Sponsorship Appeals - Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada
Sponsorship Appeals - Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada
Sponsorship Appeals - Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada
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<strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division<br />
SPONSORSHIP APPEALS<br />
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE<br />
PROTECTION ACT<br />
Legal Services<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Refugee</strong> <strong>Board</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Canada</strong><br />
January 1, 2008
TABLE OF CONTENTS<br />
Introduction<br />
Chapter One – Financial Refusals <strong>and</strong> Requirements for the Sponsor<br />
Chapter Two – Criminal Refusals<br />
Chapter Three – Health Grounds - Medical Inadmissibility - Section 38 <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Refugee</strong> Protection Act<br />
Chapter Four – Adoptions<br />
Chapter Five – Spouses, Common-Law Partners <strong>and</strong> Conjugal Partners<br />
Chapter Six – Bad Faith Family Relationships<br />
Chapter Seven – Relationship<br />
Chapter Eight – Misrepresentation<br />
Chapter Nine – Non-compliance with the Act or the Regulations<br />
Chapter Ten – Discretionary Jurisdiction<br />
Chapter Eleven – Fairness <strong>and</strong> Natural Justice under the IRPA<br />
Chapter Twelve – Consent to Return to <strong>Canada</strong><br />
“T” – Transitional Provisions
Introduction<br />
Introduction<br />
This paper deals with the sponsorship provisions <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Refugee</strong><br />
Protection Act (IRPA) <strong>and</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Refugee</strong> Protection Regulations (IRP<br />
Regulations) as they pertain to the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division.<br />
The paper, within the sponsorship context, outlines the legislative purpose <strong>of</strong> the IRPA<br />
<strong>and</strong> discusses how the IRPA has been interpreted by the courts.<br />
This paper does not constitute legal opinion <strong>and</strong> should not be taken to represent the<br />
views <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Refugee</strong> <strong>Board</strong> <strong>and</strong> its members.<br />
General<br />
A sponsorship appeal to the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division is a hearing de novo in a broad<br />
sense. 1 It is open to the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division to consider issues which were not before<br />
the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer. 2 The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division is not bound by legal or technical rules <strong>of</strong><br />
evidence <strong>and</strong> it may receive <strong>and</strong> base its decision on any evidence considered necessary <strong>and</strong><br />
credible or trustworthy. 3<br />
The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division is bound by the common law duty <strong>of</strong> fairness. A<br />
participant at a hearing must have sufficient knowledge <strong>of</strong> what is at issue to afford her an<br />
opportunity to participate in the hearing in a meaningful way. 4<br />
The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division may allow or dismiss a sponsorship appeal. It may<br />
allow in law or by granting special relief, or both. The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division must give<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
4<br />
Kahlon, Darshan Singh v. M.E.I (F.C.A., no. A-115-86), Mahoney, Stone, MacGuigan, February 6, 1989.<br />
Reported: Kahlon v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1989), 7 Imm. L.R. (2d) 91 (F.C.A.).<br />
The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division may make use <strong>of</strong> newly created evidence in sponsorship cases: Valdez,<br />
Enrico Villanueva v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5430-97), Reed, March 12, 1999; Nadon, Claude v. M.C.I.<br />
(F.C., no. IMM-2932-06), Beaudry, January 22, 2007; 2007 FC 59; Khera, Amarjit v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-<br />
6375-06), Martineau, June 13, 2007; 2007 FC 632.<br />
Pabla, Dial v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1210-00), Blais, December 12, 2000.<br />
See section 175(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA.<br />
David, Solomon v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5599-06), Martineau, May 24, 2007; 2007 FC 546; M.C.I. v. Dang,<br />
Thi Kim Anh (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3113-99), Dawson, July 20, 2000. [Judicial review <strong>of</strong> IAD T98-03773,<br />
MacAdam, June 4, 1999]. Thus where the sponsor indicated she was not putting into issue the correctness <strong>of</strong><br />
the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer’s decision, the Appeal Division came under an obligation to clearly advise the Minister <strong>of</strong> its<br />
decision to nevertheless inquire into the adequacy <strong>of</strong> that decision.<br />
<strong>Sponsorship</strong> <strong>Appeals</strong> 1 Legal Services<br />
January 1, 2008<br />
Introduction
easons for its decision. 5 If the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division allows an appeal by a sponsor, the<br />
matter goes back for further processing <strong>and</strong> an assessment <strong>of</strong> whether the requirements <strong>of</strong> the<br />
IRPA <strong>and</strong> the IRP Regulations, other than those requirements upon which the decision <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division has been given, are met. 6<br />
If the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division dismisses an appeal <strong>and</strong> a new application for a<br />
permanent resident visa is filed, refused on the same ground <strong>and</strong> appealed again, <strong>and</strong> if no new<br />
evidence is adduced at the second appeal, the appeal may be dismissed as an abuse <strong>of</strong> process; 7 if<br />
new evidence is adduced, the second appeal may be dismissed using the doctrine <strong>of</strong> res judicata<br />
unless special circumstances apply. 8 A decision allowing the appeal on compassionate or<br />
humanitarian grounds has the effect <strong>of</strong> blanketing the ground <strong>of</strong> refusal that was appealed <strong>and</strong><br />
that particular refusal ground cannot be used again 9 unless new material facts come to the<br />
attention <strong>of</strong> the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer. 10<br />
5<br />
6<br />
7<br />
8<br />
9<br />
10<br />
See section 54 <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division Rules, <strong>and</strong> section 169(b) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA.<br />
See section 70 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA. However, a visa <strong>of</strong>ficer is not precluded from refusing a sponsored application on<br />
the same statutory basis as was relieved against by the Appeal Division when new material facts arising after<br />
the Appeal Division hearing or discovered after the Appeal Division hearing <strong>and</strong> not before the Appeal<br />
Division, come to the attention <strong>of</strong> the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer: Au, Shu Foo v. M.C.I. [2002] F.C. 257 (C.A.).<br />
Kaloti, Yaspal Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-526-98), Décary, Sexton, Evans, March 13, 2000. Li, Wei Min v.<br />
M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5040-05), Lemieux, June 14, 2006; 2006 FC 757. See too Dhaliwal, Baljit Kaur v.<br />
M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1760-01), Campbell, December 21, 2001 where the Court found that evidence <strong>of</strong><br />
continuing commitment was new <strong>and</strong> relevant evidence with respect to the parties’ intention at the time <strong>of</strong><br />
marriage <strong>and</strong> thus the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division erred in finding abuse <strong>of</strong> process. See Rahman, Azizur v.<br />
M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1642-06), Noël, November 2, 2006; 2006 FC 1321 where Dhaliwal was distinguished.<br />
Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc. [2001] 2 S.C.R. 460; 2001 SCC 44. See Kaloti, Yaspal Singh v. M.C.I.<br />
(F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4932-97), Dubé, September 8, 1998; Bath, Ragbir Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-01993), Lam,<br />
December 8, 1997 (appeal dismissed on grounds <strong>of</strong> res judicata where ground <strong>of</strong> refusal, parties, law <strong>and</strong><br />
factual matter to be determined were the same as on the first appeal); <strong>and</strong> Singh, Ahmar v. The Queen<br />
(F.C.T.D., no. T-1495-95), Muldoon, December 2, 1996; affirmed in Singh, Ahmar v. The Queen (F.C.A., no.<br />
A-1014-96), Strayer, Isaac, Linden, November 5, 1998. (res judicata applied regarding a challenge to the<br />
validity <strong>of</strong> regulations). For a contrary position, see Jhammat, Harjinder Kaur v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-1669-<br />
88), Muldoon, October 13, 1988, where res judicata was held to be inapplicable in public law, allowing the<br />
Minister to question the validity <strong>of</strong> a marriage on appeal from a second refusal despite having conceded the<br />
validity <strong>of</strong> the marriage in the appeal from the first refusal. A court order quashing a refusal on a limited basis<br />
does not have the effect <strong>of</strong> rendering the whole ground <strong>of</strong> refusal res judicata: Wong, Chun Fai v. M.E.I.<br />
(F.C.T.D., no. T-2871-90), Jerome, February 26, 1991. See also the in-depth discussion <strong>of</strong> res judicata <strong>and</strong><br />
abuse <strong>of</strong> process at chapter 6, section 6.7 “Repeat <strong>Appeals</strong>”.<br />
The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division must allow the sponsor to present the alleged new evidence before deciding<br />
the abuse <strong>of</strong> process/res judicata issues: Kular, Jasmail v. M.C. I. (F.C.T.D., no., IMM-4990-99), Nadon,<br />
August 30, 2000. [Judicial review <strong>of</strong> IAD T98-00523, Maziarz, September 20, 1999.] But the Appeal Division<br />
is under no obligation to grant a full oral hearing, new evidence by way <strong>of</strong> affidavit is acceptable: Sekhon,<br />
Amrik Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1982-01), McKeown, December 10, 2001.<br />
Mangat, Parminder Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-153-85), Strayer, February 25, 1985. However, if a new<br />
ground <strong>of</strong> refusal is subsequently discovered, nothing would preclude a second refusal/appeal.<br />
Au, supra, footnote 6.<br />
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Introduction
A decision <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division may be challenged by way <strong>of</strong> judicial<br />
review to the Federal Court with leave <strong>of</strong> the Court. 11<br />
Sponsor<br />
Whether or not one qualifies as a "sponsor" is covered in Chapter 1.<br />
Member <strong>of</strong> the Family Class<br />
The issue <strong>of</strong> who is a "member <strong>of</strong> the family class" <strong>and</strong> thus can be sponsored is covered<br />
in Chapter 7. Topics that are discussed in greater detail within this issue include: adoptions (see<br />
Chapter 4), foreign marriages, common-law partners <strong>and</strong> conjugal partners (see Chapter 5), <strong>and</strong><br />
bad faith family relationships (see Chapter 6).<br />
Grounds <strong>of</strong> Refusal<br />
A permanent resident visa may be refused for various reasons including: financial (see<br />
Chapter 1), criminality (see Chapter 2), health grounds (see Chapter 3), misrepresentations (see<br />
Chapter 8), <strong>and</strong> non-compliance with the Act including not an immigrant (see Chapter 9).<br />
Discretionary Relief (special relief)<br />
The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division has the power to allow an appeal using its discretionary<br />
jurisdiction (s. 67(1)(c) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA). This issue is discussed in detail in Chapter 10.<br />
Transitional Provisions<br />
The transitional provisions <strong>of</strong> IRPA <strong>and</strong> IRP Regulations that govern sponsorship appeals<br />
pending before the IAD are covered in Tab “T”.<br />
11<br />
See section 72(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA.<br />
<strong>Sponsorship</strong> <strong>Appeals</strong> 3 Legal Services<br />
January 1, 2008<br />
Introduction
CASES<br />
Au, Shu Foo v. M.C.I. [2002] F.C. 257 (C.A.) ............................................................................................................... 2<br />
Bath, Ragbir Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-01993), Lam, December 8, 1997.................................................................... 2<br />
Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc. [2001] 2 S.C.R. 460; 2001 SCC 44 ............................................................... 2<br />
David, Solomon v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5599-06), Martineau, May 24, 2007; 2007 FC 546;<br />
M.C.I. v. Dang, Thi Kim Anh (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3113-99), Dawson, July 20, 2000.............................................. 1<br />
Dhaliwal, Baljit Kaur v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1760-01), Campbell, December 21, 2001 .................................. 2<br />
Jhammat, Harjinder Kaur v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-1669-88), Muldoon, October 13, 1988 ...................................... 2<br />
Kahlon, Darshan Singh v. M.E.I (F.C.A., no. A-115-86), Mahoney, Stone, MacGuigan,<br />
February 6, 1989. Reported: Kahlon v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>)<br />
(1989), 7 Imm. L.R. (2d) 91 (F.C.A.)........................................................................................................................ 1<br />
Kaloti, Yaspal Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-526-98), Décary, Sexton, Evans, March 13, 2000................................. 2<br />
Kaloti, Yaspal Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4932-97), Dubé, September 8, 1998............................................. 2<br />
Khera, Amarjit v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6375-06), Martineau, June 13, 2007; 2007 FC 632...................................... 1<br />
Kular, Jasmail v. M.C. I. (F.C.T.D., no., IMM-4990-99), Nadon, August 30, 2000 ..................................................... 2<br />
Li, Wei Min v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5040-05), Lemieux, June 14, 2006; 2006 FC 757 ............................................. 2<br />
Mangat, Parminder Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-153-85), Strayer, February 25, 1985.......................................... 2<br />
Nadon, Claude v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2932-06), Beaudry, January 22, 2007; 2007 FC 59...................................... 1<br />
Pabla, Dial v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1210-00), Blais, December 12, 2000.......................................................... 1<br />
Rahman, Azizur v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1642-06), Noël, November 2, 2006; 2006 FC 1321.................................... 2<br />
Sekhon, Amrik Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1982-01), McKeown, December 10, 2001................................... 2<br />
Singh, Ahmar v. The Queen (F.C.A., no. A-1014-96), Strayer, Isaac, Linden, November 5, 1998 ............................... 2<br />
Singh, Ahmar v. The Queen (F.C.T.D., no. T-1495-95), Muldoon, December 2, 1996 ................................................. 2<br />
Valdez, Enrico Villanueva v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5430-97), Reed, March 12, 1999......................................... 1<br />
Wong, Chun Fai v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-2871-90), Jerome, February 26, 1991....................................................... 2<br />
<strong>Sponsorship</strong> <strong>Appeals</strong> 4 Legal Services<br />
January 1, 2008<br />
Introduction
Chapter One<br />
Financial Refusals <strong>and</strong> Requirements for the Sponsor<br />
Introduction<br />
A Canadian citizen or permanent resident may sponsor a foreign national who is a<br />
member <strong>of</strong> the family class [IRPA, s. 13(1)].<br />
General<br />
An undertaking is binding on the sponsor [IRPA, s. 13(3)].<br />
The Act authorizes regulations on "sponsorships, undertakings, <strong>and</strong> penalties for failure to<br />
comply with undertakings" [IRPA, s. 14(2)(e)].<br />
An <strong>of</strong>ficer is to apply the regulations on sponsorship in accordance with any instructions<br />
made by the Minister [IRPA, s. 13(4)].<br />
Appeal Rights<br />
Sponsors who have filed an application to sponsor in the prescribed manner have a right<br />
to appeal a decision not to issue a member <strong>of</strong> the family class a permanent resident visa [IRPA, s.<br />
63(1)]. 1 A sponsorship application that is not in accordance with section 10(1) <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong><br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>Refugee</strong> Protection Regulations [IRP Regulations] is not "filed in the prescribed manner"<br />
[IRP Regulations, s. 10(6)].<br />
Discretionary Jurisdiction<br />
The IAD cannot consider humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate considerations on an appeal<br />
unless the sponsor is "a sponsor within the meaning <strong>of</strong> the regulations" [IRPA, s. 65]. "A sponsor<br />
within the meaning <strong>of</strong> the regulations" means as described in section 130 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations.<br />
1<br />
Khera, Ram<strong>and</strong>eep Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA6-01433), Workun, May 9, 2007 (wife <strong>of</strong> deceased sponsor could<br />
not continue appeal in his place).<br />
<strong>Sponsorship</strong> <strong>Appeals</strong> 1 Legal Services<br />
January 1, 2008 Financial Refusals & Sponsors - Ch. 1
It is assumed that a sponsor is “a sponsor within the meaning <strong>of</strong> the regulations” unless a<br />
decision not to issue a permanent resident visa is made on this basis or the issue is raised on the<br />
evidence adduced by the parties at the hearing. 2<br />
Applications<br />
An application by a foreign national as a member <strong>of</strong> the family class must be preceded or<br />
accompanied by a sponsorship application [IRP Regulations, s. 10(4)].<br />
A sponsor cannot file more than one sponsorship application in respect <strong>of</strong> the same<br />
member <strong>of</strong> the family class if a final decision has not been made on the other application [IRP<br />
Regulations, s. 10(5)].<br />
The application must:<br />
(a) be made in writing using the form provided by the Department, if any;<br />
(b) be signed by the applicant;<br />
(c) include all information <strong>and</strong> documents required by the Regulations, as well as<br />
any other evidence required by the Act;<br />
(d) be accompanied by evidence <strong>of</strong> payment <strong>of</strong> the applicable fee, if any, set out in<br />
the Regulations;<br />
(e) if applicable, identify who is the principal applicant <strong>and</strong> who is the<br />
accompanying spouse or common-law partner [IRP Regulations, s. 10(1)].<br />
A sponsorship application not made in accordance with section 10(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRP<br />
Regulations is considered not filed in the prescribed manner for purposes <strong>of</strong> an appeal to the IAD<br />
under section 63(1) <strong>of</strong> IRPA [IRP Regulations, s. 10(6)].<br />
If the requirements <strong>of</strong> sections 10 <strong>and</strong> 11 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations are not met, the<br />
application <strong>and</strong> all documents submitted in support shall be returned to the applicant [IRP<br />
Regulations, s. 12].<br />
According to a CIC Instruction on "Minimal Necessary Requirements for a Submission to<br />
be Considered an Application" (RIM-02-032 dated June 27, 2002), very limited information is<br />
required for a submission to be considered an application satisfactory for section 10(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRP<br />
Regulations. Furthermore, the decision is to be taken up front <strong>and</strong> before any processing has<br />
begun. Once an application has been accepted, it is not to be returned for re-submission; rather,<br />
any missing information is to be requested during case processing. It would appear unlikely that<br />
the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division (IAD) will have before it applications that have not been filed<br />
as prescribed for these would have been returned by CIC for re-submission per section 12. As a<br />
result, the IAD will not be faced with the issue <strong>of</strong> whether to dismiss an appeal for lack <strong>of</strong><br />
2<br />
N<strong>and</strong>ra, Rajwinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA3-00771), Borst, May 28, 2004.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Financial Refusals & Sponsors - Ch. 1
jurisdiction if the application was not filed as prescribed or to allow the sponsor to correct a<br />
minor deficiency in the application.<br />
A decision shall not be made on an application for a permanent resident visa by a member<br />
<strong>of</strong> the family class if the sponsor withdraws their sponsorship application [IRP Regulations, s.<br />
119].<br />
Sponsor<br />
A sponsor must be a Canadian citizen or permanent resident who is at least 18 years <strong>of</strong><br />
age; resides in <strong>Canada</strong>; <strong>and</strong> has filed a sponsorship application in accordance with section 10 <strong>of</strong><br />
the IRP Regulations [IRP Regulations, s. 130(1)]. An exception is provided where the sponsor is<br />
a Canadian citizen <strong>and</strong> does not reside in <strong>Canada</strong>: they may sponsor their spouse, common-law<br />
partner, conjugal partner or dependent child who has no dependent children if the sponsor will<br />
reside in <strong>Canada</strong> when the applicant becomes a permanent resident [IRP Regulations, s. 130(2)].<br />
A sponsor must satisfy section 130 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations from the time <strong>of</strong> initiation <strong>of</strong><br />
the sponsorship application until a decision is made on the application otherwise they will not be<br />
considered a sponsor. 3<br />
“Resides in <strong>Canada</strong>” for section 130(1)(b) <strong>of</strong> the Regulations can be established by<br />
evidence <strong>of</strong> presence on Canadian soil <strong>and</strong> involvement in day-to-day activities not requiring<br />
absence abroad. 4 Physical absence from <strong>Canada</strong> may not constitute an interruption <strong>of</strong> residence<br />
in <strong>Canada</strong>. 5 The question is whether a sponsor has centralized their mode <strong>of</strong> living in <strong>Canada</strong>. 6<br />
Humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate consideration is not possible where the sponsor is less<br />
than 18 years <strong>of</strong> age as they are not a sponsor within the meaning <strong>of</strong> the regulations. 7<br />
For a sponsor who is a Canadian citizen not residing in <strong>Canada</strong>, a mere expression <strong>of</strong><br />
intent to return <strong>and</strong> reside in <strong>Canada</strong> is insufficient to satisfy section 130(2) <strong>of</strong> the IRP<br />
Regulations. 8 A change in intent subsequent to the <strong>of</strong>ficer’s decision on the application is<br />
irrelevant. 9<br />
3<br />
4<br />
5<br />
6<br />
7<br />
8<br />
9<br />
See section 133(1)(a) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations.<br />
Cook, Donald Charles v. M.C.I. (IAD MA5-01579), Hudon, August 10, 2006.<br />
Gritsan, Serguei v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-10556), D’Ignazio, October 5, 2004.<br />
Zhang, Tieshi v. M.C.I. (IAD MA3-02491), Patry, September 20, 2004.<br />
Chan, May Yee v. M.C.I. (IAD VA4-01434), Boscariol, March 23, 2005.<br />
Law, Peter Koi v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-11031), D'Ignazio, May 19, 2004 (reasons signed June 2, 2004).<br />
Cook, Donald Charles v. M.C.I. (IAD MA5-01579), Hudon, August 10, 2006. Compare Bobocel, Norman<br />
Dean v. M.C.I. (IAD WA5-00008), Munro, October 21, 2005 (reasons signed November 30, 2005) where a<br />
sponsor who misapprehended the legitimacy <strong>of</strong> his sponsorship was held to satisfy section 130(2).<br />
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January 1, 2008 Financial Refusals & Sponsors - Ch. 1
Undertaking<br />
The undertaking is given to the Minister or the competent authority <strong>of</strong> the province if the<br />
province has entered into an agreement referred to in section 8(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA [IRP Regulations,<br />
s. 131].<br />
The undertaking obliges the sponsor to reimburse <strong>Canada</strong> or a province for every benefit<br />
provided as social assistance to the sponsored foreign national <strong>and</strong> their family members during<br />
the period beginning on the day the foreign national becomes a permanent resident. The<br />
undertaking ends in 10 years subject to exceptions: for a spouse, common-law or conjugal<br />
partner, three years; for a dependent child 10 less than 22 when they become a permanent resident,<br />
10 years later or when they reach 25, whichever is earlier; <strong>and</strong> for a dependent child 22 or older<br />
when they become a permanent resident, three years [IRP Regulations, s. 132(1)]. There are<br />
separate rules for undertakings to a province [IRP Regulations, s. 132(2), (3)].<br />
A permanent resident visa shall not be issued to an applicant unless the sponsorship<br />
undertaking in respect <strong>of</strong> the applicant is in effect (i.e. has not been withdrawn) [IRP<br />
Regulations, s. 120(a)].<br />
Agreement<br />
The sponsor, co-signer if any <strong>and</strong> member <strong>of</strong> the family class who is at least 22 or if less<br />
than 22 is the sponsor's spouse, common-law or conjugal partner must enter into a written<br />
agreement that includes: a statement to provide for the basic requirements <strong>of</strong> the member <strong>of</strong> the<br />
family class <strong>and</strong> their accompanying family members for the period <strong>of</strong> the undertaking; a<br />
declaration by the sponsor <strong>and</strong> co-signer that their financial obligations do not prevent them from<br />
honouring the agreement <strong>and</strong> undertaking; <strong>and</strong> a statement by the member <strong>of</strong> the family class that<br />
they will make every reasonable effort to provide for their <strong>and</strong> their accompanying family<br />
members' basic requirements [IRP Regulations, s. 132(4)].<br />
Co-signers<br />
The sponsor's spouse or common-law partner may co-sign the undertaking if they are a<br />
permanent resident or Canadian citizen at least 18 years <strong>of</strong> age <strong>and</strong> residing in <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>and</strong> they<br />
meet the requirements for sponsoring in section 133(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations (excluding section<br />
133(1)(a)). A co-signer is jointly <strong>and</strong> severally or solidarily liable for a breach <strong>of</strong> the undertaking<br />
[IRP Regulations, s. 132(5)]. A co-signer may continue an appeal following the death <strong>of</strong> the<br />
sponsor if the evidence indicates a joint sponsorship. 11<br />
10<br />
11<br />
For a full description see section 132(1)(b)(ii) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations.<br />
Annor, Gladys v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-04677), Whist, September 28, 2005.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Financial Refusals & Sponsors - Ch. 1
Requirements for the Sponsor<br />
A sponsorship application shall only be approved by an <strong>of</strong>ficer if from the day the<br />
application was filed until a decision is made with respect to the application, the sponsor meets<br />
the requirements set out in section 133(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations. These requirements are that<br />
the sponsor:<br />
(a) is a sponsor as described in section 130;<br />
(b) intends to fulfil the obligations in the undertaking;<br />
(c) is not subject to a removal order;<br />
(d) is not detained in a penitentiary, jail, reformatory or prison;<br />
(e) has not been convicted <strong>of</strong> an <strong>of</strong>fence <strong>of</strong> a sexual nature against any person or<br />
an <strong>of</strong>fence that results in bodily harm to a relative <strong>of</strong> the sponsor including a<br />
dependent child or other family member 12 , a relative <strong>of</strong> the sponsor's spouse,<br />
common-law or conjugal partner (unless acquitted or pardoned or at least 5<br />
years have elapsed since completion <strong>of</strong> the sentence 13 ); 14<br />
(f) has not been convicted outside <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>of</strong> an equivalent <strong>of</strong>fence to (e) (unless<br />
acquitted or 5 years have elapsed since sentence <strong>and</strong> rehabilitation is shown) 15 ;<br />
(g) is not in default <strong>of</strong> any undertaking or any support payment obligations<br />
ordered by a court;<br />
(h) is not in default <strong>of</strong> repayment <strong>of</strong> a debt referred to in section 145(1) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
IRPA;<br />
(i) is not an undischarged bankrupt;<br />
(j) the sponsor's total income is at least equal to the minimum necessary income<br />
but this requirement does not apply if the sponsored person is the sponsor's<br />
spouse, common-law or conjugal partner with no dependent children; or with a<br />
dependent child who has no dependent children; or is a dependent child <strong>of</strong> the<br />
sponsor who has no dependent children or a person referred to in section<br />
117(1)(e) or (g) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations 16 ;<br />
(k) the sponsor is not in receipt <strong>of</strong> social assistance other than for a disability 17 .<br />
12<br />
13<br />
14<br />
15<br />
16<br />
17<br />
“Family member” includes a person who was the sponsor’s wife at the time the <strong>of</strong>fence was committed<br />
although they were divorced when the sponsor was convicted: Joshi, Ajay v. M.C.I. (IAD WA3-00046),<br />
Wiebe, December 19, 2003.<br />
Section 133(2) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations.<br />
This provision is not to be taken lightly: Gill, Amarjeet Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA3-02834), Borst, August 10,<br />
2004.<br />
Section 133(3) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations.<br />
Section 133(4) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations. See Chekole, Awoke v. M.C.I. (IAD WA2-00099), Wiebe, April 25,<br />
2003 (reasons signed June 5, 2003) where the sponsor <strong>of</strong> a dependent child was not required to meet the MNI.<br />
Section 133(1)(k) is not contrary to section 15 <strong>of</strong> the Charter: Velasquez Guzman, Neila Rosa v. M.C.I. (F.C.,<br />
no. IMM-184-06), Noël, September 28, 2006; 2006 FC 1134 (appeal to FCA dismissed for mootness:<br />
Velasquez Guzman, Neila Rosa v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-467-06), Linden, Evans, Sharlow, November 5, 2007;<br />
2007 FCA 358.<br />
<strong>Sponsorship</strong> <strong>Appeals</strong> 5 Legal Services<br />
January 1, 2008 Financial Refusals & Sponsors - Ch. 1
All the above requirements may be overcome by special relief 18 except for (a), "is a<br />
sponsor as described in section 130" since section 65 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA precludes an appeal on<br />
humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate considerations if the sponsor is not a sponsor within the<br />
meaning <strong>of</strong> the regulations.<br />
An <strong>of</strong>ficer can approve a sponsorship application only if the sponsor satisfies the<br />
requirements continuously from the day the application was filed until the <strong>of</strong>ficer makes a<br />
decision on the application.<br />
If the <strong>of</strong>ficer made no error in concluding that a requirement <strong>of</strong> section 133(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRP<br />
Regulations was not met at any time between the filing <strong>of</strong> the application <strong>and</strong> the making <strong>of</strong> the<br />
decision on the application, the IAD must uphold the <strong>of</strong>ficer’s decision in law, even if the facts at<br />
the time <strong>of</strong> the hearing are such that the particular requirement is now met. 19<br />
There is a specified time frame for the minimum necessary income requirement whereby<br />
the income is calculated on the taxation year preceding the date <strong>of</strong> filing <strong>of</strong> the sponsorship<br />
application [IRP Regulations, s. 134(1)]. The IAD will make its determination using the same<br />
time period. Therefore if a sponsor meets the minimum necessary income at the time <strong>of</strong> the<br />
hearing before the IAD, that fact will be relevant to the discretionary jurisdiction <strong>of</strong> the IAD<br />
only. In these circumstances, a lower threshold for granting special relief will be appropriate<br />
given that the obstacle to admissibility has been overcome. 20<br />
The sponsor has to meet the requirements <strong>of</strong> section 133 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations (section<br />
137 if in Quebec) up until the time the family members become permanent residents [IRP<br />
Regulations, s. 120(b)]. If a sponsor dies before that time the IAD may not consider<br />
humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate considerations for the applicants. 21<br />
A sponsor who was adopted <strong>and</strong> whose adoption has been revoked may sponsor an<br />
application by a member <strong>of</strong> the family class provided the revocation was not obtained for the<br />
purpose <strong>of</strong> sponsoring the application [IRP Regulations, s. 133(5)].<br />
Income Calculation Rules/Minimum Necessary Income<br />
The sponsor's income is to be calculated on the last notice <strong>of</strong> assessment or equivalent<br />
document issued by the Minister <strong>of</strong> National Revenue in respect <strong>of</strong> the most recent taxation year<br />
preceding the date <strong>of</strong> filing <strong>of</strong> the sponsorship application [IRP Regulations, s. 134(1)(a)]. The<br />
income calculation may be made solely from these source documents. If a sponsor proposes a<br />
18<br />
19<br />
20<br />
21<br />
Effat, Mansoora v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-20734), Hoare, June 24, 2004.<br />
Ganidagli, Mustafa Serhat v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-11913), Whist, February 16, 2004.<br />
Jugpall, Sukhjeewan Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD T98-00716), Aterman, Goodman, Townshend, April 12, 1999.<br />
Rahman, Mohammed Ataur v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-12830), Whist, May 24, 2006.<br />
<strong>Sponsorship</strong> <strong>Appeals</strong> 6 Legal Services<br />
January 1, 2008 Financial Refusals & Sponsors - Ch. 1
different methodology <strong>and</strong> reliance on other source documents, the sponsor carries the burden <strong>of</strong><br />
establishing the reliability <strong>of</strong> that evidence <strong>and</strong> how it applies to the calculation. 22<br />
The income is income earned as reported in that document less any provincial allowance<br />
for instruction or training; any social assistance 23 or financial assistance under a resettlement<br />
program; employment insurance, other than special benefits; Old Age Security Act income; <strong>and</strong><br />
any child tax benefit [IRP Regulations, s. 134(1)(c)]. If there is a co-signer, their income as<br />
calculated in the same manner is included in the sponsor's income [IRP Regulations, s.<br />
134(1)(d)].<br />
If the sponsor does not produce a notice <strong>of</strong> assessment or equivalent document or if their<br />
income is less than the minimum necessary income, the sponsor's Canadian income for the 12<br />
month period preceding the filing <strong>of</strong> the sponsorship application is the income earned by the<br />
sponsor not including the amounts mentioned in the preceding paragraph.<br />
In the case <strong>of</strong> business income, the relevant amount is net income (gross income less<br />
deductions). 24 Net income is to be calculated under section 134(1)(c) without deducting<br />
depreciation <strong>and</strong> amortization (which may have been deducted for tax purposes). 25<br />
If an <strong>of</strong>ficer receives information that a sponsor is no longer able to fulfil the undertaking,<br />
the Canadian income <strong>of</strong> the sponsor is calculated on the basis <strong>of</strong> the 12 month period preceding<br />
the day the <strong>of</strong>ficer receives the information rather than the 12 month period preceding the date <strong>of</strong><br />
filing <strong>of</strong> the undertaking [IRP Regulations, s. 134(2)].<br />
"Minimum necessary income" is defined in section 2 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations. It is the low<br />
income cut-<strong>of</strong>f figure published by Statistics <strong>Canada</strong> for urban areas <strong>of</strong> 500,000 or more. The<br />
number <strong>of</strong> persons includes the sponsor <strong>and</strong> their family members 26 ; the sponsored foreign<br />
national, their family members whether accompanying or not; <strong>and</strong> every other person <strong>and</strong> their<br />
family members in respect <strong>of</strong> whom the sponsor has given or co-signed an undertaking still in<br />
effect <strong>and</strong> in respect <strong>of</strong> whom the sponsor's spouse or common-law partner has given or cosigned<br />
an undertaking still in effect, if the sponsor's spouse or common-law partner has co-signed<br />
with the sponsor the undertaking in respect <strong>of</strong> the foreign national.<br />
Default in Undertaking<br />
22<br />
23<br />
24<br />
25<br />
26<br />
Singh Chahal, Balwinder v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1423-07), Barnes, September 24, 2007; 2007 FC 953.<br />
As defined in section 2 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations.<br />
Warraich, Harpreet Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD TA6-12398), Ahlfeld, October 12, 2007.<br />
Braafhart, Gerrit v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-04251), Waters, January 31, 2005.<br />
As defined in section 1(3) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations. “Family member” includes a separated spouse <strong>and</strong> the<br />
spouse’s dependent children: Boyd, Isabella Seabra v. M.C.I. (IAD VA6-01833), Miller, October 30, 2007.<br />
<strong>Sponsorship</strong> <strong>Appeals</strong> 7 Legal Services<br />
January 1, 2008 Financial Refusals & Sponsors - Ch. 1
Default begins when the government makes a payment that the sponsor promised to repay<br />
in the undertaking or an obligation in the undertaking is breached <strong>and</strong> it ends when the sponsor<br />
reimburses the government in full or in accordance with an agreement with the government 27 or<br />
ceases to be in breach <strong>of</strong> the obligation [IRP Regulations, s. 135]. A sponsor’s conduct in regard<br />
to the outst<strong>and</strong>ing debt is relevant to the exercise <strong>of</strong> discretionary relief. 28<br />
Suspension <strong>of</strong> Processing <strong>of</strong> <strong>Sponsorship</strong> Application<br />
If certain proceedings are brought against a sponsor or co-signer, the sponsorship<br />
application shall not be processed until final determination <strong>of</strong> the proceedings [IRP Regulations,<br />
s. 136]. 29 In a proceeding initiated by a report under section 44(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA, there is a final<br />
determination when the IAD stays the removal order. 30<br />
Province <strong>of</strong> Quebec<br />
A different scheme applies in the Province <strong>of</strong> Quebec [IRP Regulations, s. 137]. Under<br />
the agreement with the Province <strong>of</strong> Quebec, the initial selection falls under the responsibility <strong>of</strong><br />
the Quebec authorities <strong>and</strong> consequently the financial evaluation is made by them. This division<br />
<strong>of</strong> responsibilities does not preclude CIC from refusing a foreign national under section 39 <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Act. An appeal <strong>of</strong> the Quebec refusal is possible before the TAQ (Tribunal administratif du<br />
Québec). An appeal before the IAD based on the Quebec refusal is limited to humanitarian <strong>and</strong><br />
compassionate considerations.<br />
Inadmissibility for Financial Reasons<br />
A foreign national is inadmissible for financial reasons if they are or will be unable or<br />
unwilling to support themselves or any other person who is dependent on them, <strong>and</strong> they have not<br />
satisfied an <strong>of</strong>ficer that adequate arrangements for care <strong>and</strong> support other than those that involve<br />
social assistance have been made [IRPA, s. 39]. Section 39 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA may be used where the<br />
sponsor is on social assistance for a disability <strong>and</strong> is therefore not caught by section 133(1)(k) <strong>of</strong><br />
the IRP Regulations. 31 The low-income cut<strong>of</strong>f figures can be used as a guide to determine if<br />
adequate arrangements have been made. 32<br />
27<br />
28<br />
29<br />
30<br />
31<br />
32<br />
This provision is more favourable to a sponsor than the former comparable provision: Aryan, Miajan v. M.C.I.<br />
(FC, no. IMM-6676-02), Lemieux, February 20, 2004; 2004 FC 254.<br />
Brar, Charanjit Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA5-00400), Workun, March 30, 2006.<br />
Section 136 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations. Proceedings are revocation <strong>of</strong> citizenship; report under s. 44(1) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
IRPA; charges re an <strong>of</strong>fence punishable by at least 10 years imprisonment.<br />
Dhillon, Rajbir Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-19586), Hoare, April 11, 2006.<br />
Amir, Shafqat v. M.C.I. (IAD MA6-08358), Gaetani, September 27, 2007.<br />
Debara, Sara v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-27021), D’Ignazio, November 13, 2003.<br />
<strong>Sponsorship</strong> <strong>Appeals</strong> 8 Legal Services<br />
January 1, 2008 Financial Refusals & Sponsors - Ch. 1
Transitional Issues<br />
The transitional provisions <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations provide at section 351(1) that an<br />
undertaking under the former Act is governed by IRPA. However, there is an exception made to<br />
allow for recovery <strong>of</strong> social assistance payments as a result <strong>of</strong> a breach <strong>of</strong> an undertaking given<br />
under the former legislation [IRP Regulations, s. 351(2)]. Also the duration <strong>of</strong> an undertaking<br />
given under the former Act is not affected [IRP Regulations, s. 351(3)] 33 .<br />
Under section 320(8) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations, a person is inadmissible for financial<br />
reasons if they had been determined to be inadmissible under section 19(1)(b) <strong>of</strong> the former Act.<br />
33<br />
Sharma: M.C.I. v. Sharma, Ashok Kumar (F.C., no. IMM-6517-03), von Finckenstein, August 18, 2004; 2004<br />
FC 1144.<br />
<strong>Sponsorship</strong> <strong>Appeals</strong> 9 Legal Services<br />
January 1, 2008 Financial Refusals & Sponsors - Ch. 1
CASES<br />
Amir, Shafqat v. M.C.I. (IAD MA6-08358), Gaetani, September 27, 2007 .................................................................. 8<br />
Annor, Gladys v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-04677), Whist, September 28, 2005 ..................................................................... 4<br />
Aryan, Miajan v. M.C.I. (FC, no. IMM-6676-02), Lemieux, February 20, 2004; 2004 FC 254 ................................... 8<br />
Bobocel, Norman Dean v. M.C.I. (IAD WA5-00008), Munro, October 21, 2005 (reasons signed<br />
November 30, 2005).................................................................................................................................................. 3<br />
Boyd, Isabella Seabra v. M.C.I. (IAD VA6-01833), Miller, October 30, 2007 ............................................................ 7<br />
Braafhart, Gerrit v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-04251), Waters, January 31, 2005.................................................................... 7<br />
Brar, Charanjit Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA5-00400), Workun, March 30, 2006............................................................. 8<br />
Chan, May Yee v. M.C.I. (IAD VA4-01434), Boscariol, March 23, 2005 .................................................................... 3<br />
Chekole, Awoke v. M.C.I. (IAD WA2-00099), Wiebe, April 25, 2003 (reasons signed June 5,<br />
2003) ......................................................................................................................................................................... 5<br />
Cook, Donald Charles v. M.C.I. (IAD MA5-01579), Hudon, August 10, 2006 ........................................................... 3<br />
Debara, Sara v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-27021), D’Ignazio, November 13, 2003 ................................................................ 8<br />
Dhillon, Rajbir Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-19586), Hoare, April 11, 2006 .................................................................. 8<br />
Effat, Mansoora v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-20734), Hoare, June 24, 2004............................................................................ 6<br />
Ganidagli, Mustafa Serhat v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-11913), Whist, February 16, 2004 .................................................... 6<br />
Gill, Amarjeet Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA3-02834), Borst, August 10, 2004 ................................................................. 5<br />
Gritsan, Serguei v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-10556), D’Ignazio, October 5, 2004.................................................................. 3<br />
Joshi, Ajay v. M.C.I. (IAD WA3-00046), Wiebe, December 19, 2003 ......................................................................... 5<br />
Jugpall, Sukhjeewan Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD T98-00716), Aterman, Goodman, Townshend, April<br />
12, 1999..................................................................................................................................................................... 6<br />
Khera, Ram<strong>and</strong>eep Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA6-01433), Workun, May 9, 2007 ............................................................ 1<br />
Law, Peter Koi v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-11031), D'Ignazio, May 19, 2004 (reasons signed June 2,<br />
2004) ......................................................................................................................................................................... 3<br />
N<strong>and</strong>ra, Rajwinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA3-00771), Borst, May 28, 2004............................................................... 2<br />
Rahman, Mohammed Ataur v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-12830), Whist, May 24, 2006.......................................................... 6<br />
Sharma: M.C.I. v. Sharma, Ashok Kumar (F.C., no. IMM-6517-03), von Finckenstein, August 18,<br />
2004; 2004 FC 1144.................................................................................................................................................. 9<br />
<strong>Sponsorship</strong> <strong>Appeals</strong> 10 Legal Services<br />
January 1, 2008 Financial Refusals & Sponsors - Ch. 1
Singh Chahal, Balwinder v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1423-07), Barnes, September 24, 2007; 2007<br />
FC 953....................................................................................................................................................................... 7<br />
Velasquez Guzman, Neila Rosa v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-184-06), Noël, September 28, 2006;<br />
2006 FC 1134 (appeal to FCA dismissed for mootness: Velasquez Guzman, Neila Rosa v.<br />
M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-467-06), Linden, Evans, Sharlow, November 5, 2007; 2007 FCA 358 ................................ 5<br />
Warraich, Harpreet Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD TA6-12398), Ahlfeld, October 12, 2007..................................................... 7<br />
Zhang, Tieshi v. M.C.I. (IAD MA3-02491), Patry, September 20, 2004....................................................................... 3<br />
<strong>Sponsorship</strong> <strong>Appeals</strong> 11 Legal Services<br />
January 1, 2008 Financial Refusals & Sponsors - Ch. 1
Chapter Two<br />
Criminal Refusals<br />
Introduction<br />
An application for permanent residence made by a member <strong>of</strong> the family class can be<br />
refused if the member <strong>of</strong> the family class or a dependant is inadmissible to <strong>Canada</strong> on any <strong>of</strong> the<br />
following grounds related to matters <strong>of</strong> criminality:<br />
• “serious criminality” – IRPA, s. 36(1)<br />
• “criminality” – IRPA, s. 36(2)<br />
• “organized criminality” – IRPA, s. 37<br />
• “security” – IRPA, s. 34<br />
• “human or international rights violations” – IRPA, s. 35<br />
Section 64(1) <strong>and</strong> (2) <strong>of</strong> IRPA provides that no appeal may be made to <strong>Immigration</strong><br />
Appeal Division (IAD), by either a foreign national or their sponsor, if the foreign national has<br />
been found to be inadmissible on the following grounds:<br />
• “serious criminality”, where the <strong>of</strong>fence was punished in <strong>Canada</strong> by a term <strong>of</strong><br />
imprisonment <strong>of</strong> at least two years – IRPA, s. 36(1)<br />
• “organized criminality” – IRPA, s. 37<br />
• “security” – IRPA, s. 34<br />
• “human or international rights violations” – IRPA, s. 35<br />
The Federal Court has held that the IAD has no jurisdiction to entertain appeals in such<br />
cases. The appeal must be dismissed for lack <strong>of</strong> jurisdiction if the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer has determined the<br />
foreign national to be inadmissible on one <strong>of</strong> the enumerated grounds; the IAD is not empowered<br />
to determine whether the foreign national is in fact inadmissible. 1<br />
1<br />
Kang, Sarabjeet Kaur v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2445-04), Mactavish, February 25, 2005; 2005 FC 297. The<br />
case in question also considered the effect <strong>of</strong> section 196 <strong>of</strong> the Transitional Provisions, which provides for the<br />
discontinuation <strong>of</strong> an appeal if the appeal could not have been made because <strong>of</strong> section 64 <strong>of</strong> IRPA.<br />
SPONSORSHIP APPEALS<br />
Legal Services<br />
January 1, 2008 1 Criminal Refusals – Ch. 2
This chapter will therefore deal only with the grounds <strong>of</strong> serious criminality <strong>and</strong><br />
criminality, as both <strong>of</strong> these can constitute proper grounds for the IAD to refuse a sponsorship<br />
appeal on the merits.<br />
The relevant sections <strong>of</strong> IRPA dealing with serious criminality <strong>and</strong> criminality can be<br />
broken down as follows: 2<br />
• “serious criminality” – conviction in <strong>Canada</strong>; punishable by maximum prison term <strong>of</strong><br />
10 years or more or where a prison term <strong>of</strong> more than 6 months was imposed – IRPA,<br />
s. 36(1)(a)<br />
• “serious criminality” – equivalent conviction outside <strong>Canada</strong>; punishable in <strong>Canada</strong><br />
by maximum prison term <strong>of</strong> 10 years or more – IRPA, s. 36(1)(b)<br />
• “serious criminality” – committed equivalent <strong>of</strong>fence outside <strong>Canada</strong>; punishable in<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> by maximum prison term <strong>of</strong> 10 years or more – IRPA, s. 36(1)(c)<br />
• “criminality” – conviction in <strong>Canada</strong>; punishable by maximum prison term <strong>of</strong> less<br />
than 10 years – IRPA, s. 36(2)(a)<br />
• “criminality” – equivalent conviction outside <strong>Canada</strong>; punishable in <strong>Canada</strong> by<br />
maximum prison term <strong>of</strong> less than 10 years – IRPA, s. 36(2)(b)<br />
• criminality – committed equivalent <strong>of</strong>fence outside <strong>Canada</strong>; punishable in <strong>Canada</strong> by<br />
maximum prison term <strong>of</strong> less than 10 years – IRPA, s. 36(1)(c)<br />
• “criminality” – two summary convictions in <strong>Canada</strong> (not arising out <strong>of</strong> a single<br />
occurrence) – IRPA, s. 36(2)(a)<br />
• “criminality” – equivalent <strong>of</strong> two summary convictions outside <strong>Canada</strong> (not arising<br />
out <strong>of</strong> a single occurrence) outside <strong>Canada</strong> – IRPA, s. 36(2)(b)<br />
The common point <strong>of</strong> reference for the grounds <strong>of</strong> serious criminality <strong>and</strong> criminality,<br />
whether for a Canadian conviction or a foreign conviction or crime, is that the underlying <strong>of</strong>fence<br />
is or is equivalent to “an <strong>of</strong>fence under an Act <strong>of</strong> Parliament”, that is an <strong>of</strong>fence found in a<br />
Canadian federal statute.<br />
The most common basis for inadmissibility is the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer’s conclusion that the<br />
applicant for permanent residence or a dependant has been convicted <strong>of</strong> or has committed an<br />
<strong>of</strong>fence outside <strong>Canada</strong> that, if committed in <strong>Canada</strong>, would constitute an <strong>of</strong>fence in <strong>Canada</strong>.<br />
This ground <strong>of</strong> inadmissibility raises issues known as equivalency <strong>of</strong> foreign <strong>of</strong>fences to<br />
Canadian ones.<br />
2<br />
For the full text <strong>of</strong> the inadmissibility provisions refer to the relevant sections <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Refugee</strong><br />
Protection Act.<br />
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St<strong>and</strong>ard <strong>of</strong> Pro<strong>of</strong><br />
Section 33 <strong>of</strong> IRPA provides that inadmissibility under section 36 includes facts arising<br />
from omissions <strong>and</strong> may be based on facts for which there are reasonable grounds to believe that<br />
they have occurred, are occurring or may occur.<br />
The meaning <strong>of</strong> the term “reasonable grounds to believe”, which was found as well in the<br />
former <strong>Immigration</strong> Act, was considered in Mugesera, 3 where the Supreme Court <strong>of</strong> <strong>Canada</strong><br />
endorsed the following statements <strong>of</strong> the law:<br />
[114] The first issue raised by s. 19(1)(j) <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Act [i.e., the<br />
predecessor <strong>of</strong> IRPA, s. 35(1)(a)] is the meaning <strong>of</strong> the evidentiary st<strong>and</strong>ard that<br />
there be “reasonable grounds to believe” that a person has committed a crime<br />
against humanity. The FCA has found, <strong>and</strong> we agree, that the “reasonable<br />
grounds to believe” st<strong>and</strong>ard requires something more than mere suspicion, but<br />
less than the st<strong>and</strong>ard applicable in civil matters <strong>of</strong> pro<strong>of</strong> on the balance <strong>of</strong><br />
probabilities: Sivakumar v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>),<br />
[1994] 1 F.C. 433 (C.A.), at p. 445; Chiau v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>Immigration</strong>), [2001] 2 F.C. 297 (C.A.), at para. 60. In essence, reasonable<br />
grounds will exist where there is an objective basis for the belief which is based<br />
on compelling <strong>and</strong> credible information: Sabour v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong><br />
Citizenship & <strong>Immigration</strong>) (2000), 9 Imm. L.R. (3d) 61 (F.C.T.D.).<br />
The Court also noted, at para. 116, that the “reasonable grounds to believe” st<strong>and</strong>ard<br />
applies only to questions <strong>of</strong> fact:<br />
When applying the “reasonable grounds to believe” st<strong>and</strong>ard, it is important to<br />
distinguish between pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> questions <strong>of</strong> fact <strong>and</strong> the determination <strong>of</strong> questions<br />
<strong>of</strong> law. The “reasonable grounds to believe” st<strong>and</strong>ard <strong>of</strong> pro<strong>of</strong> applies only to<br />
questions <strong>of</strong> fact: Moreno v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>),<br />
[1994] 1 F.C. 298 (C.A.), at p. 311.<br />
Thus the “reasonable grounds to believe” st<strong>and</strong>ard does not apply to conclusions <strong>of</strong> law,<br />
which are decided on the balance <strong>of</strong> probability <strong>and</strong> reviewed by the Federal Court on the<br />
correctness st<strong>and</strong>ard. 4 When dealing with a foreign conviction or crime outside <strong>Canada</strong>, it is a<br />
question <strong>of</strong> law whether the conviction or crime satisfies the requirements <strong>of</strong> an <strong>of</strong>fence under an<br />
Act <strong>of</strong> Parliament, i.e., whether equivalency is established.<br />
Canadian convictions<br />
A foreign national applying for permanent residence may be inadmissible for having been<br />
convicted <strong>of</strong> a criminal <strong>of</strong>fence during a previous period <strong>of</strong> residence or stay in <strong>Canada</strong>. Only<br />
3<br />
4<br />
Mugesera v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 91, at para. 114; 2005 SCC<br />
40.<br />
Ibid., para 37.<br />
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convictions under Canadian federal laws (“an <strong>of</strong>fence under an Act <strong>of</strong> Parliament”) render a<br />
person inadmissible on grounds <strong>of</strong> serious criminality or criminality. 5<br />
Whether a Canadian conviction will render the person inadmissible on the ground <strong>of</strong><br />
serious criminality or criminality depends on the nature <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fence, the possible punishment<br />
based on the maximum term <strong>of</strong> imprisonment the <strong>of</strong>fence carries under law, <strong>and</strong> the actual<br />
sentence that was imposed on conviction for the <strong>of</strong>fence. Inadmissibility on the grounds <strong>of</strong><br />
serious criminality or criminality cannot be based on <strong>of</strong>fences alleged to have been committed in<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> for which there has been no conviction registered by the courts.<br />
The relevant sections <strong>of</strong> IRPA dealing with serious criminality <strong>and</strong> criminality based on<br />
Canadian convictions can be broken down as follows: 6<br />
• “serious criminality” – conviction in <strong>Canada</strong>; punishable by maximum prison term <strong>of</strong><br />
10 years or more – IRPA, s. 36(1)(a)<br />
• “criminality” – conviction in <strong>Canada</strong>; punishable by maximum prison term <strong>of</strong> less<br />
than 10 years (indictable or hybrid <strong>of</strong>fence) – IRPA, s. 36(2)(a)<br />
• “criminality” – two summary convictions in <strong>Canada</strong> (not arising out <strong>of</strong> a single<br />
occurrence) – IRPA, s. 36(2)(a)<br />
Criminal <strong>of</strong>fences are either indictable or summary conviction, depending on their<br />
seriousness. Certain criminal <strong>of</strong>fences, known as “hybrid <strong>of</strong>fences”, can be prosecuted either by<br />
way <strong>of</strong> indictment or summary conviction, at the election <strong>of</strong> the Crown. By virtue <strong>of</strong> paragraph<br />
34(1)(a) <strong>of</strong> the Interpretation Act, hybrid <strong>of</strong>fences are indictable until the prosecution elects to<br />
proceed by summary conviction. However, section 36(3) <strong>of</strong> IRPA provides that for the purposes<br />
<strong>of</strong> IRPA, a “hybrid <strong>of</strong>fence” is deemed to be indictable, even if it has been prosecuted<br />
summarily. 7<br />
Where an <strong>of</strong>fence is prosecuted by way <strong>of</strong> summary conviction, section 787(1) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Criminal Code states that the maximum term <strong>of</strong> imprisonment is six months, unless otherwise<br />
provided. The maximum possible sentence for an indictable <strong>of</strong>fence is five years, unless<br />
otherwise specified (see section 743 <strong>of</strong> the Criminal Code).<br />
The validity <strong>of</strong> a Canadian conviction on the merits cannot be put in issue at a hearing<br />
before the IAD. A conviction under a wrong name is nonetheless a conviction. 8 Offences<br />
5<br />
6<br />
7<br />
8<br />
This was underscored in Massie, Pia Yona v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6345-98), Pinard, May 26, 2000,<br />
where the Court held that someone convicted <strong>of</strong> criminal contempt <strong>of</strong> court, an uncodified common law<br />
<strong>of</strong>fence would not be caught.<br />
For the full text <strong>of</strong> the inadmissibility provisions refer to the relevant sections <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Refugee</strong><br />
Protection Act.<br />
This provision was applied in Derbas, Rachid v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1923-07), Shore, November 15, 2007;<br />
2007 FC 1194, where the person was found described in section 36(2)(a) despite the fact that he was found<br />
guilty <strong>of</strong> a “hybrid” <strong>of</strong>fence that was punished on summary conviction.<br />
Lampros, Michael George v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-434-05), Lemieux, February 18, 2005; 2005 FC 267.<br />
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designated as contraventions under the Contraventions Act cannot be the basis for<br />
inadmissibility for serious criminality or criminality (see section 36(3)(e)).<br />
The words “term <strong>of</strong> imprisonment … imposed” found in section 36(1)(a) refer to the<br />
sentence imposed by the court <strong>and</strong> not the actual time served in prison. 9 The Federal Court has<br />
held that time spent in pre-trial or pre-sentence custody which is computed by the criminal court<br />
in arriving at the person’s sentence should be considered part <strong>of</strong> the “term <strong>of</strong> imprisonment” for<br />
the purposes <strong>of</strong> section 64(2) <strong>of</strong> IRPA. 10 The same rationale would apply to section 36(1)(a).<br />
The IAD has ruled that a conditional sentence constitutes a “term <strong>of</strong> imprisonment” under<br />
section 32(1)(a) <strong>of</strong> IRPA. The rationale is that a conditional sentence is not an alternative to<br />
imprisonment; it is a term <strong>of</strong> imprisonment served in the community. 11 This appears to be<br />
consistent with the dicta <strong>of</strong> the Supreme Court <strong>of</strong> <strong>Canada</strong>. 12<br />
The words “not arising out <strong>of</strong> a single occurrence” found in section 36(2)(a) were<br />
interpreted in two Federal Court cases decided in relation to the predecessor provision under the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Act. It was held that an “occurrence” is synonymous with the terms “event” <strong>and</strong><br />
“incident” <strong>and</strong> not with “a course <strong>of</strong> events”. Therefore, summary conviction <strong>of</strong>fences which<br />
were committed on different dates arose out <strong>of</strong> different occurrences rather than a single<br />
occurrence. 13<br />
9<br />
10<br />
11<br />
12<br />
13<br />
Compare Martin, Claudette v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-126-05), Nadon, Sexton, Sharlow, October 25 2005; 2005<br />
FCA 347, where the Court interpreted the word “punished” used in section 64(2) <strong>of</strong> IRPA with respect to a<br />
term <strong>of</strong> imprisonment.<br />
M.C.I. v. Atwal, Iqbal Singh (F.C., no. IMM-3260-03), Pinard, January 8, 2004; 2004 FC 7; Cheddesingh<br />
(Jones), Nadine Karen v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2453-05), Beaudry, February 3, 2006; 2006 FC 124. However,<br />
in R. v. Mathieu, 2008 SCC 21, the Supreme Court <strong>of</strong> <strong>Canada</strong> held that “the term <strong>of</strong> imprisonment in each case<br />
is the term <strong>of</strong> imposed by the judge at the time <strong>of</strong> sentence. The <strong>of</strong>fender’s prior detention is merely one factor<br />
taken into account by the judge in determining that sentence.” The Court also stated: “Although it is possible,<br />
on an exceptional basis, to treat the time spent in pre-sentence custody as part <strong>of</strong> the term <strong>of</strong> imprisonment<br />
imposed at the time <strong>of</strong> sentence — in the context <strong>of</strong> a minimum sentence, for example, or <strong>of</strong> a conditional<br />
sentence — these are exceptions that prove the rule. As to minimum sentences, see R. v. Wust, [2000] 1 S.C.R.<br />
455, 2000 SCC 18; regarding conditional sentences, see R. v. Fice, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 742, 2005 SCC 32.”<br />
Meerza, Rizwan Mohamed v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-21315), Hoare, September 15, 2003. An adjudicator came to<br />
the same conclusion with respect to a person described in section 27(1)(d) <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Act. See M.C.I.<br />
v. Santizo, Marco Antonio (Adjudication A1-00471), Nupponen, September 27, 2001. A member <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Division held to the contrary: M.C.I. v. Sahota, Ranjit Singh (ID A3-02512), Iozzo, March 11,<br />
2004.<br />
In R. v. Fice, 2005 SCC 32, Justice Bastarache, writing for the majority, stated at para 17: “in enacting s. 742.1<br />
[<strong>of</strong> the Criminal Code – Imposing <strong>of</strong> Conditional Sentence], Parliament intended to cast a small net <strong>and</strong> only<br />
capture conduct serious enough to attract a sentence <strong>of</strong> incarceration but not so severe as to warrant a<br />
penitentiary term.” (emphasis added).<br />
Alouache, Samir v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3397-94), Gibson, October 11, 1995. Reported: Alouache v.<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1995), 31 Imm. L.R. (2d) 68 (F.C.T.D.). Affirmed on other<br />
grounds by Alouache, Samir v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-681-95), Strayer, Linden, Robertson, April 26, 1996. In<br />
this case, the applicant was convicted <strong>of</strong> three <strong>of</strong>fences that occurred on different dates. The applicant argued<br />
that these convictions arose out <strong>of</strong> a single occurrence, namely a marital dispute. The Court did not accept this<br />
argument as the breakdown <strong>of</strong> the applicant’s marriage was “a course <strong>of</strong> events” <strong>and</strong> not a single occurrence.<br />
Compare with Libby, Tena Dianna v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-1013-87), Urie, Rouleau, McQuaid, March 18,<br />
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The Canadian criminal law provisions in place at the time <strong>of</strong> the appeal to the IAD are<br />
used to determine the criminal admissibility <strong>of</strong> the foreign national. Thus persons may become<br />
inadmissible or may no longer be inadmissible by virtue <strong>of</strong> changes to the Criminal Code or<br />
other statute occurring after a conviction. 14<br />
The use <strong>of</strong> the word “convicted” in section 36 <strong>of</strong> IRPA means a conviction that has not<br />
been expunged. 15<br />
Section 36(3)(b) <strong>of</strong> IRPA provides that inadmissibility on the grounds <strong>of</strong> serious<br />
criminality or criminality may not be based on a conviction in respect <strong>of</strong> which there has been a<br />
final determination <strong>of</strong> acquittal, for example, on appeal to a higher court.<br />
If a person pleads guilty to, or is found guilty <strong>of</strong>, an <strong>of</strong>fence in <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>and</strong> is granted a<br />
conditional or absolute discharge, this will not constitute a conviction for the purposes <strong>of</strong><br />
IRPA. 16 Section 730(3) <strong>of</strong> the Criminal Code, which establishes the effect <strong>of</strong> conditional <strong>and</strong><br />
absolute discharges, provides that, in such cases as are specified, “the <strong>of</strong>fender shall be deemed<br />
not to have been convicted <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fence”, subject to certain exceptions.<br />
Section 36(3)(b) <strong>of</strong> IRPA provides that inadmissibility on the grounds <strong>of</strong> serious<br />
criminality or criminality may not be based on a conviction in respect <strong>of</strong> which a pardon has<br />
been granted, <strong>and</strong> that pardon has not ceased to have effect or been revoked under the Criminal<br />
Records Act. Section 3 <strong>of</strong> the Criminal Records Act provides that a person who has been<br />
convicted <strong>of</strong> an <strong>of</strong>fence under an Act <strong>of</strong> Parliament or a regulation made under an Act <strong>of</strong><br />
Parliament can apply to the National Parole <strong>Board</strong> for a pardon <strong>of</strong> that <strong>of</strong>fence.<br />
Generally, the concept <strong>of</strong> rehabilitation applies only to persons who have been convicted<br />
<strong>of</strong> or who committed crimes outside <strong>Canada</strong>. Section 18.1 <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Refugee</strong><br />
Protection Regulations, however, provides for the possibility <strong>of</strong> deemed rehabilitation for<br />
persons inadmissible solely on the basis <strong>of</strong> having been convicted in <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>of</strong> two or more<br />
14<br />
15<br />
16<br />
1988. Reported: Libby v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1988), 50 D.L.R. (4th) 573<br />
(F.C.A.), where the Court held that the applicant’s original charge <strong>of</strong> theft <strong>and</strong> his failure to report for<br />
fingerprinting in connection with that charge arose out <strong>of</strong> the same occurrence.<br />
Robertson v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1979] 1 F.C. 197 (C.A.); Ward, Patrick<br />
Francis v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-504-96), Heald, December 19, 1996. Reported: Ward v. <strong>Canada</strong><br />
(Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1996), 37 Imm. L.R. (2d) 102. The facts at the time <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fence<br />
must be assessed based on the Canadian law as it reads at the time <strong>of</strong> the admissibility hearing or appeal to the<br />
IAD.<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) v. Burgon, [1991] 3 F.C. 44 (C.A.).<br />
See Lew v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Manpower <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1974] 2 F.C. 700 (C.A.), where the appellant<br />
successfully appealed the conviction, <strong>and</strong> was granted an absolute discharge after he had been ordered<br />
deported, but before the matter was determined on appeal to the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal <strong>Board</strong>. The Court held<br />
that the <strong>Board</strong> ought to have considered the appeal in light <strong>of</strong> the circumstances existing at the time <strong>of</strong> the<br />
appeal (i.e., the absolute discharge). In Kalicharan v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Manpower <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1976]<br />
2 F.C. 123 (T.D.), the Court held that a person convicted at trial is a convicted person notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing that he<br />
may have an unexhausted right <strong>of</strong> appeal. However, when a court <strong>of</strong> appeal substitutes a conditional discharge<br />
for a sentence imposed by a trial court, then the conviction is deemed never to have been passed <strong>and</strong> the basis<br />
for making the removal order not only no longer exists in fact, but it is deemed, not to have existed at all.<br />
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<strong>of</strong>fences that may only be prosecuted summarily, as a prescribed class for the application <strong>of</strong><br />
36(2)(a) <strong>of</strong> IRPA, provided that at least five years have elapsed since the completion <strong>of</strong> the<br />
imposed sentence. (See the section dealing with Rehabilitation below.)<br />
Section 36(3)(e) <strong>of</strong> IRPA provides that <strong>of</strong>fences under the Young Offenders Act are not a<br />
basis for inadmissibility on the grounds <strong>of</strong> serious criminality or criminality. (A young <strong>of</strong>fender<br />
is someone who is 12 years <strong>of</strong> age or older but less than 18 years <strong>of</strong> age.) However, if the<br />
proceedings were transferred to adult court, they may render the person inadmissible. 17 The<br />
Young Offenders Act was repealed on April 1, 2003 <strong>and</strong> replaced with the Youth Criminal<br />
Justice Act, 2002. However, IRPA has not been amended accordingly. Bill C-3 (An Act to<br />
amend the <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Refugee</strong> Protection Act (certificate <strong>and</strong> special advocate) <strong>and</strong> to<br />
make a consequential amendment to another Act), in clause 3, updates the reference to the Young<br />
Offenders Act in section 36(3)(e) <strong>of</strong> IRPA with a new reference to the Youth Criminal Justice<br />
Act. Under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, the transfer provision is eliminated. Instead, the<br />
youth court first determines whether or not the young person is guilty <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fence <strong>and</strong> then,<br />
under certain circumstances, the youth court may impose an adult sentence. Citizenship <strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>Canada</strong> has publicly taken the position that a young <strong>of</strong>fender convicted under the<br />
Youth Criminal Justice Act is not inadmissible, unless he or she received an adult sentence. 18 The<br />
Youth Criminal Justice Act is presently under legislative review.<br />
Foreign convictions <strong>and</strong> crimes<br />
A person may be inadmissible on the grounds <strong>of</strong> serious criminality or criminality either<br />
because <strong>of</strong> a conviction for an <strong>of</strong>fence committed outside <strong>Canada</strong> that, if committed in <strong>Canada</strong>,<br />
would constitute an <strong>of</strong>fence under an Act <strong>of</strong> Parliament or for having committed an act outside<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> that is an <strong>of</strong>fence in the place where it was committed <strong>and</strong> that, if committed in <strong>Canada</strong>,<br />
would constitute an <strong>of</strong>fence under an Act <strong>of</strong> Parliament. These grounds <strong>of</strong> inadmissibility raise<br />
issues known as equivalency <strong>of</strong> foreign <strong>of</strong>fences to Canadian ones, a concept that is discussed in<br />
detail below.<br />
The relevant sections <strong>of</strong> IRPA dealing with serious criminality <strong>and</strong> criminality for foreign<br />
convictions or crimes committed outside <strong>Canada</strong> can be broken down as follows: 19<br />
17<br />
18<br />
19<br />
In Tessma (Ayele), Letwled Kasahun v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5652-02), Kelen, October 2, 2003; 2003 FC<br />
1126, the Court held that proceedings transferred from youth court to ordinary court under section 16 <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Young Offenders Act are not covered by the exemption in section 36(3)(e) <strong>of</strong> IRPA. Section 16(7) <strong>of</strong> the Young<br />
Offenders Act, provided that, after the youth court judge made an order transferring the proceedings to ordinary<br />
court, the proceedings under that Act were discontinued, <strong>and</strong> the proceedings with respect to the criminal<br />
charges were taken before the ordinary court.<br />
Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>Canada</strong> website, Internet:<br />
.<br />
For the full text <strong>of</strong> the inadmissibility provisions refer to the relevant sections <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Refugee</strong><br />
Protection Act.<br />
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• “serious criminality” – equivalent conviction outside <strong>Canada</strong>; punishable in <strong>Canada</strong><br />
by maximum prison term <strong>of</strong> 10 years or more – IRPA, s. 36(1)(b)<br />
• “serious criminality” – committed equivalent <strong>of</strong>fence outside <strong>Canada</strong>; punishable in<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> by maximum prison term <strong>of</strong> 10 years or more – IRPA, s. 36(1)(c)<br />
• “criminality” – equivalent conviction outside <strong>Canada</strong>; punishable in <strong>Canada</strong> by<br />
maximum prison term <strong>of</strong> less than 10 years – IRPA, s. 36(2)(b)<br />
• criminality – committed equivalent <strong>of</strong>fence outside <strong>Canada</strong>; punishable in <strong>Canada</strong> by<br />
maximum prison term <strong>of</strong> less than 10 years – IRPA, s. 36(1)(c)<br />
• “criminality” – equivalent <strong>of</strong> two summary convictions outside <strong>Canada</strong> (not arising<br />
out <strong>of</strong> a single occurrence) – IRPA, s. 36(2)(b)<br />
Foreign convictions<br />
Foreign dispositions in criminal matters may take forms unknown under Canadian law<br />
<strong>and</strong> their effect will have to be determined by the IAD. 20 The use <strong>of</strong> the word “convicted” in<br />
section 36 <strong>of</strong> IRPA means a conviction that has not been expunged. 21 Foreign convictions can<br />
also be expunged.<br />
In the case <strong>of</strong> a foreign jurisdiction, the legislation providing for the expunging <strong>of</strong> a<br />
conviction should be accorded respect where the laws <strong>and</strong> the legal system are similar to<br />
<strong>Canada</strong>’s. 22 The Federal Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal in Saini, 23 endorsed the following statement <strong>of</strong> the law<br />
with respect to the effect to be given to a foreign discharge or pardon:<br />
20<br />
21<br />
22<br />
See, for example, Drake, Michael Lawrence v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4050-98), Tremblay-Lamer, March<br />
11, 1999. Reported: Drake v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1999), 49 Imm. L.R. (2d) 218<br />
(F.C.T.D.), which considered the effect <strong>of</strong> an “Alford plea” in the State <strong>of</strong> Washington.<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) v. Burgon, [1991] 3 F.C. 44 (C.A.).<br />
M.E.I. v. Burgon, David Ross (F.C.A., no. A-17-90), MacGuigan, Linden, Mahoney (concurring in the result),<br />
February 22, 1991. Reported: <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) v. Burgon, [1991] 3 F.C. 44<br />
(C.A.). The Court had to consider the application to the definition <strong>of</strong> “convicted” in the former <strong>Immigration</strong> Act<br />
<strong>of</strong> the United Kingdom Powers <strong>of</strong> Criminal Courts Act, 1973, which legislation provided that a person who<br />
was convicted <strong>of</strong> an <strong>of</strong>fence (like Burgon’s <strong>of</strong>fence) <strong>and</strong> received a probation order was deemed not to be<br />
convicted <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fence. In the Court’s view, Burgon was not considered convicted under United Kingdom<br />
law; therefore, because the United Kingdom <strong>and</strong> Canadian legal systems were so similar, there was no<br />
conviction for purposes <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Act. See also Barnett, John v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4280-94),<br />
Jerome, March 22, 1996. Reported: Barnett v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1996),<br />
33 Imm. L.R. (2d) 1 (F.C.T.D.). The Court considered another piece <strong>of</strong> legislation, the United Kingdom<br />
Rehabilitation <strong>of</strong> Offenders Act, 1974, which provided that, where a person was convicted <strong>and</strong> sentenced for<br />
certain <strong>of</strong>fences <strong>and</strong> was then rehabilitated, the conviction was expunged. The Court applied the rationale in<br />
Burgon <strong>and</strong> found that, although there were differences in the two pieces <strong>of</strong> legislation, the effect was the<br />
same: under both statutes, the person could not be said to have been convicted. Therefore, Barnett was not<br />
considered to have been convicted in the United Kingdom <strong>and</strong> he was not convicted for purposes <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Act.<br />
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[24] To summarize, our jurisprudence requires that three elements must be<br />
established before a foreign discharge or pardon may be recognized: (1) the<br />
foreign legal system as a whole must be similar to that <strong>of</strong> <strong>Canada</strong>; (2) the aim,<br />
content <strong>and</strong> effect <strong>of</strong> the specific foreign law must be similar to Canadian<br />
law; <strong>and</strong> (3) there must be no valid reason not to recognize the effect <strong>of</strong> the<br />
foreign law.<br />
The Court in Saini also held that in the absence <strong>of</strong> evidence as to the motivating<br />
considerations which led to the grant <strong>of</strong> a pardon by another state jurisdiction, the <strong>Board</strong> is not<br />
bound by the pardon.<br />
The Federal Court had considered the application <strong>of</strong> these principles in several cases. 24 In<br />
one case, the Federal Court held that an acquittal based solely on a pardon by the victim <strong>of</strong> a<br />
crime is not similar to that <strong>of</strong> Canadian law <strong>and</strong> should not be recognized in <strong>Canada</strong>. 25<br />
The applicability <strong>of</strong> section 36(3)(e) <strong>of</strong> IRPA, dealing with the Young Offenders Act, to<br />
foreign convictions is not entirely clear. 26<br />
Equivalency <strong>of</strong> foreign convictions or crimes<br />
Paragraphs 36(1)(b) <strong>and</strong> (c) <strong>and</strong> 36(2)(b) <strong>and</strong> (c) <strong>of</strong> IRPA contain the equivalency<br />
provisions. Equivalencing is the equating <strong>of</strong> a foreign conviction or crime, whether an act or<br />
omission to a Canadian <strong>of</strong>fence.<br />
23<br />
24<br />
25<br />
26<br />
M.C.I. v. Saini, Parminder Singh (F.C.A., no. A-121-00), Linden, Sharlow, Malone, October 19, 2001; 2001<br />
FCA 311. Reported: <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) v. Saini, [2002] 1 F.C. 200 (F.C.A.).<br />
The Court also held that the crime in question, hijacking, is so serious that it provided a solid rationale to depart<br />
from the principle that a pardon granted by another jurisdiction, whose laws are based on a similar foundation<br />
as in <strong>Canada</strong>, should be recognized in <strong>Canada</strong>.<br />
See, for example: Sicuro, Fortunato v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-695-02), Mosley, March 25, 2004; 2004 FC 461;<br />
S.A. v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3512-05), Gibson, April 27, 2006; 2006 FC 515.<br />
Magtibay, Brigida Cherly v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2701-04), Blais, March 24, 2005; 2005 FC 397.<br />
In a decision which considered the applicability <strong>of</strong> the former <strong>Immigration</strong> Act, where there was no provision<br />
dealing specifically with young <strong>of</strong>fenders, the Court held that since the person convicted abroad for crimes<br />
committed as a minor was tried in adult court, that constituted a conviction under that Act: M.C.I. v.<br />
Dinaburgsky, Yuri (F.C., no. T-234-04), Kelen, September 29, 2006; 2006 FC 1161. For a different<br />
interpretation which made specific reference to the provisions <strong>of</strong> the Young Offenders Act, see Wong, Yuk Ying<br />
v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4464-98), Campbell, February 22, 2000.<br />
According to information posted on the Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>Canada</strong> website, Internet:<br />
, a young <strong>of</strong>fender is not<br />
inadmissible if he or she was treated as a young <strong>of</strong>fender in a country which has special provisions for young<br />
<strong>of</strong>fenders, or was convicted in a country which does not have special provisions for young <strong>of</strong>fenders but the<br />
circumstances <strong>of</strong> the conviction are such that he or she would not have received an adult sentence in <strong>Canada</strong>.<br />
However, a young <strong>of</strong>fender would be inadmissible if he or she was convicted in adult court in a country that<br />
has special provisions for young <strong>of</strong>fenders, or was convicted was convicted in a country that does not have<br />
special provisions for young <strong>of</strong>fenders but the circumstances <strong>of</strong> the conviction are such that he or she would<br />
have been treated as an adult in <strong>Canada</strong>.<br />
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There is a distinction between paragraphs (b) <strong>and</strong> (c) in both sections 26 <strong>and</strong> 37.<br />
Paragraph (b) is used where there has been a conviction outside <strong>Canada</strong>, whereas paragraph (c) is<br />
used where it is alleged that the person has “committed” an <strong>of</strong>fence. While the latter provision<br />
has been applied in cases where the person fled justice after being charged but before being tried<br />
or has never been charged in the jurisdiction where the crime was committed, it is not clear<br />
whether the provision was intended to apply to persons who were convicted for the crime<br />
committed in the foreign jurisdiction 27 or who were tried in that jurisdiction but court chose not<br />
to enter a conviction. 28 The <strong>Immigration</strong> Division has applied it in the former case, <strong>and</strong> the<br />
Federal Court appears to have accepted that it can apply in the latter case.<br />
To satisfy paragraph (b), there must have been a conviction outside <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>and</strong> this<br />
conviction must then be compared to a Canadian <strong>of</strong>fence. Under section 36(1)(b), the<br />
determination to be made is whether the <strong>of</strong>fence outside <strong>Canada</strong> would, if it had been committed<br />
in <strong>Canada</strong>, be an <strong>of</strong>fence punishable by a maximum term <strong>of</strong> imprisonment <strong>of</strong> at least 10 years.<br />
Under section 36(2)(b), the determination to be made is whether the <strong>of</strong>fence outside <strong>Canada</strong><br />
would, if it had been committed in <strong>Canada</strong>, be an indictable <strong>of</strong>fence (which includes “hybrid”<br />
<strong>of</strong>fences) punishable by a maximum term <strong>of</strong> imprisonment <strong>of</strong> less than 10 years, or whether, in<br />
the case <strong>of</strong> two <strong>of</strong>fences not arising out <strong>of</strong> a single occurrence, those <strong>of</strong>fences would, if<br />
committed in <strong>Canada</strong>, be federal <strong>of</strong>fences.<br />
To satisfy paragraph (c) in sections 36(1) <strong>and</strong> 36(2) the focus is on the commission <strong>of</strong> an<br />
<strong>of</strong>fence. The first determination which must be made is whether the person has committed an act<br />
or omission which would be an <strong>of</strong>fence in the place where it occurred. Once this determination<br />
has been made, there must be a determination as to whether that act or omission, if committed in<br />
<strong>Canada</strong>, would be an <strong>of</strong>fence in <strong>Canada</strong>. 29 Under section 36(1)(c), the relevant Canadian <strong>of</strong>fence<br />
must be punishable by a maximum term <strong>of</strong> imprisonment <strong>of</strong> at least 10 years. Under section<br />
27<br />
28<br />
29<br />
In M.P.S.E.P v. Watson, Malcolm (ID A6-00450), Lasowski, December 18, 2006 (reasons signed January 22,<br />
2007), the subject <strong>of</strong> the admissibility hearing was convicted in New York State <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fences <strong>of</strong> sexual abuse<br />
in the third degree <strong>and</strong> endangering the welfare <strong>of</strong> a child. The <strong>Immigration</strong> Division found that the <strong>of</strong>fence <strong>of</strong><br />
sexual abuse in the third degree is equivalent to the <strong>of</strong>fence <strong>of</strong> sexual exploitation under section 153 <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Canadian Criminal Code. The foreign <strong>of</strong>fence is broader than the Canadian <strong>of</strong>fence, as the latter contains the<br />
essential element that the accused be in a position <strong>of</strong> trust or authority towards the victim. Since the subject <strong>of</strong><br />
the proceeding was the victim’s ninth grade English teacher, he was in a position <strong>of</strong> trust with respect to the<br />
victim. He was therefore found to be a person described in section 36(1)(b) <strong>of</strong> IRPA. He was also found to be<br />
described in section 36(1)(c) <strong>of</strong> the Act based on the same facts.<br />
In Magtibay, Brigida Cherly v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2701-04), Blais, March 24, 2005; 2005 FC 397, the<br />
Court in the Philippines found that although the applicant’s spouse had committed an <strong>of</strong>fence, since the victim<br />
pardoned her aggressor, no conviction resulted. An immigration <strong>of</strong>ficer found the <strong>of</strong>fence equivalent to sexual<br />
assault in <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>and</strong> gave no effect to the pardon. The Court held that the immigration <strong>of</strong>ficer was correct in<br />
not giving effect to the pardon <strong>and</strong> finding inadmissibility under s. 36(1)(c) <strong>of</strong> IRPA, since there was no need to<br />
prove a conviction; rather, certain acts must have been committed that render the person inadmissible.<br />
This approach was followed in decisions such as M.C.I. v. Legault, Alex<strong>and</strong>er Henri (F.C.A., no. A-47-95),<br />
Marceau, MacGuigan, Desjardins, October 1, 1997. Reported: <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>Immigration</strong>) v. Legault (1997), 42 Imm. L.R. (2d) 192 (F.C.A.) <strong>and</strong> Zeon, Kyong-U v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-<br />
7766-04), Campbell, September 29, 2005; 2005 FC 1338. However, in Pardhan, Wazir Ali v. M.C.I. (F.C., no.<br />
IMM-936-06), Blanchard, July 20, 2007; 2007 FC 756, the Court suggested that the essential elements <strong>of</strong> the<br />
foreign <strong>and</strong> Canadian <strong>of</strong>fences must be compared to ascertain whether or not the evidence adduced was<br />
sufficient to establish equivalency.<br />
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36(2)(c), the relevant Canadian <strong>of</strong>fence must be an indictable <strong>of</strong>fence (which includes “hybrid”<br />
<strong>of</strong>fences) punishable by a maximum term <strong>of</strong> imprisonment <strong>of</strong> less than 10 years.<br />
As mentioned earlier, there is the requirement that the <strong>of</strong>fence be punishable in <strong>Canada</strong><br />
“under an Act <strong>of</strong> Parliament”. This requirement is not met where the <strong>of</strong>fence is punishable<br />
through the inherent jurisdiction <strong>of</strong> the court rather than through federal legislation. 30<br />
The st<strong>and</strong>ard <strong>of</strong> pro<strong>of</strong> for the serious criminality <strong>and</strong> criminality provisions, including<br />
equivalency, is “reasonable grounds to believe,” which is less than a balance <strong>of</strong> probabilities. In<br />
determining whether there are “reasonable grounds to believe” a person has committed an<br />
<strong>of</strong>fence abroad, the IAD should examine evidence pertaining to the <strong>of</strong>fence. 31 In Legault, the<br />
Federal Court – Trial Division held that the contents <strong>of</strong> the warrant for arrest <strong>and</strong> the indictment<br />
did not constitute evidence <strong>of</strong> the commission <strong>of</strong> alleged criminal <strong>of</strong>fences. 32 The Federal Court<br />
<strong>of</strong> Appeal overturned this decision <strong>and</strong> determined that the warrant for arrest <strong>and</strong> the indictment<br />
were appropriate pieces <strong>of</strong> evidence to consider. 33<br />
If the Canadian <strong>of</strong>fence used for equivalencing is unconstitutional then there can be no<br />
equivalent Canadian <strong>of</strong>fence. 34 However, there is no obligation to consider the constitutionality<br />
<strong>of</strong> foreign criminal law. 35<br />
The principles to be followed when determining equivalency have been set out in several<br />
Federal Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal decisions.<br />
In Brannson, 36 the Court said:<br />
Whatever the names given the <strong>of</strong>fences or the words used in defining them, one<br />
must determine the essential elements <strong>of</strong> each <strong>and</strong> be satisfied that these essential<br />
30<br />
31<br />
32<br />
33<br />
34<br />
35<br />
36<br />
There is sentencing jurisdiction under the common law <strong>and</strong> under the Criminal Code. In Massie, Pia Yona v.<br />
M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6345-98), Pinard, May 26, 2000, the Court found that the powers available to a<br />
judge in imposing punishment for contempt <strong>of</strong> court was inherent from common law. Thus, the <strong>of</strong>fence,<br />
criminal contempt, was not one “that may be punishable under any Act <strong>of</strong> Parliament.”<br />
Legault, Alex<strong>and</strong>er Henri v. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-7485-93), McGillis, January 17, 1995. Reported:<br />
Legault v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Secretary <strong>of</strong> State) (1995), 26 Imm. L.R. (2d) 255 (F.C.T.D.).<br />
See Kiani, Raja Ishtiaq Asghar v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3433-94), Gibson, May 31, 1995. Reported:<br />
Kiani v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1995), 31 Imm. L.R. (2d) 269 (F.C.T.D.), which<br />
distinguishes Legault on its facts because in Kiani the adjudicator made an independent determination on the<br />
basis <strong>of</strong> the evidence adduced.<br />
Legault (F.C.A.), supra, footnote 31.<br />
Halm v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1995] 2 F.C. 331 (T.D.). The Federal Court –<br />
Trial Division, in Howard, Kenrick Kirk v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5252-94), Dubé, January 4, 1996, stated<br />
that the IAD does not have the jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality <strong>of</strong> any legislation other than the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Act (since replaced by IRPA). Challenges to the constitutionality <strong>of</strong> other federal legislation, as it<br />
may arise in an appeal before the IAD, must be brought in another forum.<br />
Li, Ronald Fook Shiu v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-329-95), Strayer, Robertson, Chevalier, August 7, 1996.<br />
Reported: Li v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1997] 1 F.C. 235 (C.A.). Affirming in part,<br />
Li, Ronald Fook Shiu v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4210-94), Cullen, May 11, 1995.<br />
Brannson v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1981] 2 F.C. 141 (C.A.), at 152-153.<br />
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elements correspond. One must, <strong>of</strong> course expect differences in the wording <strong>of</strong><br />
statutory <strong>of</strong>fences in different countries.<br />
After Brannson, the Court in Hill 37 provided some further guidance <strong>and</strong> said that there<br />
were three ways to establish equivalency:<br />
1. by a comparison <strong>of</strong> the precise wording in each statute both through<br />
documents <strong>and</strong>, if available, through the evidence <strong>of</strong> an expert or experts in the<br />
foreign law <strong>and</strong> determining therefrom the essential ingredients <strong>of</strong> the respective<br />
<strong>of</strong>fences;<br />
2. by examining the evidence adduced before the adjudicator, both oral <strong>and</strong><br />
documentary, to ascertain whether or not that evidence was sufficient to establish<br />
that the essential ingredients <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fence in <strong>Canada</strong> had been proven in the<br />
foreign proceedings, whether precisely described in the initiating documents or in<br />
the statutory provisions in the same words or not; <strong>and</strong><br />
3. by a combination <strong>of</strong> paragraph one <strong>and</strong> two.<br />
In Li, 38 the Court stated that the fundamental test <strong>of</strong> equivalency is whether the acts<br />
committed abroad <strong>and</strong> punished there would have been punishable in <strong>Canada</strong>?<br />
The visa <strong>of</strong>ficer is required to establish a prima facie case for equating the <strong>of</strong>fence with a<br />
provision <strong>of</strong> the Canadian criminal law. 39 The visa <strong>of</strong>ficer, not a legal expert, must be satisfied<br />
that all the elements set out in the relevant provision have been met. 40 The onus, however, is<br />
always on the sponsor to show that the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer erred in determining that the applicant is<br />
criminally inadmissible to <strong>Canada</strong>.<br />
To determine equivalency between a foreign <strong>and</strong> a Canadian <strong>of</strong>fence, it is not necessary<br />
for the Minister to present evidence <strong>of</strong> the criminal statutes <strong>of</strong> the foreign state; however, pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong><br />
foreign law ought to be made if the foreign statutory provisions exist. 41 Where there is no<br />
evidence <strong>of</strong> the foreign law, the evidence before the panel must be examined to determine<br />
whether the essential ingredients <strong>of</strong> the Canadian <strong>of</strong>fence had to have been proven to have<br />
secured the foreign conviction. 42<br />
In some cases where the law <strong>of</strong> the foreign jurisdiction has not been adduced in evidence,<br />
use has been made <strong>of</strong> the legal concept <strong>of</strong> malum in se. Black’s Law Dictionary (6th edition)<br />
defines malum in se as follows (in part):<br />
37<br />
38<br />
39<br />
40<br />
41<br />
42<br />
Hill, Errol Stanley v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-514-86), Hugessen, Urie (concurring), MacGuigan, January 29,<br />
1987. Reported: Hill v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1987), 1 Imm. L.R. (2d) 1<br />
(F.C.A.), at 9.<br />
Li, Ronald Fook Shiu (F.C.A.), supra, footnote 35, 249.<br />
Tsang, Sau Lin v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-9587), D. Davey, Chu, Ahara, January 8, 1988.<br />
Choi, Min Su v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-975-99), Denault, May 8, 2000.<br />
Dayan v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1987] 2 F.C. 569 (C.A.).<br />
Ibid.<br />
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An act is said to be malum in se when it is inherently <strong>and</strong> essentially evil, that is,<br />
immoral in its nature <strong>and</strong> injurious in its consequences, without any regard to the<br />
fact <strong>of</strong> its being noticed or punished by the law <strong>of</strong> the state. Such are most or all<br />
<strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fenses cognizable at common law (without the denouncement <strong>of</strong> a<br />
statute); as murder, larceny, etc.<br />
In Dayan, the concept <strong>of</strong> malum in se was used because there was no pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> the foreign<br />
law for the purposes <strong>of</strong> equivalencing. Justice Urie said the following about the use <strong>of</strong> this<br />
doctrine:<br />
Reliance on the concept <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fences as malum in se to prove equivalency with<br />
provisions <strong>of</strong> our Criminal Code, is a device which should be resorted to by<br />
immigration authorities only when for very good reason, established to the<br />
Adjudicator’s satisfaction, pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> foreign law has been difficult to make <strong>and</strong><br />
then only when the foreign law is that <strong>of</strong> a non-common law country. It is a<br />
concept to which resort need not be had in the case <strong>of</strong> common law countries. 43<br />
If the scope <strong>of</strong> the Canadian <strong>of</strong>fence is narrower than the scope <strong>of</strong> the foreign <strong>of</strong>fence,<br />
then it is necessary to ascertain the particulars <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fence <strong>of</strong> which the applicant was<br />
convicted. 44 It is necessary to “go beyond the wording <strong>of</strong> the statute in order to determine<br />
whether the essential ingredients <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fence in <strong>Canada</strong> had been proven in the foreign<br />
proceedings.” 45<br />
If the scope <strong>of</strong> the Canadian <strong>of</strong>fence is wider than the scope <strong>of</strong> the foreign <strong>of</strong>fence, it is<br />
not necessary to go beyond the wording <strong>of</strong> the statute in order to determine whether the essential<br />
ingredients <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fence in <strong>Canada</strong> had been proven in the foreign proceedings. 46<br />
There is no legal requirement to find the equivalent that is “most similar” <strong>and</strong> make the<br />
decision with respect to that provision only. 47<br />
Where neither a Canadian equivalent <strong>of</strong>fence nor the essential ingredients <strong>of</strong> the foreign<br />
<strong>of</strong>fence are identified in the record, it may be impossible to conclude that the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer had<br />
made a comparison between an <strong>of</strong>fence under Canadian law <strong>and</strong> the foreign <strong>of</strong>fence. 48<br />
43<br />
44<br />
45<br />
46<br />
47<br />
48<br />
Ibid., at 578. See also M.C.I. v. Obaseki, Eghe (IAD T99-07461), Kalvin, November 15, 2000, where the IAD<br />
noted that the doctrine <strong>of</strong> malum in se is to be used only where there is a very good reason why the foreign law<br />
was not adduced in evidence. Moreover, it held that it is not appropriate to extend the doctrine <strong>of</strong> malum in se<br />
to a case in which, not only was the law <strong>of</strong> the foreign jurisdiction not adduced, but the person concerned was<br />
not convicted <strong>of</strong> an <strong>of</strong>fence.<br />
Brannson, supra, footnote 36.<br />
Lei, Alberto v. S.G.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5249-93), Nadon, February 21, 1994. Reported: Lei v. <strong>Canada</strong><br />
(Solicitor General) (1994), 24 Imm. L.R. (2d) 82 (F.C.T.D.).<br />
Lam, Chun Wai v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4901-94), Tremblay-Lamer, November 16, 1995.<br />
M.C.I. v. Brar, Pinder Singh (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6313-98), Campbell, November 23, 1999.<br />
Jeworski, Dorothy Sau Yun v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. W86-4070), Eglington, Goodspeed, Vidal, September 17, 1986.<br />
Reported: Jeworski v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1986), 1 Imm. L.R. (2d) 59<br />
(I.A.B.).<br />
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In a judicial review from a visa <strong>of</strong>ficer’s refusal based on section 19(2)(b)(ii) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Act [i.e., the equivalent <strong>of</strong> two Canadian summary convictions, now IRPA, s.<br />
36(2)(a)], the applicant argued that the <strong>of</strong>fences for which he was convicted were equivalent to<br />
municipal by-law infractions <strong>and</strong> not Criminal Code <strong>of</strong>fences. The visa <strong>of</strong>ficer had no oral or<br />
documentary evidence as to the circumstances <strong>of</strong> the commission <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fences. In allowing the<br />
application, the Court noted that in order for an <strong>of</strong>fence to be equivalent to a Criminal Code<br />
<strong>of</strong>fence, it usually consists <strong>of</strong> the actus reus <strong>and</strong> mens rea. The Court held:<br />
In general, the essential elements <strong>of</strong> an <strong>of</strong>fence are those components <strong>of</strong> an<br />
<strong>of</strong>fence usually consisting <strong>of</strong> the actus reus <strong>and</strong> mens rea, which must be<br />
proven for a finding <strong>of</strong> guilt. 49<br />
An issue which has arisen on many occasions concerns the availability <strong>of</strong> defences <strong>and</strong><br />
how defences fit into the evaluation <strong>of</strong> the essential elements <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fence for the purpose <strong>of</strong><br />
equivalencing. The Federal Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal dealt with this issue in the case <strong>of</strong> Li. 50 In that case,<br />
the Federal Court – Trial Division had found that the availability <strong>of</strong> defences is not an essential<br />
element <strong>of</strong> the equivalency test. 51 The Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal disagreed <strong>and</strong> said as follows:<br />
A comparison <strong>of</strong> the “essential elements” <strong>of</strong> the respective <strong>of</strong>fences requires a<br />
comparison <strong>of</strong> the definitions <strong>of</strong> those <strong>of</strong>fences including defences particular to<br />
those <strong>of</strong>fences or those classes <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fences. 52<br />
In addition, the Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal concluded that the procedural or evidentiary rules <strong>of</strong> the<br />
two jurisdictions should not be compared, even if the Canadian rules are m<strong>and</strong>ated by the<br />
Charter. The issue to be resolved in any equivalencing case is not whether the person would have<br />
been convicted in <strong>Canada</strong>, but whether there is a Canadian equivalent for the <strong>of</strong>fence <strong>of</strong> which<br />
the person was convicted outside <strong>Canada</strong>.<br />
The Federal Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal has held that the validity <strong>of</strong> a foreign conviction on the<br />
merits cannot be put in issue. 53 However, in a decision <strong>of</strong> the Federal Court, it was held that the<br />
Adjudicator was required to consider the applicant’s allegation that the statements he made to the<br />
police that resulted in his conviction in India were given under torture. 54<br />
49<br />
50<br />
51<br />
52<br />
53<br />
54<br />
Popic, Bojan v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5727-98), Hansen, September 14, 2000. The Court held that the<br />
visa <strong>of</strong>ficer erred by importing into the analysis considerations which are not relevant to a determination <strong>of</strong> the<br />
essential elements <strong>of</strong> an <strong>of</strong>fence, namely that like all residents <strong>of</strong> Germany, the applicant knew he must pay for<br />
public transit <strong>and</strong> that being caught three times is quite exceptional<br />
Li, Ronald Fook Shiu (F.C.A.), supra, footnote 35.<br />
Li, Ronald Fook Shiu (F.C.T.D.), supra, footnote 35. Li (F.C.T.D.) distinguished Steward, Charles Chadwick v.<br />
M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-962-87), Heald, Marceau, Lacombe, April 15, 1988. Reported: Steward v. <strong>Canada</strong><br />
(Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1988] 3 F.C. 487 (C.A.) on the basis that “colour <strong>of</strong> right” in the<br />
Steward <strong>of</strong>fence was an essential element <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fence <strong>and</strong> not a defence.<br />
Li, Ronald Fook Shiu (F.C.A.), supra, footnote 35, at 258.<br />
Brannson, supra, footnote 36, at 145; Li, Ronald Fook Shiu (F.C.A.), supra, footnote 35, at 256.<br />
Sian, Jasvir Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1673-02), O’Keefe, September 3, 2003; 2003 FC 1022.<br />
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Equivalency decisions have been overturned because <strong>of</strong> inadequate analysis <strong>of</strong> the<br />
relevant statutes, the essential elements <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fences, <strong>and</strong> the evidence. 55 For a more detailed<br />
discussion <strong>of</strong> equivalency please see Chapter 8 <strong>of</strong> the Removal Order <strong>Appeals</strong> paper.<br />
Rehabilitation<br />
Section 36(3)(c) <strong>of</strong> IRPA provides that sections 36(1)(b) <strong>and</strong> (c) <strong>and</strong> 36(2)(b) <strong>and</strong> (c) –<br />
i.e., foreign convictions <strong>and</strong> crimes committed outside <strong>Canada</strong> – do not constitute inadmissibility<br />
for permanent residents or foreign nationals, if they:<br />
(i) satisfy the Minister that they have been rehabilitated after the prescribed period (5<br />
years after the completion <strong>of</strong> the sentence imposed or the commission <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>of</strong>fence), in accordance with section 17 <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Refugee</strong><br />
Protection Regulations; or<br />
(ii)<br />
are a member <strong>of</strong> a prescribed class that are deemed to have been rehabilitated, in<br />
accordance with section 18 <strong>of</strong> the Regulations.<br />
Section 17 <strong>of</strong> the Regulations provides that, after a period <strong>of</strong> 5 years from the completion<br />
<strong>of</strong> any sentence imposed or from the commission <strong>of</strong> an <strong>of</strong>fence, a person will no longer be<br />
inadmissible if the person is able to satisfy the Minister that he or she has been rehabilitated,<br />
provided that the person has not been convicted <strong>of</strong> a subsequent <strong>of</strong>fence other than a<br />
contravention under the Contraventions Act or an <strong>of</strong>fence under the Young Offenders Act.<br />
Deemed rehabilitation under section 18 <strong>of</strong> the Regulations is triggered by the passage <strong>of</strong> a<br />
period <strong>of</strong> time after the completion <strong>of</strong> a sentence or the commission <strong>of</strong> an <strong>of</strong>fence, as the case<br />
may be, without having to apply to the Minister. Deemed rehabilitation does not apply to persons<br />
who are inadmissible on the ground <strong>of</strong> serious criminality. Persons inadmissible on the ground <strong>of</strong><br />
serious criminality, as well as others who do not qualify for deemed rehabilitation, can apply to<br />
the Minister for individual rehabilitation under Regulation 17.<br />
Section 18 <strong>of</strong> the Regulations sets out three prescribed classes <strong>of</strong> persons who can qualify<br />
for deemed rehabilitation:<br />
(a) persons convicted outside <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>of</strong> only one <strong>of</strong>fence that, if committed in <strong>Canada</strong>, would<br />
constitute an indictable <strong>of</strong>fence (including a “hybrid” <strong>of</strong>fence) punishable in <strong>Canada</strong> by a<br />
sentence <strong>of</strong> less than 10 years, <strong>and</strong> they meet the following requirements:<br />
o at least 10 years have elapsed since the completion <strong>of</strong> their sentence<br />
o<br />
o<br />
they have not been convicted in <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>of</strong> an indictable <strong>of</strong>fence<br />
they have not been convicted in <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>of</strong> any summary conviction <strong>of</strong>fence in the last<br />
10 years or more than one summary conviction <strong>of</strong>fence in the 10 years before that<br />
(other than a contravention under the Contraventions Act or an <strong>of</strong>fence under the<br />
Youth Criminal Justice Act)<br />
55<br />
Pardhan, Wazir Ali v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-936-06), Blanchard, July 20, 2007; 2007 FC 756.<br />
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o<br />
o<br />
o<br />
they have not in the last 10 years been convicted outside <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>of</strong> an <strong>of</strong>fence that, if<br />
committed in <strong>Canada</strong>, would constitute a federal <strong>of</strong>fence (other than a contravention<br />
under the Contraventions Act or an <strong>of</strong>fence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act)<br />
they have not in the 10 years before that been convicted outside <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>of</strong> more than<br />
one <strong>of</strong>fence that, if committed in <strong>Canada</strong>, would constitute a summary conviction<br />
<strong>of</strong>fence<br />
they have not committed an act described in section 36(2)(c)<br />
(b) persons convicted outside <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>of</strong> two or more <strong>of</strong>fences that, if committed in <strong>Canada</strong>,<br />
would constitute summary conviction <strong>of</strong>fences, <strong>and</strong> they meet the following requirements:<br />
o at least 5 years have elapsed since completion <strong>of</strong> their sentences<br />
o they have not been convicted in <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>of</strong> an indictable <strong>of</strong>fence<br />
o they have not been convicted in <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>of</strong> a federal <strong>of</strong>fence in the last 5 years (other<br />
than a contravention under the Contraventions Act or an <strong>of</strong>fence under the Youth<br />
Criminal Justice Act)<br />
o they have not in the 5 years before that been convicted in <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>of</strong> more than one<br />
summary conviction <strong>of</strong>fences (other than a contravention under the Contraventions<br />
Act or an <strong>of</strong>fence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act)<br />
o they have not in the last 5 years been convicted outside <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>of</strong> an <strong>of</strong>fence that, if<br />
committed in <strong>Canada</strong>, would constitute a federal <strong>of</strong>fence (other than a contravention<br />
under the Contraventions Act or an <strong>of</strong>fence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act)<br />
o they have been convicted outside <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>of</strong> an <strong>of</strong>fence referred to in s. 36(2)(b) that,<br />
if committed in <strong>Canada</strong>, would constitute an indictable <strong>of</strong>fence<br />
o they have not committed an act described in section 36(2)(c)<br />
(c) persons who have committed only one act outside <strong>Canada</strong> that is an <strong>of</strong>fence in the place<br />
where it was committed <strong>and</strong> that, if committed in <strong>Canada</strong>, would constitute an indictable<br />
<strong>of</strong>fence (including a “hybrid” <strong>of</strong>fence), punishable in <strong>Canada</strong> by a maximum sentence <strong>of</strong> less<br />
than 10, <strong>and</strong> they meet the following requirements:<br />
o at least 10 years have elapsed since the commission <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fence<br />
o<br />
o<br />
o<br />
o<br />
o<br />
they have not been convicted in <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>of</strong> an indictable <strong>of</strong>fence<br />
they have not been convicted in <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>of</strong> any summary conviction <strong>of</strong>fence in the last<br />
10 years or more than one summary conviction <strong>of</strong>fence in the 10 years before that<br />
(other than a contravention under the Contraventions Act or an <strong>of</strong>fence under the<br />
Youth Criminal Justice Act)<br />
they have not in the last 10 years been convicted outside <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>of</strong> an <strong>of</strong>fence that, if<br />
committed in <strong>Canada</strong>, would constitute a federal <strong>of</strong>fence (other than a contravention<br />
under the Contraventions Act or an <strong>of</strong>fence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act)<br />
they have not in the 10 years before that been convicted outside <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>of</strong> more than<br />
one <strong>of</strong>fence that, if committed in <strong>Canada</strong>, would constitute a summary conviction<br />
<strong>of</strong>fence<br />
they have not been convicted outside <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>of</strong> an <strong>of</strong>fence that, if committed in<br />
<strong>Canada</strong>, would constitute an indictable <strong>of</strong>fence<br />
There is very little jurisprudence from the Federal Court interpreting the legislation<br />
providing for deemed rehabilitation. 56 Unlike individual rehabilitation (section 18 <strong>of</strong> the<br />
56<br />
See, for example, Driessen, Kenneth Leroy v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-9044-04), Snider, November 1, 2005;<br />
2005 FC 1480.<br />
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Regulations), which is at the discretion <strong>of</strong> the Minister, it is arguable that the deemed<br />
rehabilitation provisions can be applied by the IAD.<br />
As under section 17 <strong>and</strong> 18 <strong>of</strong> the Regulations, one <strong>of</strong> the criteria for rehabilitation in the<br />
predecessor sections 19(1)(c.1) <strong>and</strong> 19(2)(a.1) <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Act, was that at least five years<br />
have elapsed “since the expiration <strong>of</strong> any sentence imposed for the <strong>of</strong>fence.” For immigration<br />
purposes, the IAD held that “any sentence imposed” would include any period <strong>of</strong> incarceration,<br />
probation or the suspension <strong>of</strong> a privilege. 57<br />
The Minister <strong>of</strong> Public Safety <strong>and</strong> Emergency Preparedness must decide the question <strong>of</strong><br />
rehabilitation. Reasons are required to be provided for decisions <strong>of</strong> this nature. 58 The IAD held,<br />
with respect to the predecessor section 19(1)(c.1) or 19(2)(a.1) <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Act, that it did<br />
not have jurisdiction to determine whether a person has or has not been rehabilitated. 59 The same<br />
would appear to hold true for section 17 <strong>of</strong> the Regulations, which specifies that it is the Minister<br />
who must be satisfied. Rehabilitation is, however, a factor which the IAD can consider in the<br />
exercise <strong>of</strong> its discretionary jurisdiction. 60<br />
The Minister can delegate the power to determine rehabilitation. 61 The Court held,<br />
however, that the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer has no duty to question the reasonableness <strong>of</strong> the Minister’s<br />
decision on rehabilitation even where, on the face <strong>of</strong> the record, the decision may be<br />
unreasonable. 62 Conversely, the Court held that it is not necessary for the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer to consider<br />
pardons obtained under foreign legislation; rather the pardon could be one <strong>of</strong> the Minister’s<br />
considerations when determining whether or not the person has been rehabilitated. 63<br />
An issue which has arisen is whether there is a duty on the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer to inform the<br />
applicant <strong>of</strong> the existence <strong>of</strong> the rehabilitation provisions. The Federal Court has only dealt with<br />
this issue as it relates to earlier legislation which required, in the case <strong>of</strong> section 19(1)(c) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Act, for the Governor in Council to be satisfied as to rehabilitation. In Wong, 64 the<br />
57<br />
58<br />
59<br />
60<br />
61<br />
62<br />
63<br />
64<br />
Shergill, Ram Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD W90-00010), Rayburn, Arpin, Verma, February 19, 1991.<br />
Thamber, Avtar Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2407-00), McKeown, March 12, 2001, in obiter, citing<br />
Baker v. M.C.I., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 (S.C.C.). The Court held that the Minister erred by not considering<br />
relevant evidence (the fact that the applicant had not re<strong>of</strong>fended for a period <strong>of</strong> ten years) <strong>and</strong> by coming to an<br />
unreasonable conclusion, given the totality <strong>of</strong> evidence.<br />
Crawford, Haslyn Boderick v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. T86-9309), Suppa, Arkin, Townshend (dissenting), May 29,<br />
1987. Reported: Crawford v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1987), 3 Imm. L.R. (2d) 12<br />
(I.A.B.).<br />
See chapter 9, Compassionate or Humanitarian Considerations, for a more detailed discussion.<br />
See section 6(2) <strong>of</strong> IRPA. This power was also found in section 121 <strong>of</strong> the former <strong>Immigration</strong> Act.<br />
In Leung, Chi Wah Anthony v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1061-97), Gibson, April 20, 1998, the Court<br />
certified the question: “Is a visa <strong>of</strong>ficer under a duty to question the reasonableness <strong>of</strong> the Minister’s decision<br />
made pursuant to section 19(1)(c.1)(i) <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Act where on the face <strong>of</strong> the record the decision may<br />
be unreasonable?” The Federal Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal answered in the negative: Leung, Chi Wah Anthony v. M.C.I.<br />
(F.C.A., no. A-283-98), Stone, Evans, Malone, May 3, 2000.<br />
Kan, Chow Cheung v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-728-00), Rouleau, November 21, 2000.<br />
Wong, Yuen-Lun v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2882-94), Gibson, September 29, 1995.<br />
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applicant provided material to establish his rehabilitation to the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer instead <strong>of</strong> to the<br />
Governor in Council. The Court found it “unfortunate” that the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer did not assist the<br />
applicant in getting the material to the proper place, but did not find this to be a reviewable error<br />
as the burden to show that the Governor in Council was satisfied as to rehabilitation rests with<br />
the applicant. In addition, the cases <strong>of</strong> Mohammed, 65 Gill, 66 <strong>and</strong> Dance 67 indicated that the<br />
responsibility <strong>of</strong> the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer is to be satisfied that no decision by the Governor in Council has<br />
been made.<br />
The issue which has not been resolved is whether this applies to the situation where the<br />
Minister (rather than the Governor in Council) makes the decision as to rehabilitation, given the<br />
proximity <strong>of</strong> the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer to the Minister. Is there an obligation <strong>of</strong> fairness on the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer<br />
to advise the applicant about the rehabilitation provisions? 68 In a case involving an application<br />
for permanent residence within <strong>Canada</strong> on humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate grounds, the Court<br />
held that since section 36(3)(c) <strong>of</strong> IRPA places the onus on the applicant to satisfy the Minister<br />
that she has been rehabilitated, it follows that she must be given an opportunity to discharge the<br />
onus by making submissions concerning the particular facts <strong>of</strong> her case which favour such a<br />
finding. 69<br />
Right <strong>of</strong> appeal – pre-sentence custody<br />
The IAD has no jurisdiction to entertain a sponsorship appeal (on the merits) based on<br />
refusal on the ground <strong>of</strong> serious criminality where the <strong>of</strong>fence was punished in <strong>Canada</strong> by a term<br />
<strong>of</strong> at least two years.<br />
65<br />
66<br />
67<br />
68<br />
69<br />
Mohammed v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1989] 2 F.C. 363 (C.A.).<br />
M.E.I. v. Gill, Hardeep Kaur (F.C.A., no. A-219-90), Heald, Hugessen, Stone, December 31, 1991. Gill was<br />
applied in Dhaliwal, Jagdish Kaur v. M.E.I. (IAD V91-01669), MacLeod, Wlodyka, Singh, March 29, 1993.<br />
Dance, Neal John v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-366-95), MacKay, September 21, 1995.<br />
In Crawford, supra, footnote 59 at 3, the majority <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal <strong>Board</strong> found that when the<br />
Minister was to determine rehabilitation, a duty existed to advise the applicant <strong>of</strong> the possibility <strong>of</strong> coming<br />
within the exception. The majority stated as follows:<br />
… the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer is responsible to act as a representative <strong>of</strong> the Minister on the issue <strong>of</strong><br />
rehabilitation. Once the prohibition has been established under paragraph 19(2)(a) the visa<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficer has an obligation to inform the applicant <strong>of</strong> the possibility <strong>of</strong> coming within the exception<br />
from the general rule <strong>of</strong> criminal inadmissibility by showing rehabilitation to the Minister.<br />
Aviles, Martha Alcadia Gonzales v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1036-05), Rouleau, October 7, 2005; 2005 FC<br />
1369. The Court was perplexed why the applicant’s counsel’s letter, which set out all the factors demonstrating<br />
that the applicant has been rehabilitated, was not treated as an application for rehabilitation. Moreover, if it was<br />
not an application for rehabilitation, the applicant should be given an opportunity to make the application. For a<br />
related decision on an application for permanent residence abroad see Shum, Mei Wing v. M.C.I. (F.C., no.<br />
IMM-5527-06), Lutfy, July 5, 2007; 2007 FC 710, where the Court held that the applicant or spouse should<br />
have been given effective notice <strong>of</strong> the legal issues in play.<br />
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The words “punished” found in section 64(2) refers to the sentence imposed by the court<br />
<strong>and</strong> not the actual time served in prison. 70<br />
Time spent in pre-trial or pre-sentence custody which is computed by the criminal court<br />
in arriving at the person’s sentence should be considered part <strong>of</strong> the “term <strong>of</strong> imprisonment” for<br />
the purposes <strong>of</strong> section 64(2) <strong>of</strong> IRPA. 71<br />
Compassionate or humanitarian considerations<br />
For a complete discussion <strong>of</strong> this subject in sponsorship appeals, see chapter 9,<br />
“Compassionate or Humanitarian Considerations”.<br />
Where the refusal is valid in law, the IAD may consider whether or not compassionate or<br />
humanitarian considerations exist to warrant the granting <strong>of</strong> special relief pursuant to section<br />
67(1)(c) <strong>of</strong> IRPA.<br />
In the situation <strong>of</strong> criminal refusals, the fact that the Minister is not satisfied that the<br />
applicant has been rehabilitated or that the five-year period has expired does not prevent a<br />
consideration <strong>of</strong> the applicant’s rehabilitation under compassionate or humanitarian<br />
considerations. 72<br />
70<br />
71<br />
72<br />
Martin, Claudette v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-126-05), Nadon, Sexton, Sharlow, October 25 2005; 2005 FCA 347.<br />
Cheddesingh (Jones), Nadine Karen v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2453-05), Beaudry, February 3, 2006; 2006 FC<br />
124.<br />
Perry, Ivelaw Barrington v. M.C.I. (IAD V94-01575), Ho, November 1, 1995.<br />
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CASES<br />
Aguilar: M.C.I. v. Aguilar, Valentin Ogose, (ADQML-98-00476), Turmel, December 10, 1998 ............................. 10<br />
Alouache, Samir v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-681-95), Strayer, Linden, Robertson, April 26, 1996 ................................. 5<br />
Alouache, Samir v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3397-94), Gibson, October 11, 1995. Reported:<br />
Alouache v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1995), 31 Imm. L.R. (2d) 68<br />
(F.C.T.D.).................................................................................................................................................................. 5<br />
Atwal: M.C.I. v. Atwal, Iqbal Singh (F.C., no. IMM-3260-03), Pinard, January 8, 2004; 2004 FC 7........................... 5<br />
Aviles, Martha Alcadia Gonzales v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1036-05), Rouleau, October 7, 2005;<br />
2005 FC 1369.......................................................................................................................................................... 18<br />
Baker v. M.C.I., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 (S.C.C.)............................................................................................................. 17<br />
Barnett, John v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4280-94), Jerome, March 22, 1996. Reported:<br />
Barnett v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1996), 33 Imm. L.R. (2d) 1<br />
(F.C.T.D.).................................................................................................................................................................. 8<br />
Brannson v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1981] 2 F.C. 141 (C.A.)............................... 11, 13<br />
Brar: M.C.I. v. Brar, Pinder Singh (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6313-98), Campbell, November 23, 1999.......................... 13<br />
Burgon: M.E.I. v. Burgon, David Ross (F.C.A., no. A-17-90), MacGuigan, Linden, Mahoney<br />
(concurring in the result), February 22, 1991. Reported: <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>Immigration</strong>) v. Burgon, [1991] 3 F.C. 44 (C.A.) ..................................................................................................... 8<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) v. Saini, [2002] 1 F.C. 200 (F.C.A.)............................................. 8<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) v. Burgon, [1991] 3 F.C. 44 (C.A.) ................................ 6, 7, 8, 9<br />
Cheddesingh (Jones), Nadine Karen v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2453-05), Beaudry, February 3,<br />
2006; 2006 FC 124.............................................................................................................................................. 5, 19<br />
Choi, Min Su v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-975-99), Denault, May 8, 2000 ............................................................. 12<br />
Crawford, Haslyn Boderick v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. T86-9309), Suppa, Arkin, Townshend (dissenting),<br />
May 29, 1987. Reported: Crawford v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>)<br />
(1987), 3 Imm. L.R. (2d) 12 (I.A.B.) ...................................................................................................................... 17<br />
Dance, Neal John v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-366-95), MacKay, September 21, 1995 ......................................... 18<br />
Dayan v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1987] 2 F.C. 569 (C.A.).......................................... 12<br />
Derbas, Rachid v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1923-07), Shore, November 15, 2007; 2007 FC 1194................................ 4<br />
Dhaliwal, Jagdish Kaur v. M.E.I. (IAD V91-01669), MacLeod, Wlodyka, Singh, March 29, 1993.......................... 18<br />
Dinaburgsky: M.C.I. v. Dinaburgsky, Yuri (F.C., no. T-234-04), Kelen, September 29, 2006; 2006<br />
FC 1161..................................................................................................................................................................... 9<br />
Drake, Michael Lawrence v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4050-98), Tremblay-Lamer, March 11,<br />
1999. Reported: Drake v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1999), 49 Imm.<br />
L.R. (2d) 218 (F.C.T.D.) ........................................................................................................................................... 8<br />
Driessen, Kenneth Leroy v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-9044-04), Snider, November 1, 2005; 2005 FC<br />
1480......................................................................................................................................................................... 16<br />
Gill: M.E.I. v. Gill, Hardeep Kaur (F.C.A., no. A-219-90), Heald, Hugessen, Stone,<br />
December 31, 1991 ................................................................................................................................................. 18<br />
Halm v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1995] 2 F.C. 331 (T.D.). The<br />
Federal Court – Trial Division, in Howard, Kenrick Kirk v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5252-<br />
94), Dubé, January 4, 1996 ..................................................................................................................................... 11<br />
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Hill, Errol Stanley v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-514-86), Hugessen, Urie (concurring), MacGuigan,<br />
January 29, 1987. Reported: Hill v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1987),<br />
1 Imm. L.R. (2d) 1 (F.C.A.), at 9 ............................................................................................................................ 12<br />
Jeworski, Dorothy Sau Yun v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. W86-4070), Eglington, Goodspeed, Vidal,<br />
September 17, 1986. Reported: Jeworski v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>)<br />
(1986), 1 Imm. L.R. (2d) 59 (I.A.B.) ...................................................................................................................... 13<br />
Kalicharan v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Manpower <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1976] 2 F.C. 123 (T.D.) ....................................... 6<br />
Kan, Chow Cheung v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-728-00), Rouleau, November 21, 2000 ....................................... 17<br />
Kang, Sarabjeet Kaur v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2445-04), Mactavish, February 25, 2005; 2005<br />
FC 297....................................................................................................................................................................... 1<br />
Kiani, Raja Ishtiaq Asghar v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3433-94), Gibson, May 31, 1995.<br />
Reported: Kiani v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1995), 31 Imm. L.R.<br />
(2d) 269 (F.C.T.D.) ................................................................................................................................................. 11<br />
Lam, Chun Wai v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4901-94), Tremblay-Lamer, November 16, 1995.............................. 13<br />
Lampros, Michael George v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-434-05), Lemieux, February 18, 2005; 2005<br />
FC 267....................................................................................................................................................................... 4<br />
Legault, Alex<strong>and</strong>er Henri v. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-7485-93), McGillis, January 17, 1995.<br />
Reported: Legault v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Secretary <strong>of</strong> State) (1995), 26 Imm. L.R. (2d) 255 (F.C.T.D.).............................. 11<br />
Legault: M.C.I. v. Legault, Alex<strong>and</strong>er Henri (F.C.A., no. A-47-95), Marceau, MacGuigan,<br />
Desjardins, October 1, 1997. Reported: Legault v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Secretary <strong>of</strong> State) (1995), 26<br />
Imm. L.R. (2d) 255 (F.C.T.D.).......................................................................................................................... 10, 11<br />
Lei, Alberto v. S.G.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5249-93), Nadon, February 21, 1994. Reported: Lei v.<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> (Solicitor General) (1994), 24 Imm. L.R. (2d) 82 (F.C.T.D.) ................................................................... 13<br />
Leung, Chi Wah Anthony v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-283-98), Stone, Evans, Malone, May 3, 2002............................. 17<br />
Leung, Chi Wah Anthony v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1061-97), Gibson, April 20, 1998 ...................................... 17<br />
Lew v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Manpower <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1974] 2 F.C. 700 (C.A.) .................................................. 6<br />
Li, Ronald Fook Shiu v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-329-95), Strayer, Robertson, Chevalier, August 7,<br />
1996. Reported: Li v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1997] 1 F.C. 235<br />
(C.A.) ...................................................................................................................................................................... 11<br />
Libby, Tena Dianna v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-1013-87), Urie, Rouleau, McQuaid, March 18, 1988.<br />
Reported: Libby v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1988), 50 D.L.R. (4th)<br />
573 (F.C.A.) .............................................................................................................................................................. 5<br />
Magtibay, Brigida Cherly v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2701-04), Blais, March 24, 2005; 2005 FC<br />
397....................................................................................................................................................................... 9, 10<br />
Martin, Claudette v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-126-05), Nadon, Sexton, Sharlow, October 25 2005;<br />
2005 FCA 347..................................................................................................................................................... 5, 19<br />
Massie, Pia Yona v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6345-98), Pinard, May 26, 2000................................................. 4, 11<br />
Meerza, Rizwan Mohamed v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-21315), Hoare, September 15, 2003.................................................. 5<br />
Mohammed v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1989] 2 F.C. 363 (C.A.) ................................. 18<br />
Mugesera v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 91, at para. 114;<br />
2005 SCC 40 ............................................................................................................................................................. 3<br />
Obaseki: M.C.I. v. Obaseki, Eghe (IAD T99-07461), Kalvin, November 15, 2000................................................... 13<br />
Pardhan, Wazir Ali v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-936-06), Blanchard, July 20, 2007; 2007 FC 756......................... 10, 15<br />
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Perry, Ivelaw Barrington v. M.C.I. (IAD V94-01575), Ho, November 1, 1995 ......................................................... 19<br />
Popic, Bojan v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5727-98), Hansen, September 14, 2000................................................. 14<br />
R. v. Fice, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 742, 2005 SCC 32 .............................................................................................................. 5<br />
R. v. Wust, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 455, 2000 SCC 18.............................................................................................................. 5<br />
Robertson v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1979] 1 F.C. 197 (C.A.)...................................... 6<br />
S.A. v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3512-05), Gibson, April 27, 2006; 2006 FC 515 .......................................................... 9<br />
Sahota: M.C.I. v. Sahota, Ranjit Singh (ID A3-02512), Iozzo, March 11, 2004........................................................... 5<br />
Saini: M.C.I. v. Saini, Parminder Singh (F.C.A., no. A-121-00), Linden, Sharlow, Malone,<br />
October 19, 2001; 2001 FCA 311............................................................................................................................. 8<br />
Santizo: M.C.I. v. Santizo, Marco Antonio (Adjudication A1-00471), Nupponen, September 27,<br />
2001........................................................................................................................................................................... 5<br />
Shergill, Ram Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD W90-00010), Rayburn, Arpin, Verma, February 19, 1991 ............................... 17<br />
Shum, Mei Wing v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5527-06), Lutfy, July 5, 2007; 2007 FC 710........................................... 18<br />
Sian, Jasvir Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1673-02), O’Keefe, September 3, 2003; 2003 FC<br />
1022......................................................................................................................................................................... 14<br />
Sicuro, Fortunato v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-695-02), Mosley, March 25, 2004; 2004 FC 461.................................... 9<br />
Steward, Charles Chadwick v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-962-87), Heald, Marceau, Lacombe, April<br />
15, 1988. Reported: Steward v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1988] 3<br />
F.C. 487 (C.A.)........................................................................................................................................................ 14<br />
Tessma (Ayele), Letwled Kasahun v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5652-02), Kelen, October 2, 2003;<br />
2003 FC 1126............................................................................................................................................................ 7<br />
Thamber, Avtar Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.C., no. Imm-2407-00), McKeown, March 12, 2001 ..................................... 17<br />
Tsang, Sau Lin v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-9587), D. Davey, Chu, Ahara, January 8, 1988.................................................. 12<br />
Ward, Patrick Francis v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-504-96), Heald, December 19, 1996.<br />
Reported: Ward v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1996), 37 Imm. L.R.<br />
(2d) 102..................................................................................................................................................................... 6<br />
Wong, Yuen-Lun v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2882-94), Gibson, September 29, 1995 ........................................... 18<br />
Zeon, Kyong-U v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7766-04) .................................................................................................... 10<br />
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Chapter Three<br />
Health Grounds - Medical Inadmissibility<br />
Section 38 <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Refugee</strong> Protection Act<br />
Introduction<br />
The <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Refugee</strong> Protection Act (IRPA) has changed the wording <strong>of</strong> the<br />
medical inadmissibility provision from that in the <strong>Immigration</strong> Act <strong>and</strong> has provided additional<br />
definitions <strong>of</strong> key terms such as "excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s" in the Regulations (IRPR) to the new Act.<br />
It has retained a requirement for medical examinations for all sponsored immigrants <strong>and</strong> their<br />
dependents. IRPA has however provided an exemption for prescribed close family members from<br />
the excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s part <strong>of</strong> the medical inadmissibility definition. Lastly IRPA preserves a<br />
discretionary power for members <strong>of</strong> the IAD to <strong>of</strong>fer special relief from this ground <strong>of</strong><br />
inadmissibility.<br />
A. LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS<br />
Medical Inadmissibility - Definition<br />
Section 38 <strong>of</strong> IRPA sets out the basis on which a foreign national may be determined to be<br />
inadmissible on medical grounds:<br />
s. 38 A foreign national is inadmissible on health grounds if their health condition<br />
(a) is likely to be a danger to public health;<br />
(b) is likely to be a danger to public safety; or<br />
(c) might reasonably be expected to cause excessive dem<strong>and</strong> on health or<br />
social services.<br />
As the cases prior to IRPA are based on the <strong>Immigration</strong> Act, (now repealed), the medical<br />
inadmissibility provision is included below for comparative purposes:<br />
s. 19.(l) No person shall be granted admission who is a member <strong>of</strong> any <strong>of</strong> the<br />
following classes:<br />
(a) persons who are suffering from any disease, disorder, disability or<br />
other health impairment as a result <strong>of</strong> the nature, severity or probable<br />
duration <strong>of</strong> which, in the opinion <strong>of</strong> a medical <strong>of</strong>ficer concurred in by at<br />
least one other medical <strong>of</strong>ficer,<br />
(i) they are or are likely to be a danger to public health or to public<br />
safety, or<br />
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January 1, 2008 Medical Inadmissibility - Ch. 3
(ii) their admission would cause or might reasonably be expected to<br />
cause excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s on health or social services.<br />
Definitions – foreign national<br />
A “foreign national” means a person who is not a Canadian Citizen or a permanent resident <strong>and</strong><br />
includes a stateless person. 1<br />
Definition <strong>of</strong> “excessive dem<strong>and</strong>”<br />
The term "excessive dem<strong>and</strong>" means<br />
(a) a dem<strong>and</strong> on health services or social services for which the anticipated<br />
costs would likely exceed average Canadian per capita health services <strong>and</strong> social<br />
services costs over a period <strong>of</strong> five consecutive years immediately following the most<br />
recent medical examination required by these regulations, unless there is evidence that<br />
significant costs are likely to be incurred beyond that period in which case the period<br />
is no more than 10 consecutive years; or<br />
(b)<br />
a dem<strong>and</strong> on health services or social services that would add to existing<br />
waiting lists <strong>and</strong> would increase the rate <strong>of</strong> mortality <strong>and</strong> morbidity in <strong>Canada</strong> as a<br />
result <strong>of</strong> the denial or delay in the provision <strong>of</strong> those services to Canadian citizens or<br />
permanent residents. 2<br />
Definition <strong>of</strong> Health Services<br />
The term "health services" means any health services for which the majority <strong>of</strong> the funds<br />
are contributed by governments, including the services <strong>of</strong> a family physicians, medical<br />
specialists, nurses, chiropractors, <strong>and</strong> physiotherapists, laboratory services <strong>and</strong> the supply <strong>of</strong><br />
pharmaceutical or hospital care. 3<br />
Definition <strong>of</strong> Social Services<br />
The term "social services" means any social service, such as home care, specialized<br />
residence <strong>and</strong> residential services, special education services, social <strong>and</strong> vocational rehabilitation<br />
services, personal support services <strong>and</strong> the provision <strong>of</strong> devices related to those services,<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
S. 2(1) <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Refugee</strong> Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27.<br />
S. 1(1) <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Refugee</strong> Protection Regulations (IRPR), SOR/2002-227.<br />
S. 1(1) IRPR.<br />
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(a) that are intended to assist a person in functioning physically, emotionally, socially,<br />
psychologically, or vocationally; <strong>and</strong><br />
(b) for which the majority <strong>of</strong> the funding, including funding that provides direct or<br />
indirect financial support to an assisted person, is contributed by governments, either<br />
directly or through publicly-funded agencies. 4<br />
IRPA - Health Condition<br />
Note that IRPA no longer makes reference to "disease, disorder, disability or other health<br />
impairment" contained in the former <strong>Immigration</strong> Act <strong>and</strong> uses "health condition" instead.<br />
Means <strong>of</strong> pro<strong>of</strong><br />
The former means <strong>of</strong> pro<strong>of</strong> was "in the opinion <strong>of</strong> a medical <strong>of</strong>ficer concurred in by at<br />
least one other medical <strong>of</strong>ficer". In s. 20 <strong>of</strong> the IRPR, it sets out that one <strong>of</strong>ficer designated to do<br />
that task must now make that assessment:<br />
s. 20 An <strong>of</strong>ficer shall determine that a foreign national is inadmissible on health<br />
grounds if an assessment <strong>of</strong> their health condition has been made by an <strong>of</strong>ficer<br />
who is responsible for the application <strong>of</strong> s. 29 to 34 <strong>and</strong> who concluded that the<br />
foreign national's health condition is likely to be a danger to public health or<br />
public safety or might reasonably be expected to cause excessive dem<strong>and</strong>.<br />
It should be noted that under IRPA there continues to be two decisions on medical<br />
inadmissibility that take place for an application for permanent residence: the "medical" opinion<br />
<strong>and</strong> the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer's assessment <strong>of</strong> that opinion.<br />
Factors to be considered<br />
The terms "excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s", "health services" <strong>and</strong> "social services" are used in<br />
Regulations 31, 33 <strong>and</strong> 34 respectively which states that "before concluding whether a foreign<br />
national's health condition (a) is likely to be a danger to public health or (b) is likely to be a<br />
danger to public safety or (c) might reasonably be expected to cause excessive dem<strong>and</strong>" the<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficer shall consider<br />
(a) any reports made by a health practitioner or medical laboratory with respect to the foreign<br />
national; <strong>and</strong><br />
(b) in the case <strong>of</strong> excessive dem<strong>and</strong>, "any condition identified by the medical examination"<br />
(c) in the case <strong>of</strong> public health, "the communicability <strong>of</strong> any disease that the foreign national<br />
is affected by or carries",<br />
4<br />
S. 1(1) IRPR.<br />
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(d) in the case <strong>of</strong> public safety, "the risk <strong>of</strong> a sudden incapacity or <strong>of</strong> unpredictable or violent<br />
behavior <strong>of</strong> the foreign national that would create a danger to the health or safety <strong>of</strong><br />
persons living in <strong>Canada</strong>."<br />
All Immigrants must undergo a medical examination<br />
All applicants for permanent resident status (<strong>and</strong> non-accompanying dependants) are<br />
required to undergo a medical examination. 5 When a holder <strong>of</strong> a permanent Resident visa seeks<br />
to enter <strong>Canada</strong> as an immigrant he or she must also hold a valid medical certificate indicating<br />
they are not medically inadmissible based on a medical examination within the prior 12 months. 6<br />
It should be noted that a failure to undergo a medical examination can form the basis for a refusal<br />
based on a separate ground <strong>of</strong> inadmissibility, i.e. non-compliance with the Act or Regulations,<br />
as per s. 41(a) <strong>of</strong> IRPA. Although an appeal can be granted to overcome this ground the applicant<br />
must still undergo a medical for further visa processing to continue.<br />
Classes <strong>of</strong> persons exempt from "excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s"<br />
Section 38(2) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA specifically states<br />
s. 38(2) (excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s) does not apply in the case <strong>of</strong> a foreign national who<br />
(a) has been determined to be a member <strong>of</strong> the family class <strong>and</strong> to be the<br />
spouse, common-law partner or child <strong>of</strong> a sponsor within the meaning <strong>of</strong> the<br />
regulations;<br />
(b) has applied for a permanent resident visa as a Convention refugee or a<br />
person in similar circumstances;<br />
(c) is a protected person; or<br />
(d) is, where prescribed by the regulations, the spouse, common-law partner,<br />
child or other family member <strong>of</strong> a foreign national referred to in any <strong>of</strong> paragraphs<br />
(a) to (c).<br />
It should be noted that the exemption set out above only applies to the ground <strong>of</strong><br />
"excessive dem<strong>and</strong>" <strong>and</strong> not to the inadmissibility based on "danger to public health" or "danger<br />
to public safety". The IRPA objective in s. 3(1)(h) <strong>of</strong> protecting the public from infectious<br />
diseases is not compromised by the family-based exemptions.<br />
See also s. 24 <strong>of</strong> the IRPR which provides an exemption for a "conjugal partner" <strong>and</strong> dependent<br />
child from the excessive dem<strong>and</strong> inadmissibility.<br />
This exemption applies only to a "nuclear" family member <strong>and</strong> does not extend to parents<br />
<strong>of</strong> a sponsor or their dependent children or other sponsorable members <strong>of</strong> the family class. In<br />
5<br />
6<br />
. 30(1)(a) <strong>of</strong> IRPR.<br />
S. 30(4) <strong>of</strong> IRPR.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Medical Inadmissibility - Ch. 3
those cases, the discretionary relief provision is available. See the reference below for more<br />
comment on that special relief.<br />
B. APPLICATION OF PROVISIONS IN A SPONSORSHIP APPEAL<br />
HEARING<br />
The vast majority <strong>of</strong> appeals at the IAD respecting medical inadmissibility are restricted<br />
solely to a request for discretionary relief. Should a member <strong>of</strong> the IAD be called on to assess<br />
whether a foreign national is inadmissible on health grounds, i.e. whether the refusal is valid in<br />
law, there will continue to be a requirement to determine if the <strong>of</strong>ficer has reached the conclusion<br />
properly.<br />
Legal validity <strong>of</strong> the refusal<br />
Historically the IAD <strong>and</strong> the Federal Court have framed many challenges to the refusal to<br />
issue permanent resident visas to family class applicants as a failure to follow proper prescribed<br />
procedure or a failure to employ proper technical language. Often there is an underlying but<br />
unstated breach <strong>of</strong> natural justice which has led to the decision being found to be unreasonable.<br />
Often these early cases involved a breach <strong>of</strong> the duty to act fairly or in a manner which would<br />
allow the applicant an opportunity to know the case to be met on appeal. Lastly, there can be an<br />
overlap <strong>of</strong> purely "technical defects" <strong>and</strong> natural justice issues.<br />
Technical defects<br />
Early decisions <strong>of</strong> the IAD which allowed appeals in law in medical refusal cases, <strong>and</strong><br />
especially those which followed the Federal Court’s decision in Hiramen, 7 tended to do so on<br />
purely technical grounds based on deficiencies in the refusal letter or the Medical Notification<br />
form. However, later decisions <strong>of</strong> the Court generally emphasized a less technical <strong>and</strong> more<br />
purposive approach which looked at whether the sponsor was informed <strong>of</strong> the case to be met <strong>and</strong><br />
whether there was an expression <strong>of</strong> the opinion required under the <strong>Immigration</strong> Act.<br />
The disadvantage to the sponsor <strong>of</strong> winning an appeal based on a technical defect is that<br />
the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer may again refuse the application on the medical ground, as the substantive ground<br />
did not form the basis for the IAD’s decision. 8 For example, where the appeal was allowed<br />
7<br />
8<br />
Hiramen, S<strong>and</strong>ra Cecilia v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-956-84), MacGuigan, Thurlow, Stone, February 4, 1986. In<br />
Hiramen, the Court held that the entries in the Medical Notification form were inconsistent to the point <strong>of</strong><br />
incoherence. Refer to page 6, “Medical Notification Form,” for further details.<br />
Section 77(5) <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Act provides that where an appeal has been allowed by the IAD, processing<br />
<strong>of</strong> the application is to be resumed, <strong>and</strong> the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer is to approve the application, if “the requirements <strong>of</strong><br />
[the] Act <strong>and</strong> regulations, other than those requirements on which the decision <strong>of</strong> the Appeal Division has been<br />
given,” have been met.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Medical Inadmissibility - Ch. 3
ecause the medical reports had expired before the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer rejected the application, the visa<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficer could again consider the medical condition, as the <strong>Board</strong>’s decision did not relate to the<br />
medical condition. 9 Likewise, where the appeal was allowed because the reasons for refusal did<br />
not adequately inform the sponsor <strong>of</strong> the case to be met, the application could again be refused on<br />
the same ground, but this time with the reasons for the refusal adequately expressed. 10 The effect<br />
<strong>of</strong> section 77(5) <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Act was examined by the Federal Court in King. 11 The Court<br />
held that the applicant still had to establish her medical admissibility. The only issue that was res<br />
judicata was the medical issue found to be erroneous by the IAD. 12<br />
Defective Refusal Letter<br />
Pursuant to section 77(l) <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Act, the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer was required to inform<br />
the sponsor <strong>of</strong> the reasons for the refusal <strong>of</strong> the sponsored application for permanent residence.<br />
The purpose <strong>of</strong> this provision was to ensure that the sponsor was aware <strong>of</strong> the case that has to be<br />
met on appeal.<br />
It has been held that the nature <strong>of</strong> the medical condition must be disclosed where the<br />
refusal is based on medical inadmissibility. 13 However, the refusal letter should not be looked at<br />
in isolation from the record. 14 Section 77(1) <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Act can be complied with by<br />
setting out intelligible reasons in the record. 15<br />
Medical Notification Form<br />
After assessing an applicant’s medical condition, the medical <strong>of</strong>ficers prepare a Medical<br />
Notification form to notify the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>of</strong> their diagnosis, opinions, <strong>and</strong> the applicant’s<br />
medical pr<strong>of</strong>ile. The visa <strong>of</strong>ficer relies on this information to determine the applicant’s<br />
admissibility. The Medical Notification form must contain an expression <strong>of</strong> the opinion required<br />
by section 19(1)(a) <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Act in order to support a refusal. Once there is a clear<br />
9<br />
10<br />
11<br />
12<br />
13<br />
14<br />
15<br />
Mangat, Parminder Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-153-85), Strayer, February 25, 1985. Nor had the <strong>Board</strong><br />
taken a “[…] decision that the medical problem in question was to be ignored, e.g. on compassionate grounds.”<br />
(at 2).<br />
Dhami, Gurnam Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 84-6036), Chambers, Tremblay, Howard, January 8, 1987.<br />
King, Garvin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2623-95), Dubé, May 23, 1996.<br />
The IAD had found the Medical Notification form unreasonable because it was unclear as to whether the mass<br />
in question was in the lung or mediastinum. The appeal was allowed in law as a result. The appeal on<br />
compassionate or humanitarian grounds was dismissed.<br />
Shepherd, Tam Yue Philomena v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 82-6093), Davey, Benedetti, Suppa, November 18, 1982.<br />
M.E.I. v. Singh, Pal (F.C.A., no. A-197-85), Lacombe, Urie, Stone, February 4, 1987. Reported: <strong>Canada</strong><br />
(Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) v. Singh (1987), 35 D.L.R. (4th) 680 (F.C.A.).<br />
Tung, Nirmal Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-6021), Mawani, Singh, Anderson (dissenting), June 30, 1987.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Medical Inadmissibility - Ch. 3
expression <strong>of</strong> the medical opinion required by section 19(1)(a), the evidentiary burden <strong>of</strong> pro<strong>of</strong><br />
shifts to the sponsor to show that the medical <strong>of</strong>ficers failed to take into consideration relevant<br />
factors, or took into consideration irrelevant factors in forming their opinion. 16<br />
Where the information in the Medical Notification form is inconsistent to the point <strong>of</strong><br />
incoherence <strong>and</strong> is couched in terms <strong>of</strong> “possibility,” rather than “probability” as is required by<br />
section 19(1)(a)(ii) <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Act, the refusal based on that form is not valid. 17<br />
However, in assessing the Medical Notification form, the IAD should consider the form as a<br />
whole, to see if it contains on its face a clear expression <strong>of</strong> the medical opinion required. 18<br />
Further, the IAD should not find the refusal invalid because the word “possibility” rather than<br />
“probability” was used in the form without considering the rest <strong>of</strong> the document. 19 Nevertheless,<br />
where a probability regarding treatment was deduced from a mere possibility <strong>of</strong> health<br />
deterioration, the Federal Court has found the Medical Notification form to be defective. 20 In<br />
addition, the Federal Court has upheld the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal <strong>Board</strong>’s decision that the Medical<br />
Notification form only expressed a possibility <strong>of</strong> excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s, rather than a probability,<br />
where the medical <strong>of</strong>ficers indicated that the progression <strong>and</strong> prognosis were unknown. 21<br />
Some examples <strong>of</strong> situations in which the Medical Notification form has been found to be<br />
defective include notifications in which the concurring medical <strong>of</strong>ficer’s signature is missing; 22<br />
the date <strong>and</strong> name <strong>of</strong> the medical <strong>of</strong>ficers are not filled in <strong>and</strong> in which neither box is ticked <strong>of</strong>f to<br />
indicate which subparagraph <strong>of</strong> section 19(1)(a) is being relied on. 23<br />
A refusal based on an expired Medical Notification form is invalid, 24 but Medical<br />
Notification forms with the “valid until” space left blank (as is usually the case in appeals before<br />
the IAD) have been held not to be subject to challenge. 25<br />
16<br />
17<br />
18<br />
19<br />
20<br />
21<br />
22<br />
23<br />
24<br />
M.E.I. v. Chong Alvarez, Maria Del Refugio (IAD V90-01411), Wlodyka, April 10, 1991. This case was a<br />
section 71 appeal by the Minister from the decision <strong>of</strong> an adjudicator not to issue a removal order. The onus <strong>of</strong><br />
pro<strong>of</strong> in a section 71 appeal <strong>and</strong> at an inquiry under section 27 <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Act lies with the Minister.<br />
Hiramen, supra, footnote 7.<br />
Parmar, Jaipal Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-836-87), Heald, Urie, Stone, May 16, 1988; M.E.I. v. Pattar,<br />
Sita Kaur (F.C.A., no. A-710-87), Marceau, Desjardins, Pratte (dissenting), October 28, 1988. Reported:<br />
Pattar v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1988), 8 Imm. L.R. (2d) 79 (F.C.A.); M.E.I. v.<br />
Sihota, Sukhminder Kaur (F.C.A., no. A-76-87), Mahoney, Stone, MacGuigan, January 25, 1989; Bola,<br />
Lakhvir Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-417-88), Marceau, Stone, Desjardins (dissenting), May 18, 1990.<br />
Reported: Bola v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1990), 11 Imm. L.R. (2d) 14 (F.C.A.).<br />
Bola, ibid.<br />
Badwal, Tripta v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-1193-88), MacGuigan, Urie, Mahoney, November 14, 1989.<br />
Reported: Badwal v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1989), 9 Imm. L.R. (2d) 85;<br />
64 D.L.R. (4th) 561 (F.C.A.).<br />
M.E.I. v. Sidhu, Satinder Singh (F.C.A., no. A-1250-88), Desjardins, Heald, Mahoney, January 12, 1990.<br />
Tang, Lai Keng v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 79-6093), Campbell, Glogowski, Loiselle, September 20, 1979.<br />
Khan, Mary Angela v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-9043), Tisshaw, Blumer, Ahara, October 6, 1986. See also<br />
Mohamed, Liaquat Ali v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-9648), Sherman, Chu, Eglington (dissenting), July 27, 1987, where<br />
the panel reached the opposite conclusion, relying on the narrative statement on the form.<br />
Jean Jacques, Soutien v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 80-1187), Scott, Houle, Tremblay, May 20, 1981.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Medical Inadmissibility - Ch. 3
Where the Medical Notification form indicates that the condition is one <strong>of</strong> “unknown<br />
pathology,” the inability to determine the exact cause <strong>of</strong> the disorder or illness does not result in<br />
the Medical Notification form being deficient. 26<br />
Where the Medical Notification form outlines several health conditions, but does not<br />
indicate which medical pr<strong>of</strong>ile category applies to which condition, the notification is not<br />
deficient where it contains enough information for the sponsor to know the case to be met. 27<br />
Further, as criteria in the <strong>Immigration</strong> Manual are mere guidelines, the failure to comply with<br />
these guidelines is not fatal where there is other evidence to support the opinion. 28 Similarly,<br />
where multiple health conditions are listed in the Medical Notification form, it is not always<br />
essential to identify which conditions form the basis <strong>of</strong> the medical opinion. 29<br />
Where the narrative on a Medical Notification form contained an erroneous <strong>and</strong> highly<br />
probative fact, <strong>and</strong> a reasonable possibility existed that conclusions reached in the narrative were<br />
based on this fact, the refusal was invalid as a result. 30<br />
Duty <strong>of</strong> fairness owed by Visa <strong>and</strong> Medical Officers<br />
There is a duty upon immigration <strong>of</strong>ficials to act fairly <strong>and</strong> to ensure that the medical<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficers’ opinion is reasonable. 31 What is necessary to comply with the duty <strong>of</strong> fairness will<br />
depend on the circumstances <strong>of</strong> each case.<br />
The Federal Court has recognized an immigration <strong>of</strong>ficer’s duty to act fairly. This duty <strong>of</strong><br />
fairness was breached when an applicant was not given a fair opportunity to make submissions<br />
before the decision was made to refuse his son on medical grounds. 32 An immigration <strong>of</strong>ficer<br />
25<br />
26<br />
27<br />
28<br />
29<br />
30<br />
31<br />
32<br />
Fung, Alfred Wai To v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 83-6205), Hlady, Glogowski, Petryshyn, December 14, 1984;<br />
Shanker, Gurdev Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-535-86), Mahoney, Pratte, Heald, June 25, 1987.<br />
Pattar, supra, footnote 18.<br />
Parmar, supra, footnote 18.<br />
Ibid.<br />
Sihota, supra, footnote 18.<br />
Mahey, Gulshan v. M.C.I. (IAD V96-02119), Clark, July 20, 1998; upheld in M.C.I. v. Mahey, Gulshan<br />
(F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3989-98), Campbell, May 11, 1999. The narrative in question stated that the applicant,<br />
who suffered from coronary heart disease, was 42 years old when in fact he was 52.<br />
Gingiovvenanu, Marcel v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3875-93), Simpson, October 30, 1995. Reported:<br />
Gingiovvenanu v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1995), 31 Imm. L.R. (2d) 55<br />
(F.C.T.D.); Ismaili, Zafar Iqbal v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3430-94), Cullen, August 17, 1995. Reported:<br />
Ismaili v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1995), 29 Imm. L.R. (2d) 1 (F.C.T.D.); Jaferi, Ali<br />
v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4039-93), Simpson, October 24, 1995. Reported: Jaferi v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong><br />
Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1995), 35 Imm. L.R. (2d) 140 (F.C.T.D.).<br />
Gao, Yude v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-980-92), Dubé, February 8, 1993. Reported: Gao v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong><br />
Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1993), 18 Imm. L.R. (2d) 306 (F.C.T.D.). Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong><br />
<strong>Canada</strong> Manual OP 15 – Medical Procedures , dated 2007 – 04 - 23, requires visa <strong>of</strong>ficers to advise applicants<br />
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January 1, 2008 Medical Inadmissibility - Ch. 3
may also be under a duty to undertake further investigation or call for an updated medical<br />
examination. 33<br />
Visa <strong>of</strong>ficers routinely send a “fairness letter” inviting further medical evidence from<br />
applicants before a final decision on medical admissibility is made. 34 The Federal Court has been<br />
critical <strong>of</strong> the wording <strong>of</strong> some <strong>of</strong> the letters 35 <strong>and</strong> has found in their use a breach <strong>of</strong> procedural<br />
fairness. For example, in one case, the letter did not disclose the criteria used by the medical<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficers in forming their opinion or the nature <strong>of</strong> the excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s. 36 Where the fairness<br />
letter was mistakenly sent to the applicant’s husb<strong>and</strong> in the Philippines instead <strong>of</strong> to the applicant<br />
in <strong>Canada</strong>, she was denied an opportunity to respond to the medical inadmissibility finding<br />
respecting her son. 37<br />
Non-disclosure <strong>of</strong> information requested by an applicant’s counsel concerning the basis<br />
on which a medical opinion has been rendered is a breach <strong>of</strong> fairness. 38<br />
Where the medical <strong>of</strong>ficers requested a medical report <strong>and</strong> received it within two weeks,<br />
the Federal Court held that the medical <strong>of</strong>ficers had a duty to consider the report in forming their<br />
opinions. 39 The duty to consider the new medical evidence has been characterized by the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division as a legitimate expectation <strong>of</strong> the sponsor. 40<br />
33<br />
34<br />
35<br />
36<br />
37<br />
38<br />
39<br />
40<br />
<strong>of</strong> the medical <strong>of</strong>ficers’ opinion <strong>and</strong> give them an opportunity to present further medical evidence before<br />
refusing the application. Where such evidence is presented, medical <strong>of</strong>ficers are instructed to clearly state, in<br />
their statutory declarations, that they have considered such evidence.<br />
Ibid. See also Boateng, Dora Amoah v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2700-97), Lutfy, September 28, 1998 to<br />
the same effect.<br />
See the discussion in chapter 11, “Fairness <strong>and</strong> Natural Justice under the IRPA”, “Knowing Case to be Met<br />
<strong>and</strong> Opportunity to Respond.” Earlier case-law established that the duty <strong>of</strong> fairness did not oblige an<br />
immigration <strong>of</strong>ficer to communicate relevant medical information to an applicant before making a decision:<br />
Stefanska, Alicja Tunikowska v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-1738-87), Pinard, February 17, 1988. Reported:<br />
Stefanska v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1988), 6 Imm. L.R. (2d) 66 (F.C.T.D.).<br />
However, this case may be <strong>of</strong> doubtful authority in view <strong>of</strong> the current practices <strong>of</strong> immigration <strong>and</strong> medical<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficers.<br />
Fei, Wan Chen v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-741-96), Heald, June 30, 1997. See however Ma, Chiu Ming v.<br />
M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-812-97), Wetston, January 15, 1998.<br />
Li, Leung Lun v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-466-96), Tremblay-Lamer, September 30, 1998.<br />
Acosta, Mercedes v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4790-97), Reed, January 7, 1999.<br />
Wong, Ching Shin Henry v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3366-96), Reed, January 14, 1998. The Court<br />
subsequently ordered the medical <strong>of</strong>ficers to respond by a specified date to counsel’s questions: Wong, Ching<br />
Shin Henry v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3366-96), Reed, November 27, 1998.<br />
Lee, Sing v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-2459-85), Martin, May 1, 1986.<br />
Shah, Nikita v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-02633), D’Ignazio, June 23, 1998, followed in Singh, Narinder Pal v. M.C.I.<br />
(IAD T97-04679), D'Ignazio, September 27, 1999.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Medical Inadmissibility - Ch. 3
The failure to avail oneself <strong>of</strong> the opportunity to make submissions (when given two<br />
months to do so) is not a breach <strong>of</strong> procedural fairness. 41<br />
The Federal Court in Parmar 42 held that its intervention was not warranted where the<br />
medical <strong>of</strong>ficers had failed to comply strictly with all the guidelines set out in the <strong>Immigration</strong><br />
Manual <strong>and</strong> the non-compliance was minimal <strong>and</strong> non-prejudicial. It further held: “It is essential<br />
for those <strong>of</strong>ficials both in <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>and</strong> abroad to be meticulous in ensuring that applicants for<br />
admission to this country be made aware <strong>of</strong> the basis for refusing their application for admission<br />
to <strong>Canada</strong>.”<br />
Use <strong>of</strong> expert medical reports by IAD<br />
A member may receive expert reports as to the health condition <strong>of</strong> the foreign national but<br />
they must be assessed in conformity with the guidelines below <strong>and</strong> may not be used to disprove<br />
the diagnosis <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>ficer. They may however be useful in assessing the present condition as it<br />
impacts the issue <strong>of</strong> discretionary relief.<br />
What follows is a synopsis <strong>of</strong> the case law that developed under the <strong>Immigration</strong> Act<br />
respecting the medical <strong>of</strong>ficer’s decision (medical notification) as well as the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer’s<br />
consideration <strong>of</strong> that decision <strong>and</strong> the process by which such decisions are reached.<br />
The Diagnosis <strong>and</strong> Prognosis<br />
The Federal Court’s statement in Mohamed 43 that the applicant must have been suffering<br />
from the medical condition diagnosed by the medical <strong>of</strong>ficers may seem to indicate that the IAD<br />
is to consider the correctness <strong>of</strong> the medical diagnosis made by the medical <strong>of</strong>ficers. Likewise,<br />
the Federal Court’s statement in Uppal 44 that whether a diagnosis is correct is a question <strong>of</strong> fact<br />
on which the parties may lead evidence may have led to the same conclusion. However, in<br />
neither <strong>of</strong> these cases was the issue directly before the Court. In Mohamed, the issue was the<br />
reasonableness <strong>of</strong> the medical <strong>of</strong>ficers’ opinions <strong>and</strong> in Uppal, the issue was whether the<br />
diagnosis was vague. However, in Jiwanpuri, 45 the issue was squarely raised before the Federal<br />
Court. The IAD had found that the diagnosis was erroneous, based on the evidence before it.<br />
The Federal Court held that the IAD cannot question the correctness <strong>of</strong> a medical diagnosis as it<br />
does not have the necessary expertise to do so <strong>and</strong> should not do so even with the help <strong>of</strong> expert<br />
medical evidence.<br />
41<br />
42<br />
43<br />
44<br />
45<br />
Hussain,Amin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3419-95) Noël, September 26, 1996. Reported: Hussain v.<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1996), 35 Imm. L.R. (2d) 86 (F.C.T.D.)<br />
Parmar, supra, footnote 18, at 7.<br />
Mohamed, infra, footnote 51.<br />
Uppal v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1987] 3 F.C. 565.<br />
Jiwanpuri, infra, footnote 73.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Medical Inadmissibility - Ch. 3
The IAD has interpreted the Federal Court cases as still allowing the IAD to determine<br />
whether or not the diagnosis is vague, ambiguous, uncertain or insufficient. If there has not been<br />
a definite diagnosis, it cannot support the opinion reached by the medical <strong>of</strong>ficers; 46 if there has<br />
been a definite diagnosis, its correctness cannot be challenged.<br />
Whether a diagnosis is vague, insufficient, uncertain or ambiguous is a question <strong>of</strong> fact<br />
rather than law that must be determined after examining the evidence presented. 47<br />
Certainty in prognosis is not required. The use <strong>of</strong> “long term” <strong>and</strong> “short term” in the<br />
prognosis is not vague. 48<br />
The medical <strong>of</strong>ficers must base their diagnosis <strong>and</strong> opinion on medical evidence. A<br />
diagnosis cannot be based only on an admission <strong>of</strong> a charge <strong>of</strong> conspiring to supply controlled<br />
drugs <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> past drug addiction. 49<br />
Reasonableness <strong>of</strong> Medical Officers’ Opinion<br />
The IAD must decide whether the opinion expressed by the medical <strong>of</strong>ficers pursuant to<br />
section 19(1)(a) <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Act regarding danger to public health or safety or excessive<br />
dem<strong>and</strong>s is reasonable based on the circumstances <strong>of</strong> the particular case. 50<br />
In Mohamed, 51 the Federal Court set out the general rule as follows:<br />
46<br />
47<br />
48<br />
49<br />
50<br />
Nijjar, Ranjit Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD V89-00964), Wlodyka, Chambers, Verma, January 9, 1991.<br />
Uppal, supra, footnote 44; Shanker, supra, footnote 25.<br />
M.C.I. v. Ram, Venkat (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3381-95), McKeown, May 31, 1996. See also Pattar, supra,<br />
footnote 18, where a condition <strong>of</strong> “unknown pathology” did not render the Medical Notification form deficient.<br />
In Litt, Mohinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-01928), Jackson, June 11, 1998, the medical <strong>of</strong>ficer used “mild<br />
chronic renal failure” <strong>and</strong> “chronic renal failure” interchangeably <strong>and</strong> the medical report was not found to be<br />
inconsistent or vague. But in Phan, Hat v. M.C.I. (IAD W93-00090), Wiebe, September 4, 1996, the IAD<br />
found a diagnosis <strong>of</strong> “respiratory insufficiency” so vague as to be meaningless where the report cited no timeframes<br />
as to deterioration <strong>and</strong> there was no reference to functional disabilities that might impair the applicant.<br />
In Singh, Balbir Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-01550), Carver, May 8, 1998, the prognosis <strong>of</strong> deterioration was<br />
found to be not speculative merely because coronary angiogram procedures were not available (in Fiji) or used<br />
in forming the diagnosis <strong>of</strong> coronary artery disease.<br />
M.E.I. v. Burgon, David Ross (F.C.A., no. A-17-90), MacGuigan, Linden, Mahoney (concurring in the result),<br />
February 22, 1991. Reported: <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) v. Burgon (1991), 13 Imm.<br />
L.R. (2d) 102 (F.C.A.). See also D’Costa Correia, Savio John v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-03318), Maziarz,<br />
February 27, 1998, in which the IAD held that the applicant’s admission, which he later denied, that he drank<br />
half a bottle <strong>of</strong> alcohol per day did not constitute a proper basis for a diagnosis <strong>of</strong> “chronic alcohol abuse”<br />
where the Medical Notification form did not mention the type <strong>of</strong> alcohol consumed or the medical<br />
consequences, if any, <strong>of</strong> such consumption.<br />
Ahir v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1984] 1 F.C. 1098 (C.A.).<br />
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It is therefore open to an appellant to show that the medical <strong>of</strong>ficers’ opinion was<br />
unreasonable <strong>and</strong> this may be done by the production <strong>of</strong> evidence from medical<br />
witnesses other than “medical <strong>of</strong>ficers”. However, evidence that simply tends to<br />
show that the person concerned is no longer suffering from the medical condition<br />
which formed the basis <strong>of</strong> the medical <strong>of</strong>ficers’ opinion is clearly not enough; the<br />
medical <strong>of</strong>ficers may well have been wrong in their prognosis but so long as the<br />
person concerned was suffering from the medical condition <strong>and</strong> their opinion as to<br />
its consequences was reasonable at the time it was given <strong>and</strong> relied on by the visa<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficer, the latter’s refusal <strong>of</strong> the sponsored application was well founded. 52<br />
Reasonableness is a question <strong>of</strong> fact; thus it is incumbent on a sponsor to establish an<br />
evidentiary foundation to any such challenge. 53<br />
The IAD should not assume that the medical <strong>of</strong>ficers’ opinion is reasonable based only on<br />
an agreement that the medical condition exists. 54<br />
In assessing reasonableness, the IAD should consider whether the medical <strong>of</strong>ficers<br />
applied the correct criteria in assessing an applicant. 55 Medical <strong>of</strong>ficers may rely on the<br />
guidelines in the Medical Officer’s H<strong>and</strong>book in making their assessment, but they must be<br />
flexible <strong>and</strong> look at individual circumstances. The guidelines are based on generally accepted<br />
medical experience. 56 The H<strong>and</strong>book may be given a great deal <strong>of</strong> weight as it is similar to<br />
medical journals <strong>and</strong> textbooks. The issue is whether the medical <strong>of</strong>ficers fettered their<br />
discretion. 57<br />
“Tests <strong>of</strong> admissibility must be relevant to the purpose <strong>and</strong> duration for which admission<br />
is sought.” 58 It is unreasonable for the medical <strong>of</strong>ficers to assess a visitor based on the same<br />
criteria used to assess an immigrant. 59 Likewise, an applicant who is included in the principal<br />
applicant’s application as a dependant should not be assessed as an independent applicant <strong>and</strong><br />
required to establish self-sufficiency. 60 The IAD has applied this reasoning in a number <strong>of</strong><br />
51<br />
52<br />
53<br />
54<br />
55<br />
56<br />
57<br />
58<br />
59<br />
Mohamed v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1986] 3 F.C. 90 (C.A.).<br />
Ibid., at 98.<br />
Takhar, Manjit Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD V90-00588), Wlodyka, Chambers, Verma, March 4, 1991.<br />
Deol, Daljeet Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-280-90), MacGuigan, Linden, Robertson, November 27, 1992.<br />
Reported: Deol v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1992), 18 Imm. L.R. (2d) 1 (F.C.A.).<br />
Ibid.<br />
Ajanee, Gulbanoo Sadruddin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-1750-92), MacKay, March 29, 1996. Reported: Ajanee<br />
v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>)(1996), 33 Imm. L.R. (2d) 165 (F.C.T.D.).<br />
Ludwig, James Bruce v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1135-95), Nadon, April 9, 1996. Reported: Ludwig v.<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1996) 33 Imm. L.R. (2d) 213 (F.C.T.D.).<br />
Adjudicator Leckie, quoted with approval by the Federal Court in Ahir, supra, footnote 50, at 1101. See also<br />
Deol, supra, footnote 54; Ng, Kam Fai Andrew v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2903-94), Jerome, January 16,<br />
1996; <strong>and</strong> Chu, Raymond Tak Wah v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-272-94), Jerome, January 16, 1996.<br />
Ahir, ibid.<br />
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cases. 61 In Wong, 62 the Federal Court clarified the factors to be considered in the case <strong>of</strong> an<br />
applicant who was a dependant:<br />
The assessment <strong>of</strong> probable dem<strong>and</strong>s is to involve an analysis <strong>of</strong> whether, on the<br />
balance <strong>of</strong> probabilities having regard to all the circumstances, including, but not<br />
limited to, the severity <strong>of</strong> her condition, the degree <strong>and</strong> effectiveness <strong>of</strong> the support<br />
promised by her family, <strong>and</strong> her prospects for economic <strong>and</strong> personal physical self<br />
sufficiency, [she] will be cared for in her family home into the future. 63<br />
The grounds <strong>of</strong> unreasonableness include incoherence or inconsistency, absence <strong>of</strong><br />
supporting evidence, failure to consider cogent evidence 64 <strong>and</strong> failure to consider the factors<br />
stipulated in section 22 <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Regulations. 65 Note, however, that the failure to<br />
consider the section 22 factors only applies to section 19(1)(a)(i) <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Act, not to<br />
section 19(1)(a)(ii). 66<br />
The duty to look at the reasonableness <strong>of</strong> the opinion arises where the notice is manifestly<br />
in error, e.g. where it relates to the wrong party or an irrelevant disease or if not all relevant<br />
medical reports had been considered. 67 The visa <strong>of</strong>ficer has no authority to review the diagnostic<br />
assessment made by the medical <strong>of</strong>ficers. Where the issue <strong>of</strong> reasonableness arises on the<br />
evidence before the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer, the <strong>of</strong>ficer may elect to seek further medical evidence. Where<br />
no such issue arises, the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer must rely on the opinion. The visa <strong>of</strong>ficer has no discretion<br />
but to refuse if the opinion is that the person is inadmissible. 68<br />
The IAD has held that where there are two different <strong>and</strong> contradictory medical<br />
notifications on file concerning an applicant the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer has a duty to forward them to the<br />
60<br />
61<br />
62<br />
63<br />
64<br />
65<br />
66<br />
67<br />
68<br />
Ng, supra, footnote 58; Chu, supra, footnote 58. See also Deol, supra, footnote 54, where the IAD failed to<br />
consider that the medical <strong>of</strong>ficers appeared to have assessed the applicant as a “new worker” instead <strong>of</strong> a<br />
sponsored dependant. See also Chun, Lam v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5208-97), Teitelbaum, October 29,<br />
1998, where the medical <strong>of</strong>ficers’ assessment should not have been limited to economic factors given that the<br />
applicant’s daughter was a dependant who was not expected to become independent in the immediate future.<br />
Tejobunarto, Lianggono v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-00565), Boire, July 28, 1998; Grewal, Parminder Singh v. M.C.I.<br />
(IAD V95-01266), Boscariol, November 21, 1997; Kaila, Harm<strong>and</strong>eep Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-02830),<br />
McIsaac, October 2, 1997; Nagra, Ajaib Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V94-00245), Bartley, July 14, 1997.<br />
Wong, Chan Shuk King v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2359-95), Simpson, May 24, 1996. Reported: Wong v.<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1996), 34 Imm. L.R. (2d) 18 (F.C.T.D.).<br />
Ibid., at 2-3.<br />
Ismaili, supra, footnote 31.<br />
Gao, supra, footnote 32.<br />
See discussion <strong>of</strong> Ismaili, supra, footnote 31.<br />
Hussain, Amin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3419-95), Noël, September 26, 1996. Reported: Hussain v.<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1996), 35 Imm. L.R. (2d) 86 (F.C.T.D.).<br />
Ajanee, Gulbanoo Sadruddin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-1750-92), MacKay, March 29, 1996. Reported:<br />
Ajanee v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1996), 33 Imm. L.R. (2d) 165 (F.C.T.D.). See<br />
also Ludwig, James Bruce v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1135-95), Nadon, April 9, 1996. Reported: Ludwig<br />
v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1996), 33 Imm. L.R. (2d) 213 (F.C.T.D.); <strong>and</strong> Tong,<br />
Kwan Wah v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2565-96), Heald, October 31, 1997.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Medical Inadmissibility - Ch. 3
medical <strong>of</strong>ficer to re-consider. This situation should have raised a doubt in the mind <strong>of</strong> the visa<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficer as to the reasonableness <strong>of</strong> the medical notification. 69<br />
In a recent case decided under IRPA, Kim, a psychologist’s report had been filed detailing<br />
the extent <strong>of</strong> the applicant’s son’s disability <strong>and</strong> considering some aspects <strong>of</strong> long-term prognosis<br />
<strong>and</strong> care. The Respondent admitted that it had never been reviewed by the <strong>of</strong>ficer deciding this<br />
matter. It was sent to Ottawa’s Medical Services who sent a report that was in the record. Justice<br />
Phelan held that it is not sufficient for the <strong>of</strong>ficer to ignore the psychologist’s report on the basis<br />
that someone else (e.g. Medical Services) would deal or had dealt with it. 70<br />
The medical <strong>of</strong>ficers’ opinion that the applicant was not likely to respond to treatment<br />
was not unreasonable in light <strong>of</strong> the medical reports, one indicating the condition was likely to<br />
improve <strong>and</strong> two suggesting a potential for improvement. 71<br />
Where the medical <strong>of</strong>ficers ignore a report, indicating significant improvements in the<br />
abilities <strong>of</strong> the applicant's dependant children in one year <strong>and</strong> only a need for some educational<br />
support, their opinion is unreasonable. 72<br />
Following cases like Jiwanpuri, 73 it appears that the IAD can consider evidence other than<br />
strictly medical evidence to question the reasonableness <strong>of</strong> the medical opinion.<br />
Excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s<br />
“Excessive Dem<strong>and</strong>s” is now defined in section 1 <strong>of</strong> the IRPR.<br />
Where there is a lack <strong>of</strong> evidence before the medical <strong>of</strong>ficers as to the likelihood <strong>of</strong> the<br />
particular applicant's recourse to social services, the particular social services likely required<br />
should such recourse be required, the expense <strong>of</strong> such services (adjusting for any set-<strong>of</strong>fs), <strong>and</strong><br />
the quality <strong>of</strong> family support available, their conclusion as to excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s lacks an<br />
sufficient evidentiary basis. The medical <strong>of</strong>ficers have a duty to assess the circumstances <strong>of</strong> each<br />
individual that comes before them in his or her uniqueness. 74 This direction arose in the context<br />
69<br />
70<br />
71<br />
72<br />
73<br />
74<br />
Syal-Bharadwa, Bela v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-02011), Borst, November 30, 1999.<br />
Kim, Shin Ki v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-345-07), Phelan, January 29, 2008; 2008 FC 116.<br />
Hussain, supra, footnote 67.<br />
Ten, Luisa v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1606-97), Tremblay-Lamer, June 26, 1998.<br />
Jiwanpuri, Jasvir Kaur v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-333-89), Marceau, Stone, MacGuigan, May 17, 1990.<br />
Reported: Jiwanpuri v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1990), 10 Imm. L.R. (2d) 241<br />
(F.C.A.).<br />
Poste, John Russell v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4601-96), Cullen, December 22, 1997. Applied in Ho, Nam<br />
Van v. M.C.I. (IAD C97-00009), Wiebe, January 13, 2000.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Medical Inadmissibility - Ch. 3
<strong>of</strong> a mental disability, but it may be applicable to other areas <strong>of</strong> medical refusals as well <strong>and</strong> has<br />
recently been found to be applicable to cases <strong>of</strong> physical disability. 75<br />
“Excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s” was held in Jim 76 to mean “more than what is normal or necessary.”<br />
The Federal Court accepted “excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s” as meaning “unreasonable” or “beyond what<br />
the system reasonably provides to everyone.” 77 The Federal Court applied this definition in<br />
Ludwig, 78 holding that<br />
[…] the necessity <strong>of</strong> monitoring the applicant’s health situation over a fiveyear<br />
period, the probability that the applicant’s cancer would recur, <strong>and</strong> the<br />
applicant’s reduced chances <strong>of</strong> a cure, would cause or might reasonably be<br />
expected to cause, dem<strong>and</strong>s on <strong>Canada</strong>’s health or social services that would<br />
be more than “normal or necessary”. 79<br />
There should be some evidentiary basis for determining that an applicant’s admission<br />
would cause or might reasonably be expected to cause excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s. 80 The fact that an<br />
applicant was found unfit, by reason <strong>of</strong> insanity, to st<strong>and</strong> trial for murder <strong>and</strong> had since, at all<br />
material times, been detained under a Lieutenant Governor’s warrant did not automatically<br />
support the conclusion that the applicant’s admission might reasonably be expected to cause<br />
excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s on health or social services. 81 Neither does the fact that someone had been<br />
75<br />
76<br />
77<br />
78<br />
79<br />
80<br />
81<br />
Cabaldon Jr., Antonio Quindipan v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3675-96), Wetston, January 15, 1998..<br />
Jim, Yun Jing v. S.G.C. (F.C.T.D., no. T-1977-92), Gibson, October 25, 1993. Reported: Jim v. <strong>Canada</strong><br />
(Solicitor General) (1993), 22 Imm. L.R. (2d) 261 (F.C.T.D.). Cited with approval in Choi, Hon Man v. M.C.I.<br />
(F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4399-94), Teitelbaum, July 18, 1995. Reported: Choi v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship<br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1995), 29 Imm. L.R. (2d) 85 (F.C.T.D.).<br />
Jim, ibid. In Gill, Gurpal Kaur v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3082-98), Evans, July 16, 1999, the Court noted<br />
in obiter dicta that the fact that many Canadians <strong>of</strong> the applicant’s age require a particular operation (knee<br />
replacement) cannot justify in law a finding that the admission <strong>of</strong> a person who also needs this operation will<br />
impose excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s on the health system. In this situation, any “excessive dem<strong>and</strong>” is caused by the<br />
devotion <strong>of</strong> resources that are inadequate to meet the dem<strong>and</strong> from the present population, not by the admission<br />
<strong>of</strong> an otherwise qualified applicant for a visa. The IAD on the re-hearing <strong>of</strong> this appeal declined to follow this<br />
obiter dicta: Gill, Gurpal Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-02345), Whist, January 21, 2000.<br />
Ludwig, supra, footnote 57, at 14.<br />
See also Ajanee, supra, footnote 56, where the finding <strong>of</strong> excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s was also upheld. There was<br />
evidence that the applicant had undergone a mastectomy; there was no evidence <strong>of</strong> recurrence <strong>of</strong> the cancer<br />
after two years; <strong>and</strong> her examining physician indicated that her prognosis was excellent. However, relying on<br />
the medical guidelines, the medical <strong>of</strong>ficers were <strong>of</strong> the opinion that the applicant’s admission might cause<br />
excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s because a five-year period had not yet elapsed; it was probable she would suffer a<br />
significant recurrence; <strong>and</strong> there was only a 70 per cent chance <strong>of</strong> survival over a five-year period.<br />
Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>Canada</strong> instructions OP 96-10, IP 96-13, EC 96-02, dated May 9, 1996, instruct<br />
medical <strong>of</strong>ficers to prepare statutory declarations routinely to support their opinions <strong>of</strong> excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s.<br />
The declarations are to refer to all medical evidence considered; any experts consulted <strong>and</strong> their qualifications;<br />
the reasons for forming their opinion; <strong>and</strong> the costs <strong>of</strong> required health or social services. It should be noted that<br />
the Appeal Division has rarely seen these statutory declarations in appeals. Please note: 2007 OP 15 has no<br />
reference to such a Stat Dec. See also Kumar, Varinder v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-03366), Boscariol, December 30,<br />
1998 where the panel comments on the sufficiency <strong>of</strong> the respondent's evidence.<br />
Seyoum, Zerom v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-412-90), Mahoney, Stone, Décary, November 15, 1990.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Medical Inadmissibility - Ch. 3
addicted to drugs automatically bring the person within section 19(1)(a)(ii) <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong><br />
Act. 82<br />
The IAD has dealt with an applicant’s physical disability <strong>and</strong> its impact on the validity <strong>of</strong><br />
a refusal. In Rai, 83 the applicant suffered from post-polio paraparesis <strong>of</strong> her lower limbs. The<br />
applicant produced medical evidence that she had adapted remarkably to her infirmity <strong>and</strong><br />
intended to forego recommended medical treatment to prevent deterioration <strong>of</strong> the condition. The<br />
panel found that the applicant’s willingness to forego recommended medical treatment did not go<br />
towards showing the unreasonableness <strong>of</strong> the opinion regarding excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s. The panel<br />
also held that eligibility for provincial income assistance programs for persons with disabilities<br />
did not constitute excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s. In Wahid, 84 the applicant who suffered from quadriplegia<br />
was entitled to attendant care services, but never used them as he preferred to be independent.<br />
The IAD considered the evidence that the sponsor had made his house physically accessible <strong>and</strong><br />
that the applicant had the determination <strong>and</strong> the resources to ensure that he would not place<br />
excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s on services to conclude that the refusal was not valid in law.<br />
A Federal Court decision, has indirectly dealt with the notions <strong>of</strong> scarcity <strong>of</strong> services <strong>and</strong><br />
cost. In Rabang 85 , a case involving an applicant with developmental delay with cerebral palsy,<br />
the Court found that a determination as to the reasonableness <strong>of</strong> the opinion <strong>of</strong> the medical<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficers with regard to excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s could not be made without evidence that the services<br />
in question are publicly funded <strong>and</strong> evidence as to availability, scarcity or cost <strong>of</strong> those services.<br />
The Court was not ready to accept that this was a matter within the special knowledge or<br />
expertise <strong>of</strong> the medical <strong>of</strong>ficer, nor was the Court ready to accept the argument that requiring<br />
such evidence would pose an undue administrative burden. The services in question were special<br />
education, physical therapy, occupational therapy, <strong>and</strong> speech therapy as well as ongoing<br />
specialist care. The Court was also not willing to accept that the onus is on the appellant to<br />
satisfy the medical <strong>of</strong>ficer that the applicant's dem<strong>and</strong>s on publicly funded health <strong>and</strong> social<br />
services would not be excessive. The Court stated that this was not the fundamental problem in<br />
the case, the problem being that the record disclosed no evidence at all on the critical question <strong>of</strong><br />
excessive<br />
dem<strong>and</strong>.<br />
Post-Hilewitz Law<br />
Since the Supreme Court <strong>of</strong> <strong>Canada</strong> decision in Hilewitz 86 the legal l<strong>and</strong>scape has<br />
dramatically shifted for medical inadmissibility visa refusals based on excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s. It is<br />
important therefore to consider what changed <strong>and</strong> any potential impact those changes may have<br />
for appeals at the IAD.<br />
82<br />
83<br />
84<br />
85<br />
86<br />
Burgon, supra, footnote 49; D’Costa Correia, supra, footnote 49.<br />
Rai, Paramninder Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-00279), Carver, April 20, 1998.<br />
Wahid, Gurbax Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-04717), Kitchener, January 21, 1998.<br />
Rabang, Ricardo Pablo v M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4576-98), Sharlow, November 29, 1999.<br />
Hilewitz v. <strong>Canada</strong> (M.C.I.) <strong>and</strong> De Jong v. <strong>Canada</strong> (M.C.I.) were joined in Hilewitz <strong>and</strong> De Jong v. <strong>Canada</strong><br />
[2005] SCC 57, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 706, decided October 21, 2005.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Medical Inadmissibility - Ch. 3
Hilewitz <strong>and</strong> De Jong applied separately for permanent resident visas in the investor <strong>and</strong><br />
self-employed categories respectively. Visa <strong>of</strong>ficers refused the applications, despite the<br />
applicant’s substantial financial resources, because the applicants’ children suffered from a<br />
intellectual disability, <strong>and</strong> were found to be medically inadmissible under the former <strong>Immigration</strong><br />
Act, s. 19(1)(a)(ii). The <strong>of</strong>ficers concluded that they would require a variety <strong>of</strong> social services,<br />
e.g., special schooling, vocational training, etc., far in excess <strong>of</strong> the social services required by an<br />
average Canadian resident <strong>of</strong> his age. Their admission would cause excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s on social<br />
services. The issues in both <strong>of</strong> these cases are: <strong>of</strong> what relevance were the financial<br />
circumstances <strong>of</strong> the prospective immigrants? How should one view their willingness <strong>and</strong> ability<br />
to pay for social services once they reach <strong>Canada</strong>?<br />
The Supreme Court joined the two appeals <strong>and</strong> held that the term “excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s” is<br />
inherently evaluative <strong>and</strong> comparative so medical <strong>of</strong>ficers must assess likely dem<strong>and</strong>s on social<br />
services, not mere eligibility for them. They must necessarily take into account both medical <strong>and</strong><br />
non-medical factors. This requires individualized assessments. The Court explained that the<br />
medical <strong>of</strong>ficer cannot ignore the very assets that qualify the applicant for admission to <strong>Canada</strong><br />
when determining the admissibility <strong>of</strong> his disabled son. Given their financial resources, the<br />
applicants would likely be required to contribute substantially, if not entirely, to any costs for<br />
social services provided by the province <strong>of</strong> Ontario, where they wish to settle.<br />
How has this l<strong>and</strong>mark decision been interpreted by the Federal Court <strong>and</strong> the IAD?<br />
Kelen J. held in both Airapetyan 87 <strong>and</strong> Ching-Chu 88 that one’s ability or intention to pay for<br />
social services should not be restricted to applicants in business immigration categories. The IAD<br />
has reached the same conclusion as well 89 . In Colaco 90 , the Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal held, in an<br />
application for permanent residence by a “skilled worker” class, that the Minister erred in not<br />
considering the applicant’s financial willingness <strong>and</strong> commitment to pay for social services for<br />
their mildly mentally retarded child.<br />
Of course “excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s” can apply to both social services as well as “medical<br />
services”. Campbell J. made this distinction in Lee where an applicant is the “entrepreneur<br />
category was refused for excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s as a result <strong>of</strong> his polycystic kidney disease. The<br />
Court held:<br />
(1) Although the Applicant is an entrepreneur with considerable net worth, the Officer did<br />
not err by failing to consider the Applicant’s ability to pay for his own health care for the<br />
following reasons: (i) Hilewitz (SCC) dealt specifically with “social services” <strong>and</strong> not<br />
“health services”; (ii) a permanent resident automatically has health insurance in <strong>Canada</strong>;<br />
(iii) paying for health care is contrary to Canadian public policy; (iv) charging patients for<br />
87<br />
88<br />
89<br />
90<br />
Airapetyan, Lidiya v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2570-06), Kelen, January 17, 2007; 2007 FC 42.<br />
Ching-Chu, Lai v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-694-07), Kelen, August 28, 2007; 2007 FC 855.<br />
Zhang, Jiang v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-10174), Tumir, February 7, 2006.<br />
Colaco, Peter Anthony v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-366-06), Linden, Létourneau, Sexton, September 12, 2007;<br />
2007 FCA 282.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Medical Inadmissibility - Ch. 3
insured health services is expressly prohibited under the <strong>Canada</strong> Health Act. Based upon<br />
how <strong>Canada</strong> disseminates health services to permanent residents, a person’s financial<br />
ability to pay for health services would be irrelevant (Deol); <strong>and</strong> (v) excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s<br />
on health care are more than just financial dem<strong>and</strong>s, e.g., using up finite places in waiting<br />
lists (Gilani).<br />
(2) The Officer breached procedural fairness by not also considering the Applicant’s<br />
request for a temporary resident permit.<br />
In Kirec 91 the applicant’s daughter suffers from Althetoid Cerebral Palsy. The visa <strong>of</strong>ficer<br />
found she was medically inadmissible for excessive dem<strong>and</strong> based on her need for social<br />
services. The applicant argued that he did not know the contents <strong>of</strong> the medical file <strong>and</strong> did not<br />
know the criteria applied to assess his daughter’s condition <strong>and</strong> therefore the fairness letter<br />
process was flawed. The Court disagreed as the fairness letter included the medical findings in<br />
the medical notification. The letter indicated the applicant’s daughter was non-verbal, completely<br />
dependent for all activities <strong>of</strong> self care, utilizes the services <strong>of</strong> occupational <strong>and</strong> speech therapy,<br />
physiotherapy <strong>and</strong> assistive technology for communication. Although there was not a dollar<br />
figure on the services utilized by the applicant’s daughter through the publicly funded Vancouver<br />
School <strong>Board</strong>, there was evidence that she required a full time special education assistant - this<br />
alone constitutes an excessive dem<strong>and</strong> on social service as it clearly exceeds the threshold <strong>of</strong> $4,<br />
057. In addition, she required the services <strong>of</strong> physiotherapists, occupational therapists, speech<br />
language therapists <strong>and</strong> had utilized public funds for a wheelchair. It was reasonable for the visa<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficer to trust the findings <strong>of</strong> the medical <strong>of</strong>ficer that she would continue to use those services on<br />
return to <strong>Canada</strong>. The applicant failed to make any submissions regarding how family support<br />
would <strong>of</strong>fset the excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s other than an expressed intention to utilize private services.<br />
The visa <strong>of</strong>ficer properly took into account the applicant’s daughter’s personal circumstances<br />
including her long history <strong>of</strong> using social services while in <strong>Canada</strong>.<br />
There have been some specific situations that have arisen worth noting. The Court<br />
commented 92 that the medical <strong>of</strong>ficer should compare the applicant’s situation to the average cost<br />
for Canadian citizens <strong>of</strong> the same age group. It should be noted that this interpretation is at odds<br />
with the actual definition <strong>of</strong> “excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s” in IRPA. The visa <strong>of</strong>ficer cannot be faulted for<br />
failing to conduct an individualized assessment when no plan for the daughter’s care in <strong>Canada</strong><br />
<strong>and</strong> no submissions are put forward for consideration 93 .<br />
Intellectual Disability Cases<br />
Special mention must be made <strong>of</strong> cases involving intellectual disability or “mental<br />
retardation”. The concept <strong>of</strong> mental retardation cannot be used as a stereotype. The degree <strong>and</strong><br />
91<br />
92<br />
93<br />
Kirec, Babur v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6272-05), Blais, June 23, 2006; 2006 FC 800<br />
Hossain, Ishtiaq v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4132-05), Gauthier, April 11, 2006; 2006 FC 475.<br />
Gau, Hui-Chun v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7127-05), Mactavish, October 23, 2006; 2006 FC 1258.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Medical Inadmissibility - Ch. 3
probable consequences <strong>of</strong> the degree <strong>of</strong> mental retardation for excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s must be<br />
assessed by the IAD. It is an error for a medical <strong>of</strong>ficer to fail to specify the degree <strong>of</strong> mental<br />
retardation, thus making it difficult to assess the reasonableness <strong>of</strong> the finding. 94 The degree <strong>of</strong><br />
mental retardation must be indicated by the medical <strong>of</strong>ficers, as there may be a higher level <strong>of</strong><br />
pro<strong>of</strong> required to establish excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s in the case <strong>of</strong> mild mental retardation. 95<br />
If a finding <strong>of</strong> excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s is based not on the medical condition as such, but on<br />
the potential failure <strong>of</strong> family support, there must be evidence as to the probability <strong>of</strong> such<br />
failure. 96 The Federal Court set aside a visa <strong>of</strong>ficer’s refusal where the record did not contain an<br />
estimation <strong>of</strong> the actual amount <strong>of</strong> specialized education required by the applicant’s daughter or<br />
any documentation concerning the availability <strong>of</strong>, or current access to, that specialized<br />
education. 97<br />
An opinion based on the need for special schooling, training <strong>and</strong> indefinite home care <strong>and</strong><br />
supervision was found to be reasonable in Choi. 98 In Jaferi, 99 the daughter <strong>of</strong> an applicant was<br />
found to be developmentally h<strong>and</strong>icapped <strong>and</strong> special schooling would cost 260 per cent more<br />
than schooling for a healthy child. The Federal Court found that the medical <strong>of</strong>ficers’ finding<br />
was not unreasonable. However, in Ismaili, 100 the Federal Court found that the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer did<br />
not properly consider the issue <strong>of</strong> excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s as the evidence was that the applicant’s son<br />
required a vitamin supplement at a cost <strong>of</strong> $12 per month <strong>and</strong> there was no waiting list at the<br />
special school he required. The cost <strong>of</strong> the special schooling was not canvassed as in Jaferi. 101<br />
In Ma, 102 it was held to be well established that specialized education is a “social service”<br />
within the meaning <strong>of</strong> the Act. In Sabater, 103 the Federal Court held that services provided by<br />
schools to the h<strong>and</strong>icapped may be considered as social services. The Federal Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal in<br />
94<br />
95<br />
96<br />
97<br />
98<br />
99<br />
Deol, supra, footnote 54; Sabater, Llamado D. Jr. v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2519-93), McKeown,<br />
October 13, 1995. Reported: Sabater v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1995), 31 Imm.<br />
L.R. (2d) 59 (F.C.T.D.); Nagra, supra, footnote 61.<br />
Sabater, supra, footnote 94. See also Poste, John Russell v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4601-96), Cullen,<br />
December 22, 1997; Fei, supra, footnote 35; <strong>and</strong> Lau, Hing To v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4361-96), Pinard,<br />
April 17, 1998.<br />
Litt, Jasmail Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2296-94), Rothstein, February 17, 1995. Reported: Litt v.<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1995), 26 Imm. L.R. (2d) 153 (F.C.T.D.). See also Truong,<br />
Lien Phuong v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-00900), Kitchener, Bartley, Boire, April 7, 1997.<br />
Cabaldon Jr., supra, footnote 75.<br />
Choi, supra, footnote 76.<br />
Jaferi, supra, footnote 31.<br />
100 Ismaili, supra, footnote 31.<br />
101 Jaferi, supra, footnote 31.<br />
102 Ma, supra, footnote 35.<br />
103 Sabater, supra, footnote 94.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Medical Inadmissibility - Ch. 3
Thangarajan 104 <strong>and</strong> in Yogeswaran 105 indicated that the education <strong>of</strong> mentally challenged<br />
students within the publicly funded provincial school system does constitute a “social service”<br />
within the meaning <strong>of</strong> section 19(1)(a)(ii) <strong>of</strong> the Act. The Court explained that since<br />
institutionalization <strong>of</strong> the mentally retarded is a social service, a substitute more modern program,<br />
special education, is also a social service.<br />
In deciding whether to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction the Appeal Division would<br />
fetter its discretion by not considering all factors relevant to its determination. For example, in<br />
Deol, 106 the Appeal Division focused on the refusal <strong>of</strong> the family to acknowledge the mental<br />
retardation <strong>of</strong> one <strong>of</strong> its members <strong>and</strong> the successful functioning <strong>of</strong> the two households. At the<br />
same time, the Appeal Division failed to consider, particularly, the nature <strong>of</strong> the medical<br />
condition <strong>of</strong> mental retardation, “the psychological dependencies it engenders <strong>and</strong> the close<br />
bonds <strong>of</strong> affection that may arise in such a family, all in light <strong>of</strong> the objective [...] <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Act <strong>of</strong> facilitating the reunion <strong>of</strong> close relatives in <strong>Canada</strong>.” 107 The Federal Court<br />
has observed that the Appeal Division should not use stereotyping or irrelevant considerations in<br />
deciding whether to grant special relief. 108<br />
Timing<br />
Generally, the reasonableness <strong>of</strong> a medical opinion is to be assessed at the time it was<br />
given <strong>and</strong> relied on by a visa <strong>of</strong>ficer. 109 Nevertheless, in making that assessment, the IAD may<br />
rely on any relevant evidence adduced before it. 110 Further, where the IAD is presented with a<br />
new opinion <strong>of</strong> a medical <strong>of</strong>ficer, concurred in by another medical <strong>of</strong>ficer, it is the reasonableness<br />
<strong>of</strong> that opinion that must be assessed. 111<br />
Evidence as to an applicant’s condition subsequent to the refusal has limited relevance to<br />
the legal validity <strong>of</strong> the refusal. In Shanker, 112 the Federal Court held that evidence <strong>of</strong> an<br />
applicant’s medical condition subsequent to the refusal is not relevant to the legality <strong>of</strong> the<br />
refusal. However, it may still be relevant to the extent that it can demonstrate that the medical<br />
104 M.C.I. v. Thangarajan, Rajadurai Samuel (F.C.A., no. A-486-98), Létourneau, Rothstein, McDonald, June 24,<br />
1999; reversing Thangarajan, Rajadurai Samuel v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3789-97), Reed, August 5,<br />
1998.<br />
105 Yogeswaran, Thiyagaraja v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1505-96), McKeown, April 17, 1997.<br />
106 Deol, supra, footnote 54.<br />
107 Ibid., at 7.<br />
108 Budhu, Pooran Deonaraine v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-272-97), Reed, March 20, 1998.<br />
109 See, for example, Jiwanpuri, supra, footnote 73; Gao, supra, footnote 32; <strong>and</strong> Mohamed, supra, footnote 51.<br />
110 Jiwanpuri, supra, footnote 73.<br />
111 Kahlon, Darshan Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-115-86), Mahoney, Stone, MacGuigan, February 6, 1989.<br />
Reported: Kahlon v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1989), 7 Imm.L.R. (2d) 91 (F.C.A.)<br />
112 Shanker, supra, footnote 25.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Medical Inadmissibility - Ch. 3
<strong>of</strong>ficer’s opinion was unreasonable at the time it was given <strong>and</strong> relied on by the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer. 113 It<br />
is not enough to simply show that the applicant is no longer suffering from the medical<br />
condition. 114<br />
Discretionary Jurisdiction to grant special relief<br />
The IAD continues to have the power to grant relief to those sponsored members <strong>of</strong> the<br />
family class who are medically inadmissible. The member may grant their appeal if they are<br />
satisfied that at the time the appeal is disposed <strong>of</strong> "taking into account the best interests <strong>of</strong> a child<br />
directly affected by the decision, sufficient humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate considerations<br />
warrant special relief in light <strong>of</strong> all the circumstances <strong>of</strong> the case" 115 .<br />
Of particular relevance when considering compassionate or humanitarian factors within<br />
the context <strong>of</strong> medical inadmissibility is evidence <strong>of</strong> an applicant’s current state <strong>of</strong> health. 116<br />
Improvement will be considered in favour <strong>of</strong> the sponsor (although a decision to grant special<br />
relief probably should not turn solely on this criterion), 117 while evidence that the condition is<br />
stable or has deteriorated may be considered against the sponsor. 118<br />
In Szulikowski, 119 the IAD allowed the appeal on discretionary grounds although the cost<br />
<strong>of</strong> open-heart surgery would exceed $25,000, given there was no waiting list in Alberta <strong>and</strong><br />
appropriate post-operative care was not available in the Ukraine for the applicant, who was the<br />
sponsor’s adopted son.<br />
In Rai, 120 the efforts <strong>of</strong> a family to provide specialized transport <strong>and</strong> to adapt their house<br />
for wheelchair accessibility were positive humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate factors to be<br />
considered.<br />
113 Jiwanpuri, supra, footnote 73.<br />
114 Mohamed, supra, footnote 51.<br />
115 S. 67(1)(c) IRPA.<br />
116 Kirpal is a now a historic footnote: Kirpal no longer applicable in the IRPA context. According to one decision<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Federal Court, the IAD errs if it “weighs” the legal impediment to admissibility against the strength <strong>of</strong><br />
the humanitarian or compassionate factors present in an appeal: Kirpal v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>Immigration</strong>), [1997] 1 F.C. 352 (T.D.). Further, the Court in Kirpal held that the IAD should consider<br />
separately whether the granting <strong>of</strong> special relief is warranted with respect to each applicant. However, as<br />
canvassed in Chauhan, Gurpreet K. v. M.C.I. (IAD T95-06533), Townshend, June 11, 1997, in decisions that<br />
pre-date Kirpal, the Federal Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal has sanctioned consideration <strong>of</strong> the legal impediment in the<br />
exercise <strong>of</strong> the IAD’s discretionary jurisdiction. In Chauhan, the panel also articulated its disagreement with<br />
the holding in Kirpal regarding the separate consideration <strong>of</strong> special relief for each applicant.<br />
117 Choi, Tommy Yuen Hung v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 84-9134), Weisdorf, Suppa, Teitelbaum, September 2, 1986.<br />
118 Zheng, Bi Quing v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-01428), Sherman, Weisdorf, Tisshaw, January 3, 1992; Tonnie v. M.E.I.<br />
(IAD T91-00202), Bell, Fatsis, Singh, March 30, 1992; Moledina, Narjis v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-02516), Ahara,<br />
Chu, Fatsis, May 8, 1992.<br />
119 Szulikowski, Myron Joseph (Mike) v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-03154), Nee, August 13, 1998.<br />
120 Rai, supra, footnote 83.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Medical Inadmissibility - Ch. 3
IRPA now sets out the impact <strong>of</strong> an allowed appeal on the sponsorship process: "An<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficer, in examining a permanent resident or foreign national, is bound by the decision <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division to allow an appeal in respect <strong>of</strong> a foreign national." 121<br />
121 S. 70(1) IRPA.<br />
<strong>Sponsorship</strong> <strong>Appeals</strong> 22 Legal Services<br />
January 1, 2008 Medical Inadmissibility - Ch. 3
CASES<br />
Acosta, Mercedes v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4790-97), Reed, January 7, 1999...................................................... 9<br />
Ahir v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1984] 1 F.C. 1098 (C.A.). .................................... 12, 13<br />
Airapetyan, Lidiya v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2570-06), Kelen, January 17, 2007; 2007 FC 42 ................................. 17<br />
Ajanee, Gulbanoo Sadruddin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-1750-92), MacKay, March 29, 1996.<br />
Reported: Ajanee v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1996), 33 Imm. L.R.<br />
(2d) 165 (F.C.T.D.). .......................................................................................................................................... 14, 15<br />
Ajanee, Gulbanoo Sadruddin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-1750-92), MacKay, March 29, 1996.<br />
Reported: Ajanee v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>)(1996), 33 Imm. L.R.<br />
(2d) 165 (F.C.T.D.) ................................................................................................................................................. 12<br />
Badwal, Tripta v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-1193-88), MacGuigan, Urie, Mahoney, November 14,<br />
1989. Reported: Badwal v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1989),<br />
9 Imm. L.R. (2d) 85; 64 D.L.R. (4th) 561 (F.C.A.) .................................................................................................. 7<br />
Boateng, Dora Amoah v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2700-97), Lutfy, September 28, 1998....................................... 9<br />
Bola, Lakhvir Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-417-88), Marceau, Stone, Desjardins (dissenting),<br />
May 18, 1990. Reported: Bola v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1990),<br />
11 Imm. L.R. (2d) 14 (F.C.A.). ................................................................................................................................. 7<br />
Budhu, Pooran Deonaraine v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-272-97), Reed, March 20, 1998 ..................................... 20<br />
Burgon: M.E.I. v. Burgon, David Ross (F.C.A., no. A-17-90), MacGuigan, Linden, Mahoney<br />
(concurring in the result), February 22, 1991. Reported: <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>Immigration</strong>) v. Burgon (1991), 13 Imm. L.R. (2d) 102 (F.C.A.). ................................................................... 11, 16<br />
Cabaldon Jr., Antonio Quindipan v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3675-96), Wetston, January 15,<br />
1998................................................................................................................................................................... 15, 19<br />
Chauhan, Gurpreet K. v. M.C.I. (IAD T95-06533), Townshend, June 11, 1997........................................................ 21<br />
Ching-Chu, Lai v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-694-07), Kelen, August 28, 2007; 2007 FC 855....................................... 17<br />
Choi, Hon Man v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4399-94), Teitelbaum, July 18, 1995. Reported:<br />
Choi v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1995), 29 Imm. L.R. (2d) 85<br />
(F.C.T.D.).......................................................................................................................................................... 15, 19<br />
Choi, Tommy Yuen Hung v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 84-9134), Weisdorf, Suppa, Teitelbaum, September 2,<br />
1986......................................................................................................................................................................... 21<br />
Chong Alvarez: M.E.I. v. Chong Alvarez, Maria Del Refugio (IAD V90-01411), Wlodyka,<br />
April 10, 1991. .......................................................................................................................................................... 7<br />
Chu, Raymond Tak Wah v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-272-94), Jerome, January 16, 1996...................................... 13<br />
Chun, Lam v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5208-97), Teitelbaum, October 29, 1998.................................................. 13<br />
<strong>Sponsorship</strong> <strong>Appeals</strong> 23 Legal Services<br />
January 1, 2008 Medical Inadmissibility - Ch. 3
Colaco, Peter Anthony v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-366-06), Linden, Létourneau, Sexton, September<br />
12, 2007; 2007 FCA 282......................................................................................................................................... 17<br />
D’Costa Correia, Savio John v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-03318), Maziarz, February 27, 1998............................................ 11<br />
Darshan Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-115-86), Mahoney, Stone, MacGuigan, February 6, 1989.<br />
Reported: Kahlon v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1989), 7 Imm.L.R.<br />
(2d) 91 (F.C.A.)....................................................................................................................................................... 21<br />
Deol, Daljeet Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-280-90), MacGuigan, Linden, Robertson,<br />
November 27, 1992. Reported: Deol v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>)<br />
(1992), 18 Imm. L.R. (2d) 1 (F.C.A.). .................................................................................................. 12, 13, 19, 20<br />
Dhami, Gurnam Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 84-6036), Chambers, Tremblay, Howard, January 8,<br />
1987........................................................................................................................................................................... 6<br />
Fei, Wan Chen v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-741-96), Heald, June 30, 1997........................................................ 9, 19<br />
Fung, Alfred Wai To v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 83-6205), Hlady, Glogowski, Petryshyn, December 14,<br />
1984........................................................................................................................................................................... 8<br />
Gao, Yude v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-980-92), Dubé, February 8, 1993. Reported: Gao v.<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1993), 18 Imm. L.R. (2d) 306 (F.C.T.D.). ............... 9, 13, 20<br />
Gau, Hui-Chun v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7127-05), Mactavish, October 23, 2006; 2006 FC 1258........................... 19<br />
Gill, Gurpal Kaur v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3082-98), Evans, July 16, 1999 ..................................................... 15<br />
Gill, Gurpal Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-02345), Whist, January 21, 2000 ................................................................... 15<br />
Gingiovvenanu, Marcel v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3875-93), Simpson, October 30, 1995.<br />
Reported: Gingiovvenanu v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1995),<br />
31 Imm. L.R. (2d) 55 (F.C.T.D.)............................................................................................................................... 8<br />
Grewal, Parminder Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-01266), Boscariol, November 21, 1997 ............................................ 13<br />
Hilewitz <strong>and</strong> De Jong v. <strong>Canada</strong> [2005] SCC 57, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 706, decided October 21, 2005........................... 17<br />
Hiramen, S<strong>and</strong>ra Cecilia v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-956-84), MacGuigan, Thurlow, Stone,<br />
February 4, 1986 ................................................................................................................................................... 5, 7<br />
Ho, Nam Van v. M.C.I. (IAD C97-00009), Wiebe, January 13, 2000......................................................................... 15<br />
Hossain, Ishtiaq v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4132-05), Gauthier, April 11, 2006; 2006 FC 475 .................................. 18<br />
Hussain, Amin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3419-95), Noël, September 26, 1996. Reported:<br />
Hussain v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1996), 35 Imm. L.R. (2d) 86<br />
(F.C.T.D.).......................................................................................................................................................... 13, 14<br />
Ismaili, Zafar Iqbal v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3430-94), Cullen, August 17, 1995. Reported:<br />
Ismaili v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1995), 29 Imm. L.R. (2d) 1<br />
(F.C.T.D.)...................................................................................................................................................... 8, 13, 19<br />
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Jaferi, Ali v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4039-93), Simpson, October 24, 1995. Reported: Jaferi<br />
v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1995), 35 Imm. L.R. (2d) 140 (F.C.T.D.)..................... 8, 19<br />
Jean Jacques, Soutien v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 80-1187), Scott, Houle, Tremblay, May 20, 1981.......................................... 8<br />
Jim, Yun Jing v. S.G.C. (F.C.T.D., no. T-1977-92), Gibson, October 25, 1993. Reported: Jim v.<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> (Solicitor General) (1993), 22 Imm. L.R. (2d) 261 (F.C.T.D.) ................................................................. 15<br />
Jiwanpuri, Jasvir Kaur v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-333-89), Marceau, Stone, MacGuigan, May 17,<br />
1990. Reported: Jiwanpuri v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1990),<br />
10 Imm. L.R. (2d) 241 (F.C.A.). ................................................................................................................. 14, 20, 21<br />
Kaila, Harm<strong>and</strong>eep Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-02830), McIsaac, October 2, 1997 .................................................... 13<br />
Khan, Mary Angela v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-9043), Tisshaw, Blumer, Ahara, October 6, 1986. ....................................... 7<br />
Kim, Shin Ki v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-345-07), Phelan, January 29, 2008; 2008 FC 116 ......................................... 14<br />
King, Garvin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2623-95), Dubé, May 23, 1996................................................................ 6<br />
King, Garvin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2623-95), Dubé, May 23, 1996................................................................ 6<br />
Kirec, Babur v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6272-05), Blais, June 23, 2006; 2006 FC 800............................................... 18<br />
Kirpal v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1997] 1 F.C. 352 (T.D.) ............................................ 21<br />
Kumar, Varinder v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-03366), Boscariol, December 30, 1998 .......................................................... 15<br />
Lau, Hing To v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4361-96), Pinard, April 17, 1998 .......................................................... 19<br />
Lee, Sing v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-2459-85), Martin, May 1, 1986.......................................................................... 10<br />
Li, Leung Lun v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-466-96), Tremblay-Lamer, September 30, 1998.................................... 9<br />
Ling, Simeon Tsan En v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-00173), Tisshaw, Weisdorf, Chu, September 26, 1991. ............................ 9<br />
Litt, Jasmail Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2296-94), Rothstein, February 17, 1995.<br />
Reported: Litt v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1995), 26 Imm. L.R. (2d)<br />
153 (F.C.T.D.)......................................................................................................................................................... 19<br />
Litt, Mohinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-01928), Jackson, June 11, 1998 ................................................................. 11<br />
Ludwig, James Bruce v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1135-95), Nadon, April 9, 1996. Reported:<br />
Ludwig v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1996), 33 Imm. L.R. (2d) 213<br />
(F.C.T.D.).......................................................................................................................................................... 14, 15<br />
Ludwig, James Bruce v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1135-95), Nadon, April 9, 1996. Reported:<br />
Ludwig v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1996) 33 Imm. L.R. (2d) 213<br />
(F.C.T.D.)................................................................................................................................................................ 12<br />
Ma, Chiu Ming v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-812-97), Wetston, January 15, 1998. ............................................. 9, 20<br />
Mahey, Gulshan v. M.C.I. (IAD V96-02119), Clark, July 20, 1998.............................................................................. 8<br />
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Mahey: M.C.I. v. Mahey, Gulshan (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3989-98), Campbell, May 11, 1999 ...................................... 8<br />
Mangat, Parminder Singh v. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D., no. T-153-85), Strayer, February 25, 1985. ........................................ 6<br />
Mohamed v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1986] 3 F.C. 90 (C.A.) .......................... 12, 20, 21<br />
Mohamed, Liaquat Ali v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-9648), Sherman, Chu, Eglington (dissenting), July 27,<br />
1987........................................................................................................................................................................... 7<br />
Moledina, Narjis v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-02516), Ahara, Chu, Fatsis, May 8, 1992........................................................ 21<br />
Nagra, Ajaib Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V94-00245), Bartley, July 14, 1997 .................................................................... 13<br />
Ng, Kam Fai Andrew v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2903-94), Jerome, January 16, 1996......................................... 13<br />
Nijjar, Ranjit Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD V89-00964), Wlodyka, Chambers, Verma, January 9, 1991. ............................. 11<br />
Parmar, Jaipal Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-836-87), Heald, Urie, Stone, May 16, 1988 .............................. 7, 8, 10<br />
Pattar: M.E.I. v. Pattar, Sita Kaur (F.C.A., no. A-710-87), Marceau, Desjardins, Pratte<br />
(dissenting), October 28, 1988. Reported: Pattar v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>Immigration</strong>) (1988), 8 Imm. L.R. (2d) 79 (F.C.A.). ...................................................................................... 7, 8, 11<br />
Phan, Hat v. M.C.I. (IAD W93-00090), Wiebe, September 4, 1996........................................................................... 11<br />
Poste, John Russell v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4601-96), Cullen, December 22, 1997 .................................. 15, 19<br />
Rabang, Ricardo Pablo v M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4576-98), Sharlow, November 29, 1999................................ 16<br />
Rai, Paramninder Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-00279), Carver, April 20, 1998. .................................................... 16, 22<br />
Ram: M.C.I. v. Ram, Venkat (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3381-95), McKeown, May 31, 1996. .......................................... 11<br />
Sabater, Llamado D. Jr. v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2519-93), McKeown, October 13, 1995.<br />
Reported: Sabater v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1995), 31 Imm. L.R.<br />
(2d) 59 (F.C.T.D.). ............................................................................................................................................ 19, 20<br />
Seyoum, Zerom v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-412-90), Mahoney, Stone, Décary, November 15, 1990. ........................... 16<br />
Shah, Nikita v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-02633), D’Ignazio, June 23, 1998........................................................................... 10<br />
Shanker, Gurdev Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-535-86), Mahoney, Pratte, Heald, June 25, 1987. ................ 8, 11, 21<br />
Shepherd, Tam Yue Philomena v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 82-6093), Davey, Benedetti, Suppa,<br />
November 18, 1982................................................................................................................................................... 6<br />
Sidhu: M.E.I. v. Sidhu, Satinder Singh (F.C.A., no. A-1250-88), Desjardins, Heald, Mahoney,<br />
January 12, 1990. ...................................................................................................................................................... 7<br />
Sihota: M.E.I. v. Sihota, Sukhminder Kaur (F.C.A., no. A-76-87), Mahoney, Stone, MacGuigan,<br />
January 25, 1989. .................................................................................................................................................. 7, 8<br />
Singh, Balbir Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-01550), Carver, May 8, 1998....................................................................... 11<br />
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Singh, Narinder Pal v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-04679), D'Ignazio, September 27, 1999 ..................................................... 10<br />
Singh: M.E.I. v. Singh, Pal (F.C.A., no. A-197-85), Lacombe, Urie, Stone, February 4, 1987.<br />
Reported: <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) v. Singh (1987), 35 D.L.R. (4th)<br />
680 (F.C.A.) .............................................................................................................................................................. 6<br />
Stefanska, Alicja Tunikowska v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-1738-87), Pinard, February 17, 1988.<br />
Reported: Stefanska v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1988), 6 Imm.<br />
L.R. (2d) 66 (F.C.T.D.). ............................................................................................................................................ 9<br />
Syal-Bharadwa, Bela v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-02011), Borst, November 30, 1999.......................................................... 14<br />
Szulikowski, Myron Joseph (Mike) v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-03154), Nee, August 13, 1998............................................. 22<br />
Takhar, Manjit Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD V90-00588), Wlodyka, Chambers, Verma, March 4, 1991. ............................ 12<br />
Tang, Lai Keng v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 79-6093), Campbell, Glogowski, Loiselle, September 20, 1979. ............................. 7<br />
Tejobunarto, Lianggono v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-00565), Boire, July 28, 1998 ............................................................... 13<br />
Ten, Luisa v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1606-97), Tremblay-Lamer, June 26, 1998. .............................................. 14<br />
Thangarajan, Rajadurai Samuel v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3789-97), Reed, August 5, 1998............................. 20<br />
Tong, Kwan Wah v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2565-96), Heald, October 31, 1997 ................................................ 14<br />
Tonnie v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-00202), Bell, Fatsis, Singh, March 30, 1992. .................................................................. 21<br />
Truong, Lien Phuong v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-00900), Kitchener, Bartley, Boire, April 7, 1997..................................... 19<br />
Tung, Nirmal Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-6021), Mawani, Singh, Anderson (dissenting), June 30,<br />
1987........................................................................................................................................................................... 6<br />
Uppal, Pal Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-771-86), Mahoney, Heald, Pratte (dissenting in part),<br />
June 25, 1987. Reported: Uppal v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>),<br />
[1987] 3 F.C. 565; 2 Imm. L.R. (2d) 143 (C.A.)..................................................................................................... 10<br />
Wahid, Gurbax Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-04717), Kitchener, January 21, 1998. ...................................................... 16<br />
Wong, Chan Shuk King v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2359-95), Simpson, May 24, 1995.<br />
Reported: Wong v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1996), 34 Imm. L.R.<br />
(2d) 18 (F.C.T.D.). .................................................................................................................................................. 13<br />
Wong, Ching Shin Henry v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3366-96), Reed, January 14, 1998........................................ 9<br />
Wong, Ching Shin Henry v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D.,no. IMM-3366-96), Reed, November 27, 1998 .................................... 9<br />
Yogeswaran, Thiyagaraja v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1505-96), McKeown, April 17, 1997................................ 20<br />
Zhang, Jiang v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-10174), Tumir, February 7, 2006.......................................................................... 17<br />
Zheng, Bi Quing v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-01428), Sherman, Weisdorf, Tisshaw, January 3, 1992................................... 21<br />
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January 1, 2008 Medical Inadmissibility - Ch. 3
Chapter Four<br />
Adoptions<br />
A child who has been adopted by a permanent resident or a Canadian citizen may qualify<br />
as a member <strong>of</strong> the family class pursuant to paragraph 117(1)(b) <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Refugee</strong><br />
Protection Regulations (“IRP Regulations”) as a dependent child <strong>of</strong> the sponsor. The<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Refugee</strong> Protection Act (IRPA) also allows for adoptions <strong>of</strong> persons 18 years <strong>of</strong><br />
age or older 1 in prescribed circumstances. As well, a child whom the sponsor intends to adopt<br />
may also quality as a member <strong>of</strong> the family class. 2<br />
Section 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations, the “bad faith” provision, applies to applicant spouses,<br />
common-law partners, conjugal partners <strong>and</strong> adopted children. With respect to an adopted child,<br />
the IRP Regulation states that a foreign national shall not be considered an adopted child if the<br />
adoption is “not genuine or was entered into primarily for the purpose <strong>of</strong> acquiring any status or<br />
privilege under the Act.” Under the former Regulations pursuant to the <strong>Immigration</strong> Act, in order<br />
to meet the definition <strong>of</strong> “adopted”, a person had to show that the adoption creates a “genuine<br />
parent-child relationship” <strong>and</strong> the adoption was not for an “immigration purpose”.<br />
Adoption <strong>of</strong> minors<br />
IRP Regulations<br />
3(2) For the purposes <strong>of</strong> these Regulations, “adoption”, for greater<br />
certainty, means an adoption that creates a legal parent-child relationship<br />
<strong>and</strong> severs the pre-existing legal parent-child relationship.<br />
117(2) A foreign national who is the adopted child <strong>of</strong> a sponsor <strong>and</strong><br />
whose adoption took place when the child was under the age <strong>of</strong> 18 shall<br />
not be considered a member <strong>of</strong> the family class by virtue <strong>of</strong> that adoption<br />
unless it was in the best interests <strong>of</strong> the child within the meaning <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Hague Convention on Adoption.<br />
117(3) The adoption referred to in subsection (2) is considered to be in<br />
the best interests <strong>of</strong> a child if it took place under the following<br />
circumstances:<br />
(a) a competent authority has conducted or approved a home study <strong>of</strong> the<br />
adoptive parents;<br />
1<br />
2<br />
IRP Regulation 117(4). It should be noted that the adult adoptee must still meet the definition <strong>of</strong> “dependent<br />
child” at IRP Regulation 2, <strong>and</strong> IRP Regulation 117(1)(b).<br />
IRP Regulation 117(1)(g).<br />
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(b) before the adoption, the child's parents gave their free <strong>and</strong> informed<br />
consent to the child's adoption;<br />
(c) the adoption created a genuine parent-child relationship;<br />
(d) the adoption was in accordance with the laws <strong>of</strong> the place where the<br />
adoption took place;<br />
(e) the adoption was in accordance with the laws <strong>of</strong> the sponsor's place <strong>of</strong><br />
residence <strong>and</strong>, if the sponsor resided in <strong>Canada</strong> at the time the adoption<br />
took place, the competent authority <strong>of</strong> the child's province <strong>of</strong> intended<br />
destination has stated in writing that it does not object to the adoption;<br />
(f) if the adoption is an international adoption <strong>and</strong> the country in which<br />
the adoption took place <strong>and</strong> the child's province <strong>of</strong> intended destination<br />
are parties to the Hague Convention on Adoption, the competent<br />
authority <strong>of</strong> the country <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> the province have stated in writing that<br />
they approve the adoption as conforming to that Convention; <strong>and</strong><br />
(g) if the adoption is an international adoption <strong>and</strong> either the country in<br />
which the adoption took place or the child's province <strong>of</strong> intended<br />
destination is not a party to the Hague Convention on Adoption, there is<br />
no evidence that the adoption is for the purpose <strong>of</strong> child trafficking or<br />
undue gain within the meaning <strong>of</strong> that Convention.<br />
In Sertovic, 3 the issue to be decided was whether the adoption had created a legal parentchild<br />
relationship <strong>and</strong> severed the pre-existing legal parent-child relationship, as required by<br />
section 3(2) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations. According to the adoption laws <strong>of</strong> Bosnia-Herzegovina, the<br />
adoption <strong>of</strong> the applicant was considered to be an “incomplete adoption” because the child was<br />
over the age <strong>of</strong> five at the time <strong>of</strong> the adoption. The effect <strong>of</strong> the law in that country is that the<br />
adoptive parents gain the full rights <strong>of</strong> parents but the natural parents’ rights are not affected.<br />
The legal relationship between the applicant child <strong>and</strong> her mother, the only surviving parent, had<br />
not been severed. Although the panel found that the appellant <strong>and</strong> her spouse had been actively<br />
involved in parenting the applicant, the appeal was dismissed because there was no severance <strong>of</strong><br />
the legal parent-child relationship between the child <strong>and</strong> her natural parent.<br />
Regulation 117(3) sets out the criteria that must be met in order to demonstrate that an<br />
adoption <strong>of</strong> a child under 18 was in the best interests <strong>of</strong> the child in accordance with s. 117(2).<br />
The criteria are: a competent authority has conducted or approved a home study <strong>of</strong> the adoptive<br />
parents; the child’s parents must have given their free <strong>and</strong> informed consent to the child’s<br />
adoption; the adoption created a genuine parent-child relationship; the adoption was in<br />
accordance with the laws <strong>of</strong> the place where the adoption took place; the adoption was in<br />
accordance with the laws <strong>of</strong> the sponsor’s place <strong>of</strong> residence <strong>and</strong>, if the sponsor resided in<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> at the time <strong>of</strong> adoption, the competent authority <strong>of</strong> the child’s province <strong>of</strong> intended<br />
destination has issued a no-objection certificate; if the adoption is an international one <strong>and</strong> the<br />
3<br />
Sertovic, Safeta S. v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-16898), Collins, September 10, 2003.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Adoptions - Ch. 4
country in which the adoption takes place <strong>and</strong> the child’s province <strong>of</strong> intended destination are<br />
parties to the Hague Convention on Adoption, the competent authorities <strong>of</strong> each give written<br />
approval <strong>of</strong> the adoption as conforming to the Convention; <strong>and</strong> if the adoption is an international<br />
adoption <strong>and</strong> either the country in which the adoption took place or the child’s province <strong>of</strong><br />
intended destination is not a party to the Hague Convention, there must be no evidence that the<br />
adoption is for the purpose <strong>of</strong> child trafficking or undue gain within the meaning <strong>of</strong> that<br />
Convention.<br />
Refusals under the IRPA are most <strong>of</strong>ten based on s. 117(2) <strong>and</strong> 117(3)(c) <strong>and</strong> 117(3)(d) <strong>of</strong><br />
the IRP Regulations. The key issue in these appeals is whether the adoption created a genuine<br />
parent-child relationship. Whether the adoption was in accordance with the laws <strong>of</strong> the place<br />
where the adoption took place remains an important issue. The case law which developed under<br />
the old <strong>Immigration</strong> Act concerning genuine parent-child relationships continues to be relevant<br />
under the IRPA. Under the IRPA, even if the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division finds that there is a<br />
genuine parent-child relationship <strong>and</strong> the adoption was in accordance with the laws <strong>of</strong> the place<br />
where the adoption occurred, the panel will have to be satisfied that all <strong>of</strong> the other requirements<br />
in Regulation 117(3) have been met. If all <strong>of</strong> the requirements are not met, the child cannot be<br />
considered a member <strong>of</strong> the family class.<br />
Genuine Parent-Child Relationship<br />
The determination <strong>of</strong> whether or not a particular adoption creates a genuine parent-child<br />
relationship is a question <strong>of</strong> appreciation <strong>of</strong> all the facts <strong>and</strong> circumstances surrounding the<br />
adoption.<br />
The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division, in De Guzman, 4<br />
relationship <strong>of</strong> parent <strong>and</strong> child” as follows:<br />
examined the issue <strong>of</strong> “genuine<br />
The question then is, what constitutes a genuine relationship <strong>of</strong> parent <strong>and</strong><br />
child? Or more appropriately, what are the factors that could be considered<br />
in assessing the genuineness <strong>of</strong> a parent-child relationship in respect <strong>of</strong> an<br />
adoption within the meaning <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Regulations, 1978?<br />
The answer to such a question may appear to be intuitive, however, upon<br />
reflection, like all considerations involving human conditions, the answer is<br />
inherently complex. Nonetheless, guidance may be found in the commonly<br />
accepted premise that generally parents act in the best interest <strong>of</strong> their<br />
children. 5<br />
De Guzman identified some <strong>of</strong> the factors used in assessing the genuineness <strong>of</strong> a<br />
relationship <strong>of</strong> parent <strong>and</strong> child as follows: 6<br />
4<br />
5<br />
6<br />
De Guzman, Leonor G. v. M.C.I. (IAD W95-00062), Ariemma, Bartley, Wiebe, August 16, 1995.<br />
Ibid., at 5.<br />
Ibid., at 6.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Adoptions - Ch. 4
7<br />
8<br />
9<br />
• motivation <strong>of</strong> the adopting parent(s); 7<br />
• to a lesser extent, the motivation <strong>and</strong> conditions <strong>of</strong> the natural parent(s);<br />
• authority <strong>and</strong> suasion <strong>of</strong> the adopting parent(s) over the adopted child;<br />
• supplanting <strong>of</strong> the authority <strong>of</strong> the natural parent(s) by that <strong>of</strong> the adoptive parent(s);<br />
• relationship <strong>of</strong> the adopted child with the natural parent(s) after adoption; 8<br />
• treatment <strong>of</strong> the adopted child versus natural children by the adopting parent(s);<br />
• relationship between the adopted child <strong>and</strong> the adopting parent(s) before the adoption;<br />
• changes flowing from the new status <strong>of</strong> the adopted child such as records, entitlements,<br />
etc., <strong>and</strong> including documentary acknowledgment that the child is the son or daughter <strong>of</strong><br />
the adoptive parent(s); <strong>and</strong><br />
• arrangements <strong>and</strong> actions taken by the adoptive parent(s) as they relate to caring, providing<br />
<strong>and</strong> planning for the adopted child.<br />
In other IAD decisions, the following additional factors have also been examined:<br />
• the nature <strong>and</strong> frequency <strong>of</strong> continued contact, if any, between<br />
the child <strong>and</strong> the natural parents;<br />
• the viability, stability <strong>and</strong> composition <strong>of</strong> the adoptive family;<br />
• the timing <strong>of</strong> the sponsorship <strong>of</strong> the adopted child’s application<br />
in the context <strong>of</strong> the particular facts; 9<br />
• the composition <strong>of</strong> the adopted child’s biological family,<br />
including the cultural context <strong>of</strong> the family (for example,<br />
In Dizon, Julieta Lacson v. M.C.I. (IAD V98-02115), Carver, September 1, 1999, the panel was <strong>of</strong> the view that<br />
in a case involving the unusual circumstance <strong>of</strong> gr<strong>and</strong>parents adopting children from living <strong>and</strong> caring<br />
biological parents, it is extremely important that a credible motivation for the adoption be provided. See too<br />
Kwan, Man Tin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5527-00), Muldoon, August 30, 2001. The fact that the adoptive<br />
mother wanted a child in her home concerns her motivation to enter into an adoption, but does not establish that<br />
a genuine relationship existed.<br />
Visa <strong>of</strong>ficers sometimes express concern when the applicant continues to reside with the natural parents after<br />
the adoption. For a discussion <strong>of</strong> this issue, see Toor, Gurdarshan Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-00959), McIsaac,<br />
February 4, 1997; Gill, Gurm<strong>and</strong>eep Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD W95-00111), Wiebe, October 17, 1996, where the<br />
applicant had continued contact with his biological parents, although he did not reside with them; Molina, Rufo<br />
v. M.C.I. (IAD T98-04608), Kelley, November 8, 1999; Rajam, Daniel v. M.C.I. (IAD V98-02983), Carver,<br />
November 5, 1999; <strong>and</strong> Minhas, Surinder Pal Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD M98-10540), Colavecchio, December 15,<br />
1999. The relationship between the natural parents <strong>and</strong> the child after adoption is <strong>of</strong>ten relevant, although it is<br />
not determinative, Kwan, supra, footnote 7. See also Ly, Ngoc Lan v. M.C.I. (IAD T99-04453), Kelley, June<br />
22, 2000 which, in part, discusses the issue from the child’s perspective. In Sai, Jiqiu (Jacqueline) v. M.C.I.<br />
(IAD TA0-11403), Michnick, August 22, 2001, the panel found that evidence from the child’s perspective must<br />
be evaluated in light <strong>of</strong> the particular circumstances <strong>of</strong> the individual adoption.<br />
With regard to the timing <strong>of</strong> the sponsorship, while delay in sponsorship sometimes attracts a negative<br />
inference, there may be valid reasons for the delay: Sohal, Talwinder Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-00396), Clark,<br />
May 23, 1996. In addition, a prospective filial relationship is not sufficient; there must be evidence <strong>of</strong> a<br />
genuine parent <strong>and</strong> child relationship at the time <strong>of</strong> the hearing: Capiendo, Rosita v. M.C.I. (IAD W95-00108),<br />
Wiebe, August 18, 1997.<br />
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whether or not the child is an only child or has siblings <strong>of</strong> the<br />
same sex);<br />
• the viability <strong>and</strong> stability <strong>of</strong> the biological family;<br />
• the age <strong>of</strong> the child at the time <strong>of</strong> the adoption;<br />
• depending on the age <strong>of</strong> the child, the extent <strong>of</strong> the child’s<br />
knowledge <strong>of</strong> the adoptive family;<br />
• the age difference between the child <strong>and</strong> the adoptive parents;<br />
• previous attempts by the biological family to immigrate to<br />
<strong>Canada</strong>;<br />
• that the child’s name had not been changed;<br />
• that the adoption was not generally known outside the child’s<br />
natural family;<br />
• the sending <strong>of</strong> money <strong>and</strong> gifts by the adoptive parent(s);<br />
• plans <strong>and</strong> arrangements for the child’s future.<br />
The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division must consider all the evidence in context. Where the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division failed to consider facts that were not contradicted <strong>and</strong> showed that<br />
a genuine parent-child relationship existed, the Court held that the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division<br />
ignored the evidence. “…[t]he <strong>Board</strong> in failing to consider the context, the distance <strong>and</strong> the<br />
separation, <strong>and</strong> particularly the way the applicant made efforts to create <strong>and</strong> sustain the parentchild<br />
relationship, made a reviewable error.” 10<br />
The Court found the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer’s conclusion that there was no genuine parent-child<br />
relationship unreasonable where it was not supported by the preponderance <strong>of</strong> the evidence <strong>and</strong><br />
was based solely upon an inference which was equally consistent with another conclusion 11 .<br />
In assessing the genuineness <strong>of</strong> the relationship created by the adoption, no guidance is<br />
provided in the definition <strong>of</strong> “adopted” as to whose intentions should be looked at (those <strong>of</strong> the<br />
adoptive parents, the natural parents or the child. The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division generally<br />
considers all <strong>of</strong> the circumstances <strong>of</strong> the case, including the demonstrated intentions <strong>and</strong><br />
declarations <strong>of</strong> the both natural <strong>and</strong> adoptive parents where available. In the case <strong>of</strong> young<br />
children, the Federal Court has found their intentions may not be a proper consideration. 12<br />
Testimony <strong>of</strong> other witnesses, both ordinary <strong>and</strong> expert may assist the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal<br />
Division in its assessment. 13<br />
10<br />
11<br />
12<br />
13<br />
Pabla, Dial v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1210-00), Blais, December 12, 2000.<br />
Sinniah, Sinnathamby v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5954-00), Dawson, July 25, 2002; 2002 FCT 822.<br />
See, by analogy, Bal, Sukhjinder Singh v. S.G.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1212-93), McKeown, October 19, 1993.<br />
In Dooprajh, Anthony v. M.C.I. (IAD M94-07504), Dur<strong>and</strong>, November 27, 1995, the Appeal Division was<br />
favourably impressed by the testimony <strong>and</strong> the Adoption Home Study Report <strong>of</strong> a social worker for Quebec’s<br />
Secrétariat à l’adoption internationale.<br />
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The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division has made findings in many cases that the sponsor <strong>and</strong><br />
the applicant have a genuine relationship but that the relationship in not one <strong>of</strong> parent <strong>and</strong> child. 14<br />
Determining the Legal Validity <strong>of</strong> the Adoption<br />
Most adoption cases that come before the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division involve foreign<br />
adoptions. Where the refusal is based on the legal validity <strong>of</strong> the adoption, the sponsor must<br />
establish that the adoption is valid under the laws (sometimes under the customs) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
jurisdiction where the adoption took place. This involves presenting evidence <strong>of</strong> the content <strong>and</strong><br />
effect <strong>of</strong> the foreign law or custom. 15 For example, in the case <strong>of</strong> Indian adoptions, that evidence<br />
is usually the Hindu Adoptions <strong>and</strong> Maintenance Act, 1956 (HAMA).<br />
In addition to the actual foreign law, sponsors may also submit other forms <strong>of</strong> evidence<br />
such as expert evidence, doctrine, foreign case-law, declaratory judgments, decrees <strong>and</strong> deeds.<br />
In determining whether an adoption is legally valid as required by IRP Regulation<br />
117(3)(d), it is important to underst<strong>and</strong> how foreign law is proved <strong>and</strong> it is necessary to identify<br />
<strong>and</strong> underst<strong>and</strong> the principles <strong>of</strong> conflicts <strong>of</strong> laws which touch upon the effect <strong>of</strong> foreign laws <strong>and</strong><br />
judgments on Canadian courts <strong>and</strong> tribunals. 16<br />
Foreign Law<br />
Glossary <strong>of</strong> terms<br />
The following terms are used in reference to foreign law:<br />
14<br />
15<br />
16<br />
In Reid, Eric v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1357-99), Reed, November 25, 1999, the Court noted that it is not<br />
unusual to see an older sibling provide support, love <strong>and</strong> care <strong>of</strong> a younger sibling but that this does not convert<br />
the relationship into one <strong>of</strong> parent <strong>and</strong> child. Another example is Brown, Josiah Lanville v. M.C.I. (IAD T89-<br />
02499), Buchanan, June 23, 1999, where the member concluded that the sponsors, the uncle <strong>and</strong> aunt <strong>of</strong> the<br />
applicant, had a well meaning intention to extend their financial support to their niece by sponsoring her to<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> but that the relationship between them was not that <strong>of</strong> parents <strong>and</strong> child.<br />
For an example <strong>of</strong> cases where the adoption in question was proven by custom, see Bilimoriya, Parviz v. M.C.I.<br />
(IAD T93-04633), Muzzi, September 18, 1996; <strong>and</strong> Vuong, Khan Duc v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3139-97),<br />
Dubé, July 21, 1998. However, in Seth, Kewal Krishan v. M.C.I. (IAD M94-05081), Angé, March 27, 1996,<br />
the sponsor failed to establish that there existed a custom in the Sikh community permitting simultaneous<br />
adoptions; <strong>and</strong> in Kalida, Malika v. M.C.I. (IAD M96-08010), Champoux, July 3, 1997, the sponsor failed to<br />
show that Moroccan law allowed adoption.<br />
In this regard, see Castel, J.-G., Introduction to Conflict <strong>of</strong> Laws (Toronto: Butterworths, 1986, at 6, where it is<br />
stated that “when the problem involves the recognition or enforcement <strong>of</strong> a foreign judgment, the court must<br />
determine whether that judgment was properly rendered abroad.”<br />
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*“declaratory judgment”: a judgment declaring the parties’ rights or expressing<br />
the court’s opinion on a question <strong>of</strong> law, without ordering that anything be<br />
done; 17<br />
*“in personam”: where the purpose <strong>of</strong> the action is only to affect the rights <strong>of</strong> the<br />
parties to the action inter se [between them]; 18<br />
*“in rem”: where the purpose <strong>of</strong> the action is to determine the interests or the<br />
rights <strong>of</strong> all persons with respect to a particular res [thing]; 19<br />
*“deed <strong>of</strong> adoption”: registered document purporting to establish the fact that an<br />
adoption has taken place.<br />
Pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> foreign law<br />
The usual rule in <strong>Canada</strong> is that foreign law is a fact which must be pleaded <strong>and</strong> proved. 20<br />
The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division cannot take judicial notice <strong>of</strong> it. In cases before the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division, the burden <strong>of</strong> proving the foreign law or custom lies on the party<br />
relying on it, in most cases, the sponsor. 21<br />
There are several ways in which foreign law can be proved, including statute, expert<br />
evidence, <strong>and</strong> agreement <strong>of</strong> the parties (consent). The foreign law ought to be proved in each<br />
case. The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division is not entitled to take judicial notice <strong>of</strong> the pro<strong>of</strong><br />
presented in other cases, 22 although it can adopt or follow the reasoning <strong>of</strong> other panels regarding<br />
their interpretation <strong>of</strong> the foreign law. The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division has also examined the<br />
text <strong>of</strong> the law itself <strong>and</strong> given it a reasonable interpretation where expert evidence respecting its<br />
meaning was lacking. 23 The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division has rejected arguments that it is not<br />
competent to interpret foreign law. 24<br />
Section 23 <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Canada</strong> Evidence Act 25 provides that evidence <strong>of</strong> judicial proceedings or<br />
records <strong>of</strong> any court <strong>of</strong> record <strong>of</strong> any foreign country may be given by a certified copy there<strong>of</strong>,<br />
17<br />
18<br />
19<br />
20<br />
21<br />
22<br />
23<br />
24<br />
25<br />
Dukelow, D.A., <strong>and</strong> Nuse, B., The Dictionary <strong>of</strong> Canadian Law (Scarborough: Carswell, 1991), at 259.<br />
McLeod, J.G., The Conflict <strong>of</strong> Laws (Calgary: Carswell, 1983), at 60.<br />
Ibid.<br />
Castel, supra, footnote 16, at 44. For a case where the Appeal Division ruled that foreign law must be strictly<br />
proved, see Wang, Yan-Qiao v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-04690), Muzzi, October 6, 1997. Also, in Okafor-<br />
Ogbujiagba, Anthony Nwafor v. M.C.I. (IAD T94-05539), Aterman, April 14, 1997, the panel held that the<br />
evidence failed to establish that the adoption in question had been carried out in accordance with Nigerian law.<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) v. Taggar, [1989] 3 F.C. 576; 8 Imm. L.R. (2d) 175 (C.A.).<br />
Kalair, Sohan Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-919-83), Stone, Heald, Urie, November 29, 1984.<br />
Gossal, Rajinder Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 87-9401), Sherman, Chu, Benedetti, February 15, 1988. Reported:<br />
Gossal v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1988), 5 Imm. L.R. (2d) 185 (I.A.B.).<br />
Gill, Ranjit Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V96-00797), Clark, April 7, 1999.<br />
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Adoptions - Ch. 4
purported to be under the seal <strong>of</strong> the court, without further pro<strong>of</strong>. However, the <strong>Immigration</strong><br />
Appeal Division does not normally require strict pro<strong>of</strong> in this manner although the failure to<br />
comply with section 23 has been relied on in weighing the evidence produced. 26<br />
The jurisdiction <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division in an adoption case is to determine<br />
whether or not the adoption in question falls within the IRP Regulations, i.e. (i) it has been<br />
proven under the relevant law, (ii) is genuine <strong>and</strong> (iii) has not been entered into primarily for the<br />
purpose <strong>of</strong> acquiring any status or privilege under the Act. It is not to adjudicate the status <strong>of</strong><br />
adoption generally. 27 The IRP Regulations require that the adoption be in accordance with the<br />
laws <strong>of</strong> the jurisdiction where the adoption took place.<br />
For example, in Siddiq, 28 the issue was whether the adoption in question was valid under<br />
the laws <strong>of</strong> Pakistan. The expert evidence submitted by the Minister was to the effect that in<br />
Pakistan, legal adoptions were not recognized <strong>and</strong> could not be enforced. The sponsor was<br />
unable to obtain evidence to the contrary <strong>and</strong> therefore, failed to establish that the adoption was<br />
valid. The absence <strong>of</strong> an adoption law in the foreign jurisdiction could not have the effect <strong>of</strong><br />
allowing the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division to adjudicate the adoption under Canadian law.<br />
Another example is Alkana, 29 where the alleged adoption was challenged on the basis that<br />
there was no provision for Christian adoptions under Pakistani laws. The sponsor attempted to<br />
prove the adoption by means <strong>of</strong> a “Declaration <strong>of</strong> Adoption”, which was essentially an affidavit<br />
made by the natural parents giving their approval or consent to the adoption. In the absence <strong>of</strong><br />
pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> a law in Pakistan allowing for adoption, the appeal was dismissed. The panel recognized<br />
the hardship created by the ruling <strong>and</strong> recommended that the Minister facilitate the admission <strong>of</strong><br />
26<br />
27<br />
28<br />
29<br />
Brar, Kanwar Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD W89-00084), Goodspeed, Arpin, Vidal (concurring in part), December 29,<br />
1989.<br />
In Singh, Babu v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-210-85), Urie, Mahoney, Marceau, January 15, 1986, at 1, the Court<br />
indicated that the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal <strong>Board</strong> was entitled to conclude that the adoption in question had not<br />
been proven, but that it was not authorized to make a declaration that the adoption was “void as far as meeting<br />
the requirements <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Act, 1976”. In <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) v.<br />
Sidhu, [1993] 2 F.C. 483 (C.A.), at 490, the Court noted that “[the Appeal Division’s] jurisdiction is limited by<br />
the Act which, in turn, is subject to the Constitution Act, 1867. Parliament has not purported to legislate<br />
independently on the subject matter <strong>of</strong> adoption for immigration purposes. On the contrary, on that very point,<br />
it defers or it adopts by reference the foreign legislation.” The Court added in a footnote that “[t]he provision<br />
generally reflects the characterization made by English Canadian common law courts, i.e., that adoption relates<br />
to the recognition <strong>of</strong> the existence <strong>of</strong> a status <strong>and</strong> is governed by the lex domicilii [the law where a person is<br />
domiciled].”<br />
Siddiq, Mohammad v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 79-9088), Weselak, Davey, Teitelbaum, June 10, 1980. See also Addow,<br />
Ali Hussein v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-01171), D’Ignazio, October 15, 1997, for a case involving a purported<br />
Somalian adoption; <strong>and</strong> Zenati, Entissar v. M.C.I. (IAD M98-09459), Bourbonnais, September 17, 1999, for a<br />
case involving a purported Moroccan adoption. For a decision involving a case <strong>of</strong> guardianship in Morocco,<br />
see Demnati, Ahmed v. M.C.I. (M99-10260), di Pietro, April 3, 2001.<br />
Alkana, Robin John v. M.E.I. (IAD W89-00261), Goodspeed, Arpin, Rayburn, November 16, 1989.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Adoptions - Ch. 4
the child into <strong>Canada</strong> so that he could be adopted here “[...] to alleviate the hardship created by<br />
the statutory lacuna in Pakistan regarding Christian adoptions.” 30<br />
In a much earlier case, Lam, 31 the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal <strong>Board</strong> put it thus:<br />
No pro<strong>of</strong> was adduced that the law <strong>of</strong> China prevailing in that part <strong>of</strong><br />
Mainl<strong>and</strong> China where the appellant <strong>and</strong> his alleged adopted mother resided<br />
at the time <strong>of</strong> the alleged adoption – the province <strong>of</strong> Kwangtung – recognized<br />
the status <strong>of</strong> adoption, or that if it did, how this status was established. This<br />
is not a situation where the lex fori may be applied in the absence <strong>of</strong> pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong><br />
foreign law. 32<br />
Declaratory judgments <strong>and</strong> deeds<br />
Sponsors before the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division <strong>of</strong>ten seek to establish the status <strong>of</strong><br />
applicants for permanent residence through the production <strong>of</strong> foreign judgments declaring the<br />
applicants’ status in the foreign jurisdiction.<br />
The issue has been expressed as one <strong>of</strong> determining whether the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal<br />
Division ought to look behind the judgment to determine either its validity or its effect on the<br />
issues before the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division.<br />
As stated by Wlodyka, A. in Guide to Adoptions under the Hindu Adoptions <strong>and</strong><br />
Maintenance Act, 1956: 33<br />
The starting point in any discussion <strong>of</strong> the legal effect <strong>of</strong> a declaratory<br />
judgment [...] is the decision <strong>of</strong> the Federal Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal in Taggar 34 .<br />
This case st<strong>and</strong>s for the proposition that a declaratory judgment is a judgment<br />
“in personam” <strong>and</strong> not “in rem”. Therefore, it is binding only on the parties<br />
to the action. Nevertheless, the declaratory judgment is evidence <strong>and</strong> the<br />
weight to be accorded to the declaratory judgment depends on the particular<br />
circumstances <strong>of</strong> the case.<br />
30<br />
31<br />
32<br />
33<br />
34<br />
Ibid., at 7. However, in Jalal, Younas v. M.C.I. (IAD M93-06071), Blumer, August 16, 1995, reported: Jalal v.<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1995), 39 Imm. L.R. (2d) 146 (I.A.D.), the <strong>Immigration</strong><br />
Appeal Division held that in the absence <strong>of</strong> legislation in Pakistan, the Shariat applies in personal <strong>and</strong> family<br />
law, <strong>and</strong> the prohibition against adoption does not apply to non-Muslims. The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division<br />
accepted the expert evidence that Christians in Pakistan may adopt.<br />
Lam, Wong Do v. M.M.I. (I.A.B.), October 2, 1972, referred to in Lit, Jaswant Singh v. M.M.I. (I.A.B. 76-<br />
6003), Scott, Benedetti, Legaré, August 13, 1976.<br />
Lit, ibid., at 4.<br />
25 Imm L.R. (2d) 8.<br />
Taggar, supra, footnote 21.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Adoptions - Ch. 4
In S<strong>and</strong>hu, 35 a pre-Taggar decision, the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal <strong>Board</strong> was <strong>of</strong> the opinion<br />
that a foreign judgment, “even one in personam is final <strong>and</strong> conclusive on the merits [...] <strong>and</strong> can<br />
not be impeached for any error either <strong>of</strong> fact or <strong>of</strong> law.” 36 The declaratory judgment in question<br />
was issued in an action for a permanent injunction restraining interference with lawful custody <strong>of</strong><br />
the applicant. The panel was <strong>of</strong> the view that the judgment would have to have been premised on<br />
a decision about the adoptive status <strong>of</strong> the applicant. The panel treated the judgment <strong>of</strong> the<br />
foreign court as a declaration as to status, conclusive <strong>and</strong> binding on the whole world (including<br />
Canadian authorities), <strong>and</strong> thus found the adoption was valid under Indian law. The panel did not<br />
feel required itself to examine whether the adoption was in accordance with Indian law. 37<br />
S<strong>and</strong>hu was distinguished in Brar 38 as follows:<br />
[...] the decision in S<strong>and</strong>hu was not intended to have universal application in<br />
cases where foreign judgments are presented as pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> the validity <strong>of</strong><br />
adoptions <strong>and</strong> can be distinguished in this case.<br />
In S<strong>and</strong>hu the judgment was accepted as part <strong>of</strong> the record <strong>and</strong> at no time<br />
was the authenticity <strong>of</strong> the document challenged by the respondent. The<br />
authenticity <strong>of</strong> the judgment referred to in S<strong>and</strong>hu was not an issue.<br />
However, in the present case the <strong>Board</strong> has been presented with a document<br />
which contains discrepancies, has not been presented in accordance with<br />
section 23 <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Canada</strong> Evidence Act <strong>and</strong> purports to validate an adoption<br />
which clearly does not comply with the requirements <strong>of</strong> the foreign statute. 39<br />
The majority <strong>of</strong> the panel determined that the declaratory judgment had no weight. 40 The<br />
member who concurred in part was <strong>of</strong> the view that the reasoning in S<strong>and</strong>hu applied <strong>and</strong> that the<br />
declaratory judgment was a declaration as to status <strong>and</strong> was binding on the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal<br />
Division.<br />
In Atwal, 41 the majority accepted the declaratory judgment but noted that<br />
35<br />
36<br />
37<br />
38<br />
39<br />
40<br />
41<br />
S<strong>and</strong>hu, Bachhitar Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-10112), Eglington, Goodspeed, Chu, February 4, 1988.<br />
Ibid., at 14.<br />
S<strong>and</strong>hu, Bachhitar Singh, supra, footnote 35 was followed in Patel, Ramesh Ch<strong>and</strong>ra v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-<br />
9738), Jew, Arkin, Tisshaw, April 15, 1988.<br />
Brar, supra, footnote 26.<br />
Ibid., at 10.<br />
For other cases in which it has been held that declaratory judgments are not determinative, see Singh, Ajaib v.<br />
M.E.I. (I.A.B. 87-4063), Mawani, Wright, Petryshyn, April 26, 1988 (declaratory judgment disregarded where<br />
internally inconsistent, collusive, <strong>and</strong> did not result from fully argued case); Burmi, Joginder Singh v. M.E.I.<br />
(I.A.B. 88-35651), Sherman, Arkin, Weisdorf, February 14, 1989 (regarding a marriage); Badwal, Jasbir Singh<br />
v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 87-10977), Sherman, Bell, Ahara, May 29, 1989; <strong>and</strong> Atwal, Manjit Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-<br />
4205), Petryshyn, Wright, Arpin (concurring), May 8, 1989, where the concurring member gave no weight to<br />
the declaratory judgment. In Pawar, Onkar Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD T98-04518), D’Ignazio, October 1, 1999, the<br />
panel held that notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing the existence <strong>of</strong> a declaratory judgment, the evidence established that there was<br />
no mutual intention <strong>of</strong> either the birth parents or the adoptive parents to transfer the child <strong>and</strong> therefore, the<br />
adoption did not meet the requirements in HAMA.<br />
Atwal, ibid.<br />
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[i]t is the opinion <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Board</strong> that a foreign judgment is not to be disturbed<br />
unless there is pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> collusion, fraud, lack <strong>of</strong> jurisdiction <strong>of</strong> the court <strong>and</strong><br />
the like. No such evidence was presented to the <strong>Board</strong>. 42<br />
In Sran, 43 the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division expressed it thus:<br />
[...] a declaratory judgment [...] is merely evidence which must be considered<br />
along with other evidence in determining the validity <strong>of</strong> the adoption. By<br />
itself, it does not dispose <strong>of</strong> the issue.<br />
This decision appears to reflect the current decision making <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal<br />
Division in light <strong>of</strong> Taggar. 44<br />
An adoption deed may be presented as pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> the validity <strong>of</strong> an adoption. In Aujla, 45 the<br />
panel ruled that:<br />
The <strong>Board</strong> accepts the Adoption Deed as prima facie evidence <strong>of</strong> an adoption<br />
having taken place. However, as to whether the adoption was in compliance<br />
with the requirements <strong>of</strong> the [Indian] Adoptions Act is a question <strong>of</strong> fact to<br />
be determined by the evidence in each case. In this connection, the <strong>Board</strong><br />
also drew counsel’s attention to a recent Federal Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal 46 decision<br />
where the Court expressed the view that it was proper for the <strong>Board</strong> to<br />
determine whether the adoption had been made in accordance with the laws<br />
<strong>of</strong> India, <strong>and</strong> that the registered Deed <strong>of</strong> Adoption was not conclusive <strong>of</strong> a<br />
valid adoption. 47<br />
Presumption <strong>of</strong> Validity under Foreign Law<br />
The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division has dealt with the issue <strong>of</strong> adoption deeds in the context<br />
<strong>of</strong> section 16 <strong>of</strong> HAMA, which creates a presumption <strong>of</strong> validity. 48 In Dhillon, 49 the sponsor<br />
42<br />
43<br />
44<br />
45<br />
46<br />
47<br />
48<br />
49<br />
Ibid., at 4.<br />
Sran, Pritam Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD T93-10409), Townshend, May 10, 1995, at 6.<br />
Taggar, supra, footnote 21.<br />
Aujla, Surjit Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 87-6021), Mawani, November 10, 1987.<br />
Dhillon, Harnam Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-387-85), Pratte, Marceau, Lacombe, May 27, 1987.<br />
Aujla, supra, footnote 45, at 5. See also Chiu, Jacintha Chen v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-6123), Mawani, Gill<strong>and</strong>ers,<br />
Singh, July 13, 1987; <strong>and</strong> Jaswal, Kaushaliya Devi v. M.E.I. (IAD W89-00087), Goodspeed, Wlodyka,<br />
Rayburn, September 27, 1990.<br />
Section 16 <strong>of</strong> HAMA provides that:<br />
16. Whenever any document registered under any law for the time being in force is produced<br />
before any court purporting to record an adoption made <strong>and</strong> is signed by the person giving <strong>and</strong><br />
the person taking the child in adoption, the court shall presume that the adoption has been made<br />
in compliance with the provisions <strong>of</strong> this Act unless <strong>and</strong> until it is disproved.<br />
Dhillon, Harnam Singh, supra, footnote 46. The facts <strong>of</strong> the case are set out in Dhillon, Harnam Singh v.<br />
M.E.I. (I.A.B. 83-6551), Petryshyn, Glogowski, Voorhees, January 3, 1985.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Adoptions - Ch. 4
presented as evidence a registered deed <strong>of</strong> adoption <strong>and</strong> argued that section 16 <strong>of</strong> HAMA was<br />
substantive, <strong>and</strong> therefore the adoption in question had to be considered valid unless disproved by<br />
an Indian court. The Federal Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal rejected the argument:<br />
There is, in our view, no merit in that submission. Under subsection 2(1) <strong>of</strong><br />
the <strong>Immigration</strong> Regulations, the <strong>Board</strong> had to determine whether the<br />
adoption had been made in accordance with the laws <strong>of</strong> India. If, as<br />
contended, the <strong>Board</strong> was required to apply section 16 <strong>of</strong> the Hindu<br />
Adoptions <strong>and</strong> Maintenance Act, 1956 in making that determination, it was<br />
bound to apply it as it read, namely, as creating merely a rebuttable<br />
presumption regarding the validity <strong>of</strong> registered adoptions. As there was no<br />
doubt that the adoption here in question had not been made in accordance<br />
with Indian laws, it necessarily followed that the presumption was rebutted. 50<br />
In Singh, 51 the Federal Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal went further when it stated:<br />
Presumptions imposed by Indian law on Indian courts, which might be<br />
relevant if the issue were simply to know, in private international law terms,<br />
the status <strong>of</strong> the sponsorees in India, are <strong>of</strong> no assistance in determining<br />
whether either <strong>of</strong> them qualifies as an “adopted son” for the very special<br />
purposes <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Act [...] the presumption in section 16 is directed<br />
specifically to “the court”, it is difficult, in any event, to conceive <strong>of</strong> it as<br />
being other than procedural since it is unlikely to have been the intention <strong>of</strong><br />
the Indian Parliament to bind a court over which it had no authority or<br />
jurisdiction. 52<br />
In Seth, 53 the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division followed Singh <strong>and</strong> added that it is not up to<br />
the Canadian High Commission in New Delhi to seek st<strong>and</strong>ing before an Indian court to have the<br />
adoption declared invalid. Instead, the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer is entitled to conclude that an alleged adoption<br />
has not been proven for immigration purposes.<br />
The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division has applied the reasoning <strong>of</strong> the Federal Court <strong>of</strong><br />
Appeal in Singh to cases <strong>of</strong> adoptions in countries other than India. For example, in Persaud, 54<br />
the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division considered a final order <strong>of</strong> the Supreme Court <strong>of</strong> Guyana <strong>and</strong><br />
held that the order is one piece <strong>of</strong> evidence but is not determinative <strong>of</strong> whether the adoption is in<br />
compliance with the <strong>Immigration</strong> Act. In Sinniah 55 , the Court held that it was patently<br />
unreasonable for the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer to ignore the effect at law <strong>of</strong> a final Court order <strong>and</strong> to decide, in<br />
50<br />
51<br />
52<br />
53<br />
54<br />
55<br />
Dhillon, Harnam Singh, supra, footnote 46, at 2.<br />
Singh v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1990] 3 F.C. 37; 11 Imm. L.R. (2d) 1 (C.A.);<br />
leave to appeal to Supreme Court <strong>of</strong> <strong>Canada</strong> (Doc. 22136, Sopinka, McLachlin, Iacobucci) refused on<br />
February 28, 1991, Singh v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1991), 13 Imm. L.R. (2d) 46<br />
[Appeal Note].<br />
Ibid., at 44.<br />
Seth, supra, footnote 15.<br />
Persaud, Kowsilia v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-00912), Kalvin, July 13, 1998.<br />
Sinniah, supra, footnote 11.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Adoptions - Ch. 4
the absence <strong>of</strong> cogent evidence, that an order pronounced by a court in Sri Lanka was insufficient<br />
to establish that an adoption was made in accordance with the laws <strong>of</strong> Sri Lanka.<br />
Parent <strong>and</strong> child relationship created by operation <strong>of</strong> law<br />
This issue has arisen in the context <strong>of</strong> section 12 <strong>of</strong> HAMA, 56 which many <strong>Immigration</strong><br />
Appeal <strong>Board</strong> decisions interpreted as having the effect <strong>of</strong> creating a parent <strong>and</strong> child relationship<br />
by operation <strong>of</strong> law. 57<br />
In Sharma, 58 the Federal Court – Trial Division indicated that<br />
[a] parent <strong>and</strong> child relationship is not automatically established once the<br />
requirements <strong>of</strong> a foreign adoption have been demonstrated. In other words,<br />
even if the adoption was within the provisions <strong>of</strong> HAMA, whether the<br />
adoption created a relationship <strong>of</strong> parent <strong>and</strong> child, thereby satisfying the<br />
requirements <strong>of</strong> the definition <strong>of</strong> “adoption” contained in subsection 2(1) <strong>of</strong><br />
the <strong>Immigration</strong> Regulations, 1978, must still be examined. 59<br />
In Rai, 60 the applicant had been adopted under the Alberta Child Welfare Act. The<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division rejected the argument that the granting <strong>of</strong> an adoption order under<br />
that Act was clear <strong>and</strong> incontrovertible pro<strong>of</strong> that a genuine parent <strong>and</strong> child relationship was<br />
created.<br />
Power <strong>of</strong> attorney<br />
In cases where a sponsor, for one reason or another, does not travel to the country where<br />
the applicant resides in order to complete the adoption, the sponsor may give a power <strong>of</strong><br />
attorney 61 to someone to act in his or her stead. The power <strong>of</strong> attorney gives the person named in<br />
56<br />
57<br />
58<br />
59<br />
60<br />
61<br />
Section 12 provides, in part, as follows:<br />
12. An adopted child shall be deemed to be the child <strong>of</strong> his or her adoptive father or mother for<br />
all purposes with effect from the date <strong>of</strong> the adoption <strong>and</strong> from such date all the ties <strong>of</strong> the child<br />
in the family <strong>of</strong> his or her birth shall be deemed to be severed <strong>and</strong> replaced by those created by<br />
the adoption in the adoptive family [...]<br />
See, for example, S<strong>and</strong>hu, Gurcharan Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 87-9066), Eglington, Teitelbaum, Sherman,<br />
November 13, 1987; <strong>and</strong> Shergill, Kundan Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-6108), Mawani, Gill<strong>and</strong>ers, Singh,<br />
April 8, 1987. Reported: Shergill v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1987), 3 Imm. L.R.<br />
(2d) 126 (I.A.B.).<br />
M.C.I. v. Sharma, Chaman Jit (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-453-95), Wetson, August 28, 1995.<br />
Ibid., at 4. This two-stage process was followed in M.C.I. v. Edrada, Leonardo Lagmacy (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-<br />
5199-94), MacKay, February 29, 1996 <strong>and</strong> Gill, Banta Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-760-96), Gibson,<br />
October 22, 1996 (upheld by the Federal Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal in Gill, Banta Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-859-96),<br />
Marceau, Linden, Robertson, July 14, 1998. These cases indicate that the issue had already been determined by<br />
the Federal Court in Singh, supra, footnote 51.<br />
Rai, Suritam Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-02710), Major, Wiebe, Dossa, November 30, 1999.<br />
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “Power <strong>of</strong> Attorney” as “[...] an instrument authorizing another to act as one’s<br />
agent or attorney. The agent is attorney in fact <strong>and</strong> his power is revoked on the death <strong>of</strong> the principal by<br />
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January 1, 2008 Adoptions - Ch. 4
it the authority to do whatever is necessary in order to complete the adoption in accordance with<br />
the laws <strong>of</strong> the jurisdiction where the adoption is to take place.<br />
An issue that has arisen in this area with respect to Indian law is whether HAMA requires<br />
that a power <strong>of</strong> attorney be in writing <strong>and</strong> registered for an adoption to be valid. In a number <strong>of</strong><br />
decisions, panels have ruled that neither is required. 62<br />
Another issue is whether a sponsor can give a power <strong>of</strong> attorney to the biological parent <strong>of</strong><br />
the person to be adopted. In Poonia, 63 in dealing with the requirements <strong>of</strong> a giving <strong>and</strong> taking<br />
ceremony under Indian law, <strong>and</strong> after reviewing a number <strong>of</strong> Indian authorities, the <strong>Immigration</strong><br />
Appeal Division held that the power <strong>of</strong> attorney must be given to a third party who cannot be the<br />
biological parent as that person is a party to the adoption.<br />
Revocation <strong>of</strong> adoption<br />
The concept <strong>of</strong> revocation <strong>of</strong> adoption is found in IRP Regulation 133(5). 64 This<br />
provision allows an <strong>of</strong>ficer (<strong>and</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division) to consider whether the<br />
revocation by a foreign authority or by a Canadian court was obtained for the purpose <strong>of</strong><br />
sponsoring an application for permanent residence made by a member <strong>of</strong> the family class (<strong>of</strong> the<br />
biological family) <strong>and</strong> if it was, to rule that the intended sponsorship is not permissible.<br />
In the past, visa <strong>of</strong>ficers refused to recognize revocations by foreign authorities <strong>and</strong> in a<br />
number <strong>of</strong> cases involving the failed sponsorships <strong>of</strong> biological parents by their former children,<br />
the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division (<strong>and</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal <strong>Board</strong>) have had occasion to<br />
consider the matter.<br />
In Sharma, 65 the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division was presented with a declaratory judgment<br />
from an Indian court nullifying the adoption <strong>of</strong> the sponsor. The judgment was obtained by the<br />
62<br />
63<br />
64<br />
65<br />
operation <strong>of</strong> law [...].” The Canadian Law Dictionary gives the following definition: “An instrument in<br />
writing authorizing another to act as one’s agent or attorney. It confers upon the agent the authority to perform<br />
certain specified acts or kinds <strong>of</strong> acts on behalf <strong>of</strong> his principal. Its primary purpose is to evidence the authority<br />
<strong>of</strong> the agent to third parties with whom the agent deals.”<br />
See, for example, Gill, Balwinder Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD W89-00433), Goodspeed, Arpin, Rayburn,<br />
September 13, 1990; Paul, Satnam Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 87-6049), Howard, Anderson (dissenting),<br />
Gill<strong>and</strong>ers, February 13, 1989; <strong>and</strong> Kler, Sukhdev Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 82-6350), Goodspeed, Vidal, Arpin,<br />
May 25, 1987.<br />
Poonia, Jagraj v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-02478), Arpin, Townshend, Fatsis, October 5, 1993.<br />
S.133(5) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations reads:<br />
(5) A person who is adopted outside <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>and</strong> whose adoption is subsequently<br />
revoked by a foreign authority or by a court in <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>of</strong> competent jurisdiction<br />
may sponsor an application for a permanent resident visa that is made by a member<br />
<strong>of</strong> the family class only if the revocation <strong>of</strong> the adoption was not obtained for the<br />
purpose <strong>of</strong> sponsoring that application.<br />
Sharma, Sudhir Kumar v. M.E.I. (IAD V92-01628), Wlodyka, Singh, Verma, August 18, 1993.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Adoptions - Ch. 4
sponsor’s biological father in an uncontested proceeding. After considering the expert evidence<br />
presented by the parties, the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division concluded that the judgment was in<br />
personam <strong>and</strong> that the weight to be given to it would depend on the particular circumstances <strong>of</strong><br />
the case. The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division inferred from the evidence that the Indian court had<br />
not been informed <strong>of</strong> the immigration purpose for the action <strong>and</strong> gave the judgment little weight.<br />
It also found that the only possible reason for nullifying an adoption under Indian law,<br />
misrepresentation, was not present in the case. 66<br />
In Chu, 67 the panel acknowledged that an adoption can be terminated in China with the<br />
agreement <strong>of</strong> the parties. However, because neither the sponsor nor her adoptive father had any<br />
real <strong>and</strong> substantial connection with China at the time the revocation was obtained, the panel<br />
ruled that the applicable law was not Chinese law but British Columbian law. Under this law,<br />
termination <strong>of</strong> adoption was not possible.<br />
In Purba, 68 the sponsor had been adopted by her gr<strong>and</strong>parents, but when she was granted<br />
an immigrant visa, it was on the basis that she was their dependent daughter. The fact <strong>of</strong> the<br />
adoption was not disclosed to the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer. A few years later, she attempted to sponsor her<br />
biological mother but that application was refused. The evidence presented at the <strong>Immigration</strong><br />
Appeal Division hearing showed that the adoption was void ab initio; 69 however, the appeal was<br />
dismissed on the basis <strong>of</strong> estoppel. As the panel put it:<br />
[The sponsor] was granted status in <strong>Canada</strong> as a l<strong>and</strong>ed immigrant<br />
<strong>and</strong> subsequently as a Canadian citizen based on a misrepresented<br />
status which was acted upon by Canadian immigration <strong>of</strong>ficials. In<br />
my view, she is estopped from claiming a change in status to enable<br />
her to sponsor her biological mother [...]. 70<br />
Bad faith relationships<br />
In Sahota, 71 the application for permanent residence was refused under section 4 <strong>of</strong> the<br />
IRP Regulations, as well as under subsections 117(2) <strong>and</strong> 117(3)(a), (c), (d) <strong>and</strong> (e) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Regulations. The panel found that in most appeals <strong>of</strong> adoption refusals where there are a number<br />
<strong>of</strong> grounds <strong>of</strong> refusal, a determination should first be made in relation to section 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP<br />
Regulations. If there is a determination that the foreign national is an “adopted child” pursuant to<br />
66<br />
67<br />
68<br />
69<br />
70<br />
71<br />
See also Heir, Surjit Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 80-6116), Howard, Campbell, Hlady, January 16, 1981.<br />
Chu, Si Gina v. M.E.I. (IAD V90-00836), Wlodyka, MacLeod, June 28, 1990.<br />
Purba, Surinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD T95-02315), Teitelbaum, September 10, 1996.<br />
The evidence included a judgment <strong>of</strong> a court in India declaring the adoption null <strong>and</strong> void. The gr<strong>and</strong>father<br />
already had three daughters <strong>and</strong> therefore did not have the legal capacity to adopt another daughter under<br />
HAMA.<br />
Purba, supra, footnote.68, at 8.<br />
Sahota, Gurdev Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-03374), Mattu, February 23, 2004.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Adoptions - Ch. 4
section 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations, then a determination should be made in relation to all or some<br />
<strong>of</strong> the provisions <strong>of</strong> section 117 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations, as necessary.<br />
Section 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations states, among other things, that for purposes <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Regulations, no foreign national shall be considered an “adopted child” if the adoption is not<br />
genuine <strong>and</strong> was entered into primarily for the purpose <strong>of</strong> acquiring any status or privilege under<br />
the IRPA, whereas, subsection 117(2) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations states that a foreign national “who<br />
is the adopted child” <strong>of</strong> a sponsor <strong>and</strong> whose adoption took place when the child was under the<br />
age <strong>of</strong> 18 shall not be considered a member <strong>of</strong> the family class by virtue <strong>of</strong> that adoption unless it<br />
was in the best interests <strong>of</strong> the child within the meaning <strong>of</strong> the Hague Convention on Adoption<br />
(emphasis added). In the words <strong>of</strong> the panel,<br />
“When the words <strong>of</strong> sections 4 <strong>and</strong> 117(2) <strong>of</strong> the Regulations are read<br />
in their ordinary <strong>and</strong> grammatical sense, in a manner to blend harmoniously<br />
with the scheme <strong>of</strong> the IRPA <strong>and</strong> its Regulations <strong>and</strong> the object <strong>and</strong> intention<br />
<strong>of</strong> Parliament, I am satisfied that there should be a determination under<br />
section 4 <strong>of</strong> the Regulations as to whether or not the foreign national is an<br />
“adopted child” before any determination is made under section 117(2) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Regulations that the adoption is in the best interests <strong>of</strong> the child. I come to<br />
this conclusion because section 117(2) <strong>of</strong> the Regulations appears to only<br />
apply in cases where the foreign national has been determined to be an<br />
adopted child.” 72<br />
In Sahota, the panel found that a two-fold test must be applied in order to disqualify an<br />
adopted child under section 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations. 73 The two elements are: that the adoption<br />
is not genuine <strong>and</strong> that the adoption was entered into primarily for the purpose <strong>of</strong> acquiring any<br />
status or privilege under the IRPA. The panel also found that in the circumstances <strong>of</strong> an adoption<br />
the status or privilege that can be acquired under IRPA is that the adopted child is granted<br />
permanent resident status in <strong>Canada</strong> through membership in the family class when the adopted<br />
child qualifies to be sponsored to <strong>Canada</strong>. 74 The panel noted that the term “genuine” has not<br />
been defined in IRPA or the IRP Regulations. 75 In the panel’s view, the fundamental nature <strong>of</strong> an<br />
adoption is the relationship between parent <strong>and</strong> child. Noting that Parliament specifically<br />
included the factor <strong>of</strong> a genuine parent-child relationship as one element in the determination <strong>of</strong><br />
the best interests <strong>of</strong> the child in the context <strong>of</strong> section 117(3) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations, the panel<br />
found the issue <strong>of</strong> a genuine parent-child relationship to be <strong>of</strong> primary relevance in the context <strong>of</strong><br />
considering the genuineness <strong>of</strong> an adoption. While conceding that this factor is not the only<br />
factor that could be used to determine whether or not an adoption is “genuine” in the context <strong>of</strong><br />
section 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations, the panel found it to be a key factor to consider in the<br />
determination <strong>of</strong> the genuineness <strong>of</strong> an adoption.<br />
72<br />
73<br />
74<br />
75<br />
Ibid., paragraph 14.<br />
Ibid., paragraph 17.<br />
Ibid., paragraph 18.<br />
Ibid., paragraph 19.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Adoptions - Ch. 4
In Singh 76 the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division adopted the reasoning in Sahota 77 <strong>and</strong> held<br />
that it was appropriate to make a final determination under section 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations with<br />
respect to whether the adoption was in bad faith before undertaking a consideration <strong>of</strong> whether or<br />
not the adoption was in the best interests <strong>of</strong> the child under section 117(3) <strong>of</strong> the IRP<br />
Regulations.<br />
In De Guia, 78 the panel found that the adoption fell within Regulation 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP<br />
Regulations. The adoption took place in 1989 when the applicant was four years old <strong>and</strong> the<br />
appellant’s application to sponsor the applicant was submitted more than twelve years after the<br />
adoption was finalized. The appellant was unable to explain satisfactorily the delay in sponsoring<br />
the applicant. When the applicant was interviewed, he stated that the appellant adopted him<br />
because his parents were jobless <strong>and</strong> for his future. The appellant had not visited him since 1988,<br />
<strong>and</strong> she never provided for his physical <strong>and</strong> emotional needs on a daily basis. He continued to<br />
live with his biological father after the adoption. While the appellant provided financial support<br />
for the applicant’s education, she did not direct his education <strong>and</strong> was not advised within a<br />
reasonable timeframe <strong>of</strong> his decision to quit school. The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division found that<br />
a parent-child relationship did not exist between the appellant <strong>and</strong> the applicant at the time <strong>of</strong> the<br />
adoption, <strong>and</strong> that no such relationship had developed over the years. The adoption was not<br />
genuine <strong>and</strong> was primarily for the purpose <strong>of</strong> acquiring a status or privilege under the Act.<br />
In Hussein, 79 the sponsored application for permanent residence <strong>of</strong> the appellant’s<br />
adopted children (his sister’s children) was refused pursuant to s.4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations. There<br />
was evidence at the hearing <strong>of</strong> the appeal that was not before the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer to the effect that the<br />
appellant had been making major decisions for the applicants since their father died, including<br />
decisions that were contrary to their biological mother’s wishes. While the elder applicant had<br />
told the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer that she intended to continue to have a normal mother-daughter relationship<br />
with her biological mother after the adoption, it would be a denial <strong>of</strong> reality to expect teenage<br />
children to forget their biological mother. It was more important that the applicants had accepted<br />
the appellant as their father <strong>and</strong> regarded his counsel <strong>and</strong> authority as paramount to that <strong>of</strong> their<br />
biological mother.<br />
76<br />
77<br />
78<br />
79<br />
Singh, Jaspal v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-17789), Hoare, August 6. 2004.<br />
Sahota, supra, footnote 71.<br />
De Guia, Avelina Fern<strong>and</strong>ez Quindipan v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-11030), Waters, December 14, 2005.<br />
Hussein, Mohammed Yassin v. M.C.I. (IAD WA5-00123), Ostrowski, December 15, 2006.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Adoptions - Ch. 4
Adult Adoptions<br />
IRP Regulations<br />
117(4) A foreign national who is the adopted child <strong>of</strong> a sponsor <strong>and</strong><br />
whose adoption took place when the child was 18 years <strong>of</strong> age or over<br />
shall not be considered a member <strong>of</strong> the family class by virtue <strong>of</strong> that<br />
adoption unless it took place under the following circumstances:<br />
(a) the adoption was in accordance with the laws <strong>of</strong> the place where the<br />
adoption took place <strong>and</strong>, if the sponsor resided in <strong>Canada</strong> at the time<br />
<strong>of</strong> the adoption, the adoption was in accordance with the laws <strong>of</strong> the<br />
province where the sponsor then resided;<br />
(b) a genuine parent-child relationship exists at the time <strong>of</strong> the adoption<br />
<strong>and</strong> existed before the child reached the age <strong>of</strong> 18; <strong>and</strong><br />
(c) the adoption is not primarily for the purpose <strong>of</strong> acquiring a status or<br />
privilege under the Act.<br />
Adult adoptees were not previously sponsorable under Canadian immigration law as<br />
members <strong>of</strong> the family class; pursuant to the IRP Regulations they may be sponsored provided<br />
they also meet the definition <strong>of</strong> “dependent child” in the IRP Regulations. The <strong>Immigration</strong><br />
Appeal Division has not yet had the occasion to decide an appeal from a refusal <strong>of</strong> a sponsored<br />
application for permanent residence based on section 117(4) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations.<br />
Intent to adopt provisions<br />
Statutory Provision<br />
IRP Regulations<br />
117(1) A foreign national is a member <strong>of</strong> the family class if, with respect<br />
to a sponsor, the foreign national is:<br />
(g) a person under 18 years <strong>of</strong> age whom the sponsor intends to adopt in<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> if<br />
(i) the adoption is not primarily for the purpose <strong>of</strong> acquiring any<br />
privilege or status under the Act,<br />
(ii) where the adoption is an international adoption <strong>and</strong> the<br />
country in which the person resides <strong>and</strong> their province <strong>of</strong> intended<br />
destination are parties to the Hague Convention on Adoption, the<br />
competent authority <strong>of</strong> the country <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> the province have approved<br />
the adoption in writing as conforming to that Convention; <strong>and</strong><br />
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January 1, 2008 Adoptions - Ch. 4
(iii) where the adoption is an international adoption <strong>and</strong> either the<br />
country in which the person resides or the person’s province <strong>of</strong><br />
intended destination is not a party to the Hague Convention on<br />
Adoption<br />
(A) the person has been placed for adoption in the country in which<br />
they reside or is otherwise legally available in that country for<br />
adoption <strong>and</strong> there is no evidence that the intended adoption is<br />
for the purpose <strong>of</strong> child trafficking or undue gain within the<br />
meaning <strong>of</strong> the Hague Convention on Adoption, <strong>and</strong><br />
(B) the competent authority <strong>of</strong> the person’s province <strong>of</strong> intended<br />
destination has stated in writing that it does not object to the<br />
adoption;<br />
In Vaganova, 80 the appellant appealed from the refusal <strong>of</strong> the sponsored application for<br />
permanent residence <strong>of</strong> her gr<strong>and</strong>nephew, whom she intended to adopt. The issue was whether<br />
the intended adoption met the requirements <strong>of</strong> section 117(1)(g)(iii)(A) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations.<br />
The IRP Regulations require that the applicant be placed for adoption in the country in which he<br />
or she resides or be otherwise legally available for adoption in that country. The panel held that<br />
whether an applicant is “otherwise legally available for adoption” is to be assessed against the<br />
country <strong>of</strong> the applicant’s residence rather than the province <strong>of</strong> his destination. The appellant<br />
produced two consents to adoption signed by the applicant’s biological mother, but no expert<br />
evidence was presented as to whether the signing <strong>of</strong> a consent to adopt by the biological mother<br />
placed the applicant for adoption in Russia or resulted in the applicant being otherwise legally<br />
available for adoption in Russia. The intended adoption did not meet the requirements <strong>of</strong> section<br />
117(1)(g)(iii)(A) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations.<br />
It should be noted that in Vaganova, although a “no objection” letter from the province <strong>of</strong><br />
intended destination was provided to the panel by the appellant, counsel did not rely on, nor did<br />
the panel turn its mind to, s.117(7)(b) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations. 81<br />
In Al-Shikarchy, 82 another 117(1)(g)(iii) intent to adopt in <strong>Canada</strong> case, the panel<br />
commented that although neither party referred to s.117(7) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations, the provision<br />
would appear to be relevant to the applicant’s circumstances. The appeal was decided on other<br />
grounds so the panel did not undertake an analysis <strong>of</strong> the impact <strong>of</strong> s.117(7) <strong>of</strong> the IRP<br />
80<br />
81<br />
82<br />
Vaganova, Ludmila v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-17969), Waters, May 18, 2006.<br />
This provision reads as follows:<br />
(7) If a statement referred to in clause (1)(g)(iii)(B) or paragraph (3) (c) or (f) has<br />
been provided to an <strong>of</strong>ficer by the foreign national’s province <strong>of</strong> intended<br />
destination, that statement is, except in the case <strong>of</strong> an adoption where the<br />
adoption is primarily for the purpose <strong>of</strong> acquiring a status or privilege under the<br />
Act, conclusive evidence that the foreign national meets the following applicable<br />
requirements:<br />
(b) in the case <strong>of</strong> a person referred to in paragraph (1)(g), the requirements<br />
set out in clause (1)(g)(iii)(A);<br />
Al-Shikarchy, Salam v. M.C.I. (IAD TA5-13169), B<strong>and</strong>, September 5, 2007.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Adoptions - Ch. 4
Regulations. The meaning to be given to the words “has been placed for adoption in the country<br />
in which they reside or is otherwise legally available in that country for adoption” interpreted in<br />
light <strong>of</strong> 117(7)(b) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations thus remains an outst<strong>and</strong>ing issue for the <strong>Immigration</strong><br />
Appeal Division.<br />
The panel in Al-Shikarchy citing s.121 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations, found that the applicant<br />
did not qualify as a member <strong>of</strong> the family class in light <strong>of</strong> the fact that she was over the age <strong>of</strong> 18<br />
when the immigration authorities received her application for a permanent resident visa <strong>and</strong> over<br />
18 years <strong>of</strong> age when her application for a permanent resident visa was determined. 83<br />
In Taylor 84 the question before the panel was at what point in time is an applicant’s age to<br />
be calculated in order to determine whether he or she is over or under 22 years <strong>of</strong> age <strong>and</strong><br />
therefore a dependent child. In contrast to the findings <strong>of</strong> the panel in Al-Shikarchy, who found<br />
both the date <strong>of</strong> receipt <strong>of</strong> the application for permanent residence <strong>and</strong> the date <strong>of</strong> the<br />
determination <strong>of</strong> the application to be relevant, the panel in Taylor concluded that the only<br />
relevant date, when the issue is the applicant’s age, is the date <strong>of</strong> receipt <strong>of</strong> the application for<br />
permanent residence. 85 There appears to be conflicting jurisprudence in the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal<br />
Division as to whether or not there is a “lock-in” date with respect to the applicant’s age in light<br />
<strong>of</strong> s.121 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations. Is an applicant a member <strong>of</strong> the family class as a “child to be<br />
adopted” if the applicant was under 18 years <strong>of</strong> age at the time his or her application was received<br />
by immigration authorities but over 18 when the application is being determined by a visa<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficer?<br />
Canadian Charter <strong>of</strong> Rights <strong>and</strong> Freedoms<br />
Sponsors have also argued that certain provisions in the foreign adoption legislation are<br />
discriminatory <strong>and</strong> thus contrary to the Canadian Charter <strong>of</strong> Rights <strong>and</strong> Freedoms. The<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division (<strong>and</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal <strong>Board</strong>) have rejected these<br />
arguments. 86<br />
In a different context, the Federal Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal, in Li, 87 dealt with an argument that an<br />
adjudicator considering the issue <strong>of</strong> equivalency must have regard to whether the procedures<br />
83<br />
84<br />
85<br />
86<br />
87<br />
Ibid, at 21. See also Ch<strong>and</strong>ler, Lucy Mary v. M.C.I. (IAD VA4-01200), Boscariol, September 26, 2006.<br />
Taylor, Joan v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-00871), Whist, May 19, 2004.<br />
In Lidder, the court found that the effective (“lock-in”) date <strong>of</strong> a sponsored application for permanent residence<br />
is the date <strong>of</strong> the filing <strong>of</strong> the application for permanent residence. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>Immigration</strong>) v. Lidder, [1992] 2 F.C. 621; 16 Imm. L.R. (2d) 241 (C.A.).<br />
See, for example, Dhillon, Gurpal Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 83-9242), D. Davey, Benedetti, Suppa, July 30, 1985;<br />
Mattam, Mary John v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-10213), Arkin, Fatsis, Ahara, December 10, 1987; Magnet, Marc v.<br />
M.E.I. (IAD W89-00002), Arpin, Goodspeed, Rayburn, April 10, 1990; <strong>and</strong> Syed, Abul Maali v. M.E.I. (IAD<br />
T89-01164), Tisshaw, Spencer, Townshend, January 7, 1992.<br />
Li, Ronald Fook Shiu v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-329-95), Strayer, Robertson, Chevalier, August 7, 1996.<br />
Reported: Li v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1997] 1 F.C. 235 (C.A.).<br />
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January 1, 2008 Adoptions - Ch. 4
followed in the country <strong>of</strong> conviction would be acceptable under the Charter. The Court rejected<br />
the argument <strong>and</strong> noted that<br />
[...] the Supreme Court <strong>of</strong> <strong>Canada</strong> has held the Charter to be irrelevant<br />
abroad even where acts by foreign police <strong>of</strong>ficers inconsistent with the<br />
Charter have yielded evidence for use in a Canadian court. In Terry v. The<br />
Queen 88 [... a person] was given the warnings required by U.S. law but was<br />
not advised immediately <strong>of</strong> a right to counsel as would have been required<br />
by [...] the Charter had he been arrested in <strong>Canada</strong>. Nevertheless<br />
statements made by him to police [...] were held admissible at a subsequent<br />
trial in <strong>Canada</strong>. The Court held that the Charter could not govern the<br />
conduct <strong>of</strong> foreign police acting in their own country. The same must<br />
surely be true <strong>of</strong> a foreign court trying a person then subject to its<br />
jurisdiction. 89<br />
The other type <strong>of</strong> Charter challenge involves an attack on the constitutional validity <strong>of</strong><br />
particular provisions <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Act or Regulations. For example, in Dular, 90 the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division found that the age 19 limitation in the definition <strong>of</strong> “son” in the<br />
Regulations was contrary to section 15 <strong>of</strong> the Charter <strong>and</strong> not saved by section 1 <strong>of</strong> the Charter.<br />
However, the Federal Court disagreed with the panel’s section 1 analysis <strong>and</strong> set aside its<br />
decision. 91 A different approach was followed in Daley, 92 where the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal<br />
Division held that if there was discrimination on the basis <strong>of</strong> age (in this case, the age limitation<br />
was 13), it was the applicant’s rights <strong>and</strong> not the sponsor’s which were being infringed. As the<br />
applicant was outside <strong>Canada</strong>, the Charter had no application.<br />
In Rai, 93 the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division held that the requirement that an adoption not<br />
be for immigration purposes does not violate the s.15 Charter rights <strong>of</strong> adoptive parents.<br />
In Ch<strong>and</strong>ler, 94 the appellant’s challenge to the constitutionality <strong>of</strong> s.117(1)(g) <strong>of</strong> IRPA<br />
failed. Counsel argued that limiting the sponsorship <strong>of</strong> children intended to be adopted in <strong>Canada</strong><br />
to the age <strong>of</strong> under 18 years, when dependent biological or adopted children can be sponsored to<br />
the age <strong>of</strong> 22, contravened sections 12 <strong>and</strong> 15 <strong>of</strong> the Canadian Charter <strong>of</strong> Rights <strong>and</strong> Freedoms.<br />
The distinction between biological <strong>and</strong> adopted children <strong>and</strong> children intended to be adopted in<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> violates section 15 <strong>of</strong> the Charter but was justified under section 1 <strong>of</strong> the Charter. The<br />
appellant was not subjected to cruel <strong>and</strong> unusual treatment contrary to section 12 <strong>of</strong> the Charter.<br />
88<br />
89<br />
90<br />
91<br />
92<br />
93<br />
94<br />
R. v. Terry, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 207.<br />
Li, supra, footnote 87, at 257.<br />
Dular, Shiu v. M.C.I. (IAD V93-02409), Ho, Lam, Verma, February 22, 1996. See also Bahadur, Ramdhami v.<br />
M.E.I. (IAD T89-01108), Ariemma, Tisshaw, Bell (dissenting), January 14, 1991 (re the age 13 limitation in the<br />
former Regulations).<br />
M.C.I. v. Dular, Shiu (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-984-96), Wetston, October 21, 1997.<br />
Daley, Joyce v. M.E.I. (IAD T89-01062), Sherman, Bell, Chu, February 3, 1992.<br />
Rai, supra, footnote 60.<br />
Ch<strong>and</strong>ler, supra, footnote 83.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Adoptions - Ch. 4
Repeat <strong>Appeals</strong><br />
In adoption applications, there is no fluidity with respect to the point at which the<br />
determination is made as to whether the applicant is a member <strong>of</strong> the family class. That point in<br />
time is fixed by the IRPA. Therefore, in repeat appeals from adoption refusals, the evidence must<br />
always relate to the intention at the time the applicant was purported to become a member <strong>of</strong> the<br />
family class. 95 Repeat appeals from these refusals require a more restrictive approach. Where an<br />
appellant attempts to relitigate unsuccessful appeals, two doctrines may be applicable: res<br />
judicata <strong>and</strong> abuse <strong>of</strong> process 96 . The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division must allow the sponsor to<br />
present the alleged new evidence before finding either an abuse <strong>of</strong> process or res judicata. 97 . The<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division is under no obligation to grant a full oral hearing; new evidence by<br />
way <strong>of</strong> affidavit is acceptable. 98<br />
If the evidence adduced is in fact new evidence, then the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division<br />
can decide whether the issues raised are res judicata. Even where all the criteria for the<br />
application <strong>of</strong> res judicata are met, a repeat appeal will only be res judicata if there exist no<br />
special circumstances that would bring the appeal within the exception <strong>of</strong> the application <strong>of</strong> the<br />
doctrine. Such special circumstances would include fraud or other misconduct in the previous<br />
proceedings which would raise natural justice issues, or where there is the discovery <strong>of</strong> decisive<br />
new evidence that could not have been discovered by the exercise <strong>of</strong> reasonable diligence in the<br />
first proceeding. 99 Further, whether or not to apply the doctrine <strong>of</strong> res judicata in any case is a<br />
matter <strong>of</strong> discretion. 100 In Bhatti 101 , the Appeal Division dismissed the appeal on the basis <strong>of</strong> the<br />
doctrine <strong>of</strong> res judicata in that there was no “decisive new evidence” which could have altered<br />
the result <strong>of</strong> the first appeal.<br />
If the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division decides the evidence adduced does not constitute new<br />
evidence then it is open to it to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it is an abuse <strong>of</strong> process. 102<br />
In some cases, it may be appropriate to consider applying the doctrine <strong>of</strong> abuse <strong>of</strong> process instead<br />
<strong>of</strong> or in addition to res judicata. 103 See Chapter 6, (“Repeat <strong>Appeals</strong>”) for an in-depth discussion<br />
<strong>of</strong> these issues.<br />
95<br />
96<br />
97<br />
98<br />
99<br />
Singh, Gurmukh v. M.C.I. (IAD T98-08941), Wales, March 15, 2000.<br />
Hira, Chaman Lal v. M.C.I. (IAD V99-01877), Boscariol, Ross, Mattu, July 14, 2000.<br />
Kular, Jasmail v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4990-99), Nadon, August 30, 2000.<br />
Sekhon, Amrik Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1982-01), McKeown, December 10, 2001.<br />
Sangha, Amarjit v. M.C..I. (IAD VA1-04029), Boscariol, February 21, 2002.<br />
100 Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., [2001] S.C.R. 460; Raika, Labh Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA1-02630),<br />
Boscariol, June 6, 2002.<br />
101 Bhatti, Darshan Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA1-03848), Workun, April 19, 2002.<br />
102 Toor, Rajwant Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA0-00917), Clark, June 1,2001 (reasons signed June 8, 2001); Kaler,<br />
Gurdip Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V99-04536), Baker, October 10, 2000; Gill, Balvir Singh v. M.C.I. (V99-03132),<br />
Mattu, September 25, 2000; Punni, Pal Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V99-01483), Boscariol, June 30, 2000.<br />
103 Sangha, supra, footnote 99; Bagri, Sharinder Singh v. M.C.I. (VA1-00913), Boscariol, December 10, 2001.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Adoptions - Ch. 4
An issue that arose after the IRPA came into effect was whether or not res judicata<br />
continues to apply as a result <strong>of</strong> the change in wording <strong>of</strong> the test to be applied in section 4 <strong>of</strong> the<br />
IRP Regulations, including the change in timing <strong>of</strong> the assessment <strong>of</strong> the test. In Vuong 104 the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division panel held that the changes between section 4(3) <strong>of</strong> the former<br />
Regulations <strong>and</strong> section 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations are not <strong>of</strong> sufficient legal significance to create<br />
an exception to res judicata <strong>and</strong> concluded that res judicata applied.<br />
The Federal Court has ruled 105 that the Vuong approach is correct <strong>and</strong> that except in unique<br />
or special circumstances that the principle <strong>of</strong> res judicata applies as it is not in the public interest<br />
to allow the re-litigation <strong>of</strong> failed marriage appeals unless there are special circumstances.<br />
104 Vuong, Phuoc v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-16835), Stein, December 22, 2003.<br />
105 Mohammed, Amina v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-1436-05), Shore, October, 27, 2005: 2005 FC 1442.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Adoptions - Ch. 4
CASES<br />
Addow, Ali Hussein v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-01171), D’Ignazio, October 15, 1997............................................................ 8<br />
Alkana, Robin John v. M.E.I. (IAD W89-00261), Goodspeed, Arpin, Rayburn, November 16,<br />
1989....................................................................................................................................................................... 8, 9<br />
Al-Shikarchy, Salam v. M.C.I. (IAD TA5-13169), B<strong>and</strong>, September 5, 2007 ............................................................. 19<br />
Atwal, Manjit Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-4205), Petryshyn, Wright, Arpin (concurring), May 8,<br />
1989................................................................................................................................................................... 10, 11<br />
Aujla, Surjit Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 87-6021), Mawani, November 10, 1987............................................................. 11<br />
Badwal, Jasbir Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 87-10977), Sherman, Bell, Ahara, May 29, 1989. ........................................ 10<br />
Bagri, Sharinder Singh v. M.C.I. (VA1-00913), Boscariol, December 10, 2001 ........................................................ 22<br />
Bahadur, Ramdhami v. M.E.I. (IAD T89-01108), Ariemma, Tisshaw, Bell (dissenting),<br />
January 14, 1991. .................................................................................................................................................... 21<br />
Bal, Sukhjinder Singh v. S.G.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1212-93), McKeown, October 19, 1993 .................................... 5<br />
Bhatti, Darshan Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA1-03848), Workun, April 19, 2002............................................................ 22<br />
Bilimoriya, Parviz v. M.C.I. (IAD T93-04633), Muzzi, September 18, 1996................................................................ 6<br />
Brar, Kanwar Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD W89-00084), Goodspeed, Arpin, Vidal (concurring in part),<br />
December 29, 1989. ............................................................................................................................................ 8, 10<br />
Brown, Josiah Lanville v. M.C.I. (IAD T89-02499), Buchanan, June 23, 1999 ............................................................ 6<br />
Burmi, Joginder Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 88-35651), Sherman, Arkin, Weisdorf, February 14, 1989.......................... 10<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) v. Lidder, [1992] 2 F.C. 621; 16 Imm. L.R.<br />
(2d) 241 (C.A.)........................................................................................................................................................ 20<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) v. Sidhu, [1993] 2 F.C. 483 (C.A.).............................................. 8<br />
Capiendo, Rosita v. M.C.I. (IAD W95-00108), Wiebe, August 18, 1997...................................................................... 4<br />
Ch<strong>and</strong>ler, Lucy Mary v. M.C.I. (IAD VA4-01200), Boscariol, September 26, 2006 ............................................ 20, 21<br />
Chiu, Jacintha Chen v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-6123), Mawani, Gill<strong>and</strong>ers, Singh, July 13, 1987...................................... 11<br />
Chu, Si Gina v. M.E.I. (IAD V90-00836), Wlodyka, MacLeod, June 28, 1990 .......................................................... 15<br />
Daley, Joyce v. M.E.I. (IAD T89-01062), Sherman, Bell, Chu, February 3, 1992. ..................................................... 21<br />
Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., [2001] S.C.R. 460; Raika, Labh Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD<br />
VA1-02630), Boscariol, June 6, 2002..................................................................................................................... 22<br />
De Guia, Avewlina Fern<strong>and</strong>ez Quindipan v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-11030), Waters, December 14,<br />
2005......................................................................................................................................................................... 17<br />
De Guzman, Leonor G. v. M.C.I. (IAD W95-00062), Ariemma, Bartley, Wiebe, August 16, 1995. ............................ 3<br />
Demnati, Ahmed v. M.C.I. (M99-10260), di Pietro, April 3, 2001................................................................................. 8<br />
Dhillon, Gurpal Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 83-9242), D. Davey, Benedetti, Suppa, July 30, 1985. ................................. 20<br />
Dhillon, Harnam Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-387-85), Pratte, Marceau, Lacombe, May 27,<br />
1987................................................................................................................................................................... 11, 12<br />
Dhillon, Harnam Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 83-6551), Petryshyn, Glogowski, Voorhees, January 3,<br />
1985......................................................................................................................................................................... 11<br />
Dizon, Julieta Lacson v. M.C.I. (IAD V98-02115), Carver, September 1, 1999 ........................................................... 4<br />
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January 1, 2008 Adoptions - Ch. 4
Dooprajh, Anthony v. M.C.I. (IAD M94-07504), Dur<strong>and</strong>, November 27, 1995............................................................ 5<br />
Dular, Shiu v. M.C.I. (IAD V93-02409), Ho, Lam, Verma, February 22, 1996. ......................................................... 21<br />
Dular: M.C.I. v. Dular, Shiu (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-984-96), Wetston, October 21, 1997............................................ 21<br />
Edrada: M.C.I. v. Edrada, Leonardo Lagmacy (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5199-94), MacKay, February<br />
29, 1996................................................................................................................................................................... 13<br />
Gill, Balvir Singh v. M.C.I. (V99-03132), Mattu, September 25, 2000 ....................................................................... 22<br />
Gill, Balwinder Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD W89-00433), Goodspeed, Arpin, Rayburn, September 13,<br />
1990......................................................................................................................................................................... 14<br />
Gill, Banta Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-859-96), Marceau, Linden, Robertson, July 14, 1998.............................. 13<br />
Gill, Banta Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-760-96), Gibson, October 22, 1996................................................. 13<br />
Gill, Gurm<strong>and</strong>eep Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD W95-00111), Wiebe, October 17, 1996......................................................... 4<br />
Gill, Ranjit Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V96-00797), Clark, April 7, 1999............................................................................. 7<br />
Gossal, Rajinder Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 87-9401), Sherman, Chu, Benedetti, February 15, 1988.<br />
Reported: Gossal v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1988), 5 Imm. L.R.<br />
(2d) 185 (I.A.B.)........................................................................................................................................................ 7<br />
Heir, Surjit Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 80-6116), Howard, Campbell, Hlady, January 16, 1981...................................... 15<br />
Hira, Chaman Lal v. M.C.I. (IAD V99-01877), Boscariol, Ross, Mattu, July 14, 2000.............................................. 22<br />
Hussein, Mohammed Yassin v. M.C.I. (IAD WA5-00123), Ostrowski, December 15, 2006 ...................................... 17<br />
Jalal, Younas v. M.C.I. (IAD M93-06071), Blumer, August 16, 1995 reported: Jalal v. <strong>Canada</strong><br />
(Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1995), 39 Imm. L.R. (2d) 146 (I.A.D.)................................................. 9<br />
Jaswal, Kaushaliya Devi v. M.E.I. (IAD W89-00087), Goodspeed, Wlodyka, Rayburn,<br />
September 27, 1990................................................................................................................................................. 11<br />
Kalair, Sohan Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-919-83), Stone, Heald, Urie, November 29, 1984................................. 7<br />
Kalida, Malika v. M.C.I. (IAD M96-08010), Champoux, July 3, 1997. ........................................................................ 6<br />
Kler, Sukhdev Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 82-6350), Goodspeed, Vidal, Arpin, May 25, 1987......................................... 14<br />
Kular, Jasmail v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4990-99), Nadon, August 30, 2000 ..................................................... 22<br />
Kwan, Man Tin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5527-00), Muldoon, August 30, 2001 .................................................. 4<br />
Lam, Wong Do v. M.M.I. (I.A.B.), October 2, 1972. .....................................................................................................9<br />
Li, Ronald Fook Shiu v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-329-95), Strayer, Robertson, Chevalier, August 7,<br />
1996. Reported: Li v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1997] 1 F.C. 235<br />
(C.A.)................................................................................................................................................................. 20, 21<br />
Lit, Jaswant Singh v. M.M.I. (I.A.B. 76-6003), Scott, Benedetti, Legaré, August 13, 1976.......................................... 9<br />
Ly, Ngoc Lan v. M.C.I. (IAD T99-04453), Kelley, June 22, 2000................................................................................. 4<br />
M.C.I. v. Sharma, Chaman Jit (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-453-95), Wetson, August 28, 1995 ............................................ 13<br />
Magnet, Marc v. M.E.I. (IAD W89-00002), Arpin, Goodspeed, Rayburn, April 10, 1990. ........................................ 20<br />
Mattam, Mary John v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-10213), Arkin, Fatsis, Ahara, December 10, 1987...................................... 20<br />
Minhas, Surinder Pal Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD M98-10540), Colavecchio, December 15, 1999....................................... 4<br />
Mohammed, Amina v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-1436-05), Shore, October, 27, 2005: 2005 FC 1442 ............................ 23<br />
Molina, Rufo v. M.C.I. (IAD T98-04608), Kelley, November 8, 1999.......................................................................... 4<br />
Okafor-Ogbujiagba, Anthony Nwafor v. M.C.I. (IAD T94-05539), Aterman, April 14, 1997. ..................................... 7<br />
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Pabla, Dial v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1210-00), Blais, December 12, 2000.......................................................... 5<br />
Patel, Ramesh Ch<strong>and</strong>ra v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-9738), Jew, Arkin, Tisshaw, April 15, 1988 ......................................... 10<br />
Paul, Satnam Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 87-6049), Howard, Anderson (dissenting), Gill<strong>and</strong>ers,<br />
February 13, 1989. .................................................................................................................................................. 14<br />
Pawar, Onkar Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD T98-04518), D’Ignazio, October 1, 1999........................................................... 10<br />
Persaud, Kowsilia v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-00912), Kalvin, July 13, 1998........................................................................ 12<br />
Poonia, Jagraj v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-02478), Arpin, Townshend, Fatsis, October 5, 1993........................................... 14<br />
Punni, Pal Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V99-01483), Boscariol, June 30, 2000 .................................................................... 22<br />
Purba, Surinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD T95-02315), Teitelbaum, September 10, 1996. ............................................... 15<br />
Rai, Suritam Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-02710), Major, Wiebe, Dossa, November 30, 1999 ............................... 13, 21<br />
Rajam, Daniel v. M.C.I. (IAD V98-02983), Carver, November 5, 1999 ....................................................................... 4<br />
Reid, Eric v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1357-99), Reed, November 25, 1999............................................................ 6<br />
Sahota, Gurdev Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-03374), Mattu, February 23, 2004........................................................... 15<br />
Sai, Jiqiu (Jacqueline) v. M.C.I. (IAD TA0-11403), Michnick, August 22, 2001......................................................... 4<br />
S<strong>and</strong>hu, Bachhitar Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-10112), Eglington, Goodspeed, Chu, February 4,<br />
1988......................................................................................................................................................................... 10<br />
S<strong>and</strong>hu, Gurcharan Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 87-9066), Eglington, Teitelbaum, Sherman,<br />
November 13, 1987. ................................................................................................................................................ 13<br />
Sangha, Amarjit v. M.C..I. (IAD VA1-04029), Boscariol, February 21, 2002 ............................................................ 22<br />
Sekhon, Amrik Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1982-01), McKeown, December 10, 2001................................. 22<br />
Sertovic, Safeta S. v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-16898. Collins, September 10, 2003 .............................................................. 2<br />
Seth, Kewal Krishan v. M.C.I. (IAD M94-05081), Angé, March 27, 1996. ............................................................ 6, 12<br />
Sharma, Sudhir Kumar v. M.E.I. (IAD V92-01628), Wlodyka, Singh, Verma, August 18, 1993. .............................. 14<br />
Shergill, Kundan Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-6108), Mawani, Gill<strong>and</strong>ers, Singh, April 8, 1987.<br />
Reported: Shergill v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1987), 3 Imm. L.R.<br />
(2d) 126 (I.A.B.)...................................................................................................................................................... 13<br />
Siddiq, Mohammad v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 79-9088), Weselak, Davey, Teitelbaum, June 10, 1980...................................... 8<br />
Singh (Ajaib): Singh v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1990] 3 F.C. 37;<br />
11 Imm. L.R. (2d) 1 (C.A.); leave to appeal to Supreme Court <strong>of</strong> <strong>Canada</strong> (Doc. 22136, Sopinka,<br />
McLachlin, Iacobucci) refused on February 28, 1991, Singh v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong><br />
Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1991), 13 Imm. L.R. (2d) 46 [Appeal Note]. ....................................................... 12<br />
Singh, Ajaib v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 87-4063), Mawani, Wright, Petryshyn, April 26, 1988. ............................................... 10<br />
Singh, Babu v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-210-85), Urie, Mahoney, Marceau, January 15, 1986. ....................................... 8<br />
Singh, Gurmukh v. M.C.I. (IAD T98-08941), Wales, March 15, 2000........................................................................ 22<br />
Singh, Jaspal v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-17789), Hoare, August 6. 2004............................................................................. 17<br />
Sinniah, Sinnathamby v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5954-00), Dawson, July 25, 2002; 2002 FCT<br />
822............................................................................................................................................................................. 5<br />
Sohal, Talwinder Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-00396), Clark, May 23, 1996. ................................................................. 4<br />
Sran, Pritam Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD T93-10409), Townshend, May 10, 1995............................................................... 11<br />
Syed, Abul Maali v. M.E.I. (IAD T89-01164), Tisshaw, Spencer, Townshend, January 7, 1992. ............................... 20<br />
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Taggar: <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) v. Taggar, [1989] 3 F.C. 576;<br />
8 Imm. L.R. (2d) 175 (C.A.). .......................................................................................................................... 7, 9, 11<br />
Taylor, Joan v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-00871), Whist, May 19, 2004 ................................................................................ 20<br />
Terry: R. v. Terry, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 207. ..................................................................................................................... 21<br />
Toor, Gurdarshan Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-00959), McIsaac, February 4, 1997....................................................... 4<br />
Toor, Rajwant Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA0-00917), Clark, June 1,2001 (reasons signed June 8,<br />
2001) ....................................................................................................................................................................... 22<br />
Vaganova, Ludmila v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-17969), Waters, May 18, 2006 ................................................................... 19<br />
Vuong, Khan Duc v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3139-97), Dubé, July 21, 1998 ......................................................... 6<br />
Vuong, Phuoc v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-16835), Stein, December 22, 2003 ...................................................................... 23<br />
Wang, Yan-Qiao v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-04690), Muzzi, October 6, 1997......................................................................... 7<br />
Zenati, Entissar v. M.C.I. (IAD M98-09459), Bourbonnais, September 17, 1999......................................................... 8<br />
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Chapter Five<br />
Spouses, Common-Law Partners<br />
<strong>and</strong> Conjugal Partners<br />
Introduction<br />
The <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Refugee</strong> Protection Act (“IRPA”) 1 <strong>and</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Refugee</strong><br />
Protection Regulations (“IRP Regulations”) 2 exp<strong>and</strong>ed the family class to include common-law<br />
partners <strong>and</strong> conjugal partners as well as spouses. 3 In addition, common-law partners are family<br />
members <strong>of</strong> members <strong>of</strong> the family class. 4 These changes, brought about by the implementation<br />
<strong>of</strong> the IRPA in 2002, are part <strong>of</strong> a legislative framework which sets out, for the first time, specific<br />
rules concerning the sponsorship <strong>of</strong> common-law partners <strong>and</strong> conjugal partners <strong>of</strong> the same or<br />
opposite sex as the sponsor. 5<br />
Modifications were also brought to the definition <strong>of</strong> “marriage.” 6 The IRP Regulations<br />
now require that a foreign marriage be valid under Canadian law. Furthermore, contrary to the<br />
former <strong>Immigration</strong> Regulations, 1978, the IRPA <strong>and</strong> IRP Regulations do not define “spouse.”<br />
The discussion that follows addresses the definitions <strong>of</strong> “common-law partner,” “conjugal<br />
partner,” <strong>and</strong> “marriage.” It also deals with excluded <strong>and</strong> bad faith relationships which disqualify<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
4<br />
5<br />
6<br />
S.C. 2001, c. 27, entered into force on June 28, 2002 as amended.<br />
SOR/202-227, June 11, 2002 as amended.<br />
S. 12(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA <strong>and</strong> s. 116 <strong>and</strong> s. 117(1)(a) <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Refugee</strong> Protection Regulations (“IRP<br />
Regulations”). “Common-law partner” is defined at s. 1(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations as: “…in relation to a<br />
person, an individual who is cohabiting with the person in a conjugal relationship, having so cohabited for a<br />
period <strong>of</strong> at least one year.” “Conjugal partner” is defined at s. 2 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations as: “…in relation to a<br />
sponsor, a foreign national residing outside <strong>Canada</strong> who is in a conjugal relationship with the sponsor <strong>and</strong> has<br />
been in that relationship for a period <strong>of</strong> at least one year.”<br />
S. 1(3)(a) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations states:<br />
For the purposes <strong>of</strong> the Act, other than s. 12 <strong>and</strong> paragraph 38(2)(d), <strong>and</strong> these Regulations, “family member”<br />
in respect <strong>of</strong> a person means<br />
(a) the spouse or common-law partner <strong>of</strong> the person;<br />
Prior to the coming into force <strong>of</strong> the IRPA, common-law partners <strong>of</strong> Canadian citizens or permanent residents<br />
who wished to apply for permanent resident status to reunite with their partner were considered on<br />
humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate grounds under s. 114(2) <strong>of</strong> the former <strong>Immigration</strong> Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2..<br />
S. 2 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations defines “marriage” as:<br />
…in respect <strong>of</strong> a marriage that took place outside <strong>Canada</strong>, means a marriage that is valid both<br />
under the laws <strong>of</strong> the jurisdiction where it took place <strong>and</strong> under Canadian law.<br />
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a foreign national from being considered a spouse, common-law partner, conjugal partner or<br />
member <strong>of</strong> the family class.<br />
Background to the Legislative Changes concerning Common-law Partners<br />
<strong>and</strong> Conjugal Partners<br />
Under the IRPA, common-law partners have a status equal to that <strong>of</strong> spouses. The<br />
relevant provisions <strong>of</strong> the IRPA <strong>and</strong> the IRP Regulations are intended to grant common-law<br />
partners the same benefits <strong>and</strong> obligations granted to spouses. 7 The provisions <strong>of</strong> the IRPA as<br />
they relate to common-law partners take into account case law such as Miron v. Trudel 8 <strong>and</strong> M. v.<br />
H. 9 in which the Supreme Court found that legislative provisions excluding same <strong>and</strong> opposite<br />
sex common-law partners from benefits afforded to married partners were discriminatory <strong>and</strong><br />
violated the right to equality guaranteed by s. 15 <strong>of</strong> the Charter <strong>of</strong> Rights <strong>and</strong> Freedoms. 10 In<br />
addition, the provisions <strong>of</strong> the IRPA keep in step with the Modernization <strong>of</strong> Benefits <strong>and</strong><br />
Obligations Act, 11 which amended other federal acts following the decision in M. v. H. 12 in order<br />
to extend to same-sex partners the benefits <strong>and</strong> obligations afforded married <strong>and</strong> opposite-sex<br />
partners.<br />
Conjugal partners have a different status than that <strong>of</strong> spouses <strong>and</strong> common-law partners<br />
under the IRPA. The definition <strong>of</strong> “conjugal partner” is found in the IRP Regulations. The<br />
recognition <strong>of</strong> conjugal partners under the IRPA was meant to acknowledge the particular<br />
circumstances <strong>of</strong> the sponsorship context that are generally not present where partners reside in<br />
the same country. Hence, “conjugal partner” refers only to a person in a conjugal relationship<br />
with the sponsor for a period <strong>of</strong> at least one year. Whereas spouses <strong>and</strong> common-law partners are<br />
eligible for permanent residence by virtue <strong>of</strong> their relationship with the sponsor (qualifying them<br />
as members <strong>of</strong> the family class) or by virtue <strong>of</strong> their relationship with a member <strong>of</strong> the family<br />
class (qualifying them as a family members <strong>of</strong> a member <strong>of</strong> the family class), conjugal partners<br />
are only eligible for permanent residence by virtue <strong>of</strong> their relationship with the sponsor<br />
(qualifying them as a member <strong>of</strong> the family class) <strong>and</strong> not with any other person. A conjugal<br />
partner is therefore not a family member <strong>of</strong> a member <strong>of</strong> the family class. 13<br />
7<br />
8<br />
9<br />
10<br />
11<br />
12<br />
13<br />
See to this effect the comments concerning the changes to the family class in the Regulatory Impact <strong>and</strong><br />
Analysis Statement (“RIAS”) published with the IRP Regulations.<br />
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 418.<br />
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 3.<br />
Part I <strong>of</strong> the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the <strong>Canada</strong> Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.<br />
S.C. 2000, c.12, as amended. The definition <strong>of</strong> “common-law partner” in the Modernization <strong>of</strong> Benefits <strong>and</strong><br />
Obligations Act is essentially the same as that in the IRP Regulations. It states: "common-law partner," in<br />
relation to an individual, means a person who is cohabiting with the individual in a conjugal relationship,<br />
having so cohabited for a period <strong>of</strong> at least one year.”<br />
Supra, footnote 9. See to this effect the comments on the changes to the family class in the RIAS.<br />
See the definition <strong>of</strong> “conjugal partner” at s. 2 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations as well as s. 117(1)(a) <strong>and</strong> the definition<br />
<strong>of</strong> “family member” at s. 1(3) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations.<br />
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Relevant Legislative Provisions<br />
The relevant provisions are:<br />
• Section 11(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA provides that before entering <strong>Canada</strong>, a foreign national<br />
must apply for a visa which shall be issued if the <strong>of</strong>ficer is satisfied that the foreign<br />
national is not inadmissible <strong>and</strong> meets the requirement <strong>of</strong> the IRPA;<br />
• Section 6 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations indicates that a foreign national may not enter <strong>and</strong><br />
remain in <strong>Canada</strong> on a permanent basis without first obtaining a permanent resident<br />
visa;<br />
• Section 70 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations sets out the requirements that must be met for a<br />
permanent resident visa to be issued to a member <strong>of</strong> an eligible class <strong>and</strong> to the<br />
accompanying family member <strong>of</strong> such a member;<br />
• Section 12(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA provides that a foreign national may be selected as a<br />
member <strong>of</strong> the family class on the basis <strong>of</strong> their relationship with a Canadian citizen<br />
or a permanent resident as a spouse, a common-law partner or other prescribed family<br />
member; 14<br />
• Section 13(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA provides that a Canadian citizen or permanent resident may<br />
sponsor a member <strong>of</strong> the family class;<br />
• Section 116 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations prescribes the family class as a class <strong>of</strong> persons<br />
that may become permanent residents;<br />
• Section 117(1)(a) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations indicates that a foreign national who is the<br />
sponsor’s spouse, common-law partner or conjugal partner is a member <strong>of</strong> the family<br />
class;<br />
• Sections 1(1) <strong>and</strong> 1(2) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations set out respectively the definition <strong>of</strong><br />
“common-law partner” <strong>and</strong> the exception to the requirement <strong>of</strong> cohabitation;<br />
• Section 2 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations provides the definition for “marriage” <strong>and</strong> “conjugal<br />
partner;”<br />
• Section 1(3) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations defines “family member,” other than for the<br />
purposes <strong>of</strong> s. 12 <strong>and</strong> s. 38(2)(d) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA;<br />
• Sections 5(a) <strong>and</strong> 5(b) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations list circumstances in which a foreign<br />
national is not considered a “spouse” or “common-law partner;”<br />
• Sections 117(9)(a) to (d) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations list circumstances in which a spouse,<br />
common-law partner or conjugal partner are not considered members <strong>of</strong> the family<br />
class. Sections 117(10) <strong>and</strong> (11), read together, create an exception to the<br />
exclusionary provision <strong>of</strong> section 117(9)(d).<br />
• Section 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations indicates that a foreign national shall not be<br />
considered a spouse, common-law partner or conjugal partner if the marriage,<br />
common-law partnership or conjugal partnership is a bad faith relationship – that is,<br />
14<br />
The expression “prescribed family member” in s. 12 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA appears to refer to the members <strong>of</strong> the family<br />
class that are prescribed in s. 117(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations. The definition <strong>of</strong> “family member” at s. 1(3) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
IRP Regulations specifically states that it is not applicable to s. 12 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA.<br />
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the relationship is not genuine <strong>and</strong> was entered into primarily for the purpose <strong>of</strong><br />
acquiring any status or privilege under the IRPA or IRP Regulations;<br />
• Section 4.1 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations indicates that a foreign national shall not be<br />
considered a spouse, common-law partner or conjugal partner <strong>of</strong> a person if the<br />
foreign national has begun a new conjugal relationship with that person after a<br />
previous marriage, common-law partnership or conjugal relationship with that person<br />
was dissolved primarily so that the foreign national, another foreign national or the<br />
sponsor could acquire any status or privilege under the Act.<br />
• Section 121 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations requires a member <strong>of</strong> the family class or family<br />
member <strong>of</strong> a member <strong>of</strong> the family class to be a family member <strong>of</strong> the applicant or<br />
sponsor at the time the application is made, <strong>and</strong> without taking into account whether<br />
the person has attained the age <strong>of</strong> 22 years, at the time <strong>of</strong> the determination <strong>of</strong> the<br />
application.<br />
• Section 122 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations states that a foreign national who is an<br />
accompanying family member <strong>of</strong> a member <strong>of</strong> the family class shall become a<br />
permanent resident if the person who made the application becomes a permanent<br />
resident <strong>and</strong> the accompanying family member is not inadmissible.<br />
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A PERMANENT RESIDENT VISA TO A<br />
SPOUSE, COMMON-LAW PARTNER AND A CONJUGAL PARTNER IN THE<br />
CONTEXT OF FAMILY CLASS SPONSORSHIPS<br />
A foreign national is issued a permanent resident visa if he or she meets the requirements<br />
<strong>of</strong> the IRPA including those pertaining to a member <strong>of</strong> the family class <strong>and</strong> is not inadmissible. 15<br />
A spouse, common-law partner or conjugal partner <strong>of</strong> a Canadian citizen or permanent resident is<br />
a member <strong>of</strong> the family class. 16<br />
Similarly, a foreign national accompanying a member <strong>of</strong> the family class who is issued a<br />
permanent resident visa shall in turn be issued a permanent resident visa where he or she meets<br />
the definition <strong>of</strong> “family member” <strong>and</strong> is not inadmissible. 17 A spouse or common-law partner <strong>of</strong><br />
a member <strong>of</strong> the family class is a “family member.” Note, however, that a conjugal partner is not<br />
a “family member.” 18<br />
Spouse<br />
15<br />
16<br />
17<br />
18<br />
S. 11 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA <strong>and</strong> s. 70(1) <strong>and</strong> (2) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations.<br />
S. 12(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA <strong>and</strong> s. 116 <strong>and</strong> s. 117(1)(a) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations.<br />
S. 11 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA <strong>and</strong> s. 122 <strong>and</strong> s. 70(4) <strong>and</strong> (5) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations.<br />
S. 1(3)(a) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations.<br />
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In order for a foreign national applying as a “spouse” to be considered a member <strong>of</strong> the<br />
family class or a family member, the foreign national’s marriage must meet the definition <strong>of</strong><br />
marriage set out in s. 2 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations <strong>and</strong> the marital relationship must not be excluded<br />
by virtue <strong>of</strong> s. 4, s. 4.1, or s. 5 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations. In addition, a foreign national applying as<br />
a spouse <strong>and</strong> member <strong>of</strong> the family class must not be in an excluded relationship mentioned in s.<br />
117(9) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations.<br />
The term spouse is not defined in the IRPA or the IRP Regulations. While in common usage, the<br />
term spouse may sometimes refer to common-law or conjugal partners, under the IRPA, it refers<br />
exclusively to individuals who are married. “Common-law partner” <strong>and</strong> “conjugal partner” are<br />
defined separately.<br />
Definition <strong>of</strong> Marriage<br />
The definition <strong>of</strong> marriage set out in s. 2 19 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations requires that a foreign<br />
marriage be valid both under the law <strong>of</strong> the jurisdiction where it took place <strong>and</strong> under Canadian<br />
law.<br />
Prior to 2005, the definition <strong>of</strong> marriage was recognized as “the voluntary union for life<br />
<strong>of</strong> one man <strong>and</strong> one woman to the exclusion <strong>of</strong> all others.” 20 This created some debate regarding<br />
whether same-sex couples who were legally married could be recognized as a spouse for the<br />
purpose <strong>of</strong> family class sponsorship. This question was settled with the passage <strong>of</strong> the Civil<br />
Marriage Act. 21 Section 2 <strong>of</strong> that Act defines marriage, for civil purposes, as “the lawful union<br />
<strong>of</strong> two persons to the exclusion <strong>of</strong> all others.” This definition is gender neutral <strong>and</strong> is further<br />
clarified by section 4 which stipulates that “for greater certainty, a marriage is not void or<br />
voidable by reason only that the spouses are <strong>of</strong> the same sex.” Presently the number <strong>of</strong><br />
jurisdictions that allow same-sex marriage is small, 22 so the issue has not arisen before the IAD;<br />
however, it can be expected that over time the number <strong>of</strong> jurisdictions where same-sex couples<br />
can legally marry will increase as will the number <strong>of</strong> sponsorship applications from same-sex,<br />
married couples.<br />
Validity <strong>of</strong> the Marriage in the Jurisdiction Where it Took Place<br />
19<br />
20<br />
21<br />
22<br />
S.2 “marriage”, in respect <strong>of</strong> a marriage that took place outside <strong>Canada</strong>, means a marriage that is valid both<br />
under the laws <strong>of</strong> the jurisdiction where it took place <strong>and</strong> under Canadian law. (“marriage”)<br />
Payne, M. A., Canadian Family Law (2001), Ch. 2; Modernization <strong>of</strong> Benefits Act, S.C. 2000, c. 12, s. 1.1 [this<br />
section repealed S.C. 2005, c. 33, s. 15].<br />
S.C. 2005, c. 33.<br />
For example, as at January 1, 2008, the Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>Canada</strong> website lists five jurisdictions<br />
outside <strong>of</strong> <strong>Canada</strong> where same-sex partners can legally marry: Belgium, the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s, South Africa, Spain,<br />
<strong>and</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> Massachusetts.<br />
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The validity <strong>of</strong> a marriage in the jurisdiction where it took place is established by<br />
demonstrating that the formal <strong>and</strong> essential requirements <strong>of</strong> marriage have been respected. The<br />
formal validity refers to the formal requirements <strong>of</strong> the ceremony while essential validity refers<br />
to the state <strong>of</strong> being married <strong>and</strong> is concerned with such things as prohibited degrees <strong>of</strong><br />
relationships as prescribed by law, fraud, duress, <strong>and</strong> capacity. 23<br />
Formal Validity<br />
In general, formal validity includes the nature <strong>of</strong>, <strong>and</strong> prerequisites for, a ceremony. 24<br />
Formal validity is determined in accordance with the law <strong>of</strong> the place where the marriage was<br />
celebrated. Where the law <strong>of</strong> the place is foreign law, it must be proved as any other fact by the<br />
party who is relying on it. 25 Therefore, when it is alleged, for example, that a marriage has not<br />
been duly solemnized, local marriage law applies <strong>and</strong> it must be decided whether the marriage in<br />
question complies with the formal requirements <strong>of</strong> that law. If it does not, then the effect <strong>of</strong> this<br />
defect must also be decided in accordance with that same law. 26 In the absence <strong>of</strong> evidence to the<br />
contrary, it must be presumed that the foreign law purports to be exhaustive as to the defects that<br />
invalidate a marriage. 27 Depending on the applicable law, as proved, the absence <strong>of</strong> a ceremony<br />
may 28 or may not invalidate the marriage. 29 If it is not proven that the marriage is valid, the<br />
applicant is not a “spouse” for purposes <strong>of</strong> the IRPA <strong>and</strong> therefore not a member <strong>of</strong> the family<br />
class.<br />
There are situations where what the appellant tries to establish is that a marriage is not<br />
valid. For example, an appellant may argue that a sibling who is included in the parents'<br />
sponsorship application is not married (even though the person appears to have gone through a<br />
marriage ceremony) <strong>and</strong> still a dependant, or an appellant in an appeal involving<br />
23<br />
24<br />
25<br />
26<br />
27<br />
28<br />
29<br />
Virk, Sukhpal Kaur v. M.E.I. (IAD V91-01246), Wlodyka, Gill<strong>and</strong>ers, Verma, February 9, 1993.<br />
McLeod, James G., The Conflict <strong>of</strong> Laws (Calgary: Carswell, 1983), at 253.<br />
Lit, Jaswant Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 76-6003), Scott, Benedetti, Legaré, May 30, 1978. For example, in El<br />
Salfiti, Dina Khalil Abdel Karim v. M.E.I. (IAD M93-08586), Dur<strong>and</strong>, January 24, 1994, the Appeal Division<br />
found that the "marriage contract" was in fact a "preliminary" engagement contract under Kuwati law. For a<br />
discussion <strong>of</strong> whether marriages by telephone are valid, see Shaheen, Shahnaz v. M.C.I. (IAD T95-00090),<br />
Wright, February 20, 1997; Sobhan, Rumana v. M.C.I. (IAD T95-07352), Boire, February 3, 1998; Patel,<br />
Allarakha v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-24341), Sangmuah, May 5, 2005; Mahamat, Ali Saleh v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-<br />
04059), Sangmuah, April 13, 2005; Akhtar, Waseem v M.C.I. (IAD VA6-00938), Ostrowski, June 5, 2007; <strong>and</strong><br />
Sasani, Sam v. M.C.I. (IAD VA6-00727), Shahriari, September 5, 2007.<br />
Grewal, Ravinder v. M.C.I. (IAD MA3-00637), Beauchemin, May 4, 2004.<br />
Mann, Harnek Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-6199), Wlodyka, June 5, 1987.<br />
See, for example, Mann, ibid.; <strong>and</strong> Chiem, My Lien v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-838-98), Rothstein, January<br />
11, 1999.<br />
Mann, Kirpal Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-6008), Mawani, Gill<strong>and</strong>ers, Wlodyka, April 14, 1987; Oucherif,<br />
Ichrak v. M.C.I. (IAD MA4-03183), Barazi, October 27, 2005.<br />
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misrepresentation may argue that he or she was not married at the time <strong>of</strong> l<strong>and</strong>ing as a single<br />
dependant. 30<br />
Essential Validity<br />
Essential validity includes matters relating to consent to marry, existing prior marriage, 31<br />
prohibited degrees <strong>of</strong> relationship, 32 non-consummation <strong>of</strong> the marriage, 33 fraud, <strong>and</strong> duress.<br />
In cases that raise an issue <strong>of</strong> essential validity, there is conflicting authority regarding the<br />
law that governs the circumstances; that is, whether it is the foreign law (the law <strong>of</strong> prenuptial<br />
domicile <strong>of</strong> the purported spouses) or Canadian domestic law (the law <strong>of</strong> their intended<br />
matrimonial home).<br />
While the Federal Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal sanctioned the application <strong>of</strong> the law <strong>of</strong> the intended<br />
matrimonial home in Narwal, 34 it subsequently clarified that decision in Kaur, 35 indicating that<br />
the law <strong>of</strong> the intended matrimonial home is to be applied exceptionally, only in “very special<br />
circumstances” such as those that existed in Narwal, that is, where the marriage had been<br />
celebrated in a third country, there was no doubt about the good faith <strong>of</strong> the spouses, <strong>and</strong> the<br />
spouses had a “clear <strong>and</strong> indefeasible” intention “to live in <strong>Canada</strong> immediately <strong>and</strong> definitely.”<br />
The Court in Kaur was not prepared to apply the law <strong>of</strong> the intended matrimonial home where<br />
the marriage had been celebrated in India, the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer did not believe the marriage was bona<br />
fide, <strong>and</strong> no effect could be given to the intention <strong>of</strong> the spouses to live in <strong>Canada</strong> because the<br />
applicant had been previously deported <strong>and</strong> was prohibited from coming into <strong>Canada</strong> without a<br />
Minister’s permit. The law <strong>of</strong> the prenuptial domicile was the proper law to apply to such facts. 36<br />
30<br />
31<br />
32<br />
33<br />
34<br />
35<br />
Ramdai, Miss v. M.C.I. (IAD T95-01280), Townshend, October 22. 1997 (sponsored application <strong>of</strong> son); Li,<br />
Bing Qian v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4138-96), Reed, January 8, 1998 (misrepresentation); <strong>and</strong> Tran, My<br />
Ha v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-01139), Singh, March 9, 1998 (misrepresentation).<br />
For example, see Savehilaghi, Hasan v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-02047), Kalvin, June 4, 1998, which dealt with the<br />
issue <strong>of</strong> whether a Mullah in Iran is authorized to effect a divorce; Ratnasabapathy, Jeyarajan v. M.C.I.<br />
(F.C.T.D., no. IMM-382-98), Blais, September 27, 1999, where the Court noted that if the IAD concludes that<br />
the first marriage is still valid, it should not go on to consider the validity <strong>of</strong> a second marriage; <strong>and</strong><br />
Nadesapillai, Sritharan v. M.C.I. (IAD T99-11883), Hoare, August 1, 2001, where the panel did not accept as<br />
credible the evidence regarding the applicant’s alleged belief that her first husb<strong>and</strong> was dead. The applicant<br />
failed to establish that her first marriage was either invalid or dissolved.<br />
For example, see Grewal, Inderpal Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD T91-04831), Muzzi, Aterman, Leousis, February 23,<br />
1995; Badhan, Lyle Kishori v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-00432), Boscariol, September 3, 1997; <strong>and</strong> Saini, Jaswinder<br />
Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD T89-07659), D'Ignazio, August 26, 1999. These cases dealt with the issue <strong>of</strong> whether a<br />
woman can marry her husb<strong>and</strong>'s brother under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.<br />
McLeod, supra, footnote 24, at 256.<br />
M.E.I. v. Narwal, Surinder Kaur (F.C.A., no. A-63-89), Stone, Marceau, MacGuigan, April 6, 1990.<br />
Kaur, Narinder v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-405-89), Marceau, Desjardins, Linden, October 11, 1990, at 5.<br />
Reported: Kaur v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1990), 12 Imm. L.R. (2d) 1 (F.C.A.).<br />
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The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division has generally applied the reasoning <strong>of</strong> Kaur to questions <strong>of</strong> the<br />
legality <strong>of</strong> a marriage, 37 although at least one decision has applied the reasoning in Narwal. 38<br />
Evidentiary Issues – foreign marriages<br />
Where the validity <strong>of</strong> a marriage is in issue <strong>and</strong> the marriage has been registered, it must<br />
be determined what effect registration has on the validity <strong>of</strong> the marriage. Registration creates a<br />
presumption that a marriage has met the requirements for formal validity. 39 In other words,<br />
registration constitutes prima facie evidence <strong>of</strong> the marriage <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> the validity <strong>of</strong> the marriage 40<br />
until a court <strong>of</strong> competent jurisdiction rules otherwise 41 or “until compelling evidence is adduced<br />
to show that the marriage was not duly solemnized prior to its registration.” 42 Therefore, even if<br />
a marriage has been registered <strong>and</strong> a certificate presented, if other evidence on the record<br />
indicates that the persons are not validly married, it may be found that the sponsor has failed to<br />
prove that a valid marriage took place. 43<br />
36<br />
37<br />
38<br />
39<br />
40<br />
41<br />
42<br />
43<br />
Ibid. See also Donoso Palma, Sergio v. M.C.I. (IAD MA1-03349), di Pietro, July 9, 2002 where the panel<br />
applied the law <strong>of</strong> the country in which the first marriage was contracted (Chile) <strong>and</strong> held that there was “no<br />
pro<strong>of</strong>” that the first marriage had been dissolved in accordance with Chilean laws, notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing that it had<br />
been dissolved by a Canadian judgment.<br />
In Virk, supra, footnote 23, the appellant married her first husb<strong>and</strong>’s brother in India, which was prohibited by<br />
Indian law but was not one <strong>of</strong> the prohibited relationships in Canadian law. The panel determined that the<br />
proper law to be applied was Indian law since the marriage took place in India. It rejected the submission that<br />
the essential validity <strong>of</strong> the marriage should be determined only based on Canadian law, as the definition <strong>of</strong><br />
marriage as found in the former <strong>Immigration</strong> Act was clear that it applied to the place <strong>of</strong> marriage. The panel<br />
noted that this definition had not been considered in either Narwal or Kaur. In Khan v. M.C.I. (IAD) V93-<br />
02590), Lam, July 4, 1995, the panel distinguished Narwal on the basis that in Narwal the couple had been<br />
married in a third country. In Brar, Karen Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA0-02573), Workun, December 4, 2001, the<br />
panel applied the law <strong>of</strong> the prenuptial domicile. It found that the circumstances were distinguishable from<br />
those in Narwal as the parties in this case married in India notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing that, as first cousins, the<br />
relationship came within the degrees <strong>of</strong> prohibited relationship under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. In Singh,<br />
Harpreet v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-01365), Stein, May 10, 2006 the panel examined the law <strong>of</strong> the place <strong>of</strong><br />
marriage, India.<br />
In Xu, Yuan Fei v. M.C.I. (IAD M99-04636), Sivak, June 5, 2000 the panel applied the law <strong>of</strong> the parties’<br />
intended matrimonial home (<strong>Canada</strong>). The sponsor <strong>and</strong> his wife were first cousins <strong>and</strong> the Chinese marriage<br />
law prohibited marriage between collateral relatives by blood up to the third degree <strong>of</strong> kinship. Therefore, the<br />
marriage was not valid in China. The panel allowed the appeal finding that the degrees <strong>of</strong> consanguinity which<br />
were a bar to the lawful solemnization <strong>of</strong> marriage in Ontario did not include first cousins.<br />
In Tran, supra, footnote 30, the evidence showed that in Vietnam, the recognition <strong>and</strong> recording <strong>of</strong> a marriage<br />
by the People's Committee is required for the marriage to be legally binding.<br />
Parmar, Ramesh Kumar v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-9772), Eglington, Weisdorf, Ahara, September 12, 1986.<br />
Kaur, Gurmit v. C.E.I.C. (F.C.T.D., no. T-2490-84), Jerome, May 8, 1985.<br />
Parmar, supra, footnote 40; Pye, Helen Leona v. M.C.I. (IAD MA5-00247), Beauchemin, September 21, 2006.<br />
Lotay, Harjit Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.D. T89-03205), Ariemma, Townshend, Bell, April 18, 1990; Bakridi, Faizal<br />
Abbas v. M.C.I. (IAD V99-03930), Baker, January 9, 2001.<br />
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Little weight may be given to an ex parte judgment in personam 44 purporting to establish<br />
the marriage in question where the record shows that the evidence before the issuing court was<br />
incomplete <strong>and</strong> where the evidence on appeal indicates that the sponsor was married to another<br />
person <strong>and</strong> therefore lacked the capacity to marry his purported wife. 45<br />
Little weight may also be given to a declaratory judgment by a court where the judgment<br />
fails to refer to the date <strong>and</strong> place <strong>of</strong> the marriage in question <strong>and</strong> where the judgment is obtained<br />
after the applicant has received the letter <strong>of</strong> refusal. 46<br />
However, caution must be exercised in concluding that a marriage is not valid in the face<br />
<strong>of</strong> what appears to be a valid Court order. 47<br />
The appellant has the duty <strong>of</strong> providing objective evidence <strong>of</strong> a customary law <strong>of</strong><br />
marriage. International, national or even customary law are not within the general knowledge <strong>of</strong><br />
the Appeal Division. It is not the sort <strong>of</strong> information that the Appeal Division can be expected to<br />
know or take judicial notice <strong>of</strong>. 48<br />
In cases involving the application <strong>of</strong> foreign law such as the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, it<br />
may be alleged that custom or usage exempts the purported spouses, who fall within the<br />
prohibited degrees <strong>of</strong> relationship, from strict compliance with that Act. However, where the<br />
sponsor claims to be the spouse <strong>of</strong> the applicant by reason <strong>of</strong> an exemption to the law based on<br />
custom or usage, the sponsor has the onus <strong>of</strong> clearly proving its existence. 49 A declaratory in<br />
personam judgment, which rules on the existence <strong>of</strong> the custom or usage in issue, may be<br />
considered to be evidence <strong>of</strong> its existence. 50 The testimony <strong>of</strong> an expert witness, 51 even a<br />
transcript <strong>of</strong> the testimony <strong>of</strong> an expert witness in another hearing, 52 may be accepted as<br />
establishing the existence <strong>of</strong> a custom.<br />
Validity <strong>of</strong> the Marriage under Canadian Law<br />
44<br />
45<br />
46<br />
47<br />
48<br />
49<br />
50<br />
51<br />
52<br />
An in personam judgment is one that binds only the two persons to an action.<br />
Gill, Sakinder Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD V89-01124), Gill<strong>and</strong>ers, Verma, Wlodyka, July 16, 1990.<br />
Burmi, Joginder Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 88-35,651), Sherman, Arkin, Weisdorf, February 14, 1989.<br />
Sinniah, Sinnathamby v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5954-00), Dawson, July 25, 2002; 2002 FCT 822.<br />
Quao, Daniel Essel v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5240-99), Blais, August 15, 2000.<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) v. Taggar, [1989] 3 F.C. 576 (C.A.); Buttar, Amrit Kaur v.<br />
M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-1669-06), Blais, October 25, 2006; 2006 FC 1281; Patel, Sunil Jayantibhai v. M.C.I.<br />
(IAD TA3-19443), B<strong>and</strong>, September 28, 2006. For an in-depth analysis regarding the pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> the validity <strong>of</strong> a<br />
marriage between a Christian <strong>and</strong> a Hindu in India, see Pye, supra, footnote 42.<br />
Taggar, Ibid.<br />
Atwal, Jaswinder Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-4204), Petryshyn, Wright, Rayburn, January 30, 1989.<br />
Bhullar, Sawarnjit Kaur v. M.E.I. (IAD W89-00375), Goodspeed, Rayburn, Arpin (concurring), November 19,<br />
1991.<br />
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The validity <strong>of</strong> the marriage “under Canadian law” is established by demonstrating that<br />
the foreign marriage is valid under the applicable Canadian law. The expression “Canadian law”<br />
may refer to Canadian rules pertaining to the conflict <strong>of</strong> laws 53 applicable to foreign marriages, to<br />
rules concerning the formal <strong>and</strong> essential validity <strong>of</strong> a marriage concluded in <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>and</strong> to<br />
federal legislation regulating certain aspects <strong>of</strong> marriage, namely the Marriage (Prohibited<br />
Degrees) Act 54 which prohibits marriage between certain individuals <strong>and</strong> the Criminal Code 55<br />
which criminalizes bigamy <strong>and</strong> polygamy.<br />
The issue that arises is whether all three sets <strong>of</strong> rules (common-law rules concerning<br />
conflict <strong>of</strong> laws, provincial rules pertaining to formal validity <strong>of</strong> marriage <strong>and</strong> the federal rules<br />
concerning essential validity <strong>of</strong> a marriage <strong>and</strong> those regulating certain aspects <strong>of</strong> marriage)<br />
should be applied when determining if a foreign marriage is valid “under Canadian law.” It<br />
would seem that only rules respecting essential aspects <strong>of</strong> marriage <strong>and</strong> federal legislation<br />
regulating certain aspects <strong>of</strong> marriage were intended to be applicable.<br />
The rules concerning conflict <strong>of</strong> laws in cases <strong>of</strong> foreign marriages applicable in <strong>Canada</strong><br />
refer back to the rules <strong>of</strong> the place where the marriage was celebrated for questions <strong>of</strong> formal<br />
validity <strong>and</strong> to the rules <strong>of</strong> the spouses’ domicile prior to marriage for questions <strong>of</strong> essential<br />
validity. If these rules are applied, the result is the same as that obtained in applying the first part<br />
<strong>of</strong> the definition <strong>of</strong> “marriage” 56 thus making the second part <strong>of</strong> the definition <strong>of</strong> marriage in<br />
IRPA redundant.<br />
In <strong>Canada</strong>, the rules concerning the formal validity <strong>of</strong> marriage are a matter under<br />
provincial jurisdiction <strong>and</strong> vary from province to province. It is suggested that these rules were<br />
not intended to be applied in the context <strong>of</strong> the validity <strong>of</strong> a foreign “marriage” under the IRPA.<br />
It is difficult to see the merit, for immigration purposes, in requiring that foreign marriages<br />
accord with provincial rules concerning the solemnization <strong>of</strong> marriages. 57<br />
On the other h<strong>and</strong>, rules concerning the essential validity <strong>of</strong> marriage in <strong>Canada</strong> fall under<br />
federal jurisdiction <strong>and</strong> are relevant because they govern the substantial aspects <strong>of</strong> marriage. The<br />
same can be said <strong>of</strong> provisions in the Marriage (Prohibited Degrees) Act 58 <strong>and</strong> those concerning<br />
53<br />
54<br />
55<br />
56<br />
57<br />
58<br />
“Conflict <strong>of</strong> laws” generally refers to a situation where the laws <strong>of</strong> more than one jurisdiction may apply to the<br />
legal issue to be determined. For instance, in determining the validity <strong>of</strong> a foreign marriage, the laws <strong>of</strong> the<br />
jurisdiction where the partners celebrated their marriage, <strong>of</strong> their domicile prior to marriage as well as those <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Canada</strong> may, at least initially, all appear applicable. In such cases, there are legal rules <strong>and</strong> common-law<br />
principles that assist in sorting out which jurisdiction’s rules actually apply.<br />
S.C. 1990, c. 46 as amended.<br />
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 as amended.<br />
Castel, J.-G., Canadian Conflict <strong>of</strong> Laws (Toronto: Butterworths, 1986).<br />
Note that the age at which a person may contract marriage in <strong>Canada</strong> is <strong>of</strong> provincial jurisdiction. This issue is<br />
addressed in the immigration context in s. 5(a) <strong>and</strong> s. 117(9)(a) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations.<br />
Supra, footnote 54.<br />
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igamy <strong>and</strong> polygamy in the Criminal Code. 59 These rules are interrelated with the definition <strong>of</strong><br />
marriage as it is understood <strong>and</strong> applied in <strong>Canada</strong>. It is arguable therefore that interpreting the<br />
expression “under Canadian law” to refer to both the rules <strong>of</strong> essential validity <strong>of</strong> a marriage in<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> <strong>and</strong> to federal legislation regulating certain aspects <strong>of</strong> marriage best conforms to the<br />
intended purpose <strong>of</strong> the definition <strong>of</strong> marriage in the IRP Regulations.<br />
The rules concerning essential validity 60 <strong>of</strong> marriage <strong>and</strong> the provisions <strong>of</strong> federal<br />
legislation concerning certain aspects <strong>of</strong> marriage are as follows: 61<br />
‣ The Parties Must have the Capacity to Consent to Marriage<br />
The parties must have the capacity to consent freely to the marriage, underst<strong>and</strong>ing the nature<br />
<strong>and</strong> consequences <strong>of</strong> the act.<br />
‣ The Marriage must not be one Prohibited by Degrees <strong>of</strong> Consanguinity<br />
An individual may not marry a person to whom he or she is related lineally (for instance,<br />
gr<strong>and</strong>father, father, <strong>and</strong> daughter) or as the brother, sister, half-brother or half-sister, including by<br />
adoption. 62 Such marriages, if contracted, are void. 63<br />
Note that s. 155 <strong>of</strong> the Criminal Code, 64 concerning the <strong>of</strong>fence <strong>of</strong> incest closely mirrors s. 2(2) <strong>of</strong><br />
the Marriage (Prohibited Degrees) Act, 65 except for the specific provision in the latter concerning<br />
adoption.<br />
‣ The Marriage must be Monogamous<br />
Marriage is defined by the common-law 66 <strong>and</strong> by s. 2 <strong>of</strong> the Civil Marriage Act 67 as an exclusive<br />
relationship. In addition, bigamy <strong>and</strong> polygamy are considered criminal <strong>of</strong>fences. 68<br />
59<br />
60<br />
61<br />
62<br />
63<br />
64<br />
65<br />
66<br />
67<br />
Supra, footnote 55.<br />
Conditions <strong>of</strong> essential validity that may be raised only by the spouses themselves are not considered here<br />
given that the sponsorship appeal process does not oppose one spouse against the other.<br />
Davies, C., Family Law in <strong>Canada</strong> (Calgary: Carswell Legal Publications, 1984).<br />
S. 2(2) <strong>of</strong> the Marriage (Prohibited Degrees) Act, supra, footnote 54 states: “no person shall marry another<br />
person if they are related lineally, or as the brother or sister or half-brother or half-sister, including by<br />
adoption.”<br />
S. 3(2) <strong>of</strong> the Marriage (Prohibited Degrees) Act, supra, footnote 54.<br />
S. 155(1) <strong>of</strong> the Criminal Code, supra, footnote 55 states:<br />
Every one commits incest who, knowing that another person is by blood relationship his or<br />
her parent, child, brother, sister, gr<strong>and</strong>parent or gr<strong>and</strong>child, as the case may be, has sexual<br />
intercourse with that person.<br />
S. 155(4) <strong>of</strong> the Criminal Code states: In this section, “brother” <strong>and</strong> “sister” respectively include halfbrother<br />
<strong>and</strong> half-sister.<br />
Supra, footnote 54.<br />
See introduction.<br />
Supra, footnote 21<br />
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A prior marriage is dissolved by divorce, annulment or by the death <strong>of</strong> one <strong>of</strong> the parties to the<br />
marriage. 69 The rules concerning the recognition <strong>of</strong> foreign divorce judgments in <strong>Canada</strong> are<br />
provided by the case law <strong>and</strong> s. 22 <strong>of</strong> the Divorce Act.<br />
COMMON-LAW PARTNER<br />
In order for a foreign national applying as a common-law partner to be considered a<br />
member <strong>of</strong> the family class or a family member, the foreign national must meet the definition <strong>of</strong><br />
“common-law partner” set out in s. 1(1) as interpreted by s. 1(2) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations, <strong>and</strong> the<br />
relationship must not be excluded by virtue <strong>of</strong> s. 4, s. 4.1, or s. 5 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations. In<br />
addition, a foreign national applying as a common-law partner <strong>and</strong> member <strong>of</strong> the family class<br />
must not be in an excluded relationship mentioned at s. 117(9) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations.<br />
Definition <strong>of</strong> “Common-law Partner”<br />
“Common-law partner” is defined at s. 1(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations as:<br />
… in relation to a person, an individual who is cohabiting with the person, in a<br />
conjugal relationship, having so cohabited for a period <strong>of</strong> at least one year.<br />
Section 1(2) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations complements the definition. It provides a rule<br />
<strong>of</strong> interpretation which states:<br />
For the purposes <strong>of</strong> the Act <strong>and</strong> these Regulations, an individual who has been in a<br />
conjugal relationship with a person for at least one year but is unable to cohabit<br />
with the person, due to persecution or any form <strong>of</strong> penal control, shall be<br />
considered a common-law partner <strong>of</strong> the person.<br />
The definition <strong>of</strong> common-law partner refers to “…in relation to a person, an individual<br />
who is cohabiting with the person, in a conjugal relationship…” without limiting the relationship<br />
to one between a male partner <strong>and</strong> a female partner. The definition is therefore gender-neutral 70<br />
<strong>and</strong> as such includes relationships between same-sex <strong>and</strong> opposite-sex partners.<br />
The evidence must establish that all the elements <strong>of</strong> the definition are met in order for a<br />
foreign national to be considered a “common-law partner.” The elements <strong>of</strong> the definition <strong>of</strong><br />
“common-law partner” are discussed below.<br />
68<br />
69<br />
70<br />
S. 290(1) <strong>and</strong> s. 293 <strong>of</strong> the Criminal Code, supra footnote 55, respectively.<br />
For a more detailed discussion regarding the dissolution <strong>of</strong> a prior marriage, see the discussion regarding<br />
Regulation 117(9)(c)(i) later in this chapter.<br />
In comparison, the definition <strong>of</strong> "spouse" in s. 2(1) <strong>of</strong> the former <strong>Immigration</strong> Regulations, 1978 stated:<br />
"…means the party <strong>of</strong> the opposite sex to whom the person is joined in marriage."<br />
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Conjugal Relationship<br />
As stated above, to be a common-law partner within the definition in IRPA, the couple<br />
must be in a conjugal relationship. Although the IRPA <strong>and</strong> IRP Regulations do not define<br />
“conjugal relationship,” the term conjugal is ordinarily defined 71 <strong>and</strong> interpreted in the case law<br />
as referring to a “marriage-like relationship.” 72 The jurisprudence has established several criteria<br />
that are useful in determining whether a conjugal relationship exists. The principal case is M. v.<br />
H., 73 wherein the Supreme Court <strong>of</strong> <strong>Canada</strong> stated the following in relation to a conjugal<br />
relationship:<br />
[59] Molodowich v. Penttinen (1980), 17 R.F.L. (2d) 376 (Ont. Dist. Ct.), sets out<br />
the generally accepted characteristics <strong>of</strong> a conjugal relationship. They include<br />
shared shelter, sexual <strong>and</strong> personal behaviour, services, social activities,<br />
economic support <strong>and</strong> children, as well as the societal perception <strong>of</strong> the couple.<br />
However, it was recognised that these elements may be present in varying degrees<br />
<strong>and</strong> not all are necessary for the relationship to be found to be conjugal. While it<br />
is true that there may not be any consensus as to the societal perception <strong>of</strong> samesex<br />
couples, there is agreement that same-sex couples share many other<br />
"conjugal" characteristics. In order to come within the definition, neither<br />
opposite-sex couples nor same-sex couples are required to fit precisely the<br />
traditional marital model to demonstrate that the relationship is "conjugal".<br />
[60] Certainly an opposite-sex couple may, after many years together, be considered to be<br />
in a conjugal relationship although they have neither children nor sexual relations.<br />
Obviously the weight to be accorded the various elements or factors to be considered in<br />
determining whether an opposite-sex couple is in a conjugal relationship will vary widely<br />
<strong>and</strong> almost infinitely. The same must hold true <strong>of</strong> same-sex couples. Courts have wisely<br />
determined that the approach to determining whether a relationship is conjugal must be<br />
flexible. This must be so, for the relationships <strong>of</strong> all couples will vary widely.<br />
In the immigration context, the court has stated that “it is clear that a conjugal relationship<br />
is one <strong>of</strong> some permanence, where individuals are interdependent – financially, socially,<br />
emotionally, <strong>and</strong> physically – where they share household <strong>and</strong> related responsibilities, <strong>and</strong> where<br />
they have made a serious commitment to one another. 74<br />
71<br />
72<br />
73<br />
74<br />
Conjugal is defined as “consort, spouse, to join together, join in marriage, <strong>of</strong> or relating to marriage,<br />
matrimonial.” The Oxford Concise Dictionary, 7 th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).<br />
For instance, M. v. H., supra, footnote 9.<br />
Supra, footnote 9.<br />
Siev, Samuth v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2472-04), Rouleau, May 24, 2005; 2005 FC 736.<br />
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The criteria enunciated in M. v. H. 75 have been refined <strong>and</strong> exp<strong>and</strong>ed in subsequent case<br />
law. The following factors have been considered when examining the issue <strong>of</strong> the existence <strong>of</strong> a<br />
conjugal relationship in the context <strong>of</strong> family class sponsorship applications. 76<br />
‣ Shelter: Whether the partners live together in the same home as a couple <strong>and</strong> whether there is<br />
evidence they intend to co-exist as a single family unit upon reunification in <strong>Canada</strong>. 77<br />
‣ Sexual <strong>and</strong> personal behavior: How the partners met, evidence <strong>of</strong> the development <strong>of</strong> their<br />
relationship, <strong>and</strong> whether the partners’ relationship is exclusive, committed, loving, intimate<br />
<strong>and</strong> evidenced by emotional, intellectual <strong>and</strong> physical interaction. Sexual relations are not an<br />
absolute requirement 78 although a conjugal relationship does imply that the couple has met<br />
face to face 79 <strong>and</strong> has engaged in a physical relationship. 80 The relationship should also be<br />
viewed as long-term <strong>and</strong> on-going. Note, also, that in Singh 81 , the court recognized that it is<br />
possible to have a valid common-law relationship while being legally married to another<br />
person, provided neither one <strong>of</strong> the legally married spouses continues the marital relationship.<br />
‣ Services: Whether household <strong>and</strong> other family–type responsibilities are shared <strong>and</strong> whether<br />
there is evidence <strong>of</strong> mutual assistance especially in time <strong>of</strong> need.<br />
‣ Social activities: Whether the partners share time together or participate in leisure activity<br />
together - Whether they have relationships or interaction with each other’s respective family.<br />
‣ Economic support: Whether the partners are financially interdependent or dependent;<br />
Whether the partners have joined, to some extent, their financial affairs (for instance, as in<br />
75<br />
76<br />
77<br />
78<br />
79<br />
80<br />
81<br />
Supra, footnote 9.<br />
See, for example, Siev, supra, footnote 74; Porteous, Robert William v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-22804), Hoare,<br />
October 27, 2004; McCullough, Robert Edmund v. M.C.I. (IAD WA3-00043), Boscariol, February 5, 2004;<br />
Kumar, Monika v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-10172), MacDonald, May 8, 2006; Dunham Audrey Pearl v. M.C.I. (IAD<br />
TA4-00144), Néron, August 24, 2004; Stephen, Ferdin<strong>and</strong> v. M.C.I. (IAD TA5-09330), MacLean, October 12,<br />
2007.<br />
This factor is replaced by the requirement to cohabit in the definition <strong>of</strong> “common-law partner.”<br />
Stephen, supra, footnote 76.<br />
Dunham, supra footnote 76; Naidu, Kamleshni Kanta v. M.C.I. (IAD VA5-00244), Sealy, February 1, 2006.<br />
Ursua, Erlinda Arellano v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-08587), Boire, September 12, 2005.<br />
Singh, Amarjit v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5641-02), Snider, May 4, 2006; 2006 FC 565. In that case the court<br />
accepted that a valid common-law relationship could exist even though the appellant was legally married to<br />
another woman in his country, but rejected that such a situation existed on the facts because there was evidence<br />
that the appellant had been sending money to his wife in India <strong>and</strong> that, if he returned to India, his wife would<br />
expect him to return to her. See also Cantin, Edmond v. M.C.I. (IAD MA4-06892), Néron, August 1, 2005<br />
wherein the panel found that the appellant had a genuine conjugal relationship with the applicant despite the<br />
fact that the appellant was still married, provided for his wife financially, <strong>and</strong> occasionally visited her. The<br />
appellant’s wife had had Alzheimer’s disease for several years <strong>and</strong> was in an advanced vegetative state in a<br />
special care facility. The panel was critical <strong>of</strong> the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer’s “restrictive definition” <strong>of</strong> the concept <strong>of</strong><br />
exclusivity given the unique <strong>and</strong> unfortunate circumstances <strong>of</strong> the case.<br />
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joint-ownership) or arranged them to reflect their ongoing relationship (for instance, naming<br />
the other partner beneficiary in an insurance policy or will).<br />
‣ Children: The existence <strong>of</strong> children <strong>and</strong> the partners’ attitude <strong>and</strong> conduct towards children<br />
in the context <strong>of</strong> their relationship.<br />
‣ Societal perception: Whether the partners are treated or perceived by the community as a<br />
couple.<br />
‣ Capacity to consent: The partners must be capable <strong>of</strong> freely consenting to a conjugal<br />
relationship as well as underst<strong>and</strong> its nature <strong>and</strong> consequences.<br />
‣ Not prohibited by degrees <strong>of</strong> consanguinity: The relationship must not be one which falls<br />
within the prohibited degrees <strong>of</strong> marriage set out in s. 2(2) <strong>of</strong> the Marriage (Prohibited<br />
Degrees) Act. 82<br />
‣ The relationship must not be a “precursor” to a conjugal relationship: Where the<br />
relationship may be described as a precursor to a “marriage-like” relationship, it will not be<br />
considered a conjugal relationship. For instance, persons whose marriage has been arranged<br />
but who have not met each other or persons who are dating but have not established a<br />
marriage-like relationship, are not in a conjugal relationship. Note that fiancés are no longer<br />
members <strong>of</strong> the family class but may nevertheless be considered common-law partners or<br />
conjugal partners if they meet the requirements <strong>of</strong> the applicable definition including, being<br />
at the time <strong>of</strong> the application, in a marriage-like relationship. 83<br />
The interplay <strong>of</strong> these factors in the context <strong>of</strong> family class sponsorships has been<br />
considered in several cases. The jurisprudence clearly indicates that the importance <strong>of</strong> any <strong>of</strong><br />
these characteristics will vary with the context <strong>and</strong> it is not necessary that all <strong>of</strong> them be present<br />
before a conjugal relationship is found to exist. The goal is to determine whether the relationship<br />
is conjugal <strong>and</strong> the criteria must be applied only ins<strong>of</strong>ar as they may assist in this determination. 84<br />
82<br />
83<br />
84<br />
Supra, footnote 54.<br />
S. 121(a) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations. According to the RIAS, supra, footnote 7:<br />
The Regulations as pre-published have been modified to remove fiancés <strong>and</strong> intended commonlaw<br />
partners. The number <strong>of</strong> people who have been seeking permanent residence as fiancés has<br />
been steadily declining. With respect to the “intended common-law partners,” the assessment <strong>of</strong><br />
the intention <strong>of</strong> couples to cohabit goes beyond the scope <strong>of</strong> a normal immigration assessment<br />
<strong>and</strong> would be extremely difficult to administer. The conjugal partner category is a more workable<br />
approach to accommodate persons in a conjugal relationship unable to cohabit.<br />
Lavoie v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> National Revenue), [2000] F.C.J. No. 2124 (F.C.A.), (QL) at para. 13 (the<br />
dissenting reasons <strong>of</strong> Justice Décary) wherein it is mentioned:<br />
I would add, for the purposes <strong>of</strong> the rehearing, that the factors set out in Milot [case citing the<br />
factors in Molodowich v. Penttinen]… do not have absolute value. They are useful to be sure,<br />
but they must be adapted to the context in which they are used. If we look too closely at the<br />
trees, we may not see the forest. In this case the forest is the conjugal relationship, a concept that<br />
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The question is essentially whether the evidence establishes a marriage-like relationship between<br />
the partners.<br />
When determining whether a conjugal relationship exists, it is important to consider the<br />
cultural realities <strong>of</strong> the relationship. This is particularly important in the immigration context<br />
where one or both <strong>of</strong> the partners <strong>of</strong>ten are coming from a cultural background quite different<br />
than the Canadian milieu. In Siev, the Federal Court stated that “…the case law indicates to us<br />
that the evidence should not be minutely scrutinized <strong>and</strong> that one should refrain from applying<br />
North American reasoning to an applicant’s conduct.” 85 Cultural factors are <strong>of</strong>ten particularly<br />
relevant in same-sex relationships. In Leroux, 86 the court stated that “it seems to me to be<br />
important to keep in mind the restrictions which apply because the partners live in different<br />
countries, some <strong>of</strong> which have different moral st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>and</strong> customs which may have an impact<br />
on the degree <strong>of</strong> tolerance for conjugal relationships, especially where same-sex partners are<br />
concerned. Nevertheless, the alleged conjugal relationship must have a sufficient number <strong>of</strong><br />
features <strong>of</strong> a marriage to show that it is more than just a means <strong>of</strong> entering <strong>Canada</strong> as a member<br />
<strong>of</strong> the family class.” 87<br />
Cohabitation<br />
The definition <strong>of</strong> common-law partner requires that an individual “… is cohabiting …in a<br />
conjugal relationship, having so cohabited for a period <strong>of</strong> at least one year.” The partners must<br />
therefore be cohabiting <strong>and</strong> have cohabited conjugally <strong>and</strong> for at least one year. It is necessary,<br />
therefore, to determine when the partners were cohabitating.<br />
In addition to being one <strong>of</strong> the factors indicative <strong>of</strong> a conjugal relationship, cohabitation is<br />
a m<strong>and</strong>atory requirement <strong>of</strong> the definition <strong>of</strong> common-law partner. Hence, for the purposes <strong>of</strong><br />
the definition <strong>of</strong> common-law partner, the “shelter” criterion, which serves in the case law to<br />
establish whether the relationship is marriage-like, is replaced by the legislative requirement to<br />
cohabit in a conjugal relationship for at least one year.<br />
85<br />
86<br />
87<br />
evokes a common life, which presupposes that the couple are involved with each other, together<br />
<strong>and</strong> in a lasting way on the personal, sexual, family, social <strong>and</strong> financial levels.”<br />
For some other cases that have applied the criteria originally listed in Molodowich v. Penttinen, see the<br />
following: Baird v. Iaci, [1997] B.C.J. No. 1789 (S.C.)(QL); Roberts v. Clough, [2002] P.E.I.J. No. 37 (S.C.<br />
(T.D.)), (QL); Fraser v. Canadien National, [1999] J.Q. no. 2286, (S.C.)(QL) <strong>and</strong> Spracklin v. Kichton, [2000]<br />
A.J. No. 1329 (Q.B.), (QL). For recent cases from the IAD see: McCullough, supra, footnote 76; Macapagal,<br />
Rodolfo v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-25810), D’Ignazio, February 18, 2004.<br />
Siev, supra, footnote 74 at paragraph 16. See also McCullough, supra, footnote 76.<br />
Leroux, Jean-Stéphane v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IM-2819-06), Tremblay-Lamer, April 17, 2007; 2007 FC 403 at<br />
paragraph 23.<br />
Ibid.<br />
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Cohabitation is not defined in the IRPA or the IRP Regulations but has been interpreted in<br />
the common law to mean “living together as husb<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> wife.” 88 The IAD has adopted this<br />
definition as well. 89 Case law interpreting the term cohabitation in the family law context<br />
indicates that it refers to persons living under the same ro<strong>of</strong> in a conjugal relationship <strong>and</strong> also<br />
indicates that partners are not required to be divorced or legally separated from a former partner<br />
to cohabit. 90 Further, the common-law partners do not have to necessarily physically reside at the<br />
same location without interruption. 91 In the context <strong>of</strong> family <strong>and</strong> estate law, the courts have held<br />
that in certain circumstances, usually in cases involving shared custody arrangements or work<br />
related obligations, cohabitation is established even though the parties do not physically live<br />
together at the “conjugal home” throughout the week or for a period <strong>of</strong> the year. 92<br />
However, it is not clear whether the time the partners spend apart (not cohabiting<br />
conjugally) is automatically to be taken into account in calculating the one-year period <strong>of</strong><br />
cohabitation. For instance, where a partner has cohabited in a conjugal relationship for nine<br />
months <strong>and</strong>, although the relationship is ongoing, he or she spends the remaining three months<br />
out <strong>of</strong> the one-year period in another city (away from his or her partner), will the partner be<br />
considered to have cohabited in a conjugal relationship for one year or for nine months? In<br />
calculating the period <strong>of</strong> cohabitation, it appears relevant to consider the reasons for which the<br />
partners were not residing together.<br />
Cohabitation does not come to an end if the partners live separately during a “cooling-<strong>of</strong>f<br />
period” or during a time <strong>of</strong> reassessment; it ends when “either party regards it as being at an end<br />
<strong>and</strong>, by his or her conduct, has demonstrated in a convincing manner that this state <strong>of</strong> mind is a<br />
settled one.” 93<br />
Cohabitation alone does not necessarily signify a common-law relationship. There must<br />
also be a “mutual commitment to a shared life.” 94<br />
88<br />
89<br />
90<br />
91<br />
92<br />
93<br />
94<br />
Exception to the Requirement to Cohabit<br />
Cohabitation: To live together as husb<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> wife. The mutual assumption <strong>of</strong> those marital rights, duties <strong>and</strong><br />
obligations which are usually manifested by married people, including but not necessarily dependent on sexual<br />
relations. Black’s Law Dictionary, 6 th ed. (St. Paul, West Publishing Co.).<br />
Do, Thi Thanh Thuy (IAD TA3-17390), D’Ignazio, September 3, 2004.<br />
Sullivan v. Letnik (1997), 27 R.F.L. (4 th ) 79 (Ont. C.A.).<br />
Do, supra, footnote 89. In this case, the applicant had been travelling back <strong>and</strong> forth to Vietnam over a period<br />
<strong>of</strong> 11 years, living with his partner during the times he was in Vietnam, <strong>and</strong> they had had a child together. The<br />
panel found that a common-law relationship existed.<br />
Thauvette v. Malyon [1996] O.J. No. 1356 (Gen. Div.)(QL), mentioned in: McCrea v. Bain Estate, [2004]<br />
B.C.J. No.290 (QL); See also Hazlewood v. Kent, [2000] O.J. No. 5263 (Sup. Ct.)(QL) <strong>and</strong> Craddock v.<br />
Glover Estate [2000] O.J. No. 680 (S.C.)(QL).<br />
S<strong>and</strong>erson v. Russell (1979), 24 O.R. (2d) 429, (C.A.) <strong>and</strong> Feehan v. Attwells (1979), 24 O.R. (2d) 248 (Co.<br />
Ct).<br />
Cai, Changbin v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6729-06), Kelen, August 3, 2007; 2007 FC 816.<br />
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Section 1(2) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations states:<br />
For the purposes <strong>of</strong> the Act <strong>and</strong> these Regulations, an individual who has been in a conjugal<br />
relationship with a person for at least one year but is unable to cohabit with the person, due to<br />
persecution or any form <strong>of</strong> penal control, shall be considered a common-law partner <strong>of</strong> the person.<br />
This provision sets out the circumstances under which an individual in a conjugal<br />
relationship with another person for at least one year will be considered a common-law partner <strong>of</strong><br />
that person even though the requirement <strong>of</strong> cohabitation in the definition <strong>of</strong> “common-law<br />
partner” has not been met.<br />
According to s. 1(2) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations, a partner is excused from fulfilling the<br />
cohabitation requirement where he or she is unable to cohabit with the other due to persecution or<br />
any form <strong>of</strong> penal control. The comments on this provision in the RIAS suggest that the intent <strong>of</strong><br />
this section is that the persecution or penal control must be due to the partners’ conjugal<br />
relationship. 95<br />
The IRPA <strong>and</strong> the IRP Regulations do not define persecution or penal control.<br />
Persecution has been characterized in Canadian case law pertaining to the Convention refugee<br />
definition as referring to repeated or systemic infliction <strong>of</strong> serious harm 96 or treatment which<br />
compromises or denies basic human rights. 97 Discrimination is not persecution but cumulative<br />
acts <strong>of</strong> discrimination may amount to persecution. 98<br />
Penal control is a form <strong>of</strong> punishment usually inflicted or sanctioned by the state. Given<br />
the use <strong>of</strong> the expression “due to … any for <strong>of</strong> penal control” in s. 1(2) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations,<br />
“penal control” is arguably not limited to incarceration or detention but may include corporal<br />
punishment, house arrest <strong>and</strong> other significant measure taken to punish an individual. 99 Such<br />
control may be the result <strong>of</strong> civil or criminal action <strong>and</strong> may be extra-judicial.<br />
95<br />
96<br />
97<br />
98<br />
99<br />
See the comments at p. 261 <strong>of</strong> the RIAS, supra, footnote 7:<br />
It was suggested to exp<strong>and</strong> the factors excusing common-law partners from cohabiting to<br />
include discrimination in addition to “persecution” <strong>and</strong> “penal control”. Considering that<br />
“persecution” or “any form <strong>of</strong> penal control” can mean strong social sanctions which result in<br />
ostracism, loss <strong>of</strong> employment, inability to find shelter or other forms <strong>of</strong> persecution as a<br />
result <strong>of</strong> the relationship, no change has been made to the pre-published provisions.”<br />
Rajudeen v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), (1984), 55 N.R. 129 (F.C.A.).<br />
Chan v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 593. For instance, the following<br />
mistreatment has been considered to be persecution: torture, beatings, rape, death threats, trumped-up charges,<br />
arbitrary detention <strong>and</strong> denial <strong>of</strong> the right to work. See in general Chapter 3 entitled “Persecution” <strong>of</strong> the RPD<br />
Interpretation <strong>of</strong> the Convention <strong>Refugee</strong> Definition in the Case Law Paper, December 31, 2005.<br />
See the jurisprudence listed in section 3.1.2. <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Refugee</strong> Protection Division, Interpretation <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Convention <strong>Refugee</strong> Definition in the Case Law Paper, December 31, 2005.<br />
For instance, a same-sex conjugal relationship may be considered illegal <strong>and</strong> the partners subject to<br />
imprisonment or lashings.<br />
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The persecution or penal control must be such that an individual is unable to cohabit with<br />
another. In cases where an individual may obtain relief from persecution or penal control, it may<br />
be relevant to assess whether such relief was sought so as to enable one partner to cohabit with<br />
the other.<br />
CONJUGAL PARTNER 100<br />
In order for a foreign national applying as a conjugal partner to be considered a member<br />
<strong>of</strong> the family class, the foreign national must meet the definition <strong>of</strong> “conjugal partner” at s. 2 <strong>of</strong><br />
the IRP Regulations <strong>and</strong> the relationship must not be excluded by virtue <strong>of</strong> s. 4, s. 4.1 or by s.<br />
117(9) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations.<br />
Definition <strong>of</strong> “Conjugal Partner”<br />
Conjugal partner is defined at s. 2 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations as:<br />
… in relation to a sponsor, a foreign national residing outside <strong>of</strong> <strong>Canada</strong> who is in a conjugal<br />
relationship with the sponsor <strong>and</strong> has been in that relationship for a period <strong>of</strong> at least one year.<br />
The definition <strong>of</strong> conjugal partner refers to “…in relation to a sponsor, a foreign national<br />
… who is in a conjugal relationship…” without limiting the relationship to one between a male<br />
partner <strong>and</strong> a female partner. The definition is therefore considered gender-neutral <strong>and</strong> as such<br />
includes relationships between same-sex <strong>and</strong> opposite-sex partners. This has been confirmed by<br />
the Federal Court in Leroux. 101<br />
The elements <strong>of</strong> the definition <strong>of</strong> “conjugal partner” are considered below.<br />
Conjugal Relationship<br />
Subject to the following discussion, the comments earlier in this chapter concerning<br />
“conjugal relationship” in the context <strong>of</strong> the definition <strong>of</strong> “common-law partner” apply to the<br />
definition <strong>of</strong> “conjugal partner” because both definitions require that the partners be in a conjugal<br />
relationship. Although cohabitation is not required by the definition <strong>of</strong> “conjugal partner,” where<br />
the partners allege to have cohabited, the comments concerning cohabitation may be helpful.<br />
Given that cohabitation is one <strong>of</strong> the characteristics <strong>of</strong> a conjugal relationship according to the<br />
case law, the applicant <strong>and</strong> the sponsor may reasonably be required to indicate why they have not<br />
cohabited.<br />
100 Many <strong>of</strong> the concepts applicable to common-law partners are also applicable to conjugal partnerships, <strong>and</strong> are<br />
not repeated in this section. Please refer to the section on common-law partners.<br />
101 Leroux, supra, footnote 86.<br />
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The relationship <strong>of</strong> “conjugal partners” may not be as developed as that <strong>of</strong> “common-law<br />
partners” because they may not have cohabited. The partners may not have the same depth <strong>of</strong><br />
knowledge <strong>of</strong> one another. However, this does not change the fact that their relationship is<br />
required to be a conjugal one <strong>and</strong> not simply one that is anticipated to become conjugal. While<br />
there is no cohabitation requirement, in one case the IAD stated that in the context <strong>of</strong> a<br />
relationship that developed over the internet over a three-year period <strong>of</strong> time, it would have been<br />
expected that the partners met in person. 102 In another case the IAD panel stated that “persons<br />
whose marriage has been arranged but who have not met each other <strong>and</strong> have not established a<br />
marriage-like relationship are not in a conjugal relationship.” 103 Finally, in Ursua 104 the panel<br />
dismissed an appeal on the basis that the relationship had not been established within the oneyear<br />
requirement. In that case, the appellant indicated that the conjugal relationship had started<br />
when they had made love on the phone. The panel, however, rejected this argument indicating<br />
that a conjugal relationship implies a physical relationship.<br />
Conjugal partners may be reasonably asked to establish whether they intend to marry or<br />
live in a common-law relationship once reunited with their sponsor. “Conjugal partner” is not a<br />
legally recognized status in <strong>Canada</strong>. Conjugal partners do not have the same rights <strong>and</strong> benefits<br />
as spouses <strong>and</strong> common-law partners under Canadian law. It is therefore reasonable to expect<br />
that partners will convert their ongoing conjugal relationship to a common-law relationship or<br />
they will marry. However, prior to making the sponsorship application, the partners do not have<br />
to be married or live in a common-law relationship, even if that would have been possible. 105<br />
Duration <strong>of</strong> the Conjugal Relationship<br />
As when assessing common-law relationships, it is important to determine when the<br />
conjugal relationship began. Partners are required to be <strong>and</strong> to have been in a conjugal<br />
relationship for at least one year. 106 Although it is not necessary to determine the exact date on<br />
which the conjugal relationship began, evidence should establish that it began before the oneyear<br />
requirement. 107 There is no indication that the one-year relationship must necessarily have<br />
102 Dunham, supra, footnote 76.<br />
103 Naidu, supra, footnote 79.<br />
104 Ursua, supra, footnote 80.<br />
105 In Chartr<strong>and</strong>, Rita Malvina v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-18146), Collins, February 20, 2006, the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer had<br />
rejected the sponsorship application because “if couples can marry or cohabit, they are expected to do so before<br />
the immigration process takes place.” The panel rejected this notion, indicating that couples have a right to<br />
choose the type <strong>of</strong> relationship that suits them best as well as the right time to marry. The IAD found that there<br />
was no requirement to marry before the immigration process started even if the couple could have done so.<br />
106 See, for example, Bui, Binh Cong v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-18557), Whist, August 19, 2005 wherein the panel<br />
assessed the criteria for the existence <strong>of</strong> a conjugal relationship <strong>and</strong> concluded that while the partners may have<br />
been in a conjugal relationship at the time they made their sponsorship application, the indicia did not indicate<br />
that it had begun one year before the application was made.<br />
107 See, for example, Laforge, Robert v. M.C.I. (IAD MA3-08755), Beauchemin, July 20, 2004 wherein the panel<br />
stated that the conjugal relationship started in July or August 2002, but in any event it was within the one-year<br />
requirement.<br />
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taken place in the year immediately preceding the application for permanent residence.<br />
However, the partners are required to be in a conjugal relationship at the time <strong>of</strong> the application<br />
<strong>and</strong> may be reasonably requested to explain the break in their conjugal relationship. The<br />
partnership between the partners may be said to begin when the characteristics <strong>of</strong> a conjugal<br />
relationship were first present <strong>and</strong> to end when such characteristics are no longer present. 108<br />
EXCLUDED RELATIONSHIPS<br />
Section 5 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations 109<br />
A foreign national is not considered a spouse or a common-law partner where the foreign<br />
national is in an excluded relationship mentioned in s. 5 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations.<br />
The excluded relationships are described below.<br />
Section 5(a): A foreign national shall not be considered the spouse or the<br />
common-law partner <strong>of</strong> a person if the foreign national is under the age <strong>of</strong> 16<br />
years; or<br />
A foreign national must be 16 years <strong>of</strong> age or older to be considered a spouse or commonlaw<br />
partner. The foreign national must meet the age requirement at the time the application for a<br />
permanent resident visa is made. 110 While this section applies only to spouses <strong>and</strong> common-law<br />
partners, note that IRP Regulation 117(9)(a) contains a similar restriction that applies to spouses,<br />
common-law partners, <strong>and</strong> conjugal partners who are being sponsored.<br />
Section 5(a) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations does not impede a foreign national from marrying or<br />
cohabiting in a conjugal relationship prior to the age <strong>of</strong> 16 years. Consequently, it appears that a<br />
foreign national may cohabit in a conjugal relationship prior to the age <strong>of</strong> 16 years in order to<br />
fulfill the one-year requirement to so cohabit contained in the definition <strong>of</strong> “common-law<br />
partner” <strong>and</strong> thereby be in a position to apply for a permanent resident visa upon turning 16 years<br />
old.<br />
Note, however, that local legislation may regulate or prohibit marriage or common-law<br />
relationships where either or both parties are under a certain age. If the act <strong>of</strong> engaging in sexual<br />
activity with a minor under a certain age is considered an <strong>of</strong>fence under local legislation <strong>and</strong> is<br />
108 See the case law concerning the duration <strong>of</strong> cohabitation, supra, footnote 93, which applies the same approach<br />
in determining the end <strong>of</strong> cohabitation.<br />
109 There is substantial overlap between section 5 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations <strong>and</strong> section 117(9). Please refer to the<br />
discussion later in this chapter regarding regulation 117(9) for further discussion regarding some <strong>of</strong> these<br />
concepts.<br />
110 S. 121(a) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations requires that the person be a family member (in this case, spouse or commonlaw<br />
partner) <strong>of</strong> the applicant or <strong>of</strong> the sponsor at the time the application is made.<br />
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also considered an <strong>of</strong>fence under Canadian law, the foreign national may be inadmissible for<br />
serious criminality or criminality by virtue <strong>of</strong> s. 36 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA.<br />
Section 5(b)(i): A foreign national shall not be considered the spouse <strong>of</strong> a<br />
person if the foreign national or the person was, at the time <strong>of</strong> their marriage,<br />
the spouse <strong>of</strong> another person; or<br />
The foreign national will not be considered a spouse where, at the time the foreign<br />
national <strong>and</strong> the sponsor or the member <strong>of</strong> the family class married, either or both, were the<br />
spouse <strong>of</strong> another person.<br />
The effect <strong>of</strong> this provision is to exclude foreign nationals in bigamous <strong>and</strong> polygamous<br />
relationships from being considered spouses. The marriage will not be considered an excluded<br />
relationship if it is a first marriage for both parties or, if it is not their first marriage, at the time<br />
they married, all prior marriages had been dissolved.<br />
Section 5(b)(ii): A foreign national shall not be considered the spouse <strong>of</strong> a<br />
person if the person has lived separate <strong>and</strong> apart from the foreign national<br />
for at least one year <strong>and</strong> is the common-law partner <strong>of</strong> another person.<br />
The foreign national will not be considered a spouse where the following two elements are<br />
present: first, the foreign national <strong>and</strong> the person have lived separate <strong>and</strong> apart for at least one<br />
year <strong>and</strong> second, the person is the common-law partner <strong>of</strong> another person.<br />
• “Separate <strong>and</strong> Apart”: This expression is used in the context <strong>of</strong> family law <strong>and</strong> more<br />
particularly in s. 8(2)(a) <strong>of</strong> the Divorce Act, to refer to spouses who are no longer in a<br />
conjugal relationship <strong>and</strong> are leading separate lives. 111 In cases where the spouses continue<br />
to live under the same ro<strong>of</strong>, they are considered to be living separate <strong>and</strong> apart if they are<br />
not cohabiting in a conjugal manner.<br />
• Involvement with a common-law partner: The sponsor or the member <strong>of</strong> the family<br />
class must be involved in a common-law partnership with another person. In order to meet<br />
the definition <strong>of</strong> common-law partner, the parties must have been cohabiting in a conjugal<br />
relationship for at least one year. Where the sponsor or the member <strong>of</strong> the family class<br />
<strong>and</strong> the spouse have not been living separate <strong>and</strong> apart for a year, the relationship with the<br />
partner will not be considered a common-law relationship. These rules preclude a sponsor<br />
from sponsoring his spouse while at the same time having his or her relationship with<br />
another person qualify as a common-law partnership. Similarly, a member <strong>of</strong> the family<br />
class will not be able to name his or her spouse as an accompanying family member <strong>and</strong><br />
have a relationship with another person qualify as a common-law partnership.<br />
111 Supra, footnote 61.<br />
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Section 5(b)(ii) probably does not apply in the following situations because one or more <strong>of</strong><br />
the elements <strong>of</strong> the provision is not met <strong>and</strong> the foreign national is considered a “spouse:”<br />
• The foreign national (spouse) <strong>and</strong> the person (sponsor or member <strong>of</strong> the family class) have<br />
been living separate <strong>and</strong> apart <strong>and</strong> the person is not the common-law partner <strong>of</strong> another<br />
person; 112<br />
• The foreign national (spouse) <strong>and</strong> the person (sponsor or member <strong>of</strong> the family class) have<br />
been living separate <strong>and</strong> apart for less than one year <strong>and</strong> the sponsor or the member <strong>of</strong> the<br />
family class is involved in a relationship <strong>of</strong> a conjugal nature. The relationship <strong>of</strong> a conjugal<br />
nature would not qualify as a common-law relationship because the partners have not<br />
cohabited in an exclusive conjugal relationship for at least one year. The person has lived in<br />
a marital relationship with the foreign national for part <strong>of</strong> the year. Hence, the sponsor or<br />
member <strong>of</strong> the family class is precluded from establishing a common-law relationship if he or<br />
she has not been living separate <strong>and</strong> apart from the foreign national for at least one year.<br />
Section 117(9) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations<br />
Section 117(9) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations provides that a foreign national is not considered a<br />
member <strong>of</strong> the family class by virtue <strong>of</strong> his or her relationship to the sponsor where the<br />
relationship is described in one or more <strong>of</strong> the provisions at s. 117(9)(a) to (d).<br />
The excluded relationships are discussed below.<br />
Section 117(9)(a): The foreign national is the sponsor’s spouse, common-law<br />
partner or conjugal partner <strong>and</strong> is under 16 years <strong>of</strong> age; or<br />
A foreign national applying for permanent residence as a sponsor’s spouse, common-law<br />
partner or conjugal partner must be 16 years <strong>of</strong> age or older to be considered a member <strong>of</strong> the<br />
family class. The foreign national must meet the age requirement at the time the application for a<br />
permanent resident visa is made. 113<br />
Section 117(9)(a) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations does not impede a foreign national from<br />
marrying or entering into a conjugal relationship prior to the age <strong>of</strong> 16 years. Consequently, it<br />
appears that a foreign national may cohabit in a conjugal relationship prior to the age <strong>of</strong> 16 years<br />
in order to fulfill the one-year requirement to so cohabit contained in the definition <strong>of</strong> “commonlaw<br />
partner” <strong>and</strong> be in a position to apply for a permanent resident visa upon turning 16 years<br />
old. Similarly, a foreign national may enter into a conjugal relationship prior to the age <strong>of</strong> 16<br />
years in order to fulfill the requirement <strong>of</strong> being in a conjugal relationship for at least one year<br />
contained in the definition <strong>of</strong> “conjugal partner” <strong>and</strong> apply for a permanent resident visa at 16<br />
years old.<br />
112 Note, however, that s. 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations (provision concerning bad faith relationships) may apply.<br />
113 Supra, footnote 110.<br />
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Note, however, that local legislation may regulate or prohibit marriage, common-law<br />
relationships or conjugal relationships where either or both parties are under a certain age. If the<br />
act <strong>of</strong> engaging in sexual activity with a minor under a certain age is considered an <strong>of</strong>fence under<br />
local legislation <strong>and</strong> is also considered an <strong>of</strong>fence under Canadian law, the foreign national may<br />
be inadmissible for serious criminality or criminality by virtue <strong>of</strong> s. 36 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA.<br />
In addition, a foreign national applying as a sponsor’s spouse or common-law partner is<br />
not considered a “spouse” or a “common-law partner” prior to age 16 pursuant to s. 5(a) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
IRP Regulations <strong>and</strong> is consequently not a member <strong>of</strong> the family class. The purpose served by s.<br />
117(9)(a) in the case <strong>of</strong> a foreign national applying as a sponsor’s spouse or common-law partner<br />
is redundant. Section 117(9)(a) may serve to explicitly remove a foreign national applying as a<br />
sponsor’s spouse or common-law partner from the family class.<br />
Section 117(9)(b): The foreign national is the sponsor’s spouse, common-law<br />
partner or conjugal partner, the sponsor has an existing sponsorship<br />
undertaking in respect <strong>of</strong> a spouse, common-law partner or conjugal partner<br />
<strong>and</strong> the period referred to in subsection 132(1) in respect <strong>of</strong> that undertaking<br />
has not ended; or<br />
A spouse, common-law partner or conjugal partner is not considered a member <strong>of</strong> the<br />
family class where the sponsor’s previous undertaking with respect to a spouse, common-law<br />
partner or conjugal partner has not come to an end. In the case <strong>of</strong> a family class sponsorship, an<br />
undertaking begins, in accordance with s. 132(1)(a)(iii) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations, on the day on<br />
which the foreign national becomes a permanent resident <strong>and</strong> ends pursuant to s. 132(1)(b)(i), on<br />
the last day <strong>of</strong> a period <strong>of</strong> three (3) years from the first day. Where the sponsor resides in a<br />
province which has entered into an agreement referred to in s. 8(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA, s. 132(3) sets the<br />
duration <strong>of</strong> the undertaking at ten (10) years unless a shorter duration 114 is provided by provincial<br />
legislation. In Quebec, s. 23(a)(i) <strong>of</strong> the Regulation respecting the selection <strong>of</strong> foreign<br />
nationals, 115 sets the duration <strong>of</strong> an undertaking in the case <strong>of</strong> the sponsorship <strong>of</strong> a spouse, de<br />
facto spouse <strong>and</strong> conjugal partner at three (3) years.<br />
For transitional cases, s. 351(3) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations specifically provides that the<br />
duration <strong>of</strong> undertakings given under s. 118 the former <strong>Immigration</strong> Act, which include<br />
undertakings for sponsorships <strong>of</strong> members <strong>of</strong> the family class given before June 28 th 2002, is not<br />
affected by the IRP Regulations. The duration <strong>of</strong> an undertaking for the sponsorship <strong>of</strong> a spouse<br />
was ten (10) years pursuant to the definition <strong>of</strong> undertaking in s. 2(1) <strong>and</strong> s. 5(2) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Regulations, 1978. For undertakings given by Quebec residents, s. 23(a)(i) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Regulation respecting the selection <strong>of</strong> foreign nationals 116 provided that in the case <strong>of</strong> spouses,<br />
the duration <strong>of</strong> the undertaking was three (3) years.<br />
114 S. 132(3) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations.<br />
115 R.R.Q., 1981, c. M-23.1, r. 2 as amended.<br />
116 Ibid.<br />
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Section 117(9)(c)(i): The foreign national is the sponsor’s spouse <strong>and</strong> the<br />
sponsor or the foreign national was, at the time <strong>of</strong> their marriage, the spouse<br />
<strong>of</strong> another person; or<br />
The foreign national will not be considered a member <strong>of</strong> the family class where at the<br />
time the foreign national <strong>and</strong> the sponsor married, either or both, were the spouse <strong>of</strong> another<br />
person.<br />
There is some overlap between this regulation <strong>and</strong> s. 5(b)(i) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations which<br />
stipulates that a foreign national is not to be considered the spouse <strong>of</strong> a person if either the<br />
foreign national or the spouse was, at the time <strong>of</strong> their marriage, the spouse <strong>of</strong> another person.<br />
The marriage will not be considered an excluded relationship if it is a first marriage for both<br />
parties or, if it is not their first marriage, at the time they married, all prior marriages had been<br />
dissolved. Note that this provision does not apply to common-law partners or conjugal partners.<br />
A prior marriage is dissolved by divorce, annulment or by the death <strong>of</strong> one <strong>of</strong> the parties<br />
to the marriage. Section 117(9)(c)(i) <strong>of</strong> the regulations is most commonly at issue when the<br />
validity <strong>of</strong> a previous divorce <strong>of</strong> either <strong>of</strong> the spouses is in question. 117 The rules concerning the<br />
recognition <strong>of</strong> foreign divorce judgments in <strong>Canada</strong> are provided by the case law <strong>and</strong> s. 22 <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Divorce Act. 118<br />
Section 22(1) <strong>of</strong> the Divorce Act stipulates that for a divorce to be recognized in <strong>Canada</strong>,<br />
one <strong>of</strong> the spouses must have been “ordinarily resident” in the place where the divorce was<br />
granted for at least a year before the divorce was granted. Ordinarily resident has been<br />
interpreted to carry “a restricted significance” <strong>and</strong> to mean “residence in the course <strong>of</strong> the<br />
customary mode <strong>of</strong> life <strong>of</strong> the person concerned, <strong>and</strong> it is contrasted with special or occasional or<br />
casual residence. The general mode <strong>of</strong> life is, therefore, relevant to the question <strong>of</strong> its<br />
application.” 119<br />
117 In this regard, the discussion earlier in this chapter regarding evidentiary issues <strong>of</strong> foreign marriages may be<br />
helpful.<br />
118 22. (1) A divorce granted, on or after the coming into force <strong>of</strong> this Act [editor’s note: this was July 1, 1986],<br />
pursuant to a law <strong>of</strong> a country or subdivision <strong>of</strong> a country other than <strong>Canada</strong> by a tribunal or other authority<br />
having jurisdiction to do so shall be recognized for all purposes <strong>of</strong> determining the marital status in <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>of</strong><br />
any person, if either former spouse was ordinarily resident in that country or subdivision for at least one year<br />
immediately preceding the commencement <strong>of</strong> proceedings for the divorce.<br />
(2) A divorce granted, after July 1, 1968, pursuant to a law <strong>of</strong> a country or subdivision <strong>of</strong> a country other than<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> by a tribunal or other authority having jurisdiction to do so, on the basis <strong>of</strong> the domicile <strong>of</strong> the wife in<br />
that country or subdivision determined as if she were unmarried <strong>and</strong>, if she was a minor, as if she had attained<br />
the age <strong>of</strong> majority, shall be recognized for all purposes <strong>of</strong> determining the marital status in <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>of</strong> any<br />
person.<br />
(3) Nothing in this section abrogates or derogates from any other rule <strong>of</strong> law respecting the recognition <strong>of</strong><br />
divorces granted otherwise than under this Act.<br />
119 Thomson v. M.N.R., [1946] S.C.R. 209 per R<strong>and</strong> J. See also MacPherson v. MacPherson (1977), 13 O.R. (2d)<br />
233 (C.A.) at paragraph 8 per Evans J. dissenting in part, but not on this point.<br />
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Note also that subsection 22(3) <strong>of</strong> the Divorce Act preserves the common-law with<br />
respect to the recognition <strong>of</strong> divorces. There were several common-law rules developed prior to<br />
the adoption <strong>of</strong> divorce legislation in <strong>Canada</strong> which are succinctly summarized in El Qaoud, 120<br />
quoting Payne on Divorce, 4 th ed. :<br />
. . . Section 22(3) <strong>of</strong> the Divorce Act expressly preserves pre-existing judge<br />
made rules <strong>of</strong> law pertaining to the recognition <strong>of</strong> foreign divorces. It may be<br />
appropriate to summarize these rules. Canadian courts will recognize a foreign<br />
divorce: (i) where jurisdiction was assumed on the basis <strong>of</strong> the domicile <strong>of</strong> the<br />
spouses; (ii) where the foreign divorce, though granted on a non-domiciliary<br />
jurisdictional basis, is recognized by the law <strong>of</strong> the domicile <strong>of</strong> the parties; (iii)<br />
where the foreign jurisdictional rule corresponds to the Canadian jurisdictional<br />
rule in divorce proceedings; (iv) where the circumstances in the foreign<br />
jurisdiction would have conferred jurisdiction on a Canadian court had they<br />
occurred in <strong>Canada</strong>; (v) where either the petitioner or respondent had a real <strong>and</strong><br />
substantial connection with the foreign jurisdiction wherein the divorce was<br />
granted; <strong>and</strong> (vi) where the foreign divorce is recognized in another foreign<br />
jurisdiction with which the petitioner or respondent has a real <strong>and</strong> substantial<br />
connection.<br />
Thus, in Bhatti, 121 the applicant was refused an immigrant visa <strong>and</strong> the issue in the appeal<br />
was the validity <strong>of</strong> the appellant’s marriage to the applicant. The appellant had obtained a<br />
religious divorce in Pakistan. The panel recognized the divorce <strong>and</strong> allowed the appeal finding<br />
that the appellant had a real <strong>and</strong> substantial connection to Pakistan. However in Ghosn, 122 the<br />
panel rejected the argument that the appellant had legally divorced in <strong>Canada</strong> when he went<br />
through a form <strong>of</strong> religious divorce.<br />
Section 117(9)(c)(ii): The foreign national is the sponsor’s spouse <strong>and</strong> the<br />
sponsor has lived separate <strong>and</strong> apart from the foreign national for at least one<br />
year <strong>and</strong> (A) the sponsor is the common-law partner <strong>of</strong> another person or the<br />
conjugal partner <strong>of</strong> another foreign national; or (B) the foreign national is<br />
the common-law partner <strong>of</strong> another person or the conjugal partner <strong>of</strong><br />
another sponsor; or<br />
The foreign national will not be considered a member <strong>of</strong> the family class where the<br />
following two elements are present: first, the sponsor <strong>and</strong> the foreign national must have been<br />
living separate <strong>and</strong> apart for at least one year <strong>and</strong> second, the sponsor is involved in a commonlaw<br />
partnership with another person or a conjugal partnership with another foreign national or the<br />
120 Orabi v. Qaoud, 2005 NSCA 28 at paragraph 14.<br />
121 Bhatti, Mukhtar Ahmad (IAD TA2-11254), MacPherson, July 10, 2003 followed in Amjad, Ali Saud v. M.C.I.<br />
(IAD TA3-09455), Hoare, February 11, 2005.<br />
122 Ghosn, Kassem Ata v. M.C.I. (IAD VA4-02673), Rozdilsky, March 27, 2006.<br />
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foreign national is involved in a common-law partnership with another person or in a conjugal<br />
partnership with another sponsor.<br />
• “Separate <strong>and</strong> Apart”: This expression is used in the context <strong>of</strong> family law <strong>and</strong> more<br />
particularly in s. 8(2)(a) <strong>of</strong> the Divorce Act, to refer to spouses who are no longer in a<br />
conjugal relationship <strong>and</strong> are leading separate lives. 123 In cases where the spouses<br />
continue to live under the same ro<strong>of</strong>, they are considered to be living separate <strong>and</strong> apart if<br />
they are not cohabiting in a conjugal manner.<br />
• Involvement with a common-law partner or conjugal partner: Where the sponsor <strong>and</strong><br />
the spouse have not been living separate <strong>and</strong> apart for a year, the sponsor’s or the foreign<br />
national’s relationship with another partner will not be considered a common-law or<br />
conjugal relationship because the relationship has not been exclusive <strong>and</strong> ongoing for one<br />
year. These rules preclude a sponsor from sponsoring his spouse <strong>and</strong> having his or her<br />
relationship with another individual, or the spouse’s relationship with another individual,<br />
qualify as a common-law partnership or conjugal partnership.<br />
Note that s. 5(b)(ii) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations may also apply to disqualify a foreign national<br />
from being considered a spouse or a common-law partner <strong>and</strong> hence a member <strong>of</strong> the family<br />
class.<br />
Section 117(9)(d): subject to subsection (10), the sponsor previously made an<br />
application for permanent residence <strong>and</strong> became a permanent resident <strong>and</strong>,<br />
at the time <strong>of</strong> that application, the foreign national was a non-accompanying<br />
family member <strong>of</strong> the sponsor <strong>and</strong> was not examined.<br />
This provision, which was amended in 2004 124 to its current form, excludes foreign<br />
nationals who, at the time the sponsor applied for permanent residence, were non-accompanying<br />
family members <strong>of</strong> the sponsor <strong>and</strong> were not examined.<br />
Sections 117(10) <strong>and</strong> (11) <strong>of</strong> the regulations were also added in 2004. Section 117(10)<br />
creates an exception to the exclusionary rule. It stipulates that regulation 117(9)(d) does not<br />
apply when the foreign national was not examined because an <strong>of</strong>ficer had determined that they<br />
were not required by the Act or the former Act to be examined. This exception is narrowed<br />
somewhat in subsection (11) which stipulates that the exception in subsection (10) does not apply<br />
if an <strong>of</strong>ficer determines that (a) the sponsor was informed that the foreign national could be<br />
examined <strong>and</strong> the sponsor was able to the make the foreign national available for examination but<br />
did not do so or the foreign national did not appear for the examination, or (b) the foreign<br />
national was the sponsor’s spouse, was living separate <strong>and</strong> apart from the sponsor <strong>and</strong> was not<br />
examined.<br />
123 Supra, footnote 61.<br />
124 SOR/2004-167, July 22, 2004.<br />
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The constitutionality <strong>of</strong> s. 117(9)(d) has been confirmed by the Federal Court <strong>of</strong><br />
Appeal. 125 Further, the Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal has interpreted the phrase “at the time <strong>of</strong> the<br />
application” in section 117(9)(d) to mean the life <strong>of</strong> the application from the time when it is<br />
initiated by the filing <strong>of</strong> the authorized form to the time when permanent resident status is<br />
granted at a port <strong>of</strong> entry. 126 Therefore, a foreign national who makes an application for<br />
permanent residence is under an obligation to disclose all non-accompanying family members at<br />
the time they make the application <strong>and</strong> the obligation continues up to the time they are granted<br />
l<strong>and</strong>ing at the port <strong>of</strong> entry. A foreign national will not be considered a member <strong>of</strong> the family<br />
class if they were a non-accompanying family member who was not declared by the sponsor at<br />
the time <strong>of</strong> the application even if the sponsor had not been aware <strong>of</strong> the foreign national’s<br />
existence at that time. 127<br />
Transitional Issues<br />
For transitional cases, the IRP Regulations provide as follows:<br />
Section 352: A person is not required to include in an application a non-accompanying<br />
common-law partner if the application was made under the former <strong>Immigration</strong> Act;<br />
Section 353: Section 70(1)(e) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations, which requires that nonaccompanying<br />
family members not be inadmissible in order for a permanent resident visa to be<br />
issued to a foreign national, is not applicable where the non-accompanying family member is a<br />
common-law partner <strong>and</strong> the application was made under the former <strong>Immigration</strong> Act;<br />
Section 354: The non-accompanying common-law partner <strong>of</strong> a person who made an<br />
application before June 28 th 2002 shall not be considered an inadmissible non-accompanying<br />
family member under s. 42(a) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA, shall not be subject to a medical examination under s.<br />
30(1)(a) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations <strong>and</strong> will not be required to establish that they meet the<br />
requirements <strong>of</strong> the IRPA <strong>and</strong> the IRP Regulations upon examination at the port <strong>of</strong> entry in<br />
accordance with s. 51(b) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations.<br />
Section 355: If a person who made an application under the former Act before June 28,<br />
2002 sponsors a non-accompanying dependent child, referred to in section 352, who makes an<br />
application as a member <strong>of</strong> the family class or the spouse or common-law partner in <strong>Canada</strong><br />
class, or sponsors a non-accompanying common-law partner who makes such an application,<br />
paragraph 117(9)(d) does not apply in respect <strong>of</strong> that dependent child or common-law partner.<br />
125 De Guzman, Josephine Soliven v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-558-04), Evans, Desjardins, Malone, December 20,<br />
2005; 2005 FCA 436, leave to appeal to the SCC rejected with costs June 22, 2006 (De Guzman v. M.C.I.,<br />
2006 S.C.C.A. No. 70 (Q.L.)).<br />
126 M.C.I. v. Fuente, Cleotilde Dela (F.C.A., no. A-446-05), Noël, Sharlow, Malone, May 18, 2006; 2006 FCA<br />
186.<br />
127 Adjani, Joshua Taiwo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2033-07), Blanchard, January 10, 2008; 2008 FC 32. [this case<br />
included in this paper despite the publishing deadline <strong>of</strong> January 1, 2008]<br />
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Thus, in Kong 128 the IAD allowed an appeal where the appellant had immigrated to<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> with his then spouse <strong>and</strong> children. At the time, he had a girlfriend with whom he had a<br />
son. Neither the girlfriend nor son had been disclosed at the time <strong>of</strong> his first application. He<br />
later attempted to sponsor them after his marriage broke down <strong>and</strong> he had subsequently married<br />
his girlfriend. The IAD found that the transitional provision in section 352 applied to his new<br />
wife as there were no provisions to sponsor common-law partners under the former <strong>Immigration</strong><br />
Act. Further, the IAD found that the transitional provision in section 355 applied to the son as<br />
he was being sponsored as a dependent child <strong>of</strong> his wife <strong>and</strong> not directly by the appellant.<br />
RELATIONSHIPS FOR THE PURPOSE OF ACQUIRING A STATUS OR PRIVILEGE<br />
UNDER THE ACT<br />
Bad Faith – Section 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations<br />
Section 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations states:<br />
For the purposes <strong>of</strong> these Regulations, no foreign national shall be<br />
considered a spouse, a common-law partner, a conjugal partner or an<br />
adopted child <strong>of</strong> a person if the marriage, common-law partnership,<br />
conjugal partnership or adoption is not genuine <strong>and</strong> was entered into<br />
primarily for the purpose <strong>of</strong> acquiring any status or privilege under the<br />
Act.<br />
In order for a foreign national to be considered a spouse, common-law partner or conjugal<br />
partner, the evidence must establish that the relationship in question, namely the marriage, the<br />
common-law partnership or the conjugal partnership, is not a bad faith relationship. The burden<br />
<strong>of</strong> establishing the bona fides <strong>of</strong> the marriage is on the appellant at the IAD 129 but the evidence<br />
should not be minutely scrutinized nor should North American reasoning necessarily be applied<br />
to partners coming from another culture. 130 Genuineness <strong>of</strong> a relationship should be examined<br />
through the eyes <strong>of</strong> the parties themselves against the cultural background in which they have<br />
lived. 131<br />
128 Kong, Wai Keung Michael v. M.C.I. (IAD TA6-08094), Ahlfeld, January 31, 2008.<br />
129 Morris, Lawrence v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-5045-04), Pinard, March 18, 2005; 2005 FC 369.<br />
130 Siev, supra, footnote 74.<br />
131 Therefore, in Khan, Mohammad Farid v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-2971-06), Hughes, December 13, 2006; 2006<br />
FC 1490 the court allowed an application for judicial review <strong>of</strong> an IAD decision wherein it had been found that<br />
the marriage between the appellant <strong>and</strong> the sister <strong>of</strong> his deceased brother was not genuine. Although the<br />
evidence indicated that the marriage was entered into to preserve the honour <strong>of</strong> the family, there was no reason<br />
why such a marriage cannot be genuine given the cultural factors. See also Owusu, Margaret v. M.C.I. (F.C.<br />
no. IMM-1402-06), Harrington, October 6, 2006; 2006 FC 1195.<br />
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According to s. 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations, a bad faith relationship is one for which it is<br />
established (1) the relationship is not genuine <strong>and</strong> (2) the relationship was entered into primarily<br />
for the purpose <strong>of</strong> acquiring any status or privilege under the Act. 132 To succeed in an appeal, the<br />
appellant must only demonstrate that one <strong>of</strong> the two prongs does not apply to the relationship. 133<br />
Some <strong>of</strong> the factors helpful in assessing the intention <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> genuineness <strong>of</strong> the relationship are:<br />
the length <strong>of</strong> the relationship, whether it was an arranged marriage, the age difference, the<br />
partners’ former marital or civil status, their respective financial situation, their employment,<br />
their family background, their knowledge <strong>of</strong> one another’s histories, their language, their<br />
respective interests, <strong>and</strong> their immigration histories. 134 However, these factors are only useful<br />
guidelines that must be adapted to fit the circumstances. 135<br />
The genuineness branch <strong>of</strong> the bad faith test in s. 4 uses the present tense; therefore, the<br />
focus is on whether there is a continuing genuine relationship at the time <strong>of</strong> assessment. 136 Also,<br />
a relationship will not be considered genuine if, at the time <strong>of</strong> the hearing <strong>of</strong> the appeal, the<br />
evidence establishes that the partners do not intend to continue their relationship. 137 In assessing<br />
the genuineness <strong>of</strong> the relationship, it is not just the intention <strong>of</strong> the sponsored spouse, commonlaw<br />
partner, or conjugal partner that is relevant. The focus is on the overall genuineness <strong>of</strong> the<br />
relationship <strong>and</strong> its primary purpose, for which the evidence <strong>of</strong> both spouses is relevant. 138 When<br />
determining if a marriage is caught by the first prong <strong>of</strong> the test in section 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP<br />
Regulations, genuine does not equate to legal. The test in section 4 is only applied to what has<br />
already been determined to be a legal marriage under section 2. 139<br />
A relationship that was entered into primarily for the purpose <strong>of</strong> acquiring any status or<br />
privilege under the IRPA is one that was entered into in order to obtain permanent residence in<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> or some other status or privilege. In the case <strong>of</strong> a marriage, the time at which the<br />
relationship was entered into refers to the date <strong>of</strong> the marriage. In the case <strong>of</strong> a common-law<br />
partnership, it refers to the date on which the partners began to cohabit in a conjugal relationship<br />
<strong>and</strong> in the case <strong>of</strong> a conjugal partnership, it refers to the date on which the foreign national <strong>and</strong><br />
the sponsor began a conjugal relationship. While the focus <strong>of</strong> this branch <strong>of</strong> the test is the<br />
132 Sanichara, Omeshwar v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-5233-04), Beaudry, July 25, 2005; 2005 FC 1015; Froment,<br />
Danielle Marie v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-475-06), Shore, August 24, 2006; 2006 FC 1002.<br />
133 Ouk, Chanta v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-865-07), Mosley, September 7, 2007; 2007 FC 891.<br />
134 See, for example, Khera, Amarjit v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6375-06), Martineau, June 13, 2007; 2007 FC 632<br />
<strong>and</strong> Owusu, supra, footnote 131.<br />
135 Owusu, supra, footnote 131.<br />
136 Donkor, Sumaila v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-654-06), Mosley, September 12, 2006; 2006 FC 1089. The Court<br />
also recognized that s. 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations may leave open the possibility that a relationship that was<br />
originally entered into for the purpose <strong>of</strong> acquiring a status or privilege under the Act may become genuine <strong>and</strong><br />
therefore not be excluded by the regulation.<br />
137 Kang, R<strong>and</strong>ip Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-02099), Clark, June 3, 2003.<br />
138 Gavino, Edwin Dorol v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-3249-05), Russell, March 9, 2006; 2006 FC 308; Mann,<br />
Jagdeep Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-19094), Stein, August 5, 2005.<br />
139 Ni, Zhi Qi v. M.C.I.,(F.C. no. IMM-4385-04), Pinard, February 17, 2005; 2005 FC 241.<br />
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intention <strong>of</strong> the partners at the time they entered into the relationship, the IAD is entitled to<br />
examine the conduct <strong>of</strong> the couple after the relationship began in order to determine what their<br />
intention was when they entered into the relationship. 140 Only one <strong>of</strong> the partners in the<br />
relationship need have as their primary purpose the acquisition <strong>of</strong> any status or privilege under<br />
the Act. 141 Finally, the appeal may be allowed if immigration is a factor in the relationship,<br />
provided it is not the primary factor. 142<br />
The relationship need not be entered into for the purpose <strong>of</strong> acquiring a status or privilege<br />
for the sponsored foreign national. The relationship will be caught by the second prong <strong>of</strong><br />
section 4 so long as the relationship was entered into primarily to ensure that some privilege<br />
under the Act would be conveyed to someone. Therefore, in Gavino, 143 the court held that even<br />
if the privilege accrued from the marriage would be conveyed to the appellant’s children, the<br />
second prong <strong>of</strong> the branch was satisfied.<br />
While many <strong>of</strong> the factors relevant in determining if a common-law or conjugal<br />
partnership exist are the same as the factors relevant in determining good faith, it is still a distinct<br />
two-step process wherein first the validity <strong>of</strong> the relationship is established, <strong>and</strong> then whether<br />
section 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP regulations applies. 144<br />
New Relationships – Section 4.1 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations<br />
The IRP Regulations were amended in 2004 with the addition <strong>of</strong> section 4.1 145 which<br />
added a new category <strong>of</strong> bad faith relationships. Section 4.1 reads as follows:<br />
For the purposes <strong>of</strong> these Regulations, a foreign national shall not<br />
be considered a spouse, a common-law partner or a conjugal<br />
partner <strong>of</strong> a person if the foreign national has begun a new<br />
conjugal relationship with that person after a previous marriage,<br />
common-law partnership or conjugal partnership with that person<br />
was dissolved primarily so that the foreign national, another<br />
foreign national or the sponsor could acquire any status or<br />
privilege under the Act.<br />
The intent <strong>of</strong> section 4.1 has been stated to be “to prevent persons in a conjugal<br />
relationship from dissolving the relationship to free them to gain admission to <strong>Canada</strong> only to<br />
140 Mohamed, Rodal Houssein v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6790-05), Beaudry, May 24, 2006; 2006 FC 696.<br />
141 See, for example, Brunelle, Sherry Lynn v. M.C.I. (IAD VA4-00937), Munro, January 28, 2005.<br />
142 Lorenz, Hubert Calvin v. M.C.I. (IAD VA6-00444), Nest, June 15, 2007.<br />
143 Gavino, supra, footnote 138.<br />
144 Macapagal, supra, footnote 84.<br />
145 SOR/2004-167, s. 4.<br />
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turn around <strong>and</strong> resume their previous relationship. 146 Section 4.1 will apply even if the partners<br />
originally dissolved their relationship with the intent <strong>of</strong> facilitating their admission to another<br />
country, only to change their plans <strong>and</strong> come to <strong>Canada</strong>. 147<br />
In Wen, 148 the IAD set out a list <strong>of</strong> non-exhaustive factors to consider when assessing the<br />
applicability <strong>of</strong> section 4.1 <strong>of</strong> the Regulations. They are: when the relationship was dissolved,<br />
the reason for the dissolution <strong>of</strong> the relationship, the temporal relationship between the ending <strong>of</strong><br />
the relationship <strong>and</strong> the forming <strong>of</strong> a new relationship with the subsequent partner, evidence that<br />
the former spouses or partners did not separate or end contact with each other, the intent <strong>of</strong> the<br />
spouses or partners upon reestablishing their relationship, the length <strong>of</strong> the subsequent<br />
relationship, the temporal connection between the dissolving <strong>of</strong> the subsequent relationship <strong>and</strong><br />
the re-establishment <strong>of</strong> a new relationship with the previous spouse or partner, <strong>and</strong> the intentions<br />
<strong>of</strong> the parties to the new relationship in respect <strong>of</strong> immigration.<br />
TIMING – Section 121(a) <strong>of</strong> IRP Regulations<br />
Section 121(a) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations requires that a person who makes an application<br />
for a permanent resident visa as a member <strong>of</strong> the family class or as a family member must be a<br />
family member <strong>of</strong> the applicant or <strong>of</strong> the sponsor both at the time <strong>of</strong> the application <strong>and</strong> at the<br />
time <strong>of</strong> its determination. Hence, the foreign national must be a spouse or meet the definition <strong>of</strong><br />
common-law partner or <strong>of</strong> conjugal partner <strong>and</strong> not be in an excluded relationship or bad faith<br />
relationship both at the time <strong>of</strong> the application for a permanent residence visa <strong>and</strong> at the time a<br />
determination is made by the <strong>of</strong>ficer.<br />
It is arguable that a foreign national must also be a member <strong>of</strong> the family class or a family<br />
member at the time <strong>of</strong> the filing <strong>of</strong> the appeal <strong>and</strong> at the time <strong>of</strong> the hearing before the IAD since<br />
their interest in obtaining a permanent resident visa is premised on their continuing relationship<br />
with the sponsor or the applicant. Section 67(1)(a) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA 149 may be relied upon as support<br />
for this position.<br />
146 Harripersaud, Janet Rameena v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-11611), Sangmuah, June 30, 2005. See also Mariano,<br />
Edita Palacio v. M.C.I. (IAD WA5-00122), Lamont, September 20, 2006.<br />
147 Harripersaud, ibid.<br />
148 Wen, Chun Xiu v. M.C.I. (IAD TA5-14563), MacLean, May 29, 2007. See also Zheng, Wei Rong v. M.C.I.<br />
(IAD TA4-16616), MacLean, August 23, 2007.<br />
149 S. 67(1)(a) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA states: To allow an appeal, the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division must be satisfied that, at<br />
the time that the appeal is disposed <strong>of</strong>, the decision appealed is wrong in law or fact or mixed law <strong>and</strong> fact.<br />
[emphasis added]<br />
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In some cases, where an application for permanent residence was based on marriage <strong>and</strong><br />
the IAD has found that marriage not to be valid, they have examined whether or not the appeal<br />
could be allowed based upon a common-law or conjugal partnership. 150<br />
DISMISSAL IN LAW OF THE SPONSORSHIP APPEAL<br />
Where the IAD dismisses an appeal because the applicant is not a spouse or does not meet<br />
the definition <strong>of</strong> “common-law partner” or “conjugal partner” or due to the application <strong>of</strong> s. 4, s.<br />
4.1, s. 5 or s.117(9) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations, the dismissal <strong>of</strong> the appeal is arguably based in law<br />
<strong>and</strong> not on a lack <strong>of</strong> jurisdiction, given the wording in s. 63(1) <strong>and</strong> s. 65 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA. Contrary<br />
to the former <strong>Immigration</strong> Act, the IRPA specifically provides in s. 65 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA that<br />
humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate grounds may only be considered where the foreign national is a<br />
member <strong>of</strong> the family class. The absence <strong>of</strong> such a specific provision in the former <strong>Immigration</strong><br />
Act was the basis, along with the wording in s. 77 <strong>of</strong> the former Act, for the jurisdictional<br />
dismissal <strong>of</strong> the appeal.<br />
150 Tabesh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA3-00941), Wiebe, January 7, 2004 followed in Ur-Rahman, Mohammed Ishtiaq v.<br />
M.C.I. (IAD TA3-04308), Collins, January 13, 2005. It must be noted that it is not common practice for the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division to amend refusal grounds without application from a party.<br />
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CASES<br />
Adjani, Joshua Taiwo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2033-07), Blanchard, January 10, 2008; 2008<br />
FC 32....................................................................................................................................................................... 28<br />
Amjad, Ali Saud v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-09455), Hoare, February 11, 2005................................................................... 26<br />
Atwal, Jaswinder Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-4204), Petryshyn, Wright, Rayburn, January 30, 1989............................ 9<br />
Badhan, Lyle Kishori v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-00432), Boscariol, September 3, 1997....................................................... 7<br />
Baird v. Iaci, [1997] B.C.J. No. 1789 (S.C.)(QL) ....................................................................................................... 15<br />
Bakridi, Faizl Abbas v. M.C.I. (IAD V99-03930), Baker, January 9, 2001 .................................................................. 8<br />
Bhatti, Mukhtar Ahmad (IAD TA2-11254), MacPherson, July 10, 2003.................................................................... 26<br />
Bhullar, Sawarnjit Kaur v. M.E.I. (IAD W89-00375), Goodspeed, Rayburn, Arpin (concurring),<br />
November 19, 1991................................................................................................................................................... 9<br />
Brar, Karen Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA0-02573), Workun, December 4, 2001 .............................................................. 8<br />
Brunelle, Sherry Lynn v. M.C.I. (IAD VA4-00937), Munro, January 28, 2005.......................................................... 31<br />
Bui, Binh Cong v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-18557), Whist, August 19, 2005 ...................................................................... 21<br />
Burmi, Joginder Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 88-35,651), Sherman, Arkin, Weisdorf, February 14,<br />
1989........................................................................................................................................................................... 9<br />
Buttar, Amrit Kaur v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-1669-06), Blais, October 25, 2006; 2006 FC 1281 ................................ 9<br />
Cai, Changbin v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6729-06), Kelen, August 3, 2007; 2007 FC 816 ......................................... 18<br />
Cantin, Edmond v. M.C.I. (IAD MA4-06892), Néron, August 1, 2005 ...................................................................... 14<br />
Castel, J.-G., Canadian Conflict <strong>of</strong> Laws (Toronto: Butterworths, 1986) ................................................................... 10<br />
Chan v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 593 ................................................... 18<br />
Chartr<strong>and</strong>, Rita Malvina v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-18146), Collins, February 20, 2006 ................................................... 20<br />
Chiem, My Lien v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-838-98), Rothstein, January 11, 1999 ................................................. 6<br />
Craddock v. Glover Estate [2000] O.J. No. 680 (S.C.)(QL) ....................................................................................... 17<br />
De Guzman v. M.C.I., 2006 S.C.C.A. No. 70 (Q.L.) ................................................................................................... 28<br />
De Guzman, Josephine Soliven v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-558-04), Evans, Desjardins, Malone,<br />
December 20, 2005; 2005 FCA 436........................................................................................................................ 28<br />
Do, Thi Thanh Thuy (IAD TA3-17390), D’Ignazio, September 3, 2004 .................................................................... 17<br />
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Donkor, Sumaila v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-654-06), Mosley, September 12, 2006; 2006 FC 1089............................ 30<br />
Donoso Palma, Segio v. M.C.I. (IAD MA1-03349), di Pietro, July 9, 2002................................................................. 7<br />
Dunham Audrey Pearl v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-00144), Néron, August 24, 2004 ..................................................... 14, 20<br />
El Salfiti, Dina Khalil Abdel Karim v. M.E.I. (IAD M93-08586), Dur<strong>and</strong>, January 24, 1994 ...................................... 6<br />
Feehan v. Attwells (1979), 24 O.R. (2d) 248 (Co. Ct)................................................................................................. 17<br />
Ferdin<strong>and</strong> v. M.C.I. (IAD TA5-09330), MacLean, October 12, 2007 ........................................................................ 14<br />
Fraser v. Canadien National, [1999] J.Q. no. 2286, (S.C.)(QL)................................................................................. 15<br />
Froment, Danielle Marie v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-475-06), Shore, August 24, 2006; 2006 FC<br />
1002......................................................................................................................................................................... 30<br />
Fuente: M.C.I. v. Fuente, Cleotilde Dela (F.C.A., no. A-446-05), Noël, Sharlow, Malone, May 18,<br />
2006; 2006 FCA 186............................................................................................................................................... 28<br />
Gavino, Edwin Dorol v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-3249-05), Russell, March 9, 2006; 2006 FC 308 ....................... 30, 31<br />
Ghosn, Kassem Ata v. M.C.I. (IAD VA4-02673), Rozdilsky, March 27, 2006........................................................... 26<br />
Gill, Sakinder Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD V89-01124), Gill<strong>and</strong>ers, Verma, Wlodyka, July 16, 1990................................... 9<br />
Grewal, Inderpal Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD T91-04831), Muzzi, Aterman, Leousis, February 23, 1995 ........................... 7<br />
Grewal, Ravinder v. M.C.I. (IAD MA3-00637), Beauchemin, May 4, 2004 ................................................................ 6<br />
Harripersaud, Janet Rameena v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-11611), Sangmuah, June 30, 2005 ............................................ 32<br />
Hazlewood v. Kent, [2000] O.J. No. 5263 (Sup. Ct.)(QL)........................................................................................... 17<br />
Kang, R<strong>and</strong>ip Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-02099), Clark, June 3, 2003 ...................................................................... 30<br />
Kaur, Gurmit v. C.E.I.C. (F.C.T.D., no. T-2490-84), Jerome, May 8, 1985 ................................................................. 8<br />
Kaur, Narjinder v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-405-89), Marceau, Desjardins, Linden, October 11,<br />
1990, at 5. Reported: Kaur v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1990),<br />
12 Imm. L.R. (2d) 1 (F.C.A.) .................................................................................................................................... 7<br />
Khan v. M.C.I. (IAD) V93-02590), Lam, July 4, 1995.................................................................................................. 8<br />
Khan, Mohammad Farid v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-2971-06), Hughes, December 13, 2006; 2006<br />
FC 1490................................................................................................................................................................... 30<br />
Khera, Amarjit v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6375-06), Martineau, June 13, 2007; 2007 FC 632 .................................... 30<br />
Kong, Wai Keung Michael v. M.C.I. (IAD TA6-08094), Ahlfeld, January 31, 2008.................................................. 29<br />
Kumar, Monika v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-10172), MacDonald, May 8, 2006.................................................................... 14<br />
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Laforge, Robert v. M.C.I. (IAD MA3-08755), Beauchemin, July 20, 2004................................................................ 21<br />
Lavoie v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> National Revenue), [2000] F.C.J. No. 2124 (F.C.A.), (QL) ....................................... 15<br />
Leroux, Jean-Stéphane v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IM-2819-06), Tremblay-Lamer, April 17, 2007; 2007<br />
FC 403............................................................................................................................................................... 16, 19<br />
Li, Bing Qian v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4138-96), Reed, January 8, 1998 ............................................................ 7<br />
Lit, Jaswant Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 76-6003), Scott, Benedetti, Legaré, May 30, 1978 .............................................. 6<br />
Lorenz, Hubert Calvin v. M.C.I. (IAD VA6-00444), Nest, June 15, 2007.................................................................. 31<br />
Lotay, Harjit Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.D. T89-03205), Ariemma, Townshend, Bell, April 18, 1990 .................................. 8<br />
Macapagal, Rodolfo v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-25810), D’Ignazio, February 18, 2004................................................ 15, 31<br />
Mahamat, Ali Saleh v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-04059), Sangmuah, April 13, 2005.............................................................. 6<br />
Mann, Harnek Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-6199), Wlodyka, June 5, 1987 .................................................................... 6<br />
Mann, Jagdeep Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-19094), Stein, August 5, 2005 ................................................................. 30<br />
Mann, Kirpal Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-6008), Mawani, Gill<strong>and</strong>ers, Wlodyka, April 14, 1987 ................................. 6<br />
Mariano, Edita Palacio v. M.C.I. (IAD WA5-00122), Lamont, September 20, 2006 ................................................ 32<br />
McCrea v. Bain Estate, [2004] B.C.J. No.290 (QL).................................................................................................... 17<br />
McCullough, Robert Edmund v. M.C.I. (IAD WA3-00043), Boscariol, February 5, 2004............................. 14, 15, 16<br />
McLeod, James G., The Conflict <strong>of</strong> Laws (Calgary: Carswell, 1983)....................................................................... 6, 7<br />
Mohamed, Rodal Houssein v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6790-05), Beaudry, May 24, 2006; 2006 FC<br />
696........................................................................................................................................................................... 31<br />
Molodowich v. Penttinen (1980), 17 R.F.L. (2d) 376 (Ont. Dist. Ct.) ........................................................................ 13<br />
Morris, Lawrence v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-5045-04), Pinard, March 18, 2005; 2005 FC 369 .................................. 29<br />
Nadesapillai, Sritharan v. M.C.I. (IAD T99-11883), Hoare, August 1, 2001............................................................... 7<br />
Naidu, Kamleshni Kanta v. M.C.I. (IAD VA5-00244), Sealy, February 1, 2006.................................................. 14, 20<br />
Narwal: M.E.I. v. Narwal, Surinder Kaur (F.C.A., no. A-63-89), Stone, Marceau, MacGuigan,<br />
April 6, 1990.)........................................................................................................................................................... 7<br />
Ni, Zhi Qi v. M.C.I.,(F.C. no. IMM-4385-04), Pinard, February 17, 2005; 2005 FC 241........................................... 31<br />
Orabi v. Qaoud, 2005 NSCA 28 at paragraph 14........................................................................................................ 26<br />
Oucherif, Ichrak v. M.C.I. (IAD MA4-03183), Barazi, October 27, 2005 .................................................................... 6<br />
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Ouk, Chanta v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-865-07), Mosley, September 7, 2007; 2007 FC 891....................................... 30<br />
Owusu, Margaret v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-1402-06), Harrington, October 6, 2006; 2006 FC 1195 ......................... 30<br />
Parmar, Ramesh Kumar v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-9772), Eglington, Weisdorf, Ahara, September 12,<br />
1986........................................................................................................................................................................... 8<br />
Patel, Allarakha v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-24341), Sangmuah, May 5, 2005....................................................................... 6<br />
Patel, Sunil Jayantibhai v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-19443), B<strong>and</strong>, September 28, 2006 ....................................................... 9<br />
Porteous, Robert William v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-22804), Hoare, October 27, 2004...................................................... 14<br />
Pye, Helen Leona v. M.C.I. (IAD MA5-00247), Beauchemin, September 21, 2006................................................. 8, 9<br />
Quao, Daniel Essel v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5240-99), Blais, August 15, 2000.................................................. 9<br />
Rajudeen v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), (1984), 55 N.R. 129 (F.C.A.) .............................. 18<br />
Ramdai, Miss v. M.C.I. (IAD T95-01280), Townshend, October 22. 1997 .................................................................. 7<br />
Ratnasabapathy, Jeyarajan v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-382-98), Blais, September 27, 1999 ................................. 7<br />
Roberts v. Clough, [2002] P.E.I.J. No. 37 (S.C. (T.D.)), (QL).................................................................................... 15<br />
Saini, Jaswinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD T89-07659), D'Ignazio, August 26, 1999 ......................................................... 7<br />
S<strong>and</strong>erson v. Russell (1979), 24 O.R. (2d) 429, (C.A.)................................................................................................ 17<br />
Sanichara, Omeshwar v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-5233-04), Beaudry, July 25, 2005; 2005 FC 1015 .......................... 30<br />
Sasani, Sam v. M.C.I. (IAD VA6-00727), Shahriari, September 5, 2007 ..................................................................... 6<br />
Savehilaghi, Hasan v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-02047), Kalvin, June 4, 1998 ........................................................................ 7<br />
Shaheen, Shahnaz v. M.C.I. (IAD T95-00090), Wright, February 20, 1997 ................................................................. 6<br />
Siev, Samuth v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2472-04), Rouleau, May 24, 2005; 2005 FC 736........................ 13, 14, 16, 29<br />
Singh, Amarjit v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5641-02), Snider, May 4, 2006; 2006 FC 565............................................ 14<br />
Singh, Harpreet v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-01365), Stein, May 10, 2006.............................................................................. 8<br />
Sinniah, Sinnathamby v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5954-00), Dawson, July 25, 2002; 2002 FCT<br />
822............................................................................................................................................................................. 9<br />
Sobhan, Rumana v. M.C.I. (IAD T95-07352), Boire, February 3, 1998 ....................................................................... 6<br />
Spracklin v. Kichton, [2000] A.J. No. 1329 (Q.B.), (QL)............................................................................................ 15<br />
Sullivan v. Letnik (1997), 27 R.F.L. (4 th )(Ont. C.A.) 79.............................................................................................. 17<br />
Tabesh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA3-00941), Wiebe, January 7, 2004.................................................................................... 33<br />
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Taggar: <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) v. Taggar, [1989] 3 F.C. 576....................................... 9<br />
Thauvette v. Malyon [1996] O.J. No. 1356 (QL)......................................................................................................... 17<br />
Thomson v. M.N.R., [1946] S.C.R. 209 per R<strong>and</strong> J ..................................................................................................... 26<br />
Tran, My Ha v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-01139), Singh, March 9, 1998............................................................................. 7, 8<br />
Ur-Rahman, Mohammed Ishtiaq v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-04308), Collins, January 13, 2005 ......................................... 33<br />
Ursua, Erlinda Arellano v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-08587), Boire, September 12, 2005 .............................................. 14, 20<br />
v. MacPherson (1977), 13 O.R. (2d) 233 (C.A.) ......................................................................................................... 26<br />
Virk, Sukhpal Kaur v. M.E.I. (IAD V91-01246), Wlodyka, Gill<strong>and</strong>ers, Verma, February 9, 1993 .......................... 6, 8<br />
Wen, Chun Xiu v. M.C.I. (IAD TA5-14563), MacLean, May 29, 2007 ...................................................................... 32<br />
Xu, Yuan Fei v. M.C.I. (IAD M99-04636), Sivak, June 5, 2000 ................................................................................... 8<br />
Zheng, Wei Rong v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-16616), MacLean, August 23, 2007............................................................... 32<br />
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Chapter Six<br />
Bad Faith Family Relationships<br />
THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK<br />
Introduction<br />
A Canadian citizen or permanent resident may sponsor an application for permanent<br />
residence made by a member <strong>of</strong> the family class. Section 117(1) <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Refugee</strong><br />
Protection Regulations (the “IRP Regulations”) includes “the sponsor’s spouse, common-law<br />
partner or conjugal partner” as a member <strong>of</strong> the family class.<br />
The IRP Regulations have combined in one provision – “bad faith” – a test <strong>of</strong> relationship<br />
for a number <strong>of</strong> family relationships. Section 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations provides a two-pronged<br />
test <strong>of</strong> relationship for marriage, common-law partnership, conjugal partnership <strong>and</strong> adoption.<br />
Section 4 relates to all applications not just family class applications. If both prongs <strong>of</strong> the test<br />
set out in section 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regullations are met, the foreign national shall not be considered<br />
as within the particular family relationship. For family class sponsorships, if the foreign national<br />
is not within the specified family relationship, that person will not be a member <strong>of</strong> the family<br />
class in relation to their sponsor nor will that person be considered as within the specified family<br />
relationship to the person being sponsored. In this chapter, the scope <strong>of</strong> section 4 as well as other<br />
related provisions is reviewed. How these provisions are applied to a particular family<br />
relationship will be covered in chapter 5 <strong>of</strong> this paper (Spouses, Common-Law Partners <strong>and</strong><br />
Conjugal Partners).<br />
Statutory Provisions<br />
Section 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations 1 reads as follows:<br />
For the purposes <strong>of</strong> these Regulations, a foreign national shall not be<br />
considered a spouse, a common-law partner, a conjugal partner or an<br />
adopted child <strong>of</strong> a person if the marriage, common-law partnership,<br />
conjugal partnership or adoption is not genuine <strong>and</strong> was entered into<br />
primarily for the purpose <strong>of</strong> acquiring any status or privilege under the<br />
Act.<br />
1<br />
This section was amended in 2004 to clarify the wording <strong>of</strong> the section. Prior to amendment it read as follows:<br />
“For the purposes <strong>of</strong> these Regulations, no foreign national shall be considered a spouse, a common-law<br />
partner, a conjugal partner or an adopted child <strong>of</strong> a person if the marriage, common-law partnership, conjugal<br />
partnership or adoption is not genuine or was entered into primarily for the purpose <strong>of</strong> acquiring any status or<br />
privilege under the Act.”<br />
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In 2004 2 a new provision, Section 4.1, was added to the IRP Regulations to cover the<br />
situation <strong>of</strong> a new relationship where a prior relationship was dissolved primarily for immigration<br />
purposes. Section 4.1 reads as follows:<br />
For the purposes <strong>of</strong> these Regulations, a foreign national shall not be<br />
considered a spouse, a common-law partner or a conjugal partner <strong>of</strong> a<br />
person if the foreign national has begun a new conjugal relationship with<br />
that person after a previous marriage, common-law partnership or<br />
conjugal partnership with that person was dissolved primarily so that the<br />
foreign national, another foreign national or the sponsor could acquire<br />
any status or privilege under the Act.<br />
There are other IRP Regulations that deal with the bone fides <strong>of</strong> family relationships 3 in<br />
considering whether a person is a member <strong>of</strong> the family class as follows:<br />
• Section 117(1)(g)(i) that deals with persons under 18 whom a sponsor intends to adopt in<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> requires that “the adoption is not primarily for the purpose if acquiring any privilege<br />
or status under the Act”. 4<br />
• Section 117(4)(c) that deals with an adopted child who was adopted when the child was over<br />
age 18 requires that “the adoption is not primarily for the purpose if acquiring any privilege<br />
or status under the Act”.<br />
Section 63(1) <strong>of</strong> IRPA provides for the right <strong>of</strong> appeal against a decision not to issue a<br />
permanent resident visa to a member <strong>of</strong> the family class <strong>and</strong> reads as follows:<br />
A person who has filed in the prescribed manner an application to<br />
sponsor a foreign national as a member <strong>of</strong> the family class may appeal to<br />
the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division against a decision not to issue the<br />
foreign national a permanent resident visa.<br />
Pursuant to section 65 <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Refugee</strong> Protection Act (“IRPA”), the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division may not consider humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate considerations<br />
unless the applicant is a member <strong>of</strong> the family class <strong>and</strong> their sponsor is a sponsor within the<br />
meaning <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations as:<br />
2<br />
3<br />
4<br />
SOR/2004-167, s. 3(E).<br />
A provision dealing with guardianship was never enacted.<br />
In addition, section 117(2) provides that where the child was adopted under the age <strong>of</strong> 18 years the adoption<br />
must be in the child’s best interests within the meaning <strong>of</strong> the Hague Convention on Adoption otherwise the<br />
adopted child shall not be considered a member <strong>of</strong> the family class. Under section 117(3), one <strong>of</strong> the<br />
requirements to determine whether the adoption is in the child’s best interests is that the adoption created a<br />
genuine parent-child relationship. For a discussion <strong>of</strong> this issue see the chapter in this paper on adoptions.<br />
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In an appeal under 63(1) or (2) respecting an application based on<br />
membership in the family class, the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division may<br />
not consider humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate considerations unless it has<br />
decided that the foreign national is a member <strong>of</strong> the family class <strong>and</strong> their<br />
sponsor is a sponsor within the meaning <strong>of</strong> the regulations.<br />
In order to interpret section 4 <strong>and</strong> the related provisions in the IRP Regulations, it is<br />
helpful to consider the wording <strong>of</strong> similar provisions in the <strong>Immigration</strong> Regulations, 1978 (the<br />
“former Regulations”), as there is considerable case law in relation to those provisions.<br />
Section 4(3) <strong>of</strong> the former Regulations that dealt with marriages read as follows:<br />
The family class does not include a spouse who enters into the marriage<br />
primarily for the purpose <strong>of</strong> gaining admission to <strong>Canada</strong> as a member <strong>of</strong><br />
the family class <strong>and</strong> not with the intention <strong>of</strong> residing permanently with<br />
the other spouse.<br />
Section 6(1)(d)(i) <strong>of</strong> the former Regulations that dealt with the sponsorship <strong>of</strong> fiancées 5<br />
read in part as follows:<br />
…where a member <strong>of</strong> the family class makes an application for an<br />
immigrant visa, a visa <strong>of</strong>ficer may issue an immigrant visa to the<br />
member, <strong>and</strong> the member’s accompanying dependants if … (d) in the<br />
case <strong>of</strong> a fiancée, … (i) the sponsor <strong>and</strong> the fiancée intend to reside<br />
together permanently after being married <strong>and</strong> have not become engaged<br />
primarily for the purpose <strong>of</strong> the fiancée gaining admission to <strong>Canada</strong> as a<br />
member <strong>of</strong> the family class…<br />
Sections 2(1) <strong>and</strong> 6(1)(e) <strong>of</strong> the former Regulations that dealt with adoptions read in part<br />
as follows:<br />
2(1) – “adopted” means a person who is adopted … but does not include<br />
a person who is adopted for the purpose <strong>of</strong> gaining admission to <strong>Canada</strong><br />
or gaining the admission to <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>of</strong> any <strong>of</strong> the person’s relatives.<br />
6(1)(e) - …where a member <strong>of</strong> the family class makes an application for<br />
an immigrant visa, a visa <strong>of</strong>ficer may issue an immigrant visa to the<br />
member, <strong>and</strong> the member’s accompanying dependants if … (e) in the<br />
case <strong>of</strong> a person described in paragraph (b) <strong>of</strong> the definition <strong>of</strong> “member<br />
<strong>of</strong> the family class” in subsection 2(1), or a dependant <strong>of</strong> a member <strong>of</strong> the<br />
family class, who has been adopted, the person or dependant was<br />
5<br />
It must be noted that fiancées are not members <strong>of</strong> the family class under IRPA or IRP Regulations. Section 356<br />
<strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations provides that where a fiancée application for a permanent resident visa was made before<br />
June 28, 2002, the application is governed by the former Act. See also the section in this chapter on the<br />
Transitional Provisions.<br />
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adopted before having attained 19 years <strong>of</strong> age <strong>and</strong> was not adopted for<br />
the purpose <strong>of</strong> gaining admission to <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>of</strong> the person or dependant,<br />
or gaining the admission to <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>of</strong> any <strong>of</strong> the person’s or dependant’s<br />
relatives.<br />
Type <strong>of</strong> Refusal: jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional<br />
Under the former Regulations, the onus was on the appellant to establish that the<br />
sponsored spouse was not excluded from membership in the family class by reason <strong>of</strong> the<br />
application <strong>of</strong> section 4(3) 6 or that an adopted child was not excluded from the definition <strong>of</strong><br />
“adopted”. In either case, if membership in the family class was not established, the appeal<br />
would be dismissed for lack <strong>of</strong> jurisdiction. Under the former Regulations, the <strong>Immigration</strong><br />
Appeal Division had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal with respect to a sponsorship where the<br />
applicant was not a member <strong>of</strong> the family class in relation to the sponsor.<br />
Under IRPA, the same issue arises. If a foreign national is not considered a spouse, a<br />
common-law partner, a conjugal partner or an adopted child <strong>of</strong> the sponsor due to the application<br />
<strong>of</strong> section 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations, then the foreign national is not a member <strong>of</strong> the family class<br />
with respect to his or her sponsor.<br />
Section 63(1) <strong>of</strong> IRPA provides that a person who has filed in prescribed manner an<br />
application to sponsor a foreign national as a member <strong>of</strong> family class may appeal to the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division against a decision not to issue the foreign national a permanent<br />
resident visa. Section 10(6) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations provides that a sponsorship application not<br />
made in accordance with section 10(1) is considered not to be an application filed in a prescribed<br />
manner for the purposes <strong>of</strong> section 63(1) <strong>of</strong> IRPA in which case there would be no right <strong>of</strong> appeal<br />
to the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division. Section 10(1) <strong>of</strong> IRP Regulations sets out the form <strong>and</strong><br />
content <strong>of</strong> an application. 7<br />
Section 65 <strong>of</strong> IRPA provides that in an appeal under subsection 63(1) or (2) respecting an<br />
application based on membership in the family class, the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division may not<br />
consider humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate considerations unless it has decided that the foreign<br />
national is a member <strong>of</strong> the family class <strong>and</strong> that their sponsor is a sponsor within the meaning <strong>of</strong><br />
the regulations. At issue is whether the appeal to the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division is<br />
jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional.<br />
Based on the wording <strong>of</strong> sections 63(1) <strong>and</strong> 65 <strong>of</strong> IRPA <strong>and</strong> subject to sections 10(1) <strong>and</strong><br />
10(6) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations, <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division panels have treated family class<br />
sponsorship appeals as non-jurisdictional. 8 While the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division may not be<br />
6<br />
7<br />
8<br />
M.C.I. v. Heera, Lilloutie (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5316-93), Noël, October 27, 1994.<br />
Where the sponsorship application is not filed in a prescribed manner per s. 10(6) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations, any<br />
refusal will be jurisdictional.<br />
See for example Zeng, Qing Wei v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-02640), Workun, April 22, 2003, where the appeal was<br />
dismissed as the refusal was valid in law <strong>and</strong> not dismissed for lack <strong>of</strong> jurisdiction.<br />
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able to exercise discretionary relief in favour <strong>of</strong> the appellant, it still has jurisdiction to hear the<br />
appeal. Accordingly, if the appellant is successful, the appeal will be allowed based on the<br />
refusal being not valid in law. If the appellant is not successful, the appeal will be dismissed<br />
based on the refusal being valid in law. As noted above, this can be contrasted to the situation<br />
under the former Regulations, where the appeal would have been dismissed for lack <strong>of</strong><br />
jurisdiction. Where the appellant is not successful, there will be no recourse to the discretionary<br />
jurisdiction <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division due to the application <strong>of</strong> section 65 <strong>of</strong> IRPA as<br />
the applicant will have been determined not to be a member <strong>of</strong> the family class.<br />
THE JURISPRUDENCE<br />
The Test<br />
Under the former Regulations the test for marriages for immigration purposes was twopronged;<br />
the applicant had to be caught by both prongs <strong>of</strong> the test to be excluded from the family<br />
class. To successful challenge this type <strong>of</strong> refusal, an appellant had to establish that the applicant<br />
did not enter into the marriage primarily to gain admission to <strong>Canada</strong> or that the applicant<br />
intended to reside permanent with the appellant. 9<br />
The test for adoptions for immigration purposes under the former Regulations had only<br />
one prong, the child was not to be a person adopted for the purpose <strong>of</strong> gaining admission to<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> or gaining the admission to <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>of</strong> any <strong>of</strong> the person’s relatives.<br />
The Federal Court in a number <strong>of</strong> cases including Mohamed, 10 Donkar, 11 Ouk, 12 Khella, 13<br />
<strong>and</strong> Khera 14 has concluded that “section 4 <strong>of</strong> the Regulations must be read conjunctively, that is<br />
the questioned relationship must be both not genuine <strong>and</strong> entered into primarily for the purpose<br />
<strong>of</strong> acquiring any status or privilege under the Act” 15 for the section to apply to exclude the<br />
sponsored foreign national as a member <strong>of</strong> the family class. This means that section 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP<br />
Regulations applies to a relationship described in section 4 only if both <strong>of</strong> the two prongs <strong>of</strong> the<br />
bad faith test apply to the relationship. Accordingly, to succeed in an appeal, the appellant need<br />
only show that one <strong>of</strong> the two prongs does not apply to the relationship. This is unchanged from<br />
9<br />
10<br />
11<br />
12<br />
13<br />
14<br />
15<br />
Horbas v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1985] 2 F.C. 359 (T.D.), at 369. In Sanitchar,<br />
Omeshwar v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-5233-04), Beaudry, July 25, 2005; 2005 FC 1015 the Court found that<br />
Horbas continues to be useful for the purpose <strong>of</strong> the immigration element <strong>of</strong> the bad faith test under the IRP<br />
Regulations. However, the Court noted that the element <strong>of</strong> the sponsored spouse’s intention <strong>of</strong> residing<br />
permanently with the sponsoring spouse is no longer present under section 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations.<br />
Mohamed, Rodal Houssein v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6790-05), Beaudry, June 5, 2006; 2006 FC 696.<br />
Donkar, Sumaila v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-654-06), Mosley, September 12, 2006; 2006 FC 1089.<br />
Ouk, Chanta v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-865-07), Mosley, September 7, 2007; 2007 FC 891.<br />
Khella, Palwinder Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-1811-06), de Montingny, November 10, 2006; 2006 FC<br />
1357.<br />
Khera, Amarjit v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6375-06), Martineau, June 13, 2007; 2007 FC 632.<br />
Donkar, supra, footnote 11.<br />
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section 4(3) <strong>of</strong> the former Regulations where, as noted above, both prongs must apply for a<br />
spouse to be excluded from the family class. Therefore, there is no need to pursue an analysis<br />
with respect to the second prong when the first prong is not met. 16<br />
In Ni, 17 the Court held that the test in section 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations can only be applied<br />
to a marriage defined in section 2 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations, <strong>and</strong> to interpret “genuine” as meaning<br />
“legal” would render section 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations redundant.<br />
In applying the new test, it will be necessary for the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division to<br />
consider the meaning <strong>of</strong> “genuine” <strong>and</strong> the phrase “was entered into primarily for the purpose <strong>of</strong><br />
acquiring any status or privilege under the Act.” It appears that “genuine” encompasses factors<br />
relevant to the second prong <strong>of</strong> the test from the former Regulations (“intention <strong>of</strong> residing<br />
permanently with the other spouse”), although it appears to be broader <strong>and</strong> more flexible than<br />
that test. 18 In Kang 19 the panel agreed with the submissions <strong>of</strong> counsel for the Minister that a<br />
genuine marriage is “one in which both parties are committed to living with one another for the<br />
rest <strong>of</strong> their lives.” In Ouk, 20 the Court noted that the focus <strong>of</strong> the examination under section 4 is<br />
on the relation between the couple <strong>and</strong> that “while family connections may be seen as a<br />
consideration to be weighed, the genuineness <strong>of</strong> the marriage should be a separate question from<br />
concerns about familial connections.” 21<br />
In Khera, 22 the Court in reviewing the panel’s decision that a marriage was caught by<br />
section 4 noted as follows: “Indeed, the IAD was allowed to consider, <strong>and</strong> considered in its<br />
decision, the length <strong>of</strong> the parties’ prior relationship before their arranged marriage, their age<br />
difference, their former marital or civil status, their respective financial situation <strong>and</strong><br />
employment, their family background, their knowledge <strong>of</strong> one another’s histories (including the<br />
applicant’s daughters’ ages <strong>and</strong> general situation), their language, their respective interests, the<br />
fact that the sponsoree’s mother, two <strong>of</strong> his brothers, as well as aunts <strong>and</strong> cousins were living in<br />
British Columbia, <strong>and</strong> the fact that the sponsoree had tried to come to <strong>Canada</strong> before.”<br />
Member Hoare in Chavez 23 had the following to say regarding genuineness:<br />
16<br />
17<br />
18<br />
19<br />
20<br />
21<br />
22<br />
23<br />
M.C.I. v. Davydenko, Anna (F.C. no. IMM-1482-00), Pinard, March 30, 2001; 2001 FCT 257.<br />
Ni, Zhi Qi v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-4385-04), Pinard, February 17, 2005; 2005 FC 241.<br />
For a brief discussion <strong>of</strong> section 4 in relation to adoptions see chapter 4 <strong>of</strong> this paper, with that issue considered<br />
in relation to common-law partners <strong>and</strong> conjugal partners in chapter 5 <strong>of</strong> this paper.<br />
Kang, R<strong>and</strong>ip Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-02099), Clark, June 3, 2003.<br />
Ouk, supra, footnote 12.<br />
In Ouk, supra, footnote 12, the Court noted at paragraph 17 that: “It was open to the appeal panel to find that<br />
the sponsoree is inadmissible for misrepresentation pursuant to s. 40 <strong>of</strong> the Act or that the marriage is not<br />
genuine, but the distinction between these two avenues <strong>of</strong> inquiry must be kept clearly separate.”<br />
Khera, supra, footnote 14 at paragraph 10.<br />
Chavez, Rodrigo v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-24409), Hoare, January 17, 2005 at paragraph 3.<br />
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The genuineness <strong>of</strong> the marriage is based on a number <strong>of</strong> factors. They are<br />
not identical in every appeal as the genuineness can be affected by any<br />
number <strong>of</strong> different factors in each appeal. They can include, but are not<br />
limited to, such factors as the intent <strong>of</strong> the parties to the marriage, the length<br />
<strong>of</strong> the relationship, the amount <strong>of</strong> time spent together, conduct at the time <strong>of</strong><br />
meeting, at the time <strong>of</strong> an engagement <strong>and</strong>/or the wedding, behaviour<br />
subsequent to a wedding, the level <strong>of</strong> knowledge <strong>of</strong> each other’s relationship<br />
histories, level <strong>of</strong> continuing contact <strong>and</strong> communication, the provision <strong>of</strong><br />
financial support, the knowledge <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> sharing <strong>of</strong> responsibility for the care<br />
<strong>of</strong> children brought into the marriage, the knowledge <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> contact with<br />
extended families <strong>of</strong> the parties, as well as the level <strong>of</strong> knowledge <strong>of</strong> each<br />
other’s daily lives. All these factors can be considered in determining the<br />
genuineness <strong>of</strong> a marriage.<br />
Member Hoare went on in the same paragraph to comment on the second prong <strong>of</strong> the test<br />
as follows;<br />
The second prong <strong>of</strong> the test - whether the relationship was entered into<br />
primarily for the purpose <strong>of</strong> acquiring any status <strong>of</strong> privilege under IRPA -<br />
is self-evident <strong>and</strong> self explanatory. The advantage sought in spousal<br />
appeals is generally entry to <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>and</strong> the granting to the applicant <strong>of</strong><br />
permanent resident status as a member <strong>of</strong> the family class.<br />
Under the former Regulations, the word “primarily” in section 4(3) has been defined as<br />
“<strong>of</strong> the first importance, chief.” Thus, the objective <strong>of</strong> gaining admission to <strong>Canada</strong> must be “the<br />
dominant driving force” for the marriage before an applicant is caught by section 4(3) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
former Regulations. 24 A similar argument may be made under the current provision. In Lorenz 25 ,<br />
the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division panel found that immigration was probably a factor in the<br />
applicant wanting to marry a Canadian, but that the evidence as a whole did not support a finding<br />
that it was the primary factor.<br />
The Court in Gavino 26 concluded that so long as the primary purpose <strong>of</strong> the marriage was<br />
to ensure that some privilege under IRPA would be conveyed to someone, the marriage fails the<br />
second prong <strong>of</strong> the bad faith test. Section 4 does not require a consideration <strong>of</strong> whether that<br />
primary purpose was achieved <strong>and</strong> a status or privilege was acquired. The privilege need not<br />
accrue to the person applying for permanent residence. In this case, the purpose <strong>of</strong> the marriage<br />
was to facilitate or permit the sponsorship <strong>of</strong> the person’s children.<br />
It will be necessary for the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division to differentiate between the two<br />
prongs <strong>of</strong> the test under the IRP Regulations. Is there an overlap between the first <strong>and</strong> the second<br />
24<br />
25<br />
26<br />
Singh, Ravinder Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-10228), Chu, Suppa, Eglington (dissenting), August 8, 1988, at 5.<br />
Lorenz, Hubert Calvin v. M.C.I. (IAD VA6-00444), Nest, June 15, 2007.<br />
Gavino, Edwin Dorol v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3249-05), Russell, March 9, 2006; 2006 FC 308.<br />
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prong <strong>of</strong> the new test? It will also be necessary for the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division to<br />
determine which prong would be emphasized in its decisions. As evident from the <strong>Immigration</strong><br />
Appeal Division decision in Chavez 27 , it appears emphasis is being placed on the “genuineness”<br />
first prong <strong>of</strong> the test with that prong being the first prong to be analyzed by the panel.<br />
Onus<br />
Under the former Regulations, the Minister did not have the burden on an appeal to the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division to demonstrate that the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer’s refusal <strong>of</strong> an application for<br />
permanent residence was correct. 28 The onus was on the appellant to prove that the applicant was<br />
not caught by the excluding section (such as section 4(3)) 29 or met the requirements set out in the<br />
relevant provision within section 6 (for example fiancées). Additional evidence that was not<br />
before the immigration or visa <strong>of</strong>ficer could be taken into account by the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal<br />
Division on appeal. 30<br />
Section 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations does not change the onus or evidence that may be<br />
presented at the appeal. The Federal Court has concluded that the onus is on the appellant to<br />
show that section 4 does not apply to the relationship. 31 In Thach, 32 the Court rejected the<br />
applicant’s submission that the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division erred in law by not finding that the<br />
burden shifted to the Minister once an appellant has adduced evidence in support ot the<br />
genuineness <strong>of</strong> the marriage as the onus was on the appellant to show his wife was a member <strong>of</strong><br />
the family class.<br />
Intention<br />
Under the former Regulations, the intention <strong>of</strong> the foreign spouse was paramount for<br />
spousal sponsorship refusals for immigration purposes 33 <strong>and</strong> the intention <strong>of</strong> both fiancées was<br />
27<br />
28<br />
29<br />
30<br />
31<br />
32<br />
33<br />
Chavez, supra, footnote 23.<br />
Heera, supra, footnote 6.<br />
S.G.C. v. Bisla, Satvinder (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5690-93), Denault, November 28, 1994.<br />
Kahlon, Darshan Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-115-86), Mahoney, Stone, MacGuigan, February 6, 1989.<br />
Reported: Kahlon v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1989), 7 Imm. L.R. (2d) 91 (F.C.A.).<br />
See for example Morris, Lawrence v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-5045-04), Pinard, March 18, 2005; 2005 FC 369<br />
<strong>and</strong> Khera, supra, footnote 14.<br />
Thach,Phi Anne v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-5344-06), Heneghan, February 1, 2008; 2008 FC 133.<br />
Bisla, supra, footnote 29.<br />
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elevant for fiancée sponsorship refusals for immigration purposes. 34 For adoptions sponsorships<br />
refused for immigration purposes, no guidance was provided in the definition <strong>of</strong> “adopted” as to<br />
whose intentions should be looked at (those <strong>of</strong> the adoptive parents, the natural parents, or the<br />
child).<br />
Section 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations requires the assessment <strong>of</strong> the appellant’s <strong>and</strong><br />
applicant’s intention. In Gavino, 35 the Court noted that the evidence <strong>of</strong> both spouses was<br />
relevant to determining intention. An issue to be resolved is the relative weight to be given to the<br />
appellant’s intention – should equal weight be given or should the applicant’s intention be given<br />
greater weight. In Tran 36 the panel concluded: “while the intentions <strong>of</strong> both the appellant <strong>and</strong> the<br />
applicant must now be examined, it is the applicant’s intention that will remain a key<br />
determinant.” In Duong 37 the panel determined that it is the applicant’s intention that governs<br />
stating: “… it is the applicant who wishes to come to <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>and</strong> if the applicant’s intentions<br />
show that he/she is caught by the excluding provisions, then it is my view that this should take<br />
precedence over the intentions <strong>of</strong> the appellant, which must also be assessed.”<br />
FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED<br />
As noted in by the Federal Court <strong>and</strong> by the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division in Chavez, 38<br />
there are a number <strong>of</strong> factors that assist in determining whether a relationship is genuine or<br />
whether the primary purpose <strong>of</strong> the relationship was for immigration purposes. Case law under<br />
the IRP Regulations as well as from the former Regulations (which remains relevant in<br />
considering these factors) have dealt with the following factors:<br />
A) Inconsistent or contradictory statements<br />
Where there are significant discrepancies between the information that a sponsor provides<br />
to an immigration <strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>and</strong> the information that an applicant gives to the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer abroad<br />
about such matters as the origin <strong>and</strong> development <strong>of</strong> the relationship between the couple, this<br />
may result in a refusal. Allegations that an applicant’s lack <strong>of</strong> knowledge may have been caused<br />
by difficulty with the interpretation at the interview must be supported by the evidence. 39<br />
34<br />
35<br />
36<br />
37<br />
38<br />
39<br />
Sidhu, Kulwant Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 88-35458), Ahara, Rotman, Eglington (dissenting), August 25, 1988;<br />
Rasenthiram, Kugenthiraja v. M.C.I. (IAD T98-01452), Buchanan, February 17, 1999.<br />
Gavino, supra, footnote 26.<br />
Tran, Quoc An v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-16608), MacPherson, September 26, 2003.<br />
Duong, Nhon Hao v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-19528), D’Ignazio, November 12, 2003.<br />
Chavez, supra, footnote 23.<br />
M.C.I. v. Singh, Jagdip, (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2297-01), Tremblay-Lamer, March 22, 2002; 2002 FCT 313.<br />
[Judicial review <strong>of</strong> IAD VA0-00314, Mattu, April 26, 2001]. The Appeal Division found the applicant’s <strong>and</strong><br />
sponsor’s testimony regarding the circumstances <strong>of</strong> the marriage consistent. In granting the judicial review,<br />
the Court concluded that “the evidence” did not support this finding in that the statement provided during the<br />
applicant’s immigration interview <strong>and</strong> the sponsor’s testimony were inconsistent.<br />
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As noted by the Court in Roopch<strong>and</strong> 40 : “The section [section 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations]<br />
raises questions <strong>of</strong> fact with respect to the intent <strong>and</strong> purpose <strong>of</strong> the sponsored spouse. As a<br />
practical matter, a person’s intent is not likely to be successfully tested by a grilling crossexamination<br />
designed to elicit an admission <strong>of</strong> fraud or dishonesty. Rather, in the usual case, the<br />
trier <strong>of</strong> fact will draw inferences from such things as inconsistent or contradictory statements<br />
made by the parties, the knowledge the parties have about each other <strong>and</strong> their shared history, the<br />
nature, frequency <strong>and</strong> content <strong>of</strong> communications between the parties, any financial support, <strong>and</strong><br />
any previous attempt by the applicant spouse to gain admission to <strong>Canada</strong>.”<br />
In Bhango, 41 the Court noted that there must be a link between credibility issues <strong>of</strong> an<br />
applicant <strong>and</strong> section 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations. 42<br />
Procedural fairness does not require an immigration <strong>of</strong>ficer to give spouses the<br />
opportunity to respond to discrepancies in the evidence they have presented in their separate<br />
interviews. 43<br />
B) Previous attempts by applicant to gain admission to <strong>Canada</strong><br />
Relevant, though not conclusive, 44 is the applicant’s history <strong>of</strong> previous attempts to gain<br />
admission to <strong>Canada</strong>. 45 A marriage contracted when removal from <strong>Canada</strong> is imminent, in <strong>and</strong> by<br />
itself, does not support a conclusion that the marriage is not bona fide. 46<br />
40<br />
41<br />
42<br />
43<br />
44<br />
45<br />
46<br />
Roopch<strong>and</strong>, Albert v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-1473-07), Dawson, October 26, 2007; 2007 FC 1108.<br />
Bhango, Gurpal Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-625-07), Dawson, October 5, 2007; 2007 FC 1028.<br />
The Court in overturning an <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division decision noted that the contradictions relied upon<br />
have to be relevant to the point at h<strong>and</strong> which was whether or not the marriage was primarily for the purpose <strong>of</strong><br />
acquiring a status or privilege under IRPA: Habib, Mussarat v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-5262-06), Harrington,<br />
May 16, 2007; 2007 FC 524. As noted by Justice Harrington in Owusu, Margaret v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-<br />
1402-06), Harrington, October 6, 2006; 2006 FC 1195, the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division cannot engage in<br />
conjecture as an evidentiary basis for finding that a marriage is a bad faith marriage.<br />
M.C.I. v. Dasent, Maria Jackie (F.C.A., no. A-18-95), Strayer, Linden, McDonald, January 18, 1996.<br />
S<strong>and</strong>hu, Corazon Dalmacio Campos v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-4082), Rayburn, Goodspeed, Arkin, April 7, 1987;<br />
Malik, Estelita v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-4271), Rayburn, Goodspeed, Petryshyn, April 11, 1988. A previous<br />
application for permanent residence may show an applicant has an interest in admission to <strong>Canada</strong> but that does<br />
not in itself establish that the applicant has become engaged primarily for that objective: Jung, Harry Kam v.<br />
M.E.I. (I.A.B. 84-6237), D. Davey, Chambers, Anderson, May 17, 1985. Similarly, the mere fact that an<br />
applicant has immigration problems does not necessarily lead to a conclusion that his marriage is for<br />
immigration purposes: Sau, Cecilia Mui Fong v. M.C.I. (IAD V96-00079), Boscariol, January 2, 1997.<br />
For example, marriage shortly after the refusal <strong>of</strong> a false refugee claim: Singh, Muriel v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-<br />
1098), Angé, Cardinal, Lefebvre, January 8, 1987. The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division is allowed to consider<br />
that the sponsored spouse had tried to come to <strong>Canada</strong> before: Khera, supra footnote 14. In Akhlaq, Afshan v.<br />
M.C.I. (IAD VA4-01933), Boscariol, June 16, 2005, the panel noted that the mere fact that the applicant had<br />
made an effort to leave Pakistan in the past <strong>and</strong> had possibly made a false refugee claim in France did not<br />
preclude him from entering into a genuine relationship with the appellant. In Aujla (Sidhu), Jagwinder Kaur v.<br />
M.C.I. (IAD VA5-02812), Shahriari, April 17, 2007, no negative inference was drawn from the applicant's<br />
previous unsuccessful attempt to come to <strong>Canada</strong> as an adopted child.<br />
Maire, Beata Jolanta v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5420-98), Sharlow, July 28, 1999.<br />
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C) Previous marriages<br />
Evidence <strong>of</strong> a prior marriage for immigration purposes, in <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> itself, does not generally<br />
provide a sufficient evidentiary basis for finding that a subsequent marriage is likewise one for<br />
immigration purposes. 47<br />
D) Arranged marriages<br />
The practice <strong>of</strong> arranged marriages does not in itself call into question the good faith <strong>of</strong><br />
the spouses as long as the practice is customary in their culture. 48<br />
E) Cultural Context<br />
The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division in assessing the bona fides <strong>of</strong> a marriage must take into<br />
consideration the cultural context within which the marriage took place. 49 In Dhaliwal, 50 the<br />
Court held that the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division did take into consideration the cultural context<br />
<strong>and</strong> found that the arranged marriage did not conform to Sikh tradition. The main explanation for<br />
the marriage was destiny, with no evidence being provided as to the role <strong>of</strong> destiny in Sikh<br />
culture. In Khan, 51 the Court noted that the genuineness <strong>of</strong> a spousal relationship must be<br />
examined through the eyes <strong>of</strong> the parties themselves against the cultural backdrop in which they<br />
have lived. 52<br />
F) Mutual Interest<br />
i) Knowledge about the other<br />
One <strong>of</strong> the basic indicators <strong>of</strong> mutual interest between a sponsor <strong>and</strong> applicant is<br />
knowledge about each other. However, the application <strong>of</strong> this criterion tends to vary according to<br />
the nature <strong>of</strong> the marriage, that is, whether or not the marriage was arranged by the families <strong>of</strong><br />
47<br />
48<br />
49<br />
50<br />
51<br />
52<br />
Devia, Zarish Norris v. M.C.I. (IAD T94-05862), B<strong>and</strong>, April 23, 1996. See also Martin, Juliee v. M.C.I. (IAD<br />
V95-00961), Lam, October 18, 1996. The Appeal Division’s decision was upheld on judicial review in M.C.I.<br />
v. Martin, Juliee Ida (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4068-96), Heald, August 13, 1997. In Martin, the applicant had been<br />
married twice before to Canadian women who had sponsored, but had later withdrawn, their sponsorship <strong>of</strong> his<br />
application.<br />
Brar, Baljit Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V93-02983), Clark, July 7,1995. Reported: Brar v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong><br />
Citzenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1995), 29 Imm. L.R. (2d) 186 (IAD). See also Cheng, Shawn v. M.C.I. (IAD<br />
V96-02631), Boscariol, April 27, 1998 (even though marriage arranged by sponsor’s mother had probably been<br />
for pragmatic reasons, it did not necessarily follow it was for immigration purposes). Contrast Cant, Bant<br />
Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-02643), Boscariol, January 12, 2000, where the arranged marriage defied important<br />
societal norms.<br />
Froment, Danielle Marie v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-475-06), Shore, August 24, 2006; 2006 FC 1002.<br />
Dhaliwal, Jaswinder v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-1314-07), de Montigny, October 15, 2007; 2007 FC 1051.<br />
Khan, Mohammed Farid v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-2971-06), Hughes, December 13, 2006; 2006 FC 1490.<br />
See also, Siev, Samuth v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-2472-04), Rouleau, May 24, 2005; 2005 FC 736 where the<br />
Court noted that case law has established that the evidence is not to be scrutinized <strong>and</strong> that North American<br />
reasoning should not be applied to the sponsor’s conduct.<br />
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the couple. 53 In Froment, 54 the Court found that the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division’s conclusion<br />
that the sponsored spouse knew little about his wife’s activities was justified, <strong>and</strong> the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division had the right to take this lack <strong>of</strong> knowledge into consideration.<br />
ii) Contact between the couple<br />
Of relevance in ascertaining intention is evidence suggesting that a sponsor <strong>and</strong> applicant<br />
keep in touch <strong>and</strong> avail themselves <strong>of</strong> opportunities to spend time together. This includes<br />
evidence <strong>of</strong> communication by telephone <strong>and</strong> mail; visits; cohabitation; consummation <strong>of</strong> the<br />
marriage; the sponsor’s willingness to emigrate to the applicant’s country in the event <strong>of</strong> an<br />
unsuccessful appeal; <strong>and</strong> expressions <strong>of</strong> love <strong>and</strong> affection. 55<br />
iii) Family ties<br />
Depending on the cultural or religious context, the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division will<br />
consider evidence regarding family ties, contact between the couple <strong>and</strong> their respective in-laws 56<br />
<strong>and</strong> the presence <strong>of</strong> members <strong>of</strong> both families at engagement <strong>and</strong> marriage ceremonies. 57<br />
However, as noted by the Court in Ouk, 58 the focus <strong>of</strong> the examination under<br />
section 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations “is on the relation between the couple. While family<br />
connections may be seen as a consideration to be weighed, the genuineness <strong>of</strong> the marriage<br />
should be a separate question from the concerns about family connections.”<br />
iv) Financial support <strong>and</strong> exchange <strong>of</strong> gifts<br />
53<br />
54<br />
55<br />
56<br />
57<br />
58<br />
S<strong>and</strong>hu v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), 4 Imm.L.R. (2d) 39; Bhangal, Baljit Singh v.<br />
M.E.I. (IAD W90-00173), Goodspeed, December 6, 1991. In Basi, Navjot Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-00664),<br />
Lam, July 4, 1996, an adverse inference was drawn from the applicant’s lack <strong>of</strong> knowledge <strong>of</strong> the sponsor’s<br />
education on the basis that in arranged marriages, the educational level <strong>of</strong> prospective spouses is an important<br />
criterion <strong>of</strong> compatibility.<br />
Froment, supra, footnote 49.<br />
In Coolen, Andrea Van v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 84-9741), D. Davey, Benedetti, Petryshyn, October 2, 1985, in<br />
ascertaining whether or not there was an intention to reside permanently with the other spouse, the panel took<br />
into consideration that neither the sponsor nor her spouse spent vacation or holiday time together. The panel in<br />
Chaikosky, Marianne v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 84-4156), Petryshyn, Hlady, Voorhees, June 7, 1985, took into account<br />
whether or not the sponsor would be willing to emigrate to join the applicant in the event <strong>of</strong> an unsuccessful<br />
sponsorship. See also Jassar, Surjit Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V94-01705), Lam, May 14, 1996 (sponsor at no time<br />
expressed any love or affection for the applicant).<br />
S<strong>and</strong>hu, Corazon Dalmacio Campos, supra, footnote 44.<br />
Chaikosky, supra, footnote 55, where the panel noted that there were no members from either side <strong>of</strong> the family<br />
at the civil marriage ceremony even though some <strong>of</strong> them lived in the same city where the ceremony had taken<br />
place.<br />
Ouk, supra, footnote 12.<br />
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In relation to certain cultural contexts, the exchange <strong>of</strong> gifts 59 <strong>and</strong> financial support 60 have<br />
been viewed favourably by the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division as indicators <strong>of</strong> a genuine<br />
relationship.<br />
v) Delay in submission <strong>of</strong> sponsorship application<br />
Delay in submitting a sponsorship application may not be a significant factor in<br />
repudiating the genuineness <strong>of</strong> a spousal relationship because if the marriage was for immigration<br />
purposes, “the parties would not wish to delay the sponsorship application unduly, the ultimate<br />
aim presumably, in both instances, being to get the applicant into <strong>Canada</strong> as soon as possible.” 61<br />
However, if there is no satisfactory explanation for the delay, it may be significant. 62<br />
vi) Persistence in pursuing appeal<br />
A sponsor’s persistence in pursuing an appeal from a spouse’s refusal has been taken into<br />
account in considering the genuineness <strong>of</strong> their marriage. 63<br />
v) Birth <strong>of</strong> a child<br />
In Mansro, 64 the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division panel held that while typically the birth <strong>of</strong><br />
a child is an important factor in considering whether a marriage is genuine, the existence <strong>of</strong> a<br />
child is not determinative, <strong>and</strong> in that appeal the lack <strong>of</strong> credible evidence from the appellant <strong>and</strong><br />
applicant was so striking that it overwhelmed the fact that there was a child <strong>of</strong> the marriage. In<br />
Aujla (Sidhu) 65 the panel found that absent exceptional circumstances, a reasonable person<br />
accepts the existence <strong>of</strong> a child as pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> a genuine spousal relationship.<br />
G) “Compatibility”<br />
The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division has been critical <strong>of</strong> some visa <strong>of</strong>ficers’ practice <strong>of</strong><br />
stereotyping a spousal relationship, as it is normally understood, based on the compatibility <strong>of</strong><br />
two persons as marital partners. As the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division has stated: 66<br />
It almost goes without saying that individuals with differences in religious<br />
beliefs <strong>and</strong> backgrounds regularly marry in <strong>Canada</strong>, <strong>and</strong> are not normally<br />
deemed, by virtue <strong>of</strong> that factor alone, to be incompatible as a married<br />
59<br />
60<br />
61<br />
62<br />
63<br />
64<br />
65<br />
66<br />
S<strong>and</strong>hu, Corazon Dalmacio Campos, supra, footnote 44.<br />
Virk, Raspal Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-9145), Fatsis, Arkin, Suppa, December 18, 1986. Reported: Virk v.<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1988), 2 Imm. L.R. (2d) 127 (I.A.B.).<br />
S<strong>and</strong>hu, supra, footnote 53 at 7-8.<br />
Johal, Surinder Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD V87-6546), Wlodyka, Singh, Verma, February 15, 1989.<br />
Bahal, Vijay Kumar v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-02759), Townshend, August 4, 1998.<br />
Mansro, Gurmel Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA6-00931), Miller, July 18, 2007.<br />
Aujla (Sidhu), supra, footnote 45.<br />
S<strong>and</strong>hu, Corazon Dalmacio Campos, supra, footnote 44 at 5-6.<br />
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couple. The conclusion reached by the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer that a permanent marital<br />
relationship was not contemplated appears to have been based solely on his<br />
questionable definition <strong>of</strong> a normal spousal relationship.<br />
In deciding upon the validity <strong>of</strong> refusals where incompatibility has been alleged,<br />
differences in religion, 67 education <strong>and</strong> language, 68 <strong>and</strong> age 69 have been examined. In Froment, 70<br />
the Court held that the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division could consider factors such as age <strong>and</strong><br />
differences in customs or language. It is not contrary to the Canadian Charter <strong>of</strong> Rights <strong>and</strong><br />
Freedoms to consider differences in age, education <strong>and</strong> marital status <strong>of</strong> the parties. 71<br />
H) Summary<br />
The case-law indicates that no single criterion is decisive. It is the interplay <strong>of</strong> several<br />
factors that leads the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division in any given case to make its finding as to the<br />
genuineness, the purpose for, <strong>and</strong> intentions in respect <strong>of</strong>, a marital relationship or a relationship<br />
between common law or conjugal partners. 72<br />
Timing<br />
67<br />
68<br />
69<br />
70<br />
71<br />
72<br />
See, for example, S<strong>and</strong>hu, Corazon Dalmacio Campos, supra, footnote 44, where the panel took into<br />
consideration evidence that the sponsor <strong>and</strong> applicant did not perceive differences in their religions to be<br />
problematic as they respected each other’s religion <strong>and</strong> attended each other’s place <strong>of</strong> worship together.<br />
See, for example, Dhillon, Gurprit Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 89-00571), Sherman, Ariemma, Tisshaw, August 8,<br />
1989, where the panel acknowledged that incompatibility in education <strong>and</strong> language alone were generally<br />
insufficient to found a refusal, but took them into consideration, together with other factors such as the<br />
sponsor’s lack <strong>of</strong> knowledge about his spouse’s background, to conclude that the marriage was for immigration<br />
purposes.<br />
See, for example, Dhaliwal, Rup Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V96-00458), Jackson, September 5, 1997, where the<br />
panel accepted the evidence <strong>of</strong> the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer that an age difference <strong>of</strong> two to five years is considered<br />
reasonable for purposes <strong>of</strong> compatibility in an arranged marriage <strong>and</strong> concluded that the 14-year age gap<br />
between the sponsor <strong>and</strong> applicant was not reasonable. In Glaw, Gerhard Franz v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-02268),<br />
Townshend, July 21, 1998 but for the 40-year age difference between the sponsor <strong>and</strong> applicant, the panel<br />
would have had no difficulty in concluding the relationship to be genuine. The panel concluded that the age<br />
difference ought not to change the panel’s view as it was not for the panel to judge whether or not a man in his<br />
60s should marry a woman in her late 20s, a matter <strong>of</strong> individual choice. In Sangha (M<strong>and</strong>), Narinder Kaur v.<br />
M.C.I. (IAD V97-01626), Carver, September 21, 1998, the sponsor’s astrological attributes were more<br />
important to the applicant than differences in age <strong>and</strong> marital background. In Judge, Mansoor Ali v. M.C.I.<br />
(IAD TA3-20841), Leon<strong>of</strong>f, July 25, 2005, the panel noted that while there was a considerable age difference<br />
between the parties; a finding <strong>of</strong> a bad faith relationship could not be based on the age disparity alone.<br />
Froment, supra, footnote 49.<br />
Parmar, Charanjit Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V98-04542), Boscariol, November 23, 1999.<br />
See, for example, Sidhu, Gurdip Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD W90-00023), Goodspeed, Arpin, Rayburn,<br />
September 12, 1990, where the panel gave little or no weight to evidence <strong>of</strong> differences in age <strong>and</strong> education in<br />
view <strong>of</strong> evidence <strong>of</strong> other important factors in arranging a traditional Sikh marriage.<br />
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Under the former Regulations, intention was considered as at the date <strong>of</strong> the marriage,<br />
engagement or adoption.<br />
Regarding the timing <strong>of</strong> the assessment <strong>of</strong> “genuineness’, section 4 inquires into whether<br />
or not the relationship is genuine or was entered into primarily to acquire status under IRPA.<br />
With respect to the “genuineness” prong <strong>of</strong> the test, the inquiry is phrased in the present tense<br />
“suggesting an on-going inquiry, not necessary fixed at the time <strong>of</strong> marriage.” 73 This would<br />
appear to require an assessment <strong>of</strong> the “genuineness” <strong>of</strong> the relationship as at the date <strong>of</strong> the<br />
hearing. 74<br />
The Court in Donkar noted that section 4 does not state that the time <strong>of</strong> the marriage is<br />
the time at which the genuineness <strong>of</strong> the relationship is to be assessed. The section “speaks in the<br />
present tense for a determination <strong>of</strong> the genuineness <strong>of</strong> the relationship <strong>and</strong> in the past tense for<br />
assessing the purpose for which it was created. This appears to be consistent with the practice<br />
followed by <strong>Immigration</strong> Officers in assessing spousal sponsorship applications. It appears, from<br />
the cases the Court has seen, that in interviews with claimants (sic) <strong>and</strong> their putative spouses the<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficers focus on whether there is a continuing relationship.” 75 In applying the second prong <strong>of</strong><br />
the test, the time <strong>of</strong> assessment should be the date <strong>of</strong> entry <strong>of</strong> the relationship. 76<br />
It may be necessary to consider the impact <strong>of</strong> section 121 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations <strong>and</strong><br />
whether or not that section requires that the relationship be genuine from the date <strong>of</strong> application<br />
to the final determination <strong>of</strong> the application.<br />
Evidence<br />
Under the former Regulations, evidence on the first prong <strong>of</strong> the test <strong>of</strong> whether the<br />
relationship was primarily for immigration purposes for marriages <strong>and</strong> engagements could be<br />
used in connection with the second prong <strong>of</strong> that test 77 with the analysis <strong>of</strong> most panels being<br />
directed at the primary purpose <strong>of</strong> the marriage or engagement.<br />
In Gavino, the Court could not see why the evidence examined by the <strong>Immigration</strong><br />
Appeal Division panel to decide the marriage was not genuine would not also have relevance<br />
when the panel turned its mind to motivation.” 78 There appears to be no reason why evidence<br />
from one prong <strong>of</strong> the new test cannot be used in any analysis <strong>of</strong> the second prong.<br />
73<br />
74<br />
75<br />
76<br />
77<br />
78<br />
Vuong, Phuoc v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-16835), Stein, December 22, 2003.<br />
Gill, Ranjit Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-03074), Kang, November 12, 2003.<br />
Donkar, supra, footnote 11, at paragraph 18.<br />
Donkar, supra ,footnote 11.<br />
Bisla, supra, footnote 29.<br />
Gavino, supra, footnote 26.<br />
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An issue that <strong>of</strong>ten arises in a section 4 appeal hearing is whether or not the applicant<br />
must testify, <strong>and</strong> if the applicant does not testify whether a negative inference should be drawn.<br />
In Mann, 79 a negative inference was not drawn by the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division from<br />
the applicant's failure to testify as the testimony <strong>of</strong> the appellant, combined with the<br />
documentary evidence, was sufficiently persuasive for the panel to decline to draw a negative<br />
inference from the failure <strong>of</strong> the applicant to testify. The panel noted that with respect to the<br />
second prong <strong>of</strong> the test under section 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations, the intentions <strong>of</strong> the applicant<br />
are still important, as it is the applicant who typically has the most to gain from an immigration<br />
perspective. However, with respect to the first prong <strong>of</strong> the test - whether the marriage is<br />
genuine - it is the intentions <strong>of</strong> both the appellant <strong>and</strong> applicant that are significant. By focusing<br />
the inquiry on the broad question <strong>of</strong> whether the marriage is genuine, Parliament intended a shift<br />
away from a narrow focus on the applicant's intentions at the time <strong>of</strong> the marriage. The panel<br />
held that the testimony <strong>of</strong> the appellant alone can suffice to persuade the panel <strong>of</strong> the bona fides<br />
<strong>of</strong> the parties' intentions.<br />
The panel in Mann 80 went on to note that there are cases in which the testimony <strong>of</strong> the<br />
applicant will be necessary to successfully discharge the evidentiary burden. <strong>Appeals</strong> in which it<br />
might be advisable or even necessary to call the applicant as a witness include circumstances<br />
such as the following:<br />
Where there are specific <strong>and</strong> significant inconsistencies in the record – as between the<br />
appellant <strong>and</strong> the applicant or within the applicant’s own answers;<br />
Where the applicant has a questionable immigration history;<br />
Where there is an obvious reason to question the motivation <strong>of</strong> the applicant, such as<br />
where there is persuasive evidence that the applicant is using the appellant to acquire status in<br />
<strong>Canada</strong>;<br />
Where there is minimal or inadequate documentary evidence to corroborate the testimony<br />
<strong>of</strong> the appellant.<br />
The panel noted that: “these circumstances are not exhaustive. Nor are they mutually<br />
exclusive. However, in some cases, even where the above problems exist, the appellant alone<br />
may be able to persuasively explain the problem. The decision whether to call the applicant as a<br />
witness is individual to each appeal <strong>and</strong> in the view <strong>of</strong> the panel, should be based on the quality<br />
<strong>of</strong> the available other evidence in its entirety. As noted above, even where one <strong>of</strong> the above<br />
circumstances exists, the testimony <strong>of</strong> the appellant alone may suffice to discharge the<br />
evidentiary burden. In some appeals, it may be sufficient for the applicant to provide evidence<br />
via sworn Affidavit.” 81<br />
The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division has commented in another case as follows where the<br />
sponsored spouse was not called to testify by the appellant whom the panel had found to have<br />
provided credible testimony: “The appellant made a judgment decision in this regard <strong>and</strong> he<br />
79<br />
80<br />
81<br />
Mann, Jagdeep Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-19094), Stein, August 5, 2005.<br />
Mann, supra, footnote 79 at paragraph 14.<br />
Mann, supra, footnote 79 at paragraph 15.<br />
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concluded that the applicant was not needed, <strong>and</strong> that the panel had all the evidence it needed to<br />
make its decision, I draw no adverse inference from the applicant not giving her evidence at the<br />
hearing. Her evidence in detail was given to the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>and</strong> is contained on the CAIPS<br />
notes. Some <strong>of</strong> it is accurate <strong>and</strong> some <strong>of</strong> it is not, but on balance, the panel finds that the<br />
applicant’s evidence with respect to the core issues, where it overlaps with the appellant’s<br />
evidence, does confirm <strong>and</strong> corroborate the same.” 82<br />
CHANGE IN MARITAL STATUS<br />
Where a common law or conjugal partner marries a sponsor at some time during the<br />
processing <strong>of</strong> an application for permanent residence, the issue arises whether or not to continue<br />
to treat the application as that <strong>of</strong> a common law or conjugal partner. 83<br />
A) Marriage after filing <strong>of</strong> undertaking <strong>of</strong> assistance, but before filing <strong>of</strong> application for<br />
permanent residence<br />
The relevant date for determining marital status is the date an applicant swears to the truth<br />
<strong>of</strong> the contents <strong>of</strong> the application for permanent residence. 84<br />
B) Marriage after filing <strong>of</strong> undertaking <strong>of</strong> assistance <strong>and</strong> application for permanent<br />
residence, but before refusal <strong>of</strong> application<br />
The Federal Court has held that a marriage post-dating an application for permanent<br />
residence <strong>of</strong> a fiancé(e) is irrelevant in dealing with the application. 85 The Court added that any<br />
form <strong>of</strong> marriage must be considered a positive factor in resolving the issue <strong>of</strong> the sincerity <strong>of</strong> a<br />
sponsor <strong>and</strong> applicant to be married if the applicant is admitted to <strong>Canada</strong>.<br />
C) Marriage after refusal, but before hearing <strong>of</strong> appeal<br />
The general approach, based on Kaur, 86 a case involving a fiancé(e) application under the<br />
former Regulations, is that the initial application by the applicant is to be dealt with entirely<br />
without reference to a subsequent marriage. 87<br />
82<br />
83<br />
84<br />
85<br />
86<br />
Mann, Pitter Ali Ram v. M.C.I. (IAD TA6-13395), B<strong>and</strong>, December 21, 2007 at paragraphs 15 <strong>and</strong> 16.<br />
In a case involving a fiancé under the former Regulations, the visa <strong>of</strong>fice may treat an intervening marriage as<br />
indicative <strong>of</strong> a new application: Kaur, Amarjit v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-03654), Buchanan, June 24, 1999.<br />
Owens, Christine Janet v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-615-83), Urie, Le Dain, Marceau, March 27, 1984. Thus<br />
where a sponsor married her fiancé after the undertaking <strong>of</strong> assistance was filed but before the filing <strong>of</strong> the<br />
application for permanent residence, the application ought to have been assessed as a spousal one: Gill, Balbir<br />
Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 88-00074), Wlodyka, MacLeod, Verma, February 7, 1989. As previously noted, under<br />
the IRP Regulations a fiancé(e) is not a member <strong>of</strong> the family class unless the applicant is within the definition<br />
as a common law or conjugal partner.<br />
Kaur, Gurmit v. C.E.I.C. (F.C.T.D., no. T-2490-84), Jerome, May 8, 1985. Kaur was followed in Dhaliwal,<br />
Charanjit Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-6194), Ariemma, Mawani, Singh, May 7, 1987.<br />
Kaur, supra, footnote 85.<br />
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D) Marriage after commencement, but before completion <strong>of</strong> hearing <strong>of</strong> appeal<br />
Where an applicant marries a sponsor after the commencement <strong>of</strong> the appeal hearing, the<br />
appeal is heard as a common law partner or conjugal partner appeal. 88<br />
E) Summary <strong>of</strong> change in status<br />
The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division typically views the critical time for determining the<br />
status <strong>of</strong> an applicant (i.e. spouse, common law or conjugal partner) to be the date <strong>of</strong> the<br />
swearing <strong>of</strong> the application for permanent residence, takes as determinative the applicant’s status<br />
at that point in time, <strong>and</strong> considers a subsequent marriage as evidence in favour <strong>of</strong> the<br />
genuineness <strong>of</strong> the relationship if consistent with other evidence. 89<br />
As summarized by the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division in relation to a former Regulations<br />
fiancée appeal: 90<br />
[...] in the <strong>Board</strong>’s opinion, the decision in Kahlon 91 does not, without more,<br />
have the effect <strong>of</strong> converting the application from one <strong>of</strong> a fiancée to one <strong>of</strong> a<br />
spouse, nor consequently have the effect <strong>of</strong> automatically converting an<br />
appeal from a fiancée refusal to one from a spousal refusal. What it does is<br />
to enable the <strong>Board</strong> to take into account the subsequent marriage <strong>of</strong> the<br />
parties <strong>and</strong> the circumstances surrounding it <strong>and</strong> any other evidence which<br />
exists at the time <strong>of</strong> the hearing in reaching its decision. The issue<br />
nevertheless remains the inadmissibility <strong>of</strong> the applicant as a fiancée.<br />
F) Converting spousal application to a conjugal or common law partner<br />
application<br />
In unique circumstances, 92 <strong>and</strong> sometimes with the consent <strong>of</strong> counsel for the Minister (or<br />
on the panel’s own application), the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division has “converted” a spousal<br />
87<br />
88<br />
89<br />
90<br />
91<br />
92<br />
Khella, Kulwinder Kaur v. M.E.I. (IAD V89-00179), Singh, Angé, Verma, June 29, 1989. See also Bh<strong>and</strong>hal,<br />
Amanpreet Kaur v. M.E.I. (IAD T89-06326), Bell, Tisshaw, Townshend, April 4, 1990; <strong>and</strong> Su, Khang San v.<br />
S.S.C. (IAD T93-12061), Aterman, June 1, 1994.<br />
In a fiancé appeal under the former Regulations: Chow, Wing Ken v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-9800), Tisshaw, Jew,<br />
Bell (dissenting), July 8, 1988. Reported: Chow v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1988),<br />
6 Imm. L.R. (2d) 97 (I.A.B.).<br />
See, for example, Mann, Paramjit Kaur v. M.E.I. (IAD V89-00516), Chambers, Gill<strong>and</strong>ers, Verma, March 20,<br />
1990; Bh<strong>and</strong>hal, supra, footnote 87; Ta, Suy Khuong v. M.C.I. (IAD W99-00121), D’Ignazio, November 21,<br />
2000.<br />
Gill, Manjeet Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD V87-6408), Mawani, MacLeod, Verma, August 16, 1989, at 3.<br />
Kahlon, supra, footnote 30, where it was held that a hearing <strong>of</strong> an appeal by the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal <strong>Board</strong> is a<br />
hearing de novo in a broad sense.<br />
Usually where a sponsor <strong>and</strong> applicant genuinely believe they are validly married but later discover there is a<br />
defect in regard to the marriage including an invalid proxy marriage. Under the former <strong>Immigration</strong><br />
Regulations the conversion was to the status <strong>of</strong> a fiancé(e).<br />
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application to that <strong>of</strong> a conjugal or common law partner. 93 By treating an applicant as a conjugal<br />
or common law partner, the applicant continues to be a member <strong>of</strong> the family class <strong>and</strong> the<br />
sponsor is not required to recommence the immigration process with a new application. The<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division panel in Tabesh 94 concluded that if a person applies as a member <strong>of</strong><br />
the family class as a spouse <strong>and</strong> the refusal is based on the formal validity <strong>of</strong> the marriage, it is<br />
incumbent on the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer to consider as well whether the person could be either a conjugal or<br />
common-law partner. A failure to do so could give rise to multiple refusals <strong>and</strong> appeals on<br />
essentially the same facts. The determination <strong>of</strong> all categories within the one class <strong>of</strong> marital,<br />
conjugal or common-law partners could be made by the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division even in the<br />
absence <strong>of</strong> an application by a party to amend the grounds <strong>of</strong> refusal.<br />
REPEAT APPEALS – RES JUDICATA AND ISSUE ESTOPPEL<br />
A) Introduction<br />
IRPA contemplates that there may be re-applications in immigration matters <strong>and</strong> hence<br />
the possibility <strong>of</strong> repeat appeals to the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division.<br />
In some repeat appeals, for example, from financial or medical refusals, it is<br />
acknowledged that circumstances may change following the first appeal, <strong>and</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong><br />
Appeal Division may evaluate evidence <strong>of</strong> improved fiscal or physical health on a repeat appeal<br />
from a second refusal.<br />
However, in marriage <strong>and</strong> adoption applications, there is limited fluidity with respect to<br />
the point at which the determination is made as to whether the applicant is a member <strong>of</strong> the<br />
family class: that point in time is fixed by legislation. In repeat appeals from marriage or<br />
adoption refusals, the evidence must always relate to the intention at the time the applicant was<br />
purported to become a member <strong>of</strong> the family class. Repeat appeals from these refusals require a<br />
more restrictive approach.<br />
Two tools are available to the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division to deal with attempts to<br />
relitigate unsuccessful appeals: the doctrines <strong>of</strong> res judicata <strong>and</strong> abuse <strong>of</strong> process. The former<br />
has specific criteria which must be met before it can be applied, while the latter has developed as<br />
a more flexible doctrine meant to encompass situations that may not meet the stricter res judicata<br />
criteria. While res judicata will be the most appropriate doctrine to apply in most marriage <strong>and</strong><br />
adoption repeat appeals, abuse <strong>of</strong> process is available in appropriate cases <strong>and</strong> may be used<br />
instead <strong>of</strong>, or in conjunction with, a finding <strong>of</strong> res judicata.<br />
93<br />
94<br />
Tabesh, Rita v. M.C.I. (IAD VA3-00941), Wiebe, January 7, 2004; See also, Ur-Rahman, Mohammed v. M.C.I.<br />
(IAD TA3-04308), Collins, January 13, 2005.<br />
ibid<br />
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B) Doctrine <strong>of</strong> Res Judicata<br />
Res Judicata has two forms: issue estoppel <strong>and</strong> cause <strong>of</strong> action estoppel. The form that is<br />
relevant to repeat appeals is issue estoppel <strong>and</strong> it is <strong>of</strong>ten referred to generically as res judicata.<br />
There are three requirements for issue estoppel/res judicata to apply;<br />
i. that the same question has been decided<br />
ii. that the judicial decision which is said to have created the estoppel was<br />
final; <strong>and</strong><br />
iii. that the parties to the judicial decision or their privies 95 were the same<br />
persons as the parties to the proceedings in which the estoppel is raised or<br />
their privies. 96<br />
The doctrine avoids the potential to have inconsistent decisions in which a previous<br />
decision is undermined by a finding on a repeat appeal.<br />
Issue estoppel is a common law rule <strong>of</strong> public policy that balances the right<br />
<strong>of</strong> a plaintiff to litigate an issue against the court’s concern as to duplication<br />
<strong>of</strong> process, use <strong>of</strong> its limited facilities, concern for conflicting findings <strong>of</strong><br />
fact, <strong>and</strong> for achieving justice between litigants. 97<br />
In the context <strong>of</strong> appeals before the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division, res judicata is always<br />
appropriate for consideration. This is because in the majority <strong>of</strong> repeat appeals all three criteria<br />
set out above are present. In the usual scenario the appellant has commenced a new sponsorship<br />
application following the dismissal <strong>of</strong> his first appeal. An immigration <strong>of</strong>ficer has refused the<br />
application <strong>and</strong> the appellant appeals the new refusal to the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division. The<br />
decision made by the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division on the first appeal was final <strong>and</strong> the parties<br />
(applicant, appellant <strong>and</strong> Minister) are the same. Most <strong>of</strong> the time, the remaining criterion –<br />
same question to be decided - is also met: for example, the immigration intention <strong>of</strong> the parties at<br />
the time <strong>of</strong> the marriage, the genuineness <strong>of</strong> the marriage or the genuineness <strong>of</strong> a parent/child<br />
relationship in an adoption. 98<br />
95<br />
96<br />
97<br />
98<br />
Black’s Law Dictionary defines privy as one who has acquired an interest in the subject matter affected by the<br />
judgment through or under one <strong>of</strong> the parties.<br />
Angle v. Minister <strong>of</strong> National Revenue (1974), 47 D.L.R. (3d) 544 (S.C.C.) at 555-56. See also, The Doctrine<br />
<strong>of</strong> Res Judicata in <strong>Canada</strong>, Donald J. Lange, (Butterworths, Toronto, 2000) at 23.<br />
Machin et al v. Tomlison (2000), 51 OR (3d) (OCA) 566 at 571.<br />
Sometimes the issue may be characterized as different on a second appeal, but it is really the same issue as in<br />
the first appeal because it involves an analysis <strong>of</strong> the same facts. What may be phrased as a separate issue may<br />
in fact be different facets <strong>of</strong> the same issue based on the same basic underlying facts. For example, a finding<br />
that the intention on an adoption was for immigration purposes cannot really be separated from a finding on the<br />
genuineness <strong>of</strong> the parent child relationship. The underlying facts are intertwined. Please see M.C.I. v. Sekhon,<br />
Amrik Singh (IAD T99-05069), Sangmuah, March 30, 2001, at 17, where the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division<br />
stated; “In my view, short <strong>of</strong> refusing an application or dismissing an appeal on the ground that the adoption<br />
did not comply with the laws <strong>of</strong> the jurisdiction in which it took place, a decision-maker cannot avoid an<br />
inquiry into the intent behind the adoption. A finding that it was entered into primarily for immigration<br />
purposes essentially determines the application against the applicant or the appeal against the appellant.”<br />
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The rules governing res judicata should not be mechanically applied. Once a<br />
determination is made that the criteria for res judicata are met the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division<br />
must still consider whether as a matter <strong>of</strong> discretion res judicata ought to be applied. 99 The<br />
Supreme Court <strong>of</strong> <strong>Canada</strong> in Danyluk 100 listed factors which may be considered in the exercise <strong>of</strong><br />
that discretion. The factor relevant to the Appeal Division’s exercise <strong>of</strong> discretion in res judicata<br />
motions would be the potential for injustice if the doctrine is applied. In this regard the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division will balance the public interest in the finality <strong>of</strong> litigation with the<br />
public interest in ensuring that justice is done.<br />
C) Abuse <strong>of</strong> Process<br />
Even though repeat appeals at the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division will, due to the nature <strong>of</strong><br />
the process, almost always meet the criteria for res judicata, in some cases the Appeal Division<br />
may find it more appropriate to consider applying the doctrine <strong>of</strong> abuse <strong>of</strong> process instead <strong>of</strong> or in<br />
addition to res judicata.<br />
Unlike res judicata, which requires that the same parties or their privies be involved in the<br />
earlier decision, abuse <strong>of</strong> process is not constrained by such formalities. It requires only that the<br />
same question be decided previously.<br />
Abuse <strong>of</strong> process is a discretionary principle that is not limited by any set<br />
number <strong>of</strong> categories. It is an intangible principle that is used to bar<br />
proceedings that are inconsistent with the objectives <strong>of</strong> public policy. 101<br />
In particular, it can be used to prevent the abuse <strong>of</strong> tribunal procedures by applicants who<br />
would otherwise re-apply ad infinitum. 102<br />
Rearguing a case in appeal for the sake <strong>of</strong> reargument <strong>of</strong>fends public interest.<br />
It is well recognized that superior courts have the inherent jurisdiction to<br />
prevent an abuse <strong>of</strong> their process <strong>and</strong> there is some suggestion that<br />
administrative tribunals do too. …Clearly, therefore the Appeal Division has<br />
jurisdiction to control its process <strong>and</strong> to prevent its abuse. 103<br />
99<br />
Chadha, Neena v. M.C.I. (IAD VA0-01981), Boscariol, March 26, 2002; Bhinder, Satinder Kaur v. M.C.I.<br />
(IAD TA0-20537), MacAdam, June 13, 2002.<br />
100 Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc. [2001] S.C.J. No.46, Q.L. The Supreme Court noted that the<br />
underlying purpose <strong>of</strong> res judicata is to balance the public interest in the finality <strong>of</strong> litigation with the public<br />
interest in ensuring that justice be done on the facts <strong>of</strong> a particular case. It set out a non-exhaustive list <strong>of</strong><br />
factors that a court may consider in deciding whether to exercise its discretion to apply res judicata. The factors<br />
are: the wording <strong>of</strong> the statute, the purpose <strong>of</strong> the legislation, the availability <strong>of</strong> an appeal, the safeguards<br />
available to the parties in the administrative procedure, the expertise <strong>of</strong> the administrative decision-maker, the<br />
circumstances giving rise to the prior administrative proceedings <strong>and</strong> the potential injustice. Of all theses<br />
factors, it would seem the last (potential for injustice) is the one that would be most relevant for the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division to consider before finding that an appeal is res judicata. See also Pillai,<br />
Rajkumar Vadugaiyah v. M.C.I., (F.C.T.D., Imm-6124-00), Gibson, December 21, 2001.<br />
101 Canam Enterprises Inc. v. Coles (2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 481 (O.C.A.).<br />
102 O’Brien v. <strong>Canada</strong> (1993), 153 N.R. 313 (FCA).<br />
103 Kaloti v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [2000] 3 F.C. 390 (C.A.).<br />
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Abuse <strong>of</strong> process is a particularly powerful tool for preserving tribunal resources <strong>and</strong> for<br />
upholding the integrity <strong>of</strong> the process by avoiding inconsistent results. 104 It has been held that<br />
exposing a court to the risk <strong>of</strong> inconsistent decisions is an abuse <strong>of</strong> process. 105<br />
The doctrine may be applied, out <strong>of</strong> a concern for the integrity <strong>of</strong> the process, even in the<br />
absence <strong>of</strong> inappropriate behaviour by the parties. 106 The use <strong>of</strong> abuse <strong>of</strong> process ought to be<br />
reserved for cases where there is an additional serious element present, beyond the mere fact <strong>of</strong><br />
relitigation, justifying the application <strong>of</strong> abuse <strong>of</strong> process 107 .<br />
D) Special Circumstances Exception to Res Judicata <strong>and</strong> Abuse <strong>of</strong> Process<br />
Even where all the criteria for the application <strong>of</strong> res judicata are met (same question,<br />
same parties, final decision) a repeat appeal can only be res judicata if there exist no special<br />
circumstances that would bring the appeal within the exception to the doctrine. 108<br />
The exception <strong>of</strong> special circumstances applies where in the previous proceedings there<br />
was fraud or other misconduct that raises natural justice issues. 109 In addition, the exception<br />
extends to decisive new evidence that could not have been discovered by exercise <strong>of</strong> reasonable<br />
diligence in the first proceeding. It also applies to changes in the law <strong>and</strong> public policy<br />
considerations. 110<br />
…subject to the exceptions I shall mention in a moment, no one can relitigate<br />
a cause <strong>of</strong> action or an issue that has previously been decided against him in<br />
the same court or in any equivalent court having jurisdiction in the matter<br />
where he has or could have participated in the previous proceedings unless<br />
some overriding question <strong>of</strong> fairness requires a rehearing. The exceptions to<br />
the forgoing include fraud or other misconduct in the earlier proceedings or<br />
the discovery <strong>of</strong> decisive fresh evidence which could not have been adduced<br />
at the earlier proceeding by the exercise <strong>of</strong> reasonable diligence. 111<br />
Even though the exception <strong>of</strong> special circumstances developed from the case law on res<br />
judicata, it also applies to abuse <strong>of</strong> process <strong>and</strong> each repeat appeal must be examined to ascertain<br />
if there exist special circumstances that would preclude the application <strong>of</strong> either res judicata or<br />
abuse <strong>of</strong> process.<br />
104 Lange text, supra, footnote 96 at 348.<br />
105 R. v. Duhamel (1984), 57 A.R. 204 (S.C.C.).<br />
106 Abacus Cities Ltd. (Bankrupt) v. Bank <strong>of</strong> Montreal (1987), 80 A.R 254 (C.A.) at 259.<br />
107 Dhaliwal, Baljit Kaur v. M.C.I., (F.C.T.D., IMM-1760-01), Campbell, December 21, 2001.<br />
108 The case law is clear that the existence <strong>of</strong> special circumstances such as fraud or new evidence are an exception<br />
to res judicata. See Cobb v. Holding Lumber Co. (1977), 79 D.L.R. (3d) 332 (B.C.S.C.) at 334.<br />
109 In Tut, Sukhbir Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V98-03881), Mattu, March 7, 2002 the panel found that the<br />
incompetence <strong>of</strong> previous counsel resulted in a denial <strong>of</strong> natural justice as the sponsor had been denied a full<br />
<strong>and</strong> fair hearing.<br />
110 Lange text, supra, footnote 96 at 205.<br />
111 Saskatoon Credit Union Ltd. v. Central Park Enterprises Ltd. (1998), 47 D.L.R. (4 th ) 431 at 438.<br />
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E) Are there Special Circumstances? Procedure for Assessment <strong>of</strong> Evidence in<br />
Repeat Claims<br />
The burden <strong>of</strong> pro<strong>of</strong> rests upon the person alleging that special circumstances exist. 112<br />
Therefore the appellant would have to establish that the evidence pr<strong>of</strong>fered falls within the<br />
meaning <strong>of</strong> decisive new evidence or one <strong>of</strong> the other exceptions to the doctrines.<br />
A decision on whether either doctrine is applicable to a repeat appeal should be made<br />
without an oral hearing into the merits <strong>of</strong> the appeal. 113 Since the concept behind res judicata<br />
<strong>and</strong> abuse <strong>of</strong> process is to protect the limited resources <strong>of</strong> courts <strong>and</strong> tribunals <strong>and</strong> to prevent relitigation<br />
<strong>of</strong> issues already decided by a tribunal member, it would defeat that purpose if a full<br />
hearing were held on a repeat appeal just to determine if res judicata or abuse <strong>of</strong> process<br />
applies. 114 The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division therefore, should, by way <strong>of</strong> motion, review the<br />
evidence submitted in support <strong>of</strong> the second appeal <strong>and</strong> dismiss the appeal summarily if there<br />
exist no special circumstances. 115<br />
Only if special circumstances are found, <strong>and</strong> therefore res judicata <strong>and</strong> abuse <strong>of</strong> process<br />
do not apply, should the matter proceed to a full hearing where the decisive new evidence would<br />
be considered in the context <strong>of</strong> all the evidence.<br />
…the Appeal Division has jurisdiction to control its process <strong>and</strong> to prevent<br />
its abuse. It may entertain, as it did in this case, preliminary motions to<br />
summarily dispose <strong>of</strong> an appeal which is but an abusive attempt to re-litigate<br />
what had been litigated in a previous appeal. A full hearing on the merits <strong>of</strong><br />
the appeal is not necessary. 116<br />
Submissions in writing from the Minister <strong>and</strong> the Appellant, together with supporting<br />
affidavits <strong>and</strong> other material, may be entertained on such a motion. The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal<br />
Division should be presented with a summary <strong>of</strong> the new evidence that the appellant feels<br />
supports a second appeal. 117<br />
The evaluation <strong>of</strong> the purported new evidence will be key on such motions. The nature <strong>of</strong><br />
the evidence will determine whether, barring special circumstances, the repeat appeal should be<br />
considered res judicata, abuse <strong>of</strong> process, or both.<br />
112 Lange text, supra, footnote 96 at 208.<br />
113 Sekhon, Amrik Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D. IMM-1982-01), McKeown, December 12, 2001. The Federal Court<br />
approved the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division’s practice <strong>of</strong> considering evidence in writing, without an oral<br />
hearing, on res judicata motions. (The application for judicial review in the Sekhon case was allowed on other<br />
grounds.)<br />
114 Sekhon, supra, footnote 98, at 19.<br />
115 Sekhon, supra, footnote 98. See also, Kaloti , supra, footnote 103.<br />
116 Kaloti, supra, footnote 103, at 5.<br />
117 Sekhon, supra, footnote 98.<br />
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F) Using Res Judicata <strong>and</strong> Abuse <strong>of</strong> Process<br />
Recent case law appears to minimize the clear delineation that once existed between the<br />
doctrines <strong>of</strong> res judicata <strong>and</strong> abuse <strong>of</strong> process. Lange, in his text, The Doctrine <strong>of</strong> Res Judicata<br />
in <strong>Canada</strong>, makes the following statement with respect to the overlap between res judicata <strong>and</strong><br />
abuse <strong>of</strong> process;<br />
The courts have stated that abuse <strong>of</strong> process is res judicata in the wider sense<br />
or a form <strong>of</strong> res judicata, <strong>and</strong> that abuse <strong>of</strong> process arguments are res judicata<br />
arguments in another form. To seek to litigate an issue that is barred by<br />
cause <strong>of</strong> action estoppel or issue estoppel is an abuse <strong>of</strong> process. The<br />
requirements <strong>of</strong> issue estoppel apply by analogy to the application <strong>of</strong> abuse<br />
<strong>of</strong> process <strong>and</strong> where the requirements <strong>of</strong> issue estoppel are met, it is an<br />
abuse <strong>of</strong> process by relitigation. 118<br />
It is open to the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division to apply either or both doctrines in<br />
appropriate cases. 119 In Kaloti, the Court acknowledged that res judicata may have been<br />
applicable, but on the particular facts <strong>of</strong> the case, where no new evidence was pr<strong>of</strong>fered to<br />
support the second appeal, the Court preferred to make a finding <strong>of</strong> abuse <strong>of</strong> process.<br />
The Court in Kaloti cautioned however, that one should remain aware <strong>of</strong> the distinction to<br />
be made between res judicata <strong>and</strong> abuse <strong>of</strong> process. 120<br />
The Court in Dhaliwal 121 <strong>of</strong>fers some guidance in this area. It held that it is inappropriate<br />
to make a finding <strong>of</strong> abuse <strong>of</strong> process where new evidence exists which might be relevant to the<br />
intention <strong>of</strong> the applicant at the time <strong>of</strong> the marriage or adoption. It cautions that abuse <strong>of</strong><br />
process ought to be used only in the exceptional cases.<br />
There are examples where courts have used the doctrine <strong>of</strong> abuse <strong>of</strong> process as a<br />
concurrent ground with res judicata 122 <strong>and</strong> situations where courts have declined to commit to<br />
the use <strong>of</strong> one over the other.<br />
I decline to decide whether the forgoing conclusion represents the application<br />
<strong>of</strong> a species <strong>of</strong> estoppel by res judicata or abuse <strong>of</strong> process as the result is the<br />
same. 123<br />
118 Lange text, supra, footnote 96 at 344-5.<br />
119 Sekhon, supra, footnote 98.<br />
120 In Kaloti, supra, footnote 103, the Court quoted from the judgment <strong>of</strong> Auld L.J. in Bradford & Bigley Society<br />
v. Seddon, [1999] 1 W.L.R. 1482 at 1490 (C.A.): In my judgment, it is important to distinguish clearly between<br />
res judicata <strong>and</strong> abuse <strong>of</strong> process not qualifying as res judicata, a distinction delayed by the blurring <strong>of</strong> the two<br />
in the court’s subsequent application <strong>of</strong> the above dictum, The former, in its cause <strong>of</strong> action estoppel form, is<br />
an absolute bar to re-litigation, <strong>and</strong> in its issue estoppel form also, save in “special cases” or “special<br />
circumstances” […] The latter, which may arise where there is no cause <strong>of</strong> action or issue estoppel, is not<br />
subject to the same test, the task <strong>of</strong> the court being to draw the balance between the competing claims <strong>of</strong> one<br />
party to put his case before the court <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> the other not to be unjustly hounded given the earlier history <strong>of</strong> the<br />
matter.<br />
121 Dhaliwal, supra, footnote 69.<br />
122 Lange text, supra, footnote 96 at 345.<br />
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It is suggested that the nature <strong>of</strong> the purported new evidence put forward to support a<br />
repeat appeal will determine whether one or both <strong>of</strong> the doctrines should be applied. Where there<br />
is no new evidence pr<strong>of</strong>fered or the evidence is spurious, abuse <strong>of</strong> process may be applicable <strong>and</strong><br />
appropriate. 124 In all other situations where new evidence is pr<strong>of</strong>fered that may not meet the<br />
st<strong>and</strong>ard <strong>of</strong> decisive new evidence, res judicata is the appropriate doctrine to apply.<br />
In all but exceptional circumstances, 125 the panel on the motion will not be able to make<br />
credibility assessments on the new evidence put forward to support a repeat appeal. In the<br />
absence <strong>of</strong> an opportunity to examine a witness on his or her statements, the statements must be<br />
assumed to be true.<br />
G) Evidentiary framework for the application <strong>of</strong> either res judicata or abuse <strong>of</strong><br />
process: Examination <strong>of</strong> Decisive New Evidence<br />
Decisive new evidence has been described as evidence “demonstrably capable <strong>of</strong> altering<br />
the result” 126 <strong>of</strong> the first proceeding.<br />
1. Evidence that existed at the first appeal but was not reasonably available<br />
Where the appellant presents purported new evidence, the evidence must be examined to<br />
discern if it could not reasonably have been adduced at the first appeal. 127 If it passes this test it<br />
must be further examined to see if it is decisive new evidence.<br />
Following Kular, in order to justify a hearing <strong>of</strong> the merits <strong>of</strong> the second<br />
appeal, there must be evidence which is material to the matters in issue which<br />
was not heard at the first appeal. But it must also be evidence which could<br />
not have been available using due diligence at the time <strong>of</strong> the first hearing.<br />
In short more evidence does not necessarily justify a new hearing. It is<br />
123 Saskatoon Credit, supra, footnote 111 at 438.<br />
124 Litt, Gurdev Singh v. M.C.I. (V99-03351), Baker, December 18, 2000 where a child was purportedly born to<br />
the applicant after the first hearing but where no DNA evidence was submitted, the panel held that there was no<br />
new evidence given that the panel in the first appeal did not consider the evidence <strong>of</strong> the pregnancy credible.<br />
Further, the panel found that the failure to submit DNA evidence when an adjournment was granted for the<br />
purpose was in itself an abuse <strong>of</strong> process.<br />
125 In Melo, Eduardo Manuel v. M.C.I. (IAD T94-07953), Hoare, February 7, 2001, the panel found, on a motion<br />
to reopen, that statements in the applicant’s affidavit were not persuasive as they asserted facts on an issue on<br />
which the previous panel had made negative credibility findings. See too Nijjar (Mann), Gurtejpal Kaur v.<br />
M.C.I. (IAD V98-03483), Borst, December 8, 2000 where the panel found the new evidence not to be credible,<br />
the medical tests did not prove that the couple tried to conceive. In Bassi, Viyay Kamal Lata v. M.C.I. (IAD<br />
V99-02989), Borst, October 17, 2000 the panel found the evidence concerning the pregnancy <strong>and</strong> its<br />
termination manufactured. Where the applicant made no mention <strong>of</strong> the pregnancy at his interview, despite<br />
being asked for new evidence relating to the spousal relationship, the panel found the evidence <strong>of</strong> the<br />
pregnancy not credible: Sahota, Paramjit Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA0-00929), Baker, October 31, 2000.<br />
126 Lundrigan Group Ltd. v. Pilgrim (1989), 75 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 217 (Nfld. C.A.) at 223.<br />
127 In Alzaim (Sekala), Khadija v. M.C.I. (IAD TA1-05412), Sangmuah, April 23, 2002 the panel found statements<br />
from the applicant, the sponsor’s son <strong>and</strong> various friends <strong>and</strong> family members could have been adduced in the<br />
previous proceedings by the exercise <strong>of</strong> due diligence.<br />
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evidence justifying a new hearing if <strong>and</strong> only if it is material evidence which<br />
was not available at the time <strong>of</strong> the first hearing <strong>and</strong> could not have been<br />
obtained by due diligence at that time. 128<br />
If this new evidence is found to be capable <strong>of</strong> altering the result in the first appeal (i.e.<br />
“decisive”), res judicata <strong>and</strong> abuse <strong>of</strong> process do not apply. The matter then goes to a full<br />
hearing where the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division will determine if the evidence found to be<br />
capable <strong>of</strong> altering the result does in fact produce a different disposition. 129<br />
2. Evidence that came into existence following the first appeal<br />
Within the context <strong>of</strong> a repeat appeal, it will be rare that new evidence will surface that<br />
existed at the time <strong>of</strong> the first appeal, but was not reasonably available. The more likely scenario<br />
will involve evidence that relates specifically to activities that occurred in the time period<br />
between the dismissal <strong>of</strong> the first appeal <strong>and</strong> the repeat appeal.<br />
Such evidence is clearly new evidence in the sense that it did not exist at the time <strong>of</strong> the<br />
first hearing. 130 However, it does not fall within the special circumstances exception to res<br />
judicata <strong>and</strong> abuse <strong>of</strong> process unless it is decisive new evidence.<br />
Decisive new evidence is at a minimum that which would be probative to the intention<br />
fixed in time by the relevant definition in the legislation. For example, the Court in Kaloti set out<br />
that since under section 4(3) <strong>of</strong> the former Regulations the intention <strong>of</strong> an applicant in a marriage<br />
is fixed in time <strong>and</strong> cannot be changed, a new application would have to be based on new<br />
evidence pertaining to that point in time. 131 Evidence that stems from the period <strong>of</strong> time between<br />
the two appeals ought to be further examined. 132 The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division must<br />
differentiate between that which is decisive fresh evidence <strong>and</strong> that which is merely additional<br />
128 M.C.I v. Nirwan, Malkiat Singh (IAD VA0-01903), Clark, April 24, 2001, at 5. In Hamid, Abdul v. M.C.I.<br />
(F.C., no. IMM-872-06), Martineau, February 26, 2007; 2007 FC 220, the Court held that the subsequent birth<br />
<strong>of</strong> a child does not, on its own, suffice as special circumstances. In Anttal, Narinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (F.C., no.<br />
IMM-2179-07), Snider, January 9, 2008; 2008 FC 30 the pregnancy <strong>of</strong> the sponsored spouses was found not to<br />
be decisive new evidence.<br />
129 See Sukhchain, Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD TA5-14717), MacLean, November 15, 2007 for a discussion at<br />
paragraphs 31 <strong>and</strong> 32 on how the panel proceeded to deal with the repeat appeal after the preliminary ruling by<br />
another member that res judicata did not apply to the repeat appeal.<br />
130 While courts may only consider new evidence that was in existence at the time <strong>of</strong> the previous court decision,<br />
the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division is in a unique position. Under the former <strong>Immigration</strong> Act, a person may<br />
reapply so we may look at completely new evidence that did not exist at the time <strong>of</strong> the first appeal, however<br />
that new evidence must pass several tests including its relevance to the intention <strong>of</strong> an applicant at a fixed point<br />
in time in marriages <strong>and</strong> adoptions.<br />
131 Kaloti, supra, footnote 103 at 4. Also see Sekhon, supra, footnote 98, at 12, where the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal<br />
Division discusses the fixed point in time for determining the bona fides <strong>of</strong> a parent /child relationship.<br />
132 Dhillon, Manohar Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA0-01782), Boscariol, June 29, 2001. The panel allowed the appeal<br />
in finding that the new evidence <strong>of</strong> continuing communication between the appellant <strong>and</strong> the applicant<br />
confirmed a consistent pattern <strong>of</strong> regular telephone calls made since the marriage; whereas, in Alzaim, supra,<br />
footnote 127, the panel noted the evidence <strong>of</strong> contact between the appellant <strong>and</strong> the applicant after the first<br />
appeal was new but not decisive given the totality <strong>of</strong> the evidence.<br />
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evidence. The latter is evidence, which if brought at the first appeal, may have been given<br />
significant weight, but coming after the dismissal has less probative value. Decisive fresh<br />
evidence should genuinely affect an evaluation <strong>of</strong> the intention <strong>of</strong> the parties at the time the<br />
applicant purports to become a member <strong>of</strong> the family class while additional evidence simply tries<br />
to bolster or create the intention.<br />
In both cases a res judicata analysis is applied. In the former, where it is decisive new<br />
evidence capable <strong>of</strong> altering the result, special circumstances may be established <strong>and</strong> the matter<br />
goes on to a full oral hearing on the merits. 133 In the latter, where it is merely additional new<br />
evidence, the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division may find the appeal is res judicata. 134 In addition to<br />
a finding <strong>of</strong> res judicata, the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division may find that the second appeal is an<br />
abuse <strong>of</strong> process if the nature <strong>of</strong> the additional new evidence was spurious or without much<br />
merit/substance.<br />
There may also be new evidence that indicates a genuine relationship at the time <strong>of</strong> the<br />
second appeal but does not establish that the intention existed at the time the applicant purported<br />
to become a member <strong>of</strong> the family class. While the evidence shows that a relationship may have<br />
developed after the first appeal was dismissed, the matter may still be res judicata as the time<br />
requirement for establishing the intention was not met. In these circumstances the matter would<br />
be res judicata, however a finding <strong>of</strong> abuse <strong>of</strong> process is not recommended.<br />
3. No new evidence pr<strong>of</strong>fered to support the appeal<br />
Where the appellant presents no new evidence to support a second appeal, the attempt to<br />
re-litigate the issue may properly be characterized as an abuse <strong>of</strong> process without resorting to a<br />
res judicata analysis. This was the situation in Kaloti <strong>and</strong> the Court was clear that it was not<br />
necessary in that case to apply the doctrine <strong>of</strong> res judicata.<br />
H) Res Judicata under IRPA<br />
The case law that has developed with respect to the application <strong>of</strong> res judicata <strong>and</strong> issue<br />
estoppel is based on the timing determination under the former Regulations.<br />
An issue that arose with the new legislation was whether or not res judicata continues to<br />
apply as a result <strong>of</strong> the change in wording <strong>of</strong> the test to be applied in section 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP<br />
Regulations including the change in timing <strong>of</strong> the assessment <strong>of</strong> the test. In Vuong 135 the<br />
133 Where the new evidence confirmed a continuing relationship after the first refusal <strong>and</strong> the conception <strong>of</strong> a child<br />
out <strong>of</strong> that relationship, the panel did not apply the doctrine <strong>of</strong> res judicata: Parmar, Kuljit Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD<br />
VA1-03015), Boscariol, May 13, 2002; Samra, Sukhwinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA1-01988), Boscariol,<br />
December 14, 2001. Similarly, in S<strong>and</strong>hu, R<strong>and</strong>eep Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA0-04145), Boscariol, December<br />
14, 2001 <strong>and</strong> in Gill, Harjinder Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA1-00462), Boscariol, February 8, 2002 the birth <strong>of</strong> a<br />
child is held to be “decisive new evidence”.<br />
134 Samra, Kulwinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA0-01995), Baker, June 27, 2001; Ch<strong>and</strong>, Rekha v. M.C.I. (V99-<br />
04372), Mattu, December 4, 2001; Dhaliwal, Kulwinder Kaur Nijjar v. M.C.I. (IAD V99-04535), Cochran,<br />
October 10, 2000 (reasons signed on October 31, 2000).<br />
135 Vuong, supra, footnote 73.<br />
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<strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division panel held that the changes between section 4(3) <strong>of</strong> the former<br />
Regulations <strong>and</strong> section 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations are not <strong>of</strong> sufficient legal significance to create<br />
an exception to res judicata <strong>and</strong> concluded that res judicata applied. In Lu 136 the panel adopted a<br />
different position <strong>and</strong> concluded that res judicata does not apply as while the intent <strong>and</strong> nature <strong>of</strong><br />
the inquiry into the genuineness <strong>of</strong> the relationship may be substantially the same as under the<br />
former Regulations, the broader language <strong>of</strong> section 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations requires the<br />
decision-maker to decide a different question.<br />
The Federal Court has now ruled in a number <strong>of</strong> cases 137 that the Vuong approach is<br />
correct <strong>and</strong> that except in unique or special circumstances that the principle <strong>of</strong> res judicata<br />
applies as it is not in the public interest to allow the re-litigation <strong>of</strong> failed marriage appeals unless<br />
there are special circumstances.<br />
In Rahman, the Court noted that by definition, res judicata is a pre-hearing matter that, if<br />
applied, precludes a full hearing. The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division has the authority to<br />
summarily dismiss an appeal when the appellant seeks to re-litigate on essentially the same<br />
evidence <strong>and</strong> was not required to grant him an oral hearing. 138<br />
I) Summary<br />
Repeat appeals should not proceed to a full hearing until the evidence supporting the second<br />
appeal has been evaluated, in summary proceedings, to determine if res judicata or abuse <strong>of</strong><br />
process do not apply.<br />
Unless the appellant can establish that there is evidence to bring the appeal within the<br />
special circumstances exception mentioned above, there will likely be no hearing on the merits.<br />
In most repeat appeals there will be new evidence presented in support <strong>of</strong> the second<br />
appeal that stems from the period <strong>of</strong> time between the first appeal <strong>and</strong> the second appeal. This<br />
additional evidence will usually not be decisive new evidence as it comes after a dismissal <strong>and</strong><br />
therefore does not have as much probative value as evidence presented at the first appeal. In<br />
these situations res judicata may be applied. Where the new evidence appears to be spurious a<br />
finding <strong>of</strong> abuse <strong>of</strong> process in addition to res judicata may be made. However, where the panel<br />
finds that decisive new evidence has been presented, then the repeat appeal will go to a full<br />
hearing.<br />
136 Lu, Hung Xuong (Roy) v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-02237), Workun, March 24, 2004.<br />
137 See Mohammed, Amina v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-1436-05), Shore, October 27, 2005; 2005 FC 1442.; Li v.<br />
M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-5040-05), Lemieux, June 14, 2006; 2006 FC 757; Deuk, Chy v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-<br />
1541-06), Pinard, December 19, 2006; 2006 FC 1495; Rahman, Azizur v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-1642-06),<br />
Noel, November 2, 2006; 2006 FC 1321.<br />
138 Rahman was applied in Hamid, Abdul v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-872-06), Martineau, February 26, 2007; 2007<br />
FC 220. For examples <strong>of</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division cases which deal with res judicata see Klair, Paramjit<br />
v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-09098), Sangmuah, February 22, 2006; Singh, Amrik v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-14292), Waters,<br />
September 21, 2005; Bui, Ham Hung v. M.C.I. (IAD TA5-03192), Whist, September 1, 2005; Dhaliwal, Iqbal<br />
Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA4-01638), Workun, April 1, 2005.<br />
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Where no additional evidence is brought to support a repeat appeal, a finding <strong>of</strong> abuse <strong>of</strong><br />
process is appropriate without the need to address res judicata.<br />
Prior Relationship Dissolved Primarily for <strong>Immigration</strong> Purposes – section 4.1<br />
As noted above, in 2004 a new provision, Section 4.1, was added to the IRP Regulations<br />
to cover the situation <strong>of</strong> a new relationship where a prior relationship was dissolved primarily for<br />
immigration purpose.<br />
In Mariano, 139 the appellant divorced her spouse who was medically inadmissible <strong>and</strong><br />
removed him from her application for permanent residence. After becoming a Canadian citizen<br />
she remarried her spouse <strong>and</strong> sponsored him. The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division held that section<br />
4.1 applied as the panel found that the divorce was obtained solely to remove the applicant from<br />
the appellant’s application so that she could acquire permanent residence. The panel concluded<br />
that section 4.1 was enacted to prevent couples from dissolving their relationship to gain<br />
admission to <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>and</strong> then resuming it. In Wen, 140 the panel in examining the reasons for a<br />
divorce <strong>and</strong> subsequent remarriage after one spouse became a permanent resident came to an<br />
opposite conclusion as the panel accepted the explanations for the breakdown <strong>of</strong> the first <strong>and</strong><br />
second marriages as well as the explanation for the appellant’s reconciliation <strong>and</strong> remarriage to<br />
her first husb<strong>and</strong>.<br />
In Harripersaud, 141 the panel found that Section 4.1 applied in a situation where the<br />
appellant <strong>and</strong> applicant remarried after a separation <strong>of</strong> eight years. The panel rejected counsel’s<br />
argument that section 4.1 did not apply because the appellant would not have planned such a long<br />
separation from the applicant <strong>and</strong> held that: “The simple answer to this argument is that the<br />
immigration process takes time <strong>and</strong> even more time, where, as in this case, it involves, marriage,<br />
divorce, <strong>and</strong> a subsequent marriage.” In Zheng, 142 the panel found that section 4.1 applied even<br />
though there was an intervening marriage between the first marriage to the applicant <strong>and</strong> the<br />
marriage which facilitated the appellant’s immigration to <strong>Canada</strong>. The panel came to this<br />
conclusion as otherwise the intention <strong>of</strong> Parliament would be thwarted if the effect <strong>of</strong> section 4.1<br />
could be avoided by inserting an intervening marriage in the chain <strong>of</strong> causality.<br />
Prohibited Relationships<br />
Section 117(9) includes a number <strong>of</strong> family relationships that if applicable result in the<br />
foreign national not being considered a member <strong>of</strong> the family class by virtue <strong>of</strong> that relationship.<br />
There is some overlap with section 5 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations that applies to all applications <strong>and</strong><br />
139 Mariano, Edita Palacio v. M.C.I. (IAD WA5-00122), Lamont, September 20, 2006.<br />
140 Wen, Chu Xiu v. M.C.I. (IAD TA5-14563), MacLean, May 29, 2007.<br />
141 Harripersaud, Janet Rameena v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-11611), Sangmuah, June 30, 2005.<br />
142 Zheng, Wei Rong v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-16616), MacLean, August 23, 2007.<br />
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not just applications by foreign nationals who are members <strong>of</strong> the family class. This provision is<br />
discussed in detail in chapter 5 <strong>of</strong> this paper.<br />
Transition Provisions<br />
There is a transition provision for spousal <strong>and</strong> fiancée sponsorships that were refused<br />
under the former Act <strong>and</strong> Regulations for being relationships for immigration purposes.<br />
Generally these sponsorships were refused as the applicant was determined to be a member <strong>of</strong> an<br />
inadmissible class under section 19(2)(d) <strong>of</strong> the former Act. Section 320(10) <strong>of</strong> the IRP<br />
Regulations provides that:<br />
A person is inadmissible under the <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Refugee</strong> Protection<br />
Act for failing to comply with that Act if, on the coming into force <strong>of</strong> this<br />
section, the person had been determined to be a member <strong>of</strong> an<br />
inadmissible class described in paragraph 19(1)(h) or (i) or 2(c) or (d) <strong>of</strong><br />
the former Act,…<br />
There is a transition provision for sponsorship applications <strong>of</strong> fiancées made before June<br />
28, 2002. Section 356 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations provides that:<br />
If a person referred to in paragraph (f) <strong>of</strong> the definition “member <strong>of</strong> the<br />
family class” in subsection 2(1) <strong>of</strong> the former Regulations made an<br />
application under those Regulations for a permanent resident visa before<br />
the day on which this section comes into force, the application is<br />
governed by the former Act.<br />
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CASES<br />
Abacus Cities Ltd. (Bankrupt) v. Bank <strong>of</strong> Montreal (1987), 80 A.R 254 (C.A.) ......................................................... 22<br />
Akhlaq, Afshan v. M.C.I. (IAD VA4-01933), Boscariol, June 16, 2005...................................................................... 10<br />
Alzaim (Sekala), Khadija v. M.C.I. (IAD TA1-05412), Sangmuah, April 23, 2002.............................................. 26, 27<br />
Angle v. Minister <strong>of</strong> National Revenue (1974), 47 D.L.R. (3d) 544 (S.C.C.)............................................................. 20<br />
Anttal, Narinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2179-07), Snider, January 9, 2008; 2008 FC 30............................. 26<br />
Aujla (Sidhu), Jagwinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA5-02812), Shahriari, April 17, 2007 ...................................... 10, 13<br />
Bahal, Vijay Kumar v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-02759), Townshend, August 4, 1998.......................................................... 13<br />
Basi, Navjot Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-00664), Lam, July 4, 1996............................................................................ 12<br />
Bassi, Viyay Kamal Lata v. M.C.I. (IAD V99-02989), Borst, October 17, 2000 ........................................................ 25<br />
Bh<strong>and</strong>hal, Amanpreet Kaur v. M.E.I. (IAD T89-06326), Bell, Tisshaw, Townshend, April 4, 1990......................... 18<br />
Bhangal, Baljit Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD W90-00173), Goodspeed, December 6, 1991.................................................. 12<br />
Bhango, Gurpal Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-625-07), Dawson, October 5, 2007; 2007 FC<br />
1028......................................................................................................................................................................... 10<br />
Bhinder, Satinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD TA0-20537), MacAdam, June 13, 2002 ....................................................... 21<br />
Bisla: S.G.C. v. Bisla, Satvinder (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5690-93), Denault, November 28, 1994......................... 8, 9, 16<br />
Bradford & Bigley Society v. Seddon, [1999] 1 W.L.R. 1482 at 1490 (C.A.) ............................................................. 25<br />
Brar, Baljit Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V93-02983), Clark, July 7,1995. Reported: Brar v. <strong>Canada</strong><br />
(Minister <strong>of</strong> Citzenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1995), 29 Imm. L.R. (2d) 186 (IAD) .................................................. 11<br />
Bui, Ham Hung v. M.C.I. (IAD TA5-03192), Whist, September 1, 2005 ................................................................... 29<br />
Canam Enterprises Inc. v. Coles (2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 481 (O.C.A.).......................................................................... 22<br />
Cant, Bant Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-02643), Boscariol, January 12, 2000 .............................................................. 11<br />
Chadha, Neena v. M.C.I. (IAD VA0-01981), Boscariol, March 26, 2002 .................................................................. 21<br />
Chaikosky, Marianne v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 84-4156), Petryshyn, Hlady, Voorhees, June 7, 1985 ................................... 12<br />
Ch<strong>and</strong>, Rekha v. M.C.I. (V99-04372), Mattu, December 4, 2001 ............................................................................... 27<br />
Chavez, Rodrigo v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-24409), Hoare, January 17, 2005 .............................................................. 7, 8, 9<br />
Cheng, Shawn v. M.C.I. (IAD V96-02631), Boscariol, April 27, 1998....................................................................... 11<br />
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Chow, Wing Ken v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-9800), Tisshaw, Jew, Bell (dissenting), July 8, 1988.<br />
Reported: Chow v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1988), 6 Imm. L.R.<br />
(2d) 97 (I.A.B.) ....................................................................................................................................................... 18<br />
Cobb v. Holding Lumber Co. (1977), 79 D.L.R. (3d) 332 (B.C.S.C.)......................................................................... 22<br />
Coolen, Andrea Van v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 84-9741), D. Davey, Benedetti, Petryshyn, October 2, 1985.......................... 12<br />
Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc. [2001] S.C.J. No.46, Q.L ............................................................................ 21<br />
Dasent: M.C.I. v. Dasent, Maria Jackie (F.C.A., no. A-18-95), Strayer, Linden, McDonald,<br />
January 18, 1996 ..................................................................................................................................................... 10<br />
Davydenko: M.C.I. v. Davydenko, Anna (F.C. no. IMM-1482-00), Pinard, March 30, 2001; 2001<br />
FCT 257 .................................................................................................................................................................... 6<br />
Deuk, Chy v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-1541-06), Pinard, December 19, 2006; 2006 FC 1495 ...................................... 28<br />
Devia, Zarish Norris v. M.C.I. (IAD T94-05862), B<strong>and</strong>, April 23, 1996.................................................................... 11<br />
Dhaliwal, Baljit Kaur v. M.C.I., (F.C.T.D., IMM-1760-01), Campbell, December 21, 2001..................................... 22<br />
Dhaliwal, Charanjit Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-6194), Ariemma, Mawani, Singh, May 7, 1987................................ 17<br />
Dhaliwal, Iqbal Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA4-01638), Workun, April 1, 2005.............................................................. 29<br />
Dhaliwal, Jaswinder v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-1314-07), de Montigny, October 15, 2007; 2007 FC<br />
1051......................................................................................................................................................................... 11<br />
Dhaliwal, Kulwinder Kaur Nijjar v. M.C.I. (IAD V99-04535), Cochran, October 10, 2000<br />
(reasons signed on October 31, 2000)..................................................................................................................... 27<br />
Dhaliwal, Rup Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V96-00458), Jackson, September 5, 1997 .................................................. 14, 25<br />
Dhillon, Gurprit Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 89-00571), Sherman, Ariemma, Tisshaw, August 8, 1989 ......................... 14<br />
Dhillon, Manohar Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA0-01782), Boscariol, June 29, 2001....................................................... 27<br />
Doctrine <strong>of</strong> Res Judicata in <strong>Canada</strong>, Donald J. Lange, (Butterworths, Toronto, 2000) ............................................. 20<br />
Donkar, Sumaila v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-654-06), Mosley, September 12, 2006; 2006 FC 1089.................... 5, 6, 15<br />
Duong, Nhon Hao v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-19528), D’Ignazio, November 12, 2003......................................................... 9<br />
Froment, Danielle Marie v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-475-06), Shore, August 24, 2006; 2006 FC<br />
1002............................................................................................................................................................. 11, 12, 14<br />
Gavino, Edwin Dorol v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3249-05), Russell, March 9, 2006; 2006 FC 308 .................... 8, 9, 16<br />
Gill, Balbir Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 88-00074), Wlodyka, MacLeod, Verma, February 7, 1989 ................................. 17<br />
Gill, Harjinder Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA1-00462), Boscariol, February 8, 2002....................................................... 27<br />
Gill, Manjeet Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD V87-6408), Mawani, MacLeod, Verma, August 16, 1989.................................. 18<br />
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Gill, Ranjit Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-03074), Kang, November 12, 2003 ............................................................... 15<br />
Glaw, Gerhard Franz v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-02268), Townshend, July 21, 1998.......................................................... 14<br />
Habib, Mussarat v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-5262-06), Harrington, May 16, 2007; 2007 FC 524 ................................ 10<br />
Hamid, Abdul v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-872-06), Martineau, February 26, 2007; 2007 FC 220.......................... 26, 29<br />
Harripersaud, Janet Rameena v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-11611), Sangmuah, June 30, 2005 ............................................ 30<br />
Heera: M.C.I. v. Heera, Lilloutie (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5316-93), Noël, October 27, 1994. .................................... 4, 8<br />
Horbas v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1985] 2 F.C. 359 (T.D.)........................................... 5<br />
Jassar, Surjit Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V94-01705), Lam, May 14, 1996........................................................................ 12<br />
Johal, Surinder Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD V87-6546), Wlodyka, Singh, Verma, February 15, 1989................................ 13<br />
Judge, Mansoor Ali v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-20841), Leon<strong>of</strong>f, July 25, 2005 ................................................................... 14<br />
Jung, Harry Kam v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 84-6237), D. Davey, Chambers, Anderson, May 17, 1985.................................. 10<br />
Kahlon, Darshan Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-115-86), Mahoney, Stone, MacGuigan,<br />
February 6, 1989. Reported: Kahlon v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>)<br />
(1989), 7 Imm. L.R. (2d) 91 (F.C.A.) ................................................................................................................. 8, 18<br />
Kaloti v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [2000] 3 F.C. 390 (C.A.) ................................ 22, 24, 27<br />
Kang, R<strong>and</strong>ip Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-02099), Clark, June 3, 2003 ........................................................................ 6<br />
Kaur, Amarjit v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-03654), Buchanan, June 24, 1999 ........................................................................ 17<br />
Kaur, Gurmit v. C.E.I.C. (F.C.T.D., no. T-2490-84), Jerome, May 8, 1985 ............................................................... 17<br />
Khan, Mohammed Farid v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-2971-06), Hughes, December 13, 2006; 2006<br />
FC 1490................................................................................................................................................................... 11<br />
Khella, Kulwinder Kaur v. M.E.I. (IAD V89-00179), Singh, Angé, Verma, June 29, 1989....................................... 18<br />
Khella, Palwinder Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-1811-06), de Montingny, November 10, 2006;<br />
2006 FC 1357............................................................................................................................................................ 5<br />
Khera, Amarjit v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6375-06), Martineau, June 13, 2007; 2007 FC 632 ........................ 5, 6, 8, 10<br />
Klair, Paramjit v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-09098), Sangmuah, February 22, 2006 ............................................................. 29<br />
Li v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-5040-05), Lemieux, June 14, 2006; 2006 FC 757 ........................................................... 28<br />
Litt, Gurdev Singh v. M.C.I. (V99-03351), Baker, December 18, 2000 ...................................................................... 25<br />
Lorenz, Hubert Calvin v. M.C.I. (IAD VA6-00444), Nest, June 15, 2007.................................................................... 7<br />
Lu, Hung Xuong (Roy) v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-02237), Workun, March 24, 2004......................................................... 28<br />
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Lundrigan Group Ltd. v. Pilgrim (1989), 75 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 217 (Nfld. C.A.)......................................................... 26<br />
Machin et al v. Tomlison (2000), 51 OR (3d) (OCA).................................................................................................. 20<br />
Maire, Beata Jolanta v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5420-98), Sharlow, July 28, 1999............................................. 10<br />
Malik, Estelita v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-4271), Rayburn, Goodspeed, Petryshyn, April 11, 1988 .................................... 10<br />
Mann, Jagdeep Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-19094), Stein, August 5, 2005 ................................................................. 16<br />
Mann, Paramjit Kaur v. M.E.I. (IAD V89-00516), Chambers, Gill<strong>and</strong>ers, Verma, March 20, 1990 ......................... 18<br />
Mann, Pitter Ali Ram v. M.C.I. (IAD TA6-13395), B<strong>and</strong>, December 21, 2007 at paragraphs 15<br />
<strong>and</strong> 16...................................................................................................................................................................... 17<br />
Mansro, Gurmel Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD VA6-00931), Miller, July 18, 2007 ............................................................... 13<br />
Mariano, Edita Palacio v. M.C.I. (IAD WA5-00122), Lamont, September 20, 2006 ................................................ 29<br />
Martin, Juliee v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-00961), Lam, October 18, 1996........................................................................... 11<br />
Martin: M.C.I. v. Martin, Juliee Ida (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4068-96), Heald, August 13, 1997 .................................. 11<br />
Melo, Eduardo Manuel v. M.C.I. (IAD T94-07953), Hoare, February 7, 2001 .......................................................... 25<br />
Mohamed, Rodal Houssein v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6790-05), Beaudry, June 5, 2006; 2006 FC<br />
696............................................................................................................................................................................. 5<br />
Mohammed, Amina v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-1436-05), Shore, October 27, 2005; 2005 FC 1442 ............................ 28<br />
Morris, Lawrence v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-5045-04), Pinard, March 18, 2005; 2005 FC 369 .................................... 8<br />
Ni, Zhi Qi v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-4385-04), Pinard, February 17, 2005; 2005 FC 241............................................. 6<br />
Nijjar (Mann), Gurtejpal Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V98-03483), Borst, December 8, 2000 ............................................. 25<br />
Nirwan: M.C.I v. Nirwan, Malkiat Singh (IAD VA0-01903), Clark, April 24, 2001................................................. 26<br />
O’Brien v. <strong>Canada</strong> (1993), 153 N.R. 313 (FCA) ........................................................................................................ 22<br />
Ouk, Chanta v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-865-07), Mosley, September 7, 2007; 2007 FC 891............................... 5, 6, 13<br />
Owens, Christine Janet v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-615-83), Urie, Le Dain, Marceau, March 27, 1984 ........................ 17<br />
Owusu, Margaret v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-1402-06), Harrington, October 6, 2006; 2006 FC 1195 ......................... 10<br />
Parmar, Charanjit Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V98-04542), Boscariol, November 23, 1999 ............................................. 14<br />
Parmar, Kuljit Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA1-03015), Boscariol, May 13, 2002 ............................................................. 27<br />
Pillai, Rajkumar Vadugaiyah v. M.C.I., (F.C.T.D., Imm-6124-00), Gibson, December 21, 2001.............................. 21<br />
R. v. Duhamel (1984), 57 A.R. 204 (S.C.C.) ............................................................................................................... 22<br />
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Rahman, Azizur v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-1642-06), Noel, November 2, 2006; 2006 FC 1321.................................. 28<br />
Rasenthiram, Kugenthiraja v. M.C.I. (IAD T98-01452), Buchanan, February 17, 1999.............................................. 9<br />
Roopch<strong>and</strong>, Albert v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-1473-07), Dawson, October 26, 2007; 2007 FC 1108.......................... 10<br />
Sahota, Paramjit Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA0-00929), Baker, October 31, 2000.......................................................... 25<br />
Samra, Kulwinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA0-01995), Baker, June 27, 2001 ............................................................. 27<br />
Samra, Sukhwinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA1-01988), Boscariol, December 14, 2001 ............................................ 27<br />
S<strong>and</strong>hu v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), 4 Imm.L.R. (2d) 39........................................... 12, 13<br />
S<strong>and</strong>hu, Corazon Dalmacio Campos v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-4082), Rayburn, Goodspeed, Arkin,<br />
April 7, 1987 ......................................................................................................................................... 10, 12, 13, 14<br />
S<strong>and</strong>hu, R<strong>and</strong>eep Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA0-04145), Boscariol, December 14, 2001................................................ 27<br />
Sangha (M<strong>and</strong>), Narinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-01626), Carver, September 21, 1998....................................... 14<br />
Sanitchar, Omeshwar v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-5233-04), Beaudry, July 25, 2005; 2005 FC 1015............................. 5<br />
Saskatoon Credit Union Ltd. v. Central Park Enterprises Ltd. (1998), 47 D.L.R. (4 th )........................................ 23, 25<br />
Sau, Cecilia Mui Fong v. M.C.I. (IAD V96-00079), Boscariol, January 2, 1997 ....................................................... 10<br />
Sekhon, Amrik Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D. IMM-1982-01), McKeown, December 12, 2001................................. 23, 27<br />
Sekhon: M.C.I. v. Sekhon, Amrik Singh (IAD T99-05069), Sangmuah, March 30, 2001 .......................................... 21<br />
Sidhu, Gurdip Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD W90-00023), Goodspeed, Arpin, Rayburn, September 12,<br />
1990......................................................................................................................................................................... 15<br />
Sidhu, Kulwant Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 88-35458), Ahara, Rotman, Eglington (dissenting),<br />
August 25, 1988. ....................................................................................................................................................... 9<br />
Siev, Samuth v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-2472-04), Rouleau, May 24, 2005; 2005 FC 736........................................... 12<br />
Singh, Amrik v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-14292), Waters, September 21, 2005.................................................................... 29<br />
Singh, Muriel v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-1098), Angé, Cardinal, Lefebvre, January 8, 1987............................................... 10<br />
Singh, Ravinder Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-10228), Chu, Suppa, Eglington (dissenting), August 8,<br />
1988........................................................................................................................................................................... 7<br />
Singh: M.C.I. v. Singh, Jagdip, (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2297-01), Tremblay-Lamer, March 22, 2002;<br />
2002 FCT 313 ......................................................................................................................................................... 10<br />
Su, Khang San v. S.S.C. (IAD T93-12061), Aterman, June 1, 1994............................................................................ 18<br />
Sukhchain, Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD TA5-14717), MacLean, November 15, 2007 ......................................................... 26<br />
Ta, Suy Khuong v. M.C.I. (IAD W99-00121), D’Ignazio, November 21, 2000.......................................................... 18<br />
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Tabesh, Rita v. M.C.I. (IAD VA3-00941), Wiebe, January 7, 2004............................................................................ 19<br />
Thach,Phi Anne v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-5344-06), Heneghan, February 1, 2008; 2008 FC 133................................ 8<br />
Tran, Quoc An v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-16608), MacPherson, September 26, 2003 .......................................................... 9<br />
Tut, Sukhbir Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V98-03881), Mattu, March 7, 2002..................................................................... 22<br />
Ur-Rahman, Mohammed v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-04308), Collins, January 13, 2005 ..................................................... 19<br />
Virk, Raspal Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-9145), Fatsis, Arkin, Suppa, December 18, 1986.<br />
Reported: Virk v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1988), 2 Imm. L.R. (2d)<br />
127 (I.A.B.) ............................................................................................................................................................. 13<br />
Vuong, Phuoc v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-16835), Stein, December 22, 2003................................................................ 15, 28<br />
Wen, Chu Xiu v. M.C.I. (IAD TA5-14563), MacLean, May 29, 2007 ........................................................................ 30<br />
Zeng, Qing Wei v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-02640), Workun, April 22, 2003........................................................................ 5<br />
Zheng, Wei Rong v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-16616), MacLean, August 23, 2007............................................................... 30<br />
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Chapter Seven<br />
Relationship<br />
Generally<br />
A Canadian citizen 1 or a permanent resident 2 may sponsor the application for permanent<br />
residence <strong>of</strong> a foreign national 3 who is a member <strong>of</strong> the family class. 4 A sponsorship application<br />
must precede or accompany the application for permanent residence. 5 The application for<br />
permanent residence is considered to be an application made for the principal applicant <strong>and</strong><br />
his/her accompanying family members. 6<br />
The visa shall be issued if the <strong>of</strong>ficer is satisfied that the foreign national is not<br />
inadmissible 7 <strong>and</strong> meets the requirements <strong>of</strong> the Act. 8 A foreign national is inadmissible for<br />
failing to comply with the Act through an act or omission that contravenes, directly or indirectly,<br />
a provision <strong>of</strong> the Act. 9 A foreign national is inadmissible on the grounds <strong>of</strong> an inadmissible<br />
accompanying family member <strong>and</strong> in prescribed circumstances, an inadmissible nonaccompanying<br />
family member. 10<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
4<br />
5<br />
6<br />
7<br />
8<br />
9<br />
10<br />
Section 2 <strong>of</strong> the IRPR defines “Canadian citizen” as a citizen referred to in subsection 3(1) <strong>of</strong> the Citizenship<br />
Act.<br />
Section 2(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA defines “permanent resident” as a person who has acquired permanent resident status<br />
<strong>and</strong> has not subsequently lost that status under section 46.<br />
Section 2(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA defines “foreign national” as a person who is not a Canadian citizen or a permanent<br />
resident, <strong>and</strong> includes a stateless person.<br />
Section 13(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA. See Chapter 1 for a discussion <strong>of</strong> the requirements <strong>of</strong> a sponsor.<br />
Section 10(4) <strong>of</strong> the IRPR. Section 10 sets out the form <strong>and</strong> content <strong>of</strong> the application. Information regarding<br />
all family members, whether accompanying or not, must be provided. All family members are examined<br />
except in the circumstances outlined in section 23 <strong>of</strong> the IRPR. Unexamined family members are not members<br />
<strong>of</strong> the family class pursuant to section 117(9)(d) <strong>of</strong> the IRPR. Sections 352 to 355 <strong>of</strong> the IRPR contain the<br />
transitional provisions for applications that were made under the former Act.<br />
Section 10(3) <strong>of</strong> the IRPR. “Family member” is defined in section 1(3) <strong>of</strong> the IRPR as:<br />
(a) The spouse or common law partner <strong>of</strong> the person;<br />
(b) A dependent child <strong>of</strong> the person or <strong>of</strong> the person’s spouse or common-law partner; <strong>and</strong><br />
(c) A dependent child <strong>of</strong> a dependent child referred to in paragraph (b).<br />
Sections 33 to 43 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA deal with inadmissibility.<br />
Section 11 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA. The sponsor must also meet the requirements <strong>of</strong> the Act, see again see Chapter 2.<br />
Section 25(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA gives the Minister humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate jurisdiction where the<br />
requirements cannot be met. See also sections 66, 67 <strong>and</strong> 69 <strong>of</strong> the IRPR.<br />
Section 41 <strong>of</strong> the IRPR.<br />
Section 42 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA <strong>and</strong> Section 23 <strong>of</strong> the IRPR.<br />
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Membership in the family class is determined by the relationship <strong>of</strong> the applicant to the<br />
sponsor 11 .<br />
The sponsor has the right to appeal against a decision not to issue the foreign national a<br />
permanent resident visa. 12<br />
Not a member <strong>of</strong> the Family Class 13<br />
The Definition<br />
(1) A foreign national is a member <strong>of</strong> the family class if, with respect to the sponsor, the foreign<br />
national is<br />
(a) the sponsor’s spouse, common-law partner or conjugal partner;<br />
(b) a dependent child <strong>of</strong> the sponsor;<br />
(c) the sponsor’s mother 14 or father;<br />
(d) the mother or father <strong>of</strong> the sponsor’s mother or father;<br />
(e) …. 15<br />
(f) a person whose parents are deceased, who is under 18 years <strong>of</strong> age, who is not a<br />
spouse or common-law partner <strong>and</strong> who is<br />
(i) a child <strong>of</strong> the sponsor’s mother or father,<br />
(ii) a child <strong>of</strong> a child <strong>of</strong> the sponsor’s mother or father, or<br />
(iii) a child <strong>of</strong> the sponsor’s child;<br />
(g) a person under 18 years <strong>of</strong> age whom the sponsor intends to adopt in <strong>Canada</strong>, if<br />
(i) the adoption is not primarily for the purpose <strong>of</strong> acquiring any privilege or<br />
status under the Act,<br />
(ii) where the adoption is an international adoption <strong>and</strong> the country in which<br />
the person resides <strong>and</strong> their province <strong>of</strong> intended destination are parties to the<br />
Hague Convention on Adoption, the competent authority <strong>of</strong> the country <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> the<br />
province have approved the adoption in writing as conforming to that Convention,<br />
<strong>and</strong><br />
(iii) where the adoption is an international adoption <strong>and</strong> either the country in<br />
which the person resides or the person’s province <strong>of</strong> intended destination is not a<br />
party to the Hague Convention on Adoption<br />
11<br />
12<br />
13<br />
14<br />
15<br />
Section 12(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA. See also section 117 <strong>of</strong> the IRPR.<br />
Section 63(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA. The right <strong>of</strong> appeal is restricted by section 64 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA.<br />
Section 117 <strong>of</strong> the IRPR. For a full discussion <strong>of</strong> adoptions <strong>and</strong> guardianships, see Chapter 4. For foreign<br />
marriages, common-law partners <strong>and</strong> conjugal partners, see Chapter 5. For bad faith family relationships, see<br />
Chapter 6.<br />
The term ‘mother’ (in the English version) <strong>and</strong> “parents” (in the French version) <strong>of</strong> the Regulations does not<br />
include “step-parents” as members <strong>of</strong> the family class. M.C.I. v. Vong, Chan Cam (F.C., no. IMM-1737-04),<br />
Heneghan, June 15, 2005; 2005 FC 855.<br />
Repealed, SOR/2005-61, s. 3.<br />
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(A) the person has been placed for adoption in the country in which they<br />
reside or is otherwise legally available in the country for adoption<br />
<strong>and</strong> there is no evidence that the intended adoption is for the purpose<br />
<strong>of</strong> child trafficking or undue gain within the meaning <strong>of</strong> the Hague<br />
Convention on Adoption, <strong>and</strong><br />
(B) the competent authority <strong>of</strong> the person’s province <strong>of</strong> intended<br />
destination has stated in writing that it does not object to the<br />
adoption; or 16<br />
(h) a relative 17 <strong>of</strong> the sponsor, regardless <strong>of</strong> age, if the sponsor does not have a spouse,<br />
a common-law partner, a conjugal partner, a child, a mother or father, a relative<br />
who is a child <strong>of</strong> that mother or father, a relative who is a child <strong>of</strong> a child <strong>of</strong> that<br />
mother or father, a mother or father <strong>of</strong> that mother or father or a relative who is a<br />
child <strong>of</strong> the mother or father <strong>of</strong> that mother or father<br />
(i) who is a Canadian citizen, Indian or permanent resident, or<br />
(ii) whose application to enter <strong>and</strong> remain in <strong>Canada</strong> as a permanent resident<br />
the sponsor may otherwise sponsor<br />
(2) A foreign national who is the adopted child <strong>of</strong> a sponsor <strong>and</strong> whose adoption took place<br />
when the child was under the age <strong>of</strong> 18 shall not be considered a member <strong>of</strong> the family class by<br />
virtue <strong>of</strong> that adoption unless it was in the best interests <strong>of</strong> the child within the meaning <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Hague Convention on Adoption. 18<br />
(3) .… 19<br />
(4) A foreign national who is the adopted child <strong>of</strong> a sponsor <strong>and</strong> whose adoption took place<br />
when the child was 18 years <strong>of</strong> age or older shall not be considered a member <strong>of</strong> the family<br />
class by virtue <strong>of</strong> that adoption unless it took place under the following circumstances:<br />
(a) the adoption was in accordance with the laws <strong>of</strong> the place where the adoption took<br />
place <strong>and</strong>, if the sponsor resided in <strong>Canada</strong> at the time <strong>of</strong> the adoption, the<br />
adoption was in accordance with the laws <strong>of</strong> the province where the sponsor then<br />
resided;<br />
16<br />
17<br />
18<br />
19<br />
See Chapter 4.<br />
“Relative” is defined in section 2 <strong>of</strong> the IRPR as “a person who is related to another person by blood or<br />
adoption”. This term was not defined under the former Act <strong>and</strong> Regulations <strong>and</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal<br />
Division had previously found that it should be broadly defined to include relatives by marriage. For example,<br />
see Dudecz, Ewa v. M.C.I. (IAD TA02446), Whist, December 6, 2002. That broad interpretation is no longer<br />
valid. However, the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division also considered the same section <strong>of</strong> the former Regulations<br />
in Sarmiento, Laura Victoria v. M.C.I. (IAD TA1-28226), Whist, November 1, 2002 <strong>and</strong> held that while<br />
sponsors can only sponsor one relative under a given sponsorship, it was open to sponsor a further relative on<br />
another occasion as long as the other conditions <strong>of</strong> the section were met at that specific time. “One” relative<br />
did not mean only one relative could ever be sponsored as the parliamentary intent <strong>of</strong> the section was to assist<br />
persons isolated in <strong>Canada</strong> without family. See also, supra, footnote 14 regarding the interpretation <strong>of</strong><br />
“mother”.<br />
See Chapter 4.<br />
Defines “best interests <strong>of</strong> the child”. See Chapter 4.<br />
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(b) a genuine parent-child relationship exists at the time <strong>of</strong> the adoption <strong>and</strong> existed<br />
before the child reached the age <strong>of</strong> 18; <strong>and</strong><br />
(c) the adoption is not primarily for the purpose <strong>of</strong> acquiring a status or privilege<br />
under the Act. 20<br />
(5) …. 21<br />
(6) …. 22<br />
(7) …. 23<br />
(8) …. 24<br />
(9) No foreign national may be considered a member <strong>of</strong> the family class by virtue <strong>of</strong> their<br />
relationship to a sponsor if<br />
(a) the foreign national is the sponsor’s spouse, common-law partner or conjugal<br />
partner <strong>and</strong> is under 16 years <strong>of</strong> age;<br />
(b) the foreign national is the sponsor’s spouse, common-law partner or conjugal<br />
partner, the sponsor has an existing sponsorship undertaking in respect <strong>of</strong> a<br />
spouse, common-law partner or conjugal partner <strong>and</strong> the period referred to in<br />
subsection 132(1) in respect <strong>of</strong> that undertaking has not ended;<br />
(c) the foreign national is the sponsor’s spouse <strong>and</strong><br />
(i) the sponsor or the foreign national was, at the time <strong>of</strong> their marriage, the<br />
spouse <strong>of</strong> another person, or<br />
(ii) the sponsor has lived separate <strong>and</strong> apart from the foreign national for at<br />
least one year <strong>and</strong><br />
(A) the sponsor is the common-law partner <strong>of</strong> another person or the<br />
conjugal partner <strong>of</strong> another foreign national, or<br />
(B) the foreign national is the common-law partner <strong>of</strong> another person or the<br />
conjugal partner <strong>of</strong> another sponsor, or<br />
(d) subject to subsection (10), the sponsor previously made an application for<br />
permanent residence <strong>and</strong> became a permanent resident <strong>and</strong>, at the time <strong>of</strong> that<br />
application, the foreign national was a non-accompanying family member or a<br />
former spouse or common-law partner <strong>of</strong> the sponsor <strong>and</strong> was not examined. 25<br />
20<br />
21<br />
22<br />
23<br />
24<br />
25<br />
See Chapter 4.<br />
Repealed, SOR/2005-61, s. 3.<br />
Repealed, SOR/2005-61, s. 3.<br />
Deals with written statements <strong>of</strong> competent authority from province <strong>of</strong> intended destination.<br />
Deals with new evidence received after the written statement.<br />
See also sections 4 <strong>and</strong> 5 <strong>of</strong> the IRPR. Excluded family relationships <strong>and</strong> bad faith family relationships are<br />
dealt with fully in Chapter 6.<br />
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(10) Subject to subsection (11), paragraph (9)(d) does not apply in respect <strong>of</strong> a foreign national<br />
referred to in that paragraph who was not examined because an <strong>of</strong>ficer determined that they<br />
were not required by the Act or the former Act, as applicable, to be examined.<br />
(11) Paragraph (9)(d) applies in respect <strong>of</strong> a foreign national referred to in subsection (10) if an<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficer determines that, at the time <strong>of</strong> the application referred to in that paragraph,<br />
(a) the sponsor was informed that the foreign national could be examined<br />
<strong>and</strong> the sponsor was able to make the foreign national available for<br />
examination but did not do so or the foreign national did not appear for<br />
examination; or<br />
(b) the foreign national was the sponsor’s spouse, was living separate <strong>and</strong><br />
apart from the sponsor <strong>and</strong> was not examined.<br />
(12) In subsection (10), “former Act” has the same meaning as in section 187 <strong>of</strong> the Act.<br />
Section 117(9)(d) has been the subject <strong>of</strong> intense judicial scrutiny.<br />
The scope <strong>of</strong> the Regulation is not limited to deliberate or fraudulent non-disclosure, but<br />
to any non-disclosure which may prevent examination <strong>of</strong> a dependent. Non-disclosed, nonaccompanying<br />
family members cannot be admitted as members <strong>of</strong> the family class. 26 Whatever<br />
the motive, a failure to disclose which prevents the immigration <strong>of</strong>ficer from examining the<br />
dependent precludes future sponsorship <strong>of</strong> that person as a member <strong>of</strong> the family class. 27<br />
The Act <strong>and</strong> Regulations do not create a distinction between deliberate misrepresentations<br />
<strong>and</strong> innocent misrepresentations, including those made on faulty legal advice. 28<br />
“At the time <strong>of</strong> that application” in paragraph 117(9)(d) <strong>of</strong> the Regulations contemplates<br />
the life <strong>of</strong> the application from the time when it was initiated by the filing <strong>of</strong> the authorized form<br />
to the time when permanent resident status is granted at a port <strong>of</strong> entry. 29<br />
Paragraph 117(9)(d) is constitutionally valid. In De Guzman 30<br />
Appeal answered the following certified question in the negative:<br />
the Federal Court <strong>of</strong><br />
“Is paragraph 117(9)(d) <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Refugee</strong> Protection Regulations invalid<br />
or inoperative because it is unconstitutional as it deprives the applicant <strong>of</strong> her right to liberty<br />
26<br />
27<br />
28<br />
29<br />
30<br />
Adjani, Joshua Taiwo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2033-07), Blanchard, January 10, 2008; 2008 FC 32.<br />
Chen, Hong Mei v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-8979-04), Mosley, May 12, 2005; 2005 FC 678; see also De<br />
Guzman, Josephine Soliven v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-558-04), Desjardins,Evans, Malone, December 20, 2005;<br />
2005 FCA 436.<br />
Chen, supra, footnote 27.<br />
Dela Fuente, Cleotilde v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-446-05), Noel, Sharlow, Malone, May 18, 2006; 2006 FCA<br />
186.<br />
De Guzman, supra, footnote 27.<br />
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<strong>and</strong>/or her right to security <strong>of</strong> person, in a manner not in accordance with the principle <strong>of</strong><br />
fundamental justice, contrary to section 7 <strong>of</strong> the Charter?”<br />
Further, in Adjani 31 The Federal Court held that the paragraph does not infringe an<br />
applicant’s section 15 Charter rights as there is no deferential treatment as between a child born<br />
out <strong>of</strong> wedlock 32 versus legitimate children. In Azizi 33 the Federal Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal found the<br />
paragraph not to be ultra vires the IRPA as a bar to family reunification. The paragraph simply<br />
provides that non-accompanying family members who have not been examined for a reason other<br />
than a decision by a visa <strong>of</strong>ficer 34 will not be admitted as members <strong>of</strong> the family class.<br />
Jurisdiction<br />
The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division is the competent Division <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>Refugee</strong> <strong>Board</strong> to hear appeals by a sponsor against a decision not to issue a permanent resident<br />
visa. 35 It has sole <strong>and</strong> exclusive jurisdiction to hear <strong>and</strong> determine all questions <strong>of</strong> law <strong>and</strong> fact,<br />
including questions <strong>of</strong> jurisdiction, in proceedings brought before it. 36<br />
The sponsor’s right <strong>of</strong> appeal is limited where the foreign national has been found to be<br />
inadmissible on the grounds <strong>of</strong> security, violating human or international rights, serious<br />
criminality or organized criminality. 37 Where the refusal is based on a finding <strong>of</strong><br />
misrepresentation, there is no right <strong>of</strong> appeal unless the foreign national is the sponsor’s spouse,<br />
common-law partner or child. 38 The new provision dealing with inadmissibility for<br />
misrepresentation is very broad in scope. 39 It applies to both applicants <strong>and</strong> sponsors <strong>and</strong> there is<br />
seemingly no requirement that the misrepresentation actually impacted on the application. The<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division may not consider humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate considerations<br />
31<br />
32<br />
33<br />
34<br />
35<br />
36<br />
37<br />
38<br />
39<br />
Adjani, supra, footnote 26.<br />
Woldeselassie, Tesfalem Mekonen v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3084-06), Beaudry, December 21, 2006; 2006 FC<br />
1540 was a case <strong>of</strong> innocent non-disclosure which should be limited to the facts <strong>of</strong> that particular decision. In<br />
that case the Court held that the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer erred when he said the appellant was caught by the paragraph<br />
because he did not include an allegedly “unknown” child in his application for permanent residence filed prior<br />
to the birth <strong>of</strong> the child (an impossibility).<br />
Azizi, Ahmed Salem v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-151-05), Rothstein, Linden, Pelletier, December 5, 2005; 2005<br />
FCA 406.<br />
See paragraphs 117(10) <strong>and</strong> (11). Note that it is the <strong>of</strong>ficer who must make the decision not to examine.<br />
See sections 62 <strong>and</strong> 63(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA.<br />
Section 162(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA.<br />
Section 64 (1) <strong>and</strong> (2) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA.<br />
Section 64(3) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA.<br />
Section 40 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA provides that a permanent resident or foreign national is inadmissible for a two year<br />
period for directly or indirectly misrepresenting or withholding material facts relating to a relevant matter that<br />
induces or could induce an error in the administration <strong>of</strong> the Act. A permanent resident or foreign national can<br />
also be inadmissible for being sponsored or having been sponsored by someone determined to be inadmissible<br />
for misrepresentation if the Minister is satisfied that the facts <strong>of</strong> the case justify the inadmissibility. For a full<br />
discussion, see Chapter 8, Misrepresentation.<br />
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unless it has decided that the foreign national is a member <strong>of</strong> the family class <strong>and</strong> their sponsor is<br />
a sponsor as defined. 40<br />
When a sponsored person is determined by the <strong>of</strong>ficer not eligible as a member <strong>of</strong> the<br />
family class, that person is split from the processing <strong>of</strong> the application: visas are issued to the<br />
principal applicant <strong>and</strong> other eligible family members. 41 There is no right <strong>of</strong> appeal to the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division as there is no family class refusal.<br />
In P<strong>and</strong>hi, 42 the application for permanent residence <strong>of</strong> the appellant’s parents <strong>and</strong> two<br />
brothers was refused pursuant to sections 11(1) <strong>and</strong> 42(a) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA as false birth certificates<br />
had been provided for the brothers. The principal applicant was inadmissible for serious<br />
criminality <strong>and</strong> this rendered the other applicants inadmissible as well. As well, the son whose<br />
age was misrepresented did not fall within the definition <strong>of</strong> a “dependent child” <strong>and</strong> was therefore<br />
not a member <strong>of</strong> the family class. The other purported son was also not a member <strong>of</strong> the family<br />
class, as he did not have the necessary relationship. Neither <strong>of</strong> the sons was entitled to<br />
consideration <strong>of</strong> humanitarian or compassionate factors as a result. The parents were entitled to<br />
consideration but insufficient factors existed to warrant special relief.<br />
In Kang, 43 the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division considered the scope <strong>of</strong> its jurisdiction under<br />
section 64 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA, that is, whether it is to determine if a finding described in the provision<br />
has been made or whether it is required to conduct a de novo hearing to determine whether the<br />
finding made is correct. The panel looked at the similar wording used in section 70(5) in the<br />
former Act that the Courts have interpreted to mean there was no right <strong>of</strong> appeal to the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division. Given the wording <strong>of</strong> section 64(1), it is logical that the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division would simply determine whether the relevant finding has been<br />
made rather than contest the correctness <strong>of</strong> the finding. This interpretation is consistent with the<br />
objectives <strong>of</strong> the IRPA, one <strong>of</strong> which is to streamline the immigration appeal system to avoid<br />
lengthy litigation.<br />
Timing<br />
Since the processing <strong>of</strong> applications for permanent residence can take years, the relevant<br />
definitions must be ascertained.<br />
40<br />
41<br />
42<br />
43<br />
Section 65 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA. For a full discussion <strong>of</strong> whether the refusal is jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional, see<br />
Chapter 6, Bad Faith Family Relationships.<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Manuals, Overseas Processing (OP), Chapter OP 2 at page 50.<br />
P<strong>and</strong>hi, Harinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-02813), Clark, June 27, 2003.<br />
Kang, Sarabjeet Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD TA1-13555), Sangmuah, February 24, 2004. In particular, see paragraph<br />
25:<br />
Given the wording <strong>of</strong> section 64(1), it is logical that the IAD would simply determine whether the<br />
relevant finding has been made <strong>and</strong> it is open to the appellant to dispute that no such finding has<br />
been made, as opposed to contesting the correctness <strong>of</strong> the finding. The appellant may dispute<br />
the correctness <strong>of</strong> the finding in another forum: the Federal Court.<br />
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The transitional provisions 44 <strong>of</strong> the Act provide that if the notice <strong>of</strong> appeal has been filed<br />
with the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division before June 28, 2002, the appeal shall continue under the<br />
former Act, <strong>and</strong> therefore, the former definitions apply. 45<br />
In Sinkovits, 46 the panel considered the effect <strong>of</strong> the transitional provisions contained in<br />
sections 355, 352 <strong>and</strong> section 117(9)(d) <strong>of</strong> the IRPR <strong>and</strong> their effect on section 192 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA.<br />
It held that those provisions covered applicants who were refused under the former Act because<br />
they were over 19 years <strong>of</strong> age <strong>and</strong> therefore not dependent sons or daughters but are under 22<br />
years <strong>of</strong> age <strong>and</strong> now fit within the new definition <strong>of</strong> dependent child in the IRPR. No exception<br />
was created to the application <strong>of</strong> section 192.<br />
In Noun, 47 the panel considered whether to apply the definition <strong>of</strong> orphan in the former<br />
Act or the IRPR. The appellant argued that at the time the undertaking was submitted in May <strong>of</strong><br />
2002, the applicant was under 19 years <strong>of</strong> age <strong>and</strong> acquired the right to be assessed under the<br />
former definition. The visa <strong>of</strong>ficer did not assess her application for permanent residence until<br />
after June 28, 2002 <strong>and</strong> applied the current definition. The panel held the only determination that<br />
was made before the IRPA came into force was that the appellant met the requirements for a<br />
sponsor <strong>and</strong> the undertaking would be forwarded for further processing. Therefore section 190<br />
did apply <strong>and</strong> there are no other transitional provisions that apply in these circumstances. The<br />
intent <strong>of</strong> the legislature is clear <strong>and</strong> unequivocal <strong>and</strong> the appellant cannot rely on accrued or<br />
vested rights.<br />
The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division has also had the opportunity to consider the effect <strong>of</strong><br />
sections 196 <strong>and</strong> 64 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA <strong>and</strong> their applicability to sponsorship appeals.<br />
In Williams, 48 the appeal from the refusal <strong>of</strong> the sponsored application for permanent<br />
residence was filed on November 6, 2001. The Minister sought to have the appeal discontinued<br />
under section 196 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA. The two conditions precedent to the discontinuance are that the<br />
appellant has not been granted a stay under the former Act <strong>and</strong> that the appeal could not have<br />
been made because <strong>of</strong> section 64 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA. The panel was greatly influenced by the fact that<br />
section 196 refers to section 64 which on its face applies to sponsorship appeals. Looking at the<br />
44<br />
45<br />
46<br />
47<br />
48<br />
For a full discussion <strong>of</strong> the transitional provisions, see Chapter T.<br />
Section 192 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA.<br />
Sinkovits, Zoltan v. M.C.I. (IAD TA1-20320), Whist, August 29, 2002.<br />
Noun, Pho v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-03260), MacPherson, August 27, 2003.<br />
Williams, Sophia Laverne v. M.C.I. (IAD TA1-21446), Wales, November 29, 2002. In particular, see paragraph<br />
40:<br />
In reviewing section 196 in its ordinary <strong>and</strong> grammatical sense, <strong>and</strong> in a manner to blend<br />
harmoniously with the scheme <strong>of</strong> the Act, the object <strong>of</strong> Parliament, <strong>and</strong> the intention <strong>of</strong><br />
Parliament, I am satisfied the scope <strong>of</strong> section 196 is broad enough to include sponsorship<br />
appeals. If it were not, then Parliament’s intention, as set out in the guide distributed to the<br />
Parliamentary Committee, would not be achieved.<br />
An application for judicial review was dismissed: (F.C., no. IMM-6479-02), Phelan, May 6, 2004; 2004 FC<br />
662.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Relationship - Ch. 7
scheme <strong>of</strong> the Act <strong>and</strong> the intention <strong>of</strong> Parliament, section 196 is broad enough to include<br />
sponsorship appeals.<br />
However, in Sohal, 49 the panel considered the same conditions precedent to the<br />
application <strong>of</strong> section 196. The panel found that if the intention <strong>of</strong> Parliament was to extinguish<br />
the appellant’s appeal rights under section 77(3) <strong>of</strong> the former Act, the language <strong>of</strong> section 196<br />
fails to do so. The section does not expressly state this intention <strong>and</strong> the reference to a stay<br />
makes no sense in the context <strong>of</strong> an appellant who, as a Canadian citizen, cannot be made subject<br />
to any proceedings that could lead to an immigration stay. It held that sections 196 <strong>and</strong> 197 are<br />
restricted to removal order appeals under the former Act.<br />
Specific Relationships<br />
“Dependent child”<br />
The Definition<br />
The definitions <strong>of</strong> “dependent son” <strong>and</strong> “dependent daughter” have been replaced with the<br />
single definition <strong>of</strong> “dependent child”. There is no definition <strong>of</strong> “child”. Dependent child is<br />
defined in section 2 <strong>of</strong> the Regulations as:<br />
“dependent child”, in respect <strong>of</strong> a parent, means a child who<br />
(a) has one <strong>of</strong> the following relationships with the parent, namely,<br />
(i) is the biological child <strong>of</strong> the parent, if the child has not been adopted by a person<br />
other than the spouse or common-law partner <strong>of</strong> the parent, or<br />
(ii) is the adopted child 50 <strong>of</strong> the parent; <strong>and</strong><br />
(b) is in one <strong>of</strong> the following situations <strong>of</strong> dependency, namely,<br />
(i) is less than 22 years <strong>of</strong> age <strong>and</strong> not a spouse or common-law partner,<br />
(ii) has depended substantially on the financial support <strong>of</strong> the parent since before the<br />
age <strong>of</strong> 22 - or if the child became a spouse or common-law partner before the age <strong>of</strong> 22,<br />
since becoming a spouse or common-law partner – <strong>and</strong>, since before the age <strong>of</strong> 22 or<br />
since becoming a spouse or common-law partner, as the case may be, has been a student<br />
(A) continuously enrolled in <strong>and</strong> attending a post-secondary institution that is<br />
accredited by the relevant government authority, <strong>and</strong><br />
(B) actively pursuing a course <strong>of</strong> academic, pr<strong>of</strong>essional or vocational training<br />
on a full-time basis, or<br />
(iii) is 22 years <strong>of</strong> age or older <strong>and</strong> has depended substantially on the financial support<br />
<strong>of</strong> the parent since before the age <strong>of</strong> 22 <strong>and</strong> is unable to be financially self-supporting due<br />
to a physical or mental condition.<br />
49<br />
50<br />
Sohal, Manjit Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD TA1-28054), MacPherson, November 29, 2002. An application for judicial<br />
review by the Minister was dismissed: (F.C., no.IMM-6292-02), Lutfy, May 6, 2004; 2004 FC 660.<br />
For a full discussion see Chapter 4, Adoptions.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Relationship - Ch. 7
The current definition refers to the biological child <strong>of</strong> the parent, rather than using the<br />
former term “issue”. This is not a change in substance as the Federal Court has held that “issue”<br />
required the children be biologically linked to their parents to come within the former definition<br />
<strong>of</strong> “daughter” or “son”. 51<br />
To come within the definition, the child has to establish dependency either by showing he<br />
or she is under 22 years <strong>of</strong> age <strong>and</strong> not a spouse or a common-law partner, 52 or by showing he or<br />
she is financially dependent due to student status or a physical or mental condition.<br />
Timing<br />
Section 121 <strong>of</strong> the Regulations sets at what time the requirements must be met:<br />
121. The requirements with respect to a person who is a member <strong>of</strong> the<br />
family class or a family member <strong>of</strong> a member <strong>of</strong> the family class who makes<br />
an application under Division 6 <strong>of</strong> Part 5 are the following;<br />
(a) the person is a family member <strong>of</strong> the applicant or <strong>of</strong> the sponsor both at<br />
the time the application is made <strong>and</strong>, without taking into account whether the<br />
person has attained 22 years <strong>of</strong> age, at the time <strong>of</strong> the determination <strong>of</strong> the<br />
application; <strong>and</strong><br />
(b) …. 53<br />
Section 67(1) <strong>of</strong> the Act makes reference to the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division being<br />
satisfied at “the time that the appeal is disposed <strong>of</strong>”. Unfortunately, this does not seem to clarify<br />
whether the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division should consider the situation as at the time <strong>of</strong> the<br />
refusal or the date <strong>of</strong> the hearing.<br />
Under paragraph (b)(i), the child must be under 22 years <strong>of</strong> age <strong>and</strong> not a spouse or<br />
common-law partner when the application is made <strong>and</strong> without taking into account their age, they<br />
must continue not to be a spouse or a common-law partner when the visa is issued. Becoming a<br />
spouse or common law partner after turning 22 is a disqualifying characteristic. 54<br />
Under paragraph (b)(ii), the child must, since before the age <strong>of</strong> 22 or since becoming a<br />
spouse or common-law partner, be financially dependent <strong>and</strong> continuously enrolled, in attendance<br />
51<br />
52<br />
53<br />
54<br />
M.A.O. v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no IMM-459-02), Heneghan, December 12, 2003; 2003 FC 1406.<br />
CIC <strong>Immigration</strong> Manual, OP 2 page 16, s.5.13 states that “[a] dependent child who is single, divorced,<br />
widowed, or whose marriage has been annulled is not a spouse. Similarly, if the dependent child was involved<br />
in a common-law relationship but that relationship no longer exists, they may be considered to meet the<br />
definition.”<br />
Repealed, SOR/2004-167, s. 42.<br />
Dehar, Rupinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2281-06), de Montigny, May 28, 2007; 2007 FC 558.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Relationship - Ch. 7
<strong>and</strong> actively pursuing a course <strong>of</strong> study at an accredited post-secondary school, both at the time<br />
the application is made <strong>and</strong> the visa issued. 55<br />
Under paragraph (b)(iii), the child must, since before the age <strong>of</strong> 22, have been financially<br />
dependent due to a physical or mental condition when the application was made <strong>and</strong> that<br />
dependency must continue at the date the visa is issued. 56<br />
Student Status<br />
Paragraph (b)(ii) <strong>of</strong> the definition <strong>of</strong> “dependent child” still has two requirements: one<br />
relates to student status, the other to financial dependency <strong>and</strong> both must be met to satisfy the<br />
definition. No substantive change has been made to the financial dependency requirement. Some<br />
<strong>of</strong> the older cases dealing with financial dependency are as follows:<br />
In Szikora-Rehak, 57 the Appeal Division considered whether sums collected by the<br />
applicant through employment associated with practicum assignments would be sufficient to<br />
finance studies or cover daily expenses <strong>and</strong> found the applicant continued to be financially<br />
dependent.<br />
The Appeal Division held in another decision, 58 when considering the issue <strong>of</strong> financial<br />
dependency, that the degree <strong>of</strong> financial support is to be determined by looking at the entire<br />
income <strong>of</strong> the applicant to see from where that income is derived. In that case, the applicant was<br />
married <strong>and</strong> her spouse was employed. The panel determined, on a balance <strong>of</strong> probabilities, the<br />
greater part <strong>of</strong> the applicant’s income was provided by the sponsor <strong>and</strong> the applicant was,<br />
therefore, a dependent.<br />
In Tiri, 59 the applicant worked from time to time as a nurse during the day <strong>and</strong> attended<br />
school at night. The applicant continued to attend school during the times he was not working <strong>and</strong><br />
received regular financial assistance from the sponsor. The applicant was held to be a dependent.<br />
In Huang, 60 the applicant received his mother’s pension, lived rent free in the family<br />
home <strong>and</strong> occasionally received cash from his mother (the sponsor). His brother provided free<br />
meals <strong>and</strong> occasional pocket money. The Minister argued that since the sponsor was then<br />
dependent on her daughter, the applicant could not be dependent on the sponsor. The panel found<br />
the source <strong>of</strong> the sponsor’s income was irrelevant, subject to any evidence that this was merely a<br />
ruse to hide that the applicant had an independent source <strong>of</strong> income.<br />
55<br />
56<br />
57<br />
58<br />
59<br />
60<br />
Hamid; M.C.I. v. Hamid, Ali (F.C.A., no. A-632-05), Nadon, Sexton, Evans, June 12, 2006; 2006 FCA 217.<br />
See Gilani, infra, footnote 72<br />
Szikora-Rehak, Terezia v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-01559), Jackson, April 24, 1998.<br />
Popov, Oleg Zinovevich v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-05162), Aterman, November 26, 1998.<br />
Tiri, Felicitas v. M.C.I . (IAD T96-021480, Hoare, April 22, 1998.<br />
Huang, Su-Juan v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-02369), Carver, August 21, 1998.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Relationship - Ch. 7
In Bains, 61 the issue was whether the sponsor’s brother was the dependent son <strong>of</strong> their<br />
father. The brother was a part-time farmer <strong>and</strong> received financial support from his parents. The<br />
sponsor testified that since his arrival in <strong>Canada</strong>, he was the sole financial support <strong>of</strong> the brother.<br />
The panel found the applicant was not wholly or substantially supported by his parents.<br />
Requirements to be “continuously enrolled in <strong>and</strong> attending” <strong>and</strong> “actively<br />
pursuing a course”<br />
There is no longer any provision dealing with interruptions in studies. Regular school<br />
vacation breaks should still be considered part <strong>of</strong> the course <strong>of</strong> studies <strong>and</strong> should not impact on<br />
the requirement to be “continuously enrolled <strong>and</strong> attending”. There may now be no way to give<br />
relief from situations where the failure to enroll or attend is due to a situation beyond the control<br />
<strong>of</strong> the applicant.<br />
Both enrolment <strong>and</strong> attendance must still be established. The change in wording <strong>of</strong> the<br />
definition has arguably maintained the qualitative <strong>and</strong> quantitative elements <strong>of</strong> “attending” 62<br />
(S<strong>and</strong>hu). The wording used in the definition <strong>of</strong> “dependent child” in the Regulations expresses<br />
the intent to codify the test articulated by the Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal in S<strong>and</strong>hu. Sub-part (A) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
definition carries forward the requirement <strong>of</strong> full-time enrolment <strong>and</strong> attendance in an<br />
educational program, while sub-part (B) articulates the requirement for a mental presence in the<br />
educational program in the form <strong>of</strong> a genuine, bona fide effort on the part <strong>of</strong> the student. 63 The<br />
burden is on the applicants to establish that they made a bona fide attempt to assimilate the<br />
material <strong>of</strong> the subjects in which they were enrolled for each year <strong>of</strong> academic study. 64<br />
In S<strong>and</strong>hu the Court enumerated the following factors which should be considered in<br />
making such a determination <strong>and</strong> cautioned that this list may not be exhaustive. First is the record<br />
<strong>of</strong> the student’s actual attendance. Second is the grades the student achieved. Third is whether the<br />
student can discuss the subjects studied in, at the very least, a rudimentary fashion. Fourth is<br />
whether the student is progressing satisfactorily in an academic program. Fifth is whether the<br />
student has made a genuine <strong>and</strong> meaningful effort to assimilate the knowledge in the courses<br />
being studied. The factors might perhaps be summed up by asking whether the person is a bona<br />
fide student. 65 While one could be a bona fide student <strong>and</strong> still have a poor academic<br />
performance, in such cases visa <strong>of</strong>ficers ought to satisfy themselves that, students have made a<br />
genuine effort in their studies.<br />
61<br />
62<br />
63<br />
64<br />
65<br />
Bains, Sohan Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-01233), Singh, April 14, 1997.<br />
M.C.I. v. S<strong>and</strong>hu, Jagwinder Singh (F.C.A., no. A-63-01), Sexton, Strayer, Sharlow, February 28, 2002; 2002<br />
FCA 79.<br />
Lee, Kuo Hsiung v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5273-03), Dawson, July 21, 2004; 2004 FC 1012.<br />
Dhillon, Jhalman Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C., IMM-2234-06), Lutfy, November 24, 2006; 2006 FC 1430.<br />
See too Sharma, Sukh Rajni v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-388-01), Rothstein, August 23, 2002; 2002 FCT 906<br />
where the Court followed S<strong>and</strong>hu to identify the issue as whether the applicant was a full-time student in a<br />
genuine, meaningful <strong>and</strong> bona fide respect.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Relationship - Ch. 7
Credibility can be an issue in assessing such cases as well. In one case, the Appeal Division held<br />
that it was not plausible that it took the applicant 20 years to reach grade 10. 66 In another, 67 the<br />
applicant had taken the same course <strong>and</strong> failed the exam for six years. The applicant was found to<br />
be a student in name only.<br />
The Educational Institution<br />
The institution attended must be a post-secondary one that is accredited by the relevant<br />
government authority. 68<br />
In Ahmed 69 , the Court considered if an institution was a post-secondary institution, in the<br />
context <strong>of</strong> a visa <strong>of</strong>ficer’s assessment <strong>of</strong> educational qualifications in an application for<br />
permanent residence. It held the question is whether or not the institution <strong>of</strong>fers programs <strong>of</strong><br />
study requiring a high school diploma as a condition <strong>of</strong> admission. In Shah 70 the Court adopted<br />
the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary definition <strong>of</strong> “accredited” as meaning “furnished with<br />
credentials; authoritatively sanctioned.” “It does not equate to “recognized” in some informal<br />
sense.”<br />
Physical or Mental Condition<br />
It is important to note the change <strong>of</strong> wording in the provision from “disability” to<br />
“condition”. It remains to be seen how this change will be interpreted though there appears to be<br />
no reason why the previous jurisprudence relating to what a “disability” is should be rejected. If<br />
anything, “condition” should be seen as broader than “disability.”<br />
It is more difficult to comment on the removal <strong>of</strong> the requirement <strong>of</strong> the former Act that a<br />
medical <strong>of</strong>ficer make a determination. Given the provisions dealing with medical<br />
examinations 71 , this may be a matter <strong>of</strong> drafting, rather than substance.<br />
The relevant portions <strong>of</strong> the definition “dependent child” do not require that an applicant<br />
demonstrate that a “physical or mental” condition causing an applicant child to be unable to be<br />
financially self-supporting, has existed at all times since the applicant became twenty-two (22)<br />
years <strong>of</strong> age <strong>and</strong> that the condition was diagnosed before the applicant reached that age. Whether<br />
66<br />
67<br />
68<br />
69<br />
70<br />
71<br />
Ali, Akram v. M.C.I. (IAD T93-12274) Teitelbaum, June 2, 1994.<br />
Sangha, Jaswinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-02919), Singh, February 24, 1998.<br />
Supra, footnote 52 sets out guidelines for <strong>of</strong>ficers where there is no relevant government authority or<br />
accreditation is in question. Some unlicensed institutions may be acceptable under the definition. Examples <strong>of</strong><br />
institutions that do not fall within the definition are “on the job training”, “correspondence courses” <strong>and</strong> sham<br />
institutions.<br />
Ahmed, Syed Anjum v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4027-01), Hansen, July 30, 2003; 2003 FC 937.<br />
Shah,Mayuri Rameshch<strong>and</strong>ra v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1461-06), Gibson, September 22, 2006; 2006 FC 1131.<br />
For a full discussion <strong>of</strong> medical refusals, see Chapter 3.<br />
<strong>Sponsorship</strong> <strong>Appeals</strong> 13 Legal Services<br />
January 1, 2008 Relationship - Ch. 7
or not the condition was diagnosed before the age <strong>of</strong> twenty-two (22) is irrelevant. A careful<br />
reading <strong>of</strong> subparagraph (b)(iii) <strong>of</strong> the definition “dependent child” discloses that an applicant<br />
must establish that “… he has depended substantially on the financial support <strong>of</strong> a parent since<br />
before the age <strong>of</strong> twenty-two (22) <strong>and</strong> that he is “… unable to be financially self-supporting due<br />
to a physical or mental condition.” 72<br />
Social dependence by the applicant child on his parents, which is to say continuous<br />
dependence on his parents for parenting support, is irrelevant. 73<br />
Lastly, it should also be noted that the spouse, common-law partner or child <strong>of</strong> a sponsor<br />
who has been determined to be a member <strong>of</strong> the family class is exempted from the application <strong>of</strong><br />
inadmissibility on the ground <strong>of</strong> excessive dem<strong>and</strong> on health <strong>and</strong> social services. 74<br />
Some <strong>of</strong> the older cases dealing with “physical or mental disability” are noted below.<br />
“Physical disability” includes a hearing disability. 75 Amputation <strong>of</strong> the left leg below the<br />
knee following a motor vehicle accident is a physical disability. 76<br />
The question is whether the applicant is able to support herself in the country in which she<br />
is currently residing, not whether she would become self-supporting in <strong>Canada</strong>. In this case, the<br />
applicant, who resided in Egypt, was found to be a dependent daughter. She suffered from mild<br />
mental retardation <strong>and</strong> epilepsy. 77<br />
In Khan, 78 the applicant was a deaf mute. The Appeal Division held that the applicant was<br />
required to meet the requirements <strong>of</strong> the definition <strong>of</strong> a “dependent daughter” during the entire<br />
period <strong>of</strong> processing the application for permanent residence. The applicant does not need to<br />
establish that she will be incapable <strong>of</strong> supporting herself in the future. The evidence established<br />
the applicant’s disability was an essential, determinative factor in her incapacity to support<br />
herself, though it may not have been the only factor. Not every physical or mental disability <strong>of</strong><br />
dependants will lead to the result <strong>of</strong> medical inadmissibility.<br />
In contrast, in Arastehpour, 79 the principal applicant had asked that a medically<br />
inadmissible, 29 year old son be deleted from the application for permanent residence. The son<br />
suffered from muscular dystrophy <strong>and</strong> there was ample evidence to conclude he could not<br />
support himself. The visa <strong>of</strong>ficer was not required to consider the son’s future prospects in<br />
72<br />
73<br />
74<br />
75<br />
76<br />
77<br />
78<br />
79<br />
Gilani, Harakhji Zaver v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-9214-04), Gibson, November 9, 2005; 2005 FC 1522.<br />
Gilani, supra, footnote 72.<br />
Section 38(2)(a) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA <strong>and</strong> section 24 <strong>of</strong> the IRPR.<br />
Haroun,Stanley v. M.C.I. (IAD V94-00129), Singh, August 29, 1994.<br />
Huang, Wing Dang v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-03836), Baker, June 4, 1999.<br />
Arafat, Khaled v. M.C.I. (IAD T94-02413), Hopkins, January 17, 1995.<br />
Khan, Seema Aziz v. M.C.I. (IAD M97-03209), Lamarche, June 4, 1999.<br />
Arastehpour, Mohammad Ali v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4328-98), MacKay, August 31, 1999.<br />
<strong>Sponsorship</strong> <strong>Appeals</strong> 14 Legal Services<br />
January 1, 2008 Relationship - Ch. 7
<strong>Canada</strong> where no such evidence was provided to the <strong>of</strong>ficer. A dependant at the time an<br />
application is made may no longer be so as a result <strong>of</strong> changed circumstances before the<br />
application is determined. Here, the fact that he would be left to live with an aunt did not mean he<br />
was no longer a dependent son. It should be noted that if the matter had been an appeal before the<br />
Appeal Division. It would have been open to lead evidence regarding the son’s prospects in<br />
<strong>Canada</strong>.<br />
In Huang, 80 the applicant, an amputee, was responsible for farming the family’s<br />
government plot. He was unable to do the physical labour <strong>and</strong> hired people to do the farm work.<br />
After expenses, there was little, if any, money for the applicant’s support <strong>and</strong> the requirement <strong>of</strong><br />
financial dependency was met. While willing to work, the documentary evidence establishes his<br />
physical disability limits his opportunities. Considering all the evidence, the Appeal Division<br />
held that the applicant was incapable <strong>of</strong> supporting himself due to his disability.<br />
In Teja, 81 the panel found the sponsor not to be credible. Medical evidence <strong>of</strong> epilepsy<br />
<strong>and</strong> dementia was before the panel but had not been provided to the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer. There was no<br />
evidence that a medical <strong>of</strong>ficer had determined that the applicant was suffering from a physical or<br />
mental disability. The applicant did not qualify as a dependent son.<br />
In Ramdhanie, 82 there was evidence that the applicants were suffering from posttraumatic<br />
stress disorder. The panel was prepared to conclude that a medical <strong>of</strong>ficer had made the<br />
necessary determination <strong>of</strong> a medical disability. The determination by an immigration <strong>of</strong>ficer as<br />
to whether the applicants were incapable <strong>of</strong> supporting themselves by reason <strong>of</strong> that disability<br />
was subject to a de novo review. The panel found the disability severely impaired the applicant’s<br />
ability to earn a living. They were reliant on the sponsor for financial support <strong>and</strong> were dependent<br />
daughters.<br />
80<br />
81<br />
82<br />
Huang, Wing Dang v. M.C.I.. (IAD V97-03836), Baker, June 4, 1999.<br />
Teja, Ajit Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V94-01205), Singh, June 30, 1997.<br />
Ramdhanie (Dipch<strong>and</strong>), Asha v. M.C.I. (IAD T95-06314), Townshend, September 18, 1998.<br />
<strong>Sponsorship</strong> <strong>Appeals</strong> 15 Legal Services<br />
January 1, 2008 Relationship - Ch. 7
CASES<br />
Adjani, Joshua Taiwo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2033-07), Blanchard, January 10, 2008; 2008 FC<br />
32........................................................................................................................................................................... 5, 6<br />
Ahmed, Syed Anjum v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4027-01), Hansen, July 30, 2003; 2003 FC 937.......................... 13<br />
Ali, Akram v. M.C.I. (IAD T93-12274) Teitelbaum, June 2, 1994 .............................................................................. 13<br />
Arafat, Khaled v. M.C.I. (IAD T94-02413), Hopkins, January 17, 1995.................................................................... 14<br />
Arastehpour, Mohammad Ali v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4328-98), MacKay, August 31, 1999 ........................... 14<br />
Azizi, Ahmed Salem v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-151-05), Rothstein, Linden, Pelletier, December 5,<br />
2005; 2005 FCA 406 ................................................................................................................................................. 6<br />
Bains, Sohan Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-01233), Singh, April 14, 1997..................................................................... 12<br />
Chen, Hong Mei v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-8979-04), Mosley, May 12, 2005; 2005 FC 678....................................... 5<br />
De Guzman, Josephine Soliven v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-558-04), Desjardins,Evans, Malone,<br />
December 20, 2005; 2005 FCA 436.......................................................................................................................... 5<br />
Dehar, Rupinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2281-06), de Montigny, May 28, 2007; 2007 FC<br />
558........................................................................................................................................................................... 10<br />
Dela Fuente, Cleotilde v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-446-05), Noel, Sharlow, Malone, May 18, 2006;<br />
2006 FCA 186 ........................................................................................................................................................... 5<br />
Dhillon, Jhalman Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C., IMM-2234-06), Lutfy, November 24, 2006; 2006 FC<br />
1430......................................................................................................................................................................... 12<br />
Dudecz, Ewa v. M.C.I. (IAD TA02446), Whist, December 6, 2002.............................................................................. 3<br />
Gilani, Harakhji Zaver v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-9214-04), Gibson, November 9, 2005; 2005 FC<br />
1522......................................................................................................................................................................... 14<br />
Hamid; M.C.I. v. Hamid, Ali (F.C.A., no. A-632-05), Nadon, Sexton, Evans, June 12, 2006; 2006<br />
FCA 217.................................................................................................................................................................. 11<br />
Haroun,Stanley v. M.C.I. (IAD V94-00129), Singh, August 29, 1994........................................................................ 14<br />
Huang, Su-Juan v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-02369), Carver, August 21, 1998...................................................................... 11<br />
Huang, Wing Dang v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-03836), Baker, June 4, 1999........................................................................ 14<br />
Huang, Wing Dang v. M.C.I.. (IAD V97-03836), Baker, June 4, 1999....................................................................... 15<br />
Jaca, Eugenia v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-13722), D’Ignazio, February 20, 2003 .................................................................. 8<br />
Kang, Sarabjeet Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD TA1-13555), Sangmuah, February 24, 2004 ................................................. 7, 8<br />
Khan, Seema Aziz v. M.C.I. (IAD M97-03209), Lamarche, June 4, 1999 ................................................................... 14<br />
Le, Thi Cam Ly v. M.C.I. (IAD MA1-06279), Beauchemin, May 15, 2003 .................................................................. 8<br />
Lee, Kuo Hsiung v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5273-03), Dawson, July 21, 2004; 2004 FC 1012................................... 12<br />
M.A.O. v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no IMM-459-02), Heneghan, December 12, 2003; 2003 FC 1406 ................................. 10<br />
Noun, Pho v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-03260), MacPherson, August 27, 2003 ....................................................................... 8<br />
P<strong>and</strong>hi, Harinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-02813), Clark, June 27, 2003 ................................................................. 7<br />
Popov, Oleg Zinovevich v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-05162), Aterman, November 26, 1998 ................................................. 11<br />
Ramdhanie (Dipch<strong>and</strong>), Asha v. M.C.I. (IAD T95-06314), Townshend, September 18, 1998 ................................... 15<br />
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January 1, 2008 Relationship - Ch. 7
S<strong>and</strong>hu: M.C.I. v. S<strong>and</strong>hu, Jagwinder Singh (F.C.A., no. A-63-01), Sexton, Strayer, Sharlow,<br />
February 28, 2002; 2002 FCA 79............................................................................................................................ 12<br />
Sangha, Jaswinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-02919), Singh, February 24, 1998...................................................... 13<br />
Sarmiento, Laura Victoria v. M.C.I. (IAD TA1-28226), November 1, 2002................................................................. 3<br />
Seydoun, Saber Hussain v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-00576), Workun, June 18, 2003............................................................ 9<br />
Shah,Mayuri Rameshch<strong>and</strong>ra v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1461-06), Gibson, September 22, 2006;<br />
2006 FC 1131.......................................................................................................................................................... 13<br />
Sharma, Sukh Rajni v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-388-01), Rothstein, August 23, 2002; 2002 FCT<br />
906........................................................................................................................................................................... 12<br />
Sinkovits, Zoltan v. M.C.I. (IAD TA1-20320), Whist, August 29, 2002 ....................................................................... 8<br />
Sohal, Manjit Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD TA1-28054), MacPherson, November 29, 2002................................................... 9<br />
Szikora-Rehak, Terezia v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-01559), Jackson, April 24, 1998............................................................ 11<br />
Teja, Ajit Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V94-01205), Singh, June 30, 1997 ............................................................................ 15<br />
Tiri, Felicitas v. M.C.I . (IAD T96-021480, Hoare, April 22, 1998 ............................................................................ 11<br />
Vong: M.C.I. v. Vong, Chan Cam (F.C., no. IMM-1737-04), Heneghan, June 15, 2005; 2005 FC<br />
855............................................................................................................................................................................. 2<br />
Williams, Sophia Laverne v. M.C.I. (IAD TA1-21446), Wales, November 29, 2002.................................................... 8<br />
Woldeselassie, Tesfalem Mekonen v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3084-06), Beaudry, December 21,<br />
2006; 2006 FC 1540.................................................................................................................................................. 6<br />
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January 1, 2008 Relationship - Ch. 7
Chapter Eight<br />
Misrepresentation<br />
Introduction<br />
The misrepresentation provisions under the old <strong>Immigration</strong> Act provide that a permanent<br />
resident, where granted l<strong>and</strong>ing by reason <strong>of</strong> a false or improperly obtained passport, visa or other<br />
document pertaining to the person’s admission, or by reason <strong>of</strong> any fraudulent or improper means<br />
or misrepresentation <strong>of</strong> any material fact, whether exercised or made by that person or any other<br />
person, may be subject to the initiation <strong>of</strong> removal proceedings under s.27(1)(e) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Act.<br />
The materiality <strong>of</strong> misrepresentations under the <strong>Immigration</strong> Act has been the subject <strong>of</strong><br />
numerous court decisions including the decision <strong>of</strong> the Supreme Court <strong>of</strong> <strong>Canada</strong> in <strong>Canada</strong><br />
(Minister <strong>of</strong> Manpower <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) v. Brooks, [1974] S.C.R. 850. Brooks held, among<br />
other things, that mens rea, or intention, was not an essential element for the misrepresentation.<br />
Chapter 5 <strong>of</strong> the Removal Order <strong>Appeals</strong> paper discusses the impact <strong>of</strong> the Brooks decision <strong>and</strong><br />
misrepresentations in general.<br />
The purpose <strong>of</strong> the misrepresentation provisions is to ensure that applicants provide<br />
complete, honest <strong>and</strong> truthful information in every manner when applying for entry into <strong>Canada</strong>. 1<br />
The misrepresentation provisions under the <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Refugee</strong> Protection Act<br />
(IRPA) can lead to a finding <strong>of</strong> inadmissibility (s.40) whether the person is inside <strong>Canada</strong> or<br />
abroad. An inadmissibility report prepared with respect to a permanent resident, may lead to an<br />
inadmissibility hearing before the <strong>Immigration</strong> Division where a removal order may be made.<br />
(s.44(1) & s.44(2)).<br />
Inadmissibility for Misrepresentation<br />
The misrepresentation provisions under the IRPA can lead to a finding <strong>of</strong> inadmissibility<br />
<strong>of</strong> a permanent resident (leading to a removal order) or a foreign national being refused<br />
sponsorship. Section 40 reads, in part, as follows:<br />
40. (1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible for<br />
misrepresentation<br />
(a) for directly or indirectly misrepresenting or withholding material<br />
facts relating to a relevant matter that induces or could induce an error<br />
in the administration <strong>of</strong> this Act;<br />
1<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Manuals, ENF 2, Evaluating Inadmissibility, section 9.<br />
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(b) for being or having been sponsored by a person who is determined<br />
to be inadmissible for misrepresentation;<br />
If a person is found to be inadmissible pursuant to section 40, that permanent resident or<br />
foreign national continues to be inadmissible for misrepresentation for a period <strong>of</strong> two years<br />
following a final determination <strong>of</strong> inadmissibility in a refused sponsorship, or the date the<br />
removal order is enforced for a determination in <strong>Canada</strong>. 2 A person who pursues their appeal<br />
rights following a determination in <strong>Canada</strong> will, in effect, extend the two-year period because the<br />
removal order would not be enforced until a later date.<br />
A foreign national subject to the two-year period <strong>of</strong> continued inadmissibility must obtain<br />
the written authorization <strong>of</strong> an <strong>of</strong>ficer under Regulation 225(3) 3 in order to return to <strong>Canada</strong><br />
within the two-year period.<br />
A further qualification to section 40(1)(b) is found in section 40(2)(b). It provides that<br />
“paragraph (1)(b) does not apply unless the Minister is satisfied that the facts <strong>of</strong> the case justify<br />
the inadmissibility” (emphasis added). It is not known at present how the Minister will exercise<br />
this “justification”.<br />
Possible Legal <strong>and</strong> Evidentiary Issues<br />
Specific wording contained in section 40 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA will likely give rise to legal <strong>and</strong><br />
evidentiary issues. For example, what is the meaning in s. 40(1)(a) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA <strong>of</strong> the phrase “…<br />
directly or indirectly misrepresenting or withholding material facts…”? Does it matter whether<br />
the person made the misrepresentation as opposed to someone else making the<br />
misrepresentation? (Under the former <strong>Immigration</strong> Act, the jurisprudence shows it did not<br />
matter.) Does this include giving untruthful or partial answers, or omitting reference to material<br />
facts (even if the person does not know what is material or was not asked)?<br />
“directly or indirectly”<br />
2<br />
3<br />
Section 40(2)(a) reads as follows:<br />
the permanent resident or the foreign national continues to be inadmissible for misrepresentation for a<br />
period <strong>of</strong> two years following, in the case <strong>of</strong> a determination outside <strong>Canada</strong>, a final determination <strong>of</strong><br />
inadmissibility under subsection (1) or, in the case <strong>of</strong> a determination in <strong>Canada</strong>, the date the removal<br />
order is enforced;<br />
Reg. 225(3) reads as follows:<br />
A foreign national who is issued an exclusion order as a result <strong>of</strong> the application <strong>of</strong> paragraph<br />
40(2)(a) <strong>of</strong> the Act must obtain a written authorization in order to return to <strong>Canada</strong> within the twoyear<br />
period after the exclusion order was enforced.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Misrepresentation - Ch. 8
In Wang 4 the IAD adopted the <strong>Immigration</strong> Division member’s analysis <strong>and</strong> conclusion<br />
on indirect misrepresentation. He noted that under IRPA there was no longer a reference to a<br />
misrepresentation “by any other person”. The new language is “directly or indirectly”. The<br />
member held that “it is not immediately apparent by this language that “indirectly” means a<br />
misrepresentation by another person. Nonetheless I can find no other logical interpretation.” The<br />
Federal Court approved this approach. The word “indirectly” can be interpreted to cover the<br />
situation such as the present one where the applicant relied on being included in her husb<strong>and</strong>’s<br />
application, even though she did not know <strong>of</strong> his previous marriage.<br />
“indirect misrepresentation”<br />
An agent for the appellant obtained for him <strong>and</strong> submitted to CIC false or fraudulent<br />
documents relating to his education. This constitutes an indirect misrepresentation. 5<br />
Similarly, what is the meaning in s. 40(1)(a) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA <strong>of</strong> the phrase “… material facts<br />
relating to a relevant matter that induces or could induce an error in the administration <strong>of</strong> this<br />
Act”? How might we interpret “an error in the administration <strong>of</strong> this Act”? [Note: There is a<br />
difference in the wording in the French version which could influence interpretation – rather than<br />
saying that induces it says, as this induces.] Is there a timing element in this provision – does it<br />
catch persons who misrepresent any immigration related circumstances at any time? What might<br />
be included in this provision? For example, does this include an applicant or sponsor making<br />
misrepresentations, partial answers, omissions, etc.; applicants on humanitarian <strong>and</strong><br />
compassionate considerations who became permanent residents; or applicants withholding<br />
information from the examining designated physician?<br />
“could induce an error”<br />
The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division found the words “could induce an error” as referring to<br />
the potential <strong>of</strong> causing an error at any time, not the actual causing <strong>of</strong> the error. It was meant to<br />
catch those who caused an error or misrepresented or withheld material (an attempt to deceive)<br />
that had a potential <strong>of</strong> causing an error. It does not speak from the time <strong>of</strong> the “catching” <strong>of</strong> the<br />
misdeed, but at the time <strong>of</strong> the misdeed itself. 6<br />
Two factors must be present for a finding <strong>of</strong> inadmissibility under s. 40(1). There must be<br />
misrepresentations by the applicant <strong>and</strong> those misrepresentations must be material in that they<br />
could have induced an error in the administration <strong>of</strong> the IRPA. There is no requirement in s.<br />
40(1)(a) that the misrepresentations must be intentional, deliberate or negligent. 7<br />
4<br />
5<br />
6<br />
7<br />
Wang, Xiao Qiang v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5815-04), O’Keefe, August 3, 2005; 2005 FC 1059. A question was<br />
certified but not answered on appeal: (F.C.A., no. A-420-05), Noel, Evans, Malone, October 24, 2006; 2006 FCA<br />
345.<br />
M.P.S.E.P. v. Zhai, Ning (IAD VA6-02206), Ostrowski, March 6, 2007; application for leave <strong>and</strong> judicial review<br />
dismissed: (F.C., no. IMM-2035-07), Harrington, August 13, 2007.<br />
Zhai, supra, footnote 5.<br />
Bellido,Patricia Zevallous v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2380-04), Snider, April 6, 2005; 2005 FC 452.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Misrepresentation - Ch. 8
In Pierre-Louis 8 the applicant married the appellant in 2001. He applied for a visitor’s<br />
visa in Haiti <strong>and</strong> was refused. On that application he disclosed a child born in 1996. In 2002 he<br />
applied for permanent residence in <strong>Canada</strong>. At that time he said he had no dependent children.<br />
The visa <strong>of</strong>ficer rejected this application because <strong>of</strong> misrepresentations made during the<br />
interview. The applicant was inadmissible because <strong>of</strong> the misrepresentation about the child he<br />
had previously declared.<br />
Finally, what is the meaning in s. 40(1)(b) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA <strong>of</strong> the phrase “…for being or<br />
having been sponsored by a person who is determined to be inadmissible for<br />
misrepresentation.”? Does this put the sponsor at risk <strong>of</strong> removal for making<br />
misrepresentations? If yes, how far back may it go?<br />
Asuncion 9 partly answers the first question. The appellant was sponsored to <strong>Canada</strong> by his<br />
mother as a dependent in 1998. Prior to leaving the Philippines he married his spouse in a civil<br />
ceremony, <strong>and</strong> knew that there would be some sort <strong>of</strong> reprim<strong>and</strong> if he failed to declare his new<br />
status. After he was l<strong>and</strong>ed in <strong>Canada</strong> he returned to the Philippines <strong>and</strong> he <strong>and</strong> his wife had a<br />
church wedding. In 2001 he applied to sponsor his wife <strong>and</strong> two children, which application was<br />
refused since they had not been examined at the time he became a permanent resident. An<br />
admissibility hearing led to a removal order, the appeal <strong>of</strong> which was dismissed. A result <strong>of</strong> the<br />
misrepresentation was that he made it impossible for him to sponsor his loved ones <strong>and</strong> also<br />
prohibited him from seeking to come back to <strong>Canada</strong> for a period <strong>of</strong> two years following the<br />
enforcement <strong>of</strong> the removal order.<br />
Legislative Framework<br />
Section 44 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA, reproduced in part below, sets out the procedure to be followed<br />
under section 40:<br />
44. (1) An <strong>of</strong>ficer who is <strong>of</strong> the opinion that a permanent resident or a foreign<br />
national who is in <strong>Canada</strong> is inadmissible may prepare a report setting out<br />
the relevant facts, which report shall be transmitted to the Minister.<br />
(2) If the Minister is <strong>of</strong> the opinion that the report is well-founded, the<br />
Minister may refer the report to the <strong>Immigration</strong> Division for an<br />
admissibility hearing, except in the case <strong>of</strong> a permanent resident who is<br />
inadmissible solely on the grounds that they have failed to comply with the<br />
residency obligation under section 28 <strong>and</strong> except, in the circumstances<br />
prescribed by the regulations, in the case <strong>of</strong> a foreign national. In those<br />
cases, the Minister may make a removal order.<br />
8<br />
9<br />
Pierre-Louis, Cynthia v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7627-04), Beaudry, March17, 2005; 2005 FC 377.<br />
Asuncion, Aristar Mallare v. M.C.I.. (F.C., no. IMM-10231-04), Rouleau, July 20, 2005; 2005 FC 1002.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Misrepresentation - Ch. 8
An inadmissibility report prepared with respect to a permanent resident may lead to an<br />
inadmissibility hearing before the <strong>Immigration</strong> Division where a removal order may be made.<br />
The effect <strong>of</strong> s.44(2) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA is that a removal order made against a permanent resident for<br />
misrepresentation must be made by the <strong>Immigration</strong> Division, not by the Minister (except in the<br />
case <strong>of</strong> not complying with the residency obligation). Therefore, the IAD will have a full record<br />
for an appeal against a removal order for misrepresentation.<br />
Jurisdiction – Legislative Appeal Rights to the IAD<br />
Parts <strong>of</strong> sections 63 to 65 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA are set out below:<br />
63. (1) A person who has filed in the prescribed manner an application to<br />
sponsor a foreign national as a member <strong>of</strong> the family class may appeal to the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division against a decision not to issue the foreign<br />
national a permanent resident visa.<br />
63. (2) A foreign national who holds a permanent resident visa may appeal to<br />
the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division against a decision at an examination or<br />
admissibility hearing to make a removal order against them.<br />
63. (3) A permanent resident or a protected person may appeal to the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division against a decision at an examination or<br />
admissibility hearing to make a removal order against them.<br />
63. (4) A permanent resident may appeal to the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division<br />
against a decision made outside <strong>of</strong> <strong>Canada</strong> on the residency obligation under<br />
section 28.<br />
63. (5) The Minister may appeal to the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division against a<br />
decision <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Division in an admissibility hearing.<br />
64. (3) No appeal may be made under subsection 63(1) in respect <strong>of</strong> a decision<br />
that was based on a finding <strong>of</strong> inadmissibility on the ground <strong>of</strong><br />
misrepresentation, unless the foreign national in question is the sponsor’s<br />
spouse, common-law partner or child.<br />
65. In an appeal under subsection 63(1) or (2) respecting an application based on<br />
membership in the family class, the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division may not<br />
consider humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate considerations unless it has<br />
decided that the foreign national is a member <strong>of</strong> the family class <strong>and</strong> that<br />
their sponsor is a sponsor within the meaning <strong>of</strong> the regulations.<br />
Note that the effect <strong>of</strong> s.64(3) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA is that a spouse, common-law partner or child<br />
does have an appeal to the IAD, but other members <strong>of</strong> the family class, such as parents, do not<br />
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January 1, 2008 Misrepresentation - Ch. 8
have an appeal to the IAD if found inadmissible for misrepresentation. In decisions 10 <strong>of</strong> the IAD<br />
where the applicant was not the sponsor’s spouse, common-law partner or child, the IAD has<br />
dismissed the appeals for lack <strong>of</strong> jurisdiction. In none <strong>of</strong> these cases has the appellant sought<br />
judicial review.<br />
In Mathew 11 the IAD allowed the appeal under s. 65 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA on humanitarian <strong>and</strong><br />
compassionate grounds <strong>and</strong> then found the marriage to be genuine, overcoming the<br />
inadmissibility for misrepresentation. The Court held that Parliament’s intent was clear that<br />
before waiving a breach <strong>of</strong> the Act (the misrepresentation) on H&C factors, the marriage, if<br />
challenged, as it was here, had to be determined to be genuine before applying the H&C factors.<br />
The Minister’s application was allowed.<br />
The requirements to sponsor a member <strong>of</strong> the family class are found in Regulation 130.<br />
10 Warrich, Ghazananfar v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-20264), D’Ignazio, July 11, 2005; Nazmus, Masoma v. M.C.I. (IAD<br />
TA6-03843), Whist, September 18, 2006; Anis, Kamran v. M.C.I. (IAD TA7-01595), Waters, August 31, 2007.<br />
11 M.C.I. v. Mathew, Marjorie Ellen (F.C., no. IMM-6049-06), Lemieux, June 29, 2007; 2007 FC 685.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Misrepresentation - Ch. 8
Transitional Issues<br />
Section 192 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA provides as follows:<br />
192. If a notice <strong>of</strong> appeal has been filed with the <strong>Immigration</strong><br />
Appeal Division immediately before the coming into force <strong>of</strong> this<br />
section, the appeal shall be continued under the former Act by the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Board</strong>.<br />
The IRPA came into force on June 28, 2002. In Manzanares 12 the refusal letter pre-dated<br />
the implementation date <strong>of</strong> the IRPA <strong>and</strong> was, therefore, a refusal under the <strong>Immigration</strong> Act.<br />
The Notice <strong>of</strong> Appeal, however, was dated <strong>and</strong> was thus filed after the IRPA was proclaimed.<br />
Pursuant to section 192 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA, the panel proceeded with the appeal under the IRPA.<br />
At the outset <strong>of</strong> the hearing, the Minister raised a preliminary issue. He asked the panel to<br />
treat the refusal based on the ground <strong>of</strong> misrepresentation under section 40(1)(a) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA.<br />
The panel rejected this argument by the Minister. There had been a misrepresentation by the<br />
applicant (by filing false documents with the visa post) but it was not a refusal based on the<br />
ground <strong>of</strong> misrepresentation (such as a refusal under section 9(3) <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Act).<br />
Further, there was no application by the Minister to amend the ground <strong>of</strong> refusal <strong>and</strong>, therefore,<br />
there was no legal basis to treat the refusal as one based on misrepresentation.<br />
General Offences<br />
It should be noted that there are criminal sanctions in respect <strong>of</strong> misrepresentations in the<br />
IRPA. Because these <strong>of</strong>fences are beyond the scope <strong>of</strong> this paper they are merely reproduced<br />
below for ease <strong>of</strong> reference.<br />
126. Every person who knowingly counsels, induces, aids or abets or attempts to counsel,<br />
induce, aid or abet any person to directly or indirectly misrepresent or withhold material facts<br />
relating to a relevant matter that induces or could induce an error in the administration <strong>of</strong> this Act<br />
is guilty <strong>of</strong> an <strong>of</strong>fence.<br />
127. No person shall knowingly<br />
(a) directly or indirectly misrepresent or withhold material facts relating to a relevant<br />
matter that induces or could induce an error in the administration <strong>of</strong> this Act.<br />
12 Manzanares, Ma Christina v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-15088, Stein, June 9, 2003.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Misrepresentation - Ch. 8
CASES<br />
Anis, Kamran v. M.C.I. (IAD TA7-01595), Waters, August 31, 2007 .......................................................................... 6<br />
Asuncion, Aristar Mallare v. M.C.I.. (F.C., no. IMM-10231-04), Rouleau, July 20, 2005; 2005 FC<br />
1002........................................................................................................................................................................... 4<br />
Bellido,Patricia Zevallous v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2380-04), Snider, April 6, 2005; 2005 FC 452........................... 3<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Manpower <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) v. Brooks, [1974] S.C.R. 850......................................................... 1<br />
M.P.S.E.P. v. Zhai, Ning (IAD VA6-02206), Ostrowski, March 6, 2007...................................................................... 3<br />
Manzanares, Ma Christina v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-15088, Stein, June 9, 2003 ............................................................... 7<br />
Mathew: M.C.I. v. Mathew, Marjorie Ellen (F.C., no. IMM-6049-06), Lemieux, June 29, 2007;<br />
2007 FC 685.............................................................................................................................................................. 6<br />
Nazmus, Masoma v. M.C.I. (IAD TA6-03843), Whist, September 18, 2006 ................................................................ 6<br />
Pierre-Louis, Cynthia v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7627-04), Beaudry, March17, 2005; 2005 FC 377............................ 4<br />
Wang, Xiao Qiang v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5815-04), O’Keefe, August 3, 2005; 2005 FC 1059 .............................. 3<br />
Warrich, Ghazananfar v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-20264), D’Ignazio, July 11, 2005 ............................................................ 6<br />
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January 1, 2008 Misrepresentation - Ch. 8
Chapter Nine<br />
Non-compliance with the Act or the Regulations<br />
Introduction<br />
Under IRPA a sponsored member <strong>of</strong> the family class may be refused a permanent resident<br />
visa if that person does not meet the requirements <strong>of</strong> the Act or the Regulations (IRPR).<br />
Generally speaking a person must be eligible to be sponsored <strong>and</strong> they must be admissible to<br />
<strong>Canada</strong>.<br />
As well, the Act <strong>and</strong> Regulations prescribe many additional requirements those persons<br />
seeking to become permanent residents through sponsorship must meet. Section 41 <strong>of</strong> IRPA<br />
establishes a general inadmissibility provision to cover these requirements:<br />
s. 41 A person is inadmissible for failing to comply with this Act<br />
(a) in the case <strong>of</strong> a foreign national, through an act or omission<br />
which contravenes, directly or indirectly, a provision <strong>of</strong> this Act;<br />
Note as well that s. 2(2) <strong>of</strong> IRPA states that unless otherwise indicated, references in this<br />
Act to "this Act" include Regulations made under it.<br />
A refusal letter 1 must set out with sufficient detail the basis <strong>of</strong> the refusal. It is necessary<br />
therefore that s. 41(a) is also accompanied by a statutory reference to the specific requirement<br />
which it is alleged the applicant cannot meet.<br />
Some requirements that are commonly not met <strong>and</strong> are likely to lead to a refusal under<br />
subsection 41(a) will be discussed below but this list is not exhaustive.<br />
Not an Immigrant<br />
In the case <strong>of</strong> parents who are sponsored to <strong>Canada</strong> for the purpose <strong>of</strong> settling their<br />
dependent children in <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>and</strong> who do not intend to remain permanently in <strong>Canada</strong>, so called<br />
"courier parents", the applicable requirement is set out in s. 20(1)(a) <strong>of</strong> the Act, reproduced<br />
below:<br />
s. 20(1) Every foreign national, … who seeks to enter or remain in<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> must establish,<br />
1<br />
S. 21(1) IRPA.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Non-compliance - Ch. 9
(a) to become a permanent resident, that they hold the visa or other<br />
document required under the regulations <strong>and</strong> have come to <strong>Canada</strong><br />
in order to establish permanent residence;…[emphasis added]<br />
It should be noted that although the scheme <strong>of</strong> the Act suggests that this provision may<br />
properly ground a refusal for such an applicant, IRPA no longer contains the words "immigrant"<br />
<strong>and</strong> "l<strong>and</strong>ing" which figured heavily in the reasoning in cases under the former Act.<br />
Does the language <strong>of</strong> s. 20(1)(a) give rise to a requirement on the part <strong>of</strong> applicants to<br />
intend to reside in <strong>Canada</strong> permanently? The IAD has held that the concept <strong>of</strong> “courier parent”<br />
survives in IRPA in s. 20(1)(a). The panel distinguished between the obligation to maintain<br />
permanent residence in <strong>Canada</strong> under s. 28 from the requirement <strong>of</strong> an intent to establish<br />
permanent residence in <strong>Canada</strong> under s. 20(1)(a) 2 .<br />
The balance <strong>of</strong> this subtopic is based on cases decided under the <strong>Immigration</strong> Act as they<br />
may provide useful guidance for members.<br />
Intention<br />
An applicant for permanent residence must have the requisite intention to reside<br />
permanently in <strong>Canada</strong>. The visa <strong>of</strong>ficer will undertake an examination <strong>of</strong> all <strong>of</strong> the surrounding<br />
circumstances to determine whether or not such intention exists.<br />
Intention can be demonstrated in one <strong>of</strong> two ways. “It [intention] can be revealed by<br />
speech or conduct.” 3 Generally, the intention <strong>of</strong> the applicant will become evident during the<br />
visa <strong>of</strong>ficer's interview with the applicant in the statements made by the applicant in answer to the<br />
visa <strong>of</strong>ficer's questioning. Other times, the finding <strong>of</strong> no intention will be based on the applicant's<br />
failure to pursue all <strong>of</strong> the steps involved in the application process. 4 The visa <strong>of</strong>ficer's decision<br />
may also be founded on evidence <strong>of</strong> the applicant's past behaviour when he or she had previously<br />
been granted permanent resident status, but subsequently lost it. 5<br />
2<br />
3<br />
4<br />
5<br />
Daliri, Farshid Hafezi v. M.C.I., (IAD TA3-01591), MacDonald, May 6, 2004; [2004] I.A.D.D. No. 210 (QL).<br />
Kan, Chak Pan v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-2977-91), Muldoon, March 19, 1992. Reported: Kan v. <strong>Canada</strong><br />
(Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1992), 17 Imm. L.R. (2d) 206 (F.C.T.D.).<br />
See Villanueva, Antonio Ordonez v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-9741), Benedetti, Weisdorf, Bell, November 12, 1986,<br />
where the applicant's failure to respond to the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer's request for documentation regarding his separation<br />
from his wife led the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal <strong>Board</strong> to conclude that he was not an immigrant. In Saroya, Kuljeet<br />
Kaur v. M.E.I. (IAD V92-01880), Verma, September 21, 1993, one <strong>of</strong> the bases for the refusal was that the<br />
applicant disregarded instructions given to her during the processing <strong>of</strong> the application, as she did not show up<br />
for three scheduled interviews <strong>and</strong> did not respond to some communications. See also Goindi, Surendra Singh<br />
v. M.C.I. (IAD T93-10856), Aterman, December 13, 1994, where the applicants had ignored requests for them<br />
to undergo medical examinations as was required.<br />
In Shergill, Sohan Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD T92-05406), Weisdorf, Chu, Ahara, February 8, 1993, the applicant<br />
was l<strong>and</strong>ed in 1981, but returned to India shortly thereafter, leaving the sponsor <strong>and</strong> a daughter behind. In her<br />
present application, statements had been made to the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer that she wished to remain in <strong>Canada</strong> for only<br />
six or seven months, for the purpose <strong>of</strong> bringing her alleged adopted son to <strong>Canada</strong>. The applicant's declared<br />
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Meaning <strong>of</strong> “permanently”<br />
The ordinary definition <strong>of</strong> “permanently” connotes something lasting indefinitely.<br />
However, this ordinary definition is not applicable within the context <strong>of</strong> permanent residence.<br />
“Permanently” does not mean immutably or forever, or for the applicant's lifetime or anyone<br />
else's. An intention to leave <strong>Canada</strong> at some time in the immediate future is not inconsistent with<br />
an intention to reside permanently in <strong>Canada</strong> until then. 6 Nevertheless, “permanently” has the<br />
opposite meaning <strong>of</strong> “temporarily”, <strong>and</strong> an applicant must not be seeking admission to <strong>Canada</strong><br />
for a short, fixed period <strong>of</strong> time for a temporary purpose. 7<br />
There are several examples in the case-law <strong>of</strong> what have come to be known as “courier<br />
parents”. In such cases, the panel finds that the purpose <strong>of</strong> the applicant's immigration to <strong>Canada</strong><br />
is to facilitate the immigration to <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>of</strong> the applicant's accompanying dependent son or<br />
6<br />
7<br />
intentions were “strikingly similar” to her behaviour in 1981, <strong>and</strong> therefore it was reasonable to conclude that<br />
she had no intention to reside permanently in <strong>Canada</strong>. See also: Patel, Mohamed v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-03124),<br />
Weisdorf, Ahara, Fatsis, April 15, 1993, where the panel considered the applicants' past actions as one <strong>of</strong> the<br />
factors in assessing their intentions in the current applications; Saroya, supra, footnote 4; <strong>and</strong> Sidhu, Gurdev<br />
Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD V92-01678), Singh, November 17, 1993. In Gill, Jagjit Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-<br />
00365), McIsaac, May 8, 1997, the applicant lost his permanent residence status after residing in <strong>Canada</strong> for<br />
only seven months in a 12-year period. For each request for a returning resident permit he gave a different<br />
reason, none <strong>of</strong> which appeared to be the real reason for his extended stay in India. It was not established on a<br />
balance <strong>of</strong> probabilities that he intended to reside permanently in <strong>Canada</strong>.<br />
Toor, Joginder Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-310-82), Thurlow, Heald, Verchere, February 15, 1983.<br />
Reported: Re Toor <strong>and</strong> <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1983), 144 D.L.R. (3d) 554, QL<br />
[1983] F.C.J. 114 (F.C.A.). In Dhaul, Paramjit Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-6004), Chambers, March 5, 1987, the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal <strong>Board</strong> held that a person may still be an “immigrant” for the purposes <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong><br />
Act even though the person is undecided as to whether or not he or she will wish to remain in <strong>Canada</strong> after<br />
admission. In Sarwar, Abida Shaheen v. M.C.I. (IAD T93-11195), Ariemma, Leousis, Muzzi, April 24, 1995,<br />
the panel agreed that establishing permanent residence in <strong>Canada</strong> does not imply that the applicant is barred<br />
from returning to his or her homel<strong>and</strong>. In this case, if the appellant had established that the applicant genuinely<br />
required to return to Pakistan to attend to personal or family matters, the panel would have had no difficulty in<br />
finding that he was a genuine immigrant, “irrespective <strong>of</strong> how many times or when he intended to travel to his<br />
country”. In Sanghera, Rajwinder Kular v. M.C.I. (IAD V96-01527), Clark, February 17, 1998, the panel<br />
accepted the applicants’ testimony at the hearing that they always intended to reside permanently in <strong>Canada</strong> but<br />
did plan to visit India sometimes. In response to the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer’s question about when he would return to<br />
India, the principal applicant said a year or two. He was asked whether he intended to be a permanent resident<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>Canada</strong>, to which he replied in the negative. The CAIPS notes revealed that the <strong>of</strong>ficer did not explain what<br />
it meant to be a “permanent resident”. The answers given to the <strong>of</strong>ficer's questions were consistent with the<br />
applicants not knowing whether or not permanent residents are allowed to leave <strong>Canada</strong> for any reason.<br />
In Mirza, Shahid Parvez v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-9081), Teitelbaum, Weisdorf, Townshend, December 1, 1986, the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal <strong>Board</strong> held that an applicant who intended to come to <strong>Canada</strong> for only a temporary period<br />
<strong>of</strong> time was not an immigrant. In Gill, Shivinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD T94-06519), Wright, May 16, 1995, the<br />
panel held that the applicant’s statement that he would return to India if he did not like <strong>Canada</strong> was not<br />
unreasonable <strong>and</strong> did not negate his intention to establish permanent residence in <strong>Canada</strong>. In Wiredu, Alex v.<br />
M.C.I. (IAD T97-00727), Muzzi, December 8, 1997, the panel found that the family members desired a<br />
reunion, but for a fixed period <strong>of</strong> time on the part <strong>of</strong> the principal applicant. The immigration <strong>of</strong>ficer’s<br />
h<strong>and</strong>written notes revealed that the applicant’s intention was to visit her sons in <strong>Canada</strong>. As such, she was not<br />
making an applicant for permanent residence.<br />
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daughter <strong>and</strong> that the applicant does not have the requisite intention to reside permanently in<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> as the applicant intends to return to his or her homel<strong>and</strong> after spending a period <strong>of</strong> time in<br />
<strong>Canada</strong>. 8 The possibility that the applicant might have the requisite intention to reside<br />
permanently in <strong>Canada</strong> at a later time is not sufficient as “[t]his form <strong>of</strong> deferred intent […] is not<br />
contemplated in the <strong>Immigration</strong> Act.” 9<br />
Other factors which have been considered by panels in the determination <strong>of</strong> whether or<br />
not an intention to reside permanently in <strong>Canada</strong> exists include the preservation <strong>of</strong> a family base<br />
in the homel<strong>and</strong> 10 <strong>and</strong> the retention <strong>of</strong> assets abroad. 11<br />
Motivation<br />
The relevant issue is whether or not the applicant has the requisite intention to reside<br />
permanently in <strong>Canada</strong>. The motivation behind the applicant's intention is not <strong>of</strong> itself relevant. 12<br />
For example, the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division held that an applicant's desire to facilitate the<br />
entry into <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>of</strong> her two unmarried sons did not, in that case, preclude a finding <strong>of</strong> an<br />
intention on the part <strong>of</strong> the applicant to reside permanently in <strong>Canada</strong>; therefore, the applicant<br />
was found not to be a “courier parent.” 13<br />
8<br />
9<br />
10<br />
11<br />
12<br />
13<br />
See for example: Shergill, supra, footnote 7; Patel, Mohamed, supra, footnote 15; Kala, Bhupinder Kaur v.<br />
M.E.I. (IAD T92-09579), Arpin, Townshend, Fatsis, May 18, 1993; Mahil, Tarlochan v. M.E.I. (IAD T92-<br />
08178), Weisdorf, Townshend, Ahara, May 18, 1993; Kamara, Abass Bai Mohamed v. M.E.I. (IAD W91-<br />
00092), Arpin, February 24, 1994; Brown, Earlyn v. M.C.I. (IAD T93-09712), Ramnarine, August 17, 1994;<br />
Gill, Harbans Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V92-00694), Lam, March 27, 1996; <strong>and</strong> Dh<strong>and</strong>war, Jatinder Kaur v. M.C.I.<br />
(IAD T96-01977), Bartley, June 6, 1997. In Molice, Antoine Anel v. M.E.I. (IAD M93-07976), Dur<strong>and</strong>,<br />
March 22, 1994, one <strong>of</strong> the factors which the panel considered was the sponsor's statement that he did not<br />
sponsor his parents in the early 1980s when he could have, as he was waiting until the law would allow him to<br />
also sponsor his siblings, his parents' accompanying dependants. The panel held that if the applicants were not<br />
“courier parents”, there would have been no reason for the sponsor to have waited for the law to change before<br />
sponsoring them; as well, the sponsor could not have known or predicted that the law would be changed in the<br />
future. Cherfaoui, Azzedine Dino v. M.C.I., (IAD MA1-01747), Beauchemin, February 11, 2002 (reasons<br />
signed February 13, 2002).<br />
Sarwar, supra, footnote 6. Ha, Byung Joon v. M.C.I. (IAD TA0-04969), Sangmuah, October 3, 2001 (reasons<br />
signed January 8, 2002).<br />
Deol, Dilbag Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 80-6012), Campbell, Hlady, Howard, February 11, 1981.<br />
Pacampara, Enrique P<strong>and</strong>ong v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-9684), Ariemma, Arkin, De Morais, April 10, 1987; Ruhani,<br />
Zahida v. M.C.I. (IAD T92-07177), Teitelbaum, Muzzi, B<strong>and</strong>, March 8, 1995; <strong>and</strong> Lalli, Kulwinder v. M.C.I.<br />
(IAD V94-01439), Lam, November 20, 1995. See however Gill, Shivinder Kaur, supra, footnote 7, where<br />
there was evidence that the retention <strong>of</strong> the family home was a cultural norm <strong>and</strong> that in any event, the<br />
applicant <strong>of</strong>fered a plausible explanation when he said that he didn’t want to sell the home so that the family<br />
could have accommodation when they returned to India to visit relatives. In Dhiman, Jasvir Kaur v. M.C.I.<br />
(IAD V95-00675), McIsaac, May 27, 1996, one basis for the refusal was that the applicants’ societal traditions<br />
were such that parents lived with their sons (married or not), <strong>and</strong> not with their married daughters; the<br />
applicants applied to go <strong>and</strong> live with their married daughter in <strong>Canada</strong>, while their eldest son remained in<br />
India. This basis was not accepted, however, <strong>and</strong> the refusal was found to be invalid in law.<br />
Aquino, Edmar v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-9403), Eglington, Weisdorf, Ahara, August 13, 1986.<br />
Ruhani, supra, footnote 11.<br />
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Timing<br />
In appeals where the issue is whether or not the applicant is an immigrant, the question <strong>of</strong><br />
timing arises: that is, at what point in time must the applicant have had the requisite intention to<br />
reside permanently in <strong>Canada</strong>? In Kahlon 14 , the Federal Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal held that the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal <strong>Board</strong> (the predecessor to the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division) had to decide<br />
the appeal on the basis <strong>of</strong> the law as it stood at the time <strong>of</strong> the hearing <strong>of</strong> the appeal because the<br />
hearing before the <strong>Board</strong> was a hearing de novo. If one applies Kahlon, where the refusal is<br />
based on the applicant's not being an immigrant, the panel would determine the applicant's<br />
intention as <strong>of</strong> the date <strong>of</strong> the hearing. However, there has been some conflicting case-law in this<br />
area.<br />
In Patel, Manjulaben, it was held that a determination should be made <strong>of</strong> the applicant's<br />
intention at the time that the applicant made his or her application for permanent residence since<br />
it is a jurisdictional question. 15 However, more recently, <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division panels<br />
have not followed Patel on the timing issue, <strong>and</strong> have instead relied on Kahlon <strong>and</strong> held that the<br />
applicant's intention to establish permanent residence in <strong>Canada</strong> must be determined as <strong>of</strong> the<br />
time <strong>of</strong> the hearing. 16 In Ampoma 17 , the majority applied Kahlon <strong>and</strong> held that intention must be<br />
assessed at the time <strong>of</strong> the hearing. The dissenting member specifically refused to follow the<br />
decision in Patel. 18<br />
In Quadri, the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division stated that the burden <strong>of</strong> pro<strong>of</strong> on a sponsor<br />
is to prove that either the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer erred in finding that there was no intention to immigrate at<br />
14<br />
15<br />
16<br />
17<br />
18<br />
Kahlon, Darshan Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-115-86), Mahoney, Stone, MacGuigan, February 6, 1989.<br />
Reported: Kahlon v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1989), 7 Imm. L.R. (2d) 91 (F.C.A.).<br />
Patel, Manjulaben v. M.E.I. (IAD T89-03915), Townshend, Weisdorf, Chu, April 20, 1990 (leave to appeal<br />
refused July 16, 1990); see infra, for a discussion on jurisdiction. Patel was applied by the majority in Uddin,<br />
Mohammed Moin v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-02394), Chu, Ahara, Fatsis (dissenting), August 28, 1992.<br />
Gnanapragasam, Dominic Gnanase v. M.C.I. (IAD T99-11000), Whist, December 4, 2000.<br />
Ampoma, Eric Sackey v. M.E.I. (IAD W91-00008), Gill<strong>and</strong>ers, Verma, Wlodyka (dissenting), February 10,<br />
1992. Reported: Ampoma v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1992), 17 Imm. L.R. (2d)<br />
219 (IAD).<br />
See also Dh<strong>and</strong>war, supra, footnote 8; R<strong>and</strong>hawa, Baljeet Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-01361), Lam, July 23,<br />
1996; <strong>and</strong> the dissenting reasons in Uddin, supra, footnote 15. In Sanghera, Charan Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD V93-<br />
00595), Verma, December 9, 1993, the panel held that at the time <strong>of</strong> the hearing, the applicant wanted to live<br />
permanently in <strong>Canada</strong>; his contrary intention at the time <strong>of</strong> the interview was due to stress <strong>and</strong> shock on<br />
account <strong>of</strong> his mother's death <strong>and</strong> his brother's recent suicide in <strong>Canada</strong>. Similarly, in Sidhu, supra, footnote 5,<br />
the panel held that any statements that the father may have made about returning to India were due to his<br />
emotional stress at the time. In Mallik, Azim v. M.C.I. (IAD T94-04692), Aterman, September 8, 1995, the<br />
applicant’s responses at the interview suggested that she did not intend to reside permanently in <strong>Canada</strong>; the<br />
Appeal Division accepted the appellant’s explanation that the applicant was under stress as a result <strong>of</strong> the way<br />
in which the interview was conducted, <strong>and</strong> that she had become flustered; it also accepted the explanation that<br />
the applicant was not sophisticated. See also Sanghera, Avtar Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V93-02360), Singh,<br />
July 22, 1994 <strong>and</strong> Khanna, Sadhana Kumari v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-01555), Wright, June 3, 1996. But see Gill,<br />
Harbans Kaur, supra, footnote 8, where the panel considered the applicants’ statements at the time <strong>of</strong> their<br />
interview to be more credible <strong>and</strong> trustworthy than their affidavits made subsequent to the refusal, finding that<br />
the affidavits were “clearly a self-serving attempt to correct earlier statements”.<br />
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the time <strong>of</strong> the interview, or alternatively, that the intention to immigrate arose after the interview<br />
<strong>and</strong> was present at the time <strong>of</strong> the hearing <strong>of</strong> the appeal. 19<br />
Fairness<br />
There is a general duty <strong>of</strong> procedural fairness which governs visa <strong>of</strong>ficers in their<br />
processing <strong>of</strong> sponsored applications for l<strong>and</strong>ing. The issue has sometimes arisen with respect to<br />
an applicant’s intention to reside permanently in <strong>Canada</strong>. A sponsor may challenge the validity <strong>of</strong><br />
a refusal on the basis that there was a breach <strong>of</strong> the principles <strong>of</strong> natural justice, namely the denial<br />
<strong>of</strong> a fair hearing; such an argument is based on the decision in Pangli 20 . In that case, the Court<br />
held that the immigration <strong>of</strong>ficer had a duty to clear up conflicting statements made by the<br />
applicant on the same day. In both Rahman <strong>and</strong> Dory 21 , the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division held<br />
that the applicant was never given an opportunity to answer supplementary questions allowing<br />
her to clarify contradictory statements regarding her intention to reside permanently in <strong>Canada</strong>.<br />
Furthermore, the immigration <strong>of</strong>ficer who interviewed the applicant should have been the<br />
one who actually refused the application; 22 this principle was satisfied where one immigration<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficer interviewed <strong>and</strong> made a recommendation to refuse the application, <strong>and</strong> another <strong>of</strong>ficer<br />
countersigned the recommendation <strong>and</strong> signed the refusal letter.<br />
Pangli has also been applied to support the principle that a visa <strong>of</strong>ficer has the duty to<br />
explain to the applicant the difference between permanent resident <strong>and</strong> visitor status, <strong>and</strong> to<br />
explain the possible negative impact <strong>of</strong> any statutory declaration signed by the applicant which<br />
attests to the applicant's intention not to reside permanently in <strong>Canada</strong>. 23<br />
19<br />
20<br />
21<br />
22<br />
23<br />
Quadri, Fatai Abiodun v. S.S.C. (IAD T93-12576), Hopkins, September 30, 1994.<br />
Pangi v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) [1987] F.C.J. No. 1022. For a fuller discussion <strong>of</strong><br />
fairness, see Chapter 11, “Fairness <strong>and</strong> Natural Justice under IRPA”.<br />
Rahman, Mohibur v. M.C.I. (IAD M94-05434), Angé, March 3, 1995; Dory, Roosevelt v. M.C.I. (IAD M94-<br />
03745), Angé, December 19, 1995. In Sian, Malkit Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-00955), McIsaac, January 20,<br />
1997, the panel stated that the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer had a duty to clear up the conflict between her conclusion that the<br />
applicants did not intend to reside permanently in <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>and</strong> their contrary intention inherent in their<br />
application for permanent residence. The visa <strong>of</strong>ficer had arrived at her conclusion based on the applicant’s<br />
responses at the interview; what was needed was “a further questioning…thereby affording him the opportunity<br />
to state finally, <strong>and</strong> unequivocally, what his intention was ins<strong>of</strong>ar as coming to <strong>Canada</strong> was concerned”.<br />
This principle was applied in Gill, Rajwinder Kaur v. M.E.I. (IAD V91-00898), Arpin, July 26, 1993.<br />
See, for example, Rodriguez, Meliton v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-00107), Weisdorf, Fatsis, Ariemma, August 8, 1991,<br />
where the panel applied Pangli <strong>and</strong> held that if at the interview the applicant indicated a desire to come to<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> as a visitor, the choice <strong>of</strong> a visitor visa rather than a permanent resident visa should have been put to<br />
her; there was no evidence that such a choice had been given to the applicant; Merius, Ronald v. M.E.I. (IAD<br />
M93-05810), Angé, June 13, 1994; <strong>and</strong> Quadri, supra, footnote 19 <strong>and</strong> M.C.I. v. Gough, Glen Patrick (IAD<br />
TA0-1561), MacAdam, March 26, 2001 where the respondent had signed a voluntary declaration <strong>of</strong><br />
ab<strong>and</strong>onment <strong>of</strong> Canadian permanent resident status <strong>and</strong> h<strong>and</strong>ed over his Canadian record <strong>of</strong> l<strong>and</strong>ing in<br />
unexpected circumstances <strong>and</strong> at a moment <strong>of</strong> intense sleep deprivation. The panel held that he could not be<br />
faulted for having singed it without an actual intention to ab<strong>and</strong>on <strong>Canada</strong> as his place <strong>of</strong> permanent residence.<br />
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Failure to answer truthfully or provide documents<br />
Under the Regulations to the <strong>Immigration</strong> Act, s. 9(3) provided a basis for a visa <strong>of</strong>ficer to<br />
refuse a visa for failure to provide information needed to assess both eligibility <strong>and</strong> admissibility<br />
<strong>of</strong> an applicant. At a de novo <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division hearing the applicant may have<br />
provided a reasonable explanation or lawful excuse for the default <strong>and</strong> the refusal would no<br />
longer be lawful. If an appeal was allowed in law or on a discretionary basis, care was to be taken<br />
that the visa <strong>of</strong>ficer had the information needed to determine eligibility <strong>and</strong> admissibility when<br />
processing <strong>of</strong> the application re-commenced after the appeal. A similar scheme has been enacted<br />
in IRPA.<br />
Where an applicant has answered questions in the application or at an interview which<br />
answers have turned out to be false, a refusal has been tied to the duty to answer questions<br />
truthfully. In IRPA this requirement is set out in those provisions that govern the making an<br />
application <strong>of</strong> any kind:<br />
s. 16(1) A person who makes an application must answer truthfully<br />
all questions put to them for the purpose <strong>of</strong> the examination <strong>and</strong><br />
must produce a visa <strong>and</strong> all relevant evidence <strong>and</strong> documents that<br />
the <strong>of</strong>ficer reasonably requires.<br />
An applicant for permanent residence would seem to be covered by the duty in this<br />
provision. They must provide adequate pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> both eligibility (e.g. relationship to sponsor) <strong>and</strong><br />
admissibility<br />
The failure to answer questions truthfully may also give rise to a separate inadmissibility<br />
finding under s. 40(1)(a) <strong>of</strong> IRPA, i.e. misrepresentation, which may have the effect <strong>of</strong> barring<br />
the foreign national from <strong>Canada</strong> for two years. This is dealt with in more detail in Chapter 8.<br />
Failure to undergo a medical examination<br />
This has been dealt with in Chapter 3 on medical inadmissibility. See comments above as<br />
to continuing obligation to provide pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> admissibility.<br />
Discretionary Jurisdiction<br />
The general category <strong>of</strong> inadmissibility described in s. 41(a) is designed to ensure all<br />
applicants undergo a thorough <strong>and</strong> detailed process <strong>of</strong> examination to ensure they meet the<br />
requirements <strong>of</strong> the Act <strong>and</strong> regulations. A refusal may be challenged as unlawful or a sponsor<br />
may seek special relief from the requirement <strong>and</strong> produce a sufficient evidentiary basis for the<br />
applicant to be relieved <strong>of</strong> the challenged requirement. The integrity <strong>of</strong> the immigration system<br />
must be examined against the particular circumstances supporting the request for special relief.<br />
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CASES<br />
Ampoma, Eric Sackey v. M.E.I. (IAD W91-00008), Gill<strong>and</strong>ers, Verma, Wlodyka (dissenting),<br />
February 10, 1992. Reported: Ampoma v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>)<br />
(1992), 17 Imm. L.R. (2d) 219 (IAD) ....................................................................................................................... 5<br />
Aquino, Edmar v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-9403), Eglington, Weisdorf, Ahara, August 13, 1986 .......................................... 4<br />
Brown, Earlyn v. M.C.I. (IAD T93-09712), Ramnarine, August 17, 1994.................................................................... 4<br />
Cherfaoui, Azzedine Dino v. M.C.I., (IAD MA1-01747), Beauchemin, February 11, 2002 (reasons<br />
signed February 13, 2002)......................................................................................................................................... 4<br />
Daliri, Farshid Hafezi v. M.C.I., (IAD TA3-01591), MacDonald, May 6, 2004; [2004] I.A.D.D.<br />
No. 210 (QL)............................................................................................................................................................. 2<br />
Deol, Dilbag Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 80-6012), Campbell, Hlady, Howard, February 11, 1981. .................................. 4<br />
Dh<strong>and</strong>war, Jatinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-01977), Bartley, June 6, 1997.......................................................... 4, 5<br />
Dhaul, Paramjit Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-6004), Chambers, March 5, 1987. ............................................................. 3<br />
Dhiman, Jasvir Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-00675), McIsaac, May 27, 1996. ................................................................ 4<br />
Dory, Roosevelt v. M.C.I. (IAD M94-03745), Angé, December 19, 1995..................................................................... 6<br />
Gill, Harbans Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V92-00694), Lam, March 27, 1996................................................................... 4, 5<br />
Gill, Jagjit Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-00365), McIsaac, May 8, 1997.......................................................................... 2<br />
Gill, Rajwinder Kaur v. M.E.I. (IAD V91-00898), Arpin, July 26, 1993 ...................................................................... 6<br />
Gill, Shivinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD T94-06519), Wright, May 16, 1995. ................................................................ 3, 4<br />
Gnanapragasam, Dominic Gnanase v. M.C.I. (IAD T99-11000), Whist, December 4, 2000....................................... 5<br />
Goindi, Surendra Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD T93-10856), Aterman, December 13, 1994 .................................................... 2<br />
Gough: M.C.I. v. Gough, Glen Patrick (IAD TA0-1561), MacAdam, March 26, 2001............................................... 6<br />
Ha, Byung Joon v. M.C.I. (IAD TA0-04969), Sangmuah, October 3, 2001 (reasons signed January<br />
8, 2002) ..................................................................................................................................................................... 4<br />
Kahlon, Darshan Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-115-86), Mahoney, Stone, MacGuigan,<br />
February 6, 1989. Reported: Kahlon v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>)<br />
(1989), 7 Imm. L.R. (2d) 91 (F.C.A.)........................................................................................................................ 5<br />
Kala, Bhupinder Kaur v. M.E.I. (IAD T92-09579), Arpin, Townshend, Fatsis, May 18, 1993..................................... 4<br />
Kamara, Abass Bai Mohamed v. M.E.I. (IAD W91-00092), Arpin, February 24, 1994................................................ 4<br />
Kan, Chak Pan v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-2977-91), Muldoon, March 19, 1992. Reported: Kan v.<br />
<strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1992), 17 Imm. L.R. (2d) 206 (F.C.T.D.)............................. 2<br />
Khanna, Sadhana Kumari v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-01555), Wright, June 3, 1996 .............................................................. 5<br />
Lalli, Kulwinder v. M.C.I. (IAD V94-01439), Lam, November 20, 1995...................................................................... 4<br />
Mahil, Tarlochan v. M.E.I. (IAD T92-08178), Weisdorf, Townshend, Ahara, May 18, 1993. ..................................... 4<br />
Mallik, Azim v. M.C.I. (IAD T94-04692), Aterman, September 8, 1995. ...................................................................... 5<br />
Merius, Ronald v. M.E.I. (IAD M93-05810), Angé, June 13, 1994............................................................................... 6<br />
Mirza, Shahid Parvez v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-9081), Teitelbaum, Weisdorf, Townshend, December 1,<br />
1986........................................................................................................................................................................... 3<br />
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Molice, Antoine Anel v. M.E.I. (IAD M93-07976), Dur<strong>and</strong>, March 22, 1994. .............................................................. 4<br />
Pacampara, Enrique P<strong>and</strong>ong v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-9684), Ariemma, Arkin, De Morais, April 10,<br />
1987........................................................................................................................................................................... 4<br />
Pangi v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) [1987] F.C.J. No. 1022 ................................................. 6<br />
Patel, Manjulaben v. M.E.I. (IAD T89-03915), Townshend, Weisdorf, Chu, April 20, 1990....................................... 5<br />
Patel, Mohamed v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-03124), Weisdorf, Ahara, Fatsis, April 15, 1993. ........................................... 2, 4<br />
Quadri, Fatai Abiodun v. S.S.C. (IAD T93-12576), Hopkins, September 30, 1994...................................................... 6<br />
Rahman, Mohibur v. M.C.I. (IAD M94-05434), Angé, March 3, 1995. ........................................................................ 6<br />
R<strong>and</strong>hawa, Baljeet Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-01361), Lam, July 23, 1996.................................................................. 5<br />
Rodriguez, Meliton v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-00107), Weisdorf, Fatsis, Ariemma, August 8, 1991. .................................... 6<br />
Ruhani, Zahida v. M.C.I. (IAD T92-07177), Teitelbaum, Muzzi, B<strong>and</strong>, March 8, 1995............................................... 4<br />
Sanghera, Avtar Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V93-02360), Singh, July 22, 1994.................................................................... 5<br />
Sanghera, Charan Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD V93-00595), Verma, December 9, 1993........................................................ 5<br />
Sanghera, Rajwinder Kular v. M.C.I. (IAD V96-01527), Clark, February 17, 1998..................................................... 3<br />
Saroya, Kuljeet Kaur v. M.E.I. (IAD V92-01880), Verma, September 21, 1993 ...................................................... 2, 2<br />
Sarwar, Abida Shaheen v. M.C.I. (IAD T93-11195), Ariemma, Leousis, Muzzi, April 24, 1995............................. 3, 4<br />
Shergill, Sohan Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD T92-05406), Weisdorf, Chu, Ahara, February 8, 1993................................... 2, 4<br />
Sian, Malkit Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-00955), McIsaac, January 20, 1997 ................................................................. 6<br />
Sidhu, Gurdev Singh v. M.E.I. (IAD V92-01678), Singh, November 17, 1993 ............................................................. 2<br />
Toor, Joginder Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-310-82), Thurlow, Heald, Verchere, February 15,<br />
1983. Reported: Re Toor <strong>and</strong> <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1983),<br />
144 D.L.R. (3d) 554, QL [1983] F.C.J. 114 (F.C.A.)................................................................................................ 3<br />
Uddin, Mohammed Moin v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-02394), Chu, Ahara, Fatsis (dissenting), August 28,<br />
1992........................................................................................................................................................................... 5<br />
Villanueva, Antonio Ordonez v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-9741), Benedetti, Weisdorf, Bell, November 12,<br />
1986........................................................................................................................................................................... 2<br />
Wiredu, Alex v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-00727), Muzzi, December 8, 1997 ........................................................................... 3<br />
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Chapter Ten<br />
Discretionary Jurisdiction<br />
GENERALLY 1<br />
The statutory provision for the determination <strong>of</strong> discretionary relief in sponsorship<br />
appeals under the <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Refugee</strong> Protection Act (IRPA) is found in s. 67. It is<br />
open to the Appeal Division to allow an appeal on both legal grounds <strong>and</strong> on the ground<br />
that, taking into account the best interests <strong>of</strong> a child directly affected by the decision,<br />
sufficient humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate considerations warrant special relief in light <strong>of</strong><br />
all the circumstances <strong>of</strong> the case. Generally, however, special relief is granted after a<br />
refusal is found to be valid in law.<br />
Statutory Provisions<br />
67. (1) To allow an appeal, the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division must be satisfied that, at the<br />
time that the appeal is disposed <strong>of</strong>,<br />
(a) the decision appealed is wrong in law or fact or mixed law <strong>and</strong> fact;<br />
(b) a principle <strong>of</strong> natural justice has not been observed; or<br />
(c) other than in the case <strong>of</strong> an appeal by the Minister, taking into account<br />
the best interests <strong>of</strong> a child directly affected by the decision, sufficient<br />
humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate considerations warrant special relief<br />
in light <strong>of</strong> all the circumstances <strong>of</strong> the case. (emphasis added)<br />
Paragraph 3(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA provides the following as some <strong>of</strong> the objectives <strong>of</strong> the Act<br />
with respect to immigration:<br />
3.(1) The objectives <strong>of</strong> this Act with respect to immigration are<br />
(d) to see that families are reunited in <strong>Canada</strong>;<br />
(h) to protect the health <strong>and</strong> safety <strong>of</strong> Canadians <strong>and</strong> to maintain the security<br />
<strong>of</strong> Canadian society;<br />
(i) to promote international justice <strong>and</strong> security by fostering respect for<br />
human rights <strong>and</strong> by denying access to Canadian territory to persons<br />
who are criminals or security risks;<br />
Paragraph 3(3)(f) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA provides the following:<br />
(3) This Act is to be construed <strong>and</strong> applied in a manner that<br />
1<br />
Reference may be made to other chapters which discuss discretionary jurisdiction for more on the subject.<br />
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(f) complies with international human rights instruments to which <strong>Canada</strong><br />
is signatory.<br />
Exercise <strong>of</strong> Discretionary Jurisdiction<br />
In Dimacali-Victoria 2 , the Federal Court, discussing the Appeal Division’s discretionary<br />
jurisdiction under the former <strong>Immigration</strong> Act, said the following:<br />
[…] the decision <strong>of</strong> the IAD [on compassionate or humanitarian<br />
considerations] does involve what I am satisfied is a discretionary<br />
grant <strong>of</strong> an exemption from the ordinary requirements <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Act […] I am satisfied that the determination <strong>of</strong> the<br />
IAD under paragraph 77(3)(b) is, like the decision in question in<br />
Shah, 3 “[…] wholly a matter <strong>of</strong> judgment <strong>and</strong> discretion <strong>and</strong> the law<br />
gives […] no right to any particular outcome.” [It has to exercise]<br />
its discretion in accordance with well established legal principles,<br />
that is to say in a bona fide manner, uninfluenced by irrelevant<br />
considerations <strong>and</strong> not arbitrarily or illegally.<br />
The Supreme Court <strong>of</strong> <strong>Canada</strong> has held that discretion must be exercised in accordance<br />
with the boundaries imposed by law, fundamental Canadian values <strong>and</strong> the Canadian Charter <strong>of</strong><br />
Rights <strong>and</strong> Freedoms. 4<br />
In Lutchman, 5 the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal <strong>Board</strong> described its discretionary jurisdiction in<br />
these terms:<br />
2<br />
3<br />
4<br />
5<br />
In its wisdom, Parliament saw fit to include such provision to mitigate the<br />
rigidity <strong>of</strong> the law by enabling the <strong>Board</strong> to dispose <strong>of</strong> an appeal favourably<br />
when the strict application <strong>of</strong> the law would not permit such a determination,<br />
but the circumstances dem<strong>and</strong> a fair <strong>and</strong> just solution. […] Clearly, this<br />
jurisdiction is discretionary in nature <strong>and</strong>, as such, it must be exercised with<br />
caution. Its application must be based on objective elements, the evaluation<br />
<strong>of</strong> which must not be vitiated by subjective feelings, sentimental propensities,<br />
Dimacali-Victoria, April Grace Mary v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3323-96), Gibson, August 29, 1997. See<br />
Budhu, Pooran Deonaraine v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-272-97), Reed, March 20, 1998, where stereotyping<br />
<strong>and</strong> irrelevant considerations led the Federal Court – Trial Division to set aside the Appeal Division’s decision.<br />
Shah, Syed v. M.E.I. (F.C.A, no. A-617-92), Hugessen, MacGuigan, Linden, June 24, 1994.<br />
Baker v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817. In the context <strong>of</strong> an<br />
immigration <strong>of</strong>ficer’s decision involving the exercise <strong>of</strong> discretion on compassionate or humanitarian grounds,<br />
the Court found that the <strong>of</strong>ficer’s comments gave rise to a reasonable apprehension <strong>of</strong> bias as they did not<br />
disclose the existence <strong>of</strong> an open mind or the weighing <strong>of</strong> the particular circumstances <strong>of</strong> the case free from<br />
stereotypes. The <strong>of</strong>ficer’s comments regarding the applicant’s being a strain on the welfare system were based<br />
on the fact that the applicant had been diagnosed with a psychiatric illness <strong>and</strong> was a single mother with several<br />
children.<br />
Lutchman, Umintra v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 88-35755), Ariemma, Townshend, Bell, January 10, 1989. Reported:<br />
Lutchman v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1989), 12 Imm. L.R. (2d) 224 (I.A.B.).<br />
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or biased outlooks. What are these objective elements, <strong>and</strong> what weight each<br />
carries, can only be determined by the facts <strong>of</strong> each case. 6<br />
In many decisions the Federal Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal sanctioned consideration <strong>of</strong> the legal<br />
impediment in the exercise <strong>of</strong> the Appeal Division’s discretion. 7 The approach taken by the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division is reflected in the following statement:<br />
[…] [T]his jurisdiction is exercised to overcome a legal obstacle which<br />
originated from the fact that an applicant was found to be inadmissible […]<br />
[T]he question is: how compelling must the evidence be to overcome such<br />
an obstacle <strong>and</strong> to warrant the granting <strong>of</strong> special relief? Objectivity <strong>and</strong><br />
fairness require that the evaluation <strong>of</strong> evidence be carried out in some<br />
consistent fashion <strong>and</strong>, while it is not possible to establish an absolute scale<br />
<strong>of</strong> values against which to measure the weight <strong>of</strong> the evidence, it is clear that<br />
such scale must be commensurate with the magnitude <strong>of</strong> the obstacle to be<br />
overcome. Therefore, in the case where at the time <strong>of</strong> the hearing the<br />
impediment which gave rise to the refusal no longer exists, the compelling<br />
force <strong>of</strong> the evidence need not be great to overcome what, in effect, is only a<br />
legal technicality. 8<br />
In Dhaliwal, 9 a case decided under the <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Refugee</strong> Protection Act, the<br />
applicant argued that the <strong>Board</strong> erred in conducting a weighing exercise <strong>of</strong> the humanitarian <strong>and</strong><br />
compassionate considerations against countervailing factors. The Court noted that Kirpal 10 was<br />
decided under paragraph 77(3)(b) <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Act, <strong>and</strong> that Justice Gibson in Kirpal had<br />
explicitly concluded that the tribunal could not consider the countervailing factors on the basis<br />
that the phrase “having regard to all the circumstances” was absent from the enactment. Those<br />
words were subsequently added by Parliament to the former Statute <strong>and</strong> are contained in IRPA<br />
paragraph 67(1)(c). The Court concluded that it was open to the <strong>Board</strong> to consider other matters<br />
in weighing the humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate factors.<br />
Jugpall 11<br />
re-states the traditional approach:<br />
The Appeal Division has long held that the exercise <strong>of</strong> its statutory discretion<br />
is a function <strong>of</strong> the context created by a determination <strong>of</strong> inadmissibility. […]<br />
[T]he relief in question is relief from the determination <strong>of</strong> inadmissibility<br />
[…].<br />
6<br />
7<br />
8<br />
9<br />
10<br />
11<br />
Ibid., at 4-5.<br />
These decisions are canvassed in Chauhan, Gurpreet K. v. M.C.I. (IAD T95-06533), Townshend, June 11,<br />
1997.<br />
Lutchman, supra, footnote 5, at 5.<br />
Dhaliwal, Resham Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-8123-04), Mosley, June 15, 2005; 2005 FC 869.<br />
Kirpal v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1997] 1 F.C. 352 (T.D.).<br />
Jugpall, Sukhjeewan Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD T98-00716), Aterman, Goodman, Townshend, April 12, 1999, at 9-<br />
11; 17-18. See too M.C.I. v. Dang, Thi Kim Anh (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3113-99), Dawson, July 20, 2000, where<br />
the panel adopted the reasoning in Jugpall <strong>and</strong> the Court found that the panel did not err in law when it allowed<br />
the appeal on H&C grounds.<br />
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[…]<br />
The need to establish the context in which an appeal pursuant to s. 77(3)(b) is<br />
to be considered can be understood as a practical <strong>and</strong> purposive approach to<br />
the administration <strong>of</strong> the Act. If the purpose <strong>of</strong> the Act is to facilitate rather<br />
than frustrate immigration, then one <strong>of</strong> the aims <strong>of</strong> the Act in granting a right<br />
<strong>of</strong> appeal pursuant to s. 77(3)(b) is to make available a remedy where the<br />
strict application <strong>of</strong> the law produces harsh results. This aim can be realised<br />
by measuring the compassionate or humanitarian aspects <strong>of</strong> an individual’s<br />
case in relation to the legal obstacles to admissibility.<br />
[…]<br />
The Appeal Division has consistently applied an approach which requires the<br />
degree <strong>of</strong> compelling circumstances to be commensurate with the legal<br />
obstacle to admissibility in order to justify granting discretionary relief.<br />
Thus, in cases where changes in the circumstances <strong>of</strong> the case by the time it<br />
gets to appeal are such that the original basis for a finding <strong>of</strong> inadmissibility<br />
has been overcome, a mildly compelling case may be sufficient to warrant<br />
granting discretionary relief. […] [A] complete surmounting <strong>of</strong> the substance<br />
<strong>of</strong> the original ground <strong>of</strong> inadmissibility weighs very heavily in the Appeal<br />
Division’s assessment <strong>of</strong> the compassionate or humanitarian circumstances<br />
<strong>of</strong> the case.<br />
[…]<br />
In the context <strong>of</strong> cases where Parliament’s concerns with admissibility have<br />
been met, it may not be necessary to look for overwhelming circumstances in<br />
order to grant special relief. The values <strong>of</strong> quick <strong>and</strong> fair adjudication would<br />
not be served by forcing the appellant to start the sponsorship process all<br />
over again […].<br />
Where the obstacle to admissibility has been overcome, particularly with respect to<br />
medical <strong>and</strong> financial inadmissibility, there must be positive factors present over <strong>and</strong> above the<br />
ability <strong>of</strong> the sponsor to surmount the obstacle to admissibility in order for the Appeal Division to<br />
grant special relief:<br />
There must be positive factors independent <strong>of</strong> [the obstacle to admissibility]<br />
which move the decision-maker to conclude that it would be unfair to require<br />
the appellant to start the whole sponsorship process all over again. 12<br />
As well, there should be no negative factors which would undermine any<br />
justification for granting special relief. 13<br />
The Chirwa 14 st<strong>and</strong>ard applies where the initial ground <strong>of</strong> inadmissibility has not in<br />
substance been overcome. The following definitions <strong>of</strong> “compassionate or humanitarian<br />
considerations” were given in Chirwa:<br />
12<br />
13<br />
14<br />
Ibid., at 18.<br />
Ibid.<br />
Chirwa v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Manpower <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1970), 4 I.A.C. 338 (I.A.B.), at 350.<br />
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[...] “compassion” [is defined] as “sorrow or pity excited by the distress or<br />
misfortunes <strong>of</strong> another, sympathy” [...] “compassionate considerations” must<br />
[...] be taken to be those facts, established by the evidence, which would<br />
excite in a reasonable man in a civilized community a desire to relieve the<br />
misfortunes <strong>of</strong> another – so long as these misfortunes “warrant the granting<br />
<strong>of</strong> special relief” from the effect <strong>of</strong> the provisions <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Act.<br />
[...]<br />
[...] “humanitarianism” [is defined] as “regard for the interests <strong>of</strong> mankind,<br />
benevolence.”<br />
Some <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division panels have articulated their underst<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>of</strong> the test<br />
for discretionary relief pursuant to the <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Refugee</strong> Protection Act in the context <strong>of</strong><br />
sponsorship appeals.<br />
In Menon, 15 the panel opined that Chirwa remains a sound guide for the <strong>Immigration</strong><br />
Appeal Division in exercising its discretion, but that the test for discretionary relief is broader<br />
than that under the <strong>Immigration</strong> Act.<br />
Another panel, in Chang, 16 expressed the view that the case law as it developed in the<br />
area <strong>of</strong> discretionary relief in relationship to sponsorship appeals under the former Act continues<br />
to be relevant given the similar wording between the former <strong>and</strong> current Acts.<br />
In the opinion <strong>of</strong> the panel in Chang the requirement under the IRPA that the<br />
humanitarian or compassionate considerations be “sufficient” is a legislative recognition that, in<br />
most appeals <strong>of</strong> this nature, there will be some humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate considerations<br />
present. The panel noted that in all appeals involving family class sponsorships the issue <strong>of</strong><br />
family re-unification is present to a greater or lesser degree. The inclusion <strong>of</strong> “sufficient” along<br />
with the requirement that humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate considerations warranting relief be<br />
assessed “in light <strong>of</strong> all the circumstances <strong>of</strong> the case” suggests that a balancing or weighing<br />
process must take place.<br />
Member Workun in Chang concluded that the phrase “in light <strong>of</strong> all the circumstances <strong>of</strong><br />
the case” in the context <strong>of</strong> a sponsorship appeal does not have the specialized meaning which was<br />
formerly attributed to the phrase in the context <strong>of</strong> removal order appeals. She expressed the view,<br />
however, that certain Ribic 17 factors could be relevant considerations, depending on the facts <strong>of</strong><br />
the case. In the case <strong>of</strong> criminality outside <strong>of</strong> <strong>Canada</strong>, for example, the seriousness <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fence<br />
leading to the inadmissibility, possibility <strong>of</strong> re-<strong>of</strong>fence, evidence <strong>of</strong> rehabilitation, <strong>and</strong> degree <strong>of</strong><br />
family <strong>and</strong> community support are relevant considerations.<br />
15<br />
16<br />
17<br />
Menon, Romola Gia v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-01956), D’Ignazio, January 15, 2004.<br />
Chang, Hea Soon v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-02703), Workun, July 15, 2003.<br />
Ribic,Marida v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 84-9623), D. Davey, Benedetti, Petryshyn, August 20, 1985.<br />
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Along with these considerations the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division must assess the<br />
humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate considerations present <strong>and</strong> within the context <strong>of</strong> all other<br />
relevant circumstances. The overall circumstances <strong>of</strong> the appellant <strong>and</strong> applicant, including those<br />
supportive <strong>of</strong> special relief <strong>and</strong> those non-supportive <strong>of</strong> such relief, must be considered. The<br />
panel’s considerations must also include a consideration <strong>of</strong> the legal obstacle to admission <strong>and</strong> a<br />
weighing exercise must then be done.<br />
In Khan 18 the panel addressed the test for discretionary relief in the <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>Refugee</strong> Protection Act. In Member Stein’s view, the <strong>of</strong>ten cited test in Chirwa touches on one<br />
important basis – a desire to relieve misfortune – for exercising discretionary relief. However,<br />
over the years, IAD jurisprudence has exp<strong>and</strong>ed to consider a much wider range <strong>of</strong> factors in<br />
deciding whether to grant special relief. Section 67(1)(c) <strong>of</strong> IRPA grants an extremely broad<br />
power including a requirement to consider the best interests <strong>of</strong> a child directly affected by the<br />
decision, <strong>and</strong> whether there are sufficient humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate considerations in light<br />
<strong>of</strong> all the circumstances <strong>of</strong> the case. In the panel’s view, this jurisdiction is not limited to an<br />
assessment <strong>of</strong> whether exercising discretionary relief would alleviate misfortune.<br />
Who May Benefit From Special Relief<br />
Special relief may only be granted in respect <strong>of</strong> members <strong>of</strong> the family class. 19 The<br />
applicants must first be determined to come within the definition <strong>of</strong> a member <strong>of</strong> the family class<br />
or to qualify as dependants <strong>of</strong> the member <strong>of</strong> the family class. 20<br />
In Kirpal, the Federal Court – Trial Division indicated that “[…] nothing on the face <strong>of</strong><br />
the Act <strong>and</strong> Regulations […] requires a uniform result from the Tribunal in the exercise <strong>of</strong> its<br />
equitable jurisdiction, in respect <strong>of</strong> each <strong>of</strong> the […] family members <strong>of</strong> the applicant […]”. 21 The<br />
Appeal Division generally does not undertake an individual assessment <strong>of</strong> compassionate or<br />
humanitarian factors for each applicant. Where the Appeal Division does engage in such<br />
18<br />
19<br />
20<br />
21<br />
Khan, Khalid v. M.C.I.(IAD TA4-08639), Stein, November 1, 2005.<br />
s.65 <strong>of</strong> IRPA<br />
65. In an appeal under subsection 63(1) or (2) respecting an application based on membership in the<br />
family class, the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division may not consider humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate<br />
considerations unless it has decided that the foreign national is a member <strong>of</strong> the family class <strong>and</strong> that<br />
their sponsor is a sponsor within the meaning <strong>of</strong> the regulations.<br />
117(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations defines the members <strong>of</strong> the family class.<br />
Kirpal, supra, footnote 10, at 365-366. In one case, it was argued, following Kirpal, that the Appeal Division<br />
could grant special relief with respect to some <strong>of</strong> the applicants, thereby allowing the sponsor to fulfil her<br />
undertaking. The Appeal Division concluded that Kirpal cannot be interpreted so as to allow sponsors to<br />
circumvent the admissibility requirements <strong>of</strong> the Act <strong>and</strong> Regulations: Dosanjh, Balbir Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD<br />
V95-00550), McIsaac, July 31, 1997.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Discretionary Jurisdiction - Ch. 10
individual assessments, 22 it usually comes to a uniform conclusion for all applicants on the<br />
question <strong>of</strong> whether special relief is warranted. 23<br />
When a sponsored person is determined by an immigration <strong>of</strong>ficer to be not eligible as a<br />
member <strong>of</strong> the family class, that person is split from the processing <strong>of</strong> the application: visas are<br />
issued to the principal applicant <strong>and</strong> other eligible family members. 24 There is no right <strong>of</strong> appeal<br />
to the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division as there is no family class refusal.<br />
A foreign national, other than a protected person, is inadmissible on grounds <strong>of</strong> an<br />
inadmissible family member if their accompanying family member, or in prescribed<br />
circumstances, their non-accompanying family member, is inadmissible. 25 A foreign national,<br />
other than a protected person, is inadmissible if they are an accompanying family member <strong>of</strong> an<br />
inadmissible person. 26<br />
Effect <strong>of</strong> Allowing an Appeal Pursuant to s. 67(1)(c) <strong>of</strong> IRPA<br />
A decision in the sponsor’s favour on compassionate or humanitarian grounds blankets<br />
<strong>and</strong> thus overcomes the ground <strong>of</strong> inadmissibility. 27 The blanketing effect is in relation to the<br />
particular ground that was before the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division. This means that when the<br />
application is returned to the <strong>of</strong>ficer to be further processed, if the <strong>of</strong>ficer discovers another<br />
reason for refusing the application, there is nothing to preclude a second refusal. The Division’s<br />
earlier decision granting special relief relates only to the matter that was before it at the time.<br />
Thus the Division may, on a subsequent appeal, on the facts then existing, decide that the<br />
granting <strong>of</strong> special relief is not warranted. 28 The earlier decision granting special relief may be<br />
revisited <strong>and</strong> the doctrine <strong>of</strong> res judicata does not apply.<br />
22<br />
23<br />
24<br />
25<br />
26<br />
27<br />
28<br />
See, however, Chauhan, supra, footnote 7, where the panel articulated its disagreement with Kirpal in this<br />
respect.<br />
One <strong>of</strong> the rare instances where discretionary relief was “split” in respect <strong>of</strong> the applicants was in Jagpal,<br />
Saw<strong>and</strong>eep Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V96-00243), Singh, June 15, 1998, where the panel, citing Kirpal, found<br />
discretionary relief was warranted for the sponsor’s parents but not for her brother.<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Manuals, Overseas Processing (OP), Chapter OP2 at 50.<br />
s.42(a) <strong>of</strong> IRPA <strong>and</strong> IRP Regulation 23.<br />
s.42(b) <strong>of</strong> IPRA; “family member” is defined in IRP Regulation 1(3).<br />
Mangat, Parminder Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-153-85), Strayer, February 25, 1985.<br />
Wong, Kam v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 83-6438), Davey, Hlady, Howard, March 7, 1984.<br />
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EVIDENCE<br />
Burden <strong>of</strong> Pro<strong>of</strong><br />
Before a decision favourable to a sponsor may be given on compassionate or<br />
humanitarian grounds, the sponsor has the burden <strong>of</strong> adducing evidence sufficient to attract this<br />
jurisdiction.<br />
Evidence existing at the time <strong>of</strong> the Appeal<br />
An appeal on humanitarian or compassionate grounds is decided on the facts existing at<br />
the time the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division makes its decision. In Gill, 29 the Federal Court <strong>of</strong><br />
Appeal stated:<br />
It is noteworthy to observe that the jurisprudence <strong>of</strong> this Court has<br />
established that a hearing <strong>of</strong> this nature is a hearing de novo in a broad sense,<br />
<strong>and</strong> at such a hearing the <strong>Board</strong> is entitled to consider contemporary matters<br />
which necessarily involve a consideration <strong>of</strong> changed circumstances when<br />
exercising its equitable jurisdiction.<br />
GENERAL PRINCIPLES<br />
It has been held that the sponsor’s circumstances are at least as important as those <strong>of</strong> the<br />
applicants, if not paramount, 30 on an appeal on humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate grounds.<br />
The policy objective set out in section 3(1)(d) <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Refugee</strong> Protection<br />
Act, to see that families are reunited in <strong>Canada</strong>, informs the exercise <strong>of</strong> discretionary relief.<br />
However, since it is the basis for all sponsorship applications, it is not, without more, sufficient to<br />
warrant special relief. 31 Marriage to a Canadian citizen does not, in itself, create any entitlement<br />
to special relief. 32<br />
29<br />
30<br />
31<br />
M.E.I. v. Gill, Hardeep Kaur (F.C.A., no. A-219-90), Heald, Hugessen, Stone, December 31, 1991, at 6-7.<br />
Johl, Baljinder Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-4006), Eglington, Arpin, Wright, January 26, 1987.<br />
Hylton, Claudine Ruth v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-9807), Arkin, Suppa, Ariemma, March 17, 1987; see also Valdes,<br />
Juan Gonzalo Lasa v. M.E.I. (IAD V90-01517), Wlodyka, Chambers, Gill<strong>and</strong>ers, January 21, 1992. In one<br />
case <strong>of</strong> the Federal Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal, Justice Mahoney at page 6 <strong>of</strong> his concurring reasons stated, although in<br />
obiter: “The circumstances in which the <strong>Board</strong> may exercise its discretion under s. 77(3)(b) need not be<br />
extraordinary.”: M.E.I. v. Burgon, David Ross (F.C.A., no. A-17-90), MacGuigan, Linden, Mahoney<br />
(concurring in the result), February 22, 1991. Reported: <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) v.<br />
Burgon (1991), 13 Imm. L.R. (2d) 102 (F.C.A.). This case was commented on in Sotoodeh, Isheo v. M.E.I.<br />
(IAD T91-00153), Fatsis, Chu (concurring), Bell (dissenting), July 22, 1991. The obiter statement in Burgon<br />
was relied on in granting special relief in Kadri, Darwish Mohamad v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-02769), Boscariol,<br />
August 4, 1998, the panel stating at page 5 that “compassionate considerations need not be extraordinary but<br />
can be as simple as the love between a husb<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> wife <strong>and</strong> their desire to be together”. However, in<br />
Taghizadeh-Baraz<strong>and</strong>e, Parviz v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-00073), D’Ignazio, January 20, 1998, although separation<br />
<strong>of</strong> a husb<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> wife was causing them some distress, this alone was held insufficient to warrant special relief.<br />
In Brar, Charanjit Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA5-00400), Workun, March 30, 2006, the sponsored application for<br />
permanent residence <strong>of</strong> the appellant’s husb<strong>and</strong> was refused on the basis that the appellant was in default <strong>of</strong><br />
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There is a distinction between achieving family unification <strong>and</strong> facilitating the reunion <strong>of</strong><br />
the sponsor with close relatives from abroad. 33 Generally speaking, the concern is not with<br />
maintaining the unification <strong>of</strong> all relatives abroad. As a general rule, the fact that a relative<br />
abroad does not wish or is ineligible to come to <strong>Canada</strong> is not relevant to the granting <strong>of</strong> relief to<br />
permit the sponsor to be reunited with other relatives. 34<br />
Where there is more than one ground <strong>of</strong> refusal, different considerations go to the<br />
discretionary jurisdiction with respect to each ground. 35<br />
An argument may be presented that an applicant’s opportunities in <strong>Canada</strong> would be far<br />
more attractive than in the applicant’s home country. This has been characterized as an economic<br />
argument <strong>and</strong> is generally not accepted as a humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate factor. 36<br />
The policy objective set out in section 3(1)(h) <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Refugee</strong> Protection<br />
Act, to protect the health <strong>and</strong> safety <strong>of</strong> Canadians <strong>and</strong> to maintain the security <strong>of</strong> Canadian<br />
society, can guide discretion. 37<br />
The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division has considered the exercise <strong>of</strong> special relief to alleviate<br />
an anomaly in the law. 38<br />
32<br />
33<br />
34<br />
35<br />
36<br />
37<br />
38<br />
sponsorship obligations under a previous undertaking signed on behalf <strong>of</strong> her former husb<strong>and</strong>. Her conduct visà-vis<br />
the outst<strong>and</strong>ing debt was a highly negative feature <strong>of</strong> the case. Notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing the spousal nature <strong>of</strong> the<br />
sponsorship <strong>and</strong> the fact that the appellant <strong>and</strong> applicant now had a child, there were insufficient humanitarian<br />
<strong>and</strong> compassionate considerations to warrant granting special relief.<br />
Singh, Rosina v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 83-6483), Anderson, Chambers, Voorhees, December 31, 1984.<br />
Mohamed v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1986] 3 F.C. 90 (C.A.).<br />
Ibid. In Ahmed, Muhammad Jamail v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-6238), Anderson, November 18, 1986, the panel held<br />
irrelevant the fact that if the applicants were granted permanent residence in <strong>Canada</strong>, their gr<strong>and</strong>children in<br />
Pakistan would be deprived <strong>of</strong> their love <strong>and</strong> affection. In Rupert, Constance Elizabeth v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-<br />
6191), Mawani, Singh, Ariemma, May 22, 1987, the sponsor’s willingness to join her husb<strong>and</strong> abroad was held<br />
to be irrelevant since it is reunion in <strong>Canada</strong> that is an express objective <strong>of</strong> the Act. In Bagri, Sharinder Singh<br />
v. M.C.I. (IAD V96-02022), Borst, May 9, 1999, the fact that the applicant would be leaving behind an adult<br />
son who was dependent on him was irrelevant to the exercise <strong>of</strong> special relief.<br />
Khan, Roshina v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-03369), Carver, November 13, 1998. In Khan, in relation to the criminality<br />
ground <strong>of</strong> refusal, rehabilitation <strong>and</strong> remorse together with the sponsor’s emotional attachment warranted<br />
special relief; but in relation to the financial ground, the same considerations did not apply <strong>and</strong> should not be<br />
transferred over to this ground. Humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate considerations regarding the financial ground<br />
were insufficient to warrant special relief.<br />
Judge, Mahan Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 80-6239), Campbell, Hlady, Howard, March 13, 1981. However, in<br />
Doan, Hop Duc v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-4145), Eglington, Goodspeed, Vidal, September 15, 1986, the proposition<br />
that money considerations could never be humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate considerations was rejected.<br />
Lai, Gia Hung v. M.E.I. (IAD V92-01455), Wlodyka, Singh (dissenting in part), Verma, November 12, 1993.<br />
It is especially relevant in medical inadmissibility cases such as Lai.<br />
Mtanios, Johnny Kaissar v. M.C.I. (IAD T95-02534), Townshend, May 8, 1996. The anomaly deprived one set<br />
<strong>of</strong> Convention refugees from sponsoring their dependants.<br />
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The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division has held that the doctrine <strong>of</strong> res judicata applies to a<br />
decision regarding humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate considerations. 39<br />
Evidence <strong>of</strong> country conditions <strong>and</strong> hardship to the applicant in that country is admissible<br />
in assessing humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate considerations in sponsorship appeals. 40<br />
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD<br />
The Supreme Court <strong>of</strong> <strong>Canada</strong> decision in Baker 41 held that decision-makers, when<br />
considering an application for l<strong>and</strong>ing on humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate grounds, must take<br />
into account the best interests <strong>of</strong> the applicant’s children. Since the 1999 Baker judgment, the<br />
<strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division has been citing Baker as authority for the proposition that in the<br />
exercise <strong>of</strong> the Division’s discretionary jurisdiction, children’s best interests must be considered<br />
<strong>and</strong> given substantial weight. The Supreme Court <strong>of</strong> <strong>Canada</strong> arrived at the following conclusion<br />
with respect to the certified question that was before the Federal Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal.<br />
[para75] The certified question asks whether the best interests <strong>of</strong><br />
children must be a primary consideration when assessing an applicant<br />
under s. 114(2) <strong>and</strong> the Regulations. The principles discussed above<br />
indicate that, for the exercise <strong>of</strong> the discretion to fall within the st<strong>and</strong>ard <strong>of</strong><br />
reasonableness, the decision-maker should consider children's best<br />
interests as an important factor, give them substantial weight, <strong>and</strong> be alert,<br />
alive <strong>and</strong> sensitive to them. That is not to say that children's best interests<br />
must always outweigh other considerations, or that there will not be other<br />
reasons for denying an H & C claim even when children's interests are<br />
given this consideration. However, where the interests <strong>of</strong> children are<br />
minimized, in a manner inconsistent with <strong>Canada</strong>'s humanitarian <strong>and</strong><br />
compassionate tradition <strong>and</strong> the Minister's guidelines, the decision will be<br />
unreasonable.<br />
.<br />
As a result <strong>of</strong> the IRPA, the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division has a statutory m<strong>and</strong>ate to<br />
consider best interests as part <strong>of</strong> the exercise <strong>of</strong> its discretionary jurisdiction. However, the<br />
analysis <strong>of</strong> the principle pursuant to the statute does not differ appreciably from the analysis that<br />
would have been undertaken before the IRPA. The best interests <strong>of</strong> any child directly affected by<br />
the decision <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division must be considered <strong>and</strong> given substantial<br />
weight. While a child’s best interests must be considered, it is unlikely that this individual factor<br />
will be determinative <strong>of</strong> an appeal.<br />
There have been a number <strong>of</strong> Federal Court decisions with respect to the application <strong>of</strong><br />
Baker. While some Court decisions concern <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division cases, most <strong>of</strong> the<br />
decisions are in relation to refused applications for permanent residence from within <strong>Canada</strong><br />
39<br />
40<br />
41<br />
Nyame, Daniel v. M.C.I. (IAD T98-09032), Buchanan, December 31, 1999.<br />
Alaguthrai, Suboshini v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-01964), Kelley, December 8, 1999.<br />
Baker v. <strong>Canada</strong> (M.C.I.), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817.<br />
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ased on humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate considerations (“H&C applications”) or in relation to<br />
applications for a stay <strong>of</strong> removal. These decisions provide the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division<br />
with general guidance on this issue.<br />
In Legault, 42 a case involving an H&C application, the Federal Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal held that<br />
“the mere mention <strong>of</strong> the children is not sufficient. The interests <strong>of</strong> the children is a factor that<br />
must be examined with care <strong>and</strong> weighed with other factors. To mention is not to examine <strong>and</strong><br />
weigh.”<br />
The Court went on to consider another question: Did Baker create a prima facie<br />
presumption that the children’s best interests should prevail, subject only to the gravest<br />
countervailing grounds? It answered that question in the negative <strong>and</strong> concluded that the<br />
children’s interests are not superior to other factors that must be considered.<br />
The Federal Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal in Owusu 43 held that if there is no evidence adduced by an<br />
applicant with respect to the best interests <strong>of</strong> the child, an immigration <strong>of</strong>ficer is under no<br />
obligation to inquire further about their best interests.<br />
It appears that the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division will need to consider the best interests <strong>of</strong><br />
a child directly affected by a decision who does not reside in <strong>Canada</strong>. The Supreme Court <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Canada</strong> in Baker did not address this issue. In Irimie, 44 however, Pelletier, J. decided that the<br />
principles in Baker should apply to all <strong>of</strong> the children <strong>of</strong> the individual in question, both Canadian<br />
<strong>and</strong> foreign children. This should be contrasted with the Federal Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal decision in<br />
Owusu 45 where in dismissing the appeal the Court stated “we must not be taken to have affirmed<br />
the Applications Judge’s view that an immigration <strong>of</strong>ficer’s duty to consider the best interests <strong>of</strong><br />
an H&C applicant’s children is engaged when the children in question are not in, <strong>and</strong> have never<br />
been to, <strong>Canada</strong>. This interesting issue does not arise for decision on the facts <strong>of</strong> this case <strong>and</strong><br />
must await a case in which the facts require it to be decided.” The Court went on to note that in<br />
Baker the Supreme Court <strong>of</strong> <strong>Canada</strong> made no mention <strong>of</strong> Ms. Baker’s four other children residing<br />
in Jamaica, nor did it comment on any consideration that the immigration <strong>of</strong>ficer gave or failed to<br />
give to the best interests <strong>of</strong> the children who did not reside in <strong>Canada</strong>.<br />
42<br />
43<br />
44<br />
45<br />
M.C.I. v. Legault, Alex<strong>and</strong>er Henri (F.C.A., no. A-255-01), Richard, Décary, Nöel, March 28, 2002; 2002 FCA<br />
125.<br />
Owusu, Samuel Kwabena v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. A-114-03), Evans, Strayer, Sexton, January 26, 2004; 2004 FCA<br />
38.<br />
Irimie, Mircea Sorin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-427-00), Pelletier, November 22, 2000. In paragraph 20 <strong>of</strong><br />
the judgment, the Court stated “that ‘attentiveness <strong>and</strong> sensitivity to the importance <strong>of</strong> the rights <strong>of</strong> children, to<br />
their best interests, <strong>and</strong> to the hardship that may be caused to them by a negative decision’ must be read to<br />
include all <strong>of</strong> the children <strong>of</strong> the individuals in question, both Canadian <strong>and</strong> foreign. To hold otherwise is to say<br />
that the humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate needs <strong>of</strong> Canadian children <strong>of</strong> particular parents are more worthy <strong>of</strong><br />
consideration than those <strong>of</strong> the non-Canadian children <strong>of</strong> the same parents. It is underst<strong>and</strong>able that distinctions<br />
be drawn between those children for legal purposes: it would be ‘inconsistent with <strong>Canada</strong>’s humanitarian <strong>and</strong><br />
compassionate tradition’ to suggest that there are humanitarian distinctions to be drawn between them based<br />
upon citizenship.”<br />
Owusu, supra, footnote 43.<br />
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Given the open ended language <strong>of</strong> subsection 67(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA, <strong>and</strong> the jurisprudence <strong>of</strong><br />
the Federal Court - Trial Division, it appears that a restrictive interpretation is not warranted - the<br />
best interests <strong>of</strong> any child directly affected by the appeal must be considered in assessing whether<br />
or not to exercise discretionary relief. 46 In an appeal from the refusal <strong>of</strong> a sponsored application<br />
for permanent residence by the appellant’s parents in Punjab, the member turned her mind to the<br />
question <strong>of</strong> the best interests <strong>of</strong> the three gr<strong>and</strong>children in <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>and</strong> the gr<strong>and</strong>children who<br />
lived in India. 47 She concluded that while it might be in the best interests <strong>of</strong> the appellant’s<br />
children for the applicants to come to <strong>Canada</strong>, it could not be concluded that it was not also in the<br />
best interests <strong>of</strong> the many gr<strong>and</strong>children in Punjab for their gr<strong>and</strong>parents to remain in India with<br />
them.<br />
In Momcilovic, 48 at issue was the interpretation to be given to the words “child directly<br />
affected”. The Court found that Nadja, a motherless teenaged girl for whom the applicant for<br />
permanent residence was the primary caregiver, was a “child directly affected” such that her best<br />
interests had to be properly assessed. The Court opined that “[a] plain reading <strong>of</strong> subsection<br />
25(1) is broader than the best interests <strong>of</strong> a parent’s own child. The section does not use wording<br />
such as ‘child <strong>of</strong> the marriage’ or ‘the applicant’s child’. It refers to the best interests <strong>of</strong> a ‘child<br />
directly affected’. 49<br />
CONSIDERATIONS FOR SPECIAL RELIEF<br />
Generally Applicable<br />
• the objective in section 3(1)(d) <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Refugee</strong> Protection Act, to see<br />
that families are reunited in <strong>Canada</strong><br />
• nature <strong>and</strong> degree <strong>of</strong> legal impediment<br />
• the relationship <strong>of</strong> the sponsor to the applicant(s)<br />
• the reason(s) for the sponsorship<br />
• the strength <strong>of</strong> the relationship between the applicant(s) <strong>and</strong> the sponsor 50<br />
• the situation <strong>of</strong> the sponsor in <strong>Canada</strong> 51<br />
• the past conduct <strong>of</strong> the sponsor 52<br />
46<br />
47<br />
48<br />
49<br />
50<br />
51<br />
52<br />
It must be noted that “best interests” cannot be used to overcome a legal barrier such as the failure <strong>of</strong> the<br />
appellant to have legally adopted the applicant.<br />
Bhatwa, Paramjit v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-23671), Stein, April 19, 2005 (reasons signed May 18, 2005).<br />
Momcilovic, Kosanka v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5601-03), O’Keefe, January 20, 2005; 2005 FC 79.<br />
Ibid., at paragraph 45.<br />
Wong, Philip Sai Chak v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-05637), Chu, Fatsis, Ahara, November 5, 1992.<br />
Jean, Marie Béatrice v. M.E.I. (IAD M93-05594), Dur<strong>and</strong>, September 9, 1993. For example, whether the<br />
applicant could help the sponsor by babysitting the children while the sponsor goes to work.<br />
Laii, supra, footnote 37. For example, the fact that the sponsor has been on social assistance. In Lawler,<br />
Valerie Ann v. M.C.I. (IAD T95-03411), B<strong>and</strong>, February 23, 1996, the Appeal Division distinguished<br />
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January 1, 2008 Discretionary Jurisdiction - Ch. 10
• the situation <strong>of</strong> the applicant(s) abroad, including hardship 53<br />
• the ease <strong>of</strong> travel for the sponsor/applicant(s)<br />
• the existence <strong>of</strong> family or other support for the applicant(s) abroad 54<br />
• the existence <strong>of</strong> family or other support for the sponsor in <strong>Canada</strong><br />
• the existence <strong>of</strong> cultural duties to one another 55<br />
• the financial burden on the sponsor from having the applicant(s) abroad<br />
• the financial dependency <strong>of</strong> the applicant(s) on the sponsor<br />
• the best interests <strong>of</strong> the child 56<br />
Medical Inadmissibility 57<br />
• whether there is evidence <strong>of</strong> an improved medical condition at the time <strong>of</strong> the<br />
appeal 58 <strong>and</strong> current status <strong>of</strong> same if not an improvement<br />
• whether there are likely to be excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s on Canadian services (health/social) 59<br />
53<br />
54<br />
55<br />
56<br />
57<br />
58<br />
59<br />
Tzemanakis v. M.E.I. (1970), 8 I.A.C. 156 (I.A.B.), which the Minister relied on in support <strong>of</strong> the proposition<br />
that persons who knowingly enter into a relationship (in this case marriage to a person in an inadmissible class)<br />
must abide by the reasonable consequences <strong>of</strong> their actions. The approach taken in Tzemanakis, which<br />
indicated that “equity” is an exception to the letter <strong>of</strong> the law <strong>and</strong> that the right to benefit from special relief is<br />
predicated on good faith <strong>and</strong> the honest <strong>and</strong> responsible attitude <strong>of</strong> whoever seeks equity, is irrelevant. The<br />
Appeal Division must exercise its discretionary powers, not as an exception to some other jurisdiction it has,<br />
but as a separate <strong>and</strong> distinct power, st<strong>and</strong>ing alone.<br />
Dutt, John Ravindra v. M.E.I. (IAD V90-01637), Chu, Wlodyka, Tisshaw, July 22, 1991. See also Parel,<br />
Belinda v. M.C.I. (IAD W97-00112), Boire, June 23, 1999, where the sons <strong>of</strong> the applicant, the sponsor’s<br />
mother, provided her with little or no support, her life was in some danger <strong>and</strong> there was a close bond between<br />
her <strong>and</strong> the sponsor warranting special relief; <strong>and</strong> Saskin, Atif v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-03348), Maziarz, January 30,<br />
1998, where traumatic past events <strong>and</strong> pending deportation to Bosnia led to the granting <strong>of</strong> special relief.<br />
Baldwin, Ellen v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-01664), Chu, Arpin, Fatsis, June 30, 1992.<br />
Sotoodeh, supra, footnote 31.<br />
Zaraket, Zahra v. M.C.I. (IAD M99-06909), Fortin, October 10, 2000. An <strong>of</strong>ficer deciding a section 25<br />
humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate application must consider when deciding on the “best interests <strong>of</strong> the child”,<br />
language difficulties. In Kim, Shin Ki v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-345-07), Phelan, January 29, 2008; 2008 FC<br />
116, the Court found that the applicant, who had lived most <strong>of</strong> his life in <strong>Canada</strong>, if returned to South Korea<br />
would have an insufficient grasp <strong>of</strong> Korean to enter university or to obtain a job other than manual or menial<br />
labour. In Arulraj, Rasalingam v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4137-05), Barnes, April 27, 2006; 2006 FC 529, also<br />
a s. 25 application, the Court found the decision was unreasonable in its treatment <strong>of</strong> the best interests <strong>of</strong> the<br />
children. The <strong>of</strong>ficer felt that, in considering best interests <strong>of</strong> the children it was necessary to find that they<br />
would be irreparably harmed by their father’s “temporary” removal from <strong>Canada</strong>. There is simply no legal<br />
basis for incorporating a burden <strong>of</strong> irreparable harm into the consideration <strong>of</strong> the best interests <strong>of</strong> the children.<br />
The benefit to the children from the continuing presence <strong>of</strong> a parent <strong>and</strong> all other relevant factors, as well as the<br />
potential harm caused by removal, must all be weighed.<br />
See Chapter 3 for full discussion <strong>of</strong> Medical Refusals.<br />
Hu, Jenkin Ching-Kim v. M.C.I. (IAD V92-01452), Ho, March 30, 1995.<br />
Sooknanan, Lochan v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1213-97), Gibson, February 27, 1998; Dutt, supra, footnote<br />
53.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Discretionary Jurisdiction - Ch. 10
• the relative availability <strong>of</strong> health services to the applicant(s), in <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>and</strong> abroad 60<br />
• the cost <strong>of</strong> treatment <strong>of</strong> the medical condition 61<br />
• the availability <strong>of</strong> family support in <strong>Canada</strong> 62<br />
• the psychological dependencies <strong>of</strong> the applicant(s) on the sponsor 63<br />
• the objective in section 3(1)(h) <strong>of</strong> the Act, to protect the health, safety <strong>of</strong> Canadians<br />
<strong>and</strong> to maintain the security <strong>of</strong> Canadian society<br />
Criminal Inadmissibility<br />
• whether there is evidence <strong>of</strong> rehabilitation 64<br />
• whether there is evidence <strong>of</strong> remorse 65<br />
• the seriousness <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fences 66<br />
• evidence <strong>of</strong> good character 67<br />
• the length <strong>of</strong> time since the <strong>of</strong>fence(s) <strong>and</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> further trouble with the law 68<br />
• evidence <strong>of</strong> criminal history, future prospects <strong>and</strong> risk <strong>of</strong> future danger to the public 69<br />
• hardship to the applicant in the home country 70<br />
60<br />
61<br />
62<br />
63<br />
64<br />
65<br />
66<br />
67<br />
68<br />
69<br />
70<br />
Dutt, ibid.<br />
Valdes, supra, footnote 31; Che Tse, David Kwai v. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2645-93), McKeown,<br />
December 15, 1993.<br />
Luong, Chinh Van v. M.E.I. (IAD V92-01963), Clark, July 5, 1994; Lakhdar, Ahmed v. M.C.I. (IAD M96-<br />
13690), Lamarche, February 13, 1998; Colterjohn, David Ian v. M.C.I. (IAD V96-00808), Jackson, March 11,<br />
1998.<br />
Deol, Daljeet Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-280-90), MacGuigan, Linden, Robertson, November 27, 1992.<br />
Reported: Deol v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1992), 18 Imm. L.R. (2d) 1 (F.C.A.).<br />
In Parmar, Hargurjodh v. M.E.I. (IAD T92-03914), Townshend, September 16, 1993, the panel distinguished<br />
Deol because the sponsor’s conduct did not show the psychological dependency or bonds <strong>of</strong> affection<br />
mentioned in Deol.<br />
Perry, Ivelaw Barrington v. M.C.I. (IAD V94-01575), Ho, November 1, 1995. Thamber, Avtar Singh v. M.C.I.<br />
(F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2407-00), McKeown, March 12, 2001. Ramirez, Roberto v. M.C.I. (IAD VA4-00578),<br />
Kang, May 12, 2005 (reasons signed May 30, 2005).<br />
Ramirez, ibid.<br />
Khan, supra, footnote 35.<br />
Ibid.<br />
Au, Chui Wan Fanny v. M.C.I. (IAD T94-05868), Muzzi, March 13, 1996; Fu, Chun-Fai William v. M.C.I.<br />
(IAD T94-04088), Townshend, March 19, 1996.<br />
Nagularajah,Sathiyascelam v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3732-98), Sharlow, July 7, 1999. This decision<br />
arose in the context <strong>of</strong> a removal order appeal so may not exactly fit the sponsorship context.<br />
Alaguthrai, supra, footnote 40.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Discretionary Jurisdiction - Ch. 10
Financial Refusals<br />
Please see Chapter 1, “Financial Refusals”.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Discretionary Jurisdiction - Ch. 10
CASES<br />
Ahmed, Muhammad Jamail v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-6238), Anderson, November 18, 1986 .............................................. 9<br />
Alaguthrai, Suboshini v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-01964), Kelley, December 8, 1999 .................................................... 10, 14<br />
Arulraj, Rasalingam v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4137-05), Barnes, April 27, 2006; 2006 FC 529 ............................... 13<br />
Au, Chui Wan Fanny v. M.C.I. (IAD T94-05868), Muzzi, March 13, 1996 ................................................................ 14<br />
Bagri, Sharinder Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD V96-02022), Borst, May 9, 1999..................................................................... 9<br />
Baker v. <strong>Canada</strong> (M.C.I.), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817........................................................................................................... 10<br />
Baker v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817....................................................... 2<br />
Baldwin, Ellen v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-01664), Chu, Arpin, Fatsis, June 30, 1992 .......................................................... 13<br />
Bhatwa, Paramjit v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-23671), Stein, April 19, 2005 ........................................................................ 12<br />
Brar, Charanjit Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA5-00400), Workun, March 30, 2006 ............................................................. 8<br />
Budhu, Pooran Deonaraine v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-272-97), Reed, March 20, 1998........................................ 2<br />
Burgon: M.E.I. v. Burgon, David Ross (F.C.A., no. A-17-90), MacGuigan, Linden, Mahoney<br />
(concurring in the result), February 22, 1991. Reported: <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>Immigration</strong>) v. Burgon (1991), 13 Imm. L.R. (2d) 102 (F.C.A.)............................................................................. 8<br />
Chang, Hea Soon v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-02703), Workun, July 15, 2003 ....................................................................... 5<br />
Che Tse, David Kwai v. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2645-93), McKeown, December 15, 1993................................. 14<br />
Chirwa v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Manpower <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1970), 4 I.A.C. 338 (I.A.B.), at 350 ............................ 4<br />
Colterjohn, David Ian v. M.C.I. (IAD V96-00808), Jackson, March 11, 1998............................................................ 14<br />
Dang: M.C.I. v. Dang, Thi Kim Anh (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3113-99), Dawson, July 20, 2000....................................... 3<br />
Deol, Daljeet Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-280-90), MacGuigan, Linden, Robertson, November<br />
27, 1992. Reported: Deol v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1992), 18<br />
Imm. L.R. (2d) 1 (F.C.A.) ....................................................................................................................................... 14<br />
Dhaliwal, Resham Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-8123-04), Mosley, June 15, 2005; 2005 FC 869........................... 3<br />
Dimacali-Victoria, April Grace Mary v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3323-96), Gibson, August 29,<br />
1997........................................................................................................................................................................... 2<br />
Doan, Hop Duc v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-4145), Eglington, Goodspeed, Vidal, September 15, 1986.................................. 9<br />
Dosanjh, Balbir Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V95-00550), McIsaac, July 31, 1997................................................................. 6<br />
Dutt, John Ravindra v. M.E.I. (IAD V90-01637), Chu, Wlodyka, Tisshaw, July 22, 1991......................................... 13<br />
Fu, Chun-Fai William v. M.C.I. (IAD T94-04088), Townshend, March 19, 1996...................................................... 14<br />
Gill: M.E.I. v. Gill, Hardeep Kaur (F.C.A., no. A-219-90), Heald, Hugessen, Stone, December 31,<br />
1991........................................................................................................................................................................... 8<br />
Hu, Jenkin Ching-Kim v. M.C.I. (IAD V92-01452), Ho, March 30, 1995................................................................... 13<br />
Hylton, Claudine Ruth v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 86-9807), Arkin, Suppa, Ariemma, March 17, 1987...................................... 8<br />
Irimie, Mircea Sorin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-427-00), Pelletier, November 22, 2000 ...................................... 11<br />
Jagpal, Saw<strong>and</strong>eep Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD V96-00243), Singh, June 15, 1998 ............................................................... 7<br />
Jean, Marie Béatrice v. M.E.I. (IAD M93-05594), Dur<strong>and</strong>, September 9, 1993......................................................... 12<br />
Johl, Baljinder Kaur v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-4006), Eglington, Arpin, Wright, January 26, 1987..................................... 8<br />
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January 1, 2008 Discretionary Jurisdiction - Ch. 10
Judge, Mahan Singh v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 80-6239), Campbell, Hlady, Howard, March 13, 1981 ..................................... 9<br />
Jugpall, Sukhjeewan Singh v. M.C.I. (IAD T98-00716), Aterman, Goodman, Townshend, April 12,<br />
1999........................................................................................................................................................................... 3<br />
Kadri, Darwish Mohamad v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-02769), Boscariol, August 4, 1998 ..................................................... 8<br />
Khan, Khalid v. M.C.I.(IAD TA4-08639), Stein, November 1, 2005............................................................................ 6<br />
Khan, Roshina v. M.C.I. (IAD V97-03369), Carver, November 13, 1998..................................................................... 9<br />
Kim, Shin Ki v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-345-07), Phelan, January 29, 2008; 2008 FC 116.......................................... 13<br />
Lai, Gia Hung v. M.E.I. (IAD V92-01455), Wlodyka, Singh (dissenting in part), Verma,<br />
November 12, 1993 ................................................................................................................................................... 9<br />
Lakhdar, Ahmed v. M.C.I. (IAD M96-13690), Lamarche, February 13, 1998 ............................................................ 14<br />
Lawler, Valerie Ann v. M.C.I. (IAD T95-03411), B<strong>and</strong>, February 23, 1996 ............................................................... 12<br />
Legault: M.C.I. v. Legault, Alex<strong>and</strong>er Henri (F.C.A., no. A-255-01), Richard, Décary, Nöel,<br />
March 28, 2002; 2002 FCA 125.............................................................................................................................. 11<br />
Luong, Chinh Van v. M.E.I. (IAD V92-01963), Clark, July 5, 1994 ........................................................................... 14<br />
Lutchman, Umintra v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 88-35755), Ariemma, Townshend, Bell, January 10, 1989.<br />
Reported: Lutchman v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>) (1989), 12 Imm.<br />
L.R. (2d) 224 (I.A.B.)............................................................................................................................................ 2, 3<br />
Mangat, Parminder Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-153-85), Strayer, February 25, 1985.......................................... 7<br />
Menon, Romola Gia v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-01956), D’Ignazio, January 15, 2004.......................................................... 5<br />
Mohamed v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Employment <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1986] 3 F.C. 90 (C.A.)......................................... 9<br />
Momcilovic, Kosanka v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5601-03), O’Keefe, January 20, 2005; 2005 FC 79......................... 12<br />
Mtanios, Johnny Kaissar v. M.C.I. (IAD T95-02534), Townshend, May 8, 1996......................................................... 9<br />
Nyame, Daniel v. M.C.I. (IAD T98-09032), Buchanan, December 31, 1999 .............................................................. 10<br />
Owusu, Samuel Kwabena v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. A-114-03), Evans, Strayer, Sexton, January 26,<br />
2004; 2004 FCA 38................................................................................................................................................. 11<br />
Parel, Belinda v. M.C.I. (IAD W97-00112), Boire, June 23, 1999.............................................................................. 13<br />
Parmar, Hargurjodh v. M.E.I. (IAD T92-03914), Townshend, September 16, 1993.................................................. 14<br />
Perry, Ivelaw Barrington v. M.C.I. (IAD V94-01575), Ho, November 1, 1995.......................................................... 14<br />
Ramirez, Roberto v. M.C.I. (IAD VA4-00578), Kang, May 12, 2005......................................................................... 14<br />
Ribic, Marida v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 84-9623), D. Davey, Benedetti, Petryshyn, August 20, 1985 ...................................... 5<br />
Rupert, Constance Elizabeth v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 85-6191), Mawani, Singh, Ariemma, May 22, 1987 ............................ 9<br />
Saskin, Atif v. M.C.I. (IAD T96-03348), Maziarz, January 30, 1998........................................................................... 13<br />
Sathiyascelam v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3732-98), Sharlow, July 7, 1999.......................................................... 14<br />
Shah, Syed v. M.E.I. (F.C.A, no. A-617-92), Hugessen, MacGuigan, Linden, June 24, 1994....................................... 2<br />
Singh, Rosina v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 83-6483), Anderson, Chambers, Voorhees, December 31, 1984 ................................. 8<br />
Sooknanan, Lochan v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1213-97), Gibson, February 27, 1998.......................................... 13<br />
Sotoodeh, Isheo v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-00153), Fatsis, Chu (concurring), Bell (dissenting), July 22,<br />
1991........................................................................................................................................................................... 8<br />
Taghizadeh-Baraz<strong>and</strong>e, Parviz v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-00073), D’Ignazio, January 20, 1998 .......................................... 8<br />
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January 1, 2008 Discretionary Jurisdiction - Ch. 10
Thamber, Avtar Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2407-00), McKeown, March 12, 2001..................................... 14<br />
Tzemanakis v. M.E.I. (1970), 8 I.A.C. 156 (I.A.B.) ..................................................................................................... 12<br />
Valdes, Juan Gonzalo Lasa v. M.E.I. (IAD V90-01517), Wlodyka, Chambers, Gill<strong>and</strong>ers,<br />
January 21, 1992 ....................................................................................................................................................... 8<br />
Wong, Kam v. M.E.I. (I.A.B. 83-6438), Davey, Hlady, Howard, March 7, 1984 .......................................................... 7<br />
Wong, Philip Sai Chak v. M.E.I. (IAD T91-05637), Chu, Fatsis, Ahara, November 5, 1992...................................... 12<br />
Zaraket, Zahra v. M.C.I. (IAD M99-06909), Fortin, October 10, 2000 ...................................................................... 13<br />
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January 1, 2008 Discretionary Jurisdiction - Ch. 10
Chapter Eleven<br />
Fairness <strong>and</strong> Natural Justice under the IRPA<br />
Context for the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division<br />
The <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division (IAD) may allow an appeal if it is satisfied that “a<br />
principle <strong>of</strong> natural justice has not been observed”. This ground <strong>of</strong> appeal is expressly set out in<br />
the <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Refugee</strong> Protection Act (IRPA). 1<br />
In a sponsorship appeal, it may be argued that the <strong>of</strong>ficer who denied a foreign national’s<br />
permanent resident visa application breached natural justice in some respect while processing the<br />
application <strong>and</strong> that the appeal should be allowed on that basis. Although the IRPA contemplates<br />
such a scenario in providing a legislative basis for the IAD to overturn an <strong>of</strong>ficer’s decision on<br />
this ground, in actual practice it is seldom argued or used as a basis for allowing an appeal. It is<br />
nevertheless useful to examine what the duty <strong>of</strong> fairness entails for <strong>of</strong>ficers administering the<br />
IRPA in a sponsorship context as there may be reason to advance a breach <strong>of</strong> fairness or natural<br />
justice as a ground <strong>of</strong> appeal.<br />
Duty <strong>of</strong> Fairness for Officers under IRPA<br />
Introduction<br />
Under the IRPA, the Minister designates <strong>of</strong>ficers to carry out the purposes <strong>of</strong> the Act. 2<br />
The <strong>of</strong>ficers perform their functions in accordance with any instructions that the Minister may<br />
give. 3<br />
Officers must comply with the duty <strong>of</strong> procedural fairness in the administration <strong>of</strong> the Act<br />
because their decisions affect the rights, privileges or interests <strong>of</strong> individuals. 4<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
4<br />
IRPA, s. 67(1)(b).<br />
IRPA, s. 6(1).<br />
For example, IRPA, s. 15(4), on conducting examinations.<br />
Cardinal v. Director <strong>of</strong> Kent Institution, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 643.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Fairness & Natural Justice under the IRPA – Ch. 11
Content <strong>of</strong> the Duty <strong>of</strong> Fairness<br />
General<br />
The duty <strong>of</strong> fairness requires an <strong>of</strong>ficer to act with an open mind without unduly fettering<br />
their discretion <strong>and</strong> to give an applicant an opportunity to respond to the <strong>of</strong>ficer’s concerns with<br />
respect to the processing <strong>of</strong> an application. 5 Essentially, the question is whether, considering all<br />
the circumstances, a person whose interests are affected has a meaningful opportunity to present<br />
their case fully <strong>and</strong> fairly.<br />
The requirements <strong>of</strong> fairness vary according to the circumstances. Some relevant factors<br />
are: 6 • the nature <strong>of</strong> the decision being made <strong>and</strong> the process followed in making it;<br />
• the nature <strong>of</strong> the statutory scheme in question <strong>and</strong> the terms <strong>of</strong> the statute pursuant to<br />
which the body operates;<br />
• the importance <strong>of</strong> the decision to the individual affected;<br />
• the legitimate expectations <strong>of</strong> the person challenging the decision; <strong>and</strong><br />
• the choices <strong>of</strong> procedure made by the decision-maker, particularly when the statute leaves<br />
to the decision-maker the ability to choose its own procedures or when the agency has an<br />
expertise in determining what procedures are appropriate in the circumstances.<br />
Knowing Case to be Met <strong>and</strong> Opportunity to Respond<br />
An <strong>of</strong>ficer must provide an applicant with an opportunity to refute evidence in the<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficer’s possession which is relied on by the <strong>of</strong>ficer, 7 <strong>and</strong> the <strong>of</strong>ficer must advise the applicant <strong>of</strong><br />
any concerns <strong>and</strong> provide an opportunity to respond before making a decision, 8 although an oral<br />
hearing is not essential for that purpose. 9<br />
5<br />
6<br />
7<br />
8<br />
9<br />
The Supreme Court <strong>of</strong> <strong>Canada</strong> in Baker v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1999] 2 S.C.R.<br />
817 held that a full <strong>and</strong> fair consideration <strong>of</strong> the issues was required <strong>and</strong> the applicant must have a meaningful<br />
opportunity to present relevant evidence <strong>and</strong> have it fully <strong>and</strong> fairly considered<br />
Baker, supra, footnote 5.<br />
Gill, Jh<strong>and</strong>a Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-501-90), Jerome, March 20, 1990.<br />
Begum, Shamsun Naher v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1947-02), Lemieux, January 30, 2004; 2004 FC 165.<br />
Yue, Zhao v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2015-01), Kelen, September 25, 2002; 2002 FCT 1004.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Fairness & Natural Justice under the IRPA – Ch. 11
Use <strong>of</strong> Extrinsic Evidence<br />
Extrinsic evidence means evidence that comes from an outside source. 10 An applicant<br />
may be unaware <strong>of</strong> it. An <strong>of</strong>ficer should provide an applicant with an opportunity to comment<br />
upon extrinsic evidence. 11 Failure to share a document with an applicant may deny the applicant<br />
a meaningful opportunity to present the case fully <strong>and</strong> fairly. 12 Readily accessible public domain<br />
information (such as from the Internet) if novel <strong>and</strong> significant may as a matter <strong>of</strong> fairness need<br />
to be disclosed. 13<br />
Legitimate Expectations<br />
The doctrine <strong>of</strong> legitimate expectations means that if an <strong>of</strong>ficer expressly or impliedly<br />
undertakes to follow a certain procedure, the <strong>of</strong>ficer may be held to their undertaking as a matter<br />
<strong>of</strong> procedural fairness. 14 There is nothing unfair about a visa <strong>of</strong>ficer’s request for DNA testing in<br />
circumstances where the documentary evidence falls short <strong>of</strong> establishing the claimed<br />
relationship. 15<br />
Bias<br />
Bad faith, abuse <strong>of</strong> discretion or improper conduct on the part <strong>of</strong> an <strong>of</strong>ficer may amount to<br />
bias so as to invalidate the <strong>of</strong>ficer’s decision for breach <strong>of</strong> fairness or natural justice. A<br />
reasonable apprehension <strong>of</strong> bias does not arise merely because the same <strong>of</strong>ficer has made the<br />
decision on the different processes whereby an applicant seeks legal status in <strong>Canada</strong>. 16<br />
10<br />
11<br />
12<br />
13<br />
14<br />
15<br />
16<br />
Dasent, Maria Jackie v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5386-93), Rothstein, December 8, 1994.<br />
Ngo, Tu Van v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5340-01), Dawson, November 7, 2002; 2002 FCT 1150.<br />
Singh, Amarjit v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6526-02), Mactavish, February 4, 2004; 2004 FC 187 (applicant on<br />
“h&c” application should have been provided with negative PRRA report).<br />
Ali, Mohammed Elsheikh v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-8683-04), Mosley, February 23, 2006; 2006 FC 248.<br />
A legitimate expectation was created when an applicant was advised his supplementary information would be<br />
considered <strong>and</strong> it was a breach <strong>of</strong> natural justice for the <strong>of</strong>ficer to decide without having considered it:<br />
Pramauntanyath, Teeradech v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1622-03), Mactavish, February 2, 2004; 2004 FC 174.<br />
On the other h<strong>and</strong>, an <strong>of</strong>ficer was under no obligation to advise <strong>of</strong> the future consequences <strong>of</strong> not having a<br />
dependant examined: Jankovic, Milos v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-567-02), Russell, December 17, 2003; 2003<br />
F.C. 1482 nor <strong>of</strong> the avenue <strong>of</strong> redress in s. 25 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA (humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate relief):<br />
Mustapha, Javed v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7286-05), von Finckenstein, September 13, 2006; 2006 FC 1092.<br />
Obeng, Addo Kwadwo v. M.C.I. (IAD VA5-01112), Workun, August 14, 2006.<br />
Kouka, Serge v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1823-06), Harrington, October 17, 2006; 2006 FC 1236.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Fairness & Natural Justice under the IRPA – Ch. 11
Delay<br />
In order for delay in processing an application to be unreasonable <strong>and</strong> to constitute a<br />
breach <strong>of</strong> the duty <strong>of</strong> fairness, the delay must be unacceptable to the point <strong>of</strong> being so oppressive<br />
as to taint the proceedings. 17<br />
Providing Reasons for Decision<br />
An <strong>of</strong>ficer’s failure to give reasons may be a breach <strong>of</strong> fairness depending on the<br />
consequences <strong>of</strong> the decision to the person affected. 18 Before the IAD, the CAIPS notes in<br />
conjunction with the refusal letter may adequately set out the reasons for refusal <strong>and</strong> satisfy the<br />
requirements <strong>of</strong> natural justice. 19<br />
Interview<br />
The duty <strong>of</strong> fairness includes the right to have counsel attend <strong>and</strong> observe an applicant’s<br />
interview with the <strong>of</strong>ficer. 20 The initiative to have counsel present must come from the applicant<br />
as the <strong>of</strong>ficer is under no duty to inform the applicant <strong>of</strong> this right. 21 The duty <strong>of</strong> fairness does<br />
not necessarily require an <strong>of</strong>ficer to conduct an oral interview before reaching a decision. 22 It<br />
may not be unfair to conduct an interview without prior notice to the individual. 23 There is no<br />
duty to interview third parties identified in the context <strong>of</strong> any given application. 24 The procedure<br />
whereby an interview is conducted by one <strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>and</strong> the decision made by a different <strong>of</strong>ficer is<br />
not a breach <strong>of</strong> fairness. 25<br />
17<br />
18<br />
19<br />
20<br />
21<br />
22<br />
23<br />
24<br />
25<br />
Malhi, Kalmajit Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-8368-03), Martineau, June 2, 2004; 2004 FC 802.<br />
Figueroa, S<strong>and</strong>ra Toscano v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-69-03), Heneghan, December 18, 2003; 2003 FC 1339.<br />
See also Baker, supra, footnote 5 (<strong>of</strong>ficer’s notes were held to constitute sufficient reasons).<br />
Lee, Dip Gai v. M.C.I. (IAD WA5-00010), Rozdilsky, January 4, 2006.<br />
Ha, Mai v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-38-03), Sexton, Linden, Malone, January 30, 2004; 2004 FCA 49. The Court<br />
did not decide whether in other circumstances a more active or limited role for counsel would be required.<br />
MPSEP v. Cha, Jung Woo (F.C.A., no. A-688-04), Décary, Noël, Pelletier, March 29, 2006; 2006 FCA 126.<br />
Aigbirior, Doris v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2833-01), Blais, August 13, 2002; 2002 FCT 854.<br />
Bh<strong>and</strong>al, Tej Kaur v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4679-05), Blais, April 3, 2006; 2006 FC 427.<br />
Obeng, Addo Kwadwo v. M.C.I. (IAD VA5-01112), Workun, August 14, 2006.<br />
Ngo, supra, footnote 11. The Court held that the content <strong>of</strong> the duty <strong>of</strong> fairness was limited by the context <strong>of</strong><br />
an “h & c” decision, for example, it does not require an oral interview. See Aujla (Sidhu), Jagwinder Kaur v.<br />
M.C.I. (IAD VA5-02812), Shahriari, April 17, 2007 where in the context <strong>of</strong> a spousal refusal it was not a<br />
breach <strong>of</strong> natural justice for one visa <strong>of</strong>ficer to conduct the interview <strong>and</strong> another <strong>of</strong>ficer to make the decision.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Fairness & Natural Justice under the IRPA – Ch. 11
Revisiting a Decision<br />
The doctrine <strong>of</strong> functus <strong>of</strong>ficio does not apply to prevent an <strong>of</strong>ficer from refusing a visa<br />
after another <strong>of</strong>ficer had initially <strong>of</strong>fered a visa, 26 nor is it contrary to natural justice or fairness.<br />
Remedies for Breach <strong>of</strong> Fairness/Natural Justice<br />
The usual consequence <strong>of</strong> a denial <strong>of</strong> fairness or natural justice is to render the resulting<br />
decision invalid. 27 The Supreme Court <strong>of</strong> <strong>Canada</strong> has introduced an exception to this principle, 28<br />
<strong>and</strong> where it is certain that even if a fair hearing is held, the applicant cannot as a matter <strong>of</strong> law<br />
succeed, the remedy may be withheld. 29<br />
The IAD may allow an appeal from an <strong>of</strong>ficer’s decision not to issue a foreign national a<br />
permanent resident visa if the IAD is satisfied that a principle <strong>of</strong> natural justice has not been<br />
observed by the <strong>of</strong>ficer in the processing <strong>of</strong> the application. 30 Failure <strong>of</strong> Canadian <strong>of</strong>ficials to<br />
apply their policy may amount to a breach <strong>of</strong> natural justice. 31<br />
The de novo nature <strong>of</strong> appeal proceedings in the IAD may remedy a breach <strong>of</strong> natural<br />
justice at the <strong>of</strong>ficer level.<br />
The IAD must first decide the issue <strong>of</strong> an applicant’s membership in the family class<br />
before it can address any allegation that the <strong>of</strong>ficer breached the rules <strong>of</strong> natural justice or<br />
fairness in connection with the processing <strong>of</strong> a sponsorship application. 32<br />
Reopening in the IAD for Breach <strong>of</strong> Natural Justice<br />
Under the IRPA, the IAD may reopen an appeal if it failed to observe a principle <strong>of</strong><br />
natural justice in the case <strong>of</strong> a foreign national under a removal order. 33 Since the IRPA only<br />
26<br />
27<br />
28<br />
29<br />
30<br />
31<br />
32<br />
33<br />
Lo, Kin Ching v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4927-01), Beaudry, November 7, 2002; 2002 FCT 1155.<br />
Cardinal, supra, footnote 4.<br />
Mobil Oil <strong>Canada</strong> Ltd. v. <strong>Canada</strong>-Newfoundl<strong>and</strong> Offshore Petroleum <strong>Board</strong>, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 202.<br />
Bermido, Marites Hugo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2866-03), von Finckenstein, January 14, 2004; 2004 FC 58.<br />
IRPA, s. 67(1)(b).<br />
Balla, Bradley Dale v. M.C.I. (IAD VA6-00305), Lamont, July 4, 2007.<br />
M.C.I. v. Petrea, Marian (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4395-00), Blanchard, December 13, 2001; 2001 FCT 1373;<br />
Sertovic, Safeta v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-16898), Collins, September 10, 2003. Where a sponsor argued that the<br />
visa <strong>of</strong>ficer ought to have considered humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate factors for an applicant excluded from<br />
the family class which allegedly resulted in a breach <strong>of</strong> natural justice, the IAD held that the avenue <strong>of</strong> redress<br />
should be to the Federal Court not to the IAD: Patel, Amit Krishnakant v. M.C.I. (IAD TA5-11490), Collins,<br />
March 14, 2006.<br />
IRPA, s. 71.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Fairness & Natural Justice under the IRPA – Ch. 11
addresses reopening in a removal order situation, a sponsor who alleges a breach <strong>of</strong> natural<br />
justice in a sponsorship appeal may not apply to reopen under section 71 <strong>of</strong> the Act. 34 However,<br />
a sponsor may apply to reopen for breach <strong>of</strong> natural justice under common law.<br />
The principles <strong>of</strong> natural justice in the IAD generally relate to procedural matters such as<br />
notice, opportunity to be heard <strong>and</strong> knowledge <strong>of</strong> the case to be met. 35 The incompetence <strong>of</strong><br />
counsel may constitute a breach <strong>of</strong> natural justice. 36 A change in the law is not a basis for<br />
reopening for denial <strong>of</strong> natural justice. 37 There must have been a breach <strong>of</strong> natural justice in the<br />
first proceeding as a basis for reopening. 38<br />
34<br />
35<br />
36<br />
37<br />
38<br />
Mustafa, Ahmad v. M.C.I. (IAD VA1-02962), Wiebe, February 13, 2003.<br />
Huezo Tenorio, Alex Ernesto v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-01982), Wiebe, March 31, 2003.<br />
Ye, Ai Hua v. M.C.I. (IAD VA1-01247), Wiebe, August 5, 2003. Counsel’s incompetence must be egregious<br />
in order to result in a denial <strong>of</strong> natural justice.<br />
Clarke, Lloyd Charles v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-01824), MacAdam, January 9, 2003.<br />
Johal, Gurwinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-02295), Workun, October 3, 2006.<br />
<strong>Sponsorship</strong> <strong>Appeals</strong> 6 Legal Services<br />
January 1, 2008 Fairness & Natural Justice under the IRPA – Ch. 11
CASES<br />
Aigbirior, Doris v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2833-01), Blais, August 13, 2002; 2002 FCT 854.............................. 4<br />
Ali, Mohammed Elsheikh v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-8683-04), Mosley, February 23, 2006; 2006<br />
FC 248....................................................................................................................................................................... 3<br />
Aujla (Sidhu), Jagwinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA5-02812), Shahriari, April 17, 2007 .............................................. 4<br />
Baker v. <strong>Canada</strong> (Minister <strong>of</strong> Citizenship <strong>and</strong> <strong>Immigration</strong>), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 .................................................. 2, 4<br />
Balla, Bradley Dale v. M.C.I. (IAD VA6-00305), Lamont, July 4, 2007...................................................................... 5<br />
Begum, Shamsun Naher v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1947-02), Lemieux, January 30, 2004; 2004 FC<br />
165............................................................................................................................................................................. 2<br />
Bermido, Marites Hugo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2866-03), von Finckenstein, January 14, 2004;<br />
2004 FC 58................................................................................................................................................................ 5<br />
Bh<strong>and</strong>al, Tej Kaur v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4679-05), Blais, April 3, 2006; 2006 FC 427 ........................................ 4<br />
Cardinal v. Director <strong>of</strong> Kent Institution, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 643 .................................................................................. 1, 5<br />
Clarke, Lloyd Charles v. M.C.I. (IAD T97-01824), MacAdam, January 9, 2003 ......................................................... 6<br />
Dasent, Maria Jackie v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5386-93), Rothstein, December 8, 1994..................................... 3<br />
Figueroa, S<strong>and</strong>ra Toscano v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-69-03), Heneghan, December 18, 2003; 2003<br />
FC 1339..................................................................................................................................................................... 4<br />
Gill, Jh<strong>and</strong>a Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-501-90), Jerome, March 20, 1990......................................................... 2<br />
Ha, Mai v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-38-03), Sexton, Linden, Malone, January 30, 2004; 2004 FCA<br />
49............................................................................................................................................................................... 4<br />
Huezo Tenorio, Alex Ernesto v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-01982), Wiebe, March 31, 2003 ................................................... 6<br />
Jankovic, Milos v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-567-02), Russell, December 17, 2003; 2003 F.C. 1482.............................. 3<br />
Johal, Gurwinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (IAD VA2-02295), Workun, October 3, 2006......................................................... 6<br />
Kouka, Serge v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1823-06), Harrington, October 17, 2006; 2006 FC 1236............................... 3<br />
Lee, Dip Gai v. M.C.I. (IAD WA5-00010), Rozdilsky, January 4, 2006 ...................................................................... 4<br />
Lo, Kin Ching v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4927-01), Beaudry, November 7, 2002; 2002 FCT<br />
1155........................................................................................................................................................................... 5<br />
Malhi, Kalmajit Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-8368-03), Martineau, June 2, 2004; 2004 FC 802............................ 4<br />
Mobil Oil <strong>Canada</strong> Ltd. v. <strong>Canada</strong>-Newfoundl<strong>and</strong> Offshore Petroleum <strong>Board</strong>, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 202. .......................... 5<br />
<strong>Sponsorship</strong> <strong>Appeals</strong> 7 Legal Services<br />
January 1, 2008 Fairness & Natural Justice under the IRPA – Ch. 11
MPSEP v. Cha, Jung Woo (F.C.A., no. A-688-04), Décary, Noël, Pelletier, March 29, 2006; 2006<br />
FCA 126.................................................................................................................................................................... 4<br />
Mustafa, Ahmad v. M.C.I. (IAD VA1-02962), Wiebe, February 13, 2003 ................................................................... 6<br />
Mustapha, Javed v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7286-05), von Finckenstein, September 13, 2006; 2006<br />
FC 1092..................................................................................................................................................................... 3<br />
Ngo, Tu Van v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5340-01), Dawson, November 7, 2002; 2002 FCT 1150 ............................ 3, 4<br />
Obeng, Addo Kwadwo v. M.C.I. (IAD VA5-01112), Workun, August 14, 2006...................................................... 3, 4<br />
Patel, Amit Krishnakant v. M.C.I. (IAD TA5-11490), Collins, March 14, 2006 .......................................................... 5<br />
Petrea: M.C.I. v. Petrea, Marian (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4395-00), Blanchard, December 13, 2001;<br />
2001 FCT 1373 ......................................................................................................................................................... 5<br />
Pramauntanyath, Teeradech v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1622-03), Mactavish, February 2, 2004;<br />
2004 FC 174.............................................................................................................................................................. 3<br />
Sertovic, Safeta v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-16898), Collins, September 10, 2003 ................................................................. 5<br />
Singh, Amarjit v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6526-02), Mactavish, February 4, 2004; 2004 FC 187................................. 3<br />
Ye, Ai Hua v. M.C.I. (IAD VA1-01247), Wiebe, August 5, 2003 ................................................................................. 6<br />
Yue, Zhao v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2015-01), Kelen, September 25, 2002; 2002 FCT 1004 .............................. 2<br />
<strong>Sponsorship</strong> <strong>Appeals</strong> 8 Legal Services<br />
January 1, 2008 Fairness & Natural Justice under the IRPA – Ch. 11
Chapter Twelve<br />
Consent to Return to <strong>Canada</strong><br />
Introduction<br />
In the <strong>Immigration</strong> Act (the former Act) there existed inadmissible classes <strong>of</strong> persons<br />
described in s. 19(1)(i) <strong>and</strong> s. 27(2) (h) who sought to come into or entered <strong>Canada</strong> without the<br />
consent <strong>of</strong> the Minister when it was required by s. 55 <strong>of</strong> that Act. It followed that if a person<br />
being sponsored had been issued one <strong>of</strong> the three removal orders that person may be found by a<br />
visa <strong>of</strong>ficer to be inadmissible to <strong>Canada</strong> <strong>and</strong> form the basis <strong>of</strong> a lawful refusal <strong>of</strong> the sponsored<br />
application.<br />
Under IRPA a similar scheme is enacted by s. 41 <strong>of</strong> IRPA:<br />
s. 41 A person is inadmissible for failing to comply with this Act<br />
(a) in the case <strong>of</strong> a foreign national, through an act or omission<br />
which contravenes, directly or indirectly, a provision <strong>of</strong> this<br />
Act;<br />
Note that s. 2(2) <strong>of</strong> IRPA states that unless otherwise indicated, references in this Act to<br />
"this Act" include regulations made under it.<br />
What then is the "act or omission" giving rise to inadmissibility? Simply put, it is the<br />
return to <strong>Canada</strong> without written authorization as required under each type <strong>of</strong> removal order.<br />
S. 223 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations continues the three types <strong>of</strong> removal orders, namely<br />
departure orders, exclusion orders, <strong>and</strong> deportation orders. Each type <strong>of</strong> order has attached<br />
conditions as to its duration <strong>and</strong> effect on admissibility.<br />
S. 52(1) <strong>of</strong> IRPA says that if a removal order has been enforced the foreign national shall<br />
not return to <strong>Canada</strong> unless authorized by an <strong>of</strong>ficer or in other prescribed circumstances.<br />
As well, s. 25 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations prohibits a visa <strong>of</strong>ficer from issuing a visa to a<br />
foreign national who is subject to an unenforced removal order.<br />
Departure Orders - no time period if enforced in compliance with requirements<br />
S. 224(1) IRP Regulations relieves a person subject to an enforced departure order from<br />
the requirement to obtain authorization to return to <strong>Canada</strong> provided they had met the departure<br />
requirements in s. 240(a) to (c) within 30 days <strong>of</strong> the order becoming enforceable. If the person<br />
failed to meet those requirements the order is deemed to be a deportation order.<br />
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January 1, 2008 Consent to Return to <strong>Canada</strong> - Ch. 12
This means a person is admissible who complied with the procedure for executing a<br />
departure order within the timeframes in the regulations. If the person did not comply they are<br />
inadmissible <strong>and</strong> require written authorization to return.<br />
Exclusion Orders - One year or Two years for Misrepresentation<br />
S. 225(1) IRP Regulations requires a person subject to an exclusion order to obtain the<br />
written authorization <strong>of</strong> an <strong>of</strong>ficer to return to <strong>Canada</strong> during the one-year period after the order<br />
was enforced. If the order was based on misrepresentation s. 225(3) a two-year period applies.<br />
An exception for accompanying family members <strong>of</strong> a foreign national found to be inadmissible<br />
<strong>and</strong> given an exclusion order is provided in s. 225(4) <strong>of</strong> IRP Regulations.<br />
Deportation Order - requires Written Authorization<br />
S. 226(1) <strong>of</strong> IRP Regulations makes it a requirement <strong>of</strong> those who were issued a<br />
deportation order to obtain the written authorization to return to return to <strong>Canada</strong> at any time<br />
after the order was enforced. An exception for accompanying family members <strong>of</strong> a foreign<br />
national found to be inadmissible <strong>and</strong> given a deportation order is provided in s. 226(2) <strong>of</strong> IRP<br />
Regulations.<br />
Who shall provide the written authorization?<br />
The IRPA in s. 52(1) specifies an <strong>of</strong>ficer may grant the written authorization to return to<br />
<strong>Canada</strong>. The Regulations do not appear to prescribe the criteria for issuing an authorization. In<br />
an application to return to <strong>Canada</strong> there is a duty <strong>of</strong> fairness on the <strong>of</strong>ficer assessing the<br />
application to provide an opportunity to address the <strong>of</strong>ficer’s concerns. Of particular relevance<br />
should be the reasons why the person delayed in leaving <strong>Canada</strong> after a departure order <strong>and</strong> thus<br />
converting it to a deportation order <strong>and</strong> the reasons for first coming to <strong>Canada</strong>. 1<br />
Removal Costs are to be Reimbursed<br />
The Regulations 2 specify certain removal costs must be paid before a person is allowed to<br />
return to <strong>Canada</strong> if that person was removed at government expense <strong>and</strong> was not reimbursed by a<br />
transporter. These costs are fixed at $750 for removal to contiguous territory or $1500 for any<br />
other country <strong>of</strong> removal.<br />
Discretionary relief<br />
1<br />
2<br />
Sahakyan, Sergey v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-9934-03), Harrington, November 2, 2004; 2004 FC 1542.<br />
S. 243 IRP Regulations.<br />
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The IRPA in s. 63(1) provides an appeal to sponsors whose family class relatives are<br />
refused an immigrant visa. It is a condition precedent before considering special relief on<br />
humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate grounds that the applicant is found a member <strong>of</strong> the family class<br />
<strong>and</strong> the sponsor meets the definition <strong>of</strong> “sponsor” found in s. 130 <strong>of</strong> the Regulations. Once those<br />
findings have been made, or are not in issue at the appeal, the IAD may apply s. 67(1) <strong>and</strong> take<br />
into account the best interests <strong>of</strong> a child directly effected by the decision <strong>and</strong> determine if<br />
sufficient humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate considerations warrant special relief in light <strong>of</strong> all the<br />
circumstances <strong>of</strong> the case.<br />
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CASES<br />
Sahakyan, Sergey v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-9934-03), Harrington, November 2, 2004; 2004 FC<br />
1542........................................................................................................................................................................... 2<br />
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Transitional Provisions<br />
Introduction<br />
This chapter examines various transitional situations provided in the <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>Refugee</strong> Protection Act 1 (IRPA) <strong>and</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Refugee</strong> Protection Regulations 2 (IRP<br />
Regulations) as specifically concerns sponsorship appeals before the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal<br />
Division (IAD). Since the coming into force <strong>of</strong> IRPA on June 28, 2002, the Courts have now<br />
settled many issues raised by some <strong>of</strong> the transitional provisions.<br />
Transitional Situations<br />
Although there are very few transitional cases left, discussed below are likely transitional<br />
situations which the IAD has had to deal with <strong>and</strong>, in some cases, may yet be faced with in the<br />
course <strong>of</strong> management <strong>of</strong> sponsorship appeal cases since the coming into force <strong>of</strong> the IRPA.<br />
a) <strong>Appeals</strong> filed prior to the coming into force <strong>of</strong> the IRPA<br />
Where a notice <strong>of</strong> appeal from the refusal <strong>of</strong> a sponsored application for a permanent<br />
resident visa has been filed with the IAD prior to the coming into force <strong>of</strong> the IRPA, the general<br />
transitional rule in section 192 provides that the appeal shall be continued under the <strong>Immigration</strong><br />
Act 3 (old Act).<br />
There is one exception to this general rule: section 196 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA, which provides for<br />
the discontinuance <strong>of</strong> appeals filed under the old Act where “[…] the appeal could not have<br />
been made because <strong>of</strong> section 64 <strong>of</strong> this Act”. It is clear from section 64(1) that no appeal from<br />
the refusal <strong>of</strong> an application for a permanent resident visa may be made to the IAD by a sponsor<br />
where the foreign national being sponsored has been found to be inadmissible on corresponding<br />
grounds <strong>of</strong> security, violating human or international rights, serious criminality (as described in<br />
section 64(2) 4 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA) or organized criminality.<br />
1<br />
2<br />
3<br />
4<br />
S.C. 2001, c. 27.<br />
SOR/2002-227.<br />
R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2.<br />
In M.C.I. v. Atwal, Iqbal Singh (F.C., no. IMM-3260-03), Pinard, January 8, 2004, the Federal Court ruled that<br />
pre-sentence custody which is expressly factored into a person’s criminal sentence forms part <strong>of</strong> the term <strong>of</strong><br />
imprisonment under section 64(2) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA <strong>and</strong> as such, must be considered. See also Allen, Deon Aladin v.<br />
M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2439-02), Snider, May 5, 2003; M.C.I. v. Smith, Dwight Anthony (F.C., no. IMM-<br />
2139-03), Campbell, January 16, 2004; 2004 FC 63; M.C.I. v. Gomes, Ronald (F.C. no. IMM-6689-03),<br />
O’Keefe, January 27 2006; 2005 FC 299; Cheddesingh (Jones), Nadine Karen v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-2453-05,<br />
Beaudry, February 3, 2006; 2006 FC 124.<br />
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Transitional Provisions
Section 196 <strong>of</strong> IRPA applies to sponsorship appeals as well as to removal appeals. In a<br />
number <strong>of</strong> cases, it was argued that section 196, as a transitional provision, was limited to<br />
removal orders because it refers specifically to appellants who have not been granted a stay under<br />
the old Act. The prevailing jurisprudence <strong>of</strong> the Federal Court is to the effect that section 196<br />
applies to sponsorship appeals <strong>and</strong> therefore, operates to discontinue removal <strong>and</strong> sponsorship<br />
appeals 5 . In interpreting this transitional provision, the Court noted that sections 196 <strong>and</strong> 197<br />
refer in particular to section 64 <strong>and</strong> that section 64 refers specifically to sponsors. Therefore,<br />
sections 196 <strong>and</strong> 64 <strong>of</strong> IRPA were intended to affect the rights <strong>of</strong> appellants who are sponsors.<br />
b) <strong>Appeals</strong> filed after the coming into force <strong>of</strong> the IRPA which stem from<br />
sponsorship applications refused before the IRPA came into force<br />
As the Federal Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal said in Medovarski 6 , section 192 creates an exception to<br />
the general rule set out in section 190 which provides that cases pending or in progress on the<br />
day <strong>of</strong> the coming into force <strong>of</strong> IRPA are governed by IRPA. Therefore, sponsorship appeals<br />
filed on or after the coming into force <strong>of</strong> the IRPA which stem from refusals made prior to June<br />
28, 2002 are governed by the provisions <strong>of</strong> the IRPA <strong>and</strong> IRP Regulations 7 . This means that the<br />
IAD will assess the facts presented at the time <strong>of</strong> the appeal hearing against the corresponding<br />
IRPA grounds <strong>of</strong> inadmissibility set out in section 320 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations. It is important to<br />
note that section 320 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations does not as such set out corresponding grounds<br />
from the <strong>Immigration</strong> Regulations, 1978 to the IRP Regulations which would lead to an<br />
inadmissibility finding under the IRPA. For example, there is no specific corresponding ground<br />
for section 4(3) <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Regulations, 1978. However, section 320(10) provides in<br />
particular that a person who had been determined to be inadmissible pursuant to section 19(2)(d)<br />
<strong>of</strong> the old Act becomes inadmissible under section 41(a) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA for failure to comply with<br />
the IRPA. Failure to comply with the IRPA includes the IRP Regulations by virtue <strong>of</strong> section<br />
2(2) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA. The IAD will also decide these appeals taking into account sections 63(1), 64,<br />
65 <strong>and</strong> 67 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA. This entails numerous consequences. Below is a discussion <strong>of</strong> particular<br />
transitional situations, jurisdictional b) 1- <strong>and</strong> non-jurisdictional b) 2-, which are likely to arise.<br />
b) 1- Matters in which the IAD has no jurisdiction, no jurisdiction in law or no<br />
discretionary jurisdiction<br />
5<br />
6<br />
7<br />
Touita, Wafa El Jaji v. M.C.I. (F.C., No. IMM-6351-04), De Montigny, April 21, 2005; 2005 FC 543; Alleg,<br />
Sahila v. M.C.I. (F.C., No. IMM- 6278-04), Martineau, March 11, 2005; 2005 FC 348; Kang, Sarabjeet Kaur v.<br />
M.C.I. (F.C., No. IMM-2445-04), Mactavish, February 25, 2005; 2005 FC 297; M.C.I. v. Bhalrhu, M<strong>and</strong>eep<br />
Kaur (F.C., No. IMM-2228-03), Gauthier, September 9, 2004; 2004 FC 1236; Williams, Sophia Laverne v.<br />
M.C.I. (F.C. No. IMM-6479-02), Phelan, May 6 2004; 2004 FC 662; see also, M.C.I. v. Seydoun, Saber Hussain<br />
(F.C., No. IMM-8407-04), Lutfy, February 2, 2006; 2006 FC 121; M.C.I. v. Sohal, Manjit Kaur (F.C., No. IMM-<br />
6292-02), Lutfy, May 6 2004; 2004 FC 660, where, on the contrary, the Federal Court decided that section 196<br />
did not apply to sponsorship appeals. The fact that a stay was never contemplated for a sponsor is indicative <strong>of</strong><br />
Parliament’s intent to remove the right <strong>of</strong> appeal for removal order appellants only.<br />
Medovarski: M.C.I. v. Medovarski, Olga (F.C.A., No. A-249-03), Evans, Rothstein, Pelletier (dissenting), March<br />
3, 2004, par. 50; 2004 FCA 85 (upheld by the SCC, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 539<br />
Section 2(2) <strong>of</strong> IRPA provides that references to “this Act” include regulations made under it.<br />
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‣ Inl<strong>and</strong> applications <strong>and</strong> sponsorship refusals<br />
Section 63(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA provides for an appeal from a decision not to issue a<br />
foreign national a permanent resident visa. Inl<strong>and</strong> applicants are never issued or<br />
refused visas. Rather, they are given or refused permanent resident status. Thus, it<br />
may be seen that appeals from inl<strong>and</strong> sponsorship refusals should be dismissed for<br />
lack <strong>of</strong> jurisdiction because they were not contemplated by section 63(1) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
IRPA <strong>and</strong> as such, there appears to be no right <strong>of</strong> appeal to the IAD 8 .<br />
‣ <strong>Sponsorship</strong> refusals based on corresponding grounds <strong>of</strong> security, violating<br />
human or international rights, serious criminality or organized criminality<br />
The consequence <strong>of</strong> section 320 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations will be that an appellant<br />
will have no right to appeal from the refusal <strong>of</strong> a sponsored application for a<br />
permanent resident visa if the foreign national was determined to be inadmissible<br />
on grounds which correspond to section 64(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA. As such, foreign<br />
nationals who had been determined to be inadmissible under sections 19(l)(e), (f),<br />
(g) or (k) <strong>of</strong> the old Act are inadmissible under the IRPA on security grounds<br />
(section 320(l) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations). There will be no appeal for foreign<br />
nationals determined to be inadmissible under sections l9(1)(j) or (l) <strong>of</strong> the old Act<br />
because they are inadmissible on grounds <strong>of</strong> violating human or international<br />
rights under the IRPA (section 320(2) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations). The same<br />
consequence will follow for foreign nationals determined to be inadmissible under<br />
sections 19(1)(c.2) or 19(1)(d)(ii) <strong>of</strong> the old Act as they are inadmissible on<br />
grounds <strong>of</strong> organized criminality under the IRPA (section 320(6) <strong>of</strong> the IRP<br />
Regulations).<br />
Sections 320(3) <strong>and</strong> 320(5)(a) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations indicate which inadmissible<br />
classes under the old Act correspond to the inadmissible class <strong>of</strong> serious<br />
criminality under the IRPA. However, appellants in those cases will not be<br />
deprived <strong>of</strong> a right <strong>of</strong> appeal unless the foreign national comes within the specific<br />
criteria <strong>of</strong> serious criminality provided for in section 64(2) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA, which<br />
indicates that serious criminality must be with respect to a crime that was punished<br />
in <strong>Canada</strong> by a term <strong>of</strong> imprisonment <strong>of</strong> at least two years 9 .<br />
Section 326(2) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations also stipulates that persons in respect <strong>of</strong><br />
whom section 77(3.01)(b) <strong>of</strong> the old Act applied on the coming into force <strong>of</strong> the<br />
IRPA are subject to section 64(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA.<br />
‣ <strong>Sponsorship</strong> application not filed in the prescribed manner<br />
8<br />
9<br />
Dargan v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-09872), Boire, November 18, 2004; Marish v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-03526), Boire,<br />
January 28, 2005.<br />
On the interpretation <strong>of</strong> term <strong>of</strong> imprisonment, see supra, footnote 4.<br />
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Transitional Provisions
Refusals based on the sponsor’s failure to fulfill basic requirements in the filing <strong>of</strong> a<br />
sponsorship application were generally uncommon before the IAD under the old<br />
Act. It should be noted that section 10(6) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations now specifically<br />
provides that a sponsorship application which does not meet the requirements <strong>of</strong><br />
section 10(1) is not an application filed in a prescribed manner for the purpose <strong>of</strong><br />
section 63(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA. Hence, in such cases, there may be no right <strong>of</strong> appeal if<br />
the sponsor’s application is refused on the ground that it was not filed in a<br />
prescribed manner. The IAD would likely dismiss the appeal for lack <strong>of</strong> jurisdiction<br />
if it so concludes. It appears that in such cases the IAD would not be in a position to<br />
allow the sponsor to remedy any non-compliance with section 10(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRP<br />
Regulations.<br />
‣ Refusals based on the sponsor’s inability to fulfill the undertaking or failure to<br />
comply with a previous undertaking as determined by the Province <strong>of</strong> Quebec<br />
Sponsored applications destined to the Province <strong>of</strong> Quebec may not be approved by<br />
an <strong>of</strong>ficer where the competent authority <strong>of</strong> the Province determines that the sponsor<br />
is unable to fulfill the undertaking as per section 137 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations.<br />
As was the case under the old Act, section 9(2) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA provides that there is<br />
no appeal in law where the refusal is based on the determination <strong>of</strong> provincial<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficials that the sponsor either fails to meet financial criteria or does not comply<br />
with a previous undertaking. Thus, the IAD may only hear the appeal on the basis<br />
<strong>of</strong> humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate grounds.<br />
‣ No discretionary jurisdiction where the IAD determines that the foreign national is<br />
not a member <strong>of</strong> the family class or that the sponsor is not a sponsor within the<br />
meaning <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations<br />
Section 65 <strong>of</strong> IRPA provides that the IAD has no jurisdiction to consider<br />
humanitarian <strong>and</strong> compassionate grounds (H&C) if it has decided that the foreign<br />
national is not a member <strong>of</strong> the family class pursuant to section 117(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRP<br />
Regulations 10 or that the appellant is not a sponsor as defined in section 130 <strong>of</strong> the<br />
IRP Regulations.<br />
Section 117(9) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations lists a number <strong>of</strong> situations where the<br />
foreign national is not considered a member <strong>of</strong> the family class. The Federal Court<br />
upheld a number <strong>of</strong> decisions where the IAD concluded that it had no jurisdiction<br />
to consider H&C because the foreign national was excluded from the family class<br />
pursuant to section 117(9)(d) in that the sponsor had not disclosed the existence <strong>of</strong><br />
a dependent child. In so doing, the Federal Court confirmed that sections 352 <strong>and</strong><br />
355 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations applied to applications made under the old Act <strong>and</strong><br />
were meant to exclude from the application <strong>of</strong> section 117(9)(d) those children<br />
between the ages <strong>of</strong> 19 <strong>and</strong> 22 who were not considered a “dependent daughter”<br />
10<br />
For spouses, common-law <strong>and</strong> conjugal partners, see more specifically sections 4, 5 <strong>and</strong> 117(9) <strong>of</strong> the IRP<br />
Regulations.<br />
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Transitional Provisions
or “dependent son” under the old Act, but were a “dependent child” under IRPA<br />
<strong>and</strong> IRP Regulations 11 .<br />
b) 2- Matters in which the IAD has jurisdiction in law <strong>and</strong> discretionary<br />
jurisdiction<br />
‣ Refusals based on medical grounds<br />
Section 320(7) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations provides that sponsored applicants for a<br />
permanent resident visa who were found to be inadmissible under section 19(1)(a)<br />
<strong>of</strong> the old Act are inadmissible under the IRPA on health grounds.<br />
Danger to public health or public safety does not pose any difficulty. However,<br />
appeals from refusals based on excessive dem<strong>and</strong>s on health or social services has to<br />
be considered in light <strong>of</strong> section 38 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA <strong>and</strong> the definition <strong>of</strong> excessive<br />
dem<strong>and</strong> contained in section 1(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations.<br />
Section 38(2)(a) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA provides that a foreign national who is expected to<br />
cause excessive dem<strong>and</strong> on health or social services is not inadmissible on health<br />
grounds if it has been determined that the foreign national is a member <strong>of</strong> the family<br />
class <strong>and</strong> is the spouse, common-law partner 12 or child <strong>of</strong> a sponsor within the<br />
meaning <strong>of</strong> the regulations. This represents a substantial change from the old Act<br />
provisions which permitted such refusals. Such refusals made under the old Act <strong>and</strong><br />
appealed on or after June 28, 2002 would appear to be invalid in law under the<br />
IRPA. To our knowledge, none <strong>of</strong> these cases have proceeded to a hearing before<br />
the IAD.<br />
Medical refusals based on excessive dem<strong>and</strong> on health or social services concerning<br />
foreign nationals other than the spouse, common-law partner, conjugal partner or<br />
child <strong>of</strong> a sponsor will have to be assessed by the IAD against the definition <strong>of</strong><br />
excessive dem<strong>and</strong> contained in section 1(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations. Failure <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Minister to clearly justify the refusal against the new definition <strong>of</strong> excessive dem<strong>and</strong><br />
could result in the IAD allowing the appeal <strong>and</strong> referring the matter back for<br />
reconsideration based on the IRPA <strong>and</strong> IRP Regulations (section 67(2) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
IRPA).<br />
11<br />
12<br />
Dumornay, Jean-Bernard v. M.C.I. (F.C. No. IMM-2596-05), Pinard, May 11, 2006; 2006 FC 541; Le, Van<br />
Dung v. M.C.I. (F.C. No. IMM-8951-04) Blanchard, May 2, 2005; 2005 FC 600; Collier, Amelia v. M.C.I. (F.C.<br />
No. IMM-8635-03), Snider, September 2, 2004; 2004 FC 1209.<br />
Conjugal partners are also specifically exempted, not in IRPA, but by section 24 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations.<br />
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Transitional Provisions
‣ Refusals based on financial grounds<br />
Section 320(8) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations provides that persons who had been<br />
determined to be inadmissible pursuant to section 19(1)(b) <strong>of</strong> the old Act are<br />
inadmissible under section 39 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA. It is to be noted that the wording <strong>of</strong> both<br />
sections is similar. As a result, these transition cases do not raise any particular<br />
problem.<br />
‣ Refusals based on sponsor’s inability to meet the financial criteria or failure to<br />
comply with a previous undertaking<br />
Refusals made on the basis <strong>of</strong> the sponsor’s failure to meet settlement arrangements<br />
under the old Act <strong>and</strong> section 5(2)(f) <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Immigration</strong> Regulations, 1978 require a<br />
reassessment based on section 134 <strong>and</strong> the definition <strong>of</strong> minimum necessary income<br />
in section 2 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations. For cases destined to the Province <strong>of</strong> Quebec,<br />
there are jurisdictional implications as discussed above.<br />
As for refusals to comply with a previous undertaking (section 133(1)(g) <strong>of</strong> IRP<br />
Regulations), it should be noted that the duration <strong>of</strong> an undertaking has been<br />
reduced under IRP Regulations. Section 132 provides an undertaking <strong>of</strong> 3 years for<br />
spouses, common law partners <strong>and</strong> conjugal partners <strong>and</strong> from 3 to 10 years for a<br />
dependent child, depending on the age <strong>of</strong> the child at the time <strong>of</strong> l<strong>and</strong>ing. However,<br />
section 351(3) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations provides that the duration <strong>of</strong> an undertaking<br />
under the old Act is not affected by IRP Regulations. It flows that the duration <strong>of</strong><br />
sponsorship undertakings signed prior to June 28, 2002 remain at 10 years 13 .<br />
‣ Misrepresentation<br />
Section 320(9) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations provides that persons determined to be<br />
inadmissible on the basis <strong>of</strong> sections 27(1)(e) or (2)(g) or (i) <strong>of</strong> the old Act will<br />
become inadmissible for misrepresentation under section 40 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA. There is<br />
no such equivalent for foreign nationals whose application for permanent residence<br />
may have been refused on the basis <strong>of</strong> sections 9(3) <strong>and</strong> 19(2)(d) <strong>of</strong> the old Act. In<br />
these cases the foreign national becomes inadmissible for failure to comply with the<br />
IRPA, as provided by sections 320(10) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations <strong>and</strong> 41 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA.<br />
This distinction is important in view <strong>of</strong> section 64(3) <strong>of</strong> the IRPA which denies a<br />
right <strong>of</strong> appeal against a refusal <strong>of</strong> a sponsored application for a permanent resident<br />
visa made by a foreign national found to be inadmissible on the ground <strong>of</strong><br />
misrepresentation unless the foreign national is the sponsor’s spouse, common-law<br />
partner or child.<br />
13<br />
M.C.I. v. Sharma, Ashok Kumar (F.C., no. IMM-6517-03), von Finckenstein, August 18, 2004; 2004 FC 1144.<br />
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c) <strong>Appeals</strong> which stem from sponsorship applications refused after the IRPA<br />
came into force<br />
Sponsored applications for permanent residence which had not been finalized by a visa<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficer prior to June 28, 2002 will continue to be processed under the IRPA <strong>and</strong> the IRP<br />
Regulations per section 190 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA 14 . As such, any decisions, positive or negative, will be<br />
based on the IRPA 15 . One exception to the above concerns fiancés who are no longer members <strong>of</strong><br />
the family class under section 117(1) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations. As permitted by section 201 <strong>of</strong> the<br />
IRPA, section 356 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations specifically deals with fiancé applications made prior<br />
to June 28, 2002. These applications will continue to be processed as fiancé applications under<br />
the old Act <strong>and</strong> Regulations until they are finally disposed <strong>of</strong>.<br />
d) Court ordered rehearings<br />
In cases where the IAD is directed by the Federal Court or the Supreme Court to<br />
reconsider an appeal which had been filed prior to the coming into force <strong>of</strong> the IRPA, section<br />
350(5) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations stipulates that the <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeal Division shall dispose <strong>of</strong> the<br />
matter in accordance with the former Act 16 . This is consistent with section 192 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA which<br />
directs that if the filing <strong>of</strong> the notice <strong>of</strong> appeal predates the coming into force <strong>of</strong> the IRPA, the<br />
appeal shall be continued under the old Act. This represents one <strong>of</strong> the underlying consequences<br />
<strong>of</strong> a de novo hearing, which is to place the parties in the position they were in when the litigation<br />
began.<br />
In the case <strong>of</strong> Court ordered rehearings, the Federal Court determined in Denton-James 17 that the<br />
application <strong>of</strong> sections 196 <strong>and</strong> 64 <strong>of</strong> the IRPA may not be considered. The language <strong>of</strong> section<br />
350(5) <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations is unambiguous.<br />
Conclusion<br />
A number <strong>of</strong> problems raised by the transitional provisions have been settled by the<br />
Courts. In view <strong>of</strong> the fact that there are very few transitional cases left, the transitional provisions<br />
are not likely to generate additional litigation.<br />
14<br />
15<br />
16<br />
17<br />
Note that sections 352 to 355 <strong>of</strong> the IRP Regulations facilitate timely processing <strong>of</strong> pending sponsored<br />
applications by not requiring applicants to update their file if they do not so desire, for instance, in the case <strong>of</strong><br />
children who did not qualify under the former <strong>Immigration</strong> Regulations, 1978.<br />
Siewattee, Door v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-24492), Whist, September 4, 2003; Noun, Pho v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-03260),<br />
MacPherson, August 27, 2003. See also, M.C.I. v. Fuente, Cleotilde Dela (F.C.A., no. A-446-05), Noël,<br />
Sharlow, Malone, May 18 2006; CAF 186, where the F.C.A. answered in the negative the certified question as to<br />
whether the doctrine <strong>of</strong> legitimate expectations could be relied upon to avoid the application <strong>of</strong> section 190 <strong>of</strong><br />
the IRPA.<br />
Fani, Ahmad v. M.C.I. (IAD TA0-08820), MacPherson, July 10, 2003.<br />
Denton-James, Lucy Eastwood v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1819-02), Snider, June 24, 2004; 2004 FC 911.<br />
<strong>Sponsorship</strong> <strong>Appeals</strong> 7 Legal Services<br />
January 1, 2008<br />
Transitional Provisions
CASES<br />
Alleg, Sahila v. M.C.I. (F.C., No. IMM- 6278-04), Martineau, March 11, 2005; 2005 FC 348 .................................... 2<br />
Allen, Deon Aladin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2439-02), Snider, May 5, 2003....................................................... 1<br />
Atwal: M.C.I. v. Atwal, Iqbal Singh (F.C., no. IMM-3260-03), Pinard, January 8, 2004 .............................................. 1<br />
Bhalrhu: M.C.I. v. Bhalrhu, M<strong>and</strong>eep Kaur (F.C., No. IMM-2228-03), Gauthier, September 9,<br />
2004; 2004 FC 1236 .................................................................................................................................................. 2<br />
Cheddesingh (Jones), Nadine Karen v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-2453-05, Beaudry, February 3, 2006;<br />
2006 FC 124 .............................................................................................................................................................. 1<br />
Collier, Amelia v. M.C.I. (F.C. No. IMM-8635-03), Snider, September 2, 2004; 2004 FC 1209.................................. 5<br />
Dargan v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-09872), Boire, November 18, 2004.................................................................................. 3<br />
Denton-James, Lucy Eastwood v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1819-02), Snider, June 24, 2004; 2004<br />
FC 911....................................................................................................................................................................... 7<br />
Dumornay, Jean-Bernard v. M.C.I. (F.C. No. IMM-2596-05), Pinard, May 11, 2006; 2006 FC 541........................... 5<br />
Fani, Ahmad v. M.C.I. (IAD TA0-08820), MacPherson, July 10, 2003 ........................................................................ 7<br />
Fuente: M.C.I. v. Fuente, Cleotilde Dela (F.C.A., no. A-446-05), Noël, Sharlow, Malone, May 18<br />
2006; CAF 186 .......................................................................................................................................................... 7<br />
Gomes: M.C.I. v. Gomes, Ronald (F.C. no. IMM-6689-03), O’Keefe, January 27 2006; 2005 FC<br />
299............................................................................................................................................................................. 1<br />
Kang, Sarabjeet Kaur v. M.C.I. (F.C., No. IMM-2445-04), Mactavish, February 25, 2005; 2005 FC<br />
297............................................................................................................................................................................. 2<br />
Le, Van Dung v. M.C.I. (F.C. No. IMM-8951-04) Blanchard, May 2, 2005; 2005 FC 600........................................... 5<br />
Marish v. M.C.I. (IAD TA4-03526), Boire, January 28, 2005....................................................................................... 3<br />
Medovarski: M.C.I. v. Medovarski, Olga (F.C.A., No. A-249-03), Evans, Rothstein, Pelletier<br />
(dissenting), March 3, 2004, par. 50; 2004 FCA 85 (upheld by the SCC, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 539................................ 2<br />
Noun, Pho v. M.C.I. (IAD TA3-03260), MacPherson, August 27, 2003 ....................................................................... 7<br />
Sharma: M.C.I. v. Sharma, Ashok Kumar (F.C., no. IMM-6517-03), von Finckenstein, August 18,<br />
2004; 2004 FC 1144 .................................................................................................................................................. 6<br />
Siewattee, Door v. M.C.I. (IAD TA2-24492), Whist, September 4, 2003 ..................................................................... 7<br />
Smith: M.C.I. v. Smith, Dwight Anthony (F.C., no. IMM-2139-03), Campbell, January 16, 2004;<br />
2004 FC 63 ................................................................................................................................................................ 1<br />
Sohal: M.C.I. v. Sohal, Manjit Kaur (F.C., No. IMM-6292-02), Lutfy, May 6 2004; 2004 FC 660 ............................. 2<br />
Touita, Wafa El Jaji v. M.C.I. (F.C., No. IMM-6351-04), De Montigny, April 21, 2005; 2005 FC<br />
543............................................................................................................................................................................. 2<br />
Williams, Sophia Laverne v. M.C.I. (F.C. No. IMM-6479-02), Phelan, May 6 2004; 2004 FC 662 ............................. 2<br />
<strong>Sponsorship</strong> <strong>Appeals</strong> 8 Legal Services<br />
January 1, 2008<br />
Transitional Provisions