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 FACIL: 50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Power 05000397  
 AUTH. NAME: SORENSEN, G.C. AUTHOR AFFILIATION: Washington Public Power Supply System  
 RECIP. NAME: DENTON, H.R. RECIPIENT AFFILIATION: Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Director

SUBJECT: *Secret* Forwards "Design Reverification Program," Vols 1 & 2, final assessment rept. Results of program will be presented to NRC in late Oct 1983.

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ACT OF 1934 (Public Law No. 233, 48 Stat. 986) relating to the taxation of gifts, and to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.

Section 2511. (a) The term "gift" means any transfer of property by an individual, whether or not for consideration, if the donor at the time of the transfer has a taxable gift.

(b) The term "taxable gift" means any property which is included in the donor's gross estate for estate tax purposes, or which is included in the donee's gross estate for gift tax purposes.

SEC. 2512.

SECTION	SECTION	SECTION	SECTION	SECTION
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## Washington Public Power Supply System

P.O. Box 968 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington 99352 (509)372-5000

Docket No. 50-397

September 27, 1983

Mr. Harrold R. Denton, Director  
Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555


Subject: WNP-2 Design Reverification Program

- References:
- a) Letter, G.D. Bouchey to H.R. Denton, "Nuclear Project No. 2 - Verification of Design and Construction Adequacy," dated October 22, 1982.
  - b) Letter, R. L. Ferguson to W.J. Dircks, "WNP-2 Plant Verification Program for WNP-2," dated November 24, 1982.
  - c) Letter, H.R. Denton to R.L. Ferguson, "Design Verification Program for WNP-2," dated December 28, 1982.
  - d) Letter, G.D. Bouchey to A. Schwencer, "Nuclear Project No. 2 - Qualification of Engineers Assigned to the WNP-2 Reverification Reviews," dated January 13, 1983.

References (a) and (b) described the Supply System programs for assuring that WNP-2 is designed and constructed in accordance with our commitments. One element of that overall program was an in-depth design reverification review of three reactor systems to provide added assurance of WNP-2 design adequacy. Reference (c) indicated your acceptance of the program proposed by the Supply System and requested additional information regarding the qualifications and independence of the engineers assigned to perform the design reviews. Reference (d) supplied the requested resumes and independence certifications.

Enclosed are copies of the final assessment report which provides the results of the WNP-2 Design Reverification Program. A meeting is being scheduled with NRC staff in late October, 1983, to present the results of the program.

If questions arise regarding the WNP-2 Design Reverification Program, you may contact Dr. G. D. Bouchey, (509)372-5359.



G. C. Sorensen, Acting Manager  
Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Programs

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
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
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# WASHINGTON NUCLEAR PLANT 2 DESIGN REVERIFICATION PROGRAM

Volume II:  
Appendices to Final Assessment Report



September 1983

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**Washington Public Power Supply System**  
Richland, Washington 99352

Docket # 50-397  
Control # 8310070342  
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**APPENDIX 1**

**WNP-2 Requirements and Design Reverification  
Final Assessment Report**

**List of Potential Finding Reports**



APPENDIX 1  
LIST OF POTENTIAL FINDING REPORTS  
(Page 1 of 13)

PFR No.	Classification**			Review Area*	Description
	F	O	NV		
HPCS-1		X		3.1	The B&R criteria document does not include requirements for all design input areas identified on the requirements reverification checklist.
HPCS-2		X		3.2.3.1.D	The equipment piece number for diesel engine cooling water heat exchanger is not consistent on all drawings.
HPCS-3		X		3.2.3.6.A	The diesel air start system is not totally redundant as described on the Flow Diagram.
HPCS-4		X		3.2.3.10.A	Current calculation revisions were not used as the basis for subsequent calculations.
HPCS-5		X		3.2.3.10.B	B&R and alternate calculations do not agree on the diesel exhaust pressure drop.
HPCS-6			X	3.1	Cold working of instrument tubing.
HPCS-7		X		3.2.3.2	Detail B showing HPCS Instrumentation is missing from Flow Diagram.
HPCS-8			X	3.2.3.5.B	HPCS/RCIC condensate storage level instrumentation separation is questioned.
HPCS-9		X		3.1	FSAR does not state the correct ASME Code Classification for the HPCS diesel cooling water heat exchanger.
HPCS-10			X	3.1	FSAR states that all fuel oil piping is ASME III whereas some is B31.1.
HPCS-11			X	3.2.3.6.B	Calculations that justify condensate storage level transfer setpoint not found.
HPCS-12			X	3.1	FSAR does not state the piping material requirements specified in the ECD.

\*\* F - Finding  
O - Observation  
NV - Not Valid

\*Corresponds to Report Section Number

LIST OF POTENTIAL FINDING REPORTS  
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PFR No.	Classification**			Review Area*	Description
	F	O	NV		
HPCS-13			X	3.1	Different sections of the engineering criteria document do not agree on piping corrosion allowance.
HPCS-14		X		3.1	FSAR does not agree with ASME piping code effective date specified in the ECD.
HPCS-15	X			3.2.3.6.A	B&R calculation on emergency water volume for HPCS pump suction is inconsistent with other calculations and the design events.
HPCS-16			X	3.2.3.7.A	HPCS relief valve design does not incorporate GE design specifications for double flange gaskets.
HPCS-17		X		3.2.4.3	The DSA diesel engine exhaust system line size does not correspond to manufacturers recommendations.
HPCS-18		X		3.2.4.3	The diesel fuel oil system does not meet NFPA Std. 37 requirements.
HPCS-19	X			3.2.4.3	No air box drain collection tank is provided for the HPCS diesel.
HPCS-20		X		3.1	Design requirement documents and FSAR values for vital piping damping coefficient do not agree.
HPCS-21	X			3.2.6.4.B	There is clearance between the attached parts of two snubbers where gaps are not allowed.
HPCS-22		X		3.2.5.3	No design calculations traceable to the HPCS pump support anchor bolts were found.
HPCS-23			X	3.2.5.1.D	Design procedures covering aspects of the Instrumentation Installation Contractor design process were considered inadequate.
HPCS-24		X		3.2.5.1.D	Improper stress intensification factors were used in the analysis of PI Line X-73a.
HPCS-25		X		3.2.5.1.D	Evaluation of local stresses caused by weld attachments for PI Line X-73a was considered to be inadequate.

\*\* Finding  
O - Observation

\*Corresponds to Report Section Number

LIST OF POTENTIAL FINDING REPORTS  
(Page 3 of 13)

PFR No.	Classification**			Review Area*	Description
	F	O	NV		
HPCS-26	X			3.2.5.1.D	No faulted conditions stress evaluation was found for PI Line X-73a.
HPCS-27	X			3.2.5.1.A	Loads used in the design of pipe supports for M2U0-2 piping system are not current.
HPCS-28	X			3.2.6.4.A	Potential restraint to thermal expansion of PI Line X-73a was identified.
HPCS-29	X			3.2.4.5	HPCS-FE-7 is installed with pressure taps and attached instruments located at the top rather than horizontally as suggested by good engineering practice.
HPCS-30	X			3.2.3.4	There are ambiguities in the piping code specifications for the CST to HPCS pump suction piping.
HPCS-31	X			3.2.3.5.B	Discrepancies in separation criteria were noted in the BRI documentation.
HPCS-32	X			3.2.4.6	GE specifications for instrument setpoint, accuracy, drift and range are not consistent.
HPCS-33		X		3.2.4.4	Instrument tubing match line elevations disagree between two isometric drawings.
HPCS-34		X		3.2.4.5	There is a discrepancy between the flange bore and pipe ID for HPCS-FE-7.
HPCS-35	X			3.2.4.6	The nameplate and ranges specified in the instrument data sheet for DPIS-9 do not agree.
HPCS-36		X		3.2.6.2	There is a discrepancy between GE and BRI recommendations upstream and downstream straight pipe run for orifice flowmeters.
HPCS-37	X			3.2.6.2.C	Discrepancies between the GE and BRI requirements for impulse line slope and instrument elevation are noted.
HPCS-38	X			3.2.6.2.B	HPCS-LS-2A was tagged with a tag identifying the level switch as HPCS-LS-2B.
HPCS-39	X			3.2.3.7.B	The instrument line for the suppression pool level switch is not orificed to provide containment isolation per RG 1.11.

\*\* F - Finding  
O - Observation  
NV - Not Valid

\*Corresponds to Report Section Number



LIST OF POTENTIAL FINDING REPORTS  
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PFR No.	Classification**			Review Area*	Description
	<u>F</u>	<u>U</u>	<u>NV</u>		
HPCS-40			X	3.2.6.2	The specified and nameplate ranges of HPCS-PS-12 do not agree.
HPCS-41		X		3.2.3.2	The valve interlock control function for HPCS-LS-2A is correctly shown in the GE specifications and FCD but not shown on the GE P&ID or BRI Flow Diagram.
HPCS-42			X	3.2.3.4	The seismic classification of HPCS suction piping from the CST is incorrect.
HPCS-43		X		3.2.4.3	There are discrepancies in the BRI calculations which sized restrictive orifice HPCS-RO-4.
HPCS-44		X		3.2.3.1.C	The calculated pressure drop for HPCS diesel starting air system exceeds manufacturers recommendations.
HPCS-45			X	3.2.3.4	There are ambiguities in FSAR Table 3.2-1 on code class groups for the HPCS system.
HPCS-46	X			3.2.4.7	The adjustable range for Breaker 4-41 short circuit tripping does not meet the GE specification.
HPCS-47		X		3.2.4.7	The relay element connected to Breaker 4-41 does not permit proper coordination.
HPCS-48		X		3.2.3.3	As-built data was not used in BRI voltage drop calculation 2.06.03 for TR4-41.
HPCS-49	X			3.2.4.7	Ground fault alarm relays on Bus SM-4 will not function reliably.
HPCS-50		X		3.2.3.3	The effect of simultaneous starting of 480V and 4KV motors was not considered in BRI Voltage Drop Calculation 2.06.03, Rev. 5.
HPCS-51		X		3.2.3.6.C	The present design does not include the required degraded voltage protection and auto return to standby.
HPCS-52		X		3.2.3.3	The vendor print file for TR 4-41 contains two contradicting drawings.
HPCS-53		X		3.2.3.3	No fault duty calculation was provided for MC-4A.

\*\* Finding  
 0 - Observation  
 NV - Not Valid

\*Corresponds to Report Section Number

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PFR No.	Classification**			Review Area*	Description
	F	O	NV		
HPCS-54		X		3.2.6.3	One of the bolts is missing from the HPCS pump grounding lug connection.
HPCS-55		X		3.2.3.7.A	There is an equipment piece number discrepancy between FSAR Table 6.2-16 and B&R Drawing M520 for several valves.
HPCS-56		X		3.2.5.2.B	Local pipe stress from a welded attachment lug for pipe support 910-N was not calculated adequately.
HPCS-57		X		3.2.5.2.A	Miscellaneous errors exist in the design calculation for pipe support HPCS-66.
HPCS-58	X			3.2.5.1.B	There is an error in the piping design guide.
HPCS-59		X		3.2.5.1.B	Calculation 8.14.64A does not correctly calculate the functional capability stress of the piping system.
HPCS-60			X	3.2.5.1.B	The pipe crack evaluation appears to be incomplete for BRI Calculation 8.14.64A.
HPCS-61			X	3.2.5.1.B	The displacement summaries for branch pipe connections do not include rotations.
HPCS-62		X		3.2.5.1.B	The load data source for chugging, SRV and LOCA jet direct loads are not referenced in BRI calculation 8.14.64A.
HPCS-63		X		3.2.5.1.B	There are documentation problems with seismic analysis input calculations for BRI Calculation 8.14.64A.
HPCS-64		X		3.2.5.1.B	Improper revisions were made to support load tables in BRI Calculation 8.14.64A.
HPCS-65		X		3.2.5.1.B	The thermal displacements at branch connections were not correctly summarized.
HPCS-66	X			3.2.5.1.B	Support design loads were incorrectly reported for HPCS-910N in BRI Calculation 8.14.64A.

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PFR No.	Classification**			Review Area*	Description
	<u>F</u>	<u>O</u>	<u>NV</u>		
HPCS-67		X		3.2.5.1.B	Errors were found in revised thermal expansion computer runs in BRI Calculation 8.14.64A.
HPCS-68		X		3.2.5.1.B	Some stress intensification factors were not included in the stress analysis in BRI Calculation 8.14.64A.
HPCS-69		X		3.2.5.1.B	An incorrect mass was used in the computer model of valve HPCS-V-15.
HPCS-70			X	3.2.5.1.B	The physical properties of HPCS-V-15 used in the computer model did not come from the referenced drawings.
HPCS-71			X	3.2.5.1.B	Various errors were made in the thermal expansion analysis in BRI Calculation 8.14.64A.
HPCS-72			X	3.2.5.1.B	Emergency condition temperatures were not considered in the thermal expansion analysis in BRI Calculation 8.14.64A.
HPCS-73				N.A.	This number was not used.
HPCS-74		X		3.2.5.1.A	Valve nozzle end loads and accelerations are not evaluated per requirements of the ECD.
HPCS-75				N.A.	This number was not used.
HPCS-76				N.A.	This number was not used.
HPCS-77			X	3.2.5.1.A	The SSE response spectra for mass point 40 (BRI Calculation 8.14.82) is not included in referenced document.
HPCS-78			X	3.2.5.1.A	The stress index, C2, used for the 3/4" elbowlet is lower than that required by ASME Section III.
HPCS-79		X		3.2.5.1.A	An additional weight of 1047 pounds was added to the 12" HPCS-V-5.
HPCS-80			X	3.2.5.1.A	HPCS-V-76 was modeled using a weight 400 pounds less than the drawings indicate.

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PFR No.	Classification**			Review Area*	Description
	F	O	NV		
HPCS-81	X			3.2.5.1.A	Incorrect scales were used for ADLPIPE response spectra input.
HPCS-82		X		3.2.5.2.D	Thermal loads used for design of HPCS-52 do not match those in the applicable pipe calculation.
HPCS-83		X		3.2.5.1.C	Elbow dimensions used in the analysis of small bore line DE-1738-1 are in error.
RFW-1	X			3.4.6.3	RFW-TE-41A had been improperly terminated in the field.
RFW-2		X		3.4.4.3.B	RFW line "A" temperature element installed orientation does not correspond to orientation shown on pipe isometric.
RFW-3		X		3.4.6.3	The signal cable for RFW-TE-41A was incorrectly labeled.
RFW-4		X		3.4.4.3.D	The wrong type of flow element was selected for RFW-FE-15.
RFW-5			X	3.4.4.1	RFW-V-32A was not specified to be testable with low pressure air as required by 10CFR50 Appendix J.
RFW-6	X			3.4.4.1.B	The feedwater heater relief valve capacity is not sufficient to provide relief for all hypothetical events.
RFW-7		X		3.4.4.2.A	Motor operator for RFW-V-65 is supplied with Class 1E power per PED 218-E-2858 but Drawing E-528, Sheet 27 has not been updated.
RFW-8		X		3.4.6.3	The air operator extension shaft of RFW-V-32A interferes with RWCU inlet line to header "A".
RFW-9		X		3.4.4.3.C	Inconsistencies are noted on the elementary and other electrical drawings for RFW-V-32A.
RFW-10		X		3.4.4.3.D	Upstream straight piping section length for RFW-FE-1A is inconsistent with ECD requirements.
RFW-11	X			3.4.4.3.D	Downstream straight piping length requirements for RFW-FE-1A is inconsistent with the ECD.

\*\* F - Finding  
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LIST OF POTENTIAL FINDING REPORTS  
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PFR No.	Classification**			Review Area*	Description
	F	O	NV		
RFW-12			X	3.4.4.3	Connecting pipe size and pressure loss documentation inconsistencies are noted for RFW-FE-1A.
RFW-13			X	3.4.4.3	RFW-FE-1A is not installed as shown on GE drawings.
RFW-14			X	3.4.4.3	System flushing and protection screening for RFW-FE-1A is not installed.
RFW-15			X	3.4.6.3	The RFW-FE-1A pressure tap configuration and connections are not installed per manufacturers recommendations.
RFW-16		X		3.4.4.3.D	RFW-FE-1A calibration curve anomalies.
RFW-17		X		3.4.6.3	RFW-DPT-803A signal loop wiring and instrument rack tubing runs are not labeled in accordance with contractor requirements.
RFW-18			X	3.4.3.4	Documentation inconsistencies were found in the review of RFW-V-32A containment isolation requirements.
RFW-19		X		3.4.3.4	Loss of signal lock-up interlocks for RFW-DT-1A, DT-1B and-FCV-10 have not been implemented in accordance with GE recommendations.
RFW-20			X	3.4.3.4	The BRI elementary diagram does not show the required interlock between V-112B and DPS-4.
RFW-21	X			3.4.4.1.B	Control valve cavitation problems exist with some valves.
RFW-22		X		3.4.4.1.B	There are inconsistencies and design input errors in the sizing calculation for RFW-FCV-15.
NL-1		X		3.4.5.3	Vendor approved nozzle loads did not include flange deadweights for RFW-P-1A and 1B.
RHR-1		X		3.3.4.3.C	All required cable types were not listed in Class 1E list.
RHR-2		X		3.3.3.1.C	The BRI wiring design for several RHR valves did not follow GE requirements.

\*\* Finding  
O - Observation  
NV - Not Valid

\*Corresponds to Report Section Number

LIST OF POTENTIAL FINDING REPORTS  
(Page of 13)

PFR No.	Classification**			Review Area*	Description
	F	O	NV		
RHR-3		X		3.3.3.5	Containment isolation valve limit switches prematurely indicate valve closure.
RHR-4		X		3.1	FSAR incorrectly states that seismic reevaluation is supplemented by NUREG-0800.
RHR-5			X	3.1	No design requirement was found to match FSAR commitment for vertical cable tray run fire breaks.
RHR-6	X			3.3.3.4	RHR-FC -64B was not included in the remote shutdown system design as required by specification 22A3085.
RHR-7		X		3.3.3.4	Remote shutdown system design specification 22A3085, Para. 4.1.1 is not met in that a new common point was created.
RHR-8		X		3.3.3.3	BRI drawing E503-8, Rev. 23 shows RHR-P-3 in Division B instead of Division 2.
RHR-9		X		3.3.3.1.C	The GE documentation for RHR-V-3B throttling are contradictory.
RHR-10	X			3.3.3.1.D	The second level undervoltage relays will cause bypass of the 115 kV source and will lockout the shed ESF loads.
RHR-11		X		3.3.3.1.D	Feeder loads for MC-7BB and 7BA are missing from the MC-7B load calculation.
RHR-12		X		3.3.3.1.D	Feeder circuit breaker for MC-7BB may be set too low.
RHR-13		X		3.3.4.1.A	There is a discrepancy in the RHR-FCV-64 operating time specifications.
RHR-14		X		3.3.4.2.A	RHR-FIS-10B is overranged.
RHR-15			X	3.3.3.1.D	V-4B is missing from Drawing E528-36; V47B is missing from E528-37. Fuse and thermal overload sizes are not included on the E-528 drawing for RHR-V-4B and RHR-V-47B.
RHR-16		X		3.3.4.3.C	The voltage drop from E-SL-81 to MC-8BB is larger than the 3% recommended by BRI criteria.

\*\* F - Finding  
O - Observation  
NV - Not Valid

\*Corresponds to Report Section Number

LIST OF POTENTIAL FINDING REPORTS  
(Page 10 of 13)

PFR No.	Classification**			Review Area*	Description
	F	O	NV		
RHR-17		X		3.3.4.2.A	RHR-FT-1 impulse lines are not routed as shown with the flow diagram.
RHR-18		X		3.3.4.2.B	The documentation (GE) for RHR-FI-5 does not agree with the installed instrument indicating scales.
RHR-19			X	3.3.4.B	RHR-MO-24B and 64B were ordered specifying the wrong environmental class.
RHR-20		X		3.3.4.1.C	A cavitation check was not included in BRI Calculation 5.17.13 for RHR-RO-1B.
RHR-21		X		3.3.4.1.C	A cavitation check was not included in BRI Calculation 5.17.26 for RHR-RO-3B.
RHR-22		X		3.3.4.3.C	Cable 2M8BA-20 is not sized for derated conditions.
RHR-23		X		3.3.5.2.B	Heat exchanger drawings do not match the calculations.
RHR-24	X			3.3.5.2.B	Heat exchanger installation does not reflect the calculation and installation specification requirements.
RHR-25	X			3.3.5.2.B	Due to increased loadings, the anchor bolt analysis is incomplete.
RHR-26		X		3.3.5.2.A	The original calculations were not updated or referenced to supporting calculations.
RHR-27			X	3.3.5.2.A	A buckling analysis was not performed as required by design criteria.
RHR-28		X		3.3.5.2.A	The anchor bolt analysis for the upper lateral supports is incomplete.
RHR-29		X		3.3.5.2.A	Assumed future (design) hanger loads must be verified against the actual hanger loads.
RHR-30		X		3.3.4.3.A	Motor starters and TR-8-81 are subjected to over voltages (SM-8 side of the 480 V system).
RHR-31			X	3.3.4.3.B	Documentation discrepancies for the fuse and overload heater sizes for three valves were noted.
RHR-32				N.A.	To be included in Pipe and Support Addendum.

\*\* Finding  
 O - Observation  
 NV - Not Valid

\*Corresponds to Report Section Number

LIST OF POTENTIAL FINDING REPORTS  
(Page 1 of 13)

PFR No.	Classification**			Review Area*	Description
	F	O	NV		
RHR-33	X			3.3.6	Lugs on the heat exchanger are not shimmed per the GE specifications.
RHR-34				N.A.	This number was not used.
RHR-35		X		3.3.4.3.A	Fuse/circuit breaker coordination information is missing.
EQ-1		X		3.5.5.2	HPCS-MO-4 is not listed in QID file identified on the Class 1E list.
EQ-2		X		3.5.5.2	The QID file referenced for HPCS-RO-4 did not contain the required design certification documentation.
EQ-3		X		3.5.5.1	QID file for HPCS-42-4A7C does not include required qualification data.
EQ-4			X	3.5.5.2	There is no in-situ pull/deflection operability test record for valve RHR-FCV-64B in the QID file.
EQ-5				N.A.	Number not used.
EQ-6				N.A.	Number not used.
EQ-7		X		3.5.5.6	Confirmation is required for existence of low pressure isolation alarm and procedure to isolate auxiliary steam system.
EQ-8				N.A.	Number not used.
EQ-9		X		3.5.5.2	The dynamic qualification levels identified in the QID file for HPCS-LS-2A are less than the required inputs.
EQ-10		X		3.5.5.6	Computer runs for the HVAC cooldown phase of HELB environments are not documented in the calculation file.
EQ-11		X		3.5.5.6	EQ environment calculation predicts peak pressures across RWCU heat exchanger room (R510) walls exceeding FSAR design values.

\*\* F - Finding  
O - Observation  
NV - Not Valid

\*Corresponds to Report Section Number



LIST OF POTENTIAL FINDING REPORTS  
(Page 12 of 13)

PFR No.	Classification**			Review Area*	Description
	F	O	NV		
EQ-12			X	3.5.5.6	Subcompartment pressure analysis does not consider a door in Room R408.
EQ-13	X			3.5.5.6	Non-conservative isolation valve closure characteristics assumed in RCIC line break analysis.
EQ-14	X			3.5.5.6	A non-conservative time delay was assumed for generating RWCU break isolation signal.
EQ-15	X			3.5.5.6	HELB calculations for EQ profiles did not specifically address single failure criteria.
EQ-16	X			3.5.5.6	Normal HVAC ductwork may not retain its integrity to support post-HELB cooldown.
EQ-17		X		3.5.5.1	There are discrepancies between the model numbers on the Class 1E/SRM lists and the installed components.
FP-1		X		3.5.3.3	Several dedicated cables that require protection were not listed in the E-948 cable tray node summaries.
FP-2			X	3.5.3	Thermolag fire barrier is applied to an empty tray that is not required to be lagged.
FP-3			X	3.5.3	Cable spreading room penetration curbs shown on M-576 are not shown on S-906.
FP-4		X		3.5.3.2	Note 7 on M521 SH2 should not apply to RHR-V-40.
WL-1		X		3.5.6.2	Main steam tunnel north wall load combinations are not verified.
WL-2	X			3.5.6.2	FSAR criteria incorrectly applied to the main steam tunnel north wall deflection calculation.
WL-3		X		3.5.6.1	Attachment loads were not considered in BRI design calculation for the main steam tunnel north wall.

\*\* Finding  
O - Observation  
NV - Not Valid

\*Corresponds to Report Section Number

LIST OF POTENTIAL FINDING REPORTS  
(Page 3 of 13)

PFR No.	Classification**			Review Area*	Description
	F	O	NV		
WL-4		X		3.5.6.2	Main steam tunnel north wall minimum reinforcing steel inconsistent with FSAR. The minimum reinforcing steel ratios used in the main steam tunnel are not consistent with FSAR descriptions but do meet ACI 318-1971 requirements.
WL-5			X	3.5.6.2	Jet impingement load factors were not properly considered in calculating the dynamic loading of the main steam tunnel north wall.
PB-1	X			3.5.4.1.B	Material allowables used for approval of loads and/or stresses for PWS-2-1 are not traceable.
PB-2		X		3.5.4.1.C	Field walkdown of HPCS pipe break location identified more potential targets than those cited in the B&R calculation.
PB-3			X	3.5.4.1.D	Post-accident damage sequence differs from that postulated in the original B&R calculation.
PB-4			X	3.5.4.1.B	As-built strut size is smaller than the size specified in BRI calculation 8.01.52.
PB-5				N.A.	Number not used.
PB-6			X	3.5.4.2.B	Field walkdown of RWCU pipe break location identified more potential targets than cited in the BRI calculation.
PB-7			X	3.5.4.1.E	Process deficiencies in potential target resolution were noted.

\*\* F - Finding  
O - Observation  
NV - Not Valid

\*Corresponds to Report Section Number

## SECTION A - REQUIREMENTS REVERIFICATION

### A.1 Mechanical

#### A.1.1 Specifications

##### BRI Documents:

B & R Engineering Criteria Document, Rev. 11.

B & R Tech. Memos 443, Rev. A; 526, Rev. A; 308, 667, 1010, 148, 156, 653, 776, 785, 845.

##### General Electric Documents:

22A1843, HPCS System Design Specification, Revision 4.

22A1843AU, HPCS System Design Specification Data Sheets, Revision 4.

731E931, P&ID - HPCS System, Revision 7.

731E932AD, Process Diagram - HPCS System, Revision 3.

731E950AD, Flow Control Diagram - HPCS System, Revision 2.

GEK-71334, Hanford 2 Operation and Maintenance Instruction HPCS System, July 1978.

22A3095, Pressure Integrity of Piping Design Specification.

22A3095AD, Pressure Integrity of Piping Design Specification Data Sheet.

22A3790, System Design Pressures Design Specification.

22A3062, Mechanical Codes and Standards Design Specification.

22A2625, System Criteria and Applications for Protection Against Dynamic Effects of Pipe Break Design Specification.

22A2988, Separation Criteria, Revision 6.

22A7416, Separation Criteria, February 1981.

3316-031, Instruction Manual - HPCS Diesel Generator.

21A8657, Rev. 3, Valves.

21A8658, Rev. 1, Electric valve actuators.

21A9347AF, Rev. 1, Instrumentation and Electric equipment.

22A2625, Rev. 1, Protection against pipe whip.

22A2702AB, Rev. 1, Seismic design.

22A2817, Rev. 3, Residual heat removal.

22A2817AY, Rev. 0, Data sheet for 22A2817.

22A3007, Rev. 1, Testability of instrumentation and controls.

22A3008, Rev. 5, Equipment environmental data.

22A3039, Rev. 1, Process instrumentation.

22A3062, Rev. 2, Mechanical codes and standards.

22A3095AD, Rev. 1, Data sheet for 22A3095.

22A3730, Rev. 0, RHR heat exchanger.

22A3730AB, Rev. 0, Data sheet for 22A03730.

22A3797, Floor response spectra.

22A5267, Rev. 1, Regulatory requirements.

22A7416, Rev. 1, Electrical separation.

21A8658, General Requirements MOV Actuation.

22A2703E, Radiation Sources.

22A2703F, Radiation Sources.

22A2707, Water Quality.

22A2708, Water Sampling.

22A2710, Standby AC Power.

22A2711, Plant DC Power.

22A2719AB, RFP Turbine Responses.

22A2719, FW Flow Measurement and Control.

22A2800, Rated Steam Output Curve.

22A2801, GE Reactor System Heat Balance Rated.

22A2802, GE Reactor System Heat Balance - 105% Rated.

22A2887, Nuclear Boiler System.

22A2907, Feedwater Control System.

22A3061, Rev. 0, Electrical Codes and Standards.

22A3790, Feedwater System Description.

22A3046, Rev. 1, Core Standby Cooling System Network.

A.1.2 Westinghouse Thermal Performance Data

AB095-1554, 1205849 KW, Maximum Calculated Not Guaranteed

AB095-1555, 115745 KW, Maximum Guaranteed

AF111-0330, No. 5 Extraction

AF111-0331, No. 6 Extraction

AE111-0572, Nos. 4 and 5 Extraction Zone Enthalpy

AE111-0573, No. 6 Extraction Zone Enthalpy


A.1.3 Codes and Standards

ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 1971 Edition with Addenda through Winter 1973.

ANSI-B.31.1, Power Piping Code, 1973 Edition with Addenda through Winter 1973.

AISC Manual of Steel Construction, Seventh Edition, 1970.

WNP-2 FSAR with Amendments through 26, November 1982, Sections 1.2, 3.1, 3.2, 3.5, 3.11, 5.2, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 9.5, Appendix F, 14.2.





A.2 Instruments and Controls (Generic Design Requirements Applicable to HPCS, RHR and RFW Systems)

A.2.1 Specifications

BRI Documents:

BRI Design Criteria, Section G "Instrumentation and Control".  
Paragraphs 4.0, 4.4, 6.0, 7.4.2, Page G-45, Paragraph 2,  
Paragraph 7.4.1

General Electric Documents:

22A3039, Rev. 1, March 26, 1973, "Process Instrumentation".  
Sections: Paragraph 4.3.4.2.

22A3061, Rev. 0, September 3, 1971, "Electrical Codes and Standards".

22A3062, Rev. 0, March 10, 1971, "Mechanical Codes and Standards".

22A3095, Rev. 0, July 17, 1972, "Pressure Integrity of Piping and  
Equipment Pressure Parts". Sections: Paragraph #A3.3

22A3790, Rev. 0, May 31, 1973, "System Design Pressures".

22A3059, Rev. 1, November 6, 1972, "Definition of Piping Interfaces  
- Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary".

22A2702A, Rev. 1, January 7, 1971, "Seismic Design" Design  
Specification.

21A8696, Rev. 0, May 10, 1971, "Seismic Requirement for Class I  
Instrumentation".

21A8658, Rev. 1, May 17, 1971, "General Requirements for Motor Operated Valve Actuators". Purchase Requisition.

22A3008, Rev. 5, April 8, 1977, "BWR Equipment Environmental Interface Data". Sections: Paragraph 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 4.2, and 4.5.

22A3095 AD, Rev. 0, September 26, 1973, "Design Requirements for Pressure Integrity of Piping and Equipment Pressure Parts - Data Sheet".

22A2718, Rev. 5, April 10, 1974, "Special Wire and Cable".

22A3067, Rev. 2, October 12, 1972, "Mechanical Equipment Separation". Paragraph 4.5

22A7416, Rev. 0, "Electrical Equipment, Separation for Safeguards System". Specification February 19, 1982.

22A2988, Rev. 6, June 20, 1975, "Electrical Equipment; Separation for Safeguards Systems". Plant Requirements. Paragraphs: 4.3.3.1, 4.3.3.1.1, 4.3.3.1.2, SHT 10 Table IV, 4.4.1, 4.4.3, 4.4.3.4, 4.4.4, SHT 17, Table 3.

22A2625, Rev. 2, March 9, 1973, "Dynamic Effects/Pipe Break". Design Guide.

### A.2.3 Contracts

Contract 42 Tech. Spec. Div. 15

Contract 215 Tech. Spec. Div. 50

Contract 220 Tech. Spec. Div. 50 Page 50A-16, Page 50A-34A, Page 50A-37, 38

A.3 RHR System - Design Requirements (I&C Section)

A.3.1 Specifications

BRI Documents:

Engineering Design Criteria, Section G

General Electric Documents:

22A2817, Rev. 3, November 27, 1973, "Residual Heat Removal System - System Design Specification", Section 4.3, 4.1.2, 4.1.2.4, 4.5.

22A2817AY, Rev. 0, October 31, 1974, "Residual Heat Removal System - System Design Specification - Data Sheet", Sections 2.1, 4.4, and 4.6.

22A3008, Rev. 5, April 8, 1977, "BWR Equipment Environmental Interface Data".

22A3041, Rev. 1, March 14, 1971, "Essential Components".

22A3185, Rev. 1, February 4, 1975, "Piping Interfaces".

22A2711, Rev. 3, January 9, 1974, "Plant D-C Power".

22A2718, Rev. 5, April 10, 1974, "Special Wire and Cable".

22A7416, Rev. 0, March 3, 1982, "Electrical Equipment, Separation for Safeguards System".

22A3007, Rev. 1, December 1, 1971, "Engineering Safeguards Systems, Criterion for Testability of Instrumentation and Controls".

22A3061, Rev. 0, September 3, 1971, "Electrical Codes and Standards".

22A3067, Rev. 2, October 12, 1972, "Mechanical Equipment Separation".

22A2710A, Rev. 7, September 9, 1974, "Standby A-C Power".

22A3095, Rev. 0, July 17, 1972, "Pressure Integrity of Piping and Equipment Pressure Parts".

22A3095AD, Rev. 0, September 26, 1973, "Design Requirements for Pressure Integrity of Piping and Equipment Pressure Parts - Data Sheet".

20A4756, Rev. 1, December 28, 1970, "Logic Symbols".

22A3059, Rev. 1, November 6, 1972, "Definition of Piping Interfaces Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary".

22A2707, Rev. 5, May 28, 1974, "Water Quality".

22A2749, Rev. 1, June 24, 1975, "Cleaning of Piping and Equipment".

22A3790, Rev. 0, May 31, 1973, "System Design Pressures".

22A3039, Rev. 1, March 26, 1973, "Process Instrumentation".

MPL A62-4310, "Qualification Testing of Instrument and Control Devices Classified as Essential.

21A8696, Rev. 0, May 10, 1971, "Seismic Requirements for Class I Instrumentation". Sections SHT 2, 3.

22A3062, Rev. 2, March 10, 1971, "Mechanical Codes and Industrial Standards".

22A3746, Rev. 1, January 21, 1974, "System Design Specification -  
Local Instrument Panels".

22A2702A.

A.3.2 Contracts

Contract 42, Division 15, Sections 15A, B, and C

Contract 58, Division 50


Contract 59, Division 16, Section 16A

Contract 59, Division 50

Contract 215, Division 50

Contract 218, Division 50

Contract 220, Division 50



A.4 HPCS System - Design Requirements (I & C Section)

A.4.1 Specifications

BRI Documents:

Engineering Design Criteria, Section G, Paragraph 4.0, 4

General Electric Documents:

22A1483, Rev. 4, February 19, 1974, "High Pressure Core Spray System", Sections 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 4.3.1, 4.3.1.2, 4.3.1.3, 4.3.1.5, 4.5.

731E932AD 11 P&ID, HPCS System", SHTS 1 and 2.

22A3039, Rev. 1, March 26, 1973, "Process Instrumentation" System Design Specification.

22A3061, Rev. 0, September 3, 1971, "Electrical Codes and Standards".

22A3062, Rev. 2, March 10, 1971, "Mechanical Codes and Standards".

22A3095, Rev. 0, July 17, 1972, "Pressure Integrity of Piping and Equipment Pressure Parts", Section 4, Table A.

22A3790, Rev. 0, May 31, 1973, "System Design Pressures".

22A3059, Rev. 1, June 24, 1975, "Cleaning of Piping and Equipment".

22A1483AU, Rev. 4, August 13, 1979, "High Pressure Core Spray System", Design Specification Data Sheet.

22A8696, Rev. 0, May 10, 1971, "Seismic Requirements for Class I Instrumentation", Sections: SHTS 2, 3.

A.4.2 Contracts:

Contract 42 Tech. Spec. Div. 15

Contract 215 Tech. Spec. Div. 50

Contract 220 Tech. Spec. Div. 50



A.5 RFW System - Specific Design Requirements (I&C Section)

A.5.1 Specifications

BRI Documents:

Engineering Design Criteria, Section G

General Electric Documents:

22A2907, Rev. 3, March 28, 1974, "Feedwater Control System (Steam Turbine Driven Reactor Feed Pumps)", System Design Specification, Sections 5.3, 4.3.2.2, 3.1.3.2, 3.3, 4.3.2.

22A2907AB, Rev. 1, August 16, 1971, "Feedwater Control System (Steam Turbine Driven Feed Pumps)" Design Specification, Section 4.1.3.

22A2719, Rev. 2, June 15, 1973, "Feedwater Flow Measurement and Control" Specification, Section 4.4.1.1.

22A2719AB, Rev. 0, July 26, 1971, "Feedwater Flow Measurement and Control" BWR Plant Requirements, Section 2.3.

22A3790, Rev. 0, May 31, 1973, "System Design Pressures".

22A2887, Rev. 6, January 29, 1979, "Nuclear Boiler System", Design Specification.

22A3095, Rev. 0, July 17, 1972, "Pressure Integrity of Piping and Equipment Pressure Parts", Sections: SHT 10, D2, SHT 95, SHT 90, 91; Table I, SHT 98 Comment #1.

238X241AD, Rev. 9, "Feedwater Control System - Master Parts List".

DL807E160TC, Rev. 0, June 15, 1978, "Device List and System Elementary Diagram--Feedwater Control System".

22A3041, Rev. 1, March 14, 1972, "Essential Components", Design Specification.

239X241AD, Rev. 9, "Feedwater Control System (Turbine)" Master Parts List.

PL368X482, Rev. 7, "Reactor Feedwater Document List".

22A3095AD, Rev. 0, September 26, 1973, "Design Requirements for Pressure Integrity of Piping and Equipment Pressure Parts - Data Sheet", Sections: SHT 20 A2.1, SHT 98 Paragraph C.

22A3059, Rev. 1, November 6, 1972, "Definition of Piping Interfaces - Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary".

22A2707, Rev. 5, May 28, 1974, "Water Quality.

22A2887AB, Rev. 4, "Nuclear Boiler System--REVAB" System Design Specification.

22A86796, Rev. 1, March 7, 1978, "Seismic Requirements for Essential Instrumentation", Purchase Specification, Sections: SHT's 2, 3.

21A8657, Rev. 3, May 20, 1975, "General Requirements for Valves".

22A2988, Rev. 6, June 20, 1975, "Electrical Equipment, Separation for Safeguards Systems". Plant Requirements, Paragraphs: 4.3.3.1, 4.3.3.1.1, 4.3.3.1.2, SHT 10 Table IV, 4.4.1, 4.4.3, 4.4.3.4, 4.4.4, SHT 17 Table 3.

22A3067, Rev. 2, October 12, 1972, "Mechanical Equipment Separation", Paragraph 4.5.

22A2271AS, Rev. 1, November 30, 1978, "Preoperational Test Program", Pre-op Test Specifications.

22A3838, Rev. 1, March 8, 1976, "Recommended Prerequisites for Pre-Operational Testing". Preoperational Test Specification.



## A.6 Electrical

### A.6.1 Specifications

#### BRI Documents:

B&R Engineering Criteria Document, Rev. 11, March 16, 1982, Plus Project Criteria Advance Changes dated up to November 1, 1982, Sections D and F.

TM-330, Rev. N/A, June 28, 1972, "Medium Voltage Switchgear Basis".

TM-427, Rev. 1, February 21, 1973, "Control and Secondary Wiring Internal to Switchgear, Panels, and Similar Enclosures".

TM-443, Rev. A, March 29, 1973, "Systems Description, High Pressure Core Spray System".

TM-510, Rev. N/A, May 3, 1973, "Motor Control Center Basis".

TM-526, Rev. A, June 28, 1973, System Description, Residual Heat Removal System".

TM-671, Rev. N/A, July 5, 1974, "Contract #2 - PVC Cables".

TM-990, Rev. 1, March 11, 1977, "MCC - PCU Insulated Control Wiring".

TM-1129, Rev. N/A, August 11, 1978, "Class 1E Motor Operated Valves".

System Description #72, Rev. 0, September 25, 1975, "Feedwater System".

EM-79-006, Rev. N/A, January 2, 1979, "MCC Master List".

General Electric Documents:

21A8658, Rev. 1, May 17, 1971, "General Requirements for Motor Operated Valve Actuators - Purchase Specification".

21A9222, Rev. 2, January 11, 1974, "Electric Motors, General - Purchase Specification".

21A9222DM, Rev. 5, December 14, 1979, "Motors, Vertical (RHR) - Purchase Specification".

22A1483, Rev. 4, February 19, 1974, "HPCS System - Design Specification".

22A1483AU, Rev. 4, August 13, 1979, "HPCS System - Data Sheet".

22A2710A, Rev. 7, September 9, 1974, "Standby AC Power - BWR Requirements".

22A2711, Rev. 3, January 9, 1974, "Plant DC Power - Design Specification".

22A2817, Rev. 3, November 27, 1973, "RHR System - Design Specification".

22A2817AY, Rev. 2, October 31, 1974, "RHR System - Data Sheet".

22A3008, Rev. 5, April 8, 1977, "BWR Equipment Environmental Interface Data - Design Specification".

22A3038, Rev. 6, February 5, 1979, "Motor List, Electric - Design Specification".

22A3061, Rev. 0, September 3, 1971, "Electrical Codes and Standards - Design Specification".

22A5267, Rev. 1, May 2, 1979, "Regulatory Requirements and Industrial Standards - Design Bases".

22A7416, Rev. 0, February 19, 1981, "Electrical Equipment, Separations for Safeguards Systems - Plant Requirement".

22A2907, Rev. 3, March 28, 1974, "Feedwater Control System - Design Specification".

22A2907AB, Rev. 1, August 16, 1971, "Feedwater Control System - Data Sheet".

#### A.6.2 Supply System Documents

Supply System EDI-4.8, Rev. 0, September 22, 1981, "Acceptance Criteria for WNP-2 Safety Related Equipment Qualification".

#### A.6.3 Contracts

Contract #35, Sect. 15A, "Miscellaneous Pumps and Motors".

Contract #41A, Sect. 15A, "Nuclear Valves".

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
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- 418-1.2, Rev. 10, Flow Element to Cont. (Line A)
- 3, Rev. 4, Flow Element to Cont. (Line A)
- 4, Rev. 7, Cont. to Reactor Vessel (Line A)
- 5.6, Rev. 5, Cont. to Reactor Vessel (Line A)
- 7.8, Rev. 5, Cont. to Reactor Vessel (Line A)
- 9.10, Rev. 7, Cont. to Reactor Vessel (Line A)
- 11.12, Rev. 6, Cont. to Reactor Vessel (Line A)
- 13, Rev. 6, Cont. to Reactor Vessel (Line A)
- 419-1.2, Rev. 8, Flow Meter to Cont. (Line B)
- 3, Rev. 4, Flow Meter to Cont. (Line B)
- 4, Rev. 4, Cont. to Reactor Vessel (Line B)
- 5.7, Rev. 7, Cont. to Reactor Vessel (Line B)
- 8.9, Rev. 7, Cont. to Reactor Vessel (Line B)
- 10.11, Rev. 5, Cont. to Reactor Vessel (Line B)
- 12.13, Rev. 7, Cont. to Reactor Vessel (Line B)
- 479-1.3, Rev. 2, FW Pump 1B to Hp Htrs. 6A and 6B
- 480-1.4, Rev. 4, Bypass Line, RFW Pump Disch. to Hx6A Disch.

Vendor Drawings

CCI Control Valve, Dwg. #921901077, Rev. H.

Anchor Darling Valve Dwg. #3084-3, Rev. A.

Fisher Control Dwg. #52A8558, Rev. C.

I-R Pump Curve Dwg. #49413.

I-R Seal Injection Control Dwg. #2636-C-18C.

I-R CN Pump Dwg. #C-18X17CN500X4B.

I-R CN Pump Parts List, Dwg. #C-18X17CN500X4.

Velan Dwg. #P2-3319-N-33, Rev. J.

D.1.6 Memoranda

WPBR-73-891, Containment Isolation Valves, 12-11-73.

BRWP-74-365, Containment Isolation Valves, 4-10-74.

WPBR-74-460, Containment Isolation Valves, 4-19-74.

EN-RLH-81-05, Containment Iso. and Testability Eval., 10-12-81.

D.1.7 Contract Specifications

<u>Cont. No.</u>	<u>Award Date</u>	<u>Item</u>
2808-10	1-14-72	Feedwater Heaters
2808-11A	2-18-72	Reactor Feed Pumps
2808-41A	12-3-73	Nuclear Valves
2808-41B	12-3-73	Nuclear Valves
2808-42A	5-13-74	Misc. Control Valves, Controllers and Acc.
2808-215	5-13-74	Mechanical Equipment Installation

B&W Equipment Spec. #08-1004-352-00 (RFW-FCV-15)

D.1.8 Reports

Anchor Darling Valve Design Report: 24"-900# Check Valves.

Anchor Darling Material Certification Report for RFW-V-32A.

CCI Material Certification Report (RFW-FCV-15).

Velan Certificate of Compliance (RFW-V-65A).

## D.2 Electrical References

### D.2.1 Design Specifications

B&R Engineering Criteria Document, Section D, Electrical Engineering Criteria.

B&R Engineering Criteria Document, Appendix 3, Electrical Separation Practices, Rev. 1, 12-22-82.

### D.2.2 Calculations

2.02.02 (Main Plant Bus Load Calculations), Rev. 1, DL 6/15/81.

2.02.07 (Motor Control Centers Load Calculations), Rev. 1,  
DL 10-12-76.

2.03.07 (480 Volt Switchgear Short Circuit Calculations), Rev. 2,  
DL 1/20/77.

2.03.09, (MCC Short Circuit Calculations), Rev. 0, DL 1/24/78.

2.06.03, (Computer Run) - (Main One Line Voltage Drop Calculations),  
Rev. 5, DL 1/18/80.

2.06.05 (Reactor Building Feeder and Voltage Drop Calculations),  
Rev. 3, DL 2/8/77.

2.06.06 (Turbine Generator Building, Feeder and Voltage Drop  
Calculations), Rev. 1, DL 12/16/74.

2.06.10 (480 Volt MCC Voltage Drop Calculation and Cable Sizing),  
Rev. 1, DL 4/30/74.



2.12.00 (Relay Setting Time Current Characteristic Curves), Rev. 5,  
DL 9/15/82.

2.12.12 (480 Volt Switchgear Relay Settings Motor Data), Rev. 1,  
DL 11/30/76.

D.2.3 Technical Memorandum/Engineering Memo

EM-79-006, Rev. 0, 1/2/79, MCC Master List.

Tech. Memo 1060, Rev. 2, Voltage Drop Study.

B&R Engrg. Memo EM-79-239, Rev. 0, 3/22/79, MCC Master List Revision.

D.2.4 Manuals

ITE Imperial Corporation, Rowan Controller Manual.

Reactor Feed Pump drive Turbine (Delaval), 2808-12.

Limiterorque Manual, SMDI-170.

D.2.5 Drawings

The following B&R drawings with revision numbers listed were reviewed:

EWD-72E-001, MOV RFW-V-65A (B22-F065A), Rev. 1, 7/22/82.

EWD-72E-013, MOV RFW-V-109, Rev. 1, 2/3/83.

EWD-72E-015, MOV RFW-V-112A, Rev. 1, 7/22/82.

EWD-72E-037, Turb. RFW-DT-1A Turning Gear RFT-M-TNGA, Rev. 1,  
7/22/82.

EWD-72E-039, Turb. RFW-DT-1A Main Oil Pump RFT-M-MOPA, Rev. 2,  
8/31/82.

E502-2, Main One Line Diag., Rev. 19, 1/19/83.

E503-1, Aux. One Line Diag., Rev. 15, 3/21/83.

E503-6, Aux. One Line Diag., Rev. 26, 3/22/83.

E515-1, Breaker Setting 480V Swgr. SL-11 to SL-31, Rev. 1, 10/19/81.

E515-3, Breaker Setting 480V Swgr. SL-63 to SL-81, Rev. 2, 2/20/82.

E528-1, MCC Equip. Overload Summary MCC-MC-1A, Rev. 1, 12/17/82.

E528-2, MCC Equip. Overload Summary MCC-MC-1B, Rev. 2, 11/17/82.

E535-3A, Connection Wiring Diag. Motor Control Center, Rev. 9,  
12/07/82.

E535-3B, Connection Wiring Diag. Motor Control Center, Rev. 10,  
2/1/83.

E535-10A, Connection Wiring Diag. Motor Control Center, Rev. 11,  
4/13/82.

E535-10B, Connection Wiring Diag. Motor Control Center, Rev. 13,  
2/1/83.

E528-27, MCC Equip. Overload Summary MCC-MC-7C, Rev. 0, 12/17/82.

E537-19A, Connection Wiring Diag. Control Room Term. Cabinet, Rev.  
6, 4/4/83.

E550, Cable Schedule - Power, Rev. 34, 12/7/82.

E558-2, Turb. Gen. Bldg. Grounding Plans and Details, Rev. 4,  
4/12/82.

E902-3, Turb. Gen. Bldg. Grnd. Fl. El. 441'-0" Location Plan Cable  
Tray Nodes, Rev. 1, 7/16/75.

E918, Reactor Bldg. El. 501'-0" Location Plan Cable Tray Nodes, Rev.  
11, 4/6/83.

E929, Radwaste and Control Bldg. El. 467'-0" Location Plan Cable  
Tray Nodes, Rev. 10, 4/6/83.

E933, Radwaste and Control Bldg. Misc. Elev's. Location Plan Cable  
Tray Nodes, Rev. 4, 4/6/83.

E935-4, Radwaste and Control Bldg. - Section "4-4" Locations Cable  
Tray Nodes, Rev. 8, 4/6/83.

Other Vendor Drawings Reviewed

B&R File No. 4900 0001, ITE Imperial Corp., MCC Layout for MCC-MC-1B.

B&R File No. 4900 0035, ITE Imperial Corp., MCC Layout for MCC-MC-7C.

B&R File No. 1200 0003, Console Oil Diagram (Delaval Turbine, Inc.).

B&R File No. 41A-00-0073, Limitorque Corp.

B&R File No. 43-00-0061, Walworth Co.

B&R File No. 43-00-0112, Walworth Co.

GE Motor for Turning Gear, DD-17271.

D.2.6 Memoranda

Included in Section D.2.3

D.2.7 Contract Specifications: (B&R)

- i) Contract Specification 2808-12, Reactor Feed Pump Turbine - Bid Issue, BD-24.
- ii) Contract Specification 2808-41, Nuclear Valves, Division 15, Section 15A.
- iii) Contract Specification 2808-43, Standard Cast or Forged Steel Valves, Division 15, Section 15A.
- iv) Contract Specification 2808-49, Motor Control Centers, Division 16, Section 16A.
- v) Contract Specification 2808-62A and 62B, Electrical Cable.

D.2.8 Others

Vendor Drawings

Veelan Engrg. Co., Test Reports for RFW-MO-65A, (Veelan Order No. P2-3313-N).

Walworth Co., Test Report for RFW-MO-109, RFW-MO-112A, (Walworth Co., P.O. PP 32500, 5/25/77).

Delaval Certificate of Conformance for RFT-M-MOPA, RFT-M-TNGA.

Bussman Fuse Manufacturing, Part III, Component Protection for Electrical Systems.

## Industry Codes and Standards

NEMA MG-1, Para. MG1-1.26 (Totally Enclosed Machine).

NEMA ICS-2-322.21 (Combination Motor Control Unit Ratings).

NEMA ICS-2-321.41 (Short Time Capability).

IPCEA - No. P-54-440, "Ampacities, Cables in Open Top Cable Trays".

NFPA 70-1981, "National Electric Code".

ANSI C37.04-1979 (American National Standard Rating Structure for AC High Voltage Circuit Breakers Rated on a Symmetrical Current Basis).

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IEEE-279-1971 (Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations).

IEEE-308-1974 (Criteria for Class 1E Power Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations).

IEEE-323-1974 (Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations).

IEEE-344-1975 (Recommended Practices for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations).

IEEE-382-1974 (Type Test of Class 1E Electric Valve Operators for Nuclear Power Generating Stations).

IEEE-383-1974 (Type Test of Class 1E Electric Cables, Field Splices and Connections for Nuclear Power Generating Stations).

IEEE-384-1977 (Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits).

R-G-1.75, Physical Independence of Electric Systems.

NUREG 0588, Category 2, (Environmental Qualification of Class 1E Equipment).

### D.3 Instrumentation and Control References

#### D.3.1 Specifications (General Electric and Burns and Roe, Inc.)

22A2907, Rev. 3, "Feedwater Control System (Steam Driven Turbine Reactor Feed Pumps)", 3/28/74.

22A2907AB, Rev. 1, "Feedwater Control System" Data Sheet, 8/16/71.

22A2719, Rev. 2, "Feedwater Flow Measurement and Control" Design Specification, Dated 7/26/71.

22A2719AB, Rev. 0, "Feedwater Flow Measurement and Control" BWR Plant Requirements Specification, 7/26/71.

732E120AD, "IED - Feedwater Control System, Turbine Feed Pumps", Rev. 3.

807E160TC, "Feedwater System" Elementary Diagram, Sheets 1, Rev. 12; 2, Rev. 12; 3, Rev. 10; 4, Rev. 12; 5, Rev. 8.

807E153TC, "Nuclear Boiler Process Instrumentation System" Elementary Diagram, Sheets: 1, Rev. 13; 1A, Rev. 10; 2, Rev. 11; 3, Rev. 3; 4, Rev. 12.

DL807E160TC, "Device List - System Elementary C34A", (6/15/78).

234A9304TC, "IDS - Feedwater Control System", Dated 7/6/73.

GEK-71337, "Instrumentation Manual for Vendor Supplied Instruments", (Feedwater Control System Device CVI Data), Volumes I, II, III, IV, V and VI.

22A3067, Rev. 3, "Mechanical Equipment Separation" System Design Specification, Dated 8/31/75.

22A7416, Rev. 0, "Electrical Equipment, Separation for Safeguards Systems" Design Specification, Dated 2/19/81.

22A3085, Rev. 3, "Remote Shutdown System" Design Specification, Dated 5/25/79.

22A3007, Rev. 1, "Engineering Safeguards Systems, Criteria for Testability of Instrumentation and Controls", 12/1/71.

22A8658, Rev. 1, "General Requirements for Motor Operated Valve Actuators", Dated 5/17/71.

GEK-71314, "Feedwater Control System, O and M Manual", Dated 9/78.

166B7135A, "Information Document - Feedwater Dynamic Analysis Data", Sheets: 1, Rev. C; 2, Rev. C; 3, Rev. C; 4, Rev. C; 5, Rev. C; 6, Rev. C; 7, Rev. C; 8, Rev. C; 9, Rev. C; 10, Rev. C; 10A, Rev. C; 11, Rev. C; 12, Rev. C; 13, Rev. C; 14, Rev. C; 15, Rev. C; 16, Rev. C; 17, Rev. C; 18, Rev. C

Burns and Roe Engineering Design Criteria, Section F, Table 7.4-3, Equipment Classifications.

22A3039, Rev. 1, "Process Instrumentation", 3/26/73, Design Specification Para. 4.2.2, 4.3.3, Figures 12, 1.8.10, Para. 4.2.4; 4.2.5.

22A3041, Rev. 1, "Essential Components", 3/14/77.

22A3746, Rev. 1, "Local Instrument Panels" Design Specification, 1/21/74.



22A3008, Rev. 5, "BWR Equipment Environmental Interface Data", (4/8/77), Design Specification.

239X241AD, "Feedwater Control System (Turbine Driven Reactor Feed Pumps) - Parts List", Rev. 10, Dated 6/4/80.

234A9301TC, Sheet 22, Rev. 1 (8/1/73), "IDS - Nuclear Boiler System".

22A3181AD, Rev. 0, "Flow Element (Main Steam Restrictor" System Design Specification and Data Sheet (11/13/73).

127D1835TC, Rev. 1 (7/19/73), "Main Steam Flow Instrument Panel A (H22-P015).

21A9387AB, Rev. 0, "IDS - Feedwater Control System - Turbine Drive" (9/17/71), Sheet 5.

21A9430, Rev. 0, "Main Steam Flow Element", (11/4/71).

22A2887AB, Rev. 4, Sheet 4, "Nuclear Boiler System Data Sheet" (1/10/75).

163C1029TC, "Piping Diagram - Main Steam Flow Instrument Panel A (H22-P015), Rev. 2 (7/22/77).

127D1845TC, Rev. 2 (7/22/77), "Connection Diagram - Main Steam Flow Instrument Panel A (H22-P015).

163C1183, Rev. 0, "Differential Pressure Transmitter Detail", 4/4/74.

127D1826TC, Rev. 4, "Arrangement, Reactor Vessel Level and Pressure Instrument Panel A (H22-P004)".

127D1814TC, Rev. 3, "Piping Diagram, Reactor Vessel Level and Pressure Instrument Panel A (H22-P004)".

127D1827TC, Rev. 2, "Electrical Diagram, Reactor Vessel Level and Pressure Instrument Panel A (H22-P004)".

117C-4928, Rev. B, "Feedwater Flow Meter Section - Purchased Part" (Shows C34-N001A, B as a double section in which each section is double flanged (flanged at both ends), dated 2/16/71.

761E443, Rev. 1, "Primary Steam Piping Nuclear Boiler - Purchased Part", Dated 2/8/70 (shows C34-N001A, B Specifications).

131C7598, Sheet 1, Rev. 1, "Flow Meter Section - Feedwater Control System", Dated 6/1/71 (C34-N001A, B specification drawing), shows C34N001A, B as a double section in which the sections are flanged together only. The outer ends are for welding.

21A9414, Rev. 1, "Feedwater Flow Meter Section" - Purchase Specific 1/7/71 (has calibration procedures and materials, etc. specification for C34-N001A and B) entire document.

21A9414AB, Rev. 2, "Feedwater Flow Section" - Purchase Specification Data Sheet, Dated 8/24/73, entire document.

328X154TC, Section A, Rev. 11, "Shipping Group Parts List - Nuclear Boiler Local Instrumentation".

238X178A1, Page 7, Rev. 22, "Nuclear Boiler System - Master Parts List" (shows B22-N041 temp. elements code, equipment and source classifications).

159C4520, Sheet 1, Rev. 6, "Temperature Element - Nuclear Boiler", (Details on B22-N041A or RFW-TE-41A).

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22A2887, Rev. 6, "Nuclear Boiler System", 1/29/79, Para. 4.11.3.3, Design Specification.

22A2718, Rev. 5, "Special Wire and Cable", 4/10/74, Para. 2.13.2, 2.13.4 (gives wiring type criteria and lead resistance criteria).

828E185TC, Rev. 4, "Arrangement, Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Temperature Recorder VB".

22A3041, Rev. 1, "Essential Components", 3/14/72, Design Specification.

22A8696, Rev. 1, "Seismic Requirements for Essential Class I Instrumentation", 3/7/78.

22A2702A, Rev. 1, "Seismic Design", 1/7/71, Design Specification.

22A3059, Rev. 1, "Cleaning of Piping and Equipment", 6/24/75.

248A9393, Rev. 0, "General Use, Controller Assembly Data Sheet".

GE-1, Feedwater Control System "Preoperational Test Instruction" (12/12/77), Rev. 0.

STI-23X, Feedwater Control System Tune-Up Procedure, "Startup Test Instructions" (6/10/81), Rev. 2.

GEZ-6894, "Hanford 2 Nuclear Power Station Control Systems Design Report", R. W. Polomik, S. T. Chow (2/80), Chapter 7.

22A4152, Rev. B, "Startup Test Program", Sht. 53 (shows Feedwater System Control response performance criteria).

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22A2801, Rev. 1, "GE Reactor System Heat Balance - Rated" System Design Specification, Dated 1/24/72.

22A2802, Rev. 1, "GE Reactor System Heat Balance - 105% of Rated" System Design Specification, Dated 1/24/72.

22A2800, Rev. 2, "Rated Steam Output Curve" Design Specification, Dated 1/9/79.

22A3148, Rev. 1, "Heat Balance, Reactor System - 105% of Rated" Information Document, Dated 1/9/79.

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P.O. 282-F9762, Rev. 0, "Temperature Element Product Quality Checklist", Dated 9/17/74

Burns and Roe Engineering Criteria Document, Rev. 11, 3/16/82 Section G. Instrumentation and Control, Section F Equipment Classification, Appendix 3, "WNP-2 Electrical Separation Practices", Rev. 1.

### D.3.2 Calculations

7.10.02, Rev. 3, "Flow Element Sizing Calculations", 10/26/76, Sheet 8.

Alden Research Laboratories Worchester Polytechnic Institute, "Calibration - Two 24" Flow Nozzle Assemblies, Serial Numbers N-1031, N-1032. The Permutit Company Purchase Order Number L-58671-1565", Dated October, 1974, (Calibration Data for C34-N001A and C34-N001B).

Vickery - Simms #BC-N-1005-5, Orifice Bore Calculations.

### D.3.3 Technical Memorandum

BRI Technical Memorandum 1010, "Operation of Feedwater Delivery System" (4/29/77), (with updated Exhibits and FE #166B7135A drawings).

BRI Technical Memorandum 667, "Feedwater Delivery System" (6/26/74).

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BRI Technical Memorandum 308, Rev. A, "System Description - Condensate/ Reactor Feed" (10/6/72).

### D.3.4 Manuals (Vendor)

Anchor Darling Valve Company, "Instrument Manual, Operator - Maintenance Instructions and Parts Catalog for WNP-2" (V-32A, B, V-10A, B), WPPSS CVI 0251B-00-75-1, 11/28/76.

Permutit Corporation Operating Instructions for C34-N001A and C34-N001B, Rev. 1, BRI AEF 02-11-0710.

Anchor Darling Co. Instruction Manual, Operator - Maintenance Instructions and Parts Catalog", CVI 02-41B-00, Sht. 75, Issue 1.

"Self Drag Flow Control Valve Operation and Maintenance Manual", Babcock and Wilcox CVI 02-42D-00, Sht. 12.

Woodward Governor Operation and Maintenance Manual Reactor Feedwater Turbines CVI 02-12-00, Sht. 16.

Fisher Technical Bulletin 62.1:546, dated 12/76, "Type 546, 546S and 546ST, Electro-Pneumatic Transducers.

### D.3.5 Drawings

#### Burns and Roe Drawings

##### Mechanical

M151, Rev. 0, "General Arrangement - Ground Floor Plan".

M152, Rev. 0, "General Arrangement - Mezzanine Floor Plan".

M153, Rev. 0, "General Arrangement - Operating Floor Plan".

M154, Rev. 0, "General Arrangement - Reactor Building and Miscellaneous Plans".

M502, Rev. 27, "Main and Exhaust Steam System, Turbine Generator Building".

M504, Rev. 36, "Flow Diagram, Condensate and Feedwater System".

M506, Rev. 28A, "Flow Diagram Miscellaneous Drains, Vents and Sealing Systems, Turbine Generator Building".

M509, Rev. 16, "Flow Diagram - Turbine Oil Purification and Transfer System, Turbine Generator Building".

M529, Rev. 28, "Nuclear Boiler System - Flow Diagram".

M610, Rev. 5, "Installation of Thermowells and Sample Probes".

M200, Sheet 335, Rev. 7, "Reactor Feedwater Piping, RFW Pumps to Reactor", 5/16/80.

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Sht. 64C, Rev. 7, "IR-64 Arrangement"

Sht. 64D, Rev. 4, "Connection Diagram IR-64"

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Sht. 12B, Rev. 4, "Inst. Rack IR-12 Arrangement"

Sht. 12C, Rev. 3, "Inst. Rack IR-12 Tubing Arrangement"

Sht. 12E, Rev. 2, "Inst. Rack IR-12 Wiring"

Sht. 12F, Rev. 4, "Inst. Rack IR-12 External Electrical Connections"

Sht. 12G, Rev. 0, "Inst. Rack IR-12 External Electrical Connections"

Sht. 12D, Rev. 5, "Inst. Rack IR-12 Tubing Arrangement Cont."

M619, Sht. 85, Rev. 5, "Inst. Rack IR-1B Connection Diagram"

Sht. 110, Rev. 4, "IR-12 Instrument Connection Diagram"

Sht. 112, Rev. 6, "IR-12 Instrument Connection Diagram"

Sht. 142, Rev. 9, "IR-64 Reactor Building Inst. Rack"

Sht. 104, Rev. 5, "Inst. Rack IR-9 Connection Diagram".

M621, Sht. 1, Rev. 5, "Panel/Console/Cabinet/Rack Classification List"

Sht. 4, Rev. 2, "Panel/Console/Rack List".

M620, Sht. 504-17, Rev. 0, "H.P. Heater Outlet Line M.O. Valve Control Logic Diagram"

Sht. 506-10, Rev. 1, "Reactor Feedwater Pump Turbine RFW-DT-1A Drain Valve Control Sch. and Logic Diagram".

M200-335, Rev. 7, "Reactor Feedwater Piping RFW Pumps to Reactors", 5/22/80.

M502, Rev. 27, "Flow Diagram - Main and Exhaust Steam System, T.G. Building", 2/25/83.

M504, Rev. 36, "Flow Diagram - Feedwater and Condensate System, T.G. Building", 1/14/83.

M506, Rev. 28A, "Flow Diagram - Misc. Drains, Vents and Sealing System T.G. Building", 1/28/83.

M509, Rev. 16, "Flow Diagram - Turbine Oil Purification and Transfer System T.G. Building", 12/10/82.

M529, Rev. 28, "Flow Diagram - Nuclear B1r. Main Steam System, Reactor Building", 3/4/83.

M610, Rev. 5, "Installation of Sample Probes and Thermowells", 10/25/82.

M617-12A, Rev. 6, "Instrument Rack IR-12 Legend", 5/26/82.

M617-12B, Rev. 4, "Dwg. Voided by PED 220-I-0772", 10/08/81.

M617-12C, Rev. 3, "Instrument Rack IR-12 Tubing Arrangement", 5/26/82.

M617-12D, Rev. 5, "Instrument Rack IR-12 Tubing Arrangement", 5/26/82.

M617-12E, Rev. 2, "Dwg. Voided by PED 220-I-0772", 11/13/81.

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M617-12G, Rev. 0, "Instrument Rack IR-12 External Electrical Connections".

M617-64A, Rev. 6, "Instrument Rack IR-64 Legend", 2/3/83.

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M619-85, Rev. 5, "IR-1B Reactor feed Pump 1B Instrument Rack", 3/14/83.

M619-142, Rev. 9, "IR-64 Reactor Building Instrument Rack El. 501'-0", Div. II", 3/14/83.

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##### D.5.4.1 Design Requirement References

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##### D.5.4.2 Calculations

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## SECTION E - SYSTEMS INTERACTIVE REVIEW REFERENCES

### E.1 Fire Protection

#### E.1.1 Specifications

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10CFR50, Appendix R.

APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A, Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear  
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2.07.03, Rev. 1, A.C. Motor Control Center Bus and Cable Sizing.

#### E.1.2 Technical Memorandum

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## E.2 Pipe Break/Missile Evaluation/Jet Impingement/Falling Objects/Flooding

### E.2.1 Specifications

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5.49.051, Rev. 1, Target Determination, Pipe Breaks Inside Containment, 12/17/82.

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5.51.051, Rev. 1, Target Resolution for Postulated Targets Outside Containment.

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TM 1151, Criteria for the Pipe Break and Missile Redundancy Evaluation Outside Primary Containment, 6/27/79.

E.2.4 Drawings

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E-550

E-551

Mechanical

M-519

M-520

M-521

M-523

M-529

M-530

M-543

M-557

Structural

S-794  
S-918  
S-1001, Rev. 10  
S-1000, Rev. 21  
S-783, Rev. 12  
S-1024, Rev. 2

Isometric

RWCU-895-8.12  
RWCU-894-14.21  
RWCU-277-1.3  
RWCU-895-1.7  
D220-X-106  
D220-X-108  
D-220-031.0-IR-68  
CEP-625-11.12  
M200 Sht. 129  
RCIC-664-1.7  
M200 Sheet 126  
M200 Sheet 128  
D220-7.1-X-78(e)  
EDR-571-4.5  
HPCS-630-31.33  
HPCS-630-29.30  
ED-A-9  
ED-A-16  
ED-A-6  
ED-A-5  
M-200, Sheet 2  
RHR-4434-1

Hanger

RWCU-181

RWCU-928N

RWCU-238

HPCS-64

HPCS-66

F20APKD500X4-C IR-RHR Pump Detail

238X178AD

239X527AD

239X241AD

238X201AD

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#### E.3.1 Calculations

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E.4.2 Calculations

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### E.5.1 Specifications

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### E.5.2 Drawings

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M 567, Rev. 7, Reactor Building General Arrangement

M 568, Rev. 23, Reactor Building General Arrangement

M 569, Rev. 23, Reactor Building General Arrangement

M 584, Rev. 6, Standby Service Water Pump House Arrangement

S 540, Rev. 8, Pump House Instrument Rack Supports

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E538-15VF-1, Rev. 0, Arrangement Drawing For IR-21

E538-15VF-2, Rev. 0, Arrangement Drawing For IR-22

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E538-16VF-3, Rev. 0, Arrangement Drawing For IR-26

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E538-19VF-1, Rev. 0, Arrangement Drawing For IR-64

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E538-19VF-3, Rev. 1, Arrangement Drawing For IR-66

E538-20VF-1, Rev. 1, Arrangement Drawing For IR-67

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E538-22VF-2, Rev. 0, Arrangement Drawing For IR-72

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IR-22	CVI 02-58-00-33-1; -2; -3	Rev. 1-31-78
IR-24	CVI 02-58-00-40-1; -2; 03	Rev. 12-5-77
IR-25	CVI 02-58-00-41-1; -2; -3	Rev. 1-31-78
IR-26	CVI 02-58-00-4-1; -2; -3	Rev. 1-31-78
IR-61	CVI 02-58-00-9-1; -2; -3	Rev. 1-31-78
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IR-63	CVI 02-58-00-20-1; -2; -3	Rev. 1-31-78
IR-64	CVI 02-58-00-22-1; -2; -3	Rev. 1-31-78
IR-65	CVI 02-58-00-10-1; -2; -3	Rev. 1-31-78
IR-66	CVI 02-58-00-13-1; -2; -3	Rev. 3-16-78
IR-67	CVI 02-58-00-24-1; -2; -3	Rev. 1-31-78
IR-68	CVI 02-58-00-11-1; -2; -3	Rev. 1-31-78
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IR-72 CVI 02-58-00-18-1; -2; -3 Rev. 3-16-78

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E.5.3 Other

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Pressure loads due to pipe break do not necessarily peak with pipe whip and jet impingement loads; however, in the analysis, they are considered to act simultaneously.

With regard to pipe break, when high energy pipes under pressure fail, a fluid jet is created. The associated jet impingement force on a target as well as the reaction force exerted on the piping by the fluid jet force have a time history qualitatively presented in Figure 3.6-118. This force is conservatively idealized as a step function load. For the fluid forces associated with these pipe failures, see Table 3.6-6.

To obtain a solution for the actual complex system, the structure is idealized by an equivalent single degree of freedom system (see Figure 3.6-119) following the procedures described by J. M. Biggs in Chapter 5 of "Introduction to Structural Dynamics" (Reference 3.6-1). The response of this mathematical idealization to a step function load (jet impingement) or to a step function load concurrently with an impact loading (due to whipping pipe) involves an energy transfer from the impacting object to the impacted structure. The following exposition on how this energy transfer is addressed makes use of procedures that have been presented by the Bechtel Corporation in its report on missile impact, Topical Report BC-TOP-9A, Revision 2 (Reference 3.6-13).

#### 3.6.1.6.3.2 Structural Response to Whipping Pipe Missile Impact Load

##### a. Discussion

A method of energy-balance procedures is utilized in order to evaluate the structural response, when a missile impacts a target. The method utilizes the strain energy of the target at maximum response to counteract the residual kinetic energy of the target or target missile combination that results from the missile impact.

A missile of mass  $M_m$  is postulated to strike a spring-backed target mass,  $M_e$ , with a velocity,  $V_s$ . Since the actual coupled mass during impact varies, an estimated average effective target mass,  $M_e$ , is used to evaluate the inertia effects during impact. The impact of the missile is considered plastic. This assumes that the missile remains in contact with the target after impact.



WHERE PIPING IS RESTRAINED AND BREAK SEPARATION IS LIMITED TO ONE HALF PIPE DIAMETER OR LESS A FAN JET IS POSTULATED. A FAN JET IS PERPENDICULAR TO THE PIPE CENTERLINE AND EXTENDS 360° AROUND THE BREAK AT A 10° HALF ANGLE AS SHOWN IN FIGURE 3.6-148. WNP-2

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The values of  $u_r$  should be less than the allowable ductility ratios,  $u$ , given in Table 3.6-1.

#### 3.6.1.6.3.3 Jet Impingement

Jet impingement loads are loads that emanate from a break in a high energy line. It is postulated that the characteristics of the jet are such that the jet exits from a break opening in the pipe equal in area to the cross sectional area of the pipe itself (see Figure 3.6-117). The jet is postulated to travel conforming to the configuration of the cross sectional area of the pipe for a distance of five pipe diameters and then to diverge at an angle of divergence of 10°. For the jet thrust forces at the postulated breaks, see Table 3.6-6. Jet loads impacting structures are treated as equivalent static loads. A dynamic load factor is applied to the jet force emanating from the pipe and the resulting load is modified by an appropriate load factor according to its use in combination with other loads. The structure impacted is then evaluated for structural capability.

#### 3.6.1.6.4 Allowable Design Stresses and Strains

For allowable design stresses and strains for reinforced concrete and structural steel, see 3.8.4.5 and Tables 3.8-12 and 3.8-17, except as modified in 3.6.1.6.4.1 and 3.6.1.4.2.

##### 3.6.1.6.4.1 Pipe Whip Loading With or Without Other Loads

The acceptability of pipe whip loading with or without other loads is considered from two aspects:

- a. The overall structural response of the impacted structural element
- b. The local damage sustained by the impacted structural element.

The overall structural response is considered acceptable if the ductility ratio resulting from the loading does not exceed the maximum allowable ductility ratios as given in Table 3.6-1. The determination of ductility ratios utilizes the procedures set forth in 3.6.1.6.3 and the loading combinations in 3.6.1.6.6. In using these procedures, the allowable limit on section strength,  $M$ , used in the determination of yield displacement  $X_e$ , (3.6.1.6.3.2e, Tables 3.6-9, 3.6-10 and Figure 3.6-120) is computed in accordance

electrical division to which the component belongs; what the function of the component is; the various references, such as the drawings, in which the component is found; devices interconnecting the component and another system; and additional information of this type. This coding facilitates storage of the input for retrieval at any time.

and

Table 3.6-6 lists the high energy design basis break locations outside containment, the piping subsystems involved, the pipe diameter, the plan figure showing the piping subsystem, the maximum blowdown thrust or the thrust versus time figure, ~~and the room or area containing the postulated pipe break. Figures 3.6-41a through 3.6-41h illustrate the high energy break locations outside containment.~~

Figures 3.6-12 through 3.6-36 illustrate and list the high energy break locations inside containment.

Moderate energy crack locations are postulated in accordance with Standard Review Plans 3.6.1 and 3.6.2.

#### 3.6.1.11.2 Method of Analysis for Postulated High Energy Fluid System Ruptures

##### 3.6.1.11.2.1 Effects of Postulated Passive Component Failures

Postulated pipe breaks in high energy fluid systems are investigated to determine their effects on the ability to bring the plant to a safe shutdown and to limit the offsite radiological consequences to an acceptable level as stated in 10CFR50.

On a case-by-case basis, the effects of pipe whip, jet impingement, and the resulting environmental conditions on safety-related equipment are evaluated. The effects of the postulated pipe break are dependent on the fluid properties of the system, the location and orientation of the pipe break, the proximity to safety-related systems, components, and structures, and the individual design limits of the safety-related systems, components, and structures.



### 3.6.1.11.3 Method of Analysis for Postulated Moderate Energy Fluid System Ruptures

#### 3.6.1.11.3.1 Approach

Postulated ruptures in moderate energy fluid systems do not generate pipe whip. The analysis investigates the effects of the environment which results from such a postulated rupture on safety-related equipment, including the effects of water spray.

The effects of the postulated moderate energy pipe cracks are dependent on the fluid properties, available fluid reservoir, drain systems, location of the safety-related equipment, components, and structures, and the individual design limits of the safety-related equipment, components, and structures.

Where moderate energy pipe cracks are postulated in close proximity to high energy systems, the environmental analysis compares the effects of both high and moderate energy pipe ruptures. The most limiting case is evaluated for safe cold shutdown.

Moderate energy pipe cracks are postulated according to the criteria in 3.6.2.1.

#### 3.6.1.11.3.2 Method of Analysis

The locations of all postulated ruptures, resulting in through wall leakage cracks, are identified for later retrieval. The analysis assumes that the spray resulting from a postulated moderate energy rupture causes the malfunction of all equipment not enclosed by watertight compartments.

Additionally, the most damaging single random active component failure in a system not effected by the postulated passive component failure is postulated. If the direct consequences of the passive component failure results in a turbine or reactor trip, then offsite power is assumed unavailable.

#### 3.6.1.11.4 Summary of Analysis

~~Some~~ *In those cases where the*  
 The analyses discussed in 3.6.1.11.2 and 3.6.1.11.3 ~~do not~~  
 identify ~~a~~ location where a postulated passive component

Impacted pipes of smaller nominal diameter than the impacting pipe are assumed to fail, regardless of wall thickness of impacted pipe. Impacted pipes of both larger nominal diameter and thinner wall thickness than the impacting pipe are assumed to develop through wall leakage cracks.

- c. Additionally, a single random active component not affected by a) and b) is assumed to malfunction. Should a) or b) result in a turbine generator or reactor trip, then offsite power is assumed unavailable.
- d. After a), b), and c) above have been evaluated, possible shutdown modes are analyzed. If shutdown is possible, the postulated passive component failure is not significant from a safety standpoint.
- e. Should alternate shutdown modes not be available then:
  1. Reroute or relocate cable, pipe, or equipment to prevent loss of function.
  2. If (1) is not feasible, shield the adversely affected component(s) to prevent loss of function.
- f. The flooding and environmental effects of moderate energy failure are evaluated to determine whether they are more severe than the high energy breaks and are addressed in 3.6.1.15.

The area temperature is evaluated by determining the limiting postulated pipe break and using RELAP4/MOD5 (Reference 3.6-21). The limiting pipe break for temperature analysis is that pipe break giving the highest energy release rate over the longest blowdown period.

The effects of flooding are evaluated by determining the limiting pipe break and calculating the effects of the fluid release. The limiting pipe break for flooding analysis is that pipe break with the highest mass flow rate over the longest blowdown period.

Peak differential pressure analysis results are provided in Table 3.6-12 and discussed in 3.6.1.20.

NO REVISIONS THIS PAGE

THE COMPONENT WAS RELOCATED OR PROTECTED  
IMPACTED A SAFETY RELATED COMPONENT WHICH

failure in a high or moderate energy system precluded the safe shutdown and cooling of the reactor. ~~Therefore, the ruptures in fluid piping systems, which are postulated, have no effect on the ability to bring the reactor to a cold shutdown condition.~~

This analysis by actual examination of the plant is undertaken to provide results based on as-built conditions.

Design drawings are used to supplement the study in cases where piping or equipment have not been installed. Prior to fuel load, a walkdown of the plant is performed to verify the results of the analysis and confirm that all design modifications have been implemented.

Piping layouts for areas containing high and moderate energy lines, whose failure can affect the performance of safety-related equipment, are presented as Figures 3.6-43 through 3.6-62, inclusive.

Section 3.6.1.11 discusses in detail <sup>the</sup> methods used to demonstrate that no single postulated passive component failure, in conjunction with a single active component failure, precludes safe shutdown of the plant.

The following should serve to further clarify the method of analysis:

- a. The forces developed at each postulated high energy pipe break are determined by the methods of 3.6.2.2. The effects of the resultant pipe whip and jet impingement are evaluated. Credit is taken for automatic isolation and operator action to mitigate the consequences of the postulated pipe break, if the equipment required for this function is not affected by the break or included in 3.6.1.11.4(c) below.
- b. As a first step, all equipment impacted by the whipping pipe or jet is assumed to fail. If the equipment is required for safe cold shutdown or accident mitigation, a detailed analysis is performed to determine if the equipment will actually fail. Structures contacted by the whipping pipe or jet are evaluated for structural adequacy by the methods of 3.6.2.2.



## 3.6.1.13 Electrical Equipment Environmental Qualifications

All electrical systems, necessary for safe shutdown and necessary to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition, are designed to remain functional in the general area environment resulting from a high energy line break or from leakage cracks in moderate energy piping. Specific equipment is either:

- a. Designed to remain functional as long as necessary in the general area environment.
- b. Isolated from the general area environment in compartments capable of maintaining normal equipment operating conditions.

Certain rotating equipment cannot be designed to function in the more severe, local steam environment. However, due to physical separation, rotating equipment, of not more than one subsystem, is exposed to the local conditions which exceed the general area accident environment. Required redundancy is thus maintained for safety equipment.

Refer to 3.11 for a more complete description of environmental design of electrical equipment.

## 3.6.1.13.1 Identification of Equipment

Safety equipment required to mitigate the consequences of an accident and place the reactor in a cold shutdown condition is listed in Table 3.11-2. The table also indicates the required duration, following an accident, which equipment is required to operate.

## 3.6.1.13.2 Environmental Design

Refer to 3.11 for a discussion of environmental design and an analysis of safety-related electrical components. The section identifies the safety-related equipment that must operate in a hostile environment, and Table 3.11-2 indicates the postulated environmental envelop conditions for both the general and local accident areas.


## 3.6.1.13.2 Jet Impingement Barriers

For results of the steam system study, see 3.6.1.11.4. Analysis indicates ~~jet impingement barriers are not required at WNP-2 since no postulated pipe break precludes reactor safe shutdown.~~ Some room walls, floors, and ceilings act as jet impingement barriers, however.

JET IMPINGEMENT BARRIERS HAVE BEEN PROVIDED WHERE

IN ADDITION,

TO PROTECT COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR



## 3.6.2.3.2 Jet Impingement Effect

## 3.6.2.3.2.1 Physical Separation

The physical separation of different essential systems and components is used to ensure that the plant retains function of sufficient essential systems to assure safe shutdown in the event of a postulated LOCA, and subsequent generation of a jet stream together with an additional single random active component failure and the loss of offsite power.

Where physical separation cannot be used to protect systems, a detailed analysis is performed to determine the effects of jet impingement on their operability. If necessary, barriers are provided to protect structures, systems, and components required for a safe shutdown, to prevent offsite radiological consequences, and to mitigate the effects of a LOCA.

## 3.6.2.3.2.2 Jet Impingement Evaluation

The evaluation of the adequacy of physical separation included the inspection of all essential systems and their components that are necessary to start, operate, and control the essential systems required for safe shutdown. The evaluation included the following:

- a. Review pipe break locations ~~inside primary containment~~, to provide conservative jet stream orientation and geometry. ✓
- b. Review effected equipment by both design drawing examination and plant walkdown.
- c. Review signals that result in the actuation of essential systems.
- d. Review signals that are necessary to be returned to inside primary containment, to activate the shutdown systems.
- e. Review availability of power that is required inside primary containment to operate the essential systems.
- f. Review mechanical engineered safety systems required for safe shutdown.




TABLE 3.5-12

SUMMARY OF SUBCOMPARTMENT PRESSURE ANALYSIS (a)

Compartment Where Break Occurs			Piping System	Differential Pressure			
Elevation (ft.)	Room Number	Description	Line Designation	Maximum Differential (psi)	Differential Between the Rooms	Time of the Peak (sec)	Design Pressure (psi)
442	R14/R113	RHR Pump Rooms	4" RCIC (13)-4	0.33	R14, R113/R206	0.33	0.50
				0.33	R14, R113/R12, R114	0.33	0.50
				0.33	R14, R113/R15, R112	0.33	0.50
422	R15/R112	RCIC Pump Room	4" RCIC (13)-14	0.51	R15, R112/R206	0.53	0.76
				0.51	R15, R112/R14, R113	0.53	0.76
				0.51	R15, R112/R6, R116	0.53	0.76
471	R206	El. 471' Open Floor Area	4" AS (11)-2	0.05	R206/R103, R105, R106, R305, R308, R310, R306, R315	0.35	0.08
				0.05	R206/R114, R113, R112	0.35	0.08
				0.05	R206/R116, R115		
501	R308	TIP Room	4" RCIC (13)-4	0.32	R308/R305, R206, R313	0.03	0.50
501	R308	TIP Room	6" RUCU (2)-4	0.48	R308/R305, R206, R313	0.35	0.60
501	R313	El. 510' Valve Room	6" RUCU (2)-4	0.41	R313/R308, R408	0.35	0.60
522	R404	El. 522' Open Floor Area	8" CRD (12)-3	0.03	R404/R305, R504, R508	0.04	0.05

NO REVISIONS THIS PAGE 3.5-94

(a) Table applies to reactor building secondary containment, exclusive of the main steam tunnel, tunnel ventway, and tunnel extension.





TABLE 3.6-11

DESIGN LOAD IN AREAS WHERE PIPING FAILURES OCCUR

Pipe Break Nos.	Room	Elev. (ft.)	Differential Pressure (psi)	Differential Temperature of		Live Load (psf)	Hung Loads (psf)		Equip. Loads (Kips)
				Int. to Int.	Int. to Ext.		From Floor	From Ceiling	
120-8 <del>8-10</del>	R 15	422	0.51	0°	40°	-	-	59	1.4 <sup>k</sup> Pump
120-4 <del>4</del>	R 113	441	0.33	0°	40°	250	59	68	None
120-5,6,7 <del>5-7</del>	R 112	441	0.51	0°	40°	250	59	68	None
139-3,4 <del>41-45</del>	R 206	471	0.05	0°	40°	250	32	34	None
120-1,2 <del>1-2</del>	R 313	510'-6"	0.48	0°	40°	250	40	30	None
128-11 <del>21, 22</del>									
128-10 <del>20</del>	R 408	522	1.0	0°	-	250	41	88	None
126-3,5 <del>13-15</del>	R 406	522	15.0	0°	-	250	126	0	1.5 <sup>k</sup> Pump
129-47,48 <del>30-34</del>	R 407	535	11.0	0°	-	250	40	80	None
126-1,2 <del>11, 12</del>	R 409	535	11.0	0°	-	250	40	80	None
129-39,41,42,43,44 <del>23-29</del>									
129-48,52 <del>5</del>									
144-27,28 <del>60, 61</del>	R 511	548	4.4	20°	-	400	80	55	None
144-32,65 <del>6</del>									
126-6,7 <del>16-18</del>	R 510	548	1.8	20°	-	400	65	51	Heat Exchs.
128-7,8 <del>55-57</del>									
142-20,21,22,23 <del>55-57</del>									16.2 & 29.5
144-29,31 <del>52-61</del>									
128-9 <del>19</del>	R 509	548	2.1	20°	-	400	88	50	None
139-1 <del>40, 47</del>	R 604	572	0.03	0°	40°	250	15	36	Heat & Vent Unit 51K
148-1,2,3,5,6,7, 8,9,10,11,12 <del>49, 70</del>									
<del>90-04</del>	<del>R 564</del>	<del>540</del>	<del>0.90</del>	<del>0°</del>	<del>40°</del>	<del>400</del>	<del>59</del>	<del>15</del>	<del>None</del>
120-6 <del>4</del>	R 308	501	0.41	0°	40°	1000	63	55	None
Steam Tunnel	R 310	501	20.0	20°	-	1000	277	41	None

TABLE 3.6-6

- NOTES: 1. For location of pipe break nos., see Figures 3.6-13 through 3.6-50.  
2. For vertical and horizontal seismic factors, see 3.7.





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



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


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




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
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







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



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WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM  
 NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2

MODERATE ENERGY FLUID PIPING SYSTEM  
 RUPTURE LOC. PLAN @ EL. 422'-3"

FIGURE  
 3.6-42






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
WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM  
 NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2

MODERATE ENERGY FLUID PIPING SYSTEM  
 RUPTURE LOC. PLAN @ EL. 441'

FIGURE  
 3.6-42








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WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM  
 NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2

MODERATE ENERGY FLUID PIPING SYSTEM  
 RUPTURE LOC. PLAN @ EL. 471'

FIGURE  
 3.6-42c




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 NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2

MODERATE ENERGY FLUID PIPING SYSTEM  
 RUPTURE LOC. PLAN @ EL. 501'


FIGURE  
 3.6-42





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WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2	MODERATE ENERGY FLUID PIPING SYSTEM RUPTURE LOC. PLAN @ EL. 522'	FIGURE 3.6-42
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


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WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM  
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MODERATE ENERGY FLUID PIPING SYSTEM  
 RUPTURE LOC. PLAN @ EL. 548'

FIGURE  
 3.6-421




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MODERATE ENERGY FLUID PIPING SYSTEM  
 RUPTURE LOC. PLAN @ EL. 572'

FIGURE  
 3.6-4




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WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM  
 NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2


MODERATE ENERGY FLUID PIPING SYSTEM  
 RUPTURE LOC. PLAN @ EL. 606'-10 1/2"

FIGURE  
 3.6-42




(B) Jet From Circumferential Break with Ends Restrained  
(FAN JET)





- KEY:  
 (RC1) = TYPICAL BREAK LOCATION  
 RCR1 = TYPICAL RESTRAINT DESIGNINATION  
 SUFFIX "LL" INDICATES LONGITUDINAL BREAK  
 \* INDICATES LOOP A ONLY
- NOTES: (1) THIS FIGURE REPRESENTS LOOP A. LOOP B IS SIMILAR EXCEPT AS NOTED.  
 (2) SEE FIGURE 3.6-35b FOR RESTRAINT-BREAK LOCATION CORRELATION AND BREAK TYPES.  
 (3) ONLY THOSE RESTRAINTS THAT MAY ACT DURING THE POSTULATED BREAKS ARE SHOWN.



Due 6/6/83

BURNS AND ROE S A R CHANGE NOTICE  
(BRSCN)

Part I SAR section(s) affected: 3.6  
Ref: WPBP-RO-83-11.3  
SS - SCN 82-175

Part II Description of Need for Amendment: Review of concern with  
proposed changes due to New South  
Pipe Break Analysis made by Supply  
System and H.E.

Part III Are there any new commitments in change: YES  NO

Identify: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

See attached pages for proposed revisions. Attach supporting documentation for information.

Part IV Approvals

Approvals indicate authorization to submit the proposed change to the client. Differing viewpoints should be resolved as much as possible before sign-off. Resolution of conflict should be explained in remarks.

	<u>Signature</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Licensing Lead	<u>J.L. Brown</u>	<u>6/8/83</u>	<u>SEE FIGURE 35A</u> <u>See comments on page</u> <u>22 TELECON W/ D. BOST =</u> <u>BIR &amp; SS CONCUR WITH</u> <u>WRITE-UP.</u>
Group Supervisor	_____	_____	_____
Other	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>6/10/83</u>	_____
Appropriate Licensing Eng. or Sup.	_____	_____	_____
Project Licensing Supervisor	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>6/15/83</u>	_____

For  
INFO

Washington Public Power Supply System

P.O. Box 968 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington 99352 (509) 372-5000

May 26, 1983  
WPBR-RO-83-163  
NS-L-02-JCA-83-050

Mr. J. A. Forrest  
Project Manager  
Burns and Roe, Inc.  
601 Williams Blvd.  
Richland, WA 99352


Dear Mr. Forrest:

Subject: CHANGES DUE TO NEW LOADS PIPE  
BREAK ANALYSIS (SCN 82-175 ATTACHED)

Please review and concur with the attached SCN 82-175 for incorporation into the Supply System's final amendment into the WNP-2 FSAR. The subject SCN also includes revisions to the FSAR by General Electric.

Please respond by June 8, 1983.


Very truly yours,



L.T. Harrold  
Assistant Director,  
WNP-2 Engineering

JCA/mt  
Attachment

cc: WS Chin - BPA  
~~WG Conn~~ B&R RO-2  
AI Cygelman - B&R Site  
AN Kugler - B&R Site  
TA Mangelsdorf - BECH  
N Powell - BECH  
JJ Verderber - B&R NY  
WNP-2 Files  
M Ouer - B&R HAPO



SAR CHANGE NOTICE

SAR Section(s) Affected: 3.6 3.12

Description of Change: Changes due to New  
Load Pipe Buck Analysis

Reasons for Change: \_\_\_\_\_

This SCN satisfies OCI Log Commitment No.: N/A

This SCN commits to the following: \_\_\_\_\_

This SCN will be incorporated into Amendment No.: 31

See attached pages for original and/or revised SAR Section(s).

Approvals: Signature indicates authorization to file the subject change into an amendment.


	Signature	Date	Remarks
Lead Technical Reviewer(s) LTRs	<u>JMBor</u> *	<u>3/29/83</u>	<u>includes revisions provided by LAN'S</u>
<u>W. K. Stockdale</u>	<u>W.K. Stockdale</u> **	<u>3/30/83</u>	<u>51 &amp; 70</u> <u>Page 3.6-52, JUST ABOVE PAR. REF TO 3.12.13 SHOULD BE TO 3.12.33</u>
Project <sup>Engry.</sup> Licensing Manager	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>4/6/83</u>	
Plant Operations Manager	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>4/15/83</u>	
Project <sup>Licensing</sup> Engineering Manager	<u>[Signature]</u>		
Project QA Manager*	<u>N/A</u>		

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29  
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\*Applicable only for changes affecting Quality Assurance.

de \* Forward to BFI for concurrence and incorporation into final write up

\* \* Note GE revisions on page 3.6-23



500 32-175  
Rosalind

GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.  
NUCLEAR POWER SYSTEMS DIVISION

LICENSING ACTION NOTICE  
WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2

Notice # 70 Rev. 0

Transmittal Date: February 12, 1983

Responds to: Letter from David Basi 12-2-82

SUBJECT: New-Load Pipe Joint Analysis

FSAR: 3.6 and 3.12 Reference LAN #51

NRC Question #: \_\_\_\_\_

ACTION REQUIRED:

*Cirily*  
**RECEIVED**  
MAR 4 - 1983

R. M. NELSON  
MANAGER  
WNP-2 PROJECT LICENSING

*Attached are marked up copies of pages from the FSAR. These changes are in answer to questions from Mr. David Basi.*

*In response to your question on section 3.6.2.5.3.5; "Aren't the cases of Table 6.3-7 bounding? Therefore, this statement is moot. Suggest this be revised to reflect that Table 6.3-7 lists the bounding cases."; Table 6.3-7 cases are not bounding. The writeup in section 3.6.2.5.3.5 should be left as transmitted in LAN #51.*

Submitted by P. B. Kingston Date 2-12-83

Reviewed by A. F. DeVault Date 2/23/83

Approved by F. A. MacLean Date 2/23/83

- Distribution:
- 1. Licensing Eng. 682
  - 2. Projects 394
  - 3. WPPSS (Original)
  - 4. Burns & Roe (R.O.)



GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.  
NUCLEAR POWER SYSTEMS DIVISION

LICENSING ACTION NOTICE  
WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2

Notice # 51 Rev. \_\_\_\_\_

Transmittal Date: August 12, 1982

Responds to: N/A

SUBJECT: New Loads Pipe Break Analysis

FSAR: Sections 3.6, 3.12

NRC Question #: N/A

**ACTION REQUIRED:**

Attached are the recommended FSAR changes of Section 3.6 and 3.12 to reflect the New Loads Pipe Break Analysis.

Please Note: Ge recommends that Burns & Roe review Section 3.6.2.5.3.6, items a,b,c for consistency with Section 6.2.4. It may be preferable to replace the write-up here with a reference to Section 6.2.4.

7-298' 925-2914

Submitted by L. E. Santos Date Aug. 11, 1982  
L. E. Santos (Licensing Engineer)

- Distribution:
- 1. Licensing Eng. 52.
  - 2. Projects 39.
  - 3. WPPSS (Original)
  - 4. Burns & Roe (R.O.)


Reviewed by A. F. DeVault Date 8/13/82  
A. F. DeVault (Project Engineer)

Approved by F. A. MacLean Date 8/13/82  
F. A. MacLean (Project Manager)

LS:hmc/1615  
8/13/81

*Curry*  
**RECEIVED**  
AUG 17 1982

R. M. NELSON  
MANAGER  
WPPSS PROJECT LICENSING



3.6.2 DETERMINATION OF BREAK LOCATIONS FOR DYNAMIC EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE POSTULATED RUPTURE OF PIPING

Information concerning postulated break and crack location criteria and methods of analysis for evaluating the dynamic effects associated with postulated breaks and cracks in high and moderate energy fluid system piping inside and outside of primary containment is presented in this section. The information presented in this section, and in 3.6.1, confirms that the requirements for the protection of structures, systems, and components relied upon for safe reactor shut-down, or to mitigate the consequences of a postulated pipe break, have been met.

3.6.2.1 Criteria Used to Define Break and Crack Location and Configuration

The following section establishes the criteria for the location and configuration of postulated breaks and cracks in high energy and moderate energy piping systems both inside and outside of primary containment.

High-energy fluid systems are defined as those systems, or portions of systems, that during normal plant conditions (a) are maintained pressurized under conditions where either one or both of the following are met:

- a. Maximum temperature exceeds 200°F
- b. Maximum pressure exceeds 275 psi;

Moderate energy fluid systems are defined as those systems, or portions of systems, that during normal plant conditions are pressurized under both of the following conditions:

- a. Maximum temperature is 200°F or less.
- b. Maximum pressure is 275 psig or less.

(a) Normal plant conditions is defined as the plant operating conditions during reactor startup, operation at power, ~~for~~ <sup>hot</sup> ~~reactor cold shutdown, but excluding test modes. Since~~ ~~hot standby occurs less than one percent of the total operating time, this condition is excluded from consideration of high energy piping.~~ <sup>standby</sup>

COOL-DOWN TO

BRI! → Please review for compatibility with your pipe analysis

3.6-23

*supply for Dem-1*  
 We prefer to leave the definition of normal plant conditions as it is accepted (i.e. no changes) however, if the words "hot standby" are inserted, the last sentence should remain incorporated to the hot standby mode.

Piping systems are classified as moderate-energy systems, when they operate as high energy piping for only short periods in performing their system function. For the major operational period they qualify as moderate-energy fluid systems. An operational period is considered "short" if the total fraction of time that the system operates, within the pressure-temperature conditions specified for high-energy fluid system, is less than approximately two percent of the time period that the system operates as a moderate energy fluid system, or less than one percent of the normal operating life span of the plant.

A postulated pipe break is defined as a sudden, gross failure of the pressure boundary either in the form of a complete circumferential severance (guillotine break), or as development of a sudden longitudinal ~~uncontrolled~~ crack (longitudinal split). These are postulated for high energy fluid systems only. For moderate energy fluid systems, pipe LEAKAGE rupture is confined to postulation of ~~contained~~ cracks in piping and branch runs. These cracks affect the surrounding environmental conditions only, and do not cause jet impingement or uncontrolled whipping of the pipe.

A moderate energy piping system crack is not postulated simultaneously with a high energy piping system break, nor is any pipe break or crack outside containment postulated concurrently with a pipe break or crack inside containment.

Postulated pipe break locations are selected as described herein; and are based on the guidelines provided in Regulatory Guide 1.46, Rev. 0; the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Branch Technical Position APCS 3-1, Appendix B; and as expanded in NRC Branch Technical Position MEB 3-1 for piping inside and outside primary containment.

#### 3.6.2.1.1 Postulated Pipe Break Locations in High Energy Fluid System Piping Not in the Containment Penetration Area

Pipe breaks (not including leakage cracks) are postulated at locations as indicated below:

## 3.6.2.1.1.1 Postulated Pipe Break Locations in ASME Section III Class 1 Piping Runs

- a. The terminal ends(a) of the pressurized portions of the run.
- b. Intermediate locations of postulated pipe breaks are selected by application of one of the following sets of rules:
  - (1) Pipe break is postulated at each location of significant change in flexibility, such as pipe fittings (elbows, tees and reducers), and circumferential connections to valves and flanges.
  - (2) Based on stress and fatigue analysis, as calculated according to ASME Code Section III Sub-article NB-3600, no break is postulated if any of the following applies:
    - (a)  $S_n$ (b) does not exceed  $2.4S_m$ (c)
    - (b)  $S_n$  exceeds  $2.4S_m$  but does not exceed  $3S_m$ , and the Cumulative Usage Factor (U)(d) does not exceed 0.1

---

(a) Terminal ends are extremities of piping runs that connect to structures, equipment, or pipe anchors that ~~are assumed to~~ act as rigid constraints to free thermal expansion of piping. A branch connection to a main piping run is a terminal end for a branch run, except when the nominal size of the branch is at least one half that of the main piping run, and the branch and main runs are modeled as a common piping system during the piping stress analysis.

- (b)  $S_n$  is the primary, plus secondary stress intensity range, as calculated by use of Equation (10) of ASME Code Section III Subsection NB, Paragraph NB 3653.1 between any two load sets (including the zero load set) for normal and upset plant conditions, including an OBE event transient.
- (c)  $S_m$  is the design stress intensity, as described in ASME Code Section III Subsection NB Paragraph NB 3229.
- (d) U is the Cumulative Usage Factor that indicates the total fatigue damage as calculated by the procedure in ASME Code Section III Subsection NB, Paragraph NB 3653.

(c)  $S_n$  exceeds  $3S_m$  but  $S_e$  (e) and  $S_r$  (f) are each less than  $2.4S_m$ , and  $U$  does not exceed 0.1

- c. When two or more intermediate locations cannot be determined by stress or usage factor limits as described above, then intermediate locations of significant change in flexibility are chosen as postulated pipe rupture locations on a reasonable basis for each piping run (a) or branch run (b) as necessary to provide protection. A reasonable basis as used herein considers the locations of highest computed value of stress,  $S_n$ . Cumulative usage factor is also considered. As a minimum, two intermediate locations are chosen for each piping run or branch run, except for a piping run having only one change in direction in which case only one intermediate break is postulated. Intermediate breaks are not postulated in sections of straight pipe, where there are no pipe fittings, valves, or flanges.

- 
- (e)  $S_e$  is the nominal value of expansion stress as calculated by use of Equation (12) of ASME Code Section III Subsection NB, Paragraph NB 3653.6(a).
- (f)  $S_r$  is the range of primary plus secondary membrane plus bending stress intensity, excluding thermal bending and thermal expansion stresses as calculated by use of Equation (13) of ASME Code Section III Subsection NB.
- (a) A piping run is defined as piping which interconnects equipment such as pressure vessels, pumps, and other equipment that act as rigid constraints to free thermal expansion of piping.
- (b) A branch run is defined as differing from a pipe run only in that it originates at a piping intersection as a branch of the main pipe run, except that branch lines which are included with main run piping in the stress analysis computer mathematical model and are shown to have significant effect on the main run behavior are considered part of the main run.

Piping and electrical penetration details are discussed and shown in 3.8.6.

The stress criteria for postulating breaks in containment penetration piping between isolation valves is given in 3.6.2.1.2.1 and 3.6.2.1.2.2.

Welded attachments, for pipe supports or other purposes, to these portions of piping are avoided except where detailed stress analyses, or tests, are performed to demonstrate compliance with the limits of 3.6.2.1.2. In addition, the number of circumferential and longitudinal piping welds and branch connections are minimized.

Any pipe anchors or restraints (e.g., connections to containment penetrations and pipe whip restraints) are designed such that they are not welded directly to the outer surface of the piping except where such welds are 100 percent volumetrically examinable while in service, and a detailed stress analysis is performed to demonstrate compliance with the limits of 3.6.2.1.2.

Tunnel structures surrounding the primary containment penetration piping are designed for the thermal and pressure loads of a through-wall leakage crack regardless of crack postulation requirements. Refer to 3.6.1.20 for further discussion.

Access for inservice inspection of welds in high energy (hot type) containment penetration assemblies is described in 3.8.6.1.1. All required inservice inspection locations are accessible.

*Through Wall*

3.6.2.1.3 Postulated Leakage Crack Locations in High and Moderate Energy Fluid Systems

In high energy piping systems consisting of ASME Code Section III Class 1 piping, (including fluid system piping between primary containment isolation valves) cracks are not postulated, ~~provided the primary plus secondary stress intensity range,  $S_{II}$ , does not exceed  $1.2 S_m$ , for transients resulting from normal plant conditions. There are no moderate energy piping systems consisting of ASME Code Section III Class 1 piping. *for example, no cracks are postulated in the recirculation piping system.*~~

In high energy and moderate energy piping systems consisting of ASME Code Section III Class 2 and 3 piping and moderate energy non-nuclear piping, including fluid system piping between primary containment isolation valves, cracks are not

April 1980

postulated provided the stress range of  $0.4 (1.2S_h(a) + S_A(b))$  is not exceeded for the load combination which includes the effects of pressure, weight, other sustained loads and occasional loads such as the operating basis earthquake, and thermal expansion loads. Since all piping in structures housing safety-related systems are supported and controlled as Seismic Category I systems regardless of service, the criteria for postulated cracks is the same as above for all systems.

3.6.2.1.4 Types of Breaks and Cracks Postulated in High Energy and Moderate Energy Fluid System Piping

3.6.2.1.4.1 Breaks in High Energy Fluid System Piping

The following types of breaks are postulated in high energy fluid system piping:

- a. No breaks need be postulated in piping having a nominal diameter less than, or equal to one inch.
- b. Circumferential breaks are postulated only in piping exceeding a one inch nominal pipe diameter.
- c. Longitudinal splits are postulated only in piping having a nominal pipe diameter equal to or greater than 4 inches.
- d. Longitudinal splits are not postulated at terminal ends.
- e. At each of the postulated break locations, consideration is given to the occurrence of either a longitudinal split or circumferential break. Both types of breaks are considered, if the maximum stress ranges in the circumferential and axial directions are not significantly different. Only one type break is considered as follows:


(a)  $S_h$  is the allowable stress at maximum (hot) temperatures defined in ASME Code Section III, Article NC 3611.2

(b)  $S_A$  is the allowable stress range for thermal expansion, as defined in ASME Code Section III, Article NC 3611.2.



- (2) If this type of analysis indicates that the maximum stress range, in the circumferential direction, is at least 1.5 times that in the axial direction, only a longitudinal split is postulated.
- f. Where break locations are selected without the benefit of stress calculations, circumferential breaks are postulated at the piping welds to each fitting, valve or welded attachment. Postulated longitudinal splits are described in FSAR 3.6.2.1.4.1.i.
  - g. For a longitudinal split, the break area is assumed to be equal to cross-sectional flow area of the pipe.
  - h. For circumferential breaks, pipe whipping is assumed to occur in the plane defined by the piping configuration, and is assumed to cause pipe movement in the direction of the jet reaction.
  - i. A longitudinal break is assumed to result in an axial split without severance and to be oriented at any point about the circumference of the pipe, or alternately, at the point(s) of highest stress as indicated by a detailed stress analysis. If a postulated break location is at a non-axisymmetric fitting, such as a tee or elbow, the split is assumed to be oriented (but not concurrently) on each side of the fitting at its center, perpendicular to the plane of the fitting and is assumed to cause pipe movement in the direction of the jet reaction.
  - j. For a circumferential break, the dynamic force of the jet discharge at the break location is based upon the effective cross-sectional flow area of the pipe and on a calculated fluid pressure, as modified by an analytically or experimentally determined thrust coefficient. A circumferential break is assumed to result in pipe severance with full separation, except as limited by structural design features. The break is assumed to be oriented perpendicular to the

AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST A  
ONE PIPE DIAMETER LATERAL  
DISPLACEMENT OF THE  
RUPTURED PIPING SECTIONS.



longitudinal axis of the pipe. Line restrictions, flow limiters, and the absence of energy reservoirs are accounted for, in the calculation of the design jet discharge.

#### 3.6.2.1.4.2 Cracks in High Energy and Moderate Energy Fluid System Piping


The following controlled, through-wall leakage cracks, are postulated in high energy and moderate energy fluid systems (or portion of systems):

- a. Cracks are postulated in fluid systems or portions of systems whose size exceeds a nominal pipe diameter of one inch.
- b. Fluid flow, from the postulated crack, is based on a circular opening of area equal to that of a rectangle one-half pipe-diameter in length and one-half pipe wall thickness in width.
- c. The flow from the postulated crack is assumed to result in an environment that wets all unprotected components within the compartment, with subsequent flooding in the compartment and communicative compartments. Flooding effects are determined on the basis of a conservatively estimated time period required to affect corrective action.

#### 3.6.2.1.5 Protection Criteria for the Effects of Pipe Break

Protection from the effects of a whipping pipe due to a pipe break is provided where necessary. Protection from pipe whip need not be provided if any one of the following conditions exists:

- a. The piping is classified as moderate energy piping.
- b. Following a single postulated pipe break, piping for which the unrestrained movement of either end of the ruptured pipe, in the direction of the jet reaction about a plastic hinge, formed within the piping, cannot impact any structure, system or component important to safety.



(1) The transient forcing functions, <sup>OCCUR</sup> at points along the pipe ~~result~~ from the propagation of waves (wave thrust) along the pipe, and <sup>AT THE BROKEN</sup> from the reaction force due to the momentum <sup>END</sup> of the fluid leaving the end of the pipe (blowdown thrust).

(2) The waves cause various sections of the pipe to be loaded with time-dependent forces. It is assumed that the pipe is one-dimensional in that there is no attenuation or reflection of the pressure waves at bends, elbows, and the like. Following the rupture, a decompression wave is assumed to travel from the break at a speed equal to the local speed of sound within the fluid. Wave reflections ~~will occur at the break end, change in~~ <sup>direction of piping,</sup> and the pressure vessel <sup>END</sup> until a steady flow condition is established. ~~Vessel and free-space~~ <sup>AND VESSEL</sup> conditions are used as boundary conditions. The blowdown thrust causes a reaction force perpendicular to the plane of the pipe break, <sup>REACHING A FINAL STEADY STATE</sup> VALUE.

(3) The initial blowdown force on the pipe is taken as the sum of the wave and blowdown thrusts and is equal to the vessel pressure ( $P_0$ ) times the break area ( $A$ ). After the initial decompression period (i.e., the time it takes for a wave to reach the first change in direction), the force is assumed to drop off to the value of the blowdown thrust (i.e.,  $0.7 P_0 A$ ).

(4) Time histories of transient pressure, flow rate, and other thermodynamic properties of the fluid can be used to calculate the blowdown force on the pipe using the following equation:


$$F = \left\{ (P - P_a) + \frac{\rho u^2}{g} \right\} A$$

where:

$F$  = Blowdown Force

$P$  = Pressure at exit plane

82-175



*no change*

- $P_a$  = Ambient pressure  
 $u$  = Velocity at exit plant  
 $\rho$  = Density at exit plane  
 $A$  = Area of break  
 $g$  = Gravitational constant

- (5) Following the transient period, a steady-state period is assumed to exist. Steady-state blowdown forces are calculated, considering frictional effects. For saturated steam, these effects reduce the blowdown forces from the theoretical maximum of  $1.26 P_o A$ . The method of accounting for these effects is presented in Reference 3.6-3. For sub-cooled water, a reduction from the theoretical maximum of  $2.0 P_o A$  is found through the use of Bernoulli's and other standard equations, such as Darcy's equation, which account for friction.
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*STET*  
*STET*  
*THE RESULTS*  
*LATTON STS*

- b. The following is an alternate method for calculating blowdown forcing functions.

The computer code RELAP3 (Reference 3.6-9) is used to obtain exit plane thermodynamic states for postulated ruptures (see 3.12.11 for further discussion of RELAP3). Specifically, RELAP3 calculates exit pressure, specific volume and mass rate. From these data the blowdown reaction load is calculated using the following relation:

$$\frac{T}{\lambda_2} = P_2 - P_o + \frac{G_2^2 \bar{V}_2}{g_c}$$

$$R = - \frac{T}{\lambda_2} = \lambda_2$$

where:

$$\frac{T}{\lambda_2} = \text{thrust per unit break area}$$

$P_E$  - exit pressure

$P_r$  - receiver pressure

$G_E$  - exit mass flux

$\bar{V}_E$  - exit specific volume

$g_c$  - gravitational constant

$R$  - Reaction force on the pipe

### 3.6.2.2.2 Analytical Methods to Define Response Models

#### 3.6.2.2.2.1 General Description of Analytical Methods

The prediction of time-dependent and steady-thrust reaction loads caused by blowdown of sub-cooled, saturated, and two-phase fluid from a ruptured pipe, is used in the design of piping systems and in the evaluation of dynamic effects of pipe breaks. A detailed discussion of the analytical methods employed to compute these blowdown loads are given in 3.6.2.2.1. The analytical methods used to account for this loading are discussed below.


#### 3.6.2.2.2.2 Dynamic Analysis of the Effects of Pipe Rupture

##### a. Criteria

- (1) Analysis is performed for each postulated pipe break.
- (2) The analysis includes the dynamic response of all components of the system including the pipe, pipe whip restraints and all structures required to transmit loading to foundation. The structures are analyzed for a suddenly applied force in conjunction with impact and rebound effects due to gaps between piping and pipe whip restraints.



- (3) The analytical model adequately represents the mass/inertia and stiffness properties of the system.
- (4) Pipe whipping is assumed to occur in the plane defined by the piping geometry and configuration, and to cause pipe movement in the direction of the jet reaction.
- (5) Piping contained within the broken loop, is no longer considered part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). Plastic deformation in the pipe is considered as a potential energy absorber. Limits of strain are imposed ~~which are similar to strain~~ *pipe whip* <sup>✓</sup> ~~levels allowed in restraint plastic mem~~ *material* <sub>(see 3.6.2.2:3.2)</sub> ~~bars~~. Piping systems are designed so that plastic instability ~~does~~ *would* not occur in the pipe at the design dynamic and static loads, unless damage studies are performed which show that the consequences ~~do~~ *could* not result in the direct damage of any essential system or component. ✓
- (6) Components, such as vessel safe ends and valves, which are attached to the broken piping system and do not serve a safety function or whose failure would not further escalate the consequences of the accident, are not designed to meet ASME Code requirements for essential components under faulted loading. However, if these components are required for safe shutdown, or if they serve a safety function to protect the structural integrity of an essential component, then these components are designed to Code limits for faulted conditions and to ensure operability. *the limits necessary to* ✓



## b. Analytical Models

- (1) Lumped-Parameter Analysis Model: Lumped mass points are interconnected by springs to take into account for the effects of inertia and stiffness inherent in the system, and time histories of the responses are computed by numerical integration to account for gaps and inelastic effects. This analytical method is discussed in detail in Reference 3.6-4.
- (2) Energy-Balance Analysis Model: Kinetic energy, generated during the first quarter cycle movement of the ruptured pipe as imparted to the piping/restraint system through impact, is converted into equivalent strain energy. Deformations of the pipe and the restraint are compatible with the level of absorbed energy.
- (3) Pipe whip restraints, for the reactor recirculation system, are designed by the NSSS supplier. The analytical method utilized for this design is the computer program PDA which is described in Reference 3.6-4 and further discussed in 3.12.33. Pipe whip restraints for all other piping systems, requiring such protection, are designed by the architect/engineer; The method described in c., (below) is utilized for this pipe whip restraint design. P  
t

## c. Simplified Dynamic Analysis

- (1) In order to simplify dynamic analysis the following conservative assumptions are utilized:
- (a) The entire structure including pipe, restraint linkage, support beams and major structure to foundation connections absorb energy by elastic, elasto-plastic, or plastic deformation. In order to provide a simplified dynamic mathematical model, one member is generally considered to absorb all the energy. This member is classified as an energy

Reference 3.6-6 provides the ductility ratio that corresponds to collapse ( $\mu_c$ ). For structural steel members, these values vary, with upper limits in the order of 20 to 30 and up (for very ductile structures). For WNP-2, the maximum permissible ductility ratio is limited to 50% of ( $\mu_c$ ), except that energy absorbing members in direct contact with primary containment are limited to 5% of ( $\mu_c$ ). For WNP-2, only steel members are utilized as energy absorbing members, as defined in 3.6.2.3.3.2.d. The maximum values of ( $\mu_c$ ), for various structural components, are given in Table 3.6-1.

- (i) The equation derived in Figure 3.6-2 accounts for a suddenly applied, constantly maintained force, in conjunction with a kinetic energy of impact on the resisting member. Total transfer of energy is implied. This is combined with the constantly maintained force (from ruptured piping blowdown) on the restraint structure. This assumption is consistent with a zero coefficient of restitution (full plasticity), and is a conservative assumption.

With regard to rebound, it should be noted that, if a coefficient of restitution of unity is assumed (full rebound), there is zero kinetic energy transfer to the restraint structure.

If a coefficient of restitution less than unity is assumed (partial rebound), there is a partial amount of kinetic energy transfer to the restraint structure.

A coefficient of restitution of zero, conservatively assumed in the application of the equation mentioned above,

gives zero rebound with 100% kinetic energy transfer to the restraint structure.

It should also be noted, that the assumption of a suddenly applied, constantly maintained force, as used in the equation mentioned above is conservative with respect to rebound. Rebound implies a finite time of short duration contact with the restraint structure, in contrast to the infinite time assumed.

- (3) Actual structural resistance, for the above structures, is determined by methods of limit analysis using a dynamic yield strength, as defined in 3.6.2.2.3.1.

### 3.6.2.2.3 Material Properties Under Dynamic Loads

#### 3.6.2.2.3.1 Dynamic Yield Strength

To account for the rapid strain rate effects, dynamic yield strength is utilized. This phenomenon is documented in References 3.6-6 and 3.6-7. Material tests have shown a consistent increase in yield strength under rapid loading. Under rapid strain rate, carbon steel yield strength consistently improves by more than 40%. High strength alloy steel displays a somewhat smaller improvement. For WNP-2, a conservative dynamic yield strength of 110% of minimum static yield strength, at the specified operating temperature, is utilized.

#### 3.6.2.2.3.2 Maximum Strain of Tension Members

~~Pure tension members, such as U-Bars shown on Fig. 3.6-4 which constitute pipe whip limit stops, are permitted to deform a maximum of 50% of the minimum uniform strain, during energy absorption.~~

*See  
Insert*

#### 3.6.2.2.3.3 Maximum Deformation of Flexural Members

Deformations of energy absorbing flexural support members are generally limited to 50% of that deformation which corresponds to structural collapse, except that deformation of energy absorbing members in direct contact with the primary containment vessel is limited to 5% of that deformation which corresponds to structural collapse.

Insert p. 3.6-42

## 3.6.2.2.3.2 Maximum Strain of Tension Members

Pure tension members, such as U-Bars shown on Figure 3.6-4 which act to limit pipe whip are permitted to deform during energy absorption, (a) a maximum of 50% of the minimum uniform strain (at the maximum stress on an engineering stress-strain curve) based on <sup>actual</sup> restraint material tests, or (b) one-half of minimum percent elongation as specified in the applicable ASME Code Section II or ASTM Specifications, if demonstrated to be ~~as or more conservative than (a)~~. The dynamic tensile and impact properties are specified to be not less than: (a) 70% of the static percent elongation, or (b) 80% of the statically determined minimum total energy absorption.

*less than 50% of the minimum uniform strain based on representative test results.*

- c. Jet impingement loading on primary containment penetrations is discussed in 3.8.6.

### 3.6.2.3.3 Pipe Whip Restraints

#### 3.6.2.3.3.1 Definition of Function

Pipe whip restraints, as differentiated from piping supports, are designed to function and carry load for an extremely low probability gross failure in a piping system carrying high energy fluid. The piping integrity does not depend on the pipe whip restraints for any loading combination. If the piping integrity is compromised by a pipe break, the pipe whip restraint acts to limit the movement of the broken pipe to an acceptable distance. The pipe whip restraints (i.e., those devices which serve only to control the movement of a ruptured pipe following gross failure) will be subjected to a once in a lifetime loading. ~~For design purposes, the pipe break event is considered to be a faulted condition, and the pipe, its restraints, and structure to which the restraint is attached, are analyzed accordingly.~~ *for the* ~~Plastic deformation of the pipe is considered as a potential energy absorber.~~ *would* ~~Piping systems are designed so that plastic instability does not occur in the pipe under design dynamic and static loads, if the consequences of such instability will result in the loss of the primary containment integrity or loss of required plant shutdown capability.~~ *could* ~~INSERT~~

#### 3.6.2.3.3.2 Pipe Whip Restraint Features

- a. The restraints are close to the pipe to minimize the kinetic energy of impact and yet are sufficiently removed from the pipe to permit unrestricted thermal pipe movement.
- b. To facilitate in-service inspection of piping, the restraints are generally located a suitable distance away from all circumferential welds and are of bolted construction so as to be removable.
- c. Pipe whip restraint structures fall into one of the following two categories:
  - (1) Energy absorbing members - These are modelled as elastic, elasto-plastic or plastic springs in a dynamic analysis.


INSERT FSAR p. 3.6-51

Section 3.6.2.3.3.1

The design and analysis of these components for this event are described later in this Section, and in Section 3.6.2.2. Piping is no longer considered to be a part of the RCPB following the break.

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The required resistance (strength) of these structures is derived by application of the principles of structural dynamics.

- (2) Load transmitting members - These are relatively stiff components and are modelled as rigid members in the dynamic analysis. Their function is to transmit loading from the source to foundation. The load due to the postulated pipe rupture is in the form of an equivalent static load and is derived as a result of the dynamic analysis performed for the energy absorbing members.

- d. Energy absorbing members are ductile structures such as simple beams, frames and ring girders, (including the piping system itself), having the capability to deflect significantly in absorbing the energy imparted to them by a postulated broken pipe. For loading conditions, including the effects of postulated pipe rupture, these members are designed within the limits for inelastic systems as stated in Table F1322.2-1 of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III Appendix F "Rules for Evaluation of Faulted Conditions", adjusted to account for rapid strain rate effects, as discussed in 3.6.2.2.3. These members are constructed to meet the requirements of Quality Class I structures. ~~They are also known by the shape of~~ U-Bar straps, as shown in Figure 3.6-4 and described in 3.6.2.2.3.2, ~~which~~ act as non-linear, non-rebounding, plastic springs. The U-Bar straps are justified by empirical data, AS DESCRIBED IN 3.6.2.2.2.2.2.2.6(3) AND 3.12.13.33

" the

ENERGY  
ABSORBING

- e. Load transmitting members are rigid components such as clevises, brackets or pins, rigid pipe whip restraint weldments as shown in Figures 3.6-4 AND 3.6-5a through 3.6-5e, or similar components; as well as major structures such as the drywell diaphragm floor, primary containment vessel, reactor pedestal, reactor building and foundation. For loading conditions, including the effects of postulated pipe rupture, these members are designed within the limits stated in Table F1322.2-1 of ASME Code Section III Appendix F "Rules for Evaluating Faulted Condition" for

IN FIGURES 3.6-5a  
THROUGH 3.6-5e

components and component supports; except that the members beyond those included in the dynamic analytical model (i.e. reactor pedestal, reactor building, as well as certain steel members assumed to be infinitely rigid) are designed to AISC, ACI and other appropriate structural component criteria. All these members are constructed to the requirements of Quality Class I structures.

→ **INSERT PARAGRAPH**

RESTRRAINTS  
(FIGURE 3.6-4)


- f. The recirculation pump discharge and suction piping utilizes the U-Bar strap pipe whip ~~restraints~~ <sup>restraints</sup>, while all other systems listed in Table 3.6-2 utilize rigid types as shown in Figures 3.6-5a through 3.6-5e or similar configurations.
- g. Typical installations of pipe whip restraints are shown in Figures 3.6-6 through 3.6-10.

### 3.6.2.3.3.3 Pipe Whip Restraint Loading

- a. For the purpose of predicting the pipe rupture forces associated with the reactor blowdown, the local line pressures are assumed to be those normally associated with the reactor operating at 105 percent of rated power and with a vessel dome pressure of 1025 psig.
- b. In calculating pipe reaction, full credit is taken for any line restriction and line friction between the break and the pressure reservoir. The following represent typical restrictions to flow which are specifically considered:

- (1) Jet pump nozzles
- (2) Core spray nozzles (inside internals shroud)
- (3) Feedwater sparger
- (4) Steamline flow limiter

The hydraulic bases and calculational techniques for predicting unbalanced forces on a pipe associated with a postulated instantaneous pipe rupture are as discussed in 3.6.2.2.1.



Insert Page 3.6-53

The design limits for connecting members such as clevises, brackets, and pins per Figure 3.6-4 are based on the following stress limits:

(1) Primary stresses (in accordance with definitions in ASME Section III) are limited to the higher of:

(a) 70% of  $S_u$ , where  $S_u$  = minimum ultimate strength by tests or ASTM specification;


(b)  $S_y$  +  $1/3 (S_u - S_y)$ , where  $S_y$  = minimum yield strength by test or ASTM specification; or

(2) Recommended stress limits in accordance with ASME Code Section III, Subsection NF for faulted conditions, if applicable. The design limits for welds of connecting members to steel structures are based on the following stress limits: the maximum primary weld stress intensity (two times shear stress) is limited to three times AWS or AISC building allowable weld shear stress.

*should be:*

$S_y$

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c. The dynamic loading on the pipe whip restraint commences at the effective time of impact of the pipe with the restraint. It includes the following:

- (1) Unbalanced force on the pipe associated with a postulated instantaneous pipe rupture in the form of a suddenly applied force.
- (2) Dynamic inertia load of the moving section of pipe which is accelerated by the unbalanced force associated with the pipe rupture and collides with the restraint. This load is in the form of kinetic energy of impact.

#### 3.6.2.3.4 Pipe Whip Effects on Safety Related Components


Pipe whip (displacement) effects on safety related structures, systems and components can be placed in two categories:

(a) pipe displacement effects on components (nozzles, valves, tees, etc.) which are in the same piping run in which the break occurred; and (b) controlled pipe whip displacements as they apply to external components such as building structure, other piping systems, cable trays and conduits.

##### 3.6.2.3.4.1 Pipe Displacement Effects on Components in Same Piping Run

a. The criteria which is used for determining the effects of pipe displacements on in-line components are as follows:

- (1) Components such as vessel safe ends, and valves which are attached to the broken piping system and do not serve a safety function or whose failure would not further escalate the consequences of the accident, need not be designed to meet ASME Code Section III imposed requirements for essential components under faulted loading.
- (2) If these components are required for safe shutdown, or serve a safety function to protect the structural integrity of an essential component, the Code requirements for faulted conditions and limits to ensure operability, if required, are met.





- a. Assurance of primary containment leak tightness.
- b. Assurance that potential for damage is such that the maximum pipe break areas and/or combinations of pipe break areas do not exceed the values described in 3.6.2.5.3.2 so that emergency core cooling system capability is not impaired.
- c. Assurance that the control rod drive system maintains sufficient function to assure reactor shutdown.
- d. Assurance that there is sufficient capability to maintain the reactor in a safe shutdown condition.

The criteria used to define pipe rupture locations for piping systems discussed in 3.6.2.5.4 follows 3.6.2.1.1.lb(1) except for the following which follow 3.6.2.1.1.lb(2):

*and 3.6.2.1.1.c in case of item d.*

- a. One elbow only, in each of the two redundant reactor feedwater systems inside primary containment, in 3.6.2.5.4.2 and in Figures 3.6-16a and 3.6-17a.
- b. The entire standby liquid control (SLC) system in 3.6.2.5.4.4 and in Figure 3.6-i9a.
- c. The entire RPV drain system in 3.6.2.5.4.13 and in Figure 3.6-32a.

Figures 3.6-12a through 3.6-35 show the piping configurations for each high energy system inside primary containment and include numerical identification of all significant points of interest in the piping system, locations of pipe whip supports and postulated pipe break locations. The pipe whip supports are identified by the acronym PWS followed by an identification number on Figures 3.6-12a through 3.6-34a and as noted on Figure 3.6-35.

### 3.6.2.5.3 System Requirements Subsequent to Postulated Pipe Rupture

#### 3.6.2.5.3.1 Control Rod Insertion Capability

To maintain the ability to insert the control rods in the event of a pipe break, no more than one in any array of nine control rod drive (CRD) withdrawal lines may be completely

- d. The entire reactor recirculation cooling system in 3.6.2.5.4.14 and in Figures 3.6-35a and 3.6-35b.

## 3.6.2.5.3.2 Core Cooling Requirements

The designed ECCS capability can be maintained provided that dynamic effects consequences do not exceed the following break area, break combination, and maintenance of minimum core cooling requirements.

## 3.6.2.5.3.3 Maximum Allowable Break Areas

- a. For breaks involving recirculation piping, the total effective area of all broken pipes, including the effective area of the recirculation line break, does not exceed the total effective area of the design basis double-ended recirculation line break. By limiting the total area of all broken pipes involving recirculation loops, to an area less than, or equal to that of the design basis accident (DBA) (circumferential break of recirculation loop), no accident can be more severe than the DBA.
- b. ~~For breaks not involving recirculation piping, the effects are much less severe than recirculation line breaks. Hence, the total break area can be allowed to be larger than the recirculation breaks. Therefore, the total break area does not exceed the sum of one feedwater header pipe area, one steam line pipe area (upstream of flow limiter), and one core spray pipe area.~~

SEE  
INSERT

## 3.6.2.5.3.4 Break Combinations

In addition to the pipe break area restrictions, breaks involving one recirculation loop do not result in loss of function or damage to the other recirculation loop, or loss of coolant from the other loop in excess of that which can result from a break of the attached cleanup connection on the suction side of the loop.

## 3.6.2.5.3.5 Required Cooling Systems

~~To ensure compliance with Appendix 1 of 10 CFR Part 50, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, the following cooling system requirements are met after an additional single active safety system failure.~~

SEE INSERT

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INSERT FSAR p. 3.6-58

Sect. 3.6.2.5.3.3

- (b) For breaks not involving recirculation piping, the total effective area of all broken pipes for a given system shall not exceed the total effective area of the double-ended break of the maximum area pipe connected to the reactor boundary for that system.


fix

Sect. 3.6.2.5.3.5

To ensure compliance with Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 50, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, the cooling system requirements after an additional single active safety system failure are defined in Table 6.3-7. Cases which do not meet the requirements in Table 6.3-7 must be assessed on an individual basis to determine compliance with core cooling requirements.

on

Are't the cases of Table 6.3.7 bounding? Therefore this statement is moot. Suggest this be revised to reflect that Table 6.3.7 list the bounding cases.



- a. For breaks not involving recirculation piping, at least two LPCI pumps or one core spray system is available for core cooling.
  - b. For breaks involving recirculation piping, at least one core spray line and 2 LPCI pumps, or 2 core spray lines, are available for core cooling.
  - c. For a LOCA with a total effective break area less than  $0.7 \text{ ft}^2$ , either the HPCS or ADS is available for reactor depressurization.
  - d. For liquid breaks, such as cleanup suction or the combination of liquid and steam breaks whose total break area is less than  $0.7 \text{ ft}^2$  in which the ADS system is required for depressurization, at least 6 ADS valves are available.
  - e. For breaks less than the equivalent flow area of one open ADS valve, at least 6 ADS valves are available. However, the required number of ADS valves is one less for each additional steam break area equivalent to the area of one open ADS valve.
- ok*

### 3.6.2.5.3.6 Containment System Integrity

The following were considered in addressing the LOCA dynamic effects with respect to containment system integrity:

- a. Leak tightness of the containment fission product barrier is assured throughout any LOCA.
- b. For those lines which penetrate the containment and are closed during normal operation, the inboard isolation valves are as close as practicable to the reactor pressure vessel. This arrangement reduces the length of pipe subject to a pipe break.
- c. Pipe whip supports are provided in the vicinity of normally open isolation valves inside and outside primary containment for high energy systems, to assure that operability of these valves remains unimpaired during a postulated pipe rupture event.

support is also utilized as a rigid three-way support.

3.6.2.5.4.14 Reactor Recirculation Cooling System

a. System Arrangement

TWO LOOPS "A" AND "B" OF THE SYSTEM

AS SHOWN  
IN FIGURE  
3.6-35a.

The recirculation piping consists of the pump discharge and suction piping systems. The recirculation pump "A" and "B" discharge lines are arranged with mirror image symmetry, in the northern and southern segments of primary containment. The lines exit the reactor pressure vessel in five, equally spaced, 12-inch diameter lines commencing at azimuth 30° and ending at azimuth 150° (for the mirror image azimuth 210° to 330°). These five lines drop vertically alongside the sacrificial shield wall, from elevation 536'-~~1/4~~" to a 16-inch diameter header at centerline elevation of 528'-~~1/4~~". A single 24-inch diameter line then drops vertically from the center of the header to elevation 506'-~~1/8~~" where it is routed into the discharge nozzles of the recirculation pumps.

RESPECTIVELY

ARRANGED IN A DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED MANNER,

"A"

"B" LINES

0"

0"

3 7/8"

**"B" AND "A"**

The recirculation pump ~~"A" and "B"~~ suction lines **ARE** ~~consists of two mirror image systems oriented~~ **RESPECTIVELY** along the 0° and 180° azimuths, ~~(with respect to~~ **SUCTION LINE** the reactor pressure vessel. Each ~~loop~~ consists of a single 24-inch diameter line which exits the reactor pressure vessel at elevation 535'-3/4" and drops vertically alongside the sacrificial shield wall to elevation 502'-6 1/8" where it is routed to the suction nozzles of the recirculation pumps.

**b. Pipe Whip Protection**

For the recirculation pump suction and discharge systems, the location of postulated pipe breaks and pipe whip restraints are shown on Figure 3.6-35a, 3.6-35 which is representative of both recirculation loops. Where pipe breaks are postulated inside primary containment, the recirculation system piping is restrained to prevent unacceptable motion. These restraints are generally mounted on the side of the sacrificial shield wall structure or the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) pedestal, immediately below. Four restraints, which are located near the diaphragm floor and are not near the sacrificial shield wall or the RPV pedestal, consist of saddle type structures mounted on the diaphragm floor.

CONFORMANCE OF THE  
POSTULATED BREAK LOCA-  
TIONS WITH THE CRITERIA  
OF SECTION 3.6.2.1.1 IS  
DEMONSTRATED IN  
FIGURE 3.6-35.

**c. Verification of Pipe Whip Protection Adequacy**

RESTRAINTS


Sufficient pipe whip protection is provided for the reactor recirculation cooling system piping to assure safety as defined in 3.6.2.5.2. Pipe whip ~~supports~~ are provided to prevent impact with the diaphragm floor as well as to mitigate the consequences of a pipe rupture with respect to surrounding piping systems, structures and components required for safe shutdown.

The physical separation of the recirculation system from the containment vessel precludes any damage that could result as a result of postulated pipe break.

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM  
NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2

U-BAR  
RESTRAINT TYPE PIPE WHIP  
CONFIGURATION

FIGURE  
3.6-4




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~~337 A~~



KEY:  
 (RC1) = Typical Break Location  
 RCR1 = Typical Restraint Designation  
 Suffix "LL" indicates longitudinal break  
 \* indicates Loop A only

Notes: (1) This figure represents Loop A. Loop B is similar except as noted.  
 (2) See Figure 36-35b for restraint-break location correlation and break types.  
 (3) Only those restraints that may act during the postulated breaks are shown.

REACTOR RECIRCULATION PIPING SYSTEM

FIGURE 3.6-35a

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
FIGURE 3.6-35b

RECIRCULATION PIPING SYSTEM OPERATING STRESSES AND RESTRAINTS AT BREAK LOCATIONS (1)

BREAK IDENT (1)	Acting Restraint No. (1)	STRESS RATIO PER ASME EQNS.			USAGE FACTOR	BREAK TYPE	BREAK BASES SECTION NO.
		EQ(10) $\frac{S_u}{3S_m}$	EQ(12) $\frac{S_o}{3S_m}$	EQ(13) $\frac{S}{3S_m}$			
RC1	RCR1	0.62	0.13	0.52	0.00	CIRCMF	3.6.2.1.1.1.a
RC15	RCR20	0.56	0.12	0.33	0.00	"	"
RC18	RCR19	0.70	0.26	0.48	0.00	"	"
RC20	RCR18	0.63	0.16	0.49	0.00	"	"
RC23	RCR17	0.68	0.22	0.49	0.00	"	"
RC26	RCR16	0.67	0.23	0.49	0.00	"	"
RC13	RCR10	0.94	0.24	0.65	0.01	" (3)	3.6.2.1.1.1.c
RC16	RCR11	1.10	0.17	0.69	0.03	" (3)	"
RC12	RCR12 RCR13	1.17	0.60	0.55	0.096	" (5)	"
RC21	RCR14	1.52	0.65	0.68	0.60	" (3)	3.6.2.1.1.1.b(2)(b)
RC21LL	RCR14	1.52	0.65	0.68	0.60	LONG (2)	"
RC24	RCR15	1.14	0.44	0.66	0.05	CIRCMF (3)	3.6.2.1.1.1.c

{ See Footnotes on next page.

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# HANFORD 2

## FIGURE 3.6.35b


### RECIRCULATION PIPING SYSTEM OPERATING STRESSES AT BREAK LOCATIONS (1) AND RESTRAINTS

BREAK IDENT (1)	Acting Restraint No. (1)	STRESS RATIO PER ASME EQNS.			USAGE FACTOR	BREAK TYPE	BREAK BASES SECTION NO.
		EQ(10) $\frac{S_u}{S_{Sm}}$	EQ(12) $\frac{S_o}{S_{Sm}}$	EQ(13) $\frac{S}{S_{Sm}}$			
RC1LL	RCRB	1.02	0.19	0.83	0.08	LONG (3)	3.6.2-1-1.1b(2)(c)
RC3LL	RCR2I RCR2II	0.97	0.34	0.70	0.01	LONG (3)	3.6.2.1.1.C


Notes: (1) This information is for Loop A and is typical for loop B. Break RC3LL applies to Loop A only. See Figure 3.6-35a for Break <sup>identity</sup> ~~RC3LL~~ and Restraint No.

- (2) Out-of-plane longitudinal
- (3) Break at connection of contour nozzle to the header
- (4) Circumferential <sup>break</sup> at branch weld, but longitudinal type for the riser.
- (5) Break at branch weld.

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was deleted in A-39 why indicated again?



WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM  
NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2

TYPICAL RESTRAINT FORCE-DEFLECTION  
CURVE

FIGURE  
3.12-5

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THIS FIGURE HAS BEEN  
INTENTIONALLY DELETED

Referred to Figure 3.6-35a

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WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2	BREAK LOCATIONS AND RESTRAINTS ANALYZED, PDA VERIFICATION PROGRAM	FIGURE 3.12-6
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




TABLE 3.12-3

RESTRAINT PROPERTIES USED IN ANALYSES

*BY BOTH HSC AND PDA <sup>(1)</sup> Comparison*

*Property*  
General Restraint Data for 1 Bar of a Restraint

$$F = C_2 (\Delta \text{ restraint})^n$$

Where  $\Delta$  restraint =  $\delta$  pipe - Total clearance (See Figure 3.12-5)

Pipe Size (In)	Rest Load Direction	$C_2$	n	Limit $\delta$ Restraint	Initial Clearance	Effective Clearance	Total Clearance
12	0°	27,733	0.24	6.129	4	1.941	5.941
12	90°	14,795	0.401	9.063	4	12.247	16.247
16	0°	109,265	0.24	6.278	4	1.934	5.934
16	90°	62,599	0.387	8.978	4	12.187	16.187
24	0°	102,228	0.24	8.222	4	1.984	5.984
24	90°	55,531	0.375	11.972	4	13.605	17.605
24	38° (2)	109,888	0.24	5.588	4	5.698	9.698
24	52° (2)	109,835	0.24	5.473	4	8.462	12.462

(1) HSC denotes Nuclear Services Corporation, and PDA denotes "Pipe Dynamic Analysis Program for Pipe Break Movement" by General Electric Company.

(2) ~~Applies to Restraint RCR-3 only.~~

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TABLE 3.12-3 (Continued)  
COMPARISON OF PDA AND HSC CODE <sup>(1)</sup>

Break Indent (Figure 3.12-6)	Restraint Indent (Figure 3.12-6)	No. of Bars		Load (kips)		Restraint Deflection (in.)		% Of Design Restraint Deflection		Pipe Deflection (in.)	
		PDA	HSC	PDA	HSC	PDA	HSC	PDA	HSC	PDA	HSC
RC1 <sub>J</sub>	RCR1	5	5	003.2	708.3	6.57	7.926	79.93%	96.4 %	17.72	15.58
RC2 <sub>LL</sub>	RCR1	5	5	766.4	458.4	14.99	7.495	125 %	62.6 %	35.83	24.52
RC3 <sub>LL</sub>	KCR2	6	6	747.0	639.7	2.27	3.73	27.65%	45.35%	17.16	20.11
RC3 <sub>LL</sub>	KCR2	6	6	796.6	780.3	10.22	10.54	57.8 %	59.6 %	41.48	43.0
RC4 <sub>LL</sub>	KCR3	5	5	836.0	838.4	7.64	8.05	92.95%	97.98%	18.87	16.43
RC4 <sub>LL</sub>	RCR3	8	8	1319.0	1073.9	5.43	4.62	99.23%	76.85%	23.38	17.25
RC4C <sub>V</sub>	RCR3	8	8	1260.7	1275.0	4.49	5.58	80.37%	99.89%	22.56	18.73
RC6A <sub>V</sub>	RCR3	8	8	928.5	722.5	1.22	1.77	22.46%	31.7 %	23.68	95.39
RC7 <sub>J</sub>	RCR7	6	6	953.3	80.6	6.38	5.76	76.4 %	70.12%	16.46	21.63
RC8 <sub>LL</sub>	KCR6	4	4	599.0	0	0.28	0	112.46%	0	26.76	
	RCR7	6	6	895.0	0	8.16	0	110.76%	0	29.316	8.39
RC9C <sub>V</sub>	RCR6	4	4	575.8	520.16	4.16	5.53	50.63%	67.33%	13.2	14.56
RC9 <sub>LL</sub>	RCR8	6	6	830.2	546.8	11.408	6.815	95.29%	56.9 %	36.612	26.24
RC11A	KCR8	6	6	818.3	493.6	10.98	5.99	91.72%	50.07%	31.404	23.71
RC13	RCR10	4	4	668.4	478.0	5.87	3.66	93.5 %	58.39%	13.37	10.44
RC16	RCR11	4	4	687.4	518.4	6.59	4.38	105 %	69.86%	15.37	10.22
RC14C <sub>V</sub>	KCR20	8	8	285.0	309.6	2.83	5.88	46.3 %	95.92%	15.45	13.96
RC14 <sub>LL</sub>	RCR20	8	8	116.3	129.9	0.96	3.36	10.5 %	37.1 %	22.13	23.56

(1) HSC denotes Nuclear Services Corporation, and PDA denotes "Pipe Dynamic Analysis Program for Pipe Rupture Movement" by General Electric Company.

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WNP-2

Page 2 of 3  
APPENDIX NO. 1  
JULY 1978

AMENDMENT NO. 1  
JULY 1978



TABLE 3.6-6

DESIGN BASIS BREAK LOCATIONS OUTSIDE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

Break No.	Line Designation	Isometric No. (M200)	Diameter (Inches)	Max. Force (kips) or Thrust vs. Time Figure	Plan Location Figure
1	RCIC(13)-4	120-1	4	Later	3.6-49
2	RCIC(13)-4	120-2	4	3.6-69, 70	3.6-49
3	RCIC(13)-4	120-3	4	3.6-65, 66	3.6-49
4	RCIC(13)-4	120-4	4	Later*	3.6-48
5	RCIC(13)-4	120-5	4	Later*	3.6-48
6	RCIC(13)-4	120-6	4	Later*	3.6-48
7	RCIC(13)-4	120-7	4	Later*	3.6-48
8	RCIC(13)-4	120-8	4	Later*	3.6-47
9	<del>RCIC(13)-4</del>	<del>120-9</del>	<del>4</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-47</del>
10	RCIC(13)-4	120-10	4	3.6-63, 64	3.6-47
11	RWCU(1)-4	126-1	5	3.6-79, 80	3.6-51
12	RWCU(1)-4	126-2	6	3.6-75, 76	3.6-50
13	RWCU(1)-4	126-3	6	Later*	3.6-50
14	<del>RWCU(1)-4</del>	<del>126-4</del>	<del>4</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-50</del>
15	RWCU(1)-4	126-5	2	Later*	3.6-50
16	RWCU(1)-4	126-6	2	3.6-81, 82	3.6-51
17	RWCU(2)-4	128-7	5	3.6-67, 68	3.6-51
18	RWCU(2)-4	128-8	5	Later*	3.6-51
19	RWCU(2)-4	128-9	6	Later*	3.6-51
20	RWCU(2)-4	128-10	5	Later*	3.6-50
21	RWCU(2)-4	128-11	5	Later*	3.6-49
22	<del>RWCU(2)-4</del>	<del>128-12</del>	<del>6</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-49</del>
23	<del>RWCU(3)-4</del>	<del>128-13</del>	<del>5</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-50</del>
24	<del>RWCU(3)-4</del>	<del>128-14</del>	<del>5</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-50</del>
25	<del>RWCU(3)-4</del>	<del>128-15</del>	<del>6</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-50</del>

RE-PLACE PHASES  
 ATTACHED

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3.6-81

DESIGN BASIS BREAK LOCATIONS OUTSIDE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT


Break No.	Line Designation	Isometric No. (M200)	Diameter (Inches)	Max. Force (kips) or Thrust vs. Time Figure	Plan Location Figure
26	RWCU(3)-4	129-42	6	Later*	3.6-50
27	RWCU(3)-4	129-43	4	Later*	3.6-50
28	RWCU(3)-4	129-44	4	Later*	3.6-50
29	RWCU(3)-4	129-45	4	Later*	3.5-50
30	<del>RWCU(3)-4</del>	<del>129-46</del>	<del>4</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-50</del>
31	RWCU(3)-4	129-47	3	Later*	3.5-50
32	RWCU(3)-4	129-48	1	Later*	3.6-50
33	<del>RWCU(3)-4</del>	<del>129-49</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.5-50</del>
34	RWCU(3)-4	129-50	3	Later*	3.6-50
35	MS(20)-4	134-1	2	Later*	3.6-44
36	MS(20)-4	134-2	2	Later*	3.6-44
37	MS(20)-4	134-3	2	Later*	3.6-44
38	MS(20)-4	134-4	2	Later*	3.6-44
39	<del>MS(20)-4</del>	<del>134-5</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-44</del>
40	AS(11)-2	139-1	3	3.6-97, 98	3.6-43
41	<del>AS(11)-2</del>	<del>139-2</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-43</del>
42	AS(11)-2	139-3	3	3.6-93, 94	3.6-43
43	AS(11)-2	139-4	4	Later*	3.6-43
44	<del>AS(11)-2</del>	<del>139-5</del>	<del>4</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-43</del>
45	<del>AS(11)-2</del>	<del>139-6</del>	<del>4</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-43</del>
46	AS(11)-2	139-7	4	Later*	3.6-43
47	<del>AS(11)-2</del>	<del>139-8</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-43</del>
48	<del>AS(11)-2</del>	<del>139-9</del>	<del>4</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-43</del>
49	<del>AS(11)-2</del>	<del>139-17</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>3.6-95, 96</del>	<del>3.6-43</del>
50	AS(11)-2	141-10	6	Later*	3.6-43


↑  
AS(10)-2.

3.6-82

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




KEY:  
 RC4CV • TYPICAL BREAK LOCATION  
 RCR3A • TYPICAL RESTRAINT DESIGNATION  
 RCR3A

REPLACE  
 following P&ID  
 with

Updated in Amendment 31



*Handwritten notes:*  
 RC3LL is a longitudinal break in the RHR shutdown suction line.  
 RC3LL is a longitudinal break in the RHR shutdown return line.  
 RC3LL is a longitudinal break in the RHR shutdown suction line.

KEY

- RC1 - TYPICAL BREAK LOCATION
- RCR1 - TYPICAL RESTRAINT DESIGNATION
- SUFFIX "LL" INDICATES LONGITUDINAL BREAK
- \* INDICATES LOOP A ONLY

NOTES:

1. THIS FIGURE REPRESENTS LOOP A. LOOP B IS SIMILAR EXCEPT AS NOTED.
2. SEE FIGURE 3.6-35b FOR RESTRAINT-BREAK LOCATION CORRELATION AND BREAK TYPES.
3. ONLY THOSE RESTRAINTS THAT MAY ACT DURING THE POSTULATED BREAKS ARE SHOWN.

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2	BREAK LOCATIONS AND RESTRAINTS ANALYZED, PDA VERIFICATION PROGRAM	FIGURE 3.6-35a
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New

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SUMMARY OF POSTULATED PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS

CIRCUMFERENTIAL BREAKS

LONGITUDINAL BREAKS

NODE 11  
NODE 12  
NODE 41  
NODE 42  
NODE 9  
NODE 37

NODE 11A  
NODE 41A

WILMINGTON PUBLIC  
UTILITY SUPPLY SYSTEM  
NUCLEAR FACILITY  
110 2


RFW INSIDE MAIN STEAM  
TUNNEL

FIG 3.6-24B

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM  
NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2

RFW INSIDE MAIN STEAM TUNNEL

FIGURE  
3.6-34a



A-32

DESIGN BASIS BREAK LOCATIONS OUTSIDE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

<u>Break No.</u>	<u>Line Designation</u>	<u>Isometric No. (M200)</u>	<u>Diameter (Inches)</u>	<u>Max. Force (kips) or Thrust vs. Time Figure</u>	<u>Plan Location Figure</u>
51	AS(10)-2	141-11	6	Later* 7.28	3.6-43
52	AS(10)-2	141-12	6	Later* 7.28	3.6-43
53	RWCU(1)-4	142-20	4	Later* <i>Fig 3.6-85</i>	3.6-51
54	RWCU(1)-4	142-21	4	Later* "	3.6-51
55	RWCU(1)-4	142-22	4	Later* "	3.6-51
56	RWCU(1)-4	142-23	4	Later* "	3.6-51
57	RWCU(1)-3	144-24	4	Later*	3.6-53
58	<del>RWCU(1)-3</del>	<del>144-25</del>	<del>4</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-51</del>
59	RWCU(1)-3	144-26	4	Later*	3.6-51
60	RWCU(1)-3	144-27	4	Later*	3.6-51
61	RWCU(1)-3	144-28	4	Later*	3.6-51
62	RWCU(1)-3	144-29	6	Later*	3.6-51
63	<del>RWCU(2)-3</del>	<del>144-30</del>	<del>6</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-51</del>
64	RWCU(2)-3	144-31	4	Later*	3.6-51
65	RWCU(2)-3	144-32	6	Later*	3.6-51
66	<del>RWCU(2)-3</del>	<del>144-33</del>	<del>6</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-51</del>
67	RWCU(2)-3	144-34	6	Later*	3.6-51
68	<del>RWCU(2)-3</del>	<del>144-35</del>	<del>6</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-51</del>
69	RWCU(2)-3	144-36	6	Later*	3.6-53
70	HS(9)-2	148-1	3	3.6-112, 113	3.6-43
71	HS(1)-2	148-2	4	Later*	3.6-43
72	<del>HS(5)-2</del>	<del>148-4</del>	<del>4</del>	<del>3.6-105, 106</del>	<del>3.6-43</del>
73	HS(5)-2	148-5	2	Later*	3.6-43
74	HS(5)-2	148-6	2	Later*	3.6-43
75	HS(5)-2	148-7	2	Later*	3.6-43

3.6-83

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DESIGN BASIS BREAK LOCATIONS OUTSIDE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

Break No.	Line Designation	Isometric No. (M200)	Diameter (Inches)	Max. Force (kips) or Thrust vs. Time Figure	Plan Location Figure
76	HS(5)-2	148-8	2	Later*	3.6-43
77	HS(5)-2	148-9	2	Later*	3.5-43
78	HS(5)-2	148-10	2	Later*	3.6-43
79	HS(5)-2	148-11	2	Later*	3.5-43
80	HS(5)-2	148-12	2	Later*	3.6-43
<del>81</del>	<del>HS(9)-2</del>	<del>148-13</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-43</del>
<del>82</del>	<del>HS(1)-2</del>	<del>148-14</del>	<del>4</del>	<del>3.6-87, 88, 107</del>	<del>3.6-43</del>
<del>83</del>	<del>HCO(11)-1</del>	<del>149-1</del>	<del>6</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-62</del>
84	HCO(11)-1	149-2	4	Later*	3.6-62
<del>85</del>	<del>HCO(11)-2</del>	<del>149-3</del>	<del>4</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-58</del>
<del>86</del>	<del>HCO(11)-2</del>	<del>149-4</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-58</del>
87	HCO(11)-2	149-5	3	3.6-99	3.6-58
<del>88</del>	<del>HCO(11)-2</del>	<del>149-6</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>3.6-100, 101</del>	<del>3.6-58</del>
<del>89</del>	<del>HCO(11)-2</del>	<del>149-7</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-62</del>
<del>90</del>	<del>HCO(11)-2</del>	<del>149-8</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>3.6-102</del>	<del>3.6-59</del>
<del>91</del>	<del>HCO(5)-2</del>	<del>149-9</del>	<del>2.5</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-59</del>
<del>92</del>	<del>HCO(5)-2</del>	<del>149-10</del>	<del>2.5</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-59</del>
<del>93</del>	<del>HCO(5)-2</del>	<del>149-11</del>	<del>2.5</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-59</del>
<del>94</del>	<del>HCO(5)-2</del>	<del>149-12</del>	<del>2.5</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-59</del>
95	RFW(1)-4	335-1	24	Later*	3.6-49
96	RFW(1)-4	335-2	24	Later*	3.6-49
97	RFW(1)-4	335-3	24	Later*	3.6-49
98	RFW(1)-4	335-4	24	Later*	3.6-49
99	AS(9)-2	342-13	6	Later*	3.6-43
100	AS(9)-2	342-14	4	Later*	3.6-43

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DESIGN BASIS BREAK LOCATIONS OUTSIDE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

<u>Break No.</u>	<u>Line Designation</u>	<u>Isometric No. (M200)</u>	<u>Diameter (Inches)</u>	<u>Max. Force (kips) or Thrust vs. Time Figure</u>	<u>Plan Location Figure</u>
<del>101</del>	<del>AS(1)-2</del>	<del>342-15</del>	<del>8</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-43</del>
<del>102</del>	<del>AS(3)-2</del>	<del>341-16</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-43</del>
<del>103</del>	<del>MS(1)-4</del>	<del>400-8</del>	<del>25</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-44</del>
<del>104</del>	<del>MS(1)-4</del>	<del>400-9</del>	<del>26</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-44</del>
<del>105</del>	<del>MS(1)-4</del>	<del>400-10</del>	<del>30</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-44</del>
<del>106</del>	<del>MS(1)-4</del>	<del>400-11</del>	<del>26</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-44</del>
<del>107</del>	<del>MS(1)-4</del>	<del>400-12</del>	<del>26</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-44</del>
<del>108</del>	<del>MS(1)-4</del>	<del>400-13</del>	<del>30</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-44</del>
<del>109</del>	<del>MS(1)-4</del>	<del>400-14</del>	<del>26</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-44</del>
<del>110</del>	<del>MS(1)-4</del>	<del>400-15</del>	<del>26</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-44</del>
<del>111</del>	<del>MS(1)-4</del>	<del>400-16</del>	<del>30</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-44</del>
<del>112</del>	<del>MS(1)-4</del>	<del>400-17</del>	<del>30</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-44</del>
<del>113</del>	<del>MS(1)-4</del>	<del>400-18</del>	<del>26</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-44</del>
<del>114</del>	<del>MS(1)-4</del>	<del>400-19</del>	<del>26</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-44</del>
<del>115</del>	<del>MS(1)-4</del>	<del>400-20</del>	<del>30</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-44</del>
<del>116</del>	<del>MS(1)-4</del>	<del>400-21</del>	<del>30</del>	<del>Later*</del>	<del>3.6-44</del>
117	CO(3)-2	440-1	2.5	Later*	N/A
118	CO(3)-2	440-2	2.5	Later*	N/A
119	CO(3)-2	440-3	2.5	Later*	N/A
120	HS(5)-1	447-19	6	Later*	N/A
121	HS(5)-1	447-25	6	Later*	N/A
122	HS(5)-1	447-26	6	Later*	N/A
123	HS(5)-1	447-27	6	Later*	N/A
124	HS(1)-1	448-15	6	Later*	N/A
125	HS(1)-1	448-16	6	Later*	N/A

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DESIGN BASIS BREAK LOCATIONS OUTSIDE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

<u>Break No.</u>	<u>Line Designation</u>	<u>Isometric No. (M200)</u>	<u>Diameter (Inches)</u>	<u>Max. Force (kips) or Thrust vs. Time Figure</u>	<u>Plan Location Figure</u>
126	HS(1)-1	448-17	6	Later*	N/A
127	HS(1)-1	448-18	6	Later*	N/A
128	HS(1)-1	448-19	6	Later*	N/A
129	HS(1)-1	448-20	6	Later*	N/A
130	HS(1)-1	448-21	5	Later*	N/A
131	HS(1)-1	448-22	5	Later*	N/A
132	HS(1)-1	448-23	4	Later*	N/A
133	HS(1)-1	448-24	<del>6</del> 2"	Later*	N/A
134	HCO(5)-1	449-13	3	Later*	N/A
135	HCO(5)-1	449-14	3	Later*	N/A
136	HCO(5)-1	449-15	3	Later*	N/A
137	HCO(5)-1	449-16	3	Later*	N/A
138	HCO(5)-1	449-17	3	Later*	N/A
139	HCO(5)-1	449-18	3	Later*	N/A
140	HCO(5)-1	449-19	3	Later*	N/A
141	HCO(5)-1	449-20	3	Later*	N/A
142	HCO(5)-1	449-21	3	Later*	N/A
143	HCO(5)-1	449-22	3	Later*	N/A
144	HCO(5)-1	450-33	3	Later*	N/A
145	HCO(5)-1	450-24	3	Later*	N/A
146	HCO(5)-1	450-25	3	Later*	N/A
147	HCO(5)-1	450-26	2.5	Later*	N/A
148	HCO(5)-1	450-27	3	Later*	N/A
149	HCO(5)-1	449-28	3	Later*	N/A
150	MS(9)-4	451-6	3	Later*	N/A

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DESIGN BASIS BREAK LOCATIONS OUTSIDE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

<u>Break No.</u>	<u>Line Designation</u>	<u>Isometric No. (M200)</u>	<u>Diameter (Inches)</u>	<u>Max. Force (kips) or Thrust vs. Time Figure</u>	<u>Plan Location Figure</u>
151	MS(9)-4	451-7	3	Later*	N/A
<del>152</del>	<del>CRD(12)-3</del>	N/A	8	N/A	See Section 3.6.1.18.3.5 and the response to NRC Question 010 014.

*KEEP*

\*Information is scheduled to be ready for Staff review in late 1982.

3.6-85b

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TABLE 3.6-7

SEISMIC AND QUALITY CLASSIFICATION

Page 1 of 2

<u>Line Designation</u>	<u>Diameter</u>	<u>Classification</u>	
		<u>Seismic</u>	<u>Quality</u>
RCIC (13)-4	4	I	I
RWCU (1)-4	4,6	I	I
RWCU (2)-4	4,6	I	I
RWCU (1)-3	4	I	I
RWCU (2)-3	4,6	I	I
RWCU (3)-4	4,6	I	I
RWCU (5)-3	4,6	I	I
RWCU (6)-4	6	I	I
RWCU (7)-3	6	I	I
AS (1)-2	4,8	I/II	II
AS (3)-2	2	I	II
AS (10)-2	6,8	I/II	II
AS (11)-2	2,3,4	I	II
AS (16)-2	2.5,3	I	II
CO (3)-2	2,2.5	II	II
HCO (5)-1	2.5,3	II	II
HCO (5)-2	2,2.5,3	I	II
HCO (9)-2	2	I	II
HCO (11)-1	2.5,4,6	I	II
HCO (11)-2	3	I	II
HS (1)-1	4,6	I/II	II
HS (1)-2	2,4	I	II
HS (5)-1	6	I/II	II
HS (5)-2	4.3	I	II



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TABLE 3.6-6

DESIGN BASIS BREAK LOCATIONS OUTSIDE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

172-50 150 - BREAK	LINE DESIGNATION	PIPE DIA.	MAX FORCE (KIPS) OR THRUST VS TIME GRAPH	PLAN LOCAT. FIGURE
120-1	RLIC (13)-4	4"	FIG 3.6-65	FIG 3.6-49
120-2	RLIC (13)-4	4"	FIG 3.6-65	FIG 3.6-49
120-3	RLIC (13)-4	4"	FIG 3.6-65	FIG 3.6-49
120-4	RLIC (13)-4	4"	FIG 3.6-65	FIG 3.6-48
120-5	RLIC (13)-4	4"	FIG 3.6-63	FIG 3.6-48
120-6	RLIC (13)-4	4"	FIG 3.6-63	FIG 3.6-48
120-7	RLIC (13)-4	4"	FIG 3.6-63	FIG 3.6-48
120-8	RLIC (13)-4	4"	FIG 3.6-63	FIG 3.6-47
120-11	RLIC (13)-4	4"	FIG 3.6-65	FIG 3.6-49
120-12	RLIC (13)-4	4"	FIG 3.6-63	FIG 3.6-47
120-13	RLIC (13)-4	4"	FIG 3.6-63	FIG 3.6-47
126-1	RWCU (1)-4	6"	FIG 3.6-80	FIG 3.6-51
126-2	RWCU (1)-4	6"	FIG 3.6-75	FIG 3.6-50
126-3	RWCU (1)-4	2"	FIG 3.6-72	FIG 3.6-50
126-5	RWCU (1)-4	2"	FIG 3.6-72	FIG 3.6-50
126-6	RWCU (1)-4	4"	FIG 3.6-81	FIG 3.6-51
126-51	RWCU (1)-4	4"	FIG 3.6-71	FIG 3.6-50
126-52	RWCU (1)-4	6"	FIG 3.6-80	FIG 3.6-51
126-53	RWCU (1)-4	6"	FIG 3.6-80	FIG 3.6-51
128-7	RWCU (2)-4	4"	FIG 3.6-84	FIG 3.6-51
128-8	RWCU (2)-4	6"	FIG 3.6-68	FIG 3.6-51
128-9	RWCU (2)-4	6"	FIG 3.6-68	FIG 3.6-51
128-10	RWCU (2)-4	6"	FIG 3.6-68	FIG 3.6-50
128-11	RWCU (2)-4	6"	FIG 3.6-68	FIG 3.6-49
128-61	RWCU (2)-4	6"	FIG 3.6-68	FIG 3.6-49

TABLE 3.6-6

DESIGN BASIS BREAK LOCATIONS OUTSIDE PRIMARY

M200-150 -BREAK	LINE DESIGNATION	PIPE DIA.	MAX FORCE (KIPS)	CONTAINMENT
			OR THRUST VS TIME GRAPH	PLAN LOCATION FIGURE
129-39	RWCU (3)-4	6"	FIG 3.6-77	FIG 3.6-50
129-41	RWCU (3)-4	6"	FIG 3.6-77	FIG 3.6-50
129-42	RWCU (3)-4	6"	FIG 3.6-77, 73	FIG 3.6-50
129-43	RWCU (3)-4	4"	FIG 3.6-73	FIG 3.6-50
129-44	RWCU (3)-4	4"	FIG 3.6-73	FIG 3.6-50
129-45	RWCU (3)-4	4"	FIG 3.6-73	FIG 3.6-50
129-47	RWCU (3)-4	3"	FIG 3.6-73	FIG 3.6-50
129-48	RWCU (3)-4	4"	FIG 3.6-73	FIG 3.6-50
129-50	RWCU (3)-4	3"	FIG 3.6-73	FIG 3.6-50
129-54	RWCU (3)-4	4"	FIG 3.6-73	FIG 3.6-50
129-55	RWCU (3)-4	4"	FIG 3.6-73	FIG 3.6-50
134-1	MS(20)-4	2"	2.85	FIG 3.6-44
134-2	MS(20)-4	2"	2.85	FIG 3.6-44
134-3	MS(20)-4	2"	2.85	FIG 3.6-44
134-4	MS(20)-4	2"	2.85	FIG 3.6-44
134-35	MS(20)-4	3"	2.85, 6.88	FIG 3.6-44
134-36	MS(20)-4	3"	6.88	FIG 3.6-44
139-1	AS(11)-2	3"	FIG 3.6-97	FIG 3.6-43
139-3	AS(11)-2	3"	FIG 3.6-93	FIG 3.6-43
139-4	AS(11)-2	4"	FIG 3.6-87	FIG 3.6-43
139-7	AS(11)-2	4"	FIG 3.6-87	FIG 3.6-43
139-15	AS(11)-2	4"	12.6, 3.2	FIG 3.6-43
139-19	AS(11)-2	4"	FIG 3.6-87	FIG 3.6-43
139-20	AS(11)-2	4"	FIG 3.6-87	FIG 3.6-43
139-21	AS(11)-2	4"	FIG 3.6-87	FIG 3.6-43

TABLE 3.6-6

PAGE 3 OF 7

## DESIGN BASIS BREAK LOCATIONS OUTSIDE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

M200-150 BREAK	LINE DESIGNATION	PIPE DIA.	MAX FORCE (KIPS) OR FORCE VS TIME GRAPH	PLAN LOCATION FIGURE
141-10	AS (10)-2	6"	7.28	FIG 3.6-43
141-11	AS (10)-2	6"	7.28	FIG 3.6-43
141-12	AS (10)-2	6"	7.28	FIG 3.6-43
141-20	AS (10)-2	8"	12.61	FIG 3.6-43
141-21	AS (7)-2	8"	12.61	FIG 3.6-43
142-20	RWCU (1)-4	4"	FIG 3.6-85	FIG 3.6-51
142-21	RWCU (1)-4	4"	FIG 3.6-85	FIG 3.6-51
142-22	RWCU (1)-4	4"	FIG 3.6-85	FIG 3.6-51
142-23	RWCU (1)-4	4"	FIG 3.6-85	FIG 3.6-51
144-24	RWCU (1)-3	4"	13.34	FIG 3.6-51
144-26	RWCU (1)-3	4"	13.34	FIG 3.6-51
144-27	RWCU (1)-3	4"	13.34	FIG 3.6-51
144-28	RWCU (1)-3	4"	13.34	FIG 3.6-51
144-29	RWCU (1)-3	6"	30.25	FIG 3.6-51
144-31	RWCU (2)-3	4"	13.34	FIG 3.6-51
144-32	RWCU (2)-3	6"	30.25	FIG 3.6-51
144-36	RWCU (2)-3	4"	13.34	FIG 3.6-53
144-56	RWCU (1)-3	4"	13.34	FIG 3.6-51
144-57	RWCU (2)-3	6"	30.12	FIG 3.6-51
144-58	RWCU (1)-3	4"	13.28	FIG 3.6-51
144-59	RWCU (2)-3	6"	30.12	FIG 3.6-49
144-60	RWCU (5)-3	6"	30.12	FIG 3.6-49

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


TABLE 3.6-6.

DESIGN BASIS BREAK LOCATIONS OUTSIDE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

M200-150 BREAK	LINE DESIGNATION	PIPE DIA.	MAX FORCE (KIPS) OR THRUST VS TIME FIGURE	LOCATION PLAN FIGURE
148-1	HS (9)-2	3"	FIG 3.6-97	FIG 3.6-60
148-2	HS (1)-2	4"	FIG 3.6-97	FIG 3.6-60
148-3	AS (11)-2	3"	FIG 3.6-97	FIG 3.6-60
148-5	HS (5)-2	2"	FIG 3.6-97	FIG 3.6-60
148-6	HS (5)-2	2"	FIG 3.6-97	FIG 3.6-60
148-7	HS (5)-2	2"	FIG 3.6-97	FIG 3.6-60
148-8	HS (5)-2	2"	FIG 3.6-97	FIG 3.6-60
148-9	HS (5)-2	2"	FIG 3.6-97	FIG 3.6-60
148-10	HS (5)-2	2"	FIG 3.6-97	FIG 3.6-60
148-11	HS (5)-2	2"	FIG 3.6-97	FIG 3.6-60
148-12	HS (5)-2	2"	FIG 3.6-97	FIG 3.6-60
148-30	HS (5)-2	3"	FIG 3.6-97	FIG 3.6-60
149-2	HCO (11)-1	4"	.182	FIG 3.6-58
149-5	HCO (11)-2	3"	.182	FIG 3.6-58
149-30	HCO (11)-2	3"	.182	FIG 3.6-58
149-31	HCO (11)-2	3"	.182	FIG 3.6-58
149-32	HCO (11)-2	3"	.182	FIG 3.6-58
149-33	HCO (11)-2	3"	.182	FIG 3.6-58
149-34	HCO (11)-2	3"	.182	FIG 3.6-60
335-1	RFW (1)-4	24"	433.12	
335-3	RFW (1)-4	24"	433.12	
335-5	RFW (1)-4	24"	433.12	
335-6	RFW (1)-4	24"	433.12	

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TABLE 3.6-6

PAGE 5 of 7

DESIGN BASIS BREAK LOCATIONS OUTSIDE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

M200 ISO BILSTEEL	LINE DESIGNATION	PIPE DIA.	MAX FORCE (KIP) OR THRUST VS TIME FIGURE	PLAN LOCATION FIGURE
342-13	HS (1) -1	6"	7.28	FIG 3.6-43
342-14	AS (9) -2	4"	3.21	FIG 3.6-43
342-25	AS (1) -2	8"	12.6	N/A
342-26	SS (1) -2	8"	12.6	N/A
342-27	AS (9) -2	4"	3.21	FIG 3.6-43
315-8	MS (1) -4	26"	444.5	FIG 3.6-44
315-30	MS (1) -4	26"	432.2	FIG 3.6-44
400-11	MS (1) -4	26"	444.5	FIG 3.6-44
400-33	MS (1) -4	26"	432.2	FIG 3.6-44
401-14	MS (1) -4	26"	444.5	FIG 3.6-44
401-30	MS (1) -4	26"	432.2	FIG 3.6-44
402-18	MS (1) -4	26"	444.5	FIG 3.6-44
402-31	MS (1) -4	26"	432.2	FIG 3.6-44
440-1	CO (3) -2	2 1/2"	1.63	N/A
440-2	CO (3) -2	2 1/2"	1.63	N/A
440-3	CO (3) -2	2 1/2"	1.63	N/A
447-19	HS (5) -1	6"	1.82	N/A
447-25	HS (5) -1	6"	1.82	N/A
447-26	HS (5) -1	6"	1.82	N/A
447-27	HS (5) -1	6"	1.82	N/A

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TABLE 3.6-6

DESIGN BASIS BREAK LOCATION OUTSIDE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

M200 ISO BREAK	LINE DESIGNATION	PIPE DIA.	MAX FORCE (KIPS) OR THRUST VS. TIME FIGURE	PLAN LOCATION FIGURE
448-15	HS (1)-1	6"	1.82	N/A
448-16	HS (1)-1	6"	1.82	N/A
448-17	HS (1)-1	6"	1.82	N/A
448-18	HS (1)-1	6"	1.82	N/A
448-19	HS (1)-1	6"	1.82	N/A
448-20	HS (1)-1	6"	1.82	N/A
448-21	HS (1)-1	6"	1.82	N/A
448-22	HS (1)-1	4"	.802	N/A
448-23	HS (1)-1	4"	.802	N/A
448-24	HS (1)-1	2"	.186	N/A
449-13	HCO (5)-1	3"	.093	N/A
449-14	HCO (5)-1	3"	.093	N/A
449-15	HCO (5)-1	3"	.093	N/A
449-16	HCO (5)-1	3"	.093	N/A
449-17	HCO (5)-1	3"	.093	N/A
449-18	HCO (5)-1	3"	.093	N/A
449-19	HCO (5)-1	3"	.093	N/A
449-20	HCO (5)-1	3"	.093	N/A
449-21	HCO (5)-1	3"	.093	N/A
449-22	HCO (5)-1	3"	.093	N/A

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
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TABLE 3.6-6.

DESIGN BASIS BREAK LOCATION OUTSIDE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

M200 ISO BREAK	LINE DESIGNATION	PIPE DIA	MAX FORCE (KIPS) OR THRUST VS TIME FIGURE	PLAN LOCATION FIGURE
450-23	HCO(S)-1	3"	.093	N/A
450-21	HCO(S)-1	3"	.093	N/A
450-25	HCO(S)-1	2½"	.060	N/A
450-26	HCO(S)-1	2½"	.060	N/A
450-27	HCO(S)-1	2½"	.060	N/A
450-28	HCO(S)-1	2½"	.060	N/A
451-6	MS(9)-4	3"	6.88	FIG 3.6-44
451-30	MS(9)-4	3"	6.88	FIG 3.6-44

No Changes



WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM  
NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2

MAIN STEAM LOOP A ISOMETRIC

FIGURE  
3.6 (A)




SUMMARY OF POSTULATED PIPE BREAK LOCATIONSCIRCUMFERENTIAL BREAKS

~~Node 215~~  
 Node 216  
~~Node 217~~  
 Node 219  
 Node 221  
~~Node 222~~  
~~Node 223~~  
 Node 224  
 Node 226  
 Node 227  
 Node 229  
 Node 230  
 Node 232  
 Node 291  
~~Node 628~~  
~~Node 630~~  
~~Node 632~~  
~~Node 634~~  
~~NODE 633~~  
~~NODE 631~~  
~~NODE 629~~  
~~NODE 627~~

LONGITUDINAL BREAKS

~~Node 218~~  
 Node 220  
 Node 225  
 Node 228  
 Node 231  
 NODE 633  
 NODE 631  
 NODE 629  
 NODE 627



SYSTEM

WITH STEAM LOOP B ISOMETRIC

FIGURE 3.6-13:

WNP-2

SUMMARY OF POSTULATED PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS

CIRCUMFERENTIAL BREAKS


LONGITUDINAL BREAKS

- ~~Node 233~~
- ~~Node 234~~
- Node 235
- Node 237
- ~~Node 238~~
- ~~Node 239~~
- Node 240
- Node 242
- ~~Node 243~~
- ~~Node 245~~
- Node 246
- Node 248
- Node 249
- Node 251
- Node 292
- Node 636
- ~~Node 638~~
- Node 640
- ~~Node 642~~
- Node 644
- NOE 214A
- ~~Node 643~~
- ~~Node 644~~
- ~~Node 645~~
- ~~Node 637~~
- ~~Node 635~~

- Node 236
- Node 241
- ~~Node 244~~
- Node 247
- Node 250
- NOE 643
- NOE 641
- NOE 639
- NOE 637
- NOE 635



No Change



AMENDMENT NO. 9  
April 1980



SUMMARY OF POSTULATED PIPE BREAK LOCATIONSCIRCUMFERENTIAL BREAKS

~~Node 252~~  
~~Node 253~~  
 Node 254'  
 Node 256'  
~~Node 257~~  
~~Node 258~~  
 Node 259'  
 Node 261'  
~~Node 262~~  
~~Node 264~~  
 Node 265'  
 Node 267'  
 Node 268'  
 Node 270'  
 Node 293'  
 Node 646' NODE 646'  
~~Node 648~~  
 Node 650' NODE 650'  
~~Node 652~~  
 Node 654'

LONGITUDINAL BREAKS


Node 255-  
 Node 260-  
~~Node 263~~  
 Node 266-  
 Node 269-  
 NODE 653 -  
 NODE 651'  
 NODE 649'  
 NODE 647'  
 NODE 645'

No Change



WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM  
1951 FAR. PROJECT NO. 2

MAIN STEAM LOOP D ISOMETRIC




SUMMARY OF POSTULATED PIPE BREAK LOCATIONSCIRCUMFERENTIAL BREAKS

~~Node 271~~  
 Node 272.  
~~Node 273~~  
 Node 275.  
 Node 277.  
~~Node 278~~  
~~Node 279~~  
 Node 280.  
 Node 282.  
 Node 283.  
 Node 285.  
 Node 286.  
 Node 288.  
 Node 290.  
~~Node 656~~  
~~Node 658~~  
~~Node 660~~  
~~Node 662~~

LONGITUDINAL BREAKS

~~Node 274~~  
 Node 276.  
 Node 281.  
 Node 284.  
 Node 287.  
~~NODE 661~~  
~~NODE 659~~  
~~NODE 657~~  
~~NODE 655~~





WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM  
 NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 12

REACTOR FEEDWATER (LINE 'A') ISOMETRIC

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WNP-2

AMENDMENT NO. 32  
1983

SUMMARY OF POSTULATED PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS

CIRCUMFERENTIAL BREAKS

LONGITUDINAL BREAKS


CIRCUMFERENTIAL BREAKS		
NODES		
85	124	115
86	126	117
88	127	118
89	129	120
90	136	130
91	100	132
93	101	137
97A	102	103
97	104	
111	105	
98	107	
99	108	
112	110	
114	133	
121	135	
123	138	


QA  
96

LONGITUDINAL BREAKS	
NODES	
87	97B
92	98A
113	100A
122	103A
125	
128	
106	
109	
134	
116	
119	
131	

Note: Break locations based on average in piping flexibility. ~~because of~~ ~~analysis not~~ complete.

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER	REACTOR FEEDWATER (LINE A)	FIG. 3.6-16b
SUPPLY SYSTEM NUCLEAR		
PROJECT NO. 2		





WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM  
NUCLEAR PROJECT (NO. 2)

REACTOR FEEDWATER (LINE 6)  
ISOMETRIC

FIGURE  
3.6-17a

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AMENDMENT NO. 32  
1983

SUMMARY OF POSTULATED PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS

CIRCUMFERENTIAL BREAK

LONGITUDINAL BREAK

	<u>NODES</u>
140	154
141	155
143	156
144	157
145	170
146	172
148	173
152 A	175
152	179
166	181
167	192
169	159
176	160
178	162
182	163
184	165
185	188
187	190
193	191
153	158

move

<u>NODES</u>	
142	152 B
147	153 A
168	155 A
177	157 A
183	
186	
171	
174	
180	
161	
164	
189	


Note: Break locations based on change in piping flexibility. ~~because stress analysis not complete.~~

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER  
SUPPLY SYSTEM NUCLEAR


REACTOR FEEDWATER (LINE B)

FIGURE  
3.6-17b

AMENDMENT NO. 132  
April 1980



FOR CONT. SEE  
FIG. 3.6-18b



No Change

FOR CONT. SEE FIG. 3.6-32a

FOR CONT. SEE FIG. 3.6-18a

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM  
 NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2

AMENDMENT NO. 9  
 April 1980

REACTOR WATER CLEANUP ISOLATION

FIGURE 3.6-18L

SUMMARY OF POSTULATED PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS

CIRCUMFERENTIAL BREAKS

~~Node 419~~  
~~Node 420~~  
~~Node 421~~  
~~Node 423~~  
~~Node 424~~  
~~Node 426~~  
~~Node 427~~  
~~Node 428~~  
~~Node 429~~

LONGITUDINAL BREAKS

~~Node 422~~  
~~Node 425~~



SUMMARY OF POSTULATED PIPE BREAK LOCATIONSCIRCUMFERENTIAL BREAKS

<u>Node 333</u>	<del>Node 372</del>	<del>Node 388</del>
<del>Node 340</del>	<del>Node 373</del>	<del>Node 389</del>
<del>Node 341</del>	<del>Node 375</del>	<del>Node 389A</del>
<del>Node 342</del>	<del>Node 377</del>	<del>Node 389B</del>
<del>Node 343</del>	<del>Node 379</del>	<del>Node 390</del>
<del>Node 344</del>	<del>Node 380</del>	<del>Node 391</del>
<del>Node 345</del>	<del>Node 381</del>	<del>Node 392</del>
<del>Node 347</del>	<del>Node 381A</del>	<del>Node 393</del>
<del>Node 348</del>	<del>Node 381B</del>	<del>Node 394</del>
<del>Node 350</del>	<del>Node 382</del>	<del>Node 395</del>
<del>Node 352</del>	<del>Node 383</del>	<del>Node 396</del>
<del>Node 365</del>	<del>Node 384</del>	<del>Node 397</del>
<del>Node 366</del>	<del>Node 385</del>	<del>Node 399</del>
<del>Node 367</del>	<del>Node 386</del>	<del>Node 400</del>
<del>Node 368</del>	<del>Node 387</del>	<del>Node 402</del>
<del>Node 370</del>		
<del>Node 370</del>		
<u>Node 357</u>		

LONGITUDINAL BREAKS

~~Node center of [341, 342, 343] (TEE)~~  
~~346~~  
~~349~~

~~Node center of [384, 385, 386] (TEE)~~  
~~374~~  
~~371~~

~~Node center of [366, 367, 368] (TEE)~~

~~Node center of [394, 395, 396] (TEE)~~  
~~398~~  
~~401~~

~~Node center of [389, 389A, 390] (TEE)~~

~~Node center of [380, 381, 381A] (TEE)~~





FIGURE  
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INCORPORATE  
CORRECT  
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AMENDMENT NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
1943



~~Amendment No. 9~~  
Amendment NO. 33

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER  
SUPPLY SYSTEM MODIFICATION

STANDARD LIQUID CONTROL  
ISOMETRIC

FILED IN  
3.6-19a

W:  
Dr  
By  
FR

WNP-2

AMENDMENT NO. 38  
1973

SUMMARY OF POTENTIAL PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS

CIRCUMFERENTIAL BREAKS

- NODE 295
- NODE 308
- NODE 310
- NODE 312
- NODE 316
- NODE 318
- NODE 319
- NODE 321
- NODE 322

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER

SUPPLY SYSTEM NUCLEAR


PROJECT NO. 2

STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL

FIGURE

3.6-106

No Change




SUMMARY OF POSTULATED PIPE BREAK LOCATIONSCIRCUMFERENTIAL BREAKS

Node 17.  
Node 18.  
Node 20.  
~~Node 21.~~  
~~Node 22.~~  
~~Node 23.~~  
~~Node 25.~~  
Node 26.  
Node 28.  
~~Node 29.~~  
~~Node 30.~~  
Node 31.

LONGITUDINAL BREAKS

Node 19.  
~~Node 24.~~  
Node 27.

No Change



SUMMARY OF POSTULATED PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS

MISCELLANEOUS BREAKS


Node 33  
Node 34  
Node 36  
~~Node 37~~  
~~Node 38~~  
~~Node 39~~  
~~Node 41~~  
Node 42  
Node 44  
~~Node 45~~  
~~Node 46~~  
Node 47

LONGITUDINAL BREAKS

Node 35  
~~Node 40~~  
Node 43



No Change



WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM  
 NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2

RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL  
 LPCI MODE (LOOP C)  
 ISOMETRIC

FIGURE  
 3.6-22a



SUMMARY OF POSTULATED PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS

PERIPHERAL BREAKS


- Node 49•
- Node 50•
- Node 52•
- ~~Node 53~~
- ~~Node 54~~
- ~~Node 55~~
- ~~Node 57~~
- Node 58•
- Node 60•
- ~~Node 61~~
- ~~Node 62~~
- Node 63•

LONGITUDINAL BREAKS

- Node 51•
- ~~Node 56~~
- Node 59•

No Change


Amendment No. 9  
April 1980



WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM  
NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2

RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL  
SHUTDOWN COOLING (LOOP A) ISOMETRIC

FIGURE  
3.6-23a




SUMMARY OF POSTULATED PIPE BREAK LOCATIONSCIRCUMFERENTIAL BREAKS

Node 65•  
Node 65A•  
Node 65C•  
~~Node 65D•~~  
~~Node 65E•~~  
Node 65G•  
Node 66•  
Node 67•  
Node 69•  
~~Node 71•~~  
NODE 70

LONGITUDINAL BREAKS

Node 65B•  
~~Node 65E~~  
Node 68•

No Change



WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2	RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SHUTDOWN COOLING (LOOP B) ISOMETRIC	FIGURE 3.6-24a
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

SUMMARY OF POSTULATED PIPE BREAK LOCATIONSCIRCUMFERENTIAL BREAKS

Node 72A  
Node 72B  
Node 72D  
Node 72E  
Node 72G  
~~Node 73~~  
~~Node 74~~  
Node 75  
~~Node 78~~  
**NODE 77**

LONGITUDINAL BREAKS

Node 72C  
Node 72F  
Node 76

No Change



WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM  
 NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2

RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL  
 SHUTDOWN COOLING SUPPLY ISOMETRIC

FIGURE  
 3.6-25a

WNP-2

SUMMARY OF POSTULATED PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS


CIRCUMFERENTIAL BREAKS


Node 79A •  
~~Node 79B •~~  
~~Node 79D •~~  
Node 79E •  
Node 79G •  
Node 79H •  
Node 79J •  
~~Node 80 •~~  
~~Node 81 •~~  
Node 82 •

LONGITUDINAL BREAKS

~~Node 79C •~~  
Node 79F •  
Node 79I •

No. Change





WNP-2

SUMMARY OF POSTULATED PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS

CIRCUMFERENTIAL BREAKS

Node 622.  
Node 623.  
Node 625.  
Node 626.

LONGITUDINAL BREAKS

Node 624.

RCIC RPV HEAD SPRAY ~~SHUTDOWN~~





WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM  
NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2

~~RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SHUTDOWN  
COOLING SUPPLY~~

FIGURE  
3.6-  
26b

No Change







No Change

WNP-2

Amendment No. 9  
April 1980


SUMMARY OF POSTULATED PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS

CIRCUMFERENTIAL BREAKS

- Node 1•
- Node 2•
- Node 4•
- Node 5•
- Node 6•
- Node 7•

LONGITUDINAL BREAKS

- Node 3•





SUMMARY OF POSTULATED PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS

CIRCUMFERENTIAL BREAKS

Node 9•  
Node 10•  
Node 12•  
Node 13•  
Node 14•  
Node 15•  
NODE III

LONGITUDINAL BREAKS

Node 11•



WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2	RHR CONDENSING MODE RCIC TURBINE STEAM ISOMETRIC	FIGURE 3.6-29a
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
SUMMARY OF POSTULATED PIPE BREAK LOCATIONSCIRCUMFERENTIAL BREAKS

~~Node 194~~  
~~Node 195~~  
~~Node 197~~  
~~Node 198~~  
~~Node 200~~  
~~Node 201~~  
~~Node 202~~  
~~Node 203~~  
~~Node 205~~  
~~Node 206~~  
~~Node 208~~  
~~Node 209~~  
~~Node 211~~  
~~Node 211A~~  
~~Node 212~~  
~~Node 212A~~  
~~Node 214~~  
~~Node 214B~~  
~~Node 214C~~  
~~Node 214D~~  
~~Node 214E~~  
~~Node 214F~~  
~~Node 214G~~  
~~Node 214H~~  
~~Node 214I~~  
~~Node 214J~~  
~~Node 214K~~  
~~Node 214L~~  
~~Node 214M~~  
~~Node 214N~~  
~~Node 214O~~  
~~Node 214P~~  
~~Node 214Q~~  
~~Node 214R~~  
~~Node 214S~~  
~~Node 214T~~  
~~Node 214U~~  
~~Node 214V~~  
~~Node 214W~~  
~~Node 214X~~  
~~Node 214Y~~  
~~Node 214Z~~  
**Node 214B**

LONGITUDINAL BREAKS

~~Node 196~~  
~~Node 199~~  
~~Node 201A~~  
~~Node 204~~  
~~Node 207~~  
~~Node 210~~  
~~Node 213~~

No Change




WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM  
NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2

MAIN STEAM VALVES DRAINAGE  
PIPING ISOMETRIC

FIGURE  
6.6-30a

SUMMARY OF POSTULATED PIPE BREAK LOCATIONSCIRCUMFERENTIAL BREAKS

<del>Node 541</del>	Node 557•	Node 574•
<del>Node 542</del>	<del>Node 558</del>	Node 576•
Node 543•	<del>Node 559</del>	Node 577•
<del>Node 544</del>	Node 560•	<del>Node 578</del>
<del>Node 545</del>	Node 562•	<del>Node 579</del>
<del>Node 546</del>	<del>Node 563</del> NODE 563•	Node 580•
<del>Node 547</del>	Node 565•	Node 582•
<del>Node 549</del>	Node 566•	Node 583•
Node 550•	Node 568•	Node 585•
<del>Node 551</del>	Node 569•	Node 586•
<del>Node 553</del>	Node 570•	Node 588•
Node 554•	<del>Node 571</del>	Node 589•
Node 556•	<del>Node 573</del>	




CONT. I.O. 4" EDR(47)-1

AMENDMENT NO. 8  
APRIL 1984

MAIN STEAM RPY LEAD VENT ISOMETRIC  
FIGURE 6-31a






SUMMARY OF POSTULATED PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS

CIRCUMFERENTIAL BREAKS

Node 663 •  
~~Node 664~~  
~~Node 666~~  
~~Node 666A~~  
~~Node 666B~~  
~~Node 667~~  
 Node 668 •  
~~Node 669~~  
~~Node 670~~  
~~Node 671~~  
~~Node 672~~  
~~Node 673~~  
~~Node 674~~  
~~Node 675~~  
 Node 675A •  
 Node 675B •  
 NODE 666C

Node 676 •  
 Node 677 •  
 Node 678 •  
 Node 679 •  
~~Node 680~~  
~~Node 681~~  
 Node 683 •  
~~Node 687~~  
~~Node 689~~  
 Node 690 •  
~~Node 692~~  
~~Node 694~~  
 Node 695 •  
~~Node 696~~  
~~Node 697~~  
~~Node 698~~  
 NODE 682 A  
 NODE 682 C  
 NODE 682 D  
 NODE 682 F  
 NODE 682 G  
 NODE 682 I  
~~NODE 682 J~~  
 NODE 683 A  
 NODE 683 B  
 NODE 683 C



WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM  
NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2

RRC REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL  
DRAIN ISOMETRIC

FIGURE  
3.6-32a

W.O.  
Draw  
By  
Title.

...E, INC.  
...adell, N.J.

*NEW*

Book No. \_\_\_\_\_ Page No. \_\_\_\_\_  
Sheet \_\_\_\_\_ Cont on Sheet \_\_\_\_\_  
Approved \_\_\_\_\_  
*ANALYSIS*

WNP-2

AMENDMENT NO. 32  
September 1983.

SUMMARY OF PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS.


CIRCUMFERENTIAL BREAK.

- NODE 717
- NODE 715
- NODE 713
- NODE 410
- NODE 409
- NODE 418
- NODE 416

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM	RRC REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL DRAIN	FIGURE 3.6-326
NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2		

No Change


AMENDMENT NO. 9  
April 1980



WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM  
NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2

MAIN STEAM PIPING (LOOP A, B, C & D)  
INSIDE MAIN STEAM TUNNEL

FIGURE  
3.6-33a



SUMMARY OF POSTULATED PIPE BREAK LOCATIONSCIRCUMFERENTIAL BREAKS

<del>Node 1</del>	<del>Node 80</del>
<del>Node 2</del>	<del>Node 117</del>
<del>Node 4</del>	<del>Node 118</del>
<del>Node 5</del>	Node 120
<del>Node 7</del>	Node 123
<del>Node 8</del>	Node 124
<del>Node 10</del>	<del>Node 125</del>
<del>Node 12A</del>	<del>Node 125A</del>
<del>Node 11</del>	<del>Node 126</del>
<del>Node 13</del>	<del>Node 127</del>
<del>Node 14</del>	<del>Node 128</del>
<del>Node 17</del>	<del>Node 129</del>
<del>Node 64</del>	<del>Node 132</del>
<del>Node 65</del>	<del>Node 168</del>
Node 68	<del>Node 169</del>
Node 70	Node 171
Node 71	Node 173
<del>Node 72</del>	Node 174
<del>Node 72A</del>	<del>Node 175</del>
<del>Node 73</del>	<del>Node 175A</del>
<del>Node 74</del>	<del>Node 176</del>
<del>Node 76</del>	<del>Node 177</del>
<del>Node 77</del>	<del>Node 180</del>

LONGITUDINAL BREAKS

Node 7A
<del>Node 10B</del>
<del>Node 12A</del>
Node 70A
<del>Node 73A</del>
<del>Node 76A</del>
Node 123A
<del>Node 126A</del>
<del>Node 129A</del>
Node 173A
<del>Node 176A</del>

