM-459-02), Heneghan, December 12, 2003; 2003 FC 1406 ................................. 10 

Noun, Pho v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-03260), MacPherson, August 27, 2003 ....................................................................... 8 

Pandhi, Harinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-02813), Clark, June 27, 2003 ................................................................. 7 

Popov, Oleg Zinovevich v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-05162), Aterman, November 26, 1998 ................................................. 11 

Ramdhanie (Dipchand), Asha v. M.C.I. (IAD T95-06314), Townshend, September 18, 1998 ................................... 15 



Sandhu: M.C.I. v. Sandhu, Jagwinder Singh (F.C.A., no. A-63-01), Sexton, Strayer, Sharlow, 

February 28, 2002; 2002 FCA 79............................................................................................................................ 12 

Sangha, Jaswinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-02919), Singh, February 24, 1998...................................................... 13 

Sarmiento, Laura Victoria v. M.C.I. (IAD TA1-28226), November 1, 2002................................................................. 3 

Seydoun, Saber Hussain v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-00576), Workun, June 18, 2003............................................................ 9 

Shah,Mayuri Rameshchandra v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1461-06), Gibson, September 22, 2006; 

2006 FC 1131.......................................................................................................................................................... 13 

Sharma, Sukh Rajni v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-388-01), Rothstein, August 23, 2002; 2002 FCT 

906........................................................................................................................................................................... 12 

Sinkovits, Zoltan v. M.C.I. (IAD TA1-20320), Whist, August 29, 2002 ....................................................................... 8 

Sohal, Manjit Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD TA1-28054), MacPherson, November 29, 2002................................................... 9 

Szikora-Rehak, Terezia v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-01559), Jackson, April 24, 1998............................................................ 11 

Teja, Ajit Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V94-01205), Singh, June 30, 1997 ............................................................................ 15 

Tiri, Felicitas v. M.C.I . (IAD T96-021480, Hoare, April 22, 1998 ............................................................................ 11 

Vong: M.C.I. v. Vong, Chan Cam (F.C., no. IMM-1737-04), Heneghan, June 15, 2005; 2005 FC 

855............................................................................................................................................................................. 2 

Williams, Sophia Laverne v. M.C.I. (IAD TA1-21446), Wales, November 29, 2002.................................................... 8 

Woldeselassie, Tesfalem Mekonen v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3084-06), Beaudry, December 21, 

2006; 2006 FC 1540.................................................................................................................................................. 6 



Chapter Eight 

Misrepresentation 

Introduction 

The misrepresentation provisions under the old Immigration Act provide that a permanent 

resident, where granted landing by reason of a false or improperly obtained passport, visa or other 

document pertaining to the person’s admission, or by reason of any fraudulent or improper means 

or misrepresentation of any material fact, whether exercised or made by that person or any other 

person, may be subject to the initiation of removal proceedings under s.27(1)(e) of the 

Immigration Act. 

The materiality of misrepresentations under the Immigration Act has been the subject of 

numerous court decisions including the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada 

(Minister of Manpower and Immigration) v. Brooks, [1974] S.C.R. 850. Brooks held, among 

other things, that mens rea, or intention, was not an essential element for the misrepresentation. 

Chapter 5 of the Removal Order Appeals paper discusses the impact of the Brooks decision and 

misrepresentations in general. 

The purpose of the misrepresentation provisions is to ensure that applicants provide 

complete, honest and truthful information in every manner when applying for entry into Canada. 1 

The misrepresentation provisions under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 

(IRPA) can lead to a finding of inadmissibility (s.40) whether the person is inside Canada or 

abroad. An inadmissibility report prepared with respect to a permanent resident, may lead to an 

inadmissibility hearing before the Immigration Division where a removal order may be made. 

(s.44(1) & s.44(2)). 

Inadmissibility for Misrepresentation 

The misrepresentation provisions under the IRPA can lead to a finding of inadmissibility 

of a permanent resident (leading to a removal order) or a foreign national being refused 

sponsorship. Section 40 reads, in part, as follows: 

40. (1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible for 

misrepresentation 

(a) for directly or indirectly misrepresenting or withholding material 

facts relating to a relevant matter that induces or could induce an error 

in the administration of this Act; 

1 

Immigration Manuals, ENF 2, Evaluating Inadmissibility, section 9. 


January 1, 2008 Misrepresentation - Ch. 8

(b) for being or having been sponsored by a person who is determined 

to be inadmissible for misrepresentation; 

If a person is found to be inadmissible pursuant to section 40, that permanent resident or 

foreign national continues to be inadmissible for misrepresentation for a period of two years 

following a final determination of inadmissibility in a refused sponsorship, or the date the 

removal order is enforced for a determination in Canada. 2 A person who pursues their appeal 

rights following a determination in Canada will, in effect, extend the two-year period because the 

removal order would not be enforced until a later date. 

A foreign national subject to the two-year period of continued inadmissibility must obtain 

the written authorization of an officer under Regulation 225(3) 3 in order to return to Canada 

within the two-year period. 

A further qualification to section 40(1)(b) is found in section 40(2)(b). It provides that 

“paragraph (1)(b) does not apply unless the Minister is satisfied that the facts of the case justify 

the inadmissibility” (emphasis added). It is not known at present how the Minister will exercise 

this “justification”. 

Possible Legal and Evidentiary Issues 

Specific wording contained in section 40 of the IRPA will likely give rise to legal and 

evidentiary issues. For example, what is the meaning in s. 40(1)(a) of the IRPA of the phrase “… 

directly or indirectly misrepresenting or withholding material facts…”? Does it matter whether 

the person made the misrepresentation as opposed to someone else making the 

misrepresentation? (Under the former Immigration Act, the jurisprudence shows it did not 

matter.) Does this include giving untruthful or partial answers, or omitting reference to material 

facts (even if the person does not know what is material or was not asked)? 

“directly or indirectly” 

2 

3 

Section 40(2)(a) reads as follows: 

the permanent resident or the foreign national continues to be inadmissible for misrepresentation for a 

period of two years following, in the case of a determination outside Canada, a final determination of 

inadmissibility under subsection (1) or, in the case of a determination in Canada, the date the removal 

order is enforced; 

Reg. 225(3) reads as follows: 

A foreign national who is issued an exclusion order as a result of the application of paragraph 

40(2)(a) of the Act must obtain a written authorization in order to return to Canada within the twoyear 

period after the exclusion order was enforced. 



In Wang 4 the IAD adopted the Immigration Division member’s analysis and conclusion 

on indirect misrepresentation. He noted that under IRPA there was no longer a reference to a 

misrepresentation “by any other person”. The new language is “directly or indirectly”. The 

member held that “it is not immediately apparent by this language that “indirectly” means a 

misrepresentation by another person. Nonetheless I can find no other logical interpretation.” The 

Federal Court approved this approach. The word “indirectly” can be interpreted to cover the 

situation such as the present one where the applicant relied on being included in her husband’s 

application, even though she did not know of his previous marriage. 

“indirect misrepresentation” 

An agent for the appellant obtained for him and submitted to CIC false or fraudulent 

documents relating to his education. This constitutes an indirect misrepresentation. 5 

Similarly, what is the meaning in s. 40(1)(a) of the IRPA of the phrase “… material facts 

relating to a relevant matter that induces or could induce an error in the administration of this 

Act”? How might we interpret “an error in the administration of this Act”? [Note: There is a 

difference in the wording in the French version which could influence interpretation – rather than 

saying that induces it says, as this induces.] Is there a timing element in this provision – does it 

catch persons who misrepresent any immigration related circumstances at any time? What might 

be included in this provision? For example, does this include an applicant or sponsor making 

misrepresentations, partial answers, omissions, etc.; applicants on humanitarian and 

compassionate considerations who became permanent residents; or applicants withholding 

information from the examining designated physician? 

“could induce an error” 

The Immigration Appeal Division found the words “could induce an error” as referring to 

the potential of causing an error at any time, not the actual causing of the error. It was meant to 

catch those who caused an error or misrepresented or withheld material (an attempt to deceive) 

that had a potential of causing an error. It does not speak from the time of the “catching” of the 

misdeed, but at the time of the misdeed itself. 6 

Two factors must be present for a finding of inadmissibility under s. 40(1). There must be 

misrepresentations by the applicant and those misrepresentations must be material in that they 

could have induced an error in the administration of the IRPA. There is no requirement in s. 

40(1)(a) that the misrepresentations must be intentional, deliberate or negligent. 7 

4 

5 

6 

7 

Wang, Xiao Qiang v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5815-04), O’Keefe, August 3, 2005; 2005 FC 1059. A question was 

certified but not answered on appeal: (F.C.A., no. A-420-05), Noel, Evans, Malone, October 24, 2006; 2006 FCA 

345. 

M.P.S.E.P. v. Zhai, Ning (IAD VA6-02206), Ostrowski, March 6, 2007; application for leave and judicial review 

dismissed: (F.C., no. IMM-2035-07), Harrington, August 13, 2007. 

Zhai, supra, footnote 5. 

Bellido,Patricia Zevallous v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2380-04), Snider, April 6, 2005; 2005 FC 452. 



In Pierre-Louis 8 the applicant married the appellant in 2001. He applied for a visitor’s 

visa in Haiti and was refused. On that application he disclosed a child born in 1996. In 2002 he 

applied for permanent residence in Canada. At that time he said he had no dependent children. 

The visa officer rejected this application because of misrepresentations made during the 

interview. The applicant was inadmissible because of the misrepresentation about the child he 

had previously declared. 

Finally, what is the meaning in s. 40(1)(b) of the IRPA of the phrase “…for being or 

having been sponsored by a person who is determined to be inadmissible for 

misrepresentation.”? Does this put the sponsor at risk of removal for making 

misrepresentations? If yes, how far back may it go? 

Asuncion 9 partly answers the first question. The appellant was sponsored to Canada by his 

mother as a dependent in 1998. Prior to leaving the Philippines he married his spouse in a civil 

ceremony, and knew that there would be some sort of reprimand if he failed to declare his new 

status. After he was landed in Canada he returned to the Philippines and he and his wife had a 

church wedding. In 2001 he applied to sponsor his wife and two children, which application was 

refused since they had not been examined at the time he became a permanent resident. An 

admissibility hearing led to a removal order, the appeal of which was dismissed. A result of the 

misrepresentation was that he made it impossible for him to sponsor his loved ones and also 

prohibited him from seeking to come back to Canada for a period of two years following the 

enforcement of the removal order. 

Legislative Framework 

Section 44 of the IRPA, reproduced in part below, sets out the procedure to be followed 

under section 40: 

44. (1) An officer who is of the opinion that a permanent resident or a foreign 

national who is in Canada is inadmissible may prepare a report setting out 

the relevant facts, which report shall be transmitted to the Minister. 

(2) If the Minister is of the opinion that the report is well-founded, the 

Minister may refer the report to the Immigration Division for an 

admissibility hearing, except in the case of a permanent resident who is 

inadmissible solely on the grounds that they have failed to comply with the 

residency obligation under section 28 and except, in the circumstances 

prescribed by the regulations, in the case of a foreign national. In those 

cases, the Minister may make a removal order. 

8 

9 

Pierre-Louis, Cynthia v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7627-04), Beaudry, March17, 2005; 2005 FC 377. 

Asuncion, Aristar Mallare v. M.C.I.. (F.C., no. IMM-10231-04), Rouleau, July 20, 2005; 2005 FC 1002. 



An inadmissibility report prepared with respect to a permanent resident may lead to an 

inadmissibility hearing before the Immigration Division where a removal order may be made. 

The effect of s.44(2) of the IRPA is that a removal order made against a permanent resident for 

misrepresentation must be made by the Immigration Division, not by the Minister (except in the 

case of not complying with the residency obligation). Therefore, the IAD will have a full record 

for an appeal against a removal order for misrepresentation. 

Jurisdiction – Legislative Appeal Rights to the IAD 

Parts of sections 63 to 65 of the IRPA are set out below: 

63. (1) A person who has filed in the prescribed manner an application to 

sponsor a foreign national as a member of the family class may appeal to the 

Immigration Appeal Division against a decision not to issue the foreign 

national a permanent resident visa. 

63. (2) A foreign national who holds a permanent resident visa may appeal to 

the Immigration Appeal Division against a decision at an examination or 

admissibility hearing to make a removal order against them. 

63. (3) A permanent resident or a protected person may appeal to the 

Immigration Appeal Division against a decision at an examination or 

admissibility hearing to make a removal order against them. 

63. (4) A permanent resident may appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division 

against a decision made outside of Canada on the residency obligation under 

section 28. 

63. (5) The Minister may appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division against a 

decision of the Immigration Division in an admissibility hearing. 

64. (3) No appeal may be made under subsection 63(1) in respect of a decision 

that was based on a finding of inadmissibility on the ground of 

misrepresentation, unless the foreign national in question is the sponsor’s 

spouse, common-law partner or child. 

65. In an appeal under subsection 63(1) or (2) respecting an application based on 

membership in the family class, the Immigration Appeal Division may not 

consider humanitarian and compassionate considerations unless it has 

decided that the foreign national is a member of the family class and that 

their sponsor is a sponsor within the meaning of the regulations. 

Note that the effect of s.64(3) of the IRPA is that a spouse, common-law partner or child 

does have an appeal to the IAD, but other members of the family class, such as parents, do not 



have an appeal to the IAD if found inadmissible for misrepresentation. In decisions 10 of the IAD 

where the applicant was not the sponsor’s spouse, common-law partner or child, the IAD has 

dismissed the appeals for lack of jurisdiction. In none of these cases has the appellant sought 

judicial review. 

In Mathew 11 the IAD allowed the appeal under s. 65 of the IRPA on humanitarian and 

compassionate grounds and then found the marriage to be genuine, overcoming the 

inadmissibility for misrepresentation. The Court held that Parliament’s intent was clear that 

before waiving a breach of the Act (the misrepresentation) on H&C factors, the marriage, if 

challenged, as it was here, had to be determined to be genuine before applying the H&C factors. 

The Minister’s application was allowed. 

The requirements to sponsor a member of the family class are found in Regulation 130. 

10 Warrich, Ghazananfar v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-20264), D’Ignazio, July 11, 2005; Nazmus, Masoma v. M.C.I. (IAD 

TA6-03843), Whist, September 18, 2006; Anis, Kamran v. M.C.I. (IAD TA7-01595), Waters, August 31, 2007. 

11 M.C.I. v. Mathew, Marjorie Ellen (F.C., no. IMM-6049-06), Lemieux, June 29, 2007; 2007 FC 685. 




Section 192 of the IRPA provides as follows: 

192. If a notice of appeal has been filed with the Immigration 

Appeal Division immediately before the coming into force of this 

section, the appeal shall be continued under the former Act by the 

Immigration Appeal Division of the Board. 

The IRPA came into force on June 28, 2002. In Manzanares 12 the refusal letter pre-dated 

the implementation date of the IRPA and was, therefore, a refusal under the Immigration Act. 

The Notice of Appeal, however, was dated and was thus filed after the IRPA was proclaimed. 

Pursuant to section 192 of the IRPA, the panel proceeded with the appeal under the IRPA. 

At the outset of the hearing, the Minister raised a preliminary issue. He asked the panel to 

treat the refusal based on the ground of misrepresentation under section 40(1)(a) of the IRPA. 

The panel rejected this argument by the Minister. There had been a misrepresentation by the 

applicant (by filing false documents with the visa post) but it was not a refusal based on the 

ground of misrepresentation (such as a refusal under section 9(3) of the Immigration Act). 

Further, there was no application by the Minister to amend the ground of refusal and, therefore, 

there was no legal basis to treat the refusal as one based on misrepresentation. 

General Offences 

It should be noted that there are criminal sanctions in respect of misrepresentations in the 

IRPA. Because these offences are beyond the scope of this paper they are merely reproduced 

below for ease of reference. 

126. Every person who knowingly counsels, induces, aids or abets or attempts to counsel, 

induce, aid or abet any person to directly or indirectly misrepresent or withhold material facts 

relating to a relevant matter that induces or could induce an error in the administration of this Act 

is guilty of an offence. 

127. No person shall knowingly 

(a) directly or indirectly misrepresent or withhold material facts relating to a relevant 

matter that induces or could induce an error in the administration of this Act. 

12 Manzanares, Ma Christina v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-15088, Stein, June 9, 2003. 



CASES 

Anis, Kamran v. M.C.I. (IAD TA7-01595), Waters, August 31, 2007 .......................................................................... 6 

Asuncion, Aristar Mallare v. M.C.I.. (F.C., no. IMM-10231-04), Rouleau, July 20, 2005; 2005 FC 

1002........................................................................................................................................................................... 4 

Bellido,Patricia Zevallous v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2380-04), Snider, April 6, 2005; 2005 FC 452........................... 3 

Canada (Minister of Manpower and Immigration) v. Brooks, [1974] S.C.R. 850......................................................... 1 

M.P.S.E.P. v. Zhai, Ning (IAD VA6-02206), Ostrowski, March 6, 2007...................................................................... 3 

Manzanares, Ma Christina v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-15088, Stein, June 9, 2003 ............................................................... 7 

Mathew: M.C.I. v. Mathew, Marjorie Ellen (F.C., no. IMM-6049-06), Lemieux, June 29, 2007; 

2007 FC 685.............................................................................................................................................................. 6 

Nazmus, Masoma v. M.C.I. (IAD TA6-03843), Whist, September 18, 2006 ................................................................ 6 

Pierre-Louis, Cynthia v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7627-04), Beaudry, March17, 2005; 2005 FC 377............................ 4 

Wang, Xiao Qiang v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5815-04), O’Keefe, August 3, 2005; 2005 FC 1059 .............................. 3 

Warrich, Ghazananfar v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-20264), D’Ignazio, July 11, 2005 ............................................................ 6 



Chapter Nine 

Non-compliance with the Act or the Regulations 

Introduction 

Under IRPA a sponsored member of the family class may be refused a permanent resident 

visa if that person does not meet the requirements of the Act or the Regulations (IRPR). 

Generally speaking a person must be eligible to be sponsored and they must be admissible to 

Canada. 

As well, the Act and Regulations prescribe many additional requirements those persons 

seeking to become permanent residents through sponsorship must meet. Section 41 of IRPA 

establishes a general inadmissibility provision to cover these requirements: 

s. 41 A person is inadmissible for failing to comply with this Act 

(a) in the case of a foreign national, through an act or omission 

which contravenes, directly or indirectly, a provision of this Act; 

Note as well that s. 2(2) of IRPA states that unless otherwise indicated, references in this 

Act to "this Act" include Regulations made under it. 

A refusal letter 1 must set out with sufficient detail the basis of the refusal. It is necessary 

therefore that s. 41(a) is also accompanied by a statutory reference to the specific requirement 

which it is alleged the applicant cannot meet. 

Some requirements that are commonly not met and are likely to lead to a refusal under 

subsection 41(a) will be discussed below but this list is not exhaustive. 

Not an Immigrant 

In the case of parents who are sponsored to Canada for the purpose of settling their 

dependent children in Canada and who do not intend to remain permanently in Canada, so called 

"courier parents", the applicable requirement is set out in s. 20(1)(a) of the Act, reproduced 

below: 

s. 20(1) Every foreign national, … who seeks to enter or remain in 

Canada must establish, 

1 

S. 21(1) IRPA. 


January 1, 2008 Non-compliance - Ch. 9

(a) to become a permanent resident, that they hold the visa or other 

document required under the regulations and have come to Canada 

in order to establish permanent residence;…[emphasis added] 

It should be noted that although the scheme of the Act suggests that this provision may 

properly ground a refusal for such an applicant, IRPA no longer contains the words "immigrant" 

and "landing" which figured heavily in the reasoning in cases under the former Act. 

Does the language of s. 20(1)(a) give rise to a requirement on the part of applicants to 

intend to reside in Canada permanently? The IAD has held that the concept of “courier parent” 

survives in IRPA in s. 20(1)(a). The panel distinguished between the obligation to maintain 

permanent residence in Canada under s. 28 from the requirement of an intent to establish 

permanent residence in Canada under s. 20(1)(a) 2 . 

The balance of this subtopic is based on cases decided under the Immigration Act as they 

may provide useful guidance for members. 

Intention 

An applicant for permanent residence must have the requisite intention to reside 

permanently in Canada. The visa officer will undertake an examination of all of the surrounding 

circumstances to determine whether or not such intention exists. 

Intention can be demonstrated in one of two ways. “It [intention] can be revealed by 

speech or conduct.” 3 Generally, the intention of the applicant will become evident during the 

visa officer's interview with the applicant in the statements made by the applicant in answer to the 

visa officer's questioning. Other times, the finding of no intention will be based on the applicant's 

failure to pursue all of the steps involved in the application process. 4 The visa officer's decision 

may also be founded on evidence of the applicant's past behaviour when he or she had previously 

been granted permanent resident status, but subsequently lost it. 5 

2 

3 

4 

5 

Daliri, Farshid Hafezi v. M.C.I., (IAD TA3-01591), MacDonald, May 6, 2004; [2004] I.A.D.D. No. 210 (QL). 

Kan, Chak Pan v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-2977-91), Muldoon, March 19, 1992. Reported: Kan v. Canada 

(Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1992), 17 Imm. L.R. (2d) 206 (F.C.T.D.). 

See Villanueva, Antonio Ordonez v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-9741), Benedetti, Weisdorf, Bell, November 12, 1986, 

where the applicant's failure to respond to the visa officer's request for documentation regarding his separation 

from his wife led the Immigration Appeal Board to conclude that he was not an immigrant. In Saroya, Kuljeet 

Kaur v. M.E.I. (IAD V92-01880), Verma, September 21, 1993, one of the bases for the refusal was that the 

applicant disregarded instructions given to her during the processing of the application, as she did not show up 

for three scheduled interviews and did not respond to some communications. See also Goindi, Surendra Singh 

v. M.C.I. (IAD T93-10856), Aterman, December 13, 1994, where the applicants had ignored requests for them 

to undergo medical examinations as was required. 

In Shergill, Sohan Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD T92-05406), Weisdorf, Chu, Ahara, February 8, 1993, the applicant 

was landed in 1981, but returned to India shortly thereafter, leaving the sponsor and a daughter behind. In her 

present application, statements had been made to the visa officer that she wished to remain in Canada for only 

six or seven months, for the purpose of bringing her alleged adopted son to Canada. The applicant's declared 



Meaning of “permanently” 

The ordinary definition of “permanently” connotes something lasting indefinitely. 

However, this ordinary definition is not applicable within the context of permanent residence. 

“Permanently” does not mean immutably or forever, or for the applicant's lifetime or anyone 

else's. An intention to leave Canada at some time in the immediate future is not inconsistent with 

an intention to reside permanently in Canada until then. 6 Nevertheless, “permanently” has the 

opposite meaning of “temporarily”, and an applicant must not be seeking admission to Canada 

for a short, fixed period of time for a temporary purpose. 7 

There are several examples in the case-law of what have come to be known as “courier 

parents”. In such cases, the panel finds that the purpose of the applicant's immigration to Canada 

is to facilitate the immigration to Canada of the applicant's accompanying dependent son or 

6 

7 

intentions were “strikingly similar” to her behaviour in 1981, and therefore it was reasonable to conclude that 

she had no intention to reside permanently in Canada. See also: Patel, Mohamed v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-03124), 

Weisdorf, Ahara, Fatsis, April 15, 1993, where the panel considered the applicants' past actions as one of the 

factors in assessing their intentions in the current applications; Saroya, supra, footnote 4; and Sidhu, Gurdev 

Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD V92-01678), Singh, November 17, 1993. In Gill, Jagjit Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V95- 

00365), McIsaac, May 8, 1997, the applicant lost his permanent residence status after residing in Canada for 

only seven months in a 12-year period. For each request for a returning resident permit he gave a different 

reason, none of which appeared to be the real reason for his extended stay in India. It was not established on a 

balance of probabilities that he intended to reside permanently in Canada. 

Toor, Joginder Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-310-82), Thurlow, Heald, Verchere, February 15, 1983. 

Reported: Re Toor and Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1983), 144 D.L.R. (3d) 554, QL 

[1983] F.C.J. 114 (F.C.A.). In Dhaul, Paramjit Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-6004), Chambers, March 5, 1987, the 

Immigration Appeal Board held that a person may still be an “immigrant” for the purposes of the Immigration 

Act even though the person is undecided as to whether or not he or she will wish to remain in Canada after 

admission. In Sarwar, Abida Shaheen v. M.C.I. (IAD T93-11195), Ariemma, Leousis, Muzzi, April 24, 1995, 

the panel agreed that establishing permanent residence in Canada does not imply that the applicant is barred 

from returning to his or her homeland. In this case, if the appellant had established that the applicant genuinely 

required to return to Pakistan to attend to personal or family matters, the panel would have had no difficulty in 

finding that he was a genuine immigrant, “irrespective of how many times or when he intended to travel to his 

country”. In Sanghera, Rajwinder Kular v. M.C.I. (IAD V96-01527), Clark, February 17, 1998, the panel 

accepted the applicants’ testimony at the hearing that they always intended to reside permanently in Canada but 

did plan to visit India sometimes. In response to the visa officer’s question about when he would return to 

India, the principal applicant said a year or two. He was asked whether he intended to be a permanent resident 

of Canada, to which he replied in the negative. The CAIPS notes revealed that the officer did not explain what 

it meant to be a “permanent resident”. The answers given to the officer's questions were consistent with the 

applicants not knowing whether or not permanent residents are allowed to leave Canada for any reason. 

In Mirza, Shahid Parvez v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-9081), Teitelbaum, Weisdorf, Townshend, December 1, 1986, the 

Immigration Appeal Board held that an applicant who intended to come to Canada for only a temporary period 

of time was not an immigrant. In Gill, Shivinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD T94-06519), Wright, May 16, 1995, the 

panel held that the applicant’s statement that he would return to India if he did not like Canada was not 

unreasonable and did not negate his intention to establish permanent residence in Canada. In Wiredu, Alex v. 

M.C.I. (IAD T97-00727), Muzzi, December 8, 1997, the panel found that the family members desired a 

reunion, but for a fixed period of time on the part of the principal applicant. The immigration officer’s 

handwritten notes revealed that the applicant’s intention was to visit her sons in Canada. As such, she was not 

making an applicant for permanent residence. 



daughter and that the applicant does not have the requisite intention to reside permanently in 

Canada as the applicant intends to return to his or her homeland after spending a period of time in 

Canada. 8 The possibility that the applicant might have the requisite intention to reside 

permanently in Canada at a later time is not sufficient as “[t]his form of deferred intent […] is not 

contemplated in the Immigration Act.” 9 

Other factors which have been considered by panels in the determination of whether or 

not an intention to reside permanently in Canada exists include the preservation of a family base 

in the homeland 10 and the retention of assets abroad. 11 

Motivation 

The relevant issue is whether or not the applicant has the requisite intention to reside 

permanently in Canada. The motivation behind the applicant's intention is not of itself relevant. 12 

For example, the Immigration Appeal Division held that an applicant's desire to facilitate the 

entry into Canada of her two unmarried sons did not, in that case, preclude a finding of an 

intention on the part of the applicant to reside permanently in Canada; therefore, the applicant 

was found not to be a “courier parent.” 13 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

See for example: Shergill, supra, footnote 7; Patel, Mohamed, supra, footnote 15; Kala, Bhupinder Kaur v. 

M.E.I. (IAD T92-09579), Arpin, Townshend, Fatsis, May 18, 1993; Mahil, Tarlochan v. M.E.I. (IAD T92- 

08178), Weisdorf, Townshend, Ahara, May 18, 1993; Kamara, Abass Bai Mohamed v. M.E.I. (IAD W91- 

00092), Arpin, February 24, 1994; Brown, Earlyn v. M.C.I. (IAD T93-09712), Ramnarine, August 17, 1994; 

Gill, Harbans Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V92-00694), Lam, March 27, 1996; and Dhandwar, Jatinder Kaur v. M.C.I. 

(IAD T96-01977), Bartley, June 6, 1997. In Molice, Antoine Anel v. M.E.I. (IAD M93-07976), Durand, 

March 22, 1994, one of the factors which the panel considered was the sponsor's statement that he did not 

sponsor his parents in the early 1980s when he could have, as he was waiting until the law would allow him to 

also sponsor his siblings, his parents' accompanying dependants. The panel held that if the applicants were not 

“courier parents”, there would have been no reason for the sponsor to have waited for the law to change before 

sponsoring them; as well, the sponsor could not have known or predicted that the law would be changed in the 

future. Cherfaoui, Azzedine Dino v. M.C.I., (IAD MA1-01747), Beauchemin, February 11, 2002 (reasons 

signed February 13, 2002). 

Sarwar, supra, footnote 6. Ha, Byung Joon v. M.C.I. (IAD TA0-04969), Sangmuah, October 3, 2001 (reasons 

signed January 8, 2002). 

Deol, Dilbag Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 80-6012), Campbell, Hlady, Howard, February 11, 1981. 

Pacampara, Enrique Pandong v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-9684), Ariemma, Arkin, De Morais, April 10, 1987; Ruhani, 

Zahida v. M.C.I. (IAD T92-07177), Teitelbaum, Muzzi, Band, March 8, 1995; and Lalli, Kulwinder v. M.C.I. 

(IAD V94-01439), Lam, November 20, 1995. See however Gill, Shivinder Kaur, supra, footnote 7, where 

there was evidence that the retention of the family home was a cultural norm and that in any event, the 

applicant offered a plausible explanation when he said that he didn’t want to sell the home so that the family 

could have accommodation when they returned to India to visit relatives. In Dhiman, Jasvir Kaur v. M.C.I. 

(IAD V95-00675), McIsaac, May 27, 1996, one basis for the refusal was that the applicants’ societal traditions 

were such that parents lived with their sons (married or not), and not with their married daughters; the 

applicants applied to go and live with their married daughter in Canada, while their eldest son remained in 

India. This basis was not accepted, however, and the refusal was found to be invalid in law. 

Aquino, Edmar v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-9403), Eglington, Weisdorf, Ahara, August 13, 1986. 

Ruhani, supra, footnote 11. 



Timing 

In appeals where the issue is whether or not the applicant is an immigrant, the question of 

timing arises: that is, at what point in time must the applicant have had the requisite intention to 

reside permanently in Canada? In Kahlon 14 , the Federal Court of Appeal held that the 

Immigration Appeal Board (the predecessor to the Immigration Appeal Division) had to decide 

the appeal on the basis of the law as it stood at the time of the hearing of the appeal because the 

hearing before the Board was a hearing de novo. If one applies Kahlon, where the refusal is 

based on the applicant's not being an immigrant, the panel would determine the applicant's 

intention as of the date of the hearing. However, there has been some conflicting case-law in this 

area. 

In Patel, Manjulaben, it was held that a determination should be made of the applicant's 

intention at the time that the applicant made his or her application for permanent residence since 

it is a jurisdictional question. 15 However, more recently, Immigration Appeal Division panels 

have not followed Patel on the timing issue, and have instead relied on Kahlon and held that the 

applicant's intention to establish permanent residence in Canada must be determined as of the 

time of the hearing. 16 In Ampoma 17 , the majority applied Kahlon and held that intention must be 

assessed at the time of the hearing. The dissenting member specifically refused to follow the 

decision in Patel. 18 

In Quadri, the Immigration Appeal Division stated that the burden of proof on a sponsor 

is to prove that either the visa officer erred in finding that there was no intention to immigrate at 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

Kahlon, Darshan Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-115-86), Mahoney, Stone, MacGuigan, February 6, 1989. 


Patel, Manjulaben v. M.E.I. (IAD T89-03915), Townshend, Weisdorf, Chu, April 20, 1990 (leave to appeal 

refused July 16, 1990); see infra, for a discussion on jurisdiction. Patel was applied by the majority in Uddin, 

Mohammed Moin v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-02394), Chu, Ahara, Fatsis (dissenting), August 28, 1992. 

Gnanapragasam, Dominic Gnanase v. M.C.I. (IAD T99-11000), Whist, December 4, 2000. 

Ampoma, Eric Sackey v. M.E.I. (IAD W91-00008), Gillanders, Verma, Wlodyka (dissenting), February 10, 

1992. Reported: Ampoma v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1992), 17 Imm. L.R. (2d) 

219 (IAD). 

See also Dhandwar, supra, footnote 8; Randhawa, Baljeet Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-01361), Lam, July 23, 

1996; and the dissenting reasons in Uddin, supra, footnote 15. In Sanghera, Charan Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD V93- 

00595), Verma, December 9, 1993, the panel held that at the time of the hearing, the applicant wanted to live 

permanently in Canada; his contrary intention at the time of the interview was due to stress and shock on 

account of his mother's death and his brother's recent suicide in Canada. Similarly, in Sidhu, supra, footnote 5, 

the panel held that any statements that the father may have made about returning to India were due to his 

emotional stress at the time. In Mallik, Azim v. M.C.I. (IAD T94-04692), Aterman, September 8, 1995, the 

applicant’s responses at the interview suggested that she did not intend to reside permanently in Canada; the 

Appeal Division accepted the appellant’s explanation that the applicant was under stress as a result of the way 

in which the interview was conducted, and that she had become flustered; it also accepted the explanation that 

the applicant was not sophisticated. See also Sanghera, Avtar Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V93-02360), Singh, 

July 22, 1994 and Khanna, Sadhana Kumari v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-01555), Wright, June 3, 1996. But see Gill, 

Harbans Kaur, supra, footnote 8, where the panel considered the applicants’ statements at the time of their 

interview to be more credible and trustworthy than their affidavits made subsequent to the refusal, finding that 

the affidavits were “clearly a self-serving attempt to correct earlier statements”. 



the time of the interview, or alternatively, that the intention to immigrate arose after the interview 

and was present at the time of the hearing of the appeal. 19 

Fairness 

There is a general duty of procedural fairness which governs visa officers in their 

processing of sponsored applications for landing. The issue has sometimes arisen with respect to 

an applicant’s intention to reside permanently in Canada. A sponsor may challenge the validity of 

a refusal on the basis that there was a breach of the principles of natural justice, namely the denial 

of a fair hearing; such an argument is based on the decision in Pangli 20 . In that case, the Court 

held that the immigration officer had a duty to clear up conflicting statements made by the 

applicant on the same day. In both Rahman and Dory 21 , the Immigration Appeal Division held 

that the applicant was never given an opportunity to answer supplementary questions allowing 

her to clarify contradictory statements regarding her intention to reside permanently in Canada. 

Furthermore, the immigration officer who interviewed the applicant should have been the 

one who actually refused the application; 22 this principle was satisfied where one immigration 

officer interviewed and made a recommendation to refuse the application, and another officer 

countersigned the recommendation and signed the refusal letter. 

Pangli has also been applied to support the principle that a visa officer has the duty to 

explain to the applicant the difference between permanent resident and visitor status, and to 

explain the possible negative impact of any statutory declaration signed by the applicant which 

attests to the applicant's intention not to reside permanently in Canada. 23 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

Quadri, Fatai Abiodun v. S.S.C. (IAD T93-12576), Hopkins, September 30, 1994. 

Pangi v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1987] F.C.J. No. 1022. For a fuller discussion of 

fairness, see Chapter 11, “Fairness and Natural Justice under IRPA”. 

Rahman, Mohibur v. M.C.I. (IAD M94-05434), Angé, March 3, 1995; Dory, Roosevelt v. M.C.I. (IAD M94- 

03745), Angé, December 19, 1995. In Sian, Malkit Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-00955), McIsaac, January 20, 

1997, the panel stated that the visa officer had a duty to clear up the conflict between her conclusion that the 

applicants did not intend to reside permanently in Canada and their contrary intention inherent in their 

application for permanent residence. The visa officer had arrived at her conclusion based on the applicant’s 

responses at the interview; what was needed was “a further questioning…thereby affording him the opportunity 

to state finally, and unequivocally, what his intention was insofar as coming to Canada was concerned”. 

This principle was applied in Gill, Rajwinder Kaur v. M.E.I. (IAD V91-00898), Arpin, July 26, 1993. 

See, for example, Rodriguez, Meliton v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-00107), Weisdorf, Fatsis, Ariemma, August 8, 1991, 

where the panel applied Pangli and held that if at the interview the applicant indicated a desire to come to 

Canada as a visitor, the choice of a visitor visa rather than a permanent resident visa should have been put to 

her; there was no evidence that such a choice had been given to the applicant; Merius, Ronald v. M.E.I. (IAD 

M93-05810), Angé, June 13, 1994; and Quadri, supra, footnote 19 and M.C.I. v. Gough, Glen Patrick (IAD 

TA0-1561), MacAdam, March 26, 2001 where the respondent had signed a voluntary declaration of 

abandonment of Canadian permanent resident status and handed over his Canadian record of landing in 

unexpected circumstances and at a moment of intense sleep deprivation. The panel held that he could not be 

faulted for having singed it without an actual intention to abandon Canada as his place of permanent residence. 



Failure to answer truthfully or provide documents 

Under the Regulations to the Immigration Act, s. 9(3) provided a basis for a visa officer to 

refuse a visa for failure to provide information needed to assess both eligibility and admissibility 

of an applicant. At a de novo Immigration Appeal Division hearing the applicant may have 

provided a reasonable explanation or lawful excuse for the default and the refusal would no 

longer be lawful. If an appeal was allowed in law or on a discretionary basis, care was to be taken 

that the visa officer had the information needed to determine eligibility and admissibility when 

processing of the application re-commenced after the appeal. A similar scheme has been enacted 

in IRPA. 

Where an applicant has answered questions in the application or at an interview which 

answers have turned out to be false, a refusal has been tied to the duty to answer questions 

truthfully. In IRPA this requirement is set out in those provisions that govern the making an 

application of any kind: 

s. 16(1) A person who makes an application must answer truthfully 

all questions put to them for the purpose of the examination and 

must produce a visa and all relevant evidence and documents that 

the officer reasonably requires. 

An applicant for permanent residence would seem to be covered by the duty in this 

provision. They must provide adequate proof of both eligibility (e.g. relationship to sponsor) and 

admissibility 

The failure to answer questions truthfully may also give rise to a separate inadmissibility 

finding under s. 40(1)(a) of IRPA, i.e. misrepresentation, which may have the effect of barring 

the foreign national from Canada for two years. This is dealt with in more detail in Chapter 8. 

Failure to undergo a medical examination 

This has been dealt with in Chapter 3 on medical inadmissibility. See comments above as 

to continuing obligation to provide proof of admissibility. 


The general category of inadmissibility described in s. 41(a) is designed to ensure all 

applicants undergo a thorough and detailed process of examination to ensure they meet the 

requirements of the Act and regulations. A refusal may be challenged as unlawful or a sponsor 

may seek special relief from the requirement and produce a sufficient evidentiary basis for the 

applicant to be relieved of the challenged requirement. The integrity of the immigration system 

must be examined against the particular circumstances supporting the request for special relief. 



CASES 

Ampoma, Eric Sackey v. M.E.I. (IAD W91-00008), Gillanders, Verma, Wlodyka (dissenting), 

February 10, 1992. Reported: Ampoma v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) 

(1992), 17 Imm. L.R. (2d) 219 (IAD) ....................................................................................................................... 5 

Aquino, Edmar v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-9403), Eglington, Weisdorf, Ahara, August 13, 1986 .......................................... 4 

Brown, Earlyn v. M.C.I. (IAD T93-09712), Ramnarine, August 17, 1994.................................................................... 4 

Cherfaoui, Azzedine Dino v. M.C.I., (IAD MA1-01747), Beauchemin, February 11, 2002 (reasons 

signed February 13, 2002)......................................................................................................................................... 4 

Daliri, Farshid Hafezi v. M.C.I., (IAD TA3-01591), MacDonald, May 6, 2004; [2004] I.A.D.D. 

No. 210 (QL)............................................................................................................................................................. 2 

Deol, Dilbag Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 80-6012), Campbell, Hlady, Howard, February 11, 1981. .................................. 4 

Dhandwar, Jatinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-01977), Bartley, June 6, 1997.......................................................... 4, 5 

Dhaul, Paramjit Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-6004), Chambers, March 5, 1987. ............................................................. 3 

Dhiman, Jasvir Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-00675), McIsaac, May 27, 1996. ................................................................ 4 

Dory, Roosevelt v. M.C.I. (IAD M94-03745), Angé, December 19, 1995..................................................................... 6 

Gill, Harbans Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V92-00694), Lam, March 27, 1996................................................................... 4, 5 

Gill, Jagjit Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-00365), McIsaac, May 8, 1997.......................................................................... 2 

Gill, Rajwinder Kaur v. M.E.I. (IAD V91-00898), Arpin, July 26, 1993 ...................................................................... 6 

Gill, Shivinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD T94-06519), Wright, May 16, 1995. ................................................................ 3, 4 

Gnanapragasam, Dominic Gnanase v. M.C.I. (IAD T99-11000), Whist, December 4, 2000....................................... 5 

Goindi, Surendra Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD T93-10856), Aterman, December 13, 1994 .................................................... 2 

Gough: M.C.I. v. Gough, Glen Patrick (IAD TA0-1561), MacAdam, March 26, 2001............................................... 6 

Ha, Byung Joon v. M.C.I. (IAD TA0-04969), Sangmuah, October 3, 2001 (reasons signed January 

8, 2002) ..................................................................................................................................................................... 4 

Kahlon, Darshan Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-115-86), Mahoney, Stone, MacGuigan, 


(1989), 7 Imm. L.R. (2d) 91 (F.C.A.)........................................................................................................................ 5 

Kala, Bhupinder Kaur v. M.E.I. (IAD T92-09579), Arpin, Townshend, Fatsis, May 18, 1993..................................... 4 

Kamara, Abass Bai Mohamed v. M.E.I. (IAD W91-00092), Arpin, February 24, 1994................................................ 4 

Kan, Chak Pan v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-2977-91), Muldoon, March 19, 1992. Reported: Kan v. 

Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1992), 17 Imm. L.R. (2d) 206 (F.C.T.D.)............................. 2 

Khanna, Sadhana Kumari v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-01555), Wright, June 3, 1996 .............................................................. 5 

Lalli, Kulwinder v. M.C.I. (IAD V94-01439), Lam, November 20, 1995...................................................................... 4 

Mahil, Tarlochan v. M.E.I. (IAD T92-08178), Weisdorf, Townshend, Ahara, May 18, 1993. ..................................... 4 

Mallik, Azim v. M.C.I. (IAD T94-04692), Aterman, September 8, 1995. ...................................................................... 5 

Merius, Ronald v. M.E.I. (IAD M93-05810), Angé, June 13, 1994............................................................................... 6 

Mirza, Shahid Parvez v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-9081), Teitelbaum, Weisdorf, Townshend, December 1, 

1986........................................................................................................................................................................... 3 



Molice, Antoine Anel v. M.E.I. (IAD M93-07976), Durand, March 22, 1994. .............................................................. 4 

Pacampara, Enrique Pandong v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-9684), Ariemma, Arkin, De Morais, April 10, 

1987........................................................................................................................................................................... 4 

Pangi v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1987] F.C.J. No. 1022 ................................................. 6 

Patel, Manjulaben v. M.E.I. (IAD T89-03915), Townshend, Weisdorf, Chu, April 20, 1990....................................... 5 

Patel, Mohamed v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-03124), Weisdorf, Ahara, Fatsis, April 15, 1993. ........................................... 2, 4 

Quadri, Fatai Abiodun v. S.S.C. (IAD T93-12576), Hopkins, September 30, 1994...................................................... 6 

Rahman, Mohibur v. M.C.I. (IAD M94-05434), Angé, March 3, 1995. ........................................................................ 6 

Randhawa, Baljeet Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-01361), Lam, July 23, 1996.................................................................. 5 

Rodriguez, Meliton v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-00107), Weisdorf, Fatsis, Ariemma, August 8, 1991. .................................... 6 

Ruhani, Zahida v. M.C.I. (IAD T92-07177), Teitelbaum, Muzzi, Band, March 8, 1995............................................... 4 

Sanghera, Avtar Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V93-02360), Singh, July 22, 1994.................................................................... 5 

Sanghera, Charan Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD V93-00595), Verma, December 9, 1993........................................................ 5 

Sanghera, Rajwinder Kular v. M.C.I. (IAD V96-01527), Clark, February 17, 1998..................................................... 3 

Saroya, Kuljeet Kaur v. M.E.I. (IAD V92-01880), Verma, September 21, 1993 ...................................................... 2, 2 

Sarwar, Abida Shaheen v. M.C.I. (IAD T93-11195), Ariemma, Leousis, Muzzi, April 24, 1995............................. 3, 4 

Shergill, Sohan Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD T92-05406), Weisdorf, Chu, Ahara, February 8, 1993................................... 2, 4 

Sian, Malkit Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-00955), McIsaac, January 20, 1997 ................................................................. 6 

Sidhu, Gurdev Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD V92-01678), Singh, November 17, 1993 ............................................................. 2 

Toor, Joginder Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-310-82), Thurlow, Heald, Verchere, February 15, 

1983. Reported: Re Toor and Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1983), 

144 D.L.R. (3d) 554, QL [1983] F.C.J. 114 (F.C.A.)................................................................................................ 3 

Uddin, Mohammed Moin v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-02394), Chu, Ahara, Fatsis (dissenting), August 28, 

1992........................................................................................................................................................................... 5 

Villanueva, Antonio Ordonez v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-9741), Benedetti, Weisdorf, Bell, November 12, 

1986........................................................................................................................................................................... 2 

Wiredu, Alex v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-00727), Muzzi, December 8, 1997 ........................................................................... 3 



Chapter Ten 


GENERALLY 1 

The statutory provision for the determination of discretionary relief in sponsorship 

appeals under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) is found in s. 67. It is 

open to the Appeal Division to allow an appeal on both legal grounds and on the ground 

that, taking into account the best interests of a child directly affected by the decision, 

sufficient humanitarian and compassionate considerations warrant special relief in light of 

all the circumstances of the case. Generally, however, special relief is granted after a 

refusal is found to be valid in law. 

Statutory Provisions 

67. (1) To allow an appeal, the Immigration Appeal Division must be satisfied that, at the 

time that the appeal is disposed of, 

(a) the decision appealed is wrong in law or fact or mixed law and fact; 

(b) a principle of natural justice has not been observed; or 

(c) other than in the case of an appeal by the Minister, taking into account 

the best interests of a child directly affected by the decision, sufficient 

humanitarian and compassionate considerations warrant special relief 

in light of all the circumstances of the case. (emphasis added) 

Paragraph 3(1) of the IRPA provides the following as some of the objectives of the Act 

with respect to immigration: 

3.(1) The objectives of this Act with respect to immigration are 

(d) to see that families are reunited in Canada; 

(h) to protect the health and safety of Canadians and to maintain the security 

of Canadian society; 

(i) to promote international justice and security by fostering respect for 

human rights and by denying access to Canadian territory to persons 

who are criminals or security risks; 

Paragraph 3(3)(f) of the IRPA provides the following: 

(3) This Act is to be construed and applied in a manner that 

1 

Reference may be made to other chapters which discuss discretionary jurisdiction for more on the subject. 


January 1, 2008 Discretionary Jurisdiction - Ch. 10

(f) complies with international human rights instruments to which Canada 

is signatory. 

Exercise of Discretionary Jurisdiction 

In Dimacali-Victoria 2 , the Federal Court, discussing the Appeal Division’s discretionary 

jurisdiction under the former Immigration Act, said the following: 

[…] the decision of the IAD [on compassionate or humanitarian 

considerations] does involve what I am satisfied is a discretionary 

grant of an exemption from the ordinary requirements of the 

Immigration Act […] I am satisfied that the determination of the 

IAD under paragraph 77(3)(b) is, like the decision in question in 

Shah, 3 “[…] wholly a matter of judgment and discretion and the law 

gives […] no right to any particular outcome.” [It has to exercise] 

its discretion in accordance with well established legal principles, 

that is to say in a bona fide manner, uninfluenced by irrelevant 

considerations and not arbitrarily or illegally. 

The Supreme Court of Canada has held that discretion must be exercised in accordance 

with the boundaries imposed by law, fundamental Canadian values and the Canadian Charter of 

Rights and Freedoms. 4 

In Lutchman, 5 the Immigration Appeal Board described its discretionary jurisdiction in 

these terms: 

2 

3 

4 

5 

In its wisdom, Parliament saw fit to include such provision to mitigate the 

rigidity of the law by enabling the Board to dispose of an appeal favourably 

when the strict application of the law would not permit such a determination, 

but the circumstances demand a fair and just solution. […] Clearly, this 

jurisdiction is discretionary in nature and, as such, it must be exercised with 

caution. Its application must be based on objective elements, the evaluation 

of which must not be vitiated by subjective feelings, sentimental propensities, 

Dimacali-Victoria, April Grace Mary v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3323-96), Gibson, August 29, 1997. See 

Budhu, Pooran Deonaraine v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-272-97), Reed, March 20, 1998, where stereotyping 

and irrelevant considerations led the Federal Court – Trial Division to set aside the Appeal Division’s decision. 

Shah, Syed v. M.E.I. (F.C.A, no. A-617-92), Hugessen, MacGuigan, Linden, June 24, 1994. 

Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817. In the context of an 

immigration officer’s decision involving the exercise of discretion on compassionate or humanitarian grounds, 

the Court found that the officer’s comments gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias as they did not 

disclose the existence of an open mind or the weighing of the particular circumstances of the case free from 

stereotypes. The officer’s comments regarding the applicant’s being a strain on the welfare system were based 

on the fact that the applicant had been diagnosed with a psychiatric illness and was a single mother with several 

children. 

Lutchman, Umintra v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 88-35755), Ariemma, Townshend, Bell, January 10, 1989. Reported: 

Lutchman v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1989), 12 Imm. L.R. (2d) 224 (I.A.B.). 



or biased outlooks. What are these objective elements, and what weight each 

carries, can only be determined by the facts of each case. 6 

In many decisions the Federal Court of Appeal sanctioned consideration of the legal 

impediment in the exercise of the Appeal Division’s discretion. 7 The approach taken by the 

Immigration Appeal Division is reflected in the following statement: 

[…] [T]his jurisdiction is exercised to overcome a legal obstacle which 

originated from the fact that an applicant was found to be inadmissible […] 

[T]he question is: how compelling must the evidence be to overcome such 

an obstacle and to warrant the granting of special relief? Objectivity and 

fairness require that the evaluation of evidence be carried out in some 

consistent fashion and, while it is not possible to establish an absolute scale 

of values against which to measure the weight of the evidence, it is clear that 

such scale must be commensurate with the magnitude of the obstacle to be 

overcome. Therefore, in the case where at the time of the hearing the 

impediment which gave rise to the refusal no longer exists, the compelling 

force of the evidence need not be great to overcome what, in effect, is only a 

legal technicality. 8 

In Dhaliwal, 9 a case decided under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the 

applicant argued that the Board erred in conducting a weighing exercise of the humanitarian and 

compassionate considerations against countervailing factors. The Court noted that Kirpal 10 was 

decided under paragraph 77(3)(b) of the Immigration Act, and that Justice Gibson in Kirpal had 

explicitly concluded that the tribunal could not consider the countervailing factors on the basis 

that the phrase “having regard to all the circumstances” was absent from the enactment. Those 

words were subsequently added by Parliament to the former Statute and are contained in IRPA 

paragraph 67(1)(c). The Court concluded that it was open to the Board to consider other matters 

in weighing the humanitarian and compassionate factors. 

Jugpall 11 

re-states the traditional approach: 

The Appeal Division has long held that the exercise of its statutory discretion 

is a function of the context created by a determination of inadmissibility. […] 

[T]he relief in question is relief from the determination of inadmissibility 

[…]. 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

Ibid., at 4-5. 

These decisions are canvassed in Chauhan, Gurpreet K. v. M.C.I. (IAD T95-06533), Townshend, June 11, 

1997. 

Lutchman, supra, footnote 5, at 5. 

Dhaliwal, Resham Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-8123-04), Mosley, June 15, 2005; 2005 FC 869. 

Kirpal v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1997] 1 F.C. 352 (T.D.). 

Jugpall, Sukhjeewan Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD T98-00716), Aterman, Goodman, Townshend, April 12, 1999, at 9- 

11; 17-18. See too M.C.I. v. Dang, Thi Kim Anh (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3113-99), Dawson, July 20, 2000, where 

the panel adopted the reasoning in Jugpall and the Court found that the panel did not err in law when it allowed 

the appeal on H&C grounds. 



[…] 

The need to establish the context in which an appeal pursuant to s. 77(3)(b) is 

to be considered can be understood as a practical and purposive approach to 

the administration of the Act. If the purpose of the Act is to facilitate rather 

than frustrate immigration, then one of the aims of the Act in granting a right 

of appeal pursuant to s. 77(3)(b) is to make available a remedy where the 

strict application of the law produces harsh results. This aim can be realised 

by measuring the compassionate or humanitarian aspects of an individual’s 

case in relation to the legal obstacles to admissibility. 

[…] 

The Appeal Division has consistently applied an approach which requires the 

degree of compelling circumstances to be commensurate with the legal 

obstacle to admissibility in order to justify granting discretionary relief. 

Thus, in cases where changes in the circumstances of the case by the time it 

gets to appeal are such that the original basis for a finding of inadmissibility 

has been overcome, a mildly compelling case may be sufficient to warrant 

granting discretionary relief. […] [A] complete surmounting of the substance 

of the original ground of inadmissibility weighs very heavily in the Appeal 

Division’s assessment of the compassionate or humanitarian circumstances 

of the case. 

[…] 

In the context of cases where Parliament’s concerns with admissibility have 

been met, it may not be necessary to look for overwhelming circumstances in 

order to grant special relief. The values of quick and fair adjudication would 

not be served by forcing the appellant to start the sponsorship process all 

over again […]. 

Where the obstacle to admissibility has been overcome, particularly with respect to 

medical and financial inadmissibility, there must be positive factors present over and above the 

ability of the sponsor to surmount the obstacle to admissibility in order for the Appeal Division to 

grant special relief: 

There must be positive factors independent of [the obstacle to admissibility] 

which move the decision-maker to conclude that it would be unfair to require 

the appellant to start the whole sponsorship process all over again. 12 

As well, there should be no negative factors which would undermine any 

justification for granting special relief. 13 

The Chirwa 14 standard applies where the initial ground of inadmissibility has not in 

substance been overcome. The following definitions of “compassionate or humanitarian 

considerations” were given in Chirwa: 

12 

13 

14 

Ibid., at 18. 

Ibid. 

Chirwa v. Canada (Minister of Manpower and Immigration) (1970), 4 I.A.C. 338 (I.A.B.), at 350. 



[...] “compassion” [is defined] as “sorrow or pity excited by the distress or 

misfortunes of another, sympathy” [...] “compassionate considerations” must 

[...] be taken to be those facts, established by the evidence, which would 

excite in a reasonable man in a civilized community a desire to relieve the 

misfortunes of another – so long as these misfortunes “warrant the granting 

of special relief” from the effect of the provisions of the Immigration Act. 

[...] 

[...] “humanitarianism” [is defined] as “regard for the interests of mankind, 

benevolence.” 

Some Immigration Appeal Division panels have articulated their understanding of the test 

for discretionary relief pursuant to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act in the context of 

sponsorship appeals. 

In Menon, 15 the panel opined that Chirwa remains a sound guide for the Immigration 

Appeal Division in exercising its discretion, but that the test for discretionary relief is broader 

than that under the Immigration Act. 

Another panel, in Chang, 16 expressed the view that the case law as it developed in the 

area of discretionary relief in relationship to sponsorship appeals under the former Act continues 

to be relevant given the similar wording between the former and current Acts. 

In the opinion of the panel in Chang the requirement under the IRPA that the 

humanitarian or compassionate considerations be “sufficient” is a legislative recognition that, in 

most appeals of this nature, there will be some humanitarian and compassionate considerations 

present. The panel noted that in all appeals involving family class sponsorships the issue of 

family re-unification is present to a greater or lesser degree. The inclusion of “sufficient” along 

with the requirement that humanitarian and compassionate considerations warranting relief be 

assessed “in light of all the circumstances of the case” suggests that a balancing or weighing 

process must take place. 

Member Workun in Chang concluded that the phrase “in light of all the circumstances of 

the case” in the context of a sponsorship appeal does not have the specialized meaning which was 

formerly attributed to the phrase in the context of removal order appeals. She expressed the view, 

however, that certain Ribic 17 factors could be relevant considerations, depending on the facts of 

the case. In the case of criminality outside of Canada, for example, the seriousness of the offence 

leading to the inadmissibility, possibility of re-offence, evidence of rehabilitation, and degree of 

family and community support are relevant considerations. 

15 

16 

17 

Menon, Romola Gia v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-01956), D’Ignazio, January 15, 2004. 

Chang, Hea Soon v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-02703), Workun, July 15, 2003. 

Ribic,Marida v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 84-9623), D. Davey, Benedetti, Petryshyn, August 20, 1985. 



Along with these considerations the Immigration Appeal Division must assess the 

humanitarian and compassionate considerations present and within the context of all other 

relevant circumstances. The overall circumstances of the appellant and applicant, including those 

supportive of special relief and those non-supportive of such relief, must be considered. The 

panel’s considerations must also include a consideration of the legal obstacle to admission and a 

weighing exercise must then be done. 

In Khan 18 the panel addressed the test for discretionary relief in the Immigration and 

Refugee Protection Act. In Member Stein’s view, the often cited test in Chirwa touches on one 

important basis – a desire to relieve misfortune – for exercising discretionary relief. However, 

over the years, IAD jurisprudence has expanded to consider a much wider range of factors in 

deciding whether to grant special relief. Section 67(1)(c) of IRPA grants an extremely broad 

power including a requirement to consider the best interests of a child directly affected by the 

decision, and whether there are sufficient humanitarian and compassionate considerations in light 

of all the circumstances of the case. In the panel’s view, this jurisdiction is not limited to an 

assessment of whether exercising discretionary relief would alleviate misfortune. 

Who May Benefit From Special Relief 

Special relief may only be granted in respect of members of the family class. 19 The 

applicants must first be determined to come within the definition of a member of the family class 

or to qualify as dependants of the member of the family class. 20 

In Kirpal, the Federal Court – Trial Division indicated that “[…] nothing on the face of 

the Act and Regulations […] requires a uniform result from the Tribunal in the exercise of its 

equitable jurisdiction, in respect of each of the […] family members of the applicant […]”. 21 The 

Appeal Division generally does not undertake an individual assessment of compassionate or 

humanitarian factors for each applicant. Where the Appeal Division does engage in such 

18 

19 

20 

21 

Khan, Khalid v. M.C.I.(IAD TA4-08639), Stein, November 1, 2005. 

s.65 of IRPA 

65. In an appeal under subsection 63(1) or (2) respecting an application based on membership in the 

family class, the Immigration Appeal Division may not consider humanitarian and compassionate 

considerations unless it has decided that the foreign national is a member of the family class and that 

their sponsor is a sponsor within the meaning of the regulations. 

117(1) of the IRP Regulations defines the members of the family class. 

Kirpal, supra, footnote 10, at 365-366. In one case, it was argued, following Kirpal, that the Appeal Division 

could grant special relief with respect to some of the applicants, thereby allowing the sponsor to fulfil her 

undertaking. The Appeal Division concluded that Kirpal cannot be interpreted so as to allow sponsors to 

circumvent the admissibility requirements of the Act and Regulations: Dosanjh, Balbir Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD 

V95-00550), McIsaac, July 31, 1997. 



individual assessments, 22 it usually comes to a uniform conclusion for all applicants on the 

question of whether special relief is warranted. 23 

When a sponsored person is determined by an immigration officer to be not eligible as a 

member of the family class, that person is split from the processing of the application: visas are 

issued to the principal applicant and other eligible family members. 24 There is no right of appeal 

to the Immigration Appeal Division as there is no family class refusal. 

A foreign national, other than a protected person, is inadmissible on grounds of an 

inadmissible family member if their accompanying family member, or in prescribed 

circumstances, their non-accompanying family member, is inadmissible. 25 A foreign national, 

other than a protected person, is inadmissible if they are an accompanying family member of an 

inadmissible person. 26 

Effect of Allowing an Appeal Pursuant to s. 67(1)(c) of IRPA 

A decision in the sponsor’s favour on compassionate or humanitarian grounds blankets 

and thus overcomes the ground of inadmissibility. 27 The blanketing effect is in relation to the 

particular ground that was before the Immigration Appeal Division. This means that when the 

application is returned to the officer to be further processed, if the officer discovers another 

reason for refusing the application, there is nothing to preclude a second refusal. The Division’s 

earlier decision granting special relief relates only to the matter that was before it at the time. 

Thus the Division may, on a subsequent appeal, on the facts then existing, decide that the 

granting of special relief is not warranted. 28 The earlier decision granting special relief may be 

revisited and the doctrine of res judicata does not apply. 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

See, however, Chauhan, supra, footnote 7, where the panel articulated its disagreement with Kirpal in this 

respect. 

One of the rare instances where discretionary relief was “split” in respect of the applicants was in Jagpal, 

Sawandeep Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V96-00243), Singh, June 15, 1998, where the panel, citing Kirpal, found 

discretionary relief was warranted for the sponsor’s parents but not for her brother. 

Immigration Manuals, Overseas Processing (OP), Chapter OP2 at 50. 

s.42(a) of IRPA and IRP Regulation 23. 

s.42(b) of IPRA; “family member” is defined in IRP Regulation 1(3). 

Mangat, Parminder Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-153-85), Strayer, February 25, 1985. 

Wong, Kam v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 83-6438), Davey, Hlady, Howard, March 7, 1984. 



EVIDENCE 

Burden of Proof 

Before a decision favourable to a sponsor may be given on compassionate or 

humanitarian grounds, the sponsor has the burden of adducing evidence sufficient to attract this 

jurisdiction. 

Evidence existing at the time of the Appeal 

An appeal on humanitarian or compassionate grounds is decided on the facts existing at 

the time the Immigration Appeal Division makes its decision. In Gill, 29 the Federal Court of 

Appeal stated: 

It is noteworthy to observe that the jurisprudence of this Court has 

established that a hearing of this nature is a hearing de novo in a broad sense, 

and at such a hearing the Board is entitled to consider contemporary matters 

which necessarily involve a consideration of changed circumstances when 

exercising its equitable jurisdiction. 

GENERAL PRINCIPLES 

It has been held that the sponsor’s circumstances are at least as important as those of the 

applicants, if not paramount, 30 on an appeal on humanitarian and compassionate grounds. 

The policy objective set out in section 3(1)(d) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection 

Act, to see that families are reunited in Canada, informs the exercise of discretionary relief. 

However, since it is the basis for all sponsorship applications, it is not, without more, sufficient to 

warrant special relief. 31 Marriage to a Canadian citizen does not, in itself, create any entitlement 

to special relief. 32 

29 

30 

31 

M.E.I. v. Gill, Hardeep Kaur (F.C.A., no. A-219-90), Heald, Hugessen, Stone, December 31, 1991, at 6-7. 

Johl, Baljinder Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-4006), Eglington, Arpin, Wright, January 26, 1987. 

Hylton, Claudine Ruth v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-9807), Arkin, Suppa, Ariemma, March 17, 1987; see also Valdes, 

Juan Gonzalo Lasa v. M.E.I. (IAD V90-01517), Wlodyka, Chambers, Gillanders, January 21, 1992. In one 

case of the Federal Court of Appeal, Justice Mahoney at page 6 of his concurring reasons stated, although in 

obiter: “The circumstances in which the Board may exercise its discretion under s. 77(3)(b) need not be 

extraordinary.”: M.E.I. v. Burgon, David Ross (F.C.A., no. A-17-90), MacGuigan, Linden, Mahoney 

(concurring in the result), February 22, 1991. Reported: Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. 

Burgon (1991), 13 Imm. L.R. (2d) 102 (F.C.A.). This case was commented on in Sotoodeh, Isheo v. M.E.I. 

(IAD T91-00153), Fatsis, Chu (concurring), Bell (dissenting), July 22, 1991. The obiter statement in Burgon 

was relied on in granting special relief in Kadri, Darwish Mohamad v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-02769), Boscariol, 

August 4, 1998, the panel stating at page 5 that “compassionate considerations need not be extraordinary but 

can be as simple as the love between a husband and wife and their desire to be together”. However, in 

Taghizadeh-Barazande, Parviz v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-00073), D’Ignazio, January 20, 1998, although separation 

of a husband and wife was causing them some distress, this alone was held insufficient to warrant special relief. 

In Brar, Charanjit Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA5-00400), Workun, March 30, 2006, the sponsored application for 

permanent residence of the appellant’s husband was refused on the basis that the appellant was in default of 



There is a distinction between achieving family unification and facilitating the reunion of 

the sponsor with close relatives from abroad. 33 Generally speaking, the concern is not with 

maintaining the unification of all relatives abroad. As a general rule, the fact that a relative 

abroad does not wish or is ineligible to come to Canada is not relevant to the granting of relief to 

permit the sponsor to be reunited with other relatives. 34 

Where there is more than one ground of refusal, different considerations go to the 

discretionary jurisdiction with respect to each ground. 35 

An argument may be presented that an applicant’s opportunities in Canada would be far 

more attractive than in the applicant’s home country. This has been characterized as an economic 

argument and is generally not accepted as a humanitarian and compassionate factor. 36 

The policy objective set out in section 3(1)(h) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection 

Act, to protect the health and safety of Canadians and to maintain the security of Canadian 

society, can guide discretion. 37 

The Immigration Appeal Division has considered the exercise of special relief to alleviate 

an anomaly in the law. 38 

32 

33 

34 

35 

36 

37 

38 

sponsorship obligations under a previous undertaking signed on behalf of her former husband. Her conduct visà-vis 

the outstanding debt was a highly negative feature of the case. Notwithstanding the spousal nature of the 

sponsorship and the fact that the appellant and applicant now had a child, there were insufficient humanitarian 

and compassionate considerations to warrant granting special relief. 

Singh, Rosina v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 83-6483), Anderson, Chambers, Voorhees, December 31, 1984. 

Mohamed v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1986] 3 F.C. 90 (C.A.). 

Ibid. In Ahmed, Muhammad Jamail v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-6238), Anderson, November 18, 1986, the panel held 

irrelevant the fact that if the applicants were granted permanent residence in Canada, their grandchildren in 

Pakistan would be deprived of their love and affection. In Rupert, Constance Elizabeth v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85- 

6191), Mawani, Singh, Ariemma, May 22, 1987, the sponsor’s willingness to join her husband abroad was held 

to be irrelevant since it is reunion in Canada that is an express objective of the Act. In Bagri, Sharinder Singh 

v. M.C.I. (IAD V96-02022), Borst, May 9, 1999, the fact that the applicant would be leaving behind an adult 

son who was dependent on him was irrelevant to the exercise of special relief. 

Khan, Roshina v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-03369), Carver, November 13, 1998. In Khan, in relation to the criminality 

ground of refusal, rehabilitation and remorse together with the sponsor’s emotional attachment warranted 

special relief; but in relation to the financial ground, the same considerations did not apply and should not be 

transferred over to this ground. Humanitarian and compassionate considerations regarding the financial ground 

were insufficient to warrant special relief. 

Judge, Mahan Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 80-6239), Campbell, Hlady, Howard, March 13, 1981. However, in 

Doan, Hop Duc v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-4145), Eglington, Goodspeed, Vidal, September 15, 1986, the proposition 

that money considerations could never be humanitarian and compassionate considerations was rejected. 

Lai, Gia Hung v. M.E.I. (IAD V92-01455), Wlodyka, Singh (dissenting in part), Verma, November 12, 1993. 

It is especially relevant in medical inadmissibility cases such as Lai. 

Mtanios, Johnny Kaissar v. M.C.I. (IAD T95-02534), Townshend, May 8, 1996. The anomaly deprived one set 

of Convention refugees from sponsoring their dependants. 



The Immigration Appeal Division has held that the doctrine of res judicata applies to a 

decision regarding humanitarian and compassionate considerations. 39 

Evidence of country conditions and hardship to the applicant in that country is admissible 

in assessing humanitarian and compassionate considerations in sponsorship appeals. 40 

BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 

The Supreme Court of Canada decision in Baker 41 held that decision-makers, when 

considering an application for landing on humanitarian and compassionate grounds, must take 

into account the best interests of the applicant’s children. Since the 1999 Baker judgment, the 

Immigration Appeal Division has been citing Baker as authority for the proposition that in the 

exercise of the Division’s discretionary jurisdiction, children’s best interests must be considered 

and given substantial weight. The Supreme Court of Canada arrived at the following conclusion 

with respect to the certified question that was before the Federal Court of Appeal. 

[para75] The certified question asks whether the best interests of 

children must be a primary consideration when assessing an applicant 

under s. 114(2) and the Regulations. The principles discussed above 

indicate that, for the exercise of the discretion to fall within the standard of 

reasonableness, the decision-maker should consider children's best 

interests as an important factor, give them substantial weight, and be alert, 

alive and sensitive to them. That is not to say that children's best interests 

must always outweigh other considerations, or that there will not be other 

reasons for denying an H & C claim even when children's interests are 

given this consideration. However, where the interests of children are 

minimized, in a manner inconsistent with Canada's humanitarian and 

compassionate tradition and the Minister's guidelines, the decision will be 

unreasonable. 

. 

As a result of the IRPA, the Immigration Appeal Division has a statutory mandate to 

consider best interests as part of the exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction. However, the 

analysis of the principle pursuant to the statute does not differ appreciably from the analysis that 

would have been undertaken before the IRPA. The best interests of any child directly affected by 

the decision of the Immigration Appeal Division must be considered and given substantial 

weight. While a child’s best interests must be considered, it is unlikely that this individual factor 

will be determinative of an appeal. 

There have been a number of Federal Court decisions with respect to the application of 

Baker. While some Court decisions concern Immigration Appeal Division cases, most of the 

decisions are in relation to refused applications for permanent residence from within Canada 

39 

40 

41 

Nyame, Daniel v. M.C.I. (IAD T98-09032), Buchanan, December 31, 1999. 

Alaguthrai, Suboshini v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-01964), Kelley, December 8, 1999. 

Baker v. Canada (M.C.I.), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817. 



ased on humanitarian and compassionate considerations (“H&C applications”) or in relation to 

applications for a stay of removal. These decisions provide the Immigration Appeal Division 

with general guidance on this issue. 

In Legault, 42 a case involving an H&C application, the Federal Court of Appeal held that 

“the mere mention of the children is not sufficient. The interests of the children is a factor that 

must be examined with care and weighed with other factors. To mention is not to examine and 

weigh.” 

The Court went on to consider another question: Did Baker create a prima facie 

presumption that the children’s best interests should prevail, subject only to the gravest 

countervailing grounds? It answered that question in the negative and concluded that the 

children’s interests are not superior to other factors that must be considered. 

The Federal Court of Appeal in Owusu 43 held that if there is no evidence adduced by an 

applicant with respect to the best interests of the child, an immigration officer is under no 

obligation to inquire further about their best interests. 

It appears that the Immigration Appeal Division will need to consider the best interests of 

a child directly affected by a decision who does not reside in Canada. The Supreme Court of 

Canada in Baker did not address this issue. In Irimie, 44 however, Pelletier, J. decided that the 

principles in Baker should apply to all of the children of the individual in question, both Canadian 

and foreign children. This should be contrasted with the Federal Court of Appeal decision in 

Owusu 45 where in dismissing the appeal the Court stated “we must not be taken to have affirmed 

the Applications Judge’s view that an immigration officer’s duty to consider the best interests of 

an H&C applicant’s children is engaged when the children in question are not in, and have never 

been to, Canada. This interesting issue does not arise for decision on the facts of this case and 

must await a case in which the facts require it to be decided.” The Court went on to note that in 

Baker the Supreme Court of Canada made no mention of Ms. Baker’s four other children residing 

in Jamaica, nor did it comment on any consideration that the immigration officer gave or failed to 

give to the best interests of the children who did not reside in Canada. 

42 

43 

44 

45 

M.C.I. v. Legault, Alexander Henri (F.C.A., no. A-255-01), Richard, Décary, Nöel, March 28, 2002; 2002 FCA 

125. 

Owusu, Samuel Kwabena v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. A-114-03), Evans, Strayer, Sexton, January 26, 2004; 2004 FCA 

38. 

Irimie, Mircea Sorin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-427-00), Pelletier, November 22, 2000. In paragraph 20 of 

the judgment, the Court stated “that ‘attentiveness and sensitivity to the importance of the rights of children, to 

their best interests, and to the hardship that may be caused to them by a negative decision’ must be read to 

include all of the children of the individuals in question, both Canadian and foreign. To hold otherwise is to say 

that the humanitarian and compassionate needs of Canadian children of particular parents are more worthy of 

consideration than those of the non-Canadian children of the same parents. It is understandable that distinctions 

be drawn between those children for legal purposes: it would be ‘inconsistent with Canada’s humanitarian and 

compassionate tradition’ to suggest that there are humanitarian distinctions to be drawn between them based 

upon citizenship.” 

Owusu, supra, footnote 43. 



Given the open ended language of subsection 67(1) of the IRPA, and the jurisprudence of 

the Federal Court - Trial Division, it appears that a restrictive interpretation is not warranted - the 

best interests of any child directly affected by the appeal must be considered in assessing whether 

or not to exercise discretionary relief. 46 In an appeal from the refusal of a sponsored application 

for permanent residence by the appellant’s parents in Punjab, the member turned her mind to the 

question of the best interests of the three grandchildren in Canada and the grandchildren who 

lived in India. 47 She concluded that while it might be in the best interests of the appellant’s 

children for the applicants to come to Canada, it could not be concluded that it was not also in the 

best interests of the many grandchildren in Punjab for their grandparents to remain in India with 

them. 

In Momcilovic, 48 at issue was the interpretation to be given to the words “child directly 

affected”. The Court found that Nadja, a motherless teenaged girl for whom the applicant for 

permanent residence was the primary caregiver, was a “child directly affected” such that her best 

interests had to be properly assessed. The Court opined that “[a] plain reading of subsection 

25(1) is broader than the best interests of a parent’s own child. The section does not use wording 

such as ‘child of the marriage’ or ‘the applicant’s child’. It refers to the best interests of a ‘child 

directly affected’. 49 

CONSIDERATIONS FOR SPECIAL RELIEF 

Generally Applicable 

• the objective in section 3(1)(d) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, to see 

that families are reunited in Canada 

• nature and degree of legal impediment 

• the relationship of the sponsor to the applicant(s) 

• the reason(s) for the sponsorship 

• the strength of the relationship between the applicant(s) and the sponsor 50 

• the situation of the sponsor in Canada 51 

• the past conduct of the sponsor 52 

46 

47 

48 

49 

50 

51 

52 

It must be noted that “best interests” cannot be used to overcome a legal barrier such as the failure of the 

appellant to have legally adopted the applicant. 

Bhatwa, Paramjit v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-23671), Stein, April 19, 2005 (reasons signed May 18, 2005). 

Momcilovic, Kosanka v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5601-03), O’Keefe, January 20, 2005; 2005 FC 79. 

Ibid., at paragraph 45. 

Wong, Philip Sai Chak v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-05637), Chu, Fatsis, Ahara, November 5, 1992. 

Jean, Marie Béatrice v. M.E.I. (IAD M93-05594), Durand, September 9, 1993. For example, whether the 

applicant could help the sponsor by babysitting the children while the sponsor goes to work. 

Laii, supra, footnote 37. For example, the fact that the sponsor has been on social assistance. In Lawler, 

Valerie Ann v. M.C.I. (IAD T95-03411), Band, February 23, 1996, the Appeal Division distinguished 



• the situation of the applicant(s) abroad, including hardship 53 

• the ease of travel for the sponsor/applicant(s) 

• the existence of family or other support for the applicant(s) abroad 54 

• the existence of family or other support for the sponsor in Canada 

• the existence of cultural duties to one another 55 

• the financial burden on the sponsor from having the applicant(s) abroad 

• the financial dependency of the applicant(s) on the sponsor 

• the best interests of the child 56 

Medical Inadmissibility 57 

• whether there is evidence of an improved medical condition at the time of the 

appeal 58 and current status of same if not an improvement 

• whether there are likely to be excessive demands on Canadian services (health/social) 59 

53 

54 

55 

56 

57 

58 

59 

Tzemanakis v. M.E.I. (1970), 8 I.A.C. 156 (I.A.B.), which the Minister relied on in support of the proposition 

that persons who knowingly enter into a relationship (in this case marriage to a person in an inadmissible class) 

must abide by the reasonable consequences of their actions. The approach taken in Tzemanakis, which 

indicated that “equity” is an exception to the letter of the law and that the right to benefit from special relief is 

predicated on good faith and the honest and responsible attitude of whoever seeks equity, is irrelevant. The 

Appeal Division must exercise its discretionary powers, not as an exception to some other jurisdiction it has, 

but as a separate and distinct power, standing alone. 

Dutt, John Ravindra v. M.E.I. (IAD V90-01637), Chu, Wlodyka, Tisshaw, July 22, 1991. See also Parel, 

Belinda v. M.C.I. (IAD W97-00112), Boire, June 23, 1999, where the sons of the applicant, the sponsor’s 

mother, provided her with little or no support, her life was in some danger and there was a close bond between 

her and the sponsor warranting special relief; and Saskin, Atif v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-03348), Maziarz, January 30, 

1998, where traumatic past events and pending deportation to Bosnia led to the granting of special relief. 

Baldwin, Ellen v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-01664), Chu, Arpin, Fatsis, June 30, 1992. 

Sotoodeh, supra, footnote 31. 

Zaraket, Zahra v. M.C.I. (IAD M99-06909), Fortin, October 10, 2000. An officer deciding a section 25 

humanitarian and compassionate application must consider when deciding on the “best interests of the child”, 

language difficulties. In Kim, Shin Ki v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-345-07), Phelan, January 29, 2008; 2008 FC 

116, the Court found that the applicant, who had lived most of his life in Canada, if returned to South Korea 

would have an insufficient grasp of Korean to enter university or to obtain a job other than manual or menial 

labour. In Arulraj, Rasalingam v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4137-05), Barnes, April 27, 2006; 2006 FC 529, also 

a s. 25 application, the Court found the decision was unreasonable in its treatment of the best interests of the 

children. The officer felt that, in considering best interests of the children it was necessary to find that they 

would be irreparably harmed by their father’s “temporary” removal from Canada. There is simply no legal 

basis for incorporating a burden of irreparable harm into the consideration of the best interests of the children. 

The benefit to the children from the continuing presence of a parent and all other relevant factors, as well as the 

potential harm caused by removal, must all be weighed. 

See Chapter 3 for full discussion of Medical Refusals. 

Hu, Jenkin Ching-Kim v. M.C.I. (IAD V92-01452), Ho, March 30, 1995. 

Sooknanan, Lochan v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1213-97), Gibson, February 27, 1998; Dutt, supra, footnote 

53. 



• the relative availability of health services to the applicant(s), in Canada and abroad 60 

• the cost of treatment of the medical condition 61 

• the availability of family support in Canada 62 

• the psychological dependencies of the applicant(s) on the sponsor 63 

• the objective in section 3(1)(h) of the Act, to protect the health, safety of Canadians 

and to maintain the security of Canadian society 

Criminal Inadmissibility 

• whether there is evidence of rehabilitation 64 

• whether there is evidence of remorse 65 

• the seriousness of the offences 66 

• evidence of good character 67 

• the length of time since the offence(s) and absence of further trouble with the law 68 

• evidence of criminal history, future prospects and risk of future danger to the public 69 

• hardship to the applicant in the home country 70 

60 

61 

62 

63 

64 

65 

66 

67 

68 

69 

70 

Dutt, ibid. 

Valdes, supra, footnote 31; Che Tse, David Kwai v. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2645-93), McKeown, 

December 15, 1993. 

Luong, Chinh Van v. M.E.I. (IAD V92-01963), Clark, July 5, 1994; Lakhdar, Ahmed v. M.C.I. (IAD M96- 

13690), Lamarche, February 13, 1998; Colterjohn, David Ian v. M.C.I. (IAD V96-00808), Jackson, March 11, 

1998. 

Deol, Daljeet Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-280-90), MacGuigan, Linden, Robertson, November 27, 1992. 

Reported: Deol v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1992), 18 Imm. L.R. (2d) 1 (F.C.A.). 

In Parmar, Hargurjodh v. M.E.I. (IAD T92-03914), Townshend, September 16, 1993, the panel distinguished 

Deol because the sponsor’s conduct did not show the psychological dependency or bonds of affection 

mentioned in Deol. 

Perry, Ivelaw Barrington v. M.C.I. (IAD V94-01575), Ho, November 1, 1995. Thamber, Avtar Singh v. M.C.I. 

(F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2407-00), McKeown, March 12, 2001. Ramirez, Roberto v. M.C.I. (IAD VA4-00578), 

Kang, May 12, 2005 (reasons signed May 30, 2005). 

Ramirez, ibid. 

Khan, supra, footnote 35. 

Ibid. 

Au, Chui Wan Fanny v. M.C.I. (IAD T94-05868), Muzzi, March 13, 1996; Fu, Chun-Fai William v. M.C.I. 

(IAD T94-04088), Townshend, March 19, 1996. 

Nagularajah,Sathiyascelam v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3732-98), Sharlow, July 7, 1999. This decision 

arose in the context of a removal order appeal so may not exactly fit the sponsorship context. 

Alaguthrai, supra, footnote 40. 



Financial Refusals 

Please see Chapter 1, “Financial Refusals”. 



CASES 

Ahmed, Muhammad Jamail v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-6238), Anderson, November 18, 1986 .............................................. 9 

Alaguthrai, Suboshini v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-01964), Kelley, December 8, 1999 .................................................... 10, 14 

Arulraj, Rasalingam v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4137-05), Barnes, April 27, 2006; 2006 FC 529 ............................... 13 

Au, Chui Wan Fanny v. M.C.I. (IAD T94-05868), Muzzi, March 13, 1996 ................................................................ 14 

Bagri, Sharinder Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V96-02022), Borst, May 9, 1999..................................................................... 9 

Baker v. Canada (M.C.I.), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817........................................................................................................... 10 

Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817....................................................... 2 

Baldwin, Ellen v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-01664), Chu, Arpin, Fatsis, June 30, 1992 .......................................................... 13 

Bhatwa, Paramjit v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-23671), Stein, April 19, 2005 ........................................................................ 12 

Brar, Charanjit Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA5-00400), Workun, March 30, 2006 ............................................................. 8 

Budhu, Pooran Deonaraine v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-272-97), Reed, March 20, 1998........................................ 2 



Immigration) v. Burgon (1991), 13 Imm. L.R. (2d) 102 (F.C.A.)............................................................................. 8 

Chang, Hea Soon v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-02703), Workun, July 15, 2003 ....................................................................... 5 

Che Tse, David Kwai v. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2645-93), McKeown, December 15, 1993................................. 14 

Chirwa v. Canada (Minister of Manpower and Immigration) (1970), 4 I.A.C. 338 (I.A.B.), at 350 ............................ 4 

Colterjohn, David Ian v. M.C.I. (IAD V96-00808), Jackson, March 11, 1998............................................................ 14 

Dang: M.C.I. v. Dang, Thi Kim Anh (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3113-99), Dawson, July 20, 2000....................................... 3 

Deol, Daljeet Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-280-90), MacGuigan, Linden, Robertson, November 

27, 1992. Reported: Deol v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1992), 18 

Imm. L.R. (2d) 1 (F.C.A.) ....................................................................................................................................... 14 

Dhaliwal, Resham Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-8123-04), Mosley, June 15, 2005; 2005 FC 869........................... 3 

Dimacali-Victoria, April Grace Mary v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3323-96), Gibson, August 29, 

1997........................................................................................................................................................................... 2 

Doan, Hop Duc v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-4145), Eglington, Goodspeed, Vidal, September 15, 1986.................................. 9 

Dosanjh, Balbir Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-00550), McIsaac, July 31, 1997................................................................. 6 

Dutt, John Ravindra v. M.E.I. (IAD V90-01637), Chu, Wlodyka, Tisshaw, July 22, 1991......................................... 13 

Fu, Chun-Fai William v. M.C.I. (IAD T94-04088), Townshend, March 19, 1996...................................................... 14 

Gill: M.E.I. v. Gill, Hardeep Kaur (F.C.A., no. A-219-90), Heald, Hugessen, Stone, December 31, 

1991........................................................................................................................................................................... 8 

Hu, Jenkin Ching-Kim v. M.C.I. (IAD V92-01452), Ho, March 30, 1995................................................................... 13 

Hylton, Claudine Ruth v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-9807), Arkin, Suppa, Ariemma, March 17, 1987...................................... 8 

Irimie, Mircea Sorin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-427-00), Pelletier, November 22, 2000 ...................................... 11 

Jagpal, Sawandeep Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V96-00243), Singh, June 15, 1998 ............................................................... 7 

Jean, Marie Béatrice v. M.E.I. (IAD M93-05594), Durand, September 9, 1993......................................................... 12 

Johl, Baljinder Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-4006), Eglington, Arpin, Wright, January 26, 1987..................................... 8 



Judge, Mahan Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 80-6239), Campbell, Hlady, Howard, March 13, 1981 ..................................... 9 

Jugpall, Sukhjeewan Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD T98-00716), Aterman, Goodman, Townshend, April 12, 

1999........................................................................................................................................................................... 3 

Kadri, Darwish Mohamad v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-02769), Boscariol, August 4, 1998 ..................................................... 8 

Khan, Khalid v. M.C.I.(IAD TA4-08639), Stein, November 1, 2005............................................................................ 6 

Khan, Roshina v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-03369), Carver, November 13, 1998..................................................................... 9 

Kim, Shin Ki v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-345-07), Phelan, January 29, 2008; 2008 FC 116.......................................... 13 

Lai, Gia Hung v. M.E.I. (IAD V92-01455), Wlodyka, Singh (dissenting in part), Verma, 

November 12, 1993 ................................................................................................................................................... 9 

Lakhdar, Ahmed v. M.C.I. (IAD M96-13690), Lamarche, February 13, 1998 ............................................................ 14 

Lawler, Valerie Ann v. M.C.I. (IAD T95-03411), Band, February 23, 1996 ............................................................... 12 

Legault: M.C.I. v. Legault, Alexander Henri (F.C.A., no. A-255-01), Richard, Décary, Nöel, 

March 28, 2002; 2002 FCA 125.............................................................................................................................. 11 

Luong, Chinh Van v. M.E.I. (IAD V92-01963), Clark, July 5, 1994 ........................................................................... 14 

Lutchman, Umintra v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 88-35755), Ariemma, Townshend, Bell, January 10, 1989. 

Reported: Lutchman v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1989), 12 Imm. 

L.R. (2d) 224 (I.A.B.)............................................................................................................................................ 2, 3 

Mangat, Parminder Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-153-85), Strayer, February 25, 1985.......................................... 7 

Menon, Romola Gia v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-01956), D’Ignazio, January 15, 2004.......................................................... 5 

Mohamed v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1986] 3 F.C. 90 (C.A.)......................................... 9 

Momcilovic, Kosanka v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5601-03), O’Keefe, January 20, 2005; 2005 FC 79......................... 12 

Mtanios, Johnny Kaissar v. M.C.I. (IAD T95-02534), Townshend, May 8, 1996......................................................... 9 

Nyame, Daniel v. M.C.I. (IAD T98-09032), Buchanan, December 31, 1999 .............................................................. 10 

Owusu, Samuel Kwabena v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. A-114-03), Evans, Strayer, Sexton, January 26, 

2004; 2004 FCA 38................................................................................................................................................. 11 

Parel, Belinda v. M.C.I. (IAD W97-00112), Boire, June 23, 1999.............................................................................. 13 

Parmar, Hargurjodh v. M.E.I. (IAD T92-03914), Townshend, September 16, 1993.................................................. 14 

Perry, Ivelaw Barrington v. M.C.I. (IAD V94-01575), Ho, November 1, 1995.......................................................... 14 

Ramirez, Roberto v. M.C.I. (IAD VA4-00578), Kang, May 12, 2005......................................................................... 14 

Ribic, Marida v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 84-9623), D. Davey, Benedetti, Petryshyn, August 20, 1985 ...................................... 5 

Rupert, Constance Elizabeth v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-6191), Mawani, Singh, Ariemma, May 22, 1987 ............................ 9 

Saskin, Atif v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-03348), Maziarz, January 30, 1998........................................................................... 13 

Sathiyascelam v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3732-98), Sharlow, July 7, 1999.......................................................... 14 

Shah, Syed v. M.E.I. (F.C.A, no. A-617-92), Hugessen, MacGuigan, Linden, June 24, 1994....................................... 2 

Singh, Rosina v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 83-6483), Anderson, Chambers, Voorhees, December 31, 1984 ................................. 8 

Sooknanan, Lochan v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1213-97), Gibson, February 27, 1998.......................................... 13 

Sotoodeh, Isheo v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-00153), Fatsis, Chu (concurring), Bell (dissenting), July 22, 

1991........................................................................................................................................................................... 8 

Taghizadeh-Barazande, Parviz v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-00073), D’Ignazio, January 20, 1998 .......................................... 8 



Thamber, Avtar Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2407-00), McKeown, March 12, 2001..................................... 14 

Tzemanakis v. M.E.I. (1970), 8 I.A.C. 156 (I.A.B.) ..................................................................................................... 12 

Valdes, Juan Gonzalo Lasa v. M.E.I. (IAD V90-01517), Wlodyka, Chambers, Gillanders, 

January 21, 1992 ....................................................................................................................................................... 8 

Wong, Kam v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 83-6438), Davey, Hlady, Howard, March 7, 1984 .......................................................... 7 

Wong, Philip Sai Chak v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-05637), Chu, Fatsis, Ahara, November 5, 1992...................................... 12 

Zaraket, Zahra v. M.C.I. (IAD M99-06909), Fortin, October 10, 2000 ...................................................................... 13 



Chapter Eleven 

Fairness and Natural Justice under the IRPA 

Context for the Immigration Appeal Division 

The Immigration Appeal Division (IAD) may allow an appeal if it is satisfied that “a 

principle of natural justice has not been observed”. This ground of appeal is expressly set out in 

the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). 1 

In a sponsorship appeal, it may be argued that the officer who denied a foreign national’s 

permanent resident visa application breached natural justice in some respect while processing the 

application and that the appeal should be allowed on that basis. Although the IRPA contemplates 

such a scenario in providing a legislative basis for the IAD to overturn an officer’s decision on 

this ground, in actual practice it is seldom argued or used as a basis for allowing an appeal. It is 

nevertheless useful to examine what the duty of fairness entails for officers administering the 

IRPA in a sponsorship context as there may be reason to advance a breach of fairness or natural 

justice as a ground of appeal. 

Duty of Fairness for Officers under IRPA 

Introduction 

Under the IRPA, the Minister designates officers to carry out the purposes of the Act. 2 

The officers perform their functions in accordance with any instructions that the Minister may 

give. 3 

Officers must comply with the duty of procedural fairness in the administration of the Act 

because their decisions affect the rights, privileges or interests of individuals. 4 

1 

2 

3 

4 

IRPA, s. 67(1)(b). 

IRPA, s. 6(1). 

For example, IRPA, s. 15(4), on conducting examinations. 

Cardinal v. Director of Kent Institution, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 643. 


January 1, 2008 Fairness & Natural Justice under the IRPA – Ch. 11

Content of the Duty of Fairness 

General 

The duty of fairness requires an officer to act with an open mind without unduly fettering 

their discretion and to give an applicant an opportunity to respond to the officer’s concerns with 

respect to the processing of an application. 5 Essentially, the question is whether, considering all 

the circumstances, a person whose interests are affected has a meaningful opportunity to present 

their case fully and fairly. 

The requirements of fairness vary according to the circumstances. Some relevant factors 

are: 6 • the nature of the decision being made and the process followed in making it; 

• the nature of the statutory scheme in question and the terms of the statute pursuant to 

which the body operates; 

• the importance of the decision to the individual affected; 

• the legitimate expectations of the person challenging the decision; and 

• the choices of procedure made by the decision-maker, particularly when the statute leaves 

to the decision-maker the ability to choose its own procedures or when the agency has an 

expertise in determining what procedures are appropriate in the circumstances. 

Knowing Case to be Met and Opportunity to Respond 

An officer must provide an applicant with an opportunity to refute evidence in the 

officer’s possession which is relied on by the officer, 7 and the officer must advise the applicant of 

any concerns and provide an opportunity to respond before making a decision, 8 although an oral 

hearing is not essential for that purpose. 9 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

The Supreme Court of Canada in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 

817 held that a full and fair consideration of the issues was required and the applicant must have a meaningful 

opportunity to present relevant evidence and have it fully and fairly considered 

Baker, supra, footnote 5. 

Gill, Jhanda Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-501-90), Jerome, March 20, 1990. 

Begum, Shamsun Naher v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1947-02), Lemieux, January 30, 2004; 2004 FC 165. 

Yue, Zhao v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2015-01), Kelen, September 25, 2002; 2002 FCT 1004. 



Use of Extrinsic Evidence 

Extrinsic evidence means evidence that comes from an outside source. 10 An applicant 

may be unaware of it. An officer should provide an applicant with an opportunity to comment 

upon extrinsic evidence. 11 Failure to share a document with an applicant may deny the applicant 

a meaningful opportunity to present the case fully and fairly. 12 Readily accessible public domain 

information (such as from the Internet) if novel and significant may as a matter of fairness need 

to be disclosed. 13 

Legitimate Expectations 

The doctrine of legitimate expectations means that if an officer expressly or impliedly 

undertakes to follow a certain procedure, the officer may be held to their undertaking as a matter 

of procedural fairness. 14 There is nothing unfair about a visa officer’s request for DNA testing in 

circumstances where the documentary evidence falls short of establishing the claimed 

relationship. 15 

Bias 

Bad faith, abuse of discretion or improper conduct on the part of an officer may amount to 

bias so as to invalidate the officer’s decision for breach of fairness or natural justice. A 

reasonable apprehension of bias does not arise merely because the same officer has made the 

decision on the different processes whereby an applicant seeks legal status in Canada. 16 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

Dasent, Maria Jackie v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5386-93), Rothstein, December 8, 1994. 

Ngo, Tu Van v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5340-01), Dawson, November 7, 2002; 2002 FCT 1150. 

Singh, Amarjit v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6526-02), Mactavish, February 4, 2004; 2004 FC 187 (applicant on 

“h&c” application should have been provided with negative PRRA report). 

Ali, Mohammed Elsheikh v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-8683-04), Mosley, February 23, 2006; 2006 FC 248. 

A legitimate expectation was created when an applicant was advised his supplementary information would be 

considered and it was a breach of natural justice for the officer to decide without having considered it: 

Pramauntanyath, Teeradech v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1622-03), Mactavish, February 2, 2004; 2004 FC 174. 

On the other hand, an officer was under no obligation to advise of the future consequences of not having a 

dependant examined: Jankovic, Milos v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-567-02), Russell, December 17, 2003; 2003 

F.C. 1482 nor of the avenue of redress in s. 25 of the IRPA (humanitarian and compassionate relief): 

Mustapha, Javed v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7286-05), von Finckenstein, September 13, 2006; 2006 FC 1092. 

Obeng, Addo Kwadwo v. M.C.I. (IAD VA5-01112), Workun, August 14, 2006. 

Kouka, Serge v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1823-06), Harrington, October 17, 2006; 2006 FC 1236. 



Delay 

In order for delay in processing an application to be unreasonable and to constitute a 

breach of the duty of fairness, the delay must be unacceptable to the point of being so oppressive 

as to taint the proceedings. 17 

Providing Reasons for Decision 

An officer’s failure to give reasons may be a breach of fairness depending on the 

consequences of the decision to the person affected. 18 Before the IAD, the CAIPS notes in 

conjunction with the refusal letter may adequately set out the reasons for refusal and satisfy the 

requirements of natural justice. 19 

Interview 

The duty of fairness includes the right to have counsel attend and observe an applicant’s 

interview with the officer. 20 The initiative to have counsel present must come from the applicant 

as the officer is under no duty to inform the applicant of this right. 21 The duty of fairness does 

not necessarily require an officer to conduct an oral interview before reaching a decision. 22 It 

may not be unfair to conduct an interview without prior notice to the individual. 23 There is no 

duty to interview third parties identified in the context of any given application. 24 The procedure 

whereby an interview is conducted by one officer and the decision made by a different officer is 

not a breach of fairness. 25 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

Malhi, Kalmajit Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-8368-03), Martineau, June 2, 2004; 2004 FC 802. 

Figueroa, Sandra Toscano v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-69-03), Heneghan, December 18, 2003; 2003 FC 1339. 

See also Baker, supra, footnote 5 (officer’s notes were held to constitute sufficient reasons). 

Lee, Dip Gai v. M.C.I. (IAD WA5-00010), Rozdilsky, January 4, 2006. 

Ha, Mai v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-38-03), Sexton, Linden, Malone, January 30, 2004; 2004 FCA 49. The Court 

did not decide whether in other circumstances a more active or limited role for counsel would be required. 

MPSEP v. Cha, Jung Woo (F.C.A., no. A-688-04), Décary, Noël, Pelletier, March 29, 2006; 2006 FCA 126. 

Aigbirior, Doris v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2833-01), Blais, August 13, 2002; 2002 FCT 854. 

Bhandal, Tej Kaur v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4679-05), Blais, April 3, 2006; 2006 FC 427. 

Obeng, Addo Kwadwo v. M.C.I. (IAD VA5-01112), Workun, August 14, 2006. 

Ngo, supra, footnote 11. The Court held that the content of the duty of fairness was limited by the context of 

an “h & c” decision, for example, it does not require an oral interview. See Aujla (Sidhu), Jagwinder Kaur v. 

M.C.I. (IAD VA5-02812), Shahriari, April 17, 2007 where in the context of a spousal refusal it was not a 

breach of natural justice for one visa officer to conduct the interview and another officer to make the decision. 



Revisiting a Decision 

The doctrine of functus officio does not apply to prevent an officer from refusing a visa 

after another officer had initially offered a visa, 26 nor is it contrary to natural justice or fairness. 

Remedies for Breach of Fairness/Natural Justice 

The usual consequence of a denial of fairness or natural justice is to render the resulting 

decision invalid. 27 The Supreme Court of Canada has introduced an exception to this principle, 28 

and where it is certain that even if a fair hearing is held, the applicant cannot as a matter of law 

succeed, the remedy may be withheld. 29 

The IAD may allow an appeal from an officer’s decision not to issue a foreign national a 

permanent resident visa if the IAD is satisfied that a principle of natural justice has not been 

observed by the officer in the processing of the application. 30 Failure of Canadian officials to 

apply their policy may amount to a breach of natural justice. 31 

The de novo nature of appeal proceedings in the IAD may remedy a breach of natural 

justice at the officer level. 

The IAD must first decide the issue of an applicant’s membership in the family class 

before it can address any allegation that the officer breached the rules of natural justice or 

fairness in connection with the processing of a sponsorship application. 32 

Reopening in the IAD for Breach of Natural Justice 

Under the IRPA, the IAD may reopen an appeal if it failed to observe a principle of 

natural justice in the case of a foreign national under a removal order. 33 Since the IRPA only 

26 

27 

28 

29 

30 

31 

32 

33 

Lo, Kin Ching v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4927-01), Beaudry, November 7, 2002; 2002 FCT 1155. 

Cardinal, supra, footnote 4. 

Mobil Oil Canada Ltd. v. Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 202. 

Bermido, Marites Hugo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2866-03), von Finckenstein, January 14, 2004; 2004 FC 58. 

IRPA, s. 67(1)(b). 

Balla, Bradley Dale v. M.C.I. (IAD VA6-00305), Lamont, July 4, 2007. 

M.C.I. v. Petrea, Marian (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4395-00), Blanchard, December 13, 2001; 2001 FCT 1373; 

Sertovic, Safeta v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-16898), Collins, September 10, 2003. Where a sponsor argued that the 

visa officer ought to have considered humanitarian and compassionate factors for an applicant excluded from 

the family class which allegedly resulted in a breach of natural justice, the IAD held that the avenue of redress 

should be to the Federal Court not to the IAD: Patel, Amit Krishnakant v. M.C.I. (IAD TA5-11490), Collins, 

March 14, 2006. 

IRPA, s. 71. 



addresses reopening in a removal order situation, a sponsor who alleges a breach of natural 

justice in a sponsorship appeal may not apply to reopen under section 71 of the Act. 34 However, 

a sponsor may apply to reopen for breach of natural justice under common law. 

The principles of natural justice in the IAD generally relate to procedural matters such as 

notice, opportunity to be heard and knowledge of the case to be met. 35 The incompetence of 

counsel may constitute a breach of natural justice. 36 A change in the law is not a basis for 

reopening for denial of natural justice. 37 There must have been a breach of natural justice in the 

first proceeding as a basis for reopening. 38 

34 

35 

36 

37 

38 

Mustafa, Ahmad v. M.C.I. (IAD VA1-02962), Wiebe, February 13, 2003. 

Huezo Tenorio, Alex Ernesto v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-01982), Wiebe, March 31, 2003. 

Ye, Ai Hua v. M.C.I. (IAD VA1-01247), Wiebe, August 5, 2003. Counsel’s incompetence must be egregious 

in order to result in a denial of natural justice. 

Clarke, Lloyd Charles v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-01824), MacAdam, January 9, 2003. 

Johal, Gurwinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-02295), Workun, October 3, 2006. 



CASES 

Aigbirior, Doris v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2833-01), Blais, August 13, 2002; 2002 FCT 854.............................. 4 

Ali, Mohammed Elsheikh v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-8683-04), Mosley, February 23, 2006; 2006 

FC 248....................................................................................................................................................................... 3 

Aujla (Sidhu), Jagwinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA5-02812), Shahriari, April 17, 2007 .............................................. 4 

Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 .................................................. 2, 4 

Balla, Bradley Dale v. M.C.I. (IAD VA6-00305), Lamont, July 4, 2007...................................................................... 5 

Begum, Shamsun Naher v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1947-02), Lemieux, January 30, 2004; 2004 FC 

165............................................................................................................................................................................. 2 

Bermido, Marites Hugo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2866-03), von Finckenstein, January 14, 2004; 

2004 FC 58................................................................................................................................................................ 5 

Bhandal, Tej Kaur v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4679-05), Blais, April 3, 2006; 2006 FC 427 ........................................ 4 

Cardinal v. Director of Kent Institution, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 643 .................................................................................. 1, 5 

Clarke, Lloyd Charles v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-01824), MacAdam, January 9, 2003 ......................................................... 6 

Dasent, Maria Jackie v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5386-93), Rothstein, December 8, 1994..................................... 3 

Figueroa, Sandra Toscano v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-69-03), Heneghan, December 18, 2003; 2003 

FC 1339..................................................................................................................................................................... 4 

Gill, Jhanda Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-501-90), Jerome, March 20, 1990......................................................... 2 

Ha, Mai v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-38-03), Sexton, Linden, Malone, January 30, 2004; 2004 FCA 

49............................................................................................................................................................................... 4 

Huezo Tenorio, Alex Ernesto v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-01982), Wiebe, March 31, 2003 ................................................... 6 

Jankovic, Milos v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-567-02), Russell, December 17, 2003; 2003 F.C. 1482.............................. 3 

Johal, Gurwinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-02295), Workun, October 3, 2006......................................................... 6 

Kouka, Serge v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1823-06), Harrington, October 17, 2006; 2006 FC 1236............................... 3 

Lee, Dip Gai v. M.C.I. (IAD WA5-00010), Rozdilsky, January 4, 2006 ...................................................................... 4 

Lo, Kin Ching v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4927-01), Beaudry, November 7, 2002; 2002 FCT 

1155........................................................................................................................................................................... 5 

Malhi, Kalmajit Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-8368-03), Martineau, June 2, 2004; 2004 FC 802............................ 4 

Mobil Oil Canada Ltd. v. Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 202. .......................... 5 



MPSEP v. Cha, Jung Woo (F.C.A., no. A-688-04), Décary, Noël, Pelletier, March 29, 2006; 2006 

FCA 126.................................................................................................................................................................... 4 

Mustafa, Ahmad v. M.C.I. (IAD VA1-02962), Wiebe, February 13, 2003 ................................................................... 6 

Mustapha, Javed v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7286-05), von Finckenstein, September 13, 2006; 2006 

FC 1092..................................................................................................................................................................... 3 

Ngo, Tu Van v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5340-01), Dawson, November 7, 2002; 2002 FCT 1150 ............................ 3, 4 

Obeng, Addo Kwadwo v. M.C.I. (IAD VA5-01112), Workun, August 14, 2006...................................................... 3, 4 

Patel, Amit Krishnakant v. M.C.I. (IAD TA5-11490), Collins, March 14, 2006 .......................................................... 5 

Petrea: M.C.I. v. Petrea, Marian (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4395-00), Blanchard, December 13, 2001; 

2001 FCT 1373 ......................................................................................................................................................... 5 

Pramauntanyath, Teeradech v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1622-03), Mactavish, February 2, 2004; 

2004 FC 174.............................................................................................................................................................. 3 

Sertovic, Safeta v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-16898), Collins, September 10, 2003 ................................................................. 5 

Singh, Amarjit v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6526-02), Mactavish, February 4, 2004; 2004 FC 187................................. 3 

Ye, Ai Hua v. M.C.I. (IAD VA1-01247), Wiebe, August 5, 2003 ................................................................................. 6 

Yue, Zhao v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2015-01), Kelen, September 25, 2002; 2002 FCT 1004 .............................. 2 



Chapter Twelve 

Consent to Return to Canada 

Introduction 

In the Immigration Act (the former Act) there existed inadmissible classes of persons 

described in s. 19(1)(i) and s. 27(2) (h) who sought to come into or entered Canada without the 

consent of the Minister when it was required by s. 55 of that Act. It followed that if a person 

being sponsored had been issued one of the three removal orders that person may be found by a 

visa officer to be inadmissible to Canada and form the basis of a lawful refusal of the sponsored 

application. 

Under IRPA a similar scheme is enacted by s. 41 of IRPA: 

s. 41 A person is inadmissible for failing to comply with this Act 

(a) in the case of a foreign national, through an act or omission 

which contravenes, directly or indirectly, a provision of this 

Act; 

Note that s. 2(2) of IRPA states that unless otherwise indicated, references in this Act to 

"this Act" include regulations made under it. 

What then is the "act or omission" giving rise to inadmissibility? Simply put, it is the 

return to Canada without written authorization as required under each type of removal order. 

S. 223 of the IRP Regulations continues the three types of removal orders, namely 

departure orders, exclusion orders, and deportation orders. Each type of order has attached 

conditions as to its duration and effect on admissibility. 

S. 52(1) of IRPA says that if a removal order has been enforced the foreign national shall 

not return to Canada unless authorized by an officer or in other prescribed circumstances. 

As well, s. 25 of the IRP Regulations prohibits a visa officer from issuing a visa to a 

foreign national who is subject to an unenforced removal order. 

Departure Orders - no time period if enforced in compliance with requirements 

S. 224(1) IRP Regulations relieves a person subject to an enforced departure order from 

the requirement to obtain authorization to return to Canada provided they had met the departure 

requirements in s. 240(a) to (c) within 30 days of the order becoming enforceable. If the person 

failed to meet those requirements the order is deemed to be a deportation order. 


January 1, 2008 Consent to Return to Canada - Ch. 12

This means a person is admissible who complied with the procedure for executing a 

departure order within the timeframes in the regulations. If the person did not comply they are 

inadmissible and require written authorization to return. 

Exclusion Orders - One year or Two years for Misrepresentation 

S. 225(1) IRP Regulations requires a person subject to an exclusion order to obtain the 

written authorization of an officer to return to Canada during the one-year period after the order 

was enforced. If the order was based on misrepresentation s. 225(3) a two-year period applies. 

An exception for accompanying family members of a foreign national found to be inadmissible 

and given an exclusion order is provided in s. 225(4) of IRP Regulations. 

Deportation Order - requires Written Authorization 

S. 226(1) of IRP Regulations makes it a requirement of those who were issued a 

deportation order to obtain the written authorization to return to return to Canada at any time 

after the order was enforced. An exception for accompanying family members of a foreign 

national found to be inadmissible and given a deportation order is provided in s. 226(2) of IRP 

Regulations. 

Who shall provide the written authorization? 

The IRPA in s. 52(1) specifies an officer may grant the written authorization to return to 

Canada. The Regulations do not appear to prescribe the criteria for issuing an authorization. In 

an application to return to Canada there is a duty of fairness on the officer assessing the 

application to provide an opportunity to address the officer’s concerns. Of particular relevance 

should be the reasons why the person delayed in leaving Canada after a departure order and thus 

converting it to a deportation order and the reasons for first coming to Canada. 1 

Removal Costs are to be Reimbursed 

The Regulations 2 specify certain removal costs must be paid before a person is allowed to 

return to Canada if that person was removed at government expense and was not reimbursed by a 

transporter. These costs are fixed at $750 for removal to contiguous territory or $1500 for any 

other country of removal. 

Discretionary relief 

1 

2 

Sahakyan, Sergey v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-9934-03), Harrington, November 2, 2004; 2004 FC 1542. 

S. 243 IRP Regulations. 



The IRPA in s. 63(1) provides an appeal to sponsors whose family class relatives are 

refused an immigrant visa. It is a condition precedent before considering special relief on 

humanitarian and compassionate grounds that the applicant is found a member of the family class 

and the sponsor meets the definition of “sponsor” found in s. 130 of the Regulations. Once those 

findings have been made, or are not in issue at the appeal, the IAD may apply s. 67(1) and take 

into account the best interests of a child directly effected by the decision and determine if 

sufficient humanitarian and compassionate considerations warrant special relief in light of all the 

circumstances of the case. 



CASES 

Sahakyan, Sergey v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-9934-03), Harrington, November 2, 2004; 2004 FC 

1542........................................................................................................................................................................... 2 



Transitional Provisions 

Introduction 

This chapter examines various transitional situations provided in the Immigration and 

Refugee Protection Act 1 (IRPA) and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations 2 (IRP 

Regulations) as specifically concerns sponsorship appeals before the Immigration Appeal 

Division (IAD). Since the coming into force of IRPA on June 28, 2002, the Courts have now 

settled many issues raised by some of the transitional provisions. 

Transitional Situations 

Although there are very few transitional cases left, discussed below are likely transitional 

situations which the IAD has had to deal with and, in some cases, may yet be faced with in the 

course of management of sponsorship appeal cases since the coming into force of the IRPA. 

a) Appeals filed prior to the coming into force of the IRPA 

Where a notice of appeal from the refusal of a sponsored application for a permanent 

resident visa has been filed with the IAD prior to the coming into force of the IRPA, the general 

transitional rule in section 192 provides that the appeal shall be continued under the Immigration 

Act 3 (old Act). 

There is one exception to this general rule: section 196 of the IRPA, which provides for 

the discontinuance of appeals filed under the old Act where “[…] the appeal could not have 

been made because of section 64 of this Act”. It is clear from section 64(1) that no appeal from 

the refusal of an application for a permanent resident visa may be made to the IAD by a sponsor 

where the foreign national being sponsored has been found to be inadmissible on corresponding 

grounds of security, violating human or international rights, serious criminality (as described in 

section 64(2) 4 of the IRPA) or organized criminality. 

1 

2 

3 

4 

S.C. 2001, c. 27. 

SOR/2002-227. 

R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2. 

In M.C.I. v. Atwal, Iqbal Singh (F.C., no. IMM-3260-03), Pinard, January 8, 2004, the Federal Court ruled that 

pre-sentence custody which is expressly factored into a person’s criminal sentence forms part of the term of 

imprisonment under section 64(2) of the IRPA and as such, must be considered. See also Allen, Deon Aladin v. 

M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2439-02), Snider, May 5, 2003; M.C.I. v. Smith, Dwight Anthony (F.C., no. IMM- 

2139-03), Campbell, January 16, 2004; 2004 FC 63; M.C.I. v. Gomes, Ronald (F.C. no. IMM-6689-03), 

O’Keefe, January 27 2006; 2005 FC 299; Cheddesingh (Jones), Nadine Karen v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-2453-05, 

Beaudry, February 3, 2006; 2006 FC 124. 



Transitional Provisions

Section 196 of IRPA applies to sponsorship appeals as well as to removal appeals. In a 

number of cases, it was argued that section 196, as a transitional provision, was limited to 

removal orders because it refers specifically to appellants who have not been granted a stay under 

the old Act. The prevailing jurisprudence of the Federal Court is to the effect that section 196 

applies to sponsorship appeals and therefore, operates to discontinue removal and sponsorship 

appeals 5 . In interpreting this transitional provision, the Court noted that sections 196 and 197 

refer in particular to section 64 and that section 64 refers specifically to sponsors. Therefore, 

sections 196 and 64 of IRPA were intended to affect the rights of appellants who are sponsors. 

b) Appeals filed after the coming into force of the IRPA which stem from 

sponsorship applications refused before the IRPA came into force 

As the Federal Court of Appeal said in Medovarski 6 , section 192 creates an exception to 

the general rule set out in section 190 which provides that cases pending or in progress on the 

day of the coming into force of IRPA are governed by IRPA. Therefore, sponsorship appeals 

filed on or after the coming into force of the IRPA which stem from refusals made prior to June 

28, 2002 are governed by the provisions of the IRPA and IRP Regulations 7 . This means that the 

IAD will assess the facts presented at the time of the appeal hearing against the corresponding 

IRPA grounds of inadmissibility set out in section 320 of the IRP Regulations. It is important to 

note that section 320 of the IRP Regulations does not as such set out corresponding grounds 

from the Immigration Regulations, 1978 to the IRP Regulations which would lead to an 

inadmissibility finding under the IRPA. For example, there is no specific corresponding ground 

for section 4(3) of the Immigration Regulations, 1978. However, section 320(10) provides in 

particular that a person who had been determined to be inadmissible pursuant to section 19(2)(d) 

of the old Act becomes inadmissible under section 41(a) of the IRPA for failure to comply with 

the IRPA. Failure to comply with the IRPA includes the IRP Regulations by virtue of section 

2(2) of the IRPA. The IAD will also decide these appeals taking into account sections 63(1), 64, 

65 and 67 of the IRPA. This entails numerous consequences. Below is a discussion of particular 

transitional situations, jurisdictional b) 1- and non-jurisdictional b) 2-, which are likely to arise. 

b) 1- Matters in which the IAD has no jurisdiction, no jurisdiction in law or no 

discretionary jurisdiction 

5 

6 

7 

Touita, Wafa El Jaji v. M.C.I. (F.C., No. IMM-6351-04), De Montigny, April 21, 2005; 2005 FC 543; Alleg, 

Sahila v. M.C.I. (F.C., No. IMM- 6278-04), Martineau, March 11, 2005; 2005 FC 348; Kang, Sarabjeet Kaur v. 

M.C.I. (F.C., No. IMM-2445-04), Mactavish, February 25, 2005; 2005 FC 297; M.C.I. v. Bhalrhu, Mandeep 

Kaur (F.C., No. IMM-2228-03), Gauthier, September 9, 2004; 2004 FC 1236; Williams, Sophia Laverne v. 

M.C.I. (F.C. No. IMM-6479-02), Phelan, May 6 2004; 2004 FC 662; see also, M.C.I. v. Seydoun, Saber Hussain 

(F.C., No. IMM-8407-04), Lutfy, February 2, 2006; 2006 FC 121; M.C.I. v. Sohal, Manjit Kaur (F.C., No. IMM- 

6292-02), Lutfy, May 6 2004; 2004 FC 660, where, on the contrary, the Federal Court decided that section 196 

did not apply to sponsorship appeals. The fact that a stay was never contemplated for a sponsor is indicative of 

Parliament’s intent to remove the right of appeal for removal order appellants only. 

Medovarski: M.C.I. v. Medovarski, Olga (F.C.A., No. A-249-03), Evans, Rothstein, Pelletier (dissenting), March 

3, 2004, par. 50; 2004 FCA 85 (upheld by the SCC, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 539 

Section 2(2) of IRPA provides that references to “this Act” include regulations made under it. 




‣ Inland applications and sponsorship refusals 

Section 63(1) of the IRPA provides for an appeal from a decision not to issue a 

foreign national a permanent resident visa. Inland applicants are never issued or 

refused visas. Rather, they are given or refused permanent resident status. Thus, it 

may be seen that appeals from inland sponsorship refusals should be dismissed for 

lack of jurisdiction because they were not contemplated by section 63(1) of the 

IRPA and as such, there appears to be no right of appeal to the IAD 8 . 

‣ Sponsorship refusals based on corresponding grounds of security, violating 

human or international rights, serious criminality or organized criminality 

The consequence of section 320 of the IRP Regulations will be that an appellant 

will have no right to appeal from the refusal of a sponsored application for a 

permanent resident visa if the foreign national was determined to be inadmissible 

on grounds which correspond to section 64(1) of the IRPA. As such, foreign 

nationals who had been determined to be inadmissible under sections 19(l)(e), (f), 

(g) or (k) of the old Act are inadmissible under the IRPA on security grounds 

(section 320(l) of the IRP Regulations). There will be no appeal for foreign 

nationals determined to be inadmissible under sections l9(1)(j) or (l) of the old Act 

because they are inadmissible on grounds of violating human or international 

rights under the IRPA (section 320(2) of the IRP Regulations). The same 

consequence will follow for foreign nationals determined to be inadmissible under 

sections 19(1)(c.2) or 19(1)(d)(ii) of the old Act as they are inadmissible on 

grounds of organized criminality under the IRPA (section 320(6) of the IRP 

Regulations). 

Sections 320(3) and 320(5)(a) of the IRP Regulations indicate which inadmissible 

classes under the old Act correspond to the inadmissible class of serious 

criminality under the IRPA. However, appellants in those cases will not be 

deprived of a right of appeal unless the foreign national comes within the specific 

criteria of serious criminality provided for in section 64(2) of the IRPA, which 

indicates that serious criminality must be with respect to a crime that was punished 

in Canada by a term of imprisonment of at least two years 9 . 

Section 326(2) of the IRP Regulations also stipulates that persons in respect of 

whom section 77(3.01)(b) of the old Act applied on the coming into force of the 

IRPA are subject to section 64(1) of the IRPA. 

‣ Sponsorship application not filed in the prescribed manner 

8 

9 

Dargan v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-09872), Boire, November 18, 2004; Marish v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-03526), Boire, 

January 28, 2005. 

On the interpretation of term of imprisonment, see supra, footnote 4. 




Refusals based on the sponsor’s failure to fulfill basic requirements in the filing of a 

sponsorship application were generally uncommon before the IAD under the old 

Act. It should be noted that section 10(6) of the IRP Regulations now specifically 

provides that a sponsorship application which does not meet the requirements of 

section 10(1) is not an application filed in a prescribed manner for the purpose of 

section 63(1) of the IRPA. Hence, in such cases, there may be no right of appeal if 

the sponsor’s application is refused on the ground that it was not filed in a 

prescribed manner. The IAD would likely dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction 

if it so concludes. It appears that in such cases the IAD would not be in a position to 

allow the sponsor to remedy any non-compliance with section 10(1) of the IRP 

Regulations. 

‣ Refusals based on the sponsor’s inability to fulfill the undertaking or failure to 

comply with a previous undertaking as determined by the Province of Quebec 

Sponsored applications destined to the Province of Quebec may not be approved by 

an officer where the competent authority of the Province determines that the sponsor 

is unable to fulfill the undertaking as per section 137 of the IRP Regulations. 

As was the case under the old Act, section 9(2) of the IRPA provides that there is 

no appeal in law where the refusal is based on the determination of provincial 

officials that the sponsor either fails to meet financial criteria or does not comply 

with a previous undertaking. Thus, the IAD may only hear the appeal on the basis 

of humanitarian and compassionate grounds. 

‣ No discretionary jurisdiction where the IAD determines that the foreign national is 

not a member of the family class or that the sponsor is not a sponsor within the 

meaning of the IRP Regulations 

Section 65 of IRPA provides that the IAD has no jurisdiction to consider 

humanitarian and compassionate grounds (H&C) if it has decided that the foreign 

national is not a member of the family class pursuant to section 117(1) of the IRP 

Regulations 10 or that the appellant is not a sponsor as defined in section 130 of the 

IRP Regulations. 

Section 117(9) of the IRP Regulations lists a number of situations where the 

foreign national is not considered a member of the family class. The Federal Court 

upheld a number of decisions where the IAD concluded that it had no jurisdiction 

to consider H&C because the foreign national was excluded from the family class 

pursuant to section 117(9)(d) in that the sponsor had not disclosed the existence of 

a dependent child. In so doing, the Federal Court confirmed that sections 352 and 

355 of the IRP Regulations applied to applications made under the old Act and 

were meant to exclude from the application of section 117(9)(d) those children 

between the ages of 19 and 22 who were not considered a “dependent daughter” 

10 

For spouses, common-law and conjugal partners, see more specifically sections 4, 5 and 117(9) of the IRP 

Regulations. 




or “dependent son” under the old Act, but were a “dependent child” under IRPA 

and IRP Regulations 11 . 

b) 2- Matters in which the IAD has jurisdiction in law and discretionary 

jurisdiction 

‣ Refusals based on medical grounds 

Section 320(7) of the IRP Regulations provides that sponsored applicants for a 

permanent resident visa who were found to be inadmissible under section 19(1)(a) 

of the old Act are inadmissible under the IRPA on health grounds. 

Danger to public health or public safety does not pose any difficulty. However, 

appeals from refusals based on excessive demands on health or social services has to 

be considered in light of section 38 of the IRPA and the definition of excessive 

demand contained in section 1(1) of the IRP Regulations. 

Section 38(2)(a) of the IRPA provides that a foreign national who is expected to 

cause excessive demand on health or social services is not inadmissible on health 

grounds if it has been determined that the foreign national is a member of the family 

class and is the spouse, common-law partner 12 or child of a sponsor within the 

meaning of the regulations. This represents a substantial change from the old Act 

provisions which permitted such refusals. Such refusals made under the old Act and 

appealed on or after June 28, 2002 would appear to be invalid in law under the 

IRPA. To our knowledge, none of these cases have proceeded to a hearing before 

the IAD. 

Medical refusals based on excessive demand on health or social services concerning 

foreign nationals other than the spouse, common-law partner, conjugal partner or 

child of a sponsor will have to be assessed by the IAD against the definition of 

excessive demand contained in section 1(1) of the IRP Regulations. Failure of the 

Minister to clearly justify the refusal against the new definition of excessive demand 

could result in the IAD allowing the appeal and referring the matter back for 

reconsideration based on the IRPA and IRP Regulations (section 67(2) of the 

IRPA). 

11 

12 

Dumornay, Jean-Bernard v. M.C.I. (F.C. No. IMM-2596-05), Pinard, May 11, 2006; 2006 FC 541; Le, Van 

Dung v. M.C.I. (F.C. No. IMM-8951-04) Blanchard, May 2, 2005; 2005 FC 600; Collier, Amelia v. M.C.I. (F.C. 

No. IMM-8635-03), Snider, September 2, 2004; 2004 FC 1209. 

Conjugal partners are also specifically exempted, not in IRPA, but by section 24 of the IRP Regulations. 




‣ Refusals based on financial grounds 

Section 320(8) of the IRP Regulations provides that persons who had been 

determined to be inadmissible pursuant to section 19(1)(b) of the old Act are 

inadmissible under section 39 of the IRPA. It is to be noted that the wording of both 

sections is similar. As a result, these transition cases do not raise any particular 

problem. 

‣ Refusals based on sponsor’s inability to meet the financial criteria or failure to 

comply with a previous undertaking 

Refusals made on the basis of the sponsor’s failure to meet settlement arrangements 

under the old Act and section 5(2)(f) of the Immigration Regulations, 1978 require a 

reassessment based on section 134 and the definition of minimum necessary income 

in section 2 of the IRP Regulations. For cases destined to the Province of Quebec, 

there are jurisdictional implications as discussed above. 

As for refusals to comply with a previous undertaking (section 133(1)(g) of IRP 

Regulations), it should be noted that the duration of an undertaking has been 

reduced under IRP Regulations. Section 132 provides an undertaking of 3 years for 

spouses, common law partners and conjugal partners and from 3 to 10 years for a 

dependent child, depending on the age of the child at the time of landing. However, 

section 351(3) of the IRP Regulations provides that the duration of an undertaking 

under the old Act is not affected by IRP Regulations. It flows that the duration of 

sponsorship undertakings signed prior to June 28, 2002 remain at 10 years 13 . 

‣ Misrepresentation 

Section 320(9) of the IRP Regulations provides that persons determined to be 

inadmissible on the basis of sections 27(1)(e) or (2)(g) or (i) of the old Act will 

become inadmissible for misrepresentation under section 40 of the IRPA. There is 

no such equivalent for foreign nationals whose application for permanent residence 

may have been refused on the basis of sections 9(3) and 19(2)(d) of the old Act. In 

these cases the foreign national becomes inadmissible for failure to comply with the 

IRPA, as provided by sections 320(10) of the IRP Regulations and 41 of the IRPA. 

This distinction is important in view of section 64(3) of the IRPA which denies a 

right of appeal against a refusal of a sponsored application for a permanent resident 

visa made by a foreign national found to be inadmissible on the ground of 

misrepresentation unless the foreign national is the sponsor’s spouse, common-law 

partner or child. 

13 

M.C.I. v. Sharma, Ashok Kumar (F.C., no. IMM-6517-03), von Finckenstein, August 18, 2004; 2004 FC 1144. 




c) Appeals which stem from sponsorship applications refused after the IRPA 

came into force 

Sponsored applications for permanent residence which had not been finalized by a visa 

officer prior to June 28, 2002 will continue to be processed under the IRPA and the IRP 

Regulations per section 190 of the IRPA 14 . As such, any decisions, positive or negative, will be 

based on the IRPA 15 . One exception to the above concerns fiancés who are no longer members of 

the family class under section 117(1) of the IRP Regulations. As permitted by section 201 of the 

IRPA, section 356 of the IRP Regulations specifically deals with fiancé applications made prior 

to June 28, 2002. These applications will continue to be processed as fiancé applications under 

the old Act and Regulations until they are finally disposed of. 

d) Court ordered rehearings 

In cases where the IAD is directed by the Federal Court or the Supreme Court to 

reconsider an appeal which had been filed prior to the coming into force of the IRPA, section 

350(5) of the IRP Regulations stipulates that the Immigration Appeal Division shall dispose of the 

matter in accordance with the former Act 16 . This is consistent with section 192 of the IRPA which 

directs that if the filing of the notice of appeal predates the coming into force of the IRPA, the 

appeal shall be continued under the old Act. This represents one of the underlying consequences 

of a de novo hearing, which is to place the parties in the position they were in when the litigation 

began. 

In the case of Court ordered rehearings, the Federal Court determined in Denton-James 17 that the 

application of sections 196 and 64 of the IRPA may not be considered. The language of section 

350(5) of the IRP Regulations is unambiguous. 

Conclusion 

A number of problems raised by the transitional provisions have been settled by the 

Courts. In view of the fact that there are very few transitional cases left, the transitional provisions 

are not likely to generate additional litigation. 

14 

15 

16 

17 

Note that sections 352 to 355 of the IRP Regulations facilitate timely processing of pending sponsored 

applications by not requiring applicants to update their file if they do not so desire, for instance, in the case of 

children who did not qualify under the former Immigration Regulations, 1978. 

Siewattee, Door v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-24492), Whist, September 4, 2003; Noun, Pho v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-03260), 

MacPherson, August 27, 2003. See also, M.C.I. v. Fuente, Cleotilde Dela (F.C.A., no. A-446-05), Noël, 

Sharlow, Malone, May 18 2006; CAF 186, where the F.C.A. answered in the negative the certified question as to 

whether the doctrine of legitimate expectations could be relied upon to avoid the application of section 190 of 

the IRPA. 

Fani, Ahmad v. M.C.I. (IAD TA0-08820), MacPherson, July 10, 2003. 

Denton-James, Lucy Eastwood v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1819-02), Snider, June 24, 2004; 2004 FC 911. 




CASES 

Alleg, Sahila v. M.C.I. (F.C., No. IMM- 6278-04), Martineau, March 11, 2005; 2005 FC 348 .................................... 2 

Allen, Deon Aladin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2439-02), Snider, May 5, 2003....................................................... 1 

Atwal: M.C.I. v. Atwal, Iqbal Singh (F.C., no. IMM-3260-03), Pinard, January 8, 2004 .............................................. 1 

Bhalrhu: M.C.I. v. Bhalrhu, Mandeep Kaur (F.C., No. IMM-2228-03), Gauthier, September 9, 

2004; 2004 FC 1236 .................................................................................................................................................. 2 

Cheddesingh (Jones), Nadine Karen v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-2453-05, Beaudry, February 3, 2006; 

2006 FC 124 .............................................................................................................................................................. 1 

Collier, Amelia v. M.C.I. (F.C. No. IMM-8635-03), Snider, September 2, 2004; 2004 FC 1209.................................. 5 

Dargan v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-09872), Boire, November 18, 2004.................................................................................. 3 

Denton-James, Lucy Eastwood v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1819-02), Snider, June 24, 2004; 2004 

FC 911....................................................................................................................................................................... 7 

Dumornay, Jean-Bernard v. M.C.I. (F.C. No. IMM-2596-05), Pinard, May 11, 2006; 2006 FC 541........................... 5 

Fani, Ahmad v. M.C.I. (IAD TA0-08820), MacPherson, July 10, 2003 ........................................................................ 7 

Fuente: M.C.I. v. Fuente, Cleotilde Dela (F.C.A., no. A-446-05), Noël, Sharlow, Malone, May 18 

2006; CAF 186 .......................................................................................................................................................... 7 

Gomes: M.C.I. v. Gomes, Ronald (F.C. no. IMM-6689-03), O’Keefe, January 27 2006; 2005 FC 

299............................................................................................................................................................................. 1 

Kang, Sarabjeet Kaur v. M.C.I. (F.C., No. IMM-2445-04), Mactavish, February 25, 2005; 2005 FC 

297............................................................................................................................................................................. 2 

Le, Van Dung v. M.C.I. (F.C. No. IMM-8951-04) Blanchard, May 2, 2005; 2005 FC 600........................................... 5 

Marish v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-03526), Boire, January 28, 2005....................................................................................... 3 

Medovarski: M.C.I. v. Medovarski, Olga (F.C.A., No. A-249-03), Evans, Rothstein, Pelletier 

(dissenting), March 3, 2004, par. 50; 2004 FCA 85 (upheld by the SCC, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 539................................ 2 

Noun, Pho v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-03260), MacPherson, August 27, 2003 ....................................................................... 7 

Sharma: M.C.I. v. Sharma, Ashok Kumar (F.C., no. IMM-6517-03), von Finckenstein, August 18, 

2004; 2004 FC 1144 .................................................................................................................................................. 6 

Siewattee, Door v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-24492), Whist, September 4, 2003 ..................................................................... 7 

Smith: M.C.I. v. Smith, Dwight Anthony (F.C., no. IMM-2139-03), Campbell, January 16, 2004; 

2004 FC 63 ................................................................................................................................................................ 1 

Sohal: M.C.I. v. Sohal, Manjit Kaur (F.C., No. IMM-6292-02), Lutfy, May 6 2004; 2004 FC 660 ............................. 2 

Touita, Wafa El Jaji v. M.C.I. (F.C., No. IMM-6351-04), De Montigny, April 21, 2005; 2005 FC 

543............................................................................................................................................................................. 2 

Williams, Sophia Laverne v. M.C.I. (F.C. No. IMM-6479-02), Phelan, May 6 2004; 2004 FC 662 ............................. 2

Sponsorship Appeals - Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

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