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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) proposes to introduce new or updated standards for parts, taking into account
the principles of efficiency and harmonisation.
In particular, this NPA proposes to:
— modify a number of ETSOs in order to harmonise them with the corresponding FAA TSOs;
— introduce one new ETSO (Index 1) which is, where possible, technically similar to the corresponding FAA TSO; and
— introduce some new ETSOs (Index 2), which either do not exist in the FAA TSO series, or which contain significant
technical differences from the corresponding FAA TSOs.
The proposed amendments are expected to extend the possibilities of ETSO authorisations for EU applicants and to align
CS-ETSO with the state of the art and with European operational requirements.
These amendments will ensure a level playing field for European manufacturers, and will increase the cost-effectiveness
of compliance demonstrations.
Action area: Regular updates
Affected rules: CS-ETSO Rulemaking group: No
Affected stakeholders: Manufacturers of parts Rulemaking Procedure: Standard
Driver: Efficiency/proportionality; Level playing
field
Impact assessment: None
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Table of contents
Table of contents
3. Proposed amendments....................................................................................... 18
3.1. Draft certification specifications (CSs) .....................................................................18
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About this NPA
1 Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2018 on common rules in the field of
civil aviation and establishing a European Union Aviation Safety Agency, and amending Regulations (EC) No 2111/2005,
(EC) No 1008/2008, (EU) No 996/2010, (EU) No 376/2014 and Directives 2014/30/EU and 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament
and of the Council, and repealing Regulations (EC) No 552/2004 and (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the
Council and Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91 (OJ L 212, 22.8.2018, p. 1) (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1535612134845&uri=CELEX:32018R1139).
2 EASA is bound to follow a structured rulemaking process as required by Article 115(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139. Such a process
has been adopted by the EASA Management Board (MB) and is referred to as the ‘Rulemaking Procedure’. See MB Decision
No 18-2015 of 15 December 2015 replacing Decision 01/2012 concerning the procedure to be applied by EASA for the issuing of
opinions, certification specifications and guidance material (http://www.easa.europa.eu/the-agency/management-board/decisions/easa-
mb-decision-18-2015-rulemaking-procedure).
3 https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/general-publications?publication_type%5B%5D=2467
4 In accordance with Article 52 of the Basic Regulation, and Articles 5(3) and 6 of the Rulemaking Procedure.
5 In case of technical problems, please contact the CRT webmaster (crt@easa.europa.eu).
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2. In summary — why and what
6 Commission Regulation (EU) No 748/2012 of 3 August 2012 laying down implementing rules for the airworthiness and environmental
certification of aircraft and related products, parts and appliances, as well as for the certification of design and production
organisations (OJ L 224, 21.8.2012, p. 1).
7 FAA TSOs are available at http://www.airweb.faa.gov.
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2. In summary — why and what
CS-ETSO Subpart A
CS-ETSO Subpart B
Index 1
ETSO-C10c: Pressure Altimeter System
This update of ETSO-C10b is based on FAA TSO-C10c, issued on 31 October 2016.
According to this revision proposal, newly designed pressure altimeter systems should meet the
minimum performance standard (MPS) qualification and documentation requirements in SAE
International’s Aerospace Standard AS8009C, Pressure Altimeter Systems, dated 24 May 2016.
In line with the FAA TSO, some modifications to the referenced standards are introduced into the ETSO
in Appendix 1.
8 Refer to NPA 2018-09 ‘Regular update of AMC-20: AMC 20-152 on Airborne Electronic Hardware and AMC 20-189 on Management
of Open Problem Reports’ (https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/notices-of-proposed-amendment/npa-2018-09).
9 Refer to NPA 2018-09 ‘Regular update of AMC-20: AMC 20-152 on Airborne Electronic Hardware and AMC 20-189 on Management
of Open Problem Report’ (https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/notices-of-proposed-amendment/npa-2018-09).
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According to this revision proposal, newly designed life preservers should meet the minimum
performance standard (MPS) qualification and documentation requirements in SAE International’s
Aerospace Standard AS1354, Individual Inflatable Life Preserver, dated 24 February 2016.
In line with the FAA TSO, some modifications to the referenced standards are introduced into the ETSO
in Appendices 1 and 2.
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ETSO-C117b: Airborne Wind shear Warning and Escape Guidance Systems for Transport Aeroplanes
This update of ETSO-C117a is based on FAA TSO-C117b, issued on 27 March 2018.
According to this revision proposal, newly designed temperature instruments should meet the minimum
performance standard (MPS) qualification and documentation requirements provided in Appendix 1 of
this ETSO.
ETSO-C145e A1: Airborne Navigation Sensors Using the Global Positioning System Augmented by the
Satellite Based Augmentation System
This update of ETSO-C145e is intended to provide applicants with the option to use an ETSO-2C204a
SBAS circuit card assembly (CCA) functional sensor as part of their ETSO application, and to correct an
unintended difference from Appendix 2 of published FAA TSO-145e. These changes are in line with FAA
TSO-C145e.
No technical changes are proposed for the Minimum Operational Performance Standard (MOPS) in
comparison with ETSO-C145e.
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ETSO-C146e A1: Stand-Alone Airborne Navigation Equipment Using the Global Positioning System
Augmented by the Satellite Based Augmentation System
This update of ETSO-C146e is intended to provide applicants with the option to use an ETSO-2C205a
class delta circuit card assembly (CCA) functional sensor as part of their ETSO application, and to correct
an unintended difference from Appendix 2 of published FAA TSO-146e. These changes are in line with
FAA TSO-C146e.
No technical changes are proposed for the Minimum Operational Performance Standard (MOPS) in
comparison with ETSO-C146e.
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ETSO-C196b: Airborne Supplemental Navigation Sensors for Global Positioning System Equipment
Using Aircraft-Based Augmentation
This update of ETSO-C196a is intended to provide applicants with the option to use an ETSO-2C206 GPS
circuit card assembly (CCA) as part of their ETSO application. This is in line with FAA TSO-C196b.
No technical changes are proposed for the MOPS in comparison with ETSO-C196a.
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Index 2
ETSO-2C19c A1: Portable Water-Solution Type Hand Fire Extinguishers
This update of ETSO-2C19c is intended to correct some typos in paragraph 3.1.1. During the previous
update of this ETSO, the old MOPS reference was not removed, and only the new MOPS reference was
added.
The existing revision letter is, however, kept to ensure synchronisation with the revision letter of the
FAA TSO, and an amendment number is added to highlight the change.
ETSO-2C204a: Circuit Card Assembly (CCA) Functional Sensors using Satellite-Based Augmentation
System (SBAS) for Navigation and Non-Navigation Position/Velocity/Time (PVT) Output
This new ETSO is based on FAA TSO-C204a, issued on 5 September 2017.
This ETSO provides the requirements for circuit card assembly functional sensors that use satellite-based
augmentation for navigation and non-navigation position/velocity/time output which are designed and
manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO.
To be identified with the applicable ETSO marking, these ETSO articles should meet the requirements
provided in RTCA document DO-229E, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Global
Positioning System/Satellite-Based Augmentation System Airborne Equipment, dated
15 December 2016, Section 2, as modified by Appendices 2 and 4 of the ETSO-C145e standard.
Compared with the corresponding FAA TSO, this new ETSO contains additional requirements that are
related to partial environmental testing, and the delivery of test procedures for the end user, allowing
the possibility of installation in equipment other than C145e equipment. For this reason, this new ETSO
has been included in Index 2.
ETSO-2C205a: Circuit Card Assembly (CCA) Functional Class Delta Equipment Using the Satellite-Based
Augmentation System (SBAS) For Navigation Applications
This new ETSO is based on FAA TSO-C205a, issued on 5 September 2017.
This ETSO provides the requirements for circuit card assembly functional class delta equipment that uses
the satellite-based augmentation system for navigation applications which are designed and
manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO.
To be identified with the applicable ETSO marking, these ETSO articles should meet the requirements
provided in RTCA document DO-229E, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Global
Positioning System/Satellite-Based Augmentation System Airborne Equipment, dated
15 December 2016, Section 2, as modified by Appendices 2 and 4 of the ETSO-C146e standard.
Compared with the corresponding FAA TSO, this new ETSO contains additional requirements that are
related to partial environmental testing, and the delivery of test procedures for the end user, allowing
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the possibility of installation in equipment other than ETSO-C146e equipment. For this reason, this new
ETSO has been included in Index 2.
ETSO-2C206: Circuit Card Assembly Functional Sensors using Aircraft-Based Augmentation for
Navigation and Non-Navigation Position/Velocity/Time (PVT) Output
This new ETSO is based on FAA TSO-C206, issued on 20 December 2013.
This ETSO provides the requirements for circuit card assembly functional sensors that use aircraft-based
augmentation for navigation and non-navigation position/velocity/time output which are designed and
manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO.
To be identified with the applicable ETSO marking, these ETSO articles should meet the requirements
provided in RTCA document DO-316, Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for Global
Positioning System/Aircraft Based Augmentation System Airborne Equipment, dated 14 April 2009,
Section 2.
Compared with the corresponding FAA TSO, this new ETSO contains additional requirements that are
related to partial environmental testing, and the delivery of test procedures for the end user, allowing
the possibility of installation in equipment other than ETSO-C196b equipment. For this reason, this new
ETSO has been included in Index 2.
ETSO-2C516: Airborne Systems For Video/Audio Surveillance Of Cabin And Cargo Areas
This new ETSO provides the requirements that airborne systems for video/audio surveillance of cabin
and cargo areas designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be
identified with the applicable ETSO marking.
According to this proposal, newly designed airborne systems for video/audio surveillance of cabin and
cargo areas must meet the standards provided in Appendix 1 of this ETSO.
Currently, there is no FAA TSO that corresponds to the proposed ETSO-2C516.
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New standards regarding requirements for flight recorders and underwater locating devices in
Part-CAT
In 2015, a new air operation requirement was introduced in Part-CAT (CAT.GEN.MPA.210 ‘Location of
an aircraft in distress — Aeroplanes’), which requires some categories of large aeroplanes manufactured
after January 2021 to be equipped with ‘robust and automatic means to accurately determine, following
an accident where the aeroplane is severely damaged, the location of the point of end of flight’. The
most mature technologies to meet this requirement are automatic deployable flight recorders (ADFRs),
which per ED-112A must each be fitted with an emergency locator transmitter (ELT), and the type of ELT
that is automatically triggered in flight upon the detection of a catastrophic situation (also called a
‘distress-tracking ELT’).
The above changes are introduced under RMT.0400 (OPS.090) ‘Amendment of requirements for flight
recorders and underwater locating devices, which also considers the new ‘high rate tracking’ (HRT)
technology complemented with a 121.5 MHz homing device to address the CAT.GEN.MPA.210
requirement. HRT technology is not yet mature enough to be the subject of a specific ETSO.
To support the implementation of this CAT.GEN.MPA.210 requirement, the following amendments of
existing ETSOs and a new ETSO-2C517 are proposed:
ETSO-C123d: Cockpit Voice Recorder Equipment
According to this revision proposal, newly designed cockpit voice recorder (CVR) equipment
should meet the standards provided in EUROCAE document ED-112A, MOPS for Crash Protected
Airborne Recorder Systems, dated September 2013, as amended by the new Appendix 1.
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In particular, Appendix 1 extends the duration of the deep-sea pressure and seawater
immersion tests to 90 days in accordance with ETSO-C121b ‘Underwater Locating Device
(Acoustic) (Self-powered)’.
This update clarifies that the procedures to retrieve recorded information from a recorder
(damaged or undamaged) must be documented, and that any special tools/recovery techniques
that are necessary for that purpose shall be made available to the accident investigation
authorities on request.
For deployable recorders, the reference to ED-112A, Section 3, has been replaced by a reference
to the newly proposed ETSO-2C517.
Currently, the FAA TSO that corresponds to ETSO-C123d is at Revision b.
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2. In summary — why and what
2.4. What are the expected benefits and drawbacks of the proposals
Technology and its related requirements are continuously changing, and thus new industry standards
have been developed, or existing industry standards (to which existing ETSOs refer) have been updated
and improved. As a result of this, new ETSOs could be developed and existing ETSOs need to be revised.
This will contribute to ensuring that parts to be used on aircraft correspond to the latest (and safest)
standards and technological solutions.
This practice is also expected to bring economic benefits to the industry, and no specific drawbacks have
been identified.
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3. Proposed amendments
3. Proposed amendments
The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted text, new or amended text as shown below:
— deleted text is marked with struck through;
— new or amended text is highlighted in blue;
— an ellipsis ‘[…]’ indicates that the rest of the text is unchanged.
SUBPART A — GENERAL
1. APPLICABILITY
1.1 Requirements for the issue of European Ttechnical Sstandard Oorder (ETSO) authorisations are
found in Part-21, Section A, Subpart O.
1.2 Marking requirements for the issue of European Ttechnical Sstandard Oorder (ETSO) authorisations
are found in Part-21, Section A, Subpart Q.
Unless otherwise stated in paragraph 3.1.2 of the specific ETSO, the applicable environmental
standards are contained in EUROCAE/RTCA document ED-14D, Change 3/DO-160D ‘Environmental
Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment’, Change 3, dated December 2002,
ED-14E/DO-160E dated March 2005, ED-14F/DO-160F dated March 2008, ED-14G/DO-160G dated
December 2010, or ED-14G Change 1/DO-160G Change 1 dated January 2015.
Compliance shall be demonstrated entirely with one of the above versions of the applicable
environmental standards.
2.2 Software standards
When If the ETSO article includes airborne software, unless otherwise stated in paragraph 3.1.3 of
the specific ETSO, one the software shall be developed with development assurance. Acceptable
means of compliance for the development assurance of the airborne software is outlined in the
latest revision of AMC 20-115, entitled Airborne Software Considerations Development Assurance
in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certificationusing EUROCAE ED-12 and RTCA DO-178.
The software level, also known as the ‘item development assurance level (IDAL)’, may be
determined by using the guidance proposed in Section 2.4 of this document, below. The applicant
must declare the software level(s) to which the software has been developed and verified.
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3. Proposed amendments
If the ETSO article includes airborne electronic hardware, the airborne electronic hardware shall be
developed with development assurance. The acceptable means of compliance for the development
of airborne electronic hardware is outlined in the latest revision of AMC 20-15210, entitled
‘Development Assurance for Airborne Electronic Hardware’.
The airborne electronic hardware design assurance level, also known as the ‘item development
assurance level (IDAL)’, may be determined by using the guidance proposed in Section 2.4 of this
document, below. The applicant must declare the airborne electronic hardware design assurance
level(s) to which it has been developed and verified.
If the article contains a complex application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) or a complex
programmable logic device such as a programmable array logic components (PAL), a field-
programmable gate array components (FPGA), a general array logic components (GAL), or an
erasable programmable logic device (EPLD), all of which are known as ‘complex electronic
hardware’ to accomplish the function, develop the component according to EUROCAE/RTCA
document ED-80/DO-254 ‘Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware’, dated
April 2000.
Supplemental guidance material for all airborne electronic hardware (including boards, simple
electronic hardware, use of COTS devices) included in the ETSO article may be found in ‘EASA CM-
SWCEH-001 Development Assurance of Airborne Electronic Hardware’ Issue 01, revision 01, dated
March 2012.
The design assurance level, also known as the ‘item development assurance level (IDAL) for
airborne electronic hardware (AEH)’, may be determined by using the guidance proposed in Section
2.4. The applicant must declare the design assurance level(s) to which the AEH has been developed
and verified.
2.4 Failure condition classification and development assurance
During the development of an ETSO article, consideration should be given to failure conditions, and
the ETSO article should then be developed in accordance with the possible effects of those failure
conditions at the system and aircraft levels (see AMC CS xx.1309 for further guidance; for CS-23
aircraft, further guidance can be found in FAA AC 23.1309-1E).
The ETSO article shall be developed according to at least the development assurance level that is
appropriate to the failure condition classifications that are expected for the intended installation.
Where If the effects at the system or aircraft level are not known, due to the non-availability of
aircraft or system design data, the applicant should develop an assumption for the failure
classification. The assumed failure classification should be at least as high as the assumed failure
classifications may be used, but at a minimum hazard classification to the level required in the ETSO.
The Cclassification of failure conditions at the level of the ETSO article may change as a result of
particular aircraft installation architectures and characteristics.
10 Refer to NPA 2018-09 ‘Regular update of AMC-20: AMC 20-152 on Airborne Electronic Hardware and AMC 20-189 on Management
of Open Problem Reports’ (https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/notices-of-proposed-amendment/npa-2018-09).
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3. Proposed amendments
EUROCAE/SAE document ED-79A/ARP 4754A, ‘Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and
Systems’, dated December 2010, may be used to assign the development assurance levels of the
ETSO article, software and AEH. The document may also be used as well as guidance to ensure that
a proper development, validation and verification process is followed for of the ETSO article and its
functional requirements.
When If the ETSO article implements one (or several) ETSO-2C153-authorised integrated modular
avionics (IMA) platforms/modules and for which the applicant seeks compliance credit from this
(these) ETSOA authorisation(s) to demonstrate compliance with one or several functional ETSO
standard(s), the applicant shall apply for authorisation to the ETSO-C214 standard, together with
the intended functional ETSO standard(s).
Note: aA functional ETSO standard is any ETSO standard of CS-ETSO that describes describing an
‘aircraft’ function, i.e. it is typical of typically the majority of all ETSO standards, except ETSO-2C153
and ETSO-C214.
3. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
3.1 In some ETSOs, reference is made to an associated FAA standard. In these cases, the corresponding
FAA technical standard order (TSO) can be consulted on
http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgTSO.nsf/Frameset?OpenPage.
3.2 Standards documents referred to in this CS-ETSO may be purchased or obtained from the following
organisations:
— ASD-STAN documents:
11 Refer to NPA 2018-09 ‘Regular update of AMC-20: AMC 20-152 on Airborne Electronic Hardware and AMC 20-189 on Management
of Open Problem Reports’ (https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/notices-of-proposed-amendment/npa-2018-09).
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— FCC Documents:
http://www.fcc.gov
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Index 1
ETSO-C14b Aircraft Fabric, Intermediate Grade; External Covering Material CS-ETSO/Initial Issue
ETSO-C25a Aircraft Seats and Berths (Type I Transport 6g Forward Load) CS-ETSO/Initial Issue
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ETSO-C39c Aircraft Seats and Berths Certified by Static Testing only CS-ETSO/6
ETSO-C49b Electric Tachometer: Magnetic Drag (Indicator and Generator) CS-ETSO/Initial Issue
ETSO-C53a Fuel and Engine Oil System Hose Assemblies CS-ETSO/Initial Issue
ETSO-C69c Emergency Evacuation Slides, Ramps and Slide/Rafts Combinations CS-ETSO/Initial Issue
Airborne Static (‘DC to DC’) Electrical Power Converter (for Air CS-ETSO/Initial Issue
ETSO-C71
Carrier Aircraft)
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ETSO-C102 Airborne Radar Approach and Beacon Systems for Helicopters CS-ETSO/Initial Issue
Optional Display Equipment for Weather and Ground Mapping CS-ETSO/Initial Issue
ETSO-C105
Radar Indicators
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Airborne Collision Avoidance System II (ACAS II) Version 7.1 with CS-ETSO/11
ETSO-C119d
Hybrid Surveillance
ETSO-C135a Large Aeroplane Wheels, and Wheels and Brake Assemblies CS-ETSO/6
ETSO-C158 Aeronautical Mobile High Frequency Data Link (HFDL) Equipment CS-ETSO/7
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ETSO-C165ab Electronic Map Systems for Graphical Depiction of Aircraft Position CS-ETSO/915
ETSO-C178 Single Phase 115 VAC, 400 Hz Arc Fault Circuit Breakers CS-ETSO/8
ETSO-C198 Automatic Flight Guidance and Control System (AFGCS) Equipment CS-ETSO/8
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3. Proposed amendments
Index 2
EASA ETSO ref. Title Last amended by
Power Plant Fire Detection Instruments (Thermal and Flame CS-ETSO/Initial Issue
ETSO-2C11e
Contact Types)
ETSO-2C19c A1 Portable Water-Solution Type Hand Fire Extinguishers CS-ETSO/1215
ILS Glide Slope Receiving Equipment Operating within the Radio CS-ETSO/Initial Issue
ETSO-2C34f
Frequency Range of 328.6–335.4 Megahertz (MHz)
ETSO-2C35d Radar Marker Receiving Equipment CS-ETSO/Initial Issue
Airborne ILS Localizer Receiving Equipment Operating within the CS-ETSO/Initial Issue
ETSO-2C36f
Radio Frequency Range 108–112 Megahertz
VOR Receiving Equipment Operating within the Radio Frequency CS-ETSO/Initial Issue
ETSO-2C40c
Range of 108–117.95 Megahertz
ETSO-2C41d Airborne Automatic Direction Finding (ADF) Equipment CS-ETSO/Initial Issue
ETSO-2C48a Carbon Monoxide Detector Instruments CS-ETSO/6
Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) Operating within the Radio CS-ETSO/Initial Issue
ETSO-2C66b
Frequency Range 960–1215 Megahertz
ETSO-2C75 Hydraulic Hose Assembly CS-ETSO/Initial Issue
Airborne Interim Standard Microwave Landing System Converter CS-ETSO/Initial Issue
ETSO-2C93b
Equipment
ETSO-2C104a Microwave Landing System (MLS) Airborne Receiving Equipment CS-ETSO/Initial Issue
Devices That Prevent Blocked Channels Used in Two-Way Radio CS-ETSO/Initial Issue
ETSO-2C122
Communications Due to Simultaneous Transmissions
Devices That Prevent Blocked Channels Used in Two-Way Radio CS-ETSO/Initial Issue
ETSO-2C128
Communications Due to Unintentional Transmissions
ETSO-2C153 Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) Platform and Modules CS-ETSO/10
VHF Radio Communications Transceiver Equipment Operating CS-ETSO/6
ETSO-2C169a
within the Radio Frequency Range 117.975 to 137 Megahertz
ETSO-2C197a Information Collection and Monitoring Systems CS-ETSO/715
Circuit Card Assembly (CCA) Functional Sensors using Satellite- CS-ETSO/15
ETSO-2C204a Based Augmentation System (SBAS) for Navigation and Non-
Navigation Position/Velocity/Time (PVT) Output
Circuit Card Assembly Functional Class Delta Equipment Using The CS-ETSO/15
ETSO-2C205a
Satellite-Based Augmentation System For Navigation Applications
Circuit Card Assembly Functional Sensors using Aircraft-Based CS-ETSO/15
ETSO-2C206 Augmentation for Navigation and Non-Navigation
Position/Velocity/Time Output
ETSO-2C500a Combined ILS/MLS Airborne Receiving Equipment CS-ETSO/Initial Issue
ETSO-2C501 Mode S Aircraft Data Link Processor CS-ETSO/Initial Issue
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Date : 24.10.03 XX.XX.20XX
European
Union
Aviation
Safety
Agency
European Technical Standard Order (ETSO)
Subject: PRESSURE ALTIMETER SYSTEM AIRCRAFT ALTIMETER, PRESSURE ACTUATED,
SENSITIVE TYPE.
1— Applicability
This ETSO gives provides the requirements which pressure altimeter systems altimeters pressure
actuated that are designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to
be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.
2— Procedures
2.1 — General
The Aapplicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None.
3— Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
The applicable Sstandards are those set forthprovided in the SAE International’s Aerospace Standard
(AS) document: AS8009C, Pressure Altimeter Systems, dated 24 May 2016, as modified by Appendix 1
to this ETSO. AS 392C, „Altimeter, Pressure Actuated Sensitive Type’, revision date February, 1959 with
the following exceptions, and as amended and supplemented by this ETSO: Exceptions
(i) The following specifically numbered paragraphs in AS 392C do not concern minimum performance
and therefore are not essential to compliance with this paragraph: 3.1, 3.1.1, 3.1.2, 3.2,
3.2(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f).
(ii) In lieu of Section 7. in AS 392C, it is a requirement that the altimeters covered by this section be
capable of successfully passing the test in paragraphs 7.1 through 7.5 and an External Case Pressure
Test which is as follows:
External Case Pressure Test The static pressure source of the instrument shall be sealed when an
ambient temperature of 25°C and an ambient pressure of 29.92 inches (absolute) of mercury have
been achieved. The ambient pressure shall then be increased at a rate of 20 inches of mercury in
two seconds to 50 inches (absolute) of mercury and held at that pressure for three minutes. There
shall be no adverse effect on the instrument or its accuracy.
(iii) The „Reference Section’ under Table II of AS 392C is not applicable.
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3.1.2 — Computer Software Environmental Standard
None.
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1.
3.1.3 — Software
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.2.
3.1.4 — Airborne Electronic Hardware
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.3.
3.2 — Specific
None The declaration of design and performance (DDP) and the installation manual shall state the
maximum calibrated altitude.
3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4.
4— Marking
4.1 — General
Marking is detailed in See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2. In addition, the maximum altitude for
which altimeter is qualified to operate shall be legibly and permanently marked.
4.2 — Specific
None.
5— Availability of Referenced Documents
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 3.
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APPENDIX 1
This Appendix defines modifications and additions to the MPS for pressure altimeter equipment specified in SAE
AS8009C, Pressure Altimeter Systems, dated 24 May 2016.
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Date: 24.10.03 XX.XX.20XX
European
Union
Aviation
Safety
Agency
1— Applicability
This ETSO gives provides the requirements which life preservers that are designed and manufactured on
or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.
2— Procedures
2.1 — General
The Aapplicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None.
3— Technical cConditions
3.1 — Basic
The standards of this ETSO apply to items of equipment that are intended to function as life
preservers.
3.1.1 — Minimum pPerformance sStandard
The applicable Sstandards are those set forth provided in the appendix 1 to this ETSO. SAE
International’s Aerospace Standard AS1354, Individual Inflatable Life Preserver, dated
February 2016, as modified by Appendix 1.
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3.1.4 — Airborne Electronic Hardware
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.3.
3.2 — Specific
None
3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification
Not applicable.
4— Marking
4.1 — General
Marking is detailed in See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.
4.2 — Specific
As given inSee Appendix 1.
Federal Test Method Standards No 191A may be obtained (or purchased) from the General
Service Administration, Business Service Center, Region 3, 7th and D Streets, S.W.,
Washington DC 20407.
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3.1.5 Seam Strength and Adhesives. Cemented or heat sealable seams used in the
manufacture of the device must meet the following minimum strength
requirements.
3.1.5.1 Cemented Seams. Seams using adhesive on coated fabrics must be sealed
with tape having a minimum width of 30 mm (1 3/16 inches). Devices
manufactured with cemented seams must meet the following minimum
strength requirements:
Seam Shear Strength (Grab Test)
30.6 N/mm width at 24°C (175 pounds/inch width at 75 degrees F)
7.0 N/mm width at 60°C (40 pounds/inch width at 140 degrees F)
Peel Strength (Peel Test)
1.8 N/mm width at 21°C (10 pounds/inch width at 70 degrees F)
3.1.5.2 Heat Sealed Seams. The application of tape over heat sealed seams is optional.
Devices manufactured with heat sealed seams used in the manufacture of
the device must meet the following minimum strength requirements:
Seam Strength (Grab Test)
7.9 N/mm width at 21°C (45 pounds/inch width at 70 degrees F)
5.3 N/mm width at 60°C (30 pounds/inch width at 140 degrees F)
3.1.6 Seam Tape. If tape is used, the fabric used for the seam tape must have a minimum
breaking strength (Grab Test) of not less than 8.8 N/mm (50 pounds/inch) width in
both the warp and fill directions. When applied to the seam area, the adhesion
strength characteristics must meet the seam strength requirements in paragraph
3.1.5.
3.1.7 Materials Other Than Coated Fabrics.
3.1.7.1 Webbing. Webbing used to attach the life preserver to the wearer must have
a minimum tensile strength of 1023 N (230 pounds).
3.1.7.2 Thread. Thread used in the life preserver must be Size E nylon or equivalent
with a minimum tensile strength of 38 N (8.5 pounds).
3.1.8 Flammability. The device (including packaging) must be constructed of materials
which are in compliance with CS-25.853(a) [Appendix F, Part I (a)(1)(iv)].
3.1.9 Molded Nonmetallic Fittings. Molded nonmetallic fittings must retain their physical
characteristics when subjected to temperatures of –51 to +71°C (-60 to +160 degrees
F).
3.2 Metallic Parts. All metallic parts must be made of corrosion resistant material or must be
suitably protected against corrosion.
4. Detail Requirements.
4.1 Design and Construction.
4.1.1 Reversibility. The life preserver must perform its intended function when reversed,
unless the design of the preserver precludes the probability of improper donning.
4.1.2 Compartmentation, Type I Life Preserver. An inflatable life preserver may have one or
more separate gas tight flotation chambers. Each separate flotation chamber must
meet the inflation requirements of paragraph 4.1.4.
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4.1.3 Protection Against Abrasion and Chafing, Type I Life Preserver. The flotation chambers
must be protected in such a manner that metallic or nonmetallic parts do not cause
chafing or abrasion of the material in either the packed or inflated condition.
4.1.4 Inflation, Type I Life Preserver.
4.1.4.1 Oral Inflation. A means must be provided by which the wearer, excluding
child and infant-small child wearers who would require adult assistance,
without previous instruction, may inflate each flotation chamber by blowing
into a mouthpiece. The mouthpiece for oral inflation must be readily
available to the wearer without interfering with the wearer’s face or body.
For infant-small child and child life preservers, the oral inflation means must
be readily available to assisting persons.
4.1.4.2 Oral Inflation Valve. The opening pressure of the oral inflation valve, with no
back pressure applied to the valve, may not exceed 3 kN/m2 (0.44 pounds
per square inch gage (psig)). The oral inflation valve may not leak when back
pressure throughout the range from 0 – 69 kN/m2 (0 psig through 10 psig) is
applied. The joint between the oral inflation valve and the flotation chamber
may not fail when a 445 N (100-pound) tensile load is applied for at least 3
seconds outwardly from and perpendicular to the surface of the flotation
chamber at the point of valve attachment. To support the flotation chamber
fabric during load application, an adapter having an inside diameter at least
19 mm (3/4 inch) larger than the outside diameter of the valve at the point
of attachment must be used.
4.1.4.3 Manual Mechanical Inflation. A means must be provided by which the
wearer, or person assisting a child or infant-small child wearer who would
require adult assistance, without previous instruction, may inflate each
flotation chamber of the life preserver by manual operation.
4.1.4.3.1 Gas Reservoir. A reservoir containing a suitable compressed gas
must be provided to inflate each flotation chamber of the life
preserver. If carbon dioxide (CO2) cylinders are used, the
standards of MIL-C-601G Amendment 1 dated August 31, 1972 or
the equivalent are acceptable not withstanding any size or weight
limitations.
4.1.4.3.2 Pull Cord Assembly. The mechanical inflation means must have a
pull cord assembly for each gas reservoir. The pull cords must be
identical in length, clearly visible, and extend between 38 to 76
mm (1 1/2 to 3 inches) below the edge of the life preserver. The
end of each pull cord assembly must be attached to a red pull
knob or tab having rounded edges.
4.1.5 Deflation, Type I Life Preserver. A means by which the wearer or the person assisting
a child or infant-small child wearer who would require adult assistance, may quickly
deflate each flotation chamber must be provided. Use of the deflation means may not
preclude subsequent re-inflation of the flotation chamber by either oral or mechanical
inflation means. Inadvertent deflation of the flotation chamber must be precluded. In
particular, inadvertent deflation from movement of a child or infant-small child and
deliberate deflation by a child or small child must be precluded.
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4.1.6 Functional Temperature Range. The life preserver must be capable of satisfactory
inflation after exposure for a minimum period of five minutes to the temperature
range from –40 to +60°C (-40 to +140 degrees F).
4.1.7 Overpressure Protection. Type I Life Preserver. A flotation chamber, when orally
inflated to a operating pressure not less than 7 kN/m2 (l psig), must not burst upon
subsequent discharge of the mechanical inflation system.
4.1.8 Buoyancy. The life preserver must provide a buoyant force not less than that shown
in Table I, Minimum Buoyant Force. The buoyant force of the life preserver is equal to
the weight of the volume of fresh water displaced by the life preserver when totally
submerged. Buoyancy must be demonstrated using the standard gas reservoirs
described in 4.1.4.3.1 without further oral inflation, starting from a vacuumed flat unit.
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4.1.11 Life Preserver Retention and Donning Characteristics. The means of retaining the life
preserver on the wearer, excluding infant-small child wearers, must require that the
wearer secure no more than one attachment and make no more than one adjustment
for fit. It must be demonstrated, in accordance with the donning tests specified in
paragraph 5.9, that at least 75% of the total number of test subjects and at least 60%
of the test subjects in each age group specified in paragraph 5.9 can don the life
preserver within 25 seconds unassisted, starting with the life preserver in its storage
package. Percentage calculations may not be increased when rounded off. It must be
demonstrated that an adult unassisted can install an appropriate life preserver on
another adult or a child within 30 seconds. It also must be demonstrated, in
accordance with the donning tests specified in paragraph 5.9, that 60% of the adult
test subjects can install an infant-small child dummy in an infant-small child life
preserver within 90 seconds.
4.1.12 Comfort, Fit, and Adaptability. The design of the life preserver must be such that:
4.1.12.1 After donning, inadvertent release by the wearer is not likely.
4.1.12.2 Adjustment may be made by the wearer, or the person assisting a child or
infant-small child wearer, while in the water.
4.1.12.3 Unobstructed view by the wearer, excluding infant-small child wearers, is
allowed in both the forward and sideward directions. An observation
window must be provided for viewing of an infant-small child wearer by the
assisting person if the life preserver is enclosed.
4.1.12.4 Blood circulation of the wearer is not restricted.
4.1.12.5 The wearer’s breathing is not restricted.
4.1.13 Survivor Locator Light. The life preserver must be equipped with a survivor locator
light which meets the requirements of ETSO-C85a. The light must be automatically
activated. This can be accomplished upon contact with water, upon inflation or by any
other means not requiring additional user action.
4.1.14 Life Preserver Package. A package must be provided for the life preserver for storage
of the life preserver on board the aircraft. The means of opening the package must be
simple and obvious, and must be accomplished in one operation without the use of
any tool or excessive physical force.
4.1.15 Color. The color of the life preserver must be an approved international orange-yellow
or similar high visibility color. The color of the flight crew life preservers may be an
approved red-orange or similar high visibility contrasting color.
4.2 Marking. The following information and instructions must be shown:
4.2.1 Pictorial Presentation. The proper donning procedure and other operational
instructions on the use of the life preserver must be simple, obvious, and presented
primarily pictorially with minimum use of words.
4.2.1.1 Orientation of Instructions. Instructions pertaining to operations which
would normally be accomplished after the life preserver has been donned
must be oriented so that the wearer, or the person assisting a child or an
infant-small child wearer, may read them while in the water.
4.2.1.2 Readability in Emergency Lighting Conditions. Size, position, and contrast of
instructions must be such that the pictorial descriptions and written
instructions are easily distinguishable and readable in low level illumination.
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The markings and instructions must be readable by a person having 20/20
vision at a minimum viewing distance of 610 mm (24 inches) with
illumination no greater than 0.54 lx (0.05 foot-candle). For written
instructions, an acceptable means of complying with this requirement is by
use of bold lettering approximately 5.6 mm (0.22 inch) high with a stroke
width of 1.2 mm (0.047 inch).
4.2.3 Date of manufacture of fabric (month and year).
4.2.4 Size category: ‘Adult,’ ‘Adult-Child,’ ‘Child,’ or ‘Infant-Small Child,’ as appropriate and
weight limitation of each category.
4.2.5 The life preserver package must clearly indicate that it contains a life preserver, the
size category and the weight limitation of the life preserver. The package also must be
marked with the life preserver ETSO and part number or the information must be
visible through the package.
5. Tests.
5.1 Material Tests. The material properties specified in paragraph 3 of this standard must be
conducted in accordance with the following test methods or other approved equivalent
methods:
Accelerated AgeMethod 5850 Per Note (9)(1)
Tensile Strength (Grab Test) Method 5100 Per Note (9)(7)
Tear Strength (Trapezoid Test) Method 5136 Per Note (9)(5)
Tear Strength (Tongue Test) Method 5134 Per Note (9)
(Alternate to Trapezoid Test see
3.1.4.1)
Ply Adhesion Method 5960 Per Note (9)(3)
Coat Adhesion Method 5970 Per Note (9)(8)
Permeability Method 5460 Per Note (5)(6)
Seam Shear Strength Per Note (9)(2)
Seam Peel Strength Method 5960 Per Note (9)(3)
Flammability CS-25, Appendix F,Part I(b)(5),
Horizontal Burn Rate Per Note (4)
NOTES:
(1) Samples of coated fabric and seams for the accelerated ageing tests must be exposed to
a temperature of 70 ± 3°C (158 ± 5 degrees F) for not less than 168 hours. After exposure,
the samples must be allowed to cool to 21 ± 1°C (70 ± 2 degrees F) for neither less than
16 hours nor more than 96 hours before determining their physical properties in
accordance with paragraph 3.1 of this standard.
(2) Samples must consist of two strips of material 50mm (2 inches) maximum width by 127
mm (5 inches) maximum length. Strips must be bonded or heat sealed together along the
width with an overlap of 19 mm (3/4 inch) maximum. Heat sealed seams must have a 3.2
± 0.8 mm (1/8 ± 1/32) inch width minimum heat seal bead with the heat seal 6.3 mm (1/4
inch) from each end. The free ends must be placed in the testing machine described in
FTMS 191A, Method 5100 and separated at a rate of 305 ± 13 mm/minute (12 ± 0.5
inches/minute). The average value of two samples must be reported. Samples may be
multilayered to ensure against premature material failure. Samples may be gripped across
the full 50 mm (two inches) of width.
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(3) Separation rate must be 50 to 65 mm/minute (2.0 to 2.5 inches/minute). Sample shall be
25 mm (one inch).
(4) The material must meet the flammability requirements of CS-25.853(a) [Appendix F, Part
I (a) (l) (iv)]
(5) Federal Test Method Standard No. 191 in effect December 31, 1968.
(6) ASTM Method D1434-82, Procedure V, approved July 30, 1982, is an acceptable alternate
method.
(7) Use of pneumatic grips, for holding test samples, is an acceptable alternate to the
mechanical grips described in Method 5100.
(8) The sample shall be prepared using the adhesive and construction methods used to
manufacture the life preserver. Separation rate must be 50 to 65 mm/minute (2.0 to 2.5
inches/minute).
(9) Federal Test Method Standard No. 191A dated July 20, 1978.
5.2 Leakage Test, Type I Life Preserver. The life preserver may not lose more than 3.5 kN/m2 (1/2
psig) per flotation chamber after each flotation chamber has been inflated to not less than
13.8 kN/m2 (2 psig) and hung in a rack for at least 12 hours.
5.3 Overpressure Test, Type I Life Preserver. Each flotation chamber of the life preserver must
withstand an inflation pressure of not less than 69 kN/m2 (10 psig) for at least 5 minutes.
5.4 Submersion Test. The life preserver must be submerged in fresh water at 22 ± 3°C (72 ± 5
degrees F) so that no part of it is less than 610 mm (24 inches) below the surface. The buoyancy
of the preserver must not be less than the value specified in paragraph 4.1.8 of this standard.
Submersion must continue for at least 8 hours, except that the test may be discontinued in
less than 8 hours if buoyancy measurements taken at four successive 30-minute intervals show
that the buoyancy of the preserver has stabilized at a value at least equal to the value specified
in paragraph 4.1.8 of this standard.
5.5 Salt Spray Test.
5.5.1 Salt Spray Test Procedure. All metal parts must be placed in an atomized salt solution
spray for a period of not less than 100 hours. The solution must be atomized in the
chamber at a rate of 10 litres per cubic metre of chamber volume (3 quarts per 10 cubic
feet of chamber volume) per each 24-hour period. The temperature in the chamber
must be maintained at 35 ± 1°C (95 ± 2 degrees F) throughout the test.
5.5.2 Salt Spray Solution. The salt used must be sodium chloride or equivalent containing not
more than 0.2 percent of impurities on the dry weight basis. The spray solution must
be prepared by dissolving 20 ± 2 parts by weight of salt in 80 ± 2 parts by weight of water
containing not more than 200 parts per million of solids. The spray solution must be
kept from exceeding this level of solids throughout the test. The spray solution must be
maintained at a specific gravity of from 1.126 to 1.157 and a pH between 6.5 and 7.2
when measured at 35 ± 1°C (95 ± 2 degrees F).
5.6 Inflator Test, Type I Life Preserver.
5.6.1 Operating Force. The force necessary to operate the mechanical inflation means may
not exceed 67 N (15 pounds) when applied through the pull cord.
5.6.2 Pull Cord Strength. The pull cord may not fail or separate from the mechanical inflation
means when a minimum tension load of 267 N (60 pounds) is applied to the cord for at
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least 3 seconds. If the pull cord is designed to separate from the mechanical inflation
means when operated, the pull cord shall be capable of withstanding a minimum tension
load of 133 N (30 pounds) for 3 seconds without failure.
5.6.3 Proof Pressure. The mechanical inflation means must withstand a hydrostatic pressure
of not less than 10.3 MN/m2 (1,500 psig) without deformation or leakage. The
mechanical inflation means may not leak when subjected to 13.8 kN/m2 (2 psig) air
pressure and may not lose more than 3.4 kN/m2 (0.5 psig) when subjected to 276 kN/m2
(40 psig) air pressure. Each test pressure must be applied for not less than 30 seconds.
5.6.4 Mechanical Inflation Valve. The mechanical inflation valve must allow a minimum flow
of 4 liters of air per minute at 276 kN/m2 (40 psig) inlet pressure. The valve may not
leak when subjected to a vacuum of 3 kN/m2 (12 inches of water) applied so as to reduce
the seating spring pressure and with atmospheric pressure on the opposite side. The
joint between the valve and the flotation chamber may not fail when a 1112 N (250-
pound) load is applied, for at least 3 seconds, outwardly from and perpendicular to the
surface of the flotation chamber at the point of valve attachment. To secure the joint
during application of the load, an adapter having an inside diameter at least 19 mm (3/4
inch) larger than the outside diameter of the valve at the point of attachment must be
used.
5.7 Jump Test.
5.7.1 Adult, Adult-Child or Child. An inflated adult, adult-child, or child Type I or Type II life
preserver, excluding infant-small child life preservers, must remain attached and not
cause injury to the wearer when the wearer jumps into the water at any attitude from
a height above the water of at least 1.5 m (5 feet). There must not be any damage to
the preserver following the jump. Minor skin chafing is not considered an injury in this
respect.
5.7.2 Infant-Small Child. An infant-small child life preserver must remain inflated and
undamaged and the infant-small child dummy, specified in paragraph 5.9.1, must
remain properly secured when an adult holding the dummy, with the preserver installed
on the dummy, jumps into the water from a height above the water of at least 1.5 m (5
feet). The adult must be wearing an inflated life preserver for the test.
5.8 Fire Protection Test. Materials used in the life preserver and the storage package for the life
preserver must be tested by the horizontal burn rate test prescribed in paragraph 5.1 of this
standard.
5.9 Donning Test.
5.9.1 Test Subjects. There must be a minimum of 25 test subjects. There must be a minimum
of five test subjects in each of the following age groups: 20-29 years; 30-39 years; 40-
49 years; 50-59 years; and 60-69 years. Not more than 60% of the test subjects in any
age group may be of the same sex. The number of test subjects in any age group may
not exceed 30% of the total number of test subjects. Infant-small child donning tests
must be performed by a minimum of 5 adult test subjects of both sexes between the
ages of 20-40. Tests must be performed using an articulating infant-small child dummy,
as described below. Adult test subjects must have no prior experience in donning tests
of life preservers.
5.9.2 Infant-Small Child Test Dummy. The dummy to be used in the donning tests must have
the basic physical characteristics for a composite 50th percentile unisex child of 24
months with a height of 864 mm (34 inches) and weighing 12.3 kg (27.2 pounds). The
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dummy shall have articulating joints and, if used for water testing, must not absorb
water. The anthropometric values for the dummy are presented in Table II. These data
are considered valid for the stated chronological age plus or minus three months and
are representative of U.S. children, as reported by the University of Michigan from 1975-
1985.
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TABLE II, ANTHROPOMETRIC CHARACTERISTICS OF TWO YEAR OLD CHILD
Body Segment Length (mm (in)) Weight (gm) Volume (%)
Top of Head (ref.) -
Top of Shoulder/
Upper Arm Pivot - 191 ( 7.5)* 1, 591.6 12.9
Elbow Pivot - 152 ( 6.0) 876.0 (2) 7.1
Wrist Pivot - 127 ( 5.0) 530.5 (2) 4.3
Finger Tip - 89 ( 3.5) 123.5 (2) 1.0
Top of Shoulder/
Upper Arm Pivot -
Crotch/ Thigh Pivot 330 (13.0)* 5, 564.4 45.1
Knee Pivot - 140 ( 5.5)* 579.9 (2) 4.7
Bottom of Foot 203 ( 8.0)* 481.1 (2) 3.9
Total *864 (34.0) Height 12,338.0 (27.2 lb) 100.0
Circumferences
Head 488 (19.2)
Neck 234 ( 9.2)
Chest 488 (19.2)
Waist 460 (18.1)
Hip 470 (18.5)
Mid-Thigh 251 ( 9.9)
Calf 196 ( 7.7)
Ankle 135 ( 5.3)
Upper Arm 150 ( 5.9)
Forearm 147 ( 5.8)
Wrist 130 ( 5.1)
5.9.3 Test Arrangement. Subjects must be seated in actual or simulated air carrier coach class
seating with a seat row in front of the subjects creating a seat row pitch not exceeding
31 inches. Each subject must have the seat belt fastened. Subjects may be tested
singularly or in groups seated side by side. Infant-small child life preserver donning tests
must be performed with adults in adjacent seats who must not assist or hamper the
adult performing the donning test. Subjects must receive no donning information other
than a typical preflight briefing and donning demonstration on the use of life preservers.
5.9.4 Test Procedure. The donning test must be begun with the life preserver contained in
the storage package required by paragraph 4.1.14, and the package held in the test
subject’s hand. Separate timing must be kept for each test subject. Timing starts on
signal when the test subject has both hands on the packaged life preserver and stops
when the life preserver is properly donned, secured, and adjusted for fit. During the test,
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the test subject may release the seat belt and rise from the seat but may not move to
any extent from the area immediately in front of the seat.
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Appendix 1
Functional and Environmental Qualification Requirements
Appendix 1 modifies the text in SAE International’s Aerospace Standard AS1354, Individual Inflatable Life
Preserver, dated February 2016. Compliance with the modified text is required in order to comply with the
requirements of this ETSO.
Section 2 Apply all the subsections unless they are disregarded or modified below:
The following publications form a part of this document to the extent specified herein.
The applicable issue of cited publications shall be the issue that was in effect on the date
of the publication of this document, unless otherwise specified. In the event of conflict
between the text of this document and the references cited herein, the text of this
document takes precedence. Nothing in this document, however, supersedes the
applicable laws and regulations unless a specific exemption has been obtained.
Page 6, subsection 2.3 applies as written, except the replacement of the definition of the
following terms as follows :
CHILLED HANDS TEST METHOD: A technique to simulate the reduced dexterity of chilled,
wet hands that may occur during an emergency in a cold and wet environment. A naïve
test subject simultaneously submerges left and right forearms and hands in 50 °F (10 °C)
water for 2 minutes and immediately upon removal attempts to open/operate the
designated packaging/equipment. The test subject shall be healthy and wear a
loose-fitting, sleeveless upper garment that will not inhibit blood flow to the arms and
hands. (Alternate: GLOVED HANDS TEST METHOD)
SEAT PITCH: The distance from any point on one seat to exactly the same point on the
seat in front or behind it.
TEST SUBJECTS: Individuals who participate in life preserver tests (e.g. donning, retention,
flotation). All such individuals shall be naïve, i.e. they shall have had no experience in using
a life preserver or the specific equipment to be tested, and they shall not have viewed or
talked with other persons performing the same or similar activities. Note that individuals
who have experience in using marine or boating life preservers are considered to be
acceptable test subjects.
Section 3 Apply all the subsections unless they are disregarded or modified below:
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Page 7, Section 3, replace the introductory text with the following:
Tests and measurements performed to demonstrate compliance with this standard shall
be conducted with equipment that is calibrated according to the original equipment
manufacturer (OEM) specifications, using standards and references that are traceable to
a recognised national authority (e.g. the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST)). The description of the test results shall include the accuracy and precision of the
measurement(s), e.g. measured in 5-pound increments with an accuracy of
± 0.10 pounds.
All tests that require timing shall use time-encoded video. In addition, tests that require
human subjects or a child test dummy shall use time-encoded video.
Demonstration life preservers are not addressed by this ETSO. They are not intended to
be functional and should be marked accordingly.
3.9 Donning
Donning tests shall be performed to show compliance with the design requirements and
the comprehensibility of markings. The procedure for donning the life preserver shall be
simple and obvious such that it can be rapidly donned by an untrained person without
any assistance. This shall be demonstrated in accordance with the test criteria and
procedures in subsection 5.3.
For the adult and adult-child category, it shall be demonstrated that at least 75 % of the
total number of test subjects, and at least 60 % of the test subjects in each age group
specified in subsection 5.3.1, can don the life preserver within 25 seconds, unassisted,
starting with the packaged life preserver on the test participant’s lap. It must also be
demonstrated that an unassisted adult can install an appropriate life preserver on
another adult or child within 30 seconds.
For the child and infant-small child category, it shall be demonstrated that at least 60 %
of five adult test subjects of both sexes between the ages of 20 and 40, unassisted, can
install a child life preserver on a child who weighs between 35 and 90 pounds (15.88 and
40.82 kg) and an infant-small child life preserver on a child dummy within 90 seconds,
unassisted, starting with the packaged life preserver.
The donning-time test does not apply to constant wear life preservers that are intended
to be fully donned by the wearer while on board the aircraft. The donning-time test does
apply to constant wear life preservers that are intended to be partially donned by the
wearer while on board the aircraft and require an additional donning procedure prior to
inflating the life preserver or entering the water. For these partially donned life preserver
designs, the test shall begin with the life preserver in the partially donned condition.
Page 10, replace subsection 3.10 with the following text:
3.10 Retention
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The means of retaining the life preserver on the wearer for an adult, adult-child, and child
life preserver shall require the wearer to secure no more than one attachment and make
only one adjustment for fit. This requirement does not apply to constant wear life
preservers. The retention means shall not make use of knots. The means of retaining the
life preserver shall not require any action to secure it other than fastening and fit
adjustment (e.g. removal of rubber bands, unfastening of attachment points). Partially
donned life preservers shall not require the wearer to secure more than one attachment
or make more than one adjustment for fit after the life preserver is partially donned.
The means of retaining the life preserver shall be shown to be operable within 5 seconds
with chilled or gloved hands (e.g. fastening/unfastening buckles, snapping/unsnapping,
etc.). This will be demonstrated in accordance with the Chilled Hands or Gloved Hands
Test Methods in subsection 5.4.2. This requirement does not apply to constant wear life
preservers that are intended to be fully donned by the wearer while on board the aircraft.
The adult, adult-child, and child category life preserver shall remain inflated, secured, and
not cause injury to a wearer when it is tested in accordance with 5.4. There shall be no
damage to the life preserver as a result of the jump. Chafing of the wearer’s skin shall not
be considered to be an injury.
The infant-small child category life preserver shall remain inflated and undamaged, and
the infant-small child dummy, specified in 5.3.2, shall remain properly secured in the
donned life preserver, while being held by an adult and tested in accordance with 5.4.3.
The life preserver shall provide insulation for the wearer’s head and upper torso (i.e. from
the waist up) with a minimum R-value of 0.25 (equivalent to approximately 2 mm of
wetsuit fabric). There shall be a means, other than knots, to restrict the position of the
life preserver relative to the wearer, so as to provide proper function and prevent the
wearer from releasing the means of restriction. Means shall be provided to prevent the
introduction and/or entrapment of water. This shall be demonstrated in accordance with
the Flotation Attitude Test procedure in 5.5.2.
A tether of PIA-C-5040, Type 3 cord or equivalent, at least 72 inches (182.88 mm) long,
shall be attached to the infant-small child life preserver. The attachment shall be located
such that the flotation attitude specified in 3.11.2 is maintained when the line is held taut
in the water. The attachment shall be shown to withstand a 70-pound (31.75 kg) pull for
at least 3 seconds without a failure of the line or the attachment.
A positive-buoyancy attachment means shall be provided at the free end of the tether.
The attachment means shall be shown to be operable with cold, wet hands, using either
the Chilled Hands or Gloved Hands Test Method. This must be demonstrated in
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accordance with subsection 5.9. There shall be a provision for stowing or securing the
tether during use so that it remains readily accessible and does not dangle loosely.
The life preserver shall be equipped with a survivor locator light that meets the
requirements of ETSO-C85b or TSO-C85b, Survivor Locator Lights. The light shall
automatically activate upon initial immersion in the water or by other means that do not
require additional action by the wearer once the life preserver is fully donned. The light
shall be located so to enhance visibility from a surface vessel or from an aircraft.
Opening of the package shall be demonstrated in accordance with the Package Opening
test procedures in 5.7.
3.18.1 Instructions
The proper donning procedure and other operational instructions shall be simple,
obvious, and shall be presented pictorially with a minimum use of words. Instructions that
pertain to operations normally accomplished after the life preserver has been donned
shall be oriented so that the wearer, or the person assisting a child or an infant-small child
wearer, can see them while in the water. Instructions shall be sized, positioned and
contrasted with the background to make them easily readable and comprehensible at a
viewing distance of 24 inches (60.96 cm) with illumination no greater than 0.05 ft-c
(0.54 lux) by a person who has 20/20 vision. Written instructions shall use bold lettering
at least 0.22 inches (5.6 mm) high with a stroke width of at least 0.047 inches (1.2 mm).
Comprehensibility shall be demonstrated in accordance with the Comprehensibility test
procedure in subsection 5.8.
Section 4 Apply all the subsections unless they are disregarded or modified below:
4.2.1 Permeability
The materials used in the construction of the air holding cell shall have a maximum
permeability to helium of 5 L/m2 in 24 hours at 77 °F (25 °C) when tested in accordance
with 5.6.3.
Section 5 Apply all the subsections unless they are disregarded or modified below:
5.1.2 Overpressure
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The life preserver shall meet the minimum buoyancy requirements defined in 3.4 when it
is subjected to overpressure. Inflate each flotation chamber via the oral inflation tube to
1 psig (6.89 kPa), then manually actuate the discharge of the gas reservoir for each
chamber. Submerge the life preserver in fresh water at a temperature of 70 °F ± 5 °F
(21.1 °C ± 2.8 °C), so that no part of it is less than 24 inches (60.96 cm) below the surface
of the water. Measure the buoyancy to show compliance with the applicable requirement
in Table 1. Keep the life preserver submerged for at least 8 hours, after which time it shall
be shown to meet or exceed the requirement in Table 1.
Infant-small child donning tests shall be performed by a minimum of 5 adult test subjects
of both sexes between the ages of 20 and 40. Tests shall be performed using an
articulating infant-small child dummy per subsection 5.3.2.
Adult test subjects shall have no experience with inflatable life preservers or donning
tests. Test subjects shall not be familiar with the manufacture, production, or
maintenance of inflatable life preservers.
Test subjects shall receive no donning instructions other than the general introduction
briefing and preflight video briefing on the use of the life preserver per Appendix D —
Donning Test Briefings. Instructions for the child and infant-small child category life
preserver shall be the typical briefing given by a flight attendant to a parent/guardian that
accompanies a child or infant on a flight. Test subjects may be informed (during the pre-
test introduction briefing) that this is a timed test, and that their task is to don the life
preserver within the applicable timeframe specified in subsection 3.9.
Furthermore, the installation, operating and maintenance instructions shall also reflect
the requirements of this section. The operating instructions must report the detailed
content of the simulated preflight briefing and any special instructions for the unique
aspects of operating the design of the life preserver that should be considered for its
operational use and continued performance.
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5.3.3 Arrangement
Subjects in tests of an adult, adult-child, or child life preserver shall be seated in previously
approved air carrier coach class seating, with a seat row in front of the test subjects,
creating a seat pitch not exceeding 31 inches (78.74 cm). Subjects shall be seated one per
row. All subjects shall have their seat belts fastened.
Infant-small child life preserver donning tests shall be performed with the adult test
subject holding the infant on his/her lap, seated between two other adult subjects who
shall not assist or hamper the test subject who performs the donning test. The adult test
subject shall be wearing his/her own life preserver.
5.3.4 Procedure
The donning test shall start on signal with the packaged life preserver held on the test
subject’s lap, or for a constant wear life preserver, the test shall start in the partially
donned configuration. The timing of the test shall end when the life preserver is properly
donned, secured, and adjusted for fit (the means of adjustment shall be adjusted for a
snug fit on the test subject). Donning tests shall be captured on video; the timing for each
individual subject shall be recorded separately.
Demonstrate the operability of the life preserver retention mechanism using either the
Chilled Hands or Gloved Hands Test Method (see 2.3 Definitions). At least 4 out of 5 test
subjects shall secure the life preserver retention mechanism (e.g. fasten and then
unfasten it) within 5 seconds. In cases for which additional participants are required, 75 %
of the total number of test participants for each demonstration must complete the
retention mechanism task within the allowed time.
The infant-small child category life preserver shall remain inflated and undamaged, and
the infant-small child dummy, specified in 5.3.2, shall remain properly secured in the
donned life preserver, while being held by an adult who jumps into the water from a
height of 5 feet (1.52 m) above the water. The adult shall wear an inflated life preserver
for this test.
5.6.2 Flammability
The life preserver and package shall be constructed of material that meets the
requirements of the latest amendment of CS-25, Appendix F, Part I. The definition and
use of parts that are considered to be small parts (e.g. oral inflation tubes, clips, etc.) that
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would not contribute significantly to the propagation of a fire must be coordinated in
advance with EASA.
5.6.3 Permeability
The permeability shall be tested in accordance with the permeability test procedure in
FTMS 191, Method 5460; or alternatively, ASTM D1434-82, Procedure V may be used. The
permeameter shall be calibrated for the gas that is used.
The pull force necessary to operate the opening mechanism shall be mechanically
demonstrated not to exceed 9 pounds (40 N), or the opening of the mechanism shall be
demonstrated in less than 7 seconds by at least 8 of 10 females over the age of 60, without
any preview of the instructions. The timing shall start when the test participant has both
hands on the package and is ready to open it, and shall end when the package is fully
opened (e.g. the pull tab/strip is completely removed). A nick or cut shall not be
introduced in the edge of the material at the tear line unless it is normally a part of the
package design. In cases for which additional participants are required, 75 % of the total
number of test participants for each demonstration must complete the opening of the
package within the allowed time.
5.8 Comprehensibility
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Demonstrate that the means of attachment, on the tether of the infant-small child life
preserver, is operable using either the Chilled Hands or Gloved Hands Test Method (see
2.3 Definitions). At least 4 out of 5 test subjects shall secure the means of attachment of
the life preserver. In cases for which additional participants are required, 75 % of the total
number of test participants for each demonstration must complete the attachment task.
This test may be performed on dry land.
Appendix A No change
Appendix B No change
Appendix C Page 24, replace Appendix C with Appendix 2 Tests Involving Subjects.
See Appendix 2 on final page.
You must use the following scripts for the donning-test briefing. For the assisted donning
tests, substitute the appropriate donning time requirement as specified in subsection 3.9.
The scripts may be modified as applicable for constant wear life preservers that are
designed to be partially donned during flight.
The test will simulate an actual airline emergency; your goal is to put on the life preserver
as quickly as possible within 25 seconds or less. Video cameras will record your actions.
To start the test, your instructor will say: ‘3, 2, 1, go!’ This is your signal to open the
package and put on the life preserver.
[Optional: Before the video, please review the safety information card for additional
instructions on putting on the life preserver.]
This test will simulate an actual airline emergency; your goal is to put on the life preserver
as quickly as possible within 25 seconds or less. To start the test, your instructor will say:
‘3, 2, 1, go!’ This is your signal to open the package and put on the life preserver.
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— Pull the tab and tear open the package.
— Remove the life preserver from the package.
— Pull the life preserver over your head.
— Grab the waist strap and wrap it around your waist.
— Insert the clip into the buckle and pull the end of the waist strap to tighten the belt.
— Raise your arms when you have finished.
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APPENDIX 2
*NOTE: Tests that require human subjects or a child test dummy shall use time-encoded video.
Operation of the Opening 5.7.2 —10 minimum, female with reduced dexterity
Mechanism simulated by chilled or gloved hands (see 2.3)
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European
Union
Aviation
Safety
Agency
1— Applicability
This ETSO gives provides the requirements which combustion heaters and accessories that are designed
and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the
applicable ETSO marking.
2— Procedures
2.1 — General
The Aapplicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None.
3— Technical cConditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum pPerformance sStandard
The applicable Sstandards are those set forthprovided in the Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc .,
(SAE) Aerospace Standard AS
143B „HEATERS, AIRPLANE, INTERNAL COMBUSTION HEAT EXCHANGER TYPE’,
issued January 11, 1943, revised January 1949 SAE International’s Aerospace Standard AS8040B,
Heater, Aircraft, Internal Combustion Heat Exchanger Type, dated February 2013, as amended by
Appendices 1 and 2 of this ETSO.
3.1.1.1 — Functionality
This standard in this ETSO applies to equipment that is intended to provide heated air for civil
aircraft.
Note: For combustion heaters and accessories, the maintenance and inspection items contained
in the instructions for continued airworthiness play an important role in preventing failures that
result in combustion by-products entering the cabin/flight deck.
3.1.2 — Environmental Standard
Demonstrate the required performance under the test procedures in SAE AS8040B, Heater ,
Aircraft, Internal Combustion Heat Exchanger Type, dated February 2013, as amended by
Appendix 1 of this ETSO, using standard environmental conditions and test procedures that are
appropriate for airborne equipment.
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As indicated in AS 143B.
3.1.3 — Computer Software
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.2.
None
3.1.4 — Airborne Electronic Hardware
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.3.
3.2 — Specific
None
3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification
(1) A failure of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1.1 of this ETSO is a major failure condition.
(2) A loss of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1.1 of this ETSO is a minor failure condition.
(3) Design the system to at least fulfil these failure conditions above.
4— Marking
4.1 — General
Markings is detailed in See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.
4.2 — Specific
None
If the article includes software and/or airborne electronic hardware, then the part numbering
scheme for the article must identify the configuration of both the software and the airborne
electronic hardware. The part numbering scheme can use separate, unique part numbers for the
software, the hardware, and the airborne electronic hardware.
If the combustion heater includes a deviation from this ETSO, the marking must include a means
to indicate that a deviation was granted.
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Date: 24.10.03 XX.XX.20XX
APPENDIX 1
This Appendix prescribes the MPS for Combustion Heaters. The applicable standard is SAE International’s
Aerospace Standard AS8040B, Heater, Aircraft, Internal Combustion Heat Exchanger Type, dated February 2013.
EASA has modified it as follows:
Section: 3. Accessories
3.2.a. Includes the fuel/air ratio controller, fuel lines and preheater.
3.2.b. Rewritten to read ‘Ignition System: The ignition system uses an aircraft-supplied energy source to enable
the proper functioning of the igniter. Examples of accessory devices that may be utilised in a heater ignition
system include but are not limited to:’
3.2.b.3. Removes the statement ‘Heaters with output ratings of 11,700 W (40,000 Btu/hour) or less may use an
electrically heated resistance wire as an ignition source.’
3.2.c. Includes the requirement ‘Any component whose failure could lead to an unsafe condition, such as
ducting, that is in a fire zone, must be fireproof.’
3.2.c. Includes ducting/tubing, the combustion air blower, combustion air flow sensor, ventilation air flow
sensor, and air flow/pressure regulator.
3.2.e. Includes a device to sense differential pressure across the combustion chamber, a device to sense
combustion, a device that senses excessive combustion by products in the ventilation air, a device to shut off
fuel flow when required, and a device to alert the crew that a safety system has engaged.
3.3.2. Includes the phrase ‘having the capacity to withstand at least as well as .015-inch-thick stainless steel, the
heat produced when there is a severe fire of extended duration.’
3.6. Includes the statement ‘It is best practice to set inspection, maintenance and/or replacement intervals
based on individual component performance during design qualification testing (such as endurance testing).’
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Section: 4. Detail Requirements
4.3.5. Replaces ‘no lead or low lead type gasoline and kerosene’ with the word ‘applicable’. Adds ‘Low starting
temperature limits for other types of fuels need to be addressed on a case-by-case basis.’ to the end of this
paragraph.
4.5. Replaces ‘649 °C (1 200 °F)’ with ‘material capabilities in this section of the heater’. Adds the sentence ‘Best
practice is to ensure that the temperature at the point of discharge does not exceed 649 °C (1 200 °F).
Consideration should also be given to the impact of heat impingement on the region of the aircraft that
surrounds the combustion heater.’ to the end of the paragraph.
4.6.3. Adds to the end of the paragraph the following: ‘or heated solid surface, though it is not considered to be
a best practice to use resistance wires as ignition sources for power levels above 11 700 W.’
4.6.8. Adds the statement ‘Other types of fuels need to be addressed on a case-by-case basis.’ to the end of the
paragraph.
4.6.9. Adds the statement ‘Other types of fuels need to be addressed on a case-by-case basis.’ to the end of the
paragraph.
4.7.d. Replaced with this paragraph: ‘These safety controls shall be independent of the controls that are normally
used to control the operation of the heater. The shut-off of ignition and fuel shall occur at a point that is remote
from the heater itself. The combustion heater shall have a means to warn the crew when any heater whose heat
output is essential for safe operation has been shut off by the automatic means. The requirement to shut off
ignition and fuel at a point that is remote from the heater until restarted by the crew, may require a safety
interlock relay and an additional fuel shut-off device to be supplied in addition to the valve that is usually
supplied with the heater as an accessory. The relay and valve are the responsibility of the installer. See 5.2.10.6
for the tests to be conducted on safety controls.’
4.9. Adds at end of first paragraph: ‘Use electrical load analysis to show that the heater is safe to operate in the
worst-case situation.’
Radio Interference
4.12.1 If the manufacturer elects to demonstrate compliance with the standard radio interference requirements,
it is considered to be a best practice to test the combustion heat exchanger per EUROCAE ED-14/RTCA DO-160F
Chapter 21, or a later EASA accepted revision, and report the result in the aircraft flight manual supplement.
4.12.2 If the manufacturer elects not to demonstrate compliance with the radio interference requirements, the
manufacturer shall include the following statement in the aircraft flight manual supplement for the combustion
heat exchanger:
‘This combustion heat exchanger assembly does not include protection against radio and/or avionics
interference, and has not been tested against it.’
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Section: 5 Required Testing
The initial paragraph includes the statement ‘Test plans and reports shall be generated and retained for the life
of the design.’
5.2.2.2. Revised to include ‘A suitable instrument with a resolution no higher than 5 ppm, calibrated against a
known standard, will be used to determine CO concentration.’
5.2.2.3. Adds the statement ‘A pressure decay test may alternatively be used, provided that the decay rate can
be determined to be equivalent to the requirements listed above.’ at the end of the paragraph.
5.2.3. Replaces:
‘The service ceiling determined by this test shall meet the requirement specified by the purchaser.’
with:
‘It is typical for the service ceiling of a combustion heater to be at least 6 100 m (20 000 ft), and in order
to ensure that there is an adequate margin with this test being performed on only one heater, a safety
margin of 5 % shall be applied. Therefore, in order to set a service ceiling of 6 100 m (20 000 ft), the peak
of the ignition characteristics curve shall be no lower than 6 405 m (21 000 ft).’
‘Install the test unit into the test set up used in 5.2.2.1 and cold soak the combustion heater assembly to - 54 °C
(- 65 °F) for gasoline type heaters, and - 29 °C (- 20 °F) for kerosene type heaters (for other fuel types, the
applicable temperature will be determined on a case-by-case basis). The valve leakage in the closed position
with either the rated fuel pressure or the minimum practical fuel pressure shall not exceed 0.068 fluid ounces
(2 mL) of fuel in 10 minutes. Supply combustion air and ventilating air to the heater at sea-level pressure and a
temperature of - 54 °C (- 65 °F). The temperature of the fuel supplied to the heater shall be - 54 °C (- 65 °F) for
gasoline-type heaters and - 29 °C (- 20 °F) for kerosene-type heaters. The combustion and ventilating air
pressure levels and the mass flow rates shall be the same as in 5.2.2.1. Glow plug ignited heaters shall ignite
within 200 seconds. Spark ignited heaters shall ignite within 15 seconds when burning gasoline-type fuels, and
within 60 seconds when burning kerosene-type fuels. Measure and record the parameters specified in 5.2.2.1.’
5.2.10.6.2.1. This includes the following statement after the first sentence in the second paragraph: ‘Leakage
through the fuel valve shall then be measured, and shall not exceed 0.068 fluid ounces (2 mL) in 10 minutes.’
6.1.2 This includes the statement ‘Other types of fuels need to be addressed on a case-by-case basis.’
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APPENDIX 2
1.0 The following information contained in this Appendix must be included in the manual to ensure that the
combustion heater and its accessories continue to comply with the ETSO once it is installed in a product.
1.1 Scheduling information for each part of the combustion heater, stating the inspection criteria and
service limits. Necessary cross-references to the Airworthiness Limitations section must also be
included.
1.2 Troubleshooting information that describes the probable malfunctions, and how to recognise and
resolve those malfunctions.
1.3 Information that describes the order and method for removing and replacing parts, the order and
method for disassembly and assembly, with any necessary precautions to be taken.
1.4 Cleaning and inspection instructions that cover the material and apparatus to be used and the methods
and precautions to be taken. Methods of inspection must also be included.
1.5 Details of repair methods for worn or otherwise substandard parts and components, along with the
information necessary to determine when a replacement is necessary.
1.6 Instructions for testing, including the use of the test equipment and instrumentation.
1.7 A list of the tools and equipment that are necessary for maintenance, and guidance for their use.
1.8 Instructions on how to ensure that the combustion heater assembly is fit to return to service after
maintenance and prior to installation (for example, procedures for a pressure decay test).
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European
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Agency
1— Applicability
This ETSO gives provides the requirements which twin seaplane floats that are designed and
manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the applicable
ETSO marking.
2— Procedures
2.1 — General
The Aapplicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None.
3— Technical cConditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum pPerformance sStandard
Standards set forth in the National Aircraft Standards Specification NAS 807, dated June 1, 1951 as
amended and supplemented by this ETSO:
(i) Section 4.3.3.4 Unsymmetrical Landing. Two-Float Landing with Drift.
Third sentence :
„The side load shall be tanb/4 times the step landing load of 4.3.3.1.“
(ii) Section 4.3.3. Limit Load Factors for General Structure Design. Definition of symbols
following subpart (b) :
„Vso = airplane design stalling speed at design landing weight with zero thrust and landing
flaps or other high lift devices in position for landing.
W = one half the airplane design landing weight.“
The applicable standards are those provided in Aerospace Industries of America, Inc., National
Aerospace Standard (NAS) 807, Revision 2, Twin Seaplane Floats, dated 30 June 2017.
3.1.2 — Environmental Standard
None
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1.
3.1.3 — Computer Software
None
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.2.
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3.1.4 — Airborne Electronic Hardware
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.3.
3.2 — Specific
None
3.2.1 — Functionality
The standards of this ETSO apply to twin seaplane floats that are suitable for use on aeroplanes.
3.2.2 — Failure Condition Classification
A failure condition classification is not required.
3.2.3 — Functional Qualification
The materials and workmanship must conform to the requirements specified in Section 3 of
NAS 807, Revision 2. The functional performance must be demonstrated under the test conditions
specified in Section 4 of NAS 807, Revision 2. The applicant must define the design parameters to
which the article is qualified (e.g. maximum aeroplane weight, Vso, etc.).
4— Marking
4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.
4.2 — Specific
None.
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1 — Applicability
This ETSO gives provides the requirements which temperature instruments that are designed and
manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the
applicable ETSO marking.
2 — Procedures
2.1 — General
The Aapplicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None.
3 — Technical cConditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum pPerformance sStandard
The applicable Sstandards are those set forthprovided in the Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc.
(SAE) International’s Aerospace Standard (AS) 8005, ‘Minimum Performance Standard for
Temperature Instruments’, reaffirmed October, 1984 Revision A, September 1996, as modified by
Appendix 1 amended and supplemented by this ETSO:
Exceptions:
(i) In the friction error test of SAE AS 8005AAS8005A, paragraph 4.8, the vibration (to minimize
minimise friction) provisions of paragraph 4.3 do not apply.
(ii) For clarification, the vibration test of SAE AS 8005AS8005A, paragraph 5.8, shall be conducted
in accordance with the test procedure of EUROCAE/RTCA document ED-14G/DO-160DG,
paragraph 8.5.1 or the latest revision of EUROCAE/RTCA document ED-14/DO-160.
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3.2 — Specific
3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4.
4 — Marking
4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.
4.2 — Specific
None.
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APPENDIX 1
‘Unless otherwise specified herein, all the tests required shall be made at the atmospheric conditions
specified in Section 3.5 of ED-14/DO-160.’
— Remove Section 4.3 of SAE AS8005A, as vibration as a means to reduce friction is no longer
acceptable.
— In Section 5 of SAE AS8005A, remove the sentence ‘The order of tests shall be in accordance with
paragraph 3.2, page 5,DO-138.’
— In Section 5 of SAE AS8005A, the text ‘RTCA Document Number DO-138 entitled “Environmental
Conditions and Test Proc. for Airborne Electronic/Electrical Equipment and Instruments ”, dated 27
June 1968’ shall be replaced with ‘EUROCAE/RTCA document ED-14G/DO-160G or the latest revision
of EUROCAE/RTCA document ED-14/DO-160’
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Date: 05.08.2016 XX.XX.20XX
European
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1 — Applicability
This ETSO provides the requirements which airborne multipurpose electronic displays that are
designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified
with the applicable ETSO marking.
2 — Procedures
2.1 — General
The Aapplicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None.
3 — Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
The applicable standards are those set forth provided in the SAE AS8034BC, Minimum
Performance Standards for Airborne Multipurpose Electronic Displays, dated 6/1/2011
30 July 2018, as modified by paragraph 3.1.1.1 of this ETSO. Additional requirements on colour
can be found in Appendix 1 toof this document.
To be eligible to this ETSO standard, the equipment shall at least contain a display unit that
provides providing the visualisation function.
It should be noted that this ETSO standard does not provide minimum performance standards
for head-up displays or headworn displays. ETSO-C210 provides requirements for head-up
displays.
3.1.1.1 — Modifications to AS8034C Section 5
SAE AS8034C, Section 5, second bullet, page 22, is modified as follows:
‘During the specified testing, (5.5, 5.20) it is up to the applicant to prove that the touchscreen
functions as intended during the test and that no false positive touches are received. Touch
screen compliance may be demonstrated by testing during DO-160G, outside of the DO-160G
testing, analysis or some combination thereof. ’
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through 5.1.6)’ with ‘The following performance requirements (5.1.1 through 5.1.7)’.
For SAE AS8034C, Section 5.4.4.3, Overpressure Test, the last sentence is amended as follows:
‘When the equipment is subjected to the overpressure test, the requirements of 5.1 (excluding
5.1.7) shall be met.’
4 — Marking
4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.
4.2 — Specific
None.
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Appendix 1 — Colour
APPENDIX 1
COLOUR
SAE AS8034B, Section 4.3.4, requires lays down colour-coding requirements. This Appendix provides
additional guidance on colour.
1. Display features, precipitation, and turbulence areas should be colour -coded as depicted in Table A1
and Table A2 respectively, unless otherwise specified by the ETSO application being displayed.
Table A1
Note 2: Use of the colour green for tape elements (for example, airspeed and altitude) has also been
found to be acceptable if the colour green does not adversely affect flight crew alerting .
Table A2
2. Background colour (gray grey or other shade) may be used to enhance the display presentation.
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3. Colours should track brightness so that chrominance and relative chrominance separation are
maintained as much as possible during day-night operations.
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Subject: AIRBORNE WINDSHEAR WIND SHEAR WARNING AND ESCAPE GUIDANCE SYSTEMS
(REACTIVE TYPE) FOR TRANSPORT AEROPLANES
1 — Applicability
This ETSO gives provides the requirements that airborne windshear wind shear warning and escape
guidance systems (reactive type) for transport aeroplanes which that are designed and
manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the
applicable ETSO marking. It is not applicable to systems that look ahead to sense windshear wind
shear conditions before the phenomenon is encountered, nor to systems that use atmospheric
and/or other data to predict the likelihood of a windshear wind shear alert.
Appendix 1 of this ETSO describes the MPS for the airborne wind shear warning and escape
guidance systems for transport category aeroplanes.
Appendix 2 of this ETSO describes the wind field models used to evaluate the performance of the
wind shear warning and escape guidance system.
Appendix 3 of this ETSO describes the conversion of the velocity equations in Appendix 2 to
rectangular coordinates.
Appendix 4 of this ETSO contains data that defines the Dryden turbulence model and the discrete
gust model used in conducting the wind shear alert tests.
Appendix 5 of this ETSO describes shear intensity.
Appendix 6 of this ETSO provides a sample computer listing for a simplified aircraft simulation
model for evaluating the effectiveness of various guidance schemes.
2 — Procedures
2.1 — General
The Aapplicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None.
3 — Technical Conditions
3.1 — General
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
The applicable standards are provided in the attached Appendix 1.
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(2) Scope. This ETSO applies only to wind shear warning systems which identify wind
shear phenomenon by sensing the encounter of conditions exceeding the threshold values contained
in this ETSO. In addition to wind shear warning criteria, this ETSO provides criteria applicable to
systems that provide optional wind shear caution alert capability. Windshear escape guidance is
provided to assist the pilot in obtaining the desired flight path during such an encounter.
(3) Applicable Documents. The following documents shall form a part of this ETSO to
the extent specified herein. Should conflicting requirements exist, the contents of this ETSO shall be
followed.
(i) EUROCAE/RTCA Document ED-14D/DO-160D, „Environmental Conditions
and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment’ change 3, dated December 2002 respectively
subsequent revisions, see CS-ETSO Subpart A § 2.
(ii) EUROCAE/RTCA Document ED-12B/DO-178B, „Software Considerations in
Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification,’ dated December 1992 respectively subsequent
revisions, see CS-ETSO Subpart A § 2.
(iii) Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc. (SAE) Aerospace Recommended
Practice (ARP) 4102/11, „Airborne Windshear Systems,“ dated July 1988.
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(vii) Nuisance Warning or Caution. A warning or caution which occurs when
a phenomenon is encountered, such as turbulence, which does not, in fact, endanger the aircraft
because of the duration of subsequent change of the windshear magnitude.
(viii) Recovery Procedure. A vertical flight path control technique used to
maximize recovery potential from an inadvertent encounter with windshear.
(ix) Severe Windshear. A windshear of such intensity and duration which
would exceed the performance capability of a particular aircraft type, and likely cause inadvertent loss
of control or ground contact if the pilot did not have information available from an airborne windshear
warning and escape guidance system which meets the criteria of this ETSO.
(x) Windshear Caution Alert. An alert triggered by increasing performance
conditions which is set at a windshear level requiring immediate crew awareness and likely
subsequent corrective action.
(xi) Windshear Warning Alert. An alert triggered by decreasing performance
conditions which is set at a windshear level requiring immediate corrective action by the pilot.
b. General Standards. The following general requirements shall be met by all windshear
warning and escape guidance systems:
(1) Airworthiness. Design and manufacture of the airborne equipment must provide
for installation so as not to impair the airworthiness of the aircraft. Material shall be of a quality which
experience and/or tests have demonstrated to be suitable and dependable for use in aircraft systems.
Workmanship shall be consistent with high quality aircraft electromechanical and electronic
component manufacturing practices.
(2) General Performance. The equipment must perform its intended function, as
defined by the manufacturer.
(3) Fire Resistance. Except for small parts (such as knobs, fasteners, seals, grommets,
and small electrical parts) that would not significantly contribute to the propagation of fire, all
materials used must be self-extinguishing. One means for showing compliance with this requirement
is contained in CS 25.853 and Appendix F.
(4) Operation of Controls. Controls intended for use during flight shall be designed
to minimize errors, and when operated in all possible combinations and sequences, shall not result in
a condition whose presence or continuation would be detrimental to the continued performance of
the equipment.
(5) Accessibility of Controls. Controls that are not normally adjusted in flight shall not
be readily accessible to the operator.
(6) Interfaces. The interfaces with other aircraft equipment must be designed such
that normal or abnormal windshear warning and escape guidance equipment operation shall not
adversely affect the operation of other equipment.
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(8) Interchangeability. System components which are identified with the same
manufactured part number shall be completely interchangeable.
(10) Control/Display Readability. The equipment shall be designed so that all displays
and controls shall be readable under all cockpit ambient light conditions ranging from total darkness
to reflected sunlight and arranged to facilitate equipment usage. Limitations on equipment
installations to ensure display readability should be included in the installation instructions.
(11) Effects of Test. The design of the equipment shall be such that the application
of the specified test procedures shall not produce a condition detrimental to the performance of the
equipment except as specifically allowed.
(12) Equipment Computational Response Time. The equipment shall employ suitable
update rates for computation and display of detection and guidance information.
(14) Self-Test Capability. The equipment shall employ a self-test capability to verify
proper system operation.
(i) Any manually initiated self-test mode of operation shall automatically
return the system to the normal operating mode upon completion of a successful test.
(ii) Any automatically activated self-test feature must annunciate this mode
of operation to the pilot if this feature activates annunciation lights, aural messages, or displaces the
guidance commands in any way.
(iii) Conduct of the system self-test feature must not adversely affect the
performance of operation of other aircraft systems.
(iv) Failure of the system to successfully pass the self-test shall be
annunciated.
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c. Equipment Functional Requirements - Standard Conditions. The equipment shall meet the
following functional requirements.
(1) Mode Annunciation. The windshear escape guidance display mode of operation
shall be annunciated to the pilot upon escape guidance activation during a windshear encounter and
upon reversion to a different flight guidance mode.
These malfunction/failure indications shall occur independently of any operator action. The lack of
adequate warning displays, escape guidance information, or sensor signals or sources shall be
annunciated when compliance with the requirements of this ETSO cannot be assured.
(3) Windshear Caution Alert. If the equipment includes a windshear caution alert:
(i) It shall provide an annunciation of increasing performance shear (updraft,
increasing headwind, or decreasing tailwind) in accordance with the shear intensity curve shown in
figure 1.
(ii) This caution alert shall display or provide an appropriate output for display
of an amber caution annunciation dedicated for this purpose. An aural alert may be provided as an
option. The caution display (or output) should remain until the threshold windshear condition no
longer exists (not less than a minimum of 3 seconds) or a windshear warning alert occurs.
(iii) Gust conditions shall not cause a nuisance caution alert. Turbulence shall
not cause more than one nuisance caution alert per 250 hours (or 3,000 flight cycles based on 1
hour/flight cycle) of system operation.
(5) Operating Altitude Range. The system shall be designed to function from at least
50 feet above ground level (AGL) to at least 1000 feet AGL.
(6) Windshear Escape Guidance. Flight guidance algorithms shall incorporate the
following design considerations:
(i) At the point of system warning threshold, the available energy of the
aeroplane must be properly managed through a representative number of windfield conditions.
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These conditions must take into account significant shear components in both the horizontal and
vertical axes, individually and in combination.
(ii) The flight path guidance commands must be suitable to the dynamic
response of aircraft of the type on which the system is intended for installation.
(iii) If the magnitude of the shear components are such as to overcome the
performance capability of the aeroplane, guidance commands must be such that ground impact will
occur in the absence of ability to produce additional lift, absence of excessive kinetic energy, and
without putting the aircraft into a stalled condition.
(iv) Flight guidance command information shall be provided for presentation
on the primary flight display/attitude direction indicator (PFD/ADI) and any available Head Up Display
(HUD).
(v) Flight guidance displays which command flight path and pitch attitude
should be limited to an angle-of-attack equivalent to onset of stall warning or maximum pitch
command of 27º, whichever is less.
(vi) Flight guidance commands and any auto recovery mode (if included) may
be automatically activated concurrent with or after the windshear warning alert occurs or may be
manually selected. If manual selection is utilized, it shall only be via the takeoff-go around (TOGA)
switch or equivalent means (i.e., a function of throttle position, other engine parameters, etc.).
(vii) Manual deselection of windshear flight guidance and any auto recovery
mode (if included) shall be possible by means other than the TOGA switches.
(viii) Systems incorporating automatic reversion of flight guidance commands
from windshear escape guidance to another flight guidance mode should provide a smooth transition
between modes. Flight guidance commands shall not be removed from the flight guidance display
until either manually deselected or until the aircraft, following exit of the warning conditions, has
maintained a positive rate of climb and speed above 1.3 Vs1 for at least 30 seconds.
FIGURE 1
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SHEAR INTENSITY CURVE
fav,x =
average shear intensity to cause a warning at time tx (resulting in a 20 knot windspeed change,
bounded as shown; applies to horizontal, vertical, and combination shear intensities)
tx
o f(t)dt
= whereby f(t) = instantaneous shear intensity at time t
tx
1 A nuisance warning test utilizing the Dryden turbulence model and discrete gust
model are conducted independently from alert threshold tests to verify the acceptability of potential
nuisance warnings due to turbulence or gusts.
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Unless otherwise specified, the test procedures applicable to a determination of equipment
performance under environmental test conditions are set forth in EUROCAE/RTCA Document ED-
14D/DO-160D, „Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment.“
Performance tests which must be made after subjection to test environments may be conducted after
exposure to several environmental conditions.
(iv) In-Flight Loss of Cooling Test (When Required). The equipment shall be
subjected to the test conditions as specified in EUROCAE/RTCA Document ED-14D/DO-160D,
paragraph 4.5.4, and the following requirements of this standard shall be met:
(a) Section 3.1.1(c)(1) - Mode Annunciation
(b) Section 3.1.1(c)(2) - Malfunction/Failure Indications
(c) Section 3.1.1(c)(3) - Windshear Caution Alert
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(d) Section 3.1.1(c)(4) - Windshear Warning Alert
(e) Section 3.1.1(c)(6) - Windshear Escape Guidance
Additionally, all system controls, displays, inputs, and outputs shall perform their intended
functions.
(v) Altitude Test. The equipment shall be subjected to the test conditions as
specified in EUROCAE/RTCA Document ED-14D/DO-160D, paragraph 4.6.1, and the following
requirements of this standard shall be met:
(a) Section 3.1.1(c)(1) - Mode Annunciation
(b) Section 3.1.1(c)(2) - Malfunction/Failure Indications
(c) Section 3.1.1(c)(3) - Windshear Caution Alert
(d) Section 3.1.1(c)(4) - Windshear Warning Alert
(e) Section 3.1.1(c)(6) - Windshear Escape Guidance
Additionally, all system controls, displays, inputs, and outputs shall perform their intended
functions.
(2) Temperature Variation Test (ED-14D/DO-160D, Section 5.0). The equipment shall
be subjected to the test conditions as specified in EUROCAE/RTCA Document ED-14D/DO-160D,
Section 5.0, and the following requirements of this standard shall be met:
(i) Section 3.1.1(c)(1) - Mode Annunciation
(ii) Section 3.1.1(c)(2) - Malfunction/Failure Indications
(iii) Section 3.1.1(c)(3) - Windshear Caution Alert
(iv) Section 3.1.1(c)(4) - Windshear Warning Alert
(v) Section 3.1.1(c)(6) - Windshear Escape Guidance
Additionally, all system controls, displays, inputs, and outputs shall perform their intended
functions.
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(3) Humidity Test (ED-14D/DO-160D, Section 6.0). The equipment shall be subjected
to the test conditions as specified in EUROCAE/RTCA Document ED-14D/DO-160D, Section 6.0, and
the following requirements of this standard shall be met:
(i) Section 3.1.1(c)(1) - Mode Annunciation
(ii) Section 3.1.1(c)(2) - Malfunction/Failure Indications
(iii) Section 3.1.1(c)(3) - Windshear Caution Alert
(iv) Section 3.1.1(c)(4) - Windshear Warning Alert
(v) Section 3.1.1(c)(6) - Windshear Escape Guidance
Additionally, all system controls, displays, inputs, and outputs shall perform their intended
functions.
(ii) Crash Safety Shocks. The application of the crash safety shock tests may
result in damage to the equipment under test. Therefore, this test may be conducted after the other
tests have been competed. In this case, paragraph 3.1.1 (b)(11), „Effects of Test,“ of this standard does
not apply. The equipment shall be subjected to the test conditions as specified in EUROCAE/RTCA
Document ED-14D/DO-160D, paragraph 7.3, and shall meet the requirements specified therein.
(5) Vibration Test (ED-14D/DO-160D, Section 8.0). The equipment shall be subjected
to the test conditions as specified in EUROCAE/RTCA Document ED-14D/DO-160D, Section 8.0, and
the following requirements of this standard shall be met:
(i) Section 3.1.1(c)(1) - Mode Annunciation
(ii) Section 3.1.1(c)(2) - Malfunction/Failure Indications
(iii) Section 3.1.1(c)(3) - Windshear Caution Alert
(iv) Section 3.1.1(c)(4) - Windshear Warning Alert
(v) Section 3.1.1(c)(6) - Windshear Escape Guidance
Additionally, all system controls, displays, inputs, and outputs shall perform their intended
functions.
(6) Explosion Proofness Test (ED-14D/DO-160D, Section 9.0) (When Required). The
equipment shall be subjected to the test conditions as specified in EUROCAE/RTCA Document ED-
14D/DO-160D , Section 9.0. During these tests, the equipment shall not cause detonation of the
explosive mixture within the test chamber.
(i) Drip Proof Test (When Required). The equipment shall be subjected to the
test conditions as specified in EUROCAE/RTCA Document ED-14D/DO-160D, paragraph 10.3.1, and the
following requirements of this standard shall be met:
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(a) Section 3.1.1(c)(1) - Mode Annunciation
(b) Section 3.1.1(c)(2) - Malfunction/Failure Indications
(c) Section 3.1.1(c)(3) - Windshear Caution Alert
(d) Section 3.1.1(c)(4) - Windshear Warning Alert
(e) Section 3.1.1(c)(6) - Windshear Escape Guidance
Additionally, all system controls, displays, inputs, and outputs shall perform their intended
functions.
(ii) Spray Proof Test (When Required). The equipment shall be subjected to
the test conditions as specified in EUROCAE/RTCA Document ED-14D/DO-160D, paragraph 10.3.2, and
the following requirements of this standard shall be met:
NOTE: This test shall be conducted with the spray directed perpendicular to the most vulnerable
area(s) as determined by the equipment manufacturer.
(a) Section 3.1.1(c)(1) - Mode Annunciation
(b) Section 3.1.1(c)(2) - Malfunction/Failure Indications
(c) Section 3.1.1(c)(3) - Windshear Caution Alert
(d) Section 3.1.1(c)(4) - Windshear Warning Alert
(e) Section 3.1.1(c)(6) - Windshear Escape Guidance
Additionally, all system controls, displays, inputs, and outputs shall perform their intended
functions.
(iii) Continuous Stream Proof Test (When Required). The equipment shall be
subjected to the test conditions as specified in EUROCAE/RTCA Document ED-14D/DO-160D,
paragraph 10.3.3, and the following requirements of this standard shall be met:
(a) Section 3.1.1(c)(1) - Mode Annunciation
(b) Section 3.1.1(c)(2) - Malfunction/Failure Indications
(c) Section 3.1.1(c)(3) - Windshear Caution Alert
(d) Section 3.1.1(c)(4) - Windshear Warning Alert
(e) Section 3.1.1(c)(6) - Windshear Escape Guidance
Additionally, all system controls, displays, inputs, and outputs shall perform their intended
functions.
At the end of the 24-hour exposure period, the equipment shall operate at a level of performance that
indicates that no significant failures of components or circuitry have occurred. Following the two-hour
operational period at ambient temperature, after the 160-hour exposure period at elevated
temperature, the following requirements of this standard shall be met:
(a) Section 3.1.1(c)(1) - Mode Annunciation
(b) Section 3.1.1(c)(2) - Malfunction/Failure Indications
(c) Section 3.1.1(c)(3) - Windshear Caution Alert
(d) Section 3.1.1(c)(4) - Windshear Warning Alert
(e) Section 3.1.1(c)(6) - Windshear Escape Guidance
Additionally, all system controls, displays, inputs, and outputs shall perform their intended
functions.
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(ii) Immersion Test (When Required). The equipment shall be subjected to the
test conditions as specified in EUROCAE/RTCA Document ED-14D/DO-160D, paragraph 11.4.2, and the
following requirements of this standard shall be met:
At the end of the 24-hour immersion period specified in ED-14D/DO-160D, paragraph 11.4.2, the
equipment shall operate at a level of performance that indicates that no significant failures of
components or circuitry have occurred. Following the two-hour operational period at ambient
temperature, after the 160-hour exposure period at elevated temperature, the following
requirements of this standard shall be met:
Additionally, all system controls, displays, inputs, and outputs shall perform
their intended functions.
(9) Sand and Dust Test (ED-14D/DO-160D, Section 12.0) (When Required). The
equipment shall be subjected to the test conditions as specified in EUROCAE/RTCA Document ED-
14D/DO-160D, Section 12.0, and the following requirements of this standard shall be met:
Additionally, all system controls, displays, inputs, and outputs shall perform
their intended functions.
(10) Fungus Resistance Test (ED-14D/DO-160D, Section 13.0) (When Required). The
equipment shall be subjected to the test conditions as specified in EUROCAE/RTCA Document ED-
14D/DO-160D, Section 13.0, and the following requirements of this standard shall be met:
Additionally, all system controls, displays, inputs, and outputs shall perform
their intended functions.
(11) Salt Spray Test (ED-14D/DO-160D, Section 14.0) (When Required). The
equipment shall be subjected to the test conditions as specified in EUROCAE/RTCA Document ED-
14D/DO-160D, Section 14.0, and the following requirements of this standard shall be met:
Additionally, all system controls, displays, inputs, and outputs shall perform
their intended functions.
(12) Magnetic Effect Test (ED-14D/DO-160D, Section 15.0). The equipment shall be
subject to the test conditions as specified in EUROCAE/RTCA Document ED-14D/DO-160D, Section
15.0, and the equipment shall meet the requirements of the appropriate instrument or equipment
class specified therein.
(i) Normal Operating Conditions. The equipment shall be subjected to the test
conditions as specified in EUROCAE/RTCA Document ED-14D/DO-160D, paragraphs 16.5.1 and 16.5.2,
as appropriate, and the following requirements of this standard shall be met:
Additionally, all system controls, displays, inputs, and outputs shall perform
their intended functions.
Additionally, all system controls, displays, inputs, and outputs shall perform
their intended functions.
Additionally, all system controls, displays, inputs, and outputs shall perform
their intended functions.
(15) Audio Frequency Conducted Susceptibility Test (ED-14D/DO-160D, Section 18.0).
The equipment shall be subjected to the test conditions as specified in EUROCAE/RTCA Document ED-
14D/DO-160D, Section 18.0, and the following requirements of this standard shall be met:
Additionally, all system controls, displays, inputs, and outputs shall perform
their intended functions.
Additionally, all system controls, displays, inputs, and outputs shall perform
their intended functions.
Additionally, all system controls, displays, inputs, and outputs shall perform
their intended functions.
(18) Emission of Radio Frequency Energy Test (ED-14D/DO-160D, Section 21.0). The
equipment shall be subjected to the test conditions as specified in EUROCAE/RTCA Document ED-
14D/DO-160D, Section 21.0, and the requirements specified therein shall be met.
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(19) Lightning Induced Transient Susceptibility (ED-14D/DO-160D, Section 22.0). The
equipment shall be subjected to the test conditions as specified in EUROCAE/RTCA Document ED-
14D/DO-160D, Section 22.0, and the requirements specified therein shall be met:
Additionally, all system controls, displays, inputs, and outputs shall perform their
intended functions.
(1) Definitions of Terms and conditions of Tests. The following definitions of terms and
conditions of tests are applicable to the equipment tests specified herein:
(i) Power Input Voltage. Unless otherwise specified, all tests shall be
conducted with the power input voltage adjusted to design voltage ±2 percent. The input voltage shall
be measured at the input terminals of the equipment under test.
(iii) Windfield Models. Unless otherwise specified, the windfield models used
for tests shall be those specified in appendix 1 of this ETSO.
(iv) Adjustment of Equipment. The circuits of the equipment under test shall
be aligned and adjusted in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommended practices prior to the
application of the specified tests.
(v) Test Instrument Precautions. Due precautions shall be taken during the
conduct of the tests to prevent the introduction of errors resulting from the connection of voltmeters,
oscilloscopes, and other test instruments across the input and output impedances of the equipment
under test.
(vii) Warm-up Period. Unless otherwise specified, all tests shall be conducted
after the manufacturer’s specified warm-up period.
(viii) Connected Loads. Unless otherwise specified, all tests shall be performed
with the equipment connected to loads which have the impedance values for which it is designed.
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(2) Test Procedures. The equipment shall be tested in all modes of operation that
allow different combinations of sensor inputs to show that it meets both functional and accuracy
criteria.
Dynamic testing provides quantitative data regarding windshear warning and escape
guidance equipment performance using a simplified simulation of flight conditions. This testing, when
properly performed and documented, may serve to minimize the flight test requirements.
It shall be the responsibility of the equipment manufacturer to determine that the
sensor inputs, when presented to the windshear warning and escape guidance equipment, will
produce performance commensurate with the requirements of this standard. Additional sensor inputs
may be optionally provided to enhance equipment capability and/or performance.
The equipment required to perform these tests shall be defined by the equipment
manufacturer as a function of the specific sensor configuration of his equipment. Since these tests
may be accomplished more that one way, alternative test equipment setups may be used where
equivalent test function can be accomplished. Combinations of tests may be used wherever
appropriate.
The test equipment signal sources shall provide the appropriate signal format for
input to the specific system under test without contributing to the error values being measured. Tests
need only be done once unless otherwise indicated.
The scenarios established for testing windshear warning and escape guidance systems
represent realistic operating environments to properly evaluate such systems. The windfield models
contained in appendix 1 of this ETSO should be used to evaluate the performance of the windshear
warning and escape guidance system. The manufacturer may propose different windfield models
provided it is shown that they represent conditions at least as severe as those contained in this ETSO.
(3) Test Setup. Simulator tests shall be used to demonstrate the performance
capability of the windshear warning and escape guidance equipment. A suitable equipment interface
shall be provided for recording relevant parameters necessary to evaluate the particular system under
test. The aircraft simulator shall be capable of appropriate dynamic modeling of a representative
aircraft and of the windfield and turbulence conditions contained in appendices 1 and 2 of this ETSO
or other windfield/turbulence models found acceptable by the Administrator.
(4) Functional Performance (paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(6)). Each of the functional
capabilities identified in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(6) shall be demonstrated with the windshear
warning and escape guidance equipment powered. These capabilities shall be evaluated either by
inspection or in conjunction with the tests described in paragraphs (e)(5) through (e)(11).
(5) Mode Annunciation (paragraph (c)(1)). With the equipment operating, verify the
windshear escape guidance display mode of operation is annunciated to the pilot upon escape
guidance activation and upon reversion to a different flight guidance mode.
(i) With the system active (within the operating altitude range) and inactive
(outside the operating altitude range), remove one at a time each required electrical power input to
the equipment. There shall be a failure indication by the equipment of each simulated failure
condition.
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(ii) With the system active (within the operating altitude range) and inactive
(outside the operating altitude range), cause each sensor or other signal input to become inadequate
or invalid. There shall be a failure indication by the equipment of each simulated failure condition.
(i) Configure the equipment for simulation test as defined in paragraph (e)(3).
Subject the equipment to acceleration waveform values meeting the following conditions (reference
figure 2). The system shall generate an appropriate caution alert (or no alert) within the time intervals
specified when subjected to the following average shear intensity (fav,x) values:
0.02 20 no alert
0.04 20 no alert
0.105 10 alert within 10 sec
1.049/t t alert within t sec (2)
0.21 5 alert within 5 sec
=0.270 5 alert within 5 sec
Notes: (1) The average shear intensity which must result in a caution alert after a time tx or less meets
the definition of fav,x in figure 1. The maximum instantaneous shear intensity of the test waveform is
restricted to 0.075 or 100 percent of fav,x above the average shear value fav,x, whichever is less. The
minimum instantaneous shear intensity of the test waveform is zero. Test waveform rise and fall rates
shall be limited to a maximum of 0.1 per second. The shear intensity before time 0 is zero for a
sufficiently long time to allow the system to settle to stable conditions.
(2) t = 6, 7, 8, 9
The test conditions specified above shall be repeated 5 times. A different waveform for fav,x will be
utilized for each of the 5 runs. An appropriate alert (or no alert) must be generated for each test
condition.
Verify the system displays or provides an appropriate output for display of an amber caution
annunciation dedicated for this purpose. Verify the visual caution display (or output) remains at least
until the threshold windshear condition no longer exists or a minimum of 3 seconds (whichever is
greater), or until a windshear warning occurs.
Notes: (1) The average shear intensity which must result in a warning alert after a time tx or less meets
the definition of fav,x in figure 1. The maximum instantaneous shear intensity of the test waveform is
restricted to 0.075 or 100 percent of fav,x above the average shear value fav,x, whichever is less. The
minimum instantaneous shear intensity of the test waveform is zero. Test waveform rise and fall rates
shall be limited to a maximum of 0.1 per second. The shear intensity before time 0 is zero for a
sufficiently long time to allow the system to settle to stable conditions.
(2) t = 6, 7, 8, 9
The test conditions specified above shall be repeated 5 times. A different waveform for fav,x will be
utilized for each of the 5 runs. An appropriate alert (or no alert) must be generated for each test
condition.
Verify the system displays or provides an appropriate output for display of a red warning
annunciation labeled „windshear“ dedicated for this purpose. Verify the visual warning display (or
output) remains until the threshold windshear condition no longer exists or a minimum of 3 seconds,
whichever is greater. Verify an aural alert is provided that annunciates „windshear“ for three aural
cycles.
(ii) Subject the equipment to windspeeds defined by the Dryden turbulence model contained
in appendix 2. The system shall be exposed to these conditions for a minimum of 50 hours (or 600
flight cycles) at each altitude specified in appendix 2 for a minimum total test duration of 250 hours
(or 3,000 flight cycles based on 1 hour/flight cycle). No more than one nuisance warning shall be
generated during this test
FIGURE 2
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(9) Operating Altitude Range (paragraph (c)(5)). Configure the equipment for
simulation tests as defined in paragraph (e)(3). Simulate a takeoff to an altitude of at least 1500 feet
AGL. Verify the windshear warning and escape guidance system is operational from at least 50 feet
AGL to at least 1000 feet AGL. Simulate an approach to landing from 1500 feet AGL to touchdown.
Verify the windshear warning and escape guidance system is operational from at least 1000 feet AGL
to at least 50 feet AGL.
(10) Windshear Escape Guidance (paragraph (c)(6)). Configure the equipment for
simulation tests as defined in paragraph (e)(3). Subject the equipment to each of the windfield
conditions contained in appendix 1 for each operating mode (takeoff, approach, landing, etc.)
available. Each test condition shall be repeated 5 times. Recovery actions for the fixed pitch method
comparison shall be initiated immediately upon entering the shear condition.
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(i) Verify the flight path guidance commands manage the available energy of
the aircraft to achieve the desired trajectory through the shear encounter. These tests shall be
performed with vertical only, horizontal only, and combination vertical and horizontal shear
conditions.
(a) For the takeoff case, verify the flight guidance commands produce
a trajectory that provides a resultant flight path at least as good (when considered over the entire
spectrum of test cases) as that obtained by establishing a 15° pitch attitude (at an approximate rate
of 1.5° per second) until onset of stall warning and then reducing pitch attitude to remain at the onset
of stall warning until exiting the shear condition. Evidence of a significant decrement (considered over
the entire spectrum of test cases) below the flight path provided by the fixed pitch method that results
from use of the guidance commands provided by the system must be adequately substantiated.
(ii) Verify the flight guidance command outputs are capable of display on
associated flight displays. Interface specifications shall be verified and determined to be appropriate
for the systems identified in the equipment installation instructions.
(v) Verify that windshear recovery guidance commands and any automatic
recovery mode can be deselected by a means other than the TOGA switches.
(vii) Verify flight guidance commands are not removed from the flight
guidance display until either manually deselected or until the aircraft, following exit of the warning
conditions, has maintained a positive rate of climb and speed above 1.3 Vs1 for at least 30 seconds.
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4 — Marking
4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.
4.2 — Specific
None.
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APPENDIX 1
EASA PERFORMANCE STANDARD FOR AIRBORNE WIND SHEAR WARNING AND ESCAPE GUIDANCE
SYSTEMS FOR TRANSPORT AEROPLANES
1. PURPOSE.
This Appendix establishes the minimum performance standards (MPS) for airborne wind shear
warning and escape guidance systems for transport category aeroplanes.
2. SCOPE.
The scope of this Appendix is to provide MPS for airborne wind shear warning and escape guidance
systems for transport category aeroplanes. All the paragraph references cited herein are in reference
to this Appendix only.
This performance standard applies only to wind shear warning systems which identify wind shear
phenomena by sensing an encounter with conditions that exceed the threshold values contained in
this performance standard. In addition to wind shear warning criteria, this performance standard
provides criteria that are applicable to systems that provide optional wind shear caution alert
capability. Wind shear escape guidance is provided to assist the pilot in obtaining the desired flight
path during such an encounter.
3. DEFINITION OF TERMS.
4. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS.
In addition to the performance requirements provided in the main text of this MPS and in the
appendices of ETSO-C117b, the following general requirements and equipment characteristics are
defined below:
a. General standards.
The following general requirements shall be met by all wind shear warning and escape
guidance systems:
(1) Airworthiness.
The design and manufacture of the airborne equipment shall provide for installation so as
not to impair the airworthiness of the aircraft. The material shall be of a quality which
experience and/or tests have demonstrated to be suitable and dependable for use in
aircraft systems. The workmanship shall be consistent with high-quality aircraft
electromechanical and electronic component manufacturing practices.
(2) General performance.
The equipment shall perform its intended function, as defined by the manufacturer.
(3) Fire resistance.
Except for small parts (such as knobs, fasteners, seals, grommets and small electrical parts)
that would not significantly contribute to the propagation of fire, all the materials that are
used shall be self-extinguishing. One means to show compliance with this requirement is
contained in Part 25, Appendix F.
(4) Operation of controls.
Controls that are intended for use during flight shall be designed to minimise errors, and
when operated in all possible combinations and sequences shall not result in a condition
whose presence or continuation would be detrimental to the continued performance of
the equipment.
(5) Accessibility of controls.
Controls that are not normally adjusted in flight shall not be readily accessible to the
operator.
(6) Interfaces.
The interfaces with other aircraft equipment shall be designed such that the normal or
abnormal operation of wind shear warning and escape guidance equipment does not
adversely affect the operation of other equipment.
(7) Compatibility of components.
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If a system component is individually acceptable but requires calibration adjustments or
matching to other components in the aircraft for its proper operation, it shall be identified
in a manner that will ensure its performance to the requirements specified in this ETSO.
(8) Interchangeability.
System components which are identified with the same manufactured part number shall
be completely interchangeable.
(9) Control/display capability.
A suitable interface shall be provided to allow data input, data output, and control of the
operation of the equipment. The control/display shall be operable by one person with the
use of only one hand.
(10)Control/display readability.
The equipment shall be designed so that all the displays and controls are readable under
all cockpit ambient light conditions, ranging from total darkness to reflected sunlight, and
are arranged to facilitate the use of the equipment. If limitations are necessary on
equipment installations to ensure that the displays are readable, they shall be included in
the installation instructions.
(11)Effects of test.
The design of the equipment shall be such that the application of the specified test
procedures does not produce a condition that is detrimental to the performance of the
equipment, except as specifically allowed.
(12)Equipment computational response time.
The equipment shall employ suitable update rates for the computation and display of
detection and guidance information.
(13)Supplemental heating or cooling.
If supplemental heating or cooling is required by system components to ensure that the
requirements of this ETSO are met, they shall be specified by the equipment manufacturer
in the installation instructions.
(14)Self-test capability.
The equipment shall employ a self-test capability to verify the proper operation of the
system.
(i) Any manually initiated self-test mode of operation shall automatically return the
system to the normal operating mode upon completion of a successful test.
(ii) Any automatically activated self-test feature shall annunciate this mode of
operation to the pilot if this feature activates annunciation lights, aural messages, or
displaces the guidance commands in any way.
(iii) Use of the system self-test feature shall not adversely affect the performance of
operation of other aircraft systems.
(iv) A failure of the system to successfully pass the self-test shall be annunciated.
(15)Independence of warning and escape guidance functions.
Irrespective of whether the warning and escape guidance functions are in a combined
system or are separate systems, they should be sufficiently independent such that a
failure of either system does not necessarily preclude or inhibit the presentation of
information from the other. A warning system failure shall not result in any ambiguous or
erroneous guidance system mode annunciations.
(16)System reliability.
(i) The probability of a false warning being generated within the wind shear warning
system or the wind shear warning and escape guidance system shall be 1E-4 or less
per flight hour.
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(ii) The probability of an unannunciated failure of the wind shear warning system or
the wind shear warning and escape guidance system shall be 1E-5 or less per flight
hour (reserved).
b. Equipment functional requirements — standard conditions.
The equipment shall meet the following functional requirements.
(1) Mode annunciation.
The wind shear escape guidance display mode of operation shall be annunciated to the
pilot upon escape guidance activation during a wind shear encounter, and upon reversion
to a different flight guidance mode.
(2) Malfunction/failure indications.
The equipment shall indicate:
(i) any inadequacy or absence of primary power;
(ii) equipment failures;
(iii) inadequate or invalid warning or guidance displays or output signals;
(iv) inadequate or invalid sensor signals or sources.
These malfunction/failure indications shall occur independently of any operator actions.
The lack of adequate warning displays, escape guidance information, or sensor signals or
sources shall be annunciated when compliance with the requirements of this ETSO cannot
be assured.
(3) Wind shear caution alert.
If the equipment includes a wind shear caution:
(i) it shall provide an annunciation of increasing performance shear (updraft,
increasing headwind, or decreasing tailwind) in accordance with the shear intensity
curve shown in Figure 1;
(ii) this caution alert shall display or provide an appropriate output for display of an
amber caution annunciation dedicated for this purpose. An aural alert may be
provided as an option. The caution display (or output) should remain until the
threshold wind shear condition no longer exists (not less than 3 seconds) or a wind
shear warning alert occurs;
(iii) gust conditions shall not cause a nuisance caution alert. Turbulence shall not cause
more than one nuisance caution alert per 250 hours (or 3 000 flight cycles based on
1 hour/flight cycle) of system operation.
(4) Wind shear warning alert.
(i) A wind shear warning alert shall provide an annunciation of decreasing
performance shear (downdraft, decreasing headwind, or increasing tailwind) with a
magnitude that is equal or greater than that shown in the shear intensity curve shown
in Figure 1.
(ii) This warning alert shall display or provide an appropriate output for display of a
red warning annunciation labelled ‘wind shear’ dedicated for this purpose. The visual
alert should remain at least until the threshold wind shear condition no longer exists,
or for a minimum of 3 seconds, whichever is greater. An aural alert shall be provided
that annunciates ‘wind shear’ for 3 aural cycles. The aural alert need not be repeated
for subsequent wind shear warning alerts within the same mode of operation.
(iii) Gust conditions shall not cause a nuisance warning alert. Turbulence shall not
cause more than 1 nuisance warning alert per 250 hours (or 3 000 flight cycles based
on 1 hour/flight) of system operation.
(5) Wind shear alert with increased approach sensitivity and reduced take-off sensitivity
modes.
(i) Increased approach sensitivity mode. If your system separates approach and
take-off scenarios, you may reduce the shear intensity level in the approach
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mode to increase the probability of providing timely wind shear alerts. You
may lower the floor of the shear intensity curve ‘must alert’ curve in Figure 1
from 0.105 to 0.090. If you lower the floor, you may also modify the
turbulence rejection tests in paragraph 4(d)(7)(ii) such that an alert in this
region is not a failure of the turbulence rejection test.
(ii) Reduced take-off sensitivity mode. If your system separates approach and
take-off scenarios, you may desensitise the take-off mode to reduce the
probability of unwanted alerts. You may raise the floor of the shear intensity
‘must alert’ curve in Figure 1 from 0.105 to 0.120.
(iii) Additional reduced take-off sensitivity mode. Some high-performance jet
aircraft receive unwanted wind shear alerts after take-off when climbing at
high rates through atmospheric wind gradients. If these unwanted alerts risk
desensitising pilots to wind shear alerting, you may tailor the floor of the
shear intensity ‘must alert’ curve in Figure 1 to reduce these unwanted alerts
under the following conditions:
(a) The airborne wind shear warning and escape guidance system can
determine that the aircraft is in the take-off versus approach phase.
(b) The aircraft is climbing at a high rate of climb, the aircraft continues to
climb at a high rate, and the rate of climb is known to create unwanted
wind shear alerts.
(c) The aircraft power setting is at or near a level that is representative of
the maximum for the segment of the take-off, for example maximum
take-off thrust.
(d) The Figure 1 shear intensity ‘must alert’ curve shall be complied with
after take-off.
(6) Alerting prioritisation.
If alerting is prioritised in the presentation for wind shear warning and escape guidance
system (reactive wind shear), forward-looking wind shear system, terrain awareness and
warning system, ground proximity warning system, traffic collision avoidance system, or
when a simultaneous aural annunciation could occur, sequencing shall be implemented
that ensures that reactive wind shear warning alerts are presented or annunciated first.
Reactive wind shear alerts that are cautions have a lower priority than all terrain
awareness and warning or ground proximity warning system alerts.
(7) The reactive wind shear systems caution alert should be disabled if a forward-looking wind
shear system is in operation. It is acceptable to issue reactive wind shear caution alerts if
the forward-looking wind shear system is inoperative.
(8) Operating altitude range.
The system shall be designed to function from at least 50 feet above ground level (AGL)
to at least 1 000 feet AGL.
(9) Wind shear escape guidance.
Flight guidance algorithms shall incorporate the following design considerations:
(i) At the point of the system warning threshold, the available energy of the
aeroplane shall be properly managed through a representative number of
wind field conditions. These conditions shall take into account significant
shear components in both the horizontal and vertical axes, individually and in
combination.
(ii) The flight path guidance commands shall be suitable for the dynamic response
of aeroplane of the type on which the system is intended for installation. The
applicant shall demonstrate that the flight guidance commands during a
dynamic wind shear encounter can be followed without resulting in pilot-
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induced oscillations.
(iii) If the magnitude of the shear components is such as to overcome the
performance capability of the aeroplane, guidance commands shall be such
that a ground impact will occur in the absence of the ability to produce
additional lift, an absence of excessive kinetic energy, and without putting the
aircraft into a stalled condition.
(iv) Flight guidance command information shall be provided for presentation on
the primary flight display/attitude direction indicator (PFD/ADI) and any
available head-up display (HUD).
(v) Flight guidance displays which command the flight path and pitch attitude
should be limited to an angle of attack that is equivalent to the onset of a stall
warning or a maximum pitch command of 27°, whichever is less.
(vi) Flight guidance commands and any autorecovery mode (if included) may be
automatically activated concurrently with or after the wind shear warning
alert occurs, or may be manually selected. If manual selection is utilised, it
shall only be via the take-off/go-around (TOGA) switch or equivalent means
(i.e. a function of the throttle position, other engine parameters, etc.).
(vii) Manual deselection of wind shear flight guidance and any autorecovery mode
(if included) shall be possible by means other than the TOGA switches.
(viii) Systems that incorporate the automatic reversion of flight guidance
commands from wind shear escape guidance to another flight guidance mode
should provide a smooth transition between the modes. Flight guidance
commands shall not be removed from the flight guidance display until either
they are manually deselected or until the aircraft, following the end of the
warning conditions, has maintained a positive rate of climb and speed above
1.3 Vs1 for at least 30 seconds.
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FIGURE 1 — SHEAR INTENSITY CURVE
fav,x = average shear intensity to cause a warning at time tx (resulting in a 20-knot wind speed
change, bounded as shown; applies to horizontal, vertical, and combination shear
intensities),
𝑡
∫0 𝑥 𝑓(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
= 𝑡𝑥
,
1 A nuisance warning test that utilises the Dryden turbulence model and discrete gust model is
conducted independently from the alert threshold tests to verify the acceptability of potential
nuisance warnings due to turbulence or gusts.
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Crash Safety √
Vibration 8 √
Explosion proofness 9 When
required
Waterproofness 10
Condensing Water Proof When
required
Drip Proof When
required
Spray Proof When
required
Continuous Stream Proof When
required
Fluids susceptibility 11
Spray When
required
Immersion When
required
Sand and dust 12 When
required
Fungus resistance 13 When
required
Salt spray 14 When
required
Magnetic effect 15 √
Power input 16
Normal Operating Conditions (AC/DC) √
Abnormal Operating Conditions (AC/DC) √
Load Equipment Influence on Aircraft Electrical Power System When
(AC/DC) required
Voltage spike 17
Category A Requirements (If applicable) √
Category B Requirements (If applicable) √
Audio frequency conducted susceptibility 18 √
Induced signal susceptibility 19 √
RF susceptibility 20 √
Emission of RF energy 21 √
Lightning-induced transient susceptibility 22 √
Lightning Direct Effects 23 When
required
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The wind field models contained in Appendix 2 of ETSO C117b should be used to evaluate
the performance of the wind shear warning and escape guidance systems. The
manufacturer may propose different wind field models provided that it is shown that they
represent conditions that are at least as severe as those contained in this ETSO.
Note: The test waveform parameters provided in the ETSO are sufficiently broad
to cover the wind field parameters that were observed in the known accident
cases. However, the manufacturer is encouraged to verify that the detection
systems will actually detect these wind shears by subjecting them to the wind field
conditions specified for use in evaluating guidance commands.
(3) Test set-up. Simulator tests shall be used to demonstrate the performance capability of
the wind shear warning and escape guidance equipment. A suitable equipment interface
shall be provided for recording the relevant parameters that are necessary to evaluate the
particular system under test. The aircraft simulator shall be capable of appropriate
dynamic modelling of a representative aircraft and of the wind field and turbulence
conditions contained in Appendices 2 and 3 of this ETSO, or other wind field/turbulence
models that are found to be acceptable by the administrator.
Note: This section requires testing in a single representative aircraft simulator.
Approval of the installation will require system testing in an aircraft simulator that
is representative of the aircraft. Thus, we recommend you to accomplish the
Section 4(d)(3) simulator testing in as many representative simulators as are
necessary to cover all the intended installations.
(4) Functional performance (paragraphs 4(b)(1) through 4(b)(5), 4(b)(8) and 4(b)(9)). Each of
the functional capabilities identified in paragraphs 4(b)(1) through 4(b)(5), 4(b)(7) and
4(b)(8) shall be demonstrated with the wind shear warning and escape guidance
equipment powered. These capabilities shall be evaluated either by inspection or in
conjunction with the tests described in paragraphs 4(d)(5) through 4(d)(10).
(5) Mode annunciation (paragraph 4(b)(1)). With the equipment operating, verify that the
wind shear escape guidance display mode of operation is annunciated to the pilot upon
activation of the escape guidance and upon reversion to a different flight guidance mode.
(6) Malfunction/failure indications (paragraph 4(b)(2)). Configure the equipment for
simulation tests as defined in paragraph 4(d)(3).
(i) With the system active (within the operating altitude range) and inactive (outside
the operating altitude range), remove one at a time each required electrical
power input to the equipment. There shall be a failure indication by the
equipment of each simulated failure condition.
(ii) With the system active (within the operating altitude range) and inactive (outside
the operating altitude range), cause each sensor or other signal input to become
inadequate or invalid. There shall be a failure indication by the equipment of each
simulated failure condition.
(7) Wind shear caution alert (paragraphs 4(b)(3) and 4(b)(5)(i)). For equipment that
incorporates a wind shear caution alert function, accomplish the following tests:
(i) Configure the equipment for a simulation test as defined in paragraph 4(d)(3).
Subject the equipment to acceleration waveform values that meet the following
conditions (reference Figure 2). The system shall generate an appropriate caution
alert (or no alert) within the time intervals specified when subjected to the
following average shear intensity (fav,x) values:
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fav,x (1) Time of Exposure (t) Alert within (sec) (3)
0.0200 20 no alert
0.0400 20 no alert
0.1050 10 10
0.1166 9 9
0.1311 8 8
0.1499 7 7
0.1748 6 6.2
0.2100 5 5.7
0.2700 (2) 5 5
Notes:
(1) The average shear intensity which shall result in a caution alert after
a time tx or less meets the definition of fav,x in Figure 1. The maximum
instantaneous shear intensity of the test waveform is restricted to
0.075 or 100 % of fav,x above the average shear value fav,x, whichever
is less. The minimum instantaneous shear intensity of the test
waveform is zero. The test waveform rise and fall rates shall be
limited to a maximum of 0.1 per second. The shear intensity before
time 0 is zero for a sufficiently long time to allow the system to settle
to stable conditions.
(2) In order to achieve the test condition with the shear intensity fav,x
equal to or greater than 0.270, it is necessary to have an initial rise
of sufficient rate to achieve a shear intensity f value that will allow
subsequent rise and fall rates that are limited to 0.1 per second to
achieve the required fav,x value.
(3) Account for latency due to the alert calculation and alert
annunciation display functionality when measuring the alert time.
The test conditions specified above shall be repeated 5 times for each axis
(horizontal and vertical). A total of 90 runs are required for verification of the
detection (9 conditions × 5 for each axis) for both performance increasing and
performance decreasing wind shears. A different waveform for fav,x will be utilised
for each of the 5 runs. An appropriate alert (or no alert) shall be generated for
each test condition.
Verify that the system displays or provides an appropriate output for display of an
amber caution annunciation that is dedicated for this purpose. Verify that the
visual caution display (or output) remains at least until the threshold wind shear
condition no longer exists, or a minimum of 3 seconds (whichever is greater), or
until a wind shear warning occurs.
(ii) Subject the equipment to wind speeds that are defined by the Dryden turbulence
model contained in Appendix 4 of ETSO C117b. The system shall be exposed to
these conditions for a minimum of 50 hours (or 600 flight cycles) at each altitude
specified in Appendix 4 of ETSO C117b for a minimum total test duration of
250 hours (or 3 000 flight cycles based on 1 hour/flight cycle).
No more than 1 nuisance caution shall be generated during this test.
An alternative test equipment set-up may be used to accomplish the equivalent
test function for the turbulence testing. A combination of analysis, simulation and
testing may be used to demonstrate the performance of the equipment.
(iii) Subject the equipment to the wind speeds that are defined by the discrete gust
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rejection model contained in Appendix 4 of ETSO C-117b. No alert shall be
generated as a result of this test.
(8) Wind shear warning alert (paragraphs 4(b)(4) and 4(b)(5)(ii)).
(i) Configure the equipment for simulation tests as defined in paragraph (d)(3).
Subject the equipment to acceleration waveform values that meet the following
conditions (reference Figure 2). The system shall generate an appropriate warning
alert (or no alert) within the time intervals that are specified when it is subjected
to the following average shear intensity (fav,x) values:
Notes:
(1) The average shear intensity which shall result in a warning alert after
a time tx or less meets the definition of fav,x in Figure 1. The maximum
instantaneous shear intensity of the test waveform is restricted to
0.075 or 100 % of fav,x above the average shear value fav,x , whichever
is less. The minimum instantaneous shear intensity of the test
waveform is zero. The test waveform rise and fall rates shall be
limited to a maximum of 0.1 per second. The shear intensity before
time 0 is zero for a sufficiently long time to allow the system to settle
to stable conditions.
(2) In order to achieve the test condition with the shear intensity fav,x
equal to or greater than 0.270, it is necessary to have an initial rise
of a sufficient rate to achieve a shear intensity f value that will allow
the subsequent rise and fall rates that are limited to 0.1 per second
to achieve the required fav,x value.
(3) Account for any latency due to the alert calculation and alert
annunciation display functionality when measuring the alert time.
The test conditions specified above shall be repeated 5 times for each axis
(horizontal and vertical). A total of 90 runs are required for verification of the
detection (9 conditions × 5 for each axis) for both increasing and decreasing wind
shears. A different waveform for fav,x will be utilised for each of the 5 runs. An
appropriate alert (or no alert) shall be generated for each test condition.
Verify that the system displays or provides an appropriate output for display of a
red warning annunciation labelled ‘wind shear’ that is dedicated for this purpose.
Verify that the visual warning display (or output) remains until the threshold wind
shear condition no longer exists, or a minimum of 3 seconds, whichever is greater.
Verify that an aural alert is provided that annunciates ‘wind shear’ for
3 aural cycles.
(ii) Subject the equipment to the wind speeds that are defined by the Dryden
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turbulence model contained in Appendix 4 of ETSO C117b. The system shall be
exposed to these conditions for a minimum of 50 hours (or 600 flight cycles) at
each altitude specified in Appendix 4 of ETSO C117b for a minimum total test
duration of 250 hours (or 3 000 flight cycles based on 1 hour/flight cycle). No more
than 1 nuisance warning shall be generated during this test.
An alternative test equipment set-up may be used to accomplish the equivalent
test function for the turbulence testing. A combination of analysis, simulation, and
testing may be used to demonstrate the performance of the equipment specified
in this paragraph 4(d)(8)(ii).
(iii) Subject the equipment to the wind speeds that are defined by the discrete gust
rejection model contained in Appendix 4 of ETSO C117b. No alerts shall be
generated as a result of this test.
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(9) Operating altitude range (paragraph 4.b(8)). Configure the equipment for the simulation
tests as defined in paragraph (d)(3). Simulate a take-off to an altitude of at least 1 500 feet
AGL. Verify the wind shear warning and escape guidance system is operational from at
least 50 feet AGL to at least 1 000 feet AGL. Simulate an approach to landing from
1 500 feet AGL to touchdown. Verify the wind shear warning and escape guidance system
is operational from at least 1 000 feet AGL to at least 50 feet AGL.
(10)Wind shear escape guidance (paragraph 4.b(9)). Configure the equipment for simulation
tests as defined in paragraph (d)(3). Subject the equipment to each of the wind field
conditions contained in Appendix 2 of ETSO C117b for each operating mode (take-off,
approach, landing, etc.) that is available. Each test condition shall be repeated 5 times.
Recovery actions for the fixed pitch method comparison shall be initiated immediately
upon entering the shear condition.
Notes:
(1) Evaluate wind shear escape guidance commands using a simulation that
incorporates the necessary dynamic modelling of the representative aircraft
(more than 1 representative aircraft model may be necessary) in which
installation of the equipment is intended. Dynamic modelling of the
representative aircraft should include consideration of all the relevant
effects, including but not limited to pitch and roll rates, control authority,
delays between control inputs and aircraft responses, display system leads
and lags, etc.
(2) The simulator should provide for a pilot in the loop evaluation of guidance
flyability during simulated wind shear encounters. The guidance command
gains should be consistent with those incorporated in the flight guidance
system. While ‘fine-tuning’ of the guidance commands to obtain the
optimum performance for a specific aeroplane may be accomplished, the
use of unique tailoring for a specific aeroplane may not be necessary.
Evaluation through means of a suitable engineering simulation may be
acceptable to demonstrate the suitability of the guidance commands for a
representative aeroplane. However, the equipment manufacturer should
demonstrate that the flight guidance commands during a dynamic wind
shear encounter can be followed without resulting in pilot-induced
oscillations.
(i) Verify that the flight path guidance commands manage the available energy of the
aircraft to achieve the desired trajectory through the shear encounter. These tests
shall be performed with vertical only, horizontal only, and a combination of vertical
and horizontal shear conditions. You may reduce the number of times you repeat each
of these tests conditions to less than 5. To reduce the number of repetitions to less
than 5, you shall have gathered sufficient data to demonstrate that the flight path
guidance commands meet these requirements. You should also include aircraft weight
and centre of gravity variations if applicable.
a. For the take-off case, verify that the flight guidance commands produce a
trajectory that provides a resultant flight path that is at least as good (when
considered over the entire spectrum of test cases) as that obtained by establishing
a 15° pitch attitude (at an approximate rate of 1.5° per second) until the onset of
a stall warning, and then reducing the pitch attitude to remain at the onset of a
stall warning until the shear condition is exited. Evidence of a significant
decrement (considered over the entire spectrum of test cases) below the flight
path that is provided by the fixed pitch method that results from the use of the
guidance commands provided by the system shall be adequately substantiated.
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b. For the approach/landing case, verify that the flight guidance commands produce
a trajectory that provides a resultant flight path that is at least as good (when
considered over the entire spectrum of test cases) as that obtained by establishing
the maximum available thrust and a 15° pitch attitude (at an approximate rate of
1.5° per second) until the onset of stall warning, and then reducing the pitch
attitude to remain at the onset of stall warning until the shear condition is exited.
Evidence of a significant decrement (considered over the entire spectrum of test
cases) below the flight path that is provided by the fixed pitch method that results
from the use of the guidance commands that are provided by the system shall be
adequately substantiated.
c. For shear conditions that exceed the available performance capability of the
aircraft, verify that the flight guidance commands result in a ground impact in the
absence of the ability to produce additional lift, an absence of excessive kinetic
energy, and without putting the aircraft into a stalled condition.
Note: There is no requirement to perform the tests described in paragraphs
4(d)(10)(ii) through (vii) with horizontal only, vertical only, and a combination of
vertical and horizontal shear conditions. You may perform the tests described in
paragraphs 4(d)(10)(ii) through (vii) with only the combination vertical and
horizontal shear conditions.
(ii) Verify that the flight guidance command outputs are capable of display on the
associated flight displays. The interface specifications shall be verified and determined
to be appropriate for the systems that are identified in the equipment installation
instructions.
(iii) Verify that the pitch attitude commands do not result in an angle of attack that
exceeds the onset of a stall warning or a maximum pitch command of 27°, whichever
is less.
(iv) For systems that incorporate manual activation of recovery flight guidance
commands, verify that the system is activated only by the TOGA switches (or
equivalent means). For systems that provide automatic activation of recovery
guidance, verify that the system is activated concurrently with the wind shear warning
alert.
(v) Verify that the wind shear recovery guidance commands and any automatic recovery
mode can be deselected by a means other than the TOGA switches.
(vi) For systems that incorporate automatic reversion of flight guidance commands from
wind shear escape guidance to another flight guidance mode, verify that the transition
between the flight guidance modes provides smooth guidance information.
(vii) Verify that flight guidance commands are not removed from the flight guidance
display until either they are manually deselected or until the aircraft, following the
exit of the warning conditions, has maintained a positive rate of climb and speed
above 1.3 Vs1 for at least 30 seconds.
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APPENDIX 2
This appendix Appendix contains data that defines the windfield wind field models to be used in
conducting the tests specified in paragraph (e)(104(d)(19)) of this ETSO. This material was
developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), reference NASA
Technical Memorandum 100632 [ref. 1].
The downburst model parameters below provide the variables to be used to obtain the
representative test conditions: (1) and (2)
(1) From analytic microburst model documented in NASA TM-100632. These parameters are
based on data from Proctor’s Terminal Area Simulation System (TASS) model.
(2) For the take-off case, the downburst center centre is positioned at the point the aircraft
lifts off the runway for all test cases.
(3) For the approach/landing case, the downburst center centre is positioned as stated. The
test is begun with the aircraft at an initial altitude of 1 500 feet on a 3° glideslope (touchdown
point approximately 29 000 feet away). The Ddistance from starting point indicates where the
center centre of the downburst shaft is located relative to the starting point. The number in
parenthesisparentheses next to it indicates the relative distance of the microburst center
centre from the touchdown point (not the end of the runway). A negative number indicates
that the microburst center centre is located before the touchdown point, positive indicates it
is past the touchdown point.
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SUMMARY
A simple downburst model has been developed for use in batch and real-time piloted simulation
studies of guidance strategies for terminal area transport aircraft operations in wind shear conditions.
The model represents an axisymmetric stagnation point flow, based on velocity profiles from the
Terminal Area Simulation System (TASS) model developed by Proctor [ref. 6-9], and it satisfies the
mass continuity equation in cylindrical coordinates. Altitude dependence, including boundary layer
effects near the ground, closely matches real-world measurements, as do the increase, peak, and
decay of outflow and downflow with increasing distance from the downburst center centre. Equations
for horizontal and vertical winds were derived, and found to be infinitely differentiable, with no
singular points existent in the flow field. In addition, a simple relationship exists among the ratio of
maximum horizontal to vertical velocities, the down draft downdraft radius, depth of outflow, and
altitude of maximum outflow. In use, a microburst can be modelled by specifying four characteristic
parameters. Velocity components in the x, y and z directions, and the corresponding nine partial
derivatives are obtained easily from the velocity equations.
INTRODUCTION
Terminal area operation of transport aircraft in a wind shear environment has been recognised
recognized as a serious problem. Studies of aircraft trajectories through downbursts show that specific
guidance strategies are needed for aircraft to survive inadvertent downburst encounters. In order for
guidance strategies to perform in simulations as in actual encounters, a realistic set of conditions must
be present during development of the strategies. Thus, aeroplane and wind models that closely
simulate real-world conditions are essential in obtaining useful information from the studies.
Wind models for use on personal computers, or for simulators with limited memory space availability,
have been difficult to obtain because variability of downburst characteristics makes analytical models
unrealistic, and large memory requirements make use of numerical models impossible on any except
very large capacity computers.
Bray [ref. 12] developed a method for analytic modelling of wind shear conditions in flight simulators,
and applied his method in modelling a multiple downburst scenario from Joint Airport Weather
Studies (JAWS) data. However, the altitude dependence of his model is not consistent with observed
data, and, although flexibility in sizing the downbursts is built into the model, it does not maintain the
physical relationships which are seen in real-world data among the sizing parameters. In particular,
boundary layer effects should cause radial velocity to decay vertically to zero at the ground, as does
the vertical velocity.
In a study conducted at NASA Langley Research Center, three different guidance strategies for a
Boeing 737-100 aeroplane encountering a microburst on take-off were developed [ref. 23-4]. These
strategies were first developed using a personal computer, and then implemented in a pilot-in-the-
loop simulation using a very simple wind model in both efforts. The wind velocities used are depicted
in Figure 1. [fig. 1]. This model consisted of a constant outflow outside of the downburst radius and a
constant slope headwind to tailwind shear across the diameter of the downburst. It was recognized
that a more realistic wind model could significantly alter the outcome of the trajectory. For the
subsequent part of this study, which involves altering the aeroplane model to simulate approach to
landing and escape maneuvers and additional takeoff cases, a more realistic wind model was
preferred. The simple analytical model outlined in this report was developed for this purpose.
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It was recognised that a more realistic wind model could significantly alter the outcome of the
trajectory. For the subsequent part of this study, which involves altering the aeroplane model to
simulate approach to landing and escape manoeuvres and additional take-off cases, a more realistic
wind model was preferred. The simple analytical model outlined in this report was developed for this
purpose.
SYMBOLS
Beginning with the full set of Euler and mass continuity equations, some simplifying assumptions
about the down burstdownburst flow conditions were made. Effects of viscosity were parameterised
explicitly, and the flow was assumed to be invariant with time. The downburst is axisymmetric in
cylindrical coordinates, and characterised by a stagnation point at the ground along the axis of the
downflow column. The flow is incompressible, with no external forces or moments acting on it.
v 0. (1)
u w u
0. (2)
r z r
w g r 2 q z
(3a)
fr 2
u p z
r
(3b)
provided that
f r 2 g r 2 (4a)
2
f r 2
Note that f r
2
. To solve this system of equations, solutions were assumed for two of the
r 2
functions and the other two were obtained from equations 4a and 4b.
It was desired that the velocity profiles of this analytic model exhibit the altitude and radial
dependence shown in the large-scale numerical weather model TASS (Terminal Area Simulation
System) model [ref. 3,46-9]. The TASS model is based on data from the Joint Airport Weather Studies
(JAWS) [ref. 510], and provides a three-dimensional velocity field, frozen in time, for given locations
of an aeroplane within the shear [ref. 611-12].
Figure 2 shows dimensionless vertical profiles of horizontal velocity, u, for TASS data, laboratory data
obtained by impingement of a jet on a flat plate, and data from NIMROD (Northern Illinois
Meteorological Research on Downbursts) [ref. 713-21]. Specific points of interest are the maximum
horizontal velocity (located 100-200 metersmetres above the ground), below which is a decay region
due to boundary layer effects, zero velocity at the stagnation point on the ground, and an exponential
decay with altitude above the maximum velocity altitude. Vertical velocity profiles from TASS data are
shown in figure Figure 3, also exhibiting a decay to zero at the stagnation point.
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VERTICAL PROFILES OF VERTICAL VELOCITY FOR 30 JUN 82 CASE:
SENSITIVITY TO RADIUS OF PRECIPITATION SHAFT
The radially varying characteristics desired for the horizontal wind were two peaks of equal magnitude
and opposite direction located at a given radius, with a smooth, nearly linear transition between the
two. Beyond the peaks, the velocity should show an exponential decay to zero. The vertical velocity
was required to have a peak along the axis of symmetry (r = 0), and decay exponentially at increasing
radius.
A pair of shaping functions that gave velocity profiles matching TASS data as required are given below.
2
g(r 2 ) e ( r / R )
p(z) e z/ z e z/
The remaining solutions were found by integrating equations 4a and 4b, yielding:
f r 2
R 2
2
1 e r / R
2
q (z) e z/ 1 z e z/ z 1 .
Figures 4 and 5 show plots of these shaping functions.
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Combining the functions as in equation 3, the horizontal and vertical velocities are expressed as
u
R 2
2r
1 e r / R
2
e z / z
e z/ (5)
w e r / R
2
e z/
1 z e z/ z 1 . (6)
By taking derivatives of equations 5 and 6 with respect to r and z, respectively, and substituting in
equation 2, it can be shown that the velocity distributions satisfy continuity.
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The parameters z* and were defined as characteristic scale lengths associated with ‘out of boundary
layer’ and ’in boundary layer’ behaviour, respectively. Analysis of TASS data indicated that z* = zm2,
the altitude at which the magnitude of the horizontal velocity is half the maximum value.
zm
0.22
z
To determine the location of the maximum horizontal velocity, the partial derivatives of u with respect
to r and z where set equal to zero. The resulting equation for the r r-derivative is
2
r 2
2 e ( r / R ) 1.
R
zm 1
1n z/ .
z z/ 1
Recalling that zm/z* = 0.22, the values 1.1212 and 12.5 were obtained from iteration for the ratios r/R
and z*/, respectively.
Using these values, the maximum horizontal velocity can be expressed as umax = 0.2357 R. The
maximum vertical wind is located at r = 0 and z = zh, by definition, and is given by
z /z
w max z e h 0.92 .
A ratio of maximum outflow and downflow velocities can be formed
um 0.2357R
w m z e zh / z 0.92 .
The Scaling factor, , was determined by using either of equations 5 or 6 for horizontal or vertical
velocity, and setting it equal to the maximum velocity, umax or wmax, respectively. Solving for resulting
in:
wm um
z e z h / z 0.92 0.2357 R.
The velocity equations were easily converted to rectangular coordinates, as shown in Appendix 3.
Partial derivatives with respect to x, y, and z were obtained by differentiating the velocity equations,
and are also listed in the Appendix.
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DISCUSSION AND RESULTS
Vertical and horizontal velocity profiles for u and w are shown in figures Figures 6 and 7.
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Four profiles are shown for each component. The horizontal wind profiles in Figure 6 were taken at
the radios of peak outflow (r = 1.1212 R) and at about one-fourth that radius (r = 0.3 R), where the
maximum outflow is approximately half the value at the peak outflow radius. The vertical wind profiles
were taken at the radius of peak downflow (r = 0) and at r = 0.3 R. Horizontal wind and vertical wind
profiles in Figure 7 were taken at altitudes of h = zm (maximum outflow), h = z* (half-maximum
outflow), and h = zh (depth of outflow).
This analytical model is compared with TASS, laboratory, and NIMROD data in Figure 8. The figure
shows that, when non-dimensionalised by the altitude of half-maximum outflow (z*) and by the
maximum outflow (u = umax), the analytical model agrees closely with the other data.
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Different shears can be modelled by specifying four parameters, and the location of downburst centre
relative to the aeroplane flying through it. The four parameters are: 1) a characteristic horizontal
dimension; 2) maximum wind velocity; 3) altitude of maximum outflow; and 4) depth of outflow. The
characteristic horizontal dimension specified is the radius of the downdraft column, noting that this is
about 89per cent of the radius of peak outflow. The maximum wind velocity can be either horizontal
or vertical.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The analytic micorburst microburst model developed for use in real-time and batch simulation studies
was shown to agree well with real-world measurements for the cases studied. The functions chosen
for the model showed boundary-layer effects near the ground, as well as the peak and decay of
outflow at increasing altitudes, and increasing downflow with altitude. The exponential increase and
decay of downflow and outflow (in the radial direction) are also characterised by the model. Equations
for horizontal and vertical winds are simple and continuously differentiable, and partial derivatives in
rectangular or cylindrical coordinates can be easily obtained by direct differentiation of the velocity
equations. The governing equation for this system is the mass conservation law, and the analytic
velocity functions developed here satisfied this condition. The model is sustained by a strong physical
basis and yields high fidelity results, within the limitations of maintaining simplicity in the model, and
variability of the microburst phenomenon. Parameterisation of some of the characteristic dimensions
allows flexibility in selecting the size and intensity of the microburst.
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REFERENCES
1. Oseguera, M. and Bowles R. L.: A Simple, Analytic 3-Dimensional Downburst Model Based on
Boundary Layer Stagnation Flow, Rosa, July 1988.
3. 2. Hinton, D. A.: Aircraft Trajectory Guidance During Wind Shear Encounters. Master’s Thesis,
George Washington University, January 1988.
4. Hinton, D.A.: Flight management strategies for escape from microburst encounters, NASA TR
4057, 29, pp., 1988.
5. Hinton, D.A.: Relative merits of reactive and forward-look detection for wind shear encounters
during landing approach for various microburst escape strategies, NASA TM-4158,
DOT/FAA/DS-89/35, 1990.
6. 3. Proctor, F.H.: The Terminal Area Simulation System, Volume I: Theoretical Formulation,
NASA Contractor Report 4046, April 1987.
7. Proctor, F. H.: Numerical simulations of an isolated microburst. Part I: Dynamics and structure,
J. Atmos. Sci., 45, pp. 3137-3160, 1988.
8. 4. Proctor, F.H.: The Terminal Area Simulation System, Volume II: Verification Cases. NASA
Contractor Report 4047, April 1987.
9. Proctor, F. H., 1989: Numerical simulations of an isolated microburst. Part II: Sensitivity
experiments, J. Atmos. Sci., 46, pp. 2143-2165.
10. 5. Frost, W.: Modeling and Implementation of Wind Shear Data. Wind Shear/Turbulence
Inputs to Flight Simulation and Systems Verification, NASA CP-2474, 1987, pp. 49-66.
11. 6. Proctor, F. H.: NASA Wind Shear Model--Summary of Model Analysis. Airborne Wind Shear
Detection and Warning Systems, NASA CP-10006, 1988, pp. 29-66.
12. Proctor, F. H., and Bowles, R. L.: Three-dimensional simulation of the Denver 11 July 1988
microburst-producing storm, Meteorol. and Atmos. Phys., 49, 1992, pp. 107-124.
13. Oseguera, R. M.; Bowles, R. L.; and Robinson, P. A., 1992: Airborne In Situ Computation of the
Wind Shear Hazard Index, AIAA Paper 92-0291, 1992.
14. Lewis M. S., Robinson P. A., Hinton D. A., Bowles R. L.: The relationship of an integral wind
shear hazard to aircraft performance limitations, NASA TM-109080, 1994.
15. Arbuckle, P. D., Lewis M. S., Hinton D. A.: Airborne systems technology application to the
windshear threat, 20th Congress of the International Council of the Aeronautical Sciences,
ICAS Paper No. 96-5.7.1, pp. 1640-1650, 1996.
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16. Airborne Windshear Detection and Warning Systems. First Combined Manufacturers’ and
Technologists’ Conference, NASA CP-10006, DOT/FAA/PS-88/7, 1988.
17. Airborne Windshear Detection and Warning Systems, Second Combined Manufacturers’ and
Technologists’ Conference, NASA CP-10050, 1990.
18. Airborne Windshear Detection and Warning Systems, Third Combined Manufacturers’ and
Technologists’ Conference, NASA CP-10060, DOT/FAA/RD-91/2-1, 1991.
19. Airborne Windshear Detection and Warning Systems, Fourth Combined Manufacturers’ and
Technologists’ Conference, NASA CP-10105, DOT/FAA/RD-92/19-1, 1992.
20. Airborne Windshear Detection and Warning Systems, Fifth and Final Combined
Manufacturers’ and Technologists’ Conference, NASA CP-10139, DOT/FAA/RD-94/14-1, 1994.
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APPENDIX 3
This Appendix describes the conversion of the velocity equations in Appendix 2 to rectangular
coordinates.
2
er = e (r/R) ed = ez ee
ez = e (h/z*)
R2
WX (1 e r )e d x ad
2r 2
R2
Wy (1 e r )e d y ad
2r 2
Wh e r e c
Partial Derivatives
w x R 2 e d 2x ad 2 2x ad 2 2x ad 2
e 2 1 2 1
x 2r 2 r R 2 r r
w x R 2 x ad y ad e d 1 1 1
e r R 2 r 2 r 2
y r2
w x R 2 x ad e e
h
1 e r e z
z *
2
2r
w y R 2 x ad y ad e d 1 1 1
e r R 2 r 2 r 2
x r2
w y R 2 e d 2 y ad 2 2 y ad 2 2 y ad 2
e 2 1 2 1
y 2 r 2 r R 2 r r
w y R 2 y ad e e
h
1 e r e z
z *
2
2r
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w h 2x ad e r e c
x R2
w h 2y ad e r e c
y R2
w h
e r e d
h
Other Relationships
zm z*
From TASS 0.22 12.5
z*
wy max = wx max
w x max 0.2357R
w h max z * e z h / z* 0.92
Variable List
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APPENDIX 4
This appendix Appendix contains data that defines the Dryden turbulence model and discrete gust
model to be used in conduction conducting the tests specified in paragraphs (e)(7)(ii), (e)(7)(iii),
(e)(8)(ii), and (e)(8)(iii) of this ETSO.
TAUw (1 + SQRT3*TAUw*S)
Fw(S)= SIGMAw * SQRT ( )
PI2 (1 + TAUw*S)*(1 + TAUw*S)
Fv(S) = SIGMAv * SQRT (TAUv/PI2) * (1 + SQRT3*TAUv*S)
(1 + TAUv*S)*(1 + TAUv*S)
where:
SIGMAu, SIGMAv, SIGMAw are the RMS intensities;
TAUu = Lu/VA;
TAUv = Lv/VA;
TAUw = Lw/VA;
Lu, Lv, Lw are the turbulence scale lengths;
VA is the aircraft’s true airspeed (ft/sec);
PI = 3.1415926535;
PI2 = 6.2831853070 (2 times PI);
SQRT3 = 1.732050808 (square root of 3); and
S is the Laplace transform variable.
The following table lists SIGMAu, SIGMAv, SIGMAw, Lu, Lv, and Lw versus altitude. Extrapolation will
not be used, and simulator altitudes outside the bounds of the turbulence list will use the data at the
boundary.
The applicant shall demonstrate that the variance of their turbulence implementation is adequate.
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Discrete Gust Rejection
Discrete gusts (in the horizontal axis) with ranges of amplitude and frequency (A and OMEGA) of the
form
[A(1 cos (OMEGAt))] shall be used. The following table lists the values of A and OMEGA to be used
(this simulates an approximate 15-knot gust condition):
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APPENDIX 35
SHEAR INTENSITY
wx wh
f (t)
g V
where
w x = Horizontal component of the wind rate of change expressed in g units
(1.91 kts/sec = 0.1 g) (positive for increasing headwind).
2
g = Gravitational acceleration (ft/sec ).
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APPENDIX 46
The following computer listing (written in QuickBasic) provides a simplified aircraft simulation model for
evaluating the effectiveness of various guidance schemes. This simulation runs on a personal computer, and the
results obtained using it have been found to be comparable to those obtained on a full six-degrees-of-freedom
simulator. This model was developed by J. Rene Barrios of the Honeywell Company.
The Wind Shear Simulation Model (WSSM) is a point mass three-degrees-of-freedom mathematical model which
simulates the motion of an aircraft in a vertical plane. The equations of motion, which are described in the wind
axes, include the wind components of velocity and acceleration so that the aircraft dynamics during a wind shear
encounter are accurately modelled. This model has been used by several investigators to study the behaviour
of an aircraft during wind shear encounters.
Note: The Wind Shear Simulation Model provided at the end of this Appendix is an example written in Microsoft
QuickBasic. Other programming languages such as Microsoft FORTRAN, C, of assembly language are also
acceptable.
The motion of a constant mass point in the vertical plane may be described by four equations of state and a
control variable. For an aircraft, it is convenient to use an orthogonal reference frame which is attached to the
frame of the aircraft, and its x-direction points in the direction of motion. Such a reference frame is the relative
wind reference frame.
The following equations model the states of the aircraft in the wind axes: (Copies of that listing may be may be
purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402-9325,
USA.)
Where:
Vdt Rate of change of true airspeed in knots/second
G Gravitational constant in knots/second
T Total engine thrust in lb
csalf cos (alpha)
alpha Angle of attack in radians
D Total drag in lb.
W Gross weight in lb
sngam sin (gamma)
gamma Flight path angle in radians
Wxdt Inertial wind shear x-component in knots/second
Gdt Rate of change of gamma in rad/second
snalf sin (alpha)
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L Total lift in lb
V True airspeed in knots
Hdt Altitude rate in knots
Wz Inertial wind z-component in knots
Xdt Ground speed in knots
In the above equations, the positive directions are upwards and forwards. This implies that tailwinds and
updrafts are positive, while headwinds and downdrafts are negative. All the states can be determined from a
given alpha; therefore, alpha is the control variable.
Since the model is that of a point mass, it is necessary to introduce the concept of alpha command and actual
alpha to account for the effect of the horizontal tail/elevator. This is done by introducing a lag between the
alpha_command and the actual alpha. Therefore, any command that is given to the elevator or stabiliser can be
interpreted as an alpha_command, which will cause a change in angle of attack.
From equations 1, 2, 3 and 4, it can be seen that any change in alpha will produce a change in the longitudinal
and normal accelerations, which in turn will change the states of the aircraft.
The different segments of the trajectory flown by the WSSM are described by a series of alpha_commands,
which are generated by the procedure explained below.
1. The aircraft is trimmed for the initial conditions specified by the user. The initial conditions are usually
specified as the altitude, gross weight, flaps, speed, flight path angle, and wind characteristics. The
trimming operation consists in finding the angle of attack that satisfies the equations of state and will
result in an unaccelerated motion.
2. After the initial trim, alpha_command must be specified for each segment of the trajectory, which
usually consists of a climb or descent segment at constant speed of constant path angle, and guidance
through wind disturbances. The wind disturbance is provided by wind models that can be selected at
initialisation time.
3. In order to specify an alpha command, the user must supply a subroutine where a quadratic function is
defined in such a way that when minimised with respect to alpha, and constrained by the equations of
state, the minimising alpha will produce the desired path in an optimal manner. For example, if we want
to fly initially at a constant path angle, say 8 degrees, then the quadratic function may be defined by the
expression:
8 2
cst = (gamma + Gdt ∗ dt − 57.3) (5)
Where:
cst Function to be minimised w/r/t alpha
dt Time increment used in simulation in sec.
Gdt*dt A predictive term which anticipates the change in gamma
Other expressions follow:
cst = (V + Vdt ∗ dt − V_cmd)2 Constant speed
cst = (alpha + gamma + Gdt ∗ dt − pitch_cmd)2 Constant Pitch
The minimisation of the function cst is performed by a subroutine at each time frame and is totally
transparent to the user, who has to supply only the objective function cst.
4. Each expression defining a different value of the objective function cst is called a ‘LAW’. The user selects
the guidance law to be used during the wind shear encounter at menu a time. This method allows the
user to compare different guidance laws under the exact same conditions.
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The Wind Models
The WSSM has two types of wind models: the Dallas-Ft Worth accident wind field, simulated by a quad_vortex
model, and the constant shear model, which is user defined via the initial conditions menu.
Plotting Capabilities
The WSSM can plot up to 3 runs with 10 parameters per run. The length of each run should be kept under
60 seconds. This feature allows the user to compare different trajectories by overlaying the results.
The Program
The WSSM is written in Microsoft QuickBasic, which is a highly structured language with a very friendly full page
editor. QuickBasic is very convenient for development, since it allows the user to stop execution, change the
program and continue executing. It also interfaces with Microsoft FORTRAN, C, or assembly language.
The procedure suggested for this application is that the WSSM be compiled without subroutines DETECT and
GUIDE. DETECT and GUIDE can be separately compiled and put in a library called WNDSHR.QLB. These external
subroutines may be written in Microsoft FORTRAN, C, or assembly language.
Listing of Program
'************ AIRCRAFT FLIGHT PROFILE SIMULATION **********
'
'
DECLARE SUB PLOT ( )
DECLARE SUB TAKEOFF ( )
DECLARE SUB EULER ( )
DECLARE SUB MCRBRST ( )
DECLARE SUB WINDS ( )
DECLARE SUB OPT ( )
DECLARE SUB MIN (DM, M2, C1, C2, C3, M)
DECLARE SUB BEGIN ( )
DECLARE SUB VSHAKER ( )
DECLARE SUB COST ( )
DECLARE SUB LIMIT ( )
DECLARE SUB RATES ( )
DECLARE SUB THRUST ( )
DECLARE SUB ATMOS ( )
DECLARE SUB PRINTS ( )
DECLARE SUB DRAGS ( )
COMMON SHARED FLPS%, GEAR%, GEAR$, CL, CD, LIFT, DRAG, ALPHA
COMMON SHARED SEC, ALT, DST, HDOT, ALF, GAM, GAMREF, GREF, G
COMMON SHARED WSALERT%, WXO, WL, WX, WXDT, WZ, WZDT, DFW
COMMON SHARED WV, LC%, GM, GREFF, NOSAVE, GMO
COMMON SHARED DELTA, ISA, T0, SPDSND, VT, VC, MACH, A0, TAT, TAMF
COMMON SHARED THRST, EPR, TFCT, APPFLG%
COMMON SHARED SNGM, CSGM, CSAL, SNAL, VDOT, WG, GDOT, XDOT
COMMON SHARED AWX, AWZ, AU, AZ, VG, GRND, KF1, GMIN, KF2
COMMON SHARED ACMD, OLDALF, DT, HP, LP, ALFLIM
COMMON SHARED LAW%, GMR, ASS, CST, VTO, GCMD
COMMON SHARED OUTFILE$, DM, ALT1, PL$, TTT, WXDTO, TDX, TSH, WZO, TDZ, TSV
COMMON SHARED GM1, VTP, THETA
COMMON SHARED ALFRTE, PLMFLG%
'*******************************************
' MAIN PROGRAM *
'*******************************************
START: '< ----------------<< RE-RUNS START HERE
CLOSE : CLEAR
COLOR 15, 1: CLS : VIEW PRINT
LOCATE 8, 23: PRINT "WINDSHEAR SIMULATION"
LOCATE 10, 23: PRINT "FOR "
LOCATE 12, 23: PRINT "BOEING 737/200 "
LOCATE 23, 23: PRINT "TYPE " + CHR$(&H22) + "I" + CHR$(&H22) + " FOR INFORMATION"
DO WHILE a$ = ""
a$ = INKEY$
LOOP
IF a$ = "I" OR a$ = "i" THEN
a$ = "": CLS
'---------------------- INFORMATION PAGE-----------------------------------------
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LOCATE 2, 2: PRINT "BOEING 737/200 INFORMATON"
LOCATE 3, 2: PRINT "JT8D-17 ENGINES"
LOCATE 5, 2: PRINT "-------------------------------------------------------------------------"
LOCATE 7, 2: PRINT "ALLOWABLE WEIGHT RANGES..................: 75,000 TO 120,000 POUNDS"
LOCATE 9, 2: PRINT "ALLOWABLE TAKEOFF FLAP SETTINGS.........: 1, 2, 5, 15, 20, 25 DEGREES"
LOCATE 11, 2: PRINT "ALLOWABLE LANDING FLAP SETTINGS.........: 30, 40 DEGREES"
LOCATE 13, 2: PRINT "TAKEOFF EPR AT SEA LEVEL, STD. DAY...: 2.1 "
LOCATE 15, 2: PRINT "REFERENCE WING AREA.......................: 980 SQUARE FEET"
LOCATE 17, 2: PRINT "REFERENCE TAKEOFF SPEED..................: V2 + 10"
LOCATE 19, 2: PRINT "REFERENCE LANDING SPEED..................: 1.3 Vs"
LOCATE 23, 2: PRINT "Press Any Key to Continue..."
DO: LOOP WHILE INKEY$ = ""
END IF
ANS$ = "2"
CLS
WHILE (ANS$ = "2")
LOCATE 10, 30: PRINT "Fly ..... 1"
LOCATE 12, 30: PRINT "Plot ..... 2"
LOCATE 14, 30: PRINT "Exit ..... 3"
LOCATE 18, 30: INPUT "Selection ....."; ANS$
IF ANS$ = "2" THEN
CALL PLOT
COLOR 15, 1
CLS
END IF
WEND
IF ANS$ = "3" THEN END
CALL BEGIN 'GET DATA/INITIALIZE VARIABLES
CALL THRUST 'INITALIZE THRUST
CALL TAKEOFF 'INITALIZE TAKEOFF
CALL COST 'SUBROUTINE COST
CALL PRINTS 'SUBROUTINE PRINT
FOR ICL% = 1 TO TTT ' TTT IS THE RUN TIME IN SECONDS
CALL THRUST ' SUBROUTINE EPR/THRUST
CALL WINDS ' SUBROUTINE WINDS
' CALL DETECT ' SUBROUTINE WINDSHEAR DETECTION
' SUPPLIED BY USER
' MUST RESIDE IN LIBRARY WNDSHR.QLB
CALL OPT ' SUBROUTINE OPTIMIZE
CALL LIMIT ' SUBROUTINE ALPHA RATE
CALL EULER ' SUBROUTINE INTEGRATE
CALL ATMOS ' SUBROUTINE ATMOSPHERE
CALL PRINTS ' SUBROUTINE PRINT
IF ALT < 0 THEN EXIT FOR
NEXT ICL%
PRINT "RUN IS COMPLETE"
PRINT "TYPE " + CHR$(&H22) + "D" + CHR$(&H22) + " FOR RUN DATA"
a$ = ""
DO WHILE a$ = "" ' Wait for key to be pressed
a$ = INKEY$
LOOP
VIEW PRINT: COLOR 15, 4: CLS
IF a$ = "D" OR a$ = "d" THEN
a$ = ""
LOCATE 2, 2: PRINT "DATA FROM CURRENT RUN"
LOCATE 4, 2: PRINT "--------------------------------------------------------------"
LOCATE 6, 2: PRINT "GROSS WEIGHT: "; WG; " POUNDS"
LOCATE 7, 2: PRINT "ISA DEVIATION: "; ISA; " DEG C"
LOCATE 8, 2: PRINT "FLAP POSITION: "; FLPS%; " DEGREES"
LOCATE 9, 2: PRINT "GEAR POSITION: "; GEAR$
LOCATE 11, 2: PRINT "CONTROL LAW: "; LAW%
LOCATE 12, 2: PRINT "GAMMA REFERENCE: "; GAMREF
LOCATE 13, 2: PRINT "PITCH LIMITING: "; PL$
IF PL$ = "YES" THEN
LOCATE 14, 2: PRINT "MAXIMUM PITCH: "; HP * 57.3; " DEGREES"
LOCATE 15, 2: PRINT "MINIMUM PITCH: "; LP * 57.3; " DEGREES"
END IF
LOCATE 16, 2: PRINT "TIME OF RUN: "; TTT * DT; " SECONDS"
IF DFW = 1 THEN
LOCATE 17, 2: PRINT "DALLAS/FW Wind Model"
ELSE
LOCATE 17, 2: PRINT "HORIZ. WIND MAGNITUDE "; WXO; " KNOTS"
LOCATE 18, 2: PRINT "HORIZ. SHEAR MAGNITUDE: "; WXDTO; " KNOTS/SECOND"
LOCATE 19, 2: PRINT "HORIZ. SHEAR DURATION: "; TDX; " SECONDS"
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LOCATE 20, 2: PRINT "VERT. WIND MAGNITUDE: "; WZO * 1.689; " FT/SECOND"
LOCATE 21, 2: PRINT "VERT. WIND DURATION: "; TDZ; " SECONDS"
LOCATE 22, 2: PRINT "--------------------------------------------------------------"
END IF
IF LEN(OUTFILE$) = 0 THEN OUTFILE$ = "NONE"
LOCATE 23, 2: PRINT "OUTPUT FILE: "; OUTFILE$
LOCATE 24, 2: PRINT "Press Any Key to Continue...."
DO: LOOP WHILE INKEY$ = "" 'Wait for key to be pressed
END IF
GOTO START
END
SUB ATMOS STATIC
'******************************************************
' SUBROUTINE ATMOSPHERE *
'******************************************************
STATIC THETA
L% = ALT > 36089!
FISA = 1.8 * ISA
IF ALT > 36089 THEN
TMP = .7519 * T0
DELTA = .2234 * EXP((36089! - ALT) / 20806)
ELSE
TMP = T0 - .0035662 * ALT
DELTA = (TMP / T0) ^ 5.256
END IF
TAMB = TMP + FISA 'TAMBient in deg. R
TAMF = TAMB - 459.7 ' " " F
THETA = TAMB / T0
SQRTH = SQR(THETA)
SPDSND = A0 * SQRTH
IF VT > 0 THEN MACH = VT / SPDSND
VC = A0 * SQR(5 * (((1 + MACH * MACH / 5) ^ 3.5 - 1) * DELTA + 1) ^ .28571 - 5)
TAX = (TMP + FISA) * (1 + .2 * MACH * MACH) 'Deg. R
TAT = 5 * (TAX - 459.7 - 32) / 9 'Deg. C
IF INKEY$ < > "" THEN PRINT : INPUT "Press ENTER to continue...."; XXX
END SUB
SUB BEGIN STATIC
CLS : VIEW PRINT
'<--------------------------------- DATA_INPUT ------------------------------>
PRINT
INPUT "OUTPUT FILE (DEFAULT IS NO FILE) "; OUTFILE$
IF OUTFILE$ = " " THEN
NOSAVE = 1
ELSE
NOSAVE = 0
END IF
' CONSTANTS USED IN CALCULATIONS:
A0 = 661.478599# 'Speed of sound at sea level in knots
G = 19.07583 'Gravitational constant in knots/sec
T0 = 518.67 'Standard temperature at SL in deg Rankine
DT = .25 'Simulation time step in seconds
' ---------------------------------- INITIALIZATION OF VARIABLES--------------------------
GMIN = 0
VDOT = 0
ALT1 = 0
INPUT "TAKEOFF OR APPROACH (T/A) (Default is T)....."; ANS$
IF ANS$ = "a" OR ANS$ = "A" THEN
INPUT "ENTER ALTITUDE IN FEET (Default is 1000' . "; ALT1
IF ALT1 = 0 THEN ALT1 = 1000
APPFLG% = 1
TFCT = 1
END IF
ALT = ALT1
' ----------------------- CONFIGURTATION CONSTANTS------------------------------------------
ASS = 16.5 'Stick Shaker alpha in degrees
ASS = ASS / 57.3 ' " " " "radians
' ------------------------------------------- GROSS WEIGHT ENTRY------------------------------------------
PRINT : INPUT "ENTER GROSS WEIGHT IN POUNDS (Default is 110000) "; WG
IF WG = 0 THEN WG = 110000! ' DEFAULT SETTING
FL% = 0
WHILE (NOT FL%)
INPUT "ENTER FLAPS SETTING (Default is 0)............."; FLPS%
SELECT CASE FLPS%
CASE 0, 1, 2, 5, 15, 20, 25, 30, 40
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FL% = -1
CASE ELSE
FL% = 0
PRINT "Invalid flaps setting"
PRINT "Only 0, 1, 2, 5, 15, 20, 25, 30, & 40 are supported"
PRINT
END SELECT
WEND
IF FLPS% < 15 THEN GEAR% = 1
IF FLPS% = 15 THEN INPUT "GEAR UP OR DOWN (1/0) (Default is Down)....."; GEAR%
IF GEAR% = 1 THEN
GEAR$ = " UP"
ELSE
GEAR$ = " DOWN"
END IF
INPUT "ENTER ISA DEV. IN DEGREES C (Default is 0)......"; ISA
PRINT
CALL VSHAKER ' COMPUTE V2+10 FOR FLAPS<33 OR 1.3Vs FOR FLAPS>32
PRINT " CONTROL LAW SELECTION:"
PRINT
PRINT " Speed = 1.1* V_stall = 1"
PRINT " Alpha = Stick Shaker Alpha = 2"
PRINT " Horizontal Acceleration = 0 = 3"
PRINT " 15_Degree Pitch = 4"
PRINT " Theoretical HONEYWELL/SPERRY = 5"
PRINT " User Defined = 6"
PRINT
INPUT " SELECT CONTROL LAW ....................... "; LAW%
IF LAW% = 0 THEN LAW% = 5
PRINT : PRINT
' ----------------------------------- GAMMA REFERENCE INPUT---------------------------------
IF LAW% > 4 THEN
INPUT "ENTER GAMMA REFERENCE IN DEGREES (Default is 0)........."; GMR
PRINT
GAMREF = GMR
GMR = GMR / 57.3: GMIN = GMR
END IF
' --------------------------------------- PITCH LIMITING SELECTION---------------------------------------------
INPUT "PITCH LIMITING DESIRED (y/n) (Default is NO)..............."; PL$
IF PL$ = "Y" OR PL$ = "y" THEN
PL$ = "YES"
INPUT " MAXIMUM PITCH ALLOWED IN DEGREES "; HP
INPUT " MINIMUM PITCH ALLOWED IN DEGREES "; LP
HP = HP / 57.3: LP = LP / 57.3: PL% = 1
ELSE
HP = 100
LP = -100
PL% = 0
PL$ = "NO"
END IF
CLS
' ----------------------------------------------- TIME FOR RUN----------------------------------------------------------------
PRINT
INPUT "ENTER TIME OF RUN IN SECONDS (Default is 45).............."; TTT
TTT = TTT / DT
IF TTT = 0 THEN TTT = 45 / DT ' DEFAULT SETTING
' ------------------------------------- WINDSHEAR SET UP----------------------------------------------------
INPUT "DALLAS/FW Wind Model (y/n)...(Default is constant Shear)....."; ANS$
IF ANS$ = "Y" OR ANS$ = "y" THEN
DFW = 1
ELSE
DFW = 0
PRINT
INPUT "MAGNITUED OF HORZ. WIND IN KNOTS......(Head wind < 0)......"; WXO
INPUT "MAGNITUED OF HORZ. SHEAR IN KT/SEC. (Dec. Perf. > 0)......"; WXDTO
INPUT "DURATION OF HORZ. SHEAR IN SEC.............(Default is 0)......"; TDX
INPUT "TIME FOR SHEAR TO START IN SEC..............(Default is 0)......"; TSH
PRINT
INPUT "MAGNITUED OF VERT. WIND IN FT/SEC. (Down Draft < 0)......"; WZO
WZO = WZO / 1.689 'Convert to knots
INPUT "DURATION OF VERT. WIND IN SEC...........(Default is 0)........"; TDZ
INPUT "TIME FOR SHEAR TO START IN SEC...........(Default is 0)......"; TSV
PRINT
END IF
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' -------------------- OTHER SET UPS----------------------------------------------------
VT = VTO
WX = WXO
CALL ATMOS ' SUBROUTINE ATMOSPHERE
' ---------------------------------- HEADERS FOR SCREEN DISPLAY----------------------------------------------------
CLS : PRINT
PRINT "TIME ALT HDOT VT ALPHA GAMMA PITCH GREF WXDT WZ VDOT ALRT"
PRINT "(SEC) (FT) (FPM) (KTS) (DEG) (DEG) (DEG) (DEG) (KT/S) (FPS) (KT/S)"
PRINT STRING$(75, "-"): VIEW PRINT 5 TO 25
'**************************************
' SUBROUTINE INIT_OUTPUT FILE *
'**************************************
IF NOSAVE THEN ' CREATE OUTPUT FILE
ELSE
OPEN "O", 2, OUTFILE$
FMT$ = " ###.## ##### ##### #### #### ## ###.## ###.## ###.##"
FMT$ = FMT$ + " ###.## ###.# ###.# ##.## "
END IF
END SUB
SUB COST STATIC
'************************************************************
' SUBROUTINE COST *
'************************************************************
CALL DRAGS ' SUBROUTINE DRAG & LIFT
CALL RATES ' SUBROUTINE RATES
IF LC% = 0 THEN 'Constant gamma segment
FCT = (GM + GDOT * DT - GMO) ^ 2
GREFF = 57.3 * GMO
ELSE 'All guidance laws
SELECT CASE LAW%
CASE 1 ' ---------------------------- 1.1*Vstall-----------------------------------
CST = (VT + VDOT * DT - 1.1 * 135) ^ 2
CASE 2 ' ---------------------------- Alpha = Ass-----------------------------------
CST = (ALPHA - ASS) ^ 2
CASE 3 ' ---------------------------- Ax = 0-----------------------------------
CST = (VDOT - VT * GDOT * GM + WXDT) ^ 2
CASE 4 ' ---------------------------- 15 Degrees-----------------------------------
CST = (GM + 3 * GDOT * DT + ALPHA - 15 / 57.3) ^ 2
CASE 5 ' ---------------------------- User Defined-----------------------------------
PRINT "Not defined"
STOP
CASE 6 ' ---------------------------- User Supplied-----------------------------------
'User must supply a subroutine called GUIDE
'which must reside in the WNDSHR.QLB Library
'GUIDE can have a list of arguments
'As an example
'ALF = 57.3*ALPHA
'PTH = 57.3 * (ALPHA + GM)
' units : ft fpm kt deg deg g's g's *
'CALL GUIDE(ALT, HDOT, VC, ALF, PTH, AU, AZ, CST)
END SELECT
END IF
' CST is the Cost Function to be minimized
END SUB
SUB DRAGS STATIC
'*****************************************************
' SUBROUTINE DRAG FOR B737/200 *
'*****************************************************
X = 57.3 * ALPHA + 1
CF5 = 0: CF4 = 0: CF3 = 0: CF2 = 0
SELECT CASE FLPS%
CASE 0
CF1 = .091
CF0 = .0156
CASE 1
CF3 = -1.164058E-04
CF2 = 2.48561E-03
CF1 = .0905781
CF0 = .062114
CASE 2
CF0 = .101198
CF1 = .110993
CF2 = -.0015162
CF3 = 1.8931E-04
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CF4 = -7.1427E-06
CF5 = -4.2776E-09
CASE 5
CF0 = .192638
CF1 = .123509
CF2 = -.0051477
CF3 = 6.4968E-04
CF4 = -3.0891E-05
CF5 = 4.1291E-07
CASE 10
CF0 = .249855
CF1 = .114005
CF2 = 7.1207E-04
CF3 = -9.9541E-05
CF4 = 7.0431E-06
CF5 = -2.3773E-07
CASE 15
CF0 = .40149
CF1 = .118723
CF2 = -6.4877E-04
CF3 = 6.6281E-05
CF4 = -1.6113E-07
CF5 = -1.4278E-07
CASE 25
CF0 = .592655
CF1 = .122433
CF2 = -.0026365
CF3 = 3.5963E-04
CF4 = -1.5579E-05
CF5 = 1.0894E-07
CASE 30
IF X < 4 THEN
CF1 = .12
CF0 = .72
ELSE
CF3 = -1.651192E-04
CF2 = 4.16461E-03
CF1 = 8.337061E-02
CF0 = .8350316
END IF
CASE 40
IF X < 4 THEN
CF1 = .12
CF0 = 1.08
ELSE
CF3 = -1.689903E-04
CF2 = 3.733285E-03
CF1 = 8.483822E-02
CF0 = 1.201596
END IF
CASE ELSE
PRINT "Flaps "; FLPS%; " not available....."
END
END SELECT 'For CL computation
CL = ((((CF5 * X + CF4) * X + CF3) * X + CF2) * X + CF1) * X + CF0
SELECT CASE FLPS% 'Low Speed Drag Polars
CASE 0
D0 = .013285: D1 = .052868: D2 = -.07182: D3 = .071561
CASE 1
D0 = .026143: D1 = .022358: D2 = -.00083: D3 = .016338
CASE 2
D0 = .070346: D1 = -.0852: D2 =.097453: D3 = -.01207
CASE 5
D0 = .045214: D1 = -.0178: D2 =.04373: D3 = .002101
CASE 10
D0 = -.04266: D1 = .19643: D2 = -.1152: D3 = .03966
CASE 15
IF GEAR% = 0 THEN
D0 = .034954: D1 = .098892: D2 = -.04187: D3 = .020496
ELSE
D0 = -.02822: D1 = .174631: D2 = -.0874: D3 = .029566
END IF
CASE 25
D0 = -.10416: D1 = .327506: D2 = -.17059: D3 = .043313
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CASE 30
D0 = .124697: D1 = -.03348: D2 =.055295: D3 = -.00311
CASE 40
D0 = .124925: D1 = .052537: D2 =.006912: D3 = .0058
CASE ELSE
PRINT "Flaps "; FLPS% " not available...."
END
END SELECT
CD = ((D3 * CL + D2) * CL + D1) * CL + D0
Q = 1451770 * MACH * MACH * DELTA 'B737/200
LIFT = Q * CL
DRAG = Q * CD
END SUB
SUB EULER STATIC
'*****************************************************************
' SUBROUTINE EULER'S PREDICTOR/CORRECTOR *
' (INTEGRATION SUBROUTINE) *
'*****************************************************************
DTH = DT / 3600: DTM = DT / 60: SEC = SEC + DT: VTP = VT
CALL RATES ' SUBROUTINE RATES <<PREDICTOR>>
ALT1 = ALT: HDOT1 = HDOT: ALT = ALT + HDOT * DTM
GM1 = GM: GDOT1 = GDOT: GM = GM + GDOT * DT
DST1 = DST: XDOT1 = XDOT: DST = DST + XDOT * DTH
VT1 = VT: VDOT1 = VDOT: VT = VT + VDOT * DT
CALL RATES ' SUBROUTINE RATES <<CORRECTOR>>
ALT = ALT1 + (HDOT1 + HDOT) * DTM / 2
GM = GM1 + (GDOT1 + GDOT) * DT / 2
DST = DST1 + (XDOT1 + XDOT) * DTH /2
VT = VT1 + (VDOT1 + VDOT) * DT / 2
END SUB
SUB LIMIT STATIC
'*****************************************************************************
' SUBROUTINE ALPHA DOT AND PITCH LIMIT *
'*****************************************************************************
ALPHA = OLDALF + .25 * (ACMD - OLDALF) 'Pitch dynamics
CALL DRAGS ' SUBROUTINE DRAG (REQ'D FOR RATE SUB CALL)
IF PLMFLG% = 0 THEN EXIT SUB
OLDGM = GM
PLIM% = 0
DO WHILE (PLIM% = 0)
CALL RATES ' SUBROUTINE RATES
X = ALPHA + OLGM + GDOT * DT
IF X > HP THEN ALPHA = .9 * ALPHA
IF X < LP THEN ALPHA = 1.1 * ALPHA
IF ALPHA > ALFLIM THEN
ALPHA = ALFLIM
PLIM% = 1
END IF
LOOP
END SUB
SUB MCRBRST STATIC
IF MU1 = 0 THEN
MU1 = -37141!
AV = 5500: H1 = 2500: G3 = 3: J1 = -700: J2 = 800: J3 = 6.5
MU2 = -20000
BV = 12000: H2 = 2000: N1 = 200: N2 = 2500: N3 = 4
WX = 5
IF ALT > 1000 THEN
PRINT
PRINT " DFW data not available above 1000'"
PRINT " Please start at or below 1000'"
END
END IF
END IF
X = 6078 * DST: Y = ALT: A1 = AV: A2 = BV
NX1 = Y - H1: DENX1 = (Y - H1) ^ 2 + (X - A1) ^ 2
NY1 = X + J2 - A1: DENY1 = (Y + J1 - H1) ^ 2 + (X + J2 - A1) ^ 2
NX2 = Y - H2: DENX2 = (Y - H2) ^ 2 + (X - A2) ^ 2
NY2 = X + N2 - A2: DENY2 = (Y + N1 - H2) ^ 2 + (X + N2 - A2) ^ 2
NX3 = Y + H1: DENX3 = (Y + H1) ^ 2 + (X - A1) ^ 2
NY3 = X + J2 - A1: DENY3 = (Y + J1 + H1) ^ 2 + (X + J2 - A1) ^ 2
NX4 = Y + H2: DENX4 = (Y + H2) ^ 2 + (X - A2) ^ 2
NY4 = X + N2 - A2: DENY4 = (Y + N1 + H2) ^ 2 + (X + N2 - A2) ^ 2
XX = MU1 * (-NX1 / DENX1 + NX3 / DENX3) + MU2 * (NX2 / DENX2 - NX4 / DENX4)
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WX = WX + .65 * (XX - WX) + 2 * G3
IF DST = 0 THEN WXP = WX
ZZ = MU1 * (NY1 / DENY1 - NY3 / DENY3) * J3 + MU2 * (-NY2 / DENY2 + NY4 / DENY4) * N3
WZ = WZ + .65 * (ZZ - WZ)
IF DST = 0 THEN WZP = WZ
WX5 = WX4: WX4 = WX3: WX3 = WX2: WX2 = WX1: WX1 = WX
WZ5 = WZ4: WZ4 = WZ3: WZ3 = WZ2: WZ2 = WZ1: WZ1 = WZ
IF WCNT% < 4 THEN WXDT = (WX - WXP) / DT: WXP = WX
IF WCNT% < 4 THEN WZDT = (WZ - WZP) / DT: WZP = WZ
IF WCNT% > 3 THEN WXDT = (26 * WX5 - 27 * WX4 - 40 * WX3 - 13 * WX2 + 54 * WX1) / (70 * DT)
IF WCNT% > 3 THEN WZDT = (26 * WZ5 - 27 * WZ4 - 40 * WZ3 - 13 * WZ2 + 54 * WZ1) / (70 * DT)
IF ABS(WXDT) > 15 THEN WXDT = 15 * SGN(WXDT)
IF ABS(WZDT) > 15 THEN WZDT = 15 * SGN(WZDT)
WCNT% = WCNT% + 1
END SUB
SUB MIN (DM, M2, C1, C2, C3, M) STATIC
'************************************************************
'SUBROUTINE MIN_CST BY LEAST SQUARES PARABOLA *
'************************************************************
ALPHA = M2 + DM 'INCREMENT ALPHA
CALL COST 'SUBROUTINE COST
IF DM < 0 THEN
C4 = CST
ELSE
SWAP C1, C3
C5 = CST
END IF
ALPHA = M2 - DM 'DECREMENT ALPHA
CALL COST 'SUBROUTINE COST
IF DM < 0 THEN
C5 = CST
ELSE
C4 = CST
END IF
M = ABS(DM) * (14 * C1 + 7 * C4 - 7 * C5 - 14 * C3) / (20 * C1 - 10 * C4 - 20 * C2 - 10 * C5 + 20 * C3)
END SUB
SUB OPT STATIC
'****************************************************************************
'SUBROUTINE OPTALF - DETERMINES THE ALPHA REQD FOR CMD GAMMA *
'****************************************************************************
OLDALF = ALPHA: GM1 = GM
CALL ATMOS ' SUBROUTINE ATMOSPHERE
CALL RATES ' SUBROUTINE RATES
DM = 1 / 57.3 ' SET ALPHA INCREMENT TO 1 DEGREE
C1 = 1E+20
C2 = 1E+20
C3 = 1E+20
OPTFLG% = 0
WHILE (OPTFLG% = 0)
CALL COST ' SUBROUTINE COST
C3 = C2: C2 = C1: C1 = CST
M3 = M2: M2 = M1: M1 = ALPHA
LGC% = C1 > C2 AND C3 = 1E+20
IF LGC% THEN
DM = -DM ' Reverse search direction
C1 = C2: C2 = CST: M1 = M2: M2 = ALPHA
ALPHA =ALPHA + 2 * DM
ELSE
IF C1 < C2 THEN
L% = ABS(OLDALF - ALPHA) / DT > ALFRTE OR ALPHA > ALFLIM OR ALPHA < -.08
IF L% THEN OPTFLG% = 1
ALPHA = ALPHA + DM
ELSE
DM = DM / 2
CALL MIN(DM, M2, C1, C2, C3, M)'Fit parabola & find minimum
ALPHA = M2 + M 'This is the optimum alpha
OPTFLG% = 1 'Set flag to terminate
END IF
END IF
WEND
ALFLIM = ASS 'SET ALPHA LIMIT TO ALPHA STICK SHAKER
SELECT CASE LAW%
CASE 4
ALFLIM = ASS - .035 'LIMIT TO SS MINUS 2 DEG
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CASE 5, 6
ALFLIM = ASS - KF2
CASE ELSE
END SELECT
IF ALPHA < -.08 THEN ALPHA = -.08
IF ALPHA > ALFLIM THEN ALPHA = ALFLIM
ACMD = ALPHA 'SET ALPHA COMMAND TO COMPUTED ALPHA
END SUB
SUB PLOT
'*************************************************************************************
'* PLOT ROUTINE *
'*************************************************************************************
REM $DYNAMIC
' TWO DIMENSIONAL PLOTTER
DEFINT I-L, N
DIM F$(3) ' file name array
DIM DTA(3, 250, 15) ' data array
DIM TY$(14) ' title array (dependant variable)
TITLE$ = "HONEYWELL WINDSHEAR SIMULATION" ' main title
TX$ = "Time (s)" ' X title
TY$(1) = "Altitude ft "
TY$(2) = "Alt Rate fpm "
TY$(3) = "T A S kts "
TY$(4) = "Alpha deg "
TY$(5) = "Gamma deg "
TY$(6) = "Pitch deg "
TY$(7) = "G_ref deg "
TY$(8) = "Hz Shear kps "
TY$(9) = "Vt Wind fps "
TY$(10) = "Vt rate kps "
TY$(11) = "W/S Flag "
NV = 12
CLS
LOCATE 3, 15: PRINT "Enter the names of the data files you wish to plot."
FOR NC = 1 TO 3
LOCATE 6 + 2 * NC, 25 ' input
PRINT "FILENAME "; NC; " "; ' filenames
INPUT ; F$(NC) ' containing
IF F$(NC) = " " THEN EXIT FOR ' data
NEXT NC
NC = NC - 1 ' number of curves to plot
LOCATE 20, 15: PRINT "Reading from disk........."
FOR I = 1 TO NC
CLOSE
OPEN "I", #1, F$(I) ' open file for input
NP = 0
DO
NP = NP + 1 ' number of points
FOR J = 1 TO NV
INPUT #1, DTA(I, NP, J) ' read data
NEXT J
LOOP UNTIL EOF(1)
CLOSE
NEXT I
DO ' display all selected parameters
DO ' prompt user until a valid parameter is selected
100 CLS
LOCATE 3, 20: PRINT "Select the parameter you wish to plot."
FOR I = 1 TO NV - 1
LOCATE 4 + I, 30: PRINT TY$(I); " = "; I
NEXT I
LOCATE 21, 30: INPUT "parameter number (0 to exit)"; PARAM%
IF PARAM% = 0 THEN
CLS
EXIT SUB ' return to calling program
END IF
LOOP UNTIL 1 <= PARAM% AND PARAM% <= 14 'end of select loop
PARAM% = PARAM% + 1
DX = 5 ' x axis grid increment
GOSUB 400 ' find maximum x and y values
IF PLTFLG% = 1 THEN
PRINT "No information to plot...."
PRINT "Press any key to continue..."
DO: LOOP WHILE INKEY$ = ""
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GOTO 100
END IF
GOSUB 600 ' grid and titles
FOR I = 1 TO NC
GOSUB 1110 ' plot graph
NEXT I
DO
LOOP WHILE INKEY$ = ""
CLS : SCREEN 0
LOOP
'**************************************************************************************
400 '* MAX SUBROUTINE *
'**************************************************************************************
'
MAXX = DTA(1, 1, 1)
MAXY = DTA(1, 1, PARAM%)
MINY = DTA(1, 1, PARAM%)
FOR I = 1 TO NC
FOR J = 1 TO NP
IF DTA(I, J, 1) > MAXX THEN MAXX = DTA(I, J, 1)
IF DTA(I, J, PARAM%) > MAXY THEN MAXY = DTA(I, J, PARAM%)
IF DTA(I, J, PARAM%) < MINY THEN MINY = DTA(I, J, PARAM%)
NEXT J
NEXT I
PLTFLG% = 0
DY = (MAXY - MINY) / 15
IF DY = 0 THEN
PLTFLG% = 1
DY = 5
END IF
MAG = 10 ^ (INT(LOG(DY) / LOG(10))): DY = DY / MAG
IF DY <= 5 THEN
DY = 5
ELSE
DY = 10
END IF
DY = DY * MAG
IF INT(MAXX / DX) < > MAXX / DX THEN MAXX = INT(MAXX / DX + 1) * DX
IF INT(MAXY / DY) < > MAXY / DY THEN MAXY = INT(MAXY / DY + 1) * DY
IF INT(MINY / DY) < > MINY / DY THEN MINY = INT(MINY / DY) * DY
NUMX = MAXX / DX
NUMY = (MAXY - MINY) / DY
RETURN
600
'***************************************************************************************
'* GRID AND TITLES *
'***************************************************************************************
'
CLS
SCREEN 2 ' 640*200 monochrome graphics
KEY OFF
'
FOR J = 0 TO NUMX
Z = J * 580 / NUMX + 59
LINE (Z, 10) - (Z, 170) ' vertical grid line
Z = J * 71 / NUMX + 7
a = DX * J
IF a < > 0 THEN ' adjustment for
D = INT(LOG(a) / LOG(10)) + 1 ' large numbers
IF D > 1 THEN Z = Z - D + 1
END IF
LOCATE 23, Z
PRINT a;
NEXT J
FOR J = 0 TO NUMY
Z = J * 160 / NUMY + 10
LINE (60, Z) - (640, Z) ' horizontal grid line
Z = 22 - J * 20 / NUMY
LOCATE Z, 2
Z = DY * J + MINY
AZ = ABS(Z)
IF INT(Z) = Z THEN
G$ = "######"
ELSEIF AZ < .1 THEN
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G$ = "#.####"
ELSEIF AZ >= .1 AND AZ < 1 THEN
G$ = "##.###"
ELSEIF AZ >= 1 AND AZ < 10 THEN
G$ = "###.##"
ELSEIF AZ >= 10 AND AZ < 100 THEN
G$ = "####.#"
ELSE
G$ = "######"
END IF
PRINT USING G$; Z;
NEXT J
Z = (80 - LEN(TITLE$)) / 2 + 2
LOCATE 1, Z: PRINT TITLE$ ' print main title
LOCATE 24, 36: PRINT TX$; ' X axis title
LOCATE 8, 1 ' Y
FOR J = 1 TO LEN(TY$(PARAM% - 1)) ' axis
PRINT MID$(TY$(PARAM% - 1), J, 1) ' title
NEXT J
LOCATE 25, 10: PRINT "1"; ' curve
LINE (90, 195) - (130, 195)
LOCATE 25, 20: PRINT "2"; ' labels
FOR J = 0 TO 40 STEP 8
XX = 170 + J
PSET (XX, 195)
CIRCLE (XX + 80, 195) , 2
NEXT J
LOCATE 25, 30: PRINT "3";
RETURN
'*****************************************************************************************
'* PLOTTING ROUTINE *
'*****************************************************************************************
'
1110 FOR J = 1 TO NP
XX = 580 * DTA(I, J, 1) / MAXX + 60' calculate pixel X position
YY = 170 - 160 * (DTA(I, J, PARAM%) - MINY) / (MAXY - MINY)
IF J = 1 THEN GOTO 1170
IF I = 1 THEN LINE (XXOLD, YYOLD) - (XX, YY) ' line 1170
1170 XXOLD = XX: YYOLD = YY
IF I = 2 THEN PSET (XX, YY) ' point
IF I = 3 THEN CIRCLE (XX, YY), 2 ' circle
NEXT J
RETURN
END SUB
REM $STATIC
DEFSNG I-L, N
SUB PRINTS
'******************************************************************
' SUBROUTINE PRINT TO SCREEN AND FILE *
'******************************************************************
ACMDG = 57.3 * ACMD
ALF = 57.3 * ALPHA
GAM = 57.3 * GM
PITCH = ALF + GAM
WZX = 1.689 * WZ
IF NOSAVE = 0 THEN PRINT #2, SEC, ALT, HDOT, VT, ALF, GAM, PITCH, GREFF, WXDT, WZX, VDOT, WSALERT%
FMT1$ = "###.## #### ##### ### ###.# ###.# ###.# ##.# ###.# ###.# ###.# #"
PRINT USING FMT1$; SEC, ALT, HDOT, VT, ALF, GAM, PITCH, GREFF, WXDT, WZX, VDOT, WSALERT%
END SUB
SUB RATES STATIC
'******************************************************************
' SUBROUTINE RATES *
'******************************************************************
SNGM = SIN(GM): CSGM = COS(GM): SNAL = SIN(ALPHA): CSAL = COS(ALPHA)
VDOT = G * ((THRST * CSAL - DRAG) / WG - SNGM) - WXDT * CSGM - WZDT * SNGM
GDOT = G * ((LIFT + THRST * SNAL) / WG - CSGM) + WXDT * SNGM - WZDT * CSGM
GDOT = GDOT / VT
HDOT = 101.28 * (VT * SNGM + WZ)
XDOT = VT * CSGM + WX
AWX = VDOT + WXDT * CSGM + WZDT * SNGM 'Inertial Acc. along Wind_x axis
AWZ = VT * GDOT - WXDT * SNGM + WZDT * CSGN 'Inertial Acc. along Wind_z axis
AU = (AWX * CSAL + AWZ * SNAL) / G 'LONG. ACCEL. ->=?
AZ = (AWX * SNGM + AWZ * CSGM) / G 'VERT. ACCEL. UP=?
VG = XDOT
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GRND = (VT * GM + WZ) / (VT + WX) 'Gamma w/r ground
KF1 = 1
GHAT = GMIN * (1 + WX / VT)
IF WZ > -30 AND WZ < -20 THEN KF1 = 1 + .025 * (WZ + 20)
IF WZ <= -30 THEN KF1 = .75
DGAM = 57.3 * (20 * GDOT - (GHAT - GRND + (1 - KF1) * WZ / 152 + 20 * GDOT))
IF DGAM < 0 THEN
KF2 = (2 + .4 * DGAM)
ELSE
KF2 = 2
END IF
IF KF2 < 0 THEN KF2 = 0
KF2 = KF2 / 57.3
END SUB
SUB TAKEOFF STATIC
'********************************************************************
' SUBROUTINE INTIALIZE TAKEOFF *
'********************************************************************
IF APPFLG% = 0 THEN
ALPHA = .12
WHILE (LIFT <= WG)
CALL DRAGS
ALPHA = ALPHA + .01
WEND
GM = (THRST - DRAG) / WG 'COMPUTE POTENTIAL GAMMA
ELSE
GM = -3 / 57.3
ALPHA = 2 / 57.3
CALL DRAGS
TFCT = 1
CALL THRUST
T = DRAG - .052 * WG
IF T < 0 THEN T = .2 * THRST
TFCT = T / THRST
THRST = T
END IF
GMO = GM
CALL RATES
END SUB
SUB THRUST STATIC
'*******************************************************************
' SUBROUTINE EPR/THRUST *
'*******************************************************************
' TAKE-OFF THRUST FOR JT8D-17 ENGINES
VE = 1.668 * VT
R00 = 14688.74: R01 = -.65187546#: R02 = 6.7371E-05
R10 = -13.9295: R11 = .000751143#: R12 = -1.5405E-07
R20 = .014643: R21 = 5.3444E-07: R22 = -4.8907E-10
AA0 = (R02 * ALT + R01) * ALT + R00
AA1 = (R12 * ALT + R11) * ALT + R10
AA2 = (R22 * ALT + R21) * ALT + R20
THRST = 2 * ((AA2 * VT + AA1) * VT + AA0) 'Temp. = 100 F
IF APPFLG% = 1 THEN
IF LC% = 1 AND TFCT < 1 THEN
GMO = .136
TSPL = 5.5
'Engine Spool Up Time
TFCT = TFCT + DT / TSPL
END IF
IF TFCT > 1 THEN TFCT = 1
ELSE
TFCT = 1
END IF
THRST = TFCT * THRST
'' THRST = 2 * (((2.64159E-05 * VT + 5.110896E-03) * VT - 12.56476) * VT + 15550)
END SUB
SUB VSHAKER STATIC
'------------------------------------ COMPUTATION OF Vss AND V2-------------------------
V2 = 145
VTO = V2 + 10' SETS INITAL SPEED EQUAL TO V2 + 10
SELECT CASE FLPS%
CASE 10
IF VTO < 150 THEN VTO = 150 ' TAKEOFF
CASE 18
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IF VTO < 148 THEN VTO = 148 ' FLAP
CASE 22
IF VTO < 147 THEN VTO = 147 ' SETTINGS
CASE 33
VTO = 63.11225 + .222468 * WG / 1000 ' APPROACH
CASE 42 ' FLAP
VTO = 62.67386 + .21744 * WG / 1000 ' SETTINGS
CASE ELSE
END SELECT
END SUB
SUB WINDS STATIC
'******************************************************************
' SUBROUTINE WINDS *
'******************************************************************
'
IF TDX > 0 THEN
T1 = 4
T2 = TSH
T3 = T1 + T2
T4 = -4
T5 = T3 + TDX
T6 = T5 - T4
B1 = 3 * WXDTO / T1 ^ 2
A1 = -2 * B1 / (3 * T1)
B2 = 3 * WXDTO / T4 ^ 2
A2 = -2 * B2 / (3 * T4)
IF SEC > T2 AND SEC < = T3 THEN
X = SEC - T2
WXDT = (A1 * X + B1) * X * X
END IF
IF SEC > T5 AND SEC < = T6 THEN
X = SEC - T6
WXDT = (A2 * X + B2) * X * X
END IF
IF SEC > T6 THEN WXDT = 0
WX = WX + WXDT * DT
END IF
IF TDZ > 0 THEN
T1 = 4
T2 = TSV
T3 = T1 + T2
T4 = - 4
T5 = T3 + TDZ
T6 = T5 - T4
B1 = 3 * WZO / T1 ^ 2
A1 = -2 * B1 / (3 * T1)
B2 = 3 * WZO / T4 ^ 2
A2 = -2 * B2 / (3 * T4)
IF SEC > T2 AND SEC <= T3 THEN
X = SEC - T2
WZ = (A1 * X + B1) * X * X
WZC = WZ
END IF
IF SEC > T5 AND SEC <= T6 THEN
X = SEC - T6
WZ = (A2 * X + B2) * X * X
WZC = WZ
END IF
KALT = (-.0000011 * ALT + .00212) * ALT - .0251
IF KALT < 0 OR ALT <= 0 THEN KALT = 0
KALT = 1
WZ = KALT * WZC
IF SEC > T6 THEN WZ = 0
WZDT = (WZ - WZ1) / DT
WZ1 = WZ
END IF
IF DFW = 1 THEN CALL MCRBRST 'DALLAS Model
END SUB
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Date: 23.02.2018 XX.XX.20XX
European
Union
Aviation
Safety
Agency
European Technical Standard Order (ETSO)
Subject: COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER SYSTEMS
1— Applicability
This ETSO provides the requirements that cockpit voice recorder (CVR) systems that are designed and
manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the applicable
ETSO marking.
2— Procedures
2.1 — General
The Aapplicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None
All the information specified in EUROCAE ED-112A, Section 2-1, 2-1.3.4, excluding item 6, shall be
documented in a manual and be made available to the accident investigation authorities on request. In
addition, if special tools or recovery techniques are used to retrieve recorded information from any
memory device that is used within the crash-protected memory module removed from a crash-damaged
recorder, these tools/recovery techniques shall be also made available to the accident investigation
authorities on request.
Note: Requests from accident investigation authorities can be independent of any ongoing investigation.
3— Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
The applicable Sstandards are those set forth provided in EUROCAE document ED-112A, MOPS for Crash
Protected Airborne Recorder Systems, dated September 2013, that pertain to the CVR type, except
Chapters I-1 and I-6, and Sections 2-1.1 , 2-1.5 , 2-1.6 , 2-1.11 , 2-1.12 , 2-3.1 , 2-5 , 3 3-1.1, 3-1.2, 3-1.3,
3-1.4, 3-1.5 , 3-1.7, Annex I-A, Annex I-C, and other ED-112A requirements related to installation, flight
testing, aircraft maintenance and as modified in Appendix 1 of this ETSO.
Table 1 lists CVR types and the ED-112A section and part containing the MPS for each type:
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Table 1. — CVR MPS Requirements
CVR Type ED-112A Reference
Single-function CVR in a non-deployable Section 2 and Part I.
recorder
CVR function in a deployable recorder Section 2 (except for tests covered by
ETSO-2C517), Section 3 and Part I.
The recorder shall also comply with ETSO-2C517.
CVR function in a combined Section 2, Section 4, and Part I.
non-deployable recorder
CVR function in a combined deployable Section 2 (except for tests covered by
recorder ETSO-2C517), Section 4 and Part I.
The recorder shall also comply with ETSO-2C517.
Note: aA CVR article may cover multiple types. A CVR may be a combined CVR and may also be
deployable, in which case the applicable MOPS are Sections 2, 3, 4 and Part I, following the table above.
3.1.2 —Environmental Standard
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1
3.1.3 — Software
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.2
3.1.4 — Airborne Electronic Hardware
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.3.
3.2 — Specific
3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4.
A Ffailure of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO is a minor failure condition.
A Lloss of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO is a minor failure condition.
The applicant must develop the system to at least the development assurance level that is
commensurate with these failure conditions.
Note: tThe failure classification requirement is driven by the use of CVRs in accident investigations.
4— Marking
4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.
4.2 — Specific
4.2.1 — Lettering identification
The equipment shall comply with the identification requirement in EUROCAE ED-112A, Section 2-1,
paragraph 2-1.16.3, if it is fixed, and Section 3-1, paragraph 3-1.8.3, if it is deployable.
5— Availability of Referenced Documents
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 3.
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Date: 24.10.03 XX.XX.20XX
APPENDIX 1
The standard EUROCAE ED-112a, MOPS for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems, dated
September 2013, shall be modified as per Table 1 below.
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Date: 23.02.2018 XX.XX.20XX
European
Union
Aviation
Safety
Agency
European Technical Standard Order (ETSO)
Subject: FLIGHT D ATA RECORDER SYSTEMS
1— Applicability
This ETSO provides the requirements that flight data recorder (FDR) systems that are designed and
manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the applicable
ETSO marking.
2— Procedures
2.1 — General
The Aapplicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None
All the information specified in EUROCAE ED-112A, Section 2-1, 2-1.3.4 excluding item 6, shall be
documented in a manual and be made available to the accident investigation authorities on request. In
addition, if special tools or recovery techniques are used to retrieve recorded information from any
memory device used within the crash-protected memory module removed from a crash-damaged
recorder, these tools/recovery techniques shall be also made available to the accident investigation
authorities on request.
Note: Requests from accident investigation authorities can be independent of any ongoing investigation.
3— Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
The applicable Sstandards are those set forth provided in the applicable sections of EUROCAE document
ED-112A, MOPS for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems, dated September 2013, that pertain to
the FDR type, except Chapters II-1 and II-6, and Sections 2-1.1, 2-1.5, 2-1.6, 2-1.11, 2-1.12, 2-3.1, 2-5,
3 3-1.1, 3-1.2, 3-1.3, 3-1.4, 3-1.5 , 3-1.7, Annex II-A, Annex II-B, and other ED-112A requirements related
to aircraft-level equipment installation, flight testing, and aircraft maintenance and as modified in
Appendix 1 of this ETSO.
Table 1 lists FDR types and the ED-112A section and part containing the MPS for each type:
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Table 1. — Recorder MPS Requirements
Recorder Type ED-112A Reference
Single-function FDR in a non-deployable
Section 2 and Part II.
recorder
Section 2 (except for tests covered by
FDR function in a deployable recorder ETSO-2C517), Section 3 and Part II.
The recorder shall also comply with
ETSO-2C517.
FDR function in a combined non-deployable
Section 2, Section 4, and Part II.
recorder
FDR function in a combined deployable Section 2 (except for tests covered by
recorder ETSO-2C517), Section 4 and Part I.
The recorder shall also comply with
ETSO-2C517.
Note: aAn FDR article may cover multiple types. An FDR may be a combined FDR and may also be
deployable, in which case the applicable MOPS are Sections 2, 3, 4 and Part I, following the table above.
3.1.2 — Environmental Standard
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1.
3.1.3 — Software
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.2.
3.1.4 — Airborne Electronic Hardware
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.3.
3.2 — Specific
3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4.
A Ffailure of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO is a minor failure condition.
A Lloss of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO is a minor failure condition.
The applicant must develop the system to at least the development assurance level that is
commensurate with this failure condition.
Note: The failure classification requirement is driven by the use of FDRs in accident investigations.
4— Marking
4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.
4.2 — Specific
4.2.1 — Lettering Identification
The equipment shall comply with the identification requirement in EUROCAE ED-112A, Section 2-1,
paragraph 2-1.16.3, if it is fixed, and Section 3-1, paragraph 3-1.8.3, if it is deployable.
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5— Availability of Referenced Documents
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 3.
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APPENDIX 1
The standard EUROCAE ED-112a, MOPS for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems, dated September 2013,
shall be modified as per Table 1 below.
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1 — Applicability
This ETSO provides the requirements which 406 and 121.5 MHz Emergency Locator Transmitters
that are designed and manufactured on or after the applicability date of this ETSO must meet in
order to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.
2 — Procedures
2.1 — General
The Aapplicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None.
3 — Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
The applicable Sstandards are those set forth provided in the EUROCAE ED-62BA, Minimum
Operational Performance Specification MOPS for Aircraft Emergency Locator Transmitters
406 MHz and 121.5 MHz ( Optional 243 MHz), dated February 2009December 2018. ELT(DT)s
shall also meet the additional minimum performance specification for internal/integral GNSS
receivers described in Appendix 1 of this ETSO.
Additionally, the use of hook and loop fasteners is not an acceptable means of attachment in
complying with the Crash Safety requirements of section 4.5.7.3 of EUROCAE ED-62A for
automatic fixed (AF) and automatic portable (AP) ELTs.
The shock and crash safety tests in EUROCAE ED-62A, section 4.5.7.3, require testing coincident
with each orthogonal axes individually. Additionally, to better simulate more realistic aircraft
crash scenarios, it is recommend that shock and crash safety testing be accomplished with
simultaneous longitudinal and vertical cross-axis forces.
3.1.2 — Environmental Standard
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1 and EUROCAE ED-62B.
3.1.3 — Computer Software
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.2.
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3.2 — Specific
The battery used in the Emergency Locator Transmitter authorised under this ETSO must be
appropriate for the intended operational environment, not pose a hazard to the aircraft, and
meet the requirements of acceptable battery standards.
If non-rechargeable lithium cells and batteries are used to power the Emergency Locator
Transmitter, ETSO-C142a ‘Non-Rechargeable Lithium Cells And Batteries — Lithium Batteries’
provides MPS for such lithium batteries.
If rechargeable lithium cells and batteries are used to power the Emergency Locator Transmitter,
ETSO-C179a ‘Permanently Installed Rechargeable Lithium Cells, Batteries, and Battery Systems’
provides MPS for such batteries.
If nickel-cadmium, nickel metal-hydride or lead acid batteries are used to power the Emergency
Locator Transmitter, ETSO-C173a ‘Nickel-Cadmium, Nickel Metal-Hydride, and Lead-Acid
Batteries’ provides MPS for such batteries.
If batteries with a different chemistry are used to power the Emergency Locator Transmitter, the
applicant must propose to EASA an appropriate MPS to be used for such batteries.
None.
A failure of the function defined in paragraph 3.1 that results resulting in signal outputs that do
not meeting the requirements of paragraph 3 is a minor failure condition. A Lloss of the function
defined in paragraph 3.1 is a minor failure condition.
A transmission of an erroneous encoded location for an ELT(DT) is a minor failure condition.
An unintended deployment of an ELT(AD) is a major failure condition.
3.2.2 — Documentation
The DDP shall list the type, class, categories and capabilities of the ELT, as well as the applicable
version of the COSPAS-SARSAT beacon standards.
A copy of the COSPAS-SARSAT approval shall be provided to EASA.
4 — Marking
4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.
4.2 — Specific
None.
As per EUROCAE ED-62 Sections 3.10, 3.3.3, 2.9.3.2 and 3.8.2.
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APPENDIX 1
ADDITIONAL MINIMUM PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATION FOR INTERNAL/INTEGRAL GNSS RECEIVERS
In addition to the EUROCAE ED-62B requirements, the internal or integral GNSS receiver shall permit the ELT(DT)
system to transmit a correct encoded location in the following flight parameter ranges:
— pitch: ± 60°,
— roll: ± 60°,
— pitch rate: ± 20°/s,
— roll rate: ± 30°/s,
— yaw rate: ± 20°/s,
— altitude: 0 to 14 000 m,
— longitude: ± 180°,
— latitude: ± 90°,
— speed: 0 to 260 m/s,
— vertical speed: 80 m/s.
The internal or integral GNSS receiver of an ELT(DT) shall be tested in a GNSS simulator using the protocol of
COSPAS-SARSAT documents C/S T.007, Annex K, or C/S T.021, Annex D, Section 3, as appropriate. The GNSS
receiver should be tested along the trajectory attached to this ETSO, which could be summarised as follows:
— 5 minutes of stationary (static position) with the beacon in ‘ARMED’ mode and then approximately
15 seconds before the end of this time, turn the ELT(DT) to the ‘ON’ mode;
— accelerate due North at a rate of 5.55 m/s2 for 60 seconds in a straight line, while climbing to 5 000 m;
— maintain a horizontal speed of 333 m/s for 60 seconds while climbing to 10 000 m;
— level out (pitch, roll and heading set to 0) and at a constant horizontal speed of 333 m/s apply the following
for 30 seconds:
roll: bank right by + 30°/s until + 30° is reached, then bank left by – 30°/s until – 30° is reached;
continue this sequence until the end of the 30-second sequence;
heading, pitch, altitude and speed remain unchanged;
— still maintaining the same altitude, and at a constant horizontal speed of 333 m/s, simultaneously apply
the following for 2 seconds:
pitch: pitch down by – 10°/s until – 20° is reached;
roll: bank left by – 30°/s until – 60° is reached;
heading, altitude and speed remain unchanged;
— from this point until the impact at sea level, maintain a constant speed of 333 m/s while implementing a
trajectory with the following characteristics until the impact:
maintain pitch: – 20°;
and decrease the altitude using a vertical speed of – 80 m/s;
and simultaneously repeat the following sequence:
o for 17.5 seconds:
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maintain roll at – 60°,
and decrease the heading at a yaw rate of – 10°/s;
o for 4 seconds:
increase roll at 30°/s until + 60° is reached,
increase yaw rate at + 5°/s² until + 10°/s is reached;
o for 17.5 seconds:
maintain roll at + 60°,
and increase the heading at a yaw rate of + 10°/s;
o for 4 seconds:
decrease roll at – 30°/s until – 60° is reached,
decrease yaw rate at – 5°/s² until – 10°/s is reached,
— once impact with the ground occurs, maintain a stationary position for 60 seconds.
Pass criteria:
— the last encoded position which is transmitted before the impact is within 6 NM of the impact location;
— for a crash-survivable ELT(DT): an encoded position within 200 m of the impact position is transmitted not
later than 15 seconds after the impact.
Attached file:
The trajectory that is attached to this ETSO is provided in earth-centred, earth-fixed (ECEF) coordinates.
ECEF_Trajectory_ETS
O_C126c.csv
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1 — Applicability
This ETSO gives provides the requirements which non-rechargeable lithium cells and batteries that are
intended to provide power for aircraft equipment, including emergency systems, that are designed and
manufactured on or after the effective date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the
applicable ETSO marking.
This ETSO is not applicable to coin or button cells that contain containing less than 2 Wattwatt-hours (Wh)
of capacity, and that is are compliant to with the requirements of UL 1642 and the UN transport regulations.
Note: Lithium sulphur dioxide (LiSO2) batteries approved under ETSO-C97 ‘Lithium Sulphur Dioxide
Batteries’ dated 24/10/2003 may still be manufactured under the provisions of their original approval, but
new applications for non-rechargeable lithium sulphur dioxide batteries must meet the MPS of this new
ETSO. If there are major design changes to lithium cells and batteries approved under current version of
ETSO-C97, they must comply with this ETSO-C142a.
2 — Procedures
2.1 — General
The Aapplicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None.
3 — Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
RTCA DO-227A ‘Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for Non-Rechargeable Lithium
Batteries’ from June 199521 September 2017, as amended per unless otherwise specified by Appendix 1 of
this ETSO.
3.1.3 — Software
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.2.
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Note: For ETSO-C142b-7 approvals, the ETSO marking must be on the End Item. The cell or battery within the
End Item must be part marked and identified as a component within the End Item. The cell or battery must have
a notation in the manufacturer’s documentation that the cell or battery is not to be used in another End Item
unless it is tested separately in the new End Item. The End Item is required in order to meet the requirement of
this ETSO, and the configuration control documentation must state that the cell or battery is approved based
solely on the fact that it is tested and validated within the approved End Item. Only cells or batteries that are
approved under the ETSO-C142b End Item article may be used. Do not use any cells or batteries that are not
approved by the manufacturer of the article. If a different cell or battery is to be used with this End Item, the
manufacturer must submit a new ETSO application (for the End Item) to EASA.
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APPENDIX 1.
PURPOSE.
This appendix Appendix prescribes the MPS for lithium batteries, as modified by this ETSO.
REQUIREMENTS.
The standards applicable to this ETSO are provided in the industry standard, RTCA/DO-227 ‘Minimum
Operational Performance Standard for Lithium Batteries’ dated June 23, 1995.
The standard is modified as follows:
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Figure 2-3. Standard Random Vibration Test Curves for Equipment Installed in Fixed Wing Aircraft with
Turbojet Engines
Figure 2-4. Robust Random Vibration Test Curves for Equipment Installed in Fixed Wing Aircraft with
Turbojet Engines
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Fire Test equipment unit with Unit must contain the fragments/debris from
battery in place for fire explosion but not gases/vapors/smoke. Fire within
penetration by igniting a single the unit must self-extinguish. Note that the presence
unit. of a fire extinguishing or suppression system outside
SoC of a cell : 100% the battery (such as in the equipment compartment)
may be used to provide this feature if the system is
designed to handle this fire threat.
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European Technical Standard Order (ETSO)
Subject: AIRBORNE NAVIGATION SENSORS USING THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM AUGMENTED BY
THE SATELLITE-BASED AUGMENTATION SYSTEM
1— Applicability
This ETSO provides the requirements which airborne navigation sensors using the Global
Positioning System (GPS) augmented by the Satellite-Based Augmentation System (SBAS) that
are designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in or der to be
identified with the applicable ETSO marking.
The standards of this ETSO apply to equipment intended to provide position information to a
navigation management unit that outputs deviation commands referenced to a desired flight
path. Pilots or autopilots will use these deviations to guide the aircraft.
Note: Revision A1 provides applicants with an option to use an ETSO-2C204a SBAS circuit card
assembly (CCA) functional sensor as part of their ETSO application. There is no change to the
technical MOPS in comparison with ETSO-C145e.
2— Procedures
2.1 — General
The Aapplicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None
This section applies only for ETSO articles that use an ETSO-2C204a Beta CCA.
Applicants who use an ETSO-2C204a Beta CCA will need to coordinate with their Beta CCA
supplier at least for the following aspects:
2.2.1 — Access to the Information of the Selected ETSO-2C204a CCA
The applicant is responsible for establishing the necessary communication channels with the
ETSO-2C204a holder company. Applicants who use an ETSO-2C204a SBAS CCA will need to
coordinate with their SBAS CCA supplier to obtain the documentation that supports
ETSO-2C204a.
The applicant’s organisation shall establish a means of communication to obtain timely
notifications of design changes, open problem reports (at least the ones that impact the usage
of the circuit card assembly), occurrence reports and airworthiness directives that affect or are
related to the ETSO-2C204a article.
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The applicant shall perform an impact analysis of the design changes to the ETSO-2C204a article,
and shall perform the necessary development life-cycle activities that are impacted by the
ETSO-2C204a changes.
Note: When a major change (as assessed per point 21.A.611) is applied to the ETSO-2C204a
article, which is installed in the ETSO-C145e article, it is systematically also considered to be a
major change for the ETSO-C145e function.
The applicant shall perform the assessment of the ETSO-2C204a CCA OPRs. The applicant shall
report the resulting open problem reports that affect the ETSO-C145e article.
3— Technical cConditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum pPerformance sStandard
The applicable Sstandards are those set forth provided for functional equipment Class Beta in
RTCA document DO-229E, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Global Positioning
System/Satellite-Based Augmentation System Airborne Equipment, dated
15 December 15, 2016, Section 2, as modified by Appendix 2 and 4 of this ETSO.
Class Beta equipment is defined in DO-229E, Section 1.4.
The test procedures are defined in DO-229E, Section 2.5.
The standards in this ETSO apply to equipment intended to provide position, velocity, and time
information for a navigation management unit application that outputs deviation commands
keyed to a desired flight path, or a non-navigation application such as an automatic dependent
surveillance-broadcast automatic dependent surveillance — broadcast (ADS-B) or terrain
awareness and warning system (TAWS). In navigation applications, pilots or autopilots will use
the deviations output by the navigation management unit to guide the aircraft. In non-
navigation applications, the position, velocity, and time outputs will provide the necessary
inputs for the end-use equipment. These ETSO standards do not address integration issues with
other avionics.
environmental qualification testing. The testing shall include the detailed functional test
procedures delivered by the ETSO-2C204a CCA provider. This testing is required to address the
paragraphs of this ETSO that are not covered by the points listed above.
Note: The manufacturer of end-use equipment that uses an ETSO-2C204a SBAS CCA functional
sensor assumes full responsibility for its design and function under their ETSO-C145e
authorisation.
Note: These failure condition classifications are considered to be the minimum classifications.
Guidance for the installation of navigation systems at the aircraft level (e.g. Certification
Specifications and Acceptable Means of Compliance for Airborne Communications, Navigation
and Surveillance (CS-ACNS)) could require a different failure condition classification.
3.2.2 — Additional Specific
If the equipment can satisfy the requirements of RTCA/ DO-229E only when used with a
particular antenna, the use of that antenna (by part number) shall be a requirement on the
installation.
This requirement shall be included in the installation manual (IM) as a limitation.
The applicant shall have all the data necessary to evaluate the geostationary (GEO) satellite bias
as defined in RTCA/ DO-229E, Section 2.1.4.1.5, available for review by EASA.
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If the equipment uses barometric-aiding to enhance the FDE availability of FDE, then the
equipment shall meet the requirements in RTCA/ DO-229E, Appendix G.
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APPENDIX 1
Reserved.
END-USE EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER TESTS FOR SBAS CCA FUNCTIONAL POSITION, VELOCITY, TIME
(PVT) SENSORS USED FOR NAVIGATION AND NON-NAVIGATION APPLICATIONS
1 — Scope.
This Appendix describes the required supplementary equipment level testing, in addition to the
environmental testing of RTCA DO-229E, Section 2.4, that is required to be conducted by the
manufacturer of the end-use equipment to receive an ETSO-C145e Class Beta authorisation when using
an ETSO-2C204a SBAS CCA functional sensor.
To perform functional tests and measure the performance in the environment, the applicant will use the
detailed functional test procedures delivered with the ETSO-2C204a CCA. These test procedures are
intended to streamline and simplify the ETSO-C145e authorisation process for the manufacturer of the
end-use equipment by allowing credit for the design and selected testing performed at the SBAS CCA
functional sensor level. However, the manufacturer of the end-use equipment remains fully responsible
for the design and control of the article per their ETSO-C145e ETSOA.
2 — General principles.
(a) Testing methods for GPS/SBAS equipment have been standardised by RTCA DO-229E, and serve as
the basis for ETSO-C145e. RTCA DO-229E was written to cover equipment that can be installed on
aircraft. Section 2.4 specifically addresses the issues of the environment in which the equipment
operates and provides the approved test methods to validate the performance of the equipment in
this environment. Section 2.4 represents the RTCA consensus in identifying which RTCA DO-229E
requirements are sensitive to environmental effects. These requirements are listed in the
environmental tables referenced in Section 2.4.1.
(b) The determination that an MOPS requirement is susceptible to the environment does not depend
on whether or not the implementation is a CCA installed within an ETSO-C145e article. This is the
same concept as an equipment enclosure that is designed to protect against a benign environment
compared with one that is designed for a severe environment; the identification of the susceptible
requirements is the same.
(c) Therefore, this Appendix uses the tables of RTCA DO-229E Section 2.4.1 to identify the MOPS
requirements that are susceptible to environmental affects for an SBAS CCA functional sensor in the
end-use equipment. The focus is on the change in environment seen by the SBAS CCA functional
sensor as a result of its installation in the end-use equipment. For example, other components inside
the end-use equipment may radiate RF energy that could interfere with the GPS functions; therefore,
the ambient testing performed at the CCA level is not equivalent to tests performed in the end-use
equipment. This is the basis for defining the RTCA DO-229E Section 2.5 performance tests that need
to be repeated by the manufacturer of the end-use equipment.
(d) The Class Beta environmental table referenced in RTCA DO-229E Section 2.4.1 is the prime source to
determine the MOPS performance requirements that are susceptible to environmental conditions.
Based on the table, the susceptible requirements can be grouped into two categories: those that are
susceptible to most types of environmental conditions (described in Section 3) and those that are
susceptible to only a few (described in Section 4).
Note: The tables for Class Beta-1, -2, and -3 equipment identify similar requirements that are
susceptible to the installed environment. The only difference is the applicable MOPS requirements
that are consistent with the operational class (i.e. Class -1, - 2, or -3).
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repeated for both the minimum and the maximum satellite power only for the worst-case
environment.
3.2 — RTCA DO-229E – 2.5.2 Message Loss Rate Test.
(a) Section 2.5.2 specifies the message loss rate test for the Section 2.1.1.3.2 message loss rate
requirement. This test is conducted in conjunction with the Section 2.5.8 accuracy testing.
Section 2.5.2.2 defines the test procedure to collect data to verify the SBAS message loss rate in the
presence of interference using the test cases in which the SBAS satellite is at minimum power.
Section 2.5.2.3 defines the pass-fail criteria.
(b) The test in Section 2.5.2.2 is performed during the measurement accuracy broadband interference
test case described in paragraph 3.1.
(c) The test procedure in Section 2.5.2.4.1 is run in conjunction with the Section 2.5.8.3 24-hour accuracy
test. Section 2.5.2.4.2 defines the pass-fail criteria for the test case described in paragraph 3.1(b)(3).
4 — Performance requirements that are partially susceptible to environmental conditions.
(a) The Class Beta tables (Tables 2-14, 2-16, and 2-18) in Section 2.4.1 of RTCA DO-229E indicate that the
requirements for the initial acquisition time (2.1.1.7) and the satellite reacquisition time (2.1.1.9) are
sensitive to four environmental conditions: icing; lightning-induced transient susceptibility; lightning
direct effects; and normal/abnormal operating conditions. The requirements for loss of navigation
(2.1.1.13.2, 2.1.4.12.2, and 2.1.5.12.2) and loss of integrity (2.1.1.13.1, 2.1.4.12.1, and 2.1.5.12.1) are
sensitive to low and high operating temperatures.
(b) The lightning-induced transient susceptibility, lightning direct effects, or icing environmental
conditions are not pertinent to the environment that is created by the end-use equipment relative
to the SBAS CCA functional sensor. However, the manufacturer of the end-use equipment remains
responsible for meeting the overall environmental qualification requirements at the end-use
equipment level.
(c) The loss of navigation and loss of integrity indications are limited to temperature testing, and the
information in RTCA DO-229E, Sections 2.4.1.1.2 and 2.4.1.1.3, is appropriate. The purpose is to
ensure that the interface used to indicate the loss of navigation is functional under the environmental
conditions that are present after the SBAS CCA functional sensor is installed in the end-use
equipment. Sections 2.4.1.1.2 and 2.4.1.1.3 indicate that any source that generates the indication
can be used, since it is the interface and not the detection mechanism that is verified. The
temperature testing performed at the end-use equipment level is the worst-case scenario. It is not
necessary to repeat the CCA-level test at room temperature in the end-use equipment, since the
environmental qualification adequately addresses the testing for these requirements.
(d) EUROCAE ED-14 Section 16 relates to aircraft power supplies (refer to ETSO Section 3.1.2 for the
environmental qualification requirements). Sections 16.5.1.2 and 16.6.1.2 are for supply voltage
modulation (AC)/ripple (DC). Given the potential susceptibility of the SBAS CCA functional sensor to
power supply noise, it is prudent to repeat the tests at the end-use equipment level on this basis.
(e) Sections 4.1 and 4.2 identify the testing that manufacturers of end-use equipment are required to
repeat to demonstrate that the SBAS CCA functional sensor continues to meet the acquisition time
and reacquisition time performance requirements relative to the normal/abnormal operating
conditions after installation in the end-use equipment. All the tests shall be run under conditions in
which the functions of the end-use equipment are fully enabled, to create the worst-case
environment.
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navigation indication and loss of integrity indication tests as part of the environmental qualification
according to RTCA DO-229E Sections 2.4.1.1.2 and 2.4.1.1.3 respectively.
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APPENDIX 2
ADDITION TO RTCA/ DO-229E SECTION 1.
This Appendix describes the required modifications and additions to RTCA DO-229E for compliance with this
TSO. This Appendix adds a new Section 1.8.3 on cybersecurity and GPS spoofing mitigation to RTCA/ DO-229E
and corrects a long-standing mistake in the Section 2.4 environmental requirement tables.
The new section provides information for cybersecurity and spoofing mitigation to make RTCA/ DO-229E
consistent with the new RTCA MOPS template and RTCA/ DO-253D, Minimum Operational Performance
Standards for GPS Local Area Augmentation System Airborne Equipment.
This section contains information to address intentional interference with the GPS. Spoofing is caused by RF
waveforms that mimic true signals in some ways, but deny, degrade, disrupt, or deceive a receiver’s
operation when they are processed. Spoofing may be unintentional, such as effects from the signals of a GPS
repeater, or may be intentional and even malicious. There are two classes of spoofing:
— Measurement spoofing introduces RF waveforms that cause the target receiver to produce incorrect
measurements of time of arrival or frequency of arrival or their rates of change;
— Data spoofing introduces incorrect digital data to the target receiver for its use in processing of
signals and the calculation of positioning, navigation and timing (PNT).
Either class of spoofing can cause a range of effects, from incorrect outputs of PNT to receiver malfunctions.
The onset of effects can be instantaneous or delayed, and the effects can continue even after the spoofing
has ended. Improperly used or installed GNSS re-radiators act like spoofers. Re-radiators, replay and GNSS
emulator devices can present misleading information to GNSS equipment and/or could cause lasting effects.
Aircraft equipment information vulnerabilities (such as cybersecurity risks) have been present for digital
systems since the development of the personal computer (PC) in the late 1970s and even longer for RF
systems, and the advent of internet connectivity has substantially increased those risks. Typically, access to
navigation receivers has been controlled such that they are considered to be vulnerable only through RF
signals and OEM and/or aircraft operator controlled processes for maintenance and updates. In some cases,
aircraft GNSS receivers may be field-loadable by approved personnel, requiring physical access and physical
interface to the ground receivers. However, it is expected that not all aircraft in the future will rely on such
physical isolation for the security of avionics. Internet and Wi-Fi connectivity have become popular as a
means for aircraft or equipment manufacturers to update installed avionics software, to update databases,
12 https://ics-cert.us-
cert.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Improving_the_Operation_and_Development_of_Global_Positioning_
System_(GPS)_Equipment_Used_by_Critical_Infrastructure_S508C.pdf
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or provide an alternate means of communicating with the flight crew or cabin (e.g., in-flight entertainment,
weather, etc.).
In most countries, the State provides oversight of safety-of-flight systems (sometimes referred to as
‘authorised services’) which provide information to aircraft, such as ILS, VOR, GNSS, and DME, to name a few.
However, the State typically does not provide oversight on ‘non-trusted’ connectivity such as the internet,
Wi-Fi, or manufacturer-supplied equipment interfaces which permit the input of externally -supplied
externally supplied data into aircraft systems. A manufacturer may expose aircraft information vulnerabilities
vulnerability through equipment design through the design of the equipment, or the equipment may become
vulnerable as a result of being connected to a common interface. Therefore, it is important that for
manufacturers to consider aircraft information security risk mitigation strategies in their equipment design,
particularly when the equipment is responsible for an interface between the aircraft and aircraft-external
systems.
Apart from any specific aircraft-information-security-related performance requirements that are contained
in the MOPS, it is recommended that manufacturers look at consider a layered approach to aircraft
information security risk mitigation that includes both technical (e.g., software, signal filtering) and physical
strategies. From a technical perspective, for example, this could include signal spoofing detection capabilities
or more stringent, multi-factored authentication techniques such as passwords, PINs, and digital certificates.
From a physical perspective, a manufacturer could consider connectors that require special tools to remove
them to prevent passenger tampering, although navigation avionics are typically located in an avionics bay
inaccessible to passengers. And finally, but just as important, manufacturers should consider supply chain
risk management; for example, if a manufacturer is outsources outsourcing the development of software
code development, are the contractor and its staff properly vetted?
Civil Aaviation Aauthorities (CAAs) have a regulatory interest when an applicant’s design makes use of a
non-trusted connection through which connectivity where the installation can potentially introduce aircraft
information security vulnerabilities. This requires the applicant to address not only the information security
vulnerabilities and mitigation techniques for the new installation, but to also consider how vulnerabilities
could propagate to existing downstream systems. Therefore, it is recommended that manufacturers
reference their equipment aircraft information security review and mitigation strategies in the equipment’s
installation manual of the equipment so that the applicant can consider them in meeting the installation
regulatory requirements of the installation.
The tables incorrectly reference and label RTCA DO-160 Sections 16.5.1.2 and 16.6.1.2 regarding ‘2.1.1.7
Acquisition Time’ and ‘2.1.1.9 Reacquisition Time’. Change the table references as follows:
The MOPS initial acquisition time requirement (2.1.1.7) applies to both AC and DC equipment under
abnormal operating conditions (DO-160E Section 16.5.2 and 16.6.2) and the satellite reacquisition time
requirement (2.1.1.9) applies to both AC and DC equipment under normal operating conditions
(DO-160E Sections 16.5.1 and 16.6.1).
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APPENDIX 3
Reserved.
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APPENDIX 4
This Appendix prescribes EASA modifications to RTCA document DO-229E, Section 2.
‘The demodulation of data from the GPS signals shall be restricted to the necessary subset of the
data defined in Appendix II of IS-GPS-200D, ‘Navstar GPS Space Segment / Navigation User
Interfaces’, December 2004, provided on RF link L1. The pseudo-ranging shall be performed on RF
link L1 utilisingutilizing the coarse/acquisition (C/A) code.’
This is to ensure that only the L1 NAV data, for which the SBAS provides corrections and integrity, is used,
and that no CNAV data, which is defined in Appendix III of IS-GPS-200D, is used, for which the SBAS does not
provide integrity.
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European
Union
Aviation
Safety
Agency
European Technical Standard Order (ETSO)
Subject: STAND-ALONE AIRBORNE NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT USING THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM
AUGMENTED BY THE SATELLITE-BASED AUGMENTATION SYSTEM
1— Applicability
This ETSO provides the requirements which stand-alone airborne navigation equipment using
the Global Positioning System (GPS) augmented by the Satellite-Based Augmentation System
(SBAS) that isare designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in
order to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.
Note: Revision A1 provides applicants with an option to use an ETSO-2C205a Class Delta circuit
card assembly (CCA) functional sensor as part of their ETSO application. There is no technical
MOPS change in comparison with ETSO-C146e.
2— Procedures
2.1 — General
The Aapplicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None
This section only applies to ETSO articles that use an ETSO-2C205a CCA.
Applicants that use an ETSO-2C205a CCA will need to coordinate with their CCA supplier for at
least the following aspects:
2.2.1 — Access to the Information on the Selected ETSO-2C205a CCA
The applicant is responsible for establishing the necessary communication channels with the
ETSO-2C205a holder company. Applicants who use an ETSO-2C205a SBAS CCA will need to
coordinate with their SBAS CCA supplier to obtain the documentation that supports
ETSO-2C205a.
The applicant’s organisation shall establish a means of communication to obtain timely
notifications of design changes, open problem reports (at least the ones that impact the usage
of the CCA), occurrence reports and airworthiness directives that affect or relate to the
ETSO-2C205a article.
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The applicant shall perform an impact analysis of the design changes to the ETSO-2C205a article,
and shall perform the necessary development life-cycle activities that are impacted by the
ETSO-2C205a changes.
Note: When a major change (as assessed per point 21.A.611) is applied to the ETSO-2C205a
article, which is installed into the ETSO-C146e article, it is systematically also considered to be
a major change for the ETSO-C146e function.
The applicant shall perform the assessment of the ETSO-2C205a CCA OPRs. The applicant shall
report the resulting OPRs that affect the ETSO-C146e article.
3— Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
The applicable Sstandards are those set forthprovided for functional equipment Class Gamma
or Delta in RTCA document DO-229E, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Global
Positioning System/Satellite-Based Augmentation System Airborne Equipment, dated
15 December 15, 2016, Section 2, except as modified by Appendix 2 and 4 of this ETSO.
Classes Gamma and Delta of equipment are defined in DO-229E, Section 1.4.
The test procedures are defined in DO-229E, Section 2.5.
The standards in this ETSO apply to equipment intended to accept a desired flight path and
provide deviation commands keyed to that path. Pilots and autopilots will use these deviations
to guide the aircraft. Except for automatic dependent surveillance with Class Gamma, these
ETSO standards do not address integration issues with other avionics.
Use of an ETSO-2C205a Class Delta CCA functional sensor
Applicants for Class Delta-4 ETSO-146e have the option to use an ETSO-2C205a Delta-4 CCA
functional sensor. Applicants who choose to use an ETSO-2C205a Delta-4 CCA can take credit
for certification compliance by virtue of the ETSO-2C205a ETSOA for:
— meeting the Class Delta-4 MPS requirements in Sections 2.1.1, 2.1.5, and 2.3;
— the development assurance of the hardware/software;
— the classification of failure conditions;
— the MPS Section 2.5 performance testing (functional qualification), except that specified in
Appendix 1 of this document; and
— the partial environmental testing performed on the ETSO-2C205a CCA.
After the integration of the ETSO-2C205a CCA into the ETSO-146e article, the applicant shall
perform the testing described in Appendix 1. The applicant shall also complete the
environmental qualification testing. The testing shall include the detailed functional test
procedures delivered by the ETSO-2C205a CCA provider. This testing is required to address the
paragraphs of this ETSO that are not covered by the items listed above.
Note: An end-use manufacturer that uses an ETSO-2C205a SBAS CCA functional sensor assumes
full responsibility for the design and its function under their ETSO-C146e authorisation.
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4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.
4.2 — Specific
At least one major component shall be permanently and legibly marked with the operational
equipment class as defined in Section 1.4.2 of RTCA document DO-229E (e.g., Class 2). A marking
of Class 4 indicates compliance with the Delta-4 requirements. The functional equipment class
defined in Section 1.4.1 of RTCA document DO-229E (e.g. Gamma, Delta) is not required to be
marked.
It is sufficient to declare the proper functional equipment class in the declaration of design and
performance (DDP)).
5— Availability of Referenced Documents
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 3.
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APPENDIX 1
Reserved
END-USE EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER TESTS AFTER INTEGRATION OF DELTA CCA FUNCTIONAL
SENSORS USED FOR NAVIGATION APPLICATIONS
1 — Scope.
This Appendix describes the required supplementary equipment level testing, in addition to the
environmental testing of RTCA DO-229E, Section 2.4, that the manufacturer of end-use equipment is
required to conduct to receive an ETSO-C146e Class Delta-4 authorisation when using an ETSO-2C205a
Delta CCA functional sensor.
To perform functional tests and to measure the performance in the environment, the applicant will use
the detailed functional test procedures delivered with the ETSO-2C205a CCA. These test procedures are
intended to streamline and simplify the ETSO-C146e authorisation process for the manufacturer of the
end-use equipment by allowing credit for the design and for selected testing performed at the Delta CCA
functional sensor level. However, the manufacturer of the end-use equipment remains fully responsible
for the design and control of the article per their ETSO-C146e ETSOA.
2 — General principles.
(a) Testing methods for GPS/SBAS equipment have been standardised by RTCA DO-229E, and serve as
the basis for ETSO-C146e. RTCA DO-229E was written to cover equipment that can be installed on
aircraft. Section 2.4 specifically addresses the issues of the environment in which the equipment
operates, and provides the approved test methods to validate its performance in this environment.
Section 2.4 represents the RTCA consensus in identifying which RTCA DO-229E requirements are
sensitive to environmental effects. These requirements are listed in the environmental tables
referenced in Section 2.4.1.
(b) The determination that an MOPS requirement is susceptible to the environment does not depend
on whether or not the implementation is a CCA installed within ETSO-C146 article. This is the same
concept as an equipment enclosure that is designed to protect against a benign environment
compared with one designed for a severe environment; the identification of the susceptible
requirements is the same.
(c) Therefore, this Appendix uses the tables of RTCA DO-229E, Section 2.4.1, to identify the MOPS
requirements that are susceptible to environmental conditions for a Delta CCA functional sensor in
the end-use equipment. The focus is on the change in environment seen by the Delta CCA functional
sensor as a result of its installation in the end-use equipment. For example, other components inside
the end-use equipment may radiate RF energy that could interfere with the GPS functions; therefore,
the ambient testing performed at the CCA level is not equivalent to tests performed in the end-use
equipment. This is the basis for defining the RTCA DO-229E Section 2.5 performance tests that need
to be repeated by the manufacturer of the end-use equipment.
(d) The Class Delta-4 environmental table referenced in RTCA DO-229E, Section 2.4.1, is the prime source
to determine the MOPS performance requirements that are susceptible to environmental conditions.
Based on that table, Class Delta-4 has the same susceptible requirements as Class Beta, but adds two
additional requirements for navigation displays and databases that are optional capabilities for
Class Delta-4. Those Delta-4 requirements that are similar to those for Class Beta can be grouped in
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two categories: those that are susceptible to most types of environmental conditions (described in
Section 3) and those that are susceptible to only a few (described in Section 4).
(e) The options for databases and navigation displays in Delta-4 equipment do not present any repeat
MOPS testing requirements for a manufacturer who incorporates an ETSO-2C205a Delta CCA
functional sensor in its ETSO-C146e article. The environmental qualification performed by the end-
use equipment manufacturer according to ETSO-C146e is sufficient. The rationale is stated below.
(1) The database requirement testing in the environment is meant to ensure that the database
storage hardware, which may be separate, is fully functional during the environmental
testing. As the pass criterion for such testing is that the retrieved data is correct, the test
procedures in the environment are as sensitive to hardware issues as any ambient
environment test. Therefore, nothing justifies repeating the tests under ambient conditions
in the end-use equipment.
(2) Manufacturers of end-use equipment that includes a database must perform the
environmental qualification specified by ETSO-C146e and MOPS Section 2.4 irrespective of
whether the database is hosted in the Delta CCA functional sensor or elsewhere in the
equipment.
(3) It is impossible for the Delta CCA functional sensor to incorporate a display or to be a
display.
3 — Performance requirements that are susceptible to most environmental conditions.
The RTCA DO-229E requirements for accuracy (Section 2.1.5.1), and sensitivity and dynamic range
(Section 2.1.1.10) are sensitive to most environmental conditions. However, these requirements are
linked to the message loss rate requirement in Section 2.1.1.3.2. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 below identify the
testing that manufacturers of end-use equipment are required to repeat to demonstrate that the Delta
CCA functional sensor continues to meet the accuracy, dynamic range and message loss rate performance
requirements after installation in the end-use equipment. All the tests shall be run under conditions in
which the functions of the end-use equipment are fully enabled to create the worst-case environment.
3.1 — RTCA DO-229E- 2.5.8 Accuracy Test.
(a) The accuracy test described in Section 2.5.8 is actually a joint test that covers accuracy, sensitivity
and dynamic range. This joint testing also applies in the environment as stated in Section 2.4.1.1.5,
with the environmental adaptations as described in Section 2.4.1.1.1.
(b) The demonstration of accuracy is performed in accordance with Section 2.5.8.1 only for the test case
with broadband external interference noise. This test must be repeated when the CCA is installed in
the end-use equipment, and it is sufficient to perform it using broadband interference.
(1) The environmental testing is limited to broadband interference, as it represents the
worst-case signal-to-noise condition, which is the most sensitive to environmental effects.
This applies equally to the environment for the CCA that is created by the end-use
equipment.
(2) Section 2.5.8 contains a measurement accuracy test in Section 2.5.8.1, with the detailed
test procedure in Section 2.5.8.2. The Section 2.5.8.1 test must be run under the worst-case
environment identified in the section on ‘Additional considerations for internal
interference sources’ below. The measurement accuracy testing can be combined with the
message loss rate testing in Section 2.5.2.1.
(3) Section 2.5.8.3 is a 24-hour actual satellite accuracy test. The Section 2.5.8.3 test exposes
the equipment to a variety of signal conditions and data-processing conditions over varying
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satellite geometries that will increase the confidence that no unforeseen interactions
between the components within the end-use equipment and the Delta CCA functional
sensor will go undetected. The 24-hour testing in Section 2.5.8.3 can be combined with the
24-hour message loss rate testing in Section 2.5.2.4 (see the section on additional
considerations for internal interference sources).
(4) Section 2.5.8.4 (SBAS Tracking Bias) is an analysis of the GPS hardware, and it is therefore
not necessary to repeat it at the end-use equipment level provided that no extra RF
components that affect the RF filtering response are inserted into the RF path. Otherwise,
the manufacturer of the end-use equipment must also repeat the SBAS Tracking Bias test.
(c) The test threshold is relaxed from 110 to 125 % as specified in Table 2-25 of the Section 2.5.8.2.1 test
procedure to shorten the duration of the test. However, the Section 2.5.8 testing (excluding the SBAS
Tracking Bias test in 2.5.8.4) for the CCA in the end-use equipment shall be under ambient conditions
per Section 2.5, with the 110-% test pass threshold for maximum test sensitivity.
(d) The Section 2.5.8 testing (excluding the SBAS Tracking Bias test in Section 2.5.8.4) should be repeated
against the accuracy requirement in Section 2.1.5.1.
(e) Only the test case for broadband external interference noise using minimum satellite power will be
executed in most cases to shorten the duration of the test. The Section 2.5.8.1 testing will be
repeated for both the minimum and the maximum satellite power only for the worst-case
environment.
3.2 — RTCA DO-229E - 2.5.2 Message Loss Rate Test.
(a) Section 2.5.2 specifies the message loss rate test for the 2.1.1.3.2 message loss rate requirement.
This test is conducted in conjunction with the Section 2.5.8 accuracy testing. Section 2.5.2.2 defines
the test procedure to collect data that verifies the SBAS message loss rate in the presence of
interference using the test cases in which the SBAS satellite is at minimum power. Section 2.5.2.3
defines the pass-fail criteria.
(b) The test in Section 2.5.2.2 will be performed during the measurement accuracy broadband
interference test case described in paragraph 3.1.
(c) The test procedure in Section 2.5.2.4.1 is run in conjunction with the 2.5.8.3 24-hour accuracy test.
Section 2.5.2.4.2 defines the pass-fail criteria for the test case described in paragraph 3.1(b)(3).
4 — Performance Requirements Partially Susceptible to Environmental Conditions.
(a) The Class Delta-4 Table 2-20 in Section 2.4.1 of RTCA DO-229E indicates that the requirements for
initial acquisition time (2.1.1.7) and satellite reacquisition time (2.1.1.9) are sensitive to four
environmental conditions: icing; lightning-induced transient susceptibility; lightning direct effects;
and normal/abnormal operating conditions. The requirements for loss of navigation
(Sections 2.1.1.13.2, 2.1.5.12.2, and 2.3.6.2) are sensitive to low and high operating temperatures.
Note: Class Delta-4 provides deviation guidance only during the final approach segment of an LP/LPV
approach, in which a loss of integrity is treated as a loss of navigation capability.
(b) The lightning-induced transient susceptibility, lightning direct effects or icing environmental
conditions are not pertinent to the environment created by the end-use equipment relative to the
Delta CCA functional sensor. However, the manufacturer of the end-use equipment remains
responsible for meeting the overall environmental qualification at the end-use equipment level.
(c) Loss of navigation indications are limited to temperature testing, and the information in RTCA
DO-229E, Sections 2.4.1.1.2 and 2.4.1.1.3, is appropriate. The purpose is to ensure that the interface
that is used to indicate the loss of navigation is functional under the environmental conditions that
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are present after the Delta CCA functional sensor is installed in the end-use equipment.
Sections 2.4.1.1.2 and 2.4.1.1.3 indicate that any source that generates the indication can be used,
since it is the interface, and not the detection mechanism, that is verified. The temperature testing
performed at the end-use equipment level is the worst-case scenario. It is not necessary to repeat
the CCA level test at room temperature in the end-use equipment since the environmental
qualification adequately addresses testing for these requirements.
Note: The Class Delta table requires more than just temperature testing under environment to
support the optional display component of Class Delta. Since a CCA cannot be a display or incorporate
a display, the additional testing in the environment does not apply.
(d) EUROCAE ED-14 Section 16 relates to aircraft power supplies (refer to ETSO paragraph 3.1.2 for the
environmental qualification requirements). Sections 16.5.1.2 and 16.6.1.2 are for supply voltage
modulation (AC)/ripple (DC). Given the potential susceptibility of the Delta CCA functional sensor to
power supply noise, it is prudent to repeat the tests at the end-use equipment level on this basis.
(e) Sections 4.1 and 4.2 identify the testing that manufacturers of end-use equipment are required to
repeat to demonstrate that the Delta CCA functional sensor continues to meet the acquisition time
and reacquisition time performance requirements relative to the normal/abnormal operating
conditions after installation in the end-use equipment.
All tests shall be run under conditions where the functions of the end-use equipment are fully
enabled to create the worst-case environment.
4.1 — RTCA DO-229E - 2.5.4 Initial acquisition test procedures.
The information in RTCA DO-229E, Section 2.4.1.1.4, on the initial acquisition test in Section 2.5.4 applies.
The manufacturer of the end-use equipment shall repeat the initial acquisition testing described in RTCA
DO-229E, Section 2.5.4.
4.2 — RTCA DO-229E - 2.5.6 Satellite reacquisition time test.
The manufacturer of the end-use equipment is required to repeat the satellite reacquisition time testing
in RTCA DO-229E, Section 2.5.6.
5 — Additional considerations for internal interference sources.
(a) Installing a Delta CCA functional sensor into end-use equipment that also includes other functions
requires a careful evaluation of the potential internally radiated and conducted interference. The
manufacturer of the end-use equipment must evaluate each operating mode to determine whether
the mode changes the environment for the installed Delta CCA functional sensor. If there is only one
environment or there is clearly one worst-case environment, then the accuracy and message loss
rate testing in Section 3 can be run in that operating mode only. For example, if the end-use
equipment includes an RF transmitter that radiates at one frequency, one could reasonably argue
that setting the transmitter at full power with maximum data throughput would generate a clear
worst-case environment in which to run all the testing.
(b) In the case of multiple environments, the accuracy and message loss rate tests can either be run
under each environment or the methodology in RTCA DO-229E, Section 2.4.1.2.3, can be used to run
an aggregate test with approximately equal time in each mode. The methodology in Section 2.4.1.2.3
must be used to identify the modes with the greatest susceptibility under which the combined
accuracy and message loss rate tests are repeated in addition to the aggregate test. For example, the
methodology of Section 2.4.1.2.3 is appropriate for end-use equipment that contains a high power
transmitter that operates on a large number of frequencies such that it is impractical to run a test at
each frequency. This is analogous to the large number of frequencies that need to be tested during
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the EUROCAE ED-14 RF and Induced Signal Susceptibility testing, and this is the reason why the
methodology of Section 2.4.1.2.3 was developed.
(c) It is sufficient to identify one worst-case environment when performing the acquisition and 24-hour
accuracy testing.
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6 — Summary.
(a) The manufacturer of the end-use equipment that incorporates a Delta CCA functional sensor is
required to repeat the following RTCA DO-229E Section 2.5 testing under ambient conditions (see
Section 5) after installing the Delta CCA functional sensor in the end-use equipment:
— The Section 2.5.8 Accuracy testing (excluding the SBAS Tracking Bias test in 2.5.8.4) adapted
per Section 2.4.1.1.1, except that the 110-% test pass threshold is used.
Note: Excluding the SBAS Tracking Bias test is acceptable, provided that the end-use
equipment does not insert into the RF signal path any components that affect the filtering
response. Otherwise, the manufacturer of the end-use equipment must also repeat the SBAS
Tracking Bias test.
— The Section 2.5.2 message loss rate test.
— The Section 2.5.4 initial acquisition test.
— The Section 2.5.6 satellite reacquisition time test.
(b) The manufacturer of the end-use equipment remains responsible for completing a full environmental
qualification evaluation (see ETSO Section 3.1.2) at the end-use equipment level. The manufacturer
of end-use equipment that incorporates a Delta CCA functional sensor is required to repeat the loss
of navigation indication and loss of integrity indication testing as part of the environmental
qualification according to RTCA DO-229E, Sections 2.4.1.1.2 and 2.4.1.1.3.
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APPENDIX 2
MPS FOR STAND-ALONE AIRBORNE NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT USING GPS AUGMENTED BY SBAS
This Appendix describes required modifications and additions to RTCA/ DO-229E for compliance with this
ETSO. This Appendix adds a new Section 1.8.3 on cybersecurity and GPS spoofing mitigation, and additional
required leg types in Section 2.2.1.3 of to RTCA/ DO-229E.
The new Section, 1.8.3, contains no new requirements, but provides information for cybersecurity and
spoofing mitigation to make RTCA/ DO-229E consistent with the new RTCA MOPS template and RTCA/
DO-253D, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for GPS Local Area Augmentation System Airborne
Equipment.
The new 2.2.1.3 leg type requirements are applicable to Class Gamma equipment only and are necessary to
properly execute published instrument procedures designed to provide maximum efficiency, flexibility, and
aircraft eligibility. These instrument procedure designs may include RNAV components and/or leg types
associated with conventional procedures. The modifications and additions to Section 2.2.1.3 are necessary
to ensure Class Gamma equipment can properly execute current and future instrument procedure designs.
This section contains information to address intentional interference with the GPS. Spoofing is caused by RF
waveforms that mimic true signals in some ways, but deny, degrade, disrupt, or deceive a receiver’s
operation when they are processed. Spoofing may be unintentional, such as effects from the signals of a GPS
repeater, or may be intentional and even malicious. There are two classes of spoofing. Measurement
spoofing introduces RF waveforms that cause the target receiver to produce incorrect measurements of time
of arrival or frequency of arrival or their rates of change. Data spoofing introduces incorrect digital data to
the target receiver for its use in processing of signals and the calculation of PNT. Either class of spoofing can
cause a range of effects, from incorrect outputs of PNT to receiver malfunctions. The onset of effects can be
instantaneous or delayed, and the effects can continue even after the spoofing has ended. Improperly used
or installed GNSS re-radiators act like spoofers. Re-radiators, replay and GNSS emulator devices can present
misleading information to GNSS equipment and/or could cause lasting effects.
Equipment manufacturers should implement measures to mitigate processing of erroneous data. Cross-
checks of GNSS sensor data against independent position sources and/or other detection monitors using
GNSS signal metrics or data checks can be implemented in the antenna, receiver, and/or through integration
with other systems at the aircraft level. Data validity checks to recognise and reject measurement and data
spoofing should be implemented in the receiver. Additional guidance and best practices related to GPS
equipment can be found in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security document ‘Improving the Operation
and Development of Global Positioning System (GPS) Equipment Used by Critical Infrastructure’13 and
GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEMS DIRECTORATE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING & INTEGRATION: INTERFACE
SPECIFICATION, IS-GPS-200, Navstar GPS Space Segment/Navigation User Interfaces, Revision H, IRN-IS-
200H-003 28 July 2016.
Aircraft equipment information vulnerabilities (such as cybersecurity risks) have been present for digital
systems since the development of the personal computer (PC) in the late 1970s and even longer for RF
systems, and the advent of internet connectivity has substantially increased those risks. Typically, access to
13 https://ics-cert.us-
cert.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Improving_the_Operation_and_Development_of_Global_Positioning_System_(GPS)_Equipment_Used_
by_Critical_Infrastructure_S508C.pdf
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navigation receivers has been controlled such that they are considered to be vulnerable only through RF
signals and OEM and/or aircraft operator controlled processes for maintenance and update. In some cases,
aircraft GNSS receivers may be field loadable by approved personnel, requiring physical access and physical
interface to the ground receivers. However, it is expected that not all aircraft in the future will rely on such
physical isolation for the security of avionics. Internet and Wi-Fi connectivity have become popular as a
means for aircraft or equipment manufacturers to update installed avionics software, to update databases,
or provide an alternate means of communicating with the flight crew or cabin (e.g., in-flight entertainment,
weather, etc.).
In most countries, the State provides oversight of safety-of-flight systems (sometimes referred to as
‘authorised services’) which provide information to aircraft, such as ILS, VOR, GNSS, and DME, to name a few.
However, the State typically does not provide oversight on ‘non-trusted’ connectivity such as the internet,
Wi-Fi, or manufacturer-supplied equipment interfaces which permit input of externally-supplied externally
supplied data into aircraft systems. A manufacturer may expose aircraft information vulnerability
vulnerabilities through equipment design through the design of the equipment, or the equipment may
become vulnerable as a result of being connected to a common interface. Therefore, it is important that for
manufacturers to consider aircraft information security risk mitigation strategies in their equipment design,
particularly when the equipment is responsible for an interface between the aircraft and aircraft-external
systems.
Apart from any specific aircraft-information-security-related performance requirements that are contained
in the MOPS, it is recommended that manufacturers look at consider a layered approach to aircraft
information security risk mitigation that includes both technical (e.g., software, signal filtering) and physical
strategies. From a technical perspective, for example, this could include signal spoofing detection capabilities
or more stringent, multi-factored authentication techniques such as passwords, PINs, and digital certificates.
From a physical perspective, a manufacturer could consider connectors that require special tools to remove
them to prevent passenger tampering; — although navigation avionics are typically located in an avionics bay
inaccessible to passengers. And finally, but just as important, manufacturers should consider supply chain
risk management; for example, if a manufacturer is outsourcing outsources the development of software
code development, is are the contractor and its staff properly vetted?
Civil Aaviation Aauthorities (CAAs) have a regulatory interest when an applicant’s design makes use of a
non-trusted connection through which connectivity where the installation can potentially introduce aircraft
information security vulnerabilities. This requires the applicant to address not only the information security
vulnerabilities and mitigation techniques for the new installation, but to also consider how vulnerability
vulnerabilities could propagate to existing downstream systems. Therefore, it is recommended that
manufacturers reference their equipment aircraft information security review and mitigation strategies in
the equipment’s installation manual of the equipment so that the applicant can consider them in meeting
the installation regulatory requirements of the installation.
The desired path shall be defined according to the following leg types:
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Note: There is no intent to require a heading or altitude source connected to the equipment to automatically
execute leg types with heading or altitude components. Manual equipment inputs for heading/altitude with
manual aircraft control methods are acceptable for these leg types.
Replace Section 2.2.1.3.6 as shown and add the following leg type descriptions. Re-numberRenumber
existing paragraphs (starting with 2.2.1.3.7) to account for the newly added sections:
An FA leg shall be defined as a specified track over the ground from a database waypoint to a specified
altitude at an unspecified position.
An FM leg shall be defined as a specified track over the ground from a database fix until a manual
termination of the leg.
Manual
FM Leg Termination
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A VA leg shall be defined as a specified heading to a specific altitude termination at an unspecified position.
No correction is made for wind.
VA Leg
8,000 Ft
A VI leg shall be defined as a specified heading to intercept a subsequent leg at an unspecified position. No
correction is made for wind.
Next
VI Leg Leg
A VM leg shall be defined as a specified heading until a manual termination of the leg. No correction is
made for wind.
Manual
VM Leg Termination
[…]
2.2.1.3.12 Course to Altitude (CA).
A CA leg shall be defined as a specified course to a specific altitude at an unspecified position. The course is
flown making adjustment for wind.
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An HA leg is a holding pattern which terminates at the next crossing of the hold fix when the aircraft altitude
is at or above the specified altitude. The altitude is provided by the navigation database. The source of the
magnetic variation needed to convert magnetic courses to true courses is detailed in Section 2.2.1.3.12.
An HF leg is a holding pattern which terminates at the first crossing of the hold fix after becoming established
on the inbound course. This is typically after the entry procedure is performed. The source of the magnetic
variation needed to convert magnetic courses to true courses is detailed in Section 2.2.1.3.12.
An HM leg is a holding pattern which terminates only after flight crew action. The source of the magnetic
variation needed to convert magnetic courses to true courses is detailed in Section 2.2.1.3.12.
The tables incorrectly reference and label RTCA/ DO-160 Sections 16.5.1.2 and 16.6.1.2 regarding ’‘2.1.1.7
Acquisition Time’ and ’‘2.1.1.9 Reacquisition Time.’. Change the table references as follows:
The MOPS Initial Acquisition Time requirement (2.1.1.7) applies to both AC and DC equipment under
abnormal operating conditions (DO-160E Sections 16.5.2 and 16.6.2) and the Satellite Reacquisition Time
satellite reacquisition time requirement (2.1.1.9) applies to both AC and DC equipment under normal
operating conditions (DO-160E Sections 16.5.1 and 16.6.1).
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APPENDIX 3
Reserved.
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APPENDIX 4
This Appendix prescribes EASA modifications to RTCA document DO-229E, Section 2.
This is to ensure that only the L1 NAV data, for which the SBAS provides corrections and integrity, is
used, and no CNAV data, which is defined in Appendix III of IS-GPS-200D, is used, for which the SBAS
does not provide integrity.
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European
Union
Aviation
Safety
Agency
1 — Applicability
This ETSO provides the requirements which Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems (TAWS) that
are designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified
with the applicable ETSO marking.
2 — Procedures
2.1 — General
The Aapplicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None.
3 — Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
The applicable Sstandards are those set forthprovided in theRTCA DO-367, Minimum
Operational Performance Standard (MOPS) for Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems (TAWS)
Airborne Equipment, Section 2, dated 31 May 2017. Requirements for Class A, Class B and
Class C equipment are provided in RTCA DO-367 Sections 2.2.1, 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 respectively and
amended as follows:
In Section 2.2.1.1.6.3.1 Aural Alert — Caution
The sentence ‘For a caution level FLTA alert clue to a predicted terrain conflict, Class A
Equipment shall (TAWS_MOPS_051) be capable of generating or triggering an aural
message of at least one of ‘Terrain Ahead’ and ‘Caution Terrain’. The requirement does
not imply that Class A Equipment must be able to support both aural messages, although
it is permissible for Class A Equipment to support both messages.’
should be replaced by
‘For a caution level FLTA alert clue to a predicted terrain conflict, Class A Equipment shall
(TAWS_MOPS_051) be capable of generating or triggering both types of aural messages:
at least one of ‘Terrain Ahead’ and ‘Caution Terrain’.
The requirement does not imply that Class A Equipment must be able to support both
these aural messages, although it is permissible for Class A Equipment to support both
messages.
[…]
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4 — Marking
4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.
4.2 — Specific
None.
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APPENDIX 1
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 PURPOSE. This standard provides the MPS for a Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS).
1.2 SCOPE. This Appendix sets forth the standard for two classes of TAWS equipment: Class A and
Class B.
1.3 SYSTEM FUNCTION AND OVERVIEW. The system must provide the flight crew with sufficient
information and appropriate alerts to detect a potentially hazardous terrain situation that, in turn, prevents
a CFIT event. The basic TAWS functions for all TAWS systems approved under this ETSO include the
following:
a. A forward looking terrain avoidance (FLTA) function. The FLTA function looks ahead of the aeroplane
along and below the aeroplane’s lateral and vertical flight path and provides suitable alerts if a
potential CFIT threat exists.
b. A premature descent alert (PDA) function. The PDA function of the TAWS uses the aeroplane’s current
position and flight path information, as determined from a suitable navigation source and airport
database, to determine if the aeroplane is hazardously below the normal (typically three-degree)
approach path for the nearest runway as defined by the alerting algorithm.
c. An appropriate visual and aural discrete signal for both caution and warning alerts.
d. Class A TAWS equipment must provide terrain information, which is presented on a display system.
e. Class A TAWS equipment must provide indications of imminent contact with the ground for the
following conditions as further defined in RCTA/DO-161A, Minimum Performance Standards -Airborne
Ground Proximity Warning Equipment, dated May 27, 1976, and section 3.3 of this Appendix.
Deviations from RTCA/DO-161A are acceptable providing the nuisance alert rate is minimised, the
deviation is approved under the provision of Part-21, 21.A.610, and an equivalent level of safety for
the following conditions is provided.
— Mode 5: Excessive downward deviation from an Instrument Landing System (ILS) glideslope,
Localizer Performance and Vertical Guidance (LPV), or Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)
Landing System (GLS) glidepath.
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Note: RTCA/DO-161A glideslope requirements are incorporated for GLS and LPV glidepaths for
TAWS Class A systems, reference paragraph 3.3f. It is desirable to provide a
glidepath/glideslope warning function on any approach with vertical guidance.
— Altitude Callout: A voice callout (‘Five Hundred’) when the aeroplane descends to
500 feet above terrain or nearest runway elevation. All TAWS equipment must provide a 500 foot
voice call out.
Note: The altitude callout is not defined in RTCA/DO-161A but is a requirement for the TAWS
system. The altitude callout requirements are defined in paragraph 3.3.c. of this
Appendix.
f. Class B equipment basic TAWS functions include functions listed in paragraphs 1.3.a through 1.3.c and
it must provide indications of imminent contact with the ground during the following aeroplane
operations as defined in paragraph 3.4 of this Appendix:
— Altitude Callout: A voice callout (‘Five Hundred’) when the aeroplane descends to 500 feet above
the nearest runway elevation. All TAWS equipment must provide the 500 foot voice call out.
1.4 ADDED FEATURES. If the manufacturer elects to add features to the TAWS equipment, those features
must at least meet the same qualification testing, software verification, and validation requirements as
provided under this ETSO. Additional information, such as human-made obstacles, may be added as long
as they do not adversely alter the terrain functions.
1.5 OTHER TECHNOLOGIES. Although this ETSO envisions a TAWS based on the use of on-board terrain and
airport databases, other technologies such as the use of radar are not excluded. Other concepts and
technologies may be approved under this ETSO’s provisions for non-ETSO functionality.
2.0 DEFINITIONS
2.1 Advisory Alerts. The level or category of alert for conditions that require flight crew awareness and may
require subsequent flight crew response.
2.2 Alert. A visual, aural, or tactile stimulus presented to attract attention and convey information regarding
system status or condition.
2.3 Aural Alert. A discrete sound, tone, or verbal statement used to annunciate a condition, situation, or
event.
2.4 Caution Alert. The level or category of alert for conditions that require immediate flight crew awareness
and subsequent flight crew response.
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2.5 Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT). An accident or incident in which an aircraft, under the full control
of the pilot, is flown into terrain, obstacles, or water.
2.6 Failure. The inability of the equipment or any sub-part of that equipment to perform within previously
specified limits.
2.7 False Alert. An inappropriate alert that occurs as result of a failure within the TAWS or when the design
alerting thresholds of the TAWS are not exceeded.
2.8 Forward-Looking Terrain Avoidance (FLTA). Looks ahead of the aeroplane along and below the
aeroplane’s lateral and vertical flight path and provides suitable alerts if a potential CFIT exists.
2.9 Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). A world-wide position, velocity, and time determination
system that includes one or more satellite constellations, receivers, and system integrity monitoring,
augmented as necessary to support the required navigation performance for the actual phase of operation.
2.10 Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS) Landing System (GLS). GLS provides precision navigation
guidance for exact alignment and descent of aircraft on approach to a runway. GLS uses the Ground Based
Augmentation System (GBAS) to augment the Global Navigation Satellite System(s) and to provide locally
relevant information to the aircraft, including the definition of the approach path.
2.11 Hazard. A state or set of conditions that together with other conditions in the environment can lead
to an accident.
2.12 Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI). An incorrect depiction of the terrain threat relative to the
aeroplane during an alert condition (excluding source data).
2.13 Localizer Performance with Vertical Guidance (LPV). A wide area augmentation system (WAAS)
approach that provides vertical guidance to as low as 200 feet above ground level (AGL).
2.14 Nuisance Alert. An inappropriate alert, occurring during normal safe procedures, which is the result
of a design performance limitation of TAWS.
2.15 Required Obstacle Clearance (ROC). Required vertical clearance expressed in feet between an aircraft
and an obstruction. (Per Order 8260.3B, Change 20)
2.16 Search Volume. A volume of airspace around the aeroplane’s current and projected path that is used
to define a TAWS alert condition.
2.17 Terrain Cell. A grid of terrain provided by the TAWS database which identifies the highest terrain
elevation within a defined geographical area. Terrain cell dimensions and resolution can vary depending
on the needs of the TAWS system and availability of data. If a supplier desires, obstacle height can be
included in the terrain elevation.
2.18 Visual Alert. The use of projected or displayed information to present a condition, situation, or event.
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2.19 Warning Alert. The level or category of alert for conditions that require immediate flight crew
awareness and immediate flight crew response.
3.1 Class A and Class B Requirements for FLTA. The majority of CFIT accidents occur because flight crews
do not have adequate situational information regarding the terrain in the vicinity of the aeroplane and its
projected flight path. Class A and Class B equipment is required to look ahead of the aeroplane, within the
design search volume, and provide timely alerts in the event terrain is predicted to penetrate the search
volume. The FLTA function should be available during all airborne phases of flight including turning flight.
The search volume consists of a computed look ahead distance, a lateral distance on both sides of the
aeroplane’s flight path, and a specified look down distance based upon the aeroplane’s vertical flight path.
This search volume should vary as a function of phase flight, distance from runway, and the required
obstacle clearance (ROC) in order to perform its intended function and to minimise nuisance alerts. The
lateral search volume should expand as necessary to accommodate turning flight. The TAWS search
volumes should consider the accuracy of the TAWS navigation source. The TAWS lateral search area should
be less than the protected area defined by the United States Standard for Terminal Instrument Procedures
(TERPS), FAA Order 8260.3B and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Procedures for Air
Navigation Services — Aircraft Operations (PAN-OPS) 8168, volume 2, in order to prevent nuisance alerts.
3.1.1 Reduced Required Terrain Clearance (RTC). Class A and Class B equipment must provide suitable
alerts when the aeroplane is above the terrain in the aeroplane’s projected flight path, but the projected
amount of terrain clearance is considered unsafe for the particular phase of flight. The required obstacle
(terrain) clearance (ROC), as specified in TERPS and the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM), has been
used to define the minimum requirements for obstacle/terrain clearance (ROC) appropriate to the FLTA
function. These requirements are specified in Table 3.1.1. The FLTA function must be tested to verify that
the alerting algorithms meet the test conditions specified in Appendix 2, Tables A, B, C, D, E, and F.
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Phase of Flight TERPS (ROC) TAWS (RTC) Level Flight TAWS (RTC) Descending
Note 1: During the departure phase of flight, the FLTA function of Class A and B equipment must alert if
the aeroplane is projected to be within 100 feet vertically of terrain. However, Class A and Class
B equipment should not alert if the aeroplane is projected to be more than 400 feet above the
terrain.
Note 2: As an alternate to the stepped down reduction from the terminal to approach phase as shown in
Table 3.1.1, a linear reduction of the RTC as the aircraft comes closer to the nearest runway is
allowed, provided the requirements of Table 3.1.1 are met.
Note 3: During the visual segment of a normal instrument approach (typically about 1 NM from the
runway threshold), the RTC should be defined/reduced to minimise nuisance alerts. Below a
certain altitude or distance from the runway threshold, logic may be incorporated in order to
inhibit the FLTA function. Typical operations below minimum descent altitude (MDA), decision
altitude (DA), decision height (DH), or the visual descent point (VDP) should not generate
nuisance alerts.
Note 4: The specific RTC values are reduced slightly for descending flight conditions to accommodate the
dynamic conditions and pilot response times.
3.1.2 Imminent Terrain Impact. Class A and Class B equipment must provide suitable alerts when the
aeroplane is below the elevation of a terrain cell along the aeroplane’s lateral projected flight path and, based
upon the vertical projected flight path, the equipment predicts that the terrain clearance will be less than
the value given in the RTC column of Table 3.1.1. See Appendix 2 for test conditions that must be conducted
(Table G).
3.1.3 FLTA Turning Flight. Class A and Class B equipment must provide suitable alerts for the functions
specified in paragraphs 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 when the aeroplane is in turning flight.
3.2 Class A and Class B Equipment Requirements for Detection and Alerting for Premature Descent Along
the Final Approach Segment. Class A and Class B equipment must provide a suitable alert when it determines
that the aeroplane is significantly below the normal approach flight path to a runway. Approximately one-
third of all CFIT accidents occur during the final approach phase of flight, when the aeroplane is properly
configured for landing and descending at a normal rate. For a variety of reasons, which include poor visibility,
night time operations, loss of situational awareness, operating below minimums without adequate visual
references, and deviations from the published approach procedures, many aeroplanes have crashed into the
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ground short of the runway. Detection of this condition and alerting the flight crew is an essential safety
requirement of this ETSO, and there are numerous ways to accomplish these overall objectives. Alerting
criteria may be based upon height above runway elevation and distance to runway. It may be based upon
height above the terrain and distance to runway or other suitable means. This ETSO will not define the
surfaces for which alerting is required. Instead, it specifies some general requirements for alerting and some
cases when alerting is inappropriate. See Appendix 2, Table H, for test requirements.
a. The PDA function must be available for all types of instrument approaches. This includes both straight-
in approaches and circling approaches.
b. The TAWS equipment must not generate PDA alerts for normal visual flight rules (VFR) operations in
the airport area. Aeroplanes routinely operate at traffic pattern altitudes of 800 feet above
field/runway elevation when within 5 NM of the airport.
c. Aeroplanes routinely operate in VFR conditions at 1 000 feet above ground level (AGL) within
10–15 NM of the nearest airport, and these operations must not generate alerts.
d. Aeroplanes routinely operate in the visual segment of a circling approach within 2 NM of the
airport/runway of intended landing, with 300 feet of obstacle clearance. Operations at circling
minimums must not cause PDA or FLTA alerts.
3.3 Class A Requirements for Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) Alerting. In addition to the TAWS
FLTA and PDA functions, the equipment must provide the Mode 1 through Mode 5 GPWS functions listed
below in accordance with ETSO-C92c and the altitude callout function in accordance with paragraph 3.3.c. of
this Appendix. However, it is essential to retain the independent protective features provided by both the
GPWS and FLTA functions. In each case, all of the following modes must be covered. Some GPWS alerting
thresholds may be adjusted or modified to be more compatible with the FLTA alerting function and to
minimise GPWS nuisance alerts. Modifications to the GPWS requirements require an approved deviation in
accordance with Part-21, 21.A.610. The failure of the ETSO-C92c equipment functions, except for power
supply failure, input sensor failure, or failure of other common portions of the equipment, must not cause a
loss of the FLTA, PDA, or terrain display.
— Mode 5: Excessive downward deviation from an ILS glideslope, LPV, and/or GLS glidepath
a. Flap Alerting Inhibition. A separate, guarded control may be provided to inhibit Mode 4 alerts based
on flaps being other than landing configuration.
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b. Speed. Airspeed or groundspeed must be included in the logic that determines basic GPWS alerting
time for ‘excessive closure rate to terrain’ and ‘flight into terrain when not in landing configuration’ to
allow maximum time for the flight crew to react and take corrective action.
c. Altitude Callouts. Class A equipment must provide a voice callout of ‘five hundred’ or equivalent when
descending through 500 feet above terrain or 500 feet above the nearest runway elevation during
nonprecision approaches, but are recommended for all approaches. Additional altitude callouts, such
as ‘one hundred’ or ‘two hundred’ are acceptable, but not required. This voice callout will not be made
at ascent, for example on a missed approach or departure.
e. Mode 5 Glidepath Deviation Alerting. Class A TAWS equipment must provide Mode 5 alerting for
localizer performance with vertical guidance (LPV) glidepath and GNSS landing system (GLS) glidepath,
as well as the ILS glideslope. The LPV and GLS envelope, deactivation, reactivation, arming, disarming,
alert requirements must follow the Mode 5 requirements in RTCA/DO-161A. The FAA recommends
that the glidepath aural alert for LPV and GLS approaches say ‘glidepath’ or equivalent, but the use of
‘glideslope’ is also acceptable. Follow test guidance in RTCA/DO-161A.
a. Class B equipment must provide alerts for excessive descent rates. The Mode 1 alerting envelope of
RTCA/DO-161A was modified to accommodate a larger envelope for both caution and warning alerts.
Height above terrain may be determined by using the terrain database elevation and subtracting it
from the QNH (corrected) barometric altitude, or GNSS altitude (or equivalent). In addition, since the
envelopes are not limited by a radio altitude measurement to a maximum of 2 500 feet AGL, the
envelopes are expanded to include higher vertical speeds. The equipment must meet either the
requirements provided in Appendix 2, paragraph 7.0, or those specified in RTCA/DO-161A.
b. Class B equipment must provide alerts for ‘negative climb rate after takeoff or missed approach’ or
‘altitude loss after takeoff,’ as specified in RTCA/DO-161A. The alerting envelopes are identical to the
Mode 3 alerting envelopes in RTCA/DO-161A. Height above terrain may be determined by comparison
of aircraft altitude (GNSS or barometric) with runway threshold elevation or by radio altimeter.
c. This feature also has an important CFIT protection function. In the event the aeroplane is operated
unintentionally close to terrain when not in the airport area or the area for which PDA protection is
provided, this voice callout will alert the flight crew to hazardous conditions. The equipment must meet
the requirements specified in Appendix 2, section 9.0. Class B TAWS equipment must provide a 500
foot voice call out when descending through 500 feet above the runway threshold elevation for
landing. This feature is primarily intended to provide situational awareness to the flight crew when the
aeroplane is being operated properly, per normal procedures. During a normal approach, it is useful
to provide the flight crew with a voice callout at 500 feet, relative to the runway threshold elevation
for the runway of intended landing. The Class B TAWS equipment must also provide a 500 foot voice
call out above terrain when not landing. This 500 foot voice call out above terrain when not landing is
an important CFIT protection function. In the event the aeroplane is operated unintentionally close to
terrain when not in the airport area or the area for which PDA protection is provided, this voice callout
will indicate hazardous conditions to the flight crew.
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3.5 Class A Equipment Requirements for a Terrain Display. Class A equipment must be designed to
interface with a colour terrain display, and may be designed to also interface to a monochromatic terrain
display. Class A equipment for TAWS must also be capable of providing the following terrain-related
information to a display system:
a. The terrain must be depicted relative to the aeroplane’s position such that the pilot can estimate the
relative bearing to the terrain of interest.
b. The terrain must be depicted relative to the aeroplane’s position such that the pilot may estimate the
distance to the terrain of interest.
c. The terrain depicted must be oriented to either the heading or the track of the aeroplane. In addition,
a north-up orientation may be added as a selectable format.
d. Variations in terrain elevation must be depicted relative to the aeroplane’s current or projected
elevation (above and below) and be visually distinct. Terrain that is more than 2 000 feet below the
aeroplane’s elevation can be excluded.
e. Terrain that generates alerts must be displayed in a manner to distinguish it from non-hazardous
terrain, consistent with the caution and warning alert level.
3.6 Class B Equipment Requirements for a Terrain Display. Operators required to install Class B equipment
are not required to include a terrain display. However, Class B TAWS equipment must be capable of driving
a terrain display function in the event the installer wants to include the terrain display function.
4.1 The TAWS is required to provide aural and visual alerts for each of the functions described in section 3.0
of this Appendix.
4.2 The TAWS must provide the required aural and visual alerts in a manner that clearly indicates to the
flight crew that they represent a single event. The TAWS may accomplish the entire alerting function, or
provide alert inputs to an external aircraft alerting system. Exceptions to this requirement are allowed when
suppression of aural alerts is necessary to protect pilots from nuisance aural alerting, but a visual alert is
still appropriate.
4.3 Each aural alert must identify the reason for the alert, such as ‘too low terrain’,- ‘glideslope’, or another
acceptable annunciation.
4.4 The system must remove the visual and aural alert once the situation has been resolved.
4.5 The system must be capable of accepting and processing aeroplane performance-related data or
aeroplane dynamic data and providing the capability to update aural and visual alerts at least once per
second.
4.6 The aural and visual outputs as defined in Table 4-1 must be compatible with the standard cockpit
displays and auditory systems.
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4.7 The aural and visual alerts should be selectable to accommodate operational commonality among
aeroplane fleets.
4.8 The visual display of alerting information must be immediately and continuously displayed until the
situation is resolved or no longer valid.
4.9 At a minimum, the TAWS must be capable of providing aural alert messages described in Table 4-1. In
addition to this minimum set, other voice alerts may be provided.
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Table 4-1
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Note 1: The call out for ground proximity altitude is considered advisory.
Note 2: Visual alerts may be put on the terrain situational awareness display, if doing so fits with the
overall human factors alerting scheme for the flight deck. This does not eliminate the visual alert
color requirements, even in the case of a monochromatic display. Typically in such a scenario,
adjacent colored annunciator lamps meet the alerting color requirements.
Note 3: Additional callouts can be made by the system, but the system is required to make the 500 foot
voice callout.
4.10 Prioritisation
a. Class A Equipment. Class A Equipment must have an interactive capability with other external alerting
systems so that an alerting priority can be executed automatically. This prevents confusion or chaos on
the flight deck during multiple alerts from different alerting systems. Typical alerting systems that may
be interactive with TAWS include predictive wind shear (PWS), reactive wind shear (RWS), and traffic
alert collision and avoidance system (TCAS). The TAWS system must include an alert prioritisation
scheme for Class A equipment. Table 4-2 provides an example prioritisation scheme for Class A
equipment. If the PWS, RWS, or TCAS functions are provided within TAWS, the alert prioritisation
scheme in Table 4-2 also applies. The FAA will consider alert prioritisation schemes other than the one
included in Table 4-2.
b. Class B Equipment
1. Class B Equipment does not require prioritisation with external systems such as TCAS, RWS, and
PWS. If prioritisation with those functions is provided, the prioritisation scheme should be in
accordance with the scheme in Table 4-2.
2. Class B Equipment must establish an internal priority alerting system (scheme) for each of the
functions. The priority scheme must ensure that the more critical alerts override alerts of lesser
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priority. Table 4-3 provides a example internal priority scheme for Class B equipment. Class B
Equipment need only consider the TAWS functions required for Class B Equipment.
Table 4-2
Note: These alerts can occur simultaneously with TAWS voice callout alerts.
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Table 4-3
4.11 During ILS glideslope, LPV, GLS glidepath, or other localizer-based approach operations, TAWS should
not cause an alert for a terrain/obstacle located outside the TERPS-protected airspace. Special design
considerations may be necessary to address this issue.
5.0 TAWS Position Requirements. TAWS relies on horizontal position, vertical position, velocity, and
vertical rate information. This information can be generated internally to the TAWS, or acquired by
interfacing to other installed avionics on the aircraft.
5.1 External Sources. When the TAWS interfaces to external sources for position, velocity, or rate
information, the TAWS installation manual must define the performance requirements for the interface.
5.2 Internal Sources. When the TAWS includes internal sources for position, velocity, or rate information,
these sources must meet the performance requirements in the applicable ETSO, if an applicable ETSO
exists. The performance of the internal source must be sufficient for the TAWS to meet its intended
function. Examples of applicable ETSOs include:
a. GNSS equipment: ETSO-C129a Airborne Supplemental Navigation Equipment Using the Global
Positioning System (or subsequent), or any revision of ETSO-C145 Airborne Navigation Sensors Using
the Global Positioning System Augmented by the Satellite-Based Augmentation System, ETSO-C146
Stand-Alone Airborne Navigation Equipment Using the Global Positioning System Augmented by the
Satellite-Based Augmentation System, or ETSO-C196 Airborne Supplemental Navigation Sensors for
Global Positioning System Equipment Using Aircraft-Based Augmentation.
b. Barometric altitude equipment: ETSO-C10b Altimeter, Pressure Actuated, Sensitive Type, or ETSO-
C106 Air Data Computer.
c. Radio altimeter equipment: ETSO-C87a Airborne Low-Range Radio Altimeter (or subsequent),
ETSO-2C87 Low Range Radio Altimeters, or RTCA/DO-155 Minimum Performance Standards Airborne
Low-Range Radar Altimeters.
d. Vertical velocity equipment: ETSO-C8 Vertical Velocity Instruments (or subsequent), or ETSO-C106
Air Data Computer (or subsequent).
5.3 Primary Horizontal Position Sources. Horizontal position for TAWS must come from a GNSS source
meeting ETSO-C129a or any revision of ETSO-C145, ETSO-C146, or ETSO-C196 (or subsequent). As an
exception, TAWS equipment limited to installation in aircraft where the EU Regulation on Air Operations
does not require such equipment may be configurable to operate solely on a non-GNSS position source.
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5.4 Alternate Horizontal Position Sources. Retaining TAWS functionality during GNSS outage or
unavailability provides a safety benefit. It is acceptable and recommended to incorporate a secondary, non
GNSS position source, to provide horizontal position when the GNSS is not available or reliable.
5.5 Vertical Position Sources. Vertical position for TAWS may come from a barometric source, such as an
altimeter or an air data computer, or from a geometric source, such as GNSS. GNSS vertical accuracy, at a
minimum, must meet RTCA/DO-229D, section 2.2.3.3.4. Designs that cross check barometric and geometric
altitude are recommended. Class A TAWS also requires a radio altimeter.
5.6 Position Source Faults. If a position source generates a fault indication or any flag indicating the
position is invalid or does not meet performance requirements, the TAWS must stop utilizing that position
source. The TAWS may revert to an alternate position source, and must provide indications, as appropriate,
regarding loss of function associated with the loss of the position source. The TAWS must inhibit FLTA and
PDA alerts when the position source in use is faulted or invalid.
6.0 CLASS A AND CLASS B REQUIREMENTS FOR A TERRAIN AND AIRPORT DATABASE
6.1 Minimum Geographical Consideration. At a minimum, terrain and airport information must be
provided for the expected areas of operation, airports, and routes flown.
6.2 Development and Methodology. The manufacturer must present the development methodology used
to validate and verify the terrain and airport information.
RTCA/DO-200A/ED-76 Standards for Processing Aeronautical Data should be used as a guideline.
6.3 Resolution. Terrain and airport information must be accurate and of acceptable resolution in order for
the system to perform its intended function. Terrain data should be gridded at 30 arc seconds with
100-foot resolution within 30 NM of all airports with runway lengths of 3 500 feet or greater, and whenever
necessary (particularly in mountainous environments), 15 arc seconds with 100-foot resolution (or even 6
arc seconds) within 6 NM of the closest runway. It is acceptable to have terrain data gridded in larger
segments over oceanic and remote areas around the world.
Note: Class B equipment may require information relative to airports with runways less than 3 500 feet
whether public or private. Small aeroplane owners and operators will likely be the largest market
for Class B equipment and they frequently use airports of less than 3 500 feet. Those TAWS
manufacturers who desire to sell to this market must be willing to customize their terrain databases
to include selected airports used by their customers.
6.4 Continued Airworthiness Updates. The system must be capable of accepting updated terrain and
airport information. Updating of terrain, obstacle, and airport databases does not require a change to the
ETSO authorization.
7.0 CLASS A AND CLASS B FAILURE INDICATION. Class A and Class B equipment must include a failure
monitor function that provides reliable indications of equipment condition during operation. It must
monitor the equipment itself, input power, input signals, and aural and visual outputs. A means to inform
the flight crew whenever the system has failed or can no longer perform the intended function must be
provided.
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8.0 CLASS A AND CLASS B REQUIREMENTS FOR SELF-TEST. Class A and Class B equipment must have a
self-test function to verify system operation and integrity. It must monitor the equipment itself, input
power, input signals, and aural and visual outputs. Failure of the system to successfully pass the self-test
must be annunciated.
Note: Flight crew verification of the aural and visual outputs during a self-test is an acceptable method
for monitoring aural and visual outputs.
9.0 CLASS A EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR INHIBITING THE FLTA FUNCTION, THE PREMATURE
DESCENT ALERT FUNCTION, AND THE TERRAIN DISPLAY
9.1 Manual Inhibit. The TAWS system must have a capability (e.g. a control switch to the flight crew) to
manually inhibit the TAWS (FLTA/PDA) aural alerts, visual alerts, and the terrain display. The switch must
not inhibit any of the GPWS alerts defined in section 1.3.e. If the TAWS system incorporates an automatic
inhibit function that automatically inhibits TAWS (FLTA/PDA) aural alerts, visual alerts, and terrain display
when a position source is faulted or unavailable, then the manual inhibit may be designed to only inhibit
aural and visual alerts. This alternate manual inhibit functionality will allow pilots to disable the TAWS
(FLTA/PDA) alerting without removing the terrain display when landing at a site not included in the
database or landing at a site that generates known nuisance alerts. Inhibit status must be annunciated to
the flight crew.
9.2 Automatic Inhibit. The capability of automatically inhibiting Class A functions within TAWS equipment
is acceptable when utilizing the conditions described in paragraph 7.0. If auto inhibit capability is provided,
the ‘inhibit status’ must be annunciated to the flight crew.
10.0 CLASS A and B PHASE OF FLIGHT DEFINITIONS. The TAWS equipment search volumes and alerting
thresholds should vary as necessary in order to be compatible with TERPS and other operational
considerations. For this reason, a set of definitions is offered for enroute, terminal, approach and
departure phases of flight. Other definitions for enroute, terminal, and approach may be used by TAWS
provided they are compatible with TERPS and standard instrument approach procedures and comply with
the test criteria specified in Appendix 2. If other definitions for enroute, terminal, and approach are used
by TAWS, they must be submitted to EASA in the form of a deviation as per Part 21 21.A.610.
10.1 Enroute Phase. The enroute phase exists when the aeroplane is more than 15 NM from the nearest
airport or whenever the conditions for terminal, approach, and departure phases are not met.
10.2 Terminal Phase. The terminal phase exists when the aeroplane is 15 NM or less from the nearest
runway while the range to the nearest runway threshold is decreasing and the aeroplane is at or lower
than a straight line drawn between the two points specified in Table 10 relative to the nearest runway.
Note: If the aircraft is accomplishing a procedure turn as part of an instrument approach procedure, the
system may remain in the terminal phase, even though the distance to the runway threshold may
be temporarily increasing and the conditions for the approach phase may be temporarily met.
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Table 10
10.3 Approach Phase. The approach phase exists when the distance to the nearest runway threshold is
equal to or less than 5 NM; and the height above the nearest runway threshold location and elevation is
equal to or less than 1900 feet; and the distance to the nearest runway threshold is decreasing.
10.4 Departure Phase. The departure phase should be defined by some reliable parameter that initially
determines that the aeroplane is on the ground upon initial power-up. If, for example, the equipment can
determine that the aeroplane is ‘on the ground’ by using some logic such as ground speed less than 35
knots and altitude within ± 75 feet of field elevation or nearest runway elevation and ‘airborne’ by using
some logic such as ground speed greater than 50 knots and altitude 100 feet greater than field elevation,
then the equipment can reliably determine that it is in the ‘Departure Phase’. Other parameters to consider
are climb state and distance from departure runway. Once the aeroplane reaches 1 500 feet above the
departure runway, the departure phase is ended.
10.5 Nearest Airport or Runway. The enroute phase considers distance to the nearest airport, and the
terminal and approach phases consider distance to the nearest runway in determining the appropriate
phase of flight, and thus the appropriate terrain alerting requirements. The phase of flight may also be
determined by basing the phase of flight on the intended landing airport or runway, if the TAWS has the
intended landing airport or runway information available. The phase of flight determination may also
exclude airports or runways which are unsuitable for landing of a particular type of aircraft. For example,
the TAWS could be configurable at installation on a large transport category aircraft to only change the
phase of flight based on runways of a certain minimum length.
Table 11
(reserved)
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APPENDIX 2
TEST CONDITIONS
1.0 FORWARD-LOOKING TERRAIN AVOIDANCE — REDUCED REQUIRED TERRAIN CLEARANCE (RTC) TEST
CONDITIONS. These conditions exist when the aeroplane is currently above the terrain, but the
combination of current altitude, height above terrain, and projected flight path indicates that there is a
significant reduction in the RTC.
1.1 Phase of Flight Definitions. For the following test conditions, refer to Appendix 1, paragraph 10.0, for
an expanded explanation of the definitions of the phases of flight.
1.2 En route Descent Requirement. A terrain alert must be provided in time to ensure that the aeroplane
can level off (L/O) with a minimum of 500 feet altitude clearance over the terrain/obstacle when
descending toward the terrain/obstacle at any speed within the operational flight envelope of the
aeroplane. The test conditions assume a descent along a flight path with terrain that is 1 000 feet below
the expected L/O altitude. If the pilot initiates the L/O at the proper altitude, no TAWS alert is expected.
However, if the pilot is distracted or otherwise delays the L/O, a TAWS alert is required to permit the pilot
to recover to level flight in a safe manner.
Note: The L/O initiation height of 20 % of the vertical speed was chosen (as a minimum standard for
nuisance alarm-free operations) because it is similar to typical autopilot or flight director L/O
(altitude capture) algorithms. In contrast, the technique of using 10 %of the existing vertical
speed as a L/O initiation point is usually considered a minimum, appropriate only to manual
operations of smaller general aviation (GA) aeroplanes. With high rates of descent, experienced
pilots often use a manual technique of reducing the vertical speed by one half when reaching
1 000 feet above/below the L/O altitude. This technique will significantly reduce the likelihood of
nuisance alerts. In the event that using 20 %of the vertical speed as a minimum standard for
nuisance-free operations is shown not to be compatible with the installed autopilot or flight
director L/O (altitude capture) algorithms, consideration should be given to setting the alert logic
closer to the 10 %vertical speed criteria to minimize nuisance alerts.
a. Table A, column A, represents the test condition. Columns B, C, and D are for information purposes
only. Column E represents the minimum altitude for which TAWS alerts must be posted to perform
their intended function. Column F represents the maximum altitude for which TAWS alerts may be
provided in order to meet the nuisance alert criteria. See Appendix 2, paragraph 4.0.
b. For each of the descent rates specified below, recovery to level flight at or above 500 feet terrain
clearance is required.
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Note1: The actual values for the aeroplane altitude, distance, and time from the terrain cell when
caution and warning alerts are posted and the minimum terrain clearance altitude must be
recorded.
Note 2: Enroute operations are considered to exist beyond 15 NM from the departure runway until
15 NM from the destination airport. Use of the nearest runway logic is permissible provided
suitable logic is incorporated to ensure that the transitions to the terminal logic will typically
occur only when the aeroplane is in terminal airspace.
Note 3: The values shown in column E may be reduced by 100 feet (to permit a L/O to occur at 400
feet above the obstacle) provided that it can be demonstrated that the basic TAWS Mode 1
alert (sink rate) is issued at or above the altitude specified in column E for typical terrain
topographies.
Note 4: Class B Equipment Considerations. The values shown in Column F are appropriate for
autopilot or flight director operations with an altitude capture function typical of many CS-
25-certified aeroplanes (Transport Category Aircraft). The values are based upon 20 %of the
aeroplane’s vertical velocity. If TAWS is installed on an aeroplane without such an autopilot
or flight director function, consideration should be given to computing the alerts based upon
10 %of the vertical velocity, which is more appropriate to manual flight and small, GA
aeroplane operations.
TABLE A
ENROUTE DESCENT ALERTING CRITERIA
A B C D E F
VERT SPEED ALT LOST ALT REQ’D TO TOTAL ALT LOST MINIMUM MAXIMUM
(FPM) WITH 3-SEC L/O WITH DUE TO TAWS TAWS CAUTION
PILOT DELAY 0.25G RECOVERY WARNING ALERT HEIGHT
MANEUVER ALERT HEIGHT (ABOVE
(ABOVE TERRAIN)
TERRAIN)
1 000 50 17 67 567 1 200
2 000 100 69 169 669 1 400
4 000 200 278 478 978 1 800
1.3 Enroute Level Flight Requirement. During level flight operations (vertical speed is ± 500 FPM), a terrain
alert should be posted when the aeroplane is within 700 feet of the terrain and is predicted to be equal to
or less than 700 feet within the prescribed alerting time or distance. See Table B for test criteria.
Note: The actual values for the aeroplane altitude, distance and time from the
terrain cell when caution and warning alerts are posted must be recorded.
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TABLE B
ENROUTE LEVEL FLIGHT ALERTING CRITERIA
TEST RUN
GROUND SPEED (KT) HEIGHT OF TERRAIN CELL
ALTITUDE ALERT CRITERIA
MEAN SEA LEVEL (MSL)
(MSL)
1.4 Terminal Area (Intermediate Segment) Descent Requirement. A terrain alert must be provided in time
to ensure that the aeroplane can L/O with a minimum of 300 feet altitude clearance over the
terrain/obstacle when descending toward the terrain/obstacle at any speed within the operational flight
envelope of the aeroplane. The test conditions assume a descent along a flight path with terrain that is
500 feet below the expected L/O altitude. If the pilot initiates the L/O at the proper altitude, no TAWS alert
is expected. However, if the pilot is distracted or otherwise delays the L/O, a TAWS alert is required to
permit the pilot to recover to level flight in a safe manner.
a. Table C, column A, represents the test condition. Columns B, C, and D are for information purposes
only. Column E represents the minimum altitude for which TAWS alerts must be posted to perform their
intended function. Column F represents the maximum altitude for which TAWS alerts may be provided in
order to meet the nuisance alert criteria. See Appendix 2, paragraph 4.0.
b. For each of the descent rates specified below, recovery to level flight at or above 300 feet terrain
clearance is required.
Note 1: The actual values for the aeroplane altitude, distance, and time from the terrain cell when
caution and warning alerts are posted and the minimum terrain clearance altitude must be
recorded.
Note 2: For Class B Equipment Considerations. The values shown in Column F are appropriate for
autopilot or flight director operations with an altitude capture function typical of many CS-25-
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certificated aeroplanes (Transport Category Aircraft). The values are based upon 20 %of the
aeroplanes vertical velocity. If TAWS is installed on an aeroplane without such an autopilot or
flight director function, consideration should be given to computing the alerts upon 10 %of the
vertical velocity, which is more appropriate to manual flight and small, GA aeroplane operations.
Table C
TERMINAL DESCENT AREA ALERTING CRITERIA
A B C D E F
VERT SPEED ALT LOST ALT REQ’D TOTAL ALT LOST MINIMUM TAWS MAXIMUM TAWS
(FPM) WITH 1SEC TO L/O WITH DUE TO RECOVERY WARNING ALERT CAUTION ALERT
PILOT DELAY 0.25G MANEUVER HEIGHT HEIGHT
(ABOVE TERRAIN) (ABOVE TERRAIN)
1 000 17 17 34 334 700
2 000 33 69 102 402 900
3 000 50 156 206 506 1 100
1.5 Terminal Area (Intermediate Segment) Level Flight Requirement. During level flight operations
(vertical speed less than ± 500 feet per minute), a terrain alert should be posted when the aeroplane is less
than 350 feet above the terrain and is predicted to be within less than 350 feet within the prescribed alerting
time or distance. See Table D for test criteria.
Note: The actual values for the aeroplane altitude, distance, and time from the terrain cell when caution
and warning alerts are posted must be recorded.
Table D
TERMINAL AREA LEVEL FLIGHT ALERTING CRITERIA
GROUND SPEED HEIGHT OF TERRAIN TEST RUN ALTITUDE ALERT CRITERIA
(KT) CELL (MSL) (MSL)
1.6 Final Approach Segment Descent Requirement. A terrain alert must be provided in time to ensure that
the aeroplane can L/O with a minimum of 100 feet altitude clearance over the terrain/obstacle when
descending toward the terrain/obstacle at any speed within the operational flight envelope of the
aeroplane.
a. Table E, column A, represents the test condition. Columns B, C, and D are for information purposes only.
Column E represents the minimum altitude for which TAWS alerts must be posted to perform their intended
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function. Column F represents the maximum altitude for which TAWS alerts may be provided in order to
meet the nuisance alert criteria. See appendix 2, paragraph 4.0.
b. For each of the descent rates specified below, recovery to level flight at or above 100 feet terrain
clearance is required.
Note: 1: The actual values for the aeroplane altitude, distance, and time from the terrain cell when
caution and warning alerts are posted and the minimum terrain clearance altitude must be
recorded.
Note: 2: For Class B Equipment Considerations. The values shown in column F are appropriate for
autopilot or flight director operations with an altitude capture function typical of many
CS-25-certificated aeroplanes (Large Aeroplanes). The values are based upon 20 %of the
aeroplanes vertical velocity. If TAWS is installed on an aeroplane without such an autopilot
or flight director function, consideration should be given to computing the alerts based upon
10 %of the vertical velocity, which is more appropriate to manual flight and small, GA
aeroplane operations.
Table E
A B C D E F
VERT SPEED ALT LOST WITH ALT REQ’D TO TOTAL ALT LOST MINIMUM TAWS MAXIMUM
(FPM) 1SEC PILOT L/O WITH DUE TO WARNING ALERT TAWS CAUTION
DELAY 0.25G RECOVERY HEIGHT (ABOVE ALERT HEIGHT
MANEUVER TERRAIN) (ABOVE
TERRAIN)
1.7 Final Approach Level Flight Requirement. During level flight operations at the minimum descent
altitude (MDA), a terrain alert should be posted when the aeroplane is within 150 feet of the terrain and
is predicted to be within less than 150 feet within the prescribed alerting time or distance.
See Table F for test criteria.
Note: The actual values for the aeroplane altitude, distance, and time from the terrain cell when
caution and warning alerts are posted must be recorded.
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Table F
FINAL APPROACH LEVEL FLIGHT ALERT CRITERIA
GROUND SPEED HEIGHT OF TERRAIN DISTANCE TERRAIN TEST RUN ALTITUDE ALERT CRITERIA
(KT) CELL (MSL) FROM RWY (NM) (MSL)
120 400 2.0 650 NO ALERT
140 400 2.0 650 NO ALERT
160 400 2.0 650 NO ALERT
120 400 2.0 600 MAY ALERT
140 400 2.0 600 MAY ALERT
160 400 2.0 600 MAY ALERT
100 400 2.0 550 MUST ALERT
120 400 2.0 550 MUST ALERT
140 400 2.0 550 MUST ALERT
160 400 2.0 550 MUST ALERT
2.0 FORWARD-LOOKING TERRAIN AVOIDANCE IMMINENT TERRAIN IMPACT TEST CONDITIONS.
The following test conditions must be conducted to evaluate level flight performance during all phases of
flight:
Note: 1: The actual values for the aeroplane altitude, distance and time from the terrain cell when
caution and warning alerts are posted must be recorded.
Note: 2: Based upon a one-second pilot delay and a 0.25g incremental pull to constant 6.0-degree climb
gradient, compute and record the aeroplane altitude at the terrain cell, the positive (or
negative) clearance altitude, and the aeroplane position and time (after the alert), when the
alert envelope is cleared.
2.1 Test Criteria. For each of the test cases below, a positive clearance of the terrain cell of interest is
required.
2.2 Additional Test Criteria. Repeat each of the test cases below with the altitude error of – 200 feet). A
positive clearance of the terrain cell of interest is required.
Table G
3.0 PDA TEST CONDITIONS. The purpose of this test is to verify that the pilot will be alerted to a ’low
altitude condition’ at an altitude defined by the specific design PDA alert surface. This ETSO does not define
specific pass/fail criteria since, as stated in paragraph 3.2 of appendix 1, it does not define the surface for
which alerting is required. The applicant must provide the proposed pass/fail criteria along with the
proposed recovery procedures for the specific alerting criteria proposed by the applicant. In developing
the test plan, the applicant should refer to paragraph 3.2 of appendix 1 for general requirements for
alerting (if alerting is applicable). The applicant may also want to consider the recovery procedures
specified in paragraphs 1.2, 1.4, and 1.6 of paragraph 1 of appendix 2. The following test conditions must
be conducted to evaluate PDA performance:
Note: For each test condition listed in table H, compute and record the PDA alert altitude and the
recovery altitude to level flight.
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Table H
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4.0 NUISANCE ALERT TEST CONDITIONS — GENERAL. The following test conditions must be conducted
to evaluate TAWS performance during all phases of flight. The following general criteria apply:
4.1 4 000 FPM. Descent must be possible at 4 000 FPM in the enroute airspace and pilots must be able to
L/O 1 000 feet above the terrain using a normal L/O procedure (leading by 20 %of the vertical speed)
without a caution or warning alert. See Table A.
4.2 2 000 FPM. Descent must be possible at 2 000 FPM in the terminal area and pilots must be able to
L/O 500 feet above the terrain using the normal L/O procedure described in paragraph 4.1 above, without
a caution or warning alert. See Table C.
4.3 1 000 FPM. Descent must be possible at 1 000 FPM in the final approach segment and pilots must be
able to L/O at the MDA using the normal L/O procedure described in paragraph 4.1 above, without a
caution or warning alert. See Table E.
5.0 NUISANCE TEST CONDITIONS FOR HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL FLIGHT TECHNICAL ERRORS. It must
be shown by analysis, simulation, or flight testing, that the system will not produce nuisance alerts when
the aeroplane is conducting normal flight operations in accordance with published instrument approach
procedures. This assumes the normal range in variation of input parameters.
5.1 Test Cases. At a minimum, the following cases listed in Table I must be tested twice: one set of runs
conducted with no lateral or vertical errors while another set is conducted with both lateral and vertical
flight technical errors (FTE). Certain conditions must be simulated, such as: a lateral FTE of 0.3 NM and a
vertical FTE of – 100 feet (such as when the aircraft is closer to terrain) up to the final approach fix (FAF),
as well as a lateral FTE of 0.3 NM and a vertical FTE of – 50 feet from the FAF to the missed approach point
(MAP). For all listed VHF omni- directional range navigation system (VOR), VOR/distance measuring
equipment (DME) and localizer-based approaches, from the FAF to the MAP, the aeroplane descends at
1 000 FPM until reaching either MDA (run #1) or MDA – 50 feet (run #2). The aeroplane then levels off and
flies level until reaching the MAP. Localizer updating of lateral position errors (if provided) may be
simulated.
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Table I
NUISANCE ALERT TEST CONDITIONS FOR HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL FLIGHT TECHNICAL ERRORS
6.0 TEST CONDITIONS USING KNOWN ACCIDENT CASES. The aircraft configuration and flight
trajectory for each case may be obtained from the FAA Regulatory and Guidance Library site. Click
‘Technical Standards and Orders and Index’, click ‘Current’, and then click ‘TSO-C151c’.
6.1 Test Report. The test report should include as many of the following parameters as possible used to
recreate the events: (1) latitude; (2) longitude; (3) altitude; (4) time from terrain at caution and warning
alerts; (5) distance from terrain at caution and warning alerts; (6) ground speed; (7) true track; (8) true
heading; (9) radio altitude (height above terrain); (10) gear position; and (11) flap position.
6.2 Computation and Recording. In addition to the parameters above, when the warning is posted for
each test case, based upon a one second pilot delay and a 0.25 g incremental pull to a constant 6.0 degree
climb gradient, do the following: compute and record the aeroplane altitude at the terrain cell, the positive
(or negative) clearance altitude, and the aeroplane position and time (after the alert) when the alert
envelope is cleared.
Note: The terrain cell of interest is the one associated with the accident and not necessarily the terrain
cell that caused the warning.
6.3 Test Criteria. For each of the test cases below in table J, demonstrate that the aeroplane profile clears
the terrain of interest.
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Table J
AIRCRAFT
LOCATION DATE REGISTRATION
NUMBER
La Paz, Bolivia 1/1/1985 N819EA
Flat Rock, NC 8/23/1985 N600CM
Windsor, MA 12/10/1986 N65TD
Eagle, CO 3/27/1987 N31SK
Tegucigalpa, Honduras 10/21/1989 N88705
Halawa Point, HI 10/28/1989 N707PV
San Diego, CA 3/16/1991 N831LC
Rome, GA 12/11/1991 N25BR
Gabriels, NY 1/3/1992 N55000
Alamogordo, NM 6/24/1992 N108SC
E. Granby, CT 11/12/1995 N566AA
Buga, Columbia 12/20/1995 N651AA
Nimitz Hill, Guam 8/6/1997 H7468
7.0 CLASS B EQUIPMENT TEST REQUIREMENTS FOR EXCESSIVE DESCENT RATE. Use the following
performance envelopes down to a ‘height above terrain’ value of 100 feet. If a radar altimeter input is
unavailable, determine the height of terrain by subtracting the terrain elevation (as obtained from the
terrain database) from the current QNH (corrected) barometric altitude, the GNSS altitude, or an equivalent
source. GNSS vertical accuracy must meet RTCA/DO-229D Section 2.2.3.3.4. The curve in figure 1
represents the minimum heights at which alerting must occur.
Note: Class B equipment may be designed to meet the requirements of RTCA/DO-161A, Mode 1, for
excessive descent rate in lieu of the requirements of paragraph 7.0.
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Figure 1
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8.0 CLASS B EQUIPMENT TEST REQUIREMENTS FOR NEGATIVE CLIMB RATE OR ALTITUDE LOSS AFTER
TAKEOFF. Use the existing performance envelopes specified in RTCA/DO-161A based upon a ‘height above
runway’ using barometric altitude, GNSS altitude, or equivalent, and runway elevation in lieu of radio
altimeter inputs, if radio altimeter inputs are unavailable.
9.1 CLASS A EQUIPMENT ALTITUDE CALLOUT TEST REQUIREMENTS. With the landing gear in landing
configuration test for approach to an airport with a 1 500 FPM descent rate. Ensure the TAWS provides a
single aural callout of ‘Five Hundred’ or equivalent within one second of the aircraft descending through
500 feet above terrain or the runway threshold elevation (when comparing the aircraft’s barometric or
geometric altitude against the database runway elevation).
9.2 CLASS B EQUIPMENT ALTITUDE CALLOUT TEST REQUIREMENTS. Instead of using height of terrain as
determined by a radio altimeter, determine height above runway by subtracting the runway elevation (from
the airport database) from the current barometric altitude, GNSS altitude, or equivalent, if a radio altimeter
input is unavailable. When the height above the runway value first reaches 500 feet, a single voice callout
(‘Five Hundred’) or equivalent must be provided.
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APPENDIX 3
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 This Appendix describes modifications to this ETSO for the GA category of aircraft that is not required to
have TAWS equipment installed. Class C equipment is intended for small GA aeroplanes that are not required
to install Class B equipment.
1.2 This Appendix contains only modifications to existing requirements in this ETSO. It is intended that Class
C meet all Class B requirements that are not modified or addressed here. The paragraph numbers below relate
directly to the paragraphs in Appendices 1 and 2.
2.0 Class C TAWS equipment must meet all of the requirements of a Class B TAWS with the modifications
described herein. If the equipment is designed only to function as Class C, per these modifications, it should be
appropriately marked as Class C so that it can be uniquely distinguished from the Class A and Class B TAWS
required by the EU Regulation on Air Operations.
1.1 Phase of Flight Definitions. For Appendix 3, the terms ‘takeoff’, ‘cruise’, and ‘landing’ are used instead of
‘departure’, ‘enroute’, and ‘approach’ because they are more suitable to the GA environment.
— Takeoff—positive ROC, inside traffic area, distance to nearest runway threshold is increasing, and
aeroplane is below 1 000 feet.
— Cruise — anytime the aeroplane is outside the airport traffic control area.
— Landing — inside traffic area and distance to nearest runway threshold is decreasing, and aeroplane is
below 1 000 feet.
1.2 Altitude Accuracy and Display. A means must be provided to compute an actual MSL aircraft altitude
value that is immune to temperature errors and manual correction mis-sets that would otherwise prevent the
TAWS from performing its intended function. This type of altitude is derived primarily from geometric sources
such as GPS, and referenced to MSL typically via a database correction. If the TAWS includes a terrain display,
this reference altitude value used for the TAWS alerts should also be indicated to the pilot on the display. The
altitude value should be labelled according to AC 20-163, Displaying Geometric Altitude Relative to Mean Sea
Level, which recommends ‘GSL’.
1.3 (f)(3) System Function and Overview. This data is pilot selectable for both ‘altitude’ and ‘inhibit’.
3.1.1 Reduced Required Terrain Clearance (RTC). The required terrain clearance in the alternate table 3.1.1
applies to small aircraft flying visually, and the TERPS criteria need not apply to TAWS. Thus, ROC numbers
that are more appropriate to low level flight have been chosen.
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Alternate Table 3.1.1
Note: 1: During the takeoff phase of flight, the FLTA function must alert if the aircraft is projected to be
within 100 feet vertically of terrain. However, the equipment should not alert if the aircraft is
projected to be more than 250 feet above the terrain.
3.3.c Voice Callouts. This data is pilot selectable for both ‘altitude’ and ‘inhibit’.
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Table 4-1
Note: 1: The aural alert for ground proximity voice callout is considered advisory.
Note: 2: Visual alerts may be put on the terrain situational awareness display, if this fits with the overall
human factors alerting scheme for the flight deck. This does not eliminate the visual alert color
requirements, even in the case of a monochromatic display. Typically in such a scenario, adjacent
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colored enunciator lamps meet the alerting color requirements. Audio alerts are still required
regardless of terrain display visual alerts.
Note: 1: Paragraph 1.1 of this ETSO is not applicable; for small aircraft, only the ‘takeoff,’ ‘cruise,’ and
‘final approach to landing’ phases of flight are considered.
Note: 2: Paragraph 1.2 of this ETSO is changed to specify altitude levels, test speeds, and pull-ups more
appropriate for small aircraft.
1.2 Cruise Descent Requirements. A terrain alert must be provided in time to ensure that the aeroplane
can L/O with a minimum of 200 feet altitude clearance over the terrain/obstacle when descending toward
the terrain/obstacle at any speed within the operational flight envelope of the aeroplane. The test
conditions assume a descent along a flight path with terrain that is 500 feet below the expected L/O
altitude. If the pilot initiates the L/O at the proper altitude, no TAWS alert is expected. However, if the
pilot is distracted or otherwise delays the L/O, a TAWS alert is required to permit the pilot to recover to
level flight in a safe manner.
a. Table A, column A, represents the test condition. Columns B, C, and D are for information purposes
only. Column E represents the minimum altitude for which TAWS alerts must be posted in order to
perform their intended function. Column F represents the maximum altitude for which TAWS alerts may
be provided in order to meet the nuisance alert criteria. See Appendix 2, paragraph 4.0.
b. For each of the descent rates specified below, recovery to level flight at or above 200 feet terrain
clearance is required.
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c. Test Conditions for cruise descent requirements:
Note: 1: The actual values for the aeroplane altitude, distance and time from the terrain cell when caution
and warning alerts are posted, and the minimum terrain clearance altitude must be recorded.
Note: 2: Cruise operations are considered to exist beyond the airport control area until inside the
destination airport control area for VFR operations. Distances may extend to 10 NM from the
airport (takeoff and landing) for IFR operations. Use of the nearest runway logic is permissible
provided suitable logic is incorporated to ensure that the transitions to the terminal logic will
typically occur only when the aeroplane is in terminal airspace.
Note: 3: The values shown in column E may be reduced by 50 feet (to permit a L/O at 150 feet above the
obstacle) provided that it demonstrates that the basic TAWS Mode 1 alert (sink rate) is issued at
or above the altitude specified in column E for typical terrain topographies.
Note: 4: The values shown in column F are appropriate for an aeroplane without an autopilot or flight
director function, and are based upon 10–15 %of the vertical velocity, which is appropriate to
manual flight and small, GA aeroplane operations.
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Table A
Note: Paragraph 1.3 in this ETSO is changed to specify altitude levels, test speeds, and pull-ups more
appropriate to small aircraft.
1.3 Cruise Level Flight Requirement. During level flight operations (vertical speed is ± 200 feet per minute),
a terrain alert should be posted when the aeroplane is within 250 feet of the terrain and is predicted to be
equal to or less than 200 feet within the prescribed test criteria. See Table B for test criteria.
Note: The actual values for the aeroplane altitude, distance, and time from the terrain cell when caution
and warning alerts are posted must be recorded.
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Table B
1.6 Final Approach Descent Requirements. Revised to specify altitude levels, test speeds, and pull-ups more
appropriate to small aircraft:
a. Table E, column A, represents the test conditions. Columns B, C, and D are for information purposes
only. Column E represents the minimum altitude for which TAWS alerts must be posted in order to
perform their intended function. Column F represents the maximum altitude for which TAWS alerts may
be provided in order to meet the nuisance alert criteria. See Appendix 2, paragraph 4.0.
b. For each of the descent rates specified below, recovery to level flight at or above 100 feet terrain
clearance is required.
Note 1: The actual values for the aeroplane altitude, distance and time from the terrain cell when
caution and warning alerts are posted, and the minimum terrain clearance altitude must be recorded.
Note 2: The values shown in column F are appropriate for an aeroplane without an autopilot or flight
director function, and are based upon 10 %of the vertical velocity that is appropriate for manual flight
and small, GA aeroplane operations.
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Table E
2.0 through 2.2 FORWARD-LOOKING TERRAIN AVOIDANCE IMMINENT INPACT TEST CONDITIONS.
Apply using Table G for speed cases of 100 through 250 knots; however, change the incremental
pull from 0.25g to 1.0g as described in note 2.
3.0 through 3.1 PREMATURE DESCENT ALERT TEST CONDITIONS. Apply as written.
4.2 2 000 FPM. Descent must be possible at 2 000 FPM and pilots must be able to L/O at 500 feet above the
terrain using a normal L/O procedure (leading by 10 %of the vertical speed), without a caution or warning alert.
4.3 1 000 FPM. Descent must be possible at 1 000 FPM in a final approach segment and pilots must be able to
L/O at 250 feet using the normal L/O procedure described in 4.2 above, without a caution or warning alert.
5.0 NUISANCE TEST CONDITIONS FOR HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL FLIGHT TECHNICAL ERRORS. Applicable as
written.
5.1 Test Cases. Is applicable as written; however, test cases are limited to locations 3, 6, 7, and 8 in table I.
6.0 TEST CONDITIONS USING KNOWN ACCIDENT CASES. Paragraphs 6.0 through 6.3 of Appendix 2 are to be
determined by the applicant using actual National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) or national equivalent
entity GA accidents. Since detailed data is usually not available, reasonable constructed scenarios matching the
actual known accident data may be demonstrated. Pulls of up to 1.0g may be used instead of the 0.25g as
specified in paragraph 6.2, computation and recording.
7.0 CLASS C EQUIPMENT TEST REQUIREMENTS FOR EXCESSIVE DESCENT RATE. Apply Class B as written.
8.0 CLASS C EQUIPMENT TEST REQUIREMENTS FOR NEGATIVE CLIMB RATE OR ALTITUDE LOSS AFTER
TAKEOFF. Apply Class B as written.
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9.0 CLASS C EQUIPMENT TEST REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ALTITUDE CALLOUTS. Apply Class B as written.
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European
Union
Aviation
Safety
Agency
European Technical Standard Order (ETSO)
Subject: NEXT GENERATION SATELLITE SYSTEMS (NGSS) EQUIPMENT
1— Applicability
This ETSO provides the requirements which next generation satellite systems (NGSS) equipment
that are is designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be
identified with the applicable ETSO marking.
2— Procedures
2.1 — General
The Aapplicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None.
3— Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
The Sstandards are those set forth provided in the EUROCAE ED-243RTCA DO-262B, Minimum
Operational Performance Standards for Avionics Supporting Next Generation Satellite Systems
(NGSS), dated April, 2017June 17, 2014; except that they are not required to meet any requirement
of RTCA DO-326, Airworthiness Security Process Specification, in Normative Appendix D or E (as
applicable) where referenced.
Note: There are no MPS security requirements for NGSS equipment. However, a security risk
assessment may be required at the time of installation, and if needed, security controls may be
implemented in connected aircraft systems or addressed by flight crew procedures.
3.1.2 — Environmental Standard
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1.
3.1.3 — Software
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.2.
3.1.4 — Airborne Electronic Hardware
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.3
3.2 — Specific
The MPS allows for different equipment classes and subclasses as defined by EUROCAE
ED-243RTCA DO-262B. There are 6 applicable equipment classes and 13 equipment subclass
components identified as shown in Tables 1A, 1B and Tables 2A, 2B of this ETSO. Tables 1A and 2A
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show the requirements for satellite communication (short burst data) (SATCOM (SBD)) equipment
classes and subclass components, and Tables 1B and 2B show the requirements for satellite
communication (swiftbroadband) (SATCOM (SBB)) equipment classes and subclass
components(see RTCA DO-262B, Appendix D and Appendix E). The manufacturer must declare the
equipment class requirements from those identified in the applicable appendix table of this ETSO.
The equipment configuration shall satisfy the relevant requirements of the EUROCAE ED-243 RTCA
DO-262B minimum operational performance standards (MOPS) as identified in Tables 1A and 1B
and 2A and 2B in Appendix 1 of this ETSO.
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Subclass Identifier Description Requirement
transceiver and IGA for use
with AES7.
This ETSO standard applies to equipment intended for long-range communication services,
procedural and continental communication services, aeronautical mobile satellite (route) services
(AMS(R)S) by means of satellite communications between AES, corresponding satellites, and
ground earth stations (GES). The NGSS supports voice and data communications, or data and voice
communications, between aircraft users and ground-based users, such as air navigation service
providers (ANSPs) and aircraft operators.
Equipment class AES1 supports data communications only. All other equipment classes support
both data and voice communications.
(1)The functionality of an NGSS supports four categories of communication service in the aircraft
control domain (ACD) and/or aircraft information services domain (AISD). Two are in the safety of
flight category: communication used for air traffic services (ATS) and aeronautical operational
control (AOC) communication. The other two are in the non-safety of flight category: aeronautical
administrative communication (AAC) and special-purpose aeronautical passenger communication
(APC) under the physical or virtual access control of the flight crew.
EUROCAE ED-243, Normative Appendix E, also contains provisions for supporting a non-priority
communications service known as passenger information and entertainment services (PIES).
EUROCAE ED-243, Normative Appendix E, states that non-priority services are outside the scope of
that Appendix. However, PIES communications, if supported, must be partitioned from
communications in the ACD and AISD for security reasons. Therefore, PIES communications are
non-ETSO functions, and equipment that supports shared ACD and PIES communications must
provide security partitioning of the PIES functionality from priority communications services in the
ACD and AISD in accordance with this ETSO.
See paragraphs 3.1.3, 3.1.4, 3.2.1, 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 of this ETSO for specific additional data,
design/security assurance and verification requirements related to the required security
partitioning for equipment intended to support shared ACD/AISD and PIES communications.
(2) NGSS equipment is intended for procedural/continental airspace area operations. The failure
conditions specified in paragraph 3.2.1 of this ETSO have been determined based on NGSS
equipment that supplements or complements primary HF/VHF voice or data communications in
procedural/continental airspace area operations, and on equipment that provides ‘Segregation &
arbitration’ as described in EUROCAE ED-243, Appendix E, Section 1.3.4, or the equivalent
functionalityoperating as an approved Long-Range Communication System (LRCS) in oceanic
airspace area environments. Use of NGSS equipment in other operating environments (for
example, high density terminal/en route airspace) may impact equipment performance and safety
considerations.
3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4.
A loss or malfunction of the security partitioning required by paragraph 3.2 of this ETSO that
enables unauthorised or inadvertent access to ACD or AISD communications from outside the ACD
or AISD is a major failure condition.
Failure A loss or malfunction of the functions defined in paragraph 3.b1 of this ETSO, except for a
loss or malfunction of the security partitioning required by paragraph 3.2 of this ETSO, is a minor
failure condition.
Loss of the function as defined in paragraph 3.b of this ETSO is a minor failure condition.
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Note: The use of NGSS equipment as the sole means of routine ATS communication may change
the classification of the failure conditions. for primary voice or data communications may
necessitate the development of the NGSS equipment to a higher design assurance level than
required for the failure criticality levels specified above and may drive a revision to this ETSO.
4— Marking
4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.
4.2 — Specific
The NGSS class and subclass markings shall include the complete equipment identifier reference
(such as AES1, AES4, or AES7). An example subclass component (such as a high-gain antenna (HGA),
Transceiver, or Diplexer/Low Noise Amplifier(DLNA)) marking would display AES6 -2/HGA, Type A
Transceiver AES7-7/7MA, or Type F Diplexer AES6-3/DF, etc.
For valid combinations of system component markings, see tTable 3 below in Appendix 1 to this
ETSO.
Table 3 — Valid Combinations of System Components
Valid EUROCAE Transceiver Transcei DLNA Antenna Compl
Combinat ED- ver & ete
ions 243Norm DLNA Syste
ative m
LGA (passive)
Appendix
DMA
6MA
7MA
HGA
SBD
IGA
LBT
6D
7D
DF
6F
7F
AES 1 D x
1 2 D x x
AES 3 D
2 4 D x x
AES 5 D x
3 6 D x x x
AES 1 E x
4
AES 2 E x x x
5 3 E x x x
4 E x x
5 E x x x
6 E x
AES 7 E x x x
7 8 E x x x
9 E x x
10 E x x x
11 E x
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Appendix 1
Tables
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Table 2: Equipment Sub-Class Identifiers
Sub-Class
Description Requirement
Identifier
LGA Passive LGA for use with AES1, AES2 or Appendix D, Section 2.2.3.1.1
AES3.
IGA Active IGA for AES3. Appendix D, Section 2.2.3.1.1
HGA Active HGA for AES3. Appendix D, Section 2.2.3.1.1
HGA HGA for AES6. Appendix E, Section 2.2.3.1.2
IGA IGA for AES7. Appendix E, Section 2.2.3.1.2
6MA Transceiver, SDU Configuration Module Appendix E, Section 2.2.1.1.5
(SCM), SDU, Modified Type A (DMA)
DLNA, and HGA for use with AES6.
7MA Transceiver, SDU, SCM, DMA DLNA, and Appendix E, Section 2.2.1.1.7
IGA for use with AES7.
6D Transceiver and DLNA combination Appendix E, Section 2.2.1.1.9
includes SDU, High Power Amplifier (HPA),
DLNA, SCM, and HGA functions for use
with AES6.
7D Transceiver and DLNA combination Appendix E, Section
includes SDU, HPA, DLNA, SCM, and IGA 2.2.1.1.10
functions for use with AES7.
6F Transceiver and Type F (DF) DLNA Appendix E, Section 2.2.1.1.6
includes SDU, HPA, SCM, and HGA
functions for use with AES6.
7F Transceiver and DF DLNA includes SDU, Appendix E, Section 2.2.1.1.8
HPA, SCM, and IGA functions for use with
AES7.
DMA DLNA with standard Transmitter (Tx) filter Appendix E, Section
configures with 6MA transceiver and HGA 2.2.1.1.11
for use with AES6, or 7MA transceiver and
IGA for use with AES7.
DF DLNA with enhanced Tx filter configures Appendix E, Section
with 6MA or 6F transceiver and HGA for 2.2.1.1.12
use with AES6, or with 7MA or 7F
transceiver and IGA for use with AES7.
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Table 3: Valid Combinations of System Components
Trans-
Transceiver ceiver DLNA Antenna
& DLNA
Complete System
IGA switched beam
IGA/HGA phased
steering array
LGA (passive)
Valid
Combi- System
DMA
nations
6MA
7MA
HGA
SBD
IGA
LBT
6D
7D
DF
6F
7F
Appendix
1 X
D
AES1
Appendix
2 X X
D
Appendix
3 X
D
AES2
Appendix
4 X X
D
Appendix
5 X
D
Appendix
6 X X X
D
AES3
Appendix
7 X X X
D
Appendix
8 X X X
D
AES Appendix
1 X
4 E
Appendix
2 X X X
E
Appendix
3 X X X
E
AES Appendix
4 X X
6 E
Appendix
5 X X X
E
Appendix
6 X
E
Appendix
7 X X X
E
Appendix
8 X X X
E
AES Appendix
9 X X
7 E
Appendix
10 X X X
E
Appendix
11 X
E
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European
Union
Aviation
Safety
Agency
1 — Applicability
This ETSO gives provides the requirements which VDL Mode 2 communications equipment that
isare designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be
identified with the applicable ETSO marking.
2 — Procedures
2.1 — General
The Aapplicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None.
3 — Technical cConditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum pPerformance sStandard
The applicable Sstandards are those set forth provided in the EUROCAE ED-92B, Minimum
Operational Performance Standards for Aircraft VDL Mode 2 Physical, Link, and Network Layer,
dated 21 /03/March 2012, or in EUROCAE ED-92C, Minimum Operational Performance Standards
for an Airborne VDL Mode-2 System Operating in the Frequency Range 118-136.975 MHz, dated
September 2018. ED-92B is identical to RTCA DO-281B. ED-92C is identical to RTCA DO-281C.
Compliance shall be demonstrated entirely with one of the versions of the applicable minimum
operational performance standards.
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See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4.
A failure of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO has been determined to be a minor
failure condition.
4 — Marking
4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.
4.2 — Specific
None.
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European
Union
Aviation
Safety
Agency
European Technical Standard Order (ETSO)
1 — Applicability
This ETSO gives provides the requirements that any electronic map system for the graphical
depiction of aircraft position (own-ship), designed and manufactured on or after the date of this
ETSO, must meet in order to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.
This ETSO applies to equipment that is intended to provide a graphical depiction of advisory
information on a display (e.g. navigation, traffic, weather, obstacles, graphical taxi routing, etc.).
The system is intended to improve flight crew positional awareness of the aircraft own -ship
position relative to other items depicted on the display.
2 — Procedures
2.1 — General
The Aapplicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
Applications to certify only the software without certifying the hardware and/or the operating
system will be accepted. Nevertheless, the applicant has to specify the requirements for the
hardware and/or the operating system to be used, the tests to be performed once the software
is integrated into the final system, and the environment which has been used to demonstrate
the functionality of the system functionality.
2.3 — Databases
If the article includes database(s), each database must be processed in accordance with the
requirements in EUROCAE ED-76A, Standards For Processing Aeronautical Data, dated June 2015,
or RTCA DO-200B, Standards for Processing Aeronautical Data, dated 18 June 2015.
3 — Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard (MPS)
New models of electronic map systems that are to be so identified and that are manufactured
on or after the effective date of this ETSO must meet the The applicable standards are those
set forth provided for moving map equipment in Section 2 of RTCA document DO-257BA,
‘Minimum Operational Performance Standards for the Depiction of Navigational Information on
Electronic Maps’, dated 22 March 2018June, 25, 2003 as amended by Appendix 1 to this ETSO.
Electronic map systems may include displays, controls, and processing equipment that is
intended to provide a graphical depiction of navigation information on the display (e.g. flight
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plans, fixes, navaids, electronic charts, terrain, weather, obstacles, aerodrome surfaces,
graphical taxi routing, etc.). The electronic map system improves flight crew positional
awareness of the aircraft relative to other items depicted on the display. The standards were
updated to support required navigation performance (RNP) systems, specifically when the in-
flight (plan view) and vertical situation display (VSD) maps are displaying defined paths that are
generated by the RNP system.
1) Electronic Map Systems for use in flight must meet the MPS in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 of RTCA/DO-
257A as amended by Appendix 1 to this ETSO;
2) Electronic Map Systems for use on the airport surface – AMMD applications - must meet the MPS
in Sections 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 of RTCA/DO-257A as amended by Appendix 1 to this ETSO; and
3) Electronic Map Systems including Vertical Situation Displays (VSD) for use in facilitating pilot’s
awareness of the aircraft’s vertical flight path must meet the MPS in Sections 2.1, 2.2, and 2.4 of
RTCA/DO-257A as amended by Appendix 1 to this ETSO.
Table 1 provides the RTCA DO-257B requirements that are applicable to each specific function
of the summarises the functional description and applicable MPS requirements for electronic
map systems.
In flight X X X
Table 1
Demonstrate the required functional performance under the test conditions specified in
RTCA/DO-257A, Section 2.6 as modified by appendix 1 of this ETSO.
Displays that are part of the electronic map system must also be approved in accordance with
ETSO-C113 at the latest revision.
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3.2 — Specific
3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4. For the definitions of the intended functions see RTCA/DO-257A
section 1.4. RTCA DO-257B Section 2.1.8 defines the minimum failure condition classifications for the
specific electronic map system functions that are summarised in Table 1, except for the loss of the
aerodrome moving map display, which is a minor failure condition.
Failure of the functions defined in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO for Electronic Map Systems used in flight
and VSD equipment (airborne applications) have been determined to be a major failure condition for
malfunctions causing the incorrect depiction of aircraft position (own-ship).
Loss of function for Electronic Map Systems used in flight and VSD equipment (airborne applications) has
been determined to be a minor failure condition.
Failure of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO for Electronic Map Systems used on the
airport surface (ground applications) have been determined to be a minor failure condition for
malfunctions causing the incorrect depiction of aircraft position (own-ship).
Loss of function for Electronic Map Displays used on the airport surface (ground applications) is
determined to be a no safety effect failure condition.
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accuracy requirements of RTCA DO-257B, Section 2.4.1.1; and
— a requirement stating that the aeronautical database(s) associated with the electronic map
system, whether internal or external to the electronic map system, must demonstrate
compliance with EUROCAE ED-76A/RTCA DO-200B, or its subsequent revisions as required in
paragraph 2.3 of this ETSO.
4 — Marking
4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.
4.2 — Specific
None.
5 — Availability of Referenced Documents
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 3.
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Appendix 1
Additional Requirements for Electronic Map Systems
This appendix defines changes to the Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for
Electronic Map Systems specified in RTCA/DO-257A, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for
the Depiction of Navigational Information on Electronic Maps, dated June, 25, 2003.
Some changes replace sections of RTCA/DO-257A. Other just add additional text; in this latter case the
additional text is underlined.
2. Database (Navigation)
2.2.5 The first paragraph from 2.2.5 and the current sub-section 5 has been replaced, two new sub-sections
to 2.2.5 have been added:
As an alternative to (or in addition to) an external data source, the EMD may use an internal database
to store information such as flight plans, nearby fixes, airspace boundaries, raster aeronautical charts,
or airport mapping information. If an internal or external database is being used, the following
requirements apply: …
- Subsection 5 changes are underlined:
5. The processes of producing and updating aeronautical databases shall meet the standards
specified in EUROCAE ED-76/RTCA DO-200A Standards for Processing Aeronautical Data, dated
October 1998 or subsequent revisions.
- Add the following new subsections:
7. Specification of the Data Quality Requirements (DQRs) for the EMD system shall be developed
and incorporated as part of the compliance documentation (Reference EUROCAE ED-76/RTCA DO-
200A, section 2.3.2).
8. Corruption of the map database shall be detected and annunciated to the flight crew clearly and
in a timely manner.
3. Runways
2.3.1.1.1 The current sub-section 6 of section 2.3.1.1.1 has been deleted and replaced by:
6. The aerodrome database accuracy for runway data elements shall meet medium category data
quality as defined in EUROCAE ED-99C/RTCA DO-272C User Requirements for Aerodrome Mapping
Information, dated September 2011, or subsequent revisions.
- The following new subsection is added:
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7. The total system accuracy shall be sufficient for the AMMD intended function, and shall not
exceed 50 meters (95 %). The position source accuracy (36 m) and total database accuracy (5 m)
may be reallocated, if the total system accuracy remains less than or equal to 50 meters. The
formula for calculating total system accuracy is:
√[(Position Source Accuracy)2 + (Total Database Accuracy)2 + (Latency Effects)2 + (Display Errors)2 ]
+ |𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝑃𝑆 𝐴𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑎 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑡| = Total System Accuracy
4. Taxiways
2.3.1.1.2 In page 32, the current sub-section 4 of section 2.3.1.1.2 has been deleted and replaced by:
4. When depicted, the aerodrome database accuracy for taxiway data elements shall meet medium
category data quality as defined in RTCA DO-272C/ED-99C, or subsequent revisions.
Note: For airports where no known taxiway data is published and errors are noted, operators
using the moving map will report database errors to the database supplier as described in
section 2.3.5.
5. The total system accuracy shall be sufficient for the AMMD intended function, and shall not
exceed 50 meters (95 %). The position source accuracy (36 m) and total database accuracy (5 m)
may be reallocated, if the total system accuracy remains less than or equal to 50 meters. The
formula for calculating total system accuracy is:
√[(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦)2 + (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦)2 + (𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠)2 + (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑦 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠)2
|𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝑃𝑆 𝐴𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑎 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑡| = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦
6. Database (AMMD)
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Both internal and external EMD databases shall meet the following requirements: …
- By keeping the notes sub-section 2 of section 2.3.5 has been deleted and replaced by:
2. The processes of producing and updating aerodrome databases shall meet the standards specified
in EUROCAE ED-76/RTCA DO-200A or subsequent revisions. Description of the data quality
requirements (DQRs) for the EMD database shall be specified (Reference EUROCAE ED-76/RTCA
DO-200A, section 2.3.2).
Section 2.6 is modified so as to include all additional and modified requirements stated above in the applicable
test sections.
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ETSO-C168
Date: XX.XX.20XX
European
Union
Aviation
Safety
Agency
1 — Applicability
This ETSO provides the requirements which aviation visual distress signals that are designed and
manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the
applicable ETSO marking.
2 — Procedures
2.1 — General
The applicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None.
3 — Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
For handheld, high-intensity, stroboscopic light sources that can be added to aviation survival kits
to supplement pyrotechnic devices, the standards are those provided in SAE International’s
Aerospace Standard AS5134A, Aviation Distress Signal, dated 27 September 2007.
3.1.2 — Environmental Standard
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1.
3.1.3 — Software
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.2.
3.1.4 — Airborne Electronic Hardware
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.3.
3.2 — Specific
3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4.
3.2.2 — Others
These light sources must:
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— eliminate the significant potential equipment and personnel hazards that are posed by
untrained personnel using pyrotechnics in inflatable life rafts; and
— provide an equivalent level of safety to pyrotechnics that aid in locating and rescuing aviation
accident survivors.
4 — Marking
4.1 — General
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.
4.2 — Specific
None.
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3. Proposed amendments
ETSO-C176ab
Date: 21.02.2018 XX.XX.20XX
European
Union
Aviation
Safety
Agency
European Technical Standard Order (ETSO)
Subject: AIRCRAFT COCKPIT IM AGE RECORDER SYSTEMS
1— Applicability
This ETSO provides the requirements that aircraft cockpit image recorder (CIR) systems (CIR) that are
designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with
the applicable ETSO marking.
2— Procedures
2.1 — General
The Aapplicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None
All the information specified in EUROCAE ED-112A, Section 2-1, 2-1.3.4, excluding item 6, shall be
documented in a manual and be made available to the accident investigation authorities on request. In
addition, if special tools or recovery techniques are used to retrieve recorded information from any
memory device used within the crash-protected memory module removed from a crash-damaged
recorder, these tools/recovery techniques shall be also made available to the accident investigation
authorities on request.
Note: Requests from accident investigation authorities can be independent of any ongoing investigation.
3— Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
The applicable Sstandards are those set forth provided in the applicable sections of EUROCAE document
ED-112A, MOPS for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems, dated September 2013, that pertain to
the cockpit image recorder (CIR) type, except Chapters III-1 and III-6, and Sections 2-1.1, 2-1.5, 2-1.6,
2-1.11, 2-1.12, 2-3.1, 2-5, 3, 3-1.1, 3-1.2, 3-1.3, 3-1.4, 3-1.5 , 3-1.7 Annex III-A, Annex III-B, and other
ED-112A requirements related to aircraft-level equipment installation, flight testing, and aircraft
maintenance as modified in Appendix 1 of this ETSO.
The table below lists the types of recorder types and the ED-112A section or part with that contains the
MPS for each of them:
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Table 1. — CIR MPS Requirements
CIR Type ED-112A Reference
Single CIR in a non-deployable Section 2 and Part III.
recorder
CIR function in a deployable recorder Section 2, Section 3 (except for tests
covered by ETSO-2C517) and Part III.
The recorder shall also comply with
ETSO-2C517.
CIR function in a combined Section 2, Section 4 and Part III.
non-deployable recorder
CIR function in a combined deployable Section 2 (except for the tests covered
recorder by ETSO-2C517), Section 4 and Part I.
The recorder shall also comply with
ETSO-2C517.
Note: aA CIR article may cover multiple types. A CIR may be a combined CIR and may also be deployable,
in which case the applicable MOPS are in Sections 2, 3, 4 and Part I, following the table above.
3.1.2 — Environmental Standard
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1.
3.1.3 — Software
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.2.
3.1.4 — Airborne Electronic Hardware
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.3.
3.2 — Specific
3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4.
A Ffailure of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO is a minor failure condition.
A Lloss of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO is a minor failure condition.
Note: tThe failure classification requirement is driven by the use of recorders in accident investigations.
4— Marking
4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.
4.2 — Specific
4.2.1 — Lettering Identification
The equipment shall comply with the identification requirement in EUROCAE ED-112A, Section 2-1,
paragraph 2-1.16.3, if it is fixed, and Section 3-1, paragraph 3-1.8.3, if it is deployable.
5— Availability of Referenced Documents
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 3.
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APPENDIX 1
The standard EUROCAE ED-112A, MOPS for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems, dated September
2013, shall be modified as per Table 1 below.
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ETSO-C177ab
Date: 19.12.2016 XX.XX.20XX
European
Union
Aviation
Safety
Agency
European Technical Standard Order (ETSO)
Subject: DATA LINK RECORDER EQUIPMENT
1— Applicability
This ETSO gives provides the requirements that new models of data link recorder systems that are
designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with
the applicable ETSO marking.
2— Procedures
2.1 — General
The Aapplicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None
All the information specified in EUROCAE ED-112A, Section 2-1, 2-1.3.4, excluding item 6, shall be
documented in a manual and be made available to the accident investigation authorities on request. In
addition, if special tools or recovery techniques are used to retrieve recorded information from any
memory device used within the crash-protected memory module removed from a crash-damaged
recorder, these tools/recovery techniques shall be also made available to the accident investigation
authorities on request.
Note: Requests from accident investigation authorities can be independent of any ongoing investigation.
3— Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
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3.2 — Specific
3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4.
A Lloss or erroneous behaviour of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO has been
determined to be a minor failure condition.
Note: tThe failure classification is driven by the accident investigation need the use of recorders in
accident investigations.
4— Marking
4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2
4.2 — Specific
See EUROCAE document ED-112A Section 2-1, paragraph 2-1.16.3, if the recorder is fixed, and
Section 3-1, paragraph 3-1.8.3, if it is deployable.
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Date: 21.02.2018 XX.XX.20XX
APPENDIX 1
The standard EUROCAE ED-112A, MOPS for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems, dated
September 2013, shall be modified as per Table 1 below.
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ETSO-C179ab
Date: 05.07.2012 XX.XX.20XX
European
Union
Aviation
Safety
Agency
Subject: PERMANENTLY INSTALLED RECHARGEABLE LITHIUM CELLS, BATTERIES, AND BATTERY SYSTEMS
1 — Applicability
This ETSO gives provides the requirements which permanetly installed rechargeable lithium cells,
batteries, and battery systems that are designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO
must meet in order to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.
2 — Procedures
2.1 — General
The Aapplicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None.
3 — Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
For equipment with rechargeable lithium cells, lithium batteries and battery systems that are
intended to provide power for aircraft equipment, including emergency systems , permanently
installed rechargeable lithium cells, batteries and lithium battery systems intended to provide
power for aircraft equipment S the applicable standards are those set forth provided in Sections 2
and 3 of Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) Document DO-311A, Minimum
Operational Performance Standards for Rechargeable Lithium Batteries and Battery Systems,
dated 19 December 2017March 13, 2008. Refer to Table 4-1 of DO-311 for test schedule
information. However, the demonstration of compliance with this ETSO may not rely on
Appendix C of DO-311A.
3.1.2 — Environmental Standard
Test the equipment according to Section 3 of RTCA/ DO-311A, Minimum Operational Performance
Standards for Rechargeable Lithium Batteries and Battery Systems document dated
19 December 2017March 13, 2008.
3.1.3 — Computer Software
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.2.
3.1.4 — Airborne Electronic Hardware Qualification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.3.
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3.2 — Specific
3.2.1 —Failure Condition Classification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4.
Failure of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO has been determined to be a major
failure condition.
4 — Marking
4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.
4.2 — Specific
The Sspecific marking requirements are detailed in Section 1.9.72.13 of RTCA/ DO-311A, Minimum
Operational Performance Standards for Rechargeable Lithium Batteries and Battery Systems
document, dated 19 December 2017March 13, 2008.
In addition, the article must be marked with:
— its serial number;
— ‘ETSO-C179b-CLASS A-XY’ or ‘ETSO C179b-CLASS B-XY’ as shown below (where X stands for the
energy category and Y stands for the venting category as listed in the table below and defined
in RTCA DO-311A Sections 1.4.1 and 1.4.2):
o ETSO-C179b CLASS A — During the RTCA DO-311A Section 2.4.5.5 Battery Thermal
Runaway Containment Test, all the cells within the battery must undergo thermal
runaways.
o ETSO-C179b CLASS B — During the RTCA DO-311A Section 2.4.5.5 Battery Thermal
Runaway Containment Test, not all the cells within the battery undergo thermal
runaways.
(For example: ETSO-C179b CLASS B-1A would be a rechargeable lithium battery and battery
system that is of energy category 1 and a venting category of A, and not all the cells
underwent thermal runaways during the RTCA DO-311A Section 2.4.5.5 testing.)
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ETSO-C196ab
Date: 05.07.2012 XX.XX.20XX
European
Union
Aviation
Safety
Agency
1 — Applicability
This ETSO gives provides the requirements which airborne supplemental navigation sensors for Global
Positioning System equipment using aircraft-based augmentation that are designed and
manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the applicable
ETSO marking.
This ETSO cancels ETSO-C129a Airborne Supplemental Navigation Equipment Using Global
Positioning System (GPS)
Note: Revision b provides applicants with the option to use an ETSO-2C206 GPS GNSS circuit card
assembly (CCA) as part of their ETSO application. There is no technical change to the MOPS in
comparison with ETSO-C196a.
2 — Procedures
2.1 — General
The Aapplicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None
This section applies only for ETSO articles that use an ETSO-2C206 GNSS CCA.
Applicants who use an ETSO-2C206 GNSS CCA will need to coordinate with their GNSS CCA supplier
for at least the following aspects:
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3 — Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
The applicable Sstandards are those set forth provided in the Radio Technical Commission for
Aeronautics (RTCA) document DO-316, Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for
Global Positioning System/Aircraft Based Augmentation System Airborne Equipment, dated
14 /04/April 2009, Section 2.
A Ffailure of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO has been determined to be a
major failure condition for a malfunction of oceanic/remote, en route and terminal navigation and
lateral navigation (LNAV) approaches.
A Ffailure of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO has been determined to be a
minor failure condition for a loss of navigation of oceanic/remote, en route and terminal navigation
and lateral navigation (LNAV) approaches.
Note: These failure condition classifications are considered to be the minimum classifications.
Guidance for the installation of navigation systems at the aircraft level (e.g. Certification
Specifications and Acceptable Means of Compliance for Airborne Communications, Navigation and
Surveillance (CS-ACNS)) could require a different failure condition classification.
4 — Marking
4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.
4.2 — Specific
None.
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ETSO-C196ab
Date: 05.07.2012 XX.XX.20XX
APPENDIX 1
END-USE EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER TESTS FOR GNSS CCA FUNCTIONAL PVT SENSORS
USED FOR NAVIGATION AND NON-NAVIGATION APPLICATIONS
1 — Scope
This Appendix describes the required supplementary equipment level testing, in addition to the
environmental testing of RTCA DO-316, Section 2.2, that the manufacturer of the end-use equipment is
required to conduct in order to receive an ETSO-C196b authorisation if they use an ETSO-2C206 GNSS CCA
functional sensor. These test procedures are intended to streamline and simplify the ETSO-C196b
authorisation process for the manufacturer of the end-use equipment by allowing credit for the design and
selected testing performed at the GNSS CCA functional sensor level. However, the manufacturer of the end-
use equipment remains fully responsible for the design and control of the article per their ETSO-C196b
authorisation.
2 — General principles
(a) The testing methods for GPS equipment have been standardised by RTCA DO-316, and these serve
as the basis for ETSO-C196b. RTCA DO-316 was written to cover equipment that can be installed
on aircraft. Section 2.2 specifically addresses the issues of the environment in which the
equipment operates, and provides the approved test methods to validate its performance in this
environment. Section 2.2 represents the RTCA consensus in identifying which RTCA DO-316
requirements are sensitive to environmental effects. These requirements are listed in Table 2-2
referenced in Section 2.2.1.
(b) The determination that an MOPS requirement is susceptible to the environment does not depend
on whether or not the implementation is a GNSS CCA within an ETSO-C196b article. Only the
sensitivity to the environment is affected. This is the same concept as an equipment enclosure
that is designed to protect against a benign environment compared with one that is designed for
a severe environment; the identification of the susceptible requirements is the same.
(c) Therefore, this Appendix uses Table 2-2 of RTCA DO-316, Section 2.2.1, to identify the MOPS
requirements that are susceptible to environmental conditions for a GNSS CCA functional sensor
in the end-use equipment. The focus is on the change in environment seen by the GNSS CCA
functional sensor as a result of its installation in the end-use equipment. For example, other
components inside the end-use equipment may radiate RF energy that could interfere with the
GPS functions; therefore, the ambient testing performed at the CCA level is not equivalent to the
tests performed in the end-use equipment. This is the basis for defining the Section 2.3
performance tests that need to be repeated by the manufacturer of the end-use equipment.
(d) Table 2-2 referenced in RTCA DO-316, Section 2.2.1, is the prime source to determine the MOPS
performance requirements that are susceptible to environmental conditions. Based on that table,
the susceptible requirements can be grouped into two categories: those that are susceptible to
most types of environmental conditions (described in Section 3) and those that are susceptible
to only a few (described in Section 4).
3 — Performance requirements that are susceptible to most environmental conditions.
3.1 — RTCA DO-316: Accuracy, sensitivity and dynamic range.
The RTCA DO-316 requirements for accuracy (2.1.3.1) and for sensitivity and dynamic range (2.1.1.10) are
sensitive to most environmental conditions. Section 3 identifies the testing that manufacturers of end-use
equipment are required to repeat to demonstrate that the GNSS CCA functional sensor continues to meet
the accuracy and dynamic range performance requirements after installation in the end-use equipment. All
the tests shall be run under conditions in which the functions of the end-use equipment are fully enabled to
create the worst-case environment.
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3.2 — RTCA DO-316: Section 2.3.6 Accuracy Test.
(a) The accuracy test described in Section 2.3.6 is actually a joint test that covers accuracy, sensitivity
and dynamic range. This joint testing also applies under the environment as stated in
Section 2.2.1.1.5, with the environmental adaptations as described in Section 2.2.1.1.1.
(b) The demonstration of accuracy is performed in accordance with Section 2.3.6 only for the test
case with broadband external interference noise. This test must be repeated when the GNSS CCA
functional sensor is installed in the end-use equipment, and it is sufficient to perform it using
broadband interference.
(1) The environmental testing is limited to broadband interference, as it represents the worst-
case signal-to-noise condition, which is the most sensitive to environmental effects. This
applies equally to the environment for the GNSS CCA functional sensor that is created by
the end-use equipment.
(2) Section 2.3.6 contains a measurement accuracy test in 2.3.6.1, with the simulator and
interference conditions described in 2.3.6.2, and the detailed test procedure in 2.3.6.2.1.
The Section 2.3.6 test must be run under the worst-case environment identified in
Section 5 ‘Additional considerations for internal interference sources’ below.
(3) Section 2.3.6.3 is a 24-hour actual satellite accuracy test. The Section 2.3.6.3 test exposes
the equipment to a variety of signal conditions and data-processing conditions over
varying satellite geometries that will increase the confidence that no unforeseen
interactions between the components within the end-use equipment and the GNSS CCA
functional sensor will go undetected.
(c) The test threshold is relaxed from 110 to 125 %, as specified in Table 2-6 of the 2.3.6.2.1 test
procedure, to shorten the duration of the test. However, the Section 2.3.6 testing for the GNSS
CCA functional sensor in the end-use equipment shall be under the ambient conditions per
Section 2.3 with the 110-% test pass threshold for maximum test sensitivity.
(d) Only the broadband external interference noise test case using the minimum satellite power will
be executed in most cases to shorten the duration of the test. The testing of Sections 2.3.6.1 and
2.3.6.2 will be repeated for both the minimum and the maximum satellite power only for the
worst-case environment.
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(d) EUROCAE ED-14 Section 16 relates to aircraft power supplies (refer to ETSO Section 3.1.2 for the
environmental qualification requirements). Sections 16.5.1.2 and 16.6.1.2 are for
normal/abnormal operating conditions. Given the potential susceptibility of the GNSS CCA
functional sensor to power supply noise, it is prudent to repeat the tests at the end-use
equipment level on this basis. Table 2-2 referenced in RTCA DO-316, Section 2.2.1, does not
guarantee the execution of specific acquisition testing.
(e) Sections 4.1 and 4.2 identify the testing that manufacturers of end-use equipment are required
to repeat to demonstrate that the GNSS CCA functional sensor continues to meet the acquisition
time and reacquisition time performance requirements relative to the normal/abnormal
operating conditions after installation in the end-use equipment. All the tests shall be run under
conditions in which the functions of the end-use equipment are fully enabled to create the worst-
case environment.
(b) In the case of multiple environments, the accuracy and message loss rate tests can either be run
under each environment, or the methodology in RTCA DO-316, Section 2.2.1.2.3, can be used to
run an aggregate with approximately equal time in each mode. The methodology in
Section 2.2.1.2.3 must be used to identify the modes of greatest susceptibility under which the
combined accuracy and message loss rate tests are repeated in addition to the aggregate test.
For example, the 2.2.1.2.3 methodology is appropriate for end-use equipment that contains a
high power transmitter that operates on a large number of frequencies such that it is impractical
to run a test at each frequency. This is analogous to the large number of frequencies tha t need
to be tested during the EUROCAE ED-14() RF and Induced Signal Susceptibility testing, and this is
the reason why the Section 2.2.1.2.3 methodology was developed.
(c) It is sufficient to identify one worst-case environment when performing acquisition and 24-hour
accuracy testing.
6 — Summary.
(a) The manufacturer of end-use equipment that incorporates a GNSS CCA functional sensor is
required to repeat the following RTCA DO-316 Section 2.3 testing under ambient conditions (see
paragraph 5) after installing the GNSS CCA functional sensor in the end-use equipment:
— The Section 2.3.6 accuracy test adapted per Section 2.2.1.1.1, except that the 110-% test
pass threshold is used.
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Note: Refer to Section 5 ‘Additional considerations for internal interference sources’ of this
Appendix, which could affect the test methodology.
— The Section 2.3.3 initial acquisition test.
— The Section 2.3.4 satellite reacquisition time test.
(b) The manufacturer of the end-use equipment remains responsible for completing a full
environmental qualification evaluation (see ETSO Section 3.1.2) at the end-use equipment level.
The manufacturer of the end-use equipment that incorporates a GNSS CCA functional sensor is
required to repeat the Loss of Navigation and Loss of Integrity indication environmental testing
according to RTCA DO-316, Sections 2.2.1.1.2 and 2.2.1.1.3.
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European
Union
Aviation
Safety
Agency
European Technical Standard Order (ETSO)
Subject: TRAFFIC AWARENESS BEACON SYSTEM (TABS)
1— Applicability
This ETSO provides the requirements for the applicable equipment class defined by this ETSO which
tTraffic aAwareness bBeacon sSystems (TABSs) that are designed and manufactured on or after the date
of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.
TABS devices are distinctly different from other transponders. TABS devices are intended for voluntary
equipage on aircraft that are exempted from carrying a transponder or aAutomatic dDependent
sSurveillance- — bBroadcast (ADS-B) equipment, such as gliders, balloons and aircraft without electrical
systems. TABS devices do not meet the transponder or ADS-B requirements defined in Commission
Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1207/2011 of 22 November 2011 laying down requirements for the
performance and the interoperability of surveillance for the single European sky. TABS equipment built
to the minimum requirements of this ETSO will enable an aircraft to be visible to other aircraft equipped
with:
— a Traffic Advisory System (TAS) as defined in ETSO-C147();
— a Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System I (TCAS I) as defined in ETSO-C118();
— a Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System II (TCAS II) as defined in ETSO-C119d;
— ADS-B IN capability as defined in ETSO-C154c, ETSO-C166b(), and ETSO-C195b.
2— Procedures
2.1 — General
The Aapplicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None.
3— Technical cConditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum pPerformance sStandard
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TABS requirements are derived from existing transponder and ADS-B requirements. Equipment that only
meets meeting only the minimum TABS requirements will provide the capability to be seen by other
aircraft equipped with traffic advisory systems, but may not support its detection by ground surveillance
systems that rely on full transponder functionality. A designer who builds building equipment to meet
this ETSO may decide to incorporate more capability than what is outlined in this ETSO, as long as it
meets the applicable requirements in the referenced standards (e.g., EUROCAE ED-73E, MOPS for
Secondary Surveillance Radar Mode S Transponders, as amended by Appendix 1 to ETSO-C112e).
TABS functionality is divided into four categories: the transponder function, the altitude source
function, the ADS-B OUT function, and the position source function.
A Class A TABS:
— includes the transponder, altitude source, and ADS-B OUT functionality; refer to
Ssubparagraphs (1), (2), and (3) below;
— consists of a Class A device, or an ETSO-C112e and an ETSO-C166b compliant device.
A Class B TABS:
— includes the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) position source functionality; refer to
Ssubparagraph (4) below;
— consists of a Class B device, or an ETSO-C129a (cancelled), ETSO-C145c or later revision,
ETSO-C146c or later revision, or an ETSO-C196b-compliant GPS.
A TABS may include an ADS-B IN function, but it is not required. If it is implemented, the ADS-B IN
function shall meet the performance specified in ETSO-C195b as well as ETSO-C154c, or
ETSO-C166b, or all three. A TABS is intended to make the aircraft a valid TIS-B and ADS-R client.
(a) The transponder functionality must meet a subset of the requirements in document RTCA /
DO-181E, MOPS for Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System/Mode Select (ATCRBS/Mode S)
Airborne Equipment, dated 17 March 17, 2011, Section 2, for a Level 2, Class 2 transponder
as modified by Appendix 1.
(b) The altitude source functionality must meet the requirements of ETSO-C88a or later revision,
Automatic Pressure Altitude Reporting Code Generating Equipment, dated 5 August 5, 2016.
(c) The ADS-B OUT function must meet a subset of the requirements found in doc ument
EUROCAE ED-102A, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for 1090 MHz Extended
Squitter Automatic Dependent Surveillance –— Broadcast (ADS-B) and Traffic Information
Services- — Broadcast (TIS-B), dated December, 2009, including Corrigendum-1, Section 2,
dated January, 2012, Class B0 as modified by Appendix 1. The system must be built such that
it transmits Navigation Integrity Code (NIC), Navigation Accuracy Category for Position
(NACp), Navigation Accuracy Category for Velocity (NACv), Geometric Vertical Accuracy
(GVA), and Safety Integrity Level (SIL) values that are appropriate for the GNSS receiver used.
(d) The position source function must use a GNSS receiver that meets the requirements defined
in Appendix 1. The intent of this ETSO is to allow the use of commercially available GNSS
position sources. The receiver must be capable of using SBAS-provided corrections and
health messages, as defined in Appendix 1, in order to provide a means to prevent the TABS
from transmitting false or misleading information. The receiver may continue to provide
position when outside of SBAS coverage or when using unmonitored satellites. TABS Class B
position sources may not be used for certified navigation equipment.
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For Class A equipment, demonstrate the required performance under the test conditions specified
in RTCA/ DO-181E Section 2.3 and EUROCAE ED-102A, including Corrigendum-1, Section 2.3, dated
January, 2012.,
For Class B equipment, demonstrate the required performance under the test conditions specified
in Appendix 3.
3.1.3 — Software
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.2.
This requirement applies to Class A equipment only. Class B equipment is exempt from the
software qualification defined in this paragraph.
3.1.4 — Airborne Electronic Hardware
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.3.
This requirement applies to Class A equipment only. Class B equipment is exempt from the
electronic hardware qualification defined in this paragraph.
3.2 — Specific
3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4.
A Ffailure of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO that results resulting in misleading
information is a minor failure condition.
A Ffailure of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO that results resulting in a loss of
function is a minor failure condition.
Class B equipment is intended to be met by commercially available GNSSs and is unlikely to be
designed specifically to support a minor hazard classification. The suitability of Class B equipment
suitability for supporting the function in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO is established by performing
the functional and environmental testing in Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 of this ETSO , with no
further analysis required.
4— Marking
4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.
4.2 — Specific
None.
5— Availability of Referenced Documents
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 3.
EUROCONTROL Documents: EUROCONTROL, STA/R/460/0001/1, Study to Address the Detection
and Recognition of Light Aircraft in the Current and Future ATM Environment, Issue 1.0, Final
Report, dated 31 March 2005.
EUROCONTROL Surveillance Document Library:
https://www.eurocontrol.int/articles/surveillance-library
FCC Documents: Federal Communication Commission document OET Bulletin 65 Ed 97-01,
Evaluating Compliance with FCC Guidelines for Human Exposure to Radiofrequency
Electromagnetic Fields is available on the internet at:
http://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Engineering_Technology/Documents/bulletins/oet65/oet65.pdf
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US Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Documents: order copies of 14 CFR parts 21, 45 and 91 from
the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 979050, St. Louis, MO
63197. Telephone (202) 512-1800, fax (202) 512-2250. You can also download copies online at:
http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?tpl=/ecfrbrowse/
UK Public Health Documents Public Health England document HPA-RPD-031, Exposure to EMFs
from Lightweight Aviation Transponders, dated September 2007, ISBN 978-0-85951-605-1
978¬0-85951-605-1, can be obtained on line by going to:
http://www.hpa.org.uk/Publications/Radiation/HPARPDSeriesReports/HpaRpd031/
Global Positioning System Signals, Measurements, and Performance, Ganga-Jamuna Press, by
Pratap Misra and Per Enge. ISBN: 0-9709544-0-9
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APPENDIX 1
TRAFFIC AWARENESS BEACON SYSTEM (TABS) REQUIREMENTS
A1 Introduction
A1.1.1 The intent of a TABS is to increase safety by encouraging the voluntary equipage of a low-cost,
compact, easy-to-install device that will allow other aircraft equipped with collision avoidance systems and
traffic advisory systems to track and display the TABS aircraft. TABSs are intended to be used on aircraft that are
exempted from carrying a transponder or Automatic Dependent Surveillance —- Broadcast (ADS-B) equipment,
such as gliders, balloons and aircraft without electrical systems. TABS devices do not meet the transponder
requirements defined in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1207/2011 of 22 November 2011 laying
down requirements for the performance and the interoperability of surveillance for the single European sky.
A TABS will allow these exempted aircraft to be visible to other aircraft equipped with:
— a Traffic Advisory System (TAS) as defined in ETSO-C147();
— a Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System I (TCAS I) as defined in ETSO-C118();
— a Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System II (TCAS II) as defined in ETSO-C119d;
— ADS-B IN capability as defined in ETSO-C166b, and ETSO-C195b;
— ADS-B IN capability as defined in ETSO-C154c in airspace where UAT is used.
A1.1.3 A TABS can potentially act as a low-cost platform for other aviation applications. Although additional
capabilities are beyond the scope of this ETSO, TABSs may include additional functions such as data loggers,
search and rescue transmitter, or provide flight information services.
A1.2 Requirements
A1.2.1 TABS requirements are derived from existing Mode S transponder and 1090 MHz Extended Squitter
ADS-B requirements. A designer who builds building equipment to meet this ETSO may decide to incorporate
the full transponder and ADS-B capability by using a device that meets ETSO-C112e and ETSO-C166b. If they
elect to implement the full functionality, they must demonstrate that functionality against the unmodified test
procedures in EUROCAE ED-102A, including Corrigendum-1, dated January, 2012, that are required by
ETSO-C112e and ETSO-C166b respectively. Designers that wish to take advantage of the reduced transponder
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requirements afforded to ETSO-C199 Class A devices must meet the modified requirements outlined in
paragraphs A1.2.3 Transponder Function Requirements, A1.2.4 Altitude Source Function Requirements, and
A1.2.5 ADS-B OUT Function Requirements in this Appendix in their entirety. Designers who wish wishing to take
advantage of the Class B reduced GNSS requirements will need to meet the requirements outlined in paragraphs
A1.2.6 GNSS Position Source Function Requirements.
A1.2.2 MOPS text is used here with the permission of the RTCA. Table 1 provides notes in italics and
parentheses explaining how to read the tables that modify the text in the source documents.
A1.2.3 Transponder Function Requirements Derived From DO-181E (For Class A Devices)
A1.2.3.1 The transponder function must meet the Minimum Performance Standards (MPS) qualification and
documentation requirements in RTCA, Inc. document RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2, for a Level 2, Class 2,
transponder as modified below.
A1.2.3.1.2 A cost factor in any device is the control and display functions to interface with the human operator.
TABS display and control requirements are a subset of those required for transponders. Some user controls are
allowed via an external device prior to flight (e.g., a personal electronic device (PED)). If the system is powered
by batteries, display of available battery life is recommended. Table 2 provides an overview of flight crew control
functions.
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A1.2.3.1.3 RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.1.7.a, Flight Crew Control Functions, is amended as shown in Table 3.
A1.2.3.1.4 RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.1.7.b, Flight Crew Control Functions, is amended as shown in Table 4.
A1.2.3.1.5 RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.1.7.c, Flight Crew Control Functions, is amended as shown in Table 5.
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A1.2.3.1.6 RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.1.7.d, Flight Crew Control Functions, is amended as shown in Table 6.
A1.2.3.2.1 This section reduces the minimum reply rate capability of the TABS consistently with the
interrogation acceptance based on two assumptions. The following rationale describes how the modified reply
rates were chosen.
A1.2.3.2.1.1 Assumption 1. The worst-case Mode C interrogation count in a 100-millisecond interval from
one1 ATCRBS radar is approximately 14 interrogations. Four 4 ATCRBS radar overlapping beam dwells in a
1 second is approximately 53 Mode C interrogations. The Mode C interrogation acceptance rate from 10 TCAS I
units is approximately 15 interrogations per second. This represents a total demand on the TABS of 68 Mode C
replies per second for this example.
A1.2.3.2.1.2 Assumption 2. The worst-case Mode S reply rate is primarily derived from the expected
interrogation pattern of a set of 50 nearby TCAS II units all equipped with hybrid surveillance. The radar load
from only roll-call interrogations would be small and would require networked sensors, otherwise the Mode S
ground interrogation acceptance rate from radar systems would be 0 (zero).
A1.2.3.2.2 Based on assumptions 1 and 2, RTCA/ DO-181E Section 2.2.3.4 Reply Rate Capability is changed as
follows:
A1.2.3.2.2.1 RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.3.4.1.a, ATCRBS Reply Rate Capability, is amended as shown in
Table 7.
A1.2.3.2.2.2 RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.3.4.1.c, ATCRBS Reply Rate Capability, is amended as shown in
Table 8.
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A1.2.3.2.2.3 RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.3.4.2.a, Mode S Reply Rate Capability, is amended as shown in
Table 9.
A1.2.3.2.2.4 RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.3.4.2.b, Mode S Reply Rate Capability, is amended as shown in
Table 10.
A1.2.3.3.1 The modifications in this section address reply rate limiting for ATCRBS and Mode S reply rates
consistently with the previous section.
A1.2.3.3.2 RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.7.3.1, ATCRBS Reply Rate Limiting, is amended as shown in Table 11.
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Table 13 — DO-181E Section 2.2.7.3.1 amendment
A1.2.3.4 RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.13.1.2.c, Variable Direct Data, is amended as shown in Table 12.
A1.2.3.5 RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.13.1.2.d, Variable Direct Data, is amended as shown in Table 13.
A1.2.3.6 RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.13.1.2.e, Variable Direct Data, is amended as shown in Table 14.
A1.2.3.7.1 The transponder All-Call interrogation reply acceptance requirements are reduced to reply only to
ATCRBS Mode C (P1-P3) interrogations. The purpose is to reduce the reply rate of TABS while maintaining TCAS
and TAS interoperability. The requirements of this ETSO are identical to RTCA/ DO-181E except for the changes
shown below.
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A1.2.3.7.2 RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.18.2.2.b, Interrogation Acceptance Protocol (Figure 2-12), is amended
as shown in Table 15.
A1.2.3.7.3 RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.18.2.2.c, Interrogation Acceptance Protocol (Figure 2-12), is amended as
shown in Table 16.
A1.2.3.8 RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.18.2.2.g, Interrogation Acceptance Protocol, paragraph g, All-Call
Lockout Conditions, is amended as shown in Table 17.
A1.2.3.9 RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.18.2.2.i, Interrogation Acceptance Protocol Stochastic All-Calls, should
not be implemented in Class A TABS.
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A1.2.3.10 Two new sections are added here to explicitly define interrogation acceptance criteria for TABS.
A1.2.3.10.1 RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.18.2.2.L, Interrogation Acceptance Protocol (Figure 2-12), is added as
shown in Table 18.
A1.2.3.10.2 RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.18.2.2.m, Interrogation Acceptance Protocol (Figure 2-12), is added to
as shown in Table 19. This change reduces the range at which addressed Mode S ground
interrogations would be replied to. The intent is to reduce the reply rate of the TABS. Sensitivity to
TCAS interrogations are is not affected.
A1.2.3.11 RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.18.2.3, Interrogation Reply Coordination, is amended as shown in
Table 20.
A1.2.3.12 RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.18.2.4, Lockout Protocol, should not be implemented in Class A TABS.
A1.2.3.13 RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.18.2.5, Multisite Lockout Protocol, should not be implemented in
Class A TABS.
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A1.2.3.14 RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.18.2.7, Flight Status and Vertical Status Protocols, isare amended as
shown in Table 21.
A1.2.3.15 RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.18.2.9, All-Call Reply Protocol, should not be implemented in Class A
TABS.
A1.2.3.16 RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.19.1, Minimum Level 2 Transponder Requirements, is amended as
shown in Table 22.
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Comm-U/V (air-air) (see §2.2.19.1.16). Report Codes 4 through 7 in the CA field (see
Multisite message operation (see §2.2.19.2). paragraph 2.2.14.4.6).
Report Codes 4 through 7 in the CA field (see TCAS crosslink capability (see paragraph
§2.2.14.4.6). 2.2.19.1.18).
TCAS crosslink capability (see §2.2.19.1.18).
Table 24 — DO-181E Section 2.2.19.1 amendment
A1.2.3.17 RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.19.1.3, Information Transfer, should not be implemented in Class A
TABS.
A1.2.3.18 RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.19.1.4, Interrogation-Reply Coordination, is amended per Table 23.
Equipment using Minimum Level 2 Transponder Requirements, SHALL follow the text in DO-181E
as written.
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A1.2.3.27 Linked Comm-A Coding described in RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.19.1.14, should not be
implemented in Class A TABS.
A1.2.3.28 The Comm-U/V Protocol described in RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.19.1.16, should not be
implemented in Class A TABS.
A1.2.3.29 The Data Handling Interfaces described in RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.19.1.17, should not be
implemented in Class A TABS.
A1.2.3.30 The Multisite Message Protocol described in RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.19.2, should not be
implemented in Class A TABS.
A1.2.3.31 Surveillance Identifier (SI) requirements contained in RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.24.2, should not
be implemented in Class A TABS.
A1.2.3.32 The Elementary Surveillance (ELS) Compliant Transponder requirements in RTCA/ DO-181E,
Section 2.2.24, do not apply to TABS equipment. TABS SHALL not claim ELS compliance. Changes
made to ELS registers do not need to be indicated via a Comm-B broadcast. If one or more of the
ELS registers are supported, then Section 2.2.24 requirements SHALL apply except
Sections 2.2.24 b 4, 2.2.24 c, 2.2.24.2, 2.2.24.3.2.5, and 2.2.24.3.4, which do not apply.
A1.2.3.33 The Enhanced Surveillance (EHS) Compliant Transponders requirements in RTCA/ DO-181E,
Section 2.2.25, do not apply to TABS. TABS equipment SHALL not claim EHS compliance. Changes
made to EHS registers do not need to be indicated via a Comm-B broadcast. If one or more of the
EHS registers are supported, then Section 2.2.25 requirements SHALL apply except
Sections 2.2.25.1.2.4 and 2.2.25.2.3, which do not apply. Also, Section 2.2.25, paragraph 6
‘Transponder capable of supporting EHS…’, must support ELS per A1.2.3.32 of this ETSO.
A1.2.4 Altitude Source Function Requirements (For Class A Devices)
A1.2.4.1 The altitude source function shall meet the performance requirements of ETSO-C88b, Automatic
Pressure Altitude Reporting Code-Generating Equipment, dated 5 August5, 2016. It is
recommended that the altitude source provide 25 ft or better resolution.
A1.2.5 ADS-B OUT Function Requirements Derived From EUROCAE ED-102A, including Corrigendum-1,
(For Class A Devices)
A1.2.5.1 The ADS-B OUT function must be 1090 Extended Squitter (ES) OUT, to support TCAS surveillance.
The 1090 ES OUT function must meet the Minimum Performance Standards (MPS) qualification
and documentation requirements in EUROCAE ED-102A, MOPS for 1090 MHz Extended Squitter
Automatic Dependent Surveillance — Broadcast (ADS-B) and Traffic Information Services —
Broadcast (TIS-B), dated December, 2009, including Corrigendum-1, Section 2, dated January,
2012, for a Class B0 ADS-B OUT transmitter with the following modifications.
A1.2.5.2 EUROCAE ED-102A, including Corrigendum-1, Section 2, dated January, 2012, Paragraph 2.2.2.1.c,
Mode S Transponder Based Transmitters, is amended as shown in Table 24.
ED-102A text Modified text for this ETSO
If the ADS-B transmitter is based on Mode S If the ADS-B transmitter is based on Mode S
transponders, then for transponder functions it transponders, then for The transponder
Shall comply with RTCA/ DO-181D (EUROCAE ED- functions SHALL comply with RTCA/ DO-181E
73C) for each class of transponder specified in (EUROCAE ED-73E) for each class of transponder
the latest version of FAA TSO C112 (ETSO 2C112) specified in the latest version of ETSO-C112 (FAA
TSO C112), except where modified by
Appendix 1 of this ETSO.
Table 26 — ED-102A Section 2.2.2.1.c amendment
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A1.2.5.3 The output power SHALL be as specified in EUROCAE ED-102A, including Corrigendum-1, dated
January, 2012, Section 2.2.2.2.10.1.a., for Class A0 and B0 equipment. The RF Peak Output power
SHALL be at least 18.5 dBW (70 watts).
A1.2.5.4 Broadcast of the ADS-B Surface Position Messages defined in EUROCAE ED-102A including
Corrigendum-1, Section 2.2.3.2.4, is optional.
A1.2.5.5 EUROCAE ED-102A including Corrigendum-1, Section 2.2.3.2.7.2, Aircraft Operational Status
Messages, is amended as shown in Table 25.
ED-102A text Modified text for this ETSO
The ‘Aircraft Operational Status Message’ is The ‘Aircraft Operational Status Message’ is
used to provide the current status of the aircraft. used to provide the current status of the aircraft.
The format of the Aircraft Operational Status The format of the Aircraft Operational Status
Message shall be as specified in Figure 2-11, Message shall be as specified in Figure 2-11,
while further definition of each of the subfields while further definition of each of the subfields
is provided in the subsequent paragraphs. is provided in the subsequent paragraphs.
Broadcast of Aircraft Operational Status
Message subtype=1, Surface Messages, is
optional.
Table 27 — Aircraft Operational Status Message
A1.2.5.6 When TABS is installed with a position source meeting the Class B requirements of this ETSO and
transmitting a valid position, the transmitted NIC SHALL be set to 6 (0.5 NM), reference EUROCAE
ED-102A including Corrigendum-1, dated January, 2012, Section 2.2.8.1.16. The transmitted SIL
SHALL be set to 1, (1x×1E-3/ hr), reference EUROCAE ED-102A including Corrigendum-1, dated
January, 2012, Section 2.2.5.1.40. When TABS is installed with a position source compliant with
ETSO-C145, ETSO-C146 or ETSO-C196, NIC and SIL SHALL be set in accordance with EUROCAE
ED-102A including Corrigendum-1, dated January, 2012. When the position is not valid, NIC and
SIL SHALL be set to 0 (zero).
A1.2.5.7 The System Design Assurance (SDA), SHALL be set to 1, reference EUROCAE ED-102A, including
Corrigendum-1, dated January, 2012, Section 2.2.5.1.50. The probability of an undetected fault
causing transmission of false or misleading information SHALL be less than or equal to 1E-3.
A1.2.5.8 Navigation Accuracy Category for Position, (NACp) SHALL be derived from the Horizontal Figure
of Merit (HFOM) in accordance with EUROCAE ED-102A, including Corrigendum-1, dated
January, 2012, Section A.1.4.9.9;, however, TABS Class B position sources may not provide HFOM
directly. When HFOM is not available directly, HFOM SHALL be derived from Horizontal Dilution
of Precision (HDOP) according to the following formula: HFOM = 2 * HDOP * User Equivalent
Range Error (UERE), where the UERE is 6 metres. This UERE is based on typical single frequency
(L1) receiver performance and an assumption of mid-latitude atmospheric propagation. Although
the real-time UERE may fluctuate, this assumption is sufficient to support the TABS use case.
(Ref. Global Positioning System Signals, Measurements and Performance, by Pratap Misra and Per
Enge, copyright 2001).
A1.2.5.9 When a TABS is installed with a position source meeting the Class B requirements of this ETSO
and transmitting a valid position, the transmitted Navigation Accuracy Category for Velocity,
(NACv) SHALL be set to 1 (10 m/s), reference EUROCAE ED-102A including Corrigendum-1, dated
January, 2012, Section 2.2.5.1.19. When position is not valid, NACv SHALL be set to 0 (zero).
A1.2.5.10 Geometric Vertical Accuracy (GVA) SHALL be derived from Vertical Figure of Merit, (VFOM) in
accordance with EUROCAE ED-102A including Corrigendum-1, dated January, 2012,
Section 2.2.3.2.7.2.8. Class B position sources may not provide VFOM directly. When VFOM is not
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available directly, VFOM SHALL be derived from Vertical Dilution of Precision (VDOP) according to
the following formula: VFOM = 2 * VDOP * UERE, where the UERE is 6 metres.
A1.2.5.11 The Type Code 31, Operational Status Message, subfield ‘Airborne Capability Class Code’, SHALL
be changed to indicate the device is a TABS.
A1.2.5.11.1 The Operational Status Message SHALL be modified to indicate that it meets the performance
standards of this ETSO. ED-102A, including Corrigendum-1, dated January, 2012,
paragraph 2.2.18.4.7 and Figure 2-40, is modified by this ETSO. Message bits 53-54, (ME
Bits 21-22), SHALL describe the capabilities of the TABS per Table 26. Set bit 54 to 1 (one) to
indicate that either TABS Class A, Class B, or both classes of equipment are installed.
Bit 53 Bit 54 Description
0 0 Not TABS equipped
0 1 TABS Equipped
1 0 TABS device (reserved for future use)
1 1 TABS device (reserved for future use)
Table 28 — ED-102A Airborne Capability Class Message format
A1.2.6 GNSS Position Source Function Requirements (For Class B Devices)
A1.2.6.1 Manufacturers may use commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) GNSS position sources to meet the
performance of this ETSO as long as the sensor meets the requirements in this section. The
position source shall be capable of using Ssatellite-Bbased Aaugmentation Ssystem (SBAS)
corrections and health messages to exclude satellites from the position solution or to correct
satellite range errors. In areas where the SBAS is available, the TABS shall use the SBAS corrections
and health messages to exclude satellites from the position solution or to correct satellite range
errors. In areas where the SBAS is not available or out of service, the TABS may continue to
operate. The regional airspace authority will determine what operational impacts this may have
on air-to-ground usage of TABS equipment. According to the FAA, the GPS constellation
experiences a significant ramp error approximately once a year. During these events, a chipset
which uses the SBAS will, depending on the received SBAS messages, either correct or exclude the
faulty satellite. Refer to RTCA/ DO-229E, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Global
Positioning System/Satellite-Based Augmentation System Airborne Equipment, when interpreting
SBAS-related requirements.
A1.2.6.2 The GNSS position source SHALL provide a GPS-only solution for use by the TABS ADS-B function.
The FAA and EASA have not evaluated the performance of other GNSS systems for use in support
of aviation-intended functions. This ETSO will be updated once sufficient analysis has been done
performed to show that other GNSS are appropriate for use by TABS equipment. Note, the GPS-
only solution refers to the use of the GPS satellite constellation, it does not exclude augmentation
of the GPS solution, such as provided by SBAS or GBAS systems.
A1.2.6.3 The GNSS horizontal position error SHALL not exceed 30 metres, 95th percentile, when the
Horizontal Dilution of Precision (HDOP) is 2.5 or less. The GNSS position source SHALL either
transmit a Horizontal Figure of Merit (95 %) (HFOM) or an HDOP metric.
Note: The 30-metre horizontal position fixing error requirement assumes a UERE of 6 metres,
consistent with Section A1.2.5.8.
A1.2.6.4 Removed.
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A1.2.6.5 The GNSS position source SHALL be capable of transmitting horizontal velocity measurements
more accurate than 10 m/s, 95th percentile.
A1.2.6.6 The GNSS position source SHALL not transmit false or misleading data in the presence of
broadband interference. There is no minimum interference rejection requirement for TABS
equipment and loss of position in the presence of interference is acceptable behaviour.
A1.2.6.7 The GNSS position source SHALL not use SBAS corrections when the SBAS satellite is broadcasting
message type 0.
A1.2.6.8 The GNSS position source SHALL exclude satellites with UDREI = 15 reported in the SBAS fast
corrections.
A1.2.6.9 The GNSS position source SHALL apply SBAS fast and long-term corrections when available.
A1.2.6.10 The GNSS position source SHALL be capable of transmitting geometric altitude, Height Above the
Ellipsoid (HAE) measurements more accurate than 45 metres, 95th percentile, when the Vertical
Dilution of Precision (VDOP) is 3.7 or less. The GNSS position source SHALL either transmit a
Vertical Figure of Merit (95 %) (VFOM) or a Vertical Dilution of Precision (VDOP) metric.
Note: The 45-metre vertical position fixing error requirement assumes a UERE of 6 metres,
consistent with Section A1.2.5.10.
A1.2.7 Antenna Function Requirements
A1.2.7.1 The requirements for transponder antennas are specified in ETSO-C112e. The requirements for
GNSS antennas are specified in ETSO-C190 and ETSO-C144a. The antennas should be designed to
meet the performance specified in the applicable ETSO. However, the TABS may benefit
significantly in installation costs from implementations where the antennas are integrated in the
TABS equipment. Small degradations in antenna performance may be acceptable as a trade-off
for installation cost.
A1.2.7.2 Antennas may be installed internally on aircraft that are transparent to radio frequencies. An
internal antenna may not be appropriate on aircraft with a metal hull. If an antenna is installed
internally, testing will need to be conducted to ensure the TABS is not negatively impacted and
installation guidance must accompany the unit to ensure the system is properly fitted to the
aircraft.
A1.2.7.3 Because TABS may be installed on a radio frequency (RF) transparent fuselage near a pilot or
passenger, or in a cockpit in close proximity to a pilot or passenger, consideration must be given
to antenna placement to ensure it does not pose a hazard to humans or combustible materials.
Manufacturers must provide installation guidance describing the minimum safe distance the
antenna can be to the nearest human body or, if applicable, combustible material. Appendix 3 of
this ETSO provides a more in-depth discussion of this subject based on FCC and European
documents.
A1.2.8 Form factor and power
A1.2.8.1 An ideal implementation of the TABS would be a single integrated unit with minimal connections
to the airframe, such as:; mechanical mounting, power, and static air source. Where the
equipment might be shared between multiple airframes, the mechanical mounting could
incorporate an airframe-specific configuration module (containing such items as the ICAO 24-bit
aircraft address), and be designed such that no tools are required to remove or install the TABS.
A1.2.8.2 Low power consumption design is important. Designs specifically intended for long-term battery
operation are ideal. If the TABS is battery powered, it should be designed to provide system
integrity commensurate with the failure condition category/classification stated in
paragraph 3.2.1.
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APPENDIX 2.
TEST REQUIREMENTS
A2 Testing Introduction
A2.1 Testing Intent
A2.1.1 This appendix Appendix provides an acceptable means to verify the major functions of the TABS.
A2.1.2 The TABS is not intended to accept and reply to any UF=11 All-Call interrogations. RTCA/ DO-181E
tests like 2.4.2.1 Step 6 that use the Mode S Only All-Call interrogation (UF=11) will need to use a
different interrogation, such as a UF=0 interrogation.
A2.2 Testing Requirements
A2.2.1 The tests defined here are derived from tests in the reference documents or written here to
ensure compliance with the intended capabilities of TABS equipment. These tests are one
acceptable means to demonstrate that the equipment meets the functional requirements defined
in Appendix 1 of this ETSO. Functionality not modified by Appendix 1 should be verified by the
test outlined in the applicable standards, e.g. RTCA/ DO-181E.
A2.2.2 Table 27 provides notes in italics and parenthesis explaining how to read the tables that modify
the text in the source documents.
(Source document reference) Modified text for this ETSO
(This is a copy of the original text from the (This is the requirement for this ETSO.
source document. Material to be deleted Modifications to the source text are marked
from this original text is marked with in bold and underlined to assist in identifying
strikethrough formatting.) changes).
Table 29 — (Source document reference) (type of change)
A2.2.3 Testing Transponder Function Requirements Derived From DO-181E (For Class A Devices)
A2.2.3.1 Testing of the transponder function of the TABS should follow the tests outlined in document
RTCA/ DO-181E, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Air Traffic Control Radar
Beacon System/Mode Select (ATCRBS/Mode S) Airborne Equipment, dated 17 March17, 2011,
Sections 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5, with the following exceptions:
A2.2.3.1.1 Testing of Flight Crew Control Functions
A2.2.3.1.2 Testing should verify that the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, as modified by paragraph
A1.2.3.1.2 of this ETSO, have been properly incorporated.
A2.2.3.1.3 Testing should verify that changes made to paragraph 2.1.7 a, in RTCA/ DO-181E, per
Section A1.2.3.1.3, have been properly incorporated.
A2.2.3.1.3.1 Testing should verify the requirements of A1.2.3.1.3, by performing the test outlined in RTCA/ DO-
181E Section 2.5.4.11. Test results should verify that the 4096 code can be set while on the
ground. If the 4096 code can be set in flight, testing should verify that the 4096 code can be set
while in the air (weight-off-wheels condition) per RTCA/ DO-181E Section 2.5.4.11.
A2.2.3.1.3.2 Testing should verify the requirements of A1.2.3.1.3, by performing the test outlined in RTCA/
DO-181E Section 2.5.4.11. Testing should verify that a means of selecting and transmitting
Mode 3/A code 7700 (emergency) is provided and tested per RTCA/ DO-181E Section 2.5.4.11.
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A2.2.3.1.3.3 Testing should verify the requirements of A1.2.3.1.3, by performing the test outlined in RTCA/
DO-181E Section 2.5.4.11. Testing should also verify that a means of selecting and transmitting an
alternate Mode 3/A codes is provided and tested per RTCA/ DO-181E Section 2.5.4.11.
A2.2.3.1.4 Testing should verify the requirements of A1.2.3.1.4, by performing the test outlined in RTCA/
DO-181E Section 2.5.4.3.b. Test results should verify that aircraft without a means of determining
air/ground state, reportsreport in-the-airin the air at all times. Aircraft with an automatic means
to determine the air/ground state, must verify that the air/ground state is set properly. Perform
the test outlined in RTCA/ DO-181E 2.5.4.3.b. If capable of determining the air-ground air/ground
state, test results should verify that the aircraft reports in the airin-the-air when in the air, and on
the groundon-the-ground when on the ground.
A2.2.3.1.5 Testing should verify that the requirements of A1.2.3.1.5, have been properly incorporated. If a
means of selecting the Sstandby condition is provided, testing should verify return to normal
operation from standby condition is within five 5 seconds.
A2.2.3.1.6 Testing should verify that the requirements of A1.2.3.1.6, have been properly incorporated. If a
means of initiating the IDENT (SPI) feature is installed, testing shall verify it functions properly per
RTCA/ DO-181E Section 2.5.4.3. (see Also A1.2.3.5and A2.2.3.5).
A2.2.3.2 Testing Reply Rate Capability Changes
A2.2.3.2.1 This section provides test criteria for the reply rate changes based on assumptions made in
Section A1.2.3.2.1.
A2.2.3.2.2 Testing should verify that changes made to A1.2.3.2.2, have been correctly incorporated into TABS
equipment.
A2.2.3.2.2.1 Testing should verify that the requirements of A1.2.3.2.2.1, of this ETSO have been satisfied.
Testing outlined in DO-181E, Section 2.3.2.2.3 step 1, should verify that the transponder be able
to continuously generate at least 100 ATCRBS 15-pulse replies per second.
A2.2.3.2.2.2 Testing should verify that the requirements of A1.2.3.2.2.2, of this ETSO have been satisfied.
Testing outlined in DO-181E, Section 2.3.2.2.3 step 3, should verify that the transponder is capable
of a peak reply rate of 150 ATCRBS 15-pulse replies per second for a duration of 100 milliseconds.
A2.2.3.2.2.3 Testing should verify that changes made to RTCA/ DO-181E Section 2.2.3.4.2.a have been correctly
incorporated into TABS equipment per A1.2.3.2.2.3.
A2.2.3.2.2.3.1 Testing should verify that the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.3.2.4.2.a, as modified
by paragraph A1.2.3.2.2.3 of this ETSO have been satisfied. Testing outlined in DO-181E,
Section 2.3.2.2.3 step 2, should verify that the transponder provide at least 29 short Mode S
replies in any 1-second interval.
A2.2.3.2.2.3.2 Testing should verify that the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.3.2.4.2.a, as modified
by paragraph A1.2.3.2.2.3 of this ETSO have been satisfied. Testing outlined in DO-181E,
Section 2.3.2.2.3 step 3, should verify that the transponder provide at least 10 short Mode S
replies in a 100-millisecond interval.
A2.2.3.2.2.3.3 Testing should verify that the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.3.2.4.2.a, as modified
by paragraph A1.2.3.2.2.3 of this ETSO have been satisfied. Testing outlined in DO-181E,
Section 2.3.2.2.3 step 4, should verify that the transponder provide at least 5 short Mode S replies
in a 25-millisecond interval.
A2.2.3.2.2.3.4 Testing should verify that the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.3.2.4.2.a, as modified
by paragraph A1.2.3.2.2.3 of this ETSO have been satisfied. Testing outlined in DO-181E,
Section 2.3.2.2.3 step 5, should verify that the transponder provide at least 3 short Mode S replies
in a l.6-millisecond interval.
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A2.2.3.2.2.4 Testing should verify that changes made to RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.3.4.2.b, have been
correctly incorporated into TABS equipment per A1.2.3.2.2.4.
A2.2.3.2.2.4.1 Testing should verify that the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.3.2.4.2.b, as modified
by paragraph A1.2.3.2.2.4, of this ETSO have been satisfied. Testing outlined in DO-181E,
Section 2.3.2.2.3 step 2, should verify that the transponder provide at least 10 of the 29 Mode S
replies as long-format replies in any 1-second interval.
A2.2.3.2.2.4.2 Testing should verify that the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.3.2.4.2.b, as modified
by paragraph A1.2.3.2.2.4, of this ETSO have been satisfied. Testing outlined in DO-181E,
Section 2.3.2.2.3 step 3, should verify that the transponder provide at least 4 of the 10 Mode S
replies as long-format replies in a 100-millisecond interval.
A2.2.3.2.2.4.3 Testing should verify that the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.3.2.4.2.b, as modified
by paragraph A1.2.3.2.2.4, of this ETSO have been satisfied. Testing outlined in DO-181E,
Section 2.3.2.2.3 step 4, should verify that the transponder provide at least 3 of the 5 Mode S
replies as long-format replies in a 25-millisecond interval.
A2.2.3.2.2.4.4 Testing should verify that the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.3.2.4.2.b, as modified
by paragraph A1.2.3.2.2.4, of this ETSO have been satisfied. Testing outlined in DO-181E,
Section 2.3.2.2.3 step 5, should verify that the transponder provide at least 2 of the 4 Mode S
replies as long-format replies in a l.6-millisecond interval.
A2.2.3.3 Testing Reply Rate Limiting Changes
A2.2.3.3.1 Testing should verify that the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.7.3.1, as modified by
paragraph A1.2.3.3.1, of this ETSO have been satisfied. Testing outlined in DO-181E,
Section 2.4.2.2.5 step 1, should be performed to verify that the unit does not reply to Mode A
interrogations.
A2.2.3.3.2 Testing should verify that the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.7.3.1, as modified by
paragraph A1.2.3.3.2 of this ETSO have been satisfied. Testing outlined in DO-181E,
Section 2.4.2.2.5 step 1, should be performed to verify that the unit is capable of between
100 continuous ATCRBS Mode C replies per second and the maximum continuous rate of which
the transponder is capable, or 200 replies per second, whichever is less, without regard to the
number of pulses in each reply. Sensitivity reduction SHALL apply only to the receipt of ATCRBS
interrogations.
A2.2.3.4 Testing should verify that the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.13.1.2.c, as modified
by paragraph A1.2.3.4 of this ETSO have been satisfied. Testing should show that airborne status
is set to in the air unless the aircraft is air/ground determination capable. If the aircraft can
determine air/ground state, testing should show this capability is determined determines on the
ground when on the ground and in the air when in the air.
A2.2.3.5 Testing should verify that the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.13.1.2.d, as modified
by paragraph A1.2.3.5 of this ETSO have been satisfied. If the aircraft is capable of providing SPI,
follow the test outlined in A2.2.3.1.6 of the this ETSO to verify it functions properly per RTCA/
DO-181E Section 2.5.4.3. (Ssee also, Section A1.2.3.1.6 and A2.2.3.1.6).
A2.2.3.6 Testing should verify that the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.13.1.2.e, as modified
by paragraph A1.2.3.6 of this ETSO have been satisfied. Testing should show the Aaircraft ID
loaded while on the ground is broadcast. If aircraft ID can be changed in flight, testing should
verify that aircraft ID can be changed in flight and the new aircraft ID is broadcast.
A2.2.3.7 Testing of Interrogation Acceptance Protocol Changes (All-Call reply capability)
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A2.2.3.7.1 Except where noted here, testing of the Interrogation Acceptance Protocol capability should
follow that called out in RTCA/ DO-181E. Testing of the Interrogation Acceptance Protocol
capability should be modified from those called out in RTCA/ DO-181E to meet the changes made
in A1.2.3.7.1.
A2.2.3.7.2 Testing should verify that the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.18.2.2.b, as modified
by paragraph A1.2.3.7.2 of this ETSO have been satisfied. Various tests in RTCA DO-181E,
Section 2.4, utilise utilize the Mode S Only All-Call interrogation and the expected reply to execute
the test procedure. A discrete interrogation should be used as a substitute for these test
procedures. Testing outlined in RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.5.4.2, should verify that UF=11
interrogations are not accepted.
A2.2.3.7.3 Testing should verify that the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.2.18.2.2.c, as modified
by paragraph A1.2.3.7.3 of this ETSO have been satisfied. Testing outlined in RTCA/ DO-181E,
Section 2.5.4.2, should verify that an ATCRBS/Mode S All-Call interrogation (1.6-microseconds P4)
is not accepted. The pulse decoder tests in Section 2.4.2.5 for ATCRBS/Mode S All-Call
interrogation acceptance shall be modified to verify that no ATCRBS/Mode S All-Call
interrogations that meet the criteria for acceptance in RTCA DO-181E, Section 2.2.6.2, produce a
reply.
A2.2.3.8 Testing of the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Interrogation Acceptance Protocol, per
Section 2.5.4.4 and 2.5.4.5, are not required per A1.2.3.8 of this ETSO.
A2.2.3.9 Testing of the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Stochastic All-Calls, per Section 2.5.4.13, is not
required per A1.2.3.9 of this ETSO.
A2.2.3.10 Testing should verify the modified Mode S MTL requirements added to RTCA/ DO-181E, per
Section A1.2.3.10. Test to ensure that paragraphs 2.2.18.2.2.L, and 2.2.18.2.2.m, have been
properly incorporated.
A2.2.3.10.1 Testing outlined in RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.4.2, should verify that ATCRBS Mode A
interrogations (P1-P3 spacing 8 microseconds) are not accepted per A1.2.3.10.1. Various tests in
RTCA DO-181E, Section 2.4, utilise utilize Mode A interrogations to execute the test procedure.
Mode C interrogations should be used as a substitute for these test procedures. The pulse decoder
tests in DO-181E, Section 2.4.2.5, for Mode A interrogation acceptance shall be modified to verify
that no Mode A interrogations that meet the criteria for acceptance in DO-181E, Section 2.2.6.2,
produce a reply. The Rrequirement for recovery from a Mode A interrogation per A1.2.3.10.1 shall
be tested according to DO-181E, Section 2.4.2.6, Sstep 1, except using a Mode A interrogation
from the master and a Mode C interrogation from the slave.
A2.2.3.10.2 Testing should verify the requirements added to RTCA/ DO-181E, paragraph 2.2.18.2.2.m, have
been properly incorporated per Section A1.2.3.10.2. Verify the requirement added by this ETSO,
by performing the test procedure in RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.4.2.1. step 6, using a UF=0 to verify
the Mode S MTL in Section 2.2.2.4.b and UF=4, 5, 20 and 21 to verify the modified MTL per
A1.2.3.10.2.
A2.2.3.11 Testing should verify that the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Interrogation Reply Coordination,
Section 2.2.18.2.3, as modified by A1.2.3.11 of this ETSO are satisfied. Testing outlined in DO-
181E, Section 2.5.4.2, shall be modified to verify that the unit does not reply to ATCRBS Mode A
interrogations. Test ATCRBS Mode A/Mode S All-Calls, ATCRBS Mode C/Mode S All-Calls or UF=11
interrogations per testing outlined in A2.2.3.7 and A2.2.3.10.
A2.2.3.12 Testing of RTCA/ DO-181E, Lockout Protocol, Section 2.2.18.2.4, is not required since TABS devices
do not reply to All-Call interrogations per A1.2.3.12 of this ETSO. Testing using interrogations in
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RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.5.4.4, should be performed to verify that the unit properly replies to
interrogations containing lockout commands from ground interrogations.
A2.2.3.13 Testing of RTCA/ DO-181E, Multisite Lockout Protocol, Section 2.2.18.2.5, is not required since
TABS devices do not reply to All-Call interrogations per A1.2.3.13 of this ETSO. Testing using
interrogations in RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.5.4.5, should be performed to verify that the unit
properly replies to interrogations containing multisite lockout commands from ground
interrogations.
A2.2.3.14 Testing should verify that the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Flight Status and Vertical Status
Protocols, Section 2.2.18.2.7, as modified by A1.2.3.14 of this ETSO are satisfied. Testing outlined
in DO-181E, Section 2.5.4.7, should be performed to verify that the unit sets the flight status bits
properly consistently with the capabilities provided for Mode 3/A code entry per A1.2.3.1.3.
A2.2.3.15 Testing the requirement of RTCA/ DO-181E, All-Call Reply Protocol, Section 2.2.18.2.9, as modified
by A1.2.3.15, is not required. Testing outlined in DO-181E, Section 2.5.4.8, does not need to be
performed since the TABS does not support the All-Call Protocol.
A2.2.3.16 Testing should verify the Level 2 Transponder Requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Minimum Level 2
Transponder Requirements, Section 2.2.19.1, as modified by A1.2.3.16 of this ETSO are satisfied.
Testing outlined in RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.5.3, should be performed to verify that the unit
performs per design specifications. Also, testing outlined in RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.5.4.17,
should be performed to verify that the unit does not process DF=16 messages.
A2.2.3.17 No test is required to verify the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Information Transfer,
Section 2.2.19.1.3, per A1.2.3.17.
A2.2.3.18 Testing should verify that the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Interrogation-Reply Coordination,
Section 2.2.19.1.4, as modified by A1.2.3.18 are met. Use tests in A2.2.3.7 and A2.2.3.10 in this
ETSO to verify that the TABS does not reply to ATCRBS Mode A, ATCRBS/Mode S All-Calls and
UF=11 interrogations.
A2.2.3.19 Testing of the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Lockout Protocol, Section 2.2.19.1.5, per
Section 2.5.4.4, are not required per A1.2.3.19 of this ETSO. Testing should verify that the TABS
does not perform the UM Protocol per RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.5.4.18.
A2.2.3.20 Since TABSs do not support the Comm-B protocol except for GICB extraction requests, the
requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, UM Protocol, Section 2.2.19.1.9, do not apply, per A1.2.3.20.
Using a subset of the interrogations identified in RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.5.4.18, select
12 interrogations with UF=4, 5, 20 and 21 and containing DI=0, 1 and 7 and verify that the reply
contains UM field of 0 (zero)ZERO.
A2.2.3.21 Testing of the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Comm-A Protocol, Section 2.2.19.1.10, per
Section 2.5.4.15, are is not required per A1.2.3.21 of this ETSO. Testing should verify that the TABS
does not perform the Com-A Protocol per RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.5.4.15.
A2.2.3.22 Testing of the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Broadcast Protocol, Section 2.2.19.1.11, as
modified by A1.2.3.22 is not required since TABSs do not support this protocol.
A2.2.3.23 Testing of the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Air-Initiated Comm-B Protocol,
Section 2.2.19.1.12.4, per Section 2.5.4.18 is not required per A1.2.3.23. To verify GICB extraction
requirements, perform the portion of the test procedure of RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.5.4.18,
using interrogation patterns 1 to 24, to test the transponder in state 1 of the test matrix to verify
proper reply content.
A2.2.3.24 Testing the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Comm-B Broadcast Protocol, Section 2.2.19.1.12.5,
per 2.5.4.21 is not required per A1.2.3.24.
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A2.2.3.25 Testing should verify the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Updating the Data Link Capability
Report, Section 2.2.19.1.12.6.3, as modified by A1.2.3.25. Testing should verify that the TABS does
not perform the Updating the Data Link Capability Report per RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.5.4.33.
A2.2.3.26 Testing should verify the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Change of Aircraft Identification,
Section 2.2.19.1.13.e, as modified by A1.2.3.26. Testing should verify that the TABS does not
perform the Change of Identification per RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.5.4.19.
A2.2.3.27 Testing the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Linked Comm-A Coding, Section 2.2.19.1.14, per
2.5.4.15, is not required per A1.2.3.27.
A2.2.3.28 Testing the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Comm-U/V Protocol, Section 2.2.19.1.16, per
2.5.4.17, as modified by A1.2.3.28 is not required.
A2.2.3.29 Testing the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Data Handling Interfaces, Section 2.2.19.1.17, per
2.5.4.20, as modified by A1.2.3.29 is not required.
A2.2.3.30 Testing the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Multisite Message Protocol, Section 2.2.19.2, per
Section 2.5.4.5, as modified by A1.2.3.30 is not required.
A2.2.3.31 Testing the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Surveillance Identifier (SI), Section 2.2.24.2, per
2.6.2, as modified by A1.2.3.31 is not required.
A2.2.3.32 Testing the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Elementary Surveillance Capability, Section 2.2.24,
as modified by A1.2.3.32 is not required. If one or more ELS registers are supported, test per RTCA/
DO-181E, Section 2.6.
A2.2.3.33 Testing the requirements of RTCA/ DO-181E, Enhanced Surveillance Capability, Section 2.2.25.3.2,
as modified by A1.2.3.33 is not required. If the unit is Enhanced Surveillance Capability capable,
test per RTCA/ DO-181E, Section 2.7.
A2.2.4 Testing Altitude Source Function Requirements
A2.2.4.1 Testing of the Altitude Source Function should follow that called out in ETSO-C88b, Automatic
Pressure Altitude Reporting Code Generating Equipment, dated 5 August 2016.
A2.2.5 Testing ADS-B OUT Function Requirements (For Class A Devices)
A2.2.5.1 Testing should verify the ADS-B system performs its intended function per EUROCAE ED-102A,
MOPS for 1090 MHz Extended Squitter Automatic Dependent Surveillance —– Broadcast (ADS-B)
and Traffic Information Services —– Broadcast (TIS-B), dated December, 2009, including
Corrigendum-1, dated January, 2012, except as modified by Section A1.2.5. Testing should follow
the tests outlined in EUROCAE ED-102A, including Corrigendum 1, dated January, 2012, Sections
2.3 and 2.4, with the following exceptions:
A2.2.5.2 Per Section A1.2.5.2, testing of transponder functions should follow the requirements in
Sections A1.2.3 and A2.2.3 of this ETSO.
A2.2.5.3 Testing should verify the System RF Peak Power Output has a peak output level of at least
18.5 dBW (70 watts) per A1.2.5.3, reference EUROCAE ED-102A, including Corrigendum-1, dated
January, 2012, RF Peak Power, Section 2.2.2.2.10.1.a. Testing outlined in ED-102A,
Section 2.3.2.2.6.1 step 5, should verify that the unit under test provides a peak output power
level of at least 18.5 dBW (70 watts).
A2.2.5.4 If the optional ADS-B Surface Position Messages function is provided, per Section, A1.2.5.4, testing
should verify that the ADS-B Surface Position Message is correctly populated and broadcast per
EUROCAE ED-102A, Section 2.4.3.2.1.2.2.
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A2.2.5.5 If the optional Typecode 31, subtype 1, Aircraft Operational Status Messages is provided per
Section A1.2.5.5, testing should verify that the Aircraft Operational Status Messages is correctly
populated and broadcast per EUROCAE ED-102A, Section 2.4.3.2.7.2
A2.2.5.6 Per Section A1.2.5.6, testing should verify that NIC=6, and SIL=1 when using position from a Class B
position source using test procedures in EUROCAE ED-102A, including Corrigendum-1, dated
January, 2012, Sections 2.4.8.1.5, and 2.4.5.1.40.
A2.2.5.7 Testing should verify that the System Design Assurance (SDA) is set to 1 to verify the requirement
in Section A1.2.5.7, reference EUROCAE ED-102A, including Corrigendum-1, dated January, 2012,
System Design Assurance (SDA), Section 2.2.5.1.50.
A2.2.5.8 Per Section A1.2.5.8, testing should verify that Navigation Accuracy Category for Position (NACp)
is set according to EUROCAE ED-102A including Corrigendum-1, dated January, 2012,
Section 2.4.3.2.7.1.3.8. Testing should verify that the NACp is set appropriately when the position
source is providing HDOP and not HFOM.
A2.2.5.9 If a TABS Class B position source is installed, verify that Navigation Accuracy Category Velocity
(NACv) is set to 1 (10 m/s) per A1.2.5.9.
A2.2.5.10 Verify that Geometric Vertical Accuracy (GVA) is set per A1.2.5.10. Testing outlined in EUROCAE
ED-102A, including Corrigendum-1, dated January, 2012, Section 2.4.3.2.7.2.8, should verify that
GVA is set appropriately when the position source is providing VDOP and not VFOM.
A2.2.5.11 Verify Type Code 31, Airborne Capability Class Message, indicates that the unit under test is a
TABS per A1.2.5.11.
A2.2.6 Testing of GNSS Position Source Function Requirements (For Class B Devices)
A2.2.6.1 A TABS incorporating a position source that is compliant with ETSO-C129, ETSO-C145, ETSO-C146
or ETSO-C196 must also meet the additional ADS-B criteria defined in AMC1 ACNS.D.ADSB.070 of
CS-ACNS, to include any required testing. GNSS position sources that are not compliant with an
existing GNSS ETSO will need to meet the requirements in paragraph A1.2.6 of this ETSO and verify
it meets the minimum requirements by performing the tests outlined in Section A2.2.6 of this
ETSO. The following tests were derived from a reduced set of requirements and associated tests
found in RTCA/ DO-229E.
A2.2.6.2 GPS Only Solution.
A2.2.6.2.1 Per paragraph A1.2.6.2, verify that the position source provides a GPS-SBAS or GPS Only solution
for use by Class A TABS.
A2.2.6.3 Position Accuracy Tests.
A2.2.6.3.1 Two tests are used to verify the horizontal position accuracy to ensure the requirement in
paragraph A1.2.6.3 is met. The first test is a 24-hour static scenario using live satellite signals. The
second test uses a GNSS simulator to generate a scenario incorporating both static and dynamic
aircraft manoeuversmanoeuvres.
A2.2.6.3.2 24-Hour Accuracy Test.
A2.2.6.3.2.1 The equipment SHALL be tested over a 24-hour period using live GPS satellite signals at a surveyed
location. The equipment SHALL use an antenna representative of what will be used in an actual
airborne installation. The horizontal position error SHALL be computed for each position estimate
output by the equipment.
A2.2.6.3.2.2 Monitor the sensor-provided HFOM and VFOM, or HFOM and VFOM derived from the sensor-
provided HDOP and VDOP per paragraphs A1.2.5.8 and A1.2.5.10. In order to pass the test, the
horizontal position error must be less than 30 metres for at least 95 % of the samples and the
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horizontal accuracy reported must be greater than the actual position error for at least 95 % of
the samples. In order to pass the test, the vertical position error must be less than 45 metres for
at least 95 % of the samples and the vertical accuracy reported must be greater than the actual
position error for at least 95 % of the samples.
A2.2.6.3.2.3 The horizontal position error SHALL not exceed 0.5 NM at any time during the test.
A2.2.6.3.2.4 Only those position outputs that are reported as valid by the equipment need to be considered
for the accuracy evaluation. In order to pass the test, 99.9 % of the position outputs must be
reported as valid, excluding those position reports prior to the first position fix.
A2.2.6.3.3 GPS Simulator-based Accuracy Tests.
A2.2.6.3.3.1 The equipment SHALL be tested using a GPS simulator scenario that includes both static and
dynamic aircraft manoeuversmanoeuvres. The horizontal and vertical position errors SHALL be
computed for each position estimate output by the equipment.
A2.2.6.3.3.2 Monitor the sensor-provided HFOM and VFOM, or HFOM and VFOM derived from the sensor-
provided HDOP and VDOP per paragraphs A1.2.5.8 and A1.2.5.10. In order to pass the test, the
horizontal position error must be less than 30 metres for at least 95 % of the samples and the
horizontal accuracy reported must be greater than the actual position error for at least 95 % of
the samples. In order to pass the test, the vertical position error must be less than 45 metres for
at least 95 % of the samples and the vertical accuracy reported must be greater than the actual
position error for at least 95 % of the samples.
A2.2.6.3.3.3 The horizontal position error SHALL not exceed 0.5 NM at any time during the test.
A2.2.6.3.3.4 Simulator Scenario Details
A2.2.6.3.3.4.1 Only those position outputs that are reported as valid by the equipment need to be considered
for the accuracy evaluation. In order to pass the test, 99.9 % of the position outputs must be
reported as valid, excluding those position reports prior to the first position fix.
A2.2.6.3.3.4.2 The simulator scenario SHALL use the standard 24-satellite constellation in RTCA/ DO-229E
Appendix B. The initial position and time should be chosen to ensure the satellite geometry
supports the test Pass/Failpass-fail criteria, and the HDOP is close to 2.5 and the VDOP is close to
3.7.
A2.2.6.3.3.4.3 The simulation SHALL include both stationary and dynamic portions, as follows:
A2.2.6.3.3.4.3.1 At least 10 minutes of stationary position.
A2.2.6.3.3.4.3.2 A sequence of different manoeuversmanoeuvres, including acceleration to a constant
velocity, climbs, descents, and turns.
A2.2.6.3.3.4.3.2.1 A series of turns should be included to ensure a constantly changing velocity to expose
any effects of filtering on the position output.
A2.2.6.3.3.4.3.3 At least 10 minutes of accelerated manoeuversmanoeuvres SHALL be simulated.
A2.2.6.3.3.4.3.4 Aircraft dynamics are as follows: ground speed = 200 kt, horizontal
acceleration = 0.58 g, vertical acceleration of 0.5 g.
A2.2.6.3.3.4.4 The simulated satellite signals SHALL be set to - 134 dBm while position measurements are taken.
Signal powers may be increased at the beginning of the scenario to allow for initial acquisition.
A2.2.6.3.3.4.5 Simulated signals SHALL include ranging errors for atmospheric effects (troposphere and
ionosphere) that adhere to approved models. Refer to DO-229E, Appendix A, Section A.4.2.4 and
IS-GPS-200G, dated 5 September5, 2012.
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A2.2.6.3.3.4.6 No interference needs to be simulated.
2.2.6.4 Reserved.
A2.2.6.5 Velocity Accuracy Tests.
A2.2.6.5.1 The velocity accuracy tests specified in AC 20-138D Appendix 4, Sections 4-2, 4-3 and 4-4, SHALL
be performed per the requirement in A1.2.6.5 and show the unit provides an accuracy of 10 m/s
or less, at least 95 % of the time. It is assumed that the GPS position source does not provide a
velocity accuracy output and the TABS will broadcast NACv = 1. Only the tests required to
demonstrate a NACv = 1 need be run.
A2.2.6.6 Interference Tests.
A2.2.6.6.1 The equipment SHALL be tested using simulated GPS signals mixed with an interfering signal of
gradually increasing power until the equipment loses position to verify the requirement outlined
in paragraph A1.2.6.6. The horizontal position accuracy will be evaluated.
A2.2.6.6.2 Simulator Scenario Details.
A2.2.6.6.2.1 Use the same simulator scenario set-up found in A2.2.6.3.3.4 with the following exceptions:
A2.2.6.6.2.2 The interfering signal SHALL be broadband noise with bandwidth of 20 MHz centred on
1575.42 MHz. The initial power spectral density SHALL be – 170.5 dBm/Hz (– 97.5 dBm total
power).
A2.2.6.6.2.3 The scenario may need to be extended to allow sufficient time for increasing interference power.
A2.2.6.6.3 Test Procedure
A2.2.6.6.3.1 Step 1: The interfering signal SHALL initially be turned off.
A2.2.6.6.3.2 Step 2: The simulator scenario SHALL be engaged and the satellites’ RF SHALL be turned on.
A2.2.6.6.3.3 Step 3: The equipment SHALL be powered on and initialised. It is assumed that the receiver has
obtained a valid almanac for the simulator scenario to be tested prior to conducting these tests.
A2.2.6.6.3.4 Step 4: The receiver SHALL be allowed to reach steady state. When the receiver has reached
steady state, an interfering broadband noise signal of – 170.5 dBm/Hz SHALL be applied.
A2.2.6.6.3.5 Step 5: The interference power SHALL be maintained until the accuracy has reached steady
statesteady-state. Position measurements and validity indications SHALL be recorded during this
interval.
A2.2.6.6.3.6 Step 6: The power of the interfering signal SHALL be increased by 2 dB and maintained for
200 seconds.
A2.2.6.6.3.7 Step 7: Go to Step 5 and repeat until the receiver is unable to maintain a position fix.
A2.2.6.6.4 Pass/Fail Pass-Fail Criteria
A2.2.6.6.4.1 The horizontal position errors SHALL be computed for each position estimate output by the
equipment.
A2.2.6.6.4.2 The horizontal position error SHALL not exceed 0.5 NM at any time during the test.
A2.2.6.6.4.3 Only those position outputs that are reported as valid by the equipment need to be considered
for the accuracy evaluation. There is no minimum interference rejection requirement for TABS
equipment, and loss of position in the presence of interference is acceptable behaviour.
A2.2.6.7 Verification of SBAS Message Type 0
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A2.2.6.7.1 Test to verify that the GNSS position source does not use SBAS corrections when the SBAS satellite
is broadcasting message type 0 per A1.2.6.7.
A2.2.6.7.2 Simulator Scenario Details
A2.2.6.7.2.1 The simulator scenario SHALL use the standard 24-satellite constellation in RTCA/ DO-229E
Appendix B.
A2.2.6.7.2.2 A single SBAS satellite SHALL be simulated with a fast corrections (MT 2-5) update rate of
6 seconds.
A2.2.6.7.2.3 At 500 seconds into the scenario, the SBAS satellite SHALL start broadcasting message type 0 for
60 seconds. The message type 0 broadcast SHALL contain message type 2 data (if appropriate for
the SBAS service being simulated).
A2.2.6.7.2.4 The scenario SHALL have a static user position.
A2.2.6.7.2.5 The simulated satellite signals SHALL be set to a nominal power level (– 128 dBm).
A2.2.6.7.2.6 Simulated signals SHALL include ranging errors for atmospheric effects (troposphere and
ionosphere) that adhere to approved models. Refer to DO-229E Appendix A Section A.4.2.4 and
IS-GPS-200G, dated 5 September5, 2012.
A2.2.6.7.2.7 No interference needs to be simulated.
A2.2.6.7.3 Test Procedure
A2.2.6.7.3.1 Step 1: The simulator scenario SHALL be engaged and the satellites’ RF SHALL be turned on.
A2.2.6.7.3.2 Step 2: The equipment SHALL be powered on and initialised. It is assumed that the receiver has
obtained a valid almanac for the simulator scenario to be tested prior to conducting the tests.
A2.2.6.7.3.3 Step 3: Monitor the receiver output for the indication of SBAS use. Verify that the receiver
indicates that SBAS is not in use before an SBAS satellite has been acquired.
A2.2.6.7.3.4 Step 4: Allow the receiver to reach steady-state navigation. Verify that the receiver indicates that
SBAS is in use before proceeding to the next step.
A2.2.6.7.3.5 Step 5: 500 seconds into the scenario, the SBAS satellite SHALL start broadcasting message type 0.
A2.2.6.7.3.6 Step 6: Monitor the receiver output for the indication of SBAS use. Verify that the receiver
indicates that SBAS is not used within 8 seconds.
A2.2.6.8 Exclusion of satellites identified by SBAS as unhealthy
A2.2.6.8.1 Test to verify that the GNSS position source excludes satellites with UDREI = 15 reported in the
SBAS fast corrections per A1.2.6.8. The ability of the position source to exclude unhealthy
satellites based on the SBAS UDREI will be tested by injecting a ramp error on a satellite
measurement and subsequently broadcasting an SBAS UDREI of 15 (‘do not use’) for that satellite.
A2.2.6.8.2 UDREI = 15 in fast corrections message (MT 2-5, 24)
A2.2.6.8.2.1 The equipment SHALL be tested to verify that the UDREI data contained in the SBAS fast
corrections messages (MT 2-5, 24) is used to exclude unhealthy satellites.
Note: The test does not assume that the receiver outputs an indication that the unhealthy satellite
has been removed from the position solution. Instead, it uses a pass criterioncriteria based on
horizontal position error.
A2.2.6.8.2.2 Simulator Scenario Details
A2.2.6.8.2.2.1 The simulator scenario SHALL use the standard 24-satellite constellation in RTCA/ DO-229E
Appendix B.
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A2.2.6.8.2.2.2 A single SBAS satellite SHALL be simulated with a fast corrections (MT 2-5, 24) update rate of
6 seconds. The integrity information message (MT 6) SHALL not be broadcast.
A2.2.6.8.2.2.3 The simulation start time and location SHALL be such that the resulting HDOP is close to 5.0.
A2.2.6.8.2.2.4 The simulation SHALL use nominal aircraft dynamics, defined to be ground speed = 200 kt and
horizontal acceleration = 0.58 g. These dynamics can be simulated as a series of turns.
A2.2.6.8.2.2.5 The scenario SHALL allow the receiver time to achieve steady-state navigation before introducing
any satellite errors.
A2.2.6.8.2.2.6 The scenario SHALL introduce a ramp error on each simulated GPS satellite individually, as follows:
A2.2.6.8.2.2.6.1 Step 1: A 5-m/s ramp error SHALL be introduced on the simulated GPS satellite.
A2.2.6.8.2.2.6.2 Step 2: Six 6 seconds after the introduction of the ramp error, the simulated SBAS satellite
SHALL broadcast a UDREI of 15 for the GPS satellite in the fast correction message.
A2.2.6.8.2.2.6.3 Step 3: The ramp error SHALL be applied until one of the following conditions occur:
— The horizontal position error of a valid position output exceeds 0.5 NM; or
— The ramp error exceeds 2 000 m; or
— The affected GPS satellite is excluded from the solution.
A2.2.6.8.2.2.6.4 Step 4: Allow the receiver time to return to steady state before repeating sSteps 1 to 3 on
the next satellite.
A2.2.6.8.2.2.7 The simulated satellite signals SHALL be set to - 134 dBm while position measurements are
taken. Signal powers may be increased at the beginning of the scenario to allow for initial
acquisition.
A2.2.6.8.2.2.8 Simulated signals SHALL include ranging errors for atmospheric effects (troposphere and
ionosphere) that adhere to approved models. Refer to DO-229E, Appendix A, Section A.4.2.4
and IS-GPS-200G, dated 5 September5, 2012.
A2.2.6.8.2.2.9 No interference needs to be simulated.
A2.2.6.8.2.3 Pass/Fail Pass-Fail Criteria
A2.2.6.8.2.3.1 The test SHALL be run on two different space-time scenarios. The two scenarios SHALL be
sufficiently separated to ensure that different satellite geometry is presented to the receiver.
A2.2.6.8.2.3.2 The horizontal position errors SHALL be computed for each position estimate output by the
equipment during the test.
A2.2.6.8.2.3.3 The horizontal position error SHALL not exceed 0.5 NM at any time during the test.
A2.2.6.8.2.3.4 Only those position outputs that are reported as valid by the equipment need to be considered
for the accuracy evaluation.
A2.2.6.9 Testing GNSS Position Source SBAS Fast and Long-Term Corrections
A2.2.6.9.1 Application of Fast Corrections (MT 2-5, 24) and Long-Term Corrections (MT 24, 25). The
equipment SHALL be tested to verify that fast corrections and long-term corrections are applied
properly per A1.2.6.9.
A2.2.6.9.2 Simulator Scenario Details
A2.2.6.9.2.1 The simulator scenario SHALL use the standard 24-satellite constellation in RTCA/ DO-229E
Appendix B.
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A2.2.6.9.2.2 A single SBAS satellite SHALL be simulated with a fast corrections (MT 2-5, 24) update rate of
6 seconds and standard long-term corrections (MT 24, 25) update rate of 120 seconds.
A2.2.6.9.2.3 The simulation start time and location SHALL be such that the resulting HDOP is close to 5.0.
A2.2.6.9.2.4 The simulation SHALL use nominal aircraft dynamics, defined to be ground speed = 200 kt and
horizontal acceleration = 0.58 g. These dynamics can be simulated as a series of turns.
A2.2.6.9.2.5 The scenario SHALL introduce a bias and ramp error on a single satellite selected so that the range
error will result in the maximum horizontal position error if not corrected by SBAS. The SBAS long-
term corrections will be applied to correct the bias error. At each 6-seconds update, SBAS fast
corrections will be provided to correct the ramp error for the affected satellite, as follows:
A2.2.6.9.2.5.1 Step 1: A 70-metre bias SHALL be introduced on the simulated GPS satellite. Provide SBAS long-
term corrections to correct the bias term. The bias magnitude was chosen to approximate the
maximum value that can be corrected by the δaf0 term in a type 25 message (using velocity
code 0).
A2.2.6.9.2.5.2 Step 2: Start the scenario broadcasting MT 25 with the correction for the bias error introduced on
the selected satellite.
A2.2.6.9.2.5.3 Step 3: Allow the receiver time to acquire the GPS and SBAS satellites and obtain a steady-state
differential fix, including sufficient time to acquire a type 25 message for the selected GPS
satellite.
A2.2.6.9.2.5.4 Step 4: Inject a 5-m/s ramp error on the selected satellite in the same direction as the bias error.
A2.2.6.9.2.5.5 Step 5: At each 6-second update, provide SBAS fast corrections equivalent to the size of the
growing ramp error.
A2.2.6.9.2.5.6 Step 6: The ramp error SHALL be applied until the ramp error plus bias error reaches 325 metres.
Maintain the error of 325 metres for 5 minutes.
A2.2.6.9.2.6 The simulated satellite signals SHALL be set to – 134 dBm while position measurements are taken.
Signal powers may be increased at the beginning of the scenario to allow for initial acquisition.
A2.2.6.9.2.7 Simulated signals SHALL include ranging errors for atmospheric effects (troposphere and
ionosphere) that adhere to approved models. Refer to DO-229E Appendix A Section A.4.2.4 and
IS-GPS-200G, dated 5 September 2012.
A2.2.6.9.2.8 No interference needs to be simulated.
A2.2.6.9.3 Pass/Fail Pass-Fail Criteria
A2.2.6.9.3.1 The horizontal and vertical position errors SHALL be computed for each position estimate output
by the equipment during the test.
A2.2.6.9.3.2 Monitor the sensor-provided HFOM and VFOM, or HFOM and VFOM derived from the sensor-
provided HDOP and VDOP per paragraphs A1.2.5.8 and A1.2.5.10. Compare the HFOM against the
horizontal position error for each valid position estimate. Compare the VFOM against the vertical
position error for each valid position estimate. In order to pass the test, the horizontal and vertical
position accuracy output must be greater than the actual position error at least 95 % of the time.
Analyse the position estimates to determine whether if the fast corrections and long-term
corrections are being applied correctly.
A2.2.6.9.3.3 Only those position outputs that are reported as valid by the equipment need to be considered
for the accuracy evaluation.
A2.2.6.9.3.4 The test only needs to be run using a single space/time scenario.
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A2.2.6.10 Test the GNSS position source requirements in Section 0 by running the test outlined in
Section A2.2.6.3.3.
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APPENDIX 3.
ENVIRONMENTAL TESTING FOR CLASS B EQUIPMENT
A3 Environmental Test Considerations
A3.1 The environmental tests and performance requirements described in this subsection provide a
laboratory means of determining the overall performance characteristics of the equipment under
conditions that are representative of those that may be encountered in actual aeronautical
operations.
A3.2 The following test procedures must be run when performing environmental testing on Class B
Eequipment. Class B equipment only needs to be tested under DO-160D change 3 or later
Environmental Test, Section 4 Temperature and Altitude, and Section 5 Temperature Variation
Testing.
A3.3 The test procedure set forth provided below is considered satisfactory for use in determining the
performance of the equipment performance under environmental conditions. Although specific
test procedures are cited, it is recognised that other methods may be preferred. These alternative
procedures may be used if the manufacturer can show that they provide at least equivalent
information. In such cases, the procedures cited herein should be used as one criterion in
evaluating the acceptability of the alternative procedures.
Note: The intent of this section is to minimise the testing of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
devices.
A3.4 Class B Equipment System Test
A3.4.1 Equipment Required: A representative antenna of what will be installed in an actual airborne
TABS.
A3.4.2 Figure 1 provides a representation of the test set-up.
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horizontal position error for each valid position estimate. In order to pass the test, the horizontal
position accuracy output must be greater than the actual position error for at least 95 % of the
samples. The horizontal position error SHALL not exceed 0.5 NM at any time during the test.
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ETSO-C207a
Date: 19.12.2016 XX.XX.20XX
European
Union
Aviation
Safety
Agency
European Technical Standard Order (ETSO)
Subject: AERONAUTICAL MOBIL E AIRPORT COMMUNICATION SYSTEM (AeroMACS)
1— Applicability
This ETSO gives provides the requirements which aeronautical mobile airport communication systems
(AeroMACSs) that are designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order
to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.
2— Procedures
2.1 — General
The Aapplicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None.
3— Technical cConditions
3.1 — Basic
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3.1.2 — Environmental sStandard
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1.
3.1.3 — Software
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.2.
3.2 — Specific
None.
4— Marking
4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.
4.2 — Specific
None.
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Date: 19.12.2016 XX.XX.20XX
European
Union
Aviation
Safety
Agency
European Technical Standard Order (ETSO)
Subject: PORTABLE WATER -SOL UTION TYPE HAND FIRE EXTINGUISHERS
1— Applicability
This ETSO provides gives the requirements which new models of portable water-solution type hand fire
extinguishers that are designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order
to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.
2— Procedures
2.1 — General
The Aapplicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None.
3— Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.2 — Specific
None
3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4.
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4— Marking
4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.
Instead of the optional serial number, the date of manufacture has to be marked.
4.2 — Specific
These are Aas specified in the SAE International’s Aerospace Standard document AS245A AS245B,
paragraph 3.2.
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APPENDIX 1.
MPS FOR PORTABLE WATER SOLUTION TYPE HAND FIRE EXTINGUISHERS
The applicable standard is SAE AS245B, Water Solution Type Hand Fire Extinguisher, dated (revised)
April 2004, shall be modified as follows:
Table 1:
the ’‘b’‘ and ’‘p’‘ factors indicated depend on the type of extinguisher
type
b p
Type I 2,7 1,5
Type II 2,4 1,2
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ETSO-2C197a
Date: 05.07.2012 XX.XX.20XX
European
Union
Aviation
Safety
Agency
1 — Applicability
This ETSO gives provides the requirements which information collection and monitoring systems that
record cockpit audio, aircraft data, airborne images, or data link communications and that are designed
and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the
applicable ETSO marking.
2 — Procedures
2.1 — General
The Aapplicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
All the documents specified in EUROCAE ED-155, Section 2-1, 2-1.3.4, must be provided. In addition,
a statement must be provided that tools are readily available for the retrieval of recorded
information from any memory device used within the robust memory module removed from a crash -
damaged recorder.
Note: The documents and tools/special recovery techniques required above are meant to be offered
to any safety investigation authority, whether or not the request from that authority is made in the
frame of an ongoing investigation.
None.
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3 — Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
The applicable Sstandards are those set forthprovided in the EUROCAE ED-155, Minimum Operational
Performance Specification for Lightweight Flight Recording Systems, dated July 2009.
All ICMS must meet the requirements in ED-155 Chapters 2-1, 2-2, 2-3 and 2-4 of Section 2.
All deployable ICMS must also meet the requirements in ED-155 Chapters 3-1, 3-2, 3-3 and 3-4 of
Section 3. Additionally, each Type of ICMS must meet the requirements of ED-155 listed in the table
below.
ICMS Your design must also meet the following Your design does not need to meet the
Type requirements in ED-155 following requirements in ED-155
I Part I, Cockpit Audio Recording System I-2.1.7 and I-6
II Part II, Aircraft Data Recording System II-2.1.7, II-2.1.9, II-2.1.12, and II-6
III Part III, Airborne Image Recording System III-2.2 and III-6
IV Part IV, Data-link Recording System IV-2.1.6, IV-2.1.11, and IV-6
4 — Marking
4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.
4.2 — Specific
None.
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ETSO-2C204a
Date: XX.XX.20XX
European
Union
Aviation
Safety
Agency
1 — Applicability
This ETSO provides the requirements that circuit card assembly (CAA) functional sensors that use
satellite-based augmentation systems (SBASs) for navigation and non-navigation
position/velocity/time (PVT) output, which are designed and manufactured on or after the date of
this ETSO, must meet in order to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.
ETSO-2C204a is intended as a means for manufacturers of end-use equipment to rationalise their
ETSO-C145e applications for Class Beta PVT sensors by using ETSO-authorised SBAS CCAs for partial
certification credit.
An ETSO-2C204a article has a limitation that requires the manufacturer of end-use equipment to
repeat selected detailed functional tests in the end-use equipment and complete the environmental
qualification tests in RTCA DO-229E (see paragraphs 3.1.2.2 and 3.2.2 below).
2 — Procedures
2.1 — General
The applicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None.
3 — Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
The applicable standards are those provided for Class Beta functional equipment in RTCA
document DO-229E, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Global Positioning
System/Satellite-Based Augmentation System Airborne Equipment, dated 15 December 2016,
Section 2, as modified by Appendices 1 and 3 of this ETSO standard.
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The standards in this ETSO apply to CCAs that are intended to provide PVT information for
navigation management unit applications that output deviation commands keyed to a desired
flight path, or non-navigation applications such as automatic dependent surveillance —
broadcast (ADS-B) or terrain awareness and warning systems (TAWS). In navigation
applications, pilots or autopilots will use the deviations output by the navigation management
unit to guide the aircraft. In non-navigation applications, the PVT outputs will provide the
necessary inputs for the end-use equipment.
For the applicable environmental standards, see CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1.
Nevertheless, not all types of environmental test are required for this ETSO standard, as the
ETSO article for this ETSO standard is a CCA that will be later integrated into an ETSO equipment.
Therefore, a minimal set of the environmental test conditions of EUROCAE ED-14/RTCA DO-160
has been defined (refer to Table 1) in order to verify the performance of the ETSOA article under
this minimal set of conditions. The required performance under a particular environmental test
is defined in the related test section in RTCA document DO-229E, Minimum Operational
Performance Standards for Global Positioning System/Satellite-Based Augmentation System
Airborne Equipment, dated 15 December 2016, Section 2.4.
This minimal set is defined in Table 1 below. The chosen test category, associated with the
selectable parameters in the test conditions per EUROCAE ED-14/RTCA DO-160, should be
documented in the installation manual as limitations for the installation.
The test sections that are identified as optional are not required for an ETSO-2C204a
application. Nevertheless, the ETSO CCA article can be subjected to these test conditions on the
applicant’s voluntary basis. If optional sections are not tested, they shall be marked with X in
the environmental testing summary.
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The end user of this ETSO article will be required to complete the environmental qualification
testing after integration of the ETSO-2C204a CCA. In order to allow the end user to properly test
the functionality of the SBAS CCA functional sensor in environmental conditions, the applicant
for the ‘SBAS CCA functional sensor’ shall provide the detailed functional test procedures to
evaluate the required performance of the SBAS CCA functional sensor in compliance with RTCA
document DO-229E, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Global Positioning
System/Satellite-Based Augmentation System Airborne Equipment, dated 15 December 2016,
Section 2.4.
3.1.3 — Software
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.2.
3.1.4 — Airborne Electronic Hardware
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.3.
3.2 — Specific
3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4.
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— major failure condition for a loss of function of approach localiser performance without
vertical guidance (LP), and approach localiser performance with vertical guidance (LPV)
position data; and
—
hazardous failure condition for a malfunction of approach (LP and LPV) position data
that results in misleading information.
3.2.2 — Additional Specific
If the SBAS CCA functional sensor can only satisfy the requirements of RTCA DO-229E when used
with a particular antenna, the use of that antenna (by part number) shall be a requirement on
the installation.
This requirement shall be included in the installation manual as a limitation.
The applicant shall have all the data necessary to evaluate the geostationary (GEO) satellite bias
as defined in RTCA DO-229E, Section 2.1.4.1.5, available for review by EASA.
If the SBAS CCA functional sensor uses barometric-aiding to enhance the availability of FDE,
then the equipment shall meet the requirements in RTCA DO-229E, Appendix G.
The applicant shall provide to the end user the detailed functional test procedures of the SBAS
CCA functional sensor for the end user to complete the environmental testing.
Limitations:
The following specific limitations shall be documented in the installation manual and in the DDP
of the SBAS CCA functional sensor:
— ‘The manufacturer of the end-use equipment, who installs the <insert equipment model>
SBAS CCA functional sensor, is required to perform the testing described in ETSO -
C145e<latest revision> Appendix 1 with the SBAS CCA functional sensor installed in the
end-use equipment.’
— ‘The manufacturer of end-use equipment is required to complete full environmental
qualification at the end-use equipment level.’
4 — Marking
4.1 — General
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.
4.2 — Specific
The SBAS CCA functional sensor must be permanently and legibly marked with the operational
equipment class (e.g. Class 2), as defined in Section 1.4.2 of RTCA document DO-229E. The
functional equipment class (e.g. Beta) defined in Section 1.4.1 of RTCA document DO-229E is not
required to be marked.
It is sufficient to declare the proper functional equipment class in the declaration of design and
performance (DDP).
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Date: XX.XX.20XX
APPENDIX 1
This Appendix describes the modifications and additions to RTCA DO-229E that are required for compliance
with this ETSO.
This Appendix adds a new Section 1.8.3, on cybersecurity and GPS spoofing mitigation, to RTCA DO-229E,
and corrects a long-standing mistake in the Section 2.4 environmental requirements tables. The new section
provides information for cybersecurity and GPS spoofing mitigation to make RTCA DO-229E consistent with
the new RTCA MOPS template and RTCA DO-253D, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for GPS
Local Area Augmentation System Airborne Equipment, dated July 2017.
This section contains information to address intentional interference with the GPS. Spoofing is caused by RF
waveforms that mimic true signals in some ways, but deny, degrade, disrupt, or deceive the operation of a
receiver when they are processed. Spoofing may be unintentional, such as effects from the signals of a GPS
repeater, or may be intentional and even malicious. There are two classes of spoofing:
— Measurement spoofing introduces RF waveforms that cause the target receiver to produce incorrect
measurements of the time of arrival or the frequency of arrival, or their rates of change;
— Data spoofing introduces incorrect digital data to the target receiver for its use in the processing of
signals and the calculation of positioning, navigation and timing (PNT).
Either class of spoofing can cause a range of effects: from incorrect outputs of PNT to receiver malfunctions.
The onset of effects can be instantaneous or delayed, and the effects can continue even after the spoofing
has ended. Improperly used or improperly installed GNSS re-radiators act like spoofers. Re-radiators, replay
and GNSS emulator devices can present misleading information to GNSS equipment and/or could cause
lasting effects.
Equipment manufacturers should implement measures to mitigate the processing of erroneous data. Cross-
checks of GNSS sensor data against independent position sources and/or other detection monitors using
GNSS signal metrics or data checks can be implemented in the antenna, receiver, and/or through integration
with other systems at the aircraft level. Data validity checks to recognise and reject measurement and data
spoofing should be implemented in the receiver. Additional guidance and best practices related to GPS
equipment can be found in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security document ‘Improving the Operation
and Development of Global Positioning System (GPS) Equipment Used by Critical Infrastructure’14 and
GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEMS DIRECTORATE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING & INTEGRATION: INTERFACE
SPECIFICATION, IS-GPS-200, Navstar GPS Space Segment/Navigation User Interfaces, Revision H,
IRN-IS-200H-003, 28 July 2016.
Aircraft equipment information vulnerabilities (such as cybersecurity risks) have been present for digital
systems since the development of the personal computer (PC) in the late 1970s and even longer for RF
systems, and the advent of internet connectivity has substantially increased those risks. Typically, access to
navigation receivers has been controlled such that they are considered to be vulnerable only to RF signals
and OEM and/or aircraft operator controlled processes for maintenance and update. In some cases, aircraft
14 https://ics-cert.us-ert.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Improving_the_Operation_and_Development_of_Global_Positioning_
System_(GPS)_Equipment_Used_by_Critical_Infrastructure_S508C.pdf
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GNSS receivers may be field-loadable by approved personnel, requiring physical access and a physical
interface to the ground receivers. However, it is expected that not all aircraft in the future will rely on such
physical isolation for the security of avionics. Internet and Wi-Fi connectivity have become popular as means
for aircraft or equipment manufacturers to update the software of installed avionics, to update databases,
or provide an alternate means of communicating with the flight crew or cabin (e.g. in-flight entertainment,
weather, etc.).
In most countries, the State provides oversight of safety-of-flight systems (sometimes referred to as
‘authorised services’) which provide information to aircraft, such as ILS, VOR, GNSS and DME, to name a few.
However, the State typically does not provide oversight of ‘non-trusted’ connectivity such as the internet,
Wi-Fi, or manufacturer-supplied equipment interfaces which permit the input of externally supplied data into
aircraft systems. A manufacturer may expose aircraft information vulnerabilities through the design of the
equipment, or the equipment may become vulnerable as a result of being connected to a common interface.
Therefore, it is important for manufacturers to consider aircraft information security risk mitigation strategies
in their equipment design, particularly when the equipment is responsible for an interface between the
aircraft and aircraft-external systems.
Apart from any specific aircraft-information-security-related performance requirements that are contained
in the MOPS, it is recommended that manufacturers should consider a layered approach to aircraft
information security risk mitigation that includes both technical (e.g. software, signal filtering) and physical
strategies. From a technical perspective, for example, this could include signal spoofing detection capabilities
or more stringent, multi-factored authentication techniques such as passwords, PINs, and digital certificates.
From a physical perspective, a manufacturer could consider connectors that require special tools to remove
them to prevent passenger tampering, although navigation avionics are typically located in an avionics bay
inaccessible to passengers. And finally, but just as important, manufacturers should consider supply chain
risk management; for example, if a manufacturer outsources the development of software code, are the
contractor and its staff properly vetted?
Civil aviation authorities (CAAs) have a regulatory interest when an applicant’s design makes use of a
non-trusted connection through which the installation can potentially introduce aircraft information security
vulnerabilities. This requires the applicant to address not only the information security vulnerabilities and
mitigation techniques for the new installation, but to also consider how vulnerabilities could propagate to
existing downstream systems. Therefore, manufacturers are recommended to reference their equipment
aircraft information security review and mitigation strategies in the installation manual of the equipment so
that the applicant can consider them in meeting the regulatory requirements of the installation.
The tables incorrectly reference and label RTCA/DO-160 Sections 16.5.1.2 and 16.6.1.2 regarding ‘2.1.1.7
Acquisition Time’ and ‘2.1.1.9 Reacquisition Time’. Change the table references as follows:
The MOPS initial acquisition time requirement (2.1.1.7) applies to both AC and DC equipment under
abnormal operating conditions (DO-160E Sections 16.5.2 and 16.6.2) and the satellite reacquisition time
requirement (2.1.1.9) applies to both AC and DC equipment under normal operating conditions (DO-160E
Sections 16.5.1 and 16.6.1).
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APPENDIX 2
Reserved.
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APPENDIX 3
This Appendix describes the EASA modifications to RTCA document DO-229E, Section 2.
‘The demodulation of data from the GPS signals shall be restricted to the necessary subset of the data defined
in Appendix II of IS-GPS-200D, “Navstar GPS Space Segment/Navigation User Interfaces”, December 2004,
provided on RF link L1. The pseudo-ranging shall be performed on RF link L1 utilising the coarse/acquisition
(C/A) code.’
This is to ensure that only the L1 NAV data, for which the SBAS provides corrections and integrity, is used,
and that no CNAV data, which is defined in Appendix III of IS-GPS-200D, is used, for which the SBAS does not
provide integrity.
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European
Union
Aviation
Safety
Agency
Subject: CIRCUIT CARD ASSEMBLY (CCA) FUNCTIONAL CLASS DELTA EQUIPMENT USING THE SATELLITE-
BASED AUGMENTATION SYSTEM (SBAS) FOR NAVIGATION APPLICATIONS
1 — Applicability
This ETSO provides the requirements which circuit card assembly (CCA) functional Class Delta-4
equipment using the satellite-based augmentation system (SBAS) for navigation applications, that
are designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO, must meet in order to be
identified with the applicable ETSO marking.
ETSO-2C205a is intended as a means for manufacturers of end-use equipment to rationalise their
ETSO-C146e application for a Class Delta-4 sensor by using an ETSO Delta-4 CCA for partial
certification credit. ETSO-2C205a is only intended for navigation applications; it is not intended for
non-navigation applications.
The standards in this ETSO apply to equipment that is intended to accept a desired flight path and
provide deviation commands that are keyed to that path. Pilots and autopilots will use these
deviations to guide the aircraft.
An ETSO-2C205a article has a limitation that requires the end-use equipment manufacturer to
repeat selected detailed functional tests in the end-use equipment and complete the
environmental qualification tests in RTCA DO-229E (see paragraphs 3.2.2.1 and 3.2.2 below).
2 — Procedures
2.1 — General
The applicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None.
3 — Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
The applicable standards are those provided for functional Class Delta-4 equipment in RTCA
document DO-229E, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Global Positioning
System/Satellite-Based Augmentation System Airborne Equipment, dated 15 December 2016,
Section 2, as modified by Appendices 1 and 3 of this ETSO standard. Class Delta-4 equipment is
defined in DO-229E, Section 1.4.
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This minimal set is defined in Table 1 below. The chosen test category, associated with the
selectable parameters in the test conditions per EUROCAE ED-14/RTCA DO-160, should be
documented in the installation manual as limitations for the installation.
The test sections that are identified as optional are not required for an ETSO-2C205a application.
Nevertheless, the ETSO CCA article can be subjected to these test conditions on the applicant’s
voluntary basis. When optional sections are not tested, they shall be marked with X in the
environmental testing summary.
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Environmental Test EUROCAE ED- Requirement for ETSO-2C205a
14/RTCA DO-
160 Section
integration phase as part of the end-user ETSO application or
as part of a type-certification programme.
Audio Frequency 18.0 Mandatory for CCA interfaces that are directly connected to
Conducted the aircraft power distribution system.
Susceptibility —
Power Input Note: CCA interfaces that are not directly connected to the
aircraft power distribution system will be tested after the
integration phase as part of the end-user ETSO application or
as part of a type-certification programme.
Induced-Signal 19.0 Mandatory for CCA interfaces that are directly connected to
Susceptibility the aircraft wiring.
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3.1.2.2 — Environmental Test Procedures for End User
The end user of this ETSO article will be required to verify its performance after integration, and
complete the environmental qualification testing after integration of the ETSO -2C205a CCA. In
order to allow the end user to properly test the functionality of the CCA functional Class Delta
equipment in environmental conditions, the applicant for the ‘functional Class Delta ETSO article’
shall provide the detailed functional test procedures to evaluate the required performance of the
functional Class Delta equipment in compliance with RTCA document DO-229E, Minimum
Operational Performance Standards for Global Positioning System/Satellite -Based Augmentation
System Airborne Equipment, dated 15 December 2016, Section 2.4.
3.1.3 — Software
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.2.
3.1.4 — Airborne Electronic Hardware
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.3.
3.2 — Specific
3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4
The applicant shall have all the data necessary to evaluate the geostationary (GEO) satellite bias
as defined in RTCA DO-229E, Section 2.1.4.1.5, available for review by EASA.
If the functional Class Delta equipment uses barometric-aiding to enhance the availability of FDE,
then the equipment shall meet the requirements in RTCA DO-229E, Appendix G.
The applicant shall provide to the end user the detailed functional test procedures of the functional
Class Delta equipment for the end user to complete the environmental testing.
Limitations:
The following specific limitations shall be documented in the IM and in the DDP of the CCA
functional Class Delta equipment :
— ‘The manufacturer of the end-use equipment, using the <insert equipment model> Class
Delta CCA, is required to perform the testing described in ETSO-C146e<latest revision>
Appendix 1 with the Class Delta CCA installed in the end-use equipment.’
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— ‘the manufacturer of end-use equipment is required to complete full environmental
qualification at the end-use equipment level.’
4 — Marking
4.1 — General
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.
4.2 — Specific
The functional Class Delta equipment must be permanently and legibly marked with the operational
equipment class (e.g. Class 4) as defined in Section 1.4.2 of RTCA document DO-229E. A marking of
Class 4 indicates compliance with the Delta-4 requirements. The functional equipment class (e.g.
Delta) defined in Section 1.4.1 of RTCA document DO-229E is not required to be marked.
It is sufficient to declare the proper functional equipment class in the declaration of design and
performance (DDP).
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APPENDIX 1
This Appendix describes the modifications and additions to RTCA DO-229E that are required for compliance with
this TSO.
This Appendix adds a new Section 1.8.3, on cybersecurity and GPS spoofing mitigation, to RTCA DO-229E, and
corrects a long-standing mistake in the Section 2.4 environmental requirement tables. The new section provides
information for cybersecurity and GPS spoofing mitigation to make RTCA DO-229E consistent with the new RTCA
MOPS template and RTCA DO-253D, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for GPS Local Area
Augmentation System Airborne Equipment, dated July 2017.
This section contains information to address intentional interference with the GPS. Spoofing is caused by RF
waveforms that mimic true signals in some ways, but deny, degrade, disrupt, or deceive the operation of a
receiver when they are processed. Spoofing may be unintentional, such as effects from the signals of a GPS
repeater, or may be intentional and even malicious. There are two classes of spoofing:
— Measurement spoofing introduces RF waveforms that cause the target receiver to produce incorrect
measurements of the time of arrival or the frequency of arrival, or their rates of change;
— Data spoofing introduces incorrect digital data to the target receiver for its use in the processing of
signals and the calculation of positioning, navigation and timing (PNT).
Either class of spoofing can cause a range of effects: from incorrect outputs of PNT to receiver malfunctions. The
onset of effects can be instantaneous or delayed, and the effects can continue even after the spoofing has
ended. Improperly used or improperly installed GNSS re-radiators act like spoofers. Re-radiators, replay and
GNSS emulator devices can present misleading information to GNSS equipment and/or could cause lasting
effects.
Equipment manufacturers should implement measures to mitigate the processing of erroneous data. Cross-
checks of GNSS sensor data against independent position sources and/or other detection monitors using GNSS
signal metrics or data checks can be implemented in the antenna, receiver, and/or through integration with
other systems at the aircraft level. Data validity checks to recognise and reject measurement and data spoofing
should be implemented in the receiver. Additional guidance and best practices related to GPS equipment can
be found in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security document ‘Improving the Operation and Development
of Global Positioning System (GPS) Equipment Used by Critical Infrastructure’15 and GLOBAL POSITIONING
SYSTEMS DIRECTORATE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING & INTEGRATION: INTERFACE SPECIFICATION, IS-GPS-200,
Navstar GPS Space Segment/Navigation User Interfaces, Revision H, IRN-IS-200H-003, 28 July 2016.
Aircraft equipment information vulnerabilities (such as cybersecurity risks) have been present for digital systems
since the development of the personal computer (PC) in the late 1970s and even longer for RF systems, and the
advent of internet connectivity has substantially increased those risks. Typically, access to navigation receivers
has been controlled such that they are considered to be vulnerable only to RF signals and OEM and/or aircraft
operator controlled processes for maintenance and update. In some cases, aircraft GNSS receivers may be field-
loadable by approved personnel, requiring physical access and a physical interface to the ground receivers.
However, it is expected that not all aircraft in the future will rely on such physical isolation for the security of
avionics. Internet and Wi-Fi connectivity have become popular as a means for aircraft or equipment
15 https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Improving_the_Operation_and_Development_of_Global_Positioning_
System_(GPS)_Equipment_Used_by_Critical_Infrastructure_S508C.pdf
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manufacturers to update the software of installed avionics, to update databases, or provide an alternate means
of communicating with the flight crew or cabin (e.g. in-flight entertainment, weather, etc.).
In most countries, the State provides oversight of safety-of-flight systems (sometimes referred to as ‘authorised
services’) which provide information to aircraft, such as ILS, VOR, GNSS, and DME, to name a few. However, the
State typically does not provide oversight of ‘non-trusted’ connectivity such as the internet, Wi-Fi, or
manufacturer-supplied equipment interfaces which permit the input of externally supplied data into aircraft
systems. A manufacturer may expose aircraft information vulnerabilities through the design of the equipment,
or the equipment may become vulnerable as a result of being connected to a common interface. Therefore, it
is important for manufacturers to consider aircraft information security risk mitigation strategies in their
equipment design, particularly when the equipment is responsible for an interface between the aircraft and
aircraft-external systems.
Apart from any specific aircraft-information-security-related performance requirements that are contained in
the MOPS, manufacturers are recommended to consider a layered approach to aircraft information security risk
mitigation that includes both technical (e.g. software, signal filtering) and physical strategies. From a technical
perspective, for example, this could include signal spoofing detection capabilities or more stringent, multi-
factored authentication techniques such as passwords, PINs, and digital certificates. From a physical perspective,
a manufacturer could consider connectors that require special tools to remove them to prevent passenger
tampering, although navigation avionics are typically located in an avionics bay inaccessible to passengers. And
finally, but just as important, manufacturers should consider supply chain risk management; for example, if a
manufacturer outsources the development of software code, are the contractor and its staff properly vetted?
Civil aviation authorities (CAAs) have a regulatory interest when an applicant’s design makes use of a non-trusted
connection through which the installation can potentially introduce aircraft information security vulnerabilities.
This requires the applicant to address not only the information security vulnerabilities and mitigation techniques
for the new installation, but to also consider how vulnerabilities could propagate to existing downstream
systems. Therefore, manufacturers are recommended to reference their equipment aircraft information
security review and mitigation strategies in the installation manual of the equipment so that the applicant can
consider them in meeting the regulatory requirements of the installation.
The tables incorrectly reference and label RTCA DO-160 Sections 16.5.1.2 and 16.6.1.2 regarding ‘2.1.1.7
Acquisition Time’ and ‘2.1.1.9 Reacquisition Time’. Change the table references as follows:
The MOPS Initial Acquisition Time requirement (2.1.1.7) applies to both AC and DC equipment under abnormal
operating conditions (DO-160E Sections 16.5.2 and 16.6.2), and the satellite reacquisition time requirement
(2.1.1.9) applies to both AC and DC equipment under normal operating conditions (DO-160E Sections 16.5.1 and
16.6.1).
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APPENDIX 2
Reserved.
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APPENDIX 3
This Appendix describes the EASA modifications to RTCA document DO-229E, Section 2.
‘The demodulation of data from the GPS signals shall be restricted to the necessary subset of the data defined
in Appendix II of IS-GPS-200D, “Navstar GPS Space Segment/Navigation User Interfaces”, December 2004,
provided on RF link L1. The pseudo-ranging shall be performed on RF link L1 utilising the coarse/acquisition (C/A)
code.’
This is to ensure that only the L1 NAV data, for which the SBAS provides corrections and integrity, is used, and
that no CNAV data, which is defined in Appendix III of IS-GPS-200D, is used, for which the SBAS does not provide
integrity.
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Date: XX.XX.20XX
European
Union
Aviation
Safety
Agency
1 — Applicability
This ETSO provides the requirements which circuit card assembly (CCA) functional sensors using
aircraft-based augmentation for navigation and non-navigation position/velocity/time (PVT) output,
that are designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO , must meet in order to be
identified with the applicable ETSO marking.
ETSO-2C206 is intended as a means for manufacturers of end-use equipment that incorporates a GPS
CCA to rationalise their ETSO-C196b application for a GPS PVT sensor by using an ETSO-authorised
GNSS CCA for partial certification credit.
An ETSO-2C206 article has a limitation that requires the end-use equipment manufacturer to repeat
selected detailed functional tests in the end-use equipment and complete the environmental
qualification tests in RTCA DO-316 (see paragraphs 3.1.2.2 and 3.2.2 below).
This ETSO standard applies to equipment that is intended to provide PVT information for a navigation
management unit application that outputs deviation commands keyed to a desired flight path, or a
non-navigation application (such as automatic dependent surveillance — broadcast (ADS-B)). In
navigation applications, pilots or autopilots will use the deviations output by the navigation
management unit to guide the aircraft. In non-navigation applications, the PVT outputs will provide
the necessary capability for the end-use equipment.
2 — Procedures
2.1 — General
The applicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None.
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3 — Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
The applicable standards are those provided for functional sensors in RTCA document DO-316,
Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Global Positioning System/Aircraft -Based
Augmentation System Airborne Equipment, dated 14 April 2009, Section 2.
For the applicable environmental standards, see CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1, for the
applicable environmental standard.
Nevertheless, not all types of environmental test are required for this ETSO standard, as the ETSO
article for this ETSO standard is a CCA that will be later integrated into an ETSO equipment.
Therefore, a minimal set of the environmental test conditions of EUROCAE ED-14/RTCA DO-160
has been defined (refer to Table 1) in order to verify the performance of the ETSOA article under
this minimal set of conditions. The required performance under a particular environmental test is
defined in the related test section in RTCA document DO-316, Minimum Operational Performance
Standards for Global Positioning System/Aircraft Based Augmentation System Airborne Equipment,
dated 14 April 2009, Section 2.2.
This minimal set is defined in Table 1 below. The chosen test category, associated wih the
selectable parameters in the test conditions per EUROCAE ED-14/RTCA DO-160 should be
documented in the installation manual as limitations for the installation.
The test sections that are identified as optional are not required for an ETSO-2C206 application.
Nevertheless, the ETSO CCA article can be subjected to these test conditions on the applicant’s
voluntary basis. When optional sections are not tested, they shall be marked with X in the
environmental testing summary.
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Environmental EUROCAE ED- Requirement for ETSO-2C206
Test 14/RTCA DO-
160 Section
a chosen intended environment, and, finally, indicate in the
installation manual the temperature range for which the
correct operation of the CCA is guaranteed.
Altitude 4.6 Mandatory
Temperature 5.0 Mandatory
Variation
As for Section 4.5, if the performance of the CCA under
environmental conditions is dependent on the end-user
equipment, it is the responsibility of the applicant to adapt
the EUROCAE ED-14/RTCA DO-160 high and low
temperature values and temperature variation cycles to the
intended CCA installation context.
As for Section 4.5, for example, in the case of temperature
testing (Section 4.0 of EUROCAE ED-14/RTCA DO-160),
where the temperature of the environment of the CCA
(inside an equipment) may be much higher or lower than the
equipment level condition as expressed in Section 4.0 of
EUROCAE ED-14/RTCA DO-160, the applicant can qualify
their CCA based on a chosen intended environment, and,
finally, indicate in the installation manual the temperature
range for which the correct operation of the CCA functional
sensor is guaranteed.
Humidity 6.0 Mandatory
Shock 7.2 Optional
(operational)
Shock (Crash 7.3 Optional
Safety)
Vibration 8.0 Optional
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Environmental EUROCAE ED- Requirement for ETSO-2C206
Test 14/RTCA DO-
160 Section
Fungus 13.0 Optional
Resistance
Salt Fog 14.0 Optional
Magnetic Effect 15.0 Optional
Power Input 16.0 Mandatory for CCA interfaces that are directly connected to
the aircraft power distribution system.
Voltage Spike 17.0 Mandatory for CCA interfaces that are directly connected to
the aircraft power distribution system.
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Environmental EUROCAE ED- Requirement for ETSO-2C206
Test 14/RTCA DO-
160 Section
part of the end-user ETSO application or as part of a type-
certification programme.
Lightning Direct 23.0 Optional
Effects
Icing 24.0 Optional
Electrostatic 25.0 Mandatory for all areas that are subject to human contact
Discharge (ESD) during the operation of the CCA.
Fire, Flammability 26.0 Mandatory
The end user of this ETSO article will be required to complete the environmental qualification
testing after integration of the ETSO-2C206 CCA. In order to allow the end user to properly test the
functionality of the CCA functional sensor in environmental conditions, the applicant for a ‘CCA
functional sensor’ shall provide the detailed functional test procedures to evaluate the required
performance of the CCA functional sensor in compliance with RTCA document
DO-316, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Global Positioning System/Aircraft
Based Augmentation System Airborne Equipment, dated 15 December 2016, Section 2.2.
3.1.3 — Software
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.2.
3.1.4 — Airborne Electronic Hardware
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.3.
3.2 — Specific
3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4.
The applicant shall provide to the end user the detailed functional test procedures of the CCA
functional sensor for the end user to complete the environmental testing.
Limitations:
The following specific limitations shall be documented in the installation manual and in the DDP of
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the CCA functional sensor:
— ‘The manufacturer of the end-use equipment, using the <insert equipment model> CCA
functional sensor, is required to perform the testing described in ETSO -C196<latest
revision> Appendix 1 with the CCA functional sensor installed in the end-use equipment.’
— ‘The manufacturer of end-use equipment is required to complete full environmental
qualification at the end-use equipment level.’
4 — Marking
4.1 — General
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.
4.2 — Specific
None.
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European
Union
Aviation
Safety
Agency
1 — Applicability
This ETSO provides the requirements which an aircraft halocarbon clean agent hand-heldhandheld
fire extinguisher that is designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in
order to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.
2 — Procedures
2.1 — General
The Aapplicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None.
3 — Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
The applicable Sstandards are those set forthprovided in the Society of Automotive Engineers
(SAE) International’s Aerospace Standard AS6271, ‘Halocarbon Clean Agent Hand-Held Fire
Extinguisher’, issued in January 2013, as modified by Appendix Appendices 1 and 2 to of this
ETSO.
3.1.2 — Environmental Standard
Refer to the environmental qualification requirements specified in ANSI/UL 2129.
3.1.3 — Computer Software
None.
3.1.4 — Airborne Electronic Hardware Qualification
None.
3.2 — Specific
3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification
A Ffailure of the function defined in paragraph 3.1.1 of this ETSO has been determined to be a
minor failure condition.
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4 — Marking
4.1 — General
Marking as detailed in See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.4.2.
4.2 — Specific
The fire extinguisher type, as specified in paragraph 3.1 of AS6271, shall be marked on the article.
In addition, the fire extinguisher rating, as specified in ANSI/UL 711, shall be marked on the
article.
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APPENDIX 1
This Appendix prescribes the minimum performance standards (MPSs) for aircraft handheld fire
extinguishers. The applicable standard is SAE AS6271 ‘Halocarbon Clean Agent Hand-Held Fire Extinguisher’,
issued in January 2013. EASA did has revised it as follows:
16 Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the Registration,
Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency, amending Directive
1999/45/EC and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 793/93 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1488/94 as well as Council
Directive 76/769/EEC and Commission Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC (OJ L 396, 30.12.2006,
p. 1).
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APPENDIX 2
This Appendix prescribes the minimum performance standards (MPSs) for aircraft handheld fire extinguishers.
As referred to in SAE AS6271, the applicable standard is ANSI/UL 2129 ‘Halocarbon Clean Agent Hand-Held Fire
Extinguisher’, issued in February 2005. EASA did has revised it as follows:
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European
Union
Aviation
Safety
Agency
1— Applicability
This ETSO provides the requirements which airborne systems to be installed on aircraft for the
surveillance of cabin and cargo areas using video (and audio) detector means that are designed and
manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with the applicable
ETSO marking.
2— Procedures
2.1 — General
The applicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None.
3— Technical conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
The applicable standards are provided in Appendix 1.
3.1.2 — Environmental Standard
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.1.
Equipment that is part of a video surveillance system (VSS) shall be tested in accordance with
Appendix 1, Chapter 4, of this ETSO.
3.1.3 — Software
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.2.
3.1.4 — Airborne Electronic Hardware
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.3.
3.2 — Specific
3.2.1 — Failure Condition Classification
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 2.4.
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4— Marking
4.1 — General
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.
4.2 — Specific
None.
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APPENDIX 1
AIRBORNE SYSTEMS FOR VIDEO/AUDIO SURVEILLANCE OF CABIN AND CARGO AREAS
1. GENERAL
DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM
The video surveillance system (VSS) consists of electronic on-board equipment and is, by itself, not required for
any phase of flight by any aviation rule, although it is used for required functions. It is normally not connected
to, nor does it interact with, any aircraft system, except the intercom, electrical power and mechanical
mounting. However, in special cases, it may be useful to establish additional interfaces with other systems.
Examples are communication management systems for the transmission of data such as video, audio data, etc.
It might be useful to use further detectors for further data, e.g. temperature detectors, etc.
The main functions of the system might be:
— cabin video (and audio) monitoring,
— cockpit door video (and audio) surveillance,
— cargo video (and audio) surveillance,
— ‘direct view’ applications as per CS 25.785.
The VSS may allow cabin/cockpit crew and security staff on board the aircraft to assess the criticality of
exceptional cabin events by monitoring the affected cabin and cargo areas of the aircraft. Video and audio data
from the cameras and microphones should be recordable for archiving and later analysis by the e.g. airline
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operations centre. In addition, the data streams might be made available at an existing ground service panel,
and could be used by armed forces to observe the situation in the cabin from outside the aircraft. Further, the
surveillance of the cargo area might be useful, for instance concerning luggage or cargo theft, aircraft damage
control, etc.
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE AND COMPONENTS
This paragraph describes the architecture of the system and its components. The following block diagram shows
an example of the basic system architecture:
The elements should be considered as parts of an overall concept, which provides for easy modular adaptions.
All the elements can be connected by network infrastructure. However, not all the elements are required, and
further items could be added, depending on the use cases.
Cameras shall have an infrared (IR) means of illumination to provide their function under conditions of poor
illumination, if needed. The cameras might have variants with different lenses and mounting directions to adapt
to the mounting position and the situation of their integration. The cargo and flight deck cameras shall have a
dedicated panel/housing for cargo or flight deck area use.
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For the end-to-end functional chain, considering the mounting position and the distance to the observed object,
all the system performance parameters such as the resolution of the image, colour space, frame rate and the
optical system, etc., shall be sufficient to:
The system shall be compliant with the cabin attendant direct view requirements of CS 25.785, if this use case
is foreseen.
The data acquisition unit (DAU) shall host the configuration data of the system and shall be responsible for
managing the configuration of the system. It shall establish the communication interfaces between the elements
of the system, and those between the VSS and the aircraft systems, if applicable. Smaller system configurations
may operate without a DAU if the functions of a DAU are implemented by other elements of the VSS.
The ADUs shall collect data streams and shall provide power supplies for the cameras. The ADUs shall be able to
be connected to each other in a daisy-chain configuration.
A ground service panel might be connected to the system to provide a data link.
The DVR shall be capable of recording all data streams (video, audio, further data) from all connected cameras
(respectively from other detectors) to exchangeable data storage media, e.g. solid-state drives (SSDs).
Aircraft data for control of the system and e.g. watermarking of the video streams might be obtained via an
integrated interface (e.g. ARINC 429) and shall be distributed system-wide by e.g. the DVR or the DAU.
The ACPs shall allow the system to be operated via the HMI on a touchscreen. The ACPs shall be able to display
live video streams from the cameras and shall provide playback of recorded streams from the DVR.
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AIRWORTHINESS
The equipment shall not, under either normal or failure conditions, impair the airworthiness of the aircraft in
which it is installed.
OPERATION OF CONTROLS
None of the possible positions, combinations and sequences of the controls that are intended for use during
flight shall result in a condition whose presence or continuation would be detrimental to the continued safe
operation of the aircraft.
Operating the system shall not significantly affect the workload of the aircrew.
DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
The controls and indicators intended for use by the flight crew shall be of a design that is suitable for the
intended cockpit environment/philosophy (e.g. size, readability, illumination).
If VSS equipment is integrated within a required aircraft system, the VSS equipment shall not adversely affect
the safety of the aircraft or its occupants, or the proper functioning of required equipment or systems under all
foreseeable conditions.
EFFECTS OF TESTS
Unless otherwise provided, the design of the equipment shall be such that, subsequent to the application of the
specific tests, no condition exists which would be detrimental to the continued safe operation of the aircraft.
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AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT INFORMATION VULNERABILITIES
If the equipment interfaces with aircraft busses and has connectivity to non-governmental services (e.g. Wi-Fi,
the internet, etc.), the manufacturer may expose aircraft information vulnerabilities (such as cybersecurity risks)
through the design of the equipment, or the equipment may become vulnerable as a result of being connected
to a common interface. Therefore, it is important for manufacturers to consider aircraft information security
risk mitigation strategies in the design of their equipment, particularly when the equipment is responsible for
an interface between the aircraft and aircraft-external systems.
It is recommended that manufacturers consider a layered approach to aircraft information security risk
mitigation that includes both technical (e.g. software, signal filtering) and physical strategies. From a technical
perspective, for example, this could include signal spoofing detection capabilities or more stringent, multi-
factored authentication techniques such as passwords, PINs, and digital certificates. From a physical perspective,
for example, for equipment such as in an in-flight entertainment system in the cabin, a manufacturer could
consider connectors that require special tools to remove them to prevent passenger tampering. And finally, but
just as important, manufacturers should consider supply chain risk management; for example, if a manufacturer
outsources the development of software code, are the contractor and its staff properly vetted?
Civil aviation authorities (CAAs) have a regulatory interest when an applicant’s design makes use of a non-trusted
connection through which the installation can potentially introduce aircraft information security vulnerabilities.
This requires the applicant to address not only the information security vulnerabilities and mitigation techniques
for the new installation, but to also consider how vulnerabilities could propagate to existing downstream
systems. Therefore, it is recommended that manufacturers reference their equipment aircraft information
security review and mitigation strategies in the installation manual of the equipment so that the applicant can
consider them in meeting the regulatory requirements of the installation.
If stored data streams of the VSS (video, audio, etc.) are to be used for judicial purposes, these stored data
streams must be legally admissible. This means that the data must be marked by the VSS as authentic (e.g. by
watermarking) and must be permanently protected against manipulation.
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GENERAL
The VSS must meet the basic requirement that it must not interfere with other on-board systems.
It must be ensured that the equipment can neither become a source of danger in itself, nor threaten the proper
functioning of any essential system or service.
SYSTEM PARAMETERS
If appropriate, the manufacturer shall define details to show compliance with the ‘GENERAL’ subpart of this
document.
A set of technical parameters showing that the system performs its intended functions shall be declared by the
manufacturer. This set of data should include the quality, availability and reliability of the information channel
and all the requirements for such equipment. However, provided that it is agreed by EASA, a demonstration of
compliance is only necessary for a very basic requirement such as ‘a live video stream should be displayed’.
However, the extent of the demonstration of compliance depends on the use case of the VSS.
If the system interfaces with other on-board equipment, compliance with the interface-related requirements
for that equipment has to be shown in order to exclude adverse effects on connected systems and the aircraft
itself.
A means shall be provided to disconnect the equipment from the power bus or from other systems (if applicable)
(i.e. a master switch) for the case of unexpected interference, fire, smoke or other hazards.
Note: Compliance with this requirement can be achieved by the design of the equipment itself, or by measures
described in the installation manual.
CLASSES OF EQUIPMENT
Not applicable.
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INTRODUCTION
The environmental tests and performance requirements described in this chapter provide a laboratory means
of determining the performance characteristics of the equipment under conditions that are representative of
those which may be encountered in actual operations.
The VSS needs to comply with environmental tests so far as it is necessary to ensure that the equipment cannot
become a source of danger under environmental conditions.
Some of the tests contained in this chapter are identified with the phrase ‘if required’. They do not have to be
performed unless the manufacturer wishes to qualify the equipment for these additional environmental
conditions, or if they are requested by EASA.
Unless otherwise specified, the test procedures that are applicable to a determination of the performance of
the equipment under environmental test conditions are specified below.
During all the shock and vibration tests, the equipment shall remain in its mounting, and no part of the
equipment or its mounting shall become detached and free of the shock test table.
Direct lightning tests of any equipment that is to be mounted outside the aircraft are only intended to ensure
that a lightning strike is blocked by the outside of the equipment itself, and that the lightning cannot affect other
installations, or the aircraft itself.
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PERFORMANCE TESTS
The following environmental requirements shall apply:
+ mandatory test
– if required
* not here definable due to unknown equipment design and installation location in aircraft
The tests marked with ‘if required’ may become mandatory for specific technical reasons. The aforementioned
test CAT shall be treated as the minimum performance. This shall be agreed with EASA.
Note: The table above is based on ED-14G/RTCA DO-160G. If the test conditions or test levels are re-evaluated,
CS-ETSO requires compliance with ED-14G/RTCA DO-160G or later revisions as endorsed by CS-ETSO
paragraph 2.1.
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The material contained in the following paragraphs is intended as guidance material only, and it does not have
any direct significance in the type certification of the equipment concerned. The aircraft installation must comply
with the applicable airworthiness requirements, and it needs to be agreed by EASA.
EQUIPMENT INSTALLATION
Special care should be taken in selecting the locations in which VSS articles are installed in relation to other
aircraft systems. A non-interference demonstration is required. Aircraft lightning zones and the necessary
system lightning protection have to be determined. The interface with the on-board intercom or other systems
shall be installed in such a manner that a malfunction of the communication system does not cause conditions
which prevent the safe continuation of the flight. The equipment shall be installed in accordance with the
manufacturer’s installation instructions.
If the VSS equipment contains a memory retention device which employs a rechargeable lithium battery, the
flammability risk must be addressed. Manufacturers of installed VSS equipment that employs a rechargeable
lithium battery must ensure that the lithium battery meets the airworthiness standards that are appropriate for
the size and the intended function of the battery.
OPERATING RESTRICTIONS
All the operating restrictions which are defined, e.g. by any rule of an authority, should be enforced by technical
provisions and procedures that are stated in the installation manual , as well as in the operation manual.
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European
Union
Aviation
Safety
Agency
1— Applicability
This ETSO provides the requirements which automatic deployable flight recorder (AFDR) systems that
are designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified
with the applicable ETSO marking.
2— Procedures
2.1 — General
The applicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None.
3— Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
The applicable standards are those provided in EUROCAE document ED-112A, MOPS for Crash
Protected Airborne Recorder Systems, dated September 2013, Section 3, as modified per
Appendix 1 of this ETSO.
The ADFR system shall also be approved in accordance with the latest revision of the ETSO that is
applicable to the supported function:
ETSO-C123() Cockpit Voice Recorder Systems
ETSO-C124() Flight Data Recorder Systems
ETSO-C176() Aircraft Cockpit Image Recorder Systems
ETSO-C177() Data Link Recorder Equipment
The emergency locator transmitter fitted to the ADFR shall be approved in accordance with ETSO-
C126c, Type ELT(AD) Class 0 or 1, with capabilities C (Crash resistance), H1 (121.5MHz homing) and
be of any generation (capability T.001 or T.018).
4— Marking
4.1 — General
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.
4.2 — Specific
4.2.1 — Lettering identification
The equipment shall comply with the identification requirement in EUROCAE ED-112A, Section 3-1,
paragraph 3-1.8.3 as modified by Appendix 1 of this ETSO.
5— Availability of Referenced Documents
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 3.
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APPENDIX 1
The applicable standard is EUROCAE ED-112a, MOPS for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems, dated
September 2013, and shall be modified as per Table 1 below.
3-1.5.1 In addition to the safety requirements In addition to the safety requirements specified in
specified in paragraph 2-1.3.1, the Section 2-1.3.1, the exterior of the automatic
following requirements shall apply to all deployable package shall have no sharp edges or
deployable recorders: projections that could damage inflatable survivable
a. The exterior of the equipment shall equipment or injure persons.
have no sharp edges or projections that
could damage inflatable survivable
equipment or injure persons.
b. The overall quantitative probability (per
flight hour) of the failure event ‘non-
commanded deployment’ shall be < 10–7.
This probability objective addresses such
hardware and software components,
which contribute directly to the
deployment event.
3-1.5.2 In addition to the certification documents In addition to the certification documents specified in
specified in paragraph 2-1.3.4, the Section 2-1.3.4, the following shall be provided:
following shall be provided. a. The transmission frequency and modulation
a. Instructions shall be provided for safely characteristics of the radio location beacon.
removing deployable recorders from the b. Installation instructions that contain:
aircraft for maintenance purposes. 1. the tested impact speed;
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Location Initial ED-112A text Amending text
b. The transmission frequency and 2. the deployment time as defined in 3-1.7.f;
modulation characteristics of the radio 3. the immersion depth at which the
location beacon. hydrostatic sensor triggers the
deployment;
4. the immersion depth that the automatic
deployable package can withstand before
deployment as tested in 3-3.2.8;
5. the maximum ice thickness that can be
permitted before de-icing action is
necessary, as determined during the icing
test in Table 2 of this Appendix;
6. the recommended recorder orientation
on the fuselage to ensure the
performance of the deployment when
installed;
7. instructions shall be provided for safely
removing deployable recorders from the
aircraft for maintenance purposes;
8. the kinetic energy of the automatic
deployable package once deployed from
a fixed position;
9. installation constraints.
Because of the reduced levels of qualification of the
memory unit and of the ELT, the ADFR system
installation manual shall state that the installer must
verify that:
a. the automatic deployable package is installed
at the aft of the aircraft, so that it may not be
crushed or penetrated by aircraft parts when
deployed;
b. the impact speed of the automatic
deployable package is less than the one used
for the impact shock test (Section 3-3.2.1);
c. the automatic deployable package lands
away from the crash site locations where fire
may exceed the characteristics used during
the high and low temperature fire tests
(Sections 3-3.2.4 and 3-3.2.5);
d. the automatic deployable package does not
collide with the aircraft.
3-1.6 Refer to ED-112A Unchanged
3-1.6.1 A visual method to alert the cockpit crew The ADFR system shall provide a means to inform the
when the deployable recorder is no longer flight crew that the recorder is no longer captive to
captive to the aircraft shall be provided. the aircraft.
The cockpit crew shall have an
unobstructed view of the visual indicator
when in the normal seated position.
The brilliance of any indicator may be
adjustable to levels suitable for data
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Location Initial ED-112A text Amending text
interpretation under all cockpit ambient
light conditions ranging from total
darkness to reflected sunlight.
3-1.7.a Refer to ED-112A Unchanged
3-1.7.b Refer to ED-112A Unchanged
3-1.7.c Refer to ED-112A Unchanged
3-1.7.d. Refer to ED-112A Ignore 3.1.7.d.
3-1.7.e. Refer to ED-112A Ignore 3.1.7.e.
3-1.7.f Refer to ED-112A Unchanged
3-1.7.g g. In order to minimise potential safety g. The ADFR system shall provide a means to lock the
hazards, the deployment mechanism may deployment mechanism while the aircraft is on the
be locked while the aircraft is on the ground.
ground. There shall be no means for
manual deployment.
3-1.8.h h. There shall be no means for manual deployment.
3-1.8.i i. the impact point of the automatic deployable
package shall be within 20 metres of the deployment
mechanism, and its speed shall never exceed
14 m/swhen deployed from a fixed position in any
direction over a horizontal plane.
3.1.7. The design characteristics of a deployable The equipment manufacturer shall provide sufficient
recorder should result in the recorder information to the installer so that the installer can
landing clear of the aircraft wreckage. verify on representative accident trajectories:
The unit shall incorporate flight — that the impact speed of the automatic
characteristics that enable it to rapidly deployable package is less than the one used for
establish a flight trajectory that clears the the impact shock test (Section 3-3.2.1);
airframe. — that the automatic deployable package lands
The unit shall not be given sufficient initial away from the crash site locations where fire may
momentum on deployment such that its exceed the characteristics used during the high
release could endanger ground support and low temperature fire tests (Sections 3-3.2.4
personnel or the aircraft itself. and 3-3.2.5);
— that the automatic deployable package does not
collide with the aircraft.
The unit shall not be given so much initial momentum
on deployment that its release could endanger
ground support personnel.
3-1.7.1 Refer to ED-112A Ignore 3-1.7.1
3-1.7.2 Sensor(s) shall be installed to activate The ADFR system shall deploy the automatic
deployment of the recorder at a depth of deployable package when it detects an immersion by
3 m or more. measuring the water pressure. A pressure equivalent
to a water depth between 1.5 and 5 m (between 5
and 16.4 ft — between 2.1 and 7.1 PSI
relative pressure or between 16.9 and 21.9 PSI
absolute pressure) is recommended for the switching
threshold of a hydrostatic pressure switch.
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onto a hard surface such as rock, concrete and declare it in the installation manual and the
or steel. declaration of design and performance (DDP).
NOTE: The definitions of ‘landing attitude’
and ‘most damage-vulnerable direction’ NOTE: The definitions of ‘landing attitude’ and ‘most
should not be limited to the three primary damage-vulnerable direction’ should not be limited
axes of the recorder. to the three primary axes of the recorder.
b. The deployable recorder that contains the
b. The deployable recorder containing the
protected memory module shall impact or be
protected memory module shall impact or
impacted by a hard surface (a 50-mm-thick steel plate
be impacted by a hard surface (50 mm
of dimensions greater than the overall dimensions of
thick steel plate of dimensions greater
the recorder) at a minimum impact velocity of
that the overall dimensions of the
46.33 m/s (152 ft/s) (or higher as declared by the
recorder) at a minimum impact velocity of
manufacturer). Figure 3-3.1 illustrates an acceptable
46.33 m/s (152 ft/s). Figure 3-3.1
impact shock test set-up for the automatic
illustrates an acceptable impact shock test
deployable package. Figure 3-3.2 illustrates an
set-up for deployable recorders. Figure 3-
acceptable method and set-up for the retrieval of the
3.2 illustrates an acceptable method and
deployable after impact. The mass of the impact plate
set-up for retrieval of the deployable after
shall be greater than 10 times the mass of the
impact. The mass of the impact plate shall
deployable recorder and shall not yield when it is
be greater than 10 times the mass of the
subjected to the impact.
deployable recorder and experience no
yield when subjected to the impact.
c. Apart from the test sequence specified in
c. Apart from the test sequence specified paragraph 3-1.8.a.iii, electronic components that are
in paragraph 3-1.8 a iii, electronic external to the crash-protected memory may be
components external to the crash- removed and replaced with representative mass
protected memory may be removed and models prior to commencing the impact shock test.
replaced with representative mass models For test sequence iii, the radio location beacon shall
prior to commencing the impact shock be installed and the test carried out on the complete
test. For test sequence iii, the radio automatic deployable package.
location beacon shall be installed and the
test carried out on the complete recorder.
3-3.2.2 Refer to ED-112A Unchanged
(except
note)
3-3.2.2 NOTE: This test methodology is the same NOTE: This test methodology is the same as that for
(note) as the penetration test specified for the impact test specified for emergency locator
Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELTs) in transmitters (ELTs) in ED-62B Section 4.5.10. Per
ED-62A. ETSO-C126c, the ELT(AD)s fitted to the ADFR are
required to pass the ED-62B impact test described in
Section 4.5.10.
3-3.2.3 Refer to ED-112A Add the following note to ED-112A Section 3-3.2.3:
NOTE: Per ETSO-C126c, the ELT(AD)s fitted to the
ADFR are required to pass the static crush test, as
described in ED-62B Section 4.5.12.
3-3.2.4 Refer to ED-112A Add the following note to ED-112A Section 3-3.2.4:
NOTE: Per ETSO-C126c, the ELT(AD)s fitted to the
ADFR are required to pass the ED-62B Section 4.5.14
fire test.
3-3.2.5 Refer to ED-112A Add the following note to ED-112A Section 3-3.2.5:
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Location Initial ED-112A text Amending text
NOTE: Per ETSO-C126c, the ELT(AD)s fitted to the
ADFR are required to pass the ED-62B Section 4.5.14
fire test.
3-3.2.6 Refer to ED-112A Unchanged
3-3.2.7 Refer to ED-112A Unchanged
3-3.2.8 The deployable recorder shall be buoyant The automatic deployable package shall be buoyant
and, when floating in fresh water or salt and, when floating in fresh water or salt water, shall
water, shall be self-righting and be self-righting and sufficiently stable to maintain the
sufficiently stable to maintain the antenna antenna substantially in its normal operating
substantially in its normal operating position, and to transmit on its 406-MHz and
position and to transmit on its 406 MHz 121.5-MHz frequencies.
and 121.5 MHz frequencies. Transmission
of the ELT frequencies shall be The automatic deployable package shall be immersed
demonstrated by testing in fresh and then at the immersion depth for 5 minutes and shall then
salt water and confirming the reception of return to the surface when released.
the 406 MHz Alert frequency via COSPAS Transmission on the ELT frequencies shall then be
SARSAT Satellite, and the 121.5 MHz demonstrated by conducting testing in fresh water
homing frequency via a SAR Homing and confirming the reception of the 406-MHz alert
receiver. This test shall be performed in frequency via the COSPAS SARSAT Satellite. The
water conditions that are representative 121.5-MHz homing transmission shall be tested in the
of an open sea state 7 (equivalent to conditions described in ED-62B Section 5.5.6.
Beaufort Scale force 10).
3-3.2.9 Unless it can be shown that the recording Ignore 3-3.2.9.a.
a. medium can withstand the conditions
associated with deep sea immersion and
that it is unlikely to be damaged as a
consequence of collapse of any protective
armour, immerse the recorder in sea
water at a pressure of 60 MPa (equivalent
to a depth of 6 000 m (20 000 feet) for a
period of 30 days.
3-3.2.9 Unless it can be shown that the recording Unless it can be shown that the recording medium
b. medium and the identification required by and the identification required by Section 2-1.16.3
paragraph 2-1.16.3 are resistant to the are resistant to the corrosive effects of seawater,
corrosive effects of sea water, immerse immerse the recorder in seawater at a depth of 3 m
the recorder in sea water at a depth of 3 and a nominal temperature of at least + 25.0 °C for a
m and nominal temperature of + 25°C for period of 90 days.
a period of 30 days.
3-3.2.10 Add a section: Water sensor test
This test may be performed on an additional
individual ADFR system that is not part of the test
sequence.
The ELT shall be activated and the system deprived of
external power before the test for the duration
defined in Section 3-1.7.2, as modified by this
Appendix.
For an ADFR system that is fitted with a water-
detection sensor, submerge it in fresh water at a
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Location Initial ED-112A text Amending text
speed of not less than 1 m per minute. Verify that the
ADFR deploys when the water sensor is submerged.
For an ADFR system that is fitted with a pressure
sensor, submerge it in fresh water at a speed of not
less than 1 m per minute. Verify that the ADFR
deploys when the water sensor is at a depth of
between 1.5 and 5 m.
Perform an aliveness test of the ELT as defined in
EUROCAE ED-62B Section 4.3.1.
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APPENDIX 2
DANGER LABELS FOR THE AUTOMATIC DEPLOYABLE FLIGHT RECORDER (ADFR) SYSTEM
If the automatic deployable package (ADP) is designed to be installed with one side exposed to the exterior of
the aircraft, that side of the ADP shall bear an external danger label.
This external danger label is intended to provide a visual warning to maintenance and servicing crews, as well
as to rescue or other personnel at the scene of an accident or incident in the event that the ADFR has not
deployed. The ADFR system may include devices such as rocket motors, mortars, explosive projectiles, springs
or other stored-energy devices, and additional marking may be required at the installation level to address this.
DA NG E R
DEPLOYABLE
PART
DANGER
STAY CLEAR
Explanatory text and contact
In addition to the above external danger label, any ADFR system device that stores energy in excess of 50 Joules
(e.g. a rocket motor) should bear a device danger label to warn rescue personnel in the event that this device
becomes separated from the aircraft due to high G forces on impact.
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This device label shall:
a) be of a 5-cm minimum triangular form with the word ‘DANGER’;
b) have contact information as well as graphic images;
c) be printed with a red border with white (or reverse type) letters with a descriptive graphic element.
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ETSO-2C518
Date: XX.XX.20XX
European
Union
Aviation
Safety
Agency
1— Applicability
This ETSO provides the requirements which runway overrun awareness and alerting systems that are
designed and manufactured on or after the date of this ETSO must meet in order to be identified with
the applicable ETSO marking.
2— Procedures
2.1 — General
The applicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None.
3— Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
The applicable standards are those provided in EUROCAE ED-250, Minimum Operational Performance
Standards for a Runway Overrun Awareness and Alerting System, dated December 2017.
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4— Marking
4.1 — General
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.
4.2 — Specific
None.
5— Availability of Referenced Documents
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 3.
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ETSO-2C519
Date: XX.XX.20XX
European
Union
Aviation
Safety
Agency
1— Applicability
This ETSO provides the requirements which emergency breathing systems (EBSs), for operations to or
from helidecks that are located in hostile sea areas, that are designed and manufactured on or after the
date of this ETSO, must meet in order to be identified with the applicable ETSO marking.
2— Procedures
2.1 — General
The applicable procedures are detailed in CS-ETSO, Subpart A.
2.2 — Specific
None.
3— Technical Conditions
3.1 — Basic
3.1.1 — Minimum Performance Standard
The applicable standards are those provided in AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of
Europe — Standardization (ASD-STAN) document EN4856:2018, dated December 2018.
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Date: XX.XX.20XX
See CS-ETSO, Subpart A, paragraph 1.2.
4.2 — Specific
The specific marking requirements are detailed in ASD-STAN document EN4856:2018.
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4. Impact assessment
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5. Proposed actions to support implementation
17
https://www.easa.europa.eu/easa-and-you/aircraft-products/etso-authorisations/list-of-current-etso
18
https://www.easa.europa.eu/easa-and-you/aircraft-products/etso-authorisations/list-of-all-etso
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6. References
6. References
6.1. Affected regulations
N/A
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