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THE
PROTAGORAS OF PLATO

EDITED BY

B. D. TURNER, M.A.

SOMETIME FELLOW OF JESUS COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, AND
ASSISTANT-MASTER AT MARLBOROUGH COLLEGE

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ἐπιστήμας ὧς εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ὥσθ' ἅμα συμ-
βαίνειν εἶδέναι τε τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον.

ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΗΘ. ΕΥΔ. Α.

ὁ λέγων, ἔγνωκα αὐτόν, καὶ τὰς ἐντολάς αὐτοῦ μὴ τηρῶν,
ψεύστης ἔστι, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἡ ἀλήθεια οὐκ ἔστιν.

ΙΩΑΝΝΟΥ ΕΠ. ΚΑΘ. Α.

PREFACE

THE production of another English edition of Plato's *Protagoras* hardly, it is believed, needs apology. Mr. Wayte's edition is in itself an excellent one, and has also put within easy reach of any student the results of the labour expended by Heindorf upon the dialogue. But it professes to be in the main a "grammatical commentary," and to pay less attention to the subject matter.

Abroad, and especially in Germany, the dialogue has received far more attention, and the object of the present edition is partly to present the results to the English reader.

The *Protagoras* is one of the most attractive of the Platonic dialogues, and one specially suited to younger scholars. Heindorf remarks, *ab hoc potissimum (dialogo) incipiendam tironibus Platoniorum librorum lectionem iudico*: Bonitz says, "es für ein Unrecht ansehen würde, dies Meisterwerk Platons den Schülern des Gymnasiums vorzuenthalten": Westermayer refers to it as "ein solches Kleinod der Literatur dass ich sie jedem jungen

Manne als ein Vademecum auf den Weg des Lebens mitgeben möchte.”

As one of the “Socratic” dialogues of Plato, it aims especially at giving the “torpedo shock,” which breaks up the lifeless deposits of convention, and stirs the mind to rouse itself and to shake off the fatal effects of intellectual slumber. Now, as then, few exercises are better adapted for restoring or developing the mental activity than the careful analysis of the value of the terms which form the currency of our speech.

The books to which I have been most indebted in preparing the present edition are Grote’s *Plato*; the translations, with introduction, of Schleiermacher, Steinhart and Müller, and Jowett, the prolegomena of Steinhart being especially valuable; and the editions of Heindorf, Stallbaum, Hermann Sauppe, Kroschel, Deuschle and Cron, and Wayte. Sauppe’s edition, which has been translated, with some modifications, in America, is almost a model of what a school edition should be. I have also found the monographs of Schöne (*Ueber Platons Protagoras*) and Westermayer (*Der Protagoras des Plato*) suggestive.

In the text I have had the advantage of Schanz’s recensus, and I have added to the Introduction a short account of the MSS. of Plato, so far as they apply to our dialogue, drawn mainly from his *Studien zur Geschichte des Platonischen Textes* and his *Novae Commentationes Platonicae*. Wherever I have dissented

from his reading, and I have always done so with a feeling of presumption, it has been to return to the best supported text.

In dealing with grammatical difficulties I have mostly added references to the grammars consulted. No apology is needed for referring the learner to Jelf or Riddell, or to Mr. Thompson, whose *Syntax* is now a standard one. It may seem useless to have referred to Krueger's work, *Griechische Sprachlehre*; but it is cheap and has a most minute index, and its stores are available to any one possessing a very slight acquaintance with the German language. I regret that the enlarged edition of Goodwin's *Greek Moods and Tenses* came into my hands too late to be used throughout.

It will be found that a somewhat full Index has been provided. It is hoped that it may be of use in illustrating Platonic idioms apart from special reference to this dialogue. References have been verified in nearly every case, but undetected errors must exist, and the Editor will feel grateful to those who will be at pains to point them out.

B. D. TURNER.

MARLBOROUGH, *May* 1891.

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INTRODUCTION

§ 1. PROTAGORAS

FEW particulars of Protagoras' life are recoverable, and these are mostly the subjects of considerable discussion. ^{Incidents of his life.} He was born in Abdera, a town consisting largely of immigrants from Teos, who deserted their town to escape servitude to Persia, of a Tean family, his father's name being Artemon or Maeandrus. He spent a large portion of his life in travelling, "giving himself out to the whole of Greece as a Sophist" (349A). His excursions reached as far as Sicily. He appears to have paid his first visit to Athens in 451 B.C., where he became the friend of Pericles. In 445 or 443 B.C. he was commissioned by him to draw up a code of laws for the newly-founded settlement of Thurii. He was in Athens again before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, and the only considerable fragment of his writings extant is one preserved by Plutarch,¹ in which he commends the fortitude displayed by Pericles after the death of his two sons in the Great Plague. He was probably in Athens also in 422 B.C., for Eupolis (in the *Κόλακες*) alludes to him in a line quoted by Diog. Laert. ix. 54: *ἐνδοθι μὲν ἐστὶ*

¹ *Moral.* p. 118 E.

Πρωταγόρας ὁ Τήϊος. Being accused of impiety under the Four Hundred, on account of a passage¹ at the beginning of one of his works which acknowledged doubts as to the existence of the gods, he attempted to escape to Sicily, and was drowned on the voyage. He was seventy years of age at his death, and had been ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ forty years. The date ordinarily assigned to his death is 411 B.C., because (Diog. Laert. ix. 54) his accuser Pythodorus is said to have been "one of the Four Hundred," and this would put his birth-year at 481 B.C. Many authorities,² however, in view of the passage (317 C) in which he says that he is old enough to be the father of any one present (Socrates himself was born 468 B.C.) antedate his birth to 485 B.C. or earlier, in which case his death falls in 415 B.C. at the latest. Sauppe argues that the passage from Diogenes does not explicitly state that Pythodorus at the time was one of the Four Hundred, and that in 415 B.C. the Athenians were so excited by the mutilation of the Hermae as to be ready for an intolerant prosecution. But it would appear safer to take such definite statements in the natural meaning of the words, and rather to suppose that Plato has used an artist's license in widening the gap between the ages of Socrates and Protagoras.

His teaching.

Protagoras³ held similar views to those of Heraclitus, with whom Plato couples him in the *Theaetetus* (152 E), upon the constant change to which all things

¹ Diog. Laert. ix. 50.

² Schanz, 420-417 B.C., Cron, Sauppe.

³ Plato himself is our chief authority for Protagoras' opinions, and we cannot judge how far they have been modified by transmission through this medium. The passages quoted in the succeeding statement are all to be found in Ritter and Preller's invaluable collection.

are subject, and the consequent impossibility of knowledge. The only knowledge, such as it is, possible consisted of the information supplied by the senses, so that for each man things were what they seemed to him at any given time, and under any given circumstances to be. Thus about anything diametrically opposite opinions could be advanced, and every proposition was equally true or equally false. This being Protagoras' view, it is difficult to see how he could maintain the benefits or even the possibility of teaching. But a means for deserting a position which is repugnant to common sense was found in the somewhat illogical evasion, that although it is impossible to make any one's perceptions *truer* for him, he can be brought from a state of sickness to health, in which his perceptions (apparently as judged by the standard of convention) will be good and beneficial instead of the reverse.¹ This conversion Protagoras proposed to effect more particularly in reference to social and political life, offering to teach ἡ πολιτικὴ τέχνη, "how a man would best administer his own household, and how in the affairs of the city he would be most capable of acting and speaking."²

It was thus that rhetoric³ with its handmaid, Attention paid to rhetoric. grammar, was one of the chief subjects in which he gave instruction; and it was a natural sequel to his convictions that he should have elaborated a system of treating propositions indifferently from either side,⁴ a process which could not fail to render him liable to the charge of "making the worse argument appear the better" (τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν).⁵ He was one

¹ Plato, *Theaetetus*. 166 D, E.

² Plato, *Protagoras*. 318 E.

³ *Ibid.* 312 D, 334 E. ⁴ Diog. Laert. ix. 53. ⁵ Aristot. *Rhet.* ii. 24, 11.

of the first to teach for pay, and seems to have amassed a considerable fortune. Plato¹ at all events estimates him as a richer man than Pheidias. The original arrangement, however, by which he² left it to his pupil to fix his remuneration is sufficient to prove his honesty.

§ 2. OBJECT OF THE DIALOGUE

Title and object of the dialogue.

The title of the dialogue given in full is Πρωταγόρας ἡ σοφισταί, to which is added, after Thrasyllus,³ ἐνδεικτικός or “probative.” It need hardly be said that few critics believe such alternative titles to have come from the pen of Plato himself.⁴ In all probability they merely reflect the opinion which a grammarian held as to the subjects of the dialogues to which they are prefixed, as the *Republic* is entitled Πολιτεία ἡ περὶ δικαίου. The secondary title, σοφισταί, accordingly would, even if it were less vague, be of little value in determining the object of the present dialogue. What Plato’s aim was in composing the *Protagoras*, is a question which a multitude of critics have answered in almost as many different ways, and a comparison of their views is instructive, though Schleiermacher⁵ complains that more have eulogised than have correctly explained the work.

Schleiermacher’s view

Schleiermacher will, in the eyes of most modern scholars, fall under his own condemnation. He regards the *Protagoras* as exhibiting the external manifestation of the internal process described in the *Phaedros*, and

¹ *Meno*, 91 D.

² *Protag.* 328 B.

³ Grote’s *Plato* (cabinet ed.), vol. i. p. 365.

⁴ BT however add ἡ σοφισταί.

⁵ *Platons Werke*, vol. I. i. p. 150 (3 Aufl.)

maintains that its object is to proclaim the Socratic dialectic as the proper form of true philosophic communication, the illustrations being drawn from that division of philosophy with which Socrates almost exclusively concerned himself—Ethics. The declamatory style of the Sophists is shown to be always ready to leave the actual subject under discussion and to serve rather to confuse than to clear the mind of the hearer: indeed the want of acuteness attributed to the representative Sophist is explicable only on the grounds of the falsity of his method, while the true method of discovering truth is exhibited in action. The Sophist in fact wants the philosophic craving which is shown to be indispensable in the *Phaedros*.

The connection which Schleiermacher discovers between the various sections is thus rather one of form than of contents. The dialogue which follows the long discourse of Protagoras is regarded more as offering a contrast to it in form than as intended to correct the theories advanced. The elucidation by Socrates of the poem of Simonides is viewed rather as demonstrating the futility of such deductions from the words of poets than as being germane to the question under discussion. To those who hold that the dialogue investigates the questions, Is virtue teachable? Is virtue one? Schleiermacher points out with emphasis that it ends with a confession that such questions have not been answered. It is a necessary corollary to his arbitrary view of the position which the dialogue holds in the development of the Platonic system,¹ that he discovers in it distinct traces of the ideal theory.

¹ See criticism by Steinhart, *Einleit. zur Müller'schen Uebersetzung*, p. 419.

Schöne's
view.

Schöne,¹ like Schleiermacher, regards the *Protagoras* as subsequent to the *Phaedros*. This latter he regards as the dialogue which inaugurates his period of teaching at the Academy. To all subsequent compositions he aimed at giving an artistic and dramatic form,² renouncing any real dialectical object. In connection with this it is noticeable that he rejects the contents of the different dialogues as an indication of their order of composition, maintaining that an estimate of their form and style is the only trustworthy method of arriving at a conclusion upon the question, and that tried by both these tests the *Protagoras* falls after the *Phaedros*.³ A further result of his point of view is that he sees more significance in the vindication of the Socratic method and the reprobation of the Sophists, developed in the course of the work, than in the inquiry into the nature of Virtue. What importance there is in the latter, consists, he thinks, in the fact that the *Protagoras* aims at supplementing the Socratic ethics. Many of the statements in Protagoras' mouth are Platonic, and the victory of Socrates over Protagoras is one of method rather than of doctrine, formal rather than real. In the elucidation of the poem of Simonides, Platonic views are over and over again propounded by Socrates himself.

Grote's
view.

Grote is at one with Schöne in considerably depreciating the importance to be attached to the dialogues as embodying Plato's actual teaching.⁴ "His writings," he says, "are altogether dramatic. All

¹ *Ueber Platons Protagoras* (Leipz. 1862).

² P. 82.

³ For further difficulties connected with an earlier position for the *Protag.*, see Schöne, pp. 72 ff., and Grote's *Plato*, vol. i. pp. 326 ff.

⁴ Grote, vol. i. p. 355 ; compare Jowett, vol. i. p. 114.

INTRODUCTION

opinions on philosophy are enunciated through one or other of his spokesmen." And he points to the negative value assigned by Plato himself to all written exposition, seeing that they cannot discharge the living functions of a master skilled in eliciting truth by question and answer.¹ What the dialogues could effect, however, was to test, examine, refute,—at the least to sweep away the conceit of knowledge which, apart from such an operation, is inveterate. For this purpose the continuous discourses of the Sophists were useless, and in the antithesis between them and the cross-questioning of Socrates, Grote is inclined, with Schleiermacher, to see² "at least one main purpose of Plato, if it be not even *the* purpose in this memorable dialogue." Further, he says, "It is this antithesis between the eloquent popular lecturer and the analytical inquirer and cross-examiner which the dialogue seems mainly intended to set forth."³ On the other hand, Grote⁴ admits that the ethical theory which the Platonic Socrates lays down in it "is positive and distinct, to a degree very unusual with Plato," and he maintains that the identification of the Pleasurable and the Good is to be regarded as seriously intended, pointing out that "throughout all the Platonic compositions, there is nowhere to be found any train of argument more direct, more serious, and more elaborate."⁵

Bonitz,⁶ who writes to modify the position main- Bonitz's
view.

¹ It is suggested that herein we have an explanation of the fact that Aristotle's account of Plato's philosophy does not square with that hitherto extracted from the extant dialogues, special information being reserved for oral communication. Later researches, however, tend to show that the difficulty may be explained without such an hypothesis.

² Vol. ii. p. 277.

³ Vol. ii. p. 303.

⁴ Vol. ii. p. 308.

⁵ Vol. ii. p. 314.

⁶ *Platonische Studien*, 3 Aufl., p. 255.

tained by Meinardus,¹ that the *Protagoras* shows how the great teacher of virtue met with or rather brought failure on himself, argues in the first place that the publication of the dialogue falls too long after Protagoras' death for it to be regarded as an attack upon his personal activity as a teacher; while, on the other hand, his specific teaching is not handled. Further, the introductory episode rather directs attention to the fact that it is the Sophists in general that are aimed at, two of whom are besides associated with Protagoras in the discussion, and finally involved in his admissions and silenced at his defeat. The object of the dialogue in effect is to show, in the person of the first recognised Sophist, how the class failed as teachers of virtue. Nor is it only negative: it positively vindicates the Socratic method. Throughout there runs a definite train of thought which constitutes its ethical teaching. The remarks of Socrates on the reversal of position of himself and Protagoras, though coupled with a promise of future inquiry, are practically an admission that the problem is solved. In fine, Bonitz gives it as his verdict, that whilst the dialogue may be employed for acquiring a knowledge of Plato's ethics, not this but the intention of showing the failure of the Sophists is the dominant idea.²

Sauppe's
view.

Sauppe³ similarly decides that the "polemical and

¹ *Wie ist Platons Protagoras aufzufassen?* Oldenburg, 1865.

² Susemihl objects, Bonitz, *Plat. Stud.* p. 269 n., that in all such cases where the Socratico-Platonic ethics are treated in combination with a discomfiture of the Sophists, the latter is to be regarded as subsidiary. But Bonitz remarks that, however reasonable this may be as a general proposition, the true answer in any given case can only be supplied by a careful investigation applied to the particular dialogue.

³ Pp. 24 ff. of his edition of the *Protagoras* (4 Aufl.)

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of virtue is, for if that discovery is made, the solution to the problem—is virtue or is it not communicable by teaching?—will be apparent. With this may be compared the passage in which Socrates (349 B) sums up the precedent discussion as being directed to determining the unity of virtue. Finally, the very admission at the close of the dialogue that virtue requires further analysis, so far from being an opposite indication, as Schöne takes it to be, seems convincing evidence that this is the subject mainly dealt with. Bonitz indeed sees in the admission a hint that the Platonic Socrates considers the main position to be secured, and merely to require further strengthening.¹

The number of less definite indications may be multiplied almost at will. In the introductory scenes of the dialogue it early becomes manifest that it is the Sophist as a teacher of something which forms the subject of discussion, not so much as a master of a certain method. As elsewhere, indeed, we find the two views naturally, nay necessarily, incapable of absolute separation, but the question, after being raised (312 C) in a more general reference, finally in 312 E narrows itself to the definite interrogation, τί δὴ ἐστὶ τοῦτο, περὶ οὗ αὐτός τε ἐπιστήμων ἐστὶν ὁ σοφιστὴς καὶ τὸν μαθητὴν ποιεῖ; In connection with which it may be noticed (1) that Socrates bids Hippocrates (313 A) beware how he misuses or neglects the soul, which is far more precious than the body, and from

¹ *Platonische Studien*, 3 Aufl., pp. 263, 264. Steinhart, *Einleit.* p. 417, takes a similar view, comparing Plato's habit in other dialogues. See Westermayer, *Der Protagoras des Plato*, u.s.w. pp. 194, 196: he supposes Plato to be speaking at the conclusion in his own person, the wish for a renewal of the discussion signifying that in his opinion some of the conclusions require modification.

which moral guidance proceeds; (2) that Protagoras (319 A) distinctly avows that his profession is the teaching of *ἡ πολιτικὴ τέχνη*,¹ and that he undertakes to make men good citizens, and to dissipate Socrates' misgivings, as the possibility of teaching virtue throws his beliefs upon its nature into the form of a myth.

The most varied opinions have been expressed about the discourse put into the mouth of Protagoras. Schleiermacher and Stallbaum have little but adverse criticism for the views contained in it, but this is rather because they proceed from a Sophist, than for any more substantial reason. Grote² seems to be more just and more true in remarking that "it is one of the best parts of the Platonic writings, as an exposition of the growth and propagation of common sense," and that "it seems full of matter and argument, exceedingly free from superfluous rhetoric." Steinhart³ considers that the fable constitutes a very solid contribution to the cycle of thought in the dialogue, the interpretation of it put in Protagoras' mouth being very worthy of Plato, and originating from him. If his opinion be adopted, and, in view of the very marked consideration with which Protagoras is treated by Socrates throughout, it appears the most reasonable one, the chief reason for introducing the discourse can

The discourse of Protagoras mainly introduced as a contribution towards fixing the nature of virtue.

¹ The identification of the teaching of *ἀρετή* simply with this teaching of *ἡ πολιτικὴ τέχνη* is first seen in Socrates' words, 319 E, *ἀλλὰ ἰδίᾳ ἡμῖν οἱ σοφώτατοι καὶ ἄριστοι τῶν πολιτῶν ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν ἦν ἔχουσιν οὐχ οἰοί τε ἄλλοις παραδιδόναι*, and more distinctly still in 320 B, *ἐγὼ οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, εἰς ταῦτα ἀποβλέπων οὐχ ἡγοῦμαι διδακτὸν εἶναι ἀρετὴν*. The existence of the two descriptions of virtue, the common or "civil," and the scientific, supplies the clue to the general denial by Socrates of the teachableness of virtue. It is true of the first, not true of the second, from the philosophical point of view.

² Vol. ii. p. 274.

³ *Einleitung*, p. 422.

hardly be found in a wish to discredit Protagoras' method. Rather it is a device in part for regarding virtue from another standpoint, the importance of which is abundantly recognised by the characteristic procedure of Socrates when he approaches the task of obtaining any generalised conception.¹

The interpretation of the poem of Simonides is treated from the same standpoint.

The avowed object with which Protagoras proposes the poem of Simonides for elucidation by Socrates has been alluded to above. It is further to be noticed how, immediately the poem has been despatched, Socrates, with a depreciatory remark upon such interruptions to true intercourse, recurs to the charge, and presses (347 C) the previous form of the question, with a discussion of which the remainder of the dialogue is occupied.

Protagoras and the two other Sophists take, however, a prominent part.

While the question as to the nature of virtue is thus prominently handled, it cannot be denied that the figure of Protagoras occupies a large amount of our attention as we read the dialogue. Nor is it Protagoras alone. Prodicus and Hippias, as Bonitz² has pointed out, are associated with him in the closing scenes, alike in his replies and in the silence which acknowledges defeat. We cannot fail either to note the significance of the opening scenes, which introduce us into the circle of Sophists and their disciples in the house of a man who has notoriously spent³ his substance upon their entertainment. We hear too, in Hippocrates' words, an echo of the interest excited in the Athenian world of culture by the news of Protagoras' arrival. Even the bluntness of the doorkeeper

¹ Cp. Grote's *History of Greece* (cabinet ed.), vol. viii. p. 147, where he quotes Plato, *Parmenides*, pp. 135, 136.

² *Plat. Stud.* p. 259.

³ Plato, *Apol.* 20 A.

betrays to us how Callias' guests have attracted many other visitors as persistent, it may be, as Socrates and his young companion in their determination to hear the great itinerant professors. The unrivalled play of only half-veiled sarcasm with which Socrates describes the scene to his friend emphasises the personality of the Sophists in the dialogue, and that at its very outset. In the interlude, where there is danger lest the discussion should be broken off owing to the incompatibility of the two methods of Protagoras and Socrates, the attention of the reader is again diverted temporarily from the arguments which have been left incomplete to a consideration of the company which significantly divides itself into a Socratic and Protagorean camp. Here, too, the Sophists, Prodicus and Hippias, no longer remain "dumb characters," but each gives utterance to a characteristic speech, which, though wide of the subject under discussion, is none the less favourably received by the audience. This cannot be done without the intention of making a side thrust at the Sophists, and, from its other side, the elucidation by Socrates of Simonides' poem serves the same purpose. The Sophists laid great stress upon such exegesis of the poets, Protagoras being even said to take money for it: while their exegesis was of the extravagant kind, here travestied, which rather imposes a foreign than extracts a natural sense. Indeed, the mock heroic account of the history of the Sophists with which Socrates prefaces his commentary is sufficient to mark how, in this section of the dialogue, attention is again directed to them. In the concluding portion of the dialogue reference is made to the Sophists only in direct connection with what is assumed to be

the main subject. Socrates has shown how, being "overcome by pleasure," to commit a wrong act is a mistaken way of describing what is really a failure in knowledge. He concludes, addressing the holders of the vulgar view (357 E), "but you, holding that it is something different from ignorance, neither go yourselves nor send your sons to the Sophists here who teach these subjects (the sciences which make a right moral choice possible), thinking the thing cannot be taught: but keeping your money in your pockets and not offering it to them, you fail to prosper as individuals and as a state."

Constant reference to the Sophists necessary as teachers of "virtue."

It is, perhaps, in this passage that we see most clearly how impossible any discussion of the nature of virtue, especially if it be examined as a subject for communication by teaching, is, without constant and intimate reference to the Sophists. Plato has shown how Sophists may be viewed apart from a distinctly ethical discussion in other dialogues: and had he wished to treat Protagoras in such a way as to gibbet him as a representative of sophistic teaching, nothing would have been easier or more effective than to exhibit him as maintaining, in the face of the Socratic engine of criticism, the famous apophthegm, *πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος*, afterwards discussed in the *Theaetetus*. As it is, Socrates treats Protagoras throughout with a deference which he does not always show to his interlocutors, and which can hardly be explained upon the supposition that the aim of the dialogue is mainly to discredit his method. It will suffice to take one passage in evidence: "I," says Socrates (348 D), "on this account like to talk with you more than with any one else, because I imagine

that you would have the clearest view not only on all subjects where it is to be expected that the reasonable man should, but especially on virtue."

In fact, it is as teachers of virtue that Socrates has to do with Protagoras and the Sophists. They appear to have held in their hands at this time at Athens all the higher education which was attainable. In the long discourse of Protagoras, an account of the ordinary curriculum of Athenian education is given (325 D—326 E) with some detail. It appears that the course was not such as would satisfy a youth of any genius or originality. Nor was it adapted to provide any one with the special weapons requisite for forcing his way to the front in political life.¹ Thus the speculative and practical minds were alike impelled to look elsewhere for satisfaction, and it was to supply the demand that Sophists came forward. How far, in meeting the want, they proved destructive to the conventional morality of their times has been freely debated.² It is sufficient for our immediate purpose that it should be recognised that the Sophists alone professed to give instruction in subjects not touched, or at least not adequately treated, by the elementary education of the time. Education, it must be remembered, ceased at a much earlier age at Athens than is the custom with our middle and upper classes, and, there being little or

¹ P. 318 E; *Meno*, p. 91 A; cp. *Rep.* x. 600 C; so in *Xen. Mem.* i. 2, 12, we find Critias and Alcibiades coming to Socrates himself for the same purpose. Cp. the Deuschle-Cron edition (1884), pp. 2, 3. Many of the Sophists professed to teach *rhetoric*, of course for the same end.

² See the sixty-seventh chapter of Grote's *History of Greece*; Cope's Essay in *Journal of Class. and Sacred Philology*, No. 2; the introduction to his translation of the *Gorgias*, pp. xxiv., xxv. Mill's Review of Grote's *Plato* (*Dissertations and Discussions*, iii. 308 ff.), extracts from which are given in Wayte's edition, pp. viii.-xi.

no demand, there had been no supply of men professing to continue it in its higher branches: But the vast strides which the prosperity of the state made after the Persian victories created new aims and new ambitions, and withal a freshness of intellectual life capable of satisfying them.¹ The new teachers devoted a large share of their attention to ethical or ethico-political problems. To readers of Plato, the person of Gorgias will suggest itself as a striking type of the class of men who professed to qualify their pupils for taking a foremost part in public life. The dialogue named after him has several points of contact with the *Protagoras*,² and in it ethical disputation is a very prominent feature.

Dramatic
necessity for
introduction
of Sophists.

Dealing then with the very kernel of ethics—the nature of virtue—Plato could hardly have in any way dispensed with mention of the Sophists. Treating the subject dramatically, it was an artistic necessity that those who to the mass of the people represented the “new learning” should here take part in the discussion: treating it in the Socratic manner, it was indispensable for the many-sided investigation which he insisted upon that the opposite theories should be duly impersonated in the dialogue.³

To be dramatic was inborn in Plato. We may possibly read a part of Plato's own intellectual history in the account which the Socrates of the *Phaedo*⁴ gives of his early impulse to the writing of poetry. It is a difficult question how far we may assume the autobiographical statements of the Platonic Socrates to

¹ The Renaissance of thought in Elizabeth's time is a singular parallel. ² Grote's *Plato* (cabinet ed. 1888), vol. ii. pp. 345 ff.

³ Westermayer, pp. 185, 186, shows that Protagoras was chosen as their chief representative because he emphasised the *ethical* side of the sophistic teaching, cp. 348 E. ⁴ 60 D ff.

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process by which it is arrived at, must be duly estimated if we wish to appreciate the true tendency of the Platonic compositions, and to understand why the dialogue form was especially selected. We need not indeed deny the co-operation of other influences. Schöne,¹ for instance, points out that the form may have been suggested to Plato by existing literature, and adopted partly on account of the opportunity it afforded for isolating the compositions more completely from the personality of the author than if the same thoughts were embodied in a treatise. And Grote² remarks that "the borrowed names under which he wrote, and the veil of dramatic fiction, gave him greater freedom as to the thoughts enunciated, and were adopted for the express purpose of acquiring greater freedom." But it will be generally agreed that these were subsidiary considerations.

The dramatic nature of the *Protagoras*.

In the *Protagoras* we see Plato's dramatic power at its strongest. Hardly any one who has treated of the dialogue has failed to pay it the highest tribute of praise. Schleiermacher³ calls it a richly adorned dialogue. Steinhart⁴ says, "The masterly construction and arrangement of the dialogue, and the rich and varied but symmetrical combination of its parts, the luxuriant fulness of dramatic ornament, the plastic power of its presentation, the lifelike characterisation not only of the chief interlocutors but also of the persons introduced to enliven the dialogue, and the perfect unity of the action which advances with rapid and lively movement, lastly, the harmony which reigns

¹ *Ueber Platons Protagoras*, pp. 76 ff. See Westermayer, *Der Protagoras des Plato*, pp. 183, 184.

² Vol. i. p. 360.

³ P. 147.

⁴ *Einleit.* p. 399.

over the whole, and the result which, if not actually conclusive, provides a happy reconciliation, rank this work amongst the most perfect works of art of any time." Schöne¹ calls it one of the most eminent and most purely dramatic works of Plato.² Stallbaum³ remarks that it is a dialogue which exhibits the most consummate art, and that no one not devoid of all taste can read it without unalloyed pleasure. Bonitz⁴ attributes to its artistic excellences, "before which weapons of attack sink to the ground," the fact that its genuineness has always remained unimpeached even "by the sophistical misrepresentation of pretended criticism." With Jowett⁵ it is "a great dramatic work." Grote has almost as high an opinion of it. Hermann Sauppe⁶ gives as his verdict, that "in few dialogues is the dramatic form so artistically maintained."

To point out in detail all there is in the dialogue which calls for praise, would be to forestall the reader, if not to blunt his appreciation. And its beauty, as Steinhart remarks, will strike the most careless observer. But it may be serviceable to direct attention to the skill with which the introductory episodes are adapted to excite our curiosity about Protagoras; how appropriate is the *mise en scène* in the house of Callias; how consistent the delineation of character both in the principal and subordinate parts; how unrivalled the light play of the Socratic irony; how each touch, each incident, while it prevents the interest from flagging,

¹ P. 23.

² So Socher, *Ueber Platon*, p. 226. "Als ästhetische Kunstwerk ist der Dialog Protagoras das meisterhafteste unter den Werken Platon's."

³ P. 31.

⁴ *Plat. Stud.* 3 Aufl. p. 255.

⁵ Vol. i. p. 118; cp. p. 114.

⁶ P. 16 of his Introduction.

substantially contributes to the whole effect and could be ill dispensed with.

The elaboration of the dialogue implies the importance of the subject.

The care bestowed on the composition of the dialogue is in itself an indication that it deals with an important subject, such as the question of the nature of virtue would necessarily be especially in a "Socratic" dialogue. The teaching of Socrates, if he can be said positively to have taught anything, was eminently practical. If we open at random the pages of Xenophon's interesting memoirs of the man, we find him at one time¹ advising Critobulos how to choose his friends and how to keep them, at another² discussing the nature of pleasure, now³ reproving a friend for shirking political duties, now⁴ demonstrating how nature punishes any violation of her laws. Yet if we consider rightly, we shall see that no discussion has any but a moral end. The Socratic dialectic devoted itself to obtaining general conceptions mostly on subjects connected with the conduct of life. Socrates went up and down the Athens of his day, using the engine of his dialectical method to convince men of ignorance and to set them on the straightest and best road to knowledge. But the general conceptions which he was most concerned to obtain were of such common terms as piety, justice, wisdom, the Good, the Beautiful, courage, self-control, an accurate and complete comprehension of which he regarded as an essential condition of that conscious morality which it was his mission to advocate. The inseparability⁵ of virtue and knowledge, nay the actual identification of the two, was the central point of his ethical convictions,

The inseparability of virtue from knowledge, the central point of Socrates' ethics.

¹ Xen. *Mem.* II. 6.

² I. 6.

³ III. 7.

⁴ IV. 4, 23.

⁵ III. 9, 5.

as it is the central point in the positive teaching of the *Protagoras*. If, even when Plato's transcendental philosophy passed into regions more remote from practical matters, and his ethical was subordinated to his metaphysical teaching, the former still, as in the *Philebus*, receives a fair share of his attention, it is no wonder that in one of his earlier dialogues, where the influence of Socrates is still strong upon him, we find him devoting all his powers to supply an appropriate setting for the discussion of the central doctrine of his master's ethics.

Both Stallbaum and Steinhart take in the main the same view of the object of the *Protagoras*. The former places it in connection with the *Laches*, *Charmides*, and *Euthyphro*, in which an examination of single virtues is first essayed, and with the *Meno* and *Euthydemus*, in which preliminary excursions against the Sophists are made, though in view of its artistic excellence it may not have been actually published till later. The object of the *Protagoras* is, Stallbaum thinks, to demonstrate the absolute worthlessness of that teaching of "virtue" which was in most repute, and with this purpose it is shown (1) that the views of the Sophists about virtue are false; (2) that their system is useless for the discovery of truth. By implication it is proved that Socrates alone is qualified to teach, though the views actually put in his mouth are not necessarily held by him.

Steinhart, in his introduction, agrees with Stallbaum in considering the *Protagoras* as closely connected with such minor Socratic dialogues as the *Ion*, *Hippias*, *Alcibiades*, *Lysis*, and *Charmides*. In these "fragmentary studies" single virtues had been examined, and the

Stallbaum's
view of the
object of the
Protagoras.

Steinhart's
view.

contrast between the teaching of the Sophists and their want of fixed notions in the sphere of morals and politics, and the Socratic method had been emphasised. In the *Protagoras* Plato undertakes to present as a connected whole the main points of Socrates' theory of Virtue,¹ and to defend it against its opponents; to give an answer, in fine, to the question which was the problem of Socrates' life, what is Virtue? This answer is found in the truth that "Virtue is knowledge." But the method adopted is as instructive as the result; for while a masterly illustration of the Socratic dialectic is given, the false methods of the Sophists indicate the ease with which an investigator, who has not the true guiding principle, may strike into bypaths which lead no whither. If virtue is a form of knowledge (1) its conception must be a definite one; (2) it must be communicable by teaching. When Socrates objects to admitting the latter, he merely intends to maintain that, as conceived by Protagoras, virtue, being capable of no scientific analysis, cannot be taught. The position that "no one sins willingly" is in this light capable of demonstration, and in his elucidation of the Simonidean poem, Socrates, amidst much light play of fancy, proceeds to substantiate the proposition. Steinhart holds, that as the sum total of the dialogue four truths emerge: (1) Each virtue is a knowledge, and thus teachable, wrongdoing being a defect of knowledge; (2) the conception of Virtue is simple and undivided:

¹ Compare Westermayer, *op. cit.* pp. 185 ff., especially p. 194. "Die sokratische Tugend, nach ihrer materialen und formalen Seite, ist der einheitliche Gedanke der Schrift, der Gegensatz der sophistischen Tugend nach ihrer materialen und formalen Seite nur als Folie dieses Grundgedankens so dargestellt, dass sich dieser am Widerspruche gegen die sophistische Tugendauffassung entwickelt."

all virtues are included in each single one, the knowledge of the good underlying each; (3) it is the aim of men to order their lives morally in accordance with a true estimate of what is right; (4) God alone is the eternal absolute Good: man belonging to the world of Becoming and change, his moral state oscillates between good and bad.

The final and positive outcome of our dialogue is to be found in the position Virtue is knowledge, though the precise subject of this knowledge is left undefined. In its widest interpretation the truth requires the completest subordination of the appetites to Reason, the realisation of which may be opposed to experience, but is not on the face of it an impossibility.¹ Nowadays, indeed, this truth is publicly recognised by a system of state education whose demonstrable effect is to diminish crime. But it is only in the highest system of morality which has ever been revealed to man that the practical and speculative aspects of the truth have been reconciled.²

Outcome of
the dialogue.

§ 3. ANALYSIS OF THE DIALOGUE

Introduction

309 A-310 A.

Socrates meets a friend in some place of public resort, and is induced by him to tell the story of his interview with Protagoras.

¹ Socrates must have known that experience denied his teaching, but, like other great teachers who have used paradox, he saw that the activity of a truth is impaired by qualification.

² Schöne, *Ueber Platons Protagoras*, p. 59. Jowett (vol. i. p. 120) looks to some "metaphysic of the future" to reconcile the divided elements of human nature.

310 A-314 C. *Socrates' Narration—Preliminary Conversation with Hippocrates*

Hippocrates, a young Athenian of good birth and much enthusiasm, knocks violently at Socrates' door one morning before sunrise. He has heard that Protagoras is in the town, and wishes to be introduced to him. As it is too early to go at once, the two walk in the courtyard till daylight. Socrates finds that Hippocrates has no clear idea of what it is that Protagoras will do for him; but one thing becomes clear after some talk—that he is going to Protagoras, not to be made a Sophist, but to be *taught* something which a Sophist knows. What this is, however, Hippocrates cannot tell. Here Socrates points out how rash it is to accept teaching without being an expert in detecting its quality. No one would buy food or drink, or take them, without possessing knowledge or obtaining advice as to their wholesomeness. And the danger is so much the greater in the present case, inasmuch as the teaching of a Sophist cannot be carried away in a vessel and reserved for future examination, but must be there and then assimilated by the hearer. Still, as Hippocrates has set his heart upon it, Socrates consents to take him to Protagoras.

314 C-316 A.

The Scene at Callias' House

The two take their way to Callias' house, where the Sophists Protagoras, Hippias, and Prodicus are staying, and after some altercation with the porter, who does not approve of his young master's lavish entertainment of such guests, enter. They halt a few

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their knowledge to their sons. To remove his doubts Protagoras is ready to give a disquisition upon virtue and its origin.

320 C-328 D.

Protagoras' μῦθος ἀνα λόγος

He explains by the aid of a myth the universal distribution of the *πολιτικὴ τέχνη*. By the mistake of Epimetheus, who had been too generous to the other animals, man on the eve of his appearance in the world was but ill equipped for the struggle of life. Prometheus, called in by his brother, partially supplied the defect by the gift of fire and the arts. But as they still wanted the *πολιτικὴ τέχνη*, which would have gathered them into cities for mutual protection, they went near to be exterminated by the wild beasts, till Zeus sent this to them by Hermes in the shape of *δίκη καὶ αἰδώς*, instructing him to assign some to every one without distinction. And now if a man proclaims his deficiency in those qualities, they count him for a madman, for he thereby confesses that he has no place among mankind.

Yet there is proof that this virtue is not considered to come naturally or spontaneously, but in any one man is the result of careful training. For, whereas for natural defects that cannot be corrected, such as deformity and ill-health, men are only pitied, injustice and impiety, and all that is the opposite of virtue, meet with blame and punishment, which punishment, rightly viewed, is not retributive or vindictive, but corrective, having in view the offender's improvement.

As to Socrates' objection (1) that the sons of statesmen are taught everything else but the very

virtue for which their fathers are eminent; and (2) that they are no better in this than other people's sons, he is under a misconception. For (1) the whole course of Athenian education is really directed to the teaching of virtue, and the very laws provide models for conduct: and (2) if all were taught flute-playing as an essential, it is likely that the son of a famous flutist would no more excel others in this, than the son of a statesman does in virtue, though both would show well among people who knew nothing of either.

Lastly, just as it would be difficult to find any one with special knowledge of the Greek language, though all know it, so it is hard to find a professor of virtue. Socrates must be content if he can find a man capable in ever so little degree of giving higher instruction in the subject, and not quarrel where a fee is demanded, for payment is purely by result.

Conversation between Socrates and Protagoras

328 D-334 C.

Socrates describes how for a time he was silent, entranced by the speech. On one point alone does he still feel uncertainty; but Protagoras, who knows how to answer a question,—unlike the ordinary orator on whom a question has the same effect as a finger laid on a sounding vessel,—will quickly dissipate it. Many terms were made use of, justice, temperance, holiness, as though they were all “virtue”: Is Virtue one? and are justice, temperance, etc., parts of it? or are these merely different ways of speaking of one and the same thing? Protagoras answers that they are parts of it, differing in their properties, qualitatively, like the

parts of one face, no one being like another. Justice, however, he admits, after considerable discussion, to be somewhat like holiness, just as white is in a way like black, and hard like soft, and one feature of the face like another; but he will not agree that because justice is holy and holiness is just, therefore it is fair to say that justice and holiness are identical.

Seeing that Protagoras is annoyed, Socrates attacks the subject from another side. Are temperance (*σωφροσύνη*) and wisdom (*σοφία*) different? Both are opposites of *ἀφροσύνη*, and on the ground that a thing can only have one opposite are identified. It only remains to identify temperance and justice, and all the virtues will be proved to be one. Protagoras, however, who had been growing more and more disinclined to answer the later questions of Socrates, goes off at a tangent when asked to admit that good things are beneficial, arguing vehemently that some things which are called good are not beneficial, or only beneficial to classes and not universally.

Interlude

Protagoras' speech is much applauded by the company, but Socrates, ironically complaining that he has not himself the memory requisite for dealing with continuous discourse, requires that he shall confine himself to simple question and answer. Protagoras in return asks Socrates how he thinks he would have made himself a name if he had shaped the discussion as an opponent desired. Socrates replies that Protagoras professes to be expert in both methods, and if he will adopt the shorter, well and good: otherwise he has an

engagement and must be going. As he rises to do so, Callias catches hold of his hand and begs him not to interrupt the discussion, but Socrates is still obstinate. Here Alcibiades interferes, suggesting that if Protagoras confesses himself inferior in this species of discussion, he ought to admit the fact; if not, let him resume without his long digressions. Critias follows, deprecating the partiality of the last two speakers; and Prodicus in a ridiculous speech, marked by pedantic distinctions in the terms he employs, repeats his wish for a fair hearing. Hippias, in an equally absurd speech, in which "he apprehends a world of figures," and drags in a commonplace about nature and convention, suggests that a compromise should be effected by the audience selecting a "moderator." Socrates demurs to this as irrational, though it meets favour with all, including Callias, and proposes that if Protagoras objects to being questioned, he shall be the questioner, and Socrates the respondent, till Protagoras has had enough, when Socrates shall resume, the company in general seeing fair play.

Elucidation of a Poem of Simonides

338 E-349 C.

Protagoras is to begin, and the power to criticise poetry being the prime mark of culture, he proposes to Socrates the elucidation of a poem by Simonides, which has direct reference to the main subject of the discussion—virtue. Simonides, according to Protagoras, says, addressing Scopas, that it is hard to become good, and yet blames Pittacus for saying that it is hard to be good. Socrates calls in the aid of Prodicus with his distinction of terms, and at first suggests that, as Hesiod

says, the ascent to virtue is hard, but when the summit is reached, it is an easy task to continue there. Protagoras objects that it is in worse contradiction to general belief to say this. In consequence, Prodicus' aid is again invoked, and Socrates, Prodicus approving, explains that Simonides understood Pittacus to mean "bad" when he said "difficult," and so rightly blamed him. Having implicated Prodicus in maintaining so ridiculous a position, however, Socrates himself abandons it, pointing out that it is inconsistent with what follows, and proceeds to his own interpretation. Parodying Protagoras' previous account of the Sophists, he shows that the wisdom of old times was embodied in short aphorisms such as the Lacedaemonians, who, despite appearances, were the true philosophers of antiquity, were fond of. Simonides has set himself to combat such a saying as that of Pittacus, "It is hard to be good," thinking by overthrowing it to make himself famous. He aims at proving that to be good is not difficult but impossible, a prerogative of the gods: man is only able to become for a time good. This view Socrates only supports by doing considerable violence to the grammar. He discovers for his own part in other sections of the poem confirmation of his conviction that virtue is knowledge of the good: vice a defect of knowledge. Hippias concurs and wishes to produce a disquisition of his own, but this Alcibiades postpones indefinitely, reminding him that if Protagoras is satisfied, Socrates should resume the character of questioner. Socrates takes occasion to depreciate literary criticism as an unworthy adjunct to feasts of reason, and expresses his readiness to recur to the original discussion with the simple object of eliciting the truth.

Second Conversation between Protagoras and Socrates 349 D-360 E.

Protagoras restates his position in answer to Socrates, in a slightly modified form. Of the five virtues, Justice, Temperance, Wisdom, Holiness are moderately alike one another, but Courage is quite different, for men may fail to possess any one of the former and still be courageous. Socrates, rejoining, shows (1) that Confidence (*θάρασος*) is an essential component of Courage, considered as *καλόν τι*; (2) that Confidence is a direct result of knowledge; and therefore that Wisdom and true Courage are identical. To this Protagoras objects that, though he has admitted that the courageous are confident, he has not admitted that all the confident are courageous, which is the form the proposition must take before the above conclusion can be drawn; on the contrary, he considers that some men are confident from training or from the effects of anger or madness.

Socrates, without troubling to point out that those confident people only, whose confidence results from knowledge, have been identified with the courageous, adopts a different method of proof. He asks Protagoras whether all pleasant things are not good, and all unpleasant things evil. Protagoras refuses his absolute assent to this statement, and proposes that the question shall be considered at length. What does Protagoras then think of knowledge? Is it not supreme in the direction of actions? Yet the majority talk of people, though they know what is best, doing something else, "overcome by pleasure." What do they mean by the phrase "overcome by pleasure"? They cannot produce any other standard of actions good and bad than

the amount of pleasure or pain ultimately resulting. Consequently "to be overcome by pleasure," so as not to do what is best, is the unthinking method of expressing a mistake in estimating the amount of pleasure to be derived from two different courses of action. In other words, this being overcome by pleasure is ignorance in its worst form. Just so ignorance of what ought to be the object of honest fear is cowardice. When the coward does not choose what is good, death in honourable fight, but what is evil, safety by dishonourable flight, this is a case of ignorance. True courage consists in a knowledge of what is and what is not to be feared: and in this conclusion Protagoras when pressed concurs.

360 E-362 A.

Conclusion

In conclusion Socrates reflects upon the reversal of their positions produced by the discussion. He, who denied the possibility of imparting virtue by teaching, is now maintaining it against Protagoras, who in the beginning asserted it. In view of this, Socrates expresses a desire for a further inquiry into the nature of virtue, but Protagoras, complimenting Socrates, and prophesying great things of him, is compelled to keep another engagement.

§ 4. THE DATE OF THE ACTION

The indications of date in the dialogue are numerous, but their inconsistency troubled critics as early as the time of Athenaeus.¹

¹ V. p. 218 ; xi. p. 505.

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of the "Ἄγριοι still remains, and is as little surmounted by the suggestion that an earlier representation is alluded to, or that, as Stallbaum hints, the reader is hereby put in possession of the date of composition.¹

Now it is quite inconceivable that a writer should so openly disregard chronology as to allude to a person so famous as Pericles as still living nearly a decade after his death, the occasion of which, by its connection with the Great Plague and the opening scenes of the Peloponnesian war, could not fail to be only too well known to his readers. It is far more conceivable that matters of less public interest should be intentionally displaced if any definite purpose could be served thereby.² We can, indeed, see little to gain by the mention of the "Ἄγριοι; but on the other hand, among the multiplicity of dramas yearly produced at Athens, an error in the precise date of one of them would easily pass undetected, and for the purpose in hand would be quite immaterial. It is, however, quite different in the other case. Hipponicus seems to have been entirely unlike his son, who was notoriously extravagant in his hospitality to the Sophists. In the time of the father there would have been an impropriety in depicting the house as crowded with these personages; under Callias no better house could have been chosen for the scene than this, the most splendid and luxurious house in Athens,³ the owner of which was connected with Pericles and Alcibiades, and known as an ardent and generous patron of Sophists.⁴

¹ *Praefat.* p. 37 (ed. 1840): cp. Schleiermacher, *Einleit.* p. 149.

² Schleiermacher, *Einleit.* p. 150, suggests that anything coming under this description was "als Verzierung vielleicht bewusstlos eingemischt."

³ Schleiermacher, p. 147.

⁴ Heindorf, *ad Protag.* p. 311 A.

The balance of evidence is thus all in favour of a date at least previous to 430 B.C. It is perhaps better with Sauppe¹ to set it still farther back to 432 or 433 B.C. After the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, locomotion would be neither so easy nor so safe as it was, and the attention of most men would presumably be directed to observing the fortunes of their country. The earlier date too brings us more closely to the period when these Sophists were at the height of their celebrity, and when the circle of young men with their thirst for knowledge was not yet occupied in affairs military and political. In his dialogues, Plato aims rather at an internal artistic unity which essentially represents the truth, than at historic accuracy of detail.

The earlier date preferable.

§ 5. THE IDENTIFICATION OF ἡδύ AND ἀγαθόν

One of the main difficulties connected with the subject-matter of the *Protagoras* lies in the fact that Socrates in it identifies or seems to identify Good and Pleasurable. The passage concerned extends from 351 B to 358 E. It follows upon the discussion of the relations between Courage and the other virtues, and is introduced as affording a more complete answer to the objection of Protagoras, that many brave men are at the same time unjust, impious, uncontrolled in the extreme.

Socrates requires Protagoras to admit that a man would have lived well if he died after a pleasant life (ἡδέως βιούς). Thus, says Socrates, τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν is ἀγαθόν. Protagoras attempts to qualify this by adding

Statement of the position in the *Protagoras*, 351 B-358 E.

¹ Sauppe, *Einleit.* pp. 10, 11.

εἴπερ τοῖς καλοῖς ζῶη ἡδόμενος, and when Socrates urges that all pleasurable things *qua* pleasurable (καθ' ὃ ἡδέα ἐστίν) are good, that is, that all pleasure is good, still maintains that some pleasurable things are not good.

For deciding the point a wider question must be opened. Ἐπιστήμη, as both Socrates and Protagoras agree in opposition to common opinion, is the ruling power (οἶον ἄρχειν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου), and if a man *knows* what is good, he will never be persuaded to act in contradiction to that knowledge. Others (οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων) however do not admit this, but hold that many, knowing what is best, are not willing to do it, being overcome by pleasure (ὑπὸ ἡδονῆς ἡττώμενοι). An instance is accordingly examined: a man drinks because he is ὑπὸ ποτοῦ κρατούμενος, though he knows that it is bad for him. But such things are accounted bad only because εἰς ἀνίας τε ἀποτελευτᾶ καὶ ἄλλων ἡδονῶν ἀποστερεῖ, while conversely painful things are good only when they procure ultimate pleasure. In fact, men seek pleasure as a good, avoid pain as an evil. To this Protagoras assents and agrees that ἡδύ and ἀγαθόν are convertible terms. Hereupon Socrates requires him to substitute the one for the other in such vulgar statements as that “often a man, knowing things to be evil, does them because of the immediate pleasure, overcome by the pleasure,” and shows the absurd results obtained.

The truth is, that when a man pleads that he was ὑπὸ ἡδονῆς ἡττώμενος, he pleads guilty to ignorance in its gravest form—ignorance of what is good or pleasurable. The whole determination of our conduct depends upon estimating the proportions between the

pleasures and pains involved in any given action, and as the problem is complicated by such considerations as the nearness and distance of the pleasures and pains, it is obvious that a special science (*ἐπιστήμη*) is required for the purpose. Still *ἡδύ* and *ἀγαθόν* are ultimately identical, and it is admitted that all men act primarily on this supposition.

The scattered statements of the Xenophontic Socrates on the same subject are broadly in harmony with the view thus advanced in the *Protagoras*. In *Mem.* ii. 1, 19 he points out that for motives of self-interest men *πονεῖν ἡδέως καὶ ζῆν εὐφραινομένους*. In Prodicus' *Choice of Hercules*, which Socrates subsequently relates with approval, Virtue says she will not deceive Hercules *προοιμίους ἡδονῆς*, but if he obeys her the *pleasures* of eating, of sleeping, of recollection, will be greater, and he will reach *τὴν μακαριστοτάτην εὐδαιμονίαν*. In *Mem.* iv. 5, 9 it is said that there is more *pleasure* in self-control than in indulgence (*ἢ ἐγκράτεια πάντων μάλιστα ἡδεσθαι ποιεῖ*); with which may be compared the further statement that *τοῖς ἐγκρατέσι μόνοις ἔξεστι σκοπεῖν τὰ κράτιστα τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ, ἔργῳ καὶ λόγῳ διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη, τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ προαιρεῖσθαι, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀπέχεσθαι*. In iii. 9, 4 we are told that no one deserved the name of temperate who was acting in opposition to his conviction, that, in fact, as each man chose *τὰ συμφωρότατα*, it was impossible for the case to occur. From iii. 8, 1-3 and iv. 2, 31 we see that Socrates held that there was no absolute good. So far as he recognised any fixed end for action, it was utility; "the immediate utility of the individual thus becomes the measure of conduct and the foundation of

Socrates' views in the *Memorabilia* agree.

all moral rule and legal enactment. Accordingly each precept of which Socrates delivers himself is recommended on the ground that obedience to it will promote the pleasure, the comfort, the advancement, the well-being of the individual.”¹

The teaching of the *Gorgias*, 491 E-500 D.

There are two other dialogues besides the *Protagoras*, in which Plato has discussed at length the relation of Pleasure to the Good. In the *Gorgias*, 491 E—500 D, Socrates is represented as combating the opinion of Callicles that the man who would live correctly must allow his desires to be as great as possible, and be able to satisfy them (δει τὸν ὀρθῶς βιωσόμενον τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἔαν ὡς μέγιστας εἶναι καὶ μὴ κολάζειν, ταύταις δὲ ὡς μεγίσταις οὔσαις ἱκανὸν εἶναι ὑπηρετεῖν δι’ ἀνδρείαν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ ἀποπιμπλάναι ὧν ἂν αἰεὶ ἢ ἐπιθυμία γίγνηται). Callicles believes in a constant condition, e.g. of being thirsty and having the power to satisfy the thirst, of itching and being able to supply the antidote of scratching, and is not convinced by Socrates’ similes of the sieve and leaky jars. Socrates, therefore, (1) argues that some pleasures are bad, and that, therefore, ἡδύ and ἀγαθόν cannot be identical. Callicles maintaining, however, that there is no distinction between good and bad pleasures, (2) a second argument is brought to bear upon him. Οἱ εὖ πράττοντες are the opposite to οἱ κακῶς πράττοντες, and, in general, good and evil cannot coexist in the same subject. But thirst, like all craving, is painful (ἀνιαρόν), while drinking when thirsty is pleasant, and a man who drinks when he is thirsty consequently feels pain and

¹ Dr. H. Jackson in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (9th ed.), article “Socrates.”

pleasure at once; and, as it is impossible *κακῶς* and *εὖ πράττειν* at once, *τὸ ἡδύ* is different from *τὸ ἀγαθόν*. Also we part with our thirst and the pleasure of slaking it at one and the same time—that is, we lose pleasure and pain at once; thus again pleasure is not convertible with the good, for we cannot get rid of good and evil at once. Moreover, (3) the good are good by the presence of what is good, but inasmuch as the cowardly, who are bad, feel as much pleasure, for instance, when the enemy retires, as the good, then if pleasure and “good” are identical, the cowards have as much good in them—that is, are as good—as the good themselves. Hereupon (499 B) Callicles gives way and says, “As if, Socrates, you think that I, or any other man does not believe some pleasures to be better, some worse.” “Then there are really good and bad pleasures?” “Yes; the good pleasures are the beneficial (*ὠφέλιμοι*) ones, such as those of eating and drinking when productive of health and strength; the bad pleasures those that are injurious (*βλαβεραί*).” Finally, as all our actions must be directed to the good, we must choose the good, that is, the beneficial, pleasures, and for this choice a specialist (*τεχνικός*) is required.

In the *Philebus* a large share of the discussion is devoted to determining whether Intelligence or Pleasure is more akin to the Good; and the examination of Pleasure is undertaken in order more definitely to settle its claims. (1) Pleasures in the body arise when the disturbed harmony of its constitution is restored; as the disturbance of the harmony which is called hunger is a pain, the restoration of the harmony by eating is a pleasure. The most intense pleasures of this kind are preceded by the most intense desires.

The
Philebus.

(2) There are pleasures entirely of the soul as expectation, and pains as apprehension. These depend upon memory (*μνήμη*), which is a preservation of sensation. (*σωτηρία αἰσθήσεως*). It is remarked that desires also, where the subject desires the opposite of his present state, are dependent upon memory, and so of the soul only. (3) There are states in which a man may be in pain in body, but, remembering the pleasures which would relieve the pain, may feel in his soul an additional pleasure or pain, according to the greater or less probability of obtaining such relief. Now (*α*) the pleasures and pains in the soul may be true or false, for opinions upon which the pleasures and pains depend are true and false, and consequently the pleasures and pains themselves may be true or false; (*β*) just as we are apt to be mistaken about the size of objects seen at a distance, so the present pleasures or pains are likely to appear greater than those at a distance, and the excess over the true amount is a false pleasure or pain; (*γ*) the so-called pleasure which is a mere cessation of pain is a false pleasure; such pleasures then are false and impure, the true and the pure pleasures are the intellectual pleasures, which involve no conscious antecedent or simultaneous pain, and the pleasures caused by colours, shapes, smells, in their most refined forms.

Three other considerations suggest themselves: (1) Pleasure is a *γένεσις* not an *οὐσία*; consequently subordinate to some *οὐσία* and incapable of being the *ἀγαθόν*; (2) if we make pleasure the good, we must wish for what produces it; pleasure is caused by the relief of pains which are a *διάλυσις* or *φθορά*; (3) if pleasure is the only good, courage and temperance

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choosing. At the same time he admits that the views held by the Socrates of the dialogue are little to be distinguished from those of the Xenophontic Socrates, and this fact seems a fatal objection to adopting such a method of reconciliation.

Schöne¹ finds the ethical teaching of the *Protagoras*, on the contrary, more advanced upon this point than that in the *Gorgias*. In the latter dialogue Plato has expressly said, he argues, that ἀγαθόν is ὠφέλιμον, whence it is to be inferred that the Good is not indeed to be identified with "the ordinary transient pleasure"; but τὸ ἡδύ in a higher sense, or "permanent pleasure," can still scarcely be disjoined from the Good, and so we find it in the *Protagoras*. This fining down of the ordinary sense of τὸ ἡδύ, in itself a comprehensive term, is however too desperate a resource to be adopted if any more reasonable explanation presents itself.

The position in the *Protagoras* is that held by Plato while under Socratic influence.

And it seems less open to objections to suppose that the views in the *Protagoras* were those held by Plato while still under the immediate influence of his master,² the discussions in the *Gorgias* and *Philebus* marking his departure from this original position. If it be thought unworthy of Plato ever to have held views so base, it may be argued that the hedonistic basis of conduct, in the absence of moral obligation, is far the most obvious and logical one.³ The ethics of Plato

¹ *Ueber Platons Protagoras*, p. 88.

² In Westermayer's opinion (*Der Protagoras des Plato*, p. 174) Plato during Socrates' life was merely the exponent of his master's views.

³ Dr. Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*, vol. ii. p. 304 (3d ed.), says "The theory upon this subject which in this country has played, and still plays, the leading part against every doctrine of intuitive morals, is that which, started by Hobbes, and descending with various enrichments and some qualifications, through Hartley, Bentham, the two

advanced in correspondence with the rest of his philosophical teaching. Out of the Socratic concepts he had developed his theory of ideas. In doing this he appears to have at first adhered too closely to his model, teaching that an idea existed wherever a class-name could be used.¹ At the same time he proclaimed the idea of the Good to be the sole source of existence; everything existed only so far as it was good; the formal and final cause were one and the same.² Subsequently the difficulty of holding that ideas of things evil derived their existence from the idea of good, and other embarrassments, caused Plato to considerably modify his theory,³ and the *Philebus* is one dialogue in which this modification is seen in course of development, and the final identification of *νοῦς* and the Good foreshadowed. It is here consequently that we see the new relation in which the "pleasurable" must necessarily stand to the Good, for among the ingredients which tend to make the *μικτὸς βίος* good, it is found that even the purest pleasures take the lowest place. If then—and Plato never abandoned this position⁴—virtue is still to be regarded as a knowledge of the Good, it follows that the earlier hedonistic view had

Necessity
for abandon-
ing it.

Mills, and Austin, reappears in Bain, and in its ethical aspect is popularly known as *Utilitarianism*; while, in its psychological, it is generally (though not necessarily) identified in the schools with *Hedonism*." For a statement of the modern types, see *ibid.* pp. 304 ff.

¹ *Rep.* x. 596 A.

² See H. Sidgwick, *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (9th ed.), vol. viii. pp. 579 ff.

³ See Henry Jackson on "Plato's Later Theory of Ideas," *Journal of Philology*, vol. x. pp. 253 ff.; and Archer Hind's *Introduction to the Timaeus*.

⁴ The *ad interim* recognition of a "civic" virtue is no abandonment of the principle.

definitely to be given up. The contradiction, in fine, between the views of the *Protagoras* and those of later dialogues is a necessary result of Plato's philosophical development.

Supporters
of this
opinion.

Powerful supporters of this opinion are found in Professor Jowett, Henry Sidgwick, and Hermann Sauppe. The last indeed argues,¹ from the Socratic views on the relation of the good and pleasurable, that the *Protagoras* is one of Plato's earliest writings, "since later the conception of the good was more fully defined." K. F. Hermann² considers the dialogue to contain the early opinions of Plato himself, and Zeller³ regards the position taken up in the *Gorgias* as an advance in the development of his ethics, not so much in contrast as in scientific elaboration. That the *Protagoras* provides no final teaching is hinted at in 351 D, 353 E, 354 E, and in the promise of a renewal at some future time of the whole discussion.

The
Protagoras
one of the
"Socratic"
dialogues.

There is indeed a large consensus of opinion which believes the dialogue, as one of the group of so-called "Socratic" dialogues, to have been composed earlier than the *Gorgias*, *Philebus*, and *Republic*. Schöne, indeed, who considers both the *Philebus*⁴ and the *Meno*⁵ anterior, falls out of line with the other critics, but

¹ *Einleitung*, p. 26.

² *Gesch. und Syst. der Plat. Phil.* pp. 462, 463.

³ *Plato and the Older Academy* (Eng. trans.), p. 188, note.

⁴ *Ueber Platons Protagoras*, p. 78.

⁵ Pp. 95 ff. On the difficult question of the position of the *Meno* amongst the Platonic dialogues, see Grote's *Plato*, especially vol. ii. p. 246, note 3. The subject of the dialogue is treated so much less earnestly in the *Meno* than in our dialogue that I cannot imagine it to give the answer to the problem propounded in the latter. Schleierm. vol. II. i. pp. 228, 229.

the majority¹ regard the *Protagoras* as one of Plato's earlier compositions, ranking it, for the most part, most closely with the *Hippias Maior*, the *Lysis*, the *Alcibiades I.*, the *Charmides*, the *Laches*,² which may be regarded as "fragmentarische Vorstudien."³

With the position thus fixed agrees the absence of all reference to the theory of ideas upon which all discussions in later dialogues are based. The fact that the virtues are still five,⁴ and not, as in the *Republic* and subsequently, the four "cardinal" virtues, is a less decisive indication, but one which should not be neglected; and it is to be remarked that the virtue based on *ἐπιστήμη* is alone recognised, and not the "vulgar" sort dependent upon *δόξα ἀληθῆς*.

§ 6. THE ACTUAL DATE OF COMPOSITION

Upon this there is little agreement. Grote holds with Schöne (*Ueber Platons Protag.*, p. 72 foll.) that the difficulties attending the assumption that any dialogues were published before Socrates' death in 399 B.C. are insuperable, but is unable to assign any definite date, though admitting that the *Protagoras* is a work of Plato's full maturity. Ast pronounces for about 408, Schleiermacher for between 406 and 404

¹ Schleiermacher, Ast, Steinhart, Munk, Susemihl, Ueberweg, Stallbaum, Kroschel, besides those already mentioned.

² Kroschel thinks this was posterior, *Prolegomena*, p. 26.

³ Steinhart, *Einleitung*, pp. 399, 431; cp. Westermayer, *Der Protagoras*, p. 184.

⁴ Bonitz, however (*Plat. Stud.* pp. 234, 235), thinks that where Plato is looking at the popular view of the virtues, as in this dialogue, he regards them as five; where he himself divides them, they are only four, *δσιότης* disappearing as a distinct virtue and being merged in *δικαιοσύνη*; see Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*, vol. i. pp. 72 ff.

B.C., Steinhart sets it at about 404 B.C., K. F. Hermann, Susemihl, and Ueberweg agree that it was composed before 399 B.C., Socher, Kroschel, Zeller, and Cron that it was after; Munk even places it as late as 386.

§ 7. THE POEM OF SIMONIDES

Schleiermacher,¹ contesting Heyne's views, was the first to separate the remains of the poem from Plato's text, where they lay embedded, and it was on his lines that G. Hermann, at Heindorf's² request, attempted to reconstruct the poem. He made it consist of three strophes,—στροφὴ α' imperfect, στρ. β' beginning at οὐδέ μοι, an ἐπώδος beginning ἔμοιγ' ἐξαρκεῖ, στρ. γ' beginning τοῦνεκεν οὐ ποτ' ἐγώ. In the main Schneidewin, in his *Delectus poesis Graecorum*, has followed him, but he calls στροφὴ β' the ἀντιστροφὴ, and regards the poem as incomplete. His version is subjoined—

Στροφὴ α'.

Ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν,
 χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου τε-
 τυγμένον.

(Desunt quinque versus.)

Ἄντιστρ. α'.

Οὐδέ μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιπτάκειον νέμεται,
 καίτοι σοφοῦ παρὰ φωτὸς εἰρημένον· χαλεπὸν φάτ' ἐσθλὸν
 ἔμμεναι.
 Θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτ' ἔχοι γέρας· ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ
 κακὸν ἔμμεναι,
 ὃν ἀμάχανος συμφορὰ καθέλη.

¹ Vol. I. i. p. 270 (3 Aufl.)

² See note on p. 598 of his edition.

Πράξαις γὰρ εὖ πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός,
κακὸς δ' εἰ κακῶς, καὶ
τοῦπιπλείστον ἄριστοι, τοὺς κε θεοὶ φιλέωσιν.

Ἐπωδὸς α΄.

Ἐμοιγ' ἐξαρκεῖ,
ὅς ἂν μὴ κακὸς ἦ
μηδ' ἄγαν ἀπάλαμνος, εἰδὼς γ' ὄνασίπολιν δίκαν, ὑγιῆς ἀνὴρ.
Οὐ μιν ἐγὼ μωμάσομαι·
οὐ γὰρ ἐγὼ φιλόμωμος·
τῶν γὰρ ἀλιθίων ἀπείρων γενέθλα.
Πάντα τοι καλά, τοῖσί τ' αἰσχρὰ μὴ μέμικται.

Στροφὴ β΄.

Τοῦνεκεν οὐ ποτ' ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι δυνατόν
διζήμενος κενεὰν ἐς ἄπρακτον ἐλπίδα μοῖραν αἰῶνος βαλέω,
πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον, εὐρυεδοῦς ὅσοι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα
χθονός·
ἐπὶ τ' ἔμμιν εὐρῶν ἀπαγγελέω.
Πάντας δ' ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω,
ἐκὼν ὅστις ἔρδη
μηδὲν αἰσχρόν· ἀνάγκη δ' οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται.

Bergk's arrangement is monostrophic, and differs in important particulars—

Στροφὴ α΄.

Ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γένεσθαι
χαλεπὸν χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον, ἄνευ
ψόγου τετυγμένον.
ὅς ἂν ἦ κακὸς μηδ' ἄγαν ἀπάλαμνος, εἰδὼς γ' ὄνασίπολιν
δίκαν
ὑγιῆς ἀνὴρ· οὐδὲ μὴ μιν ἐγὼ
μωμάσομαι· τῶν γὰρ ἀλιθίων·
ἀπείρων γενέθλα.
πάντα τοι καλά, τοῖσί τ' αἰσχρὰ μὴ μέμικται.

Στροφὴ β΄.

Οὐδέ μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιπτάκειον

νέμεται, καίτοι σοφοῦ παρὰ φωτὸς εἰρημένον· χαλεπὸν
 φάτ' ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι.
 θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτ' ἔχοι γέρας· ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ
 κακὸν ἔμμεναι,
 ὃν ἀμάχανος συμφορὰ καθέλη.
 πράξαις γὰρ εὖ πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός,
 κακὸς δ' εἰ κακῶς (τι).
 καὶ τὸ πλείστον ἄριστοι, τοὺς θεοὶ φιλέωντι.

Στροφὴ γ'.

Τοῦνεκεν οὔ ποτ' ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι
 δυνατόν διζήμενος, κενεὰν ἐς ἄπρακτον ἐλπίδα μοῖραν
 αἰῶνος βαλέω,
 πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον, εὐρυεδοῦς ὅσοι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα
 χθονός.
 ἐπὶ τ' ὑμῖν εὐρῶν ἀπαγγελέω,
 πάντας δ' ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω.
 ἐκὼν ὅστις ἔρδη
 μηδὲν αἰσχρόν, ἀνάγκα δ' οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται.

It will be seen that he omits ἔμοιγ' ἐξαρκεῖ, as the words of Plato, and utilises the "epode" to complete *στροφὴ α'*, for which purpose he reads *ὃς ἂν ἦ κακός* for *ὃς ἂν μὴ κακὸς ἦ*, and *οὐδὲ μή μιν ἐγὼ* for *οὐ μιν ἐγὼ*, rejecting further *οὐ γὰρ ἐγὼ φιλόμωμος*.

Blass¹ writes the poem in four strophes—

(1) Incomplete; the omitted parts containing the address to Scopas, and a further description of the perfect man.

(2) Incomplete; the first two lines being condensed by Plato into the words ἔμοιγ' ἐξαρκεῖ.

(3) Beginning with οὐδέ μοι.

(4) Beginning with τοῦνεκεν οὐ ποτ' ἐγὼ.

With the exceptions mentioned, he considers the poem complete, and to have been a skolion, the train of thought being: (1) It is hard to be perfect; (2) I am

¹ See Cron, *Einl.* p. 21, note.

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as essentially dependent upon knowledge,¹ and subsequently takes advantage of the general assent accorded to this reading of the poem. And here it must not be left unnoticed that common opinion regarded the poets, and in particular Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides, as supplying the canon of morality. At the same time, by an intentional employment of arbitrary interpretation,² he demonstrates how unscientific an instrument of education this was that the Sophists set such store by, how untrustworthy for the communication of real truth. Doubtless the very poem from which Socrates is exhibited as extracting support for his own views had, as one with which people were commonly acquainted, been cited as evidence for the truth of teaching diametrically opposed, and herein lies the point of its present application.

§ 8. ON THE TEXT

The text is that of Schanz's edition (1880). The variations are noted below.

The Archetypus.

Professor Schanz, in his *Studien zur Geschichte des Platonischen Textes* (Würzburg, 1874), makes a new estimate of the MSS. in Bekker's *Apparatus Criticus*. He supposes an Archetypus, or exemplar of all existing MSS., in two volumes, the first containing the first seven tetralogies of Thrasyllus,³ the second the eighth

¹ Schöne, pp. 39, 42 ; Steinhart, p. 414 ; Bonitz, p. 263 ; Sauppe, pp. 23, 24.

² See especially Bonitz, p. 263. Kroschel (p. 16), on the other hand, and Schleiermacher, vol. I. i. p. 158 (3 Aufl.), regard the interpretation as defensible.

³ Grote's *Plato*, ch. vi. ; Schanz, *Studien u. s. w.*, pp. 12, 24.

and ninth tetralogies, the *Definitions*, and seven spurious dialogues.

He confines himself to an examination of the first part.

The Archetypus appears, from the fact that it had interpolations in passages quoted correctly by later writers, such as Theodoret and Eusebius,¹ to have been made not earlier than 400 A.D.

Of its first volume two copies were made, one, an incomplete one, and another, a complete one.²

The incomplete form is seen in the codex Clarkianus³ or Oxoniensis or Bodleianus, written in 896 A.D.,⁴ which is wanting in the seventh tetralogy (*Hippias Maior* and *Minor*, *Io*, *Menexenus*), and a passage in the *Theaetetus*, 208 D—209 A; and in the codices Vaticanus Δ ,⁵ and Venetus II (both twelfth century), which exhibit the same lacuna in the *Theaetetus*. These, with the codex Tubingensis, Schanz regards as forming the first class of Platonic MSS. All the other MSS. (which show the complete form) he relegates to the second class. Their numerous interpolations and the variations arbitrarily introduced by their copyists make them quite untrustworthy, and they are only employed when absolutely necessary for supplying omissions in the source of the good MSS.

MSS. of the first class.

Now an interesting fact shows that Vat. Δ is a copy of Clarkianus, either directly or indirectly.⁶ The

¹ Schanz, *op. cit.* pp. 32, 45.

² *Ibid.* p. 46.

³ Bekker's \mathfrak{A} , denoted in Schanz's edition by B; *b* being the second hand.

⁴ Schanz's *Novae Commentationes Platonicae*, p. 114; *ibid.*, pp. 105 ff., an interesting account of the discovery and characteristics of the MS. is given.

⁵ *I.e.* the first part of Vat. $\Delta\Theta$.

⁶ Schanz, pp. 53, 54.

Clarkianus suffered from damp, the effect of which has been to render illegible whole pages, the ink of one having come off on the one opposite. Fortunately, in the *Protagoras* the damage is chiefly confined to the few first lines of the page, but the result is that the copyist of Vat. Δ, or of the MS. that intervened between it and the Clarkianus, has often been unable to decipher his exemplar, and has been obliged to leave gaps.¹ Thus the readings of Vat. Δ² may practically be neglected. Venetus II and Tubingensis do not contain the *Protagoras*. Consequently, the codex Clarkianus is the sole representative of the first class of importance for our dialogue.³

Character-
istics of the
codex
Clarkianus.

Its characteristics, which are also those of the Archetypus, are as follows—

(1) Verbal errors arise in the main from the incorrect combination or separation of letters, *e.g.*—

- In 321 B. Schanz reads ὑποδῶν, Clarkianus ὑπὸ ποδῶν.
 324 C. Schanz reads οἱ σοί, Clarkianus οἷς οἱ.
 327 C. Schanz reads ἐν ἐννόμοις, Clarkianus ἐν νόμοις.
 346 C. Schanz reads τ' ὀνησίπολιν, Clarkianus γε ὀνήσει πόλιν.
 348 D. Schanz reads περιῶν, Clarkianus περιὶ ῶν.

(2) Interpolations are very numerous, *e.g.*—

- 314 A. Schanz brackets παρὰ τοῦ καπήλου καὶ ἐμπορίου of Clarkianus.
 329 D. Schanz brackets τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἑτέρων of Clarkianus.
 332 A. Schanz brackets εἰ . . . ἔπραττον of Clarkianus.
 355 B. Schanz brackets λέγετε of Clarkianus.
 358 B. Schanz brackets καὶ ὠφέλιμοι of Clarkianus.

¹ A considerable number of instances are given by Schanz, p. 54.

² V in Schanz's edition.

³ Schanz, *Prolegg. ad Euthydemum* (1873), follows it as the sole authority upon *iota adscriptum* and *ν ἐφελκυστικόν*.

And a very large number more are detected by Schanz, though, with other editors, I have not always been able to agree.

(3) Omission of letters, syllables, and words, in consequence of the vicinity of similar letters, etc., is frequent; but whole sentences are not omitted, *e.g.*—

- 312 A. Schanz reads οἷαπερ ἢ παρά, Clarkianus οἷα περί.
 316 C. Schanz reads μάλιστ' ἂν γενέσθαι, Clarkianus μάλιστα γενέσθαι.
 354 C. Schanz reads ἀλλ' ἢ ἡδονάς, Clarkianus ἀλλ' ἡδονάς.
 356 C. Schanz reads αἶ φωναὶ αἶ ἴσαι, Clarkianus αἶ φωναὶ ἴσαι.

(4) Transpositions are infrequent. I have noticed none in the *Protagoras*.

It has been stated already how little value Schanz attaches to the MSS. of the second class. He regards Bekker's † (Venetus, append., class 4, cod. 1), which he denotes by T, as the original of them all. MSS. of the second class.

He mentions only one passage in our dialogue, where T has escaped an interpolation found in B (Clarkianus). This is 332 E, where he reads πότερον οὖν, with T, instead of the πρότερον οὐκοῦν of B. In several places, however, he prefers the reading of T to that of B, but only assigns to it the same authority that a happy conjecture would have.¹ To take the first few pages, we find Schanz reading

- 309 B. αὐτοῦ T for αὐτοῦ B.
 312 A. οἷαπερ ἢ παρά T for οἷα περί B.
 312 D. ἢ ἀπόκρισις T for ἢ ἀποκρίσεως B.
 313 B. αὐτῷ T for αὐτῶ B.
 313 B. διείλεξαι T for διήλεξαι B.
 313 C. μαθήμασι T for μάθησιν B.

¹ Compare his remarks, *Prolegg. ad Euthyd.* (1873), p. x.

It should, however, be noticed that Kroschel¹ thinks that the words of Plato are given with fewer errors by this MS. as being of purer descent than the Clarkianus, and "has not hesitated in a difference of readings, provided both readings could stand, to follow it."

Below will be found the variations of this edition from that of Schanz (1880). They are nearly all in the direction of a return to the MSS. reading. The differences between Schanz's and the received orthography of certain words are not noticed.

- 309 C. σοφώτατον for σοφώτερον.
 311 A. ἐκείσε [ἴωμεν] for [ἐκείσε ἴωμεν].
 311 D. μοι, for μοι.
 312 B. παιδοτρίβου· for παιδοτρίβου;
 313 C. φαίνεται γὰρ ἔμοιγε τοιοῦτός τις, attributed to Socrates;
 by Schanz to Hippocrates.
 315 B. Brackets round ἔφη "Ὀμηρος removed.
 315 C. Brackets round ἀστρονομικά removed.
 316 B. μόνοι deleted.
 316 C. μάλιστα γενέσθαι for μάλιστ' ἂν γενέσθαι.
 317 D. αὐτοί τε for αὐτοί.
 319 A. κέκτησαι for ἔκτησαι.
 319 C. ἐξαίρωνται for ἐξάρωνται.
 319 D. περὶ [τῶν] τῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως for περὶ τῶν τῆς
 πόλεως [διοικήσεως].
 320 C. διεξελθών for διεξέλθω.
 320 D. νείμαντος δέ μου for νείμαντος δ' ἐμοῦ.
 322 A. Brackets round δι' Ἐπιμηθέα removed.
 322 A. Brackets round διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ συγγένειαν removed.
 325 D. ὅπως ὡς for ὅπως.
 327 C. ἐν νόμοις καί for ἐν ἐννόμοις.
 328 A. διδάξειεν, for διδάξειεν;
 329 A. τούτου deleted.
 329 B. δολιχόν for δόλιχον.

¹ *Prolegg. ad Protag.* pp. 35, 36; and see Sauppe, p. 143.

- 329 D. Brackets round τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἑτέρων removed, and ἀλλήλων deleted.
- 331 E. Brackets round τὸ ὁμοῖον removed.
- 333 B. πλείοσι for πλείω.
- 333 D. Brackets round ὅτι ἀδικοῦσιν removed.
- 333 E. παρατετάχθαι for παρατετάσθαι.
- 334 A. οὐδενί for οὐδέσι.
- 335 E. Brackets round δρομεῖ ἀκμάζοντι removed.
- 338 A. ὥς for ὡς.
- 338 A. πείθεσθε for πίθεσθε.
- 340 C. ἔλεγεν τὸ χαλεπὸν, γενέσθαι for ἔλεγεν χαλεπὸν, τὸ γενέσθαι.
- 343 B. εἰρημένα· for εἰρημέν' ἅ.
- 347 D. καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι for [πεπαιδευμένοι].
- 349 D. Brackets round διαφερόντως removed.
- 353 D. ὅ τι μαθόντα for ὅτι παθόντα.
- 355 B. Brackets round λέγετε removed.
- 356 A. ἀναξία for δὴ ἀξία.



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C ΕΤ. Καὶ τί ἂν γεγονὸς εἴη περὶ σὲ κακείνον τοσοῦτον πρᾶγμα ; οὐ γὰρ δήπου τινὶ καλλίονι ἐνέτυχες ἄλλω ἔν γε τῆδε τῆ πόλει.

ΣΩ. Καὶ πολὺ γε.

ΕΤ. Τί φῆς ; ἀστῶ ἢ ξένω ;

ΣΩ. Ξένω.

ΕΤ. Ποδαπῶ ;

ΣΩ. Ἀβδηρίτη.

ΕΤ. Καὶ οὕτω καλὸς τις ὁ ξένος ἔδοξέν σοι εἶναι, ὥστε τοῦ Κλεινίου υἱέος καλλίων σοι φανῆναι ;

ΣΩ. Πῶς δ' οὐ μέλλει, ὦ μακάριε, τὸ σοφώτατον κάλλιον φαίνεσθαι ;

ΕΤ. Ἀλλ' ἢ σοφῶ τινι ἡμῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐντυχὼν πάρει ;

D ΣΩ. Σοφωτάτῳ μὲν οὖν δήπου τῶν γε νῦν, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ σοφώτατος εἶναι Πρωταγόρας.

ΕΤ. ὦ τί λέγεις ; Πρωταγόρας ἐπιδεδήμηκεν ;

ΣΩ. Τρίτην γε ἤδη ἡμέραν.

ΕΤ. Καὶ ἄρτι ἄρα ἐκείνῳ συγγεγονὼς ἦκεις ;

310 ΣΩ. Πάνυ γε πολλὰ καὶ εἰπὼν καὶ ἀκούσας.

ΕΤ. Τί οὖν οὐ διηγῆσω ἡμῖν τὴν ξυνουσίαν, εἰ μὴ σέ τι κωλύει, καθιζόμενος ἐνταυθί, ἐξαναστήσας τὸν παῖδα τουτονί ;

ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ χάριν γε εἶσομαι, ἐὰν ἀκούητε.

ΕΤ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἡμεῖς σοί, ἐὰν λέγῃς.

ΣΩ. Διπλῆ ἂν εἴη ἡ χάρις. ἄλλ' οὖν ἀκούετε.

Τῆς παρελθούσης νυκτὸς ταυτησί, ἔτι βαθέος ὄρθρου, Ἰπποκράτης ὁ Ἀπολλοδώρου υἱός, Φάσωνος
B δὲ ἀδελφός, τὴν θύραν τῆ βακτηρία πάνυ σφόδρα ἔκρουε, καὶ ἐπειδὴ αὐτῶ ἀνέωξέ τις, εὐθύς εἶσω ἦεν ἐπειγόμενος, καὶ τῆ φωνῆ μέγα λέγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἐγρήγορας ἢ καθεύδεις ; καὶ ἐγὼ τὴν φωνὴν

γνοὺς αὐτοῦ, Ἴπποκράτης, ἔφην, οὗτος· μή τι νεώτερον
 ἀγγέλλεις; Οὐδέν γ', ἢ δ' ὅς, εἰ μὴ ἀγαθὰ γε. Εὖ
 ἂν λέγοις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἔστι δὲ τί, καὶ τοῦ ἔνεκα τηνι-
 κάδε ἀφίκου; Πρωταγόρας, ἔφη, ἤκει, στὰς παρ'
 ἐμοί. Πρώην ἔφην ἐγώ· σὺ δὲ ἄρτι πέπυσαι; Νῆ
 τοὺς θεούς, ἔφη, ἐσπέρας γε. καὶ ἅμα ἐπιψηλαφήσας
 τοῦ σκίμποδος ἐκαθέζετο παρὰ τοὺς πόδας μου, καὶ
 εἶπεν· Ἐσπέρας δῆτα, μάλα γε ὄψὲ ἀφικόμενος ἐξ
 Οἰνόης. ὁ γάρ τοι παῖς με ὁ Σάτυρος ἀπέδρα· καὶ
 δῆτα μέλλων σοι φράζειν, ὅτι διωξιόμην αὐτόν, ὑπό-
 τινος ἄλλου ἐπελαθόμην· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἦλθον καὶ δε-
 δειπνηκότες ἦμεν καὶ ἐμέλλομεν ἀναπαύεσθαι, τότε
 μοι ἀδελφὸς λέγει, ὅτι ἤκει Πρωταγόρας. καὶ ἔτι μὲν
 ἐνεχείρησα εὐθὺς παρὰ σὲ ἵεναι, ἔπειτά μοι λίαν
 πόρρω ἔδοξε τῶν νυκτῶν εἶναι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ τάχιστα με
 ἐκ τοῦ κόπου ὁ ὕπνος ἀνήκεν, εὐθὺς ἀναστὰς οὕτω
 δεῦρο ἐπορευόμην. καὶ ἐγὼ γιγνώσκων αὐτοῦ τὴν
 ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὴν πτόησιν, Τι οὖν σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,
 τοῦτο; μὴ τί σε ἀδικεῖ Πρωταγόρας; καὶ ὅς γελάσας,
 Νῆ τοὺς θεούς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι γε μόνος ἐστὶ
 σοφός, ἐμὲ δὲ οὐ ποιεῖ. Ἄλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δία, ἔφην ἐγώ,
 ἂν αὐτῷ διδώσῃ ἀργύριον [καὶ πείθῃς ἐκεῖνον,] ποιήσῃ
 καὶ σὲ σοφόν. Εἰ γάρ, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ θεοί, ἐν
 τούτῳ εἴη· ὡς οὐτ' ἂν τῶν ἐμῶν ἐπιλίποισι οὐδὲν οὔτε
 τῶν φίλων· ἀλλ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ νῦν ἤκω παρὰ σέ,
 ἵνα ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ διαλεχθῆς αὐτῷ. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἅμα μὲν καὶ
 νεώτερός εἰμι, ἅμα δὲ οὐδὲ ἑώρακα Πρωταγόραν πώ-
 ποτε οὐδ' ἀκήκοα οὐδέν· ἔτι γὰρ παῖς ἦ, ὅτε τὸ
 πρότερον ἐπεδήμησεν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες,
 πάντες τὸν ἄνδρα ἐπαινοῦσιν καὶ φασιν σοφώτατον
 εἶναι λέγειν· ἀλλὰ τί οὐ βαδίζομεν παρ' αὐτόν, ἵνα
 ἔνδον καταλάβωμεν; καταλύει δ', ὡς ἐγὼ ἤκουσα,
 παρὰ Καλλία τῷ Ἴππονίκου· ἀλλ' ἴωμεν. καὶ ἐγὼ

εἰς 311 α
 εἰς 311 α

εἶπον· Μήπω γ', ὦγαθέ, ἐκείσε [ἴωμεν,] πρῶ γάρ ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ δεῦρο ἐξαναστῶμεν εἰς τὴν αὐλήν, καὶ περιιόντες αὐτοῦ διατρίψωμεν, ἕως ἂν φῶς γένηται· εἶτα ἴωμεν. καὶ γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ Πρωταγόρας ἔνδον διατρίβει, ὥστε, θάρρει, καταληψόμεθα αὐτόν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ἔνδον.

Μετὰ ταῦτα ἀναστάντες εἰς τὴν αὐλήν περιῆμεν·
 B καὶ ἐγὼ ἀποπειρώμενος τοῦ Ἴπποκράτους τῆς ῥώμης
 διεσκόπουν αὐτόν καὶ ἠρώτων, Εἶπέ μοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ
 Ἴππόκρατες, παρὰ Πρωταγόραν νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς ἰέναι,
 ἀργύριον τελῶν ἐκείνῳ μισθὸν ὑπὲρ σεαυτοῦ, ὡς παρὰ
 τίνα ἀφιζόμενος καὶ τίς γενησόμενος; ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ
 ἐπενόεις παρὰ τὸν σαυτοῦ ὁμώνυμον ἔλθων Ἴπποκράτη
 τὸν Κῶον, τὸν τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν, ἀργύριον τελεῖν
 ὑπὲρ σαυτοῦ μισθὸν ἐκείνῳ, εἴ τίς σε ἤρετο, Εἶπέ μοι,
 μέλλεις τελεῖν, ὦ Ἴππόκρατες, Ἴπποκράτει μισθὸν ὡς
 C τίτι ὄντι; τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω; Εἶπον ἂν, ἔφη, ὅτι ὡς
 ἰατρῷ. Ὡς τίς γενησόμενος; Ὡς ἰατρός, ἔφη. Εἰ
 δὲ παρὰ Πολύκλειτον τὸν Ἀργεῖον ἢ Φειδίαν τὸν
 Ἀθηναῖον ἐπενόεις ἀφικόμενος μισθὸν ὑπὲρ σαυτοῦ
 τελεῖν ἐκείνοις, εἴ τίς σε ἤρετο· τελεῖν τοῦτο τὸ
 ἀργύριον ὡς τίτι ὄντι ἐν νῶ ἔχεις Πολυκλείτῳ τε καὶ
 Φειδίᾳ; τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω; Εἶπον ἂν ὡς ἀγαλματο-
 ποιοῖς. Ὡς τίς δὲ γενησόμενος αὐτός; Δῆλον ὅτι
 D ἀγαλματοποιός. Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· παρὰ δὲ δὴ Πρω-
 ταγόραν νῦν ἀφικόμενοι ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ ἀργύριον
 ἐκείνῳ μισθὸν ἐτοῖμοι ἐσόμεθα τελεῖν ὑπὲρ σοῦ, ἂν μὲν
 ἐξικνηῆται τὰ ἡμέτερα χρήματα καὶ τούτοις πείθωμεν
 αὐτόν, εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων προσαναλίσκοντες.
 εἰ οὖν τις ἡμᾶς περὶ ταῦτα οὕτω σφόδρα σπουδάζοντας
 ἔροιτο· εἶπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατές τε καὶ Ἴππόκρατες, ὡς
 τίτι ὄντι τῷ Πρωταγῶρα ἐν νῶ ἔχετε χρήματα τελεῖν;
 E τί ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκριναίμεθα; τί ὄνομα ἄλλο [γε]

λεγόμενον περὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούομεν, ὥσπερ περὶ
 Φειδίου ἀγαματοποιὸν καὶ περὶ Ὀμήρου ποιητήν, [τι
 τοιοῦτον περὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούομεν;] Σοφιστὴν δὴ τοι
 ὀνομάζουσί γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι, ἔφη.
 Ὡς σοφιστῆ ἄρα ἐρχόμεθα τελούντες τὰ χρήματα;
 Μάλιστα. Εἰ οὖν καὶ τοῦτό τίς σε προσέροιτο· αὐτὸς
 δὲ δὴ ὡς τίς γενησόμενος ἐρχεῖ παρὰ τὸν Πρωταγόραν;
 καὶ ὃς εἶπεν ἐρυθριάσας—ἤδη γὰρ ὑπέφαινέν τι ἡμέρας,
 ὥστε καταφανῆ αὐτὸν γενέσθαι—Εἰ μὲν τι τοῖς 312
 ἔμπροσθεν ἔοικεν, δῆλον ὅτι σοφιστῆς γενησόμενος.
 Σὺ δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἂν αἰσχύνοιο εἰς τοὺς
 Ἕλληνας σαυτὸν σοφιστὴν παρέχων; Νῆ τὸν Δία, ὦ
 Σώκρατες, εἶπερ· γε ἂ διανοοῦμαι χρὴ λέγειν. Ἄλλ'
 ἄρα, ὦ Ἰππόκρατες, μὴ οὐ τοιαύτην ὑπολαμβάνεις
 σου τὴν παρὰ Πρωταγόρου μάθησιν ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλ'
 οἴαπερ ἢ παρὰ τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ ἐγένετο καὶ κιθα- B
 ριστοῦ καὶ παιδοτρίβου· τούτων γὰρ σὺ ἐκάστην οὐκ
 ἐπὶ τέχνῃ ἔμαθες, [ὡς δημιουργὸς ἐσόμενος,] ἀλλ' ἐπὶ
 παιδείᾳ, ὡς τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τὸν ἐλεύθερον πρέπει. *Μακε δ*
 Πάνυ μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, τοιαύτη μᾶλλον εἶναι *cf. 315*
 ἢ παρὰ Πρωταγόρου μάθησις. *ὡς σοφιστῆς*
Σωκρῆτις

Οἶσθα οὖν ὃ μέλλεις νῦν πράττειν, ἢ σε λανθάνει;
 ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Τοῦ πέρι; Ὅτι μέλλεις τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν
 σαυτοῦ παρασχεῖν θεραπεῦσαι ἀνδρὶ, ὡς φῆς, σοφιστῆ· C
 ὃ τι δέ ποτε ὁ σοφιστῆς ἐστίν, θαυμάζοιμ' ἂν εἰ οἶσθα.
 καίτοι εἰ τοῦτ' ἀγνοεῖς, οὐδὲ ὅτῳ παραδίδως τὴν ψυχὴν
 οἶσθα, οὔτ' εἰ ἀγαθῶ οὔτ' εἰ κακῶ πράγματι. Οἶμαί
 γ', ἔφη, εἰδέναί. Λέγε δὴ, τί ἡγεῖ εἶναι τὸν σοφιστὴν;
 Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὥσπερ τοῦνομα λέγει, τοῦτον εἶναι
 τὸν τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμονα. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,
 τοῦτο μὲν ἔξεστι λέγειν καὶ περὶ ζωγράφων καὶ περὶ
 τεκτόνων, ὅτι οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμονες·
 ἀλλ' εἴ τις ἔροιτο ἡμᾶς, τῶν τί σοφῶν εἰσιν οἱ D

παρασχεῖν? (καὶ: καὶ παρασχεῖν· πᾶσαι).

ζωγράφοι ἐπιστήμονες, εἴπομεν ἄν που αὐτῷ, ὅτι τῶν πρὸς τὴν ἀπεργασίαν τὴν τῶν εἰκόνων, καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως. εἰ δέ τις ἐκεῖνο ἔροιτο, ὁ δὲ σοφιστῆς τῶν τί σοφῶν ἐστίν; τί ἂν ἀποκρινοίμεθα αὐτῷ; ποίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης; Τί ἂν, †εἶ† εἴπομεν αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν; Ἴσως ἂν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ λέγοιμεν, οὐ μέντοι ἱκανῶς γε· ἐρωτήσεως γὰρ ἔτι ἢ ἀπόκρισις ἡμῖν δεῖται. περὶ ὅτου ὁ σοφιστῆς δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν· Ἐὼσπερ ὁ κιθαριστῆς δεινὸν δήπου ποιεῖ λέγειν περὶ οὐπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμονα, περὶ κιθαρίσεως· ἦ γάρ; Ναί. Εἶεν· ὁ δὲ δὴ σοφιστῆς περὶ τίνος δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν; †ἦ† δῆλον ὅτι περὶ οὐπερ καὶ ἐπίσταται; Εἰκός γε. Τί δὴ ἐστίν τούτο, περὶ οὗ αὐτός τε ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν ὁ σοφιστῆς καὶ τὸν μαθητὴν ποιεῖ; Μὰ Δί', ἔφη, οὐκέτι ἔχω σοι λέγειν.

313 Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον μετὰ τούτο· Τί οὖν; οἶσθα εἰς οἶόν τινα κίνδυνον ἔρχει ὑποθήσων τὴν ψυχὴν; ἢ εἰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα ἐπιτρέπειν σε ἔδει τῷ, διακινδυνεύοντα ἢ χρηστὸν αὐτὸ γενέσθαι ἢ πονηρόν, πολλὰ ἂν περισκέψω, εἴτ' ἐπιτρεπτέον εἴτε οὐ, καὶ εἰς συμβουλήν τούς τε φίλους ἂν παρεκάλεις καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους, σκοπούμενος ἡμέρας συχνάς· ὁ δὲ περὶ πλείονος τοῦ σώματος ἡγεί, τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ πάντ' ἐστὶν τὰ σα ἢ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πράττειν, χρηστοῦ ἢ πονηροῦ αὐτοῦ γενομένου, Β περὶ δὲ τούτου οὔτε τῷ πατρὶ οὔτε τῷ ἀδελφῷ ἐπεκοινώσω οὔτε ἡμῶν τῶν ἐταίρων οὐδενί, εἴτ' ἐπιτρεπτέον εἴτε καὶ οὐ τῷ ἀφικομένῳ τούτῳ ξένῳ τὴν σὴν ψυχὴν, ἀλλ' ἐσπέρας ἀκούσας, ὡς φῆς, ὄρθριος ἦκων περὶ μὲν τούτου οὐδένα λόγον οὐδὲ συμβουλήν ποιεῖ, εἴτε χρὴ ἐπιτρέπειν σαυτὸν αὐτῷ εἴτε μή, ἐτοῖμος δ' εἶ ἀναλίσκειν τὰ τε σαυτοῦ καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων χρήματα, ὡς ἤδη διεγνωκῶς, ὅτι πάντως συνεστέον

Πρωταγόρα, ὃν οὔτε γιννώσκεις, ὡς φῆς, οὔτε διείλεξαι
 οὔδεπώποτε, σοφιστήν δ' ὀνομάζεις, τὸν δὲ σοφιστήν, C
 ὃ τί ποτ' ἔστιν, φαίνει ἀγνοῶν, [ὧ μὲλλεις σαυτὸν σοφιστήν
 ἐπιτρέπειν ;] καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας, "Εοικεν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώ-
 κρατες, ἐξ ὧν σὺ λέγεις. Ἄρ' οὖν, ὦ Ἰππόκρατες, ὁ
 σοφιστῆς τυγχάνει ὧν ἔμπορός τις ἢ κάπηλος τῶν
 ἀγωγίμων, ἀφ' ὧν ψυχὴ τρέφεται ; φαίνεται γὰρ
 ἔμοιγε τοιοῦτός τις. Τρέφεται δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ψυχὴ
 τίνι ; Μαθήμασιν δήπου, ἣν δ' ἐγώ. καὶ ὅπως γε μή,
 ὦ ἑταῖρε, ὁ σοφιστῆς ἐπαινῶν ἀ πωλεῖ ἔξαπατήσει
 ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος τροφήν, [ὁ σοφιστῆς
 ἔμπορός τε καὶ κάπηλος.] καὶ γὰρ οὗτοί που ὧν D
 ἀγούσιν ἀγωγίμων οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἴσασιν ὅ τι χρηστὸν ἢ
 πονηρὸν [περὶ τὸ σῶμα,] ἐπαινοῦσιν δὲ πάντα πωλοῦν-
 τες, οὔτε οἱ ὠνούμενοι παρ' αὐτῶν, εἰ μὴ τις τύχη
 γυμναστικὸς ἢ ἰατρὸς ὧν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ μαθήματα
 περιάγοντες κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ πωλοῦντες καὶ
 καπηλεύοντες τῷ ἀεὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντι ἐπαινοῦσιν μὲν
 πάντα ἀ πωλοῦσιν, τάχα δ' ἂν τινες, ὦ ἄριστε, καὶ
 τούτων ἀγνοοῖεν ὧν πωλοῦσιν ὅ τι χρηστὸν ἢ πονηρὸν
 [πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν.] ὡς δ' αὐτως καὶ οἱ ὠνούμενοι παρ' E
 αὐτῶν, εἰ μὴ τις τύχη περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτῶν ἰατρικὸς
 ὧν. εἰ μὲν οὖν σὺ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστήμων τούτων τί
 χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρὸν, ἀσφαλές σοι ὠνεῖσθαι μαθήματα
 καὶ παρὰ Πρωταγόρου καὶ παρ' ἄλλου ὄτουοῦν. εἰ δὲ
 μή, ὄρα, ὦ μακάριε, μὴ περὶ τοῖς φιλτάτοις κυβεύης 314
 [τε καὶ κινδυνεύης.] καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ πολὺ μείζων
 κίνδυνος ἐν τῇ τῶν μαθημάτων ὠνῇ ἢ ἐν τῇ τῶν
 σιτίων. σιτία μὲν γὰρ καὶ ποτὰ πριάμενον [παρὰ
 τοῦ καπήλου καὶ ἐμποροῦ] ἔξεστιν ἐν ἄλλοις ἀγγείοις
 ἀποφέρειν, καὶ πρὶν δέξασθαι αὐτὰ εἰς τὸ σῶμα [πίοντα
 ἢ φαγόντα,] καταθέμενον οἴκαδε [ἔξεστιν] συμβουλεύ-
 σασθαι, παρακαλέσαντα τὸν ἐπαίοντα, ὅ τι τε ἐδεστέον

καὶ χρηστὸν περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα
 βίωσιν εἰς τὸ σῶμα - τῇ ψυχῇ

ἢ ποτέον καὶ ὅ τι μή, καὶ ὅπόσον καὶ ὅποτε· ὥστε ἐν τῇ ὠνῇ οὐ μέγας ὁ κίνδυνος. μαθήματα δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν B ἐν ἄλλῳ ἀγγείῳ ἀπενεγκεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη, καταθέντα τὴν τιμὴν, τὸ μάθημα ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ λαβόντα [καὶ μαθόντα] ἀπιέναι ἢ βεβλαμμένον ἢ ὠφελημένον. ταῦτα οὖν σκοπώμεθα καὶ μετὰ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἡμῶν· ἡμεῖς γὰρ ἔτι νέοι ὥστε τοσοῦτον πράγμα διελέσθαι. νῦν μέντοι, ὥσπερ ὠρμήσαμεν, ἴωμεν [καὶ ἀκούσωμεν] τοῦ ἀνδρός, ἔπειτα ἀκούσαντες καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνακοινωσώμεθα· καὶ γὰρ οὐ μόνος Πρωταγόρας αὐτόθι ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἰππίας ὁ Ἡλείος· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Πρόδικον τὸν Κεῖον· καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ καὶ σοφοί.

Δόξαν ἡμῖν ταῦτα ἐπορευόμεθα· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐν τῷ προθύρῳ ἐγενόμεθα, ἐπιστάντες περὶ τίνος λόγου διελεγόμεθα, ὃς ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ἐπέπεσεν· ἴν' οὖν μὴ ἀτελής γένοιτο, ἀλλὰ διαπερανάμενοι οὕτως ἐσίοιμεν, ἐπιστάντες ἐν τῷ προθύρῳ διελεγόμεθα, ἕως συνωμολογήσαμεν ἀλλήλοις. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι, ὁ θυρωρός, εὐνοῦχός τις, κατήκουεν ἡμῶν, κινδυνεύει δὲ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν σοφιστῶν ἀχθεσθαι τοῖς φοιτῶσιν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν· ἐπειδὴ γοῦν ἐκρούσαμεν τὴν θύραν, ἀνοίξας καὶ ἰδὼν ἡμᾶς, Ἔα, ἔφη, σοφισταί τινες· οὐ σχολὴ αὐτῷ· καὶ ἅμα ἀμφοῖν τοῖν χεροῖν τὴν θύραν πάνυ προθύμως ὡς οἶός τ' ἦν ἐπήραξεν. καὶ ἡμεῖς πάλιν ἐκρούομεν, καὶ ὃς ἐγκεκλημένης τῆς θύρας ἀποκρινόμενος εἶπεν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ἔφη, οὐκ ἀκηκόατε, ὅτι οὐ σχολὴ αὐτῷ; Ἄλλ' ὠγαθέ, ἔφην ἐγώ, οὔτε παρὰ Καλλίαν ἤκομεν οὔτε σοφισταί ἐσμεν· ἀλλὰ θάρρει· E Πρωταγόραν γὰρ τοι δεόμενοι ἰδεῖν ἤλθομεν· εἰσάγειλον οὖν. μόγισ οὖν ποτε ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπος ἀνέωξεν τὴν θύραν·

Ἐπειδὴ δὲ εἰσῆλθομεν, κατελάβομεν Πρωταγόραν ἐν τῷ προστώῳ περιπατοῦντα, ἐξῆς δ' αὐτῷ συμπερι-

ουσομεθα C
 constant me.
 Ἰππίας:
 311. 6.
 313. 2.
 C: ἐστάντες
 = ἐστάντες
 D: ἐστάντες

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Πρόδικος ἔτι κατέκειτο, ἐγκεκαλυμμένος ἐν κωδίοις
 τισὶν καὶ στρώμασιν καὶ μάλα πολλοῖς, ὡς ἐφαίνετο·
 παρεκάθηντο δὲ αὐτῷ ἐπὶ ταῖς πλησίον κλίμαις
 Πausανίας τε ὁ ἐκ Κεραμέων καὶ μετὰ Πausανίου
 E νέου τι ἔτι μειράκιον, ὡς μὲν ἐγῶμαι, καλὸν τε κἀγαθὸν
 τὴν φύσιν, τὴν δ' οὖν ἰδέαν πάνυ καλός. ἔδοξα ἀκούσαι
 ὄνομα αὐτῷ εἶναι Ἀγάθωνα, καὶ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι, εἰ
 παιδικὰ Πausανίου τυγχάνει ὦν. τοῦτ' ἦν τὸ μειρά-
 κιον, καὶ τὸ Ἀδειμάντω ἀμφοτέρω, ὃ τε Κήπιδος καὶ ὁ
 Λευκολοφίδου, καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς ἐφαίνοντο· περὶ δὲ ὧν
 διελέγοντο οὐκ ἐδυνάμην ἐγωγε μαθεῖν ἔξωθεν, καίπερ
 λιπαρῶς ἔχων ἀκούειν τοῦ Προδίκου.—πάσσοφος γάρ
 316 μοι δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ εἶναι καὶ θεῖος.—ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν βαρύτητα
 τῆς φωνῆς βόμβος τις ἐν τῷ οἰκήματι γιγνόμενος
 ἀσαφῆ ἐποίει τὰ λεγόμενα.

Καὶ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἄρτι εἰσεληλύθειμεν, κατόπιν δὲ
 ἡμῶν ἐπεισῆλθον Ἀλκιβιάδης τε ὁ καλός, ὡς φῆς σὺ
 καὶ ἐγὼ πείθομαι, καὶ Κριτίας ὁ Καλλαίσχρου.

Ἡμεῖς οὖν ὡς εἰσῆλθομεν, ἔτι σμίκρ' ἄττα δια-
 B τρίψαντες καὶ ταῦτα διαθεασάμενοι προσῆμεν πρὸς
 τὸν Πρωταγόραν, καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· ὦ Πρωταγόρα, πρὸς
 σέ τοι ἦλθομεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ Ἰπποκράτης οὗτος. Πότερον,
 ἔφη, μόνω βουλόμενοι διαλεχθῆναι ἢ καὶ μετὰ τῶν
 ἄλλων; Ἡμῖν μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· ἀκούσας
 δέ, οὐ ἔνεκα ἦλθομεν, αὐτὸς σκέψαι. Τί οὖν δὴ ἐστίν,
 ἔφη, οὐ ἔνεκα ἦκετε; Ἰπποκράτης ὅδε ἐστὶν μὲν τῶν
 ἐπιχωρίων, Ἀπολλοδώρου υἱός, οἰκίας μεγάλης τε καὶ
 εὐδαίμονος, αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν φύσιν δοκεῖ ἐνάμιλλος εἶναι
 C τοῖς ἡλικιώταις. ἐπιθυμεῖν δέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐλλόγιμος
 γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει, τοῦτο δὲ οἶεται οἱ μάλιστα
 γενέσθαι, εἰ σοὶ συγγένοιτο· ταῦτ' οὖν ἤδη σὺ σκόπει,
 πότερον περὶ αὐτῶν μόνος οἶει δεῖν διαλέγεσθαι πρὸς
 μόνους, ἢ μετ' ἄλλων. Ὁρθῶς, ἔφη, προμηθεῖ, ὦ

τὸν Σκίμωνα δὲ, ἧμιν ἐπιπέσει ἕως ζεῖον ἐνδρα δι
εὐλαβεῖσθαι τὰ πρᾶττοντα.

Σώκρατες, ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ. ξένον γὰρ ἄνδρα καὶ ἰόντα εἰς πόλεις μεγάλας, καὶ ἐν ταύταις πείθοντα τῶν νέων τοὺς βελτίστους ἀπολείποντας τὰς τῶν ἄλλων συνουσίας, καὶ οἰκείων καὶ ὀθνείων, καὶ πρεσβυτέρων καὶ νεωτέρων ἑαυτῷ συνεῖναι ὡς βελτίους ἐσομένους διὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ συνουσίαν, χρὴ εὐλαβεῖσθαι [τὸν] ταῦτα D πρᾶττοντα· οὐ γὰρ σμικροὶ περὶ αὐτὰ φθόνοι τε γίνονται καὶ ἄλλαι δυσμένεαί τε καὶ ἐπιβουλαί. ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν σοφιστικὴν τέχνην φημὶ μὲν εἶναι παλαιάν, τοὺς δὲ μεταχειριζομένους αὐτὴν τῶν παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν, φοβουμένους τὸ ἐπαχθὲς αὐτῆς, πρόσχημα ποιεῖσθαι (316. ε. [καὶ προκαλύπτεσθαι,] τοὺς μὲν ποιήσιν, οἷον Ὀμηρόν Cobi. Int. τε καὶ Ἡσίοδον καὶ Σιμωνίδην, τοὺς δὲ αὐτὴν τελετάς τε D θεαί τε καὶ χρησμωδίας, τοὺς ἀμφί τε Ὀρφέα καὶ Μουσαῖον· ἐνίοις δὲ τινὰς ἡσθημαὶ καὶ γυμναστικὴν, οἷον Ἴκκος τε ὁ Ταραντῖνος καὶ ὁ νῦν ἔτι ὢν οὐδενὸς ἡττων E σοφιστῆς Ἡρόδικος ὁ Σηλυμβριανός, τὸ δὲ ἀρχαῖον Μεγαρεύς· μουσικὴν δὲ Ἀγαθοκλῆς τε ὁ ὑμέτερος πρόσχημα ἐποιήσατο, μέγας ὢν σοφιστῆς, καὶ Πυθοκλείδης ὁ Κεῖος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί. οὗτοι πάντες, ὥσπερ λέγω, φοβηθέντες τὸν φθόνον ταῖς τέχναις ταύταις παραπετάσασιν ἐχρήσαντο· ἐγὼ δὲ τούτοις 317 ἅπασιν κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι οὐ συμφέρομαι· ἡγούμαι γὰρ αὐτοὺς οὐ τι διαπράξασθαι ὃ ἐβουλήθησαν· οὐ γὰρ λαθεῖν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς δυναμένους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι πράττειν, ὧν περ ἕνεκα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν τὰ προσχήματα· ἐπεὶ οἳ γε πολλοὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν αἰσθάνονται, ἀλλ' ἅπτ' ἂν οὗτοι διαγγέλλωσι, ταῦτα ὑμνοῦσιν. τὸ οὖν ἀποδιδράσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι ἀποδρᾶναι, ἀλλὰ καταφανῆ εἶναι, πολλὴ μωρία καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος, καὶ πολὺ δυσμενεστέρους παρέχεσθαι ἀνάγκη τοὺς B ἀνθρώπους· ἡγούνται γὰρ τὸν τοιοῦτον πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πανούργον εἶναι. ἐγὼ οὖν τούτων τὴν

ἐναντίαν ἅπασαν ὁδὸν ἐλήλυθα, καὶ ὁμολογῶ τε
 σοφιστῆς εἶναι καὶ παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους, καὶ εὐλά-
 βειαν ταύτην οἶμαι βελτίω ἐκείνης εἶναι, τὸ ὁμολογεῖν
 μᾶλλον ἢ ἔξαρνον εἶναι· καὶ ἄλλας πρὸς ταύτη
 C ἔσκεμμαι, ὥστε, σὺν θεῷ εἰπεῖν, μηδὲν δεινὸν πάσχειν
 διὰ τὸ ὁμολογεῖν σοφιστῆς εἶναι. καίτοι πολλά γε
 ἔτη ἤδη εἰμι ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ· καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὰ ξύμπαντα
 πολλά μοί ἐστιν· οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ πάντων ἀν ὑμῶν
 καθ' ἡλικίαν πατὴρ εἶην· ὥστε πολὺ μοι ἡδιστόν
 ἐστιν, εἴ τι βούλεσθε, περὶ τούτων ἀπάντων ἐναντίον
 τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων τὸν λόγον ποιείσθαι. καὶ ἐγώ—
 ὑπώπτευσα γὰρ βούλεσθαι αὐτὸν τῷ τε Προδίκῳ καὶ
 τῷ Ἰππία ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ καλλωπίσασθαι, ὅτι ἐρασταὶ
 D αὐτοῦ ἀφιγμένοι εἴμεν—Τί οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, οὐ καὶ
 Πρόδικον καὶ Ἰππίαν ἐκαλέσαμεν καὶ τοὺς μετ' αὐτῶν,
 ἵνα ἐπακούσωσιν ἡμῶν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Πρω-
 ταγόρας. Βούλεσθε οὖν, ὁ Καλλίας ἔφη, συνέδριον
 κατασκευάσωμεν, ἵνα καθιζόμενοι διαλέγησθε; Ἐδόκει
 χρῆναι· ἄσμενοι δὲ πάντες ἡμεῖς, ὡς ἀκουσόμενοι
 ἀνδρῶν σοφῶν, καὶ αὐτοί τε ἀντιλαβόμενοι τῶν βάθρων
 καὶ τῶν κλινῶν κατεσκευάζομεν παρὰ τῷ Ἰππία· ἐκεῖ
 E γὰρ προῦπήρχε τὰ βάθρα. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ Καλλίας τε
 καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης ἠκέτην ἄγοντε τὸν Πρόδικον, ἀνα-
 στήσαντες ἐκ τῆς κλίνης, καὶ τοὺς μετὰ τοῦ Προδίκου.
 Ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντες συνεκαθεζόμεθα, ὁ Πρωταγόρας,
 Νῦν δὴ ἄν, ἔφη, λέγοις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ οἶδε
 πάρειςιν, περὶ ὧν ὀλίγον πρότερον μνείαν ἐποιούῃ πρὸς
 ἐμὲ ὑπὲρ τοῦ νεανίσκου. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι Ἡ αὐτὴ
 μοι ἀρχή ἐστιν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἥπερ ἄρτι, περὶ ὧν
 318 ἀφικόμην. Ἰπποκράτης γὰρ ὅδε τυγχάνει ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ
 ὧν τῆς σῆς συνουσίας· ὅ τι οὖν αὐτῷ ἀποβήσεται,
 εἴαν σοι συνῆ, ἠδέως ἄν φησι πυθέσθαι. τοσοῦτος ὁ
 γε ἡμέτερος λόγος. ὑπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας

οὐτις καὶ
 ἔλλειψεν
 ἢ ἡμῶν
 ἢ ἐκείνου
 (side)

εἶπεν· ὦ νεανίσκε, ἔσται τοίνυν σοι, ἐὰν ἐμοὶ συνῆς, ἢ ἂν ἡμέρα ἐμοὶ συγγένη, ἀπιέναι οἴκαδε βελτίονι γεγυότι, καὶ ἐν τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ταῦτά ταῦτα· καὶ ἐκάστης ἡμέρας ἀεὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἐπιδιδόναι. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας εἶπον· ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν B θαυμαστόν λέγεις, ἀλλὰ εἰκός, ἐπεὶ κὰν σύ, καίπερ τηλικούτος ὢν καὶ οὕτως σοφός, εἴ τίς σε διδάξειεν ὃ μὴ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστάμενος, βελτίων ἂν γένοιο· ἀλλὰ μὴ οὕτως, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ αὐτίκα μάλα μεταβαλὼν τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν Ἰπποκράτης ὅδε ἐπιθυμήσειεν τῆς συνουσίας τούτου τοῦ νεανίσκου τοῦ νῦν νεωστὶ ἐπιδημοῦντος, Ζευξίππου τοῦ Ἡρακλεώτου, καὶ ἀφικόμενος παρ' αὐτόν, ὥσπερ παρὰ σὲ νῦν, ἀκούσειεν αὐτοῦ ταῦτά C ταῦτα, ἅπερ σοῦ, ὅτι ἐκάστης ἡμέρας ξυνὼν αὐτῷ βελτίων ἔσται καὶ ἐπιδώσει· εἰ αὐτόν ἐπανέροιτο· τί δὴ φῆς βελτίω ἔσεσθαι καὶ εἰς τί ἐπιδώσειν; εἶποι ἂν αὐτῷ ὁ Ζεύξιππος, ὅτι πρὸς γραφικὴν· κὰν εἰ Ὀρθαγόρα τῷ Θηβαίῳ συγγενόμενος, ἀκούσας ἐκείνου ταῦτά ταῦτα, ἅπερ σοῦ, ἐπανέροιτο αὐτόν εἰς ὃ τι βελτίων καθ' ἡμέραν ἔσται συγγιγνόμενος ἐκείνῳ, εἶποι ἂν, ὅτι εἰς αὐλήσιν· οὕτω δὴ καὶ σὺ εἶπέ τῷ νεανίσκῳ D καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπὲρ τούτου ἐρωτῶντι, Ἰπποκράτης ὅδε Πρωταγόρα συγγενόμενος, ἢ ἂν αὐτῷ ἡμέρα συγγένηται, βελτίων ἅπεισι γενόμενος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡμερῶν ἐκάστης οὕτως ἐπιδώσει εἰς τί, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ περὶ τοῦ; καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας ἐμοῦ ταῦτα ἀκούσας, Σὺ τε καλῶς ἐρωτᾷς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἐγὼ τοῖς καλῶς ἐρωτῶσι χαίρω ἀποκρινόμενος. Ἰπποκράτης γὰρ παρ' ἐμὲ ἀφικόμενος οὐ πείσεται, ἅπερ ἂν ἔπαθεν ἄλλῳ τῷ συγγενόμενος τῶν σοφιστῶν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ E ἄλλοι λωβῶνται τοὺς νέους· τὰς γὰρ τέχνας αὐτοὺς πεφευγότας ἄκοντας πάλιν αὐτῶν ἄγοντες ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τέχνας, λογισμούς τε καὶ ἀστρονομίαν καὶ γεω-

μετρίαν καὶ μουσικὴν διδάσκοντες — καὶ ἅμα εἰς
 τὸν Ἰππίαν ἀπέβλεψεν — παρὰ δ' ἐμὲ ἀφικόμενος
 μαθήσεται οὐ περὶ ἄλλου του ἢ περὶ οὗ ἦκει. τὸ δὲ
 μάθημά ἐστιν εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἂν
 ἄριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς
 319 πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατώτατος ἂν εἶη καὶ
 πράττειν καὶ λέγειν. Ἄρα, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἔπομαί σου
 τῷ λόγῳ; δοκεῖς γάρ μοι λέγειν τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην
 καὶ ὑπισχνεῖσθαι ποιεῖν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς πολίτας.
 Αὐτὸ μὲν οὖν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ
 ἐπάγγελμα, ὃ ἐπαγγέλλομαι.

Ἡ καλόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τέχνημα ἄρα κέκτησαι, εἴπερ
 κέκτησαι· οὐ γάρ τι ἄλλο πρὸς γε σὲ εἰρήσεται ἢ
 ἄπερ νοῶ. ἐγὼ γὰρ τοῦτο, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, οὐκ ὄμην
 B διδακτὸν εἶναι, σοὶ δὲ λέγοντι οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως [ἂν]
 ἀπιστῶ. ὅθεν δὲ αὐτὸ ἠγοῦμαι οὐ διδακτὸν εἶναι
 μηδ' ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων παρασκευαστὸν ἀνθρώποις, δίκαιός
 εἶμι εἰπεῖν. ἐγὼ γὰρ Ἀθηναίους, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι
 Ἕλληνες, φημὶ σοφοὺς εἶναι. ὁρῶ οὖν ὅταν συλλε-
 γῶμεν εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἐπειδὴν μὲν περὶ οἰκοδομίας
 τι δέη πράξαι τὴν πόλιν, τοὺς οἰκοδόμους μεταπεμπο-
 μένους συμβούλους [περὶ τῶν οἰκοδομημάτων] ὅταν δὲ
 C περὶ ναυπηγίας, τοὺς ναυπηγούς, καὶ τὰλλα πάντα
 οὕτως, ὅσα ἠγοῦνται μαθητὰ τε καὶ διδακτὰ εἶναι·
 εἰ δέ τις ἄλλος ἐπιχειρῇ αὐτοῖς συμβουλεύειν, ὃν
 ἐκεῖνοι μὴ οἴονται δημιουργὸν εἶναι, κὰν πάνυ καλὸς ἦ
 καὶ πλούσιος καὶ τῶν γενναίων, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον
 ἀποδέχονται, ἀλλὰ καταγελῶσι καὶ θορυβοῦσιν, ἕως
 ἂν ἢ αὐτὸς ἀποστῇ ὃ ἐπιχειρῶν λέγειν καταθορυβηθείς,
 ἢ οἱ τοξόται αὐτὸν ἀφελκύσωσιν [ἢ [ἐξαίρωνται] κελευ-
 ὄντων τῶν πρυτάνεων. περὶ μὲν οὖν ὧν οἴονται ἐν
 D τέχνη εἶναι, οὕτω διαπράττονται· ἐπειδὴν δέ τι περὶ
 [τῶν] τῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως δέη βουλευσασθαι, συμ-

ἄρα κελεύει συμβούλους εἰλεκεν μετ' ἀφελκύν [δὲνα: λακων: 3.6.1]

βουλεύει αὐτοῖς ἀνιστάμενος περὶ τούτων ὁμοίως μὲν
 τέκτων, ὁμοίως δὲ χαλκεὺς σκυτοτόμος, ἔμπορος ναύ-
 κληρος, πλούσιος πένης, γενναῖος ἀγεννής, καὶ τούτοις
 οὐδεὶς τοῦτο ἐπιπλήττει ὥσπερ τοῖς πρότερον, ὅτι
 οὐδαμόθεν μαθῶν, οὐδὲ ὄντος διδασκάλου οὐδενὸς αὐτῷ,
 ἔπειτα συμβουλεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ· δῆλον γάρ, ὅτι οὐχ
 ἠγοῦνται διδακτὸν εἶναι. μὴ τοίνυν ὅτι τὸ κοινὸν τῆς
 πόλεως οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλὰ ἰδίᾳ ἡμῖν οἱ σοφώτατοι καὶ E
 ἄριστοι τῶν πολιτῶν ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν ἣν ἔχουσιν
 οὐχ οἰοί τε ἄλλοις παραδιδόναι· ἐπεὶ Περικλῆς, ὁ
 τουτωνὶ τῶν νεανίσκων πατήρ, τούτους ἅ μὲν διδα-
 σκάλων εἶχετο καλῶς καὶ εὖ ἐπαίδευσεν, ἅ δὲ αὐτὸς 320
 σοφός ἐστιν, οὔτε αὐτὸς παιδεύει οὔτε τῷ ἄλλῳ παρα-
 δίδωσιν, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ περιμόντες νέμονται ὥσπερ ἄφετοι,
 εἴαν που αὐτόματοι περιτύχωσιν τῇ ἀρετῇ. εἰ δὲ
 βούλει, Κλεινίαν, τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδου τουτουῖ νεώτερον
 ἀδελφόν, ἐπιτροπεύων ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος ἀνὴρ Περικλῆς,
 δεδιὼς περὶ αὐτοῦ μὴ διαφθαρῆ δὴ ὑπὸ Ἀλκιβιάδου,
 ἀποσπάσας ἀπὸ τούτου, καταθέμενος ἐν Ἀρίφρονος
 ἐπαίδευε· καὶ πρὶν ἕξ μῆνας γεγονέναι, ἀπέδωκε τούτῳ
 οὐκ ἔχων ὅ τι χρήσαιτο αὐτῷ. καὶ ἄλλους σοι B
 παμπόλλους ἔχω λέγειν, οἳ αὐτοὶ ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες οὐδένα
 πώποτε βελτίῳ ἐποίησαν οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων οὔτε τῶν
 ἀλλοτρίων. ἐγὼ οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, εἰς ταῦτα ἀπο-
 βλέπων οὐχ ἠγοῦμαι διδακτὸν εἶναι ἀρετὴν· ἐπειδὴ
 δέ σου ἀκούω ταῦτα λέγοντος, κάμπτομαι καὶ οἶμαί
 τί σε λέγειν διὰ τὸ ἠγεῖσθαί σε πολλῶν μὲν ἔμπειρον
 γεγονέναι, πολλὰ δὲ μεμαθηκέναι, τὰ δὲ αὐτὸν ἐξηυρη-
 κέναι. εἰ οὖν ἔχεις ἐναργέστερον ἡμῖν ἐπιδείξαι, ὡς C
 διδακτὸν ἐστὶν ἢ ἀρετὴ, μὴ φθονήσης, ἀλλ' ἐπίδειξον.
 Ἄλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐ φθονήσω· ἀλλὰ πότερον
 ὑμῖν, ὡς πρεσβύτερος νεωτέροις, μῦθον λέγων ἐπιδείξω
 ἢ λόγῳ διεξελθῶν; πολλοὶ οὖν αὐτῷ ὑπέλαβον τῶν

παρακαθημένων, ὁποτέρως βούλοιτο, οὕτως διεξιέναι. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ἔφη, χαριέστερον εἶναι μῦθον ὑμῖν λέγειν.

Ἦν γάρ ποτε χρόνος, ὅτε θεοὶ μὲν ἦσαν, θνητὰ δὲ
D γένη οὐκ ἦν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ τούτοις χρόνος ἦλθεν
εἰμαρμένος γενέσεως, τυποῦσιν αὐτὰ θεοὶ γῆς ἔνδον ἐκ
γῆς καὶ πυρὸς μίξαντες καὶ τῶν ὅσα πυρὶ καὶ γῆ
κεράννυται. ἐπειδὴ δ' ἄγειν αὐτὰ πρὸς φῶς ἔμελλον,
προσέταξαν Προμηθεὶ καὶ Ἐπιμηθεὶ κοσμήσαι τε καὶ
νεῖμαι δυνάμεις ἑκάστοις ὡς πρέπει. Προμηθεῖα δὲ
E παραιτεῖται Ἐπιμηθεὺς αὐτὸς νεῖμαι, νείμαντος δέ
μου, ἔφη, ἐπίσκεψαι· καὶ οὕτως πείσας νέμει. νέμων
δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἰσχὺν ἄνευ τάχους προσῆπτεν, τὰ δ'
ἀσθενέστερα τάχει ἐκόσμει· τὰ δὲ ὥπλιζε, τοῖς δ'
ἀοπλον διδοὺς φύσιν ἄλλην τιν' αὐτοῖς ἐμηχανᾶτο
δύναμιν εἰς σωτηρίαν. ἃ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν σμικρότητι
ἤμπισχεν, πτηνὸν φυγὴν ἢ κατάγειον οἴκησιν ἔνεμεν·
321 ἃ δὲ ἠϋῆξε μεγέθει, τῷδε αὐτῷ αὐτὰ ἔσωζεν· καὶ τᾶλλα
οὕτως ἐπανισῶν ἔνεμεν. ταῦτα δὲ ἐμηχανᾶτο εὐλάβειαν
ἔχων μή τι γένος ἀἰστωθείη· ἐπειδὴ δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀλλη-
λοφθοριῶν διαφυγὰς ἐπήρκεσε, πρὸς τὰς ἐκ Διὸς
ᾠρας εὐμάρειαν ἐμηχανᾶτο ἀμφιεννὺς αὐτὰ πυκ-
ναῖς τε θριξίν καὶ στερεοῖς δέρμασιν, ἱκανοῖς μὲν
ἀμῦναι χειμῶνα, δυνατοῖς δὲ καὶ καύματα, καὶ ἐς
εὐνάς ἰοῦσιν ὅπως ὑπάρχοι τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα στρωμνὴ
B οἰκεία τε καὶ αὐτοφυῆς ἑκάστω· καὶ ὑποδῶν τὰ μὲν
ὄπλαῖς, τὰ δὲ [θριξίν καὶ] δέρμασιν στερεοῖς καὶ
ἀναίμοις. τούντεῦθεν τροφὰς ἄλλοις ἄλλας ἐξεπόριζεν,
τοῖς μὲν ἐκ γῆς βοτάνην, ἄλλοις δὲ δένδρων καρπούς,
τοῖς δὲ ῥίζας· ἔστι δ' οἷς ἔδωκεν εἶναι τροφήν ζῶων
ἄλλων βοράν· καὶ τοῖς μὲν ὀλιγογονίαν προσῆψε, τοῖς
δ' ἀναλισκομένοις ὑπὸ τούτων πολυγονίαν, σωτηρίαν
τῷ γένει πορίζων. ἅτε δὴ οὖν οὐ πάνυ τι σοφὸς ὢν

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καὶ ἡ δημιουργικὴ τέχνη αὐτοῖς πρὸς μὲν τροφήν ἱκανὴ
 βοηθὸς ἦν, πρὸς δὲ τὸν τῶν θηρίων πόλεμον ἐνδεής·
 πολιτικὴν γὰρ τέχνην οὐπω εἶχον, ἧς μέρος πολεμική.
 ἐζήτουν δὴ ἀθροίζεσθαι καὶ σώζεσθαι κτίζοντες πόλεις·
 ὅτ' οὖν ἀθροισθεῖεν, ἠδίκουν ἀλλήλους ἅτε οὐκ ἔχοντες
 τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην, ὥστε πάλιν σκεδαννύμενοι
 διεφθείροντο. Ζεὺς οὖν δείσας περὶ τῷ γένει ἡμῶν,
 C μὴ ἀπόλοιτο πᾶν, Ἑρμῆν πέμπει ἄγοντα εἰς ἀνθρώπους
 αἰδῶ τε καὶ δίκην, ἵν' εἴεν πόλεων κόσμοι τε καὶ
 δεσμοὶ φιλίας συναγωγοί. ἐρωτᾷ οὖν Ἑρμῆς Δία,
 τίνα οὖν τρόπον δοίῃ δίκην καὶ αἰδῶ ἀνθρώποις·
 πότερον ὡς αἱ τέχναι νενέμηνται, οὕτω καὶ ταύτας
 νείμω; νενέμηνται δὲ ὧδε· εἷς ἔχων ἰατρικὴν πολλοῖς
 ἱκανὸς ἰδιώταις, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοί· καὶ δίκην
 δὴ καὶ αἰδῶ οὕτω θῶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ ἐπὶ πάντα
 D νείμω; ἐπὶ πάντα, ἔφη ὁ Ζεὺς, καὶ πάντες μετεχόντων·
 οὐ γὰρ ἂν γένοιτο πόλεις, εἰ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν μετέχοιεν
 ὥσπερ ἄλλων τεχνῶν· καὶ νόμον γε θεὸς παρ' ἐμοῦ,
 τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον αἰδοῦς καὶ δίκης μετέχειν κτείνειν
 ὡς νόσον πόλεως.

Οὕτω δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οἱ τε ἄλλοι
 καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅταν μὲν περὶ ἀρετῆς τεκτονικῆς ἢ
 λόγος ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς δημιουργικῆς, ὀλίγοις οἴονται
 μετεῖναι συμβουλής, καὶ εἰάν τις ἐκτὸς ὧν τῶν ὀλίγων
 E συμβουλεύῃ, οὐκ ἀνέχονται, ὡς σὺ φῆς· εἰκότως, ὡς
 323 ἐγὼ φημι· ὅταν δὲ εἰς συμβουλήν πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς
 ἴωσιν, ἣν δεῖ διὰ δικαιοσύνης πᾶσαν ἰέναι καὶ σωφρο-
 σύνης, εἰκότως παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἀνέχονται, ὡς παντὶ
 προσῆκον ταύτης γε μετέχειν τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἢ μὴ εἶναι
 πόλεις. αὕτη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτου αἰτία.

Ἴνα δὲ μὴ οἴῃ ἀπατᾶσθαι, ὡς τῷ ὄντι ἡγοῦνται
 πάντες ἀνθρωποὶ πάντα ἄνδρα μετέχειν δικαιοσύνης
 τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς, τόδε αὖ λαβὲ

τεκμήριον. ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, εἴαν τις φῆ ἀγαθὸς αὐλητῆς εἶναι, ἢ ἄλλην ἡντινοῦν τέχνην, ἣν μὴ ἐστίν, ἢ καταγελωῶσιν ἢ χαλεπαίνουσιν, καὶ οἱ οἰκεῖοι προσιόντες νουθετοῦσιν ὡς μαινόμενον· ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ πολιτικῇ ἀρετῇ, εἴαν τινα καὶ εἰδῶσιν ὅτι ἄδικός ἐστιν, εἴαν οὗτος αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτοῦ τάληθῆ λέγῃ ἐναντίον πολλῶν, ὃ ἐκεῖ σωφροσύνην ἡγοῦντο εἶναι, τάληθῆ λέγειν, ἐνταῦθα μανίαν, καὶ φασιν πάντας δεῖν φάναι εἶναι δικαίους, εἴαν τε ᾧσιν εἴαν τε μὴ, ἢ μαίνεσθαι τὸν μὴ προσποιούμενον [δικαιοσύνην] ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, οὐδένα ὄντιν' οὐχὶ ἀμῶς γέ πως μετέχειν αὐτῆς, ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις. C

“Ὅτι μὲν οὖν πάντ' ἄνδρα εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται περὶ ταύτης τῆς ἀρετῆς σύμβουλον διὰ τὸ ἡγεῖσθαι παντὶ μετεῖναι αὐτῆς, ταῦτα λέγω· ὅτι δὲ αὐτὴν οὐ φύσει ἡγοῦνται εἶναι οὐδ' ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου, ἀλλὰ διδακτόν τε καὶ ἐξ ἐπιμελείας παραγίγνεσθαι ᾧ ἂν παραγίγνηται, τοῦτό σοι μετὰ τοῦτο πειράσομαι ἀποδείξαι. ὅσα γὰρ ἡγοῦνται ἀλλήλους κακὰ ἔχειν ἄνθρωποι φύσει ἢ τύχῃ, οὐδεὶς θυμοῦται οὐδὲ νουθετεῖ οὐδὲ διδάσκει οὐδὲ κολάζει τοὺς ταῦτα ἔχοντας, ἵνα μὴ τοιοῦτοι ᾧσιν, ἀλλ' ἐλεοῦσιν· οἷον τοὺς αἰσχροὺς ἢ σμικροὺς ἢ ἀσθενεῖς τίς οὕτως ἀνόητος, ὥστε τι τούτων ἐπιχειρεῖν ποιεῖν; ταῦτα μὲν γάρ, οἶμαι, ἴσασιν ὅτι φύσει τε καὶ τύχῃ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις γίγνεται τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰναντία τούτοις· ὅσα δὲ ἐξ ἐπιμελείας καὶ ἀσκήσεως καὶ διδαχῆς οἴονται γίγνεσθαι ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώποις, εἴαν τις ταῦτα μὴ ἔχη, ἀλλὰ τὰναντία τούτων κακὰ, ἐπὶ τούτοις που οἷ τε θυμοὶ γίγνονται καὶ αἱ κολάσεις καὶ αἱ νουθετήσεις. ᾧν ἐστίν ἐν καὶ ἡ ἀδικία καὶ ἡ ἀσέβεια καὶ συλλήβδην πᾶν τὸ ἐναντίον τῆς πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς· ἐνθα δὴ πᾶς παντὶ θυμοῦται καὶ νουθετεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι ὡς ἐξ ἐπιμελείας καὶ

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μαθήσεως κτητῆς οὔσης. εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλεις ἐννοῆσαι τὸ
 κολάζειν, [ὦ Σώκρατες,] τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας τί ποτε δύνα-
 ται, αὐτὸ σε διδάξει, ὅτι οἱ γε ἄνθρωποι ἡγοῦνται
 παρασκευαστὸν εἶναι ἀρετῆν. οὐδεὶς γὰρ κολάζει
 τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πρὸς τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων καὶ τούτου
 ἕνεκα, ὅτι ἠδίκησεν, ὅστις μὴ ὡσπερ θηρίον ἀλογίστως
 τιμωρεῖται· ὁ δὲ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιχειρῶν κολάζειν οὐ
 τοῦ παρεληλυθότος ἕνεκα [ἀδικήματος] τιμωρεῖται—οὐ
 γὰρ ἂν τό γε πραχθὲν ἀγέννητον θείῃ—ἀλλὰ τοῦ
 μέλλοντος [χάριν,] ἵνα μὴ αὐθις ἀδικήσῃ μήτε αὐτὸς
 οὗτος μήτε ἄλλος ὁ τούτον ἰδὼν κολασθέντα· καὶ
 τοιαύτην διάνοιαν ἔχων διανοεῖται παιδευτὴν εἶναι
 ἀρετῆν· ἀποτροπῆς γοῦν ἕνεκα κολάζει. ταύτην οὖν
 τὴν δόξαν πάντες ἔχουσιν, ὅσοι περ τιμωροῦνται καὶ
 ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ· τιμωροῦνται δὲ καὶ κολάζονται οἱ
 τε ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι οὓς ἂν οἴωνται ἀδικεῖν, καὶ οὐχ
 ἠκιστα Ἀθηναῖοι, οἱ σοὶ πολῖται· ὥστε κατὰ τοῦτον
 τὸν λόγον καὶ Ἀθηναῖοί εἰσι τῶν ἡγουμένων παρα-
 σκευαστὸν εἶναι καὶ διδακτὸν ἀρετῆν. ὡς μὲν οὖν
 εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται οἱ σοὶ πολῖται καὶ χαλκέως καὶ
 σκυτοτόμου συμβουλεύοντος τὰ πολιτικά, καὶ ὅτι
 διδακτὸν καὶ παρασκευαστὸν ἡγοῦνται ἀρετῆν, ἀπο-
 δέδεικται σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἱκανῶς, ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ φαίνεται.

Ἔτι δὴ λοιπὴ ἀπορία ἐστίν, ἣν ἀπορεῖς περὶ τῶν
 ἀνδρῶν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τί δήποτε οἱ ἄνδρες οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τὰ
 μὲν ἄλλα τοὺς αὐτῶν υἱεῖς διδάσκουσιν, ἀ διδασκάλων
 ἔχεται, καὶ σοφοὺς ποιοῦσιν, ἣν δὲ αὐτοὶ ἀρετῆν
 ἀγαθοί, οὐδενὸς βελτίους ποιοῦσιν. τούτου δὴ πέρι,
 ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκέτι μῦθόν σοι ἐρῶ, ἀλλὰ λόγον. ὦδε
 γὰρ ἐννόησον· πότερον ἔστιν τι εἶναι, ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐ
 ἀναγκαῖον πάντας τοὺς πολίτας μετέχειν, εἴπερ μέλλει
 πόλις εἶναι; ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ αὕτη λύεται ἡ ἀπορία, ἣν
 σὺ ἀπορεῖς, ἢ ἄλλοθι οὐδαμοῦ. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν καὶ

τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ ἐν οὐ τεκτονικὴ οὐδὲ χαλκεία οὐδὲ
 κεραμεία, ἀλλὰ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ τὸ 325
 ὄσιον εἶναι, καὶ συλλήβδην ἐν αὐτὸ προσαγορεύω εἶναι
 ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν· εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστίν, οὐ δεῖ πάντας μετέχειν
 καὶ μετὰ τούτου πάντ' ἄνδρα, εἴαν τι καὶ ἄλλο βού-
 ληται μαθάνειν ἢ πράττειν, οὕτω πράττειν, ἄνευ δὲ
 τούτου μή, ἢ τὸν μὴ μετέχοντα καὶ διδάσκειν καὶ
 κολάζειν, καὶ παῖδα καὶ ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα, ἕωςπερ ἂν
 κολαζόμενος βελτίων γένηται, ὃς δ' ἂν μὴ ὑπακούῃ
 κολαζόμενος καὶ διδασκόμενος, ὡς ἀνίατον ὄντα τοῦτον
 ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ἢ ἀποκτείνειν· εἰ οὕτω μὲν B
 ἔχει, οὕτω δ' αὐτοῦ πεφυκότος οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες[εἰ] τὰ Col. 2
 μὲν ἄλλα διδάσκονται τοὺς υἱεῖς, τοῦτο δὲ μή, σκέψαι
 ὡς θαυμάσιοι γίνονται οἱ ἀγαθοί. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ
 διδακτὸν αὐτὸ ἡγοῦνται καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία, ἀπεδεί-
 ξαμεν· διδακτοῦ δὲ ὄντος καὶ θεραπευτοῦ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα
 ἄρα τοὺς υἱεῖς διδάσκονται, ἐφ' οἷς οὐκ ἔστι θάνατος
 ἢ ζημία, εἴαν μὴ ἐπίστωνται, ἐφ' ὧν δὲ ἢ τε ζημία
 θάνατος αὐτῶν τοῖς παισὶ καὶ φυγαὶ μὴ μαθοῦσι μηδὲ C
 θεραπευθεῖσιν εἰς ἀρετὴν, καὶ πρὸς τῷ θανάτῳ
 χρημάτων τε δημεύσεις καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν[ξυλλήβδην] Col. 3
 τῶν οἴκων ἀνατροπαί, ταῦτα δ' ἄρα οὐ διδάσκονται
 οὐδ' ἐπιμελοῦνται πᾶσαν ἐπιμέλειαν ; Οἷεσθαί γε χρή,
 ὦ Σώκρατες. Ἐκ παίδων σμικρῶν ἀρξάμενοι, μέχρι
 οὐπερ ἂν ζῶσι, καὶ διδάσκουσι καὶ νοουθετοῦσιν.
 ἐπειδὴν θᾶπτον συνιῆ τις τὰ λεγόμενα, καὶ τροφὸς καὶ
 μήτηρ καὶ παιδαγωγὸς καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ πατήρ περὶ τούτου
 διαμάχονται, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος ἔσται ὁ παῖς, παρ' D
 ἕκαστον καὶ ἔργον καὶ λόγον διδάσκοντες καὶ ἐν-
 δεικνύμενοι, ὅτι τὸ μὲν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ ἀδίκον, καὶ τόδε
 μὲν καλόν, τόδε δὲ αἰσχρόν, καὶ τόδε μὲν ὄσιον, τόδε
 δὲ ἀνόσιον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ποίει, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποίει· καὶ εἴαν
 μὲν ἐκὼν πείθηται· εἰ δὲ μή, ὡςπερ ξύλον διαστρε-

φόμενον καὶ καμπτόμενον εὐθύνουσιν ἀπειλαῖς καὶ
 πληγαῖς. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα εἰς διδασκάλων πέμποντες
 E πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐντέλλονται ἐπιμελεῖσθαι εὐκοσμίας τῶν
 παίδων ἢ γραμμάτων τε καὶ κιθαρίσεως· οἱ δὲ διδάσ-
 καλοι τούτων τε ἐπιμελοῦνται, καὶ ἐπειδὴν αὐτὰ γράμ-
 ματα μάθωσιν καὶ μέλλωσιν συνήσειν τὰ γεγραμμένα,
 ὥσπερ τότε τὴν φωνήν, παρατιθέασιν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν
 βάθρων ἀναγιγνώσκειν ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα καὶ
 326 ἐκμανθάνειν ἀναγκάζουσιν, ἐν οἷς πολλὰ μὲν νοουθετή-
 σεις ἔνεισιν, πολλὰ δὲ διέξοδοι καὶ ἔπαινοι καὶ
 ἐγκώμια παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἵνα ὁ παῖς ζηλῶν
 μιμῆται καὶ ὀρέγηται τοιοῦτος γενέσθαι. οἷ τ' αὐτὸν
 κιθαρισταί, ἕτερα τοιαῦτα, σωφροσύνης τε ἐπιμελοῦνται
 καὶ ὅπως ἂν οἱ νέοι μηδὲν κακουργῶσιν· πρὸς δὲ
 τούτοις, ἐπειδὴν κιθαρίζειν μάθωσιν, ἄλλων αὐτὸν ποιη-
 τῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα διδάσκουσι [μελοποιῶν,] εἰς τὰ
 C, V. 24. B κιθαρίσματα ἐντείνοντες, καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς τε καὶ τὰς
 ἀρμονίας ἀναγκάζουσιν οἰκειοῦσθαι ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν
 παίδων, ἵνα ἡμερώτεροί τε ᾧσιν, καὶ εὐρυθμότεροι καὶ
 εὐαρμοστότεροι γιγνόμενοι χρήσιμοι ᾧσιν εἰς τὸ λέγειν
 τε καὶ πράττειν· πᾶς γὰρ ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
 εὐρυθμίας τε καὶ εὐαρμοστίας δεῖται. ἔτι τοίνυν πρὸς
 τούτοις εἰς παιδοτρίβου πέμπουσιν, ἵνα τὰ σώματα
 βελτίω ἔχοντες ὑπηρετῶσι τῇ διανοίᾳ χρηστῇ οὔσῃ,
 C καὶ μὴ ἀναγκάζονται ἀποδειλιᾶν διὰ τὴν πονηρίαν
 τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις
 πράξεσιν· καὶ ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ μάλιστα δυνάμενοι
 ἡλικίας ἀρξάμενοι φοιτᾶν, ὀψιαίτατα ἀπαλλάττονται.
 24. 24. ἐπειδὴν δὲ [ἐκ] διδασκάλων ἀπαλλαγῶσιν, ἡ πόλις αὐτὸν
 D τοὺς τε νόμους ἀναγκάζει μανθάνειν καὶ κατὰ τούτους
 ζῆν [κατὰ παράδειγμα], ἵνα μὴ αὐτοὶ ἐφ' αὐτῶν εἰκῆ

πράττωσιν, ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ οἱ γραμματισταὶ τοῖς μήπω δεινοῖς γράφειν τῶν παίδων ὑπογράφαντες γραμμὰς τῇ γραφίδι οὕτω τὸ γραμματεῖον διδῶσιν καὶ ἀναγκάζουσι γράφειν κατὰ τὴν ὑφήγησιν τῶν γραμμῶν, ὡς δὲ καὶ ἡ πόλις νόμους ὑπογράψασα, ἀγαθῶν καὶ παλαιῶν νομοθετῶν εὐρήματα, κατὰ τούτους ἀναγκάζει καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι· ὃς δ' ἂν ἐκτὸς βαίνη τούτων, κολάζει, καὶ ὄνομα τῇ κολάσει ταύτη καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν καὶ ἄλλοθι πολλαχού, ὡς εὐθυνούσης τῆς δίκης, εὐθύναι. τοσαύτης οὖν τῆς ἐπιμελείας οὔσης περὶ E ἀρετῆς ἰδία καὶ δημοσία, θαυμάζεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀπορεῖς, εἰ διδακτόν ἐστιν ἀρετή; ἀλλ' οὐ χρὴ θαυμάζειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον, εἰ μὴ διδακτόν.

Διὰ τί οὖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πατέρων πολλοὶ υἱεῖς φαῦλοι γίνονται; τοῦτο αὖ μάθε· οὐδὲν γὰρ θαυμαστόν, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ ἐγὼ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, τῆς ἀρετῆς, εἰ μέλλει πόλις 327 εἶναι, οὐδένα δεῖ ιδιωτεύειν. εἰ γὰρ δὴ ὃ λέγω οὕτως ἔχει—ἔχει δὲ μάλιστα πάντων οὕτως—ἐνθυμήθητι ἄλλο τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὀτιοῦν καὶ μαθημάτων προελόμενος. εἰ μὴ οἶόν τ' ἦν πόλιν εἶναι, εἰ μὴ πάντες αὐληταὶ ἦμεν, ὁποῖός τις ἐδύνατο ἕκαστος, καὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία πᾶς πάντα καὶ ἐδίδασκε καὶ ἐπέπληττε τὸν μὴ καλῶς αὐλοῦντα, καὶ μὴ ἐφθόνηι τούτου, ὥσπερ νῦν τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν νομίμων οὐδεὶς φθονεῖ οὐδ' ἀποκρύπτεται ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνημάτων· λυσιτελεῖ γὰρ οἶμαι ἡμῖν ἢ ἀλλήλων δικαιο- B σύνη καὶ ἀρετή· διὰ ταῦτα πᾶς παντὶ προθύμως λέγει καὶ διδάσκει καὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ νόμιμα· εἰ οὖν οὕτω καὶ ἐν αὐλήσει πᾶσαν προθυμίαν καὶ ἀφθονίαν εἴχομεν ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν, οἶει ἂν τι, ἔφη, μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐλητῶν ἀγαθοὺς αὐλητὰς τοὺς υἱεῖς γίγνεσθαι ἢ τῶν φαύλων; οἶμαι μὲν οὐ, ἀλλὰ

C ὅτου ἔτυχεν ὁ υἱὸς εὐφυέστατος γενόμενος εἰς αὐλησιν,
 οὗτος ἂν ἐλλόγιμος ἠύξηθη, ὅτου δὲ ἀφυής, ἀκλεής·
 καὶ πολλάκις μὲν ἀγαθοῦ αὐλητοῦ φαῦλος ἂν ἀπέβη,
 πολλάκις δ' ἂν φαύλου ἀγαθός· ἀλλ' οὖν αὐληταί
 γ' ἂν πάντες ἦσαν ἱκανοὶ ὡς πρὸς τοὺς ἰδιώτας καὶ
 μηδὲν αὐλήσεως ἐπαῖοντας. οὕτως οἴου καὶ νῦν, ὅστις
 σοι ἀδικώτατος φαίνεται ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἐν νόμοις
 καὶ ἀνθρώποις τεθραμμένων, δίκαιον αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ
 D δημιουργὸν τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, εἰ δέοι αὐτὸν
 κρίνεσθαι πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, οἷς μήτε παιδεία ἐστὶν
 μήτε δικαστήρια μήτε νόμοι μηδὲ ἀνάγκη μηδεμία διὰ
 παντὸς ἀναγκάζουσα ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' εἴεν
 ἄγριοί τινες, οἴους περ πέρυσιν Φερεκράτης ὁ ποιητῆς
 ἐδίδαξεν ἐπὶ Ληναίῳ. ἡ σφόδρα ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις
 ἀνθρώποις γενόμενος, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χορῷ
 μισάνθρωποι, ἀγαπήσαις ἂν, εἰ ἐντύχοις Εὐρυβάτῳ
 καὶ Φρυνώνδῃ, καὶ ἀνολοφύραι' ἂν ποθῶν τὴν τῶν
 E ἐνθάδε ἀνθρώπων πονηρίαν· νῦν δὲ τρυφᾶς, ὦ Σώ-
 κρατες, διότι πάντες διδάσκαλοί εἰσιν ἀρετῆς, καθ'
 ὅσον δύνανται ἕκαστος, καὶ οὐδεὶς σοι φαίνεται εἶναι·
 ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ζητοῖς τίς διδάσκαλος τοῦ ἐλληνίζειν, οὐδ'
 328 ἂν εἰς φανεῖη, οὐδέ γ' ἂν, οἶμαι, εἰ ζητοῖς τίς ἂν ἡμῖν
 διδάξειεν τοὺς τῶν χειροτεχνῶν υἱεῖς αὐτὴν ταύτην τὴν
 τέχνην, ἣν δὴ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς μεμαθήκασιν, καθ'
 ὅσον οἷός τ' ἦν ὁ πατὴρ καὶ οἱ τοῦ πατρὸς φίλοι ὄντες
 ὁμότεχνοι, τούτους ἔτι τίς ἂν διδάξειεν, οὐ ῥάδιον
 οἶμαι εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτων διδάσκαλον φανῆναι,
 τῶν δὲ ἀπείρων παντάπασι ῥάδιον, οὕτω δὲ ἀρετῆς
 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων· ἀλλὰ κἂν εἰ ὀλίγον ἔστιν τις
 B ὅστις διαφέρει ἡμῶν προβιβάσαι εἰς ἀρετὴν, ἀγαπητόν.
 ὦν δὴ ἐγὼ οἶμαι εἶς εἶναι, καὶ διαφερόντως ἂν τῶν
 ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ὀνήσαι τίνα πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν
 γενέσθαι, καὶ ἀξίως τοῦ μισθοῦ ὃν πράττομαι, καὶ ἔτι

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ῥηθέντων, ὥσπερ τὰ χαλκία πληγέντα μακρὸν [ἤχει
 καὶ] ἀποτείνει, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιλάβηταί τις, καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες
 Β οὕτω σμικρὰ ἐρωτηθέντες δολιχὸν κατατείνουσι τοῦ
 λόγου. Πρωταγόρας δὲ ὅδε ἱκανὸς μὲν μακροὺς
 λόγους καὶ καλοὺς εἰπεῖν, ὡς αὐτὸ δηλοῖ, ἱκανὸς δὲ καὶ
 ἐρωτηθεὶς ἀποκρίνασθαι κατὰ βραχὺ καὶ ἐρόμενος
 περιμεῖναί τε καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ἃ
 ὀλίγοις ἐστὶ παρεσκευασμένα. νῦν οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα,
 σμικροῦ τινος ἐνδεής εἰμι πάντ' ἔχειν, εἴ μοι ἀπο-
 κρίναιο τόδε. τὴν ἀρετὴν φῆς διδακτὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἐγὼ
 εἶπερ ἄλλω τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πειθοίμην ἄν, καί σοι
 C πείθομαι· ὃ δ' ἐθαύμασά σου λέγοντος, τοῦτό μοι ἐν
 τῇ ψυχῇ ἀποπλήρωσον. ἔλεγες γὰρ ὅτι ὁ Ζεὺς τὴν
 δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν αἰδῶ πέμψειεν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις,
 καὶ αὖ πολλαχοῦ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐλέγετο ὑπὸ σοῦ ἡ
 δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ὀσιότης καὶ πάντα
 ταῦτα ὡς ἓν τι εἶη συλλήβδην, ἀρετή· ταῦτ' οὖν
 αὐτὰ δῖελθέ μοι ἀκριβῶς τῷ λόγῳ, πότερον ἐν μὲν
 τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετή, μόρια δὲ αὐτῆς ἐστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη
 καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ὀσιότης, ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ
 D ἔλεγον πάντα ὀνόματα τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐνὸς ὄντος· τοῦτ'
 ἐστὶν ὃ ἔτι ἐπιποθῶ.

Ἄλλὰ ῥάδιον τοῦτό γ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνα-
 σθαι, ὅτι ἐνὸς ὄντος τῆς ἀρετῆς μόριά ἐστιν ἃ ἐρωτᾷς.
 Πότερον, ἔφην, ὥσπερ προσώπου τὰ μόρια μόριά
 ἐστιν, στόμα τε καὶ ῥίς καὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὦτα, ἢ
 ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ χρυσοῦ μόρια οὐδὲν διαφέρει τὰ ἕτερα
 τῶν ἐτέρων καὶ τοῦ ὅλου, ἀλλ' ἢ μεγέθει καὶ σμικρό-
 E τητι; Ἐκείνως μοι φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥσπερ τὰ
 τοῦ προσώπου μόρια ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ὅλον πρόσωπον.
 Πότερον οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ μεταλαμβάνουσιν οἱ
 ἀνθρώποι τούτων τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μορίων οἱ μὲν ἄλλο,
 οἱ δὲ ἄλλο, ἢ ἀνάγκη, εἴανπερ τις ἐν λάβῃ, ἅπαντα

ἔχειν; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, ἐπεὶ πολλοὶ ἀνδρείοι εἰσιν,
 ἄδικοι δέ, καὶ δίκαιοι αὖ, σοφοὶ δὲ οὐ. Ἔστιν γὰρ
 οὖν καὶ ταῦτα μόρια τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἔφην ἐγώ, σοφία τε
 καὶ ἀνδρεία; Πάντων μάλιστα δήπου, ἔφη· καὶ 330
 μέγιστόν γε ἢ σοφία τῶν μορίων. Ἐκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν
 ἐστιν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο; Ναί. Ἡ καὶ
 δύναμιν αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ἰδίαν ἔχει, ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ
 προσώπου; οὐκ ἐστὶν ὀφθαλμὸς οἶον τὰ ὦτα, οὐδ' ἢ
 δύναμις αὐτοῦ ἢ αὐτή· οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν ἐστιν
 οἶον τὸ ἕτερον οὔτε κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν οὔτε κατὰ τὰ
 ἄλλα· ἄρ' οὖν οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια οὐκ ἐστιν
 τὸ ἕτερον οἶον τὸ ἕτερον, οὔτε αὐτὸ οὔτε ἢ δύναμις B
 αὐτοῦ; ἢ δῆλα δὴ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, εἶπερ τῷ παρα-
 δείγματί γε ἔοικεν; Ἄλλ' οὕτως, ἔφη. καὶ ἐγὼ
 εἶπον· Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μορίων ἄλλ'
 οἶον ἐπιστήμη, οὐδ' οἶον δικαιοσύνη, οὐδ' οἶον ἀνδρεία,
 οὐδ' οἶον σωφροσύνη, οὐδ' οἶον ὀσιότης. Οὐκ ἔφη.
 Φέρε δὴ, ἔφην ἐγώ, κοινῇ σκεψώμεθα ποῖόν τι αὐτῶν
 ἐστὶν ἕκαστον. πρῶτον μὲν τὸ τοιόνδε· ἢ δικαιοσύνη C
 πρᾶγμα τί ἐστὶν ἢ οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ·
 τί δὲ σοί; Καμοί, ἔφη. Τί οὖν; εἴ τις ἔροιτο ἐμέ τε
 καὶ σέ· ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, εἶπετον δὴ
 μοι, τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὃ ὠνομάσατε ἄρτι, ἢ δικαιοσύνη,
 αὐτὸ τοῦτο δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἢ ἄδικον; ἐγὼ μὲν ἂν αὐτῷ
 ἀποκριναίμην ὅτι δίκαιον· σὺ δὲ τίν' ἂν ψῆφον θείῃ;
 τὴν αὐτὴν ἐμοὶ ἢ ἄλλην; Τὴν αὐτὴν, ἔφη. Ἔστιν
 ἄρα τοιοῦτον ἢ δικαιοσύνη οἶον δίκαιον εἶναι, φαίην ἂν
 ἔγωγε ἀποκρινόμενος τῷ ἐρωτῶντι· οὐκοῦν καὶ σύ; D
 Ναί, ἔφη. Εἰ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο, ἡμᾶς ἔροιτο· οὐκοῦν καὶ
 ὀσιότητά τινα φατε εἶναι; φαίμεν ἂν, ὡς ἐγὼμαι. Ναί,
 ἢ δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν φατέ καὶ τοῦτο πρᾶγμα τί εἶναι;
 φαίμεν ἂν· ἢ οὐ; Καὶ τοῦτο συνέφη. Πότερον δὲ
 τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα φατε τοιοῦτον πεφυκέναι οἶον

ρεῖ
 ρες
 τοῦ
 οὐς
 καὶ
 ενος
 , ἄ
 ὄρα,
 ἰπο-
 ἐγὼ
 σοι
 οὐ ἐν
 ; τὴν
 ἴπους,
 τοῦ ἢ
 ἄντα
 οὖν
 , μὲν
 οσύνη
 ἢ ἐγὼ
 τοῦτ'

κρινα-
 ἰρωτᾶς.
 μόρια
 ὄτα, ἢ
 ἕτερα
 μικρο-
 περ τὰ
 σωπον.
 οσιν οἰ
 , ἄλλο,
 ἅπαντα

ἀνόσιον εἶναι ἢ οἶον ὄσιον ; ἀγανακτήσαιμ' ἂν ἔγωγ',
 ἔφην, τῷ ἐρωτήματι, καὶ εἶποιμ'· ἄν· εὐφήμει, ὦ
 E ἄνθρωπε· σχολῆ μεντᾶν τι ἄλλο ὄσιον εἶη, εἰ μὴ αὐτή
 γε ἢ ὀσιότης ὄσιον ἔσται. τί δὲ σύ ; οὐχ οὕτως ἂν
 ἀποκρίναιο ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Εἰ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο εἶποι ἐρωτῶν ἡμᾶς· πῶς οὖν
 ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐλέγετε ; ἄρ' οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὑμῶν κατή-
 κουσα ; ἐδόξατέ μοι φάναι τὰτ' τῆς ἀρετῆς μέρια εἶναι
 οὕτως ἔχοντα πρὸς ἄλληλα, ὡς οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον
 αὐτῶν οἶον τὸ ἕτερον· εἶποιμ' ἂν ἔγωγε ὅτι τὰ μὲν
 ἄλλα ὀρθῶς ἤκουσας, ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ οἶει εἰπεῖν τοῦτο,
 331 παρήκουσας· Πρωταγόρας γὰρ ὅδε ταῦτα ἀπεκρίνατο,
 ἐγὼ δὲ ἠρώτων. εἰ οὖν εἶποι· ἀληθῆ ὅδε λέγει, ὦ
 Πρωταγόρα ; σὺ φῆς οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον μέρος οἶον
 τὸ ἕτερον τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς ; σὸς οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐστίν ;
 τί ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκρίναιο ; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες,
 ὁμολογεῖν. Τί οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἀποκρινούμεθα
 αὐτῷ, ταῦτα ὁμολογήσαντες, εἰ ἂν ἡμᾶς ἐπανέρηται· οὐκ
 ἄρα ἐστὶν ὀσιότης οἶον δίκαιον εἶναι πρᾶγμα, οὐδὲ
 B δικαιοσύνη οἶον ὄσιον, ἀλλ' οἶον μὴ ὄσιον· ἢ δ'
 ὀσιότης οἶον μὴ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ἀδικον ἄρα, τὸ δὲ
 ἀνόσιον ; τί αὐτῷ ἀποκρινούμεθα ; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς
 ὑπὲρ γε ἑμαυτοῦ φαίην ἂν καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην ὄσιον
 εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὀσιότητα δίκαιον· καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ δέ, εἰ με
 ἐώης, ταῦτ' ἂν ταῦτα ἀποκρινοίμην, ὅτι ἦτοι ταῦτόν
 γ' ἐστὶν δικαιοσύνης ὀσιότητι ἢ ὅ τι ὁμοιώτατον, καὶ
 μάλιστα πάντων ἢ τε δικαιοσύνη οἶον ὀσιότης καὶ ἢ
 ὀσιότης οἶον δικαιοσύνη. ἀλλ' ὄρα, εἰ διακωλύεις
 ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἢ καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ οὕτως. Οὐ πάνυ
 C μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ἀπλοῦν εἶναι, ὥστε
 συγχωρῆσαι τὴν τε δικαιοσύνην ὄσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν
 ὀσιότητα δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ τί μοι δοκεῖ ἐν αὐτῷ διάφορον
 εἶναι. ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο διαφέρει ; ἔφη· εἰ γὰρ βούλει,

ἔστω ἡμῖν καὶ δικαιοσύνη ὄσιον καὶ ὀσιότης δίκαιον. Μή μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐδὲν γὰρ δέομαι τὸ εἰ βούλει τοῦτο καὶ εἴ σοι δοκεῖ ἐλέγχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ· τὸ δ' ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ τοῦτο λέγω, οἰόμενος οὕτω τὸν λόγον βέλτιστ' ἂν ἐλέγχεσθαι, εἴ τις τὸ εἴ ἀφέλοι αὐτοῦ. Ἄλλὰ μέντοι, ἦ δ' ὅς, προσέοικέν τι δικαιο- D σύνη ὀσιότητι· καὶ γὰρ ὀτιοῦν ὀτωοῦν ἀμῆ γέ πη προσέοικεν. τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι ἔστιν ὅπη προσέοικεν, καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν τῷ μαλακῷ, καὶ τὰλλα ἂ δοκεῖ ἐναντιώτατα εἶναι ἀλλήλοις· καὶ ἂ τότε ἔφαμεν ἄλλην δύναμιν ἔχειν καὶ οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον οἶον τὸ ἕτερον, τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια, ἀμῆ γέ πη προσέοικεν καὶ ἔστιν τὸ ἕτερον οἶον τὸ ἕτερον· ὥστε τούτῳ γε τῷ E τρόπῳ κἂν ταῦτα ἐλέγχοις, εἰ βούλοιο, ὡς ἅπαντά ἐστιν ὁμοῖα ἀλλήλοις. ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τὰ ὁμοῖόν τι ἔχοντα ὁμοῖα δίκαιον καλεῖν, οὐδὲ τὰ ἀνόμοιόν τι ἔχοντα ἀνόμοια, κἂν πάνυ σμικρὸν ἔχη τὸ ὁμοῖον. καὶ ἐγὼ θαυμάσας εἶπον πρὸς αὐτόν, Ἡ γὰρ οὕτω σοι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ὄσιον πρὸς ἀλληλα ἔχει, ὥστε ὁμοῖόν τι σμικρὸν ἔχειν ἀλλήλοις; Οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη, οὕτως, οὐ μέντοι οὐδὲ αὖ 332 ὡς σύ μοι δοκεῖς οἶεσθαι. Ἄλλὰ μήν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ δυσχερῶς δοκεῖς μοι ἔχειν πρὸς τοῦτο, τοῦτο μὲν εἰσώμεν, τόδε δὲ ἄλλο ὧν ἔλεγες ἐπισκεψώμεθα.

Ἄφροσύνην τι καλεῖς; Ἔφη. Τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι οὐ πᾶν τοῦναντίον ἐστὶν ἡ σοφία; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη. Πότερον δὲ ὅταν πράττωσιν ἄνθρωποι ὀρθῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως, τότε σωφρονεῖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οὕτω πράττοντες, ἢ τοῦναντίον; Σωφρονεῖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν σωφροσύνη σωφρονοῦσιν; Ἀνάγκη. Οὐκοῦν B οἱ μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττοντες ἀφρόνως πράττουσιν καὶ οὐ σωφρονοῦσιν οὕτω πράττοντες; Συνδοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη. Τοῦναντίον ἄρα ἐστὶν τὸ ἀφρόνως πράττειν τῷ σωφρόνως; Ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν ἀφρόνως πραττόμενα

ἀφροσύνη πράττεται, τὰ δὲ σωφρόνως σωφροσύνη ;
 Ὁμολόγει. Οὐκοῦν εἴ τι ἰσχύϊ πράττεται, ἰσχυρῶς
 πράττεται, καὶ εἴ τι ἀσθενείᾳ, ἀσθενῶς ; Ἐδόκει.
 Καὶ εἴ τι μετὰ τάχους, ταχέως, καὶ εἴ τι μετὰ βρα-
 C δυτήτος, βραδέως ; Ἐφη. Καὶ εἴ τι δὴ ὡσαύτως
 πράττεται, ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράττεται, καὶ εἴ τι ἐναν-
 τίως, ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου ; Συνέφη. Φέρε δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,
 ἔστιν τι καλόν ; Συνεχώρει. Τούτῳ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον
 πλὴν τὸ αἰσχρόν ; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Τί δέ ; ἔστιν τι
 ἀγαθόν ; Ἐστιν. Τούτῳ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον πλὴν τὸ
 κακόν ; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Τί δέ ; ἔστιν τι ὀξύ ἐν φωνῇ ;
 Ἐφη. Τούτῳ μὴ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ
 βαρύν ; Οὐκ ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐνὶ ἐκάστῳ τῶν
 ἐναντίων ἐν μόνον ἔστιν ἐναντίον καὶ οὐ πολλά ;
 D Συνωμολόγει. Ἴθι δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀναλογισώμεθα τὰ
 ὠμολογημένα ἡμῖν. ὠμολογήκαμεν ἐν ἐνὶ μόνον
 ἐναντίον εἶναι, πλείω δὲ μή ; Ὁμολογήκαμεν. Τὸ δὲ
 ἐναντίως πραττόμενον ὑπὸ ἐναντίων πράττεσθαι ;
 Ἐφη. Ὁμολογήκαμεν δὲ ἐναντίως πράττεσθαι ὃ ἂν
 ἀφρόνως πράττηται τῷ σωφρόνως πραττομένῳ ; Ἐφη.
 Τὸ δὲ σωφρόνως πραττόμενον ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης πράτ-
 E τεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀφρόνως ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης ; Συνεχώρει.
 Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἐναντίως πράττεται, ὑπὸ ἐναντίου πράτ-
 τοιτ' ἂν ; Ναί. Πράττεται δὲ τὸ μὲν ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης,
 τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης ; Ναί. Ἐναντίως ; Πάνυ γε.
 Οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ ἐναντίων ὄντων ; Ναί. Ἐναντίον ἄρ'
 ἔστιν ἀφροσύνη σωφροσύνη ; Φαίνεται. Μέμνησαι
 οὖν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ὠμολόγηται ἡμῖν ἀφροσύνη
 σοφία ἐναντίον εἶναι ; Συνωμολόγει. Ἐν δὲ ἐνὶ μόνον
 ἐναντίον εἶναι ; Φημί. Πότερον οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα,
 333 λύσωμεν τῶν λόγων ; τὸ ἐν ἐνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι,
 ἢ ἐκεῖνον ἐν ᾧ ἐλέγετο ἕτερον εἶναι σωφροσύνης σοφία,
 μόνιον δὲ ἐκάτερον ἀρετῆς, καὶ πρὸς τῷ ἕτερον εἶναι

καὶ ἀνόμοια καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ
 τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια ; πότερον οὖν δὴ λύσωμεν ;
 οὗτοι γὰρ οἱ λόγοι ἀμφότεροι οὐ πάνυ μουσικῶς
 λέγονται· οὐ γὰρ συνάδουσιν οὐδὲ συναρμόττουσιν
 ἀλλήλοις. πῶς γὰρ ἂν συνάδοιεν, εἴπερ γε ἀνάγκη
 ἐνὶ μὲν ἐν μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι, πλείοσι δὲ μή, τῇ δὲ B
 ἀφροσύνη ἐνὶ ὄντι σοφία ἐναντία καὶ σωφροσύνη αὐ
 φαίνεται· ἢ γάρ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἢ ἄλλως
 πως ; Ὁμολόγησεν καὶ μάλ' ἀκόντως. Οὐκοῦν ἐν ἂν
 εἴη ἢ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἢ σοφία ; τὸ δὲ πρότερον αὐ
 ἐφάνη ἡμῖν ἢ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἢ ὀσιότης σχεδόν τι
 ταῦτόν ὄν. ἴθι δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, μὴ
 ἀποκάμωμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ διασκεψώμεθα. ἄρα
 τίς σοι δοκεῖ ἀδικῶν ἄνθρωπος σωφρονεῖν, ὅτι ἀδικεῖ ;
 Αἰσχυνοίμην ἂν ἐγωγ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο ὁμολο- C
 γεῖν, ἐπεὶ πολλοὶ γέ φασιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Πότερον
 οὖν πρὸς ἐκείνους τὸν λόγον ποιήσομαι, ἔφην, ἢ πρὸς
 σέ ; Εἰ βούλει, ἔφη, πρὸς τοῦτον πρῶτον τὸν λόγον
 διαλέχθητι τὸν τῶν πολλῶν. Ἄλλ' οὐδέν μοι διαφέ-
 ρει, ἐὰν μόνον σύ γε ἀποκρίνη, εἴτ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι
 ταῦτα, εἴτε μή. τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἐγωγε μάλιστα
 ἐξετάζω, συμβαίνει μέντοι ἴσως καὶ ἐμὲ τὸν ἐρωτῶντα
 καὶ τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἐξετάζεσθαι.

Τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἐκαλλωπίζετο ἡμῖν ὁ Πρω- D
 ταγόρας· τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἠτιᾶτο δυσχερῆ εἶναι· ἔπειτα
 μέντοι συνεχώρησεν ἀποκρίνεσθαι. - εἶσθε (

ἴθι δὴ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐξ ἀρχῆς μοι ἀπόκριναί.
 δοκοῦσί τινές σοι σωφρονεῖν ἀδικοῦντες ; Ἔστω, ἔφη.
 Τὸ δὲ σωφρονεῖν λέγεις εὖ φρονεῖν ; Ἔφη. Τὸ δ' εὖ
 φρονεῖν εὖ βουλευέσθαι ὅτι ἀδικοῦσιν ; Ἔστω, ἔφη.
 Πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ εὖ πράττουσιν ἀδικοῦντες ἢ εἰ
 κακῶς ; Εἰ εὖ. Λέγεις οὖν ἀγαθὰ ἅττα εἶναι ; Λέγω.
 Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ, ἃ ἐστὶν

νη ;
 ρῶς
 κει.
 βρα-
 τως
 αν-
 ἔγώ,
 τίου
 τι
 τὸ
 νῆ ;
 τὸ
 τῶν
 λά ;
 τὰ
 ὄνον
 ὁ δὲ
 θαι ;
 ἢ ἂν
 Εφη.
 πρᾶτ-
 ῶρει.
 πρᾶτ-
 ῶντος,
 ἢ γε.
 ἄρ'
 ησαι
 σύνη
 ἴονον
 γόρα,
 εἶναι,
 οφία,
 εἶναι

τῶν γῶ

- εἶσθε (

Ε ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ; Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἔφη, κὰν
 μὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὠφέλιμα ἦ, ἔγωγε καλῶ ἀγαθά.
 καὶ μοι ἐδόκει ὁ Πρωταγόρας ἤδη τετραχύνθαι τε καὶ
 ἀγωνιᾶν καὶ παρατετάχθαι πρὸς τὸ ἀποκρίνεσθαι.
 ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐώρων αὐτὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα, εὐλαβούμενος
 ἠρέμα ἠρόμην. Πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις, ὦ Πρω-
 334 ταγόρα, ἂ μὴδενὶ ἀνθρώπων ὠφέλιμά ἐστιν, ἢ ἂ μὴδὲ
 τὸ παράπαν ὠφέλιμα ; καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα σὺ ἀγαθὰ
 καλεῖς ; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη. ἀλλ' ἔγωγε πολλὰ οἶδ' ἂ
 ἀνθρώποις μὲν ἀνωφελῆ ἐστι, καὶ σιτία καὶ ποτὰ
 καὶ φάρμακα καὶ ἄλλα μυρία, τὰ δέ γε ὠφέλιμα.
 τὰ δὲ ἀνθρώποις μὲν οὐδέτερα, ἵπποις δέ. τὰ δὲ
 βουσὶν μόνον, τὰ δὲ κυσίν. τὰ δέ γε τούτων μὲν
 οὐδενί, δένδροις δέ. τὰ δὲ τοῦ δένδρου ταῖς μὲν ῥίζαις
 Β ἀγαθὰ, ταῖς δὲ βλάσταις πονηρά, οἶον καὶ ἡ κόπρος,
 πάντων τῶν φυτῶν ταῖς μὲν ῥίζαις ἀγαθὸν παραβαλ-
 λομένη, εἰ δ' ἐθέλοις ἐπὶ τοὺς πτόρθους καὶ τοὺς νέους
 κλῶνας ἐπιβάλλειν, πάντα ἀπόλλυσιν. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ
 ἔλαιον τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς ἅπασιν ἐστιν πάγκακον καὶ
 ταῖς θριξίν πολεμιώτατον ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων ζώων πλήν
 ταῖς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ταῖς δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀγωγὸν καὶ
 τῷ ἄλλῳ σώματι. οὕτω δὲ ποικίλον τί ἐστιν τὸ
 ἀγαθὸν καὶ παντοδαπὸν, ὥστε καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῖς μὲν
 C ἔξωθεν τοῦ σώματος ἀγαθὸν ἐστιν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, τοῖς
 δ' ἐντὸς ταῦτὸν τοῦτο κάκιστον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οἱ
 ἰατροὶ πάντες ἀπαγορεύουσιν τοῖς ἀσθενούσιν μὴ
 χρῆσθαι ἐλαίῳ, ἀλλ' ἢ ὅ τι σμικροτάτῳ ἐν τούτοις οἷς
 μέλλει ἔδεσθαι, ὅσον μόνον τὴν δυσχέρειαν κατα-
 σβέσαι τὴν ἐπὶ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι ταῖς διὰ τῶν ῥινῶν
 γιγνομένην ἐν τοῖς σιτίοις τε καὶ ὄψοις.

Εἰπόντος οὖν ταῦτα αὐτοῦ οἱ παρόντες ἀνεθορύ-
 βησαν ὡς εὖ λέγοι. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον. ὦ Πρωταγόρα,
 D ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ἐπιλήσμων τις ὢν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ εἴαν τίς

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ἀμφότερα δυνάμενον, ἵνα συνουσία ἐγίγνετο· νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐθέλεις καὶ ἐμοί τις ἀσχολία ἐστὶν καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἶός τ' εἶην σοι παραμεῖναι ἀποτείνοντι μακροὺς λόγους—ἐλθεῖν γάρ ποί με δεῖ—εἴμι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ταῦτ' ἂν ἴσως οὐκ ἀηδῶς σου ἤκουον.

Καὶ ἅμα ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ἀνιστάμην ὡς ἀπιών· καὶ
D μου ἀνισταμένου ἐπιλαμβάνεται ὁ Καλλίας τῆς χειρὸς
τῇ δεξιᾷ, τῇ δ' ἀριστερᾷ ἀντελάβετο τοῦ τρίβωνος
τουτουί, καὶ εἶπεν· Οὐκ ἀφήσομέν σε, ὦ Σώκρατες·
ἐὰν γὰρ σὺ ἐξέλθῃς, οὐχ ὁμοίως ἡμῖν ἔσονται οἱ διά-
λογοι. δέομαι οὖν σου παραμεῖναι ἡμῖν· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐδ'
ἂν ἐνὸς ἡδίου ἀκούσαιμι ἢ σοῦ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρου
διαλεγομένων· ἀλλὰ χάρισαι ἡμῖν πᾶσιν. καὶ ἐγὼ
εἶπον—ἤδη δὲ ἀνειστήκη ὡς ἐξιών—᾽Ω παῖ Ἰππονίκου,
αἰεὶ μὲν ἔγωγέ σου τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἀγαμαι, ἀτὰρ καὶ
νῦν ἐπαινῶ καὶ φιλῶ, ὥστε βουλοίμην ἂν χαρίζεσθαί
E σοι, εἴ μου δυνατὰ δέοιο· νῦν δ' ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ
δέοιό μου Κρίσωνι τῷ Ἰμεραίῳ δρομεῖ ἀκμάζοντι
ἔπεσθαι, ἢ τῶν δολιχοδρόμων τῷ ἢ τῶν ἡμεροδρόμων
C. διαθεῖν[τε καὶ ἔπεσθαι.] εἴποιμι ἂν σοι ὅτι πολὺ σοῦ
336 μᾶλλον ἐγὼ ἐμαυτοῦ δέομαι θεοῦσιν τούτοις ἀκολουθεῖν,
ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ δύναμαι, ἀλλ' εἴ τι δέει θεάσασθαι ἐν τῷ
αὐτῷ ἐμέ τε καὶ Κρίσωνα θεόντας, τούτου δέου συγκα-
θεῖναι· ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι ταχὺ θεῖν, οὗτος δὲ
δύναται βραδέως. εἰ οὖν ἐπιθυμεῖς ἐμοῦ καὶ Πρω-
ταγόρου ἀκούειν, τούτου δέου, ὥσπερ τὸ πρῶτόν μοι
ἀπεκρίνατο διὰ βραχέων τε καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ἐρωτώμενα,
οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἀποκρίνεσθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, τίς ὁ τρόπος
B ἔσται τῶν διαλόγων; χωρὶς γὰρ ἔγωγ' ὄμην εἶναι τὸ
συνεῖναι τε ἀλλήλοις διαλεγομένους καὶ τὸ δημηγορεῖν.
Ἄλλ' ὄρας, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· δίκαια δοκεῖ λέγειν
Πρωταγόρας ἀξιῶν αὐτῷ τε ἐξεῖναι διαλέγεσθαι ὅπως
βούλεται καὶ σοὶ ὅπως ἂν αὖ σὺ βούλῃ.

Ἵπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, Οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ἔφη, ὦ Καλλία· Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅδε ὁμολογεῖ μὴ μετεῖναι οἱ μακρολογίας καὶ παραχωρεῖ Πρωταγόρα, τοῦ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι οἷός τ' εἶναι καὶ ἐπίστασθαι λόγον C τε δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι θαυμάζοιμ' ἂν εἴ τῳ ἀνθρώπων παραχωρεῖ. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ Πρωταγόρας ὁμολογεῖ φαυλότερος εἶναι Σωκράτους διαλεχθῆναι, ἔξαρκεῖ Σωκράτει· εἰ δὲ ἀντιποιεῖται, διαλεγέσθω ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἀποκρινόμενος, μὴ ἐφ' ἑκάστη ἐρωτήσῃ μακρὸν λόγον ἀποτείνων, ἐκκρούων τοὺς λόγους καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων διδόναι λόγον, ἀλλ' ἀπομηκύνων ἕως ἂν ἐπιλάβωνται D περὶ ὅτου τὸ ἐρώτημα ἦν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀκούοντων· ἐπεὶ Σωκράτη γε ἐγὼ ἐγγυῶμαι μὴ ἐπιλήσεσθαι, οὐχ ὅτι παίζει καὶ φησιν ἐπιλήσμων εἶναι. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ ἐπιεικέστερα Σωκράτης λέγειν· χρὴ γὰρ ἕκαστον τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι.

Μετὰ δὲ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, Κριτίας ἦν ὁ εἰπὼν· ὦ Πρόδικε καὶ Ἴππία, Καλλίας μὲν δοκεῖ μοι μάλα πρὸς Πρωταγόρου εἶναι, Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ αἰεὶ φιλονεικός ἐστι πρὸς ὃ ἂν ὀρμήσῃ· ἡμᾶς δὲ οὐδὲν δεῖ συμ- E φιλονεικεῖν οὔτε Σωκράτει οὔτε Πρωταγόρα, ἀλλὰ κοινῇ ἀμφοτέρων δεῖσθαι μὴ μεταξὺ διαλυῖσθαι τὴν ξυνουσίαν.

Εἰπόντος δὲ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα ὁ Πρόδικος, Καλῶς μοι, 337 ἔφη, δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Κριτία· χρὴ γὰρ τοὺς ἐν τοιοῖσδε λόγοις παραγιγνομένους κοινούς μὲν εἶναι ἀμφοῖν τοῖν διαλεγομένοιν ἀκροατάς, ἴσους δὲ μή· ἔστιν γὰρ οὐ ταῦτόν· κοινῇ μὲν γὰρ ἀκοῦσαι δεῖ ἀμφοτέρων, μὴ ἴσον δὲ νεῖμαι ἑκατέρῳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν σοφτέρῳ πλέον, τῷ δὲ ἀμαθεστέρῳ ἔλαττον· ἐγὼ μὲν καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς συγχωρεῖν καὶ ἀλλήλοις περὶ τῶν λόγων ἀμφισβητεῖν μὲν, ἐρίζειν B δὲ μή· ἀμφισβητοῦσι μὲν γὰρ καὶ δι' εὐνοίαν οἱ φίλοι τοῖς φίλοις, ἐρίζουσι δὲ οἱ διάφοροί τε καὶ ἐχθροὶ

ἀλλήλοις. καὶ οὕτως ἂν καλλίστη ἡμῖν ἢ συνουσία γίγνοιτο· ὑμεῖς τε γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες μάλιστ' ἂν οὕτως ἐν ἡμῖν τοῖς ἀκούουσιν εὐδοκιμοῖτε καὶ οὐκ ἐπαινοῖσθε· εὐδοκιμεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν παρὰ ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἄνευ ἀπάτης, ἐπαινεῖσθαι δὲ ἐν λόγῳ πολλάκις παρὰ δόξαν ψευδομένων· ἡμεῖς τ' αὖ οἱ ἀκούοντες μάλιστ' ἂν οὕτως εὐφραينوίμεθα, οὐχ ἡδοίμεθα· εὐφραίνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν μαθάνοντά τι καὶ φρονήσεως μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ, ἡδεσθαι δὲ ἐσθίουτά τι ἢ ἄλλο ἢδὺ πάσχοντα αὐτῷ τῷ σώματι. Ταῦτα οὖν εἰπόντος τοῦ Προδίκου πολλοὶ πάνυ τῶν παρόντων ἀπεδέξαντο.

Μετὰ δὲ τὸν Πρόδικον Ἰππίας ὁ σοφὸς εἶπεν, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔφη, οἱ παρόντες, ἡγοῦμαι ἐγὼ ἡμᾶς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκείους καὶ πολίτας ἅπαντας εἶναι φύσει, οὐ νόμῳ· τὸ γὰρ ὁμοῖον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φύσει συγγενές ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ νόμος, τύραννος ὢν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πολλὰ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν βιάζεται. ἡμᾶς οὖν αἰσχροὺς τὴν μὲν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων εἰδέναί, σοφωτάτους δὲ ὄντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο νῦν συνεληλυθότας τῆς τε Ἑλλάδος εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρυτανεῖον τῆς σοφίας καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως εἰς τὸν μέγιστον καὶ ὀλβιώτατον οἶκον τόνδε, μηδὲν τούτου τοῦ ἀξιώματος ἀξιὸν ἀποφύνασθαι, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφέρεσθαι ἀλλήλοις. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν καὶ δέομαι καὶ συμβουλεύω, ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, συμβῆναι ὑμᾶς ὥσπερ ὑπὸ δαιτητῶν ἡμῶν συμβιβαζόντων εἰς τὸ μέσον, καὶ μήτε σὲ τὸ ἀκριβὲς τοῦτο εἶδος τῶν διαλόγων ζητεῖν τὸ κατὰ βραχὺ λῖαν, εἰ μὴ ἢδὺ Πρωταγόρα, ἀλλ' ἐφεῖναι [καὶ χαλάσαι] τὰς ἡνίας τοῖς λόγοις, ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπέστεροι καὶ εὐσχημονέστεροι ἡμῖν φαίνωνται, μήτ' αὖ Πρωταγόραν πάντα κάλων ἐκτείναντα, οὐρία ἐφέντα, φεύγειν εἰς τὸ πέλαγος

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Ἐγούμαι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ ἀνδρὶ παιδείας
 339 μέγιστον μέρος εἶναι περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸν εἶναι· ἔστιν δὲ
 τοῦτο τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν λεγόμενα οἷόν τ' εἶναι
 συνιέναι ἅ τε ὀρθῶς πεποιήται καὶ ἅ μὴ, καὶ ἐπί-
 στασθαι διελεῖν τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενον λόγον δοῦναι.
 καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔσται τὸ ἐρώτημα περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μέν,
 περὶ οὐπὲρ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ νῦν δὴ διελεγόμεθα, περὶ
 ἀρετῆς, μετενηνεγμένον δ' εἰς ποιήσιν· τοσοῦτον μόνον
 διοίσει. λέγει γάρ που Σιμωνίδης πρὸς Σκόπαν, τὸν
 Κρέοντος υἱὸν τοῦ Θετταλοῦ, ὅτι

B ἀνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν,
 χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον, ἄνευ
 ψόγου τετυγμένον.

τοῦτο ἐπίστασαι τὸ ἄσμα, ἢ πᾶν σοι διεξέλθω ; καὶ
 ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι Οὐδὲν δεῖ· ἐπίσταμαί τε γάρ, καὶ πάνυ
 μοι τυγχάνει μεμεληκὸς τοῦ ἄσματος. Εὐ, ἔφη, λέγεις.
 πότερον οὖν καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ πεποιῆσθαι καὶ ὀρθῶς, ἢ
 οὐ ; Πάνυ, ἔφην ἐγώ, †καλῶς† τε καὶ ὀρθῶς. Δοκεῖ
 δέ σοι καλῶς πεποιῆσθαι, εἰ ἐναντία λέγει αὐτὸς αὐτῷ
 C ὁ ποιητής ; Οὐ καλῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. "Ορα δὴ, ἔφη,
 βέλτιον. Ἄλλ', ὠγαθέ, ἔσκεμμαι ἱκανῶς. Οἶσθα
 οὖν, ἔφη, ὅτι προῖόντος τοῦ ἄσματος λέγει που·

οὐδέ μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιπτάκειον νέμεται,
 καίτοι σοφοῦ παρὰ φωτὸς εἶρημένον· χαλε-
 πὸν φάτ' ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι.

ἐννοεῖς ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος καὶ τάδε λέγει κακείνα τὰ
 ἐμπροσθεν ; Οἶδα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ἔφη,
 ταῦτα ἐκείνοις ὁμολογεῖσθαι ; Φαίνεται ἔμοιγε. καὶ
 ἅμα μέντοι ἐφοβούμην μὴ τὶ λέγοι. Ἄτάρ, ἔφην ἐγώ,
 D σοὶ οὐ φαίνεται ; Πῶς γὰρ ἂν φαίνοιτο ὁμολογεῖν
 αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ὁ ταῦτα ἀμφότερά λέγων, ὅς γε τὸ μὲν
 πρῶτον αὐτὸς ὑπέθετο χαλεπὸν εἶναι ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν
 γενέσθαι ἀληθεία, ὀλίγον δὲ τοῦ ποιήματος εἰς τὸ

πρόσθεν προελθὼν ἐπελάθετο, καὶ Πιπτακὸν τὸν ταῦτα λέγοντα ἑαυτῷ, ὅτι χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, τοῦτον μέμφεταιί τε καὶ οὐ φησιν ἀποδέχεσθαι αὐτοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ ἑαυτῷ λέγοντος. καίτοι ὁπότε τὸν ταῦτα λέγοντα αὐτῷ μέμφεται, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἑαυτὸν μέμφεται, ὥστε ἦτοι τὸ πρότερον ἢ ὕστερον οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγει. εἰπὼν οὖν ταῦτα πολλοῖς θόρυβον παρέσχευ καὶ ἔπαινον τῶν ἀκουόντων· καὶ ἐγὼ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, E ὡσπερὶ ὑπὸ ἀγαθοῦ πύκτου πληγεῖς, ἐσκοτώθην τε καὶ ἰλιγγίασα εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ταῦτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθορυβησάντων· ἔπειτα, ὡς γε πρὸς σὲ εἰρῆσθαι τάληθῆ, ἵνα μοι χρόνος ἐγγένηται τῇ σκέψει τί λέγοι ὁ ποιητής, τρέπομαι πρὸς τὸν Πρόδικον, καὶ καλέσας αὐτόν, ὦ Πρόδικε, ἔφην ἐγώ, σὸς μέντοι Σιμωνίδης πολίτης· δίκαιος εἶ βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνδρί. δοκῶ οὖν μοι 340 ἐγὼ παρακαλεῖν σέ, ὡσπερ ἔφη Ὀμηρος τὸν Σκάμανδρον πολιορκούμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως τὸν Σιμόεντα παρακαλεῖν, εἰπόντα·

φίλε κασίγνητε, σθένος ἀνέρος ἀμφότεροί περ
σχῶμεν.

ἀτὰρ καὶ ἐγὼ σὲ παρακαλῶ, μὴ ἡμῖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας τὸν Σιμωνίδην ἐκπέρση. καὶ γὰρ οὖν καὶ δεῖται τὸ ὑπὲρ Σιμωνίδου ἐπανόρθωμα τῆς σῆς μουσικῆς, ἧ τὸ τε βούλεσθαι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν διαιρεῖς ὡς οὐ ταῦτὸν B ὄν, καὶ ἄ νῦν δὴ εἶπες πολλά τε καὶ καλά. καὶ νῦν σκόπει, εἴ σοι συνδοκεῖ ὅπερ ἐμοί. οὐ γὰρ φαίνεται ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ Σιμωνίδης. σὺ γάρ, ὦ Πρόδικε, προαπόφηναι τὴν σὴν γνώμην· ταῦτόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ εἶναι, ἢ ἄλλο; Ἄλλο νὴ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Πρόδικος. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐν μὲν τοῖς πρώτοις αὐτὸς ὁ Σιμωνίδης τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀπεφήνατο, ὅτι ἀνδρα ἀγαθὸν ἀληθείᾳ γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν εἶη; Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη ὁ Πρόδικος. Τὸν δέ γε C

Πιπτακόν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, μέμφεται, οὐχ ὡς οἶεται Πρω-
ταγόρας, τὸ αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ λέγοντα, ἀλλ' ἄλλο. οὐ γὰρ
τοῦτο ὁ Πιπτακὸς ἔλεγεν τὸ χαλεπὸν, γενέσθαι ἐσθλόν,
ὥσπερ ὁ Σιμωνίδης, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔμμεναι· ἔστιν δὲ οὐ
ταῦτόν, ὧ Πρωταγόρα, ὡς φησιν Πρόδικος ὅδε, τὸ εἶναι
καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔστιν τὸ εἶναι τῷ
γενέσθαι, οὐκ ἐναντία λέγει ὁ Σιμωνίδης αὐτὸς αὐτῷ.

Δ καὶ ἴσως ἂν φαίη Πρόδικος ὅδε καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί, καθ'
Ἡσίοδον, γενέσθαι μὲν ἀγαθὸν χαλεπὸν εἶναι· τῆς γὰρ
ἀρετῆς ἔμπροσθεν τοὺς θεοὺς ἰδρῶτα θεῖναι· ὅταν δέ
τις αὐτῆς εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηται, ῥηϊδίην δῆπειτα πέλειν,
χαλεπήν περ εὐῶσαν, ἐκτῆσθαι.

Ὁ μὲν οὖν Πρόδικος ἀκούσας ταῦτα ἐπήνεσέν με· ὁ
δὲ Πρωταγόρας, Τὸ ἐπανόρθωμά σοι, ἔφη, ὧ Σώκρατες,
μεῖζον ἀμάρτημα ἔχει ἢ ὁ ἐπανορθοῖς. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον,
Κακὸν ἄρα μοι εἴργασται, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὧ Πρωταγόρα,
Ε καὶ εἰμί τις γελοῖος ἰατρός· ἰώμενος μεῖζον τὸ νόσημα
ποιῶ. Ἄλλ' οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη. Πῶς δὴ; ἣν δ' ἐγώ.
Πολλὴ ἂν, ἔφη, ἀμαθία εἴη τοῦ ποιητοῦ, εἰ οὕτω φαῦλόν
τί φησιν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐκτῆσθαι, ὃ ἔστιν πάντων
χαλεπώτατον, ὡς ἅπασιν δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις. καὶ ἐγὼ
εἶπον, Νῆ τὸν Δία, εἰς καιρὸν γε παρατετύχηκεν ἡμῖν
ἐν τοῖς λόγοις Πρόδικος ὅδε. κινδυνεύει γάρ τοι, ὧ
Πρωταγόρα, ἢ Προδίκου σοφία θεία τις εἶναι πάλαι,
341 ἦτοι ἀπὸ Σιμωνίδου ἀρξαμένη, ἢ καὶ ἔτι παλαιότερα.
σὺ δὲ ἄλλων πολλῶν ἔμπειρος ὦν ταύτης ἀπειρος εἶναι
φαίνει, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔμπειρος διὰ τὸ μαθητῆς εἶναι
Προδίκου τουτουῖ· καὶ νῦν μοι δοκεῖς οὐ μανθάνειν,
ὅτι καὶ τὸ χαλεπὸν τοῦτο ἴσως οὐχ οὕτως Σιμωνίδης
ὑπελάμβανεν, ὥσπερ σὺ ὑπολαμβάνεις, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ
περὶ τοῦ δεινοῦ Πρόδικός με οὔτοσὶ νουθετεῖ ἐκάστοτε,
ὅταν ἐπαινῶν ἐγὼ ἢ σὲ ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ λέγω ὅτι Πρω-
Β ταγόρας σοφὸς καὶ δεινὸς ἔστιν ἀνὴρ, ἐρωτᾷ εἰ οὐκ

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δοκεῖ διανοεῖσθαι Σιμωνίδης ἐν τούτῳ τῷ ᾄσματι,
 342 ἐθέλω σοι εἰπεῖν, εἰ βούλει λαβεῖν μου πείραν ὅπως
 ἔχω, ὃ σὺ λέγεις τοῦτο, περὶ ἐπῶν· ἐὰν δὲ βούλη, σοῦ
 ἀκούσομαι. ὁ μὲν οὖν Πρωταγόρας ἀκούσας μου
 ταῦτα λέγοντος, Εἰ σὺ βούλει, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὁ
 δὲ Πρόδικός τε καὶ ὁ Ἰππίας ἐκελευέτην πάνυ, καὶ οἱ
 ἄλλοι.

Ἐγὼ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἅ γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ περὶ τοῦ
 ᾄσματος τούτου, πειράσομαι ὑμῖν διεξελθεῖν. φιλο-
 σοφία γάρ ἐστιν παλαιοτάτη τε καὶ πλείστη τῶν
 Β Ἑλλήνων ἐν Κρήτῃ τε καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι, καὶ
 σοφισταὶ πλείστοι γῆς ἐκεῖ εἰσίν· ἀλλ' ἐξαρνοῦνται
 καὶ σχηματίζονται ἀμαθεῖς εἶναι, ἵνα μὴ κατάδηλοι
 ὦσιν ὅτι σοφία τῶν Ἑλλήνων περίεισιν, ὥσπερ οὓς
 Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγε τοὺς σοφιστάς, ἀλλὰ δοκῶσιν τῷ
 μάχεσθαι καὶ ἀνδρεία περιεῖναι, ἡγούμενοι, εἰ γνωσ-
 θεῖεν ὧς περίεισιν, πάντας τοῦτο ἀσκήσειν. νῦν δὲ
 ἀποκρυψάμενοι ἐκεῖνο ἐξηπατήκασιν τοὺς ἐν ταῖς
 πόλεσι λακωνίζοντας, καὶ οἱ μὲν ὦτά τε κατάγνυνται
 C μιμούμενοι αὐτούς, καὶ ἰμάντας περιειλίπτονται καὶ
 φιλογυμναστοῦσιν καὶ βραχείας ἀναβολὰς φοροῦσιν,
 ὡς δὴ τούτοις κρατοῦντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοὺς Λακε-
 δαιμονίους· οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐπειδὴν βούλωνται
 ἀνέδην τοῖς παρ' αὐτοῖς συγγενέσθαι σοφισταῖς, καὶ
 ἤδη ἄχθονται λάθρα ξυγγιγνόμενοι, ξενηλασίας ποιού-
 μενοι τῶν τε λακωνιζόντων τούτων καὶ ἐὰν τις ἄλλος
 ξένος ὢν ἐπιδημήσῃ, συγγίγνονται τοῖς σοφισταῖς
 D λανθάνοντες τοὺς ξένους, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐδένα ἐῶσιν τῶν
 νέων εἰς τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις ἐξιέναι, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ Κρήτες,
 ἵνα μὴ ἀπομανθάνωσιν ἅ αὐτοὶ διδάσκουσιν. εἰσὶν δὲ
 ἐν ταύταις ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐ μόνον ἄνδρες ἐπὶ παιδεύσει
 μέγα φρονούντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ γυναῖκες. γνοῖτε δ' ἄν,
 ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγω καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρὸς

φιλοσοφίαν καὶ λόγους ἄριστα πεπαίδευνται, ὧδε· εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλει τις Λακεδαιμονίων τῷ φαυλοτάτῳ συγγενέσθαι, τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις εὐρήσει αὐτὸν E φαῦλόν τινα φαινόμενον, ἔπειτα, ὅπου ἂν τύχη τῶν λεγομένων, ἐνέβαλεν ῥῆμα ἄξιον λόγου βραχὺ καὶ συνεστραμμένον ὥσπερ δεινὸς ἀκοντιστής, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον παιδὸς μηδὲν βελτίω. τοῦτο οὖν αὐτὸ καὶ τῶν νῦν εἰσὶν οἱ κατανενοήκασι καὶ τῶν πάλαι, ὅτι τὸ λακωνίζειν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐστὶν φιλοσοφεῖν ἢ φιλογυμναστεῖν, εἰδότες ὅτι τοιαῦτα οἷόν τ' εἶναι ῥήματα φθέγγεσθαι τελέως πεπαιδευμένου ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου. τούτων ἦν καὶ Θαλῆς ὁ Μιλήσιος 343 καὶ Πιπτακὸς ὁ Μυτιληναῖος καὶ Βίας ὁ Πριηνεὺς καὶ Σόλων ὁ ἡμέτερος καὶ Κλεόβουλος ὁ Λίνδιος καὶ Μύσων ὁ Χηνεὺς, καὶ ἔβδομος ἐν τούτοις ἐλέγετο Λακεδαιμόνιος Χίλων. οὗτοι πάντες ζηλωταὶ καὶ ἐρασταὶ καὶ μαθηταὶ ἦσαν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων παιδείας· καὶ καταμάθοι ἂν τις αὐτῶν τὴν σοφίαν τοιαύτην οὔσαν, ῥήματα βραχέα ἀξιομνημόνευτα ἐκάστῳ εἰρημένα· οὗτοι καὶ κοινῇ ξυνελθόντες B ἀπαρχὴν τῆς σοφίας ἀνέθεσαν τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι εἰς τὸν νεῶν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς, γράψαντες ταῦτα, ἃ δὴ πάντες ὑμνοῦσιν, γνῶθι σαυτὸν καὶ μηδὲν ἄγαν.

Τοῦ δὴ ἔνεκα ταῦτα λέγω ; ὅτι οὗτος ὁ τρόπος ἦν τῶν παλαιῶν τῆς φιλοσοφίας, βραχυλογία τις Λακωνική· καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦ Πιπτακοῦ ἰδίᾳ περιεφέρετο τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν σοφῶν, τὸ χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι. ὁ οὖν Σιμωνίδης, ἅτε φιλότιμος C ὢν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, ἔγνω ὅτι, εἰ καθέλοι τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα ὥσπερ εὐδοκιμοῦντα ἀθλητὴν [καὶ περιγένοιτο αὐτοῦ,] C· αὐτὸς εὐδοκιμήσει ἐν τοῖς τότε ἀνθρώποις. εἰς τοῦτο οὖν τὸ ῥῆμα καὶ τούτου ἔνεκα τούτῳ ἐπιβουλεύων κολοῦσαι αὐτὸ ἅπαν τὸ ἄσμα πεποίηκεν, ὡς μοι φαίνεται.

Ἐπισκεψώμεθα δὴ αὐτὸ κοινῇ ἅπαντες, εἰ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω. εὐθὺς γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ ἄσματος
 D μανικὸν ἂν φανείη, εἰ βουλόμενος λέγειν, ὅτι ἄνδρα
 ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν, ἔπειτα ἐνέβαλε τὸ μέν.
 τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἓνα λόγον φαίνεται ἐμβεβληῆσθαι,
 εἰ μὴ τις ὑπολάβῃ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ Πιπτακοῦ ῥῆμα
 ὡσπερ ἐρίζοντα λέγειν τὸν Σιμωνίδην, λέγοντος τοῦ
 Πιπτακοῦ ὅτι χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, ἀμφισβητοῦντα
 εἰπεῖν ὅτι Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ γενέσθαι μὲν χαλεπὸν ἄνδρα
 ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ὧ Πιπτακέ, ὡς ἀληθῶς—οὐκ ἀληθείᾳ
 E ἀγαθόν, οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτῳ λέγει τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὡς ἄρα
 ὄντων τινῶν τῶν μὲν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθῶν, τῶν δὲ
 ἀγαθῶν μὲν, οὐ μέντοι ἀληθῶς· εὐήθες γὰρ τοῦτό γε
 φανείη ἂν καὶ οὐ Σιμωνίδου· ἀλλ' ὑπερβατὸν δεῖ
 θεῖναι ἐν τῷ ἄσματι τὸ ἀλαθέως, οὕτως· πῶς ὑπει-
 πόντα τὸ τοῦ Πιπτακοῦ, ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ θεῖμεν αὐτὸν
 λέγοντα τὸν Πιπτακὸν καὶ Σιμωνίδην ἀποκρινόμενον,
 εἰπόντα ὧ ἄνθρωποι, χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, τὸν δὲ
 344 ἀποκρινόμενον ὅτι ὧ Πιπτακέ, οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγεις· οὐ
 γὰρ εἶναι ἀλλὰ γενέσθαι μὲν ἐστιν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν χερσί-
 τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγ-
 μένον, χαλεπὸν ἀλαθέως. οὕτω φαίνεται [τὸ] πρὸς
 λόγον τὸ μέν ἐμβεβλημένον καὶ τὸ ἀλαθέως ὀρθῶς
 ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ κείμενον· καὶ τὰ ἐπιόντα πάντα τούτῳ
 μαρτυρεῖ, ὅτι οὕτως εἴρηται. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστι καὶ
 B περὶ ἐκάστου τῶν ἐν τῷ ἄσματι εἰρημένων ἀποδείξαι
 ὡς εὖ πεποιήται· πάνυ γὰρ χαριέντως καὶ μεμελη-
 μένως ἔχει. ἀλλὰ μακρὸν ἂν εἴη αὐτὸ οὕτω διελθεῖν·
 ἀλλὰ τὸν τύπον αὐτοῦ τὸν ὅλον διεξέλθωμεν καὶ τὴν
 βούλησιν, ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἔλεγχός ἐστιν τοῦ
 Πιπτακείου ῥήματος διὰ παντὸς τοῦ ἄσματος.

Λέγει γὰρ μετὰ τοῦτο ὀλίγα διελθών, ὡς ἂν εἰ
 λέγοι λόγον, ὅτι γενέσθαι μὲν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν χαλεπὸν

πρὸς
 C.
 581.

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ὦ πρῶτον μὲν ὑπάρχει ἰατρῶ εἶναι, ἔπειτα ἀγαθῶ
 ἰατρῶ· οὗτος γὰρ ἂν καὶ κακὸς γένοιτο· ἡμεῖς δὲ οἱ
 ἰατρικῆς ἰδιῶται οὐκ ἂν ποτε γενοίμεθα κακῶς πρά-
 ξαντες οὔτε ἰατροὶ οὔτε τέκτονες οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν
 Β τοιούτων· ὅστις δὲ μὴ ἰατρὸς ἂν γένοιτο κακῶς πράξας,
 δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ κακὸς ἰατρός· οὕτω καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς
 ἀνὴρ γένοιτ' ἂν ποτε καὶ κακὸς ἢ ὑπὸ χρόνου ἢ ὑπὸ
 πόνου ἢ ὑπὸ νόσου ἢ ὑπὸ ἄλλου τινὸς περιπτώματος·
 αὕτη γὰρ μόνη ἐστὶ κακὴ πράξις, ἐπιστήμης στερη-
 θῆναι· ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἀνὴρ οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο κακός·
 ἔστιν γὰρ αἰεί· ἀλλ' εἰ μέλλει κακὸς γενέσθαι, δεῖ
 αὐτὸν πρότερον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι· ὥστε καὶ τοῦτο
 C τοῦ ἄσματος πρὸς τοῦτο τείνει, ὅτι εἶναι μὲν ἄνδρα
 ἀγαθὸν οὐχ οἷόν τε, διατελοῦντα ἀγαθόν, γενέσθαι δὲ
 ἀγαθὸν οἷόν τε, καὶ κακόν γε τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον· ἐπὶ
 πλείστον δὲ καὶ ἄριστοί εἰσιν οὓς ἂν οἱ θεοὶ
 φιλῶσιν.

Ταῦτά τε οὖν πάντα πρὸς τὸν Πιπτακὸν εἴρηται,
 καὶ τὰ ἐπιόντα γε τοῦ ἄσματος ἔτι μᾶλλον δηλοῖ.
 φησὶ γάρ·

τοῦνεκεν οὐ ποτ' ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι
 δυνατὸν

διζήμενος κενεὰν ἐς ἄπρακτον ἐλπίδα
 μοῖραν αἰῶνος βαλέω,

πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον, εὐρυεδοῦς ὅσοι καρ-
 πὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός·

ἔπειθ' ὑμῖν εὐρῶν ἀπαγγελέω,

D φησὶν· οὕτω σφόδρα καὶ δι' ὅλου τοῦ ἄσματος ἐπεξέρ-
 χεται τῷ τοῦ Πιπτακοῦ ῥήματι·

πάντας δ' ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω

ἐκὼν ὅστις ἔρδη

μηδὲν αἰσχρόν· ἀνάγκη δ' οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχον-
 ται·

καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτ' εἰρημένον. οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτος ἦν Σιμωνίδης, ὥστε τούτους φάναι ἐπαινεῖν, ὃς ἂν ἐκὼν μηδὲν κακὸν ποιῆ, ὡς ὄντων τινῶν οἱ ἐκόντες κακὰ ποιούσιν. ἐγὼ γὰρ σχεδόν τι οἶμαι τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐδεὶς τῶν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν ἠγείται οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων ἐκόντα ἐξαμαρτάνειν οὐδὲ αἰσχροῦ τε καὶ E κακὰ ἐκόντα ἐργάζεσθαι, ἀλλ' εὖ ἴσασιν ὅτι πάντες οἱ τὰ αἰσχροῦ καὶ τὰ κακὰ ποιούντες ἄκοντες ποιούσιν· καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης οὐχ ὃς ἂν μὴ κακὰ ποιῆ ἐκὼν, τούτων φησὶν ἐπαινέτης εἶναι, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἑαυτοῦ λέγει τοῦτο τὸ ἐκὼν. ἠγείτο γὰρ ἄνδρα καλὸν κάγαθον πολλάκις αὐτὸν ἐπαναγκάζειν φίλον τινὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐπαινέτην [φιλεῖν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν], οἷον ἀνδρὶ πολ- 346 λάκις συμβῆναι μητέρα ἢ πατέρα ἀλλόκοτον ἢ πατρίδα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων. τοὺς μὲν οὖν πονηροὺς, ὅταν τοιοῦτόν τι αὐτοῖς συμβῆ, ὥσπερ ἀσμένους ὄραν καὶ ψέγοντας ἐπιδεικνύναι καὶ κατηγορεῖν τὴν πονηρίαν τῶν γονέων ἢ πατρίδος, ἵνα αὐτοῖς ἀμελοῦσιν αὐτῶν μὴ ἐγκαλῶσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι μηδ' ὄνειδίξωσιν ὅτι ἀμελοῦσιν, ὥστε ἔτι μᾶλλον B ψέγειν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ἔχθρας ἐκουσίους πρὸς ταῖς ἀναγκαίαις προστίθεσθαι· τοὺς δ' ἀγαθοὺς ἐπικρύπτεσθαί τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἀναγκάζεσθαι, καὶ ἂν τι ὀργισθῶσιν τοῖς γονεῦσιν ἢ πατρίδι ἀδικηθέντες, αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς παραμυθεῖσθαι καὶ διαλλάττεσθαι προσαναγκάζοντας ἑαυτοὺς φιλεῖν τοὺς ἑαυτῶν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν. πολλάκις δέ, οἶμαι, καὶ Σιμωνίδης ἠγήσατο καὶ αὐτὸς ἢ τύραννον ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἐπαινεῖσαι καὶ ἐγκωμιάσαι οὐχ ἐκὼν, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαζό- C μενος. ταῦτα δὴ καὶ τῷ Πιπτακῷ λέγει ὅτι ἐγώ, ὦ Πιπτακέ, οὐ διὰ ταῦτά σε ψέγω· ὅτι εἰμὶ φιλόψογος, ἐπεὶ

ἔμοιγ' ἐξαρκεῖ ὃς ἂν μὴ κακὸς ἦ

. μηδ' ἄγαν ἀπάλαμνος, εἰδώς τ' ὀνησίπολιν
 δίκαν ὑγιῆς ἀνὴρ·

οὐ μιν ἐγὼ μωμήσομαι.

οὐ γάρ εἰμι φιλόμωμος·

τῶν γὰρ ἠλιθίων ἀπείρων γενέθλα,

ὥστ' εἴ τις χαίρει ψέγων, ἐμπλησθείη ἂν ἐκείνους μεμ-
 φόμενος.

πάντα τοι καλά, τοῖσί τ' αἰσχροῖα μὴ μέμικται.

D οὐ τοῦτο λέγει, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἔλεγε πάντα τοι λευκά,
 οἷς μέλανα μὴ μέμικται· γελοῖον γὰρ ἂν εἴη πολλαχῆ·
 ἴλλ' ὅτι αὐτὸς καὶ τὰ μέσα ἀποδέχεται ὥστε μὴ
 ψέγειν· καὶ οὐ ζητῶ, ἔφη, πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον,
 εὐρυεδοῦς ὅσοι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός, ἔπειθ'
 ὑμῖν εὐρῶν ἀπαγγελέω· ὥστε τούτου γ' ἔνεκα
 οὐδένα ἐπαινέσομαι, ἀλλὰ μοι ἐξαρκεῖ, ἂν ἦ μέσος καὶ
 μηδὲν κακὸν ποιῆ, ὡς ἐγὼ πάντας φιλέω καὶ ἐπαί-
 νημι — καὶ τῇ φωνῇ ἐνταῦθα κέχρηται τῇ τῶν

E Μυτιληναίων, ὡς πρὸς Πιπτακὸν λέγων τὸ πάντας
 δὲ ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω ἐκῶν (ἐνταῦθα δεῖ ἐν τῷ
 ἐκῶν διαλαβεῖν λέγοντα) ὅστις ἔρδη μηδὲν αἰσ-
 χρόν, ἄκων δ' ἔστιν οὓς ἐγὼ ἐπαινῶ καὶ φιλῶ. σὲ
 347 οὖν, καὶ εἰ μέσως ἔλεγες ἐπιεικῆ καὶ ἀληθῆ, ὦ
 Πιπτακέ, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἔψεγον. νῦν δέ—σφόδρα γὰρ
 καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ψευδόμενος δοκεῖς ἀληθῆ
 λέγειν, διὰ ταῦτά σε ἐγὼ ψέγω.

Ταῦτά μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Πρόδικε καὶ Πρωταγόρα, ἦν δ'
 ἐγώ, Σιμωνίδης διανοούμενος πεποιηκέναι τοῦτο τὸ
 ἄσμα.

Καὶ ὁ Ἰππίας, Εὐ μὲν μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες,
 B καὶ σὺ περὶ τοῦ ἄσματος διεληλυθέναι· ἔστι μέντοι,
 ἔφη, καὶ ἐμοὶ λόγος περὶ αὐτοῦ εὐ ἔχων, ὃν ὑμῖν ἐπι-
 δείξω, ἂν βούλησθε. καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, Ναί, ἔφη,

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μιμείσθαι ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ, καταθεμένους τοὺς ποιητὰς αὐτοὺς δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πείραν λαμβάνοντας· κὰν μὲν βούλη ἔτι ἐρωτᾶν, ἐτοιμὸς εἰμί σοι παρέχειν ἀποκρινόμενος· εἰ δὲ βούλη, σὺ ἐμοὶ παράσχεις, περὶ ὧν μεταξὺ ἐπαυσάμεθα διεξιόντες, τούτοις τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι.

- B Λέγοντος οὖν ἐμοῦ ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἄλλα οὐδὲν ἀπεσάφει ὁ Πρωταγόρας ὁπότερα ποιήσοι. εἶπεν οὖν ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης πρὸς τὸν Καλλίαν βλέψας, ὦ Καλλία, δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, καὶ νῦν καλῶς Πρωταγόρας ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἐθέλων εἴτε δώσει λόγον εἴτε μὴ διασαφεῖν; ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐ δοκεῖ· ἀλλ' ἦτοι διαλεγέσθω ἢ εἰπέτω ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλει διαλέγεσθαι, ἵνα τούτῳ μὲν ταῦτα συνειδῶμεν,
- C Σωκράτης δὲ ἄλλῳ τῷ διαλέγεται ἢ ἄλλος ὅστις ἂν βούληται ἄλλῳ. καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αἰσχυνθείς, ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ ἔδοξεν, τοῦ τε Ἀλκιβιάδου ταῦτα λέγοντος καὶ τοῦ Καλλίου δεομένου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σχεδόν τι τῶν παρόντων, μόγις προὔτράπετο εἰς τὸ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ἐκέλευεν ἐρωτᾶν αὐτὸν ὡς ἀποκρινόμενος.

Εἶπον δὴ ἐγώ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, μὴ οἷου διαλέγεσθαί μέ σοι ἄλλο τι βουλόμενον ἢ ἂν αὐτὸς ἀπορῶ ἐκάστοτε, ταῦτα διασκέψασθαι. ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ πάνυ λέγειν τι τὸν Ὅμηρον τὸ

- D σύν τε δὺ' ἐρχομένῳ, καί τε πρὸ δ' τοῦ ἐνόησεν. εὐπορώτεροι γάρ πως ἅπαντές ἐσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς ἅπαν ἔργον καὶ λόγον καὶ διανόημα· μῦθος δ' εἶπερ τε νοήσῃ, αὐτίκα περιὼν ζητεῖ ὅτῳ ἐπιδείξεται καὶ μεθ' ὅτου βεβαιώσῃται, ἕως ἂν ἐντύχῃ. ὥσπερ καὶ ἐγὼ ἔνεκα τούτου σοὶ ἡδέως διαλέγομαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλῳ τινί, ἡγούμενός σε βέλτιστ' ἂν ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ περὶ
- E τῶν ἄλλων περὶ ὧν εἰκὸς σκοπεῖσθαι τὸν ἐπιεικῆ, καὶ

δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς. τίνα γὰρ ἄλλον ἢ σέ; ὅς γε οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς οἶει καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, ὥσπερ τινὲς ἄλλοι αὐτοὶ μὲν ἐπιεικεῖς εἰσιν, ἄλλους δὲ οὐ δύνανται ποιεῖν· σὺ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς εἶ καὶ ἄλλους οἷός τ' εἶ ποιεῖν ἀγαθοῦς. καὶ οὕτω πεπίστευκας σαυτῷ, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων ταύτην τὴν τέχνην ἀποκρυπτομένων σύ γ' ἀναφανδὸν σεαυτὸν ὑποκηρυξάμενος εἰς πάντας τοὺς Ἑλληνας, σοφιστὴν ἐπονομάσας, σεαυτὸν ἀπέ- 349 φηνας παιδεύσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλον, πρῶτος τούτου μισθὸν ἀξιώσας ἄρνησθαι. πῶς οὖν οὐ σε χρὴν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν τούτων σκέψιν καὶ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀνακοινοῦσθαι; οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως οὐ. καὶ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἐκεῖνα, ἅπερ τὸ πρῶτον ἠρώτων περὶ τούτων, πάλιν ἐπιθυμῶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ μὲν ἀναμνησθῆναι παρὰ σοῦ, τὰ δὲ συνδιασκέψασθαι. ἦν δέ, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, τὸ B ἐρώτημα τόδε· σοφία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ὀσιότης, πότερον ταῦτα, πέντε ὄντα ὀνόματα, ἐπὶ ἐνὶ πράγματι ἐστίν, ἢ ἐκάστῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων ὑπόκειται τις ἴδιος οὐσία καὶ πρᾶγμα ἔχον ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν ἕκαστον, οὐκ ὄν οἶον τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν τὸ ἕτερον; ἔφησθα οὖν σὺ οὐκ ὀνόματα ἐπὶ ἐνὶ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἕκαστον ἰδίῳ πράγματι τῶν ὀνομάτων C τούτων ἐπικεῖσθαι, πάντα δὲ ταῦτα μόρια εἶναι ἀρετῆς, οὐχ ὡς τὰ τοῦ χρυσοῦ μόρια ὁμοιά ἐστίν ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ οὐ μόριά ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὡς τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ οὐ μόριά ἐστίν καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἀνόμοια, ἰδίαν ἕκαστα δύναμιν ἔχοντα. ταῦτα εἰ μὲν σοι δοκεῖ ἔτι ὥσπερ τότε, φάθι· εἰ δὲ ἄλλως πως, τοῦτο διόρισαι, ὡς ἐγωγε οὐδέν σοι ὑπόλογον τίθεμαι, εἴαν πῃ ἄλλη νῦν φήσης· οὐ γὰρ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι, εἰ τότε ἀποπειρώμενός μου ταῦτα ἔλεγες. D

Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ σοι, ἔφη, λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα μόρια μὲν ἐστίν ἀρετῆς, καὶ τὰ μὲν τέτταρα

αὐτῶν ἐπιεικῶς παραπλήσια ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἢ δὲ
 ἀνδρεία πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρει πάντων τούτων. ὧδε δὲ
 γνώσει ὅτι ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω· εὐρήσεις γὰρ πολλοὺς
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀδικωτάτους μὲν ὄντας καὶ ἀνοσιω-
 τάτους καὶ ἀκολαστοτάτους καὶ ἀμαθεστάτους, ἀνδρειο-
 τάτους δὲ διαφερόντως. Ἔχε δὴ, ἔφην ἐγώ· ἄξιον
 γάρ τοι ἐπισκέψασθαι ὃ λέγεις. πότερον τοὺς
 ἀνδρείους θαρραλέους λέγεις ἢ ἄλλο τι; Καὶ ἴτας
 γ', ἔφη, ἐφ' ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ φοβοῦνται ἰέναι. Φέρε δὴ,
 τὴν ἀρετὴν καλὸν τι φῆς εἶναι, καὶ ὡς καλοῦ ὄντος
 αὐτοῦ σὺ διδάσκαλον σαυτὸν παρέχεις; Κάλλιστον
 μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, εἰ μὴ μαίνομαί γε. Πότερον οὖν, ἦν δ'
 ἐγώ, τὸ μὲν τι αὐτοῦ αἰσχρὸν, τὸ δέ τι καλόν, ἢ ὅλον
 καλόν; Ὅλον που καλὸν ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα. Οἴσθα
 οὖν τίνες εἰς τὰ φρέατα κολυμβῶσιν θαρραλέως;
 350 Ἔγωγε, ὅτι οἱ κολυμβηταί. Πότερον διότι ἐπίστανται
 ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι; Ὅτι ἐπίστανται. Τίνες δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν
 ἵππων πολεμεῖν θαρραλέοι εἰσίν; πότερον οἱ ἵππικοὶ
 ἢ οἱ ἀφιπποὶ; Οἱ ἵππικοί. Τίνες δὲ πέλτας ἔχοντες;
 οἱ πελταστικοὶ ἢ οἱ μή; Οἱ πελταστικοί. καὶ τὰ
 ἄλλα γε πάντα, εἰ τοῦτο ζητεῖς, ἔφη, οἱ ἐπιστήμονες
 τῶν μὴ ἐπισταμένων θαρραλεώτεροί εἰσιν, καὶ αὐτοὶ
 Β ἑαυτῶν, ἐπειδὰν μάθωσιν, ἢ πρὶν μαθεῖν. Ἦδη δέ
 τινες ἐώρακας, ἔφην, πάντων τούτων ἀνεπιστήμονας
 ὄντας, θαρροῦντας δὲ πρὸς ἕκαστα τούτων; Ἔγωγε,
 ἢ δ' ὅς, καὶ λίαν γε θαρροῦντας. Οὐκοῦν οἱ θαρραλέοι
 οὔτοι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν; Αἰσχρὸν μεντᾶν, ἔφη, εἶη
 ἢ ἀνδρεία· ἐπεὶ οὔτοί γε μαινόμενοί εἰσιν. Πῶς οὖν,
 ἔφην ἐγώ, λέγεις τοὺς ἀνδρείους; οὐχὶ τοὺς θαρραλέους
 εἶναι; Καὶ νῦν γ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν οὔτοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἱ
 C οὔτω θαρραλέοι ὄντες οὐκ ἀνδρεῖοι ἀλλὰ μαινόμενοι
 φαίνονται; καὶ ἐκεῖ αὖ οἱ σοφώτατοι οὔτοι καὶ θαρρα-
 λεώτατοί εἰσιν, θαρραλεώτατοι δὲ ὄντες ἀνδρεῖότατοι;

(C. 155. P)

ἀνδρείους

(C. 155. P)

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εὖ ζῆν, τοὺς δὲ κακῶς; Ἔφη. Ἄρ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι
 ἄνθρωπος ἂν εὖ ζῆν, εἰ ἀνιώμενός τε καὶ ὀδυνώμενος
 ζῶη; Οὐκ ἔφη. Τί δ', εἰ ἠδέως βιοὺς τὸν βίον
 τελευτήσειεν, οὐκ εὖ ἂν σοι δοκοῖ οὕτως βεβιωκέναι;
 Ἔμοιγ', ἔφη. Τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἠδέως ζῆν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δ'
 C ἀηδῶς κακόν. Εἵπερ τοῖς καλοῖς γ', ἔφη, ζῶη ἠδόμενος.
 Τί δή, ὦ Πρωταγόρα; μὴ καὶ σύ, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί,
 ἠδέ' ἅττα καλεῖς κακὰ καὶ ἀνιάρὰ ἀγαθὰ; ἐγὼ γὰρ
 λέγω, καθ' ὃ ἠδέα ἐστίν, ἄρα κατὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀγαθὰ,
 μὴ εἴ τι ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀποβήσεται ἄλλο; καὶ αὖθις αὖ
 τὰ ἀνιάρὰ ὡσαύτως οὕτως οὐ καθ' ὅσον ἀνιάρὰ, κακὰ;
 Οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἀπλῶς οὕτως, ὡς σὺ
 D ἐρωτᾷς, εἰ ἐμοὶ ἀποκριτέον ἐστίν, ὡς τὰ ἠδέα τε ἀγαθὰ
 ἐστὶν ἅπαντα καὶ τὰ ἀνιάρὰ κακὰ· ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ οὐ
 μόνον πρὸς τὴν νῦν ἀπόκρισιν ἐμοὶ ἀσφαλέστερον
 εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς πάντα τὸν ἄλλον
 βίον τὸν ἐμόν, ὅτι ἐστὶ μὲν ἂ τῶν ἠδέων οὐκ ἐστὶν
 ἀγαθὰ, ἐστὶ δ' αὖ καὶ ἂ τῶν ἀνιάρων οὐκ ἐστὶ κακὰ,
 ἐστὶ δ' ἂ ἐστὶν, καὶ τρίτον ἂ οὐδέτερα, οὔτε κακὰ οὔτ'
 ἀγαθὰ. Ἠδέα δὲ καλεῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ τὰ ἠδονῆς
 E μετέχοντα ἢ ποιούντα ἠδονῆν; Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Τοῦτο
 τοίνυν λέγω, καθ' ὅσον ἠδέα ἐστίν, εἰ οὐκ ἀγαθὰ, τὴν
 ἠδονῆν αὐτὴν ἐρωτῶν εἰ οὐκ ἀγαθόν ἐστὶν. Ὡσπερ
 σὺ λέγεις, ἔφη, ἐκάστοτε, ὦ Σώκρατες, σκοπώμεθα
 αὐτό, καὶ εἰ μὲν πρὸς λόγον δοκῆ εἶναι τὸ σκέμμα
 καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνεται ἠδύ τε καὶ ἀγαθόν, συγχωρη-
 σόμεθα· εἰ δὲ μή, τότε ἤδη ἀμφισβητήσομεν. Πότερον
 οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, σὺ βούλει ἠγεμονεύειν τῆς σκέψεως, ἢ
 ἐγὼ ἠγῶμαι; Δίκαῖος, ἔφη, σὺ ἠγεῖσθαι· σὺ γὰρ καὶ
 κατάρχεις τοῦ λόγου. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῆδέ πη
 352 καταφανὲς ἂν ἡμῖν γένοιτο; ὥσπερ εἴ τις ἄνθρωπον
 σκοπῶν ἐκ τοῦ εἶδους ἢ πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι
 τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἔργων, ἰδὼν τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ τὰς

χεῖρας ἄκρας εἶποι· ἴθι δὴ μοι ἀποκαλύψας καὶ τὰ
 στήθη καὶ τὸ μετάφρενον ἐπίδειξον, ἵνα ἐπισκέψωμαι
 σαφέστερον· καὶ ἐγὼ τοιοῦτόν τι ποθῶ πρὸς τὴν
 σκέψιν· θεασάμενος ὅτι οὕτως ἔχεις πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν
 καὶ τὸ ἡδύ, ὡς φῆς, δέομαι τοιοῦτόν τι εἰπεῖν· ἴθι δὴ *C. εἶπει*
 μοι, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ τόδε τῆς διανοίας ἀποκάλυψον· B
 πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς ἐπιστήμην; πότερον καὶ τοῦτό σοι
 δοκεῖ ὡσπερ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ ἄλλως; δοκεῖ
 δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ ἐπιστήμης τοιοῦτόν τι, οὐκ
 ἰσχυρὸν οὐδ' ἡγεμονικὸν οὐδ' ἀρχικὸν εἶναι· οὐδὲ ὡς
 περὶ τοιούτου αὐτοῦ ὄντος διανοοῦνται, ἀλλ' ἐνούσης
 πολλάκις ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπιστήμης οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ
 ἄρχειν, ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι, τοτὲ μὲν θυμόν, τοτὲ δὲ ἡδονήν,
 τοτὲ δὲ λύπην, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἔρωτα, πολλάκις δὲ φόβον,
 ἀτεχνῶς διανοούμενοι περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ὡσπερ περὶ C
 ἀνδραπόδου, περιελκομένης ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων.
 ἄρ' οὖν καὶ σοὶ τοιοῦτόν τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοκεῖ, ἢ καλόν
 τε εἶναι ἢ ἐπιστήμη καὶ οἶον ἄρχειν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου,
 καὶ ἐάνπερ γιγνώσκη τις τὰγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακά, μὴ ἂν
 κρατηθῆναι ὑπὸ μηδενός, ὥστε ἄλλ' ἄττα πράττειν ἢ
 ἂν ἐπιστήμη κελεύη, ἀλλ' ἱκανὴν εἶναι τὴν φρόνησιν
 βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ; Καὶ δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὡσπερ σὺ
 λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἅμα, εἶπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ, αἰσχροῦν
 ἐστι καὶ ἐμοὶ σοφίαν καὶ ἐπιστήμην μὴ οὐχὶ πάντων D
 κράτιστον φάναι εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων.
 Καλῶς γε, ἔφην ἐγώ, σὺ λέγων καὶ ἀληθῆ. οἶσθα οὖν
 ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐμοί τε καὶ σοὶ οὐ πεί-
 θονται, ἀλλὰ πολλοὺς φασὶ γιγνώσκοντας τὰ βέλτιστα
 οὐκ ἐθέλειν πράττειν, ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ ἄλλα πράττειν·
 καὶ ὅσους δὴ ἐγὼ ἠρόμην ὃ τί ποτε αἰτίον ἐστι
 τούτου, ὑπὸ ἡδονῆς φασὶν ἠττωμένους ἢ λύπης ἢ ὧν E
 νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον ὑπὸ τινος τούτων κρατουμένους
 ταῦτα ποιεῖν τοὺς ποιοῦντας. Πολλὰ γὰρ οἶμαι, ἔφη,

ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἄλλα οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι.
 Ἴθι δὴ μετ' ἐμοῦ ἐπιχείρησον πείθειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους
 353 καὶ διδάσκειν ὃ ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, ὃ φασιν
 ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττᾶσθαι καὶ οὐ πράττειν διὰ ταῦτα
 τὰ βέλτιστα, ἐπεὶ γινώσκειν γε αὐτά. ἴσως γὰρ ἂν
 λεγόντων ἡμῶν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγετε, ὦ ἄνθρωποι,
 ἀλλὰ ψεύδεσθε, ἔροιντ' ἂν ἡμᾶς· ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε
 καὶ Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ ἐστὶν τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα ἡδονῆς
 ἡττᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ τί ποτ' ἐστίν, καὶ τί ὑμεῖς αὐτό φατε
 εἶναι; εἶπατον ἡμῖν. Τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, δεῖ ἡμᾶς
 σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν τῶν πολλῶν δόξαν ἀνθρώπων, οἷ ὅ τι
 B ἂν τύχῃσι τοῦτο λέγουσιν; Οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἶναί
 τι ἡμῖν τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ ἐξευρεῖν περὶ ἀνδρείας, πρὸς
 τᾶλλα μέρη τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς πῶς ποτ' ἔχει. εἰ οὖν
 σοι δοκεῖ ἐμμένειν οἷς ἄρτι ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν, ἐμὲ ἡγήσασθαι,
 ἦ οἶμαι ἂν ἔγωγε, κάλλιστα φανερὸν γενέσθαι, ἔπου·
 εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλει, εἰ σοι φίλον, ἐὼ χαίρειν. Ἄλλ', ἔφη,
 ὀρθῶς λέγεις· καὶ πέραινε ὥσπερ ἤρξω.

C Πάλιν· τοίνυν, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἰ ἔροιντο ἡμᾶς· τί οὖν
 φατὲ τοῦτο εἶναι, ὃ ἡμεῖς ἡττω εἶναι τῶν ἡδονῶν
 λέγομεν; εἶποιμ' ἂν ἔγωγε πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὡδί· ἀκούετε
 δὴ· πειρασόμεθα γὰρ ὑμῖν ἐγώ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρας
 φράσαι. ἄλλο τι γάρ, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, φατὲ ὑμῖν τοῦτο
 γίνεσθαι ἐν τοῖσδε, οἷον πολλάκις ὑπὸ σίτων καὶ
 ποτῶν καὶ ἀφροδισίων κρατούμενοι ἡδέων ὄντων,
 γινώσκοντες ὅτι πονηρὰ ἐστὶν, ὅμως αὐτὰ πράττειν;
 Φαῖεν ἂν. Οὐκοῦν ἐροίμεθ' ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ
 D πάλιν· πονηρὰ δὲ αὐτὰ πῆ φατὲ εἶναι; πότερον ὅτι
 τὴν ἡδονὴν ταύτην ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα παρέχει καὶ ἡδύ
 ἐστὶν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, ἢ ὅτι εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον
 νόσους τε ποιεῖ καὶ πενίας καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλὰ
 παρασκευάζει; ἢ κἂν εἴ τι τούτων εἰς τὸ ὕστερον
 μηδὲν παρασκευάζει, χαίρειν δὲ μόνον ποιεῖ, ὅμως δ'

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χαίρειν τότε λέγετε κακὸν εἶναι, ὅταν μείζονων ἡδονῶν
 ἀποστερηῆ ἢ ὅσας αὐτὸ ἔχει, ἢ λύπας μείζους παρα-
 D σκευάζῃ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἡδονῶν· ἐπεὶ εἰ κατ' ἄλλο τι αὐτὸ
 τὸ χαίρειν κακὸν καλεῖτε καὶ εἰς ἄλλο τι τέλος ἀπο-
 βλέψαντες, ἔχοιτε ἂν καὶ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν· ἀλλ' οὐχ ἔξετε.
 Οὐδ' ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν, ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας. Ἔτι
 οὖν πάλιν καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι ὁ αὐτὸς
 τρόπος; τότε καλεῖτε αὐτὸ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἀγαθόν, ὅταν
 ἢ μείζους λύπας τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ οὐσῶν ἀπαλλάττῃ ἢ
 μείζους ἡδονὰς τῶν λυπῶν παρασκευάζῃ; ἐπεὶ εἰ πρὸς
 ἄλλο τι τέλος ἀποβλέπετε, ὅταν καλῆτε αὐτὸ τὸ
 E λυπεῖσθαι ἀγαθόν, ἢ πρὸς ὃ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἔχετε ἡμῖν
 εἰπεῖν· ἀλλ' οὐχ ἔξετε. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ
 Πρωταγόρας. Πάλιν τοίνυν, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἰ με ἀνέροισθε,
 ὦ ἄνθρωποι, τίνος οὖν δήποτε ἔνεκα πολλὰ περὶ τούτου
 λέγεις καὶ πολλαχῆ; συγγιγνώσκετέ μοι, φαίην ἂν
 ἔγωγε. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐ ρᾶδιον ἀποδείξαι, τί ἐστίν
 ποτε τοῦτο, ὃ ὑμεῖς καλεῖτε τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττω εἶναι·
 ἔπειτα ἐν τούτῳ εἰσὶν πᾶσαι αἱ ἀποδείξεις. ἀλλ' ἔτι
 355 καὶ νῦν ἀναθέσθαι ἔξεστιν, εἴ πῃ ἔχετε ἄλλο τι φάναι
 εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὴν ἡδονήν, ἢ τὸ κακὸν ἄλλο τι ἢ
 τὴν ἀνίαν, ἢ ἀρκεῖ ὑμῖν τὸ ἡδέως καταβιῶναι τὸν βίον
 ἀνευ λυπῶν; εἰ δὲ ἀρκεῖ καὶ μὴ ἔχετε μηδὲν ἄλλο
 φάναι εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ὃ μὴ εἰς ταῦτα τελευτᾷ,
 τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀκούετε. φημὶ γὰρ ὑμῖν τούτου οὕτως
 ἔχοντος γελοῖον τὸν λόγον γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν λέγητε, ὅτι
 πολλάκις γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ἄνθρωπος, ὅτι κακά
 B ἐστίν, ὅμως πράττει αὐτά, ἐξὸν μὴ πράττειν, ὑπὸ τῶν
 ἡδονῶν ἀγόμενος καὶ ἐκπληττόμενος· καὶ αὖθις αὖ
 λέγετε, ὅτι γιγνώσκων ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὰ ἀγαθὰ πράττειν
 οὐκ ἐθέλει διὰ τὰς παραχρῆμα ἡδονὰς, ὑπὸ τούτων
 ἡττώμενος. ὡς δὲ ταῦτα γελοῖά ἐστιν, κατάδηλον
 ἔσται, εἰ μὴ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι χρώμεθα (ἄρα) ἡδεῖ τε

καὶ ἀνιαρῶ καὶ ἀγαθῶ καὶ κακῶ, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ δύο ἐφάνη ταῦτα, δυοῖν καὶ ὀνόμασιν προσαγορεύωμεν αὐτά, πρῶτον μὲν ἀγαθῶ καὶ κακῶ, ἔπειτα αὖθις ἡδεῖτε καὶ ἀνιαρῶ. θέμενοι δὴ οὕτω λέγωμεν, ὅτι γι- C
 γνώσκων ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακὰ ἐστίν, ὅμως αὐτὰ ποιεῖ. εἰ οὖν τις ἡμᾶς ἔρηται, διὰ τί, ἡττώμενος, φήσομεν· ὑπὸ τοῦ; ἐκεῖνος ἐρήσεται ἡμᾶς· ἡμῖν δὲ ὑπὸ μὲν ἡδονῆς οὐκέτι ἔξεστιν εἰπεῖν· ἄλλο γὰρ ὄνομα μετείληφεν ἀντὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς τὸ ἀγαθόν· ἐκεῖνῳ δὲ ἀποκρινώμεθα καὶ λέγωμεν, ὅτι ἡττώμενος — ὑπὸ τίνος; φήσει· τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, φήσομεν νῆ Δία. ἂν οὖν τύχη ὁ ἐρόμενος ἡμᾶς ὑβριστῆς ὢν, γελάσεται καὶ ἐρεῖ· ἢ γελοῖον λέγετε πράγμα, εἰ πράττει τις κακὰ, γιγνώσκων ὅτι κακὰ ἐστίν, οὐ δέον αὐτὸν D
 πράττειν, ἡττώμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν. ἄρα, φήσει, οὐκ ἀξίων ὄντων νικᾶν ἐν ὑμῖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ κακὰ, ἢ ἀξίων; φήσομεν δῆλον ὅτι ἀποκρινόμενοι, ὅτι οὐκ ἀξίων ὄντων· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐξημάρτανεν ὅν φαμεν ἡττω εἶναι τῶν ἡδονῶν. κατὰ τί δέ, φήσει ἴσως, ἀνάξιά ἐστίν τὰ ἀγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν ἢ τὰ κακὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν; ἢ κατ' ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅταν τὰ μὲν μείζω, τὰ δὲ σμικρότερα ἦ; ἢ πλείω, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω ἦ; οὐχ ἔξομεν εἰπεῖν ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο. δῆλον ἄρα, φήσει, ὅτι τὸ ἡττᾶσθαι τοῦτο E
 λέγετε, ἀντὶ ἐλαττόνων ἀγαθῶν μείζω κακὰ λαμβάνειν. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὕτω. μεταλάβωμεν δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα πάλιν τὸ ἡδύ τε καὶ ἀνιαρὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις, καὶ λέγωμεν ὅτι ἄνθρωπος πράττει, τότε μὲν ἐλέγομεν τὰ κακὰ, νῦν δὲ λέγωμεν τὰ ἀνιαρὰ, γιγνώσκων, ὅτι ἀνιαρὰ ἐστίν, ἡττώμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδέων, δῆλον ὅτι ἀναξίων ὄντων νικᾶν. καὶ τίς ἄλλη ἀναξία ἡδονῆ 356
 πρὸς λύπην ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἢ ὑπερβολὴ ἀλλήλων καὶ ἔλλειψις; ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ μείζω τε καὶ σμικρότερα γιγνώμενα ἀλλήλων καὶ πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω καὶ μᾶλλον

καὶ ἦττον. εἰ γάρ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἀλλὰ πολὺ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ παραχρήμα ἡδὺ τοῦ εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον καὶ ἡδέος καὶ λυπηροῦ, μῶν ἄλλω τῷ, φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε, ἢ ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ; οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅτῳ
 B ἄλλω. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸς ἰστάναι ἄνθρωπος, συν-
 θεῖς τὰ ἡδέα καὶ συνθεῖς τὰ λυπηρά, καὶ τὸ ἐγγὺς καὶ
 τὸ πόρρω στήσας ἐν τῷ ζυγῷ, εἶπε πότερα πλείω
 ἐστίν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα πρὸς ἡδέα ἰστήσῃ, τὰ μείζω
 αἰεὶ καὶ πλείω ληπτέα· εἰ δὲ λυπηρὰ πρὸς λυπηρά,
 τὰ ἐλάττω καὶ σμικρότερα· εἰ δὲ ἡδέα πρὸς λυπηρά,
 εἰ μὲν τὰ ἀνιάρὰ ὑπερβάλληται ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδέων, εἰ μὲν
 τε τὰ ἐγγὺς ὑπὸ τῶν πόρρω εἰ μὲν τε τὰ πόρρω ὑπὸ τῶν
 ἐγγύς, ταύτην τὴν πρᾶξιν πρακτέον ἐν ἧ ἂν ταῦτ' ἐνῆ·
 C εἰ δὲ τὰ ἡδέα ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνιάρων, οὐ πρακτέα· μή πῃ
 ἄλλη ἔχει, φαίην ἂν, ταῦτα, ὦ ἄνθρωποι; οἶδ' ὅτι οὐκ
 ἂν ἔχοιεν ἄλλως λέγειν. Συνεδόκει καὶ ἐκείνῳ. "Ὅτε
 δὴ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, τόδε μοι ἀποκρίνασθε, φήσω.
 φαίνεται ὑμῖν τῇ ὄψει τὰ αὐτὰ μεγέθη ἐγγύθεν μὲν
 μείζω, πόρρωθεν δὲ ἐλάττω· ἢ οὐ; Φήσουσι. Καὶ τὰ
 παχέα καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὡσαύτως; καὶ αἱ φωναὶ ταῖτ' ἴσαι
 ἐγγύθεν μὲν μείζους, πόρρωθεν δὲ σμικρότεραι; Φαίεν
 D ἂν. Εἰ οὖν ἐν τούτῳ ἡμῖν ἦν τὸ εὖ πράττειν, ἐν τῷ
 τὰ μὲν μεγάλα μήκη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λαμβάνειν, τὰ
 δὲ σμικρὰ καὶ φεύγειν καὶ μὴ πράττειν, τίς ἂν ἡμῖν
 σωτηρία ἐφάνη τοῦ βίου; ἄρα ἢ μετρητικὴ τέχνη ἢ ἢ
 τοῦ φαινομένου δύναμις; ἢ αὕτη μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐπλάνα καὶ
 ἐποίει ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω πολλάκις μεταλαμβάνειν ταῦτα
 καὶ μεταμέλειν καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν καὶ ἐν ταῖς
 αἰρέσεσιν τῶν μεγάλων τε καὶ σμικρῶν, ἢ δὲ μετ-
 ρητικὴ ἄκυρον μὲν ἂν ἐποίησε τοῦτο τὸ φάντασμα,
 E δηλώσασα δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἡσυχίαν ἂν ἐποίησεν ἔχειν
 τὴν ψυχὴν μένουσαν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ καὶ ἔσωσεν ἂν τὸν
 βίον; ἄρ' ἂν ὁμολογοῖεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς ταῦτα ἡμᾶς

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καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ὠμολογήκατε ἐπιστήμης ἐνδεία ἐξαμαρ-
 τάνειν περὶ τὴν τῶν ἡδονῶν αἴρεσιν· καὶ λυπῶν τοὺς
 ἐξαμαρτάνοντας· ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν ἀγαθὰ τε καὶ κακά·
 καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἔτι
 ὠμολογήκατε ὅτι μετρητικῆς· ἢ δὲ ἐξαμαρτανομένη
 E πρᾶξις ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης ἴστε που καὶ αὐτοὶ ὅτι ἀμαθία
 πράττεται. ὥστε τοῦτ' ἐστὶν τὸ ἡδονῆς ἥττω εἶναι,
 ἀμαθία ἢ μεγίστη· ἣς Πρωταγόρας ὅδε φησὶν ἰατρὸς
 εἶναι καὶ Πρόδικος καὶ Ἰππίας· ὑμεῖς δὲ διὰ τὸ
 οἶεσθαι ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀμαθίαν εἶναι οὔτε αὐτοὶ, οὔτε τοὺς
 ὑμετέρους παῖδας παρὰ τοὺς τούτων διδασκάλους τούσδε
 [τοὺς σοφιστὰς] πέμπετε, ὡς οὐ διδακτοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλὰ
 κηδόμενοι τοῦ ἀργυρίου καὶ οὐ διδόντες τούτοις κακῶς
 πράττετε καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία.

358 Ταῦτα μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀποκεκριμένοι ἂν ἦμεν·
 ὑμᾶς δὲ δὴ μετὰ Πρωταγόρου ἐρωτῶ, τῷτ' Ἰππία τε
 καὶ Πρόδικε—κοινὸς γὰρ δὴ ἔστω ὑμῖν ὁ λόγος—
 πότερον δοκῶ ὑμῖν ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι. Ὑπερ-
 φυῶς ἐδόκει ἅπασιν ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὰ εἰρημένα. Ὁμο-
 λογεῖτε ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ
 ἀνιαρὸν κακόν. τὴν δὲ Προδίκου τοῦδε διαίρεσιν τῶν
 ὀνομάτων παραιτοῦμαι· εἴτε γὰρ ἡδὺ εἴτε τερπνὸν
 λέγεις εἴτε χαρτόν, εἴτε ὀπόθεν καὶ ὅπως χαίρεις τὰ
 B τοιαῦτα ὀνομάζων, ὧ βέλτιστε Πρόδικε, τοῦτό μοι
 πρὸς ὃ βούλομαι ἀπόκριναι. Γελάσας οὖν ὁ Πρόδικος
 συνωμολόγησε, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι. Τί δὲ δὴ, ὧ ἄνδρες,
 ἔφην ἐγώ, τὸ τοιόνδε; αἰ ἐπὶ τούτου πράξεις ἅπασαι,
 ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀλύπως ζῆν καὶ ἡδέως, ἂρ' οὐ καλαί [καὶ
 ὠφέλιμοι]; καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἔργον ἀγαθόν τε καὶ ὠφέ-
 λιμον; Συνεδόκει. Εἰ ἄρα, ἔφην ἐγώ, τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαθόν
 ἐστιν, οὐδεὶς οὔτε εἰδὼς οὔτε οἰόμενος ἄλλα βελτίω
 C εἶναι, ἢ ἂ ποιεῖ, καὶ δυνατά, ἔπειτα ποιεῖ ταῦτα, ἐξὸν
 τὰ βελτίω· οὐδὲ τὸ ἥττω εἶναι αὐτοῦ ἄλλο τι τοῦτ'

οἶ
 ἴτε κ.
 οὔτε C.

cf Plato
 66.A.

ἐστὶν ἢ ἀμαθία, οὐδὲ κρείττω ἑαυτοῦ ἄλλο τι ἢ σοφία. Συνοδοῦκει πᾶσιν. Τί δὲ δῆ; ἀμαθίαν ἄρα τὸ τοιόνδε λέγετε, τὸ ψευδῆ ἔχειν δόξαν καὶ ἐψεῦσθαι περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τῶν πολλοῦ ἀξίων; Καὶ τοῦτο πᾶσι συνοδοῦκει. "Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπὶ γε τὰ κακὰ οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν ἔρχεται οὐδ' ἐπὶ ἃ οἴεται κακὰ εἶναι, οὐδ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐν ἀνθρώπου φύσει, ἐπὶ ἃ οἴεται D κακὰ εἶναι ἐθέλειν ἰέναι ἀντὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· ὅταν τε ἀναγκασθῆ δυοῖν κακοῖν τὸ ἕτερον αἰρεῖσθαι, οὐδεὶς τὸ μείζον αἰρήσεται ἐξὸν τὸ ἔλαττον. "Ἀπαντα ταῦτα συνοδοῦκει ἅπασιν ἡμῖν. Τί οὖν; ἔφην ἐγώ, καλεῖτέ τι δέος καὶ φόβον; καὶ ἄρα ὅπερ ἐγώ; πρὸς σὲ λέγω, ὦ Πρόδικε. προσδοκίαν τινὰ λέγω κακοῦ τοῦτο, εἴτε φόβον εἴτε δέος καλεῖτε. Ἐδοῦκει Πρωταγόρα μὲν καὶ Ἰππία δέος τε καὶ φόβος εἶναι τοῦτο, Προδίκῳ δὲ δέος, φόβος δ' οὐ. Ἄλλ' οὐδέν, ἔφην ἐγώ, E † ὦ† Πρόδικε, διαφέρει· ἀλλὰ τότε, εἰ ἀληθῆ τὰ ἔμπροσθέν ἐστιν, ἄρα τις ἀνθρώπων ἐθελήσει ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἰέναι ἃ δέδοικεν, ἐξὸν ἐπὶ ἃ μή; ἢ ἀδύνατον ἐκ τῶν ὠμολογημένων; ἃ γὰρ δέδοικεν, ὠμολόγηται ἠγεῖσθαι κακὰ εἶναι· ἃ δὲ ἠγεῖται κακά, οὐδένα οὔτε ἰέναι ἐπὶ ταῦτα οὔτε λαμβάνειν ἐκόντα. Ἐδοῦκει καὶ 359 ταῦτα πᾶσιν.

Οὕτω δὲ τούτων ὑποκειμένων, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, † ὦ† Πρόδικέ τε καὶ Ἰππία ἀπολογείσθω ἡμῖν Πρωταγόρας ὅδε, ἃ τὸ πρῶτον ἀπεκρίνατο, πῶς ὀρθῶς ἔχει, μὴ ἃ τὸ πρῶτον παντάπασιν· τότε μὲν γὰρ δὴ πέντε ὄντων μορίων τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐδέν ἔφη εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον οἶον τὸ ἕτερον, ἰδίαν δὲ αὐτοῦ ἕκαστον ἔχειν δύναμιν· ἀλλ' οὐ ταῦτα λέγω, ἀλλ' ἃ τὸ ὕστερον εἶπεν. τὸ γὰρ ὕστερον ἔφη τὰ μὲν τέτταρα ἐπιεικῶς παραπλήσια ἀλλήλοις εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἐν πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρειν τῶν ἄλλων, τὴν B ἀνδρείαν, γνῶσεσθαι δέ μ' ἔφη τεκμηρίῳ τῷδε· εὐρήσεις

τοῦτο
δέος

γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀνθρώπους ἀνοσιωτάτους μὲν ὄντας
 καὶ ἀδικωτάτους καὶ ἀκολαστοτάτους καὶ ἀμαθεστά-
 τους, ἀνδρειοτάτους δέ· ὧ γινώσκει ὅτι πολὺ διαφέρει ἢ
 ἀνδρεία τῶν ἄλλων μορίων τῆς ἀρετῆς. καὶ ἐγὼ εὐθύς
 τότε πάνυ ἐθαύμασα τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον
 ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα μεθ' ὑμῶν διεξῆλθον. ἠρόμην δ' οὖν
 τοῦτον, εἰ τοὺς ἀνδρείους λέγοι θαρραλέους· ὁ δέ, καὶ
 C ἴτας γ', ἔφη. μέμνησαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα,
 ταῦτα ἀποκρινόμενος; Ὁμολόγει. Ἴθι δὴ, ἔφην ἐγώ,
 εἰπὲ ἡμῖν, ἐπὶ τί λέγεις ἴτας εἶναι τοὺς ἀνδρείους; ἢ
 ἐφ' ἅπερ οἱ δειλοί; Οὐκ ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἐφ' ἕτερα.
 Ναί, ἦ δ' ὅς. Πότερον οἱ μὲν δειλοὶ ἐπὶ τὰ θαρραλέα
 ἔρχονται, οἱ δὲ ἀνδρεῖοι ἐπὶ τὰ δεινά; Λέγεται δὴ,
 ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Ἀληθῆ,
 D ἔφην ἐγώ, λέγεις· ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ· ἀλλὰ σὺ ἐπὶ
 τί φῆς ἴτας εἶναι τοὺς ἀνδρείους; ἂρ' ἐπὶ τὰ δεινά,
 ἠγουμένους δεινὰ εἶναι, ἢ ἐπὶ τὰ μή; Ἀλλὰ τοῦτό
 γ' ἔφη, ἐν οἷς σὺ ἔλεγες τοῖς λόγοις ἀπεδείχθη ἄρτι
 ὅτι ἀδύνατον. Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἀληθὲς λέγεις·
 ὥστ' εἰ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἀπεδείχθη, ἐπὶ μὲν ἂ δεινὰ ἠγεῖται
 εἶναι οὐδεὶς ἔρχεται, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἠττω εἶναι ἑαυτοῦ
 εὐρέθη ἀμαθία οὔσα· Ὁμολόγει. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπὶ ἅ
 γε θαρροῦσιν πάντες αὖ ἔρχονται, καὶ δειλοὶ καὶ
 ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ ταύτη γε ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔρχονται οἱ δειλοί
 E τε καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι· Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες,
 πᾶν γε τοῦναντίον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ ἂ οἷ τε δειλοὶ ἔρχονται
 καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι. αὐτίκα εἰς τὸν πόλεμον οἱ μὲν
 ἐθέλουσιν ἰέναι, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν. Πότερον, ἔφην
 ἐγώ, καλὸν ὄν ἰέναι ἢ αἰσχρόν; Καλόν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν
 εἶπερ καλόν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν ὠμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς ἔμ-
 προσθεν· τὰς γὰρ καλὰς πράξεις ἀπάσας ἀγαθὰς
 ὠμολογήσαμεν. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, καὶ ἀεὶ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ
 οὕτως. Ὁρθῶς γε, ἔφην ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ ποτέρους φῆς

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ἔτι δοκοῦσιν εἶναί τινες ἄνθρωποι ἀμαθέστατοι μὲν, ἀνδρειότατοι δέ. Φιλονεικεῖν μοι, ἔφη, δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον· χαριούμαι οὖν σοι, καὶ λέγω ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ὠμολογημένων ἀδύνατόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι.

Οὗτου ἦν δ' ἐγὼ ἄλλου ἔνεκα ἐρωτῶ πάντα ταῦτα, ἢ σκέψασθαι βουλόμενος, πῶς ποτ' ἔχει τὰ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν αὐτό ἢ ἀρετή. οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι
 361 τούτου φανεροῦ γενομένου μάλιστα ἂν κατάδηλον γένοιτο ἐκεῖνο, περὶ οὗ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ μακρὸν λόγον ἑκάτερος ἀπετείναμεν, ἐγὼ μὲν λέγων ὡς οὐ διδακτὸν ἀρετή, σὺ δ' ὡς διδακτόν. καὶ μοι δοκεῖ ἡμῶν ἢ ἄρτι ἔξοδος τῶν λόγων ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος κατηγορεῖν τε καὶ καταγελάειν, καὶ εἰ φωνὴν λάβοι, εἰπεῖν ἂν ὅτι ἄτοποί γ' ἐστέ, ὦ Σώκρατές τε καὶ Πρωταγόρα· σὺ μὲν λέγων ὅτι οὐ διδακτὸν ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν,
 Β νῦν σεαυτῷ τὰναντία σπεύδεις, ἐπιχειρῶν ἀποδείξαι ὡς πάντα χρήματα ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία, ὧ τρόπῳ μάλιστ' ἂν διδακτὸν φανείη ἢ ἀρετή· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο τι ἦν ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἢ ἀρετή, ὥσπερ Πρωταγόρας ἐπεχείρει λέγειν, σαφῶς οὐκ ἂν ἦν διδακτόν· νῦν δὲ εἰ φανήσεται ἐπιστήμη ὅλον, ὡς σὺ σπεύδεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, θαυμάσιον ἔσται μὴ διδακτὸν ὄν. Πρωταγόρας δ' αὖ διδακτὸν τότε ὑποθέμενος νῦν τοῦναντίον ἔοικεν σπεύδοντι,
 C ὀλίγου πάντα μᾶλλον φανῆναι αὐτὸ ἢ ἐπιστήμην· καὶ οὕτως ἂν ἦκιστα εἴη διδακτόν. ἐγὼ οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, πάντα ταῦτα καθορῶν ἄνω κάτω ταραπτόμενα δεινῶς, πᾶσαν προθυμίαν ἔχω καταφανῆ αὐτὰ γενέσθαι, καὶ βουλοίμην ἂν ταῦτα διεξελθόντας ἡμᾶς ἐξελθεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὃ τι ἐστὶν, καὶ πάλιν ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ, εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε μὴ διδακτόν, μὴ πολλάκις ἡμᾶς ὁ Ἐπιμηθεὺς ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἐν τῇ σκέψει σφήλη

ἐξαπατήσας, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ διανομῇ ἡμέλησεν ἡμῶν, D
ὡς φῆς σύ. ἤρεσεν οὖν μοι καὶ ἐν τῷ μύθῳ ὁ Προμη-
θεὺς μᾶλλον τοῦ Ἐπιμηθέως· ᾧ χρώμενος ἐγὼ καὶ
προμηθούμενος ὑπὲρ τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἐμαυτοῦ παντὸς
πάντα ταῦτα πραγματεύομαι, καὶ εἰ σὺ ἐθέλεις, ὅπερ
καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἔλεγον· μετὰ σοῦ ἂν ἡδιστα ταῦτα
συνδιασκοποίην. καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας, Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη,
ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπαινῶ σου τὴν προθυμίαν καὶ τὴν
διέξοδον τῶν λόγων. καὶ γὰρ οὔτε τᾶλλα οἶμαι κακὸς
εἶναι ἄνθρωπος, φθονερός τε ἢ κιστ' ἀνθρώπων, ἐπεὶ E
καὶ περὶ σοῦ πρὸς πολλοὺς δὴ εἶρηκα, ὅτι ὦν ἐντυγ-
χάνω πολὺ μάλιστα ἄγαμαι σέ, τῶν μὲν τηλικούτων
καὶ πάνυ· καὶ λέγω γε ὅτι οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι εἰ τῶν
ἐλλογίμων γένοιο ἀνδρῶν ἐπὶ σοφία. καὶ περὶ τούτων
δὲ εἰσαῦθις, ὅταν βούλη, διέξιμεν· νῦν δ' ὥρα ἤδη καὶ
ἐπ' ἄλλο τι τρέπεσθαι. Ἄλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὔτω χρή 362
ποιεῖν, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ. καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ οἶπερ ἔφην ἰέναι
πάλαι ὥρα, ἀλλὰ Καλλία τῷ καλῷ χαριζόμενος παρέ-
μεινα.

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- 309 A. εἶτα τί τοῦτο ; Suppl. ἐστὶ ἢ διαφέρει, cp. 331 C.
οὐ σὺ μέντοι. Stallbaum on *Rep.* i. 339 B says that μέντοι is in *interrogationibus usurpatum quae habent vim confirmandi*. Similar instances are *Theaetet.* 163 E, τί δέ ; μνήμην οὐ λέγεις μέντοι τι ; *Charmides*, 159 B ; *Rep.* vii. 521 D. Below in 339 E the word has a similar sense.
- 309 B. χαριεστάτην ἤβην εἶναι τοῦ ὑπηνήτου. The passage referred to is Hom. *Il.* xxiv. 347, βῆ δ' ἰέναι κούρω αἰσυμνητήρι εἰκώς, | πρῶτον ὑπηνήτη, τοῦ περ χαριεστάτη ἤβη, where the allusion is to Hermes. Clemens Alexandrinus (*Protrept.* § 53) mentions that Alcibiades was in his day used as a model for busts of Hermes. In the text the absence of the article is felt. An easy correction would be to insert τὴν before ἤβην where it may very well have dropped. Perhaps, however, its absence is due to a literal repetition of Homer's words.
- ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ εἶπε. As will be seen in 336 B, C, D and 348 B, C. καὶ οὖν καί. Answering the previous question ἦ παρ' ἐκείνου φαίνει ; "and indeed I actually come immediately from him." ἀπ' ἐκείνου . . . αὐτοῦ. For different pronouns referring to the same person cp. 310 D below ; *Euthyphro*, 14 D, τίς αὕτη ἢ ὑπηρεσία ἐστὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ; αἰτεῖν τε φῆς αὐτοῦ καὶ διδόναι ἐκείνοισ ; *Phaedo*, 111 B, τὰς δὲ ὥρας αὐτοῖς κρᾶσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην, ὥστε ἐκείνους ἀνόσους εἶναι : in *Rep.* x. 600 B, where αὐτός and αὐτὸς ἐκεῖνος seem to have the same reference, the passage is probably corrupt. Shilleto *ad Thuc.* i. 132, 5, παιδικά ποτε ὦν αὐτοῦ καὶ πιστότατος ἐκείνω, has a most interesting note. He quotes from Plato, below 310 D ; *Rep.* v. 472 C ; *Phaedr.* 253 A.
- ἐπελανθανόμεν τε. Stallbaum refers to 347 E and 361 E below, remarking that τε after οὔτε often marks a climax. The usage is common in the poets ; cp. Eur. *Hipp.* 303, οὔτε γὰρ τότε | λόγοις ἐτέγγεθ' ἤδε, νῦν τ' οὐ πείθεται. A similarly marked instance, the negative being dissociated from the τε in the second clause, is found in Thuc. i. 5, 2, ὡς οὔτε ὦν πυθάνονται ἀπαξιούντων τὸ ἔργον, οἷς τ' ἐπιμελὲς εἶη εἰδέναι, οὐκ ὀνειδίζόντων. Cp. Soph. *Ant.* 763 ; Herodot. v. 49 ; Thuc. ii. 81, 1 ; Plato, *Rep.* viii. 566 D, καὶ οὔτε τύραννός φησιν εἶναι, ὑπισχνεῖται τε πολλὰ καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία. So in Latin *nec* is followed by *et* : Livy, iii. 49, 8.
- 309 C. καὶ πολὺ γε. Sc. καλλίονι ἐνέτυχον.
υἱέος. Schanz, relying on the evidence of inscriptions and the codex Parisinus, here and elsewhere writes υἱέος. The evidence of BT is, however, strongly in favour of the text. Sauppe, Kroschel and Deuschle also insert the ι.
τὸ σοφώτατον. Heindorf, Bekker, the Zürich editors, Schanz and Sauppe read σοφώτερον against BT, in reliance upon Ficinus' Latin version. Kroschel, Deuschle, and Stallbaum retain σοφώτατον. It is a sententious generalisation : "what is wisest must needs appear more fair."
ἀλλ' ἦ. Said with an accent of disappointment which is met

by Socrates with the answer *Σοφωτάτῳ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.έ.*, “No, not a *wise* man but one wisest of all,” cp. *Gorg.* 447 A, ἀλλ’ ἦ, τὸ λεγόμενον, κατόπιν ἐορτῆς ἤκομεν; *Phaedr.* 261 B, ἀλλ’ ἦ τὰς Νέστορος καὶ Ὀδυσσεὺς τέχνας (systems) μόνον περὶ λόγων ἀκήκοας;

309 D. Πρωταγόρας. Notice the skill with which, while the curiosity is excited, the name is kept back to the last in this answer.

310 A. τί οὖν οὐ διηγῆσω. The impatience of the speaker is marked by the aorist which implies that the narration should have already begun. Cp. below 317 D; *Charm.* 154 E, τί οὖν, ἔφην, οὐκ ἀπεδύσαμεν αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ τοῦτο; *Symp.* 173 B, τί οὖν, ἔφη, οὐ διηγῆσω μοι; *Phaed.* 86 D, εἰ οὖν τις ὑμῶν εὐπορώτερος ἐμοῦ, τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο; *Soph. O. T.* 1002. See Jelf, § 403, 3.

παῖδα. “Slave”: Sauppe remarks that no Athenian willingly went about unattended by at least one slave.

διπλῆ. So most editors with B. Sauppe in deference to the reading of T διπλη writes Διπλῆ γ’ ἄν, the Γ of an uncial copy readily passing into I *adscriptum*.

βαθέος ὄρθρου. In *Ar. Vesp.* 216 it is a time later than μέσαι νύκτες, the period just before dawn. The epithet βαθύς (applied also to νύξ) is used in the same sense as we speak of the “depth of winter” (*Ar. Nub.* 514, βαθὺ τῆς ἡλικίας) or the “height of summer” to denote the extreme of any condition.

Φάσωνος δὲ ἀδελφός. For the omission of the μὲν Stallbaum refers to Elmsley on *Eur. Medea*, 940. Cp. *Aesch. Pers.* 151, μήτηρ βασιλέως, βασίλεια δ’ ἐμή. Jelf (§ 767, 3 b) remarks that the μὲν is often omitted “where several predicates or attributes belong to the same subject”: he quotes *Herod.* vii. 8, 2, Ἀρισταγόρῃ τῷ Μιλησίῳ, δούλῳ δὲ ἡμετέρῳ.

310 B. εὐθύς. Hippocrates’ anxiety is marked by many touches: πάνυ σφόδρα ἔκρουε—ἐπειγόμενος—τῇ φωνῇ μέγα λέγων, etc.

ἦεν. For a discussion of the form see Schanz, vol. xii. § 13. Here BT have ἦει, and never in fact add the ν before a vowel, as the codex Parisinus does.

Ἰπποκράτης, ἔφην, οὗτος. Not, as Heindorf takes it, an address, “Hullo! Hippocrates,” which would rather require οὗτος to be next to Ἰπποκ., but a comment by Socrates, who recognises the voice, meant to reach H.’s ears, “Why, that’s Hippocrates, I said.”

νεώτερον. L. and S. give a number of instances showing how both this word and, though more rarely, its positive have the sense of “untoward,” and that not only in the poets.

εὖ ἂν λέγοις. “That is well”: lit. “you would say well, if that were so.” Cp. *Soph. O. C.* 647, μέγ’ ἂν λέγοις δώρημα τῆς συνουσίας.

τηνικάδε. Sc. ἐτι βαθέος ὄρθρου: compare the opening words of the *Crito*, Τί τηνικάδε ἀφίξαι, ὦ Κρίτων; ἢ οὐ πρῶ ἐστιν;

στὰς παρ’ ἐμοί. To be connected with ἔφη.

πρῶην. “The day before yesterday”: cp. above 309 D, τρίτην γε ἤδη ἡμέραν, as in the phrase χθὲς καὶ πρῶην; *Thuc.* iii.

113, 8, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς γε οὐδενὶ ἐμαχόμεθα χθές, ἀλλὰ πρῶην ἐν τῇ ἀποχωρήσει.

310 B. ἐσπέρας γε. "Yesterday evening," as we say, but the Athenians reckoned the day from sundown to sundown.

310 C. ἐπιψηλαφήσας. "Feeling after." From 312 A it will be seen that it was still dark; *Phaed.* 99 B, ψηλαφῶντες οἱ πολλοὶ ὥσπερ ἐν σκότῳ.

τοῦ σκίμποδος. The low bed on which Socrates was lying, of the same character as the one with which he accommodates Strepsiades in the *Nubes* (called ἀσκάντης, l. 633), and which Strepsiades finds so uncomfortably populated: l. 709, ἐκ τοῦ σκίμποδος | δάκνουσί μ' ἐξέρποντες οἱ Κορίνθιοι.

Οἰνός. There were two townships of this name, one N.E. of Athens, near Marathon, the other N.W. of Athens, near Eleutherae, at the foot of Mt. Cithaeron. The latter, being on the direct road across the frontiers into Boeotia, would be the one for which the runaway would make. Wayte refers to Arnold's note on Thuc. ii. 18, 1.

τ ὁ Σάτυρος. The presence of the article implies that the slave was known to Socrates, and the words μέλλων σοι φράζειν imply a close intimacy between Hippocrates and Socrates.

ὑπὸ τίνος ἄλλου. *Apol.* 17 A, ἐγὼ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὀλίγου ἐμαντοῦ ἐπελαθόμεν. A similar construction is found in Hom. *Il.* vi. 73, Τρῶες ὑπ' Ἀχαιῶν | Ἴλιον εἰσανέβησαν, after φεύγειν and ἀποθανεῖν, and in the common phrases ὑπὸ δέους, ὑφ' ἡδονῆς.

ἦλθον. "Returned home." Hom. *Od.* x. 267, οἶδα γὰρ ὡς οὔτ' αὐτὸς ἐλεύσει οὔτε τιν' ἄλλον | ἄξεις σῶν ἐτάρων.

ἀδελφός. Heindorf's correction adopted by Schanz and Sauppe. BT have ἀδελφός, which is awkward, but retained by Deuschle and Kroschel. Schanz, however (*Nov. Comment.* p. 98), gives reasons for rejecting the authority of B on this point, and says, *itaque in talibus substantivis spiritum mutabimus, ubicunq; sensus vel grammatica postulaverit.*

ἔτι μὲν ἐνεχείρησα. The ἔτι implies an obstacle: cp. Xen. *Anab.* ii. 2, 15, Ξενοφῶν μὲν ἔτι ἐπεχείρησεν . . . ἐκπλεῦσαι, θυομένῳ δὲ αὐτῷ . . . ἐσήμηνεν ὁ θεὸς σύστρατεύεσθαι; *Hell.* ii. 4, 11, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ Φυλῆς ἔτι μὲν ἐπεχείρησαν μὴ ἀνιέναι αὐτούς, ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.έ.

310 D. λίαν πόρρω τῶν νυκτῶν. "Too far on (πρό-σω) in the night": the partitive genitive; where the genitive with πόρρω is the gen. of separation, the word acquires the sense of "far from." For the plural νύκτες, denoting the several watches of the night, cp. *Phileb.* 50 D, ἡ μέσας ποιήσεις νύκτας; *Rep.* x. 621 B, ἐπειδὴ δὲ κοιμηθῆναι καὶ μέσας νύκτας γενέσθαι.

ἐκ τοῦ κόπου. Not "released me from my weariness," but "after my weariness." The phrase ὕπνος ἀνήκεν is Homeric: *Il.* ii. 71; *Od.* xix. 551.

οὕτω. Ast gives many instances of this οὕτω which sums up the preceding statements. It is often found after participles: cp. 314 C below, and *Gorg.* 457 C, ὅτι οὐ ῥαδίως δύνανται . . .

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honourable offices. Hipponicus the father had, in co-operation with Nicias and Eurymedon, gained some success in the Tanagraean territory (426 B.C.), but had fallen in 424 B.C. at Delium. He was a very rich man and thrifty. His son Callias was of a different character, and lavished the money he inherited upon the entertainment of the Sophists and their disciples. He was in command of forces with Iphicrates in 393 B.C.; ambassador to Sparta in 371 B.C. He died in want. His mother after separating from Hipponicus married Pericles; his sister Hipparete married Alcibiades. It is at his house that the scene of Xenophon's *Symposium* is also laid.

311 A. μήπω γ', ὦγαθέ, ἐκέισε [ἴωμεν]. Τ μήπω ἀγαθὲ ἐκέισε ἴωμεν. B the same with variant ἴωμεν. Cobet, whom Schanz and Sauppe follow, strikes out ἐκέισε ἴωμεν, on the ground that in such sentences the verb is not repeated: cp. Soph. *Philoct.* 1409; Arist. *Nub.* 195; Plat. *Phaedr.* 242 A, κἀγὼ . . . ἀπέρχομαι. Φ. Μήπω γ', ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὶν ἂν τὸ καῦμα παρέλθῃ. Deuschle retains the words however. It is easy to understand how ἴωμεν, which is not needed, could have been interpolated from ἀλλ' ἴωμεν above or εἶτα ἴωμεν below; but, with Kroschel, I cannot see how ἐκέισε can appear in the best MSS. if it was not original, and have therefore retained it. It is in emphatic contrast with δεῦρο, and may indeed like the latter be constructed with ἐξαναστῶμεν.

δεῦρο ἐξαναστῶμεν. The common, so-called pregnant, construction. *Phaed.* 116 A, ἐκείνος μὲν ἀνίστατο εἰς οἴκημά τι ὡς λουσόμενος; Xen. *Symp.* ix. 1, Αὐτόλυκος δὲ . . . ἐξανίστατο εἰς περίπατον; pseudo-Plat. *Theages*, 129 B, ἐμὲ δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖν ἐξαναστῆναι.

ἔνδον διατρίβει. Quite unlike Socrates who (Xen. *Mem.* i. 1, 10) αἰεὶ μὲν ἦν ἐν τῷ φανερωῷ· πρῶτ' τε γὰρ εἰς τοὺς περιπάτους καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια ἦει, καὶ πληθούσης ἀγορᾶς ἐκεῖ φανερός ἦν, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν αἰεὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ἦν ὅπου πλείστοις μέλλοι συνέσεσθαι, Protagoras (*Theaet.* 152 C) τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔλεγε.

ὥστε, θάρρει, καταληψόμεθα αὐτόν. More ordinarily θάρρει is not parenthetical; cp. below 314 E, ἀλλὰ θάρρει· Πρωταγόραν γὰρ τοι κ.τ.έ., but we find the same usage in *Menex.* 249 E, θάρρει, οὐ κατερῶ; Soph. *O. C.* 1185, οὐ γὰρ σε, θάρσει, πρὸς βίαν παρασπάσει | γνώμης; Xen. *Cyrop.* v. 4, 36, and vii. 3, 12.

311 B. ἀποπειρώμενος. "Testing Hippocrates' determination." For this meaning of ῥώμη cp. *Politic.* 259 C, πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς σύνεσιν καὶ ῥώμην; Thuc. vii. 18, 2, μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐγεγένητό τις ῥώμη, διότι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐνόμιζον . . . εὐκαθαιρετωτέρους ἔσεσθαι.

διεσκόπουν αὐτόν. "I scanned him closely," not merely "I examined him," which is perhaps the meaning of the verb in *Apol.* 21 C. That there was sufficient light 312 A shows.

In other places Plato records the peculiarly penetrating

gaze of his master, notably *Phaedo*, 117 B, ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον : cp. below 328 D (twice); *Phaedo*, 60 A, 86 D, διαβλέψας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὡς περ τὰ πολλὰ εἰώθει καὶ μειδιάσας, Δίκαια μέντοι, ἔφη, λέγει ὁ Σιμμίας, on which passage Archer-Hind quotes Xen. *Symp.* v. 5, where Socrates says οὕτω μὲν ἤδη τοίνυν οἱ ἐμοὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ καλλίονες ἂν τῶν σῶν εἴησαν. Πῶς δὴ ; ὅτι οἱ μὲν σοὶ τὸ κατ' εὐθὺ μόνον ὀρώσιν, οἱ δὲ ἐμοὶ καὶ τὸ ἐκ πλαγίου διὰ τὸ ἐπιπόλαιοι εἶναι ; *Theaetet.* 143 E, where Socrates alludes to his own ugliness, τὴν τε σιμότητα καὶ τὸ ἔξω τῶν ὀμμάτων. In *Rep.* i. 336 D a playful description of the power of his glance in disarming Thrasymachus' wrath is given ; add *Phaed.* 63 A, ἐπιβλέψας εἰς ἡμᾶς, and Alcibiades' description of him at Delium retreating (*Sympros.* 221 B), ἔπειτα ἔμοιγε ἐδόκει, ὦ Ἀριστόφανες, τὸ σὸν δὴ τοῦτο, καὶ ἐκεῖ διαπορεύεσθαι ὡς περ καὶ ἐνθάδε, βρενθυόμενος καὶ τῷ φθαλμῷ παραβάλλων, ἡρέμα παρασκοπῶν καὶ τοὺς φίλους καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους. The allusion is to Arist. *Nub.* 362.

311 B. τελῶν. Future : cp. below 311 E, ἐρχόμεθα τελούντες, and 313 A. ἔρχει ὑποθήσων.

ὡς περ ἂν εἰ ἐπενόεις . . . εἴ τίς σε ἤρετο. Protases accumulated as in *Gorg.* 453 C, ὡς περ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανόν σε ἐρωτῶν τίς ἐστι τῶν ζωγράφων Ζεῦξις, εἴ μοι εἶπες ὅτι ὁ τὰ ζῶα γράφων, ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν δικαίως σε ἠρόμην ὁ τὰ ποῖα τῶν ζῴων γράφων ; and most strikingly in *Meno*, 74 B. The mannerism is possibly a reflection of Socrates' colloquial style ; certainly the habit of examining analogous cases drawn from everyday life is. "Ὡς περ ἂν εἰ and κὰν εἰ may be used either (1) as here and in 318 B, 327 E, 335 E, 353 D, where a verb follows with which ἂν may be connected and to which it has been pointing ; or (2) as in 328 A, 341 C, where no verb is expressed ; or (3) where the verb is expressed but cannot grammatically be connected with the foregoing ἂν : e.g. *Meno*, 72 C, κὰν εἰ πολλαί (αἱ ἀρεταί) εἰσιν ἐν γέ τι εἶδος ἔχουσιν. See Professor Jebb on *Soph. Ai.* 1078.

Ἴπποκράτη τὸν Κῶνον. *Phaedr.* 270 C, εἰ μὲν οὖν Ἴπποκράτει γε τῷ τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν δεῖ τι πείθεσθαι. Born about 460 B.C. in Cos, and said to be either seventeenth or nineteenth in descent from Asclepius ; studied at Cos ; travelled extensively, and taught and practised at Athens ; died at Larissa in Thessaly at an uncertain date. He may be regarded as the founder of the scientific study of medicine, which he emancipated from superstition. He is the reputed author of many aphorisms, among which are ἡ πείρα σφαλερὴ, ἡ δὲ κρίσις χαλεπὴ, and ὁ βίος βραχύς, ἡ δὲ τέχνη μακρὴ.

311 C. Πολύκλειτον τὸν Ἀργεῖον. Born in Sicyon, but a citizen of Argos. He was a pupil of Ageladas as Pheidias had been. He excelled in the delineation of the human form (*Quint. Inst.* xii. 10, 7) as Pheidias did in the ideal representation of gods. Polycleitus' Hera, a chryselephantine statue in the temple of the goddess near Argos, is said by Quintilian (*l.c.*) non explevisse deorum auctoritatem, but his statues, the

Doryphorus and Diadumenus, are considered unrivalled examples of human proportion.

311 C. Φειδῖαν τὸν Ἀθηναῖον. So described in opposition to τὸν Ἀργεῖον. The facts of his life are matters of much dispute. He was perhaps born about 488 B.C., and died about 432 B.C. He helped Pericles in the adornment of Athens; the frieze of the Parthenon, which was consecrated 438 B.C., was the work of him or his pupils, and portions of it, or of a copy, are now in the British Museum. His two other most noted works were the chryselephantine statues of Zeus at Olympia, and of Athene Parthenos in the Parthenon. He is said to have died in prison where he had been thrown on the charge of embezzling the gold provided for the statue of Athene, and introducing on the shield of the goddess figures of himself and Pericles.

311 D. εἶεν. Used here as in *Apol.* 18 E, to mark the transition from the settlement of preliminaries to the discussion of the main question.

ἂν μὲν ἐξικνῆται. Not the ordinary ellipse of εὖ ἔχει, εὖ ἂν ἔχοι, as is usual in sentences where a contrast is introduced by εἰ δὲ μή: cp. 325 D below, and Hom. *Il.* i. 135 ff., ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν δώσουσι γέρας μεγάθυμοι Ἀχαιοί, . . . | εἰ δὲ κε μὴ δώσωιν, ἐγὼ δὲ κεν αὐτὸς ἔλωμαι. Here some more special remark is to be supplied from the context: cp. *Rep.* ix. 575 D, εἰ μὲν ἐκόντες ὑπέικωσιν, εἰ μὴ ἐπιτρέπη ἡ πόλις . . . οὕτω πάλιν τὴν πατρίδα . . . κολάσεται; Xen. *Mem.* iii. 9, 11.

εἰ . . . ἔροιτο. Notice the change from εἰ ἤρετο: the former instances have been placed in the past; the question about Protagoras concerns the future.

εἰπέ. Singular, notwithstanding the two persons addressed. *Euthyd.* 283 B, εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες τε καὶ ὑμεῖς οἱ ἄλλοι; *Laches*, 186 E, σὺ δ', ὦ Λάχης καὶ Νικία, εἶπετον ἡμῖν ἐκάτερος; Arist. *Acharn.* 319, εἰπέ μοι, τί φειδόμεσθα τῶν λίθων, ὦ δημόται; Jelf, 390, 2 a.

311 E. τί ὄνομα ἄλλο γε. "What designation, distinct from his proper name, do we hear applied to Protagoras?"

ὥσπερ περὶ Φειδίου. "As in the case of Pheidias, 'statuary.'"

σοφιστὴν δὴ τοι ὀνομάζουσί γε. See Introduction, p. 15, note 2. Notice the deprecatory γε: "well, they call the man 'sophist.'" For the construction Jelf, § 475, obs. 2, quotes Hdt. iv. 33, τὰς ὀνομάζουσι Δῆλιοι εἶναι Ὑπερόχην τε καὶ Λαοδίκην; Xen. *Apol. Socr.* § 13, μάντις ὀνομάζουσι τοὺς προσημαίνοντας εἶναι: cp. Plato, *Rep.* iv. 428 E, ὅσοι ἐπιστήμας ἔχοντες ὀνομάζονται τινες εἶναι; *Theaet.* 160 B (see Heindorf *ad loc.*); *Apol.* 23 A; *Laches*, 192 A; *Phileb.* 13 B, πάσας ἡδονὰς ἀγαθὸν εἶναι προσαγορεύεις (cp. 325 A below); *Phaedo*, 102 C, ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει σμικρὸς τε καὶ μέγας εἶναι.

εἰ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο κ.τ.έ. The apodosis is supplied in the answer. Cp. *Phaedr.* 268 B, εἰ οὖν εἶποι ὅτι, Οὐδαμῶς· ἀλλ' ἀξιῶ τὸν ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μαθόντα αὐτὸν οἶόν τ' εἶναι ποιεῖν & ἐρωτᾶς.

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κινδυνεύεται (v.l. κινδυνεύηται); Thuc. iii. 53, 2; Arist. *Eth. Nic.* x. 1, 3, μή ποτε δὲ οὐ καλῶς τοῦτο λέγεται. Sometimes, however, the future indie. is found: *Rep.* v. 451 A, φοβερὸν τε καὶ σφαλερὸν . . . μὴ σφαλῆς τῆς ἀληθείας οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φίλους ξυνεπισπασάμενος κείσομαι; *Phileb.* 13 A, φοβοῦμαι δὲ μή τινὰς ἡδονὰς ἡδοναῖς εὐρήσομεν ἐναντίας. In these cases, obviously, the realisation of the fear cannot be implied, but it is intended to indicate the certainty of its realisation: see Stallb. ad *Rep.* v. 451 A; Krueger, 54, 8, 12; Thompson, pp. 264, 266, 267. In accordance with the origin of the usage, I have removed the note of interrogation in Schanz's text.

312 B. γραμματιστοῦ . . . κιθαριστοῦ . . . παιδοτρίβου. Corresponding to the three branches of Athenian education; see 325 D—326 C below.

ἐπὶ τέχνῃ . . . ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ. The form of expression denotes the motive upon which an action is based: *Rep.* i. 334 B, ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ . . . τῶν φίλων καὶ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῶν ἐχθρῶν; *Apol.* 36 D, δεομένῳ ἄγειν σχολὴν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμετέρα παρακελεύσει; 315 A below. For the thought, compare *Gorg.* 485 A, φιλοσοφίας μὲν ὅσον παιδείας χάριν καλὸν μετέχειν; *Xen. Mem.* iii. 10, 1, τῶν τὰς τέχνας ἐχόντων καὶ ἐργασίας ἔνεκα χρωμένων αὐταῖς.

τὸν ιδιώτην. The opposite to δ' ἐπαίων in relation to any profession; the verb is ιδιωτεύειν, 327 A: cp. below 314 A, 322 C, 327 C, 344 C, 345 A.

τὸν ἐλεύθερον. Compare our phrase, "a liberal education": cp. Cicero, *De Invent.* i. 25, quos habuerit artium liberalium magistros; Plato, *Rep.* vii. 561 D, ἐλευθέριον καὶ μακάριον καλῶν τὸν βίον τοῦτον.

παρασχεῖν θεραπεῦσαι. The epexegetic infinitive is common with παρέχω: *Apol.* 33 B, καὶ πλουσίῳ καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἑμαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν; *Meno.* 70 C; *Phaedr.* 228 E, ἑμαυτὸν σοὶ ἐμμελετᾶν παρέχειν οὐ πάνυ δέδοκται.

312 C. θαυμάζοιμ' ἂν εἰ οἴσθα. "I should be surprised if you knew"; for the construction see below, 315 E. The alternative construction with ὅτι is very rare in Plato, and generally less common in Greek; it admits the fact at which surprise is expressed, *Theaetet.* 142 A, ἐθαύμαζον ὅτι οὐχ οἶδς τ' ἢ εὐρεῖν.

πράγματι. A vague and contemptuous way of alluding to the sophist: cp. *Gorg.* 520 B, μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι (sc. τῷ δήμῳ) δ' αὐτοὶ παιδεύουσι; *Dem.* 383, 4, ἀσταθμητότατον πρᾶγμα ὁ δῆμος; *Xen. Cyrop.* vi. i. 36 (of a woman), ἄμαχον πρᾶγμα; *Arist. Eccles.* 441, γυναῖκα δ' εἶναι πρᾶγμ' ἔφη νουβυστικόν; Virgil's *Variūm et mutabile semper Femina*; so the Latin *negotium*; Cicero (*Ep. in Senecam post red.* c. 6) talks of a man as *sine sensu, sine sapore, elinguem, tardum, inhumanum negotium*.

ὥσπερ τοῦνομα λέγει. As though it were = σοφῶν ἴστωρ: cp. the derivation of Ἄρτεμις in *Cratyl.* 406 B as ἀρετῆς ἴστωρ, and of Ἡφαιστος (407 C) as ὁ φάεος ἴστωρ. The real derivation

is of course from σοφίζω: cp. Scholiast *ad* Arist. *Nub.* 331, σοφιστὰς τοὺς διδασκάλους νβει ὡς τοὺς ἄλλους σοφίζοντας.

312 D. τῶν τί σοφῶν. "To what is the art directed in which the painters are skilled?" *lit.* "painters are conversant with the craft (τὰ σοφά) directed to what end." It is easy to find instances in which σοφός referring to a person is constructed with an accusative, e.g. *Phileb.* 17 C, ἀλλ' οὐπω σοφὸς ἂν εἴησ τὴν μουσικὴν εἰδὼς ταῦτα μόνον, but the construction in the text is very harsh, for the use of the plural τὰ σοφά forbids us (Jelf, 436, 2 d, 3) to translate the phrase by the abstract substantive "cleverness" which could more regularly take an accusative: Thuc. i. 70, 3, τῆς τε γνώμης μηδὲ τοῖς βεβαλοῖς πιστεῦσαι, is not a parallel instance, nor in the passages quoted by L. and S.—Eur. *Iph. in Aul.* 1214; Soph. *Phil.* 1246—does the phrase have this meaning. For the subsidiary position of the interrogative in the sentence compare *Rep.* i. 332 D, ἡ . . . τίσι τί ἀποδιδούσα τέχνη δικαιοσύνη ἂν καλοῖτο; *Gorg.* 454 A, ποίας δὴ πειθοῦς καὶ τῆς περὶ τί πειθοῦς ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐστὶ τέχνη; pseudo-Plat. *Theag.* 125 C, τῶν τί σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ φῆς σοφοῦς εἶναι τοὺς τυράννους; καὶ τὰλλα οὕτως. Supply εἵπομεν ἂν: so below, 319 B, ποιούοντας must be supplied, and in *Symp.* 176 A, ποιήσαντας: cp. 326 A and 344 D.

τί ἂν ἀποκρινόμεθα. So BT and most editors. Bekker, ἀποκρινάμεθα, which Wayte and Kroschel regard as a necessary correction. There seems no reason, however, to say that aorist and present cannot correspond in these cases: cp. *Apol.* 29 D, εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀφλοῖτε, εἵπομι' ἂν ὑμῖν κ.τ.έ.; and below, λέγομεν ἂν apparently in apodosis to εἴ τις ἔροιτο. Goodwin, however, *Greek Moods and Tenses* (new ed.), gives no instances except where εἶμι is concerned, and I can find none in Jelf or Krueger.

ποίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης; The reading in the text is that of Schanz, which only varies from the MSS. in the insertion of εἰ before εἵπομεν, and on the whole is the most satisfactory of a variety of readings. Sauppe has ποίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης; Τί ἂν εἵπομεν αὐτὸν εἶναι, ᾧ Σώκρατες; ἢ ἐπιστάτην κ.τ.έ., there being some slight MS. authority for the insertion of ἢ, and this variation from the text of Stallbaum, the Zürich editors, and Deuschle (in which there is no break in the sentence after Σώκρατες), is more suited than theirs to the diffident character of Hippocrates. The best MSS., however, do not recognise the ἢ, and as there is no means of explaining its disappearance, if in the original text, we must reject this remedy for the passage. Heindorf and Madvig assign τί ἂν εἵπομεν αὐτὸν εἶναι; to Socrates, but this makes Hippocrates' answer begin with the vocative ᾧ Σώκρατες, which is unusual and most inappropriate to the modest Hippocrates; and to make (with Kroschel) Hippocrates' answer begin, Αὐτὸν εἶναι, ᾧ Σώκρατες κ.τ.έ., produces an impossibly abrupt form of speech. Heusde, to remedy the fault, repeats εἵπομεν,

reading τί ἂν εἴποιμεν ; Εἴποιμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι κ.τ.έ. In defence of his reading Schanz quotes (*Nov. Comm. Plat.* p. 56) Arist. *Nub.* 154, τί δῆτ' ἂν ἕτερον εἰ πύθοιο Σωκράτους | φρόντισμα ; *Lys.* 399, τί δῆτ' ἂν εἰ πύθοιο καὶ τὴν τῶνδ' ὕβριν ; It has been noticed (*Introd.* p. 53) that B is particularly subject to such omission of similar syllables.

312 D. τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν. Compare *Gorgias*, 520 A, B, especially ταῦτόν, ᾧ μακάρι', ἐστὶ σοφιστῆς καὶ ῥήτωρ, ἢ ἐγγύς τι καὶ παραπλήσιον.

312 E. οὐκέτι ἔχω σοι λέγειν. Hippocrates has gone so far above as to suggest a description of the "sophist" as ἐπιστάτης τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν ; he also confesses inability to answer further : cp. *Phaedr.* 235 B, τοῦτο ἐγὼ σοι οὐκέτι οἶός τε ἔσομαι πείθεσθαι.

313 A. ἔρχει ὑποθήσων. See note on 311 B.

ἢ εἰ μὲν. The ἢ introduces an alternative to the previous sentence, "Do you know, or have you neglected to consider?" but this alternative is complicated by a comparison which disguises its real simplicity. According to our English idiom, the μὲν sentence would be thrown into the shape of a reservation or concession : cp. *Rep.* x. 598 A, μή τι διαφέρει (κλίνη) αὐτῆ ἑαυτῆς, ἢ διαφέρει μὲν οὐδὲν φαίνεται δὲ ἀλλοία ; ("or does it appear different, though differing in no way?"); *Theaetet.* 171 A, εἰ δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν ᾤετο, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος μὴ συνοίεται ; *Thuc.* iv. 80, 4, where the MSS. are needlessly corrected by Hude. For the sense of the passage see *Apol.* 20 A ff. ; *Gorg.* 514 D, E.

διακινδυνεύοντα. Not found elsewhere in Plato with an infinitive. L. and S. quote *Thuc.* vii. 1, εἴτε ἐν δεξιᾷ λαβόντες τὴν Σικελίαν διακινδυνεύσωσιν ἐσπλεύσαι. Here, however, there is the considerable difference that the subject of the infinitive is not the same as the subject of διακινδυνεύοντα. Even the simple verb which regularly takes the infinitive only appears to do so when the subject remains the same.

πολλὰ ἂν περιεσκέψω. The aorist after ἔδει and in conjunction with παρεκάλεις is noticeable. The significance of the tense in contrast with the imperfect in such cases is variously explained. According to Goodwin and to Thompson (*Greek Syntax*, p. 216) it denotes the "instantaneousness" of the single act, but this is obviously not appropriate here : Jelf, § 856 a, obs. 1, suggests that the action is emphasised rather than its time or duration ; and with him Krueger, who (54, 10, 5) says that the aorist here denotes "das Eintreten der Handlung," in the main agrees. For other instances see Heind. ad *Gorg.* 514 D ; *Theaetet.* 144 E ; *Meno*, 72 B and 86 D ; above, 311 B ; pseudo-Plat. *Theag.* 123 B. The usage seems common, however, only with such words as ἀποκρίνασθαι and σκέψασθαι.

εἴτε οὔ. Εἰ in the sense of "whether" or "that" (after verbs like θαυμάζω) regularly takes οὔ, and so εἴτε in double dependent questions, but if the question implies doubt then

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See on 315 A and Krueger, 60, 6, 2; and for the Latin usage consult Mayor's notes on *Juv. Sat.* i. 157, xi. 25.

313 B. γιγνώσκεις. The present is used for the perfect, as is the case with ἀκούω, πυνθάνομαι, αἰσθάνομαι, μανθάνω. *Phaed.* 116 C, γιγνώσκεις γὰρ τοὺς αἰτίους where ἔγνωκα in the same sense has just been used.

313 C. ἔοικεν. Sc. ἐμὲ ἀγνοεῖν; but it is commonly used personally in answers: *Euthyd.* 296 C, ἀπαντα γὰρ ὁμολογεῖς ἐπίστασθαι. Ἔοικα, ἔφην ἐγώ; *Cratyl.* 407 C, ἦ τὸν γενναῖον τὸν φάεος ἱστορα ἐρωτᾷς; Ἔοικα; *Gorg.* 519 D, σὺ δ' οὐκ ἂν οἴος τ' εἶης λέγειν, εἰ μὴ τίς σοι ἀποκρίνοιτο; Ἔοικά γε.

ἀρ'. *Nonne.* Arist. *Av.* 797, ἀρ' ὑπόπτερον γενέσθαι παντός ἐστιν ἄξιον; Ast in his *Lexicon*, i. p. 269, gives very many instances. Stallbaum, ad *Rep.* viii. 566 A, quotes Buttman: *Differunt in his Ἄρα et Ἄρ' οὐ: quippe affirmativus utique est utriusque formulae sensus, sed ita ut simplex ἄρα aliquid sive verae sive fictae dubitationis admisceat.* Contrast Krueger, 69, 9, who regards ἄρα without the οὐ as expressive of confidence in the answer.

ἔμπορός τις ἢ κάπηλος. "Wholesale or retail dealer." Plato gives his own interpretation of the terms in *Rep.* ii. 371 D, ἢ οὐ καπήλους καλοῦμεν τοὺς πρὸς ὠνήν τε καὶ πρᾶσιν διακονοῦντας, ἰδρυμένους ἐν ἀγορᾷ, τοὺς δὲ πλάνητας ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐμπόρους; cp. *Sophist.* 223 D. In *Sophist.* 224 D we have the same comparison, ἴθι δὴ νῦν συναγάγωμεν αὐτὸ λέγοντες ὡς τὸ τῆς κτητικῆς, μεταβλητικῆς, ἀγοραστικῆς, ἐμπορικῆς, ψυχεμπορικῆς περὶ λόγους καὶ μαθήματα ἀρετῆς πωλητικὸν δεύτερον ἀνεφάνη σοφιστικῆ.

φαίνεται γὰρ ἔμοιγε. These words I have assigned to Socrates with the Zurich editors, Schleiermacher, Heindorf, Wayte, Deuschle. Schanz and Sauppe attribute them to Hippocrates, but the stress on ἔμοιγε is in that case inexplicable and inappropriate, and Hippocrates can hardly assent if, as the succeeding words show, he is ignorant of what the sophist's wares are. Kroschel interchanges ὦ Σώκρατες and ἦν δ' ἐγώ, without authority, in order to retain Socrates as questioner.

ἔξαπατήσει. Bekker's correction for ἔξαπατήσῃ of BT. Krueger, 54, 8, 7, gives no instance of the subjunctive in the elliptical construction. Jelf, § 812, 2, one only, *Hdt.* vi. 85. In 348 D as here Schanz abandons the reading of BT in favour of the commoner construction.

313 D. ὁ ἔμπορός τε καὶ κάπηλος. These words are rejected by Naber (*Comm.* ii. 79). The form of expression is irregular and would strictly mean, "he who is both wholesale and retail dealer"; but see *Rep.* x. 604 B, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ.

ὧν ἀγουσιν ἀγωγίμων. For τούτων δ' ἀγουσιν ἀγωγήματα, the genitive being constructed with ὅ τι: "what of the wares they bring is good or bad."

313 E. ὡς δ' αὐτως. So *Phaedo*, 102 E, ὡς δ' αὐτως καὶ τὸ μικρὸν τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἐθέλει ποτὲ μέγα γίγνεσθαι οὐδὲ εἶναι (see Stallb. ad loc.); *Politic.* 310 D, ὡς δ' αὐτως τὸ περὶ τὴν ἀνδρίαν γένος

δρᾶ; Xen. *Anab.* v. 6, 9. Less elegantly *Gorg.* 460 D, ὡσ-
αύτως δέ, and *Symp.* 186 E.

313 E. καὶ οἱ ὄνούμενοι. Sc. ἀγνοοῖεν ἄν.

τυγχάνεις ἐπιστήμων τούτων. Heindorf, while admitting that the participle appears to be omitted after τυγχάνω by Plato in places where a copyist's mistake cannot be given as excuse, e.g. *Hipp. Mai.* 300 A, where οὔσα must have been the form, restores it here as he proposes to do in *Gorg.* 502 B, εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει ἀηδὲς καὶ ὠφέλιμον [δν]. Other editors acquiesce in its omission in many places, such as *Phaedr.* 263 D; *Rep.* ii. 369 B (see *ad loc.* Stallb., who, however, quotes Porson *ad Eur. Hec.* 782 as approving the insertion of ὄν in the passage in the *Republic*); *Tim.* 61 C.

314 A. περὶ τοῖς φιλτάτοις. Used in the same reference in *Gorg.* 513 A, ὅπως μὴ . . . σὺν τοῖς φιλτάτοις ἢ αἵρεσις ἡμῶν ἔσται ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς ἐν τῇ πόλει, of spiritual welfare; *Laws*, i. 650 A, ἐπιτρέποντα αὐτοῦ θυγατέρας τε καὶ υἱεῖς καὶ γυναικάς, οὕτως ἐν τοῖς φιλτάτοις κινδυνεύσαντα, of close relations; cp. Hom. *Il.* iv. 161. Metaphors from games of hazard are frequent in Plato, *Rep.* vi. 487 B, x. 604 C; *Laches*, 187 B; *Laws*, i. 634 E, v. 739 A, vii. 820 C, x. 903 D, xii. 968 E, τὸ λεγόμενον, ὧ φίλοι, ἐν κοινῷ καὶ μέσῳ ἔοικεν ἡμῶν κείσθαι, καὶ εἴπερ κινδυνεύειν περὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἐθέλομεν συμπίσης, ἢ τρις ἕξ, φασίν, ἢ τρεῖς κύβους βάλλοντας, πάντα ποιητέον; below, 355 A, ἀναθέσθαι; pseudo-Plat. *Eryx*, 395 B.

κυβεύης τε καὶ κινδυνεύης. See *Gorg.* 467 D, πλεῖν τε καὶ κινδυνεύειν, for a similar combination.

σιτία μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.έ. The passage in the *Gorgias* (464 B—465 D) where ῥητορική is compared to ὀψοποιική illustrates the present.

παρὰ τοῦ καπήλου καὶ ἐμπόρου. So BT (except that T reads του). The words are however bracketed by Schanz after Hirschig. Hermann reads παρά του only; Sauppe παρὰ τοῦ καπήλου, arguing that the retail trader is alone in question, that ἔμπορος καὶ κάπηλος is the usual order, that the form of expression is wrong and should be at least τοῦ καπήλου ἢ ἐμπόρου. In answer to the last objection, see *Rep.* x. 604 B, quoted in 313 D; as regards the second Kroschel supplies a number of instances in which Plato purposely alters the order of a combination to avoid monotony, and the order is here reversed to bring into prominence the retail trader, who is chiefly though not, as Sauppe says, solely in question. The words are retained intact by the Zürich editors, Deuschle and Kroschel.

ἐν ἄλλοις ἀγγείοις. "Other," that is to say, than our own bodies.

οἴκαδε. The notion of carrying thither is implied in καταθέμενον.

ἔξιστιν. A repetition of the same word from above. This is a characteristic of Plato's style. Schanz (*Nov. Comm. Plat.* pp. 10, 11) compares *Rep.* viii. 547 B; *Cratyl.* 404 B; *Lys.*

209 B; *Crito*, 54 B; *Meno*, 72 B; *Charm.* 164 E; below, 345 C; *Gorg.* 484 B, etc.

314 B. καταθέντα τὴν τιμὴν. Of ready money payment, as below, 328 C; add *Laws*, xi. 921 D, οὗτος τῇ δραχμῇ ἐκάστου μηνὸς ἐπωβελίαν κατατιθέτω; *Ar. Ran.* 176.

καὶ μαθόντα. Bracketed by Schanz; omitted by Deuschle originally, but retained in the 4th edition by Cron. Sauppe defends the words as answering to πiónτα ἢ φαγόντα above; just as ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ λαβόντα does to ἐν ἄλλοις ἀγγελίοις ἀποφέρειν.

ἔτι νέοι ὥστε . . . διελέσθαι. *Eur. Androm.* 80, γέρων ἐκεῖνος ὥστε σ' ὠφελεῖν παρών; *Xen. Cyrop.* iv. 5, 15, ὀλίγοι ἐσμέν ὥστε ἐγκρατεῖς εἶναι αὐτῶν; *Mem.* iii. 13, 3. Heindorf points out that this form of expression is adopted because it does not, like νεώτεροι ἢ ὥστε would, entirely deny the power to discriminate. In *Thuc.* ii. 61, 2, ταπεινὴ ὑμῶν ἢ διάνοια ἐγκαρτερεῖν ἃ ἔγνωτε, the same sense is given without the aid of ὥστε. See Krueger, 49, 1; Thompson, p. 156. For the orthography of τοσοῦτον see Schanz, *Nov. Comm.* pp. 1 ff.

Ἰππίας ὁ Ἡλείος. The son of Diopeithes; a man of some influence in his state, and mentioned as being sent on a diplomatic mission to Sparta. In his travels he visited many places, amongst them Sicily, where his teaching was well rewarded. He was a man of universal attainments and of much practical skill. See Deuschle, *Einleitung*, pp. 7, 8, and Grote, *History of Greece*, ch. lxxvii.

314 C. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ κ.τ.έ. Supply αὐτόθι εἶναι. For similar parentheses see *Symp.* 176 B; *Laches*, 180 A, ἐγὼ μὲν . . . κοινωνεῖν ἔτοιμος, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Λάχητα τόνδε.

Πρόδικον τὸν Κεῖον. Born between 465 and 460 B.C. He visited Athens as accredited agent of Ceos. Ethics were prominent in his teaching; the Choice of Hercules (*Xen. Mem.* ii. 1, 21) was included in one of his discourses (ᾠραι). He is spoken of with respect by Socrates and by Aristophanes (*Nub.* 360) for his simple morality. Another side of his teaching dealt with the distinction of terms, and a course of lectures, περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος, is in several places alluded to by Plato. Theramenes, Euripides, Isocrates are reputed to have been his hearers.

δόξαν ἡμῖν ταῦτα. A very irregular construction in which the rule that a neuter plural subject takes a singular verb is extended to the agreement of the participle; cp. *Xen. Anab.* iv. 1, 13, δόξαν δὲ ταῦτα ἐκήρυξαν οὕτω ποιεῖν; but *Xen. Hellen.* iii. 2, 19, δόξαντα δὲ ταῦτα καὶ περανθέντα, τὰ μὲν στρατεύματα ἀπῆλθεν; *Andoc.* i. 81, δόξαντα ὑμῖν ταῦτα εἴλεσθε ἀνδρας εἴκοσιν; Jelf, § 384, obs. 1; Krueger, 56, 9, 5 and 6.

προθύρω. As the name (it is sometimes used in the plural, *Phileb.* 64 C) denotes, this is a passage leading up to, or a space immediately before the doors of a house, sometimes

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ἀπέχεται, in none of which passages is there any v.l. in Zürich edition; *Theaetet.* 155 E, οὐδ' ἂν δύνωνται ἀπρίξ τοῖν χεροῖν λαβέσθαι, where there is a v.l. ταῖν.

314 D. ἐγκεκλημένης. Bekker's correction (for ἐγκεκλειμένης B and Zürich ed., and ἐγκεκλεισμένης T and Heindorf) adopted by Schanz, Sauppe, Kroschel, Deuschle. Krueger (§ 40) gives κλήω, κέκληκα, κέκλημαι, ἐκλήσθην, as the Attic forms of the verb: see W. H. Thompson ad *Phaedr.* 251 D, and Dr. Rutherford's *New Phrynichus*, p. 102.

οὐ σχολή αὐτῷ. "Master is not at home." For αὐτός used thus cp. Ar. *Nub.* 219, τίς οὗτος; Αὐτός. Τίς αὐτός; Σωκράτης; *Rep.* i. 327 B, καί μου ὀπισθεν ὁ παῖς λαβόμενος τοῦ ἱματίου, Κελεύει ὑμᾶς, ἔφη, Πολέμαρχος περιμεῖναι. Καὶ ἐγὼ μετεστράφην τε καὶ ἠρόμην, ὅπου αὐτὸς εἶη; below, 315 B; Krueger, 51, 5, 4; Thompson, p. 55.

314 E. μόγισ . . . ποτε. As ποτε often = *tandem* (cp. in Lat. *aliquando* for *tandem aliquando*)—*Laws*, viii. 832 D, μνησθῆναι ποτε περὶ πάντων τῶν ἀγώνων τῶν γυμνικῶν; Arist. *Ran.* 268, ἔμελλον ἄρα παύσειν ποθ' ὑμᾶς τοῦ κοᾶξ; Xen. *Cyrop.* vii. 2, 19, πάμπολλα δὲ θύων ἐξιλασάμην ποτὲ αὐτόν—so the phrase here = *vix tandem*: cp. *Theaetet.* 160 E, τοῦτο μὲν δὴ μόγισ ποτε ἐγεννήσαμεν.

ἄνθρωπος. BT ἄνθρωπος, but see note on 309 A. Most editors are agreed to read here as in the text. Heindorf reads ἄνθρωπος, but the passages he quotes are not to the point; as in both a descriptive clause is added to the substantive and takes the place of the article.

ἐν τῷ προστώῳ. See note on 314 C. Protagoras seems to have been in the portico upon which the entrance passage opened, and Hippias in the one opposite (315 C).

ἐξῆς δ' αὐτῷ. *Cratyl.* 420 D, ὅτι τούτοις ἐξῆς ἐστί.

ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα. The ἐκ is the appropriate preposition from the Greek point of view to correspond with our "on" or "towards": Thuc. i. 64, 1, τὸ δ' ἐκ τοῦ ἰσθμοῦ τεῖχος εὐθὺς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀποτειχίσαντες ἐφρούρου (the wall on the side of the neck of land); cp. i. 62, 1, ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο πρὸς Ὀλύνθου (on the Olynthus side of the city). The general form of the expression may as easily be paralleled: Thucydides has τὰ ἐπὶ Θράκης *passim*; i. 2, 5, ἐκ τοῦ ἐπὶ πλείστον; vii. 37, 2, ἐκ τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα προσήει τῷ τείχει; Xen. *Anab.* v. 4, 10, εἰς τὴν χώραν εἰσβάλλειν ἐκ τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα. Plato does not apparently use elsewhere the particular phrase, but he has ἐκ τοῦ ἐπ' ἀριστερά, *Euthyd.* 297 C, and εἰς τὸ ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα in *Phaed.* 112 B; *Rep.* ix. 587 B.

Καλλίας ὁ Ἰππονίκου. See note on 311 A.

315 A. Χαρμίδης ὁ Γλαύκωνος. The man after whom the dialogue of the same name is called, brother of Perictione, Plato's mother: see the table given on 316 A. From a passage in Andocides (*Or.* i. 26) it appears likely that Callias was married to another sister of Charmides.

Φιλιππίδης ὁ Φιλομήλου. Mentioned here only by Plato.

315 A. Ἀντίμοιρος ὁ Μενδαῖος. Kroschel quotes Themistius, *Or.* 29, p. 347 D, Καλλίας οὐ μόνον Πρωταγόραν ἐθεράπευε καὶ περιείπεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἀντίμοιρον τὸν Μενδαῖον. He is not otherwise known.

ἐπὶ τέχνη. See on 312 B.

τούτων δὲ οἱ ὀπισθεν. BT omit οἱ which was added by Stephanus, and is adopted by Schanz. Sauppe after Baiter, ὀπισθεν οἱ; but if οἱ was in the original text it would have more readily dropped out *before* ὀπισθεν. Heindorf does not insert it, but inserts ὦν before τὸ μὲν πολὺ, following Ficinus' version. After λεγομένων it might easily have fallen out, but it is a cumbrous addition in this part of the sentence where there are already two other relatives.

ἐξ ἐκάστων τῶν πόλεων. *Rep.* x. 600 C, Plato says if people had derived as much benefit from Homer and Hesiod as they did from Protagoras and Prodicus they would not have let them stroll about singing (ῥαψωδεῖν περιύοντας), but, οὐχὶ μᾶλλον ἂν αὐτῶν ἀντείχοντο ἢ τοῦ χρυσοῦ καὶ ἠνάγκαζον παρὰ σφίσιν οἴκοι εἶναι, ἢ, εἰ μὴ ἔπειθον, αὐτοὶ ἂν ἐπαιδαγώγουν (attended on them) ὅπη ἤσαν, ἕως ἱκανῶς παιδείας μεταλάβοιεν; *Apol.* 19 E, he says of Gorgias, Prodicus, and Hippias, τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστος . . . ἰὼν εἰς ἐκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους, οἷς ἕξεστι τῶν ἑαυτῶν πολιτῶν προῖκα ξυνεῖναι ᾧ ἂν βούλωνται, τούτους πείθουσι τὰς ἐκείνων ξυνουσίας ἀπολιπόντας σφίσι ξυνεῖναι χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσειδέναι.

κηλῶν τῇ φωνῇ. A very favourite word with Plato: amongst many other passages compare *Symp.* 215 C, ὁ μὲν γε (Μαρσύας) δι' ὀργάνων ἐκήλει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ στόματος δυνάμει. See Valcken. *ad Eur. Hipp.* 303.

οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν ἔπονται. An irregular continuation of the relative sentence οὗς ἄγει κ.τ.έ. See note on 313 B, and add Shilleto *adn. critt. ad Thuc.* i. 74, 1, ὅς αἰτιώτατος ἐν τῷ στένῳ ναυμαχῆσαι ἐγένετο . . . καὶ αὐτὸν (v.l. αὐτοί) διὰ τοῦτο δὴ μάλιστα ἐτιμήσατε. He quotes Tac. *Ann.* iii. 24, *ob imprudicitiā filiae ac neptis, quas urbe depulit adulteros-que earum morte aut fuga punivit.*

315 B. ἐν τῷ χορῷ. The term is used playfully here with reference to the organised movements of Protagoras' followers. Sauppe compares the arrangement of the tragic chorus of 15 which was often disposed in three ranks of five each. The κορυφαῖος, whose place is here taken by Protagoras, was in the middle of the front line, and when this went right about face, the two other ranks fell back to right and left to let it pass through and then closed up again in the rear. In *Rep.* vi. 490 C there is an allusion to this order of priority in the chorus: καὶ δὴ τὸν ἄλλον τῆς φιλοσόφου φύσεως χορὸν, τί δεῖ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀναλαμβάνοντα τάττειν; see Donaldson's *Theatre of the Greeks* (7th ed.), p. 243, and Müller's *Eumeniden* as there referred to.

τὸν δὲ μετ' εἰσενόησα. That is, after Sisyphus, to whom, with his vain labour, Protagoras is perhaps likened. The passage

is from *Od.* xi. 601, out of the Νέκυια, and the educated Athenian would supply the rest,—βίην Ἡρακληείην | εἶδωλον. Plato is perhaps hinting at the “shadowy,” unsubstantial reputation of the sophists, and the want of reality in their philosophy. Some see in the mention of Hercules an allusion to Hippias’ pugnacity, as below Prodicus is represented by Tantalus in consequence of his desire for wealth.

315 B. ἔφη Ὀμηρος. Omitted by Schleiermacher, bracketed by Schanz. The words are not necessary, for a quotation from Homer stands in *Cratyl.* 415 A without them; but cp. *Theaetet.* 170 E, νῆ τὸν Δία, ᾧ Σώκρατες, μάλα μυρίοι δῆτα, φησὶν Ὀμηρος.

315 C. ἐν θρόνῳ. Repeated below, ἐν θρόνῳ καθήμενος, with special emphasis. The θρόνος was the usual seat of the master, and is always in Plato (*v.* Ast’s *Lexicon*, *s.v.*) a seat of authority, differing as such from the ordinary καθέδρα. The βάθρα (but see on 325 E) are the scholars’ benches. Plato emphasises Hippias’ position, because from Socrates’ point of view the teacher’s function was not to dogmatise but to evoke knowledge. Sauppe quotes Plutarch, *περὶ τοῦ ἀκούειν*, c. 12, ἀναστάντες γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ θρόνου καὶ ἀποθέμενοι τὰ βιβλία . . . (οἱ σοφισταὶ) μικροὶ φαίνονται. See Mayor’s note on Juvenal, *Sat.* vii. 152.

Ἐρυξίμαχος τε ὁ Ἀκουμενοῦ. As one of the interlocutors in the *Symposium* he gives (176 D) his opinion, ὅτι χαλεπὸν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢ μέθη ἐστὶ, and that he would advise no one to drink, especially on the morrow of a debauch. He and his father (*Symp.* 214 B; *Phaedr.* 268 A) were notable physicians.

Φαῖδρος ὁ Μυρρινούσιος. The person after whom the dialogue is named.

Ἀνδρῶν ὁ Ἀνδροτίωνος. Mentioned (*Gorg.* 487 C) as κοινωνὸς γεγονὼς σοφίας with three others who held it right μὴ προθυμεῖσθαι εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν φιλοσοφεῖν. His son, inheriting his grandfather’s name as was usual, was the Androtion attacked by Demosthenes.

περὶ φύσεως. Grote, *History of Greece*, chap. lxvii., says, “Hippias is represented as distinguished for the wide range of his accomplishments. . . . He could teach astronomy, geometry, and arithmetic.” See *Hipp. Mai.* 285 B, ἀ σὺ κάλλιστα ἐπίστασαι, τὰ περὶ τὰ ἄστρα τε καὶ τὰ οὐράνια πάθη; pseudo-Plat. *Hipp. Min.* 367 E, ἧς αὖ σὺ τέχνης (τῆς ἀστρονομίας) ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμων οἶει εἶναι ἢ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν.

τῶν μετεώρων. *Apol.* 43 D, τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς; but the term also connoted fanciful speculation, and Socrates (*Apol.* 18 B) complains that he, as τὰ μετέωρα φροντιστής, was under the condemnation which attached to such speculations of being little better than an atheist. Cp. *Ar. Nub.* 227, where Socrates is made to say οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε | ἐξηῦρον ὀρθῶς τὰ μετέωρα πράγματα, | εἰ μὴ κρεμάσας τὸ νόημα καὶ τὴν φροντίδα (*i.e.* in the basket) | λεπτήν καταμίξας ἐς τὸν ὄμοιον ἀέρα κ.τ.έ.;

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as founded on that of Gorgias ; add Donaldson's *Theatre of the Greeks*, p. 160.

315 D. ἐκ Κεραμέων. Probably the same as the Κεραμεικός, a deme in Attica just outside Athens.

315 E. τὴν δ' οὖν ἰδέαν πάνυ καλός. Agreeing with μειράκιον according to the sense: cp. *Laches*, 180 E, τὰ γὰρ μειράκια τάδε πρὸς ἀλλήλους . . . διαλεγόμενοι θαμὰ ἐπιμέμνηνται Σωκράτους ; *Symp.* 179 A, ἐγκαταλιπεῖν γε τὰ παιδικὰ ἢ μὴ βοηθῆσαι κινδυνεύοντι. Tr. "of a fine natural disposition, I believe ; at all events of pleasing exterior."

ἔδοξα ἀκούσαι. "I fancy, I heard," etc.

τοῦτ' ἦν τὸ μειράκιον. If the words are retained (as they are by Schanz, Sauppe, Deuschle) we must translate "there was this youth" ; but the passages adduced for this usage of εἶμι are not conclusive, the initial position of the verb in them giving it the requisite strength, as in *Rep.* x. 615 D, ἦσαν δὲ καὶ ἰδιῶται τινες, and *Phaed.* 59 B. No alterations are however satisfactory. Heindorf, with Schleiermacher's approval, suggests τοῦτο τ' οὖν which the Zürich edd. adopt.

ὁ τε Κήπιδος. This Adeimantus is otherwise unknown. The other, the son of Leucolophides, is best known as colleague of Philocles and Conon, who were elected generals after the battle of Arginusae. He is reputed to have betrayed the Athenian fleet at Aegospotami, and falling with Philocles into Lysander's hands to have been spared on this account when Philocles was put to death. For this he seems to have been afterwards accused by Conon. He is mentioned as unpopular in *Ar. Ran.* 1513. See *Xen. Hell.* i. 4, 21, ii. 1, 32 ; *Demosth. De F. L.* § 211, and Shilleto's note ; Holden's *Onomast. Aristoph.* s.v. Ἀδείμαντος.

λιπαρῶς ἔχων. Cp. 335 B.


πάσσοφος. Used in the same ironical sense, *Rep.* x. 598 D, ἐντυχῶν γόητί τινι καὶ μιμητῇ ἐξηπατήθη, ὥστε ἔδοξεν (ὁ γόης) αὐτῷ πάσσοφος εἶναι ; *Euthyd.* 287 C, Socrates is bantering Dionysodorus for choosing his own time to answer questions ; on what ground do you exercise this discretion ? ἢ δῆλον ὅτι κατὰ τόνδε (τὸν λόγον), ὅτι σὺ νῦν πάσσοφος τις ἡμῖν ἀφίξαι περὶ λόγους ; *Lys.* 216 A, οὗτοι οἱ πάσσοφοι ἄνδρες, οἱ ἀντιλογικοί ; *Theaetet.* 152 C, ἀρ' οὖν πρὸς Χαρίτων πάσσοφος τις ἦν ὁ Πρωταγόρας.

316 A. ἀνὴρ. See on 309 A, 314 E.

ἡμεῖς μὲν ἄρτι εἰσεληλύθειμεν. This co-ordination of a temporal sentence instead of its subordination is often found with the pluperfect, *Xen. Anab.* i. 9, 14, τοὺς γε μέντοι ἀγαθοὺς εἰς πόλεμον ὠμολόγητο διαφερόντως τιμᾶν. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν κ.τ.έ.

ὡς φῆς σὺ καὶ ἐγὼ πείθομαι. A very common phrase with Plato : *Rep.* iv. 424 C, ὡς φησί τε Δάμων καὶ ἐγὼ πείθομαι ; *Sympos.* 186 E, ὡς φασιν οἷδε οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ ἐγὼ πείθομαι.

Κριτίας ὁ Καλλαίσχρου. The man infamous in history as president of the Thirty Tyrants. The following table will explain the relationship of some of the characters.



316 A. ἔτι σμίκρ' ἅττα διατρίψαντες. They stood out of sight in the end of the passage leading into the αὐλή from the street. Heindorf says, *paullulum morati*, male Cornarius, *pauca quaedam collocuti*. The latter meaning might be supported by *Phileb.* 20 C, σμίκρ' ἅττα . . . διομολογησώμεθα, but διατρίβω in Plato never occurs in the derived sense of “conversing” with an accusative of the conversation held. For the adverbial use of σμίκρ' ἅττα cp. *Polit.* 259 C, ὡς βασιλεὺς ἅπασ χερσὶ . . . σμίκρ' ἅττα εἰς τὸ κατέχειν τὴν ἀρχὴν δύναται.

316 B. πρὸς σέ τοι. The particle emphasises the personality of the person addressed. *Arist. Plut.* 1099, σέ τοι λέγω; *Soph. Ai.* 1228, σέ τοι, τὸν ἐκ τῆς αἰχμαλωτίδος λέγω; Krueger, 69, 61, 1. Notice the same use of δῆ: *Soph. Ant.* 442, σὲ δῆ, σὲ τὴν νεύουσαν ἐς πέδον κάρα. It is remarkable that BT both give τι, which Bekker retains. Kroschel says, *τοι in BT recentiore Graecorum pronuntiatione mutatum est in τι.*

μόνῳ βουλόμενοι διαλεχθῆναι. It is not necessary with Schanz, after Cobet (var. lectt. p. 112), to insert μόνοι before μόνῳ.

ἐνάμιλλος εἶναι τοῖς ἡλικιώταις. “To hold his own with his contemporaries.” So used with a dative in *Rep.* iv. 433 D, twice.

316 C. μάλιστα γενέσθαι. So BT, followed by Heind., Stallb., and Zürich edd.; later editions mostly insert ἄν after Stephanus, and Sauppe says that the particle is always present unless the principal verb itself makes the reference to the future manifest. Heindorf and Stallbaum, however (add Krueger, 54, 6, 9), imagine that its omission is an indication of Hippocrates' confidence. Whatever the explanation, we must with Goodwin (*Greek Moods and Tenses*, new ed. § 127) recognise the existence of many passages in which the ἄν is omitted, and not with Madvig correct them. Compare the following: *Thuc.* i. 127, 1, νομίζοντες ἐκπεσόντος αὐτοῦ ῥᾶόν σφισι προχωρεῖν τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων (see *ad loc.* Shilleto, who regards the present as the graphic present of the *or. recta*); iii. 24, 1, νομίζοντες ἤκιστα σφᾶς ταύτην αὐτοῦς

ὑποτοπῆσαι τραπέσθαι τὴν ἐς τοὺς πολεμίους ; ii. 3, 2, ἐνβμισαν ἐπιθέμενοι ῥαδίως κρατῆσαι.

- 316 C.** μόνος οἶει δεῖν. For μόνον ; cp. Dem. 51, 1, πεποίηκα τοῦτ' ἐγώ, διό φημι δεῖν αὐτὸς στεφανοῦσθαι.
- 316 D.** τὸν ταῦτα πράττοντα. Summing up and emphasising the foregoing words ; a not uncommon use of οὗτος, cp. *Laws*, iv. 713 C, where ταῦτ' οὖν διανοούμενος is resumptive. Krueger, 65, 9, 2.
- φοβουμένους τὸ ἐπαχθὲς αὐτῆς. *Lach.* 184 B, ἐπίφθονος γὰρ ἡ προσποίησις τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπιστήμης.
- προκαλύπτεσθαι, τοὺς μὲν ποιήσιν. For the construction L. and S. compare Eur. *Iph. in Taur.* 312, πέπλων . . . προῦκαλύπτει εὐπήνους ὑφάς.
- οἶον "Ομηρον. Diog. Laert. *Prooem.* 12, οἱ σοφοὶ καὶ σοφισταὶ ἐκαλοῦντο, καὶ οὐ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ σοφισταί, καθὰ καὶ Κρατῖνος ἐν 'Αρχιλόχῳ τοὺς περὶ "Ομηρον καὶ 'Ησίοδον ἐπαινῶν οὕτως καλεῖ ; see L. and S. s.v. σοφιστής ; Ar. *Ranæ*, 1031, 'Ορφεὺς μὲν γὰρ τελετάς θ' ἡμῖν κατέδειξε φόνων τ' ἀπέχεσθαι, | Μουσαῖος δ' ἐξακέσεις τε νόσων καὶ χρησμούς, 'Ησίοδος δὲ | γῆς ἐργασίας, καρπῶν ὥρας, ἀρότους· ὁ δὲ θεῖος "Ομηρος | ἀπὸ τοῦ τιμῆν καὶ κλέος ἔσχεν, πλὴν τοῦδ' ὅτι χρῆστ' ἐδίδαξε, | τάξεις, ἀρετάς, ὀπλίσεις ἀνδρῶν ; Onomacritus in Peisistratus' time collected the works of Orpheus and Musaeus, in consequence of which they are often mentioned in combination : *Apol.* 41 A ; *Ion*, 536 B ; *Rep.* ii. 364 E.
- 316 E.** "Ικκος τε ὁ Ταραντῖνος. Won in the *pentathlon* in the 77th Olympiad, c. 470 B.C., and afterwards established himself as a γυμναστής, i.e. παιδοτρίβης (Pausan. vi. 10, 2) or ἰατρός. He is mentioned in the *Laws* (viii. 839 E) as a singular instance of temperance ; Eustathius (quoted by Heind.) refers to the proverb "Ικκου δεῖπνον· ἐπὶ ἀπερίττως δειπνούντων.
- 'Ηρόδικος. Mentioned also *Rep.* iii. 406 A, μίξας γυμναστικὴν ἰατρικὴν ἀπέκναισε πρῶτον μὲν καὶ μάλιστα ἑαυτόν, ἔπειτ' ἄλλους ὕστερον πολλούς ; *Phaedr.* 227 E (where see Heindorf). Suffering from ill-health himself he devised a rigid regimen which restored him to good health. Eustathius (quoted by Stallb. on *Rep.* l.c.) says, τοῦ δὲ διαιτητικοῦ (φασί) 'Ιπποκράτην μὲν κατάρξαι, 'Ηρόδικον δὲ συντελέσαι.
- τὸ δὲ ἀρχαῖον Μεγαρεύς. This pointless addition is introduced by Plato, Sauppe thinks, to exhibit Protagoras' love of displaying his universal knowledge.
- 'Αγαθοκλῆς τε ὁ ὑμέτερος. The scholiast, ad *Alcib. I.* 118 C, says that Pythocleides was teacher of Agathocles, and he (*Laches*, 180 D) of Damon. Pericles was himself acquainted (*Alcib. I.* l.c.) with the first and the last, and Aristotle (quoted by Plutarch, *Pericles* 14) says that Damon was his instructor in music.
- 317 A.** κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι. Goodwin (*Greek Moods and Tenses*, new ed. §§ 781-783) regards this as the infinitive used like a limiting accusative. Instances are very numerous with ἐκῶν ; for other phrases compare Thuc. iv. 28, 1 ; viii. 48, 5, τὸ ἐπ'

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subject of ὁμολογῶ, in which case it would have been ἔξαρκος. For the omission of *τινα* see note on 318 E, and add *Apol.* 39 A, ἄλλαι μηχαναὶ πολλαὶ εἰσιν ἐν ἐκάστοις τοῖς κινδύνοις, ὥστε διαφεύγειν θάνατον; *Meno*, 97 A, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθῶς ἠγεῖσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ φρόνιμος ᾖ, τοῦτο ὁμοιοὶ ἐσμεν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὁμολογηκόσιν.

317 B. ἄλλας. Sc. εὐλαβείας.

317 C. σὺν θεῷ εἰπεῖν. Used to avert nemesis for a boast: *Theaet.* 151 B, καί, σὺν θεῷ εἰπεῖν, πάνυ ἰκανῶς τοπάζω, οἷς ἂν συγγενόμενοι ὄναιτο; *Ar. Plut.* 114, οἶμαι γάρ, οἶμαι, ξὺν θεῷ δ' εἰρήσεται, | ταύτης ἀπαλλάξειν σε τῆς ὀφθαλμίας.

εἰμὶ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ. For the fact cp. *Meno*, 91 E, οἶμαι γὰρ αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν ἐγγὺς καὶ ἐβδομήκοντα ἔτη γεγονότα, τετταράκοντα δὲ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ ὄντα; for the phrase, *Soph. O. T.* 562, τότε οὖν ὁ μάντις οὗτος ἦν ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ; *Hdt.* ii. 82, οἱ ἐν ποιήσει γενόμενοι; *Phaed.* 59 A, ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἡμῶν ὄντων; 319 C, below.

οὐδενὸς ὄτου. For this attraction cp. 323 B below. Cobet, *Nov. Lect.* 320, proposes to strike out πάντων, but compare *Demosth. Adv. Lept.* 458, § 3, οὐ γὰρ ἐστ' ἐφ' ὄτου τοῦτ' οὐ πεπύθητε τῶν πάντων.

ἀπάντων. To be joined with τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων, put out of its proper place for emphasis' sake.

ὑπώπτουσα γάρ. Schanz, *Nov. Comm.* p. 84, quotes many instances in which a causal sentence is thus inserted immediately after a personal pronoun.

ἐρασταί. "Admirers"; often used by Plato in this sense with an abstract object: *Phaedr.* 253 D, τιμῆς ἐραστῆς μετὰ σωφροσύνης τε καὶ αἰδοῦς; but not so frequently in this modified sense with reference to persons: cp. *Symp.* 173 B, Σωκράτους ἐραστῆς ὢν ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα τῶν τότε.

317 D. τί οὖν κ.τ.έ. See note on 310 A.

συνέδριον. Only used here in Plato apparently; mostly of the "meeting" and not of the place: see L. and S. s.v.

καθιζόμενοι. So B; καθεζόμενοι T, which Kroschel prefers, but his attempt to draw a distinction in meaning between the two forms is not successful, and it is better to follow the best MS.

ἔδοκει χρῆναι. Cp. 338 E for a similar asyndeton.

αὐτοί τε. So BT; Schanz, Sauppe, Kroschel, Deuschle, omit τε; Ast alters to γε. If retained it is answered by ἐν δὲ τούτῳ κ.τ.έ. Such an irregularity is not uncommon, see *Stallb. ad Rep.* ii. 367 C, ἀ τῶν τε ἀποβαινόντων ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἔνεκα ἄξια κεκτῆσθαι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτὰ αὐτῶν; *Politic.* 270 D, ἄλλα τε παθήματα πολλὰ καὶ θαυμαστὰ καὶ καινὰ ξυμπίπτει, μέγιστον δὲ τόδε; *Shilleto ad Thuc.* i. 25, 4, κατὰ τε τὸ δίκαιον . . . ἅμα δὲ καὶ μίσει; and *adhn. critt. ad Demosth. De F. L.* § 176. Generally, however, a climax is to be marked in such cases, and here there is none. The meaning of the αὐτοί is that they were too eager to wait for servants.

317 E. ἀναστήσαντες. Heind. proposes ἀναστήσαντε, but there is so

much irregularity in the treatment of the dual, which after all is but an old form of the plural, that it is unwise to make any correction, though the presence of ἄγοντε makes *Euthyd.* 273 D, ἀμφω βλέψαντες, hardly a parallel.

- 317 E. νῦν δὴ ἄν, ἔφη, λέγοις. The common formula of polite request. The protasis need not be consciously present to the speaker. Thompson, § 196, 2; Krueger, 54, 3, 8.

ὅτι Ἡ αὐτή μοι. For ὅτι introducing *or. rect.* see Jelf, § 802, obs. 8; Krueger, 65, 11, 8. Both consider it as the final result of the tendency in Greek for the *or. obl.* to assimilate itself to the *or. rect.*: cp. *Crito*, 50 C, ἴσως ἂν εἴποιεν ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ θαύμαζε τὰ λεγόμενα.

- 318 A. τοσοῦτος ὃ γε ἡμέτερος λόγος. "That is all we have to say." *Rep.* x. 608 C, οἷοι ἀθανάτῳ πράγματι ὑπὲρ τοσοῦτου (so little) δεῖν χρόνου ἐσπουδακέναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός; *Phaed.* 83 B.

ἐν τῇ ὑστεραία. Hirschig proposes to omit ἐν, and Schanz brackets it; Kroschel, however, aptly quotes Thuc. 1, 44, 1, τῇ μὲν προτέρᾳ . . . ἐν δὲ τῇ ὑστεραία.

ταῦτά ταῦτα. See Stallb. ad *Symp.* 178 E, ταῦτόν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τὸν ἐρώμενον ὀρώμεν. Either ἔσται must be supplied or the words are an adverbial accusative qualifying βελτίονι γεγονότι.

ἐπιδιδόναι. Ast, *Lex.* i. p. 774, quotes only two instances, out of a large number, in which the verb has not the meaning of to "improve" (*donner en avant*) in Plato.

- 318 B. δ μὴ τυγχάνεις. Bekker, τυγχάνοις, but no one appears to follow him. The indicative is more appropriate since it implies that there are some things which he does not know: cp. Xen. *Anab.* i. 9, 28, προσκαλῶν τοὺς φίλους ἐσπουδαιολογεῖτο, ὡς δηλοῖη οὐς τιμᾶ; Krueger, 54, 6, 2; Jelf, § 888; Thompson, §§ 321, 322.

ἀλλὰ μὴ οὕτως. A case of ellipse rather than aposiopesis, for there is no special animation intended: cp. below, 331 C; *Rep.* ii. 381 E, μὴ γάρ, ἔφη; x. 597 A, μὴ γάρ; *Meno*, 74 D, ἀλλὰ μὴ μοι οὕτως, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ κ.τ.έ.; Ar. *Ach.* 345, ἀλλὰ μὴ μοι πρόφασιν, ἀλλὰ κατάθου τὸ βέλος.

ὥσπερ ἂν εἶ. See note on 311 B.

Ζευξίππου. It has been suggested (by Coraes ad Plutarch, *Pericl.* 13) that this is the lengthened form of Zeuxis, the famous painter, who was also of Heraclea. Sauppe quotes from Herodian (*Etym. Magn.* 93, 50) Ἄμφις for Ἄμφιάραιος (Aesch.) and Ἴφις for Ἴφιγένεια. Later many such abbreviations were common: Lucas for Lucanus; Annas for Ananas; Zenos for Zenodorus; Apollos for Apollonius.

- 318 C. Ὀρθαγόρα τῷ Θηβαίῳ. The Thebans excelled in the use of the flute (*Anthol.* ed. Jacobs, ii. p. 633). This Orthagoras is apparently the same as the one who (Athenaeus, 184 E) is mentioned as Epaminondas' teacher.

ἐπανέροιτο αὐτόν. For αὐτόν after ἐκείνου see note on 309 B.

- 318 D. Πρωταγόρα. Instead of the natural σοι; imitating the pomposity of the man.

318 E. τὰς γὰρ τέχνας αὐτοὺς πεφευγότας. Τέχναι here = “the sciences,” “lessons,” “learning”: Müller, “die Künste”; Schleierm., “die Schulkünste.” With the views expressed here about higher education (φιλοσοφία in its widest sense) compare *Gorg.* 484 C, φιλοσοφία γὰρ τοί ἐστίν, ὦ Σώκρατες, χαρίεν, ἂν τις αὐτοῦ μετρίως ἄψηται ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, and a passage quoted by Thompson *ad loc.* from Isocrates, *Panathen.* p. 238 B, in which the orator recommends young men to pay attention to the ordinary subjects of education, as at least likely to keep them out of mischief, but deprecates too much application in their elders as likely to make them censorious, pedantic, unpractical.

τὸ δὲ μάθημα. *Meno*, 91 A. The sophists professed to be teachers ταύτης τῆς σοφίας καὶ ἀρετῆς, ἣ οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὰς τε οἰκίας καὶ τὰς πόλεις καλῶς διοικοῦσι καὶ τοὺς γονέας τοὺς αὐτῶν θεραπεύουσι, καὶ πολίτας καὶ ξένους ὑποδέξασθαι τε καὶ ἀποπέμψαι ἐπίστανται.

ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα . . . διοικοῖ. For the omission of τις see 317 B, and add *Apol.* 29 B, ἡ τοῦ οἰεσθαι εἰδέναι (ἀμαθία) ἀ οὐκ οἶδεν; *Rep.* x. 611 C, τοιοῦτον ἰκανῶς λογισμῶ διαθεατέον, καὶ πολὺ κάλλιον αὐτὸ εὐρήσει; *Gorg.* 456 D; Jelf, § 373, 6. For the construction see Jelf, § 810, 4; Riddell, *Digest*, § 68; Thompson, § 229, n. 3.

319 A. ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς πολίτας. To be taken together; “to promise to make (of them) good citizens”: cp. *Thuc.* i. 74, 1, ἄνδρα στρατηγὸν ξυνετώτατον; *Ar. Eq.* 1304, ἄνδρα μοχθηρὸν πολίτην; *Plat. Rep.* x. 620 C, ἀνδρὸς ἰδιώτου ἀπράγμονος; without an adj. it is very common, cp. above, 312 C, ἀνδρὶ σοφιστῆ; *Phaed.* 64 D, φιλοσόφου ἀνδρός; *Rep.* x. 620 B, ἀθλητοῦ ἀνδρός.

ἣ καλὸν . . . τέχνημα ἄρα κέκτησαι. For the sarcastic sense of καλός cp. *Rep.* x. 595 C, and 607 E. For the form of the sentence cp. *Soph. Ai.* 1121, οὐ γὰρ βάνουσον τὴν τέχνην ἐκτησάμην.

εἴπερ κέκτησαι. So BT; Schanz ἐκτησαι, on the ground (*Praefat. ad vol. xii.* § 16) that Plato uses this form after consonants; see Kroschel *ad* 340 D, and Krueger, 28, 10, 4.

οὐκ ᾗμην διδακτὸν εἶναι. That in fact it (*Meno*, 99 E) θεία μοίρα παραγίγνεσθαι. Ἄρετή μετὰ φρονήσεως is communicable by teaching, but not the πολιτικὴ or δημοτικὴ ἀρετή, which the sophist professed to teach; see App. I. to Mr. Archer-Hind's edition of the *Phaedo*.

319 B. ὅπως ἀπιστῶ. BT ὅπως ἂν: the correction is Heindorf's. ὅπως in the modal sense as here, with a deliberative conjunctive, almost universally dispenses with the ἂν; it was probably inserted either from a reminiscence of ὅπως ἂν above, or by writing twice over the first syllable of the verb. See, however, Thompson, § 234, n. 4.

ἡγοῦμαι οὐ διδακτὸν εἶναι μηδ' ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων παρασκευαστόν. See note on 317 A, and add Jelf, § 745, obs. 1; Thompson, § 283, n. 3; Krueger, 67, 7, 4. The peculiarity of this

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- 319 D.** *περὶ [τῶν] τῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως.* B τῶν τῆς π. δ. (but with a mark of error in the margin); T the same, but a second hand has marked τῶν as doubtful. Schanz (*Nov. Comm.* p. 61) brackets διοικήσεως, and Sauppe retains the words intact. It seems harsh, however, to take τῶν τῆς πόλεως as objective genitive after διοικήσεως which is thus too far removed from *περὶ*. If τῶν is omitted the difficulty disappears: for πόλεως can readily dispense with the article, similar forms of it not being written in juxtaposition till the time of Aristotle and later writers: cp. *Politic.* 296 E, τὸν ὄρον ὀρθῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως. The plural *περὶ τούτων* need create no difficulty (see Stallb. *ad loc.*), but may serve to explain the interpolation.
- μαθῶν.** For the change of number cp. below, 324 B; *Rep.* i. 347 A; iii. 413 D; vi. 489 D, 496 C; ix. 574 A, 591 A. See Heind. *ad Gorg.* 478 B, C, and Krueger, 61, 4, 1.-
- μὴ τοίνυν ὅτι.** There is an ellipse of εἶπω or εἶπης: cp. Lat. *ne dicam*. For the idiom consult Riddell, *Digest*, § 154; Jelf, § 762, 2, 3; Krueger, 67, 14, 3. For the unusual omission of καί after ἀλλά in the second part cp. *Apol.* 40 D, οἶμαι ἂν μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινά, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαριθμήτους (τὰς νύκτας) ἂν εὐρεῖν; and Livy, i. 10, *Nec domi tantum indignationes continebant, sed congregabantur undique ad regem*; Cic. *Ad Fam.* i. 6, *Pollio omnibus negotiis non interfuit solum, sed praefuit*.
- τὸ κοινόν.** Hdt. vi. 14, τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Σαμίων.
- 319 E.** **Περικλῆς.** For the chronology see Introduction, p. 33. In the *Meno* (94 B) Socrates makes the same remarks about Pericles' education of his sons: τούτους μέντοι ἰππέας μὲν ἐδίδαξεν οὐδενὸς χείρου Ἀθηναίων, καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ ἀγωνίαν καὶ τᾶλλα ἐπαίδευσεν, ὅσα τέχνης ἔχεται, οὐδενὸς χείρου· ἀγαθοὺς δὲ ἄρα ἄνδρας οὐκ ἐβούλετο ποιῆσαι; δοκῶ μὲν, ἐβούλετο, ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἦ διδακτόν.
- ὅσα διδασκάλων.** Everything that concerned, or depended upon, good teachers.
- 320 A.** **παραδίδωσιν.** The usual elliptical construction after verbs of this kind. It is most common with ἐπιτρέπω, see note on 319 C, and *Gorg.* 504 C, ἔλεγε καὶ μὴ ἐπίτρεπε.
- νέμονται ὡσπερ ἄφετοι.** Originally used of beasts which roamed about at large, being dedicated to some god. Heind. quotes Arrian, *Exp. Alex.* vii. 20, 7, νέμεσθαι τε τὴν νῆσον αἰξί τε ἀγρίαις καὶ ἐλάφοις καὶ ταύτας ἀνεῖσθαι ἀφέτους τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι; add *Critias*, 119 D, ἀφέτων ὄντων ταύρων ἐν τῷ Ποσειδῶνος ἱερῷ. For the applied sense cp. Eur. *Ion*, 821, ὁ δ' ἐν θεοῦ | δόμοισιν ἄφετος, ὡς λάθοι, παιδεύεται; *Rep.* vi. 498 C, τότε ἤδη ἀφέτους (δεῖ) νέμεσθαι (of those who are past the age for service).
- εἰ δὲ βούλει.** Giving an alternative proof: cp. *Rep.* iv. 432 A, εἰ μὲν βούλει, φρονήσει, εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἰσχύι.
- Κλεινίαν.** Alcibiades and Cleinias were sons of Cleinias, who had married Deinomache, daughter of Megacles, who was the brother of Agariste, the mother of Pericles and Ariphron.

- 320 A.** μὴ διαφθαρεῖ δῆ. “Lest he should be *corrupted*”: δῆ in adding emphasis to a statement frequently does so for the purpose of irony; below, 342 C, ὡς δῆ τούτοις κρατοῦντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. Socrates here assumes the appearance of talking ironically in deference to the presence of Alcibiades. For δῆ and δῆθεν see Shilleto *ad* Thuc. i. 92, 1.
- καταθέμενος ἐν Ἀρίφρονος. Κατατίθεσθαι is used technically = deposit for safe keeping. Ast quotes, among other passages, *Laws*, xi. 913 C, ἀ μὴ κατέθου, μὴ ἀνέλη. For ἐν Ἀρίφρονος, cp. *Theaetet.* 206 A, ἐν κιθαριστοῦ.
- πρὶν ἕξ μῆνας γεγονέναι. “Before six months had passed.” Heind. quotes *Phaed.* 108 C, ἕως ἂν δῆ τινες χρόνοι γένωνται; Lysias, *Or.* vii. 9, πρὶν ἡμέρας πέντε γενέσθαι; Xen. *Hell.* ii. 4, 25, πρὶν δὲ ἡμέρας δέκα γενέσθαι.
- ἀπέδωκε τούτῳ. That is, to the vicious Alcibiades, who has throughout the sentence been referred to by οὗτος; there is no need, with Heindorf, to make any correction. Cleinias is called even by his brother (*Alcibiades I.* 118 E) a μαινόμενος ἄνθρωπος.
- 320 B.** κάμπτομαι. “I am inclined to give way”: the same force of the present as in ἀποδιδράσκοντα (317 A). For the metaphorical use of the verb, cp. *Laches*, 192 E, εἴ τις ἰατρὸς ὢν, περιπνευμονία τοῦ υἱέος ἐχομένου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς καὶ δεομένου πιεῖν ἢ φαγεῖν δοῦναι, μὴ κάμπτοιτο ἀλλὰ καρτεροῖ; Thuc. iii. 58, 1, ἀξιοῦμεν . . . καμφθῆναι ὑμᾶς καὶ μεταγνῶναι.
- πολλῶν μὲν κ.τ.έ. Protagoras has (1) had much experience, (2) heard many *dicta*, (3) made many original reflexions.
- 320 C.** ἐπιδείξω. Not in the sense of making a show speech, from which later ἐπίδειξις was derived, and which is confined to the middle voice, but simply = “demonstrate”: *Gorg.* 464 B, σαφέστερον ἐπιδείξω δ λέγω.
- μῦθον . . . λόγῳ. See below, 324 D, where, after giving the Promethean myth and the reflexions suggested by it, Protagoras passes to the actual facts of experience with the words, τούτου δῆ περί, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκέτι μῦθον σοι ἐρῶ ἀλλὰ λόγον. The words are contrasted also in *Gorg.* 523 A; *Laws*, ii. 664 A; *Phaed.* 61 B; *Rep.* iii. 398 B.
- Zeller (*Plato and the Older Academy*, Eng. Trans. p. 160, n. 23) gives a complete list of the myths to be found in the writings of Plato. Besides the *Timaeus*, which is mythic in treatment throughout, and the present myth, the more important are—the accounts of “the last things” in *Rep.* x. 614 B ff., *Phaedo*, 107 D ff., *Gorgias*, 523 A ff.; the description of the soul’s nature and the heavenly regions in *Phaedr.* 246 A ff.; the story of the world’s life in *Politic.* 268 E ff. In general, the nature, history, and future of the soul, or the origin of the material world and its inhabitants, were the subjects of the mythus, for which Plato’s system provided no adequate explanation while the data were necessarily few. His unfixed speculations were embodied in the mythus because its poetical form

lent itself to a vaguer delineation of his beliefs, the details of which might be filled in by fuller knowledge. About the essential truth of the teaching so conveyed Plato felt no doubts: ἄκουε δὴ, he says when introducing the myth in the *Gorgias*, μάλα καλοῦ λόγου, ὃν σὺ μὲν ἠγήσει μῦθον, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον· ὡς ἀληθῆ γὰρ ὄντα σοι λέξω ἃ μέλλω λέγειν; in the *Politicus* the story is a "fairly credible tale," and the words with which he concludes the mythus in the *Phaedo* are: τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα δυσχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἐγὼ διελήλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρί· ὅτι μέντοι ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ τοιαῦτ' ἅττα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις, . . . τοῦτο καὶ πρέπει μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεῦσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν.

320 C. Λόγω διεξεληθών; So BT; Cobet (*Var. Lect.* 91), followed by Schanz, changes it to διεξέλθω, since the present would be more regular than the aorist participle here. However, the meaning of the aorist participle is so unfixed that this is not sufficient ground for upsetting the MS. reading, and in *Theaetet.* 167 D occurs a very parallel expression, ἀμφισβήτει λόγῳ ἀντιδιεξεληθών. Kroschel observes that any such alteration weakens the emphasis intended to be laid on ἐπιδείξω.

ἦν γὰρ ποτε χρόνος. The preface answers to our "Once upon a time": cp. *Timaeus*, 23 C, ἦν γὰρ δὴ ποτε, ὦ Σόλων, ὑπὲρ τὴν μεγίστην φθορὰν ὕδασι κ.τ.έ.; Theocr. *Id.* vii. 1, ἦν χρόνος, ἀνίκ' ἐγὼ κ.τ.έ.; Achilles Tattus, ii. 11, ἦν γὰρ χρόνος, ὅτε τῆς πορφύρας ὁ κόσμος ἀνθρώποις ἀπόρρητος ἦν.

320 D. γῆς ἔνδον. Krueger (ii. 47, 29, 3) says that ἔνδον with gen. is found in prose only in this passage and in the phrase ἔνδον εἶναι αὐτοῦ (*Antiphon*, 5, 45), which appears to belong more to the older poetic Attic. Much of the phraseology of this myth, indeed, is poetic, as ἰσχὺν ἀνευ τάχους προσῆπτεν, ἄοπλον φύσιν, σμικρότητι ἠμπισχεν, πτηνὸν φυγῆν, γένος ἀίστωθείη, ὀλιγογονίαν προσῆψε, σωτηρίαν τῷ γένει πορίζων, τὴν ἔμπυρον τέχνην, θείας μετέσχε μοίρας, etc.

ἐκ γῆς καὶ πυρὸς μίξαντες. *Timaeus*, 42 E, the created gods μιμούμενοι τὸν σφέτερον δημιουργόν, πυρὸς καὶ γῆς ὕδατος τε καὶ ἀέρος ἀπὸ τοῦ κόσμου δανειζόμενοι μόρια, ὡς ἀποδοθησόμενα πάλιν, εἰς ταῦτόν τὰ λαμβανόμενα συνεκβάλλων; Hor. *Od.* 1, 16, 13-16, where Orelli says that this portion of the fable is unknown to Homer and Hesiod.

τῶν ὄσα πυρὶ καὶ γῆ κεράννυται. Compare Ritter and Preller, *Historia Philosophiae*, n. 19 (Anaximenes) and n. 131 b, 135 (Empedocles), where similar instances of the passing of elements into one another are given, and fire and earth mentioned as the two poles between which air and water lie. The article used as a demonstrative is frequent before relatives in Plato only (Krueger, 50, 1, 20): see Heind. *ad Plat. Soph.* 241 E, περὶ τεχνῶν τῶν ὄσαι περὶ ταῦτά εἰσι, where *Rep.* v. 469 B, and vi. 510 A are referred to, and Stallbaum on *Phaedo*, 75 B.

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Xen. *Hell.* vi. 1, 6, νόσων θεραπειαῖς καὶ περὶ ταφὰς κόσμῳ; Sallust, *De Cat. Con.* 3, quae sibi quisque facilia factu putat aequo animo accipit, supra ea veluti ficta pro falsis ducit.

321 B. ἔστι δ' οἷς. So 346 E, ἔστιν οὖς; but 342 E, εἰσὶν οἷ, which is the more usual Attic form of the *nominative*. See, however, Krueger, 61, 5, 3, and Xen. *Anab.* v. 10, 6 (vi. 2, 6), ἔστι δ' οἷ καὶ Ξενοφῶντα (προὔβαλλοντο).

ὀλιγογονίαν . . . πολυγονίαν. This and many other reflexions in the myth are accepted as facts by modern science.

οὐ πάνυ τι σοφὸς ὢν. "Not being very wise." For the meaning of οὐ πάνυ and πάνυ οὐ, consult Shilleto *ad* Thucyd. i. 3, 2, Thompson on *Gorg.* 457 E, and especially Note C to E. M. Cope's *Translation of the Gorgias*, pp. 139-146, all of whom, in opposition to Donaldson's statement that οὐ πάνυ means "altogether not," agree that, though it may mean this, it frequently means "not altogether."

τὰς δυνάμεις. After this T has εἰς τὰ ἄλογα: Ficinus *in bruta*. No modern editor inserts it against the authority of B.

321 C. ὅ τι χρήσαιτο. "Ὅ τι is the adverbial accusative, αὐτῷ being understood: cp. *Lysis*, 213 C; *Rep.* ii. 368 B, ὅσῳ δὲ μᾶλλον πιστεύω, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἀπορῶ, ὅ τι χρήσωμαι; Xen. *Cyrop.* v. 5, 1, ὅπως περὶ τῶν φρουρίων ὧν εἰλήφεσαν, βουλευσάιντο, ὅ τι χρήσάιντο.

ἐμμελῶς πάντων ἔχοντα. The genitive of general connexion: *Phileb.* 62 A, οὗτος ἰκανῶς ἐπιστήμης ἔξει; *Phaed.* 108 A; *Rep.* v. 456 D, πῶς ἔχεις δόξης τοῦ τοιοῦδε πέρι; Thuc. iii. 92, 5, with another word than ἔχειν; *Rep.* iv. 421 C; Thuc. i. 36, 2, τῆς τε γὰρ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας καλῶς παράπλου κεῖται; Eur. *Alc.* 291, καλῶς ἦκον βίου.

321 D. ἐχόμενος. So T: B σχόμενος (with mark of error). Heindorf, the Zürich edd., Schanz, and Kroschel read as in text. There seems no reason for deserting the best accredited reading: σχόμενος (adopted by Orelli, Sauppe, Deuschle) is mostly found in the passive sense in compounds. See Schanz, *Nov. Comm.* p. 31.

εὖροι. The oblique form in historic sequence of the deliberative subjunctive.

τὴν ἔντεχνον σοφίαν σὺν πυρὶ. Cp. Aesch. *P. V.* 109, πυρὸς | πηγῆν κλοπαίαν, ἧ διδάσκαλος τέχνης | πάσης βροτοῖς πέφυκε. In the *Politicus* (274 C) Prometheus is said to have given fire to mortals, Hephaestus and Athene the arts. The meaning of the phrase in the text is illustrated by the words below τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον σοφίαν (the arts which attend to physical wants), which are opposed to ἡ πολιτικὴ σοφία.

ἔσχε. "Came into possession of": εἶχε = "was in possession of."

τὴν ἀκρόπολιν. Olympus is regarded, after Homer, as built like any other Grecian town, though inhabited by gods.

οὐκέτι ἐνεχώρει. He had no longer *time* to go to Zeus' palace, besides the fact that it was guarded, so he went into the workshop of Hephaestus and Athene which was nearer.

- 321 D. αἱ Διὸς φυλακαί. Hesiod, *Theogon.* 385, Κράτος and Βία, children of Styx ; Aesch. *P. V.* 12.
- 321 E. εἰς δὲ τὸ τῆς κ.τ.έ. This action has already been referred to above, κλέπτει Ἡφαιστοῦ καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς κ.τ.έ. As is seen *passim* in the Old Testament, the ancients paid less attention to strictness of sequence in narration than we do.
- 322 A. δι' Ἐπιμηθέα. Epimetheus' want of foresight was the original cause. Schanz and Sauppe needlessly reject the words. **θείας μετέσχε μοίρας.** "Shared the privilege of gods" : Genesis iii. 5, 22.
- διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ συγγένειαν.** So BT foll. by Heindorf and previous edd. Schanz and Deuschle strike out the words, and Hermann strikes out τοῦ θεοῦ, Kroschel altering to τῶν θεῶν. No offence need be found with the singular, whether τοῦ θεοῦ is generic, like ὁ ἄνθρωπος above, or refers to Ζεὺς. Nor is it an objection that the words repeat *θείας μετέσχε μοίρας* ; and to those who, on the contrary, argue that the words are unwarranted by any previous statement, it may be replied that the adj. *συγγενής* often means no more than "of like kind."
- ἔπειτα.** As usual after *πρῶτον μὲν* : Thuc. i. 121, 2 ; *Rep.* i. 337 E, viii. 545 B.
- φωνὴν καὶ ὀνόματα διηρθρώσατο.** "Produced articulate language," the art which Prometheus had given him directing his natural capacities.
- 322 B. ὅτ' οὖν ἀθροισθεῖεν. "In all cases where they were collected together."
- δείσας περὶ τῷ γένει ἡμῶν.** Contrast 320 A, *δεδιῶς περὶ αὐτοῦ*. See Heindorf ad *Euthyd.* 275 B, *φοβούμεθα δὴ περὶ αὐτοῦ* ; *Theaetet.* 148 C, *θάρρει τοίνυν περὶ σαντῶ* ; *Phaed.* 114 D, *τούτων δὴ ἔνεκα θαρρεῖν χρὴ περὶ τῆ αὐτοῦ ψυχῇ ἄνδρα*. There seems no difference in meaning between the constructions.
- 322 C. αἰδῶ τε καὶ δίκην. Mentioned in conjunction in Hesiod ("Ἔργα καὶ Ἡμέραι, 192, of the people in the iron age, *δίκη δ' ἐν χερσὶ καὶ αἰδῶς | οὐκ ἔσται*) and Theognis (291, 2, *αἰδῶς μὲν γὰρ ὄλωλεν, ἀναιδείη δὲ καὶ ὕβρις | νικήσασα δίκην γῆν κατὰ πᾶσαν ἔχει*), and the poetical expressions, *πόλεων κῶσμοι τε καὶ δεσμοὶ φιλίας συναγωγοί*, require little alteration to turn them into a hexameter. The last two words should be taken together as in *Timaeus*, 31 C, *δεσμὸν . . . ἐν μέσῳ δεῖ τινὰ ἀμφοῖν ξυναγωγὸν γίγνεσθαι*.
- τίνα οὖν τρόπον δόλη.** Δόλη is the historic sequence of the deliberative subjunctive. For οὖν retained in *orat. obliq.* cp. *Sympos.* 219 D, *ὥστε οὐθ' ὅπως οὖν ὀργιζομένην εἶχον* : ἀρα is used in the same way, *Phaedr.* 228 D ; *Menex.* 240 D. The vivacity of the reproduced dialogue of which this particle is an indication leads to a relapse into the *or. rect.* below. Cobet's suggestion δῶ for δόλη, however, is needless, as Heind. *ad loc.* gives other instances of the transition : cp. 320 D, 325 D, 338 B.
- καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοί.** Sc. πολλοῖς ἕκαστος ἰδιώταις ἱκανοὶ εἰσὶ.

- 322 C. ἐπὶ πάντας.** This is inconsistent with the view that people can be ἄδικοι and that virtue is communicable by teaching. Possibly Plato purposely puts the inconsistency in the mouth of a sophist.
- 322 D. νόσον πόλεως.** Aesch. *P. V.* 1068, τοὺς προδότας γὰρ μισεῖν ἔμαθον, | κούκ ἔστι νόσος, | τῆσδ' ἦντιν' ἀπέπτυσσα μᾶλλον.
- Ἀθηναῖοι.** Used generically without the article: cp. *Rep.* iii. 406 A, τῆ νῦν ἰατρικῇ πρὸ τοῦ Ἀσκληπιάδαι οὐκ ἐχρῶντο; Xen. *Sympros.* iv. 47, Ἕλληνες καὶ βάρβαροι θεοὺς ἡγοῦνται πάντα εἰδέναι.
- ἢ λόγος.** More ordinarily ὁ λόγος (see Heind. *ad loc.*), but in meaning it is merely a difference between "when the discussion is upon, etc." and "when there is a discussion upon, etc."
- 323 A. ἦν δεῖ διὰ δικαιοσύνης πᾶσαν ἰέναι.** Which must proceed within the limits, must follow the path of, must be argued on the ground of justice and prudence: *Laws*, i. 632 C, ὁ θεὸς τοὺς νόμους ἅπασιν τούτοις φύλακας ἐπιστήσει, τοὺς μὲν διὰ φρονήσεως, τοὺς δὲ δι' ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἰόντας; compare phrases like δι' ἐχθρας γίγνεσθαι, and those compounded with πορεύεσθαι, ἐλθεῖν διὰ.
- ἢ μὴ εἶναι πόλεις.** Compare 323 C; here some word like ἀναγκαῖον must be supplied out of προσῆκον, as in *Phaedr.* 245 D, τοῦτο δὲ οὐτ' ἀπόλλυσθαι οὔτε γίγνεσθαι δυνατόν, ἢ πάντα τε οὐρανὸν πᾶσάν τε γένεσιν συμπεσοῦσαν στῆναι; 271 D; *Parmen.* 164 C, τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἔτι λείπεται ἢ μηδένοσ εἶναι ἄλλοις; *Soph. O. C.* 1402. See Stallb. on *Rep.* v. 463 D.
- ὡς τῶ ὄντι ἡγοῦνται.** Connect with ἀπατάσθαι (as Heind.), not with τεκμήριον (Sauppe, Kroschel, Deuschle), which is at too great a distance, though 324 C shows the possibility of so doing: "That you may not think you are being deceived about the real fact that all men imagine," etc. Cp. *Cratyl.* 413 D, ἴσως γὰρ ἂν σε καὶ τὰ ἐπίλοιπα ἐξαπατήσαιμι ὡς οὐκ ἀκηκοὺς λέγω; *Rep.* i. 345 A, ἐμέ γε οὐ πείθει ὡς ἔστι τῆσ δικαιοσύνης κερδαλεώτερον.
- 323 B. ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ.** "Where it is a case of being just."
ἐάν τινα . . . ἐὰν οὗτος. Cp. 311 B for the accumulation of conditions.
- ἐκεῖ . . . ἐνταῦθα.** Cp. *Gorg.* 459 B, τοῦτο ἐνταῦθά γε συμβαίνει; *Sympr.* 187 C, τὴν δὲ ὁμολογίαν πᾶσιν τούτοις, ὡσπερ ἐκεῖ ἢ ἰατρικῇ, ἐνταῦθα ἢ μουσικῇ ἐντίθησιν. For the ellipse of ἡγοῦνται after *μανίαν*, Heind. quotes *Rep.* viii. 550 E.
- προσποιούμενον.** Ast quotes no other instances of the simple accusative as object; ordinarily the verb is followed by an infinitive or object clause. The primary meaning, however, *sibi arrogare*, makes the construction here natural; it is found sparingly in other authors.
- ὡς ἀναγκαῖον.** Thompson, on *Gorg.* 495 C, ὡς ἕτερον τὴν ἀνδρείαν τῆσ ἐπιστήμησ, δύο ταῦτα ἔλεγεσ; proposes to insert *δν*; but see Stallb. on *Rep.* ii. 358 C, ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ὡς

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Greek legends *passim*; cp. Aesch. *Choeph.* 313, δράσαντι παθεῖν, τριγέρων μῦθος τάδε φωνεῖ.

324 C. τιμωροῦνται δὲ καὶ κολάζονται. Distinguished in Arist. *Rhet.* i. 10, 17, διαφέρει δὲ τιμωρία καὶ κόλασις· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κόλασις τοῦ πάσχοντος ἕνεκά ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ τιμωρία τοῦ ποιούντος ἵνα ἀποπληρώθῃ; but often combined without any apparent distinction, as in Demosth. 9, 45, and Arist. *Eth. Nic.* iii. 7 (5). For the unusual present middle of κολάζεσθαι cp. Ar. *Vesp.* 405, νῦν ἐκείνο, νῦν ἐκείνο τοῦξύθυμον, ᾧ κολαζόμεσθα, κέντρον ἐντέτατ' ὀξύ.

Ἀθηναῖοι. See note on 322 D.

εἰσι τῶν ἡγουμένων. Cp. *Euthyd.* 277 C, τῶν λαμβανόντων ἄρ' εἰσὶν οἱ μανθάνοντες; Xen. *Cyrop.* i. 2, 15, οἳ ἂν ἐν τοῖς τελείοις διαγένωνται ἀνεπίληπτοι, οὗτοι τῶν γεραιτέρων γίγνονται; *Rep.* ii. 367 C. See Krueger, 47, 9, 2.

ἀποδέχονται. Cp. 337 C, 339 D below; *Laws*, i. 634 C, πρῶως ἀποδεχόμεθα ἀλλήλων. In *Phaed.* 96 E, ὅς γε οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι ἑμαυτοῦ οὐδὲ ὡς, ἐπειδὴν ἐνὶ τις προσθῆ ἔν, ἡ τὸ ἐν ᾧ προσετέθη δύο γέγονεν, κ.τ.έ., the explanation of the idiom is seen, the genitive denoting the person from whom some statement is accepted.

324 D. ἔτι δὴ. The same combination introduces the last section of a discussion in *Euthyd.* 277 D.

λοιπὴ ἀπορία. Heind., whom Kroschel follows, inserts ἡ. This is not necessary, even if the reference is directly to 319 E, for Sauppe quotes instances in which the article is omitted with a substantive to which a relative clause is attached, as *Rep.* iii. 413 E, φύλαξ αὐτοῦ ὧν ἀγαθὸς καὶ μουσικῆς ἧς ἐμάνθανεν (see note on 314 E, ἄνθρωπος). We avoid all difficulty, however, by translating "There is still a difficulty remaining."

διδάσκουσιν. For διδάσκονται ("get them taught") as παιδεύω in 320 A, and *Meno*, 94 B, cp. Xen. *Anab.* i. 4, 10, Κῦρος δ' αὐτὸν (τὸν παραδείσον) ἐξέκοψεν. See Krueger, 52, 1, 4. Heind. refers to Porson *ad Eur. Med.* 297.

ἃ διδασκάλων ἔχεται. See 319 E, and cp. ὅσα τέχνης ἔχεται in *Meno*, 94 B.

οὐδενὸς βελτίους. So 335 A. More ordinarily with words implying inferiority, as οὐδενὸς δεύτερος, ὑστερος, ἥσων, ἐλάττων, ἐνδεής, as in English we only say, "second to none": cp. however, Demosth. 2, 17, οὐδένων εἰσὶ βελτίους.

οὐκέτι μῦθον. At 322 D his discourse had already abandoned the myth form, but he has since been engaged on deductions from it. He is now professing to treat the subject scientifically.

324 E. οὐ ἀναγκαῖον. The omission of the verb ἐστι is unusual, as is that of εἰσι in ἦν δὲ αὐτοὶ ἀρετὴν ἀγαθοί above. Krueger, 62, 1, 3 and 4.

εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν. The sentence is a close imitation of the oral delivery in its accumulated conditions, its resumptions, and the tendency of the subordinate sentences to usurp the place of the principal.

- 324 E. οὐ τεκτονική. The negative belongs to the word and not to the sentence, or it would be μή.
- 325 A. καὶ μετὰ τούτου πάντ' ἄνδρα. For μεθ' οὗ πάντ' ἄνδρα κ.τ.έ., in accordance with the usual Greek idiom noticed on 313 B and 315 A.
- 325 B. οὕτω δ' αὐτοῦ πεφυκότος. "This being the nature of it," *i.e.* of virtue.
- ὡς θαυμάσιοι γίνονται. The MS. reading is ὡς θαυμασίως γίνονται which can only be translated, as Heindorf has seen, *quam miris modis boni in civitate existunt*. This meaning, however, is quite foreign to the context; and the expressions which Sauppe quotes to prove that θαυμασίως γίνονται differs little from θαυμάσιοι γίν., such as ἡδέως, καλῶς γίνεσθαι from Plutarch, and θαυμασίως πέφυκε from *Phaed.* 60 B, are not conclusive. Schanz, Kroschel, Deuschle, read θαυμάσιοι; Schleiermacher, θαυμάσιοί σοι. The common phrase ὡς θαυμασίως might easily have been written by a copyist's mistake.
- ἐφ' ὧν. Heind. ἐφ' ᾧ. The plural, ταῦτα δ' ἄρα is against the change, and the genitive may be defended (1) as a pleasant variation after ἐφ' οἷς, and (2) as more adequately expressing the connection of the punishment with (not actual crime, but) ignorance of what is right: tr. "Things in the case of which," etc.: cp. *Laws*, vii. 793 E, for the same variation, ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν δούλων γ' ἐλέγομεν, . . . ταῦτόν δραστέον τοῦτό γε καὶ ἐπ' ἐλευθέροισι; Krueger, 68, 40, 5; Thompson, p. 321.
- ἢ τε ζημία θάνατος. The article is added because it is "the customary penalty." The position of τε, after ζημία instead of θάνατος, is irregular. Such a displacement, common enough in the rugged style of Thucydides, is not frequent in Plato: compare, however, 336 C, below; *Gorg.* 460 D, ἐὰν ὁ πύκτης τῇ πυκτικῇ μὴ καλῶς χρῆται τε καὶ ἀδικῇ; *Apol.* 18 D, σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενον τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν μηδενὸς ἀποκρινόμενον; *Rep.* v. 470 C.
- 325 C. ξυλλήβδην. Hirschig omits this word; it is certainly cumbrous in conjunction with ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν: tr. however, "so to speak, the subversion of houses generally."
- ταῦτα δ' ἄρα. For the iterative δέ see note on 313 B above. For the ἄρα see Heind. ad *Phaedo*, 68 A; and *Meno*, 91 E, *Phileb.* 30 B (where also it is combined with the iterative δέ); *Laws*, xi. 931 C; *Apol.* 34 C, 37 D; *Rep.* ix. 589 E; x. 600 C. It is used in this regretful sense (*animi dolorem significat*, Cobet quoted by Shilleto on Thuc. i. 69, 8) as early as Homer; *Od.* xvii. 454, ᾧ πόποι, οὐκ ἄρα σοὶ γ' ἐπὶ εἶδει καὶ φρένες ἦσαν. The combination δ' ἄρα (where δέ answers regularly to μέν) is common in Plato; for its usage consult Stallb. ad *Rep.* iv. 445 A, who remarks, *Concludit a minore ad maius; in qua conclusionis forma, μέν . . . δ' ἄρα frequentatur*.
- οἴεσθαί γε χρή. Sc. "that they do get them taught these

things." It is a common formula, often used where the speaker is answering himself: cp. *Crito*, 53 D, 54 B; *Phaed.* 68 B.

- 325 C. ἐκ παίδων σμικρῶν ἀρξάμενοι. *Hipp. Mai.* 296 C, κακὰ δέ γε πολὺ πλείω ποιοῦσιν ἢ ἀγαθὰ πάντες ἄνθρωποι, ἀρξάμενοι ἐκ παίδων. For notices on Greek education see R. L. Nettleship's Essay in *Hellenica*, pp. 88 ff.; Bekker's *Charicles; Laws*, i. 643 A-C, vii. 809 E-812 A; Introd. to Mr. Warren's *Republic*, i.-v., pp. xlvi. ff. Plato while attaching his own interpretation to it passes a favourable verdict upon the traditional system which was intended to produce the *mens sana in corpore sano*: *Rep.* ii. 376 E, τίς οὖν ἡ παιδεία; ἢ χαλεπὸν εὐρεῖν βελτίω τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ χρόνου εὐρημένης; μέχρι οὐπὲρ ἂν ζῶσι. "So long as the persons to be educated live": cp. below, 326 C; Kroschel, however, understands, "so long as the good fathers live." For illustration of the phrase which should mean "until" compare the corresponding employment of ἕως. Shilleto, on *Thuc.* i. 90, 3, remarks that, "whereas *we* have now a marked distinction between *while* and *until*, the Greeks and Romans had the same words ἕως, ἔστε, μέχρι or μεχριπερ, *dum*, *donec*, the tenses following alone fixing the meaning of the particles." He points out a similar indifference in Elizabethan English: *Stow's Annales*, p. 574, "In the feast of the Purification (A.D. 1416) seven dolphins of the sea came up the river Thames, and plaid there whiles four of them were killed."
- ἐπειδὴν θᾶπτον. For ἐπειδὴν τάχιστα: cp. *Alcib. I.* 105 A, εἰθ' ἂν θᾶπτον (*cum primum*) εἰς τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον παρέλθης; pseudo-*Plat. Ep.* vii. 324 B, εἰ θᾶπτον ἐμαντοῦ γενομένην κύριος; *Xen. Cyrop.* iii. 3, 20, ἦν τὰ τῶν θεῶν ἡμῖν θᾶπτον συγκαταινῆ, ἐξίωμεν ὡς τάχιστα.
- 325 D. ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος. BT omit ὡς (and so Schanz and Sauppe), but it is inserted by the second hand of T (Heind. Kroschel, Deuschle). It seems necessary to the sense, and might easily have fallen out after the similar termination of ὅπως.
- παρ' ἑκάστον. So παρ' αὐτὰ τὰ ἀδικήματα quoted by Heind. from Demosth. = *eo ipso tempore quo peccaverint*.
- τὰ μὲν ποιεῖ. So B: τάδε μὲν . . . τάδε δέ T, which is due to the influence of the previous clause. The reading in the text (adopted by all modern editors) avoids monotony.
- εἰάν μὲν ἐκῶν πείθηται. See on 311 D: here εὐ ἔχει may be supplied.
- εἰς διδασκάλων πέμποντες. At the age of ten, is Plato's own recommendation: *Laws*, vii. 809 E.
- 325 E. ἐπιμελίσθαι εὐκοσμίαι. See *Juv. Sat.* vii. *ad fin.*
- γραμματῶν. Reading and writing: κιθαρίσις = singing and playing.
- ὥσπερ τότε. On the other occasion, *i.e.* ἐπειδὴν θᾶπτον συνιῆ τις τὰ λεγόμενα. *Phileb.* 38 E, δ τότε δόξαν ἐκάλουμεν; below, 355 E, and frequently.
- ἐπὶ τῶν βάθρων. See on 315 C. In Demosth. *De Coron.* p. 313,

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however, necessary to the sense, and would naturally have dropped out.

- 326 C.** τῆς ἡλικίας. To be joined with *πρωτατα*, as in phrases like *πύρρῳ τῶν νύκτων*, *Symp.* 217 D ; *τῆς ὥρας ἐγίγνετο ὄψέ*, *Dem.* 21, 84 ; *Krueger*, 47, 10, 4 ; *Thompson*, p. 85.
- ἐκ διδασκάλων ἀπαλλαγῶσιν. "Get free of masters" : *Cratyl.* 408 D, *ἀπαλλαγῶμεν ἐκ τῶν θεῶν*, and *ib.* 407 D. It is not necessary with Sauppe to suppose an ellipse as with *εἰς διδασκάλων* ; the verb does not then suit so well.
- 326 D.** [κατὰ παράδειγμα.] Expunged by Schanz, Sauppe, and Kroschel. Wayte retains it, quoting passages to illustrate the absence of *ὡς*, and Deuschle follows ; Heind. reads *καθάπερ παράδειγμα*. The objection that the laws are not so much example as exemplar is not weighty, as the two meanings run into one another so much ; and that the word is here used in an unusual sense is an argument against its being a gloss.
- ὑπογράψαντες γραμμάς. "Ruling lines for guidance," not as understood by Seneca, *Ep.* 94, § 51 ; *Quintil.* i. 1, 27, and v. 14, 31 (*literae praeformatae*), of tracing letters (*γράμματα*) for the boy's pen to follow. For the use of the word in the same connection as here, see *Laws*, v. 734 E, *νόμους πολιτείας ὑπογράφειν*. In composition *ὑπό* is not unfrequently used of "laying something down as a basis" ; cp. *ὑφηγέομαι* : *ὑποκρούω* (give time by beating) : *ὑποσημαίνω* *σάλπιγγι* : *ὑποτείνω* ; *Gorg.* 448 E, *ὡσπερ τὰ ἔμπροσθέν σοι ὑπετείνατο Χαιρεφῶν*, and *Theaet.* 179 D ; see note on *ὑπειπεῖν*, 343 E.
- ὡς δέ. "Ὠς is a rare form in Attic prose, chiefly used (1) in combinations with *οὐδέ*, *μηδέ*, *καί* ; (2) in the phrase *ὡς οὖν*, 338 A, below ; *Thuc.* iii. 37, 5 ; (3) in answer to a preceding *ὡς* as here, and *Rep.* vii. 530 D. The *δέ* (see 328 A) is interposed irregularly after it, as after *ὡσαύτως* in *Phaed.* 72 C, where Heind. quotes *Soph.* 258 C ; *Cratyl.* 394 B, 425 C ; *Soph. Ant.* 426, *El.* 27, *Trach.* 116. It is a trace of the simpler co-ordinating tendency of earlier literature, *Jelf*, § 770 *b* ; *Krueger*, 25, 10, 11.
- εὐθύναι. Properly only the official examination of a magistrate at Athens on leaving office. Here, in reference to 325 D, *ὡσπερ ξύλον διαστρεφόμενον καὶ καμπτόμενον εὐθύνουσιν ἀπειλαῖς καὶ πληγαῖς*, extended to all correction by punishment.
- 326 E.** εἰ διδακτόν ἐστίν ἀρετή. And yet, as Sauppe points out, Protag. has only shown that it is *thought to be* teachable.
- ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν. 324 E.
- τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, τῆς ἀρετῆς. Schanz (*Nov. Comm.* p. 70) compares *Euthyd.* 274 E.
- 327 A.** ἰδιωτεύειν. In opposition to *δημιουργόν τούτου τοῦ πράγματος*. The verb is joined here with a genitive of general connection ; cp. the construction of the substantive, *Timaeus*, 20 A, *Κριτῶν δέ που πάντες οἱ τῆδ' ἴσμεν οὐδενὸς ἰδιώτην ὄντα ὦν λέγομεν* ; below, 345 A, *λατρικῆς ἰδιώται*. In *Laws*, xi. 916 B ;

Soph. 221 C, there is the same antithesis between *ιδιώτης* and *δημιουργός*, or *τέχνην τινα ἔχων*.

327 A. *καὶ τοῦτο*. That is *καὶ (εἰ) τοῦτο κ.τ.έ.*, the apodosis coming, after the resumptive *εἰ οὖν οὕτω*, at *οἷε ἄν*.

πάντα . . . τὸν μὴ καλῶς αὐλοῦντα. Governed by the combined expression, *ἐδίδασκε καὶ ἐπέπληττε*, and not by *ἐπέπληττε*, which in prose and, with one or two exceptions, in verse takes the dative. For similar instances cp. below, 327 A, *τῶν νομίμων οὐδεὶς φθονεῖ οὐδ' ἀποκρύπτεται ὡσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνημάτων*; *Gorg.* 460 D, *μὴ τῷ διδάξαντι ἐγκαλεῖν μηδὲ ἐξελαύνειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι*. Shilleto on *Thuc.* i. 39, 1 (cp. iii. 68, 2) supplies interesting instances in *Plant. Aulul.* ii. 3, 3, *Vascula intus pure propera atque elue*; *Ter. Adelph.* v. 7, 19, *Tu illas abi et traduce*; *St. Mark*, i. 7, "The latchet of whose shoes I am not worthy to stoop down and unloose"; where the original does not suggest such a rendering. Add *Soph. El.* 709, 710; *Antig.* 1280; and consult Riddell's *Digest*, §§ 301, 302.

327 B. *οἷε ἄν τι, ἔφη, μᾶλλον*. For the position of *τι* cp. *Xen. Cyrop.* i. 6, 11, *οἷε τι, ἔφη, ἦττον τοῦτο εἶναι αἰσχρόν*;

327 C. *οἷου ἔτυχεν*. "Whoever a man's father was, if he was apt by nature."

ἐλλόγιμος. Proleptic: cp. *Rep.* iv. 424 E, *ἐννόμους τε καὶ σπουδαίους ἐξ αὐτῶν ἄνδρας αὐξάνεσθαι*; so with *τρέφειν*, *ib.* x. 606 B, *θρέψαντα γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνοις ἰσχυρὸν τὸ ἐλεεινὸν οὐ ῥάδιον ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῦ πάθεσι κατέχειν*; viii. 565 C, *τοῦτον τρέφειν τε καὶ αὔξειν μέγαν*. Heindorf on this passage gives many other instances: see Krueger, 57, 4, 1-3; Jelf, § 439, 2.

ἀλλ' οὖν αὐληταί γ' ἄν. Corrected for *αὐληταί γοῦν* of BT, independently by Shilleto, Nattmann, Hirschig; the *ἄν* is required and *γοῦν* here would be ugly and superfluous. For *ἀλλ' οὖν . . . γε*, introducing what, in spite of possible objections to the rest of a preceding statement, is undoubted, Stallb. quotes *Soph.* 254 C, *ἀλλ' οὖν λόγου γε ἐνδεεῖς μηδὲν γιγνώμεθα*; *Aeschin. Or.* 3, 11, *ἀλλ' οὖν προβάλλεται γέ τι πρὸ τῆς αἰσχύνης*; for other instances, and *ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ . . . γε*, see Ast, *Lex.* i. p. 103, and compare *ἄταρ οὖν δὴ . . . γε*, *Politic.* 269 D.

ἱκανοὶ ὡς πρὸς τοὺς ιδιώτας. *Soph. O. T.* 1118, *πιστὸς ὡς νομεὺς ἀνὴρ*.

οὕτως οἷου καὶ νῦν. Sauppe, *ῶου κἂν νῦν*, which is not necessary. The sense is, So be assured, as matters are, the most unjust man is just, supposing he were matched against men uncivilised. For the irregularity cp. *Apol.* 19 E, *τοῦτό γέ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἴ τις οἶός τ' εἴη παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους ὡσπερ Γοργίας τε κ.τ.έ.*

τῶν ἐν νόμοις καὶ ἀνθρώποις. BT, foll. by Sauppe, Kroschel, Deuschle. Schanz, *ἐν ἐννόμοις ἀνθρώποις*; Cobet, *ἐν νομίμοις ἀνθρώποις*. There is no need for correction: *ἄνθρωποι*, partaking of virtue *ex hypothesi*, 323 C, are fittingly coupled with *νόμοις*, and the combination is opposed to *ἄγριοι*.

327 D. οἷς μήτε παιδεία ἐστὶν . . . ἀλλ' εἶεν ἄγριοί τινες. For ἀλλ' οἷ εἶεν : see above, on 313 B, 315 A, 325 A, and add Thuc. v. 2, 4. In the first part of the clause ἐστὶ is not attracted, as is usual, into the optative, see on 318 B, but the optative reappears in the latter part where the necessary condition is most obviously expressed.

οἷους περ πέρυσιν. So Schanz. BT, οἷοι περ οὖς πέρυσιν ; retained by Heind., Hirschig (who compares *Cratyl.* 432 E, ἵνα κομιδῇ ἢ τοιοῦτον οἷον περ οὖ ὄνομά ἐστιν), Kroschel and Deuschle. Sauppe reads οἷους πέρυσιν, explaining the MSS. reading as the result of writing οἷοι οὖς over οἷους, so that the οὖς extended over the first syll. of πέρυσιν. Athenaeus, quoting the passage, reads οἷους.

Φερεκράτης. A poet of the Old Comedy (Donaldson's *Theatre of the Greeks*, p. 170), first exhibited with success in 438 B.C. Eighteen of his plays are recognised by the Alexandrian canon. In this play, the "Ἄγριοι, produced 421 B.C., possibly the savages were intended to represent the demoralised and degraded condition to which the war was tending to reduce the Athenians (Steinh. and Müller, i. p. 504). Men who, from hatred of their own kind, had fled to the "Ἄγριοι found that the worst of those they had left were preferable.

ἐπὶ Ληναίῳ. This cannot mean, directly, "at the Lenaea," for which the Greek name is Διονύσια τὰ ἐπὶ Ληναίῳ or τὰ Λήναια, but only, "at the Lenaeum," i.e. "at the enclosure sacred to Bacchus," the article being omitted as with ἐν ἄστει, etc. As this included the temple of Dionysus, which was (Donaldson's *Theatre of the Greeks*, p. 220) the regular place for all dramatic representations, Sauppe thinks that the phrase here is simply = "put on the stage." Considering, however, its special connection with the name for the second of the four great Dionysiac festivals, it is inconceivable that it should refer here to the production of a play at any but the Lenaeian festival. See Holden's *Lexicon Aristoph.* s.v. Λήναιον, and Hesychius ; Leake's *Topography of Athens*, pp. 137, 284.

ὥσπερ οἷ ἐν ἐκέλευ τῷ χορῷ μισάνθρωποι. It is better to suppose a slight irregularity in the order and to translate, "You, finding yourself in the middle of such men, as the misanthropes did in the middle of the chorus in that play, would be content," than to alter μισάνθρωποι in such a way (Heinrich, ἡμάνθρωποι ; Jacobs, μιξάνθρωποι ; Lehrs, μεσάνθρωποι) that it will be a synonym for "Ἄγριοι. Such a change is necessary if we render "Finding yourself among such men as the — in that chorus," for the chorus must (though Heind. thinks otherwise) have consisted of "Ἄγριοι, in accordance with the common nomenclature of plays, and they can hardly be described as μισάνθρωποι.

Εὐρυβάτω καὶ Φρυνώνδα. Proverbial scoundrels. Aeschin. in *Ctesiph.* p. 73, § 137, ἀλλ', οἷμαι, οὐτε Φρυνώνδας οὐτε Εὐρύβατος οὐτ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς πώποτε τῶν πάλαι πονήρων τοιοῦτος

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probable that the account here given is truer than Aristotle's, and that it was only when the pupil objected to pay the regular fee that recourse was had to this method of "payment by results." Thompson on *Gorg.* 520 C remarks, "our modern honoraria answer in theory to the suggestion"; cp. 519 C, and his note on 520 D.

- 328 B.** ἀποδέδωκεν. Bracketed by Schanz: omitted by Sauppe. Kroschel, ἀπέδωκεν, Deuschle as in the text. The perfect perhaps denotes rapidity; the action is complete before it can be described: Xen. *Cyrop.* iv. 2, 26, ὁ κρατῶν ἅμα πάντα συνήρπακεν; Plat. *Cratyl.* 432 B (with εὐθύς); Arist. *Plut.* 569 (co-ord. with present).
 ἐλθὼν εἰς ἱερόν. Aeschin. in *Timarch.*, λαβὼν εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ χεῖρα τὰ ἱερὰ καὶ ὀμόσας μὴ λαβεῖν δῶρα . . . εἰληφῶς ἠλέγχθη. See Smith's *Dict. of Antiqq.* p. 660 b, s.v. *jusjurandum*. Κατέθηκε = "he puts down": the gnomic aorist.
- 328 C.** οἱ Πολυκλείτου υἱεῖς. Nothing more is known of them.
 τῶνδε. Because they were present; see 314 E, 315 A. Heindorf says, *Addit haec adolescentium gratiae captator propter illa quae de iis supra Socrates dixerat*, referring to 319 E.
- 328 D.** ἐπιδειξάμενος. See on 320 C.
 ἐπὶ μὲν πολὺν χρόνον. Repeated in ἔτι and marking the continuance of the entranced gaze: cp. *Menex.* 235 B, οὕτως ἔναυλος ὁ λόγος τε καὶ ὁ φθόγγος παρὰ τοῦ λέγοντος ἐνδύεται εἰς τὰ ὦτα, ὥστε μόγις τετάρτη ἢ πέμπτη ἡμέρα ἀναμιμνήσκομαι ἑμαυτοῦ καὶ αἰσθάνομαι οὐ γῆς εἰμι. For ἐπὶ cp. 344 B; *Gorg.* 524 D; *Phaed.* 84 C. Schanz wishes to read ἔτι μὲν πολὺν χρόνον, striking out ἔτι before πρὸς.
 συναγείρας. *Charm.* 156 D, καὶ μοι κατὰ σμικρὸν πάλιν ἡ θρασύτης ξυνηγείρετο.
 ὦ παῖ Ἀπολλοδώρου. In mock deference; cp. 335 D, ὦ παῖ Ἴππονίκου; the ironical mood is evinced in the words νῦν δὲ πέπεισμαι, πλὴν σμικρὸν τι κ.τ.έ.
 ὦδε = δεῦρο. Photius and Suidas say that this is a Platonic usage, but Ast gives no other instance.
- 328 E.** ἐπεκδιδάξει. Schanz (*Nov. Comm.* p. 103) cites *Crito*, 44 D; *Rep.* i. 336 E; *Gorg.* 473 E; *Cratyl.* 399 A; *Euthyd.* 281 C, etc., for the alternation of a compound with a simple verb.
 καὶ γάρ. On the difficult question of the meaning of γάρ in these combinations see Shilleto on *Thuc.* i. 25, 4; Riddell's *Digest*, §§ 147-149; Krueger, 69, 32, 21. The sense here = *etenim*; Protagoras will explain, for while orators like books cannot answer questions, and like bells once struck go on sounding, he is able not only to make speeches but ἐρωτηθεὶς ἀποκρίνασθαι κατὰ βραχύ.
- 329 A.** καὶ τοιούτους λόγους. Sauppe, whom Schanz follows, proposes to insert τούτου since καὶ cannot belong in sense to τοιούτους nor by position to Περικλέους. That neither objection is sufficient to justify alteration of the MSS. reading will be seen by consulting Riddell's *Digest*, §§ 132 ff. The instances

there given, especially of the *intensive* *καί*, make it impossible to say that we may not translate “*precisely* such,” or that *καί* cannot be carried over to Περικλέους. Kroschel and Deuschle make no alteration.

329 A. εἰπεῖν. Instead of λέγειν: see Heindorf *ad loc.* and *Symp.* 177 E; *Phaedr.* 235 A; 239 A.

ὡσπερ βιβλία. *Phaedr.* 275 D, δεινὸν γάρ που, ὦ Φαῖδρε, τοῦτ' ἔχει γραφή, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁμοιον ζωγραφία· καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐκείνης ἔκγονα ἔστηκε μὲν ὡς ζῶντα, ἐὰν δ' ἀνέρη τι, σεμνῶς πάνυ σιγαῶ· ταῦτόν δὲ καὶ οἱ λόγοι· δόξαις μὲν ἂν ὡς τι φρονούντας αὐτοὺς λέγειν, ἐὰν δέ τι ἔρη τῶν λεγομένων βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, ἐν τι σημαίνει μόνον ταῦτόν αἰ.

χαλκία. So Dindorf, Sauppe, Kroschel; see L. and S. *s.v.* χαλκίον; Schanz, χαλκεῖα.

μακρὸν ἤχει καὶ ἀποτείνει. “Sound loud and long”: μακρὸν in the sense of “loud” qualifies ἤχει only; it is too harsh (with Wayte) to make it qualify ἀποτείνει also in the sense of “long.” Ἀποτείνω is used absolutely also in *Gorg.* 458 B, καὶ νῦν ἴσως πόρρω ἀποτενοῦμεν, ἣν διαλεγώμεθα.

καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες οὕτω. For οὕτω καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες, the emphasis being laid upon the personality of the ῥήτορες: cp. *Rep.* i. 354 B, ἀλλ' ὡσπερ οἱ λίχνοι τοῦ αἰὲ παραφερομένου ἀπογεύονται ἀρπάζοντες, καὶ ἐγὼ μοι δοκῶ οὕτω κ.τ.έ.; ix. 585 A; *Phaedr.* 230 D.

329 B. δολιχὸν κατατείνουσι τοῦ λόγου. So BT. The construction is difficult; it is hardly parallel to such expressions as συχνοὺς τείνω τῶν λόγων, *Gorg.* 519 E; ἀτοπα τῆς σμικρολογίας, *Theaetet.* 175 A; ἀμήχανον τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, *Apol.* 41 C; χαλεπὸν τοῦ βίου, *Rep.* i. 328 E. Perhaps we may take δολιχὸν κατατείνουσι together (κατατείνω being used absolutely, cp. *Rep.* ii. 358 D, 367 B) = “are long-winded,” and τοῦ λόγου as a genitive of general connection = “in their speech.” Stephanus, followed by Schanz, Sauppe, Kroschel, reads δόλιχον = “a long race,” cp. 335 E; but the metaphor is most unfitted to the context.

αὐτὸ δηλοῖ. BT αὐτά; corrected by Stephanus, whom later edd. follow; see note on 324 A. Heind., however, retains the MSS. reading, comparing Xen. *Cyrop.* vi. 1, 7, αὐτὰ τὰ ἔργα δεικνυσι; Soph. *O. T.* 341.

σμικροῦ τινος. Cp. *Lysis*, 215 E, λέγων ὡς ἄρα παντὸς δέοι τὸ ὁμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον εἶναι; *Cratyl.* 432 D, ὅσου ἐνδέουσιν αἱ εἰκόνες ταῦτ' ἔχειν ἐκείνοις ὧν εἰκόνες εἰσὶν; *Theaetet.* 158 A, πολλοῦ δεῖ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκάστω ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι; Xen. *Hell.* iv. 1, 36, τίνος ἂν δέοιο μὴ οὐχὶ πάμπαν εὐδαίμων εἶναι; see Krueger, 47, 16, 2 and 3; 55, 3, 4.

εἴπερ ἄλλω τῷ ἀνθρώπων πειθοίμην ἂν, καὶ σοι πείθομαι. So BT, and Heindorf, adducing *Meno*, p. 98 B, εἴπερ τι ἄλλο φαίην ἂν εἶδέναι; add Demosth. *De Cor.* 190, εἰ μήτ' ἔστι μήτ' ἦν μήτ' ἂν εἰπεῖν ἔχοι μηδεὶς μηδέπω καὶ τήμερον τί τὸν σύμβουλον ἐχρῆν ποιεῖν; Goodwin, *Greek Moods and Tenses*, § 50, note 2, regards the expression as containing an apodosis

to an omitted protasis: "If I would trust any other man (if he would give me his word), I trust you." See Krueger, 54, 11, 2; Thompson, *Greek Syntax*, pp. 206, 207; Shilleto on *De F. L.* § 190. It is difficult to see how such a hard reading could have been developed out of the simple εἶπερ ἄλλω τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, πειθοίμην ἂν καὶ σοί, but this is what Schanz, Sauppe, and Cron read. Kroschel's alteration, εἶπερ ἄλλω τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι, is more satisfactory. A copyist might easily have supplied πειθοίμην if not πειθοίμην ἂν, and as Sauppe remarks the verb is rarely supplied with the combination εἶπερ ἄλλος.

329 C. δ δ' ἐθαύμασά σου λέγοντος. *Rep.* i. 329 D, ἀγασθεὶς αὐτοῦ εἰπόντος ταῦτα; *Theaetet.* 161 B, οἷσθ' οὖν . . . δ θαυμάζω τοῦ ἐταίρου σου Πρωταγόρου; *Phaed.* 89 A, ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἐθαύμασα αὐτοῦ, πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο κ.τ.έ.; *Apol.* 17 A; *Rep.* ii. 376 A; *Crit.* 50 C; cp. *Rep.* ii. 367 D, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἐπαίνεσον δικαιοσύνης; *Menex.* 241 B, τοῦτο ἄξιον ἐπαινεῖν τῶν ἀνδρῶν. See Krueger, 47, 10, 8 and 9.

αὐ. "On the contrary": as if they were not distinct; πολλοῦ, 323 A, E, 325 A, 326 E.

νῦν δὴ or **νυνδὴ**. See Krueger, 69, 17, 1; Shilleto, *De F. L.* § 72; Heindorf ad *Soph.* 221 C. Ast gives as instances (1) of νῦν alone, with a past reference, *Soph.* 241 D; *Politic.* 307 C; *Laws*, iv. 719 E; xii. 962 A: (2) of νῦν δὴ, (a) with a past tense, a large number; (b) with a present tense, *Phaedr.* 277 A; *Gorg.* 462 B; *Politic.* 287 C; add 349 A below, in none of which cases is it certain that the δὴ belongs exclusively to the νῦν; (c) with a future reference, *Soph.* 221 C; *Rep.* i. 353 A; *Laws*, iii. 683 E, in the last of which only, οὐκοῦν νῦν δὴ μᾶλλον βεβαιωσόμεθα τὸ τοιοῦτον, does δὴ belong without dispute to νῦν. There is the same flexibility in our phrase "just now."

329 D. ὥσπερ προσώπου τὰ μόρια. Contrast below ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ χρυσοῦ μόρια and ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια. Perhaps we should translate strictly, "Is it in the same sense that its (the face's) parts are parts of a face."

τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἑτέρων. The MSS. after this add ἀλλήλων, which Sauppe strikes out. Schanz retains it and brackets τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἑτέρων, relying upon the restatement of the argument in 349 C. It is more likely, however, that ἀλλήλων is a gloss upon τὰ ἕτ. τῶν ἑτ. than *vice versa*, and the position would be stated with more precision at first than is afterwards found necessary.

ἀλλ' ἢ. Riddell (*Digest*, § 148) says, "The joint meaning is 'except.' By the ἀλλά the exception to the negative which has preceded is stated flatly: the ἢ allows the negative meaning to revive subject to this exception alone." See Jelf, § 773, 5, obs. 1; Krueger, 69, 4, 6. The expression is found only after negatives or questions equivalent to negatives: cp. 354 C, 356 A.

329 E. μεταλαμβάνουσιν . . . ἄλλο. This verb ordinarily takes a

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Socrates cries *Εὐφήμει, ὦ Πῶλε*; cp. *Rep.* i. 329 C; vi. 509 A, etc.

330 E. *σχολῆ*. *Phaed.* 65 B, *εἰ αὐταὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα αἰσθήσεων μὴ ἀκριβεῖς εἰσι μηδὲ σαφεῖς, σχολῆ γε αἱ ἄλλαι*; *Rep.* x. 610 E, and other passages, for which see Ast. Compare our old English 'by leisure': Shakespeare, *Titus Andronicus*, I. ii. 301.

ἡ ὁσιότης ὁσιον ἔσται. Grote (*Plato*, ii. p. 279, smaller edition) says, "The intermediate position (which is assumed to form the proof that virtue is one)—viz. that holiness is holy, and that justice is just—is either tautological or unmeaning, and cannot serve as a real proof of anything. It is, indeed, so futile that if it were found in the mouth of Protagoras, and not in that of Socrates, commentators would probably have cited it as an instance of the futilities of the sophists."

ἀρ' οὐκ ὀρθῶς. "Did I hear you incorrectly?"

† τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μέρια. So Schanz, Sauppe, Kroschel, Deuschle; BT om. *τά*. Perhaps, as the variation *εἶναι οὕτως ἔχοντα* for *οὕτως ἔχειν* is otherwise unmeaning, the passage might be corrected by reading *φάναι τῆς ἀρετῆς τὰ μέρια μέρια εἶναι οὕτως ἔχοντα*. The similar passage, 329 D, is obviously referred to, and such a reading as that suggested would be very susceptible of corruption.

ὥς οὐκ εἶναι. The infinitive is rare after *ὥς* in the sense of *ὥστε* (in such phrases as *ὥς εἰπεῖν* the infinitive stands absolutely and *ὥς* merely modifies), though it is of the same kind as the common one after *ὅλος*, etc. I can find no other instance in Plato; in Xenophon it is somewhat more frequent: see Krueger, 65, 3, 4; Thompson, p. 273.

331 A. *ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁμολογεῖν*. Sc. that I did assert that the parts of virtue were different in quality from one another.

οἶον δίκαιον εἶναι πρᾶγμα. "Holiness is not of the nature to be a just thing." For the concord see on 330 C. Notice that in the preceding dialogue (330 E) Socrates has expressly distinguished himself in opinion from Protagoras. It is only for purposes of discussion that he now (*Τί οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἀποκρινόμεθα αὐτῷ*;) formally joins himself to him.

331 B. *ἀλλ' ἀδικον ἄρα, τὸ δὲ ἀνόσιον*. This is Heindorf's reading for *ἀλλὰ δίκαιον ἄρα* of BT. It is adopted by most editors, and seems the most satisfactory emendation of a *locus desperatus*. We may translate either (a), "Holiness is of the nature to be not just, but consequently unjust, whereas justice is unholy," and the viciousness of the argument (see note on 333 B) is, I fear, no objection to adopting the reading: so Sauppe, Deuschle, Müller, and Schleierm. who reads *ἀλλ' ἀδικον, τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ ἀνόσιον*; or (b) supplying *τὸ μὲν* (see on 330 A), "But the one is unjust, the other unholy": so Heind., Ficinus, Kroschel. Stephanus, omitting *ἀλλά*, reads *δίκαιον ἄρα τὸδε ἀνόσιον* (*iustum igitur hoc non sanctum*). Still another correction, which keeps more closely than others

to the reading of BT, is ἀλλὰ δίκαιον ἄρα τὸ ἀνόσιον = "but in that case what is unholy is just." Socrates' answer, φαίην ἂν καὶ τὴν δικ. κ.τ.έ., follows much more easily and intelligibly if from ἀλλὰ to ἀνόσιον is omitted. This is perhaps too drastic a remedy to employ, but the words, however read, undoubtedly savour of a gloss.

331 B. καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ δέ. "Yes, and in your name."

ἦτοι ταῦτόν γε. For the sentiment cp. *Gorg.* 507 B, καὶ μὴν περὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπους τὰ προσήκοντα πράττων δίκαι' ἂν πράττοι, περὶ δὲ θεοῦς ὄσια. The form δικαιοσύνης, apparently found in only one other passage in Plato (*Gorg.* 508 A), is here adopted from its correspondence to ὀσιότης; see note on 356 A. In Xenophon it is more common.

καὶ μάλιστα πάντων. These words seem an anticlimax, and Kroschel for other reasons suspects the passage. We must translate "And most undoubtedly that justice," etc.

οὐ πάνυ. See note on 321 B.

331 C. ἀλλὰ τί μοι κ.τ.έ. "There seems to me to be a little difference in the case. But what difference does that make?"

μή μοι. See on 318 B.

τὸ εἰ βούλει τοῦτο. Socrates does not wish to make opinions politely conceded the subject of investigation, but convictions with which their holders are identified, τὸ δ' ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ τοῦτο; cp. 333 C, τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἐξετάζω, συμβαίνει μέντοι ἴσως καὶ ἐμέ τὸν ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἐξετάζεσθαι. For this use of the article cp. below, 333 A; *Rep.* i. 352 D, περὶ τοῦ ὄντινα τρόπον χρῆσθην; v. 449 C, τὸ ὀρθῶς τοῦτο.

οὕτω. For the orthography of this word see Schanz, *Nov. Comm.* pp. 4-8.

331 D. ὅπη. BT δ μή.

331 E. ταῦτα ἐλέγχοις. "You would prove about these," the ταῦτα according to the usual idiom being transposed from the subordinate clause.

τὸ ὁμοῖον. Rejected by Hirschig, Henneberger, Schanz, and Sauppe; Heindorf proposes to read τὸ ἀνόμοιον ἢ τὸ ὁμοῖον after the conjecture, which Schleierm. afterwards abandoned, founded upon the version of Ficinus. Kroschel, Deuschle, and Hier. Müller (in his translation) retain the reading of the MSS. As Schleierm. remarks, in sentences like the present often only the *first* of two clauses has its corresponding clause supplied: cp. 345 C. Here the omission is further justified by the fact that "likeness" is the prominent idea: cp. all that has preceded, and below, ὥστε ὁμοῖόν τι σμικρὸν ἔχειν ἀλλήλοις. .

332 A. οὐ μέντοι οὐδὲ αὖ. "It is not, however, as you seem to think either." *Phaedr.* 278 E, οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ τὸν σὸν ἐταῖρον δεῖ παρελθεῖν.

ἀφροσύνην τι καλεῖς; Cp. 330 C.

ἢ τούναντίον. Stallbaum's correction, adopted by all edd., for

- ἢ εἰ τούναντιον ἔπραττον, to which σωφρονεῖν is an inappropriate answer.
- 332 A.** οὐκοῦν σωφροσύνη σωφρονοῦσιν; See a similar course of argument in *Gorg.* 476 B ff.
- 332 C.** ὡσαύτως. "If anything is done in the same manner, it is done by the same." This generalisation completes this step in the proof.
ὄξύ . . . βαρύ. "Acute . . . grave": "high . . . low."
- 332 D.** ἀναλογισώμεθα τὰ ὁμολογημένα ἡμῖν. "Let us reckon up the points agreed upon": cp. *Rep.* vii. 524 D, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων . . . ἀναλογίζου; but the simple meaning "think over" is more common, see Ast. For similar phrases of recapitulation cp. ἀνομολογησώμεθα τὰ εἰρημένα (*Symp.* 200 E) and ἀναλαμβάνειν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὸν λόγον (*Gorg.* 506 C).
- 333 A.** πρότερον . . . λύσωμεν τῶν λόγων; Cp. *Gorg.* 480 E, κακέϊνα λυτέον; 509 A, where the metaphor is expanded; *Phaedr.* 256 D, (πίστεις) λύσαι.
τὸ ἐν ἐνὶ μόνον ἐναντιον εἶναι. See on 331 C; add *Phaed.* 94 A, εἰ ὀρθὴ ἢ ὑπόθεσις ἦν τὸ ψυχὴν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι.
πρὸς τῷ ἑτερον εἶναι. The more idiomatic expression is seen in *Symp.* 195 C, νέος μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ πρὸς δὲ τῷ νέῳ ἀπαλός; *Rep.* x. 610 E, καὶ πρὸς γ' ἐτι τῷ ζωτικῷ ἀγρυπνον; *Theaetet.* 185 E, καλός τε καγαθός πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ εὖ ἐποίησάς με.
οὐ πάνυ μουσικῶς. The metaphor is carried out in *συνάδουσι*, and *συναρμόττουσι*. Heind. regards it as a mocking echo of Protagoras' words (326 B), πᾶς γὰρ ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εὐρυθμίας τε καὶ ἀρμοστίας δεῖται, but it is too common a metaphor for the allusion to be very marked: cp. *συνῳδός*, *Phaed.* 92 C; *συμφωνεῖν* and *διαφωνεῖν*, *Gorg.* 480 B; *Phaed.* 101 D; *σύμφωνος*, *Gorg.* 457 E; a highly metaphorical passage, *Laches*, 188 D; *συναρμόττειν* and *ἀναρμοστεῖν*, *Soph.* 261 D; *ἐμμελῶς*, *Rep.* viii. 569 C; *πλημμελεῖν*, *Phileb.* 27 C; *ἀντίφωνος*, *Laus*, iv. 717 B.
- 333 B.** πλείοσι δὲ μή. Modern edd. πλείω δὲ μή following a conjecture of Heindorf, who compares 332 D. Ficinus, however, translates *pluribus vero nequaquam*, and the meaning in the end is the same with either case. We may say ἀφροσύνη is opposite to no more than one thing, or that it has no more than one opposite, though certainly the latter method of expression is more suited to this passage.
ἦ γάρ; Sc. οὕτως ἔχει.
τὸ πρότερον. See 331 A, B.
καὶ τὰ λοιπά. Δικαιοσύνη and ὀσιότης have been proved nearly the same, σωφροσύνη and σοφία absolutely the same. For the conclusion it is required to prove the identity of one of the first pair, δικαιοσύνη, with σωφροσύνη, one of the second.
ὅτι ἀδικεῖ. Limiting ἀδικῶν: "in so far as he acts unjustly." So in 332 B, οὕτω πράττοντες limits ὅταν πράττωσιν.
- 333 C.** ἐπεὶ πολλοί γε. See on 317 A. The doctrine is akin to that upheld by Polus in the *Gorgias*, and countered by Socrates with the proposition, κρεῖττον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν.

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ἀν μὴ σοφόν, ἀμαθές, ἢ οὐκ ἦσθησαι ὅτι ἔστι τι μεταξὺ σοφίας καὶ ἀμαθίας. Bonitz (*Plat. Stud.* p. 265 and n. 6; cp. Steinhart, *Einleit.* pp. 413, 414) supposes that the very grossness of the fallacies used (das Umdeuten des contradictorischen Gegensatzes in den conträren und die Benützung der Unbestimmtheit im Gebrauche von ἀφροσύνη) is intended to mark the absence of the critical faculty in Protagoras (so nearly Sauppe, p. 81 of his ed., and Kroschel, p. 8). That this is not entirely true is seen by 331 C ff. and 350 C ff., where Protagoras is allowed to object. A less inconsistent explanation of the difficulty may be found in the tentative method which is a marked characteristic of all Plato's dialogues, and particularly of the Socratic series. Westermayer, p. 86, supposes that Plato is imitating the historical Socrates.

- 333 D. ἐκαλλωπίζετο. "Gave himself airs"; *Phaedr.* 236 D, παῦσαι πρὸς με καλλωπιζόμενος.
 ὅτι ἀδικοῦσιν. Bracketed by Schanz; but cp. above, 333 B, σωφρονεῖν ὅτι ἀδικεῖ, where the addition is necessary to the accuracy of the argument. The same is the case here where εὖ βουλευέσθαι is substituted for σωφρονεῖν. Plato is considering whether the notions σωφρονεῖν (εὖ βουλευέσθαι) and ἀδικεῖν are compatible *in the same act*; if not, then σωφρονεῖν is the opposite of ἀδικεῖν, and by a similar argument to that employed above σωφροσύνη will be identified with δικαιοσύνη.
 ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ, ἃ κ.τ.έ. Xen. *Mem.* iv. 6, 8, ἄλλο ἂν τι φαίης ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ἢ τὸ ὠφέλιμον; Οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Τὸ ἄρα ὠφέλιμον ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν ὅτῳ ἂν ὠφέλιμος ᾖ.
- 333½E. ἀγωνιᾶν καὶ παρατετάχθαι. "To be showing fight and marshalling his force for the reply" ("against replying" would require πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἀποκρ.) On these two words see L. and S. The former, according to Ast, is only found besides in Plato in *Charm.* 162 C, and *Lysis*, 210 E. In form it is a desiderative = "to be eager for fight." For παρατετάχθαι cp. *Rep.* iii. 399 B, παρατεταγμένως καὶ καρτερούντως ἀμνησμένου τὴν τύχην. There seems no need to read παρατετάσθαι (Schanz after Kock) or παρατεταράχθαι (Cornarius).
- 334 A. ἃ ἀνθρώποις μὲν κ.τ.έ. A sentence which reproduces Protagoras' own confusion. Το ἀνθρώποις μὲν ἀνωφελῆ we expect as antithesis τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις ζώοις καὶ φυτοῖς ὠφέλιμα. In consequence, however, of the threefold division into beneficial, harmful, neutral, a sub-antithesis to ἀνωφελῆ is inserted in the words τὰ δὲ γε ὠφέλιμα κ.τ.έ., in the last member of which ἀνθρώποις is repeated to prepare afresh for the main antithesis, ἵπποις δὲ κ.τ.έ., in which ὠφέλιμα is to be supplied. For οὐδέτερα cp. below 351 D; ἀνωφελής is more than "not beneficial," it = "harmful" (as *inutilis* in Latin, Livy, iii. 33): cp. Xen. *Hell.* i. 7, 27, ἀναμνήσθητε ὡς ἀλγεινὸν καὶ ἀνωφελές ἤδη ἐστὶ; *Rep.* viii. 560 D, on which passage Stallb. compares Pindar's use (*Olymp.* i. 85) of ἀκέρδεια for βλαβή.

- 334 A. οὐδενί. What is not good for individuals is not by implication good for classes ; so that there is no need (with Schanz after Naber) to read οὐδέσι ("to none of these classes").
- 334 B. εἰ δ' ἐθέλοις . . . ἀπόλλυσιν. The certainty of the result is indicated by the irregularity. The optative in protasis followed by fut. indie. is fairly common ; it is rare to find the present : Goodwin (*Greek Moods and Tenses*), § 54, 2 a, quotes none, Krueger (54, 12, 7) only one ; Thompson, § 195. τὸ ἔλαιον. Sauppe quotes Theophr. *De Causis Plant.* 5, 16, 6, καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα (oleum, rix, aders) φθείρει καὶ μάλιστα τὰ φυτὰ τὰ νεά ; Plinius, *N.H.* 17, 234. ἐνταῦθα. "In man" : cp. later ἀγαθὸν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. .
- 334 C. ταῦτόν. For the orthography of this and similar words see Schanz, *Nov. Comm.* pp. 1 ff. μέλλει. For the change of number after ἀσθενούσιν see on 319 D. ὅσον μόνον . . . κατασβέσαι. See on 330 C, and compare the phrase ὅσον ἀφοσιούσθαι. ὡς εὖ λέγοι. Equivalent to ὅτι οὕτως : *Phaedr.* 58 E, εὐδαίμων γάρ μοι ἀνὴρ ἐφαίνετο . . . ὡς ἀδεῶς καὶ γενναίως ἐτελεύτα ; 117 D, τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ τύχην (ἀπέκλαιον), οἴου ἀνδρὸς ἐταίρου ἐστερημένος εἶην ; above, 315 B.
- 334 E. καὶ μακρὰ λέγειν . . . καὶ αὖ βραχέα. In *Phaedr.* 267 B it is said of Tisias and Gorgias that they συντομίαν τε λόγων καὶ ἀπειρα μήκη περὶ πάντων ἀνεύρου ; and, *Gorg.* 449 C, Gorgias says, καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ τοῦτο ἐν ἔστιν ἔν φημί, μηδένα ἀν ἐν βραχυτέροις ἐμοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ εἰπεῖν, and Socrates replies, τούτου μὴν δεῖ, ὦ Γοργία· καὶ μοι ἐπίδειξιν αὐτοῦ τούτου ποιήσαι, τῆς βραχυλογίας, μακρολογίας δὲ εἰσαῦθις. Thompson on the latter passage quotes the words from Sextus Empiricus (*adv. Matth.* ii. 7), in which Zeno likens dialectic to the clenched, rhetoric to the open hand.
- 335 A. εἰ τοῦτο ἐπόλουν . . . διελεγόμεν. The omission of the conjunction between two sentences where the second is in explanation of the former is very common in Plato, below 340 E, 341 A, 341 D. Heindorf (ad *Soph.* § 52=239 E) quotes a very similar passage, *Rep.* ii. 359 C, εἰ τοιόνδε ποιήσαιμεν τῇ διανοίᾳ, δόντες ἐξουσίαν ἐκατέρῳ . . . εἴτ' ἐπακολουθήσαιμεν θεώμενοι, where see Stallb. In his index to the *Republic*, s.v. *Asyndeton in epexegesi*, he quotes a large number of passages : iii. 416 B ; iv. 442 A ; vi. 487 B, 508 B ; ix. 589 D ; x. 613 C, 615 B. Krueger, 59, 1, 5. οὐδενὸς βελτίων. See on 324 D. The remark is one calculated to contrast Protagoras unfavourably with Socrates, who always professes to be a seeker after truth only : see on 348 C. Πρωταγόρου ὄνομα. *Apol.* 20 D, δ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκε τό τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν ; *Hipp. Mai.* 281 C, ὦν ὀνόματα μεγάλα λέγεται ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ ; *Thuc.* ii. 64, 4, γινώτε δὲ ὄνομα μέγιστον αὐτὴν ἔχουσαν. ἤρεσεν . . . ἐθελήσοι. The immediate fact and its remoter consequences. Often, however, no such distinction is

apparent: Xen. *Anab.* ii. 1, 3, οὔτοι ἔλεγον ὅτι Κῦρος μὲν τέθνηκεν, Ἀριαῖος δὲ πεφευγὼς ἐν τῷ σταθμῷ εἶη; Goodwin, *Greek Moods and Tenses*, § 70, 2, remark 1; Jelf, § 802; Krueger, 65, 11, 2 and 3; Thompson's *Greek Syntax*, p. 184.

335 C. τὰ μακρὰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατος. So τὸν ἀμφοτέρα δυνάμενον below: cp. *Meno*, 94 B, ἀδυνάτους γεγονέναι τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα, and perhaps *Phaed.* 85 C; τοῦτο δυνατὸς ὢν occurs in *Polit.* 295 B. ἐπεὶ ἐβουλόμην ἄν. Add ἐπεὶ καὶ ταῦτ' ἄν κ.τ.έ. below, and see note on 317 A.

ἵνα συνουσία ἐγίγνετο. *Crito*, 44 D; *Euthyd.* 304 E; *Symp.* 181 D; *Laws*, xii. 959 C, are other instances of the construction in Plato. The principal sentence is either an unfulfilled wish or an unfulfilled apodosis, but that the subordinate sentence was regarded as final and not (Krueger) as the apodosis of a condition is shown by the fact that μή and not οὐ is the negative employed in it. Krueger, 54, 8, 8; Thompson, § 230; Prof. Jebb on *Soph. El.* 1134.

335 D. τρίβωνος. By derivation a "threadbare mantle"; then any mantle of a coarse description. It was worn by Socrates, as here and *Symp.* 219 B, where he uses it as bed-clothes too: cp. Xen. *Mem.* i. 6, 2, ἱμάτιον ἠμφίεσαι οὐ μόνον φαῦλον, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ θέρους τε καὶ χειμῶνος, and Ar. *Nub.* 870; and by those who wished to exhibit simplicity of life, as philosophers, Spartans, and their imitators: cp. below, 342 B, C; Demosth. 54, § 34, οἱ μεθ' ἡμέραν ἐσκυθρωπάκασι καὶ λακωνίζειν φασὶ καὶ τρίβωνας ἔχουσι καὶ ἀπλᾶς ὑποδέδονται; Plut. *Phoc.* 10, ἦν δέ τις Ἀρχιβιάδης ἐπικαλούμενος Λακωνιστῆς, πώγωνά τε καθειμένος ὑπερφυῆ μεγέθει καὶ τρίβωνα φορῶν ἀεὶ καὶ σκυθρωπάζων.

οὐδ' ἄν ἐνός. The division of the word οὐδεὶς does not necessarily give it any special force, such as "not even one": compare this passage and 343 D below with 328 A.

ἀνειστήκη. B and second hand of T, ἀνεστήκη, and so Wayte. The correction, adopted by Sauppe, Kroschel, Deuschle, is Schanz's, who, vol. vii. § 13, gives five instances where the MSS. give the augment (*Euthyd.* 271 A; *Lysis*, 206 E; *Sympos.* 220 C (on the second occurrence of the word); *Rep.* i. 343 A; ix. 587 C), and two (*Sympos.* 220 C; *Theaetet.* 208 E) besides the present where they do not: Krueger, 28, 6, 2. The termination -η, Krueger (30, 6) says, originates from the Ionic -εα, and is used by Plato as an archaism. Rutherford (*New Phrynichus*, pp. 229 ff.) says that Dawes discovered that -η, -ης, -ει or -ει(ν), were the only genuine terminations of the pluperf. sing., later Greek forms having been introduced into MSS. by copyists, and (p. 235) that the better the MSS. of Plato are, the more frequently they exhibit the -η forms. See Stallb. ad *Sympos.* 198 C.

ἀεὶ μὲν ἔγωγε . . . ἄγαμαι. A kind of present perfect; for the shape of the sentence cp. Xen. *Symp.* viii. 8, ἀεὶ μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε ἠγάμην τὴν σὴν φύσιν, νῦν δὲ καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον; *Rep.* ii. 367 E, ἀεὶ μὲν δὴ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ τε Γλαύκωνος καὶ τοῦ

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Iph. in Aul. 865. In all these passages the adverb is used predicatively as here, a usage which is almost confined to adverbs of place: Krueger, 62, 2, 4.

- 336 B. **δημηγορεῖν.** Containing the two notions of making a long speech and speaking for effect, *contionari*: *Gorg.* 519 D, ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγορεῖν με ἠνάγκασας; see Stallb. *ad* 482 C; *Rep.* i. 350 E, εἰ οὖν λέγοιμι, εὔ οἶδ' ὅτι δημηγορεῖν ἄν με φαίης; *Laws*, vii. 817 C, δημηγορεῖν πρὸς παῖδάς τε καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ τὸν πάντα ὄχλον; cp. *Gorg.* 520 B, τοῖς δημηγόροις τε καὶ σοφισταῖς.

ὄρας. "You understand": some editors write a note of interrogation after this phrase, and in Plato it is mostly found in interrogative sentences. For other instances cp. *Xen. Cyrop.* iv. 5, 45; *Hier.* i. 16; *Arist. Thesmoph.* 496, ταῦθ', ὄρας, οὐδεπώποτ' εἶπεν; *Pac.* 331; *Eur. Orest.* 581, ὄρας, Ὀδυσσέως ἄλοχον οὐ κατέκτανε | Τηλέμαχος; *Bacch.* 315. See Schanz, *Nov. Comm.* p. 138.

τοῦ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι οἷός τ' εἶναι. This genitive (of separation) is to be constructed with *παραχωρεῖ* as in *Xen. Mem.* ii. 3, 16, (νομίζεται) καὶ ὁδοῦ παραχωρήσαι τὸν νεώτερον τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ . . . καὶ λόγων ὑπεῖξαι. Ast gives no other instances, however, from Plato.

- 336 C. **λόγον τε δοῦναι.** For the position of *τε* see note on 325 B.

εἰ . . . παραχωρεῖ. See 312 C, θαυμάζοιμ' ἄν εἰ οἴσθα.

ἀντιποιεῖται. Elsewhere in Plato followed by an accus. or gen. of what is claimed; here we must supply *διαλεχθῆναι*.

ἀποτείνων. Cp. 335 C; notice that *μή* is joined with it while the influence of the imperative is still strong: below we find *οὐκ ἐθέλων*.

ἐκκρούων. The simple verb is found in *Theaetet.* 154 E, ἀλλήλων τοὺς λόγους τοῖς λόγοις ἐκρούομεν, and the compound in its primary sense in *Phaedr.* 228 E, ἐκκέκρουκάς με ἐλπίδος. From meaning "knock out of" (as a weapon out of the hand), or "knock aside," it means to "disarm," "make useless," and so "elude." *Arist. Eth. Nic.* iii. 15, κἂν μεγάλαι καὶ σφοδραὶ ᾧσι (αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι), καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκκρούουσιν. Heindorf takes it to be a metaphor from boxing; he quotes *Demosth.* 40, § 43, δικήν ἐκκρούειν.

- 336 D. **ἐπεὶ Σωκράτη γε.** See note on 317 A.

οὐχ ὅτι παίζει. Sc. οὐ λέγω ὅτι παίζει, "not but what he has his joke and says he is forgetful": cp. *Gorg.* 450 E, οὐχ ὅτι τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως εἶπες; *Theaetet.* 157 B; *Lysis*, 220 A, οὐχ ὅτι πολλάκις λέγομεν.

ὦ Πρόδικε καὶ Ἰππία. Heindorf refers to 330 C; 337 A, E; 353 A, where *τε* is attached to the first of the two persons addressed. A comparison of the passages given in his note shows that it is more ordinarily inserted, but chiefly where the voc. does not end, as here, in -ε and create an unpleasant jingle. In *Laws*, v. 747 D, however, we find ὦ Μέγιλλέ τε καὶ Κλεινία, but there the long penult. aids.

πρὸς Πρωταγόρου. In favour of Protagoras: cp. *πρὸς λόγου*

in *Gorg.* 459 C, *ἐάν τι ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγου ἦ*, and *πρὸς τρόπου*, *Phaedr.* 252 D: = Lat. *stare a partibus Protagorae*. Thompson, p. 337.

337 A. *κοινούς . . . ἴσους*. Prodicus is mentioned (*Cratyl.* 384 B) as giving advanced lectures (*ἡ πεντηκοντάδραχμος ἐπίδειξις*) for fifty drachmae, *περὶ ὀρθότητος ὀνομάτων* (cp. *Euthyd.* 277 E), and elementary for one drachma (*ἡ δραχμιαία*); of which Socrates professes to have heard the latter, as below, 341 A, he gives himself out as a pupil of Prodicus. That Prodicus' distinctions, useful in themselves, were not free from exaggeration and arbitrariness is seen, besides in the present passage, from the way in which Socrates elsewhere alludes to them: below, 340 A; 358 A, D; *Charm.* 163 D, and *Meno*, 96 D (where he also alludes to his discipleship); *Laches*, 197 D; *Meno*, 75 E. The words *κοινός . . . ἴσος* are found combined in a similar context, Demosth. 18, § 7 (= *De Coron.* p. 227), *παρασχών ἑαυτὸν ἴσον καὶ κοινὸν ἀμφοτέροις ἀκροάτην*; 29, § 1 (= *in Aphob.* p. 844), *ἄνπερ ἴσοι καὶ κοινοὶ γένησθε ἀκροαταί*; Andoc. *in Alcib.* p. 114 (Reiske), *δέομαι ὑμῶν, τῶν λόγων ἴσους καὶ κοινούς ἡμῖν ἐπιστάτας γενέσθαι*.

337 B. *ἀμφισβητεῖν μὲν, ἐρίζειν δὲ μὴ*. Cicero (cp. Priscian, viii. § 35) translates, *Nunc a vobis, o Protagora et Socrate, postulo, ut de isto concedatis alter alteri, et inter vos de huiuscemodi rebus controversemini, non concertetis*.

καὶ οὐκ ἐπαινοῖσθε. The ordinary usage, as Heind. points out, would write *ἀλλά* for *καὶ*, or omit both.

337 C. *εὐφραϊνοίμεθα*. Arist. *Top.* ii. 6, *Πρόδικος διηρεῖτο τὰς ἡδονὰς εἰς χαρὰν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ εὐφροσύνην· ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα τοῦ αὐτοῦ, τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὀνόματά ἐστι*.

ἀπεδέξαντο. See note on 324 C.

ἡγοῦμαι ἐγὼ ἡμᾶς. Heindorf, followed by all modern editors, for *ὑμᾶς*, BΓ.

337 D. *φύσει, οὐ νόμῳ*. A disregard of *convention* was one of the characteristics of the Sophists, so far as they can be regarded as a body or school, and in one of its aspects this was identified with a rejection of law as a device for over-riding natural rights. There is a distinct echo here of the fragment of Pindar, *Νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων ἄγει Δικαιῶν τὸ βιαιότατον ὑπερτάτα χειρὶ*, used by Callicles (*Gorgias*, 484 B; cp. 482 E) to justify his view that laws are made in favour of the weaker and many, the natural tendency being "that they should take who have the power, and they should keep who can." See W. H. Thompson on *Gorg.* 484 B; Arist. *de Soph. El.* c. 12, 6. Hippias is similarly represented by Xenophon (*Mem.* iv. 4, 14) as wanting in respect for the laws, and a like opinion is attributed to Protagoras in *Theaetetus*. 172 B; cp. *Laws*, x. 889 E.

τὸ γὰρ ὁμοῖον τῷ ὁμοίῳ. *Gorg.* 510 B, *φίλος μοι δοκεῖ ἕκαστος ἑκάστῳ εἶναι ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα, ἄνπερ οἱ πάλαιοί τε καὶ σοφοὶ λέγουσιν, ὁ ὁμοῖος τῷ ὁμοίῳ*, where Thompson quotes Hom. *Od.* xvii. 218, *ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον*,

and Arist. *Rhet.* i. 11, 25; cp. *Sympos.* 195 B; *Lysis*, 214 B.

337 D. κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο. As being σοφώτατοι. •

τὸ πρυτανεῖον. A building which was the centre of authority in every Greek city, and of its common life, in which was the ἐστία of the state. Thus in Athenaeus, v. p. 187 D, a Pythian oracle calls Athens ἐστίαν καὶ πρυτανεῖον τῆς Ἑλλάδος. Like flattering denominations, very dear to the Athenian (Isocr. 15, 166), are Pericles' τῆς Ἑλλάδος παιδευσίς (Thuc. ii. 41, 1), cp. τὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος μουσεῖον (Athenaeus, l.c.); Thucydides' Ἑλλάδος Ἑλλάς (*Epiigr.* to Euripides, *Anthol.* 7, 45); Pindar's Ἑλλάδος ἔρεισμα (*Fr.* 54 [46]).

ἀποφῆνασθαι. "To give utterance to": used almost universally by Plato in the middle voice; see Ast.

337 E. συμβῆναι ὑμᾶς ὡς περ ὑπὸ δίκαιητῶν ἡμῶν. The verb συμβῆναι is regarded as a passive, "to be brought to a compromise," and is so constructed with ὑπό; cp. a similar use of φεύγειν and ἐκπίπτειν (to be banished), ἀποθνήσκειν (to be killed), κείσθαι (to be laid down), Krueger, 52, 3, 1. For the position of ἡμῶν cp. *Timaeus*, 27 B, ὡς εἰς δικαστὰς ἡμᾶς; 79 A; *Rep.* iii. 414 E; viii. 545 E, ὡς πρὸς παῖδας ἡμᾶς παιζούσας. The preposition is rarely repeated like it is in *Rep.* i. 328 D, παρ' ἡμᾶς φοιτᾶ ὡς παρὰ φίλους.

338 A. τὸ ἀκριβὲς τοῦτο εἶδος. See on 313 B.

λίαν. To be joined with ζητεῖν; it is in the emphatic position as showing the one extreme to be avoided, while πάντα κάλων ἐκτείναντα indicates the other.

τὰς ἡνίας. The richness of metaphor is probably a characteristic of Hippias' style, purposely exaggerated; like Hotspur's it "apprehends a world of figures." For the expression here cp. *Laius*, iii. 701 C, δεῖν φαίνεται ἔμοιγε οἶόν περ ἵππον τὸν λόγον ἐκάστοτε ἀναλαμβάνειν, καὶ μὴ καθάπερ ἀχάλινον κεκτημένον τὸ στόμα, βία ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου φερόμενον κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἀπὸ τινος ὄνου πεσεῖν.

ἡμῖν φαίνονται. BT ὑμῖν. Socrates and Protagoras, however, are being addressed on the subject of their style, which is to be modified to the taste, not of them, but of the speaker and the rest of the company. Deuschle alone of modern edd. retains the 2nd person.

πάντα κάλων ἐκτείναντα. Not as Heindorf, *omni fune contento*, but expressing the same as κάλων ἐξίεναι (*Eur. Med.* 278, ἐχθροὶ γὰρ ἐξιάσι πάντα δὴ κάλων), a nautical term, like others in this passage, for "crowding all sail"; because letting out the sheet to the full is, in the case of square-rigged ships like those of the Greeks, equivalent to "sailing before the wind," οὐρίᾳ ἐφεῖναι. For ἐφεῖναι used intransitively see on 336 A.

εἰς τὸ πέλαγος τῶν λόγων. *Parmen.* 137 A, πῶς χρὴ τηλικόνδε ὄντα διανεῦσαι τοιοῦτόν τε καὶ τοσοῦτον πέλαγος λόγων; *Rep.* v. 453 D, οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡμῖν νευστέον καὶ πειρατέον σώζεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ λόγου; *Rep.* iv. 441 C; v. 472 A; *Phaedr.* 264 A.

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A ; after *ἔστι*, Soph. *Philoct.* 656 ; after *δύναμιν παρέσχεν*, *Rep.* iv. 433 B ; after *ἔξεις*, *Laws*, iy. 709 D ; after *ἔξέσται*, *Crito*, 51 A.

338 C. *ἐπεὶ τό γ' ἐμόν*. For *ἐπεὶ* see on 317 A ; *τὸ ἐμόν* is the adverbial accusative qualifying *διαφέρει* : cp. *Rep.* i. 345 A, *τό γ' ἐμόν οὐ πείθομαι*. Ast (*Lex.* i. 689) gives a dozen other instances.

338 D. *λόγον ὑποσχέτω*. In a more literal interpretation than the usual sense of "rendering an account" : so *δώσειν λόγον* below.

338 E. *πάνυ μὲν οὐκ ἤθελεν*. "Was clearly unwilling" : for *πάνυ οὐ* see on 321 B.

339 A. *περὶ ἐπῶν*. "Ἐπη is used in the sense of 'poetry.' Protagoras' views here are in accordance with what is known of his teaching. In *Phaedr.* 267 C he is mentioned as giving instruction in *ὀρθόεπια* : Aristotle (*Poet.* 19 ; *Soph. El.* 14) gives two of his criticisms. That such criticism was fashionable can be inferred from Socrates' remark, 347 C, and the words which (*Ar. Ran.* 1120 ff.) usher in the contest between Aesch. and Eur. ; Prodicus (*Cratyl.* 384 B) is also mentioned as teaching *τὴν ἀλήθειαν περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος* ; Hippas (pseudo-Plat. *Hipp. Min.* 368 D) is said by Socrates to be *ἐπιστήμων περὶ ῥυθμῶν καὶ ἀρμονιῶν καὶ γραμμάτων ὀρθότητος*, and professes (347 A, below) himself to have a dissertation on the poem of Simonides.

διελεῖν. "To divide into its parts, analyse, explain" : so *Hipp. Mai.* 285 C, *ἃ σὺ ἀκριβέστατα ἐπίστασαι ἀνθρώπων διαιρεῖν* ; and in the middle, 314 B, above.

νῦν δὴ διελεγόμεθα. Stallbaum's necessary correction for *νῦν διαλεγόμεθα* of BT : for (1) there must be an opposition to *νῦν ἔσται* above, as in 340 B ; (2) *ἀρετή* was not the subject they were at the actual moment discussing.

Σιμωνίδης πρὸς Σκόπαν. Simonides, son of Leoprepes, was born at Iulis in Ceos, 559 or 556 B.C. He was invited by Hipparchus to Athens, and after his death he visited Thessaly, and as guest of the Aleuadae and Scopadae (*Theocr. Id.* xvi. 36 ff.), the ruling families in Thrace, to which this Scopas, son of Creon, in Crannon, belonged, immortalised them in his verse. After 490 B.C. we find him again in Athens, where he was acquainted with the most famous of his contemporaries, including Aeschylus and Themistocles. Finally he settled in Syracuse, where he gained much influence with Hiero, at whose court he died in his ninetieth year, c. 469 B.C. Of his poems—elegies, lyrics, epigrams—a considerable number of fragments are printed in Bergk's collection. Some of the best known of them—the epitaphs on those killed at Marathon and Thermopylae, and the fragment on the battle of Artemisium—were inspired by the struggle of Greece for freedom against the Persians. Wordsworth (Sept. 1819) talks of "One precious, tender-hearted, scroll of pure Simonides." Lessing (*Laocoon*, Vorrede) calls him "the Greek Voltaire."

- 339 B. **τετράγωνον.** Arist. *Rhet.* iii. 11, τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φάναι εἶναι τετράγωνον μεταφορά· ἀμφω γὰρ τέλεια; *Eth. Nic.* i. (10) 11, 11, αἰεὶ γὰρ ἢ μάλιστα πάντων πράξει καὶ θεωρήσει τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ τὰς τύχας οἴσει κάλλιστα καὶ πάντη πάντως ἐμμελῶς ὃ γ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τετράγωνος ἄνευ ψόγου. The square and the number four were the symbols of perfection and divinity to the Pythagoreans, but it was the passage of Simonides which made the idea commonly current. Horace has a similar idea in his *totus teres atque rotundus* (*Sat.* ii. 7, 86).
- τυγχάνει μεμεληκός.** *Soph.* 227 A, τῇ τῶν λόγων μεθόδῳ σπογγιστικῆς ἢ φαρμακοποσίας οὐδὲν ἦττον οὐδέ τι μᾶλλον τυγχάνει μέλον; *Phaedr.* 235 A, ἢ ἴσως οὐδὲν αὐτῷ μέλον τοῦ τοιούτου.
- ἔφην ἐγώ, †καλῶς† τε καὶ ὀρθῶς.** Bekker's correction, adopted by Schanz, Sauppe, Kroschel, Deuschle, for ἐγώ τε καὶ B, and ἔγωγε καὶ T. The emphatic ἔγωγε it is impossible to retain.
- 339 C. **ὄρα δή.** Protagoras thinks that Socrates answered without reflection.
- ἐμμελέως.** To be joined with εἰρημένον.
- νέμεται.** The simple verb instead of the derivative νομίζω: cp. *Soph. O. C.* 879, τάνδ' ἄρ' οὐκ ἔτι νέμω πόλιν; *O. T.* 1080, ἐγὼ δ' ἐμαντὸν παῖδα τῆς τύχης νέμων; *El.* 150, σὲ δ' ἔγωγε νέμω θεόν; *Al.* 1331.
- χαλεπὸν φάτ' ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι.** The scholiast on *Cratyl.* 384 A, and *Hipp. Mai.* ad fin. (Bekker, pp. 369, 394) tells us that Pittacus, the tyrant of Mitylene, on hearing that Periander of Corinth κατ' ἀρχὰς δημοτικὸς ὦν ὕστερον εἰς τὸ τύραννος εἶναι μετῆλθε, made solemn request that he should be relieved of his authority, giving as his reason, χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, and that Solon on learning it remarked, χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά.
- ὁμολογεῖσθαι . . . ὁμολογεῖν.** The middle in Plato is regularly used of things, the active of persons. Instances to the contrary, such as *Timaeus*, 32 C, τὸ τοῦ κόσμου σῶμα ἐγεννήθη δι' ἀναλογίας ὁμολογήσαν, and *Rep.* iv. 436 C, ἀκριβέστερον ὁμολογησώμεθα, are exceptional.
- 339 D. **τοῦ ποιήματος.** To be joined with εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν: *Laus*, iii. 682 A, εἰς δὴ τὸ πρόσθεν προέλθωμεν ἔτι τοῦ νῦν ἐπελθόντος ἡμῖν μύθου; below, 357 D.
- τοῦτον.** The personality of Pittacus is emphasised by the pleonastic pronoun: see *Rep.* iii. 391 D, where Stallb. quotes *Sympos.* 219 B, and *Xen. Cyrop.* ii. 2, 26, ὡσπερ ἵππους οἱ ἂν ἄριστοι ὦσιν, οὐχ οἱ ἂν πατριῶται, τούτους ζητεῖτε, οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπους οἱ ἂν ὑμῖν μάλιστα δοκῶσι συνισχυρεῖν τε ὑμᾶς καὶ συγκοσμήσειν, τούτους λαμβάνετε.
- ἀποδέχεσθαι.** See on 324 C.
- ἦτοι τὸ πρότερον.** "At the first or afterwards": τὸ πρότερον is an adverb; if taken as object of λέγει, the article would be required with ὕστερον also.
- θόρυβον παρέσχεν καὶ ἔπαινον.** Θόρυβος is used of favourable

or unfavourable manifestations ; contrast the employment of the verb in 319 C and 334 C. Sauppe objects to the harshness of the combination *ἐπαινον παρέσχεν* ; but (1) *παρέχω* and *παρέχομαι* (= "excite," "afford material for") are used very widely (*v. Ast, s.v.*) in a large number of apparently unnatural conjunctions, and (2) any awkwardness is softened by the fact that *ἐπαινος*, *ἐπαινῶ*, are constantly found in the same context with *θόρυβος* : *cp. Laws*, ix. 876 B, *θορύβου μεστὰ καθάπερ θέατρα ἐπαινοῦντά τε βοῆ καὶ ψέγοντα* ; *Rep.* vi. 492 B, *ὅταν . . . ξὺν πολλῷ θορύβῳ τὰ μὲν ψέγωσι . . . τὰ δὲ ἐπαινῶσι*.

339 E. *ὑπὸ ἀγαθοῦ πύκτου πληγείς.* *Euthyd.* 303 A, *ὡσπερ πληγείς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἐκείμην ἄφωνος* ; *Phileb.* 22 E, *ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ νῦν ἡδονή σοι πεπτωκέναι καθάπερ πληγείσα ὑπὸ τῶν νῦν δὴ λόγων*.

ἱλιγγίασα. Schanz *εἰλιγ.* with BT, see vol. vii. p. v. ; but the instances seem to Sauppe to go against spelling it with the diphthong. The word is a very favourite one with Plato : *Lysis*, 216 C, *ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι αὐτὸς ἱλιγγιῶ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ λόγου ἀπορίας* ; *Gorg.* 486 B, 527 A (coupled with *χασμῶμαι*) ; *Phaed.* 79 C, *ἱλιγγιᾶ ὡσπερ μεθύουσα (ἢ ψυχῆ)*.

ὡς γε . . . εἰρήσθαι. See on 309 A.

ἐγγένηται. Heindorf's correction, universally adopted, for *ἐκγένηται* of BT ; he quotes *Sympos.* 184 A, *ἵνα χρόνος ἐγγένηται* ; *Phaedo*, 86 E, *χρόνου ἐγγενομένου*.

σὸς μέντοι Σιμωνίδης πολίτης. Both were born at Iulis in Ceos : *μέντοι* = *vero*, *cp. Rep.* i. 329 C, *ἀσμεναίτατα μέντοι αὐτὸ ἀπέφυγον* ; 309 A, above ; Krueger, 69, 36.

340 A. *παρακαλεῖν.* There is no need to take *παρακαλεῖν* as the future, for, although *δοκῶ* in this sense ordinarily takes a future infinitive, *e.g. Theaetet.* 183 D, *ἀλλὰ μοι δοκῶ . . . οὐ πείσεσθαι αὐτῷ*, it also takes the present, as *Phaedr.* 230 E, *ἐγὼ μὲν μοι δοκῶ κατακεῖσθαι*.

ἔφη "Ὀμηρος. *Il.* xxi. 307 ff., *Σιμόεντι δὲ κέκλετ' αὔσας, | Φίλε κασίγνητε, σθένος ἀνέρος ἀμφότεροί περ | σχῶμεν, ἐπεὶ τάχα ἄστν μέγα Πριάμοιο ἀνακτος | ἐκπέρσει*.

ἐκπέρση. An echo of the unquoted lines. Heindorf gives several instances of the metaphor from the poets : *Eur. Phoen.* 565 ; *Soph. Ai.* 896 ; *Trach.* 1104, *τυφλῆς ὑπ' ἄτης ἐκπεπόρθημαι τάλας* ; but the word would not without reason have been so employed in prose.

τὸ ὑπὲρ Σιμωνίδου ἐπανόρθωμα. The correction (of Protagoras' statement) in Simonides' behalf.

τῆς σῆς μουσικῆς. "Your skill." *Μουσική* is a general term for education (*Rep.* ii. 376 E, *ἔστι . . . ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ σώμασι (παιδεία) γυμναστική, ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ ψυχῇ μουσική*), including literary studies (*Rep.* iii. 398 B, *τῆς μουσικῆς τὸ περὶ λόγους τε καὶ μύθους*). Socrates is obviously alluding to Prodicus' speech in 337 A ff. No such distinction is found there, but Socrates had (341 A) attended Prodicus' lectures. Notice the absence of the article before *ἐπιθυμεῖν*, though it is to be

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Prodicus quarrels about my usage of the term *δεινός* . . . , so the Ceians and Simonides by *χαλεπός* mean perhaps *κακός* or something of the sort." The difficulty in the sentence is owing to the fact that *ἔρωτᾶ* looks like a principal verb, instead of being in the clause introduced by *ἀλλ' ὥσπερ* and co-ordinated *per asyndeton* (see on 335 A) with *νουθετεῖ*. In consequence the verb for which *ἀλλά* is waiting, *ὑπολαμβάνουσιν*, is introduced when it comes by *ἴσως οὖν* as though a fresh sentence were beginning. For *εἰ οὐκ αἰσχύνομαι* see on 313 A.

- 341 A. **σοφὸς καὶ δεινός.** Combined, pseudo-Plat. *Hipp. Min.* 373 B; *Theaetet.* 154 D, 173 B; Arist. *Ran.* 968; *Eccles.* 245: opposed, *Theaetet.* 164 C; *Phaedr.* 245 C; often a sarcastic description of sophists; in the last two passages these are opposed as *δεινοί* to those who are really *σοφοί*.
- 341 B. **λέγει ἐκάστοτε.** "Says in each instance."
δεινοῦ πλούτου κ.τ.έ. Genitives of exclamation, as Theocr. *Id.* xv. 75, *χρηστῶ κῶκτίρμονος ἀνδρός*; generally in connection with an interjection, *Rep.* vi. 509 C, "Ἀπολλων δαιμονίας ὑπερβολῆς; *Euthyd.* 303 A, ὦ Πόσειδον δεινῶν λόγων, and mostly with the article in the absence of an epithet as Xen. *Cyrop.* ii. 2, 3; Arist. *Eccles.* 787; *Ach.* 87; but occasionally without, Eur. *Orest.* 412.
τὴν Σιμωνίδου φωνήν. "Ask him about Simonides' dialect": *Phaedo*, 62 A, "Ἰττω Ζεὺς, ἔφη, τῇ αὐτοῦ φωνῇ εἰπών; *Cratyl.* 398 D, ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ φωνῇ; below, 341 C, 346 D.
- 341 C. **ἄτε Λέσβιος ὢν.** And so using the Aeolic and not the Attic dialect, which Prodicus used and considered the only true form of the Greek language. Simonides did not himself use the pure Attic, but a dialect which was far more akin to it than the "barbarous" Aeolic.
- 341 D. **Πρόδικόν γε τόνδε εἰδέναι.** Socrates cleverly turns the tables on Prodicus. His assent to the identity of *χαλεπός* and *κακός* had been given seriously, and now Socrates tells him that he could not have been in earnest. Prodicus is incapable of protest, for the sense of the audience is evidently against the identification.
δοκεῖν ἀποπειρᾶσθαι. The pleonasm of *δοκεῖν* after *οἶμαι* is illustrated by *Soph.* 235 D, *δοκῶ μὴν τό γε δι' ἡδονὴν τῆς περὶ ταῦτα διατριβῆς ἀμελὲς τῶν οἰκείων γιγνόμενον . . . καλεῖσθαι κατὰ γνώμην τὴν ἐμὴν οὐχ ἕτερον ἀδολεσχικοῦ*; *Phileb.* 32 C; *Lach.* 192 C, *τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔμοι γε φαίνεται, ὅτι οὐ πᾶσά γε, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, καρτερία ἀνδρία σοι φαίνεται*; *Phaed.* 60 C.
- 341 E. **τοῦτ' ἔχει γέρας.** "Have this as a privilege"; *γέρας* is predicate, as the absence of the article shows: cp. 323 A.
εἶτα. Kroschel reads *εἶπερ* with a comma only after *ἔχει γέρας*, objecting to the full stop and want of a conjunction before *οὐ δήπου*; for the asyndeton, however, see note on 335 A, adding *Dem.* 4, 20, *ὅπως μὴ ποιήσετε δὲ πολλάκις ὑμᾶς ἔβλαψεν· πάντ' ἐλάττω νομίζοντες εἶναι τοῦ δέοντος . . . ἐπὶ*

τῷ πράττειν οὐδὲ τὰ μικρὰ ποιεῖτε. For εἶτα after a participle introducing an opposition, a fairly common usage, cp. *Rep.* ii. 359 C, μάλιστ' ἂν αἰσθοίμεθα, εἰ . . . δόντες ἐξουσίαν . . . εἶτ' ἐπακολουθήσασιν; *Phaedr.* 236 A; *Phileb.* 13 B; *Sympos.* 200 A, πότερον ἔχων αὐτὸ . . . εἶτα ἐπιθυμῶ;

341 E: οὐδαμῶς Κεῖον. The inhabitants of Ceos enjoyed such a reputation for morality that, *Laws*, i. 638 B, the conquest of the Ceians by the Athenians is given as a proof that virtue does not necessarily find its reward in victory; *Ar. Ran.* 970, Κεῖος is opposed to Χῖος, the Chians being as famous for the laxness of their morals.

342 A. δ σὺ λέγεις τοῦτο. "The expression you make use of"; with reference rather to the whole phrase, ὅπως ἔχω περὶ ἐπῶν (see 338 E), with which τοῦτο is in apposition; cp. τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο in *Gorg.* 514 E.

φιλοσοφία γάρ. This discourse of Socrates is a parody of Protagoras', 316 C ff. He accepts Protagoras' statements regarding (1) the antiquity of the profession, and (2) the necessity for concealment, and then proceeds, εἰρωνεύων, to enunciate solemnly the paradox that, in consequence, the countries which least seem to be devoted to the search after knowledge, Lacedaemon and Crete, really abound in σοφισταί. Lest, however, others should imitate this source of their success, they conceal the fact under roughness of habits and speech. Nay, their very brevity is a mark of the highest wisdom.

πλείστη τῶν Ἑλλήνων. *Thuc.* iv. 60, 1, δύναμιν ἔχοντες μεγίστην τῶν Ἑλλήνων. Probably γῆς is in the same construction with πλείστοι, but it may be taken with ἐκεῖ.

342 B. σχηματίζονται. *Gorg.* 511 D, οὐ σεμνύνεται (ἢ κυβερνητικῆ) ἐσχηματισμένη ὡς ὑπερήφανόν τι διαπραττομένη; *Phaedr.* 255 A, οὐχ ὑπὸ σχηματιζομένου τοῦ ἐρώντος ἀλλ' ἀληθῶς τοῦτο πεπονθότος.

ὡσπερ οὖς κ.τ.έ. For the attraction cp. 359 D, below; *Crito*, 48 C, ἃς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις; *Heind.* ad *Gorg.* 483 A; add *Rep.* x. 602 D, ᾧ δὴ ἡμῶν τῷ παθήματι τῆς φύσεως ἡ σκιαγραφία ἐπιθεμένη γοητείας οὐδὲν ἀπολείπει.

τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι λακωνίζοντας. "The party in each state which aped Spartan manners," i.e. the oligarchical faction: see *Gorg.* 515 E; *Ar. Av.* 1281, ἐλακωνομάνουν ἅπαντες ἄνθρωποι τότε, | ἐκόμων, ἐπέινων, ἐρρύπων, ἐσωκράτουν; *Demosth. in Conon.* (54, § 34), and *Plut. Phoc.* 10 (p. 746), quoted above on 335 D.

ᾧτά τε κατάγνυνται. Are battered in glove-fights. *Theocr.* *Id.* xxii. 45, δεινὸς ἰδεῖν, σκληραῖσι τεθλαγμένος οὐατα πυγμαῖς; *Gorg.* 515 E, τῶν τὰ ᾧτα κατεαγόντων ἀκούεις ταῦτα. The ἱμάντες were the thongs which, wrapped round fist and arm, served, unlike our gloves, to make the blows more punishing: *Virg. Aen.* v. 401.

342 C. βραχείας ἀναβολάς. "Short cloaks": the same as the τρίβων in 335 D; the derivation is illustrated by *Theaetet.* 175 E,

ἀναβάλλεσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἐπισταμένου ἐπιδέξια ἐλευθέρως. For the shortness cp. Thuc. i. 6, 3, μετρία δ' αὖ ἐσθῆτι καὶ ἐς τὸν νῦν τρῆπον πρῶτον Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐχρήσαντα; Arist. *Eth. Nic.* iv. (7) 13, 15, καὶ ἐνίοτε ἀλαζονεῖα φαίνεται· οἷον ἢ τῶν Λακῶνων ἐσθῆς· καὶ γὰρ ἢ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἢ λίαν ἔλλειψις ἀλαζονικόν.

342 C. ὡς δὴ τούτοις κρατοῦντας. The accusative absolute (Thompson, p. 167) in conjunction with ὡς, as frequently the genitive absolute: *Rep.* i. 345 E, ὡς οὐχὶ αὐτοῖσιν ὠφέλειαν ἐσομένην; ii. 383 A, ὡς μήτε αὐτοὺς γόητας ὄντας; iv. 426 C; *Phaed.* 109 D, where see Stallb. For the sarcastic use of ὡς δὴ see two good instances in *Gorg.* 468 E, 499 B.

ξενηλασίας ποιούμενοι. Plut. *Lycurg.* p. 56 C, οὐδ' ἀποδημεῖν ἔδωκε (Λυκοῦργος) τοῖς βουλομένοις καὶ πλανᾶσθαι ξενικὰ συναγοντας ἤθη καὶ μιμήματα βίων ἀπαιδευτῶν καὶ πολιτευμάτων διαφορὰν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἀθροισζομένους ἐπ' οὐδενὶ χρησίμῳ καὶ παρεισρέοντας εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἀπέλαυνεν . . . ὅπως μὴ διδάσκαλοι κακοῦ τινος ὑπάρξωσι; so Aristotle (*arud* Harpocrat. s.v. κάθετος), οὐκ ἐξεῖναι φησιν ἀποδημεῖν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ὅπως μηδὲ ἐθίζωνται ἄλλων νόμων εἶναι φίλοι; Thuc. i. 144, 2; cp. *Hipp. Mai.* 284 A ff. (Hippias complains that he may not teach at Sparta). In *Laws*, xii. 949 E ff. Plato allows ἢ πόλεων ἐπιμιξία πόλεσιν only under certain conditions which will minimise the danger, for τοῖς εὖ πολιτευομένοις of evil communications, admitting that complete seclusion is neither possible nor politic: cp. Pericles' boast (Thuc. ii. 39, 2), οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτε ξενηλασίαις ἀπείργομέν τινὰ ἢ μαθήματος ἢ θεάματος. That the same seclusion was affected by Cretans is to be inferred from a passage in *Laws*, xii. 950 C.

342 D. ἀλλὰ καὶ γυναῖκες. Socrates' proof of the wisdom of the Lacedaemonians is based upon their laconic utterances. The like evidence is forthcoming in the case of the women. A work is attributed to Plutarch entitled *Λακωνῶν ἀποφθέγματα*; compare the well-known words of a Spartan mother giving his shield to her son, ἢ τὰν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς.

εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλει τις. See 324 A.

342 E. ἐνέβαλεν ῥῆμα. The tense, being an aorist, describes the mere action without accessories of progress or completion; the time, being past, intimates that the action is over as soon as it occurs. Stallb. ad *Rep.* iii. 406 D, ἐὰν δέ τις αὐτῷ μακρὰν δίαιταν προστάτῃ . . . ταχὺ εἶπεν ὅτι οὐ σχολὴ κάμνειν, cites many passages of a similar kind; *Gorg.* 484 A, 511 D, 524 E, 525 A, 526 C; *Rep.* iii. 411 A, B; v. 462 C; vi. 495 B, 508 D; ix. 586 A (add x. 609 A); *Soph.* 262 C; *Phaed.* 73 D; *Sympos.* 188 B, 197 A. For the metaphor (συνεστραμμένον, Lat. *contortum*, meaning "condensed" in reference to style, and "drawn tight" of a bow string) compare *Theaetet.* 180 A, ὥσπερ ἐκ φαρέτρας ῥηματισκία αἰνιγματώδη ἀνασπῶντες ἀποτοξεύουσι; *Sympos.* 219 B, ἐγὼ μὲν δὴ ταῦτα ἀκούσας καὶ εἰπὼν, καὶ ἀφείς ὥσπερ βέλη, τετρῶσθαι αὐτὸν ᾤμην; *Laws*, iii. 698 D, καὶ τινὰ λόγον εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν πόλιν ἀφῆκε φοβερόν; *Phileb.* 23 B, οἷον βέλη

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connect too closely the *individual* dicta with the maxims said to be chosen by all for inscribing in the temple. For the tradition cp. Pausan. x. 24, οὗτοι οἱ ἄνδρες ἀφικόμενοι εἰς Δελφοὺς ἀνέθεσαν τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι τὰ ἀδόμηνα Γνώθι σαυτὸν καὶ Μηδὲν ἄγαν; a third maxim, Ἐγγύα, πάρα δ' ἄτα, is mentioned by Plutarch (*De Garrul.* p. 511 A) and Diodorus Siculus. See Mayor's note on Juv. *Sat.* xi. 27.

343 B. τοῦ δὴ ἔνεκα ταῦτα λέγω; This device of a question so addressed by the speaker to himself is seen 349 A below; *Gorg.* 453 C; *Phaedr.* 235 C, 237 D; *Laws*, i. 630 B; iii. 701 C, *atque ita sexcenties* (Heind.) See Riddell's *Digest*, § 325.

τῶν παλαιῶν. The less ambiguous order would be ὁ τῶν παλαιῶν τρόπος τῆς φιλοσοφίας: cp. Xen. *Anab.* vi. 1, 1, ἡ Χειρισόφου ἀρχὴ τοῦ παντὸς κατελύθη; *Laws*, i. 648 E, τὴν πάντων ἦτταν φοβούμενος ἀνθρώπων τοῦ πώματος; *Phaed.* 85 A, οἱ ἄνθρωποι διὰ τὸ αὐτῶν δέος τοῦ θανάτου καὶ τῶν κύκνων καταψεύδονται; Thuc. iii. 12, 2, δοκοῦμεν ἀδικεῖν διὰ τὴν ἐκείνων μέλλησιν τῶν ἐς ἡμᾶς δεινῶν; but there is no rule: cp. *Charm.* 164 D, ὡς δὴ πρόσρησις οὔσα τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν εἰσιόντων, and advantage is taken of this to place τῶν παλαιῶν in a more emphatic position. Krueger, 47, 9, 6.

343 C. εἰ καθέλοι. "If he gained a victory over": cp. 344 C (bis), and see L. and S.; the verb is mostly so used in the poets, as Aesch. *Eum.* 286, χρόνος καθαιρεῖ πάντα.

τούτῳ ἐπιβουλεύων κολουῖσαι αὐτό. For the change of pronoun see on 309 B; and for the infinitive after the verb cp. *Sympos.* 203 B, ἡ οὖν Πενία ἐπιβουλεύουσα διὰ τὴν αὐτῆς ἀπορίαν παιδίον ποιήσασθαι ἐκ τοῦ Πόρου κ.τ.έ., and *Rep.* viii. 566 B. To take τούτῳ as "with it" (sc. τῷ ᾄσματι) with Sauppe and Kroschel is less convenient.

κολοῖσαι. *Rep.* vii. 528 C, ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀτιμαζόμενα καὶ κολουόμενα, and see L. and S.

343 D. ἔπειτα ἐνέβαλε τὸ μὲν. "He had yet thrown in, on the one hand": ἔπειτα is used much like εἶτα after a participle; see on 341 E. The argument is that the word μὲν in the first line of the song implies a subsequent opposition which is found only in the contrast between εἶναι and γενέσθαι.

οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕνα λόγον. "To no purpose at all": for οὐδὲ . . . ἕνα, see 335 D; for πρὸς λόγον, 344 A, 351 E.

λέγοντος τοῦ Πιπτακοῦ κ.τ.έ. A sentence explanatory of ἐρίζοντα λέγειν; see on 335 A.

ὡς ἀληθῶς. To be connected with χαλεπόν. With οὐκ ἀληθεῖα ἀγαθόν begins a parenthesis, which in its course develops into the main sentence. The passage should run, "No; but to become good is really difficult,—'really' refers to 'difficult,' not to 'good,'—but to be good is not so." The parenthesis is, however, so long that instead of εἶναι δέ κ.τ.έ. we have in οὐ γὰρ εἶναι a restatement of the opposition between γενέσθαι and εἶναι.

343 E. οὐ μέντοι ἀληθῶς. Notice the method of avoiding οὐ δὲ ἀληθῶς. Plato might have written οὐ μὴν ἀληθῶς γε: cp.

Phileb. 12 D, εἰσι μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἐναντίων, ὧ Σώκρατες, αὐται πραγμάτων, οὐ μὴν αὐταί γε ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι.

343 E. καὶ οὐ Σιμωνίδου. This (possessive) genitive acting as predicate is most commonly found after such verbs as νομίζω, καλέω, etc.: *Apol.* 27 D, ὦν δὴ καὶ λέγονται; *Demosth.* 1, § 10, τὸ πολλὰ ἀπολωλέναι τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀμελείας ἂν τις θείη δικαίως; *Krueger*, 47, 6, 11; *Thompson*, p. 79.

ὑπερβατόν. "One must suppose the word 'truly' to be displaced in the poem." The term (ὑπερβατός) is here first employed in the technical sense which it afterwards acquired (Lat. *transgressio verbi*). Heindorf quotes *Arist. Rhet. ad Alex.* 31, ἐὰν . . . μὴ ὑπερβατῶς αὐτὰ (sc. τὰ ὀνόματα) τιθῶμεν, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τὰ ἐχόμενα ἐξῆς τάττομεν; and *Longinus, De Sublim.* τῆς δὲ αὐτῆς ιδέας καὶ τὰ ὑπερβατὰ θετέον· ἔστι δὲ λέξεων ἢ νοήσεων ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἀκολουθίαν κεκινημένη τάξις.

ὑπειπόντα. "Interpreting Pittacus' saying somewhat as though," etc. The verb is used irregularly here; it ordinarily means (1) *πραεῖναι* (*Shilleto ad Thuc.* i. 35, 5, and 90, 4); cp. *Arist. Vesp.* 55, φέρε νυν κατέλω τοῖς θεαταῖς τὸν λόγον, | ὀλίγ' ἄθ' ὑπειπὼν πρῶτον αὐτοῖσιν τάδε, and (2) "to suggest"; cp. *Soph. Ai.* 212, ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν αἰδρῖς ὑπέλοις, *dicendo suggeras* (*Hermann*), and αἰτίας ὑπειπεῖν. Here it acquires the secondary meaning, "explain," "interpret."

εἰπόντα. Supply τὸν μὲν; see note on 330 A.

344 A. γενέσθαι μὲν. The μὲν is a reminiscence of the original probably, but its occurrence here is not inconsistent with its primary meaning. Like μῆν, a strengthened form of it (cp. ἦ μὲν alternating with ἦ μῆν in Homer), μὲν serves to lay special emphasis upon the statement it introduces. Such emphasis ordinarily implies opposition from a subsequent statement, and thus μὲν is generally answered by δέ or some other adversative particle; but this is not necessarily or always the case: cp. *Rep.* i. 334 C, εἰκὸς μὲν; iv. 423 B, οἶμαι μὲν; v. 475 E; *Sophist.* 221 A; and *Crito*, 43 D, δοκεῖ μὲν; *Soph. O. T.* 82; in all which passages the δέ clause is wanting.

φαίνεται πρὸς λόγον. So Heindorf (or φαίνεται τοι), Schanz, Sauppe, Kroschel, Deuschle, for φαίνεται τὸ πρὸς λόγον BT. The article is difficult, and interpolations, especially of similar syllables, are not uncommon in B.

τὰ ἐπιόντα. See 345 C, and Introduction, p. 49.

344 B. τύπον. "General outline or character": *Rep.* iii. 414 A, ὡς ἐν τύπῳ, μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας, εἰρησθαι, where Stallb. τύπος, *quod proprie de imaginum adumbratione dicitur, indicat generalem neque singula persequentem rei descriptionem*. He quotes *Rep.* vi. 491 C; viii. 559 A; *Phileb.* 61 A.

λέγει γάρ. In the words οὐδέ μοι ἐμμελέως κ.τ.έ., 339 C.

ὡς ἂν εἰ λέγοι λόγον. "As if he were pursuing an argument."

οἶόν τε μέντοι. A similar antithesis in *Gorg.* 493 E, δυνατὰ μὲν πορίζεσθαι χαλεπὰ δέ.

- 344 C. ἔξει. "A permanent state," opposed to διάθεσις, "a transitory disposition": *Phileb.* 11 D.
 οὐκ ἀνθρώπειον, ἀλλὰ θεός κ.τ.έ. Arist. *Met.* i. 2 (982 b, *ad fin.*), ὥστε κατὰ Σιμωνίδην θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτ' ἔχοι τὸ γέρας, ἀνδρα δ' οὐκ ἄξιον μὴ οὐ ζητεῖν τὴν καθ' αὐτὸν ἐπιστήμην (*q.v.* Bonitz).
 μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι. See Jelf, § 750; Krueger, 67, 12, 6; Thompson, § 298 C.
 καθέλη. See 343 C.
 καταβάλοι. A wrestling metaphor: pseudo-Plat. *Hipp. Min.* 374 A, αἴσχιον ἐν πάλη τὸ πίπτειν ἢ τὸ καταβάλλειν.
 τὸν δὲ κείμενον οὐ. A pleonastic iteration, as is so frequent in comparisons, see on 328 A above: cp. *Gorg.* 452 E; 521 D, E, ἅτε οὖν οὐ πρὸς χάριν λέγων τοὺς λόγους οὐς λέγω ἐκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἡδιστον; *Rep.* iii. 411 E.
- 344 D. καὶ ἰατρὸν ταῦτὰ ταῦτα. See 312 D; ἰατρὸν is governed by some verb understood from the context, which verb is qualified by ταῦτὰ ταῦτα (internal accusative), as may be seen from *Rep.* vii. 535 D, ταῦτὸν τοῦτο ἀνάπηρον ψυχὴν θήσομεν, where Stallb. cites *Polit.* 308 E; *Meno*, 90 D; *Phileb.* 37 D; *Sympos.* 178 E.
 παρ' ἄλλου ποιητοῦ. Quoted Xen. *Mem.* i. 2, 20, but the author is unknown. The passage is alluded to possibly in Eur. *Hec.* 591 ff.; Soph. *Antig.* 365.
- 344 E. οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ γενέσθαι. Sc. κακῶ: *Meno*, 89 A, εἰ φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἐγίγνοντο.
 τὸ δ' ἐστίν κ.τ.έ. "Whereas it is difficult though possible to become (good), but impossible to be so (permanently)." For τὸ δέ = whereas (lit. "but as for that") cp. *Apol.* 23 A, οἴονται γὰρ με ἐκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφόν, ἃ ἂν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω· τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὧ ἄνδρες, τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι; *Rep.* i. 340 D, and many instances given by Ast, *Lex.* i. pp. 421 ff.
 [ἐσθλόν]. Bracketed by Schneidewin (*Coni. Crit.* p. 152) originally, and since rejected by Schanz, Sauppe, Kroschel, Deuschle. It is a weak and useless repetition of ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι above, which injures the antithesis between εἶναι and γενέσθαι.
 πράξας μὲν γὰρ εὔ. The μὲν is not part of the original, but the γὰρ is, and introduces a justification of the two preceding lines, ἀνδρα δ' οὐκ ἔστι . . . καθέλη. Thus in the original context πράξας εὔ = "when all goes well," "in prosperity," κακῶς πράττειν = "to be afflicted with disaster (from an external source)," and an idea is presented which is constant in the Greek drama. Plato in his commentary reads into the passage the Socratic view that it is *well* with a man only when he is possessed of knowledge, the loss or absence of it alone constituting misfortune, αὕτη γὰρ μόνη ἐστὶ κακὴ πράξις, ἐπιστήμης στέρηθῆναι.
 κακὸς δ' εἰ κακῶς. Sc. ἔπραξε: thus εἰ κακῶς ἔπραξε = κακῶς πράξας as Socrates quotes it below, where Ast in fact reads

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to introduce a further part of the quotation. For *φησίν*, which is pleonastic, see 314 A.

345 D. *ἐπεξέρχεται*. *Euthyphr.* 4 D, *τῷ πατρὶ φόνου ἐπεξέρχομαι*; *Rep.* viii. 549 E; *Laws*, ix. 866 B; *Gorg.* 492 D.

ἔρδη. The usage of the conjunctive without *ἄν* after a relative is very frequent in Homer, see Krueger, ii. 54, 15, 2, and Monro's *Hom. Gr.* § 283 a. In Attic it is confined to a few passages, e.g. *Eur. Or.* 795, *ὡς ἀνὴρ, ὅστις τρόποισι συντακῆ θυραῖος ὢν*; *Soph. O. C.* 395, *γέροντα δ' ὀρθοῦν φλαῦρον ὃς νέος πέση*.

ἀνάγκη. A proverbial expression: *Laws*, v. 741 A, *ἀνάγκην δὲ οὐδὲ θεὸς εἶναι λέγεται δυνατὸς βιάζεσθαι*; vii. 818 A, *ἔοικεν ὁ τὸν θεὸν πρῶτον παροιμασάμενος εἰς ταῦτα ἀποβλέψας εἰπεῖν, ὡς οὐδὲ θεὸς ἀνάγκη μήποτε φανῆ μαχόμενος*; *Aesch. P. V.* 518, *οὐκοῦν ἄν ἐκφύγοι γε τὴν πεπρωμένην*; *Gorg.* 512 E, *πιστεύσαντα ταῖς γυναιξὶν ὅτι τὴν εἰμαρμένην οὐδ' ἄν εἰς ἐκφύγοι*.

ὥστε τούτους. A change in number common where the allusion is general; repeated below in *τούτων φησὶν ἐπαινέτης εἶναι*: cp. *Xen. Oecon.* 21, 8, *τούτους δὴ δικαίως ἄν τις καλοῖη μεγαλογνώμονας, ᾧ ἄν ταῦτα γιγνώσκοντες πολλοὶ ἔπωνται*; see 324 B; Krueger, 58, 4, 5; Jelf, § 390, 1.

οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων ἐκόντα ἑξαμαρτάνειν. A constant maxim with Socrates, read into the context to support the position that all virtue is knowledge, 352 D, 358 E, though obviously, as is seen by the studied opposition in the original between *ἀνάγκη* and *ἐκῶν*, Simonides intended *ἐκῶν* and *ἔρδη* to be taken in close connection. For the Socratic sentiment see Zeller's *Socrates and the Socratic Schools* (Eng. trans.), p. 140, especially n. 1; *Gorg.* 509 E, *ὠμολογήσαμεν μηδένα βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' ἄκοντας τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πάντας ἀδικεῖν*; the *ἀπορίαι* discussed in *Laws*, ix. 861 A ff.; Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Philos.* n. 201, where are quoted *Apol.* 25 D, pseudo-Plat. *Hipp. Min.* 365 D, *Xen. Mem.* iii. 9, 4, *Arist. Eth. Nic.* vii. 3, etc.

346 A. [*φιλεῖν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν*]. So BT; rejected rightly as a gloss by Heind. and succeeding edd.

οἶον. "As for instance"; grammatically *οἶον* is in apposition to the sentence which it introduces.

μητέρα ἢ πατέρα. This is the usual order. Heindorf quotes *Crito*, 51 A; *Hom. Od.* ix. 367.

ἀλλόκοτον. *Rep.* vi. 487 D, *τοὺς μὲν πλείστους καὶ πάνυ ἀλλόκοτους γιγνομένους, ἵνα μὴ παμπονήρους εἴπωμεν*: the word is a derivative of *ἄλλος*, expressing deviation from the ordinary course of nature, "unnatural."

ὥσπερ ἀσμένους. "As it were gladly": *Phaed.* 88 D, *ὥσπερ ὑπέμνησέ με*; *Rep.* v. 451 B, *ἀφιεμέν σε ὥσπερ φόνου . . . καθαρὸν εἶναι*.

346 B. *ὥστε ἔτι μᾶλλον*. "So that they (the sons) not only blame their parents more (than is justifiable), but also voluntarily exaggerate their ill-will beyond what the facts demand":

lit. take upon themselves voluntary in addition to the necessary hatred. BT *ἀνάγκαις*, corr. by Heusde, whom other edd. follow. For *μᾶλλον* in this sense cp. *Phaedo*, 63 D, *φησὶ γὰρ θερμαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον τοὺς διαλεγομένους*.

- 346 B. *ἀναγκάζεσθαι*. Passive: "feel themselves compelled."
ἑαυτοὺς παραμυθεῖσθαι. "Overcome their feelings and are reconciled": *παραμυθ.*, like *παράφημι* (Hom.), *παρηγορέω* (Trag.), from the simple sense of "speak to" acquires in different contexts the further meanings of "exhort," "admonish," "persuade," "control."
ἠγήσατο. "Thought it right himself to praise," etc. Heindorf compares a similar usage of *λογίζεσθαι* (Eur. *Or.* 548), of *οἰεσθαι* (Lysias *in Eratosth.* 12, § 26), and *νομίζειν* (Xen. *Cyrop.* viii. 1, 12). The old explanation was that *δεῖν* was omitted; it is more reasonable to regard the infinitive as virtually the oblique form of a command (Krueger, 55, 3, 15), as in Thuc. iii. 44, 4, *νομίζω περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον βουλεύεσθαι*, quoted by Riddell who (*Digest*, § 83) takes a somewhat different view; see Jelf, § 665. For the fact stated about Simonides see Theocr. *Id.* xvi. 36, and Cic. *de Orat.* ii. 86.
- 346 C. *ἀναγκαζόμενος*. By motives of gain.
τ' ὀνησίπολιν. BT *γε ὀνήσει πόλιν*; the text is G. Hermann's correction.
οὐ μιν. BT *οὐ μήν*; Schleiermacher's correction.
ἀπείρων. Nom. fem. sing. agreeing with *γενέθλα* (*γενέθλη*); BT reads *γένεθλα*, which must be a neut. plur.
πάντα τοι καλά. Heind. notices the customary use of *τοι* in aphorisms, and quotes numerous instances. The meaning of the proverb here, as is subsequently explained, is that Simonides finds everything *καλός* which involves nothing absolutely *αἰσχρός*; *καλός* in Simonides' language includes many gradations of *τὸ καλόν*. For the position of these words in the original song see *Introd.* p. 49.
- 346 D. *τούτου γ' ἔνεκα*. "So far as that goes": "if I am to wait till I find a perfect man." See a number of passages quoted by Heind. on *Charm.* 158 E; *Politic.* 304 A; *Theaetet.* 148 D; *Rep.* i. 337 D; *Phaed.* 85 B, *ἀλλὰ τούτου γε ἔνεκα λέγειν τε χρὴ καὶ ἐρωτᾶν ὅ τι ἂν βούλησθε*.
ὥς πρὸς Πιπτακὸν λέγων. This is not meant seriously by Socrates. It is true that *ἐπαίνημι* is an Aeolic form, but such forms are common to Epic and Doric dialects: Jelf, § 190, 1; Krueger, ii. 37, 2, 6.
- 346 E. *διαλαβεῖν*. "We must divide the sentence at *ἐκών*."
- 347 A. *νῦν δέ*. This phrase followed by a clause with *γάρ* frequently involves an apparent aposiopesis: cp. *Apol.* 38 B, *εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησάμην ἂν χρημάτων ὅσα ἔμελλον ἐκτίσειν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐβλάβην· νῦν δέ, οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ὅσον ἂν ἐγὼ δυναίμην ἐκτίσαι, τοσούτου βούλεσθέ μοι τιμῆσαι*. By the interposition of the *γάρ* clause the main statement introduced by *νῦν δέ* is in such cases diverted

from its original course—even here the resumptive *διὰ ταῦτα* is needed to recall it—but is not left unexpressed. Riddell (*Digest*, § 149) collects a large number of instances, but explains the combination *νῦν δὲ . . . γάρ*, as well as *ἀλλὰ γάρ*, by his theory of the “simultaneous entrance” of the particles into the sentence; he too allows of no ellipse. See Heind. ad *Theaetet.* 143 D.

347 B. ἐπιδείξω. For the meaning of the verb see on 320 C. That this conceit was characteristic of Hippias is seen by a like boast in *Hipp. Mai.* 286 A, *ἔστι γάρ μοι περὶ αὐτῶν πάγκαλος λόγος συγκείμενος, καὶ ἄλλως εὖ διακείμενος καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι*: cp. pseudo-Plat. *Hipp. Min.* 368 B.

ἃ ὁμολογησάτην. The antecedent to ἃ is the conditions which are here repeated, *Πρωταγόρας μὲν . . . τὸν ἕτερον.*

347 C. περὶ μὲν ἄσμάτων τε καὶ ἐπῶν ἑάσωμεν. Here, as in *Alcib. I.* 113 D, *ἑάσαντες οὖν περὶ αὐτῶν σκοποῦσιν ὁπότερα συνοίσει πράξασι*, the infinitive *σκοπεῖσθαι* or some expression to the same effect must be understood after *ἑάσωμεν*.

τοῖς συμποσίοις. Compare Socrates' own proposal, *Sympos.* 176 E, *εἰσηγοῦμαι τὴν μὲν ἄρτι εἰσελθοῦσαν αὐλητρίδα χαίρειν ἔαν, αὐλοῦσαν ἑαυτῇ, ἢ, ἂν βούληται, ταῖς γυναιξὶ ταῖς ἔνδον, ἡμᾶς δὲ διὰ λόγων ἀλλήλοις συνεῖναι τὸ τήμερον.*

ἀγοραίων. Men ἐν ἀγορᾷ τεθραμμένοι (*Ar. Eq.* 292, 636), and so devoid of real culture. Ἀγοραῖος is the word used in *Acts xvii.* 5, “Certain lewd fellows of the baser sort.”

τιμίας ποιούσι τὰς αὐλητρίδας. “Make flute-players dear”: cp. *Euthyd.* 304 B, *τὸ γὰρ σπάνιον, ὧ Εὐθύδημε, τίμιον· τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ εὐωνότατον.* The opposite word is *ἄξιος* (cheap) used when you “get your money's worth.” For the custom alluded to see *Sympos.* 176 E, quoted above, and *Xen. Sympos.* 2, 1.

347 D. συμπόται καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι. BT om. *καὶ* which is supplied in a correction to T, and is read by Athenaeus (3, p. 97 b). Schanz strikes out *πεπαιδευμένοι* as well, as a gloss. The text is read by Sauppe, Kroschel, Deuschle. *καὶ* could readily have dropped out after the *-ται*, and *πεπαιδευμένοι* is important since it is the want of *παίδευσις* which is blamed in *οἱ ἀγοραῖοι*.

347 E. κἂν πάνυ πολὺν οἶνον πῖωσιν. As Socrates himself does in the *Symposium* without, however, being affected. Alcibiades mentions as one of Socrates' good points that he had a steadier head than anyone else: *ibid.* 214 A, 220 A.

ἐὰν μὲν λάβωνται ἀνδρῶν. “If they catch men.” The *συνουσίαι* are personified and regarded as “laying hold of” those they want, and in the sentence *ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας συνουσίας κ.τ.έ.* the subject is supplied from this personification. The opposition to *ἐὰν μὲν* is left unstated as not being pertinent to the discussion, as below, 349 D, for the same reason there is nothing to correspond to *μόρια μὲν ἔστιν ἀρετῆς*.

ἐπαγόμενοι τε αὐτούς. The pronoun here represents the relative, see note on 313 B. For *ἐπάγεσθαι*, “cite as a witness,” cp.

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- 348 D. ἐπιδείξεται . . . βεβαιώσηται. "To whom he is to exhibit and with whom he can confirm it"; the deliberative conjunctive in accordance with the reading of BT, which Schanz, Sauppe, Kroschel alter to the future.
- ἡγούμενος. Explanatory of ἐνεκα τούτου: *Phaedo*, 102 D, λέγω δὲ τοῦδ' ἐνεκα βουλόμενος δόξαι σοι ὅπερ ἐμοί, where Heind. quotes *Parmen.* 126 A, πάρειμί γε ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο, δεησόμενος ὑμῶν; *Theaetet.* 151 B, ταῦτα δὴ σοι, ὦ ἀριστε, ἐνεκα τοῦδ' ἐμήκυνα, ὑποπτεύων σε . . . ὠδίνειν τι κυοῦντα ἔνδον.
- 348 E. σὺ δὲ καὶ αὐτός. This clause, a mere repetition of ὅς γε οὐ μόνον κ.τ.έ., interrupts the regular course of the sentence which should have proceeded, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλους οἷός τ' εἶ κ.τ.έ.; see Riddell's *Digest*, § 300.
- ἄλλων ταύτην τὴν τέχνην ἀποκρυπτομένων. See 316 D.
- ὑποκηρυξάμενος. "Having got yourself cried as a sophist": cp. *Aeschin. in Ctesiph.* p. 432 (§ 41), ἄλλοι δὲ τινες ὑποκηρυξάμενοι τοὺς αὐτῶν οἰκέτας ἀφίεσαν ἀπελευθέρους; for εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας see 312 A.
- 349 A. μισθὸν ἀξιώσας ἄρνησθαι. See 328 B.
- πῶς οὖν οὐ σε χρῆν. For the rhetorical question see on 343 B.
- νῦν δὴ. See note on 329 C.
- 349 B. ἦν δὲ . . . τὸ ἐρώτημα. See 329 C ff.
- οὐκ ὄν οἷον τὸ ἕτερον. In irregular partitive apposition to πρᾶγμα.
- 349 C. ὑπόλογον. "I put down nothing to be accounted for by you": *Lach.* 189 B, μηδὲν τὴν ἡμετέραν ἡλικίαν ὑπόλογον ποιούμενος. Riddell (*Digest*, § 131) regards the ὑπό as meaning "against" in ὑπολογίζεσθαι = "to reckon one thing against another"; in this word however, as in ὑπεύθυνος, there is the notion of being *subject* to a reckoning.
- 349 D. μόρια μὲν. See on 347 E.
- διαφερόντως. Bracketed by Schanz, and wanting in 359 B. Cobet reads ἀνδρείους διαφερόντως. It is indeed hard to see how διαφερόντως could have been interpolated, and Sauppe defends the reading of the text by citing *Timaeus*, 23 C, πόλις ἀρίστη πρὸς τε τὸν πόλεμον καὶ κατὰ πάντα εὐνομωτάτη διαφερόντως; *Thuc.* viii. 68, 3, παρέσχε δὲ καὶ ὁ Φρύνιχος ἑαυτὸν πάντων διαφερόντως προθυμότατον ἐς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν.
- 349 E. ἔχε δὴ. "Hold": see *Gorg.* 460 A (q.v. Thompson), 490 B; *Rep.* i. 353 B; it is used alone in *Alc. I.* 109 B, ἔχε· πῶς ἕκαστα τούτων πάσχοντες; *Arist. Pac.* 1193; *Vesp.* 1149.
- ἴτας. From ἰέναι. "People ready to go at that," etc., Jowett; used also in *Sympos.* 203 D, ἐπιβουλός ἐστιν (ὁ Ἔρως) τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς καὶ τοῖς καλοῖς, ἀνδρείος ὢν καὶ ἴτης καὶ σύντονος; *Ar. Nub.* 444, θρασύς, εὐγλωττος, πολμηρός, ἴτης; *Hesych.* ἴτης· ἰταμός, θρασύς.
- εἰ μὴ μαίνομαι γε. "Unless I am out of my senses": *Euthyd.* 283 E, ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τ' εἶναι ψεύδεσθαι; *Nῆ Δία*, ἔφη, εἰ μὴ μαίνομαι γε; cp. *Charm.* 156 A, καὶ τοῦνομά μου σὺ ἀκριβοῖς; *Ei μὴ ἀδικῶ γε* (if I am not wrong); and *Rep.* x. 612 D, where the sentence is thrown into a rather more natural form.

- 349 E. τὸ μὲν τι αὐτοῦ. *Rep.* viii. 547 D, ἢ φανερόν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν μιμήσεται τὴν προτέραν πολιτείαν, τὰ δὲ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, ἀπ' ἐν μέσῳ οὔσα, τὸ δὲ τι καὶ αὐτῆς ἔξει ἴδιον; i. 339 C, τοὺς μὲν (νόμους) ὀρθῶς τιθέασι, τοὺς δὲ τινὰς οὐκ ὀρθῶς; *Phileb.* 13 C; *Thuc.* vii. 48, 2; *Xen. Cyrop.* iii. i. 41.
- κολυμβῶσιν. "Who in the course of their vocation descend wells"; *i.e.* to clean or repair them. The same two instances of courage are given in *Laches*, 193 B and C, where the argument takes much the same line.
- 350 A. τὰ ἄλλα γε πάντα. The accusative (adverbial) is in loose construction with the thought contained in the sentence: cp. 310 E, and Krueger, 46, 3, 2-5; Thompson, p. 414.
- 350 B. οἱ θαρραλέοι οὗτοι. These kind of courageous people.
- τοὺς ἀνδρείους. For the constr. with λέγω cp. *Phaedr.* 265 C, πῶς . . . αὐτὸ λέγεις; *Cratyl.* 407 A, τὸ ἕτερον πῶς λέγεις; and translate, "What do you mean by the brave? Do you not mean that they are the courageous? I still mean it." There seems no need with Schanz and Sauppe to omit the article with θαρραλέους. The argument does not wish to prove that "the brave are courageous," but to establish an identity, that "the brave" and "the courageous" are co-extensive terms, an identity which Protagoras in C demurs to. Throughout the discussion, however, the "intelligently courageous" alone are in question as being brave, and with this modification the identity is true. It is upon this ground—that ἐπιστήμη is an *essential* to ἀνδρεία—that Plato actually identifies ἐπιστήμη (the unscientific term σοφία is substituted for it in 350 C) with ἀνδρεία. Plato's conclusion is indeed not warranted by the arguments which he has adduced (cp. note on 333 C), but Protagoras in his objections has not taken into consideration the restricted sense to which θαρραλέος is by implication confined, and has failed to put his finger upon the real defect in Plato's reasoning.
- 350 D. τοὺς δὲ ἀνδρείους ὡς οὐ θαρραλέοι εἰσίν. A confused construction: "You never proved that my admission that the brave are courageous was wrong." The οὐ is introduced because Protagoras is thinking immediately of the *disproof* of his admission, the negation of which is ὡς οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι οὐ θαρραλέοι εἰσίν. For the pleonasm of the negative Heindorf compares *Lysis*, 222 B, οὐ ῥάδιον ἀποβαλεῖν τὸν πρόσθεν λόγον, ὡς οὐ τὸ ὁμοῖον τῷ ὁμοίῳ κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα ἄχρηστον; add *Meno*, 89 D, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη (ἢ ἀρετή), σκέψαι ἐάν σοι δοκῶ εἰκότως ἀπιστεῖν; *Charm.* 169 E, after ἀμφισβητῶ; *Gorg.* 508 A. Krueger, 67, 12, 2; Thompson, p. 365.
- τούτῳ δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ μετιών. Protagoras forgets that while it could be said above οἱ ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης θαρραλέοι οὐκ ἀνδρεῖοι εἰσίν, it cannot be said that οἱ ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης δυνατοὶ οὐκ ἰσχυροὶ εἰσίν, and that so his comparison fails in a vital point. Intelligence is not such an inalienable accompaniment of ἰσχύς as it is of ἀνδρεία.

- 351 A. τὸ μὲν καὶ ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης γίνεσθαι, τὴν δύναμιν. For the difference of genders see on 330 D.
- 351 B. ἀνδρεία δὲ ἀπὸ φύσεως καὶ εὐτροφίας τῶν ψυχῶν. Protagoras wishes to say that courage is a "natural" quality dependent upon a healthy condition of the soul; but inasmuch as the *food* of the soul consists of μαθήματα (313 C), he is really so far in agreement with Socrates' present contention that he acknowledges that wisdom is an essential of courage. Cp. *Rep.* iii. 410 C ff.
- 351 C. μὴ εἴ τι. BT εἰ μὴ τι, which Thompson suggests may be a relic of a reading εἰ μὴ εἴ τι, Lat. *nisi si*, cp. *Gorg.* 480 B. Translate, "not according to whether anything undesirable will result"; μὴ is written since there is a notion of *forbidding* the question to be considered on these grounds.
- 351 D. ἔστι μὲν ἃ τῶν ἡδέων οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθά. Contrast what Dr. Martineau says, *Types of Ethical Theory*, ii. p. 110: "I cannot be content to use, even for argument's sake, the assumption of two dimensions of pleasure, without again insisting on its fallaciousness. If there are *sorts* of pleasure they must be something more than pleasure; each must have its *differentia* added on to what suffices for the genus; and the addition cannot be *pleasurable quality*, else it would not detach anything from the genus; to mark a species at all, it must be an *extra-hedonistic quality*."
καὶ τρίτον ἃ οὐδέτερα. Possibly this exhaustive division was a part of Protagoras' own method; cp. 334 A.
- 351 E. πρὸς λόγον. Protagoras means to say, "Let us consider it, if the discussion is to the point, and if good and pleasant seem to us identical we will agree"; what he actually says is nonsense. For πρὸς λόγον cp. *Gorg.* 459 C.
δίκαιος . . . σύ. The second person of εἶμι is omitted also in *Gorg.* 487 D, καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε οἶος παρρησιάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ αἰσχύνεσθαι, αὐτὸς τε φῆς κ.τ.έ.; Aesch. *P. V.* 320, 475; but the omission is rare. Krueger, 62, 1, 5; Jelf, § 376.
- 352 A. ὥσπερ εἴ τις κ.τ.έ. The apodosis to εἰ . . . εἶποι in the simile is merged in the statement of the reality καὶ ἐγὼ τοιοῦτόν τι κ.τ.έ. Τὰς χεῖρας ἄκρας = "the hands at the end (of the arms)."
θεασάμενος. This is in explanation of the foregoing, whence the omission of the conjunction; see on 335 A.
- 352 B. καὶ τοῦτο. "Whether knowledge too (like pleasure, 351 C) appears to you to be like it does to the majority." There is the same ellipse in *Phaedr.* 234 C, τί σοι φαίνεται . . . ὁ λόγος; *Meno*, 82 E; *Phileb.* 22 A.
οὐδὲ ὡς περὶ τοιοῦτου αὐτοῦ ὄντος. See on 337 E.
- 352 C. ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνδραπόδου. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* vii. 3, δεινὸν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης, ὡς ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἄλλο τι κρατεῖν καὶ περιέλκειν αὐτὸν (τὸν ἐπιστάμενον) ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον.
ἢ ἂν ἐπιστήμη κελεύη. B ἢ ἃ η; T ἢ ἄν. The reading in the text, practically almost the same as that of B written in uncials, is Sauppe's conjecture followed by Schanz and others.

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reason or other they make a man feel pleasure," μαθόντα being either nom. plur. neut. or accus. sing. masc. without detriment to the sense. In support of the latter explanation, which is adopted by Wayte and Deuschle, we may adduce *Apol.* 36 B, τί ἀξίός εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι, ὃ τι μαθῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἤγον ("for having taken it into my head to deny myself rest," Riddell); *Euthyd.* 283 E, εἶπον ἄν, Σοὶ εἰς κεφαλὴν, ὃ τι μαθῶν ἐμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καταψεύδει τοιοῦτο πρᾶγμα; and other passages in which the phrase is used, whatever the explanation of it, in the general sense of *propterea quod* (Jelf, § 872 κ). Kroschel's objection that it is only so used of persons is not a grave one, as (α) it is possible to take μαθόντα here as accus. masc. sing. with τινὰ omitted (see Stallb. ad *Crit.* 43 B), and (β) Deuschle points out that though originally so employed, it may easily have been extended in its application to things. Sauppe writes as more suitable to the passage ὃ τι παθόντα (accus. sing.), and translates "through whatever influence and in whatever way they make a man rejoice." Stallbaum has ὅτι παθόντα, translating *quia faciunt ut quis quomodocunque affectus gaudcat*, which Schanz reads and Kroschel prefers though confessing to a wish to expunge the sentence. C. F. Hermann's correction, ὅτι παρόντα, is neat but not conclusive.

354 A. πάλιν αὖ αὐτούς. Πάλιν ἄν αὐτούς, the reading of BT, is retained by Deuschle alone of modern editors. He justifies the ἄν as anticipating the apodosis φαίεν ἄν, according to the common idiom of the Greek language which marks the character of a sentence from its beginning. Sauppe omits εἰ; Schanz more reasonably reads αὖ, to which Kroschel assents, hinting, however, that it is merely a mistaken repetition of the first syllable of αὐτούς.

λιμοκτονιῶν. "Cures by abstinence."

354 B. ἄλλων ἀρχαί. "Rule over other states." Ast gives several instances of the objective genitive with the word: *Gorg.* 514 A, ἀρχήν τινῶν; *Politic.* 275 A, τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς πόλεως; *Rep.* i. 341 D, τὴν τῶν ναυτῶν ἀρχήν; *Critias*, 114 A. Heindorf however, objecting that the plur. ἀρχαί should in this context mean "magistracies," suspects the passage.

354 C. ἀλλ' ἢ ἡδονάς. Stephanus' correction, rejected by C. F. Hermann, for ἀλλ' ἡδονάς of BT. For the phrase see on 329 D. For the view compare what Bentham says in the opening paragraph of *Morals and Legislation*: "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of cause and effect, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think; every effort we can make to throw off our subjection will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it.

In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire ; but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while."

- 354 C. ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὄν. For οὖσαν by attraction : cp. 329 D, 359 D ; *Rep.* i. 354 C, ὅποτε γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον μὴ οἶδα ὃ ἐστὶ, σχολῆ εἶσομαι, εἴτε ἀρετὴ τις οὖσα (for ὄν) τυγχάνει, εἴτε καὶ οὐ ; see Stallb. ad *Rep.* i. 333 E, who quotes *ibid.* 336 A ; iv. 420 C, οἱ γὰρ ὀφθαλμοί, κάλλιστον ὄν, οὐκ ὀστρέω ἐναληλιμμένοι εἶεν ; *Gorg.* 463 E ; *Meno*, 79 E, etc.
- ὅταν μειζόνων ἡδονῶν ἀποστερηῆ. See *Phaedo*, 68 E ff., where Plato in a fine passage stigmatises this position as unworthy of philosophers.
- 354 D. ἄλλο τι οὖν. See note on 353 C.
- 354 E. εἴ με ἀνέροισθε. In the heat of the argument οἱ ἄνθρωποι are directly addressed without the fiction (inaugurated in 353 A) of regarding them as third persons.
- ἐν τούτῳ. "Upon this the whole proof turns" ; *i.e.* the meaning of the expression τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττω εἶναι. See note on 310 D.
- 355 A. ἀναθέσθαι. Generally regarded as a metaphor from draughts, "retracting" a move, as in pseudo-Plat. *Hipparch.* 229 E, ὡς περ πεττεύων ἐθέλω σοι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀναθέσθαι ὃ τι βούλει τῶν εἰρημένων ; but Riddell (*Digest*, § 111) says not necessarily so. It is used also in *Gorg.* 461 D, καὶ ἐγὼ ἐθέλω τῶν ὠμολογημένων, εἴ τί σοι δοκεῖ μὴ καλῶς ὠμολογήσθαι, ἀναθέσθαι ὃ τι ἂν σὺ βούλη ; *Phaed.* 87 A, οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ οὐχὶ πάννυ χαριέντως . . . ἀποδεδεῖχθαι. Thompson, on *Gorg.* 493 C, supposes that μετατίθεσθαι is a metaphor drawn from the same source, comparing *Rep.* i. 345 B, εἰ μὴ μετατιθῆ, φανερώς μετατίθεσο, καὶ ἡμᾶς μὴ ἐξαπάτα.
- ἢ τὸ κακὸν ἄλλο τι. BT ἢ ἄλλο τι : a manifest error corrected by the second hand of T.
- ἄνθρωπος. Sauppe's correction for ἄνθρωπος BT, which is retained by Wayte, Kroschel, Deuschle. As in 321 D, the word without the article can mean "man" in the generic sense as well as it does with the article below. It is not, however, likely that the two varieties of the expression should occur so close together, and Schanz adopts Sauppe's correction. We cannot translate ἄνθρωπος, "a man," the ἄνθρωπος on its second occurrence being written with the article to refer to the first mention, because this would have been expressed by γιγνώσκων τις τὰ κακά, at all events not by ἄνθρωπος.
- 355 B. καὶ αὐθις αὐτὸ λέγετε. If the sentence ran its due course we should have ὅταν λέγητε here also ; but the form of it lapses into a direct unconditional statement of the illogical popular position. Schanz, however, brackets λέγετε ; Kroschel and Deuschle after Heind. read λέγητε.
- χρώμεθα ἄρα. "If we do not use consequently a number of terms" ; it is the result of the discussion above that ἀγαθόν and ἡδύ, κακόν and ἀνιαρόν are respectively identified. For the peculiar position of ἄρα Heindorf quotes *Gorg.* 519 B,

πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκότες ἄρα ἀδίκως ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἀπόλλυνται; *Phileb.* 41 C, ἕως ἂν αἱ λεγόμεναι ἐπιθυμίαι ἐν ἡμῖν ὧσι δίχα ἄρα, τότε τὸ σῶμα καὶ χωρὶς τῆς ψυχῆς τοῖς παθήμασι διέλληπται; see also *Sympos.* 199 A, ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἤδη ἄρα τὸν τρόπον τοῦ ἐπαίνου; 177 E, ταῦτα δὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ἄρα ξυνέφασαν; *Rep.* viii. 547 B; *Laus*, x. 906 B; *Soph.* 224 E, 229 C. Kroschel alone changes to ἅμα, which is certainly suitable to the sense.

355 B. ταῦτα. These conceptions.

355 C. θέμενοι δὴ οὕτω. "Making this arrangement."

ὑπὸ μὲν ἡδονῆς. "We shall not now be allowed to say 'by pleasure.'" The μὲν is not formally answered by a sentence like "but we must say 'by the good,'" but irregularly by ἐκείνω δὴ κ.τ.έ.

τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Stallb. ad *Gorg.* 449 E shows that the omission of the preposition in answers is common.

355 D. ἐν ὑμῖν. "In your eyes"; lit. "amongst you": cp. 337 B, ἐν ἡμῖν τοῖς ἀκούουσιν; *Gorg.* 464 D, εἰ δέοι ἐν παισὶ διαγωνίζεσθαι ὀψοποιὸν τε καὶ ἰατρὸν. Ast gives a large number of instances (*Lex.* i. p. 701); amongst them, *Laus*, x. 886 E, ὅλον κατηγορήσαντός τινος ἐν ἀσεβέσιν ἀνθρώποις ἡμῶν; xi. 916 B, δικάζεσθω . . . ἐν τισὶ τῶν ἰατρῶν.

οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐξημάρτανεν. A thing which *ex hypothesi* he has done.

ἀνάξιά ἐστιν τὰγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν. "In what respect are good things inferior in value to bad things?"

ἢ πλείω. For the omission of τὰ μὲν cp. 330 A, 331 B.

355 E. μεταλάβωμεν. "Let us use conversely the terms pleasant and painful for these same conceptions." The use of ἐπί here is adapted from the phrase καλεῖν τι ἐπί τινι; for a very similar passage cp. *Cratyl.* 433 E, ἐπί μὲν ᾧ νῦν σμικρόν, μέγα καλεῖν, ἐπί δὲ ᾧ μέγα, σμικρόν.

356 A. ἄνθρωπος. For ἄνθρωπος BT: see on 355 A.

καὶ τίς ἄλλη ἀναξία ἡδονῆ πρὸς λύπην; Kroschel defends ἀναξία, the reading of BT, as meaning "inferiority," arguing (1) that it is a naturally formed opposite to ἀξία, as ἀγυμνασία from γυμνασία, (2) that Plato is accustomed to coin words to suit an argument, e.g. ἀχρηστία (*Rep.* vi. 489 B), δικαιοσύνης (above, 331 B), ἀψεύδεια (*Rep.* vi. 485 C), διαφορότης (*passim*). Considering further (3) the parallelism of the clause with 355 D, κατὰ τί δέ, φήσει ἴσως, ἀνάξια . . . ἢ κατ' ἄλλο τι κ.τ.έ., (4) the fact that Cicero's translation (*apud* Priscian. 5, § 64) and Ficinus' both give *indignitas*, and lastly (5) that the MSS. indicate no variant, it is perhaps best, with Heind., to acquiesce in the reading. Schanz reads δὴ ἀξία, followed by Sauppe, who shows that the step from ΔΗ to ΑΝ is not a great one. The necessary change from ἡδονή BT to ἡδονῆ is due to Schleiermacher.

ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ μείζω. Ταῦτα refers not so much to ὑπερβολή and ἔλλειψις as to things exhibiting them; it is in consequence

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- and is supplied with *πόρρωθεν καὶ ἐγγύθεν* as well. In enumerations it is often omitted, as *Crit.* 47 C, *περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχροῦν καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν.*
- 357 C. *ὑμεῖς δὲ δὴ ἔφατε.* The reference is to 352 C ff. The original structure of the sentence is abandoned, for we cannot subordinate the words to *ἦνίκα*, in order to emphasise the statement *ὑμεῖς δὲ δὴ κ.τ.έ.* by making an independent sentence of it. This necessitates the repetition *ἐπειδὴ δὲ . . . μετὰ τοῦτο ἤρεσθε κ.τ.έ.* A similar irregularity has been noticed on 355 A, *αὐθις αὖ λέγετε.*
- 357 D. *εἴπομεν . . . κατεγελᾶτε.* See on 311 D.
εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν. See 339 D.
- 357 E. *ἀμαθία πράττεται.* See 332 B.
τοῦτ' ἐστίν. "So that this being overcome by pleasure is ignorance in its extremest form."
οὔτε αὐτοί. Sc. *προσέρχεσθε*, to be understood out of the context. Madvig ingeniously writes *αὐτοὶ ἔτε*, but Sauppe compares a similar irregularity in Demosth. 29, § 54, *ὁ δ' οὔτ' αὐτὸς (ὀμόσαι) οὔτ' ἐκείνοις οὔτ' ἐμοὶ δοῦναι τὸν ὄρκον ἠξίωσεν*, and 49, § 52, *οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἀνευ γε σταθμοῦ ἤμελλεν οὔθ' ὁ ὑποτιθέμενος (παραλήψεσθαι) οὔθ' ὁ ὑποτιθεὶς τὸν χαλκὸν παραδώσειν.*
- 358 A. *ἔρωτῶ, †ῶ† Ἰππία.* BT om. *ῶ* which has dropped out after the *-ῶ* of the preceding termination; the same has happened and been similarly corrected in 358 E, 359 A.
ὑμῖν. Sauppe reads *ἡμῖν* against MS. authority. Socrates means that Hippias and Prodicus as well as Protagoras share in the answer, as before, 343 C, they are invited to join in the investigation, and hereafter, 358 D, they are in agreement with the conclusion.
διαίρεσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων. See 337 A, B, C; for *παραιτοῦμαι* see 320 D.
ὀπόθεν. "Of whatever extraction and of whatever form the name you rejoice to designate it by." Socrates plays upon a common formula in which the Greeks deprecated the anger of a god miscalled: *Cratyl.* 400 E, *ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς εὐχαῖς νόμος ἐστὶν ἡμῖν εὐχεσθαι, οἳτινές τε καὶ ὀπόθεν χαίρουσιν ὀνομαζόμενοι*; Aesch. *Ag.* 160, *Ζεὺς, ὅστις ποτ' ἐστίν, εἰ τῶδ' αὐτῷ φίλον κεκλημένῳ, τοῦτό μιν προσεννέπω*; *Phaedr.* 273 C; *Crit.* 50 A; *Phileb.* 12 C. Orelli (*ad* Hor. *Carm. Saec.* 15) says, *Πολυωνυμία numinibus divinis exoptatissima est gloria quam a Iove postulat Diana apud Callim. Hymn.* 3, 6, *Δὸς μοι παρθενίην αἰώνιον, ἄππα, φυλάσσειν | καὶ πολυωνυμίην κ.τ.έ.*, quoting also *Sat.* ii. 6, 20, *Matutine pater seu Iane libentius audis.*
- 358 B. *ῶ βέλτιστε Πρόδικε.* A mocking jingle, like *ῶ λῶστε Πῶλε* in *Gorg.* 467 B. See Thompson *ad loc.*
τοῦτο. "Use that term in answering."
αἱ ἐπὶ τούτου πράξεις. *Actiones huc ducentes*, says Heindorf, and so Kroschel, doubting however if *ἐπὶ τούτῳ* should not be read in the absence of any expressions more parallel than

- those in which *ἐπί* is constructed with a genitive of place, as Thuc. i. 116, 1, *πλείν ἐπὶ Σάμου*. Perhaps we may translate "actions in this case, in the case of a painless and pleasant existence," comparing *Rep.* iii. 399 A, *ἐπὶ πολεμικῶν ἀνδρῶν*; v. 460 A, *ἐφ' ἐκάστης συνέρξεως*; so Sauppe almost, but he compares a genitive of time, *ἐπὶ τοῦ σοῦ βίου*, *Phaedr.* 242 A.
- 358 B. *καλαί*. In BT follow *καὶ ὠφέλιμοι*, which Schleiermacher, Heindorf approving, rejects as confusing the course of the argument. Socrates wishes to prove that those actions which are connected with *τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν* will be chosen in preference to any others. This he does by extracting the admissions (1) that all such actions are *καλός*, (2) that, being *καλός*, they are *ἀγαθός*, and so *ὠφέλιμος*; whence it follows directly that they will be chosen by any one who can discern the fact.
- 358 C. *ἢ ἂ ποιεῖ, καὶ δυνατά*. The almost meaningless reading of BT is *ἢ ἐποιεῖ καὶ δύναται*. The text is Schleiermacher's correction, adopted by Schanz, Sauppe, Kroschel, Deuschle. Ast proposes to strike out *καὶ δυνατά*, as repeated by *ἐξὸν τὰ βελτίω*; but the repetition is quite in accordance with the custom of Plato, and does not require Sauppe's defence that *δυνατά* means "practicable generally," *ἐξὸν τ. β.* defining it as practicable for an individual case.
- 358 D. *ἀντὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν*. For this condensed form of expression see note on 317 B.
- καλεῖτέ †τι† δέος*. BT *καλεῖτε δέος*. The correction is Heindorf's adopted by subsequent editors: cp. 332 A. Schanz (*Nov. Comm.* p. 119) in 1871 refused the correction, quoting *Cratyl.* 399 D, *ψυχὴν γὰρ που καὶ σῶμα καλοῦμεν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*; pseudo-Plat. *Alc.* II. 145 A, *καλεῖς γὰρ δήπου φρονίμους τε καὶ ἄφρονας*; but in his 1880 edition adopts it.
- προσδοκίαν κακοῦ*. *Laches*, 198 B, *δέος γὰρ εἶναι προσδοκίαν μέλλοντος κακοῦ*; *Arist. Eth. Nic.* iii. 9, *διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον ὀρίζονται προσδοκίαν κακοῦ*.
- 358 E. *δέος, φόβος δ' οὐ*. Shilleto on Thuc. i. 36, 1 supports Prodicus' distinction, translating *τὸ δεδιός*, "cautious apprehension of danger," and so Ammonius, s.v. *δέος*, says, *δέος καὶ φόβος διαφέρει· δέος μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ πολυχρόνιος κακοῦ ὑπόνοια, φόβος δὲ ἢ παραυτικά πτόησις*. The distinction, like most, is more honoured in the breach than in the observance.
- ἀλλὰ τόδε*. Some general expression is to be supplied such as "look at this," "there is this." Krueger (62, 3, 10) quotes several similar instances, among them *Hipp. Mai.* 283 D, *τί δῆτ' ἂν εἴη ὅτι . . . οὐ πλήρη σε ἀργυρίου ἀπέπεμψαν; ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο, μὴ Λακεδαιμόνιοι σοῦ βέλτιον ἂν παιδεύσειαν τοὺς αὐτῶν παῖδας*;
- 359 A. *ὑποκειμένων*. The usual perf. part. pass. of *ὑποτίθημι*: cp. 339 D.
- τὸ πρῶτον παντάπασιν*. See 330 A, B.
- τὸ ὕστερον*. See 349 B.
- 359 B. *ἔτι μᾶλλον*. Sc. *θαυμάζω*.
- ἠρόμην*. See 349 E.

- 359 C. ἀποκρινόμενος.** Schanz (*Nov. Comm.* p. 70) quotes several instances of the present used with verbs of remembering, as *Gorg.* 460 C, D; *Charm.* 156 A; *Lach.* 180 E; *Theaet.* 207 D; Xen. *Anab.* v. 9, 23; Dem. *De F. L.* § 253.
- ἐπὶ τί.** So BT and modern editors: cp. ἐπὶ τί below, and *Phaed.* 58 C, τί ἦν τὰ λεχθέντα; Bekker and Stallb. in consideration of the plurals, however, read τίνα which is written over τί in B.
- τὰ θαρραλέα.** “Things about which confidence is felt”: *Laches*, 194 E, τὴν τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων ἐπιστήμην. Ast gives many instances: *Rep.* v. 450 E; *Laus*, xii. 959 B, etc.
- 359 D. ἐν οἷς . . . τοῖς λόγοις.** See on 342 B, and add Riddell, *Digest*, § 216.
- ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἤττω εἶναι ἑαυτοῦ κ.τ.έ.** Ast wishes to strike out these words as out of place and anticipating 360 B. But the sense, however ill expressed, is, No one goes to meet τὰ δεινά if he knows them to be such; if he does go to meet τὰ δεινά, here too it will be through ignorance, just as giving way to one’s passions was shown to be ignorance of good and evil. For οὔσα see on 354 C.
- 359 E. αὐτίκα.** In 318 B possibly it also means “for instance.” The notion is that the first fact which comes to hand provides an example; the usage is common in Aristophanes, and εὐθύς is sometimes so employed. See Riddell, *Digest*, § 143 γ.
- 360 A. κάλλιον.** Stephanus’ correction for κάλον BT.
- 360 B. οὐκ αἰσχροῦς φόβους.** They do of course have an “honest fear” of what is really evil.
- εἰ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρά, ἄρ’ οὐ καλά;** See note on 333 C.
- [καὶ οἱ θαρσεῖς].** “The over-confident,” the class alluded to above, 350 B, C, as not ἀνδρεῖοι: cp. *Laches*, 197 B. The words are omitted by Dobree, whom Schanz and Sauppe follow. It is not however necessary to assume a correspondence between δειλοί and φόβους, and μαινόμενοι and θάρρη, which is upset by the introduction of θαρσεῖς. Rather all three classes are at fault both in their fear and in their confidence. That θρασύς (or θαρσύς) is a rare word in Plato, and that it does not occur elsewhere in this dialogue, are additional difficulties in the way of regarding it as a gloss.
- 360 C. ἐπένευσεν.** “Nodded assent”: he sees defeat imminent and loses his temper; see what Socrates says, *Gorg.* 457 C, D, and notice the ascending scale below, ἔτι ἐπένευσεν—μόγις ἐπένευσεν—οὔτ’ ἐπινεῦσαι ἠθέλησεν ἐσίγα τε.
- 360 D. αὐτός, ἔφη, πέρανον.** So Callicles in the *Gorgias*, 506 C, λέγε, ὦγαθέ, αὐτὸς καὶ πέραινε.
- 360 E. φιλονεικεῖν . . . τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον.** Contrast *Rep.* i. 338 A, προσεποιεῖτο δὲ φιλονεικεῖν πρὸς τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον, which is the ordinary construction of the verb which is intransitive. No other instance in Plato of the direct accusative after the verb (*Gorg.* 457 D is not one) is given by Ast, but Heindorf quotes Thuc. v. 111, 5, τὰ

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- 362 A. Καλλία τῷ καλῷ. The term *καλός* in such contexts is a merely conventional compliment (*vulgare illud Atticae urbanitatis blandimentum*, Heind.) like “our good host”: cp. *Hipp. Mai.* 281 A, Ἰππίας ὁ καλός τε καὶ σοφός; *Phileb.* 11 C; *Phaedr.* 278 E; Xen. *Mem.* iv. 2, 1; *Hellen.* ii. 3, 56 (Theramenes’ last words), Κριτία τοῦτ’ ἔστω τῷ καλῷ. ἀπῆμεν. Socrates and Hippocrates.

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