Senate Hearing, 113TH Congress - Cruise Industry Oversight: Recent Incidents Show Need For Stronger Focus On Consumer Protection

S. HRG.
113642
CRUISE INDUSTRY OVERSIGHT: RECENT

INCIDENTS SHOW NEED FOR STRONGER
FOCUS ON CONSUMER PROTECTION
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JULY 24, 2013
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Ranking
BILL NELSON, Florida
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
ROY BLUNT, Missouri
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEAN HELLER, Nevada
MARK WARNER, Virginia
DAN COATS, Indiana
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
TED CRUZ, Texas
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
JEFF CHIESA, New Jersey
ELLEN L. DONESKI, Staff Director
JAMES REID, Deputy Staff Director
JOHN WILLIAMS, General Counsel
DAVID SCHWIETERT, Republican Staff Director
NICK ROSSI, Republican Deputy Staff Director
REBECCA SEIDEL, Republican General Counsel and Chief Investigator
(II)
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CONTENTS
Page
Hearing held on July 24, 2013 ...............................................................................

Statement of Senator Rockefeller ...........................................................................
Statement of Senator Thune ...................................................................................
Statement of Senator Nelson ..................................................................................
Statement of Senator Schatz ..................................................................................
Statement of Senator Begich ..................................................................................
Statement of Senator Blumenthal ..........................................................................
Statement of Senator Markey .................................................................................
1
1
24
32
125
128
131
133
WITNESSES
Rear Admiral Joseph Servidio, Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy,
United States Coast Guard .................................................................................
Prepared statement ..........................................................................................
Ross A. Klein, Ph.D., Professor, Memorial University of Newfoundland in
St. Johns, Newfoundland, Canada .....................................................................
Hon. Mark Rosenker, Former Chairman, National Transportation Safety
Board and Member, Cruise Line International Associations Panel of Experts .....................................................................................................................
Gerald Cahill, President and Chief Executive Officer, Carnival Cruise Lines ...
Adam M. Goldstein, President and Chief Executive Officer, Royal Caribbean
International .........................................................................................................
25
27
33
35
92
94
114
114
118
120
APPENDIX
Letter dated August 19, 2013 to Senator John D. Rockefeller IV from Kathy
A. Notarianni, Ph.D., P.E., Head, Department of Fire Protection Engineering; Associate Professor, Fire Protection Engineering and Associate Professor, Mechanical Engineering and Chemical Engineering, Worcester Polytechnic Institute ...................................................................................................
Response to written questions submitted to Rear Admiral Joseph Servidio by:
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV ............................................................................
Hon. Barbara Boxer .........................................................................................
Response to written questions submitted to Gerald Cahill by:
Hon. Barbara Boxer .........................................................................................
Hon. Maria Cantwell ........................................................................................
Response to written questions submitted to Adam M. Goldstein by:
Hon. Maria Cantwell ........................................................................................
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Ross A. Klein, Ph.D. ........................................................................................
147
148
150
151
154
154
156
158
159
(III)
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CRUISE INDUSTRY OVERSIGHT: RECENT

INCIDENTS SHOW NEED FOR STRONGER
FOCUS ON CONSUMER PROTECTION
WEDNESDAY, JULY 24, 2013
U.S. SENATE,
TRANSPORTATION,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m., in room
SR253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John D. Rockefeller
IV, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
COMMITTEE
ON
COMMERCE, SCIENCE,
AND
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV,

U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
The CHAIRMAN. I thank all of you for being here. And I will proceed with an opening statement, followed by Senator Thune, and
then we will go directly to testimony, and then we will have a lively discussion.
Millions of Americans enjoy taking cruises every year. I completely understand why. Cruise lines sell people a fun-filled, oncein-a-lifetime dream vacation. Probably with that in mind, I guess,
two my children have taken cruise line ships. And sometimes they
get that dream. Sometimes they get that dream. But, as we all
know, sometimes cruises hit rough waters and that dream can turn
into a nightmare.
In March 2012, after several very troubling safety incidents occurred on cruise ships, I held a hearing in this room to get answers
about why passengers sometimes find themselves in harms way. It
was a serious attempt to get answers. The leader of the Cruise Industry Trade Association sat right there and told me, basically, to
trust herthat doesnt come easily in the Senate, right?to trust
that the industry was engaged in a rigorous review of safety procedures that would fix everything. I did not entirely believe her at
the time, but I felt like the industry needed a fair chance to correct
their course. It has now been 16 months since that hearing, and
I have not seen much evidence that things have changed.
Since that hearing, since those empty promises, serious incidents
continue to plague cruise ships. And Im sorry about that. This conduct should make us all very angry. If the industry is seriously
working to improve the safety and security of its ships, why have
we witnessed so many serious incidents in the last 16 months? Is
the industry really trying to adopt a culture of safety or are these
safety reviews and temporary investments a cynical effort to
counter bad publicity? That happens.
(1)
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I seriously worked to improve the safety and security of these
ships. Why have we witnessed so many serious incidents in the last
16 months? I believe the culture of safety that Americans expect,
as they should, is clearly not always a priority for cruise lines.
Thats not necessarily restricted to cruise lines, I might say. I can
think of a number of American industries where I might make the
same comment.
Cruise ships on fire and drifting at sea tend to make headlines,
and we know how they impact passengers. But, cable news doesnt
cover the many crimes committed against individual passengers on
cruise ships, which are just as concerning to me.
We have been reviewing the industry for a while now, for quite
a long while, and have found some sobering details. Consumers
have the right to know what we have learned before they book
their first or next dream vacation. For instance, if somebody steals
your property or assaults you on a cruise ship, you cannot, obviously, call 911 and have the police there in a few minutes; you can
only call the ships security officer, who, I think, predictably, happens to be an employee of the cruise line. Thats not a criticism,
its just a fact. The cruise industry has fought to limit when and
where passengers can file lawsuits, so it becomes incredibly difficult, if not impossible, to right these wrongs.
I have placed, for your reading enjoyment, in front of you, this.
I went to the ophthalmologist, 2 days ago, and, in spite of my very
best efforts last night and this morning, I cant read a word of this.
[Laughter.]
The CHAIRMAN. And, at one hearing, we were told that, when you
are sold a ticket, that, after the ticket sale is made, then you peel
off, and then you run into this. What this is are many pages, in
absolutely the smallest type that I have ever seen in my entire life.
Its all about liability limitations. Not all of it, but a lot of it. Its
stunning. And what is most important to me, I guess, is that it
isnt readable. So, if it isnt readable, is it, in fact, like its not there
and that theyre not being warned?
I dont think people go on cruise ships with the idea of wanting
to sue, but, after some of these incidents recently, it may be that
people do have that in mind.
Anyway, to make things worse, under current law, cruise ship
crime report data is not available to the public. Thats crime data.
That means consumers have no way to find out what their real
risks are before they take a cruise. Now, granted, these are huge
ships. I guess the largest one is now, what, 5,000-plus people and
2,000 employees. And Im not criticizing that. Its a stunning sight
to see, in the Virgin Islands or the Bahamas or somewhere. But,
ImI cant criticize thatbut, implicit in 7,000 people on a ship
in such tight quarters over a fairly long period of time, the possibility of predators and criminal activities, whether it be on persons
or on property, is obviously large.
During the last few months, my staff has been analyzing the FBI
crime report. And thats this. Its the FBI crime report data that
does not get publicly released. And Im not doing it. They recently
submitted a report to me on cruise ship crimes. Thats that.
I ask unanimous consent to put this staff report in the record of
this hearing.
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[The information referred to follows:]
4
TABLE
OF
CONTENTS
Executive Summary
I. The Commerce Committees Review
II. Background on Cruise Passenger Resources and Recourse Following a Crime Onboard
A. Calling for Help
B. Onboard Investigation
C. Jurisdictional Issues
D. Ticket Contracts Limit Passenger Rights
E. Impact of Differences
III. The CVSSA Crime Reporting Requirements
IV. Analysis of Cruise Crime Statistics Since CVSSA
V. Conclusion
Appendices
I. Alleged Crime Incident Data for 2011 and 2012
II. Alleged Crime Victim Data for 2012
III. U.S. Coast Guard Publicly Reported Cruise Crime Data for 2010, 2011, and
2012
Executive Summary
For many passengers, a cruise is a dream vacation: a floating city full of exciting
attractions and adventure for the whole family. However, crime on a cruise ship can
turn a dream vacation into a nightmare. While crimes occur infrequently on cruise
ships,1 when crime does occur onboard the victim often lacks the same access to law
enforcement and emergency servicesas well as avenues for recoursethat are
available in the United States. Particularly given these differences, it is important
that passengers are informed about crime on cruises before they travel.
To increase transparency regarding crime on cruise vessels,2 Congress included in
the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010 (CVSSA) public reporting requirements regarding cruise ship crime. Under the CVSSA, cruise lines must report to
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) any allegation of a crime 3 as soon as possible and the United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard)4 must maintain and publicly post on a website a statistical compilation of the alleged crimes. Unfortunately,
the public reporting process established under this language is not providing consumers a complete view of crimes reported on cruise vessels.
Actual Cruise Crime Data is Higher than Publicly Reported
Unlike with crimes reported on land in the United States,5 the public database
established pursuant to CVSSA discloses only those crimes that are no longer under
investigation by the FBI. The law also requires only a subset of the types of crimes
reported to the FBI to be reported publicly.6 Data the Committee on Commerce,
1 Cruise Line I A, CLIA Statement: Congressional Hearing (Mar. 27, 2001) (online at http://
www.cruising.org/vacation/node/316).
2 Congress found that Passengers on cruise vessels have an inadequate appreciation of their
potential vulnerability to crime while on ocean voyages, and those who may be victimized lack
the information they need to understand their legal rights or to know whom to contact for help
in the immediate aftermath of the crime. Pub. L. No. 111207, Sec. 2, (2010).
3 CVSSA classifies as crimes required to be reported to the FBI as all homicide, suspicious
death, a missing United States national, kidnapping, assault with serious bodily injury, any offense to which section 2241, 2242, 2243, or 2244(a) or (c) of title 18 applies, firing or tampering
with the vessel, or theft of money or property in excess of $10,000. Pub. L. No. 111207.
4 CVSSA requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to maintain and publicly post a statistical compilation of alleged crimes reported and no longer under investigation by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. These statistics are published on the Coast Guards website. Pub. L.
No. 111207.
5 Federal Bureau of Investigations, Crime Statistics, Uniform Crime Reports Web Site (online
at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr-publications#Crime) (accessed June 10, 2013).
6 The owner of a cruise vessel is required to keep logs of all allegations of crime but is only
required to report certain types of crime incidents to the FBI. The owner of a cruise vessel may
voluntary report other alleged crimes to the FBI. CVSSA provides that only the crimes that are
required to be reported to the FBI must be reported publicly. These crimes include all homicide,
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Science and Transportation obtained from Coast Guard and the FBI shows that,
since passage of the CVSSA, the number of alleged crimes cruise lines reported to
the FBIincluding crimes reported voluntarily by cruise linesis 30 times higher
than the number of alleged crimes reported publicly. Since 2011, cruise lines have
reported 959 alleged crimes to the FBI, while the Coast Guard reported only 31 alleged crimes publicly.
Further, with respect to the categories of crimes for which the CVSSA specifically
requires cruise lines to report alleged incidents to the FBI, the number of alleged
crimes that cruise lines reported is over four times higher than the number of alleged crimes reported publicly. Since 2011, cruise lines have reported 130 of such
alleged crimes to the FBI, while only 31 alleged crimes were reported publicly.
Crimes Committed Against Minors are Unrepresented in Official Statistics

The Committees review of cruise crime statistics also identified that crimes committed against minors are unrepresented in publicly available statistics. In cases of
sexual assault, cruise crime data that is not publicly reported indicates minors are
the victim in a significant percentage of total alleged sexual assaults.
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suspicious death, a missing United States national, kidnapping, assault with serious bodily injury, any offense to which section 2241, 2242, 2243, or 2244(a) or (c) of title 18 applies, firing
or tampering with the vessel, or theft of money or property in excess of $10,000. Pub. L. No.
111207. The FBI records crimes reported to the Bureau, but not required to be reported or publicly listed by the Coast Guard, as Other Crimes.
6
I. The Commerce Committees Review
In March 2012, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
held a hearing on the cruise industry and its ability to protect its passengers. The
Committee received testimony raising concerns that the public was receiving incomplete information regarding alleged cruise crimes.7 At the hearing Ross Klein, a professor at Memorial University of Newfoundland, testified about his Freedom of Information (FOIA) request to the FBI for cruise crime data after the passage of
CVSSA:
The material returned in response was totally unhelpful. All useful information
was redacted. As well, the FBI says they are not required to keep track of or
report crimes committed on cruise ships unless they have opened a file of investigation and subsequently closed the file. That means that allegations of crime
are no longer available for analysis . . . [This absence of data] is not in the interest of the public or in the spirit of the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act
of 2010. 8
To further examine these concerns, Committee Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV
requested that the FBI provide the Committee the crime data that the cruise lines
reported to the FBI since passage of CVSSA. Using the crime data provided by the
FBI,9 Committee staff then compared this data to the publicly reported cruise crime
data that is posted on the Coast Guards website.10
II. Background on Cruise Passenger Resources and Recourse Following a
Crime Onboard
According to the cruise industry, a cruise is as safe as your average community
in the United States, 11 and the incidence of crime onboard is very small given the
large number of guests carried. 12 However, there are significant differences between how crimes that occur on land in the United States are responded to as compared to crimes that occur on cruise vessels.
A. Calling for Help
In the United States, when a crime occurs, a victim or a witness to the crime generally can call 911 to access police, medical, and other services.13 Often, within minutes, law enforcement trained to investigate and eventually help prosecute criminals
is on the scene.14 Law enforcement called to the scene is an impartial party to the
investigation;15 they must protect the scene, take statements, and collect and preserve evidence in accordance with the law.16
When a crime occurs on a cruise vessel, it can be an entirely different story for
the victim. Victims generally report crimes to cruise vessel security officers, who are
employees of the cruise company.17 These employees do an initial investigation and
determine when and whether to report a crime to law enforcement.18 As employees
7 Testimony of Professor Ross Klein, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Oversight of the Cruise Ship Industry: Are Current Regulations Sufficient to Protect Passengers and the Environment?, 112th Cong. (Mar. 1, 2012).
8 Id. at p. 47.
9 Letter from Stephen D. Kelly, Assistant Director, Office of Congressional Affairs, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Senate Commerce Committee Chairman Rockefeller (July 16, 2012);
Letter from Stephen D. Kelly, Assistant Director, Office of Congressional Affairs, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Senate Commerce Committee Chairman Rockefeller (Apr. 4, 2013).
10 The Coast Guard Cruise Crime Website (online at http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg2/cgis/
CruiseLine.asp) These statistics can be found attached to this report as Appendix III.
11 Mystery at Sea: Who Polices the Ships?, New York Times (Feb. 26, 2006) (online at http://
www.nytimes.com/2006/02/26/travel/26crime.html?pagewanted=all&lr=1&).
12 Carnival Cruise Line Website (online at https://secure.carnival.com/cms/fun/cruisel
control/securitylsafetylact.aspx) (accessed June 10, 2013).
13 The National 911 Program (online at http://www.911.gov/about.html).
14 See, e.g., Department of Justice, Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide for Law Enforcement
(Jan. 2000) (online at http://www.nij.gov/nij/topics/law-enforcement/investigations/crimescene/guides/generalscenes/welcome.htm).
15 See, e.g., Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Officer Requirements page (online at
http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Content/CJST/Menu/Officer-Requirements-Main-Page/LE-EthicalStandardsof-Conduct.aspx); FBI, Quick Facts (noting FBI core values include fairness) (online
at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/quick-facts) (accessed June 28, 2013).
16 Department of Justice, Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide for Law Enforcement (Jan.
2000), pp.iii, 1, and 10.
17 House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation of the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, Hearing on Crimes Against Americans on Cruise Ships,
110th Cong. (Mar. 27, 2007), p. 30.
18 Senate Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Hearing on Cruise
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of the cruise lines, these security officers do not have the same arms length relationship with the cruise lines as do local and Federal law enforcement officials.19
Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network (RAINN) testified before the Commerce
Committee about the inherent difficulties victims face when reporting a crime that
occurred onboard to security officers who work for the cruise company:
You wont have any rape crisis personnel onboard to support you, let alone law
enforcement officials to come to your aid. You might turn to cruise ship employees for help, only to later find that the cruise line has a vested interest in
shielding themselves against negative publicity or legal jeopardy. And you
might wonder how any security personnel hired by the cruise line will react if
presented with any situation that might give rise to a potential conflict of interest between their employer and yourself.20
B. Onboard Investigation
Since law enforcement generally is not immediately present when a crime occurs
on a cruise ship, the cruise ship security officers and sometimes the victims themselves are responsible for preserving the scene of the crime and any evidence.21 According to Congressional testimony, cruise lines have taken the position that they
have no duty to investigate crimes.22 Victims groups and others have raised concerns that cruise lines have omitted basic steps such as taking witness statements
and have lost, destroyed, or mishandled evidence.23 The International Maritime Organization 24 (IMO) is developing draft guidelines to help guide cruise line crew in
crime scene preservation.25
C. Jurisdictional Issues
Because of complex jurisdictional rules governing cruise line activities, in some
cases passengers may not have the same legal protections on cruise vessels as they
do in the United States.26 U.S. laws and protections only govern in certain circumstances and there are instances where U.S. law enforcement has limited jurisShip Safety: Examining Potential Steps for Keeping Americans Safe At Sea, 110th Cong.
(June 19, 2008), pp. 5556.
110th Cong. (Mar. 27, 2007), p. 30.
20 Senate Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Hearing on Cruise Ship Safety: Examining
Potential Steps for Keeping Americans Safe At Sea, 110th Cong. (June 19, 2008), p. 13.
21 Id. p. 12.
22 See Testimony of International Cruise Victims Association, Inc. President Kendall Carver,
Cruise Ship Safety: Examining Potential Steps for Keeping Americans Safe at Sea (June 19,
2008) (discussing cruise lines legal position and attaching legal memo by a leading cruise line
taking this position) (online at http://www.internationalcruisevictims.org/files/Total-testimoney
1a-1-withltitles.pdf) (accessed July 15, 2013).
23 See, e.g., The World TodayBrimble inquest hears staff disturbed crime scene, ABC Online
(June 15, 2006) (online at http://www.abc.net.au/cgibin/common/printfriendly.pl?http://
www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2006/s1663754.htm); Testimony of Professor Ross Klein,
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Oversight of the Cruise Ship Industry: Are Current Regulations Sufficient to Protect Passengers and the Environment?, 112th
Cong. (Mar. 1, 2012), pp. 39 and 43 (stating that crew training for crime scenes is inadequate);
Testimony of RAINN (Rape, Abuse, and Incest National Network), Senate Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security, of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Cruise Ship Safety: Examining Potential
Steps for Keeping Americans Safe at Sea, 110th Cong. (June 19, 2008), p. 12, 18 (discussing
issues concerning contaminated evidence).
24 IMO is a United Nations agency that sets international standards for ship safety, security,
and pollution. IMO, See About IMO page (on line at http://www.imo.org/About/Pages/Default.aspx).
25 International Maritime Organization, Collation and Preservation of Evidence Following an
Allegation of a Serious Crime Having Taken Place on Board a Ship or Following a Report of
a Missing Person from a Ship, and Pastoral and Medical Care of Victims, Legal Committee
100th session, Agenda item 7 (I:/LEG/100/7.doc) (Feb. 8, 2013).The International Cruise Victims
Association has raised concerns about the adequacy of these draft guidelines. See CDR. Mark
Gaouette, USNR (Ret.), Unpublished paper entitled ICV Discussion on the IMO Legal Committee
Guidelines: Collation and Preservation of Evidence Following an Allegation of a Serious Crime
2013; Mark Gaouette, Campaigners and industry clash over crime guidelines, Fairplay (June 6,
2013).
26 Myers, Rosie, Cruise Industry Regulation: What Happens on Vacation Stays on Vacation,
A&NZ Mar LJ (2007) (online at http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?collection=journals
&handle=hein.journals/ausnewma21&div=11&id=&page=), pp. 109 and 114.
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diction over crimes.27 For example, a U.S. citizen can report a cruise crime to the
FBI, but if the ship has left U.S. port the FBI is not typically in a position to act
as an onboard police force immediately after the crime happens.28 Law enforcement
may be located thousands of miles away 29 and may have to work through a myriad
of jurisdictional issues with other countries that share jurisdiction over the incident.30
Further, only certain crimes meet the threshold for the FBI to intervene. Theft
of items valued under a certain amount 31 or lack of evidence 32 may result in the
FBI declining to investigate an alleged crime. Even if the FBI does investigate, another countrys law enforcement agency may play the lead role in investigating and
prosecuting the crime.33
D. Ticket Contracts Limit Passenger Rights
Passengers may also find their ability to pursue legal action limited by clauses
in the passenger contract that provides the terms and conditions of a cruise.34 For
example, ticket contracts may require that a passenger has to file a lawsuit in a
much shorter period than if the crime had occurred on land.35 Contracts also may
include restrictions on the location of where an aggrieved passenger can file a lawsuittypically requiring actions to be brought in Florida, where the major cruise
lines are based.36 Further, cruise contracts often require mandatory arbitration 37
or limit class action lawsuits.38
E. Impact of Differences
The vast majority of cruise passengers are not victims of onboard crime. However,
where a crime does occur, the difference between passenger resources and recourse
available on a cruise vessel versus on land can be the difference between justice and
injustice for a crime victim. A case in point is the account of Laurie Dishman, who
testified to Congress that while she was traveling on a cruise to Mexico, a janitor
who was filling in for a security guard raped her, leaving ligature marks on her
neck and other physical evidence.39 According to Ms. Dishmans testimony, following
this incident, the cruise line personnel contaminated the scene, mishandled evidence, destroyed or re-used closed circuit television camera tapes, delayed notifying the FBI, delayed providing medical treatment, did not immediately seal the
crime scene, and provided limited information to Ms. Dishman.40 Further, she stat27 Senate Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Crimes Against
Americans on Cruise Ships, 110th Cong. (Mar. 27, 2007), p. 1.
28 Senate Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Cruise Ship Safety: Examining Potential Steps for Keeping Americans Safe At Sea, 110th Cong. (June 19, 2008),
p. 13.
29 Rosie Myers, Cruise Industry Regulation: What Happens on Vacation Stays on Vacation, 21
Australian and New Zealand Maritime Law Journal (2007), pp. 106107.
30 Id. at pp. 114117.
31 Asia N. Wright, High Seas Ship Crimes, Loyola Maritime Law Journal 1 (2009), p. 8.
110th Cong. (Mar. 27, 2007), p. 12.
110th Cong. (Mar. 27, 2007), pp. 1112; Asia N. Wright, High Seas Ship Crimes, Loyola Maritime Law Journal 1 (2009), p. 19.
34 Christopher Elliott, Can you trust the cruise lines new passenger bill of rights?, Chicago
Tribune (June 18, 2013) and Princess Cruises, Passage Contract (online at http://
www.princess.com/legal/passagelcontract/index.jsp).
35 Justice Thomas A. Dickerson, The Cruise Passengers Rights and Remedies: 2013 (June 10,
2013) pp. 120123. (online at http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/9jd/TacCertlpdfs/Dickerson
lDocs/CRUISEPASSENGERSRIGHTS&REMEDIES2013ONLINE.pdf).
36 Michael D. Eriksen, U.S. Maritime Public Policy Versus Ad-hoc Federal Forum Provisions
in Cruise Tickets, The Florida Bar Journal Volume 80, p.11 (Dec. 2006) (online at http://
www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNJournal
01.nsf/c0d731e03de9828d852574580042ae7a/
78faff425fc6f9e48525723300561ebf!OpenDocument&Highlight=0,*).
37 Justice Thomas A. Dickerson, The Cruise Passengers Rights and Remedies: 2013 (June 10,
2013) (online at http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/9jd/TacCertlpdfs/DickersonlDocs/CRUISE
PASSENGERSRIGHTS&REMEDIES2013ONLINE.pdf), pp. 127128.
38 E.g., Princess Cruise Lines Passage Contract, p. 14 (online at http://www.princess.com/
legal/passagelcontract/index.jsp) (accessed July 1, 2013).
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Crimes Against Americans on Cruise Ships, 110th
Cong. (Mar. 27, 2007) pp. 158159.
40 Id.
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ed that the FBI was not able to access the crime scene for several days. At the time,
the FBI indicated they did not have enough evidence to further investigate the
crime. The accused crew member was not arrested, and he was allowed to return
to his home country.41
Stories like this and others provided impetus for Congress to enact a number of
provisions addressing crime on cruise ships in the 2010 CVSSA.42
III. The CVSSA Crime Reporting Requirements
In 2007, the FBI, Coast Guard, and the cruise lines agreed that cruise lines would
voluntarily report to the FBI incidents involving serious violations of U.S. law:
homicide, suspicious death, missing U.S. nationals, kidnapping, assault with bodily
injury, sexual assaults, firing or tampering with vessels, and theft greater than
$10,000.43
According to U.S. Coast Guard testimony, under this agreement, the FBI would
annually compile this data and prepare a comprehensive report to share with the
Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA). The Coast Guard encouraged CLIA
to disclose this information to potential cruise ship passengers.44 A victims group
indicated it had been able to obtain these statistics through FOIA requests.45 However, this information was not readily available to the public.
One of the ways Congress sought in the CVSSA to improve the safety of cruise
passengers was to provide for greater transparency in reporting crimes that occur
on cruise ships.46 In most major U.S. localities and foreign countries, the public can
view local crime statistics based on crimes reported.47 The FBI views these crime
statistics as an important and helpful tool.48 The public can use information regarding the occurrence of crimes to make more informed decisions about their travel and
actions.49
The CVSSA includes language providing for public access to crime reports for
cruise lines similar to reports the public can access regarding communities across
the country. Toward that end, the law requires cruise lines to report a specific set
of crimes to the FBI that (1) occur on a vessel owned by a U.S. person, (2) involve
a U.S. national, (3) that occur in U.S. waters, or (4) will depart from or arrive at
a U.S. port.50 Additionally, the Coast Guard must make these crime statistics publicly available online.51 However, unlike crime reporting on land in the United
41 Id.
42 Id.; Senate Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure,
Safety, and Security of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Hearing on
Cruise Ship Safety: Examining Potential Steps for Keeping Americans Safe At Sea, 110th Cong.
(June 19, 2008).
Transportation, Crimes Against Americans on Cruise Ships (11021) (Mar. 27, 2007), pp. 2, 15
16.
44 Id.
45 Kendall Carver and Jamie Barnett, International Cruise Victims Challenges Cruise Crime
Statistics Provided by FBI (June 10, 2012) (online at http://internationalcruisevictims.active
board.com/t49559394/icv-update-june-102012/?wlr=1354674534)
46 Pub. L. No. 111207.
47 The Federal Bureau of Investigations, Uniform Crime Reporting Program page (online at
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr); the State Department, International Travel Page (online
at http://travel.state.gov/travel/cislpaltw/cis/cisl4965.html).
48 See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports, Crime in the United States,
Statement of FBI Director Robert S. Mueller (noting: The significant challenge of protecting life
and property requires many different kinds of resources, including data such as the information
found in this report. The highest mission of the FBIs UCR Program is to provide information
to help law enforcement and other community leaders better understand the issues they face
and more effectively prepare to meet them each day) (online at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/
cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.2010/message-from-the-director).
49 For example, numerous travel articles discuss crime as a factor for consumers considering
tourist destinations. See, e.g., Komal Bakhru, Safest Vacation Destinations in the Caribbean
(July 2011) (online at http://www.buzzle.com/articles/safest-vacation-destinations-in-the-caribbean.html).
50 The CVSSA requires cruise lines to report to the FBI all incidents of homicide, suspicious
death, a missing United States national, kidnapping, assault with serious bodily injury, any offense to which section 2241, 2242, 2243, or 2244(a) or (c) of title 18 applies, firing or tampering
with the vessel, or theft of money or property in excess of $10,000. Pub. L. No. 111207.
51 Id.
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States,52 the FBI interprets the CVSSA to require public reporting of only those incidents that are no longer under investigation by the FBI.53
The CVSSA also requires cruise lines to keep logs of all complaints of crimes committed on any voyage that embarks or disembarks passengers in the United
States.54 This requirement covers a broader range of crimes than those required to
be reported to the FBI. Under the CVSSA, cruise lines may voluntarily report any
of the alleged incidents that do not fall under the category of incidents required to
be reported, and many cruise lines have voluntarily provided this information to the
FBI.55
While CVSSA attempted to improve public access to reported cruise crime data,
today complete information is still not publicly released.
IV. Analysis of Cruise Crime Statistics Since CVSSA
Cruise crime data reviewed by Commerce Committee staff 56 shows that since enactment of CVSSA, the public has not been able to access complete information regarding reported crimes aboard cruise vessels. Since passage of the CVSSA, the
total number of alleged crimes cruise lines reported to the FBIincluding both incidents reported voluntarily and those required to be reported to the FBI by cruise
linesis 30 times higher than the number of alleged crimes reported publicly. Since
2011, cruise lines have reported 959 alleged crimes to the FBI, while the Coast
Guard reported only 31 alleged crimes publicly.
52 Federal Bureau of Investigations, Crime Statistics, Uniform Crime Reports Web Site (online
at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr-publications#Crime) (accessed June 10, 2013).
53 Under the CVSSA, the incidents of homicide, suspicious death, a missing United States national, kidnapping, assault with serious bodily injury, any offense to which section 2241, 2242,
2243, or 2244(a) or (c) of title 18 applies, firing or tampering with the vessel, or theft of money
or property in excess of $10,000, that are reported and are no longer under investigation by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation must be maintained on an Internet site that provides a numerical accounting of each of these incidents. Pub. L. No. 111207 (2010).
54 Pub. L. No. 111207.
55 Id.
56 To conduct this analysis, Committee staff reviewed publicly available cruise crime statistics
and those requested by the Chairman, and by victim advocate groups through Freedom of Information Requests (FOIA). Letter from Stephen D. Kelly, Assistant Director, Office of Congressional Affairs, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Senate Commerce Committee Chairman
Rockefeller (July 16, 2012); Letter from Stephen D. Kelly, Assistant Director, Office of Congressional Affairs, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Senate Commerce Committee Chairman
Rockefeller (Apr. 4, 2013); Letter from David M. Hardy Section Chief, Record/Information Dissemination Section, Records Management Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Mr. Kendall Carver, International Cruise Victims Association (June 14, 2013) regarding FOIA request
for 2012 cruise crime data submitted to the FBI. Appendix I includes the incident data analyzed
to determine total alleged crimes reported to the FBI versus total alleged crimes reported publicly in 2011 and 2012. The FBI provided such incident data for 2011 and the incident data for
2012 was drawn from an FBI response to a FOIA request. The FBI also provided the Committee
data for 2012 that tallies victims of alleged crimesas opposed to incidents of alleged crimes
and this data is shown in Appendix II.
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Figure I: Discrepancies Between Publicly and FBI Reported Cruise Crime Data
There is also a significant discrepancy between the total crimes in the categories
of crime for which CVSSA mandates reporting to the FBI, and total crimes in these
categories that are reported publicly. According to the FBI, for the years 2011 and
2012, the total alleged crimes that cruise lines reported to the FBI, in categories
where reporting is required, was 130over four times the total reported publicly by
the Coast Guard. Figure II shows this difference.
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Figure II: Cruise Crime Statistics Reported to the FBI and by the Coast Guard, Excluding Crimes Voluntarily Reported to the FBI
12
Figure III provides additional detail, displaying by categories of crime the difference between the number of alleged crimes reported to the FBI by cruise lines
and the number of alleged crimes reported publicly.
Figure III: Detailed Cruise Crime Statistics as Reported by the FBI and Coast
Guard 57
In some cases, as with assaults with serious injury reported in 2011, the number
of crimes publicly reported matches the number of crimes reported to the FBI. In
most cases, however, the number of crimes reported to the FBI differs significantly
from the number reported publicly. For example, with respect to alleged sexual assault crimes, the 13 alleged crimes publicly reported in 2011 represented only 31
percent of the 42 alleged crimes reported to the FBI, and in 2012 the 11 alleged
crimes publicly reported represented only 38 percent of the 28 alleged crimes reported to the FBI. Figure III also shows that the FBI receives cruise line data on
other crimes that is not shared publicly.
In addition to the discrepancy between total alleged crimes reported to the FBI
and total alleged crimes reported publicly, the FBI also receives additional victim
detail not reported publicly concerning the age of victims of reported crimes. According to the FBI, of the 29 alleged reported sexual assault victims in 2012, 10or 34
percentwere minors. Figure IV depicts this added detail that the FBI obtains
when gathering cruise crime data with specific regard to alleged sexual assaults.
Figure IV2012 Sexual Assault Data as Reported by the FBI 58
Two recent media accounts of alleged sexual assaults on board cruise ships, one
involving an alleged groping of a 12-year-old girl by a passenger,59 and one involving an alleged groping of an 11-year-old girl by a crew member,60 are reminders
that minors as well as adults can be victims of crimes onboard cruise ships.
V. Conclusion
Since the enactment of CVSSA, the number of alleged crimes reported by cruise
lines to the FBI have been substantially higher than the number reported publicly.
Further, the public does not currently have the ability to assess the extent to which
minors are victims of cruise crime because this information is not currently publicly
released.
57 Id.
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58 Letter from Stephen D. Kelly, Assistant Director, Office of Congressional Affairs, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, to Senate Commerce Committee Chairman Rockefeller (Apr. 4, 2013).
59 KTOO, Ketchikan DA Investigating Alleged Cruise Ship Sexual Assault (July 12, 2013).
60 USA Today, Watchdogs Urge Better Reporting of Cruise Ship Crime (June 10, 2013).
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24
The CHAIRMAN. Our exhaustive oversight of the cruise industry
and the recent events that have left thousands stranded at sea
make it absolutely clear that more needs to be done. So, this week
I took action. I introduced new legislation to make the common
sense consumer protection improvements the cruise lines have not
been willing to make on their own.
At this point, incidentally, I should thank the Royal Caribbean
CEO for coming. He was the most cooperative. And I dont know
what hes going to say, but he came, and it was his own decision,
and I want to thank him for that.
Consumers deserve to know what rights and protections they
have, and, more importantly, that they do not have, on their cruise.
I have been assured repeatedly by the industry, that things will get
better.
Take a look at the events over the past 16 months and tell me
if this is what you think better looks like. Cruise lines are on notice that the safety and protection of passengers is now their number one priority, whether they like it or not.
That is the conclusion of my statement, and I turn now to Senator John Thune, the Ranking Member, whom Im very fortunate
to be able to work with.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
Senator THUNE. Likewise. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding

this hearing today. And I want to thank our witnesses for being
here to testify.
Ensuring safety across all modes of transportation is one of this
committees most important functions. And recent events, in several modes, whether by air, rail, or sea, have demonstrated how
challenging this can be. This task can be made even more difficult
when a vessel like a cruise ship must travel through several jurisdictions during a single voyage.
For instance, when a cruise ship embarks from a U.S. port, the
cruise line must ensure compliance with safety regulations through
coordination with the industry, the U.S. Coast Guard, and with foreign governments in countries through which the cruise ship is
passing, either by sailing in foreign territorial waters or docking at
a port within a foreign governments jurisdiction.
While the cruise ship industrys safety record is generally good,
there have been a few troubling incidents in recent years. The most
tragic of these was the fatal accident involving the Costa
Concordia, which ran aground off the coast of Italy in 2012. Thankfully, other incidents, other recent incidents, including those involving ships departing from U.S. ports, have not resulted in fatalities
or significant injuries. Nevertheless, these particular incidents,
which received significant media attention, did underscore the challenges and discomfort that passengers can be subjected to, including days without power or plumbing, and raise questions about the
protections afforded to U.S. passengers.
In the wake of these incidents, the cruise ship industry has
taken several noteworthy steps to further ensure the safety and
comfort of its customers and crews. The industry should be commended for its adoption of the Cruise Industry Passenger Bill of
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Rights, which includes the right to disembark from a ship if essential provisions cannot be provided; the right to a refund for a trip
canceled due to mechanical failures; and the right to an emergency
power source in the case of a generator failure. As the Chairman
has noted, however, the Committee has an interest in ensuring
that these commitments are translating into better experiences for
passengers.
So, I look forward to hearing more from our witnesses about
these and other steps the cruise industry has taken to improve
safety.
Additionally, I am interested in hearing from the Coast Guard
about any recommendations stemming from their investigations of
recent cruise ship incidents and the work that theyre doing at the
Cruise Ship National Center of Expertise, in Everglades, Florida.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for holding this hearing, and I
want to thank our witnesses for being here and for their willingness to testify.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Thune.
I think we should just move right into the witnesses. Thats not
pleasing to three distinguished colleagues of mine over there, but
theyll have a lot of time to ask questions and to engage.
Why dont we just start the way it is here: Rear Admiral Joseph
Servidio, Assistant Commandant for Prevention and Policy, United
States Coast Guard.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL JOSEPH SERVIDIO,
ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR PREVENTION POLICY,
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
Admiral SERVIDIO. Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member

Thune, members of the Committee, good afternoon. On behalf of
the Commandant and the men and women of your Coast Guard
who perform our challenging safety, security, and environmental
stewardship missions each day, including our response to the blowout well going on in the Gulf right now, sir, I thank you for your
continuing strong support of our service. And, Mr. Chairman,
thank you for your oversight.
Today, I look forward to telling you how the Coast Guard regulates foreign-flagged cruise ships to ensure they are as safe as possible for the U.S. passengers who embark them. I want to leave you
with three messages, sir: that we have a robust inspection regime
for foreign-flagged cruise ships; I believe, the strongest port state
control program in the world; that we have trained vessel inspectors and a National Center for Expertise to provide consistency in
identifying risks and enforcing compliance; and that we have an assertive investigations process, a feedback loop informing our inspectors and our inspections, as well as our forward-leaning standards
development process. Were looking to address todays and tomorrows potential risks.
Our regulatory oversight of cruise ships starts when they are
still on the drawing board. Coast Guard naval architects review design drawings with a focus on critical elements, like fire- and lifesafety plans, including structural fire protection and emergency escape routes. Once the design drawings are reviewed, we send our
inspectors overseas to conduct onsite inspections and see if the ves-
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sels are constructed as they are designed. Once the ship is complete, it must pass the rigorous inspection initial exam before we
allow it to embark passengers in U.S. ports. Finally, once in service, the ship is regularly inspected and will be examined on a riskbased schedule at least semiannually.
If we have any concerns about a ships safety, we will not permit
it to embark passengers until our concerns are addressed. For example, several weeks ago, the Carnival Triumph was attempting to
return to service after suffering an engine-room fire. Before we
would allow it back into service, Triumph had to pass an initial inspection, which included Coast Guard inspectors examining fire-detection, firefighting, and lifesaving systems and observing the crew
conduct safety drills. Triumph did not initially pass, the captain of
the port formally detained the vessel. Triumph eventually did pass,
but, because it was detained, well be conducting more frequent inspections on the vessel.
Inspecting these vessels is difficult, sir. Modern cruise ships are
some of the most sophisticated vessels on the water today, due to
their size and their complexity. To ensure our Coast Guard inspectors are experts, we leverage our National Cruise Ship Center of
Expertise, in Fort Lauderdale. The NCOE collects studies and applies lessons learned from inspections and casualty investigations,
and uses them to update our cruise ship inspection procedures,
courses, and job aids.
As an example, the Coast Guard was, and is, actively involved
in a number of investigations. Weve learned that our attention to
detail on structural fire protection has worked. Systems generally
performed well; they protected passengers and they likely saved
lives. However, we also learned, in the Carnival Splendor investigation, that we need to inspect some areas more closely, like fixed
engine-room firefighting systems, as well as to focus on higher-risk
engine-room fires and drill evaluations. With the NCOE, we have
adjusted our inspection procedures to make these changes.
Because almost all of the cruise ships are foreign flagged, we are
exerting leadership internationally to make cruise ships safer. Last
month, I attended the IMOs Maritime Safety Committee meeting.
At this session, we adopted an amendment that requires passengers to receive safety instructions prior to, or immediately after,
departure. We also tasked IMO experts to study how cruise ship
designs can be enhanced to increase survivability.
In summary, the Coast Guard is dedicated to ensuring the safety
and security of every cruise passenger and crew member, as well
as protecting our environment. Our oversight of foreign cruise
ships is comprehensive, but we strive to improve, every day. Were
learning from our casualty investigations and working on better
leading indicators. And, although leadership at theand, through
leadership at the IMO, were looking to mitigate tomorrows, as
well as todays, risks.
I thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Servidio follows:]
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL JOSEPH SERVIDIO, ASSISTANT
COMMANDANT FOR PREVENTION POLICY, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
Introduction
Good morning Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Thune, and distinguished members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss issues related to cruise ship safety. I would like to provide background into the
Coast Guards oversight of the cruise industry, highlight what weve learned and implemented from recent casualties, and discuss the effectiveness of our Port State
Control system in holding cruise industry companies and their vessels accountable
for safe passenger operations.
In my role as the Coast Guards Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy, I
am responsible for setting standards for safety, security, and environmental stewardship for commercial vessels, facilities, and mariners, ensuring compliance with
those standards, and conducting investigations of violations and accidents.
Over the past three years weve seen a number of high profile ship casualties
within the cruise industry, fires aboard the Carnival Splendor, Carnival Triumph
and Grandeur of the Seas highlight serious questions about the design, maintenance
and operation of fire safety equipment on board these vessels, as well as their companies safety management cultures. As the United States lead as a Port State for
holding foreign companies accountable for the safe and secure design and operation
of these vessels, I am very concerned about these failures. I am working to ensure
that the Coast Guard thoroughly reviews each incident to determine causes and
identify corrective actions and hold the cruise lines accountable for improving safety
aboard vessels through increased examination and oversight. Additionally we will
work through the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to update the design
and operational standards for cruise ships based on these incidents.
We recently completed our investigation into the Carnival Splendor engine explosion and debilitating fire. We are treating the recommendations for Coast Guard action in that report as requirements, and based on that report, the Coast Guard is
changing its examination program for foreign cruise ships to examine CO2 system
installations and arrangements more closely. Additionally, we have increased our
expectations for successful fire drills. We have also made recommendations to Carnival Corporation to improve their training programs. I will cover these recent developments in more detail a bit later in my testimony.
In late June, I led the U.S. delegation to the 92nd session of the IMO Maritime
Safety Committee. At this session, we adopted new rules governing cruise ship passenger safety briefings which will become mandatory in July 2015. These new rules
ensure that whenever U.S. passengers board a Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) regulated passenger ship for more than 24 hours, they will receive a detailed safety
briefing either prior to, or immediately after, the vessel gets underway. This regulatory change elevates the standard globally for approximately one third of all cruise
passengers who dont embark ships in the U.S.
Further, based in part on our proposals at this June session, IMO has commenced
reviewing design standards in order to make cruise ships safer, and even more damage-tolerant, through improved survivability standards.
Modern Standards for Cruise Ships
Over the past decade, the international shipping community, through the IMO
and with Coast Guard leadership, has moved decisively toward a proactive approach
to passenger ship safety. With cruise ships growing progressively in size and capacity, in May 2000 the IMO agreed to undertake a holistic examination of safety
issues pertaining to passenger ships, with particular emphasis on large cruise ships.
The outcome of this proactive initiative is an entirely new prevention-and survivability-based regulatory philosophy for cruise ship design, construction, and operation.
The U.S., through the efforts of the Coast Guard, has taken a very active leadership role throughout this initiative, putting forward many of the recommendations
for action taken by the various IMO Sub-Committees. This effort identified a number of areas of concern related to cruise ships, and resulted in substantial amendments to major IMO conventions, including SOLAS, International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution From Ships (MARPOL) 73/78, International Tonnage,
Standards for Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping (STCW) and Load Line
conventions. These amendments address surveys, structures, stability, machinery,
fire safety, lifesaving equipment, communications, navigation equipment, safety
management, maritime security, pollution prevention, crew competency, watertight
integrity, and safe loading.
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Significant improvements under the five main pillars of the IMO initiative entered into force in July 2010 include:
Prevention: Amendments to the STCW Code and supporting guidelines focus on
navigation safety and resource management;
Improved survivability: New SOLAS requirements for the safe return to port
concept address essential system redundancy, management of emergencies, and
casualty mitigation, including the new concept of dedicated shipboard safety
centers to manage emergencies;
Regulatory flexibility: Amendments to SOLAS provide a methodology for the approval of new and innovative safety technologies and arrangements;
Operations in areas remote from SAR facilities: Guidelines on external support
from SAR authorities, as well as guidance to assist seafarers taking part in SAR
operations have been developed; and finally; and
Health safety and medical care: Guidelines on establishing medical safety programs, and a revised Guide on Cold Water Survival.
Other recent improvements include stability and survivability of cruise ships
through new probabilistic subdivision and damage stability regulations, and flooding
detection systems; improved voyage planning, particularly in remote and high latitude areas; and voyage data recorders. As a separate initiative, stemming from the
2006 fire aboard the Star Princess, significant improvements have been made to the
fire safety features of external areas on cruise ships. Overall, the past decade has
been an enormous leap forward in cruise ship safety measures and has been largely
proactive to casualties. The U.S. Coast Guards leadership in the international community with respect to cruise ship safety measures and our support to foreign casualty investigations evidences our dedication to the world wide safety of U.S. passengers.
The Safety, Security, and Environmental Protection Net
The IMO conventions form the basis for the international safety, security, and
stewardship net designed to ensure consistent standards across the world wide fleet
of cruise ships. Owners and operators, vessel crews, classification societies, flag
states (or their recognized organizations when delegated to act on the behalf of the
flag state), and port states each have distinct roles in ensuring compliance with
those standards. Each of these entities performs specific roles intended to maximize
safety, security, and environmental protection.
Flag states have the primary responsibility to ensure their vessels meet international and domestic standards. They often achieve this through recognized third
party organizations who certify that vessels meet design, construction, operating,
and manning requirements throughout the life of the vessel.
Port states verify substantial compliance with international standards and ensure
compliance with applicable domestic requirements for vessels of all flags calling in
their ports. As the port state authority for the U.S., the Coast Guard has established a robust control verification program that subjects cruise ships calling in U.S.
ports to a much higher level of scrutiny than other foreign flag vessels, and much
higher than any other port state requires for foreign flag cruise ships in their ports.
Although we cannot provide total quality control for foreign cruise ships visiting
our ports, we do take prompt action to ensure deficiencies we find during our examinations are corrected in an expeditious manner. If a deficiency is serious, we ensure
it gets corrected before the vessel leaves port. When one or more deficiencies lead
us to conclude a ship is substandard, we detain the vessel. A detention means the
vessel cannot leave port until the serious deficiencies are corrected. We report the
detention to IMO and list the vessel on international forums as a detained vessel,
and we will examine the vessel more frequently for a period of three years.
Most recently, the Coast Guard detained the Carnival Triumph after it was found
to have three serious deficiencies at its first examination after completing repairs
following the February 2013 fire. As described above, the vessel was held in port
until these deficiencies were corrected, we reported the detention to IMO and listed
the vessel as detained on our website, and the vessel will be subject to quarterly
examinations for three years. This detention demonstrates the effectiveness of our
control verification program, as well as our willingness to hold substandard vessels
accountable.
Coast Guard Control Verification Program for Foreign Flag Cruise Ships
All foreign flag cruise ships arriving in the United States that embark passengers
or make a U.S. port call while carrying U.S. citizens as passengers must participate
in the control verification process. Cruise ships that return to U.S. service after a
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prolonged absence are treated as if they had never been in service in the U.S. and
must undergo the entire process again.
The Coast Guard control verification program includes initial, annual, and periodic examinations for foreign flag cruise ships calling in our ports. Further, it includes concept review during the very earliest stages of design and pre-construction
planning by Coast Guard naval architects and fire protection engineers, mid-construction inspections at the builders yard by Coast Guard marine inspectors, an initial operational inspection of the vessel upon completion of construction, and at least
annual inspections while the vessel is in service in U.S. ports. This regime allows
the Coast Guard to determine that the vessel is in substantial compliance with all
applicable international and domestic standards.
The engineering review of plans for structural fire protection arrangements provides an additional level of assurance that shipboard fire safety arrangements meet
international standards. After review, these same engineers visit the ship to confirm
that the arrangements on the vessel are the same as those shown on the structural
fire protection plans. On the basis of this initial examination, the Coast Guard
issues a certificate of compliance that allows the vessel to operate in U.S. ports.
The annual examination ensures that foreign cruise ships continue to maintain
the systems the Coast Guard previously examined during the initial exam in proper
operating condition and that the flag administration has performed annual renewal
surveys as required by SOLAS. Inspectors focus on marine environmental protection, firefighting, lifesaving, and emergency systems and witness a comprehensive
fire and boat drill by the crew. In addition, inspectors examine the vessel for modifications that would affect the vessels structural fire protection and means of escape. They also check for modifications completed without the vessels flag administration approval. After a satisfactory annual examination, the Coast Guard re-issues
a certificate of compliance.
Periodic examinations are also conducted, typically midway between the annual
examinations. These examinations are more limited in scope but still compliment
the more comprehensive annuals, and they are intended to ensure vessels are being
operated in a safe manner. The periodic examinations focus on the performance of
officers and crew, with specific attention paid to their training on and knowledge
of the ships emergency procedures, environmental protection, security, firefighting,
lifesaving systems, and conduct during the drills. To ensure the overall material
condition of the ship has not appreciably changed since the annual examination, inspectors randomly select sample items for examination.
Inspectors also vary the scope of the examination depending on such factors as
the material condition of the vessel, recordkeeping, the maintenance of the vessel,
and the professionalism and training of the crew. At every Coast Guard examination
of a foreign cruise ship, the inspectors will determine whether the vessel is in substantial compliance with the international convention standards.
Investigations
Foreign vessels operating in U.S. waters are required by U.S. law to report accidents immediately. Upon accident notification, we proactively investigate casualties
meeting a threshold to determine causes and issue safety recommendations to prevent recurrences.
This is a continuous improvement process which incorporates lessons learned
from accident investigations to enhance cruise ship safety and ensure compliance
with national and international laws.
After the Costa Concordia incident, and as a Substantially Interested State in
accordance with IMO Protocols, the Coast Guard immediately offered technical expertise and support to the Government of Italys marine casualty investigation.
Similarly, following the Carnival Triumph fire and the Grandeur of the Seas fire,
the Coast Guard is participating in the investigations with the vessels flag state
of the Bahamas as a Substantially Interested State. It is long standing practice to
cooperate in all manner of accident investigations involving different flag and coastal states and the Coast Guard routinely acts in this accord.
After the Carnival Splendor fire in November 2010, the Coast Guard reached out
to Panama, the vessels flag state, to offer assistance. In accordance with international protocols and at the request of Panama, the Coast Guard took the lead for
the investigation into this casualty. While this incident did not lead to major damage to the vessel, injury or loss of life, the investigation revealed a number of major
safety concerns. As a result, the Coast Guard immediately issued two safety alerts
to advise the industry of potential CO2 system problems.
The Coast Guard report of investigation which was released on July 15, 2013, also
contains five safety recommendations. Three of the recommendations are addressed
to Carnival and Panama (as the flag state) to ensure that the conditions which con-
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tributed to the fire, are addressed appropriately. In addition, there are two safety
recommendations which are aimed at exercising and enhancing the Coast Guards
role as the Port State for this and many other foreign flag cruise ships. These recommendations will be implemented by my staff and will ensure that Coast Guard
Port State Control Officers are armed with the information needed to not only
evaluate the mechanical systems onboard these complex vessels, but the human element as well.
Investigations informing the Control Verification Process and other actions
In its role as a Port State, the Coast Guard employs casualty investigation lessons
learned where practical and appropriate to inform the Control Verification process.
For example, as a result of the Costa Concordia incident, we directed Coast Guard
field inspectors to witness the passenger muster required by SOLAS whenever they
are aboard a cruise ship conducting an initial, annual, or periodic examination. Our
personnel witness these musters either immediately before or during vessel departure from port. In conjunction, the cruise industry associations announced a new
emergency drill policy requiring mandatory muster for embarking passengers prior
to departure from port.
As a result of the Carnival Splendor casualty, we are directing Coast Guard field
inspectors to examine vessel CO2 systems more closely during examinations. There
was evidence that the CO2 system had not been installed and maintained properly,
and we are looking at sister vessels for similar problems. Any similar problems will
require swift correction. We have also increased our expectations for the fire drills
we witness during our examinations. Too often, ships perform drills for our inspectors which do not address a fire in a high-risk area such as an engine room. We
will direct ships to perform an engineroom fire drill during the next examination
of all vessels, and will expect such demonstrations periodically thereafter.
Following the Carnival Triumph fire in the Gulf of Mexico in February of 2013,
we engaged aggressively in Carnivals Safety Management System (SMS) by requesting them and the vessels flag state (the Bahamas) to hold their annual audit
early, with which they complied. We participated in Carnivals company level SMS
Document of Compliance audit conducted by Lloyds Registry in April, and plan to
observe one of their shipboard SMS audits. Based on the most recent audit results,
we have been generally satisfied with Carnivals SMS implementation, and will continue to keep a close eye on their progress.
A more recent casualty to the Grandeur of the Seas yielded several observations
which we are taking immediate action to correct. One involves a deluge system
valve that protected the mooring deck area that had caught fire. The valve was located in an area made inaccessible due to the fire. Our inspectors will examine sister ships for similar problems. Another observation involved un-insulated aluminum
deck hatches which failed and allowed the fire to affect adjacent spaces. Again, our
inspectors will examine sister ships for similar problems.
Search and Rescue (SAR) and Mass Rescue Operations (MRO)
The Coast Guard has maintained a sound relationship with the cruise lines regarding search and rescue and medical evacuations. For the Coast Guard, a Mass
Rescue Operation involving a cruise ship casualty offshore, with potentially thousands of passengers and crew forced to evacuate into lifeboats and the water, presents our greatest search and rescue challenge.
Working with cruise line and passenger vessel companies, the Coast Guard continues to develop and improve SAR and MRO contingency plans. In addition to internal Coast Guard SAR plans, the Coast Guard holds a copy of cruise ship SAR
plans and is able to incorporate the cruise ship plans into our overall SAR planning.
The Coast Guard also meets periodically with cruise line medical personnel to discuss plans for medical emergencies.
Coast Guard passenger vessel safety personnel at each of our Districts assist in
the conduct and coordination of Coast Guard mass rescue exercises. Over the last
five years, the Coast Guard conducted thirty-six mass rescue exercises involving
passenger vessels, three of which involved a cruise ship.
Mass rescue exercises have been structured around a five-year cycle. The Coast
Guard has directed that, at a minimum, each Coast Guard District conduct and/or
participate in one discussion based (e.g., seminar, workshop, game, or tabletop) and
one operations based (e.g., drills, functional, full scale) mass rescue exercise over a
five year period.
To meet this exercise requirement the Coast Guard initiated a five-year mass rescue exercise series known as Black Swan. The exercise series commenced in April
2013 with a full scale exercise on a passenger ship in Freeport, Bahamas, and will
continue with a full scale exercise in Hawaii in 2015 and Norfolk in 2017. The scope
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of these exercises provides a valuable opportunity to identify and resolve the difficulties associated with rescuing hundreds or thousands of people. Black Swan will
continue to focus on the exercise of Coast Guard mass rescue plans, coordination
with other authorities and industry partners, notification and information processes,
personnel accountability, and unique challenges of embarking thousands of survivors on rescue ships from the water, lifeboats and rafts, and rescued passenger
and crew support.
Cruise Ship Security and Crime
The events of September 11, 2001, spurred the development of the Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA) and the IMO International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, both of which are rigorously enforced by the Coast
Guard. The Coast Guard examines every cruise ship that visits the U.S. for compliance with MTSA and ISPS requirements during the ships annual and periodic Control Verification exam, as well as on a random basis throughout the year during unannounced port security checks.
Despite this security compliance regime, there have been serious incidents and
crimes that have affected U.S. citizens aboard foreign-flagged cruise ships. This has
led to an increased focus on protecting our citizens both in port and while they are
at sea. In 2010, Congress enacted the Cruise Ship Security and Safety Act of 2010
(CVSSA) which prescribes security and safety requirements for designated cruise
ships.
CVSSA addresses many areas that affect personal safety and security, including:
ship design; better public access to information about crime aboard cruise ships; improved precautions, response, medical care, support for victims of sexual assault;
preservation of evidence necessary to prosecute criminals; and more consistent and
complete reports. Some of these requirements went into effect when the President
signed the legislation on July 27, 2010; however, there are areas that require implementation through the publication of regulations.
Thus far, the Coast Guard has completed the following actions with respect to implementing the CVSSA:
The Coast Guard published policy establishing guidelines for Coast Guard Marine Inspectors examining cruise vessels for compliance to include physical requirements, such as: rail heights; door peep-holes (similar to hotel doors), which
allow cabin occupants to see who is outside; and the passenger security guide.
The Coast Guard established an Internet-based portal (NCC@uscg.mil) to facilitate electronic submission of crime reports.
The Coast Guard established a web link to publish cruise ship sexual assault
and criminal activity data received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) in accordance with the Act: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg2/cgis/.
An Inter-agency workgroup consisting of Coast Guard, FBI, and the Maritime
Administration personnel completed development of a model course addressing
crime scene preservation standards and curricula.
The Coast Guard published policy promulgating training standards and curricula for the certification of passenger vessel security personnel.
Closing
In closing, let me emphasize that the Coast Guard understands and embraces our
lead role in protecting our most precious cargopeople, who are carried aboard
cruise ships in many of the worlds most pristine marine environments. We continue
to place the highest priority on enforcing compliance with safety, security and environmental regulations on those vessels that embark passengers in the United States
and embark U.S. passengers world-wide.
We have a strong and effective port state control program for foreign cruise ships
and will continue to ensure that vessels calling on ports in the United States are
in substantial compliance with applicable international and domestic standards.
Through proactive oversight and enforcement, we participate in casualty investigations, even those taking place overseas, and we lead efforts at the IMO to improve maritime safety, security, and environmental protection standards. As those
investigation results are analyzed, the Coast Guard will continue to capture the lessons learned and incorporate them into our safety regime, and continue to recommend international requirement updates where necessary. Internally, we are also
changing our examination procedures to address the lessons made apparent from
other recent cruise ship fire casualties and ensure our port state control examinations target areas of concern.
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The Coast Guard looks forward to continued cooperation with this committee, passenger victims groups, and the passenger vessel industry to maximize cruise vessel
safety, security, and environmental protection.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. I will be pleased to answer
any questions you may have.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

I want to make two announcements at this point. One is that
Senator Nelsonobviously, from Floridathis is a big deal, this
hearing, for himhas left another hearing that hes chairing and,
I think, is going back, and he asked me if he could make a short
statement.
Im looking at my three esteemed colleagues over there, praying
for sympathetic looks.
[Laughter.]
The CHAIRMAN. The Ranking Member is sympathetic, so Senator
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Were very, very, very sympathetic.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
[Laughter.]
The CHAIRMAN. And the other thing is, I would ask Committee
staff to remove these photographs. Theyve been up, now, and I
want this to be unfettered exchange, as opposed to pictorial matters.
Please go ahead, Senator Nelson.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and to my colleagues, for your indulgence.
As scheduling would have it, the Aging Committee is meeting,
right now, of which Im chairing. Senator Collins is taking the
gavel while Im gone, and I must return. But, I did want to thank
you for your consideration that I could makeChairman, could
make a statement. And I look forward to reviewing the legislation
that you have filed.
All of us here have a responsibility to ensure that cruise passengers are safe, that ships are well maintained, in top condition,
and the crew members onboard these ships are well trained and
thoroughly prepared to handle any situation that might arise at
sea. So, we, obviously, all of us, have a keen interest in this, naturally.
The cruise industry is of concern to us, in my state. They have
a major presence in Florida. They employ over 130,000 people. In
my state, cruising accounted for $6.7 billion in total economic impact in Florida, and, last year, nearly 6 million cruise passengers
departed from ports in Florida. So, I can share with the members
of this committee that, in my meetings with the industry, I have
stressed that passenger and crew safety must be the industrys top
priority. The industry has responded to me that it is making a
good-faith effort in prioritizing and improving its safety programs
and that it is ready to work with this committee, and with you, Mr.
Chairman, and they hope to continue this improvement.
And I want to thank you again for your efforts, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank you, as the Chairman of our overall committee, on
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the work that you do to ensure the safety of the traveling public,
not just on the seas, but in all means of travel.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. And, youre right, its in all means of travel.
Senator NELSON. It is.
The CHAIRMAN. And thank you for coming here.
Senator NELSON. And Iwith your permission, I will return to
my chairing duties over at Aging.
The CHAIRMAN. Uh-huh.
Senator NELSON. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Dr. Ross Klein is Professor of the School of Social Work, which
resonates with me, at St. Johns College, Memorial University of
Newfoundland.
Please.
STATEMENT OF ROSS A. KLEIN, PH.D., PROFESSOR,
MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY OF NEWFOUNDLAND
IN ST. JOHNS, NEWFOUNDLAND, CANADA
Dr. KLEIN. OK, thank you. It is an honor to be asked to share

my knowledge and insights with the U.S. Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
In my brief oral remarks, I will identify some of the key points
in my written submission.
The cruise industry has received considerable attention in the
media in recent years. In 2013 alone, the media has reported for
cruise ships: three running aground; five with fires; two collisions;
19 mechanical problems, including power loss, propulsion problems,
and generator problems; 10 canceled port calls and/or changes in
itinerary; 16 cruises with delayed embarkation and/or debarkation;
two cruises where passengers have been bumped; and eight ships
that have failed U.S. health inspection.
In response to the negative publicity from these events and Senator Schumers call for greater consumer protection, the Cruise
Lines International Association, in late May, issued its Passenger
Bill of Rights, an obvious public relations initiative. A systematic
evaluation reveals that, while many of the promises, on their face,
are reassuring to cruise passengers, a deeper look indicates the
Passenger Bill of Rights is filled with empty promises.
Take, for example, number 5, the right to a ship crew that is
properly trained in emergency and evacuation procedures. There is
a huge chasm between being properly trained and those same crew
members demonstrating, through behavior, competence in executing emergency and evacuation procedures.
Take for example the U.S. Coast Guards investigation of the fire
and power loss of Carnival Splendor. It indicates a number of instances of human error.
Also take the cost of Concordia.
I doubt that crew members were not properly trained, but what
assurances does a CLIA Passenger Bill of Rights provide that
training will be reflected in behavior, and what recourse does a
passenger have when this, or any right, is not realized?
Also take for example right number 1, the right to disembark a
docked ship if essential provisions cannot be adequately provided.
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What cruise passenger would not be reassured by this? But, how
is this right fulfilled when a ship is dead in the water for 3 or 4
days, and being towed to port? And once the ship returns to port,
who decides how quickly the disembarkation will begin, and does
the passenger have any rights if it takes longer than they think is
fair? Coming up with a list of rights is easy. But, as they say, the
devil is in the details.
Perhaps more troubling are contradictions between CLIAs Passenger Bill of Rights and the typical cruise passenger contract.
Theres no indication which takes precedence, especially given the
restrictiveness of the passenger cruise contract with regard to
rights held by a cruise passenger, particularly in comparison to the
rights of the cruise line, and the extreme limitations on the cruise
lines liability for almost anything that happens on a cruise ship.
My written testimony systematically analyzes CLIAs Bill of
Rights and a typical cruise passenger contract. This analysis points
to the need for better consumer protection of cruise passengers,
much like the protections that are available to passengers on other
modes of commercial transportation, including air carriers.
My written testimony also provides systematic analysis of the
Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010. I look at the implications of differences between the Act, as initially introduced, and
the final Act that was passed. I also look at issues that are not adequately addressed by the current Act.
One major issue is the reporting of statistics on crime on cruise
ships. The original intent was that the Act would make available
all reported crimes on cruise ships. In practice, there are many
crimes that are neitherthat are either not being reported to the
FBI or which the FBI chooses not to make available to the American public. Take as just one example the fact that, for a 15-month
period, the FBI reports a single case of sexual assault on Norwegian Cruise Line, but, in the legal case, in discovery, they disclosed that there were 23 sexual assaults for that same time period.
Access to comprehensive, reliable data is essential if were going
to be able to do a proper social epidemiological analysis of the problems, especially as relates to crimes against children.
Now, another point worth mention is the nature of security on
a cruise ship. Presently, a crime committed on a cruise ship is initially investigated by security personnel who are cruise line employees. They are not independent, as would be the case for a crime
reported on land. The cruise line employee is clearly in a conflictof-interest position. This doesnt give much confidence to a victim
of a crime on a cruise ship.
I will stop my oral testimony here. I invite all interested to read
my written testimony for a deeper understanding of my insights
and resulting concerns. I certainly welcome the Committees questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Klein follows:]
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROSS A. KLEIN, PH.D., PROFESSOR, MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY
OF NEWFOUNDLAND IN ST. JOHNS, NEWFOUNDLAND, CANADA
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Oral Testimony
Written Testimony
I. Safety and Security of Cruise Ships
The Nature of the Problem
Lessons to be Learned from These Events
The Relative Absence of Reliable Data
Frequency and Types of Events
Discernable Insights from Data
Learning from Success, Not Just Accidents
Regulation and Oversight of the Cruise Industry
II. Safety and Security of Cruise Passengers
Scope of the Problem
The Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010
From Hearings to Legislation
Persons Overboard
Sexual Assaults
Prevention
Intervention
Investigation
Prosecution
Other Crimes
III. Consumer Rights and Cruise Ship Liability
CLIA Bill of Rights
The Right to Disembark a Docked Ship
The Right to a Full Refund
The Right to Medical Care
The Right to Timely Information
The Right to Trained Crew
The Right to an Emergency Power Source
The Right to Transportation
The Right to Lodging
The Right to a Toll-Free Number
The Right to Have Published
CLIA Passenger Bill of Rights and the Cruise Contract
What the CLIA Passenger Bill of Rights Does Not Include
Passenger Rights
Cruise Line Rights
Issues of Liability
Illness Outbreaks
Independent Contractors
Medical Care
Shore excursions
Sexual Assaults
Limit of Liability
IV. In Closing
V. Summary of Recommendations
Appendix 1: Summary of Cruise Ship Incidents, January 2009June 2013
Appendix 2: Ships with Two or More Mechanical Incidents, January 2009June
2013
Appendix 3: Summary of Persons Overboard, January 1995June 2013
Appendix 4: Drug Busts, January 2009June 2013
Appendix 5: Sex at Sea: Sexual Crimes Aboard Cruise Ships
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ORAL TESTIMONY
It is an honor to be asked to share my knowledge and insights with the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. In my brief oral remarks
I will identify some of the key points in my written submission.
The cruise industry has received considerable attention in the media in recent
years. In 2013 alone the media reports for cruise ships: 3 running aground; 5 fires;
2 collisions; 19 mechanical problems including power loss, propulsion problems, and
generator problems; 10 canceled port calls and/or changes in itinerary; 16 cruises
with delayed embarkation and/or disembarkation; 2 cruises where passengers were
bumped; and 8 ships that have failed U.S. health inspections.
In response to the negative publicity from these events, and Senator Schumers
call for greater consumer protection, the Cruise Lines International Association
(CLIA) in late-May issued its Passenger Bill of Rightsan obvious public relations
initiative. Sadly, a systematic evaluation reveals that while many of the promises
on their face are reassuring to cruise passengers, a deeper look indicates the Passenger Bill of Rights is filled with empty promises. Take for example Right #5The
right to a ship crew that is properly trained in emergency and evacuation procedures. There is a huge chasm between being properly trained and those same crewmembers demonstrating through behavior competence in executing emergency and
evacuation procedures. Take for example the U.S. Coast Guards investigation of the
fire and power loss of Carnival Splendor in 2010. It indicates human error in a fire
alarm being reset, leading to a 15-minute delay in activation of an automatic firesuppression system; the crews lack of familiarity with the engine room, which hampered their ability to locate and fight the fire; and the captain ventilating the compartment where the fire began before it was fully extinguished, allowing the flames
to flare again. I doubt the crewmembers were not properly trained, but what assurance does CLIAs Passenger Bill of Rights provide that training will be reflected in
action. And what recourse does a passenger have when this or any Right is not realized?
Also take for example Right #1The right to disembark a docked ship if essential
provisions cannot adequately be provided onboard. What cruise passenger would not
be reassured by this, but how is this Right fulfilled when a ship is dead in the water
for 3 or 4 days and being towed to port? And once the ship returns to port, who
decides how quickly disembarkation will begin? Does a passenger have any right to
contest a decision to keep them onboard?
Coming up with a list of mom-and-apple-pie rights is easy. But as they say, the
devil is in the details.
Perhaps more troubling are contradictions between CLIAs Passenger Bill of
Rights and the typical cruise passenger contract. There is no indication which takes
precedence, especially given the restrictiveness of the passenger cruise contract with
regard to rights held by a cruise passenger (particularly in comparison to the rights
of the cruise line) and the extreme limitations on the cruise lines liability for almost
anything that happens on a cruise ship. My written testimony systematically analyses CLIAs Bill of Rights and typical passenger cruise contracts. This analysis
points to the need for better consumer protection of cruise passengers, much like
the protections available to passengers on other modes of commercial transportation, including air carriers.
My written testimony also provides systematic analysis of the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010. I look at the implications of differences between the
Act as initially introduced and the final Act passed. I also look at issues that are
not adequately addressed by the current Act. One major issue is the reporting of
statistics of crime on cruise ships. The original intent was that the Act would make
available all reported crimes on cruise ships. In practice, there are many crimes that
are either not being reported to the FBI or which the FBI chooses not to make available to the American public. Take as just one example the fact that for one 15month period the FBI reports a single case of sexual assault on Norwegian Cruise
Line; however records disclosed in discovery indicate the number was actually 23.
Access to reliable data is important for passengers who have a right to know the
relative risk, including between one cruise line and another and ideally between one
cruise ship and another. Through a Freedom of Information request by International
Cruise Victims Association I was given 12-months of data to analyze. The analysis
was illuminating. It revealed where sexual assaults occur, the identity of perpetrators and victims, and the conditions surrounding an attack (including the presence
of alcohol and the high rate of victimization of children). Availability of such data
is important for passengers, and access to data is essential for a proper social epidemiological analysis of the problem.
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I will stop my oral testimony here. I invite all interested to read my written testimony for a deeper understanding of my insights and resulting concerns. I welcome
the Committees questions.
WRITTEN TESTIMONY
It is an extreme honor to be asked to share my knowledge and insights with the
U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. My testimony
focuses on the parameters I was given when I was invited to testify:
safety and security issues relating to cruise ships (e.g., fires, collisions, and
other accidents);
safety and security of cruise ship passengers, including discussion of the Cruise
Vessel Security and Safety act of 2010;
consumer rights and issues relating to cruise ship liability, including discussion
of CLIAs Passenger Bill of Rights.
I. Safety and Security of Cruise Ships
As the luxury liner finally made it to shore . . . [passengers] expressed disgust
at the way they had been treated . . . Conditions inside the cabins were said to
have been beyond horrific due to the lack of air conditioning and running water.
Lavatories overflowed and they were fed on little but spam sandwiches. They were
forced to sleep on deck in sweltering temperatures of up to 35C (95F) and said that
the stench in the corridors and cabins was so bad it would remain with them for
a long time . . . Sheer luck has disguised the incompetence from start to finish.
Some people are blissfully unaware of how lucky they are.
The alarm was first raised at around 1.30 p.m. on Monday when an electrical
fault caused a fire in the engine room and power was lost . . . All passengers were
told to go to their muster stations, at which point many said they feared they would
have to abandon ship . . . It then took three hours to conduct a roll call amid chaotic scenes and growing panic. As black smoke billowed from one of the chimneys,
it became immediately clear that a fire had broken out on board.
American Gordon Bradwell, 72, from Georgia, who used to work in the travel industry, was on the cruise ship with his wife Eleanor when the engine caught fire.
It was very tense, he said. We are just happy to have got through it. We were
very hot and the sewage was very poor. Right now were delighted to be off the ship.
We are living off adrenalin right now. We have been eating dried sandwiches for
three days so we are looking forward to eating a proper meal. After the fire broke
out there was nothing to propel the ship along. Things deteriorated rather quickly.
There was no running water so we had go back to living a primitive existence. The
cabin temperature reached 110F so we had to sleep on the deck. 1
One might think this describes the ordeal on Carnival Triumph in February 2013,
but it is about an almost identical incident occurring a year earlier in February
2012. The Costa Allegra experienced an engine fire, causing a loss of all power and
setting it adrift for three days in the Indian Ocean. It was finally towed to Port Victoria on the island of Mahe in the Seychelles where passengers disembarked. The
ship was decommissioned and scrapped after the incident.
A. The Nature of the Problem
The cruise industry would like us to believe incidents such as the one described
above, and the eerily similar incident involving Carnival Triumph which had an engine fire knocking out all power and setting the ship adrift for five days 2finally
arriving in Mobile under toware uncommon. The question isnt whether they are
uncommon, but how common they are. Take for example the following engine fires,
all involving members of the Cruise Lines International Association:3
June 2009Royal Princess had an engine room fire while leaving Port Said,
Egypt. The ship returned to the port the next day and after evaluation of damage the cruise was terminated.
November 2010Carnival Splendor has engine room fire setting it adrift; the
ship was finally towed to San Diego (150 miles north) even though it was 55
miles west of Punta San Jacinto, Mexico. It was a five day ordeal for pas1 Ward,
V. 2012. Costa Allegra: Passengers Tell of Hell On-board. The Telegraph (March
1).
2 See
Brown, R., K. Severson, and B. Meier. 2013. Cruise Lines Woes are Far From Over
as Ship Makes Port, New York Times, (February 15).
3 All of these events are reported at Events at Sea (www.cruisejunkie.com/events.html)
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sengers. Initially there was no electricity and toilets did not work, but toilets
were restored by the end of the first day although there was no air conditioning
and no hot food service. The ships engine that failed had had five alarms between July 21, 2010 and November 5, 2010, most recently repaired on November 5, 2010; the fire occurred on November 8, 2010.4
September 2011Hurtigrutens Nordyls suffered an engine room fire, killing
two crew members and injuring 16. The ship was evacuated by lifeboat and the
cruise was terminated. The Washington Post reported salvage teams pumped
water from the cruise liner in danger of capsizing, reducing the tilt 21.7 degrees
in the morning to 16 degrees in the evening.
October 2011Cunard Lines Queen Mary 2 suffered an engine fire causing a
loss of power while in a major storm (two other ships chose to turn back from
the storm, but the Queen Mary decided to battle through). Staff members were
given a 90 minute warning in order to prepare to deploy the lifeboats. Guests
had their children dropped off and their animals picked up from the kennels.
Power was restored, but people were understandably shaken up. Three weeks
later the ship twice went dead in the water on a transAtalantic cruise. And
again in February 2012 the ship had a total power failure and was dead in the
water.
March 2012Azamara Quest had an engine room fire, injuring five crew members (one critically), setting the ship adrift between Manila and Borneo. The
ship was able to restore power and some propulsion after 24 hours and limped
to Sandakan, Malaysia, arriving three days after the fire. The cruise was terminated and passengers flown home.
April 2012Adventure of the Seas had an engine room fire causing section 6
of the ship to be temporarily evacuated. The ship was adrift for 12 hours and
then continued on one engine.
November 2012Adventure of the Seas had an engine room fire while crossing
the Atlantic causing a brief loss of power and electricity.
February 2013Carnival Triumph suffers an engine room fire, setting it adrift
for five days without power, air conditioning, or toilets. Initial plans were to tow
the ship to the closest port, Progresso, Mexico, however a decision was subsequently made to tow the ship to Mobile. NOTE: The ship was reported to have
technical problems with its propulsion system affecting its cruising speed and
causing a six hour delay in its return to port two weeks before;
June 2013Pullmanturs Zenith had a disabling engine fire and had to be
towed to port (Venice, Italy)
There are also ships running aground (19 since 2009) with some incidents leading
to termination of the cruise. Some examples include:
January 2009Hurtigrutens Richard With ran aground at the port of Trondheim on the west coast of Norway suffering propeller damage and taking on
water through a leak in a seal. All 153 passengers were evacuated by the local
emergency services from land.
February 2009Quark Expeditions Ocean Nova ran aground off Antarctica.
Passengers were evacuated to other ships. Unofficial sources report the ships
engines were turned off for maintenance when the ship was blown aground.
August 2010Clipper Adventurer ran aground in Canadas Northwest Passage.
Passengers wer transported to Coppermine, Nunavut to be transported home.
October 2010Celebrity Cruises Century damaged its rudder at Villefranchesur-Mer. Cruise terminated.
March 2013Hurtigrutens Kong Harald was forced to wait for the tide to come
in and lift the ship off the underground rock at the entrance to Trollfjord where
it was grounded and the hull breached. Once the incoming tide freed the ship
it carried on to Svolvaer, where all 258 passengers onboard disembarked and
were flown home today.
March 2013Coastal and Maritime Voyages Marco Polo ran aground just outside Sortland in Vesteralen causing a leak in a ballast tank.
March 2013Lindblad Expeditions National Geographic Sea Lion hit a rock in
the Las Perlas Islands, about 70 nautical miles from Panama City. The ship
4 See United States Coast Guard. 2013. Report of Investigation into the Fire Onboard the Carnival Splendor which Occurred in the Pacific Ocean Off the Coast of Mexico on November 8,
2010, which Resulted in Complete Loss of Power, MISLE Incident Investigation Activity Number: 3897765 (July 15).
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sustained damage to its hull and one propeller during the incident, but after
clearance from the U.S. Coast Guard returned to Panama City on its own
power. The cruise was terminated.
It isnt just engine fires and ships running aground. There are other problems
worth note:
March 2009P&O Cruises Aurora experienced propulsion problems four hours
after leaving Sydney. It limped to Auckland where passengers remained onboard for five days while repairs were completed. The world cruise itinerary was
changed.
April 2009Passengers were told upon embarkation on Seven Seas Voyager
that most port calls between Dubai and Rome were canceled because of propulsion problems; the next two cruises canceled.
November 2009Norwegian Dawn lost power for hours (and no air conditioning). Power was restored and the ship sailed to San Juan from where passengers were flown home. This and the next cruise were canceled.
February 2010Costa Europa collided with pier in Sharm-el-Sheikh, ripping a
hole in the side of the ship and flooding crew cabins. Three crewmembers were
killed; four passengers were injured. The 18-day cruise from Dubai to Savona
was terminated and passengers flown home.
February 2010P&O Australias Pacific Dawn was delayed in port for 18 hours
because of propulsion and maintenance problems; its itinerary is changed. Two
months later the ship lost power and propulsion and narrowly missed collision
with a bridge in Brisbane.
May 2010P&O Cruises Artemis notified passengers upon boarding that engine problems require one port to be dropped from the itinerary. But once underway on the 20 day cruise, originally with ten scheduled port calls, passengers were issued a revised itinerary with four ports calls, only three of which
were on the original itinerary.
June 2010Celebrity Cruises Infinity was delayed five or six hours because of
engine problems causing a port call to be canceled. Five days later an electrical
fire caused a power loss for several hours.
February 2011P&O Australias Pacific Sun delayed 24 hours in its arrival at
Newcastle because of engine problems; several port calls canceled. Propulsion
problems in November 2010 caused a 10-hour delayed arrival in Melbourne, engine problems cause a cruise to be canceled in April 2010, mechanical problems
caused two ports calls to be canceled, and in November 2009 a cruise was canceled to permit repair of the propulsion system.
March 2011MSCs Opera twice collided with pier at Buenos Aires damaging
several cabins and delaying departure for 10 hours while repairs completed.
September 2011Toilets in front and mid-ship cabins were inoperable for a day
on Carnival Imagination. Passengers were told to use public washrooms in the
aft section.
May 2011MSCs Opera had failure of an electric panel causing power loss for
8.5 hours. The ship was towed to port and the cruise canceled.
November 2011Carnival Splendor collided with pier in Puerto Vallarta, requiring it to stay an extra day to complete repairs; the next port call was canceled.
January 2012Costa Concordia hits a rock off the Italian coast and capsizes
killing 32 people.
February 2012Enchantment of the Seas left Baltimore 24 hours late after unsuccessful attempts to repair an engine. The ship started the cruise on one engine, sailing at half speed, and the itinerary changed. Two weeks later the
cruise had propulsion problems that left it in Port Canaveral for 27 hours for
repairs, again requiring a change to the itinerary.
March 2012Silversea Cruises Silver Shadow collided with container ship in
Viet Nam holing the cargo ship; only minor damage to the cruise ship. Passengers were frightened.
October 2012Celebrity Cruises Summit had a tender run aground with 93
passengers and 2 crew members. The tender suffered major damage and passengers were rescued by a fishing boat and whale-watching boat.
November 2012Saga Ruby had engine problems that required the current
cruise to be canceled.
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March 2013A malfunction of the backup emergency power diesel generator
caused power outages and plumbing issues on Carnival Dream and led to a
cruise being terminated in Saint Maarten and passengers flown home.
March 2013Steering problems required Carnival Elation to have a tugboat escort to port.
March 2013Carnival Legend was disabled and stuck in Costa Maya for a day.
It finally got underway at reduced speed and dropped a port call to arrive on
time at its port of disembarkation. The itinerary of the subsequent cruise was
changed because of propulsion problems.
March 2013Seven Seas Voyager suffered propulsion problems causing ports to
be skipped.
April 2013Crown Princess began a cruise with 410 cabins having toilets that
would not flush. Until they were fixed, passengers needed to go to public bathrooms (even during the middle of the night).
The list can go on. Appendix 2 lists cruise ships having two or more incidents between January 2009 and June 2013. It shows 353 incidents involving mechanical
problems and accidents, approximately 80 incidents per year.
The obvious question is how such events can be so common. A February 2013 in
Newsweek gives the perspective of Jim Hall, head of the National Transportation
Safety Board during the Clinton administration:
[He] says the industry is watched over by paper tigers like the International
Maritime Organization and suffers from bad actors . . . The maritime industry is the oldest transportation industry around. Were talking centuries. Its a
culture that has never been broken as the aviation industry was, and you see
evidence of that culture in the [Costa Concordia] accident, says Hall.
Ships may seem and feel American but are mostly flagged in countries like
the Bahamas or Panama in order to operate outside of what he says are reasonable safety standards. It is, and has been, an outlaw industry, says Hall. People who book cruises should be aware of that. 5
B. Lessons to be Learned from These Events
My point is not to muckrake, listing all that goes wrong with cruise ships. My
analysis instead provides insights. By knowing the problems, we can identify potential solutions. The available data raises several issues.
1. The Relative Absence of Reliable Data
No one is systematically collecting data of collisions, fires, evacuations,
groundings, sinkings, says Jim Walker, a maritime lawyer, to the New York Times.
The article goes on to say:
The reason for the lack of data is that cruise lines, while based in the United
States, typically incorporate and register their ships overseas. Industry experts
say the only place cruise lines are obligated to report anything is to the state
under whose laws the ship operates. 6
As the article points out, there remains no comprehensive public database of
events at sea like fires, power failures, and evacuations except the data available
at my website, Cruise Junkie dot Com.
While I take this acknowledgement as a compliment, it identifies a major gap in
available information. My data is based on reports available in the public media
and, on occasion, reports from passengers and/or crewmembers. There are many incidents occurring that never reach the public domain. Consequently, there is no way
for passengers to know the track record of an individual cruise line or the ships
comprising the line.
The data I have benefits greatly from the efforts of Senator Rockefeller who made
public a list of casualty investigations by the U.S. Coast Guard for 20082012 and
the Sun-Sentinel, which posted online U.S. Coast Guard data received through a
Freedom of Information request. While the two datasets have considerable overlap,
there are incidents on one list not appearing on the other, and incidents in my
dataset that appear on neither.
Making data available is more important than simply making passengers aware.
It allows a sort of social epidemiology of cruise ship incidents from which patterns
can be discerned and potential solutions formulated. Rather than seeing each major
5 Conant, E. 2013. Carnival from Hell: The Warning Signs Before the Triumph Disaster,
Newsweek (February 22).
6 Rosenbloom, S. 2013. How normal are cruise mishaps, New York Times (May 8, 2013).
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incident as unique and unrelated to anything before it, a comprehensive data set
permits early identification of trends or common problems. Unlike the airline industry, which is governed by the FAA, there is no similar authority when it comes to
the cruise industry.
Recommendation #1: There is need for systematic reporting of all cruise ship incidents to an independent, central authority charged with responsibility for data
analysis and policy and operational recommendations.
2. Frequency and Types of Events
There is a range of incidents occurring on cruise ships. Between January 2009
and June 2013 there were more than 350 incidents involving mechanical problems
or accidents (see Appendix 1). The most frequent incidents were:
propulsion and engine problems (average 19.59 per year)7 in which cruise
ships were known to go adrift;
fires (average 13.56 per year)6 known to require evacuation and 4 with loss
of power;
material failure and lifeboat failure (average 13.33 per year); and
collisions (average 11.56 per year).
These four categories account for 261 incidentsall combined yielding an average
58 incidents per year. As seen in Appendix 1, less frequent incidents include loss
of power (n=21), running aground (n=19), maneuverability and steering problems
(n=15), experiencing a severe list (n=11), and technical (n=8) and electrical (n=8)
problems. It needs to be remembered that these accounts rely on public reports, so
the list is largely incomplete and underrepresents the actual frequency. For example, as relates to fires, a ship officer recently wrote to me saying:
Every ship, almost weekly, has some type of fire incident. This could be something as simple as a cigarette butt in a trash can or a fire in the silo of the
incinerator, or a grease fire, toaster fire, electrical cord fire in the galley. These
are never reported because they are put out quickly, within minutes. However,
there are fires happening on ships every single week. (Private correspondence)
In part related to these incidents, and in part related to weather-related factors
(not including tropical storms and hurricanes), there were 104 cruises (average 23
per year) with media-reported canceled port calls, 69 cruises with media-reported
itinerary changes, 25 cruises with media-reported canceled cruises, and 73 cruises
with media-reported delays in embarkation/debarkation. In sum, there are 271 incidents resulting in a cruise itinerary provided passengers when he or she booked the
cruise being different than the itinerary delivered. The number is undoubtedly considerably higher given that there is no centralized collection of data on the degree
to which cruise ships approximate their published itinerary, and my data does not
include cruise itinerary changes caused by hurricanes or tropical storms.
Recommendation #2: Similar to data maintained on airlines documenting on
time performance, there should be a mechanism whereby cruise ships and cruise
lines have reported their adherence to itineraries and on time performance.
3. Discernable Insights from Data
Based on cursory analysis of the limited data availableapproximately 1,500 incidents in four-and-a-half years (an average 333 per year)there are two insights
that stand out. First is that Carnival Cruise Lines is disproportionately represented.
Appendix 2 shows ships with two or more mechanical incidents from January 2009
through June 2013. Not only does Carnival Cruise Lines have a higher proportion
of its fleet included on the list (19 of 23 (82.6 percent) versus 10 of 16 (62.5 percent)
for Princess Cruises, 10 of 21 (47.6 percent) for Royal Caribbean International, and
4 of 11 (36.3 percent) for Celebrity Cruises), but it has a higher average rate of incidents per ship listed (3.89 for Carnival Cruise Lines versus 3.40 for Princess
Cruises, 3.25 for Celebrity Cruises, and 3.20 for Royal Caribbean International). An
obvious question is why the rate of incidents for Carnival Cruise Lines would be
20 percent higher than for Royal Caribbean International; 30 percent higher than
for Holland America Line and P&O Cruises, both of which are also owned by Carnival Corporation.
One factor may be the number and training of staff, but this is based on conjecture. An inside source in Royal Caribbean Cruises Limited wrote to me after the
Carnival Triumph fire saying:
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Ive worked at RCCL for many years. Over the last 10 years they have been
steadily decreasing the number of marine employees. These are the employees
that navigate and maintain the engines and the main employees dealing with
life saving. If there is a fireits the marine team suiting up and fighting the
fires. If the ship is listing or sinkingits the marine team dealing with technical systems such as water tight doors, moving tank contents from one area
to another, making contact with rescue services, lowering life boats, etc.
The reason for the decrease in marine manning? Its purely driven by concern
for profit. You can get rid of two marine employees who do not generate any
income (they just play a major role in saving lives if something goes wrong) and
replace them with a hotel employee such as a marketing and revenue manager
or a matre d for income-generating specialty restaurants, or bar supervisors.
Many times employees are cut in the marine department or doubled up in cabins so the company can revamp the crew cabins into sellable cruise guest cabins.
Approximately 5 years ago RCCL got rid of the safety officer position and combined the job with the chief officer position. There is now talk about changing
the marine contracts for 3 stripe officers from 10 weeks/10 weeks off to 4
months on/2 months off so they match the hotel officer positions. The degree
of technical knowledge needed, and the tremendous life saving responsibility
marine officers have, is in no way equal to the demands placed on hotel officers
to sell another drink. When the ship is sinkingdo you want a marine officer
that knows the technical systems or do you want a hotel officer selling you another beer as you are stepping into a lifeboat? (Personal correspondence)
While these comments are specific to one corporation, it raises to the forefront the
degree to which this pattern is common to other cruise lines. Anecdotal accounts indicate changes of the same nature are taking place within Carnival Cruise Lines.
This leads to a question requiring empirical research using reliable data. The problem is that such data is not available, largely because systematic independent oversight of the cruise industry is lacking. It is in stark contrast to the airline industry
where oversight and reporting is the norm.
Recommendation #3: There is need for greater oversight and monitoring of the
cruise industry in order to monitor changing trends and to determine whether these
changes are related to changes in safety and/or casualties.
A second insight from the data is a preliminary conclusion also based in part on
anecdotal information. It appears there is a pattern of incidents involving ships
built on the Destiny platform (Destiny-class and Dream-class ships): my understanding is that Carnival Destiny, Carnival Triumph, Carnival Splendor, Carnival
Glory, Carnival Breeze, Carnival Dream, Carnival Liberty, and Carnival Magic have
all reported electrical and/or propulsion issues, power losses, and some electrical
fires over the last three years or so (not all of these have been reported in the media
and are thus not included in my dataset); Costa Concordia, Costa Magica, Costa
Serena and Costa Pacifica have also reported similar problems during this timespanall of these ships are Destiny platform design ships.
The relevant difference between Destiny platform and the Spirit/Vista 1/Vista 2/
Signature classes is simple. Destiny platform ships have only been built at
Fincantieri shipyards in Italy from a design by Fincantieri. Spirit & Vista 1 class
ships originated in Kvaener Masa shipyards and were then adapted/enlarged by
Fincantieri. The original blueprints had more than enough redundancy to allow for
growth and design tweaks. There is limited redundancy built into the Destiny platform ships, which may be why they suffer from systemic failures.
This is illustrated in the report of the Carnival Splendor fire, leading to the ship
losing all power and going dead in the water. The report observes that vessel engineers were unable to restart the unaffected main generators due to extensive damage to cables in the aft engine room. 7 It goes on to state, there is susceptibility
of the Carnival Splendor and all Dream class vessels to a complete loss of power
resulting from damage to a single area of electrical system components in either the
forward or aft engine room. Presumably, with appropriate redundancy the main
generators would have been functional.
The report also observes design flaws that cut across Dream class (and presumably Destiny platform vessels). These include air cooler drainage problems, noted as
7 United States Coast Guard. 2013. Report of Investigation into the Fire Onboard the Carnival
Splendor which Occurred in the Pacific Ocean Off the Coast of Mexico on November 8, 2010,
which Resulted in Complete Loss of Power, MISLE Incident Investigation Activity Number:
3897765 (July 15).
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far back as October 2009 and documented problems with the CO2 system. That
these problems were identified as early as 2009, and may have been factors in the
catastrophic nature of both the Carnival Splendor and Carnival Triumph fires lends
convincing support for increased independent oversight of the cruise industry.
Carnival Cruise Lines appears to address the shortcoming of redundancy through
its announcement April 17, 2013, of a $300 million program to enhance operating
reliability, an initiative spurred by the Carnival Triumph fire in February 2013. As
stated in the companys press release, the initiative will add an additional emergency generator on each vessel and install a second permanent back-up power system. There will also be increased fire prevention, detection and suppression systems.
As well, there will be modifications to decrease the likelihood of losing propulsion
or primary power.
The modifications will include a reconfiguration of certain engine-related electrical components. On ships where these enhancements will be made, the design
of specialized components will require longer lead times for completion.8
While the company deserves recognition of the steps being taken, an obvious question is how many of these enhancements involve adding components that were not
originally included in the ships design, but are normally included in the design of
ships operated by other cruise lines and/or built and designed by other ship yards.
An independent audit is the only reliable means for determining the situation.
More serious is that the company did not appear to maximize learning from the
Carnival Splendor fire in 2010. First, a report about the incident was not issued
until three years later, perhaps because responsibility rested with Panamanian authorities; this even though Carnival Cruise Lines had employed a number of experts
to provide them with analysis of causes of the fire. However, a preliminary U.S.
Coast Guard investigation revealed several holes in the ships fire fighting methodology, not to mention significant errors in its firefighting operations manual.
According to a marine advisory issue by the Coast Guard, the Splendors firefighting instruction manual was riddled with problems, including references to
pulling valves that actually needed to be turned to operate, incorrect descriptions of system locations, inaccurate graphics and schematics and confusing instructions such as: Once the fire has been extinguished, make sure that the
temperature has decreased before investigate the area same time is needed to
wait hours. 9
Recommendation #4: Ships operating from U.S. ports should be obligatorily subject to accident investigations by the National Transportation Safety Board as a condition of using U.S. ports, and should be subject to the same fines and other administrative actions the NTSB is empowered to take with other modes of commercial
transportation.
4. Learning from Success, Not Just Accidents
So far I have looked at what might be learned from accidents and things that go
wrong on cruise ships. There is another way to look at the data; concentrate on
those cruise ships and cruise lines that appear to be under-represented when it
comes to incidents. For example, among the mass market cruise lines Norwegian
Cruise Line and MSC Cruises appear to have much lower incidence of fires,
groundings, engine failures and accidents than others in this class. It would be interesting to know what those cruise lines are doing differently than Carnival Cruise
Lines and Royal Caribbean International. The problem is that cruise lines under
Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA) tend to not effectively differentiate
themselves with regard to such things, and the consuming public lacks reliable data
on which to compare cruise lines. As an authority on the cruise industry I am often
asked what cruise line or cruise ship is the safest. I can give an anecdotal response,
but without adequate data it is difficult to give a fully informed response.
There are similar contrasts among cruise lines in the premium and ultra-luxury
segments, however they arent as stark as among the mass market cruise lines. It
appears that Oceania Cruises has a better record than Celebrity Cruises and both
have a better record than Holland America Line; all have a better record than Princess Cruises. Similarly, Seabourn Cruises appears to have fewer incidents than
8 See Carnival Cruise Lines announces fleetwide $300 million program to enhance operating
reliability and guest comfort. April 17, 2013. Online at: http://carnival-news.com/2013/04/17/
carnival-cruise-lines-announces-fleetwide-300-million-program-to-enhance-operating-reliabilityand-guest-comfort/
9 Wolfe, K.A. 2013. Horrific Carnival cruise gets D.C.s attention, Politico (February 27).
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Silverseas Cruises and both less than Regent Seven Seas Cruises. Seadream Yacht
Club has a lower incidence rate than any of the ships in the ultra-luxury category.
Again, it appears that some companies are doing a far-better job than others. Research on what they are doing, whether in staffing and training or in ship design
and maintenance, is worth attention. This would naturally be something undertaken by an industry-based body, but this is unlikely to happen given the dominance in CLIA of under-achievers. As well, such research must be done by a whollyindependent researcher.
Recommendation #5: There needs to be funded research, ideally provided by the
cruise industry to a wholly independent body, to learn from those cruise lines that
appear to be effective in reducing incidents and accidents.
5. Regulation and Oversight of the Cruise Industry
Unlike the airline industry, the cruise industry is largely self-regulated. As foreign-registered vessels operated by foreign-located corporations, cruise ships are not
subject to many regulations and laws in the U.S. However, cruise ships operating
from U.S. ports are subject to regular safety inspections by the U.S. Coast Guard
and they voluntarily participate in the Vessel Sanitation Program of the Centers for
Disease Control (CDC) and report illness outbreaks affected 3 percent or more of
passengers and/or 2 percent or more of crew members on ships operating from a
U.S. port (ships operating from foreign ports, but sailing with a majority or U.S.
passengers do not have to file illness reports with the CDC). While reports of CDC
activities are available online, reports of U.S. Coast Guard inspections are not.
I received from a San Francisco-based NBC-affiliate a set of inspections (Annual
Control Verification Exam) done by the U.S. Coast Guard in San Francisco from
2002 to 2012; they had been acquired through a Freedom of Information request.
These reports spanning 82 pages were illuminating. It was interesting to see the
types of deficiencies identified by inspectors (e.g., fuel leaks, water leaks from fire
pumps, many lifeboat problems, missing or faulty equipment, faulty fire extinguishers, improper record keeping of required information, exposed live electric
wires, faulty doors, mixing of segregated garbage streams (including hazardous
waste), fire risks, security deficiencies, and more) and the length of time permitted
for correction of some of the deficiencies. Given these are annual inspections, it is
difficult to know how long deficiencies were overlooked or ignored. Of greater concern is that these inspections are not entirely unannounced, so officers and crew
often prepare for them and the most obvious problems are corrected in advance.
In extreme cases, a matter identified in the Annual Control Verification Exam
was referred to the vessels Classification Society (e.g., Lloyds Register, Bureau
Veritas, Registro Italiano Navale, Det Norske Veritas), which certifies the ships
safety and seaworthiness. While these societies appear to be independent, they earn
their income from cruise lines and may be conflicted when taking action that can
cost the cruise line money or cause a ship to be taken out of service. For example,
there is a fair number of cases where ships have been judged to have insufficient
lifeboat space for the number of passengers. In some, the Classification Society has
instructed the cruise line to book fewer passengers on the ship until the lifeboat(s)
has/have been repaired. In others, the Classification Society has permitted the
cruise ship to accommodate passengers on inflatable rafts rather than lifeboats. It
is unclear whether this is a reasonable solution if there were need for emergency
evacuation, especially if like the Costa Concordia half of the lifeboats cannot be deployed.
There is also need for the U.S. Coast Guard to oversee and review the work of
classification societies. For example, the report of the Carnival Splendor fire indicates:
The firefighting manual available to officers onboard the Carnival Splendor referred to a CO2 system but not the one that was installed onboard the vessel.
Related system photographs, images, schematics and diagrams were also found
to be inaccurate.
A review of CO2 system documents revealed a RINA approved test memoranda
dated October 20, 2006, which established the following procedure for testing
the CO2 system: (1) select the zone or line, (2) observe the shutdowns of ventilation systems, machinery and other warning alarms and then (3) move to the
gas-release procedure, which included cylinder selection for the particular zone
and verification of pressurization of the manifold, etc. Another document that
appears to be part of a RINA approval letter dated December 28, 2008, describes the operational procedure in exact reverse order.
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In this instance, ships crew opened the cylinder valves first. As a result, the
pressure differential across the zone valve prevented opening of the ball valve.
This reminds me of publicly-reported findings in 2001 and 2004 respectively, both
involving a ship approved by their Classification Society. The first involves Holland
America Lines Zaandam. In May 2001 a crew member noticed a sprinkler head
missing from a passenger cabin and upon investigation found that a branch of the
sprinkler system did not connect to the main water supply. The problem was corrected.10
In the second, the British Marine and Coastguard Agency ordered Cunard Lines
Queen Mary 2 in June 2004 to fit extra sprinklers in the ships 1,300 passenger cabins. A BBC investigation revealed material used in the ships bathroom units did
not meet international fire safety regulations. A short-term remedy was fitting all
cabins with an extra smoke detector, but the ship must also add extra sprinklers
in bathrooms. The ship is estimated to contain 140,000 pounds (63,503 kilograms)
of the material causing concern.11
Recommendation #6: Ships should have thorough and exhaustive safety inspections by the U.S. Coast Guard without advance warning. Full reports (including all
details) of cruise ship inspections by the U.S. Coast Guard should be available online.
The importance of an unannounced, surprise inspection is demonstrated by a recent health inspection of Silversea Cruises Silver Shadow. The ship had never had
an inspection score of 99 in May 2012 and 95 in September 2012, however following
complaints to the CDC from crewmembers a surprise inspection was done June 17,
2013, and the ship received a failing score of 84. Crewmembers had alleged that
they were forced to store raw meat, salami, fish, cakes, and every kind of culinary
preparations in their cabins and remote hallways to avoid inspections by the U.S.
Public Health (USPH), and that some spoilable food items were kept out of the refrigerator in cabins and hallways but were served the following day to the cruise
passengers. Other complaints included the alleged use of out-of-date ingredients
which were served to the guests. Again, the importance of inspections being done
unannounced and without advance notice cannot be stressed enough.
II. Safety and Security of Cruise Passengers
Previous committee hearings have dealt with safety and security of cruise passengers.12 I wont duplicate that information here, except to summarize some important points.
A. Scope of the Problem
It is worth noting that the only comprehensive dataset for crime on cruise ships
is based on data provided by the FBI in response to a Freedom of Information request by the International Cruise Victims Association. Between October 1, 2007 and
September 30, 2008, the data reveals there were 115 simple assaults, 16 assaults
with serious bodily injury, 89 thefts less then $10,000, 12 thefts more than $10,000,
154 sex related incidents, 7 people overboard, and 3 drug arrests. A comprehensive
analysis of the data on sexual assaults on cruise ships is reported in Sex at Sea:
Sexual Crimes Aboard Cruise Ships, published in 2011 in the Journal of Tourism
in Marine Environments (see Appendix 4).
Two areas are worth further mention here because the data is not reported elsewhere. First, is persons overboard. Since 1995, there have been 201 reports of persons gone overboard from passenger ships.13 As shown in Appendix 3, 73.8 percent
were male, 26.2 percent female. On average, males are a shade younger than females (38.85 percent vs 42.11 percent). The majority go overboard from cruise ships:
91.4 percent from a cruise ship, 8.6 percent from a ferry. While data is limited, we
know that the person overboard was rescued alive in 16.7 percent of cases, 11 percent cases were a confirmed suicide, and all indications are that 3.3 percent of cases
involve murder. Alcohol was a factor in at least 6.2 percent of cases, a fight with
a significant other in 7.1 percent of cases, 2.4 percent followed a significant loss in
10 Seatrade
Insider. 2001. Another Ship Sprinkler Problem, Seatrade Insider (June 5).
News. 2004. Urgent Safety Work Starts on QM2, BBC News (June 26).
before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Hearings on Oversight of the Cruise Industry, March 1, 2012; Testimony before the Subcommittee
on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security, Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, June 19, 2008; Testimony before Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Hearings on Crimes Against Americans on Cruise Ships, March 27, 2007.
13 See www.cruisejunkie.com/Overboard.html
11 BBC
12 Testimony
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the casino, and 9.5 percent were witnessed and confirmed to be a fall. These numbers will be discussed further later.
The second area worth mention is drug arrests. Between January 2009 and June
2013 there were 53 media reports of drug arrests on cruise ships involving 87 people. Based on cases where data is available, we know that males are more likely
to be arrested than females (83.33 percent vs 16.66 percent); the average age is the
same for both genders. The largest number of individual incidents occur in Bermuda
(n=27) where cruise ships are routinely searched by government officials using drugsniffing dogs; the U.S. had 8 incidents involving the arrest of 27 individuals, in all
cases the person was apprehended by Customs and Border Protection agents. Ships
with the largest number arrests are Norwegian Dawn (9) and Explorer of the Seas
(6) (see Appendix 4). Most frequently, drug arrests are for small amounts of marijuana, from several grams to less than an ounce.
B. The Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010 (CVSSA)
The Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act was introduced in 2008 following Congressional hearings in 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008. The hearings in 2005 were convened in December by two subcommittees of the House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform: the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats and International Relations chaired by Christopher Shays and the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources chaired by Mark
Souder. The hearings had a twofold purpose. First, given the recent attack of the
Seabourn Spirit by pirates off the coast of Somalia, they sought to determine the
decision-making procedures and processes that were in place to determine the extent to which the U.S. Government responds to a ship being attacked by terrorists
or pirates. The second purpose of the hearings was to determine jurisdictional conflicts that occur when U.S. citizens traveling on a foreign-flagged vessel are involved
in a criminal incident. These incidents included sexual assaults, physical assaults,
robbery, and missing persons. The hearings concluded with an assurance they would
reconvene in March in order to hear directly from victims.
Hearings were reconvened in March 2006. The Committee heard from six victims
of crime on cruise ships: three victims of a sexual assault, two families with three
persons overboard (one mysterious, one alcohol-related fall), and one incident involving a theft of $6,700. The Committee also heard from International Cruise Victims
Association (ICV), which presented 10 recommendations, many of which would be
incorporated in the CVSSA; and from an expert hired by the cruise industry who
claimed the rate of sexual assault on cruise ships was half the rate on land. The
Committee appeared to be sceptical about the reliability of crime statistics and acknowledged the absence of reliable data on persons overboard from cruise ships.
Subsequent to the hearing Representative Shays introduced on June 28, 2006 HR
5707, Cruise Line Accurate Safety Statistics Act. The bill was straightforward. It required cruise ships that call at a port in the United States to report all crimes occurring on the ship in which a U.S. citizen is involved. It also required this information to be made available to the public on the Internet. The cruise industry didnt
embrace the legislation and with the current session of Congress near-complete the
legislation died in committee.
In March 2007 hearings were held by the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation of the House of Representatives Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure. Two things appear to have solidified support for the hearings.
First, the Los Angeles Times published an article on January 20, 2007, which based
on internal documents from Royal Caribbean said sex-related onboard incidents was
a larger problem than the cruise industry suggested in March 2006. The documents
revealed 273 reported incidents within a period of thirty-two months, including 99
cases of sexual harassment, 81 of sexual assault, 52 of inappropriate touching, 28
of sexual battery and 13 cases that fit into other categories.14 When the companyspecific numbers were subjected to the same statistical analysis as done with industry-wide data in James Foxs 2006 testimony before Congress, the rate of sexual assault was not half the average rate for rape in the U.S., but 50 percent greater than
the U.S. rate.15
The second factor that pushed for a new round of hearings was that Representative Doris Matsui from California had a constituent, Laurie Dishman, appeal for
help following non-prosecution of a rape by a security officer on a Royal Caribbean
14 Yoshino, K. 2007. Cruise Industrys Dark Waters: What Happens at Sea Stays There as
Crimes on Lineres Go Unresolved, Los Angeles Times (January 20).
15 Klein, R. A. 2007. Crime Against Americans on Cruise Ships, Testimony Before the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, United States House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, March 27.
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Internationals Vision of the Seas. Matsui was not only concerned about the way
Laurie had been treated and her case handled, but also with discrepancies in crime
statistics.
These hearings opened with the FBI and Coast Guard announcing that an agreement had just been reached with the cruise industry whereby cruise line members
of the Cruise Line International Association (CLIA) agreed to report to the FBI (either a field office in the U.S. or the FBI Legal Attache at an embassy or consulate
closest to the vessels location at the time of the incident) all crimes against Americans on their ships. To many the timing of the announcement was suspicious. As
well, the agreement appeared to be a rehash of the zero tolerance policy announced by the International Council of Cruise Lines in 1999 and it was redundant
to reporting requirements already in place. The key difference was the agreement
provided a standardized form for reporting crimes that the FBI could use to establish a data set from which reports could be drawn for Congress and other government authorities. The data would not to be available to the public. The hearings
also heard from ICV, Laurie Dishman, a sociologist who reported on analysis of the
crime statistics presented in the Los Angeles Times, an attorney who represents
cruise victims, and representatives of the cruise industry. At the end of the hearings
the subcommittee chair, Elijah Cummings, called on CLIA and ICV to get together
and to attempt to find some common ground and solutions. He said hed prefer a
solution that did not require legislation, but also said that legislation was always
an option. He gave the two sides six months and said the hearings would reconvene
in September.
With no solution from collaboration between ICV and CLIA, hearings were reconvened in September 2007. The day before the Congressional subcommittee reconvened September 19, 2007, Representatives Matsui and Shays with twenty-three cosponsors introduced a House Resolution to call attention to the growing level of
crime on cruise ships and the lack of Federal regulations overseeing the cruise industry. The purpose of the reconvened hearings was to receive an update on the status of discussions between ICV and CLIA and to examine whether the security practices and procedures aboard cruise ships are adequate to ensure the safety of all
passengers. As before, it received testimony from the FBI and Coast Guard, which
discussed the implementation of the reporting framework announced at the previous
hearings; from ICV and several of its members (parents of a 21-year-old who fell
overboard while throwing up over a railing, two sexual assault victims, a surviving
family member whose father died in a cruise ship fire); and from the cruise industry. Not surprisingly the cruise industry painted a picture that said everything was
under control, that it is working diligently to improve situations raised as sources
of concern by its critics, and that cruises continue to be safe.16 The claim of safety
was based in large part on the FBI receiving from cruise ships only forty-one reports
of sexual assault and twenty-eight cases of sexual contact between April 1 and August 23, 2007. Together, these numbers give an annualized rate for sexual abuse
on CLIA member cruise lines of 172 incidents; a rate of 56.9 per 100,000 passengersseveral fold higher than the rate claimed in the 2006 hearings. The industry also used the hearings to announce formation of its survivors working group,
a group that ostensibly attempted to supplant ICV.
Less than a week after the hearings, the House Committee on Homeland Security
approved by voice vote inclusion of language in the Coast Guard Authorization Act
requiring cruise lines to notify the Department of Homeland Security Secretary of
security-related incidents involving U.S. persons when it advises its next port of call
of its arrival. Incidents required to be reported under the legislation include any act
that results in death, serious bodily injury, sexual assault, a missing person, or that
poses a significant threat to the cruise ship, any cruise ship passenger, any port facility, or any person in or near the port. Unlike Representative Shays Cruise Line
Accurate Safety Statistics Act, the reports would not be made public.
At the same time there was a move involving Senator John Kerry and Representatives Matsui, Shays, and Maloney to write legislation that would require cruise
ships to immediately notify the FBI about crimes, suicides, and disappearances. The
legislation would also provide protocols for collecting evidence. The legislation in
many ways is like the agreement announced in March 2007 between CLIA and the
FBI would be mandatory. A key requirement of any legislation or regulation, if it
is to be useful to the public, is public disclosure. Passengers should know the history
of problems and incidents on a cruise ship, much the same as they can view reports
16 Dale, T. 2007. Cruise Ship Security Practices and Procedures, Testimony Before the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, United States House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, September 19.
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of sanitation inspections conducted on cruise ships by the Centers for Disease Control.
The Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation held hearings in June 2008. The hearings heard from ICV; CLIA;
the Rape, Abuse, Incest and Neglect Network (RAINN); and a sociologist reporting
on analysis of sexual assault data and on persons overboard. The information presented was similar to previous hearings in the House of Representatives, however
RAINN discussed the need and methods for providing support to victims of sexual
assault on cruise ships. The CVSSA was introduced shortly after the hearings.
1. From Hearings to Legislation
A key advocate for legislation was the International Cruise Victims Association,
formed when its founders (Ken Carver whose 40 year old daughter mysteriously
went missing in 2004 from Mercury, a Celebrity ship; Bree Smith whose 26 year
old brother mysteriously went missing in on his honeymoon in 2005 from Brilliance
of the Seas, a Royal Caribbean ship; Son Michael Pham whose parents aged 67 and
71 mysteriously went missing in 2005 from Carnival Destiny; the parents of 23 year
old Amy Bradley who mysteriously went missing in 1998 from Rhapsody of the Seas,
a Royal Caribbean ship; and the parents of 22 year old James Scavone who mysteriously went missing in 1999 from Carnival Destiny) met at the 2005 hearings. The
sponsor of the CVSSA in 2008 in the U.S. House of Representatives was Doris Matsui (HR 6408); in the U.S. Senate John Kerry (S 3204). The legislation was reintroduced in 2009 as HR 3360 and S 588 and subsequently passed, becoming Public
Law 111207.
The initial version of the CVSSA reflected concerns raised in hearings and contained solutions to identified problems. However, a number of provisions of the Act
when it was first introduced in 2008 and in March 2009 were changed when introduced in the Senate in June 2009, presumably partially in response to lobbying by
the cruise industry or others. These changes and other elements of the legislation
will guide this discussion.
2. Persons Overboard
The number of people going overboard from cruise ships is significant: between
20 and 25 a year since 2009. It is known that in 9.5 percent of cases the person
fell overboard, however if we trust cruise industry claimsthey often say a passenger has fallen or jumped even if the assertion cannot be independently corroboratedthen the percentage is much higher. With that in mind, it is curious that
the original version of the CVSSA stated, The vessel shall be equipped with ship
rails that are located not less than 412 feet above the deck ( 3507 (a)(1)(A)). However the legislation passed set the height one foot lower at 42 inches. In retrospect,
it would appear the original provision of 54 inches (412 feet) may be more reasonable as an impediment to passengers falling overboard.
A second change is seen in 3507(a)(1)(D). The original proposed legislation stated, The vessel shall integrate technology that can be used for detecting passengers
who have fallen overboard, to the extent that such technology is available. Such
technology is available, but there are cost implications.
The revised legislation states, The vessel shall integrate technology that can be
used for capturing images of passengers or detecting passengers who have fallen
overboard, to the extent that such technology is available. While close-circuit television (CCTV) technology (used to capture images of persons going overboard) may
be effective if it were monitored in real-time, it is of little use when tapes are reviewed only after it is known a person has disappeared. In addition, there are issues
with whether CCTV cameras cover all relevant areas where a person may go overboard, and whether images are readily made available when requested. In a recent
case in which I was retained as an expert witness we found that the CCTV images
were recorded using old technology (not in a format easily viewed) and when converted the images were of limited probative value. Again, it would appear that the
original legislation proposed in 2007 was more effective in identifying when a person
goes overboard and in causing a response that is more likely to lead to a live rescue.
Many of the 16.7 percent of cases where a person is rescued alive is when their disappearance is observed and reported to officers who immediately execute rescue procedures.
Data also indicates there is sufficient number of cases of persons going overboard
when they are intoxicated. In two known cases the person was bending over the
railing while throwing-up over the side of the ship. This is further reason for raising
railing height, but also reinforces the need for stringent rules for the responsible
service of alcohol; not just training, but practice.
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One other concern is the way the FBI interprets the CVSSA. International Cruise
Victims Association reports they have been told by the FBI that a person overboard
is not necessarily a crime and thus will not be investigated and not included in the
FBIs official statistics. It is difficult to understand how a determination can be
made about whether a case of a person overboard is not a crime without a proper
investigation. Even if CCTV videotapes show a person falling overboard, an investigation may be warranted to determine the conditions surrounding the incident, for
example whether intoxication is an issue and whether the cruise ship was responsible in serving alcohol. Current wording of the CVSSA does not classify a person
overboard as a crime.
Recommendation #7: Original provisions of the CVSSA regarding railing height
and technology to detect passengers who have fallen overboard be reconsidered.
3. Sexual Assaults
Contrary to cruise industry claims, sexual assaults are an ongoing problem on
cruise ships. Just in the past couple of months there have been media reports of
a 12-year-old girl groped on Celebrity Century by a 30-year-old male passenger, and
an 11-year-old girl molested by a crew member on Disney Dream. In neither case
was the perpetrator arrested or prosecuted; in the latter, the crewmember was
offloaded by the cruise line in the Bahamas and flown home to India at the cruise
lines expense. Data from the FBI for October 2007 through September 2008 reveals
that at least 18 percent of sexual assault victims are younger than age 18. The data
was secured through a freedom of information request.
Unfortunately, reliable data is hard to come by. No comprehensive FBI data has
been available since 2008. The only other data available for analysis was provided
in the discovery phase of lawsuits, yielding incident reports from 1998 through 2002
for one cruise line; 1998 through 2005 for another. In a recent lawsuit involving the
sexual assault of a minor a cruise line was ordered by the judge to disclose to the
plaintiffs attorney all reported cases of sexual assault for the previous five years.
The cruise line settled the case out of court in order to avoid complying with the
court order.
There is much to be learned from incident reports of sexual assault. We know that
the most frequent perpetrator among crewmembers (between 50 percent and 77 percent of sexual assaults on passengers are perpetrated by a crew member) is a room
steward (34.8 percent) followed by dining room waiter (25 percent) and bar worker
(13.2 percent). We also know that the most frequent location for the assault is a
passenger cabin (36.4 percent) and that alcohol is a factor in 36 percent of incidents
involving minors. Having detailed data permits identification of risk and of potential
solutions or means for ameliorating the problem. However, changes to the CVSSA
between the first versions to the version passed make this data much more difficult
to access and thus more difficult for proper prevention and intervention. The following discussion will be organized around prevention, intervention, investigation,
and prosecution.
Prevention
The best way to deal with sexual assault is to have methods of primary prevention. One of the most effective methods is for passengers to know the risk. That is
why the initial version of the CVSSA not only required all sexual assaults to be reported to the FBI but that The Secretary shall maintain, on an Internet site of the
department in which the Coast Guard is operating, a numerical accounting of the
missing persons and alleged crimes . . . ( 3507(c)(4)(A)). But the section was
changed in the final version to read, The Secretary shall maintain a statistical compilation of all incidents described in paragraph (3)(A)(i) on an Internet site that provides a numerical accounting of the missing persons and alleged crimes recorded in
each report filed under paragraph (3)(A)(i) that are no longer under investigation
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation ( 3507(e)(4)(A)0.
The result is that the FBI only publicly discloses those cases where they have
opened a case and they have subsequently closed the case. Those incidents judged
to be he said-she said, or where sufficient evidence is not available, do not have an
investigation so appear to be not reported. Unlike crimes on land that are included
in Uniform Crime Statistics and that reflect all complaints of a crime, crimes on
cruise ships are only publicly recorded when the FBI has decided first that an investigation is warranted and second when the investigation is closed. The result is that
the number of publicly reported sexual assaults on cruise ships is grossly under-reported. The one-year data for 200708 reported 154 sex-related incidents. In stark
contrast, the FBI dataset on the U.S. Coast Guard website (which is difficult to find)
reports 11 incidents in 2012 (data for 2010 and 2011 was not accessible). More illu-
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minating is a recent case I was involved with. The FBI indicated that the cruise
line (NCL) had one case of sexual assault in 15 months, but records disclosed in
discovery indicated the cruise line had received (and we assume reported to the FBI
in compliance with the CVSSA) 23 complaints. The change in the language of the
Act effectively makes invisible the true scale of the problem of sexual assault and
undermines passenger awareness of the need to protect themselves and their children.
Recommendation #8: The CVSSA should require reported cases of sexual assault
committed on a cruise ship be displayed online and broken down by cruise line and
cruise ship. In addition, the raw data of cases should be made available upon request
for statistical/sociological analysis in order to permit a social epidemiology of the
problem.
A provision that was not changed, but that may need to be revisited relates to
crew access to passenger cabins. 3507(f)(1) states that a cruise ship shall establish
and implement procedures and restrictions concerning(A) which crewmembers
have access to passenger staterooms; and (B) the periods during which they have
access; and (2) ensure that the procedures and restrictions are fully and properly
implemented and periodically reviewed. While this provision is clear in its intent,
it may not be specific enough in its statement. I am not sure if it effectively addresses certain incidents of sexual assault. Take for example the teenage daughter left
in her parents cabin who is walked in upon and sexually assaulted by a crew member gaining access with a room key; or the adult woman who returns to her room
in the middle of the afternoon and when she walks out of the shower finds a crew
member in her room and is raped; or a woman who wakes in the middle of the night
and finds a crew member standing over her and is assaulted. These cases are not
anomalies, but even if they were they demonstrate why there is clear need for strict
restrictions on crewmember access to passenger cabins. As it stands, restrictions on
access to passenger cabins by room stewards, maintenance people, minibar stockers,
and others are unclear. This may be addressed in legislation that more clearly identifies parameters for when crew members have access to passenger cabins (e.g., between 9:00 AM and 11:59 AM, and between 6:00 PM and 9:00 PM). At the very
least, passengers should be told what hours of the day a crewmember may have access to their cabin.
Recommendation #9: The CVSSA should require passengers to be advised of the
hours during which crewmembers may access their cabin without specific permission
from the passenger.
Another strategy for prevention, as well as useful for investigation, is CCTV cameras. There are two issues. One is that cruise ships often have real cameras and
dummy cameras around the ship. Consequently, a crewmember may take a passenger to an area with no camera or a dummy camera and then assault them. This
was the case when an 8-year-old girl was molested on a cruise ship: a cleaner led
her down a hallway with the promise he would help her find her way back to her
familys cabin. He knew where there were active cameras and where there were
dummy cameras.
A second related issue is where live cameras are located. In a recent case in which
I served as an expert witness I raised concern about where cameras were and were
not located, pointing out that cameras were not directed toward areas that I believed were high risk. The cruise lines attorney countered that the CVSSA only requires that The owner of a vessel . . . shall maintain a video surveillance system
to assist in documenting crimes on the vessel and in providing evidence for the prosecution of such crimes ( 3507(b)(1). In this case the area not being covered was
the entrance to public washrooms even though one data set indicates that 4.4 percent (n=14) of sexual assaults occur in public washrooms. While it shouldnt be necessary for an act to clearly specify where CCTV surveillance should take place, the
current language of the Act is so vague that it can be effectively used to counter
and/or undermine victim claims when an assault occurs. As has already been mentioned, the videotapes that were provided by the cruise line in this case were of such
poor quality that they had no probative value.
Recommendation #10: The CVSSA more clearly and specifically state requirements for CCTV surveillance and the quality and format of tape recordings.
A final method of prevention is making passengers aware of the risk of crime on
cruise ships. I have already discussed the quality of information reported on the
website maintained by the U.S. Coast Guard, however the website is difficult to find
and for most passengers does not alert them to the risk. Perhaps a better way to
alert passengers of onboard risk is through the Security Guide required under
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3507(c)(1)(A) of the Act. Presently the Act requires the guide to be available for
each passenger, but doesnt specify how availability is achieved. The Act requires
the guide to provide a description of medical and security personnel designated on
board to prevent and respond to criminal and medical situations with 24 hour contact instructions and to describe the jurisdictional authority applicable and the law
enforcement process available with respect to reporting a crime. However there is
no requirement for the guide to include a clear statement of what crimes occur on
cruise ships, nor for it to educate passengers in methods and/or strategies for reducing vulnerability to crime. The guide could be an effective method for forewarning
passengers of known dangers.
Ironically, passengers are often advised in port lectures of things they can do to
reduce the likelihood of becoming a victim to crime ashore, but there is no parallel
information for how to reduce the likelihood of crime onboard the ship. It is reasonable to expect a cruise ship to alert parents to the need to supervise their children
and to be aware of the risk of child sexual assault onboard, to advise adult passengers of the risk of sexual assault and the most common places and scenarios
where these occurthis may include advice to keep track of ones drink to be sure
it is not drugged or otherwise tampered with. The data on sexual assaults provides
considerable insight into where and when sexual assaults occur; information that
passengers would benefit from knowing.
Recommendation #11: The CVSSA explicitly require the Security Guide be
placed in plain sight in every passenger cabin and that the content of the guide include information about the types of crimes on cruise ships, where they commonly
occur, and steps a passenger can take to decrease the likelihood of becoming a victim
of crime.
Intervention
Despite best efforts, it is likely some sexual assaults will occur on cruise ships.
The issue then is how victims will be treated. Again, there was a critical change
from early drafts of the CVSSA and the Act that subsequently passed into law.
3507(e)(3) stated,
. . . make available on the vessel at all times an individual licensed to practice
as a medical doctor in the United States to promptly perform such an examination upon request and to provide proper medical treatment of a victim, including antiretroviral medications and other medications that may prevent the
transmission of human immunodeficiency virus and other sexually transmitted
diseases.
This was replaced with 3507(d)(3) that reads:
(3) make available on the vessel at all times medical staff who have undergoe
a credentialing process to verify that he or she(A) possesses a current physicians or registered nurses license and(i) has at least 3 years of post-graduate
or postregistration clinical practice in general and emergency medicine; or (ii)
holds board certification in emergency medicine, family practice medicine, or internal medicine;. . .and (C) meets guidelines established by the American College of Emergency Physicians relating to the treatment and care of victims of
sexual assault.
The most significant change is the required qualifications of the person providing
medical care to a sexual assault victim. The original draft clearly required a physician who is licensed to practice in the United States; the change permits either a
doctor or a nurse and makes no reference to where that person was trained or
where they are licensed. This change is significant.
There are several reasons why this change may be of concern. First, some may
believe a physician would be better able to deal with a medical issue. But more importantly is where that doctor was trained and is licensed. There has traditionally
been a wide variation in medical care on cruise ships. Some cruise lines have chosen
only physicians trained and licensed in the U.S., Canada, or U.K.; others have
drawn physicians from a variety of countries because they are able to pay significantly less. This is not to impugn the competence of all foreign-trained physicians,
but there may be issues around language (competence in English, which is important given the nuances and emotions at play in a sexual assault), issues around culture and different views about women and sexuality, and differences in knowledge
of clinical guidelines common in the U.S. Perhaps more important is that when
there is malpractice a physician in the U.S., Canada, or the U.K. may be easy to
find, but a physician from a developing country or a non-English speaking country
may be exceedingly difficult for a patient to track down.
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The reference in the CVSSA to guidelines established by the American College of
Emergency Physicians may be seen as a way of dealing with some of these concerns.
However a review of the Policy Compendium (2013 Edition) of the American College
of Emergency Physicians (ACEP) brings other issues to the forefront. The Compendium reads:
The sexually assaulted patient, who may be an adult or child of either sex, presents special medical, psychological, and legal needs. ACEP believes that all patients who report a sexual assault are entitled to prompt access to emergency
medical care and competent collection of evidence that will assist in the investigation and prosecution of the incident. ACEP has therefore developed the following guidelines:
With the cooperative efforts of local governments, law enforcement agencies,
hospitals, courts, and other relevant organizations, each county, state or other
geographic area should establish a community plan to deal with the sexually
assaulted patient. The plan should ensure that capable, trained personnel and
appropriate equipment are available for treating sexual assault patients.
Each community plan should address the medical, psychological, safety, and
legal needs of the sexually assaulted patient. The plan should provide for
counseling, and should specifically address pregnancy and testing for and
treatment of sexually transmissible diseases, including HIV.
Each hospital should provide for access to appropriate medical, technical, and
psychological support for the patient. A community may elect to establish,
under the supervision of a physician, an alternative medical site, which specializes in the care of the sexually assaulted patient and provides medical and
psychological support capabilities when no other injuries are evident.
A victim of sexual assault should be offered prophylaxis for pregnancy and
for sexually transmitted diseases, subject to informed consent and consistent
with current treatment guidelines. Physicians and allied health practitioners
who find this practice morally objectionable or who practice at hospitals that
prohibit prophylaxis or contraception should offer to refer victims of sexual
assault to another provider who can provide these services in a timely fashion.
Specially trained, nonphysician medical personnel should be allowed to perform evidentiary examinations in jurisdictions in which evidence collected in
such a manner is admissible in criminal cases.
Physicians and trained medical staff who collect evidence, perform in good
faith, and follow protocols should be immune from civil or criminal penalties
related to evidence collection, documentation of findings, and recording of the
patients subjective complaints.
For the special diagnostic and therapeutic needs of the pediatric patient, a
community plan should provide for primary referral centers with expertise
and ancillary social services that support a multidisciplinary approach.
As part of its ongoing quality management activities, the hospital should establish patient care criteria for the management of the sexually assaulted patient and monitor staff performance.
ED staff should have ongoing training and education in the management of
the sexually assaulted patient.
ACEP supports appropriate measures to prevent sexual assault in the community.
First, and perhaps most important, is the guidelines place the emergency care
physician as the primary care provider to a victim of sexual assault. Nonphyscian
medical personnel may be allowed to perform evidentiary examinations, however the
guidelines do not contemplate a nurse being responsible for the care received by a
sexual assault victim. The CVSSA contradicts this by permitting it.
Second, the guidelines set expectations on the community, including ongoing quality management activities, however these do not appear to be part of what a cruise
ship does, especially with physicians typically working a four-month (or less) contract. The infirmary on a cruise ship is not comparable to a land-based hospital and
it is difficult for it to comply with the guidelines.
One guideline that is of particular note is that the ACEP expects the physician
to support appropriate measures to prevent sexual assault in the community. As has
already been discussed, there is much more a cruise ship can do to prevent sexual
assault and to, in turn, comply with this guideline. One has to wonder whether an
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under-contract physician who is considered an independent contractor is in a position to effectively advocate on such a matter.
Finally, the guidelines are explicit that the psychological and safety needs of a
sexual assault victim be addressed. It also has very specific expectations for how the
pediatric patient will be treated, including referral centers and ancillary social services. These best practices are not available on a cruise ship. There are no psychological services available onboard, and cruise ships do not typically take responsibility for referring the sexual assault victim (especially a child) to appropriate therapeutic and support services. As well, a victim of sexual assault will often see their
perpetrator wandering freely on the cruise ship, which seriously questions the commitment to the victims need for feeling safe. In both cases discussed above, of the
11-year-old and 12-year-old girls recently sexually assaulted, the perpetrator was
not apprehended in a timely manner (in one case the perpetrator was not apprehended at all).
While the intent of the CVSSA in referencing the ACEP guideline is laudable, it
is an empty gesture when the guidelines do not fit with the setting. More appropriate would be language that addresses: (1) the qualifications of the physician
charged with treating sexual assault victims; (2) the appropriate role played by nonphysician medical personnel; and (3) the provision of psychological and therapeutic
services both onboard and appropriate referrals for when the victim returns home
from the ship. These latter requirements may be met through a partnership with
land-based organizations such as RAINN or with land-based service providers. Interestingly, based on the landscape of onboard sexual assaults I advocated in my
2002 book, Cruise Ship Blues: The Underside of the Cruise Industry, that cruise
ships invest in having a counselor onboard a ship, both for passengers and crew.
I write:
The counselor would be someone competent in dealing with cases of sexual assault, who could serve as an ombudsperson in matters arising between passengers and staff or between shipboard employees. If a counselor is to be effective and seen as someone to turn to, it is essential that he or she be independent of the ships hierarchical structurea status similar to the ships physician who on medical matters essentially answers to no one onboard, not even
the captain. Counselors would need to be independent, and independently available. The simple fact is that abuses are known to occur on ships, but the information is kept within the shipboard community. The only way that information
gets out is by having an outsider brought in (p. 161).
I know this was read by cruise industry executives and their lawyers, but it had
no apparent effect.
Recommendation #12: The CVSSA should require onboard physicians to be
board certified in emergency medicine, family practice medicine, or internal medicine
in the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia, France, or Germany. Further, there should be
clear statements about how cruise ships will treat the psychological and safety needs
of sexual assault victims, especially victims who are minors.
Investigation
Proper investigation of cruise ship crimes and preservation of evidence is critical,
especially in a case of sexual assault. In addition, there needs to be proper procedures for ensuring chain of evidence requirements. Though beyond my expertise, I
have to wonder whether evidence collected and secured by a shipboard safety officer
will stand up in a shore side court of law. I suspect a critical issue will also be
whether the safety officer is available to testify in a criminal prosecution or a civil
case, especially if the case is against his/her employer.
This raises a critical issue with regard to the independence and impartiality of
onboard security officers. On land when there is a sexual assault the victim can talk
to their local law enforcement office, which is totally independent of the perpetrator,
and they receive medical care and support services from professionals who are also
independent of the perpetrator. On a cruise ship, a victims case is investigated by
an employee of the cruise line, a relationship that becomes particularly thorny when
the perpetrator is also a cruise line employeethe most recent comprehensive data
of sexual assaults on cruise ships indicates that the majority are perpetrated by a
cruise ship employee; and then their medical care is provided by another employee
of the cruise line. This situation does not engender the same level of trust a victim
is likely to have when dealing with the same issue on land.
Recommendation #13: Cruise ships should be required to have a private, independent law enforcement agent for purposes of crime investigation. These would be
similar to the wholly-independent Ocean Rangers placed on cruise ships by the State
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of Alaska to monitor discharge of waste streams while the ship is in Alaska state
waters.
Notwithstanding the above, 3508(a) of the CVSSA states that the Secretary
shall develop training standards and curricula to allow for the certification of passenger vessel security personnel, crewmembers, and law enforcement officials on the
appropriate methods for prevention, detection, evidence preservation, and reporting
of criminal activities in the international maritime environment. The intent of this
provision is clear, however the execution appears to be problematic. Compliance is
ostensibly effected by Model Course CVSSA 1101: Crime Prevention, Detection, Evidence Preservation and Reporting. This is an on-line course that takes eight hours
(one day) to complete. Aside from there being no direct contact between an instructor and a student, there is a total of three hours devoted to Crime Scene Actions,
which includes techniques used by law enforcement, action required to preserve different crime scenes, and access control. There is extremely limited content on collection and preservation of evidence. The stated measure of competence for this threehour module is that requirements related to reporting and recording of serious
crimes are correctly identified and demonstrated. It is unclear from the manual
how students are tested (although it appears that the most likely method is multiple
choice and other closed-choice exams) and whether the student can learn in three
hours the skills and knowledge commonly possessed by crime scene investigators on
shore. While the course may be useful for training support personnel to a professionally trained investigator, it appears inadequate preparation if the concern is
with gathering evidence that will withstand the requirements of land-based law enforcement and a court of law.
Recommendation #14: In the absence of a professionally qualified crime scene investigator, a cruise ship should be required to have onboard a staff person with more
than adequate training in all facets of crime scene preservation, collection of evidence, and methods to ensure proper chain of evidence.
Prosecution
The final area to consider regarding sexual assault is prosecution of the perpetrator. I have already addressed the need for evidence to facilitate prosecution. Another critical issue is to detain the offender. This may be more easily done when
the perpetrator is a crewmember, however when a passenger perpetrates a sexual
assault he or she should also be detained for law enforcement personnel at the next
U.S. port. It is unfortunate when a crewmember is flown to his home country from
a foreign port rather than having to face prosecution, especially when the crime is
irrefutably caught on videotape, as was the case of the 11-year-old girl molested on
Disney Dream in May 2013. It is equally sad that a 30-year-old man who groped
a 12 year old girl can wander freely on the ship while the girl and her family are
reminded of the ordeal every time they see him.
Recommendation #15: Cruise ship personnel should take more seriously their responsibility to detain perpetrators of sexual assault until the ship arrives at its next
U.S. port. Further, Congress should contemplate whether there needs to be a legislated requirement to ensure perpetrators are isolated from the general public onboard
the ship and held for delivery to land-based law enforcement personnel.
4. Other Crimes
There are two crimes for which the FBI collected data in 200708, but that are
not required to be reported under the CVSSA. One is a theft of less than $10,000
there were 89 in the one year period 200708. The other is simple assaultthere
were 115 in the same one year period. It doesnt seem right that these crimes are
not recorded and that victim rights are apparently truncated.
As regards theft, there is the obvious fact that crew members know that a theft
of less than $10,000 will not only not be prosecuted, but will not be recorded. This
seems like an open door for a permissible level of crime. Why $10,000 rather than
$9,800? The amount appears arbitrary. However, more importantly, by not collecting data there is no ability for analysis to discern patterns or trends that might
inform interdiction or prevention. As well, there is no way to know whether the
problem is increasing or decreasing, and whether the problem on cruise ships is
greater or lesser than on land.
Judge Thomas A. Dickerson of the New York State 9th Judicial District makes
the same point, but more eloquently:
[The Act does not] . . . require the reporting of thefts which are between $1,000
and $9,999 in value. These problems may be resolved as follows. First, requiring
owners to report thefts less than $10,000 would allow local law enforcement to
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investigate and deter future crimes. Second, mandating owners to include the
recorded thefts of property valued between $1,000 and $9,999 on the USCG
website would allow prospective cruise passengers to better appreciate the risks
associated with cruises. An even more effective method would be to breakdown
the USCG online reporting by individual cruise ships, rather than by cruise
lines, as is currently required.17
There are similar concerns with regard to simple assault. What if the assault is
a case of domestic violence (a fair proportion of which do fall within this category)
why would this not be reported and considered for prosecution, especially if the victim decides to press charges. Also, what is the fine line between a simple assault
and an assault with serious bodily injury? Are cruise ship personnel expert in making this determination? I think not. But most importantly is the fact that having
this data is useful both to determine changes over time as well as to compare the
situation between different cruise ships and between cruise ships and incidence on
land. It would seem it is in the interest of the cruise industry to have this data collected, unless they are concerned that the rate onboard their ships is higher than
the rate onshore.
Recommendation #16: The CVSSA should require reporting to the FBI of all onboard crime, including thefts less than $10,000 and simple assaults.
III. Consumer Rights and Cruise Ship Liability
The issue of consumer rights was directly addressed by CLIAs recent announcement of its Passenger Bill of Bights. This will be discussed first. I will then shift
to the broader issue of liability as it applies to cruise ships and cruise lines.
A. CLIA Passenger Bill of Rights
The CLIA Bill of Rights is as interesting for what it includes as for what it does
not include. It was announced May 22, 2013 just five days before a fire on Grandeur
of the Sea; probably motivated in large part by a series of problems before and following the media-focused fire on the Carnival Triumph and by Senator Schumers
stated intent to develop a passenger bill of rights. In the month before the Carnival
Triumph fire, five ships experienced propulsion problems causing delay and/or requiring itinerary changes: Carnival Splendor, Carnival Destiny, Carnival Legend,
Carnival Triumph, and P&O Cruises Aurora (all ships operated by Carnival Corporation). In the several months following the Carnival Triumph fire there were the
following:
Seabourn Odyssey had a power failure and was towed to port in New Zealand;
Cunard Lines Queen Elizabeth had a collision with a tug boat packed with
pleasure seekers in New Zealand;
Hurtigrutens Kong Herald ran aground and the cruise was canceled;
Coastal and Maritime Voyages Marco Polo was holed and canceled its cruise;
Carnival Dream had generator problems and ended a cruise early, flying passengers home from Saint Maarten;
Carnival Legend had propulsion problems and was stuck for a day in Costa
Maya; the ship altered the itinerary on this cruise and the next because of continuing problems;
Carnival Elation had steering problems and required assistance of a tug to
navigate to New Orleans;
P&Os Ventura had propulsion problems transatlantic and changed its itinerary;
Regent Seven Seas Voyager had propulsion problems causing significant delays;
Carnival Sunshine canceled two cruises because of longer-than-anticipated time
in dry dock; when the ship finally left dry dock passengers complained that
work was still being done and some ship services are unavailable;
Celebrity Millennium had propulsion problems that caused itinerary changes, at
one point being dead in the water for three hours in the South China Sea;
Carnival Ecstasy experienced a power failure;
Coral Princess experienced a fire;
17 Dickerson, T.A. and S. L. Sgroi. 2012. Recent Developments in Maritime Law, Presented
at the Joint Judicial Seminar Program for the Appellate Divisions for the First and Second Judicial Departments, April 25. Available at: <www.nycourts.gov/courts/9jd/TacCertlpdfs/
DickersonlDocs/recentldevlmaritimelaw.pdf>
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And then comes the Passenger Bill of Rightsno doubt a public relations initiative to counter the wave of bad publicity (notably, all but three of the problems occurred on ships operated by Carnival Corporation). In announcing the Bill of Rights
CLIA stated that they detail CLIA members commitment to the safety, comfort
and care of guests. CLIA also stated the Bill of Rights codifies many longstanding
practices of CLIA members and goes beyond these to further inform cruise guests
of the industrys commitment to their comfort and care. The obvious question then
is what is new about the Bill of Rights. I will address this and then consider what
isnt contained in the Bill of Rights.
1. The right to disembark a docked ship if essential provisions such as food, water,
restroom facilities and access to medical care cannot adequately be provided onboard,
subject only to the Masters concern for passenger safety and security and customs
and immigration requirements of the port.
This Right makes perfect sense if a ship is alongside a pier, however it does not
consider the issue of passengers who are stranded on ships without electrical power,
propulsion, toilets, air conditioning and adequate food for three to five days. What
are the rights of those passengers? Getting off a ship when it is docked is an easy
Right to guarantee. However there are still questions. As Senator Schumer observes
in his May 21, 2013 letter to CLIA, who determines that essential provisions cannot
be adequately provided? If someone on the ship or the cruise line is the decision
maker, how can passengers appeal that decision? But there is also the issue of disembarking in a port that requires clearance by customs and immigration officials.
A cruise ship can prevent disembarkation if local port authorities do not cooperate.
What are the rights of passengers then?
The issue of landing and needing clearance from immigration officials was raised
as a potential concern when Carnival Triumph had its fire and the company decided
to tow the ship to a U.S. port rather than to a closer Mexican port. The explanation
given was that many passengers didnt have passports, so disembarking in Mexico
and repatriating to the U.S. could be problematic. Does the location of a ship truncate ones rights? On surface the Right sounds reasonable, but in the concrete situation with a range of conditions it isnt as straightforward.
2. The right to a full refund for a trip that is canceled due to mechanical failures,
or a partial refund for voyages that are terminated early due to those failures.
Again, the Right is straightforward and sounds reasonable. If a product paid for
is not delivered there will be a refund. But the Right does not indicate whether the
refund is in cash and how long it will take for the refund to be processedthe passenger paid for their cruise 6090 days in advance of the cruise so shouldnt they
be entitled to the income generated by the cruise line for the period of time it held
the money on deposit? As well, how is a partial refund calculated and what mechanism is in place for a passenger to challenge the entitlement offered by the cruise
line.
But there is a larger issue. What is a passengers Right when they fly to a distant
port and learn upon arrival that their ship will not depart? Will the cruise line reimburse their travel costs to the port on top of refunding the cruise fare? This is
not clear from the Passenger Bill of Rights. The Passenger Bill of Rights is also not
clear about a passengers rights if a cruise line leaves port with a cruise ship that
it is known will not be able to fulfill the published itinerary, as was the case on
a couple of cruises listed in Appendix 2.
A related issue is how the Passenger Bill of Rights applies to a missed port and/
or changed itinerary. There is a significant number of these as noted in Appendix
2 (see for example Aurora (March 2009), Seven Seas Voyager (April 2009), Pacific
Dawn (February 2010), Artemis (May 2010), Infinity (June 2010), Pacific Sun (February 2011), Enchantment of the Seas (February 2012), Carnival Legend (March
2013), Seven Seas Voyager (March 2013), Crown Princess (April 2013)). Do passengers have the right to be refunded port fees, taxes, and port related services for
which they have already paid when a port call skipped, and is this payment in cash
rather than the typical practice of an onboard credit? Are they entitled to an additional payment for failure to deliver the published itinerary, especially when the
change is due to a mechanical problem or failure? And should passengers have a
right to be reimbursed for costs associated with an independently arranged shore
excursion in a port call that is skipped or canceled? Finally, how are these refunds
computed and by what means does a passenger have a right to dispute that computation? As the saying goes, the devil is in the details.
While the Passenger Bill of Rights appears to address canceled cruises, albeit
without sufficient clarity, it does not address the much more common occurrence of
port calls that are canceled. What rights do passengers have in these cases?
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3. The right to have available on board ships operating beyond rivers or coastal
waters full-time, professional emergency medical attention, as needed until shore side
medical care becomes available.
Having on board professional emergency medical attention has been a long-standing practice on cruise shipsin fact it is required by International Labor Organization Convention 164, entitled Health Protection and Medical Care for Seafarers,
requiring that ships :engaged in international voyages of more than three days duration shall carry a medical doctor as a member of crew responsible for providing
medical care. However the qualifications of medical personnel has varied widely.
In most cases a physician and/or a nurse provide medical services. Some cruise lines
have a policy of only using medical professionals trained and board certified in the
U.S., Canada, or U.K. Other cruise lines, in part because the fee paid is less, draw
medical professionals from a range of countries. In all cases, medical professionals
are considered independent contractorsthey are paid a fee by the cruise line and
receive a commission based on charges for medical services and prescriptions/supplies. Though the physician wears a senior officers uniform and is considered a
member of the crew, she or he is not a cruise line employee and the cruise line
claims no liability for his or her medical practice.
While the Right states a standard practice, and reiterates a requirement of the
CVSSA, it does not indicate a substantial fee is charged for emergency medical attention. The Passenger Bill of Rights should have greater transparency, clearly indicating that medical services on board a ship are fee-for-service. In addition, passengers have the Right to know the limitations on medical services on board a ship.
One issue is the scope of practice of the individual physician. An equally, if not more
important issue, is the limited nature of a ships infirmary. There may be limited
diagnostic facility (e.g., no X-rays or complex blood tests) and there is no surgical
theatre. As an experienced emergency physician on board a cruise ship told me, my
greatest fear is an ectopic pregnancy that needs emergency surgerythere is very
little I can do in the middle of the ocean.
What this suggests is that the Passenger Bill of Rights should include useful information about the limits of medical care on a cruise ship so a passenger can make
an informed decision and not go onboard expecting services that will not be available. In the absence of such information, the obvious question is whether a cruise
ship, by the Passenger Bill of Rights, is accepting liability for cases where emergency medical attention may be inadequate or otherwise lacking in an emergency
medical situation. What recourse is available to a passenger in such a case?
4. The right to timely information updates as to any adjustments in the itinerary
of the ship in the event of a mechanical failure or emergency, as well as timely updates of the status of efforts to address mechanical failures.
On surface this right sounds idealwhat else could a passenger expect? However
the term timely is subjective. I have been on cruises where timely was measured
in hours (sometimes many hours) whereas I as a passenger measure timely in quarter hours. It would be helpful to a passenger in understanding the Right to know
what is meant by timely. Aside from that, how will these information updates be
providedvia public announcements on board or by written notifications? And what
recourse does a passenger have if information updates are not timely? Are they entitled to compensation or some other consideration? In many ways the Right can easily become an empty promise.
Another term requiring definition is mechanical failure or emergency. This presumably includes a situation where a ship is dead in the water or has an extended
power loss. But does it also apply to a ship that has a propulsion problem causing
it to sail at reduced speeds, or a medical emergency that delays a ship and causes
a change in itinerary. It would seem that what the industry should be stating is
that a passenger has a Right to timely information updates as to any adjustments
in the itinerary of the shipfull stop.
The Right leaves unstated what compensation, if any, is available to passengers
when a port call is dropped or an itinerary is changed. Will they be refunded all
port fees, taxes and other port use expenses associated with that port? This was addressed above. In any case, the Passenger Bill of Rights should be explicit about the
parameters for what their rights are and what their rights are not.
5. The right to a ship crew that is properly trained in emergency and evacuation
procedures.
This is certainly a fair expectation on the part of passengers. However, there is
a huge chasm between being properly trained in emergency and evacuation proceduresthere may not be basis to argue that crewmembers arent trainedand those
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same crewmembers demonstrating through behavior competence in executing emergency and evacuation procedures.
Unfortunately, there is a track record of crewmembers not demonstrating this
competence, not only in emergency situations but in periodic inspections by the U.S.
Coast Guard and in annual U.S. Coast Guard Control Verification exams. The report of the Carnival Splendor fire is a good example of the point I am making. Officers were likely properly trained, however the reports says that one reason for the
catastrophic nature of the fire was human errorwhen the fire alarm first went off
on the ships bridge, a crew member reset it, leading to a 15-minute delay in the
activation of an automatic fire-suppression system. The report also faults the crews
lack of familiarity with the engine room, which hampered their ability to locate
and fight the fire, and the captains decision to ventilate the compartment where
the fire began before it was fully extinguished, allowing the flames to flare again.18
Two questions derive from these points. First, what will the cruise industry require to ensure that all crewmembers are properly trainedwill current regimes of
training be augmented or bolstered? How will proper training in emergency and
evacuation procedures be verified? Second, what recourse does a passenger have
when crewmembers do not demonstrate competence in emergency and evacuation
procedures? Will the cruise line waive damage limits contained in the Passenger
Contract and/or permit a passenger to file a lawsuit (including for emotional distress, mental suffering/anguish or psychological injury, presently excluded from the
cruise lines liability) for demonstrated failure of competence in emergency and evacuation procedures? These should be explicitly laid out in the Passenger Bill of
Rights.
6. The right to an emergency power source in the case of a main generator failure.
Like other items in the Passenger Bill of Rights, the obvious question is what is
included under main generator failure and what is excluded? We can point to Carnival Splendor, which had six diesel enginesa fire in one engine caused extensive
damage to cables in the aft engine room that meant vessel engineers were unable
to restart the unaffected main generator.19 How can CLIA guarantee that a similar
or more catastrophic event wouldnt happen on another ship? In the case of the Carnival Splendor it wasnt that the main generator failed, but that the cables carrying
power from the generator had been destroyed. Also on the Carnival Splendor the
emergency generator apparently continued to work, but only provided power to
emergency services. Does this technically comply with the right stipulated?
In the case of Carnival Dream in March 2013, news reports indicate the main
power generator had not failed, but the backup emergency diesel generator had
failed, thus causing the cruise to be terminated when the ship was in Saint
Maarten. This illustrates the confusion in the language in the Rightwhat is it actually telling a passenger and whether what is being promised can actually be delivered? And if the Right is not fulfilled, what recourse does a passenger have?
This issue is made even more confusing when considering the number of cruise
ships that have lost power and gone adriftsome for short periods of time; others
for longer periods of time. How does this Right apply to a passenger in this situation? Does this Right apply to all power outages or only power outages of a certain
duration and/or only power outages caused by failure of the main generator? Assuming a passenger has a Right to an emergency power source, what happens if it isnt
provided; what recourse or compensation is available to them? There are many
questions raised by this Right, which on surface is intended to reinforce a sense of
security, but upon reflection is potentially an empty promise.
7. The right to transportation to the ships scheduled port of disembarkation or the
passengers home city in the event a cruise is terminated early due to mechanical failures.
This Right is already a common practice of the cruise industry, however the Passenger Bill of Rights doesnt address two situations. First, what Right does a passenger have when a cruise ends early and passengers are returned to the port of
embarkationdoes the cruise line assume responsibility for the additional travel
costs (and change fees on airline tickets) associated with getting from the port of
disembarkation, does the cruise line assume responsibility for lodging and food expenses incurred by the passenger in getting home, and does the cruise line provide
18 Dolan, J. 2013. Crew Error Cited in Carnival Ship Fire that Led to Nightmare Tow, Los
Angeles Times (July 16).
19 U.S. Coast Guard. 2013. Report of Investigation into the Fire Onboard the Carnival Splendor which Occurred in the Pacific Ocean off the Coast of Mexico on November 8, 2010, which
Resulted in Complete Loss of Power. MISLE Incident Investigation Activity Number 3897765.
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compensation for a passenger who arrives home later than scheduled thereby losing
salary from missed work and having expenses for childcare etcetera? The Right to
transportation doesnt appear to extend to these issues. Related to this is whether
a passenger is accommodated in the same class of service on airlines and the same
class of hotel that they normally choose. How long will a passenger wait for reimbursement of these costs and what mechanism is in place if there is a dispute between a cruise line and the passenger about the amount due to the passenger? Does
the cruise line waive the Passenger Contract so the passenger can pursue a case
in a court of law of their choosing (for example, if they live outside the U.S. or in
a location remote from the court specified in the Passenger Contracts forum selection clause)?
Second, the Passenger Bill of Rights does not address the Right a passenger has
when a ship arrives late in a port of disembarkation and the passenger has arranged his/her own transportation. Does a passenger in this case have the Right to
have the cruise line assume responsibility for all additional travel costs (in the class
of service originally booked) as well as lodging and food expenses incurred in getting
home, and does the cruise line provide compensation for a passenger who arrives
home later than scheduled thereby losing salary from missed work and having expenses for childcare etcetera? This is an area of rights that is not addressed at all
in the Passenger Bill of Rights.
8. The right to lodging if disembarkation and an overnight stay in an unscheduled
port are required when a cruise is terminated early due to mechanical failures.
Does this Right only apply to a cruise terminated due to a mechanical failure, or
to any cruise terminated early? CLIAs choice of more restrictive language suggests
there are many situations when a cruise may be terminated in an unscheduled port
of call and lodging would not be provided. How does this Right interface with the
Passenger Bill of Rights #1?
This Right also says nothing about the quality of the lodging provided. Does a cot
in a high school gymnasium qualify as lodging? Does lodging include a private
bathroom? Based on past events, it is possible to imagine a range of scenarios. What
Right to lodging, precisely, does a passenger have and will the cruise line assume
all costs associated with that lodging? What recourse does a passenger have when
the lodging provided is unacceptable.
9. The right to have included on each cruise lines website a toll-free phone line
that can be used for questions or information concerning any aspect of shipboard operations.
Cruise lines already have toll-free numbers accessible from telephones in the U.S.
Will access to these numbers extend to all ports of call on the cruise lines itinerary
and to all countries from which passengers are drawn? More importantly, what will
be done to ensure that the information provided by an operator at a toll-free number
has accurate and correct information? Take for example the following correspondence I received from the parent of a passenger on Carnival Legend March 14, 2013:
The ship is disabled and stuck in Costa Maya on March 13, 2013. I spoke with
Carnival last night about how this might effect the itinerary because my daughter is on the ship. They told me they did not know anything about an alteration
in the cruise schedule and would only tell me the ship was moving. I called the
ship to try to speak with my daughter today and while I did not reach her, the
ship officer confirmed to me that they were in Costa Maya and not Belize yesterday. Her boyfriend called Carnival this morning as well and they denied the
ship was in Costa Maya and called it a rumor. I can understand a mechanical
issue that needs to be addressed although this seems to be a big problem with
this company. I cannot tolerate flat out lying and misinformation that they are
providing about the Legend.
What changes or initiatives are being undertaken by CLIA and its member lines
in order to avoid a similar situation? What recourse does a passenger and/or his/
her family have when misinformation is provided or information is withheld?
10. The right to have this Cruise Line Passenger Bill of Rights published on
each lines website.
This seems like the easiest Right to realize, however a quick survey of CLIA-member cruise line websites on July 15, 2013, found that the Passenger Bill of Rights
was apparently not published on 13 of the 26 member lines website. CLIAs
May 22, 2013, Press Release (Cruise Industry Adopts Passenger Bill of Rights)
states that publishing the Passenger Bill of Rights on a cruise lines website is a
condition of membership in CLIA. Are these 13 members no longer members of
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CLIA? What right or recourse does a passenger have if they have purchased a ticket
from one of these lines in the past eight weeksdoes the Passenger Bill of Rights
apply to them?
CLIA Passenger Bill of Rights and the Cruise Contract
There is one additional issue with the Passenger Bill of Rights. CLIA promised
that the Passenger Bill of Rights would be added to Cruise Passenger Contracts.
This is laudable, but this is not apparent from Passenger Contracts displayed on
cruise line websites, but more importantly there is no mention of how conflicts and
contradictions between the Passenger Bill of Rights and the Cruise Passenger Contract are resolved. Which has precedence? According to the standard passenger contract the cruise line has the right to alter a cruise itinerary for any reason and the
passenger has no recourse. As Carnival Cruise Lines states in its hard-to-find
Cruise Cancellation and Itinerary Change Policy states:
In the event an itinerary change becomes necessary while the ship is at sea or
when notice prior to sailing is not feasible, Carnival and/or the Master will attempt to substitute an alternative port. Carnival and/or the Master may, in
their discretion and for any purpose, deviate in any direction or for any purpose
from the direct or usual course, and omit or change any or all ports of calls,
arrival or departure times, with or without notice, for any reason whatsoever,
all such deviations being considered as forming part of and included in the proposed voyage. Carnival shall have no liability for any refund or other damages
in such circumstances.20
In terms of itinerary changes before a ship leaves port, the policy states:
Due to the nature of a cruise vacation, itinerary changes sometimes become necessary for safety, weather or other reasons beyond the control of Carnival. If
the itinerary change is for reasons beyond Carnivals exclusive control, including but not limited to safety, security, weather, strikes, tides, hostilities, civil
unrest, port closings, emergency debarkations of guests or crew, late air, sea,
car or motor coach departures or arrivals, mechanical breakdowns or problems
not known to Carnival, itinerary changes consistent with U.S. State Department travel warnings/advisories or other applicable U.S. or foreign governmental advisories, guests will not be provided any compensation. Guests electing to cancel will be subject to the standard cancellation terms.
And in terms of passenger costs resulting from cruise cancellations or itinerary
changes the policy states:
Carnival shall not be liable to guests for any charges, fees or expenses paid or
owed to third parties by guests (such as air travel booked by a guest directly
with an airline) in connection with a cancelled cruise or an itinerary change for
any reason.
Carnival Cruise Lines Passenger Contract is even more restrictive:
(c) If the performance of the proposed voyage is hindered or prevented (or in
the opinion of Carnival or the Master is likely to be hindered or prevented) by
war, hostilities, blockage, ice, labor conflicts, strikes on board or ashore, restraint of Princes, Rulers or People, seizure under legal process, breakdown of
the Vessel, congestion, docking difficulties or any other cause whatsoever or if
Carnival or the Master considers that for any reason whatsoever, proceeding to,
attempting to enter, or entering or remaining at the port of Guests destination
may expose the Vessel to risk or loss or damage or be likely to delay her, the
Guest and his baggage may be landed at the port of embarkation or at any port
or place at which the Vessel may call, at which time the responsibility of Carnival shall cease and this contract shall be deemed to have been fully performed,
or if the Guest has not embarked, Carnival may cancel the proposed voyage without liability to refund passage money or fares paid in advance. (emphasis added)
These statements appear at variance with a number of items in the Passenger
Bill of Rights. It appears disingenuous to promote a Passenger Bill of Rights without also clarifying how conflicts between those rights and the cruise passenger contract are to be resolved.
A common theme across all elements in the Passenger Bill of Rights is how a passenger deals with a Right that has not been fulfilled or has been directly violated.
Are these rights ultimately governed by the cruise passenger contract that sets clear
terms about when and how complaints and legal action must filed, and where law
20 See
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suits must be filed? Forum selection clauses effectively truncate a passengers rights
under the Passenger Bill of Rights given the requirement that legal action can only
be taken in a court located in the state where the cruise lines corporate headquarters is located (most frequently Florida). The cruise passenger contract also includes a class action waiver, prohibiting a passenger from taking any legal action
as a member of a class or as a participant in a class action. For many passengers
these are impediments to taking any action and they often resign to accepting whatever the cruise line offers, if anything.
B. What the CLIA Passenger Bill of Rights Does Not Include
1. Passenger Rights
There are a number of things obviously missing from the CLIA Passenger Bill of
Rights. Some of these have already been mentioned:
There is no mention of the recourse a passenger has if one of the Rights is not
fulfilled or realized.
There is no indication of how a partial refund will be computed and whether
that refund is provided in cash or, as common in the industry, as a discount
on a future cruise or an onboard credit.
There is no mention of whether the cruise line is responsible for ancillary costs
when a cruise is cancelled, including change fees for airline tickets and for the
costs of the tickets themselves, the cost of lodging required in travel to the passengers home city, and support for food and incidentals associated with delays
in getting from the ship to the passengers home city.
There is no mention of what rights a passenger has when a port of call is canceled. Some cruise lines refund port fees and taxes, however these are given
as an onboard credit rather than as a cash refund. As well, there is no transparency with regard to the amount refunded. Some cruise lines average the cost
of port fees and taxes so a refund for one port is the same as the other even
though actual fees can vary widely from one port to another. Also, it isnt transparent whether costs other than port taxes and fees that are not paid by the
cruise line because of the canceled port call are also refunded to the passenger.
There is considerable need for greater clarity and transparency around passenger rights when a port call is canceled.
There is no mention of what rights a passenger has when a cruise itinerary is
changed, such as a cruise sailing the Eastern Caribbean instead of the Western
Caribbean because of propulsion problems, or a cruise going to Canada instead
of the Caribbean because of weather. The Passenger Cruise Contract is clear
that the cruise line has no obligation or responsibility to provide compensation
in these situations. This absence of rights should be clearly articulated in the
Passenger Bill of Rights.
There is no mention of the rights a passenger has when embarkation is delayed.
Does a passenger have a Right to meal vouchers or compensation for meals purchased (as is common in airline travel)? Also, after how many hours of waiting
in a cruise terminal is the cruise line obligated to provide either lodging or a
comfortable setting to wait? A comprehensive Passenger Bill of Rights would address these situations given the frequency of delayed embarkations.
There is no mention of a passengers rights when a cruise arrives late in its
port of disembarkation, causing the passenger to miss transportation arrangements for their trip to their home city.
In addition there are some rights that should be directly addressed.
The Passenger Bill of Rights should clearly articulate the rights of a passenger
who is bumped from a cruise because of overbooking or other issues. The most recent cases involve Carnival Sunshine, which bumped passengers on its June 7,
2013, cruise because a number of cabins were needed for contractors completing
work that was not completed while the ship was in dry dock. Similarly, passengers
in 78 cabins on Grandeur of the Seas were bumped from the July 12, 2013 (and perhaps the July 19th), sailing because cabins were needed for workers who were still
making repairs following the fire earlier in the year. Some of these bumped passengers had their cruise canceled because the ship had been out of service for repairs, and here they were bumped from their replacement cruise.21
21 It is worth mention that Royal Caribbean Cruises Limited, in anticipation of these hearings
and concern that the facts might paint an unkind picture, sent an e-mail to all employees asking
them to write their Senator with the following text: Dear Senator, As one of your constituents
Continued
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Similarly, the Passenger Bill of Rights should discuss a passengers rights when
they are expelled from a cruise ship, often for questionable reasons and the result
is loss of cruise fare and their having responsibility for transportation from the port
where they are left. Between January 2009 and June 30, 2013, there are eight cases
list on my website where a passenger has been evicted or expelled (these are only
ones reported in the media). These passengers have no right to appeal or recourse.
The cruise line Cruise Passenger Contract gives them this unilateral, uncontestable
Right to evict or expel, without liability.
The Passenger Bill of Rights does not address a passengers rights when they miss
the ship because of flight delays or because of weather conditions (such as Hurricane Sandy in the fall of 2013 when passengers lost their cruise fare because they
couldnt get to the ship). The cruise lines generally take the position that this type
of situation is not their problem. A passenger without trip insurance is responsible
for lost cruise fares and/or additional travel costs to join the ship at a later point.
Further, it there are reports that some benefits under trip insurance policies offered
by the cruise line are more restrictive in the benefits they provide than insurance
policies offered independent of the cruise line.
The Passenger Bill of Rights does not address a passengers rights to have safety
concerns taken seriously. Though not the first time I have received this sort of information, on June 21, 2013, I received the following from a cruise passenger:
We have just disembarked after a 7-day Alaskan cruise aboard Celebrity Solstice. We frequented the quasar dance club each night. On night two I noticed
at 2300 (11pm), when the club only allows 18 and over, a crew member used
a small rope to tie the handles of one of the two exits closed to prevent access.
Not must looped but tied in a fashion that untying would be impossible is a
smoke filled environment or panic. This room is required to have two emergency
exits and this exit was clearly marked emergency exit. This happened three
nights in a row. I brought my concerns to the attention of guest services requesting to speak to the ships Safety Officer. I was told that another passenger
had requested to speak with him also but he stated that he was too busy with
paperwork to speak to anyone. The guest services person apologized and drafted an e-mail to him explaining my concerns and that I am a 28 year firefighter.
That night in quasar the doors were once again tied closed. As of this writing
no staff or crew has contacted me. I would encourage that all passengers be
aware of their surroundings. It appears Celebrity is not concerned with safety
and if this blatant example of reckless disregard for its passengers and crew
in a public space is allowed to exist, then I am wondering what other safety
issues exist that we did not see.
It would seem this passengers expectations were realistic, but they were ignored.
Did he have any rights? And what rights were available for this disregard of concern for fire safety?
Finally, the Passenger Bill of Rights does not address the Right to be free of sexual assault by crewmembers or cruise ship employees, or the Right to be free of
other types of crime. This type of assurance seems only natural given the rate of
sexual assault on cruise ships, but it is obviously one that would be difficult to fulfill
(although no less difficult than some of the other rights included in the Passenger
Bill of Rights). In this line of thought, the Passenger Bill of Rights should also contain a Right to contact the FBI directly from the ship when a victim of a crime.
This Right is accorded by the CVSSA, so it should be provided, however most victims will be unaware of what is available to them without it explicitly being stated
in something like a Passenger Bill of Rights. Alternatively, a cruise ship may be required to provide a crime victim with an information sheet outlining the rights and
the options available to them, including the telephone numbers for relevant law enand an employee of lllllllllllllll, one of the major cruise lines serving North
America, I am contacting you today out of concern regarding the July 24 Senate Commerce
Committee hearing regarding the cruise industry. As an individual who is intimately familiar
with cruising, it is apparent to me that there has been a great deal of misinformation and distortion regarding the industry in recent months. As one of your constituents, I am concerned
that the industry will be unfairly portrayed at this hearing. As someone that works in the cruise
line industry, I know firsthand that cruising is extremely safe and well regulated at the national
level, by the U.S. Coast Guard, and by international authorities. Additionally, the cruise industry directly benefits businesses in all 50 states, generating over 355,000 jobs and over $42 billion
in economic impact. It provides $17.4 billion in wages to American workers each year. I would
greatly appreciate your support to ensure that the cruise industry receives a fair and balanced
hearing. Thank you for your time and attention to this matter and your service to our Nation.
Sincerely, Your Name
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forcement agencies, and agencies that provide direct services or referral to services
that are likely to be needed by the victim.
In sum, it appears the Passenger Bill of Rights is a public relations initiative that
on its face accords more rights and protection to a passenger than is realistically
the case. One problem is the many empty or nonspecific promises contained in the
Passenger Bill of Rights, but a larger problem is there is no clear recourse for a
passenger who believes the rights promised have not been provided. This is all
based essentially based on a matter of trust, however as was observed by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2003, trust (or voluntary approaches) does not substantively change the status quo of the way things
are done. Focusing specifically on environmental policy, the OECD notes few cases
where voluntary approaches have improved the environment beyond a business as
usual baseline.22
Recommendation #17: Given the imprecise nature of the CLIA Passenger Bill of
Rights, there is an obvious need for a legislated solution. Passenger rights can only
be achieved by legislation that puts into place clear and specific measures for consumer protection, similar to those available to passengers of other modes of commercial transportation.
This recommendation for greater consumer protection may help level the field between the rights of cruise passengers in the U.K. versus in the U.S. Unlike the U.S.,
there have been a number of successful lawsuits in the U.K. for cruises from hell,
with problems ranging from illness outbreaks, lapses in service, and ships having
facilities that are not in proper repair or that remain under construction following
time in dry dock.
2. Cruise Line Rights
While the typical Passenger Cruise Contract accords few rights to the cruise passenger, it gives many rights to the cruise line. Unfortunately, the cruise passenger
contract is rarely given to the passenger when they make their booking and put
down a deposit. Further, they are not usually given a copy of the passenger contract
before making full payment for their cruise 6090 days before the cruise. Most frequently a copy of the cruise passenger contract is provided in small print on the
back of the tickets sent to a passenger to be used for boarding. By accepting the
ticket the passenger acknowledges receipt of applicable brochures and agrees to
abide by the terms and conditions of the cruise lines brochures and website, including but not limited to the information contained in the Frequently Asked Questions and Embarkation Information sections.23 At this point the passengers
rights have already been compromisedhe or she cannot cancel the cruise without
losing all monies paid. A cruise line would likely say that the passenger could have
downloaded the passenger contract from the companys website, however a more
proactive approach by the cruise line would make sense. When I buy an airline ticket I receive the passenger contract when I print or receive the ticket and I have
24 hours to cancel that ticket without loss of funds. It only seems reasonable that
a cruise passenger should receive a copy of the cruise passenger contract before his
or her Right to a refund passes.
As regards rights, there is an asymmetric power relationship between a passenger
and a cruise ship. As already seen, the cruise line holds all of the power when it
comes to itinerary changes and canceled cruises, and when it comes to crime. The
cruise line similarly has full control over how to resolve customer service issues
not just evictions and expulsions, but lapses in providing the services and care a
passenger is led to believe will be provided by advertising and promotional materials. The cruise contract either truncates a passengers rights in most situations,
or reinforces the cruise lines Right at the detriment of the passenger.
Some of the cruise lines rights appear unreasonable. For example, Carnival
Cruise Lines contract states:
Carnival reserves the right to increase published fares and air fare supplements
without prior notice. However, fully paid or deposited guests will be protected,
except for fares listed, quoted, advertised or booked in error, fuel supplements,
government taxes, other surcharges and changes to deposit, payment and cancellation terms/conditions, which are subject to change without notice. In the
event that a cruise fare listed, quoted or advertised through any website, Carnival sales person, travel agent or any other source is booked but is incorrect
22 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2003. Voluntary Approaches to
Environmental Policy: Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Usage in Policy Mixes, Paris:OECD.
23 See section 2(d) of Carnival Cruise Lines passenger contract.
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due to an electronic error, typographical error, human error or any other error
causing the fare to be listed, quoted or advertised for an amount not intended
by Carnival, Carnival reserves the right to correct the erroneous fare by requesting the Guest to pay the correct fare intended, or by canceling the cruise
in exchange for a full refund, but in no event shall Carnival be obligated to
honor any such booking resulting from the error or otherwise be liable in such
circumstances.
Thus, a passenger can book a cruise only to be told later that they owe additional
funds for a fuel supplement, surcharge, or government taxes. As well, if the company makes an error in booking a cruise at a fare it didnt mean to, the passenger
has no right to receive the fare advertised and under which the cruise ticket was
issued. This is another stark contrast with the airline industry.
The passenger contract also gives the cruise line the right to cancel the cruise contract at its discretion (and without the passengers consent)the passenger has no
reciprocal right. The cruise line also has no obligation to provide a passenger the
cabin reserved when a reservation was made. As Carnival Cruise Lines contract
states, Carnival reserves the right to move Guests to a comparable stateroom for
any reason, including but not limited to, instances in which a stateroom is booked
with fewer than the maximum number of Guests the stateroom can accommodate.
Again, the passenger has no recourse.
Finally, the cruise line retains an exclusive right to use photographs and videotapes of a passenger onboard a ship with no limitation (including in advertising and
publicity) and without the passengers consent. Imagine taking a cruise and some
time later seeing an advertisement or video with your image in a photograph or videotape (including when doing something silly or foolish). To some of us, this would
be construed as a violation of privacy. Rightfully, consent should be required for use
of anyones image in a public forum.
3. Issues of Liability
In addition to issue of the cruise lines rights is the extreme limits placed on the
companys liability. For claims not involving personal injury, illness, or death a passenger must give notice of claim within 30 days of disembarkation from the vessel.
Claims involving personal injury, illness or death must be filed with the company
within 6 months of the injury, event, illness or death and a lawsuit must be filed
within a year. In all cases that legal action is taken, it must be filed in the U.S.
District Court or state court where the cruise lines headquarters is located (referred
to as a forum selection clause). As already mentioned, this severely limits the option
available to many passengers.
Baggage and Personal Effects
Even when legal action may be initiated, there are other limits. Many passenger
cruise contracts limit the liability of the cruise line for lost or damaged luggage and
personal effects. For example, Carnival Cruise Lines passenger contract states . . .
that the aggregate value of Guests property does not exceed $50 USD per guest or
bag with a maximum value of $100 USD per stateroom regardless of the number
of occupants or bags. Consequently, a family of four whose luggage is lost by the
cruise line is due only $100this doesnt even cover the cost of the luggage, much
less the contents. A passenger can increase these limits by declaring a higher value
and paying 5 percent of the declared value to the cruise line. In contrast, the passenger contract for an air carrier limits liability to approximately $1,500 per passenger.24 A family of four on a cruise would have to pay $280 to the cruise line for
the same level of coverage provided automatically by an air carrier.
Illness Outbreaks
Cruise lines operating out of U.S. ports and serving U.S. ports have successfully
avoided liability for illness outbreaks. This has not consistently been the case in the
U.K. where there are stronger consumer protection laws. Part of the cruise industrys defense is their mantra that passengers bring the illness with them, thereby
coloring itself as an unwilling victim. As Rose Abello, vice president of Public Relations of Holland America Line stated, The ship is not sick. There are sick people
getting on the ship. 25 This mantra was first used in late-2002 when there was a
wave of very visible norovirus outbreaks on cruise ships, and it proved effective. In24 Coverage under the Warsaw Convention is approximately US$1,663; under the Montreal
Convention US$20 per kg for loss of or damage or delay to checked baggage, and US$400 for
unchecked package.
25 LaMendola B. and T. Steighorst. 2002. Cruise Lines Blame Passengers for 3rd Viral Outbreak on Ship, SunSentinel (November 12).
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terestingly, The International Council of Cruise Lines (ICCL) laid out its strategy
at the 2003 World Cruise Tourism Summit on March 3, 2003. An almost-inspirational video was shown about the situation in which the industry found itself and
the way that it successfully responded on the public relations front.
At the start of the video, the industry was depicted as receiving an inordinate
amount of attention for a series of norovirus outbreaks on cruise ships. Illness on
cruise ships had been the topic of stories on mainstream television: Inside Edition,
CNN, NBC, and many others. The industry had even become the brunt of jokes on
late night televisionJay Leno and David Letterman among others. Evening news
with increasing frequency showed people who had become sick on board ships.
The video described the industrys media strategy had three elements: provide
talking points to cruise executives and others in a position to present the industrys
position, arrange as many media interviews as possible, and flood the media with
positive information about the cruise industry. It proactively distributed pictures
and video footage showing ships being disinfected, and engaged in positive messaging. Carnival Cruise Lines president, Bob Dickinson, framed the problem as part
of a national epidemic and said there was no cause-and-effect with regard to
norovirus on cruise ships. Colin Veitch, NCLs CEO, pointed to the incidence of
norovirus in the general population to minimize the problem as unique to cruise
ships. The industry also enlisted the help of third parties in its campaign, most significantly the Centers for Disease Control. It helped promote the idea that people
get sick on airplanes too, but they dont experience symptoms until they get home
so they dont associate it with air travel.
ICCLs video concluded with Smooth Seas Ahead. The industry successfully
fought off the negative media attention and reframed the issue. Its message was two
pronged: cruises are a great vacation at a good price, and why worry about
norovirusit is as common as the common cold. You cant argue with that. The
media became desensitized to the issue and most of the 79 outbreaks affecting 6,630
people in 2003 and 2004 went unnoticed. The problem continues: in 2012 the were
were 34 known outbreaks affecting 5,542 passengers.
When an outbreak does happen ill passengers often are quarantined in their cabin
for days; whether they receive any compensation is wholly at the cruise lines discretion. However, cruise lines are not as innocent or defenseless as they would like to
appear. In 2005 and again in 2008 I argued in my books, in response to claims by
the industry that the low incidence among prove that norovirus is largely a passenger problem, that there are systemic disadvantages for crewmembers to report
when they are ill. This position appears to be supported by recent CDC health inspections that have identified cases where crewmembers have continued to report
to work despite being ill, including in positions of food handling and food service.
The problem for passengers is that cruise lines have effectively escaped liability
for illness among passengers. To my knowledge there have been no successful lawsuits in the U.S. for these outbreaks even though similar lawsuits have been successful under consumer protection laws in the U.K.
Independent Contractors
A cruise ship is populated with many independent contractors whose behavior and
practice the cruise line assumes no liability. Most visibly these include medical services (physician(s) and nurse(s)), but spa and personal care services (including health
and beauty staff), photographers and video diary staff, retail shop personnel, casino
workers, art auctioneers, and all other concessionaires. Even though many of these
people wear clothing with the cruise lines logo, and in the case of medical personnel
officer uniforms, they are not considered cruise line employees. Unbeknownst to
most passengers, the cruise ship has no liability for services provided and billed to
the passengers onboard account. The status of these groups as independent service
providers over whom the cruise line has no authority, control, or responsibility (even
though tacitly endorsed by the cruise line) needs to be more clearly visible to passengers. At the very least, there should be signage or formal notification to passengers of this fact.
Medical Care
Medical services are a bit different. In an emergency situation, the passenger has
no choice but to accept the service of medical personal who the cruise line has
judged to be appropriate for medical care on its ship. But the cruise ship has no
liability for their practice. It is a hard concept to get ones head around given the
service is offered by the cruise line and the cruise ship collects the fees. But the
nature of this arrangement was supported by the Florida Supreme Court in February 2007 and by the U.S. Supreme Court in October 2007.
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The case began ten years before in March 1997. Fourteen-year-old Elizabeth Carlisle was on a Caribbean cruise on Carnival Destiny with her family. On the second
night out of Miami she developed severe abdominal pain. She consulted the ships
physician, Dr. Mauro Neri, who had finished medical school in his native Italy in
1981 and had held nine medical jobs in Italy, Africa and England in the fifteen
years before joining Carnival Cruise Lines. His salary was $1,057 a month. Dr. Neri
advised that Elizabeth was suffering from the flu and sent her on her way. But her
pain became worse. On the third visit to the infirmary, after Elizabeths parents
specifically asked whether the problem could be appendicitis, Dr. Neri conducted his
first physical exam. He responded that he was sure the problem was not the girls
appendix.
When the pain continued to grow worse Elizabeths parents called their family
physician in Michigan, who advised they return home. The family took the advice,
and shortly after arriving home Elizabeth underwent emergency surgery to remove
her ruptured appendix. The infection had rendered the fourteen year old sterile and
caused lifelong medical problems. Elizabeth sued Carnival Cruise Lines in Florida
state court, a case she lost on Carnivals motion for summary judgement. The cruise
line claimed it was not responsible for the medical negligence of the doctor on board
and pointed to the fine print in the passenger cruise contract to support its position.
The family appealed the Circuit Courts decision to Floridas Third District Court
of Appeal, where the parents argued the cruise line was vicariously liable for the
doctors negligence. Judge Joseph Nesbitt agreed and reversed the lower courts decision. The judge held that the cruise line had control over the doctors medical services for agency law purposes; the doctor was to provide medical services to passengers and crew in accordance with the cruise lines guidelines. And as it was foreseeable that some passengers at sea would develop medical problems (and that the
only realistic alternative for such a passenger was treatment by the ships doctor)
the cruise line had an element of control over the doctor-patient relationship. As
such, the cruise lines duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances extended to the actions of a ships doctor placed onboard by the cruise line. The doctor
was an agent of the cruise line and his negligence was imputed to the cruise line.
This invalidated the cruise tickets purported limitation of the cruise lines liability
for the negligence of its agents.
Judge Nesbitts decision was groundbreaking. It was likely the very first case
where a cruise line was held responsible for the care provided by a ships physician.
Not surprisingly, Carnival appealed the case to the Florida Supreme Court. While
the court almost agreed with the lower courts assertion that times had changed and
that a doctors negligence at sea also shows negligence by the cruise line, it ultimately found in favour of Carnival. Justice Peggy Quince wrote in her opinion:
We find merit in the plaintiff s argument and the reasoning of the district
court. However, because this is a maritime case, this Court and the Florida district courts of appeal must adhere to the Federal principles of harmony and uniformity when applying Federal maritime law.26
The case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and the court refused to hear
it. The Florida Supreme Courts decision was the final word. If the Carlisle family
wanted to pursue the case they would have to sue the physician directly. But this
would be difficult in their case, and in most involving medical malpractice on cruise
ships, given that theyd first have to locate the physician in his present home.
Cruise lines historically have not provided assistance with locating former staff
members. In addition, malpractice cases involving treatment in international waters
must be filed in the courts of the physicians country of origin, which is both difficult
and expensive.27
Shore Excursions
Shore excursions are a major source of income for a cruise shipthe cruise ship
retains 5070 percent or more of what a passenger pays for the tour. These tours
are sold onboard at a Shore Excursion Desk by staff members wearing the cruise
lines uniform. But when something goes wrong on a shore excursion, the cruise line
is quick to remind the passenger that they are not liable; shore excursions are provided by independent contractors. Appendix 1 indicates 14 known deaths on shore
excursions (these are only incidents that have been reported in the media; there are
many more than this) and five robberies ashore (some at knife or gun point) on
26 Supreme Court of Florida. 2007. Carnival Corporation vs. Darce Carlisle, Case No. SC 04
393, February 15.
27 Chen, S. 2007. Trouble at Sea: Free-Agent Doctors, Wall Street Journal (October 24).
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shore excursions affecting dozens of passengersthese again are only those that
have been reported in the media so they underrepresent the true number.
If there is an injury or death on a shore excursion, the cruise passengers options
are limited in U.S. courts. Their options in a court in the country where the shore
excursion was offered may also offer few options. The problem is that shore excursions are largely unregulated, except by the cruise line itself, and some can be quite
dangerous.
While the cruise line has no liability for shore excursions, they tend to dissuade
passengers from taking tours that are independently available. They may talk about
safety concerns for a tour that is not approved, and will often warn passengers that
the advantage of the ship-sponsored tour is that if they are delayed the ship will
wait for them. In contrast, the ship will not wait for a passenger delayed on an independent tour. While more and more passengers are choosing to make private arrangements for land-based tours, those who make advance plans may find they are
out money when a ship alters its itinerary or cancels a port call.
Sexual Assaults
The issue of liability for sexual assaults reached public attention in the mid1990s. A tort reform measure attached to the Coast Guard Reauthorization bill had
passed on May 9, 1995. The amendment, for the most part written by the ICCL,
was introduced by Representative Don Young. He referred to it as a noncontroversial managers amendment. 28 It passed the House by a vote of 406 to 12. Only
afterwards did people read the final print.
One provision, directed at mounting claims from injuries and sexual assaults, limited liability to passengers and crew for infliction of emotional distress, mental suffering or psychological injury unless negligence or an intentional act can be proven.
The American Trial Lawyers Association characterized the amendments as dangerous legislation that jeopardized the safety of women on cruise ships. Opposition also came from the Womens Defense Fund, the National Organization for
Womens Legal Defense Fund, the Maritime Committee of the AFLCIO, and rape
treatment centers.29
The amendment languished for more than a year waiting to go to a HouseSenate
conference where lawmakers would resolve the House and Senate versions of the
Coast Guard Reauthorization Bill. Lobbying by the industry continued, including a
delegation of cruise line executives led by Micky Arison in March 1996. He and Celebrity Cruises president Richard Sasso met with Senator Larry Pressler and separately with other members of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation. Pressler chaired the Committee and would serve on the conference
committee charged with reconciling the House and Senate versions.30 By October 1,
1996, a compromise had been negotiated. Ernest Hollings, from the Senates Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, observed before the Conference
Committee that no one knew if the cruise ship people had enough votes to push the
amendments through, but the cruise industry figured they were 50 percent there
and didnt have much to lose.31 When the Conference Committee convened, Senator
Hollings threatened to kill the entire reauthorization bill if ICCLs amendments remained. In the end he capitulated after amended language was adopted for the two
provisions.
In the final version, ship owners were prohibited from limiting their liability in
cases involving sexual harassment, sexual misbehavior, assault, or rape in cases
where the victim is physically injured. Limitations were allowed in all other situations.32 Current passenger cruise contracts read, as does Carnival Cruise Lines, the
cruise line shall not be liable to the passenger for damages for emotional distress,
mental suffering/anguish or psychological injury of any kind under any circumstances, except when such damages were caused by the negligence of Carnival
and resulted from the same passenger sustaining actual physical injury, or having
been at risk of actual physical injury, or when such damages are held to be intentionally inflicted by the cruise line. Consequently, unless a cruise line can be found
negligent, a victim of a sexual assault, whether be a crew member or a fellow passenger, has no claim for emotional distress, mental suffering/anguish or psychological injury. This position appears insensitive, especially to those (including children) victimized by a cruise ship employee.
28 Glass,
29 Fox,
J. 1996. Compromise on U.S. Cruise Tort, Lloyds List (October 1), p. 1.

L. and B. R. Fox. 1995. Anchored in the Docks, Washington Post (October 8), p. E4.
S. 1996. There Oughta Be a Law, Miami New Times (March 21).
30 Rowe,
31 Ibid.
32 Glass,
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Limit of Liability
In addition to the issues already discussed, there is one other limitation on a
cruise lines liability that is worth mention; specifically that the cruise line is not
liable for the intentional or negligent acts of any persons not employed by the cruise
line (including independent contractors and other passengers) nor for any intentional or negligent acts of cruise ship employees committed while off duty or outside
the course and scope of their employment. This last exclusion is a huge loophole
given the cruise line has no responsibility when a crewmember commits a sexual
assault when off duty. As well, they are not responsible when the sexual assault
is not part of the scope of their employmentby its very nature, an assault would
be outside the scope on ones employment. While there are a large number of lawsuits filed against cruise lines for sexual assaults, the vast majority of these are settled out of court, presumably because the cruise line wishes to avoid negative publicity. However, in how many of these cases can the cruise line effectively use the
disclaimer in the passenger cruise contract?
Recommendation #18: Given the many limits on cruise line liability, there
should be a requirement that cruise lines provide passengers, in advance of when
penalties accrue for cancelation, a clear statement in plain, clear English (and
French or Spanish as required) of all limits on liability and laying out all rights
that can be freely exercised, without limitation, by the passenger.
Recommendation #19: That consumer protection legislation be promulgated that
extends to cruise passenger common rights and opportunities for complaint or other
action similar to those available to consumers of other services, especially transportation services such as train, airlines, and other commercial carriers.
IV. In Closing
Thank you again for the opportunity to share my observations and insights generated from my 17 years as an academic whose research has focused on the cruise
industry. I welcome your questions.
V. Summary of Recommendations
Recommendation #1: There is need for systematic reporting of all cruise ship incidents to an independent, central authority charged with responsibility for data
analysis and policy and operational recommendations.
Recommendation #2: Similar to data maintained on airlines documenting on
time performance, there should be a mechanism whereby cruise ships and cruise
lines have reported their adherence to itineraries and on time performance.
Recommendation #3: There is need for greater oversight and monitoring of the
cruise industry in order to monitor changing trends and to determine whether these
changes are related to changes in safety and/or casualties.
Recommendation #4: Ships operating from U.S. ports should be obligatorily subject to accident investigations by the National Transportation Safety Board as a condition of using U.S. ports, and should be subject to fines and other administrative
actions the NTSB is empowered to take with other modes of commercial transportation.
Recommendation #5: There needs to be funded research, ideally provided by the
cruise industry to a wholly independent body, to learn from those cruise lines that
appear to be effective in reducing incidents and accidents.
Recommendation #6: Ships should have thorough and exhaustive safety inspections by the U.S. Coast Guard without advance warning. Full reports (including all
details) of cruise ship inspections by the U.S. Coast Guard should be available online.
Recommendation #7: Original provisions of the CVSSA regarding railing height
and technology to detect passengers who have fallen overboard be reconsidered.
Recommendation #8: The CVSSA should require reported cases of sexual assault
committed on a cruise ship be displayed online and broken down by cruise line and
cruise ship. In addition, the raw data of cases should be made available upon request
for statistical/sociological analysis in order to permit a social epidemiology of the
problem.
Recommendation #9: The CVSSA should require passengers to be advised of the
hours during which crewmembers may access their cabin without specific permission
from the passenger.
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Recommendation #10: The CVSSA more clearly and specifically state requirements for CCTV surveillance and the quality and format of tape recordings.
Recommendation #11: The CVSSA explicitly require the Security Guide be
placed in plain sight in every passenger cabin and that the content of the guide include information about the types of crimes on cruise ships, where they commonly
occur, and steps a passenger can take to decrease the likelihood of becoming a victim
of crime.
Recommendation #12: The CVSSA should require onboard physicians to be
board certified in emergency medicine, family practice medicine, or internal medicine
in the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia, France, or Germany. Further, there should be
clear statements about how cruise ships will treat the psychological and safety needs
of sexual assault victims, especially victims who are minors.
Recommendation #13: Cruise ships should be required to have a private, independent law enforcement agent for purposes of crime investigation. These would be
similar to the wholly-independent Ocean Rangers placed on cruise ships by the State
of Alaska to monitor discharge of waste streams while the ship is in Alaska state
waters.
Recommendation #14: In the absence of a professionally qualified crime scene investigator, a cruise ship should be required to have onboard a staff person with more
than adequate training in all facets of crime scene preservation, collection of evidence, and methods to ensure proper chain of evidence.
Recommendation #15: Cruise ship personnel should take more seriously their responsibility to detain perpetrators of sexual assault until the ship arrives at its next
U.S. port. Further, Congress should contemplate whether there needs to be a legislated requirement to ensure perpetrators are isolated from the general public onboard
the ship and held for delivery to land-based law enforcement personnel.
Recommendation #16: The CVSSA should require reporting to the FBI of all onboard crime, including thefts less than $10,000 and simple assaults.
Recommendation #17: Given the imprecise nature of the CLIA Passenger Bill of
Rights, there is an obvious need for a legislated solution. Passenger rights can only
be achieved by legislation that puts into place clear and specific measures for consumer protection.
Recommendation #18: Given the many limits on cruise line liability, there
should be a requirement that cruise lines provide passengers, in advance of when
penalties accrue for cancelation, a clear statement in plain, clear English (and
French or Spanish as required) of all limits on liability and laying out all rights
that can be freely exercised, without limitation, by the passenger.
Recommendation #19: That consumer protection legislation be promulgated that
extends to cruise passenger common rights and opportunities for complaint or other
action similar to those available to consumers of other services, especially transportation services such as train, airlines, and other commercial carriers.
Appendix 1: Summary of Cruise Ship Incidents, January 2009June 2013 1
Cancelations, Itinerary Changes, Missed Port Calls (N=271) *
Cruise with Media-Reported Canceled Port Calls
Cruise with Media-Reported Itinerary Changes
Cruise with Media-Reported Canceled Cruises
Cruise with Media-Reported Delayed Embarkation and/or debarkation:
*Does
not include changes caused by a hurricane or tropical storm
Mechanical Problems (N=353)

Aground
Collision
Collision with Pier
Damage in Storm
Detained for Safety
Electrical Problems
Engine Problems
Fire (6 evacuation; 4 power loss)
Generator Problems
Lifeboat Failure
1 Data
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104
69
25
73
19
37
15
5
5
8
26
61
5
7
based on media and other reports as recorded at Cruise Junkie dot Com
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Maneuverability/Steering Problems
Material Failure
Power Loss (7 adrift, 1 towed)
Propulsion Problems (7 adrift)
Severe List
Technical Problems
15
53
21
62
11
8
Deaths on Shore (N=37)

Dive/Scuba (1 on Shore Excursion)
Jet Ski
Parasailing (3 on Shore Excursion)
Snorkeling (3 on Shore Excursion)
Swimming (7 on Shore Excursion)
Other
4
1
3
8
13
8
Miscellaneous (N=269)
Accidents Ashore (8 on Shore Excursion)
Bomb Threats:
Child Pornography Seized
Illness Outbreaks
Injuries on Shorex (n=52)
Passengers expelled/evicted
Robberies Ashore (5 on Shore Excursion)
Onboard Falls (3 deaths)
Thefts > $10K
10
14
8
189
5
11
13
9
10
Appendix 2: Ships with Two or More Mechanical Incidents, January 2009

June 2013
A. Carnival Corporation (7 companies, 45 ships, 145 incidents)
Carnival Cruise Lines (19 ships, 74 incidents)
Carnival Destiny (n=6)
11/18/2009 Primary motor unit 1 tripped due to malfunction
1/26/2010
Propulsion problems; itinerary changed, cruises canceled
10/22/2010 Propulsion problems; primary motor two faulty
9/10/2011
Lifeboat damagedremoved for repair
1/7/2012
Material failure
1/24/2013
Problem with stern thrusters; itinerary changed
Carnival Dream (n=3)
7/6/2011
Propulsion problems; change from Western Caribbean to Eastern Caribbean
itinerary
10/7/2012
Fire
3/14/2013
Malfunction of backup emergency diesel generator, power outages and plumbing
issues; cruise canceled in St. Maarten
Ecstasy (n=5)
1/19/2009
Propulsion problems; operating on half power
2/13/2009
Fire
1/28/2010
Collision with gangway
4/22/2010
Severe list to avoid buoy; damage and 60 injuries
4/18/2013
Power failure; some onboard attribute it to a fire
Elation (n=3)
10/20/2009 Propulsion problems as a result of failure with electronic control system
1/13/2011
Technical problem with propulsion system; port call skipped
3/14/2013
Steering problems; tugboat escort required
Fantasy (n=4)
1/29/2009
Equipment failure in steering system
1/5/2010
Lifeboat failure/material failure
7/27/2011
Collision with Imagination; minor damage
10/17/2011 Vessel maneuverability problem; arrives in port late
Fascination (n=3)
7/1/2010
Loss of power for several hours, adrift; late arrival
2/27/2011
Material failure
1/19/2013
Late return from dry dock; 7 hour delay
Carnival Freedom (n=3)
2/6/2010
Fire in crew cabin
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6/27/2011
8/21/2011
Blackout due to generator failure; fuel oil filters cleaned, fuel oil purifiers started
and chemical treatment added to the both service tanks.
Material failure
Carnival Glory (n=3)

5/15/2011
Vessel maneuverability
11/14/2012 Material failure
12/2/2012
Propulsion problems
Holiday (transferred to Iberocruises in 2010) (n=4)
1/20/2009
Material failure
2/6/2009
Technical problem causing reduced speeds; dropped port call on this and next
cruise
3/9/2009
Material failure
4/11/2009
Material failure
Imagination (n=3)
7/13/2010
Fire in the elevator machinery room leaving two passenger elevators and one crew
elevator inoperable
7/27/2011
Collision with Fantasy
9/28/2011
Toilets in front and midship inoperable for day
Carnival Legend (n=10)
3/21/2009
Smoke and fire system on Deck BA1 in fault and not operating properly
6/21/2009
Unpalatable water in cabins
9/30/2009
Collision with Enchantment of the Seas; minor damage
2/7/2010
Maneuverability problems given malfunctioning azipod
2/14/2010
Mechanical problems cause seven-hour delay leaving Tampa, itinerary changed;
vessel pitched when leaving Roatan, maybe caused by touching channel wall
7/11/2010
Loss of propulsion on port azipod while entering port; faulty circuit breaker
tripped
1/17/2012
Material failure
1/29/2012
Technical problem with starboard azipod causes late arrival (5 hours) and delayed
embarkation (2 hours)
3/14/2013
Disabled and stuck in Costa Maya; a day later underway with reduced speed and
changed itinerary
3/16/2013
Propulsion problems; changed itinerary
Carnival Liberty (n=4)
4/26/2010
Problems with palatable water in cabin
11/5/2010
Two diesel generators shutdown because of malfunction
1/15/2012
Technical problem, severe list
11/25/2012 Loss of electrical power
Carnival Miracle (n=3)
1/10/2010
Lifeboat material failure
1/28/2010
Collision with pier at Port Zante (St. Kitts); stay overnight for repairs and arrive
late for disembarkation
1/18/2011
Lifeboat material failure
Carnival Paradise (n=2)
8/31/2012
Material failure
10/1/2012
Partial loss of propulsion; power loss
Carnival Pride (n=2)
5/16/2009
Fire in battery room
3/31/2011
Blown from mooring at Port Canaveral; delayed departure
Sensation (n=2)
2/9/2012
Burst pipe floods 1020 cabins; departure delayed 45 hours
5/22/2012
Fire
Carnival Splendor (n=7)
11/8/2009
Delay in Long Beach (7 hours) to repair fire door
11/25/2009 Collision with Radiance of the Seas in Puerto Vallarta
12/17/2009 Collision with pier in Puerto Vallarta, stayed until 3:30PM next day for repairs;
next port call canceled
2/18/2010
Sharp turn (radar missed some small yachts in path) causes flooding onboard
11/8/2010
Fire lasting several hours knocks out all power, ship towed back to San Diego;
this and next 810 cruise canceled
1/6/2013
Itinerary changed to permit two days in Puerto Valllarta for repair of damage to
propulsion system
1/13/2013
Cruise delayed one day given repair of propulsion system; itinerary changed
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Carnival Triumph (n=4)
3/14/2010
11/18/2010 Oil leak from shaft seal of forward bow thruster; disabled until repairs made
1/27/2013
Technical problem with propulsion system affecting cruising speed; 6 hour delay
in return to port
2/10/2013
Disabling fire, adrift for days with no power/electricity, towed to port; cruise canceled
Carnival Victory (n=2)
1/17/2010
Failure of UPS battery charger
1/20/2013
Propulsion problem; leaves port almost 24 hours late, itinerary change
Costa Cruises (1 ship, 2 incidents)
Costa Europa (n=2)
3/5/2009
Propulsion problems lead to passenger revolt; ports missed
2/26/2010
Collision with pier in Sharm-el-Sheikh killing three crew and injuring four passengers; cruise canceled
Cunard Line (1 ship, 6 incidents)
Queen Mary 2 (n=6)
7/22/2009
Broke from mooring lines; damage to stern, four hour delayed departure
9/23/2010
Loss of electric and all power for an hour after explosion in electric panel
10/5/2011
Fire causes power loss in major storm, damage onboard; arrive in NYC 2 hours
late
10/17/2011 Went dead in the water twice during transatlantic cruise
2/4/2012
Total power failure, dead in the water
Holland America Line (7 ships, 21 incidents)
Maasdam (n=4)
3/17/2009
Fire in crew galley
5/22/2009
Severe list caused by pilot error
8/8/2012
Sewage and refuse from ship washes up on shore at Nahant, MA
6/13/2013
Port forward propulsion system malfunctioning; 2.5 hour delayed departure and
sailing at reduced speed
Prinsendam (n=2)
9/11/2010
Major damage from storm50 windows blown out (with flooding) and dent in
prow of ship
12/17/2010 Lifeboat failure
Ryndam (n=2)
6/8/2013
Fire40 minute wait for all clear after initial alarm
Statendam (n=2)
12/21/2009 Engine problems, changed itinerary
9/22/2012
Fuel pump explosion causes two hour power outage
Westerdam (n=2)
5/11/2011
Collision with ice; damage 15 feet below water line
10/28/2011 Fire
Zaandam (n=6)
1/13/2009
Alternator of #5 generator exploded causing switchboard to ground out; emergency
generator started 43 second later
7/13/2010
Fire
7/28/2010
Loss of electrical power
8/11/2010
Material failure
6/7/2011
Material failure
10/19/2012 Mechanical problems and/or flooding onboard
Zuiderdam (n=3)
7/8/2010
Material failure
2/9/2012
Fire in engine room
9/25/2012
Material failure
P&O Cruises (4 ships, 12 incidents)
Artemis (n=2)
4/7/2010
Engine problems, skipped St. Barts
5/8/2010
Engine problems, itinerary changed from 10 ports to 4 ports (Pax advised when
boarding that there were engine problems and 1 port would be skipped)
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Aurora (n=4)
3/3/2009
Propulsion problemsBroke down 4 hours after leaving Sydney. Stuck in Auckland (with passengers aboard) for five days for repairs. Itinerary changed
9/18/2009
Mechanical problems and loss of bow thruster; changed itinerary
9/30/2011
Electrical problems delay for three hours departure from Portland, ME
2/8/2013
Fault with port propeller shaft. Delayed in Auckland, dropped two port calls
Oriana (n=4)
8/5/2010
8/7/2010
11/30/2010
6/2/2011
Delayed four hours in Dubrovnik; computers crash causing loss of steering system
Fire on tender
Engine breakdowns; missed port call
Collision with pier
Ventura (n=2)
10/18/2012 60 mm crack on full width of deck 14; passengers advised to not use balconies
3/17/2013
Propulsion problems cause missed ports and itinerary changes
P&O Australia (3 ships, 10 incidents)
Pacific Dawn (n=3)
1/8/2009
Engine problems; arrival in Sydney 10 hours late
2/15/2010
Propulsion and maintenance problems cause 18 hour delayed departure; itinerary
changed
4/10/2010
Loss of power and propulsion; near miss collision with bridge
Pacific Pearl (n=2)
2/2/2011
Three-meter-across chandelier falls three storeys into cafe area in atrium
2/3/2011
Lack of running water and working toilets
Pacific Sun (Left fleet in 2012) (n=5)
11/10/2009 Cruise canceled to permit repair of propulsion system
3/13/2010
Mechanical problems cause canceled port calls at Suva and Denarau
4/21/2010
Engine problems; cruise canceled
11/2/2010
Propulsion problem; 10 hour delayed arrival at Melbourne
2/28/2011
Engine problems, 24 hour delayed arrival at Newcastle; several ports canceled
Princess Cruises (10 ships, 34 incidents)
Caribbean Princess (n=9)
10/16/2009 Severe list, storm damage
4/5/2010
Severe list, steering malfunction
5/9/2010
Collision with gangway; departure delayed several hours
8/8/2010
Material failure
2/4/2012
Engine problemsdelays
2/25/2012
Material failure
3/12/2012
Engine problemsnext two cruises canceled
6/8/21012
Technical fault; remain in port overnight, itinerary changed
12/15/2012 Loss of electrical power
Coral Princess (n=3)
3/19/2009
Propulsion problems; missed port
8/19/2011
Turbine oil system failure; switch to diesel electric power
5/2/2013
Fire
Crown Princess (n=3)
6/20/2009
Fire in passenger cabin
7/17/2012
Electrical fire in passenger cabin
4/13/2013
Toilets in 410 cabins not operational
Dawn Princess (n=3)
6/15/2010
Propulsion breakdown, adrift for 2.25 hours; restored and sailing at reduced speed
7/16/2010
Engine problems; missed port call
10/27/2011 Mechanical problem; missed port call
Emerald Princess (n=2)
7/26/2010
Electrical failure leads to propulsion problems; no A/C; repaired in 6 hours
5/17/2011
Collision with fuel barge damages several lifeboats
Golden Princess (n=3)
1/22/2009
Near-collision with fishing vessel
3/22/2009
Fire in engine room
3/28/2012
Royal Princess (n=2)
6/18/2009
Fire in engine room as leaving Port Said, passengers called to muster stations;
cruise and next cruise canceled
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4/9/2010
Break in fire hose fitting causes extensive damage to restaurants; water leaked all
the way down to crew decks
Sapphire Princess (n=4)

7/12/2010
Severe list to avoid collision with whale
2/4/2011
2/26/2011
Material failure
9/7/2011
2 pleasure boats swamped and float dock damaged by ships wake when maneuvering in Ketchikan Harbour
Star Princess (n=3)
3/21/2011
Material failure
7/1/2012
Material failure
8/2/2012
Material failure
Sun Princess (n=2)
7/25/2012
Material failure
8/27/2012
Transformer blown leading to loss of power adrift for 3.5 hours
B. Royal Caribbean Cruises Limited
Celebrity Cruises (4 ships, 13 incidents)
Century (n=4)
10/15/2010 Rudder damaged, stranded in Villefranche-sur-Mer; cruise canceled
10/22/2011 Vessel maneuverability problems
3/25/2012
Engine problems, late departure and late arrival
10/28/2012 Fire
Infinity (n=3)
6/22/2010
Material failure
6/26/2010
56 hour delayed departure because of engine problems, canceled port call; five
days later an electrical fire causes power loss for several hours
8/23/2012
Material failure
Millennium (n=2)
3/9/2009
Cruise canceled to allow repair of problem with bearing on propeller shaft
4/9/2013
Electrical problem adversely affects propulsion, dead in water for 3 hours; port
call at Hanoi canceled
Summit (n=4)
1/10/2009
Electrical problem causes cruise to be shortened by one day and itinerary changed
2/27/2010
Material failure
4/9/2011
10/5/2012
Tender runs aground with 93 passengers and 2 crew, sustains major damage
Pullmantur (1 ship, 2 incidents)
Zenith (n=2)
8/18/2009
Fire while docked in Stockholm, evacuated; departed one day late, itinerary
changes
6/25/2013
Fire in engine room disables ship; towed to port
Royal Caribbean International (10 ships, 32 incidents)
Allure of the Seas (n=2)
1/29/2012
Fire in incinerator area
4/12/2012
Fire in engine room, section 6 of ship evacuated; drift 12 hours and then operated on 1 engine
Brilliance of the Seas (n=2)
10/13/2009 Windows broken out in storm and 35 passenger cabins flooded, delayed departure
from Barcelona
12/12/2010 Severe list while entering Alexandria, Egypt; 30 passengers injured
Enchantment of the Seas (n=5)
7/21/2009
Material failure
3/23/2010
Load sharing problem shuts down engine 4
7/27/2011
Steering gear pump failure on pump #4
2/20/2012
Propulsion problemsone propeller broken; delayed departure by 24 hours,
changed itinerary, sailing at half speed
3/10/2012
Propulsion problems; spent 27 hours in Port Canaveral to accommodate repairs,
itinerary changed
Explorer of the Seas (n=7)
2/5/2009
Propeller damaged causes change in itinerary on this cruise and next
4/14/2009
Changes in itinerary for several upcoming cruises; too late to cancel, no explanation
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9/30/2009
1/13/2010
3/14/2010
9/14/2012
10/29/2012
Collision with Carnival Legend; minor damage

Delayed departure because delayed arrival from drydock
Severe list due to human error; injuries and considerable damage
Collision with Norwegian Star when mooring line breaks; minimal damage
Sailed into Hurricane Sandy
Grandeur of the Seas (n=3)

2/26/2009
Loss of two engines; material failure
7/30/2009
Loss of power due to malfunctioning power inverter; loss of electrical power
5/27/2013
Fire; cruise canceled
Jewel of the Seas (n=3)
8/3/2010
One hydraulic motor not working forcing reduced speeds; itinerary changes
12/7/2010
Collision with 500 meter long 2 foot wide flexible plastic pipe, becoming wrapped
around front of ship
9/6/2012
4.5 hour delay leaving Cape Liberty; no reason given
Legend of the Seas (n=2)
2/9/2009
Pulled into Key West for unscheduled stop because of faulty azipod and leaking oil
(needed boom around ship); repaired by days end
1/30/2012
Fire in bar (Cafe Promenade)
Majesty of the Sea (n=4)
8/13/2010
Lifeboat malfunction when lowered; damaged and release of oil
9/30/2011
11/2/2011
Material failure
11/7/2011
Material failure
Oasis of the Seas (n=2)
5/7/2010
Emergency generator damaged; given three months to repair
11/16/2012 Vessel maneuverability
Radiance of the Seas (n=2)
11/25/2009 Collision with Carnival Splendor in Puerto Vallarta; minor damage
1/27/2011
Ship is operating under USCG COTP due to one of two main propulsion azipods
not working; repairs anticipated in fall 2011
C. Prestige Cruise Holdings (3 companies, 5 ships, 14 incidents)
Norwegian Cruise Line (2 ships, 4 incidents)
Norwegian Dawn (n=2)
11/27/2009 Loss of power for hours (no A/C), ship disembarks in San Juan instead of Miami;
this and next cruise canceled
8/27/2010
Leaves Bermuda 11 hours early because engine problems cause slower speeds;
want to arrive in NYC on time
Norwegian Star (n=2)
4/28/2012
Collision while docking
9/14/2012
Collision with Explorer of the Seas when mooring line breaks; minimal damage
Oceania Cruise (1 ship, 3 incidents)
Regatta (n=3)
6/20/2011
Material failure
7/24/2011
Material failure
10/19/2012 Electrical outage; delayed return to port (NYC) by several hours
Regent Seven Seas Cruises (2 ships, 7 incidents)
Seven Seas Navigator (n=2)
10/25/2011 Material failure; one day delayed departure from Charleston, itinerary change
11/9/2011
Material failure
Seven Seas Voyager (n=5)
3/22/2009
Propulsion problems (fishing net caught in azipod), reduced speed; many ports
canceled
4/1/2009
Passengers told upon embarkation that most port calls canceled from Dubai to
Rome because of propulsion problems; following two cruises canceled
12/14/2009 One azipod fails so sailing at reduced speed; port call canceled
10/4/2010
Podded propulsion system fails; passengers flown home from Athens, 2 cruises
canceled
3/17/2013
Propulsion problem; skipped ports and itinerary changes
D. Independent Cruise Lines
Avalon Waterways (1 ship, 3 incidents)
Avalon Tranquility (n=3)
7/23/2009
Collision with the tall ship Schoenbrunn, a 1912-built paddlesteamer
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9/5/2011
12/13/2011
Collision with cargo shipholed, cruise ended

Fire in generator room
Celebration Cruises (1 ship, 2 incidents)

Bahamas Celebration (n=2)
2/1/2012
Maneuverability problems
3/30/2012
Maneuverability problems
Fred Olsen Cruises (1 ship, 2 incidents)
Black Watch (n=2)
10/21/2009 Severe listnavigational error while entering La Coruna Harbour (Spain)
8/12/2010
Collision with icebergdamage superficial
Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) (2 ships, 5 incidents)
Opera (n=3)
3/30/2011
Collision with pier (twice), damage to several cabins; delayed 10 hours for repairs
5/15/2011
Failure of an electric panel causes power loss for 8.5 hours; towed to port and
cruise canceled
5/27/2011
Detained by UK authorities for noncompliance with safety regulations
Poesia (n=2)
1/7/2012
Ran aground in Bahamas; waited for high tide to refloat
1/10/2012
Collision with pier while leaving Jamaican port
Saga Cruises (1 ship, 3 incidents)
Saga Ruby (n=3)
10/12/2009 Collision with pier, emergency repairs to bow; itinerary changes
11/11/2012 Engine problems; remainder of cruise canceled
1/7/2013
Mechanical problems with crankshaft; current world cruise delayed ten days
Silversea Cruises (1 ship, 2 incidents)
Silver Shadow (n=2)
3/19/12
Collision with container ship off Vietnam; major damage to container ship, minor
damage to cruise ship
9/9/2012
Material failure
Thomson Cruises (1 ship, 3 incidents)
Thomson Dream (n=3)
7/25/2010
Plumbing/sewage problems
1/17/2011
Starboard engine fire
5/20/2012
Severe list following two maneuvers caused by slip of the hand; major damage
Travel Dynamics International (1 ship, 3 incidents)
Clelia II (n=3)
12/26/2009 Propeller damaged, loss of power; escorted to port, next cruise canceled
9/1/2010
Loss of electrical power (human error)
12/9/2010
Wave in storm breaks bridge window; damage to electronics, affecting engine performance
Voyages of Discovery/Coastal and Maritime Voyages (1 ship, 4 incidents)
Discovery (n=4)
10/15/2009 Engine problems; port missed
12/05/2009 Delayed return from drydock; itinerary changed
3/4/2013
Ship detained in UK for safety issues; cruise canceled
5/7/2013
Deep cleaning after illness outbreak delays departure; itinerary change
Appendix 3: Summary of Persons Overboard, January 1995June 2013

(n=210)*
A. Gender
Male
Female
73.8%
26.2%
B. Age by Gender
Total
Male
Female
Mean
Range
Mean
Range
Mean
Range
39.82
1490
38.85
1490
42.11
1579
* The data contained in this table is based on available information. Details were not consistently available for each incident. See www.cruisejunkie.com/Overboard.html for details.
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C. Vessel
Cruise
Ferry
91.4%
8.6%
D. Passenger vs
Crew
Passenger
Crew
75%
25%
E. Rescued
16.7%
F. Alcohol
6.2%
G. Suicide
11.0%
H. Murder
3.3%
I. Fall
9.5%
J. Casino loss
2.4%
K. Fight
7.1%
Appendix 4: Drug Busts, January 2009June 2013 1

A. Gender
Male
Female
83.33%
16.66%
B. Age by Gender
Total
Female
Range
Mean
Range
Mean
Range
38.5
1974
38.6
1974
38.25
2054
C. Drug Busts by Country (N=53)

Bermuda
U.S.
Belize:
UK
St. Kitts-Nevis
Jamaica
Cayman Islands
Australia
Spain
27
8 (27 persons)
6
6
2
1
1
1
1 (9 persons)
D. Drug Busts by U.S. State/City

Florida
Baltimore
Alaska
U.S. Virgin Islands
Puerto Rico
3 (17 persons)
2
1
1
1
E. Ships with 2 or More Drug Busts

Norwegian Dawn
Explorer of the Seas
Black Watch
Enchantment of the Seas
Summit
Allure of the Seas
Bahamas Celebration
Grandeur of the Seas
Grand Princess
Norwegian Gem
Poesia
9
6
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
1 Data
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Mean
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Appendix 5: Klein, R.A. and J. Poulston. 2011. Sex at Sea: Sexual Crimes Aboard
Cruise Ships, Journal of Tourism in Marine Environments, 7:2, pp. 6780.
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92
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, sir.
And now we will go to The Honorable Mark Rosenker, whos the
former Chairman of the NTSBthat is, the National Transportation Safety Boardand member of the Cruise Line International
Associations Panel of Experts.
Please.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK ROSENKER, FORMER CHAIRMAN,
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD AND MEMBER
OF THE CRUISE LINE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS
PANEL OF EXPERTS
Mr. ROSENKER. Thank youhaving trouble getting thisthere it

goes.
The CHAIRMAN. OK.
Mr. ROSENKER. Thank you, Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking
Member Thune, distinguished members of the Committee. Thank
you very much for inviting me to testify today.
Until August of 2009, I served as the 11th Chairman of the
NTSB. Im also a retired Major General in the United States Air
Force Reserve. Prior to being appointed and confirmed to the
NTSB, I served as Deputy Assistant to the President and Director
of the White House Military Office for President George W. Bush,
with responsibility for all DOD support to the President and Vice
President. As part of my responsibilities, I was traveling with the
President on September 11, 2001.
I welcome the opportunity to once again testify before this important committee and applaud its focus, not only on cruise ship safety, but safety in all modes of transportation in our Nation.
Im testifying today in my capacity as a member of the Independent Panel of Experts established by the Cruise Lines International Association. The panel was put in place as part of the
Global Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review, launched in
January 2012, following the Concordia accident. The review was focused on the critical human factors and operational aspects of maritime safety, and was introduced to identify best practices and develop new policies that could be implemented to rapidly further enhance crew passenger and crew safety. The review was led by senior industry executives responsible for maritime safety.
Ultimately, the review resulted in the industrys adoption of 10
policies that were submitted to, and accepted by, the IMO. The
IMO is an independent international maritime regulatory body,
with 170 member states, including the United States, which mandates global standards for the safety and operation of all ships, including cruise ships.
The Independent Panel of Experts was formally appointed in
April 2012 to provide an impartial assessment of the reviews recommendations. I took this panels efforts extremely seriously and
approached it with the same unwavering commitment that I had
as NTSB Chair, to raise the bar of safety even higher on this already safe industry.
The CHAIRMAN. The Committee was appointed by whom?
Mr. ROSENKER. CLIA. Oh, which committee are you talking
about, sir?
The CHAIRMAN. The one youthat you
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Mr. ROSENKER. CLIA. CLIA created this Independent Panel of
Experts.
The CHAIRMAN. Thats the association, then.
Mr. ROSENKER. Yes, sir.
Each member of the panel has extensive experience in the maritime regulatory and/or accident investigation fields. The other
members are Stephen Mayer, a retired Rear Admiral in the Royal
Navy and led the U.K. Marine Accident Investigation Branch, the
equivalent of their NTSB for marine; Willem de Ruiterhe led the
European Maritime Safety Agency; and Dr. Jack Spencer, who led
the Office of Maritime Safety at the NTSB when I was there and
is also a retired Coast Guard Officer.
The panel deeply examines the issues and policies considered by
the industry. We are a deliberative body that is independent of
CLIAs technical and regulatory advisory committees. Our advice,
counsel, and recommendations cover a wide range of topics and are
delivered to CLIAs board of directors, executive committee, and
other advisory committees, as appropriate.
We find our views to be well received, and candor is a hallmark
of our confidential deliberations. At times, the deliberations among
the panel members, themselves, have been very spirited. This has
further assisted CLIA in highlighting for its members the various
thoughtful perspectives of complex safety issues and the related
policy implications.
Every aspect of the cruise industry is heavily regulated and monitored by the United States, EU, and international maritime law to
protect the safety of passengers and crew members. The panel has
helped to strengthen and improve the wide-ranging policies that
were put forth by the industry as part of the review. But, we also
provided many new and innovative ideas and recommendations
that were incorporated into the final policies as well as other initiatives.
When I was Chairman of the NTSB, I closely monitored trends
in safety across every sector of transportation. I applied my experiences and knowledge of transportation safety to the panel as we
evaluated and suggested policies and best-practice improvements. I
can say, unequivocally, that the cruise industry has been very receptive to our input. Ive been impressed with the level of collaboration of this industry with its regulators and other stakeholders.
Panel members have been extremely impressed with the speed
with which the industry adopted the 10 policies developed by review, all of which exceed current international regulatory requirements.
As an avid cruiser, I also know that cruise vacations are not only
quite enjoyable, but, most importantly, extremely safe. The panels
work continues as we are advising and assisting the cruise industry in providing ideas, guidance, and impartial analysis as it reviews and seeks improvements to shipboard operations and safety.
Thank you again, sir, and I look forward to the questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rosenker follows:]
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MARK ROSENKER, FORMER CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD; AND MEMBER, CRUISE LINE INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATIONS PANEL OF EXPERTS
Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Thune and distinguished members of the
Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today. My name is Mark Rosenker
and I am a former Chairman of the United States National Transportation Safety
Board and a retired United States Air Force Reserve Major General. I also served
as Deputy Assistant to President George W. Bush and Director of the White House
Military Office. I welcome the opportunity to testify before this committee, which
served as my authorizing committee during my tenure as Chairman of the National
Transportation Safety Board.
I am testifying today in my capacity as a member of the independent Panel of
Experts established by the Cruise Lines International Association, or CLIA. The
independent Panel of Experts was put in place as part of the Global Cruise Industry
Operational Safety Review, which was launched in January 2012 by the industry
in the wake of the Concordia incident. The Review was introduced as part of the
cruise line industrys efforts to execute on their stated commitment to continuous
improvement and innovation in shipboard operations and safety. It focused on the
critical human factors and operational aspects of maritime safety.
The Review was introduced to identify best practices and develop new policies
that could be implemented rapidly on an industry-wide basis to further enhance the
safety of passengers and crew. It took the lead in identifying additional best practices for industry-wide implementation and ultimately, formal submission to the
International Maritime Organization, as appropriate, that could strengthen the
cruise industrys safety record. [See appendix] The International Maritime Organization is an international maritime regulatory body with 170 Member States including the United States, which mandates global standards for the safety and operation
of cruise ships. The Review was guided by a task force consisting of senior industry
executives from CLIA member lines with responsibility for maritime safety. To commence the Review, CLIAs member lines took a detailed look at existing safety procedures and practices. Senior cruise line executives undertook internal reviews of
their own operational safety practices and procedures concerning issues of navigation, evacuation, emergency training, and related practices and procedures.
The independent Panel of Experts was formally appointed in April 2012 to provide
an impartial assessment of the recommendations developed by the Review. Collectively, those of us on the Panel of Experts bring well over a century of experience
in transportation and safety to the table. Our backgrounds include senior positions
with a diverse mix of organizations. Each Panel member has deep experience in the
maritime, regulatory and accident investigation fields and the Panel is balanced
geographically with equal representation from the United States and Europe. The
three other members of the panel are Rear Admiral (Ret.) Stephen Meyer, Dr. Jack
Spencer, and Willem de Ruiter.
Stephen Meyer is a retired Rear Admiral in the Royal Navy. He is a former commander of a number of Royal Navy Ships and was the former head of the United
Kingdom Marine Accident Investigation Branch.
Dr. Jack Spencer is the former Director of the Office of Marine Safety at the National Transportation Safety Board. Dr. Spencer has more than 40 years of experience with the U.S. Coast Guard, American Bureau of Shipping, and National Transportation Safety Board. For 30 years, he has been on United States delegations to
the International Maritime Organization.
Willem de Ruiter is former head of the European Maritime Safety Agency
(EMSA). In 2003, Mr. de Ruiter was appointed as the first executive director of
EMSA and charged with building up the organization. He joined EMSA after a distinguished career in the Dutch government and at the European Commission.
The independent Panel of Experts was formally appointed in April 2012 to provide
an impartial assessment of the Reviews recommendations. I took this panel extremely seriously and approached it with the same unwavering commitment that I
had as NTSB Chair to raise the bar of safety even higher for this safe sector.
The Panel takes a very active view of the issues being discussed and policies being
developed by CLIA that relate to all aspects of maritime safety. We are a deliberative body that is independent of CLIAs technical and regulatory advisory committees. Our advice, counsel and recommendations have covered a wide range of topics
and are delivered to CLIAs Board of Directors, Executive Committee, and other advisory committees as appropriate. We are all experienced professionals and we find
our views to be well-received and that candor is a hallmark of our confidential deliberations. We are a group of highly critical and deeply committed experts and we are
never bashful about sharing what we are thinking either as individuals or as a
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Panel. At times our deliberations between the Panel members have been very spirited. This has further assisted CLIA in highlighting for their members the various
thoughtful perspectives of complex safety issues and the related policy implications.
As someone with four decades of experience in the transportation and technology
industries, Ive always known that the cruise industry is governed by an extremely
extensive framework of safety regulations. Every aspect of the cruise industry is
heavily regulated and monitored under United States, European Union, and international maritime law to protect the safety of passengers and crewmembers. Regulations start with the design and construction of the ship and extend to the operation of the vessel, the emergency equipment on board, and scenarios for emergency
situations, including the evacuation of a ship. Cruise ships are also subject to multiple layers of enforcement at the international, flag State and port State level.
The Panel played an active role and provided many new and innovative ideas and
recommendations that were incorporated into the final policies and other initiatives,
in addition to providing independent, expert analysis of proposed policies. As the
Panel gained more experience working together, our commitment to the process
grew and the value of our role became even clearer over time, as our engagement
in the issues and policy development began to produce tangible results. It is without
question that we are working with a talented and deeply committed group of cruise
industry professionals that share the Panels values toward maritime safety. If I did
not believe this to be the case, I would most certainly not be associated with these
efforts, nor would any of my colleagues that serve on the Panel.
During the course of the Review, my fellow panelists and I examined safety-related shipboard systems and observed safety drills aboard one of the worlds largest
cruise ships. We visited the state-of-the-art full bridge simulator at the Resolve
Maritime Academy to see how technology can strengthen safety and supplement
training on cruise ships. We held a session with officials at Airbus to draw from
their efforts related to Crew Resource Management, Simulation Training, and Safety Culture. We met with leaders of the Review multiple times to review, analyze,
and discuss recommended changes to cruise industry safety practices and offered
our own ideas based on our individual and collective experiences.
As a member of the Panel of Experts during last years Review, my role was to
provide an impartial assessment of the recommendations developed by the established Task Force of cruise line experts, before they were ultimately implemented
and then submitted for formal consideration to the IMO. Additionally, as Panel
members we shared numerous, wide-ranging recommendations and suggestions that
were incorporated into the industrys policies, as well as into other important ongoing efforts that have not specifically resulted in published industry-wide policies.
All ten policies that resulted from the Review were incorporated into IMO standards. Those ten policies, in the order in which they were introduced, are as follows:
The Passenger Muster Policy requires musters for embarking passengers prior to
departure from port and was launched with immediate effect on February 9, 2012.
On occasions when guests arrive after the muster has been completed, the policy
dictates that they are promptly provided with individual or group safety briefings.
This practice exceeds existing legal requirementswhich require that musters occur
within 24 hours of passenger embarkation.
Under the Passage Planning Policy, each passage plan is to be thoroughly briefed
to all bridge team members who will be involved in execution of the plan well in
advance of its implementation. The passage plan will be drafted by the designated
officer and approved by the master. This policy was effective upon its announcement
on April 24, 2012.
To minimize unnecessary disruptions and distractions on the bridge, the Bridge
Access Policy requires bridge access be limited to those with operationally related
functions during any period of restricted maneuvering or when increased vigilance
is required such as arrival/departure from port, heavy traffic, or poor visibility. Further, member lines are to take steps to prevent distractions to watchkeeping during
these periods. This policy was effective upon its announcement on April 24, 2012.
The Excess Lifejackets Policy ensures that the number of lifejackets carried is far
in excess of the number of persons actually onboard a ship. In addition to the statutory requirements of carriage of lifejackets for each person onboard and certain specified extras, the cruise industry adopted a policy of carrying additional adult lifejackets onboard each cruise ship in excess of current legal requirements. As a result,
the number of additional adult lifejackets provided must not be less than the total
number of persons berthed within the ships most populated main vertical fire zone.
All of the additional lifejackets addressed in this policy are to be stored in public
spaces, at the muster stations, on deck or in lifeboats, and in such a manner as to
be readily accessible to crewmembers for distribution as may be necessary in the
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event of an emergency. This policy was effective upon its announcement on
April 24, 2012.
The Nationality of Passengers Policy was developed in response to the request of
governments at the May 2012 meeting of the IMO Maritime Safety Committee
meeting. This policy prescribes that the nationality of each passenger onboard is to
be recorded, kept ashore and made readily available to search and rescue personnel
as appropriate. This policy was effective upon its announcement on June 26, 2012.
Under the Common Elements of Musters and Emergency Instructions Policy, member cruise lines have specified 12 common elements that are to be communicated
to passengers in musters and emergency instructions. In addition to current legal
requirements, this policy specifically requires that musters and emergency instructions are to include the following common elements:
1. When and how to don a lifejacket
2. Description of emergency signals and appropriate responses in the event of
an emergency
3. Location of lifejackets
4. Where to muster when the emergency signal is sounded
5. Method of accounting for passenger attendance at musters both for training
and in the event of an actual emergency
6. How information will be provided in an emergency
7. What to expect if the Master orders an evacuation of the ship
8. What additional safety information is available
9. Instructions on whether passengers should return to cabins prior to mustering, including specifics regarding medications, clothing, and lifejackets
10. Description of key safety systems and features
11. Emergency routing systems and recognizing emergency exits
12. Who to seek out for additional information
This policy was effective upon its announcement on June 26, 2012.
To facilitate training for lifeboat operations, the Lifeboat Loading for Training
Purposes Policy requires that at least one lifeboat on each ship is to be filled with
crewmembers equal in number to its certified number of occupants at least every
six months. Under this policy, for safety considerations, the loading of lifeboats for
training purposes is to be performed only while the boat is waterborne and the boat
should be lowered and raised with only the lifeboat crew onboard essential for safe
operation. All lifeboat crew and embarkation/boarding station crew are to be required to attend the lifeboat loading drill. If not participating inside the lifeboat,
crew members are to observe the loading of the lifeboat to its certified number of
people and its operation. Taking into account safety consideration, the policy also
includes specific provisions for ships with crew sizes less than three hundred. This
policy was effective upon its announcement on September 20, 2012.
Operational safety can be enhanced by achieving substantive consistency in bridge
operating procedures among commonly owned ships, for example by providing that
bridge personnel who may rotate among such ships can be familiarized with a common set of procedures. The Harmonization of Bridge Procedures Policy requires that
bridge operating procedures are to be harmonized as much as possible, both within
individual companies and among brands within a commonly owned and operated
fleet. Under this policy, each member operating multiple ships and each cruise line
brand that is commonly owned and operated with another brand is to harmonize
their respective procedures for bridge operations. This policy was announced on November 15, 2012 and its implementation has been completed.
The Location of Lifejacket Stowage Policy complements the Excess Lifejackets policy under which oceangoing cruise ships carry additional adult lifejackets onboard
far exceeding the number of persons actually onboard the ship. Under this new policy lifejackets equal to or greater than the number required by international regulations and the ships flag State are to be stowed in close proximity to either muster
stations or lifeboat embarkations points on newly-constructed ships. Consequently,
lifejackets will be readily accessible by crewmembers for distribution to passengers
in the event of an emergency. This policy further enhances shipboard safety as passengers will have even greater access to lifejackets in the event of an emergency.
This policy was announced on November 15, 2012 and goes into effect with newlyconstructed cruise ships for which the building contract is placed on or after July 1,
2013.
The Securing Heavy Objects policy requires that oceangoing members include procedures in their Safety Management Systems to secure heavy objects either perma-
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nently, when not in use, or during severe weather. This policy was announced on
November 15, 2012 and its implementation is now complete.
When I was Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, I closely
monitored trends in safety across every sector of transportation. Ive been able to
apply my experiences and knowledge of transportation safety to the panel as we
evaluated the suggested policy and best practice improvements. Each of the individual Panel members brings unique and in-depth strengths to the Panel as a
whole; one of my greatest strengths is a broad view of transportation safety that
includes but reaches far beyond the maritime sector.
I can say unequivocally that the cruise industry has been very receptive to our
input. Ive also been impressed with the level of collaboration of this industry with
its regulators and other key stakeholders to enhance safety practices and procedures. The cruise industry works continually with the IMO, other global maritime
authorities, classification societies, and shipbuilders to implement and enhance
what are already stringent safety standards. My involvement on this panel has
given me confidence that the industry is engaged in proactive and responsible relationships with regulators across the globe.
Along with the other members of the Panel of Experts, Ive been extremely impressed with the speed with which the industry adopted the ten policies developed
by the Review, all of which exceed current regulatory requirements. Further, I believe that CLIAs initiative to combine these ten policies related to the Review with
an additional ten new and existing industry-wide policies is a very positive and aggressive step for a trade association to take. We specifically advised CLIA as they
considered this initiative, including with relation to developing a comprehensive
Compendium of Policies; their methods of CEO-level verification of policy implementation; and their use of Safety Management Systems to ensure the sixteen policies
related to safety and environmental protection were subject to a regulatory internal
and external auditing scheme. These are exactly the types of proactive and innovative actions that I, and my fellow Panel members, have encouraged this industry
to take. As an avid cruiser, I also feel it is important that consumers understand
that cruise vacations are extremely safe. This industry is highly regulated that is
continuously subjected to tremendous oversight, wherever they operate.
As members of the Panel of Experts, our work isnt done because the Operational
Safety Review is completed. We continue to advise and assist the cruise industry
in providing ideas, guidance and impartial analysis as it continues to review and
seek improvements to shipboard operations and safety. We remain actively engaged
by providing our advice through CLIAs Board of Directors, Executive Committee
and other Advisory Committees. This has ensured that while the formal structure
of the Operational Safety Review wound down, the cruise industry could still benefit
from our active input and expertise.
So thank you again for the opportunity to testify today and I look forward to your
questions.
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APPENDIX TABLE
OF
CONTENTS
MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE

90TH Session, Agenda Item 27
(MSC 90/27/1)
(MSC 90/27/2)
(MSC 90/27/11)
(MSC 90/27/12)
(MSC 91/7/1)
(MSC 92/6/1)
(MSC 92/6/9)
(MSC 92/6/10)
MSC/90/27/1
February 29, 2012
Original: English

90TH Session
Agenda Item 27
PASSENGER SHIP SAFETY

Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review
Submitted by Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA)
SUMMARY
Executive summary:
This document describes the work undertaken immediately following the Concordia incident, under the leadership of the Cruise
Lines International Association, to address operational safety.
This work will continue and recommendations will be provided to
the industry, IMO, and governments on an ongoing basis.
Strategic direction:
5.1
High-level action:
5.1.1
Planned output:
None
Action to be taken:
Paragraph 16
Related document:
MSC 90/1/Rev.1; MSC 90/27
Background
1. In response to the Concordia incident, and as part of the industrys continuous
efforts to review and improve safety measures, the Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA), speaking on behalf of the global cruise lines industry, announced the
launch of a Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review on 27 January 2012, although it had begun prior to that date.
2. As best practices are identified via this Review, they will be shared on an ongoing basis among CLIA members and any appropriate recommendations will be
shared with the IMO.
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Support for the Secretary-Generals Efforts
3. In expressing his condolences to the families of those lost in the Concordia incident, the Secretary-General stated his determination to work with others to ensure
that such an accident could be prevented in the future and has pledged that the
Organization will consider seriously the lessons to be learned and will take action,
as appropriate, in the light of those findings.
4. CLIA specifically supports the views expressed by the Secretary-General in his
30 January 2012 press statement on this subject.
5. The Secretary-General indicated in that statement that he had opened a channel of communication with passenger ship operatorsthrough the Cruise Lines
International Association (CLIA)and that he welcomed the response to his request
to hold meetings with him to discuss the safety of cruise passenger ships in general
and, in particular, any findings and recommendations from their own internal review of currentpractices and safety procedures in the operation of passenger ships.
6. This Review is intended to complement the efforts and goals of the Organization and to also be completely consistent with the Secretary-Generals description
of the on-going communications and operational safety initiatives of the global
cruise industry.
Description of the Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review
7. The Review will include a comprehensive assessment of the critical human factors and operational aspects of maritime safety.
8. Key components of the Review include:
.1 An internal review by CLIA members of their own operational safety practices and procedures concerning issues of navigation, evacuation, emergency
training, and related practices and procedures.
.2 Consultation with independent external experts.
.3 Identification and sharing of industry best practices and policies, as well as
possible recommendations to the IMO for substantive regulatory changes to further improve the industrys operational safety.
.4 Collaboration with the IMO, governments and regulatory bodies to implement
any necessary regulatory changes.
9. More specifically, an example of how one major cruise line intends to proceed
with their internal review in three distinct phases might be useful for the Committee:
First Phase: Bridge operating procedures; Emergency response procedures; and
Abandon ship
Second Phase: Lessons learned; Communications shoreside and with local authorities; Remote monitoring of voyages and status of ship; and Newbuild implications
Third Phase: Emergency responses to fire, flooding, collision, and grounding;
Damage control equipment; Training; Safety Management System; Audit procedures; and Corporate emergency response
10. Each cruise line will conduct their internal review in accordance with their
own Safety Management System.
Outputs of the Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review
11. The first output of the Review was the cruise industrys Passenger Muster Policy, announced on 9 February 2012 and made immediately effective, serves as an
example of the type of best practices and procedures that may be expected as outputs from the Review.
12. That Passenger Muster Policy is offered to this Committee for them to consider and reads as follows:
Current legal requirements for conducting a muster of passengers are found
in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and mandate that a muster for embarking passengers occur within 24 hours of their embarkation. Notwithstanding the legal requirement, CLIAs member cruise lines
have identified a best practice effective immediately that calls for conducting
the mandatory muster for embarking passengers prior to departure from port.
On occasions when guests arrive after the muster has been completed, CLIAs
policy is that they be promptly provided with individual or group safety briefings that meet the requirements for musters applicable under SOLAS. This
practice exceeds existing legal requirements and has been adopted by CLIAs
membership as a formal policy to help ensure that any mandatory musters or
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briefings are conducted for the benefit of all newly embarked passengers at the
earliest practical opportunity.
13. Additional outputs from the Review will be provided as appropriate to the Organization via its relevant Committees and Sub-committees.
Conclusion
14. CLIA is fully committed to understanding the factors that contributed to the
Concordia incident and is proactively responding to all maritime safety issues.
15. The Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review will enable the industry to do
so in a meaningful and expedited manner.
Action requested of the Committee
16. The Committee is invited to consider the information provided in this submission and take action as appropriate.
90th session
Agenda item 27
MSC 90/27/2
13 March 2012
Original: ENGLISH

Submitted by the Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA)
SUMMARY
Executive summary:
This document describes certain specific initial outputs from the

Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review, which was undertaken immediately following the Concordia incident, under the
leadership of the Cruise Lines International Association, to address operational safety. This work will continue and recommendations will be provided to the industry, IMO, and governments on an ongoing basis.
5.1
High-level action:
5.1.1
Planned output:
None
Action to be taken:
Paragraph 9
Related document:
MSC 90/1/Rev.1; MSC 90/27; MSC 90/27/1; MSCMEPC.3/Circ.3;

and Res. MSC255(84)
Background
3. In CLIAs previous submission, MSC 90/27/1 we described the basic framework
for the Review and reported on the first output, which was our Passenger Muster
Policy.
4. The first output of the Review was the cruise industrys Passenger Muster Policy, announced on 9 February 2012 and made immediately effective, serves as an
example of the type of best practices and procedures that may be expected as outputs from the Review.
5. In the interim, the cruise industry has developed three additional outputs
which CLIA wishes to share with this Committee:
i. The cruise industry is of the view that we, along with the rest of the maritime
community, would benefit from increased reliability and transparency with regard to marine casualty information. Specifically, we believed the relevant information contained in the IMO database would benefit from some additional
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verification. Accordingly, CLIA recently undertook an effort with the IMO Secretariat to harmonize the information in Annex I of the GISIS Marine Casualties and Incidents module to ensure that no recent and known very serious
casualties, alternatively referred to as very serious marine casualties, involving one or more fatalities on a cruise passenger ship were inadvertently
omitted. This action resulted in adding and verifying basic information on a
total of fifteen marine casualties in the database, but did not result in the removal of any existing marine casualties or associated data.
ii. Consistent with the above actions regarding Annex I of the GISIS Marine Casualties and Incidents module, CLIA is of the view that a mandatory obligation
to provide information on the occurrence of very serious casualties is beneficial
to Member States, the maritime industry, and the public at large. As we
worked through reconciling existing IMO casualty data with the best data
presently available to our industry, we found substantial inconsistency in reporting. Thus, to assist Member States in their ongoing efforts to consider improvements to maritime safety through examination of casualties, we respectfully wish to draw attention to the existing provisions in the mandatory IMO
Casualty Investigation Code (Res. MSC.255(84)) and those in MSCMEPC.3/
Circ.3.
iii. Thus, recognizing that it is not procedurally appropriate for CLIA to propose
an amendment to a mandatory instrument, we request that Member States
consider revising SOLAS Chapter XI1, Regulation 6 to expressly and more
clearly emphasize the mandatory reporting requirements regarding very serious casualties. We believe that Member States would find this to improve the
breadth and depth of reporting, providing them a better foundation for prevention of future casualties.
Conclusion
90th session
Agenda item 27
MSC 90/27/11
10 April 2012
Original: ENGLISH

SUMMARY
VerDate Nov 24 2008
Executive summary:
This document describes a specific additional output from the

Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review, which was undertaken immediately following the Concordia incident, under the
leadership of the Cruise Lines International Association, to address operational safety. This particular output relates to the
subject of Carriage of Additional Lifejackets onboard. This work
will continue and recommendations will be provided to the industry, IMO, and governments on an ongoing basis.
5.1
High-level action:
5.1.1
Planned output:
None
Action to be taken:
Paragraph 10
Related document:
MSC 90/1/Rev.1; MSC 90/27; MSC 90/27/1; MSC 90/27/2; and

MSC 90/27/12
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Background
3. In the first of CLIAs previous submissions, MSC 90/27/1, we described the
basic framework for the Review and reported on the first output, which was our
Passenger Muster Policy.
4. In MSC 90/27/2 and 90/27/XX, CLIA reported upon a series of additional outputs of the Review.
5. The first outputs of the Review, as mentioned above, were reported in MSC 90/
27/1, 90/27/2, and 90/27/12.
6. The cruise industry has developed an additional output of the Review, applicable to all of the oceangoing ships we represent, which CLIA wishes to share with
this Committee:
Carriage of Additional Lifejackets Onboard:
.1 The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), as well
as flag State regulations, require that passenger ships on international voyages
carry an approved lifejacket (Personal Flotation DevicePFD) for every person
onboard the ship.
.2 SOLAS requires that lifejackets suitable for children must also be carried in
a number equal to 10 percent of the number of passengers onboard, provided
that the number of childrens lifejackets carried must not be less than the number of children onboard.
.3 Lifejackets must also be carried for the persons on watch and must be stored
on the bridge, in the engine control room and at any other manned watch station.
.4 An additional number of lifejackets equal to 5 percent of the persons onboard
must also be carried and stored in conspicuous places on deck or at muster stations.
.5 Under certain circumstances, additional lifejackets must also be carried, and
stored at muster stations or in public spaces, when it is likely that persons may
not be able to return to their staterooms to retrieve the lifejacket stored there.
.6 Some flag states have similar requirements for domestic or non-international
voyages.
.7 CLIAs members have adopted a policy of carrying additional adult lifejackets
onboard each cruise ship in excess of these legal requirements.
.8 Under this policy the number of additional adult lifejackets to be provided
must not be less than the total number of persons berthed within the ships
most populated main vertical fire zone.
.9 Implementation of this policy ensures should result in spare lifejackets being
carried are far in excess of the number required by SOLAS.
.10 Some smaller cruise ships may be constructed with only one main vertical
fire zone that is utilized for accommodation spaces.
.11 For these vessels, CLIAs policy is that the maximum number of excess lifejackets provided need not exceed fifty percent of the total number of persons
carried by the vessel.
.12 Extra lifejackets for children in excess of legal requirements, in a number
equal to 10 percent of the number of passengers berthed within the most populated main vertical zone, must also be carried on international voyages under
this policy.
.13 All of the additional lifejackets addressed in this policy are to be stored in
public spaces, at the muster stations, on deck or in lifeboats, and in such a
manner as to be readily accessible to crewmembers for distribution as may be
necessary in the event of an emergency.
.14 Lifejackets carried for persons on watch, and at remotely located survival
craft stations, are to be carried in accordance with SOLAS and other applicable
flag State regulations.
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Conclusion
90th session
Agenda item 27
MSC 90/27/12
10 April 2012
Original: ENGLISH

SUMMARY
Executive summary:
This document describes certain specific additional outputs from

the Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review, which was undertaken immediately following the Concordia incident, under
the leadership of the Cruise Lines International Association, to
address operational safety. These particular outputs relate to the
subjects of Passage Planning and Personnel Access to the Bridge.
This work will continue and recommendations will be provided to
the industry, IMO, and governments on an ongoing basis.
5.1
High-level action:
5.1.1
Planned output:
None
Action to be taken:
Paragraph 10
Related document:
MSC 90/1/Rev.1; MSC 90/27; MSC 90/27/1; and MSC 90/27/2
Background
3. In the first of CLIAs previous submissions, MSC 90/27/1, we described the
basic framework for the Review and reported on the first output, which was our
Passenger Muster Policy.
4. In MSC 90/27/2, CLIA reported upon a series of additional outputs of the Review, which were all related to reporting of marine casualties.
5. The first outputs of the Review, as mentioned above, were reported in MSC 90/
27/1 and 90/27/2.
6. The cruise industry has developed two additional outputs of the Review, applicable to all of the oceangoing ships we represent, which CLIA wishes to share with
this Committee:
Passage Planning:
.1 Since 1999, CLIAs member lines have been subject to international guidance
concerning passage planning in accordance with IMO Resolution A.893(21),
Guidelines for Voyage Planning, adopted on 25 November 1999.
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.2 CLIA has adopted a policy that the guidance elements set forth in this resolution are deemed to be the mandatory minimum requirements in the development of passage plans by all member lines.
.3 In addition, CLIAs policy recognizes the Bridge Procedures Guide published
by the International Chamber of Shipping as a compilation of best practices valuable resource that should are to be utilized by all ship operators, either as a
component of their Safety Management Systems or Bridge Resource Management procedures.
.4 Under this policy each passage plan is to be thoroughly briefed to all bridge
team members who will be involved in execution of the plan well in advance
of its implementation.
.5 The passage plan will be drafted by the designated officer and approved by
the master.
.6 CLIAs policy is that all members are to take steps to help ensure bridge
team members are asked and encouraged to raise any operational concerns
without fear of retribution or retaliation.
Personnel Access to the Bridge:
.7 To minimize unnecessary disruptions and distractions to bridge team members in accomplishing their direct and indirect duties during any period of restricted maneuvering, or while maneuvering in conditions that the master or
company bridge procedures/policy deems to require increased vigilance (e.g., arrival/departure from port, heavy traffic, poor visibility), CLIAs members have
adopted a policy that bridge access is to be strictly limited to those with operational functions only during these periods.
.8 Further, member lines are to take steps to prevent distractions to
watchkeeping during these periods.
.9 Any deviation from this policy requires prior approval of senior management
ashore.
Conclusion
91st session
Agenda item 7
MSC 91/7/1
24 September 2012
Original: ENGLISH

SUMMARY
VerDate Nov 24 2008
Executive summary:
This document provides additional outputs from the Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review and proposes a revision to include these additional outputs in the annex to MSC.1/Circ.1446.
5.1
High-level action:
5.1.1
Planned output:
None.
Action to be taken:
Paragraph 14
Related documents:
MSC 90/27
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Background
1 In response to the Concordia incident, and as part of the industrys ongoing
launch of a Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review (hereinafter Review) on 27
January 2012, although it had begun prior to that date. As best practices are identified via this Review, they will be shared on an on-going basis among CLIA members
and as appropriate to the Organization.
2 In the first paper on this subject (MSC 90/27/1), CLIA provided the Committee
with an overview of the basic framework of the Review and also reported on the
first output, a CLIA policy on passenger muster prior to departure from port. Since
then, we have provided the Committee with additional outputs, including:
.1 The need for consistent reporting and additional verifying of marine casualties and incidents, in particular very serious casualties, with a concomitant recommendation that Member States consider revising SOLAS regulation XI1/6
to emphasize the mandatory reporting requirements of very serious casualties
(MSC 90/27/2);
.2 CLIA policies on passage planning and personnel access to the bridge (MSC
90/27/12); and
.3 CLIA policy on carriage of additional lifejackets on board (MSC 90/27/11).
3 The Committee, having considered the information provided in the Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review, invited Member Governments to recommend that
passenger ship companies conduct a review of operational safety measures with the
aim to enhance the safety of passenger ships, taking into consideration the recommended interim measures of an operational character listed in the Recommended
interim measures for passenger ship companies to enhance the safety of passenger
ships (MSC.1/Circ.1446), on ships flying their flag, on a voluntary basis and with
all possible urgency and efficiency (Resolution MSC.336(90)).
4 As part of the ongoing Review, the cruise industry has developed three additional outputs as laid out below in paragraphs 59.
Common Elements of Musters and Emergency Instructions
5 Regulations 8 and 19 of SOLAS Chapter III require musters and emergency
instructions to be provided for passengers. In addition to the legal requirements,
CLIA oceangoing members have adopted a policy that musters and emergency instructions are to include the following common elements:
.1 When and how to don a lifejacket.
.2 Description of emergency signals and appropriate responses in the event of
an emergency.
.3 Location of lifejackets.
.4 Where to muster * when the emergency signal is sounded.
.5 Method of accounting for passenger attendance at musters both for training
and in the event of an actual emergency.
.6 How information will be provided in an emergency.
.7 What to expect if the Master orders an evacuation of the ship.
.8 What additional safety information is available.
.9 Instructions on whether passengers should return to cabins prior to mustering, including specifics regarding medications, clothing, and lifejackets.
.10 Description of key safety systems and features.
.11 Emergency routing systems and recognizing emergency exits.
.12 Who to seek out for additional information.
Recording the Nationality of Passengers
6 Regulation 27 of SOLAS Chapter III requires that all persons on board be
counted prior to departure; details of those who have declared a need for special
care or assistance in an emergency be recorded and communicated to the Master
prior to departure; names and gender of all persons on board, distinguishing between adults, children and infants be recorded for search and rescue purposes; and
* The terms muster and assembly are used interchangeably and therefore are synonymous
for this purpose.
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that all of this information be kept ashore and made readily available to search and
rescue services when needed.
7 To further facilitate the effective and immediate availability of key information
in the event of an emergency situation, CLIA oceangoing members have adopted a
policy that, in addition to the information required by SOLAS, the nationality of
each passenger onboard is also to be recorded, kept ashore and made readily available to search and rescue services when needed.
Life Boat Loading for Training Purposes
8 To facilitate training for lifeboat operations, CLIA oceangoing members have
adopted a policy that at least one lifeboat on each ship is to be filled with crewmembers equal in number to its certified number of occupants at least every six
months. Under this policy:
.1 for safety considerations, the loading of lifeboats for training purposes is to
be performed only while the boat is waterborne and the boat should be lowered
and raised with only the lifeboat crew onboard;
.2 lifejackets should be worn;
.3 all lifeboat crew and embarkation/boarding station crew are to be required
to attend the lifeboat loading drill; and
.4 if not placed inside the lifeboat, those crew members are to observe the filling
of the lifeboat to its certified number of people.
9 This policy applies to ships with crew sizes of three hundred or greater, with
lifeboats installed. Ships with crew sizes of less than three hundred are to conduct
similar and equivalent training evolutions, at appropriate intervals, that are consistent with operational and safety considerations.
Proposed revision to MSC.1/Circ.1446
10 CLIA recommends the Committee consider revising MSC.1/Circ.1446 such
that these three additional outputs (paragraphs 59) would be included among the
other recommended interim measures contained in the annex to that circular.
Conclusion
11 CLIA is fully committed to understanding the factors that contributed to the
Concordia incident and is proactively responding to all maritime safety issues. The
Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review has enabled the industry to do so in a
meaningful and expedited manner.
12 Since the Review began, CLIA has provided the Committee with several outputs, including 7 new policies regarding passenger muster prior to departure from
port; passage planning; personnel access to the bridge; carriage of additional lifejackets on board; common elements of musters and emergency instructions; recording the nationality of passengers; and life boat loading for training purposes. In addition, CLIA has provided the Committee with an output of the Review regarding
marine casualty reporting.
13 Additional outputs from the Review will be provided as appropriate to the Organization via relevant Committees and Sub-Committees.
14 The Committee is invited to:
.1 consider the information provided in this document;
.2 consider revising the annex to MSC.1/Circ.1446 (paragraph 10); and
.3 take action as appropriate.
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92nd session
Agenda item 6
MSC 92/6/1
13 February 2013
Original: ENGLISH

SUMMARY
Executive summary:
This document provides additional outputs from the Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review and proposes a further revision to include these additional outputs in the annex to MSC.1/
Circ.1446/Rev.1.
5.1
High-level action:
5.1.1
Planned output:
None.
Action to be taken:
Paragraph 17
Related documents:
None.
Background
15 In response to the Concordia incident, the global cruise industry launched a
comprehensive Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review (hereinafter Review)
and identified a number of best practices, which have been shared among CLIA
members and with the Organization.
16 In the first paper on this subject (MSC 90/27/1), CLIA provided the Committee with an overview of the basic framework of the Review and also reported on
the first output, a CLIA policy on passenger muster prior to departure from port.
Since then, we have provided the Committee with additional outputs, including:
.1 The need for consistent reporting and additional verifying of marine casualties and incidents, in particular very serious casualties, with a concomitant recommendation that Member States consider revising SOLAS regulation XI1/6
to emphasize the mandatory reporting requirements of very serious casualties
(MSC 90/27/2);
.2 CLIA policies on passage planning and personnel access to the bridge (MSC
90/27/12);
.3 CLIA policy on carriage of additional lifejackets on board (MSC 90/27/11);
.4 CLIA policies on musters and emergency instructions (MSC 91/7/1);
.5 CLIA policy on recording the nationality of passengers (MSC 91/7/1); and
.6 CLIA policy on life boat loading for training purposes (MSC 91/7/1).
17 The Committee, having considered the information provided, invited Member
Governments to recommend that passenger ship companies conduct a review of
operational safety measures with the aim to enhance the safety of passenger ships,
taking into consideration the recommended interim measures of an operational
character listed in the Recommended interim measures for passenger ship companies
to enhance the safety of passenger ships (MSC.1/Circ.1446/Rev.1), on ships flying
their flag, on a voluntary basis and with all possible urgency and efficiency (Resolution MSC.[. . .](91)).
18 As part of the Review, the cruise industry has developed three additional outputs as laid out below in paragraphs 513.
Securing Heavy Objects
19 CLIAs oceangoing members have adopted a policy to incorporate procedures
into their Safety Management Systems (SMS) to help ensure the securing of heavy
objects either permanently, when not in use, or during heavy/severe weather, as appropriate. Under this policy, a person or persons are to oversee a deck by deck inspection to identify unsecured and potentially hazardous heavy objects. Integral to
the procedures is a list of identified objects which have a significant potential to
cause injury.
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20 Shipboard personnel should apply good seamanship in identifying additional
items to be secured. Attention should be given to muster * stations, evacuation
routes, and lifeboat embarkation stations as a ship emergency could give rise to conditions that differ from ship motions caused by heavy/severe weather.
21 Consideration should also be given to development of a guidance document
to assist in the identification of heavy objects and the most adequate methods for
securing them. An example of this guidance document is attached in the annex. This
annex is only intended to provide an example for one method of implementing this
policy.
22 Practices and procedures for securing heavy objects should be monitored by
each Head of Department and/or as otherwise specified by the ships command
structure, and during routine shipboard inspections and audits.
23 Heavy/severe weather should be clearly defined under the company policy
taking into account the size of the ship, operational profiles, and other information.
In defining heavy/severe weather, appropriate deference should be given to the judgment of the Captain.
Harmonization of Bridge Procedures
24 Operational safety can be enhanced by achieving substantive consistency in
bridge operating procedures among commonly owned ships, for example by providing that bridge personnel who may rotate among such ships can be familiarized
with a common set of procedures.
25 CLIAs oceangoing members have adopted a policy that bridge operating procedures are to be harmonized as much as possible, both within individual companies
and among brands within a commonly owned and operated fleet. Under this policy
and best practice, each CLIA member operating multiple ships and each cruise line
brand that is commonly owned and operated with another brand is to harmonize
their respective procedures for bridge operations, taking into account any unique operating characteristics of specialty ships (e.g., expedition ships; sail powered ships;
etc.) *
Location of Lifejacket Stowage
26 In addition to CLIAs policy on excess lifejackets (MSC 90/27/11), CLIAs
oceangoing members have adopted an additional policy to reflect best practices for
the stowage of lifejackets onboard newly-constructed cruise ships (e.g., cruise ships
for which the building contract is placed on or after 1 July 2013). Under this policy,
a number of lifejackets equal to or greater than the number required onboard under
the relevant international and flag State regulations, are to be stowed in close proximity to either muster stations or lifeboat embarkation points, and be readily available for use in case of emergency.
27 Implementation of this policy will continue to result in spare lifejackets being
carried in excess of the number required by the International Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).
Proposed revision to MSC.1/Circ.1446/Rev.1
28 CLIA recommends the Committee consider revising MSC.1/Circ.1446/Rev.1
such that these three additional outputs (paragraphs 513, annex) would be included among the other recommended interim measures contained in the annex to
that circular.
Conclusion
29 Since the Review began, CLIA has provided the Committee with several outputs, including 10 new policies regarding various operational safety matters. In addition, CLIA has provided the Committee with an output of the Review regarding
marine casualty reporting.
30 CLIA is fully committed to understanding the factors that contributed to the
Concordia incident. Ongoing innovation in safety has been a hallmark of our industry for decades and we are fully committed to continuous improvement of shipboard
operations and safety. The global cruise industry continuously reviews operational
safety and works closely with the Organization as well as flag States, Recognized
Organizations and others to enhance maritime safety.
* The terms muster and assembly are used interchangeably and therefore are synonymous
for this purpose.
* And giving due regard to any relevant flag State requirements.
The terms muster and assembly are used interchangeably and therefore are synonymous
for this purpose.
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31 The Committee is invited to:
.1 consider the information provided in this document;
.2 consider revising the annex to MSC.1/Circ.1446/Rev.1 (paragraph 14); and
.3 take action as appropriate.
ANNEX
SAMPLE STRUCTURE OF A GUIDANCE DOCUMENT
TO ASSIST IN THE IDENTIFICATION OF HEAVY OBJECTS
AND THE MOST ADEQUATE METHOD FOR SECURING THEM
Guidance document(s) should consider the following three elements, in addition
to any other relevant information.
1 Heavy Objects. The following list is an example of some heavy objects that may
be identified and secured in accordance with company policy. In this sample listing,
the objects are grouped by those that should be permanently secured, always secured when not in use, and those to be secured in heavy weather. Heavy objects
that have been identified include, but are not limited to, the following:
1.1 Heavy objects that should be permanently secured.
1.1.1 Heavy plant pots, sculptures, TVs, cash machines, laundromat equipment, slot machines, and game machines such as in teen recreation areas.
1.1.2 Display stands and racks.
1.1.3 Treatment tables, heavy standalone product displays, treadmills, exercise weight racks, and weight lifting machines.
1.1.4 Pianos, lounge speakers, and back-stage scenery equipment.
1.2 Heavy objects that should be secured at all times when not in use.
1.2.1 Trolleys and forklift trucks.
1.2.2 Paint rafts, gangways, and deck trash containers.
1.2.3 X-ray scanners.
1.2.4 Cylinder heads, pistons, charge air coolers, heavy chemical containers,
and heavy fan impellers.
1.2.5 Gas bottles (refrigerant, oxygen, acetylene, CO2, etc.)
1.3 Heavy objects not otherwise secured that should be secured for heavy
weather.
1.3.1 Loose objects on display.
1.3.2 Temporary decorations.
1.3.3 Items brought aboard temporarily as part of shows.
1.3.4 Materials/equipment onboard as part of repairs/refurbishment.
2 Securing Methods.
2.1 Consideration should be given to the strength and appropriateness of each
point of attachment to which the heavy objects are secured.
2.2 Consideration should be given to the following list of securing methods. Additional securing methods appropriate to the objects to be secured should be
identified and used as necessary. Examples are as follows; however, additional
methods should be identified and included as appropriate.
ALatch type gate hook and eye bracket mounted on bulkhead or vertical
surface.
BRatchet strap and eye brackets mounted on bulkhead or vertical surface.
CRope secured to object and adjacent suitable securing surface.
DContained in metal rack-type shelving system.
ESuction cup and bracket, ratchet strap, chain, etc.
FPermanent securing such as bolting to bulkhead or deck.
3 Various. A list of specific heavy objects that have been identified by the company during surveys and inspections and that require particular attention.
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92nd session
Agenda item 6
MSC 92/6/9
24 May 2013
Original: ENGLISH

Comments relating to the Costa Concordia incident:
The importance of shoreside management to maintaining shipboard safety
SUMMARY
Executive summary:
This document provides comments relating to the Costa

Concordia incident.
5.1, 5.2, 5.4
High-level action:
5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.1.3, 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.4.1
Planned output:
None
Action to be taken:
Paragraph 25
Related documents:
MSC 92/6/1; MSC 92/6/3; MSC 91/7/1; MSC 90/27/1; MSC 90/27/
2; MSC 90/27/11; MSC 90/27/12
Background
1 This document is submitted in accordance with paragraph 6.14 of the Guidelines on the organization and method of work of the Maritime Safety Committee and
the Marine Environment Protection Committee and their subsidiary bodies (MSC
MEPC.1/Circ.4/Rev.2), and provides comments relating to the Concordia incident
and in particular the importance of shoreside management to maintaining shipboard safety.
2 Comments related to Italys report on the safety technical investigation regarding the Concordia marine casualty investigation are in document MSC 92/6/10.
Discussion
3 The role of shoreside management is critical to the proper development and
function of an effective Safety Management System. An integrated approach is used
by the cruise industry to maintain shipboard safety; one that recognizes an essential
connection with senior shoreside officials.
4 Notwithstanding substantive progress made to date, the cruise industry continues to establish and implement operational and management measures that are
robust enough to minimize the potential for a recurrence of the type of navigational
incident recounted in document MSC 92/6/3. For example, the cruise industry takes
very seriously its responsibility to address issues surrounding the authority of the
Master with regard to maneuvering a large cruise ship and the naturally related
responsibility in management of the company to ensure safety. These efforts are ongoing and take the form of both industry-wide cooperation and company-specific actions.
5 Some specific elements that have already been addressed and will continue to
be evaluated on an ongoing basis via the cruise industrys efforts include:
.1 senior management level of engagement in safety-related matters;
.2 senior management commitment to a company-wide culture of safety;
.3 integration of shoreside management responsibilities into the companys Safety Management System; and
.4 CEO-level direct engagement in CLIAs Member Policy Verification Program.
6 Recall the prior CLIA submissions to the Committee on various outputs from
the Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review.5 As part of the cruise industrys ongoing efforts to continually improve operational safety, a wide range of additional
items were also considered but have not to this point resulted in industry-wide policies. Instead, with regard to these items, information and best practices have been
5 See MSC 92/6/1; MSC 91/7/1; MSC 90/27/1; MSC 90/27/2; MSC 90/27/11; and MSC 90/27/12
(CLIA).
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shared among our members and incorporated into their own relevant policies and
procedures as appropriate.
7 Efforts to evaluate and improve in these areas remain ongoing within our
standing committee structure and other appropriate mechanisms within our industry. Examples of areas, closely related to the role of shoreside management, that
continue to be under consideration include:
.1 discretion of the Master with regard to non-safety related voyage modifications;
.2 bridge procedures during maneuvering and shipboard emergencies;
.3 voyage plan change and general bridge procedure review practices and policies;
.4 hiring, evaluation, and training practices for Masters; and
.5 expectations and policies on when a Master may personally abandon their
ship.
8 It is the cruise industrys approach that these types of issues are very much
the responsibility of shoreside management to develop and successfully implement
via effective shipboard practices and procedures. For a Safety Management System
to be genuinely effective and within the true spirit of the ISM Code, it must carefully integrate the roles carried out by both professional shipboard staff and the
shoreside management that both lead and support them. The cruise industry continues to fully embrace such an approach and commits to continuous improvement
in this regard.
Conclusion
9 The cruise industry looks forward to working with all engaged stakeholders to
identify and prioritize areas where additional improvements can be made and to develop any necessary standards that will further the shared goal of continuous improvement of maritime safety.
10 The Committee is invited to consider the comments provided in this document and take action as appropriate.
92nd session
Agenda item 6
MSC 92/6/10
24 May 2013
Original: ENGLISH

Comments relating to the Costa Concordia incident:
Specific comments on Italys recommendations
SUMMARY
Executive summary:
This document provides comments relating to the Costa

Concordia incident.
5.1, 5.2, 5.4
High-level action:
5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.1.3, 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.4.1
Planned output:
None
Action to be taken:
Paragraph 25
Related documents:
MSC 92/6/1; MSC 92/6/3; MSC 91/7/1; MSC 90/27/1; MSC 90/27/
2; MSC 90/27/11; MSC 90/27/12
Background
1 This document is submitted in accordance with paragraph 6.14 of the Guidelines on the organization and method of work of the Maritime Safety Committee and
the Marine Environment Protection Committee and their subsidiary bodies (MSC
MEPC.1/Circ.4/Rev.2), and provides comments relating to the Concordia incident
and in particular Italys Report on the safety technical investigation regarding the
Concordia marine casualty investigation, as presented in the Marine Casualty and
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Incident Module of GISIS under Incident Reference No. C0008482 (hereafter the
Report).
2 Comments related to the importance of shoreside management to maintaining
shipboard safety are in document MSC 92/6/9 (CLIA).
Discussion
3 The Report contains 20 recommendations grouped into 6 functional areas covering stability; vital equipment & electrical distribution; emergency power generation; operational matters; evacuation analysis; and search and rescue. Seven are for
new ships only, while 11 are for both new and existing ships. The two SAR recommendations, which are external to the ship, will not be discussed in this document. CLIA welcomes the opportunity to discuss the Report, consider the recommendations made by Italy, and develop a comprehensive way forward to further
improve safety.
4 Below is a summary of CLIAs preliminary comments regarding Italys recommendations as contained in the Report.
Stability (Section 6.2.1.)
5 Double skin. Future discussions regarding the need for double skin to protect
compartments containing equipment vital for the propulsion and electrical propulsion should also take into consideration requirements and guidance relating to
SOLAS Safe Return to Port and Probabilistic Damage Stability, as appropriate.
6 Limiting down flooding points. If this recommendation is aimed at mitigating
progressive flooding, CLIA is of the view that it may need to be clarified. CLIA
notes that the Report indicates the water reached the bulkhead deck in the aft area
after about 40 minutes following the incident.
7 Computerized stability.
.1 In the discussion of computerized stability support for the master in case of
flooding, it is important to distinguish between systems having static inputs
(manual, by crew) from those having dynamic inputs (automated, in near real
time).
.2 Many cruise ships currently have computerized stability support systems on
board that are based primarily on static inputs. Such systems require manual
intervention and input by ships crew in order to display damage stability information.
.3 Dynamic simulation would likely entail inter alia fitting and interfacing of
flooding sensors on existing ships. CLIA believes that such a proposal needs an
in-depth discussion among subject matter experts. To our knowledge, such systems are currently not available to handle dynamic inputs, in near real time,
displaying predictive dynamic damage simulation.
8 Interface between flooding detection and stability computer. See paragraph 7.
Vital equipment and electrical distribution (Section 6.2.2.)
9 Discontinuity between compartments. This recommendation relates to new
ships. In addition, CLIA members have initiated a preparedness risk assessment to
inter alia identify ways to preserve functional integrity of essential systems for existing ships.
10 Bilge pumps. The recommendation regarding bilge pumps is far too vague
e.g., huge quantities of water cannot be defined. Also, there may be additional aspects to consider when discussing this proposal such as power source and requirements to feed additional pumps.
11 Relocation of main switchboard. CLIA notes that there are existing regulatory constraints regarding location of main switchboards in relation to other
spaces/equipment. Such requirements may affect aspects of this recommendation regarding relocation of main switchboards. Any future development of new/revised requirements would need to be discussed by experts and carefully considered.
12 Relocation of UHF radio switchboard. CLIA agrees in principle that the preservation adequate communications in an emergency is required. CLIA is of the view
that the basis of the Italy proposal to relocate the UHF switchboard above the bulkhead deck is not clear. Therefore, CLIA believes that other more effective and efficient options may exist to accomplish the intended goal. A number of different solutions should be discussed and evaluated by experts.
Emergency power generation (Section 6.2.3.)
13 Increasing EDG capacity. It should be clarified whether increasing EDG capacity would apply to existing certified emergency diesel generators or to the second emergency diesel generators mentioned in paragraph 14.
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14 Second EDG. CLIA agrees in principle with providing increased emergency
power supply to support additional selected services. However, the recommendation
regarding a second EDG is not clear whether the intent is to apply existing regulations (statutory EDG) to the second EDG or to allow for flexibility in the requirements applicable to the second EDG. When establishing new requirements for the
second emergency diesel generator, this proposal should be carefully considered in
relation to the multiple technical and operational aspects involved. Therefore, CLIA
recommends that any further consideration of this item be made by the relevant
technical sub-committee(s).
15 EDG functional tests. Italy proposes that both emergency diesel generators be
tested weekly for at least two hours under a load of at least 50 percent. While generally in favor of enhancing functional testing aimed at improving reliability of
EDGs during emergencies, the basis for Italys proposal is not clear and therefore
further consideration is needed in the relevant technical sub-committee(s), including
input from engine manufacturer(s).
16 Emergency light in cabins. Italys proposal regarding emergency light in cabins suggests that these lights should be fed by both UPS and emergency power. Although cruise ships are provided with such emergency lights in cabins, CLIA would
like to inform the Committee that not all of the lights are fed by the emergency
source of power. In some installations, a light is powered by stand-alone battery.
CLIA is of the view that as long as the goal is achieved (e.g., lighting the exit) and
that a process is in place to ensure that lights work in an emergency, that a requirement for feeding from emergency power is not necessary.
Operational matters (Section 6.3.4.)
17 Bridge management. CLIA supports consideration of development of training
requirements that reflect established principles such as function-based bridge management and collective decision making. CLIA is looking forward to considering this
matter, perhaps in the STW sub-committee.
18 Bridge team management certification. Italys recommendation regarding
bridge team management certification is unclear.
19 Principles of minimum safety manning. CLIA notes there is a lack of details
in Italys recommendation. Nevertheless, CLIA agrees that the current principles of
Minimum Safe Manning do not adequately reflect reality on passenger ships and
therefore supports in principle the need for further consideration on this matter.
20 Muster list. CLIA does not support the Italy proposal to show certification requirements in muster lists. CLIA notes that under the ISM Code, the Company is
already required to ensure crewmembers are duly certified according to the duties
and responsibilities assigned onboard. Cruise ships already have procedures/processes in place that ensure compliance with such requirements. In addition, robust
systems are in place to ensure that those responsible for assigning emergency duties
to the crew can easily verify the certifications required to cover such duties. CLIA
believes that this proposal could result in the addition of unnecessary and redundant information to an already over-populated document.
21 Inclusion of inclinometer data in VDR. CLIA agrees in principle with the
Italy proposal to include inclinometer data in the VDR.
Evacuation analysis (Section 6.3.4.)
22 Evacuation analysis at early stage of project. CLIA notes that evacuation
analysis is currently not on any sub-committee agenda, and that MSC 92 may consider whether to send a new work item to FP. CLIA looks forward to participating
in the discussion at the relevant sub-committee, should the Committee decide to
place this on the work programme.
23 Embarkation ladders. CLIA supports in principle consideration for additional
embarkation ladders. However, CLIA believes that in this regard careful consideration should be given to a number of important aspects, such as:
.1 the positioning of additional ladders that could impact other LSA;
.2 the difficulties for un-trained persons to utilize the ladders in conditions
other than Concordia high-side, etc.; and
.3 blanket requirements may be difficult to meet.
CLIA suggests that other individual means of evacuation should also be included
in the discussion on how to achieve the goal, with the focus of identifying improvement in their design and functions, if needed.
Conclusion
24 The cruise industry looks forward to working with all engaged stakeholders
to identify and prioritize areas where additional improvements can be made and to
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develop any necessary standards that will further the shared goal of continuous improvement of maritime safety.
25 The Committee is invited to consider the comments provided in this document and take action as appropriate.

And we will now turn to Gerald Cahill, who is the President and
Chief Executive Officer of Carnival Cruise Lines.
Welcome.
STATEMENT OF GERALD CAHILL, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES
Mr. CAHILL. Good afternoon, Chairman Rockefeller and Ranking

Member Thune and members of the Committee.
My name is Gerry Cahill, and I am President and Chief Executive Officer of Carnival Cruise Lines. I have been with Carnival
Cruise Lines and its parent corporation, Carnival Corporation, in
various roles for almost 19 years; the last 6 years, Ive been with
Carnival Cruise Lines in my current capacity.
I have submitted written testimony, for the record, which includes information on the various initiatives and investments that
Carnival Cruise Lines has undertaken in the area of safety and
passenger comfort. I will, therefore, keep my remarks today very
brief.
Carnival Cruise Lines has a fleet of 24 ships, and we operate approximately 1,500 cruises per year, carrying nearly four and a half
million guests per year. Our business is built on offering a safe,
comfortable, and affordable cruising experience to middleto millions of middle-class American families each year. The safety and
security of our guests is not only important to us, but our very success relies upon it.
In our over forty-one history, weve provided over 60 million vacations and maintained an excellent safety record. We are proud of
our record of providing our guests with safe and memorable vacation experiences, and we appreciate the continued confidence that
our guests have shown in us. We will continue to strive to exceed
the regulatory requirements of our industry and ensure that our
guests enjoy their cruise vacations.
I welcome the opportunity to participate in this hearing, and I
look forward to discussing with you ways in which we can further
improve and deliver an even better experience to the millions of
middle-class American families who sail with us each year.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cahill follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF GERALD CAHILL, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES
Good afternoon Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Thune, and Members of
the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Committee to discuss Carnival Cruise Lines (Carnival) commitment to the safety and security of
our guests. It is Carnivals number one priority.
Carnival operates 1500 cruises per year, carrying nearly 4.5 million guests. Our
parent company Carnival Corp & plc serves nearly 10 million guests annually. Our
business is built on being able to offer a safe, enjoyable, and affordable cruising ex-
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perience to millions of middle-class American families each year. Safety, security,
and guest satisfaction not only is important to us, but our success relies upon it.
Over our forty-one year history, Carnival has an excellent safety record. We work
hard to provide our guests with safe and memorable vacation experiences. Our goal
is to exceed the regulatory requirements of our industry to ensure that our guests
are confident that they will enjoy a fun cruise vacation. To that end, I will focus
my testimony on some of the steps that we take with respect to safety and security.
Regulation of the Cruise Industry
Because of the international nature of the cruise industry, there are several layers
of oversight and regulation designed to insure the safe and reliable operation of
cruise ships around the world. At the global level, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which is part of the UN, is responsible for creating standards for
all ships operating around the world.
IMO has adopted several conventions that address and regulate various areas of
vessel operations, which in turn, are ratified and enforced by Flag and Port States.
These conventions address, among other things: all aspects of safety; ship design
and equipment; fire protection, training and watch keeping; communications; search
and rescue; navigation; and, environmental protection.
The Flag State of each vessel is primarily responsible for enforcing international
requirements, as well as additional regulations imposed by the Flag State. All Port
States the vessel calls upon also ensure the vessel is in compliance, which further
strengthens what the IMO and Flag State provide. Cruise ships, like other vessels,
are subject to regular inspections and audits from both the Flag and Port States.
In the U.S, the Coast Guard is both the primary regulator and the principal enforcement agency of the laws, regulations, and international treaties applicable to
cruise ships. The U.S. is a party to IMO and has adopted the conventions described
above. The Coast Guard conducts announced and unannounced inspections of cruise
ships that operate out of U.S. ports in order to ensure compliance by ships operating
in U.S. waters. Therefore, cruise ships operating in the U.S. are subject to numerous
local, state, and Federal laws and regulations, including those related to safety.
Safety and Security
Carnival takes our compliance with all laws and regulations very seriously. Carnival has safety management systems in place that meet or exceed all regulatory
requirements. Further, our parent company in 2006 established at the Board-level,
a Health, Environmental, Safety & Security (HESS) Committee to assist the
Board in fulfilling their responsibility to supervise and monitor HESS policies, programs, initiatives at sea and onshore, and compliance with HESS legal and regulatory requirements. In addition, the HESS Committee oversees audits of each of
our ships annually to ensure compliance. Our HESS policy includes our commitments to:
Protecting the health, safety and security of our passengers, guests, employees
and all others working on behalf of Carnival;
Protecting the environment, including the marine environment in which our
vessels sail and the communities in which we operate;
Fully complying with or exceeding all legal and statutory requirements related
to health, environment, safety and security throughout our business activities;
and
Assigning health, environment, safety and security matters the same priority
as other critical business matters.
Carnival engages in regular training to ensure compliance as well. As an example,
all officers and crewmembers on Carnivals ships undergo regular safety and emergency training, which meets or exceeds all regulatory requirements. Carnival Corporation and Carnival plc also operate their own Center for Simulator Maritime
Training (CSMART), in Almere, Netherlands, which features a broad portfolio of
maritime training courses, including courses dedicated to bridge resource management, in which Carnival participates. The facility is one of the most advanced of
its kind in the maritime industry and has been praised by the U.S. Coast Guard.
Carnival has a professional Shoreside Security Department that provides training
and support to shipboard security staff on each vessel. The Security Department
consists of former law enforcement professionals. Training includes week-long annual shoreside training sessions for all shipboard Senior Security Officers, with curriculum based on the CVSSA model course 1101 designed by the FBI and U.S.
Coast Guard. Support includes pre-employment evaluation and incident response assistance and guidance. In addition, the Security Department serves as liaison to the
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FBI, U.S. Coast Guard, and local law enforcement agencies for reporting and investigation of incidents.
Global Operational Safety Review Implementation
The cruise industry, through the Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA),
initiated a comprehensive Global Operations Safety Review with the purpose of
identifying additional practices that could strengthen the cruise industrys already
exceptional safety record. CLIA received input and guidance from an independent
panel of experts with extensive experience in the maritime, regulatory and accident
investigation fields. As a result, ten new industry-wide policies that exceed current
international regulatory requirements were developed. Carnival has approved and
has implemented these policies, which have also been submitted to IMO for consideration.
The new policy recommendations that exceed current international regulatory
standards are:
Passenger Muster policy;

Passage Planning policy;
Personnel Access to the Bridge policy;
Excess Lifejackets policy
Recording the Nationality of Passengers policy;
Lifeboat Loading for Training Purposes policy;
Harmonization of Bridge Procedures policy;
Location of Lifejacket Stowage policy; and
Securing Heavy Objects policy.
Operating Reliability and Guest Comfort Enhancements

Immediately after the Carnival Triumph incident, Carnival announced a comprehensive review of its entire fleet, which was overseen by our parent company.
While no one was injured as a result of the incident, our guests clearly went
through an uncomfortable experience. As part of that review, Carnival is implementing a $300 million program to significantly enhance emergency power capabilities, take advantage of new fire safety technology, and improve the level of operating redundancies across its entire fleet. Carnivals ships have been and are safe.
The changes made as a result of the review are primarily to improve comfort and
guest convenience.
All of Carnivals ships have strong systems in place to respond to emergency situations. We meet or exceed all regulatory requirements. However, as we do on an
on-going basis, we are applying lessons learned through our operational review after
the Triumph fire, and by taking advantage of new technologies, we identified multiple areas for enhancement across our operations. These enhancements reinforce
our commitment to safe and reliable operations and to provide an enjoyable cruise
experience for the nearly 4.5 million guests who sail with us each year.
The actions by Carnival will expand the availability of hotel services for the comfort of our guests in the rare instance of a shipboard event that involves the loss
of main power. In addition, the plan will reinforce key shipboard operating systems
to further prevent a potential loss of primary power.
Increased Emergency Generator Power
The initial increase in emergency generator power across Carnivals fleet of 24
ships is projected to be completed by November. An additional emergency generator
will be installed on each vessel to provide for 100 percent of stateroom and public
toilets, fresh water and elevators in the unlikely event of a loss of main power. Upon
completion of the initial phase, the line will install a second permanent back-up
power system on each ship to provide an even greater level of hotel and guest services if main power is lost. These additional services will include expanded cooking
facilities and cold food storage, as well as Internet and telephone communications.
Increased Fire Prevention, Detection and Suppression Systems
The company will also make additional investments in the newest and most technically advanced fire prevention, detection and suppression systems. This includes
upgrading the existing water mist fire suppression systems already in place on Carnival vessels to the newest generation. When triggered, this high-pressure water
mist system instantly creates a larger and thicker blanket of water droplets than
the present system. As the water droplets evaporate, the system also rapidly cools
any hot areas to prevent the possibility of a fire restarting.
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Enhanced Operating Redundancies
All of Carnivals ships have two separate, redundant engine rooms. The companys
operational review has identified modifications to further decrease the likelihood of
losing propulsion or primary power, as happened on Carnival Triumph in February.
The modifications will include a reconfiguration of certain engine-related electrical
components to improve and enhance operational redundancies.
New Safety & Reliability Review Board
Carnival also announced the formation of a Safety & Reliability Review Board
comprised of outside experts with significant expertise in marine and occupational
safety, reliability and maintenance, marine regulatory compliance and quality control/assurance. The company already receives oversight and input from outside regulatory authorities and industry experts, as well as the HESS Committee. The new
Review Board will provide an additional, independent third-party perspective, drawing from deep experience across a number of relevant fields and organizations.
Carnivals review board will include five external members with specific expertise
in the areas of marine and occupational safety, reliability and maintenance, marine
regulatory compliance and quality control/assurance. Four highly esteemed maritime and transportation industry experts, including two former U.S. Navy Flag Officers, already have been appointed. These experts will help us drive continuous improvement and further ensure the safe and reliable operation of our fleet.
Passenger Bill of Rights
Carnival, along with 25 other CLIA North American member cruise lines, has formally adopted the Cruise Industry Passenger Bill of Rights, which details our industrys commitment to the safety, comfort and care of our guests. The voluntary implementation of the Bill of Rights formalizes many longstanding industry practices and
is currently in effect for all U.S. passengers who purchase their cruise in North
America, regardless of itinerary.
We expect the impact of the Bill to be a positive one for Carnival because we have
already taken great strides to deliver across all areas described in the Bill throughout our fleet. The Bill serves to underscore our already-existing commitment to our
guests.
The Bill covers the following set of passenger rights:
The right to disembark a docked ship if essential provisions such as food, water,
restroom facilities and access to medical care cannot adequately be provided onboard, subject only to the Masters concern for passenger safety and security
and customs and immigration requirements of the port.
The right to a full refund for a trip that is canceled due to mechanical failures,
or a partial refund for voyages that are terminated early due to those failures.
The right to have available on board ships operating beyond rivers or coastal
waters full-time, professional emergency medical attention, as needed until
shore side medical care becomes available.
The right to timely information updates as to any adjustments in the itinerary
of the ship in the event of a mechanical failure or emergency, as well as timely
updates of the status of efforts to address mechanical failures.
The right to a ship crew that is properly trained in emergency and evacuation
procedures.
The right to an emergency power source in the case of a main generator failure.
The right to transportation to the ships scheduled port of disembarkation or the
passengers home city in the event a cruise is terminated early due to mechanical failures.
The right to lodging if disembarkation and an overnight stay in an unscheduled
port are required when a cruise is terminated early due to mechanical failures.
The right to have included on each cruise lines website a toll-free phone line
that can be used for questions or information concerning any aspect of shipboard operations.
The right to have this Cruise Line Passenger Bill of Rights published on each
lines website.
Conclusion
Nothing is more important than the safety and comfort of our guests, and we will
devote the full resources of our company to meet that commitment. As I have said,
our continued success depends on our ability to offer a safe, comfortable, and affordable cruising experience to millions of middle-class American families each year. We
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strive every day to improve our performance in all areas so that our guests have
confidence in their choice of Carnival, and we will continue to do so.
The CHAIRMAN. All right, I thank you for that very brief statement.
Mr. Adam Goldstein, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Royal Caribbean International.
Welcome to you, sir.
STATEMENT OF ADAM M. GOLDSTEIN, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, ROYAL CARIBBEAN INTERNATIONAL
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Thune, distinguished members of the Committee.
My name is Adam Goldstein, and I am President and Chief Executive Officer of Royal Caribbean International, which operates 21
cruise ships around the world, with four new ships on order. Royal
Caribbean International is one of six brands owned by Royal Caribbean Cruises, Limited, the worlds second-largest cruise company.
Our company operates a total of 41 ships, globally. Last year, we
carried nearly 5 million guests, visiting approximately 425 different
destinations throughout the world.
Last week, members of this committees staff visited one of our
ships, Grandeur of the Seas, for which I thank all of you who were
there. The ship was docked in Baltimore, Maryland, while the staff
toured the engine rooms, the bridge, the medical facility, and observed firsthand some of the important safety features, such as
backup power generation and fire-suppression systems. They were
also briefed by the U.S. Coast Guard on the agencys role in inspecting cruise ships to further ensure the safety of all guests and
crew.
In addition, the staff were briefed on our extensive environmental programs and observed our advanced wastewater purification system, or AWP, in which we have invested about $150 million. As a result of the AWP systems, the wastewater that we discharge into the ocean is purified to a standard that exceeds leading
municipal, Federal, and international standards.
With regard to air emissions, Royal Caribbean began working
with manufacturers several years ago to develop advanced emissions purification, or AEP, systems to clean or scrub the sulfur
from fuel emissions before they are emitted from the ship. While
we have had some success with the two scrubbers in which we
have invested, we are now pleased to be expanding this research
project to additional vendors and to additional ships within our
fleet, including Grandeur of the Seas.
A new initiative, which Im sure well be discussing today, is the
decision of Royal Caribbean, together with our industry colleagues
from Carnival and Norwegian, to post on our websites a compilation of allegations of crime that occur onboard our ships around the
world on all itineraries by all guests and crew.
In 2010, Congress passed the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety
Act, or CVSSA, which required the U.S. Coast Guard to maintain
a public website disclosing the allegations of crime onboard U.S.based cruises, provided those allegations were the subject of a
closed FBI investigation. As this committee is aware, there are
those who have taken issue with this limitation. So, in the spirit
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of transparency, the three largest cruise companies, making up
over 85 percent of the cruise industry, have voluntarily agreed to
expand that reporting by posting all allegations in each of the
CVSSA categories on our websites, regardless of whether an investigation was opened or closed. We will have this reporting posted
on our websites by August 1, and it will date back to the last quarter of 2010, when the CVSSA was passed.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, there was a recent fire onboard
Royal Caribbeans Grandeur of the Seas. Grandeur of the Seas set
sail from Baltimore, Maryland, on Friday, May 24, for a 7-night
Bahamas cruise. Unfortunately, just before 3 oclock in the morning
on Monday, May 27, the ship experienced a fire, requiring us to
cancel the remainder of the cruise as well as six subsequent
sailings. The cause of that fire remains under investigation.
This incident was the first to occur subsequent to the cruise industrys adoption of a Passenger Bill of Rights. As I believe the
Committee knows, your colleague, Senator Charles Schumer, recommended that the industry adopt a 6-point Bill of Rights to protect those guests whose vacations are disrupted by mechanical
issues on a cruise ship. Our industry trade association, CLIA, welcomed this recommendation, expanded the Bill of Rights to 10
points, and its member cruise lines adopted it within a number of
weeks.
In the wake of the fire aboard Grandeur of the Seas, Royal Caribbean exceeded our obligations under that Bill of Rights, in terms
of both compensating and accommodating our guests.
While compensating our guests for the stress and inconvenience
caused by such a serious incident is important, clearly our immediate onboard response is of far greater importance. First and foremost, we must address and successfully resolve any immediate
threat, such as the fire itself. As required by international regulations, our crew members conduct extensive training and drills to
address emergency situations, and are well prepared to act quickly
and decisively in the event of a real emergency. Once the threat is
eliminated, crew members can and should ensure the comfort of
the guests. In the case of Grandeur, fortunately, none of the guests
or crew members were seriously injured, and the ship never lost
power.
In addition to the emergency response drills and predeparture
muster drill, each ship in our fleet is equipped with emergency
backup systems that activate in the event there is an interruption
in the main power systems. Each ship in our fleet is equipped with
multiple high-capacity pumps that are capable of removing large
amounts of water that may enter the ship. Each ship in our fleet
has two or more propellers, each operated by a separate propulsion
motor. Each ship in our fleet has three or more generators, and
each generator has its own separate power cable.
At Royal Caribbean, we recognize that there is no such thing as
perfect safety. But, there is perfect commitment to safety, and that
is our goal every minute of every day.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the Committee this
afternoon, and look forward to working with you and your staff,
now and in the future. Im happy to respond to any questions you
may have.
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[The prepared statement of Mr. Goldstein follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADAM M. GOLDSTEIN, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, ROYAL CARIBBEAN INTERNATIONAL
Good Afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Senator Thune and Members of the Committee.
My name is Adam Goldstein and I am President and Chief Executive Officer of
Royal Caribbean International which operates 21 cruise ships around the world
with four new ships on order.
Royal Caribbean International is one of six brands owned by Royal Caribbean
Cruises Ltd., (Royal Caribbean) the worlds second largest cruise company. Our
company operates a total of 41 ships globally. Last year, our brands carried nearly
5 million guests, visiting approximately 425 different destinations throughout the
world. Approximately 50 percent of our worldwide revenue is currently generated
by cruises in and out of the United Statesdown from 76 percent in 2006. We believe that this trend will continue as rapidly growing foreign markets offer significant growth and profitability.
Last week, members of this Committees staff visited one of our ships, Grandeur
of the Seas, while she was docked in Baltimore, Maryland. The staff toured the engine rooms, the bridge, the medical facility, and observed firsthand some of the important safety features such as back-up power generation and fire suppression systems. At the Committees request, the U.S. Coast Guard also participated in the
ship tour and explained its role in inspecting cruise ships to further ensure the safety of all guests and crew.
The Committee staff were also briefed on our extensive environmental programs
and observed our Advanced Wastewater Purification, or AWP, system. Royal Caribbean has invested over $150 million in our AWP systems. As a result, the wastewater that we discharge into the ocean is purified to a standard that exceeds leading municipal, Federal and international standards.
With regard to air emissions, Royal Caribbean began working with manufacturers
several years ago to develop Advanced Emissions Purification, or AEP, systems to
clean or scrub the sulfur from fuel emissions before they are emitted from the
ship. While we have had some success with the two scrubbers in which we have invested, we are now pleased to be expanding this research project to additional vendors and to additional ships within our fleet, including Grandeur of the Seas.
With the extraordinary support and cooperation of the United States Environmental Protection Agency and the United States Coast Guard, as well as the Canadian Government, Royal Caribbean has been able to develop an approach designed
to benefit the broader maritime industry. We anticipate that successful development
of this AEP technology will allow marine engines to achieve sulfur reductions below
that required by regulatory standards.
Mr. Chairman, the cruise industry has been at the forefront of not only maritime
wastewater treatment and emissions reduction technology, but other environmentally responsible initiatives. Royal Caribbean, and the cruise industry as a
whole, has adopted practices and procedures that are substantially more protective
of the environment than are required by regulation. On our website, we post our
annual Stewardship Report which provides the public with updates on our performance in nine key areas of stewardship, including safety and security, energy and air
emissions, water and wastewater, and medical operations.
Also on our websiteand on those of my colleagues from Carnival and Norwegianthe public will find a compilation of allegations of crime that occur onboard
our ships around the world, on all itineraries, by all guests and crew. In 2010, Congress passed the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act, or CVSSA, which required
the U.S. Coast Guard to maintain a public website disclosing the allegations of
crime onboard U.S.-based cruises, provided those allegations were the subject of a
closed FBI investigation.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, there are those who have taken issue with this limitation so, in the spirit of transparency, the three largest cruise linesmaking up
over 85 percent of the cruise industryvoluntarily agreed to expand that reporting
by posting all allegations in each of the CVSSA categories on our websites, regardless of whether an investigation was opened or closed. We will have this reporting
posted on our websites by August 1st and it will date back to the last quarter of
2010 when the CVSSA was passed.
We are proud of this initiative and believe that it addresses many of the concerns
raised with the limited public reporting required by the CVSSA. By providing these
statistics, as well as the land-based rates of crime, consumers will be able to see
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for themselves that cruise ships are among the safest venues when compared to any
landside communities or destinations.
At Royal Caribbean, we recognize that there is no such thing as perfect safety
but there is perfect commitment to safety and that is our goal every minute of every
day. While we are proud of our safety record and of our high rate of guest satisfaction, we understand that incidents do happen, such as the recent fire onboard Royal
Caribbean Internationals Grandeur of the Seas.
Grandeur of the Seas set sail from Baltimore, Maryland on Friday, May 24 of this
year for a 7-night Bahamas cruise. On Sunday morning, May 26, the ship made its
scheduled port call in Port Canaveral, Florida then set sail again that evening,
bound for the Bahamas. Unfortunately, just before 3 oclock in the morning on Monday, May 27, the ship experienced a fire, requiring us to cancel the remainder of
the cruise as well as six subsequent sailings. The cause of the fire remains under
investigation.
This incident was the first to occur subsequent to the cruise industrys adoption
of a Passenger Bill of Rights. As the Committee may know, your colleague Senator
Charles Schumer recommended that the industry adopt a 6-point Bill of Rights to
protect those guests whose vacations are disrupted by mechanical issues on a cruise
ship. Our industry trade association, the Cruise Lines International Association, or
CLIA, welcomed this recommendation, expanded the Bill of Rights to 10-points, and
its member cruise lines adopted it within weeks. In the wake of the fire onboard
Grandeur of the Seas, Royal Caribbean exceeded our obligations under the Bill of
Rights in terms of compensating and accommodating our guests.
While compensating our guests for the stress and inconvenience caused by such
an incident is important, clearly, our immediate onboard response is of far greater
importance. First and foremost, we must address and successfully resolve any immediate threat such as a fire. As required by international regulations, our crew
members conduct extensive training and drills to address emergency situations and
are well-prepared to act quickly and decisively in the event of a real emergency.
Once the threat is eliminated, crew members can and should ensure the comfort of
the guests. In the case of Grandeur, none of the guests or crew members were seriously injured and the ship never lost power. While I am certain the fire caused
stress and fear among guests, I am pleased that many guests took the time to write
to Royal Caribbean to commend the crews response to both the fire and the comfort
and care of the guests.
In addition to the emergency response drills and the pre-departure muster drill,
each ship in our fleet is equipped with emergency backup systems that activate in
the event there is an interruption in the main power systems. Each ship in our fleet
is equipped with multiple high capacity pumps that are capable of removing large
amounts of water that may enter the ship. Each ship in our fleet has two or more
propellers, each operated by a separate propulsion motor. Each ship in our fleet has
three or more generators and each generator has its own separate power cable.
I believe it is important to note that, in addition to what our individual companies
are doing, many of these best practices have been set forth by the industrys trade
association, CLIA, for adoption by its diverse and global membership. As the second
largest cruise company, Royal Caribbean plays a significant role in CLIA and I
would like to briefly advise the Committee of recent developments at CLIA.
CLIA represents the interests of 26 cruise lines, as well as 16,000 travel agencies,
and hundreds of port authorities, destinations, and various industry business partners. Over the course of the past year, CLIA has successfully globalized its membership so that the policies developed for its members operating in North America will
extend to CLIA members operating worldwide. CLIA now provides the single platform for a unified approach to industry policy and advocacy with representation in
North America, South America, Europe, Asia, and Australia. Prior to December
2012, nine separate trade associations represented the global cruise industry.
As a result of CLIAs aggressive efforts, our industry around the world is more
focused on higher standards of safety and security than ever before. Last year, CLIA
directed an industry-wide Operational Safety Review, a comprehensive assessment
of the critical human factors and operational aspects of maritime safety. As a result
of that review, the global cruise industry introduced ten new safety policieseach
of which exceeded current international regulatory requirements upon their announcement and each of which have now been included in formal standards for Passenger Ship Safety promulgated by the International Maritime Organization, or
IMO.
For example, passenger ships were required to conduct muster drills within 24
hours of guests embarking on a ship; CLIA identified as a best practice conducting
the muster drills prior to departure from port. CLIAs membership adopted this as
a formal policy and IMO has now adopted it as an international regulation.
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Royal Caribbean is proud to play a leadership role in CLIA and has been supportive of its relentless efforts towards continuous improvement for the global industry. CLIAs commitment to Safety, Security, Environmental Stewardship, Medical
Care, and Public Heath makes for a stronger, more consistent and more unified
cruise industry in these critical areas of our operations. I am sure my colleagues
from Carnival and from other member cruise lines will join me in saying that we
are proud of all that CLIA has accomplished and we will continue to support its
efforts to develop global policies, to address international issues, and to provide strategic communications for its worldwide audience.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the Committee this afternoon and
look forward to working with you and your staff in the future.
I am happy to respond to any questions you may have.

Ill start off. And this would be to the Coast Guard Admiral
Servidio.
The Carnival Triumph is now a household nameprobably
doesnt welcome thatand not in a good way. The ship became famous in February, when it drifted for 4 days in the Gulf of Mexico
after an engine knocked out the ships power and propulsion. Four
months later, the Coast Guard boarded the Triumph, in Galveston,
Texas, to conduct a safety inspection, and found a number of problems. As a result, the Coast Guard detained the Triumph in port
and prohibited passengers from boarding the ship.
Admiral, the Coast Guard only uses its, quote, detention authority in serious cases. Can you please explain why the Coast Guard
detained the Triumph in Galveston last month?
Admiral SERVIDIO. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
We inspected the vessel. We look at the firefighting systems, we
look at the lifesaving systems, and we examine the drills. Onboard
the Triumph, there were problems with the drills, specifically with
regard to the lifeboats, sir, and we also found problems with the
fire detection system. Basically, just like you have in your house,
there are fire detectors around the vessel. In some segments of the
vessel, there were a number of the fire detectors that werent working the way they should have been working. And there were also
some problems with the fire sprinkler system in certain parts of
the vessel. Again, its the sprinkler system thats designed, if there
is a fire, to automatically activate to put out that fire. Those are
significant problems. And, as such, we detained the vessel until
they were rectified. And they were rectified the next day, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. And you found, as I understand it, 28 deficiencies.
Admiral SERVIDIO. Yes, sir. Thethere were a number of minor
deficiencies, but those were the substantial deficiencies, sir, that
caused us to take the actions to not allow the vessel to embark passengers until they were corrected.
The CHAIRMAN. Understood.
Mr. Cahill, after the Carnival Splendor engine room fire left the
ship disabled and stranded, in November of 2010, you told the
media that this was, a very surprising incident. You later said
Carnival spent millions of dollars on, quote, lessons learned from
the Splendor fire.
After the Carnival Triumph engine-room fire left the ship disabled and stranded, in February 2013, you told the media that,
Something like this is a very rare incident. Carnival also has said
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that it was spending millions of dollars on ships in the aftermath
of the incident.
And on June 12, 2013, while the Triumph was being detained by
the Coast Guard in Galveston for failing a safety inspection, Carnival posted a video, claiming that the ship wasbefore it had
been cleared, thatyou said, in the video, the ship was repaired,
enhanced, and back in service.
Mr. Cahill, youve beenyou have a speaking role, yourself, in
this video, in which you say that Carnival has completed itan
operational review of the ship, and that it was ready to go.
In light of this record, why should the American public now believe that Carnival has a meaningful commitment to promoting its
ships? Its easy to say things happen infrequently, but, when they
happen, they affect an awful lot of people, and theyre happening,
even to the extent that the public knows about it, more frequently
than necessary. How would you answer, sir?
Mr. CAHILL. Mr. Chairman, first off, I take it very seriously, myself. After the Carnival Splendor fire, we did form a Safetya Fire
Safety Task Force, and that Fire Safety Task Force consisted of 15
people who came up with 25 recommendations, at a very significant
cost. They were allI approved them all, they were all implemented. And, in fact, they were very helpful in extinguishing the
fire on the Carnival Triumph. The Coast Guard noted that the
crew performed very well in extinguish the fire, containing the fire,
and putting it out quickly.
What happened with respect to the Triumph was that the cabling that ran over the engine room was damaged, and we lost propulsion in the mainin the forward engine room. We were able to
put the fire out. No one was injured. In either case, no one was injured. We were able to fulfill our obligation of keeping everyone
safe.
What we did do, very unfortunately, was, we really, seriously put
our guests in an uncomfortable position. And that bothers us a
great deal. And, as a result of that, we then performed an operational review. We announced, inwe consulted with the Coast
Guard, actually, before we announced it. We came out and announced that we were going to invest over $300 million across our
fleet, concentrating first thatthis problem, where we lost both engine rooms, which is not supposed to happen, to rewire the engine
rooms so that that would not happen in the future. Were also investing in additional auxiliary diesel generators, so, in the rare
case you do lose main propulsion power, we have backup power to
provide better hotel facilities. And then, lastly, we are also investing in an upgraded fire safety and detection system, a higher-quality, moreI guess, more advanced technology has come out in recent yearswater mist system.
So, we take our obligations very seriously, Mr. Chairman, and we
are working very hard. Weve also just recently announced that
weve formed an External Safety and Reliability Review Board.
There are two former Navy admirals who are on that board, as well
as people who areone gentleman from the NTSB and another
person who comes with a very significant airline maintenance
background.
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So, we take all of these thingswe consider them very important, and we are working to improve.
The CHAIRMAN. Im beyond my time, already, but I was fascinated by your opening statement. It couldnt have been more than
a minute and a half to 2 minutes, and it had no content whatsoever. I dont ask you to answer that or pass judgment on it, but
I was kind of stunned. Everybody else was talking substance, and
you were kind of walking away from things, was my impression.
Senator Thune.
Senator THUNE. Id like tooh, sorryId like to direct this to
Admiral Servidio. Could you explain to the Committee how the
Coast Guard coordinates with industry and with enforcement agencies in other countries to enforce vessel safety regulations?
Admiral SERVIDIO. Yes, Ranking Member.
Basically, the way the oversight of a foreign-flagged vessel works
is that the crew, the owner, and the operator are responsible, primarily, for ensuring that the vessel complies with all the international requirements. Thats sort of the first rung of the safety
net.
The next rung is the flag state, which is the flag that the vessel
flies, be it Bahamas, Panama, Malta. And the flag state has a requirement to ensure that, again, vessels that fly their flag comply
with this.
The next rung in that safety net is the class societies, who perform an oversight function, for insurance purposes.
And the last rung is the Coast Guard, which does port state control, sir. So, when a foreign-flagged vessel comes to the U.S., we enforce both U.S. laws and the international laws on that vessel.
So, thats the waytheres an international set of requirements.
Each flag has their own set of requirements, sir. Class society has
rules that also need to be implemented. And then, here in the U.S.,
sir, when the vessel comes in, if its foreign-flagged, we conduct
oversight to ensure the vessel is in compliance.
Senator THUNE. So, just to be specific on that, its accurate to say
that, even if a vessel is foreign-flagged, it is responsible for complying with all relevant U.S. safety standards.
Admiral SERVIDIO. Yes, sir. The vessel is required to comply with
the international standards; and, likewise, theyre required to comply with the U.S. standards that are in addition on cruise ships
that we have, sir.
Senator THUNE. OK.
Mr. Cahill, as you know, the Coast Guard, last week, issued its
final report on the 2010 Carnival Splendor incident involving the
engine fire and the complete loss of power. Youve talked about
some of the steps that Carnival is takingit sounds like, sort of,
proactivelyto correspond with some of the recommendations
made in that report. Im wondering if there are recommendations
that were made that Carnival disagrees with.
Mr. CAHILL. In thinking, nono, Senator, I think we agree with
their recommendations. Most of the recommendations that the
Coast Guard came up with, we had already implemented. We had
our own fire safety experts who came in. We had four or five independent experts that we hired who worked at the same time as the
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Coast Guard. They primarily noticed the same things. We went
right ahead and implemented them. So
And, basically, as I mentioned before, those things were very
helpful. They were effective in putting out the fire on the Carnival
Triumph.
Senator THUNE. Mr. Rosenker, you serve on CLIAs Panel of Experts that makes safety recommendations to the cruise ship industry. Can you tell me what major recommendations youve made recently, and what the reaction has been of the cruise lines to those
recommendations?
We took a look, after the operational safety review that was
going on, at a number of recommendations that we believe would
go a long way to raise the bar of safety within this industry. And
what we did was make these recommendations back to the industry; and they questioned a few of them, but immediately said, This
is the right thing to do. And I found, having had experience in
making recommendations to industries beyond the cruise industrythe rail, aviation, highway, pipelinethat, many times when
I made recommendations, it took a while for those industries either
to act or to finally implement what we had asked. This one was
done very quickly.
The 10 policies, which I submitted in my testimony, ultimately
were put forth to the IMO, and they, too, had been accepted for implementation.
So, I wasand along with my colleagues at the Independent
Panel of Expertswe were impressed with the expeditious manner
in which the industry accepted our advice and adopted the policies.
Senator THUNE. We have other members who want to ask questions, Mr. Chairman, so Idmy times expired, so Ill pass and
allow them to do so. Thanks.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, you gave them an extra second.
Senator Schatz.
STATEMENT OF HON. BRIAN SCHATZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII
Senator SCHATZ. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you, Ranking

Member.
I have a question for the Admiral.
First of all, thank you, Admiral, for appearing before the Committee. And let me say how grateful we all are, to you and your
colleagues in the United States Coast Guard, for your service and
providing a first-responder service to ensure that Americans at sea
enjoy the same level of safety and security that they do on land.
As weve heard today and in previous hearings, the Coast Guard
plays a critical role in the safety and security of cruise ship passengers, from ensuring that cruise ships makethat make a port
of call in the United States are in compliance with safety and environmental regulations to responding to accidents at sea. And I
know you have 11 statutory missions, and youre having to balance,
as all Federal agencies are, all of those missions under the constraints of the sequester.
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So, my question is, Can you speak to the resource constraints
that you have, in terms of your emergency response capability and
also your inspection regime?
Admiral SERVIDIO. Thank you, Mr.thank you, Senator.
We believewe conduct our marine safety missions, risk-based;
so, we put the most resources we have to those vessels that pose
the greatest risk. We do believe we have the resources, at present,
that we need to continue to conduct our oversight of what other
flags are doing, what the class societies are doing, as part of our
port state control, as well as with our U.S. vessels.
Senator SCHATZ. Could you just divide your answer to the emergency response side, as well as the, sort of, inspection regime? You
believe that you have the resources on, sort of, both sides of that
equation?
Admiral SERVIDIO. Well, sir, I think the Commandant has gone
on record as saying there is great concern with the age and the
numbers of some of our fleet. So, I obviously agree with everything
our Commandant has said, sir.
[Laughter.]
Senator SCHATZ. Of course you do.
I have a question for Mr. Goldstein.
Weve heard, today, about the so-called Passengers Bill of Rights.
I think its an important first step. But, bills of rights are generally
enforceable and there is an accountability mechanism. So, Im wondering if you could articulate what kinds of metrics youre going to
be putting forward to hold yourselves accountable to consumers
and to the Committee, to the Coast Guard, to all of the various constituencies to which you are responsible. I think its an important
first step, to articulate what you want to accomplish on behalf of
passengers, but we sort of need to know how youre going to measure your success and hold ourselves accountable, collectively.
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Thank you, Senator.
The first thing I would say, because the question was raised
about this earlier on in the comments, to the extent that there was
a question as to, What is the relationship between the passenger
ticket contract and the Passenger Bill of Rights?we would not,
as an industry, have agreed to issue the Passenger Bill of Rights
if we didnt expect that it would apply in all the relevant situations
that the 10 points call for.
We wanted to be fast in getting it out, and we didnt want to
wait until however many cruise lines who choose to do this would
go through whatever process they might need to go through to harmonize the passenger ticket contract with the Bill of Rights.
I am aware that, for at least a good number of cruise lines,
theyre now in the process of trying to eliminate any perceived inconsistencies.
The point is that its supposed to apply. It creates a contractual
right, between the customers and the cruise lines, on which they
can take legal action if they feel theyve been denied any of those
rights.
Senator SCHATZ. And, in plain language, and up front, in a sufficiently large font, in a
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. In
Senator SCHATZ. No, its a serious question, because
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Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Yes. In whatever font is required for the purpose. And in the case of all 26 cruise lines, on their websites, adjacent to the passenger ticket contract so that the two are there, side
by side, to be viewed, the 10 rights are stated publicly at all times.
And its a good question about the metrics. This is very new. The
main metric, I would say, is, Do the passengers actually have the
right, and are they able to exercise the right, to take action? Are
they actually able to receive the refunds that are meant to be automatically due to them under the Passenger Bill of Rights? Whereas, in the past, they would have only had the remedy of suing
under the passenger ticket contract provisions. Are these things actually happening? Is there real relief involved as different incidents
occur?
As I mentioned, with respect to Grandeur of the Seas and the fire
there, our goal was to go far enough beyond all of the relevant provisions of the Passenger Bill of Rights so that nobody would seek
action.
Senator SCHATZ. Mr. Cahill, anything to add? Mr. Cahill?
Mr. CAHILL. Yes, Senator?
Senator SCHATZ. Do you have anything to add? I have 9 seconds.
[Laughter.]
Senator SCHATZ. If not, Ill yield back.
Thank you very much.
Dr. KLEIN. May I make a comment to what he just said?
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Begich is not yet seated.
Im sorry?
Dr. KLEIN. May I make a comment in relation to the last question?
The CHAIRMAN. Of course.
Dr. KLEIN. JustIll just make it very brief. I mean, I guess, in
my written testimony, I go in detail with regard to either inconsistencies or problems, and Im not going to take the time to do that,
since you can read it. But, I do want to point out two things:
The Bill of Rights says theres a right to a refund. The practice
of the industry is, those refunds are onboard credits. I dont think
an onboard credit is a refund. It doesnt say how refunds areonboard credits are computed. Theres no way in which that can be
audited.
Finally, the Passenger Bill of Rights isstates, is that its obligatory on all members of CLIA, and if they dont do it, itsthey cant
be members of CLIA. When I went through websites last week,
preparing my testimonyI went to 26 cruise lines websitesI
found that 13 of them do not have obviously displayed anywhere
on their website the Passenger of Rights. I could not find it. So, 50
percent of the members of CLIA are out of compliance in the Bill
of Rights, which is obligatory for membership in the association.
Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Senator Begich.
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STATEMENT OF HON. MARK BEGICH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator BEGICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I apologize, I had to leave here for about a half hour. I was chairing a
meeting upstairs with veterans folks.
Let meI want to follow that up to the industry folks, and
maybe Mr. Goldstein, or whoever would like to answer this.
What is the follow-up for members to ensure that they are adhering to the Bill of Rights? Whathow do you process that? I dont
know who would like to answer that, but
Either one.
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Im sorry, Senator. By members
Senator BEGICH. CLIAs members.
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. OK.
Senator BEGICH. Like, if you didnt
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Yes.
Senator BEGICH.adhere to the Bill of Rights, whathow does
that work?
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Right. So, every CEO of a member line needed
to attest, in writing, to the fact that the Passenger Bill of Rights
was in effect, that it was displayed on all 26 websites. And it is
a condition of membership now. So, if we are found to be out of
compliance with the Passenger Bill of Rights, we would have to relinquish our membership in the organization.
Senator BEGICH. Let mein yourthe Bill of Rights youve put
into place in the last 6 months, 8 monthsis that a fair statement?
Do you think, in order to really understand its effectiveness or its
use by the different cruise lineshow much time do you think you
need thatisI mean, youve gone through itfrom Alaskas perspective, youre in a season right now. But, I know, in Florida, the
season starts later. I mean, everyone has a different season. So,
how would you measure your successor, when would you be able
to measure your success, I guess is a better way to put it?
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Sure. So, while fully admitting that there have
been more incidents in the cruise industry this year than any of
us would like to have seen, they are rare, as a matter of historical
record, and I would think it would take more thanits actually
been only 2 months
Senator BEGICH. Two months.
Mr. GOLDSTEIN.almost to the day
Senator BEGICH. Right.
Mr. GOLDSTEIN.since the Passenger Bill of Rights went into effect. So, it will takeI dont know; Im making up a number1 or
2 years, probably, to see exactly what that means, in practice.
Senator BEGICH. OK.
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. And, hopefully, it will show that the passengers
are well protected.
Senator BEGICH. How manyjust so I know. From Alaskas perspective, we had 3.5-or-so-million passenger visits. Approximately
65 percent of our port-of-call cruise passengers visit U.S. ports. Direct expenditure, in our economy, is about a billion dollars and
22,000-plus employees. So, a lot of impact to our state. You know,
not likemaybe Hawaii, to a certain extent, butnot, clearly, like
Florida, but, you know, a lot.
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And tell me, in the overall industry of U.S. port touch, how many
visits does the industry haveor, how many passengers, over a
year, would they have? How big is it? And either one could answer
this. Im
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Yes, Ill just start. With the worldwide industry,
there will be about 21 million cruises taken this year. North Americans will take approximately 11- or 12 million. The great majority
of those, plus some taken by others, will occur in and out of U.S.
ports. So, the number of cruises being taken in or out of the U.S.
is somewhere in the 10- to 12-million-person range.
Senator BEGICH. OK.
And, Mr. Chairman, I was quickly trying to grab the report and
look through it. Like you, Im having to my put glasses on, because
Im looking at the data points. But, Im
If I read this rightthis is the FBI report, and it talksJanuary
1, 2011, through December 31, 2011, Cruise Line Incident Reporting Statistics Incidents Report; it includes Other, which some industry folks dont have to report it, but they doa lot of them do.
The number is 655.
And I guessand I dont know what the total incident numbers
are, because theres, like, three or four different charts in there, so
I didnt have time to go through it, but let me just put that aside
for a second.
We dontand Im sure you are of the same viewno incidents
is great. Right? Thats the goal. Right? Is that a fair statement?
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That would be a fair statement.
Senator BEGICH. In proportional to other industries, when I look
at the millions of passengers and the incidents, then, compared to
itand no incident is a good incidentI mean, we dont want any
incidencesbut, in comparison, its a small number. Am I missing
that? And again, I know there are lots of other data points in here.
Im just quickly grabbing what I was able to pull out of this report,
here. I dont know if youve seen the report at all.
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. We havent had a lot of time, but the Chairman
wrote letters to three cruise lines, about two and a half months
ago. We answered in late May and provided a good amount of data,
as Im sure the other two cruise companies did, as well. As we
move forward and as we begin to report out, as of August 1 on our
website, all allegations of crime, irrespective of whether
Senator BEGICH. Right.
Mr. GOLDSTEIN.cases have been opened or closed or some of
the issues that have been prevalent up until now, we will be able
to compare to the uniform crime reporting that applies nationally
in the country
Senator BEGICH. For the FBI crime reporting statistics
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Right.
Senator BEGICH. Yup.
Mr. GOLDSTEIN.there will be, for the first time, the ability to
compare, on an apples-to-apples basis, what the crime rates are for
the principal CVSSA categories to what happens on land. And we
are very confident that the comparative will be beneficial for the
cruise industry, because crime is relatively rare on our ships.
Senator BEGICH. Very good.
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I know my times up, but Ijust a quick answer from either one
of you on regards toI know, in Alaska, you guys are called on,
off and on, by the Coast Guard to assist in situations. Is that just
an Alaska incident type of situation, ormaybe both of you could
respond to that.
Mr. CAHILL. Thanks, Senator.
Its a time-honored tradition that, in the maritime industry, we
all respond to help another vessel thats in need. And the Coast
Guard will often call on us in thesince March, the Coast Guard
called on Carnival ships at least three times to assist in distressed
vessels. Two times, they were relatively small vessels, and the peoplewe actually took the people onboard our shipsthat is, to assist the Coast Guard. And then, the last time was to assistto
stand by for another cruise ship that was in distress. So, we do appreciate Coast Guard helping so much, and we try to return the
same thing.
Senator BEGICH. Thank you very much.
Ill end there withI dont know if well have a second round, but
I thank the Chairman for the opportunity.
Dr. KLEIN. If we canif I can offer just a couple of quick comments.
I think one is that, in comparing the Cruise Vessel Security and
Safety Act, when it was initially proposed and what was passed,
there were two crime categories that were dropped off. And I think
its dangerous for them to be left off. That is: simple assaults and
thefts below $10,000. As Judge Thomas Dickerson, in New York,
saidsuggested in whatin a lecture he gave to a seminar of
judges, that he felt the issue of thefts, dropping those off, was a
serious problem, because it basically gives permission for those
kinds of crimes to go on.
I think the other issueand Im not too sure what thewhats
going to be reported, butI dont want to get into rates. What Id
like to identify is
Senator BEGICH. Can II hate to interrupt you, and I
Dr. KLEIN. Thats OK.
Senator BEGICH.my time is expired, butyoure saying, because its not reported, that then says to everyone, Go and commit
crimes under $10,000?
Dr. KLEIN. Well, the understanding that I have is, a crime of
value of less than $10,000 is known that it will not be prosecuted,
and it doesnt get reported. Thatyou know, and Im not too sure
how theyre handled, but it doesnt go to the FBI. So, you know,
theI guess its handled internally, if its handled.
Senator BEGICH. I dont know if the industry folks want to respond
Dr. KLEIN. Yes. Let me just make my other one comment. And
that is, the data welast comprehensive data we have was
through a Freedom of Information Request, was dated for 2007
2008. And what that data demonstrated, which is similar to data
from discovery in legal cases between 2003 and 2005this is in an
appendix in my testimonyfound that close to 18 percent of the
victims of sexual assault on cruise ships are children.
I dont want to get tied up in debates. I dont want to get tied
up into the incidents. My concern is that, when peoplewhen fami-
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lies bring their children on a cruise, and theyre told that its a safe
vacation, I think any number of children who are being victimized
is unacceptable.
We have two children, an 11-year-old girl and a 12-year-old girl,
both of whom wereone was molestedor, one was sexually assaulted, the other was groped on cruise ships within the past 4 to
6 weeks. To me, I dont care about the total numbers, I care about
that those young children are going to live with that for the rest
of their lives.
With respect to the latter comment, obviously none of us accept
anything of that sort, and we all want to work together to prevent
any allegations or crimes of that nature from taking place.
With regard to crime reporting, since 1996 it has been a legal requirement for us in the United States to report all felonies. That
remains in place, irrespective of the CVSSA categories or what
have you. So, we report thefts, for example, of $1,000 or more,
which are felonies, to the FBI. It doesnt matter that the CVSSA
did not address that. So, in terms of categories of crime, we report
much more to the FBI than the CVSSA required of us.
Also, the CVSSA is written with respect to ships going in and out
of the United States. On our websites, as of August 1, we will report all allegations of crime, wherever they may occur on any of our
ships anywhere in the world, and to any citizen of any country, not
restricted to U.S.
Senator BEGICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your patience.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Blumenthal.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. Thank you for this hearing,

Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, to the members of the panel who are here today. All
of you have an expertise and knowledge in this area thats very
valuable to this committee.
And I want to thank, particularly, Mr. Cahill and Mr. Goldstein,
for being here. I know that this is not one of the great treats or
glamorous occasions of your professional lives, so
We have tough questions, which we have an obligation to ask, in
my view, because the information coming to meI think, to many
of usis that there is inadequate protection for travelers on cruise
ships. The issues and problems may be more exceptional than the
rule, but my impression is that consumers and travelers deserve to
know better what the rights and protections are. And, in some
cases, with many cruise ship lines, they are more illusory than
real. And thats why Ive become a cosponsor of Senator Rockefellers bill, the Cruise Passenger Protection Act, which would address many of these concerns in the areas of enforceability and disclosure, transparency, accountability.
For example, Professor Klein mentionedand I think its true
that the Bill of Rights that CLIA has issued are essentially unenforceable, as a matter of contractual law, unless Im mistaken. Correct me if Im wrong, Mr. Cahill and Mr. Goldstein. Are those guar-
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antees, every one of them, that you regard as a contractual right
of a cruise ship traveler?
Mr. CAHILL. Senator, yes, we do. We would never have published
it on our website as a list of passenger rights unless we intended
it to be enforceable. I have been advised by our counsel that it is,
in fact, enforceable. Now we are in the process of going through
and changing our contract so that it corresponds to the Passenger
Bill of Rights. So, we
Senator BLUMENTHAL. And clearly you would not contest jurisdiction in any United States District Court, or oppose provisions that
would grant jurisdiction in District Courts of the passengers choosing.
Mr. CAHILL. Im not a lawyer, Senator, but we would not contest
the Bill of Rights. In fact, for all
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Well, Im asking about the forum where
its enforced, because a right without a forum, without a court,
without an enforcer, is illusory. So, theyre notyouI would be
more than happy to give you the benefit of consulting with your attorney before you ask. Im not trying to put you on the spot, here.
But, may I simply suggestand you can answer at greater length
in writingthat you can do consumers and travelers a great service by allowing them to take action as a matter of contract against
you in the forum of their choosing. Would you agree to do so?
Mr. CAHILL. I think its pretty normal practice for a company to
specify the forum on which it can be sued. In our case, its Miami
courts.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Well, it may be the normal practice in
your industry, but not necessarily in all industries. And
Lets move on, because I have a number of other points to make
about the reality of these rights. Lets talk, for example, about
CLIA right number 3talks about medical attention. In fact, it
guaranteesand Im quotingfull-time professional emergency
medical attention, as needed, until shoreside medical care becomes
available. Do your lines charge for that medical care? Are passengers charged?
So, in the normal course, yes, there are charges for using the
medical center, depending on what the situation is. And then there
are incidents and accidents, depending on what the situation is,
where we may waive charges.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. You may waive, but there are fees and
charges, which
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. There are normally fees
Senator BLUMENTHAL.which are not indicated
Mr. GOLDSTEIN.and chargeswhich are normally subjected to
insurance.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. And with respect to your line, Mr. Cahill?
Mr. CAHILL. Senator, it would be the same.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. I might cite from Carnivals ticket languageand Im quotingCarnival, in arranging for the services
called for by the physician or nurse, does so only as a convenience
for the guest. Guest agrees that Carnival assumes no responsibility, does not guarantee performance, and in no event shall be liable for any negligent or intentional acts of omissions, loss, damage,
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injury, or delay to guests. Guests use the services of all independent contractors as the guests sole risk.
My time is rapidly coming to an end, but would you agree with
me that, in effect, your cruise lines are disclaiming any and all
legal responsibility for the quality of care thats provided?
Mr. CAHILL. Senator, we have an obligation to research and hire
qualified physicians. We are not a hospital, but we are required to
make sure that the physicians that we hire are properly accredited,
properly trained. And we do that. So, we are legally liable to do
that.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Mr. Goldstein?
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Yes, we are in the same position.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. So, you would not dispute legal liability
for medical malpractice by one of those doctors performing services
during one of your trips.
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. My understanding is thatto the point that Mr.
Cahill was just makingif we make a poor choice, if we choose
somebody who is unqualified to provide that medical service, we
are liable and subject to a lawsuit for failure to do so.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. But, apart from the credentials
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Apart from the
Senator BLUMENTHAL.you would disclaim any responsibility.
Yourthe limits
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Yes.
Senator BLUMENTHAL.of your acceptance of liability isif
thereif that person has a diploma or a credential, thats where
your liability ends. Is that correct?
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. The appropriate diploma or credential, yes.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Same with you, Mr. Cahill?
Mr. CAHILL. Yes, sir.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you.
My time has expired. I apologize for running over, and Ill follow
up in second round of inquiry.
Dr. KLEIN. One quick
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Dr. KLEIN. Just want to mention, real quickly, that thethis
issue of liability was handled both by the Florida State Supreme
Court and by the U.S. Supreme Court. It was the case Carnival
Corporation versus Darce Carlisle. And that would have been in
2007. The legal opinion in that case with thewhich the cruise industry argued for and was able to getwas that they are not liable
for the behavior of a physician conducting malpractice on one of
their cruise ships.
The CHAIRMAN. Ill absorb that as best as I can.
Senator Markey.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you want me to make a speech welcoming
you once again to the Committee?
[Laughter.]
Senator MARKEY. I feel welcomed. And Im glad that youve introduced legislation in this area. And I would like to, as one of the
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first things I do, is to ask to be added as a cosponsor to your legislation. So
The CHAIRMAN. With pleasure.
Senator MARKEY. And I thank you. This hearing has been highly
illuminating.
May I ask you, Admiral ServidioI know there has been some
reference to this accident off the coast of Louisiana, and there is,
right now, from the Coast Guard, an update saying that there is
significant risk of losing the blowout preventer. Could you tell us
what are the consequences of losing the blowout preventer in a situation like this? What would the impact be upon the Gulf of Mexico?
Admiral SERVIDIO. Thank you, Senator.
From what I understand, the Hercules 265, which is thean oil
rig that was drillingI believe its about 40 miles off the Louisiana
coastsuffered a well kickback; and, as such, gas came up, and
there was an explosion last night. And, as a result of that explosion
and the fire, the cantilever, which is pretty much the derrickthe
floor ofon which the derrick was drilling, has collapsed. And,
with thatI understand that the crew was interviewed before they
evacuated; everyone evacuated safely from the mobile offshore
drilling unitthat they said they actuated the blowout preventer,
but, for whatever reason, it seems like it did not work. I dont
know, at this point in time, sir, on why that might have happened
or whether the rams actually, which are, basically, two hydraulic
presses that squeeze togetherI dont know whether they actually
actuated or whether they didnt, sir.
If there is no blowout preventer, then there might be a number
of options that I know the Unified Command is looking at. I dont
know whether capping, in a capping stack, would be a potential.
Thedue to the sand that might be in the formation, it might plug
itself. There are a number of different things that could happen,
sir. Were working with BSEE, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, and the Unified Command is looking at what
those potential options are and what might be. I cant
Senator MARKEY. Is there
Admiral SERVIDIO.speculate, sir.
Senator MARKEY. Is there a chance that the rig could sink if they
cannot get close enough to fight the fire?
Admiral SERVIDIO. There is a chance, sir, that, if theif we cant
fight the fire and it continues to burn, that there will be metal fatigue, and that will infect the vessel, sir.
Senator MARKEY. And what would that mean for the Coast
Guard or for the industry, in terms of capping the well, if the rig
actually sank?
Admiral SERVIDIO. Again, sir, I dont know specifically on what
that would do. I think a lot would depend upon what happens with
the rig and how it would end upif it does have a failure, how it
would end up failing. And I dont know the pressures of the formation or anything else, sir, so I really cant speculate, Senator.
Senator MARKEY. But, it could take upwards of 20 or 25 days to
have a relief well that is actually drilled, if this rig sinks, if there
is an inability to deal with it.
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Admiral SERVIDIO. Senator, I believe both the Coast Guard and
BSEE issued, or are issuing, a joint order to start the process of
drilling a relief well. Im not sure whether there are other contingencies, but I think theyre starting to get that process in place,
should that happen.
Senator MARKEY. Yes. You know, there was another event like
this, just 2 weeks ago, where there was a loss of well control. And
this is just a second incident in 2 weeks. So, again, its just something that we have to learn, that when we dont put in the proper
policies that ensure that these events are preventable, that they
become inevitable, and they recur. And were seeing it, now, twice
in just 2 weeks.
Admiral SERVIDIO. As youre aware, Senator, the Coast Guard
has responsibility for the safety systems onboard that mobile drilling unit. The Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement
looks at the drilling systems, the BOP and other types.
Senator MARKEY. Thank you.
Admiral SERVIDIO. But, we share. We work together.
Senator MARKEY. Thank you. Thank you, sir. Thank you for your
service, and thank you for the Coast Guards work in this instance.
Mr. Chairman, for the past three Congresses, I have actually introduced the Travelers International Bill of Rights in the House of
Representatives. And this relates to a similar, but not identical,
issue, here, that were talking about, which is a consumer who purchases international vacation travel online. My bill would require
travel website operators to prominently post information regarding
the health and safety conditions at overseas travel destinations,
such as the availability of lifeguards, medical personnel, as well as
information from the Department of State on crime statistics and
travel warnings related to their destination. So, this would actually
relate to passengers on ships that disembark when they go into
these vacation destinations.
So, Ill tell you why. Maureen Webster, she was a constituent of
mine in Woburn, Massachusettsshe educated me about the potentially deadly consequences that can result from lower safety
standards and medical response capabilities at some overseas travel destinations. Her son, Nolan, died at a resort in Mexico, when
he did not receive the medical treatment that may have been able
to safe his life.
So, Im planning on introducing that legislation in the Senate, as
well, because, by having easy access to health and safety information, Americans can actually make more informed decisions about
where to travel and where to stay when they are overseas.
Weve recently heard a number of serious incidents that compromised the safety of cruise ship passengers, including serious
mechanical failures that left thousands of passengers stranded for
days, navigational mistakes that led to passenger deaths, et cetera,
violent crimes that were committed onboard. But, the same thing
happens when passengers disembark in individual countries. And
that information, in my opinion, as well, should be made available.
So, Dr. Klein, what do you think about that, in terms of that
next step in giving protection to consumers?
Dr. KLEIN. Well, I very much agree with what youre saying and
the need for that for international travelers, but also for cruise pas-
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sengers. For example, there are casesI mean, not frequent, but
there are enoughof people going on shore excursions and being
robbed, or going on shore excursions and dying. In my testimony,
I give a list of the number of deaths onshore for people who have
taken a cruise.
And I think, as long as your legislation would extend to including
what happens ashore to cruise passengers, not just people who
have flown to stay in that location, I think it would be a wonderful
and a very positive move.
Senator MARKEY. Mr. Cahill, what would you think about that
giving that information to passengers on cruise ships or to anyone
just going into a country, flying in, as well?
Mr. CAHILL. Senator, we actually try to do that now when we
have concerns about a particular area. We have a security group.
We review ports before we go. We have actually canceled calls in
a number of portsweve stopped going to portswhen weve had
concerns about it. But, our security team reviews foris there potential with terrorism in that particular part of the world? We look
to see, Is there civil unrest? If theres civil unrest, were probably
going to pass on that port.
But, we also look at local crime. We work with local authorities.
And we will give notices to our guests. I mean, to some extent, its
common sense, just like when Im home, there are certain parts of
town you may not want to go to at night. We will tell the same
things to our guests there. So, we try and do that, today, Senator.
Senator MARKEY. But, would you support requirements that
travel website operators who sell cruise vacations must prominently post this information for consumers shopping for a cruise so
that they can understand what the dangers, what the health conditions might be in these individual ports? Would you support that
being posted, as well, on the websites of the travel
Mr. CAHILL. I think I have to look at it, first, Senator.
Senator MARKEY. Mr. Goldstein, what would you think about
that?
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That sounds like something that the industry
would be definitely open to dialogue about. We want our guests to
be informed. Both our companies and, I think, other cruise companies have very experienced people. In our case, our head of Security, Safety and Environment was a very senior long-term ranking
official at the FBI. I believe Carnivals person had a long and distinguished career at the Coast Guard.
So, we are constantly evaluating. And it seems like an eminently
sensible idea. But, I just want to stress that things change all the
time. So, for example, with the recent unrest in Turkey, cruise
ships are obviously going in and out of Turkey, land-stay vacationers are going in and out of Turkey. Were monitoring that situation literally hour by hour to make sure thatit is still okay for
the ships to go there, and so forth. So, its a very important subject
for us.
Senator MARKEY. I appreciate that. But, it turns out that
Maureen Webster, in talking to me about her son, basically
learned, as I learned in helping her, that all of this information
was knowable, that she learned so much about where her son was
going after the fact that, if there had been a conversation before-
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hand, might have prevented him ever going there. So, that was a
destination in Mexico, but it could have been in many other countries in the world. So, I would like to work with you on that, just
so that information is made public.
So, I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Markey, thank you very much. That was
a substantial input of 10 minutes and 13 seconds.
[Laughter.]
The CHAIRMAN. But, of course, very interesting.
Senator MARKEY. I was playing under American League rules.
Im over here in the National League. So, Im just learning the
rules
[Laughter.]
Senator MARKEY.you know, designated hitter, you know
Senator THUNE. Mr. Chairman
Senator MARKEY.proxies, all different rules over here. So,
Im
[Laughter.]
Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr.
Senator THUNE. Having served with the Senator from Massachusetts in the House, I know theres a real pent-up demand to talk
for long periods of time when you get to the Senate.
[Laughter.]
Senator MARKEY. When you move from a 1-minute rule
[Laughter.]
Senator MARKEY.right, its liberating.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. And maybe in the Grapefruit League.
[Laughter.]
The CHAIRMAN. Let me make a comment and read something
controversial.
My impression of this hearing is that theres a bit of a Kabuki
dance. I mean, my mind is not neutral on this. And I come from
a state where we have a lot of coal mines. And although it may be
very odd to compare coal mines to cruise ships, the psychology focused within the management of coal mines and what were talking
about here seems to be somewhat parallel.
There is danger every day in the coal mines. People understand
that. But, since coal mines, like cruise ships are located beyond the
borders of 3 miles, nobody really knows whats going on. Theres no
911 reporting system. And so, you have to depend on whatever the
rules are of management on that cruise ship.
In the coal mines, that can be very deadly. When we do have accidents, they sort of stop the world, at least the coal-mining part
of the world, and parts of the Congress. And Republicans and
Democrats come together, and they pass mine safety legislation,
because theres a shock factor, where, in fact, there should not have
been a shock factor, because the elements leading up to that were
there all the time for those of us whove dealt with coal mines and
miners for years and yearsand coal operators, in particular.
I have a feeling that those who operate here are showing the
good side, emphasizing how infrequent these matters are. I think
Ive heard it mentioned a couple of times, of passengers, but not
very much. And I think there are some people who want to see
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good done. And that, after all, is the purpose of an oversight committee. We take that extremely seriously.
So, Mr. Rosenker, I will just highlight in my statement, yes,
youre the former chairman of the National Transportation Safety
Board, and yes, you are also the CLIA-appointed Panel of Expertsyou belong to that. But, you see, that doesnt make you a
free actor. That makes you a part of the system. You can answer,
at the proper time.
Mr. ROSENKER. Thank you, Chairman
The CHAIRMAN. Iat the proper time.
Mr. ROSENKER. Oh, Im sorry.
The CHAIRMAN. I want to read to youa predecessor of yours,
Jim Hall, who Ive known for 30 years, and who had some part of,
in fact, saving my life, at one point, in Tennessee, which doesnt
bias me toward him, because this is a different subject. But, this
is what he had to say. And I didnt see this until last night, until
we just got it last night. As you know, he was head of NTSB from
1994 to 2001. He recently made some comments about the cruise
industry that I will share with you.
He said that the IMOin other words, the International Maritime Organizationand other cruise regulators are paper tigershis wordsthat havent been able to get, quote, bad actors
out of the industry. He said that the maritime industry is, quote,
a culture that has never been broken, as the aviation industry
wasand you see evidence of that in the Costa Concordia accidentby which I mean we had a lot of trouble with getting aviation to take seriously the problems of the amount of sleep that
their pilots got, and the propeller people, who had to travel over
the country and could get hardly any sleep, as opposed to those
who flew international flights pretty much on automatic control
and made a lot more money. And he even said that, though cruise
ships may seem and feel American, they flag in countries like the
Bahamas and operate outside of reasonable and safety standards.
I think there was a discussion earlier which I felt I disagreed
with, and that is that if it wasthat, you know, safety standards
applied, no matter where you were. I think thats not true. American standards of safety apply within the 3 miles. Outside of that,
its your world, your ball game.
And he said that people who book cruises should be aware of all
of this, operating outside of reasonable safety standards. And he
says that the industry is, and has been, an outlaw industry. Those
are strong words from a moderate Southern person, who I greatly
respect.
Frankly, that introduces the kind of controversy that I want in
this hearing. You, on the one hand; him, on the other hand. What
they say, I expect. What you say, I dont expect, except as I understand not breaking the culture.
So, what are your comments on Jim Halls statement?
Mr. ROSENKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I, too, along with you, respect former Chairman Hall. He
was an excellent head of this board that I had the privilege to chair
for 6 and a half years.
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Let me put a little perspective in. And I think you will appreciate
this, sir, because of being Chairman ofthis oversight committee
goes across all modes of transportation.
When I served and got confirmed by this committee, in March of
2003, until I left, in August of 2009, 2000and this is approximate210,000 people died on our Nations highways; 36 million accidents, 18 million injuries. During that same period, 210 commercial airline accidents and incidents, resulting in 10 fatal accidents,
for 138 fatalities. In the rail, without including the 180 people that
committed suicide during that six and a half years, 317 people died
in operational fatalities. In that same period, in the cruise ship
areaand this is according to G.P. Wilde, who is the authoritative
statistician that covers this industry18 people died, three of
which were passengers and 15 were crew.
None of those are acceptable fatalities, but Im just asking for a
perspective to understand where we need to be really looking to
raise the bar of safety, not just in our cruise ship area, but clearly
in others, as well.
The CHAIRMAN. Sir, you do this committee an injustice, and one
which offends me, because we do thatyoure unaware of it,
but
Mr. ROSENKER. Oh, no, sir, Im quite aware of it.
The CHAIRMAN.we do it on a constant basis.
Mr. ROSENKER. I doI know that
The CHAIRMAN. We do not accept
Mr. ROSENKER.and I applaud the work that yourebeen
doing. But
The CHAIRMAN.in any
Mr. ROSENKER.I just wanted to put it
The CHAIRMAN.in any way, shape
Mr. ROSENKER.in perspective.
The CHAIRMAN.or form
The CHAIRMAN.a comparison between the number of deaths in
one industry, as compared to the number of deaths in another industry. In that case, the coal industry might look quite good. Thats
not my view, generally, of the coal industry. And, in fact, I even
worked it out so that they had to payanytime they had toan
accident of any sort, they had to post it on the SEC website. And
I did the same withsince we do some cybersecurity, with hacking.
That now is law. If youre hacked into, you have to post it on the
website. Now, thats aimed at the shareholder, not the passenger.
But, ImI think ImI think were talking past each other. Im
not sure what were accomplishing here. I think its helpful, in that
it sort of sets up whos on what side of which, and therefore, How
can you measure what they say? But, it has not been as successful, from my point of view, a hearing as I would like.
And I will leave it there and turn to Senator Blumenthal.
Dr. KLEIN. May I make a comment?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Dr. KLEIN. If I may, just want to make a very quick comment.
We had a variation of this conversation at the last hearing, 16
months ago. And I had asserted that I think one of the problems
with the industry is an issue ofthey listen to the insiders, but
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they dont listen to the outsiders. And anybody whos not part of
the industry who has an opinion is, basically, ignored, somehow
marginalized.
And I recallto Senator Rockefellers commentthat the CEO of
CLIA suggested that perhaps CLIA should have a conversation
with me. Now, I dont take this personally. And the CEO turned
to me and says, Oh, yes, we will be talking to him, because he
may have some valuable insights. Thats 16 months ago, and Ive
received no call. Again, Im not hurt. This isits not an ego. But,
I think it reflects that, If youre not one of us, you have nothing
to offer to us that can help us.
The CHAIRMAN. Point taken.
Actually, Senator Begich
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Imwith apologies, Mr. Chairman, I will
have to leave to preside
Senator BEGICH. Let him do that, then.
Senator BLUMENTHAL.but
The CHAIRMAN. Can you put in one final question?
Senator BEGICH. No, go ahead. Ill follow him. Ill follow him.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Let me ask you
The CHAIRMAN. You mean to preside over the Senate? What a
miserable task.
[Laughter.]
Senator BLUMENTHAL. No comment.
[Laughter.]
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Mr. Cahill and Mr. Goldstein, we were
talking, a little bit earlier, about limits on liability, limits on where
remedies can be enforcedwith those limits, Ive looked and read
carefully at CLIA, and I dont see any indication of what those limits on liability are. Wouldnt you agree?
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Im sorry, I didnt follow.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Well, for example, the limits on what
standards are enforced when the guaranteeand its a guarantee,
in CLIA, that medical care would be providednowhere is there
any indication that fees are going to be charged. Thats correct?
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Right. As you noted, the Passenger Bill of Rights
does not comment on that aspect of the requirement to provide the
necessary medical care.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. And theres no indication as to the limits
on what passengers can seek, by way of recourse, if theres negligence in the provision of medical care. You simply guarantee that
a doctor has a diploma; you dont guarantee the doctors going to
provide adequate medical care. Thatsis that correct?
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Yes. But, I will note
Senator BLUMENTHAL. And theres no indication, in CLIA, of that
limitation on your obligation. Is that correct?
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is correct. But, Iif I may
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Wouldnt it be clearer ifand more transparentif, as to that rightand, by the way, many other rights
and Im going to be following, with the Chairmans permission,
with some more detailed questions in writing, not only about what
your lines guarantee, but what others do, as well, because you may
be the leaders in the industry; you may be the good guys. But,
wouldnt it be preferable if more of those limits, more of the non-
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transparent restrictions or fees or charges were provided in CLIA
instead of in the fine print of contractual disclaimers of obligations?
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. It may be, Senator. I just would emphasize two
things.
First, we wanted to be able to issue a Passenger Bill of Rights
faster rather than slower. And
Senator BLUMENTHAL. But, a Passenger Bill of Rights can be
misleading.
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Our intention was
Senator BLUMENTHAL. To put it very bluntly, it can do more
harm than good.
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. It certainly
Senator BLUMENTHAL. It would seem to a guarantee a right that,
in fact, is illusory.
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. OK. I can tell you that we do not believe, nor
does our counsel, who has advised us, believe, that any of those
rights are illusory. We believe that it has gone beyond the standard
ticket contract, over time, in meaningful ways.
And then, the second thing is that were trying
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Well, that may be part of the problem,
that the standard ticket contract limits your obligations and CLIA
seems to expand them, but, when the rubber meets the road, you
go back to the contract and insist on what Im calling the fine
print in the contract, that, in effect, narrowly constricts and limits
the rights of the passenger.
And when I say you, Im not necessarily talking about your
line; Im talking
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Yes.
Senator BLUMENTHAL.about you, other lines, as well. Im not
here to sort of cross-examine you or put you on the spot. This is
not about your line or Mr. Cahills; its really about the industry.
Mr. GOLDSTEIN. No, I understand. I just want to emphasizeI
believe Mr. Cahill noted this, in passing, earlierfor at least a
good number of cruise linesI cant say for the whole industry, but
for at least a good number of cruise lines right nowthere is a
process in place where the ticket contract is being modified and
harmonized to accord with the intent of the Passenger Bill of
Rights so that this potential dilemma doesnt exist.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Well, that is a welcome development. I
hope it will be accelerated and enhanced, and enlarged by proposed
legislation like the Chairmans, which Senator Markey and I have
joined, and that the good guys in the industry will join in educating
us as to how the potential abuses can be reduced, and the whole
industry made more transparent and accountable.
And I apologize, Mr. Chairman, for taking more than 3 minutes,
here.
And, to my colleague, Senator Begich, thank you for letting me
have this additional time.
And really appreciate all of you being here.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Begich.
Senator BEGICH. Thank you.
And, Senator Blumenthal, its okay, because you get to preside
and I dont have to.
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[Laughter.]
Senator BEGICH. So, thats a plus.
Let meyou know, I was listening to the Chairmans comment.
And, all due respect, I think its important to know the data comparisonI think thats what you were trying to donot to question
the Committeesbecause we have done a lot on airlines, Ill tell
you that. And, you know, weve clamped down, based on some disasters. But, Im going to give you a whole different data point that
I want to make sure is part of the record, and I want to submit
this for the record. Its crime-rate calculations for the three top
cruise ship industry folks which accumulate 90 percent of the traffic, basically.
[The information referred to is retained in Senator Begichs files.]
Senator BEGICH. And when you take rates, like assaults with serious bodily injury, its 3.8 per 100,000. But, when you compare it
to citiesand I was a mayor, so I can legitimately say thisits
27.1 per 100,000. Its nine times worse in a city.
Now, again, we believe, as a mayorformer mayorand, Im
sure, you alsozero is the goal. No one questions that. Am I correct on that? That is the target. But, when you look at othersand,
you know, the horrendous crime of rape on cruise ships, so the 90
percent, the three top, is 5.9 per 100,000; but, when you compare
it, again, around 27 percent perfor the cities. Sexual assaults, 8.7
per 100,000, 97.2 per 100,000 in cities. I just want to, you know
data is data. We can argue over data. But, its data.
But, here, I guess I have a question. Is there any datayou
know, I just took a ferry from the Cape over to Cape Codor, over
to Marthas Vineyard. I didnt get any Bill of Rights. I didnt get
a ticket. I got a little piece of stub. It didnt tell me anything of
my rights. And I can guarantee there have been incidences on ferriestheft, other incidencescrashes, disabledI can go through
the list. I dont use a lot of them, because, on the East Coast,
theyre more apparent, because of the way they move through the
islands. We have some in thesoutheast Alaska, run by the State
of Alaska. But, Im not familiar withwhen I went and paid my
$8, that I got some long explanation of all the issues.
The other thing Ill put on the record, because, I think, Mr.
Chairman, youre right, there is some differences. You know, I
come from a state that understands the cruise ship industry. Weve
hammered on you on certain areas aroundespecially our environmental. We have folks thatOcean Rangers that are on your ships,
when you come into our waters, to make sure you provide the environmental safety standard we require. We have onshore requirements of waste disposal, for example, that is very unique to our
state.
But, at the same time, theres a balance. For example, Iyou
know, Senator Markey, in all due respect, Id be interested in his
legislation, to look at it, but are we now going to do hotel packages,
airline packages? I can tell you, on limited liability that Senator
Blumenthal brought up, every federally-funded healthcare clinic
has limited liability set up by the Federal Government so the Federal Government doesnt have toresponsible for those doctors. Its
very interesting that we have tort reform for us, so we dont get
suedbecause these clinics are all out there, and were not sure
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but, theyre contractors, and we assume, because they are
diplomad theyve done internships, and other things, that they
have the experience. Im assuming thats the same way you do it.
I may be wrong about that. But, Im assuming youre not just getting a doc in a box with a certificate and hope to God they work
out okay. Im guessing that.
And, you know, honestly, Dr. Klein, your comment that onshore
crime occursis somehow the cruise ships faultnow, you didnt
say that, that exact way, but you implied it. Does that mean, when
I fly to a community that I get mugged or my money is taken, the
airline is at fault? No. Absolutely not.
So, Im all forbecause you all remember last year on the Coast
Guard reauthorization, that we worked, and I made sure some new
rules were put in play on safety standards and other things that
you were required to do. So, Im all for it. Guaranteed. But, we
have to be careful of how far we expand the government regulation
component when we need to have safety on these shipstheres no
question about itand, you know, again, you remember the conversations we had last year, and continue to have these conversations. But, I want to be careful of the broad statements that are
made, at times.
And, Mr. Chairman, I have not looked at your bill, but I have
one major concern, I will tell you. DOT is notI understand the
reason why, but DOT, to write standards and to manage an issue
like this would make me very nervous. Consumer Protection, I
think, is an important agency. DOT has a hard enough time figuring out which roads theyre building, what bridges they should
do, what airports they should manage. I get very nervous about
DOT. Im caught talking as a mayor who had to deal with DOT on
a national and a local level. But, I think, if there is an agency
I dont know if the Consumer Protection Agency is the right one,
but I just want to give my two bits.
I have not reviewed your bill in detail, other than that piece of
it, and II just know my headache with DOT is large, and increasing on an annual basis. I thought Id ended when I was done being
mayor, to be frank with you, but coming here and listening to the
Federal DOT is even worse. But, I would give that cautionary note
as a bill is being put together.
But, I justyou know, in all due respect, I think its important
that we look at this andthe incidents that have occurred have
been very visible. No question about it. And the families and individuals that have been harmed have had impactnot only to us in
our policy decisions and discussion, but to them, personally, obviously. But, lets be careful and cautious of how we approach this.
And Ill leave it on this one note. I didnt realize we were going
to talk about oil and gas industry when Senator Markey was here,
but let me give you an example. When we were drilling, this last
Arcticlast summer in the ArcticShell was drilling in the Arctic
Ocean. But, their incident that occurred was not in the Arctic
Ocean, it was 800 miles away, because of a transportation issue.
We heard about it all over, everywhere. They never spilled a drop
of oil, no incident and injury.
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Now, saying that, weve had a fishing vessel spewing oil out for
some period, here. Most in this room have no idea that has occurred, because it didnt have an oil company name attached to it.
We had a military ship run aground, probably 2 years agoyou
may remember this, as a Coast Guardrun aground because it
was trying to help a village move because of a climate-change
issueran aground, spilled tons of diesel. We never heard about
that, because it didnt have the word, you know, X Oil Company
on there.
So, weve got to be careful, here. Weyou know, if were going
to look at cruise ships, then wed better add ferries in this, because
they have more passenger movement, and some of those ferries are
held together by duct tape. And I didntyou know, I like getting
on them, because theyre fun, theyre enjoyable. But, you know, Ive
got to question, sometimes, how theyre operated, because theyre
usually operated by local governments or State governments that
have no money to maintain them.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator, is it your view, therefore, that we
should not proceed in looking at the cruise line industry until weve
properly done ferries?
Senator BEGICH. No. Iwhat Im saying is, as I did last year, in
the Coast Guard reauthorization bill, we absolutely looked at them,
and made some adjustments in there. But, at the same time, I
would say, 2 months on the Bill of Rightsyou know, we can barelyI mean, DOTit will take them 2 years to write the regulations, and then theyll get stuck, as you know, on some OMB sanitation department.
So, I would say that I think we have an obligation, as a committee, as whatever that seasons are done, that this industry do report to us on what is happening with their Bill of Rights, and are
they employing them correctly? Is there penalties if someone does
not respond to them?
But, 2 months on a new rule that they jumped onand I give
them credit. Now, its not perfect, and I think you guys have acknowledged that, and theres some more room, here. But, we
should spend the time to allow some improvement to occur, rather
than, 2 months after it, suddenly decide we have new rules. Because I guarantee you, DOT will takeit will take us aityou
know, 3 years from now, we will have new rules, if we started
today and had a bill, just based on the way this place operates and
DOT operates, in the sense of regulation-writing.
So, I would say, Mr. Chairman, that I would aggressively work
with them on these Bill of Rights, see howand if there are
somelike Mr. Blumenthal brought up, if there are some issues of
disconnect between the rules that are on the ticket, the detail of
it, and what theyre claiming to give to the public, then we should
help make those aligned, because we dont want false advertising;
we want correct advertising. So, if someone sees this Bill of Rights,
they know the detail is wherever it is. Thats kind of my view on
it.
But, 2 months is not enough time, I will tell you that, just from
my own experience. But, no, we should continue to work everywhere we can to increase safety, but I would include, you know
Im just telling you, Mr. Chairman, Iafter riding a couple of fer-
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ries, you know, we love duct tape in Alaska, but Im not sure Id
wrap a boat in it. Thats all.
Ill end there. There was my question, whichyou really had no
question. More of a commentary.
Dr. KLEIN. Can I respond to the
Senator BEGICH. I guess it was a question, then.
[Laughter.]
Dr. KLEIN. I just want to respond to two points.
First of all, in terms of the issue of crime onshore, I would distinguish between general crime and crime when they occur on a shore
excursion. And what I was referring to in the larger part is that,
when one goes on a shore excursion and they are robbed, when
theres an accident that results in physical injury or death, I think
the cruise line does have responsibility. But, if you read the cruise
contract, they have no liability for that, because those are independent contractors.
So, I think there are two issues there. One is liability, one is
it is something that they are selling to passengers and endorsing
as an activity.
The other issue isI cant argue with the statistics you gave.
However, as an academic, when I give numbers, Ive got to be
transparent about the methodology. And my work has to be subject
to peer review. So, without my knowing the methodology of
wherewhat those numbershow theyre constructed, the data
from which theyre drawn, the definitions that are used for those
categories, its hard for me to make any comment, other than
Senator BEGICH. Thats fair.
Dr. KLEIN.theyre numbers. OK?
So, its justyou know, again, Im not judging, Im not asking
Senator BEGICH. Understood.
Dr. KLEIN.questioning the integrity; just that, without that information, without peer review, its difficult to make any statement.
Senator BEGICH. Fair.
The CHAIRMAN. I want towere going to start voting in about
5 minutesmake a closing statement, here.
One issue that we have not spent time talking about today, but
weve spent a lot of time talking about it as a committee, or committee staff, is how the cruise industry uses a loophole in our tax
code to avoid paying its fair share of corporate income taxes.
Mr. Cahill and Mr. Goldstein, my staff reviewed your 10k financial reports for the past 7 years. They found that, in this period,
your companyyour two companies have made over $17 billion in
profit, while managing to pay only $218 million in corporate income
taxes. Your collective corporate income tax rate, therefore, comes to
about 1.3 percent.
Im not asking for your comment, Im just saying what Im saying.
Your companies are headquartered in the United States. Most of
your passengers are U.S. citizens. You use our ports, our courts,
and the services of the Coast Guard and many other government
agencies, but, because you flag your ships in other countries and
maintain the fiction that you earn most of your income outside of
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U.S. territory, you do not pay your fair share of taxes in this country.
I would just like you to know that Im working on legislation to
close this loophole. My staff has been working with the Finance
Committee and with the Joint Committee on Taxation to develop
legislation that would require your industry to pay your fair share
of taxes. I will be introducing this legislation later this week.
I thank you all for your attendance, and I thank you for your patience.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
WORCESTER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE
Worcester, MA, August 19, 2013
Senator JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV,
Chairman,
U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
Dear Senator Rockefeller,
I am writing to provide you and the Committee with my thoughts on the U.S.
Coast Guard post-accident investigation report on the Carnival Splendor fire which
occurred in the Pacific Ocean on November 8, 2010. I was asked to read this report
and to provide my thoughts to the Committee on your insight on the incident, the
quality of the investigative report, and how anything in your research could help
add value to the report. I note here two important facts: Firstly, this was a short
turn around request (2 days), therefore, my comments are at the 20,000 foot level
and are based solely on reading the report, i.e., no further investigation was conducted and Secondly, the content of this letter represents my own professional opinion and has not been endorsed by WPI.
I find the investigation and report on this incident to be very thorough, professional, and comprehensive. As a result of reading the full report, I have some
thoughts on the incident and in this letter I point out some areas where further
probing would be beneficial. I also suggest some additional recommendations that
I deem of value. I have organized my thoughts and recommendations into six important areas: alarm culture; fireproofing and protection of cable trays; maintenance of
the emergency diesel generator/system maintenance philosophy; an engineering cascade analysis of CO2 systems, recommendations for more comprehensive and effective fire-fighter training, and important areas of fire research and development.
Probing of the Alarm Culture on the Ship
Two of the major factors resulting in the negative outcomes of this incident were
the significant delay in agent delivery caused by the manual alarm reset and the
subsequent ignition of the cable trays. The report states that suppression agent delivery was delayed 15 minutes and that this delay was the result of a bridge
watchstander resetting the fire alarm panel on the bridge. The report goes on to
acknowledge that this was a critical error which allowed the fire to spread to the
overhead cables and eventually caused the loss of power. What we dont know is
why this alarm was reset. I recommend probing the alarm culture on the ship. What
operational and maintenance issues may be uncovered that would explain why the
operators first reaction was to reset the alarm? How often do they have false
alarms? Whats causing these and what changes to the installation, operation, and
maintenance of the fire alarms would result in less false alarms? While there is an
alarm log given in the report, there is no analysis or further probing associated with
it. Recommendation 1. Calls for the removal of the 40-second time delay in the automatic activation sequence for the Hi-Fog system. This recommendation correctly
notes that the seconds and minutes following the ignition of a fire are crucial to
the firefighting response. As such, failure to take quick and prompt action to extinguish a fire can lead to major, negative downstream effects. I agree with this recommendation, however, I feel the delay caused by the alarm reset and the fact that
alarms are reset is even more significant.
Fireproofing of Cable Trays
To ensure safety and prevent casualties such as fire, loss of a prime system, etc,
ship design focuses on both the hardening of critical systems and on providing redundancy in those systems. It appears that in this installation, the electrical cable
trays represent a single-point failure mode, if the cables cannot deliver electricity,
most major ships systems are rendered inoperable, yet there was neither redundancy nor hardening of the cable trays. I would recommend fireproofing and/or other
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modes of protection for these trays. The optimum way to provide this would need
to be evaluated but may take the form of passive protection such as wrappings or
coatings, or may take the form of active protection such as a suppression system.
The potential to re-route the cable trays so they do not pass directly overhead of
major hazard should also be evaluated. This is already common practice in very
similar land-based facilities. Recommendation 2f does call for addressing the susceptibility of all Dream class vessels to a complete loss of power; however, it falls short
of making a recommendation for cable tray protection.
Maintenance philosophy and Maintenance of Emergency Generators
The emergency diesel generator (EDG) stopped running several times during this
incident but we dont know why. I would probe both the maintenance philosophy
for the ship and the actual maintenance logs for specific essential equipment. Maintenance philosophies range from fixing something when it breaks down to performing routine maintenance/testing at scheduled intervals. There are also predictive maintenance philosophies and reliability-centered maintenance philosophies.
What is the maintenance philosophy employed on this ship? How was maintenance
for the EDG conducted? Was it tested under load? Was it periodically exercised?
Engineering cascade analysis of CO2 systems
The report recognizes that The CO2 system is a crucial line of defense in extinguishing an engine room fire, and must be installed and maintained properly so
that it operates when needed. I would suggest broadening this to a full engineering
cascade analysis of the CO2 system. A cascade analysis would start with system design. What standards were the system designed to? Is the design adequate? The CO2
system on this ship exhibited multiple system failures and leaky valves. Thus, the
cascade analysis should continue from design to installation, maintenance and testing.
Firefighting Procedures and Firefighter Training
The report states that approximately five hours into the firefighting effort, the
Captain evacuated the engine room and attempted to activate the installed CO2 system. The report also states that it took approximately two hours to locate the fire
in the cable runs. The math suggests that fire teams attempted to extinguish the
fire with portable extinguishers for three hours. These point again to a need for reliable, location specific detection and better defined and practice firefighting tactics.
Fire Research and Development
In any fire event, quick reliable detection and automatic suppression are key. A
study of new detection and suppression options for cruise ships should be conducted.
Two hours to locate the fire along the cable tray is not acceptable, and options beyond CO2 should be evaluated.
Respectfully submitted,
KATHY A. NOTARIANNI, PH.D., P.E.,
Head, Department of Fire Protection Engineering,
Associate Professor, Fire Protection Engineering and
Associate Professor, Mechanical Engineering and Chemical Engineering,
Worcester Polytechnic Institute.
RESPONSE
TO
WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV

TO REAR ADMIRAL JOSEPH SERVIDIO
Question 1. During the week of July 15, 2013, the Coast Guard released its investigative report on the November 2010 engine room fire that disabled the Carnival
Splendor. The report found that the Splendor fire-fighting crew did not appear to
be familiar with the engine room, and the fire-fighting team made errors in decisions critical to preventing the spread of fire. Would you say it is important for firefighting crews on cruise ships to conduct drills in the engine room space so they
can move quickly and effectively in the event of a real fire?
Answer. Yes, this is important. As a result of this event, the Coast Guard published policy in July 2013, directing Coast Guard vessel inspectors to witness a fire
drill in the engine room space on all foreign cruise ships at the next scheduled examination, and subsequently, at least once during a foreign cruise ships annual examination cycle.
Question 2. Admiral Servidio, the Coast Guard report recommends that Carnival
address firefighting training deficiencies by revising its safety management system.
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Please explain why the report asks Carnival to implement this recommendation not
just for the Splendor, but across the entire fleet.
Answer. An effective means to ensure consistency within a fleet of vessels is
through the companys Safety Management System (SMS) since an SMS applies to
each vessel in the companys fleet, vice just to one vessel.
For instance, changes made to Carnival Cruise Lines SMS, to improve firefighting
training, would therefore apply to each Carnival Cruise Line vessel. This will ensure
that ensure that fire fighting training improvements will be implemented companywide, fleet-wide, and to all crew operating throughout the cruise lines fleet of vessels.
Question 3. The Coast Guard report on the Splendor fire found that the ships CO2
firefighting equipment was not installed properly and had other flaws that prevented it from working properly during the fire. The report also said these flaws
should have been spotted by multiple parties including the shipbuilder, Carnival,
and the flag country of Panama, or the classification society operating on behalf of
the flag country.
Clearly there are multiple parties involved with review of ship equipment installation and inspection. But at the end of the day, doesnt the ship owner bear the
primary responsibility for making sure equipment on the ship doesnt present safety
risks?
Answer. Ultimately, yes. The owner/operator of the vessel has primary responsibility for the operation of the vessels equipment, while the Flag State, Class Societies and Port States verify compliance with established regulations and standards.
Question 4. After the Carnival Triumph engine room fire left that ship disabled
and stranded in February 2013, Mr. Cahill emphasized to the press that everyone
was safe, and what were talking about is the convenience of the guests.
I am concerned that such comments minimize the potential dangers of onboard
fires and other cruise accidents.
The Triumph was stranded in the Gulf of Mexico for four days before rescue was
complete. If that event had occurred during hurricane season, could we have seen
different results?
Answer. It is difficult to speculate what could have happened had this event occurred during hurricane season. The wide range of possible outcomes would likely
have been influenced by alternate actions/decisions that could have been taken by
the U.S. Government or the TRIUMPHs owner/operator, and any number of other
variables which might arise had heavy weather threatened.
That being said, the Coast Guard recognizes this incidents potential for much
more catastrophic consequences, and as one that needs to be closely examined and
learned from by all stakeholders so that risks of future occurrences can be reduced.
Question 5. While no passengers were harmed by the recent fire aboard the Royal
Caribbeans Grandeur of the Seas, if the fire occurred further out to sea and required passengers to be evacuated, could we have seen different results?
Answer. The investigation into this casualty is ongoing. From publically available
information, the vessels structural fire protection appeared to ultimately largely
contain the fire; this result would likely not have changed had the fire occurred further out to sea.
A different scenario requiring an at-sea passenger evacuation or abandon ship
would be complex but the Coast Guard cannot speculate on whether that would
have occurred based on the vessels distance out to sea.
Question 6. As part of the lessons learned analysis, do you think it is important
for cruise lines to examine potential risks highlighted by accidents in addition to
reviewing what actually happened?
Answer. Yes. It is important for any operator/owner of a vessel to examine risks
identified as causal factors in marine casualties and where possible incorporate lessons learned as a part of their Safety Management System (SMS).
Question 7. The Coast Guard has the authority to charge user fees for the inspection and other marine safety services it provides for vessels and mariners. As originally conceived in the 1980s, the user fees were expected to pay for the costs to the
Coast Guard and the Federal Government of providing the services. Do the user fees
the Coast Guard charges under section 2110 of title 46 pay the full cost of the services for which they are charged?
Answer. No. The Coast Guard estimates that user fees currently cover only 40
percent of the cost of providing the services.
Question 8. Almost two decades ago, Congress enacted the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1996. That law removed language that prevented the Coast Guard
from charging user fees for safety examination services provided to foreign cruise
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ships in U.S. ports. Does the Coast Guard charge user fees for the examinations it
performs on foreign cruise ships in U.S. ports? If not, are there any plans to do so?
Answer. The Coast Guard does not currently charge user fees for examinations
conducted on foreign cruise ships in U.S. ports. The Coast Guard is studying the
feasibility of updating all user fees and as part of that effort, a user fee for foreign
cruise ships is being considered.
Question 9. Does the U.S. Coast Guard inspect Passenger Ferry Vessels, including
state run ferries?
Answer. All ferries, including state run ferries, carrying more than six passengers
on a navigable waterway in the U.S. are inspected by the Coast Guard. Specifically,
in 2006, the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2006 amended
Title 46 United States Code Chapters 21 and 33 by defining ferry, passenger,
and small passenger vessel such that some previously uninspected ferry vessels,
including state owned ferries that did not carry passengers for hire, became subject
to Coast Guard Inspection for Certification.
Prior to this legislation, ferry vessels were not subject to Inspection for Certification if they did not carry passengers for hire (charged a fee for carriage). The new
definitions of passenger and small passenger vessel include ferries that carry at
least one passenger for a vessel of 100 gross tons and over and that carry more than
six passengers for vessels of less than 100 gross tons, regardless if a fee is paid by
the passenger.
If a vessel meets the definition of ferry, the fee is no longer a determining factor
in the application of marine inspection laws and regulations.
The total number of ferry vessels affected by this change was estimated to be 71,
which brought the total number of Coast Guard inspected ferry vessels up from approximately 384 to 455.
Question 10. What is the scope of the Coast Guards inspection for a Passenger
Ferry Vessel and how often are these inspections/exams required?
Answer. Ferry Vessel inspections are regulated by 46 CFR Subchapters T & K for
vessels less than 100 gross tons; and regulated under 46 CFR Subchapter H for vessels over 100 gross tons. Inspections are required at least annually on vessels inspected under Subchapters T & K, and annually with periodic re-inspections for vessels inspected under Subchapter H.
The scope of an inspection includes but is not limited to the Hull, Firefighting,
Electrical, Pollution Prevention, Lifesaving, Navigation, and Machinery equipment.
Additionally, inspections include witnessing drills and assessing crew proficiency in
handling shipboard emergencies, as well as witnessing the operation of a vessels
machinery and other equipment including underway tests such as man-overboard
drills. Ferry Vessels are also required to undergo periodic dry-dock examinations
Of the 455 ferries inspected by the Coast Guard:
109 are over 100 gross tons and are inspected under 46 CFR Subchapter H.
The remaining 346 are less than 100 GRT, and inspected under 46 CFR Subchapter T (235) and 46 CFR Subchapter K (111).
RESPONSE
TO
WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. BARBARA BOXER

REAR ADMIRAL JOSEPH SERVIDIO
TO
Question 1. The International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) currently requires muster drills to be performed within 24 hours of a cruise ships departure. However, last month the International Maritime Organizations (IMOs)
Maritime Safety Committee adopted an amendment to SOLAS that would require
muster drills to happen prior to or immediately upon departure. These rules will
go into effect in January 2015. Can you please clarify the phrase immediately upon
departure?
Answer. Additional guidance has not been developed at IMO on the text updates,
including immediately upon departure, related to amendments to regulation 19.2.2
of chapter III of the SOLAS Annex. The Coast Guard will work as necessary to provide clarification of this language prior to implementation.
In February 2012, the Coast Guard published policy to its field units that requires
inspectors to observe completion of passenger muster drills aboard cruise ships during the course of required cruise ship examinations in U.S. ports where passengers
have embarked the vessel. Under this policy, passenger muster drills must occur before the Coast Guard will consider the examination complete.
In the course of these examinations, the expectation is and the Coast Guards experience has been that passenger muster drills are overwhelmingly conducted prior
to vessels departure. Additionally, the industries voluntarily adopted standard out-
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lines that a cruise ships passenger muster drill should occur prior to vessels departure after embarking passengers.
Question 2. While much of the cruise industry changed its policies in February
2012 to require muster drills upon departure, I understand that the IMO rule will
not go into effect until January 2015. Why is the effective date of the policy January
2015, which is nearly a year and a half from now?
Answer. While it may seem a very slow process, in fact this new mandatory requirement for muster drills prior to or immediately upon departure will formally
enter into force as quickly as can practicably be done under the amendment process
timelines specified in Article VIII of the SOLAS Convention. The Contracting Governments to SOLAS adopted the amendments at IMO by means of Resolution
MSC.350 (92) on June 21, 2013. After adoption, Article VIII provides that the
amendment must be accepted by Contracting Governments, which is facilitated
through a process whereby acceptance is deemed to occur on a certain date if a critical mass of Contracting Governments has not objected by that time. This acceptance period, two years by default, was reduced to essentially the minimum of one
year permitted by Article VIII (until July 1, 2014). Finally, as specified in Article
VIII, the amendments enter into force six months after they are deemed to have
been accepted, which would mean entry into force on January 1, 2015. In the interim, the recommendatory guidance developed at IMO and promulgated in MSC.1/
Circ. 1446 (as revised) remains in effect.
Although the new IMO requirements for passenger musters will not formally
enter into force until January 2015, the Coast Guard is already witnessing passenger musters as part of its foreign cruise ship examination program. The Coast
Guard began doing this as a matter of policy beginning in February 2012.
Question 3. What is the Coast Guards timeline for adopting the new muster drill
standard? Will the Coast Guard wait until 2015 to adopt these new standards, despite the fact that the Cruise Line Industry Association has already adopted such
standards? If the Coast Guard plans to wait until 2015, why?
Answer. The Coast Guard has not waited to adopt this standard. Prior to the action at IMO action with respect to passenger musters, the Coast Guard adopted this
muster drill standard as a matter of a policy change that was promulgated in February 2012. Coast Guard field personnel are already witnessing this muster during
cruise vessel examinations conducted in U.S. ports where passengers have embarked the vessel.
RESPONSE
TO

TO GERALD CAHILL
Fire Safety
Question 1. Based on your companys review of the Splendor incident, what explains the failure of multiple inspections to uncover CO2 System flaws?
Answer. Before any ships are delivered, the CO2 system is inspected, tested and
approved by the shipyard and the ships classification society. RINA, the classification society responsible during shipbuilding, conducted the initial testing and approved the CO2 system prior to the Splendors delivery.
Ship engineers do not have the specialized training and experience needed to
properly maintain or uncover defects in these critical systems, so vessel operators
hire industry specialists to service and maintain CO2 systems. Carnival hired
Wilhelmsen Ship Service to perform the annual inspection and testing of the CO2
system, and all system maintenance as the service provider approved by both the
Flag state and Classification Society. Since Wilhelmsen had more than 40 years of
experience in the provision of inspection, reporting, maintenance and repair for fire
and safety systems and equipment for the maritime industry, Carnival relied on
Wilhelmsen to have the expertise to perform this service properly.
After the Splendor incident, Carnivals investigation revealed problems with the
CO2 system that should have been identified by specialists earlier, including a significant design fault in the CO2 system release sequence that increased the likelihood that a valve might not operate properly. Carnival remedied that flaw with a
major redesign of the CO2 systems on several ships to change the sequence and
achieve improved system reliability. Carnival has revised the test procedure to ensure that system operation is tested at full pressure. We have also replaced our
service provider.
While Carnival will need to continue to rely on the expertise of the maintenance
service providers, these changes to the system operation sequence will enhance reliability and full pressure testing should identify any future defects in the system.
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Question 2. Can you explain why Splendor fire-fighting crews did not train in the
engine room?
Answer. Carnival conducts firefighting training in the engineering spaces, which
includes the engine rooms, incinerator room, and other spaces. Fire drills were conducted in various locations around the ship, including similar machinery areas to
the engine room where fires might occur. Although we kept records of the fire drills,
we did not keep specific records of the locations of the fire drills.
While more emphasis will be placed on training to fight engine room fires, including secondary fires that spread to the overhead cable runs, we do not agree with
the U.S. Coast Guards conclusion that a lack of familiarization with the engine
room itself hampered efforts to locate and extinguish the fire, or allowed for further
spread of fire and smoke. (U.S. Coast Guard Report at p. 44). The Splendors firefighting crews were fully familiar with the engine room layout and equipment. The
firefighting timeline included in the U.S. Coast Guard report reveals that the engine
crew, who are intimately familiar with the engine room, were either part of, or accompanied the fire teams during firefighting operations. For instance, the Staff
Chief Engineer and the Second Engineer accompanied Fire Team Charlie into the
engine room and helped identify the location of the secondary fire in the cables
above DG5.
It was not a lack of familiarity with the engine room layout, but rather the nature
of the secondary fire in the overhead cable runs, that made firefighting difficult on
the Splendor. For most of the time, no flames were visible in the hot, smoke-filled
engine room without any lighting or power. The smoldering cable runs were located
high above the firefighters. Even the ships engineers were challenged by these difficult circumstances.
Crime Reporting
Question 3. While the Chairman understands some alleged crimes might not be
prosecuted, do you support publicly reporting the number of all crimes on cruise
ships that are reported to the FBI?
Answer. To our knowledge, no land-based vacation options have any duty to report crimes to law enforcement, let alone to publicly report crime allegations as statistics. At the same time the incidents of alleged crimes in the cruise industry are
far below those which are reported on land in the general population. Furthermore,
it is difficult to prevent the media from publishing this information out of context,
which becomes even more misleading to the consumer and unfairly damaging to the
cruise industry. Consequently, we do not support publicly reporting the number of
all alleged crimes on cruise shipsnonetheless, Carnival has voluntarily posted on
its website a listing of all the alleged crimes reported to the FBI for our North
American lines (Carnival Cruise Lines, Princess Cruises, Holland America Line and
Seabourn).
Question 4. Given that many parents and children take vacations on your cruise
ships, do you support publicly reporting the number of alleged crimes that occur
against minors?
Answer. We believe the numbers show that cruising is a very safe vacation alternative especially when compared to the crin1e statistics on land. Those land statistics are reported in the Uniform Crime Reporting system (UCR) published by the
FBI. The statistics do not separately categorize or track alleged crimes against minors. Therefore, the UCR will not offer any context or perspective to a consumer
who is provided cruise lines statistics regarding alleged crimes against minors. We
believe providing information on alleged crimes without such context would be misleading and will merely confuse the consumer. The information would also be
skewed by the fact that different companies have different passenger demographics
and correlations would therefore be unfair.
Question 5. The crime data appears to be compiled by the overarching Carnival
parent company rather than by individual line. What is the rationale for posting the
crime data in this manner? Please provide the Committee with this information broken down by individual line in the same format that you posted the information on
your website.
Answer. Carnival believes that the statistics viewed as presented provide more insight into cruise safety than when the data is broken out into individual lines. Specifically, one can compare the total number of passengers and crew we carry to the
number of crimes which occur for that population and then compare it to the land
based statistics in the UCR. This comparison clearly and easily shows that crime
statistics on cruise ships are much lower than on land for similar size populations.
Furthermore, even if all the incidents were allocated to just one of our lines, the
number would still be below UCR crime reporting for similar populations on land.
We feel strongly that providing data at a brand level would encourage meaningless
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and misleading comparisons, providing the potential for users to take the information out of context. The fact is that our incidents of crime are very low.
Question 6. Many crimes that occur on cruise ships are classified as other meaning they dont meet the threshold categories required under current law. What types
of crimes are included in the other category?
Answer. The other category includes alleged unlawful acts that are not designated in the CVSSA but are otherwise reported, such as thefts under $10,000.00
and crimes against our passengers which take place in countries outside the U.S.
or for crimes not covered by the CVSSA.
Question 7. Current law requires that only thefts greater than $10,000 be reported publicly. How many thefts of $1,000$10,000 were reported for each of the
last three years?
Answer. During the relevant period, the North American lines carried approximately 25,876,189 guests and the following thefts of $1,000$10,000 were alleged:
JulyDecember 2010:
2011:
2012:
JanuaryMay 2013:
58
82
91
52
Question 8. The posted crime data details the number of missing U.S. nationals.
How many additional non-US nationals went missing for each of the last three
years? Please indicate whether they were passengers or crew.
Answer. The total number of non-US nationals missing from the North American
lines is:
2011:
2013:
1 (non-US crewmember)
2 (passengers onboard the Carnival Spirit while in
Australia)
Bill of Rights
Question 9. According to Professor Kleins written testimony, cruise line contracts
include extreme limits on the companys liability, including requirements about
where a passenger must file a suit and how quickly they must bring the suit. Explain to me why this makes sense for a consumer. Does this seem fair to you?
Answer. Our cruise ships call on thousands of destinations, as well as carry passengers from all fifty states and from countries all over the world. Without the contract provisions that specify where, when and how a passenger should bring an action, cruise lines would be forced to defend litigation all over the country and the
world and possibly many years after a cruise when evidence and witnesses are no
longer available. The courts have agreed that cruise lines, like a myriad of other
businesses, should have some measure of predictability regarding the forum, the
timing of claims, and exposure to damages. This predictability is achieved through
the ticket contract provisions governing the forum and manner of claims (including
forum selection, choice of law, time limitations, arbitration and class action waiver
provisions). Such ticket provisions have been found to be legal if reasonably communicated to the passengers and these provisions do not limit the substantive rights
afforded under the passenger ticket contract or the Bill of Rights in any way.
Arbitration provisions, class action waivers and forum selection clauses are common in not only other transportation industries but other consumer industries (Disney World, Water-Zoo Indoor Water Park, Hilton HHonors loyalty programs,
Starwood Preferred Guest Programs, AT&T service agreements, Four Seasons Private Jet Tours and Southwest Airlines). We believe the fact that these provisions
have been routinely adopted by other industries and supported by the courts, evidences the fair balancing by these provisions of the interests of businesses and consumers.
Question 10. What recourse does the Bill of Rights provide to passengers when
one of these rights is violated? Please provide specific examples of how a passenger
could enforce the rights.
Answer. The Bill of Rights is a legally enforceable promise and thus a contractual
obligation which forms part of the agreement between cruise lines and their guests
who now have a private right of action to enforce the rights. The contractual recourse to enforce the passenger rights is in addition to remedies available under
state consumer protection laws available in virtually every port state where cruise
lines base their businesses or ships, including Florida, California, Hawaii, New
York, Texas, Alaska and Washington. These laws typically provide for recovery of
damages, injunctive relief, attorneys fees, and in some cases, double or treble damages for misleading or false advertising.
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Well established law protects the right of passengers to assert legal claims against
cruise lines arising out of the maritime contract of passage, such as the Bill of
Rights. For example, a cruise line is prohibited from abrogating the right to a trial
in court for any claims involving injury or death or providing less than one year
to commence suit based on such claims. The general maritime law of the U.S. will
typically apply although state law can sometimes supplement the remedies afforded
under U.S. maritime law where not inconsistent. Many claims arising out of the Bill
of Rights (e.g., over costs of transportation, lodging, and reimbursement), will qualify for small claims court jurisdiction which provides the passenger with a cost effective method to enforce their rights without having to hire an attorney.
RESPONSE
TO
WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED

GERALD CAHILL
BY
HON. BARBARA BOXER
TO
Question. A recent report was issued by the U.S. Coast Guard regarding the Carnival Splendor incident in November 2010. The report made a series of recommendations to Carnival to improve safety in the future. What specific steps has
Carnival taken to address the concerns and recommendations in the U.S. Coast
Guards report?
Answer. We have implemented actions to address and improve in the areas of
maintenance log management, additional firefighting training, as well as increased
fire prevention, detection and suppression systems. We have implemented new procedures for logging of technical parameters, checking the condition of the plant, precautionary measures before startup of engines, and new robust engine watch
handover policies.
Additionally, we have taken steps to strengthen the depth and frequency of all
critical system inspections and formed a new Department of Marine Safety staffed
with technical experts in the areas of fire prevention, detection, and suppression.
During the last two years the shoreside technical management has been expanded
and strengthened with dedicated diesel engine and maintenance and repair experts.
This team includes more than 140 members and has grown significantly in the past
couple of years as we continue to invest in talent across our company.
Following the Splendor fire, several new operational management personnel have
been hired at Carnival including a new SVP of Marine Operations. Earlier this
month Carnival announced the first 4 members of its new Safety & Reliability Review Board including Rear Admiral Mark H. Buzby, Rear Admiral Joseph F. Campbell, Ray Valeika and Dr. John K. Lauber who have collectively very deep experience in the marine and air transportation and maintenance fields.
RESPONSE
TO
WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

GERALD CAHILL
BY
HON. MARIA CANTWELL
TO
Natural Gas Vessels

Question 1. As Im sure youre aware, advances in technology, reduced emissions,
and high oil prices have led the transportation industry to look to natural gas as
an alternative source of fuel. Natural gas trucking has increased in current years,
and the Energy Information Agency (EIA) recently projected that for the heavy-duty
industry Natural gas, as compressed natural gas (CNG) and liquefied natural gas
(LNG), is the fastest-growing fuel in the transportation sector, with an average annual growth rate of 11.9 percent from 2011 to 2040. And a company based in my
home state has ordered the LNG conversion of two diesel ships currently in use for
Alaska trade, as well as the construction of two new first-of-their-kind LNG-powered
containerships for use on the Puerto Rico-Florida trade route. The fuel is also being
evaluated for use on our public Washington State Ferry system.
Do you believe natural gas-fueled vessels have a future within the cruise ship industry? To that end, to what extent has your company evaluated using natural gas
as a fuel source for either converted/renovated or new vessels?
Answer. Carnival has three projects related to LNG use on cruise ships.
a. Carnival is installing a dual fuel engine on one ship currently under construction, so that LNG can be used in port as well as conventional liquid fuel.
b. Carnival is developing a power barge supplied with LNG that could connect
directly to a ship in port, substituting LNG-generated electricity for utility
shorepower (Cold-Ironing).
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c. Carnival is examining the feasibility of installing limited LNG tank capacity
on one ship that would supply one dual-fuel engine that could operate on LNG
while the vessel is at sea or in port, as an alternative to shorepower.
Question 1a. What challenges or barriers exist to deploying natural gas technology
safely within the cruise ship industry? Do you believe that any of the challenges
or barriers is unique to your industry?
Answer. LNG is not available in numerous ports in which our ships currently
bunker fuel, even where a natural gas supply is available near the pier. Infrastructure for storage and delivery of LNG would need to be developed to ensure reliable
supply. Storage of LNG onboard requires greater tank capacity than liquid fuel.
This is not a significant challenge for some cargo ships, with ample space both
above and below deck. Cruise ships have very little available space either above
deck or in engine spaces below deck.
Safety issues related to switching from liquid fuel oil to LNG are a consideration,
but can be managed. U.S. Coast Guard policy guidance for refueling passenger ships
with LNG is being developed now and the resultant controls and operational restrictions could have a major impact on the potential future use by the cruise industry.
Also, in the past public perception in North America has often been that LNG is
not as safe as liquid fuel or natural gas. This is not scientifically valid, but it has
been a significant issue with development of LNG facilities in many ports and coastal areas. Today, the environmental advantages of LNG may override such concerns,
but cruising is a discretionary leisure activity and concern over the safety of LNGpowered cruise ships may need to be addressed.
Question 1b. Can you speak to your companys long-term strategy with regards
to natural gas vessels?
Answer. LNG may be an option over the mid to long term if the challenges described above can be resolved. This could be accomplished by adding limited LNG
tank capacity, or by supplying LNG to the ship while at berth from trucks or a
barge.
Cold-Ironing
Question 2. As you know, Cold-Ironing is the practice of providing cruise, container, and other vessels with shore-side electrical power for the operation of equipment while in port, thereby allowing main and auxiliary engines to be shut down.
This can reduce or eliminate many airborne emissions and improve nearby air quality. How many of your vessels are equipped to use Cold-Ironing infrastructure/
equipment while in port?
Answer. Carnival Corporation has 24 ships that are equipped to connect in seven
West Coast Ports, including Juneau, AK; Vancouver, BC; Seattle, WA; San Francisco, CA; Los Angeles, CA; Long Beach, CA; and San Diego, CA. East Coast Ports
pending development in include Brooklyn Red Hook, NY, Halifax, NS, and Quebec
City.
Ships currently equipped to connect to shorepower by Operating Company are:
Princess Cruises
Holland America Line
Carnival Cruise Lines
Cunard Line
14
6 (plus 2 partially converted)
3
1
Question 2a. Does Cold-Ironing have any negative impacts on cruise ship operation?
Answer. There is no negative impact on the technical operations of the ship, if
the shoreside system is properly installed, and if the supply of electricity is adequate and reliable. Shorepower installations have been very well received in port
communities.
Question 2b. What are the barriers to further deployment of Cold-Ironing infrastructure/equipment on your vessels? Are certain ports more/less feasible for ColdIroning?
Answer. The primary barriers are the cost to the utility company to make the necessary improvements to deploy Cold-Ironing, the cost to the cruise industry to convert its ships to tie into the electricity and the availability of electricity. Some utilities do not have excess capacity, or rates for interruptible service. As a result, ports
with limited cruise ship activity may not be able to economically justify the investment in shoreside infrastructure.
Question 2c. Please describe your companys long-term strategy with regards to
Cold-Ironing.
Answer. Shorepower will be part of the mix of technology to address air emissions
from cruise ships. This will include use of scrubbers or other technology, low sulfur
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fuel, now required in all U.S. Ports under the Emission Control Area regulations
of IMO MARPOL Annex VI and potential use of LNG in Ports.
Carnival has been the leader in developing shorepower for the cruise industry and
plans to utilize shorepower for a significant number of vessels calling regularly in
Ports on the Pacific Coast of North America, as well as select Ports in the North
Atlantic.
RESPONSE
TO

TO ADAM M. GOLDSTEIN
Crime Reporting
Question 1. At the hearing, Chairman Rockefeller entered into the record a Commerce Committee staff report showing that the number of crimes onboard cruise
ships reported to the FBI is much higher than the number that is publicly reported.
It also shows that in a significant percentage of sexual assaults reported to the FBI,
children are the alleged victims.
The Chairman also introduced legislation that would require public reporting of
all alleged crimes on cruise ships, including those against children.
While the Chairman understands some alleged crimes might not be prosecuted,
do you support publicly reporting the number of all crimes on cruise ships that are
reported to the FBI?
Answer. As the Committee is aware, just over three years ago, Congress passed
the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act (CVSSA) of 2010. In that legislation, Congress set forth the categories of serious crimes that cruise lines were required to
report to the FBI. The legislation also required the U.S. Coast Guard to maintain
a public website that lists, by cruise line, a quarterly accounting of every crime and
missing person case that has been reported to law enforcement in any of the listed
CVSSA categories where the matter is no longer under investigation by the FBI.
While we had long been reporting all crime allegations to Federal authorities, this
legislation was the first of its kind to single out a commercial industry and require
public disclosure of its allegations of crime. Although crime statistics on land are
published under the FBIs longstanding Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system for
states, cities and municipalities, they are not aggregated by type of venue (hotels,
resorts, theme parks), let alone by individual company.
Even so, we supported the legislation as we believed that publicly reporting crime
allegations would enable consumers to see for themselves that cruise ships are
among the safest venues when compared to any landside community or destination.
We were unaware until the legislation was passed that Congress was limiting the
public disclosure of the crime data to only those allegations no longer under investigation by the FBI.
Because of this provision in the new law, the numbers provided to the public by
the Federal Government did not reflect the actual number of allegations we were
reporting to the FBI. Royal Caribbean, and our colleagues at Carnival Corporation
and Norwegian Cruise Lines, took it upon ourselveswell in advance of any announced Congressional hearingto rectify the limitation imposed by Congress by
agreeing to voluntarily disclose on our websites all allegations of crime in the
CVSSA categories, on all itineraries worldwide, committed by passengers or crew
members, regardless of whether an FBI investigation had been opened or closed.
We believe that the current reporting protocolproviding the number of all allegations in each of the CVSSA categoriesallows the consumer to compare the minimal number of allegations of serious crimes onboard cruise ships with those reported for land-based communities and make informed vacation decisions. We do not
believe that any further expansion of this reporting is warranted or reasonable.
Question 2. Given that many parents and children take vacations on your cruise
ships, do you support publicly reporting the number of alleged crimes that occur
against children?
Answer. As explained above, we believe the value of publicly reporting allegations
of crimes is in providing consumers with an opportunity to compare/contrast crime
on land with crime at sea. Crime against minors is not a category reported by the
UCR for land-based communities and, thus, such disclosures by the cruise lines
would not allow consumers to draw meaningful comparisons.
Question 3. Royal Caribbean, along with the other major cruise lines, agreed to
voluntarily post crime data on its website.
The crime data appears to be compiled by the overarching Royal Caribbean parent
company rather than by individual line. What is the rational for posting the crime
data in this manner? Please provide the Committee with this information broken
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down by individual line in the same format that you posted the information on your
website.
Answer. The premise of this question is incorrect. As of August 1, 2013, Royal
Caribbean posted its crime data by individual cruise line, not by parent company.
The data may be found here:
For Royal Caribbean International:
http://www.royalcaribbean.com/contentPage.do?pagename=royallcaribbeanl
cruiselshiplcrimelallegationlstatistics
For Celebrity Cruises:
http://celebritycruises.com/genericHtmlTemplate.do?icid=spelbtltwdybrl
1306ldtbellkl921032&pagename=celebritylcrimelallegationlstatistics
For Azamara Club Cruises:
http://www.azamaraclubcruises.com/azamara-club-cruises-crime-allegation-statistics
Question 4. Many crimes that occur on cruise ships are classified as other meaning they dont meet the threshold categories required under current law. What types
of crimes are included in the other category?
Answer. The CVSSA identified eight categories of serious crimes that cruise lines
are required to report to the FBI. The other category is used to capture allegations
not designated by the CVSSA, such as thefts between $1,000 and $10,000.
Question 5. Current law requires that only thefts greater than $10,000 be reported publicly. How many thefts of $1,000$10,000 were reported for each of the
last three years?
Answer. For the three-year period, 2010 through 2012, Royal Caribbean International, Celebrity Cruises and Azamara Club Cruises carried more than 13 million
guests. During this time period, the reports of alleged property thefts valued between $1,000 and $10,000 were as follows:
201084 reports
2011103 reports
2012116 reports
Additionally, during this three-year period, RCL received a total of 97 reports alleging the theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000 from luggage. These
alleged thefts from luggage, however, may have occurred prior to the luggage arriving at the ship (e.g., airline, hotel, taxi, bus).
Question 6. The posted crime data details the number of missing U.S. nationals.
How many additional non-U.S. nationals went missing for each of the last three
years? Please indicate whether they were passengers or crew.
Answer. For the three-year period, 2010 through 2012, the reports of missing nonUS nationals were as follows:
20103 missing non-US nationals (all crew members)
20114 missing non-US nationals (all crew members)
20124 missing non-US nationals (1 guest, 3 crew members)
Bill of Rights
Question 7. According to Professor Kleins written testimony, cruise line contracts
include extreme limits on the companys liability, including requirements about
where a passenger must file a suit and how quickly they must bring the suit. Explain to me why this makes sense for a consumer. Does this seem fair to you?
Answer. With regard to virtually every sailing of ships operated by cruise lines
based in the U.S.regardless of itinerary and regardless of whether it embarks or
debarks in the U.S.passengers have access to a U.S. forum if they wish to file a
claim.
Because the travel industry accommodates customers from around the world,
forum selection clauses are commonly used across many sectors of the industry.
These clauses allow hotels, resorts, cruise lines and countless other sellers of goods
and services to have some level of legal predictability while providing guests with
the opportunity to have their claims heard.
In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a 1991 opinion, found that forum selection
clauses benefit passengers in two important ways: (1) the clauses eliminate confusion about where claims can be filed, saving litigants the time and expense of determining the correct forum; and (2) the passengers benefit from lower fares that travel
providers can offer as a result of the legal certainty established by forum selection
clauses.
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With regard to the time period for filing claims, Title 46 U.S.C. 30508, specifically permits a time limit of no less than one year for suits involving claims of personal injury (including emotional distress) or death. Courts have routinely enforced
a six-month deadline for contract claims. These limits are not considered extreme.
To the contrary, for any cruise that even touches a U.S. port, 30509 specifically
prohibits it from including any provision in a passage contract that either limits
the liability of the owner, master, or agent for personal injury or death caused by
the negligence or fault of the owner or the owners employees or agents; or [. . .]
the right of a claimant for personal injury or death to a trial by court of competent
jurisdiction.
Question 8. What recourse does the Bill of Rights provide to passengers when one
of these rights is violated? Please provide specific examples of how a passenger
could enforce the rights.
Answer. The Bill of Rights is a legally enforceable contract. It forms part of the
contract between cruise lines and our guests who now have a private right of action
to enforce the rights.
In addition, state consumer protection laws available in virtually every port state
where cruise lines base their businesses or ships, including Florida, California, Hawaii, New York, Texas, Alaska and Washington, still apply. Thus, the contractual
recourse to enforce the passenger Bill of Rights is in addition to these state laws
which typically provide for recovery of damages, injunctive relief, attorneys fees,
and in some cases, double or treble damages for misleading or false advertising.
Passengers can generally bring a legal action against cruise lines for any claims
arising out of the maritime contract of passage, such as the Bill of Rights. The general maritime law of the U.S. will typically apply although state law can sometimes
supplement the remedies afforded under U.S. maritime law where not inconsistent.
RESPONSE
TO
WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MARIA CANTWELL

ADAM M. GOLDSTEIN
TO
Natural Gas Vessels

As Im sure youre aware, advances in technology, reduced emissions, and high oil
prices have led the transportation industry to look to natural gas as an alternative
source of fuel. Natural gas trucking has increased in current years, and the Energy
Information Agency (EIA) recently projected that for the heavy-duty industry Natural gas, as compressed natural gas (CNG) and liquefied natural gas (LNG), is the
fastest-growing fuel in the transportation sector, with an average annual growth
rate of 11.9 percent from 2011 to 2040. And a company based in my home state
has ordered the LNG conversion of two diesel ships currently in use for Alaska
trade, as well as the construction of two new first-of-their-kind LNG-powered containerships for use on the Puerto Rico-Florida trade route. The fuel is also being
evaluated for use on our public Washington State Ferry system.
Question 1. Do you believe natural gas-fueled vessels have a future within the
cruise ship industry? To that end, to what extent has your company evaluated using
natural gas as a fuel source for either converted/renovated or new vessels?
Answer. We believe there is a future for LNG as a major marine fuel, although
there are a number of challenges that will need to be addressed, as outlined below.
We have done extensive studies into the current and future feasibility from a technical, operational/safety, and supply availability perspective. We have involved engine manufacturers, shipyards, existing LNG suppliers, and maritime classification
societies in these reviews.
We do not believe that CNG will ever be a realistic option given the very low energy density of CNG (i.e., we could not carry enough fuel to get the ship to port).
Question 1a. What challenges or barriers exist to deploying natural gas technology
safely within the cruise ship industry? Do you believe that any of the challenges
or barriers is unique to your industry?
Answer. There are a number of technical and operational issues with LNG compared to traditional fuels, all of which stem from the physical properties of LNG,
including:
We would have to carry twice as much volume of LNG to achieve the equivalent
amount of energy of traditional fuels
LNG must be maintained at cryogenic temperatures (i.e., 160 degrees F)
Because of these physical properties, LNG requires specialized storage tanks, piping systems, safety systems and design limitations, loading systems, and engine
modifications. We do not think there is a high likelihood that existing cruise ships
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could be retrofitted with significant LNG capacity, but believe it is more feasible in
the context of newbuilds.
Another major obstacle is the minimal supply infrastructure available. Because of
the physical properties of LNG, it is very expensive and time consuming to develop
and build the necessary supply infrastructure. While this issue exists for all ships,
it is a much larger issue for cruise ships given the amount of LNG required and
the time frame in which it would have to be loaded (e.g., 25 to 50 truck loads per
week). The other unique issue is that cruise ships tend to travel around the world,
so a single point supply solution is not sufficient; our vessels would need access to
reliable supplies around the world.
Question 1b. Can you speak to your companys long-term strategy with regards
to natural gas vessels?
Answer. Our long term strategy is to continue monitoring the regional and global
supply development to determine if and when it would be prudent to commit to an
LNG fueled vessel. We routinely re-evaluate our position when committing to
newbuild orders.
Cold Ironing
Question 2. As you know, cold ironing is the practice of providing cruise, container, and other vessels with shore-side electrical power for the operation of equipment while in port, thereby allowing main and auxiliary engines to be shut down.
This can reduce or eliminate many airborne emissions and improve nearby air quality. How many of your vessels are equipped to use cold-ironing infrastructure/equipment while in port?
Answer. We have seven vessels in our fleet that have reserved space in the electrical switchboards for equipment to connect to shore power and all future
newbuilds will have the space reservation as well. We are also in the process of
equipping one vessel with shore power capability in order that it may make frequent
calls on California ports.
Question 2a. Does cold ironing have any negative impacts on cruise ship operations?
Answer. There are always challenges when introducing a new technology to marine operations and, of course, we always take handling extremely high voltage
equipment and connections seriously. The biggest challenges relate to handling the
switch over from ship power to shore power and back again.
Question 2b. What are the barriers to further deployment of cold-ironing infrastructure/equipment on your vessels? Are certain ports more/less feasible for cold
ironing?
Answer. Cold-ironing is very much a port-by-port evaluation; furthermore, it is a
day-by-day issue within an existing port. We have found that the availability of
cold-ironing infrastructure varies by port and even by berths within a port. In addition, the ability of local utilities to scale up to meet one or more large ships power
demand is also an important factor. Of course, the reliability, cost, and environmental benefits of shore power vary by port as well.
Question 2c. Please describe your companys long-term strategy with regards to
coldironing.
Answer. Although the majority of our energy consumption occurs when we are not
in port, we continue to evaluate cold-ironing as a component of our energy/environmental strategies.
RESPONSE
TO

TO ROSS A. KLEIN, PH.D.
Crime
When a crime happens on a cruise ship, passengers can be in for a rude awakeningthey cant just call 911 to get the police to come investigate the crime, they
cant go to a U.S. hospital for treatment, and they cant always just get off the ship.
To make things more difficult, U.S. laws may not govern if the crime occurs in international waters or at a foreign port.
Question 1. Given the stark differences in the level of support available to crime
victims on land versus on cruises, how important is it that passengers have an understanding of the number and types of alleged crimes that occur on cruise ships?
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Answer. The cruise industry promotes itself as the safest mode of commercial
transportationa claim based on a 1996 study done by the U.S. Coast Guard.1 But
this study only considered three issues of safety: fatalities, injuries requiring treatment beyond first aid, and accidents such as trips and falls. Based on these criteria,
a cruise ship is safer than U.S. air carriers and motor vehicles; however, the study
did not look at simple assaults, thefts, sexual assaults or at disappearances under
mysterious circumstances. The claim by the cruise industry to be the safest mode
of transportation misleads consumers into a false sense of security.
In the face of this claim, and in the frequency of certain types of crime, it is important that cruise passengers have access to independently-verified and reliable
crime statistics for cruise lines and for cruise ships. Particularly relevant are sexrelated crimes (sexual assaults and forcible rapes), which on some cruise ships/
cruise lines may be higher than on land, but also property crimes (i.e., thefts),
crimes against persons (simple assaults and assault with serious bodily injury), and
persons overboard.
The importance and value of by-ship data is demonstrated in TABLE 1: RCI Reported Sex Related Incidents 20032005 Number of Reported Incidents and
Annualized Rate per 100,000 by Ship of my testimony before the Before the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety,
and Security, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Hearings on Cruise Ship Safety: Examining Potential Steps for Keeping Americans Safe
at Sea, Thursday, June 19, 2008. As seen in that table the rate of sexual harassment/sexual assault when viewed by ship ranged from 10.75 per 100,000 to 208.33
per 100,000 across a fleet of 19; the fleet average was 111.97 per 100,000. This level
of detailed information is helpful to passengersboth in gaining awareness that
there are certain problems or risks on cruise ships (as there are on land), and that
choices can apparently be made that minimize risk. The transparency may also benefit cruise ships and cruise lines in that it will ideally motivate a higher degree of
vigilance in preventing and effectively dealing with onboard crime in order to avoid
being the worst.
Having valid and reliable rates of crime is important for the purpose of comparison: comparison between cruise lines/ships and comparison of crime at sea versus
crime on land. There is a simple illustration that makes this point. Disney Cruise
Line reports on its website 6 sexual assaults in 2012. This sounds like a small number. However, when converted to a standardized rate it is 32.6 per 100,000almost
four times higher than claimed for the industry as a whole in its written testimony
before the U.S. Senate Commerce Committee. It is tempting to interpret this as indicating that Disney Cruise Line is worse than the rest, but the more likely interpretation is that Disney Cruise Line is being more transparent than the others.
After all, the numbers reported by Royal Caribbean and Carnival for 20102013 are
so different than what are independently confirmed as numbers for 200708, that
it makes suspect the more recent reports (see www.cruisejunkie.com/crimedat.pdf).
Crime Data
Royal Caribbean, Carnival, Norwegian, and Disney recently posted cruise crime
data on their websites. Some questions have been raised about what data is included and whether it paints a clear picture of the crime onboard vessels.
Question 2. Professor Klein, what did your review of the crime data show?
Answer. On surface, the crime statistics appear to be a positive step, however
upon reflection one has to wonder precisely what are being provided:
1. What crimes are included in the category other? There is a significant number that can undoubtedly be categorized and reported (e.g., inappropriate
touch, sexual harassment, simple assault, thefts of less than $10,000).
2. What incidents are included as sexual assaults and rape and who decides
that an incidents falls into one or another (or neither) category. If it is the
cruise line, is it in an objective position from which to judge the nature of the
incident and crime? When considering the category other, what is the number
and types of sex-related incidents that do not fall under sexual assault and
rape.
1 The claim to be the safest mode of commercial transportation has long appeared at the
website of Cruise Lines International Association, and before that at the International Council
of Cruise Lines website. It was recently removed because of intense lobbying by the International Cruise Victims Association (ICV), which called on the Coast Guard and members of
Congress to force the cruise industry to remove the misleading claim. The study to which the
industry refers was secured by ICV through a freedom of information request; the data was
based on National Transportation Statistics 1995.
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Aside from the problem of data kept invisible through the category other, and
confusion caused by lack of clarity on who makes the determination of a category
of crime (e.g., simple assault, assault with serious bodily injury, sexual assault and
rape), the data displayed at the Carnival and Royal Caribbean websites are misleading. Both companies combine cruise lines, which dilutes the rate of crime on
Carnival Cruise Lines. For example, Carnival combines four cruise lines in its reportCarnival Cruise Lines, Holland America Line, Princess Cruises, Seabourn
Cruisesand then computes the crime rate. This produces misleading statistics.
Carnival Cruise Lines accounts for 46 percent of the passenger population on ships
belonging to these four brands, however in 200708 Carnival Cruise Lines accounted for 87 percent of the sexual assaults and 96 percent of the thefts. The rate
of crime is significantly lower on the other cruise lines than on Carnival Cruise
Lines; by averaging across the lines it gives the appearance that Carnival is safer
than it actually is. The same is the case with Royal Caribbean International, Celebrity Cruises, and Azamara Cruises.
Review of the data also raised some direct questions. The FBI told the Commerce
Committee that it had received 40 reports of sexual assault on Carnival ships, but
Carnival reports on its website a total of 17 for the same period. Similarly, data
presented by NCL on its website and to the FBI is numerically different than data
provided in the discovery phase of a lawsuit.
So, while the idea of publishing the data is excellent, the underlying problem is
the reliability and integrity of the data being presented. By being done in-house,
with no independent oversight produces numbers that arent particularly informative. The public needs to be protected from erroneous claims.
Question 3. How will the provisions in the Cruise Passenger Protection Act help
ensure that all crime data is being reported publicly?
Answer. The CPPA will improve the reporting of crime data by requiring reporting of all reported crimes, however it doesnt go as far as Id like it to go. There
are crimes that will not be reported (thefts less than $10K, simple assault), and
crime reports will be amalgamated by cruise line (maybe by cruise corporation?),
which allows problem ships/lines to remain invisible.
In an ideal world, all reports to security on a cruise ship would be sent to the
FBI. The FBI would filter out cases it wishes to pursue, though all cases would go
to an independent third party for entry into a crime database (including properly
assigning complaints to a crime category). This database, showing crime by cruise
ship and cruise line, would then be available online.
Question 4. In your written testimony, you highlighted that additional crime beyond whats required by law should be reported publicly. What type of crimes are
these and how will making this information public help passengers?
When consumers have complaints about cruise shipswhether its unexpected
fees, lost baggage, or conditions on the vesselwhat recourse do they currently have
beyond lodging a complaint with the company?
Answer. This question is actually two questions. The types of crimes that should
be included in reporting include simple assault and theft less than $10,000. There
might also be consideration to include under sex-related incidents cases involving
inappropriate touch and sexual harassment. These categories were well populated in reports in 20032005. That data, when combined with data for sexual assaults and forcible rapes, is illuminating.
My view is that passengers have a right to know what crimes are being committed on different cruise ships belonging to different cruise lines. They should be
equipped to make informed shopping decisions when buying a cruise. And they
should approach a cruise taking the usual precautions families take when traveling
to a strange or new city.
The second question relates to complaints when something goes wrong. Aside from
attempting to persuade the cruise line that they owe you something, a passenger
has very little recourse. They can file a complaint with the Maritime Administration, but that is unlikely to have any impact. Alternatively, a passenger might be
able to file a claim in a small claims courtthis may or may not survive a forum
selection clause challenge, or in the odd case hire an admiralty lawyer in Miami.
In the United Kingdom, where there is stronger consumer rights legislation, legal
cases have a higher chance for success on cases that would be non-starters in the
U.S. There are cases in both the U.S. and U.K. (more so the latter) where passengers have successfully used the Internet and/or social media to extract settlements for complaints against a cruise line, but these are relatively infrequent.
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Consumer Complaints
When consumers have complaints about cruise shipswhether its unexpected
fees, lost baggage, or conditions on the vesselwhat recourse do they currently have
beyond lodging a complaint with the company?
Question 5. How would giving a Federal agency, such as the Department of Transportation authority to investigate passenger complaints, as it does for the aviation,
auto, and other industries, help passengers when something goes wrong?
Answer. I think the issue is one of oversight. The cruise industry operates out of
U.S. ports, serving largely U.S. passengers, yet unlike the aviation or other transportation industries, has no active oversight by the U.S. Government. There is some
oversight relating to cruise ship safety (U.S. Coast Guard) and sanitary conditions
(Centers for Disease Control), however there is absolutely no oversight with regard
to consumer rights and proper treatment of passengers (not to mention proper treatment of workers). An aggrieved passenger lacks a venue (other than a lawsuit) for
dealing with a serious complaint against a cruise line (other than the cruise line
itself). As well, because there is no central agency where passengers can file reports,
there is no knowledge base about complaints common on cruise ships (even specific
cruise ships or cruise lines). Such an agency would also be a venue for a passenger
to express a safety concern that was ignored while onboard a ship.
Given the size of the cruise industry, and its reliance on passengers in and from
the U.S., it makes infinite sense to treat the cruise industry like other modes of
commercial transportation (airlines, trains, buses) and for this oversight to rest in
the Department of Transportation. At present the industry is largely self-regulating.
With market domination of three corporations (comprising more than 90 percent of
the North American market), self-regulation is not in the best interests of the consumer.
Bill of Rights
The cruise industry has actively promoted their Cruise Passenger Bill of Rights,
which includes the right to professional emergency medical attention, the right to
properly trained crew, the right to timely updates for itinerary changes, etc.
Question 6. Professor Klein, you reviewed the Bill of Rights in your written testimony, what new rights were passengers provided?
Answer. In my opinion, the CLIA Cruise Passenger Bill of Rights does not provide
anything that the cruise industry wouldnt argue was already being done before the
bill of rights. What is different is that there is now, they would say, a binding
pledge that these things will absolutely be done. However CLIA Cruise Passenger
Bill of Rights does not say what a passenger is due when a right is not fulfilled
(e.g., having a trained crew, receiving timely information).
The Bill of Rights is a restatement of industry practices and is used largely as
a marketing scheme at a time that the industry was attempting to repair its image.
Question 7. Were there any major areas that were not addressed?
Answer. There are a number of things not covered in CLIA Cruise Passenger Bill
of Rights:
(1) What rights does a passenger have when essential provisions such as food,
water, restroom facilities, etc cannot be provided and the ship is not docked?
What rights does a passenger have when a ship is dead in the water?
(2) A passengers right to have refunded by the cruise line the cost of airfare to
get to a cruise when a cruise is canceled because of mechanical or other failure.
And the following copied from my written testimony:
There is no mention of the recourse a passenger has if one of the Rights is not
fulfilled or realized.
There is no indication of how a partial refund will be computed and whether
that refund is provided in cash or, as common in the industry, as a discount
on a future cruise or an onboard credit.
There is no mention of whether the cruise line is responsible for ancillary costs
when a cruise is cancelled, including change fees for airline tickets and for the
costs of the tickets themselves, the cost of lodging required in travel to the passengers home city, and support for food and incidentals associated with delays
in getting from the ship to the passengers home city.
There is no mention of what rights a passenger has when a port of call is canceled. Some cruise lines refund port fees and taxes, however these are given
as an onboard credit rather than as a cash refund. As well, there is no transparency with regard to the amount refunded. Some cruise lines average the cost
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of port fees and taxes so a refund for one port is the same as the other even
though actual fees can vary widely from one port to another. Also, it isnt transparent whether costs other than port taxes and fees that are not paid by the
cruise line because of the canceled port call are also refunded to the passenger.
There is considerable need for greater clarity and transparency around passenger rights when a port call is canceled.
There is no mention of what rights a passenger has when a cruise itinerary is
changed, such as a cruise sailing the Eastern Caribbean instead of the Western
Caribbean because of propulsion problems, or a cruise going to Canada instead
of the Caribbean because of weather. The Passenger Cruise Contract is clear
that the cruise line has no obligation or responsibility to provide compensation
in these situations. This absence of rights should be clearly articulated in the
Passenger Bill of Rights.
There is no mention of the rights a passenger has when embarkation is delayed.
Does a passenger have a Right to meal vouchers or compensation for meals purchased (as is common in airline travel)? Also, after how many hours of waiting
in a cruise terminal is the cruise line obligated to provide either lodging or a
comfortable setting to wait? A comprehensive Passenger Bill of Rights would address these situations given the frequency of delayed embarkations.
There is no mention of a passengers rights when a cruise arrives late in its
port of disembarkation, causing the passenger to miss transportation arrangements for their trip to their home city.
In addition there are some rights that should be directly addressed.
CLIA Cruise Passenger Bill of Rights should clearly articulate the rights of a passenger who is bumped from a cruise because of overbooking or other issues. The
most recent cases involve Carnival Sunshine, which bumped passengers on its June
7, 2013, cruise because a number of cabins were needed for contractors completing
work that was not completed while the ship was in dry dock. Similarly, passengers
in 78 cabins on Grandeur of the Seas were bumped from the July 12, 2013 (and perhaps the July 19th), sailing because cabins were needed for workers who were still
making repairs following the fire earlier in the year. Some of these bumped passengers had their cruise canceled because the ship had been out of service for repairs, and here they were bumped from their replacement cruise.2
Similarly, the CLIA Cruise Passenger Bill of Rights should discuss a passengers
rights when they are expelled from a cruise ship, often for questionable reasons and
the result is loss of cruise fare and their having responsibility for transportation
from the port where they are left. Between January 2009 and June 30, 2013, there
are eight cases list on my website where a passenger has been evicted or expelled
(these are only ones reported in the media). These passengers have no right to appeal or recourse. The cruise line Cruise Passenger Contract gives them this unilateral, uncontestable Right to evict or expel, without liability.
The CLIA Cruise Passenger Bill of Rights does not address a passengers rights
when they miss the ship because of flight delays or because of weather conditions
(such as Hurricane Sandy in the fall of 2013 when passengers lost their cruise fare
because they couldnt get to the ship). The cruise lines generally take the position
that this type of situation is not their problem. A passenger without trip insurance
is responsible for lost cruise fares and/or additional travel costs to join the ship at
a later point. Further, it there are reports that some benefits under trip insurance
policies offered by the cruise line are more restrictive in the benefits they provide
than insurance policies offered independent of the cruise line.
2 It is worth mention that Royal Caribbean Cruises Limited, in anticipation of these hearings
and concern that the facts might paint an unkind picture, sent an e-mail to all employees asking
them to write their Senator with the following text: Dear Senator, As one of your constituents
and an employee of ______________________, one of the major cruise lines serving North America, I am contacting you today out of concern regarding the July 24 Senate Commerce Committee hearing regarding the cruise industry. As an individual who is intimately familiar with
cruising, it is apparent to me that there has been a great deal of misinformation and distortion
regarding the industry in recent months. As one of your constituents, I am concerned that the
industry will be unfairly portrayed at this hearing. As someone that works in the cruise line
industry, I know firsthand that cruising is extremely safe and well regulated at the national
level, by the U.S. Coast Guard, and by international authorities. Additionally, the cruise industry directly benefits businesses in all 50 states, generating over 355,000 jobs and over $42 billion
in economic impact. It provides $17.4 billion in wages to American workers each year. I would
greatly appreciate your support to ensure that the cruise industry receives a fair and balanced
hearing. Thank you for your time and attention to this matter and your service to our Nation.
Sincerely, Your Name
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The CLIA Cruise Passenger Bill of Rights does not address a passengers rights
to have safety concerns taken seriously. Though not the first time I have received
this sort of information, on June 21, 2013, I received the following from a cruise
passenger:
We have just disembarked after a 7-day Alaskan cruise aboard Celebrity Solstice. We frequented the quasar dance club each night. On night two I noticed
at 2300 (11pm), when the club only allows 18 and over, a crew member used
a small rope to tie the handles of one of the two exits closed to prevent access.
Not must looped but tied in a fashion that untying would be impossible is a
smoke filled environment or panic. This room is required to have two emergency
exits and this exit was clearly marked emergency exit. This happened three
nights in a row. I brought my concerns to the attention of guest services requesting to speak to the ships Safety Officer. I was told that another passenger
had requested to speak with him also but he stated that he was too busy with
paperwork to speak to anyone. The guest services person apologized and drafted an e-mail to him explaining my concerns and that I am a 28 year firefighter.
That night in quasar the doors were once again tied closed. As of this writing
no staff or crew has contacted me. I would encourage that all passengers be
aware of their surroundings. It appears Celebrity is not concerned with safety
and if this blatant example of reckless disregard for its passengers and crew
in a public space is allowed to exist, then I am wondering what other safety
issues exist that we did not see.
It would seem this passengers expectations were realistic, but they were ignored.
Did he have any rights? And what rights were available for this disregard of concern for fire safety?
Finally, the CLIA Cruise Passenger Bill of Rights does not address the Right to
be free of sexual assault by crewmembers or cruise ship employees, or the Right to
be free of other types of crime. This type of assurance seems only natural given the
rate of sexual assault on cruise ships, but it is obviously one that would be difficult
to fulfill (although no less difficult than some of the other rights included in the Passenger Bill of Rights). In this line of thought, the Passenger Bill of Rights should
also contain a Right to contact the FBI directly from the ship when a victim of a
crime. This Right is accorded by the CVSSA, so it should be provided, however most
victims will be unaware of what is available to them without it explicitly being stated in something like a Passenger Bill of Rights. Alternatively, a cruise ship may
be required to provide a crime victim with an information sheet outlining the rights
and the options available to them, including the telephone numbers for relevant law
enforcement agencies, and agencies that provide direct services or referral to services that are likely to be needed by the victim.
Question 8. What recourse does the Bill of Rights provide to passengers have
when one of these rights is violated?
Answer. A common theme across all elements in the Passenger Bill of Rights is
how a passenger deals with a Right that has not been fulfilled or has been directly
violated. Are these rights ultimately governed by the cruise passenger contract that
sets clear terms about when and how complaints and legal action must be filed, and
where law suits must be filed? Forum selection clauses effectively limit a passengers rights under the Passenger Bill of Rights given the requirement that legal
action can only be taken in a court located in the state where the cruise lines corporate headquarters is located (most frequently Florida). The cruise passenger contract also includes a class action waiver, prohibiting a passenger from taking any
legal action as a member of a class or as a participant in a class action. For many
passengers these are impediments to taking any action and they often resign to accepting whatever the cruise line offers, if anything.
The cruise industrys representatives claimed at the hearings that the CLIA Passenger Bill of Rights is not superseded by the passenger contract, however what this
actually means remains unclear. It is unclear what recourse a passenger has when
a right has not been fulfilled, and it is unclear through what forum this recourse
is sought. Cruise passenger contracts have not yet changed.
Contract Limitations
According to your written testimony, cruise line contracts include extreme limits
on the companys liability, including requirements about where a passenger must
file a suit and how quickly they must bring the suit.
Question 9. These ticket contracts generally require that all law suits be filed in
Florida. Does this mean that even though a passenger might buy a ticket in West
Virginia and leave from a port in Maryland, they have to go all the way to Florida
to pursue a lawsuit?
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Answer. Based on the forum selection clause in the passenger cruise contract any
lawsuit must be filed in the court where the cruise line is headquarteredfor Princess Cruises it is Los Angeles, for Holland America Line Seattle, and for many others Miami. This is a huge disadvantage, if not impediment, to a passenger from out
of state of the cruise lines headquarters (e.g., West Virginia, Arizona, Vermont).
Many will initially contract with a local attorney who needs in turn to be represented by an attorney in Florida. Alternatively, the passenger may contract directly with a Florida-based attorney, but there is a challenge locating and getting
to know one. In any case, access to court of law is quite difficult (if not costly) for
the average cruise ship passenger.
Question 10. What impact do these provisions have on a passengers ability to pursue legal recourse?
Answer. This lack of recourse means that many problems, complaints, and justified claims against cruise lines are never pursued. If legal recourse were more readily available, then cruise passengers feeling wronged may feel like their concerns
can be heard. Another option (perhaps complimentary) is for an agency within the
Department of Transportation to deal with consumer complaints regarding the
cruise industry.
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Senate Hearing, 113TH Congress - Cruise Industry Oversight: Recent Incidents Show Need For Stronger Focus On Consumer Protection

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Senate Hearing, 113TH Congress - Cruise Industry Oversight: Recent Incidents Show Need For Stronger Focus On Consumer Protection

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S. HRG.

CRUISE INDUSTRY OVERSIGHT: RECENT

JULY 24, 2013

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

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Hearing held on July 24, 2013 ...............................................................................

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CRUISE INDUSTRY OVERSIGHT: RECENT

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV,

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[The information referred to follows:]

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Crimes Committed Against Minors are Unrepresented in Official Statistics

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