Tennessee Valley Authority

GROUNDWATER **INVESTIGATION** REPORT

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT SPRING CITY, TENNESSEE

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ARCADIS

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Groundwater Investigation Report

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Spring City, Tennessee

Prepared for Tennessee Valley Authority

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Groundwater Investigation Report

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Abbreviation/Acronym Listing

Executive Summary

Executive Summary

ARCADIS has prepared this report to document the findings of the groundwater investigation at the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) (Site) located near Spring City, Tennessee (Figure ES-1). TVA personnel initiated the investigation in March 2003 following the detection of tritium in newly-installed groundwater monitor wells associated with the Department of Energy tritium production program site preparation activity. A number of corrective measures were completed by TVA (described below) during 2003, prior to retaining ARCADIS to support their efforts. The primary objectives of the investigation were to:

- Identify the potential source(s) of tritium releases;
- **"** Characterize groundwater movement; and
- Determine the nature and extent of tritium in the subsurface environment.

Two tritium sources have been identified:

- **"** Liquid Radioactive Effluent Line (Rad Waste Line) which appears to have resulted in a dual branch tritium plume that extends from the Rad Waste Line toward the river and to the Turbine Building; and
- **"** Fuel transfer canal leak into the Unit 2 fuel transfer tube (FTT), which appears to have resulted in a tritium plume that is localized in the vicinity of the Unit 2 Shield Building.

Overview/Background

As part of planned plant modifications to produce tritium for the U.S. Department of Energy (USDOE), TVA expanded the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program by installing four additional monitor wells adjacent to the Rad Waste and Cooling Tower Blowdown Lines in December 2002. Initial samples in January 2003 indicated the presence of tritium in three of the four new monitor wells.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission Site Resident at WBN and the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation - Department of Radiological Health were notified and are being kept informed as investigations continue. No tritium or other radionuclides have been detected at levels exceeding background in water samples from off-site wells, public drinking water supplies, or the Tennessee River. In March 2003, a team consisting of both site and corporate TVA personnel was established to locate the

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source(s) of the tritium and eliminate the path(s) to groundwater. Potential sources were identified based on tritium concentrations in the component or system, location within the plant, and relative tritium concentrations and distribution in groundwater. The following components were considered as possible sources of tritium in groundwater:

- **"** Rad Waste and Cooling Tower Blowdown Lines;
- **"** Fuel Transfer Canal (FTC), Fuel Transfer Tube (FTT), Spent Fuel Pool (SFP), and Cask Loading Pit (CLP);
- Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST);
- **"** Auxiliary Building Passive Sump;
- **"** Various Auxiliary Building tanks; and
- **"** Reactor Refueling Cavity.

Work began immediately on source identification. This work included leak testing of lines and storage components, evaporation calculations of the SFP and RWST, installation and sampling of groundwater wells, inspection of drain lines, and boroscopic investigation of SFP, CLP, and FTC leak collection system channels and drains.

After the most recent refueling outage during the fall of last year, ARCADIS was retained in January 2004 to aid TVA in identifying the source(s) of tritium, define groundwater movement and tritium extent, and support remedial planning.

Summary of Groundwater Investigation Data

The primary types of new environmental data collection included hydraulic and groundwater quality information from strategically placed monitor wells. Groundwater levels were measured over the course of the investigation to determine the direction of groundwater flow and potential preferential pathways of movement. In general, regional groundwater movement is southerly across the Site toward the river, with the exception of groundwater captured by a French drain system surrounding the Unit **I** and Unit 2 Shield Building, Auxiliary Building, Control Building, and Turbine Building. Groundwater dewatering provided by the French drain, described below, has resulted in a groundwater capture zone surrounding the Power Block.

The French drain surrounding the Power Block consists of an 8-inch porous concrete pipe bedded in a horizontal blanket of gravel. A sump collects groundwater from the French drain on the east side of the Auxiliary Building. This sump continuously receives flow from both the north and south French drain lines and periodically is

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pumped based on the level in the sump. The north leg of the French drain routinely exhibits a higher flow rate than the south leg.

As part of a systematic program to determine the tritium source(s), 34 additional monitor wells were installed during 2003 and early 2004 to further delineate the extent of tritium. These wells have been periodically sampled since their installation, with a maximum tritium concentration [353,700 picocuries per liter (pCi/L) in October 2003] occurring at groundwater Monitor Well K near the Rad Waste Line, east of the Power Block. Tritium extends from this general area near the Unit 1 Cooling Tower, south toward the Tennessee River, and westward toward the Power Block. Based on the monitoring network and collected data, detectable concentrations of tritium have not yet reached the river. Relatively low concentrations of tritium were also detected around the Unit 2 Shield Building.

Recently, concentrations of tritium in the groundwater sump have been declining, which seems to have resulted from tritium abatement activities described below. The south leg of the sump continues to exhibit approximately twice the tritium concentration of the north leg. However, the total activity of tritium entering the sump is greater in the north leg (although a lower concentration) due to its higher flow rate. The presence of tritium in these two legs entering the sump suggests that two sources are likely.

Based on solute migration transport parameters and limited available information, it is estimated that the tritium plume movement is approximately 300 feet/year. Tritium is a radioactive form of hydrogen and decays with a half-life of 12.33 years, but is not susceptible to either biological or chemical degradation enhancement. Other natural attenuation parameters do not have a substantial impact on tritium retardation. That is, groundwater velocity and tritium migration are similar.

Source Assessment

Based on the distribution of tritium in groundwater and refined understanding of groundwater flow conditions, the tritium plumes observed at the Site are likely associated with two separate sources; the Rad Waste Line and the Unit 2 FrT seismic gap.

Source #1 - Rad Waste Line

Documented leaks from the Rad Waste Line appear to have resulted in tritium extending in a dual branch fashion west from the Well K vicinity to the southeast edge of the Turbine Building, and south from the Well K vicinity toward the Tennessee River

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(Figure ES-2). The Rad Waste Line, extending past Well K, was pressure tested, acoustically monitored, and excavated at several locations to identify potential leak locations. A leak was identified east of the Power Block (Figure ES-2) after overburden was excavated on May 1, 2003. The leak appeared to be caused by accelerated corrosion from the pipeline exterior due to a tear in the protective pipe wrap. The line was cut, inspected, and repaired. Through the fall of 2003, possible additional leaks in the line were investigated, but no additional leaks have been found.

The Rad Waste Line leak, identified and repaired in May 2003, is suspected of being the primary source of tritium. A portion of the tritium originating from the leak location has migrated toward the south leg of the French drain system along preferential pathways associated with the assumed relatively permeable bedding material surrounding the subsurface infrastructure piping. Another portion of the tritium plume originating from the leak appears to follow major subsurface lines toward the Tennessee River. Again, this directional behavior is likely associated with preferential groundwater movement associated with the higher permeability bedding material surrounding subsurface piping.

When WBN was constructed, engineered fill was placed over a majority of the Site. The tighter hydraulic properties make the fill more difficult for groundwater to flow through than the gravel packs surrounding the numerous pipe systems associated with facility infrastructure. Tritium migration toward the Turbine Building appears to be influenced by the south Condenser Cooling Water (CCW) discharge line running from the Turbine Building to the Unit 1 Cooling Tower. Tritium migration toward the river is strongly influenced by the Cooling Tower Blowdown Line, Waste Heat Park Lines, and other piping infrastructure, as their position within the subsurface is coincident with the groundwater table along portions of their length. Based on calculations of tritium in the south leg of the French drain, it is likely that a majority of the activity resides within the more permeable gravel packs of the discharge CCW Line and Raw Cooling Water Lines, because it cannot be fully accounted for with tritium observed in groundwater monitor wells. A majority of the groundwater monitor wells have shown decreasing concentrations of tritium, indicating that the primary source has been eliminated.

Source #2 - Unit 2 Fuel Transfer Tube Seismic Gap

In February 2003, it was identified that water was leaking into the Unit 2 Shield Building annulus, through the Unit 2 FTT sleeve connection between the Auxiliary Building and Unit 2 Shield Building. All of these units (SFP, CLP, and FTC) have the potential to be inter-connected behind the stainless-steel liner since the liner is not continuously bound in the concrete. A 1-inch seismic gap exists between the Auxiliary

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Building and Unit 2 Shield Building where the FTT passes through these buildings (Figures ES-3 and ES-4). Tritiated water, between the steel tube (20-inch diameter) and the concrete building, was observed flowing into the Unit 2 Shield Building annulus in February 2003. This water must flow across the seismic gap to get from the Auxiliary Building to the Unit 2 Shield Building, which provides a pathway to groundwater. This gap is filled with fiberglass and is glued on one side to the Unit 2 Shield Building. Potentially, water from the SFP, CLP, or FTC that has leaked behind the stainless-steel liner could migrate to the Unit 2 FIT sleeve.

Occasional FTC leakage has been identified over the past 5 to 6 years and attempted repairs were made. The individual "tell-tale" drain systems of the SFP and adjacent CLP, along with the FTC, are designed to detect leakage through the liner welds. Inspection of the "tell-tale" drain system is complicated due to its piping configuration. Neither of these drain systems have exhibited recent leakage, although investigations indicate that the drain system for the **SFP** and FTC is clogged, making leak detection by this method problematic. Subsequent efforts to clear these drain systems have resulted in a functioning drain system for the FTC. The SFP system still does not drain efficiently, and additional efforts are being developed. The Cask Loading Area drain system appears to be functioning as designed.

Leaks through the FTT sleeve and seismic gap have resulted in groundwater impact surrounding the Unit 2 Shield Building (Figure ES-3). The difference in potential head between the bottom of the FTI sleeve and the French drain directly north of the seismic gap is approximately 1.25 feet, indicating that water would flow toward the French drain from this point (either to the north or to the east). Calculations using the tritium concentrations in these areas of nearly 100 million pCi/L indicate it would take only a small volume of tritiated water to result in the concentrations being observed in the north leg of the French drain, and in groundwater monitoring points around the Unit 2 Shield Building.

Risk analysis is the process of organizing and systematically evaluating information pertaining to the likelihood and magnitude of adverse effects. In the context of environmental contamination, this typically includes separate analyses of the risks to human health and risks to ecological receptors. Actual risks to human and ecological receptors posed by tritium that has entered the environment at WBN are likely to be acceptable based on available environmental data and existing radiological screening criteria. However, risks may be perceived by the public to be higher than actual because the constituent of concern is a radionuclide. Therefore, it is important to

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demonstrate that measures are being taken to ensure protection of human health and the environment.

Based on the groundwater investigation findings and risk screening, remedial planning can be conducted to evaluate the need for and corrective action options. This process initially must identify remedial action objectives (RAOs) to establish and guide remedial planning. RAOs for the Site include:

- Protect ecological receptors in the Tennessee River from impacted groundwater;
- Prevent groundwater plume growth to ensure it does not migrate off site;
- Protect human health of plant workers from exposure to impacted groundwater; and
- **"** Remove tritium mass in plume core to assist in natural attenuation of remaining plume.

The primarily remedial technology for tritium corrective action is hydraulic control (pumping). A hydraulic control system positioned at the leading edge of the tritium plume, could be used to intercept tritiated groundwater before it reaches the Tennessee River. Prior to designing a hydraulic control system, refinement of the plume extent, and a better understanding of the engineered fill along the utility corridor would be required. Once this is completed, hydraulic testing could be conducted to develop the necessary data to design the recovery wells and size the system.

Recommendations

Based on these initial findings, the following observations/recommendations are made to correct the'tritium releases.

- **"** *Unit 2 FIT Sleeve Repair:* Tritiated water must be prevented from crossing the seismic gap in the Unit 2 FTT sleeve, or prevent water from entering the FIT sleeve. WBN is currently investigating the application of a coating/sealing system for the transfer canal liner to preclude leakage into this area. This is documented in the site Problem Evaluation Report (PER) number 12430.
- **"** *Replacement of Rad Waste Line Sections:* Because the existing Steam Generator Blowdown/Rad Waste Lines likely have minor existing leaks, continuing releases could be occurring from this line system. In order to prevent these possible current or future leaks, WBN is replacing this line under Design Change Notice (DCN) number 51690.

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- *Monitoring Program Development:* Groundwater sampling procedures have been refined over time to make improvements when necessary. These should be further revised to examine the sequence of well sampling and use of dedicated sampling equipment. A monitoring program should be designed to continue to collect those data that will provide information on current site conditions, and what is necessary to evaluate a remedial solution/progress. Once the monitoring program has met these needs, it should be reduced or eliminated.
- **"** *Refinement of Plume Extent:* Additional groundwater monitor wells are needed to better define the tritium plume and to monitor its movement at the distal end near the Tennessee River.
- **"** *Source #1 Remedial Measures:* Source #1 is somewhat controlled by inducing groundwater flow to the plant buildings by the French drain and actively pumping the groundwater sump. A hydraulic control system may be used to capture the entire plume by installing recovery wells in the downgradient leading edge of the plume, south of the plant. Aquifer testing and a fate and transport model may be used to design the hydraulic control system.
- **"** *Source #2 Remedial Measures:* Source #2 is completely contained by the French drain and actively pumping the groundwater sump. The extent of tritium in groundwater at Source #2 has likely been influenced by moderate to large storm events and underground infrastructure (i.e., RWST tunnel). Nevertheless, the plume around the Unit 2 Shield Building remains focused and contained, and no additional remedial actions are needed.

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Figure ES-1 Distribution of Tritium Concentrations in Groundwater, March 2004

Source #1 - Rad Waste Line Leak reading the Source Algebra 1 - Rad Waste Line Leak reading City, Tennessee
TVA, Watts Bar Nudear Plant, Spring City, Tennessee

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Source #2 - Unit 2 Fuel Transfer Tube Sleeve **of FT** TVA, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Spring City, Tennessee

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Source #2 - Schematic Cross-Section TVA, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Spring City, Tennessee

Introduction

1.0 Introduction

ARCADIS, on behalf of Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), has prepared this Groundwater Investigation Report to document the findings of a site investigation conducted at the TVA Watts Bar Nuclear (WBN) Plant (Site) located near Spring City, Tennessee (Figure **I-1** and Attachment A). The plant is located just downstream of the Watts Bar dam, near the Tennessee River (Figure 1-2). The WBN Plant was constructed during the mid-1970s and contains substantial infrastructure for the generation of electricity (Figure 1-3 and Attachment B). The Unit 1 Reactor began operation in 1996 and the Unit 2 Reactor has never been brought online.

This report includes background to the investigation, data collected, findings, risk evaluation summary, remediation planning, and recommendations for the path forward.

The primary objectives of the investigation were to:

- Identify the potential source(s) of tritium releases;
- Characterize groundwater movement;
- Determine the nature and extent of tritium in the subsurface environment; and
- **"** Determine preliminary remedial options to address tritium in groundwater.

This project was a collaborative effort between TVA and ARCADIS. TVA began researching the potential sources of tritium in early 2003. TVA retained ARCADIS after the fall 2003 refueling outage to aid in the investigation. During the early months of 2004, multiple project meetings and a sharing of resources resulted in identifying the sources of tritium release and accomplishment of project objectives. These findings were then presented to TVA management in April 2004. This report is meant to document the groundwater investigation, present the findings, and provide a path forward for the project.

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Background

2.0 Background

As part of planned plant modifications to produce tritium for the U.S. Department of Energy, TVA expanded the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) by installing four additional monitor wells (Wells A, B, C, and D) adjacent to the Liquid Radioactive Effluent Line (Rad Waste Line) and Cooling Tower Blowdown Lines in December 2002. Initial sampling in January 2003 indicated the presence of tritium in three of the four new monitor wells (Wells B, C, and D) (Tables 2-1, 2-2 and Appendix B).

Based on the tritium levels found in these newly-installed REMP wells, a team consisting of both site and corporate TVA personnel was established to locate the source of the tritium and eliminate the path to groundwater. The team's first task was to identify possible sources of tritium. The possible sources listed below were identified based on tritium concentration in the component or system, location within the plant, and relative tritium concentrations in the groundwater samples. These possible sources underwent evaluations utilizing visual inspections, testing, and sampling (Table 2-1).

The following components were considered as possible sources of tritium in the groundwater:

- Rad Waste and Cooling Tower Blowdown Lines;
- Fuel Transfer Canal (FTC), Fuel Transfer Tube (FTT), Spent Fuel Pool (SFP), and Cask Loading Pit (CLP);
- **"** Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST);
- **"** Auxiliary Building Passive Sump;
- **"** Various Auxiliary Building Tanks; and
- **"** Reactor Refueling Cavity.

Work began immediately on source identification. This work included the following: leak testing of lines and storage components; evaporation calculations of the SFP and RWST; installation and sampling of groundwater wells; inspection of drain lines; and boroscopic investigation of **SFP,** CLP, and FTC leak collection system channels and drains (Tennessee Valley Authority 2003). After the most recent refueling outage (fall 2003), ARCADIS was retained in January 2004 to aid TVA in identifying the source(s) of tritium, define groundwater movement and tritium extent, and support

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remedial planning. Details of the tritium investigation completed by TVA throughout 2003 and early 2004 are provided in the following sections.

2.1 Rad Waste Line

The Rad Waste Line contains liquids from the radioactive waste system and steam generator blowdown, as well as the condensate demineralizers drain. This line leaves various buildings in the plant and is routed to the Cooling Tower Blowdown Line, where it is diluted prior to discharging into the Tennessee River through two diffusers.

Because of the proximity of Well C to the Rad Waste Line, this line was suspected as the source of the tritium release. During March and April 2003, the line was pressure tested and acoustically monitored to determine the location of possible leaks. While pressurized to 75 pounds per square inch gauge (psig), testing indicated a leak rate of 2 to 2.5 gallons per minute (gpm). Excavation on May 1, 2003, confirmed a leak located in the eastern portion of the Power Block near the cooling towers (Figure 1-3). The leak appeared to be caused by accelerated corrosion from the pipeline exterior due to a tear in the protective pipe wrap. The line was cut, inspected, and repaired on May 5, 2003. Internally, the pipe appeared to be in very good condition. The line was then pressurized to 80 psig with no further indications of leakage noted indicating a successful repair.

Additional acoustic and pressure testing occurred during the summer of 2003 to determine if additional leaks in the line were present. The testing indicated the possibility of small leaks in the line. Several areas were excavated in an attempt to locate additional leaks, however, no more leaks were observed along the Rad Waste Line during this investigation.

2.2 Fuel Transfer Canal

The FTC is part of the plant system used to move reactor fuel during a refueling outage. Because the FTC is normally only filled with water during refueling outages, any leakage from the **FTC** will be intermittent. Occasional FTC leakage has been identified over the past 5 to 6 years (WBN Plant began operation in 1996). Repairs to these leaks were attempted as they were discovered. Because monitoring of potential leakage during the time the **FTC** is filled is difficult, the team spent some time in May 2003 "brainstorming" possible methods to detect leaks in this area **of** the plant. All current methods of testing (pressurizing the back of the welds with air or nitrogen, etc.) have been ruled out due to concerns over stressing the liner welds to the point of failure.

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Based on this, other physical inspections of the FTC were performed in lieu of a pressure test.

In early October 2003, during the most recent refueling outage, a mobile camera (submersible) was used to record the condition of the FTC walls and floor. This video was reviewed to determine possible inspection locations. The FTC has since been decontaminated in preparation for additional inspections and repair by coating or sealing methods.

2.3 Fuel Transfer Tube

As part of the equipment to refuel the reactor, a FIT is utilized along with other associated equipment to move fuel to and from the reactor. A bellows arrangement is utilized to separate the FTC and FIT from the Reactor Building. In January 2003, it was identified that the Unit 2 FIT bellows was leaking water into the Unit 2 Reactor Building annulus (Appendix A).

A catch basin was erected to catch the leakage and was routed to the appropriate tank. A boroscopic inspection of this bellows was performed on April 29, 2003. The inspection confirmed that the bellows to transfer tube weld was leaking. A repair method was developed which included removing the bellows and transfer tube and welding a plate over the remaining hole. This repair was completed in August 2003.

2.4 Unit **1** Refueling Water Storage Tank

The Unit I RWST is a large source of water used during refueling outages and is also a source of water to the reactor should there be a loss of coolant accident. The Unit 1 RWST is located just west of the Unit 1 reactor and is an above ground storage tank connected to the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building through an underground tunnel. The Unit 2 RWST is currently empty and has never been filled during the operation of the plant. The water from the Unit 1 RWST is used to fill the fuel transfer canal and the reactor cavity during refueling outages, and is returned to the RWST at the conclusion of the outage. As the water is mixed with reactor coolant during the time it is in the fuel transfer canal, it becomes a source of tritium.

Because the Unit 1 RWST is a large volume of water with elevated tritium concentrations [approximately 28 million picocuries per liter (pCi/L)], the integrity of the Unit 1 RWST was reviewed. The Unit I RWST was found to be losing water at a rate of approximately 150 to 200 gallons per day (gpd). Several valves associated with

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the piping to/from the Unit 1 RWST were examined and found to be leaking through the valve seat into interfacing systems. The valves were repaired, reducing the water loss to approximately 45 to 50 gpd in January 2004. Additional checks and repairs have been made since that time reducing the Unit **I** RWST leakage to approximately 15 **gpd** in early May 2004. This rate of loss is believed to be well within the range of loss that would be expected due to evaporation.

2.5 Spent Fuel Pool and Cask Loading Pit

The SFP is a large concrete pool with a stainless-steel liner, and is the in-plant storage location for fuel after it has been removed from the reactor core. The **SFP** is approximately 30 feet (ft) wide and 40 **ft** long and is located within the Auxiliary Building between the two reactors. The **SFP** depth is approximately 40 ft, with a bottom elevation of 709.23 ft msl and a maximum water elevation of 749.79 **ft** above mean sea level (msl) (the ground elevation around the Power Block is approximately 728 **ft** msl). The CLP is located immediately west of, and is connected to, the SFP. The CLP is an approximate 10 ft square with a bottom elevation of 706 **ft** msl. The remaining portion of the Cask Loading Area is immediately south of, and connected to, the CLP. It is approximately 20 ft long and 10 **ft** wide with a bottom elevation of 731 **ft** msl.

During refueling outages, the entire core is offloaded and stored in the SFP. Spent fuel which has reached the end of useful life remains stored in the SFP, while the remainder of the core, along with new fuel, is returned to the reactor vessel prior to restart. The tritium concentration in the **SFP** is approximately 95 million pCi/L. The **SFP** and the adjacent CLP have individual tell-tale drain systems to detect any leakage through the liner welds. Neither of these drains has exhibited any recent evidence of water leakage.

On June 16, 2003, and other occasions, boroscopic inspections were made of the drain lines and leak collection channels for the **SFP** and CLP to determine if there is any borated water leakage. Although the inspection area was limited due to piping configuration, the piping was not blocked and appeared to be free of any boron deposits. The CLP showed no signs of leakage, while the SFP showed minor signs of past leakage near the isolation valve. No recent leakage indications were identified. Most leak channels for **SFP,** FTC, and the Cask Loading Area were drilled, inspected, and no leakage was found. Water was poured down all leak channels indicating the FTC now drains while the **SFP** is still blocked.

Over a period of several months beginning in December 2003, water levels/makeup to the **SFP** was compared to measured level loss and estimates from an evaporation

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calculation. The water levels were measured using a pressure transducer. Also, data loggers were used to record spent fuel pool temperature and refueling area supply/exhaust air temperature and relative humidity. Results of this effort revealed that the makeup rate was approximately the same as the evaporation rate, indicating that there is either no leak in the SFP, or the leak is too small to be measured by this method.

2.6 Reactor Cavity

During the fall 2003 refueling outage, it was noted that when water was added to the Unit 1 Reactor Cavity, water was observed to be leaking into adjacent areas. A visual inspection revealed what appeared to be a tear in the liner. This tear was inspected at the end of the outage and found to be a non-penetrating welding arc-strike. Additional inspections will be required prior to adding water to the Unit **I** Reactor Cavity for the next refueling outage in the spring of 2005. However, it is noted that a cavity liner leak would be contained within the reactor containment by design, which would rule this out as a potential tritium pathway.

Summary of Groundwater Investigation Data

3.0 Summary of Groundwater Investigation Data

The following sections detail the various sources of data used for the tritium investigation.

3.1 Site Infrastructure

Because of the nature of building and operating nuclear plants, a large amount of information was available and was reviewed related to the construction and operation of site infrastructure. This information was not only used in identifying and eliminating possible sources, but was used to develop an understanding of the lithologic character of disturbed areas, and construct the various figures and plates used in this report. The following information was reviewed relating to site infrastructure:

- Site plans;
- Final Safety Analysis Report Sections 2.4 and 2.5 related to hydrology and geology (Tennessee Valley Authority 1980);
- Construction photos (Appendix A);
- **"** Groundwater Tritium Monitoring Status Report (Tennessee Valley Authority 2003); and
- Information obtained from TVA site personnel.

Native soil and bedrock have been extensively excavated and reworked in the Power Block area. In general, native soil was removed to expose the bedrock surface beneath category I features. Category I features were installed several feet to tens of feet into bedrock. Both category I and non-category I features were backfilled with engineered fill (Class A and Class B, respectively). Many subsurface infrastructure lines were backfilled with material such as crushed stone. Because materials used to backfill these lines is more transmissive than the engineered backfill, they provide a preferential groundwater flow pathway.

3.2 Geology/Hydrogeology

The Site is located within the Valley and Ridge Physiographic Province of the Appalachian Highlands. The Valley and Ridge province is characterized by linearly continuous valleys and corresponding ridges formed in part due to horizontally extensive and typically parallel low-angle thrust faults. The local drainage patterns are typically trellis in nature, being influenced regionally by underlying bedrock structural

Summary of Groundwater Investigation Data

features. The Site is located within a floodplain of the northeast-southwest trending portion of the Tennessee River.

The Site is underlain by unconsolidated soil and fill overlying the Middle Cambrian-aged Conasauga Shale Formation, present at an average depth of 706 ft msl (Attachment C) (Tennessee Valley Authority 1980). The unconsolidated zone is composed of alluvial deposits (Tennessee River flood plain) and underlying terrace deposits. The alluvium is characterized by fine-grained, well-sorted silts and clays, and minor quartz sand. The thickness of the unit is variable, averaging approximately 25 ft (Figure 3-1 and Attachments D through G).

The older terrace deposits can be subdivided into upper and lower units. Terrace sediments were deposited when the ancestral river was flowing at higher velocities in the past. The upper unit is characterized by sandy and silty clays, while the lower unit is composed of coarse grained pebbles, cobbles, and boulders within a sandy matrix (Tennessee Valley Authority 1980). The terrace deposits exhibit bench topography (approximately 30 ft in elevation change), which is evident 200 to 1,000 ft northwest of the river. The terrace deposits are variable in thickness, ranging from 30 to 46 ft. Trends within the basal gravel terrace deposits suggest that the main course of the river historically was near the northwest margin of the Site, based on the presence of courser grained deposits in that area (Tennessee Valley Authority 1980).

There is little *in-situ* saptrolite (weathered bedrock) overlying the competent Conasauga Shale Formation (Tennessee Valley Authority 1980). The Conasauga Shale is characterized by folded red, grey, or blue-grey fissile and calcareous shale with interbedded glauconitic and/or argillaceous limestone seams. At the Site, the estimated ratio of shale to limestone is 5.25:1 (Tennessee Valley Authority 1980). The regional strike of the Conasauga Formation is N35*E, and the beds generally dip at **160** toward the southeast (Tennessee Valley Authority 1980). Complex folding at the Site yields localized variations in bedding strike and dip from this average.

Category I structures are constructed into the Conasauga Shale after the removal of all unconsolidated material in the vicinity of these structures. The elevation of bedrock ranges from approximately 690 to 702 ft msl (Attachment C) in the Power Block area indicating that bedrock surface variations are minor (Tennessee Valley Authority 1980). The Conasauga Formation is approximately 2,000 ft in thickness in the vicinity of the Site.

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The alluvium and upper terrace deposits (finer grained) have been removed in the main plant area (excavated to an elevation of approximately 728 ft msl) (Tennessee Valley Authority 1980). Therefore, non-category I features are underlain by engineered backfill.

The Site is situated within the Tennessee River watershed (Figure 3-2), with the Tennessee River located to the south and east of the main plant. Local groundwater flow within the unconsolidated zone is toward the south, discharging to the Tennessee River (Figure 3-2 and Attachment H). An on-site groundwater drainage system, connected to a sump, surrounds the perimeter of the Power Block. This system influences shallow groundwater near the Power Block Building by creating an artificial groundwater divide (Figure 3-3 and Attachment I). Shallow groundwater to the north of this divide flows in a radial pattern toward the Power Block, due to the drawdown influence of the continuously-operating sump and drainage system (Figure 3-3 and Attachment I). South of the groundwater divide, flow is generally toward the Tennessee River (south) (Figure 3-2 and Attachment H).

The characteristics of various site infrastructure components have a significant impact on groundwater flow. The Yard Holding Pond (YHP), as an example, influences shallow groundwater flow by generating a groundwater mounding effect in the surrounding area. Underground piping and excessive cut and backfill during infrastructure construction also influences groundwater flow by providing preferential flow regimes within the transmissive backfill surrounding these pipes. Groundwater occurrence and movement within the Conasauga Formation bedrock is confined to small openings along fractures and bedding planes, but generally flows southward toward the Tennessee River also (Tennessee Valley Authority 1980).

3.3 Well Installation

As part of planned plant modifications to produce tritium for the U.S. Department of Energy (USDOE), TVA committed to modify the REMP by installing additional monitor wells around the WBN Plant. Four additional monitor wells (Wells A through D) were installed at Watts Bar along the existing Rad Waste and Cooling Tower Blowdown Lines. These wells were installed in December 2002.

Additional monitor wells and Geoprobe wells were installed throughout 2003 and early 2004 to delineate the extent of tritium impact to shallow groundwater. In March 2003, three additional monitor wells (Wells E, F, and **G)** were installed to further assess potential sources of tritium in the site groundwater. Wells H through S were installed during September and October 2003 and wells T through X were installed during

December 2003. These wells were typically drilled to bedrock and screened over the bottom 10-ft interval.

Wells Y, Z, and AA through LL were installed using a direct-push Geoprobe rig. Geoprobe wells are ¾4-inch inner diameter and 1-inch outer diameter polyvinyl chloride casings. Wells Y, Z, and AA through DD were installed during the final week of January 2004 and first week of February 2004. Geoprobe Wells EE through LL were installed at the end of February 2004. All Geoprobes were installed to refusal and screened over the bottom 10-ft interval.

3.4 Hydrology

WBN Plant is located within the Tennessee River watershed (Figure 3-2). The Tennessee River, particularly above Chattanooga, Tennessee, is one of the most highly regulated rivers in the United States. The TVA reservoir system is operated for flood control, navigation, and power generation, with flood control a prime purpose with particular emphasis on protection for Chattanooga, 64 miles downstream from the WBN Plant. The WBN Plant sits on the west bank of the Tennessee River, 57 miles upstream of Chickamauga Dam. Watts Bar Dam is 1.9 miles upstream of the plant. At the WBN Plant, The river is approximately 1,100 ft wide with depths ranging between 18 ft and 26 **ft** at the normal pool elevation of 682.5 ft msl (Tennessee Valley Authority 1980).

Based upon Watts Bar Dam discharge records since 1942, average daily stream flow at the plant is 27,800 cubic feet per second (cfs). Flow data for water years 1960 through 1987 indicate average summer flow rates (May to October) of 23,700 cfs and average winter flow rates (November to April) of 31,900 cfs. Channel velocities at WBN Plant average about 2.3 feet per second (fps) under normal winter conditions. Because of lower flows and higher reservoir elevations in the summer months, channel velocities average about 1.0 fps (Tennessee Valley Authority 1980).

The climate of the watershed is humid temperate. The area receives approximately 50 inches of precipitation per year. Based on a 30-year average (1971 through 2000), the wettest month of the year is March (5.71 inches) and the driest month of the year is October (2.65 inches). The wettest 3-month average is 4.58 inches/month for January through March and the driest 3-month average is 2.86 inches/month for August through October (National Weather Service 2004).

The local watershed surrounding the plant is relatively small because the plant is approximately 2,000 ft from the Tennessee River. The watershed divide is located north

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and northeast of the plant along a ridge (Figure 3-2). Precipitation that falls south of the ridge in the local watershed collects in numerous small streams that drain towards the Tennessee River. Precipitation collected by the Site's storm sewer system drains to the YHP before eventually being discharged to the river.

3.5 Tritium Distribution

Tritium was detected in the initial baseline groundwater samples taken from three of the four new groundwater monitor wells (Wells B, C, and D) installed as part of the REMP in January 2003. The maximum tritium detection during this initial sampling was 12,453 pCi/L at Well B (Appendix B). As described in Section 3.3, additional monitor wells and Geoprobe wells were installed throughout 2003 and the beginning of 2004 to delineate tritium in groundwater.

The most comprehensive and current tritium data set was collected on March 1, 2004, as a snapshot in time of plume distribution (Table 3-1). Based on this data, tritium is not present along the northem (Wells T, U, V, W, and X) and western (Wells Q, P, **0,** and N) sides of the Power Block and switchyard. Geoprobe Wells Y and Z (west and north, respectively, of the Unit 1 Reactor Building) were not sampled during this event, but previous sampling events indicate no detectable tritium concentrations at these locations. Based on the March 2004 and previous data sets, two distinct areas of tritium exist (Figures 3-5 through 3-7 and Attachment **J** and K).

The largest area of tritium concentrations in groundwater extend from the east side of the Turbine Building at Well R east to approximately Well K and then south to the YHP, with the southernmost extent of tritium being approximately Well B. The maximum tritium concentration during the March 2004 sampling event was located at Well K at 109,000 pCi/L. The maximum historical tritium concentration was also located at Well K on October 1, 2003 at 353,700 pCi/L. Monitor wells and Geoprobe wells with tritium concentrations greater than 10,000 pCi/L during the March 2004 sampling event include Wells K, L, R, GG, and KK (Figures 3-5 and 3-6). Maximum tritium concentrations in this area appear to follow preferential groundwater pathways created by underground piping infrastructure and their associated backfill. The Condenser Cooling Water (CCW) Discharge Pipes, particularly for Unit 1, Waste Heat Park Lines, Rad Waste Line, Storm Sewer Lines, and the Cooling Tower Blowdown Lines have the greatest affect on plume distribution. Tritium concentrations at Well L indicate a portion of tritium is moving toward the YHP, likely due to a set of abandoned waste heat lines that are positioned east/west along the northern portion of the YHP. Additional wells near the Intake Pump

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Station and Tennessee River (Wells F, J, D, H, B, E, and A) indicate tritium is migrating toward the river and has extended as far south as Well B.

The second area of tritium concentrations in groundwater is located surrounding the Unit 2 Reactor Building. Well BB is the only location with detectable concentrations of tritium (2,120 pCi/L) during the March 2004 sampling event. Wells CC and DD have also recently had detectable tritium concentrations, but these wells were **dry** during the March 2004 sampling event.

3.6 French Drain/Groundwater Sump

A perimeter drain encompasses the entire Power Block area (i.e., Reactor, Auxiliary, Control, Turbine, and Service Buildings) and was installed at foundation depths to prevent groundwater from entering the lower levels of the plant. The French drainpipe is a porous 8-inch concrete pipe set in crushed stone, which is approximately 2 ft in thickness. The highest elevation for the perimeter drain (French drain) is located at the southwest comer of the Service Building at 710 ft msl (ground elevation surrounding the plant is approximately 728 ft msl). Hence, groundwater entering the drain moves by gravity in two directions at a slope of 0.1% from this southwest comer. Each leg of the French drain is 1,250 ft in length and ends at an elevation of 708.75 ft msl along the east side of the Auxiliary Building. The two legs of the drain empty into a groundwater sump with a bottom elevation of approximately 700 **ft** msl. Groundwater collected in the sump is then normally pumped to Catch Basin (CB) 50 of the stormwater sewer system where it drains to the YHP.

Beginning in March 2003, tritium samples have been collected from the groundwater sump where the two legs of the French drain discharge. Tritium samples were periodically collected from this location through the remainder of 2003 and beginning of 2004 (Figure 3-8). During April and May 2003, groundwater sump concentrations were consistently between 10,000 and 15,000 pCi/L. Since that time, concentrations have steadily decreased from approximately 10,000 pCi/L to 4,000 pCi/L in February 2004 (Figure 3-7).

With elevated tritium concentrations discovered during 2003, groundwater from the sump was rerouted to the station sump, which is a monitored release point, instead of CB 50 on April 25, 2003. Groundwater pumped from the sump was returned to the normal discharge operation to the YHP via CB 50 on February 27, 2004, following installation of runtime meters on the sump pumps to allow characterization of the discharge from this release point.

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To further define the source of tritium, the two inputs were sampled (north and south leg of the French drain at the discharge point) periodically in December 2003 and January 2004. Both legs of the French drain system are collecting water with tritium. The northern French drain input to the groundwater sump consistently discharges more water (53.1 gpm) and a lower concentration $(4,700 \text{ pCi/L})$ than the southern leg of the French drain (19.4 gpm and $8,200$ pCi/L) (Figure 3-8).

3.7 Fate and Transport

Quantification of solute migration requires specification of various transport parameters and processes that control the rate, movement, mixing, sorption, and degradation of a contaminant in the subsurface. Advection defines the process of contaminant migration due to the movement of groundwater. Dispersion accounts for the spreading and mixing of the constituent due to heterogeneities and non-ideal flow paths in the soil that cause variations in the groundwater velocity, as well as Fickian diffusion driven by concentration gradients. Sorption refers to the partitioning of a contaminant between the liquid and solid phases of the aquifer. Degradation is the mass decay of a contaminant as a result of physical, chemical, and biological activity within the aquifer. Each of these processes and their effect on the movement of site-related constituents along flow pathways are summarized in the following sections.

3.7.1 Advective Water Movement

Water-level measurements taken in monitor wells and Geoprobes distributed spatially across the Site provide the necessary information to describe the direction of groundwater movement. These water-level measurements are combined with effective porosity and hydraulic conductivity information to determine the rate or speed of groundwater movement. In general, water-level measurements are used to define the slope of the water table (gradient) and direction of movement; groundwater moves down the slope or gradient from high water-table elevations to lower water-table elevations. Based upon both water levels and constituent concentrations, the primary flow pathways are toward the French drain near the power block and toward the Tennessee River once out of the influence of the French drain (Figures 3-2 and 3-3).

The movement of a solute with the groundwater, or advective transport, can be computed using Darcy's Law. Darcy's Law is written as follows:

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$q = Ki$ (1)

where, q is the Darcian flux $(\text{ft}^3/\text{day}/\text{ft}^2 \text{ or ft}/\text{day})$, K is the hydraulic conductivity (ft/day), and i is the hydraulic gradient **(ft/ft).** Since water can only move through the pore spaces, the Darcian flux is not the velocity at which groundwater is moving. The average linear velocity of groundwater is higher as water moves only through the voids or pore spaces of the soil:

 $v = \frac{q}{\theta}$ (2)

where v is the velocity (ft/day) and θ_e is the effective porosity (ft³/ft³). The effective porosity for the unconsolidated sediments and engineered backfill at the Site was assumed to be 0.20. The average gradient from the groundwater divide to the river is 0.018 and the average gradient to the French drain is 0.02 based on the March 2004 water-level information. Aquifer testing was not conducted as part of this investigation. Therefore, hydraulic conductivity was determined using two different methods using the flow from the French drain and by assuming a known velocity of the existing tritium plume.

The known flow in the French drain can be used to calculate the hydraulic conductivity by computing the flux of groundwater into the drain assuming all water flowing in is from groundwater. The average linear velocity of the groundwater into the French drain multiplied by the area through which the groundwater flows will yield the flow in the French drain. The average flow in the French drain (both legs combined) for the six sampling events is 72.5 gpm or 13,956 ft^3 /day (Figure 3-8). The area through which groundwater flows into the French drain is the length of the French drain (both legs, 2,500 **ft)** multiplied by the height of the saturated interval emptying into the drain (approximately 10 ft). Also, groundwater is assumed not to flow to the French drain from inside the loop because the plant was built on bedrock (i.e., not unconsolidated deposits). The hydraulic conductivity calculated using an effective porosity of 0.20 and an average gradient of 0.02 is 5.6 ft/day.

The hydraulic conductivity can also be calculated by assuming tritium is moving at the same velocity of groundwater and the tritium leak began in 1996 when the plant first went to criticality. The length of the plume (from Geoprobe JJ to just south of Well B) is 2,000 **ft,** and this plume was assumed to be created over a timeframe of 7 years (Figure 3-4). This results in a groundwater/plume velocity of 285.7 ft/year or

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0.78 ft/day. The hydraulic conductivity using this method is *8.7* ft/day by assuming an effective porosity of 0.20 and an average gradient during that timeframe of 0.018.

These two methods resulted in relatively similar hydraulic conductivities and provide confidence in the average hydraulic conductivity of the unconsolidated sediments and engineered backfill, the age of the plume, and the velocity of the plume. Based on these results, the edge of the plume (defined as 1,000 pCi/L) will reach the Tennessee River (a distance of approximately 600 ft) in slightly more than 2 years.

3.7.2 Sorptive Processes and Degradation

The term sorption refers to the removal of a solute from solution through association with a solid surface. This attraction between a soil surface and a solute can result from a number of forces. The effects of these forces or processes are commonly described by sorption isotherms. These isotherms assume that when a solution contacts a solid, the solute will tend to transfer from liquid to solid until the concentration of solute in solution is in equilibrium with the soil concentration. These processes, especially for inorganic compounds, tend to be pH dependent, not always completely irreversible, and site specific. With respect to the constituents found in groundwater at the WBN site, this process has no effect on the movement of tritiated water and only a minor effect on the movement of boron; therefore, this process is not important to understanding the fate and transport of tritium. Tritium is a radioactive form of hydrogen and has a half-life of 12.33 years. Tritium is not susceptible to either biological or chemical degradation enhancement.

3.7.3 Dispersion

Dispersion is the process whereby contaminants spread over a greater region than would be predicted solely from the average linear groundwater velocity. Dispersion occurs at multiple scales. The primary cause of dispersion is variations in groundwater velocity, on a microscale by variations in pore size and on a macroscale by variations in hydraulic conductivity. The hydrodynamic dispersion tensor is complex. For isotropic media, the dispersion coefficient written to incorporate molecular diffusion (described by Fick's Law), is calculated as follows:

$$
D_c = \alpha_d v + D \tag{3}
$$

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where D_c is the dispersion coefficient $[L^2/T]$, α_d is the dispersivity [L], v is the groundwater velocity [L/T], and D the molecular diffusion coefficient [L 2 /T]

While the general process of dispersion is understood, the dispersivity of a formation is not easily measured or quantified at the field scale. Therefore, as dispersion is related to porewater velocities, plume travel distance is the single most important factor that can be correlated to dispersivity. For the WBN site, the advective transport of tritium will far exceed the effects of dispersivity and its effects can therefore be considered negligible.

If tritiated groundwater were to discharge into the Tennessee River, the tritium would significantly be diluted. Assuming a 400-ft wide tritium plume discharging into the Tennessee River at a rate of 5.8 gpm, a tritium concentration of 1,000 pCi/L results in a surface-water concentration of 0.0024 pCi/L. A 10,000 pCi/L tritium concentration would result in a surface-water concentration of 0.024 pCi/L and a 100,000 pCiJL tritium concentration would result in a surface-water concentration of 0.24 pCi/L. Background tritium concentrations are approximately 150 pCi/L. Although these concentrations would not pose an unacceptable risk or even be detectable, TVA is going forward with plans to ensure tritium does not reach the Tennessee River (Section 6.0).

Source Assessment

4.0 Source Assessment

Based on the distribution of tritium in groundwater and refined understanding of groundwater flow conditions, the tritium plumes observed at WBN are likely associated with two separate sources. This conclusion is bolstered by the differing, yet consistent, tritium concentrations discharging from the north and south legs of the French drain. The investigation and data collected indicate that Source #1 is the result of a leak in the Rad Waste Line near Geoprobe Well JJ, and Source #2 is a result of a leak in the FIT Sleeve through the Unit 2 Shield Building seismic gap. Source #1 is partially controlled by groundwater discharge from the French drain and Source #2 is completely controlled by the French drain. The following sections detail each of the two sources.

4.1 Source #1 - Rad Waste Line

Documented leaks from the Rad Waste Line appear to have resulted in tritium extending in dual branch fashion west from the Well K vicinity to the southeast edge of the Turbine Building, and south from the Well K vicinity towards the Tennessee River (Figure 4-1). The Rad Waste Line was pressure tested, acoustically monitored, and excavated at several locations to identify potential leak locations. A leak was identified east of the Power Block (Figure 4-1) after overburden was excavated on May 1, 2003. The leak appeared to be caused by accelerated corrosion from the pipeline exterior due to a tear in the protective pipe wrap. The line was cut, inspected, and repaired. Through the fall of 2003, possible additional leaks in the line were investigated, but no additional leaks have been found.

The Rad Waste Line leak, identified and repaired in May 2003, is suspected of being the primary source of tritium. A portion of the tritium originating from the leak location has migrated toward the south leg of the French drain system along preferential pathways associated with the CCW Lines and relatively permeable bedding material. Another portion of the tritium originating from the leak appears to follow major subsurface lines (i.e., Cooling Tower Blowdown Line, Waste Heat Park Lines, and storm drains) towards the Tennessee River. Again, this directional behavior is likely associated with preferential groundwater movement associated with the higher permeability bedding material surrounding subsurface piping.

When the WBN Plant was constructed, engineered fill was placed over a majority of the Site. The tighter hydraulic properties make the fill more difficult for groundwater to flow through than the gravel packs surrounding the numerous pipe systems associated

Source Assessment

with facility infrastructure. Tritium migration towards the Turbine Building appears to be influenced by the south CCW Discharge Line running from the Turbine Building to the Unit 1 Cooling Tower. Tritium migration toward the river is strongly influenced by the Cooling Tower Blowdown Line, Waste Heat Park Lines, and other piping infrastructures, as their position within the subsurface is coincident with the groundwater table along portions of their length. Based on calculations of tritium in the south leg of the French drain, it is likely that a majority of the activity is not being• observed in groundwater monitor wells and is within the more permeable gravel packs of the discharge CCW Line and Raw Cooling Water Lines. A majority of the groundwater monitor wells has shown decreasing concentrations of tritium, indicating that the primary source has been eliminated.

4.2 Source #2 - Unit 2 Fuel Transfer Tube Seismic Gap

In February 2003, it was identified that water was leaking into the Unit 2 Shield Building annulus through the Unit 2 FTT sleeve connection between the Auxiliary and Unit 2 Shield Buildings. All of these units (SFP, CLP, and FTC) have the potential to be inter-connected behind the stainless-steel liner since the liner is not continuously bound in the concrete. A I-inch seismic gap exists between the Auxiliary Building and Unit 2 Shield Building where the FTT passes through these buildings (Figures 4-2 and 4-3). Tritiated water, between the steel tube (20-inch diameter) and the Concrete Building, was observed flowing into the Unit 2 Shield Building annulus in February 2003. This water must flow across the seismic gap to get from the Auxiliary Building to the Unit 2 Shield Building, which provides a pathway to groundwater. This gap is filled with fiberglass and is glued on one side to the Unit 2 Shield Building. Potentially, water from the SFP, CLP, or FTC that has leaked behind the stainless-steel liner could migrate to the Unit 2 FTT sleeve.

Leaks through the FTT sleeve and seismic gap have resulted in groundwater impact surrounding the Unit 2 Shield Building (Figures 4-2 and 4-3). Occasional FTC leakage has been identified over the past 5 to 6 years. The SFP and adjacent CLP, along with the FTC, have individual "tell-tale" drain systems to detect leakage through the liner welds. Neither of these drain systems has exhibited recent leakage, although recent investigations indicate that the drain system for the **SFP** and FTC is clogged, so evidence of leakage by this method is problematic. Subsequent efforts to clear these drain systems have resulted in a functioning drain system for the FTC. The SFP system continues to not drain and additional efforts are under way. The Cask Loading Area drain system appears to be functioning as designed. Inspection of the "tell-tale" drain system is further complicated due to its piping configuration.

Source Assessment

The difference in potential head between the bottom of the FTT sleeve and the French drain directly north of the seismic gap is approximately 1.25 **ft,** indicating that water would flow towards the French drain from this point (either to the north or to the east). Calculations using the tritium concentrations in these areas of nearly 100 million pCi/L indicate it would take a small volume of tritiated water to result in the concentrations being observed in the north leg of the French drain, and in groundwater monitoring points around the Unit 2 Shield Building.
Risk Summary

5.0 Risk Summary

Risk analysis is the process of organizing and systematically evaluating information pertaining to the likelihood and magnitude of adverse effects. In the context of environmental contamination, this typically includes separate analyses of the risks to human health and the risks to ecological receptors. However, both human health and ecological risk assessment consist of fundamentally similar elements. These elements include a problem formulation (description), exposure analysis, effects analysis (i.e., toxicity), and risk characterization. These elements are implicitly included in this risk summary, but only the most essential factors are discussed.

5.1 Site Conceptual Exposure Model

Exposure, in the context of human health and ecological risk, is defined as the contact of a receptor with a chemical or physical agent. For exposure to occur, a source of contamination or contaminated media must exist which serves as either **1)** a point of exposure or 2) transports contaminants away from the exposure unit to a point where exposure could occur. In addition, a receptor must come into either direct contact (i.e., ingestion, inhalation, dermal contact, or external exposure) or indirect contact (ingestion of foodstuffs that have bioaccumulated contaminants within their systems) with the contaminant. This concept, exposure pathway, includes the elements of a contaminant source, contaminated environmental media, exposure point, exposure route, and receptor.

Based on the activity patterns of a population, any given individual may be exposed to more than one exposure pathway. Therefore, the exposure assessment must also evaluate the activity patterns of the potential receptors and determine what combination, if any, of exposure pathways an individual might be exposed to. This evaluation results in the generation of exposure scenarios. Exposure scenarios represent the combination (if applicable) of exposure pathways that an individual could be exposed to based on their activity patterns. The result of an exposure pathways analysis is the development of a site conceptual exposure model (Figure 5-1).

5.2 Human Health

The site conceptual exposure model (Figure 5-1) indicates that currently no completed exposure pathways are known or suspected. Surface soil was not affected by the release and does not serve as a contaminant source. Releases of tritium initially affected subsurface soil and subsequently groundwater. The contaminated

Risk Summary

environmental media, groundwater, is not used as a source of potable water nor for process applications. No residential drinking water wells are located within the area of impact nor are anticipated to be installed.

Anticipated future maintenance or construction activities at the facility (on site) related to operation/upgrades of plant infrastructure could result in potential exposure of construction/excavation workers to impacted groundwater. This is considered a viable exposure pathway based on the known extent of the groundwater plume, the existence of preferential flow pathways (i.e., underground piping/conduits), and the relatively shallow depth to groundwater. Human exposure to tritium in groundwater could occur via incidental ingestion, inhalation, or dermal contact.

Potential future off-site exposure to receptors could occur as a result of the migration of affected groundwater to surface water. The Tennessee River is immediately downgradient of the facility and is used for recreational and navigational purposes. Human exposure to tritium in surface water during recreational activities could occur via incidental ingestion, inhalation, and dermal contact.

An analysis of potential adverse effects is the counterpart to a review of potential exposure pathways. Two important effects-based values for the protection of human health are drinking water standards and preliminary remediation goals. The drinking water Maximum Contaminant Level (MCL) for gross beta emissions is 4 millirems per year which equates to 20,000 pCi/L of tritium. The preliminary remediation goal based on exposure via incidental ingestion of water as part of a recreational scenario is 290,000 pCi/L (U.S. Department of Energy 2002). Based on these screening values, it is unlikely that the existing tritium contaminated groundwater will pose an unacceptable risk to future human receptors. This is especially true given the substantial dilution that would occur if the tritiated groundwater were to discharge to the river. As noted above, there currently are no known or suspected completed exposure pathways.

5.3 Ecological

The site conceptual exposure model (Figure 5-1) indicates that currently there are no known or suspected completed exposure pathways for ecological receptors. Future completed exposure pathways may exist for off-site receptors. However, any potential exposures for ecological receptors are likely to be well below typical levels of concern.

Risk Summary

Aquatic biota are the ecological receptors of primary concern at this site, based on the constituent of concern, affected media, and environmental setting. Terrestrial animals are not expected to be exposed to tritium in groundwater and the terrestrial vegetation in the area is part of the maintained facility, rather than a natural environment. Natural populations of aquatic biota do not occur on-site (i.e., the YHP is a treatment facility and is not maintained as an ecological habitat). Therefore, there are no known current or future on-site exposure pathways for aquatic biota.

Off-site ecological exposures could occur in surface water at the downgradient boundary of the Site. This exposure pathway is not believed to be a completed exposure pathway under current conditions. However, the groundwater tritium plume has the potential to reach the site boundary in the future. This could lead to a completed exposure pathway for aquatic biota in the river (Figure 5-1).

Although an ecological risk assessment is not warranted at this time, a brief review of the available screening values for tritium can provide a valuable perspective on the potential for future ecological impacts. The USDOE recently developed "A Graded Approach for Evaluating Radiation Doses to Aquatic and Terrestrial Biota" (U.S. Department of Energy 2002). This peer-reviewed USDOE technical standard is the first and only comprehensive guidance document on this topic and is the basis for the discussion of potential ecological impacts that follows.

The USDOE graded approach (U.S. Department of Energy 2002) provides screening values for water, sediment, and soil called Biota Concentration Guides (BCGs). A BCG is the concentration of a radioactive isotope (e.g., pCi/L) that is estimated to result in a dose rate (e.g., Rad/d) equivalent to the consensus safe exposure level for the receptor being evaluated (i.e., 1.0 Rad/d for aquatic animals and terrestrial plants and 0.1 Rad/d for terrestrial animals). BCGs are available for four classes of ecological receptors: aquatic animals, riparian animals, terrestrial animals, and terrestrial plants. The BCGs for tritium in water are presented on Table **5-1.**

Based on these conservative screening values, potential ecological impacts due to exposure to the existing tritium contaminated groundwater are highly unlikely. It is also noteworthy that tritium does not bioaccumulate. For example, the USDOE Graded Approach used conservative uptake factors (concentration ratios) for tritium that ranged from 0.2 to 1.0 (U.S. Department of Energy 2002). A value less than or equal to 1.0 indicates that receptor organism will have the same or lower concentration of the contaminant than does the media to which it is exposed. Therefore, there is no

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Risk Summary

indication of potential ecological impacts via food chain exposure pathways for tritiated groundwater.

5.4 Risk Conclusions

Actual risks to human and ecological receptors are acceptable based on available environmental data and existing radiological screening criteria. However, risks may be perceived by the public to be higher than actual because the constituent of concern is a radionuclide. Therefore, risk managers must rigorously demonstrate that remedial measures are adequate to ensure protection of human health and the environment. Additionally, risk management activities should include a risk communication component.

Remediation Planning Summary

6.0 Remediation Planning Summary

Recent assessment activities indicate that site groundwater has been impacted by tritiated process water. Two potential tritium sources have been identified; 1) Rad Waste Line, which appears to have resulted in a dual branch tritium plume that extends from the Rad Waste Line toward the river and toward the Turbine Building; and 2) Unit 2 FTT sleeve, which appears to have resulted in a tritium plume that is localized in the vicinity of the Unit 2 Shield Building. Repairs of the component infrastructure responsible for the release are already underway. All of Source #2 and a portion of Source #1 are captured by ongoing recovery at the French drain groundwater sump. The portion of the plume not captured has resulted in migration of tritiated groundwater southward toward the YHP and to the Tennessee River. This portion of the plume, and associated groundwater movement, appears to be preferentially following the bedding material surrounding the utilities, which run downgradient from the plant to the river. Since tritium does not sorb to soil, the plume is migrating at the same rate as groundwater velocity.

Remedial action objectives (RAOs) must be established to guide remedial planning and any resulting actions. RAOs are typically selected based on removing unacceptable risk to receptors, both current and potential future. The RAOs for the Site are designed to remove unacceptable risk to human receptors, protect ecological resources in the Tennessee River, and control/prevent plume growth. RAOs for the Site include:

- Protect ecological receptors in the Tennessee River from impacted groundwater;
- Prevent groundwater plume growth to ensure it does not migrate off site;
- **"** Protect human health of plant workers from exposure to impacted groundwater; and
- **"** Remove tritium mass in plume core to assist in natural attenuation of remaining plume.

Since the discharge from the YHP is monitored and tritium levels are very low (<1,000 pCi/L), no mitigation measures are likely necessary. However, additional migration of the plume toward the river should be monitored or controlled. Minimizing continued downgradient migration of the plume toward the river can only be achieved through some type of hydraulic control. An example of this commonly used technique would involve constructing a series of extraction wells (or trench) along the downgradient edge of the plume. Alternatively, hydraulic control can be accomplished by using phreatophytic vegetation to transpire tritiated water to the atmosphere,

Remediation Planning Summary

however, this approach would take longer to be effective and may not be appropriate for the WBN site (i.e., deep water table and preferential flow).

Tritium has a half life of 12.33 years. Aside from this natural decay, tritiated water has the same physical characteristics as normal water. As a result, treatment technologies (e.g., ion exchange, adsorption, precipitation, etc.) normally used to remove chemicals or compounds from water will not separate or remove tritiated water from normal water. Therefore, options for integrating extracted groundwater into the plant process stream need to be evaluated. Although the water is not "treated", downgradient receptors are protected as concentrations are sufficiently reduced such that the associated risk is neglible.

Control and/or management of plume migration can be accomplished through a complete understanding of site conditions. This would allow quantification of tritium flux into the Tennessee River and permit design of a hydraulic containment system to prevent a release of tritium to surface water. Prior to designing a hydraulic control system, refinement of the plume extent, a fate and transport model, and a better understanding of the engineered fill along the utility corridor would be required. Once this is completed, hydraulic testing would be conducted to develop the necessary data to design the recovery wells and size the system.

Recommendations

7.0 Recommendations

Based on these initial findings, the following observations/recommendations are made to correct the tritium releases.

- *Unit 2 FTT Sleeve Repair:* Tritiated water must be prevented from crossing the seismic gap in the Unit 2 FTT sleeve, or prevent water from entering the FTT sleeve. *WBN* is currently investigating the application of a coating/sealing system for the transfer canal liner to preclude leakage into this area. This is documented in the Site Problem Evaluation Report (PER) number 12430.
- **"** *Replacement of Rad Waste Line Sections:* Because the existing Steam Generator Blowdown/Rad Waste Lines likely have minor existing leaks, continuing releases could be occurring from this line system. In order to prevent these possible current or future leaks, WBN is replacing this line under the Design Change Notice (DCN) number 51690.
- **"** *Monitoring Program Development:* Groundwater sampling procedures have been refined over time to make improvements when necessary. These should be further revised to examine the sequence of well sampling and use of dedicated sampling equipment. A monitoring program should be designed to continue to collect those data that will provide information on current site conditions, and what is necessary to evaluate a remedial solution/progress. Once the monitoring program has met these needs, it should be reduced or eliminated.
- **"** *Refinement of Plume Extent:* Additional groundwater monitor wells are needed to better define the tritium plume and to monitor its movement at the distal end near the Tennessee River.
- **"** *Source #1 Remedial Measures:* Source #1 is somewhat controlled by inducing groundwater flow to the plant buildings by the French drain and actively pumping the groundwater sump. A hydraulic control system may be used to capture the entire plume by installing recovery wells in the downgradient leading edge of the plume, south of the plant. Aquifer testing and a fate and transport model may be used to design the hydraulic control system.
- **"** *Source #2 Remedial Measures:* Source #2 is completely contained by the French drain and actively pumping the groundwater sump. The extent of tritium in groundwater at Source #2 has likely been influenced by moderate to large storm events and underground infrastructure (i.e., RWST tunnel). Nevertheless, the plume around the Unit 2 Shield Building remains focused and contained, and no additional remedial actions are needed.

References

8.0 References

- U.S. Department of Energy. 2004. Risk Assessment Information System. http://risk.lsd.ornl.gov\rap hp.shtml.
- U.S. Department of Energy. 2002. A Graded Approach for Evaluating Radiation Doses to Aquatic and Terrestrial Biota. Office of Environment, Safety & Health, Air, Water, and Radiation Division. Washington, D.C. July 2002.

National Weather Service. 2004. Morristown, Tennessee.

Tennessee Valley Authority. 2003. Groundwater Tritium Monitoring Status Report. Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. November 2003.

Tennessee Valley Authority. 1980. Final Safety Analysis Report. Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.

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January 2003 - Groundwater samples collected from new mnonitor wells (A through M) indicated tritium in 3 **of** the 4 wells (Wells B, C, and 0)

January 2003 - It was identified that the Unit 2 FTT bellows was leaking water into the Unit 2 Reactor Building

March 2003 - TVA team formed to determine and eliminate the source(s) of tritium in groundwater

- March/April 2003 Pressure testing and soil sampling around the Rad Waste Line
	- May 2003 **-** Leak identified in Rad Waste Line and line was cut, inspected, and repaired
	- June 2003 Boroscopic inspections were made of the drain lines for the SFP and the CLP
	- August 2003 Repair method was developed for FTT by removing the bellows and transfer tube and placing a plate over the remaining hole
	- October 2003 Refueling outage/initiation of tritium program
	- October 2003 Mobile camera (submersible) was used to record the condition of the FTC walls and floor
- December 9, 2003 Initial Site Meeting (TVA and ARCADIS)
- January 9. 2004 Project Kick-Off Meeting (TVA and ARCADIS)
- January 23, 2004 Team Progress Meeting (TVA and ARCADIS)
- February **13,** 2004 -Team Progress Meeting (TVA and ARCADIS)
	- March i, 2004 Comprehensive "snapshot" sampling of all wells for tritium and measurement of all well water levels
- March **1 1,** 2004 Team Progress Meeting to present findings (TVA and ARCADIS)
- April i6, 2004 Presentation to TVA plant management of tritium investigation findings
	- CLP Cask Loading Pit
	- FTC Fuel Transfer Canal
	- FTT Fuel Transfer Tube
	- REMP Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program
	- SFP Spent Fuel Pool
	- TVA Tennessee Valley Authority

Table 2-2. Well Summary and Water Level

Tennessee Valley Authority Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Spring City, Tennessee

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GW - groundwater 1

msl - mean sea level NA **-** not availabie

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Table 3-1. Groundwater Tritium Concentrations (September 2003 - March 2004) Tennessee Valley Authority

Note: all values in picocuries per liter.

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NI - not installed

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Table 3-1. Groundwater Tritium Concentrations* (September 2003 - March 2004) Tennessee Valley Authority Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Spring City, Tennessee

Note: all values in picocuries per liter

N0 *- not* installed **-- -** not measured

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Table 3-1. Groundwater Tritium Concentrations* (September 2003 - March 2004) Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

Note: all values in picocuries per liter

NI - not installed

- -not measured

Page 4 of 4

ARCADIS

Table 3-1. Groundwater Tritium Concentrations* (September 2003 - March 2004)
Tennessee Valley Authority Matts Bar Nuclear Plant Spring City, Tennessee

Note: all values in picocuries per liter

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NI - not installed

-- - not measured

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Table **5-i.** Water-Only Biota Concentration Guide for Tritium

Tennessee Valley Authority Matts Bar Nuclear Plant Spring City, Tennessee

Source: U.S. Department of Energy 2002 BCG **-** Biota Concentration Guides pCi/L - picocuries per liter

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Figure 1-1 Regional Location Map TVA, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Spring City, Tennessee

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ARCADIS Figure 1-2

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E40084DWG / 13AUG2004 BH

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ARCADIS Figure 3-2

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Water Table, March 2004
TVA, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Spring City, Tennessee

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E40028.DWG / 17JUN2004 BA

TN000607.0001 / GW INV

E40029.DWG / 17JUN2004 BA

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Figure 3-4 Distribution of Tritium Concentrations in Groundwater, March 2004

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E40032.DWG-2 / 17JUN2004 Ba

ARCADIS Figure 3-5 Pigure 3-5 Distribution of Tritium Concentrations in Groundwater at Power Block, March 2004 **TVA, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Spring City, Tennessee**

ARCADIS Figure 3-6

Three-Dimensional Representation of Tritium Plume TVA, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Spring City, Tennessee

Tritium Concentrations in Sump Groundwater TVA, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Spring City, Tennessee

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Figure 3-8
Tritium Loading in Sump Groundwater TVA, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Spring City, Tennessee

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Figure 4-2 Source #2 - Unit 2 Fuel Transfer Tube Sleeve TVA, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Spring City, Tennessee

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E40036.DWG / 17JUN2004 Ba

Exhibit 4-3 Source #2 - Schematic Cross-Section TVA, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Spring City, Tennessee

Figure 5-1 **Site Conceptual Exposure Model** TVA, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Spring City, Tennessee

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Appendix A

Site Photographs

ARCADIS Appendix A - Site Photographs TVA, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Spring City, Tennessee

Photograph A-1. Fuel Transfer Tube Sleeve Leak in Unit 2 Reactor Building *Photographed May 30, 2003.*

TNO00607.0001 *I* SITE CHAR

ARCADIS Appendix A - Site Photographs TVA, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Spring City, Tennessee

Photograph **A-2.** View west from Unit 1 Cooling Tower of site construction. *Photographed April 1975.* Note condenser cooling water effluent lines, oriented east/west, emanating from south end of turbine building

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ARCADIS Appendix A - Site Photographs TVA, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant,

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Spring City, Tennessee

Photograph A-3. View east from Auxiliary Building toward Unit **1** Cooling Tower of the Condenser Cooling Water Intake and Discharge Pipe construction. *Photographed May 1975*

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ARCADIS Appendix A - Site Photographs TVA, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Spring City, Tennessee

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Photograph A-4. View east from Auxiliary Building toward Unit 1 Cooling Tower of the Condenser Cooling Water Intake and Discharge Pipe construction. *Photographed June 1975*

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Appendix B

Historical Tritium Data

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Table B-i. Groundwater Tritium Concentrations (August 2002 - August **2003)** Tennessee Valley Authority Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Spring City, Tennessee

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Note: **All** values in picocuries per liter.

NI - not installed

-- - not measured

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Table B-i. Groundwater Tritium Concentrations (August 2002 - August **2003)** Tennessee Valley Authority Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Spring City, Tennessee

Note: All values in picocuries per liter.

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-- - not measured

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NI - not installed

ARCADIS Page 3 of 3

Table B-i. Groundwater Tritium Concentrations (August 2002 - August **2003)** Tennessee Valley Authority | Watts Bar Nuclear Plant | Spring City, Tennessee

Note: All values in picocuries per liter.

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NJ- not installed

-- - not measured

ARCADIS

Tennessee Valley Authority	Watts Bar Nuclear Plant	Spring City, Tennessee				
Date	Concentration					
3/31/03	8,943					
4/2/03		8,002				
4/4/03		8,135				
4/7/03		7,808				
4/9/03		7,606				
4/11/03		7,255				
4/14/03		8,978				
4/16/03		9,012				
4/18/03		9,673				
4/21/03		10,700				
4/23/03		10,500				
4/30/03		15,070				
4/30/03		12,200				
5/1/03		11,600				
5/2/03		11,850				
5/5/03		14,540				
5/6/03		9,213				
5/7/03		10,140				
5/8/03		10,880				
5/9/03		11,910				
5/12/03		12,600				
5/13/03		10,360				
5/14/03		12,750				
5/16/03		12,630				
5/19/03		10,800				
5/21/03		12,500				
5/23/03		11,700				
5/27/03		9,864				
5/29/03		10,100				
6/2/03		10,100				
6/4/03		9,825				
6/5/03		21,510				
6/6/03		7,990				
6/9/03		7,284				
6/11/03		8,351				
6/13/03		7,666				
6/16/03		8,473				
6/18/03		7,140				
6/20/03		6,399				
6/23/03		7,010				
6/25/03		7,040				
6/27/03		6,909				
6/30/03		6,965				

Table B-2. Groundwater Sump Tritium Concentrations

Note: **All** values in picocuries per liter.

Page 2 of 2

ARCADIS

Tennessee Valley Authority	Watts Bar Nuclear Plant	Spring City, Tennessee			
Date	Concentration				
7/2/03		5,552			
7/3/03		4,496			
7/7/03		6,757			
7/9/03		6,200			
7/11/03		6,866			
7/14/03		7,240			
7/21/03		6,360			
7/29/03		8,370			
7/31/03		5,630			
8/2/03		6,700			
8/4/03		5,930			
8/7/03		6,010			
8/12/03		7,530			
8/14/03		6,190			
8/21/03		6,589			
8/28/03		8,200			
9/2/03		8,820			
9/4/03		10,500			
9/9/03		6,950			
9/16/03		5,870			
9/24/03		6,430			
10/2/03		8,453			
10/8/03		7,619			
10/19/03		5,803			
10/30/03		9,734			
11/13/03		4,256			
11/21/03		4,640			
12/1/03		5,040			
12/17/03		5,881			
12/22/03		5,560			
12/30/03		4,680			
1/21/04		4,390			
1/26/04		4,020			
2/2/04		5,120			
2/9/04		$\overline{}$			
2/16/04		4,378			
2/23/04		4,140			

Table B-2. Groundwater Sump Tritium Concentrations

Note: Note: **All** values in picocuries per liter.

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Table B-3. Manhole Tritium Concentrations

Tennessee Valley Authority			Watts Bar Nuclear Plant		Spring City, Tennessee					
Date	MH #1	MH #6B	MH #7B	MH #18	MH #20	MH #21	MH #24	MH #25	MH #26	MH #27
6/25/03	\sim	$- -$							$\bullet\bullet$	< 562
8/2/03	\sim	$-$		\sim	< 575	< 575	< 575	$\frac{1}{2}$		--
8/3/03	< 527	< 527	< 527	< 527	$\ddot{}$	\ddotsc	\sim \sim	< 527	< 527	$- -$
11/10/03	1,430	882	882	882	\rightarrow	\ddotsc				
11/11/03	سائد	1,580	22,300		$\overline{}$	\sim \sim	--			\blacksquare
11/12/03	$-$	--		$\ddot{}$		\sim	$\ddot{}$	\cdots	< 560	--

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Note: All values in picocuries per liter.

-- - not measured

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Table B-4. Catch Basin Tritium Concentrations

Note: All values in picocuries per liter.

-- - not measured

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THIS PAGE IS AN OVERSIZED DRAWING OR FIGURE, THAT CAN BE VIEWED AT THE RECORD TITLED: PLATE: B "Power Block Site Map"

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Attachment 2

Table G-5

Federal, State, and Local Authorizations

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Attachment 3

TVA Nuclear Power Group Calculation

WBNTSR-008 **R11**

Control Room Operator and Offsite Doses Due to a Steam Generator Tube Rupture

NPG CALCULATION COVERSHEETICCRIS UPDATE

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NPG CALCULATION COVERSHEETICCRIS UPDATE

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Purpose

This analysis is performed to determine the control room operator dose following a design basis steam generator tube rupture accident (SGTR). Revision 9 is performed to address the replacement steam generators (DCN 51754, which changes the mass releases) and to correct CREVS recirculation flow (PER 61493) and time increments (PER 94423).

Introduction

This analysis determines the control room operator and offsite dose due to a Steam Generator Tube Rupture accident. The steam releases (primary and secondary side) are taken from reference 45 and 46. The activities of the primary coolant are based on technical specification limits with a preexisting iodine spike of 21μ Ci/cc I-131 equivalent for a preaccident spike (note: all measurements are at STP, therefore 1 g =1cc water). An alternate accident initiated iodine spike case uses initial activity at 0.265μ Ci/cc I-131 equivalent with a factor of 500 increase in iodine release rate from the fuel. The secondary side activities start at 0.1μ Ci/cc I-131 equivalent. The secondary side activities come from WBNNAL3-003 R3 (ref.29). Credit is taken for partial flashing of the reactor coolant as it enters the steam generator. For conservatism, no credit is taken for "scrubbing" of iodine in the steam bubbles as the bubbles rise through the water, therefore it is unimportant if the break is above or below the water level at all times.

The computer code STP is used to determine the releases. The released activities are used as input to computer code COROD (ref. 15) which determines the control room operator dose. The base COROD model is taken from TI-RPS- 198 (ref.13, ingress and egress dose was not determined because the accident lasts less than 8 hours and the ingress/egress is after 8 hours). The control room operator dose considers the effect of slow closure times of 0-FCV-31-3, -4. The delay is 20.6 sec (which includes the 14 sec damper closure time and the 6.6 sec monitor response time). This is conservative because the delay in isolation allows a large slug of unfiltered radioisotopes into the control room. It is realistic because the isolation of the control room will most likely occur due to a high radiation signal in the control room intake HVAC. The control room intake vent X/Q values are taken from WBNAPS3-104 (ref 37) which are determined using ARCON96. These **X/Q** values are also found in WBNAPS3-104. The activities from STP are also used as input to the computer FENCDOSE (ref.30) which determines the offsite dose.

Revision 11 added the Unit 2 SGTR (Appendix G). The Unit 2 steam generators have are the same as the original Unit 1 steam generators, however the mass releases were reanalyzed by Westinghouse.

Assumptions

1. There is no iodine "scrubbing" by the water in the steam generator when the steam bubbles (formed due to the flashing of the primary water) rise to the surface of the water.

Technical Justification: This is conservative because this increases the amount of iodine released. Since the break may be below the water line, there will actually be some amount of scrubbing (removal) of iodine.

2. The maximum reactor coolant activities allowed under WBN Technical Specifications (ref.3) is assumed, with a distribution found in WBNNAL3-003 (ref.29), which are the expected source terms from ANSI/ANS-18.1-1984 modified for WBN.

Technical Justification: The maximum concentration is mandated by NUREG-0800 (ref.7). This assures maximum release of radioisotopes. See Attachment 2 for justification for using expected reactor coolant as the isotope distribution for establishing Technical Specification source terms.

3. The primary side to secondary side leakage is 150 gpd/steam generator, steady state.

Technical Justification: This is Technical Specification 3.4.13 (ref.33)

4. The maximum letdown of 120 gpm + 4.39 gpm = 124.39 gpm (ref.39, 41) is used.

Technical Justification: This value is used for calculation of iodine production/removal rates. This will maximize the removal rate of iodines from the primary coolant, and therefore will maximize the production rate of iodine (production = removal at steady state). See Calculation section for the formulas used. The letdown is assumed to be isolated at the beginning of the accident to maximize the reactor coolant inventories. The uncertainty of 4.39 gpm is determined in Appendix E.

5. The primary to secondary side leak rates and letdown flow rates are based on Standard Temperature and Pressure (STP). Technical Justification: This is the method by which the plant measure leakage. Also, this will maximize the releases because the density is higher at STP, therefore more mass (and hence radioisotopes) will be released. For the letdown flow, this will increase the steady state iodine production rate, and therefore increase the iodine releases.

6. In the intact steam generators, the iodine partition factor is assumed to be 100. (see also assumption 12).

Technical Justification: The mass of primary to secondary leakage which occurs to the intact steam generators is small relative to the mass of secondary coolant. Therefore none of this leakage is assumed to flash and the release to the environment is through the steaming process. Reference 7 allows a partition factor of 100 for such cases.

7. In one case, a preaccident iodine spike of 21 μ Ci/gm I-131 equivalent is assumed at the start of the accident. In the other case, an accident initiated iodine spike of 500 increase in the iodine release rate from the fuel is assumed in the accident initiated case with the reactor coolant starting at $0.265 \mu C i/gm$ I-131 equivalent.

Technical Justification: SRP 15.6.3 subsection 6a specifies the maximum allowable preaccident spike is required (21 uCi/gm is permissible for 48 hours). SRP 15.6.3 subsection 6b specifies that following an accident, the iodine release rate from the fuel to the reactor coolant is increased by a factor of 500.

8. The letdown demineralizer efficiency is assumed to be 1 for iodines.

Technical Justification: This will maximize iodine removal (=production) rate, and therefore result in larger iodine spiking. 9. The tritium inventory in the reactor coolant is assumed to be for the case with 2 TPBAR failures (98.4 μ Ci/g, ref.29).

Technical Justification: This will give an upper bound for the tritium. Also, 2 TPBAR failure is considered to be an abnormal event. This will result in conservative doses.

10. It is assumed that there is no additional fuel damage due to the accident.

Technical Justification: There is no expected extreme temperatures expected in the core due to the accident, therefore there will not be any fuel damage.

11. Only the Tritium Production Core (TPC) inventories are analyzed.

Technical Justification: Except for tritium, the reactor coolant inventories for the conventional and tritium production cores are the same. Therefore using the TPC with the additional tritium in the coolant will be conservative.

12. Water that boils in the faulted steam generator has an iodine partition factor of 100.

Technical Justification: Normally, to take into account uncovery of the faulted steam generator, there is no iodine partitioning in the release to the environment (iodine partition coefficient **= 1).** However, the water that boils is allowed a partition of 100. This is consistent with assumption 6.

13.Only one train of CREVS is in operation. Normally, each CREVS train takes suction from separate intakes with no cross communication between trains. This leads to one contaminated train, and one uncontaminated train. The only way a 2 CREVS operation could result in higher doses would be for both trains to take suction from the same vent. For this to happen, one intake path would require a failed closed intake path **AND** a fail open of normally closed passive manual damper at the beginning of the accident. An active failure of a train plus a failure of a passive component in less than 24 hours is beyond design basis.

Special Requirements/Limiting Conditions

There are no special requirements or limiting conditions in this calculation.

Calculations

The following main text represents the replacement steam generator SGTR. The original steam generator results can be found in Appendix F. The details for the App.F calculations can be found in Revision 8 of this analysis, with the exception of the COROD control room doses (which were corrected with the proper recirculation rates and time increments).

Primary Coolant Activity Releases

In NUREG-0800 R2 Chapter 15.6.3 (ref.7), section **111.5** states "The reviewer assumes the primary and secondary coolant activity concentrations allowed by the technical specifications." Reference 3 of NUREG-0800 states the following "The specific activity of the reactor coolant shall be limited to: a. Less than or equal to 1 microCurie per gram DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-13 1, and b. Less than or equal to **100/E** microCuries per gram of gross activity."

Given the above considerations, the isotopic spectrum found in WBNNAL3-003 (ref.29) was examined. The 1-131 dose equivalent and **IOO/E** values for this particular spectrum are determined in Tables 1 and 2.

Table 1: Determination of 1-131 Dose Equivalent

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Table 2: Determination of 100/EBAR

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The D/A values (rads/Curie) in Table 1 were obtained from reference 8, p.25 for each of the iodine isotopes of interest. The 1-131 dose equivalence is calculated as follows:

 $D.E_i = A_i^*(D/A)/(D/A)_{1131}$

As can be seen in Table 1, the resulting I-131 dose equivalency for the expected spectrum is 0.1255 μ Ci/g.

The definition of EBAR or E is as follows: "E shall be the average (weighted in proportion to the concentration of each radionuclide in the reactor coolant at the time of sampling) of the sum of the average beta and gamma energies per disintegration (in MeV) for isotopes, other than iodines, with half lives greater than 15 minutes, making up at least 95% of the total non-iodine-activity in the coolant."

The values for E, in Table 2 were obtained from reference 17 and the values for **Ai** are from WBNNAL3-003. The value of E is determined as follows:

 $E = (\Sigma A_i E_i) / (\Sigma A_i)$

The value for E calculated in Table 2 is 0.591 MeV/dis. This results in a non-iodine specific activity limit (100/E) of 169.14 μ Ci/g. The total specific activity of the expected coolant is 5.82 μ Ci/g.

Therefore, the values for noble gasses in the design reactor coolant given in reference 29 will have to be increased by a factor of $169.14/5.82 = 29.06$ and the values for iodines will have to be increased by a factor of $1/0.1255 = 7.965$.

For the secondary side concentrations from WBNNAL3-003, the same procedure is performed to determine the 1-131 equivalence:

To convert to $I-131$ equivalence, the secondary side $I-131$ equivalent conversion factor is $(1/3.189E-6) = 3.136E5$ gm/ μ Ci. Note that this factor has been developed for iodines. There is no limit on noble gasses in the secondary side as there is for the primary side (1 00/Ebar). However, in order to maintain the proper ratio of isotopes, and for conservatism, the iodine factor will also be applied to the noble gasses.

Note: the secondary side water does not contain any noble gasses. For conservatism, the noble gas inventory is the inventory from the secondary side steam.

The STP models consist of a pre-accident iodine spike (see figure **1)** model and an accident initiated iodine spike model (see figure 2). The model(s) consist of the following:

Volumes:

#1: Reactor Coolant: 5.78E5 **lb** (ref.29) = 2.622E8 **gm**

#2: Steam Generator w/Leak: 5.3 **1E7** gin (ref.40)

#3: Steam Generators w/out Leak: 1.593E& gm (ref.40)

#4: Environment: **I** gm (arbitrary) (This volume is made into an accumulator through the "A" card to suppress radioactive decay)

The step sources to initialize the reactor coolant and the secondary side activities are:

S=2.622E8 gm*1E-6 Ci/µCi=2.622E2 (tritium)

S=2.622E8 **gm*IE-6** Ci/pCi ***** 29.06 = 7.620E3 (noble gasses)

Pre-accident iodine spike case (initial concentration = 21 uCi/cm):

S=2.622E8 gm*1E-6 Ci/µCi * 7.965 [µCi/gm I-131]⁻¹ *21 µCi/gm = 4.386E4 (iodines)

Accident initiated iodine spike case (initial concentration = $0.265 \mu \text{C} \nu/\text{gm}$):

S--2.622E8 gm*lE-6 Ci/gCi ***** 7.965 [jtCi/gm 1-131]-1*0.265 iCi/gm = 5.534E2 (iodines)

Secondary side, all cases, steam generator with leak (initial concentration $= 0.1 \mu C i/gm$):

 $S = 5.31E7$ gm $*$ 1E-6 Ci/uCi = 5.31E1 (tritium)

 $S = 5.31E7 \text{ gm*1E-6 Ci}/\mu\text{Ci*3.136E5}$ [$\mu\text{Ci}/\text{gm}$ I-131]^{-1*} 0.1 $\mu\text{Ci}/\text{gm} = 1.665E6$ (noble gasses, iodines) Secondary side, all cases, steam generators without leak (initial concentration = $0.1 \text{ }\mu\text{Ci}/\text{gm}$):

 $S = 1.593E8$ gm $*$ 1E-6 Ci/ μ Ci = 1.593E2 (tritium)

 $S = 1.593E8$ gm*1E-6 Ci/ μ Ci*3.136E5 [μ Ci/gm I-131}^{-1*} 0.1 μ Ci/gm = 4.996E6 (noble gasses, iodines)

Continuous Sources:

For the accident initiated iodine spike case, the iodine spike is 500 times the iodine release rate from the fuel. At steady state conditions, the iodine release (production) rate is equal to the removal rate. The iodine removal is due to a) radioactive decay, b) removal by the letdown system, and c) removal through leakage to the secondary side. These terms are expressed as:

 $P = \Sigma$ removal rates = decay + letdown + leakage

or $P = \lambda + f_L \varepsilon/V + p_s/V$

where $P =$ production rate $[\text{hr}^{-1}]$

 λ = decay constant for the isotope in question [hr⁻¹] = ln(2)/T_{1/2}

 f_L = letdown flow rate = 120 gpm + 4.39 = 124.39 gpm

 ε = letdown demineralizer efficiency = 1 (assumed so as to maximize removal/production rate)

 $V =$ volume of primary coolant = 5.78E5 lb

 p_s =removal rate of iodine from primary side due to leakage = 11 gpm (= 10 gpm identified plus 1 gpm unidentified leakage)

 $T_{1/2}$ = halflife taken from ref.42

Note: All flow rates are converted to mass flow rates at **STP** (H20 = **I** g/cc).

Production/Removal Rates for 11 gpm Leakage (=10 known +1 unknown)

The accident initiated iodine spike of 500 times the increase in the iodine release (production) rate from the fuel is modeled. as a continuous source:

C = Volume * 1E-6 Ci/µCi * Prod. Rate * 500 * 1 µCi/gm I-131 equivalent conversion factor

where $Volume = 2.622E8$ gm

Prod Rate = see table above

1-131 equiv. $= 0.265 \mu \text{Ci/gm}$ 1-131 equivalent

1 gCi/gm 1-131 equivalent conversion factor = 7.965 (value determined above, this is to get the ANSI/ANS-18.1-1984 source into 1 μ Ci/gm I-131 equivalent

Continuous Source [I/hr] for Accident Initiated Iodine Spike:

The following table presents the variables that change for each case:

Flow Rates:

The following is for the replacement steam generators. The results for the original steam generators can be found in App.F (with the input details found in Revision 8 of this analysis). The amount of secondary side steam released from the ruptured steam generator is 108,200 Ibm from 0-2 hours and 35,500 Ibm from 2-8 hours (ref.45). The amount of secondary side steam released from the intact steam generators is 539,500 Ibm from 0-2 hours and 925,000 Ibm from 2-8 hours (ref.45, note that ref.45b, which is a draft, gives this values as 924,400 Ibm. This is 0.06% less than ref.45a. It is conservative to use the higher value). The reactor coolant release to the steam generator was a total of 166,200 **lb,** of which 9189 lb flashed (ref.45,46). In order to account for the release during the 20.6 second interval when the control room is not isolated, the amount of reactor coolant released at 20.6 see is needed. However, the release from the steam generators does not actually start until 176 sec post accident. Therefore, the releases at 176+ 20.6 = 196.6 see are actually needed for release calculations. Using the releases from reference 46 and adding each time increment release, the reactor coolant release at 196.5 sec is 9732.826 lb and at 197.5 see it is 9776.753 lb. For conservatism, 9776.743 **Ib** is used at 196.6 sec. The amount that flashed at 196.5 see is 1322.612 lb and at 197.5 sec is 1324.805 lb. Using linear interpolation, the amount of reactor coolant that flashed at 196.6 sec is 1322.7951b. The mass release rate from the ruptured steam generator is non-linear. However since the time frame for the release is short (20.6 sec), the average release rate can be used. From reference 45, the flashing of the reactor coolant stops at 2208.5 sec, and the break flow stops at 4670 sec.

The following flow rates/leakage rates for each component are:

Flow from Reactor Coolant #1 to Steam Generator Faulted #2 (non-flashed):

0-196.6 sec: F **=** (9776.753 lb - 1322.795 lb)*(3600 sec/hr)/(196.6 sec) **=** 1.548E5 lb/hr = 7.0217E7 g/hr 196.6 sec-4670 sec: F = (166,200 lb-9776.753 lb)-(91891b-1322.612 lb)/(4670-196.6sec) = 33.209 lb/sec = **=** 5.423E7 g/hr

4670+ sec: F=0

.Flow from Reactor Coolant #1 to Environment #4 (flashed):

176-196.6 sec: $F = (1322.795 \text{ lb})*(3600 \text{ sec/hr})/(20.6 \text{ sec}) = 2.312E5 \text{ lb/hr} = 1.0486E8 \text{ g/hr}$ 196.6 sec-2208.5 sec: F = (9189 lb-1322.795 lb)/(2208.6-20.6 see]) **=** 3.5953 lb/sec **=** 5.871E6 g/hr 2208.5+ sec: F=0

Flow from Steam Generator Faulted #2 to Environment #4:

176 sec-2 hr:(108,200 lb)/(2hr-[176sec/3600sec/hr])=5.548E4 lb/hr=2.516E7g/hr(noble gas and tritium)

0.01*(108,200 lb)/ (2hr-[176sec/3600sec/hr])=5.548E2 lb/hr=2.516E5g /hr (iodine)*

2-8 hr: (35500 lb)/(8hr-2hr) **=** 5916.67 lb/hr **=** 2.6837E6 g/hr (noble gas)

 $0.01*(35500 \text{ lb})/(8 \text{ hr-2hr}) = 59.1667 \text{ lb/hr} = 2.6837E4 \text{ g/hr}$ (iodine)

Flow from Steam Generator Unfaulted #3 to Environment #4:

176 sec-2 hr: (539,500 lb)/ (2hr-[176sec/3600sec/hr]) = 276509 lb/hr = 1.254E8 g/hr (noble gas)

 $0.01*(539,500 \text{ lb})/(2hr-[176\text{sec}/3600\text{sec/hr}]) = 2765.09 \text{ lb/hr} = 1.254E6 \text{ g/hr}(\text{iodine})$

2-8 hr: (925,000 lb)/(8hr-2hr) = 1.542E5 lb/hr **=** 6.993E7 g/hr (noble gas)

 $0.01*(925,000 \text{ lb})/(8hr-2hr) = 1.542E3 \text{ lb/hr} = 6.993E5 \text{ g/hr}$ (iodine)

Flow from Reactor Coolant #1 to Steam Generator Unfaulted #3:

 $F = 3$ steam generators * 150 gpd * 3785.48 cc/gal / 24 hr/day * 1g/cc= 7.098E4 g/hr

• Normally, to take into account uncovery of the faulted steam generator, there is no iodine partitioning in the release to the environment (iodine partition coefficient = **1).** For conservatism, no iodine scrubbing of the bubbles in the flashed water is taken into account. However, the water that boils is allowed the iodine partition of 100 (see assumption 6).

The STP output is used as input to COROD (which determines control room operator dose) and FENCDOSE (which determines 30-day and 2-hour LPZ offsite dose).

Control Room Dose

With the exception of the source activities and X/Q's, all of the input and assumptions used in TI-RPS-198 (ref.13) to calculate the control room operator dose are considered valid for this calculation. The X/Q values are taken from reference 37.

Maintenance Request MR-482000 (Attachment 2) gives measured closure times for several flow control valves in the control building ventilation system as measured on 12/8/88. Examination of reference 14 in conjunction with MR-482000 revealed that the worst case involved valves 0-FCV-31-3, -4 with closure times of 12.43 sec and 13.15 sec respectively. Therefore, it was conservatively assumed, and per reference 35, that these valves would be full open for 14 sec following the **SGTR-** (This is conservative since in actuality, as the valve closes, the flow decreases). In addition, the radiation monitor response time is 6.6 seconds (ref.38). This leads to a total unisolated control room time of 20.6 seconds. During this time the intake flow is 3200 cfin (reference 14). No filtration is provided for this stream.

Offsite Dose

The same source terms used in the COROD run are used in the FENCDOSE run. The base FENCDOSE model comes from TI-RPS-197 (ref.34). Some pertinent information from the COROD and FENCDOSE models used in this analysis are (from ref.34) with the control room X/Q values from ref.37:

30-day LPZ Offsite **X/Q** values [sec/cum]: 1.41E-4 0-2hr, 6.68E-5 2-8 hr, 4.59E-5 8-24 hr, 2.04E-5 1-4 day, 6.35E-6 4-30 day

2-hr EAB X/Q values: 6.07E-4

Control Room ARCON96 X/Q:4.03E-3 0-2hr, 3.35E-3 2-8hr, 2.27E-4 8-24hr, 1.81E-4 1-4day, 1.45E-4 4-30day

Control Room volume: 257198 cuft

Control Room makeup/pressurization flow: 711 cfm , 3200 cfm prior to isolation (ref.44*)

Control Room total flow'. 3600 cfm

Control Room recirculation flow: 2889, for normal operation (unisolated) each pass is at 3200 cfin (same as intake flow) Control Room unfiltered intake: 51 cfin

Control Room filter efficiency: 95% first pass, 70% second pass for iodine, 0% for everything else

Control Room occupancy factors: 100% 0-24 hr, 60% 1-4 days, 40% 4-30 days

ICRP-2 and ICRP-30 dose conversion factors, as well as TEDE

* 3200 cfm has been deleted from 1-47W866-4 R36 (ref.10), and has been measured to be approximately 2500 cfm (0-SI-31-31-A). The value comes from 1-47W866-4 R20. The 3200 cfm will be retained in this calculation revision since this value produces conservative results.

Figure 1: STP Model

Pre-accident Iodine Spike

Figure 2: STP Model

Accident Initiated Iodine Spike

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Results

The following Unit **I** doses were calculated for the Tritium Production Core (the Unit 2 results are found in Appendix G):

Pre-accident iodine spike of 21 uCi/c I-131 equivalent

Accident initiated iodine spike of 500 at 0.265 uCi/g **1-131** equivalent

Conclusion

The offsite doses (gamma, beta, thyroid and TEDE) due to a SGTR with a preexisting iodine spike does not exceed the 10CFRIOO limits (25 rem gamma, 300 rem beta, and 300 rem thyroid per NUREG-0800). The SGTR with accident initiated iodine spike does not exceed a small fraction of the 10CFR100 limits (10% of the 10CFRI00 limits of 25 rem gamma, 300 rem beta, and 300 rem thyroid per NUREG-0800). The control room doses due to a SGTR do not exceed the IOCFR50 App.A GDC 19 limits (5 rem gamma, 30 rem beta and 30 rem thyroid).

The reactor coolant parameters for this conclusion is based on a pre-accident spike of 21 μ Ci/gm I-131 equivalent and an accident initiated iodine spike with the initial activity at $0.265 \mu \text{C}$ /en I-131 equivalent. The secondary side activity is 0.1 μ Ci/gm I-131 equivalent. The primary to secondary leak rate (prior to the accident) is 11 gpm (10 gpm identified plus 1 gpm unidentified) with a maximum of 150 **gpd** leak in the steam generators.

Note on methodologies used:

This calculation determined the doses using 3 different methodologies. The gamma, beta and Thyroid (ICRP-2) doses are all based on TID-14844 methodologies utilizing the ICRP-2 iodine dose conversion factors found in TID-14844. The second methodology is the Thyroid (ICRP-30) dose, which is also based on TID-14844, but uses the ICRP-30 iodine dose conversion factors. The ICRP-30 iodine dose conversion factors are less conservative than the ICRP-2 factors. Finally, the third methodology used is the TEDE (Total Effective Dose Equivalent). The TEDE presents an overall weighted dose and is more representative of the impact of all isotopes on the body as a whole. The TEDE dose is presented for potential future use, however is not currently part of the design basis of the plant. It is important to note that tritium does not impact the thyroid doses utilizing the TID-14844 methodology, because only iodine is applied to the thyroid dose. However, in fact tritium does contribute to the thyroid dose, as well as other organs of the body. This is why the TEDE is a more representative dose when discussing the impact of tritium. It is up to the end user to choose the dose which is to be used, with the understanding that each methodology has a different meaning.

References

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2b. "Study of Reactor Shutdown Radioactivity 'Spiking' at Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station During February 20-2 **1,** 1976" J.E.Cline and E.D.Barefoot, July 1976

3. WBN Unit I Technical Specification 3.4.16 "Reactor Coolant System - Specific Activity" Amendment **31**

4. WBN FSAR Table 11.1-2 Amendment 62 (transmitted to TVA by Westinghouse letter WAT-D-2139, March 8, 1976

5. WBN FSAR section 15.4.3 Amendment 62 (not used as design input)

6. WBN FSAR Table 15.5-18 (Attachment 3) Amendment 62 (not used as design input)

7. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800 R2,

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9. deleted in R7

10. N3-68-4001 R3 "System Description for the Reactor Coolant System" RIMS# T29 930225 855

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12. TI-RPS-156 RO "Effect of Zero Steam Generator Blowdown on Offsite Dose During Various Events" RIMS# B45 850711 235

13. TI-RPS-198 R17 "Dose to Control Room Personnel Due to a Regulatory Guide 1.4 Loss of Coolant Accident"

14. WBN CCD drawing 1-47W866-4 R20

15. Computer code COROD R6, code I.D.262347

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17. **NTB** Isotope Library, found in GENAPS3-018 RI "NEB Isotope Library Verification"

18. WBN drawing 41N712-1 RD

19. WBN drawing 41N718-1 RE

20. WBN drawing 47W415-1 RH

21. WBN drawing 47W930-2 RP

22. WBN drawing 47W930-3 RP

23. WBN drawing 47W930-5 RE

24. WBN drawing 47W200-1 **RI1**

25. Halitsky, James et.al., "Wind Tunnel Tests of Gas Diffusion From a Leak in the Shell of a Nuclear Power Reactor and from a Nearby Stack" Department of Meteorology and Oceanography Geophysical Sciences Laboratory Report No.63-2, New York University, April **1, 1963**

26. deleted in R4

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29. WBNNAL3-003 R4 "Reactor Coolant and Secondary Side Activities in Accordance with ANSI/ANS-18.1-1984"

30. Computer code FENCDOSE R4, code I.D.262358

31. Computer code STP R6, code I.D.262165

32. Computer code PARINT RI, code I.D.262350

33. Technical Specification 3.4.13, Amendment 31

34. TI-RPS-197 R17 "Offsite Doses Due to a Regulatory Guide 1.4 Loss of Coolant Accident"

35. N3-30CB-4002 R6 "Control Building Heating, Ventilating, Air Conditioning, and Air Cleanup System"

36. WBN PER 01-000080-000

37. WBNAPS3-104 RO "WBN Control Room X/Q"

38. 0-RE-90-125 RIO "Demonstrated Accuracy Calculation For Main Control Room Air Intake Radiation Monitor 0-RE-90- 125,-126, and Emergency Air Intake Radiation Monitor 0-RE-90-205, -206"

39. N3-62-4001 R5 "System Description for Chemical and Volume Control System"

40. WBNAPS3-053 R3 "Steam Generator Leakage Detection with the Condenser Vacuum Pump Air Exhaust Monitor (1,2- RM-90-119)" RIMS# B45 880620 238

41. NSAL-00-004 "Nonconservatisms in Iodine Spiking Calculations"

42. Lederer and Shirley, "Table of Isotopes" seventh ed.

43. WBNNAL3-002 R2 "100-Day LOCA-DBA Source Terms for the EGTS and ABGTS Filters, Containment, Sump, and Shield Building Annulus" Note: this calculation is currently at R3, however the information is found in R2. 44. 1-47W866-4 R20

45a. WCAP-16286-P "Watts Bar Unit 1 Replacement Steam Generator Program NSSS Engineering Report", Jan.2005 45b. WCAP-16286-P RI draft "Watts Bar Unit **I** Replacement Steam Generator Program NSSS Engineering Report" Sept.2005

46. Westinghouse letter WTV-RSG-05-100 dated May 31,2005 "Submittal of Steam Generator Tube Rupture Dose Analysis Input" from S. Radomsky to Paul G. Trudel

47a. WBT-D- 1015 "Steam Generator Tube Rupture Input to Dose Mass Transfer Data"

47b. LTR-CRA-09-153 RI "Watts Bar Unit 2 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Input to Dose Mass Transfer Data for the Completion Project"

48. Unit 2 TS 3.4.13 Rev.A (developmental) "RCS Operational Leakage"

49. Unit 2 TS 3.4.16 Rev.A (developmental) "RCS Specific Activity"

50. Unit 2 TS 3.4.17 Rev.A (developmental) "Steam Generator (SG) Tube Integrity"

51. WBNAPS3-053 R2 "Steam Generator Leakage Detection with the Condenser Vacuum Pump Air Exhaust Monitor (1,2-RM-90-119)" note: this revision is out of date, however the pertinent data, the mass of water in a SG is relevant

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ADJACENT DOSE TO CONTROL ROOM PERSONNEL DUE TO SHINE FROM CR BLDG ENE
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Appendix E: Determination of Letdown Flow Uncertainty

The purpose of this appendix is to determine bounding errors for the measurements performed on the orifice restrictor flows using the Letdown Heat Exchanger Flow loop (1-F-62-82) during Preop Test Instruction PTI-062-03 RO.

Following these tests, a loop check was performed for the computer point **FOI** 34A by injecting a signal into the transmitter and reading the display on the computer. To determine the total loop error, the unmeasurable errors must be combined with the errors present at the time of the loop check.

WBN NESSD 1-F-62-1 will be used as a guide for determining the unmeasurable errors for loop 1-F-62-82 since it contains the same model flow element and a similar model transmitter. According to EMPAC, the flow element is a Vickery Simms Model MK-52 and the transmitter is a Foxboro E-13DM.

Millers Flow Measurement Engineering Handbook, Third Edition, Chapter **6,** Table 6.1 states that Square Edged orifice flowmeters have an accuracy of ± 1 -2%URV (upper range value) of the flow rate. A value of $\pm 2\%$ will be used for the orifice.

The loop check performed by WO 94-14264-10 (following pages) gives as found data. The largest error at 50 GPM was 1.36 GPM (50 **-**48.64) or 0.68% CS (1.36/200 = 0.68%). The largest error at 100 GPM was 0.48 GPM (100 - 99.52) or 0.24% CS (0.48/200 **=** 0.24%). The largest error at 150 GPM was 0.06 GPM (150 - 149.94) or 0.03% CS (0.06/200 = 0.03%).

Since the plant had not been started at the time of these tests, radiation was not present and need not be considered. Errors for temperature and power supply effect will need to be included. Since there is no data on actual temperature conditions, an enveloping value must be used. Environmental drawing 47E235-46 R5 gives the max abnormal temperature range as 50 - 110 °F for coordinates UA6 / El 737 where the transmitter is located per EMPAC. The transmitter is a model E-1 3DM per EMPAC. The product specification sheets (following pages) give the ambient temperature effect as ±1% per 50 °F for any span between 200 to 850" water. The transmitter will normally be calibrated at room temperature which will be between 60 and 80 °F. A temperature shift of + or - 50 °F will encompass the temperature changes seen by the transmitter. Therefore for a temperature range of ±50 °F, the temperature effect will be **±1%** CS d/p. The power supply effect is given as 0.1% CS for a 10% change in voltage. Thus Power supply effect is 0.1% CS dip.

All errors for the computer should be reflected in the loop check.

Utilizing Equation 3-24.8 of W WCAP-12096, Rev. 8 'Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology for Protection Systems, Watts Bar Units 1 and 2, Eagle 21 Version," the unmeasured transmitter errors can be converted from percent error in full scale **dip** to error in percent full span at a specified point, where Fm is the maximum flow rate of 200 GPM, and Fn is the nominal flow rate (i.e. 50, 100 or 150 GPM).

Thus total loop error = $(FE_{\text{on}}^2 + \text{Loop check}_{\text{on}}^2 + \text{Temp}_{\text{on}} (Flow)^2 + \text{pwr supp}_{\text{on}} (Flow)^2)^{0.5}$ Total loop error @ 50 GPM = $(2^2 + 0.68^2 + 2^2 + 0.2^2)^{0.5} = \pm 2.92\%$ CS = ± 5.84 GPM Total loop error @ 100 GPM = $(2^2 + 0.24^2 + 1^2 + 0.1^2)^{0.5} = \pm 2.25\%$ CS = ± 4.5 GPM Total loop error @ 150 GPM = $(2^2 + 0.03^2 + 0.67^2 + 0.067^2)^{0.5} = \pm 2.11\% \text{ CS} = \pm 4.22 \text{ GPM}$

Total loop error at 120 GPM can be determined by linear interpolation between 100 and 150 GPM. The value will be conservative since the error is nonlinear and is a function of the square root of the dip values above and the actual loop recorded values which also follow a square root curve.

Total loop error @ 120 GPM = **±** I error @ 100 GPM **+** 20(error @ 150 GPM - error @ 100 GPM) / (150 - 100) Total loop error @ 120 GPM **=** ±[4.5 GPM **+** 20(4.22 - 4.5)150] = ±[4.5 GPM **+** (-0.11)] = ±4.39 GPM

The following references were used in preparation of this appendix. Revisions to these references will not impact this appendix; so the references are 'information only' in lieu of 'design input'.

- **I** WBN NESSD 1-F-62-1 RI (Methodology & guidance)
- 2 EMPAC (Manufacturer, Model number and location)
- 3 Millers Flow Engineering Handbook, Third Edition, Chapter 6, Table **6.1** (Orifice accuracy) 4 WO 94-14264-10 (loop check data) see next page
-
- 5 Drawing 47E235-46 R5 (environmental data)
- 6 Foxboro product specification sheets (transmitter accuracy data) see next pages
- 7 WCAP-12096 R 8 (methodology for converting **dip** error to flow error)

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Appendix F: Original Steam Generator Results

The following results are for the original steam generators. The details leading to these results are found in revision 8. The COROD runs were corrected (recirculation rate and time increments). A 2 CREVS case was also added. Only the ARCON96 21 µCi/gm and 0.265 µCi/gm I-131 equivalent Iodine spiking cases were corrected.

Tritium Production Core Doses:

Offsite Dose with Preaccident Iodine Spike

Offsite Dose with Accident Initiated Iodine Spike - 11 gpm leak (10+lunidentified.)

Offsite Dose with Accident Initiated Iodine Spike - 6.75 gpm leak $(5.75+1$ unidentified.)

Offsite Dose with Accident Initiated Iodine Spike - 3.15 gpm leak $(2.15+1$ unidentified.)

Appendix F: Original Steam Generator Results (continued)

TPC Control Room/ARCON96 **X/Q** original SG

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preaccident I spike 21 uCi/gm

Appendix G: Unit 2 SGTR

The Unit 2 steam generators are the same as the original Unit 1 steam generators. However, the mass releases were reanalyzed by Westinghouse. The SGTR analyses performed below use the same methodologies as the main text, with the following changes:

Flow Rates:

The following is for the Unit 2 steam generators. The amount of secondary side steam released from the ruptured steam generator is 103,300 Ibm from 0-2 hours and 32,800 Ibm from 2-8 hours (ref.47). The amount of secondary side steam released from the intact steam generators is 492,100 Ibm from 0-2 hours and 900,200 Ibm from 2-8 hours. The reactor coolant release to the steam generator was a total of 191,400 lb, of which 10077.2 (=934.4+9142.8) lb flashed (ref.47). In order to account for the release during the 20.6 second interval when the control room is not isolated, the amount of reactor coolant released at 20.6 sec is needed. However, the release from the steam generators does not actually start until 113 sec post accident Therefore, the releases at 113+ 20.6 **=** 133.6 sec are actually needed for release calculations. Using the releases from reference 47 and adding each time increment release, the reactor coolant release at 134.5 sec is 9687.2 lb. The amount that flashed at 134.5 sec is 1049.026 lb. The mass release rate from the ruptured steam generator is non-linear. However since the time frame for the release is short (20.6 sec), the average release rate can be used. From reference 47, the flashing of the reactor coolant stops at 2253 sec, and the break flow stops at 5032 sec.

The following flow rates/leakage rates for each component are:

Flow from Reactor Coolant #1 to Steam Generator Faulted #2 (non-flashed):

0-133.6 sec: F = (9687.2 lb - 1049.026 lb)*(3600 sec/hr)/(133.6 sec) = 2.328E5 lb/hr = 1.0558E8 g/hr 133.6 sec-5032 sec: F = (191,400 lb-9687.2 lb)-(10077.2 lb-1049.026 lb)/(5032-133.6sec) = 35.253 lb/sec = =5.757E7 g/hr

5032+ see: F=0

Flow from Reactor Coolant #1 to Environment #4 (flashed):

113-133.6 sec: F = (1049.026 lb)*(3600 sec/hr)/(20.6 sec) **=** 1.833E5 lb/hr = 8.3154E7 g/hr

133.6 sec-2253 sec: F = (10077.2 lb-1049.026 lb)/(2253-20.6 sec]) = 4.0442 lb/sec = 6.604E6 g/hr $2253+$ sec: $F=0$

Flow from Steam Generator Faulted #2 to Environment #4:

113 sec-2 hr:(103,300 lb)/(2hr-[l 13sec/3600sec/hr])=5.247E4 lb/hr=-2.380E7g/hi(noble gas and tritium) $0.01*(103,300 \text{ lb})/(2 \text{hr}-113 \text{sec}/3600 \text{sec/hr}) = 5.247E2 \text{ lb/hr} = 2.380E5g/\text{hr} \text{ (iodine)}$ *

2-8 hr: (32800 lb)/(8hr-2hr) **=** 5.467E3 lb/hr = 2.480E6 g/hr (noble gas)

0.01*(32800 lb)/(8hr-2hr) = 5.467E **I** lb/hr = 2.480E4 g/hr (iodine)

Flow from Steam Generator Unfaulted #3 to Environment #4:

113 sec-2 hr: (492,100 lb)/ (2hr-[113sec/3600sec/hr]) = 2.500E5 lb/hr **=** 1.134E8 g/hr (noble gas)

0.01*(492,100 lb)/(2hr-[113sec/3600sec/hr]) = 2.500E3 lb/hr = 1.134E6 g/hr(iodine)

2-8 hr: $(900,200 \text{ lb})/(8hr-2hr) = 1.500E5 \text{ lb/hr} = 6.805E7 g/hr (noble gas)$

0.0 1*(900,200 lb)/(8hr-2hr) = 1.500E3 lb/hr **=** 6.805E5 g/hr (iodine)

Flow from Reactor Coolant #1 to Steam Generator Unfaulted #3:

F **=** 3 steam generators * **150** gpd * 3785.48 cc/gal / 24 hr/day * lg/cc= 7.098E4 g/hr

* Normally, to take into account uncovery of the faulted steam generator, there is no iodine partitioning in the release to the environment (iodine partition coefficient $= 1$). For conservatism, no iodine scrubbing of the bubbles in the flashed water is taken into account. However, the water that boils is allowed the iodine partition of 100 (see assumption 6).

Additional data:

Volume/SG = $4.735E7$ gm $(1.421E8$ gm in 3 unfaulted SG's) (ref.51)

RCS **1-131** equivalence limits: 0.265 uCi/gm 1-131 (steady state) and 21 uCi/gm (48 hr LCO) (ref.49), same as Unit **I** Leakage: 10 gm known plus **I** gpm unknown **=1** lgpm total, and 150 **gpd** per SG (ref.48,50), same as Unit **1**

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Attachment 1: Justification for Using ANSI/ANS- 18.1-1984 Expected Coolant Spectrum

The choice of iodine spectrum is fairly important, since several isotopes have short halflives. Results may be affected when accident times are on the order of the decay of the short lived isotopes. There are several possible spectra available. The spectrum chosen for this analysis is the one that most closely resembles the actual spectrum present at WBN. From the surveillance tests I-SI-68-28 performed on 7/10/00 and 4/9/01 (see following surveillance tests attached), the following concentrations were determined:

Two potential spectra are from WBNNAL3-003 (Reactor Coolant Activities in Accordance with ANSI/ANS- 18.1-1984) and from the FSAR Table 11.1-2 (Historical Design Activities). The iodine concentrations and relative concentrations for each spectrum are as follows:

As can be seen, the FSAR historical design concentrations do not reflect the actual measured concentrations. The FSAR values are weighted too strongly in favor of 1-131 (24.6% of total as opposed to < 1% of the actual total). By comparison, the ANSI/ANS-18.1-1984 fractions are very close to the actual fractions. The worst fit was for **1-134** which was 40. 1% actual versus ANSI/ANS- **18.** 1-1984 34.22%. The 1-131 is slightly over predicted by ANS- 18.1 (0.9% on 7/10/00 and 0.7% on 4/9/01 versus 4.48%), however this difference is not as large compared to the FSAR fraction. The ANSI/ANS-18.1-1984 spectrum overall fit is much better than the FSAR spectrum, therefore it can be concluded that the use of the ANSI/ANS-18.1- 1984 spectrum is acceptable.

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Attachment 1 (continued) Surveillance test 1-SI-68-28 performed on 4/9/01

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 $\label{eq:2.1} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\int_{\mathbb{R}^3}\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\right)^2\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\right)^2\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\right)^2\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\right)^2\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\right)^2\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\right)^2.$

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Appendix \mathbb{R}

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Page 1 of 1 WELLY-

$\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{L}}$ MULTIPLE EQUIPMENT LIST

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 $\label{eq:2.1} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\int_{\mathbb{R}^3}\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\right)^2\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\right)^2\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\right)^2\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\right)^2.$

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Page: 59 Plant: WBN **Rev: 11** WBNTSR-008 **Calculation No.** Subject: Control Room Operator and Offsite Doses Due to a Steam Prepared: Kivs Date: 1-14-10 Date: 1.14.10 Checked: HW **Generator Tube Rupture** $.0.56$ **ZIZ NTS R-00 7 KB 1-19-06** MR 482000 Pace. 3) EstABUSH COMMUNICATION ENTH PERSON ISTATIONED 1*7.1*ء م AT FCV-31-204 \ket{H} START STRIP RECORDERS 1 AND 3. 5) INITIATE A-TRAIN CRI OY 1-HS-31-177A الانتقاءة توريد B VERIFY THE FOLLOWING DAMPERS CLOS. $FCV-3I-3$ Ж $-31-10$ $FCO-31-17$.
Galamene $FCO - 31 - 25$ $FCO-31-26$ $FCV-31-37$ $FCV-31-204$ $\sqrt{7}$ STOP RECORDERS 1 and $-$ B)RECORD FCV-31-204_closure_TIMEAND METE_DATA_____ $\frac{11}{2}$ STOAVATCH $ID = 902597$ CAL Due Dare $7-14-89$ - 45 $\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{A}}$ $8,48$ CLOSURE IME __ **SEC** DATA TAKEN BY Ped + 5 Bus Ŧ μ tt / α |8|88

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Page: 61 Plant: WBN **Rev: 11** WBNTSR-008 **Calculation No.** Date: 1-14-10 Prepared: μv_2 Subject: Control Room Operator and Offsite Doses Due to a Steam Checked: HM Date: $1.10 \cdot 6$ **Generator Tube Rupture** $P_{\mathcal{ASE}} = 4$ 13) IMMATE B-TRAIN CRI ST F-AS-31-177B فيباعة بال 14) VERIET THE FOLLOWING DAMPERS CLOSE $FCV-31-F$ $\overline{2}$ $FCO-31-9$ $FCO-31-16$ $F(0, 3) - 25$ $FCO - 31 - 26 =$ **FCV-31-36 -**FCY-31-204 15) STOP RECORDERS 2 AND 3 ' *12/3/*38 16) RECORD FCY-31-204 CLOSURE TIME AND M&TE DATA 5 TOPLIATCH $ID = 902597$ CAL DUE DATE __ $7 - 14 - 64$ 8.22 Closure Jime SEC DATA TAKEN BY Red f 5 Bra Lett 17/0100 I.J.) RESET 1-HS-31-177B 12/3/83 Ŧ

Page: 62 **Rev: 11** Plant: WBN WBNTSR-008 **Calculation No.** Date: $1 - 19 - 10$ Prepared: $h(h)$ Subject: Control Room Operator and Offsite Doses Due to a Steam Checked: kw Date: $1.14.10$ **Generator Tube Rupture** $P_{AGE} = 5$ of \pm 18) RETURN CONTROL OF SYSTEM TO OPERATIONS TO BE AUGNED AT THEIR DISCESSON. <u>William (</u> 19) RECORD THE CLOSURE TIME FOR THE FOLLOWING DAMPERS AS MEASURED BY THE STRIP CHARTS. (Except $FCV-31-204$ which was measured BY STOPLATEN) A-TRAIN CRI \mathbb{R}^{n} B-TRAIN CRI FCV-31-3^{-12,43} sec FCY-31-4 1315 sec $FCO-31 - 103 - 9.64$ sec = FCO-31-9 - 10.94 - sec $\frac{1}{200}$ FCO-31-17 $\frac{3}{20}$ /6, 3 sec $\frac{3}{20}$ FCO-31-16 $\frac{4-7.64}{2}$ sec $\frac{3}{20}$ $FCV-31-37$ / 3.56 sec $FCO-31-36$ 12.32 sec $s_{55} = 2.5 - 3.5 - 8.57$ $5 - 31 - 25 = 8.60$ $FCQ-31-26-6.56$ 6,44 sec $FCO-31-26$ SEC $FCV-31-204-8.48$ sec $FCV-31-204 - 8.22$ sec $\mathcal{F}^{\mathcal{A}}_{\mathcal{A}}$, and the set of $\mathcal{F}^{\mathcal{A}}_{\mathcal{A}}$ DATA RECORDED BY 17/9/83 20) ATTACH STRIP CHARTS TO THIS MR. RECORD MR NUMBER ON THE CHARTS. الأماري أنست السنار المتنا \overline{a} 21) REMOVE TEST EQUIPMENT AS LISTED IN ATTACHMENT 1. - SECOND PERSON VERIFICATION IS REQUIRED. VERIFI ATTRONAENT 1 COMPLETED Polat Bradett /12/8/88

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 $\label{eq:2} \frac{1}{2} \int_{\mathbb{R}^3} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \, \mathrm{d} \mu \, \mathrm$

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Attachment 4

FENCDOSE Run

TSR8F 11Aout.txt

Time Dependent Releases 21 uCi/g 1-131 equivalent preaccident Iodine spiking case

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 $\mathbf 1$ REPRODUCTION OF INPUT DATA DECK

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KRM-83 KRM-85 KR-85
KR-87 KR-88 KR-89
XEM-131 XEM-133 XE-133 XEM-135 XE-135 XE-138
I-131 I-132 I-133 I-134 I-135
Page 2

PROGRAM FENCDOSE REVISION NUMBER: REVISION DATE: 31 JUL 2009 TODAY IS: 01/11/10 STARTING TIME IS: 18:22:00

Page 3

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1.410E-04 6.070E-04 6. 680E-05 4.590E-05 2.040E-05 6.350E-06

1 OSTEAM GENERATER TUBE RUPTURE ACCIDENT TIME TO 133.6 SEC COMPONENT 4 ENVIRONMENT **,** TIME = **0.** 1ISOTOPE KRM-83 **O.OOOOE+00** KRM-85 0.2364E+01
KR-85 0.3697E+01 KR-85 0.3697E+01
KR-87 0.2196E+01 KR-87 0.2196E+01
KR-88 0.4135E+01 KR-88 0.4135E+01
KR-89 0.0000E+00 KR-89 **O.OOOOE+00** XEM-131 0.9090E+01
XEM-133 0.9963E+00 XEM-133 0.9963E+00
XE-133 0.3516E+02 XE-133 0.3516E+02
XEM-135 0.2085E+01 XEM-135 0.2085E+01 XE-135 0.1259E+02 XE-138 0.1622E+01 XE-135

XE-138

1-131

1-132

0.3742E+01

1-132

0.1747E+02 T-132 0.1747E+02
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1-134 0.2779E+02 1-134 0.2779E+02
1-135 0.2173E+02 T-135 0.2173E+02
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OSTEAM GENERATER TUBE RUPTURE ACCIDENT TIME TO 2 HOUR

4 ENVIRONMENT

COMPONENT 1ISOTOPE

KR-87

6 ENVIRONMENT CURIES **,** TIME **=** 24.

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DAYS

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I*-132 I*-133 I*-134 I*-135 H-3 OWBN SGTR TIME TO 30 COMPONENT 1ISOTOPE

KRM-83 KRM-85 KR-85 KR-87 KR-88 KR-89 XEM-131 XEM-133 XE-133 XEM-135 XE-135

KR-88 O.OOOOE+O0

CURIES **,** TIME = 96.

6 ENVIRONMENT CURIES **,** TIME =720.

Page 6

1WBN SGTR

OGAMMA DOSE FOR EACH ISOTOPE AND TIME PERIOD (REM)

 $\label{eq:2.1} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\right)^{2} \left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\right)^{2} \left(\$

 $\label{eq:2.1} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\int_{\mathbb{R}^3}\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\right)^2\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\right)^2\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\right)^2.$

 $\label{eq:2} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\sum_{i=1}^n\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\sum_{i=1}^n\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\sum_{i=1}^n\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\sum_{i=1}^n\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\sum_{i=1}^n\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\sum_{i=1}^n\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\sum_{i=1}^n\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\sum_{i=1}^n\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\sum_{i=1}^n\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\sum_{i=1}^n\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\sum_{i=1}^n\frac{1$

 $\frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{1}{i} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \frac{1}{j} \sum_{j=1}^{n$

 $\mathcal{A}^{\text{max}}_{\text{max}}$

 $\label{eq:2} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^2$

OAT 2 HOUR EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB)

TOTAL GAMMA DOSE = 3.593E-01 REM
TOTAL BETA DOSE = 2.064E-01 REM TOTAL INHALATION DOSE (ICRP-2) = 2.836E+01 REM
TOTAL INHALATION DOSE (ICRP-30) = 1.383E+01 REM

OAT 30 DAY LPZ BOUNDARY

TOTAL GAMMA DOSE = 8.760E-02 REM TOTAL BETA DOSE = $5.253E-02$ REM TOTAL INHALATION DOSE (ICRP-2) = $6.711E+00$ REM
TOTAL INHALATION DOSE (ICRP-30) = $3.281E+00$ REM 83 IS NOT IN EPA LIBRARY. ISOTOPE IGNORED.
83 IS NOT IN EPA LIBRARY. ISOTOPE IGNORED. **KRM KRM** 83 IS NOT IN EPA LIBRARY. ISOTOPE IGNORED. **KRM** 83 IS NOT IN EPA LIBRARY. ISOTOPE IGNORED. **KRM KRM** 83 IS NOT IN EPA LIBRARY, ISOTOPE IGNORED. **KRM** 83 IS NOT IN EPA LIBRARY. ISOTOPE IGNORED.

1WBN SGTR

OTEDE FOR EACH ISOTOPE AND TIME PERIOD (REM)

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Attachment 5

FENCDOSE Run

TSR8FBout.txt

Time Dependent Releases 0.265 uCi/g 1-131 equivalent accident initiate Iodine spike case

TSR8F11BOUt.txt

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Page 1

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 $\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}$

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REPRODUCTION OF INPUT DATA DECK

 $\frac{1}{2}$ $+$ $+$ $\ddot{+}$ $+$ $+$ $\mathbf{1}$ 1
KRM-83 KRM-85 KR-85
KR-87 KR-88 KR-89
XEM-131 XEM-133 XE-133 XEM-135 XE-135 XE-138
T-131 T-132 T-133 T-134 T-135 Page 2

PROGRAM FENCDOSE REVISION NUMBER: REVISION DATE: 31 JUL 2009 TODAY IS: 01/11/10 STARTING TIME IS: 18:22:23

Page 3

1 0 0 0 0

OCHI/Q 1.410E-04 6.070E-04 6.680E-05 4.590E-05 2.040E-05 6. 350E-06

 $= 0.$

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 \bar{A}

 \bar{I} *-134 $\bar{1}$ *-135 $H-3$ **O.O000E+00 O.O000E+00** 0.3434E+04 OSTEAM GENERATER TUBE RUPTURE ACCIDENT TIME TO 8 HOUR COM PON ENT 4 ENVIRONMENT **,** TIME = 8. 1ISOTOPE

0. $0.$ $0.$ $\overline{0}$. $\overline{0}$. $0.$ 0.5 $0.$ $0.$ $\overline{0}$. $\overline{0}$. $0.$ $0.$ $0.$ $\overline{0}$. $0.$ $0.$ **O**. **O.**

1ISOTOPE

KRM-83 KRM-85 KR-85 KR-87 KR-88 KR-89 XEM-131 XEM-133 XE-133 XEM-135 XE-135 XE-138 1-131 1-132 1-133 1-134 1-135 $I*-131$ $\bar{1}$ *-132 I*-133

CURIES , TIME = 24.

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KR-87 O.O000E+00 **O.OOOOE+00**

Page 5

TSR8F11Bout.txt **,** TIME = 2.

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CURIES , TIME = 96.

6 ENVIRONMENT CURIES **,** TIME =720.

Page 6

1WBN SGTR

OGAMMA DOSE FOR EACH ISOTOPE AND TIME PERIOD (REM)

 $\sim 10^6$

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Page 9

OAT 2 HOUR EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB)

TOTAL GAMMA DOSE = 3.985E-01 REM
TOTAL BETA DOSE = 2.104E-01 REM TOTAL INHALATION DOSE (ICRP-2) = 1.233E+01 REM
TOTAL INHALATION DOSE (ICRP-30) = 4.485E+00 REM

OAT 30 DAY LPZ BOUNDARY

TOTAL GAMMA DOSE = 9.722E-02 REM
TOTAL BETA DOSE = 5.361E-02 REM TOTAL INHALATION DOSE (ICRP-2) = 2.971E+00 REM
TOTAL INHALATION DOSE (ICRP-30) = 1.094E+00 REM 83 IS NOT IN EPA LIBRARY. ISOTOPE IGNORED.
83 IS NOT IN EPA LIBRARY. ISOTOPE IGNORED. **KRM KRM KRM** 83 IS NOT IN EPA LIBRARY. ISOTOPE IGNORED. **KRM** 83 IS NOT IN EPA LIBRARY. ISOTOPE IGNORED.

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1WBN SGTR

KRM KRM

OTEDE FOR EACH ISOTOPE AND TIME PERIOD (REM)

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OTHIS RUN IS DATED 01/11/10. THE TOTAL ELAPSED TIME IS 0.0 MINUTES. 0.0 SECONDS.

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Attachment 6

TVA Nuclear Power Group Calculation

WBNTSR-009 **R11**

Control Room Operator.and Offsite Doses from a Fuel Handling Accident

TVAN CALCULATION COVERSHEET/CCRIS UPDATE

 $\overline{1}$

FENCDOSE to calculate the doses at the Site Boundary (SB)/Exclusion Area Boundary after 2 hours and at the Low Population Zone (LPZ) boundary after 30 days. The FENCDOSE model came from TI-RPS-197. The control room operator doses are below the 10CFR50 Appendix A, GDC 19 limits of 5 rem gamma, 30 rem beta, 30

rem thyroid, and 10CFR50.67 limit of 5 rem TEDE. The offsite doses are less than 25% of the 10CFR100 limits of 25 rem gamma, 300 rem beta, 300 rem thyroid, and 10CFR50.67 limit of 25 rem TEDE (= 6.25 rem gamma, 75 rem beta/thyroid, and 6.25 rem TEDE).

If the design basis of the plant is Regulatory Guide 1.25, then there are several Special Requirements/Limiting Conditions in this calculation (see main text). If the design basis of the plant is Regulatory Guide 1.183, then there are no Special Requirements/Limiting Conditions.

This calculation directly impacts FSAR Table 15.5-23

TVAN CALCULATION COVERSHEET/CCRIS UPDATE

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Page 4

 $\begin{split} \mathcal{L}_{\text{max}}(\mathbf{r}) = \mathcal{L}_{\text{max}}(\mathbf{r}) \mathcal{L}_{\text{max$

 $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}$

 $\label{eq:2} \begin{split} \mathcal{L}_{\text{max}}(\mathbf{r}) = \mathcal{L}_{\text{max}}(\mathbf{r}) \,, \end{split}$

 $\ddot{}$

 $\frac{1}{2}$

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 ~ 10

 $\label{eq:2} \frac{1}{2} \int_{\mathbb{R}^3} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \, \mathrm{d} \xi \, \mathrm{d} \xi \, \mathrm{d} \xi$

 $\sim 10^6$

 $\overline{}$

 $\label{eq:2.1} \frac{1}{2}\int_{\mathbb{R}^{3}}\frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}}\left|\frac{d\mathbf{x}}{d\mathbf{x}}\right|^{2}d\mathbf{x}$

Purpose'

The purpose of this calculation is to determine the dose to the control room operators following a design basis .Fuel 'Handling Accident **(FHA).** lI addition, the offsite. doses resulting from a **FHA** is also to be determined. This calculation:i'is'to'address concerns raised during the vertical slicereview program as to'whether the Loss of Coolant $\rm_{Accident}$ (LOCA) actually produces the bounding control room operator doses (ref.1). \rm_{Acc}
Revision 10 is performed to increase the delay in the control room isolation to 20.6 seconds (this value is the sum

of the damper closure time and the instrument reaction time, this is documented in WBN PER 01-000080-000, ref.12). ýto, change the **X/Q** values to new ones determined **by ARCON96** (while kee'pin'g the originai Halitsky **X/Q** case) **,** to' utilize NUREG/CR-5009 gap inventory releases to supplement Safety Guide 25 (Regulatory Guide 1.25), and to utilize -the latest versions of FENCDOSE (R4) and COROD (R6; which now determine thyroid doses based on IGRP-2 and ${\rm ICRP\text{-}30}$ iodine dose conversion factors, as well as the ${\rm TEDE}_r$ and also allow for changes in flow rates and filter efficiencies). Finally, the Tritium Production Core (TPC) fuel assemblies (once burned, twice burned, and three times 'buirned) are analyzed in'addition to the stanidard core **1500** EFPD assem~bly. Revision **11** is per~formied in support **of** PERs 61493 (control room recirculation rate modeling), 94426 (control room time increment modeling), 95217 (potential for~ **15** min'ute unfiltered releases and migration of contamination to other mi-isolated areas), and **'96939** (failure to evaluate F-A in the transfer canal and caak loading area) aud **EDC 51930** (downgrade PurgeFilters) and also to add Alternate Source Term (AST) cases. Revision 11 changes the containment **FHA** case to credit containment isolation in 12.7 seconds instead of crediting the purge filtration system to mitigate the consequences of an FHA in $\rm{containment.}$ The filtered release case is retained (this case will become information only once EDC 51930 is: implemented): Additionally, revision 11 adds cases based on Regulatory Guide 1.183 **(Alternate Source Term** or AST) assumptions. One of the AST cases credits filters, the other does not credit any filters.

Special Requirements/Limiting Conditions'

If the design ba'sis'for WBN is RG **1.25,** then if the equipment hatch or any penetration between the Auxiliary Building and Containment is open, the containment purge system shall be operational during fuel movement and an
Auxiliary Building Isolation (ABI) due to a high radiation signal shall initiate a Containment Ventilation Iso (CVI), and a CV due to'a high radiation signal must initiate an ABI. If other penetrations'are open to the outside of the ABSCE, the **ABGTS** system must be able to draw down within 4 minutes **of** the initiatinglevent.'

Also, forRG **1.25,** the **HVAC,** intake vent in 'the transfer canal must be blocked, and the -13•ionbuitor must be raised so that it has a line of sight across the 757 floor. The HVAC intake vents for the cask loading area shall be blocked when handling irradiated fuel in this area. The -102 monitor is far enough away so that it will see very close to' the floor at the canal/cask loading area, therefore it will not have to be raised (see assumption 17 for further discussion). This requirement is to prevent radioisotopes from entering the **HVAC** ductwork in the transfer canal '(and" ultimately released via the Auxiliary Building Vent without filtration) and therefore bypassing the isolation function of the -102 and -103 radiation monitors.
The design basis for WBN is RG 1.183 (AST), then there are no special requirements or limiting conditions.

Based on the results of this analysis; no isolation of either containment or the auxiliary building is required following a Fuel Handling Accident for AST.

Introduction

This calculation determines the offsite and control room doses due to a **•HA'** The computer code **STE** is used to ',determine the releases. Using the STP output,' the computer code FENCDOSE determines~ the offsite doses, and the computier code COROD determines the control room doses. 'The **HA'** accident is analyzed for bothithe Auxiliary. Building and the Containment. Also, 4 types of assemblies are analyzed: the 1500 EFPD end of life assembly for a standard core, a once burned TPC assembly with 24 TPBAR rods (which contain the tritium), a twice burned TPC assembly with 24 TPBAR rods, and a three times burned TPC assembly (no TPBARs).

Assumptions

1. The FHA occurs at **100** hours after shutdown, consistent with the FSAR and the Technical Specifications (ref.4 and 18).

2. All of the rods in one fuel assembly are assumed to be damaged. Technical Justification: Safety Guide 25, ref.4, implies that the activity from the worst peak assembly is released. It is conservative to assume that all rods will break, thereby maximizing the release. Regulatory, Guide 1.183 (AST), ref 36, section 3.6 requires that the case with the highest radioactivity release should be analyzed.

3. For all cases except the **12.7** containment isolation case, it is assumed that everything except tritium is released to the environment within 2 hours (ref.4). To assure this, at 2 hours all remaining isotopes (except tritium, see assumption 13) above the spent fuel pool (or in containment) are stepped into the environment (using the appropriate filter efficiency as a multiplication factor).

4. For the RG 1.25 cases, it is assumed that in the 4 minutes it takes to establish the ABSCE for an AB **FHA,** there will be no unfiltered releases to the environment (see assumption 17 regarding isolation). The ABSCE is normally established within 4 minutes and within this time-frame all of the flow is through the ABGTS. Because there will be an ABI and CVI, any other contaminated air which does not go through the ABGTS (leakage) will have to travel to a penetration in containment or the ABto go outside of the ABSCE". Because this leakage flow will be fairly'low and the distance from the contamination source is great, it can be concluded that the contaminated air will not reach the outside. Also as the **ABGTS** draws down the Auxiliary Building, the flow of air will be more likely to be drawn into the ABGTS due to flow characteristics of pumping the air volume down. For one of the RG 1,183 AST cases (case series 5), the above also applies. For the other AST case (case series 4), no isolation is assumed'

5. For the RG. 1.25 cases (case series 1, 2, and 3), all of the gap activity in the damaged rods is released which consists of 10% of the inventory in the rods at the time of the accident (ref.4), except for the following (per NUREG/CR-5009 for 60 GWd/t, note for lesser burnups the releases'are less, therefore use of these 60 GWd/t values for all burnups is conservative):

 $Kr-85 = 14%$

Kr-87 **=** 10% Note: The NUREG/CR-5009 value is actually 0.7%. Since STP is limited to 9 classes, and the halflife of Kr-87 is 76 min (ref.33), after 100 hours of decay there will be $exp(-100*ln(2)/(76/60)) =$ 1.7E-24 or 1.7E-22% left. Therefore the increase in the gap percentage does not affect the results.

Kr-88 = 10% Note: The NUREG/CR-5009 value is actually 1%. Since STP is limited to 9 classes, and the halflife of Kr-88 is 2.84 hr (ref.33), after 100 hours of decay there will be exp(-100*ln(2)/2.84) = 2.5E-11

or 2.5E-9% left. Therefore the increase in the gap percentage does not affect the results.

 $Kr-89 = 10%$

 $Xe-133 = 5%$

 $Xe-135 = 2%$ $-I-131 = 12%$

For the RG 1.183 AST cases, all of the gap activity in the damaged rods is released which consists of 8% 1- 131, 10% Kr-85, 5% other noble gasses and other halogens. Note that RG 1.183 also specifies 12% of Alkali metals (Cs, Rb), however since particulates have essentially an infinite partition factor, no alkali metals will be released and therefore are not included in this analysis.

6. The values assumed for individual fission product inventories are calculated assuming full power operation at the end of core life immediately preceding shutdown with a radial peaking factor of 1.65 (ref.4, 36) for the standard core assembly. For the TPC assemblies, the inventories are taken at the end of cycle,

with the factor of 1.65 applied to all isotopes except tritium. Also, the factor of 1.65 is the maximum peaking factor allowed by the COLR. The factor of 1.65 is not applied to the tritium isotope because the maximum inventory of tritium is used already at a maximum (see assumptions #13, and ref.29) at $1.2g$ tritium/rod with 24 rods/assembly. It would be too conservative to apply the **1.`65** to a value which is already the maximum inventory which can occur.

7. From RG 1.25 (ref.4), the iodine gap inventory is composed of inorganic species (99175%) and organic species (0.25%). From RG 1.183, the inorganic species is 99.85% and the organic species is 0.15%. An overall decontamination factor is utilized in the RG 1.183 cases(see assumption 8); therefore the makeup of the species is not utilized in AST.

8. From RG 1.25, the pool decontamination factors for the inorganic iodine is assumed to **be.** 133, and organic iodine is assumed to be 1 (ref.4). From RG 1.183 (AST) the decontamination factors are specified to be 500 for elemental (inorganic) iodine, and 1 for organic iodine. Doing the math, this leads to an overall decontamination factor of $286 = 1/(0.9985/500+0.0015/1)$. However, RG 1.183 also specifies an overall decontamination factor of 200. The use of the 200 factor is more conservative (also, BFN was asked by the NRC to use the overall factor instead of the species specific factors), and therefore the overall factor of 200 for AST will be used in this analysis.

9. The retention of noble gasses in the pool is negligible (ref.4).

10. For FHA in containment with isolation (case series 1), it is assumed that the Purge Air Exhaust (PAE) System isolates in 12.7 seconds (ref. 2). This includes instrument loop response time (6.7 sec) and containment purge valve closure time **(6** sec). This should be noted to be a very conservative value. The instrument loop response time contains very conservative assumptions and rounding. In the event that containment needs to be purged (for instance if entry is required into containment), then it is possible to defeat the isolation. An additional case (case series 3) analyzed assumes that the PAE (includingthe filters) will be used to purge containment for two hours.

11. This calculation includes a case with no credit: for the PAE filters for the FHA in containment once the purge filters are downgraded. However, for historical purposes, the filtered release analysis is retained in the results section (case series 3). The filter efficiencies for the PAE filter are 90% for inorganic iodines and 30% for organic iodines (ref.3). EDC 51930 downgrades the filters to non-safety-related. R.G. 1.140 R3 will be the standard to which these filters conform'to. The guide specifies the filter efficiency as 95%. Therefore using the original 90%/30% is conservative. One of the RG 1.183 AST cases does not credit any filters (case $series 4$).

12. The filter efficiency for the ABGTS is 99% for all iodines (ref.3).

13. It is assumed that all 24 TPBARs in a TPC once or twice burned .assembly break. It is also assumed that all the tritium (84490 Ci) in the spent fuel pool is released following the FHA through evaporation of the pool.

Technical Justification: All TPBARs breaking is conservative. Also, it is difficult to predict the chemical form of the tritium release from a broken TPBAR in the spent fuel pit. Most likely it will be in the form of tritiated water or methane. There will not be 100% release of tritium from a TPBAR failure in a FHA because there are no high temperatures involved with the accident. Reference 26, section **2.3;** gives the release from the TPBARs will not cause the water tritium concentration to exceed 60µCi/gm. If all the water (372,000 gal, ref.28) were to evaporate, then the amount of tritium release would be:

 $60 \mu \text{C/gm} * 372,000 \text{ gal} * 3,785.4 \text{ cc/gal} * 1 \text{ gm/cc} * 1E-6 \text{Ci/µCi} = 84490 \text{ Ci}$ To assume all the water evaporates within 2 hours.is very conservative. For: the RG 1.25 containment FHA

case with purge filters and Auxiliary Building case (case series 2 and 3), tritium was released over 2 hours. For the RG 1.25 containment with 12.7 sec isolation and no purge filters (case series 1) and the AST cases (case series 4 and 5), tritium was assumed to evaporate at a constant rate over 8 hours. Also, from reference 26 (see attachment 1), less than 25% of the tritium will be released at a steady rate over a period greater than 8 hours. For conservatism, 25% of the inventory will be released linearly over 8 hours for the RG 1.183 cases.

14. For the RG 1.25 case, the effective volume of upper containment is taken as 1/2 the upper containment free volume. Technical Justification: This takes'into account incomplete mixing and dead end spaces and is typical for the representation of air mixing volumes.

15. It is assumed that the suction flow for the ABGTS from the spent fuel pit area is the maximum ABGTS flow $(9000 \text{ cfm} + 10\% \text{. ref.}32)$.

Technical Justification: The ABGTS suction is actually' less-thaný this from the spent fuel pit area, since suction is also taken from several other areas, such as the pipe chase. In discussions with John Ferguson, WBN HVAC system engineer, there have been no measurements of the suction flow during ABGTS operation from the spent fuel pit area. However the majority of the flow is from the spent-fuel pit. Using the maxmum flow reduces the holdup time and increases the releases at earlier times durmng the acident. This' is therefore conservative.

16. NUREG/CR-5009 implies that Cs-134 and Cs-137 are also in the gap. This calculation assumes these isotopes do not get released to the environs.

Technical Justification: Cs- 134 decays to either Xe- 134 or Ba- 134, both of which are'stable. Cs-137 decays to Ba-137m which in turn decays to Ba-137, which is stable. Per-Regulatory Guide 1.183, particulates (Cs, Ba) have an infinite decontamination factor in the spent fuel pool/reactor vessel water. Therefore, Cs-134 and Cs-137, and their daughters, may. be neglected'from the calculation.'

17, It is assumed for the RG 1.25 design basis cases, that Auxiliary Building isolation is automatic so that there is no unfiltered release. The isolation is due to the RE-90-102 and'-103 spent fuel pool.monitors. PER 96939 documents that an accident in the fuel transfer canal and cask loading area will result in no automatic isolation since the monitors have no line of sight to the transfer canal and the HVAC intake ductwork is below the floor elevation. Therefore, any accident in the transfer canal or cask loading area will result in the HVAC uptake of radioactive gasses before it rises above the. 757' floor elevation where'it will have a line of sight to the monitors. The radioactive gasses would then be exhausted to the 'environs via the Auxiliary Building Vent with no filtration. The AB'vent X/Q values are worse thanithe Shield Building Vent (the exhaust location following isolation) X/Q values. Preliminary work indicates that this situation would result in control room doses far in excess of the.GDC 19 limits. Therefore, for the RG 1.25 assumptions (specifically, isolation of the Auxiliary Building), the following special requirements/limiting conditions apply: The HVAC intake vent in the transfer canal or cask loading area must be blocked, and the -103 monitor is raised so that it has a line of sight across the 757' floor. The -102 monitoris far. enough away so that it will see very close to the floor at the canal, therefore it will not have to be raised. [Note: the AST case with no isolation was performed due to the possibility of the transfer canal or cask loading area accident
With no ABI. In order to obtain isolation, the HVAC in the transfer canal or cask loading area must be blocked and the -103 monitor must be raised. However, since the no ABI case with AST assumptions did not exceed limits, the blockage and monitor movement will not be required if WBN becomes an AST plant for the **FHA.**

18. The RG 1.25' cases utilize exponential releases. That is, the releases are governed by the mixing volume and the exhaust flow rate. This results in conservative releases compared to linear releases as more gets released in the beginning of the accident when there is less control room filtration, (it takes 20.6 sec to

isolate the control room) and also allows more to be released prior to isolation.

The RG 1.183 cases utilize linear releases. That is, all releases are constant over the 2 hour time period (except for tritium, which is over an 8 hour time period). This is implied in RG 1.183 by requiring all releases to be within 2 hours. Also, this methodology is utilized by Westinghouse for:SQN and other utilities.

.19. Only one train of CREVS is in operation. Normally, each CREVS train takes suction from separate intakes with no cross communication between trains. This leads to one contaminated train, and one uncontaminated train. The only way a 2 CREVS operation could result in higher doses would be for both trains to take suction from the same vent. For this to happen, one intake path would require a failed closed intake path **AND** a fail open of normally closed passive manual damper at the beginning of the accident. An active failure of a train plus a failure of a passive component in less than 24 hours is beyond design basis.

Calculations

This calculation considers several cases broken down into Regulatory Guide 1.25 and Regulatory Guide 1.183 (AST) groupings

I. Regulatory Guide 1.25 Cases:

One case is for a FHA in containment with the activity released directly to the environment until containment isolation (12.7 seconds), there are no penetrations open to the AB, and the PAE filters are not credited. Another case utilizes a containment release without isolation but with Purge Filters Credited. The third case is for a FHA at the refueling area of the Auxiliary Building with the activity release through the Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS) filters. The fourth case is for a **FHA** in containment with penetrations open to the AB and thus the contamination migrates to the AB after the containment is isolated. This last case will be analyzed by simply adding the results of the isolated containment case and AB case. This is conservative because this would simulate two releases, one through **ABGTS** and, one through the **PAE** system before isolation. In reality, the flow would be through the PAE system until isolation then contaminated air will migrate to the AB and then released to the environment via the ABGTS. Computer code STP (ref.6) is used to calculate the activity released after a FHA. Figure 1 shows the model. To insure a conservative dose, the radioisotopes are allowed only 100 hours of decay after shutdown, and are released to the containment/spent fuel pit release rate based on PAE or ABGTS flow. For the Auxiliary Building case, anything left at 2 hours is automatically released through the filters nonmechanistically so that everything is released within 2 hours, except for tritium which is assumed to take 8 hours. (This is performed by stepping the remaining isotopes into the environment at 2 hours). The step source fractions of the core inventory are based on NUREG/CP.5009 and Reg.Guide 1.25. The source terms are the 1500 EFPD maximum burnup for 18 month fuel cycle from WBNAPS3-084 (ref. 14) for the standard core. These source terms are used instead of the core average 1000 EFPD source terms because the accident involves a single fuel assembly, not the entire core (as in a LOCA). For the TPC, the source terms for the once burned, twice burned, and 3 times burned assemblies are taken from WBNAPS3-098 (ref.29). The 24 TPBAR release apply only to the once and twice burned assemblies (the 3 times'burned assembly will not have any TPBARs).

Note: the arrow from component 2 to 4 (for crediting purge filters in Appendix **D),** and 3 to 5 does not imply a filter bypass. It indicates how STP models a filter with the "U" card, where $F 2-6 = F^*(efficiency)$, $F2-4 = F^*(1-efficiency)$

Component 1: Fuel volume=1.0 (arbitrary)

Component 2: Containment Air volume **=** 647,000 cuft (ref.30) /2= 3.235E5 cuft (see assumption #15) Component 3: Spent Fuel Pit volume = $10,017$ cuft = $39.5'x31.7'x8'$ (ref.31). Note: the dimensions come from ref.31b. The 8' dimension (air above the pool) is an arbitrary value to account for the rise of the gasses above the pool. This is reasonable and consistent with references 31a and 31c.

Component 4: Containment Release volume =1.0 (arbitrary)

Component 5: ABGTS Release volume=1.0 (arbitrary)

Component 6: PAE Filter volume =1.0 (arbitrary)

Component 7: ABGTS Filter volume =1.0 (arbitrary)

Flow from containment through PAE to release (U 2 6 4)= purge rate = 14954:cfm (ref **30,** note the actual value should be 14958 cfm, but this will not change the results so is not corrected) = 8.9724E5 cfh with $\frac{1}{2}$ Purge Air Exhaust filter efficiencies: 90% inorganic iodine, 30% organic (ref.3), 0% for tritium

Flow from spent fuel pit through ABGTS to release (U 3 7 5) = ABGTS flow \approx 9900 cfm = 5.94E5 cfh (see assumption #16) with filter efficiencies of 99% for iodines.

Fuel activities are as given in VWBNAPS3-084 (ref. 14) and WBNAPS3-098 (ref.29), with the inorganic iodines equal to 99.75% of total, and organic iodines equal to **0.25%-** of total iodines.

Peaking Factor for the highest activity fuel assembly = 1.65 (ref.4) except for tritium isotope, which is 1.0 (see assumption #6).

ABGTS filter efficiencies: 99% (ref.3), for iodines, 0% for tritium

The gap activity in the damaged rods is released which consists of 10% of the inventory in the rods at the time of the accident, except for the following: Kr-85=14%, Xe-133=5%, Xe-135=2%, I-131=12% Partition Factors: 133 for inorganic iodine.

The step fractions from the fuel to the containment (or spent fuel pit) are: S = **0.1** for Kr-83m, Kr-85m, Kr-87, Kr-88, Kr-89, Xe-131m, Xe-133m, Xe-135m, Xe-138, organic iodine (except **1-131) S=** 0.i4 for Kr-85 S=0.05 for Xe-133 S=o.02 for Xe- 135 S=0.000752 for 1-132,1-133,1-134, 1-134 (=0.11133) **8=0.00902** for **1-131 (=0. 12/133) S=O.** 12for **1- 131** (organic iodine)'

All of the activity for the AB FHA is assumed to be released after 2 hours, except for tritium. To simulate the AB FHA is assumed to be released after 2 hours, except for tritium. To simulate All of the activity for the AB FHA is assumed to be released after 2 hours, except for tritium. To simulation is put in the Reactor Building or Auxiliary Building at the end of 2 hours is put in this all activity remaining in the Reactor Building or Auxiliary Building at the end of 2 hours is put into a new "source" which is stepped to the environment. The stepping fraction is equal to what would have gotten through the filters (i.e. 1-efficiency, or 25% for 0-2 hr and 75% for 2-8 hrs for tritium) had the isotopes been
released through the filters. For the Containment case with isolation, the purge flow (F 2 4 0) is set to 0 c after 12.7 seconds. $T = 12.7$ seconds.
The activity released to the environment as calculated by STP is used as input to computer computer computer computer computer α

external control ref. 7) to determine the control room operator doses. The control room model is identical to that COROD (ref.7) to determine the control room operator doses. The control room model is identical to that COROD (ref.7) to determine the control room operator doses. The control room model is identical to that described in TI-RPS-198 (ref.5) except for the shine from containment which is neglected (all activity inside the containment from FHA is released). scribed in 11-AFS-198 (ref.3) except for the shine from containment which is neglected (all activity inside
e containment from FHA is released).
During the vertical slice review of the control room, a concern was raised th

During the vertical slice review of the control room, a concern was raised that when the control isolated by a signal from the main control room intake radiation monitors, some amount of unfilter isolated by a signal from the main control room intake radiation monitors, some amount of unfiltered activity could enter the control room before the isolation dampers close (ref.9). This could be the case for a fuel handling accident because there will be no safety injection signal to isolate the control room. The isolation dampers downstream from the radiation monitors are 0-FCV-31-3 and 0-FCV-31-4 (ref.10). It is required by reference 11 that the closure time of the dampers is 14 seconds, with a signal response time of 6.6 seconds (ref. 13), which gives a total closure time of 20.6 seconds. Therefore all cases will analyze the first 20.6 seconds without CREVS filtration.- The ARCON96 X/Q values used (which supersede the Halitsky K/Q values) for the Shield Building Vent were: from ref.34: 1.12E-03 sec/m³ for 0-2 hr, 9.78E-04 for 2-8 hr, (since all releases are < 8 hours, X/Q values after 8 hours are unimportant.

Prior to isolation the intake flow is 3200 cfm^* (ref.10). It is assumed that the unfiltered inleakage is the same as for the isolated case (51 cfm, due to open doors, leaky valves, etc.) After isolation, the total flow rate into the control room is 711 cfm filtered plus 51 cfm unfiltered (ref.5). The circulation flow rate in the control room is the total flow – the makeup flow = $3600 - 711 = 2889$ cfm (ref.5).

Cases were performed for the standard core using ARCON96 X/Q values and ICRP-30 dose conversion factors (see note on methodologies in Conclusion section).

The activity released to the environment as calculated by STP is used as input to computer code. The activity released to the environment as calculated by STP is used as input to computer code.
FENCDOSE (ref.8) to determine the site boundary dose. The FENCDOSE model is the same as that found FENCDOSE (ref.8) to determine the site boundary dose. The FENCDOSE model is the same as that found
in reference 19.

* 3200 cfm has been deleted from 1-47W866-4 R36 (ref. 10), and has been measured to be approximately

 2500 cfm $(0-SI-31-31-A)$. The value comes from $1-47W866-4 R20$. The 3200 cfm will be retained in this calculation revision since this value produces conservative results.

II. Regulatory Guide 1.183 (Alternate Source Term) Cases:

There are two **AST** FHA cases, One where there is an ABI (with ABGTS in operation) and one with no ABI with no-filtration. An accident in the containment is bounded by the no ABI case because containment is exhausted through the Shield Building Vent and the no ABI case exhaust is through the Auxiliary, Building Vent. The AB Vent has less favorable X/Q values than the Shield Building Vent., Computer code STP (ref.6) is used to calculate the activity released after a FHA. Figure 2 shows the model, To insure a conservative dose, the radioisotopes are allowed only 100 hours of decay after shutdown, and are released to the environment linearly, except for tritium which is assumed to take 8 hours: The step sburce fractions *of.* the core inventory are based on Reg.Guide 1.183. The source terms are the 1500 EFPD.maximum burnup for 18 month fuel cycle from WBNAPS3-084 (ref. 14) for the standard core. These source terms are used instead of the core average 1000 EFPD source terms because the accident involves a single fuel assenmbly, not the entire core (as in a LOCA). For the TPC, the source terms for the once burned, twice burned, and 3 times burned assemblies are taken from WBNAPS3-098 (ref.29). The 24 TPBAR release apply only to the once and twice burned assemblies (the 3 times burned assembly will not have any TPBARs).

Figure 2 AST STP Model

The STP model consists of the assembly inventory stepped into the Fuel component with a 1.65 peaking factor and allowed to decay for 100 hours. The remaining decayed isotopes are then stepped into the Release component based on filtration efficiency (=99% for iodines for ABI case, =0% filtered for no ABI case). The tritium will only have $25\%*(2hr/8hrs)$ for the 0-2 hour released, and $25\%*(6hr/8hrs)$ for the 2-8 hr time period.

Component 1: Fuel volume=1.0 (arbitrary) Component 2: Release volume $= 1.0$ (arbitrary)

ABGTS filter efficiencies: 99% (ref.3), for iodines, 0% for tritium

The gap activity in the damaged rods is released which consists of 5% of the inventory in the rods at the time of the accident, except for the following: Kr-85=10%, 1-131=8%

Partition Factors: 200 for all iodines (see assumption 8).

The 20.6 second delay in Control Room isolation is taken into account through the appropriate Step fractions

The step fractions from the fuel to the outside "Release" component are:

-853 $0-20.6$ sec:

S= $1.431E-4$ (=0.05*(20.6sec/7200sec)) for all except Kr-85, iodines, and H-3

 $S = 2.861E - 4 (=0.1*(20.6sec/7200sec))$ for Kr-85

 $S= 7.153E-7$ (=0.05*(20.6sec/7200sec/200)) with no ABI for iodines except I-131 or 7.153E-9 with an ABI (filter eff= 0.01)

S= 1.144E-6 (=0.08*(20.6sec/7200sec/200)) with no ABI for 1-131 or 1.144E-8 with an ABI (filter eff=0.01)

S= $1.788E-4$ (=0.25*(20.6sec/7200sec*2hr/8hr)) for H-3

20.6 sec-2 hr:

S= 4.986E-2 (=0.05*(7200 sec-20.6sec)/7200sec) for all except Kr-85, iodines, and H-3

S= $9.971E-2$ (=0.1*(7200 sec-20.6sec)/7200sec) for Kr-85

- S= 2.493E-4 (=0.05*(7200 sec-20.6sec)/7200sec/200) with no ABI for iodines except I-131or 2.493E-6 with an ABI (filter eff= 0.01)²
- S= 3.989E-4 (=0.08*(7200 sec-20.6sec)/7200sec/200) with no ABI for I-131or 3.989E-6 with an ABI (filter $eff=0.01$

S= 6.232E-2:(=0.25*(7200 sec-20.6sec)/7200sec*2hr/8hr) for H-3

2hr-8hr

S=1.875E-1 (=0.25*(6/8)) for H-3

The activity released to the environment as calculated by STP is used as input to computer code COROD (ref.7) to determine the control room operator doses. The control room model is identical to that described in TI-RPS-198 (ref.5) except for the shine from containment which is neglected (all activity inside the containment from FHA is released). For AST, all breathing rates for all times are the same 3.47E-4 m³/sec

The ARCON96 X/Q values Used for Shield Building Vent releases (which supersede the Halitsky X/Q values) were: from ref. 34: $1.12E-03$ sec/m³ for 0.2 hr, $9.78E-04$ for 2.8 hr. For Auxiliary Building Vent releases (when there is no ABI), the X/Q values are: $2.52E-3sec/m³$ for 0.2 hr, $1.57E-3$ for 2.8 hr.

Prior to isolation the intake flow is $3200 \text{ }\text{cm}^*$ (ref. 10). It is assumed that the unfiltered inleakage is the same as for the isolated case (51 cfm, due to open doors, leaky valves, etc.) After isolation, the total flow rate into the control room is 711 cfm filtered plus 51 cfin unfiltered (ref.5), The circulation flow rate in the control room is the total flow - the makeup flow $= 3600 - 711 = 2889$ cfm (ref.5).

The activity released to the environment as calculated by STP is used as input to computer code' FENCDOSE (ref.8) to determine the site boundary dose. The FENCDOSE model is the sameias that found in reference 19..

* 3200 cfra has been deleted from 1-47W866-4 R36 (ref. 10), and has been measured to be approximately 2500 cfm (0-SI-31-31-A). The value comes from 1-47W866-4 R20. The 3200 cfm will be retained in this calculation revision since this value produces conservative results.

Results

The control room doses with **I** train of CREVS and 20.6 sec control room isolation are as follows (rem): Regulatory Guide 1.25 Control Room Doses

Spent Fuel Pit/Auxiliary Building FHA, AB open or closed to containme

Containment FHA with 12.7 sec containment isolation, containment closed to AB, no Purge Filters

Containment FHA with 12.7 sec containment isolation, containment open to AB, No Purge, Filters, with ABGTS

Note that the shine through the control room walls, ceiling and floor constitute < 1E7 rem and is therefore negligible.

1.881E+00 $1.628E + 00$ $1.078E + 00$

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Conclusions

The control room operator doses resulting from a Fuel Handling Accident are less than the 10CFR50. Appendix A, GDC 19 limits of 5 rem gamma, 30 rem beta, 30 rem thyroid, and less than the 10CFR50.67 limit of 5 rem TEDE.

The 2 hour Site Boundary (SB)/Exclusion Area Boundary and 30 day Low Population Zone (LPZ) doses from a FHA are less than 25% of the 10CFR100 limits of 25 rem gamma, 300 rem beta, and 300 rem thyroid (=6.25 rem gamma, 75 rem beta, 75 rem thyroid, 6.25 rem TEDE). 10CFR50.67 provides the TEDE equivalence to the gamma limits.

It should be noted that the instrument loop response time is very conservative. For example the sample low flow alarm is at 4 cfm with a very conservative accuracy of +2 cfm, which was based on engineering judgment. This accounts for 5.5 seconds and could be lowered by approximately 1-2 seconds. Also the Response of the Beta Scintillator, Photomultiplier tube, and the pre-amplifier have been rounded up from nanoseconds to seconds. This accounts for 0.7 seconds and could be neglected.

Note on methodologies used:

This calculation determined the doses using different methodologies. The gamma, beta and Thyroid (ICRP-30) doses are all based on TID-14844 methodologies utilizing the ICRP-30 iodine dose conversion factors. The other methodology used is the TEDE (Total Effective Dose Equivalent). The TEDE presents an overall weighted dose and is more representative of the impact of all isotopes on the body as a whole. The TEDE dose is required for AST, however is not required for RG 1.25 methodology. It is important to note that tritium does not impact the thyroid doses utilizing the TID-14844 methodology, because only iodine is applied to the thyroid dose. However, in fact tritium does contribute to the thyroid dose, as well as other organs of the body. This is why the TEDE is a more representative dose when discussing the impact of tritium.

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TTQP-1-091

TRITIUM TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED TPBAR RELEASES, **INCLUDING TRITIUM**

Revision 10

Prepared By:

DO Lanning

Reviewed By:

Concurrence:

 $\frac{\mathcal{E}}{\mathbf{r} \cdot \mathbf{R}}$ Gi dependent Reviewer

uthorized Derivative Classifier

mm T.M. Brewer, Quality Engineer

BOReis

B.D. Reid, Design Task Manager

Approval:

CK Thornhill, TTP Project Manager

/6/06
Date

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Tritium Technology Program 'Undassified **TPHAR** Releases, Including Tritium **TrQP-i-091** -Revision **10** Page **I of 8**

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This document provides a complete listing of all unclassified tritium release values that should be assumed for unclassified analysis. Much of the information is brought forth *from* the related documents listed in Section 4.0 to provide a single-source listing of unclassified release values. Some information, however, is new or updated based on current design analysis and available experimental data,

This document provides unclassified information for a larger number of release scenarios than previously analyzed. This information is summarized in Tables '1, 2, and 3. In addition, a section is included to address lithium and aluminum release in the event of a 24-TPBAR breach in the spent fuel pool,

2.0 **SUMMARY OF UNCLASSIFIED RELEASES, INCLUDING TRITIUM**

Al **I** tritium-producing burnable absorber rod (TPBAR) analysis assumes a maximum of 1.2 grams of tritium per TPBAR will be generated during an 18-month operating cycle.

2.1 Intact TPBAR In-reactor Tritium Permeation

The in-reactor tritium permeation rate deduced from RCS tritium activity for the group of 240 TPBARs in Watts Bar Nuclear Cycle, 6 averaged over a year extending to end-of-cycle, was 2.4 ± 1.8 Ci/TPBAR/year (95% confidence interval) (Lanning and Pagh, 2005). The $95%$ upper bound of 2.4 $+1.8 =$:4.2 CivrPBAR/year. is recommended as the basis for assessing the tritium release from intact TPBARs.'

2.2 In-reactor Tritium Release from a Failed TPBAR

The first scenario involves a TPBAR that may have a fabrication defect or may be damaged prior to insertion into the reactor for irradiation. 'In this case, 100 percent of the tritium generated in the TPBAR is assumed to be released to the reactor coolant as it is generated.

- 2.3 TPBAR Releases from Spent Fuel Pool Accidents
	- 2.3.1 Spent Fuel Pool Tritium Concentration Limit

1t has been determined that following the simultaneous breach of 24 TPBARs, the Tennessee Valley Authority take-action limit for tritium concentration in the spent fuel pool water will not, be exceeded. The concentration limit is 60 microcuries per milliliter. The best estimate of total tritium release in this event is less than 25% of the TPBAR inventory. *r-The best estimate tritium* release is loss than 25% of the TPBAR inventory. The release will not be instantaneous, but will **occur at** a steady rate over a time period substantially greater than 8 hours. The rate will thius be less than 3% (of initial inventory) per hour.

Tritium Technology Program Unclassified TPBAR Releases, including Tritium **TTQP-1-091** Revision **10** Page 2 of 8

2.3.2 Instantaneous Tritium Release per TPBAR

In particular, the instantaneous release of tritium from breached TPBARs in the spent fuel pool (as gas within the released gas from the TPBARs) will not exceed 0.001 Ci/TPBAR.

2.3.3 Lithium and Aluminum Release

In the event of a 24-TPBAR breach in the spent fuel, the following
concentration limits for lithium and aluminum will not be exceeded:

400 ppb lithium

50 ppb aluminum.

2.4 Tritium Releases from TPBARs within Storage Canisters (<200°F)

The upper-bounding tritium partial pressure within storage canisters containing lead test assembly (LTA) TPBARs and sections is not expected to exceed 20 torr under nominal storage conditions (~86°F). The quoted bounding pressure for. maximum temperatures $(\leq 200^\circ F)$ is estimated by increasing this figure by the ratio of Kelvin temperatures, to 25 torr.

Tritium release from extracted TPBARs in storage will not exceed 1% of the declared post-extraction residual tritium (Clemmer et al. 1984; and Johnson et al. 1976).

In both cases, the form of the released tritium will be tritiated water vapor or condensate (HTO).

2.5 TPBAR Transportation Cask Event Releases

2.5.1 **Intact TPBARs**

2.5.1.1 For TPBAR temperatures ranging from ambient to less than 200 \textdegree F, and for casks containing 1,200 or less TPBARs, the tritium release from the entire cask loading would be less than 0.19 mCi per hour, based on extrapolation from an in-reactor upper bound observed permeation rate of 4.2 Ci/TPBAR/year. The tritium would be released from the TPBARs in the form of molecular tritium gas (i.e., T₂ or HT).

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Attachment 2

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October 23, 2000

TVATP-00-068

Ms. Cheryl X. Thornhill
TCP Project Manager
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
P. 0. Box 999
Richland, WA 99352

SUBJECT: VERIFICATION OF DESIGN INPUTS FOR CALCULATIONS OF BREACHED TPRAR LEACHING IN THE SPENT FUEL POOL

REF: C. K. Thornhill to J. S. Chardos letter dated
September 19, 2000, same subject

Dear Cheryl:

tva has revieved the design assumptions in the referenced letter
and finds them to be correct except for assumption number 2.
The value for tritium should be 60 uc/ml not 60 mg/ml. . If you have any questions, please call.

Sincerely

fames S. Chardos
Tratium Program Manager

JSC/LDR CC: F. A. Koontz, EQB 1A-WBN
D. M. Lafever, OPS 2B-SON
J. A. Flanigan, BR 3P-C EDMS WT 3B-K

423 385 3965 P. 637 84 NEM HAL $52:80$ $1002 - 20 - N + 1$ M

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Attachment 7

TVA Nuclear Power Group Calculation

WBNTSR-080 R6

Control Room Operator and Offsite Doses Due to a Loss of AC Power

NPG CALCULATION COVERSHEET/CCRIS UPDATE

TVA 40532 [10-2008]

NEDP-2-1 [10-20-2008]

NPG CALCULATION COVERSHEET/CCRIS UPDATE

KEY NOUNS (A-add, D-delete)

CROSS-REFERENCES (A-add, C-change, D-delete)

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Purpose

The purpose of this calculation is to determine the control room operator and offsite dose due to a Loss of AC Power. This calculation supports FSAR chapter 15.5. Revision 2 is performed because **X/Q** values have changed. Revision 3 is performed because the control room makeup flow changed from 325 to 711 cfin. Revision 4 implements EDC E50629A to allow the use of a Tritium Production Core (TPC), it also revises the source inventory to the secondary steam in WBNNAL3-003 (ref.2), and utilizes new γ /Q values used from ARCON96 methodology in addition to the old Halitsky values. Revision **5** was performed as the mass releases changed due to replacement steam generators.

Revision 6 added the Unit 2 accident (see Appendix B). Unit 2 has the original steam generators, however Westinghouse provided revised mass releases. Also the Unit 2 ARCON96 X/Q values are used. Only the TPC was evaluated as it bounds the conventional core.

Introduction

A Loss of AC Power to the Watt's Bar Nuclear Plant will result in a significant steam release to the environment. The steam will contain radionuclides if a primary to secondary side leak occurs prior to the event. The secondary steam inventory from WBNNAL3-003 consists of expected radionuclide activity levels (ANS/ANSI- 18.1-1984, ref.2). Computer code COROD (ref.4) will be used to determine the control room operator dose using the secondary steam inventory. Computer code FENCDOSE (ref.5) will be used to determine the offsite dose using the secondary steam inventory. The calculation will provide the control room operator and offshite dose for both the standard core and the TPC for both the realistic case and 1% failed fuel case.

It should be noted that there is no standard review plan or regulatory guide for this accident. This is a simple best estimate analysis. The 1% failed fuel case is a conservative analysis that utilizes a factor of 8 as a multiplier to the realistic case. This factor causes the inventories to exceed the technical specification values (which would have a multiplier of 7.965, ref. 12). The 1% failed fuel is not exactly 1%. It is based on the realistic case being close to but not exactly 0.125% failed fuel, therefore 8 times 0.125% = **I %.** It should be considered just a label for a severe case.

The offsite dose limits are 10% (ref.16) of the following regulatory limits: 25 rem gamma (1OCFRIOO. 11), 300 rem thyroid (1OCFRIOO.1 1), 300 rem beta, and 25 rem TEDE (1OCFRSO.67). SRP 6.4 in NUREG 0800 shows that the thyroid dose and beta dose limits are equivalent for the control room, therefore the offsite beta dose limit can be assumed the same as the offsite thyroid dose limit, 300 rem. I0CFR20.1201 also states that the organ (thyroid) dose and skin (beta) dose are equivalent. The control room dose limits are 5 rem gamma (1OCFR50 Appendix A GDCI9), 30 rem thyroid (SRP 6.4), 30 rem beta (SRP 6.4), and 5 rem TEDE (IOCFR50.67).

Design Input

The amount of steam released to the environment due to the loss of AC power is provided below as given in ref. 10.

- 0 2 hours 455,718 lbs.
- 2 8 hours 962,213 lbs.

The following are the χ /Q values used in the computer code models:

Offsite (ref. 12): 30 day LPZ: 1.41E-4 0-2hr; 6.68E-5 2-8hr; 4.59E-5 8-24 hr; 2.04E-5 1-4 days; 6.35E-04 4-30 days $2 hr EAB : 6.07E-4$

Control Room (ref. 13): 4.03E-3 0-2hr; 3.35E-3 2-8hr; 2.27E-4 8-24hr; 1.81E-4 1-4 day; 1.45E-4 4-30 day

Assumptions

- 1. The secondary side source consists of expected/realistic radionuclide activity levels for a reactor based on ANSI/ANS 18.1-1984, as calculated in WBNNAL3-003 (ref.2).
- 2. WBNNAL3-003 (ref.2) provides the inventory for tritium in a TPC. Only the 2 TPBAR failure source term is used for each case, as the tritium has only a small impact on the result and using the 2 TPBAR failure source term is conservative since additional failed fuel has no impact on tritium from a failed TPBAR.
- 3. Only one train of CREVS is in operation. Normally, each CREVS train takes suction from separate intakes with no cross communication between trains. This leads to one contaminated train, and one uncontaminated train. The only way a 2 CREVS operation could result in higher doses would be for both trains to take suction from the same vent. For

this to happen, one intake path would require a failed closed intake path **AND** a fail open of normally closed passive manual damper at the beginning of the accident. An active failure of a train plus a failure of a passive component in less than 24 hours is beyond design basis.

Special Requirements/Limiting Conditions

There are no special requirements or limiting conditions in this calculation.

Calculations

The radionuclide inventory is provided in μ Ci/g in WBNNAL3-003. The releases, in Ci, are determined for each isotope per the following equation and are provided in the table below (the table also provides the 1% values by multiplying the realistic values by 8 except for tritium):

Ci (isotope) = μ Ci/g (isotope) * (Ci/1E6 μ Ci) * 453.59 gm/lb. * steam released lbs.

Secondary Side Steam Inventory From WBNNAL3-003

For each case the released radionuclides are input into computer code FENCDOSE (ref. 3) to calculate the Low Population Zone (LPZ) offsite dose. The FENCDOSE model is taken from WBNAPS3-077 (ref. 12).

For each case the released radionuclides are also input into computer code COROD (ref. 4) to determine the control room operator dose. The COROD model is taken from WBNAPS3-077 (ref. 12). The χ /Q values used are from WBNAPS3-104 (ref. 13) for the SGTR accident, because the steam release points are the same.

 I

Results

Unit 1 Doses Due to Loss of AC Power (Rem)

Non-TPC

TPC

Notes for Table:

* COROD R6 does not include in the TEDE, the dose due to direct shine from outside the control room. The value is manually added to arrive at the total TEDE.

 $TEDE_{total} = TEDE_{air} + gamma_{shire} + TEDE_{in/Egress}$

where gamma shine > 0 but is negligible

Discussion and Conclusion

The calculated offsite doses are substantially below (< 10%, ref.16) the regulatory limits of 25 rem whole body, 300 rem beta, 300 rem thyroid, and 25 rem TEDE. The control room operator doses are substantially below the regulatory limits of 5 rem gamma, 30 rem beta, 30 rem thyroid, and 5 rem TEDE. The calculated offsite TEDE dose is also less than the I0CFR20.1301 (ref 14) limit of 0. **1** rem. The Unit I accident bound the Unit 2 accident.

References

- 1. **DCN** 51754, Steam Generator Replacement (I/O)
- 2. WBNNAL3-003 R4 " Reactor Coolant Activities in Accordance with ANS/ANSI-18.1-1984"
- 3. Deleted in revision 4
- 4. Computer code COROD R7, code ID 262347
- 5. Computer code FENCDOSE R5, code ID 262358
- 6. Deleted in revision 4
- 7. Deleted in revision 4
- 8. Deleted in revision 4
- 9. Deleted in revision 4
- 10. WCAP-16286-P, January 1005, "Watts Bar Unit **I** Replacement Steam Generator Program NSSS Engineering Report"
- 11. Deleted in revision 4
- 12. WBNAPS3-077 RIO, "Offsite and Control Room Operator Doses Due to a Main Steam Line Break"
- 13. WBNAPS3-104 R0, "WBN Control Room χ /Q"
- 14. 1OCFR20, section 20.1301, "Dose Limits for Individual Members of the Public"
- *15.* EDC E50629A
- 16. ANS/ANSI 51.1-1983, "Nuclear Safety Criteria for the Design of Stationary Pressurized Water Reactor Plants"
- 17a. WBT-D- 1202 October 22, 2009 "WBS 5.2.11 Revised Steam Releases for Dose"

17b. LTR-CRA-09-103 Rev.1 'Watts Bar Unit 2 Completion Project - Results of Steam Releases for Dose Calculations"

18. EDCR 54956

The following are the results for the original steam generators (R4 of this calculation).

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Appendix B: Unit 2 Loss of AC Power

This appendix evaluates the Unit 2 Loss of AC Power. The steam generators are the original steam generators, however Westinghouse has revised the mass releases.

Using the same methodology as in the main text, with the TPC only (since that bounds the conventional core), and with Unit 2 ARCON96 X/Q values (2.87E-3 sec/cum 0-2 hr, 2.46E-3 sec/cum, ref. 13):

The amount of steam released to the environment due to the loss of AC power is provided below as given in ref. 17.

0 - 2 hours 444,875 lbs.
2 - 8 hours 903,530 lbs.

903,530 lbs.

Unit 2 Loss of AC Power Releases

Results

The results for Unit 2 Loss of AC Power were (rem):

of the set

Realistic Case

1% Failed Fuel Case

Discussion and Conclusion

The calculated offsite doses are substantially below (< 10%, ref. 16) the regulatory limits of 25 rem whole body, 300 rem beta, 300 rem thyroid, and 25 rem TEDE. The control room operator doses are substantially below the regulatory limits of 5 rem gamma, 30 rem beta, 30 rem thyroid, and 5 rem TEDE. The calculated offsite TEDE dose is also less than the IOCFR20.1301 (ref.14) limit of 0.1 rem. The Unit 2 accident is bounded by the Unit 1 accident.

Attachment 8

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FENCDOSE File

TSR80FA6.txt

Time Dependent Releases realistic case

Page 1

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 $\mathbf{1}$ REPRODUCTION OF INPUT DATA DECK

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KRM-83 KRM-85 KR-89
KR-87 KR-88 KR-89
XEM-131 XEM-133 XE-133 XEM-135 XE-135 XE-137 XE-138
T-131 T-132 T-133 T-134 T-135 H-3

Page 2

TSR80FA6.txt

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Page 3

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XEM-135

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1ISOTOPE **,** TIME =720.

Page 5

1LOSS OF AC POWER

OGAMMA DOSE FOR EACH ISOTOPE AND TIME PERIOD (REM)

Page 7

TSR80FA6.txt ------------------ $- - - - - - - - -$ 3.661E-06 3.522E-06 0.OOOE+0O $0.000E + 00$ $0.000E + 00$ TOTAL 1. 576E-05 QINHALATION DOSE FOR EACH IODINE AND TIME PERIOD (REM) (ICRP 2 DATA 4-30 DAYS ID ISOTOPE 0-2 HRS 2-8 HRS 8-24 HRS 1-4 DAYS 2-HR EAB 2.060E-07 1.983E-07 0.O000E+0O **0.O000E+00** $0.000E + 00$ 1 1-131 8.869E-07 **0.O000E+00 0.O000E+00** $0.000E + 00$ 2 1-132 1. 780E-08 1. 713E-08 7.663E-08 0. **OOOE+00 0.O000E+00** 3 1-133 1.591E-07 1. 532E-07 **0.O000E+00** $6.851E-07$
4 I 6.960E-09 **0.OOOE+00** 0.OOOE+00 4 1-134 7. 231E-09 **0.OOOE+00** 3.113E-08
-⁵ 7. 292E-08 **0.OOOE+00 0.O000E+00** $0.000E + 00$ 5 1-135 7.578E-08 3.262E-07 ---TOTAL 4.660E-07 4.484E-07 **0.O000E+00** 0.OOOE+O0 **O.OOOE+00** 2.006E-06 OINHALATION DOSE FOR EACH IODINE AND TIME PERIOD (REM) (ICRP 30 DATA) 0-2 HRS 2-8 HRS 1-4 DAYS 4-30 DAYS ID ISOTOPE 8-24 HRS 2-HR **EAB** 1 1-131 1. 503E-07 1. 447E-07 0.O00E+O0 **0.O000E+00 0. OOOE+00** 6.472E-07 2. 143E-09 O.000E+00 $0.000E + 00$ **0. OOOE+00** 2 1-132 2.062E-09 9.224E-09
 $\frac{3}{1}$ 3 1-133 7.162E-08 6.893E-08 O.000E+O0 0.OOOE+00 **0.000 E+00** 3.083E-07 4 1-134 3.095E-10 2. 979E-10 0.OOOE+00 **0. OOOE+00 0.000 E+00** 1.332E-09 1.913E-08 1.841E-08 **0.OOOE+00 0.000 E+00 0. OOOE+00** 5 1-135 8.234E-08 _________ _________ . <u>.</u> ------------------_ _ _ _ _ **_ _** _ _ O.000E+O0 **O.O00E+00 O.OOOE+00** TOTAL 2.435E-07 2.344E-07 1.048E-06 OAT 2 HOUR EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY **(EAB)** TOTAL GAMMA DOSE = 1.690E-08 REM TOTAL BETA DOSE = 1.576E-05 REM TOTAL INHALATION DOSE (ICRP-2) = 2.006E-06 REM TOTAL INHALATION DOSE (ICRP-30) = 1.048E-06 REM OAT 30 DAY LPZ BOUNDARY TOTAL GAMMA DOSE = 7.742E-09 REM TOTAL BETA DOSE = 7.182E-06 REM TOTAL INHALATION DOSE (ICRP-2) = 9.144E-07 REM TOTAL INHALATION DOSE $(ICRP-30) = 4.779E-07$ REM KRM 83 IS NOT IN EPA LIBRARY. ISOTOPE IGNORED. KRM 83 IS NOT IN EPA LIBRARY. ISOTOPE IGNORED. KRM 83 IS NOT IN EPA LIBRARY. ISOTOPE IGNORED. KRM 83 IS NOT IN EPA LIBRARY. ISOTOPE IGNORED. KRM 83 IS NOT IN EPA LIBRARY. ISOTOPE IGNORED. Page 8

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1LOSS OF AC POWER

OTEDE FOR EACH ISOTOPE AND TIME PERIOD (REM)

OTHIS RUN IS DATED 01/29/10. THE TOTAL ELAPSED TIME IS 0.0 MINUTES. 0.0 SECONDS.

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Attachment 9

FENCDOSE File

TSR80FB6.txt

Time Dependent Releases 1% failed fuel case

Page 1

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 $\mathbf{1}$ REPRODUCTION OF INPUT DATA DECK

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KRM-83 KRM-85 KR-89
KR-87 KR-88 KR-89
XEM-131 XEM-133 XE-133 XEM-135 XE-135 XE-137 XE-138
I-131 I-132 I-133 I-134 I-135 H-3

Page 2

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TSR80FB6.txt

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Page 5

1LOSS OF AC POWER

OGAMMA DOSE FOR EACH ISOTOPE AND TIME PERIOD (REM)

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Page 7

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 $- - - - - - - -$ ---------. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ --------------------------TOTAL 3.677E-06 3.537E-06 0.000E+00 0.OOOE+00 0.OOOE+00 1. 583E-05 0INHALATION DOSE FOR EACH IODINE AND TIME PERIOD (REM) (ICRP 2 DATA ID ISOTOPE 0-2 HRS 2-8 HRS 8-24 HRS 1-4 DAYS 4-30 DAYS 2-HR **EAB 1** 1-131 1. 648E-06 1. 586E-06 0.OOOE+O0 O.O00E+0O $0.000E + 00$ 7.095E-06
T $I - 132$ 1.424E-07 1. 370E-07 0.O00E+00 O.O00E+O0 0. **OOOE+00** $6.130E-07$
3 I 1. 273E-06 1.225E-06 O.O00E+0O O.OOOE+00 0.000E+00 3 1-133 5.481E-06
- T 4 1-134 5. 786E-08 5. 567E-08 O.O00E+0O 0.OOOE+00 0.000 E+0O $2.491E-07$
5 I 5 1-135 6.063E-07 5.832E-07 O.000E+O0 O.O00E+00 0.000 **E+00** 2.610E-06 ---TOTAL 3.728E-06 3.587E-06 **O.OOOE+O0** O.000E+0 **0. OOOE+O0** 1.605E-05 OINHALATION DOSE FOR EACH IODINE AND TIME PERIOD (REM) (ICRP 30 DATA) 0-2 HRS 2-8 HRS 8-24 HRS 1-4 DAYS 4-30 DAYS ID ISOTOPE 2-HR EAB 1. 203E-06 **1** 1-131 1. 157E-06 0.O00E+00 **0.OOOE+00 0.OOOE+00** 5.177E-06 **0.OOOE+00** 1. 714E-08 1. 650E-08 O.000E+O0 $I - 132$ 0.000E+00 $7.379E-08$
3 I 3 1-133 5.730E-07 5.512E-07 O.000E+O0 **0.OOOE+00** 0.000E+00 2.467E-06
- T 2.476E-09 4 1-134 2. 382E-09 O.000E+OO **0. OOOE+00** $0.000E+00$ $1.066E-08$
5 I 5 1-135 1. 530E-07 1.472E-07 O.000E+O0 $0.000E+00$ $0.000E+00$ 6.588E-07 ---_________ TOTAL 1.948E-06 1.875E-06 0.OOOE+O0 O.000E+0 0. **OOOE+00** 8.387E-06 OAT 2 HOUR EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB) GAMMA DOSE = $1.366E-07$ REM TOTAL BETA DOSE = 1.583E-05 REM TOTAL 1.605E-05 REM INHALATION DOSE (ICRP-2) = TOTAL 8.387E-06 REM INHALATION. DOSE (ICRP-30) = TOTAL OAT 30 DAY LPZ BOUNDARY

TSR8OFB6.txt

TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL INHALATION DOSE (ICRP-2) **=** 7.315E-06 REM TOTAL INHALATION DOSE (ICRP-30) = 3.823E-06 REM KRM KRM KRM KRM KRM GAMMA DOSE = $6.227E-08$ REM BETA DOSE = $7.214E-06$ REM 83 IS NOT IN EPA LIBRARY. ISOTOPE IGNORED. Page 8

TSR8OFB6.txt

KRM 83 IS NOT IN EPA LIBRARY. ISOTOPE IGNORED.

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1LOSS OF AC POWER

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OTEDE FOR EACH ISOTOPE AND TIME PERIOD (REM)

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OTHIS RUN IS DATED 01/29/10. THE TOTAL ELAPSED TIME IS 0.0 MINUTES. 0.0 SECONDS. \sim

Attachment 10

TVA Nuclear Power Group Calculation

WBNAPS3-077 **R11**

Offsite and Control Room Operator Doses Due to a Main Steam Line Break
NPG CALCULATION COVERSHEET/CCRIS UPDATE

NPG CALCULATION COVERSHEETICCRIS UPDATE

KEY NOUNS (A-add, D-delete)

CROSS-REFERENCES (A-add, C-change, D-delete)

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NPG CALCULATION RECORD OF REVISION

CALCULATION IDENTIFIER WBNAPS3-077

NPG CALCULATION RECORD OF REVISION

CALCULATION IDENTIFIER **WBNAPS3-077**

TVA 40709 [10-2008] Page 1 of 1 NEDP-2-2 [10-20-2008]

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Purpose

The purpose of this calculation is to determine the offsite and control room operator dose due to a Main Steam Line Break (MSLB). The results will be used in FSAR ch. 15.5 to show compliance with 10CFR100 and IOCFR50 App.A GDC 19. This calculation also establishes the maximum primary to secondary side leakage and the maximum 1-131 equivalent concentrations in the primary and secondary side coolant.

Revision 9 is performed due to the replacement of the steam generators. The new steam generators have different mass inventories and mass releases than the original steam generators. Also, the post accident leakage due to Alternate Repair Criteria is eliminated. Therefore only one leakage case is analyzed, utilizing the Tritium Production Core (TPC). The original steam generator cases used in the FSAR are archived in Appendix G. There are two cases modeled. One case has a pre-accident iodine spike where the iodine level is the reactor coolant at the 48 hour maximum allowable 21 μ Ci/gm I-131 equivalent. The other case has the reactor coolant at the maximum steady state $I-131$ equivalent of 0.265 μ Ci/gm I-131 equivalent with an accident initiated iodine spike consisting of a 500 increase in the rate of iodine release from the fuel. In both sets, the primary to secondary side leak is 150 **gpd** in the unfaulted loops, and secondary side activity is at the Technical Specification limit of 0.1 µCi/gm. The Tritium Production Core (TPC) was used. The control room X/O values using ARCON96 methodology was used. COROD (R6) and FENCDOSE (R4) were used to determine the thyroid doses based on ICRP-2, ICRP-30 and also the TEDE. Only one train of CREVS is utilized (see assumption 14).

Revision 11 is performed to evaluate the Unit 2 MSLB. Unit 2 has the original steam generators, however Westinghouse has provided revised mass releases. Also the Unit 2 ARCON96 X/Q values are used. The results are found in Appendix H.

Introduction

A Main Steam Line Break at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant will result in a significant steam release to the environment. The steam will contain radionuclides if a primary to secondary side leak occurs prior to the MSLB event. This calculation is performed to show that the offsite and control room operator doses do not exceed the 1OCFR1OO and 1OCFR50 App.A GDC 19 dose limits.

This calculation uses the computer code **STP** (ref.3) to determine the activity releases. The **STP** output is used as input to computer codes FENCDOSE and COROD. Computer code FENCDOSE (ref.4) is used to determine the offsite dose. Computer code COROD (ref.5) is used to determine the control room operator dose. The base FENCDOSE and COROD models are taken from WBNTSR-008 (ref.9).

There are 2 cases modeled. The first case has a pre-accident iodine spike where the iodine level in the reactor coolant is at the maximum allowable of 21 μ Ci/gm I-131 equivalent (ref. 1). The second has the reactor coolant at the maximum steady state I-131 equivalent of 0.265 μ Ci/gm with an accident initiated iodine spike consisting of a 500 increase in the rate of iodine release from the fuel. In both cases, the primary to secondary side leak is 150 gpd in the unfaulted loops (ref.2 1), and the secondary side activity is at the Technical Specification limit of 0.1μ Ci/gm (ref.23). There is no additional steam generator leakage post accident, however the preaccident 1 gpm ("unknown") leakage in the faulted steam generator and the 150 gpd/unfaulted steam generator continues post accident. To establish the Iodine release rate rate from the fuel, a preaccident **10** gpm known reactor coolant leak is used with a I gpm unknown leak for a total of 11 gpm. Additional cases are performed in Appendix G with other leakage rates and other iodine concentrations. These extra cases were performed so as to give additional information for possible future changes in Technical Specifications. The relative isotopic spectrum is taken from WBNNAL3-003 (Reactor Coolant Activities in Accordance with ANSI/ANS- 18.1-1984). Justification of the usage of this spectrum as opposed to the historical design spectrum as found in chapter 11 of the FSAR can be found in Appendix A.

Assumptions

1. The primary side to secondary side leakage is 150 gpd/steam generator, steady state, with **I** gpm in the faulted steam generator (steady state). The 1 gpm in the faulted steam generator and the 150 gpd/unfaulted steam generators continue following the accident. No additional leakage is assumed.

Technical Justification: 150 gpd/steam generator and the 1 gpm are the maximum Technical Specification leakages. Having the **I** gpm in the faulted loop is conservative.

2. The maximum letdown of 120 gpm (ref.16) + 4.39 gpm uncertainty for a total of 124.39 gpm is used.

Technical Justification: This will maximize the removal rate of iodines from the primary coolant, and therefore will maximize the production rate of iodine (production = removal at steady state) and is consistent with NSAL-00-004. See Calculation section for the formulas used. Note, this value is used for calculation of iodine production/removal rates. The letdown is assumed to be isolated at the beginning of the accident to maximize the reactor coolant inventories. The uncertainty of 4.39 gpm is determined in Appendix B.

3. The primary to secondary side leak rates and letdown flow rates are based on Standard Temperature and Pressure (STP). Technical Justification: STP conditions will result in higher densities, therefore higher masses, especially when determining the production rate of iodines.

4. It is assumed that the faulted steam generator dries out at the start of the accident, resulting in an iodine partition factor of 1.0 per ref. 10.

Technical Justification: Following an accident, the Main Steam Line will be isolated and the Main and Auxiliary Feedwater will also be isolated. Since the worst case accident occurs with the line associated with a Steam Generator with Technical Specification leakage, that Steam Generator will dry out. In reality, this dry out will not occur until all feedwater has been isolated, and the water boiled off Assuming dry out conditions at time zero is clearly conservative.

5. In the intact steam generators, the iodine partition factor is assumed to be 100.

Technical Justification: The mass of primary to secondary leakage which occurs to the intact steam generators is small relative to the mass of secondary coolant. Therefore none of this leakage is assumed to flash and the release to the environment is through the steaming process. Reference 10 allows a partition factor of 100 for such cases.

6. A preaccident iodine spike of 21 μ Ci/gm I-131 equivalent is assumed at the start of the accident. In other cases, an accident initiated iodine spike of 500 increase in the iodine release rate from the fuel is assumed in the accident initiated case with the reactor coolant starting at 0.265μ Ci/gm I-131 equivalent.

Technical Justification: SRP 15.1.5 subsection 4a specifies the maximum allowable preaccident spike is required (21 μ Ci/gm is permissible for 48 hours). SRP 15.1.5 subsection 4b specifies that following an accident, the iodine release rate from the fuel to the reactor coolant is increased by a factor of 500.

7. The letdown demineralizer efficiency is assumed to be 1 for iodines.

Technical Justification: This will maximize iodine removal (=production) rate, and therefore result in larger iodine spiking. 8. The control room isolates in 20.6 seconds (ref.9) due to high radiation in the Control Building Ventilation intake (400 cpm, ref. 18). This will result in an unfiltered puff into the control room for that 20.6 seconds.

Technical Justification: This is based on 14 seconds closure time of the dampers, plus 6.6 seconds instrument response time. 9. The tritium inventory in the TPC assumes 2 TPBAR failures (98.4 µCi/gm in the reactor coolant, per WBNNAL3-003, ref.2).

Technical Justification: This will maximize the tritium release.

10. The iodine production rate is based on 10 gpm identified primary side leakage (all leaks) plus 1 gpm unidentified leak, for a total of **II** gpm.

Technical Justification: This is per Technical Specification 3.4.13 (ref.2 **1),** and maximizes the iodine production rates. This methodology is consistent with NSAL-00-004, ref.22.

11. It is assumed that the secondary side concentrations are at the maximum of 0.1 μ Ci/gm I-131 equivalent.

Technical Justification: This is the maximum allowed by the Technical Specifications (ref.23) and is conservative.

12. The noble gas inventories are maximized by scaling them up to 100/Ebar.

Technical Justification: This maximizes the noble gas inventories. 100/Ebar is the Technical Specification limit.

13. It is assumed that there are no fuel failures associated with the accident.

Technical Justification: This accident will not uncover the core, therefore the core will not see extreme temperatures which would lead to fuel failure.

14. Only one train of CREVS is in operation.

Technical Justification: Normally, each CREVS train takes suction from separate intakes with no cross contamination between trains. This leads to on contaminated train, and one uncontaminated train. The only was a 2 CREVS operation could result in higher doses would be for both trains to take suction from the same vent. For this to happen, one intake path would require a failed closed intake path AND a fail open of normally close passive manual damper at the beginning of the accident. An active failure of a train plus a failure of a passive component in less than 24 hours is beyond design basis.

Special Requirements/Limiting Conditions

There are no special requirements or limiting conditions in this calculation.

Calculations

The STP models consist of a pre-accident iodine spike (see figure 1) model and an accident initiated iodine spike model (see figure 2). The model(s) consist of the following:

Volumes:

#1: Reactor Coolant: 5.78E5 lb (ref.2) = 2.622E8 gm

#2: Steam Generator w/Leak: 5.3 **IE7** gin (ref.6)

#3: Steam Generators w/out Leak. 1.593E8 (ref.6).

#4: Environment: **I** gin (arbitrary) (This volume is made into an accumulator through the "A" card to suppress radioactive decay)

Step Sources:

The following equation is used to set up the initial activities (in Ci) for each component using the initial ANSIIANS- 18.1-1984 source modified for WBN operational parameters (which is in units of μ Ci/gm):

 $S =$ Component Volume [gm] * 1E-6 Ci/ μ Ci * I-131 equivalent conversion factor

To obtain the 1-131 equivalent conversion factor, the ANSI/ANS-18.I-1984 spectrum must be converted to 1-131 equivalence. See Appendix A for justification for using the ANSI/ANS-18.1-1984 spectrum. From WBNTSR-008, the I-131 equivalence is:

1-131 equivalent = dose conversion factor (D/A) * concentration / 1-131 dose conversion factor

The above table shows that the 1-131 equivalent concentration of the initial RCS ANSI 18.1 source term is 0.1255 uCi/gm, as compared to *I* uCi/gm when the RCS is at the TS allowable concentration. Consequently, to ratio the initial source term up to the TS allowable values, the ANSI 18.1 concentrations must be multiplied by 1/0.1255 or 7.965. Note: this equivalence is based on ICRP-2 iodine dose conversion factors because this is what Chemistry uses. Some of the final dose results are based on ICRP-30. Utilizing the different ICRP conversion factors in this case is appropriate because in the above case, the ICRP-2 establishes the inventories, which is independent of determination of doses due to releases.

For the secondary side concentrations from WBNNAL3-003, the same procedure is performed to determine the 1-131 equivalence:

To convert to 1-131 equivalence, the secondary side **1-131** equivalent conversion factor is (1/3.189E-6) **=** 3.136E5 gm/pCi (Note: since there is no Technical Specification limit on gross activity for the secondary side like the 100/Ebar for the primary side, this factor is also applied to the secondary side noble gasses in order to retain the proper isotopic ratios).

The isotopes other than iodine in the primary coolant must also be scaled up. In NUREG-0800 R2 Chapter 15.6.3, section **111.5** states "The reviewer assumes the primary and secondary coolant activity concentrations allowed by the technical specifications." Reference 3 (of the NUREG-0800) states the following "The specific activity of the reactor coolant shall be limited to: a. Less than or equal to **I** microCurie per gram DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131, and b. Less than or equal to **100/E** microCuries per gran of gross activity."

Given the above considerations, the isotopic spectrum found in WBNNAL3-003 was examined. The 100/E values for this particular spectrum are determined in the following Table:

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Table 2: Determination of 100/EBAR

Rev: 11 Plant: WBN Page: 13 **Calculation No. WBNAPS3-077** Date: Subject: Offsite and Control Room Operator Doses Due to a Main Prepared: $M \, \omega$ $29 - 10$ **Steam Line Break** Checked: Date: HML $1.74.0$

Determination of 100/EBAR - continued

The definition of EBAR or E is as follows: "E shall be the average (weighted in proportion to the concentration of each radionuclide in the reactor coolant at the time of sampling) of the sum of the average beta and gamma energies per disintegration (in MeV) for isotopes, other than iodines, with half lives greater than 15 minutes, making up at least 95% of the total non-iodine activity in the coolant."

The values for E_i in the above table were obtained from reference 9 and the values for A_i are from WBNNAL3-003. The value of E is determined as follows:

 $Ebar = E = (\Sigma A_i E_i) / (\Sigma A_i)$

The value for E calculated in Table 2 is 0.591 MeV/dis. This results in a non-iodine specific activity limit (100/E) of 169.14 μ Ci/g. The total specific activity of the expected coolant is 5.82 μ Ci/g.

Therefore, the values for noble gasses in the design reactor coolant will have to be increased by a factor of 169.14/5.82 $= 29.06.$

The step sources (Ci-gm/ μ Ci) to initialize the reactor coolant and the secondary side activities are:

All cases:

S=2.622E8 **gm*IE-6** Ci/pCi ***** 29.06 =7.6195E3 (noble gasses)

S=2.622E8 gm*1E-6 Ci/ μ Ci = 2.622E2 (tritium)

Pre-accident iodine spike case (initial concentration = $21 \mu \text{Ci/gm}$):

S=2.622E8 gm*1E-6 Ci/uCi * 7.965[uCi/gm I-131]⁻¹ *21uCi/gm I-131 = 4.386E4 (iodines)

Accident initiated iodine spike case (initial concentration = $0.265 \mu \text{Ci/gm}$):

S=2.622E8 gm*lE-6 Ci/pCi ***** 7.965 [pCi/gm 1-131]1"*0.265 pCi/gm 1-131= 5.170E2

Secondary side, all cases, steam generator w/ leak, release to environment. (concentration = 0.1μ Ci/gm) which is due to dryout (from reference 8, the initial steam from the defective steam generator is 117,200 lb):

S = 117,200 lb *453.59 g/lb ***** IE-6 Ci/4Ci ***** 3.136E5 [pCi/gm I-131]r'* 0.lpCi/gm 1-131 **= 1.667E6**

S = 117,200 lb *453.59 g/Ib ***** IE-6 CilpCi= 6.8039E1 (tritium)

Secondary side, all cases, steam generators without leak (initial concentration = $0.1 \mu C i/gm$):

S = 1.593E8 **gm*** IE-6 Ci/pCi ***** 3.136E5 [pCi/gm n-131-1* 0.lpCi/grn 1-131 = 4.996E6

S **=** 1.593E8 gm*1E-6 Ci/pCi = 1.593E2 (tritium)

Continuous Sources:

For the accident initiated iodine spike case, the iodine spike is 500 times the iodine release rate from the fuel. At steady state, the iodine release (production) rate is equal to the removal rate. The iodine removal is due to a) radioactive decay, b) removal by the letdown system, and c) removal through reactor coolant leakage. These terms are expressed as:

 $P = \Sigma$ removal rates = $\text{decay} + \text{letdown} + \text{leakage}$

or $P = \lambda + f_1 \varepsilon/V + p_s/V$

where $P =$ production rate $[hr^{-1}]$

 $\lambda =$ decay constant for the isotope in question $[\text{hr}^1] = \text{ln}(2)/T_{1/2}$

 f_L = letdown flow rate = 120 gpm + 4.39 gpm = 124.39 gpm

 ε = letdown demineralizer efficiency = 1 (assumed so as to maximize removal/production rate)

 $V =$ volume of primary coolant $= 5.78E5$ lb $= 2.62E8$ gm

p, removal rate of iodine from the primary side due to preaccident primary side leakage

 $= 11$ gpm (10 gpm identified $+ 1$ gpm unidentified)

 $T_{1/2}$ = halflife taken from ref. 15

Note: all the above flow rates are converted to mass flow rates at STP:

The accident initiated iodine spike of 500 times the increase in the iodine release (production) rate from the fuel is modeled as a continuous source:

 $C = \text{Volume}$ * 1E-6 Ci/ μ Ci * Prod. Rate * 500 * 1 μ Ci/gm I-131 equiv. conversion factor*I-131 equiv.

where $Volume = 2.622E8$ gm

Prod Rate = see table above

 1μ Ci/gm I-131 equivalent conversion factor = 7.965 (value determined above, this is to get the ANSI/ANS-18.1-1984 source into 1 uCi/gm I-131 equivalent

1-131 equiv. = 0.265μ Ci/gm 1-131

Continuous Source $[gm-Ci/µCi-hr]$ for Accident Initiated Iodine Spike:

Reactor Coolant Leak of 11 gpm (10 gpm identified + **I** gpm unidentified)

Flow Rates:

The following flow rates/leakage rates for each component are:

Flow from Reactor Coolant #1 to Environment #4 all classes (consists of 1 gpm and is for leak in the steam generators, however the production rate of iodines is based on a total RCS leakage of 11 gpm (=10gpm identified +1gpm unidentified):

 $F = 1.0$ gpm $* 60$ min/hr $* 3785.48$ cc/gal $* 1g$ /cc = 2.271E5 g/hr

Flow from Reactor Coolant #1 to Steam Generator w/no Leak #3 all classes:

F = 3 steam generators * 150 gpd * 3785.48 cc/gal / 24 hr/day * lg/cc **=** 7.098E4 g/br

From reference 25, the initial steam released from the defective steam generator is 117,200 lb. From the non-defective steam generators (= "steam generators without leak" in this model) the mass release is 442,083 lb (0-2 hr), and 922,918 lb (2-8 hr). The accident releases end at eight hours. To take into account uncovery of the faulted steam generator, there is no iodine partitioning in the release to the environment (iodine partition coefficient = 1). The mass release representing **I** gpm primary to secondary side leak is a flow directly to the environment.

The reactor coolant release to the unfaulted steam generator is small relative to the secondary side mass, therefore partitioning is allowed per the SRP. The iodine partition coefficient due to steaming for the unfaulted steam generators to the environment is 100. These mass releases translate into the following flows:

Flow from Steam Generators w/out Leak #3 to Environment #4:

 $F = (442,083 \text{ lb})(453.59 \text{ g/lb})/(2 \text{ hr}) = 1.0026E8 \text{ g/hr}$ (0-2 hr, noble gasses, tritium)

 $F = (442,083 \text{ lb})(453.59 \text{ g/lb})/(100 \text{ * } 2 \text{ hr}) = 1.0026E6 \text{ g/hr}$ (0-2 hr, iodines)

 $F = (922,918 \text{ lb})(453.59 \text{ g/lb})/(6 \text{ hr}) = 6.977E7 \text{ g/hr}$ (2-8 hr) (noble gasses, tritium)

 $F = (922,918 \text{ lb})(453.59 \text{ g/lb})/(100*6 \text{ hr}) = 6.977E5 \text{ g/hr}$ (2-8 hr) (iodines)

The STP output is used as input to COROD (which determines control room operator dose) and FENCDOSE (which determines 30-day and 2-hour LPZ offsite dose).

Some pertinent information from the COROD and FENCDOSE models used (but not changed) in this analysis are (from ref.9):

30-day LPZ Offsite X/Q values [sec/cum]: 1.41E-4 0-2hr, 6.68E-5 2-8 hr, 4.59E-5 8-24 hr, 2.04E-5 1-4 day, 6.35E-6 4-30 day

2-hr EAB X/Q values: 6.07E-4

Control Room X/Q (ARCON96 method): 4.03E-3 0-2 hr, 3.35E-3 2-8 hr, 2.27E-4 8-24 hr, 1.81E-4 1-4 day, 1.45E-4 4-30 day

Control Room volume: 257198 cuft

Control Room makeup/pressurization flow: 711 cfm (3200 cfm prior to isolation, ref.24)

Control Room total flow: 3600 cfin

TRIA

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Control Room recirculation flow: 2889 cfm

Control Room unfiltered intake: 51 cfm

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Control Room filter efficiency: 95% first pass, 70% second pass, 0% for tritium, 0% all elements prior to isolation

Control Room occupancy factors: 100% 0-24 hr, 60% 1-4 days, 40% 4-30 days

ICRP-2 and ICRP-30 dose conversion factors (internal to the codes)

TEXA

Results

The following results are based on a Tritium Production Core (TPC). The results from previous revisions showed that the TPC bounds the conventional core. In the following, the pre-accident reactor coolant lake rate is 11 gpm (10 gpm known + **I** gpm unknown), and the primary to secondary side steam generator post accident leak rate in the steam generators is **I** gpm (= the unknown leak rate). The Unit 2 results are found in Appendix H. The results were (rem):

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Unit 1 MSLB Offsite Doses (rem):

Unit 1 MSLB Control Room Doses (rem) Using ARCON96 X/Q values: **I**

Discussion and Conclusion

The offsite doses due to a MSLB with preaccident iodine spiking has 10CFR100 limits of 25 rem gamma, 300 rem beta, and 300 rem thyroid. The offsite doses due to a MSLB with accident initiated iodine spike (factor of 500) has limits of 10% of the l0CFR100 limits or 2.5 rem gamma, 30 rem beta, and 30 rem thyroid (ref.10). The control room operator doses limits from 10CFR50 App.A GDC 19 are 5 rem gamma, 30 rem beta, and 30 rem thyroid.

With the Technical Specification limits of 0.265μ Ci/gm I-131 equivalent steady state (and 21 μ Ci/gm maximum), the control room and offsite doses exceed the limits with a 1 gpm leak in the faulted line and 150 gpd in the unfaulted lines. These apply to Unit 2 also.

Unit 1 doses bound the Unit 2 doses, except for the gamma, beta and TEDE offsite doses for the accident initiated iodine spike, and the gamma control room for the accident initiated iodine spike.

Note: these limits are based on a maximum 0.1μ Ci/gm I-131 limit in the secondary side and using ARCON96 X/Q values. If the secondary side limit were to be reduced, then the primary to secondary side leakage and the primary side 1-131 concentrations can increase.

The Tritium Production Core (TPC) does not affect the limits above, because the limiting doses are the thyroid doses. The tritium affects only the beta dose and TEDE. The TPC obviously bounds the non-TPC configuration.

This calculation is conservative because it models the mass releases as linear within each time interval. This allows larger iodine releases for the accident initiated iodine spiking cases because iodine increases over time in the reactor coolant. In reality, the mass releases are greater at the beginning of the accident, and decrease over time. For the pre-existing iodine spike (which is not the limiting case), this has little effect, since the decay of short lived isotopes is compensated by the buildup of iodine in the unfaulted steam generators due to reactor coolant leakage.

Note on methodologies used:

This calculation determined the doses using 3 different methodologies. The gamma, beta and Thyroid (ICRP-2) doses are all based on TID-14844 methodologies utilizing the ICRP-2 iodine dose conversion factors found in TID-14844. The second methodology uses the ICRP-30 iodine dose conversion factors which are less conservative than the ICRP-2 factors. This methodology is presented for potential future use. Finally, the third methodology used is the TEDE (Total Effective Dose Equivalent). The TEDE presents an overall weighted dose and **is** more representative of the impact of all isotopes on the body as a whole. It is important to note that tritium does not impact the thyroid doses utilizing the TID-14844 methodology, because only iodine is applied to the thyroid dose. However, in fact tritium does contribute to the thyroid dose, as well as other organs of the body. This is why the TEDE is a more representative dose when discussing the impact of tritium. It is up to the end user to choose the dose which is to be used, with the understanding that each methodology has a different meaning.

References

and the

1. WBN Technical Specification 3.4.16, Amendment 11

2. WBNNAL3-003 R4 "Reactor Coolant Activities in Accordance with ANSIIANS-18.1-1984"

3. Computer Code STP R7, code I.D. 262165

4. Computer Code FENCDOSE R5,code I.D. 262358

5. Computer Code COROD R7, code I.D. 262347

6. WBNAPS3-053 R2 "Steam Generator Leakage Detection with the Condenser Vacuum Pump Air Exhaust Monitor (1,2-RM-90-119)"

7. WBNAPS3"043 R1 "Shielding Calculation For the Steam Generator Blowdown Demineralizer System" RIMS# B26 900620 200

8. Memorandum from J.W. Irons to W.L. Elliott, WAT-D-9489, "Verification of Data in FSAR Table 15.5-16" RIMS# T33 930927 823

9. WBNTSR-008 R11 "Control Room Operator and Offsite Dose Due to a Steam Generator Tube Rupture" 10. NUREG-0800 R2 section 15.1.5

11. WAT-D-10690, Nov.9, 1999, Memorandum from John W. Irons to J.E. Maddox "SLB Leak Rates" RIMS# B44 991109 002

12. WAT-D'10724, February 10, 2000, Memorandum from John W. Irons to J.E. Maddox "SLB Leak Rates Conversion" RIMS# **T71** 000217 928

13. N3-15-4002 R5 System Description For "Steam Generator Blowdown System"

14. FSAR Table 11.1-2 (note: this information is used only for comparison with reference 2, and not used as design input).

15. Lederer and Shirley, "Table of Isotopes', seventh ed.

16. N3-62-4001 R5 System Description for "Chemical and Volume Control System"

17. WBNNAL3-002 R2 "100-Day LOCA-DBA Source Terms for the EGTS and ABGTS Filters,

Containment, Sump, and Shield Building Annulus" Note: this calculation is currently at R3, however the infomation is found in R2.

18. WBNAPS3-050 R2 "Determine the Main Control Room Intake Monitor (0-RE-90-125, -126) Setpoints and Post Accident Air Intake Concentrations"

19. WB-DC-40-70 R1 "Accident Analysis Parameter Checklist (AAPC)", Figures 4.3.2-13 and -25

20. WBNAPS3-104 RO **"MBN** Control Room X/Q"

21. WBN Technical Specification 3.4.13

22. NSAL-00-004 "Nonconservatisms in Iodine Spiking Calculations"

23. WBN Technical Specification 3.7.14

24. WBN drawing 1-47W866-4 R36

25. WCAP 16286-P "Watts Bar Unit 1 Replacement Steam Generator Program NSSS Engineering Report" January 2005

26a. WBT-D-1202 October 22, 2009 "WBS 5.2.11 Revised Steam Releases for Dose"

26b. LTR'CRA-09-103 Rev.1 "Watts Bar Unit 2 Completion Project -- Results of Steam Releases for Dose Calculations"

27. EDCR 54956

Appendix A: Justification for Using ANSI/ANS-18.1-1984 Expected Coolant Spectrum

The choice of iodine spectrum is fairly important, since several isotopes have short halflives. Noble gas spectrum is not at important because the noble gasses contribute only to the gamma and beta doses which are orders of magnitude from the regulatory limits, whereas the limiting doses are thyroid (iodine influenced). Results may be affected when accident times are on the order of the decay of the short lived isotopes. There are several possible spectra available. The spectrum chosen for this analysis is the one that most closely resembles the actual spectrum present at WBN. From the surveillance tests 1-SI-68-28 performed on 7/10/00 and 4/9/01 (see Attachment **1),** the following concentrations were determined:

Two potential spectra are from WBNNAL3-003 (Reactor Coolant Activities in Accordance with ANSI/ANS-18.1-1984) and from the FSAR Table 11.1-2 (Historical Design Activities). The iodine concentrations and relative concentrations for each spectrum are as follows:

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As can be seen, the FSAR historical design concentrations do not reflect the actual measured concentrations. The FSAR values are weighted too strongly in favor of 1-131 (24.6% of total as opposed to < 1% of the actual total). By comparison,

the ANSI/ANS-18.1-1984 fractions are very close to the actual fractions. The worst fit was for 1-134 which was 40.1% actual versus ANSI/ANS-18.1-1984 34.22%. The 1-131 is slightly over predicted by ANS-18.1 (0.9% on 7/10/00 and 0.7% on 4/9/01 versus 4.48%), however this difference is not as large compared to the FSAR fraction. The ANSI/ANS-18.1-1984 spectrum overall fit is much better than the FSAR spectrum, therefore it can be concluded that the use of the ANSI/ANS-18.1-1984 spectrum is acceptable.

Appendix B: Determination of Letdown Flow Rate Uncertainty

The purpose of this appendix is to determine bounding errors for the measurements performed on the orifice restrictor flows using the Letdown Heat Exchanger Flow loop (1 -F-62-82) during Preop Test Instruction PTI-062-03 RO.

Following these tests, a loop check was performed for the computer point F01 34A by injecting a signal into the transmitter and reading the display on the computer. To determine the total loop error, the unmeasurable errors must be combined with the errors present at the time of the loop check.

WBN NESSD 1-F-62-1 **will** be used as a guide for determining the unmeasurable errors for loop 1-F-62-82 since it contains the same model flow element and a similar model transmitter. According to EMPAC, the flow element is a Vickery Simms Model MK-52 and the transmitter is a Foxboro E-13DM.

Millers Flow Measurement Engineering Handbook, Third Edition, Chapter 6, Table 6.1 states that Square Edged orifice flowmeters have an accuracy of ± 1 -2%URV (upper range value) of the flow rate. A value of ± 2 % will be used for the orifice.

The loop check performed by WO 94-14264-10 (following pages) gives as found data. The largest error at 50 GPM was 1.36 GPM (50 - 48.64) or 0.68% CS (1.36/200 = 0.68%). The largest error at 100 GPM was 0.48 GPM (100 - 99.52) or 0.24% CS (0.48/200 = 0.24%). The largest error at 150 GPM was 0.06 GPM (150 - 149.94) or 0.03% CS $(0.06/200 = 0.03\%)$.

Since the plant had not been started at the time of these tests, radiation was not present and need not be considered. Errors for temperature and power supply effect will need to be included. Since there is no data on actual temperature conditions, an enveloping value must be used. Environmental drawing 47E235-46 R5 gives the max abnormal temperature range as 50 - 110 °F for coordinates UA6 / El 737 where the transmitter is located per EMPAC. The transmitter is a model E-1 3DM per EMPAC. The product specification sheets (following pages) give the ambient temperature effect as ±1% per 50 °F for any span between 200 to 850" water. The transmitter will normally be calibrated at room temperature which will be between 60 and 80 °F. A temperature shift of + or - 50 °F will encompass the temperature changes seen by the transmitter. Therefore for a temperature range of ± 50 \degree F, the temperature effect will be **±1%** CS d/p. The power supply effect is given as 0.1% CS for a 10% change in voltage. Thus Power supply effect is 0.1% CS d/p.

All errors for the computer should be reflected in the loop check.

Utilizing Equation 3-24.8 of W WCAP-12096, Rev. **8** "Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology for Protection Systems, Watts Bar Units I and 2, Eagle 21 Version," the unmeasured transmitter errors can be converted from percent error in full scale **d/p** to error in percent full span at a specified point, where Fm is the maximum flow rate of 200 GPM, and Fn is the nominal flow rate (i.e. 50, 100 or 150 GPM).

Thus total loop error = $(FE_{\text{err}}^2 + \text{Loop check}_{\text{err}}^2 + \text{Temp}_{\text{err}} (Flow)^2 + \text{pwr supp}_{\text{err}} (Flow)^2)^{0.5}$ Total loop error @ 50 GPM = $(2^2 + 0.68^2 + 2^2 + 0.2^2)^{0.5} = \pm 2.92\% \text{ CS} = \pm 5.84 \text{ GPM}$ Total loop error @ 100 GPM **=** (22 **+** 0.242 **+** 12 **+** 0.12)0.5 **=** ±2.25% CS **=** ±4.5 GPM Total loop error @ 150 GPM = $(2^2 + 0.03^2 + 0.67^2 + 0.067^2)^{0.5} = \pm 2.11\% \text{ CS} = \pm 4.22 \text{ GPM}$

Total loop error at 120 GPM can be determined by linear interpolation between 100 and 150 GPM. The value will be conservative since the error is nonlinear and is a function of the square root of the **d/p** values above and the actual loop recorded values which also follow a square root curve.

Total loop error @ 120 GPM **=** +1 error @ 100 GPM **+** 20(error @ 150 GPM - error @ 100 GPM) / (150 - 100) I Total loop error @ 120 GPM **=** ±[4.5 GPM **+** 20(4.22 -4.5)/501 **=** ±[4.5 GPM **+** (-0.11)] **=** ±4.39 GPM

The following references were used in preparation of this appendix. Revisions to these references will not impact this appendix; so the references are 'information only' in lieu of 'design input'.

- **I** WBN NESSD i-F-62-1 R1 (Methodology & guidance)
- 2 EMPAC (Manufacturer, Model number and location)
- 3 Millers Flow Engineering Handbook, Third Edition, Chapter 6, Table 6.1 (Orifice accuracy)
- 4 WO 94-14264-10 (loop check data) see next page
5 Drawing 47E235-46 R5 (environmental data)
- 5 Drawing 47E235-46 R5 (environmental data)
- 6 Foxboro product specification sheets (transmitter accuracy data) see next pages
- 7 WCAP-12096 R 8 (methodology for converting **d/p** error to flow error)

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PERFORMED BY/DATE 7-9-94
MOXWNEY H4NT, STONE 100T () YES (Y NO $(100$ $\overline{1}$ \overline{PC} $()$ YES THETRUCTION NO. REVIEWED BY/BATE (SIME) $\frac{1}{\frac{REV}{N}}$

Function: Letdown Heat Exch Flow

Approved by: Ed Hall $\cancel{\in}$ Reviewed by: Gary L. Hyden

Date: 03/10/94

SEMPA 288

 $\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{eff}}$

201* 133 4 9.2568E-06 10.
211* 134 5 2,1963E-04 10. 211* 134 5 2,1963E-04 10.0
221* 135 6 2,9129E-05 10.0
23H 3 7 1,7785E-09 10.0000E+00 3 7 1.7785E-09 //GO.SYSIN3 **DD** *

1 'REACTOR COOLANT ANS/ANSI-18.1-1984 UCI/GM, WBNAPS3-003 R3' 1 0.0 2 1.71E-1 3 2.66E-1 4 1.61E-1 5 3.00E-1 6 0.0
7 6.54E-1 8 7.17E-2 9 2.53E0 10 1.39E-1 11 9.04E-1 12 1.29E-1
13 4.77E-2 14 2.25E-1 15 1.49E-1 16 3.64E-1 17 2.78E-1
18 0.0 19 0.0 20 0.0 21 0.0 22 0.0 23 9.84E1 $\frac{0}{2}$ 2 'SECONDARY COOL ANS/ANSI-18.1-1984 UCI/GM, WBNAPS3-003 R3' 1 0.0 2 3.63E-8 3 5.51E-8 4 3.22E-8 5 6.31E-8 6 0.0

10.0 10.0

10. 0000+00 *10.00005+00

10.0 10.0

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7 1.34E-7 8 1.54E-8 9 5.25E-7 10 2.90E-8 11 1.91E-7 12 2.68E-8
 13 1.41E-6 14 3.37E-6 15 4.03E-6 16 2.93E-6 17 6.19E-6
 18 0.0 19 0.0 20 0.0 21 0.0 22 0.0 23 9.84E-2
\mathbf{0}T
WBN MSLB, 21 UCI/CC INITIAL CONC, 10+IGPM LK SS,1.0 GPM LEAK IN SG
NJ= 4 KCONC= 1
1 'REACTOR COOLANT'
2 'STEAM GENERATOR W/LEAK'
3 'STEAM GENERAToRS/NO LEAK'
4 'ENVIRONMENT'
-1
INITIALIZATION
V 1 2.622E8 GM
V 2 5.31E7 GM
V 3 1.593E8 GM
V 4 1.0 GM
S 1 1 0 4.386E4
S1 1 1 7.6195E3
S 2 3 0 4.996E6
S 1 1 7 2.622E2
S 2 3 7 1.593E2
```
S 2 4 1 1.667E6 2 4 2 1.667E6 2 4 3 1.667E6 S 2 4 4 1.667E6 2 4 5 1.667E6 2 4 6 1.667E6

^S2 4 7 5.316E1

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Appendix D: Example of Accident Initiated Iodine Spike (factor of 500 increase) STP Model

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//APS77S9B JOB 264318,9MBERG.LP4T-C,MSGLEVEL=I,MSGCLASS=T
//*MAIN ORG=KNXLCLO1, CLASS=LB
//JCL JCLLIB ORDER=(APB.NEN.PS264460.PROCLIB)<br>// EXEC STP.SOUT='*'
      EXEC STP, SOUT='*'
//GO.FT07F001 DD DSN=$KB1988.APS77S9B.OUT,UNIT=ALLOC,
/1 DCB=(RECFM=FB,LRECL=80,BLKSIZE=6160),SPACE=(TRK, (5,2),RLSE),
      DISP= (NEW, CATLG, DELETE)
//GO.FT01F001 DD *
NV= 4 MS= 2
//GO.FTI11F001 DD *
                    DESCRIPTION
$ 1 NOBLE GASES
\begin{array}{ccccc} \texttt{\$} & & \texttt{2} & & \texttt{IODINE} \ \texttt{\$} & & \texttt{3} & & \texttt{TRITIUE} \end{array}TRITIUM
NI= 23 NK= 7 NG= 0 NL= 3<br>1KRM 83 1 1.0352E-04 10.0
   1KRM 83 1 1.0352E-04 10.0 10.0 10.0
   2KRM 85 1 4.2978E-05 10.0 10.0 10.0
   3KR 85 1 2.0470E-09 29.8849E-06 10.0 10.0<br>4KR 87 1 1.5141E-04 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
   4KR 87 1 1.5141E-04 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0<br>5KR 88 1 6.8765E-05 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
   5KR 88 1 6.8765E-05 10.0 10.0 10.0
          89 1 3.6328E-03 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0<br>31 1 6.7414E-07 131.3039E-08 181.3039E-08 10.0
   7XEM 131 1 6.7414E-07 131.3039E-08 181.3039E-08<br>8XEM 133 1 3.5656E-06 152.0365E-07 202.0365E-07
   8XEM 133 1 3.5656E-06 152.0365E-07 202.0365E-07 10.0
   9XE 133 1 1.5165E-06 83.5656E-06 159.0531E-06 209.0<br>0XEM 135 1 7.3818E-04 174.8062E-06 224.8062E-06 10.0
  1OXEM 135 1 7.3818E-04 174.8062E-06 224.8062E-06 10.0
  11XE 135 1 2.1043E-05 107.3818E-04 172.4322E-05 222.4<br>12XE 138 1 8.1528E-04 10.0 10.0 10.0
  12XE 138 1 8.1528E-04 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0<br>13I 131 2 9.9536E-07 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
  131    131    2    9.9536E-07    10.0    10.0    10.0    10.0    10.0    10.0    10.0
  141132 3 8.4448E-05 10.0 10.0 10.0
  151 133 4 9.2568E-06 10.0<br>161 134 5 2.1963E-04 10.0
  161 134 5 2.1963E-04 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0<br>171 135 6 2.9129E-05 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
  171 135 6 2.9129E-05 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0<br>181* 131 2 9.9536E-07 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
  181* 131 2 9.9536E-07 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0<br>191* 132 3 8.4448E-05 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
  191* 132 3 8.4448E-05 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0<br>
201* 133 4 9.2568E-06 10.0 10.0 10.0
  201* 133 4 9.2568E-06 10.0 10.0 10.0
  211* 134 5 2.1963E-04 10.0 10.0<br>221* 135 6 2.9129E-05 10.0 10.0
        135 6 2.9129E-05 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
  23H 3 7 1.7785E-09 10.OOOOE+00 10.OOOOE+00 10.OOOOE+00
//GO.SYSIN3 DD *
   1 'REACTOR COOLANT ANS/ANSI-18.1-1984 UCI/GM, WBNAPS3-003 R3'
 1 0.0 2 1.71E-1 3 2.66E-1 4 1.61E-1 5 3.OOE-1 6 0.0
 7 6.54E-1 8 7.17E-2 9 2.53E0 10 1.39E-1 11 9.04E-1 12 1.29E-1
 13 4.77E-2 14 2.25E-1 15 1.49E-1 16 3.64E-1 17 2.78E-1
 18 0.0 19 0.0 20 0.0 21 0.0 22 0.0 23 9.84E1
0
2 'SECONDARY COOL ANS/ANSI-18.1-1984 UCI/GM, WBNAPS3-003 R3'
1 0.0 2 3.63E-8 3 5.51E-8 4 3.22E-8 5 6.31E-8 6 0.0
 7 1.34E-7 8 1.54E-8 9 5.25E-7 10 2.90E-8 11 1.91E-7 12 2.68E-8
 13 1.41E-6 14 3.37E-6 15 4.03E-6 16 2.93E-6 17 6.19E-6
 18 0.0 19 0.0 20 0.0 21 0.0 22 0.0 23 9.84E-2
\OmegaT
WBN MSLB,.265 UCI/CC INIT CONC,10+1GPM LK,500 IODINE SPIKE,1.0 GPM SG LK
NJ= 4 KCONC= 1
1 'REACTOR COOLANT'
2 'STEAM GENERATOR W/LEAK'
3 'STEAM GENERATORS/NO LEAK'
4 'ENVIRONMENT'
-1
INITIALIZATION
V 1 2.622EB GM
V 2 5.31E7 GM
V 3 1.593E8 GM
V 4 1.0 GM
S1 1 0 5.534E2
S1 1 1 7.6195E3
S2 3 0 4.996E6
S1 1 7 2.622E2
S2 3 7 1.593E2
S 2 4 1 1.667E6 2
4 2 1.667E6 2 4 3 1.667E6
S2 4 4 1.667E6 2
4 5 1.667E6 2 4 6 1.667E6S 2 4 7 5.316EI
C 1 1 2 3.345E4
```


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C 1 1 3 1.166E5 C 1 1 4 4.163E4 C 1 1 5 2.512E5 C 1 1 6 6.147E4 **A** 4 F **1** 3 0 7.098E4 GM/HR F 3 4 0 1.0026E6 GM/HR F 3 4 **1** 1.0026E8 GM/HR F 3 4 7 1.0026E8 GM/HR F 1 4 0 2.271E5 GM/HR 20.6 SEC TIME TO 20.6 SEC *N* 4 0 P **1 0** 4 2.0 HR TIME TO 2.0 HR **N** 40 P **1 0** 4 **8.0** HR TIME TO 8.0 HR F 3 4 0 6.977E5 GM/HR F 3 4 1 6.977E7 GM/HR F 3 4 7 6.977E7 GM/HR P **1 0** 4 T T //

Appendix E: Example of COROD Input (ARCON96 X/Q)

//APS77C9A JOB 264318, 9MBERG.LP4T-C, MSGLEVEL=1, MSGCLASS=T //*MAIN ORG=KNXLCL01, CLASS=SB //JCL JCLLIB ORDER=(APB.NEM.EX262358.PROCLIB)
//STEP1 EXEC CORODV6,COND=(4,LT) //COROD1.FT05F001 DD \star NIT= 23 $NR = 1$ $IPP = 6$ $FACT = 1.0$ COROD-WBN MSLB s KRM 83 KRM 85 KR 85 KR 87 KR 88 KR 89 XEM 131 XEM 133 XE 133 XEM 135 XE 135 XE 138 1131 132 133 134 135
 $1*131$ $1*132$ $1*33$ $1*134$ $1*35$ H 3 'ENVIRONMENT Δ ' $$TN = 0.5722E-02$ $1, 0, 0$ 2 6.762E-02 3 1.029E-01 $46.033E-02$ 5 1.176E-01 60.0 7 2.505E-01 8 2.866E-02 $9.802E-01$ 10 5.429E-02 11 3.560E-01 12 4.999E-02 13 2.361E+00 14 5.667E+00 15 6.751E+00 16 4.964E+00 17 1.038E+01 18 0.0 19 0.0 $20, 0.0$ 210.0 220.0 23 5.415E+00 'ENVIRONMENT \overline{a} $$TN = 0.2000E+01$ 3 4.166E+00 5 3.687E+00 10.0 2 2.298E+00 4 1.513E+00 60.0 7 1.021E+01 8 1.119E+00 9 3.957E+01 10 7.468E+00 11 1.647E+01 12 3.232E-01 13 3.691E+00 14 1.293E+01 15 1.117E+01 16 1.391E+01 17 1.936E+01 18 0.0 190.0 200.0 210.0 220.0 23 6.170E+01 **ENVIRONMENT** $$TN = 0.8000E + 01$ \mathbf{A} 3 1.324E+01 $47.744E-01$ $1, 0, 0$ 2 4.043E+00 $54.691E+00$ 60.0 7 3.216E+01 8 3.429E+00 9 1.242E+02 10 1.706E+01 11 5.754E+01 12 9.744E-04 13 1.087E+01 14 1.296E+01 15 2.926E+01 16 3.585E+00 17 3.865E+01 180.0 19 0.0 200.0 210.0 $22.0.0$ 23 1.718E+02 'ENVIRONMENT -6 CURIES ' $$ TN = 0.2400E+02$ $10.000E+00$ 2 0.000E+00 3 0.000E+00 4 0.000E+00 5 0.000E+00 7 0.000E+00 8 0.000E+00 $90.000E+00$ 10 0.000E+00 6 0.000E+00 11 0.000E+00 12 0.000E+00 13 0.000E+00 14 0.000E+00 15 0.000E+00 17 0.000E+00 16 0.000E+00 18 0.000E+00 19 0.000E+00 20 0.000E+00 21 0.000E+00 22 0.000E+00 23 0.000E+00 -6 'ENVIRONMENT CURIES ' $$TN = 0.9600E+02$ 1 0.000E+00 2 0.000E+00 3 0.000E+00 4 0.000E+00 5 0.000E+00 8 0.000E+00 9 0.000E+00 10 0.000E+00 $60.000E+00$ $70.000E + 00$ 12 0.000E+00 14 0.000E+00 15 0.000E+00 $11, 0.000F + 00$ 13 0.000E+00 16 0.000E+00 17 0.000E+00 18 0.000E+00 19 0.000E+00 20 0.000E+00 21 0.000E+00 22 0.000E+00 23 0.000E+00 'ENVIRONMENT -6 **CURIES** ' $$TN = 0.7200E + 03$ 2 0.000E+00 $30.000E+00$ 4 0.000E+00 5 0.000E+00 1 0.000E+00 8 0.000E+00 9 0.000E+00 6 0.000E+00 7 0.000E+00 10 0.000E+00 12 0.000E+00 13 0.000E+00 14 0.000E+00 15 0.000E+00 11 0.000E+00 17 0.000E+00 16 0.000E+00 18 0.000E+00 19 0.000E+00 20 0.000E+00 23 0.000E+00 21 0.000E+00 22 0.000E+00 4.03E-03 4.03E-03 3.35E-03 2.27E-03 1.81E-03 1.45E-04 20.6 7179.4 21600.0 57600.0 259200.0 2246400.0 3200.0 51.0 711.0 51.0 711.0 51.0 711.0 51.0 711.0 51.0 711.0 51.0 $0.0 \t0.0 \t0.0 \t0.0 \t0.0 \t0.0 \t0.0$ 3200.0 0.95 0.70 0.95 0.70 0.99
0.95 0.70 0.95 0.70 0.99 $0.0 2889.0$ $0.0.2889.0$ 0.95 0.70 0.95 0.70 0.99 0.0 2889.0 0.95 0.70 0.95 0.70 0.99 0.0 2889.0 0.95 0.70 0.95 0.70 0.99 0.0 2889.0 100.0 60.0 40.0 1440.0 5760.0 257198.0 1.2492 0.63 0.8352 322.0 45.0 17.75 46.0 9.0 4.0 161.0 22.5 4.0 0.0 ROOFFLUX DOSE TO CONTROL ROOM PERSONNEL DUE TO SHINE THROUGH ROOF $1000.0 1000.0 1000.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 500.0 500.0 -16.0 2.25$ ADJACENT DOSE TO CONTROL ROOM PERSONNEL DUE TO SHINE FROM AUX BUILDING 270.0 150.0 148.0 27.0 15.0 14.0 135.0 75.0 -25.5 3.0 ADJACENT DOSE TO CONTROL ROOM PERSONNEL DUE TO SHINE FROM TURBINE BLDG 322.0 112.0 341.0 32.0 11.0 34.0 161.0 56.0 -25.5 3.0 ADJACENT DOSE TO CONTROL ROOM PERSONNEL DUE TO SHINE FROM SPREADING ROOM 322.0 45.0 26.0 32.0 9.0 5.0 22.5 161.0 -4.67 0.67

ADJACENT DOSE TO CONTROL ROOM PERSONNEL DUE TO SHINE FROM CR BLDG ENE
18.0 45.0 460.0 10.0 10.0 100.0 4.0 22.5 -25.5 3.0
ADJACENT DOSE TO CONTROL ROOM PERSONNEL DUE TO SHINE FROM CR BLDG ENE
18.0 45.0 460.0 10.0 10.0 100.0 *//*

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21 0.0 22 0.0 23 5.415E+00 WBN MSLB, 21 UCI/CC INITIAL CONC, 10+1GPM LK SS,1.0 GPM LEAK IN SG

WBN MSLB TIME TO 30 DAYS

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Appendix G: Additional Cases

This appendix documents the original steam generator MSLB results used as input to the FSAR (0.265 μ Ci/gm I-131 equivalent or 21 µCi/gm 1-131 equivalent, with a 10 gpm known primary to secondary side leakage and 1 gpm unknown leakage and 150 gpd per steam generator with the 3 gpm post accident leakage). The control room operator dose COROD model recirculation and time increments were corrected. All other cases (with different concentrations and/or leak rates) can be found in revision 8 of this calculation (these were not corrected, as they were not used in the FSAR). Note that all other cases are historical and utilize original steam generator data. Details of these results (excluding the COROD corrections) may be found in revision 8.

Unit 1 MSLB Control Room Doses (rem) Using ARCON96 X/Q values with **ORIGINAL STEAM** GENERATOR **DATA:**

10 gpm known + 1 gpm unknown + 3 gpm post accident leakage

Unit **I** MSLB Offsite Doses (rem) with ORIGINAL STEAM GENERATOR DATA: 10 gpm known + **I** gpm unknown + 3 gpm post accident leakage

Volumes:

#1: Reactor Coolant: 5.4E5 lb (ref.2) = 2.4494E8 gin

#2: Steam Generator w/Leak: 4.73 5E7 gra (ref.2)

#3: Steam Generators w/out Leak: 1.421E8 gm (ref.2).

Step Sources:

The step sources (Ci-gm/ μ Ci) to initialize the reactor coolant and the secondary side activities are:

All cases:

S=2.4494E8 gm*1E-6 Ci/ μ Ci * 29.06 =7.118E3 (noble gasses)

S=2.4494E8 gm*1E-6 Ci/ μ Ci = 2.4494E2 (tritium)

Pre-accident iodine spike case (initial concentration = 21 μ Ci/gm):

S=2.4494E8 gm*1E-6 Ci/µCi * 7.965[µCi/gm I-131]⁻¹ *21µCi/gm I-131 = 4.097E4 (iodines)

Accident initiated iodine spike case (initial concentration = 0.265μ Ci/gm):

 $S=2.4494E8$ gm*1E-6 Ci/ μ Ci * 7.965 [μ Ci/gm I-131]⁻¹*0.265 μ Ci/gm I-131= 5.170E2

Secondary side, all cases, steam generator w/ leak, release to environment. (concentration $= 0.1 \mu C i/m$) which is due to dryout (4.74E7 gm rounded up from 4.735E7 gm mass in steam generator with leak):

 $S = 4.74E7$ gm * 1E-6 Ci/µCi * 3.136E5 [µCi/gm I-131]⁻¹ \pm 0.1µCi/gm I-131 =1.49E6

 $S = 4.74E7$ gm $*$ 1E-6 Ci/ μ Ci = 4.74E1 (tritium)

Secondary side, all cases, steam generators without leak (initial concentration = 0.1μ Ci/gm):

 $S = 1.421E8$ gm * 1E-6 Ci/ μ Ci * 3.136E5 [μ Ci/gm I-131]⁻¹* 0.1 μ Ci/gm I-131 = 4.46E6

 $S = 1.421E8$ gm*1E-6 Ci/ μ Ci = 1.421E2 (tritium)

Continuous Sources:

For the accident initiated iodine spike case, the iodine spike is 500 times the iodine release rate from the fuel. At steady state, the iodine release (production) rate is equal to the removal rate. The iodine removal is due to a) radioactive decay, b) removal by the letdown system, and c) removal through reactor coolant leakage. These terms are expressed as:

 $P = \Sigma$ removal rates = decay + letdown + leakage

or $P = \lambda + f_1 \epsilon/V + p_s/V$

where $P =$ production rate $\{hr^{-1}\}$

 λ = decay constant for the isotope in question $[\text{hr}^{-1}] = \ln(2)/T_{1/2}$

fL= letdown flow rate = 120 gpm + 4.39 gpm = 124.39 gpm

 ε = letdown demineralizer efficiency = 1 (assumed so as to maximize removal/production rate)

 $V =$ volume of primary coolant = 5.4E5 lb

p, = removal rate of iodine from the primary side due to preaccident primary side leakage

= 11 gpm (10 gpm identified + 1 gpm unidentified)

 T_{10} = halflife taken from ref.15

Note: all the above flow rates are converted to mass flow rates at STP:

Production Rates for a Reactor Coolant Leak of 11 gpm (10 gpm identified + 1 gpm unidentified)

The accident initiated iodine spike of **500** times the increase in the iodine release (production) rate from the fuel is modeled as a continuous source:

 $C =$ Volume * 1E-6 Ci/ μ Ci * Prod. Rate * 500 * 1 μ Ci/gm I-131 equiv. conversion factor*I-131 equiv.

where Volume **=** 2.4494E8 gm

Prod Rate = see table above

1 g.Ci/gm **1-131** equivalent conversion factor = 7.965 (value determined above, this is to get the ANSI/ANS-18.1-1984 source into 1 µCi/gm I-131 equivalent

1-131 equiv. = 0.265μ Ci/gm I-131

Continuous Source [gm-Ci/µCi-hr] for Accident Initiated Iodine Spike:

Reactor Coolant Leak of 11 gpm (10 gpm identified + 1 gpm unidentified)

Flow Rates:

The following flow rates/leakage rates for each component are (determined by trial and error with the ultimate goal being to find the flow/leak which would lead to the offsite/control room doses reaching the regulatory limits):

Flow from Reactor Coolant #1 to Environment #4 all classes which consists of 1 gpm and is for leak in the steam generators, the production rate of iodines is based on a total RCS leakage of 11 gpm $(=10)$ gpm identified $+1$ gpm unidentified):

 $F = 1.0$ gpm * 60 min/hr * 3785.48 cc/gal * $1g$ /cc = 2.271E5 g/hr

Flow from Reactor Coolant #1 to Steam Generator w/ no Leak #3 all classes:

 $F = 3$ steam generators * 150 gpd * 3785.48 cc/gal / 24 hr/day * 1g/cc = 7.098E4 g/hr

The initial steam released from the defective steam generator is 4.74E7 g (entire mass of SG rounded up). From reference 26, the non-defective steam generators **(=** "steam generators without leak" in this model) the mass release is 433,079 lb (0-2 hr), and 870,754 lb (2-8 hr). The accident releases end at eight hours. To take into account uncovery of the faulted steam generator, there is no iodine partitioning in the release to the environment (iodine partition coefficient **=** 1). The mass release representing I gpm primary to secondary side leak is a flow directly to the environment. This is reflected in the flows listed above. For other leak rates, the flow cards will correctly take into account the mass released.

The reactor coolant release to the unfaulted steam generator is small relative to the secondary side mass, therefore partitioning is allowed per the SRP. The iodine partition coefficient due to steaming for the unfaulted steam generators to the environment is 100. These mass releases translate into the following flows:

Flow from Steam Generators w/out Leak #3 to Environment #4:

 $F = (433,079 \text{ lb})(453.59 \text{ g/lb})/(2 \text{ hr}) = 9.822E7 \text{ g/hr}$ (0-2 hr, noble gasses, tritium)

F **=** (433,079 lb)(453.59 g/lb)/(100*2 hr) **=** 9.822E5 g/hr (0-2 hr, iodines)

F **=** (870,754 lb)(453.59 g/lb)/(6 hr) **=** 6.583E7 g/hr (2-8 hr) (noble gasses, tritium)

 $F = (870,754 \text{ lb})(453.59 \text{ g/lb})/(100*6 \text{ hr}) = 6.583E5 \text{ g/hr}$ (2-8 hr) (iodines)

The STP output is used as input to COROD (which determines control room operator dose) and FENCDOSE (which determines 30-day and 2-hour LPZ offsite dose).

Unit 2 ARCON96 X/Q values (worst case) for Unit 2 (ref.20): 2.87E-3 sec/cunm 0-2 hr, 2.46E-3 see/cum

The Unit 2 MSLB doses are less than the 10CFRI00 and IOCFR50 GDC 19 limits. Most of the Unit **I** doses bound the Unit 2 doses, except for the gamma, beta and TEDE offsite doses for the accident initiated iodine spike, and the gamma control room for the accident initiated iodine spike.

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Surveillance test I-SI-68-28 performed on 4/9/01

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PROCEDURE#: 1-51-68-28

PROCEDURE#: 1-51-68-28

TITLE: PRIMARY RADIOCHEMISTRY REQUIREMENTS

PER SECT: CEM

PER SECT: GA/09/01

HAM EXT: 64/09/01

MAM EXT: 6004 SPP-8.2-2

FREQ: N

CO: N

ASME XI: N
 N/A
AUTHORIZATION TO BEGIN: SRO .N/A_____ DATE TIME $\frac{y}{\sqrt{2}}\sqrt{\frac{y}{\sqrt{2}}}$ 9 61
FELETION DATE TIME INSTRUCTIONS; Do NOT start prior to scheduled due date **I I** TEST PERFORMERS
SIGNATURE **THIS A COMPLETE OR PARTIAL
PERFORMACE? (EXPLAIN ^uPARTIALⁿ complete: <u>X</u> partial: .
IN REMARKS)** NAME **SIGNATURE** INIT SECT Juin Clontz WX CPA
Damiel Reens 11 IKR 6 5 # WERE ALL TECH SPEC/TECH REG/ODCM/FIRE
PROT REG ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA SATISFIED? YES;人 NO;___ N/A; **DK** CFM WERE ALL OTHER ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
SATISFIED? YES:____ NO:____ N/A ALERT SCHEDULING REQUIRED? YES: **NO:_** N/A: **I_** IF ALL TECH SPECATRICH REQVODON/FIRE PROT
REG WERE NOT SATISHIED, WAS AN LOO/TR/
ODCM/OR ACTI**ON** REGG? (EXPLAIN AN REMARKS) YES:____ NO:____N N/A:} TEST DIRECTOR / LEAD PERFORMER **DATE ACCEPTANCE** CRITERIA REVIEW: SRO **DATE / TIME** <u>4/12/07</u> **CHEN SORY THD REVA** aa.ma too aan ah in markaan in ma REMARKS, COPY OF STS SENT TO SCHEDULING: $\frac{57}{101171415}$ $\frac{4}{1015}$ SECTION/MEN/DUR HRS SECTION/#MEN/DUR HRS SECTION/AMEN/DUJR **HRS** SECTION/#MEN/DUR HRS RECORDS TRANSMITTAL#: **IN NORTH BILLER**

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Attachment 11

FENCDOSE Run

APS77F10A.txt

Time Dependent Releases preaccident 21 uCi/gm 1-131 equivalent case

Page 1

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REPRODUCTION OF INPUT DATA DECK

 $+$ $+$ $+$ $\boldsymbol{+}$ $+$ $+$ $\ddot{}$ $\ddot{}$ 1
KRM-83 KRM-85 KR-85
KR-87 KR-88 KR-89
XEM-131 XEM-133 XE-133 XEM-135 XE-135 XE-138
I-131 I-132 I-133 I-134 I-135

Page 2

APS77F10A.txt $I*-131$ $I*-132$ $I*-133$ $I*-134$ $I*-135$ $H-3$ T .141E-3 .668E-4 .459E-4 .204E-4 .635E-5 6.07E-4 WBN MSLB, 21 UCI/CC INITIAL CONC, 10+1GPM LK SS, 1.0 GPM LEAK IN SG
TIME TO 20.6 SEC
4 'ENVIRONMENT '\$ TN= 0.5722E-02 ' $$TN = 0.5722E-02$ 1 0.000E+00 $4 5.462E-02$ 2 6.118E-02 $3 \, 9.312E - 02$ $51.065E-01$ $60.000E+00$ 8 2.593E-02 9 8.871E-01 7 2.267E-01 10 4.914E-02 11 3.221E-01 12 4.523E-02 13 2.112E+00 14 5.071E+00 15 6.038E+00 16 4.445E+00 17 9.285E+00 18 0.000E+00 19 0.000E+00 20 0.000E+00 22 0.000E+00 21 0.000E+00 23 4.847E+00 WBN MSLB, 21 UCI/CC INITIAL CONC, 10+1GPM LK SS, 1.0 GPM LEAK IN SG
TIME TO 2.0 HR
4 'ENVIRONMENT '\$ TN= 0.2000E+01 $10.000E+00$ 2 2.306E+00 3 4.182E+00 4 1.518E+00 5 3.700E+00 $9\overline{3.972E+01}$ $60.000E+00$ 7 1.025E+01 8 1.123E+00 10 7.368E+00 $12 \ \ 3.237E - 01$ 14 1.292E+01 11 1.645E+01 13 3.690E+00 15 1.117E+01 16 1.391E+01 17 1.935E+01 18 0.000E+00 19 0.000E+00 20 0.000E+00 21 0.000E+00 22 0.000E+00 23 6.132E+01 WBN MSLB, 21 UCI/CC INITIAL CONC, 10+1GPM LK SS, 1.0 GPM LEAK IN SG
TIME TO 8.0 HR 'ENVIRONMENT $\overline{4}$ ' $$TN = 0.8000E+01$ 2 4.046E+00 3 1.325E+01 4 7.748E-01 $10.000E+00$ 5 4.693E+00 7 3.219E+01 6 $0.000E+00$ 8 3.429E+00 9 1.243E+02 10 1.677E+01 14 1.295E+01 12 9.735E-04 11 5.700E+01 13 1.086E+01 15 2.924E+01 18 0.000E+00 19 0.000E+00 16 3.584E+00 17 3.862E+01 20 0.000E+00 21 0.000E+00 22 0.000E+00 23 1.713E+02 **WBN MSLB** TIME TO 1 DAY ' $$TN = 0.2400E+02$ -6 ENVIRONMENT **CURIES** $30.000E+00$ -4 0.000E+00 $20.000E+00$ $10.000E+00$ $50.000E+00$ $60.000E+00$ $70.000E+00$ $90.000E+00$ 8 0.000E+00 10 0.000E+00 15 0.000E+00 11 0.000E+00 12 0.000E+00 13 0.000E+00 14 0.000E+00 16 0.000E+00 17 0.000E+00 19 0.000E+00 20 0.000E+00 18 0.000E+00 22 0.000E+00 21 0.000E+00 23 0.000E+00 WBN MSLB TIME TO 4 DAYS -6 'ENVIRONMENT **CURTES** ' $$TN = 0.9600E+02$ 2 $0.000E+00$ $30.000E+00$ $10.000E+00$ 4 0.000E+00 $50.000E+00$ $70.000E+00$ $60.000E+00$ 8 0.000E+00 $90.000E+00$ 10 0.000E+00 11 0.000E+00 12 0.000E+00 14 0.000E+00 13 0.000E+00 15 0.000E+00 17 0.000E+00 16 0.000E+00 18 0.000E+00 19 0.000E+00 20 0.000E+00 22 0.000E+00 21 0.000E+00 23 0.000E+00 **WBN MSLB** TIME TO 30 DAYS -6 ' $$ TN = 0.7200E + 03$ ENVIRONMENT **CURIES** $30.000E+00$ 1 0.000E+00 2 0.000E+00 4 0.000E+00 $50.000E+00$ 6 0.000E+00 7 0.000E+00 8 0.000E+00 $90.000E+00$ 10 0.000E+00 13 0.000E+00 15 0.000E+00 11 0.000E+00 12 0.000E+00 14 0.000E+00 17 0.000E+00 19 0.000E+00 16 0.000E+00 18 0.000E+00 20 0.000E+00 21 0.000E+00 22 0.000E+00 23 0.000E+00 \ddotmark $+$

> PROGRAM FENCDOSE **REVISION NUMBER:5** REVISION DATE: 31 JUL 2009
TODAY IS: 01/28/10 STARTING TIME IS: $16:57:35$

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6. 680E-05 4.590E-05 2.040E-05 6. 350E-06

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Page 5

 $XE-135$

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CURIES , TIME = 96.

CURIES , TIME =720.

Page 6

1WBN MSLB

OGAMMA DOSE FOR EACH ISOTOPE AND TIME PERIOD (REM)

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 $\label{eq:2} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\right)^{2} \left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\right)^{2} \left(\frac{$

Page 9

OAT 2 HOUR EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB)

TOTAL GAMMA DOSE = $2.527E-02$ REM TOTAL BETA DOSE = $8.118E-03$ REM TOTAL INHALATION DOSE (ICRP-2) = 4.306E+00 REM
TOTAL INHALATION DOSE (ICRP-30) = 2.190E+00 REM

OAT 30 DAY LPZ BOUNDARY

TOTAL GAMMA DOSE = 8.554E-03 REM TOTAL BETA DOSE = 3.221E-03 REM TOTAL INHALATION DOSE (ICRP-2) = $1.773E+00$ REM
TOTAL INHALATION DOSE (ICRP-30) = $9.325E-01$ REM 83 IS NOT IN EPA LIBRARY. ISOTOPE IGNORED.
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1WBN MSLB

OTEDE FOR EACH ISOTOPE AND TIME PERIOD (REM)

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Attachment 12

FENCDOSE Run

APS77F10B.txt

Time Dependent Releases 0.265 uCi/gm 1-131 accident initiated Iodine spike

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REPRODUCTION OF INPUT DATA DECK \sim **+ + + + + + + +** 1 KRM-83 KRM-85 KR-85 KR-87 KR-88 KR-89 XEM-131 XEM-133 XE-133 XEM-135 XE-135 XE-138 1-131 1-132 1-133 1-134 1-135 Page 2

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APS77F10B.txt $I*-131$ $I*-132$ $I*-133$ $I*-134$ $I*-135$ $H-3$ T .141E-3 .668E-4 .459E-4 .204E-4 .635E-5 6.07E-4 WBN MSLB, .265 UCI/CC INIT CONC, 10+1GPM LK, 500 IODINE SPIKE, 1.0 GPM SG LK TIME TO 20.6 SEC
4 'ENVIRONMENT ' $$TN = 0.5722E-02$ $3.9.312E-02$ 2 6.118E-02
7 2.267E-01 $10.000E+00$ 4 5.462E-02 5 1.065E-01 $60.000E+00$ 8 2.593E-02 9 8.871E-01 10 4.907E-02 11 3.221E-01 12 4.523E-02 13 2.101E+00 14 5.023E+00 15 6.006E+00 17 9.225E+00 18 0.000E+00 16 4.369E+00 19 0.000E+00 20 0.000E+00 21 0.000E+00 22 0.000E+00 23 4.847E+00 WBN MSLB, 265 UCI/CC INIT CONC, 10+1GPM LK, 500 IODINE SPIKE, 1.0 GPM SG LK
TIME TO 2.0 HR
4 'ENVIRONMENT STN= 0.2000E+01 2 2.306E+00
7 1.025E+01 1 0.000E+00 $34.182E+00$ 4 1.518E+00 5 3.700E+00 9 3.970E+01 $60.000E+00$ 8 1.121E+00 10 8.098E+00 11 1.638E+01 12 3.237E-01 13 3.079E+00 14 3.853E+01 15 1.147E+01 16 1.009E+02
21 0.000E+00 18 0.000E+00 19 0.000E+00 17 2.926E+01 20 0.000E+00 22 0.000E+00 23 6.132E+01 WBN MSLB, .265 UCI/CC INIT CONC, 10+1GPM LK, 500 IODINE SPIKE, 1.0 GPM SG LK
TIME TO 8.0 HR 'ENVIRONMENT ' $$TN = 0.8000E+01$ \mathbf{A} 2 4.046E+00 3 1.325E+01 $10.000E+00$ 4 7.748E-01 5 4.693E+00 $\bar{6}$ 0.000E+00 $8\overline{3}.533E+00$ 7 3.219E+01 9 1.262E+02 10 7.861E+01 11 1.250E+02 12 9.735E-04 13 4.417E+01 14 3.430E+02 15 1.561E+02 16 5.806E+02 17 3.509E+02 18 0.000E+00 19 0.000E+00 20 0.000E+00 21 0.000E+00 22 0.000E+00 23 1.713E+02 **WBN MSLB** TIME TO 1 DAY ' $$TN = 0.2400E+02$ -6 **ENVIRONMENT CURTES** 3 $0.000E+00$ 2 0.000E+00 4 0.000E+00 $10.000E+00$ $50.000E+00$ $70.000E+00$ 8 0.000E+00 $90.000E+00$ $60.000E+00$ 10 0.000E+00 11 0.000E+00 12 0.000E+00 13 0.000E+00 14 0.000E+00 15 0.000E+00 16 0.000E+00 17 0.000E+00 18 0.000E+00 19 0.000E+00 20 0.000E+00 22 0.000E+00 21 0.000E+00 23 0.000E+00 **WBN MSLB** TIME TO 4 DAYS ' $$TN = 0.9600E+02$ -6 ENVIRONMENT **CURIES** 2 $0.000E+00$ $30.000E+00$ $10.000E + 00$ $40.000E+00$ $50.000E+00$ $\overline{7}$ $60.000E+00$ 8 0.000E+00 $90.000E+00$ $0.000E + 00$ 10 0.000E+00 11 0.000E+00 13 0.000E+00 12 0.000E+00 14 0.000E+00 15 0.000E+00 16 0.000E+00 17 0.000E+00 18 0.000E+00 19 0.000E+00 20 0.000E+00 21 0.000E+00 22 0.000E+00 23 0.000E+00 **WBN MSLB** TIME TO 30 DAYS 'ENVIRONMENT ' $$TN = 0.7200E+03$ -6 **CURIES** 1 0.000E+00 2 0.000E+00 3 0.000E+00 4 0.000E+00 5 0.000E+00 $60.000E + 00$ \overline{z} $0.000E + 00$ 8 0.000E+00 9 0.000E+00 10 0.000E+00 11 0.000E+00 12 0.000E+00 13 0.000E+00 14 0.000E+00 15 0.000E+00 18 0.000E+00 19 0.000E+00 16 0.000E+00 17 0.000E+00 20 0.000E+00 21 0.000E+00 22 0.000E+00 23 0.000E+00 $\ddot{}$ $\ddot{}$ $\ddot{}$ $\ddot{}$

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PROGRAM FENCDOSE **REVISION NUMBER: 5** REVISION DATE: 31 JUL 2009
TODAY IS: 01/28/10 STARTING TIME IS: 16:57:51

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.65 UCI/CC INIT CONC,10+IGPM LK,500 IODINE SPIKE,1.0 GPM SG LK OWBN MSLB,. TIME TO 20. 6 SEC COMPONENT 4 ENVIRONMENT **,** TIME = 0. 1ISOTOPE KRM-83 0.0000E+00
KRM-85 0.6118E-01 KRM-85 0.6118E-01
KR-85 0.9312E-01 KR-85 0.9312E-01
KR-87 0.5462E-01 \mathbb{R}^2 KR-87 0.5462E-01
KR-88 0.1065E+00 KR-88 0.1065E+00
KR-89 0.0000E+00 KR-89 **0.OOOOE+00** XEM-131 0.2267E+00
XEM-133 0.2593E-01 XEM-133 0.2593E-01
XE-133 0.8871E+00 XE-133 0.8871E+00
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T-134 0.4369E+01 1-134 0.4369E+01
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6 ENVIRONMENT CURIES **,** TIME = 96.

6 ENVIRONMENT CURIES **,** TIME =720.

Page 6

1WBN MSLB

OGAMMA DOSE FOR EACH ISOTOPE AND TIME PERIOD (REM)

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Page 9

OAT 2 HOUR EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB).

TOTAL GAMMA DOSE = 7.091E-02 REM
TOTAL BETA DOSE = 1.787E-02 REM TOTAL INHALATION DOSE (ICRP-2) = 5.137E+00 REM
TOTAL INHALATION DOSE (ICRP-30) = 2.177E+00 REM

OAT 30 DAY LPZ BOUNDARY

TOTAL GAMMA DOSE = 6.747E-02 REM
TOTAL BETA DOSE = 1.659E-02 REM TOTAL INHALATION DOSE (ICRP-2) = 5.926E+00 REM
TOTAL INHALATION DOSE (ICRP-30) = 2.583E+00 REM 83 IS NOT IN EPA LIBRARY. ISOTOPE IGNORED. **KRM** 83 IS NOT IN EPA LIBRARY. ISOTOPE IGNORED. **KRM KRM** 83 IS NOT IN EPA LIBRARY. ISOTOPE IGNORED. **KRM** 83 IS NOT IN EPA LIBRARY. ISOTOPE IGNORED. 83 IS NOT IN EPA LIBRARY. ISOTOPE IGNORED. **KRM KRM** 83 IS NOT IN EPA LIBRARY. ISOTOPE IGNORED.

1WBN MSLB

OTEDE FOR EACH ISOTOPE AND TIME PERIOD (REM)

Attachment 13

TVA Nuclear Power Group Calculation

WBNTSR-064 R8

Offsite and Control Room Operator Doses Due to a Waste Gas Decay Tank Rupture

TVAN CALCULATION COVERSHEET/CCRIS UPDATE

TVAN CALCULATION COVERSHEET/CCRIS UPDATE

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Page 5 **TVAN** CALCULATION VERIFICATION FORM **Calculation Identifier WBNTSR-064** Revision 8 Method of verification used: $\hat{\gamma}_{\rm{sat}}$. 1. Design Review Ñ 2. Alternate Calculation \Box Verifier \mathcal{V} *Verifier* .: \mathcal{V} fate $1 - 2.4 - 66$ 3. Qualification Test **El** Comments: This calculation revision corrects the conois modes
and allo a 2 carve case. The calculation is technically
adepente TVA 40533 107-2001] TrVA 40533 **[07-2001] Page** I **of 1,** NEDP-2-4 **[07709-20,01]**

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Purpose

The purpose of this calculation is to determnine the offsite and control room operator doses due tb a Waste Gas Decay Tank rupture. This calculation will support Watts Bar Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) section 15.5.2 and Table
15.5-5. Revision 2 was done due to revised 7/Q values. Revision 3 is performed because of new control build makeup flow (711 cfm). Revision 4 is performed due to new R.G. 1-24 source terms as provided by Westinghouse as - part of the extended fuel cycle (18 months, **1000** EFPD, **5%** enrichnment). Revision **5** uses new final WGDT inventories to eliminate an UVA. Revision 6 implements **EDC** E50629A to, allow the use of a Tritium Production Core (TPC) and provide source terms for just satisfying an offsite gamiira dose **of < 0.5** rem, and supports the corrective action for PER WBN 01-000395-000. Revision 7 is performed to change the control room analysis to include a 20.6 sec isolation delay and to'incorporate'ARCON96 X/Q values. Revision 8 corrects the control roon' recirculation flow rate and time increments in the COROD model.

Introduction'

'From reference4, the gaseous waste dispbsal system (WDS) contains nine (9) gas, decay tanks. These tanks' -receive gaseous waste from the Chemical Volume and Control System **(OVCS)** Holdup Tank, **CVCS** Volume Control Tank, WDS Spent Resin Tank, CVCS Boric Acid Evaporator, and WDS Reactor Drain Tank. "The probability of a gas
decay tank rupturing is low. However, the probability of an accidental release resulting from such things as ope error or malfunction of a valve or the overpressure relief system is considered to be sufficiently high that the calculated offsite whole body exposure that might result from a single failure during normal operation should be substantially below the guidelines of 10CFR Part 100, (ref.5).

 \rm{This} calculation will determine the offsite and control room operator doses due to a Waste Gas Decay Tank rupture. The calculation will be done for both a Regulatory Guide 1:24 (1% failed fuel, ref.5) accident and for a
realistic case (ANS/ANSI-18:1-1984, ref.6) and one which results in an EAB/Site Boundary dose of just less t mrem gamnma. The maximum content of the failed decay tank is assumed to be released non-mechanistically to the environment over **a** two hour time period (ref.5). Radioactive decay is only' taken into account for the time required to ${\rm transfer}$ the gasses to the decay ${\rm tank}$ (ref-5). Computer code STP (ref.1) will be used to determine the inventory of the radioactive gasses ini the tank foi the realistic case. The R.G: 1.24 case uses the inventbry provided **by** Westinghouse in referènce 11. Computer code FENCDOSE (ref.3) will be used to determine offsite doses utilizing STP results as
input. The FENCDOSE model parameters, other than the releases activity are taken from TI-RPS-197 (ref.8). Computer code COROD (ref.7) will be used to determine the control room operator dose utilizing the STP results as
input. The COROD parameters, other than released activity, and $\sqrt{\text{Q}}$ values, are taken from TI-RPS-198 ARCON96 χ/Q values were determined in WBNAPS3-104 (ref.24). The model sections pertaining to the 20.6 sec⁻
isolation delay are taken from WBNTSR-009 (ref.31); '

The main dose limit for this calculation is an offsite gamma dose of 500 mrem from NUREG-0800 section **11.3**. The following are standard limits for accidents. The offsite gamma dose limit is 25 rem (10CFR100.11), the thyroid
dose limit is 300 rem (10CFR100.11), and the TEDE dose limit is 25 rem (10CFR50.67). SRP 6.4 in NUREG 0800 (ref.32) shows that the thyroid dose and-betadoselimits are equivalent for thecontrolroom, therefore theoffsiie beta dose limit can be assumed the same as the offsite thyroid dose limit, 300 rem. IOCFR20.1201 also states that the organ (thyroid) dose and skin (beta) dose are equivalent. The control room dose limits are 5 rem gamma (10CFR50 Appendix **A GDC 19,30 rem thyroid (SRP 6.4), 30 rem** beta (SRP 6.4), and 5 rem TEDE (10CFR50.67),

Design Input

The Following are the Regulatory Guide 1.24 WGDT activities from WAT-D-10436 . \sim .

ARCON9S **X/Q** values (ref.24): 0-2hr=2.52E-3 sec/m', 2-Shr=1.57E-3, 8-24hr=6.71E-4, 1-4day=4.99E-4, 4. 30day=3.79E-4

WGDT Rooyolvoumne **=** 11269 cuft (room 692-AS, ref.29, which-is smaller volume than WGDT rooMa A3= **1503** cuft), Flow out of WGDT room $= 944$ cfm ($=$ largest measured value, ref.30).

Assumptions

1. The tank is assumed to be filled with the highest concentration for each isotope from all sources into the WGDT. This will ensure maximum concentration of all isotopes.

a) The realistic source terms come from WBNNAL3-006 (ref.10). The WBNNAL3-006 concentrations

correspond to the realistic inventory (ANSI/ANS 18.1-1980 4). The Regulatory Guide 1.24 (design basis, 1% failed fuel) source terms are provided by Westinghouse in WAT-D-10436 (ref.11). b) WBNNAL3-003 (ref. 6) provides the total inventory of tritium for a TPC andin accordance with NUREG-0017(ref. 25) 10% of the tritium is released as gas, thus the tritium source terms are:

Only the 2 TPBAR Failure case is run, as the tritium has only a small impact on the results and using the 2 TPBAR failure source term is conservative.

- 2. Radioactive decay is only taken into account for the time period required to transfer the gasses to the tank (ref.5), except for tritium. The maximum content of the failed decay tank is assumed to be released non-mechanistically to the environment over a two hour time period (ref.5). For tritium, due to its 12.3 year half life, it is considered that no decay occurs.
- 3. The tank failure is assumed to occur immediately upon completion of the waste' gas transfer (ref.5).
- 4. Only one tank is assumed to fail, as all decay tanks are isolated from each other whenever they are in use (ref.4).

5. deleted in R5 6. The release path of the radioisotopes from the ruptured tank is through the Auxiliary Buildig vent

6. The release path of the radioisotopes from the ruptured tank is through the Auxiliary Building vent (ref. 12).

Technical Justification: A rupture of a Waste Gas Decay Tank will lead to release into the Auxiliary
Building and hence into the normal ventilation. Planned releases of the WGDT inventory to the environment will be through the Shield Building Vent. The Shield Building Vent release path is monitored by radiation monitors such that if excessive releases occur, the vent will isolate (ref. 4). The Auxiliary Building Vent is monitored and alarmed (1-RE-90-101), but no automatic isolation occurs (ref. 27). Also, the γ /Q values from the Auxiliary Building Vent are worse for the control room than the Shield Building Vent (see calculation 'WBNAPS3-104). Therefore, this release path is the most likely path and the most conservative path.

7. deleted in revision 7

8. All assumptions from TI-RPS-198 (ref.9) regarding the COROD model hold, except as denoted above.

9. Only one train of CREVS is in operation.

Technical Justification: Normally, each CREVS train takes suction from separate intakes with no cross communication between trains. This leads to one contaminated train, and one uncontaminated train. The only way a 2 CREVS operation could result in higher doses would be for both trains to take suction from the same vent. For this to happen, one intake path would require a failed closed intake **pathAND** a fail open of normally closed passive manual damper at the beginning of the accident. An active failure of a train plus a failure of a passive component in less than 24 hours is beyond design basis.

Special Requirements / Limiting Conditions

There are no special requirements or limiting conditions in this calculation.

Calculations

A waste gas decay tank has a volume of 600 cuft and is filled at 1.4 scfm (from 2 volume control tanks at 0.7 scfm each) until it reaches 100 psig (114.696 psia, ref.4). Once full, the flow is diverted to another tank. Therefore the volume of the gas at STP and the time to fill the tank is:

 $P_xV_y = P_xV_y$

or

 $V_2 = P_1V_1/P_2 = (114.696 \text{ psia}(600 \text{ cuft})/(14.696 \text{ psia})$

= 4682.7 cuft at STP

then

 $time = (4682.7 \text{ cuf})/(1.4 \text{ cuft/min} * 60 \text{ min/hr})$

 $= 55.75 \,\mathrm{hr}$

The realistic case (ANSI/ANS 18.1-1984) isotope concentration is taken from WBNNAL3-006 (ref. 10). The Regulatory Guide 1.24 case (1% failed fuel) isotope concentration is taken from WAT-D-10436 (ref.11). For each case the tritium concentration for a TPC is taken from WBNNAL3-003 (ref.6). Using computer code STP (ref.1), a continuous realistic source flows at 1.4 cfm for 55.75 hr into a component labeled "Realistic WGDT". Because a total inventory is given in reference 11, the Regulatory Guide 1.24 source is stepped into a component labeled "R.G: 1.24 WGDrT. No decay is assumed for the R.G. 1.24 case and no decay is assumed for tritium. Since the STP realistic case input values are in μ Ci/cc, and the FENCDOSE/COROD codes require input values in Curies, the realistic continuous source flow rate in the "Realistic WGDT" is:

 $F = (x \mu \text{C}i/\text{cc})(1.4 \text{ cuft/min})(60 \text{ min/hr})(28317 \text{ c}c/\text{cuft})(10.6 \text{ Ci}/\mu\text{Ci})$

 $= (x \mu C i/cc)(2.3786 \text{ Ci-}cc/\mu\text{Ci-hr}) = x * 2.3786 \text{ Ci/hr}$

At the end of the 55.75 hr time period, the inventory of the tank is assumed to be released into the atmosphere. The inventory as calculated by STP is used as input into computer code FENCDOSE (ref.3) to calculate the Low Population Zone (LPZ) and the site boundary (SB), which is the same as the Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB), offsite dose. The FENCDOSE model is taken from TI-RPS-197 (ref.8).

The inventory as calculated by STP is also used as input into computer code COROD to determine the control room operator dose. The COROD models (less the containment shine) are taken from TI-RPS-198 (ref. 9) with a 20.6 second delay in isolation. From WBNTSR-009: "During the vertical slice review of the control room, a concern was raised that when the control room is isolated by a signal from the main control room intake radiation monitors, some amount of unfiltered activity could enter the control room before the isolation dampers close. This could be the case for a fuel handling accident [or waste gas decay tank rupture] because there will be no safety injection signal to isolate the control room. The isolation dampers downstream from the radiation monitors are 0-FCV-31-3 and 0-FCV-31-4. It is required ... that the closure time of the dampers is 14 seconds, with a signal response time of 6.6 seconds, which gives a total closure time of 20.6 seconds."

The X/Q values used are different than the TI-RPS-198 model because the release points are different. There are 2 cases of X/Q values for the control room with a release from the Auxiliary Building exhaust vent. Per TI-RPS-198, the worst case X/Q values for the first 8 hours are used, with the better X/Q values used'after 8 hours due to operator action to select the better intake

Results

Table 3

Notes for Table 3

COROD R6 does not include in the TEDE the dose due to direct shine from outside the control room, the value is manually added to arrive at the TEDE.

 $\begin{array}{lcl}\n\text{TEDE}_{\text{max}} = \text{TEDE}_{\text{max}} + \text{gamma}_{\text{max}} + \text{TEDE}_{\text{max}} \\
= & 4.442\text{E}-01 + \text{negligible} + 0.0 = 4.442\text{E}-01 \text{ (Realistic TPC)}\n\end{array}$

 $= 2.406E + 00 +$ negligible $+ 0.0 = 2.406E + 00$ (R.G. 1.24 TPC)

where gamma shine > 0 but is considered to be negligible

The R.G. 1.24 EAB gamma dose presented in Table 3 exceeds the limit of 500'mrem gamma. In order to define a limiting condition for the WGDT that would, if released, not exceed the limits, a case is developed to determine the source inventory of the WGDT that would result in the EAB being just less than 500 mrem. The limiting condition for the WGDT is addressed as a total $Xe-133$ equivalency. To determine the limiting source terms a $Xe-133$ equivalent was determined for the R.G. 1.24 source inventory using dose factors for y-body in Table B-1 of R.G. 1.109 (ref.26). A reduction factor value was determined by trial and error (by using various reduced source inventories as input to FENCDOSE) to be 0.127 so that the resulting offsite dose is just below the limit of 500 mrem. The R.G. 1.24 Xe-133 equivalent values were reduced by this reduction factor using'the following equation:

[Xe-133 Equivalency - (Reduction Factor*Xe-133 Equivalency)] To determine reduced source inventory the reduced Xe-133 Equivalency for each isotope is multiplied by the same-dose factors ratio as used to determine the Xe-133 equivalency for each R. G, 1.24 isotope. This calculation is provided in Table 4. The reduced isotopic values were entered-into FENCDOSE to validate the reduced source inventory and yielded the results provided in Table 5 for both a Non-TPC core and... TPC core.

Table 4 - R.G. 1.24 case

Note that the Reduced Ci column is the "Eqv.-RF"/"Ratio" (col.6/col.3).

Using the same methodology as above the Xe-133 equivalency for the Realistic case isotopic source terms resulting from STP is 3.966E+03 Ci (Xe-133) as provided in the following table.

	Realistic Case		
Nuclide	DFBi	Ratio	
	mrem-m3/pCi-yr-	DFBi/DFBi Xc-133	Xe-133 Eqiv. Ci. Realistic (Ci)
Kr-83m .	7.56E-08	2.571E-04	0.0°
Kr-85m	1.17E-03	3.980E+00	$6.302E + 00$ 2.508E+01
Kr-85	1.61E-05	5.476E-02	$4.211E+01$ 7.689E+02
Kr-87	5.92E-03	$2.014E + 01$	7.418E-01 $1.494E + 01$
Kr-88	1.47E-02	5.000E+01	2.546E+02 5.092E+00
Kr-89	1.66E-02	$5.646E + 01$	0,0 0.0
Xe-131m	9.15E-05	3.112E-01	3.436E+02 $1.104E + 03$
Xo-133m	2.51E-04	8.537E-01.	4.546E+01 $3.881E + 01$
Xe-133	2.94E-04-	1:0	$2.636E + 03$ 2.636E+03
$Xe-135m$	3.12E-03	1.061E+01	2.611E-02 2.771E-01
Xe-135	1.81E-03	6.156E+00	9.905E+01 6:098E+02
$Xc-137$	1.42E-03	4.830E+00	3.724E-04 1.799E-03
Xe-138	8.83F-03	3.003E+01	6.085E-01 2.026E-02
			Total Xe-133 Equivalent 3.966E+03

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* Reduced = Limited to Xe-133 equivalent of $7.408E4C1$

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Discussion and Conclusion

The implementation of a TPC core impacts the beta doses determined in Revision 5 by a small amount; however, the tritium does have a significant impact on the TEDE. Thus the following conclusions are applicable to both the TPC and Non-TPC cores.

The 30 day LPZ offsite doses for a realistic and Regulatory guide 1.24 Waste Gas Decay Tank rupture accident were calculated to be substantially below the regulatory limits of 25 rem gamma, 300 rem beta, 300 rem thyroid, and 25 rem TEDE. The control room operator doses for a realistic and Regulatory guide 1.24 WGDT rupture were calculated to be below the regulatory limits of 5 rem gamma, 30 rem beta, 30 rem thyroid, and 5 rem TEDE. The Regulatory Guide 1.24 control room beta dose is relatively high, but this is due to the very conservative (high) noble gas inventory for that case.

For the realistic case, the 2-hr EAB/Site Boundary offsite dose was less than the 500 mrem criterion set forth in NUREG0800 section 11.3. The Reg. Guide 1.24 case exceeds the 500 mrem limit. In order to not exceed the 500 mrem limit, the Xe-133 equivalent for a WGDT must be maintained less than 7.408E+04 Ci. However, PAI 15.01 (ref.22) administratively limits the activity in a tank to 500 Gi (Xe 133 equivalent) or more frequent surveillance would be required. Given this administrative limit and By maintaining the Xe-133 equivalency to less than 7.408E+04 Ci-according and that the realistic case does not exceed the offsite dose limits, a rupture of a single Waste Gas Decay Tank will meet the intent of NUREG0800 section 11.3. This requirement is implemented by section 4.2 of the Gaseous Waste Disposal System Description, N3-77A-4001.

Note on Methodologies used for Doses:

This calculation determined the doses using 3 different methodologies which are in revision 5 of COROD. The gamma, beta and Thyroid (ICRP-2) doses are all based on TID-14844 methodologies utilizing the ICRP-2 iodine dose conversion factors found in TID-14844 and are the current (as of June 2001) licensing basis of the plant. The second methodology is the Thyroid (ICRP-30) dose, which is also based on TID-14844, but uses the ICRP-30 iodine dose conversion factors. The ICRP-30 iodine dose conversion factors are less conservative than the ICRP-2 factors. This methodology is presented for potential future use. Finally, the third methodology used is the TEDE (Total Effective Dose Equivalent). The TEDE presents an overall weighted dose and is more representative of the impact of all isotopes on the body as a whole. The TEDE dose is presented for potential future use. It is important to note that tritium does not impact the thyroid doses utilizing the TID-14844 methodology, because only iodine is applied to the thyroid dose. However, in fact tritium does contribute to the thyroid dose, as well as other organs of the body. This is why the TEDE is a more representative dose when discussing the impact of tritium. It is up to the end user to choose the dose which is to be used, with the understanding that each methodology has a different meaning

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IVA

Attachment 14

TVA Nuclear Power Group Calculation

TI-RPS-197 R21

Offsite Doses Due to a Regulatory Guide 1.4 Loss of Coolant Accident

NPG CALCULATION COVERSHEET/CCRIS UPDATE

Page **I**

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM/ABSTRACT

This calculation determined the offsite doses due to a Regulatory Guide 1.4 Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). Revision 2 was performed because the dispersion coefficients (X/O) values have changed, Also, the Interim Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment Enclosure (ABSCE) is being changed to the Final ABSCE. Since the ABSCE has not changed yet, this calculation determined the doses due to both the Interim and Final ABSCE. The calculation was entirely rewritten for legibility and to bring the format iaccordance with **NEP** 3.1.

Computer code STP was used to determine the activity released to the environs and computer code FENCDOSE was used to determine the offsite doses. Initial core inventories came from WBNNAL3-004. It was assumed that 25% of the iodines and 100% of the noble gasses were available for release. The primary containment leak rate was assumed to be 0.25%/day forthe first 24 hours and 0.125%/day thereafter. The annulus inleakage (250 cfm), EGTS recirculation flow rates, and EGTS exhaust rates were taken from TI-ANL-166. 75% of the leakage from containment went to the annulus and 25% to the Auxiliary Building. Iodine removal due to the ice condenser was taken into account.

-continued-

Special Requirements/Limiting Conditions

The special requirement/limiting condition of this calculation Is: if 2 EGTS fans are operating, one must be turned off between 1 and 2 hours. Failure to turn off the second fan will not result in exceeding the 10CFR100 offsite dose limits.

MM

Revision 3 was performed because the annulus setpoint was changed from -0.5" to -1.036", which results in different EGTS exhaust curves (TI-ANL-166). The Interim ABSCE case was eliminated from the analysis. Revision 4 was performed to include in the STP model a single failure of the General Ventilation Exhaust Fans in the "on" position concurrent with one isolation damper failing open leading to unfiltered bypass of the ABGTS filters (WBPER930129). Revision 5 was performed because DCN M_-29141-A fixed the unfiltered bypass condition described above. Therefore revision 5 re-establishes the revision 3 models and results. Revision 6 was performed to take into account ductwork leakage bypassing the ABGTS and EGTS filters and to also the potential temporary loss of differential pressure in the Auxiliary Building following the single failure of an ABGTS train. Revision 7 includes new **X/Q** values, added additional justification for ice condenser performance, and updated references. Revision 8 gave later test results for ABGTS leakage which is less than the values in R7. The calculation was not updated because the old leakages are more conservative. Successor calculations do not need to be revised because the results of this calculation were not changed. Revision 9 was performed to increase the ABGTS leakages. Revision **10** was performed to increase the ABGTS leakages. Revision 11 was performed because the annulus setpoint changed from - 1.036" to -1.048" H2O.

Revision 12 incorporates new source terms from WBNNAL3-004 for 1000 EFPD (18 month cycle) with 5% U235 enrichment. R13 incorporated the 650 EFPD back into the calculation. Revision 14 was performed because the annulus setpoint was changed to -1.45 " H2O and used the 1000 EFPD source. The results were the same as R13 (except for the third decimal point for the gamma, which was less by 0.001). Therefore it can be concluded that the new setpoint does not affect the offsite doses, and the analysis does not have to be performed for the 650 EFPD sources. Successor calculations do not need to be revised due to the change in setpoint.

Revision 15 is performed to establish the offsite doses with a Tritium Production Core (TPC). In addition, the standard core (non-TPC) results were redone to include different thyroid dose determination methodologies. The previous method used ICRP-2 iodine dose conversion factors. Now, ICRP-30 iodine dose conversion factors are also used, and the Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) are determined. The 650 EFPD results were deleted. Revision 15 added the new methodologies of ICRP-30 dose conversion factors for thyroid, and TEDE. Also, the TPC core was analyzed. The two TPC cores analyses (100% and 3% tritium release to atmosphere) show that the limits are not exceeded. Note that the standard core values do NOT have the same initial core inventories of iodines and noble gasses as the TPC core. This explains the difference in the standard vs. 3% tritium release TPC core results (one would have expected the results to be similar). The results are mixed, in that in some cases the TPC core gives the largest dose (such as 2-hr EAB TEDE). However, in other cases the standard core gives a larger dose (such as 2-hr **EAB** thyroid). Therefore, both standard and TPC configurations must be examined in any LOCA personnel dose analysis. The offsite doses calculated are below the regulatory limits of 25 rem gamma, 300 rem beta, and 300 rem thyroid (and below the 25 rem TEDE).

Revision 18 is performed to roll calculations WBNNAL3-028 and WBNTSR-073 into this calculation. The EGTS is assumed to fail in such a way so as to have a maximum exhaust for the duration of the accident. This will bound any accident, failure, or abnormal operation which affects the EGTS system.

Revision 19 addresses the changes in the drawdown volume of the Auxiliary Building for ABGTS resulting from the changed ABSCE boundary of DCN 52283A. Revision 19 shows that changes to the ABSCE will create a minimal difference in Auxiliary Building volume that remains bounded by the effective volume applied in this calculation. The DCN 52283-A changes are intended to remain in effect during WBN Unit 2 construction completion activities.

Revision 20 is performed to change the flow rates due to a more rigorous exhaust calculation, and to incorporate an operator action time between 1 and 2 hours to support corrective actions for PER 91670. Revision 20 investigated the impact of a new single failure scenario associated with the control loop for one pair of PCOs. Current procedures require Operations to tam off one EGTS fan subsequent to EGTS start. An operator action between 1 and 2 hours to shut off one of two EGTS fans will impact the results. If there is some recirculation with the second train running, then there will be an insignificant (about 1%) increase in the dose if the action is. at 1 hour instead of 2 hours (Appendix H). Per Appendix H, a 1 hour operator action should be the design basis of the plant, since it results in the highest doses for gamma, beta, and TEDE. The EGTS single failure with 250 cfm steady state exhaust results (Appendix I) in higher Inhalation and 2-hr **EAB** TEDE doses. Per Appendix G, there is not much difference between 8000+10% and 8000-10% EGTS flow. However, the lower flow is slightly higher, and this is primarily due to the increase time at the beginning of the accident when the annulus is at a positive pressure and the slower pump down rates. The offsite doses calculated are below the regulatory limits of 25 rem gamma, 300 rem beta, and 300 rem thyroid (and below the 25 rem TEDE). See Results section for values. Revision 21 performs the PCO control loop single failure for Unit 2 (which is bounded by the Unit 1 LOCA, Appendix J.

Special Note: The EGTS single train (250 cfm steady state exhaust) scenario applies to both units.

NPG CALCULATION COVERSHEET/CCRIS UPDATE

KEY NOUNS (A-add, D-delete)

CROSS-REFERENCES (A-add, C-change, D-delete)

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NPG CALCULATION RECORD OF REVISION CALCULATION IDENTIFIER TI-RPS-197 Title Offsite Doses Due to a Regulatory Guide 1.4 Loss of Coolant Accident Revision **DESCRIPTION OF REVISION** No. 8 Revision 8 was performed to address new ABGTS leak test data. The new data shows less leakage, therefore the calculation was not changed because the old leakage values lead to conservative results. Successor calculations do not need to be upgraded due to this revision because results did not change. pages changed: 1, 4, 6-9, 10, 11, 15, 22 pages added: 5.1, Attachment D (3 pages) pages deleted: none 9 Revision 9 was performed because the ABGTS leakage rate changed, but did not significantly impact the results. Therefore, successor calculations do not need to be updated. pages added: none pages deleted: none pageas changed: 1, 4, 5.1, 6-9, 11, 12, 15,20 10 Revision 10 was performed because the ABGTS leakage rate changed, but did not significantly impact the results. Therefore, successor calculations do not need to be updated. pages added: 1, 9.1 pages deleted: none pages changed 1.1 (old page 1), 4, 5.1, 6-12, 15, 20 11 Revision 11 was performed because of a change of theannulus setpoint from -1.036" H20 to -1.048" H20. pages added: Attachment E (5 pages) pages deleted: none pages changed: 1, 4, 5.1, 6-12, 9.1, 15-18, 20-22 Revision 12 was performed because of new source terms. The calculation is based on 5% U235 enrichment, 1000 EFPD (18 month cycle). This was specifically done for cycle 2, however the results are also applicable to cycle 1. performed for the new fuel. pages added: none pages deleted: none pages changed: 1, 4, 5.1, 6-9, 9.1, 11, 12, 20, 21 13 Revision 13 was performed to incorporate the 650 EFPD results (from R **11)** into the calculation. pages added: **I** pages changed: la (old page 1), 4, 5.1, 6-8, 11, 20,21 pages deleted: none 14 Revision 14 was performed because the annulus setpoint changed from -1.048" to -1.45" H20. pages added: none pages changed: 1, 4, 5.1, 6-9, 8.1, 11, 17, 18, 20, 21 pages deleted: none 15 Revision 15 was performed to incorporate the Tritium Production Core (TPC) as part of the analysis. Included as part of this is the revised version of FENCDOSE which can handle tritium. The answers are now expressed in terms of ICRP-2 thyroid dose (current design basis for the plant); ICRP-30 thyroid dose, and TEDE. 650 EFPD results were deleted as they no longer apply to WBN. Discussion on the limits and new dose methodologies were also added. pages added: Appendix A and B pages changed: 1, 4, 5.1, 6, 9, 9.1, 11-13, 15, 19, 20-22 pages deleted: Classification Forms **RI5:** 50 total pages 16 Revision 16 was performed as part of EDC 5095 **IA.** This lowered the ice weight and thus changed the iodine removal efficiencies. The new values were found to give less conservative dose results compared to Revision 15. Therefore the previous results are still acceptable and no successors are impacted by this revision. Also, because the previous results are more conservative, the SAR and **T/S** are not impacted. Pages deleted: TVAN CTS Form, old coversheets Pages added: CCRIS Update Sheet, Appendix D Pages Changed: 1,5-9,19,21 Total Pages :47 Revision 17 was performed as corrective action to PER 61493. This PER documented that dose calculations did not take into consideration the 17 **EXECUTS OF A CONSERVATE:** New SOFTE A GUIDE OF THE OFFICIAL ORDER THE ABGTS with a conservative arbitrary holdup time of 0.3 hours. Therefore no
17 operation of two trains of ABGTS or EGTS. This calculation models the matter the flow rate of the ABGTS, the volume is adjusted so that the holdup time is 0.3 hours. Therefore since the flowrate with two trains in operation would result in an AB volume less than that of the actual AB volume, the results would not be impacted by having two trains of ABGTS in operation.Operating with two trains of EGTS would achieve the desired annulus pressure differential in less time that with one train in operation. This results in less radioactivity released directly to the environment (i.e. less offsite dose). The steady state flow rate of 250 cfm would not be changed as this is the approximate flowrate required to maintain the desired a impact the results of this calculation. Since the body of the calculation was not revised, the results remain unchanged and the FSAR and TS's are not impacted. Pages deleted: none Pages added: 12A Pages Changed: 1, 3, 5, 12 Total Pages : 48 TVA 40709 **[10-2008]** Page **I** of **I NEDP-2-2 [10-20-20081**

Page 5

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Purpose

The purpose of this calculation is to determine the offsite doses due to a Regulatory Guide 1.4 (ref.1) Loss of Coolant Accident. Revision 2 is being performed because the **X/Q** values and EGTS exhaust rates have changed. The calculation is being rewritten for legibility and to bring the format into accordance with NEP 3.1 R1. Revision 3 is performed because the annulus setpoint was changed from -0.5" to -1.036" H20, which results in different EGTS exhaust curves (ref. 19). The Interim ABSCE case was eliminated from the analysis. Revision 4 is performed to include in the STP model a single failure of the General Ventilation Exhaust Fans in the "on" position concurrent with the failure of one of the isolation dampers to close leading to unfiltered bypass of the ABGTS filters (WBPER930129, ref.22). Revision 5 is performed to re-establish the revision 3 models and results because the ABGTS bypass no longer exists due to modifications from DCN M-29141-A (ref.25). Revision 6 is performed to take into account ABGTS and EGTS leakage and also the potential temporary loss of Auxiliary Building differential pressure following a single failure of an ABGTS train. Revision 7 is performed to incorporate new X/Q values, justify Ice Condenser parameters, and update references. Revision 8 is performed to address new ABGTS leakage values. Revision 9 is performed to increase ABGTS leakage. Revision 10 is performed to increase ABGTS leakage. Revision 11 is performed because the annulus setpoint changed from -1.036" to -1,048" H20. Revision 12 incorporates new source terms from WBNNAL3-004 for 1000 EFPD (18 month cycle) with 5% U235 enrichment. The extended burnup fuel is for cycle 2. R13 is performed to incorporate the RI 1, 650 EFPD (cycle **1)** results into the calculation. Revision 14 is performed because the annulus setpoint was changed from -1.048" to 1.45" H20.

Revision 15 is performed to establish the offsite doses with a Tritium Production Core (TPC). In addition, the standard core (non-TPC) results were redone to include different thyroid dose determination methodologies. The previous method used iCRP-2 iodine dose conversion factors. This calculation determined the doses using 3 different methodologies. The gamma, beta and Thyroid (ICRP-2) doses are all based on TID-14844 methodologies utilizing the ICRP-2 iodine dose conversion factors found in TID-14844 and are the current (as of June 2001) licensing basis of the plant. The second methodology is the Thyroid (ICRP-30) dose, which is also based on TID-14844, but uses the ICRP-30 iodine dose conversion factors. The ICRP-30 iodine dose conversion factors are less conservative than the ICRP-2 factors. This methodology is presented for potential future use. Finally, the third methodology used is the TEDE (Total Effective Dose Equivalent). The TEDE presents an overall weighted dose and is more representative of the impact of all isotopes on the body as a whole. The TEDE dose is presented for potential future use, however is not currently (as of June 2001) part of the design basis of the plant. It is important to note that tritium does not impact the thyroid doses utilizing the TID-14844 methodology, because only iodine is applied to the'thyroid dose. However, in fact tritium does contribute to the thyroid dose; as well as other organs of the body. This is why the TEDE is a more representative dose when discussing the impact of tritium. It is up to the end user to choose the dose which is to be used, with the understanding that each methodology has a'different meaning. The 650 EFPD results were deleted as WBN utilizes an extended cycle, ie. 18 months and 1000 EFPD.

Revision 18 is performed to incorporate EGTS exhaust rates which reflect failures in the EGTS system. It is now assumed that the EGTS exhausts at the maximum rate for the entire accident, and the accident starts with the annulus at 0" H20 differential pressure (instead of -5" H20). The calculations WBNNAL3-028 and WBNTSR-073 are rolled into this calculation. Revision 19 is performed to address changes in the ABSCE boundary identified as part of DCN 52283-A.

Revision 20 is performed to incorporate a 1 to 2 hour operator action to correct the EGTS system. The EGTS system will be modeled as 2 trains with appropriate recirculation/exhaust based on new more rigorous flow calculations (both initial transient conditions as well as steady state single failure conditions) as opposed to maximum exhaust with no recirculation. Appendix G is added to evaluate the difference between 2 train EGTS flows of 8000+10% **=** 8800 cfm versus 8000-

10%=7200 cfm flow. Appendix H is added to evaluate the operator action time (1 hour versus 2 hour). Revision 21 is performed to add the Unit 2 evaluation of the PCO control loop single failure (Appendix J). Only the bounding cases (as determined in revision 20) of 1 hour operation action with the 8000-10% = 7200 cfm EGTS flow were evaluated.

Introduction

Guidelines for determining the radiological consequences due to design basis Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) for a pressurized water reactor are presented in Regulatory Guide 1.4 (ref. 1). These guidelines provided the basis for this analysis. The computer code STP (ref.3) is used to calculate the activity released to the environs during the 30 days following the Reg.Guide 1.4 LOCA, and the computer code FENCDOSE (ref.4) is used to calculate the resulting offsite doses.

The offsite gamma dose limit is 25 rem (10CFRI00.1 **1),** the thyroid dose limit is 300 rem (10CFR100. **11),** and the TEDE dose limit is 25 rem (10CFR50.67). SRP 6.4 in NUREG 0800 (ref.32) shows that the thyroid dose and beta dose limits are equivalent for the control room, therefore the offsite beta dose limit can be assumed the same as the offsite thyroid dose limit, 300 rem. 1OCFR20.1201 also states that the organ (thyroid) dose and skin (beta) dose are equivalent.

Assumptions and Data

19. Releases between time--0 to times up to 66 seconds post LOCA from the various systems breaching containment listed in WB-DC-40-34 (ref.37) are not taken into account. It is assumed that the consequences of any releases from the systems during the time when the system containment isolation valves are open is insignificant.

Technical Justification: The dose due to releases from the systems which are isolated will be very small. Calculation TI-632 (ref.39) analyzed the dose due to releases due to a purge at the start of the accident. Those doses were very small. The purge mass releases will certainly bound any potential release through the other systems being isolated, especially since many of

those systems are closed/self contained. Also, most of the systems do not have a credible leakage path for the 0-66 sec time period from the containment atmosphere or reactor coolant into the system in question due to the system being at higher pressure than the containment atmosphere or the depressurized reactor coolant.

note **1)** The ABGTS flow is 9000 cfm total, but only 7000 cfm is from the Auxiliary Building. 2000 cfm is from the vacuum relief. If the vacuum relief valves fail, then the flow from the Auxiliary Building will become 9000 cfm. For conservatism, it is assumed in this calculation that the vacuum relief lines fail.

note 2) DCN M-10354-B (ref.31) installed new controllers for the ABGTS. This modification resulted in new setpoints (ref.32). Initially following an accident, both ABGTS trains start up (ref. 14). Operator action is needed to turn one of these trains off. If a single failure occurs subsequent to this action, the Auxiliary Building will lose its differential pressure. When the differential pressure reaches the setpoint, the other train is started up, but by this time the differential pressure requirement of -0.25" or greater has been lost. Therefore, according to the Standard Review Plan, secondary containment is lost. The time to reestablish the differential pressure is conservatively assumed to be the same as when the ABGTS first started at the beginning of the accident (4 minutes). The single failure is assumed to occur immediately following the operator action (30 minutes), therefore the direct leakage to the environment occurs from 30 to 34 minutes post LOCA. The leakage is assumed to be 9900 cfm, which is the same as the inleakage when there is a driving force (the differential pressure). This value is chosen because, as the differential pressure decreases, the driving force also decreases. The 9900 cfm is maximum leakage during maximum delta pressure (9000 cfm+10%), therefore, it is expected that during essential zero delta pressure, the outleakage will not exceed 9900 cfn. This calculation establishes 9900 cfm as the maximum permissible leakage. Note: the value of 9000 cfm was actually used in the analysis. This will not affect the results since the volume of the Auxiliary Building is arbitrarily set to have a holdup of 0.3 hour. If the model were changed from 9000 cfm to 9900 cfm, the volume would also change. The net effect would be for the holdup to be the same, and would not change any results.

20. For TPC configurations, two cases are analyzed. One TPC assumes 100% of the core tritium release to the containment atmosphere. The more realistic TPC case assumes 3% of the core tritium is released. (A conventional core is also analyzed) Technical Justification: The TPC 100% release is clearly conservative since most tritium is expected to be in the form of water (H₂O), especially because of hydrogen recombiners in containment. Therefore, realistically a significant fraction of tritium will be in the sump water. The'TPC 100% airborne case clearly provides an upper bound for tritium releases to the environment. The TPC 3% airborne case is amore realistic case where the tritium will mostly be in the sump. This case will maximize tritium in the sump. The 3% value is taken from the topical report, reference 41.

21. It is assumed that tritium is not filtered out by the EGTS or ABGTS system.

Technical Justification: It is expected that a significant fraction of tritium will be in the chemical form of water (HTO). Carbon filters will trap water. Assuming no delay, trapping, or filtration of the tritiated water assures that the results will be conservative.

22. Only one train of ABGTS is in operation.-Two trains of EGTS trains are in operation

Technical Justification: This calculation models the ABGTS with a conservative arbitrary holdup time of 0.3 hours. Therefore no matter the flow rate of the ABGTS, the volume is adjusted so that the holdup time is 0.3 hours. Therefore since the flow rate with two trains in operation would result in a AB volume less than that of the actual AB volume, the results would not be impacted by having two trains of ABGTS in operation. With the exception of the thyroid dose, operation with a postulated PCO control loop single failure has greater releases than the previous design basis accident assumption of a single failure of one EGTS train (250 cfm steady state exhaust). The single EGTS failure (250 cfm steady state exhaust) case is presented in Appendix I. For the EGTS, cases with no operator action and with operator action to shut down one EGTS fan are presented in this analysis. In addition, comparisons between EGTS flow of 8000 cfm +10% and 8000 cfm - 10% are examined (Appendix G).

23. The EGTS is assumed to have a PCO control loop single failure at the beginning of the accident, such that the maximum 2 train flow occurs at the beginning of the accident until operator action is credited in turning off one fan between 1 and 2 hours.

Technical Justification: This will bound any operation mode (normal, single failure, or abnormal operation) of the EGTS. With full flow, the beginning of the accident will have variable exhaust flow. As the annulus is depressurized, less exhaust will be available. From MDQ00006520070121 (ref.55), the maximum steady state 2 train EGTS flow is 6131 cfm with an

exhaust of 957 cfm. This set of flows occurs when the EGTS should be set to full recirculation mode due to excessive depressurization (see flow curves taken from TI-ANL-166). At 602 seconds, the variable exhaust flow is reduced linearly to 957 cfm (finally achieving the steady state 957 cfm at 2100 sec) with recirculation of 6131-957=5174 cfm. This will remain the exhaust for the duration of the accident for the no operator action case. For the operator action cases to shut down one EGTS fan, the flows are changed to 694 cfm exhaust and 4278-694=3584 cfm recirculation. For Unit 2, from MDQ00206520090368 (ref. 58), the 2 train EGTS flow is 6569 cfm with an exhaust of 832 cfm and recirculation of 6569- $832 = 5737$ cfm. The 1 train EGTS flow is 4059 cfm with and exhaust of 604 cfm and recirculation of 4059-604 = 3455 cfm.

24. Prior to 60 seconds with 8000-10% =7200 cfm EGTS flow, the containment leakage goes directly to the environment. For 8000+10%=8800 cfm EGTS flow, the containment leakage directly to the environment last until 56 sec. Technical Justification: From TI-ANL-166, the pressure in the annulus is positive (>-0.25" H20) for 60 sec or 56 sec. Therefore, there is no secondary containment (annulus) at that time.

25. This analysis was originally based on 250 cfm inleakage to the annulus (the tech spec leakage into the annulus at -0.5" H20). With the inclusion of EGTS control loop single failure with maximum pumping down and the EGTS exhausting continually for the duration of the accident, the inleakage is assumed to be 957 cfm at -2.1" (ref. 47) with 2 EGTS trains, and 694 cfm at -2.1" with 1 EGTS fan operating. For Unit 2, the inleakage is assumed to be 832 cfm at -1.88" (2 EGTS trains) and 604 cfm at -1.48" (1 EGTS train) (ref.47).

Technical Justification: Due to the increase in steady state exhaust, the inleakage must be at the same as the exhaust rate.

26. For the case of operator action correcting the 2 train EGTS failure scenario described above, it is assumed that the action is between 1 and 2 hours to correct the operation to a single fan.

Technical Justification: The time frame is engineering judgment. Most operator actions are assumed to occur with 30 minutes. However, during discussions with Ops, it has been determined that 30 minutes is too short a time period for the type of accident where this failure could occur. A more reasonable time period of 1 to 2 hours was used in this calculation. Appendix H evaluates the worst case time frame.

Special Requirements/Limiting Conditions

The special requirement/limiting condition of this calculation is: If 2 EGTS fans are operating, one EGTS fan must be turned off between 1 and 2 hours. See assumption 26. The fan shall not be turned off earlier than 1 hour. Failure to turn off the second train will not result in exceeding the 1OCFR100 offsite dose limits. However, turning off one fan prior to 1 hour could result in higher doses.

Calculations

The primary containment is modeled as one volume. The reduction of the iodine population due to the ice condenser is modeled as a time dependent removal process. Elemental and-particulate species are only removed, the ice condenser removal efficiencies for organic iodines is minimal, thus no credit is assumed (ref.15 sec.8.2.6). The iodine removal rates and the basis for these removal rates.are shown in Table 2. The Standard Review Plan 6.5.4 section III.l.a (ref.33) says that the ice condenser is considered ineffective in the removal of particulate iodine. However, Westinghouse has provided WBN with information (WAT-D-9902, ref.34) which shows that particulate iodine has a variety of removal mechanisms. The use of the same ice condenser removal efficiency for particulate as elemental iodine is conservative if no other particulate iodine removal mechanisms are modeled.

A description of the STP models' parameters are shown in Table 1. The activity assumed to be available for immediate release is 25% of the core activity of iodine and 100% of the core activity of noble gasses (ref.1). With the TPC, two cases are analyzed. Case B assumes 100% of the tritium is released to the containment atmosphere. In case C, only 3% is released to the containment atmosphere. The activities are taken from WBNNAL3-004 (ref.7). Activities for the TPC core are taken from WBNAPS3-098 (ref.40). The jodine is assumed to be 91% elemental, 5% particulate, and 4% organic (ref.1). Isotopes Kr-90, Xe-137, Xe-139, and Xe-140 are not used because of the very short half-lives (ranging from 13 seconds to 3.8 minutes). 1-130 is not used because it has a very small core inventory (10^3 curies) compared to the other iodine isotopes $(10^7 \cdot 10^8 \text{ curies})$.

The LPZ doses are calculated by using the computer code FENCDOSE. The activity released to the environment during the time intervals 0-2 hrs, 2-8 hrs, 8-24 hrs, 24-96 hrs, and 96-720 hrs is taken directly form the STP results. The respective dispersion coefficients (X/Q) are taken from refs. 8 and 9 (see Table 4).

Calculation No. TI-RPS-197 **Rev:** 21 **Plant:** WBN **IPage: 15** Subject: Offsite Doses Due to a Regulatory Guide 1.4 Loss of Prepared: Date: Coolant Accident Checked: Date:

Table 1

STP Parameter Description (see Figure 1)

Step Source: At t=0, 100% of the core inventory of noble gasses and 25% of the core inventory of iodine are stepped into component 1. Core inventories are taken from reference 7 for normal core, reference 40 for TPC. With the TPC core, two cases are analyzed: case B assumes 100% of the tritium is released to the containment atmosphere. Case C assumes only 3% is released. Conventional core is designated as Case A.

Primary Containment: Volume = 1.27E6 cuft (ref.2)

(component 1) Ice condenser removal efficiencies see Table 2.

Flow 1-2: 0-24 hrs: 0.25% vol/day = (0.25%)(1.27E6 cuft)(day/24hr)=132.3 cuft/hr 24 hrs-30 days: 0. 125% vol/day = (0.125%)(1.27E6 cuft)(day/24hr)=66.1 cuft/hr

Containment Leakage Split: Volume=IE-6 (arbitrarily small)

(component 2) Flow $2-6 = 1.0$ for t<114 sec

Flow $2-6 = 0.25$ for 114 sec times4 minutes (Final ABSCE)

Flow $2-6 = 0$ for time >4 min

Flow 2-3=0.25 for \uparrow -4 minutes (Final ABSCE)

Flow 2-4=0.75 for \ge 114 sec

Auxiliary Building: Flow 3-10=9000 cfm or 5.4E5 cfh for \uparrow -4 minutes

(component 3) The auxiliary building free volume is about 3.5E6 cuft (ref.14). The exhaust rate is therefore about 0.15 volumes/hour, providing a mean holdup time of more than 6 hours. To account for any short circuits (incomplete mixing) a reduction factor is arbitrarily taken so that the holdup time will be a conservatively low 0.3 hour holdup time (tH):

tH=V/F or V=tH*F= (0.3 hr) (5.4E5 cuft/hr) =1.62E5 cuft

Flow 3-4=957 cfm (5.74E4 cfh) when 2 fans of EGTS operate and 695 cfm (4.16E4 cfh) when one fan is in operation (ref.55, leakage into annulus = EGTS exhaust rate)

Flow 3-6=9900 cfm or 5.94E5 cfh (as mentioned earlier, this is the leakage out of the building during the loss of ABGTS and lasts from 30 minutes to 34 minutes post LOCA)

Flow 3-5 = 10.7 cfm or 642 cfh (ref.30). This is the leakage into the entire EGTS system from the Auxiliary Building. The number is therefore very conservative because this leakage represents the unfiltered bypass of the EGTS, but the actual value includes leakage upstream of (and therefore filtered by) the EGTS filters.

Flow 3-9 = 27.88 cfm or 1672.8 cfh (ref.27). This is the leakage into the ABGTS ductwork downstream (and therefore bypassing)'the filters and upstream of the fans. This value is for Unit 1. Unit 2 leakage is only 19.32 cfm, ref.28. Later testing (ref.38) gives the leakage for **Ul** as 5.39 cfm and for U2 as 3.73 cfm. The 27.88 cfm is conservative (more iodines will get out), therefore the model will not be updated and will bound any future increase (up to 27.88 cfm).

Annulus: Volume=0.5 * annulus free volume (this is assumed in order to account for incomplete mixing)

(component 4) $=0.5*3.75E5$ cuft $=1.88E5$ cuft

Flow 4-5=0 for t<8.33E-3 hr (based on 30 second delay in EGTS operation)

Flow 4-5=7200 cfm or 2.16E5 cfh for t>8.33E-3 hr

EGTS Flow Split: Volume=lE-6 (arbitrarily small)

(component 5) Flow 5-6= variable, see Table 3

Flow 5-4= variable, see Table 3

Environment: Volume=1 environment

(component 6) The environment is modeled as an accumulator which accumulates activity with no decay during the time periods for FENCDOSE input.

ABGTS Filters: Charcoal efficiency is 99% for iodine (ref.10), 0% for tritium (component 7) Charcoal efficiency is 99% for iodine (ref.10), 0% for tritium (component 8)

Note on filters: In revision 2, the transmission cards "X" are replaced by the "U" filter card (and components 7 and 8 are added). This is done to take into account the transmission of noble gas daughter products through the filters.

ABGTS Flow Split: Volume = 1E-6 (arbitrarily small to prevent holdup)

(component 9) Flow 9-6 = 9000 cfm or 5.4E6 cfh (this is flow through the filters to the environment)

Flow 9-3 **=** 8.87 cfm or 532.2 cfh (ref.26) This is the leakage from the Unit 1 ABGTS ductwork downstream from the ABGTS filters into the Auxiliary Building. Unit 2 leakage is 24.32 cfm, ref.29, which would result in a smaller release if used. Later testing (ref.38) gives the leakage for **Ul** as 7.15 cfm and U2 as 5.1 cfm. Again, the old values will remain for conservatism, and for any changes in the future.

Upstream ABGTS:Volume = 1E-6 (arbitrarily small to prevent holdup) (component **10)** Flow = 9000 cfm or 5.4E6 cfh (the card used is "U 10 7 9 5.4E6 0.0 0.0 0.99 0.99 0.0")

Table 2:

Ice Condenser Removal Efficiencies (ref.6) Elemental and Particulate Iodine

* Based on a primary containment free volume of 1.27E6 cuft and a flow rate of 40,000 cfm where:

Lambda = $(F/V)*eff = (40,000 \text{ cfm}/1.27E6 \text{ cuff})$ (60 min/hr)(eff) = 1.89*eff [hr⁻¹]

Note: The lower containment air return fans do not start until 8-10 minutes post LOCA (ref.35,5). However, the normal circulation during this time period is much greater than the fan flow of 40,000 cfm (see Appendix A). Therefore, it is conservative to use the 40,000 cfm for the 0-10 minute time period.

The following is the EGTS performance curve from TI-ANL-166 (ref.19) With Initial Annulus Pressure at 0" H2O for Unit 1.

TWA

This is the EGTS profile as modeled for Unit 1. The above curve is modified at 602 sec to have constant flows (see assumptions 22 and 23):

Modified **ANNULUS** DIFF. PRES. **AND EGTS EXHAUST** FLOW RATES With Controller Failure **CASE 3, ANNULUS LEAKAGE** = **957 CFM 0** -2.10 **IN** W.G., INITIAL **ANNULUS PRESSURE** = **0.0 IN** W.G.

Table 3

 $\overline{1}$

* 1 hour operator action. For no operator action cases, the 3600-30 day flows do not change from the 2100-3600 sec case.

Note: The Site Boundary is equivalent to the Exclusion Area Boundary

96-720 **-** 6.35E-06

 $\ddot{}$ l.

Results

The results for the Unit 1 LOCA with EGTS PCO control loop single failure are (rem):

30-Day LPZ

* Note that the Inhalation/Thyroid and TEDE doses for this failure scenario are bounded by the single failure of one EGTS train (see appendix I).

Discussion and Conclusion

5 J 7 A

The offsite doses calculated are below the regulatory limits of 25 rem gamma, 300 rem beta, and 300 rem thyroid (and below the 25 rem TEDE).

Revision 16 investigated iodine removal efficiencies based on reduced ice weight. The results are found in Appendix D for the bounding case of the 100% airborne TPC case. Previous results were found to be more conservative. Therefore the results found in Revision 15 are still acceptable. The reduced ice weight with updated iodine removal rates do not need to be incorporated into future analyses unless some conservatism needs to be eliminated.

Revision 19 identifies changes in the ABSCE boundary due to DCV52283-A. The offsite doses from the previous revision were found to still be applicable. An explanation can be found in Appendix F.

Revision 20 investigated the impact of an EGTS PCO control loop single failure. This failure still results in doses less than regulatory limits. An operator action between 1 and 2 hours to shut off one of two EGTS fans will impact the results. If there is some recirculation with the second fan running, then there will be an insignificant (about 1%) increase in the dose if the action is at 1 hour instead of 2 hours (Appendix H). Current procedures require Operations to turn off one EGTS fan subsequent to EGTS start. Per Appendix H, a 1 hour operator action should be the design basis of the plant, since it results in the highest doses. Per Appendix G, there is not much difference between 8000+10% and 8000-10% EGTS flow. However, the lower flow is slightly higher, and this is primarily due to the increase time at the beginning of the accident when the annulus is at a positive pressure and the slower pump down rates.. Per Appendices **I** and **J** (revision 21), the Unit **1 EGTS PCO** control loop single failure accident analyzed in the main text bounds, except for the thyroid and 2-hr **EAB TEDE** doses, the single train failure (250 **cfn** steady state exhaust) previously analyzed in **WBNNAL3-028.** The single train failure **case** is presented in Appendix **I.**

Special Note:. The EGTS single train (250 cfm steady state exhaust) scenario applies to both units.

References

1. Regulatory Guide 1.4 "Assumptions used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Loss Of Coolant Accident for Pressurized Water Reactors" Rev.2, June 1984

2. WBNAPS2-030 R1 "WBN Containment MONSTER Model Input Parameter Development" RIMS# B 18 920729 261

3. Computer code STP R6, code I.D. 262165

4. Computer code **FENCDOSE** R4, code **I.D. 262358**

5. N3-30RB-4002 R5 "Reactor Building Ventilation System" RIMS# T29 930324 956

6. Westinghouse letter from E.A. Novotnak to J.A. Raulston, February 21, 1985, RIMS# B45 850301 625 - Attachment A

7. WBNNAL3-004 R4 "Accident Dose Inside Reactor Building" RIMS# B26 951121 304

8. Memorandum from Francis P. Weatherford to Walter L.Elliott on January 27, 1995 "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Update - Dispersion Meteorology For Accident Analysis" RIMS# T33 950127 962- Attachment B

9. Not used

10. Regulatory Guide 1.52 "Design, Testing, and Maintenance Criteria for Post Accident Engineered-Safety-Feature Atmosphere Cleanup System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants" Rev.2, March 1978

11. Technical Specification TS SR 3.6.1.1, Nov, 1994

12. Technical Specification TS SR 3.6.9.4, Nov, 1994

13. WBN CCD drawing 1-47W866-1 R25

14. N3-30AB-4001 R4 "Auxiliary Building Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning System (31,44)" RIMS# T29 930324 953

15. WCAP-7426, "Topical Report - Iodine Removal in the Ice Condenser System" D.D. Malinowsky, March 1970

16. not used

17. not used

18. WBN CCD drawing 1-47W866-10 R22

19. TI-ANL-166 R15 "Annulus Pressure Control During a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)"

20. Memorandum from J.L.Standifer to D.W.Wilson, RIMS# T16 850513 943

21. FSAR section 6.2.3.3.3 Amendment 62

 $\label{eq:2.1} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\int_{0}^{\infty}\frac{dx}{\sqrt{2\pi}}\,dx\leq \frac{1}{2}\int_{0}^{\infty}\frac{dx}{\sqrt{2\pi}}\,dx$

APPENDIX **A STP** Input Deck

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// DISP=(NEW,CATLG,DELETE) DISP= (NEW, CATLG, DELETE) //GO.FT01F001 DD * NV= **10 MS= 1** //GO.FT11F001 DD * NI= 23 NK= 5 NG= 0 **NL=** 3 IKRM 83 1 1.0352E-04 **10.0000E+00** 2KRM 85 1 4.2978E-05 **10.OOOOE+00** 3KR 85 1 2.0470E-09 29.8849E-06
4KR 87 1 1.5141E-04 10.0000E+00 4KR 87 1 1.5141E-04 **10.0000E+00** 5KR 88 1 6.8765E-05 10.OOOOE+00 6KR 89 1 3.6328E-03 **10.6000E+00** 7XEM 131 2 6.7414E-07 131.3039E-08
8XEM 133 2 3.5656E-06 152.0365E-07 8XEM 133 2 3.5656E-06
9XE 133 2 1.5165E-06 9XE 133 2 1.5165E-06 83.5656E-06
10XEM 135 2 7.3818E-04 174.8062E-06 174.8062E-06
107.3818E-04 11XE 135 2 2.1043E-05 107.3818E-04
12XE 138 2 8.1528E-04 10.0000E+00 12XE 138 2 8.1528E-04 10.0000E+00
131 131 3 9.9536E-07 10.0000E+00 131 131 3 9.9536E-07 **10.OOOOE+00** 141 132 3 8.4448E-05 10.0000E+00
151 133 3 9.2568E-06 10.0000E+00 151 133 3 9.2568E-06 10.0000E+00
161 134 3 2.1963E-04 10.0000E+00 161 134 3 2.1963E-04 **10.OOOOE+00** 135 3 2.9129E-05 10.0000E+00
131 4 9.9536E-07 10.0000E+00 181* 131 4 9.9536E-07 10.0000E+00
191* 132 4 8.4448E-05 10.0000E+00 191* 132 4 8.4448E-05 **10.OOOOE+00** 201* 133 4 9.2568E-06 10.OOOOE+00 211* 134 4 2.1963E-04 10.0000E+00 221* 135 4 2.9129E-05 10.0000E+00
23H 3 5.1.7785E-09 10.0000E+00 3 5 1.7785E-09 Ω 10.OOOOE+00 10.OOOOE+00 **10.OOOOE+00** 10.0000E+00' 10.OOOOE+00 10.OOOOE+00 181.3039E-08 202.0365E-07 159.2568E-06 224.8062E-06 172.9129E-05 **10.OOOOE+00** 10.OOOOE+00 **10.OOOOE+00** 10.OOOOE+00 10.0000E+00 10.OOOOE+00 10.OOOOE+00 10.OOOOE+00 10.OOOOE+00 10.OOOOE+00 10.0000E+00 10.000OE+00 **10.OOOOE+00** 10.0000E+00 **10.OOOOE+00** 10.0000E+00 **10.OOOOE+00** 10.000OE+00 10.000OE+00 10.OOOOE+00 209.2568E-06 **10.OOOOE+00** 222.9129E-05 10.OOOOE+00 **10.OOOOE+00 10.OOOOE+00** 10.0000E+00 10.OOOOE+00 10. 00OE+00 10.OOOOE+00 **10.OOOOE+00** 10.OOOOE+00 10. **00OE+00** 10.0000E+00 10.OOOOE+00 1 'TRIT PROD CORE INV, 1000 EFPD, 5% U235 (ORIGEN), REF.WBNAPS3-098 RO' 1 1.23E7 2 2.69E7 3 8.81E5 4 5.23E7 5 7.38E7 6 9.10E7 7 9.54E5 8 5.80E6 9 1.88E8 10 3.59E7 11 4.96E7 12 1.59E8 7 9.54E5 8 5.80E6 9 1.88E8 10 3.59E7 11 4.96E7 12 1.59E8 1.88E8 10 3.59E7 11 4.96E7 12 1.59 13 8.65E7 14 1.26E8 15 1.80E8 16 2.00E8 17 1.69E8 18 3.60E6 19 5.24E6 20 7.52E6 21 8.32E6 22 7.04E6 23 2.68E7 Ω T WBN MHA-4 MIN AUX BLDG BYPASS (FINAL ABSCE) NJ= **10** 1 'PRIMARY' 'CONTAINMENT' 2 'CONT. LEAKAGE' ' SPLIT' 3 'AUX. BLD 4 'ANNULUS
5 ' EGTS 5 **-** EGTS ' ' FLOW SPLIT 6 'ENVIRONMENT ' CURIES 7 'ABGTS FILTER' 8 'EGTS FILTER' 9 'ABGTS FLOW SPLIT' **10** 'UPSTREAM ABGTS' 0.00833 HR TIME TO 30 SECOND POST LOCA V 1 1.27+6 CUFT V 2 1.0-6 V 3 1.62+5 CUFT V 4 1.88+5 CUFT **V5** 1.0-6 V 6 **1.0** ENVIRONMENT V 7 **1.OE-6** V 8 1.OE-6 V 9 1.OE-6 V **10** 1.OE-6 **A 6** *^S*1 1 0 1.0 1 1 3 0.25 1 1 4 0.25 1 1 5 0.03 F 1 2 0 132.3 CFH *F* 2 **3 0 0**

 \sim

 ~ 10

 $\mathcal{F}(\mathcal{A})$

 $\bar{\beta}$

 $\varphi_{\rm{eff}}$

 $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{L}))$ and $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{L}))$. The contribution of $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{L})$

 $\hat{\mathcal{E}}$

 $\sim 10^6$

 $\label{eq:2.1} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}}\frac{d\mu}{d\mu} \frac{d\mu}{d\mu} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}}\frac{d\mu}{d\mu} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}}$

 $\label{eq:2.1} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\sum_{i=1}^n\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\sum_{i=1}^n\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\sum_{i=1}^n\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\sum_{i=1}^n\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\sum_{i=1}^n\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\sum_{i=1}^n\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\sum_{i=1}^n\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\sum_{i=1}^n\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\sum_{i=1}^n\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\sum_{i=1}^n\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\sum_{i=1}^n\frac$

 $\label{eq:2.1} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}}\sum_{i=1}^n\frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}}\sum_{i=1}^n\frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}}\sum_{i=1}^n\frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}}\sum_{i=1}^n\frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}}\sum_{i=1}^n\frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}}\sum_{i=1}^n\frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}}\sum_{i=1}^n\frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}}\sum_{i=1}^n\frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}}\sum_{i=1}^n\frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}}\sum_{i=1}^n\$

Appendix B FENCDOSE Input Deck

TRIA

//R197F19F JOB 264360, '9MBERG.BIN111', MSGLEVEL=1, MSGCLASS=T //*MAIN ORG=LOCAL, CLASS=SB //JCL JCLLIB ORDER=(APB.NEN.EX262358.PROCLIB) //STEP1 EXEC FNCDOSV4, COND=(4, LT) //FNCDOS1.FT05F001 DD * $\mathbf{1}$ KRM-83 KRM-85 KR-85 $KR-87$ KR-88 KR-89 XEM-131 XEM-133 XE-133 XEM-135 XE-135 XE-138 $r-131$ $r-132$ $r-133$ $r-134$ $r-135$
 $r*-131$ $r*-132$ $r*-133$ $r*-134$ $r*-135$ $H-3$ \mathbf{r} $.141E-3$.668E-4 .459E-4 .204E-4 .635E-5 6.07E-4 WBN MHA-4 MIN AUX BLDG BYPASS (FINAL ABSCE) TIME TO 2.0 HOURS $6\overline{6}$ 'ENVIRONMENT **CURIES** ' $$TN = 0.2000E + 01$ 1 5.526E+02 2 1.528E+03 $3.5.974E+01$ 4.1.972E+03 5 3.788E+03 6 2.378E+02 7 6.454E+01 8 3.879E+02 9 1.268E+04 10 7.974E+02 11 3.325E+03 12 1.300E+03 13 8.458E+01 14 1.169E+02 15 1.751E+02 16 1.734E+02 17 1.623E+02 18 4.447E+00 19 5.951E+00 20 9.208E+00 21 8.491E+00 22 8.440E+00 23 5.452E+01 WBN MHA-4 MIN AUX BLDG BYPASS (FINAL ABSCE) TIME TO 8 HOURS $6₁$ ' ENVIRONMENT **CURIES** ' $$TN = 0.8000E+01$ 1 8.983E+02 2 5.238E+03 $3 \cdot 3.741E + 02$ 4 1.915E+03
9 7.792E+04 $59.316E+03$ 7 4.008E+02 $82.316E+03$ 6 1.504E-09 10 4.744E+03 12 7.954E+00 11 1.748E+04 13 1.917E+01 14 7.114E+00 15 3.444E+01 16 1.938E+00 $172.295E+01$ 18 2.378E+00 19 8.783E-01 20 4.284E+00 21 2.383E-01 22 2.844E+00 23 3.414E+02 WBN MHA-4 MIN AUX BLDG BYPASS (FINAL ABSCE) TIME TO 1 DAY $6\overline{6}$ ' ENVIRONMENT **CURIES** ' $$$ TN= 0.2400E+02 1 1.536E+02 2 4.389E+03 3 1.385E+03 4 1.109E+02 5 3.775E+03 60.0 7 1.452E+03 8 7.541E+03 9 2.738E+05 10 1.324E+04 11 3.686E+04 12 2.994E-07 13 4.914E+01 14 1.359E+00 15 6.428E+01 17 2.130E+01 16 1.704E-02 18 6.118E+00 19 1.689E-01 20 8 0298+00 21 2.119E-03 22 2.652E+00 23 1.264E+03 WBN MHA-4 MIN AUX BLDG BYPASS (FINAL ABSCE) TIME TO 4 DAYS $$TN = 0.9600E + 02$ 6 ' ENVIRONMENT **CURIES** $13.524E-01$ 2 3.044E+02 $3 \cdot 3.487E+03$ 4 1.714E-02 5 6.050E+01 60.0 7 3.390E+03 8 1.177R+04 9 5.606E+05 10 6.372E+03 11 1.385E+04 12 0.0
17 2.606E+00 13 9.541E+01 14 6.319E-03 15 4.242E+01 16 3.817E-08 18 1.188E+01 19 7.853E-04 20 5.298E+00 21 4.745E-09 22 3.246E-01 23 3.181E+03 WBN MHA-4 MIN AUX BLDG BYPASS (FINAL ABSCE) TIME TO 30 DAYS ' \$ TN= $0.7200E+03$ 6 ' ENVIRONMENT **CURIES** $23.240E-03$
7 1.404E+04 $3 \begin{array}{@{}c@{\hspace{1em}}c@{\hspace$ 1 4.419E-13 $42.444E-21$ 5 7.596E-07 60.0 9 1.048E+06 10 7.528E+00 $12\ 0.0$
17 1.279E-03 11 5.032E+01 13 2.828E+02 14 1.637E-12 15 4.113E+00 18 3.520E+01 160.0 19 1.096E-13 20 5.137E-01 22 1.592E-04 210.0 23 2.546E+04

Appendix C

 $TT-RPS-197$ Appendix AC

Flow to **lee** Condenser Prior to Air Return Fan Startup

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that sufficient containment volume will be directed to the ice
condenset compartment during the first 10 minutes of a design basis LOCA to meet statements made
concerning the ice

For this calculation, the containment model used in the safety-related qualification of the MONSTER software was rerun after modifying the printout frequency inputs to secure the flow information which was not readily retr to the ice condenser, the SON model is adequate for use. at WBN since the mass and energy releases are similar for **both** plants during the time of interest.

Sufficient flow to the loe condenser is demonstrated if at legge 400,000 ft⁸ of the lower compartment
atmosphere can be shown to enter the ice condenser during the first 10 minutes following the DBA. This
requirement co

From the following figures, which were generated from the containment model rerun, the volume entering
the ice condenser can be estimated during the blowdown period (0, to ~23 seconds, Figure A). During
this period, the t

Figure B shows the flow to the ice condenser as calculated by the model for the 50 second to 600 second
time period. An estimate of the volume entering the ice condenser during this period was not made. The
figure is inclu

References:

**IMONSTERCOS:
3. MONSTER, Software ID 382303. User Manual R3 (D01930302020 Z ANKLING FLH, SORWARD ILL**
And African TVA-F.10000

3. MONSTER Input file - Fllekeepor Reference Number 263082

 P_{reduced} , R_{reduced} , R_{reduced} , R_{reduced}

Figure A

 $T'T - R \neq 1$ Appendix & Certin وی در Prepared Liter

Part Right of The Party Checked:

Figure B

Appendix D - Ice Weight Reduction Impact

Revision 16 incorporated EDC 50951A, which reduced the ice weight in containment. This impacts the iodine removal efficiencies for this calculation. As a result of this, the iodine removal efficiencies found in ref. 44 are used in place of the old values found in ref. 15. It was found that the previous values found in Revision 15 were conservative and bounded the results in Revision 16, and thus are still acceptable. Therefore successors to this calculation will not need to be revised. The following are the iodine removal efficiencies used in the STP model:

Table 2a Iodine removal efficiencies.

Note: This table is the equivalent of Table 2 on page 15.

* Lambda = (F/V) *eff = (40,000 cfm/1.27E6 cuft)(60 min/hr)(eff) = 1.89*eff [hr⁻¹]

The following is a comparison of the results for the 100% tritium airborne case. The R16 column results use the values in the above table and are less than or equal to the doses found in R15. Only the one case was ran as it was the bounding case in R15.

Appendix E EGTS Exhaust and Recirculation Rates and old R17 Results

This appendix is to archive the old EGTS exhaust and recirculation rates. These flows are based on the old Revision 17 models. The initial conditions are for the annulus to start at -5" H20, one train of EGTS operation, and no single failure of any controllers or component in the system and 250 cfm steady state EGTS exhaust. R18 if the calculation assumes EGTS is running abnormally, so as to encompass all possible failure modes.

Revision 17 Table 3 EGTS Flow Rates

*required to maintain annulus pressure when assuming 250 cfm annulus inleakage, ref.19

Note: The annulus exhaust rates from TI-ANL-166 (ref.19) are based on total EGTS flow of 3600 cfm (=4000-10%). This is conservative as it minimizes cleanup of the annulus environment via EGTS filters.

Revision 17 EGTS performance curves:

Revision 17 Results (with EGTS operating correctly and initial -5" H20 annulus pressure)

i.

APPENDIX F - Modified **ABSCE** Boundary of **DCN 52283-A**

The purpose of this appendix is to address changes in the ABSCE boundary identified as part of DCN 52283-A. In order to complete Watts Bar Unit 2, a construction access opening needs to be created in the Unit 2 reactor building concrete wall. This requires the definition of an interim ABSCE that does not include the Unit 2 reactor building (Ref. 49).

The total ABSCE volume enclosed when one unit's containment with one annulus and Condensate Demineralized Waste Evaporator (CDWE) are added to that of the Auxiliary Building (Ref. 52) is:

Auxiliary Building (net free volume) = 3.5×10^6 ft³ One Containment (net free volume) = 1.27×10^6 ft³ One Annulus (net free volume) = 3.96×10^5 ft³ CDWE (net free volume) = 5.1433×10^4 ft³

Additionally, Door A-77 at elevation 713.0 in the auxiliary building becomes a pressure and security barrier and needs to be sealed:

The volume from elevation 713.0 not within the interim ABSCE is approximately

a) $(4.69 \times 10^2 \text{ ft}^2) \cdot (24 \text{ ft}) = 1.13 \times 10^4 \text{ ft}^3$

This was calculated using dimensions from Ref. 54 and a building height of 24 ft for the building provided in Ref. 52, Appendix A.

Also as part of the ABSCE redefinition, the west wall of room 757.0-A14 in the auxiliary building becomes the revised boundary. Door Al 57 is sealed and locked. With use of the Unit 2 reactor building equipment hatch during construction, room 757.0-A15 in the auxiliary building can either be within or outside the interim ABSCE boundary.

To correctly estimate the volume of the interim ABSCE boundary under both conditions, calculations were performed that included and excluded the equipment hatch enclosure volume from the ABSCE.

The volume from room 757.0-A14 not within the interim ABSCE is approximately

a) $(1.01 \times 10^3 \text{ ft}^2) \cdot (25 \text{ ft}) = 2.73 \times 10^4 \text{ ft}^3.$

The volume from room 757.0-Al5 is approximately

b) $(1.17 \times 10^3 \text{ ft}^2) \cdot (25 \text{ ft}) = 2.93 \times 10^4 \text{ ft}^3$.

The areas for both rooms were calculated using dimensions from Ref. 53 and a building height of 25 ft was provided in Ref. 52, Appendix A.

The volume of the revised auxiliary building is either:

a) 3.5×10^6 ft³ – [1.13 x 10⁴ ft³ + 2.73 x 10⁴ ft³] = 3.46 x 10⁶ ft³ including room 757.0-A15.

b) $3.5 \times 10^6 \text{ ft}^3 - [1.13 \times 10^4 \text{ ft}^3 + 2.73 \times 10^4 \text{ ft}^3 + 2.93 \times 10^4 \text{ ft}^3] = 3.43 \times 10^6 \text{ ft}^3 \text{ not including } 757.0 \text{-A15}.$

The volume of the revised ABSCE boundary is either:

a) $(3.46 + 1.27 + 0.396 + 0.051) \times 10^6 \text{ ft}^3 = 5.18 \times 10^6 \text{ ft}^3$ including room 757.0-A15.

b) $(3.43 + 1.27 + 0.396 + 0.051) \times 10^6 \text{ ft}^3 = 5.15 \times 10^6 \text{ ft}^3$ not including 757.0-A15.

The new total enclosed volume of the ABSCE is as much as 1.73×10^6 ft³ less than the original which contained two containments and two annuli (Ref. 52, Section 7.1).

The applied effective auxiliary building volume of 1.62×10^5 ft³ (see *Assumptions & Data* section, pg 11) is conservatively bounding for both the auxiliary building volume of 3.5×10^6 ft³ and the smallest possible auxiliary building volume of 3.43 x 10⁶ ft³ resulting from DCN 52283-A. Thus, the offsite doses calculated are still appropriate for use while the ABSCE boundary is modified.

This Appendix added by Revision 19.

Appendix G Evaluation of the EGTS Flow Rates (8000+10% vs. 8000-10%)

This appendix is to compare the EGTS flow of 8000+10%=8800 cfm total flow to 8000-10%=7200 cfm total flow. The main text contains the 7200 cfm case. The 8800 cfm case utilizes the following flow profiles from TI-ANL-166 (ref.19)

Table 3 EGTS Performance with Annulus Initially at 0" H20 (ref. 19: TI-ANL-166) 2 train EGTS 8800 cfm

Time Interval		Time Interval		Recirculation	Rate	Exhaust Rate	
[sec]	[sec]	[hours]	[hours]	[cfm]	[cfh]	[cfm]	[cfh]
$\mathbf{0}$	30	Ω	0.0083	$\mathbf 0$	$0.00E + 00$	$\bf{0}$	$0.00E + 00$
30	39	0.0083	0.0108	8800	5.28E+05	0	$0.00E + 00$
39	40	0.0108	0.0111	8033.96	$4.82E + 05$	766.04	$4.60E + 04$
40	41	0.0111	0.0114	5750.1	3.45E+05	3049.9	$1.83E + 0.5$
41	42	0.0114	0.0117	3189.48	1.91E+05	5610.52	3.37E+05
42	43	0.0117	0.0119	886.35	5.32E+04	7913.65	4.75E+05
43	71	0.0119	0.0197	$\mathbf 0$	$0.00E + 00$	8800	5.28E+05
71	80	0.0197	0.0222	5647	3.39E+05	3153	1.89E+05
80	81	0.0222	0.0225	5820	3.49E+05	2980	$1.79E + 05$
81	82	0.0225	0.0228	5804.2	3.48E+05	2995.8	1.80E+05
82	102	0.0228	0.0283	5664	3.40E+05	3136	$1.88E + 05$
102	132	0.0283	0.0367	5416	3.25E+05	3384	$2.03E + 05$
132	165	0.0367	0.0458	5259	3.16E+05	3541	$2.12E + 0.5$
165	169	0.0458	0.0469	5219	3.13E+05	3581	2.15E+05
169	210	0.0469	0.0583	5259	3.16E+05	3541	$2.12E + 0.5$
210	307	0.0583	0.0853	5550	$3.33E + 05$	3250	$1.95E + 0.5$
307	498	0.0853	0.1383	6301	3.78E+05	2499	1.50E+05
498	602	0.1383	0.1672	6986	4.19E+05	1814	1.09E+05
602	603	0.1672	0.1675	7168.4	4.30E+05	1631.6	9.79E+04
603	850	0.1675	0.2361	4597	2.76E+05	1534	9.20E+04
850	1100	0.2361	0.3056	4694	$2.82E + 05$	1437	8.62E+04
1100	1350	0.3056	0.3750	4791	2.87E+05	1340	$8.04E + 04$
1350	1600	0.3750	0.4444	-4888	2.93E+05	1243	7.46E+04
1600	1850	0.4444	0.5139	4985	$2.99E + 05$	1146	$6.88E + 04$
1850	2100	0.5139	0.5833	5082	3.05E+05	1049	$6.29E + 04$
2100	7200	0.5833	2.0000	5174	3.10E+05	957	5.74E+04
7200	30 days	2.0000	30days	3584	2.15E+05	694	4.16E+04

Results

2 train 7200 cfm

2 train 8800 cfm 2-Hr **EAB**

30-Day LPZ

30-Day LPZ

Discussion

As can be seen the 7200 cfm EGTS case is slightly higher than the 8800 cfm case. This is primarily due to the increased time to establish a negative pressure in the annulus and increased time to pump it down.

Appendix H Evaluation of Operator Action Time (1 Hour vs. 2 Hour)

This appendix is to evaluate the operator action time. As noted in Appendix F, the failure to perform an operator action could result in significant increases in offsite doses. This appendix evaluates a reasonable time frame for operator action. The main text uses a 1 hour time operator action. The 7200 cfm EGTS STP model is modified to have an operator action time at 2 hours instead of 1. The results (rem) were:

2-Hr EAB

30-Day LPZ

30-Day LPZ

Discussion:

The difference between an operator action of 1 hour or 2 hours is very small (about 1% maximum). The 1 hour action will result in slightly higher doses, therefore it should be used as the design basis of the plant. The window for operator action should be between 1 and 2 hours.

Appendix **I** - Evaluation of singe EGTS train operation with 250 cfm exhaust

Calculation WBNNAL3-028 R4 determined the offsite and control room doses due to a single EGTS train (one train has a single failure) with a Technical Specification annulus leakage of 250 cfm steady state at -0.5" H20. The following is the pertinent parts of the calculation that still apply to this analysis.

Assumptions

2. It is assumed that the annulus is at atmospheric pressure (0 inches H20) at the start of the LOCA. Technical Justification: This is the basis for this calculation.

Special Requirements/Limiting Conditions

There are no special requirements or limiting conditions in this calculation.

Calculations

The isotope releases are determined by STP. Except for the initial containment leakage and the EGTS recirculation and exhaust flows, the model is the same as the final ABSCE STP model found in TI-RPS-197. The EGTS flows are taken from TI-ANL-166 and are shown in Table 1. Since the annulus starts out at positive pressure (>0.25" H20), the containment leakage that normally goes to the annulus will instead go directly to the environment. The TI-RPS-197 flow split is 75% to the annulus and 25% to the Auxiliary Building. Since the ABGTS has not started up (until 4 minutes), the entire leakage goes to the environment. The containment flow split is therefore modeled as "F 260 1.0". This condition lasts for 114 seconds post LOCA. After 114 seconds, the annulus differential pressure falls below -0.25" (see TI-ANL-166). The containment flow split is reset to the 75% split to the annulus (and 25% split to the environment) at this time. The LPZ doses are calculated by using the computer code FENCDOSE. The activity released to the environment during the time intervals 0-2 hours, 2-8 hours, 8-24 hours, 24-96 hours, and 96-720 hours is taken directly from the STP results. The dispersion coefficients (X/O) are taken from TI-RPS-197.

The control room operator doses are determined by COROD utilizing the STP results as input. The COROD model comes from TI-RPS-198, with the recirculation rates corrected.

TRIA

Table 1 EGTS Flow Rates

*required to maintain annulus pressure when assuming 250 cfm annulus inleakage

Note: The annulus exhaust rates from TI-ANL-166 are based on total EGTS flow of 3600 cfm (=4000-10%). This is conservative as it minimizes cleanup of the annulus environment via EGTS filters

Results

The Co

Offsite Doses (rem):

Discussion and Conclusion

The offsite doses calculated are below the 1OCFR100 limits of 25 rem gamma, 300 rem beta, 300 rem thyroid and 25 rem TEDE. The control room operator doses are below the 1OCFR50 App.A GDC 19 limits of **5** rem gamma, 30 rem beta, 30 rem thyroid, and 5 rem TEDE. The doses determined in the main text (EGTS PCO control loop single failure case) bound except for the thyroid and 2-hr **EAB** TEDE doses.

Appendix J: Unit 2 PCO Control Loop Single Failure

The Unit 2 PCO Control Loop Single Failure evaluation only used the bounding Unit 1 models (7200 cfm EGTS flow, **I** hr operator action). The models were the same except for the EGTS flows (case 3-2 taken from TI-ANL-166, ref. 19).

Table 3a EGTS Performance with Annulus Initially at 0" H20 (ref.19: TI-ANL-166) 2 train EGTS 7200 cfm for Unit 2 and 1 hour operator action

After 603 sec, total flow is 5737+832= 6596 cfrn for 2 trains and 3455+604=4059 cfm for 1 train based on steady state flow calculation reference 58. This reduces the recirculation cleanup and increases effective releases.

The following is the EGTS performance curve from TI-ANL-166 (ref.19) With Initial Annulus Pressure at 0" H20 for Unit 2:

This is the EGTS profile as modeled for Unit 2. The above curve is modified at 602 sec to have constant flows (see assumptions 22 and 23):

Discussion and Conclusion

The Unit 2 LOCA with a PCO control loop single failure does not exceed the IOCFR 100 limits. The dose consequences of the Unit 2 LOCA with PCO control loop single failure are bounded by the Unit 1 LOCA with PCO control loop single failure.

Attachment A

 $P.A.$ Attachment A $T1 - RP5 - 197$ **TI-RPS-197** Westinghouse **Water Reactor** Nuclear Technology Division **Electric Corporation Divisions** Bei 355
Pittsburgh Pennsylvania 15230 ΞB February 21, 1985 **TVA** Contract #71C62-54114-1
WAT-D-6420 Mr. J. A. Raulston
Chief Nuclear Engineer NS-OPLS-OPL-85-073 یا Tennessee Valley Authority S.O. WAT/NBT-4705 400 W. Simmit Hill Drive, W10 C126
Knoxville, Tennessee 37902 Jeff Schrener horn Knoxville, Tennessee $7/4$ **SQUAD CHECKS** Dear Mr. Raulston: **D PULL REVIEW**
D REVIEW STEEPIC ASTECTS TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY **DIND REVIEW** WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT \overline{a} . UNITS NUMBERS 1 AND 2 ICE CONDENSER TODINE REMOVAL EFFICIENCY

The attached reference table (15.5-7) was calculated to show the Ice Condenser Todine Removal Efficiency for an ice veight of 2.125 x 10 pounds. The current Watts Bar FSAR Table 15.5-7 was calculated with an ice weight of

After you have reviewed the preceding, please contact Larry Tomasic at 412 + 374-4715 with any questions or comments.

Very truly yours,

L. V. Tomasic/pj Attachment

J. A. Raulston, 3L, 3A

cc: L. M. Mills, 1L, 1A J Larkin, 1L I. R. Williamson, IL
R. G. Williams 11

Clichie Hen General Tennessee Valley Authority Projects

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 $T2 - RP5 - 117$

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WATTS BAR (CALCULATIONS FOR ICE WEIGHT OF 2.125 X 10⁶ POUNDS)

TV A

REFERENCE TABLE (15.5-7)

ICE CONDENSER IODINE REMOVAL EFFICIENCY⁽¹⁾

(1) The ice condenser removal efficiencies given in the above table are used The second conservative Regulatory Cuide 1.4 analyses. The inlet steam-air
mixture coming into the ice condenser is greater than 90 percent steam by
volume initially due to the delaying of the operation of the deck fans.
W removal efficiencies would be reduced.

TI-Result

JAN 2 7 1995

Attachment Q

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January 27, 1995

950127 962 T 88

Walter L. Elliott, IOB 1A-WBN

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (FSAR) UPDATE -DISPERSION METEOROLOGY FOR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS

This replaces the January 24, 1995, (RIMS T33 950124 950) memorandum to correct information that was previously provided related to the request for additional information from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for their environmental review. A sypographical error has been corrected in Attachment 1. Attachment 2 is unchanged.

If you have any questions, please call Doyle Pittman at 8097-C.

Remedi & Rowting

f * / Frances P. Weatherford **Team Leader** Operations Support Atmospheric Sciences CEB 2A-M

DEP:JA

cc(Attachments): M. C. Berg, IOB 1F-WBN J. M. Loney, WT 8C-K V. J. Shanks, MOB 2U-WBN D. J. Voeller, MOB IF-WBN K.G. Wastrack, CEB 2A-M Files, Center, CEB 1B-M

 $-$
 $52 - 52$
 -1775 lnk Attachment 1

Atmospheric Dispersion Factors χ/Q , see/m³, for Design Basis Accident Analyses Based on Onsite
Meteorological Data for Watts Bar Naclear Plant

A. Based on Meteorological Data from 1974-88 (Section B of Table 2.3-66 in WBN FSAR)

B. Based on Meteorological Data from 1974-93

 $1/27/95$

 $0.53 - 52$ P_{12} /27/ Attachment 2

Dispersion Mcteorology - Onsite 10-meter Wind Data - 5th Percentile Values of Inverse Wind Speed (1/u) Distributions for Control Room Dose Calculations for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

A. January 1974 through December 1988 Wind Speed and Direction Data (Section B of Table 2.3-67 in WBN FSAR)

B. January 1974 through December 1995 Wind Speed and Direction Data

1/27/95

Attachment C

 $T3 - R95 - 147$ Attachments 822 $T33$ 950110

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Westinghouse Electric Corporation

Energy Systems

Nutiae) and Advanced
Technology Division

851 185 P.SSO.No.PENGSYNENIE 15230-0355 NTD-NSRLA-OPL-95-012 January 10, 1995

Mr. W.L. Ellion Manager of Engineering Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant Tennessee Valley Authority IOB-1A, P.O. Box 2000 Spring City, TN 37381

 $Npd-$

Attention: Steve Robertson

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WATTS BAR UNITS 1 & 2 Ice Condenser Iodine Removal Efficiency **ESAR Table 15.5-7**

Dear Mr. Elliott:

In response to your request, the attachment addresses the applicability of the subject table to the removal of both elemental iodine and particulate lodine.

If you have any questions, please contact the undersigned.

Very truly yours,

I cutter a. Homet for J. W. Irons, Manager

TVA Watts Bar Project

LVT/bbp

Attachments

ce: Mr. S. L. Robertson, IL

MSRIAM SLOVANO

TI-APS-1971 Attachment & Gentlemand)

 $\rho: G \to F$ Felo HAMA $\frac{1}{2}$

Attachment To WAT-D-9902

ICE CONDENSER IODINE REMOVAL EFFICIENCY

Purpose

The ice condenser iodine removal efficiencies provided in the FSAR (Table: 15.5-7, attached) were used in the LBLOCA offsite dose calculation for both elemental and particulate iodina removal. However, these efficiencies are applicable only to elemental iodine. TVA has asked if the use of the referenced efficiencies for both elemental and particulate removal is conservative in light of the overall iodine removal conservatism that exists in the dose calculation.

Evaluation

Following a LBLOCA, indine may be removed from the containment atmosphere by the ice condenser, containment sprays, and by deposition or impection on internal containment surfaces. Of these, only lodine removal by the ice condenser is currently assumed in the TVA lodine release/offsite dose calculation. The table that follows compares the overall elemental and particulate iodine removal coefficients (hr³) approximated for only the ice condenser and with the combined effects of the ice condenser and containment spray and the overall decontamination factor (DF).

The overall lodine removal coefficient is the numeric average of the initial Ė. and final coefficients.

The elemental and particulate DFs are based on 49 min of iodine removal. $2.$

Ice and spray lodine removal is consistent with current Standard Review Plan $3.$ recommendations. The ice condenser elemental iodine removal efficiency is a constant 30%. The particulate iodine removal efficiency is 0.

$TT - RPS - 117$

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Results

Both the lambdas and DFs for Iodine removal by only the ice condenser are less than the corresponding values for the combined effect of Ice and spray removal of iodine,

Conclusion

TVA's use of the FSAR ice condenser iodine removal coefficients for both elemental and particulate iodine is conservative.

 $\sim 10^{-10}$

 $\label{eq:2} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\sum_{i=1}^n\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\sum_{j=1}^n\frac{1}{j!}\sum_{j=1}^n\frac{1}{j!}\sum_{j=1}^n\frac{1}{j!}\sum_{j=1}^n\frac{1}{j!}\sum_{j=1}^n\frac{1}{j!}\sum_{j=1}^n\frac{1}{j!}\sum_{j=1}^n\frac{1}{j!}\sum_{j=1}^n\frac{1}{j!}\sum_{j=1}^n\frac{1}{j!}\sum_{j=1}^n\frac{1}{j!}\sum_{j=1}^n\frac{1}{j!}\sum_{j=1}^$

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Attachment E

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CALCULATE LEAR RATE:

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Q = \left(\frac{PI}{T1} - \frac{PI}{T1}\right) \times \frac{V}{\frac{at}{4.00125}}
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WHERE:

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ACTUAL LEAK RATE
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CALCULATE LEAK RATE:

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Q = \left(\frac{P\dot{1}}{T\dot{1}} - \frac{Pf}{T\dot{r}}\right) \times \frac{V}{4\dot{r}(4.00125)}
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Attachment 15 (Located on Attached OSM)

Met files used in the ARCON96 X/Q calculations

Metwbnp1976.dat Metwbnp1977.dat Metwbnp1978.dat Metwbnp1979.dat Metwbnp1980.dat Metwbnp1981.dat Metwbnp1982.dat Metwbnp1983.dat Metwbnp1984.dat Metwbnp1985.dat Metwbnp1986.dat Metwbnp1987.dat Metwbnpl 988.dat Metwbnp1989.dat Metwbnp1990.dat Metwbnp1991.dat Metwbnp1992.dat Metwbnp1993.dat

Attachment 16

1976 TVA Report

Impingement at Watts Bar Steam Plant

6387

IMPINGEMIENT AT WATTS BAR **STEAM PLANT**

Watts Bar Steam Plant, TVA's first fuel-burning electric power plant, is located on the right bank of the Tennessee River (Tennessee River Mile 529.2) near the upper end of Chickamauga Reservoir about 1,036 meters downstream of Watts Bar Dam (Figures 1 and 2). The four-unit plant, rated at 240,000 kW total capacity with a 280,000 gpm condenser cooling water requirement, became fully operational in April 1945. Although the plant operated on base load during much of its early history, it currently operates as a peaking plant.

Physical Data

Pumping Station - The intake screen house for the circulating water supply system is continuous with the upstream face of the service bay at the Watts Bar hydroplant and contains six intake openings at **900** to the axis of the dam. Each of the six $18.3m^2$ intake openings is equipped with a steel trashrack 6.3 meters high by 2.9 meters wide. The trashrack bars are 12.70 cm wide by 0.95 cm thick and are spaced 7.52 cm on centers. Following the trashracks, the water passes through the vertical traveling screens. These are made of 0.61 by 1.83 meter screen panels interlocked and attached to chains operating.between sprockets at the bottom and drive sprockets supported on the intake deck. These panels are made of 12-gauge galvanized wire with 0.95-cm (3/8 inch) mesh openings.

Circulating water for the condensers is supplied by gravity from the Watts Bar Reservoir through a conduit system approximately 1,036 meters long. The circulating water supply system is designed to produce a maximum flow through from condensers of 17.67 cubic meters per second (624 cfs) when the Watts Bar Reservoir is at elevation 733 (ft) and the tailwater at the steam plant discharge is at elevation

699, a gross head of 10.36 meters. With this flow through the six screens, there is a calculated velocity throug-the trashracks of 25.60 cm/sec (.83 fps).

Biological Data

1. Sampling methods

Samples were collected weekly between August 8, 1974, and May 29, 1975, as follows: at the beginning of the sample period **(1,100** hours, Wednesday), all traveling screens were simultaneously rotated and washed clean of fish and debris. Twenty-four hours later, the screens were washed individually, and the impinged fish were collected in a catch basket installed in the screen was sluiceway. All individuals were separated by species into 25 mm length categories and counted. Total weights (grams) for each length class were recorded.

2. Results

Below are listed (Table **1)** the total number of each of the 19 species collected from the 33 samples taken at Watts Bar Steam Plant during the sampling period August 8, 1974 through May 29, 1975. Seventy-three percent of the total 2,130 fish collected.were shad. The remaining 16 nonshad species which totaled 575 individuals were impinged at an average rate of 17.4 fish per sample.

Since sampling was done on a fixed schedule, independent of plant operation, the average number of screens counted per twenty-four hour sample is assumed to approximate the average number of screens in operation per day throughout the entire sampling period. In addition, the average number of fish collected per sample through the 10-month sampling period is assumed to approximate the average daily impingement for that period. Since Watts Bar is a peaking plant there were several sampling dates on which the plant was not in operation. The percent

2

of time the plant was not operating on the sampling days (30.3%) is assumed to approximate the percent of time the plant did not operate during the entire 10-month sampling period. Extrapolating the average impingement counts per sample for the number of days the plant presumably operated during the 10-month period August 1974 - May 1975 and will operate during June and July 1975 yields the estimated annual numbers (Table 2) and biomass (Table 3) impinged.

Figure 3 depicts the total number of fish impinged during each of the thirtythree 24-hour samples. The greatest number of fish for a single sample (438) occurred on March 27, 1975, in which 79.9 percent were threadfin shad.

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Table 2. Estimated Annual Number of Fish Impinged at **Watts** Bar Steam Plant (Plant Operating 69.7 Percent **r)T .he** Time)

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Table 3. Estimated Annual Biomass (kg) of Fish Impinged at Watts Bar Steam Plant (Plant Operating 69.7 Percent of the Time)

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Discussion and Conclusion

Only five of the samples contained more than 100 fish during the sampling period (August 8, 1974, to May 29, 1975). Of the 16 non-shad species collected only bluegill (7.1 per sample) and drum (7.0 per sample) were impinged at an average rate exceeding one individual per 24 hours.

Because Watts Bar.is a peaking plant and is of comparatively low generating capacity, its eooling water requirement is low resulting in a low total annual volume of water passed through the plant. These factors undoubtedly account for the low impingement at this plant. Based on the results of this study, we conclude that the impingement of fish at Watts Bar Steam Plant does not constitute an adverse enYironmental impact to the fish population of Watts Bar Reservoir.

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 $\label{eq:2} \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{1}{2} \sum_{j=1}^n \frac{1}{$

Attachment 17

Table 3-7

Total Numbers of Each Native Mussel Species Collected During Preoperational (1983-1994) and Operational (1996-1997) Surveys Near Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

Table 3-7. Total numbers of each native mussel species collected during preoperational (1983-1994) and operational (1996-1997)
surveys near Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.

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Attachment 18

Appendix A-2

Results of 14 Native Mussel Surveys at 12 Sites in the Vicinity of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, 1983-1997

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Appendix A-2. Results of 14 native mussel surveys at 12 sites in the vicinity of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, 1983-1997.

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Appendix A-2. (Continued)

TRM 520-521		Length				Height		Thickness			
and Year 1986	N	Mean	Min	Max	Mean	Min	Max	Mean	Min	Max	
Actinonaias ligamentina	4	94.93	91.3	97,5	68.15	65.3	71.6	46.03	40.3	53.8	
Amblema plicata	5	102.18	90.3	112.9	72.96	66.4	78.2	44.38	39.3	52.1	
Anodonta grandis	2	123,05	119.4	126.7	70.00	63.3	76.7	47.05	43,4	50.7	
Anodonta imbecillis		39,20	39.2	39.2	17.40	17.4	17.4	7,10	7.1	7.1	
Cyclonaias tuberculata	72	72.03	56.9	85.1	61.53	47.6	76.6	34,82	23.7	44.9	
Ellipsaria lineolata	15	73.42	51.8	86.9	54.71	39.2	65.3	30.81	22.6	42.0	
Ellintio crassidens	100	105.59	87.2	151.8	64.88	55,9	82.5	40.83	31.1	51.4	
Elliptio dilatata		109.40	109.4	109.4	45.50	45.5	45.5	39.90	39,9	39.9	
Lampsilis abrupta	41	98.43	86.1	104.7	72.45	66.3	80.7	50.15	48.3	52.2	
Lampsilis ovata		139.10	139.1	139.1	90,30	90.3	90.3	55.90	55.9	55.9	
Lasmigona costata		122.10	122.1	122.1	69.90	69.9	69.9	25.50	25.5	25.5	
Ligumia recta	7	133.40	107.7	150.2	51.84	45.0	55.9	40.80	33.1	48.6	
Megalonaias nervosa	3	148,97	146.9	150.3	102,27	97.6	109.3	57.37	53.9	63.2	
Pieurobema cordatum	94	88.69	54.9	109.6	70.34	49.7	88.5	42.39	25.2	54.6	
Potamilus alatus	11	127.29	93.4	144.9	84.49	67.9	95.8	32.73	26.8	40.0	
Ouadrula metanevra	9	69.98	54.9	80.9	54.79	42.4	64.3	37.06	31.0	42.4	
Quadrula pustulosa	17	48.40	38,2	55.9	45,26	37.2	52.8	27.30	20.5	35.7	

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Appendix A-2. (Continued)

TRM 520-521		Length				Height		Thickness		
and Year 1988	N	Mean	Min	Max	Mean	Min	Max	Mean	Min	Max
Actinonaias ligamentina	$\mathbf{2}$	93.00	90.9	95.1	71.65	71.3	72.0	49.35	47.6	51.1
Amblema plicata	12	97.95	73.2	115.3	72.45	53.0	86.1	43.01	33.3	52.1
Anodonta grandis	3	101.60	81.7	119.9	59.83	53.6	65.3	44,00	34.5	50.4
Cyclonaias tuberculata	50	75.88	64.3	88.6	64.96	55.2	75.2	38.08	32.2	44.9
Ellipsaria lineolata	9	79,49	65.1	100.0	59.98	47.5	70.6	37.53	32.7	50.3
Elliptio crassidens	52	104.08	92.4	124.5	66.17	60.1	84.9	42.50	34.1	50.7
Elliptio dilatata		96.80	96.8	96.8	45.40	45.4	45.4	26.90	26.9	26.9
Lampsilis ovata		110.70	110.7	110.7	76.90	76.9	76,9	61.80	61.8	61.8
Ligumia recta	2	156.05	144.4	167.7	57.45	54.2	60.7	48.65	44.4	52.9
Megalonaias nervosa	$\frac{1}{2}$	155.25	144.2	170.2	109.25	100.8	117.2	59.88	53.3	65,6
Pleurobema cordatum	52	91.03	68.5	110.1	73.16	54,9	83.6	46.47	38.2	54.8
Potamilus alatus	10	132.07	114.9	151.0	96.46	76.3	113.4	39.75	34.4	48.3
Ouadrula metanevra	$6 \mid$	80.70	66.7	92.1	63.15	54,2	70.1	43.43	38.4	47.3
Ouadrula pustulosa	51	57.08	52.2	68.8	52.20	46.9	61.3	34.66	31.3	37.3
Tritogonia verrucosa	3	101.07	91.8	109.4	55.10	50.5	57.4	27.93	23,2	34.0

Appendix A-2. (Continued)

Quadrula pustulosa

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Appendix A-2. (Continued)

TRM 520-521		Length				Height		Thickness		
and Years 1983-1997	N	Mean	Min	Max	Mean	Min	Max	Mean	Min	Max
Actinonaias ligamentina	16	99.43	90.9	112.3	72.23	65.3	80.1	49.66	40.3	54.9
Anbiema plicata	44	97.36	73.2	125.4	71.11	52.4	87,2	42.46	26.7	54.8
<u>Anodonta grandis</u>	7	116.96	81.7	136.3	68,73	53.6	84.9	47.76	34.5	57.2
Anodonta imbecillis	$\mathbf{3}$	47.90	39.2	52.5	22.30	17.4	24.8	11.90	7.1	14.3
Cyclonaias tuberculata	556	75.83	56.9	111.0	64.66	47.6	92.1	37.61	23.7	49.8
Cyprogenia stegaria	3	54.07	51.6	57.7	52.23	49.7	55.6	38.83	36.0	44.1
<u>Dromus dromas</u>	ı	60.10	60.1	60.1	58.30	58.3	58.3	32.80	32.8	32.8
<u>Ellipsaria lineolata</u>	112	79.78	51.8	105.5	60.54	39.2	75.1	36.80	22.6	52.6
Elliptio crassidens	727	105.54	87.2	151.8	65.89	53.7	88.6	42.08	21.0	60.9
Elliptio dilatata	8	102.20	95.4	113.3	44.42	41.0	48.8	31.81	26.9	39.9
<u>Lampsilis abrupta</u>	10 ¹	95.94	82,3	110.6	70.10	60.7	80.7	49.74	43.4	60.4
<u>Lampsilis ovata</u>	7	120.07	102.1	139.1	82.83	72.9	92.3	62.01	55.9	69.4
Lasmigona costata	1	122.10	122.1	122.1	69.90	69.9	69.9	25.50	25.5	25.5
<u>Lentodea fracilis</u>	4	85.67	59.6	110.4	54.50	34.6	72.6	30.48	20.1	39.2
<u>Ligumia recta</u>	24	147.75	107.7	170.2	56.85	45,0	63.4	45.05	33.1	52.9
Megalonaias nervosa	13	160.78	144.2	182.1	109.98	97.6	120.6	58.48	52.4	69.0
Obliquaria reflexa	7	46.50	36.5	52.7	34.72	24.1	41.6	26.83	22.9	33.9
Pleurobema cordatum	586	90.78	54.9	117.2	72.00	44.7	92.3	44.50	25.2	59.8
Pieurobema oviforme	1	72.90	72.9	72.9	56.50	56.5	56.5	40.20	40.2	40.2
Pleurobema plenum	3	59.43	51.3	68.9	56.10	49.4	66.0	41.47	36.4	48.6
Pleurobema rubrum		80.70	80.7	80.7	64,30	64.3	64.3	44.50	44.5	44.5
Potamilus alatus	87	129.80	46.9	160.0	92.11	60.1	120.9	39.49	26.8	139.8
Ptychobranchus fasciolaris	\mathbf{I}	94.40	94.4	94.4	56.70	56.7	56.7	34.80	34,8	34.8
Ouadrula metanevra	63	74.52	54.9	92.1	58.85	42.4	70.3	41.10	31.0	50.6
Quadrula pustulosa	186	52.89	38.2	74.1	49.94	37.2	64.3	31.68	20.5	45.6
Tritogonia verrucosa	$\bf{8}$	99.40	76.7	116.3	54.16	42.7	60.9	29.87	19.7	36.1

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Appendix A-2. (Continued)

TRM 526-527		Length				Height		Thickness		
and Year 1986	N	Mean	Min	Max	Mean	Min	Max	Mean	Min	Max
Amblema plicata	27	97.68	66.7	121.4	69.54	50.6	84.9	44.09	26.8	57.4
Anodonta grandis	8	125.85	80.9	147.8	70.95	50.7	82.0	52.32	35.1	63.2
Cyclonaias tuberculata	17	79.26	63,2	96.7	67.04	55.9	80.2	39.89	33.1	51.0
Ellipsaria lineolata	7	96.04	83.6	112.3	70,80	61.5	78.2	43.99	34.1	52.5
Elliptio crassidens	105	113.05	92.3	145.2İ	68.73	59.1	87.1	43.35	35.1	54.1
Elliptio dilatata		107.10	107.1	107.1	50.00	50.0	50.0	35.40	35.4	35.4
Lampsilis abrupta		114.80	114.8	114.8	77.70	77.7	77.7	57.20	57.2	57.2
Lampsilis ovata		132.90	132.9	132.9	91.30	91.3	91.3	72.60	72.6	72.6
Leptodea fragilis	6	100.25	80.1	112.1	57.62	46.6	67.5	31.87	25.3	36.0
Ligumia recta	2	158.55	153.1	164.0	67,00	66.4	67.6	49.75	48.8	50.7
Megalonaias nervosa	$\overline{\mathbf{c}}$	145.80	124.6	167.0	103.25	87.2	119.3	58.35	57.0	59.7
Obliguaria reflexa	10 _l	55.84	46.6	66.7	44.39	34.1	52.4	34.92	25.7	41.2
Pleurobema cordatum	38	96.12	75.7	117.9	75.20	63.2	83.5	47,08	42.4	56.3
Potamilus alatus	38	142.16	79.8	174.0	90.65	56.7	112.8	40.22	26.7	57.9
Ouadrula metanevra		81.40	81.4	81.4	70.40	70.4	70.4	55.30	55.3	55,3
Ouadrula pustulosa	20	57.10	42.4	67.0	54.51	42.4	66.1	33.57	25.7	40.0
Tritogonia verrucosa	20	111.93	87.1	133.0	56,05	47.6	66.7	33,90	24.7	42.9

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Appendix A-2. (Continued)

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Appendix A-2. (Continued)

Three Bed Composite		Length			Height			Thickness		
and Year 1985	N	Mean	Min	Max	Mean	Min	Max	Mean	Min	Max
Actinonaias ligamentina	11	104.72	92.7	113.4	73.72	66.8	80.3	51.75	46.6	54.9
Amblema plicata	42	103.37	76.3	132.5	75.25	58.2	94.9	43.01	30.5	56.7
Anodonta grandis	10	123.14	107.9	142.6	69.63	60.9	80.4	48.76	40.7	58.7
Cyclonaias tuberculata	124	78.39	60.5	94.6	66.76	54.7	78.4	37.85	30.6	44.9
Cyprogenia stegaria	1	57.70	57,7	57.7	55.60	55.6	55.6	44.10	44.1	44.I
Ellipsaria lineolata	35	87.83	62.3	100.4	67.24	46.9	76.9	38.96	32.0	46.8
Elliptio crassidens	306	110.22	90.1	134.8	68.72	20.1	88.5	43.21	29.5	53.7
Elliptio dilatata	2	98.80	96.8	100.8	44.20	44.2	44.2	32.30	29.8	34.8
Lampsilis abrupta	8	101.94	82.3	113.3	74.21	64.4	81.1	55.61	43.5	64.4
<u>Lampsilis ovata</u>	9	127.36	114.0	142.0	84.03	70.0	103.4	62.70	57.3	70.2
Lasmigona complanata	ŀ	180.20	180.2	180.2	114.30	114.3	114.31	40.30	40.3	40.3
Leptodea fragilis	5	100.28	86.9	114.7	59.08	50,2	66,8	33.22	28.6	39.8
Ligumia recta	11	165.39	142.2	180.3	63.30	57.2	72.4	50.06	41.3	60.4
Megalonaias nervosa	5	173.70	160.1	190.8	115.26	102.3	121.1	59.66	52.4	71.4
Obliquaria reflexa	2	55.72	46.6	66.9	42.95	36.1	50.8	32.58	23.4	36.7
Pleuroberna cordatum	245	96.42	70.4	160.2	76.58	58.2	134.9	45.35	30.2	59.1
Pleurobema oviforme		72.90	72.9	72.9	56.50	56.5	56.5	40,20	40.2	40.2
Pleurobema plenum		84.60	84.6	84.6	70.20	70.2	70.2	50.60	50.6	50.6
Pleurobema rubrum	3	87.97	80.7	92.8	70.23	64.3	74.8	48.57	44.5	51.4
Potamilus alatus	77	139.79	98.0	170.2	100.29	76.5	125.6	39.87	28.4	49.6
Quadrula metanevra	16	78.07	67.3	88.9	61.94	56.1	70.3	42.39	36.8	54.2
Ouadrula pustulosa	138	57.98	46.3	80.5	54.91	32.1	68.8	34.83	25.7	44.2
Tritogonia verrucosa	19	124.66	92.3	148.8	61.46	40.6	72.0	39.86	34.0	48.7

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Enclosure 2

List of Regulatory Commitments

Tennessee Valley Authority Watts Bar Nuclear Plant - Unit 2, Docket No. 50-391

The first two buildings are in the Unit 1 FSAR; TVA will include all three buildings (the Old Steam Generator Storage Facility, Radwaste Pad, and Decon Building) in one of the next updates to the Unit 2 FSAR.

