0 - The Black Vault

CORPORATION 

DIIN [MEN Nit)U 0Q A 

AStudy of Sthe. c Lessons Learned 

in ie nam 

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PLANN 

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THEW 

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE 

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE 

CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013 

lULl T0 

~ I &TTIOTIOS OP 

AWCI 9 March 198. 

SUBJECT: Declassification of the BDM Study, "The Strategic Lessons Learned in 

Vietnam" 

Defense Technical Information Center 

ATTN: Ms. Betty Weatherholtz 

Cameron Station 

Alexandria, VA 22314 

1. Your organization was on the distribution list for the BDM study, "The 

Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam." The study was assigned AD numbers 

B048632L rhrough 641L. 

2. In December 1.8G, the Army War College Security Office notified all 

recipients of the study by telephone that it contained classified information 

and should be secured. 

3. BDM now has cevised the appropriate pages of the study to delete all 

classified inforiwation and has conformed to all other requirements required by 

the clearance re-iew. 

4. A revised roL' of the study which is unclassified and approved for public 

release is inclooe'. DTIC Form 50's are inclosed for assignment of new AD 

numbers. 

'K.Director, 

Incls ANDREW C. REMSON, . 

as 

Colonel, CE 

Strategic Studies Instite 

11Y_ _ 

_ _

m 

CORPORATION 

7915 Jones Branch Drive 

McLean, Virginia 22102 

Phone (703) 821-5000 

April 4, 1980 

BM/W-78-128-TR-. . 

----------------- - -' -' 

IA WUDY OF STRATEGIC LESSONS ( 

LEARN ED IN ~ETNAM. / 

,VOLUME-Y'I 

PLANNING THE WAR. 

This draft report .Issubmitted to4,AMO-SSP. 

4641/t7W

THE BDM CORPORATION 

FOREWORD 

This Study is a final draft submitted to DAMO-SSP 

the provisions of Contract No. DAAG 39-78-C-0120, 

in accordance with 

The task is to identify and analyze lessons that should be learned 

from three decades of US involvement in Vietnam, This iS Volume V of the 2 

S 

Study. 

Volume I 

Volume II 

Volume III 

Volume IV 

The Enemy 

South Vietnam 

US Foreign Policy and Vietnam 

1945-1975 

US Domestic Factors Influencing 

Vietnam War Policy Making 

Volume V Planning the War 2 

Volume VI 

Volume VII 

Volume VIII 

Conduct of the War 

The Soldier 

The Results of the War 

The views of the authors do not purport to reflect the positions of 

the Department ot the Army or the Cepartmient of Defense., 

.c o 'For 

SI . • TA 3 _- 

-I 1, 

Bi....... 

•. , ', -• ?. ,r •"_ •. 'I 

I

[ •THE 

BDM CORPORATION 

PREPACE 

A. PERSPECTIVE OF THE STUDY 

I 

This volume, Planning the War, is the fifth of an eight-volume study 

entitled A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam undertaken by the 

BDN Corporation under contract to the US Army. This comprehensive research 

effort is aimed at identifying lessons which US military leaders and US 

civilian p- 1 icy makers should have learned or should now be learning frcm 

the US experience in Vietnam. 

Volume I of this study, an examination of the enemy, includes discussions 

of the DRV 

leadership and party organization, Communist Vietnamese 

goals ana strategies, and internal and external channels of support established 

to aid the North's war effort., Volume II focuses on the RVN, the 

country's societal characteristics and problems, its government and its 

armed forces. 

Volume III assesses the US's involvement in Vietnam by examining 

the global context in which that involvement occurred, 

the major 

historical precedents influencing US involvement, and the US national-leve: 

pz: 4 cy process which shaped that involvement. 

Volume IV explores the US 

domestic scene, including its political and 

economic components, the role of the media during the Vietnam conflict, and 

the extent of domestic support for the war, 

includes discussions of US 

Volume VI, Conduct of the War, 

intelligence, logistics, and advisory efforts; 

US counterinsurgency programs; and ground, air, naval and unconventional 

operations. Volume VII examines the US soloier, including the war's 

psychological effects on the soldier, drug abuse and race relations in the 

US military, and leadership and personnel policies in the US armed forces, 

Finally, Volume VIII discusses, in broad terms, the results ý, the war for 

the US in terms of domestic, foreign, and military policies. 

This eight-volume study effort is analytical, not historical in 

nature. Its focus is primarily military in orientation. 

The purpose of the 

entire eight volumes is not a retelling of the Vietnam conflict, but a 

drawing of lessons and insights of value to present and future US 

makers, both civilian and military. 

policy 

v


B. PURPOSE OF VOLUME V, "PLANNING THE WAR." 

The purpose of this volume is to provide the reader with separate analyses 

of important lessons learned in Vietnam related to planning the war. 

As outlined in the US Army's Request for Proposals (RFP) for this study, 

Volume V is a coliectio' of eight separate analytical taskings, the details 

of which are given below: 

0 Objectives and Strategies - a compariscn shal !)e made of US and 

allied objectives and strateges and those of North Vietnam and 

its two principal supporters, the USSR and the PRC. 

* US Foreign Policy - an examination of the effectiveness of US 

a 

foreign policy in providing support for US objectives in Vietnam 

will be performed. 

Contingency Planning - a description small be provided giving the 

scope and general content of US contingency planning for Southeast 

Asia in the period preceding large-scale US involvement and 

a description of the ways the actual commitment differed from the 

copditions assumed or prcjected in the contingency plans. 

* Mooilization - a determination will be made as to the extent to 

which mobilization of National Guard and Reserve Fcrces was ccnsidered., 

The decision not to mobilize until the Pueblo crisis 

will be assessed as well as its subsequent impact on the war, 

US Armed Forces and US society. 

0 Pacification and Vietnamization - a description and analysis of 

the evolution of the Pacification and Vietnamization p'ograms, 

their impact on the war effort and degree of success will be provided. 

* US Withdrawal - The primary influences that led tn the US withdrawal 

will be identified and described; also a description of 

the consequences of that withdrawal on thp war, on US international 

relations and on Asian puwer relationships will be 

provided. 

the 

Svi


0 Negotiations - a description of the extent to which the negotiating 

process assisted or detracted from attainment of US goals 

will be given. The strengths and weaknesses exploited by each 

side in the negotiating process will be identified. A des, 

tion will be given of the different approaches to negotiation 

taken by the US, North Vietnamese, GVN and VC Provisional Revolutionary 

Government (PRG)., Recommendations of how the Ulited 

States should approach or conduct such negotiations in the future 

will be provided. 

0 Follow-on Effort - a description of the post-withdrawal US 

commitment to aid South Vietnam and the degree to which it was 

carried out will be provided. The physical and psyc.,oiogical 

results will be described in detail. 

C. THEMES THAT EMERGE IN VOLUME V 

Several patterns or themes emerge fromi the analyses developed in this 

volume. In brief, they are as follows- 

* Neither the fundamental US objectives nor tne USG basic policy 

with respe-t to the RVN 

were understood completely, aod subtle 

changes (i.e., from an independent, non-communist RVN to an RVN 

not necessarily non-communist) that occurred over time were apparently 

not transmitted to the US leadership in the field. 

* As long as the fundamental doctrine of military containment of 

communism was the official US foreign policy, the decision to 

intervene in Vietnam has to be considered a logical reaction. 

The "domino" 

theory saw any conflict with the communists as a 

test of the US's national resolve and credibility. 

The communist; 

had threatened to take over "free world" territory in 

Berlin, Korea, Iran, Guatemala, Lebanon and the Dominican Republic 

and actio;-s taken by the US to prevent the loss of these 

territories were viewed by many as American Cold War successes. 

Conversely, the communists gaining control over China and Cuba 

vii


j 

were viewed as Cold War defeats for the US 

Each successive US 

president found himself bound, in large measure, by his predecessor's 

doctrine and thereafter often analyzeA issues from the 

same perspectives, continuing policies long after they had 

outlived their usefulness. 

* The policy of unreserved commitment to a particular leadership 

placed the US in a weak and manipulable position on important 

internal issues in Vietnam. The early view that there were no 

viable alternatives to President Ngo Dinh Diem greatly limited 

the extent of US influence over his regime and ruled out, over 

the years, a number of the kinds of leverage that might have been 

employed to obtain desired goals, 

* Major component command contingency plans and the corresponding 

plans of supporting component commands did not appreciate nor did 

they assess the true nature of the threat existing in Vietnam before 

the mid-sixties. 

0 There is little doubt, having the advantage of hindsight, that 

programs like Pacification and Vietnamization finally worked. 

The North Vietnamese ultimately could not have won the war via 

insurgency, out -ather had to resort to conventional military offensives 

by PAVN trocps. 

* Early or, American leadership mistakenly believed Vietnam to be 

vital not only for itself, but for what they thought its "loss" 

would mean internationally and domestically. Once the commitment 

was made, each subsequent president re-affirmed the commitment 

rather than reassessing the basic rationale as to whether vital 

US interests were involved or not. Furthermore, US leaders 

wanted a negotiated settlement without fully realizing (though 

probably more 

than their critics) that a civil war cannot be 

ended bi political compromise alone. 

The attainment of a stalemate 

on the battlfield and the effective isolation of the enem, 

from his suppliers were the keys to bringing the negotiations to 

1, a conclusion. It was unfortunate that US military strength had 

viii


no political corollary in RVN. The cease-fire agreement failed 

to stop the DRV from eventually pursuing their ultimate goal -- 

military victory over the South. 

D. HISTORICAL-CHRONOLOGICAL OVERVIEW OF VOLUME V 

Figure V-l provides an encapsulation of the data and analyses appearing 

in Volume V. The figure offers a time-sensitive depiction of major US 

foreign policy interests and objectives, perceived threats, and strategies 

for the period 1945 through 1975. The graphic also highlights the Vietnam 

decision-makers: President, Ambassador and Senior US Military commander. 

In addition, the figure plots key decision points on mobilization and US 

combat forces withdrawal, negotiations initiatives, pacification programs, 

and bombing pauses, as well as other significant data which will allow the 

reader to gauge their development within the context of the material 

developed herein. 

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ýfectliri Planning of the War xi/Xii

THE BDIVI CORPORATION 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Chapter 

Page 

FOREWORD 

PREFACE 


LIST OF FIGURES 

LIST OF TABLES 

LIST OF MAPS 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

v 

xiii 

xix 

xxiii 

xxiii 

EX-1 to EX-16 

1. OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES 1-1 to 1-26 

A. Introduction 1-1 

B. A Review of DRV, NLF (PRP & PRG), USSR, and 

PRC Objectives and Strategies 1-2 

1. The Objectives and Strategies of the 

Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) 

in Review 1-2 


National Liberation Front in Review 1-3 

3. Objectives and Strategies of the Soviet 

Union in Review 1-6 

4. Objectives and Strategies of the People's 

Republic of China (PRC) in Review 1-7 

C. A Review Of US, GVNand Allied Objectives 

and Strategies 1-9 


United States (US) and South Vietnam 

in Review 1-9 

2. The Objectives and Strategies of Major 

Allied Participants in Review 1-13 

D. An Assessment of US-Allied and Enemy 

Strategies and Objectives: Problems, 

Exploitable Differences, Contradictions, 

aiid Mi3perceptions 1-15 

E. Insighc3 1-21 

F, Lessons 1-22 

xiii


TAELE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED) 

ChlLter 

Page 

2, US FOREIGN POLICV 2-1 to 2-56 


B. Phased Assessment of US Foreign Policy 

in Southeast Asia 2-4 

1, Historical Antecedents 2-4 

2. Phase 1: 1945 to 1961 2-4 

3. Phase 2: 1961 tc 1965 2-21 

4. Phase 3:. 1965 to 1969 2-38 

5. Phase 4: 1969 to 1975 2-43 

C. Insights 2-47 

D. Lessons 2-49 

3., CONTINGENCY PLANNING 3-1 to 3-29 


B. Peacetime Perspectives 3-2 

1. Military Strategic Planning .- 2 

2. Objectives 3-3 

3. Planning Highlights 3-5 

4. CINCPAC OPLAN 32-59 3-7 

5, Related Plans 3-10 

6. Constraints on Planning Options 3-10 

C. Plans Actually Implemented 3-13 

1, OPLANs 34A and 37-64 3-13 

2. Changing Perceptions 3-14 

3. No Reserve Call-up 3-15 

4., Planning Deployment in SVN 3-15 

5. Other Factors 3-17 

6. MACV Contingency Planning Post 1965 3-17 

D. Assessment of Planning Effectiveness 3-18 

E. Summary Analysis and Insights 3-19 

F., Lessons 3-21 

xiv

)'HL BDM CORPfrja riON 


(CONTINUED) 

Chapte 

Page 

4 MOBILIZATION 4-1 to 4-38 

A. Introduction -I 

B., Mobilization of the Reservesf A Difficult 

Presidential Decision 4-2 

1. Background 

2. Mobilization: The Backbone of Early 

4-2 

Contingency Planning (1954-1961) 4-5 

SCrisis: 

3. The Bay of Pigs Fiasco and the Berlin 

Reason t) Mobilize 4-6 

4, Other Crisis Situations '1962-1965) 4-9 

5. Consmitme.it to Vietnam: 

The US Milita*'y 

* 1965 to 196S 4-10 

6. Mini-Mobiliz4tion: The Pueblo Incident 

and Tet 1bi8 

7, Vietnamization and Withdrawal: 1969-1972 

4-15 

4-24 

8. Post-War Impacts: Down to a Zero Draft 4-26 

S9. A Lesson Learned 4-30 

C. Summary Analysis and Insights 4-31 

D. Lessons 4-32 

5 PACIFICA T ION AND VIETNAMIZATION 5-1 to 5-86 


B, Pacification: A Key Variable in the 

Counterinsurgency Formula 5-2 

1, Early Pacification Efforts 5-2 

2. The Process Defined 5-4 

C. Early Pacification Efforts: The Ngo 

Experiments (1954-1963) 5-6 

1. Civic Action 5-7 

* 

2. The Land Development Program 5-9 

3. Agglomeration Camps and Agrovilles 5-12 

4. Strategic Hamlets 5-17 

5. The Civilians' Irregular Defense Groups 

(CIDG) Experiment 5-26 

6. The Territorial Forces -- Civil Guard 

and Self-Defense Corps 5-28 

7. Early Program Results and Impact on the 

War Effort 5-30 

Xv



(CONTINUE") 

Chapter 

Page 

D. Follow-On Pacification. The US Searchi for 

a New Strategy (1964-1967) 5-33 

l New Life Hamlets and the Hop Tac Ei~fert 

2. 

The US Takes Charge 5-33 

Rural Construction. A Push for a Social, 

Revolution 5-40 

3. Revolutionary Development: 

un the Other War 

Emphasis 

5-43 

4. US Participation, Looking for the Rignt 

Organization 5-45 

5. The American Solutions: A Proliferation 

of Approaches 5-46 

6. Program Results and Impact on the War 

Effort 5-47 

E. The New Model Pacification Program: Civil 

Operations and Revolutionary Development 

Support (1967-1973) 5-48 

1, The Tet Offensive: Getting Back on the 

Track and Accelerating the Pacification 

Process 5-52 

2. The Easter Offensive. A Setback for 

Both North and South 5-59 

3, Measures of Success: Reaching for the 

Brass Ring 5-59 

F. Vietnamization: An End to Americanization 

(1968-1975) 5-62 

1. Definition and Purpose 5-62 

2. Vietnamization as Viewed by the 

Vietnamese 5-64 

G. Insights 5-58 

1. Knowing the Enemy and Our Ally 5-68 

2. Pacification 5-68 

3. Vietnamization 5-72 

H. Lessons 5-73 

d 

xvi


TABLE OF CONTENT 

(CONTINUED) 

Chapter 

Page 

6 US WITHDRAWAL 6-1 to C-25 


B. Considerations in Planning and Implementing 

US Withdrawal 6-3 

l1 Withdrawal Goa-,s 6-4 

2, Change in Objectives for the Field 

Commander 6-6 

3. Concepts for Planning Withdrawal at the 

Field Command 6-7 

C. Assessment of US Withdrawal 6-9 

1, Influences Leading to Withdrawal 6-9 

2. Consequences of US Withdrawal on the War 6-11 

3. Consequences of US WithdTawal on International 

Relations 6-13 

S4. Consequences of the War on Asian Power 

Relationships 6-14 

5. Consequences of US Withdrawal Planning 6-14 

D. Summary Analysis and insights 6-15 

E. Lessons 6-18 

Appendix 6-20 

7. NEGOTIATIONS 7-1 to 7-86 

A. Introuction 7-1 

B. Phased Analysis of Negotiations 7-2 

1. Phase lk Post-WWII to 1961 7-2 

2. Phase 2: 1961 to Mid-1968 7-13 

3. Phase 3: The Paris Negotiations-- The 

Nixon and Kissinger Years 7-38 

4. Insights 7-64 

C. Lessons 7-68 

j Appendix 7-71 

xvii

4 


TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED) 

Chapter 

Page 

8 FOLLOW-ON EFFORT 8-1 to 8-28 


B. Post-Treaty/Post-Withdrawal: The Basis for and 

Nature of the US Commitment to South Vietnam 8-2 

1. Commitments Based on Private Presidential 

Assurances 8-2 

2. Commitments Based on the US Interpretation 

of the Paris Peace Accords 8-4 

3. US Aid Commitments to South Vietnam: 

"Operation Enhance"!"Enhance Plus" 8-5 

4. US Commitments To Aid and Defend South 

Vietnam: The US Congress and Its Effect 

on the US Follow-On Effort 8-6 

C. Evaluation of the US Follow-On Effort: 

Problems, Effectiveness, and Results 8-16 

D. Insights 8-20 

E. Lessons 8-23 

BIBLIOGRAPHY B-I to B-17 

xviii


LIST OF FIGURES 

Figure 

Page 

V-1 Significant Events Affecting Planning of the War xi/xii 

'-1 DRV Long and Short Term Objectives, 1961 - 

April 1975 1-4 

1-2 NLF & PRP (PRG) Long and Short Te-m Objectives, 

1961 - April 1975 1-5 

1-3 PRC and USSR Objectives in the Emerging Tri-Polar 

World and Vietnam 1-8 

1-4 US National Objectives and Strategies, 1960-1975 1-11 

1-5 The United States' Search for a Strategy, 

1960-11975 1-12 

1-6 A Summary of Allied Support to the US-GVN War 

Effort 1-14 

1-7 The North Vietnamese Perception of Contradictions 

in the "Enemy" Camp 1-16 

2-1 Summary of US Policy Toward Southeast Asia and 

Vietnam, 1945-1961 2-6 

2-2 Summary of US Policy Toward Vietnam, 1961-1965 2-22 

2-3 United States Mission - Vietnam 2-32 

2-4 Mission Council and Staff Committees 2-33 

2-5 American Embassy - Saigon 2-34 

2-6 US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 2-35 

9-7 Joint United States Public Affairs Office 

(JUSPAO) 2-36 

2-8 Agency for Inte national Development United 

States Operations Mission to Vietnam 2-37 



xix

I 


LIST OF FIGURES (CONTINUED) 

Figure 

P~age 

3-i Planning Relationships - Simplified 

(Illustrative) 3--4 

3-2 Contingency Planning 3-20 

4-1 The US Army's Active Duty Strength (1950-1974) 4-3 

4-2 Draft Calls and DOD Manpower Cuts 4-27 

5-1 Comparative Data on Counterinsurgency Operations: 

1946-1975 5-5 

5-2 The Civic Action Program 5-8 

5-3 The Land Development Program 5-10 

5-4 Agglomeration on Resettlement Camrs 5-13 

5-5 The Agroville Program 5-15 

5-6 

I5-7 

The Strategic Hamlet Program 5-18 

Operation "Sunrise" 5-21 

5-8 Strategic Hamlet Growth South Vietnam (19G2-1963) 5-24 

5-9 The New Life Hamlet Program 5-35 

5-10 The Hop Tac Program 5-36 

5-11 The Chien Thang Program 5-39 

5-12 The Rural Construction Program 5-41 

5-13 The Revolutionary Development Program 5-44 

5-14 The New Model Pacification Program 5-49 

5-15 Organ'zation, 59-Man Revolutiona'y Development 

Cadre Group 5-53 

5-!6 The Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) 

Program 5-54 

xx 

f. 

A

THE BDMCORPORATION 

LIST OF FIGURES (CONTINUED) 

Figure 

Page 

5-17 Pacification Councils and US Support 

Organization (as of 1970) 5-56 

5-Id RVNAF Organization for Pacification Support 5-57 

5-19 Summary of HES Computer Tapes (1967-1972) 5-61 

5-20 Typical Military Equipment Provided the RVNAF 

SUnder the Vietnamization Program 5-66 

b6-1 U Policy Decision on Negotiations, Withdrawal, 

and Vietnamization 6-12 

7-1 U5 Contacts and Peace Initiatives With North 

Vietnam, 1962-1968 7-20 

7-2 Bombing Pauses Over North Vietnam (1965-1968) 7-23 

7-3 A Summary of Lyndon Johnson's Assessment of the 

Major initiatives in Search for Negotiations 7-30 

7-4A Anrounced Ncotiation Posi•ions, The DRV, NLF 

and US 7-33/34 

7-48 A Comparative Analysis by Secretary of State 

Rusk of the Proposed First Steps Toward Peace 7-35 

7-5 The Principal Inputs to President Nixon's 

Decisions on Negetiations 7-63 

7-6 The DRV vs. US: Minimum and Maximum Positions 

on Key Issues in the Negotiations 7-65 

7-7 US vs. GVN: Minimum dnd Maximum Positions on 

Key Issues in the Negotiations 7-66 

0-, ..-country Personnel: Follow-On Effort 8-8 

8-2 Follow-On Effort:. The War Powers Resolution and 

Its Antecedents 81 

8-3 Follow-On Effort: US Presidential Use of and 

Compliance with the War Powers Pesolution 8-17 

i- Yxi

~ $ THE E3DMV CORPORATION 

LIST OF TABLES 

ý,iblIe 

Page 

3-1 Steps Toward "Gradualism" -- Plannin~g 

Decisions, 1964-1965 3-16 

61Total US Military Personnel in South Vietnanr 6-10 

8-1 Follow-On Effort: Summary ofl Selected Items of 

Equipment Approved in Support of RVNAF Improvement 

and Modernization Program (as of Decembeir 1972) 8-7 

8-2 Follow-Or- Effort: US Milite.y Aid Requests for 

Vietnam, 1973-1975 (US $ Billions) 8-10 

8-3 Follew-On Effort: US Economic and Import Support, 

1973-1975 (Obligation Basis: $ Million) 8-10 

8-4 Follow-On Effort: Analysis of FY-75 Funding 

jImpacts 8-11 

8-5 Follow-On Effort-, Com~parative Firepower 

1969-January 1975 8-21 

LIST OF MAPS 

Map 

Page 

3-1 Typical Early Contingency Planning for Defense 

of South Vietnam 3-9 

7-1 Cambodia North Vietnam~ese Base Areas and "Menu" 

Strikes, 1969 7-48 

7-2 Laos in 1970 7-49 

xxiii


EXECUTIVE SUMARY 

The chapters of Volume V develop a number of key insights and lessons 

relating to the planning for the US 

involvement in the Vietnam conflict. 

In addition to identifying the roots and origins of US planning and policy 

initiatives for Vietnam, this volume describes and assesses the efficacy of 

US contingency planning; the US foreign policy objectives and strategies 

for Vietnam, national mobilization policy during this critical period, the 

planning and implementation of pacification and Vietnamization programs, 

the planning and implementation of US combat forces withdrawals, the objectives 

and strategies of US 

negotiations to ena hostilities, and the impact 

of the US's follow-or effort. in support of South Vietnam. 

The insights are specific, focusing on such issues as the need for 

maintaining clarity and consistency in directives issued by the National 

Commana 

Authority which state policy objectives and strategies, the need 

for a mechanism whereby US foreign policy can be thoroughly reassessed on a 

periodic basis, and need for US leaders and planners alike to be able to 

sample or test the national will to keep plans anc policies in line with 

their desires and direction, all of which surfaced during the planning of 

the war. 

The lessons, on the other hand, are general in nature and concentrate 

on the broad issues and themes discussed in the volume. 

EX-1

THE BDM CORPORA NON 

INSIGHTS 

Objectives and When trying to translate broad national objectives and 

Strategies strategies into specifir programs that can be implemented 

successfully in a foreign country, the US is 

likely to encounter problems, the nature and seriousness 

of which are affected by many factors. The most 

significant of these factors are included below- 

* The maintenance of clarity and consistency in 

directives issued by national authorities which 

state national objectives and strategies. 

* The willingness of, and the time available for, 

in-country planners, analysts, and decision makers 

to assess the local situation in all its social 

?nd political complexity. 

• T'he nature of the local situation, including its 

social, political, economic, and military factors. 

0 The environmertal or axternal ,actors influencing 

the nature of the local situation (for example, 

USSR and PRC assistance to the DRV and factors 

associated with such alliances). 

0 The ability and adequacy of resources available to 

in-country personnel (including intelligence functionaries) 

to perform assessments, to provide 

realistic and honest app-aisals, and to make decisions 

on implementation. 

* The clarity and early presentation by in-country 

analysts and decision makers of any information 

relevant tr national level decision-making concerning 

giobal and in-country objectives and 

strategies. 

LESSON 

In conflicts involvng the US and allied 

forces against other powers, inconsistencies 

and incoherence in US and allied objectives 

and strategies are likely to arise and pose 

problems for in-country and national level 

US and allied military planneis. US national 

policy makers could greatly assist in-country 

planners by ensuring the maximum reasonable 

clarity, consistency, and specificity in any 

directives they transmit. The precise determination 

of what is maximally reasonable must 

be made at both the political and military 

levels, where explicit interpretation of 

national policy should occur before incountry 

planners are engaged. It is important 

that this determination be the result of 

prior, conscientious deliberation, rather 

than of default or over-rationalization as 

sometimes occ,,rred during the Vietnam 

conflct. 

EX-2

THE 8DM CORPORATION 

INSIGHTS 

US Foreign As long as containment of communism was the offi- 

Policy cial US policy, the decision to intervene in 

Vietnam has to be considered a logical reaction. 

The domino theory saw any conflict with the communists 

as a test of the US's national resolve and 

credibility. The Communists' gaining control over 

China and Cuba were viewed as Cold War defeats for 

the US, Each successive US president during this 

period found himself bound, in large measure, by 

his predecessor's policies. 

Tihroughout the entire period of US involvement in 

Indochina, from 1 through 1975, the policy of 

containment worked id South Vietnam was not lost 

to communism. At each key decision point, following 

the initial commitment, US policy makers 

focused on how to contain or defeat communism in 

Vietnam and not on the wisdom of being there in 

the first place. Each escalation was seemingly in 

response to the progressive escalation of the 

price of keeping the original commitment to help 

Vietnam. It was not until the "A to Z" reassessment 

in 1968 that there was a thorough review made 

of the US commitment. 

A policy of unreserved commitment to a particular 

leadership placed the US in a weak and manipulable 

position on important internal issues in Vietnam. 

The early view that there were no viable alternatives 

to President Diem greatly limited the extent 

of US influence over his regime and ruled out, 

over the years, a number of kinds of leverage that 

might have been employed to obtain desired goals. 

The politico-military actions in the November 1963 

coup against Diem would not have been possible 

without US connivance. To acquiesce in or to promote 

a coup makes sense onlly if positive results 

can reasonab., be expected. The US Country Team 

in Saigon, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, the US 

Departments of State and Defense, and the National 

Security Cauncil failed to identify a successor to 

Diem who might have been acceptable to the Vietnamese 

people as well as to the US and who might have 

provided effective leadership. 

EX-3


LESSON 

As long as US policy is defined in negative terms t 

e.g., anticommurism or anti-Diem -- it will be limited 

in coherence, continuity and relevance te US interests 

by the need to respond to situations rather than to 

consciously shape -,em. Tius despite the overwheiming 

power implied by "superpower" status, the United 

States' foreign policy will suffer humiliating defeats 

unless or until it is designed to exploit US strengths 

in pursuit of pos 4 tive goals. 

I- 

EX..4


INSIGHTS 

Contingency Planning 0 Operation plats prepared by component 

commands in the Pacific Theater and their 

principa, subordinate commands failed to 

appreciate and assess the true nature of the 

threat existing in Vietnam before 1955. 

0 OPLAN 32 was never implemented, altheugh it 

did provide a handy "rule of thumo" concerning 

the US logistic3l buildup in Vietnam. 

Onrn major reason for not implementing contingency 

plans as written was the wide variance 

between the anticipated conflict (as viewed 

by planners in the 1950s and early 1960s) and 

the insurgency-type conflict that trie United 

States actually found. Another major reason 

was emphasis by the president to play down 

the scale of US involvement in Indochina 

during the 1961-1965 time period. 

* Each situation rrcuiring a contingency plan 

is unique ind different from others which 

appear at first glance to te similar, 

LESSONS 

Clear and definitive national security policy 

guidance is essential for strategic planniro 

Once established, national security policy 

with regard to any one region should be 

frequently subjected to scrutiny and debate 

to assure that policy goals are consistent 

with actual external conditions and with 

domestic political realities, 

Contingency plans should not be shaped by -he 

"last war" but by the realities of the threat 

and US objectives in the area of the proposed 

contingency. 

Those who prepare contingency plans should be 

aware of possible domestic planning con- 

"straints and even the predispositions of top 

policy makers. 

EX-5


INSIGHTS 

Mobilization 0 Failure to mobilize during the Vietnam War caused 

repercussiops that impacted on the US economy, the 

I Congress, the e~ecutive branch, the draft-age 

young men and their families, and -- to an extent 

that cannut yet be measured -- on the military 

Services. 

* Historically, mobilization connotes a sense of 

national determination, and therefore it provides 

a strong signal to an enemy; lack of mobilization 

conveys a sense of irresolution in ci-cumstances 

such as the Vietnam War. 

The actual US commitment of combat troops to Indochina 

differed from that foreseen in contingency 

plans. All early US plans anticipated a mobilization 

of Reserve Components. The failure to call 

vp critically short technical skills, especially 

logistics and engineer units, contriouted significantly 

to delays in the deployment of combat 

troops to Vietnam. 

* The decision not to mobilize but to depend on increased 

recruitment and draft calls proved to be 

the "lesser" of two political "evils" for President 

Johnson. Militarily, the decision proved 

less than effective, and it exacerbated Selective 

Service inequities, morale problems, personnel 

turbulance and shortages of qualified leaders and 

technicians. That decision, among others, contributed 

to his political demise,. 

The call-up of the Reserves would not significantly 

have altered the final outcome of the war, 

assuming that the war would havw been prosecuted 

in essentially the same way that it actually 

unfolded. (Conversely, had the Reserve Component 

been mobilized at the outset, witn concomitant 

public support, the war might have been prosecuted 

in mure vigorous fashion and with different 

results). 

The nobilization during the Korean War and the 

Berlin Cr 4 sis made call-ups appear to US political 

leaders to be politically unacceptable. The end 

of the Vietnam war brought with it an end to the 

draft and initiation of the War Power- Act. 

Future American presidents will be faced with a 

serious dilemma if confronted with a crisis situation 

requiring rapid buildups in military manpower, 

EX-6


LESSONS 

"Banana:' wars or other small-scale, protracted but 

undeclared wars are politically difficult to 

justify and sustain. Only a radical change in US 

attitudes and perceptions might enable a US president 

to engage in such wars in the future. 

Small-scale, intense, short-term combaL operations 

are possible, using regular forces, assuming that 

the forces in the proper combinations are available 

and r'eady to fight. But any commitment of 

appreciable size or duration will require mobilization 

and the ,ull support and understanding of a 

majority of the American people. 

EX-7 

- --- - - - - - ,.~~


INSIGHTS 

Pacification and Pacification 

Vietnamization 0 Early GV' attempts at establishing pacification 

and rural development programs failed because they 

were little more than ill-devised blends of stop 

and start: 

- military and police opera-ions 

- social control techiques 

- emergency welfare efforts 

- attempts to extend political-administrative 

linkage from Saigon to the countryside. 

* During the period, the GVN failed to come to terms 

with the communist movement ana their own fundamental 

political weaknesses, which were: 

- their inheritance of France's colonial legacy 

- their debilitating internal pursuit of power 

- their reliance on US aid and doctrine rather 

than internal political support. 

* In turn, the US efforts to support GVN pacification 

programs were the product of: 

- reliance on conventional military methods, 

equipment. and training 

- culturally unsuitable and impractical 

approaches to development 

- an inability to devise conceptually relevant 

programs 

- ineffective and insufficient application of 

leverage on the GVN. 

* After 1968, the GVN, with strong jS aid, turned 

things around, and achieved success in their 

pacification and developmernt programs primarily 

because: 

- priority was finally given to security -- 

protecting and involving the people in their 

own defense 

- policies of land reform and economic redistribution 

were promoted 

* The one key thing which the Thieu government 

failed to do during this period of pacification 

progress was to fashion a political community. 

President Thieu failed to institutionalize his 

government, thereby losing the gains made through 

pacification. Regardless, there is little doubt, 

having the advantage of hindsight, that pacification 

finally worked. The North Vietnamese ultimately 

could not have won the war via insurgency, 

but rather they had to resort to conventional 

military offensives by PAVN troops. In that sense 

EX-8


paciticatlon aid succeed, although it alone, 

without a strong political base, military and 

geostrategic, could not withstand the final DRV 

onslaught. 

Vietnamization 

Spattern. 

0 After the Tet Offensive in 1968, President Thieu 

and Ge-pral Abrams (then COMUSMACV) threw their 

support behind the buildup of the territorial 

forces, the National Police and the attack against 

the VC infrastructure. And so, some ten or twelve 

years after the initiation of the insurgency 

against the RVN, there was a coordinated approach 

to the security phase of pacification. 

* The US goal to increase the RVNAF's military 

forces and ability to hold off the enemy through 

the Vietnamization program was thwarted in the end 

by the RVNAF's increased dependence on continuing 

US military aid and technical support. The more 

massive the aid, the more dependent they became, 

The RVNAF soldier had been "conditioned" by the US 

presence to rely on the almost ubiquitous air and 

artillery support in combat and had forgotten "how 

to walk," being used to vehicul3r and helicopter 

transportation, which became scarce after the US 

pullout in 1973. Former ARV1 it aders felt that 

their arnmy had been organized along the wrong 

It had gotten a big logistics tail and 

it lacked the necessary equipment and mobile 

reserve divisions essential to counter the NVA's 

final assault. 

* in light of the goals set by the Nixon administration 

(i.e., the withdrawal of US forces from RVh 

and to bring about a negotiated settlement of the 

war), Vietnamization has to be considered a 

success. The unfortunate asoect wzs that it was a 

decade too late. 

EX-9


LESSONS 

A government calling upon the United States for 

assistance in maintaining power in the face of an 

internal threat, as did the Vietnamese government, 

is unlikely to be efficient or effective or to 

meet American ideals of democracy or probity. 

American commitments to assist such -.vernments 

must be made with the recognition that the act of 

commitment and US advice cannot change the nature 

of the client regime or the society of the host 

country. In situations in which major American 

human and material resources are involved, the 

United States must be able to operate within and 

even to use the ally's own political and social 

system to assure that -he keeps his side of the 

bargain. If the US's ally does not perform satisfactorily 

in the USG's view and all means of 

influence or pressure have been exhausted, then 

the US should have a credible capability to reduce 

or withhold further support and, if possible, to 

disengage. 

Before committing itself to supporting an ally 

besieged from within, the United SLates should be 

confident that it knows the composition and the 

motivation of the threatening forces and the 

problems at issue.. Only through such knowledge 

will the US be able to assess the dimensions ef 

the problem. Simple prudence requires that the US 

know in advance whether the government's cause is 

dubious or its prospects hopeless. The US should 

help, not substitute for, the government of its 

ally. To the extent that the US "takes charge," 

we postpone (and may even jeopardize) the achievement 

of the US's ultimate objectives. The application 

of this lesson in practice, as was discovered 

in Vietnam, is difficult and calls for a careful 

selection and training of advisers. If the US 

could turn back history, the process of "Vietnamization" 

probably would have been started in 1961, 

not 1969. 

EX-1O


INSIGHTS 

US Withdrawa-, * The president, driven by domestic considerations, 

set the pace of US withdrawal and announced the 

rate of withdrawal to MACV planners virtually 

without warning. This procedure left MACV too 

little flexibility to design withdrawal plans 

which would ensure that the RVNAF could successfully 

assume the diverse responsibilities which it 

was now required to fulfill. 

. MACV was forced to serve two different masters 

with different aims: the Secretary of Defense wno 

pressed for accelerated withdrawal, and the 

National Security Adviser who needed continued US 

combat presence in Vietnam as a negotiating chip. 

LESSON 

Withdrawal plans must be designed to respond 

not only to US needs and considerations, but 

also to conditions in the host country, specifically 

to the host country's ability to 

adjust effectively to US withdrawal. 

EX-1I

-~ow -r 4, ~vr~ 


INSIGHTS 

Negotiations 0 During President Johnson's Admininstration, the 

hope for ending the war depended on being successful 

on the battlefield. Achieving a position of 

military strength became the US prerequisite for 

negotiations. This strategy suffered from two 

disabilities: (a) the nature of guerrilla warfare; 

and (b) the asymmetry in the definition of 

what constituted acceptable losses. As a result, 

American/FWMAF military successes could not be 

translated into permanent political advantage. 

0 President Nixon and Mr. Kissinger recognized that 

a military solution for the war was not available; 

therefore they set about to attain a stalemate on 

the battlefield, to caLse the DRV to be isolated 

from their communist benefactors and to arrive at 

a political solutic" in the negotiations. 

• As a venture in si~rategic persuasion, the early 

bombing of North Vietnam did not work. Limited 

and graduated air attacks met with little success. 

The symbolic rationale for bombing halts backfired 

and the DRV used negotiations as a means to get 

the bombing stopped. Only when the president 

decided to go with a heavy bombardment of Hanoi/ 

Haiphong in December 1972, did US airpower prove 

its effectivenes; in getting the DRV to negotiate 

in earnest. 

* When negotiating a settlement on behalf of our 

allies and ourselves as we did in Vietnam, the US 

must not only be actively cognizant of their 

established negotiating positions, but also of 

their input at,, reactions to alternatives. 

Early on, American leadership mistakenly believed 

Vietnam to be vital not for itself, but for what 

they thought its "loss" would mean internationally 

and domesticaily. It also meant that US leaders 

wanted a negotiated settlement without fully realizing 

(though probably more than tneir critics) 

that a civil war cannot be ended by political 

compromise alone. The attainment of a stalemate 

on the battlefield and the effective isolation of 

the enemy from their suppliers were the keys to 

bringing the negotiations to a conclusion. It was 

unfortunate that US military strength had no 

political corollary in RVN. The fact that the 

agreement failed to stop the DRV and the PRG from 

eventually pursuing their ultimate goal -- military 

victory over the South -- reinforces this 

insight. 

EX-12


LESSON 

An incremental military strategy and conciliatory 

It negotiating strategy with a communist adversary 

who equates restraint with weakness and with whom 

compromise is inconceivabie will make a meaningful 

settlement unlikely. Furthermore, it should be 

remembered that communist nat:ions do not view war 

and negotiations as separate processes, but consider 

them one and the same. Before engaging in 

talks or negotiations with a communist nation, key 

negotiators must give careful thought to strategy, 

objectives, and the "balance of forces", on the 

battlefield, always keeping in mind the fact that 

communist negotiators will be intransigent and 

unyiel~ding if they perceive a military, oulitical, 

psychological or economic edge over their adversaries. 

EX-13


INSIGHTS 

Follow-On 

Effort 

* President Nixon failed to ensure or establish congressional 

support for his post-war militaryeconomic 

aid program for the GVN, aid tne success 

of the US follow-on effort in RVN depended on the 

continuing ability and willingness of the US 

government to meet tne private commitments made by 

the administration; public and congressional 

distaste for the war, and, in particular, for the 

Thieu regime made it unlikely that the administration's 

program could be maintained over the long 

haul, a situation that was apparent at the time to 

0 

many interested obser,er-. 

While secret diplomacy has its merits, the US 

executive's refusal to brief congressional 

leadership more amply on the specifics of the 

negotiations, (including the executive branc,'s 

expectations regarding future US commitments to 

Vietnam), gave rise to South Vietnam's false 

security, diminished US credibility as an ally in 

the long run, and caused an extreme degree of 

confusion in both Saigon and Washington concerning 

the actual nature of the US commitment. 

0 While the US effort to enhance RVNAF in 1972-1973 

did augment Saigon's hardware stockpiles for a 

period of time, the crash supply program had a 

decided negative impact on RVNAF morale and 

contributed further to the GVN reliance on the 

United States, Equipment deficiencies also 

diminished the effectiveness of American efforts 

to enhance South Vietnam s military capabilities, 

0 The divisive nature of Watergate severely constrained 

the US follow-on effort and further 

complicatea Saigon's perspective on and understanding 

of the US desire to get on with detente 

(and its subsequent impatience with the Saigon 

"?adership) and gave rise to the impression that 

South Vietnam was no longer of importance to the 

US -- merely a "sideshow" -- and, hence, further 

demoralized the GVN. 

* The RVNAF's inability to adjust to a more austere 

style of fighting after the US withdrawal intensified 

the impact of US congressional aid cuts in 

military appropriations for South Vietnam at a 

time when the PAVN forces were completing their 

modernization program under Soviet tutelage. The 

Vietnamese propensity ;..o "make do" and endure was 

shattered by its exposire to US opulence and 

"pour-it-on" style of combat. 

EX-14

ago 


LESSONS 

This subtask, Follow-O:, Effort, is unique to the 

Vietnam experienLe and, therefore, it 3oes not 

provide a suitable vehicle for developing lessons 

for other situations. If there are lessons in 

follow-on efforts, they must be these-, 

* Such efforts can only be successful in 

cases where the indigenous government 

has a stronger base of support than does 

its opposition. 

= The US public and Congress must perceive 

the recipient nation and its leaders to 

be deserving of aid or it will be 

reduced or turned off. 

a 

Foreign aid cannot be a substitute for 

efforts by the supported nation to carry 

its own weight -- that is, defend itself 

and feed its own people. The American 

people have historically rejected longterm 

aid programs. 

EX-15


OVERALL LESSON 

There are limits to American Power. Beino a s.per power 

with an extensive arsenal of nuclear weapons and missiles 

plus a powerful modern armed force does not guarantee that a 

foreiqn oolicy which is designed to exploit those as well as 

other national strengths, such as economic and technological 

powers, will be successful. The limitations extend to the 

American Chief Executive, whose responsibilities have not 

diminished with regard to the formulation of US foreign 

policy or for the security of the US, bit whose power to 

wage war or commit US combat forces will require the support 

of the American people and the Congress in the future. 

Planners, be they military or civilian, must be attuneu to 

these factors as they prepare for the contingencies of the 

future. 

EX-16

! THE BDM CORPORATION 

CHAPTER 1 

OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES 

Top-level US leadership has never been very subtle when 

it comes to war. Surategy takes a back seat to physical 

strength and tactics in the White House. the 

Pentagon, and the State Department. When the "chips 

are down," we've always poured on the power until 

opponents were crushed. Our ruling councils, whose 

members were schooled in convent 4 onal combat before the 

showdown in Vietnam, subscribed to that approach. 

Threats in earlier US wars were classically military. 

Direct strategies on both sides featured force, not 

fraud or finesse. Political, economic, social, and 

psychological pressures were strictly secondary, once 

the shooting started. l/ 

Colonel John M.. Collins, US Army, 

Ret. Vietnam Postmortem: A Senseless 

Strategy. 

Our military art has successfully solved a number of 

questions relating to strategy, operations, and tactics, 

with a view to defeating a strong enemy; it has 

correctly determined the relations between man and 

weapons, politics and tech]iEue, regarding the homan 

factor, as the decisive factor, while considering 

weapons and technique also important. Now that the 

people's armed forces have the possibility of having 

better equipment, of being strengthened materially and 

technically, our military art is stili firmly maintaining 

the above guiding principles, combining politics 

and technique on the basis that politics and fighting 

spirit are the essential factor, which enhances to the 

highest degree the fighting power of the armed forces.2/ 

J"i 

General Vo Nguyen Giap, 

itary Art of People's War, 

The Mil- 

Emphasis 

in the Original. 

A. INTRODUCTION 

National strategies are ideally devised to provide maximum support to 

the pursuit of a nation's own interests and objectives -- communist or 

l-l _ 

_

- - 


non-communist, Third World nation or superpower. The dictates of domestic 

and international politics, however, 

impinge upon both the formulation and 

ultimate effectiveness of national strategy. A nation may pursue two 

objectives simultaneously whirh, in reality, are contradictory or work at 

cross-purposes, Likewise, a strategy devised by a nation for the attainment 

of a specific objective may 

fact, become, more elusive. 

,,use the desired goal to appea-, or, in 

The powers involved in the Vietnam conflict were often confronted with 

problems such as these. This chapter provides a brief review uf each 

participant's respective objectives and strategies during Cie period 1960- 

1975. These parameters are chosen because problems such as these are the 

most readily apparent during this timeframe. 

The major portion of tfe 

discussion will focus on a number of the contradictions inherent in the 

participants' stated objectives and strategies, on the deficiencies or 

merits of strategies designed by the participant to meet their objectives 

(primary focus will be placed on the US), on the incompatibilities of 

objectives and strategies pursued by assumed allies, and on the perceptions 

and misoerceptions that the powers involved had of both enemy and allied 

powers. 

B. A REVTEW OF DRV, NLF (PRP & PRG), USSR, AND PRC OBJECTIVES AND 

STRATEGIES 

Detailed analytic discussions of each participant's national objectives 

and strategies in the Vietnam War appear in other chapters of this 

eight-volume study.3/ Therefore, for the purposes of this discussion, only 

a brief review of these concerns will be included here. 

1. The Objectives and Strategies of the Democratic Republic 

of Vietnam (DRV) in Review 

One of the most salient features of the Hanoi regime was its 

capacity to integrate and coordinate its political and military strategies 

during most, if not all, of the time period under consideration. Moreover, 

with respect to its military strategy, Hanoi 

appreciated the merits of 

1-2


flexibility, allowing for a fluid interchange between guerrilla and conventional 

modes of warfare in meeting its combat requirements of the moment.4/ 

The DRV's dedication to the revoli•.onary concept of protracted struggle 

and its commitment to tactics aimed at creating a maximum sense of insecurity 

througnout the countryside were also significant aspects of the 

regime's strategic approach to the war.5/ The degree of insecurity created 

by DRV and NLF forces was a reflection of their ability to exploit the 

country's geography, available logistics, and the existing hostilities 

between the Vietnamese people and the Highland tribes.6/ 

The regime's primary objective, as Figure 1-1 

illustrates, was 

the reunification of Vietnam and its eventual communization.7/ To achieve 

this ultimate objective, a number of secondary goals were formulated: the 

elimination of US presence in Vietnam, the overthrow of the government cf 

South Vietnam, and the maintenance of the aid flow from the People's Republic 

of China (PRC) 

and the Soviet Union (USSR). 

The attainment of military objectives was consistently stressed 

by the regime as a prereauisite to negotiations.8/ This orientation 

evolved as a direct result of the leadership's experience at the 1954 

Geneva talks.9/ (See Chapter 7 of this volume for a detailed discus-ion 

of negotiations.,, From this point on, negotiations fit the DRV strategic 

scheme as an ideal step to be undertaken only when military victory 

appeared certain or had already been achieved. 

The realities of the conflict, 

however, often dictated modifications in DRV strategy, 

2. The Objectives and Strategies of the National Liberation Front 

in Review 

Wnile the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam was not an 

autonomous entity, but a creature of Hanoi's making in many respects, it 

did establish its "own" set of objectives and strategies.lO/ Many ccin,- 

cided neatly with those of the North; some underwent subtle modification or 

were alloted a level of priority at variance with those of Hanoi. 

A comparison 

of Figure 1 1 and Figure 1-2 illustrates both the similarities 

between DRV and NLF objectives and their asymmetries._l/ The NLF concurred 

with two of the DRV's major goals: the removal of the United States from 

Vietnam and the toppling of the Saigon government. The reunification of 

- 1-3 

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the country was also seen as an important Front goal, althot.-gh the NLF 

program stressed a more gradual, step-by-step approach towards eventual 

national unification. One vehicle for accomplishing national unity was the 

creation of a coalition government with the National Liberation Front at 

its head. 

the NLF 

Consistent with their role as "indigenous insurgents," members of 

gave priority to the revolutionary strategy of the general uprising. 

This strategy, or as Douglas Pike terms it - "social myth" - was an 

essential component of NLF operations, simultaneously providing it with 

legitimacy as a revolutionary force representative of the Southern populace, 

and with a propaganda weapon necessary for attracting new 

converts. In the political sense, therefore, this strategy has a number 

of pote",-ally potent features.. Militarily, it coalesced with the NVN 

desire to spawn insecurity in the South (for terrorism was an essential 

feature of the overall NLF program) l2/ However, its deficiencies, 

especially in meeting the US-ARVN high-technological capability, were 

obviously many. 

3. Objectives and Strategies of the Soviet Union in Review 

Moscow pursued a number of far-reaching objectives in the Southeast 

Asian theater during the time period under consideration. 

While the 

desire to support a fraternal socialist country certainly motivated Soviet 

involvement in the conflict, other reasons, 

perhaps more germane to the 

viability of the Soviet state, also influenced the USSR to support Hanoi, 

The balance of power in Asia, of increasing concern to the Kremlin as its 

relations with the PRC degenerated, could, from the Soviet perspective, be 

altered favorably by creating a strong Southeast Asian neighbor. 

was to serve, therefore, as the avenue for achieving this objective, 

The DRV 

Competition with Communist China in other spheres - particularly 

in the internzi-Ional communist movement - also figured in the Soviet 

Union's decision to assist Hanoi.13/ Moreover, the Vietnam conflict's 

merits as a "test case" - whether as a war of limited duration ai'd magnitude 

or as a "war of national liberation" - enticed the USSR to supply 

North Vietnam its requisite military materiel. 

1-5


The introduction of US 

combat forces into Vietnam and the concurrent 

infusion of heavy US combat support equipment had an appreciable 

impact on the Soviet Union's strategic perspective on Vietnam. Until 1965, 

Moscow viewed its involvement in the conflict as an acceptable and manageable 

risk, particularly in 1964 when it app.ared Hanoi's objectives would 

shortly reach fruition. By mid-1965, however, the issue came to rest on 

avoiding a direct military confrontation with the United States, while 

still maintaining previously articulated objectives. (See Figure 1-3 - 

"PRC 

and USSR O'rjectives in the Emerging Tri-polar World and Vietnam."14/) 

It was at this juncture in the conflict, when Hanoi's heavy materiel 

requirements increased in its efforts to counter US military power, that 

Soviet objectives came into cross-conflict. Hence, the Soviet leadership 

was faced with carefully balancing these contradictions, particularly as it 

entered a period of rplaxed tensions with the US. 

4. Objectives and Strategies of the People's Republic of China (PRC) 

in Review 

Like the Soviet Union, 

Communist China also had an ideological 

motivation for assisting Hanoi in its war effort, particularly as the 

nature of the Vietnam conflict reflected, to a certain degree, the protracted 

revolutionary struggle earlier undertaken by the Peking regir.,e.15/ 

But the Chinese involvement in Southeast Asia was also stimulated by other, 

more complex concerns, the majority of which grew directly out of the PRC's 

anti-Soviet and anti-American posture, Figure 1-3 summarized PRC and USSR 

objectives and strategies in the emerging tri-polar world; from this summary, 

it is clear that the two leading communist powers were pursuing a 

number of asymmetric objectives. 

In the first five years of the period under consideration, Peking 

not only viewed its support to Hanoi 

as a manageable risk, it also found 

hanoi's military needs comensurate with the PRC capacity to fulfill them. 

In fact, there was a certain, coincidental compatibility between the 

respective supply capabilities of the USSR and the PRC: Moscow concentrated 

primarily on Hanoi's heavy materiel needs while Peking contributed 

light, primarily small arms weaponry. 

1-7


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The PRC's strategic decision to assist Hanoi was in keeping with 

two of its primary national objectives: 

the promotion of violence in the 

Third World ano the concomitant isolation of the United States and the 

Soviet Union from these developing nations. l6/ By the mid-1960s, however, 

the nature of the conflict had changed significantly, dynamically altering 

Hanoi's supply requirements. As Peking was not equipped to supply the DRV 

with its requisite heavy weaponry, the PRC leadership was compelled to 

devise another stra+eay to meet its objectives. 

China subsequently gave 

even greater emphasis to driving the US and USSR into a direct confrontation. 

This strategy, one aspect of which was the Chinese prolonged refusal 

to coordinate a PRC-USSR united aid program for Hanoi, brought Peking's 

supposed sincerity in supporting a fraternal socialist (especially Third 

World) nation into question. 

C. A REVIEW OF US, GVN, AND ALLIED OBJECTIVES AND SIRATEGIES 

•, 

The following discussions highlight the major national objectives and 

strategies of the United States, South Vietnam, 

and those countries which 

provided allied military s'.opo-t co the US-GVN war effort. Because GVN 

strategies and objectives were, foy the most part, symmetri, with those of 

the US, 

its objectives and strategies are reviewed concurrently with those 

of the United States. 

The objectives and strategies of allied participants 

are treated together in the final review section, concentrating on only the 

major allied participants and the more significant reasons for their 

involvement in the Vietnam war effort. 

1. The Objectives and Strategies of the United States (US) and South 

V-etnam in Review 

A number of signiTicant factors influenced both the nature and 

type of nationai objectiveý; pursued by the United States during this time 

period. Attitudes and perceptions gained from the Cold War, lessons supposedly 

learned from previous US combat experiences, the shifting nature of 

tri-polar politics, and, of course, the overall political and military 

behavior of Hanoi and NVN-NLF forces had a significant impact on the US 

leaderjhip's formulation of Vietnam-related policies.17/ The containment 

1-9


of communism, and hence, the preservation of a friendly, non-communist 

K- South Vietnamese regime were the United States' initial and primary objectives 

in Southeast Asia, 

As the conflict intensified and as the domestic 

and international anti-war pressures increased, the US began to pursue a 

number of additional goals concurrent with those above including the preservation 

of US credibility and honor (especially during the negotiation and 

withdrawal period), the maintenance of US pledges to its global allies, and 

the promotion of allied self-reliance. Figure 1-4 provides an overview of 

these and other US objectives from 1960-1975.18/ 

The US 

leadership obviously delineated between its international 

objectives and strategies and its in-country goals and strategies (although 

a certain degree of compatibility between these two planes was certainly 

sought.) In the international arena, the US leadership encouraged other 

countries to contribute to Saigon's defense. It also sought to avoid a 

direct confrontation with either the USSR or PRC; US forces were consistently 

prohibited from crossing the 17th parallel for fear of provooking a 

full-force response from the PRC. 

Juring the Nixon administration, tensions 

between these two communist powers were intentionally exploited, this 

approach was in keeping with Washington's efforts to curl Hanoi's militancy 

A 

both on the battlefield in Vietnam, and at the negotiati',g table in Paris. 

US civilian and military planners aeviseýd a diverse array of 

strategies for defeating the DRV-NLF war effort anQ securing South Vietnam. 

Figure 1-5 illustrates this diversity which occurred over time.19! The 

asymmetry of US 

strategies with the nature of the conflict in Vietnam is 

acdressed in Section D of this chapter. 

South Vietnam's goals, 

States' Vieti.am-rel3ted objectives., However, 

made: 

for the most part, reflected the United 

a distinction can perhaps be 

a very fine line existed betweer the GVN's motivation for accepting 

US objectives and its disinterest in disputing them or devising a set of 

its own, Saigon's dependency on the US (and the United States' apparent 

willingness to accept this condition) diminished the efficacy of both GVN 

and US strategies, eventually bringing a number of US and GVN objectives 

into discord. 

These concerns are addressed below. 

1-10

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2, The Objectives and Strategies of Major Allied Participants in 

Review 

The United States' desire to debunk contentions that the Vietnam 

war effort was predomioately a US undertaking, was a major reason for its 

L 

call for allied participation in the conflict.20/ 

that the US 

This in no way implies 

coerced its allies to participate in the war effort, that all 

allies required solicitation prior to volunteering their services, or that 

allied assistance was inconsequential and inadequate. The Republic of 

Korea, for instance, voluntarily offered its support as early as 1954, and 

its overall military contribution to the US-GVN war effort was, indeed, 

significant, as was that of all the major allied participants., 

A large number of non-communist countries aided South Vietnam 

during the period under consideration; those whose contributions were the 

most significant - Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, the Republic of 

Thina, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand - are highlighted in this 

review. 

Figure 1-6 summarizes the nature of their contributions and the 

major objectives or motivating factors which influenced their participation.21/ 

The US need for allied assistance came to the forefront of 

Vietnam military planning in the first quarter of 1965; the importance of 

"doing everything possible to maximize our military effort to reverse che 

present unfavorable situation" served as the primary basis for the April 6, 

1965, decision to seek Frce World assistance.22/ From this point on, the 

United States initiated and/or formalized its Vietnam allied military 

assistance programs, with the aim of coordinating a united effort against 

the PRC-USSR backed NLF-NVN forces. 

As Figure 1-6 indicates, all of the miajor participants were 

distressed o~er the aggressive activities of the NLF and DRV. 

These countries' 

geographic Proximity to the area motivated their serious consideration 

of a joint US-CVN-Allied effort in Vietnam. 

Yet, other factors also 

gave impetus to allied participation in assisting Washington and Saigon., A 

number of these nations, specifically the ROK, th2 Philippines, and 

Thailand, viewed their proferred participation as a way to enhance their 

nation's political-military well-being., To a certain degree, interest in 

S!1-13


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reequipping or augmenting their respective military establishments conditioned 

their acceptance to participate in the joint effort.23/ 

In its 

attempts to make allied support more assured and attractive, the US also 

agreed to recompense the allied forces of these nations for expenses 

incurred through participation, Thus, through arrangements of this kind, 

the United States achieved its objectives of creating a united allied 

effort in Vietnam, and the ROK, the Philippines, -nd Thailand augmented 

0tieir military arsenals, 

However, such arrangements also provided these allied forces with 

a degree of leverage with the US, making it difficult for American military 

planners to elicit consistent and adequate stand- 'ds of performance (and 

requisite degrees of accountability) from participating non-Western allied 

forces. This problem and others served partially to undermine the efficacy 

of the united effort and, hence, overall US objectives and strategies for 

Vietnam. 

D, AN ASSESSMENT OF US-ALLIED AND ENEMY STRATEGIES AND OBJECTIVES. PROB- 

LEMS, EXPLOITABLE DIFFERENCES, CONTRADICTIONS, AND MISPERCEPTIONS 

L. As we have seen, the national strategies of the Hanoi regime centered 

on the concept of protracted struggle. The leaders of the DRV had no rigid 

timetable for the struggle in the South, Rather, the regime was confident 

that the longer the war lasted, the more sericj3 the "inherent contradictions" 

in the US and US-GVN relationship would become.24/ Thus, while the 

North Vietnamese communists spoke of winning the decisive victory, their 

definition of victory did not -,,ply the final seizure of power from the 

Saigon government. Instead, it meant either decisive victory on the battlefield, 

causing a turning point in the war, 

or partial annihilation of US 

and ARVN forces, forcing an American withdrawal.25/ Decisive victory was, 

therefore, to take place within the context of protracted armed and political 

struggle. 

The modus operandi was the exploitation of contradictions 

inherent in the conflict (and within the "enemy" camp) thereby making 

possible the decisive victory as defined above. 

DRV perceptions of these contradictions.26/ 

Figure 1-7 summarizes the 

1-15

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US national strategy was, in many r.spects, inappropriate to the 

conWlict in Vietnam because US 

leaders were unwilling to wage a prctracted 

war of indeterminate length. Short-cuts to victory were preferred. 

Largely as a result of this, stra.egy took a "back seat to physical 

strength and tactics ..... "27/ Previous Americpi succeszz• with conventional 

warfare reinforced the United States' impatience with counterinsurgency 

methods necessary for fighting a p"otracted war., 

More fundamentally, 

as North Vietnamese strategists r-cogrized, American society was 

psychologically averse to protracted w~r. As Major General Than Do, one of 

eight commanders of communist forrc• in the South, explained, 

We can c-.aure the hardships of a lengthy war, but they 

= unable to endure the hardships of such a war 

because they are well-to-do people. 28/ 

This intolerance of protracted war prompted American 

leaders to seek a 

clear and early resolution of the conflict. "There was always a sense of 

1American urgency - the typical American proclivity to solve present problems 

quickly, then get on with others."29/ 

Sinvolvement 

Most important, the U0 :nad other global interest3 to promote, and its 

in Vietnam was therefore, neuessarily, limited. North 

Vietnamese leaders, on the other hand, had no other global interests to 

I 

rival their goal of reunifyinq Vietnam, the conflict in Vietnam was thus, 

from their perspective, a total war. Because the DRV had no significant 

competing interests (or what Hanoi called "contradictions"), its leaders 

believed the DRV could out;ist the US in the strucigle for sovereignty in 

Vietnam. Therefore, it did not matter that the US won nearly every oattlefield 

confrontation. From the DRV perspective, as American manpower and 

,materiel were thrown into the struggle and as American losses accumulated 

over time, the endurance of the American people would reach a breaking 

point. The mounting contradictions between the American pecple and their 

national leadership would, therefore, eventually be resolved by an American 

witi.drawal froi Vietnam. 

The problem for the North Vietnamese strategists 

was to determine how best to expedite this withdrawal, all the while insuiing 

that their own staying power in Vietnam went unimpaired.. 

•]! ,1-17


Moscow and Peking's continual supply of economic and military aid was, 

perhaps, the most vital means by which the Hanoi leadership was able to 

assure this staying power. However, the DRV was faced with certain perplexing 

problems in its alliance with these two major communist powers. As 

tensions between the PRC and USSR iptensified, each attempted to draw the 

DRV into the dispute, Hanoi, on the other hand, had other, more pressing 

concerns with which to contend and it was, 

very delicate and thin line in its relationships with :,oth.30/ 

therefore, compelled to walk a 

The Soviet Union, like the US, was restrained in its support of its 

ally out of an interest in avoiding a direct confrontation with the US and, 

later, out of a desire not to jeopardize detente. 

Because of their limited 

objectives in Vietnaii,, the Soviet leaders chose a strategy of providing 

economic and military assistance to the DRV but refrained from commiting 

Soviet combat troops. The Chinese Communists most likely felt more of a 

threat from the US presence in Vietnam than did the Soviets, especially in 

light of their direct confrontation with American forces during the Korean 

experience. Moreover, Chinese-Vietnamese relations were rather strained, 

owing to mutually shared animosity that grew out of China's eirlier domination 

of Vietnam. The Chinese, therefore, like the Soviets, chose to 

participate in the conflict on a limited basis. 

ecunomic and military assistance to the DRV, 

They too chose to supply 

but did not provide combat 

forces. 

The DRV was able to single-mindedly provide its war effort a crucial 

element of consistency and certainty, an element which the US and G"N never 

truly acquired, the latter owing to political instability, corruption, and 

overdependence on the US. 

This asymmetry in global objectives created complications 

for the US 

in its planning of the war, a problem with which the 

North Vietnamese did not really have to cope. 

Of course, the problems 

would have been more difficult for Hanoi had the Soviet Union and PRC h3d 

less of an interest in supplying aid or had succeeded in forcing Hanoi's 

allegiance to one or the other power in their on-goiig dispute. 

Problems caused by contradictions in US objectives (globally and in 

Vietnam) were exacerbated by the comparative discontinuity of national 

1-18

j 


leadership in both Saigon and Washington., 

Each change in leadership was 

accomparied by some change in direction or emphasis in Vietnam policy. 

This often gave rise to uncertainty, hesitancy, misunderstaqdirg and other 

related difficulties for in-country civilian and military planning authorities. 

Perhaps the single most confusing aspect of US policy z;entered a'ound 

the statements of national objectives with respect to Vietnam.31/ An 

analysis, conducted by the Department of the Army in 1965, ef those statements 

of national objectives -- as contained in documents of the Department 

of Defense, 

the Department of State, the Agency for Internat 4 onal Development 

and the US Ioformation Agency -- revealed differing statements and 

interpretations. Some objectives were not only viewed differently but were 

found to be conflicting (e.g,, The Military Assistance Plan for 1966 indicated 

the reunification of North and South Vietnam, 

by military force, as 

an objective.)32/ With the passage of time, and in the press of day-to-day 

operations, a commander can lose sight of the principal objectives; for 

example, after having commanded MACV 

for over four years, General Westmoreland 

asked his Chief of Staff in March 1968, "what is my objective in 

Vietnam?" The reply was "to assist the Government of South Vietnam and its 

armed forces to defeat externally directed and supported communist subversion 

and aggression and attain an independent non-communist society in 

South Vietnam so it can function in a secure environment."33/ 

A few months 

later, the new COMUSMACV, General Abrams, directed his staf to develop a 

full set of military objectives because his J-5 could find none published 

or on file.34/ In short, neither the fundamental US objectives nor the USG 

basic policy with ';pect to RVN were understood completely, and the subtle 

changes (i.e., from an independent, non-communist RVN to an RVN not necessarily 

non-communist) 

that occurred over time were apparently not transmitted 

to the leadership in the field. 

During this time period, US executive leadersnip changed hands four 

• times, and the GVN executive eleven times; these leadership changes in the 

GVN occurred during the most important escalatory phase of the war, 1963- 

[V 1967. While comparative political instability on the US-GVN side did not 

1-19


necessarily cause inconsistencies in national objectives and strategies, it 

certainly did make it more difficult for in-country military and civilian 

planners to know precisely what was expected of them., It also made it 

difficult for in-country planners to coordinate overall planning with their 

South Vietnamese counte-.-parts. Such difficulties in coordination meant, by 

definition, that the cohesion of the US-SVN alliance was weaker that that 

of the Vietnamese communist command.. in contrast, the North Vietnamese 

leadership underwent only one major leadership change (with the death of Ho 

Chi Minh in 1969) and this did not lead to any appreciable alteration in 

the regime's war-related policies. 

Moreover, the Soviet leadership changed 

hands only once during this period, with Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, and 

the Chinese leadership underwenit no change durinn this time-frame. Of 

course there were power struggles and policy disputes which threatened 

change in the authority figures of these nations, but actual changes were 

at a bare minimum. On the surface, at least, continuity in the DRV, USSR, 

and PRC 

leadership allowed for a greater degree of consistency and coordination 

in their planning of the war than that enjoyed by US-allied military 

and civilian planners. 

In fact, it would not be implausible to argue that GVN political 

instability and its concurrent over-dependence on the US were the most 

significant factors which contributed to the United States' inability to 

fashion a well-coordinated, effective, and cohesive US-SVN alliance., The 

United States' failure to concentrate on making the Saigon regime into a 

viable government, or the failure to recognize that doing so lay beyond its 

means, was, perhaps, America's most significant strategic mistake with 

regard to Vietnam.35/ The South Vietnamese government was, thus, never 

capable of developing a national strategy independent of the US that would 

have enabled it to either resist or reach a satisfactory agreement with the 

Vietnamese communists. Simply stated, the paradox was that GVN was so 

dependent on the US for support that it never developed its own strategy 

(and c-pability) for successful and independent resistance against the 

communist forces, especially after the American withdrawal from Vietnam., 

At the same time, the GVN exerted enough de facto leverage over the US 

1-20


(owing to US anticommunist objectives, that made the defense of SVN seemingly 

imperative) that it did not have to comply with American demands for 

social and political reform.36/ Such reform, it should be noted, might 

have helped the GVN to resist the communist forces once the US had withdrawn 

from Vietnam, by defusing popular indigenous support for the Viet- 

* namese Communists. The ultimate strategy of President Thieu was to maintain 

the United States' support in order to achieve his government's overriding 

objective of remaining in power.37/ The fatal flaw in the GVN's 

strategy was its aszumption that the US would never allow the North 

Vietnamese Communists to take over South Vietnam by force.38/ 

E. INSIGHTS 

When trying to translate broad national objectives and strategies into 

specific programs that can be implemented successfully in a foreign country, 

the US 

is likely to encounter problems, the nature and seriousness of 

which are affected by many factors. The most significant of these include: 

0 the clarity and consistency of directives issued by national 

authorities which state national objectives and strategies; 

0 the willingness of subordinate commanders to request clarification 

of any directive or guidance considered to be too broad or 

vague, and the willingness and ability of these commanders to 

make intelligent judgments for themselves when the directives 

issued by national authorities remain vague, centradictory, or 

too broad in scope after requests for clarification; 

0 the willingness of (and the time available for) in-country planners, 

analysts, and decision makers to assess the local situation 

in all its social, political, economic, and political complexity; 

. the nature of the local situation, including its social, political, 

economic, and military factors; 

* the environmental or external factors influencing the nature of 

Sthe local situation (for example, USSR and PRC assistance to the 

DRV and factors associated with such alliances); 

1-21


* the ability of and adequacy of resources available to in-country 

personnel (including intelligence functionaries) to perform 

in-country assessments, to provide realistic and honest assessments, 

and to make decisions on implementation; and, finally, 

* the clarity and early presentation by in-country analysts and 

decision makers of any information relevant to national level 

decision making concerning global and in-country objectives and 

strategies. 

As illustrated in this chapter, the armed forces of the DRV maintained 

a comparative advantage over US and GVN forces with respect to the key 

factors identified above., The existence of this advantage tielps explain 

why Hanoi was comparatively more successful than the US and GVN, particularly 

in the long term in implementing its national objectives and strategies. 

One way to reduce or eliminate this advantage in the future is to 

insure that national objectives and strategies are translated by US leadership 

into clear, consistent, and concrete political and/or military terms 

that can be implemented by in-country civilian and military forces without 

the need for further radical translation., 

F., 

LESSONS 

In conflicts involving the US 

inconsistencies and incoherence in US 

and allied forces against other powers, 

and allied objectives and strategies 

are likely to arise and pose problems for in-country and national level US 

and allied military planners. To some extent, these problems are, admittedly, 

unavoidable; the very nature of conflict embraces an incompatibility 

or asymmetry of objectives between principal adversaries. However, especially 

with respect to interrelated problems of clarity, consistency, and 

specificity of national objectives and strategies, US national policy 

makers could greatly assist in-country planners by insuring the maximum 

reasonable clarity, consistency, 

and specificity in any directives they 

transmitted. The precise determination of what is maximally reasonable 

must be made 

at both the national political and military levels, where 

I12

"4 


explicit interpretation of national policy should occur before in-country 

planners are engaged.: It -s important that this determination be the 

result of prior, conscientious deliberation, rather than of default or 

over-rationalization as sometimes occurred during the Vietnam conflict. 

J 

12 

I! 

,)• 1-23


CHAPTER 1 ENDNOTES 

1. J.M, Collins, "Vietnam Postmortem: A Senseless Strategy," The VieLnam 

War In Perspective, S.R.G. (Washington, DC: National War College, May 

10, 1972), p. 1. It should be noted that page numbers were absent 

from the text of this particular article; page references are, therefore, 

based on the chronological sequence of pages in the article, 

2. General Vo Nguyen Giap. The Military Art of People' War. Selected 

Writings of General Vo Nygyen Giap, Ed. and with Intro, by Russell 

Stetler (New York and London:. Monthly Review Press, 1970), p, 176. 

3. For a detailed analysis of North Vietnamese, Soviet, and Chinese 

objectives and strategies, see Volume I, particularly Chapters 1, 6, 

and 7. For analyses of South Vietnamese and US objectives and straLegies, 

refer to Volume II, especially Chapters 5 and 7, and Volume III, 

especially Chapter 1, and this Volume, Passim. For a discussion of 

the national objectives and strategies of other allies of the US, see 

also Chapter 3 of this Volume. 

4. Melvin Gurtov, "Hanoi on War and Peace," Vietnam and American Foreign 

Policy. Ed. by John R. Boettiger (Lexington, Massachusetts:, D.C, 

Heath and Company, 1968), p. 56, 

5. Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston and Toronto. Little, 

Brown and Company, 1979), p. 236; and General Bruce Palmer (US Army, 

Ret.), "Remarks - Elective Course, the Vietnam War." Lecture given at 

the US Army War College, May 31, 1979, p.11. 

6. Palmer, p. 11, 

7. Figure 1-1 is adapted from Volume I - The Enem,, Chapter 6 - "External 

Support" and from other sources appearing ir. the Volume V bibliography 

and, particularly, those appearing in this Chapter's endnotes. 

8. Gurtov, p. 63. 

9, Doglass Pike, Vietnam War: View From The Other Side (Saigon: 

December 1967), p, 24., 

10. Donald S. Zaooria, Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi (New York. 

Praeger Press, 1967T, pp. 132-133; and "The Viet Cong Political Infrastructure 

in South Vietnam" (A SEATO Short Paper - 55) History of the 

Vietnam War on Microfilm (Bangkok: The Research Office, South-East 

Asia Treaty Organization, 1972), pp. 48-49. 

-2


11 Figure 1-2 is adapted from Volume I - The Enemy, Chapter 1 - "The 

Enemy's Goals," and other sources 3ppearing in the Volume V Bibliography 

and, particularly, in this Chapter's endnotes. 

12, Pike, p, 20. 

13. See Volume I, Chapter 6. 

14. Figure 1-3 is adapted from Volume I, Chapter 6; and Collins, "Vietnam 

Postmortem. 

15, See Volume I, Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion of Peking's ideological 

support. 

16. Zagoria, pp. 23-29. 

17. See Volume III, US Foreign Policy and Vietnam, 1945-1975, Chapters 1, 

2, 3 for a discussion of these influential factors. 

18. Figure 1-4 was adapted from Volume III, Chapter 1, "US Global Policy 

and Its Relationship to US Policy for Southeast Asia, 1945-1975;" The 

5-year "slice" methodology was chosen as a neutral and clinical 

research tool by which to assess US global and Vietnam-related interests, 

objectives, perceived threats, and strategies for the period 

1945-1975. See Volume III, Chapter 1, pp, 1-2 - 1-3 for a fuller 

explanation. 

19. Figure 1-r5 was oased on Volume III, Chapter 1., 

20. BG J. L. Collins, Jr, and LTG S. R. Larsen, Allied Participation In 

Vietnam, Vietnam Studies, (Washington DC. Department of the Army, 

1975), pp. 6-7. 

21. Figure 1-6 is based on information appearing in: Collins and Larsen, 

and Ruth C. Lawson, ed., International Regional Organizations, 

Constitutional Foundations (New York: Federick A. Praeger, 1962), 

Section IV - South Pacific. 

22. For a more detailed discussion, see Collins and Larsen, the following 

sections: ROK, pp. 125-129; Thailand, p. 37; and Philippines, pp., 

53-54 

23. Ibid. 

24, Gurtov, pp. 52-55. 

25. Ibid., p. 58. 

26. Ibid. 

1-25


27. Collins, "Vietnam Postmortem-. ," p. I, 

28. Gurtov, p, 54. 

29. Collins, p. 2. 

30. See Gurtov, "Hanoi on War and Peace;" also, see King C. Chen, "Hanoi 

Vs, Peking: Policies and Relations - A Survey," Asian Survey, Vol. 

XII, No. 9, September 1972. See also, Volume I, Chapter 6., 

31. US Department of the Army, Study cf the Pacification and Long-Term 

Development of Vietnam (Short Title: PROVN), March 1966., Annex F. 

"Trace of US Policy and Objective- in Time," pp. F-3 and F-4; and US 

DoD Etudy performed by the ISA, Lcng Range Planning Group Prepared for 

the Secretary of Defense in May I071, copy on file at BOM Corporation, 

McLean Virginia, with cover memorýwdum for Dr. N. F. Wikner, Special 

Assistant for Threat Analysis, Director of Defense Research and 

Engineering, Subject. Forming a Long-Range Group in the DoD, dated, 

20 May 1971. 

32. CINCPAC, Military Assistance Plan Book - Vietnam, May 7, 1965, 

(SECRET), Now unclassified; and PROVN, p. F-3, 

33. General William C. Westmoreland's Private Files, on file at the Office 

of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, Washington, D.C, 

See History File March-April 1968, memo from MACV Chief of Staff 

General Kerwin to COMUSMACV, dated March 12, 1968. 

34. Colonel J, Angus MacDonald, HQS, USMACV, APO San Francisco, CA. 96222, 

Military Objectives Study, October 16, 1968 (SECRET), Now unclassif 

,pp. 1-45 

35. Paul Y. Hammond, Cold War and Detente (New York: Harcourt Brace 

Jovanovich, Inc., 1975), p. 242. 

36, Stephen T.. Hosmer, Konrad Kellen, and Brian M, Jenkins, The Fall of 

South Vietnam: Statments By Vietnamese Military and Civiliam Leaders. 

R-2208-OSD (HIST) (Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, 

December 1978), pp. 11-15. 

37, Interview with Ambassador Ell, Bunker, conducted at the BDM 

Corporation, McLean, Va., on .,oer 8, 1979., 

38. Hosmer et.al.; dnd an interview with Ambassador Samuel Burger, conducted 

at his residence in Washington, D.C. on June 22, 1979. 

1-26


CHAPTER 2 

US FOREIGN POLICY 


Ourt policy in Vietnam is the same as it was one 

year ago and. it is the same as it was ten years 

ago. That policy [is] to assure the independence of 

South Vietnam in the face of communist subversion and 

aggressiop.1/ 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

President of the United States, 

1965. 

Aspiring to world hegemony, the US holds out 

dollars in one hand to entice people and brandishes the 

atomic bomb in the other to menace the world. The 

Tr man Doctrine, Marshall Plan; NATO Pact, and Programs 

for Southeast Asia are all US maneuvers aimed at preparing 

for a third world war. 2/ 

Ho Chi Minh 

S~lected Writings 

(February 1951) 

Throughout the period of this study, the fundamental US policy with 

respect to Vietnam, and for that matter for tn8 whole of Indochina, was to 

assure and promote its self-determination and independence in the face of 

communist-inspired subversion and aggression. Although the official pronouncements 

from six different presidential administrations reinforced this 

broad fundamental policy, there were some clear variations within that 

policy over time. 

Initially, the goal was an indcpendent (that is, independence 

within the French Union) non-communist Vietnam, later an independent 

non-communist South Vietnam leading to a unified Vietnam, then 

simply to an independent non-communist South Vietnam, and finally an 

I] independent South Vietnam not necessarily non-communist. So too the policy 

with respect to negotiations changed from one of refusing to negotiate "to 

ratify terror", to seeking negotiations on American terms, and finally to 

negotiating at almost any price.3/ 

2-1


Volur.e III of this study, entitled US Foreign Policy and Vietnam, 

1945-1975, provides the reader an in-depth assessment of tho US involvement 

in Vietnam through an examination of the global context in which that 

involvement occurred, the major historical precedents influencing US 

involvement and the US national-level policy process which shaped that 

involvement. Volume IV, entitled US Domestic Factors Influencing Vietnam 

War Policy Making, explores the US domestic scene, including its political 

and economic components, the role of the media during the conflict, and the 

extent of domestic support for the government's policies toward the war. 

In addition, Chapter 1 of this Volume provides a comparison of the 

objectives and strategies between the US and its allies and those of the 

North Vietnamese and their allies, The information developed in the foregoing 

will serve as the basis for the analysis of US policy developed 

herein. 

This chapter will examine the effectiveness of US foreign policy in 

providing support for US objectives in Vietnam. In so doing, a phased 

assessment in the following major periods will be developed: 

Phase 1: 1945 to 1961 

This phase was marked by the return of France to Indochina, the 

establishment of a Vietnam state under Bao Dai with a constitution, US 

provision of military assistance to Vietnam with the establishment of a 

MAAG, the Geneva Conference, the consolidation of the Diem "miracle" regime 

and national elections, growing internal dissidence and guerrilla activity. 

Phase 2: 1961 to 1965 

The impact of the Kennedy years and the beginning of the Johnson 

Adminictration were the hallmarks of this period. 

The years find the NLF 

coming into being, and expansion of US military and economic support. 

The advisory effort to Diem is rapidly built up, coup attempts become 

frequent, Diem is assassinated and revolving door governments become a 

characteristic. 

"2-2 

I °


Phase 3. 1965 to 1969 

This phase was truly the Johnson Admiristration; the hangover effects 

of the Kennedy Admiinistration had disappeared, It was th- period of the 

"Big War", the effort to substitute American military power for local 

weaknesses and inadequacies, The US built up ground, air and naval 

strength; the bombing of the North was initiated, and B-52's became an 

active weapon system for the US. 

Efforts were made to "internationalize" 

the war in Vietnam by encouracing friendly nations to dispatch troops to 

assist South Vietnam. The 1968 Tet attack occurred and later that year 

* President Johnson announced he would not seek reelection. The later years 

of this period saw the initiation of negotiations in Paris in an effort to 

bring peace to Vietnam, 

President Nixon was elected and one of his campaign 

promises was withdrawal "with honor" from Vietnam. 

Phase 4: 1969 to 1975 

This phase was the period of withdrawal and saw the collapse of South 

Vietnam. It was the era of the Nixon Administration, Watergate and the 

Ford Administration. 

It was marked by Executive-Congressional confrontation, 

negotiations for the withdrawal of US Armed Forces and the return of 

our ?.O.W.s. The early years of the period were hopeful ones of signs that 

the South Vietnamese were succeeding militarily, politically and economically. 

The permanence of those signs was, however, heavily dependent on US 

objectives and the policies to implement them. 

Frequently consensus on 

US/GVN objectives and how they should be achieved was lacking, although 

Vietnamese existence and viability was contingent on that consensus, 

As aa added feature, the analysis herein will include an assessment of 

the relative effectiveness of the various US Embassy country teams (especially 

the functions of the ambassadors and military commanders) with respect 

AI to the implementation of US foreign policy and providing support for US 

objectives in Vietnam 

Significant insights and lessons generated from this effort are presented 

in paragraph C and 0 below. 

2-3

jTHE BDM CORPORATION 

B. PHASED ASSESSMENT OF US FOREIGN POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 

L.I Historical Antecedents 

Ambivalence and uncertainty characterized US 

foreign policy with 

respect to Southeast Asia during World War II, On the one hand, the US 

repeatedly assured France that its coIonial possessions would be returned 

to it after the war, On the other hand, the US committed itself in the 

Atlantic Charter to support national self-determination, and President 

Roosevelt personally advocated independence for Indochina by expressing a 

desire to place it under U.N. trusteeship after the war. Ultimately, US 

policy was governed neither by the principles of the Atlantic Charter, nor 

by FDR's anticolonialism, but by the dictates of military strategy which 

focused US war effort in the Pacific on the defeat of the Japanese homeland. 

Indochina was not perceived as "vital" to US interests in that part 

of the world. Notwithstanding FOR's lip service on the subject, for all 

practical purposes there was no US policy toward Southeast Asia when Harry 

S. Truman became president following Roosevelt's death in 1945. 

2. Phase 1: 1945 to 1961 

After WWII, the US acquiesced to the reestablishment of French 

colonial rule in Vietnam, 

and in so doing, embarked on a passive policy of 

noninvolvement, At the time, Indochina appeared to be one region in the 

troubled postwar world in which the US might enjoy the luxury of abstention, 

but events in Europe and China changed the context from mid-1947 on. 

A worldwide US policy evolved--containment of spreading c-..mmunism. In 

keeping with that policy, President Truman, after much hesitation, decided 

that anticommunism was more important than anticolonialism in Indochina, 

F As a result, direct US involvement in Southeast Asian affairs was formaily 

launched when Secretary of State Acheson announced in May 1950 that the US 

would provide military and economic assistance to the French and their 

Indochinese allies for the purpose of combating communist expansion. 

ra 2-4


I 

a. US Objectives (See Figure 2-1) 

Late in 1949 ana early 1950, the National Security Council 

(NSC) developed objectives for US foreign policy with respect to Asia (NSC 

48/2) and Indochina (NSC-64) which served as the basis for US policy for 

that area u.ntil 1952. Those objectives were keyed to blocking communist 

expansion and internal subversion in Asia by: 

Establishing collective security arrangements between and/or with 

MAian natiions; or 

• Collaborating with major European allies and commonwealth countries; 

or, that failing, 

0 Establishing bilateral cooperation between separate Asian 

nations. 

Following a NSC review of the communist threat in Soutneast 

Asia in 152, President Truman approved a new statement of objectives dnd 

policy: 

To prevent the countries of Southeast Asia from passing 

into the communist orbit, and to assist them to develop 

the will and ability to resist communism from within 

and without and to contribute to the strengthening of 

the free world.4/ 

President Eisenhower took office in the context of negotiations 

for a settlement in Korea and the possible defeat of France in Indo- 

!• ichina, As the French position in Vietnam deteriorated under constant 

pressure from the Viet Minh, and as indications that France might accept a 

political settlement adverse to US interests grew, the NSC reconsidered 

basic US objectives with respect to Southeast Asia. On January 16, 1954, 

President Eisenhower approved a NSC proposal committing the US to make 

every effirt to influence France against settling for anything inconsistent 

with the basic American objectives below: 

4I 

To prevent the countries of Southeast Asia from passing 

into the communist orbit; to persuade them that their 

best interests lie in greater cooperation and stronger 

affiliations with the rest of the free world; and to 

assist them to develop tow-'d stable, free governments 

2-5

THE SDM CORPORATION 

00 

< )0 c


H 

with the will and ability to resist communim from 

within and without and to contribute to the strengthening 

of th? free world., 5/ 

US 

intervention into the Vietnam conflict became a distinct 

prospect as a French defeat there became imminent. 

Having pressed diplomatically 

for a constructive outcome during the Geneva Conference of 1954, 

the US placed its support behind Ngo Dinh Diem and the Government of South 

Vietnam, 

Despite a series of severe tests, that government succeeded in 

.-onsolidating itself and making significant progress with LIS support, US 

justification for its foreign policy objectives toward Vietnam for this 

period included the follnwing: 

0 The loss of Vietnam, the most vulnerable state of Southeast Asia, 

would imperil the other nations of the region, and ultimately 

lead to a seriously weakened US strategic position. Vietnam 

was a key to continued free world access to the human and 

material resources of Southeast Asia. 

* Communist China was pursuing an expansionist policy relying upon 

subversive aggression, China thus continued to reflect the 

unchanging Soviet objective of world conquest, and both had 

manifest designs on Southeast Asia. 

0 The US acted, through its aia programs, to help the small and 

weak nations contiguous with communist powers to maintain their 

freedom and independence. 

0 In the words of President Eisenhower, "We gave military and 

, economic assistance to the Republic of Vietnam., We entered into 

a treaty -- 

the Southeast Asia Security Treaty -- which plainly 

warned that an armed attack against this area would endanger our 

own peace and safety and that we would act accordingly." 

• US Aid for Vietnam -- economic and military -- ,iade possible not 

only its survival, but also genuine progress toward P stable 

society, an improved economy, and internal and external security. 

2-7


b. US Foreign Policy 

The following perceptions dominated US 

policy-making during this period: 

thinking and foreign 

0 The growing importance of Asia in world politics. It was thought 

that the withdrawal of the French from Indochina would create 

power vacuums and conditions of instability which would make Asia 

susceptible to becoming a battleground in the then-growing East- 

West cold war conflict. 

* The tendency to give credence to the worldwide communist threat 

in monolithic terms. 

This view was based on the relatively extensive 

influence -exerted by the Soviet Union over other communist 

nations and over the communist parties in non-communist 

states. Moreover, the West, especially the US, felt challenged 

by the expansionist policies openly proclaimed by leaders of 

virtually all communist movements of the period. 

0 The attempt of the Viet Minh to evict the French from Indochina 

as part of the communist plan of world domination, The attempt 

of Ho Chi Minh's communist regime to evict the French from Indochina 

was seen as part of the Southeast Asian manifestation of 

the communist worldwide aggressive intent. 

taking a crucial stand against expanding worlo communism. 

France was seen z 

* The tendency to interpret seL.urity as a function of the internal 

order maintained by individu, ates, Thi policy of containing 

communism (Truman Doctrine) not only viewed security as a function 

of the balance of power between states but also of the 

internal order of all states. 

Advocates of this doctrine tended 

to equate security with the maintenance of a world order that, 

under US leadership, woula ensure the triumph of American values 

(or at least ensure that US interests would be served). 

The above perceptions contributed to a widely held assumption 

by the US leadership that if Indochina was lost to communism, the 

remaining nations of Southeast Asia would be infiltrated by communists and 

ev~ntually fall by chain reaction. 

This strategic concept, which came to 

2-8


be known as the "domino theory",7/ was developed at the time of the Nationalist 

withdrawal from mainland China but before the outbreak of the Korean 

War., A position paper developed by the NSC on February 27, 1950, launched 

the domino principle when it concluded with the following statement* 

It is important to United States security interests 

that all practicable measures be taken to prevent 

further communist expansion in Southeast Asia. Indochina 

is a key area of Southeast Asia and is under 

immediate threat. The neighboring countries of Thailand 

and Burma could be expected to fall under Communist 

domination if Indochina were controlled by a 

Communist-dominated government. The balance of Southeast 

Asia would then be in grave hazard. 8/ 

The startling successes of Mao and his communist movement in 

China during the late forties brought the US to a new awareness of the 

vigor of communism in Asia, and to a sense of urgency over its containment, 

US policy instruments developed to meet unequivocal communist challenges in 

Europe were applied to the problem of the Far East. 

Concurrent with the 

development of NATO, a US search began for collective security in Asia; 

economic and military assistance programs were inaugurated; and the Truman 

Doctrine acquired wholly new dimensions by extensions into regions where 

the European empires were being dismantled., 

set forth by President Truman prevailed during that time frame: 

The following general policy 

H I believe that it must be the policy of the United 

States to support free peoples who are res-stiFg 

attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside 

pressures. I believe we must assist free peoples to 

work out their own destinies in their own way.... 9/ 

Truman was determined to commit US resources to contain 

Scommunism.. While he clearly subordinated military aid to economic and 

political means, he did assert the US interest to assist in maintaining 

security. 

We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we 

are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free 

2-9


institutions and their national integrity against 

aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them 

a totalitarian regime.l0/ 

The outbreak of the Korean War, 

and the US decision to meet 

the Iorth Korean aggression, rekindled the Truman Administration's interest 

and concerns about Southeast Asia. 

The American military response in Korea 

symbolized the basic belief that holding the line in A-ia was essential to 

American security interest. 

The French struggle in Indochina was seen as 

an integral part of the US policy of containing communism in that region of 

the world. In furtherance of that policy, Secretary of State Acheson 

announced the US 

the French in May of 1950: 

decision to provide military and economic assistance to 

The United States Government, convinced that neither 

national independence nor democratic evolution exist in 

any area dominated by Soviet imperialism, considers the 

situation to be such as to warrant its according economic 

aid and military equipment to the Associated 

States of Indochina and to France in order to assist 

them in restoring stability and permitting these states 

to pursue their peaceful and democratic development.l_/ 

The possibility of a large-scale Chinese intervention in 

Indochina, similar to the one experienced in Korea in late 1950, came to 

dominate the thinking of US policy-makers, The likelihood of such an 

intervention existed., 

The Chinese h1d large numbers of troops massed along 

the Tonkin border and they were providing material assistance to the Viet 

Minh. In time, however, the intelligence community forecast decreasing 

probabilitieq of the Indochina war being broadened. Notwithstanding intelligence 

estimates and reports of the French pcsition undergoing deterioration, 

the NSC undertook in 1952 to list a course of action for the 

"resolute defense" of Indochina in the event of a 

large-scale Chinese 

intervention. Consideration was not given, however, to the possible 

collapse of the French effort and their eventual withdrawal from the area. 

The upshot was that the NSC 

recommended the US increase its level of aid to 

French Union forces but "without relieving the French authorities of their 

basic military responsibility for the defense of the Associated States."12/ 

2-10


In his first State of the Union Message on February 4, 1953, 

President Eisenhower promised a "new, positive foreign policy," 13/ He 

went on to link the communist aggression in Korea and Malaya with Indochina, 

His Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, spoke of Korea and 

Indochina as two flanks, with the principal enemy--Red China--in the 

center,14/ In short, the new administration clearly embraced the global 

strategy of containment of communism, while specifically announcing its 

intentions to prevent the loss of Indochina by taking a more forthright, 

anticommunist stand. Furthermore, the "domino theory" and the assumptions 

behind it were never questioned. The vulnerability of the Southeast Asian 

nations was accepted as Eisenhower pointed out on August 4, 1953. 

If Indochina goes, several things will happen right 

away. The Malayan Peninsula, the last little bit of 

the end hanging on down there, would be scarcely 

defensible--and the tin and tungsten that we so greatly 

value from that area would cease coming. But all India 

would be outflanked. Burma would certainly, in its 

weakened condition, be no defense. Now, India is 

surrounded on that side by the communist empire. !ran 

on its left is in a weakened condition .. so you see, 

somewhere along the line, this must be blocked. It 

must be blocked now. That is what the French are 

doing. 15/ 

In spite of his administration's "hardline" against communist 

expansion in Indochina, Eisenhower tended to pursue a policy of 

"minimum action" to prevent the loss of Vietnam to communism. Sherman 

Adams, 

Eisenhower's White House Chief of Staff, explained how the problem 

was seen in the mid-lS50's: 

If the Communists had pushed on with an aggressive 

offensive after the fail of Dienbienphu, instead of 

stopping and agreeing to stay out of Southern Vietnam, 

Laos, and Cambodia, there was a strong possibility that 

the United States would have moved against them. A 

complete Communist conquest of Indochina would have had 

a far graver consequence for the West than a Red 

victory in Korea.16/ 

2-11

F? - , W . MW w ,k 3. TOM "a 


The Cisenhower Administration was forced to come to full 

grips with the question of direct US 

intervention in the late 1953-early 

1954 timeframe as the f-'1! uf Indochira seemed to become imminent. 

The President decided against US intervention in force as 

proposed by Vice President Nixon and Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. Further, he ruled against the advice of Army Chief of 

Staff Ridgway, 

who opposed any action that would lead to the commitment of 

US ground combat forces in an Asia land war. Ultimately, he treaded a 

middle path of doing just enough to balance off contradictory domestic, 

bureaucratic and international pressures. The US government paid almost 

all the French war costs, increased the supply of US 

increased the US military advisory mission in Vietnam, 

military hardware, 

and maintained the 

threat of US intervention, first by "United Action" (with European and 

Asian Allies) and then by forming the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization 

(SEATO)., 

The fall of Dien Bien Phu, 

and the failure to organize an 

intervention through "United Action" prior t. the beginning of the Geneva 

Conference in April 1954, led to a reappraisal of the "domino theory." The 

loss of Tonkin, 

or Vietnam or perhaps even all of Indochina, was no longer 

considered to lead inexorably to the loss to communism of all of Southeast 

Asia. Accordingly, Secretary Dulles in a press conference in May 11, 1954 

F- (four days after the French surrender at Dien Bien Phu), observed that 

"Southeast Asia could be secured even without perhaps Vietnam, Laos and 

i! Cambodia." 17/ 

C a 1 Later, as the US became reconciled to a political settlement 

at Geneva which would yield northern Vietnam to the Ho Chi Minh regime, the 

concept of "United Action" was given a new twist., It was transformed into 

an attempt to organize a long-range collective defense alliance which would 

offset the setback in Indochina and prevent further losse.. The loss of 

North Vietnam to the Viet Minh was no longer viewed as leading to a 

complete communist takeover of the non-communist countries in Southeast 

Asia. Eventually, in SEATO, the US sought to create an alliance which 

would be strong enough to withstand the fall of one such domino. 

2i

• • THE BDM CORPORATION 

Though 

proposed by the US, 

the Geneva Accords zonformed closely to the terms 

the settlement was viewed by some members of the administration 

to contain the elements of defeat. 

Part of the Free World's 

"assets" in the Far East had been "lost" to the Sino-Soviet bloc (much 

China had been "lost" to Mao Tse-tung's forces). In addition, allies of 

the US had backed away from an opportunity to deal with the communists by 

force of arms (United Action). And lastly, the US had been compelled to 

at-end an 

international conference which conferred to the communists by 

diplomacy what they had gained by force. 

In public statements and later in his memoirs, Pres'dent 

Eisenhower gave glimpses of his reasoning with respect to this period, At 

the time of Dier Bier. Phu, he noted: 

as 

It is very important, and the great idea of 

settilg up an organism is so as to defeat the domino 

result. When, each standing alone, one falls, it has 

effect on the next, and finally the whole row is down. 

You are trying, Through a unifying influence, to build 

that row of dominoes so they can stand the fall of one, 

if necessary, 

Now, so far as I am concerned, I don't think the 

free world ought to write off Ind3china. 1 think we 

ought to all look at this thing with some optimism and 

some determination. I repeat that long faces and 

defeatism don't win battles., 18/ 

Later Ike wrote, "I am convinced that the French could not 

win the war because the internal political situation in Vietnam, weak and 

confused, badly weakened their military position," Nevertheless, he persevered, 

believing that "the decision to give aid (to the French) was almost 

compulsory. The United States had no real alternative unless we were to 

abandon Southeast Asia." 19/ 

The Geneva Accords Conference of 1954 was followed by more 

t;ian a year of pessimism over the future of Indochina. Despite or perhaps 

because of that pessimism, the US stepped-up its aid to South Vietnam. In 

the fall of 1956, SEcretary Dulles said, "We have a clean base there now, 

2-13 

&


without a taint of colonialism. Dien Bien Phu was a blessing in disguise." 

20/ The years of "guarded optimism" began, The French defeat had 

cost the 11S 

about $3 billion and an immoasurable loss of prestige in Southeast 

Asia. Further, the US accepted a territorial compromise with the 

communists rather than chancing the direct involvement of US combat forces. 

However, more critically, Eisenhower had elected to replace the French and 

maintain a direct US presence in Indochina. 

advisors and training programs, 

With strong rhetoric, military 

support for Ngo Dinh Diem (especially his 

refusal to hold elections as called for by the Geneva Accords), 

and renewing 

military and economic assistance, the US, 

in effect, "created" the new 

state of South Vietnam. Thereafter, several years of military quiet and 

social progress in South Vietnam resulted. 

US 

policy with respect to Vietnam during the balance of the 

Eisenhower years was announced by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far 

Eastern Affairs Gn Juiie 1, 1956, about eight months after the US recognized 

President Diem as Chief of State of Vietnam. 

That policy was stated as follows: 

To support a friendly non-Commurist government in 

Viet- Nam and to help it diminish and eventually eradicate 

Communist subversion and influence. 

To help the Government of Viet-Nam establish the 

forces necessary for internal security, 

To encourage support for Free Viet-Nam by the 

non-Communist world. 

To aid in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of 

a country and people ravaged by 8 ruinous years of 

civil and international war. 21/ 

c. Implementing Programs 

The following key programs were developed and tailored for 

the implementation of US foreign policy in Southeast Asia during this 

period: 

0 The Mutual Defense Assistance Program. On March 10, 1950, President 

Truman approved more than $10 million in urgently needed aid 

2-14 

w4

TEBDMV CORPORATION 

for Indochina from funds previously appropriated under the Mutual 

Defense Program for "the general area of China." This was foiowedu 

.*ficial 'y an 

announcement in May 1950, by Secretary of 

State Acheson of a long-range picgram of economic and military 

assistance to France and the three countries of Indochina. On 

December 23, 1950, the Truman administration signed the Mutual 

Defense Assistance Agreement (Pentalateral Agreement) with 

France, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos., The agreement was authorized 

by Public Law 329, 81st Congress, and provided for aid 

through France to Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. Under the program 

the US committed itself to furnish military supplies, material 

and equipment for the purpose of halting the expansion of Communism 

in Indochina, and an American Military Assistance Advisory 

V 

V 

Group (MAAG), Indochina was formed to administer the support. 

Initially, US advisers functioned only as a small logistical 

accounting group and exercised little, if any, supervisory authority 

since US 

supplies and equipment were generally turned over 

to the French Expeditionary Corps for distribution as they deemed 

appropriate. After Dien Bien Phu and the departure of the French 

"middle men", the US beyan sending direct assistance to he 

Vietnamese Armed Forces on the basis of the Pentalateral Agreement. 

As a result, military personnel of the MAAG became increasingly 

involved in the organization and training of thc South 

Vietnamese Armed Forces.. An Eisenhower administration spokesman 

IOur 

described that effort in 1956 as follows: 

effortS are airected first of all toward 

I 

helping t4- sustain the internal security forces consisting 

of a regular army of about 150,000 men, a 

mobile civil guard of some 45,000, and local defense 

units which are being formed to give protection against 

subversion on the village level. We are providing 

budgetary support and equipment for these forces and 

have a mission assisting the training of the army. We 

are also helping to organize, train, and equip the 

Vietnamese police force.22/ 

2-15


0 Economi, Aid Programs. On September 7, 1951, the US signed an 

agreement authorized by Public Law 535, 81st Congress, with 

Premier Tran Van Huu's government providing for direct US economic 

aid to Vietnam, On March 7, 1955, the US, under the 

Eisenhower administration, and the government of Premier Ngo Dinh 

Diem signed an agreement which supplemented the previous economic 

aid pact, Initially, the program was designed to help sustain 

and strengthen the Vietnamese economy during its struggle to 

overcome communist subversion. After 1955, the aid focused on 

the basic development of the strife-torn Vietnamese Economy and 

on projects contributing directly to that goal. 

d. In-Country Conformance and Implementation of US Policy 

The US commitment to Vietnam in the early fifties was enigmatic. 

While the success of American policy depended upon a steady 

increase in the authority, prescige and popularity of a 

non-communist 

Vietnamese government, it also depended upon a continued French military 

effort; yet the more power the French allowed the Vietnamese to have, the 

less the reason for the French to stay and fight. When the US ambassador 

Donald R. Heath attempted to use the prospect of aid as leverage to obtain 

greater independence for the Bao Dai government 23/, the French countered 

with a veiled threat to pull out of the struggle, Both Washington and the 

Embassy in Saigon, 

conscious of the lack of leverage witn the French and 

unsure of the appeal of the Bao Dai government to the Vietnamese people, 

viewed the abandonment of Vietnam to communism as their only other 

alternative--one which was totally unacceptable, 

The first US military supplies arrived in Vietnam in June 

1950 ind the first contingent of American military officers end men arrived 

in Saigon later that year. 

Under Brigadier General Francis G. Brink, they 

formed the nucleus of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, 

Indochina, 

which was subsequently redesignated the Military Assistance Advisory Group, 

Vietnam (MAAG-V). Their organization was of the same type as used at that 

time in other countries receiving US military assistance--consisting of a 

joint headquarters with Army, Air Force and Navy officers and men., The 

2-16

~I THE BDM CORPORATION 

MAAG functioned as part of the US diplomatic mission. They were primarily 

concerned with processing requests for aid ar.d with inspecting the use made 

of furnished items. Training assistance to either the French or the fledg- 

1 i ng Vietnamese Army was not al I owed. 24/ 

The US diplomatic mission in Vietnam had moderate success in 

carrying out the US policy in the early fifties. There was a concerted 

effort made to expand the MAAG and take over the training of the Vietnamese 

Armed Forces, but the French were adamant against it.25/ In 1953 Bao Dai 

convinced the French to agree to expanding his Army. The US Embassy concurred 

in increased aid for the French, which President Eisenhower finally 

approved after pressuring the French into developing a positive military 

plan (discussed below) that had promise of success in two years. 

The plan 

failed and the US, fearing a French withdrawal and a communist takeover, 

upped the ante again, hoping to salvage something. The military training 

of the Vietnamese Armed forces continued to be the purview of the French 

Expeditionary Corps, 

and personnel of the US advisory group had little, if 

any, influence and no authority in that matter, Because of the restriction, 

the chief function of the MAAG was to make sure that equipment supplied 

by the US reached its prescribed destination and that it was prcperly 

maintained by the French. 

It was a frustrating task at best. 

To assess the value and effectiveness of US military aid and 

to try to exert influence in at least some proportion to the growing US 

commitment, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander in Chief, Pacific, sent 

Lieutenant General John W. O'Daniel, Commanding General, US Army, Pacific, 

on three trips to Indochina. General O'Daniel'e trips were made after 

General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny had been replaced by General Raoul Salan 

on 1 April 1952, and after General Henri-Eugene Navarre had succeeded 

General Salan in May of the following year. 

Gener~l O'Daniel's efforts to 

observe the activities of the French command were only moderately successful. 

In no way was he able to influence either plans or operations., 

General Navarre realized from the beginning that the French 

Union forces were overextended and tied to defensive positions. He developed 

a military plan, subsequently named after him, that called for expanding 

the Vietnamese National Army and assigning it the defensive missions, 

2-17


thus releasing French forces for mobile operations. General Navarre also 

intended to form more light mobile battalions, and he expected reinforcements 

from France. With additional US arms and equipment for his forces, 

Navarre planned to hold the Red River Delta and Cochinchina while building 

up his mobile reserves. By avoiding decisive battles during the dry season 

from October 1953 to April 1954, Navarre hoped to assemble his mobile 

strike forces for an offensive that by 1955 would result in a draw at 

least. 

The military plan had a pacification counterpart that would secure 

the dreas under Viet Minh influence. 

His plans were unsuccessful, however, despite increased US 

shipments of arms and equipment. The French politely but firmly prevented 

American advisers and General O'Daniel from intervening in what they considered 

tneir own business. 

Following instructions from Paris to block the 

communist advance into Laos, General Navarre in November 1953 decided to 

occupy and defend Dien Bien Phu. 

This fatal decision was based on grave 

miscalculations, and the Viet Minh overran Dien Bien Phu on 8 May 1954. 

Their tactical victory marked the end of effective French military operations 

in the first Indochina War, although fighting continued until 20 

July, the date the Geneva Accords were signed.26/ 

After the Geneva Accords and the signing of the SEATO treaty 

the US moved to replace the French in South Vietnam, Ambassador Heath 

presented Ngo Dinh Diem, then premier, a letter from President Eisenhower 

wherein the president asserted the willingness of the US 

South Vietnamese 

to assist the 

"in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, 

capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military 

means," but he hinged the offer upon "performance on the part of the GVN 

undertaking needed reforms "27/ Furthermore, the president directed thdZ 

American assistance would go direct to Diem's government and not through 

the French as before. 

Although several key advisers 28/ 

to President Eisenhower 

felt Premier Diem should be replaced because he seemed to lack the leadership 

qualities needed to overcome divisive elements, Diem was able to 

dominate the opposing religious sects (Cao Dai and Hoa Hao), put down the 

in 

2-18

THE BDM CORPOR\IMON 

powerful Saigon-based Mafia (Binh Xuyen), control dissident South Vietnamese 

generals and retain US support for his government. 

The US embassy in Saigon under the leadership of Ambassadors 

G. Frederick Reinhardt (1955-1957) and Elbridge Durbrow (1957-1961), and 

the MAAG under Lt, Generals Samuel T. Williams (1955-1960) and Lionel C, 

McGarr oversaw US economic and military assistance for Dien's government 

during this phase. Their attempts at exercising leverage over Diem, however, 

were not effective, Diem had firmly enscounced limself as president 

4 uF Tne RVN, handled the massive Northern -efugee resettlement problem, 

promulgated a constitutiun and had a constituent assembly elected, and made 

a modest start at land reform and pacification of the countryside. All was 

not roses, because Diem became heavy handed and authoritarian, squelching 

- opposing political parties, censoring the press and engaging sometimes in 

brutal repression. He became a confident ruler, and much to the chagrin of 

US officials, was able to manipulate his intended manipulators. 

This era was marked by General William's MAAG organizing, 

equipping and training the RVNAF Lo meet a conventional military threat 

while countrywide RVN was facing an increasing insurgency threat. President 

Diem sought to increase his armed forces so he asked the US to let him 

have extra troops, He wanted to create a special counter-guerrilla force; 

however, both Ambassador Durbrow and General Williams opposed that effort. 

Instead, the US 

took the position that what was needed was ,.ot more troops 

but governmental reforms and better utilization of existing forces.29/ 

Although President Diem seemingly accepted the US recommendations, 

little changed and the reforms never tco'. place. Shortly 

thereafter, Diem overcame a poorly-organ'zed coup attempt. The Chief, MAAG 

pressed for approval of a troop increase to show continued support for 

Diem, and it was quickly approved. Diem got his way without having to make 

*any concessions to the USG. Regardless of the direction and guidance from 

Washington, the US country team had difficulty applying effectively any 

leverage on Diem's GVN. 

219 

FA


e. Assessment of Phase 1 Effectiveness 

American foreign policy during this phase was based on the 

containment of Soviet Communism, 

a policy that, in its origins, was modest 

-3ni limited in its geographical scope and objectives. What began as a 

that was focused on Europe, directed primarily against the expansion 

of Soviet power, and designed to restore a balance of power, ended as a 

policy unlimited in geographic scope, directed against communism (or 

against any radical revolution), and designed to preserve a global status 

4 quo bearing little, if any, relation to the balance of power. 

US policy with respect to Indochina and specifically Vietnam 

was a subset of the US-Soviet strategic relationship., Over time, US 

"leaders saw Vietnam as a vital factor in alliance politics, US Soviet- 

Chinese relations, and deterrence, The record of US military and economic 

assistance to fight communism in Indochina tells the story quite clearly, 

From 1945 to 1954 US aid to France totaled about $3.0 billion. Without 

that aid the French position in Indochina would have been untenable. 

US 

commitment--deny the communists control over the region--was rational- 

1,ad in 1950 and was set in 1955 when the US replaced the French in Vietnam., 

that US 

In his last reflections on the war, Bernard Fall concluded 

policy during this phase had "not been able to produce a coherent 

frame of reference within which to operate,"30/ 

The 

He argued that the lack of 

a clear committment coupled with certain ambiguities--seeking peace in 

Korea while providing first the French and then South Vietnam and Laos the 

material base for a "die-hard" attitude--contribtted to US problems in 

Indochina. Further, he faulted the US for not applying leverage on France 

in Indochina (similar to the pressure applied on the Netherlands in Indonesia) 

to come to a peaceful arrangement with local nationalists It 

remains however, 

that if France stopped carrying the torch in Indochina, 

the US might have had to pick it up and do battle on its own.. Knowing this, 

the French even threatened Washington with withdrawal if funds were not 

made available.31/ 

The US wanted the French to continue fighting communism 

in Indochina as well as remain as a NATO bulwark against communism Mn 

J Europe, Therefore, American global priorities and alternatives set overall 

limits or US leverage on France in Indochina. 

2-20


The progress made during this period was something of a 

success. This was especially true for South Vietnam in the early years of 

the US-supported Diem regime. The immediate US objective of preventing a 

communist takeover of the entire region had been accomplished through 

improvements in the domestic and economic stability of the anLicommunist 

governm3nts. Diem had promulgated a constitution, had a cunstituent 

assembly selected, put down dissident and divisive elements, and promoted 

social and economic reforms with much success. 

The situation inherited by President Kennedy when he took 

office was rich in rhetoric and momentum. President Eisenhower and 

Secretary of State Dulles had: 

0 evoked the domino theory, reinforcing US international' and 

domestic political stakes in the future of South Vietnam 

(containment through rhetoric). 

0 substituted US presence for the French presence in Vietnam (US 

resolve demonstrated through direct presence and aid) 

0 made the GVN almost totally dependent on the US (an unfortunate 

side effect of the US involvement) because of the increased 

magnitude of US presence. 

* kept the US out of the war during Dien Bien Phu by making "united 

action" a precondition to US involvement, out also kept the US in 

Vietnam with his support for Diem 

* had "lost" the northern part of Vietnam to communism, but through 

the SEATO pact contributed to improved regional security. 

Only the long term goal of a regional political settlement 

remained, or so it appeared when John F. Kennedy assumed the Presidency in 

1961. 

3. Phase 2: 1961 to 1965 (See Figure 2-2) 

This phase began in an aura of domestic sacrifice and international 

confrontation. During his tenure as president, John Kennedy 

deepened the American involvement in Vietnam considerably. The US had 

greatly increased the number of military advisers in Vietnam, napalm and 

other antipersonnel weapons had been authorized for limiced use against the 

2-21


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ZOE 0c 

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~ 02-22


enemy, and the US had become identified with the increasingly unpopular 

regime of President Diem. President Johnson strongly reaffirmed the 

"Kennedy commitment and continued a policy which led to massive US 

involvement 

in the war by 1965. 

a. The Kennedy Policies: Increased Involvement 

When President Kennedy took office in 1961, 

the focus of US 

concern in Indochina was on Laos rather than South Vietnam. There was 

little to be done in Laos, however, other than to agree to a cease-fire and 

a neutral coalition government. Moreover, the Bay of Pigs, the Berlin 

crisis and the Cuban missile crisis, among others, had put the Vietnam 

problem on the back burner of American global interests. 

It did not stay 

there for long, however, and President Kennedy though "skeptical of the 

extent of our involvement [in Vietnam] was unwilling to abandot his predecessor's 

pledge or permit a communist conquest.. "32/ 

Kennedy faced three basic decisions with respect to Vietnam; 

they were: 

(1) to decide between seeking political reforms or military reforms 

(fighting the war) 

(2) to decide on the possible use of US c3mbat troops or not 

(3) to decide whether an open-ended commitment would prevent a ccmmunist 

takeover or not.33/ 

The first option found the USG military carrying the weight 

of making military reforms and implementing the Counterinsurgency Plan 

(CIP)., On the second issue, the US military, with support from the embassy 

country team, pushed hard--even urging the President to threaten Hanoi with 

US bombing. Opposition came from the State Department and White House 

Staff.34/ The last option, to make an open-ended commitment, had little 

support from any quarter. 

D, The Overthrow of Diem 

In dealing with President Diem over the years, the US had 

tried two different but eoually unsuccessful approaches. Under Ambassador 

Elbridge Durbrow from the late '5Os until 1961, the US used tough pressure 

tactics to bring Diem to implement programs and ideas deemed necessary to 

2-23


win the war against the Viet Cong. 

committed 

But Diem soon learned that the US was 

to him as the only Vietnamese leader capable of rallying his 

country to defeat the communists. 

Armed with this knowledge he could defer 

action or ignore the Ambassador with relative impunity. By 1961, Durbrow 

was cut off from the Palace, with little information about what was going 

on and even less influence over events. Under Frederick Nolting as US 

Ambassador, the US pursued a very different tactic. Forewarned not to 

allow himself to be isolated, Nolting set out through the patient cultivation 

of Diem's friendship and trust to secure a role for himself as Diem's 

close and confidential advisor, 

But there had been no basic change in 

American belief that there was no alternative to Diem, and Diem quickly 

sensed this, for he continued to respond primarily to family interest, 

secure in the knowledge that utlimately the US 

matter what he did. 

No 

would not abandon him no 

Both tactics failed because of American commitment. 

amount of pressure or persuasion was likely to be effective in getting 

Diem to adopt ideas or policies which he did not find to his liking, since 

the US communicated an unwillingness to consider the ultimate sanction-- 

withdrawal of support for the Diem regime. The US had ensnared itself in a 

powerless, no alternatives policy. 

With US 

support, the Diem government continued to show some 

semblance of stability and authority through mid-1963. 

Th3t is in spite of 

the constant pressure from the Viet Cong insurgents who had seriously 

eroded his control over the countryside, Also, repressive action against 

Buddhist protestors had severely weakened popular support for nis regime. 

Diem was in trouble and the US government was forced to reassess its position 

with respect to his government. 

time were:. 

The major options apparent at that 

. to continue to support Diem - despite his (and his brother Nhu's) 

growing unpopularity with the South Vietnamese (and he US 

public). 

0 to encourage or tacitly support thL overthrow of Diem (taking the 

"risk that 'he GVN might crumble and/or accommodate to the Viet 

Cong). 

2-24

I .,,, 


e to grasp the opportunity -- with all its associated risks -- of 

the political instability in South Vietnam to disengage and pull 

out. 

The first option was rejected by US leadership because of 

the belief that the Diem-Nhu government just could not win. The Diem 

government was considered to be coup-prone; it would be only a matter of 

time before he would fall from power. The third option was never very 

seriously considered as a policy alternative because of the assumption that 

an independent, 

noncommunist South Vietnam was too important a strategic 

interest to abandon, and because the situation was not sufficiently drastic 

to call into question so basic an assumption. 

preferred alternative because: 

* South Vietnam was thought to be too important to lose 

0 The US wanted to win against the communist insurgency 

The second course was the 

* The coup-plotting Vietnamese generals seemed to offer the best 

prospect of a military victorv%. 

The US opted not to prevent a coup. 

As a matter of fact the 

US decided to support, even encourage the coup. In making this choice the 

US deepened its involvement in Vietnamese affairs. 

Underlying the prevailing US view that there was no viable 

alternative to Diem was the belief that the disruptive effect of a coup on 

the war effort, and the disorganization that would follow, could only 

benefit the Viet Cong, perhaps decisively. Military estimates and reports 

emanating from MACV through the summer of 1963 continued to reflect an 

optimistic outlook, 

indicating good reason to continue support of Diem, 

even in the face of his inept handling of the Buddhist crisis, Actually, 

the GVN position in the war had begun to deteriorate seriously. This 

weakening was not apparent to US leadership. The then prevailing view held 

' that the Buddhist crisis had not yet detracted from the war effort, 

although its potential was so recognized. 

Secretary of Defense McNamara on 

July 19, 1963, told a press conference t:at the war was progressing well 

and that the Diem government's problems with the Buddhists had thus far not 

affected it. The US intelligence community, however, had already begun to 

note depressing effects of the crisis on military and civilian morale. 

tK 

2-25


Meanwhile, the US press corps was reporting a far different 

view of both the war and the Buddhist crisis, one which was, in retrospect, 

nearer to reality. In particular, they were reporting serious failures in 

the Delta in both military operations and the Strategic Hamlet Program. 

Typical of this reporting was an August 15, 1963. story in The New York 

Times by David Halberstam presenting a very negative appraisal of the 

war in the Delta. 

Such reports were vehemently refuted within the Administration, 

most notably by General Krulak, the JCS Special Assistant for 

SCounterinsurgency. At the lower echelons in the field, however, there were 

many US advisors who did not share Krulak's view of the war's progress. 

I 

Within ti.e Kennedy Administration, no real low-risk alternative 

to Diem had ever been identified. The US continued its support for 

Diem's troubled regime because he was regarded as the only Vietnamese 

figure capable of rallying national support in the struggle against the 

Viet Cong. The Buddhist crisis shattered that illusion and increased the 

domestic US political price to President Kennedy for continued support of 

Diem. Moreover, key administration advisers, among them the Secretaries of 

Defense and State, the Chairmans 

COMUSMACV, 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 

wanted to pressure Diem into dumping his controversial brother 

Nhu and carrying out US directed reforms--an exercise in futility. The 

only other option for the US seemed a coup, with highly uncertain prospects 

for post-coup political stability. 

The following quote from a State Department cable sent by 

Ambassador Lodge to Secretary of State Rusk on August 29, 1963, sums up the 

situation as viewed from the Saigon Embassy at that time: 

We are launched on a course from which there is no 

respectable turning back: the overthrow of the Diem 

government. There is no turning back in part because 

US prestiae is alread, publicly committed to this end 

in large measure and .,ll become more so as the facts 

leak out. In a more fundamental sense, there is no 

turning back because there is no possibility, in my 

*. view, that the war can be won under a Diem administration, 

still less that Diem or any member of the family 

can govern the country in a way to gain the support of 

the people who count, i.e., the educated class in and 

2-26

TF 


out of government service, civil and military--not to 

mention the American people. In the last few months 

(and especially days) they have in fact positively 

alienated these people to an incalculable degree. 

SI . The chance of bringing off a Gernerals' coup 

depends on them tn some extent; but it depends at least 

as much on us.35/ 

Althoughl former Ambassador Nolting and Under Secretary of 

State Ball argued against the US encouraging a coup attempt agairst Diem, 

the US found itself irrevocably committed to getting Diem out. 

A white paper which was published by the new South Vietnamese 

government following the November 1, 1963 overthrow of Diem delineated the 

US involvement in that Coup. It emphasized that the coup was planned, 

programmed and carried out by RVNAF officers; however, it was an American 

"who decided its success or failure under the immediate command of Henry 

Cabot Lodge . . . Besides Ambassador Cabot Lodge, another American in 

"Saigon was in charge of activating and following up the master plan of the 

Vietnamese generals. He was Lt. Colonel Conein, the adviser to Colonel Le 

Quang Tung."36/ Conein was present in the JGS headquarters building 

throughout the military actions against Diem. 

He was in constant communication 

with the US Embassy.38/ 

Many viewed the US role in the overthrow of Diem as an 

unfortunate mistake. General Westmore.a-xr- perspective is one of the 

strorger views: 

The young president (Kennedy), in his zeal, made 

the unfortunate mistake of approving our involvement in 

the overthrow of President Diem in South Vietnam. This 

action moraily locked us in Vietnam. Political chaos 

prevailed in South Vietnam for over two years. Were it 

not for our interference in political affairs oi South 

Vietnam and based on pragmatic consideration, we could 

in my opinion have justifiably withdrawn our support at 

that time in view of a demonstrated lack of leadership 

and unity in South Vietnam.39/ 

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MDM CORPORATION 

Few will argue against the fact that the role played by the 

US during the overthrow of Diem caused a deeper US involvement in Vietnam 

affairs. As efficient as the military coup leaders appeared, they were 

without a manageable base of political support. When they came to power 

and when the lid was taken off the Diem-Nhu reporting system, the GVN 

position was revealed as weak and deteriorating. And, by virtue of its 

interference in internal Vietnamese affairs, the US had assumed a significant 

responsibility for the new regime, a responsibility which heightened 

the US commitment and deepened the US involvement. 

c. The Early Johnson Years: Changing of the Guard 

Lyndon B. Johnson assumed office as a pragmatic politician 

and not a cold war ideologue. He too continued to deepen the 'S involvement 

in the Vietnam conflict, following the same foreign policy which had 

been espoused by his predecessors. At a press conference in July 1965, LBJ 

clearly enunciated his views on that matter as follows- 

We are in Vietnam to fulfill one of the most 

solemn pledges of the American Nation. Three 

Presidents--President Eisenhower, President Kennedy and 

your present President--over 11 years, have committed 

themselves and promised to help defend this small and 

valiant nation.40/ 

The objective of the Johnson Administration was to maintain 

an independent non-communist South Vietnam. In the later years, this was 

rephrased as "allowing the South Vietnamese to determine their own future 

without external interference."41/ As President Johnson crcssed the old 

barriers in pursuit of this objective, he established new ones: 

* while he ordered the bombing of the DRV, he would not approve the 

bombing of targets that ran the risk of causing confrontation 

with the PRC or USSR 

• while he permitted the US force level in RVN to go over the half 

million mark, he would not put the US economy on a wartime 

mobilization status 

0 while he allowed US ground combat offensive operations in RVN, he 

would not allow an invasion of Cambodia, Ldos or North Vietnam. 

42/ 

2-28


d. In-Country Conformance and Implementation 

Late in 1960, US Embassy in Saigon under Ambassador Durbrow 

prepared an overall counterinsurgency plan (CIP) for the RVN which was 

supposed to coordinate the programs of all in-country American agencies-- 

military, embassy, CIA and the US Operations Mission (a field agency of the 

US Information Service). Reflecting the views of General McGarr, Chief 

MAAG, the plan was forwarded to Washington early in 1961. It proposed many 

governmental reforms advocated by Ambassador Durbrow as well as improved 

military security.43/ 

The President approved the CIP shortly after assuming office 

in 1961 and ordercd its implementation. Durbrow was to use the CIP and the 

money for equipping the RVNAF which would go along with it to gain governmental 

reforms from the Diem government. US leverage failed. Diem was 

ostensibly amenable to the changes called for in the CIP; however, he 

resisted making reforms, paying them only lip service in order to get the 

money and equipment for his Army. Durbrow's attempts at applying leverage 

were unsuccessful. His replacement, Ambassador Frederick Nolting, also did 

not fare well with his attempts at exercising influence over Diem. 

Throughout Nolting's tenure and the first days of Ambassador 

Henry Cabot Lodge's tour, the US increased airlift support with US helicopters 

and crews, combat support and logistical assistance, aerial reconnaissance, 

communications intelligence, additional equipment and more 

advisers; but real administrative, political and social reforms were slow 

in coming from the Diem regime. To help implement the expanded military 

assistance program, President Kennedy had a new command created (MACV) and 

placed General Paul Harkins in command. 

The mission given to General Harkins, the MACV commander, in 

the spring of 1964 was: 

To assist the Government of Vietnam and its armed 

forces to deflect externally directed and supported 

communist subversion and agression and attain an 

independent South Vietnam function in a secure environment.44/ 

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3DM CORPORATION 

The mission failed to repeat earlier policy which had called fcr a unified 

Vietndm. 

The body of information available to this study group 

clearly inJicates extensive involvement on the part of Ambassador Lodge 

in the unfortunate overthrow of the Diem government. 45/ 

?•d 

ie 

MATERIAL DELETED 

y 

y 

Y 

a 

e 

p 

Although a GVN "White Paper" published on November 17, 1963, claimed that 

President Kennedy had put his stamp of approval on the coup efforts from 

Washington, it appears the thrust of the collaboration and the ultimate 

overthrow of the Diem Regime came from Ambassador Lodge.49/ 

The Ambassador and other USG officials who favored the 

overthrow did not anticipate the disastrous effect of Diem's demise. The 

political turmoil and upheaval inside the GVN lasted well into 1966. 

Ambassador Taylor, who came on the scene on July 2, 1964, ended up in the 

course of a year dealing with five different governments,five different 

prime ministers, five different sets of province chiefs, and five different 

sets of generals. The embassy under Taylor was constantly having to start 

programs and projects over every three months or so because of the turmoil 

created by the revolving governments.50/ 

In contrast, the embassy under Ambassador Lodge (in 1963- 

19E4) '-.s in a state of disarray because, as General Harkins put it, "t.lere 

wAas -i, coordination. He [Lodge] was a loner."51/ Conversely, Harkins 

thought Ambassador Nolting's embassy was effective and that Nolting was a 

2-30


more effective Ambassador.52/ Fcllowing a visit to RVN in December 1964, 

Secretary of Defense McNamara, 

commenting on the organizational and admin- 

"F istrative problems of the Country Team under Lodge, said the Embassy 

Country Team "lacked leadership," had been "poorly informed" and had "grave 

reporting" weaknesses.53/ 

On the other hand, the Embassy under Ambassador Taylor was a 

model of coordination and coope-ation. Taylor arrived on station in July 

1964 with a letter of instruction from the President giving him full 

control of both US civilian and US miiitarý ictivities in RVN, affording 

him the powers equivalent to a proconsul. Ambassador Taylor patterned the 

US Mission--consisting of the US Mission Council, the Embassy, MACV, USOM 

and JUSPAO (Joint US Public Affairs Office)--to fu;iction along the lines .f 

* a 'rnini-NSC."54/ (See Figures 2-3 through 2-8 for the organization charts 

of each element of the US Mission under Ambassador Taylor,) 

was the constantly revolving RVN 

Regardless, it 

governments that hindered his efforts to 

implement US policies with respect to South Vietnam. As a consequence, a 

frustrated Taylo,, called the key South Vietnamese military leaders into his 

Embassy office in December 1964, and he proceeued to dress them down like 

first ycar cadets. All of which caused General Khanh to accuse the 

Ambassador of "meddling", "abusing his power" and exhibiting "a discourteous 

attitude" toward RVN leadership.55/ 

e. Assessment of Phase 2 Effectiveness 

During this phase, the US foreign policy with respect to 

South Vietnam has to be rated as something less than successful, 

President 

Kennedy embraced his predecessors' foreign policy for the region except for 

one major revision--he did not press for "united action" with respect to 

the conflict in RVN, Somehow the precondition set by President Eisenhower 

for "united action" was never a consideration and President Kennedy's 

administration embarked on the da•ngerous 

course of unilateral action in 

Vietnam. US meddling and heavy-handedness with regard to the internal 

affairs of the South Vietnamese government, 

coupled with the calloused 

participation in the overthrow of President Diem, served to deepen, 

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rather tha:, lessen, US involvement with that iittle nation's problems, 

US had a big stake in the success of the military governments that followed 

Diem., Another amaziny point, one which has been well documented, was that 

the US was never officially invited to send combat troops into South Vietnam 

in 1965, when the first contingent of Marines landed near Da Nang.56/ 

Further, the transition of those first rew combat troops from a defensive 

posture to offensive "search and destroy" actions was so rapid that it took 

awhile before most Americans realized that the US was really at war on the 

continent of Asia--a situation that many respected former Army Commanders 

and leaders had cautioned and advised against.57/ 

Three facL-rs that contributed to President Johnson moving 

so dramatically on Vietnam when he did were- 

(1) at that time, the world was a safer place in which to live, 

Vietnam was the only continuing global crisis, the Sino-Soviet 

split had deepened, Europe was vieýwed as being secure, and mutual 

deterrence existed between the US and USSR: 

(2) the situation in Vietnam was more desperate than it had ever had 

been (if che U5 had not intervened in 1965); dnd, 

(3) tne US conventional forces (developed under the flexible response 

concept) were big enough and ready enough to interverie.53/ 

Vietnam had become very important to the vital interests of 

the US; it was perceivea to be in great danger of falling to the communists; 

and the US, at that time, was in a position to do something about 

it. The commitment was made, and the "Americanization" of the war began. 

4. Phase 3: 1%9 to 1969 (See Figure 2-9) 

President Johnson recognized that he was 


inheriting a deteriorating 

situatior in RVN when he took over as Chief of State following the 

death of JFK. VC military successes and consoant political turbulence, 

which was assccated with changes of governments from 1964 to 1966, were 

not secrets tj anyone in the US. Throughout the critical year of 1965, LBJ 

struck the themes of endurance and more-to-come; for example he: 

. ordered bombing of the DRV in a "tit-for-tat" response to VC 

attacks in Uf anc RVNAF personnel and installationc in the South, 

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0 war'nad that he saw nlu choice but to contitii~e on tne courxe set by 

JFK when he requested supplemental appr'opriationb for Vietnami in 

May of '1965, 

8 announced a nev' 125-thousand troop ceiling for US foirces in RVN 

in July 1965, 

5 stated that adaitional US forces would be provided if needed--t..e 

begi nni ngs of h is graouated mi 1-1tar., pressure, 

0 remalned alert. "to explore negotiat;ed sý luýior., that [would] 

attain US objectives in an icceptdble manrier."59/ 


obj,ýctivc of the Johnson adru~inistraLion was to maintair an 

independent non-commun ,ist South Vi etnam, In the later years, this was 

k, rephrased as "allcwing the South Vietrames.,Ž to determine their own future 

without external interference. :6O/ 

The key decisions from 196G through 1'36E appear to have been 

based on tactical considerations rather than str3teqi- ones. That -s, the 

Z_ ~ pol 4cy" alter'natives considered by the d~cis~onmaKer:ý foc'ised on a'lternative 

numbers of ground forces or altern~ti've bo;,aong prograirs;,O/1 The 

attitud.-: and 12cisions of US policy makers seemi~d to be dominatfd ;)y the 

issues of troop 1½vels, selecting bombing targets, p2c-ri~caticn efforts and 

battlefield stat-stics or "mec,;ures of progress." The -. tionale fow' such 

focus Probably stemmed from the idea 'that if the US demons -,rated its 

resolve and inteitilon to graciuFýly increase pressure on the DRV, they would 

even'lually relent and either agree to a .iegotiated settlement fir just pull 

back their suppo-t of the VC and leave the South.61/ 

a. In-Country Confcrrancýe and Implementationi 

Ambacsador Henry Cabot Lodge was reappointe'i to the Saigon 

Embassy post fi Aug-ust 1965, after General Taylbr completed a. rather d 4 s,-ppointing 

one year stint. The war was quickly becoming "Americanized", the 

Hop Tac pacification program-- successor to the Strategic Hamlet Pr--gram-- 

had flopo-c'. 

The Country Year., began pursuing new programs energetically. 

bUt found them to be plagued by dispersion of author-*'%.\ 

and lack of coordi 

nati on. 62/ Another s tuati on, trie pol iti cal. i nstabil1i ty of the GVN, 

which had been a prime source of Frustration for in-country leaaership 

?-40


after the overthrow of Diem, ac.tua~ly improved under the young "tuo'k" 

generals--Thieu and Ky. Except lr the interl'de of the Buddhist "struggle 

movemerT' in 1966, when Genera] Nguyen Chan Tni defied the Thieu-Ky leadership 

and another civil war was in the offing, thE GVN's political problems 

ceased to De a central problem.63/ Pfter the General Thi and Buddhist 

* problems were resolved, Ambassadur Lodye, as quoted by General Westmoreland, 

likened "Vietnam to a man cri-cically i 11, yet so irrascible that he 

throws p1T.chers -.f water at his doctor. That at least shows," Lodge continuei, 

"..hat he is gettirn better."64/ 

Leverage issues continued to come ,p late in 1966, especially 

as related to ccrruption within the GVN and RVNAF. Variants of the 

old paradox remained--the US country team representatives could not twist 

the arm.s of the South Vietnamese too nard because that would cause them to 

look ike US puppets, a situation which wouid run counter to ad detract 

from Lh0 

same potitical development ends that the leverage was originally 

wants ig to achieve. Furthermore, as the war was Americanized, fewer opportunities 

to apply leverage manife-,ted themselves. The US adviser's role 

dimi~iishpd in relative importance as the opportunitN, to gain command positiors 

with American .:ombat units began to take priority with careeroriented 

officers. Proposals for the encadrement of US and RVNAF personnel 

wert rejected and the idea foy establishing a combired US-RVNAF command ana 

joint coordinating staff (which was being pushed by DoD) 

failed to materialize 

because of Vietnamese resistance.65/ Pacification was the only area 

where some leverage was applied with any degree of success, and that hap- 

Dened after Mr. Komer organized CORDS in 1967.66/ 

In ofticial Washington three schools of thought began forming; 

they were: 

(1) continue to peisevere in Vietnam 

(2) seei" a way out of V;etnam by uegotiations 

(3) cut our losses and get out of Vietnam 

-eanwhile in Saigon, the US Mission was trying to ýalance' the military need 

for more US 

troops against the constraints posed by the severe economic 

inflation caused in ',VN by the introduction of US troops, 

Of the two, the 

IJ.2 

.I 

?--41


V Vietnam 

military proolem caused the greatest concern. Throughout this phase, 

President Johnson continually pressed for a predictioni or forecast on how 

long the war would last. General Westmoreland, Lodge, 

McNamara and all his 

other advisers could not answer chat question satisfactorily. 

Faced with girding for a longer war, President Johnson began 

to look (witn an eye to the 1968 presidential elections) to negotiations as 

the way out of the conflict. That too failed to yield the desi-ed rpsults. 

Ambassador Ellsworth BunKer's arrival on the scene in 1967 

was marked by change as well as improved U' mission coordination (especially 

as it relatea to pacification). He announced the formdtion of COPOS 

as an integrated military-civil effort falling under the direct command of 

COMUS MACV.66/ The Tet Offensive in 1968 created chaos tr.roughout the QVN; 

however, the end results vere: 

0 a stronger GVN under the leadership of President Thieu, 

is a more confident RVNAF, and 

S• a pacification program which was beginning to show signs cf 

suc'eeding. 

t •. 

Assessment of Phase 3 Effectiveness 

This phase saw the US policy of maintaining a viable, independent 

and non-communisL 

Scuth Vietnam change to one of allowing them tj 

determine their own future without external interference. 

period of escalation the US 

Throughout this 

in,'estment in men and war materiel grew astronomically, 

provoking domestic convulsions and dissent The fundamental 

question as to why the US continued to pour money and lives into South 

and punish (by bombing) the DRV, when the strategy of escalation 

was failing to win the war or bring the communists to the negotiating 

table, was never thoroughly addressed by key US leaders (both in Washingto:n 

and in the Eaigon Embassy).. 

Secretary 

Only after the shock of Tet in 1968 and the 

Clifford "A to Z" reassessment which followed thereafter, was 

there a leveling off anu capping of US invoive-ient. 

Once the US was totally involved in the conflict, tnere was 

no easy way out. President Johnson, rather than condLuct periodic reassessments 

of the US's fundamental cominitment, 

accepted the fact that American 

4 2-42 

4•


vital interests were involved in the Vietnam struggle and based his policy 

decisions thereafter on tactical rather than strategic considerations.. 

In 1968, 

with his decfision to persist in the struggle a 

fai ure, President Johnson ordered a limitation of the bombing ol the 

North, withdrew ;,is name from the presidential election race, set a ceiling 

on combat troops in RVN, and i:.vited the DRV to negotiate. Though not 

regarded as such, those decisio~is became almost irreversible and any subse- 

I quent decision on the partC of newly electeo Pres~dent Nixon to increase 

troop levels or renew full-F-cale bombing would have met with strong domestic 

and congressional resistance. 

5., Phase 4: 1969 to 1975 (Figure 2-10) 

The Nixon administration entered officL determined to end the US 

involvement in Vietnam. Initially, the new chief executive proposed a 

negotiations policy based on the mutjal withdrawal of DRV and LIS forces 

from South Vietnam. He also directed a step-up in the preparations for the 

RVNAF 

to stand alone--the Vietnamization Program--and for the development 

of a timetable for the progressive withdrawal of American troops no matter 

what progress or the lack thereof in the Paris peace negotiations.67/ 

two track approach--Vietnamization and withdrawal--helped silence domestic 

and congressional critics while it bought Nixon time to find a diplomatic 

solution. 

In May 1969, President Nixon, showing his disappointment with the 

lack of progrcss towards ; settlement, spoke to th? nation. 


He declared 

that the US wa. not seeking to impose "a purely military solution on the 

battlefield" and that the US would accept aoy government (although not 

explicitly stated, not necessarily non-communist) resulting from the "free 

choice of the South Vietnamese people themselves."68/ 

In keeping with President Nixo,'s new policy, Secretary of 

"evised mission statement and revised objec- 

The new mission statement for the MACN was to 

Defense 'aird insis:ed on a 

tives for U,% forces in RVN. 

focus on pycviding "maximum assistance" •o the RVN and help str.ingthen 

their armed forces, supporting pacification efforts and reducing the flow 

of supplies to the enemy.69/ The statement stressed assisting the RVNAF 

2-4 

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"to take over an increasing share of combat operations" and specified that 

the goal of military operations was to defeat the enemy's effort "to deny 

self-determination" to the South Vietnamese people.70/ 

The president recognized that a milita-"y solution of the war was 

net available; therefore, he set about to attain a stalemate on tne battlefield, 

to give pacification a chance To work, 

to isolate the DRV from their 

communist benefactors, and to arrive at a political solution in the negotiations. 

After finally getting the DRV and tl.e RVN to agree to a peace 

accord in January 1973, the US rushed massive quantities of m litary equipment 

and supplies into RVN to beat the tffective deadline date of the 

agreement. The agreement was initialed on January 23 and signed on the 

effective date four days later. President Nixon, in an address te the 

nation after the signing, stated that the US would "continue to recognize 

the government of the Republic of Vietnam as the sole legitimate novernmeit 

of South Vietnam" and that the South Vietnamese "have been guaranteed the 

right to determine their own future, without outside interference."71/ 

The US started to withdraw its last contingent of troops on 

J-nuary 28, 1973, and phased out MACV headquarters less than ninety days 

atr=. ,,F- the place of MACV, the USG established a Defense Attache's 

Office (DAO) which became a part of the US Embassy with an authorized 

strength of 50 military and about 1200 civilian personnel, 

Although the US upheld its end of the Paris agreement, the DRV 

reneged after the release of American POWs. The war did not stop; there 

was no genuine ceasefire. 

in the late spring of 1973, 

concurrent with the beginn 4 ngs of the 

Watergate scandal and the concern of the Congress that maybe President 

Nixon would some&ow reinvolve the US in Southeast Asia, the US 

branch began to actively involve themselves in the US 

legislative 

foreign policy making 

process. If the President had intended to use US airpower in the event of 

a breakdown of the agreements and the ceasefire, that course was soon 

denied him. The Congress passed an amendment to an appropriations bill on 

June 30, 1973, prohibiting aq of August 15 the use of any funds to finance 

2-45


directly or indirectly comoat activities by US military forces "in or over 

or from off the shores of North vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia,"72/ 

ýn activist US Congress pasbed the War Pcwers Rpsolution on 

November 7, 1973, over a presidential veto which further limited the chief 

executive's abil~ty to wage war without their approval, 

Although both President Nixon 

and his successor, Gerald Ford, 

sought to continue U,; military assistance to the RVN, the Congress would 

not cooperate, In the summer of 1974, they had cut the amount of military 

assistance requested by half, to dbout $700 million. Early in 1975 the 

Congress rejected a request from the Fo-.i administraticn for supplenr,ental 

aid for South Vietnam and Cambodia. It became very clear to the Sout' 

Vietnamese leadership that US policy had shifted, and that- 

* their ccuntry wis no longer vital to US interests, 

0 the US support was rapidly falling off, if not ending, and 

a they would have to go it alone, probably without the US airpower 

promised by President Nixon. 

a., 

Assessment of In-Country Conference 

The Embassy Country Team, under LO stoadv and strong political 

leadership of Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and the outstanding 

military leadership of General Creighton Abrams, 

the policies set by Washington, by- 

0 implementing the Vietnamization Program efficiently, 

e 

making pacification ýiork and stressing local security 

was effective in executing 

a giving "nation building" top priority and helping the Thieu 

government attaiin political stability, 

* effectivelv neutralizing the VC infrastructure, 

I 

effectively implementing the President's withdrawal plans, and 

• keeping the Thieu government apprised throughout on the status of 

the spcret negotiations.73/ 

took the reins in 1973 74/ 

The years of harmony changed when Ambassador Graham Martin 

The dissension among the lower and m 4 d-level 

embassy and DAO staff members did not surface, however, until the debacle 

i'- 1975.75/ 

Notwithstanding the dissension and other problems (among them 

Y 

2-46


L 

was alleged stifling of critical reports), Ambassador Martin's embassy 

apparently was doing exactly what President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger 

wanted--reporting that the RVNAF could "hack it" alone and that Thieu's 

government hau the support of a broad political base, 

C, INSIGHTS 

The following insights were developed from the analyses and assessmeats 

drain in this chaptere 

Until the final collapse, right or wrong, American national 

leadership was convinced that the US must pursue a policy which 

would prevent the 'Jss of South Vietnar to the communists from 

the North, 

Those various policies provided sufficient support to 

accomplish that ,2jective, 

could be disengaged and withdrawn. 

at least until US ground combat forces 

• As long aý the general doctrine of military containment of communism 

was the official US 

policy, the decision specifically to 

intervene in Vietnam has to be considered a logical reaction. 

The domino theury saw any conflict with the communists as a test 

i. 

of the US's natiopal resolve and credibility. The communists had 

threatened to take over "free world" territory in Berlin, Korea, 

Iran, Guatemala, Lebanon and the Dominican Republic, and actions 

taken by the US to prevent the loss of these territories were 

viewed by many as American "Cold War" successes, 

Conversely, the 

communists' gaining control over China and Cuba were viewed as 

"cold war" defeats for the US. Each successive US president 

durir.q rhis period found himself bound, in large measure, by his 

predecessor's doctrinas and thereafter analyzing issues from the 

i -same perspective in continuance of policies long after they 

outlived their usefulness. 

Throughout the entire period of US involvement in Indocnina, from 

1950 until 1975, the policy of containment worked and South 

Vietnam was not lost to communism. 

At each key or crucial decision 

point, following the initial commitment, US policy makers 

2-47

THE BCM CORPORATION 

S~2-48 

focused on how tc contain communism in Viet 1 ,am and not cn the 

wisdom of being there in the first place., 

Each escalation was 

seemingly in response to the progressive escalation of the price 

of keeping the commitment. It was not until the "A to 7" 

reassecsment in 1968 that there was 

that early commitment. 

a thorough review made of 

0 The direct US involvement in Southeast Asia provided a degree of 

stability to the region; witness the fact that Thailand, Singapore, 

Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, as well as several other 

ASEAN 

(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) nations enjoyed a 

measure of economic prosperity. 

a The collapse of South Vietnam was followed by the communist 

takeover of both Laos and Cambodia; currently Thailand's security 

is threatened. Regardless of how imperfect the "domino theory" 

may be, in the eyes of many, its validily has been demonstrated. 

0 A policy of unreserved commitment to a particular leadership 

placed the US in a weak and manipulable position on important 

internal issues in Vietnam., 

The early view that there were no 

viable alternatives to President Diem greatly limited the extent 

of US influence over his regime and ruled out, over the years, a 

number 

of kinds of leverage that might have been employed to 

obtain desired goals. 

0 The politico-military action which happeTed in the November 1963 

coup against Diem would not have been possible without US connivance. 

To acquiesce in or to -)romote a coup makes sense only if 

positive results can reasonably be expected. 

The US Country Team 

in Saigon, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, the US Departments of 

State and Defense, 

identify . 

and the National Security Council failed to 

successor to Diem who might have been acceptable to 

the Vieti -ese people as well as to the US, and who might have 

provided efiective leadership. 

0 There appears to be little evidence of much critical thinking 

about the relation of Vietnam to US security., Scholars. journalists, 

politicians and government bureaucrats all seemed to have

4 


assumed either that Vietnam was vital to US national security or 

that the American people would not stand for the loss of another 

country to communism. 76/ 

D. LESSONS 

The following lessons are drawn from the material developed above- 

0 There are limits to US power. It is unlikely that the miracle 

work performed after WWII 

in Westerr. Europe with US Marshall Plan 

aid will ever be reproduced. Being a superpower with en extensive 

arsenal oil nuclear weapons and missiles, and having a• powerful 

modern army does not automatically guaranteg that a foreign 

policy designed to exploit those strengths will be successful. 

* In tne final analysis, it is the president of the US who is held 

responsible by the American pecple for the formulaticn of US 

foreign policy as well as for the security of the nation. The 

Vietnam legacy is such that any future commitment by -n American 

president of US military force will require the support of the US 

citizenry, 

* If in the future the US finds it necessary from time to time to 

use limited force for limited objectives in certain strategic 

areas, such as in the Middle East (e.g., Iran) or in Latin 

America, where important US security interests are directly 

threatened and where limited intervention would offer the prospects 

of effective deterrence, then the US 

armed forces must be 

structured, trained, indoctrinated and equipped to meet the 

anticipated threat, and tho US congress, press and public must be 

kept apprised to retain their support for any such action. 

* As long as US policy is defined in negative terms - c anticommunism 

or anti-Diem - it will be limited in coherence, continuity 

and relevance to US interests by the need to respond to 

situations rather than to consciouIsly shape them. Thus, despite 

the overwhelming power impiled by "superpower" status, the Uni÷Ad 

2-49

StTHE BDM CORPORATION 

I! States' foreign policy will suffer humiliating defeats unless and 

ui,til its policy is designed to exploit US strengths in pursuit 

of positive goals. 

l --b 

2 5 

I-: 

r5


CHAPTER 

2 ENONOTES 

%I From President Johnson's news conference in 1965 as quoted in Charles 

B. MacDonala's An Outline History of U.S. Policy Toward Vietnam 

(Washi:igton, DC: The US Army Center of MIlitary History, 1978), p v, 

2. Hn Cni Minh, Se ected Writings 1920-1969 (Hanoi. Foreign Languages 

Publishing Hcuse, 1977), pp. 120-121, 

K 3. MacDonald. pp. v. and vi. 

4. US National Security Council Document, NSC 124/2, "%,S. Objectives 

and Courses of Action With Respect to Southeast Asia," dated June 25, 

1952, pp. 1-2. 

5. US National Security Council Statement of Policy, NSC 5405, "U.S. 

Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Southeast Asia," 

Dated January 16, 1954, pp, 3-4. 

6. Public Papers of the Presidents of 1he U.S,: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 

1957, "Special Message tc the Congress on Mutual Security Programs," 

May 21, 1957, p. 386. 

MacDonald, p. 6. 

S7. 

8. US National Security Council Document, NSC64, "Report by the National 

Security Council on the Position of the US with Respe-t to Indochina," 

dated February 27, 1950, p. 2. 

9, The Senator Gravel Edition, The Pentagon Papers:, The Defense Department 

History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, Volume I (Boston: 

Beacon Press, 1971), p.. 35, (hereafter Gravel Pentagon Pape"s), 

10. Ibid. 

11. US Department of State, "Statement of Extension of Military and Economic 

Aid," May 8, 1950, Department of State Bulletin, May 22, 1950, 

p., 821. 

12. NSC 124/2, pp. 2-3. 

13. Public Papers of the Presidents of the U.S.. Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, 

State of the Union Message, February 3, 1953, p, 5K. 

"14. Gravel, The Pentagon Papers, Vol. I, p. 85. 

15. Public Papers, President Eisenhower's Remarks, August 1:, 1955, p. 540. 

616. Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report (New York:- Harper & Row, 1961), p. 120. 

2-51

I.L 


17, US Department of State, Press Conference: Secretary Dulles, May 11, 

1954, Department if State Bulletin, May 17, 1954, p, 865. 

18. Public Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower. 1954, PresiJential News Cciference, 

May 12, ,954, p. 473, 

19. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change (New York: Douuleaay, 1963), 

p. 372, 

20. Emmet John Hughes, The Ordeal of Power (New York. Dell, 1962), p. 182. 

21, Department of StaLe, "The U.S. in Southeast Asia," Department of State 

Bulletin, June 10 1956, pp. 210-215. 

22, ibid. 

23. MacDonald, p. 5; and US-Vietnam Relations. 1945-1967, Prepared by the 

Department of Defense, Printed for the Use of the Houise Committee on 

the Armed Services (Washington, D.C." US Government Printing Office, 

1971), hereafter DOD US/VN Relations, Book 1 of 12, II.. A.1.., "The Bao 

Dai Solution," pp. A-5 to A-26. The development which brougnt about 

the US support of a government headed by Baa Dai were, (1) the massing 

of PRC forces along Vietnam's northern borders, (2) the diplomatic 

recognition of Ho Chi Minh's government by the PRC and USSR, (3) the 

agreement by the PRC to provide aid to Ho Chi Minh's government, 

(4) approval by the French of limited autonomy for a Vietnamese government 

headed by the former emperor, Bao Dai, and (5) ths Bao Oai solution 

appeared to be the only opportunity for an eventu"l stable non-communis÷ 

government, 

24. Major General George S. Eckhardt, Command and Cortvol: 1950-1969, 

Department of the Army, Vietnam Studies Series (Washington, D.C," 

U.S. Government Printing Oftice, 1974), p. 7. 

23. MacDonald, p. 10, 

26, ickhardt, pp. 8-9. 

27. Quoted in MacDonald, p. 17. 

28. A leading zdviser who thought Diem should go was for,,,er Army Chief of 

Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, who was given to-! rank of Ambassador 

and sent by Eisenhtower as his personal representat-ie to Saigon in late 

1954 to expedite a c-ash program to improve the South Vietnamese armed 

forces. Collins considered that Premier Diem was unable to pull the 

divisive elements of his society together and. therefore, should nave 

been removed. 

2-52

TI 


29. MacDonald, p. 24. 

30, Bernard Fall, Last Reflections on a War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 

1907), p., 147. 

31, DOD US/VN Relations, See Cable, Douglas Dillion to Secretary of State, 

July 29, !953, Book 9 of 12, V.B.3., pp, 107-108. 

32. Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy (New York: Harpers & Row, li%5), p. 639. 

33. Leslie H Gelb, "Vietnam: The System Worked," Beyond Containment: 

US Foreign Policy in Transition, Edited by kobert W. Tucker and 

William Watts (Wash'ngtrn D.C.: Potomac Associates, 1973), p. 45. 

34. Ibid. Ly 

I 36. 

?5. Cablegram from Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge to Secretary of State Dean 

Rusk, August 29, 1963, Subject: US Policy Toward a Coup, Reprinted 

in Gravel Pentagon Papers, pp. 738-739. 

The Coup D'Etat of November 1, 1963 (Original title: "Fronm the Day of 

the First Republic's Overthrow to the Day the qecond Republic of Vietnar: 

was Founded."), from the private files of Lucien Corein. Copy provided' 

Lo BDM on August. 25, 1979, p. 43; hereafter referred to as tl- GVN 

"White Paper" or the Diem Coup. 

37. ENDNOTE DELETED 

38. The GVN "White Paper" on the Diem Coup, p. 61. 

39. General William C, Westmoreland, "Vietnam in Perspective," The Retired 

Officer, October '1978, pp. 21-24. 

40 President Lyndon B. Johnson in an address to the nation from the White 

House in Washington, D.C., or July 28, 196!; and as quoted in the 

Department of the US Army study "Pacification and Lonq-Term Development 

of Vietnam (short title: PROVN), published in 1966, Annex F, 

"Trace of US Policy and 05jectives in Time," F-33, 

41. Gelb, p. 48. 

42. Ibid. 

43. MacDonald, p. 43. 

4 2-53 

S.. .

0DM CORPOFRATION 

44. Ibid, p, 31. 

45. The GVN "White Paper" on the Diem Coup; Interview at BOM wita the 

Vietnam Strategic Lessons Learned Senior Review Panel on September 

7-8, 1979; and DOD, US/VN Relatons, Book 3 of 12, "The Overthrow 

of Diem." 




49. Paraphrased from The University of Virginia Interview Series conducted 

with General Maxwell D. Taylor by Steve Feinberg on September 27, 

1972, see page 8 of the transcript. As an interesting sidelight, 

reporter and author Dav-d Halberstam and his fellow reporter Neil 

Sheehan supposedly contributed to the overthrow of D:em by announcing 

that they were going to get Diem. They allegedly infiuenced The 

Washington Post, The New York Times and other newspapers into printing 

an inaccurate picture of what was going on in Vietnam. 

See saminterview, 

p. 8. 

50, Ibid, p. 3, 

51. Interview with General Paul D, Harkins, US Army Military History 

Research Collection, Senior Officers Debriefing Program, April 28, 

1974, in Dallas, Texas, pp. 62-63. 

52. Ibid. p. 49. 

53. DOD US-VN Relations, Book 3 of 12, "Memorandum for the President," 

Subject: Vietnam Situation, December 1964, pp. 1-3. 

54. BDM Interview with Gereial Maxwell D. Taylor, conducted at his residence 

on July 11, 1979. 

55. Private Papers of General William C. Westmoreland, On file at the 

Office of the Chief of Military History (OCMH), US Army, Washington, 

D.J. See History Back uo File (7-31 December 1964); Embtel to State 

#1950, dated Dec 26, 1964, subject: "Discourteous Attitude and Abdse 

of Power by Ambassador Taylor." 

56. BDM Interview with General Taylor and General Westmoreland's Private 

Papers, OCMh, History Back up File, Mar 27 - May 7, 1965, See Ambassador 

Taylor, Washington consultation in Washington, D.C. April 1965 

and General Westmoreland's concept for employment and tactical use of 

US combat forces in RVN. 

2-54 

I-.•

THC BDM CORPORATION 

57. DROVN St.'dy, Annex F; and Generals MacArthur ard Ridgway both were 

among many former military leaders who continued against US combat 

involvement on tne mainland of Asia. 

58. Gelb, Bt&yond Containment, p. 47, 

59. MacDonald, p.. 51 and Gelb, Beyond Containment, p, 49. 

60. George Ball, "A Light That Failed," Atlantic Monthly, July 1972, p. 

41" 

61. General Westmoreland's Private Papers, OCMH, Washington, D.C. History 

Back Up File (Mar 27-May ,, 1965); see Memo for the Record, Meeting of 

Ambassador Taylor with Secretary of State Rusk and Consultation 

Papers, April 1965. 

62. Leslie h. Gelb with Richard Betts, Ine Irony of Vietnam: The System 

Worked (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institutior, 1979), p. 145; 

and DOD US-VN Relat-ons, Book 6 of 12, IV, C, 11. pp. 125-127. 

63., Gelb with Betts, p. 145. 

64. General William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, NY: 

Doubleday, 1976), p. 176; and quoted in Gelb with Betts, p. 145. 

65, Gelb with Betts, pp.. 145-146. 

66. DOD, US-VN Relations, Book 6 of 12, IV, C, 11. p. 127. 

67. ttional Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) Nr. 9, April 1, 1969. 

58. Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston, Mass. Little, Brown and 

Co., 1979), pp 272-273; and, MacDonald, pp 74-75. 

69, Kissinger, White House Years, p. 276. 

70. Quoted MacDonald, p. 76. 

71. MacDonald, p. 91; and Kissinger, Wnite House Years, pF. 1473-1476, 

72. Guenter Lewy, America In Vietnam (New Yorkf Oxford Universitv Press. 

1978), p. 204. 

73. Interview with Ambassador 

11 

Ellsworth Bunker at The 

on Se, ember 

BDM Corp, McLean, 

11, 1979; and Interview 

Va. 

at his Washingtun D.C. 

with Ambassado, 

residence by 

Samuel Berger 

BDM Corp study team on June 22, 1979, 

2-55

-i THE BDM CORPORATION 

74. Frank Snepp, Decent Interval (New York: Random House, 1977), pp. 66-216; 

and, Richard A. McMahon, Col, USA, "Assessment of the Army of Republic 

of Vietnam, ARVN," Declassified Intelligence Report by the US Army 

Attache, Saigon, Vietnam, 5 July 1974 (DA 'orm 2496), pp. 1-6, 

S75. Snapp, !bid. 

76. Gelb, Beyond Containment, p., 51. 

I 

I. 

I 

• 2-56


CHAPTER 3 

CONTINGENCY PLANNING 

If a commander is to grasp the essentials and reject 

the inessentials; if he is to spl' his general operation 

into a number of complementary actions in such a 

way that all shall combine to achieve the purpose 

common to every one of them, he must be able to see the 

"f situation as a whole, to attribute to each object its 

relative importance, to grasp the connections between 

each factor in the situation and t.) recognize its 

limits. 

Charles de Gaulle, The Edge of the Sword I/ 

The military proposals for Vietnam, he said, were based 

on assumptions and predictions that could not be 

verified - on help from Laos and Cambodia to halt 

infiltration from the North, or, agreement by Diem to 

reorganizations in his army and government, on more 

popular support for Diem in the countryside and un 

sealing off Communist supply routes. Estimates of both 

time and cost were either abse.it or wholly unrealistic., 

Theodore C. Sorenson about President 

VKennedy in Kennedy 2/ 


*•the 

Before 1965, US contingency planning for operations in Inaochind 

reflecteci America's percept 4 ons of its military capabilities and its role 

in stopping communist aggression abroad. 

US plans for military operations 

"in Southeast Asia did not take shape until the m;d-1950s, and at that time 

were consistent with the experience of combat in Korea, with the US view of 

Chinese threat to Southeast Asia, and with the unquestioned US supremacy 

in air and naval -,ower. 

US 

contingency plans for operations in Indochina, drarted during the 

1950s, were iemarkably similar in concept to the UN campaign in Korea. 

These plans included provisions for countering a conventional enemy 

"3-1


offensive (North Vietnamese or the combined Chinese-North Vietnamese 

forces), establishing defensive positions near the 17th parallel and northwest 

of Saigon near the RVN-Cambodia border, and mounting an eventual 

counteroffensile.. To support those plans, provisions w)re madt for, 

selecting potential targets for nuclear strikes, for occupying key cities, 

and tor interdicting the enemy's critical lines of communication (LOCs)X 

These plans did not change markedly throughout thp 1955-65 time period,3/ 

although US planners were forced to recognize the growing impertance cf 

counterinsurgency in the early 1960s, due in great measure to President 

Kennedy's deep personal interest in counterinsurgency.4/ 

The actual US commitment of combat troops in Indochina in 1965 

differed from that foreseen in contingency plans. 

Perhaps the greatest 

variation was in the incremental US commitment of combat troops, The 

grad al movement of men and equipment to Indochina, which one planning 

document zharacterized "on a business-as-usual basis", had little resemblance 

to the intensity of commitment which US pidnners nad envisioned 

during the 1950s.5/ The early US pians had anticipated a mobilization of 

reserve units; this mobilization was thought to be a cornerstone of the US 

war ef~ort.6/ rhe US commitment further differed from the planned effort 

in that US ground troops were not dispatched to protect northern Thailand 

or Laos, but only to South Vietndm. Some covert special operations were 

carried out, as the US 

had planned for, but the nuclear option was not 

seriofsly considerea during the course of US combat involvement. In 

summary, the Vietnam conflict of the 1965-73 time ppriod was quite a different 

war than .hat which was foreseen by US planners in the 19 5 0s and 

early 1960s. 

B. PEACETIME PERSPECTIVFS 

1. Milit.ry Strategic Planning 

In 1959 and 1960 the Army took an important step in long-range 

planning with the development of the Army-Long-Range Strategic Estimate 

(ARLSI). That estimate forecast the world environment 10 to 15 years in 

3-2

THI 


the future.7/ US joint planning for possible intervention in Indochina 

before 1965 fit the pattern of similar US planning for contingencies in 

other parts of the woId. The JCS issued the Joint Strategic Capabilities 

Plan (JSCP) to assign tasks, allocate forces, and provide guidance to 

commanders of unified and specified commands.8/ Guidance issued annually 

in the JSCP was used by commanders of unified aqd specified commarnds to 

develop or revise contingency plans (operation plans, or OPLANs) for areas 

of concern in their theaters. (Soe Figure 3-1). After approval by the JCS 

of the unified command's plan, detailed supporting plans were developed by 

that comaand's component commanders. Concurrently, the military services 

determined logistic resupply requirements for each contingency plan 9/ In 

the 1950s and early 196Os, the Army component of Pacific Command, US Army, 

Pacific (USARPAC), played a major role in contingency planning, since its 

commander was the designated joint field commander in each of the contingency 

pians for Indoc:,ina.lO/ Wher, U'SMACV was formed as a subordinate 

unified command, ite staff planning responsibilities were dire'ctly to 

ClNCPAC. 

In view of the complexity of the various contingency plars and 

the need for extensive coordination, considerable time was required to 

complete the planning sequence. In some cases, nine or more wonths were 

needed. In another case, the revision cycle for OPLAN 32-64 -- the basic 

plan providing for US combat participation in defense of Southeast Asia -- 

required over 18 months.ll/ 

2. Objectives 

US planners had witnessed encroachment by communist-backed forces 

in several parts of the globe, and some believed that ýhe Indochinese 

countries would soon be ripe for a communist move. As pointed out in 

official documents, three major perceptions dominated US planning and 

policymaking on Indochina during this time: the increased importance of - 

Asia in world politics; the tendency to view the wooIdwlde communist threat 

as a monolith, cent-ally directed frem Moscow; and the view u, Ho Chi 

Miri:i's attempts to evict the French as a local manifestation of the worldwide 

communist thrust.12/ 

3-3

=BDM CORPORATION 

POLICY GUIDANCE 

NSC, OSD, STATE 

POLICY GUIDANCE 

AND DIRECTIVE 

CINCPAC 

ics 

i 

0 JSOP LONG-TERM PROJECTION 

JSCP SHORT-TERM PROJECTION 

OPLANSjN 

32-YR. 

37. YR. 

CINCUSARPAC CNPCL ICAA 

OP LANS 

PASOLN 

32-YR. 32 VR. 3LYj 

(SUBORDINATE COMMANDS 

SUPPORTING PLANS' 

r LtVMUSMACV 

ILLUSTRATVE VIETNAM PLPNS 

* COMUSSEA (DR COMUSEASIA) 0 32- YR. DEFEND IIJDOCHINA 

COMMANDER 

CENTRAL RECION 

A 

32 YR. 

34-A. COVERT IN ORV 

* 37- YR. STABLIZE qVN 

SEATO FIELD FORCES 

0 99 YR. STA!LIZE LAOS 

4541/78W -31-A 

0 SEATC 4- 0EFEND h40OCHINA 

Figure 3-1. Planning Relatiunships - Simolified (Illistrative) 

pv 

.- 4


The overall objective of US 

contingency plans for Southeest Asia 

was contzinment of communism, specificaly to prevent the takeover of 

Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam by communist North Vietnam or by China. 

That objective was an integral part of the American "containment" strategy 

first proposed by George Kennan, This strategy provided for an "unalterable 

counterforce" to the communists "at every point where they show signs 

of encroachment".13/ 

The spectre of possible Chinese military intervention in Indochina 

was a central element of US planning. The Chinese inte-venti)n in 

Korea had caught some US officials, and General MacArthur in particular, by 

surprise, US planners were determined not to overlook the possibility of 

Chinese intervention in any conflict in Indochina. General MacArthur had 

miscalc'lated the PRC's intentions in Korea a' 

first, but he later raised 

the possibility of Peking extending its military power into Southeast Asia.. 

In April 1951, he stated that China was an ;:aggressive imperialist power" 

whose vigorous thrusts were evident "not only in Korea but also in Indochina 

and Tibet and pointing potentially toward the South".14/ 

At the same time, US planners were reluctant to commit American 

ground forces to yet another long inconclusive war suL: as that in Korea, 

The US ground forces were small in number compared to the Chinese Peoples' 

Liberation A-my, yet enjoyed a decisive superiority over thc Chinese in air 

and naval capabilities. Therefore, the earliest US plans for operations 

were tailored to make maximum use of the USAF's conventional and nulear 

capability, and to optimize the US Navy's ability to blockade long 

stretches of coastline. In that way, US planners believed that the Aimerican 

military force would be best employed -- with -elatively few expected 

US losses -- to protect the non-communist states of Indochina. 

3. Planning Highlights 

TWO US contingency plans in support of Frenc. forces in Indochina 

during the early 1950s warrant mention, 

as they illustrate the considerations 

given to joining forces against the communists. As early as 1951, 

G-2 and G-3 planners in Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, in Hawaii, prepared a 

staf study (then Top Secret) dealing with US Navy and US Marine Corps 

3-5


involvement in a possible contingency requiring the evacuation of French 

bnin forces and refugees from Haiphong.15/ That planning served a useful 

porpuse three years later, if only in the sense that a study had been made 

of the physical area and the problems inherent in such an undertakirq. 

regroupment south of about 900,000 refugees and 190,000 Franco-Vietnlr'mese 

troops was facilitated by that earlier planning venture. 

In early 1954, top-level US planners vigorously debated whether 

to come to the aid of French forces at Dien Bien Phu. A plan code-named 

"Vulture", was propcsed in which American airpower would be used to relieve 

the besieged garrison. 


Secretary of State John Foster D'ulles had urged the 

use of nuclear weapons, i position strongly supported by Admiral Arthur W. 

Radford, Chairman of thn JCS. In mid-April, Dulles told France that the US 

might save the French garrison if the US 

received allied support -- meaning 

primarily British support -- and "if v gave you two atomic bombs".&6/ 

President Eisenhower and the NSC studied the situation at length and 

concluded that the US should intervene only on the conditions that the 

venture include an allied coalition (including British, Australian, and New 

Zealand troops), that France grant independence to Indochina following the 

war and that France continue in the war until its successful conclusion, 

Meanwhile, General Matthew B. Ridgway, having previously directed a 

detailed study of Indochina, expressed his aoubts about the plan; General 

Ridgway believed that "the situation had an ominous ring. For .,,if we 

committed air and naval powei, tn that area, we would have to follow them 

immediately with ground forces in support"_17/ At last, President 

Eisenhower -- 

lacking the support of tne British and key members of the US 

Congress -- disapproved th& plan to intervene and Dien Bien Ph.u fell to the 

Viet Minh. W8/ 

The concept of applying massive US airpower in Indochina was 

evident in the earliest US contingency plans. 

According to the Limited War 

Plan - Indochina (revised in late 1956 and since down grade6 to unclassified), 

a major role wodld be played by US aviation, and the possible use of 

up to 215 nuclear weapons was anticipated.19/ This contingency plan 

envisioned operations by US and allied forces "to repulse the overt 

3-6


aggression by Viet Minh forces" and then 'to destroy Viet Minh forces and 

Chinese Communist forces in Indochina",20/ US planners anticipated having 

sufficient strength in South Vietnam by dbout 0 + nine months to counterattack 

and destroy enemy 

forces there, to be followed by an amphibious 

assault aimed at Hanoi. The "overt agj;:ession" theme is apparent in early 

CINCPAC plans (numbers 48 and 56) dealing with Indochina, which envisioned 

conventional 

invasions by Noth Vietnamese or combined North Vietnamese/ 

Chinese units through Laos across the Mekong River (the Thailand-Laos 

borGer) or down the Laotian panhandle, eventually to threaten Bangkck and 

Saigon.21/ 

F While these early plans were in preparation, most US planners 

lacked a firm understanding of local conditions in Indochina. 

According to 

LTG Bruc= C. Clarke, USA, commander of USARPAC in 1955, his command had "no 

first hand knowledge on the conditions in Laos and very little material in 

the files on which realistic pildns couia be based".22/ Apparently based on 

this inadequate knowledge, CINCPAC requested USARPAC to participate in the 

development of a requirement plan for the defense of Laos.23/ LTG Clarke's 

observations of local forces wei.e also insightful, for he noted their 

tendency "to pattern their armies after the United States organizational 

structbre".24/ 

4. CINCPAC OPLAN 32-59 

Contingency planning for active US military intervention evidently 

began in earnest in 1959, with the first preparation of CINCPAC 

OPLAN 32-59. According to some military historians this original "32 

Plan" was a 

crash effort to prepare for the detp-'orating situation in 

Laos 25/ For the first time, US planning tooK account of counterinsurgency 

operations ,he plan, however, retained tne spatial concept of its predecessors, 

and called for a main US 

forward defense line along the Mekong 

River, to serve as the "jump-off point" for a counteroffensive into 

40 northern La.os. A large Army buildup in northern Thailand was foreseer by 

2 US planners. 

Vietnam. 

CINCPAC OPLAN 32-5S addrc~ssed th2 insurgency in neighboring South 

The plan, however, made no provision for dealing with the sccial, 

3-7 

-


psychological, 

ana political aspects of the insurgency, which were presumably 

left to the Soutn Vietnamese. The projected US intervention was aimed 

primarily at holding critical areas and facilities with conventional 

forces. By the 1960s, the insurgency in Scuth Vietnam was recognized as a 

major threat in ;tself. In hopes of stemming the insurgency, the US orchestrated 

an expansion of RVIIAF and the Civil Guard and attempted to exact 

political and military reforms from President Diem to shore up the regime's 

supoort, by means of the Counter-Insurgency Plar (CIP) of January 1961. 

The CIP was actually the US ground plan for revitalizing the GVN; in no 

sense was it a contingency plan. 26/ 

The 32 Plan changed little in the early 1960s.. 

It envisioned an 

enemy approach down the main axis of the Laotian panhandle, with US forces 

on the defensive for several months after- a rapid reinforcement to the 

area. Major defensive lines of US forces were called for in two principal 

areas -- one stretching from Thailand across Laos north of the Bolovers 

Plateau and across RVN to the Tonkin Gulf, and the other a fallback position 

near the Cambodia-RVO border north of Saigon to pritect the capital. 

A number of geographicai targets were selected for ADM 

munition) blasts to slow the enemy advance southward, 

The US counteroffensive 

would follow, with US 

(atomic demolition 

forces making paradrops in the very heart of 

North Vietnam and staging amphibious landings along the DRV coastline. The 

"upper level" of the 32 Plan called for establishment of the position of 

Commander, US Forces, Southeast Asia (COMUSSEA) -- a senior commanrder 

directly under the JCS who would be responsible for operations throughout 

the Ind'cnina theater.27/ The 32 Plan was updated each year during the 

early 1960s. (See Map 3-1) Wnen it came, the actual conflict - as the NLF 

and their North Vietnamese fought it -- did not conform to this plan. US 

logistical support activities of the mid-'960s were, however, guideo 

chiefly by the 32 Plan. 

From this plan may be traced some of the early optimistic projections 

ol the total US manpower which would be required to counter the enemy 

operations in Indochina. 

The 32 Plan called for a total US commitment of 

about 205,000 men -- about six divisions -- in the event of a joint North 

3-8 

.1, ' ;• ,,-- ; .

THE BDMV COR~PORATION- 

HI 

I 

~ATT7tK 

~-.;MAJOR- 

CONSORN 

A 

AXISM OFUCA EAV!Qn T( 

Map w-1. Tpcaal Contingenc Plnigas ee fSot ita 

Kkw3-9

,f THE BDM CORPORATION 

k 

Vietnamese/Chinese invasion, Phase IV as it was called.28/ (it is ironic 

that in 1968, without facing Chinese forces, USMACV had about 520,000 US 

troops augmented by cver 62,000 non-US Free World forces. The early 

optimistic estimates apparently were based on the assumption that an eneiry 

nvasion would be sharply offset by US airpower,) 

5. Related Plans 

Under the Kennedy Administration, Laos continued to occupy center 

stage in contingency planning. li May 1962, the Fresident requested 

contingency planning, in the event of a breakdown of t;ie Laotian ceasefire, 

in two major areas. 

investing and holding by Thai forces with US backup in 

northern Laos west of the Mekong River, ahd holding and recapture of the 

panhandle area of southern Laos with Thai, Vietnamese, or US forces. 

President Kenn2dy asked that this planning be undertaken unilaterally bý 

the US without discussion with Thrvi o- Laotian officials.30/ 

The conceot of "increasing pressure" on the enemy is apparent in 

USARPAC OPLAN 37-64, which had as its goal the stability cf the RVN. In 

general terms, the plan called fir emphasis on border control operations, 

some limited retaliation against the DRV. and graduated overt offensives 

into the North.. The US assumptions for imiplement;ng this plan are noteworthy: 

sufficient progress by the ARVN in fighting the insurgency in the 

South to make it possible for them to launch raids iito the ORV, 

cooperacion 

by other local governments (Thailand and Laos), the availability of 

necessary funds, and the lifting of restrictions on US operations to permit 

implementation of th' plan.31/ A common thread running through all contingency 

pl~ais for a major US commitment is the assumption of a policy 

decision to monilize Army reserve uiits. 

b. Constraiits on Planning Options 

a. Geneva Accords and SEATO Agreements 

The Geneva Accords of July 1954, which settled the First 

Indochina War, imposed restrictions on American otficials in Indochina. US 

officials had to maintain a low, unobtrusive profile in RVN, a condition 

which complicated early American efforts to report conditions in the 

countryside, Tn addition, General Maxwell Taylor has noted that the Diem 

3-10 

kI-,


regime "was 

very cold to American requests to poke around the countryside". 

32/ Meanwhile, communist Viet ,inh leaders had made full use of 

their opportinities to establish a covert armed cadre and to gather intelligence.33/ 

The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), which was 

* crganized in 1954 and came into force in 1955, had as one of its major 

goals the deterrence of communist aggrescion in Indochina. 

SEATO contingency 

plans for the collective defense of this region were incorporated in 

SEATO Plans 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8.34/ These plans dealt vario.,sly with the 

defense of Thailand, Laos, 

and with the reinforcement and defense of RVN. 

Cambodia and South Vietnam (the Central Region), 

Many of the member sta'.es 

(the US, UK, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philipoines, and 

*-Thailand) were reluctant to make a military commitment to Indochina, and 

the organization lacked the cohesiveness and immediate sense of purpose to 

function as its founders had envisioned. Only token forces were pledged; 

thE '.fore SEATO's operation plans were based on requirements rather than on 

designated forces or troop units. 

b. Neutralization of Laos and the "Secret War" 

The Genevd agreement of July 1962, designed to settle the 

conflict in Laos, prohibited the US and other foreign powers from implementing 

any plan to station military forces in Laos. The very points in 

the Declaration of the Neutrality of Laos which the North Vietnamese 

repeatedly violated would block US implementation of CINCPAC OPLAN 32-64 

ana CIINCPAC OPLAii 99-64 (;hich specifically provided for the defense of 

Laos). These points included articles 2G (no foreign trops or military 

personnel in Laos), 2H (no military bases in Laos), and 21 (the prohibitio.n 

on 

simg the territory of Laos to inte-fere in the internal affairs of 

another country).35/ 

*" Rather tnan introduce military units in Laos, the Kennedy 

administration mounted a wide-ranging covert paramilitary campaign through 

the CIA and its proprietary orianization Air America (see Chapter 6, Volume 

VI)36/. William E. Colby, firmerly the Director of Central Intelligence, 

later stated that the US, having made an agreement with tre USSR in 1962 

3-11

THE BCM CORPORATION 

over Laos, "tried to hold onto it, which is why we gave aid through the 

CIA",.37/ This commitment continued through the Johnson and Nixon administrations, 

and led to a complicated series of command arrangements and 

restrictions on US operations which would continue throughout the period of 

US involvement.,38/ 

It should be noted that COMUSMACV had given consideration in 

1964 to establishing an international force below the DMZ and across Laos, 

generally along Route 9. 

In 1967 contingency plans were prepared for a 

corps-size force of three divisions to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. 

Sufficient forces were not available for suich an operation until 1968, oy 

which time President johnsun was beset by war critics and was unable to 

expand the war. 39/ 

c. Cambodian Instability 

US contingency plans generally had recognized that enemy 

forces would use sanctuary areas. Due largely to the instability of the 

Sihanouk government, PAVN (NVA) troops used parts of eastern Cambodia as 

base and sanctuary areas, from which to launch raids into RVN. 

As in the 

case of Laos, US policy-makers found no effective alternative to prevent 

use of those sanctuary areas. Covert, small-scale raids and intelligence 

reconnaissance patrols by US and ARVN troops were launched irto tne-e 

areas, but had no decisive effect. 

In efforts to deny some of the major 

Cambodian sanctuary areas, the US began a series of B-52 strikes in eastern 

Cambodia in March 1969 (see Chapter 6 Volume VI). 

d., 

PRC'USSR Attitudes 

Early US 

contingency plans were based on the expectation 

that China could intervene at any time. In addition to warnings i .suea by 

General MacArthur not to become enmeshed on Lie Asian mainland in the 

1950s, the Chinese road-building program in the far northern part of Laos 

in 1960-61 as well as the CPR's border war with India in 1962 indicated the 

possibility of Chinese military intervention against US forces. By the 

mid-1960s, however, Chira became internally convulsed by the Great 

Proletarian Cultural Revolution and its capabilities and will to intervene 

ir force dwindled. 

I .3-12


At the same time, US contingency plans did not reflvt the 

prospect of massive Soviet support of North Vietnam's military effort., 

North Vietnam was treated by US planners as a vassal state or proxy of the 

Chinese, and the scope of the Soviet-sponsored builaup of Ncrth Vietnam s 

ground and air defense forces in the nid-i960s probably took some US 

officials by surprise 

e. Internal US Constraints 

Several constraints prevented the US from preparing contingency 

plans which "fit" the real nature of the war. The first constraint 

was the faulty nature of US intelligence during the 1950s and early 1960s 

(see Chapter 9 Volume VI). This prevented US planners from gaining a true 

insight into the capabilities and intentions of both North and South 

Vietnam. Another constraint was the general lack of background knowledge 

by US planners about the enti'e region (long considered to be on the 

"periphery", far from direct US interests), These factors combined to 

ensure that faulty assumptions about enemy and friendly states would be 

included in some contingency plans. The military services lacked the 

political guidance such as that required from the State Department to set 

qoals or to define the obstacles which might be encountered in attaining 

military goals.40/ Without this necessary guidance, the Joint Chiefs were 

left to develop their own concepts of future policy. According to Gen., 

Maxwell Taylor the JCS lacked adequate military guidance as late as 1964, 

when the US was turning increased attantion to Vietnam., The JCS had the 

Secretary of Defense's encouragement, "but little guidanc- as to standards 

of s..f.iciency".41/ 

Other top military planners have remarked there was no 

unified military view of the situation in Vietnam.42/ 

C, PLANS ACTUALLY IMPLEMENTED 

!. OPLANs 34A and 37-64 

9uring the watershed year of 1964, the first contingency plan to 

be implemented was the joint MACV/CIA OPLAN 34A, an eliborate program of 

covert operations designed to punish the North Vietnamese for their support 

3-13

BDM STHE CORPORATION 

of the insurgency in the South. OPLAN 34A was firt proposed in May 1963 

and, 

after coordination by the military and CIA, was approved by President 

Johnson in mid-January 1964., Phase One began on February I, and was 

designed to ruo until May 1964. Specific paramilitary operations included 

capture of prisoners and physical destruction of installations in the DRV, 

to be carried out by both US and South Vietnamese commando troops, as well 

as an expanded effort to collect intelligence and condict psychological 

operations in thzv North (see Chapter 9, Volume VI). Phases Two and Three 

called for the same categories of action, but of increased tempo and 

magnitude -- all designed to punish th.: DRV in return for aggression. 

Phase One operations had little effect, -ir,d the subsequent phases were not 

set in motion.43/ 

A portion of CiNCPAC OP-.AN 

purposes by tne JCS in April 1964, 

37-64 was approved for planning 

That portion tabulated The number of 

planes and optimum bomb tonnage required for each phase of the air strikes 

in North Vietnam. In June the JCS refined the CINCPAC plan and produred a 

comprehensive list of 94 targets in the DRV which would be most su'table 

for air strikes.44/ The initial airstrikes were performed oy both US and 

South Vietnamese aircraft, but the VNAF 

would later be eased out of the 

operation and the US took near-total responsibility for condict of the air 

war. Significantly, top policynakers in Wasnington took the lead in 

directing the air sar, 

would not be struck until 1972. 

2. Changing Perceptions 

During 1964 and early 1965, 

and all of the 94 prime targets on tne JCS list 

a series of increasingly pessimistic 

intelligence reports from SVN apparently affected the actions of top US 

planners, particularly with regard to the spreading inFurgency in the 

South. In early 1964, the CIA claimed that the insurgency tide seemed to 

be going against the GVN in all four Corps Tactical Zones. CIA reports in 

.1 early 1965 remained somber, and pointed out the lack of progress in pacifi- 

It appears That the perspectives of most planners changed during 

j .cation. 

this time, with far more focus directly on tL. guerrilla war in the 

South. 45/ 

1 3-14 

I


3. No Reserve Call-up 

The initial logistical tjildup in 1964 refleczed some elements of 

OPLAN 32-64.46/ However, the crucial decision not to mobilize the reserves 

(see below) and inaction on the part of the JCS and Secretary cf Defense on 

CCMUSMACV's 1964 request for a logistics command and engineer construction 

units unfavorably affected the implementation of the suosequent buildup of 

combat forces in South Vietnam. See Table 3-1, 

Throughout early 1965, planners within the Department of the Army 

and at CONARC 

Headquarters generally assumed that any augmentation of the 

Army's force structure would include at least a partial call-up of Reserve 

component units. Contingency plans contained the proposed call-up of 

Rkeserve components for a maximum period of 12 months. Troop lists for 

these contingency plans were rendered useless on July 28, 1965, when 

President Johnson announced plans for the major infusion of US 

South Vietnam, an immediate increase to 125,000 men, 

forces into 

with additional forces 

to be deployed as necessary. This buildup wou'd be accomplished by 

increased draft calls, but no Reserve units or individuals were to be 

called up.47/ This surprise decision by the President-- not envisloreo in 

contingency plans -- caused a host of related problems.48/ (See chapter 4 

of this volume). 

4. Planning Deployment in SVN 

By this time, US officials realized that a large US troop 

presence would not be required in Thailand ano that such a presence in Laos 

was prohibited by the 1962 agreement. Tht- major planning issue in 19E5 vas 

where to deploy the bulk of US 

Central Highlands (where USMACV 

troop strength in South Vietnam -- in the 

and most intelligence analysts believed the 

major enemy tnrea. to be) or near populated areas on the coastline to 

protect cities and industries there (as CINCPAC had urged).49/ The issue 

of troop deployment would have a bearing on the type of operations each 

commander preferred: Gen. Westmoreland preferred mobile and heliborne 

"search and destroy" operations, whereas CINCPAC made a case for security/ 

clearing operations to clear the coastal "encleves"., 

comba: operations was discussed in this framework, 

pla:is had very littie meaning. 

3-15 

Once the planning for 

the early contingency


TABLE 3-1. STEPS TOWARD "GRAGUALISN" -- PLANNING DECISIONS, 1964-196s 

DATE: 

EVENT: 

22 APR 64 (Memo, Dep, Sec. Def, to CJCS) Secretary of Defense Mr, 

McNamara insisted that he personally approve every 

MACV manpower space, 

23 MAY 6' (Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 2304182) MACV opposed to "flooding' 

RVN with US personnel; preferred buildup on seiective 

basis. 

27 MAY 64 Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 2708052) CINCPAC agreed with 

COMUSMACV, outlined specific advisory buildup rec.mmended. 

28 JUL 64 (Msg, COMUSMACV to JCS, MACJI 7044) COMUSM'%CV requested 

4,200 personnel by 1 Dec 64. 

7 AUG 64 (Memo, Sec. Def., to CJCS) McNamara directed that his 

proposed accelerated deployment be completed by end of 

Sept 64., 

11 AUG 64 (Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, MACJ3 7738) Westmoreland 

could not absorb buildup in time requested by Sec. Def. 

IS AUG 64 (Msg, JCS to CSA, CNO, CSAF et al., JCS 7953) Sec Def 

cancelled dccelerated deployment, goes along witn 

COMUSMACV. 

26 FEB 65 Decision made in Washington to send Marines to Da Nang, 

recommended by COMUSMACV on 22 Feb; Marines land 6 Mar, 

16 MAR 65 (JCS message 0936) GEN H, K. Johnson ret.,rned from RVN, 

recommended deployment of US combat forceý. 

6 APR 65 (NSAM 328) President aoproved dispatch of 2 more Marine 

battalions and air wing, autnorizea their diploymant 

for active combat missions. 

SOURCE: Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Vol., i1, po. 416-423. 

L31 

N-


5. Other Factors 

In retrospect, it dcas noc appear that -conomic or budgetary 

factors were constraints in the development of US 

the actual buildup of U 1 forces., 

ccntingency plans nr in 

In both cuses, it was envisioned tnat a 

conflict in Indochina would be "capital-intensive," as US forces would rely 

on large imounts of (expensive) fireonwer delivered by aircraft and suph"- 

sticated grnund weapons. By contrast the IS had expected enemy forces to 

wage a similar type of "capital-intensive" i.onventional zorflict. Instead, 

the enemy actually mounted a relatively low-cost guerrilla war until 1972• 

The major domestic constraint on the initi~al US conduct of the war was a 

political )ne. President Kennedy and Pre:rdent Johnson both sought to 

minimize the scope ot the US commitmenit, even at the cosl of adopting 

policies which r•n counter to traditional military doct..ine and s;-tategy. 

6. MACV Cootingency Planning Post 1965 

a., 

Unilateral Planning 

After the influx of iarge numbers 

of American tioop units 

and the transformation of Headquarters, "SMACV into an operational headquar'ters 

directing combat operations, there existed an apparent need for a 

contingency planning capability within MACV, Previously, plannirg for 

Southeast Asian contingencies had been accomplished by component commanders 

of Pacific Command and their subordinate commanders, 

Beginning in 1965 the 

presence in RVN of signiricant US combat forces resulted i1 there being a 

de facto commander on the spot, one whose :taff could produce the necessary 

plans for likely contingencies using fcrces assigned to him plh. an\, 

additional for-es earmarked by the JCS for hs use.5C/ 

A'n gen2ral, nEar-term operations or contingencies were 

planneo for by the J-3 staff of MACV. For 3xample, plans prepared in 1969 

fcr attacking into ;ambodia were prepared by tne J-3 even though there was 

no auchorization for such attacks at that time.51/ 

U-ilateral U_ plans, such as the general war plan, the 

deferse of Thailand and tie protocol states, the defense of RVN in the face 

of a combhnea Chinese-North Vietnamese attack, arn cf.'tain sensitive code 

word P.'.ns for cuvert operations %er3 drawn up in 6,Z 3-r staff. 

I. 3-17


Soperation. 

b. SEATO Plarniog 

Prior to 1965, US planning in support of SEATO was accomplished 

in the same manner as was unilateral planning. Appropria~e 

subordinrate commands witnin gPACOM were charged with thr t ranning responsibility 

in ,espcnse to policy guidance and planning requirements provided by 

the Military Plamiiinq Office (MPO) of SEATO in Pangko',, ThaiIand. 52/ After 

1965 MAC J-52 was charged with the responsibility of prepaying the field 

com-iander's plans, since COMUSM'ACV was designated Commander, Central 

Region, SEATO Field Forces, SEATO MPO provided the basic directive, and 

the detailed contingency plans were developed by MAC J-52 COLUSMACV., 

it should be note& that the SEATO plans anticipated contingencies 

similiar to those reflected in unilhteral US plans. The latter, however, 

were based on actual troop lists and programmed reinforcements, 

whereas 

SEATO plans were based on requirements, sir-,. only token for~es were 

pledged by SEATO member nations., 

c. Concept Planning 

In June 1969 the Pacific Command sponsored a planning conference 

to provide an 

oriLntation for all, contingency planners through 

FVCOM and to discuss a proposal by tne k' int Staff for a new form of 

planning. The JCS representatives at the conference were prepared to 

recommend that complete plans be developed -nly for major contingencies. 

Minor plans, th.osei n tne same geographic areas but calling for fewer troop 

units or other assets, would be prepared in skpleton form; that is, a 

detailed concept of operations would be prepared but annexes and ippendices 

would be or,7itted unless absolutely essential to an understandino of the 

The basic premise for these "Concept Plans" was ti,at if the 

major plan, fully developed, was feasible, the lesser plans :3u~d also be 

implemented. PACOM planners welcomed the concept and recommended its 

adoptior. 53/ 

D., 

ASSESSMENT OF PLANNING EFFECTIVENESS 

In view of the sharp differences between ex 4 sting contingency plans 

and the actual US commitment nf troops in 1965, it is clear that these 

3-18


contingency plans -- or most of their componpnt elements -- were not tested 

j iin combat. In e:Fect, this precludes a thorough assessment of US planning 

effectiveness.54/ The comfiponents of US contingency plans which were 

employed in 1964 ard 1965 were depencent -- at least in part -- on a set of 

associated, complementary actions ;r, crier to ",e truiy effective. An 

examinatioi, of the covert commando assaults (callea fir in OPLAN 34A) and 

the bombing of the DRV (called for in a portion of OPLAN 37-f4) reveals 

that the concept of "gradualism" -- as reflected i, both these contingency 

plans -- was ineffective. US military operations applied in this manrer 

. did not punish the DRV enough, or ir, a concentrated "dose", Lo torce the 

E iidentify 

North to stop its support of the insurgency in the South. 

According to most accounts by Army officials, the system for contingency 

planning is basically sound.55/ 

As a rule, the associated commands 

had (and continue to have) ample opportunity to perform the necessary 

coordination and to plan for implementation of the plans at the local 

l evel Contingency planning as practiced by the Army is gr,-ally effective 

from the military standpoint. US planners, however, must rccogiiize 

that contingoncy planning does not occur in a vacuum by itself, but that a 

host of factors can -- and often w;ill -- work to alter the shape of actual 

operations in a c•'isis situation. See Figure 3-2. 

Contingency plans serve a useful purpose. They provide an opportunity 

to study an area and a potential crisis siLuation. Planners are able to 

gaps in the information available to them and to make an effort to 

fill the gaps or to devwlop appropriate 3ssumptiors and .:tsponsive and 

1ternate plans. 

E., SUMMARY ANALYSIS AND INSIGHTS 

CINCPAC OPLAN 32-year and supporting 32-year prepared by PACOM 

component commrnnds and their principal subordinate commands failed to 

appreciate and assess the true nature of the tireat existing in Vietnam 

before 1965. The 32 Plan was never invoked, although it did proviae a 

haidy 'rule of thumb" concerning the US logistical buildup. One major 

3-19


INTELLIGENCE 

,NFORMATON 

BCGON 

KNOWLEDGE 

T'hO TO FORM 

PECPTIONS 

W"MiC~ AR 

!ftSTR UNEft! AL"t ~ST AT!I.C 

I SI.ED 

SCONTINGENCY 

PLAN 

, 

WHICH MAY BE IMPEOE"3 BY 

BUREAUCRATIC 

CONSTRAINTS 

AND RESULT IN.. 

i 

ACTUAL 

CONTINGENCY 

PLAN 

SUBJECT TO 

____ 

REAL WORLD PECULI *A. - CHANGES IN 

CONSTRAINTS OF FRENOLY I 

1SITUATION 

ENEMY SITUATION 

AS WELL AS W4ICH AcFECT 

QUIRKS OF 

POIICY 

MAKERS 

ACTION IN 

CRISIS 

WHICH ,S MET BY 

[ENEMY REACTION 

AND THE 3OTTOM LINE IS 

RESULTS 

454' .78W 

SOURCE: BDM Analysts' Visualization of the Planning Process 

Figure 3-2. 

Contingency Planning 

3-20

THE BLIM CORPORATION 

reason for not implementing contingency plans as writt i, was the wide 

variance between the anticipated conflict (as viewed by US planners in the 

1950s and early 1960s) and the insuigency-type conflict that the US 

actually fought. Another major reason was emphasis by the president to 

downplay the scale of US 

period. 

US 

involvement in Inuochina during the 1961-65 time 

planning was heavily influenced by the prospect of Chinese interventlon 

in Southeast Asia. After being surprised in 1950 when the PRC 

intervened in Korea, US planners were resolved to be prepared for the 

possibility of Chinese intervention in Indcchina. 

If the enemy had fought the type of war which US planners first 

envisioned (large units operations, clearut lines of advance and retreat, 

minimal insurgency), the UIS likely would have reacted differently. Evid2ntly 

the North Vietnamese had studied the strengths and weaknesses of US 

forces which had evolved since the Korean conflict, and tailored strategy 

and tactics so as not to play into US strengths (airpower, large amounts of 

ground-based firepower, etc.). 

:.. LESSONS 

0 Contingency planning requires review by experienced analysts who 

ar'e familiar with the local political and economic realities to 

ensure that contingency plans are realistic and have r-esponded to 

changes in the Iccal situation. This input should not be co.isidered 

a substitjte for sound military strategy, but the 

[ integration of these factors PaeN have a major bearing on military 

operations. 

-I Contingency plans should not be shaped by the "last war," but by 

the realities cf the threat and US objectives in the area of the 

proposed contingency plan By contrast, there is ample evidence 

that some Vietnam contingency plars were Fhaped by the Korean 

A War: the "Yalu River syndrome" of possible Chine3e intervention, 

3-21


the expectation that UN 

allies would make some meaningful rontribution, 

and the preparation for a conventional, stand-up type 

of conflict, etc. Each situation requi.ing a contingency plan is 

unique and different from cthers which may appear at first glance 

to have been similar. 

The amount and level of interdisciplinary study to be focused on 

a contingency plan should be in proportion to the value of that 

area to I,, interests. Contingency plans for areas of critical US 

interest should receive the most scrutiny. 

a 

9 Accurate intelligence information is fundamental to the formation 

of sound contingency plans. It is imperative that this intelligence 

be unbiased, objective, and drawn frim all available 

sources. The intelligence information may be coupled with a 

scenario in order to give policymakers a realistic expectation of 

the outcome of their proposed ictions. When an actual crisis 

occurs, policymakert should have faith in a contingency plan 

which has been testea hy scena-ios and war-gaming simulations. 

Those who prepare contingency plans should be aware of jossible 

domestic planning constraints, and even the predispositions of 

top policy-makers, 

These factors -- such as t•,e Johnson ddministration's 

refusal to mobilize reserve units for Vietnara -- may 

affect the outcome of a crisis situation just as much as any 

other factor. It is recognized that. the military's duty is not 

to oversLa domestic policy, put military planners shuuld be 

"aware that policymakers hesitate to put some contingency plans 

into motion. 

, * In view of the many factors which may affect the execution of a 

contingency plan, planners shoula build in a series of realistic 

"variations and options to the central contingency plan. 

Specifically, 

each assumption upon which a plan is based must be 

accompanied by a realistic alternate plan to be used if that 

assumption fails to materialize. The key is to ident:fy necessary 

and realistic assumptions in the first place. 

3-22

THE Bf3'M CORPORATION 

a Clear and definitive national security policy guidance is 

essential for strategic planning. If adequate policy guidance is 

not givpn to military planners, they must deduce their own -- as 

a necessary starting point. Some former commanders contend that 

policy guidance during the pre-1965 era was too general to be 

usef.A. Vague or all-encompassing statements ef defeihse policy 

objectives are of little help in defense planning. Instead, 

goals and alternatives should be made as explicit as feasible and 

subjected to frequent scrutiny arn debate. Some have called for 

at least an annual review of major unified/specified command 

plans by the Secretary of Defer.se and his key assistants to 

assure that political assumptions are consistent with national 

security policy.56/ Such briefings also would broaden the understanding 

of essential policymakeys of actual US military capabilities 

and options in the event of crisis or conflict. 

I 

JI 

"i ~3-23

THE BDIM COP PORATION 


1. Charles de Gaulle, The Edge of the Swora, translated by Gerard Hopkins 

(New York: Criterion Books, 1960). This quote is extracted from 

Adrian Liddell Hart, ed., The Sword and the Pen (New York- Thomas Y, 

Croweii, 1976), p, 255. The original book by de Gaulle was published 

in 1932. 

2. Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 

552-563. Th-s quote is taken from Weldon A.. Brown, Prelude to Disaster: 

T;he American Role in Vietnam 1940-1963 (Port Washington, NWY.: Kennikat 

Press, 1975), p. 177. 

3. The Office of the Chief of Military History (OCMH) of the Oepartmert 

of thp Armv hps been consulted by the BDM research team for Data or 

Contingency Planning. Mr, Vince Demma of OCMH was particularly 

Knowledgeable ari helpful in this area, 

4. General Maxwell Taylor noted that i960 was the first year in which 

Washington appreciated the guerrilla threat, when LTG Lionel C. McGarr 

and then 0G Edward Larsdale came to Washington to "drive home the new 

situation," He referred t3 President Kennedy's pressure for getting 

counterinsurgency activity moving and added that the President 

had To beat me over the head before I understood wna 4 he was talking 

abort." interview 501, US Air Force Oral History Prolram, Declassified, 

31 December 1978. 

5. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration) Department 

of Defense, Report of DoD Study Group on Adequary of Mobility 

Planning and Operations Organization (U) July 1965. (SECRET, Gowngraded 

to CONFIDENTIAL; extract is UNCLASSIFIED). "The gradual movement 

and material to SEA, on a business-as-usual basis, has not 

provided an appropriate basis for use in evaluating OPLAN 32-64," p. 

15. This source will be referred to here as DoD Study Group - A.M.P.O.O. 

p. 9. 

6. On July 15, 1965, the Strategic Plans Division J-5, of the Joint Staff 

proposed to the Secretary of Defense the number of divisions and otner 

suppcrt needed for a major effort in Vietnam. Partial mobilization 

was key to "insure an effective force as soon as possible", General 

Bennett, then Director of Strategic Plans, made a strong point of the 

mobilization requirement. On July 28, he heard President Johnson's 

television address con:erning reinforcement of US forces in Vietnam 

"1".. without mobilizing", and he stated that he was probably the most 

shocked man in the world. Interview of General Donald V, Bennett, USA 

(Ret), US Army Military History Research Collection, Senior Officer's 

Debriefing Program, Military History Institute, US Army War College, 

Carlisle Barracks, PA., Tape 7, Transcript pp. 20-23. 

11: 3-24

THE 


7. Bennett interview, Tape 6, transcript pp, 4-5. 

8. ENDNuTE DELETED 

9. DoQ Study Group - A.M.P.O.O., p. 9. 

l0, Colonel E. W. King, GS, letter to Chief, Military History Division, 

entitled "History of Development SEA Contingency Structure for PACOM," 

21 November 1963. 

11, DoD Study Group - A.M.P.O.G., p. 10. It should be noted that planning 

organizations normally had/ha-,e cognizance over several plans, each of 

which requires updating annually. Planning staffs are often hard 

pressed to complece the reouired annual updating efficiently. In the 

case of the USMACV J-5, the one-year tour deprived that command of any 

corporate memory and continuity, 

12, The Pentagon Papers Sen. Mike Gravel Edition, Volume I of 4 Volumes 

(Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), p. 81. Hereafter Gravel Pentagon Papers. 

13, William Manchester, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964 

(Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), p. 676. 

14, Ibid., p. 658. This phrase is extracted from General MacArthur's 

farewell address to the US Congress. Also see Volume III of this 

study for a discussion of the impact that the Korean War had on US 

foreign policy. 

15. Colonel Victor J. Croizat, USMC (Ret). Interviewed on 10 February 

1970 by Mr. Benis Frank, Marine Corps nral History Program, p. 19. 

Colonel Croizat served in Vietnam in 1954 and later translated Volume 

II of the French Command's "Lessons Learned in Vietnam." 

16. Brown, Prelude to Disaster, pp. 52-53. 

17. Ibid., p. 53. 

18. President Eisenhower, acknowledging the possibility of Red Chinese 

intervention, felt that in such an event the US would have to strike at 

the head instead of the tail of the snake, at Red China itself. 

Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change 

1953-1956 (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1963), p. 354. 

Also se2 Volume III, Chapter 3, the Eisenhower Administration, pp. 

3-16 to 3-21 and Appendix A to Volume III, pp. A-18 to A-23. 

19. Department of the Army, Office of the Director of Plans, Limited War 

Plan - Indochina Revised 26 November 1956, (TOP SECRET, -s-Eedown 

graded to UNCLASSIFIED). 

4 

3-25

[ D0M CORPORATION 

20. Ibid., first page of text (not numbered)., 

21. Interview with Mr, Vince Vemma, Historian, DepQrtment of the Army, 

Office of the Chief of Military History (OCMH), on 9 November 1979. 

22. LTG 3ruce C. Clarke, USA Report of Visit of Lt. General Br'uce C. 

Clarke, Commanding General, U.S. Army Pacific to Western Pacific & 

Southeast Asia, 6-29 September 1955, Volume One (CONFIDENTIAL, extract 

is UNCLAS9IF ED), p. 61. 

23 Ibid., p. 61. 

24. Ibid., p. 24. Of coirse, by this time US advisors were helping to 

shape the organization structure of the local forces. 

L 

25. Demma interview. 

25. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol. II, pp. 23-30 piovides a discussion of 

the CIP and Ambassador Durbrow's tactics in negotiating its provisions 

with President Diem. 

27. Demma interview. In addition, DA/OCMH has a number of maps which 

cl-early zhow US defense Dlans for Indochina 

28. Daniel Ellsberg, Papers on the War (New ,o,'k: Simon and Schuster, 

1972), p. 60. Also see Secretary of Defense McNamara's Memorandum for 

tl:e President dated November 8, 1961, which discussed CINCPAC Plan 

32-59, Phase IV, in Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol, II, p. 108. The 32 

plan visualized four graduated phases of the threat with Phase IV 

being the extreme or massive invasion of *Lhe protocol states. 

29, Commander in Chief Pacific and Commander US Military Assistance Command d 

Vietnam Report on the War in Vietnam (As of June 30, 1968) (Washington: 

US Government Printing Office, 1968) p. 221. 

30. National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) No. 157 of May 29, 1962. 

Subject: Presidential Meeting on Laos, May 24, 1962, reprinted in 

Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol. II, pp. 672-673. It must be remembered 

that the US was facing several challenges from local insurgencies 

around the world at that time -- in Laos, Vietnam, the Congo, and in 

some parts of Latin America. 

A1. USARPAC OPLAN 37-64. Copy on file in the Office of the Chief of 

Military History, Department of the Army. 

32. Gen Maxwell D. Taylor, USA (Ret.), Swords and Plowshares (New York: 

W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1972), pp. 238-219. In an interview for 

the Air Force Oral History Program, General Taylor reinforced this 

point, rernarking that Diem didn't want Americans oitside of Saigon. 

Interview of General Maxwell D. Taylor, 11 January 1972, by Major 

3-26


Richard B. Clement and Jacob Van Staaveren, Number 501, US Air Force 

Oral History Program (Declassified December 31, 1978), p, 4. 

33, Details concerning the stay-behind cadres and their eventual augmentation 

are provioed in Chapters 3 and 5 of Volume 1 of this study. One 

of the opportunities seized on by the DIV was to send intelligence 

personnel South in the guise of recovering remains of deceased Viet 

,inh. These "grave teams" conducted agitprop activitie3 and gathered 

intell gence. This situation was -eported by Anita Lauve, a foreign 

service officer serving with the US Embassy in Saigon during that 

period. Her comment aas made during an 8 Juie 1979 BOM interview with 

former GVN Ambassador Bui Diem.. 

1. Mr. 

V 34. Interview on 13 November 1979 with Colonel J.A. MacDonald, USMC (Ret) 

who, in 1968-69 was Chief, US/SEATO Plans Division, J-52, USMACV. The 

.1-52 Division was responsible for maintaining/updating the SEATO Plans 

prepared for COMUSMACV who was also designed as Commander, Certral 

Region, SEATO field forces for defense of Thailand and the protocol 

states, 

35. James H., Hanse:,, "Seven Points for Laos" research paper, 22 June 1968. 

Hansen, now with BDM Corporation, monitored the Laotian political 

scene before teaching an undergraduate course in international relations 

at the University of Michigan. His research concluded that this 

double standard on the "troops in Lacs" issue out US forces at a major 

disadvantage throughout the war. 

36, According to Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, the PRC 5 road building in 

northern Laos in 1960-61 was thought to threaten Thiland, but US 

authorities fearcd that a US move into Laos (before such a move was 

prohitited by the 1962 Geneva Accords) would bring the Chinese in and 

force a US retreat to the Kra Dennisula and abandonment of Thailand. 

US decision makers found they held no capability to intervene militarily 

in Laos. Comments by Ambassador Johnson during the BDM Senior 

Review Panel meeting on 13 February 1979. 

37, Senior Review Panel meeting at BDM/Washington on 13 Pebruary 1979. 

Ambassador Colby is one of the more Knowledgeable exnfficiails about 

the "secret war" in Laos. General DePuy, fcrmer J-3 'IACV, and later 

commander of the 1st Division commented that Ambassador Sullivan kept 

the US military out of Laos and the CIA had a great time with their 

little war there. BDM interview of General William DePuy, 24 Seotember 

1978. 

38. MG Oudone Sananikone, RLA, Th,, Royal Lao Army and US Army Advice and 

Suport (McLean, VA: General.esearch Corporation), indochina Refugee 

Authored Monograph Program, prepared for Department of the Army, Office 

of Chief of Military History, pp. 74-7'* and 108-110, describes some of 

the early White Star activities in Laos prior to the 1962 accords. 

For a discussion of command relationships, see Chapter 11, Volume VI, 

3-27


Z9. General William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, NY: 

Doubleday & Comoany, 1976), pp. 147-14&. 

40, Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p. 307. 

41. Ibid., p. 307, 

42. Senior Review Panel meeting at BDM/Washington on 13 February 1979. 

USAF General John Vogt, who commanded the Seventh Air Force in Vietnam 

during the early 1970's, offered this remark, General Bennett made 

tne same point in describing a war game sponsored by the Studies, 

Analysis and Gamilg Ageicy (SAGA) under the ,CS. The game took place 

in August !964, focused on Vietnam, and the nigh-level ýarticipants 

could not identify US oojectives in Vietnam. Presidential advisor W. 

W. Rostow was furious and General Wheeler had to help keep order., 

Bennett interview, US Army Military History Research Collection Sec. 

6, pp., 26-28. 

43. Gravel Pentagon Papers, "ol. III, pp. 149-150. On 14 August 1964, the 

Stite Department directed Saigon planners to avoid operations which 

the URV leaders could interpret as "prcvocative", such as OPLAN 34A 

operations and the DE SOTO patrols (US destroyers probing the North 

Vietnamese coastline to test the enemy's capability to react). 

44. Lawrence J. Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff. The First Twenty-Fi,'e 

Years (Bloomington, IN. Indiana University Press, 1976), pp, 156, 

164. Many of the 94 targets were transnortation facilities, such as 

bridges, rail centers, etc. 

15, See Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol. II, p. 171 for 1964 surimary. See 

Vol. I:I, p. 442 for 1965 reports. 

46. Demma interview. 

47., MG Robert R. Ploger, USA, U.S. ArmmyEngineers 1965-1970. Vietnam 

Studies (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1974). 

48, For eyampie, contingency plans called for a force buildup in Vietnam 

of 30 combat engineer battalions by 1 July 1966. On July 1965, there 

were only 10 such battalions in the Army, deplojed worldwide. Army 

planners then had to maintain the existing 10 battalionr while forming 

30 new ones, equipping them with gear taken from regular forces, 

Reserves, and the National Guard. The engineers were then assigned 

back-to-back tours. General Bennett interview, Tape 6, p. 24. 

49.ý Demma interview. 

50. One excellent examp!c of additior.al forces being earmarked foo MACV 

was Deployment the 41-YR List plan (TPFDL) which identifying included an all elaborate of the Tire-Phased forces programmed Force to 

I3 

S~3-28


reinforce MACV in the event of a massive invasion from the North. The 

TPFDL reflected the activation of reserve coimponent units, their 

training cycles, availability for movement overseas, ?.nd DlanneJ 

arrival in RVN. The list incluaed bdttalions, scpp;.ate companies, Znd 

even two-mai, dog-handling sections. 

51, The J-5 staff reviewed the Cambodian plan and opined that the forces 

planned for were too few in number to be effective., Vioient media 

outcry and public concern wis forecast by the J-5 staff which recommended 

in favor of an incursion, but with significantly greater forces 

than initially planned, Based on comments by a former Chief of the 

US/SEATO Plans Division, MAC-J-52. 

E2. For example, a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), or Expeditionary 

Brigade (MEB) was tasked in the early 1960s to be prepared to enter RVN 

et Tourane (Dananq) as part of a SEATO force. Taskiny initiated in 

PACOM SEATO plans, then in Pacific Fleet SEATO pl. 1 ns, and finally in 

Task Force 79 (TF79) SEATO plans. TF79 is the Marine division/wing 

team in the Western Pacific which also has had the identity of III MEF 

(now MAF). TF79 plans were coordinated wi.h TF76, the amphibious task 

force of S.-VENTH FLEET, and with MACTHAI and SEATO ,oeadauarters in 

Bangkok. 

53. Concept Plans are now an approved format. Since most J-5 sections are 

responsible for r,,ore contingency plans than they can effectively revise 

orn an annuAl basis, the use of Concept Plans makes for greater efficiency 

and facilitates kieeing importaot plans current. 

54, This view is substantiated in DoD Study Group - A.M.P.O.O., p. 15., 

55.. Ibid., p. 9. "The current system for contingency war planning i3 

basically sound." 

56. Taylor, Swords and Plowshare, p. 308. 

?2 

I


CHAPTER 4 

MOBILIZATION 

Wly, I asked, is it necessary to call up reserve units 

at this time? If we decided on a cal>-up, how large 

should it be? Cculd we reduce the numbers by drawing 

cn forces stationed in Europe or South Korea? Cauld we 

avoid or at least postpone individual reserve call-ups? 

If reserves were Tilled, where would they be assigned? 

How long woold they serve? What would he the budgetary 

implications? Would congressional action be icessary? 

I said that I would take no action until I received 

satisfactory answers to these and several other ques- 

S~tions. I/ 


President Lyndon B. Johnson 

February 1968 

The Vantage Point 

The Reserves, by and large, other than Air Force 

Reserves, did not participate in the Vietnam war. This 

policy left a feeling of frustration on the part of a 

great many reservists who felt they had training to 

contribute during natianal emergencies and they wanted 

to participate.2/ 

Congressman Robert L. F, Sikes 

(D, Fla,) DOD appropriations 

Hearings, May 1, 1973 

We are feeding the horse [the Reserves] but never 

htkiig :iim out of the barn.3/ 

General Harold K. Johnson 

Army Chief of Staff, 19C8 

A.; quoted i n the War Managers 

A well-equipped and fully manned Nationel Guard and Resevve, deploy- 

"able on short notice, has been a goal sought by the American defense estab- 

"lishment since World War II. Despite progress that had been made in the 

retention of troops on active duty, the US Armed Forces recognized they 

could not rely entirely upon voluntary recruitment to fill their normal and 

4-1

THE RDM CORPORAT!ON 

[ a 

m• 

erwergency manpower needs; therefore, there was a continuing effort to huild 

bvt-ong and responsive REserve forcE throughout tlo Vietnam conflict.. 

The US forces build up in V-etnam caued increased pressure for a 

Reserve call-up to replace the regular troops and draftees sert overseas. 

In that respect, this chapter will determine the extent to which the mobilization 

of the Reserve and National Guard force• was considered by the 

Presid:ent and his aoviseis during .he early build up period. In ad'dition, 

there will be an examination of the rationale behi:,o the decision not to 

mobilize the Reserves until the Pueblo crisis and Tet Offensive in 1968. 

Furthe-e. the decision not to mobilize in 1965 and the decision for the 

partial mobilization in 1968 will both be contrasted as to their impact on 

the war, US armed forces, and US society in general... See Figure 4-1 for 

data on US trooo st.rength during crises, 

B. MOBILIZATION OF ThE RESERVES: A DIFFICULT PRESIDENTIAL DECISION 

•I. 

I4-2 

Many military leaders felt that the manner ;n which the Reserve components 

were treated during the Vietnam coo'lict was in error. Others 

thought their use was appropriate, Li order to have a better understanding 

of the mobilization issue, the period of US involvement in Viet,,am i5 

reviewed and assessed below, Before beginning the aszessment of the Vietnam 

involvement phdse, however, appropriate background information is 

provided in rdr tn- set the stage fur this study. 

1:. Background 

During the Korean War, 

the Conqress passed legislation placing a 

theoretical military obligation on all physically and mentally qualified 

males between 

the ages of 18-1/2 and 26 for a total of eight years of 

combined active and Reserve military service 

The Reserves were divided 

into two categories -- The Ready Reserve, which could be ordered to duty on 

declaration of an emergency by the P-esider,t and in numbers aitL, rized by 

Congress, and the Standby 'eseý,ve, which could be ordered to duty only in 

war or emergency declared by Congress. 

The system had many weaKnesses; therefore, in 1955, the Congress, 

at the urning of -'resident Cisenhow•r, pnased new Reserve legislation.


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While the act reduced the term of obligation to six years, it 

imposed a 

requirement for active participation in Reserve tr3ining oti those passing 

out ot the armed services with an unexpired obligation. 

The law aathorized 

the President, without further Congressional action, to call up to a million 

Ready Reservists to duty in an emergency proclaimed oy him. He was 

allowed to also recall selected members of the Standby Reserve in event of 

any national emergency declared by Congress, Notwitnstanding the new 

legislation, in a period of irregular voluntary enlistments and restrictel 

funds, 

most Reserve units quickly fell below their authorized strengths, 

The Ready Reserve Mobilization Reolacement Pool soon became clogged with 

unscreened and untrained personnel, 

In the late 1950s, President Eisenhower and his top advisers 

zconcluded that the LIS was spending about $80 million a year to sustain a 

Reserve force which had little or ro military value. He attempted to cut 

the paid dri'l strength, but the Congress would not go along with such a 

move. It Drc,/ed to be e.tremely difficult to persuade the Congress of the 

necessity o-" desirability of thoroughly reorganizing and reducing the many 

Rererve uiitf scaltered in Congressional districts throughout the US, 

politica1 sign'iicvnce of the Reserve and National Guard could not be 

discourtad and the Congress in 1959 voted a 700,000 man level to assure 

that :.u 

al)uroval 

furtner reductions would be made in the Reserve forces without its 

President Kennedy's Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, was 

concerned over the expenditure of defense funds for Reserves that were lorg 

on nu .. ner, 1 ýut short on readiness; therefore, he performed a thorough 

analysis of t~ho status and functions of t., 


-:serve forces during the early 

1960s. He concluded for example, that the maintenance of a force of 

400,000 National Sua'dsmen and 310,000 Army Reserves on paid drill status 

made 

little sense untss those backui. forces could step in quickly in a 

crisis and replace the regular active strategic reserve. 

The performarce 

of Reserve components called up during the Berlin Crisis in 1961 left mucil 

to be desired and brouaht much criticism about the improper assignment and 

use of individLals and units, respective':,. In tne year after the Berlin 

r< 

4~.4


call-up, the Kennedy Administration sought to bring about a drastil reorganization 

in the Reserves but ran into a storm of protest from the Congress, 

By the fall of 1967, after concessions by both the Executive Branch 

and the Congress, 

a mutually acceptable reorganization plan finally was 

approved and implemented the following year. 

To help obtain the men to fill the Reserve units, legislation was 

passed in September 1963 revising tha Reserve forces act in 1955. 

The new 

law provided for direct 2nlistments in the Reserves, which ias 3n optional 

feature of the 1955 act., Under that program, recruits were given longer 

periods of active duty to train them to fill the needs for nore highly 

skilled speciaiist., 

2. Mobilization: The Backbone of Early Contingency Planning 

(1954-1961) 

From the very beginning of American invoive-nent in Southeast 

Asia, US contingency plans called for the use of ground combat forces in 

Indochina. Several plans called for a large scale military effort backed by 

the mobilization of contirnental US (CONUS) 

Reserve cowponent forces. 

J iAfter the fall OT Dien Bien Phu and the signing of the Geneva 

Accords in 1954, US planners returned to that "never-never" land of contingency 

planning to prepare for a possible exigency in Indochina emanating 

fJ.om North Vietnam and expansionist Communist China. Earl% 3imited war 

plans for Indochina called for major participation by US 

(with possible "iuclear weapons use) backed by limited US 

forces to repulse forces of the Viet Minh and/or the Chinese. 

air and seapower 

and allied ground 

The scenario 

for the attack was a conventional invasion by the DRV or combined DRV/PRC 

forces moving through Laos across the Mekong River into Thailand or down 

the Laotian oanhandle to threaten both Saigon and Bangkok. 

After the overt 

c ',munist &9yression was repulsed, the plans called for a counterattack 

wi w amphibious assault against the Red River Delta and Hanoi,4,' Implementation 

of that contingency plan would have necessitated a 

IK 

4-5

E 

THE BOM CORPORAT!ON 

=oDiiizaLi'un of reserve components to meet other US global military commitmtnts., 

To meet such a contingency the Army Staff held thaLt 

it would be necessary to call up the Army 

Reserves and National Guard, In short we [the Army 

Staff] feit that the operation should not be attempted 

unless the country was put on virtually a war footing.5/ 

V 

in October of 1961 contingency plans calling for the use of SEATO 

fo-ces to secure South Vietnamese borders were developed. Planning emphasized 

tactical responses to localized and situational requirements. The 

plans called for the deployment of approximately one SEATO ground force 

division to South Vietnam as well as command and control communications - 

electronics support.6/ In the event that North Vietnamese forces intervened, 

the plan called for an increase of SEATO forces to 12 divisions, 

seven Regimental Combat Teams and five battalions, 

the enlarged SEATC force wp 

The US contribution to 

to have consisted of two Army divisions, cie 

Marine division/wing team and five USAF tzctical squadrons. 

Activation of 

this plan would have necessitated the use of a CONUS Army division, Imp'ementation 

would have necessitated the mobilization of one reserve division 

plus other appropriate forces to mainta 4 n the active strategic reserve. 7/ 

Contingency planning is discussed in greater detail in Chapter l 

of this volume. 

3. The Bay of Pigs Fiasco and the Berlin Crisis: Reason to 

Mobilize 

In 

the closing days of the Eisenhower administration the US 

severed diplomatic relations with Cuba, 

but the presence of a communist 

satellite ninety miles from the Florida coast was a source of constant 

irritation. In April 1961, a band of CIA-asqisted exiles launched a poorly 

conceived invasion at the Bay of Pigs with limited air but no naval gurfire 

support. When the Cuban people failed to rise up and join the invaders, 

the operatiun collapsed and a large number of the invading force was taken 

prisoner., The failure of this ill-fated US-sponsored operation did much to 

damage US prestige, and, conversely enhanced Fidel Castro's stature. The 

4-6 

4


invasion prompted offers of assistance from the Soviet Union and dark hints 

that its Premier, Nikita Knrushche',, was ready to employ Russian missile 

power to aid Cuba. 

"The tim;ng of the Cuban fias'o was unfortunate, because President 

Kennedy was scheduled to have a summit meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna in 

early June on the then delicate subject of Berlin., The growing prosperity 

of West Berlin contrasted sharply with the poverty and drabness of the 

Soviet sector. 

West Berlin had become as great an irritation to the communis:s 

as Cuba was to the US. In 1958 Khrushchev had demanded that Berlin 

be made a free city and th.'eatened that unless western troops were withdrawn 

in six months he would conclude a separate treaty with East Germany. 

Althougn Khrushchev later backed off from this threat and even showed some 

signs of a conciliatory attitude on Berlin, at the Vienna meeting he made a 

complete about fac:.8/ 

a. Rationale For the Mobilization 

Khrushchev informed President Kennedy at Vienna that unless 

the US (and the West) accepted the Soviet position, he would take unilateral 

action to solve the Berlin impasse, The Soviet premie- had hoped 

to intimidate the new president in the wake of his Bay of Pigs setback, but 

his efforts proved unsuccessful. Instead, Mr, Kennedy in July 1961, 

requested and received additional defense funds from Congress as well as 

authority to call up to 250,000 members of the Reserve and National Guard 

to active duty. 

The President refrained from declaring a national emergency, 

which would have permitted him to bring up to a million Reserve members 

into federal service; he did not wish to panic either the American public 

or the Soviet Union by a huge mobiiization, On the uther hand, he 

determined to strengthen the conventional drmed forces in the event that 

Soviet pressure on Berlin demanded a gradual commitment of US military 

might. 

During the month of August, tensions hightened as thousands 

of refugees crossed from East to West Be-lin, and the communists took the 

arastic measure of building a high wall around their sector to block 

4-7


L 

access to the West. 

As the situation grew worse, President Kennedy decided 

in September 1961, to increase US forces in Europe and to call up some 

Reserve personnel and units to strengthen CONUS strategic forces. By 

October ;961, 

almost 120,000 Reserve troops, including two National Guard 

divisions, had been ddded to the active Army, and the Regular troop 

strergth had been increased by more than 80,000 men.9/ 

As the Soviet Union became aware that the Berlin challenge 

would be met swiftly and firmly, it began to ease the pressure there again. 

The Kennedy administration had passed through its first crisis situation 

with the Soviet Union. By mid-1962, the Reserve and National Guar forces 

that had been called up were returned to civilian life, but the increases 

in the Regular forces were retained.l0/ 

b. Impact of the Berlin Crisis Call-Ups 

The partial American mobilization and rapid reinforcement of 

Europe by US grot'nd, air and naval forces were accompanied by strong 

efforts to bring the military personnel and equipment remaining in the 

CONUS to a high state of readiness. In many instances, however, designated 

posts and camps did not have adequate facilities or cadre necessary to 

house, train and equip the rapid and large influx of Reserve personnel, In 

addition, there was a strong undercurrent of discontent which surfaced 

among Vie personnel called up because they were used to beef up the active 

strategic reserve in CONUS and few, if any, were sent to Europe. 

Many Reservists questioned the mobilization because they did 

not regard the Berlin problem to be a serious threat to the security of the 

United StatesAl/ Resentment among Reservists was high because they did 

not feel they were making a contribution to the Berlin crisis by being 

mobilized and remaining in the United Statec and because of the dis"uption 

of their families and careers.12/ Many reservists ani members of their 

families complained to their representatives in Congress, which resulted in 

congressional criticisri, of the mobilization action. 13/ 

4 

i!4.8


Secretary of Defense McI~amara's reflecticn: on the Reserve 

components' call-up cduring the Berlin crisis also prcvides an insight into 

official views about that action.. He was quoted as saying: 

L 

The Berlin crisis . required a substantial number 

of reserves of all forces, We 'earned then that we 

literally lacked the equipment to train the men called 

to active duty. And when I say literally lacked the 

tiquipment, I mean exactly that, We not only did not 

have the equipment for those men to fight with, we did 

not even have the equipment fcr them to train with. 14/ 

The complaints had a definite impact on then-Vice President 

Lyndon B. Johnson, because, when faced with a decision with respect 

calling up the Reserves dur;ng the Tet Offensive in 1968, he recalled: 

I told McNamara and Wheeler there were many question! I 

wanted them to answer.. I remembered the complaints 

about the call-up of reserves during President 

Kenreay's administration and, more recently, the failure 

to use effectively those who had neen zalled up 

during t.ie Pueblo crisis.15/ 

r 

In spite of the complaints, the call-up did what it was supposed to do--the 

Sov-ets got the message of US determination and eased their pressure on 

Berlin. 

4. Other Crisis Situations (1962-1965) 

The following situations gave rise to sub(equent consideration of 

Reserve Mobilization by the National Command Authority: 

0 the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 

. a military revolt i- the Domipican Republic 

* various civic rights and civil disturbances in the US from 1962 

to 1965. 

In the first two situations listed above, the President 

lected 

to use existing active forces as augmented by the active strategic reserve, 

and no call-ups were made. In the civil disturbances and civil rights 

situations, a few select call-ups of Reserve and State National Guard units 

were executed; however, they were of brief duration and had no great impact 

(except with regard to restoring and maintaining law and order). 

4z 

!•.: 4-9

' 


,. The US Mil 4 tary Commitment To Vietnam: 1965 to 1968 

The decision to expand the US commitment in Vietnam and to consider 

mobilizing the Reserves was the result of increasing political instabiiity 

and military weakness in South Vietnam as well as advancements by the 

VC during 1964 and 1965. Though the GVN political and military situation 

wai deteriorating in 1964, 

the US did not modify its objectives 4 n Vietnam 

or develop new plans for the commitment of US ground forces. It was not 

until August of 1964 when two US 

destroyers reported being under attack in 

the Gulf of Tonkin by North Vietnamese patrol boats that the US 

began to 

alter its strategy, The US responded with air attacks against North Vietnam 

and by adopting the Southeast Asia Resolution which permicted the US to 

carry out military action against North Vietnam. 

After the elections in November of 1964, 

witn the support of a 

popular mandate and the Southeast Asia Resolution, President Johnson'S 

approach to the persistent political and milita-y instability in Vietnam 

began to change with regard to ground force commitments., 

In February of 

-1965 the Khanh regime fell and the VC attacked US facilities in Pleiku., 

Retaliatory measures consisted or air strikes on the North and the landing 

of two US Marine battalions at Da Ndng to assume responsibility for security 

of the air base there. This was the first time US ground combat troops had 

been commitLed in Asia since the Korean war. The ARVN experienced several 

disastrc.s defeats in. the spring of 1965. 

It seemed that air strikes were 

not effective in stopping North Vietnamese determination. Two 

additional 

marine battalions were sent to RVN ir April of 1965. The year of GVN 

political-military collapse had broken the psychological 

the presence of US combat units, 

barrier against 

In July of 1965 Secretary McNamara reported to the President that 

the VC were gaining in strength. 

The pace of the war had increased and thrý 

ARVN had suffered serious setba,:ks. Political and economic stability was 

deteriorating rapidly. The GVN Chief of State, General Thieu, and P,'im, 

Minister Marshal Kv had requested large-scale ground troop assistance from 

the US. 

Secretary McNamara was convinced that the GVM would fall without 

additional American assistance anw 

recommended an, increase in American 

4-10

"FHE BDM CORPORATION 

troop strength in Vietnam from 75,000 to about 200,000. He proposed a 

total Armed Force increase by mid 1966 to 600,000 consisting of 235,000 men 

from the Reserve forces.16/ Another 375,000 was to have come from 

increased recruitmet and draft calls. Authorizing a call-up of reserves 

and a supplemental appropriation would have to be requested from Congress. 

Secretary of Defense McNamara reported that Ambassador Taylor, 

Deputy Ambassador Alex Johnson, Ambassador-designate Henry Cabot Lodge, 

General Wheeler and General Westmoreland agreed with his recommendation.17/ 

The JCS urged the mobilization uf the Reserves to demonstrate US commitment 

to an independent and non-communist South Vietnam. 

Chief of Staff of the 

Army, General Johnson, pointed out that a call-up of the Reserves was 

traditionally a unifying factor.18/ 

It was understood that it was important 

to have full American support fo-r US commitments in South Vietnam. 

A few 

presidential advisers expressed doubts about increasing 

ground forces in Vietnam. First, there was the fear of oossible Chinese 

and Russian involvement. Undersecretary of State George Ball felt that as 

a result of increased commitments to South Vietnam, the US would lose 

friends in Europe and elsewhere as well. He bel-;eved that it was not 

possible to win a protracted war against local guerrillas in Asian jungles 

and that the US should cut its losses by pulling out.l9/ Presidential 

confidant, Clark Clifford, had similar feelings: 

I don't believe we can win in South Vietnam . . . If we 

send in 100,000 more men, the North Vietnamese will 

meet us. If North Vietnam runs out of men, the Chinese 

will send in volunteers. Russia and China don't intend 

for us to win the war. 20/ 

Mr. Clifford's suggestion was to find an honorable way to end US involvement 

in Vietnam. On the other hand, Dean Rusk pointed out that "If the 

Communist world finds out that we will not pursue our commitments to the 

end . . . I don't know where they will stay their hana."21/ President 

Johnson felt sure that a US withdrawal from Southeast Asia would be the 

beginning of problems in stemming communist influence ind involvement all 

over the world and would inevitably lead to the start of World War 111.22/ 

4-11


As the President and his advisers reviewed the deterior ting 

situation in Vietnam, five options became clear, 

They were outlined in the 

National Security council meeting of July 27, 1965 as follows", 

1) the US could bring the enemy to his knees by using the bombers of 

the Strategic Air Command; 

2) the US should pack up and go home; 

3) the US could stay with the status quo - and suffer the consequences, 

continue to lose territory and take casualties; 

4) the administration could go to Congress and ask for great sums of 

money; call up the Reserves and increase the draft; go on a 

war-time footing and declare a state of emergency; 

5) the USG could give the commanders in the field the men and supplies 

they need (the military commanders had refined their estimates 

from 100,000-125,000 to 50,000 men needed to meet their 

immediate problems).23/ 

a. Rationale for the Deferral of Mobilization 

The objective of increased US assistance was to reverse the 

GVN's downward military trend and help them to move to an offensive military 

posture without directly involving the Chinese and the Soviets, while 

moving toward negotiations with Hanoi. 

The last two NSC options listed above appeared to be the 

only effective ways of getting Lhe job done, 

It was felc by the President, 

however, that the fourth option could give the impression o- fntertions to 

invade North Vietnam and that this might cause di,-ect Chinese involvement. 

Furthermore, 

the use of Reserves might have been viewed as a significant 

acceleration of the war which was not compatible with the "low-key" limited 

aims of the Johnson administration, If tne President aeclared a national 

emergency, 

have been 

it would have meant that as many as one million Reservist- would 

called up for one year. As it was not likely that the war would 

be over in a year or that Congress would approve more than a 12-month 

call-up, this did not seem to be a practical move.24/ 

If the President 

requested a joint resolution from Congress authorizing a call-up of the 

Reser,'es, it probably would have resulted in congressional oppositon 

A- 4-12


because of the domestic distress experienced during the call-up of the 

Reserves during the Berlin Crisis. 

A major debate in Congress would have 

created public awareness of the seriousness of the problem in Vietnam and 

Mr. Johnson did not want to frighten the American public. A major debate 

over US commitments to Vietnam might also have encouraged Hanoi to be more 

adventurous. Finally, the president wished to maintain his "guns and 

butter" policy -- 

to protect his "Great Society" programs -- which could 

have been jeopardized seriously by a full-scale Reserve Forces call-up. 

President Johnson announced on July 28, 1965, his decision 

to commit 50,000 additional ground troops to Vietnam. 

The Reserves were 

not mobilized because he did not think iZ was essential.25/ It was 

explained that it would have taken several months to equip the Reserves 

once they were called up. Instead the 1st Cavalry Division from CONUS 

followed the Okinawa-based 173rd brigade (Airmobile) to Vietnam, and 

Imonthly draft calis were increased fromr 17,000 to 35,000.26/ Since the 

duration and level of the war could not be estimated, expansion of forces 

by an increase in draft quotas afforded a flexibility to change the level 

of the US troop commitments depending on the requirements of the war. 

The decision not to mobilize the Reserves seems to have been 

the President's alone. It appears to have been based more on political 

considerations than military.27/ 

He feared that a call-up of the Reserve 

components would have brought the Soviets and Chinese into the war; that 

congressional opposition would have threatened his Great Society Programs; 

and, that it would have alarmed the public. 

Subsequent decisions not to mobilize the Reserves were made 

in late 1965, and throughout 1966 and 1967. The Joint Chiefs continued to 

advocate a call-up of the Reserves., They contendad that commitments to 

NATO 

and other areas, as well as General Westmoreland's troop requirements 

for Vietnam could not be met without mobilization of the Reserves. 

The JCS 

also believed that only a massive introduction of troops and firepower 

would bring an ena to the war "in the shortest time with the least 

cost."23/ 

General Westmoreland's troop requirements had begun to exceed 

the limits of the services unless a call-up of the Reserves was 

nstituted. 

-i 4-13


Mobilizaticn was 

rejected by the administration throughout 

the balance of this period mainly out of a desire u.o avoid a major congressional 

debate. Moreover, it was felt that it would be difficult to obtain 

public support for a call-up. 

strategic and tactical military requirements, 

Domestic constraints continued to override 

b. The Impact of the Decision Not To Mobilize 

The decision not to mobilize the Resei.ve Forces for deployment 

to Vietnam resulted in deficiencies in several areas:, 

0 it caused a drawdown of the US Strategic Reserve, and troops 

programmea for deployment to Europe, Korea, Alaska and Caribbean,; 

. it severely drained forces available fcr any emergency or contingency 

outside of Vietnam and Southeast Asia; 

0 since the Reserves contained the majority of combat support 

units, it caused a shortage of trained technicians for Vietnam, 

particularly engineering construction urits and personnel skilled 

in ammunition management.29/ 

[ it contributed to a continual state of personnel turbulence; 

- d;scharges at end of periods of obligated service, and 

resignations and retirements were continued as in peacetine 

- 

resulting in shortages of officers in all grades 

except lieutenant,30/ 

tour length policies and worldwide distribution of forces 

caused an enlisted skill imbalance between Vietnam and the 

rotation bases,3_1/ 

- unqualified personnel received fast promotions in order to 

fill shortages,32/ 

- not mobilizing created resentment among those serving in 

Vietnam; 

* it also contributed to making the Reserves a haven for draft 

dodgers; 

4-14

S THE BM CORPORATION 

6 it made Selective Service (the Draft) the vehicle for acquiring 

manpower to handle the Vietnam buildup, This move proved unpopular 

with both the Congress and the public; it contributed to- 

- deferrments based on pr,ysic31, marital or education status, 

unfairly drafting poor, lesser educated individuals, 

toth increased dissent, antiwa, 1 demonstrations, draft card burnings, 

efforts to avoid military service, 

a poover quality soldier (under-educa~ed and in need of more 

military training) when compared to a Reserve soldier. 

6., Mini-Mobilization• The Pueblo Incident ana Tet 1968 

The communist oftensi',e during Tet in early 1968 came as a shock 

to the USG. The desperate comimunist attack proved to be flawed and ended 

"p a decisive battlefield victory for US/RVNAF forces. In contrasc, however 

it was a psychological defeat or the home front in tne US.33/ 

dent Johnson, recalling the impact of Tet, wrcte the following- 

Presi- 

I was prepared for the events of Tet, though thE scale 

of the attacks and the size of the Communist force was 

greater than I had anticipated. I did not expect the 

enemy effort to have the impact on American thinking 

that it achieved. I was not surprised that elements of 

the press, the academic community, and the Congress 

reacted as they did. I was surprised and disappointed 

that the enemy's efforts produced such a dismal effect 

on various people inside government and others outside 

whom I had always regarded as staunch and unflappable. 

Hanoi must have been delighted; it was exactly the 

reaction they sought.34/ 

a. Rationale for the Pueblo Mini-Mobilization 

The first three months of 1968 brought with them incense 

international pressure on the United States. As a prelude to the Tet 

attacks, the following crisis situations developed: 

* the North Koreans seized a US intelligence ship, the USS Pueblo, 

and imprisoned its crew. 

* an assassination squad of North Koreans made an unsuccessful 

attempt on the life of South Korea's President Park. 

4-15


0 the South Korean government, fearing another invasion from the 

North was imminer,., 

indicated that they wanted to withdraw their 

furces from the RVN to help protect their homeland., 

0 there were increased communist violations of South Koyea's north-, 

ern border. 

* the US intell ;gence community forecasted a communist-instigated 

crisis for West Berlin.35/ 

President Johnson, in his reflections on those crisis-packed 

days, concluded that the communist-inspired acts, especially the capture of 

the Pueblo, were premeditated. Moreover, he consideyed that the seizure of 

the US 

intelligence vessel eight days before Tet was orchestrated by the 

DRV's North Korean supporters to divert US military resources, and it was a 

tacti: calculated to pressure the South Koreans into recalling their combat 

troops from Vietnam. 

Those overt acts did cause South Korea seriously to 

consider an immediate withdrawal of their military units from Vietnam in 

order to build up defcnsive strength at home. The US %as forced to respond 

quickly and decisively. 36/ 

Two 

days after the Pueblo incident, President Johnson dispatched 

more than 350 aircraft to air bases in South Korea and called up 

more than 14,000 Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve and Navy personnel 

to replace the depleted strategic reserve in the US, 

The rationale behind 

the decision to dispatch massive airpower to South Korea and the accompanying 

partial mobilization was basad on the follcwing: 

a • the Soutn Korean Army, with in-country US combat forces, was 

considered capable of holding its own 

against the North Korean 

Army, therefore additional US ground combat deployments were not 

deemed necessary. 

* the North Koreans had a larger air force at the time, therefore 

the US reinforcement of nrore than 350 aircraft put the balance 

of airpower in favor of the South and served to signal US determinatioti 

tn the North. 

0 the rapid deployment of US airpower cut deeply into America's 

strategic reserve forces, therefore the President decided to call 

4-16

THE BDM CORPOPATION 

up to active duty selected :iv Nationei Guard, Air Force Reserve 

and Navy units as replacements. 

of the eignty-two man 

The seizure of a US 

ship ol the high seas, the imprisonment 

crew and the trie' ot those captives as criminals 

triggered a flurry of National Security r.-uncil meetings to review o~her 

alternative courses of action for the IJ. Among those alternatives considered 

and rejected were-. 

0 the mining of Wonsan and other North Korear harbors 

* the interd ction of North Korea'S coastal shipping lanes 

* the seizure nf a Nor~h Korean ship 

* the striking of selected North 'orean targets by air and nival 

gunfi re. 

In each case, LBJ considered the Dotential risks to, greaL and possible 

gains tro small; theiifore he opted to back t.e airpower move and partial 

mobilization with intense diplomatic efforts to free the captives, it was 

a course of action which proved laden with political pitfalls and painfully 

time co:suming. 

b. Rationale for the Tet Mobilization 

On January 31, 

1968, eight short days after the Pueblo incident, 

the DRV directed their countrywide Tet offensive against South Vietnam. 

Although the action had been predicted, Tet took the US command and 

the US public by surprise, and its strength, length and int(nsity prolonged 

the shock. As the attacks continued the Secretary of Defense requested 

that the JCS furnish plans for the emergency reinforcement of MACV. 37/ 

General Westmoreland's assessment of the situation on 

February 12 was as follows: 

Since last October, the enemy has launched a major 

campaign signaling a char,g of strategy from one of 

protracted war to one uf Quizk military/political 

victory during the Americar, election year., His first 

phase, aesigned to secure the border areas, has failed. 

The second phase, launched on the occasion of Tet and 

designed to initiate public uprising, to disrupt the 

machinery of government and command and control of the 

Vietnamese forces, and to isolate the cities, has also 

44-17

THE BDM CORFORATION 

failed. Nevertheless, the enemy's third phase, which 

is designed to seize Quang Tri and Tnua Thien provinces 

V has just begun. 38/ 

General Westmoreland thought the DRV's offensive to that 

"point was only a prelude to the enemy's main effort (or third phase) which 

he calculated would be directed against the two northerp provinces of RVN. 

thought that the focus SHe of the DRV .,ttack would be the embattled Marine 

bastion at Khe Sanh. By dttacking the nortiern-most provinces, he reasoned 

that the )RV woulc have had the advantlge zf shortened lines of communication 

and the ability to concentrate heavy artilliey fires from the DMZ. 

The General reinforced his I Corps elements from in-country assets, and 

wired the JC- to ask for "emergency' refnforcemerts (about six maneuver 

battalions) which would have allowed him to cagitaiize on the enemy's 

iosses and seize the initiative in other areas of RVN.39/ 

-JCS, 

Three plains for emergency renforcement were examined by the 

After brief celiberation the JCS recommended against the deployment 

of the nu-'..rs of troops requesteG oy the COMUSMACV. They had come to the 

realization tat US military resources had been drawn too thin, assets had 

become unavailable and tha US suprp,'t base had become too small. Overriding 

the JCS recommendation, President 2ohnson directed Secretary 

MvcNamara to deploy one brigade of the 82d Airoo'ne Division ard one Marine 

regimental landing team to South Vietnam imr 1 ediately.4_Oi This emergency 

reirforcemanL amounted to an increase of ablut 10,51.0 men. 

The JCS reacted almost immediately on the presidential 

decision to depluy those forces from tne nation's strategic active reserve 

without a concomitant reserve call-up, On February 13. ' 1 C8, they forwarded 

co Secretary tcNamara their recommerdations for actions which had to 

be taken relative to a minimum call-up of reserves. 

minimum call-up was as follows: 

The rationale used by the JCS *,,- 

their recommendation for 

. Since the 82d Airborne represented the only deployable Army 

division in the CONUS-based active strategic rýserve, it 

had to 

be reconstituted promptly by a reserwe :all-up (betwLen O,000 

and 40,00 

men). 

4-18


0 A Marine reserve call-up was deemed necessary because the deployment 

of the regimental landing team to RVN had also cut into the 

Corp's active reserve force (about 12,000 men) 

* The Navy required a small call-up of two mobile construction 

*(about 

battalions to beef up 

their depleted active st-ategic reserve 

1,700 men).41/ 

Based on the foregoing, the JCS recommended the following 

with respect to the reserve components:. 

* the immediate call-up of two Army infantry brigades 

0 the call-up of one Marine regiment plus some support forces 

* the call-up of two Navy r.•obile construction uaitalions 

• the attainment of a high state of readiress of other select 

reserve units. 

In addition, the JCS sought legislation to allow: 

* the immediate call-up of selected individua, reservists if 

required 

* an extension beyond June 30, :968 of the then existing Puchority 

to call-up selected reserve units 

* the authorization to extend the t. ms of service for active duty 

personnel.42/ 

This JCS recommendation was overtaken by subsequent requests from COMUSMALV 

and an "A to Z" reassessment conducted at the direction of the new Secretary 

of Defense, Clark Clifford. 

C. The "A to Z" Reassessment 

In the month following Tet, General Westmoreland had 

received a moderate reinforcement of about 10,530 men. All of President 

Johnson's advisers had concurred in that action, except for the JCS, 

considered it irresponsible in the absence of a reserve mobilization. The 

real debate, however, was yet to come. As the President cast about for 

"solutions, he asked former Army Chief of Staff General Mathew Ridgway about 

the feasibility of invading the North Vietnamese homeland. General Ridgway 

1 recommended against such a move, as he noted that US forces were not 

who 

available to conduct an invasion of the north. 

The same problem-- the 

4-19


depletion of the active US strategic reserve -- 

of the JCS, 

also dominated the concerns 

Even more vehemently than on the emergency augmentation issue, 

they opposed sending additional troops to Vietnam unless standby reserve 

units were mobil ized.43/ 

The JCS, 

CINCPAC and Gener3l Westmoreland all saw Tet as an 

opportunity to convince President Johnson to move finally in the direction 

of decisive escalation, a decision they had sought for several years. JCS 

Chairman General Wheeler seized upon this opportunity and went to Saigon to 

coax General Westmoreland, in private, into an ambitious additional force 

request. Though General Westmorelano was not worried by the military 

threat caused by the communist offensive itself, he set aoout planning to 

seize the battlefield initiative and to move into DRV 

sanctuaries in Laos 

and Cambodia., He came up with a requirement for 206,000 additional men. 

Actually, however, General Wheeler planned to use only half that number 

immediately in support of RVN 

operations and to use the balance to reconstitute 

the active strategic reserve in the CONUS 

so that more forces would 

be available to respond to contingencies that were cropping up elsewhere -- 

in Korea and Europe.44/ When he returned to Washington though, General 

Wheeler lobbied for those forces as being required to meet pressing combat 

needs in Vietnam. President Johnson, shaken by the Tet setback on the home 

front, decided to move General Westmoreland up the Army's organization into 

the job of Army Chief of Staff and replace him as commander ,,ith General 

Creighton Abrams. General Westmoreland was shocked and somewhat bitter 

when he later discovered that General Wheeler had portrayed his troop 

reinforcement request to policymakers in terms of such baleful urgency.45/ 

Faced with what amounted to a total US military commitment 

to the war in Vietnam, President Johnson ordered an "A to Z" reassessment 

by Secretary Clifford and a high level task force. Johnson directed 

Clifford to "give me the lesser of evils., Give me your recommendations."46/ 

Clifford had the impression that his task force was only supposed 

to develop alternative ways to implement General Westmoreland's troop 

request, and that the more far-reaching options his group eventually developed 

were real iy a venture beyond their mandate.47/ 

4-20


The reassessment brought with it extensive in-fighting in 

the DOD. Deputy Secretary of Defens? Paul Nitze said that meeting the 

request for 206,000 men would be "reinforcing weakness."48/ The DOD Office 

of Systems Analysis noted that the US objective since 1965 had been to 

maximize the costs and difficulties of the DRV. The analysts concluded 

that, "Our strategy of attrition has not worked. Adding 206,000 more US 

men ti a force of 525,000, 

gaining only 27 additional maneuver battalions 

and 270 tactical fighters at an added cost to the US 

of $10 billion per 

year rai;es the question of who is making it costly [for] whom."49/ A 

group working for Paul Warnkp in DOD 

International Security Affairs (ISA) 

developed a plan to redefine the MACV mission as "a de.,iographic strategy of 

population security" -- 

a return to the enclave strategy abandoned three 

years before -- on the grounds that no additional US 

satisfactory end to the war., 

forces could achieve a 

The new security strategy was calculated to 

buy time for the strengthening of the RVNAF's forces behind an American 

screen. The JCS attacked the Warnke group's position on the search and 

destroy strategy, which was in vogue at the time; as a result, the final 

memorandum that was presented to LBJ on March 4 was something of a compromise. 

50/ 

The Presidant deferred a decision on the troops, reserve 

call-ups ano changes in strategy until Secretary Clifford could complete 

all aspects of his reassessment. To bring home to the President "what was 

happening in the country," Clifford proposed that LBJ consult with a Senior 

Informal Advisory Group (the "Wise Men") before making any final decisions 

on further Vietnam deployments.51/ 

The Presider.' was hit by the defections of several advisers 

who earlier had been hawkish and strong advocates of the US involvement in 

the war, Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson shocked Mr. Johnson by 

stating that the JCS did not know what they were talking about with respect 

to the 206,000 man request.52/ Secretary Clifford became disenchanted 

when, 

after asking the Chiefs whether the 206,000 additional men would do 

the job, the answer he received was that they could give no assurance that 

the extra troops would, 

and that they were uncertain as to how many more 

Jf 

4-21

L 


men would be needed, or when. Clifford was told uy the JCS that there was 

no plan for victory because the tact;cal restrictions imposed by the 

President precluded victory. The JCS also said that bombing alone would 

not win the war; moreover, 

how long the war wou~d last.53/ 

there was no consensus among the Chiefs as to 

Clifford told an interviewer sears later, 

"I coulan-t get hold of a plan to end the wdr;" there was no plan for 

winning the war. 

It was like quicksilver to me."54/ 

The Wise Men 

a majority favored deescalation of tne war. 

jolted the President when it became clear that 

This rejection of rhe old 

course of nteeting the DRV's escalations whenever they were perceived or 

detected was Yunning into resistance from the US Senate's hawks, like 

Richard Russell, John Ster'is and Henry Jackson.55/ The opposition in the 

Senate establishment deeply affected Secretary Clifford as well as the 

President. 

President Johnson was crushed by what he viewed as defections 

within his administration and the awesome costs that meeting General 

Westmoreland's request would pose. He had decided in 1965 not to put the 

US on a real wartime footing by mobi!4zing the reserves or instituting 

heavy taxes and economic controls, It was readily apparent to him that it 

was no longer possible to avoid those measures and still follow the course 

of eccalation.. 

LBJ's "guns and butte," approach to the war and economy was 

on the verge of becoming a shambles, and th.e Great Society's programs were 

facing sharp congressional cuts. 

His Secretary of the Treasury warned that 

the costs associated with the 206,000 man request would cause deep cuts in 

domestic prog ams, other defense expenditures, and possibly foreiin aid. 

The JCS 

remained adamant on the necessity of calling up the reserves to 

support any troop commitment. Throughout the war, as one author pointed 

out, "when the President began to search for tne elusive point at which the 

costs of Vietnam would become unacceptable to the American people, he 

always settled upon mobilization. "5F/ 

President Johnson decided at a meeting with his key advisers 

on March 13 to deploy 30,000 more troops to RVN, but that deployment was 

not carried out because an additional 13,500 men were needed as support 

4-22

THE BDM COPPORATION 

personnel for the earlier emergency augmentation (of 10,500 men), 

In order 

Ir to accomplish the deployment of the support personnel, the President did 

F 

call to active duty a little over 10,000 Reservists. One week later, after 

F 

reviewing General Westmoreland's assessment of the ccmbat situation, wnich 

indicated glowing operational successes, LBJ decided to restrict the additional 

deployments to Vietnam to the 13,500 support troops.57/ On Ap'il 4 

the Southeast Asia Deployment Program Number 6 was approved, 

formalizing 

the emergency augmentation and support forces committed after Tet and 

establishing a final ceiling of 549,500 for US troops in RVl'.58/ 

The net result of the Pueblo incident and "A to Z" assessmqnt 

after Tet produced a mini-mobilization of approximately 25,000 Reservists, 

d. Impact of the Mini-Mobilization 

The mini-mobilizations, per se, did not bring with them any 

major problems. The Pueblo call up demonstrated US resolve and the North 

Koreans refrained from attacking the South. Following extensive diplomatic 

efforts, the Pueblo crew was finally released eleven months after their 

capture, 

Tet was a military defeat but a psychological victory for 

the DRV; PLAF (VC) forces in the South were soundly defeated, as were some 

PAVN (NVA) forces, The "third phase" attack on the two northern provinces 

of RVN and on the Marine garrision at Khe Sanh never materialized. Over 

40,000 VC/NVA soldiers were killed, the RVNAF units held their own against 

the 2nemy, and the GVN responded by lowering the draft age to eighteen and 

deLlaring a national mobilization of its manpower to build up their armed 

forces. The emergency reinforcement of General Westmoreland's forces 

proved to be more than adequate in meeting his immediate needs. 

The call-ups were not without their complaints. 

President 

Johnson, who remembered the complaints about the call-up of Reserves during 

President Kennedy's administration, was the recipient of several complaints 

stemming from the improper 

Pueblo incident.59/ 

utilization of Reservists activated during the 

i, 

4-23


V 

The real impact was not from the mini-mobilization, but 

rather from Secretary Clifford's "A to Z" reassessment, the deescalation of 

the -4ar recommendation by the "Wise Maen", the numerous defections within 

the government of former war "hardliners", the internat;onal financial 

crisis wnich faced the US dollar abroad, the resistance to new troop commitments 

among former congressional supporters of the war, the US active 

strategic reserve being at its lower limit, and the unsettling effect that 

the Tet 

IS 

offensive had on the American publ~c. 

As a result of the foregoing impacts iii the aftermath of the 

Pueblo Incident and the Tet Offensive, President Johnson: 

established a final ceiling for US troops in Vietnam (opting for 

only a mini-mobilization in the process) 

e ordered a limitation ,f bombing 

0 withdrew fron, the election race for a second term of office 

* invited North Vietnam to negotiate., 

President Johnson did not regard those decisions as irreversible at the 

time, but they rapidly came to be seen that way, ana no serious consideration 

was given during the remainder of his administration to raisi.ig troop 

level3 or renewing full-scale bombing.. The US military effort in Vietnam 

finally leveled off and began to decline.60/ 

7. Vietnamization and Withdrawal: 1969-1972 

When the Nixon Administration took office on January 20, 1969, 

over half a million American troops were in Vietnam. The nLmber was rising 

toward the 549,000-man ceiling set by LBJ in April 1968. The cost of the 

US effort in Vietnam had been $30 billion in fiscal year 1969 alone. 

American casualties had been averaging 200 men killed in action per week 

U!ring the second half of 1968; a total of 14,592 Americans died in combat 

in 1968. On Januiary 20, the cumulative total of Americans killed in action 

in Vietnam since 1961 stood at over 31,000; South Vietnamese cas,!alties 

were close to 90,000.61/ 

a. The Extent to Which Mobilization was Considered 

The Nixon Administration entered office determined to end 

the US involvement in the Vietnam conflict. President Nixon and his 

1*___ 

4-24

THE: BDM CORPORATION 

Specia, Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, after 

four difficult years, concluded their search for a negotiated agreement 

, which permitted the US to withdraw its combat troops, to get back its POWs, 

and nave a "decent interval." 

P'esident Nixon began his search for "peace with honor" by 

initiating secret talks with the DRV, 

and pursuing programs of Vietnamizaior 

and Pacification while unilaterally withdrawing US combat forces or. a 

gradual basis from the combat arena. Throughout, mobilization of the 

* Reserves to support the Vietnam confiict never becamE an issue. 

Other crisis situations, such as the unprovoked shootdown by 

North Korea on April 14, 1969, of a US Navy EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft 

over international waters, caused decision makers to consider mobilization 

as a possibl2 response option.52/ 

Subsequently, President Nixon faced each 

international crisis situation without opting for a mobilization or partial 

reserve call-up. 

President Nixon did activate selected Army 

National Guard 

and Reserve units for a brief period during a domestic crisis in 1970. On 

March 18, 1970 New York City mail carriers began an unauthorized work 

stoppage that threatened to halt essential mail services. The President 

declared a national emergency on March 23, thus paving the way for a 

partial mobilization of more than 18,000 Reservists on the next day. 

National Guard and Army Reserve members participated with Regular forces in 

assisting US postal authorities in getting the mail through, The postal 

workers soon returned to work, 

Reservists were returned to civilian status. 

and by April 3, the last of the mobilized 

b. Rationale for Deferral 

The following influenced President Nixon's decision making 

with respect to the possible use of Reserve forces during this period. 

* public opinion would not have supported him 

congressional support was lacking 

, * most Reserve units were underequipped, understaffed and not ready 

for mobilization 

j: 

4-25

FTHE 


. costs associated with mobilization would have bean exceedingly 

high. 

c: Impact of the Action 

The phasedown of US 

military operations in Vietnam and the 

accorpanying reductions in active force levels caused renewed emphasis to 

be placed on building up the Reserve forces. As early as November 1968, 

the Congress, 

concerned that the Reserve components were not being adequately 

provided for, passed and the President approved the Reserve forces 

"Bill of Rights," 

The law made the service secretaries responsible for 

providing the support needed to develop Reserve forces capable of attaining 

peacetime training goals, and they were also responsible for meeting 

approved mobilization readiness objectives. 

The act established the position 

of Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs within each of 

the military departments ana gave statutory status to the respective chiefs 

of the Army, Navy and Air Force Reserves., In August 1970, Secretary of 

Defense Laird emphatically affirmed tnat the Reserve cc".,onents would be 

prepared to provide the units and individuals required to augment the 

active forces during the initial phase of any future milita,-y expansion to 

meet an emergency situation.63/ 

By mid-1971, 

the Reserve components had substantially recovered 

from the turbulence associated with a reorganization and the mini-mobilization 

of 1968. 

The Department of Defense completed yet another reorganization 

which brought the Reserve components troop programs into consonance 

with new organizational concepts that evolved from the Vietnam 

experience. 64/ 

8. Post-War Impacts. Down to a Zero Draft 

Since President Johnson had elected not to call up the Reserves 

in the early stages of the US build up in RVN, the main burden of meeting 

the Armed Forces need for additional manpower had fallen upon the Selective 

Service System. For examp-e, increased draft calls and voluntary enlistments 

caused the Army's total strength to increase from over 969,000 in 

1965 to over 1,570,000 men in 1968 (see Figure 4-2).65/ 

k< 4-26


* (THOUSANDS) 

300299.0 - 289.9 

DRAFT CALLS 

100 

980 

500 

52-67 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 17 

CALzNDAR YEARS 

MANPOWER COSTS AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL DEFENSE COSTS 

60 5356 - 56 

40.. . /.# 

... 

PERCENT OF ~~.. 

TOTAL OUTLAYS 

20 

.rX... 

21 I fl l •l 

1964 1968 1972 1913 1974 

FISCAL YEARS 

SOURCE. STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ELLI;) L. RICHARDSON, 

FISCAL YEAR 1974, DEFENSE BUDGET REVIEW, HEAPIVGS BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

APPROPRIATIONS, HOUSE OF REPRESENT ATIV ES, 93rd CONGRESS, AFRIL j, l9 7 3 ..pp. 120-121. 

4541179W 

Figure 4-2. 

Draft Calls and DOD Manpower Cuts 

4-27


Reliance upon the Selective Service to meet the growing requirements 

of the Armed Forces whlen 

large Reserve forces were available drew 

critical comments from both Congress and the public. The complaint would 

have been the same whether the choice had been made by draft board or 

lottery, or whether it had been besed on physical, marital or educational 

status. The crunch was that some were selected and sent .o var while 

others were allowea to stay home. As the conflict wore on, the unpooularity 

of the war grew among the members 

of the draft age group, manifesting 

itself in increased antiwar demonstrations, 

druft card burnings, 

and efforts to avoid military service. 

Critical comments on the decision to depend on the draft and not 

to mobilize also came from high ranking military. General Harold K., 

John3on, Army Chief of Staff, was concerned about the overall impact on the 

Army's worldwide posture. The size of the troop commitments to Vietnam and 

the tours of only one-year duration were viewed as the biggest problems. Of 

all the Chiefs, 

he was probably the most insistent on the need for the 

Reserves.66/General Johnson argued that: 

As General 

0 the main problem preventing the call-up of Reserves was the 

legacy of the Berlin mobilization in 1961 and the ensuing outcry 

of misuse, and, 

0 the Reserves represented a wasted asset that was only good when 

not called up, and kept primarily for their deterrent value. 

Johnson once remarked about the Reserves, we are "feeding the 

horse but never taking him out of the barn."67/ 

draftees. 

General Westmoreland, on the other hand, was satisfied with 

He expressed his feeling that there never was a point when the 

President could have called up the Reserves before Tet in 1968. 

Prior to 

that watershed battle, the COMUSMACV had been ambivalent about a call-dp of 

Reserves, His thoughts were that: 

0 a call-up might set loose pressure to disengage from RVN prematurely 

in order to get the reservists home, 

• after their one year tou.rs in RVN, the reservists would apply 

pressure for release from acti\,e duty, which would be disruptive 

army-wide. 68/ 

4-28 

and,


By early 1968 the strain placed on active forces in meeting the continuing 

Vietnam buildup, keeping up other worldwide deployments, and maintaining an 

active strateoic Reserve had become so great that those tasks could no 

longer be met through reliance upon increased draft calls. The urgency of 

the situation was underscored by communist provocations in Korea and the 

Tet offensive in RVN. To the US mil;tary, Tet proviaed the hope that the 

President finally would have to loosen their leash and do what they had 

been pushing for: 

* call up reserve units 

* replenish the empty stateside strategic Reserve 

0 ticket more troops to Southeast Asia 

0 escalate the war to include attacks on sanctuaries in Laos and 

Cambodia. 69/ 

General Wheeler encouraged General Westmoreland to make his 

request for 206,000 troops ard then presented it in Washington as urgent 

without emphasizing the JCS's primary motive, to rebuild the active strategic 

reserve in the states.. The gambit backfired, causing a major reassessment 

and eventual deescalation of the war, and withdrawals of US combat 

forces from RVN. 

By 1969 draft quotas had been drastically reduced. In April 

1970, President Nixon proposed that the nation start to move in the direction 

of an all-volunteer armed force and end the Selective Service, To 

carry out Mr1•. Nixon's proposal, the Army, the service which had relied most 

heavily upon the draft, instituted a Modern Volunteer Army Program. The 

law that created Selective Service, the powerful polarizer of public opinion, 

was not extended in 1973. From a zero-draft the US had moved to a no 

draft situation depending entirely on the All Volunteer Armed Forces., 

In another historic move, the Congress took on a greater role in 

American foreign policy making when it passed the War Powers Resolution of 

1973 over President Nixon's veto. The law' precludes the President from 

continuing 

any military action beyond sixty days unless Congress vctes to 

sustain his action. The Presiaent's flexibility to deploy troops and 

commit Reserves was severely curbed by that; legislation. 

"4-29


9. A Lesson Learned 

Faced with budget cuts and lowered military manpower ceilings, 

defense and armed forces leaders sought to preclude a repeat of the Vietnam 

experience and the subsequent failure of the chief executive to mobilize 

the Reserves. 

The following actions were taken. 

* In August 1970, Secretary of Defens2 Melvin R. Laird emphatically 

affirmed that the Reserve components would be prepared to provide 

8 the units and individuals required to augment the active forces 

during the initial phases of any future expansion. 

* In 1971, Mr. Laird announced that increased reliance would be 

placed on the National Guard and Reserve, 

Force Policy" was born. 

and thus the "Total 

* Through increased reliance un the Reserve components, the DOD was 

z.3le to reduce 3ignificantly the size and structure of the active 

forces. 

* Reddiness requirements of the Reserve components were increased 

to the point that many of those units woula be expected to deploy 

aiong with active units, 

0 The Army, under the airection of Chief of Staff General Creighton 

W. Abrams, airoitly implemented the DUD Total Force Policy by 

bolstering the responsiveness and strength of the Army's Reserve 

components and by integrating them more effectively into the 

overall effort.70/ 

General Abrams had in fact learned from the decision not to 

mobilize during Vietnam, and he set about to build a leaner, responsive and 

more capable Army. In 1974, he took the DOD-directed force of 13 active 

divisions and eight Reserve component divisions and restructured tho force 

to meet the Army's commitments. He increased tne Army's active force'to 16 

divisions. In addition to increasing the active combat strength, he 

retained eight division: in the Reserve component forces, and structured 

three of the Army's sixteen divisions so that they would be "rounded out" 

by an affiliated Reserve component brigade if and when committed. 

In a 

similar fashion, other CONUS divisions were organized to have affiliated 

1~ 4-30

THE BD?,1 CORPORATION 

Reserve components battalions and brigades trained and equipped to deploy 

as part of those divisions in an emergency requiring mobilization. ,Moreover, 

as more of the Army's srength went into the combat structure (the 

combat teeth) the entire Army became more dependent upon the capabilities 

of Reserve components supporting units (the support tail). That greater 

dependence necessitated closer integration and increased concern for the 

readiness and mobilization requirement of the Army's Reserve Con-ponents. /l/ 

C. SUMMARY ANALYSIS AND INSIGHTS 

Failure to mobilize during the Vietnam War causod repercussions that 

impacted on the US economy, the Congress and executi,2_ branch, the draftage 

public, and -- to an extent that cannot yet be measured -- on the military 

services. 

0 Historically, mobilization connotes a sense of na3ticnal determination 

and therefore it provides a strong signal to an enemy; 

lack of mobilization conveys a sense of irresolut;nn in circumstances 

such as the Vietnam Way'. 

* The actual US commitment of combat troops j.:) Indo-J-ina differed 

from that foreseen in contingency plans. \ll sa ,y US plans 

anticipated a mobilization of Reserve Compoiients. The f-ilure to 

call up critically short technical skills, especially logistics 

arid engineer units, contributed sicmificantly to delays in the 

deployment of combat tr'oops to Vietri.:1,1•. 

* The decision not to mobilize but to depend on increased recruitment 

and draft calls proved to be the "lesser" of two polt.ical 

"evils" for President Johnson. Militarily, the decision proved 

less.Zhan effective, and it exacerbated selective service inequities, 

morale probl~ms, personnel turbulence and shortages of 

qualified leaders an,:, technicians. That decision, among others, 

contributed to his political demise. 

0 The call-up of the Reserves would not significantly hav3 altered 

the final outcome of the war, assuming that the wa- would have 

---. -- ,1 C 4, 

4-31

THE 8C.1 CORPORATION 

bee" pre ,4 i-A essentially lhe same way that it actually 

a 

u 1 f•,, "ioubt there would havw been less personnel turbulence 

aw, .re rapid deployment tc. Vietwiia haa the Reserves been 

nmobilizad; however, short of a threat to its national survival, 

the DRV was prepared to ,;eet the US commitments, no matter how 

quickly they were carried cult. (Conversely, had the Reserve 

Componeni. been i,-obilized at the outset, with conc,,:iit,?nt public 

support, the war might have been prosecuted in more vigorous 

fashion and with different results.) 

The mobilization during the Korean War and the Berlin Crisis made 

call ups appear to 0IS political leaders to be politically unacceptable. 

The end of the Vietnam war brought with jl an end to 

the draft and initiation of the War Powers Act. Futu'e Americap 

presidents will be faced with a serious diiemma if confronted 

with a crisis situation requiring rapid ouildups in military 

manpower. 

D. LESSONS 

* "Banana" wars or oher small-scale, protracted, but undeclared 

wars are politica!lv difficult to justify and sustain. Only a 

radical change in US attitudes and perceptions might enable a US 

president to engage in such wars in the future. 

* Small-size, intense, short-term combat operations are possible, 

using regular forces, assuming that forces in the proper combinations 

are available and ready to fight, but any commitment of 

appreciable size or duration will require mobilization and the 

full support and understanding of a majority of the American 

people. 

* Historically, the US Army has been a people's army, comprised of 

citizcn soldiers who have taken up arms in the past in defense of 

their nation. No president should commit them lightly, even if 

it is only the standing Army and not the Reserve components. lhe 

rc~ot t::;22


Army should be committed only when there is a consensus among the 

American people that the vital interests of the country are 

irvoived. 

0 Those who prepare contingency plans should be aware of possible 

domestic planning constraints, and even the predispositions of 

top policy-makers. These factors -- such as President Johnson's 

refusal to mobilize Reserve components for Vietnam -- may affect 

the outcome of a crisis situation just as much as any other 

factor, 

* Declining enlistments in the regular and Reserve forces makes it 

more imperative than ever that the following be accomplished: 

so 

of 

se 

so 

es 

4e 

Quality recruitment for regular and reserve forces 

Maintenance of required manning levels in combatant forces 

Timely provision of modern equipment 

Continuous, high-caliber training 

Tough, frequent, realistic field exercises and inspections 

Concentration on developing intelligent, dedicated, professional 

leadership at all levels of command, 

leaders who are 

imbued with a deep sense of purpose and a mind set of 

instant readiness. 

4-33


CHAPTER 4 ENONOTES 

1, Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and 

Winston, 1971), p. 387 

2. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 

House of Representatives, 93d Congress, First Session, Part 1, 

Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff, Department of Defense (Doo) 

Appropriations for 1974 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1973), p. 639. 

3. Quoted in Douglas Kinnard, The War Managers (Hanover, NH, University 

Press of New England, 1977), p. 123. 

4. James M. Gavin, Crisis Now (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 47-48. 

5. Ibid., p. 48. 

6. "Origins of the US involvement in Vietnam," US-Vietnam Relations 

1945-1967, Prepared by the Department of Defense (Washington D.C.: 

US Government Printing Office, 1971), Book 2 of 12, p, 301. Hereafter 

DoD US/RVN Relations. 

7. Ibid., Book 2. "Reaction to Contingencies", p., 307. 

8. Walter G. Hermes, "Global Pressures and Flexible Response," in 

Americain Military History, Army Historical Series, Office of the Chief 

of Military History, US Army, 1972 Draft Revision of Chapt. 27, pp. 

593-594 

9. Ibid. p. 594. 

10, Ibid. 

11, Kinnard, p. 117. 

12. BDM Interview Series with former Army Reserve and National Guard 

Officers who mer,) m~obilized during the Berlin Crisis in 1961, conducted 

1-13 November 1979 at The BDM Corp., McLean, Va. 

13. Ibid. 

14. Major General J. Milnor Roberts, "Strong Reserve Boosted by Total 

Force Impetus," Army, Vol. 24, No. 10 (October 1974): p. 77. 

15. Johnson, p. 387. 

16. Kinnard, p. 118. 

17. Johnson, p. 146. 

4-34


18. DoD 'S/RVN Relations, Summary for the Record February 9, 1966, Signed 

by John M. Steadman, Book 4, C6 IF3, pp. 32-33. 

19. Johnson, p. 147, 

20. Ibid, p, 148. 

21. Ibid, p. 147. 

22. Ibid. p. 113. 

23. Ibid. 

24.. Interview with Dr. Hermes, Office of the Chief of Military Hiztory. 

Department of the Army, Octobe- 30, 1979. 

25. DoD US/RVN Relations, "Phase I in the Buildup of US Forces," March - 

July 1965, Book 4 of 12, IV C 6, p. l1I. 

26. Ibid. U.S. Grouna Strategy and Force Deploymerts, 1965-1967, The 

President's Decision, Book 5 IV C 6 IB 3 p. 12. Phase I in the Buildup 

of U.S. Forces, The Debate March-July 1965, Presidential Sanction 

for Phase I, Book 4 IV C 6 p. 111. 

27. Lt. Gen J. M, Heiser, Jr., Logistic Support, Vietnam Study Series, 

Off'ce of the Chief of Military History (Wabhington, DC: Department 

of the Army, 1974) p. 121. 

28, Kinnard, p. 121. 

29. Heiser, P. 121 and, Lt. Gen, C, H. Dunn, Base Development in South 

Vietnam, 1965-1970, Vietnam Study Series, Office of the Chief of 

Military History (Washington, DC: Department of Army, GPO, 1972), p. 

42. 

30. Hermes interview ana Heiser, p. 33. 

31. Ibid. 

32. Kinnard, p. 117. 

33. The Pentaaon Papurs, Sen.. Gravel Edition (Boston: Beacon Press 1971) 

(HereatterGravelPentagon Papers), Vol. IV, pp. E39-604; BDM interview 

with Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker conduc+ed at the BOM offices, McLean, 

Va. on November 8, 1979; Norman Hannah, "Vietnam: Now We Know", 

National Review, June 11, 1976, p. 6,', ±nd Lyndr.i B. Johnson, p. 385. 

• 4-35

T:E BDM CORPORATION 

34. Johnson, p, 384. 

35. Ibid., p., 385. 

36. Ibid. p. 535. 

37. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol. IV, p. 539. 

38. Johnson, pp. 385-386 and General William C. Westmorelandrs PrivatcŽ 

Papers on file at the Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. 

of the Army, Washington, D.C., See History File 1-29 Feb 1968. 

39. Westmoreland, Ibid., see Historv File 1-29 Feb 1968. 

40. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol. TV, pp, 539-51.6 gives a detaiied `esi-ription 

of tn JCS decisionmaklýng pr'ocess on the emergency reinforcement 

during Tet 1963. 

41.. Ibid. pp. 542-543., 

42. Ibid. pp. 545-546. 

43. See Don Oberdorfer, Tet! (New York:. Doubleday, 1971), pp. 172-173; 

Johnson, pp.. 386 ancFd-9; Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol IV, p, 542; John 

B. Henry, II, "February 1968," Foreign Policy, Vol. 4 (Fall 1971), p. 

9; and, Herbert Schandler, Unmaking of a President. Lyndon Johnson 

and Vietnam (New Jersey. Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 

99-103, 109. 

44. General Westmoreland's original request in response to Tet '68 was 

about half of the 206,000 troop request that General Wheeler urged him 

to ask for. General Wheeler's intent was to reccnstitute the sorely 

depleted strategic reserve with about half of the total augmentation. 

After he became Army Chief of Staff, General Westmoreland recounted 

tne history of the memos and discussions on this issue and obtained 

General Wheeler's initials on his memorandum fu, the record. See 

Memorandum fcr the Reccrd foi 206,000 Troop Request in Feu"uarv 1968, 

Separate folder, General Westmoreland's personal papers ';led in 

Office of the ChieF of Military History, Washington, D.C. 

45. Leslie H, Gelb with Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The 

•ystem Workea (Washington. The Brookings Institution, 1979), pp. 

173-174; and Henry, "Cebruary 1968," pp. 8, 13, 16-21. 

46. Johnson, p. 393, 

4I-


47., Schandler, pp. 134-137. 

48. Gelb with Betts, p, 175. 

49. Ibid; Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol. 4, p. 557; and Townsend Hoopes, 

The Limits of Intervention: An Inside Account of How the Johnson 

Policy of Escalation was Reversed (New York: McKay, 1969), pp, 

145-146. 

50. Gelo with Betts, p. 175; Robert Gallucci, Neither Peace Nor Honor: 

The Politics of American Military Policy in Viet-Nam, Washington 

Center of Foreign Policy Reserarch, School of Advanced International 

Studies, Stuuies in International Affairs (Baltimore: Jo'ns Hopkins 

University Pre-s, 1975), pp. 123-124; and Gravel Pentagon Papers Vol. 

IV, pp. 561-568 and 583. 

51. Quoted in Schandler, p. 255; also see pp. 175, 247 and 25At. 

S52. Gelb with Betts, p. 176. 

53. Ibid. 

54. Quoted in Schandler, p. 162; also see Hoopes p. 204. 

Gelb with Betts, Sj5. p. 176; and Oberdorfer, pp. 289-290. 

56. Quoted from Schandler, pp. 139, 226-228. 

57. Ibid. pp. "31-232. 

58. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol IV, P. 602, This ceiling was never 

actually attained. The highest total of troops in RVN, reached early 

in 1969, was 543,000. See Henry Kissinger, White House Years (B.ton: 

Little, Crown & Co., 1979), p. 235. 

59., Jonnson, p. 387. 

60. Gelb with Betts, pp. 176-178. 

61. Kissinger, pp. 235-236. 

S62. Ibid. pp. 319-320. 

63. Walter G. Hermes, "Global Pressures and thL Flexihle Response," pp. 

615-616; and Douglas Kinnard, The War Managers ic,. 123-124. 

"4. -37

-. - 4 


64. Hermes "Global Pressures and Flexible Response" p. 616. 

65. Hearings, Committee on Appropriations, 93d Concress, p. 550, and 

Hermes, p. 616. 

66, Kinnard, p. 123. 

67. Quoted in Kinnard, Ibid. 

68. Ibid. 

69. Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises (Cambridge, 

MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 29. 

70. Hearings on Military Postire and HR 10929, 000 Authoril.ation for 

Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, Before the Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives 95th Congress, 2d Session, Part 5 

o' 7 Parts, Title IV, "Reserve Forces", Statement of Maj. General 

Francis D. Greenlief (Ret), Executive Vice President of the National 

Guard Assocation of the US, pp. 2-3; and General Creighton W. Abrams, 

"Army, 1974: Emphasis Is On Readiness," Army, Vol. 24, No. 10 

(October 1974). 8-9. 

71. Abrams, p. 9; and Major General La Vern E. Weber, "For the Mindtemen 

of the 70's, The Guard: 'A Long War'", Army, Vol 24, No. 10, (October 

1974):. 65-67. 

4-38


CHAPTER 5 

PACIFICATION AND VIETNAMIZATION 

The building of a serious pacification program in 

* Vietnam was in one aspect a progressive disillusionment 

with one scheme after another. 


Douglas S. Blaufarb 

The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. 

Doctrine and Performance, 1977 l/ 

The objective of the whole people of my country is a 

unified democratic and strong Vietnam .,. to reach this 

objective, our National Leadership Committee has promoted 

three main policies: first, military offenses;, 

second, rural pacification; and third, democracy, 

General Nguyen Duc Thang 

Chief, National Pacification Campaign, 

Address to the Honolulu Conference 

February 7, 1966 2/ 

!1•- 

Between 1954 and 1975 the GVN, with US aid and support, struggled to 

devise a successful pacification and development strategy for South Vietnam. 

The complex goal of achieving a politically and economically viable 

society under an effective government supported by the people proved to be 

eiusive. Various programs were attempted, often at US insistence. Many of 

those programs were well intentioned but ill-devised blends of stop-andstart 

military and police operations, social-control techniqdes, emergency 

welfare efforts and 

attempts to extend political-administrative linkage 

from Saigon to the countryside. Almost without exception, the early 

* programs failed to yield the desired results. By the time that Pacification, 

and for that matter Vietnamization, began showing signs of finally 

working, the nature of the struggle had c& nged and South Vietnam began to 

crumble under the DRV's conventional military pressures. 

Ij The evolution of pacification in RVN, as well as that of the USinspired 

Vietnamization Program, will be described and analyzed in this 

5-1


chapter. 

The impact of those programs on the war effort and their degree 

of success also will be assessed herein., 

B. PACIFICATION: A KEY VARIABLE IN THE COUNTERINSURGENCY FORMULA 

a broad sense, SIn pacification is one means toward an end -- defeat of 

an insurgency. Tn:e extension of a government's prescnce and reduction of 

ar insurgent's influence throughout a country, however difficult and ambitiius, 

is still a limited objective. Pacification is a key variable in the 

complex formula that must be employed to ensure a stable, popularly supported 

government. Political reform, measures to maintain a healthy 

economy, education and training to improve the quality of civilian and 

military leadership, and the development of popularly supported local and 

rational security forces are but some 

of the undertakings a threatened 

central government must mount to defeat an internal insurgent threat, 

1. Early Pacification Efforts 

Before beginning an analysis of pacification in Vietnani, it would 

be helpful to examine several ope-ational counterinsurgency models with a 

view towards determining how pacification, as a working concept, evo,\ed. 

a. The Greek Civil War 3/ 

The US experienced its first involvement in countering a 

communist insurqency after WWII whei, 

it came to the aid of the Greek government 

in 1947. US military and economic aid proved indispensable to a 

bankrupt nation struggling to rebuild its institutions after six years of 

war, of which five years were under enemy occupation. The US experience 

was attended by the following fortuitous developments: 

• The Yugoslav Communists broke ties with the Soviet Union anc 

ceased to provide aid and sanctuary to the Greek Communist insurgents. 

1 . Field Marshall Alexander Papagos, hero of the Greek battles 

I 

against Italy in WWII, elected to emerge from retirement and 

assumed command of the operations against the insurgents, 

5-2


,F, 

I 

US 

involvement was brief as the Greek insurgents proved to 

be less than skillful. There was ltle impact on the US'3 awareness of 

communist rural insurgency as a special problem. 

b. The Philippines and Huks 4/ 

The Philippine insurgency following WWII 

can be looked upon 

as the beginning of active counterinsurgency on the part of the US, Under 

the strong and effe'ctive leadership of President Magsaysay, and aided by US 

economic and military assistance, the Huk rebellion was defeated. Magsaysay 

had a program that was well balancec between military pursuit of the 

Huk insurgents and aid and assistance directed toward meeting the needs of 

the peasant population, the baie of the insurgency. 

The military and the 

rural police constabulary merged to form a single se-vice and were assigned 

the responsibility for pacifying the countryside and suppressing the Huks. 

Once local security had been established, the government set about the 

political process of reorganizing and reestablishing local government to be 

responsive to and involve the people. 

The success of the Philippine experience did net evolve from 

military actions, but was generated from the political solution devised and 

implemented by an astute national leader who exercised the democratic 

process delineatea in his nation's constitution. 

c. The British and the Malayan Communists 5/ 

Fron: 1948 to '960, 

the British colonial government successfully 

overcame the Malayan Communist Party's (MCP) insurgency, restored 

order, pacified the countryside, and launched the process whereby Malaya 

became a self-governing, independent and democratic state. That achievement 

was notable in that political and economic stability were achieved in 

the midst of the intarnai crisis created by the insurgency, 

their counterinsurgency success in Malaya, 

Following 

the British gave the Malayan: 

independence and withdrew their mi iitary personnel from the scene. 

Sd. The French Experience 6/ 

Among others after WWII, France found herself countering 

Sserious insurgent movements in Vietnam and Algeria. The French model of 

"La 

guerre revrolutionnaire" proved to be less than successful against the 

45-3


Icommunist insurgents. Basic to the French counterinsurgency "modus 

SI 

L 

operandi" was ruthless control of the details of villdge life by an occupy- 

'w] army to separate the guerrilla from the population. This, however, was 

as far as the approacn was able to go; true pacification was never 

attained. There was no answer to the problem of institutionalizing the 

gains achieved at a high cost or of how the occupying army would be able to 

let go its hold in the villages. There was little from the French experience 

that was accepted by US counterinsurgents when the Americans replaced 

the French in Vietnam. 

A graphic comparison of the above menticned counterinsurgency 

models ",s shown as Figure 5-1. 

2, The Process Defined 

Over time, pacification began to take on a broader meaning within 

the context of counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam. Security for the 

rural population became synonymous with pacification. 

In 1966, then White House consultant Robert Komer reported on ,he 

status of pacification and he defined it as follows: 

If we divide the US/GVN problem into four main 

components, three of tnem show encoLraging progress. 

The campaign against t"ie major VC/NVA (North Vietnamese 

Army) units is in high gear, the constitutiunal process 

seems to be evolving favorably, and we expect to contain 

inflation while meeting most needs of the civil 

economy. But there is a fourth problem area, that of 

securing the countryside and getting the peasant 

involved in the struggle against the Viet Cong, where 

we are lagging way behind. It is this problem area 

which I would term pacification . 

of the 

At the 

pacification 

risk of over-simplication, 

problem as involving 

I see 

three 

management 

main 

subtasks: (1) providing local security in the counL,'yside--essentially 

a military/police/ cadre task; 

(2) breaking the hold of the VC over the people; and 

(3) positive programs to win the active support of the 

rural population. 7/ 

i 

5-4

' THE BDM CORPORATION 

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5-5N. 50 ~ 

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When Komer arrived in Vietnam a year later to become the first 

Deputy for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), 

the following official aefinition for pacification had evolved- 

The military process of establishing sustained 

local security in the cuuntryside, the political process 

of establishing and re-establishing local government 

responsive to and involving the people and the 

economic and social process of meeting rural people's 

needs. 8/ 

In the eyes of official Washington, pacification 

1.d become the "umbrella" under wMi-2 1 , all programs for 

winniog the "other war" could be placed. It encompassed 

the full spectrum of military, political and 

civil efforts in Vietnam. 9/ 

C. EA1LY PACIFICATION EFFORTS: THE NGO EXPERIMENTS (1954-1963) 

Tne communists began to build up their clandestine political and military 

organizational base in South Vietnam in lq56 after it became clear 

that the governments in Washington and Saigon would not proceed with a 

plebiscite or reunification. Initially, their activities were primarily 

covert and directed toward the pelitical struggle. It is clear in retrospect 

that as their infrastructure grew the communists were preparing for a 

military struggle. 

Beginning in 1957 that military struggle was intensified 

and featured increased terrorism against officials, government installations 

and private individuals. 10/ 

The US contribution during those early years haa little relevance to 

the problem of countering a low-level insurgency., 

The MAAG Chief and most other American authorities considered the 

major threat to be an overt, mass attack by North ,ietnamese troops across 

the 17th parallel,. A conventionally trained and deployed South Viet.amese 

army was the result -- 

at the expense of a buildup of the more relevant 

militia and police-type forces -- until early 1960, when the true nature of 

I. 

the then-existing threat to the RVN -- internal subversion -- was .,ecrgn 

ized. 11/ 

74 

5-6

THE o•M CORPORATION 

Professor Herring, a highly respected diplomatic historian, described 

the problem succinctly: 

The basic problem . . was that the army was 

trained for the wrong mission, The MAAG would be 

sharply criticized for failing to prepare the South 

Vietnamese Army for dealirg with guer-illa operations, 

"but from the perspective of the mid-1950s its emphas~s 

appears quite logical, Confronting the near-impossible 

task of building fro'm scratch an army capaule of performing 

two quite diverse missions, 11AAG naturally 

leaned toward the conventional warfare with which it 

was most familiar.. At least until 1958, moreover, the 

countryside was quiescent and Diem appeared firmly 

entrenched. [L.. Gen. Samuel T.] Williams and most of 

his staff had served in Korea, and the remarkable 

resemblance between the Korean and Vietnamese situations 

inclined them to focus on the threat of an invasion 

from the north. The army was therefore trained, 

organized ana equipped primarily to fight a conventional 

war and its inadequacies were obvious only after 

South Vietnam was enveloped by a rural insurgency. 12/ 

Li 

j 

During that period, President Diem's efforts to impr-ve rural security 

in the face of the increasing communist threat centered around the regroupment 

below: 

of the populace under the various resettlement schemes discussed 

1. Civic Action (see Figure 5-2) 

While dealing with his political and security problems, President 

Diem simultaneously undertook a program of Civic Action in the rural areas. 

SInitially emerging f,-om a military effort to stimulate and assist local 

I 

peasants in rebuilding war-damaged public facilities, the Civic Action Pro- 

gram quickly developed into a program of community development. 

Although Civic Action showed signs of success in its first full 

year of operation, the program was curtailed at the end of 1956 because of 

inter-agency rivalries between the Civic Action Directorate and the Ministries 

of Health, Information, and Agriculture. The latter organization 

apparently felt threatened Ly the intrusion of the Civic Action Program 

into areas traditio.ially under the Ministry ef Agriculture jurisdiction. 

5-7


Program Title: Civic Action 

Objective: 

a 

Stimulate and assist rural peasants in Yebuilding war-damaged 

public facilities 

Timeframe: 1955-1956 

Initiator: President Diem 

US Proponent. US AID mission gave modest support in late 1955 

GVN Proponent: Civic Action Directorate 

Results: 

4 Showed signs of success 1955-1956, however, the program was 

curtailed at the end of 1956 because of inter-agency rivalries 

and jurisdictional problems between the Civic Action Directorate 

and the Ministries of Heal ch, Information and Agriculture 

Remarks: 

* Program became propagandistic and political, with less emphasis 

on economic and social services. Diem and his brother Nhu gave 

the rural Civic Action little but lip service and were more 

preoccupied with urban problems. 

Figure 5-2. 

The Civic Action Program 

5-8


In spite of objections from the US AID Mission, which mciestly supported 

Civic Action after the summer of 1955, one expert observed that the program 

became more propaqanaistic and political, with less emphasis on economic 

and social services to the people.13/ Lawrence Grinter concludes that 

President Diem and his brother Nhu gave the rural efforts of Civic Action 

little but lip service and were more 

preoccupied with urban problems-. 

battling a rebellious army and the Binh Xuyen gangs for control of Saigon, 

taming other separatist elements, 

of the government. 14/ 

and trying to master the administration 

2. The Land Development Program (see Figure 5-3) 

The next phase in the RVN pacification efforts was the inauguration 

of land development centers (Dinh Dien, 

LDC's or centres d'implantation) 

by President Diem in late 1956. 

program were: 

His motivations for devising the new 

0 To improve internal security (rather than economic considerations). 

Of the two prime areas (the Central Highlands and the 

Delta), he assigned the highest priority to the Central Highlands 

for resettlement to place a "human wall" of loyal SVN 

guard against communist i, 1 filtration. 15/ 

people to 

0 To alleviate the overcrowding and poverty conditions prevalent 

along the central coast where four million people were living on 

only 260 500 hectares of arable landl16,' 

* To resettle the undeveloped lands of the central highlands, where 

agricultural production might be increased. 

• To integrate the Montagnard tribal people of the Central Highlands 

into permanent villages and thus subject them to greater 

governmental and administrative control. 17/ 

It has been suggested by some that Diem planned to resettle 

families that were considered to be unreliable into Viet Minh-dominated 

areas. 

The land development centers for those people were to be little 

more than armed detention camps. 18/ 

When the land development was first conceived in late 1956, 

US agreed to commit over $10 million in economic aid to the program. 

Alhough the USOM 

was active in the initial stages of the program in both 

5-9 

the


Program Title: Land Development 

Objectives: 

6 Improve internal security w 4 th priority on the Central Highlands 

* Resectla the undeveloped lands of the Central Highlands, where 

agricultural production might be increased 

* Integrate the montagnard tribal people of the Central Highlands 

into permanent villages to achieve greater governmental and 

administrative control 

0 Alleviate the overcrowding and poverty conditions prevalent along 

the central coast 

Timeframe: late 1956-1959 

US Proponent: US agreed in late 1956 to commit over $10 million in economic 

aid to the program, USOM active in initial stages in 

both planning and implementation, 

I By 

GVN Proponent: 

President Diem 

Remarks: 

0 Wide diverge-icies of view developed between the US and the GVN 

concerning Lhe prog-am's scope, direction and tempo. 

late 1957 the US had withdrawn its financial support for land 

development, except for providing the equipment, spare parts and 

tools. From that point on, the GVN had to pay for the cost of 

the program on its own. 

0 The land development proygram began to falter by mid-1957 for the 

following reasons: 

S- The program was not fully accepted by the natives of 

tne Central Highlands region. 

Diem S- was in a hurry to show results--little time was 

allowed for orderly planning and preparation. 

Since the program was promoted by the President and his 

brother Nhu, most GVN officials were reluctant to 

criticize their decisions or point out shortcomings. 

By 1959 Diem appeared to have lost interest in pursuing 

the effort any further. 

Figure 5-3. 

The Land Oevelopment Program 

5-10 

*1


planning and implementation, wide divergencies of view began to develop 

concerning the program's scope, direction and tempo.. '.hile the GVN had 

declared agricultural development to be 

one of the program's long-term 

goals, USOM believed it should have been given primary attentionM9/ As 

the GVN placed increasing emphasis on the political and security objectives 

in the program, other incompatibilities soon came into focus, The US 

wanted te concentrate the effort in the Delta region and Diem insisted on 

the Central Highlands, The US held that each family in the highlands would 

require from three to five hectares of land to subsist; Diem claimed that 

one hectare would suffice. 

Tensions also arose over the management and use 

of USOM-supplied agricultural equipment. By late 1957 the US had withdrawn 

its financial support for land development, except for providing the equipment, 

spare parts and tools, From that point on, the GVN had to pay for 

the cost of the program on its own. 20/ 

The land development program began to falter by mid-1957 for the 

following reasons: 

- Focos had shifted from the Deita to the Central Highlands, where 

it was not fully accepted by the natives of that region. 

a 

Diem was in a hurry to show results--little time was allowed for 

orderly planning and preparation, 

L Since the program was being pushed by the President and his 

brotner Nhu, most GVN offic'als were reluctant to criticize 

their decisions or point out apparent shortcomings.21/ 

Though the land development prigram achieved a modicum of success 

in the Central Higtiands by 1,59, Diem appeared to lose interest in pursuing 

the effort any further and he began to concentrate his interest on the 

Delta, 

modifying it 

Rather than building on the land development concept and perhaps 

in light of experience gained, Diem actually created a new 

program -- "agrovilles" (Khu Tru Mats) formally announced in eirly 1959.22/ 

5-11


3. Agglomeration Camps and Agrovilles (see Ficure 5-4) 

In the eyes of most Americans, PresidEnt Diem had accomplished a 

miracle in the first fivc ye.3rs )f his regime., Notably, his accomplishments 

were: 

* Politica- stability - a constitution had been iritten and elections 

fcr a National Assembly were conducted, 

* Economic growth - the economy, with US aid, was showing signs of 

stability. 

. Scciil reform - many of the social needs of the people were being 

met (especially those of the urban population), 

0 Security of the countryside - This area remained a problem which 

started to become more serious in 19E9 (particuiirly in the Oelta 

region).,23/ 

Communist harrassnient of the countryside was beginning tc reach 

emergency proportions by mid-1959, 

Followir~g a clandestiite visit to RVN 

territory in late 1958, DRV politburo member Le Duan had proposed a program 

of terror and violence which becane tne blueprint for the future course of 

the VC/•NLF insurgency in tne south.24/ Cn 13 May 1959, the Lao Dong 

Pirty's C:entral Committee a,)proved Le Duan's proposal and the North Vietnamese 

campaign to conquer the South began under the direction of Hanoi.25/ 

This stepped-up attack took its toll., Landowners, officials, 

school teachers and health workers were being assisinated at a rate of 

about 100 a month.26/ Working to counter this insurgent tide, in 1959 the 

•'. 

It 

GVN began its ,ew national sýecurity program of which f;rst agglomeration 

camps and then agrovilles were to be the centerpiece. 

camps•l 

Diem and Nhu envisaged two types of agglomeration or resettlement 

* Ou; Khu - a regroupmrent (regulated zones) of pro-communist or VC 

families into special zonec where they could be watched by goverrment 

authorities, 

* Qui Ao - Types of agglomerati3n centers for ioyal, patriotic and 

reliable Families who were seen ac potential targets for VC 

terrorism and who would be protected by gove,-nment personnel.27/ 

5-12

7 


Program Title- Agglomeration Camps 

I Objectives: 

* Increased national security 

* Regroupment of pro-communist or VC families into special zones 

where they could be watched by government authorities 

P * Development of agglomeration centers for protectic _f loyal, 

patriotic and reliable families who were seen as potential iargets 

for VC terrorism. 

Timeframe: May-July 1959 

Initiators,: P'resident Diem and Counselor Nhu 

S~Results: 

Rs t Peasants were forced to leave their traditiopal homesteads - 

fi explain 

their reaction was one of unanimous protest 

* It was difficult to distinguish between genuine Viet Minh or VC 

families and nationalist families 

a Program was suspended after two minths of operation 

Remarks: 

* The GVN was unable to provide adc uate security to the people, to , 

satisfactorily the rationale for such camps, or to dedicate 

sufficient attertion to the economic and social implications 

of the resettlements., 

gt 

Figure 5-4,. Agglomeration or Resettlement Camps 

ji 

5-13


Security was the sole justification for this program. 

The following 

problems quickly develooed:. 

* Peasants, who were forced to leave their traditional homesteads, 

found themselves in strange andi unfamiliar places. 

* The Yeaction of the regrouped peasants took the form cf unanimous 

protest. 

* it was difficult to distinguish between genuine Viet Minn or VC 

families and nationalist families.28/ 

After only two months of operation, Diem suspended the exper-imentation 

of the agglomeration centers. The GVN was unable t,. provide adequate 

security to the people, to explain sati'sfactorily the rationale for 

such camps, 

or to dedicate sufficient attention to the economic and social 

implications of the resettlements.29/ The ill-conceived program had a 

quiet passing as Nhu 

taunched a new variation cn the pacification theme-- 

Agrovilles. 

In July 1959, Diem announced that the GVN was undertaking tc 

improve the rural standards of living through the escablishment of some 86 

"prosperity and density centers" (Khu Tru Mat).30/ These "Agrovilles"311 

were to be loca&.d along a strategic route system of key roads, proTected 

by new towns. (iee Figure 5-5).. The agrovilles were to be the leading 

edge of a new national security plan. The plan envibioned- 

0 The regrouping of major population elements into key rural agrovilles 

along the routes connecting strategically important 

I 

Saigon, Hue, Da Nang and Daldt, 

The recruitment of more competent and dedicated local leaders for 

[ 

village administrative Dosts. 

The2 improvement of v;llage self-finance. 

. The formation of d ",igorous yoJin movement (under Nhu's control) 

for combating 

villages.32/ 


increased Viet Cong recruitment activity in the 

plan called for the resettlement of about 500,000 people. 

Eighty agroviles were to be built by the end of 1963, each designed for 

about 400 families (2,000 to 3,000 people), and each with a surrounding 

5-14

THE B)M CORPORATION 

Program Title. Agrovilles 

Objectives: 

. Improved national secur-Ity and rural standards of living through 

the regrouping of major population elements into prosperity and 

density centers--"Agroviles"- -along the routes connecting strategically 

important Saigon, Hue, DaNang and Dalat 

0 The resettlement of about 500,000 people. Eighty agrovilles to 

be built by the end of 1963, each designed for about 400 families 

(2,000 to 3,000 people), and each with a sur'rounding cluster of 

smaller agrovilles for 120 families. New communities to offer 

farmers many advantages including c3mmunity defense, schools, 

dispensaries, market centers, public gardens aod electricity, 

Timeframe: July 1953-1960 

Initiator: President Diem and Counselor Nhu 

Results: 

0 The peasants objected to the agrovilles even more sharply than 

they had to previous resettlement experiments. 

0 In order to meet GVN Interior linistry Construction quotas, 

provincial and local officials had to bring in thousands of 

Republican youth to help because the peasants who were supposed 

to construct the settlements responded less than enthusiastically. 

Remarks: 

9 The Viet Cong put special emphasis into their anti-agroville 

campaign, issuing threats against village cadres and assassinating 

some of them. By the end of 1969, peasant resistance and 

insurgent attacks caused abandonment of the prograo with only 22 

out of 80 communities completed. 

Figure 5-5., 

The Agrcville Program 

II 

I•: 5-15


cluster of smaller agrovilles for 120 families. The new comm,,,ities 

offered the farmers many advantagas including ccmmunity Jefense, schools, 

dispensaries, market centers, public gardens, and electricity. The GVN 

expected warm surport from tne rural populace, but the peasants objected to 

the agrovilles even more sharply than they had to previous resettlement 

experiments.333,' 

Under pressu-e frcm the Interior Ministry to meet ambitious 

goiernment construction quotas, provincial and local officials scrambled to 

get agrovilles underway. The peasants, who were supposed to c ,truct the 

settlements, responded less than enthusiastically, therefore. 'courvee' 

labor was reso-ted to, and thousands of Republican Youth were imported to 

help.. For example, at one site -- Vi Thanh near Can Tho -- 20,000 peasants 

were assembled from four districts, many more than the number whc could 

expect to profit directly from the undertaking.34/ 

Moreover, most of those 

who were selected to move into tne agoovflles which they had helped build, 

did so unwillingly, for it 

home, 

often meant abandoning a cherished ancestral 

tombs and developed garcens and fields for a stringe and desolate 

place often without shade, toilet facilities cr provisions for livestock.35/ 

The Viet Cong put special emphasis into their anti-agroville 

campaign, 

issuing threats against village cadres ana assassinating some of 

them. By the end of 1960, peasant resistance and insurgent attacks caused 

abandonment of the program with only 22 out of 80 communities compieted. 36/ 

The telltale indicators of why the GVN's Land Oevelopment, 

agglomeration and Agroville schemes had failed were not being read by Diem, 

His government (with US aid) was unable to provide the rural population 

with: 

0 an effective counterinsurgency capability and, 

* a viable politico-administrative framework.37/ 

Even as the Agroville program was winding down, 

Diem and Nhu were 

formulating their next attempt at pacifying the countryside--Strategic 

Hamlets. 

-5-1


4. Strategic Hamlets (see Figure 5-6) 

The concept of Strategic Hamlets (Ap Chien Lt.oc) took shape in 

piecemeal fashion in a few localities early in 1961. 

Some local authorities 

had duplicated the village defense system as it had been employed witn 

success against the 'iet Minh in Bui Chu and Phat Diem. the two oldest 

Roman Catholic diocesan arcas in North Vietnam.38/ For example, in Ninh 

Thuan province, the province chief, Lt. Colonel Khanh, initiated a village 

defense program by encouraginq the villager- to plant a special kind of 

cactus around their village.. 

The rapid growing, thorny cactus :iedge formed 

a formidable barrier which discouragea penetration by enemy infiltrators. 

Armed with primitive weapons -- pointed sticks, lances and spears -- 

village youths, 

both male and female, performed security and guard functions, 

In the Trung Hoa village of Darlac Province, Father Hoa, a 

Catholic priest of Chinese origin who fled North Vietnam in 1954, 

his village into a North Vietnam-type of community., 

with a large number of Nung people (a 

fashioned 

Father Hoa came south 

Chinese catholic group from North 

Vietnam) whom he helped resettle in his village as well as in the district 

of Nam Con, located in Xuyen Province, The Nung (often called the "Sea 

Swallows") resettlements became tightly stockaded defensive ar'eas within 

enclosures of wooden 

stakes reinforced by a system of camouflaged trap 

holes lined with poison-tipped spikes. The villagers were armed with 

crossbows and arrows, 

Notwithstanding the crude weapons, 

lances and spears in addition to a few old rifles. 

the defense of the Nung villages was 

Effective, and served as a model for other village and hamlet self-defense 

systems in the Mekong Delta. 39/ 

Ngo Dinh Nhu launched the Strategic Hamlet Program late in 1961 

with a view towards establishing a village defense system for the entire 

country. This new scheme was an attempt at avoiding the mistake of erecting 

whole new communities from the ground up. The plan was aimed at fortifying 

existing villkges, although it did include some provisions for 

4• destroying indefensible hamlets and the relocation of the inhabitants into 

more secure communities. 

Strategic !hamlets were to concentrate on ciil 

5-17 

h 4


Program Title: Strategic Hamlets (Ap 

Chien Luoc) 

Objectives: 

0 Ebtablishment of a village defense system for the entire country, 

0 Concentration on civil defense through crude fortifications and 

ovganization of the populace in order to improve their military 

ca!.Lbility and political cohesiveness 

* Fotv ification of existing namlets to establish a continuous front 

line of interdependent combat villages 

O Fortify 11,000 of the country's 16,000 to 17,000 hamlets by 1963 

Timeframe: 1961-1963 

-4Hamlets 

Initiator: Diem, Nhu, and the Interministerial Committee for Strategic 

(IMCSH) 

US Proponents: USOM (USAID, CIA and USIS) 

Supporters: Technical assistance and program evaluation - British 

Advisory Commission headed by Sir Robert Thompson 

Results- 

* In practice, the Strategic Hamlets became instruments of control 

rather than of pacification. 

* The peasants resented having to 'eave their homes and being 

herded into fortified stockades witich tile GVh fo-ced them to 

builI( withoLt compensation, 

* In keeping wich Diem's view towar's ,plf-sufficiency and "personalism", 

peasants were pushed to con'centrate on self-improvement 

and self-help, and were deniea social services and economic aid 

to improve village life, 

* In 1963 Diem was overthrown in a military coup and the Strategic 

Hamlet Program came to a complete stop, 

Remarks: 

* The program had little strategic direction; Strategic Hamlets 

were created haphazardly and not linked together to reduce vulnerability 

to VC attack- 

- Military operations, particularly in the Delta, were not 

designed to support the advance of the program. 

- No real effort was made to separate the people in the Strategic 

Hamlets from the Viet Cong living in the hamlets. 

- Very little effort was made to ;mpose control3 on the movement 

of the Viec Ccng and their supplies in and around the 

Strategic Hamlets. 

- Critical lack of a well-integrated plan utilizing the principle 

of building outward gradually from areas cf strength, 

Instead hamlets were grouped together whenever province 

j" chiefs or local military commanders saw Fit regardless of 

local security considerations. As a result, large gaps were 

left around areas of Strategic Hamlet development and the VC 

were allowed room to maneuver. 

* Filure 5-6. The Strategic Hamlet Program 

5-18 

._._.....


defense through crude fortifications and to organize tha populace in order 

to improve their military capability and political cohesiveness. The 

social and economic needs of the rural people played second fiddle to the 

GVN's drive to transform the villages and hamlets into antiguerrilla 

bastions. 

Nhu set up an Interministerla' Committee for Strategic Hamlets 

(IMCSH) to oversee the program., High goals were established- he annourced 

that by 1962 some 11,030 of the country's 16,000 to 17,000 hamlets would be 

fortified.40/ By fortifying existing hamlets, a continucus frcot line ot 

interdependent combat villages was to be established. 

With each village 

and hamlet fortified, armed and trained to fight by employing "people's 

guerrilla tactics", the VC would find it difficult to select a point of 

weakness, meeting strong resistance everywhere. 

General Tran Dinh 7ho in his recent monograph on pacification had 

the following to say about the genesis of the Strategic Hamlet Program: 

This concept [Strategic Hamlets] was an amalgamation 

of ideas derived from Vietnamese self-defense 

villages, British anti-Communist tactics successfully 

used in Malaya, and the Israeli Kibbutz defense 

system.41/ 

The Ngo brot;iers lOOKea to Sir Robert Thompso., and his British 

advisory mission (a small group of experts with previous experience in the 

Malayan counte rinsurgency) for technical assistance and program evaluation.42/ 

Meeiwhile, large-scale US support for the Strategic Hamlet Program 

was Pot i,,mei&.ely forthcoming. Tran Dinh Tho claims the program was 

funded partly by the GVN's national budget and partly by the US 

Assistance Program 43/ 

Military 

Other sources have observed that American support 

came primarily from the CIA. 44/ As Blaufarb noted, we can be safe in 

assuming that, "frm..the CIA undertook to support these 

efforts."45/ 

a. US Participation 

Strategic sae 

Looking back to the early sixties, it can be seen that 

although the pattern of VC insurgency against the Diem government seemed 

familiar, following Lhe Viet Ininh, Malayan and Philippine insurgericies, the 

5-19


US 

did not at first have .a ready resporse to the conflict or to rural 

pacif;.atioi. Until Presidert Kennedy approved the Counterinsurgency Plan 

(riP) for Vietnam in 196,, 'he gap had been filled largely by a military 

r,ý 4 ponsa such as military civic action. a.,d improved propaganda and concentrated 

upon me3sures to transform the RVNAF 

into an effective military 

a["-;ra-Js. mobile and professionally managed, able to concentrate its 

ftoces effectively when required to strike a massive blow., It was believea 

that such a conventional force, properly supported by a competent intelligence 

effort, could easily meet and defeat the poorly arme d insurgents as 

"a lesser 4ncluded capability" of its newfound irof~ciency.46/ The CIP was 

one of the ea-.'ly expedient measures taKen; anotner was the Geographically 

Phased National Plan, a plan designed to clear priority target areas in 

phases, with the end result being a secure region to turn over to loyal 

inhabitants. 

As discussed ii Chapter 5, Vlm Iof this study, the CIP 

encompassed a good deal more t'ian military matters., For example, it called 

for President Diem to reorganize his government for greater efficiency, 

broaden its base, and eliminate corruption.. 

The US failed to apply leverage 

3n the Ngo regime and ultimately abandoned the conditions in order "to 

get on with the war.."47/ 

As it tt,'ns oL't, n~ither the CIP nor the Geographically 

Phased Plan was ever fully implementad. 

Diem made some conciliatory gestures, 

then he went about doing things a-, he wished -- US counterinsurgency 

strategy was not accepted; nevertheless, additional US aid continued 

unabated. 

Experts conclude that Diem's solution to the insurgency problem 

at that time was to focus not upon the military aspect but upon the village 

and hamlet population, with the purpose being to "dry up the sea of 

friendly peasantry in vhich swam the VC 'fish'" 48/ 

"In 1962. the GVN launched "Operation Sunrise," which was the 

first large scale resettlement combining GVN and US inputs under the Strategic 

Hamlet Program. 

Operation Sunrise (see Figure 5-7 fcr a portrayal of 

the region) focused on a cluster of villages in. Binh Duong province, 

heavily infested area northeast of Saigon that had strategic significance 

a 

5-20 

- 4• . . .


BINH OUONG lROVINCE 

ORIGINAL WAR ZONE "0" 

-SUNRISE" HAMLETS 

SAU BANGI 

BEN IN o 

"tRGN TRIANGLE' 

0TP.UNG LAP 

PHOUC ViNH NINI4PUHAON 

LA 

THEA


and was a major hub in the VC's lines of communications, It was targeted 

on a cluster of hamlets located along the road which connected the VC 

strongholds known as the "Iron T-'iang",:" and "War Zone D", 

and adjacent to 

"War -one C." The area, selected by Nhu, was accepted reluctantly by the 

US as a means to provide a test of the new concept and because the US 

wanted to encourage Vietnamese initiative in pacification.49/ One observer 

provided the following sage assessment of the operation: 

The five hamlets mo\ d and rebuilt in Operation 

Sunrise turned out to have few able-bodied male inhabicants; 

they were all with the VC. The people were 

sullen and uncooperative, and most had to be moved 

forcibly while their homes and belongings were Jeliberately 

burned. It was highly inau'spicious and not, in 

fact, typical of the program, But first impressions 

are lasting ones. The U.S. press found the spectacle 

oepeiiant and said so; it questioned whether a movement 

to "win the people" could succeed on such a foundation. 

50/ 

Counselor Nhu traveled extensively, seeking to publicize and 

to energize the Strategic Hamlet Program, Over and over he stressed a 

theme of "self-sufficiency", the necessity for Vietnam and the Vietnamese 

to rely largely on their own efforts and -esiurces.5_/ 

The US on the other 

hand, saw the host government's role in the process to be key to the proagram's 

success and responded by increasng the size and magnitude of US 

T 

aid. In order to meet perceived needs, a US-GVN committee structure was 

createa, Rehabilitation Committees were formed in each province with the 

province chief as chairman and the U3 military sector adviser as - key 

member. 

A USOM-appointed AID provi-,cial representative took his place on 

the province committee, 

and an assistant director for rural affairs provided 

a US embassy o,'_,view of the prograw. Soon thereafter, CIA and USIS 

nad representatives assigned to the provinces working with the local committee 

members. The US ambassador, Frederick Nolting, appointed his deputy 

chief of mission to Nhu's comrmittee for Strategic Hamlets t3 enhance cooperation 

and coordination at the national level. 

5-22 I 

A 

•" ••


b, Program Results--Another Failure 

Nhu drove the hamlet program BlonaQ .ý.t a frantic pace. 

Province chiefs were ordered to establish a certain number of hamlets by a 

given date., The GVN used "statistical illusion" to make the orogram appear 

to be a surging success.52/ (See Figure 5-8 for a graphic picture of thaC 

9 ° growth.) Subsequent events gave lie to early GVN claims of success. 

Notwithstanding the skepticism on the part of some US officials, 

several o0servers 53/ expressed belief that sufficient data had been 

developed by early 1963 to confirm some progress., Furthermore, both GVN 

and US officials began exprecsi-g confidence in those efforts and hopes 

that the right pacification program had been undertaken. 

Sir Robert Thompson pointed to the following weaknesses in 

the GVN's implementation of the Strategic Hamlet Program: 

0 Ic had no strategic direction; Strategic Hamlets had Deen created 

a 

haphazardly and not linked together to reduce vulnierability to VC 

attack. 

Military operations, particularly in Lhe Delta, were not Gesigned 

to support tFe advcnce of the program. 

o No real effort was made to separate the people in the Strategic 

Hamlets from the Viet Cong living in the haiilets. 

0 Very little effort was made to impose controls on the movement of 

the Vi.2t Cong and their supplies within the vicinity of and in 

the Strategic Hanlets.54/ 

In Thompson's view, the GVN 

had failed to acniev:? the three 

objectives they had set -or the Strategic Hamlet Program, i.e.,, of protecting, 

uniting and involving the people, with the ultimate aim of 

isolating the guerrilla units from the population.55/ 

Others 56/ opined that the GVN's Strategic Hamlet Program 

had encounterea opposition from the peasants it was designed to help and 

protect because the Vietnamese and US administrative and support structure 

could not keep up with their needs. 

Compounding these failures of program 

administration was the even more critical lack of a well-integrated plan 

utilizing the principle of building outward gradually from areas of 

5-23


T0 I ! ! ! 1 I 

10,000 -- 

9000I 

8,000 ,1 

6500 STRATEGIC HAMLETS 

ESTIMATED TO BE COMPLETED 

I BY 1 JULY 

7,000 , I 

APPROJIMATELY 

S6,000 6000 STRATEGIC --- , • 

60 - - - - HAMLETS COMPLETED 

Uh ,.. 4,000 

3,000 --- 

IN1COMPLETE DATA 

PPIOP TsI 

SEPTEMBER 1A2 

FI 

2,000 i 

1,000-O 

0 N 0 J F M A M J1 J A S 0 N 0 J F M A M A 

4541/78W j| 

1962 1963 1964 

SOURCE.. DoD, US/VN Relations, Book 3 of 1?. 

IV. B.2., p.31 

Figure 5-8:* Strategic Hamlet Growth South Vietnam (1962-1963) 

5-24


strength. 

Instead, hamlets were grouped together wherever province chiefs 

or local military commanders 

saw fit, regardless of local security consideratiogs.57/ 

As a result, large gaps were left around areas of Strategic 

Hamlet development and the VC were allowed room to maneuver. 

In practice, the Strategic Hamlets became instruments of 

control rather than of pacification. 

The peasants resented having to leave 

their homes (e.g., peasants in the delta where villages had been strung out 

along canals found themselves moved into a central, defensible point, 

removed from their fields and faced with the problem of trying to build and 

plant above the flood plain) and being herded into fortified stockades 

which the GVN rorced them to build without compensation.58/ In keepinq 

with Diem's view towards self-sufficiency and "personalism,I" 59/ peasants 

were pushed to concentrate on self-improvement and self-help, and were 

denied social services and economic aid to improve 4illage life, Support 

of the government was seen as a duty. 60/ 

Several authors 61/ 

point to coercive methods employed by 

the GVN to make peasants move into Strategic Hamlets. For example, areas 

whicn could nut be penetrated by government forces were aeclared to be 

"open zones" and communities within them were randomly bombarded by 

friendly artillery and aircraft in order to foice the inhabitants to the 

safety of nearby Strategic Hamlets. 

The thousands of refugees created by 

such actions were welcomed by Diem as a show of political support for his 

government--the people were said to be voting for him with their feet, The 

net effect of this type of coercion was to alienate further the rural 

population and drive a wedge between them and their government. 

In 1963, political upheavals slowed progress of the program. 

Diem. who had held off nunercus abortive milIary coups during his nineyear 

reign, finally succumbed to his plotting generals. The successful 

coup was followed by a period of political and military turmoil and instability. 

As a crnsequence, the Strategic Hamlet Program came to a complete 

.1 

1- 

5-25


k 

stop, Tran Oinh Tho recalls the impact of the coup on the program and on 

the people involved:- 

I 

J 

Those cadre who had managed and directed the 

program were either arrested or removed for having been 

part of the old regime. The few cadre who remained 

free disassociated themselves from the program, Soon 

after the military junta took over, its president 

officially announced the abolition of the Strategic 

Hamlet Program in a pe'oclamation that w.s widely 

acclaimed by the public and secretly enjoyed by the 

enemy, In some localities, the gains achieved through 

two years of hard toil disintegrated almost overnight. 

The Military Revolutionary %ouncil had acted out of 

political necessity but had not foreseen the detrimental 

consequences.62/ 

5. The Civilians' Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) Experiment 

In the eav'ly sixties, William Colby and his CIA colleagues came 

up with the idea of arming the Rhade tribe of Montagnards in toe Central 

Highlands to counter the growing VC strength in the area.63/ Up to that 

time, the GVN had made few attempts to gain the support of the Montagnard 

people; indeed they had actually antagonized them.64/ In 1-,58, there had 

been a movement among them advocating autonomy. The GVN, seeking their 

assimilation, responded to the somewhat passive movemert by confiscating 

the tribesmen's crossbows and spears, further alienating the hillpeople. 

The VC, 

on the other hand, were actively promising tribal autonomy., 

Counselor Nhu saw the CIDG program as a means of building a 

political base for his brother's government, which is what its originators 

,et as their goal. Coincidentally, the project was designed to get the 

cribespeople to participate in their own self-defense as well as social and 

economic improvement. 65/ 

The experiment began in the small Montagnard community of Buon 

Enao outside Ban Me Thuot in December 1961. It was undertaken in collaboration 

with the RVNAF's 

Special Forces and in coordination with local 

civil authorities. Though US participation was principally under CIA 

d 4 rection, the US Army Special Forces provided a military presence as well 

as tactical and small unit training. The GVN, with considerable US AID 

5-26


support, provided medical, educational and developmental supplies and 

training. 

The project was given th,- name, Citizens' Irregular Defense 

Groups (later Citizens' was changed to Civilians'), to mark it clearly as a 

civilian operation and not a military one ana irregular because it wps to 

"meet the need of various dirferent communities, 

During the fi,'st year, the CIA's experiment proved to be successfrl 

arnd its spread throughout the highlands was rapid. By December 1962, 

about 38,000 tribemei, were armed and over 200 villages, involving a population 

of 300,000, were incorporated into the overall scheme.66/ Armed 

Montagnards found their defenses to be effe-tive when backed up by a 

responsive strike force consisting of a few hundred men available from 

surrounding villages whose dssignment was to come to the aid of a community 

that was attacked by insurgents. 

success of the CIDG 

The presence of Americans was an important factor in the early 

program, mainly because the tribesmen had an abiding 

suspicion of all Vietnamese, both north and South. 

The feeling was mutual, 

and after more than a year of successes, Nhu decided that the program 

threatened GVN control of the tribal areas. He therefore directed the 

systematic disarming of many of the purely village defense units, 67/ 

sought their integration into the Strategic Hamlet Program. 

and 

At about the 

same time, a change also occurred on the US side of the CIDG pysgram.. 

CIA 

transferred its responsibility for program oversight to the Army's 

Special Forces.68/ Thereafter, the CIDG were no longer considered to be 

hamlet militia. They were formed into military units, usually company- 

- ssized, under command of Vietnamese Special Forces officers, and were given 

improved training, weapons and unifo.'ms. 

a reluctance on the part of the CIDG 


Throughout this period there was 

strike force troops to be integrated 

iito conventional Vietnamese units and the GVN, for its part, was not 

prepared to take over the ongoing village development projects.69/ 

In July 1963, there was a shift in the pricrity of the CIDG 

effort as their villages were assimilated into the Strategic Hamlet Pro- 

A gram. The mission of thp tribal strike forces was changed frow local 

5-27


security ard village defense to border surveillance and border site 

security, 

6. The Territorial Forces -- Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps 

As 

discussed in Volume II, Chapter 5, the early force st'ijcture 

of the RVNAF was organized into two principal components. the regular 

forces and the territorial forces. Regular forces consisted of infantry, 

airborne, marines, rangers, etc., which for the most part were cconver- 

[tionaily organized iito divisions with organic support elen,ents similar to 

US counterparts, and whose primary mission was to destroy the enemy thirough 

combat operations and to defend the national borders, The territorial 

for'ces, on the other hand, were made up of Civil Guard (,G) and Self- 

Defense Corps (SDC) elements, which eventually were designated to be the 

Regional Forces (RF) and Pcpular Forces (PF), respectively. iheir organization 

was local, being kept mustly at small unit size (platoon and company), 

lightly equipped and tasked for pacification and territorial 

m ~securi ty. 70/ 

The territorial forces, whose employment figured into the CIP of 

1961, were placed under the direct control of sector and subsector commanders 

to assure Iccal security. The Civil Guard (became Regional Forces 

I. 

in 1964) was basically organized into rifle companies augmented as required 

by a number cf river boat companies, mechanized platoons. heavy-weapons 

platoons, -econnaissance units, administration and logistics support com- 

Sanies and elemeits of command and czntrol. Although normally involved in 

companv-ýize operations, they were capabla of conducting multi-company 

operations. The Self-Oefense Corps (bL-amv the Popular Forces in 1964), 

were basically platoon-size units and were conceived for combat in defense 

of villages and hamlets, These forces were essentially infantry; their 

equipment and mode of subsistence were more austere than those of the Civil 

Guard. 

Operational rules were established: 

t.'e Civil Guard (or Regional 

Forces) served the province and the Self-Defense Corps (or Popu.ar Forces), 

the district, but their goals remained about the same -- 

to conduct operation 

ageinst local enemy forces.,71/ 

5-28


A former Vietnamese Corps and Military Region Commander had the 

following to say about the territorial forces of this period:' 

From their inception to 1960, botn the Civil Guard 

and Self-Cefense Corps were neither adequately eauipped 

nor orcanized and controlled to accomplish their missions 

in a satisfactory manner, This derived in good 

part from thre lack of US, support. South Vietnamese 

and U.S. viewpoints differed greatly as to the role and 

-significance assigned to these forces. It was South 

Vietnam's desire to turn the Civil Guard and Self- 

Defence Corps into strong territorial forces capablt of 

assisting the regular ARVN in defense missions. Therefore, 

the Civil Guard in particular should be organized 

into battalions and regimental-size units, sufficieirtly 

equipoed and armed to defeat enemy local forces. The 

saw it SU.S., differently, however. As expressed through 

the Civil Guard t-aining program developed by the 

Michigan State University (MSU) group, the U.S. corisidered 

the CG nothing more than a rural police force 

and neither the CG nor the SOC was supported by the 

Military Assistance Program (MAP).72/ 

v matters 

j 

As VC activity increased in 1960, the USOM expended significant 

efforts to develop and incredse the combat effectiveness of the territorial 

forces. 

To facilitate support, Diem placed the Civil Guara and the Self- 

Defense Corps under the MinisLry of ½efense. 

provide advisers to work directly with the Civil Guard 

That act allowed the MAAG to 

Directorate in 

involving training and equipment.73/ In a further refinement, the 

GVN merged the Self-Defense Corps Directorate with the Civil Guard'a com-- 

mand 

structure and disbanded the SDC's provincial and district officers, 

placing their control under a combined direction. 

territoriil forces significantly improved their unity of command. 

ihis integration of 

Notwithstanding the new arrangement under the Ministry of Defense 

and improved access to US military assistance, the CG and SDC remained the 

"step children" of the growing RVNAF family until their total integration 

with the armed forces in 1964.,74/ Before integration, the CC and SDC 

forces received no support from the RFNAF although they performed increasingly 

difficult missions combating the VC 

and suffered the same hardship 

5-29

I 


and dangers as regular ARVN troops. 

As a result, they fared very poorly by 

I comparison, especially in the areas of training and logistic support, and 

in command and leadership.75/ 

7, Early Program Results and Impact on The War Effort 


tended to view the early military and political successes 

of Ngo Dinh Piem's government with satisfaction, and to regard thereafter 

South Vietnam's internal security with growing complacency. Di2m and his 

brother Nhu were not so complacent. On the contrary, they were very conscious 

of the threat posed by the former Viet Minh guerrillas (more dangerous 

tran the Cao Dai and Binh Xuyen sects), not only because they were 

politically more persuasive, and had taught a generation of Vietnamese 

peasants the techniques of ermed conspiracy, but also because their tenets 

offered competing solutions to the most pressing problems of the Vietnamese 

people -- land and livelihoooa.76/ Tho Ngo brother's approach as a broad 

concept is hard to fault: 

The RVNAF were to reclaim regions of the countryside 

formerly held by the Viet Minh; poli'.ical indoctrination teams 

moving with the troops would carry the message of Diem"s revolution to the 

people; and then a broad follow-up program of Civic Acton -- political and 

social development, land reform and agricultural improvements--would oe 

inaugurated to meet the aspirations- )f the people7_77/ 

miscarried, as well as the subsequent agglomeration camps, 

Strategic Hamlet Programs, was due in part to the following:- 

That these plans 

Agrovilles and 

0 Resistance on tne part of the rural population and farmers, 

reicting sometimes under VC 

pressure and sometimes simply out of 

peasant conservatism (people in the Mekong Delta Region--40% of 

the total population -- have traditionally resisted central 

authority). 

* Ineipt, overbearing or corrupt GVN officials. 

- Diem's (and his brother's) unremitting anticommunist zeal, and 

tne failure of both Diem and his US advisers to appreciate the 

mdgnitude of the tasks they set for themselves or the time 

required to create meaningful reform. 

5-30


r 

0 Programs moved much too quickly under the personal concrol of 

counselor Nhu, resulting in gross failures of implementation, 

Ambiguities in assessment of the programs were created by the 

gross inadequacies in their implementation, 

* Vietnamese administrative support structure could not keep up 

S 

I A 

with the needs of the programs., 

Well-integrated plans following the orinciple of building outward 

gradually from areas of strength were rever developed. 

failure on the part of the GVN to provide the people with a 

viable political alternative to communism. 

One notable expert also correctly faults the US civilian and 

. military organization- in Vietnam for failing to have a common approach 

toward defeating the insurgents and pacifying the countryside. 

More serious at this ti'iie -- and for future years 

as well -- was the lack of common appreach and direction 

between American civilien and military organizadions 

in Vietnam. The civilian side was committed to a 

concept of counterinsurgency which focused on the 

oopulation as the heart of the matter. Necessarily. 

this meant that priority would go to the shaping 3f 

favorable attitudes to be accomplished first oy providing 

security, followed up by improved and responsive 

government services, until finally the people were 

committed anu fully engaged in their own defense. The 

military, despite concessions - no doubt sincere - to 

the importance of winning the population, was qu!ite 

unshakably wedded to the idea that priority must gc to 

destroying the enemy's armed force, and doing it by the 

familiar means of concentrating manpower and firepower 

at the right time and place. 78/ 

Hence, from the USOM/MAAG point of view, there were two programs 

instead of one for defeating the insurgency -- the pacification program 

(i.e., civic action, Agrovilles and Strategic Hamlets) on the one hand, and 

I • the military effort to seek out and destroy the VC forces on the other. 

The net effect of the military effort was a gradual expansion of military 

firepower and available air power in ways hardly suited to the nature of 

1 the war being fcght. Bombing and artillery barrages became standard 

5-31I


preliminaries to large-scale operations by the ARVN supported by US helicopters; 

inevitably they alerted the enemy, who usually slipped away in 

ample time. 

Furthermore, the bombing and the increased artillery barrages 

resulted in tile destruction of property and the death ard injury of the 

very civilian population whose loyalty was being souqht as a key to victory.,79/ 

Among the results from this lack of unified US direction was the 

loss of capability to correct the disarray on the GVN's 

side where the 

burdens were heavier and the negative effects more serious. Although 

Counselor Nhu demonstrated substantial control over the gove'nmental apparatus 

in the countryside, he was not able to exert extensive infl,,ence over 

the military commanders in the fieid. In fact, Palace influence on the 

military command structure was all in the direction of caution to avoid the 

political costs of taking heavy casualties or of establishing escentially 

meaningless military outposts. But Nhu apparently believed Lhat the Strategic 

Hamlet Program was adequate to cefeat the VC insurgency with little 

effective support from the RVNAF.80/ 

Several observers 81/ agreed that the Strategic Hamlet Program 

was beginning to show favorable results in 1962, and the improved outlook 

on the military ilde resulted in the JCS developing a plan to reduce the 

American nilitary presence starting in 1963.82/ Official optimism was 

rewarded witn public controversy c,;er the performance of the ARVN, 

notably 

after tfze battle of Ap Bac in early 1963, when heavily armed ARVN units 

cornered a large VC force only to nave them escape after failing to ..iove in 

aggressively and suffering heavy casualties in the process. American 

reporters covering the war from Vietnam began to direct strong criticism at 

Diem's regime, his "ruthless" brother and his beguiling sister-in-law, 

Madzme Nhu. Despite official claims of confidence in the continued progress 

of the GVN and its Strategic Hamlet Program, divisions in opinion 

began to spring up within the US mission in Vietnam, The head of the 

USOM's Rural Affairs Division made a personal report to President Kennedy 

in September 1963, stating that "the Deltd was ',"ling under Viet Cong 

control in areas where pacification was supposedly compiete."83/ 

5-32


Pacification difficulties were soon dwarfed by t9,e politic.,l 

chaos and coup plotting in Saigon, the overthrow and execution of the Ngo 

brothers by the generals, anci the 1collapse of the war effort. 

D. FOLLOW-ON PACIFICATION: THE US SEARCH FOR A NEW STRATEGY (1964-1967) 

Starting with the crippling Buddhist revolt, the GVN's political 

decline veered sharply downward with the murder of President Diem and his 

brother Nhu in November 1963. For the next two-plus years there was a 

crescendo of political instability, illegitimacy, uncerta 4 nty and chaos 

.from the top levels on down to the villages and hamlets. Pacification 

programs which had been moribund since mid-1963 all but disappeared. 

If Diem had a narrow and shaky political base, those who followed him 

in rapid succession had to govern while tryina to achieve balance on a 

F knife's edge;, thi.y couldn't trust even their fellow generals/ plotters! 

Coups, attempted coups, counter coups and the like fcllowed each other in 

alarming succession. Institutions of government began to deteriorate. 

Police and intelligence forces scattered.. 

No government ieader could claim 

iegitimacy or rule the country other than by military decree. The GVN 

leadership nad little time for running tne government or fighting the war, 

Political witch-hunts racked the m 4 nistries. The countrysice was almost 

devoid of governmental control. and the VC at once moved to fill this void 

with its own apparatus, 

In the face ot the deteriorating situation, the ineffective GVN 

-' itself faced with a dilemma On the one hand, there was no way tc rein- 

found 

* state the Strategic Hamlet Program since it had been linked with the Ngo 

regime and officially abolished. On the other hand, the GVN could not give 

the VC free reign over t'e countryside. As a solution and after much US 

prodding a new pacification eflort was launched, the "New Life Hamlet" 

program. 84/ 

1. New Life Hamlets and the Hop Tac Effort -- The US Takes Charge 

The first post-Diem pacification effort began in the Mekong Delta 

in January 1964. Old Strategic Hamnlets were renamed New Lire Hamlets (Ap 

!.-1 

-~ 5-33


Tin Sino) (see Figure 5-9.)Forced resettlement was prohibited.85/ There 

were not enough resourcef to commit to the program, and the new cadre were 

reluctant to implement it forcefully for fear of being identified with the 

old regime. 

Furthermore, the leadership gave it no clear-cut direction and 

the organizations that were to operate the program were plagued by ineffective 

and incompetent administrators. ?rovince chiefs were changed with 

such frequency that few knew exaccly what to do or how to do it.86/ A 

senior US province adviser was quoted as saying: 

1WSOM experts stood helplessly by as urgently 

needed programs awaited approval and implementation by 

the stymiea Vietnamese officials. Thousands of tons of 

barbed wire and pickets, commodities and building 

materials were sent to the province, but awaited approvals 

for distribution.87/ 

Although pacificaticn received low emohasis by the GVN following 

the Diem overthrow, it was taking on greater significance with the key 

members of the US Country Team in Vietnam. Proponents were often in disagreement 

on what pacification meant and how to go about achieving it. They 

often quarrelled amongst thems'e!ves (often publicly) and sometimes overiooked 

their common interests.88/ 

There was one notable exception to the pacification lull during 

the troubled 1964-1965 timeframe: the Hop Tac (Cooperation) Program (see 

Figure 5-10). An outgrowth of alarming progress being made by the VC 

arounc tne capital, it was designed to put "whatever resources are 

required" into the area surrounding Saigon to pacify it. The concept had 

been suggested by Ambassador Lodge at a high level strategy session in 

Honolulu in July of 1964, as he was on his way hon.. after his first assignment 

as ambassador.89/ Gener3l Westmoreland and the new Ambassador, Maxwell 

Taylor, proceeded with its planning and implementation on a priority 

basis. 

The US-inspired program was b4sed on "clear aod hold" military 

operations 90/ followed by civilian pacification efforts; a giant security 

"oil spot" was to spread out from Saigon toward the Cambodian bcrder and 

the South China Sea.9'i 

5-34


Program Title: New Life Hamlets 

Objectivesf 

* Establishment of a village defense system for the entire country 

similar to the Strategic Hamlet program 

No forced resettlement S• 

Timeframe: Early 1964 

Initiator: 

GVN 

U.S. Proponent: 

because 

USOM Essistance and experts available but not utilized 

of GVN inability to approve and implement necessary 

programs. 

Resiilt and Remarks: 

0 Pacification received low emphasis by the GVN following the Diem 

overthrow. 

• There were not enough resources to commit to the program. 

* New cadre were reluctant to implement the program forcefully for 

fear of being identified with the old regime. 

0 Leadership gave no clear-cut direction and the organizat-ions that 

j 

were to operate the program were piagued by ineffective and 

incompetent administrator;, 

* Province chiefs were changed with such frequency that few knLW 

exactly what to do or how to do it. 

Figure 5-9. 

The New Life Hamlet Program 

5-35


• ~~Program ... tle:. Hop Tac (Cooperation) 

Objectives: 

0 Pacify area 

necessary 

surrounding Saigon using whatever resources are 

* Develop a giant security "oil spot" spreading out from Saigon 

toward the Cambodian border and the South China Sea 

9 I Tie together the pacification plans of a seven-province area into 

an overall plan wherein each province subordinated its cwn priorities 

to the concept of building a giant oil spot around 

Sai gon, 

Timefr'me: August 1964 - 1966 

niti•'3,-,:: 

US Proponent. 

Ambassador Maxwell Taylor and General Westmoreland 

US Team Chief 

GVN Proponentf ARVN Hop Tac Staff 

Results: 

0 In the first operation, a sweep in the VC-controllea pineapple 

groves immediately to the west and soutnwest of Saigon, the lead 

ARVN unit broke off contact and turned back towards Saigon. 

* After the intitial operation, Hop Tac was a constant 3ource of 

dispute within USOM, Deadlines slipped continually; phase lines 

were readjusted; the official z3unt of hamlets consid.red to be 

pacified climbed steadily. 

Remarks, Hop Tac never achieved its goals., Ics failure was derived 

from the following: 

a Hop Tac received only token endorsement from the Vietnamese, to 

whom it be-ned pointless and purely an Amrrican excrcise. 

0 The ARVN Hop Tac Staff was a powerlcss office created merely to 

satisfy the US, 

0 The RVNAF units 'n Saigon had the priority mission of guarding 

against a coup attempt and noLhing was accomplished to make Hop 

Tac a viable progr&m, 

* ** Figure 5-10.. The Hop Tac Program 

15 -3)6


[ 

4F 

General Westmoreland, at the direction of Ambassadnr Taylor, 

began Hop Tac. He set up a ne. and additional headquarters in Saigon which 

was 

supposed to tie together the overlapping and quarrelsome commands in 

the Saigon area.92/ 

The Vietnamese set up a parallel. counterpart organization, 

although critics of Hop Tac were quick to point out that the 

Vietnamese Hop Tac headquarters had virtually no authority or influence, 

and seemed primarily designed to satisfy the Americans., 

As one source put 

vit, "Hop Tac is the Vietnamese wo~d For 'cooperation', which turned out to 

be just what Hop Tac 1acked."93/ 

The US initiative had a feature previously missing from GVN 

pacification efforts: it sought to tie together the pacification plans of 

a seven-province area (which ringed the city of Saigon like a doughnut), 

into a overall plan w'herein each province subcrdinated its own priorities 

to the concept of building a giant oil spot around Saigon. 

In a phrase which eventually became a joke in the USOM, the US 

Army Colonel who headed the Hop Tac secretariat, during a high level briefing, 

spoke of creating "rings of steel" 94/ which would grow outward (in 

four separate ripqs) from Saigon until the area from the Cambodian border 

to the South China Sea was secure, 

Each rinq (or circle) was to be pacified 

in four months, according to the original plan, which never really 

had a chance of success, 

Authorized in mid-August 1964, the program was launched one month 

iater• The US Team Chief, under great pressure to get on with the pac'fication, 

ordered a plan to be produced, got his Vietnamese counterpa'ts to 

translate it and then "ssued it. The first operation was Lo be a sweep 

into the VC-contro'led pineapple groves immediately to the west and southwest 

of Saigon -- the VC base nearest the city, which had not been entered 

by RVNAF since the last outpost had been abandoned in 1960. On the second 

'day of the operation, the leaa unit (the 51st ARVN Regiment) ran into an 

enemy minefield and suffered numerous casualties. 

the action, 

Instead of continuing 

the 51st broke off contact and turned back towards Saigon., 

When located by their US advisers they were found to be participating in an 

abortive coup attempt. 95/ 

'.1 5-37


After that initial operation, Hup Tac was a constant source of 

dispcjta within the USOM. Deadlines slipped continually; phase lines were 

readjusted; the official count of hamlets considerea tu be pacified climbed 

iteadily. However, a special study of the whole area made in October 1964, 

by members of the Country Team concluded. "Senerally speaking, Hcp Tac, as 

a program, 

does not appear to exist as a unified and meanigful operation."96/ 

Hop Tac never achieved its goals and was eventually submerged 

into a new nationwide plan developed in 1966, Its failure was derived from 

the following: 

* °Hop Tac received only token endorsement from the Vietnamese, to 

whom it seemed pointless and purely an American exercise to which 

they nPeded pay only lip service.. 

Vietnamese, hOp Tac was "the plan of the Americans." 

Put simply, in the eyes of the 

* The ARVN Hop Tcc staff was a powerless office created merely to 

satisfy the US, 

* The RVNAF units in Saigon had t;ie piority mission of guarding 

against a coup attempt and nothing was permitted to interfere 

with that overriding task.97/ 

General 

Westmoreland argued that Hop Tac had achieved limited 

success, in that VC incidents in and around Saigon had decreased He did, 

however, 

recognize that the program was in trouble and summed up Hop Tac 

problems in two words. 

"political instability."98/ 

Coincident with preparations for Hop Tac, the GVN, under the 

leadership of General Khanh, proposed a countrywide pacification plan 

called the Chien Thing (Victory) Plan. (see Figure 5-11.) The core of the 

plar was supposed to be the New Life Hamlets. As it developed, the scheme 

was a cross between the "measles" and the "oil spot" approaches, with new 

emphasis on economic develop,,'nt.99! Chien Thang started slowly in 1964, 

however, and as instability in the central government began to mount its 

execution quickly broke down, 

After Ntw Life Hamlets, Hop Tac and Chien Thang Programs had 

failed, Pacification was renamed Rural Construction. 

5-38

I 


Program Titlef Chien Thang (Victory) 

Objectives: 

0 Countrywide pacification emphasizing economic development 

0 • New Life Hamlets to be the core of the p-,n 

STimeframe:•, 1964-1966 

Initiator-, 

GVN under General Knanh 

- -zz 

, -, 

• p•.,-.=. . q . , .T _,,-- • • , --- ",- -"- 

Results- 

* The scheme was a cross betweern the "measles" and the "oil spot" 

approaches. 

Remarks: 

* Chien Thang started slowly in 1964, and as instability in the 

central government began to mount its eAecution quickly broke 

down. 

Figure 5-l1. 

The Chien Thang Program 

"5-39


2. Rural Construction: A Push for a Social Revolution 

(?See Figure 5-12) 

The 1965-1966 timeframe saw more political instability in Saigon 

1 pWhile 

and a sharp increase in US involveilent in the war, In February 1965, 

President Johnson ordered retaliatory air attacks against North Vietnam; 

sustained bombing operations began one month later. US Marines landed at 

Da Nang in March and by June 1965, both the marines and troops of the 173rd 

Airborne Brigade had begun offensive combat operations in the vicinity of 

Da Nang and Bien Hoa respectively.. The US troop buildup was underway. 

It was not until the "Young Turk" generals (led by Nguyen Cao Ky 

and Nguyen Van Thieu) had taken over Saigon, that the US was able to get 

the GVN to focus again on pacification planning.. President Johnson reappointed 

Ambassador 

Lodge to the Saigon post with orders to press the new 

GVN leaders for a "sncial revolution" of the countryside. In addition, a 

handpicked group of about ten experienced countersubversion/counterterrorism 

personnel, 

under the direction of counterinsurgency expert General 

Edward Lansdale, were sent to RVN to provide Lodge with a special 

operating %Taff in the field of political action both at the central 

government level and in connection with rural programs. 

Lodge appointed Lansdale to be the Chairman of the US 

Mission 

Liaison Group to tae newly-created Vietnamese governmental body having 

responsibility for "rural construction". Lodge saw pacification as the 

GVN's most important single responsibilicy.lO0/ He sought to use the 

growing US military presence as a means for pacifying the countryside and 

in the process making the ARVN into a vital and active force in the Vietnamese 

society, Lodge's fornula for a successful outcome of Rural Constructiun 

was based on the absolute necessity of controlling th 

villages -- first seek destruction of enemy mainforce elements and then 

paci fy. 

Lodge and Lansdale pressed the "Young Turks" to make 

reforms, tne allied military buiid-up continued. The III MAF and ARVN 

units took control of the combat effort from the Da N~ng area up tc the 

Demilitarized Zone. 

Zones. 

US Army units moved into the II and III Corps Tdctical 

Free World allies -- South Korean, Philippine, Australian and Thai 

forces -- began to share tneir butden in she conflict., Each member nation 

'2 _5_4a


Program Title- Rural Construction 

Objectives: 

0 Control of the villages by: 

- destruction of enemy main force elements by US forces 

- pacification efforts locally by the RVNAF 

0 Provision of continuous local security 

* Restoration of effective, responsible local government 

* Improvement of local living conditions 

Timeframe, i965 - 1966 

initiator- 

GVN 

% US Proponent: 

Ambassador Lodge, General Edward Lansdale, and MACV. 

GVN Proponent, 

""rYoung Turk" Generals- Nguyen Cao Ky, and Nguyen Van Thieu. 

Other Supporters: 

Free World Allies (FWMAF)--South Korea, Philippines, Australia, 

and Thailand. 

Results: 

0 The III MAF and ARVN units took control of the combat effort from 

the Da Nang area to the Demilitarized Zone and discovered that the 

toughest war was in the villages. The Marines virtually reversed 

their efforts against the VC/PAVN evemy, and concentrated on pacifying 

the viiiages within their Tactical Area of Responsibility, 

0 US Army units moved aggressively intc II and III Corps Tactical 

Zones, 

0 Political turbulence and military deterioration continued 

throughout 1965 and into 1966, and most of the modest resources 

that were allocated by the GVN for its Rural Construction effort 

were diverted back to meet conventional combat requirements. 

Remarks- 

* Each member nation of the FWMAF had a different approach to 

pacification within its Tnctical Areas of Responsibility, which 

nighlighted why the US and GVN were having difficuities with 

their pacification efforts, 

0 Rural construction ran into difficulties because of a confused 

3nd fragmented chain of command, a lack of skilied cadre, the 

inability to rezruit local RF and PF, and local political party 

ooposition. 

Figure 5-12. 

The Rural Construction Program 

5-41

THE BoM CORPORAT'ON 

of the Free World 

Forces nad a dif'erent approach to pacification within 

its Tactical Areas of Responsibilicy (TAOR), 

which highlighted why the U3 

and GVN were having difficulties with their pacification effortslOl/ 

Meanwhile, much to their amazement, the iII MAF Marines discovered 

that the toughest war was in the villages near and in the vicinity 

of the Da Nang Air Base, rather than the war against PAVN Main Force elements, 

which had retreated to the hills to regroup, rearm and buila UDr 

Within the first year of operations, the Marines virtually reversed their 

empriasis, 

turning away from the VC/PAVN enemy to the grueling and painfully 

slow effort of pacifying the vill'ages within their TAOR. Unfortunately, it 

was a task that the Marine combat units were not manned nor equipped for, 

and their efforts raised some basic questions about the role of US troops 

in Vietnam. Nonetheless, the Marines tried valiantly to make tneir efforts 

pay off, convince otners in the US 

government of its efficacy, and demonstrate 

the correctness of their still-unproved strategy. 

The result was a 

major commitment to the pacification program by a service of the US Armed 

Forces ard it produced a significant impact on the pacification approach by 

the other services, particularly the Army. 

An embassy report, submitted in April l965, summed up how 

involved with 1 ocal politics the Marines were becoming, though unintentionally, 

and said. 

The plan [pacification of Quanq Nam!, despite tne 

valiant efforts of the Marines, is in trouble, caused 

by a confused and fragmented chaia A1 command, a lack 

of -killed cadre, inability to recruit locally RF and 

PF-ana the open oppusition of the VNQDD [Vietnam Quoc 

Dan Dang, the political party controlling the provinces 

of Quang Ngai, Quang Nam and Quang rin]., 102/ 

The requirements for a successful pacification strategy were 

clear:, the provision of continuous local security, the restoration of 

effective, respnnsible local government; and, the improvement of local 

living conditions. 

5-42


Political turbulence and military deterioration continued 

throughout 1965 and into 1966, and most of the modest resources that were 

allocated by the GVN for its Rural Construction effort were diverted back 

to meet conventional combat requirements, 

The years of chaos following the fall of Diem came to ar, end in 

1966, when General Nguyen Van Thieu emerged as the single most powerful 

leader in South Vietnam. US and FWMA intervention with combat forces was 

crucial to -aving South Vietnam from collapsing under the communist offensive 

during the period. In the villages the GVN orderea yet another pacification 

effort -- this one was called "Revolutionary Development",103/ 

3. Revolutionary Development. Emphasis on the Other War 

(See Figure 5-13) 

By the beginning of 1966, the bombing of North Vietnam was in its 

eleventh month, and US ground combat forces were growing steadily; the 

Johnson Administration sought to emphasize those American activities which 

did not directly involve guns and fighting. This emphasis was on wnat came 

to be called the "other war" and reached a high point during the Honolulu 

conference in February 1966. 

LBJ put it quite simply during the neeting: 

he wanted "a better military program, a better pecification program that 

includes everything, and a oeace program".104/ Johnson received the signatures 

of Generals Thieu and Ky on a pledge to deliver on their share of the 

reforms. 

But as one author wroce: 

While the American public might have assumed that 

the Honolulu conference, beyond its exalted language, 

served as pressure for reform in the GVN, the Vietnamese 

understood it only as a renewed American commitment 

to the military regime. .,If a program exceeds 

their interest or ability to carry out, they will 

merely agree to it cnthusiastically and then do nothing 

about it.105/ 

Thieu appointed Brigadier General Nguyen Duc Thang to head the 

national pacification campaign. With the support of the US Embassy, especially 

the AID and . A, T.hang began to ene--gze t"e fV~ oacification effort 

which was based on mutually established National Priority Areas (NPA's). 

5-43


Program Title: 

Revolutionary Development 

Objectives: 

0 Emphasis on pacification - the "other war" 

* Raise the percentage of pacified RVN population from 52% to about 

66% 

Timeframe: 1966 

Initiators: 

President Johnson, Generals Thieu and Ky 

US Proponents: US Embassy (AID, CIA, USOM)., 

GVN Proponent. Brigadier General Nguyen Duc Thang 

Results: 

* The GVN pacification effort was based on four mutually estabiished 

Nat;onal Priority Areas--Quang Nam Province, Binh Dinh 

Province, most of the old Hop Tat. area and An Giang province.. 

Remarks. 

• Increased and large-sc.,le US military operations created more 

and more refugees, and refugee relocatihn and resettlement caused 

a drain on GVN assets and resources 

6 The Thieu-Ky egime ran into a series of politizal, military and 

religious crises in 1966. 

'I 

Figure 5-13., The Revolutionary Development Program 

AX, 5-44


The four NPA's (Quang Nam province in I Corps, Binh Dinh province in II 

Corps, 

most of the old Hop Tac area in III Corps and An Giang province in 

IV Corps) were initially limited to a modest 238,000 people in 192 hamlets 

who were programmed to be secured and pacified by the end of 1966, 

effort was underway to raise the percentage of the RVN's population which 

was classified as pacified from 52% to about 66%, 

it got underway. 

Several problems caused the new program to stall, really be-ore 

more and more refugees, 

drain on GVN asse4s and resources. 

Increased and large-scale US military operations created 

and refugee relocation and resettlement caused a 

Those problems were compounded when the 

Thieu-Ky regime ran into a series of political, military and religious 

crises in 1966, which emanated from Hue and threatened to consume the whole 

of I Corps. Tne fledgling government, though weakened, showed remarkabli 

resilience in putting down a Buddhist/student dissident revolt.106/ 

4. US Participation: Looking for the Right Organization 


resurgence of pacification durin% this period was dramatically 

punctuated by three presidential conferences on the Pacifir I-!zkrds 

leaders of the GVN. After each conference the relative SIwith importance of 

pacification took another leap upward -- both within the US and Viet 3mese 

governments. The USOM w:s reorganized three times over 15 months and each 

"reorganiiation was 

designed primarily to improve the management of the 

pacification effort anu raise its priority within the overall US effort in 

RVN. 

After the Honolulu Conference in February 1966, 

Deputy Ambassador 

Porter was given broad new authority to run the civilian agencies of the 

USOM. After the Manila conference in October 1966, Armbassador Porter was 

directed to r,_organize the components of USIA, ZIA and AID internally to 

create a si-igie Offic-! of Civil Operations (OCO). And after the Guar,, 

meeting it, March 1967, OCO -- redesignated as CORDS -- was put under the 

control of General Westmorelhnd, (OMUSMACV, who was g.ven a civilian deputy 

j! (Ambassador Robert Koaer) with the personal rank of Ambassador to assist 

him. 

An 

5-45


r 

e 

5. The American Solutiors: A Proliferation of Approaches 

'Throughout the period, several agencies and individuals put forth 

their own concepts and ideas on how to resolv_ the pacificatio,, problem., 

For example, General Westmoreland, shortly after assuming commano of MACV, 

proposed to Ambassador Lodge that he be designated as the sole executive in 

charge of all pacification efforts ,n Vietnam.lO7/ Lodge agreed in 

concept but delayed giving approval on implementation. When Ambassador 

Taylor took the reins in Saigon, Westmoreland's coacept was again deferred., 

Taylor, armed with instructions from LBJ giving bim full authority 

over all US activities in RVN, military anc civil, rail the Country Team/ 

Mission Council like a mini--NSC.108/ Ambassador Taylor retained final 

approval 

authority for all Mission actions, to inzlude all cacifir-tion 

projects and programs. 

in the aftermath of the 1956 Conference at Honolulu, task forces 

and study groups were suddenly assembl'ng, producing papers on priorities. 

on organization of the Mission, and on tr.e roles and missions of the warious 

agencies in pacitication.. They were al the manifestations of the rew 

mood that had come over the Country Team and the Washington bureaucracy on 

pacification., The advocates of pacification, with their widely differing 

v4ews, all saw a chaice again to put forth their uwn concepts to a newly 

interested bureaucracy,109/ 

The most impurtant of the numerous stjdi(s were: 

. The P-ogram for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of 

South Vietnam (Short Title: PROVN) -- commissioned by Army "hief 

on; Staff, General johnon in July 1965, completed and subiritted 

in Marc 1966. ll/ 

.'he Priorities S• Task Force -- 

formed in Saigon in April 1966 by 

Derut,. Ambassador Porter and complet-d in July 1965. 

0 The Inter-Agency "Roles and Missiuns" Study Groip-- also formed 

by Deputy Ambassador Porter in July 1956 and completed in August 

of that year. "11/ 

Although the recommenlations of these studies were not accepted 

I fLI ;y by US learc'rship, they played a Key role in the development of 

-1 

5-46


strategic th;nking in Washington and Saigon; and, they laid bare the flaws 

in the structure of the US 

government. 

Mission to those same senior officials of the 

F 

One month after the meetings in Honolulu, LB, 1 appoi.iter 1 Rebert 

SWashington. 

Komer his Special Assistant for Vietnam Pacification Coordination in 

Agencies supporting pacification now came under the direct 

scrutiny of the White House and the long drive to integrate US field irograms 

became a reality. '22 The basis for a pacification breakthrough wa: 

being forged and the "New Model Program" was being launched. 

S6. Proaram Results and Impact on the War Effort 

By autumn of 1966, US forces had taken over most of the main 

combat effort in the war. 

Pacification had bogged down as la'ge military 

actions generat&. more than half a million new refugees. And, although the 

GVN had declared earlier that it would give top priority to land reform, 

the matter received little more than lip service from Ky and Thieu. The 

GVP had sought to revitalize its "Chieu Hoi" (open arms) defector amnesty 

program, however, that too met with little success since RVNAF commanders 

gave it low priorityll3/ 

Furthermore, the GVN was encountering difficulty in dealing with 

the VC's poiiti:al infrastructure -- those hardcore cadre memberc who 

formed the control apparats in the villages through which the DRV articulated 

their revolution in the South. As a countermeasure the CIA sought to 

close the cadre gap between GVN 

and the, communists through training programs 

pAtterned after their earlier cadre efforts in Quang Ngai province, 

where former disciples of Diem were formed into cadre elements, integrated 

unde- CIA supervision and renamed "People's Action Teams" (PAT). Early in 

1965 there were over 14,000 men in these PAT teams, Soon thereafter, 'hey 

were +u'rned over to the GVN 

and renamed "Revolutioiiary Development" (RD) 

cadre.l,."! RD training fell under the administration of Nguyen Be, a 

former Viet Minh officer, who had develcped a successful cadrE program 

earlier in Binh Dinh province. The RD cidre ranks increased to over 20,000 

men (cr about 400 RD teams) in 1966.115/ This collateral effort showed a 

modeet degree of success as it began tj resurrect the status of the village 

and i nvotve more of the local people in the pacification process.116/ 

5- 47


With respect to measuring pacification progress, the GVN 

and US 

jointly adopted a reporting system in Maj 1964, and continued with it until 

June 1957, when the US Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) became the single, 

official syster.117/ The joint system attempted to portray military security, 

with little emphasis on administrGion control and ecou-mic developmerit, 

Reports on each hamlet in the GVN pacification prograri were developed 

by the US 

District Adviser and the Vietnamese District Chief and sent 

sepurately to their respective headquarters at province-level and Saigon. 

The US adviser was supposed to give an independent assessment, but this was 

rarely possible becacse he seldom had a good grasp of his district's history, 

and he depended almost totally upon Vietnamese interpreters to gather 

and translate information from the hamlets. 

The system developed an optimistic 

bias because reporting tended to concentrate on 

changes resulting 

from on-going work and "backslidir(" in areas previously pacified prorably 

did not show readily as progress in active areas. 118/ 

To summarize, pacification during the period continued to receive 

a lot of lip seivice and 1 ttle else. It aniounted to small scale efforts 

when comDared to what was going into the conventional war. .n general, the 

GVN 

and US military regarded the program as essentially civilian business, 

which meant that all suffered from a lack of adequate local-security 

support. For these and other reasons mentioned earlier, pacification 

remained the small tail on the very large military dog in RVN. 

E. THE NEW MODEL PA-IFICATTON PROGRAM: CIVIL OPERATIONS AND 

REVOLUTIONARY DEVELO;MEIT SUPPORT (1967-1973) 

The so-called "new model" pacification program (see Figure 5-14) was 

lauinched in May 1967. It sprang forth largely from the efforts of LBJ's 

Special Assistant for Pacification, Robert Komer., Following an April 1967 

visit to Vietnam, Komer concluded that, while the US military pacification 

effort was self-contained and effective, civilian pacification efforts were 

still splintered and lacking in overall planiing (e.g., AID, which found 

5-48


PVogram Title, New Model Pacification 

I 

I 

te 

Objective: 

e Continuous security for the hamlets 

6 Dpprive the VC of their rural base 

9 Support, advise and train RVN4F's paramilitary auxiliaries, the 

RF/PF 

0 • Positive inclusion of RVNAF into civilian pacification crforts 

* Exploitation of the growing volume of intelligence on the VC and 

concentration on the VC village cadre infrastructure 

* Convert the noaminal priorlty of pacification in RV14 into an 

actual priority 

0 Generate rural support for tne GVN and its programs 

Position American pacification advisers sc as to exert effective 

leverage on GVN officials 

Timef;'ame: 

1967-gefore Tet 

Initiator: Special Assistant for Pacification, Robert Komer, CORDS 

US Proponent-. 

CORDS 

CVN Proponent: Cadre Teams, 

ARVN 

Results: 

* Sustained territorial security. 

* Revitalized Chieu Hoi program aimed at inducing vC to rally to 

,.he GVN and then integrating them into and employing them proin 

the Sduct~veiy South Vietnamese society. 

* Systemization of previous feeble GVN efforts to identify and 

round up clandestine VC cadre composing the politico-military 

administrative, terror, propaganda, recruiting and logistic 

apparatus. Resurrection of Phung Hoang program., 

.• Revival of political support for the GVN and its leaders. 

0 • Revival of a modestly furctioning ru,,al administration through 

training programs and technical assistance, 

* Revival of the rural economic system by providing pragmatic 

incencives to the farmers. 

0 Establishment of esseitial rural services, such as medical, 

educational, refugee care and civil police protection and support. 

Remarks: 

6 There was no GVN/RVNAF counterpart agency to CORDS., 

* 4o counterpart organization to CORDS functioned in Washington, 

D.C. 

* The ad hoc nature of CORDS usurped the authority and resources 

allocated by the Congress to the separate agencies involved. 

Figure 5-14. 

The Ne% Model Pacification Program 

5-49

THE BDM C0RPORATION 

itself footing the bill for most of the program costs, was very skeptical 

of the OCO working; meanwhile, USIA and CIA both indicated that they would 

cotinue to deal directly with their field personnel 

through OCO).119/ 

The decision to turn pa'ification over to COMUSMACV, 

rather than work 

with a integrated 

militarv-civilian chain of command, was announced by newly-assigned 

Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker on May 11, 1967, The ration~ale for such a move 

was given as-, 

0 the single-manager concept is the most efficient and effective 

means of accomplishing the US role in RVN pacification, 

* security is necessary for pacification, and 

0 che majority of the securit•, forces available belong to 

COMUSMACV. 

Bunker stated that the decision to reorganize was entirely his own; 

however, clearly the decision had come frcnr the White House and was based 

on the unmistakable fact that LBJ "felt the time had come to turn pacificatior, 

over -a MACV."120/ 

Komer was given ambassadorial rank, assigned as Westmorel&nd's deputy 

in MACV, and directed to supervise the reorganization oý OCO into what 

becana known as the Office of Civil Operation and Revolutionary Development 

(CORDS). 

To many Americans in Saigon this newly intensified pressure from 

Washington 4as considered excessive and several strong voices within the 

civilian agencies began predicting problems for the new directorate and its 

new deputy director. Komer, a hard-charging, energetic, and self-assured 

man, was not Doputlar in the US mission.121/ However, by mid-summer critics 

of the CORDS operation were beginning to concede that it was making headway. 

122/ 

One expert wrote: 

To his credit Komer did not allow the pettiness of the 

Saigon-based bureaucracy to stand in his way. By 

skilliful negotiations he reorganized the old OCO 

organization, made peace--after a fashion--with the US 

military commands, and placed good people in the provinces 

[and] applied modern management techniques. 

.123/ 

jI 5-50

THE S7 BDM CORPORATION 

Komer enjoyed Westmcreland's full support and confidence; however, in 

a private session, he was instructed by his new chief not to take actions 

or report information out of the proper, official channels (an order he 

quickly sidestepped. General Westmoreland, for his part, overlooked 

Komer's "channel jumovng" with a view towards getting on with the task at 

iand). Armed with tne needed support, Komer did not delay in putting his 

new powers and resources to use. First, Komer concentrated on providing 

continuous security for the hamlets and deprivinq the VC of Their rural 

base. 

He sought CORDS involvement and responsibility for the f3llowino:,. 

0 support, advice and craininq of the RVNAF's paramilitary auxiliaries, 

the RF/PF 

* positive inclusion of the RVNAF into civiiian pacification 

efforts 

0 exploitation of the growing volume of intelligence on the VC and 

concentration on the VC village cadre infrastructure 

• ccoverting the nominal priority of pacification in RVN into an 

actual priority 

a 

generating rural support for the GVN and its programs 

0 positioning Amerivan pacification advisers so as to exert effective 

leverage on GVN officials (when required). 

Several problems faced CORDS at its beginning; some of them were: 

0 There was no GVN/RVNAF counterpart agency to the US-inspired 

solution to a Vietnamese problem. 124/ 

* no counterpart organization to CORDS functioned in Washington, 

D.C. 

* the ad hoc nature of the CORDS solution, which by presidential 

fiat usurped the authority and resources allocated by the Congress 

to the separate agencies involved. 125/ 

Perhaps it is best to describe the CORDS effort in terms of its components 

or stages, which were: 

0 sustained territorial security (local clear and hold) whose 

u:.ting edge wes the 59-man RD, 

Cadre Team (an armed paramilitary 

force to provide protection as well as developmental help to the 

5-51

THE BDM CORPuRATION 

hamlets). See Figure 5-15 for a RO team organization chart, 

Also rtlevant was tne allocation of 40 to 50 ARVN battalions to 

provide te'mporary security in selected RD campaign areas until 

the (Ic-ir neglected) RF and PF forces could be re-equipped and 

upgraded, 

* revitalized Chieu Hoi prngram aimed at inducing VC to rally to 

tne GVN 

and then integrating them into and employing them productively 

in the Souch Vietnamese society. 

0 system 4 zation of pieviously feeble GVN efforts to identify and 

round up clandestine VC cadre composing the politico-military 

administrative, terror, propaganda, recruiting, and logistic 

apparatus. The little understood Phung Hoang (Phoenix) program 

of going after the VC infrastructure was resurrected. 

0 ,evival of political support for the GVN and its leaders. 

* revival of a modestly functioning rural administration through 

training programs and techinical assistance. 

* rev; al of the rural economic system by providing pragmatic 

incentives to the farmer. 

0 establishing essential rural se.-vices, such as medical, educational, 

refugee care and handling, and civil police protection 

and support. 126/ 

L1 The Tet Offensive: Getting Back on the frack and Accelerating 

the Pacification Process (see Figare 5-16) 

Probably the greatest test of the "New Model" Revolutionary 

Development (or the Accelerated Pacification Campaign) 

pericd was during 

the VC/PAVN Tet offensive onslaught against the South Vietnamese and their 

FWMAF alies in 1968. One expert acc'.rately observed that: 

Tet changed the entire war.. It sent a g,2'at shock 

throughout the Government of South Vietnar,. Arnd it 

precipitated the American disengagement. But Tet also 

decimated Hanoi's and the Viet Cong's combat forces in 

the South. Under the pressure from Tet, the Thieu 

Government paid real attention to protecting the pop- 

,;lation. 127/ 

5-52


- 4J 

21. a) 

-n 

z 

0 

0 c 

I 

E< 

i? s-sa 

K • 5i 

z 

jc


Program Title. Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) 

Objectives: 

* Sustain local security 

* Invigorate attack on the VC infrastructure 

* Re-energize village initiatives, land reform and self-help pro- 

"jects 

0 Re-organize GVN and RVNAF cacification couicils and support 

elements to match US CORDS structure 

Timeframe: Tet 1968 - 1970 

Initiator: iVN, President Thieu 

U.S. Proponent: CORDS 

GVN 

Proponent: RD cadre teams, RF/PF Oucposts 

Results: 

. Tne Tet offensive helped strengthen the New Model program. Over 

90 per cent of the GVN s pacification forces were left intact 

after Tet. 

0 In 1969, village and hamlet elections were held and President 

Thieu promulgated decrees designed to enhance the powers of 

hamlet and village governments. 

* In 1970, the GVN passed the Land-To-The-Tiller and Montagnard 

Land Reform Programs, Over 1 million hectares were successfully 

redistributed to about 650,000 tenant farmers, 

Remarks: 

* By the end of 1970, a considerable measure of security hzd been 

restored and the ability of the VC to affect events, to mobilize 

the people, to fight, to tax and to recruit had been eroded to 

the point where it, was a manageable threat. 

Figure 5-16. The Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) Program 

5-54


Instead of killing the new model programii, the Tet offen',ive 

actually helped strengthen it. What happened was that the VC used the 

hamlet cadre and apparatus which were still under thoir control to launch 

their assault on t'ie citier, thereby by-passing the bulk of RD-cadre teams, 

police and RF/PF outposts. Over 90 per cent of the GVN's pacification 

forces were left intact after Tet.128/ Moreover, the communists lost ovEr 

45,000 VC cadres and troops killed in th first month of Tet (almost as many 

as the US 

had lost in 10 years of :he war -- a point not articulated fully 

by the US press or televisinn)J'29/ 

The major GVN priorities after Tet 1968, were: 

0 to repair the damaged cities 

9 to relocate the over one million refugees created by the enemy 

a 

became apparent. 

offensive 

0 to begin the pacification campaign anew as the Accelerated Pacification 

Campaign (AFC) 

to reconcentrate resources for village protection (the People's 

Self-Defense Force - PSDF - waf formed.)130/ 

By mid-1969, the Thieu government's rural strategy for the 1970's 

It consisted of: 

0 sustained local security 

* an invigorated attack on the VC infrastructure 

0 re-energized village initiatives, land reform and self-help 

projects. 

0 reorganized GVN and RVNAF pacification councils and support 

elements to match US CORDS structure (see Figures 5-17 and 

5-IP). '31 

Though none of the above strategies was particularly well implemented, 

by the end of 1970 they had prodizea a breakthrough in the countryside 

for the GVN 

and security in the rural areas was showing signs of 

improving. Vann observed that the GVN goal of providing "relatively 

5-55 

I• 

•

THE BDM COR2PORATION 

Tt.e •'esidem J US •nas~ador 

Cantral Pacification 

"____ I" I 

Council Coucd....a.....e...... "''''" 

MAC) / CORDOS 

Centerfor 

US Embassy 

Coordination Ministries ................ Agences 

of P&D 

Corps and MR Commander 

Re~oai I.... ..... .... 

Regional 

Paclfication Council 

LUeputy CORDS 

CopiiiayRgo 

CorpsiMilitary Regon 

Province Chief1 

Provincial 

Pacification Council 

I ,, 

r ............ 

Senior Adviser, Head 

1 Province CORDS 

DistictChif ........ Senior Adviser, Head 

Village - Hamlet 1 

4541/78W Command 

S.......~. Coordination - 

Advisory 

SCURCE: Indochina Refugee Authored Monograohs, Pacification, p. 36 

Figure 5-17. Pacification Councils and US Support Organ 4 zation (as of 1970) 

5-56


Chairman, JGS 

Pacification and 

Commander RFPF 

'Zhit? of Staff 

I 

Corps and CTZ 

Commander 

, D eput Cdr. Deputy Cdr for territorial 

for Operations 

affairs and Cdr, RF/PF 

Division ntd OTA 

Cdr. 

Sector Cdr 

ýProvince Chief) 

L T Deputy Cdr. 

also RFPF Cdr. 

• .....- ...... ,......................... . .. 

S~betrCralso 

RFPF Cdr. 

Rgoa 

Farces 

R 'F Croup Viilage Regional 

Cdr Chief I Forces 

-* - IC.arnranaz 

S........ 

Coeratlonal Controi 

S) ~~~R-F :) PF , ..... Commaru• I.nus 10per3vaOrai 

S', iControl 

454178W ................. ................ 

SOURCE: Indochin& Refugee Authored Monographs, Pacification, p. 41. 

.4 Figure 5-18. RVNAF Organization for Pacification Support 

5-57


secure" living conditions for the (lear majority of the population had been 

achieved He said: 

For the first time since 1961 all provincial capitals 

can be reached by road with unescorted single vehicle 

traffic during daylight hours.132/ 

A considerable measure of security had been restored and the 

ability of the VC to affect events, to mobilize the people, to fight, to 

tax and to recruit had been eroded to the point where it was a manageable 

threat. On the other hand, neithe-v in 1970 nor dfterward was the Phoenix 

Progvram able to dismantle fully or destroy the VC irfrastructure.133/ 

Blaufarb observed: 

Both Phoenix and Revolutiorary Development suffe-ed 

from a similar defecc. a simplified view of the 

complexities of village life in Vietnam and of the 

abf1ity of the central authority to irtervenp directly 

in the internal arrangements of thousands of villages 

similtaneously. Yet they were also overly complex 

programs for the American arid Vietnamese personnel who 

were required to carry them out, demanding too much 

trained and dedicated r-anoower and a subtle approach 

which was only possible if attempted on a small scale. 

On the other hand, the programs which succeeded were 

more direct and straightforward in concept. Unforturately, 

they evolved only after the Vietnamese 

leadership, particularly President Thieu, came to see 

pacification as an urgent and major priority, far too 

late for rapid achievement of the goals envisioned.134/ 

With respect to the GVN 

strategy of re-energi:ing the villages, 

as part of the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan, village and hamlet 

elections were held in March, June and September of 1969.135/ President 

Thieu promulgated decrees designed to enhance the powers of hamlet and 

village governme'its and authorized their reorganization. Althoigh these 

actions did no' 

ni",lify all of the previously restrictive laws, they represented 

the first attempt in the history of the country to decentralize the 

GVN's power.136/ 

5-58 

1


In 1970, after many years of pronouncements and explorations, the 

GVN passed the Land-bo-The-Tiller and Montagnard Land Reform Programs. 

Over one million hectares were successfully redistributed to about 650,000 

tenant farmers under the programs.137/ Well over two-thirds of the farm 

families in RVN were significantly affected Dy 

By 1972, 

the land retform programs. 

with peasant political participation 1i government growing aespite 

local elite resistanca, the land reform program was succeeding. 138/ 

2. The Easter Offensive: A Setback For Both North and S~uth 

a 

By early 1971, 

they were losing the war 

DRV officials had concluded 139/ that: 

* the VC infrastruct,ire was taking a beating 

* low-level guerrilla warfare could not withstand GVN/US pressures 

over the long term. 

* the GVN had achieved a breakthrough on pacification 

* the"r own internal socio-economic situation was becorming critical 

0 the tine had come for a return to the offensive based on big-unit 

* battles, employing the latest in Soviet-suppliel military hardware. 

The next year an Easter Offensive was launched in an effort to 

turn the war around by wrecking the Vietnamization program, halting pacification 

in the South, rebuilding VC cadre infrastructure and punishing the 

Souch Vietnamese for not responding to their call for a massive uprising 

againsc Thieu and his US allies. 

by the RV!.AF 

fray. 

Early PAVN battle successes were -outed 

when President Nixon ordered US air and naval forces into the 

Vigorous US reaction -- mining of the DRV's ports and ma):imum interdiction 

against logistic arteries throughout the country with laser-guided 

"smart" borbs -- helped decisively to turn the invasion arouna and send the 

DRV back to their sanctuaries, losers once again.140/ 

3. Measures of Success: Reaching For The Brass Ring 

To reach a balanced judgment on pacification progress in RVN, 

CORDS upgraded the hamlet evaluation system in 1967 The US Hamlet Evaluaticn 

System (AES) was designed ti yield comprehensive, quantifiable data on 

security and development of every hamlet in the RVR' under some degree of 

5-59 

Ud

THE BOA CORPORATION 

GVN control anr to identify hamlets under VC/NVA control. The system was 

comoletely automated oy computer processing., (For a sample summary of HES 

coITuter taoes ,ee FVgure 5-19.,) 

Under HFS, every hamlet in RVN was rated by US advisers on a 

series of tested criteria (c.g., "Does the village chief sleep in the 

hamlet at i.ghft w-'th, isi fami,,?"' RaLings viere as follows: 

e A and B: Security ful !, established, effective local government. 

* C: Government his military and administrative control, VC harass 

citizens outside the hamlet. 

s D a0 d E: Hamlet insec-ire, VC political cadre are active, governmeft 

maintains some presence 

* V: Hamlet under VC control, 141/ 

F 

ATid .he wreckage oi Tet in 1968, only 19% of RVN hamlets could 

be ratea as A or .. By IO72, 80.1% were rated A and B, while 15.7% were 

placed in the C category and the remaiing 4.3% rated D, E or V. 142/ The 

data presented below depicts the same data in terms of total population 

under GVN influence or cortrol. 

1964 1967 1972 

" "Secure" population* 6.8 11.5 18.0 

(in millions' 

Percent of total '12% 67% 93% 

. Total population 

(in millions) 16.1 1,'.2 19A3 

I. *~"Secure" category from GVN/US system for !9r4- A-P-C HES population (total 

scores) for 1967 and 1972.143/ 

How good was HES? DouJlas Kinnard',. survey of US general officers 

revealed that 2 thoLgrt It Wds a gooQ way to measure pacification 

progress, t5% thought it had weaknesses but was aboý:t as good as could be 

devised, •nd the balance, 23% dia not think it was a valid measure.144/ 

Formal studies 145/ were conducted co check the validity of the 

HES, particularly during its first stages and it was found that: 

0 changes in HES scores were sensitive enoug'i to identify progress 

or regression in areas over time. 

5-'0

low. 

TýiE BDM CORPORATION 

SOME 8.2 MILLION PEOPLE BECAME "SECURE" BETWEEN 1967 AND 1972. 

"rOUNTRYWIDE 

POPULATION 

{IN MILLIONS 1967-72 

END OF YEAR) 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 CHANGE 

SECURE (A&B) 7 2 8.2 12.5 13.4 15.8 15.4 8.: 

RELATIVZI SLZURi(C) 4.3 5.2 3.8 3.5 2.3 2.6 -1.7 

CONTESTED (D&E) 2.7 1.9 .8 19 .6 1.0 -1.7 

VC/NVA CONTROL 2.9 2.2 .4 - - .2 -2.7 

SVN TOTAL 17.2 17.5 17.6 17.9 18.7 19.3 2.1 

THIS RAISED THE PERCENTAGE OF "SECURE" FROM 42 TO 80 PERCENT 

% OF RVN 

POPULATION 

SECURE (A&B) 42 47 71 75 84 80 38 

RELATIVELY SECURE(C) 25 ZU 21 20 13 14 -11 

CONTESTED (D&E) 16 11 5 5 3 5 -1i 

VC/NVA CONTROL 17 12 2 0 0 1 -16 

SOURCE: Thayer, Hamlet Evaluation System C(.mputer Tapes 1967-1972. 

All figures are based )n total IES scores, which include the 

security, political, and socio-economic dimensions. 

Total includes oppulation in unevaluated hamlets which is not 

shown in the Table, so some of the columns do not add precisely 

to the totals. The Table incluaes the urban population: which 

means that the C-D-E-VC popu'ation iF mostly conceqtrated in 

the rural areas., 

Figure 5-19. Summary of HES Compute. Tapes (19%,-1972) 

5-61


0 'hey were not precise enough to make point estimates. 

6 comparisons between different geographical areas in the RVN at a 

single ruint in time were questionable, 

By all standards, the New Model Pacification, by far, had proven 

more successful than any other previous effort, 

F. VIETNAMIZATION: AN END TO AMERICANIZATION (1968-1975) 

1., Definition and Purpose 

After the introduction of US combat forces into the Vietnam 

conflict, the fight essentially became an American war with the South 

Vietnamese increasingly watching from the sidelines, The effort to turn 

the war back cver to the Vietnamese became known as ViGtnamization. In the 

spring of 1969, President Nixon and his National Security Adviser, Mr. 

Kissinger. devised a strategy which would allow the phase-out of American 

forces from Vietnam at a pace slow enough not to jeopardize the battlefield 

situation, but fast enough to assuage American public opinion; the approach 

was called "V;etnamization." The basic idea was that if North Vietnam 

would 

not agree to a negotiated settlement which would allow the South 

Vietnamese to settle their own affairs, then they wuuld be facing a wellarmed 

and ready South Vietnam, prepared to defend itself without compromise. 

146/ 

Another interpretation of Vietnamization is that Nixon and 

Kissinger intended only to ensure that RVN's defeat was delayed long enougn 

to place the responibi'ility solely on the GVN's shoulders, 

This interpretation, 

however, cannot be made consistent with the total record. 

President Nixon, in the four years preceding the 1973 Paris Accords, 

reduced US forces in RVN from over 550,000 men to about 24,000 men. US 

casualties were reduced dramatically and spending on the war fell from 

about $25 billion a year to less than $3 billion per year. 

policy entailed some risk of losing the war, 

and not one of complete withdrawal. 

unless Har.oi would agree to US settlement terms. 

Although the 

it was a policy of reduction 

Nixon never pledged total withdrawal 

"C-- astute observerl47i opined that Vietnamization, in practice, 

was a stratey designed to do the following things. 

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t to decrease US forces in RVN to a level that would be tolerated 

I that 

by American politics, 

0 to use tne prospects of endless US presence or assistance tc 

persuade :ianoi to accept the proferred negotiating terms. 

The process of upgrading the RVNAF, it is generally agreed, began 

before Nixon took office in the summer of 1967. CORDS had been established, 

new emphasis was placed on pacification and territorial security 

and Westmoreland's new Deputy, General Abrams, was given specific responsibility 

for improving tne performance of the RVNAF.148/ 

The report to LBJ 

from the ClarK Clifford -ask Force in early 

1968 proposed an urgent effort to improve and modernize the equipment of 

the RVNAF. LBJ acted upon the recommerdations immediately and directed 

that ARVN be provided more helicopters, M-16 rifles and other needed equipment. 

After Nixon assumed office in January 1969, the program initiated 

by former Secretary of Defense Clifford was accelerated. On 8 June 1969, 

Nixon and Thieu met on Midway Island and agreed to "Vietnamize" 149/ 

war and reduce US combat involvement. 

Also, there is general agreement that during the years of US 

disengagement che effectiveness of the RVNAF increased significantly.! 

It began with the Tet offensive and culminated with the eventual success in 

overcoming the PAVN's 1972 Easter Offensive. 

Initially, it was planned that the Vietnamization program would 

be implemented in the following three phases:151/ 

. turning over the grocnd combat responsibility to the RVNAF -- US 

was to continue to provide air, naval and logistics support., 

* helping the RVNAF develop its own combat support capabilities in 

order to achieve self-reliance on the battlefield. 

- reducing US presence to a military advisory role. 

Secretary of Defense Laird, in a speech 152/ in 1971, emphasized 

the Vietnamization program was conceived on the basis of certain 

critical assumptions. First, it was assumed that the conflict would continue 

if the Paris peace negotiations were not successfLl. Second, the 

the 

•I 5-63


process of winding down and ending US 

combdt involvement was to Degin in 

1969 and go forward steadily. Third, as iong as the conflict continued, US 

and free world assistance would be required. 

assistance, the GVN 

Fourth, with the appropriate 

and its citizens could cope with the threats to their 

security from both the VC and the North Vietnamese. 

Don, 

2. Vietnamization as Viewed by the Vietnamese 

When 

asked f-'r his opinion on Vietnamization, General Tran Van 

I Corps Commander in the 1960's, a Deputy in the Assembly and Minister 

of Defense, had this to say:. 

I was an opponent of Vietnamization- I will tell just 

one story. I visited (some units in the field) and tried 

to understand the program of Vietnamization of the 

war.,.it was in the headquarters of the 5th Division. I 

discussed the question with the commander of the division, 

General Minh Van Hieu, a most honest general, and 

capable, too, I was surpriscd by his answer; it opened 

my eyes. I asked him, "What de you think of Vietnamization?" 

He said to me, "It is impossible to be implemented." 

Why? He said, "The 5th Division covers an area 

where there were two other divisions, Americans, and now 

with the departure of the two American Divisions I have 

only my division to cover the whole area.. I have three 

regiments for this area and must use one regiment to 

replace one division. How can I face the enemy like 

this? I have become weaker." He looked very disappointed. 

I was surprised; he was a quiet man, a polite 

man, and he tried to do his best. But he :aid to ri 

that this was impossible. "How can I cover a bigger 

area with less units?" So the Vietnamization of the war 

means that we are becoming weaker.153/ 

Colonel Nuyen Huy Loi, a veteran staff officer with the JGS 

military adviser to the South Vietnamese delegation to the Paris Talks, 

thought that Vietnamization had not becn approached properly-. 

... when I was in Paris, people came to ask me, How do 

you feel about the Vietnamization? I think a Vietnamization 

program was possible, really, because we did it 

before, in 1954 with the French, but the important 

thing is to Vietnamize the whole structure, right from 

"the top, from those who conduct the whole war, not just 

the small units.. .We had good officers who would stand 

and 

of forces.154/ 

fight but we needed to put them in a right structure 

5-64


When another senior RVNAF 

would have "Vietnam zed", he responded: 

officer Wds asked recently on how nie 

Oh, we talked for a long time in 1966/67 on how the 

Vietnamese Army had to reorganize in order to become a 

really effective armed force and to get by alone, with 

just some support from the US....[But] the American 

Forces wanted to train the iietnamese Army in the image 

of the American forces.. And, as you know, even with 

American forces we [had not been abie to] fight this 

kind of war, So you have to design some other kind. 

For a loog time I tried to convince our leaders, and I 

talked with Americans as welE, we have to reorganize... 

into two forces. One is a territorial force and one is 

the main force, ready to move anywhere we want. And all 

these mobile forces have to have adequate support, some 

groand support...I think we needed a large [mobile] 

force, from ten to fiteen divisions.. .When I was in 

Vietnam I made a study of all this. ... [and] tried to 

submit it to the US and talked to our leaders. And it 

would have been nucessary for the Americans to [withdraw 

at a slower pace] until we were ready to fight alone.. 

Not just taking the equipment and leave. However, the 

JGS just stayed there and did nothing. They just did 

nothing until the end..-they only received suggestions 

[from the Americans] But everything is done at MACV 

Headquarters and sent to us, that is all,155/ 

A high-ranking civilian, Nguyen Ba Can, who for a brief period 

toward the end was Prime Minister after having served for several years as 

Speaker of t,.e House, reported that: 

Vietnamese officials used tc call Vietnamization the "US 

Dollar and Vietnam Blood Sharing Plan." Vietnamlizatiin 

was often praised, but the assistance promised to the 

Vietnamese, up-n which they had come to rely as the key 

of containment of Communist expansion in South East Asia 

was denied them after tne signing of the Paris Agreements 

-- one might say after the US had staged a "peace 

with honor" solution,156/ 

I 

Other Vietnamese leaders felt that the program (see Figure 5-20) 

was not tailored to the true requirements and the actual situation, 157/ 

for example: 

5-65


ITEM:* 

CUMULATIVE QUANTITIES: 

FY 70 FY 71 FY 75 

Rifle, M-16AI 790,866 791,225 792,237 

Machine Gun, M-60 13,925 14,059 14,415 

Grenade Launcher, M-79 45,478 46,092 47,802 

Mortar, 81-mm., M-29 1,592 1,645 1,798 

Howitzer, LT, 105-mm., MIOlAl 716 743 819 

Howitzer, LT, 105-.m., MI14A1 288 290 304 

Tank, LT, M41A3 257 278 366 

Carrier, Pers., M-113 1,010 1,088 1,149 

Carrier, Mortar, M-125A1 132 137 154 

MaSK, Protective, M-17AI 424,085 432,685 465,526 

Radio Set, AN/PRC-25 33,779 42,128 46,688 

Radio Set, AN/VRC-12 6,944 7,089 10,377 

Radio Set, AN/GRC-106 368 372 384 

Truck, Utility, 1/4-T, M-151Al 21,040 26,325 34,169 

Truck, Cargo, 2 1/2-T, M-33A2 15,802 18,865 27,222 

Truck, Cargo, 5T, M54A2 612 676 856 

Truck, WRKR, 5T, M543A2 595 622 712 

Truck, CGO, IT, M-601, & 3/4-T, 

M-37 Series 10,584 11,679 14,827 

Tractor, -T, kied., Dec. 435 528 623 

Crane, TRK MTD, 20T 275 298 378 

Semi-Trailer 12T, M-127 1,295 1,384 1,636 

Helicopter 128 376 376 

*Items of equipment provided RVNAF on a cumulative basis by USG Fiscal Year. 

SOURCE: Indochina Refugee Authored Monographs ARVN, Vietnamization and the 

Cease-fire, p. 48. 

Figure 5-20. 

Typical Military Equipment Provided the RVNAF Under the 

Vietnamization Program 

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THE 

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* M-16 rifles were provided long after the enemy had em'loyed the 

Russian AK-47 rifle 

* M-48 tanks and 175 mm self-propelled artillery were provided only 

;affta the enmmy had deplnyPd T-54 tanks and 130-mm guns. 

SThe outcome of the 1972 Easter Invasion provided the US with aP 

uneven basis 'or assessing RVNAF performance and the status of Vietnamization., 

Some Divisions like the 2 3 d (detending Kontum) and elements of the 

5th (holding An Loc) acquitted themselves well, Elite units like the 

Srangers and marines geoerally fought tenaciously, Other divisions, like 

the 3 d and 2 2 d 

and effectiveness. 

on the other hand revealed glaring weaknesses in discipline 

Territorial forces performed unevenly and were rated 

from outstanding to poor, And, the contribution of the PSDF was evaluated 

as marginal 158/ 

Regardless of the uneven RVNAF 

showing in 1972, an important test had 

been passed and pacification and Vietnamization were moving ahead under 

heavy pressure from the US. 

American ground combat troops were no longer 

available to support and bail out the RVNAF. President Nixon began tu 

press hard for a negotiated settlement, Tne stalemate in the negotiations 

was broken and after several false starts a cease-fire agreement was final- 

1 v sioned in Paris on 27 January 1973. All US combat forces were withdrawn 

within 60 days.. In the interim, the departing US forces literally duinped 

tons of military eouipnent, haraware and supplies on the RVNAF. The effort 

was massive. 159/ Vietnamization came to an end. By the terms of the 

agreement, the US rould not introduce additional heavy weapons into RVN, 

but was restricted to supporting the equipment on hand at the time of the 

agreement, 

The net result of proeiding such massive aid was that it 

increased the RVNAF's dependence on continuing US support to obtain: 

* spare parts 

a 

- fuel 

ammunition 

0- * special maintenance equipment and t-chniciars 160/ 

RVN could produce nonr of these and the US willingness to continue 

to supply these commodities came into question as a war-weary 

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Congress, 

in the face of a badly weakened executive, became increasingly 

anxious to liquidate any further US involvement in Southeast Asia. 

G. INSIGHTS 

I. Knowing the Enemy and Ou- Ally 

This is a recurring theme which was played in Volumes I and I! of 

this study. The US misread and underestimated the enemy's tenacity and 

determination to prevail at any cost. The North Vietnamese proved to be 

resourceful and able to learn from past mistakes. Their approach to insurgency 

was a stage-by-stage revolutionary process, based on redistributive 

policies of a socio-economic nature enforced by violence. 

With respect to knowing our ally, the US misread and underestimated 

the resolve, determination, character and will of the South 

Vietnamese people. In the end, after years of UG commitment and assistance, 

the South Vietnamese felt that US 

interest in their cause had waned 

greatly, whereas the enemy's support from the communist world continued 

unabated. 

2. Pacification 

Between 1954 and mid-1368, the GVN's attempts at establishing 

pacification and rural development programs failed because they were little 

more than 

I 

ill-devised blends of stop and star..,: 

military and police operations 

• social control techniques 

0 emergency welfare efforts 

0 attempts to extend political-administrative linkage from Saigon 

to the countryside. 

During the period, the GVN failed to come to terms with the 

communist movement because of their own fundamental political weaknesses, 

which were:- 

* their inheritance of France's colonial legacy 

j 

their debilitating internal pursuit of power 

A their reliance on US aid and doctrine rather than internal political 

support. 

I• 5-68


In turn, the US 

the product of: 

efforts to support GVN pacification program were 

* reliance on conventional military methods, equipment and training 

a 

culturally unsuitable and impractical approaches to development 

• an inability t) devise conceptually relevant programs 

* ineffective and insufficient application of leverage on the 

GVN 161/ 

Between 1968 and 1973 the GVN, with strong US aid, turned things 

around, and achieved success in their pacification and development programs 

F 

primarily because: 

priority was finally given, to security -- protecting and involving 

the people in their own defense 

* policies of land reform and economic redistribution were promoted 

The one key thing which the Thieu government failed to do during this 

period of pacification progress was to fashion a political ccmmunity.162/ 

As Ambassador Samuel Berger, deputy to Ambassador Bunker from 1968 tu 1971 

said, "Thieu failed to institutionalize his government" 163/ thereby losing 

the gains made through pacification. 

Regardless, there is little coubt, having the advantage of hindsight, 

that pacification finally worked. The North Vietnamese ultimately 

could not have won the war via insurgency, but rather they had to resort to 

conventional military offensives by PAVN troops. in that sense pacification 

did succeed, though it alone, without a strong political base, could 

not withstand the final DRV onslaught. 

Other pacification insights are- 

0 Security is a Prerequisite for Pacification. While both the 

provision of local security and certain nonmilitary undertakings 

are essential parts of a successful pacification program, 

- conditions for a sustained government presence mdst prevail if 

development efforts are to pay off. By eventually whittling down 

the enemy's political and military apparatus in the villages and 

hamlets of Vietnam, the GVN/1IS pacification effort began to pay 

off. 

the 

5-69


9 The Impcrtance of Intelligence, Without reliable intelligence on 

the intsurgents, a threatened government is likely to oe at such a 

SI disadvantage that assistarce, at almost any level , would be 

ireffective, A local intelligence capability is therefore a 

high-priority matter, and the US should have assured that one was 

L organized prior to making its commitment to the RVN for extensive 

V 

pacification assistance. 

* The Use of Police and Constabulary Forces, Early on, the GVN/US 

pacification effort failed to use local police and constabulary 

aqsets effectively.. 

Properly equipped and trained police forces 

couid have been an effective tool in reducing communist control 

of the South Vietnamese countryside.. 

0 The Extensive Use of Regular and Paramilitary Unts With 

Aggressive, Small-Unit Tactics, In Vietnam preciou: time was 

lost because the ARVN and the Territorial Forces werr reluctant 

to press the battle with Viet Cong guerrilla elements. 

Such a 

counterinsurgency strategy calls for aggressive small-unit 

action, which in turn calls for competent junicr and noncommissioned 

officers and realistic training programs, 

0 Development Programs and Their Relationship to the Pacification 

Effort. There should be early agreement on the role of economic, 

3ocial, and political programs. Because such agreement was 

lacking in Vietnam, a plethora of nonmilitary activities were 

undertaken, many of which were redundant, unwanted, or even 

counterproductive to the goal of defeating the insurgents. 

a Handling of Grievances. In countering any insurgency, a vigorous 

and sustained effort must be made at the earliest possible moment 

to redress genuine grievances, Indeed, serious consideration 

should be given to conditioning US assistance to the government's 

taking such action. in South Vietnam, land reform constituted 

such a real and urgent need. 

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* Refugee Control. With all the other problems confronting the 

inadequate Vietnamese bureaucracy, it is not surprising that the 

ivast swarms of refugees from VC-controlled or bombed-out villages 

were among the residual claimants for attention and resources. 

But US and Vietnamese humanitarian efforts, private and public, 

should have been better coordinated. To some extent at least, 

the refugees could have been incorporated into the manpower pool 

available for military and nonmilitary programs. 

0 Urban Population Problems.. Military ope-ations in the countryside 

of Vietnam, 

combined with relative security and substantial 

employment opportunities in the larger towns and cities, created 

a dramatic population drift to the urban areas, But pacification 

efforts primarily development programs, continued to be concentrated 

in the countryside. 

regard does not stem from what was 

rather from not doing anything at all. 

The experience in Vietnam in this 

done well or poorly, but 

* A Case for Central Management. A successful pacification effort 

requires a single focus of authority and responsibility. And this 

means central management, both in Washington and in the lield and 

on both the US and host-country sides, at a level high enough to 

wield adequate bureaucratic "clout".16_4/ 

* The Lack of a Common Approach. Early on in the Vietnam conflict, 

S* US military and civilian organizations failed to nave a common 

approach towards defeating the insurgents and pacifying the 

countryside. 

The accepted view was that there were two programs 

instead of one for defeating the insurgency--pacification on the 

one hana, and the military effort to seek out and destroy VC 

forces on the other. 

This lark of unified direction was finally 

reversed when racification was centralized under the COMUSMACV, 

and CORDS was established. Traditional military and civilian 

attitudes concerning the nature of the war and the level of 

bureaucratic involvement in pacification proved difficult to 

change until a common approach to the problem was developed and 

implemented. 

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F THE 


0 The Need For Trained Military Advisers And Pacification 

Specialists, US combat units found themselves ill-equipped and 

inadequately trained for handling the problems passed by the 

pacification programs of the early and mid-1960's, Subsequent 

formal training of officers in US service schools, coupled with 

firsthand knowledge gathered from in-country experience (second 

and third-tour personnel), 

findlly provided the cadre necessary 

to produce a significant impact on pacification in the late 

sixties and early beventies. 

3. Vietnamization 

After the Tet Offensive in 1968, President Thiej and General 

Abrams (then COMUSMACV) threw their support behind the buildup of the 

territorial forces, the National Police and the attack against the vC 

infrastructure. And so, some ten or twelve years after the initiation of 

tVe insurgency against the RVN, there %.as a coordinated approach to the 

security phase of pacification. Under the Nixon administration it was 

called Vietnamization. 

The US goal to increase the RVNAF's military might and ability to 

hold off the enemy through the Vietnamization Program was thwarted in the 

end by the RVNAF's increased dependence on continuing US military aid and 

technical support. The more massive the aid, the more dependent they 

became. The RVNAF soldier had been "conditioned" by the US presence to 

rely on the almost ubiquitous air and artillery support in combat and had 

forgotten "how 

to walk," being used to vehicular and helicopter transportation 

which became scarce after the US pullout in 1973. Former ARVN 

leaders felt that their army had been organized along the wrong pattern. 

It had gotten a big logistics tail and it 

lacked the necessary equipment 

and mobile reserve divisions essential to counter the NVA's final 

assault.!65/ 

In light of the goals set by the Nixon administration, (i.e.,, the 

withdrawal of US 

forces from RVN and to bring about a negotiated settlement 

of the war) Vietnamization has to be considered a success. 

aspect was that it was a decade too late. 

The unfortunate 

5-72


After the 1973 Paris Agreements, 

the key to the continued success of 

Vietnamization, and for that matter the GVN's Dacification Program, was the 

support promised by the USG in the form of US airpower and sustained econoinic, 

materiel and technical support. When that promised support faltered, 

Vietnamization and Pacification became shaky, deteriorated an, finally 

collapsed under the pressure of the DRV's final offens-ve, 

H. LESSONS 


following lessons are drawn from the material ol counterinsurgency, 

Pa.ificatio. and Vietnamization developed above: 

* The LIS government should establish an agreed doctrine for counterinsurgency 

and pacification which complements national goals, 

objectives and related tasks. 

* A government calling upon the United States for assistance in 

maintaining power in the face of an internal threat, as did the 

Vietnamese Government, 

is unlikely to be efficient or effective 

or to meet American ideals of democracy or probity. American 

commitments to assist such governments must be made with the 

recognition that our act of commitment and our advice cannot 

change the nature of the client regime or the society of the host 

country. 

* The ability and willingness of the US to exert leverage on a 

client state is inversely proportional to the perceived imoortance 

of that nation to US national security interests. 

0 Before committing itself to supporting an ally besieged from 

within, the United States should be confident that it 

knows the 

composition and the motivation of the threatening forces and the 

problems at issue., Only through such knowledge will we be able 

to assess the dimensions of the problem we mignt confront. 

Simple prudence requires that we know "n advance whether the 

government's cause is dubious or its prospects hopeless. 

5-73


, The bS should help, not substitute for, th• government of our 

V 

ally. To the extent that we "take charge," we postpone (and may 

even jeopardize) the achievement of our ultimate objectives. The 

epplication of this lesson in practice, as we have uiscovered in 

Vietnam, is difficult and calls for a careful selection and 

training of advisers. If we could turn back history, the process 

of "Vietnamization" probably would have been started in 1961, 

1969, 

o To reduce corruption and minimize the undertaking of overly 

o 

ambitious projects that cannot be made 

not 

ope,.ationa& quickly, US 

officials should exercise restraint in initial programming. 

This, together with arrangements for continuing follow-through 

and accountability on the part of local officials, should serve 

to increase the effectiveness of US pacification assistance. 

The most efficient and farsighted naticnal government will be 

unab]l 

to extend its influence unless it establishes an effective 

presence in the form of local officials, In Vietnam, prcvince 

ard district chiefs performed this role by providing a 

link 

between village and hamlet officials and Saigon. Government 

cadre also are an essential element in closing the gap between 

the national government and the people. But in Vietnam the 

importance of careful selection and good trairing was 

often overlooked.166/ 

all too 

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CHA`TER 5 ENDNOTES 

I. Do llas S. Blaufarb, The Counte-insurgency Era: U.S. Doctrinie and 

Performance 1950 to the Present (New York, NY; The Free Press, 1977), 

p. 223 

2. Statement made by General Nguyen Du: Thang, Chief, National Pacification 

Campaign in an address to the Honolulu Conference, Honolulu, 

Hawaii, Feb. 7, 1966. 

3. This summary was drawn from the works of , Douglas Blaufarb, pp. 22- 

23, and Lt. Col. Edward R Wainhouse, "Guerrilla War in Greece, 

1946-49 A Case Study," in Franklin M. O;anka, Modern Guerrilla Warfare 

(New York: Free Press, 1962), pp. 48-49. 

4.. Blaufarb, pp. 23-27; Alvin H. Scaff, The Philippine Answer to Communism 

(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1955), pp. 20-21; and Maj. 

Gen. EdwarJ Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars (New York, NY:, Harper & 

Row, 1972), pp. 20-42. 

5. This summary comes from various works on the subject such as: Blaufarb, 

pp. 40-47; Lucian W. Pye, Guerilla Communism in Malaya (NJ: Princeton 

Univeristy Press, 1956); Brigadier Rirhard Clutterbuck, lhe Long, 

Long War (New York, NY. Praeger, 1966); and Robert W. Komer, 'The 

Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Orgknization of the Successful Counterinsurgency 

Effort," R-957-ARPA (Santa Monica, Cdlif:' The Rand 

Corp., Feb. 1972), 

6. Blaufarb, pp. 4)-50, The problem was not witholt recognition as Paul 

X. Kelley developed in his Air War College Research Report, No, 3777, 

Air University, USAF, Maxwell Air Force Base, ALA entitled, "French 

Counterinsurgency in Algeria 1954-1962: Military Victory - Political 

Defeat," April 1969, pp. 41-42. The French Army estab ished a "5th 

Bureau" in their general staff; known as the Psychological Warfare 

Section, it was responsible for psywar, civic action, public information 

and civilian and troop morale. The campaign for the hearts and 

minds of the people and pacification of the countryside began, 

7, The Pentagon Papers- The Defense Department H;story of U.S. Decisionmaking 

on Vietnam, Senator Mike Gravel, ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 

1971), Vol., 2, p. 571, 

8. Lawrence E. Grinter, "South Vietnam: Pacification Denied," South East 

Asian Perspective, July 1975, p. 50. 

9. Gravel Pentagon Papers, Vol. 2, p. 570. 

¾ 5-75 

w,


'p 

S10. US Department of Defense United States - Vietna' Relations 1945-1967. 

Hereafter DOD US/VN Relations (Book 2 of 12, IV. A.5 Tab 2) pp, 56-60 

cites several sources in describing the increasing level of violence 

in South Vietnam. Bernaru B, Fall, Vietnam Witness (NY: Frederick A. 

Praeger, Publishers 1966), p. 185 and his Last Reflections on a War 

(NY: Schocken Books, 1972) pp, 196-199 also refer to the insurgency 

problem circ, 1955-1957, 

11. This findiny is supported by The Pentagon Papers, Gravel edition, Vol. 

I; U.S. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff 

for Military Operations, "A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term 

Development of South Vietnam" (short title. PROVN). 1 March 1966; 

General William C. Westmoreland's Private Papers on file at the US 

Army Office of the Chief of Military iiisto.'y, Washington, D.C. and 

"The Cooper Report," The American Experience with Pacification in 

Vietnam (U), Vol, I, "An Overview of Pacification (U)," Authors: 

Chester Cooper, et. al%, March 1972, IDA, ARPA Spacial Studies, pp. 

13-14. 

IZ. George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States in 

Vietnam, 1950-1975. Manuscript of the book to be published by Wiley 

manuscript 

late in 1979, 

to 

p. 

the 

57. 

BDM 

Professor 

study team. 

Herring kindly provided a copy of his 

13. William A. Nighswonger, Rural Pacification in Vietnam (New York, NY: 

Frederick Praeger, 1966), p. 36. 

14. Grinter, pp. 51-52. 

15. The Cooper Report, Supra note 11, pp., 120-122, 

15. Ibid. 

17. Dennis J. Duncanson, Gove-nment and Revolution in Vietnam (London: 

Oxford University Press, 1968) p. 247. 

18. Ibid. 

19. The Cooper Report, p. 122. 

20. John D. Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid (New York, NY; Fred- 

2 erick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 72-83.. 

J. 21. Ibid., p. 129. 

J 22. Grinter, p. 70, details why the land reform never really got off the 

ground. Other references include: RVN presidential decrees - Ordinance 

No. 2 of 8 January 1955, Ordinance No. 57 of 22 October 1956; 

Price Gittinger, "Agrarian Reform," in Lindholm, Vietnam: The First 

Five Years (New York, NY, Frederick Praeger, 1968), pp. 200-208; 

5-76


Lansdale, pp. 355-365. Also see David Warfel, "Agrarian Reform in the 

Republic of Vietnam," Far Eastern Survey, XXVII, No. 8. (August 1959)- 

113-126; 3. Price Gittinger, "Progress in South Vietnam's Agrarian 

Reform, Part I," Far Eastern Survey XXIX, No. 2 (February, 1960): 17-21,. 

Also James B.. Hendry, "Land Reform in South Vietnam", Ecoaiomic 

Development and Cultural Change, IX, No. 1, (October 1960) and Wolf 

Ladejinsky, "Agrarian Reforms in the Republic of Vietnam," in Problems 

of Freedom: South Vietnam Since Independence, ed. by Wesley R. Rishel 

(New York, NY: Free Press of Giencoe, 1961), pp. 153-175. 

23. John T, Dorsey, "South Vietnam in Perspective," Far Eastern Survey, 

Vol. XXVVII, No. 12 (December, 1958), 177. 

24. George A. Carver, Jr. "The Faceless Viet Cong", Foreign Affairs, XLIV, 

3 (April, 1966). 359-360 

25. Ibid., p. 362. As a captured Lao Dong document stated: 

"The People's Revolutionary Party has only tne appearance of an independent 

existence; actually, our party is nothing but the Lao Dong 

Party of Vietnam (Viet Minh Communist Party) unified from north to 

south under the direction of the central committee of the party, the 

chief of which is President Ho." 

This document dated 7 December 1961, was captured in Ba Xuyen province, 

RVN. 

26. Grinter, p. 51. 

27. The Cooper Report, p. 133, 

28. Robert G, Scigliano, South Vietnam, Nation Uader Stress (Boston, MA: 

Houghton Mifflin, 1964), p. 133. 

29. The rise and fall cf agglomeration camps are well reported in John D. 

Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid (New York: Frederick A. 

Praeger, 1962), pp. 72-127; also see Robert G. Scigliano, South 

Vietnaw. Nation Under Stress (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), pp. 

179-199; Joseph J. Zasloff, Rural Resettlement in Vietnam: An 

Agroville in Development (Saigon and Washington, DC: Michigan State 

University Vietnam Advisory Group (MSUVAG), 1963), pp. 6-7 and App I, 

p. 34; and the Cooper Report, p. 133. 

30. Gravel, Tf*e Pentagon Papers Vol I, D. 312; Zasloff, p.9; and Grinter, 

p. 54 all iisctss this GVN resettlement trogram. 

31. Grinter p. 71, The origin of the French exprcssion -agroville (rural 

town) - goes back to earlier pacification operatic-s in Tonkin. 

1< 5-77 

i-


32. Ibid., p. 54 

33. The following documents, among others, reflect early peasant 

objections to the agroville program. Gravel, The Pentagon Papers, 

Vol, I, p, 312-313; Grinter, pp 54-55; Bernard B. Fall, The Two 

Vietnams (New York, London. Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p, 310; 

Zasloff, p. 21; also John C. Donrnell, "Politics in South Vietnam: 

Doctrines of Authority in Conflict" (unpublished Doctoral dissertation, 

Univ. of California at Berkeley, 1964), p. 187. 

34. Gravel, The Pentagon Paper-, Vol I, p. 313. 

35. Grinter, p. 54. 

36. Gravel, The Pentagon Papers, Vo'. I, p. 313. Others, listed below, 

concluded that 23 of the original 80 Agro\illes were nearing completion 

when the program was halted -- 32,000 out of the 43,000 people 

(who actually moved) stayed, far short of the planned-for total of 

500,000 people. See Nguyen Dang, Viet-Namf Politics and Public 

Administration (Honolulu. East-West Center Press, 1966), p. 158;, 

Duncanson, p. 261; Nguyen Khoc Nhan, "Policy of Key Rural Agrovilles", 

Asian Culture, Vol. III, No. 3-4 (July-Dec., 1961): 28-49; and 

Grinter, p. 54. 

37. W. Scott Thompson & Donaldson D. Frizzel, eds. The Lessons of Vietnam 

(New York: Crane, Russak & Co., 1977), pp. 222-223. 

38. Gen. Tran Dinh Tho, ARVN. Pacification, Indochina Refugee Authored 

Monograph Program. Prepared for the Department of the Army, Office of 

tl.e Chief of Military History (McLean, VA., General Research Corp, 

October, 1977), p. 11. 

39. Tran Dinh Tho, p. 12. 

40, Gravel The Pentagon Papers, Vol. I, p. 313., 


42. Sir Robert Thompson, Defeatiny Communist Insurgency (New York: 

Praeger, 1966), pp. 121-140. 

43. Tran Dinn Tho, p. 12. 

44. Fee Grinter, p. 55; as well as John Mecklin, Mission io Torment 

(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), p. 45; and :,ravel The Pentagon 

Papers, Vol II, pp. 50-51. 

45. Blaufarb, p. 106. 

•5-73


46. Ibid., p, 100. 

47. Gravel, The Pentagon Papers, Vol II, p. 27. 

48. Biautarb, p. 104. 

49. Gravel, The Pentagon Papers, Vol. II, pp. 143-144, 


I 51, In Bernard Fall's, The Two Vietnams, p. 373, he quotes official 

statistics which put the number of pianned hamlets at 5,000 en-zlosing 

over 7 million people in December 1962; and by the end of 196,3 there 

were to be 12,000 hamlets enclosing over 13 million people., Milton E. 

Osborne's, "Strategic Har.lets in South Vietnam, a Survey and a 

comparison," Data Paper No. 55, Southeast Asia Program, Dept of Asian 

Studies, (Ithaca, NY.• Cornell University, 1965), p. 33, quotes 

offic-al sources as saying that over 3,000 strategic hamlets were 

completed by October 1961 and the figure rose to 7,200 in July 1963. 

The population projected using these figures rose frocm a claimed 

4,322,000 in October 1962 to 8,737,000 in the following year. The 

following criteria, as 

been met 

outlined in 

before a 

Tran Dinh 

strategic 

Tho, p. 13, 

hamlet was 

was to have 

considered completed: 

* The enemy infrastructure had been neutralized. 

0 The populati-n had been organized for hamlet. defense, 

0 The oefense system (barrier, moat, trenches, traps, etc.) rad 

been physically established. 

Secret underground shelters for weapons and persunnel had been 

constructcd for the hamlet dcfense force., 

* The hamlet council and administrative body had been elected and 

functioning. 

53. Blaufarb, p, 120; Duncanson, p. 326; and, Osborne, p., 36. 

54, Thompson, p, 141, 

55. Ibid , pp. 141-142. 

S6. Gravel, The Pentagon Papers, Vol. I, pp. 312-313. 


58. Guenther Levy, America In Vietnam (New York- Oxford University Press, 

1978), p. 25. 

5-79 

Im I m m


59. "Personalism," Diem's political philosophy, is discussed in detail in 

Volume II, Chapter 5, of this study. 

60. Douglas Pike, Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the 

National Liberation Front of South V~etnam (Cdmbridge, Mass.: The 

M.I.,T, Press, 1966), p. 78. 

61, Duncanson, p. 321 and Lewy, p. 25. 


63. William Colby and Peter Forbath, Honourable Men: My Life in the CIA 

(London- Hutchinson & Co., 1973), pp. 165-166, 

64. Francis J. Kelly, Col., U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961-1971, U.S. Army 

I:' Vietnam Studies Series (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing 

• . Office, 1973), p. 19. 

65. Colby. pp, 166-167. 

66. Blaufarb, p. 106, additionai details are available in "The Highlanders 

of South Vietnam," a study performed by the Central Intelligence 

Agency, declassified in August 1974 under Executive Oraer No. 1!652. 

67., Blaufarb p. 106. 

68. Roger Hilsman, To Move A Nation, (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, 1967) 

p. 455. 

69, Col. Kelly, p. 42. 

70, Ngo Quang Truong, Lt. Gen., ARVN, Territorial Forces, Indochina 

Refugee Authored Monograph Program, Prepared for the Department of the 

Army, Office of Chief of Military History, by General Research Corp., 

McLean, VA.,, 22101, p. 5. 

71. Truong, p. 26. 

72. Ibid., p. 27. 

73, James Lawton Collins, Jr., B. Gen, The Develipment and Training of the 

South Vietnamese Army, 1950-1972, U.S. Army Vietnam Studies Series. 

Washington D.C,.- U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975, pp. 41-42. 

74. Collins, pp. 41-43. 

75. Ngo Quang Truong, op, cit., p. 32. 

5-70


76. The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Vol. I, pp, 305-306, 

77, Ibid. 

78, Blaufarb, pp. 118-120 

79. Ibid. 

80. Ibid. 

81. Duncanson, p. 326 and Osborne, p. 36. 

82. Gravel, The Pentagon Papers, Vol. II, p., 717. 

63. Nighswonger, pp. 63-64. 

84, Tran Dinh Tho, p. 15. 

85.ý Grinter, p. 57. 

86. See The New York Times, January 15, 1964, p. 1 and excerpts from memorandum, 

"South Vietnam," from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to 

President Johnson, March 16, 1964, reprinted in The New York Times, 

June 13, 1971, pp. 35-36; also see Lt. Col. Edwin W. Chamberlain, Jr. 

USA, "a•- +ficatio-"•,, 

, Inantr" (Nnvember/Decpmber 1968), p.38. Grinter, 

p. 57, points out that "between February and July 1964 there were five 

different province chiefs in Long An." 

87. Nighswonger, p. 118. 

88. Gravel, The Pentagon Papers, Vol,.. II., p. 516. This ooint was confirmed 

during a review of General Westmoreland's personal papers on 

file at the Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept of the US 

Army. Following his assignment to MACV as the Depity Commander 

in early 1964, General Westmoreland found himself an active and key 

member on the "New Pacification Committee" (Mr, David Nes was the 

Deputy Chief of the Mission and the Embassy's number two man behind 

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge). In April 1964, Ambassador Lodge had 

his administrative aide take action to dissolve the Nes Committee 

because of its "uncoordinated" activities in the Pacificatior, field.. 

Soon after, Mr,. Nes wrote a letter to the Bureau uf Far Eastern 

Affairs, Dept of State to complain about Lodge's actions to cut both 

him and Westmoreland out of the pacification picture. Ambassador 

Lodge's management difficulties are also detailed in The Pentagon 

Papers, Vol. II, p. 565. 

89. Gravel, The Pentagon Papers, Vol. II, p. 521. 

90. Life Magazine, "Vietnam, A Life Panel- The Lowdown from the Top U.S. 

Command in Saigon," December 19, 1964, p. 46B. 

5-81


91. Gravel, The Pentagon Papers, Vol. II. p. 521. In a paper presented 

to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and incoming Ambassador Taylor Pt 

Honolulu (dated June 19, 1964), Lodge wrote:., "A combined GVN-US 

effort to intensify pacification efforts in critical provinces 

should be made The eight critical provinces are: Tay 41inh, Binh 

Duong, Hau Nghia, Long An, Dinh Tuong, Go Cong, Vinh Long, and Quang 

Ngai. lop priority and maximum effort should be concentrated 

initially in the strategically important provinces nearest to Saigon, 

i.e., Long An, Hau Nghia, and B;nh Duong, Once real progress has been 

made in these provinces, the same effort should be made in the five 

others." 

92. William C. Westmoreland, Gen. USA, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, 

N.Y., Doubleday & Co., 1976), pp. 82-84, 

93, The Pentagon Papers Vol. II, p. 521. 

94. The Pentagon Papers, Vol.. II, p. 522, 

95. There are several status reports on Hop Tac and memos on major Hop Tac 

problems from late 1964 through 1965 (e.g,, Hop Tac Status, dated 9 

Oct 64; major Hop Tac problems dated 30 Nov 64; Position Paper on 

Vietnam, dated 7 Dec 64; and accomplishments of Hop Tac, dated 29 Aug 

65) are available in Geperal William Westmoreland's Pri' tte Papers on a 

file at the US Army Office of the Chief of Military History, 

Washington, D.C. 

96. The Pentagon Papers, Vol II, p.. 527. 

97. For a more detailed analysis on the Hop Tac program see The Pentagon 

Papers, Vol. II, po. 521-527. 

98. Westmoreland, p. 85. 

99, Grinter, p. 57. 

100, The Pentagon Papers, Vol. II, p. 532. 

101. Crinter has a good development of the various pacification techniques 

utilized by the third country allies during the period under discussion, 

pp. 58-59. 

102. The Pentagon Papers, Vol II, p. 536. 

103. On 5 April 1965, the GVN supplanted the term "pacification" with 

"rural reconstruction" which in turn was changed to "rural construction" 

on 30 July 1965. See directive on Rural Reconstruction Policies, 

GVN Central Rural Reconstruction Committee Instruction Nc. 1535, dated 

11 December 1965. In January 1964, when the junta had renamed the 

5-82


Strategic Hamlets "New Life" Hamlets, they were later made a part of 

the Rural Reconstruction Program within the general concept of the 

Chien Thang national pacification plan. (See GVN Decree No. 64, 

5 April 1965.) The name "Rural Reconstruction" continued until 30 July 

1965, when Premier Ky renamed it "Rural Construction", and in Pebruary 

1966, the American Mission began to refer to it as "Revolutionary 

Development". See George K, Tanham, War Without Guns (New York: 

Praeger, 1966), p. 35. 

104.. The Pentagon Papers, Vol. II, p. 549. 

105. Frances FitzGerald, "The Struggle and the War- The Maze of Vietnamese 

Politics," Alartic, Vol. 220, No. 2 (August 1967): 84, 

106., The Pentagon Papers, Vol. II, pp. 554-557. 

107. General William C. Wstmoreland, 'USA, Retired), Interview at the BDM 

Corp, McLean, Va. on Aigust 17, 1979, 

108. General Maxwell D, Taylor, (USA, Retired), Interviewed at his 

residence in Washington, D.C., on July 11, 1979. 

109. DoD US/VN Relations, Book 6 of 12, IV. C. 11., pp, 74-74. 

110. The PROVN Study, Supra note 11, was made available for review by the 

US Army office of the Chief of Military History. Washington, D.C. 

PROVN recommendea two major initiatives. (I' Creation of an organization 

to integrate total US civil-military effort; and (2) the 

exercise of greatly increased direct US involvement in GVN activities. 

111, DoD US-VN Relations, Book 6, IV. C., 11., p. 74, 

112., Walter Guzzardi, Jr., "Management of the War: A Tile of Two Capitals," 

Fortune, April 1967, p. 137. 

113. Grinter, p, 59 and DoD US-VN Relations, Book 6, IV, C. 9(b), pp. 35-36, 

114. DoD US-RVN Relations, Book 6, IV, C. 8, P, 55. 

115. Robert Shaplen, The Road from War: Vietnam 1965-1970 (New York and 

Evanston: Harper and Row, 1976), pp. 36-37. 

116. Grinter, P. 60, points out that in 1956 the Diem Government had done 

away witi village government and local initiative; and that in 1967 

village chiefs and village councils were given new authority by the 

5-83


GVN in an atteript to counter the inroads made by the VC infrastructure 

during the interim years. 

117. Thompson & Frizzell, 231. 

118. Ibide, p. 233. 

119. DoD US-VN Relations, Book 6, IV. C, 11., p. 125. 

120. Ibid., P. 127 

!21. Blaufarb, p. 235, 

122. Grinter, p. 61 and R. W. Apple, Jr., The New York Times, July 10, 1967, 

p. 2. 

123. Corson, p, 213. 

124. Blaufarb, pp. 240-241; and General Westmoreland's Private Papers at 

OCMH, Washington, D.C. Westmoreland wrote a memo following a June 1967 

meeting with General Thieu during which they discussed Ambassador 

Bunker's announcement of the new CORDS program. Thieu asked 

Westmoreland's advice on what the GVN should do in the way of 

developing a shadow Vietnamese CORDS organization and if that group 

should be in the Ministry of Defense. Westmoreland advised him to 

wait until the US reorganization of the OCO was complete before making 

any changes. 

125. Blaufarb, pp. 241-242. 

126. Thompson & Frizzell, pp. 217-218. Chapter 13, "Was There Another 

Way7", written by Robert Komer, provided the basis fo- the listing of 

the stages as presented in the text. 

127. Grinter, p. 62. 

i28. Grinter, P. 62; The Washington Post, February 16, 1968, p. A-15; Time 

Magazine, February 16, 1968, p. 32; and The New York Times, February 25, 

1968, p. 20. 

129. Grinter, p. 62. 

130. The PSDF was offically established on 3 May 1968, by GVN Decree 

No. 159-TT/SL and reconfirmed in the General Mobilization Law, GVN 

Decree No.. 003/68 of June 19, 1968. By late 1969, there were 

reportedly two million on the PSOF rolls and about 4,000,000 arms had 

been issued (see Robert Komer, "Clear, Hold and Rebuild," Army Magazine, 

XX, No. 5 (May 1970): 21, and "Pacification: A Look Back and Ahead," 

Army Magazine, XX, No, 6, (June 1970). 24. 

5-84 

,.... 

..


131. Grinter, p. 62 and Tran Dinh Tho, P. 26, 

132. John Paul Vann, opening statement, February 18, 1970, before US 

Congress, Senate committee on Foreign Relations, Vietnam. Policy 

and Prospects, 1970, Hearings, p. 90. 

I 

133. Blaufarb, pp. 274-276. 

134., Blaufarb, p. 276. 

135. Grinter, P. 63 and JUSPAP/Saigon, "Village and Hamlet Elections," 

JUSPAO Saigon Psyops Circular #22, September 8, 1969, p. 3.. 

136. Allen E. Goldman, "South Vietnam and the New Security," Asian Survey, 

XII, No. 2 (February 1972): 129, 

137. The Comptroller General of the United States, "Report to the Congress., 

Progress and Problems of US Assistance for Land Reform in Vietnam," 

USAID, Department of State, June 22, 1973, B-159451, pp. 10-11. 

138. Roy L. Prosterman, "Land-to-the-Tiller in South Vietnam:- The Tables 

Turn," Asian Survey, X, No. 8 (August 1970), and Mr. Prosterman's. 

"Land Reform as Foreign Aid," Foreign Policy (Spring 1972): 135. 

139. Grinter, P. 64 

140. Robert Shaplen, "Letter from Vietnam," The New Yorker, June 24, 1972. 

p., 70; and the transcript of President Nixon's broadcast address on 

Indochina in The New York Times, June 21, 1972, pp.. 1, 14, 

141. Colonel Robert D Heinl, Jr., "On Basis of Pacification, Vietnam War 

Has Been Won," The Armed Forces Journal (February 1972): 50. 

142. Ibid. 

143. Thompson & Frizzell, p.. 236. 

144. Douglas Kinnard, The War Managers (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of 

New England, 1977), p. '36. 

145. Thompson & Frizzell, p. 236. 

146, Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System 

Worked (Wasnington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1979), p. 249. 

147. Ibid., p. 350.. 

148. General Willaim C. Westmoreland's Private Papers on file at the office 

of the Chief of Military History, US Army, Washington, D.C. (Historical 

File: 1-31 May 1976). 

5-85


149. Bernard B. Fall, Vietnam Witness: 1953-66 (New York: Frederick 

Praeger, 1966), p. 188. 

150. Lewy, P. 165, 

151. Nguyen Du% Hinh, P1 Gen, ARVN, Vietnamization and The Cease-Fire, 

Indochina Refugee Authored Monograph Program, Prepared for the Department 

of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, (McLean, 

VA: General Research Corp, September 1976), pp. 16-17. 

152. Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of the US Department of Defense, a policy 

speech given in 1971 on "Vietnamizatior and Total Force Planning." 

153. Stephen T. Hosmer, et a'., The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by 

Vietnamese Military and Civilian Leaders, d report (R-2208-OSD-HIST) 

prepared for Historian, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Santa 

Munica, CA, The RAND Corp, December 1978), p. 9. 

154. Hosmer, et al. , p. 9. 

155. Ibid., pp. 9, 10. 

155., Ibid. 

157. Nquyen Duy Hinh, p. 183. 

158. Lewy, p. 199 and MACCORDS-PSG, "Impact of the knemy Offensive on Pacification," 

September 16. 1972, p. 2. 

159. Lewy, p. 206. 

160. Ibid. 

161. Grinter, p. 67. 

162, Ibid., p. 68. 

* 163. BDM interview with Ambassador Samuel D. Berger at his residence in 

Washington, D.C. on June 22, 1979. 

164. The Cooper Report, pp. xiv-xvii, and Thompson and Frizzeli, pp. 

231-279. 

165. Hosmer, et al., p. 129. 

166. The Cooper Report, pp. xiv-xvii, Thompsuo and Frizzell, pp. 217-279, 

and Gelb and Betts, pp.. 349-352, all provide collaborating as well as 

additional supporting insights and lessons, 

[! 5-86


CHAPTER 6 

US WITHDRAWAL 


For four years General Abrams had performed with 

Qignity, one of the most thankless jobs ever assigned 

to an American general. He took over a force of 

540,000 men in 1968 but was immediately shackled by 

mounting restrictions, He was continually given 

assignments that made no military sense. Starting in 

1969 he was asked to dismantle his command at an everaccelerating 

rate while maintaining the security of 

South Vietnam and putting the South Vietnamese forces 

into a position from which they could uný'ertake their 

own defense l/ 

- Henry A. Kissinger 

White House Years, 1979 

The initial withdrawal OT US Forces in South Vietnam -- 25,000 combat 

troops from a peak level of 543,000 personnel -- was announced by President 

Nixon in his meeting with President Thieu on Midway T sland 8 June 1969.2/ 

So 

began the irreversible process of an accelerated unilateral withdrawal 

of US military forces, 

Efforts to strengthen South Vietnamese forces and to negotiate with 

the North Vietnamese to end the conflict were begun by the Johnson Administration 

in the summer of 1967. The Nixon Administration reaffirmed the 

priorities of the Johnson Administration policies as part of the strategy 

for endinq the war and withdrawing US troops in National Security Decision 

Memorandum 9 (NSDM 9) on April 1, 1969. The three-point memorandum outi 

ned Vi etnami zati on 3/, negoti ati on and wi thdrawal: 

0 Rapid and effective preparation of the RVNAF to stand alone, 

i.e., Vietniamization 

0 Insistence on mutual withdrawal of DRV and US trooos with adequate 

inspection procedures in negotiations with the North 

Vietnamese 

* Development of a specific timetable for the progressive withdrawal 

of US trocps regardless of progress made at the Paris 

Peace 

ables.4! 

6-1


President Nixon's ovrall strategy in the first few months of his 

administration was to try to weaken the enemy to the maximum possible 

extent, to speed up the modernization of GVN forces and then to begin 

withdrawals, The withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam was dependent 

noon: 

* The ability of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves without 

American troops 

0 The progress of negotiations at the Paris Peace Talks 

0 The level of enemy activity.5/ 

As discussed in Volume V, Chapter 5, the Vietnamization program 

consisted of generally three phases: 

o Turning over the ground combat responsibility to the RVNAF -- US 

to continue to provide ai-, naval and "logistics support, 

0 Helping the RVNAF to develop its own combat support capabilities 

in order to achieve self-reliance on the battlefield. 

o Reducing the US presence to a military advisory role. 

In developing negotiation strategies ard requirements, President Nixon 

abandoned the Manila Formula of President 2ohnso,, which required North 

Vietnamese forces to be withdrawn six ,ionths before the withdrawal c-f US 

forces would begin, 

A new and more concrete negotiating proposal cf sinultaneous 

withdrawal was adopted. The US was subsequently to move from the 

position of mutual to unilateral withdr3wal and from a position of residual 

US forces in country to complete departure within two months of successful 

negotiation, 

We were cliarly on the way out of Vietnam by negotiation if 

possible, by unilateral withdrawal if necassary.6/ 

It was thought that a policy of Vietnamization and negotiation would 

reduce casualties and mollify public opinion. 

The Nixon Administration 

attempted to provide a scenario in which most advocates of' alternative 

policies could see some aspects of their recommendations 

in the administration's 

policies.7/ 

In the process President Nixon gained some time as 

a result of reduced domestic pressures and could focus attention on further 

developing the strategy for withdrawal. 

6-2 

I


P_ 

The Vietnamization and negitiatirn approach, how~ever, was viewed with 

varyi-g degrees --f skeptic-ism by the key decision makers, 

President Nixun 

was most skeptical about efforts to negctLiat-e.. He: didn't 'elieve that 

negotiations would amount to anything until the military situation changed 

fundamentally, aoid he was not too eager for negotiations until some military 

progress had been made.8/ Oncp the initial withdrawal announcement 

Lad been made, Kissinger, as did others, saw that the adminiistration would 

be pressurea more and more by the public and the administration's critics 

to accelerate the withdrawal at an ever increasing level, This expected 

increased pressurA. to expedite withdrawal of US forces could onily serve to 

stren~gthen Hanoi's position in trne upcoming nagotiat Ing process,~ 

Secretary of P~efen~ze Lair~d was a5 skeptical about the utility of 

negotiations as he was abou~t the possiuility of miiayviccory, He felt 

it' was esssrntial to get the Unitced States out, ,f Vietnam beforu the administration 

lo-,t too 'much domestic support. Both Nixon arid Kissinger', however, 

thought Lhat Vietnamiztation should oroceed less precipitantly than 

Secretary of De'fense Laird advised. 

President Nixon repeatedly told the 

puolic aod his aides that he wanted a peace and not an armistice -- a peace 

that would last. According to some enalysts, Nixon intended Saigon to have 

"thie mraximium amnount of time to develop ar. etfective 5elf-defense capabiiity."9/ 

Hence V-etnamizatinn had to proceed slowly so as to develop P'INAF 

I ~ ~ 

capability -tc handle what would be an obviouslfy serious threat from the 

%ortni Vietnamrese for sometime to com~e. 10/ Ki ssinger sZw V~etnzimi~zation as 

essential to assure, when ar agreement wias at nand, that Saicgjn woulao ave 

little ground oil which to argue that it was premature~ll/ 

B., CONSIDERATI0ONS IN PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING US WITHDRAWAL 

The l~ohnson Ad,-i ni stration establ ished a troop ceiIi ng of 549, E.30 f or 

SouTh Vietnam in April 1963. That tr'oop ceiling included all military 

persoornel atithorized in the country of South Vietnami, but did riot include. 

naval forces~ operating ol~f shora with the Seventh Fleet no,~ US iforres 

stationed outside the couoitry, i.e. , Thailand, Phi lippines, rccc., Actual U'5 

6-3


troop strength in South Vietnam, 

of 1969.12/ 

however, peaked at about 543,000 in April 

Although President N:xon ,,id stated that he had a timetable in aind 

fo- the withdrawal of US forces, it was net announced in total because of 

the negative impact such an announcement weuld have had nn US flexibility 

in negotiations with Hanoi. Nonetheless, each time a troop withdrawal 

decision was announced by the president, it triggered a re-examination of 

all milii-ary spaces remaining in-country to assure that a balanced-force 

withdr3wal was maintained and that all military spaces were being effectively 

and efficiently utilized. Competition for the ever dec'ining military 

spaces authorized in-country became the order of the day as the withdrawal 

gathered momentum. 13/ Furthermore, once the decision to witndraw 

was made arid announced, the US commitment Lo unilateral withdrawal was 

manifest and irreversible both in Vietnam and the US, The Department of 

Defens3 began to plan its budget on the basis of anticipated troop reductions. 

14/ And the appetite for withdrawals was insatiabie; withdrawal 

became an 2nd in itself'. 15/ 

I Withdrawal Goals 

r In June 1969 Secretary Laird offered alternative time tables 

,anging from eighteen to fo..-i.y-two months and ceilings for the residual 

American force -- those troops remaining in-country until Hanoi's forces 

w4thoew -- ranging from 260,000 to 306,000. In his memorandum to the 

I ,president on June 2. 1969, he *;ffered a 'feasible' time table of forty-two 

P:ýnths (stretching the withdrawal to the end of 1971) 

and a residual force 

of 260,000. He warned that in t1, absence of North Vietnamese reciprocity, 

A_ r'ere rapid withdrawal would reclIt in serious setbacks to the pacification 

program, a significant dec in allied military capacity, and the 

Dossaility of a South Vietnamese collapse.16/ A- it turned out, the 

increasing domestic pressures for a speedier withdrawal and terminatio., of 

chE mi ,Tary conflict, coupled with reasonably favorablE assessments on 

progyess oi 

thne Vietnamization effort, led to an acceleration of the initial 

schledule -- the US troop level in country was apprnximately 180,000 at 

the end c' 1971, 

It should be recalled that initial plans provided for a 

6-4


large residual US torce to ,emain in-country.. However, President Nixon in 

his 3 November 1969 speech changed that provisici when he offerzd to accept 

a total American pullout in a year in case of agreed mutual withdrawal. 

The public protests and demonstrations in '969 as well as demands 

in the media and Congress for unilateral concessions in the negottiations -- 

and the October Moratorium -- clearly indicated thac President Nixon was 

going to have extreme difficulty in maintaining public support for the two 

to three years he would need to work the US out of Vietnam "with honor." 

This despite the fact that by October 1969 the admininstration had announce.i 

withdrawal of over fifty thousand troops -- on 12 September the President 

had ;!nnounced a second withdrawal of 40,500 personnel by 15 December 

-- including a reauction in B-52 sorties by 20 percent and tacticai air 

operations by 25 percent, and a change in the mission objectives for 

General Abrams that amounted to a decision tu end offensive operations.17/ 

Secretary Laird, a skilled politician, may have haa such thoughts in mind 

when in late November and early December 1970, on a visit to South Vietlam, 

he informed General Abrams that his office (OSD) 

would develop redeployment 

plans for the long-term period., 

General Abrams convinced Mr, Laird that the planning effort 

should, for obvious reasons, be undertaken by the MACV staff, In late 

December 1970, COMUSMACV directed the creation of a small planning group to 

develop a plan for the redeployment of US forces from South Vietnam., He 

gave a troop-level goal of 50,000 to 60,000 remaining in country by September 

1972. 

All of the planning effort was conducted under very tight security 

conditions with the plann 4 ng group members enjoined to secrecy and 

only a handful of key general officers on the staff authorized a need-toknow 

by COMUSMACV.18/ In the latter part of March 1971, the redeployment 

plan was 

briefed to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 

Secretary of Defense, Mr. Laird. The team briefed CINCPAC in Hawaii enroute 

to Washington. 

It should be noted that the Chairman JCS and CINCPAC 

were not aware of this planning effort until the briefing and, as will be 

discussed later, this fact caused difficulties. 

6-5


S~6-6 

The redeployment plan developed as a result of this effort became 

the basis tor subsequent withdrawal actions. Although modified several 

times to provide for changes adopted in the RVN 

force structure, US p-esidential 

decisions on timing of withdrawal increments, and updates cf assessments 

on expected DRV actions, the plan provid2d a general roadmap for 

accomplishing gradual withdrawal of US fo,'ces, 

2, Change in Objectives f. r he Field Commander 

The existing mission statement for US 

forces in Southeast Asia, 

under the Johnson administration, was to "defeat thp enemy and force its 

withdrawal to North Vietnam." 

The new mission statement (which went into 

effect 15 August, 1969) focused on: 

* 

I 

Providing maximum assistance to the South Vietnamese to strengthen 

forces. 

Supporting pacification efforts, 

. Reducing the flow of supplies to the enemy. 

Reportedly the president changed his mind on the new mission 

sta'ement at the last minute but Secretary Laird had already issued the new 

instructions on the change in mission.19/ 

In an earlier position critical of the US 

military strategy for 

Vietnam, Kissinger stressed that US mi; tary operations through 1968 had 

little relationship to the US declared political objectives -- the US 

fought a military war, while our opponents fought a political war; the US 

sought physical attrition, while our opponents aimed for our psychological 

exhaustion, 

Further, the criteria and indicators used to assess or measure 

attainment of our objectives were ambiguous and misleading.20/ While 

Vietnamization and Pacification were the priority programs prom 1969 

onward, under the new commander, General Abrams, the military policy was 

changed from "search and destroy" to "clear and hold" with a major effort 

!?voted to clearing and holding operations to keep NVA 

populated areas -- this was a major task of the remaining US 

was increasingly being taken over by ARVN.21/ 

units out of the 

forces but it 

On 6 January 1971 Secretary 

of Defense Laird annour.ced that the US ground combat role would end by 

mid-summer; thereafter the US role would oe to provide air and logistics 

support.,

Ti 


.3. Concepts for Planning Withdrawal at the Field Command 22/ 

By way of background, the MACV staff had prepared contirigency 

plans for a number of probable circumstances, such as troop withdrawials 

Jnder non-hostile conditions that would take place if the Paris Peace Talks 

were successful and hostilities were terminated, There was no long-range 

planning by the staff, however, for redeployment of forces under continued 

conditions cf hostilities, Analysis of the president's announcements 

clearly revealed his intent to drawdown US 

force levels in South Vietnam at 

a fairly steep rate to show the American public substantial progress with 

his Vietnamization program by the 1972 election year. 

Unfortunately, the field command, MACV, had to continue to implement 

the campaign plan with no advance knowledge of when the president 

would arnounce the next withdrawal, 

the amount of croops involved, or the 

period of time available to MACV for execution of the president's decision. 

Prior to the development of a long-range redeployment plan, 

earlier, the withdrawal planning effort was 

referred to 

conducted in a reactive and 

hasty planning mode. At most, COMUSMACV was advised less then 24 hours 

before the announcement was to be made. 

Within hours following the presidential 

announcement the joint staff would request MACV to advise or the 

units designated to redeploy, strengths and spaces involved, redeployment 

dates and impact assessments. Needless to say, this hasty reactive planning 

and implementation of redeployments within a constrained time frame, while 

concurrently conducting military operations, was disruptive, 

and not without risk to the continued security of the command.. 

At the field command level, the guidance of COMUSMACV was essentially 

as follows: 

inefficient 

ensure that a balanced force concept was maintained 

throughout the redeployment period; as ground ccmbat forces depart, ensure 

the maintena.nce of capabilities essential for strategic and tactical combat 

air sorties -- these were to be the only reserve immediately available to 

the commander for influencing operations when necessary; and ensure that 

the US units withdrawn do not eliminate a mission-capability requirement of 

the approved RVNAF force structure. 

Ai 

6-7

THE BDM COP PORATION 

forces was 

The programmed and planned force structure of the GVN's military 

used as a basic starting point in the redeployment planning 

process. In essence, this required a detailed evaluation of RVNAF 

w 4 ssion 

capabilities projected for the fourth quarter of Cv 1972, For example, if 

10 medium truck companies weee a programmed RVNAF furce requ~rement and 

only eight comoanies werc in the force structure in the mid-fourth-quarter 

of CY 1972, with the remaining two companies programmed to be formed and 

operational sometime in 1973, then a US capability to provide for the 

shortfall was retained in-country, 23/ 

In this manner a list of US forces 

required i-, country to match the GVN shortfall was initially developed. A 

mission analysis of all US •crces stationed in country was also undertaken 

to identify those units which would be required to remain in country in 

support of the US forces earmarked in the shortfall category. 

The requirements for the US advisory element in contry, beyond 

the fourth quarter of CY 1972, were also examined to determine what reductions 

and reorganizations would be needed in that time frame. It was 

envisioned that a small advisory team at the ARVN 

division level would be 

appropri ate. 

A reinforced airmobile element was retained in country to provide 

MACV with a US security force. Additionally the 196th Brigade was retained 

in MR I to provide security for the substantial residual US air force 

elemEnts that would be required to continue operating out of Da Nang air 

base, While GVN forces were expected to assume increasing respori.ibility 

for providing iocal security of residual US forces, it was felt not in the 

best interest of tho US to be solely dependent upon them for security of 

the command. Additionally, it was considered prudent to have quickly 

available in country a small US force for emergencies or other unforeseen 

cont•ngency situations. 

A command and control structure for the residual forces was aisc 

developed in order to determine what changes were necessary in the existing 

levels of headquarters in the country, and wnen they should be undertaken. 

After having ccoped the size and composition of the 60,000 man 

force to remain in country beyond September of 1972, planning focused on 

6-8


establishing and scheduling the force jiicrements to be redeployed., 

activity required the determination of units to be included in each force 

increment package, and the sizing of the package -- manpower spaces and 

tonnage, 

This 

analysis of port capability in country and available shipping. 

changes required in the existing stationing program, and impact on existing 

in-country interservice agreements. 

Frequent assessments of the enemy's capabilities were alsc condusted 

as the vulnerability of tne command in country would be increased 

with each force redeployment. 

The initial planning effort consiaered the 

continued presence of South Korea's two army divisions in the northern part 

of the country thru 1971, It was further assumed that the South Korean 

Marine Brigade would be returning to South Korea sometime in mid 1971. The 

assessment of US withdrawals from MR I indicated an imralance of coGbat 

forces remaining in that region and the RVN 

force structure was amended to 

include provisions for an additional combat division in MR I. Unfortunately 

considerable delay was experienced in organizing and equipping the 

additional division (The division designated, the 3rd ARVN Division, was 

heavily pounded by greatly siperior NVA units in the Easter offensive, but 

before it broke it had held on at Dong Ha for a month), 

field commander, 

The need for tactical air resources, immediately available to the 

ground forces picked up. 

became increasingly important as the withdrawal of combat 

Where possible, tact~cal air units which could 

perform their missions from bases in Fhailand were relocated out of GVN 

order to permit maximum utilization of the ever-declining, troop-ceiling 

spaces authorized for the forces remaining in country. 

Table 6-1. 

Composition of the redeplovment force increments are indicated in 

in 

CC, ASSESSMENT OF US WITHDRAWAL 

1. Influences Leadin_ to Withdrawal 

A detailed discussion of the key decisions and decision makers 

involved in the US withdrawal from Vietnam is c-ovided in Volume III of 

6-9

f 

THE BDMV CORPORATlION 

TABLE 6-1. TOTAL US MILITARY PERSONNEL IN SOUTH VIETNAM 

MARINE AIR COST 

DATE ARMY NAVY CORPS FORCE GUARD TOTAL 

31 DEC. 1960 800 15 2 68 - ABOUT 900 

31 DEC. 1961 2,100 100 5 1,000 - 3,205 

30 JUNE 1962 5,900 300 700 2,100 - 9,000 

31 DEC. 1962 7,900 500 500 2,400 - 11,300 

30 JUNE 1963 10,200 600 600 4,000 - 15,400 

31 DEC. 1963 10,100 800 800 4,600 - 16,300 

30 JUNE 1964 9,900 1,000 600 5,000 - 16,500 

31 DEC. 1964 14,700 1,100 900 6,600 - 23,300 

30 JUNE 1965 27,300 3,800 18,100 10,700 - 59.900 

31 DEC. 1965 116,800 8,400 38,200 20,600 3C0 184,300 

30 JUNE 1966 160,000 17,000 53,700 36,400 400 267,500 

31 DEC. 1966 239,400 23,300 69,200 52,900 500 385,300 

30 JUNE 1967 285,700 28,500 78,400 55,700 500 448,800 

31 DEC. 1967 319,500 31,7L0 78.000 55,900 500 485,600 

30 JUNE 1968 354,300 35,600 83,600 60,700 500 534,700 

31 DEC. 1968 359,800 36,100 81,400 58,400 400 536,100 

30 APR. 1969 363,300 36,500 81,800 61,400 400 *543,400 

30 JUNE 1969 360,500 35,800 81,500 60,500 400 538,700 

31 DEC. 1969 331,100 30,200 55,100 58,400 400 475,200 

30 JUNE 1970 298,600 25,700 39,900 5u,500 200 414,900 

31 DEC. 1970 249,600 16,700 25,100 43,100 100 334,600 

30 JUNE 1971 190,500 10,700 500 37,400 100 239,200 

31 DEC. 1971 119,700 7,600 600 28,800 100 156,800 

30 JUNE 1972 31,800 2,200 1,400 li,500 100 47,000 

31 DEC. 1972 13,800 1,500 1,200 7,600 100 24,200 

30 JUNE 1973 ** ***x 

* PEAK STRENGTH. 

S** TOTALS FOR ALL FIVE SERVICES COMBINED LESS THAN 250. 

SCURCE: US Deparement of Defense, OASD (Comptroller), 

Directorate for Informaticn Operations, March 19, 1974 

6-1 

1


this study. (See Chapter 3, pp. 3-39 to 3-47, and Appendix A to Volume 

III, pp. A-65 to A-70.) The primary influences leading to withdrawal 

included congressional and public disenchantment with the war which had 

defed the best efforts of two presidents trying to bring it under control, 

growing inflation, and the seemingly endless casualty lists. 

Criticism, 

even from allies, was strong and the government that the United States was 

supporting in Vietnam was held up to ridicule, both in the US and abroad. 

Figure 6-1 depicts the major factors involved in the US 

negotiate, Vietnamize, and withdraw., 

2. Consequences of US Withdrawal on the War 

policy decision to 

Despite the great oersonnel turbulence caused within US units in 

RVN during the withdrawal, the extrication of US forces vwas accomplished 

with su;'prising success. 

The size of the ircre,:ents to te withdrawn was 

established arbitrarily by the president, another example of how statistics 

drove much of the war, 

and the field force commander was not consulted or 

otherwise asked for his views on the size or timing of the withdrawals. 

Only because of General Abrams' insistence did Secretary Laird agree to 

permit the Military Assistance Command special planning staff tc determine 

the precise composition of the increments. To assure tactical integrity 

among the remaining forces, both RVNAF and US/FWMAF, the forces in the 

southern areas came out first, leaving a shield of US and ROK nits in the 

northern provinces to prevent an incursion across the DMZ by PAVN divisions, 

At tne same time, additional ARVN divisions were formed to take up 

the slack. In the post-Tet period, the GVN had instituted a draft, and the 

steady iicrease in RVNAF roughly matched the draw down of US aod FWMAF 

forces. 

When withdrawal was first contemplated, a US residual force was 

programmed for RVN indefinitely. Had such a force actually remained in 

country, the course of events since 1973 might have been different. 

In any 

event, the Vietnamization program was orchestrated to provide the RVNAF 

with well-equipped, modern, effective fighting force. Implicit in the 

GVN's ability to defend the RVN, however, was the promise by President 

Nixon that the US would take decisive action on behalf of the South 

6-11


DOMESTIC FACTORS.I 

FOREIGN FACTORS 

* DOMESTIC REACTION TO WAR WOR 

I 

LO CRITICISM OF WAR 

* INFLATION I * FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVESIEFFORTS 

0 EMPHASIS ON VIETNAMIZATION NEEDED ELSEWHERE (MID-EAST. PRC. 

AND USSR) 

• PESSIMISTIC OUTLOOK. ON WAR 

. PRESSURE OF POWIMIA ISSUE 

DECISION 

MARCH 1983 

* POLICY DECISION ON NEGOTIATIONS. 

W,THORAWAL AND VIETNAMIZATION 

EFFECT OF DECISION ON U S INVOLVEMENT 

IN VIETNAM 

e COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAWAL MADE 

* REDUCED U S TROOP INVOLVEMENT, ATTEMPTS 

TO STRENGTHEg RVN 

* DID NOT CONSTRAIN BOMBING 

INSIGHTS 

4541,', BIN 

* V!IETNAMIZATION APPLIED TO(C LATE 

* DOMESTIC OUTCRY IN LATE 1960s SHOULD HAVE SERVED AS SIGN 

THAT ANY FUTURE ESCALATIOI w1 E., BOMBINGS AND INVASION OF 

CAMBODIA ETC.) WOULD ALSO BE MET WITH SEVERE OPPOSITION 

9 DRAMATIC DISENGAGEMENT HAD TO BE ACCOMP_ISHED BY 

NOVEMBER 1972. PRIOR TO NEXT PRESDENTIAL ELECTION 

S.vIETNAMIZATION WAS NOT COMPLETED DUE TO LACK OF 

ST.CHICALLY QUALIFIED RVNAF PERSONNEL 

Figure 6-1. 

US Policy Decision on Negotiations, Withdrawal, 

and Vietnamization 

6-12

f THE BDM CORPORATION 

Vietnamese in the face of any major threat or violation of the cease-fire 

which ultimately was signed. US response in May-October 1972, 1eginning 

with the DRV's Easter offensive, showed that the newly modernized PAVN 

forces could be hurt and that they had acquired an inventory of sophis- 

Sticated arms that also made them more vulnerable than they had been, at 

least to a modern force. General Abrams and Ambassador Bunker thought that 

the RVNAF could successfully defend the RLpublic &s long as the US kept its 

part of the bargain by providing air and naval support in the event the 

RVNAF was threatened. 24/ (See Appendix A) 

By 1972 the heavy drawdown of US forces had forced the RVNAF to 

build up its own army. Despite substantial, valid criticism of the RVNAF, 

the results were promising if one compares the building process with that 

which occurred in Korea. 25/ 

After three years of fighting, 1950-1953, the 

Korean Army was still considered to be poor, except for a few units which 

had distinguished themselves during the war.. It required several years 

after the war for the ROK forces to develop the training, espr-'t, and 

II 

combat capability that they "inally achieved. In a similar vein, the RVNAW 

had the potential to develop in a Few years into a -ompetent military 

force.. To do so, however, required time. To buy time, the US had to make 

good on its commitments, which was not done. 26/ 

To the DRV, the US withdrawal provided the opportunity for overpowering 

the RVN;A7 if they could do so when the US was unable to retaliate 

and before the RVNAF gained sufficient strength to defend RVN successfully, 

The unilateral US withdrawal made it possible for the DRV to consummate the 

cease-fire negotiations with the expectation that they could soon defeat 

the RVNAF, particularly once the US fell off its earlier negotiating position 

requiring the withdrawal from Laos and Cambodia of the PAVN forces in 

those areas, 

"3.. Consequences of US Withdrawal on International Relations 

US international relations were strained throughout most of the 

war. This subject is presented throughout Volume III of this study, In 

brief, the withdrawal had positive and negative effects in the sphere of 

international relatois. Allies in Europe nad been concerned that the US 

6-13


was squandering its assets and attention in a remote part of the world to 

the detriment of the NATO countries. They generally expressed relief when 

the US began its withdrawal, convinced that the US would reaffirm its ties 

to NATO.. At the same time, however, some European officials expressed 

concern about the steadfastrness of the US as an ally.27/ 

In Asia, several nations owe their present healthy and independent 

status to the US involvement in Vietnam. The Second Indochina War 

absorbed much of the attention of the DRV and Cnina; Indonesia successfully 

put down a Chinese Communist-inspired coup in 1955 and maintained its independeice 

after overthrowing its communist-leaning president, Sukarno.28/ 

The ASEAN nations had time to establish strong economic ties and what 

appear to be viable governments.29/ 

study. 

4, Consequences or the War on Asian Power Relat;onships 

This topic is addressed at some 

length in Volume VIII of this 

It is interesting to note here, however, that the DRV's seizure of 

RVN caused the PRC considerable anxiety. Hanoi's incursions into Cambodia 

brought a Chirnse attack into northern Vietnam -- as a lesson. 

CamboJia 

now is torn by an internecine struggle, with strong PAVN forces in the van. 

Laos has long since slipped into the :jviet orbit., 

Japan is wary.. A recent public opinion survey in ToKyo showed 

tha,, 65% of those questio,•ed did not consider the US to be a reliable 

ally.30/ Yet the Japanese prefer to see the US out of Vietnam. 

5. Consequences of US Withdrawal Planning 

The withdrawal was accomplished in a reasonably crderly manner. 

Tactical integrity was maintained, The short span of time allocated to the 

withdrawal did not permit sufficient t;me for the parallel effort, Vietnamization, 

to be accomplisied effectively 

The planning was done by the field 

commander's staff, as properly it should have been. Critics of that planning, 

generally the staffs of subordinate commdndcrs who felt the bur,!en of 

short deadlines which were necessary becaise of the secrecy requirel, also 

accomplished their tasks in orderly fashion. 

6-14


D. SUMMARY ANALYSIS ANC INSIGHTS 

Redeployment planning in such contingencies should be initiated early 

and assigned a nigh priority effort. 

Staffing for this function needs to 

be provided for in contingency planning. One might argue that redeployment 

planning is a normal component of -.he overall planning function that should 

be performed, but, if treated in this fashion, the redeployment planning 

effort is more likely to be assigned the last priority in the lengthy list 

of actions a planner must consider, particularly at the outset of contingency 

operations. The function, if done properly, should embrace the 

political, economic and military spectrum involved when withdrawal of US 

forces is directed, whatever the reason, 'i.e., a decision by the president 

in response to the public's will or a recommendation by the field commander 

when mission and objectives are attained from the US point of view. In 

th;s connection there needs to be 

incorporated a more systematic method 

with generally agreed criteria for assessing or mLasuring the degree of 

progress towards satisfying attainment of the national strategic objectives 

established for tne operation. 

Force structure planning for host country fo-ces was an area that 

shoild have received a greater degree of in-depth analysis., 

The doctrine 

and mission responsibilities of the Services as expressed in JCS Publication 

#2 may be workable for the US military but may be quite 4nipractical to 

apply in other countries, particularly the less develop",d countries. 

Force structure planning must go beyond assessment of military requirerments 

and the military capabilities needed to meet those requirement.-. It 

must ilso consider such areas as the human resources available and the 

competing demands for them to satisfy military and non-military requirements, 

the education systpm ana base of technical knowledge available, the 

infrastructure required in country, and major program lead times as well as 

the realities imposed by political, economic and budgetary restraints. 

Modifications to the RVNAF force structure, particularly the RVN Air 

Force (VNAF), hampered effective planning and distribution of -,ersonnel 

resources allocation. When it became obvious that US forces would be 

I61 

• 6-15 

i1


redeployed at a fairly fast rate, there appeared to be a Washington emphasis 

on giving the GVN dll the mission-essential capabilities similar to 

those which US units were then providing in tne country. There was relatively 

little serious study given to the impacts on the total RVNAF 

force 

structure, the limited manpower spaces available, training and logistical 

problems, and lead times involved to acquire an opEr3tional capability by 

newly created units. 

The need for complete secrecy in planning the redeployment cf US 

forces from RVN 

while concurrently conducting military combat operations is 

self evident and requires nc. further explanation. The requirement for 

secrecy, however, prevented orderly redeployment planiing at all level3. 

The personnel replacement system ana the logistical systems of the 

military services, particularly the Army, which had the larger strength 

level in country, had to react and adjust almost on a constant basis since 

unit stand-down dates for redeployment increments were not announced until 

30 days prior to scheduled departure dates. In the meantime, in response 

to requirements levied earlier, replacement nersonnel, 

supplies and equipment 

were already enroute to South Vietnam. 

This necessitated frequent and 

oTten disruptive in-country personnel reassignments among units earmarked 

for redeployment and those designated to remain in courLry. 

RVNAF, 

which engaged in the process of rapidly expanding their forces 

and assuming more of the ground combat role, could not do any realistic 

planning for taking over tne bases and camps vacated on relatively short 

notice by redeploying US forces. Further, provisions for adequate manpower 

spaces required to operate and maintain those bases and camps, 

fully considered in development of the SVN force structure, 

were not 

The training problems inherent in developing an expanding military 

force of the size encountered in South Vietnam impacted on development of 

the redeployment schedule for the withdrawal of US forces as well as tre 

lead time required for RVNAF units to acquire an operational capability. 

When training wds required in the CONUS 

school systems, an individual took 

approximately 36 weeks of English language training before being entered in 

the skill-oriented course of instruction. 

This long-lead requirement for 

6-16


English training proved to be a significant obstacle in CONUS training for 

all RVN military services, particularly the Air Force. The lack of effective 

aptitude testing in country added to the problem since there was no 

way to determine if the student who successfully completed 36 weeks in 

language training had the aptitude to complete the end course of instruction 

successfully, i.e. , vehicle mechanic, radio mechanic, communications 

officer, helicopter pilot, etc. 

Attempts to develop a master train`nc plan 

for the RVNAF began in 1968-1969, far too late in the process. The plan 

identified only the t-aining requirements with little focus on problems 

Santicipated in its implementation. A higher priority should have been 

given to the overall RVN training problem and the role of the uS training 

establishments to provide the level and quality of instructicn required., 

It should be noted, however, that the Vietnamization program -- turning the 

war over to GVN forces -- did not get priority attention until the Nixon 

era. 

Free World forces in GVN included those nations indicated in the 

Appendix. Australia, New Zcaiand, Thailand, and the Republic of Korea cor,- 

tributed combat forces, and the Republic of the Philippines provided a 

civic action group which had its own security force. 

Just as the US administration 

was sensitive to casualty figures, so were the allied forces, 

particularly the Korean and Thai torses whose contributions to field operations 

were often criticized as being less aggressive than desired. 

While 

it was expected that allied free world forces would begin withdrawal of 

tUeir forces along with the US 

of the two South Korcan divisiun5 positioned in MR 

force withdrawal ,tne timing for withdrawal 

I and II impacted or the 

US redeployment plan. Since US combat forces in MR I were earmarked for 

late withdrawal in the planning effort and a new ARVN division was to be 

established in MR I, it was important that combat strength levels in "R I 

be maintained until an orderly adjustment of the RVNAF 

force deployment 

could be effected. In that regard, retention of the two ROK combat nivisions 

was necessary. 

Protection of the US command after late 1971 was largely dependent on 

the ARVN forces. After the "ground combat role" had been assumed by ARVN 

6-17


in accordance with the schedule of Vietnamization program -- Phase I -- the 

US command was pressured by the administration to withdraw all grojiid 

combat forces from thE country. Tuie command frequently argued the need for 

conducting a "dynamic defense" during the course of the withdrawal and a US 

combat forre, to remain in country, was essential for security of the 

command. Nevertheless tne 3d Bde, Ist Cav which had been designated in the 

MACV 

MR 

redeployment plan as the contingency force along with the 196th Bde in 

I were redeployed in July-August 1972 leaving 40,000 US military remaining 

in country. 

The principle of maintaining a balanced fcrce throughout 

the course of the withdrawal was no longer possible. 

Gi'ven the situation, the increasing US reliance on RVNAF for security 

appeared to be unwise and not without grave risk to the US 

civilian forces remaining in country. 

military and 

Further, it placed an additicnal and 

unnecessary burden on the already strainea RVNAF ground forces, 

The key insights from the study of US withdrcwal planning are as 

follows:V The Pr,:sident, driven by domestic considerations, set the pace of 

US withdrawal and announced the rate of withdrawal to MACV planner- 

virtually without warning. This procedure left MACV too 

litt+' 

flexibility to design witharawal plans which would ensure 

that -che RVNAF cnuld successfully assume the oiverse responsibilities 

which it was now required to fulfill. 

0 MACV wa, forced to serve two differeri; masters with aifferent 

aimrs. the Secretary of Defense who pressed fo- accelerated 

withdrawals, and the National Security Adviser who required 

continued U. combat presence in Vietnam as a neciotiating chip. 

E. LESSONS 

* Withdrawal of combat forces may be accomplished in a hostile or 

non-hostile environment; ei-her case requires efficient planning 

by trained personnel who are in pcssezsion of all et the -equired 

informaLion, anL the senior field force commander must oesignate 

6-18

' 


tre sequence of withdrawal to assure tactical integrity and 

efficient retrograde of personnel and equipment, 

. Witndrawal plans must be designed to respond not only to US needs 

and considerations, but also to conditions in the host country 

and, expecially, the host country's ability to adjust effectively 

to US withdrawal. 

I 

6-19


APPENDIX 

Force 

Sea Program Approval Level Effective Increase/ 

Number Date Authorized Date Decrease 

Build-alp 

1 (Pilase I) Ju! 31, 65a/ 190.1 Jun 67 - 

2 (Phases II, IA, IIIB) Dec 11, 65a/ 393.9 Jun 67 +203.8 

3 Jul 2, 66b/ 437.0 Jun 67 + 43.1 

4 Nov 18, 66-c/ 470.0 Jun 68 + 33.0 

5 Aug 14, 67d/ 525.00 2un 69 + 55.0 

6 Apr 4, 68e/ 549.5 Jun 69 + 24.5 

Withdrawal 

L 

7 (Increment 1) Jun 8. 69f/ 524.5 Aug 31, 69 - 25.0 

8 (increment 2) Sep 16, 69i/ 484.00 Dec 15, 6:- - 40.5 

9 (Increment 3) Dec 15, 69h/ 434.0 Apr 15, 70 - 50.0 

President announces 

reduction of 150,000 US 

spaces. Done in stages Apr 20, 70i/ (284.00) May 1, 71 

10 (Increment 4) Jun 3, 701/ 384.00 Oct 15, 70 - 50.0 

11 (Increment 5) Oct 12, 70k/ 344.0 Dec 31, 70 - 40.0 

12 (Increment 6) Mar 1, 71T/ 284.0 May 1, 71 - 60.0 

-150.0 

President announces 

reduction of 100,000. 

Done in 3 stages. Apr 7, 71m! (184.0) Dec 1, 71 

13 (Increment 7) Apr 9, 71n/ 254.7 Jun 30, 71 - 29..3 

14 (Increment 8) Apr 9, 71o/ 226.0 Aug 31, 71 - 28.7 

15 (Increment 9) Apr 9, 712/ 184.0 Dec 1, 71 - 42.0 

-100.0 

16 (Increment 10) Nov 12, 7!/ 139.0 Jan 31, 72 - 45.0 

17 (Increment 11) Jan 13, 72r/ 69.0 May 1, 72 - 70.C 

18 (Increment 12) Apr 26, 72s/ 49.0 Jul i, 72 - 20.0 

19 (Increment 13) Jun 28, 72t/ 39.0 Sep 1, 72 - 0.0 

20 (Increment 14) Aug 28, 72u/ 27.0 Dec 1, 72 - 12.0 

Figure 1. Authorized US Force Levels in South Viet-am, :n Thousands 

6-20


FOOTNOTES 

a. SEA Programs 1 and 2 were referred to as P,'iase I and ".SecDef memorandum, April 9, 1971, "U.S. Redeploy- 

Phase 11 Deployments, resgetively. Phase 11 was then meuts." followed by A4ssistant Secretary of Defense 

modified, and programs base 11A and Phase 1IB (Systems Analysis) memorand im, June 2, 1971, 

were adopted in late 1965 and early 1966. A draft "Southeast Asia Deployment. Pro~rsx #113" 

Presidential memorandum of Dec. '11, 196 incor- o. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) 

porated the Phase II Depleyments, called the "Decem- memorandum, July 15, 1971, "Sovtbeast As-Az Deployher 

?lan." ment Program #14." 

b eDeplomemrntdrorm Jl2,17." , Asa pUsssatSepcrestinySout 

70,000as 

Deietnse by- M nays1,197 

DelyetPannoneeto."t.1,199 olwd ndSae memorandum, Jan.i-28 197 , 1972,s AUs.a Deploc.Sce 

eoadm onve. 18 16, 19,oloed Mrh7,92,"Southeast Asa Depoyen Progrmam1& 

Deplymen Prgram""a. Presidential announcement of April 12, 1972 to reduce 

d. ~ ~ ertayo ~ ~ Asitn 90 ees Syuteast AnaDeloysis 20,000 U.Sý. spaces in South Vietuna by July 1a, 1972 

i. Prsietalad u nceen oný Apri 20,71So 

70ea to rsaeduoye and SecDef me~morandum, Nov. 15, 1972, "U.Sdeploym.5,00 

Prooprsacm nSuhita y~1 1970, moreuts From Sothe RViet foalowed , by Assistant 

epromulgty ed icremayo eensemeorndm A pril 4 4rtary of Defense (Systems An.al ysis) memorandum, 

198,"Suteat si reploy oment Prog s am Ju.e 123, 1972, "Southeast Asia. Deployment Program 

Presidential announcement on June 3, 1960, followed .PeintaanucmetoJue2.17torde 

hrAssisa Dpo.nt Serogrami of Dee7 .ý Ssem nlss0,000 U.S. spaces in South Vietnam by Mepy 1, 1972 

m.Peiemoralandum, Aug.27-1, een "Sfoes 1960, lsi eloy-d and SecD,-f memorandum, July 13, 1972, "t&S Redemy 

eat e memora~ndm Oc.6,16,Sutes plo'-ments From the RVN," followed 

ArsiaDeptilanoym 

by Assistant 

ncerrmn on" Ock290,floe ecretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) memnorandum, 

by Assistant Secretaryv of Defense (Systems Analysis) "otes saDpomn rga 1. 

memorandum, De.1,17,aothatAi ely . Presidential announcement of Aug.l 26, 1972 to reduce 

M~emPograndm, Fe1." ,17,'otes 

Assstnt 

Dpo- 

P erog tary o# 

20,000 

Dfe9."ytmsAals 

U.S. space inSotVinabyJlLI2 

and SecDef me!morandum, Sept. 4, 1972, "Redeployemea 

Prosiertal #12."cmn Aprl eas Depl90 reducements oy 

From thke RVN," followed b 

15n. W 

As y 

tresi opa 

sistant era 

sannucemein Soft Apieta byMs, 197 tordca~erry 0, 

of Defense (Systems; Analysis;) memorandu~m, 

10~~~~~~~~~~~0,000 in South U.S. slpaces VietnabyDc1,17.SotesAsaepymnPrgam by120." , 97 

byAsitn 

S OURCE:7 ofDf osur3stmnalyosDfes) "eSoteasth Asa Deloen 1975ým#1. 

nieoradum De.,1, 170,"Sothett siaDepoy


Third-nation forces: 

end-of-year strength in thousands. 

1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 

Australia .2 1.5 4.4 6.8 7.6 7.6 6.8 2.0 0 

Korea ..2 20.7 45.6 47.8 49.9 50.2 48.6 45 7 35.4 

New Zealand .03 .1 .2 .5 .6 - .6 .1 0 

Poiilippines .03 .1 2.1 2.0 1.6 0.2 0.1 .1 .1 

Thailand .02 .02 .2 2.2 r_ 9 I1.8 1'1,6 6.0 0 

Total .5 22.4 52.; 53.,3 65.6 70.,3 67,-7 53.9 35,9 

"SOURCE:. 

Table 3, Southeast Asia Statistical Summary Office of the 

Assista;,t Sozretary of Defense (Comptrol;er), February 14, 1973., 

Figure 2. Third-Nation Forces., Er.d-of-4ear Strength in Thousands 

6-22 

Ell.



1.. Henlry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 19•) 

4 p., IIII¾ 

2, Ibid.,, p. 274, 

3. In White House Years Kissinger points out that the term "de-AmericanizeT'wa-s 

used by General Goor;paster in a briefing to the President. 

Secretary of Defense Laird said that a term was needed to place emphasis 

on the right issues -- a term like "Vietnamization." Hence the 

term wac born, 

4. Charles MacDonald, An Outline History of US Policy Toward Vietnam 

(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1978), p., 74. 

5., Kissinger, White House Years, p. 271, 

6. Memorandum for the President from Henry Kissinger, September 10, 1969, 

subject "Our Present Course in Vietnam," Reprinted in White Hcuse 

Years, pp. I480-1482. Also see Henry Kissinger, "Vietnam Negotiati 

onT, Foreign Affairs, Janury l969; and John Stoessinger, henry 

Kissinger: The Anguish of Pcwer (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976), p. 51. 

"7, Allen E. Goodman, The Lost Peace (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution 

Press, 1978), p 87. 

8. Ibid., p. 78-79. 

9, Ibid., p. 87,. 

10. Kissinger, sup-a note 6, pp. 1481-1482. 

lbI, Goudman, p. 87. 

-by 

i2, Thomas Thayer, "Series B, Tactical Warfare Analysis of Vietnam Data", 

Journal of Defense ResearcA, Volume 7B Number 3, Fall 197?5 Prepared 

Battelle Columbus Laboratories for the Advanced Research Projects 

Agency of the Department of Defense. Recently declassified. See 

4ppendix A to this chapter for a table depicting the buildup and withdrawal 

of US forces in RVN, exL,'acted from this study. 

A 13. Colonel Edward F,. Astarita, US Army (Ret) was tne chief withdrawal 

planner for General Creighton Abrams, COMUSMACV. Col Astarita 

d*rected the planning, and presented briefings on the withdrawal 

planning to CINCPAC, the Chairman of the JCS &nd Secretary of Defense. 

6-23 

Alm i m mm.m

• THE 2DM 

CORPORATION 

14. William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (New York: Doubleday, 

1976), p. 359. 

15. Kissinger, White H.,'use Years, p. 1101. 

1~6 . ib id ., . 7 5 

S' 

17, Col, Astarita interviews, November 1979. Col. Astarita was a principal 

contributor to this chapter based on his extensive first-hand 

experience as the chief withdrawal planner. 

18. Ibia Col, Astarita described the need for utmost secrecy in the 

planning phase sincE premature release of information on the identity 

and sequence For unit withdrawals would risk courteractie2ns by the 

enemy while at the same time the combat effectiveness uf units scheduled 

for withdrawal would undoubtedly suffer, Col. /starita acknowledged 

the fact that combat units did not have much time to stand down 

and prapare for withdrawal as a result of the very necessary policy 

regarding secrecy, 

i9. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 276. Also see MacDonald, pp. 75-76. 

20.. Kissinger, "Vietnam Negotiations", supra note 6. Also see USMACV, 

J-52 Strategic Objectives Study, October 1S68. Declassified. Filed 

in Military History Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 

Pa. 

2L Ambassador Ellswortn Bunker described to a BDM study team the difference 

in te.tics implemented when Ceneral Abrams astumed command of 

USMACV in 1968., He stated that General Westmoreland looked on the war 

as one of attrition, but you can't win such a 4ar when the enemy has 

sanctuaries. He said that General Abrams felt that one had to hold 

territory to make Pacification and Vietnamization work while strengthening 

tne RVNAF until they could take over on their own, Interview at 

lhe BDM Corporation on 8 November 1979, Ambassador Bunker's deputy, 

Ambassador Samuel Berger, concurred with the foregoing evaluation in a 

BDM 

security 

study 

responsibility 

team interview at his home on 22 June 1979. The increasing 

of th2 ARVN was described by Col. Astarita and 

confirmed by several members of the BDM staff who served in RVN during 

that period. 

22. This section is based mainly on i~iformation provided by Col. Astarita. 

23. Of course a residual US presence was naintained only after an evaluation 

of the stated requirement and a determination that the RVNAF 

shortfall had tc be compensated for, 

24. 3unker interview 

6-24


25. Army Attache Saigon, Intelligence Report, subject "Assessment of Army 

of Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), 5 J'ily 197A. Declassified July 1975. 

The attache provided a realistic and uncomplime 1 ,tary assessment of the 

ARJN, and when he learned that his report had not been forwarded to 

Washington, he provided copies to the Secretary of Defense and the 

National Security Advisor to the President.. 

26. Bunker interview. 

27, General John Vogt, USAF (Ret) reported that he had been asked by 

several senior NATO officials -inetner or not the US would really back 

NATO, basing their questions on the US withdrawal from Vietnam and th2 

subsequent failure to make good on the promise to come to the GVN's 

2aia. 

28. Berger interview. 

29, General agreement was expressed at the Senior Review Panel meetir;,g on 

September 8, 1979 that ASEAN was nealthy and viable and that it owed 

much to the US actions in Southeast Asia., 

30. Dr. Henry J. Kenny, Special Assistant to Amhassador Mansfield in 

Tokyo, told of thz Asahi Shiu'bun public opinion survey that reflected 

the attitude of the Japanese man on the street. The survey was taken 

in 1978, 

6-25


CHAPTER 7 

NEGOTIATIONS 

The partition if Vietnam in 1954, despite the military 

aefeat of the French in thý? battle for Dien Bien Phu, meant 

t;iat the North Vietnamese achieved less at the ronference 

table than they had won on the battlefield. They resolved 

to never let that happen again. B13% the early 1960s, the 

North Vietnamese had come to see negotiations only for their 

tactical value. Thus, what Hanoi sought in direct talks 

with the United States was a say to improvw its chances of 

winning a war, 'ot a way of preventing or ending one. I/ 

Allen E. 'oodman 

The Los. Peace, 1978 

A negotiating procedure and a definitiun of objectives 

cannot guarantee a settlement, of course IT Hanoi proves 

intransigent and the war goes on, we shol 'A• eek to acnieve 

as many of our objectiies as possible uniiaterally We 

should adopt a strategy which reduces ca-ualties and concentrates 

on protecting the population. We should continue to 

strengthen the Vietoamese army to pe.-.it. ; gradual wiiLhdrawal 

of some American forces, and we shouid encourage 

Saigon to b,'odden its base so that it 4s stronger for the 

political contest with the communists wlich sooner or later 

it must undertake. 2/ 

ForignHenry A. Kiss~nger 

Foreign Affairs, Jan, 1969 


At "arious times during tne p,)st-WWII period of US involvement in 

Southeast Asia, American diplomats a-tempted to use negotiations as a means 

to attain a positi-e balance of rc,ier in the area. 

hampered by a US 

Those efforts were 

Sforties 

foreign policy w'zich varied from ambivalence in the late 

to ambiguity in the fifties and sixties, while the policy of the 

Communist Vietnamese throughout romained constant. 

"- 

7-1

THE BDM C09PORATION 

This chapter will outline the extent to which the negotiating process 

assisted or detracted from the attainment of US 

goals in Southeast Asia and 

Viet-amn The strengths and weaknesses exploited by tnc participating 

parties will be identified and analyzed within the conte:.t of the 

approaches taken in the negotiating process. 

Insights and lessons will 1be extracted from this analysis, and recommendations 

on how the US should approach and ccnduct negotiatiol's in the 

future will be developed. 

B. PHASED ANALYSIS OF NEGOTIATIONS 

' 

TU provide the desired perspective in this analysis, it was convenient 

to consider the negotiations in Vietnam in the following three phases: 

0 immediate post-WII through the Geneva Conference to 1951 

* the period 1961 to mid-1968 

the Paris Negotiations. 

1, Phase 1: Post-WWII to 1961 

US policy toward Southeast Asia during WWII was dictated by the 

expedient military strategy of concentrating its forces against the Japanese 

homeland and British intransigence on the colonial issue. The result 

was thac the US accepted Br-tish military primacy in Southeast Asia and 

concurred in the division of Indochina at the 16th parallel between the 

British and the Chinese for the purpose of occupation after the conflict 

had ended. 3/ 

In September 1945, with British cooperation, the French reestablished 

themselves south of the 16th parallel. 

The return o- the French to 

the South was facilitated by the lack of firm control by the newly independent 

Vietnamese governinont over competing nationalist elements. At that 

time the situation in the North was different. The government of Ho Chi 

Minh had established itself ip power, but the Chinese were expected to 

arrive momentarily to exercise their occupational functions. The return of 

the French to the North became canditional on two counts. 

* there had to be an agreement whereby French troops would replace 

j- Chinese forces, and 

"]I 

7-2


11i 

6 there had to be some form of accord with, Ho and the DRV government. 

4/ 

a. French-Chinese Negotiations 

The French undertook negotiations with the Chinese in Chungking 

and, at the cost of major concessions, reached an agreement on February 

28, 1946, permitting them to move military forces north of the 16th 

parallel. 

In this the French were probably assisted bl the fact that 

Chiang Kai-shek needed his troops for operations against Thinese Communist 

forces in China.5/ During this early period a series of conversations 

between the French and Ho Chi Minh showed that there were compelling reasons 

for tolerance and-compromise on both sides. For exemple, the French 

were easier to deal with than the Chinese. 

b., French-Vietnamese Negotiations 

French-Vietnamese negotiations conducted from early 1946 

through the Geneva Accords in 1954 were cnaracterized by French reluctance 

to alter in any significant way the pre-war colonial perquisites they had 

once enjoyea, At least 13 agreements, conferences or declarations suggested 

progress tow.ards some form of Vietnamese independence, but little 

real progress materialized. 

These events are presented in brief in Appendix 

A to this Chapter.6/ 

c. The Geneva Conference of 1954 

Soon after the cease-fire in Korea, in July 1953, Ho Chi 

Minh's new Chinese Communist allies began to increase the flow of combat 

materiel and advisers to his Viet Minh forces fighting the French in Indochina. 

Pressure began to build up in France for a negotiated settlement 

along lines of the one being worked out in Korea. 

At the Bermuda Conference 

of December 1953, President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Churchill and 

Premier Joseph Laniel of France decided to discuss the Indochina problem 

* with the -ov;et Union at the foreign minister level, 7/ 

The foreign ministers met in February, 

1954, and agreed to a 

conference :if interested powers to discuss both Korea and Indochina, 

to ne held at Geneva in April of that year. That was the signal for General 

Vo Nguyen Giap. Ho's field combat commander, to deliver a crippling 

7i 

S~7-3

THE BDM CORPORATMO• 

blow to the French at Dien Bien Phu so as to strengthen his side's negotiating 

position.8/ US officials reluctantly agreed to the meeting, since it 

was their belief that any settlement would probably be contrary to US 

interests, Thi US aim, therefore, was to take the emphasis off the conference 

and put it back onto the battlefield, a view which was referred to 

in Washington as "united action" (of the same character as the UN 

intervention 

in Korea--broad, multilateral and military).9/ 

The participants in the Geneva talks included the US, 

France, Great Britain, the French-sponsored State of Vietf'am (GVN), Laos, 

Cambodia, the DRV, the Soviet Union and Communist China. Britain and the 

Soviet Union, in the persons of Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and Foreign 

Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, were co-chairmen. 

When the Geneva conference began on April 27'h, the news of 

the Dien Bien Phu battle completely overshadowed the Korean part of the 

negotiations. 

By the time the delegates turned to discussion on Indochina 

matters (M3y 8th), Dien Bien Phu had fallen. 

Initially, the US postured itself as an "interested observer 

nation" during the Indochina discussions, attempting to remain influential 

but unentangled and unobligated as a participant.lO/ In contrast to the US 

attempt to cut back on its involvement in the Conference proceedings, the 

French hoped to obtain sufficient US and British support to bolster their 

negotiating position in the face of broad communist pressure. 

In response to a French aide-memoire requesting support, the 

US and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement on 28 June 1954, which 

warned: "If at Geneva the French Government is confronted with demands 

which prevent an acceptable agreement reyarding Indochina, 

the international 

situation will be seriously aggravated."ll/ 

The US ana the British formulated an unpublicized agreement 

between themselves on a set of principles which, if worked into the 

settlement terms, would enable them to "respect" the armistice. 

The principles, 

known subsequently as the "seven points", were commdnicated to the 

French. 

They were: 

0 Preservation of the integrity and independence of Laos and 

[ 

Cambodia, and assurance of Viet Minh withdrawal from those countries; 

7-4

"THE %JM CORPORATION 

4 Preservation of at least the southern nalf of Vietnam, and if 

possible an enciave in cne -onkin Delta, with the line of demarcation 

no firth'-r socth than one running generally west from Dong 

Hoi; 

* No restrictions on Laos, Cambodia, or retained Vietnam "materi1lly 

impairing their capacity to maintain stable non-Communist 

regimes, and especially restrktioos impairing their right to 

maintain adequate forces for internal security, to import arms 

and to employ foreign advisers"; 

* No "political provisions which would risk loss of the retained 

area to Communiit control"; 

* Nt, provision that would "exclude th2 possibility of the ultimate 

I 

reunification of Vietnam by peaceful means"; 

0 Provision for "the peaceful rnd humane transfer, under international 

supervision, of those people desiring to be moved from one 

zone to another of Vietiam"; 

0 Provision for "effective machinery for international supervision 

of the agreement."12/ 

The French exploited US ambivalence during the conference, 

and after getting Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to agree to returning 

high 1-vel US 

representation to the table, they began pressuring the 

Chinese and Soviet diplomats to bring the proceeding co a conclusive ending. 

Although privately the Western "Big Three" were not in complete 

agreement on how to proceed, the communists at Geneva apparently took 

Westprn public pronouncements and the return of high level US 

negotiators 

(by mid-July) to the table as a sign of a united Western frorL. With 

strong British support, 

the French plcy (skillfully directed by Mendes- 

France) worked and the communists -- Russian and Chinese -- 

"concessions from their DRV 

line with the seven points outlined above. 13/ 

for Vietnam, 

forced major 

ally which brouight settlement essentially in 

The final Caneva Accords consisted of Armistice agreements 

Laos and Cambodia as well as a Final Declaration of the Conference., 

They were designi-d to: 

* provide conditions to end hostilities and re-establish peace in 

Inaochina, and, 

7-5 

A ~ i1i


I 

. provide conditions conduciv, to the futuri_ .pendet political 

iJevzlopment of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. 

The signatories to the Armistice w, delegates of the 

Generals in Command of the combat forces. 

The DRV slL,,ed all three agreements 

(for separate cease-fires in, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia), while 

France signed the Vietnam and Laos agreements, The Khmer National Army 

signed the Cambodian one.14/ 

The Final Declaration, wh-'ch ca>,?d for a 

political settlement -- electicns in Laos and Cambodi,-, in 1955 and in 

Vietnam in 1956 -- was not signed by any of the participants, 

The French and Viet Minh were the designated executors of 

the Accords, while the GV14, under the Bao Dai regime, clearly repudiated 

the Accords 3nd declined to accept any responsibility for observing or 

enforcing them. In fact, the GVN was given its independence by France 

before the Accords were signed, and they were treated as a separate state 

throughout the conference. The GVN signed nothing at Geneva. Through the 

concessions of the communist countries and the firmness of its Western 

Allies, the GVN had been given an opportunity to get its act together and 

consolidate itself. 

A few days after the Accords had been signed, Secretary of 

State Dulles, referring to "the loss of Northern Vietnam", expresseu the 

F hope that much would be learned frcm the experience toward preventing 

further communist inroads in Asia. 

Smith, 

Under Secretary of State Walter 3edell 

in a separate declaration, said that the US would "refrain from the 

threat or the use of force to disturb" the agreements and "would view any 

renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with 

grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security."15/ 

1) Outcomes as Viewed by the Participating Nations 16/ 

* United States 

- public view was cautious, the best of a bad situation 

- private reactions were gloomy: NSC evaluated the 

conference as a major defeat, OCB considered it a 

7-6

THE BDM CORPKRATION 

;.tride forward for coinmunisn, anq others viewed it 

as a loss of prestige 

- officially. the US took note of all three armistice 

agreements and paragraphs I through 2 of 

Che Final Declaration., 

0 Great Britain 

-- their diplomacy was an unqualified success 

* their prestige as a peace-make- was heightened 

- the danger ef a wider war was averted 

S- they, re-established diplomatic ties with PRC 

S- the way was cleared for Britdin to join SEATO 

* France 

- they were allowed to extricate themselves with 

honor 

- they r'.tained a significant foothold in Indochina 

through the ýrench Union 

- they continued to be a significant force of influ- 

F _N ence in the region 

* GVN 

they were allov,ed to establish a viable governmental 

authcity in South Vietnam 

t'.:y were given time. to consolidate territory and 

regroup the population 

they lost control of territory north cf the 17th 

* DRV 

parallel 

international inspection teams were. designated to 

enforce the treaty.. 

they gained control, of all Vietnamese territory 

north of the 17th pa,'allel 

united action in support 

allies was averted 

of France by Western 

7-7


- their netional unity was compromised 

- a quick political solution (elections within 6 

months) was deferred for 2 years 

- they were forced to yield their claims advanced in 

support of the Pathet Lao and the Free Khmer 

* Soviet Union 

FForces 

- they were forced to accept international inspection 

teams over indigenous ones 

- the threat 3f massive US intervention was forestalied 

- their prestige as a world peacemaKer was enhanced 

- they saw France's rejection of the European 

Defense Community (one month after the conference) 

as a result of their strategy 

- communisC. ccnsolidation of all Indochina was not 

achieved 

* China (PRC) 

- they saw the treaty creating a neutral buffer zone 

- they preempted US military moves by diplomacy 

- their domestic economy was protected (the Koreai 

war had exacerbated economic problems in the PRC). 

the treaty did not preclude the return of US 

influence to Southeast Asia. 

2) Impact on US Goals fori Southeast Asia 

The Viet Minh victory at Dien Bien Phu signalled to the 

world the military impotence of the French forces in Indochina, 

with the bitter experience of Korea still in mind, 

tactical defeat presaged strategic disaster. 

The US, 

feared that the French 

The US goal of preventing the 

countries of Southeast Asia from passing into the communist orbit was 

beginning to crumble. After somewhat reluctantly joining the Geneva conferences, 

the US gave consideration to the following options- 

0 merely urging the French to a greater effort 

7-8

i 

THE BDIV CORPORATION 

THEB • assisting the French with material support in v3rying degrees 

0 intervening in conjunction with the British 

0 takino military action with all those prepared to do so 

0 working out a long range Southeast Asian alliance, 

None 

of these courses of action proved practical at the time. 

Nonetheleis, the outcome of Lhe Geneva Conference did serve to catalvze the 

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). 

At the highest levels of the 

US government, the "loss" of the northeri half of Vietnam to the communists 

was considered another retreat before communist expansion. 

Secretary of Stata Dulles publicly drew two lessons from che 

Geneva Conferene 17/ 

0 popular support was essential to combat communist subversion, and 

. collective defense against aggression could not be devised after 

the aggression was in progress. 

Dulles moved promptly to counter further communist advances by spearheading 

the development of a NATO-like collective security treaty for the 

region, An international conference was convened at Manila late in the 

summer of 1954 to devise such a security system, 

[d, The Manila Conference of 1954: Formation of SEATO 

The Geneva Accords were flawed from the very date of signing. 

The DRV presumed that there would be a near term unification of North 

a;.,. South Vietnam under their leadership, On the other hand, the GVN 

immediately announced its intention L) resist, and the temporary demarcation 

line, which was a key element of the settlement, soon became the basis 

for conflict, Furthermore, President Eisenhower quickly let it be known 

that the US did not feel "bound" by the accords, which to him were simply 

the "best.. .under the circumstances."18/ 

In less than two months after Geneva, 

the Southeast Asia 

"Treaty Organization (SEATO) came into being. Composed of the US, Britain, 

France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand, 

with South Vietnam, 

Laos and Cambodia added as protocol nations, SEATO was 

to be Lne new shield ag.ilnst further communist expansion. 19/ 

1-9

THE BDMVICORPORATION 

US 

representatives to Manila had been instructed to insist 

on several preconditions for US military action in Southeast Asia. They 

were: 20/ 

0 that the US would refuse to a-t dnilaterally in Asia, because of 

heavy commitments to NATO 

* that any military actiun (by the US) would have to involve not 

only Asian nations, but also major European partners 

* that the LIS would not be prepared to commit grodnd troops into 

combat in Asia; other nations would do the g-ound fighting under 

a cover of US sea and air power 

* that the US defined the communist threat as the only real danger 

to the region. 

1) Conference Outcomes 

The Manila Conference culminated in a pact termed the 

"Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and Protocol Treaty, September 8, 

1954"; the treaty was ratified by the US Senate by a vote of 82 to 1, and 

entered into force on February 19, 1955. 

Throughout the discussions at Manila the US 

insisted 

that the focus of the treaty be on the prevention of further communist 

expansion in the region. 

When the other nations would not acquiesce to US 

pressure to make anticommunism the treaty's specific objective, the US 

requested and got an "understanding" appended to the treaty.21/ 

In evert 

of other kinds of aggression the US agreed to consult with the other member 

nations. 

The final item of the treaty was a "protocol," which 

stated unanimous agreement among the member 

nations to include Cambodia, 

Laos and South Vietnam under che provisions of the treaty. In other words, 

these countries, without actually becoming members of the pact, became 

entitled to "economic support including technical assistance" and also "to 

defense against any attack, overt or not, from without or within."22/ 

US wanted these nations included under the SEATO Treaty, but membership 

would have been legally in contravention of the Geneva Accords, 


7-10 

pn


Vice Admiral A. C. Davis, Depity Assistant Secretary of 

Defense (International Security Affairs) and Chief Defense Department 

repr^esentative in the US delegation to the Manila Conference had the 

following to say at the conclusion of the proceedings: 

I believe the Manila Conference accomplished the objective 

expected of it from the United States point of view. 

In my judgment our Defense representation in the U.S, Delegation 

succeeded in its efforts to insure that the Treaty is 

cnnsistent in its military implications with the positions 

taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by this Department. 

23/ 

In the final treaty the US, in effect, had made a 

statLment of its intent to counter further communist expansionist moves in 

Southeast Asia, but left vague the specifics of its probable response. 

There was to be no ,nified command, no bases, and no contribution of combat 

troops to a standing army or group. 

2) SEATO Compared to NATO 

Although the other Mani ia conferees intended the SEATO 

pact to be similar to the NATO pact, the US was not prepared to pay the 

price of such a strong coalition. The US, with its NATO commitments 

already a sizeable biirden, was reluctant to commit itself to SEATO 

as it 

had to NATO. Therefore, the conferees took pains with thL SEATO terminology, 

caiculating carefully the effect the pacx would have on their own 

domestic politics as well as on the communist-threatenod nations. It 

remains, however, that the SEATO treaty wording on the point of just what 

response would be made by the nmembers in the event of an armed attack was 

intentionally ambiguous. 

With respect to treaty institutions, both the NATO and 

SEATO treaties establisned councils for military and planning purposes. In 

the NATO treaty this council was authorized to set up "subsidiary bodies," 

while in the SEATO Treaty such authorization was not given. This was a 

disappointment to several of the delegations at Manila., Initially, the 

Australians proposed that the conference set up a strong military organization, 

but they were persuaded by the US 

representatives to accept a 

7-l 

7--

t 

THE SIM CORPOR4TION 

mcdification to their proposal -- the concept of consultation. Thus, 

n ilitary partcipa-ion in SEATO was to be "consultative" rather than permanent 

and forma: as in the NATO Treaty. 24/ 

3) The Impact of tie SEATO Treaty on US Objectives in 

Southeast Asia. 

The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty was to be 

a "new initiative in Southeast Asia" to protect the US position in the Far 

East and stabilize "the present chaotic situation .... 

to prevent further 

losses to communi.m" through subversion or overt aggression.25/ But the 

SEATO 

pact proved to be neither the new initiative nor the strung anticommunist 

shield sought by Secretary of State Dulles. 

at Manila were self-induced. 

The failure to attain the goals set for US 

negotiators 

While Dulles wanted to put the communists on 

notice that aggression oi their p3rt would be vigorously opposed, the JCS 

insisted the US 

must not be committed financially, militarily er economically 

to unilateral action in the Far East and that US 

must not be restricted. 

freedom of action 

The two objectives conflicted and one cancelled 

out the other. Thus, the article of the SEATO treaty which was to prcvide 

"tne mechanism for collective action in the event of an enemy threat was 

diluted and was written so as not to pledge an automatic response to meet 

force with force. 

Instead, each signatory promised to "act to meec the 

common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."26/ 


attempted to put teeth into the SEATO pact through unilaterai Jeclarations 

of US readiness to act. Secretary Dulles defined the obligations under the 

treaty as being a clear and definite agreement on the part of the signatories, 

including the US, 

to come to the aid of any member of the Pact who 

under the terms of the treaty was being subjected to aggression.27/ 

However, 

he failed to instill the same jedication to instant intervention into 

the otter SEATO men.;er nations. 

The obligation assuied at the Manila conferenca emphasized 

the importance attached to Suutheast Asia by the US. 

Refusal by the 

US to pledge unqualified support to SEATO demcnstrated the need for indigenous 

strength and stability in the region in order to counter communist 

7-12

THE BDM CO.RPORATION 

r 

tj7-13 

21 

power, to make infiltration and aggression less appetizing to the potential 

enemy., 

Of the three protocol states, the most important in the eyes of US 

leadership. was the newly created South Vietnam. 

Although SEATO was intentionally ambiguous on the point 

of just what response would be made by tha members in the event of an armed 

attack, it did provide Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon 

with a justification fo;r subsequent US policy -- aid and military presence 

in Vietnam. 

Though n(. one seriously challanged US military and economic 

aid provisions under the SEUTO 

Treatj, the Johnson and Nixop administrations 

came und'r fire for the use of US 

ground combat forces in the conflict. 

SEAFO may have delayed communist aggression in Southeast 

Asia, but in the end, 

the treaty organization did not deter the communists 

from actively pursuing their goals there. 

2. Phase 2: 1961 to Mid-1968 

Early on in this phase, the overriding US objective was to limit 

"involvement in what President Kennedy anc Secretary of Defense McNamara 

regarded as essentially a Vietnamese war., In the spring of l962, the 

military situation in South Vietnam was showing some signs of improvement, 

and by mid-year the prospects looked bright for the RVNAF, To some, the 

end to the insurgency seemed 

in sight. although that optimism was not 

without the recognition that there were unsolved political problems and 

serious soft spots in areas of the military effort, US 

leadership, both on 

the scene in Vietnam and in Washington, was c)nfident though cautiously 

optimistic.28/ 

During the same timeframe, 

events in other parts of the world, 

some ostensibly unrelated, were asserting direct relevance on US policy in 

Vietnair. Developments in Berlin, Cuba and Ldos far overshaaowed Vietnam, 

and forced the Kennedy Administration to put Vietnam in the perspective of 

14 

other US world interests. 

_4 

With respect to Indochina, the Kennedy Administration established 

the following objectives:30/ 

* to seek the neutralization of Laos 

* to avoid an open-ended Asian mairland land war

TI- 

THE BDM CORPOhATION 

'If support 

. to seek the withdrawal of US military support personnel ana 

advisers from RVN 

0 to treat the insurgency in RVN as fundamencil :y a Vietnamese 

a 

matter 

to increase pressure on the GVN to make the necessary reforms and 

make the RVNAF fight harder 

* to put the lid on bureaucratic and political pressures for 

increased US involvement in Vietnam, 

a. The Geneva Conference on Laos (1961-62) 

In the fall of 1961 and thiough the spring of 1962 tte US, 

its goal of a free and independent LaoS frustrated by Soviet-backed North 

Vietnamese sutversion. had decided to silvage as much as possible by settling 

for neutralization, 

After lengthy and complex diplomatic maneuvering, 

an agreement on the critical Laotian issue was reachea. On July 23, 

1962, the 14-nation declaration and protocol 31/ establishing the neutrality 

of Laos was signed formally, ending the IE-month Geneva Confcrence on 

Lacs. In the Declaration cf Neutrality the North Vietnamese, together with 

all other participants, gave their word that. 

* they would not introduce foreign troops or military personnel 

into Laos 

* they would riot use the territory as a military base 

0 they would not interfere in the internal affairs of Laos 

a 

all foreign irregular and regular troops wiould be withdrawn from 

Laos in the shortest time possible. 32/ 

1) Outcomps of the Laotian Neutrality Treaty 

The North Vietnamese never pulled their forces from 

Laos as they had promised to do. 

They did not stop sending men anif war 

supplies to assist the ?athet Lao. More significant for the RVN, tht Lt;RV 

continued using the jungle trail5 and roads of eastern Laos ana the 

panhandle to infiltrate fighting forces and war materiel into the South in 

of its aggression there. The North Vietnamese also did not permit 

the coalition government of Laos or the International Contro, Commission 

('CC) to exercise their functions in the communist-held areas of Laos. The 

7-14


failure to obtain North Vietnamese compliance with the neutrality accords 

of 1962 was a bitter disappointment to President Kennedy,333/ 

2) Impacts of the Laotian Neutrality Treaty 

In July of 1962, 

with the Laotian problem apparently 

resolved, President Kennedy asked Secretary McNamara to re-examine the 

Vietnam problem. The Secretary of Defense did so at a conference held at 

Honolulu. The RVN situation depicted during the meeting was generally 

favorable; hence, the following decisions 34/ were made: 

0 to prepare plans For a scaling n of US units in RVN (a phased 

withdrawal over a 3-year period) 

* to prepare long-range RVNAF officers and NCO's training programs 

* to prepare a long-range materiel suppoyt program (with an eye 

towards reducin•, MAP 

funds). 

In part, the phased withdrawal program was rooted both 

in false optimism about the strength of the Diem government and the impact 

of the newly created strategic hamlet program, and in the belief that the 

NLF would continue to pose only a minor threat to -he GVN in the countryside. 

President Kennedy, it is said, believed that if any cf these factors 

should change, the way to counter their effects was through diplomacy, not 

US military iatervention.35/ Senator Mike Mansfield, who traveled to 

Southeast Asia in October 1962 at Kennedy's request, agreed, suggesting 

that if the situation should change for the worse, "We 

may well discover 

that it is in our interests to do less rather than more than we are doing. 

If that is The case, we will do well to concentrate on a vigo, -us diplomacy 

without bringing about sudden and catastrophic upheavals in Southeast 

Asia."36/ 

With the Laotian t"-aty behind them, 

the North Vietnamese 

continued with the unrestricted use of that country as a sanctuary, 

Meanwhile, the US, trying to live by the letter of the agreement, found 

that its war was constrained to Vietrin.. Therefore, to counter the DRV's 

"wider war", the (IS was forced to initiate a "secret iar" in Laos (which 

was fought by CIA operatives). 

7-15


b. The First Secret Contact 

Recognizing that a Laotian settlement probably would not 

work unless some kind of agreement was deve'oped for Vietnam, JFK authorized 

W. Averell Harrirr3n to approach the North Vietnamese Delegates at the 

Genea Conference on Laos with an offer of secret talks. 

seeking to let the DRV 

The president was 

know that he regarded the conflict in South Vietnam 

as an internal Vietnamese affair, Harriman was-•o suggast that the agreement 

on Laos could serve as 3 model 

for an accord guaranteeing Vietnam's 

neutrality., The diplomatic feeler 'ias kept secret so as not to alarm 

President Diem, who was opposed to any such talks. The meeting dnd the bite 

was arranged by a foreign minister of 0 neutral country attending the 

conference, and Ambassador Harriman took elaborate measures to avoid being 

seen by GVN negotiators. He and h.ýs c.puty, William Sullivan, had a 

ninety-i,,inute meeting with the DRV's 

military assistant. 37/ 

foreign minister and the minister's 

Ambassador Harriman suggested that the US and DRV develop an 

agreement similar to the one deve,!ped for Laos. Hanoi's represePtative 

countered with the NLF Four Point•,Manifesto as the only basis for peace in 

Vietnam. Essentially, the NLF manifesto 38/ called for the following: 

0 the immediate and tot",l withdrawal of US personnel 

0 tha establishmen' of national coalition government 

* the US end its support of the Diem regime 

a the peaceful reunification of ll of Vietnam. 

illegitimate and US 

The North ";eLiamese 

was nothing to negotiate. 

Communists held that Diem's government was 

support illegal; therefore, from their viewpoint there 

They felt it was only a matter of time before 

the Diem regime would collapse and they would move in and take over the 

th. The DRV attitude was characterized by a US representative, who 

attended that early meeting, as follcws:' 

They thought then that South Vietnam would bp theirs in a 

matter of monLhs or years and that, therefore, there was no 

need to enter negotiations to get what would certainly come 

through our default. 39/ 

S-16

iTHE 


I 

t 

U 

1) Outcome of the Early Initiatives 


eighteen months tc. engage the DRV 

continued its low-keyed efforts over the next 

in a diplomatic dialogue, without nctable 

success.. Official positions remained far apart with each side unwilling to 

bend or comprorise. American diplomats warned that if the DRV and the NLV 

did not stop disrupting the peace in the South, their aggression would be 

countered. The North Vietnamese, believing that the uS would not stand 

firm or commit mere troops to aid South Vietnam, persisted in their view 

that there was nothing to negotiate about. 

2) Impact of the Early Initiatives 

Tiere were several significant aspects of the negotiations 

during the 1961-1963 timeframe which impacted on the conflict and on 

subsecuent negotiations. They were: 

0 ths treaty to neutralize Laos caused the US to limit the war to 

Vietnam while the DRV was allowed to fight an expanded war which 

included Laos.40/ 

* the failure of those early initiatives contributed, among others, 

to the US view that the only way to respond to DRV intransigence 

was to increase commitments to the GVN.41/ 

0 the early secret diplomacy tended to reinforce misperceptions on 

both sides, which ultimately led to US 

combat ivolvement in the 

conflict.42/ 

* the stalemate in the early negotiations allowed time for the then 

sagging "VN 

to ride out a period of political chaos and social 

unrest and attain a degree of c,-der anC stability. 

3) Analysis of the Early Initiataives 

Early negotiations set the general pattern for subsequent 

peace talks. Ho Chi Minh learned his negotiating lessons well-- 

first, from his many dealings with the French End then, diring the 1954 

Geneva Conference. After Geneva, he resolved never to give up at the 

conference table what he and his followers had won on the field of battle. 

Ho and his colleagues came to see negotiations for their tactical value and 

used them to strengthen their stranglehold on Indochina, 

The Laotian 

7-17

THE B0M CORPORATION 

Neutrality Treaty of 1962 (or their complete disregard of the t.reaty) 

allowed them to fight the "wider war" while the US found itself ½.niting 

the coiflict to Vietnam. 

SMisperceptions of the DRV's goals on the part of US 

leadership eventually led to the belief that the only way to bring the DRV 

to the negotiating table was to demonstrate US 

resolve and counter force 

with force. Ultimately, this attituae led to massive US dir and combat 

4 troop involvement in the Vietnam war. 

I .In 

C. Negotiations and Bombing: "Bomb-Talk-Bomb" 

or "Tit-For-Tat" 

1964, shortly after assuming hWs responsibilities a. 

President, Lyndon Johnson announced that the neutralization of RVN was 

unacceptable to the US, that it just was another name for a communist 

takeover., President Johnson, faced with a "Catch-22" dilemma, realized 

that using force to compel the DRV to negotiate would encourage them to 

continue fighting; yet, even if negotiations were started, the North Vietnamese 

would use them only to win concessions, 

and not to reach a compromise 

settlement. Consequently, he aecided to talk to the North Vietnamese 

only when he was sure they had something to say. 

Late in 1964, U Thant, Secretary-Generl cf tthe United 

Nations, made an abortive attempt at arrarging for secret talks. The DRV 

supposedly agreed to the proposal in November, but the US showed no interest., 

Finally, some five months later American UN Ambassador Adlai 

z Stevenson responded that the US had been assured that the North Vietnamese 

were not interested in meeting. 

Later, North Vietnamese leaders c'-nied 

they had told U Thant that they were willing to have secret talks 

US. 

1it;i the 

This was the first occasion where they used the "whipsaw technique" of 

bargaining in which one DRV official would pass a message on to one :ntermediary 

arid another DRV official would turn arounr and contraaict the 

first. 43/ 

Subsequent US diplomacy duirinq this phase- wa: ;.-,ý_irt3lIy 

linked to Lte bombing program. The graduated "tit-for-tat" response 

coupled to thc targeting limirations set by LBJ 

were supposed to elicit 

7-18

"i HE BDM CORPORATION 

from the DRV some form of reciprocity or interest in accommodation. When 

that did not bring the desiired resiults within a reasonable timeframe, the 

president's advisers began to debate the efficacy of adding bombing halts 

to the US strategy. 

Defense, with occasionda 

Several insiders 44/ 

placed the Office of the Secretary of 

support from the Department of State, in favor of 

using the unilateral bombing pauses to get the DRV to the negotiating 

table.., The US military -- JCS, CINCPAC and MACV -- with support from a few 

influential people in State (e.g., Ambassador Maxwell Taylor 45/), opposed 

bombing pauses in order "not to give the communists a free ride to the 

bati.lefield."46/ 

1) The Seaborn Initiative 

Meanwhile, J. Blair Seaborr,, head of the Canadian 

delegation to the International Control Commission (ICC), got into the 

peace talks picture. From June 1964 to June 1965, Seaborn served as a 

communications link between President *.lohnsop and DRV 

Premier Pham Van Dong 

(see Figure 7-1 for a timeline represertation of those and other contacts 

during this phase). Seaborn was to tell DRV leadership that the US had 

limited objectives in Vietnam. The US commitment was to the inaependence 

and teiritorial integrity of South Vietnam so that the people there could 

freely and peacefully choose thei- '.in form of government; and, triat US 

military activities were not aimed at North Vietnam, only at ýjorthern 

infiltrators operating in the South. 

Seaborn was also instructed to say 

that the US believed Hanoi -ontrolled the military operations of the NLF 

(evidenced 

by the nearly c-.r:ylete cease-fires that had occurred on the 

DRV's orders at Tet in both 1963 and 1964), and ,lanted them to stop the 

military and materiel support of the NLF. 

Seaborn's effo,-ts were unsuccessful, [, was told by 

DFV leaders that ther-e was nothing to negotiate abouc. 

rhe wounding of over 100 Americ-an GI's during a wellcoordinated 

VC attack on the US adviser's garrissn and adjacent heliport at 

[ Pleiku on February 7, 1965, was a challenge that LBJ and his aavisers could 

not "tur,, cheek to." The P'eiku incident gave the US reason to no longer 

p~i 

7-19


Sl: i ~~- i > ,= 

" i i" 9 --" " - =" : I 

45< 

MX -I = -' < 

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-- -- o - S I € • i 

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9.. 5 5 9 - - -- S - 

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00 

5. - - -* ; _ - 9 -° . - 

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9 = -' 

- 

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Cl--e 

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a=) 

•-2

THE 8DM CORP'ORATION 

hesitate to use mfil;tdry force in Vietnam. 

US deperdents were evacuated 

from the South and a seriei of reprisal "itit-fo 1 '-tat" air strikes were 

5 conducted over North Vietnam. "Flaming Dart," followed by "Rolling 

t 

Thunder," (sustained bombing of the north) began under very strict limitations, 

ccn'roiled at the highest levels and approved on a week-to-week 

basis by the White House., 

Faced with a lack of notable success, the first oombing 

pause, Project "Mayflower", was initiated ini May 1965 (three months afte,, 

"Rolling Thunder" began). Preslidential advisers 47/ had reasoned that 

early reprisal raids hardened the DRV's positici on negot-atior,- as "tltfor-tat" 

gave way to a sustained air war. 

They also reasoned that t~he DRV 

position was unlikely to become more flexible j~nless tne air attacks were 

stooped.. After much dialogue, the Saigon. Embassy gave in to the Washingt~on 

push for a bombing pause., The embassy hoped tco "link the intepsity ot the 

US bombing after the resumption closely to the level of VC aztivity during 

the pause. The purpose would be to make it clear to Hlanoi that . . . 

F downward trend in VIC activities would be -rewarded' in a sim;1ar manner by 

decreasing !.IS bombing." 48/ There wes another bmiall 

t-ut vocal factien in 

Washi-igton that was seeking an end 4t.o sustained ra-ids and a return to the 

"tit-for-tat" response to VC/NVA 

Dause gambit. 

actions,. L8J elected to i~ry the bombing 

The "Mayfl..;wer" bom:bing pause lafteud flor fivp 

da-v- with 

no results or satisfactory response from the DRV.49/ A notla passed through 

F the US Embassy in Moscow was r-'turned by North Vietnamese diplomats without 

comment. The US responded by resuming the bombing atti.cks. 

Shortl, after the bombing was resumed, Mai Van Bo, 

Chief of the OR'! Econom~ic Delegation in ý'aris, Ppproacred French intermediaries 

with what appeared to De z softening of his country's position. 

But on further investigation US offic~als concluded '%nat tl~e Ba initiative 

bad nio new substance. 50/ The North Vie~tnamese employed the samie LCechnique 

(n-ilaying their response to a US bombing pause until a few hours after it 

was resumed) agair following a 37-day blombing halt at the end of January 

1966.51/ "The DRV probably used this gap flor two purposes: oropaganda and 

7-21

F THE 

BOM CORPORATION 

bargaining. The propaganda value was potentially high--couldn't the US 

wait a few hours vefure plunging back to the 3ttack? MoF'e importantly it 

was a way of cancelling out the US negotiating blue chip."5?/ 

3) The XYZ Affair 

Between the two bombing pauses of 1965 (see Figure 7-2, 

Bombing Pauses over North Vietnam) another series of contacts with the DRV 

were initiated. These became known as the "XYZ Affair' when former Ambassador 

Edmund Gullion (called from retirement) and another former Foreign 

Service officer were dispatched to several meetings with Mai Van 13o, Those 

meetings were characterized as being the most serious mutual effort to 

resolve matters cf substance between the two nations up to that time.53/ 

Without exception, no progress resulted from the contacts, which is indicative 

of the comparative lack of true seriousness of the majority of peace 

initiatives before l968, 

this phase was 

4) The Peace Offensive 

The most energetic and ambitious US 

initiative during 

conducted during the 37-day bombing halt which began or 

Cliristmas Eve, 1965, and became known is the "peace offensive."54/ US 

! Amnassador to Burma, Henry Byroade, was giver, a nessage to deliver to the 

ORV Consulate in Rangoon. The note was not well received by the DRV; it 

was considered an "ultimation" rather than conciliatory. 55/ Other top 

level USG representatives joined in the peace offensive--Harriman flew on a 

ten-nation trip which began in Warsaw, Poland; McGeorge Bundy went to 

Canada; Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Man;i flew to Mexico; UN Ambascador 

Goidberg visited the Vatican, the Ttalian government in Rome, ao 

Paris; Vice Prerident Humphrey went to Toky', and G. Mennen Williams toured 

fourteen African countries. At each stop the US attempted to sell its 

fourteen point program ("US contributions ýo the Basket of Peace") and tn 

convince the worla's leaders that the US %as willing to talk tc the DRV on 

almost any terms (as an addendum to the 14-points, the drafters add3d, "in 

other words, we have put everything into t0e basket of peace excep, the 

surrender of Scuth Vietnam").56/ 

7-22


US BOMBING PAUSES OVER NORTH VIEThtAM (1965-1968) 

DATA: DURATION: TYPE- 

May 12-18, 1965 5 days, 20 hours A Complete Borbing Halt 

December 24, 1965- 36 days, 15 hours A Complete Bombing Halt 

January 31, 1966 

December 23, 1966- 78 days Within 10 miles of 

March 1, 1967 

center of Hanoi 

December 24-26, 1966 2 days A Complete Bombing Halt 

December 31, 1966- 2 days A Complete Bombing Halt 


February 8-12, 1967 5 days, 18 hours A Complete Bombing Halt 

May 22-June 9. 1967 18 days Within 10 miles of 

May 23-24, 1967 24 hours 


A Complete Bombing Halt 

June 11-August 9, 1967 59 days Within 10 miles of 


August 24- 60 days Within 10 miles of 

October 23, 1967 center of Hanoi 

December 24-25, 1967 24 hours A Complete Bombing Halt 

Decemoer 31, 1967- 36 hours A Complete Bombing Halt 


Januar; 3-March 31, 1968 88 days Within 5 miles of 


January lI-March 31, 1968 75 day: Withi,, 5 miles of 

center of Haiphong 

March 31- 2)4 days North of 20th parallel 

Ncvenber 1, 1968 

November 1, 1968 Until janary 20, 1969 A Complete Bombing Halt 

SOURCE: Adapted from Lyndon ., Johnsjn, The Vantage Point, p. 578 

Figure 7-2, Bnmbing Pauses Over North Vietnam (1965-1968) 

7-23


The US effort received little more thar, lip service 

from other nations. It did, however, provoke a rather interest;ng move by 

the Soviet Union, A Soviet friendship delegation, which was in Nou.th 

Vietnam ostensibly to increase its military support to the DRV, 

reportedly 

attempted to exert some influence on Hanoi to seek a negotiated settlement 

with the US.57/ The DRV would riot budge, and on January 4 released the 

following statement: 

The United States authorities' talks about peace are 

in complete contradiction with their war schemes and 

actz. While making noise about its "peace efforts", he 

United States is making feverish preparations to double 

the United States military strength in Vietnam.58/ 

President Johnson responded du.ring his i2 January 1966, 

State of the Union Aadress, when he pledged that the US would stay in RVN 

"until the aggression has stopped." He added, "We will meet at any conference 

table, we will discuss any proposals--Four points or fourteen or 

forty--and we will consider the views of any groups. We will work for a 

ceasc-fire now or once discussions have begun. We may have to face 

long hard combat or a long, hard conference, or even both, at once ."59/ 

Furthermore, during the ;peech, Johnson noted that the bombing pause, then 

twenty days old, had not yet produced any response from the North Vietnamese.60/ 

The ruh toward: nare ,frinn the 3 7 -dra, hnmhing h.1t 

was not a well-coordinated effort. US actions in the combat arena (where 

the decreased VC/NVA activity following the bombing pause gave the appearance 

of tacit reciprocity) served to mitigate against the peace gestures 

and pronouncements. Eleven thousand more US comoat troops landed in RVN 

during the period and a large combined combat operation was launched in 

the so-called Iron Triangle, a 1C stronghold near Saigon. 

Shortly thereafter, 

an even larger search and destroy operation was laLnched by the US 

First Cavalry Division and US Marines in the II Corps Tactical Zona. 

Whetrer intentionally or not--there is some evidence that US leaders knew 

what they were doing 61/--the deployment hintEd at a tenaency that would 

7-24


arise again, to develop second thoughts about an initiative and then back 

away from it. 

January 28, 

when the US 

Ho Chi Minh ridiculed the US "peace offensive" in a 

1966 letter. His acerbic note stated that "at the very moment 

government puts forward the so-called new peace effort, it is 

frantically increasing US strength in South Vietnam", and he railed against 

"stepped-up" US combat operations and "scorched-earth policy,"62/ Ho 

continued to get favorable propaganda coverage in the world media from the 

American's ambivalent, occasionally blundering, and sometimes uncoordinated 

peace initiatives. 

On Monday, January 31st, after thirty-seven days of 

bombing pause, President Johnson ordered a renewal of the sustained air 

attacks on the North. 

The "peace offensive" had failed. 

5) More Initiatives: Marigold, Sunflower, et al. 

decision to intervene with US 

By 1966 the Americanization of the war was set. The 

combat forces had been made and the fundamental 

strategies for the ground and air wars had been set. There was 

little change until after Tet in 1968. 

Attempts to secure the elusive and 

secondary prize of negotiations continued to elude the Johnson administration. 

LBJ continued his search--at times groping--for the 

r+t% +-' t negetiznnc At hi 5 dircrtion thn US tried to: 

a develop a channel to Hanoi tnrough the Polish member of the 

International Control Commission (code name: "Marigold") in June 

1966 

. enlist the Soviet Union's help while attending funeral services 

for Indian Prime Minister Shastri and dt the Glassboro summit 

meeting in 1967 

. establish direct talks between US diplomats and North Vietnamese 

diplomats on station in Moscow 

, use unofficial "volunteers" such as Italiaii professor Giorgio La 

j Pira, American peace advocate Peter Weiss, Harvard professor 

Henry Kissinger; and several pacifist clerics 

7-25


* elicit the assistance of other nations such as Romania, Sweden, 

Norway and Italy. 63/ 

Initially "Marigold" showed some promise. The Polish 

representative to the ICC relayed to Ambassador Lodge that Ho Chi Minh 

would enter- into serious negotiations with, the US if bombing was suspended, 

He also indicated that the DRV position das very flexible; that is. 

* they would neither demand the establishment of a Socialist regime 

nor the neutralization in the South 

* they would rot interfere with the Saigon government 

0 they would consider a reasonable calendar for a US withdrawal 

from the South.64/ 

USG officials were suspicious about this initiative 

which was tagged with the code name of "Marigold" and given very "close 

hold" treatment on a "need to know basis."65! 

Durino the early months of the "Marigold" initiative, 

the war grew hotter, which in all likelihood hampered real progress towards 

r formal negotiations. At a critical point during the month of December 

1966, when the US Ambassador to Poland was preparing for a particularly 

sensitive meeting with Polish emissariez, ()S bombers struck very sensitie 

targets in the vicinity of Hanoi. The target selection was cleared 

through the White House in mid-November, but bad weather delayed the 

strikes.66/ Knowledgeable observers 67/ have concluded that top US policy 

makers simply forgot that the planned raids had been delayed, and those 

working on "Marigold" at the lower levels of the government burec-uracy did 

not know about them. 

Subsequent raids were not cancelled, and as a result, 

contacts with the DRV repr sentatives ceasid, "Marigold" went the route of 

all previous initiatives--tthe dead end. 

Apart from "Marigold," one major project--called 

"Sunflower"-- produced brief hope, especially with mid-level government 

bureaucrats, that the DRV miqht respond. In January 1967, the US passed a 

message to the North Vietnamese embassy in Mcscow proposing secret, facet3-face 

talks (the DRV 

wanted secrecy because of the PRC's opposition to 

•I negotiations of any kind).68/ DRV intransigence and US impatience led to 

7-26


•" 

the collapse of "Sunflower" and sowed the seeds of disillusionment 'n 

official Washington. 

of i i l Wa h n t n "Sunflower" was followed by L-BJ's San Antonio Formula-- 

an offer to again stop the bombing if the action would lead to prompt 

productive talks. 

The president also sweetened the ante by acquiescing to 

the idea of direct contacts between the GVN and NLF, 

done some good much earlier in the conflict, The DRV 

a move that might have 

responded by brushing 

the US initiative aside. Australian communist journalist Wilfred Burcnett 

described the DRV attitude when he wrote that "Hanoi was in no mood for 

concessions or bargaining," and that "there is an absolute refusal to offer 

anything except talks for the cemsaticn of the bombardment."69/ 

The San 

Antonio Formula was soon forgotten when the Communist forces launched their 

suicidal Tet Offensive. 

6) The Breakthrough: the Start of Talk About Talks 

Tet lEd to the resolution of a year-long debate within 

the Johnson administration over deciding on a unilateral halt to the bombing 

of the north. 

Those in favor of a cessation argued that a bombing halt 

would promote negotiations; those against, that it would prove too great a 

risk to take with the lives of US GI's in RVN. LBJ's new Secretary of 

Defense, Clark Clifford, after a thorough re-appraisal of the US role in 

the war, concluded that because the MVR was not interested in negotiations, 

a Dombing halt would not produce them, 

and that in any case, the US would 

be hard pressed to enter such talks from a position of strengtil.70/ Nevertheless, 

President Johnson called off bombing north of thie 20th paralel 

and stAted that "even this very limited bombing of the North could come to 

in early end . . if our restraint is ,,atched in Hanoi."71/ Hanoi 

responded promptly (in 4 days), calling the US action "a perfidious trick", 

however, they made it ,uite clear that they wanted to establish contact 

with US representatives, The DRV, after suffering severe losses during 

Tet, was seeking ar unconditional end to all bombing of the North (and 

other US "acts" of war), because tne bombing was beginning to interfere 

with their ability to resupply NVA elements operating ir the South. Hanoi 

was finally ready to talk, but only about talks and not atout a cessation 

of hostilities. 

7-27


Ambassador Harriman got back into the peace talks 

picture by working out a plan for secret negotiations in Paris. 

formal talks were held, his efforts were frustrated by a DRV 

Though 

offensive in 

the South and a corresponding hardening of LBJQs position with regard to 

the risk3 involved in announcing a total bomuing halt.. On November 6, 

1968, the talks finally got underway, only to be plagued by the GVN's 

unwillingness to sit at the same table with the NLF, among other issues. 

Other analysts have suggested that the elpction of Richard Nixon in 1968 

4 also contributed to the eroding of the chance for a military settlement in 

the fall of that year. 72/ 

7) Outcomes of tr,e Mid-Phase Init;atives 

This phase sao the 'evel of US involvement in Vietnam 

increase to the point where the US was actually at war. Thereafter, the 

prospect of obtaining a negotiated settlement became 

less likely., There 

were some US officials who believed that the war could be "won": others 

thought that the "US must give clear evidence that it intends to win in 

South Vietnam" Lefore Hanoi would be willing te negotiate.73/ 

believed that the DRV 

Still others 

wct.ld be ,Forely pressed by US/GVN combat forces in 

the South and US bombing in the North. "hus, they believed that by 

stages, the DRV would withdraw their support for the VC, and the war would 

subside 3nd eventually disappear, leaiing neither side faced with the 

knotty problenm of fdce-to-face negotiations. 74/ Those official perceptions 

tended to stiffen US terms for a negotiated settlement during this phase, 

8) Ijgmact of the Mid-Phase In;tiatives 

The US soun discovered that limited military pressure 

on Hanoi was not having any impact on their attitude toward negotiating. 

Selective bombing, 

which was supposed to be a suotle diplomatic orchestration 

of ,ignals and 

way to sustained reprisals. 

the enemy. 

incentives--an excercise in carrots and stlcks--gave 

It succeeded in neither signaling nor smashing 

As the war intensified ii 1966 and 1967, the prospects 

for negotiation~s dimmed. Disagreement continued amcng USG officials on thL 

appropriate -,inimum position that would be acceptable to Hanoi. 

The DRV 

7-28

THE BO3V CORPORATION 

remained adamant in refusing to enter into talks as long as the bombing of 

the North coninued. And the efforts of allies of both sides to arrange 

talks tended to convince each that the other wis insincere about negotiations 

in the fi-st place, During these years, the search for a basis for 

negutiation was also complicated by the fact that, to both the US and the 

DRV, the war appeared winnable. That is, by 19G7, in the view of the USG, 

the political and military situation in RVN had diramatically improved over 

what it had been in 1964 and 1965. And Hanoi saw victory because it was 

beginning to expand 

authority of the GVN 

its political control to areas under the nominal 

ano it saw the US presence (and thereby the US impact 

on the long-term revolutionary struggle) as only temporary. 75/ 

The shock of the DRV's Tet offensive led to a change in 

the US position on bombing. President Johnson, his policy of persistence 

in support of South Vietnam severo1y shaken, 

bombing, 

But as in Korea, 

ordered a limitation of the 

withdrew from the election race and invited the DRV to negotiate. 

the start of formal negotiations in Paris in 1968 did not 

signal the beginning of the end of the war. 

9) Analysis of the Mid-Phase Initiatives 

The search for negotiations with the DRV during this 

phdse is crobably one 3f the most. fr!,itiess chapters in the history of US 

diplomacy. White House sources 76/ reportedly estimated as many aa 2,000 

individual efforts were made to initiate talks. Or 432 of the over 800 

days of the air war against the DRV, US aircraft were either restricted in 

their targets or :ompletely prohibited from bombing in the hope of encouraging 

a favorable North Vietnamese response to a negotiating initiative. 

V ,In his memoirs, Preside.,t Johnson noted that there were some seventy-two 

negotiations initiatives which he personally followed (those listed in 

Figure 7-3 were considered by LBJ to he the most significarn ).77/ 

"As I look back," President Johnson said of the efforts 

to start negotiations, "I think that we perhaps tried too hard to spell out 

our honest desire for peace .... 

These numerous appeals through so many 

channels may well have convinced the North Vietnamese that we wanted peace 

at any price."78/ Johnson and hls advisers were, in fact, pessimistic 

7-29


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about a negotiated settlemeot from the start, believing that Hanoi would 

seek negotiations only to end the bombing and not the war.. 

LBJ's characterizations 

71/ of the search for negotiations were based on an increasingly 

embittering experience. 

Several observers have noted 8C/ 

that although President 

Johnson had a fundamentally sound understanding of how the North 

Vietnamese approached war and ihegotiations, he failed to grasp the fact 

that US goals--a successful outcome from a limited way and a pulitical 

settlement--could be achieved neither by fightirng nor by negctiating. 

Johnson's failure to get substantive talks underway and bring the war to 

successful conclusion before the presidential primaries in 1968 cost him a 

f-econd ternr of office. 

Inconceivable as it may seem, the Johnson Administration 

failed to establish a set strategy for negotiationb There were no 

clear negotiating objecties. The 14-points offereQ in December 1965, 

served only as a point of departure. What the LIS wanted to do was to get 

the DRV to si, down and talk., The US was willing to talK on almost any 

terms.81/ 

The way the US was organized for peace left much to be 

desired. President Jnohson's focal point for the peace operation was 

Ambassador Averell Harriman. He was given little authority to take or make 

new initiatives, which remained the domain of Secretary of State Rusk. 

Harriman haj no mandate for peace from thi President. 

He had no staff to 

speak of, only a seemingly endless number of well-intentioned contacts who 

wanted to be conduits fut peace in Vietnam., By any standard, it wat not a 

well organized effort. 

In the public arena, between 1965 and 1968, the various 

parties publicly stated their positicns in a variety of forums: the DRV 

announced Four Points, th,. NLF put forth Five Points, Saigon advanced Sever 

Points and the US promulgated its own Fourteen Points (see Figure 7-4 A and 

B for a graphic portrayal of each). These pronouncements produced P fairly 

wide area of apparent agreement on some general principles--that the Geneva 

accords :ould form the basis of a settlement, that American croops 

7-31


NORTH VIETNAM'S FOUR POINTS 

NLF's 

1< alliance 

1. The US imperialists 

1. Recognition of the basic nationdl rights of the Agreements, the most bre 

Vietnamese people--peace, independence, sovereignty, the sworn enemy of the Vi 

unity, and territorial integrity. According to the 2. The heroic Scuth Vi 

Geneva agreements, the US Government must withdiaw from drive out thý US impe 

South Vietnam US troops, military personnel, and South Viet,'am, achieve 

weapons of all kinds, dismantle all US military bases peaceful a.,d neutral 5 

ttiere, and cancel its military alliance with South national reunification. 

Vietnam. It must end its policy of intervention and 

aggression in South Vietnam, According to the Geneva 3, Toe valiant South 

agreements, the US Government must stop its acts of war Vietnair liberation army 

again-t North Vietnam and completely cease all sacred duty to drive ou 

encroachments on the territory and scvereignty of the 

liberate South Vietnam ar 

DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam]. 4. The South Vietnemes 

gratitude to peace- and 

2. Pending the peaceful reunif-cation of Vietnam, over for their wholehea 

while Vietnam is still temporarily aivided into two readiness to receive al 

zones, the mi.,tary provisions of the 1954 Geneva and all other war mater 

agreements on Vietnam must be styictly respected, The five continents. 

two zones must refrain fro.a entering into any military 

with foreign countries and there ,must be no 5. To unite the entire 

"foreign iilitary bases, troops, or military personncl continue to march. forwar 

in their respective territo.'y, 

fight and defeat the US 

traitors, 

"3 . The internal affairs Lf South Vietnam must be 

settled by the South V;etnamese people themselves in SOURCE: Premier Dhan, Van Dong, 

accordance with the program of the NLFSV [National National Assembly of t- 

Liberation inefrne Frent of South Vietnam] without any foreign 

Studies, pp. 167-168, 

interference. 

7 ANALYSIS: The abCve pronouncer 

4. The peaceful reunification of Vietram is to be apparent aogeement on some gener 

settled by the V-etnamese oeopte in both zones, without could form the basis of a settlem 

any foreign interference, dra' n ultimateiy th3t the reunif 

was the desire of both N'rth and 

between the Vietnamese, and that 

contain any foreign bases.. 

three of the DRV's four 

%s a 

Poini. 

stumbling blocks developeo rom ti 

SOURCE. From report of Pcmier Pha7 Van DongArril 8, ment; for South Vietnam Ps bett 

1965, as transmitted by Radio Hanoi, April 13 Saigon's rejection of a separate 

1965 (The New York Times, April 14, 1965), Communist's contention that the GVI 

disagroeme.it surfaced over the At 

indeedi. Hanoi never admitted that 

Tnward Peace) 

4 541 .*SW 

Fiqa-e 7-4A. 

Announced Neqo

•IVE POINTS* UNITED STATES' FOURTEEN POINTS* 

rare the saboteur of the Geneva L.. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an 

ken warmonger and aggressor and 

adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia; 

ktnamese people.. 2, We wo:ld welcome a conference on Southeast Asia or 

Otnamese people are resolved Lo 

any part thereof; 

!lalists in order to liberate 

r an independent, democratic, 

3. We would welcome "negotiations v.ithout precondi- 

tions" as the 17 nations put it; 

muth Vietnar, with a view to 

4. We would welcome 

S~President Johnson put it; 

unconditional disussions as 

hetnamese people and the South 

4are resolved to fulfill their 5• A cessation of hostilities could be the first 

the US imperialists so as to order of business at a conference or could be the 

• defend North Vietnam. 

subject of preliminary discussions; 

people express their profound 6 Hanoi's four points could be discussed along wi-,h 

justice-loving people the world 

other points which others might wish to propose; 

ited support and declare their 7. We want no US bases in.o5Lfi Asia; 

) assistance including weapons 

tals from +heir f-iends on the 8, We do not aesire to retain US tr-oops in South 

Vietnam after peace is assured; 

ppeople, arm the entire neople, 9. We support free elections in South Vietnam to give 

k heroically and be resolved to 

the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice; 

~aggresso-s arid th1 Vietnamese lO, The question of reunification of Vietnam should be 

determined by the Vietnamese through their own free 

decision; 

ixcerpts from his report delivered to the II. The countries of Southeast Asia can be non-aligned 

W DRV on April 8, 1965, The Vietnamese or neutral if that be their option, 

12. We would ruch prefer to use our resources for the 

pents produced a fairly wide area of economic reconstruction of Southeast Asia than in wars 

%l principles--that the Geneva accords I there c is peace, North Vietnam cout d participate in a 

mt, that American troops would be witn- regi s eaort Vietnam ould par e in a 

!ication of Vietnam should come (if that regionat effort to which we would be prepared to con- 

South) about through direct negotiatios tribute at least one billion dollars; 

'(after a settlement) Vietnam would not 13. Tne President has said, "The Vietcong would not 

Smatter of fact, the US indicated that have difficulty being represented and ha.ing their 

6 wre acceptable. Regardless, major views represented if for a moment Hanoi decided she 

ie US rejection of any internal arrange- wanted to cease aggression.. I don't think that would 

ýIed cn tne basis of the NLF program; be an insurmountahie problem," 

, " political role for the NLF; ano, the 14. We have said publicly and privately that we could 

was a puppet regime cf the US, Further ý 

kwtus of the GRV's forces in the Southe stop the Dombing of North Vietnam as a step toward 

ts ofthead's forces in the South;ee Step peace although ther'ý has not been the slightest hint or 

t hsuggestion 

from'the other side as to what they would do 

if the bombing stopped. 

SOURCE: 

From Department of State Bulletin, January 

24, 1966, p 5 116. 

ýiation Positions: The DRV, NLF and US 733/34


A COMPARATIVE ANALYSI: BY SECRETARY OF STATE RUSK OF THE 

PROPOSED FIRST STEPS TOWARD PEACE 

1. A reconvering of the Geneva conference of 1954 and a return to the 

agreements of 1954. 

2. A reconvening of the Geneva conference of 1962 on Laos and a rpturn to 

the agreements of 1962. 

3. 

4. 

A conferenre on Cambodia, 

An all-Asian ?eac3 conference, 

5. A special effort by the two cochairmen, Britain ana the Soviet Union, 

to approach thc two sides for a peaceful settlement. 

6, A scecial effort by the International Control Commissicf. - india, 

7. 

Canada, Poland - to probe the two sides for a peaceful settlemen~t. 

A role for the US, tne Security Council, the General Assembly, the 

Secretary-General. 

8. Talks through intermediaries, either singly or as a group. 

9, Direct talks either with the Government of South Vietnam or with the 

US 

10. An exchange of prisoners of war (POW). 

11. The supervision of the treatr.ent of POWs by the international Red 

Cross. 

12, Demilitarize the DMZ, 

13. 

14, 

Or widen and deiilitarize the DMZ. 

The interposition cf international forces between the combatant.. 

k15 

The mutual withdrawal of foreign forces including the forces of North 

Vietnam from South Vietna. 

16. Assistance to Cambodia to assure its neutrality and territory. 

17. 

18., 

The cessation of bombing linked with the stop of infiltration. 

A cessation of the augmentation of US forces. 

19, Three suspensions of bombings in order to permit sericus talks. 

20. The discusson of the DRV's Four Points along with whatever points 

others might raise, soch as Saigon's Four Points and our own Fourteen 

Points. 

21, Or discussion of an agreea four points as a basis for negotiation. 

22. A willingness to find the means to have the views of th2 Liberation 

Front heard in peace discussions. 

23. Negotiations without conditions, negociations about conditions, or 

private discussions ab.ut a final settlement. 

24. If peace, then the inclusion of North Vietnam in a large development 

program for all of Southeast Asia, including North V'etnam 

25. The Government of South Vietnam to be determineo bv free elections 

among he people of South Vietnam, 

26. Thc question of reunification to oe determined by free elections among 

the peoples of both Soutn Vietnam and North Vietnam 

27. Reconciliation with the Vietcong and readmission of its members to the 

body politic of South Vietnam. 

28, And South Vietnam's abi1ty to be neutral in the future, if it :a 

chooses. 

NOTE: Adapted from Secretary Rask's remarks at a White House luncheon for 

General, Westmoreland on April 28, 1967. Rusk introduced the list as representing 

"'h. proposals which we and other governments have mace pointing 

toward peace -n Southeast Asia during che past 2 or 3 years. . , . [Ojr, 

each of these we have said yes. and on each of these Hanoi has said no." 

SOURCE. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. 

Johnson, 1967, Book I,pv, 4-5-6. 

Figure 7-4B. 

A Comparative Analys's by Secretary of State Rusk 

of the Proposed Firs" Steps Toward Peace 

7-35

THE E£DM CORPORATION 

would bt withdrawn ultimately, that the reunification of Vietnam should 

come (if that was the desire of Doth ý.,Yth and South) about through direct 

negotiations between the Vietnamese, and that (after a settlement) Vietnam 

would not contain any foreign bases. As a matter oF fact, the US indicated 

[ munist's 

that three of the DRV's Four Points were acceptable.82/ 

Regardless, major 

stumbling blocks developed from the US rejection of any internal arrangements 

for South Vietnam as settled on the bas's of the NLF program; 

Saigon's rejection of a separate political role for the NIF; ana the Com- 

contention that the GVN was a puppet regime cf the US. Further 

disagreement surfaced iver the statu3 of the DRV's forces in the South; 

indeed, Hanoi never admitted that it nad forces in the South. 

There are several conclusions that one might draw from 

the material developed heretofore with respect to negotiations in this 

phase; they are that: 

0 the US had no set negotiating strategy 

* the US was poorly orqanized for negotiations 

* the US lacked imagination in its negotiating efforts 

* there was a failure of coordination within the USG with respect 

to negotiatiors 

. the incompatibility of the US and DRV styles of diplomacy produced 

a breaKdown of communication--especially in the preliminary 

phas,.s of the negotations. 

* the symbolic and incentive (car-ots and sticks) rationales for 

bombing backfired (and GVN officials viewed the 1968 bombing halt 

as signaling a withdrawal of US spirit, soon to be followed oy a 

withdrawal of US forccs) 

0 the DRV used negotiations as a means to get the boincing stopped 

I the 

in 1968 

(they needed an end to the bombing because they were 

preparing to fight a conventional war, which required long supply 

lines free from aerial attack and a secure near base in the North 

where supp ies could be marshalled) 

DRV carefully played out the negotiations according to the 

timing of the US presidential elections.83/ 

7-36

[ - w 

THE BDM CORPORATiON 

I 

A completely fair zjssessment of the above conclusions 

is difficult, at best, t-1 make with the limited material available, and it 

may nct be possible to do it thoroughly for many years, But it is clear 

than many critics have tended to cversimplify the problem. Given the 

conditions at the time, the means for motivat;ng all sides into taking 

rapid and dramatic action were not always present. All parties involved 

faced enormous difficulties. Indeed, the terdency of each side to overestimate 

the freedom of maneuver of the other certainly contributed to the 

distrust that developed over time, It caused the DRV to appear perversely 

obstinate and deceitful to the US, and the US to seem devious and obtuse to 

the DRV. 

Washington's hope for ending the war depended on success 

on the battlefield. Achieving a position of strength became an essen- 

Stial prerequisite for ncgotiations. LBJ quickly realized that such a 

position was not likly tx be achieved by merely strengthening the GVN. It 

became essential to ,ncrease military pressure on the DRV 

Hanoi to negotiate. 

and thus compel 

The DRV's leaders on the other hand, chose to refuse to 

neqotiate because they were convinced that: 

a the US could nct "win" the war as long as the NVA/VC could choose 

the time and place of the major battles (therefore control their 

own battlefield attrition) 

• the GVN would not make the internal reforms necessary to compete 

politically with the NLF 

0 the US and dorld public opinion would eventually force LBJ to 

call an end to the bombing of the North in return for the promise 

of negotiations. 

As a consequence of the foregoing, .4hen the US or 

intermediaries made proposals, the DRV assessed each in terms of whether or 

not the immediate situation on the battlefield permitted the offer to be 

rejected. 

I 

In the twilight of President Johnson's Administration, 

the US involvement in Vietnam began to level off and start its decline. 

7-37


Johnson ordered a limitation on bombing, withdrew from the election race. 

and invited the DRV to "talk" about initiating formal negotiations. 

He did 

not regard those decisions as irreversible at tne time, but they rapidly 

came to be seen that way, 

and little serious consideration was given during 

the remainder of the administration to raising the US 

troop level or renewing 

full-scale bombing. After much haggling and diplomatic maneuvering, 

followed by a prolonged harangue over procedures for the talks in Paris and 

a total bomabing halt ir November 1968, negotiations began at the end of the 

year. The initial talks may have been unproductive, but they were symbulic. 

The Nixon Adm,nistration brought with it the hope of a speedy 

settlement. 

3. Phase 3: The Paris Negotiations--The Nixon and Kissinger 

Years 

The Nixon Administration entered office determined to end the US 

involvement in the Vietnam1 Conflict, but they soon found themselves facing 

the same realities that had bedeviled President Johnson's administration. 

It did not take long for thi Prci.ent And his Assistant for National 

Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, to rule out a precipitous withdrawal of 

US forces from the war. 

0 demoralized the GVN 

They believed that such a withdrawal would have: 

0 encouraged communist aggression elsewhere 

0 caused allies to question the credibility of US commitme-,ts.84/ 

Kissinger later stated that President Nixon viewed the abandoniment of the 

RVN to the "tyranny of the communists" to be immoral as well a: 

potentially 

destructive of US efforts to build a new pattern of internationi! relations 

in the world.85/ Anucher factor which had an impact on early withdrawal 

was that the administration woula be vulnerable to charges from its conservative 

supporters that it waE 

not hard enough in its dealings with communists. 

And unless the administrati.•n could appear tough, it would be 

practically impossible for President Nixon to transfurm relations with the 

USSR and the PRC from confrontation to cooperation and detente. 

7-38


a., NSSt-,-l: Developing Objectives and Searching For a 

Strategy 

As part of his search for the best strategy to pursue in 

Vietnam, Nixon ordered Kissinger to give him all possible alternatives, 

Kissinger responded by circulating National Security Study Memorandum 

(NSSM) 

Number 1, in which he asked various government agencies to give him 

their separate views about the conduct of the war and the negotiating 

environment. The consensus was that it was time to get out. 86/ 

to NSSM 

In addition, there was general agreement by the respondents 

1 that the DRV was in Paris to negotiate for a variety of motives, 

but not primarily out of weakness., All USG agencies agreed that it was 

unlikely that the DRV had gone to Paris either to accept a face-saving 

formula for defeat or to give the US a face-saving way to withdraw. They 

concluded that the communists had been subjected to heavy military pressure, 

and therefore a desire to end thE losses and costs of the war was an 

element in their decision to negotiate. 

ooinion that Hanoi believed it could persist long enough to: 

Further, there was a concensus 

* obtain a favorable negotiated settlement 

0 undernine GVN and US relations 

* provide a better chance for PAVN victory in the South 

0 attain its ultimate goal of a unified Vietnam under communist 

control87/ 

There was sharp debate, however, between and within USG 

agencies about the effect or the possible outcome of a Vietnam settlement 

on the other Southeast Asian nations., 

A key reference document, National Intelligence Estimate 

(NIE) 50-68, which was used to formulate various agency views, tended to 

downgrade the once highly regarded "domino cheory." It stated that a 

settlement would permit the communists to take over the government of South 

* Vietnam, and, though not immediately, would be likely to bring Camboaia and 

Laos into the DRV's orbit, but that such developments would not necessarily 

unhinge the test of Asia.88/ Notably, the assessments in the NIE were 

supported by OSD, Department of Defense and DIA (Defense Intelligence 

7-39


Agency) ý.hi'.e the Arr.y, Navy, and Air Force Intelligence dissented. Within 

the Department GF State, the Bureau of Intelligence supported the NIE while 

[ the East Asian Bureau dissented, Interestingly enough, both the majority 

and the dissenters rejected the view that an unfavorable settlement in 

V 

Vietndm would invariably be followed by communist takeo¢'ers outs-de of 

Indochina.89/ 

NSSM-l 

With respect to Hanoi'. allies, it was tne view of the 

respondent agencies that Peking opposed negotiaticns with the US, 

while 'ascow preferred an early ngotiated settlement , n terms as favorable 

as possible to Hanoi. Neither the PRC nor the USSR were able (and apparently 

not very desirous) to exert heavy pressure on the DRV, although their 

military and economic assistance gage them important 13verage--the CIA 

noted that in competing for influe.ice the Chinese and Russians tended to 

cancel out each other. aome respondents felt that Hanoi was tendng to 

follow the YSSR's lead; however, for the long term they toought that the 

DRV's leadership was charting an independent course. 90/ 

Other "bottom line" conclusions of the NSSM were:., 

. that the GVN and allied position had been strengthened 

. that the GVN ;iad improved its political position, out was still 

vulneraile 

- that the RVNAF was not yet able to stand up alone to the VC/PAVN 

threat 

* that the enemy had suffered reverses although their essential 

objectives and strength to pursue th2m had not changed significantly. 

In his own 

Kissinger pointed out that the US 

assessment of the negotiating environment, Mr. 

had "lost sight of one of the cardinal 

maxims of guerrilla war: the guerrilla wins if he doe- not lose. The 

conventional army loses if it does not win.,"9l/ Kissinger was inclined to 

seek a negotiated agreement "that would end the US involvement."92/ In 

contrast, aides reported President Nixon believed at that time that "the 

only way to end the war by negotiations was to prove to Hanoi and Saigon 

that Saigon could win it."93/ 

7-40

i T THE BDMvl CORPORATION 

Notwithstanding the differences in views between the President, 

Kissinger ana the various key governmental agencies, there was 

general agreement on the necessity for forcefulness and decisiveness in the 

search for a negctiated aCreement that would permit the US to withdraw its 

combat Lroops and get back its POWs., 

Rooted behind the Nixon-Kissinger views on the Vietnam 

problem was the desire to establish trnd maintain a great-power equilibrium 

with the USSR and PRC. The reasons for the US involvement in Vietnam no 

longer seemed as compelling as they once were, Moreover, the need to seek 

equilibrium and improved relations with the previously hostile major 

nuclear powers through detente and rapprochemont, became very real and 

important. 

1) The Goal and Objectives 

After a brief period of gestation and assessment, 

President Nixon opted to actively seek a negotiated settlement in Vietnam.,94/ 

In reaching that decision, President Nixon was convinced that the 

fronly "trump card" the US had left was its preponderant military power, 

This was evidenced by the following quoto from Mr, Kissinger: 

No matter huw irrelevant some of our political conceptions 

or how insensitive our strategy, we ,-'e so powerful that 

Hanoi is simply unable to defeat us mi , arily. By its own 

efforts, Hanoi cannot force the withdrawal of American 

forces from South Vietnam. Indeed, a substartial improvement 

in the American military position seems to have taken 

place, As a result, we have achieved our minimum objective: 

Haioi is unable to gain a military v-ctory. Since it cannot 

force our withdrawal, it must negotiate about it.95/ 

* President Nixon had come to grips with the basic challange 

that faced his administration (very similar to the one France's de 

Gaulle faced in Algeria)--to withdraw from battlo as an expression of 

policy and not a, a collapse. The principal opposition it home came from 

those who wanted a ra. 'd withdrawal and immediate disengagement. Even 

though public opinion polls showed the majority of Americans eager for an 

hcnorable solution and firmly against capitulation, a sentiment Nixon was 

able to rally skillfully on several occasions. the momentum of American 

politics was moving in the direction of unilateral concessions.96/ 

7-41

THE BDM 

ORPORATION 

In arriving at the negotiating stratey, Nixon and 

Kissinger accepted i recommendation contained in NSSM-l 

Ahich was that any 

peace agreeme!.t should be aelayed for as long as possible to allow the 

GVN to strengthen its position.n Mr. Nixon feared, however, that if the 

negotiations were allowed to drag on too long, all parties (Hanoi, 

Saigon 

and official Washi~igton) would grow more intransigent. Obstacles to the 

negotiations as Mr, Nixon viewed them were: 

0 the DRV haa to have a reason to sign 

• the GVN wanted the communists out of the South and to oe left 

alone 

* the US military establishment would not have accepted a compromise 

(dt least at that tin'e). 

Mr, Kissinger felt the key to a negctiated agreement was for the US to 

avoid seeking to win at the conference table what could possibly be won on 

the field of battle.97/ 

objectives were set 

• a mutual cease-fire 

After the deliberations, the following negotiating 

• staged mutual withdrawals of external forces 

* "n early reIease of prisoners of war (POWs) 

0 internationally supervised electiens (to improve the political 

environment).98/ 

To complement those objectives, the US launched the 

Vietnamnzation Program and renewed its support of the GVN's Pacification 

effort, Respectively, each was designed to strengthen the RVNAF 

and pacify 

the countryside as well as allow the US to reduce its military presence and 

strengthen the popular support of the GVN. 

Those in the US who adv(cated keeping maximum pressure 

on the DRV 

saw tne Vietnamization Program ai the only domestically acceptable 

way of winding dcvr the war, They argLed chat it was the appropriate 

US counter to the commwunist tactic k fighting while negetiating., Oth2rs 

believci Vietnamization was acceptable but that the US should have begun 

7-42


unilaterally witndrawing its troops immediately, that is until no more than 

100,000 or so men remained, As one advocate of unilateral withdrawal put 

it, 

At least we have se,.arated the goal of te~lucirg th-. American 

prasence from factors we cannot ourselves control, namely, 

the level of combat in South Vietnam initiated by North 

Vietnam and Hanoi's intransigence in the Paris taik',.99/ 

Nearly everyone in the Nixon Adr, ,istration 

saw Vietnamization 

is the most feasible way to facilitate secret negotiatons with 

the URV--negotiations aimed at mutual troop withdrawels that would not 

involve loss of face for Hanoi and would ultimately pressure the GVN into 

reaching a political settiement with the NLF/PRG. 

While Vietnanization and US withdrawals proved to be 

responsive to the needs of the RVNAF as well as to US 

the costs of the war, 

domestic cr'ticism of 

they ultimately proved counterproductive to what the 

UZS *.,s seek'ng from the negotiations. The more the US would draw down the 

numbers of troops in Vietnam without making progress in negotiations, the 

less inLc.tive the DRV had to reach any agreement at all. Just as the US 

had given up a Dargaining "blue chip" by halting the bombing of the DRV 

when it did, 4t gave up another by withdriwing its troops without gaining 

concessions from the enemy. 100/ 

2) Getting Support: Invelving the Soviets and 

Buyir' Time at Home.: 

In May 1969, President Nixon delivered a major speech 

on Vietnam in which he oroposed a mutual withdrawal and cessation of hos- 

4 tilities and announced the withdrawal of 25,000 US troops. Mr. Kissinger 

showed an advance copy of the text to the Soviet Ambassauor to the US, 

Anatoli Dobrynin, and explained that if the Russians didn't help produce a 

settlement the US 

would "escalate the war."ll/ The President was seeking 

to pull-off a public relations "coup" at home--trying to weaken the ertemy 

tc the maximum extent possible, speed up the strengthening of the RVNAF and 

begin withdrawals--while reinforcing a perception held by Soviet leadership 

that he was a dangerous, hardline adersary. l02/ 

7 43


President Nixon's first gambit. 

with President Thieu, 

The pieces all seemed to be falling into place fnr 

During the June Il69 Midway Island meeting 

the South Vietnamese leader agreed to the idea of a 

US troop withdrawal and to Private contacts between Lhe U5 and the DRV at 

the presidential level., One mont., later, when Mr, Nixon made a surprise 

visit to Saigon, he told Preside,,t Thieu that continued US withdrawals were 

necessary to maintain America's pi'biic support., 

For t hat rpason, he argued 

it was impor-tant that the reductions appear to be on a systematic timetable 

3nd at the US's initiative. 103/ 

In October of 1969, Mr. Nixon met with Soviet Ambassador 

Dobrynin in an attempt to involve the Soviets further-in bringing the 

war to an "honorable conclusion". Through not successful, the meeting did 

serve to draw 

the Soviets into the negotiations picture a little more, 

especially since agreement on a Str'ategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT) 

began to play an 

ncreasingly important role between the two superpowers. 

Presir'ent Nixcr, spoke to the nation on November 3, a 

speech characterized by some as one oF his st-,ongest public perform3nces, 

The President successfully took his case to the American people, 

thereby 

galnlng the maneuvering room he needed in his searcn for "peace with 

honor.,"104/ 

Fhe speech had a shuck effect since it defied the protesters, 

the North Vietnamese, and all expectations by 

announcing no spectacular shift in our negotiating position 

and no trocp withdrawals., It appealed to the "great silent 

majority" of Americans to support their- Commander-in-Chief, 

Fcor the first time in a Presidential Statement it spelled 

out clearly what the President meant when he said he had "a 

plan to end the war'"--namely, the dual-track strdtegy of 

Vietnamizdtion and negotiations. And it made the point that 

Vietnamization offered a prospect of honorable disengagement 

that was not hostage to the other side's cooperation. 105/ 

Having settled on a strategy which was to be increasingly 

contested by a growing vocal minority of Americans, President Nixon 

bought some t 4 me for Vietnamization as well as for negotiations, Given the 

respite, Mr, Kissinger set about probing the pro'spects for negotiations-- 

the process where both sides tested their respective assessments of each 

7-44


other and began to shape a settlement from a seemingly intractable stale- 

=7.3 m a t e . 

b, A Return to Secret Negotiations 

The situation in the wir~ter of I?9 was 

lookir.i up for the 

new administration: there was a lull in the combat, the presdent ha( 

taken his case to tne people and the US public responded to the presiGent's 

Lall with suostantial support. The time appeared ripe for serious negotila-• 

[ tions; nowever, the North Vietnamese, who had stalemated the Paris Peace 

Talks for over a year, remained as intransigent and obstinate as ever. Mr. 

Kissilger, with the President's approval, 

thought the time right for secret 

negotiations. and through the eff rts of Genera] Vernon Walters, then 

Defense Attache in France, secret talxs were arranged in January, 1970.106/ 

And so Mr. Kissinger began what was to become an almost three-year secret 

search for a negotiated settlement to the war. The me,,44nrcs "n a small 

house situated in the Paris suburbs were attended by f[ 

an Thuy and 

his Special Adviser, Le Duc Tho, nigh ranking D'V Politburo member. Le Duc 

Tho, a strict Leninist whose "profession was revolution" and "vocation 

guerrilla warfare," ditected the efforts of the DRV 

[ tionlO_7/ 

negotiating delega- 

Le Duc Tho considered negotiations as another battlr. His 

idea of a negotiWtion was to out forard his unilateral 

demands. Their essence was fcr the US to withdraw on a 

deadline so short that the collapse of Saigon would be 

inevitahle. On the vay ouc we were being asked to dismaitie 

an allied government and establish an alternative whose 

composition would be prescribed by Hanoi. Any proposition 

that -ailed to agree with this he rejected as 'not concrete".108/ 

During a February, 1970, 

secret session, Mr, Kissinger, in a 

prepared statement, made the following points to the ORV negotiators- 

0 the US was seeking a settlement which would resolve the issues, 

once and for all. 

• Hanoi's combat position had not improved since the August 1969 

meetings 

RVN)., 

(especially with respect to the balance of fo,'ces in 

7-45


* the international situatio., hac changed, which could ipact or 

the undivided support, from their communist benefac'ors (reference 

was to the Sino-Soviet dispute). 

* the US w;- prepared to withdraw all its forces and retain no 

bases in Vietnam. 

a t he US, in F-ranging for a mrutual withdrawal!, would not insist 

The ORV representatives courtered by demanding total withdrawal 

of US 

trat the DRV's troops be placed ir, the same legal basis as Amer,- 

f.rces,109/ SCan 

-orces an. the replacement of the Thieu government before they 

woold "negotiate" with the uS In an attack on the US view of the military 

situatioi- in RVN, Le Duc Tho cut to Lne very ;:QZ' or 1re uS aliemma over 

Vietnamization, "Before, there we-e over a million UZ and puppet troops, 

and you failed, 

How can you succeed when you let ý ie puppet troops do the 

fight;ng? Now, with onl, US support, how can you win?"llO/ Le Duc Tho 

zoncluded that the militae-y and political problems should be dealt with 

' imultaneously--a position from which he never deviated until October 1972.. 

Accordingly, the only military subject for discussion was the unconditional 

liquidation of the US involvement in the corflictlll/ 

The first Iound of secret negotiations wit'i Le Duc Tho 

collapsed, much to Mr. Kissinger's disappoirtment, DRV diplomacy once 

again had correctly assessed the balance of forces in. South Vietnam. 

Duc Tho had developed an accurate sense of public opinioW 

Le 

in the US. The 

dilemmas of Vietnamization were very real, Philrsophical disagreements 

within che Nixon administration began to leak to the pr'ess, 

circunmstances, 

Given these 

Le Duc Tho could see no r-eason to modify his demands for the 

unconditional withdrawal of US 

Yroops and the ove throw of the Thieu governmeo-. 

Le Duc Tho would see no reasons "until two anu a half years 

later, when the milita-ry situation let 

h-m no other choicp."ll2/ 

c. A Wider Wart The Cambodian "zjideshow" and the Secre" 

War in Laos. 

1) The "Menu" Strikes - 1969 

Mr, 

Nixon had been in office hardl,' thirty days before 

the North Vietnamese la,!nched a countrywide offensive in South Vietnam, 

-46


The only contingency plan on hand was 

for the renewal of bombing of the 

North, an action backed strongly by the JCS, Though unpopular to practically 

all concerned, 

thete were few alternatives to the bombing cf the 

North left to pursue, The President and his National Security Adviser 

resistec such a decision, and instead they began to examine benefits to be 

derived from the bombinc of the North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia 

the sanctuaries shown S~(see in Map 7-1)., 

President Nixon, who had been in communication with DRV 

(sete dacuaring 

pehownins aapred-o)e 

officials during his administration's transition period, ,!a5 angered over 

the enemy's offensive, which had produced a large number of US casualties. 

After brief deliberations, he opted to secretly bomb Cambodian sanctuaries 

within five miles of the Vietnamese border. 

Critics 11Z/ sibsequently saw the secret expansion of 

1the war into Cambodia during that period as setting in train a course of 

events that was to destroy that "neutral" and "peaceful" country. in his 

memoirs, Mr. Kissinger 114/ pointed out that Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia 

did not protest the bombings Hanoi did not crotesL. tnem; in fact, its 

delegation in Paris accepted a US proposal for private talks on March 22 

within seventy-t,•o hours of the request. And the PRC and USSR rade no 

public Drotestacions to the bombing -.aids, 

Secretary of Defense Laird reported that MACV Commander 

General Abrams credited the bombing of the Cambodian sanctuaries by US B-52 

bombers (code name "Menu") ".s one of the most telling operations in the 

entire war,"l_5/ it disrupted enemy logistics, a*Gorted several enemy 

offensives and reduced the enemy threat to Saigon.116/ 

2) The Fight Fo, the Plain of Jars-1970 

In early 1970, Laos briefly became the focus of LIS 

concerns during a North Vietnamese cffensive which threatened to overrun 

northern Laob. 

The prospect of this happening portended grave implications 

for the security uf neighboring Thailand as well as South Vietnam. 

!anoi was 'ighting essei.tially two wars in Laos, ooth 

for the purpose of hegemony in Indochina. In the South the DRV fought to 

maintain the Ho Coi Minh Trail, which was their key link to the battlefields 

of South V;etnam (see Map 7-2). ind ir the North, they supported 

7-47

I-1.-...- 

THE;ýDM CORPORATION 

ORTH VIETNAPM:'-E BASE AREAS 

TARGET AREAS: 

BASE AREA 353("B REAK FAST") 

;i6 ARA 32 (DIN NER") 

BASEAREA.50,"DESSERT') 

BASEAREA351("SNACK") 

BASE AREA 740 ("SUPPER") 

BASE AREA 609 ("LUNCH") 

a 50 100MWLES 

I' 

0 50 100 KILOMETERS 

613 

-r~J H A L AN D 

CAM \0 D I A 

r MARCH 18, 1969 

U S BGI SECRET BOMBING 

701 

OfD NORTH VENMSOUT 

SACTNAMESE AN 

74SROP 

lIE ~ ~~~I CAMBODIA DECMIG'A uNrA~E 

SOUTHL C02NASE 

Map 

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70/7.,.8W 

SOURCE: ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Adpe3r51ssne~WieHus ~~~3 erp 4 

ot itms as ra n Mn"Srks16 A-.Cloi 

7-4T'8EA .. 34k-


IBRM 

7-i 

CFN JARSPH 

~~ LUANG PRABAN1G 

PLA!N *MUONG 

w OF soul 

- JARS 

x0 

*SAM T'HONG 

LONG IENGGULF OF TCNKIN 

I'TCHEPONE KHESANH~ 

I 

L~F ~ia!E~PLATEAU 

~BOLO-VENS 

lzj 

0 '0r,10 KIOMEER 

SOUCE:Adpte 

fom isirgr, hie His Yers p.4< 

~i p i aos 197 

-49


the Communist Pathet Lao in their 1ight to overthrow Premier Souvanna 

Phouma's Royal Laotian Army and CIA-supported Meo tribesmen led by General 

Vang Pao. 

President Nixon approved B-52 air strikes against DRY 

forces operating in northern Laos, and those coupled with successful 

counteroffensives launched by Laotian forces (supported by Thai volunteers), 

were enough to thwart the Noith Vietnamese attack and drive them 

from the strategic plains. 

military equilibrium in northern Laos was ,iai-itained, 

The Laos crisis subsided for the year and the 

Throughout this "war widening" period President Nixon 

and Mr, Kissinger pursued a military strategy that sought to pers,'ade Hanoi 

to compromise and negotiate. 

wrote: 

Reflecting on that period, a key official 

There was no purely diplomatic alternative. Unless military 

and political efforts were kept in tandem, both would prove 

sterile. Until 1972 Hanoi never gave us a p.:litical option: 

its negotiating position was to demand ojr unilateral withdrawal 

on a short deadline and the overthrow of the Saigon 

government, It did so because it believed itself to be 

winning; it chose compromise only after a military stalemate 

had become apparent1ll7/ 

3) The Cambodian Incursion 

The situation in Indochina began to deteriorate drastically 

in March and April of 1970, Mr., Kissinger's secret talks with Le 

Duc Tho were going nowhere; there was a significant ccmmurist offensive 

beginning in Laos, and the coup which had overthrown Sihanouk in Cambodia 

was followed by North Vietnamese attacks throughout the country, 

The first weeks in April saw numerous communist attacks 

on Cambodian towns and lines of communications. Intense enemy pressure was 

I 

put on the capital city of Phnom Penh, whose collapse seemed imminent. 

Further, the US faced the prospect of Sihan-iuk being returned to power by 

L, 

his newly cultivated communist benefactors. After deliberations and consultations 

with Ambassado.r Bunker and General Abrims, the NSC presented 

President Nixon with the following three tactical options:118/ 

9 doing nothing (preferred by State and DOD) 

'7-50

S~THE 

BDM CORPORAFION 

* attacking Cambodian Sanctua.'e3 with RVNAI forces only (preferred 

by Kissinger) 

* utilizing forces necessary -- to include US -- to neutralize all 

sanctuaries and bases (preferred by Bunker, Abrams and JCS) 

Vfrom 

Notwithstanding the anticipated domestic reaction, 

President Nix


Nixon walked the tightrope -- posing sufficient risk to the DRV 

to induce a 

settlement compatible with American international responsibilities and 

national honor while holding out hope to the US public that the end was in 

sight. 

Mr. Nixon, sensing the growing war-weariness in America, 

gave serious consideration to the following measures: 

9 a standstill cease-fire (to be followed by a formal diplomatic 

conference to sectle the war), or 

0 combine an all-out bombing with total withdrawal, or 

* blockade the North, resume bombing and simultaneously witndraw 

all forces. 

r It was decided to continue the drawdown of US combat 

and again test the DRV's will at both the publiic and private peace 

[troops 

talks. in the secret talks, Mr, Kissinge,- offered some minor concessions 

(ooie important--aft-r agreement, US wouli totaily "ithdraw from RVN--and 

the other cosmetic) to see if the effect3 of the Cambodian incursion had 

caused movement in the DRV's positional20/ 

wanted., 

There was little change in the DRV's oosition. They 

* an immutable deadline set for the withdrawal of US forces 

* all known non-cormunist leaders excluded from political participation 

an overthrow S• of the Thieu government 

The DRV maintained this negotiating position until Octooer 1972.121/ 

In an attempt at breaking the negotiating deadlock, Mr 

'. Nixon offered a standstill cease-fire, including a halt to US bombing 

throughout Indochina, in a speech on October 7, 1970. 

He proposed a peace 

conference to bring an end to the war in the .ountries of Indochinz. He 

expressed a re "ness to negotiate an agreed timetable for the total withdrawal 

of US troops (in the language or context of a mutual withdrawal). 

He inviLed Hanui to join with the !JS in a political settlemeit based ori the 

will of the South Vietnamese people. He offered to abide by th . outcree 

of the agreed political process but rejected as unreasonable the demand 

>-52


that the US dismantle the organized non-communists. And, finally, he 

called for the release by both sides of all POW's.122/ 

The Nixon proposal was rejected out of hand by the 

DRV's negotiators. In response, the President :.rae-ed a brief two-day 

return to bombing cf the North., 

There were three reasons for the brief return to bombing, 

which were, 

* to divert Hanoi's defenses from the Son Tay Raid (a raid to 

rescue US POWs) 

* to retaliate for the abrupt rejection of Mr. Nixon's peace proposal 

* to slow down the DRV's dry-season supply effort into the 

South. 123/ 

Under tremendous domestic pressure to announce a unilateral 

withdrawal, Mr.. Nixon announced the withdrawal of additional combat 

troops. He began to give consideration to an almost total withdrawal, and 

ne decided t3 couple that with a quarantine of the DRV and a resumption of 

heavy bombing. Mr. Kissinger cautioned against such a move early in 1972, 

on the ground& that it might hurt the prospects for Vietnamization succeeding 

and lead to the eventual collapse of the GVN. 124/ 

Meanwhile, Mr. Kissinger had developed a more practical 

strategy -- make substantial reductions in US forces until reaching a 

residual force of about 50,000 men (volunteers) by the summer of 1972, who 

would ',emain until a settlement was reached., As an added indu'cement for a 

settlement, he proposed to offer the DRV a more rapid vithdrawal program if 

they agreod to a cease-fire. If rejected, the US knev. tney wz,,4d be facing 

some kind of a DRV offensive in 1972 (during US presidential election year 

for maximum impact) and the outcome of the war would then depend on whether 

or not the RVNAF, aided only by US airpower, would be able to blunt the 

attack.125/ The strategy also called for the US to announce, sometime in 

1971, an end to US participatirn in ground combat operations., 

7-53

THl BDM CORPORATION 

For the new strategy to wcrk, it was necessary to 

punish and weaken the North Vietnamese as much as possible during the 

interval, 

Therefore the following actions were pursued: 

a a dry-season offensive was conducted in Laos in 1971 (by RVNAF 

forces with US air support) 

0 improved support "o Lon Nol's forces in Cambodia and continue 

bombings 

a increased deliveries of equipment in suppcrt of Vietnamization 

The RVNAF was only partially successful with their 1971 offensive into 

Laos; however they acquitted themselves later (when supported by US airpower) 

during the DRV's 1972 Easter Offensive, 

After Laos, the NSC staff began to assess the balance 

of forces in the conflict arena, 

They assessed the iipact of the earlier 

operations in Cambodia and Laos on the DRV capacity to launch an offensive 

in the 1972 dry-season, Because of setbacks, ths consensus opinion was 

that the DRV would probably have to wait until the iatter half of the 1972 

dry-season for staging their attack. The NSC estimate missed by only three 

weeks -- the US showed a much improved capabilitv to assess the balance of 

forces in the conflict. 126/ 

At that juncture, Mr, 

Kissinger had developed a sevenpoint 

plan which sought to bring tne US's negotiating proposals into line 

with its actions The plan included-, 

0 an offer to set a date for total withdrawal (with no demand for 

muzual withdrawals) 

* a proviso that the political future of South Vietnam be left up 

to the South Vietnamese people 

* that the DRV would stop its infiltration o• RVN and neighboring 

countries 

* a prohibition against reinforcement 

e an internationally-monitored cease-fire in-place throughout 

Indochina 

0 guarantees for the independence, neutrality and integriLy of Laos 

and Cambodia. 

7-54


0 a point calling for the immediate release by both sides of POWs 

and innocent civilians.127/ 

The new proposal marked a turning point for American 

diplomacy in Vietnem, and in essence it was accepted by the DRV about 

sixteen months later. It also served to isolate the military issues for 

separate solution: US withdrawal, cease-fire and return of POWs. It was 

accepted by in-country personnel and blessed by President Thieu (who 

changed his mind after the RVNAF's succe5s in 1972, when he felt he was 

winning). 128/ 

points with a demand that the US 

Eventually the DRV's negotiators responded to the seven 

pay reparations for the damage caused in 

the "war zones" of Vietnam, which the US rejected out of hand. However, the 

DRV 

would not countenance the withdrawal-for-prisoners exchange that was 

the staple of an on-going public American debate. Meanwhile, an eightpoint 

"peace" plan, submitted earlier by Madame Nguyen Thi Binh (Foreign 

Minister of the PRG) was receiving big play in the US Congress and the 

press. 

The administration found itself constrained from publically demonstrating 

the bogus aspects of Madame 

maintain secrecy. 

Binh's plan because of a desire to 

The USG's eagerness to make a breakthrough forced them 

to preserve a secrecy which enabled the ORV to whipsaw the administration 

between a public position they dared not rebut and a private record which 

they could not publish. 

President Nixon believed that the war had to be ended 

by mid-1972 (end of that year's dry-season).129/ To have waited until the 

next dry season would have taken the issue into the President's second 

term. Both the President and Mr. Kissinger believed that Hanoi was orchestrating 

its military actions with the US elections in mind. If Mr. Nixon 

showed any sign of weakness in his handling of the war, 

he faced the possibility 

of defeat at the polls or of being forced to make major concessions 

to growing anti-war elements. Consequently, he decided on a policy of 

applying maximum diplomatic and military pressure on the DRV to reach an 

agreement. With his domestic position greatly strengthened by his twin 

7-55


summits in Peking and Moscow, 

Hanoi 

President Nixon signalled the following to 

6 increased communist aggression would be countered swiftly 

0 the US was ready to sign an agreement to end the war before the 

next dry season (after the dry season and US elections, US terms 

would harden) 

* Hanoi's allies (USSR & PRC) saw the benefits of Getente so they 

were no longer willing to risk it for the sake of the DRV's 

struggle. 130/ 

A presidential aide uDserved at the time that, "it 

was the first time in 

the entire war that our use of force against Hanoi and our diplomacy with 

the Soviets and Chinese were coordinated solely for its effect r the 

negotiations, The P,-esident no longer wanted to win the war, he wanted to 

end it."131/ 

The "detente" diplomacy which met with success in 

Peking and Moscow had little effect on Hanoi.., On May 2, 1972, (the day 

before the northern-most province of RVN fell to the PAVN), Mr. Kissinger 

met secretly wit) Le Duc Tho for the thirteenth time. The loss of Quang 

Tri was a major test of Vietnamization and at that time was a major defeat 

for Saigon. 

It could not have come at a worse time in the negotiat'lons;" if 

anything, it 5uggested to the DRV that Quang Tri might have beeo to the US 

in 1972 what Dien Bien Phu had been to the French in 1954. 132/ 

days later, on 4 May, 

The secret talks with Le Duc Tho again got nowhere. Two 

the plenary sessions of the public Paris talks were 

suspended because of a complete lack of progress on all channels, A week 

later, President Nixon announced to the nation that the secret talks hdd 

broken down, 

and that he had ordered Haiphong Harbor to be mined along with 

other bcmbing and interdiction measures to be taken against the DRV. 

Nixon 

added that those measures would remain in effect until the day a Paris 

Agreement was signed, What the US sought, he said, was an internationally 

supervised "cease-fire in-place" throughout Indochina plus a POW exchange. 

He emphk-sized that after those terms were accepted by the DRV, US forces 

would begin their final withdrawal and complete it within four morths..133/ 

7-56


I 

At last, or so it seemed, the US was no longer fearful of Soviet or Chinese 

intervention in the conflict, and therefore could use the force necessary 

to bring about an acceptable end to US involvement. The DRV, sensing 

possible isolation and stalemate on the battlefield, began to make sounds 

like they wanted to gec. down to discussing matters of substance. 

d, An Agreement at Last 

By July 1972 with negotiations again underway in earnest, 

there was apparent agreement on the following issues:. 

e 

the principle cf a total US withdrawal 

* the release of POWs 

* the reaffirmation of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements 

9 an internationally supervised cease-fire in-place at the end. 

Howevwr, two basic disputes remained. They were: 

* the demand for reparations, and 

* the DRV's insistence that the US overthrow the GVN.134/ 

Mr. 

Kissinger noted sigrificant movement cn the part of the 

DRV throughout the summer. Hanoi, probdbly convinced that Presidert Nixon 

would be much stronger after the November presidential elections, began -o 

press for quick settlement. The bombing and mining was having their 

iimpact. Kissinger saw this as "a great opportunity; unless it was grasped 

the US nood was sch that even with an overwhelming mandate, Nixon would 

quickly be pushed against the grindstone of congressional jressures to end 

the wa7 on almost any terms."135/ 

Tn October 1972, after an unprecedented four-day secret 

session in Paris, Le Duc Tho presented the PRV's new proposals. 

Included 

was a military settlement -- withdrawal, POWs, cease-fire -- and a separate 

political solution -- dropping demands for a coalition government and 

accepting only an "Administration of National Concord,"137/ Tr~y no longer 

insisted on an end to US military aid to RVN 

after an agreement. Moreover, 

the DRj agreed to cease their infiltration into RVN, which iý observed 

would have guaranteed the erosion of North Vietnamese stay-behind ("leopard 

spots") elements in the South. 

7-57


Mr,. Kissinger, feeling that "peace was at hand", traveled to 

SSaigcn to gain the concurrence of President Thieu.. Thieu, strengthened by 

recent country-wide elections, scuttled the proposed agreements. He 

accused the US of "conniving to sell him out.i"137_/ Mr. Kissinger, forced 

to return to Washington empty-handed, was barely back when thp DRV, hoping 

to force Mr. Nixon's hand, 

proposal, 

went public and broadcast the terms of the new 

They then accused the US of stalling on its implementation. 

Mr, Kissinger held a press conference shortly thereafter in 

order to state the American position, He also used the conference as I 

forum to let Hanoi know the US was still standing Dy 0he basic understanding, 

and to let Saigon know that the US 

was determined to proceed on 

its course, An unfortunate display of optimism by Kissinger at the news 

briefing caused the administration some embarrassment. Some accused the 

Nixon people of playing politics with the peace negotiations;138/ others 

complained that the terms had been available four years before but were not 

acceptable to the US at that time, 

The President found himself in a bind. 

He was reluctant to 

impose terms on President Thieu, but he did not want to lose the concessions 

gained through long hard talks with the DRV. Mr, Kissinger returned 

to Paris in November 1972, and found the DRV less eager fo' an agreement 

when President Thieu's reservations were brought up. Meetings in November 

and December led nowhere, and on December 13th a discouraged (issinger 

returned to the US, He was convinced that the DRV had been determniiod not 

to allow the agreement to be completed.139/ 

Administration advisers recommended a military response tc 

the DRV's new intransigence. President Nixon ordered a resumption of the 

bombing (known 

as the Christmas bombing) on December 18th, which lasted for 

twelve days. On the day the bombing was resumed, the US proposed that 

talks be reasumed, 

Hanoi agreed on December 30th to begin again on January 

8, 1973. Kissinger was positive "we had won our gamble and the the next 

round of negotiations would succeed,"140/ 

7-58


Sremaining 

The January 8, 1973 meeting produced agreement on the 

issues, which were- 

0 o to designate the DMZ as a provisional military demarcation 

between two parts of Vietnam -- tnus recognizing the separate 

entiLy of South Vietnam 

0 to restrict military movement across the DMZ 

* to develop a formula whereby the PRG and GVN per se, were not 

mentioned in the agreements document, 

Shu,:ly thereafter, General Alexander Haig was given the 

mission of flying to Saigon with an ultimatum that the US 

would sign the 

peace agreements. if neceSsary, without President Thieu's concurrence, 

General Haig delivered a scorching letter from President Nixon to Thieu on 

Jinuary 16th, Its crucial paragrapih read: "I have irrevocably decided to 

initial the Agreement on January 27, i973, in Paris. I will do so, if 

necessary, alone. In that case I shall have to explain publicly that your 

government obstructs peace, 

The result will be an inevitable and immediate 

termination of US econom~c and military assiscance."141/ On January 21st, 

Thieu relented. 

On January 23, 1973, Mr. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho met for 

the last time in Paris. Prior to signing the agreements, Le Duc Tho was 

reported to have insisted on ironclad assurances of American ecoromic aid 

to North Vietnam. Mr, Kissinger told him that tnis could no+ be discussed 

further until after the agreement was signed; also that it depended on 

congressicoial approval and on observance of the agreement.142/ The Paris 

Peace Agreements were initialed then by Kissinger and L2 Duc Tho, both of 

whom were to become re:ipients of the Nobel Peace Prize for a peace that 

never came to Vietnam and Indochina. 

e. Outcomes of the Third Phase 

When he assurmed office, President Nixon recognized that the 

war was not winable. Convwrsely, the DRV was unable to gain a military 

victory while US troops dere engaged in the combat arena, Under chose 

circumstances, Nixon and his special assistant, Mr, Kissinger, devised a 

strategy which would al'ow the US to withdraw from the war as an expression 

of policy and not as of collapse. 

7-59


•" 

The Nixon-Kissinger tandem orchestrated a glooal strategy -- 

detente with the Soviet Union, and rapprochemont with China -- which eventually 

isolated the DRV, They applied sufficient milit,-ry pressure on 

"Cambodian and Laotian sanctuaries to help create a stalemate between the 

balance of forces in RVN. In addition, they Dromoted unilateral .S withdrawals, 

applied in conjunction witn Vietnamization (and Pacification 

support) to insure a maintenanca of stalemate conditions on the battlefield. 

Notwithstanding Congressional and med~a pressures as well as 

public outcries, Nixon persisted and the strategy and tactics finally paid 

off. The DRV was brought to the table, and when they exhibited intransigence, 

they were brought back in line with massIve, effective bombing and a 

ebvmining of their ports. Many agree that mili~arily, the Christmas bombing 

(Linebacker-2) was one of the most successful US operations of the wa,- 143/ 

The B-52's evasion tactics nad decisively defeated the DRV's SAM (surfaceto-air 

missile) defense systen in the North, and not a single SAM was left. 

The bombing destroyed the vital military supplies that it had taken Hanoi 

months to get because of the naval blockade.. 

In the end, the HS got back its POWs and disengaged itself 

from the war, However, official iy it was for-ced to recognize that from a 

politicai, spiritual and legal standpoint it could no longer demand a 

withdrawal of the northern (leopard spot) forces from the South. 

rhe negotlitions provided the US with a legitimate vehicle 

through which it ended a decade of direct involvement in Vietnam. What 

happened later would deperd on whether the military stclemate, tihat allowed 

the political solition to develop and made an agreement possible, would 

last. It did not last, and in 1975, 

after committing numerous treaty violations, 

the DRV crushed South Vietnam. 

f. Impacts of the Third Phase 

Nixon's global and military strategy isolated the DRV from 

its allies and forced a stalemate on the battlefield. President Thieu was 

fenced to accept an agreement to which hc had not been a party to. The 

American public, traumatized by over a decade of war, got back its POWs 

and 

7-60


a "peace with honor.," And the DRV was allowed to leave its leopard spot 

strongholds in the South, 

Probably the mtst significant impact during this period was 

in the relationships between the White House and Congresb, 

beleagured by the Watergate break-ir scandal, 

The President, 

lost continued congressional 

support for his Vietn.vm policy., In August 1973, the Congress made it 

impossible to further use any military forces in Southeast Asia, thus 

giving the DRV 

a free hand to do whatever they pleased in violation of the 

Paris agreements, Mcreover, the Congress withheld the military essistance 

funds needed to keep the South Vietramese supplied with munitions., 

Furthermore, in 1973, the President had his powers to make 

war severely restricted, The Congress passed the War Powers Act over his 

veto, This act dra3tlcally limits the President's traditional freedom of 

action in strategic decisionmaking in that it prevents him from sending 

armed forces into action or into an area where hostilities are indicated 

I 

except in a national emnergency created by an attack on the US, 

its territories, 

possessions, or its armed forces, 

Even then he must withdraw such 

forces in 60 days unless Congress acts to declare war, 

Sg. Analysis of the Third Phase 

On humanitarian grounds, some 144/ have argued that dn 

agreement with Hanoi was probably possible in Uecember 1972, without the 

final paroxysms of the Christmas bombings, Others 145/ claim that an 

agreement could have been had in 1971 (i.e., before the DRV 

launched their 

Easter Offensive in 1972) if the US had done a better job of articulating 

the "in-place" aspects of its cease-fire proposal, Still others 146/ hold 

that a treaty was available much earlier, and that the expansion of the war 

into Cambodia ard Laos through incursions and bombings in 1970 and 1971 set 

in train a course of events which destroyed those countries. All tend to 

overloolk the realities of the negotiating environment. 

Hanoi did not view 

the vc" and negotiatio-,3 as separate processes., They sought to neyotiate 

from strength 

Throughout the period, they continued to use all of Indoc[hina 

to strengthen their military hand in the South and gain the advantage 

in the balance of forces. 

7-61

THE BDM CURPORATION 

One cannot argue with the success of the Nixon and Kissinger 

negotiating strategy, They recognized that a military solution tu Viet,:am 

was not possible. 

They decided, therefore, to set their negotiating strategy 

and withdraw from the conflict on American terms, In -eFponse co 

public and congressional pressure at home, they initiated a unilateral 

withdrawal of US forces. They beefed up the RVNAF thrjugh an accelerated 

Vietnamizatioi program 9nd stepped up efforts -o improve pacification in 

the RVN. 

Thereafter, they successfully exploited detente with the Soviet 

Union and the opening with China in order to isolate the DRV 

from their 

benefactors. Then, through incursions, denial operations and bombings of 

DRV sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos, 

forces in the South, 

they effectively isolated the Enemy's 

Confronted with a stalemate in the South, punished by 

dccurate "smart" bombs and waves of B-52s, and its harbors closed by lethal 

mines, the DRV decided to negotiate (see Figure 7-5 for Presideqt Nixon's 

Negotiations Decision Tree). 

The unfirtunatc aspect of the process was that one of the 

principal parties, the $outh Vietnamese, were not brought into fhe "talks" 

until the agreement had been finalized. 

The US gct its "peace with honor," its POWs back, a "safe" 

withdrawal from oattie, and a "decent interval-" 

The DRV got to keep their 

forces iii-olace in the South and another agreement which they 2ccld violate 

with impunity and regulirity., The GVN got little more than solace. Forced 

to accept US terms, President Thieu .ried to rally his people around what 

was to become a losing cauoe. 

Throughout the rnegotiations, the US set about to convince 

the GVN that by accepting an agreement it could lose nothing it already had 

and to ýjnvince Hanoi that unless it accepted an agreement it would have no 

chaice of winning politically. Each had to oelieve that a negotiated 

ag.-eement was an interim step toward victory.147/ 

Implementing this negotiating 

strategy required both time to allow the GVN co get a(- ,stomed to 

fighting the war without US forces, and continued warfare so that the DRV 

could not be certain that simply, by waiting out US withdrawal the war would 

wind down, and wiLL it, the need to negotiate anything at all. 

7-62


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What Nixon and Kissinger most wanted to avoid in the negotiations 

with the DRV was the mistake that had been made in Korea -- the 

restriction of military action to defensive operations while armistice 

talks continued. By stopping milita-y operetions in Korea, the UN forces 

removed the only incentive for a settiemenr tnat the enemy had. That 

miscalculation produced the frustration of two years of inconclusive negotiations. 

Kissinger observed that divorcing force trom diplomacy caused 

"our power to lack purpose and our negotiations to lack force" in 

Korea.148/ Consequently, Mr. Kissinger believed that, unless the US showed 

the DRV it was willing to threaten the absolute destruction of North Vietnam. 

they would never negotiate, 

A comparative analysis of the minimum and maximum positions 

of all parties involved in the negotiations is presented in Figure 7-6 and 

7-7, The most unusual aspect of both is the fact that after successfully 

carrying oLt their strategy and isolacing the DRV, the US settled for what 

is depicted as its minimum negotiating position with respect to the DRV 

the GVN. 

4, Insights 

The following insights have been distilled from the information 

presented in the chapter: 

0 During President Johnson's Administration, the hope for ending 

the war depended on being successful on the battlefield.. Achieving 

a position of military strength became an essential US 

and 

prerequisite 

for negotiations.. This strategy suffered from two 

disabilities- (a) the nature of guerriild warfare; and, (b) the 

asymmetry in the definition of what constituted acceptaole 

losses., As a result, American/FWMAF military successes could not 

be translated into permanent pulitical advantage 

* President Nixon and Mr,. Kissinger recognized that a military 

solution to the war was not available, therefore they set about 

to attain a stalemate on the battlefield, to cause the DRV to be 

isolatea from their communist benefactors and to arrive at E. 

political solution -n the negotiations. 

7-64 

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4-

.1 THE BDM CORPORATION 

9 As a venture in strategic persuasion, the early bombing of North 

Vietnam 6id not wo-k., Limited and graduated air attacks met with 

Slittle success. The symbolic rationale for bombing halts backfired 

and the DRV 

used negouiations as a means to get the bombing 

stopped. Only when the preside2nt decided to go with a heavy 

bomba-dment of Hanoi/Haipnong in December 1972, did US airpower 

prove its effect 4 veness in getting the DRV to negotiate in earnest. 

4 The DRV carefully played out the negotiations according to the 

* timing of US presidential elections, 

S~reactions 

* When negotiating a _cttlement on behalf of our allies and ourselýes, 

the US lust nut only be actively cognizant of their 

estaolished regotiating positions, but also of their input and 

to alternatives, 

0 The utility of public negotiations is great, particularly in 

Sconcealing secret talks They cleariy provide opportunity to 

keep the press and public feeiing informed, without comD-omising 

the saliency of secret negotiating points. 

SEarly on. American leadership mistakenly believed Vietnam to be 

vital not for itself, but for what tney thought its "loss" would 

mean interna'ionally and domestically., It alsc meant that US 

leaders wanted a negotiated settlement without fully realizing 

(though probably more than their critizs) that a civil war cannot 

be ended by political compromise alone. The attainment of a 

stalemate on the battlefield and the effective isolation of the 

enemy from their suppll'ers were the keys to bringing the negotiations 

to a conclusion. It wac unfortunate that US military 

k strength had no political cu,-ollary in RVN. The fact that the 

agreement failed to stop the DRV and the PRG from eventually 

pursuing their ultimate goal -- 

reinforces this insight. 

military victory over the South-- 

7-67

THE BUM CORPORATION 

r The last insight is drawn from a statement by Mir. Kissinger which 

was made in response to a question as to whether he belleved that 

the Paris Agreements would precipitate movement toward a political 

settlement., He said: 

.it is not easv to achieve through negotiations what 

has not been achieved on the battlefield, and if you 

look at the settlements that have been made ir the 

p-stwar period, the lines of demarcation have almost 

always followed the lines of actual control,..we have 

taken the pos, tion throughout that the agreement cannot 

be analyzed in terms of any one of its provisions, but 

it has to be seen in its totality and in terms of the 

evolution that it starts. 149/ 

In this case, that "evolution" was a continuation of the war, 

proving that signatures on a cease fire agreement do not necessarily 

end a war., 

C. LESSONS 

Th'e following lessons are drawn from the information presented in 

this chapter, 

a An incremental military strategy and conciliatory negotiating 

strategy with a coninunist adversary who equates restraint with 

weakness and with whom compromise is inconceivable will make a 

meaningful -ettiement unlikely. 

0 Communist nations do not view war and negotiations as separate 

processes, but con'ider them one and the same. What the DRV 

sought in dir'ect talks with the US was a way to improve its 

chances of winning the wdr, 

, ~one.• 

not a way of preventing or ending 

* Before engaging in talks or negotiations with a commurist n3tion, 

key negotiators must give careful thought to strategy, objectives 

and the "balance of forces" on the battlefield, always keepirg in 

7-68

STHE 

BDM CORPORATIOr" 

mi;~d the fact that communist negotiators will be intransigent and 

uny'elding if they perceive a military, political, Dsychologi:al 

or economic edge over their advcrsaries, 

4 Other peoples are not as time-conscious as Americans. Our adversaries 

are likely to take aavantage of this fact by attempting t,) 

outlast rather thaoi outfight the US., As long as they can avoio 

defeat, therefore, they can hope to force the US to give up, 

Recommendations on How t',e US Should Approach and Conduct 

Negotiations in the Future 

Should the US find itself facing negotiations in the future, it 

is recommended that they be approacned and conducted as follows: 

* Top caliber career diplomats and military personnel should be 

zelected for alternate specialty training in the planning, protocols, 

and conduct of negotiations, Special emphasis should be 

placed on lessons learned from negotiating with the communists 

since W•'II. 

[ The Department of State should reassess the extent to which 

diplomatic linguistics have been devaluated in 

this century and 

should train its diplomats to deaI linguistically with monolithic 

authoritarian negotiating positions. 

. Negotiations should employ the technique so successfully used in 

Paris of maintaining open talks concurrent with secrer sessions. 

9 For any given specific negotiation, it is recommended that tne 

USG: 

so 

choose a principal negotiator who has the President's confi-- 

dence 

06 carefully select a special team of well-trained negotiators 

(including personnel who 

philosophy, 

facing). 

are familiar with the language, 

history and culture of the enemy they will be 

se 

so 

make maximum -ise of private sessions 

make a maximutq effort to gain the initiative in the talks 

7-69


so make liberal use of military personnel in the sessions, 

since tie communists have historically clothed their negotiators 

in military uniform for negotiations with free world 

countries (there is a need to have a cadre of US military 

personnel trained in negotiations). 

I7 

I


APPENDIX 

FRENCH VIETNAMESE NEGOTIATING EVENTS 

(1946 - 1954) 

Event Description Outcome 

Accord of Agreement signed by Ho Chi Minh * Led to French 

6 March 1946 with French provided that-, occupation of 

"Tonkin Pelta. 

* France -ecognized ORV as" 

"Free S;ate , forming 0 No significant 

part of the Indochina 

step taken by 

Federation and tho 

France toward 

French Union." 

ORV autonomy. 

* DRV welcomed French Army 

into Tonkin for 5 years. 

0 Further negctiations were 

to spell out, details for 

DRV independence. 

First Dalat French and DRV delegates attempted e Overshadowed by 

Conference2, to negotiate differences, but continuing 

19 April - were able to enact only minor guerrilla war 

11 May 1946 agreements on cultural and in Cochinchina. 

educational matters. 

* The commission 

set up to 

arrange an 

armistice was 

ineffective. 

Establishment of French announced formation of 0 Touched off new 

Provisional an independent Cochinchina with- wave of gue,- 

Government of in the Indochina Federation and rilla war in 

q Cochinchina, the French Union, South Vietnam. 

1 June 1946 

[I Possibility of 

divided Vietnam 

pressured DRV 

in negotiations 

with France; 

stiffened DRV 

attitudes, 

SOURCE: Adapted from DoD US-VN Relations, Book 1 of 12, "French-Vietnamese 

Negotiations", pp. B-1 through B-6. 

7-71



Fontainbleau Formal negotiations in France DRV delegation with- 

Conference, 

6 July - 

between DRV delegition 

headed by Ho Chi Minh and 

drew in protest over 

convening of Second 

10 September 

1946 

second-rank French officials 

led to no agreement on any 

Dalat Conference 

(below), resumed 

substantive issue. 

talks, then acceded 

to adjournment without 

progress. 

Second Dalat Conference among French, * Caused break- 

Conference, Cochinchinese, Laotians, down of 

1 August 1946 Cambodiens, Mcntagnards of Fontainbleu 

Annam: 

Conference, 

0 Announcei formatlin of 0 Erected new 

"federal states" under 

facade of 

I 

French High Commissioner, federation, but 

led to no signi- 

Denounced DRV delega- ficant polittion 

at Fontainbleau as 

ical concessions 

unrepresentative, 

by Frencn, 

a 

Cambodians and Cochinchinese 

moved for direct 

representation in French 

Union and abroad, but 

French refused. 

Franco-DRV After DRV delegation departed * Led to some 

Modus Vivendi, 

14 September 

from Fontainbleau, Ho Chi Minh 

signed agreement with France 

release uf 

prisoners, and 

1946 which provided, effective lull in guerrilla 

30 October 1946: operations. 

* Reciprocal rights for a No substantial 

"citizens. 

French political 

concessions 

* Reciprocal property rights eventuated. 

and restoration of seized 

French property in Vietnam. 

* Piastre related .o franc, 

0 Customs union and free trade 

within Indochina Federation. 

7-72



Franco-DRV * Armistice Commission to deai 

Modus Vivendi 

with guerrilla war in Cochin- 

(Continued) 

china. 

0 Referendum to decide Cochinchina's 

relationship to DRV. 

* France-DPV talks to resume 

in January, 1947. 

Declaration of the 

Freedom of Cochin- 

French High Commissioner 

extended powers of the Saigon 

* President Le Van 

Hoach of Cochin- 

Lhina, 4 February 

19,47 

Government to include- china admitted 

Viet Minh con- 

* Legislitive and executive trolled greater 

action un all internal 

part of Cochin- 

Sffai rs. 

china. 

a Universa' suffraqe for 0 Elections 

election of legislature. 

repeatedly postponed 

because of 

civil disorder. 

First Ha Long Bay Bao Dai associated himself a French tcok no 

Agreement, with French-sponsored action toward 

7 December 1947 nationalist moveme..t, releasing their 

contrc! in 

* French promised, in vague Vietnam. 

terms, national independence 

for Vietnam, 0 Bao Ddi withdrew 

to Europe. 

4 Agreement condemned 

by non- 

Viet Minh 

nationalists, 

e.g., Ngo Dinh 

Dinln 

7-73 

-4



Second Ha Long Bav e 

Agreement, 5 June 

France solemnly recognized 

the independence of Vietnam 

* Ftance t-ansferred 

no sig- 

1948 within the French Union. nificant polit- 

Biical 

power to 

0 Bao Dai reasscciated himself Vietnamese., 

with the at-empt t3 form a 

nationalist government. a Led only to 

further negotiations 

between 

Bao Dai and 

France. 

E!,see Agreement, In an exchange of letters French P~unomic 

8 March 1949 between Bao Dai and President and political 

Auriol, France: 

primacy remained 

* 

unchanged, even 

Reconfirmed Vietnam's status in principle. 

as an independent Associated 

State within the French * Cochinch*na 

Union. 

formally merged 

* 

with Annam and 

Agreed to ,',;ifying Vietnam, Tonkin in State ot 

and placing it under Viet- 

Vietnam in June, 

namese adm-inistration, 1949, 

under terms to be negotiated 

subsequently. 0 Plans for internal 

0 

administ-at~ve 

Retained control of Viet- transfer announci..d 

names- armed forces and 30 December 1949 

foreign relations. 

0 Practical matters 

of transfer of 

administrative 

functions. In 

principle, external 

affairs 

wer- deferred to 

Pau Negotiations 

of 1950, 

7-74


Evert Description Outcome 

Recognition ot French High Commissioner for * Cochinchina govthe 

Indenendence of Indochina and Emperor Bao Dai 

ernment tendthe 

State of Viet- exchanged letters in Saigon ered resignation 

nam, 14 June 1949 rormalizing Elysee Agreement, to Bao DaiL 

"merging in principle 

with new 

State of Vietnam. 

. No actual transfpr 

of political 

power occurred. 

French Ratifica- Following Nationd! Assembly US Recognized 

tion of the Inde- approval (29 January 1950), Sta'.e of Vietnam 

pcndence of France announced ratification (3 February 

Vietnam, of the status for Vietnam 1950). 

2 February 1950 described in the Elysee 

Agreement. e Details of trans- 

1fer of powers 

awaited Pau Negotiations 

(March- 

November, 1950). 

The Pau Negotia- Bao Dai Dressed the French The French eventually 

tions, June- in a series of conferences grdnted significant 

November 1950 for the transfer of immigration, concessicis to the 

Scommunications, ard finance Vietnamese, 

services to Vietnam, 

Laotians and 

Cambodians in each 

area, preserving 

rights of French "observation 

and intervention." 

They were 

conside.ed a success 

by the Vietnamese negotiators. 

7-75

THE BDM CORPORAT!ON 

Event Descrip.ion Outcome 

The Geneva Coriference Fol!wing the fall of Dien Thn primary objective 

1954 (April-July) BVen P;u, the French sought of the Geneva conto 

negotiate a cease-fire ference was accompwith 

the DRV and arrarge lished -- a cease-fire. 

for an end to hostilities The key previsions of 

in Vietnam, Laos ana 

the Accords were: 

and Cambodia. Besides 

France and the DRV, the . DMZ establisned 

conference included 

with DRV Army 

English, Russian, Chinese regrouped to the 

L3-tian and Cambodian 

North and French 

negotiators. The US and Union forces to 

the GVN attended as observers, the Soutiv (at 17th 

pardllel) 

I * 

Creation of the 

International 

Control Commission 

(ICC) to 

supervise compliance., 

a 

General Elections 

to be held within 

2 yea-s (by 20 July 

1956)-wrich were 

never accomplished. 

7-76

THE BDM CORPORAT!ON 


1. Allen E. Goldman, The Lost Peace (Stanford, CA. Hoover Institution 

Press, 1978), p. il. 

2. Henry A, Kissinger, "The Viet Nam Negotiations", Foreign Affairs 

Vol. 47, No, 2 (January 1969): 233-234. 

US Department of Defense, United States-Vietnam Relations, Book 1 of 

12, I.A., p. A-2 (Hereafter will be referred to as DOD, US-VN Relations) 

4. The Lessons of the War in Indochina, Vol 2., translated from French by 

V.J. Croizat, Col., USMC (Ret), Memorandum RM-5271-PR (Santa Monica. 

RAND Corp. May 1967), p. 11. 

5. Ibid, Vol. 2, p. 11. 

6, DoD, US-RVN Relations, Book 1 pp. A-37 to A-41. 

7, Bernard B. Fall, viet-Nam 4itness, 1953-66 (New YorK: Praeger, 

1966), p. 69. 

8. Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled, Vnlume II, Vietnam at 

War (New York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 814-815, and Sir Robert Thompsnn., 

Re".olutionary War in World Strategy, 1945-1969 (New York:- Traplinger, 

1970), pp. 7i-73• 

9., Robert F.. Randle, Geneva, 1954. The Settlement of the Indochina W~r 

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p.. 114 

10. Fall, p. 71. 

11. DoD, US-VN Relations, Book 1, III. A. 3., pp, A-36 & A-37. 

12. Ibid., IIl. A. 3., pp. A-37 & A-38.. 

13. Ibid, II., A. 3., pp A-39 to A-42.. 

14, j0en'nis J. Duncanson, Government and 2evolztion in Vietnam (New York: 

Oxford. 1968). pp. 8-9; Jean Laccuture, Vietnam: Between Two Truces 

(New York: Vintage, Random House, 1966), pp., 51-52; Buttinger, Vol. II, 

pp. 829-842; DoD, US-VN Relations, Book 1 IIi. A.E., p. 0-20; and 

Ellen J. Hammer, The Struggle For Indochina 1940-1955 (Stanfcrd: 

Stanford University Press, 1966), pp, 325-337. 

7-77

- I 

"tHE 3DM CORPORATION 

15, DoD US-VN Relations, Book 1, 111, D.2, p. D-17. 

.18. Dwight 

16. Ibid., III, D.1., pp. D-5 through D-17. 

17. IbiJ, III D.2, pp. u-14 and VI. A-,., p. A-13, 

D, Eisenhower Mandate For Change (New York Doubleday, '1963) 

pp. 371, 374, 

19. Leslie H, Gelb and Richard K. Betts, The Irony of V'etnam: 

The System Worked (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1979) pp 61, 62. 

20, DoD US-VN Relations, Book 1 IV. A.l., pp. A-13, A-14. 

21. oDid, IV. A.l., p. A-20. 

22. !bid, IV. A.l., p.. A-21., 

23. Ibid, IV. A.i,, p., A-22. 

24. For a *nore detailed treatment of the comparisons between the SEATO 

rnd NATO Treaties see the ("Pentagon Papers"), DoD US-VN Relations, 

Book 1 of 72, IV. A.l, pp, A-15 thru A-49a. After the WWII armistice, 

the US signed only two other agreements (before SEATO) involving 

the South Pacific Region of the World: The Agreement Establishing the 

South Pacific (Feb 6, 1947) and the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic 

Development in South and Southeast Asia: Constitutiorn of the Council for 

Technical Cooperation (Sept. 1950). The test of all three can be found 

in Ruth C. Lawson, International Regional Crganizations: Constitutional 

Foundations (New York: Proeger, 1962). 

25. DoD US-VN Relations, Book 1, IV. A.3. p. 3, 

26. "The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty dnd Protocoi rhereto," 

(SEATO) signed September 8, 1954, Article IV, paragraph I. 

27. DoD US-VN Relations, Book I IV, A,3., p. 4, 

28. Major General Lionel C. McGarr, Chief US MAAG Vietnam, "Annual 

Reports of the Chief, MAAG, Vietnam 196-1962" (on file at the 

Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA.) and 

Pentagon Papers, The Gravel Edition, The Defense Department of 

the United States, Decision making on Vietnam, Vol II (Boston: 

Beacon Press, 1971), p. 174. 

SThe 

V 

•--;


29. DoD US-VN Relations, 9ook 3, IV, B.4.,, pp, ii and iii. 

30. The Pentagon Papers, Gravel ed., pp., 161-162. 

31, The texts of "The Decidration on the Neutrality of Laos" and the 

"Protocol to the Declaration on the iNeutralitv of Laos," are contained 

in John Norton Moore's, Law and the Indo-China War, (Princeton: 

Princeton University Press, 1T72), pp, 711-723., 

32. Moore, Law and the Indo-China War, pp., 711-714. 

33. Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point (NY, Popular Library. 1971), 

pp, 59-60. 

34, DoD US-VN Relations, Book 3 IV. B.4., pp. 4-5. 

35. Goodman, D.. 13. 

36. US Congress, US Senate, Two Reports or, Vietnam and Southeast Asia 

to the President of the United States by Senator Mike Mansfield, 

93rd Congress, Ist Session, April 1973, p. 14. 

37. Goodman, pp, 13-14.. Ambassador William H. Sullivan, a member of 

the Harriman team in 1962, and later Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

State, was involved in other negotiations with the DRV, and confirms 

the fact that these early contacts were made; see Goodman, p. dv, 

38, Ibia., p. 14, 

39. Goodman, p, 14, quotes a US diplomat who attended the very first 

meeting with DRV offici-s. 

40. Ambassador U. Alexis Jonnson, Senior Revfew Panel Discussions of 

the "Stragegic Lessons Learned in Vietnam", at The BDM Corporation, 

McLean, VA, on September 7, 1979., 

41. Goodman, pp.' 14-15.. 

42. Ibiu., p. 15. 

r Vintage 

43. University of Texas Oral History Project, Interview with Benjamin 

Huger Read, Special Asst. to the Secretary of £tatUz (1964-68), Tape 

pp. 14-31 of the transcript, March 1970. (LBJ Library, S2, Austin, 

Texas), AC 74-237; Goodman, pp. 18-19; and, David Kraslow and 

Stuart H., 

Books, 

Loory, The Secret Search for Peace in Vietnam (New Yor:'- 

JLv7TlWi ), pF. 11-22. 

7-79


44. Gelb, pp. 139-140; Goodman, pp. 24-31; and, Tbhomas L. Hughes, "Negotiating 

Under Pressure--Hanoi's Position," Memorandum for Chester 

Cooper, April 23, 1965, On file at LBJ Library, Austin. Texas, LBJL/ 

NSF-VNCF, Southeast Asia Special Intelligenc? Material, Vol, V,, item 

3a. 

45, Ambassador Maxwell Taylor. BD Interview wih Ambassador Taylor at 

his residence in Washington. D. C., on July 11, 1979. 

46. Gelb, p,140, 

47, Hughes, Vol.. V, item 3a;, and Gelb with Betts, p., 140, 

48, Gelt, p.140-j41. 

49. Kraslow and Loory, pp. 121-123. 

50 Gelb, pp,140-141. 

51, DoD US-VN Relations, Book 12, VI. C.l., "Histories of Contacts", p.1. 

52, ibid,, Cook 12 VI. C.l, "Histories of Contacts", pp. 1-3, 

53. Ibid., Book 12 VI, CA.. "XYZ,", (Summary) p. 1, also pp, 3-4, 6-8, 

and (Text), pp, 8-9, 12-15, 18-19, and 21-22., 

54ý 

Gelb, p.141. 

55. Kraslow and Loory, n. 139. 

56. Ibid., pn. 140-141. The fourteen points were: 

!. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate basis 

for peace in Southeast Asia; 

2. We would welcome a conference on Southeast Asia or or, any part 

thereof; 

3. We would welcome "negotiations without preconditions" as the 17 

nations put it; 

4. We would welcome unconditional discussions as President Johnson 

put it; 

5. A cessation oF hostilities could be tht first order of 

business at a -onference or could be t subject of p;-eliminary 

discussions; 

7-80

THE BDM CORPORA FION 

6. Hanoi's Four Points could be discussed along with other points 

which otherc might wish to propose; 

7, We want no U.S. bases in Southeast Asia; 

8, We d- 'iot desire to retain U.S, troops in South Vietnam afte, 

peace is assured; 

9, We support free elections in South Vietnam to give the South 

Vietnamese a government of their own choice; 

10. The question of reunification of Vietnam should be determined 

by the Vietnamese through their own free decision; 

11. The countries of Southeast As'a can be non-aligned or neutral 

if that be their option; 

12. We would much prefer to use our resources for the economic 

reconstruction of Southeast Asia than in war. If there is 

peace, North Vietnam could participate in a regional effort to 

which we would be prepared to contribute at least one billion 

dollars; 

13. The President has said "The Viet Cong would not have difficulty 

being presented and havng their views represented if for a 

moment Hanoi decided she wanted to cease aggression. I don't 

think that would be an unsurmountable problem." 

14. We have said publicly and privately that we could stop the 

bombing of North Vietnam as a step toward peace, although 

there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the 

other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped, 

Washington's Fourteen Points. January 7, 1966, Department of State 

Bulletin (Washington, February 14, 1966). 

57. Kraslow and Loory, p. 145. 

58. Ibid., p., 146, 

59. Johnson, p. 239, 

60, Ibid. 

61. Gelu on p. 142, refers to a V' liam Bundy ,. - -,cretary 

of State Rusk, entitled: "La,. Though.s o ', - e 'roposa''," 

dated December 17, 1965, Bundy refers to a !,.",iecn with a Soviet 

Diplomat during which he inferred that Hanoi wculd dEnoance The 

bombing pause "unless we do something major with r'espect to tie 

South--which I take to imply the suspensiu.• of reirfnofcemcnts. 

7-81


This i most emphatically do not feel we should do." ("PINTA: 

RANGU01N," Text, p, la), It should also be noted that some in the 

administration had expected the pause would fail but saw it as a 

necessary last-chance offer before undertaking planned escalation. 

See Pentagon Papers Vol. 4, Gravel Edition, pp. 303, 623. 

62. Kraslow and Loory, p. 151., 

r 

63. Johnson, pp. 590-591 and Gelb pp 162-163. See Figure 7-1 for a 

graphic portrayal of the various initiatives and contacts %-uring 

the p.2riod. 

64. Gelb p. 151, and Henry Cabot L(dge, As It Was: An Inside 

View of Politics and Power in the bOTs and 60's (New York: Norton, 

1976), pp. 171-173. 

65. Kraslow and Loory, pp. 18-22. 

66, DoD US-VN Relations, Book 12 VI. C.2. (Dissension), p, 16. 

6?. Kraslow and Loory, p. 5, 

68. DoD US-VN Relations, Book 12 of 12, Vi. C.4. (Negotiations), p.8. 

69, Quoted in Chester L., Cooper, The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam 

(Greenwich, Conn., Fawicett, 1970), p.. 381. 

70. Goodman, pp. 63-64. 

71. Quoted in Goodman, p., 65. 

72. !bid., p. 71. 

73. See Consultation Memo; for Ambassador Maxwell Taylor, Wasnington, 

D.C., April 1965, His:ory Back-up Fi'e (27 March - 7 May 1965), 

Private Papers of General William Westmoreland, on file at the 

Office of the Army Chief of Military History (OCMH). 

74. See a memo by Genera" De Puy, MACV J-3, of his meeting with ARVN 

General Thang, Saigon, August 1965, History Bach-up File (July - 

August 1965), General Westmoreland's Private Papers, on file at 

CCMH, Washington, D. C. 

75. Goodman. p. 3. 

76. Quoted in Goodman, p. 24. 

77. Johnson, pp. 579.-589. 

7.. &/


78. Jonnson, p. 250. 

79, Ibid., pp. 232-26?. 

80, Goodman, p. 24; Kraslow and Loory, p. 53; and, Gelb pp. 165-167, 

81, Kraslow and Loory, p, 140.. 

82. Kissinger, Foreign Affairs, p, 217. 

83. Kissinger, Foreign Affairs, p. 217; Kraslow and Loory, p. 53"; 

Goodman, pp, 69-72; and, Gelb with Betts, p. 153. 

84. Goodman, p. 85. 

85, Henry Kissinger, "There was no Alternative:. The White House "ears," 

Time, Vol. 114, No. 15 (October 8, 1979):' 33. 

86. Kissinger. Foreign Affairs, p. 214. 

87., William R. Corson, Consequences of Failure (New York: W, W, Norton, 

1974), pp. 185-186. 

88. Corson, pp. 186-187. 

89. Ibid. 

"90., Ibid, p. 187. 

91,. Kissinger, Foreign Affairs, p, 214. 


93.. Ibid. 

94. Ibid., p. 85. 

95. Kilsiger, Foreign Affairs p. 230. 

96. Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Br~wn, 1979), 

p. 29'.. 

97. Goodman, p. 9' 

98. G. Warren Nutter, Selected Readings: The Vietnam War Elective, 

Academic Year 1977, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,-A., 

17013 (15 March 1977 - 31 May 1977), p. V" v9-14. 

7-83



100., Ibid., p., 89, 

101. Quoted rrom Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger (Boston: Little, 

Brown, 1974), p. 134. 

.02, Kissinger, White House Years, p.. 271. 

103. Ibid., p. 277. 

104. Ibid., p., 306, 

205. Ibid. 

106. BDM Interview with General Vernon A. Walters, June 8, 1979. 

107, Kissinger, White House Years, p, 441. 

108. Henry Kissinger, "White House Years: Part 2 - Tiie Agony of Vietnam," 

Time, Vol. 114, No. 15 (October 8, 1979): 35. 

109. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 4.3. 

110, Ibid p. 444, 

Ill. Ibid, p. 444-445, 

112 . TIbid. p, 448, 

U13. William Shawcross, Sideshow (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1979), p., 1-35; 

the Transc-ipt of dnedited Tape Interview with David Frost and 

Henry Kiss-nger for NBC News Special Program 3roadcast, Thursday, 

Oct. 11, (iO-ll pn, NYT) on NBC-TV, p. 3-3-3; also see the Letters 

Section, William Snawcross. "Cambodia and Kissirger," The Economist, 

52pteruber 8, 1979, p. 6. 

1ll. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 250. 

115. Ibid. p. 249., 

116., Ibid. 

117. Ibid. p. 478. 

118. IDid. p., 490 

119. Ibid. p., 968. 

7-84


120. Tad Szulc, "How Kissinger Did It: Behind the Vietnam Cease-Fire 

Agreement," Foreign Policy, Sirmmer 1974, pp. 29-33, 

121, Kissinger, White House Years, p. 979. 

122. Ibid. pp., 980-981 

123. Ibid. p 983 

124. Ibid. p. 985 

125. Ibid. p. 986 

126. Ibid. p. 1017 

127. Ibid. p. 1018 

128. Ibid. pp. 1018-1010 

129. Goodman, pp. 119-123 

130. Ibid. p. 120 

131. Ibid. 

132. Ibid. pp. 121>122 

.33, Ibid, pp, 125-126 

134, Kissinger, White House Years, p, 1028. 

135, Kissinger, "The Agony of Viet Nam," Time, p., 44. 

136. Ibid. 

i37, Ibid. p, 45 

138. Ibid. 

139, Ibid. p. 46 

140. Ibid., pp. 48-49 

14., Ibid., p. 49 

142. Kissinger, White House Years, p, 1472 

143. Goodman, p. 161, and General Vogt, during the Vietnam Study Spnior 

Review Panel, at the BOM Corporation, McLean, Va., Feb 8, 1979. 

7-85


144. Szulc, p. 69 and Goodman, pp 162-163 

145. See William Shawcross', Sideshow; Gareth Porter's, A Peace Deniedf 

The US, Vietnam and the Paris Agreements (Bloomington: :ndiana 

University Press, 1976), 357 pp; and, the transcript oa Frost- 

Kissinger Interview, NBC-TV, Oct 11, 1979. 

147.. Goodman, p. 96 

148. Ibid. 

149, From a Kissinger press conference held on June 13, 1973, as 

quoted in Goocman, p.. 167 

71 

7-8 

1±

F THE BDM CORPORATION 

CHAPTER 8 

FOLLOW-ON EFFOR T 

It should be recognized that ii most of the curreit 

conflicts Russian allies and client states (and conmunist 

suppcrted revolutionary movements) are now in a 

can-win can't-lose position because their rear, bases 

are secure while those of America's allies ae 

threatened., What is more, the latter only have to lose 

once, This is a matter of attitude, credibility, will 

and stamina - all very important weapons in anyone's 

arnmoury but in rather short supply. If, through la,:k 

of them, the American Congress under pressure fr)m 

vocal elements in American society reduces aid to South 

Vietnam below an adequate level (on the military siue 

such aid is already well below the permitted one-forone 

reolacement), there could be only one real less)n 

to be Iearnt fromr the Vietnam war: - do not rely )n 

the United States as an ally.l/ 

Sir Robert Thompson, "Milita-y 

Victory: Political Defeat - Tie 

Failure of US Strategy in Vietnam," 

1974, 

After millions of words about the lessons of Vietnam, 

we ignore the most important lesson, tha. political 

battles cannot De ,esolved by force of arms. 

We learned this lesson at great sacrifice to our 

nation. Yet our policy-makers now are engaged in a 

course of action which does not recognize this basic 

reaiity of Indochina. The United States has embarked 

upon a course of encoiraging the funding of maximum 

military confrontation, hoping that somehow those we 

are supporting can prevail. 

A 

... How can tre policy of military confrontation be 

sustained when it is clear that neither the Congress 

nor the American public is willing to fund the wars *in 

Vietnam and Cambodia at high levels for the indefinite 

future?2/ 

The Late Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, 

in a speech on US aid appropriations 

to Vietnam, 1974. 

8- I

f 



i 

The nature and efficacy of the US 

follow-on effort to South Vietnam 

was determined by a myriad of complex military and political factors, both 

in the United States end in South Vietqam. This chapter examines the most 

salient of these factors, assessing their impact on the overall viability 

of the United States' follow-on effort to t,.e GVN 

and, concurrently, South 

Vietnam's ability to endure, militarily, politically, and, perhaps most 

important, psychologically, A topical approach is undertaken: this 

chapter examines the nature of the US 

commitment to South Vietnam as pe'- 

ceived by the US and GVN after the Pars Accords came into force; Lne US 

attempts to erhance South Vietnam's military capabilities and the effectiveness 

of these efforts; the impact of US congressional legislation on the 

(US-) GVN war effort during the 1973-1975 time period; and the physical apd 

psychological problems which confronted both the GVN and the US during 

these years. 

B. POS1-lfRATY/POST-WITHDRAWAL: THE BASIS FOR AND NATURE OF THE US 

COMMITMENT TO SOUTH VIETNAM 

l• Commitments Based on Private Presidential Assuraý,ces 

The US fol'ow-on effort to South Vietnam grew out of ccmmitments 

made oy Washington to the GVN both prior to and after the finalization of 

the 1973 Peace Accords and in the treaty itself, as interpreted by the US 

government. During the negotiation process, President Nixon and Dr. 

Kissinger secured GVN President Thieu's final acceptance of the treaty 

througo threats and pressure tactics, but, more important for this particular 

discussion, through private US presidential assurances that the US 

would reintervene in Vietnam if Hanoi were to violate the Peace ALcords. 

These assurances, outgrowths of ýmerica's already immense physical and 

spiritual commitment to South Vietnaw, of Washington's intense desire to 

finalize a peace treaty and terminate hostilities in the area, and of the 

US executive's impatience and eagerness to pursue detenle with the USSR and 

8-2 

/ ,


PRC, not only prompted Thieu ultimately to aczept the Accords but perpetrated 

a degree of false security within both the military and political 

ranks of South Vietnam. In response to a letter from GVN President Thieu, 

Nixon wrote in November 1972, 

. far more important than what we say in the agreement 

on this issue is what wc do in the event the enemy 

renews its aggression, You nave my absolute assurance 

that if Hanoi fail3 to abide by the terms of this 

agreement it is my intention tc, take swift and severe 

retaliatory action.3/ 

And again, on January 5, 1973, just prior to -he finalization of the 

Accords, President Nixon sent the following private communique to the 

Presidential Palace in Saigon- 

Should you decide, as I trust you will, to go with us, 

you have my assurance of continued assistance in the 

post-settlemeit period and thdt we will respond with 

full force should the settlement be violated by North 

Vietnam. 4/ 

Finally, during President Thieu's April 2-3, 1973, 

San Clemente consultations 

with President Nixon, 

additional verbal reassurances were proffered 

the GVN: the phrases "The US will meet all contingencies in case the 

agreement is grossly violated" and "You 

can count on us," (interpreted by 

Thieu as a binding US iational commitment,) substan~ially contributed to 

Saigon's belief in and reliance on the United States for follow-on support, 

including reintervention if deemed necessary.5/ In retrospect, however, 

these US executive assurances were offered at a time whir the US legislative 

branch could hardly have been exnected to condone US reintervention in 

Indochina. Apparently the Nixon administration had not counted on 

congressional bans on US 

military operations in the area nor on the legislature's 

limitations on presidential authority to enforce the peace 

agreement.6/ The US Congress was, indeed, the vital player that would 

ultimately decide if the Nixon (and later Ford) promises to Thieu were 

reasonable and/or realistic. As Leslie Gelb explains, the US executive's 

commitment depended on two "ifs:" if Congress would continue to approve 

8-3 

I-


I 

substantial amounts of military and economic aid to South Vietnam, 

Congress would do nothing to e .... 

and if 

Iz, the threat of US military reinvolvement 

should Hanoi violate the agreement.7/ These issues arc! mcre ful,y 

explored in the section below dealing with congressional leaislation during 

this periodm 

2.. Commitmrnts Based on the US Interpretation of the Pay-is Oeace 

Accords 

While the Paris Peace Agreement of January 27, 1973, called for 

the cessation of hostilities in South Vietnam and the withdrawal of all US 

military personnel from the country, 8/ it also allowed the US a certain 

degree of freedom and flexibility in fashioning its follow-on effort to 

Sou'th Vietnam. Tne US government's interpretation -f the treaty allowed 

for a certain degree of breadth in itc. follow-on suoport to the GVN and 

with regards continued assistance to Laos and Camoodia. From the US 

Derspe:tive, the treaty allowed for a number of prrvisions, including:9/ 

4 The continuation of US air operations over Cambodia and Laos 

until such time as a cease-fire and troop-withdrawal arrangements 

had been concluded for these countries between those parties 

invo!ved. No particular timetable was sticulated by the 

Accords. 

• ThE transfer of US armaments, munitions, and war material to 

South Vietnam pyior to the Agreement's entry into force; no 

transfer was allowed subseouznt to this point in time. The 

treaty did not, however, 

stj',.ulzte whether the critical act was 

transfer of title or transfe- of possession. The US viewed this 

provision to mean the transfer of title, the-eby al'owing for the 

transfer of US 

entered into force, 

equipment to South Vietnam after the Agreement had 

* While all US military personnel were to be withdrawn 4rom South 

Vietnam wit.iin 60 days from the time the Treaty came intc force, 

US civilian advisers attached to military units or concerned with 

of military equipment could remain in- 

supply or maintenance 

rountry. 

8-4

V 


a On aircraft replacement and transfer, the US interpreted the 

Treaty to allow for the US replacement of GVN F-5A aircraft 

(bVrrowed originally from the ROK, ROC, and Iran) with F-SE 

aircraft if the F-5A crafts had already oeen returned to their 

countries of origin, 

considered "used up" 

terms of the Treaty. 

In these instances, 3 uch aircraft could he 

and could therefore be replaced under the 

0 W4hile the dismantling of all US and allied military bases in 

South Vietnam was required by the Agreement, the US interpreted 

this to mean those bases owned by the US. Hence, the US 

transfered the titles for all its military bases in South Vietnam 

to the GVN prior to the conclusion of the Treaty. 

In addition, the US also interpreted the treaty 's allowing for a one-toone 

replacement of equipment destroyed or no longer operable, as well as 

for the supply of spare patts to the armed forces of South Vietnam. Hence, 

the LIS government's interpretation of the Paris Peace Accords created a 

number of avenues for the US to Gffer military assistance to the GVN subsequent 

to the Treaty's conclusion. 

These avenues were, however, gradually 

constricted and eventually eliminated as the US Congress legislated 

rectrictions on US 

aid to anc military activities in Indochina in opposition 

to the Nixon administration's (and, 

later, Ford's) Vietpam-related 

policies. This issue is discussed more fully in a following section. 

3. US Aid Commitments to South Vietnam., "Uperation Enhance"/ 

"Enhance Plus" 

In 1972, the US government initiated an intensive sjpply program 

to upgrade the armed forces of South Vietnam. There were two, perhaps 

equally important, reasons for this US undertaking. First, as the conclusion 

of a peace agreement neared fruition, the US 

military sought to 

infuse South Vietnan with great quantities of equipment which could 

ultimately be excharged on a one-to-one basis as provided for by the ceasefire, 

Second, the effort was initiated as a got-d will gesture to underscore 

the United States' reliability as an aily and, concurrently, to 

promote Saigon's acceptance of the peace treaty. lO/ 

8-5


Through "Operaticn Enhance" (and, later, "Enchance Plus") the US 

provided RVNAF with a vast array of equipment, the majority of which was 

designated for military use., Tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery 

pieces, communications equipment, and tons of am..urition and spare parts 

were sent to South Vietnam oi, US miliary and commercial chartered cargo 

flights.ll/ Table 8-1 provides a summary of the type and quantity of items 

contributed by the US as part of this effurt.12/ 

It is interesting to note 

that the influx of additional aircraft to South Vietnam during "Enhance 

Plus" was so great that, by the end of 1972, South Vietrnam's Air Force 

ranked fourth largest in the world.13/ 

After the Peace Accords were concluded and US-allied forces 

withdrawn from South Vietnam, Washington continued its follow-or assistance 

efforts as provided for by the (US interpretation of the) treaty. (Fihe 

level of these efforts was, of course, affected by congressional legis 

lativE activities throughout the rewainder of this period.) In Marcn 1974, 

for example, the US began delivering the first of 150 F-5E jet a.•rcraft to 

South Vietnam. 14/ A spec;al ("covert") section in the US Embassy Defense 

Attache Oftice (DAO) in Saigon coordinated this and other US post-settlement 

assistance eftorts to Saigon. 15/ Figure 8-1 provides a schematic 

overview of the US DAO in Saigon and the major offices under its supervision..16/ 

The United States' efforts to enhance RVNAF served to augment 

Saigon's military stockpiles; however, they also further increased Saigon's 

dependence on th3 US, ultimately undermining the GVN's attempts at selfdefense 

and self-reliance, particularly in the wake of congressional aid 

reductions during the years 1974-1975. 

following sections of this chapter 

These problems are addressed in the 

4. US Commitmencs To Aid and Defend Soutn Vietnam: The US Congress 

and Its Effect on the US Follow-Oh! Effort 

It would nrot be an understater,,ent to, cite Capitol Hill as one of 

the most crucial battlegrounds for Vietnam during the finpi two and onehalf 

years of the US follow-en effort, January 1973 - April 1975. 17/ 

During this period:. congressional legislation forced tne termination of US 

8-6


TABLE 8-1. FOLLOW-ON EFFORT:. SUMMARY OF SELECTED ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT 

APPROVED IN SUPPORT OF RVNAF IMPROVEMEM'T AND MODERNIZATION 

PROGRAM (AS OF 15 DECEMBER 1972) 

ITEMS 

QUANTITIES 

GRENADE LAUNCHER, M-79 62,621 

HOWITZSR, LT, 105-mm, M-46, A- 1,624 

RIFLE, M-16 Al 895,308 

MACHINE GUN, M-60 17,465 

GUN, SP, 175-mm, M-107 85 

HOWrTZER, MED, 155-tm, M-1!4 A1 474 

GUN, SP TWIN, 40-mm 108 

RADIO SET, AN/PRC-25 51,371 

RADIO SET, AN/VRC-142, -46, -47 8,866 

TRUCK, UTILITY, 1/4-t M-151A A!,A2 25,693 

TRUCK, 

M-601C N-t, 3/4-E M-37, SERIES 16,063 

TRUCK, CARGO, 2 7/2-t, M-35A2 19,330 

TRUCK, CARGO, 5-t, 1,240 8-54A2 

TRACTIOR, FT, L-5, MED, 810 

SEMI-TRA!I.ER, STAKE, 12-t, M-127A2C 1,517 

ARMOR ýFLRSONNEL CARRIER, M-125AI 1,973 

CARRIER, MORTAR, 87-mm, M-i25AI 2i9 

TANK, L!, M-41A3 380 

TANK, MED., M-48A3 329 

HELICOPTER, UH-,H 1,153 

HEL!COPTER, CH-47 A 79 

SOURCE'i ndochina Refugee Authored Monographs, RVNAF, p. 281 

8-7

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miiitary activities in and over Indochina, the elimination of any possibility 

of US 

reinvolvement ir, the area, and the reduction of US 

m 4 lirary 

and economic aid to South V~etnam, Lacs, and Cambodia to levels considered 

appropriate by the US legislative brancri. _S/ 

a., Congressional Aid Reductions, 1973-1975 

Congressional reductions in US military appropriations fo' 

Vietnam impinged oil RVNAF's abililTy to defend South Vietnam for e number of 

K• reasons, the most significant of which can be summarized as follows: 

• 4 RVNAF's exposure to the US military's mode of conducting military operations 

led it to rely increasingly on a well-established logistics system 

and heavy fire power, both groand and air; to expend ammunitior at an 

exceedingly liberal rate, with little conceri, for conservation; and, 

finally, to depend on the ready accessibility and availability of replacement 

equipment and spare parts for the maintenance of military material 19/ 

The impact of the US Congress' aid reductions was particularly significant 

in light of the axtreme inflation and fuel shortages facea by the world's 

nations during this period.20/ 

Table 8-2 provides a summary of US military 

aid requests between 1973 and 1975, and the respective US legislative 

response;21/ Table b-3 depicts US economic relief to South Vietndm during 

the same fiscal year time span.22/ 

After having negotiated a 

treaty that allcwed the United 

States a certain leeway in replacing South Vietnam's militarŽ, equipment on 

a one-to-one basis, ouch reductions in aid we~re particularly disheartening 

for the US executive branch, 

One-to-one repldcement was no longer a viable 

option. By 1974, RVNAF faced severe supply shortages, particularly of 

ammunition, and a scarcity of fue" leeded for ooerating military equipment, 

Table 8-4 assesses these congressional aid reauctions for FY 

impact on RVNAF's overall combat level, 

'75 and their 

its ability to replace equipment, 

and South Vietnam's caoacity to operate and maintain a variety of systems 

and/or efforts neccessary for its self-defense. 23/ it therefore becomes 

apparent that because of these aild reductions, South Vietnam was hard 

pressed to maintain the level of self-defense to which it had become 

8-9

THE BDM CORPORAI]ON 

TABLE 8-2. FOLLOW-ON EFFORT: US MILITARY AID REQUESTS 

FOR VIETNAM, 1973-1975 ýUS $ BILLIONS) 

LEVEL OF ASSISTANCE 1973 1974 1975 

Reques'Led bv DoD/Administration 2,924 1,185 1AF0 

Appropriated by Congress 2.562 907 ,700 

Amount Cut by Lungr?ý: .362 .278 .750 

Percentage Appropriated 88% 77% 48% 

SOURCE Kinnard, The War Managers, p, 131 

TABLE 8-3, FGLLOW-ON EFFORT: US ECONOMIC AID AND IMPORT SUPPORT, 

1973-1975. (OBLIGATION BASIS: $ MILLION) 

Commercial Impoet Food for Peace Refugee Piaster Project Total 

Y,ýar Program Prooram Funding Purchase Aid 

1973 226.2 188.3 33 96 56.2 501.7 

1974 335.1 269,9 26 917 22.3 653.3 

1975 143.2 48.6 29.3 0 15,7 237.8 

SCURCE: Indochina Refugee Authored Monographs, RVNAF Logistics, 13 

8-10


TABLE 8-4. FOLLOW-ON EFFORT: ANALYSIS OF FY-75 FUNDING IMPACTS 

1,450 1.126 900 750 f,00 

MILLION MILLION MILLION MIWLION MILLION 

A. COMBAT LEVEL 

I 

FY74 Level Yes Yes Yes No Siagon Delta 

Only 

Country-wide Hot Spots Yes Yes No No 

Offensive No No No No 

B. EQUIPMENT 

REPLACEMENT 

I 

ARVN 1 for 1


accustomed during the years of direct US 

involvement and upon which it had 

grown dependent. 

b. Congress Reasserts Itself' Restricdions on US Armed 

Intervention - The Impact of the War Powers Resolution 

and Other Congress 4 ona& Limitations on the US Follow-On 

Effort 

In the late spring of 1q73, 

concurrent with tne rumblings of 

the advancing Watergate scandal and Congress' concern over the Nixon 

Sadministration's apparent attempt to reinvoivc! the US in Southeast Asia, 

V the US legislative branch began actively to assert itself in the riaking of 

US fireign policy. In May 1973, te house recommended that all supporting 

funds for the bombing of Cambodia be terminated. 

In July, both the House 

and Senate passed this recoqimendation, and prohibited US military activity 

after 15 August 1973, in, over, or off the shores of Cambodia, Lacs, and 

Vietnam without explicit congressional approval,24/ These restrictions, 

II 

occurring when they did, had as much psychological impact on the GVN as 

physical: from Saigon's perspective, actions on the Capitol Hill battlefield, 

the Nixoa administratien's problems with Watergate, the GVN's own 

difficulties with inflation and shortages, and the increased activities of 

Hanoi were il perplexing developments that called into question the United 

States' earlier assurances to GVN President Thieu., 

On 7 Novefmer 1973, the US Congress pasied Public Law 93- 

148, commonly referred to as the War Powers Resolution. Its passage marked 

the culmination of four years of congressional effort to provide for more 

ample future participation of the legislative branch in decisions regarding 

US fo.-ce commitments abroad. Figure 8-2, "The War Powers Resolution and 

Its Antecedents," illustrates the progression of congressional legislation 

during these years as it moved towards its climax in the War Powers 

Resolvtion.25/ 

After the resolution'i passage, questions regarding its 

constitutionality arose; an assessment of this issue is not undertaken 

here, both because such an effort is beyond the intended scope uf this 

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chapter and because the question nas yet to be resolved by the US government 

To date, the US executive has chosen not to challenge the resolution's 

constitutionality in court, opting rather to live with the law.26/ 

The issue in this discussion is, rather, how the resolution 

affected the US 

fellow-on effort, especially in view of Ni.Non's private 

assurances to Thieu. First, while it is obvious that both Mr. Nixon and 

Dr. Kissinger opposed the reso!ution,27/ the record indicates (and should 

have indicated to them at the time) that Congress was irtent on assuring 

itself a greater level of participation in foreign policy decision making, 

particularly vis-a-vis troop commitments 

and war-making decisions ,see 

Figure 8-2), Hence, the passage of the resolution should not havt come as 

a surprise to the administration nor should the administ,'ation "nut have 

counted on" Congress' questioning of Nixon's authority to give SVN 

President Thieu private assurances.28/ 

But the legality of President Nixon's actions is not the 

issue here; the problem lies, rather, with perceptions held by the President, 

the Congress, and the GVN regarding the actual nature of the US 

commitment to provide military assistance to Vietnam during the follow-on 

period, including reintervention if deemed necessary. As has been seen 

above, President Thieu regarded these assurances as a US national commitment 

and, perhaps, as a blanket guarantee for America's continued 

support. 29/ 

lhe Nixon administration also seemcd to consider these assuranc•A 

in such 3 light; at minimum it regarded US assistance as a moral 

obligation b3sed on America's piior, massive investment ýn South 

Vietnam. 30/ 

From tie zongressional perspective, however, shdped as it was 

by Watergate and its displeasure with the administration's extreme secrecy 

in conduct 1 ,,g foreign affairs, the US committrent raquired at least a degree 

of congressional participation in its formation., Hence - the War bowers 

Resolution. South Vietnam, unfortunately, found itself a prisoner of the 

US executive and legislative's divisiveness, compeled to defend itself 

while simultaneously ponduring the real noture of the United States' 

commitment as an ally. The ir.pact of this is more fully explored in the 

following section. 

8-i5

THE BDPA CORPORATION 

Since passage of the War Powers Resolution in November 1973, 

the president has been obliged on several occasions, to fulfill the 

E requirements of the law, (See Figure 8-2, final entry on the resolution, 

I 

its stipulatiors. and the required rEporting orocedure,) Figure 8-3, 

"Presidential Use of and Compliance with the War Powers Resolution," 

summarizes five instances during the Ford adm~iistration when presidential 

compliance with the law was expected by Congress. 30/ Four of these 

instances occurred during the US follow-on support effort to the GVN; 

three 

related to the US evacuation effort in April 1975 when US military 

support was required for completion of the evacuation. Toe War Powers 

Resolution did not diminish the efficacy ror complicate the evacuation 

process to a great extent; rather, 'he Ford administration's decision to 

pursue its loLbyinr efforts with Congress for supplemental aid for Vietnam 

at the peak of the crisis contributed greatly to the evacuation's complexity 

and disorganization.32/ 

In summary, US congressional aid reductions and limits on 

presidental war-making authority (and Congress's overall success in 

asserting its decisian-making option) refiected the American public's 

distress over the executive'S Vietnam-related policies, the legislature's 

own displeasure with these policies and with the White House s exclusionary 

foreign policy practices, and, finally, the low level of effectiveness and 

esteem to which the presidency had fallen as a result of Watergate. 

effects of this on South Vietnam and the US follow-on effort ire addressed 

below. 


S 

C. EVALUATION OF THE US FOLLGW-ON EFFORT: PROBLEMS, EFFECTIVENESS,_AND 

RESULTS 

SIn evaiuating the US follow-on effort to South Vietnam, it is important 

to recognize that its deficiencies (and merits) stem not from one or 

even several underlying causes, bit rather from a complex netwrrk of interconnected 

variables, domestic, international, and war-related -- in Saigon, 

I Washingtan, and the international-political arena. Therefore, while the 

8-16

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following discussion assesses those factors which had the most appreciable 

impact on the follow-on effort, it is helpful to remember that each factor 

is just one of many which, 

unique) facet of America's involvement in Vietnam. 

together, constitute an extremely complex (and 

The overall viability of the US follow-on effort was greatly dependent 

upon the GNV/RVNAF 

ability to exploit adequately US military assistance 

(including skills and training passed on to GVN/RVNAF prior to US force 

withdrawal) and to develno a level of political stability and iational 

self-reliance sufficient to sustain the country politically, militarily, 

and psychologically. The al'ility (or inability) of the GVN/RVNAF to fulfill 

these necessary tasks was, 

in turn, dependent upon andoskaped by a 

decade or more ef intensive interaction between the political and military 

branches of both countries. 

Throughout the duration of US combat involvement in South Vietnam, 

both the RVNAF and the GVN grew increasingly dependent upon US expertise 

and strength, while the Americans willingly assumed a disproportionate 

share of wartime responsibilities. Hence, even while skill were very 

often successfully transferred by the US to GVN military ana civilian 

personnel (see Chapter 5 for an assessment of Vietnamization), an attitude 

of "why fight? ... the US will do it for us" permeated the RVNAF.33/ South 

Vietnam's over-dependency on the United States, therefore, greatly impinged 

on the US follow-on effort. 

RVNAF 

A unique and pervasive psychosis developed in the minds of both GVN/ 

leaders and the rank and file. Having received the United States' 

private assurance that tie treaty would be upheld if violated by Hanoi, 

convinced that the United States' own self-interest would never allow 

Hanoi's conquest of RVN, a sense of "reliance without reservation" burgeoned 

throughout the country. 34/ 

perspective, 

and 

Consequently, from the South Vietnamese 

... the US couldn't afford losing Vietnam because, 

as a superpower, the US would lose face ... 

Second, losing Vietnam would mean that the free 

world lost the first country to the Communists by 

I war .... Third, (if is had not been in the US 

8-18


Reliance on the US, 

interest to intervene] the US would not have 

poured so mucn resources and sacrified so many 

American lives in Vietnam in the first place. The 

discovery oF oil off the Vietnamese coast gave us 

one more reason to believe the US wouldn't abandon 

Vietnam ... Fourth, the government of South 

Vietnam had the solid pledge from the US government 

that the US would react strongly in case of 

Communist renewed aggression.35/ 

thus, carte to be a (false) panacea for the GVN's own 

lack of self-reliance. 

The problem of over-dependency was compounded by a variety of other 

problems, some stemming from GVN internal difficulties, others arisirg as a 

result of external stimuli. After the US withdrawal and particularly after 

tne US Congrezs banned American military operations in and over Southeast 

Asia, the GVN 

found it exceedingly difficult to imbue the country with the 

requisite morale and national spirt to withstand Hanoi's offensive. 

The Enchance and Enhance-Plus operations directly contributed to South 

Vietnam's loss of morale. From the South Vietnamese perspective, the 

United States' crash supply program was inai-ative of tne cease-fire's 

deficiencies and America's low "2vel of confiaence in South Vietnam's 

ability to defend itself.. The equipment itself caused a large percentage 

of RVNAF leaders to doubt the sincerity of the United States' follow-orneffort. 

A variety of complaints regarding the material sent into Vietnam 

during this period surfaced. 

thp equpment was of dubious quality;, much of 

it was either too sophiaticated for RVNAF to operate or was obsolete, 

secondhand hardware that was 

too difficult to maintain if and when spare 

parts were available.36/ The lack of skilled RVNAF technicians and Vietnamese 

language technical manuals, 

coupled with RVNAF's poor understanding 

of preventive maintenance fueled and compounded these complaints.37/ 

Waste 

was also an extreme problem, and the GVN call for rationing and stockpiling 

were generally unheeded, owing, respectively, to bad habits and US aid 

reductions.38/ 

8-19

T14E BOM CORPORATION 

Decreases in the country's firepowei capacity (concurrent with Hanoi's 

heightened aggression) only further exacerbated moral and discipline 

problems in the RVNAF, As General Cao Van Vien explains, 

For the first time in the war the RVNAF were 

in the decided position of urderdog, Gone was 

their superiority in firepower and mobility, the 

very things that helped t'ier,, maintain tactical 

balance in the face of an enemy who held the 

initiative.39/ 

Table 8-5 illustrates the comparative decrease in (US) 

the period 1969 through January 1975. 40/ 

RVNAF firepower for 

Partially as a result of this 

decrease, RVNAF casualty and desertion rates increasea, contributing 

further to the country's rapid loss uf morale. 

But perhaps the most significant (and, hence, debilitating) problem 

that faced South Vietnam, (directly impinging on the US follow-on effort,) 

was the GVN's own political fragility. As Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker 

autly noted in 1972, 

"They [the Saigon leadership] fear that they are not 

yet well en, augh organized to compete politically with such a tough, disciplined 

crganization". 41,/ Corruption, inpfficiency, and the South Vietnamese 

public distrust of its government's leaders and progranms made it 

extraorainarily difficult for the GVN to mobilize national resources to 

meet the requirements of the period, to complement the US follow-on support 

effort, and, most important, to compensate for tLie gradual elimination of 

U, physical and moral support., 

D.ý 

INSIGHTS 

The foregoing discussion gives rise to a number of important insights 

regarding the nature arid efficacy of the US follow-on effort to South 

Vietnam 

. President Nixon failed to ensure or establish congressional 

support for his post-war military-economic aid program for the 

GVN, and the success of the US follow-on effort in SVN dependd 

): 

8-20


TABLE 8-5. FOLLOW-ON EFFORT: COMPARAIIVE FIREPOWER 

1969-JANUARY 1975. 

f 

COMPARATIVE FIREPOWER 

Q(AILY SHORT TONS ON TARGET ALL SOURCES) 

1972 General January 

1969 Offensive 1975 

US-Free World ground 2.484 - 

US air 2.942 - - 

V ARVN ground 783 1.750 694 

VNAF air 200 450 114 

S6.409 S/T 2.200 S/T 808 S/T 

SOURCE. Indochina Refugee Authored Monographs, The Final Collapse, p., 240. 

I 

I 

S~8-21


on the continuing abili:y and willingness of the US government to 

meet the private commitments made by the administration, 

Public 

and congressional aistaste for the war, and, in particular, for 

the Thieu regime, made it unlikely that the adwinistration's 

program could be maintained for an extended periou of time, a 

situation that was apparent at the time to many interested 

observers, 

While secret diplomacy has its merits, the US ex.ecutive's refusal 

to more amply brief congressional leadership on the specifics of 

the negotiations, (including the executive branch's expectations 

regarding future US com, aitments tc Vietnam), gave rise to South 

Vietnam's false security, diminished US credibility as an ally in 

the long run, 

and caused an extreme degree of confusion in both 

Saigon and Washington concernig the actual nature of the US 

commitment. 

* Whle the US effort to enhance RVNAF in 1972-1973 did augment 

Saigon's hardware stockpiles for a period of time, the crash 

supply program had a decided negative impact on RVNAF morale and 

contributed further to the GVN 

States. 

of American 

(false) reliance on the United 

Equipment deficiencies also diminished the effectiveness 

efforts to enhance South Vietnam's military capabilit 

4 es, 

The divisive nature of Watergate severely conscrained the US 

follow-on effort and further complicated Saigon's perspective on 

and understanding of the US commitment to support GVN. 

Moreover, 

the US desire to get on with detente (and its subsequent 

impatience with the Saig)n le,,arship) gave rise to the impression 

that South Vietnam was no longer of importance to the US-- 

merely a "sideshow"--and, hence, further demoralized the GVN. 

0 The RVNAF's inability to adjust to a more austere style of 

fighting after the US withdrawal intensified the impact of US 

corngressional aid cuts in military appropriations for South 

8-22 

,J


Vietnam at a time when the PAVN forces were completing their 

modernization program with Soviet assistance. 

E. LESSONS 

The collapse of South Vietnam less than three years after the US 

withdrawal is only partially attributable to the failure of the follow-on 

effort. Seeds for the collapse were sown by the errors made du.,ing U• 

,ctive involvement, and by the termes of the cease-fire. NonetheIess, a 

more comprehens~ve and sustainea follow-on effort would certainly have 

postponed the collapse of the RVN -- perhaps indefinitely. Put simply, the 

key lesson to emerge from the follow-on effort in Vietnam is as follows: 

The US public and Congress must perceive a recipient 

nation as sufficiently important to US national interests 

to merit continued aid and support; otherwise, no 

"follow-on effort will last long enough to enable an 

ally to build-up the strength to stand alone. 

01 the subject of foreign aid in general, the former chief of RVNAF's 

Joint General Staff, General Cao Van Vien, provides some penetrating 

lessons: 

To a developing nation, foreign aid is essential 

in the nascent phase. However, its receipt 

must not preclude every effort to strive for 

self-sufficiency in the shortest tin.e possible, 

for to all aid - economic or military - is usually 

attached a political string. It is an ideal thing 

if the political system and foreign pclicy of the 

two nations involved - donor and recipient - go 

hand in hand, but if they don't, a serious breakdown 

is bcund to happen, 

When a recipient nation is ravaged by war, as 

South Vietnam, naturally it needs all the aid it 

can get for a longer time than is usually 

required. In such a case, foreign aid should be 

8-23

THE BDMi CORPORATION 

V 

made the object of a long-range plan determining 

among other things the duration of the aid, the 

amounts to be made available each year, the types 

c: commodities or equipment to be delivered, etc. 

This is the only effective way to help a recipient 

nation know what it can do in its yearly planning 

and what it can expect and must do in the longterm 

when the aid will inevitably come to an end. 

By all means, aid should not be reduced sharply 

and suddenly because of the serious material and 

moral impact on the recipient nation, The ideal 

aid policy should be a sincere desire to help a 

recipient nation become self-sufficient and selfsuppcrting 

in all aspects in the shortest time 

possible. Tflis-Ts the kind of policy that will 

"likely be lorg remembered and appreciated by the 

recipient nation which in turn will likely become 

an ally deeply loyal to the donor nation- witnout 

intimidation or any strings whatsoever.42/ 

8-24

mr-I 

i, 


I Failure 


I, Sir Rcbert Thompson, "Military Victory. Political Defeat - the 

of US Strategy in Vietnam," International Defense Review 

_•(June 1974):, 729, 

. 2. Allan E.. Goodman, The Lost Pvace (Stanford, California: Hoover 

Institution Press. 978), pp 7 7-178; quoting the late Hubert H, 

H-jmphre,. 

3. Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 

1979), p. 1462., 

4. Ibid., p. i462. 

5. Stephen T. Hosmer, Konrad Kellen, and Brian M. Jenkins. The Fall of 

South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military and Civ-iiin Leaders. 

Report prepa.'ed for 'Historian, Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Monica, California: S(Santa The RAND Corporation, 1978, R-2208-0D 

(HIST), p 11; and General Cao Van Vien, The Final Collapse, ndoi 

china Refagce Autnored Monograph Program. Prepared for Department of 

tjie Army, Office of Chief of Military History (McLean, Virginia: 

General Research Corporation, 1976), p. 5. 

6. Tad Szulc, "How Kissinger Did It. Behind the Cease-Fire Agreement," 

Foreign Policy 16 (Summer 1971), p. 23; and Kissinger, p. 1373. 

7. Leslie H, Gelb with Richard K. Betts, The Irooy of Vietnam: The 

System Werked (Washington, D.C., The Tr-ookings Institution, 1979), p. 

350, 

8. Goodman, pp. 188-189. 

9. Department of State Brief~nt, Paper ("Aldridge Memo.") "Interpretations 

of the Agreement 'n E-ding the War and Restoring Peace in 

I Vietnam, (U)," pp. 1-13. see also Szulc, pp. 64-66, 

S10. Vien, p. ?4; and Hosmer, 2t al., p. 7T 

11. Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 

12.. 1978), p. 206. 

12, Figure 8-1 Doug Van Khuyen, The RVNAF, Indochina Refugee Authored 

Monograph Program. Prepared for Department of the Army, Office of 

Chief of Military History (McLean, Virginia: General Research Cor- 

"poration, 1978), p. 281. 

13. Lewy, p. 206. 

8-25


14, Szulc, p. 64. 

15. Ibid., p. 22. 

16., Graphic compiled from infornation appearing in Colonel Hoang Ngoc 

Lung. Intelligence. Indochina Rerugee Authored Monograph Program. 

Prepared for Department of the Army, Office of Chief of Military 

History (McLean, Virginia. General Research Corporation, 1976), p. 

131" and interview with Michel Costino, LTC USA (Ret) a former Defense 

Attacl-. It should be noted that although the section coordinating 

the aid effort was attached to the DAO in Sainon, it reported to a .JS 

military headquarters in Thailand; See also Szulc, pp. Z2-23. 

17. Lewy, p. 206. 

18. For a detailed dicussion of the US Congress and its reassertive role 

in US foreign policy making, see Volume III, Chapter - "Washington 

and Vietnam: US Ndtional Level Policy Making and Th- Policy Making 

Process," and Appendix A - "Significant US National Policy Decisions 

Which Influenced US Military Invulvement in Vietnam," (Mecisions 

#16-17). See also VcIme IV, Chapte: 5 - "Domestic Poiitical Factors 

Influencing Vietnam War Decision MaKing." 

19. Lewy, p. 207; Cao V3n Vien, p. 4; and Douglas Kinnard, The War 

Menagers (Hanover New Hamps;,ire: University Press of New England, 

1977), pp. 154-155. 

20. Ibid. 

21. Kinnard, p. 131. 

22. Lieutenant General F.%,g Van Khuyen, RVNAF Logistics. Indochina 

Refugee Authored Morocraph Program. Prepared 1or Department of the 

Army, Office of Chief of Military History (McLean, Virginiaf General 

Research Corporation. lS76), p. 13. 

23. Doug Van Khuyen, The RVNAF, p. 285. 

24. Lewy, p. 204. 

25. Figure 8-2 i:. ad3pted from Pat M. Holt, The War Powers Resolution- 

The Role of Cong.ress in US Armed intervention. American Enterprise 

Institute (AEI) Studies in Foreign Policj, (Washington, D.C.-, AEI, 

1978), pp., 3-8. 

26. A number of excellent works have been written which discuss this 

issue. See, for example, Holt (above); R. Gordon Hoxie, Command 

Decision and the Presidency (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1977); 

Leonard C. Meeker, "The Legality of United States Participat;on in the 

8-26


Defense of Vietnam," in US Congress, House Committee on Foreign 

Affairs, War Powers, Hearing.. 1973; Honorable Jacob K, Javits, Who 

Makes War: The President Versus Congress (New York: William Morrow 

and Co., Inc,, 1973); Congressional Qaurterly, Inc., Concressional 

Quarterly Almanac, 1975, p. 298; Thomas Eagleton, War and 

Presidential Power (New York: Liverright, 1974); ana US Congress. 

Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Congress, In-ormation and 

Foreign Affairs, September 1978, 

27. President Nixon vetoed the War Powers Resolution but his veto was 

overridden, For Dr. '1issinger's views, see Kissinger, p. 1372. 

28. Kissinger, p. 1372. 

29. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker personally delivered two letters from 

President Niyon to President Thieu in December 1972 and JanLary 1973 

giving asstir, nces that the United States would intervene if the Nrth 

Vietnamese seriously violated the terms of the Paris agreement. The GVN 

was also assured of continuing military and economic aid, but those 

assurances proved to be hollow. Ambassador Bunker described the 

situation in these terms: 

Each side could replace, on a one-for-one basis, 

equipment used up, lost, or destroyed. By July 

or August 1973, Congress made it impossible for 

us to carry out that commitment by refusing to 

appropriate money. The result was that as each 

day went by, the South Vietnamese had less and 

less to fight with. They had fewer guns, fewer 

tanks, fewer planes -- -Ahile at the same time 

the Soviets and Chinese were supplying Hanoi and 

keeping their supplies up, so that they were 

completely equipped and our. side, as each day 

went by, was less well eqLipped to continue the 

struggle. Well it seems to me the result was 

inevitable in that situation. Now one may argue 

that the President shouldn't have made that commitment 

-- that he hadn't consulted Congress 

adequately ... buL the fact is that Thieu had 

the right to rely vn the commitment, the written 

commitment, of the President of the United States. 

Thet he did. So I think it was a very sad 

chapter in American history. I Onink the Vietnamese, 

to put it baldly, I think they wepe 

betrayed. 

BDM interview with Amoassador Ellsworth Bunker at The BDM Corporation 

8 November 1979. Also see Cao Van Vien, p. 5. 

8-27

T 

'i 


30. See Lewy, p. 207; and Kissirger, P. 1372. 

31. Figure 8-3 is adapted from Holt, pp. 12-20. 

32. See, for example, Frank Snepp, Decent Interval (New York: Vintage 

Books, 1978), Part 3, "The Collapse." 

33. See, for example, Hosmer, et al., pp. 4-10 on the South Vietnamese 

attitude. Also, Kinnard, p. 155. 

34, Hosmer, et al., pp. 10-11. 

35, Ibid., p. 13. 

36. Ibid., pp. 7-10, 65-67. 

37, Ibid., also Lewy, pp., 207-221; and Kinnard, p. 155. 

38. Lewy, pp. 208-209., 

39. Cao Van Vien, p, 6. 

40. Table 8-5 is taket, from (check back cf original [in Pubs] for Source), 

41. Kissingsr, qvoting Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, Honolulu meeting, 

August 31, 1972, p, 1324. (Emphasis added), 

42. General Cao Van Vien's remarks are so insightful that it is appropriate 

to cite them as lessons regarding the US follow-on effort to 

South Vietnam. Their applicability for future US interactions with 

third world nations is obvious. Vien, The Final Collapse, p. 216.

ii 

S~BIBLIOGRAPHY 

-•I 

•'4


VOLUME V 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

PANEL DISCUSSIONS 

The following persons ;articipated in the BDM Serior Review Panel meeting 

on September 7 and 8, 1979 at The BDM Westbranch Conference Center. Menpbers 

of the panel provided a critique of the original drafts for portions 

of this volume and offered detailed comments during the panel discussions. 

Braestrup, Peter. Editor, Wilson Quarterly. Former Saigon Bureau Cnief 

for The Washington Post and author of Big Story. 

Colby, William E. LLB Former Ambassador and Deputy to COMUSMACV for 

CORDS, and former Director of Central Intelligence. 

Davis, Vincent, Dr. Professor and Director of the Patterson School of 

Diplonmacy and International Commerce, The University of Kentucky. 

Greene, Fred, !. Professor, Williams College. Former Director, Office 

of Research for East Asian Affai's, Department of State. 

Hallowell, John H., Dr. James B. Du


VOLUME V 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

INTERVIEWS 

The following interviews, conducted by members of the BDM study 

team, unless otherwise indicated, provided important information for 

this volLme: 

Bunker, Ambassador Ellsworth. Former ambassador to Republic of Vietnam 

(1968-1973). Interviewed Nov. 8, 1979. 

i Burger, June 22, Ambassador 1979. Samuel. Deputy Ambassador to RVN (1968-1972). Interviewed 

'ii 

Colby, Ambassador William E. Deputy for CORDS; Director of 

Central Intelligence. Interviewed Feb. 13, 14, 1979. 

Conein, Lucien, Colonel, US Amy (Ret). Former OSS and CIA officer, 

serving in North Vietnam in 1945-46 and 1955, and in South Vietnam in 

the mid-1950's and 1961-1964. Interviewed at The BDM Corporation on 

August 25, 1979. 

Davis, Vincent, Dr., Director, Patterson School of Diplomacy and International 

Commerce. Frequent consultant to high-level offices in the 

Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. 

interviewed at The BDPI Corporation June 13, -979. 

Demma, Vince. Deputy Assistant, Office of Chef of Military History. 

Interviewed at OCMH Oct. 30, 1979. 

Hermes, Dr. Walter G. Office of the Chief of Military History. Interviewed 

at O001H, Oct. 30, 1979. 

Johnson, Ambassador U. Alexis. Former Deputy Ambassador to RVN, (1954, 

65) Interviewed Jan. 9, Feb. 13, 14, and Sept. 7, 1979. 

Sapin, Burton M. Dean, School of Public and Internation, 1 Affairs. The 

oeorge Washington University. Interviewed Feb. 13, 14, 170. 

St'lwell, General Richard G., USA (Ret). Formerly J-3 and Chief of 

Staff MACV (1963-65), COMUSMNACTHAI/CHJUSMAAGTHAI (1965-1967), CG Prov. 

Corps and XXIV Corps (1968-1969), and DCSOPS, HQ DA 1969-1972). Interviewed 

Sept. 24, 1979. 

Taylor, General M1axwell D. US Army (Ret). Former Amy Chief of Staff 

(1956-59) Chairman of the JCS (1962-64) and Ambassador to RVN (1964-65). 

Interviewed at his residence in Wash. D.C. July 11, 1979. 

B-2

- THE BDM CORPORATION 

k 

Walters. LTG Vernon A. Former Deferse Attache in France (1967-1971), 

and Deputy Director of CIA (1972-1976). Interviewed June 8, 1979. 

Vogt, General John W. USAF (Ret). Fornerzy J-3 and Director, Joint 

Staff and DEPCOMUSMACV and Commander 7th Air Force. Interviewed Nov. 

30, 1978 and Feb. 13, 14, 1979. 

Westmoreland, General William C. (USA, Ret). Former COMUSMACV (1964- 

1968) and Army Chief of Staff (1968-1972). Interviewed Aug. 17 and 29, 

1 979. 

I6 

Iir 

Ts 

f/• B-3


VOLUME V 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

DOCUMENTZ 

Anonymous. "The Coup D'Etdt of November 1, 1963," (Original title: "From 

the Day of the First Republic's Overthrow to the Day t'e Second Republic 

of Viet-Nam was Founded.." Copy frca the files of Col. Conein provided 

to BDM Aug. 1979. 

Central Intelligence Agency. "The Highlanders of South Vietnam." Declassified 

in Aug. 1974 under Executive Order 11652. 

CINCPAC. Military Assistance Plan Book - Vietnam. May 7, 1965. (SECRET, 

now unclassified). 

CINCPAC. Operation Plans 32-59 and 32-64. 

Clarke, LTG, Bruce C. Report of Visit of Lt. General Bruce C., Clarke. 

Commanding General, US Army Pacific to Western Pacific & Southeast ASia, 

Sept. 6-29, 1955. Vol, I. 

Cooper, Chester, et al. "The Cooper Report" in The American Experience 

with Pacification in Vietnam. Vol.. I. IDA, ARPA Special Studies, Mar. 

1972. 

Croizat, Col, V. J,, USMC (Ret.) A Translation from the French- Lessons of 

the War in Indochioa, Vol, 2. RM-5271-PR. Santa Monica-. Rand Corp, 1967., 

Croizat, Col. V. J., USMC (Ret.) Partial Translation of Volume III- Lessons 

of the War in Indochina., Unpublished, 

Defense Attache Staff. Special Operations Report. Lessons Learned. Jan. 

1965 - Oct. 31, 1965.. 

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XVI, "New Problems and Old Solutions." Updated research paper, 

Dept. cf the Army, Office of the Director of Plans., Limited War Plan - 

Indochina. Nov, 1956. 

Dept. of the Arm,. Study of the Pacification and Long-Term Develupment of 

Vietnam (PROVN). Annex F. "Trace of US Folicy Objectives in Time." 

Mar. 1966. 

B-4


Dept. of the Army. Vietnam Study Series. Wash. D.C.: Dept. of the Army. 

Collins, James Lawton, Jr., BG. The Development and Trainin 1 of tne 

South Vietnamese Army, 1950-1972. 1975. 

Dunn, LG. C. H. Base Development in South Vietnam, 1965-1970. 

Eckhardt, MG. George S. Command and Control:, 1950-1969. 1974. 

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Kelly, Col. Francis J. US Army Special Forces, 1961-1971. 1973. 

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USGPO, 1971. 

Dept. of State. Briefing paper, "Aldridge Memo," "InterpretaLions of the 

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R-223 8-OSD. Santa Monica: Rand Corp., Dec. 1978. 

1-.- 

Hughes, Thomas L. "Negotiating Under Pressure - Hanoi's Position," 

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Kissinger, Henry, and Frost, David. Transcript of unedited tape interview 

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16, 1972. 

"Impact of the Enemy Offensive on Pacification." Sept. 

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16, 1954. 

I National Security Decision Memorandum No. 9, April 1, 1969. 

I• Nixon, President Richard. Transcript of broadcast address on Indochina. 

New York T~mes, June 21, 1972. 

"B-6


Nutter, G. Warren. Selected Readings: The Vietnam War Elective. 

Carlisle BarracKs, Pa.: Army War College, Mar. - May 1977. 

Office of the Army Attache. "Reorganization of the Battle Corps to Meet 

the Threat of Invasion." Vietnamese Document. American Embassy. '3igon. 

April, 1956. 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Admin.) Dept. of Defense. 

Report of DOD Study Group on Adequacy of Mobility_ Planning and 1p.ration 

Organization. (U) July 1965. 

Osborne, Milton E. "Strategic Hamlets in South Vietnam, a Sur\ay and 

Comparison." Data Paper No. 55. Southeast Asia Program, Dept. of Asian 

Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y., 1965. 

Public Papers of the Presidents of the US: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957. 

"Special message to the Congress on Mutual Security Programs." May 21, 

1957. 

RVN presidential decrees: Ordinantce No. 2 of Jan 8, 1955, & Ordinance 

57 of Oct. 22, 1956. 

The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and Protocol Thereto." 

(SEATO). Sept. 8, 1954. 

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. "Th'. Viet Cong Political infrastructure 

in South Vietnam" in, History of the Vietnam War on Microfilm. 

Bangkok: The Research Office, SEATO, 1972. 

Steadman, Ricnard C. Report to the Secretary of Defense on the National 

Military Command Structure. Report Requested by the President and 

c-(inducted in Dept. of Defense. July, 1978. 

Thang, Gen. Nguyen Duc, Chief, National Pacification Campaign. Address 

to the Honolulu Conference, Honolulu, Hawaii. Feb. 7, 1966. 

Thayer, Thowas. Journal of Defense Research. Series B: Tactical 

Warfara Analysis of Vietnam. Vol. 78, No. 3 (Fall 1975). Prepared 

Quarterly by Battelle Coltubus Laboratories for the DOD Advanceo Research 

Projects Agency. De-lassified from Confidential to Unclassified. Dec 

SU.S. COn-ess. House, Committee on Appropriations. Hearings on Department 

of Defense Appropriations for 1974. 93rd Cong. First sess. Part I 

U.S. Congress. House, Committee on Armed Services. Departr, nt of 

Defense Procedures for Accumulating and Controlling Costs for Aid to 

South Vietnam in Fiscal Year 1975. April 3, 1975. 

A--


U.S. Congress. House. Comwittee on Armed Services. Hearings on Military 

Posture and HR 10929, Department of Defense Authorizations for Fiscal 

Year 1979. 95th Cong. 2nd sess. Part 5 of 7 parts. 

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Relations, Congress, 

Information and Foreign Affairs, Septeýmber 1978. 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Rel,,tions. Hearings on 

Vietnam: Policy and Prospects. 1970. 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Two Reports on Vietnam and Southeast Asia to the 

United States by Senator M i ke Mansfield. 93rd Cong. Ist sess. April 

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Westmoreland, Gen. William C., Private Files. On file at the Office of 

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Zasloff, Joseph J. Rural Resettlement in Vietnam: An Agroville in 

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D.C.: Michigan State University, 1973., 

B-8


DOCUMENTS 

Department of the Army, Office of Chief of Military History. Indochina 

Refugee Authored Monograph Program. Monographs prepared by the General 

Research Corporation, McLean, VA. Excellent source material on the Vietnam 

War is contained in this 20-monograph series of which the following were 

used extensively in preparation of tnis volume: 

Cao Van Vien, Gen. 

The Final Collapse 

_ _The US Advisor 

_ _ _Leadership 

____and Dong Van Khuyen, LG Reflections on the Vietnam War 

Dong Van Khuyen, LG RVNAF Logistics 

_ 

_RVNAF 

koang Ngoc Lung, Col. Intelligence 

_ _General Offensives 1968-1969 

____Strategy 

and Tactics 

Ngo Quang Truong, LG 

RVNAF and US Operational Cooperation 

and Coordination 

_The Easter Offensive of 1972 

____Territorial 

Nguyen Duy Hinh, MG ARVN Lamson 719 

____Vietnamization 

_________ 

Forces 

South Vietnamese Societ. 

and the Ceasefire 

1, Sak Sutsakhan, LTG Khmer Republic at War and Final 

II 

Collapse 

Sananikone Oudone, Gen. 

Royal Lao Army &nd the US Army 

Advice and Support 

Soutchay Vongsavanh, BG RLA RLG Military Operations and 

Activities in the Laotian Panhandle 

Tran Dinh Tho, BG 

Pacification 

__ _ Cambodian Incursion 

B-9


VOLUME V 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

BOOKS 

Adams, Sherman. Firsthand Report. New York: Harper & Row, 1961. 

Betts, Richard K. Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold Wc'r Crises. 

Mass: Harvard University Press, 1977. 

Cdmbridge, 

Blaufarb, Dcuglas S. The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and 

Performance 1950 to the Present. New York, NY: The Free Press, 1977. 

Brown, Weldon A. Prelude to Disaster. The American Role in Vietnam 

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Buttinger, Joseph. Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled, Volume II, Vietnam at War. 

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Clutterbuck, Brigadier Richard. The Long Long War. New York, NY: 

Praeger, 1966. 

Colby, William and Forbath, Peter. Honourable Men: My Life in the CIA. 

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Collins, J. M. "Vietnam Postmortem: A Senseless Strategy." The Vietnam 

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B-1 0


Fall, Bernard B. The Two Vietnams. New York, London: Frederick A. Praeger, 

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Ford, President Gerald R. A Time to Heal. New York: Harper and Row 

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Gallucci, Robert. Neither Peace Nor Honor: The Politics of American 

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B-12

THE BDM CORPOPATION 

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'- 

B-13

I 

THE BDM. CORPORATION 

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i, 

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SB-!14

F 


VOLUME 

V 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

ARTICLES 

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0 - The Black Vault

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