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ΠΛΑΤΩΝ

APOLOGY OF SOCRATES CRITO ETC

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ΠΛΑΤΩΝ

THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES THE CRITO
AND PART OF THE PHÆDO

WITH

NOTES FROM STALLBAUM

SCHLEIERMACHER'S INTRODUCTIONS

A LIFE OF SOCRATES

AND SCHLEIERMACHER'S ESSAY ON THE WORTH

OF SOCRATES AS A PHILOSOPHER



Second Edition Revised

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P R E F A C E.

THE text of the following edition of the Apology of Socrates, the Crito, and part of the Phædo, is a reprint from that of Stallbaum's. The whole of his notes, which have been translated for this edition by Mr. Gillespie, A.M. of Trinity College, Dublin, are given with a few unimportant exceptions. The notes on the various readings are placed at the foot of the page, and those of an explanatory nature at the end of the volume. The Latin abbreviations used to denote the MSS. are those of Bekker's edition.

It has been justly considered by many scholars that the Apology of Socrates and the Crito might be read with great advantage in the higher classes of our schools, and it has been partly with the view of supplying a suitable edition for such a purpose that I have been induced to edit the following pages. The Apology and the Crito are written in an easy style, and are almost entirely

free from those philosophical discussions, which render the greater part of Plato's writings unsuitable for the use of schools. They also form the best introduction to the study of Plato, from the information they convey respecting the life and character of Socrates, of which it is necessary to have some knowledge in order to understand many parts of Plato's writings

The extracts from the Phædo, which contain an account of the death of Socrates, are inserted at the suggestion of Professor Malden, in order to give a complete account of the last days of Socrates.

I have to express my obligations to the Rev. Connop Thirlwall for his kindness in allowing me to make use of his translation of Schleiermacher's Introduction to the Apology, which was originally published in the Philological Museum.

WILLIAM SMITH.

London, April 2nd, 1840.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ.

SCHLEIERMACHER'S INTRODUCTION

TO THE

APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.

I HAVE already observed, in the general Introduction of this translation of Plato, that the reader is not to conclude, because certain works are placed in an appendix, that by this I mean to deny or to call in question with regard to all of them, that they are writings of Plato. My only reason for assigning such a place to the following work which has been at all times loved and admired for the spirit that breathes through it, and the image it presents of calm moral dignity and beauty, was in the first instance that it contents itself with its particular object, and makes no pretensions to the title of a scientific work. It is true that the Euthyphron likewise has unquestionably an apologetic reference to the charge brought against Socrates; but on the other hand its connection with the notions started in the Protagoras, clearly entitled it to be subjoined to that dialogue. But the

Apology is so purely an occasional piece, that it can find no place in the series of its author's philosophical productions. Yet there is certainly one sense, in which, let not the reader be startled, one might perhaps say that it is not a work of Plato's. I mean that it can scarcely be a work of his thoughts, a thing which he invented and fabricated. For if we attribute to Plato the intention of defending Socrates, we must first of all distinguish the times at which he might have done it, either during his process, or subsequently, no matter how soon or how late, to his execution. Now in the latter case Plato could only have proposed to vindicate the principles and sentiments of his friend and master. But this vindication he, who was so fond of combining several ends in one work, might easily have coupled with his scientific views: and accordingly we not only find detached intimations of this kind scattered over his later writings, but we shall soon be introduced to an important work, one which cannot be denied to be closely enough interwoven with his scientific speculations, in which a collateral object, but one made distinctly prominent, is to place the conduct and virtue of Socrates as an Athenian citizen in a clear light. Now this is intelligible enough: but Plato could scarcely have found any inducement at a later period to compose a work which merely confronts Socrates with his actual accusers. It must have been then during the process that he

wrote this speech. But for what purpose? It is manifest that he could have rendered his master no worse service, than if, before he had defended himself in court, he had published a defence under his name, just as if to help the prosecutors to the arguments which it would be their business to parry or to elude, and to place the defendant in the difficult situation of being reduced either to repeat much that had been said before, or to say something less forcible. Hence the more excellent and the better suited to the character of Socrates the defence might be, the more harm it would have done to him. But this is a supposition which will scarcely be maintained.

After the decision of the cause there were two purposes which Plato might have had, either that of making the course of the proceedings more generally known at the time, and of framing a memorial of them for posterity, or that of setting the different parties and their mode of proceeding in a proper light. Now if we inquire about the only rational means to the latter of these ends: all will agree that the speech should have been put into the mouth, not of Socrates, but of some other person defending him. For the advocate might have brought forward many things, which the character of Socrates rendered improper for him to urge, and might have shown by the work that, if the defendant's cause had only been pleaded by a person who had no need to disdain

resources which many men of honour did not think beneath them, it would have had a very different issue. Now if there were any foundation for an anecdote, not indeed a very probable one, which Diogenes Laertius has preserved from an insignificant writer, Plato's most natural course would have been, to publish the speech which he would himself have made on the same occasion if he had not been hindered.* He would then have had an opportunity of exemplifying those great precepts and expedients of rhetoric, the force of which he had himself first disclosed; and undoubtedly he might have applied them with great truth and art to the charges concerning the new deities and the corruption of youth. And so it would have been far better for him to have used any other person's name for the purpose of retorting on the accusers of Socrates, and to have spoken of his merits in a different tone. Whereas in a speech put into the mouth of Socrates himself, yet different from that which he really delivered, he can have had no other object than to show what Socrates voluntarily neglected or involuntarily let slip, and how his defence should have been framed so as to produce a better effect.

* "See Diog. Laert. II. 41. where it is related that Plato was prepared to defend Socrates, but in the first sentence of his speech was interrupted by the petulance of the jurors, and compelled to descend from the bema. But this anecdote is too little attested and too improbable in itself to build upon."

Now not to mention that this would have been scarcely possible without departing from the character of Socrates, it is evident that the defence we now have was not framed with this view. For how could such a speech have been followed by the address after the verdict, which implies an issue not more favourable than the real one? The only supposition then that remains is, that this work was designed simply to exhibit and record in substance the real proceedings of the case, for those Athenians who were not able to be hearers, and for the other Greeks, and posterity. Now are we to believe that, in such a case and under such circumstances, Plato was unable to resist the temptation of fathering upon Socrates a work of his own art, which in all but the outline was perhaps entirely foreign to him, like a boy who has a theme set him to declaim on. This we cannot believe, but must presume that in this case, where nothing of his own was wanted, and he had entirely devoted himself to his friend, especially so short a time before or after the death of Socrates, as this work was undoubtedly composed, he considered his departing friend too sacred to be disguised even with the most beautiful of ornaments, and his whole form as so faultless and majestic, that it was not right to exhibit it in any dress, but, like the statue of a god, naked, and wrapt only in its own beauty. And so in fact we find he has done. For a critic who should

undertake the task of mending this speech would find a great deal in it to alter. Thus the charge of misleading the young is not repelled with arguments by any means so cogent as it might have been, nor is sufficient stress by a great deal laid on the fact, that Socrates had done every thing in the service of Apollo, for defending him against the charge of disbelief of the antient gods: and any one with his eyes only half open may discover other weak points of the like kind, which are not so grounded in the character of Socrates that Plato should have been compelled to copy them.

Nothing therefore is more probable, than that in this speech we possess as faithful a transcript of Socrates' real defence, as Plato's practised memory enabled him to make, allowing for the necessary difference between a written speech and one carelessly spoken. But perhaps some one may say: If Plato, supposing him to be the author of this work, did nothing more than record what he had heard: what reason is there for insisting on this fact, or how can it be known, that it was he, and not some other among the friends of Socrates who were present at the trial? Such an objector, if he is familiar with the style of Plato, need only be referred to the whole aspect of the Apology, which distinctly shows that it can have proceeded from no pen but Plato's. For in it Socrates speaks exactly as Plato makes him speak, a manner in which, so far as we can judge from all we



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
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confirmed by the trial. The cause why such an imitation was not attempted by other disciples of Socrates, was probably this: that on the one hand it really required no little art to bend these peculiarities of a careless colloquial style under the laws of written discourse, and to amalgamate them with the regular beauty of expression, and on the other hand, it called for more courage to meet the censure of minute critics than Xenophon probably possessed. But this is not the place for entering further into this question.

One circumstance, however, must still be noticed, which might be alleged against the genuineness of this work, and with more plausibility indeed than any other: that it wants the dress of the dialogue, in which Plato presents all his other works, and which he has given even to the Menexenus, though in other respects that, like this, consists of nothing more than a speech. Why therefore it may be asked, should the Apology, which so easily admitted of this ornament, be the only work of Plato that is destitute of it? Convincing as this sounds, the weight of all other arguments is too strong not to counter-balance this scruple, and we reply to the objection as follows. In the first place, it is possible that the dialogic form had not then become so indispensable with Plato as it afterwards was: which may serve as an answer for those who are inclined to set a great value on the dress of the Menexenus;

or Plato himself distinguished this work from his other writings too much to think of subjecting it to the same law. Besides, it would in general be very unworthy of Plato, to consider the dialogue, even in those works where it is not very intimately blended with the main mass of the composition, as nothing more than an ornament arbitrarily appended to them: it always has its meaning, and contributes to the conformation and effect of the whole. Now if this would not have been the case in the present instance, why should Plato have brought it violently in? Especially as in all likelihood he wished to hasten the publication of this speech as much as possible, and might not think it advisable at that time to hazard a public declaration of his sentiments on the issue of the cause, which, if he had clothed the speech in the form of a dialogue, it would have been difficult to avoid, without rendering the form utterly empty and unmeaning.



ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ.

Cap. I. "Ο τι μὲν ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,^a πεπόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγορῶν, οὐκ οἶδα· ἐγὼ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὀλίγου ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμεν·^b οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καί τοι ἀληθές γε, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν,^c οὐδὲν εἰρήκασι. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἐθαύμασα^d τῶν πολλῶν ὧν ἐψεύσαντο, τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ ἔλεγον, ὡς χρῆν ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι, μὴ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατηθῆτε,^e ὡς δεινοῦ ὄντος λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυνθῆναι, ὅτι αὐτίκα ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθήσονται ἔργω, ἐπειδὴν μηδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν^f φαίνωμαι δεινὸς λέγειν,

Cap. I. p. 17. ἐγὼ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς.] So Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Vind. 1. 4. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T. Commonly ἔγωγ' οὖν. So δ' οὖν after μὲν, C. XXIII. Theaet. p. 197. B. Compare Hermann. ad Lucian. De hist. conscr. p. 255.

ὀλίγου ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμεν.] δεῖν, commonly put after ὀλίγου, is omitted in Bodl. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 3. 4. 6. Flor. b. e. g. h. i. Coisl. Ven. A. Par. D E H S T. Ang. prim. m. Vind. 2.: nor does Plato anywhere, to my knowledge, use it in connection with the Indicative preterite; see Rep. VIII. p. 563. B. Menexen, p. 236. B. Yet Æschines adv. Ctesiphont. p. 428. ὀλίγου δεῖν μεθεισθήκει.

μὴ αἰσχυνθῆναι, ὅτι αὐτίκα.] ὅ τι edit. Bass. and Forster, with the approbation of Heindorf. But although we may say αἰσχύνεσθαί τι and ἐλέγχεσθαί τι, yet ὅ τι appears the true reading. For instead of ὅ τι, I doubt not that Plato would have written ὅ.

τοῦτό μοι ἔδοξεν αὐτῶν ἀναισχυντότατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα δεινὸν καλοῦσιν οὗτοι λέγειν τὸν τᾶληθῆ λέγοντα· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο λέγουσιν, ὁμολογοίην ἂν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ.^s οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἢ τι ἢ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς εἰρήκασιν.^h ὑμεῖς δ' ἐμοῦ ἀκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δί', ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κεκαλλιεπημένους γε λόγους,ⁱ ὥσπερ οἱ τούτων, ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν, οὐδὲ κεκοσμημένους, ἀλλ' ἀκούσεσθε εἰκῆ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν ὀνόμασι· πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἃ λέγω,^k καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δήπου πρέποι, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῆδε τῆ ἡλικία, ὥσπερ μεираκίῳ πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι. καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάνυ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ παρίεμαι.^l εἰ δὲ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκοίητέ μου ἀπολογουμένου, δι' ὧν περ εἶωθα λέγειν καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν,^m ἵνα ὑμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασι, καὶ ἄλλοθι,ⁿ μήτε θαυμάζειν μήτε θορυβεῖν^o τούτου ἕνεκα. ἔχει γὰρ οὕτωςί. νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἔτη γεγονῶς

καλοῦσιν οὗτοι.] Commonly αὐτοί, which is changed from Bodl. Par. B C D S T. Vat. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Ven. b. Flor. a. d. g. h. οὗτος is used to indicate contempt, as in Crito C. IV. Sympos. p. 181. E. Rep. III. p. 403. A. and elsewhere.

ἢ τι ἢ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς εἰρ.] So Bodl. Parr. D S T. Vind. 1. Ven. b. a. pr. m. Flor. d. g. h. The rest injudiciously omit ἢ τι ἢ. δ' ἐμοῦ is Bekker's correction for the common reading δέ μου.

καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τ. τρ.] So Vind. 1. 2. 3. 6. Flor. b. e. i. Coisl. Par. B. and others. Commonly καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ καὶ ἐπὶ τρ. See note.

οἱ πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασι.] οἱ is wanting in Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Flor. d. g. h. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Par. DS. Compare τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι, C. III.

ἔτη γεγονῶς πλείω ἐβδουμήκοντα.] Bodl. Vind. 1. 4. Flor. d.

πλείω ἑβδομήκοντα^p ἀτεχνῶς οὖν ξένως ἔχω^q τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως. ὥσπερ οὖν ἄν, εἴ^r τῷ ὄντι ξένος ἐτύγχανον ὢν, ξυνεγιγνώσκετε δήπου ἄν μοι εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ἔλεγον, ἐν οἷσπερ ἔτεθράμμην,^s καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι δίκαιον, ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, τὸν μὲν τρόπον τῆς λέξεως εἶναι— ἴσως μὲν γάρ τι χείρων, ἴσως δὲ βελτίων ἂν εἴη—, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο σκοπεῖν καὶ τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγω, ἢ μή· δικαστοῦ μὲν γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετή,^t ῥήτορος δὲ τᾶληθῆ λέγειν.

II. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δίκαιός εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι,^a ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς τὰ πρῶτά μου ψευδῆ κατηγορημένα καὶ τοὺς πρῶτους κατηγοροὺς, ἔπειτα δὲ πρὸς τὰ ὕστερα καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους. Ἐμοῦ γὰρ πολλοὶ κατήγοροι γεγόνασι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη^b καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθές λέγοντες· οὐς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι ἢ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον,^c καίπερ ὄντας καὶ τούτους δεινούς. ἀλλ' ἐκείνοι δεινότεροι,^d ὦ ἄνδρες, οἱ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παίδων παραλαμβάνοντες ἔπειθόν τε καὶ κατηγοροῦν ἐμοῦ οὐδὲν

g. h. Par. D S T. omit πλείω. In Ven. b. πλείω ἢ is interlined. Nevertheless, I doubt not that it is correctly preserved by the others.

ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκῶ.] So Vind. 1. 6. Ven. b. Par. D S. Old editions γέ μοι.

μὲν γάρ τι χείρων.] Most books with Bodl. omit τι, which is found in Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T.

δικαστοῦ μ. γ. αὕτη ἀρετή.] αὕτη ἢ ἀρετή, Vat. Ven. b.

II. καὶ τοὺς πρ. κατηγογ.] So almost all MSS. instead of the common reading καὶ πρὸς τοὺς πρ. κ. Immediately afterwards πρὸς τὰ ὕστερα is restored from Bodl. Ven. b. b. Vat. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. instead of the common reading πρὸς τὰ ὕστερον.

ἐμοῦ οὐδὲν ἀληθές.] Bodl. and some others ἐμοῦ μᾶλλον οὐδὲν ἀλ., wrongly.

ἀληθές, ὡς ἔστι τις Σώκρατης, σοφὸς ἀνὴρ, τὰ τε μετέωρα φροντιστής,^e καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ἅπαντα ἀνεζητηκώς, καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν.^f οὗτοι, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταύτην τὴν φήμην κατασκεδάσαντες,^g οἱ δεινοί εἰσὶ μου κατήγοροι· οἱ γὰρ ἀκούοντες ἠγοῦνται τοὺς ταῦτα ζητοῦντας οὐδὲ θεοὺς νομίζειν.^h ἔπειτά εἰσιν οὗτοι οἱ κατήγοροι πολλοὶ καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἤδη κατηγορηκότες, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ λέγοντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἐν ἧ ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε,ⁱ παῖδες ὄντες, ἔνιοι δ' ὑμῶν καὶ μειράκια, ἀτεχνῶς ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες,^k ἀπολογουμένου οὐδενός. ὃ δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ ὀνόματα οἶόν τε αὐτῶν εἰδέναί καὶ εἰπεῖν, πλὴν εἴ τις κωμωδοποιὸς τυγχάνει ὧν. ὅσοι δὲ φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ χρώμενοι^l ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι

Σωκράτης, σοφὸς ἀνὴρ.] So Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. Par. D S. Commonly ἀνὴρ σοφός.

τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς.] So edit. Bas. 2. Bodl., all MSS. except Ven. E Vind. 2. 5. Flor. c. d. and a few others. Commonly ὑπὸ γῆν. Compare C. III. C. X. For ἅπαντα, found in Bodl. Ven. b. Flor. d. g. h. Vind. 6. Par. D S., the common reading was πάντα.

καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἤδη.] So Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Vind. 1. 3. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S. Old editions with Bekker καὶ πολὺν ἤδη χρόνον, although the latter is the usual collocation of the words, as πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη a few lines above, and in C. XVIII. τοσαῦτα ἤδη ἔτη, yet I did not wish to reject the reading of the MSS., especially since it may be justified by the consideration that πολὺν χρόνον forms a single notion, the words signifying 'for a long time.'

παῖδες ὄντες, ἔνιοι δ' ὑμῶν.] So Bodl. Ven. b. Flor. h. Parr. D S. δ' was commonly omitted.

εἴ τις κωμωδοποιὸς τ.] Commonly κωμωδιοποιός, which is corrected from Vat. Ven. E. a. b. Flor. d. g. h. Vind. 1. 2. 5. 6. Zitt. Par. B. See Pierson. ad. Moer. p. 240., who has rightly judged that the common form ought everywhere to be expelled from the writings of Plato.



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ὅπη τῷ θεῷ φίλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον καὶ ἀπολογητέον.

III. Ἀναλάβωμεν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τίς ἢ κατηγορία ἐστίν, ἐξ ἧς ἢ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ γέγονεν, ἢ δὴ καὶ πιστεύων Μέλητός με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην.^a Εἶεν. τί δὴ λέγοντες διέβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες; ὥσπερ οὖν κατηγορῶν τὴν ἀντωμοσίαν δεῖ ἀναγνῶναι αὐτῶν.^b Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ καὶ περιεργάζεται^c ζητῶν τὰ τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ τὰ ἐπουράνια, καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν, καὶ ἄλλους ταῦτα ταῦτα διδάσκων. Τοιαύτη τίς ἐστὶ ταῦτα γὰρ ἐωρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κωμῳδίᾳ,^d Σωκράτη τινὰ ἐκεῖ περιφερόμενον, φάσκοντά τε ἀεροβατεῖν καὶ ἄλλην πολλὴν φλυαρίαν φλυαροῦντα, ὧν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν^e πέρι ἐπαῖω. καὶ οὐχ

III. τίς ἢ κατηγορία ἐστίν.] ἐστίν, commonly omitted with Bas. 2., is retained in Bodl. Vat. Ven. a. b. Vind. 1. 6. Florentine and all the rest except Vind. 2. 3. 4. 5.

πιστεύων Μέλητος.] So Bodl. Ven. b. Vind. 1. Par. D. Flor. b. c. i. Angel., and that which Bekker has marked g. Commonly Μέλιτος; why this should be altered, we have discussed, Euthyphro p. 7. But Eustathius, Odys. v. 106. p. 42. Vol. II. ed. Lips., defends Μέλιτος, deriving it from μέλι; but in that case the penultima would be short.

τὰ τε ὑπὸ γῆς.] Ven. Ξ. with Steph. γῆν: the others have the genitive, see C. H. Afterwards Bodl. Flor. g. h. Vind. 6. Ven. b. Vat. καὶ τὰ οὐράνια. But ἐπουράνια is to be preferred even on account of the opposition of the words τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς.

ἄλλους ταῦτα ταῦτα διδάσκων.] Commonly ἄλλους ταῦτα διδάσκων, which is changed from Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 4. Flor. h. Par. D S.

ταῦτα γὰρ ἐωρᾶτε.] Commonly τοιαῦτα, which we have not hesitated to change from Bodl. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 3. 4. 6. Flor. d. e. g. h. Par. D S. Afterwards Σωκράτη for Σωκράτην, Bodl. Vind. 6. Par. D S., and perhaps Vat.

ὡς ἀτιμάζων^f λέγω τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην, εἴ τις περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοφός ἐστι. μή πως ἐγὼ ὑπὸ Μελήτου τοσαύτας δίκας φύγοιμι! ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδὲν μέτεστι. μάρτυρας δ’ αὐτοὺς ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι, καὶ ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς^g ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν, ὅσοι ἐμοῦ πώποτε ἀκηκόατε διαλεγομένου· πολλοὶ δὲ ὑμῶν οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσι. φράζετε οὖν ἀλλήλοις, εἰ πώποτε ἢ σμικρὸν ἢ μέγα ἤκουσέ τις ὑμῶν ἐμοῦ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαλεγομένου· καὶ ἐκ τούτων γνῶσεσθε,^h ὅτι τοιαῦτ’ ἐστὶ καὶ τᾶλλα περὶ ἐμοῦ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν.

IV. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε τούτων οὐδὲν ἐστίν, οὐδέ γ’^a εἴ τις ἀκηκόατε, ὡς ἐγὼ παιδεύειν ἐπιχειρῶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ χρήματα πράττομαι,^b οὐδέ τοῦτο ἀληθές. ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτό γέ μοι^c δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἴ τις οἷός τ’ εἴη^d παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους ὥσπερ Γοργίας τε ὁ Λεοντῖνος, καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος, καὶ Ἰππίας

τοσαύτας δίκας φύγοιμι.] Commonly φεύγοιμι, which is changed from Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D. S. g. For Μελίτου, Bodl., here also, as always, Μελήτου.

ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων.] Commonly γὰρ μοι τῶν τοιούτων, which I have changed from Bodl. Par. D S. In Vat. Flor. d. Vind. 1. 4. 6. is written, ἀλλὰ γὰρ τούτων ἐμοί.

μάρτυρας δ’ αὐτοὺς.] Commonly αὐ, for which, αὐτοὺς is found in Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S.

καὶ ἐκ τούτων γνῶσεσθε.] So Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S. Commonly τούτου, which Bekker preserves. See note.

IV. οὐδέ γ’ εἴ τις.] Bekk. has corrected οὔτε γε, contrary to the authority of MSS., and without any necessity.

τοῦτό γέ μοι δοκεῖ.] Bekk. with Par. S. Vat. a. b. Zitt. γ’ ἐμοὶ δ. No necessity, since the emphasis should not be laid on the pronoun. See note on Protagor. p. 342. A. Criton. C. V.

Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος.] Bodl. Ven. a. E. Vind. 2. 5. 6. Flor. g.

ὁ Ἥλειος. τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστος, ὦ ἄνδρες, οἷός τ' ἔστιν ἰὼν εἰς ἑκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους, οἷς ἔξεστι τῶν ἑαυτῶν πολιτῶν προῖκα ξυνεῖναι ὃ ἂν βούλωνται, τούτους πείθουσι^ε τὰς ἐκείνων ξυνουσίας ἀπολιπόντας σφίσι ξυνεῖναι χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσειδέναι. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλος ἀνὴρ ἔστι Πάριος^φ ἐνθάδε σοφός, ὃν ἐγὼ ἠσθόμην ἐπιδημοῦντα· ἔτυχον γὰρ προσελθὼν ἀνδρὶ, ὃς τετέλεκε^ς χρήματα σοφισταῖς πλείω ἢ ξύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλία τῷ Ἰππονίκου.^η τοῦτον οὖν ἀνηρόμην—ἐστὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ δύο υἱέε —^θ Ω Καλλία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ μὲν σου τὸ υἱέε πώλω ἢ μόσχῳ ἐγενέσθην, εἴχομεν ἂν αὐτοῖν ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν καὶ μισθώσασθαι,^ι ὃς ἔμελλεν αὐτῷ καλῶ τε κἀγαθῶ ποιήσειν τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετὴν· ἦν δ' ἂν οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἵππικῶν τις ἢ τῶν γεωργικῶν. νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστὸν, τίνα αὐτοῖν ἐν νῶ ἔχεις ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν; τίς τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ πολιτικῆς, ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν; οἶμαι γὰρ σε ἐσκέφθαι διὰ τὴν τῶν υἱέων κτῆσιν. ἔστι τις, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὄς. Τίς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ποδαπός; καὶ πόσου διδάσκει; Εὐνηνος, ἔφη, ὦ

Coislin. Κῖος, as Rep. X. p. 600. C. Protagor. p. 314. C. Aristoph. Ran. 997. οὐ Χῖος ἀλλὰ Κίος. Yet the inscriptions in Broensted. Itiner. N. 7. and 10. plainly have ΚΕΙΟΙ; and Theocrit. Id. XVI. 44. calls Simonides ἀοιδὸν τὸν Κήϊον: whence the form Κῖος ought not to be admitted. See Ast's Comment. ad Protag. p. 44. It may be added, that the old grammarians and the copyists by *i* long understood *ει*, according to Bastius on Gregor. Corinth. p. 892.; the diphthong, besides, is pronounced something like *i*.

καὶ Ἰππίας ὁ Ἥλειος.] Coisl. καὶ Ἰππίας δὲ ὁ Ἥλ., which Bekk. adopted.

ὃς τετέλεκε χρ.] Commonly τετελέκει: improperly. The perfect is found in Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S.

Σώκρατες, Πάριος, πέντε μνῶν.^k Καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Εὐθη-
νον ἐμακάρισα, εἰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔχει^l ταύτην τὴν τέ-
χνην καὶ οὕτως ἐμμελῶς διδάσκει. ἐγὼ γοῦν καὶ αὐτὸς
ἐκαλλυνόμεν τε καὶ ἠβρυνόμεν ἄν, εἰ ἠπιστάμην
ταῦτα· ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι,^m ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.

V. Ὑπολάβοι οὖν ἄν τις ὑμῶν ἴσως, Ἀλλ' ὦ
Σώκρατες, τὸ σὸν τί ἐστὶ πρᾶγμα ; πόθεν αἱ δια-
βολαί σοι αὐταὶ γεγόνασιν ; οὐ γὰρ δήπου σοῦ γε,
οὐδέν^a τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον^b πραγματευομένου,
ἔπειτα τοσαύτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν, εἰ μὴ τι
ἔπραττες ἀλλοῖον ἢ οἱ πολλοί. λέγε οὖν ἡμῖν, τί ἐστίν,
ἵνα μὴ ἡμεῖς περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδιάζωμεν.^c Ταυτί μοι
δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων, καὶ γὰρ ὑμῖν πειράσομαι
ἀποδείξαι, τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ὃ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκε τό-
τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν.^d ἀκούετε δὴ. καὶ ἴσως
μὲν δόξω τισὶν ὑμῶν παίζειν, εὖ μέντοι ἴστε, πᾶσαν
ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐρῶ.^e Ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθη-
ναῖοι, δι' οὐδέν ἄλλ' ἢ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τοῦτο τὸ
ὄνομα ἔσχηκα. ποίαν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην ; ἥπερ ἐστὶν
ἴσως ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία. τῷ ὄντι γὰρ κινδυνεύω ταύ-
την εἶναι σοφός· οὗτοι δὲ τάχ' ἄν, οὓς ἄρτι ἔλεγον,
μείζω τινὰ ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπον^f σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶεν, ἢ

εἰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔχει.] Commonly ἔχοι, which is changed from
Par. D S. Flor. d. Afterwards ἐμμελῶς διδάσκει, instead of the
common reading ἐμμ. διδάσκει is found in Bodl. Ven. E. b.
Vind. 3. Flor. e. g. h. Zitt. Par. D S.

V. Ὑπολάβοι οὖν ἄν τις.] Commonly ἄν οὖν omitting after-
wards ὑμῶν. The pronoun is found in Bodl. Vat. Ven. a. b. E.
Vindobb. all, Flor. a. b. e. g. h. Zitt. Parr. B C D S. g.; but οὖν
ἄν, Vind. 6. Ven. b. On the other hand some have omitted either
οὖν or ἄν.

ἵνα μὴ ἡμεῖς περὶ σοῦ.] Commonly ἵνα μὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς, against
all the MSS.

ἢ οὐκ ἔγω, τί λέγω.] Commonly ὃ τι λέγω, which is changed

οὐκ ἔχω, τί λέγω· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτὴν ἐπίσταμαι, ἀλλ' ὅστις φησὶ ψεύδεταιί τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει.⁵ καί μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ θορυβήσητε, μηδὲ ἂν δόξω τι ὑμῖν μέγα λέγειν.^h οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν λόγον, ὃν ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀξιόχρεωνⁱ ὑμῖν τὸν λέγοντα ἀνοίσω. τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δὴ τίς ἐστι σοφία καὶ οἷα,^k μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέξομαι τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς. Χαιρεφῶντα γὰρ^l ἴστε που. οὗτος ἐμός τε ἐταῖρος ἦν ἐκ νέου, καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἐταῖρός^m τε καὶ ξυνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθ' ὑμῶν κατήλθε. καὶ ἴστε δὴ, οἷος ἦν Χαιρεφῶν, ὡς σφοδρὸς ἐφ' ὃ τι ὀρμήσειε. καὶ δὴ ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐλθὼν ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο μαντεύσασθαι,ⁿ— καί, ὅπερ λέγω, μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες. ἤρετο γὰρ δὴ, εἴ τις^o ἐμοῦ εἶη σοφώτερος. ἀνεῖλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία^p μηδένα σοφώτερον εἶναι. καὶ τούτων περὶ ὃ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῖν αὐτοῦ^q οὕτωςι μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος τετελεύτηκε.

VI. Σκέψασθε δὲ, ὧν ἔνεκα ταῦτα λέγω. μέλλω γὰρ ὑμᾶς διδάξειν, ὅθεν μοι ἡ διαβολὴ γέγονε. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐνεθυμούμην οὕτωςι, Τί ποτε λέγει ὁ θεός, καὶ τί ποτε αἰνίττεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ

from Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T. Both may be correctly said. See Poppo ad Cyrop. I. 2. 10.

μὴ θορυβήσητε, μηδὲ ἂν δόξω.] Commonly μὴ θ. μηδέν, ἂν δόξω, which is corrected from Bodl. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Par. D S T. Ven. b. Flor. g. h.

γὰρ ἴστε που.] Commonly δήπου, against the authority of the MSS.

μὴ θορυβεῖτε.] So Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 15. Flor. h. Par. C D S. Commonly θορυβῆτε, contrary to usage, which was seen to require correction by Bas. ad. Greg. Corinth. p. 1005. Bodl. θορυβεῖσθε.

VI. Σκέψασθε δὲ, ὧν ἔνεκα.] Commonly δή, which is changed from Vat. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Ven. b. Par. D S T.

οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ξύνοιδα ἑμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὢν^a
 τί οὖν ποτε λέγει φάσκων ἐμὲ σοφώτατον εἶναι ; οὐ
 γὰρ δήπου ψεύδεταί γε· οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ.^b καὶ
 πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἠπόρουν, τί ποτε λέγει,^c ἔπειτα μό-
 γις πάνυ ἐπὶ ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἐτραπόμην.
 ἦλθον ἐπὶ τινὰ τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, ὡς ἐν-
 ταῦθα, εἴπερ που, ἐλέγξων τὸ μαντεῖον καὶ ἀποφανῶν
 τῷ χρησμῷ, ὅτι Οὕτοσὶ ἐμοῦ σοφώτερός ἐστι, σὺ δ'
 ἐμὲ ἔφησθα. διασκοπῶν οὖν τούτον — ὀνόματι γὰρ
 οὐδὲν δέομαι λέγειν, ἦν δέ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν, πρὸς ὃν
 ἐγὼ σκοπῶν τοιοῦτόν τι ἔπαθον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι
 — καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἔδοξέ μοι^d οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ
 δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις
 καὶ μάλιστα ἑαυτῷ, εἶναι δ' οὔ. κάπειτα ἐπειρώμην
 αὐτῷ δεικνύναι, ὅτι οἴοιτο μὲν εἶναι σοφός, εἴη δ'
 οὔ. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τούτῳ τε ἀπηχθόμην καὶ πολλοῖς
 τῶν παρόντων. πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν δ' οὖν ἀπιὼν ἐλογι-
 ζόμην,^e ὅτι Τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφώτε-
 ρός εἰμι· κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν
 καλὸν καγαθὸν εἰδέναί, ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν οἴεται τε εἰ-
 δέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δέ, ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ
 οἴομαι. ἔοικα γοῦν τούτου γε σμικρῷ τινὶ αὐτῷ

ἔπειτα μόγισ.] Commonly μόλις. Μόγισ is found in all the best and most numerous MSS., and I have no doubt that it ought to be everywhere restored to Plato; see Dorvill. ad Charit. p. 345. The distinction instituted by Thom. Mag. p. 619. is trifling.

ὅτι Οὕτοσὶ ἐμοῦ σ.] So Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. e. g. In Par. D S. is written οὕτοσιν ἐμοῦ. Old editions οὗτός γέ μου, which Bekker, with Par. C B, has changed into οὗτός γ' ἐμοῦ.

οὐδὲν καλὸν καγαθὸν εἰδέναί.] καλὸν οὐδ' ἀγαθόν, on the authority of Bas. 2. Bodl. Ven. a. b. all the Vind. and Florentine. In the other MSS. καλὸν καγαθόν.

τούτῳ σοφώτερος εἶναι,^f ὅτι ἂ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἶομαι εἰδέναί. ἐντεῦθεν ἐπ' ἄλλον ἤα τῶν ἐκείνου δοκούντων σοφωτέρων εἶναι, καὶ μοι ταῦτά ταῦτα ἔδοξε· καὶ ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἐκείνῳ καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς ἀπηχθόμην.

VII. Μετὰ ταῦτ' οὖν ἤδη ἐφεξῆς ἤα, αἰσθανόμενος μὲν καὶ λυπούμενος καὶ δεδιώς, ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμην,^a ὅμως δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἔδόκει εἶναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖσθαι. ἰτέον οὖν, σκοποῦντι^b τὸν χρησμὸν τί λέγει, ἐπὶ ἅπαντας τοὺς τι δοκοῦντας εἰδέναί. καὶ νῆ τὸν κύνα,^c ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, — δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς τᾶληθῆ λέγειν — ἢ μὴν ἐγὼ ἔπαθόν τι τοιοῦτον· οἱ μὲν μάλιστα^d εὐδοκιμοῦντες ἔδοξάν μοι ὀλίγου δεῖν τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι ζητοῦντι κατὰ τὸν θεόν, ἄλλοι δὲ δοκοῦντες φαυλότεροι ἐπιεικέστεροι εἶναι ἄνδρες πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν. δεῖ δὴ ὑμῖν τὴν ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδείξαι, ὥσπερ πόνοους τινὰς πονοῦντος, ἵνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἢ μαντεία γένοιτο^e. Μετὰ γὰρ τοὺς πολιτικούς ἤα ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς τοὺς τε τῶν τραγωδιῶν καὶ τοὺς τῶν διθυράμβων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡς ἐνταῦθα ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ καταληψόμενος ἐμαυτὸν ἀμαθέστερον ἐκείνων ὄντα. ἀναλαμβάνων οὖν αὐτῶν τὰ ποιήματα, ἃ μοι ἔδόκει μάλιστα πεπραγματεῦσθαι αὐτοῖς,^f διηρώτων ἂν αὐτοὺς τί λέγοιεν, ἵν' ἅμα τι καὶ μαθάνοιμι παρ' αὐτῶν. αἰσχύνομαι οὖν ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες, τᾶληθῆ· ὅμως δὲ ῥητέον. ὡς ἔπος γὰρ εἰπεῖν, ὀλίγου αὐτῶν ἅπαντες οἱ παρόντες ἂν βέλτιον ἔλεγον περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ ἐπεποιήκεσαν.^g ἔγνω οὖν καὶ περὶ τῶν

VII. ἰτέον οὖν, σκοποῦντι τ. χρ.] So Bodl. Ven. b. Vind. l. 4. Flor. g h. Par. D S. Old editions, καὶ ἵέναι σκοποῦντι. See note. ἔγνω οὖν καὶ περὶ τ.] ^az, commonly added after οὖν, is omit-



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ἐξεργάζεσθαι ἕκαστος ἡξίου καὶ τὰλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφώτατος εἶναι,^c καὶ αὐτῶν αὕτη ἢ πλημμέλεια ἐκείνην τὴν σοφίαν ἀπέκρυπτεν^d ὥστ', ἐμὲ ἐμαυτὸν ἀνερωτᾶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ,^e πότερα δεξαίμην ἂν οὕτως ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν, μήτε τι σοφὸς ὢν τὴν ἐκείνων σοφίαν, μήτε ἀμαθὴς τὴν ἀμαθίαν,^f ἢ ἀμφοτέρα ἂ ἐκείνοι ἔχουσιν ἔχειν. ἀπεκρινάμην οὖν ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τῷ χρησμῷ, ὅτι μοι λυσιτελοῖ ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν.

ΙΧ. Ἐκ ταυτησὶ δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθαιαί μοι γέγονασι καὶ οἶαι χαλεπώταται^a καὶ βαρύταται, ὥστε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γεγονέναι, ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι.^b οἴονται γάρ με ἕκαστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφόν, ἂ ἂν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω· τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι,^c καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενός.^d καὶ φαίνεται τοῦτ' οὐ λέγειν

ὥστ' ἐμὲ ἐμαυτὸν ἀνερωτᾶν] Commonly ὥστ' ἐμὲ καὶ αὐτὸν ἀν. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. others, ὥστε με ἐμ. Bodl. has preserved the true reading.

ὅτι μοι λυσιτελοῖ] Commonly λυσιτελεῖ. The optative is found in Bodl. Ven. a. b. Ξ. Vind. 1. 2. 5. Flor. 1. Par. B. H. Angel., which we have followed.

ΙΧ. Ἐκ ταυτησὶ δὴ τῆς ἐξ.] Commonly ἐκ ταύτης ἤδη, which arose from incorrect pronounciation. The true reading is given in Bodl. Ven. b. Vind. 4. Par. T. A little further, Ἀθηναῖοι is omitted in Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 6., and others.

φαίνεται τοῦτ' οὐ λέγειν.] Commonly τούτου. Most MSS., and those of the best authority, have τοῦτον. Wolf has correctly given τοῦτ' οὐ λέγειν, with the approbation of Hermann, Mus. Antiquit. Studior. p. 149, but Schæfer disapproves of this reading in Lamb. Bos. 705.

τὸν Σωκράτη,^e προσκεχρηῆσθαι· δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὀνόματι, ἐμὲ παράδειγμα ποιούμενος, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἴποι,^f ὅτι Οὗτος ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, σοφώτατός ἐστιν, ὅστις ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν, ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστι τῆ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιῶν ζητῶ καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ τῶν ξένων^g ἂν τινα οἶμαι σοφὸν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδὴν μοι μὴ δοκῆ, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι,^h ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφός. καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσχολίας οὔτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πρᾶξαί μοι σχολῆ γέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων, ἀλλ' ἐν πενίᾳ μυρία εἰμίⁱ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

Χ. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες, οἷς μάλιστα σχολή ἐστιν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων,^a αὐτόματοι χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται, εἶτα ἐπιχειροῦσιν^b ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν· κᾶπειτα, οἶμαι, εὐρίσκουσι πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν οἰομένων μὲν εἶδέναι τι ἀνθρώπων, εἰδότες δὲ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν.^c ἐντεῦθεν οὖν οἱ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐξεταζόμενοι ἐμοὶ ὀργίζονται,

ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἴποι] εἰ is omitted in the MSS.

περιῶν ζητῶ] Commonly ἐπιζητῶ which has been changed on the authority of the best and most numerous MSS. A little further, Bodl. Ven. B. Vat. and a few others, read καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων.

Χ. ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζομένων] Commonly ἐλεγχομένων, which has been changed from Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Parr. C S T. A little further on the old editions have εἶδέναι τι τῶν ἀνθρώπων: the article is rejected in Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T.

ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν] So Bodl. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T. Editt. ἢ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν, which Bekker also has retained.

ἀλλ' οὐχ αὐτοῖς,^d καὶ λέγουσιν, ὡς Σωκράτης τίς ἐστι μιαιώτατος καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους. καὶ ἐπειδάν τις αὐτοὺς ἐρωτᾷ, ὅ τι ποιῶν καὶ ὅ τι διδάσκων, ἔχουσι μὲν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦσιν, ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀπορεῖν, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς,^e καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νομίζουσιν, καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν. τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ, οἶμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοιεν λέγειν, ὅτι κατάδηλοι γίνονται προσποιούμενοι^f μὲν εἰδέναί, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδέν. ἅτε οὖν, οἶμαι, φιλότιμοι ὄντες καὶ σφοδροὶ καὶ πολλοί, καὶ ξυντεταγμένως καὶ πιθανῶς λέγοντες^g περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐμπεπλήκασιν ὑμῶν τὰ ὦτα^h καὶ πάλαι καὶ σφοδρῶς διαβάλλοντες. ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μέλητός μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων, Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶνⁱ ἀχθόμενος, Ἄνυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων. ὥστε, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, θαυμάζοιμ' ἂν, εἰ οἷός τ' εἶην ἐγὼ ὑμῶν ταύτην τὴν διαβολὴν ἐξελέσθαι ἐν

ἀλλ' οὐχ αὐτοῖς] Commonly ὀργίζονται, οὐκ αὐτοῖς. The reading in the text has been preserved in Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. e. g. Par. T. In others it is ὀργίζονται, οὐχ αὐτοῖς.

ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα—] Steph. ὅτι τὰ μ. καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ζητεῖ καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νομίζει καὶ τ. ἦ. λ. κρ. ποιεῖ. But ζητεῖ is omitted in Ald. Bas. 1. 2. Bodl. Vat. Nen. a. b. E. the six Vindobb. all the Florentine, Coisl. Parr., and others, so that it is impossible to trace its origin. The infinitives are given in almost all the MSS. The common reading is doubtless due to those who did not accurately observe the structure of the words.

καὶ ξυντεταγμένως] Some MSS., ξυντεταγμένως.

καὶ πάλαι καὶ σφοδρῶς δ.] Steph. καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν καὶ σφ., contrary to the authority of the best MSS. In Bodl. the reading is καὶ νῦν σφοδρῶς.

οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, οὕτω πολλὴν γεγονυῖαν. Ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τᾶληθῆ,^k καὶ ὑμᾶς οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ἀποκρυψάμενος ἐγὼ λέγω οὐδ' ὑποστειλάμενος.^l καί τοι οἶδα σχεδόν, ὅτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀπεχθάνομαι. ὃ καὶ τεκμήριον, ὅτι τᾶληθῆ λέγω καὶ ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἢ διαβολὴ ἢ ἐμὴ καὶ τὰ αἴτια ταῦτά ἐστι. καὶ ἐάν τε νῦν ἐάν τε αὖθις^m ζητήσητε ταῦτα, οὕτως εὐρήσετε.

XI. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ὧν οἱ πρῶτοί μου κατήγοροι κατηγόρουν αὕτη ἔστω ἱκανὴ ἀπολογία^a πρὸς ὑμᾶς· πρὸς δὲ Μέλητον τὸν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ φιλόπολιν,^b ὡς φησι, καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους μετὰ ταῦτα πειράσομαι ἀπολογεῖσθαι. αὖθις γὰρ δὴ, ὥσπερ ἐτέρων τούτων ὄντων κατηγόρων, λάβωμεν αὖ^c τὴν τούτων ἀντωμοσίαν. ἔχει δέ πως ὧδε.^d Σωκράτη φησὶν ἀδικεῖν τοὺς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοὺς οὐς ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά. τὸ μὲν δὴ ἔγκλημα τοιοῦτόν ἐστι· τούτου δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος ἐν ἕκαστον ἐξετάσωμεν. Φησὶ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς νέους ἀδικεῖν με διαφθείροντα. ἐγὼ δέ γε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀδικεῖν φημι Μέλητον, ὅτι σπουδῆ χαριεντίζεται,^e ῥαδίως εἰς ἀγῶνας καθιστὰς

ὅτι τᾶληθῆ λέγω.] Commonly ἀληθῆ. The true reading is found in Coisl. Ven. Λ Σ. Vind. 6. Par. B O H. Angel. Zitt. Florr. a. b. c. d. e. i. with Bas. 2. In Vat. Flor. d. is read ὅτι καὶ ἀληθῆ λ. |

XI. αὕτη ἔστω ἱκανὴ ἀπ.] Commonly ἱκανὴ ἢ ἀπ., which is corrected from Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. a. e. g. h. Par. B C D S T.

τὸν ἀγαθόν τε.] Τε is added from the best MSS.

πειράσομαι ἀπολογεῖσθαι.] Commonly ἀπολογήσασθαι. We have adopted the present from Bodl. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 6. Flor. g. h. Par. D S T. and the margin of Par. B C. Flor. a. c.

ἐγὼ δέ γε.] Γε is added from the best MSS.

ἀνθρώπους, περὶ πραγμάτων προσποιούμενος σπουδά-
ζειν καὶ κήδεσθαι, ὧν οὐδὲν τούτῳ πώποτε ἐμέλησεν.
ὡς δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, πειράσομαι καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξαι.

XII. Καί μοι δεῦρο, ὦ Μέλητε, εἶπέ,^a " Ἄλλο
τι περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ,^b ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι οἱ νεώ-
τεροι ἔσονται; " Ἐγωγε. " Ἴθι δὴ νῦν εἶπέ τούτοις,
τίς αὐτοὺς βελτίους ποιεῖ; δῆλον γάρ, ὅτι οἶσθα,
μέλον γέ σοι.^c τὸν μὲν γὰρ διαφθείροντα ἐξευρών, ὡς
φῆς, ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις τουτοισι^d καὶ κατηγορεῖς· τὸν δὲ δὴ
βελτίους ποιοῦντα ἴθι εἶπέ καὶ μήνυσον αὐτοῖς, τίς
ἐστίν. ὄρας, ὦ Μέλητε,^e ὅτι συγᾶς καὶ οὐκ ἔχεις εἰ-
πεῖν; καί τοι οὐκ αἰσχρὸν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἰκανὸν
τεκμήριον οὐ δὴ ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι σοι οὐδὲν μεμέληκεν;
ἀλλ' εἶπέ, ὦ ἄγαθέ, τίς αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους ποιεῖ; Οἱ
νόμοι. Ἄλλ' οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀλλὰ τίς
ἄνθρωπος, ὅστις πρῶτον καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἶδε, τοὺς
νόμους. Οὗτοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ δικασταί. Πῶς λέ-
γεις, ὦ Μέλητε; οἶδε τοὺς νέους παιδεύειν οἳοί τέ
εἰσι καὶ βελτίους ποιεῖν; Μάλιστα. Πότερον ἅπαν-
τες, ἢ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν, οἱ δ' οὐ; " Ἄπαντες. Ἐὐ γε-
νὴ τὴν Ἡραν^f λέγεις, καὶ πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν τῶν ὠφε-
λούντων.^g τί δαὶ δὴ, οἶδε οἱ ἀκροαταὶ βελτίους

καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξαι.] Commonly ὑποδείξαι, probably against all
MSS.

XII. Ἄλλο τι περὶ πολλοῦ π.] Commonly περὶ πλείστου,
contrary to the authority of the best MSS., that is, Bødl. Vat. Ven.
b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T. Commonly before
περὶ was inserted ἧ, which is omitted in the Florentine and
others.

τί δαὶ δὴ.] Commonly τί δὲ δὴ; the former is found in Coisl.
Vind. 3. Flor. e., and also from a correction in Bodl. Vat. See
Porson. ad. Med. 1008. Hermann. ad Vig. p. 848. Further on
τί δαὶ οἱ β., I have adopted from Flor. g. h. Vind. 3. 6. Coisl., and

ποιούσιν, ἢ οὐ; Καὶ οὗτοι. Τί δαὶ οἱ βουλευταί;^h Καὶ οἱ βουλευταί. Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ὦ Μέλητε, μὴ οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, οἱ ἐκκλησιασταί, διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους;ⁱ ἢ κακῆνοι βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἅπαντες; Κακῆνοι. Πάντες ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ἀθηναῖοι καλοὺς καγαθοὺς ποιοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω. οὕτω λέγεις; Πάνυ σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πολλήν γ' ἐμοῦ κατέγνωκας δυστυχίαν.^k καί μοι ἀπόκριναι ἢ καὶ περὶ ἵππους οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν; οἱ μὲν βελτίους ποιοῦντες αὐτοὺς πάντες ἄνθρωποι εἶναι, εἰς δέ τις ὁ διαφθείρων;^l ἢ τοῦναντίον τούτου πᾶν εἰς μὲν τις ὁ βελτίους οἷός τ' ὦν ποιεῖν ἢ πάνυ ὀλίγοι, οἱ ἵππικοί· οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἐάνπερ ξυνῶσι καὶ χρῶνται ἵπποις, διαφθείρουσιν; οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ περὶ ἵππων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ζώων; πάντως δὴ που, ἐάν τε σὺ καὶ Ἄνυτος οὐ φῆτε^m ἐάν τε φῆτε· πολλὴ γὰρ ἂν τις εὐδαιμονία εἴη περὶ τοὺς

from a correction of the Vat. instead of the common reading τί δέ οἱ β. For Planudes on Bachmanni Anecd. II. 81., is wrong in contending that τί δαὶ cannot be admitted except before a stop, since the verses of Aristoph. Av. 136. 1615. 1676. Ach. 764. Rann. 1454., and elsewhere, prove the contrary; see Elmsley ad Acharn. v. 803

οἱ ἐκκλησιασταί.] We have added the article from Bodl. Coisl. Ven. a. b. Vat. Parr. B C D S T. Flor. a. b. c. d. e. g. h. Vind. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Zittav., and others.

κατέγνωκας δυστυχίαν.] Commonly ἀτυχίαν, which is corrected from Bas. 2. Bodl. Vat. Coisl. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. b. c. d. g. h. Par. C D S T, and others.

εἰς δέ τις ὁ διαφθ.] ὁ is omitted by Steph. with Par. E. A little afterwards, γε was inserted after ὁ βελτίους in the old editions, which is found in very few MSS.

οὐ φῆτε.] Commonly μὴ φῆτε, which is changed from Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. a. d. g. h. Par. D S T.

νέους. εἰ εἷς μὲν μόνος αὐτοὺς διαφθείρει,^a οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ὠφελούσιν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Μέλητε, ἱκανῶς ἐπιδείκνυσαι, ὅτι οὐδεπώποτε ἐφρόντισας τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῶς ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδέν σοι μεμέληκε περὶ ὧν ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις.

XIII. Ἔτι δὲ ἡμῖν εἶπέ, ὦ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε, πότερον ἔστιν οἰκεῖν ἄμεινον ἐν πολίταις χρηστοῖς, ἢ πονηροῖς; ὦ τᾶν, ἀποκρίναι^a οὐδὲν γάρ τοι χαλεπὸν ἐρωτῶ. οὐχ οἱ μὲν πονηροὶ κακὸν τι ἐργάζονται τοὺς ἀεὶ ἐγγυτάτῳ ἑαυτῶν ὄντας,^b οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθόν τι; Πάνυ γε. Ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται ὑπὸ τῶν ξυνόντων βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελῆσθαι; ἀποκρίναι, ὦ ἄγαθέ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι.^c ἔσθ' ὅστις βούλεται βλάπτεσθαι; Οὐ δῆτα. Φέρε δὴ, πότερον ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις δεῦρο ὡς διαφθείροντα τοὺς νεωτέρους καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιούντα ἐκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα; Ἐκόντα ἔγωγε. Τί δῆτα, ὦ Μέλητε; τοσοῦτον σὺ ἐμοῦ σοφώτερος εἶ τηλικούτου ὄντος^d τηλικόςδε ὢν, ὥστε σὺ μὲν ἔγνωκας, ὅτι οἱ

XIII. ὦ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε] Ven. a. Vind. 5. 6., and others, πρὸς Δ. ὦ Μέλητε. But compare C. XIV. Sophist. p. 221. D.

οἱ μὲν πονηροὶ κακὸν τι] ἀεὶ is commonly inserted after πονηροί, which we have omitted with Bodl. Vind. b. Vat. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T. In others it is placed after κακόν.

καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιούντα] Commonly καὶ τούτους πον. π., against almost all the MSS. For the common reading νέους, we find νεωτέρους in Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T.

Τί δῆτα, ὦ Μ.] Commonly τί δῆ ποτε, which is changed from Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Par. C D S T. Vind. 1. 6. Flor. d. g. h. and others.

ὥστε σὺ μὲν ἔγνωκας] Commonly ὥστ' εὐ μ., which is corrected



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Μέλητε, τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ δῆλον δὴ, ὅτι^b κατὰ τὴν γραφήν,^c ἣν ἐγράψω, θεοὺς διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζειν οὗς ἡ πόλις νομίζει, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις^d ὅτι διδάσκων διαφθείρω; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα λεγώ. Πρὸς αὐτῶν τοίνυν, ὦ Μέλητε, τούτων τῶν θεῶν, ὧν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν,^e εἰπέ ἔτι σαφέστερον καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσι τουτοισί. ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι μαθεῖν, πότερον λέγεις διδάσκειν με νομίζειν εἶναί τινας θεοὺς, καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα νομίζω εἶναι θεοὺς καὶ οὐκ εἰμὶ τὸ παράπαν ἄθεος οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ἀδικῶ, οὐ μέντοι οὕσπερ γε ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ' ἑτέρους, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστίν ὃ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι ἑτέρους. ἢ παντάπασί με φῆς οὔτε αὐτὸν νομίζειν θεοὺς τοὺς τε ἄλλους^f ταῦτα διδάσκειν. Ταῦτα λέγω, ὡς τὸ παράπαν οἱ νομίζεις θεοὺς. ὦ θαυμάσιε Μέλητε, ἵνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις;^g οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην ἄρα νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι; Μὰ Δί',^h ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον λίθον φησὶν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν. Ἀναξαγόρου οἶεⁱ κατηγορεῖν, ὦ φίλε Μέλητε, καὶ οὕτω καταφρονεῖς τῶνδε καὶ οἶε αὐτοὺς ἀπείρους γραμμάτων εἶναι, ὥστε οὐκ εἰδέναί, ὅτι τὰ Ἀναξαγόρου βιβλία, τοῦ Κλαζομενίου, γέμει τούτων τῶν λόγων. καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νέοι ταῦτα^k παρ' ἐμοῦ μαθάνουσιν, ἃ ἕξεστιν ἐνίοτε, εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, δραχμῆς ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας^l πριαμένοις Σωκράτους καταγελᾶν, ἐὰν προσποιῆται ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπα ὄντα. ἀλλ' ὦ πρὸς Διός, οὕτωςί σοι δοκῶ οὐδένα νομίζειν θεὸν εἶναι; Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δί', οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν. Ἀπιστός γ' εἶ, ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, σαυτῶ.

XIV. καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι] The old editions, except Bas. 2., omit μέντοι, which is correctly preserved by all the MSS. except

ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ οὕτωςί, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πάνυ εἶναι ὑβριστῆς καὶ ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ὑβρεῖ τινὶ καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ καὶ νεότητι^m γράψασθαι. ἔοικε γὰρ ὡςπερ αἴνιγμα ξυντιθέντι διαπειρωμένῳ,ⁿ Ἄρα γινώσεται Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζομένου^o καὶ ἐναντί^o ἐμαυτῷ λέγοντος, ἢ ἐξαπατήσω αὐτον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἀκούοντας ; οὗτος γὰρ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς ἐαυτῷ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, ὡςπερ ἂν εἰ εἶποι Ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἀλλὰ θεοὺς νομίζων. καί τοι τοῦτό ἐστι παίζοντος.

XV. Ξυνεπισκέψασθε δὴ, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἢ μοι φαίνεται^a ταῦτα λέγειν· σὺ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀπόκρισαι, ὦ Μέλητε. ὑμεῖς δέ, ὅπερ κατ' ἀρχὰς ὑμᾶς παρητησάμην,^b μέμνησθέ μοι μὴ θορυβεῖν, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰωθότι τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιῶμαι.

Ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων, ὦ Μέλητε, ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ οὐ νομίζει ; ἀποκρινέσθω, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυβεῖτω. ἔσθ' ὅστις ἵππους μὲν οὐ νομίζει, ἵππικὰ δὲ πράγματα ; ἢ αὐλητὰς μὲν οὐ νομίζει εἶναι, αὐλητικὰ δὲ πράγματα ; οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν· εἰ μὴ σὺ βούλει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἐγὼ σοὶ λέγω καὶ τοῖς

Veh. Ξ. The common reading was ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ : but μὲν is omitted in Vat. Ven. b. Vind. l. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T., and, indeed, most correctly.

ξυντιθέντι διαπειρωμένῳ] Commonly ξυντιθέντι καὶ διαπ. καὶ is correctly omitted in Bodl. Ven. A. a. b. Angel. Par. E S T. Vind. l. 2. 5. 6. Flor. g. h. i. In others, ἢ is inserted after ξυντιθ.

XV. αὐλητὰς μὲν οὐ νομίζει εἶναι] εἶναι is added from Bodl. Coisl. Par. D. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. l. 3. 4. 6. Flor. d. e. h.

ἄλλοις τουτοισί. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε ἀπόκριναι. ἔσθ' ὅστις δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, δαίμονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει ;^c Οὐκ ἔστιν. Ὡς ὠνησας, ὅτι μόγισ ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τουτωνὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος.^d οὐκοῦν δαιμόνια μὲν φῆς με καὶ νομίζειν καὶ διδάσκειν, εἴτ' οὖν καινὰ εἴτε παλαιά· ἀλλ' οὖν δαιμόνιά γε νομίζω^e κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ διωμόσω ἐν τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ.^f εἰ δὲ δαιμόνια νομίζω, καὶ δαίμονας δήπου πολλὴ ἀνάγκη νομίζειν ἐμέ ἔστιν, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει ; ἔχει δὴ· τίθημι γάρ σε ὁμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀποκρίνει. τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἦτοι θεοὺς γε ἡγούμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας ;^g φῆς ἢ οὐ ; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν εἶπερ δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι, ὡς σὺ φῆς, εἰ μὲν θεοὶ τινὲς εἰσιν οἱ δαίμονες, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ὃ ἐγὼ φημί σε αἰνίττεσθαι καὶ χαριεντίζεσθαι, θεοὺς οὐχ ἡγούμενον φάναι ἐμὲ θεοὺς αὖ ἡγεῖσθαι πάλιν, ἐπειδήπερ γε δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι· εἰ δ' αὖ οἱ δαίμονες θεῶν παῖδές εἰσι νόθοι τινὲς ἢ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἐκ τινῶν ἄλλων, ὧν δὴ καὶ λέγονται,^h τίς ἂν ἀνθρώπων θεῶν μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ μή ; ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν ἄτοπον εἴη, ὥσπερ ἔν εἴ τις ἵππων μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο [ἢ] καὶ ὄνων τοὺς ἡμιόνους, ἵππους δὲ καὶ ὄνους μή

τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε] γε is restored from the best and most numerous MSS.

Ὡς ὠνησας] ὠκνησας, Steph. Injudiciously. Afterwards, for the common reading μόγισ, we have restored μόγισ from Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Parr. D S T.

καὶ διωμόσω] Commonly διομόσω, erroneously.

εἰ δὲ δαιμόνια] Steph. εἰ δὲ καὶ δ.

θεοὺς γε ἡγοῖμεθα] Old editions after ἡγοῖμεθα add εἶναι, which is omitted in Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. c. g. h. Par. D S T.

ἡγοῖτο [ἢ] καὶ ὄνων] I agree with Forster. I. H. Voss. and

ἡγοῖτο εἶναι. ἀλλ', ὦ Μέλητε, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως σὺ ταῦτα οὐχὶ ἀποπειρώμενος ἡμῶν ἐγράψω τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην, ἢ ἀπορῶν ὅ τι ἐγκαλοῖς ἐμοὶ ἀληθὲς ἀδίκημα· ὅπως δὲ σύ τινα πείθοις ἂν καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα ἀνθρώπων, ὡς οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ [ἀνδρός] ἔστι καὶ δαιμόνια καὶ θεῖα ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ αὐτοῦ αὐτοῦ μήτε δαίμονας μήτε θεοὺς μήτε ἥρωας, οὐδεμία μηχανὴ ἔστιν.¹

XVI. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες^a Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀδικῶ κατὰ τὴν Μελήτου γραφὴν, οὐ πολλῆς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολογίας, ἀλλ' ἱκανὰ καὶ ταῦτα· ὁ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλή μοι ἀπέχθεια γέγονε καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, εὐ ἴστε ὅτι ἀληθὲς ἔστι. καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει,^b εἴπερ αἰρῆ, οὐ Μελήτος, οὐδὲ Ἄνυτος, ἀλλ' ἢ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος.^c ἂ δὴ πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἤρηκεν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ αἰρήσειν· οὐδὲν δὲ δεινόν, μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στηῆ.^d

Ἴσως δ' ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις, Εἴτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνει,^e ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύσας, ἐξ οὗ κινδυνεύεις νυνὶ ἀποθανεῖν; Ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἂν δίκαιον λόγον ἀντεῖποιμι, ὅτι Οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, εἰ οἶει δεῖν κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι^f τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι ἄνδρα, ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελός ἐστιν,^g ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖν, ὅταν πράττη τι, πότερον

Schleierm. in thinking that ἢ ought to be left out. For it gives a wrong meaning, since it is plain that ἡμιόνους are παῖδας ἵππων καὶ ὄνων, not ἵππων ἢ καὶ ὄνων.

ὡς οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ (ἀνδρός)] οὐ, which was generally wanting, is restored from Bodl. Ven. a. b. Vat. Coisl. the six Vindb., Flor. a. d. h. i. Par. C D E H T. Ang. and others. But we have put ἀνδρός in brackets because it is wanting in most MSS.

XVI. ὅταν πράττη τι] Τι has been added from Paris S. alone,

δίκαια ἢ ἄδικα πράττει, καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα, ἢ κακοῦ. φαῦλοι γὰρ ἂν τῷ γε σῶ λόγῳ εἶεν τῶν ἡμιθέων ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτήκασιν, οἳ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός,^h ἕς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδύνου κατεφρόνησε παρὰ τὸ αἰσχροῦν τι ὑπομεῖναι, ὥστε ἐπειδὴ εἶπεν ἢ μήτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμουμένῳ "Εκτορα ἀποκτεῖναι, θεὸς οὔσα, οὕτωςί πως, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, "Ω παῖ, εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἐταίρῳ τὸν φόνον καὶ "Εκτορα ἀποκτενεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανεῖ· αὐτίκα γάρ τοι, φησί, μεθ' "Εκτοραὶ πότμος ἐτοῖμος· ὁ δὲ ταῦτ' ἀκούσας^k τοῦ μὲν θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ὠλιγόρησε, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον δείσας τὸ ζῆν κακὸς ὢν καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μὴ τιμωρεῖν, Αὐτίκα, φησί, τέθναίνην^l δίκην ἐπιθεῖς τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, ἵνα μὴ ἐνθάδε μένω καταγέλαστος παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν, ἄχθος ἀρούρης. μὴ αὐτὸν οἶει^m φροντίσαι θανάτου καὶ κινδύνου; οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ· οὐⁿ ἂν τις ἑαυτὸν τάξῃ ἢ ἡγησάμενοςⁿ βέλτιον εἶναι ἢ ὑπ' ἀρχοντος ταχθῆ, ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα κινδυνεύειν, μηδὲν ὑπολογιζόμενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ.^o

XVII. Ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἂν εἶην εἰργασμένος,^a ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ, ὅτε μὲν με^b οἱ ἀρχοντες

Forster conjectured ὅ τι ἂν πρ., with the approbation of Wolf. Πράττειν, placed absolutely in this manner, was not in use.

τέθναίνην δίκην ἐπιθ.] Commonly τὴν δίκην. The article is correctly omitted in Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. and others of a higher character.

τάξῃ ἢ ἡγησάμενος] We have added ἢ from Bodl. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. g. h. Par. S T.

μήτε ἄλλο μηδέν] Commonly μήτε ἄλλο τι μηδέν: but Bodl. Coisl. Vat. Ven. A b. Par. D E S T. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. a. c. d. g. h. correctly omit τι.

ἔταπτον, οὓς ὑμεῖς εἴλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτι-
 δαία καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ,^c τότε μὲν
 οὐ ἐκείνοι ἔταπτον ἔμενον ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις καὶ
 ἐκινδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάπτοντος, ὡς
 ἐγὼ ᾤηθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν
 ζῆν καὶ ἐξετάσοντα ἑμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦ-
 θα δὲ φοβηθεῖς ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πρᾶγμα
 λίπομι τὴν τάξιν. δεινὸν μὲντ' ἂν εἴη, καὶ ὡς ἀλη-
 θῶς τὸτ' ἂν με δικαίως εἰσάγοι τις εἰς δικαστήριον,
 ὅτι οὐ νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ^d καὶ
 δεδιῶς θάνατον καὶ οἰόμενος σοφὸς εἶναι, οὐκ ὢν.
 τὸ γάρ τοι θάνατον δεδιέναι, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν ἄλλο
 ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι, μὴ ὄντα· δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰ-
 δέναι^e ἐστὶν ἂ οὐκ οἶδεν. οἶδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν
 θάνατον οὐδ' εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέ-
 γιστον ὄν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδίασι δ' ὡς εὖ εἰδότες, ὅτι
 μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστὶ. καὶ τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία^f
 ἐστὶν αὕτη ἢ ἐπονείδιστος, ἢ τοῦ οἶεσθαι εἰδέναι ἂ
 οὐκ οἶδεν; ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ ἄνδρες, τούτῳ καὶ ἐνταῦθα
 ἴσως διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ εἰ δὴ τῷ
 σοφώτερός τοῦ φαίην εἶναι, τούτῳ ἂν,^g ὅτι οὐκ εἰδῶς
 ἱκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν Αἴδου οὕτω καὶ οἶομαι οὐκ εἰδέ-
 ναι. τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀπειθεῖν τῷ βελτίονι, καὶ θεῷ
 καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶν οἶδα. πρὸ
 οὖν τῶν κακῶν, ὧν οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ἂ μὴ οἶδα
 εἰ ἀγαθὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει, οὐδέποτε φοβηθήσομαι οὐδέ

XVII. λίπομι τὴν τάξιν.] So Vind. 1. 4. Flor. c. h. Ven. b. Par. D S. for the common reading λείπομι, Bodl. λίπομι.

καὶ ἀπειθεῖν] Commonly καὶ τὸ ἀπειθεῖν, against the authority of the best and most numerous MSS.

οὐδέποτε φοβηθήσομαι.] Commonly, φοβήσομαι, which is changed from Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. e. g. h. Par. DS.

φεύξομαι.^b ὥστε οὐδ'· εἴ με νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφίετε,ⁱ
 Ἄνύτῳ ἀπιστήσαντες,^k ὃς ἔφη ἢ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ
 δεῦρο εἰσελθεῖν, ἢ, ἐπειδὴ εἰσηλθόν, οὐχ οἶόν τε
 εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναί με, λέγων πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ὡς, εἰ
 διαφευξοίμην, ἤδη ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ υἱεῖς ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἅ
 Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντάπασιν διαφθαρήσον-
 ται, — εἴ μοι πρὸς ταῦτα εἴποιτε ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν
 μὲν Ἄνύτῳ οὐ πεισόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀφίεμέν σε, ἐπὶ τού-
 τῳ μέντοι, ἐφ' ᾧτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ζητήσῃ δια-
 τρίβειν μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν.^l εἰ δὲ ἄλῳς ἔτι τοῦτο
 πράττων, ἀποθανεῖ· εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τού-
 τοις ἀφίετε, εἴποιμ' ἂν ὑμῖν, ὅτι Ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄν-
 δρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ,^m πείσομαι
 δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἕωςπερ ἂν ἐμπνέω

Ἄνύτῳ ἀπιστήσαντες] Steph. ἀπειθήσαντες. Ald. Bas. 1.
 ἀπιθήσαντες. Bas. 2. with Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 3. 4. 6.
 The Florentine and almost all the others, ἀπιστήσαντες. See
 note.

ἤδη ἂν ὑμῶν — διαφθαρήσονται. Those who think that ἂν
 cannot be constructed with the future indicative, retain the com-
 mon reading, διαφθαρήσονται. But the indicative is preserved in
 Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Coisl. Vind. 1. 3. 4. 6. all the Florentine, and
 also Bekker's MSS., except Ven. Ξ and Vind. Υ 2. We have
 therefore preserved the reading which all the better MSS. supplied.
 Yet it must not be supposed that ἂν can be joined in such sentences
 with the future. In Plato, indeed, as far as we are aware, only two
 more examples of this construction are to be found, Rep. X. p. 615. D.
 and Phædo. p. 61. D; in one place ἂν is joined with ὀπωστιοῦν,
 in the other with οὐδὲ. And it appears that ἂν is not even in this
 place to be connected with διαφθαρήσονται, since we may suppose
 that the writer, when he had intended to say, ἤδη ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ υἱεῖς
 ἐπιτηδεύοιεν ἅ Σωκράτης διδάσκει, καὶ πάντες παντάπασιν διαφθαρή-
 σονται, having changed the construction of the sentence, used the
 participle. Of ἂν, construed with the future, Hermann has treated,
 De Part. ἂν Libr. I. c. 8.



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ἐγὼ οἶομαι οὐδέν πω ὑμῖν μείζον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν.[†] οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους μήτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε χρημάτων πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα,^s ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς ἀρίστη ἔσται, λέγων, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τᾶλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα^t καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων διαφθείρω^u τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη βλαβερὰ· εἰ δέ τις μέ φησιν ἄλλα λέγειν ἢ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν λέγει. πρὸς ταῦτα, φαίην ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἢ πείθεσθε Ἀνύτῳ, ἢ μή,^x καὶ ἢ ἀφίετε, ἢ μὴ ἀφίετε, ὡς ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποιήσοντος^s ἄλλα, οὐδ' εἰ μέλλω πολλάκις τεθνάναι.^z

XVIII. Μὴ θορυβεῖτε,^a ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλ' ἐμμείνατέ μοι οἷς ἐδεήθην ὑμῶν μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐφ' οἷς ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ' ἀκούειν· καὶ γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὀνήσεσθε ἀκούοντες. μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἅπτα ὑμῖν ἐρεῖν καὶ ἄλλα, ἐφ' οἷς ἴσως βοήσεσθε· ἀλλὰ μηδαμῶς ποιεῖτε τοῦτο. Εὐ γὰρ ἴστε, ἐὰν ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε

μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα] Commonly μήτε χρ. πρότερον μήτε ἄλλου τινὸς οὕτω σφόδρα, which is changed from Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T.

καὶ τᾶλλα ἀγαθὰ] So almost all the MSS., except Par. E., which has with Steph. καὶ τᾶλλα τὰγαθὰ. Instead of the common reading ἢ ἀρετὴ γίγν. I have written, omitting the article, ἀρετὴ γίγ., as in Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T.

ἢ ἀφίετε, ἢ μὴ ἀφίετε] Commonly καὶ ἢ ἀφίετε με, ἢ μὴ, ὡς ἐμοῦ κ. τ. λ. But με is omitted in Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T. and the same repeat ἀφίετε.

τοιούτον ὄντα, οἷον ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε ἢ ὑμᾶς αὐτούς. ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν βλάβειεν οὔτε Μέλητος οὔτε Ἄνυτος. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύναίτο· οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι θεμιτὸν εἶναι^b ἀμείνονι ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χείρονος βλάπτεσθαι. ἀποκτείνειε μέντ' ἂν ἴσως, ἢ ἐξελάσειεν, ἢ ἀτιμάσειεν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὗτος μὲν ἴσως οἶεται καὶ ἄλλος τίς που μεγάλα κακά, ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ οἶμαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον^c ποιεῖν ἢ οὗτος νυνὶ ποιεῖ, ἄνδρα ἀδίκως ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτιννύναί. νῦν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλοῦ δέω ἐγὼ^d ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ὥς τις ἂν οἶοιτο, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, μή τι ἐξαμάρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν ἐμοῦ καταψηφισάμενοι.^e ἔαν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε, οὐ ῥαδίως ἄλλον τοιοῦτον εὐρήσετε, ἀτεχνῶς, εἰ καὶ γελοιοτέρον εἰπεῖν, προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει^f ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὥσπερ ἵππῳ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναίῳ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νωθεστέρῳ καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μύωπος τινος· οἷον δὴ μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθεικέναι τοιοῦτόν τινα,^g ὃς ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὄνειδίζων ἕνα ἕκαστον οὐδὲν παύομαι τὴν ἡμέραν

XVIII. οὐδὲν ἂν βλάβειεν] So the best MSS. The common reading is οὐδὲν βλάβει.

οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι] Commonly οἶμαι, against the best MSS.

οὗτος μὲν ἴσως] Commonly μὲν was wanting, but it is uniformly retained by the best MSS.

μή τι ἐξαμάρτητε] Commonly τι was wanting, but it has been restored from the best MSS., as Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 4.

ἔαν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε] · So the better MSS. correctly read for με.

νωθεστέρῳ] So Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4 6. Flor. d. g. h. Parr. D S T. Commonly νωθρότερῳ, which arose from interpretation. The Grammarians at least consider νωθῆς as more commonly used by the Attic writers.

ὅλην πανταχοῦ προσκαθίζων. τοιοῦτος οὖν ἄλλος οὐ ραδίως ὑμῖν γενήσεται, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀλλ' εἴαν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, φείσεσθέ μου. ὑμεῖς δ' ἴσως τάχ' ἂν ἀχθόμενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ νυστάζοντες ἐγειρόμενοι, κρούσαντες ἂν με, πειθόμενοι Ἀνύτῳ, ραδίως ἂν ἀποκτείναιτε,^h εἶτα τὸν λοιπὸν βίον καθεύδοντες διατελοῦτ' ἂν, εἰ μὴ τινα ἄλλον ὁ θεὸς ὑμῖν ἐπιπέμψει κηδόμενος ὑμῶν. ὅτι δ' ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ὧν τοιοῦτος, οἷος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ πόλει δεδόσθαι,ⁱ ἐνθένδε ἂν κατανοήσαιτε. οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνῳ ἔοικε^k τὸ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπάντων ἡμεληκένοι καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελουμένων τοσαῦτα ἤδη ἔτη, τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον πράττειν αἰεὶ, ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστῳ προσιόντα, ὥσπερ πατέρα ἢ ἀδελφὸν πρεσβύτερον, πείθοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς. καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπέλαυον καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνων ταῦτα παρεκελευόμην, εἶχον ἂν τινα λόγον· νῦν δὲ ὁρᾶτε δὴ καὶ αὐτοί, ὅτι οἱ κατήγοροι τὰλλα πάντα ἀναισχύντως οὕτω κατηγοροῦντες τοῦτό γε οὐχ οἰοί τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναισχυντήῃσαι, παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα, ὡς ἐγὼ ποτέ τινα ἢ ἐπραξάμην μισθὸν ἢ ἤτησα. ἰκανὸν γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα,^l ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω, τὴν πενίαν.

XIX. Ἴσως ἂν οὖν δόξειεν ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ

ραδίως ἂν ἀποκτείναιτε] Commonly ἀποκτείνητε which is corrected from Bodl. Ven. b., and others.

τὸν λοιπὸν βίον] Commonly τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον, which is changed from Bas. 2. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D H S T., and others. Bodl. has χρόνον interlined.

εἶχον ἂν τινα λόγον.] Commonly εἶχεν, which is changed from Bodl. Ven. b. Flor. g. h. Vind. 6. Par. D S T.

ἀναισχύντως οὕτω] Commonly οὕτως ἀναισχύντως, which is changed from Bodl. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. g. h. Par. D S T. ἀναισχύντως certainly is the emphatic word.

ἐγὼ ἰδίᾳ μὲν ταῦτα συμβουλεύω περιῶν καὶ πολυπραγμονῶ, δημοσίᾳ δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον συμβουλεύειν τῇ πόλει. Τούτου δὲ αἴτιόν ἐστιν ὃ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται [φωνή], ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμῶδῶν Μέλητος ἐγράψατο.^a ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνή τις γιγνομένη, ἣ ὅταν γένηται, αἰεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τούτου, ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτε. τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν. καὶ παγκάλως γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐναντιοῦσθαι· εὐ γὰρ ἴστε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ἐγὼ πάλαι ἐπεχείρησα πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ πράγματα, πάλαι ἂν ἀπολώλη καὶ οὔτ' ἂν ὑμᾶς ὠφελήκη οὐδὲν οὔτ' ἂν ἐμαυτόν.^b καί μοι μὴ ἄχθεσθε λέγοντι τὰ λήθη· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται οὔτε ὑμῖν οὔτε ἄλλῳ πλῆθει οὐδενὶ γνησίως ἐναντιούμενος καὶ διακωλύων πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τὸν τῷ ὄντι μαχοῦμενον

ΣΙΧ. καὶ πολυπραγμονῶ] So Bodl. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. g. h., and some others; the rest have πολυπραγμονῶν.

γίγνεται (φωνή)] This φωνή, although retained by all MSS., is nevertheless so needless, that it has been deservedly considered as a gloss.

παγκάλως γέ μοι] δέ μοι in the old editions, against almost all the MSS.

ἀπολώλη—ὠφελήκη] Since this form of the Past Perfect, which is common in Plato, is here given by Bodl., and appears in a correction of the last syllable in Ven. b., we have not hesitated to adopt it instead of the common ἀπολώλειν and ὠφελήκειν. Compare c. VIII. at the beginning.

τὸν τῷ ὄντι μαχοῦμενον] τὸν, commonly omitted, is inserted on the authority of the best MSS.

ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὀλίγον χρόνον^c σωθήσεσθαι, ἰδιωτεύειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

XX. Μεγάλα δ' ἔγωγε ὑμῖν τεκμήρια παρέξομαι τούτων, οὐ λόγους, ἀλλ' ὃ ὑμεῖς τιμᾶτε, ἔργα· ἀκούσατε δὴ μου τὰ ἐμοὶ συμβεβηκότα, ἵν' εἰδῆτε, ὅτι οὐδ' ἂν ἐνὶ ὑπείκάθοιμι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δείσας θάνατον, μὴ ὑπείκων δὲ ἄμα καὶ ἀπολοίμην. ἐρῶ δὲ ὑμῖν φορτικά μὲν καὶ δικανικά,^a ἀληθῆ δέ. Ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄλλην μὲν ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν πώποτε ἤρξα^b ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐβουλεύσα δέ. καὶ ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ Ἀντιοχίς^c πρυτανεύουσα, ὅτε ὑμεῖς τοὺς δέκα στρατηγούς τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐβούλεσθε ἀθρόους κρίνειν,^d παρανόμως, ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑστέρω χρόνῳ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἔδοξε.^e τότε ἐγὼ μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων ἠναντιώθην^f ὑμῖν μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους, καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην· καὶ ἐτοίμῳ ὄντων ἐνδεικνύναι με καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ῥητόρων,^g καὶ

XX. ἀκούσατε δὴ μου τὰ ἐμοὶ συμβεβ.] Commonly ἀκούσατε δὴ μοι τὰ ξ., which is changed from Bodl. Ven. b. Flor. h. Par. D S T. A little further on the old editions have ὑπείκοιμι, which is found only in Flor. e. Ven. Ξ.. On the form adopted by us, see Mæris, under the word. Ruhnk. ad Tim. p. 87. Hermann ad Œd. Col. 1019..

ἄμα καὶ ἀπολοίμην.] Commonly ἄμα καὶ ἄμ' ἂν ἀπολοίμην. The MSS. disagree much. The reading which we have adopted with Bekker is found in Vind. 2. 3. Flor. b. e. i. Coisl. Angel Ven. ΛΞ. Par. E H. and pr. Ven. 6. Par. B. Fischer defends the common reading in vain.

ἐβούλεσθε]. Commonly ἐβουλεύσασθε, which is corrected from Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T.

καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ῥ.] Commonly ὑπάγειν, which is corrected from Bodl. Vat. a. b. six Vindobb., all the Florentine, and most others. See note.

ὑμῶν κελευόντων καὶ βοώντων, μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου ᾧ μὴν μᾶλλον με δεῖν διακινδυνεύειν ἢ μεθ' ὑμῶν γενέσθαι μὴ δίκαια βουλευομένων, φοβηθέντα δεσμὸν ἢ θάνατον. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἦν ἔτι δημοκρατουμένης τῆς πόλεως. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία ἐγένετο οἱ τριάκοντα αὖ μεταπεμφάμενοί με πέμπτον αὐτὸν^h εἰς τὴν θόλονⁱ προσέταξαν ἀγαγεῖν ἐκ Σαλαμίνας Λέοντα τὸν Σαλαμίνιον, ἵν' ἀποθάνοι· οἷα δὲ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐκεῖνοι πολλοῖς πολλὰ προσέταττον, βουλόμενοι ὡς πλείστους ἀναπληῆσαι αἰτιῶν.^k τότε μέντοι ἐγὼ οὐ λόγῳ, ἀλλ' ἔργῳ αὖ ἐνεδειξάμην, ὅτι ἐμοὶ θανάτου μὲν μέλει, εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἦν εἰπεῖν, οὐδ' ὀτιῶν, τοῦ δὲ μηδὲν ἄδικον μηδ' ἀνόσιον ἐργάζεσθαι, τούτου δὲ τὸ πᾶν μέλει.^l ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐκείνη ἢ ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἐξέπληξεν οὕτως ἰσχυρὰ οὔσα, ὥστε ἄδικόν τι ἐργάσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς θόλου ἐξήλθομεν, οἱ μὲν τέτταρες ᾧχοντο εἰς Σαλαμίνα καὶ ἤγαγον Λέοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ ᾧχόμεν ἀπιὼν οἴκαδε.^m καὶ ἴσως ἂν διὰ ταῦτ' ἀπέθανον, εἰ μὴ ἢ ἀρχὴ διὰ ταχέων κατελύθη. καὶ τούτων ὑμῖν ἔσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες.

XXI. Ἄρ' οὖν ἂν με οἴεσθε τοσάδε ἔτη διαγενέσθαι, εἰ ἔπραττον τὰ δημόσια, καὶ πράττων ἀξίως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις καί, ὥσπερ χρῆ, τοῦτο περὶ πλείστου ἐποιούμην;^a πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ ἄνδρες

^h Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλιγαρχ.] Heind.; without necessity, conjectures δὲ ἢ ὀλιγαρχία.

θανάτου μὲν μέλει] So Bodl. Ven. b. and all the better MSS. for the common reading μὲν θ. μ. A little further, Bekker omits ἦν with Par. E.

XXI. Ἄρ' οὖν ἂν με οἴεσθε] ἂν, commonly omitted, is restored from Bodl. Ven. Ξ b. Coisl. Vat. Vind. 1. 3. 4. 6. Flor. e. g. h. Par. D S T.

'Αθηναῖοι οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων οὐδεῖς. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου δημοσίᾳ τε εἴ ποῦ τι ἔπραξα, τοιοῦτος φανούμαι,^b καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος οὐδενὶ πώποτε ξυγχωρήσας οὐδὲν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον. οὔτε ἄλλω οὔτε τούτων οὐδενί, οὓς οἱ διαβάλλοντές μέ φασιν ἐμούς μαθητὰς εἶναι.^c ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτ' ἐγενόμην· εἰ δέ τις ἐμοῦ λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράττοντος ἐπιθυμῆ ἀκούειν,^d εἴτε νεώτερος εἴτε πρεσβύτερος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἐφθόνησα. οὐδὲ χρήματα μὲν λαμβάνων^e διαλέγομαι, μὴ λαμβάνων δ' οὔ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως καὶ πλουσίῳ καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν,^f καὶ ἐάν τις βούληται ἀποκρινόμενος ἀκούειν ὧν ἂν λέγω. καὶ τούτων ἐγώ, εἴτε τις χρηστὸς γίγνεται εἴτε μή, οὐκ ἂν δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχοιμι,^g ὧν μήτε ὑπεσχόμην μηδενὶ μηδὲν πώποτε μάθημα μήτε ἐδίδαξα. εἰ δέ τις φησι παρ' ἐμοῦ πώποτέ τι μαθεῖν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι ἰδίᾳ ὅ τι μὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, εὐ ἴστε, ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει.

XXII. 'Αλλὰ διὰ τί δή ποτε μετ' ἐμοῦ χαίρουσί

οὓς οἱ διαβάλλοντες] Commonly οὓς δὴ οἱ δ. But δὴ is omitted in Bodl. Ven. b. Parr. D S T. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. In Ven. b. Flor. h. and others, οὓς διαβάλλοντες.

ἐπιθυμῆ ἀκούειν.] So Bodl. Coisl. Ven. a. b. Par. A B C D E S T. six Vindobb. Flor. a. b. e. g. h. Zitt. Commonly ἐπιθυμοῖ, which Bekker has retained. Socrates speaks as referring all those things to the present time; whence he proceeds, further on, οὐδὲ λαμβάνων διαλέγομαι.

ἀκούειν ὧν ἂν λ.] So Bodl. Vat. Ven. a. b. Vindd. Florr., and most others. Old editions, ἀκούει.

πώποτέ τι μαθεῖν.] Commonly πώποτε ἢ μαθεῖν, which is corrected from Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T.

XXII. 'Αλλὰ διὰ τί δή ποτε] Commonly διὰ was wanting, contrary to the best MS .



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ἔπειτα Λυσανίας^f ὁ Σφήττιος, Αἰσχίνου τοῦδε πατήρ·
 ἔτι Ἀντιφῶν ὁ Κηφισιεύς οὕτοσί, Ἐπιγένους πατήρ.
 ἄλλοι τοίνυν οὗτοι,^g ὧν οἱ ἀδελφοὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ
 διατριβῇ γεγόνασι, Νικόστρατος,^h ὁ Θεοδοτίδου,
 ἀδελφὸς Θεοδότου—καὶ ὁ μὲν Θεόδοτος τετελεύτηκεν,
 ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἐκεῖνός γε αὐτοῦ καταδεηθείη—, καὶ
 Πάραλος ὅδε, ὁ Δημοδόκου, οὗ ἦν Θεάγης ἀδελφός·
 ὅδε τε Ἀδείμαντος, ὁ Ἀρίστωνος, οὗ ἀδελφὸς οὕτοσιν
 Πλάτων, καὶ Αἰαντόδωρος, οὗ Ἀπολλόδωρος ὅδε
 ἀδελφός. καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐγὼ ἔχω ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν,
 ὧν τινα ἐχρῆν μάλιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ πα-
 ρασχέσθαι Μέλητον μάρτυρα· εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελάθετο,
 νῦν παρασχέσθω, ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ,ⁱ καὶ λεγέτω, εἴ τι
 ἔχει τοιοῦτον. ἀλλὰ τούτου πᾶν τὸναντίον εὐρήσετε,
 ὧ ἄνδρες, πάντας ἐμοὶ βοηθεῖν ἐτοίμους τῷ διαφθεί-
 ροντι,^k τῷ κακὰ ἐργαζομένῳ τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτῶν, ὡς
 φασιν Μέλητος καὶ Ἄνυτος. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ

Αἰσχίνου τοῦδε πατήρ.] Commonly τούτου against Ven. b. Par. D S T. Vat. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. e. g. h. and Bodl.

ἔτι Ἀντιφῶν ὁ Κηφ.] Commonly ἔτι δ' Ἀντ., I wonder Bekker preserved this against the authority of Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S.

Νικόστρ. ὁ Θεοδοτίδου] Steph. ὁ Ζωτίδου, which is in Par. B C. marg. Bodl. Ven. b. Par. D S T. Ven. 1. 6. Flor. g. h. Θεοζωτίδου.

ὅδε τε Ἀδείμαντος] Commonly δέ, which is changed from Bas. 2. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 4. Flor. a. Par. B C.

Αἰαντόδωρος] Ald. Bas. 1. Steph. Αἰαντίδωρος, against almost all MSS. A little further on, old editions, οὗ Ἀπολλόδωρος ὁ ἀδελφός, which is rejected by all the good MSS.

ἐγὼ ἔχω ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν] Commonly ἔγωγε ἔχω, against the authority of Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T.

λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι] So Bodl. Coisl. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T. Commonly παρέχεται.

διεφθαρμένοι τάχ' ἂν λόγον ἔχοιεν βοηθοῦντες.¹ οἱ δὲ ἀδιάφθαρτοι, πρεσβύτεροι ἤδη ἄνδρες, οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες,^m τίνα ἄλλον ἔχουσι λόγον βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν ὀρθόν τε καὶ δίκαιον,ⁿ ὅτι ξυνίσασι Μελήτῳ μὲν ψευδομένῳ, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀληθεύοντι;

XXIII. Εἶεν δὴ, ὦ ἄνδρες· ἃ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχοιμ' ἂν ὑπολογεῖσθαι, σχεδόν ἐστι ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα ἴσως τοιαῦτα. Τάχα δ' ἂν τις ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσειεν^a ἀναμνησθεὶς ἑαυτοῦ, εἰ ὁ μὲν ἐλάττω τουτουὶ τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἀγῶνα ἀγωνιζόμενος^b ἐδεήθη τε καὶ ἰκέτευσε τοὺς δικαστὰς μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων, παιδία τε αὐτοῦ ἀναβιβασάμενος, ἵνα ὅ τι μάλιστα ἐλεηθείη, καὶ ἄλλους τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φίλων πολλούς, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω,^c καὶ ταῦτα κινδυνεύων, ὡς ἂν δόξαιμι, τὸν ἔσχατον κίνδυνον. τάχ' ἂν οὖν τις ταῦτα ἐννοήσας ἀνθαδέστερον ἂν πρὸς με σχοίη,^d καὶ ὀργισθεὶς αὐτοῖς τούτοις θεῖτο ἂν μετ' ὀργῆς τὴν ψῆφον. εἰ δὴ τις ὑμῶν οὕτως ἔχει,—οὐκ ἀξιῶ μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε·

ὅτι ξυνίσασι] So with Bas. 2. is read in Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Vind. b. Flor. g. h. Par. S T. and marg. Flor. a. c. Commonly ὅν ξ. which Bekker retained.

ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀληθεύοντι] So Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. g. h. Par. D S T. Old editions, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀληθῆ λέγοντι, which is a gloss.

XXIII. σχεδόν ἐστι ταῦτα] Commonly σχεδόν τί ἐστι, against the best MSS.

ἐδεήθη τε καὶ ἰκέτευσε] So Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Par. B C D H S T. Ang. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. g. h. with Bas. 2. Commonly δεδέηται τε κ. ἰκ., which is in vain defended by Schæfer, Demosth. Appar. T. II. p. 652.

παιδία τε αὐτοῦ] Steph. wrote αὐτοῦ, which is unnecessary in this narration.

καὶ φίλων πολλούς] Commonly καὶ φίλους πολλούς, against the best MSS.

εἰ δ' οὖν ἐπιεικῆ ἄν μοι δοκῶ πρὸς τοῦτον λέγειν λόγον, ὅτι Ἐμοί, ὦ ἄριστε, εἰσὶ μὲν πού τινες καὶ οἰκεῖοι. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου,^e οὐδ' ἐγὼ ἀπὸ δρυὸς οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέφυκα, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ὥστε καὶ οἰκεῖοί μοι εἰσι καὶ υἱεῖς γε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τρεῖς, εἷς μὲν μειράκιον ἤδη, δύο δὲ παιδιά. ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐδέν' αὐτῶν δεῦρο ἀναβιβασάμενος δεήσομαι ὑμῶν ἀποψηφίσασθαι. Τί δὴ οὖν οὐδέν τούτων ποιήσω; Οὐκ ἀνθαδιζόμενος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδ' ὑμᾶς ἀτιμάζων· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν θαρράλέως ἐγὼ ἔχω πρὸς θάνατον ἢ μὴ, ἄλλος λόγος, πρὸς δ' οὖν δόξαν καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ὅλη τῇ πόλει οὐ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι ἐμὲ τούτων οὐδέν ποιεῖν καὶ τηλικόνδε ὄντα καὶ τοῦτο τοῦνομα ἔχοντα,^f εἴτ' οὖν ἀληθὲς εἴτ' οὖν ψεῦδος· ἀλλ' οὖν δεδογμένον γέ ἐστι τὸν Σωκράτη διαφέρειν τινὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων.^g εἰ οὖν ὑμῶν οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφέρειν εἴτε σοφία εἴτε ἀνδρεία εἴτε ἄλλη ἡτινιοῦν ἀρετῇ τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται, αἰσχρὸν ἂν εἴη· οἷους περ ἐγὼ πολλάκις ἐώρακά τινας, ὅταν κρίνονται, δοκοῦντας μὲν τι εἶναι,^h θαυμάσια δὲ

πρὸς τοῦτον λέγειν λόγον, ὅτι—] Commonly πρὸς τοῦτον λέγειν, λέγων, ὅτι κ. τ. λ. The present reading is supplied by Ven. b. from a correction Vind. 4. Flor. a. h. Par. D S T.

καὶ υἱεῖς γε] Γε is omitted in Bodl. Ven. b. Par. D S T. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. e. g. h. h. Zitt.

Οὐκ ἀνθαδιζόμενος] So Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. a. c. d. g. h. Par. B C D T. Commonly ἀνθαδιαζόμενος. See Phrynich. ed. Lob. p. 66. Thom. M. p. 84 sq.

καὶ ὅλη τῇ πόλει] Commonly καὶ ὅλως τῇ πόλει, which is corrected from Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 3. 4. 6., and most others.

εἴτε ἀνδρεία] Bodl., Flor. seven. Ven. Α Ξ Π a. Zitt. Par. B C D H S. Ang. ἀνδρία, but ἀνδρεία is the better reading. See Matthiæ ad Eurip. Herc. fur. v. 469. The metre requires the form ἀνδρεία in Aristoph. Nubb. v. 510.

ἐργαζομένους, ὡς δεινόν τι οἰομένους πείσεσθαι, εἰ ἀποθανοῦνται, ὥσπερ ἀθανάτων ἐσομένων, ἐὰν ὑμεῖς αὐτοὺς μὴ ἀποκτείνητε· οὐ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν αἰσχύνῃν τῇ πόλει περιάπτειν, ὥστ' ἂν τινα καὶ τῶν ξένων ὑπολαβεῖν, ὅτι οἱ διαφέροντες Ἀθηναίων εἰς ἀρετήν, οὓς αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν ἐν τε ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τιμαῖς προκρίνουσιν, οὗτοι γυναικῶν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσι.ⁱ ταῦτα γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὔτε ἡμᾶς χρή ποιεῖν^k τοὺς δοκοῦντας καὶ ὀτιοῦν εἶναι, οὔτ', ἂν ἡμεῖς ποιῶμεν, ὑμᾶς ἐπιτρέπειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὅτι πολὺ μᾶλλον καταψηφιεῖσθε τοῦ τὰ ἐλεεινὰ ταῦτα δράματα εἰσάγοντος^l καὶ καταγέλαστον τὴν πόλιν ποιοῦντος ἢ τοῦ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντος.

XXIV. Χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης,^a ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι δεῖσθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ οὐδὲ δεόμενον ἀποφεύγειν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ κάθηται ὁ δικαστής, ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια,^b ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ κρίνειν ταῦτα· καὶ ὁμώμοκεν^c οὐ χαριεῖσθαι οἷς ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ δικάσειν κατὰ τοὺς

οὔτε ἡμᾶς χρή] So Flor. d. Ven. A Ξ and Coisl. from a correction, as Forster had conjectured. Commonly ὑμᾶς.

καὶ ὀτιοῦν εἶναι] So Vind. 6. Flor. e. The common reading was καὶ ὀπητιοῦν. Heindorf conjectured καὶ ὀπητοῦν τι. Bekker, without the authority of MSS., gave καὶ ὀπητιοῦν τι εἶναι. See note.

αὐτὸ ἐνδείκνυσθαι] Commonly ἐνδείκνυσθε, which is in Par. E. and a very few others.

τὰ ἐλεεινὰ τ. δρ.] Astius here, as well as in all other passages, writes ἐλεινά, against the MSS. We do not even assent to Porson, Præfat. ad Hecuh. p. vii. sq., that this form should be restored in Attic writers. Compare Lobeck. ad Phrynich. p. 87. As from δέω, δείδω, is formed δεινός, so from ἐλεέω is derived ἐλεινός, which the Poets have converted into the trisyllable ἐλεινός.

νέμους. οὐκουν χρῆ οὔτε ἡμᾶς ἐθίζειν ὑμᾶς ἐπιορκεῖν, οὔθ' ὑμᾶς ἐθίζεσθαι· οὐδέτεροι γὰρ ἂν ἡμῶν εὐσεβοῖεν. μὴ οὖν ἀξιοῦτέ^d με, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιαῦτα δεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πράττειν, ἃ μήτε ἡγοῦμαι καλὰ εἶναι μήτε δίκαια μήτε ὅσια, ἄλλως τε πάντως νῆ Δία, μάλιστα μέντοι καὶ^e ἀσεβείας φεύγοντα ὑπὸ Μελήτου τουτουί. σαφῶς γὰρ ἂν, εἰ πείθοιμι ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζοίμην^f ὁμωμοκότας, θεοὺς ἂν διδάσκοιμι μὴ ἡγεῖσθαι ὑμᾶς εἶναι, καὶ ἄτεχνῶς ἀπολογούμενος κατηγοροίην ἂν ἑμαυτοῦ, ὡς θεοὺς οὐ νομίζω. ἀλλὰ πολλοῦ δεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν· νομίζω τε γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγορῶν, καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρίναι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅπῃ μέλλει ἐμοί τε ἄριστα εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν.

XXV. Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν,^a ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μου κατεψηφίσασθε, ἀλλὰ τέ μοι πολλὰ συμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γέγονε^b τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον θαυμάζω ἑκατέρων τῶν ψήφων τὸν γεγονότα ἀριθμόν. οὐ γὰρ ὄμην ἔγωγε οὕτω παρ' ὀλίγον ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ

XXIV. οὐκουν χρῆ] Commonly οὐκοῦν, which is corrected from Par. D T. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6.

μάλιστα μέντοι καὶ ἀσ. φ.] Commonly ὅσια, μάλιστα πάντως, νῆ Δία μέντοι καὶ ἀσ. φευγ. The MSS. disagree. I have given what Bekker has collected from them.

σαφῶς γὰρ ἂν] ἂν is added from Bas. 2. Bodl. Vat. Ven. a. b. Vind. 1. 2. 4. 5. 6. Fl. a. b. g. h. i. and others.

XXV. Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν] So with Bas. 2. Bodl. Coisl. Ven. A b. Vat. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. a. b. c. d. e. h. Zitt. Ang. Par. B C D E H. The common reading was Τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ ἀγ.

πολύ· νῦν δέ, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἰ τρεῖς μόναι μετέπεσον^c
τῶν ψήφων, ἀποπεφεύγη ἄν. Μέλητον μὲν οὖν, ὡς
ἐμοὶ δοκῶ; καὶ νῦν ἀποπέφευγα, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀποπέ-
φευγα ἀλλὰ παντὶ δῆλον τοῦτό γε, ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη
Ἄνυτος καὶ Δύκων^d κατηγορήσοντες ἐμοῦ, κὰν ὦφλε
χιλίας δραχμάς, οὐ μεταλαβὼν τὸ πέμπτον μέρος
τῶν ψήφων.^e

XXVI. Τιμᾶται δ' οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου.^a Εἶεν.
ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τίνοσ ὑμῖν ἀντιτιμήσομαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖ-
οι; ἢ δῆλον, ὅτι τῆς ἀξίας;^b τί οὖν; τί ἄξιός εἰμι
παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι,^c ὅτι μαθὼν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἡσυχίαν
ἦγον, ἀλλ' ἀμελήσας ὧν περ οἱ πολλοί,^d χρηματισμοῦ
τε καὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημηγοριῶν καὶ
τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ ξυνωμοσιῶν καὶ στάσεων τῶν
ἐν τῇ πόλει γιγνομένων, ἠγησάμενος ἐμαυτὸν τῷ ὄντι
ἐπιεικέστερον εἶναι ἢ ὥστε εἰς ταῦτ' ἰόντα σώζεσθαι,
ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἦα,^e οἱ ἐλθὼν μήτε ὑμῖν μήτε ἐμαυτῷ
ἐμελλον μηδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον
ἰὼν εὐεργετεῖν τὴν μεγίστην εὐεργεσίαν, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι.

εἰ τρεῖς μόναι] Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Vind. l. 6. Flor. a. c. g. h. i.
Par. B C D S with ed. Bas. 2. εἰ τριάκοντα μόναι.

ἀποπεφεύγη ἄν.] Commonly ἀπεπεφεύγειν ἄν. The Attic form
is preserved in Bodl., in which the common termination is inter-
lined. Instances are not rare in Plato of the omission of the augment
of the pluperfect. Compare Rep. II. 374. B. Gorg. p. 515. E.
Symp. p. 215. E. Matth. §. 165. Fischer. ad Weller. II. p. 317.
Hemsterh. ad Lucian. T. I. p. 308. Further on, the common read-
ing was ἀλλὰ καὶ παντὶ δ. The best MSS. correctly reject καί.
How ἀλλὰ is put after οὐ μόνον without καὶ is shown by Hermann.
ad Viger. p. 837.

XXVI. ἢ δῆλον] Commonly ἢ δῆλον, against the MSS.

ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἦα] Commonly ἦα. Bodl. Ven. b. ἦα. Vat.
ἦα. Compare Buttmann. *Ausführl. griech. Sprachlehre* T. I. p. 554
et 558. ed. 1.

ἐνταῦθα ἦα,^f ἐπιχειρῶν ἕκαστον ὑμῶν πείθειν μὴ πρό-
 τερον μήτε τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πρὶν
 ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμεληθείη, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος καὶ φρονιμώ-
 τατος ἔσοιτο, μήτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς
 πόλεως· τῶν τε ἄλλων οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον^g
 ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. τί οὖν εἶμι ἄξιος παθεῖν τοιοῦτος ὢν;
 ἀγαθόν τι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ δεῖ γε κατὰ τὴν
 ἀξίαν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι· καὶ ταῦτά γε ἀγαθὸν
 τοιοῦτον, ὅ τι ἂν πρέποι ἐμοί. τί οὖν πρέπει ἀνδρὶ
 πένητι εὐεργέτη,^h δεομένῳ ἄγειν σχολὴν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμε-
 τέρα παρακελεύσει; οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅ τι μᾶλλον, ὦ ἄνδρες
 Ἀθηναῖοι, πρέπει οὕτως, ὡςⁱ τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν
 πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι,^k πολὺ γε μᾶλλον ἢ εἴ τις ὑμῶν
 ἵππῳ ἢ ξυνωρίδι ἢ ζεύγῃ νενίκηκεν Ὀλυμπιάσιν. ὁ
 μὲν γὰρ ὑμᾶς ποιεῖ εὐδαίμονας δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἐγὼ δὲ
 εἶναι· καὶ ὁ μὲν τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ δὲ δέομαι.
 εἰ οὖν δεῖ με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τιμᾶσθαι,
 τούτου τιμῶμαι, ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτήσεως.

XXVII. Ἴσως οὖν ὑμῖν καὶ ταυτὶ λέγων παραπλη-
 σίως δοκῶ λέγειν ὡς περ περὶ τοῦ οἴκτου καὶ τῆς ἀντι-
 βολήσεως,^a ἀπαυθαδιζόμενος· τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄνδρες
 Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε μᾶλλον. πέπεισμαι
 ἐγὼ ἐκὼν εἶναι^b μηδένα ἀδικεῖν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ ὑμᾶς
 τοῦτο οὐ πείθω· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἀλλήλοις διειλέγ-

εἰ δεῖ γε κατὰ τ. ἀ.] So Coisl. Vind. 3. Flor. b. Commonly εἰ
 δῆ γε. In many MSS. is found εἰ δέ γε. Further on, for τιμᾶσθαι,
 which is also restored from Coisl. the old editions give τιμᾶσθε.

τιμῶμαι, ἐν πρυτ. σιτήσεως.] Commonly τιμῶμαι, τῆς ἐν πρ.
 σιτήσεως. The article is omitted in Bodl. Vat. Coisl. Ven. Λ a. b.
 Ang. Par. C E H. Vind. 1. 2. 4. 5. 6. Flor. a. b. c. d. g. h. Zitt.
 Further on, the old editions again have ἀπαυθαδιαζόμενος, which
 is changed from many MSS.



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μου οὐχ οἰοί τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεγκεῖν τὰς ἐμὰς διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλ' ὑμῖν βαρύτεραι γεγόνασι καὶ ἐπιφθονώτεραι, ὥστε ζητεῖτε αὐτῶν νυνὶ ἀπαλλαγῆναι· ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα^k αὐτὰς οἴσουσι ῥαδίως. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. καλὸς οὖν ἂν μοι ὁ βίος εἴη ἐξελθόντι τηλικῶδε ἀνθρώπῳ ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης πόλιν πόλεως ἀμειβομένῳ καὶ ἐξελαυνομένῳ ζῆν.^l εὐ γὰρ οἶδ' ὅτι, ὅποι ἂν ἔλθω, λέγοντος ἐμοῦ ἀκροάσονται οἱ νέοι ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε. κὰν μὲν τούτους ἀπελαύνω,^m οὗτοι ἐμὲ αὐτοὶ ἐξελῶσι, πείθοντες τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἀπελαύνω, οἱ τούτων πατέρες τε καὶ οἰκεῖοι δι' αὐτοὺς τούτους.

XXVIII. Ἴσως οὖν ἂν τις εἴποι, Σιγῶν δὲ καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγων, ὧ Σώκρατες, οὐχ οἰός τ' ἔσει ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ζῆν; Τουτὶ δὴ ἐστὶ πάντων χαλεπώτατον πείσαιί τινος ὑμῶν. ἐάν τε γὰρ λέγω, ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ· ἐάν τ' αὖ λέγω, ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὄν^a ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦτο, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, περὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε διαλεγομένου καὶ ἐμαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος, ὁ δὲ ἀνεξετάστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ,^b ταῦτα δ'

ὅποι ἂν ἔλθω] Commonly ὅπη, against the best MSS.

XXVIII Σιγῶν δὲ] Commonly τε, which is corrected from Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Vind. 1. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S.

ἐάν τ' αὖ λέγω] So Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Vind. 1. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T. The common reading was ἐάν τ' αὖθις. Many MSS. with Bas. 2. have ἐάν ταῦτα λ.

μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὄν] *Ον has been lately added from Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T.

ἐμοῦ ἀκοίετε.] Commonly ἡκούετε, which is changed from Bodl., and most others.

ἔτι ἤττον πείσεσθέ μοι λέγοντι. τὰ δὲ ἔχει μὲν οὕτως, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, ὦ ἄνδρες, πείθειν δὲ οὐ ῥάδιον. Καὶ ἐγὼ ἅμ' οὐκ εἴθισμαι ἑμαυτὸν ἀξιούν κακοῦ οὐδενός. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησάμην ἂν χρημάτων ὅσα ἔμελλον ἐκτίσειν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐβλάβην· νῦν δέ—οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν,^c εἰ μὴ ἄρα ὅσον ἂν ἐγὼ δυναίμην ἐκτίσαι, τοσοῦτου βούλεσθέ μοι τιμῆσαι. ἴσως δ' ἂν δυναίμην ἐκτίσαι ὑμῖν μνᾶν ἀργυρίου τοσοῦτου οὖν τιμῶμαι. Πλάτων δὲ ὅδε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος κελεύουσί με τριάκοντα μνῶν τιμήσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυᾶσθαι^d τιμῶμαι οὖν τοσοῦτου· ἐγγυηταὶ δ' ὑμῖν ἔσονται τοῦ ἀργυρίου οὗτοι ἀξιόχρεοι.

XXIX. Οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἔνεκα χρόνου,^a ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὄνομα ἔχετε καὶ αἰτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τὴν πόλιν λαιδορεῖν, ὡς Σωκράτη ἀπεκτόνατε, ἄνδρα σοφόν· φήσουσι γὰρ δὴ με σοφὸν εἶναι, εἰ καὶ μὴ εἰμί, οἱ βουλόμενοι ὑμῖν ὄνειδίζειν. εἰ οὖν περιεμείνατε ὀλίγον χρόνον, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἂν ὑμῖν τοῦτο

οὐ ῥάδιον] Commonly ῥάδια, which is changed from Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. g. h. Par. D S T.

XXIX. ἀπεκτόνατε] So Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. a. c. d. g. h. Par. D. The common reading was ἀπεκτονήκατε, on which form, see Bast. Epist. Crit. p. 242. ed. Lips.

εἰ οὖν περιεμ.] Commonly γοῦν, which is corrected from Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T. Bekker retained the common reading.

ὑμῖν τοῦτο ἐγένετο] Commonly, the words ἐμὲ τεθνάναι δὴ, are added, which gloss is correctly omitted in Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Par. D S T., and the Florentine MSS.

ἐγένετο·^b ὁρᾶτε γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἡλικίαν, ὅτι πόρρω ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου,^c θανάτου δὲ ἐγγύς. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο οὐ πρὸς πάντας ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοῦ καταψηφισαμένους θάνατον. λέγω δὲ καὶ τόδε πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους. "Ἴσως με οἴεσθε, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀπορία λόγων ἐάλωκέναι τοιούτων, οἷς ἂν ὑμᾶς ἐπεισα,^d εἰ ὥμην δεῖν ἅπαντα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν, ὥστε ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν δίκην. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἀλλ' ἀπορία μὲν ἐάλωκα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀναισχυντίας καὶ τοῦ ἐθέλειν λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαῦτα, οἷ' ἂν ὑμῖν μὲν ἡδιστ' ἦν ἀκούειν, θρηνοῦντός τέ μου καὶ ὀδυρομένου καὶ ἄλλα ποιούντος καὶ λέγοντος πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι· οἷα δὴ καὶ εἴθισθε ὑμεῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν, ἀλλ' οὔτε τότε ὥμην δεῖν ἔνεκα τοῦ κινδύνου πρᾶξαι οὐδὲν ἀνελεύθερον, οὔτε νῦν μοι μεταμέλει οὕτως ἀπολογησαμένῳ, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αἰρούμαι ὧδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι ἢ ἐκείνως ζῆν·^e οὔτε γὰρ ἐν δικῇ οὔτ' ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτ' ἐμὲ οὔτ' ἄλλον οὐδένα δεῖ τοῦτο μηχανᾶσθαι, ὅπως ἀποφεύξεται πᾶν ποιῶν θάνατον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολλάκις δῆλον γίγνεται, ὅτι τό γε ἀποθανεῖν ἂν τις ἐκφύγοι καὶ ὅπλα

τὴν ἡλικίαν] Commonly, but most erroneously, ὁρᾶτε γὰρ δὴ εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν, which is corrected from Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. h. Par. D S T.

καὶ τοῦ ἐθέλειν λ.] Commonly καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐθ. λ. which Bekker retained. Μὴ is omitted in Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T.

θρηνοῦντός τέ μου] Commonly θρηνοῦντός μου., which is changed from the best MSS. Bekker wrote τ' ἐμοῦ.

ἀποθανεῖν ἂν τις ἐκφύγοι] Commonly ἂπ. ῥᾶον ἂν τις ἐκφ. ῥᾶον is omitted in Ven. b. Vind. 3. 6. Flor. a. b. c. e. g. h. i. Coisl. Ang. Par. B C D E H S T. Yet it is preserved in Bodl. which has ῥᾶιον. Further on, for the common reading τραπεῖς, we

ἀφείς καὶ ἐφ' ἱκετείαν τραπόμενος τῶν διωκόντων· καὶ ἄλλαι μηχαναὶ πολλαί εἰσιν ἐν ἐκάστοις τοῖς κινδύνοις, ὥστε διαφεύγειν θάνατον, εἴαν τις τολμᾷ^f πᾶν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' ἢ χαλεπὸν, ὦ ἄνδρες, θάνατον ἐκφυγεῖν,^g ἀλλὰ πολὺ χαλεπώτερον πονηρίαν· θάπτον γὰρ θανάτου θεῖ. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἅτε βραδύς ὢν καὶ πρεσβύτης^b ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου ἐάλων, οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ κατήγοροι ἅτε δεινοὶ καὶ ὄξεις ὄντες ὑπὸ τοῦ θάπτονος, τῆς κακίας. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἄπειμι ὑφ' ὑμῶν θανάτου δίκην ὄφλων,ⁱ οὗτοι δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας ὠφληκότες μοχθηρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν. καὶ ἔγωγε τῷ τιμήματι ἐμμένω, καὶ οὗτοι. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν που ἴσως οὕτω καὶ ἔδει σχεῖν, καὶ οἶμαι αὐτὰ μετρίως ἔχειν.

XXX. Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπιθυμῶ ὑμῖν χρησμοδῆσαι, ὦ καταψηφισάμενοί μου· καὶ γάρ εἰμι ἤδη ἐνταῦθα, ἐν ᾧ μάλιστ' ἄνθρωποι χρησμοδοῦσιν,^a ὅταν μέλλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι. φημὶ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες, οἱ ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε, τιμωρίαν ὑμῖν ἤξειν εὐθύς μετὰ τὸν ἐμὸν

have substituted *τραπόμενος* from Bodl. Coisl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 3. 4. 6. Flor. d. e. h. Par. D S T., and others.

μηχαναὶ πολλαί] So the best MSS. for the common reading *πολλαὶ μηχαναί*.

οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ κατήγοροι] So Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T. Commonly *οἱ δέ μου κ.*

καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ ἄπ.] So Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par. D S T. Old editions, *καὶ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ*. Further on the common reading was *ἀφ' ὑμῶν*, which is changed from Basil. 2. and Vat. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. a. c. d. g. h. Par. C D. and from (an alteration) in B. Ven. b. (from a correction.)

καὶ ἔγωγε τῷ τιμήματι] Bekker gives as a correction *καὶ ἐγὼ τε τ. τ.*, against all the MSS. So Ficinus's translation: *atque ego quidem pœnæ acquiesco, et isti*.

XXX. *ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε*] So Bodl. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 6. Flor.

θάνατον πολὺ χαλεπωτέραν νῆ Δί' ἢ οἴαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε.^b νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο εἴργασθε οἴομενοι ἀπαλλάξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου. τὸ δὲ ὑμῖν πολὺ ἐναντίον ἀποβήσεται, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι. πλείους ἔσονται ὑμᾶς οἱ ἐλέγχοντες, οὓς νῦν ἐγὼ κατεῖχον, ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἠσθάνεσθε· καὶ χαλεπώτεροι^c ἔσονται ὅσῳ νεώτεροί εἰσι, καὶ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσετε. εἰ γὰρ οἴεσθε ἀποκτείνοντες ἀνθρώπους ἐπισχήσειν τοῦ ὄνειδίζειν τινὰ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζῆτε, οὐκ ὀρθῶς διανοεῖσθε· οὐ γὰρ ἐσθ' αὕτη ἢ ἀπαλλαγή οὔτε πάνυ δυνατὴ οὔτε καλή, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ καλλίστη καὶ ῥάστη, μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολούειν,^d ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν παρασκευάζειν, ὅπως ἔσται ὡς βέλτιστος. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μαντευσάμενος ἀπαλλάττομαι.

XXXI. Τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισαμένοις ἠδέως ἂν διαλεχθείην ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τουτουῖ πράγματος, ἐν ᾧ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἄγουσι καὶ οὔπω ἔρχομαι οἷ

g. h. Par. D S T. The common reading is bad, εἴ με ἀποκτενεῖτε. The sense is: *ye who have condemned me to death.*

ἢ οἴαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε] Commonly ἀπεκτεῖνατε. The perfect tense, which is necessary for the sense, is supplied by Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6, and many others.

οἴεσθε ἀποκτείνοντες] Steph. ἀποκτείναντες, without the authority of MSS.

οὐκ ὀρθῶς διανοεῖσθε] Commonly οὐ καλῶς δ', which I have not hesitated to change from Bodl. Coisl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. a. c. d. g. h. Par. B C D H S T. Ang. The repetition of ὀρθῶς makes the sentence more emphatic. Bekker retained the common reading.

οὐ γὰρ ἐσθ' αὕτη] Commonly οὔτε, which is corrected from Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. a. g. h. Par. D S T. and an alteration in B.

ἑαυτὸν παρασκ.] Commonly αὐτόν which is corrected from the best MSS.

ἐλθόντα με δεῖ τεθνάναι. ἀλλά μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες, παρα-
 μέναιτε τοσοῦτον χρόνον· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει διαμυ-
 θολογῆσαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἕως ἔξεστιν. ὑμῖν γὰρ ὡς
 φίλοις οὖσιν ἐπιδείξαι ἐθέλω τὸ νυνὶ μοι συμβεβηκὸς
 τί ποτε νοεῖ. Ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί—ὑμᾶς
 γὰρ δικαστὰς καλῶν ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖην—θαυμάσιόν τι
 γέγονεν. ἢ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου^a
 ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνὴ αἰεὶ ἦν
 καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιούμενη, εἴ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ
 ὀρθῶς πράξειν· νυνὶ δὲ συμβέβηκέ μοι, ἅπερ ὁρᾶτε καὶ
 αὐτοί, ταυτί, ἧ γε δὴ οἰηθείη ἂν τις καὶ νομίζεται^b
 ἔσχατα κακῶν εἶναι. ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔτε ἐξιόντι ἔωθεν
 οἴκοθεν ἠναντιώθη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὔτε ἠνίκα
 ἀνέβαινον ἐνταυθοῖ ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτ' ἐν τῷ
 λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντί τι ἐρεῖν· καί τοι ἐν ἄλλοις
 λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δὴ με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξύ.^c νῦν
 δὲ οὐδαμοῦ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν πράξιν οὔτ' ἐν ἔργῳ οὐδενὶ
 οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἠναντιώταί μοι. τί οὖν αἴτιον εἶναι ὑπο-
 λαμβάνω;^d ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐρῶ· κινδυνεύει γὰρ μοι τὸ
 συμβεβηκὸς τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἔσθ'
 ὅπως ἡμεῖς ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὅσοι οἴομεθα κακὸν
 εἶναι τὸ τεθνάναι. μέγα μοι τεκμήριον τούτου γέγονεν·

XXXI. τί ποτε νοεῖ] Commonly τί ποτ' ἐννοεῖ, against the
 usage of the language, and the authority of all the best MSS.

οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντί τι ἐρεῖν] Commonly οὔτε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐ-
 δενί, μέλλοντί τι ἐρεῖν, which we have corrected from Bas. 2. Bodl.
 Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6., and most others.

περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν πρ.] So Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Vind. 1. 4. 6.
 Flor. d. g. h. D S T., which appears also to be the true reading from
 the preceding ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔτε ἐξ. κ. τ. λ. Old editions, περὶ ταύτην τ.
 πρ., which Bekker has retained. Further on, instead of the common
 reading ἠναντιώθη we have restored ἠναντιώται, from the same MSS.

τεκμήριον τούτου] Commonly τοῦτο, which is changed from
 Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 4. Flor. d. g. Par. D S T.

οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπως οὐκ ἠναντιώθη ἄν μοι τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον, εἰ μὴ τι ἔμελλον ἐγὼ ἀγαθὸν πράξειν.

XXXII. Ἐννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῆδε,^a ὡς πολλὴ ἐλπίς ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι. Δυοῖν γὰρ θᾶτερόν ἐστι τὸ τεθνάναι· ἢ γὰρ οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι^b μηδ' αἰσθησιν μηδεμίαν μηδενὸς ἔχειν τὸν τεθνεῶτα, ἢ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα μεταβολή τις τυγχάνει οὔσα καὶ μετοίκησις τῇ ψυχῇ^c τοῦ τόπου ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον. καὶ εἴτε δὴ μηδεμία^d αἰσθησίς ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οἷον ὕπνος, ἐπειδάν τις καθεύδων μηδ' ὄναρ μηδὲν ὄρα, θαυμάσιον κέρδος ἂν εἴη ὁ θάνατος. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι,^e εἴ τινα ἐκλεξάμενον δέοι ταύτην τὴν νύκτα, ἐν ἣ οὔτω κατέδαρθεν, ὥστε μηδ' ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀντιπαραθέντα ταύτῃ τῇ νυκτὶ δέοι σκεψάμενον εἰπεῖν, πόσας ἄμεινον καὶ ἡδιον ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς βεβίωκεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ, οἶμαι ἂν μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην^f τινά, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαριθμήτους ἂν εὐρεῖν αὐτὸν ταύτας^g πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας. εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ θάνατός ἐστι, κέρδος ἔγωγε λέγω· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν πλείων^h ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται οὔτω δὴ εἶναι ἢ μία νύξ. εἰ δ' αὖ οἷον ἀποδημησαί ἐστιν ὁ θάνατος ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστὶ τὰ λεγόμενα, ὡς ἄρα ἐκεῖ εἰσὶν ἅπαντες οἱ τεθνεῶτες, τί μείζον

XXXII. μετοίκησις τῇ ψυχῇ] So Bod. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. g. h. Par S. Commonly τῆς ψυχῆς, which Bekker also has retained. We have preferred the dative, because this construction was less known to the grammarians, and, therefore, might easily have been changed into the other. Further on, δὴ is omitted in Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. d. h. Par. D S T.

πόσας ἄμεινον] Commonly ὀπόσας, against the best MSS.

ἅπαντες οἱ τεθν.] Commonly πάντες, which is changed from all the best MSS.



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ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἀγαγόντα^ο τὴν πολλὴν στρατιάν, ἢ Ὀδυσσεά, ἢ Σίσυφον, ἢ ἄλλους μυρίους ἂν τις εἴποι^ρ καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας; οἷς ἐκεῖ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ξυνεῖναι καὶ ἐξετάζειν ἀμήχανον ἂν εἴη εὐδαιμονίας^α πάντως. οὐ δῆπου τούτου γε ἔνεκα οἱ ἐκεῖ ἀποκτείνουσι· τά τε γὰρ ἄλλα εὐδαιμονέστεροί εἰσιν οἱ ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἀθάνατοί εἰσιν, εἴπερ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ ἔστιν.

XXXIII. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς χρή,^α ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, εὐέλπιδας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἔν τι τοῦτο διανοεῖσθαι ἀληθές,^β ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τούτου πράγματα· οὐδὲ τὰ ἐμὰ νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ μοι δῆλόν ἐστι τοῦτο, ὅτι ἤδη τεθάναι καὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων βέλτιον ἦν μοι. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐμὲ οὐδαμοῦ ἀπέτρεψε τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἔγωγε τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μου καὶ τοῖς κατηγόροις οὐ πάνυ χαλεπαίνω. καί τοι οὐ ταύτη τῇ διανοίᾳ κατεψηφίζοντό μου καὶ κατηγόρουν, ἀλλ' οἰόμενοι βλάπτειν· τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ἄξιον μέμφεσθαι.

Τοσόνδε μέντοι αὐτῶν δέομαι· τοὺς υἱεῖς μου, ἐπειδὴν ἠβήσωσι, τιμωρήσασθε, ὦ ἄνδρες, ταῦτα ταῦτα λυποῦντες,^γ ἅπερ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐλύπουν, εἰάν ὑμῖν δοκῶσιν

ἀμήχανον ἂν εἴη] So Bodl. Coisl. Ven. Z a. b. Vat. six Vindobb., Flor. a. b. g. Zitt. Par. B C D E H S T g. The common reading was ἀμηχάνου.

οἱ ἐκεῖ ἀποκτείνουσι] Commonly ἀποκτενοῦσι, which is changed from Bodl. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. g. h. Par. B D S T.

XXXIII. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐμὲ] Commonly διὰ ταυτί, against all the best MSS.

οἰόμενοι βλάπτειν] Commonly βλάπτειν τι. Τι is omitted in Bodl. Vind. 1. 6. Flor. g. h. Par. D S. and pr. Ven. b.

ταῦτα ταῦτα λυποῦντες] The common reading, λυποῦντας, is

ἢ χρημάτων ἢ ἄλλου του πρότερον ἐπιμελείσθαι ἢ ἀρετῆς, καὶ εἰάν δοκῶσί τι εἶναι μηδὲν ὄντες, ὀνειδίζετε αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ὧν δεῖ, καὶ οἴονται τι εἶναι ὄντες οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι. καὶ εἰάν ταῦτα ποιῆτε, δίκαια πεπονθὼς ἐγὼ ἔσομαι ὑφ' ὑμῶν αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ υἱεῖς.

Ἄλλα γὰρ^d ἤδη ὥρα ἀπιέναι, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀποθανομένῳ, ὑμῖν δὲ βιωσομένοις. ὁπότεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἔρχονται ἐπὶ ἄμεινον πρᾶγμα, ἄδηλον παντὶ πλὴν ἢ τῷ θεῷ.

bad, and was changed by Muretus, Var., Lect. VIII. 4. into *λυποῦντες*, which also appears in Bodl. Flor. h. Par. D H S. and (from a correction) T. Ang.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

SCHLEIERMACHER'S

INTRODUCTION TO THE CRITO.

IT has been already remarked in the introduction to the Apology, that this dialogue appears to be of the same nature with that piece. It seems probable that the Crito is not properly speaking, a work conceived and framed by Plato himself, but a conversation, which actually took place; and which was communicated to Plato as faithfully as possible by Crito, between whom and Socrates it had occurred. In this conversation Plato appears to have made scarcely any alteration, except that he restored and embellished the Socratic mode of speaking, which was so well known to him, adorned the commencement and the end, and perhaps here and there supplied little deficiencies. This view rests upon exactly the same grounds, which have been explained in the introduction to the Apology. For neither in the one case nor in the other, does there appear any special philosophical object; and although the occasion itself naturally led to the most important inquiries concerning justice, law and compact, in which Plato was certainly at all times interested, yet these subjects are here treated of so exclusively with a view to the

individual case before us, that we clearly see that the persons engaged in the dialogue, if the conversation actually took place, were wholly wrapt up in it; and should it be considered as a work of Plato's, which was written without reference to anything that actually occurred, we must admit, that it bears the complete character of a work written for a special occasion. Besides, it is expressly mentioned in it that philosophical inquiry is put aside, since particular principles are only stated and taken for granted, without any further examination, and with reference to previous conversations, though by no means as if these principles were to be sought for in other writings of Plato,—a mode of proceeding never employed in those works of Plato which are of philosophical importance. But supposing it to have been Plato's own work, what could have been the occasion of his writing it? For there is no sentiment given here, which is not contained in the Apology. If, however, we should suppose that it was Plato's intention only to make known the fact, that the friends of Socrates offered to assist him in escaping from his prison, and that he refused their offer, and that the remainder, with the exception of this historical basis, is Plato's own invention: a more minute consideration would perhaps prove, that the former part of this supposition can stand the test of examination, but not the latter. For, on the one hand, there is nothing remarkable in this fact except the manner in which it took place; for the result might have been foreseen from the



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on circumstances connected with the death of Socrates, depart from a strict adherence to facts, and proceed to use them freely, and to interweave them in a work of his own, destined to illustrate certain philosophical problems. For the present, at any rate, I shall endeavour by means of this view to vindicate the claims of Plato to this dialogue, until some criticism more solid than any that has been hitherto produced, shall prove that it is not his work. Two things, chiefly, induce me to maintain this opinion; in the first place, the language, against which Ast makes no particular objection, which unites all the peculiarities of the first period of the Platonic writings just as clearly as the language of the Apology; and secondly, the great strictness with which the author keeps to the individual case which is the subject of the conversation—abstaining from introducing any kind of enquiry concerning first principles—an act of moderation, which such inferior men as the other Socratic philosophers, were certainly incapable of; and by which Plato at the same time clearly distinguishes this work from his other writings. Hence the strong emphasis, which is laid on the assertion, that all deliberation in common is impossible for those who start from different moral principles—an emphasis, which must rather be ascribed to Plato, who thereby intended to explain the nature and the tenor of the conversation, than to Socrates, who would hardly have made use of it towards his friend Crito, since he could only differ from him in his inferences.

Little importance, perhaps, is to be attached to the statement of Diogenes, that the conversation actually occurred between Socrates and Æschines, and that Plato, from dislike towards the latter, substituted Crito in his place. However, it is possible that Plato in this respect may have made some alteration, and chosen Crito, who was most secure by his station and age from unpleasant consequences, and who probably died soon after the death of Socrates. The desire, at least, of not compromising any of the Athenian friends of Socrates is evident from the fact, that Plato only mentions strangers as having partaken in the plan of saving Socrates by his escape from prison. So that the fact itself is not improbable, but the motive seems to be fictitious, but whose invention it is we do not know.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

Κ Ρ Ι Τ Ω Ν .

Char. I. *Τί τῆνικάδε ἀφίξαι, ὦ Κρίτων; ἢ οὐ πρῶ
ἔτι ἐστίν; ΚΡ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Πηνίκα μάλιστα;^a
ΚΡ. Ὅρθρος βαθύς.^b ΣΩ. Θαυμάζω, ὅπως ἠθέλησε^c
σοι ὁ τοῦ δεσμοτηρίου φύλαξ ὑπακούσαι. ΚΡ. Ξυ-
νήθης ἤδη μοί ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, διὰ τὸ πολλάκις
δεῦρο φοιτᾶν, καί τι καὶ εὐεργέτηται^d ὑπ' ἐμοῦ. ΣΩ.
Ἄρτι δὲ ἦκεις ἢ πάλαι; ΚΡ. Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι.^e*

Char. I. *ἢ οὐ πρῶ ἔτι]* All MSS. read *πρωί*. But Fischer, on the authority of the old grammarians, rightly judged that *πρῶ* ought to be restored. See Tim. Gloss. under this word. Hermann De em. rat. Gr. Gr. I. 8. p. 36 sqq. The metre in Aristophanes everywhere requires *πρῶ* to be a monosyllable, as Brunck observes ad Lysistr. v. 613., although the MSS. have *πρωί* in that passage also. The ancient copyists, instead of subscribing the *ι* to the long vowels, used to put it after them, which we know to have been constantly done in the Bodleian MS. But Buttman was deceived in recommending the rejection of *ι* by an appeal to the authority of the Etym. M. which speaks only of pronouns of the dual number, Compare Matthiæ Gr. Grammar, vol. i. p. 118.

ὅπως ἠθέλησέ σοι] Ven. a. Coisl. Vind. 2. 3. 5. and pr. Ang. ἠθελε, which Buttman ought not to have omitted.

καί τι καὶ εὐεργέτηται] Ald. with Par. E. Flor. b. g. i. *καί τοι καί*. Ald. Bas. 2. Steph. *εὐεργετείται*, which we have changed from Bodl. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 2. 4. 5. 6. 7. Flor. a. c. d. e. h. i. Tub. Zitt. Huet. Ang. Par. H. S. In several other MSS., *εὐηργέτηται*, which is interlined in Bodl. See note.

ΣΩ. Εἶτα πῶς οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐπήγειράς με, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ παρακάθησαι; ΚΡ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἤθελον^f ἐν τοσαύτῃ τε ἀγρυπνίᾳ καὶ λύπῃ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ πάλαι θαυμάζω αἰσθανόμενος, ὡς ἠδέως καθεύδεις^g καὶ ἐπίτηδές σε οὐκ ἤγειρον, ἵνα ὡς ἠδιστα διάγῃς.^h καὶ πολλάκις μὲν δὴ σε καὶ πρότερον ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ εὐδαιμόνισα τοῦ τρόπου,ⁱ πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ νυνὶ παρεστῶσιν ξυμφορᾷ, ὡς ῥαδίως αὐτὴν καὶ πρᾶως φέρεις. ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν, ὦ Κρίτων, πλημμελὲς εἶη ἀγανακτεῖν τηλικούτων ὄντων, εἰ δεῖ ἤδη τελευτᾶν. ΚΡ. Καὶ ἄλλοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τηλικούτοι ἐν τοιαύταις ξυμφοραῖς ἀλίσκονται,^k ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐπιλύεται ἢ ἡλικία τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν τῇ παρούσῃ τύχῃ. ΣΩ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. ἀλλὰ τί δὴ^l οὕτω πρῶ ἀφίξαι; ΚΡ. Ἀγγελίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φέρων χαλεπήν, οὐ σοί, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται,^m ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς σοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις πᾶσι καὶ χαλεπήν καὶ βαρεῖαν, ἣν ἐγώ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατ'ⁿ ἂν ἐνέγκαιμι. ΣΩ. Τίνα ταύτην;^o ἢ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφίικται^p ἐκ Δήλου, οὐ δεῖ ἀφικομένου τεθνάναι με; ΚΡ. Οὐ τοι δὴ ἀφίικται, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἥξειν^q τήμερον ἐξ ὧν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν

ἐν τοσαύτῃ τε ἀγρ.] So Bodl. Vind. 2. 4. 5. 6. Tub. Ven. a. b. Flor. a. b. c. f. h. i. Aug. Huet. Zitt. Par. B C D E H S. Ang. with Bas. 2. In the common editions τε was wanting; it is put after ἀγρυπνία in Vat. Vind. 1. 3. 6. Flor. d. g.

αὐτοὺς ἐπιλύεται] So Bodl. Vind. 1. 6. 7. Flor. d. f. g. Huet. Par. D S. and pr. Vat. b. Commonly αὐτοῖς.

φέρων χαλεπήν] Bodl. with some others: χαλεπήν καὶ βαρεῖαν, οὐ κ. τ. λ., which arose from what follows. The error may be detected from some MSS. having καὶ βαρεῖαν marked with points.

ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἥξειν] Bodl. Tub. Flor. h. Par. D. Ven. b. δοκεῖν.

ἤκοντές τινες ἀπὸ Σουνίου καὶ καταλιπόντες ἐκεῖ αὐτό. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν ἀγγέλων, ὅτι ἤξει τήμερον, καὶ ἀνάγκη δὴ εἰς αὔριον ἔσται, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν βίον σε τελευτᾶν.

II. ΣΩ. Ἄλλ', ὦ Κρίτων, τύχη ἀγαθῆ.^a εἰ ταύτη τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον, ταύτη ἔστω. οὐ μέντοι οἶμαι ἤξειν αὐτὸ τήμερον. ΚΡ. Πόθεν τοῦτο τεκμαίρει; ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ σοι ἐρῶ. τῇ γάρ που ὑστεραία δεῖ με ἀποθνήσκειν ἢ ἢ ἂν ἔλθῃ^b τὸ πλοῖον. ΚΡ. Φασί γέ τοι δὴ οἱ τούτων κύριοι.^c ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας οἶμαι αὐτὸ ἤξειν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐτέρας. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἐκ τινος ἐνυπνίου, ὃ ἐώρακα ὑλίγον πρότερον ταύτης τῆς νυκτός· καὶ κινδυνεύεις ἐν καιρῷ τινι^d οὐκ ἐγείραί με. ΚΡ. Ἦν δὲ δὴ τί τὸ ἐνύπνιον; ΣΩ. Ἐδόκει τίς μοι γυνὴ προσελθοῦσα^e κυλὴ καὶ εὐειδής, λευκὰ ἱμάτια ἔχουσα, καλέσαι με καὶ εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡματί κεν τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἴκοιο. ΚΡ. Ὡς ἄτοπον^f τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἐναργὲς μὲν οὖν, ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων.

III. ΚΡ. Λίαν γε, ὡς ἔοικεν. ἀλλ', ὦ δαιμόνιε^d Σώκρατες, ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐμοὶ πείθου καὶ σώθητι. ὡς ἐμοί, ἐὰν σὺ ἀποθάνῃς, οὐ μία ξυμφορά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ

II. ἢ ἢ ἂν ἔλθῃ] Commonly ἔλθοι, contrary to usage, and to the authority of the best and most numerous MSS.

Φασί γέ τοι δὴ] Commonly δέ γέ τοι δὴ, against the MSS.

ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ δ.] Commonly ὥς ἐμοὶ δ. Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 6. 7. Huet, Par. D S. Flor. f. g. h. ὥς γε μοι δ. But correctly, Tub. Flor. d. ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ δ.

III. οὐ μία ξυμφ.] Commonly οὐδεμία, which is corrected from Coisl. Ven. Ξ. Vind. 2. 3. Par. B E H. Ang. Flor. i. Zitt. Immediately afterwards. ἐστιν ἀλλὰ χ. is from Bodl. Coisl. Ven. Ξ. Ang. Par. B E H. Vind. 2. 3. Zitt., for the common reading ἐστιν

χωρὶς μὲν τοῦ ἐστερηῆσθαι τοιούτου ἐπιτηδείου, οἷον ἐγὼ οὐδένα μὴ ποτε εὐρήσω, ἔτι δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς δόξω, οἱ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ μὴ σαφῶς ἴσασιν, ὡς οἷός τ' ὢν σε σώζειν, εἰ ἤθελον ἀναλίσκειν χρήματα, ἀμελήσαι.^b καί τοι τίς ἂν αἰσχίων εἶη ταύτης δόξα^c ἢ δοκεῖν χρήματα περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι ἢ φίλους; οὐ γὰρ πείσονται οἱ πολλοί, ὡς σὺ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἠθέλησας ἀπιέναι ἐνθένδε ἡμῶν προθυμουμένων. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τί ἡμῖν, ὦ μακάριε Κρίτων, οὕτω τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλει; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιεικέστατοι, ὧν μᾶλλον ἄξιον φροντίζειν, ἠγγήσονται αὐτὰ οὕτω πεπραῆχθαι, ὥσπερ ἂν πραχθῆ. ΚΡ. Ἀλλ' ὁρᾷς δη, ὅτι ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλειν. αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα^d νυνί, ὅτι οἷοί τ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέγιστα σχεδόν, εἴαν τις ἐν αὐτοῖς διαβεβλημένος ᾖ. ΣΩ. Εἰ γὰρ ὄφελον, ὦ Κρίτων, οἷοί τε εἶναι οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἵνα οἷοί τε ᾗσαν^e αὐ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὰ μέγιστα καὶ καλῶς ἂν εἶχε. νῦν δὲ οὐδέτερα οἷοί τε· οὔτε γὰρ φρόνιμον οὔτε ἄφρονα δυνατοὶ ποιῆσαι, ποιοῦσι δὲ τοῦτο, ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσιν.^f

ἄλλη, ἀλλὰ χρ. In other MSS. ἀλλὰ is omitted, and ἄλλη preserved.

χωρὶς μὲν τοῦ ἐστερ.] Wolf's correction. The MSS. have τοῦ.

ἀμελήσαι] So Bodl. Coisl. Par. D E H S. Angel. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 2. 3. 6. 7. Flor. f. g. h. i. Tub., and others. Commonly ἀμελήσαιμι.

αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα] Steph. without necessity conjectures δηλοῖ.

ἵνα οἷοί τε ᾗσαν αὐ] αὐ is found in Ven. b. Huct. Par. D S. We have followed Bekker in adding it.

καὶ καλῶς ἂν εἶχε.] ἂν is omitted by Steph. and Ven. Ξ. Vind. 7. It is found in all the others.



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ἀγαπήσουσί σε· ἐὰν δὲ βούλη εἰς Θετταλίαν ἵεναι, εἰσὶν ἐμοὶ ἐκεῖ ξένοι, οἳ σε περὶ πολλοῦ ποιήσονται καὶ ἀσφάλειάν σοι παρέξονται ὥστε σε μηδένα λυπεῖν τῶν κατὰ Θετταλίαν.

V. "Ἐτι δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν πρᾶγμα, σαυτὸν προδοῦναι, ἐξὸν σωθῆναι^a καὶ τοιαῦτα σπεύδεις περὶ σεαυτὸν γενέσθαι, ἅπερ ἂν καὶ οἱ ἐχθροί σου σπεύσαιέν τε καὶ ἔσπευσαν σε διαφθεῖραι βουλόμενοι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τοὺς υἱεῖς τοὺς σαυτοῦ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς προδιδόναι, οὓς σοι ἐξὸν καὶ ἐκθρέψαι καὶ ἐκπαιδεῦσαι οἰχήσει καταλιπών,^b καὶ τὸ σὸν μέρος,^c ὃ τι ἂν τύχῃσι, τοῦτο πράξουσιν^d τεύξονται δέ, ὡς τὸ εἶκός, τοιούτων, οἷάπερ εἶωθε γίνεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ὀρφανίαις περὶ τοὺς ὀρφανούς. ἢ γὰρ οὐ χρῆν ποιεῖσθαι παῖδας, ἢ ξυνδιαταλαιπωρεῖν καὶ τρέφοντα καὶ παιδεύοντα· σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς τὰ ῥαθυμότατα αἰρεῖσθαι.^e χρῆ δέ, ἅπερ ἂν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἀνδρείος ἔλοιτο, ταῦτα αἰρεῖσθαι, φάσκοντά γε δὴ ἀρετῆς διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. ὡς ἔγωγε καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τῶν σῶν ἐπιτηδείων αἰσχύνομαι,^f μὴ δόξη ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ περὶ σὲ ἀνανδρία τινὶ τῆ ἡμετέρα πεπραχθαι, καὶ ἢ εἴσοδος τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον,^g ὡς εἰσῆλθες, ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσελθεῖν, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀγὼν τῆς δίκης^h ὡς ἐγένετο, καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ

V. τοιαῦτα σπεύδεις] Stephens has rashly corrected *σπεύδειν*. For these words do not depend on what goes before, but make a sentence by themselves.

σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς] Bekker from some MSS. has given δ' ἐμοὶ δ.

ὡς εἰσῆλθες] Bodl. Ven. b. Flor. d. f. *εἰσῆλθεν*: in Bodl. however, *εἰσῆλθες* is interlined. The third person can scarcely be admitted consistently with what follows, *ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσελθεῖν*.

τουτί, ὡςπερ κατάγελως τῆς πράξεως,ⁱ κακία τινὶ καὶ ἀνανδρία τῇ ἡμετέρα διαπεφευγέναι ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν,ⁱ οἵτινές σε οὐχὶ ἐσώσαμεν, οὐδὲ σὺ σαυτόν,¹ οἷόν τε ὄν καὶ δυνατόν, εἴ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ἡμῶν ὄφελος ἦν.^m ταῦτα οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὄρα, μὴ ἅμα τῷ κακῷ καὶ αἰσχροῦ ἢ σοί τε καὶ ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ βουλεύου, μάλλον δὲ οὐδὲ βουλεύεσθαιⁿ ἔτι ὦρα, ἀλλὰ βεβουλεύσθαι. μία δὲ βουλή· τῆς γὰρ ἐπιούσης νυκτὸς ταῦτα πάντα δεῖ πεπράχθαι· εἰ δέ τι περιμενοῦμεν, ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκέτι οἷόν τε. ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πείθου μοι καὶ μηδαμῶς ἄλλως ποίει.

VI. ΣΩ. ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, ἡ προθυμία σου πολλοῦ ἀξία, εἰ μετὰ τινος ὀρθότητος εἴη^a· εἰ δὲ μή, ὅσῳ μείζων, τοσοῦτῳ χαλεπωτέρα. σκοπεῖσθαι οὖν χρὴ ἡμᾶς, εἴτε ταῦτα πρακτέον εἴτε μή· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐ μόνον νῦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἰεὶ τοιοῦτος, οἷος τῶν ἐμῶν^b μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ, ὃς ἂν μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνεται. τοὺς δὲ λόγους, οὓς ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, οὐ δύναμαι νῦν ἐκβαλεῖν,^c ἐπειδὴ μοι ἤδε ἡ τύχη γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν τι ὅμοιοι φαίνονται μοι, καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς πρεσβεύω καὶ τιμῶ,^d οὓςπερ καὶ πρότερον· ὧν ἐὰν μὴ βελτίῳ ἔχωμεν λέγειν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, εὖ ἴσθι, ὅτι οὐ μὴ σοι ξυγχωρήσω,^e οὐδ' ἂν πλείω τῶν νῦν παρόντων^f ἢ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις ὡςπερ παῖδας ἡμᾶς μορμολύττηται, δεσμοὺς καὶ θανάτους ἐπιπέμπουσα

οὐχὶ ἐσώσαμεν] So Bodl. Ven. b. Tub. Vind. 1. 4. 6. 7. Flor. f. h. Par. D. for the common reading οὐ διεσώσαμεν. Almost all the others have οὐκ ἐσώσαμεν.

εἰ δέ τι περιμεν.] τι is added from Ven. b. Vat. Tub. Vind. 2. 3. 4. 6. 7. Flor. d. f. h. Huet. In Bodl. is εἰ δ' ἔτι π.

VI. τοὺς δὲ λόγους] So Bodl. Ven. b. Vind. 7. Tub. Huet. Flor. f. h. for the common reading δῆ.

καὶ χρημάτων ἀφαιρέσεις.^g Πῶς οὖν ἂν μετριώτατα σκοποίμεθα^h αὐτά; Εἰ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀναλάβοιμεν,ⁱ ὃν σὺ λέγεις^k περὶ τῶν δοξῶν, πότερον καλῶς ἐλέγεται ἐκάστοτε ἢ οὐ, ὅτι ταῖς μὲν δεῖ τῶν δοξῶν προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ταῖς δὲ οὐ· ἢ πρὶν μὲν ἐμὲ δεῖν ἀποθνήσκειν καλῶς ἐλέγεται, νῦν δὲ κατάδηλος ἄρα ἐγένετο,^l ὅτι ἄλλως ἔνεκα λόγου^m ἐλέγεται, ἣν δὲ παιδιὰ καὶ φλυαρία ὡς ἀληθῶς; ἐπιθυμῶ δ' ἔγωγε ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὦ Κρίτων, κοινῇ μετὰ σοῦ, εἴ τί μοι ἀλλοιότερος φανεῖται, ἐπειδὴ ὧδε ἔχω, ἢ ὁ αὐτός, καὶ ἐάσομεν χαίρειν, ἢ πεισόμεθα αὐτῷ. ἐλέγεται δέ πως, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, ἐκάστοτε ὧδε ὑπὸ τῶν οἰομένων τι λέγειν, ὡςπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι τῶν δοξῶν, ἃς οἱ ἄνθρωποι δοξάζουσι, δεοὶ τὰς μὲν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, τὰς δὲ μή. τοῦτο πρὸς θεῶν, ὦ Κρίτων, οὐ δοκεῖ καλῶς σοι λέγεσθαι; σὺ γάρ, ὅσα γε τὰνθρώπεια,ⁿ ἐκτὸς εἶ τοῦ μέλλειν ἀποθνήσκειν αὔριον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν σε παρακρούοι ἢ παροῦσα ξυμφορά. σκόπει δὴ οὐχ ἰκανῶς δοκεῖ^o σοι λέγεσθαι, ὅτι οὐ πάσας χρὴ τὰς δόξας τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιμᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν, τὰς δ' οὐ; οὐδὲ πάντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν, τῶν δ' οὐ; τί φήσ; ταῦτα οὐχὶ καλῶς λέγεται; ΚΡ. Καλῶς. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς τιμᾶν, τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς μή; ΚΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Χρησταὶ δὲ οὐχ αἱ τῶν φρονίμων, πονηραὶ δὲ αἱ τῶν ἀφρόνων; ΚΡ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

VII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, πῶς αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐλέγεται;

λέγεις περὶ τῶν δοξῶν] Euseb. τὸν περὶ τῶν δοξῶν.

ἐπειδὴ ὧδε ἔχω] Commonly ἐπειδὴ γε ὧδε ἔχω, against the MSS.

τὰς δόξας τῶν ἀνθρ.] Vind. 1. 6. Vat. Flor. d. with Euseb. τὰς δόξας τὰς τῶν ἀνθρ. unnecessarily. A little further οὐδὲ πάντων—τῶν δ' οὐ, are wanting in Bodl. Ven. b. Flor. h. Huet. Par. D S., yet they are found in the margin of Bodl.

γυμναζόμενος ἀνὴρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων^a πότερον παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐπαίνῳ καὶ ψόγῳ καὶ δόξῃ τὸν νοῦν προσέχει, ἢ ἐνὸς μόνου ἐκείνου, ὃς ἂν τυγχάνῃ ἰατρὸς ἢ παιδο-
 τρίβης ὢν;^b ΚΡ. Ἐνὸς μόνου. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν φοβεῖσθαι
 χρὴ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους τοὺς
 τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐκείνου, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν. ΚΡ.
 Δῆλα δῆ. ΣΩ. Ταύτη ἄρα αὐτῷ πρακτέον καὶ γυμνα-
 στέον καὶ ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον, ἢ ἂν τῷ ἐνὶ δοκῇ τῷ
 ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαίοντι μᾶλλον ἢ ἢ ξύμπασι τοῖς ἄλ-
 λοις. ΚΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Εἶεν. ἀπειθήσας δὲ τῷ
 ἐνὶ καὶ ἀτιμάσας αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους,
 τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαϊόντων ἄρα
 οὐδὲν κακὸν πείσεται; ΚΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. Τί δ'
 ἔστι τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο; καὶ ποῖ τείνει, καὶ εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ
 ἀπειθοῦντος; ΚΡ. Δῆλον, ὅτι εἰς τὸ σῶμα· τοῦτο
 γὰρ διόλλυσιν. ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ τᾶλλα,

VII. ὃς ἂν τυγχάνῃ] So Bodl. Vat. Ven. a. b. Ang. Huet. 7 Vindobb., Flor. b. d. f. h. i. Zitt. for the common reading *τυγχάνοι*. Tub. and a few others, *τυγχάνει*, erroneously.

καὶ ἐδεστέον γε] γε is omitted in Huet.

τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν] Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Tuh. Flor. d. f. h. Huet. *τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν λόγους καὶ τ. λ.* which is probably a gloss.

τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο;] τὸ is added from Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Tub. Vind. 1. 4. 6. 7. Flor. d. f. h. Huet. Par. D S.

Δῆλον, ὅτι εἰς τὸ σ.] Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. 7. Flor. d. f. h. Huet. Par. D S. have the following reading: *ἀπειθοῦντος; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι—διολλ.* Crit. Καλῶς λέγεις. Socr. Οὐκοῦν καὶ κ. τ. λ. In the same passage, Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. 7. Flor. d. h. Huet. Par. D S. *διολλύει*, which form Porson, ad Med. p. 455. considers unauthorised by the tragic poets, and Bastius Epist. crit. p. 136., by all Attic writers; but see Buttmann. Gr. Vol. I. p. 525.

ὦ Κρίτων, οὕτως, ἵνα μὴ πάντα δῖωμεν. καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχυρῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ ὧν νῦν ἡ βουλή ἡμῖν ἐστίν, πότερον τῇ τῶν πολλῶν δόξῃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἔπεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι ταύτην, ἢ τῇ τοῦ ἑνός, εἴ τίς ἐστίν ἐπαῖων, ὃν δεῖ καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ξύμπαντας τοὺς ἄλλους; ᾧ εἰ μὴ ἀκολουθήσομεν, διαφθεροῦμεν ἐκεῖνο καὶ λωβησόμεθα, ὃ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο, τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο.^c ἢ οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τοῦτο; ΚΡ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

VIII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, ἐὰν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ μὲν βέλτιον γιγνόμενον, ὑπὸ τοῦ νοσώδους δὲ διαφθειρόμενον διολέσωμεν πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαϊόντων δόξῃ,^a ἄρα βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστίν, διεφθαρμένου αὐτοῦ; ἐστὶ δέ που τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα. ἢ οὐχί; ΚΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ μετὰ μοχθηροῦ καὶ διεφθαρμένου σώματος; ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐκείνου ἄρα^b ἡμῖν βιωτὸν διεφθαρμένου, ᾧ τὸ ἀδικὸν μὲν λωβᾶται,^c τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ὀνίνησιν; ἢ φαυλότερον^d ἡγούμεθα εἶναι τοῦ σώματος ἐκεῖνο, ὃ τι πότε ἐστὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων, περὶ ὃ ἢ τε ἀδικία καὶ ἢ δικαιοσύνη ἐστίν; ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τιμιώτερον; ΚΡ. Πολύ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ βέλτιστε, πάνυ

καὶ φοβεῖσθαι ταύτην] So Vat. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Flor. a. c. d. f. Par. B C. Huet. for the common reading αὐτήν.

VIII. τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα] So Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. 7 Vindb. Tub. Flor. d. h. and others. Commonly τὸ was wanting, with the approbation of Buttman.

ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐκείνου ἄρα] Old editions after ἄρα insert ἐστίν, which is rejected by the best MSS.

ᾧ τὸ ἀδικὸν μὲν λ.] Steph. conjectures δ which is read in Euseb. and in Vind. 3. 4. Flor. d.; but see note.

ἡμῖν οὕτω φροντιστέον, τί ἐροῦσιν^e οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὅ τι ὁ ἐπαίων περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, ὁ εἷς, καὶ αὐτὴ ἢ ἀλήθεια. ὥστε πρῶτον μὲν ταύτη οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἰσηγεῖ,^f εἰσηγούμενος τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης δεῖν ἡμᾶς φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, φαίη γ' ἄν τις, οἰοίτ' εἶσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτιννύναι; ΚΡ. Δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα· φαίη γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες.^g ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ἀλλ', ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὗτός τε ὁ λόγος, ὃν διεληλύθαμεν, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι ὅμοιος εἶναι τῷ καὶ πρότερον^h καὶ τόνδε αὖ σκόπει, εἰ ἔτι μένει ἡμῖν ἢ οὐ, ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείστου ποιητέον, ἀλλὰ τὸ εὖ ζῆν. ΚΡ. Ἀλλὰ μένει. ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὅτι ταῦτόν ἐστι, μένει, ἢ οὐ μένει; ΚΡ. Μένει.

ΙΧ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων^a τοῦτο σκεπτέον, πότερον δίκαιον ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε πειρᾶσθαι ἐξιέναι, μὴ ἀφιέντων Ἀθηναίων,^b ἢ οὐ δίκαιον· καὶ ἐὰν μὲν φαίνεται δίκαιον, πειρώμεθα, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐώμεν· ἄς

τί ἐροῦσιν] Bodl. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. Tub. Huet. Par. D S. τί ἐροῦσιν. Commonly ὅ τι ἐρ., see note.

Δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα· φαίη γὰρ ἄν—] Steph. δηλαδὴ καὶ ταῦτα φαίη γ' ἄν τις, see note.

οὗτός τε ὁ λόγος] So Coisl. Vat. Ven. b. Paris. D E S. Huet. Angel. Tubing. Flor. a. b. c. h. i. and from a correction in Bodl. The common reading was γε.

δοκεῖ ἔτι ὅμοιος] ἔτι is added from Ven. b. Huet. Par. D. Flor. h. Further on the common reading was τῷ προτέρῳ, which is changed from Bodl. Ven. b. Huet. Par. D S. Vind. 4. Flor. h. into τῷ καὶ πρότερον.

καὶ τόνδε αὖ σκόπει] Commonly τόνδε δὲ αὖ σκ. But in Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Tub. Flor. d. Vind. b. Huet. δὲ is correctly omitted.

δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις περί τε ἀναλώσεως χρημάτων^c καὶ δόξης^d καὶ παίδων τροφῆς,^e μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων, σκέμματα^f ἢ τῶν ῥαδίως ἀποκτινύντων^g καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' ἄν, εἰ οἰοί τε ἦσαν, οὐδενὶ ξὺν νῶ, τούτων τῶν πολλῶν. ἡμῖν δ', ἐπειδὴ ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἰρεῖ,^h μὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκεπτέον ἢ ἡ ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, πότερον δίκαια πράξομεν καὶ χρήματα τελοῦντες τούτοις τοῖς ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε ἐξάξουσι καὶ χάριτας, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐξάγοντές τε καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι, ἢ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἀδικήσομεν ταῦτα πάντα ποιῶντες· κἂν φαινώμεθα ἄδικα αὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι, μὴ οὐδέη ὑπολογίζεσθαι οὕτ' εἰ ἀποθνήσκειν δεῖ παραμένοντας καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας, οὔτε ἄλλο ὀτιοῦν πάσχειν πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν.ⁱ ΚΡ. Καλῶς μὲν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅρα δὲ τί δρῶμεν. ΣΩ. Σκοπῶμεν, ὦ ἄγαθέ, κοινῇ, καὶ εἴ πη ἔχεις ἀντιλέγειν ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, ἀντίλεγε, καὶ σοι πείσομαι· εἰ δὲ μή, παῦσαι ἤδη, ὦ μακάριε, πολλάκις μοι λέγων τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὡς χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἀκόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐμὲ ἀπιέναι· ὡς ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιῶμαι πείσαι σε ταῦτα πράττειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος.^k ὅρα δὲ δὴ τῆς σκέψεως τὴν ἀρχήν, εἴαν σοι ἰκανῶς λέγηται, καὶ πειρῶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ ἐρωτώμενον, ἢ ἂν μάλιστα οἴη. ΚΡ. Ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι.

Χ. ΣΩ. Οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ φαμὲν ἐκόντας ἀδικητέον

ΙΧ. περί τε ἀναλώσεως χρημάτων] So Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Tub. 1. 4. 6. 7. Flor. d. h. Huet. Par. D S. The common reading was περί τε χρημάτων ἀναλώσεως, which Bekker also retained.

ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος] ἄκοντα, Vind. 6.

πειρῶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι] Old editions ἀποκρίνασθαι, against almost all the MSS. The present is best suited to the sense.



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δίκαιον; ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς. ΣΩ. Τὸ γὰρ που κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους. τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲν διαφέρει. ΚΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ΣΩ. Οὔτε ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδ' ἂν ὀτιοῦν πάσχη ὑπ' αὐτῶν.^f καὶ ὄρα, ὦ Κρίτων, ταῦτα καθομολογῶν, ὅπως μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ὁμολογῆς. οἶδα γάρ, ὅτι ὀλίγοις τισὶ ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει. οἷς οὖν οὕτω δέδοκται καὶ οἷς μή, τούτοις οὐκ ἔστι κοινὴ βουλή, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη τούτους ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν, ὀρῶντας τὰ ἀλλήλων βουλευόμενα. σκόπει δὴ οὖν καὶ σὺ εὖ μάλα,^g πότερον κοινωνεῖς καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ σοι· καὶ ἀρχόμεθα ἐντεῦθεν βουλευόμενοι, ὡς οὐδέποτε ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος^h οὔτε τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὔτε τοῦ ἀνταδικεῖν οὔτε κακῶς πάσχοντα ἀμύνεσθαι ἀντιδρῶντα κακῶς· ἢ ἀφίστασαι καὶ οὐ κοινωνεῖς τῆς ἀρχῆς; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάλαι οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ, σοὶ δ' εἴ πη ἄλλη δέδοκται, λέγε καὶ δίδασκε. εἴ δὲ ἐμμένεις τοῖς πρόσθεν, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἄκουε. ΚΡ. Ἀλλ' ἐμμένω τε καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ μοι· ἀλλὰ λέγε. ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ αὖ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, μᾶλλον δ' ἐρωτῶ·

ταῦτα καθομολογῶν] Commonly ὁμολογῶν, which is changed on the authority of Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Huet. Par. D S. Vind. 1. 4. 6. Tub. Flor. d.

οἷς οὖν οὕτω δ.] Commonly οἷς δ' οὕτω δ. The correct reading is found in Bodl. Coisl. Ven. b. Vat. Tub. all the Vindobb. Huet Par. B C D E H S. Ang. Flor. b. c. d. f. h. i. Zitt. and others.

ὀρῶντας τὰ ἀλλήλων β.] So Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Tub. Vind. 1. 4. 6. 7. Flor. d. h. Huet. Par. D S. Old editions ἀλλήλων τὰ β. Immediately after, the same have δὴ οὖν for the common reading οὖν δὴ.

ἀντιδρῶντα] So Bodl. Vat. Ven. b., Tub. Vind. 1. 4. 6. 7. Flor. a. d. f. h. Zitt. Huet. Par. B C D S. Commonly ἀντιδρῶντας.

καὶ νῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ] Huet. Par. D S. Flor. h. καὶ νῦν οὕτω δ.

πότερον ἂν τις ὁμολογήσῃ τῷ δίκαια ὄντα ποιητέον ἢ ἑξαπατητέον; ΚΡ. Ποιητέον.

XI. ΣΩ. Ἐκ τούτων δὴ ἄθρει.^a ἀπιόντες ἐνθένδε ἡμεῖς μὴ πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν^b πότερον κακῶς τινὰς ποιούμεν, καὶ ταῦτα οὐς ἤκιστα δεῖ, ἢ οὐ; καὶ ἐμμένονοι οἷς ὁμολογήσαμεν δίκαιοις^c οὐσιν, ἢ οὐ; ΚΡ. Οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς τὸ ἐρωτᾶς· οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ. ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ὧδε σκόπει. εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνθένδε^d εἴτε ἀποδιδράσκειν, εἴθ' ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάσαι τοῦτο, ἐλθόντες οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως^e ἐπιστάντες ἔροιντο· Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τί ἐν νῶ ἔχεις ποιεῖν; ἄλλο τι ἢ τούτῳ τῷ ἔργῳ,^f ᾧ ἐπιχειρεῖς, διανοεῖ τούς τε νόμους ἡμᾶς ἀπολέσαι καὶ ξύμπασαν τὴν πόλιν τὸ σὸν μέρος;^g ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε ἔτι ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀνατετράφθαι,^h ἐν ἣ ἂν αἱ γενόμεναι δίκαιⁱ μηδὲν ἰσχύωσιν, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ ἰδιωτῶν ἄκυροί τε γίνωνται καὶ διαφθείρονται; Τί ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Κρίτων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα; πολλὰ γὰρ ἂν τις ἔχοι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ, εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ τούτου τοῦ νόμου ἀπολλυμένου, ὃς τὰς δίκας τὰς δικασθείσας προστάττει κυρίας εἶναι. ἢ ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτούς, ὅτι Ἡδίκη γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἢ πόλις^k καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην ἔκρινε; Ταῦτα ἢ τί ἐροῦμεν;^l ΚΡ. Ταῦτα νῆ Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες.

XII. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν, ἂν εἴπωσιν οἱ νόμοι, ὦ

XI. ἐν ἣ ἂν αἱ γενόμεναι δ.] γιγνόμεναι, Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 6. Flor. d. and others, but the common reading is preferable. Some omitting ἂν, have γίγνονται καὶ διαφθείρονται, which is also found in Bodl. and Ven. b.

XII. Τί οὖν, ἂν εἴπωσιν] The comma was commonly omitted. Immediately afterwards, Steph. ἢ καὶ τ. and δικάζοι, against all the MSS. and the meaning of the passage.

Σώκρατες, ἢ καὶ ταῦτα ὠμολόγητο ἡμῖν τε καὶ σοί, ἢ ἐμμένειν ταῖς δίκαις αἷς ἂν ἡ πόλις δικάζη;^a εἰ οὖν αὐτῶν θαυμάζοιμεν λεγόντων, ἴσως ἂν εἴποιεν, ὅτι ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ θαύμαζε τὰ λεγόμενα, ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου, ἐπειδὴ καὶ εἴωθας χρῆσθαι τῷ ἐρωτᾶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. φέρε γάρ, τί ἐγκαλῶν ἡμῖν τε καὶ τῇ πόλει ἐπιχειρεῖς ἡμᾶς ἀπολλύναι; οὐ πρῶτον μὲν σε ἐγεννήσαμεν^b ἡμεῖς, καὶ δι' ἡμῶν ἔλαβε τὴν μητέρα σου ὁ πατήρ καὶ ἐφύτευσέ σε; φράσον οὖν, τούτοις ἡμῶν, τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς περὶ τοὺς γάμους^c μέμφει τι ὡς οὐ καλῶς ἔχουσιν; Οὐ μέμφομαι, φαίην ἄν. Ἀλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροφήν τε καὶ παιδείαν,^d ἐν ἣ καὶ σὺ ἐπαιδεύθης; ἢ οὐ καλῶς^e προσέταπτον ἡμῶν οἱ ἐπὶ τούτοις τεταγμένοι νόμοι, παραγγέλλοντες τῷ πατρὶ τῷ σῶσε ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν;^f Καλῶς, φαίην ἄν. Εἶεν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐγένου τε καὶ ἐξετράφης καὶ ἐπαιδεύθης,^g ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν πρῶτον μὲν, ὡς οὐχὶ ἡμέτερος ἦσθα καὶ ἔκγονος καὶ δούλος, αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ σοὶ πρόγονοι;^h καὶ εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, ἄρ' ἐξ ἴσου οἶει εἶναι σοὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡμῖν, καὶ ἅπτ' ἂν ἡμεῖς σε ἐπιχειρῶμεν ποιεῖν, καὶ σὺ ταῦτα ἀντιποιεῖνⁱ οἶει δίκαιον εἶναι; ἢ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα

δι' ἡμῶν ἔλαβε] ἐλάμβανε, Bodl. Ven. b. Tub. Huet. Par. D S. Vind. 4. Flor. h.; but Ven. b. in the margin, has ἔλαβε.

περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου] Ven. E. and the margin of Par. BC Flor. a. h. γεννωμένου, which might be defended from Lysis. p. 237. E. Alcibiad. I. p. 121. D. But see Herodot. V. 4. VII. 3. A little further, old editions, ἢ οὐ καλῶς, which is connected from Vind. 2. 5. Ven. b.

οἱ ἐπὶ τούτοις τεταγμένοι] I have not hesitated to adopt this reading from Bodl. Vat. Tubing. Vind. 1. 4. 6. 7. Flor. d. h. Huet. Par. D S. for the common reading τούτῳ.

καὶ σὺ ταῦτα ἀντιπ.] So Par. B. Vind. 2. 3. 5. Vat. Ven. a.



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τε εἰς πόλεμον ἄγῃ τρωθησόμενον ἢ ἀποθανούμενον, ποιητέον ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ οὐχὶ ὑπεικτέον, οὐδὲ ἀναχωρητέον, οὐδὲ λειπτέον τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ πανταχοῦ ποιητέον ἂν κελεύῃ ἢ πόλις καὶ ἢ πατρίς, ἢ πείθειν αὐτὴν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε^p βιάζεσθαι δ' οὐχ ὄσιον οὔτε μητέρα οὔτε πατέρα, πολὺ δὲ τούτων ἔτι ἦττον τὴν πατρίδα. Τί φήσομεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων; ἀληθῆ λέγειν τοὺς νόμους, ἢ οὔ; ΚΡ. "Εμοιγε δοκεῖ.

XIII. ΣΩ. Σκόπει τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαῖεν ἂν ἴσως οἱ νόμοι, εἰ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, ὅτι οὐ δίκαια ἡμᾶς ἐπιχειρεῖς δρᾶν ἂν νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς. ἡμεῖς γάρ σε γεννήσαντες, ἐκθρέψαντες, παιδεύσαντες, μεταδόντες ἀπάντων ὧν οἰοί τ' ἡμεν καλῶν σοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι πολίταις, ὅμως προαγορεύομεν τῷ ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι^a Ἀθηναίων τῷ βουλομένῳ, ἐπειδὴν δοκιμασθῆ καὶ ἴδη^b τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει πράγματα καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους, ᾧ ἂν μὴ ἀρέσκωμεν ἡμεῖς, ἐξεῖναι λαβόντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπιέναι ὅποι ἂν βούληται. καὶ οὐδεὶς

ποιητέον ταῦτα] Commonly ποιητέα, against Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Tub. Vind. 1. 4. 5. 6. Flor. a. b. c. d. f. h. i. Huet. Par. B. C D E S. A little further οὐχὶ for οὐχ is supplied by nearly the same MSS.

κελεύῃ ἢ πόλις] Commonly κελεύοι, against all the MSS. except Paris. E. The old editions also have ἢ πόλις τε καὶ ἢ πατρ., but τε is omitted by the best MSS.

XIII. ἂν νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς] νῦν formerly omitted, is found in most MSS. Also in Bas. 2.

σοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλ.] Editions have σοί τε κ. τ. ἄλλ. I have rejected τε on the authority of Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Tub. Vind. 1. 3. 4. 6. 7. Flor. d. h. Huet. Par. D S.

ἐπειδὴν δοκιμασθῆ] Commonly δοκιμάση, which Ven. E. alone appears to have.

ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐμποδῶν ἐστὶν οὐδ' ἀπαγορεύει, εἴαν
 τέ τις βούληται ὑμῶν εἰς ἀποικίαν ἵεναι, εἰ μὴ ἀρέσ-
 κοιμεν ἡμεῖς τε καὶ ἡ πόλις, εἴαν τε μετοικεῖν ἄλλοσέ
 ποι^c ἐλθῶν, ἵεναι ἐκεῖσε, ὅποι ἂν βούληται, ἔχοντα τὰ
 αὐτοῦ. ὅς δ' ἂν ὑμῶν παραμείνη, ὁρῶν δὲν τρόπον ἡμεῖς
 τάς τε δίκας δικάζομεν καὶ τὰλλα τὴν πόλιν διοικοῦ-
 μεν, ἥδη φασὲν τοῦτον ὠμολογηκέναι ἔργῳ ἡμῖν ἂν
 ἡμεῖς κελεύωμεν ποιήσῃν ταῦτα, καὶ τὸν μὴ πειθό-
 μενον τριχῆ φασὲν ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι τε γεννήταις οὖσιν
 ἡμῖν οὐ πείθεται, καὶ ὅτι τροφεῦσι, καὶ ὅτι ὁμολογή-
 σας ἢ μὴν πείθεσθαι^d οὔτε πείθεται οὔτε πείθει ἡμᾶς,^e
 εἰ μὴ καλῶς τι ποιοῦμεν, προτιθέντων ἡμῶν, καὶ οὐκ
 ἀγρίως ἐπιταπτόντων ποιεῖν ἂν κελεύωμεν, ἀλλὰ
 ἐφιέντων δυεῖν θᾶτερα, ἢ πείθειν ἡμᾶς, ἢ ποιεῖν, τού-
 των οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ.

XIV. Ταύταις δὴ φασὲν καὶ σέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῖς
 αἰτίαις ἐνέξεσθαι,^a εἴπερ ποιήσεις ἂν ἐπινοεῖς, καὶ οὐχ
 ἡκιστα Ἀθηναίων σέ, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα.^b Εἰ οὖν ἐγὼ
 εἴποιμι, διὰ τί δή; ἴσως ἂν μου δικαίως καθάπτοινο,^c

ἄλλοσέ ποι ἐλθῶν] Steph. πη, and further on ὄπη, which is in
 very few MSS.

ἔχοντα τὰ αὐτοῦ] Commonly ἔχων. Although this reading
 might be defended, it was right to change it on the authority of
 Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 3. 4. 6. 7. Flor. a. b. d. f. h. i. Coisl.
 Par. B C D H S. Angel. Huet.

ἢ μὴν πείθεσθαι] So Coisl. Par. B. C. Flor. a. b. c. f. i. and
 Ang. for the common reading ἡμῖν πειθ. In Bodl. above ἡμῖν is
 written ἦμ, that is, I think ἢ μὴν. Buttmann conjectured that
 πείσεσθαι ought to be read.

ποιοῦμεν, προτιθέντων] Vat. Flor. d. καὶ προτιθέντων. But
 see note.

ἀλλὰ ἐφιέντων] ἀφιέντων, Par. H. The form δυεῖν is pre-
 served here by all the MSS. and old editt. except Vat. Flor. d. Huet.

λέγοντες, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα Ἀθηναίων ἐγὼ αὐτοῖς ὠμολογηκῶς τυγχάνω ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν. φαῖεν γὰρ ἂν ὅτι ὦ Σώκρατες, μεγάλα ἡμῖν τούτων τεκμήρια ἔστιν, ὅτι σοι καὶ ἡμεῖς ἠρέσκομεν καὶ ἡ πόλις· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἀπάντων διαφερόντως^d ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεδήμεις, εἰ μὴ σοι διαφερόντως ἠρεσκε, καὶ οὐτ' ἐπὶ θεωρίαν^e πώποτε ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξῆλθες, ὅτι μὴ ἅπαξ εἰς Ἴσθμόν, οὔτε ἄλλοσε οὐδαμόσε, εἰ μὴ ποι στρατευσόμενος,^f οὔτε ἄλλην ἀποδημίαν ἐποιήσω πώποτε, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι, οὐδ' ἐπιθυμία σε ἄλλης πόλεως οὐδ' ἄλλων νόμων ἔλαβεν εἰδέναί,^g ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς σοι ἱκανοὶ ἦμεν καὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα πόλις· οὕτω σφόδρα ἡμᾶς ἠροῦ, καὶ ὠμολόγεις καθ' ἡμᾶς πολιτεύεσθαι^h τά τε ἄλλα καὶ παῖδας ἐν αὐτῇ ἐποιήσω, ὡς ἀρεσκούσης σοι τῆς πόλεως· ἔτι τοίνυν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δίκῃ ἐξῆν σοι φυγῆς τιμήσασθαιⁱ εἰ ἐβούλου, καὶ ὅπερ νῦν ἀκούσης τῆς πόλεως ἐπιχειρεῖς, τότε ἐκούσης ποιῆσαι. σὺ δὲ τότε μὲν ἐκαλλωπίζου ὡς οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν, εἰ δέοι τεθνάναι σε, ἀλλ' ἠροῦ, ὡς ἔφησθα, πρὸ τῆς φυγῆς θάνατον· νῦν δὲ οὐτ' ἐκείνους τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύνει, οὔτε ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐντρέπει,

XIV. ὅτι μὴ ἅπαξ εἰς Ἴσθμόν] These words are wanting in Tub. Ven. b. Vind. 6. 7. Flor. h. Huet. Par. D S. But they were read by Athenæus, as Fischer rightly observed. In Bodl. they are written in the margin.

ἀποδημίαν ἐποιήσω] This order is given in Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Tub. Vind. 1. 4. 6. 7. Flor. d. h. Huet. Editions have ἐποιήσω ἀποδ.

καθ' ἡμᾶς πολιτεύεσθαι] Stephens, against all the MSS. has given the conjectural reading πολιτεύσεσθαι, which is approved of by Buttmann. See note.

τῶν νόμων ἐντρέπει] Vind. 6. τὸν νόμον. injudiciously.



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ἐκάστοτε φῆς εὐνομεῖσθαι,¹ οὔτε ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων, οὐδὲ τῶν βαρβαρικῶν,^m ἀλλ' ἐλάττω ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀπεδήμησας ἢ οἱ χωλοὶ τε καὶ τυφλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνάπηροι· οὔτω σοι διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἤρεσκεν ἢ πόλις τε καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ νόμοι δῆλον ὅτιⁿ τίνι γὰρ ἂν πόλις ἀρέσκοι ἄνευ νόμων; νῦν δὲ δὴ οὐκ ἐμμενεῖς τοῖς ὠμολογημένοις; εἰ ἡμῖν γε πείθῃ,^o ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ οὐ καταγέλαστός γε ἔσει ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξελθών.

XV. Σκόπει γὰρ δὴ, ταῦτα παραβὰς καὶ ἐξαμαρτῶν τι τούτων τί ἀγαθὸν ἐργάσει σαυτόν, ἢ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους τοὺς σαυτοῦ· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ κινδυνεύουσὶ γέ σου οἱ ἐπιτήδειοι καὶ αὐτοὶ φεύγειν καὶ στερηθῆναι τῆς πόλεως, ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπολέσαι, σχεδόν τι δῆλον· αὐτὸς δὲ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς τῶν ἐγγύτατά τινα πόλεων ἔλθῃς, ἢ Θήβαζε ἢ Μέγαράδε, — εὐνομοῦνται

οὐδὲ τῶν βαρβαρικῶν] Commonly οὔτε, which is changed from Bodl. Ven. b. Tubing. Vind. 6. Huet. Par. D S. For the common reading βαρβάρων, Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Vind. 1. 4. 6. 7. Flor. d. h. Huet. Par. S. with Eusebius give βαρβαρικῶν. In Vat. Flor. d. and Vind. 2. Ἑλληνικῶν also is read, with Buttmann's approbation.

καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ νόμοι δῆλον ὅτι] Vind. 4. 7. Flor. h. Huet. Par. D S. καὶ οἱ νόμοι ἡμεῖς δ.

οὐκ ἐμμενεῖς τοῖς ὠμ.] Bekker corrected ἐμμενεῖς, which is added by another hand in Bodl.; whereas the other MSS. have ἐμμένεις. But the future tense is required by the next words: εἰ ἡμῖν γε πείθῃ, ὦ Σ., with which it is plain that ἐμμενεῖς is to be understood. Stephens inserted it before εἰ, writing ἐμμενεῖς δέ, εἰ κ. τ. λ.

XV. ἐξαμαρτῶν τι τούτων] ἐξαμαρτάνων, Bodl. Ven. b. Tub. Vind. 7. Flor. h. Huet. Par. D S. In Ven. b., the true reading is added in the margin.

ἢ Μέγαράδε] Commonly Μεγάραδε. The former is found in

γὰρ ἀμφότεραι—πολέμιος ἦξεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῆ
τούτων πολιτεία,^a καὶ ὅσοιπερ κήδονται τῶν αὐτῶν
πόλεων, ὑποβλέψονται σε διαφθορέα ἡγούμενοι τῶν
νόμων, καὶ βεβαιώσεις τοῖς δικασταῖς^b τὴν δόξαν,
ὥστε δοκεῖν ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην δικάσαι· ὅστις γὰρ νόμων
διαφθορεὺς ἐστι, σφόδρα πονεὶ δόξειεν ἂν νέων γε καὶ
ἀνοήτων ἀνθρώπων διαφθορεὺς εἶναι. πότερον οὖν
φεύξει τὰς τε εὐνομουμένας πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν
τοὺς κοσμιωτάτους;^c καὶ τοῦτο ποιοῦντι ἄρα ἄξιόν^d
σοι ζῆν ἔσται; ἢ πλησιάσεις τούτοις καὶ ἀναισχυν-
τήσεις διαλεγόμενος—τίνας λόγους, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἢ
οὐσπερ ἐνθάδε, ὡς ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη πλείστου
ἄξιον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ οἱ νόμοι; καὶ
οὐκ οἶει ἄσχημον ἂν φανείσθαι^e τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους
πρᾶγμα; οἶεσθαί γε χρή. Ἄλλ' ἐκ μὲν τούτων τῶν
τόπων ἀπαρεῖς, ἦξεις δὲ εἰς Θετταλίαν παρὰ τοὺς
ξένους τοὺς Κρίτωνος· ἐκεῖ γὰρ δὴ πλείστη ἀταξία καὶ
ἀκολασία,^f καὶ ἴσως ἂν ἡδέως σου ἀκούοιεν ὡς γελοίως
ἐκ τοῦ δεσμοτηρίου ἀπεδίδρασκες, σκευὴν τέ τινα

Coisl. Vind. 2. Huet. Par. D S. And we write also οἰκόνδε, πό-
λεμόνδε, κ. τ. λ.

ἄξιόν σοι ζῆν ἔσται;] So Bodl. Ven. b. Tub. Vind. 7. Flor. h.
Huet. Par. D S. for the common reading ἔστι σοι ζῆν. In others
σοι ζῆν ἔστιν, which confirms the reading of the text.

τίνας λόγους] So Ven. b. Huet. Par. D S. The common
reading was τινάς.

ἄσχημον ἂν φανείσθαι] ἂν is added from Vat. Ven. b. Huet.
Par. D S. Vind. 1. 6. 7. Flor. d. h.

τούτων τῶν τόπων] So Bodl. Vat. Ven. b. Tub. Flor. d. h.
Huet. Par. D S. for the common reading τ. τ. πόλεων. which in
Ven. b. is written in the margin.

τοὺς ξένους τοὺς Κρίτωνος] So Ven. b. Vind. 4. Tub. for the
common reading τοῦ Κρ.

σκευὴν τέ τινα] τε is added from Bodl. Vat. Ven. Ξ. a. b.

περιθέμενος,^g ἢ διφθέραν λαβών, ἢ ἄλλα οἷα δὴ εἰώ-
 θασιν ἐνσκευάζεσθαι οἱ ἀποδιδράσκοντες, καὶ τὸ σχῆ-
 μα^h τὸ σαυτοῦ μεταλλάξας. ὅτι δὲ γέρων ἀνὴρ σμικροῦ
 χρόνου τῷ βίῳ λοιποῦ ὄντος, ὡς τὸ εἶκός, ἐτόλμησας
 οὔτω γλίσχρωςⁱ ἐπιθυμῆν ζῆν, νόμους τοὺς μεγίστους
 παραβάς, οὐδεὶς ὅς ἐρεῖ; ἴσως, ἂν μή τινα λυπῆς· εἰ
 δὲ μή,^k ἀκούσει, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια
 σαυτοῦ. ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσει πάντας ἀνθρώπους
 καὶ δουλεύων^l τί ποιῶν ἢ εὐωχούμενος ἐν Θετταλία,
 ὥσπερ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἀποδεδημηκῶς εἰς Θετταλίαν; λό-
 γοι δὲ ἐκεῖνοι οἱ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης
 ἀρετῆς ποῦ ἡμῖν ἔσονται; Ἀλλὰ δὴ τῶν παιδῶν ἔνεκα
 βούλει^m ζῆν, ἵνα αὐτοὺς ἐκθρέψῃς καὶ παιδεύσῃς; τί
 δαί; εἰς Θετταλίαν αὐτοὺς ἀγαγὼν θρέψεις τε καὶ
 παιδεύσεις, ξένους ποιήσας, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτό σου
 ἀπολαύσωσιν;ⁿ ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ, αὐτοῦ^o δὲ τρεφόμενοι
 σοῦ ζῶντος βέλτιον θρέψονται καὶ παιδεύονται, μὴ
 ξυνόντος σοῦ αὐτοῖς; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιτήδειοι οἱ σοὶ
 ἐπιμελήσονται αὐτῶν. πότερον ἔαν εἰς Θετταλίαν^p

Tub. Vind. 1. 2. 3. 4. 6. 7. Flor. a. b. c. d. f. h. i. Par. and others.
 Bodl. Huet. Par. D S. Tub. Flor. h. καταλλάξας, but the margin
 of Bodl. μεταλλάξας.

οὔτω γλίσχρως] Bodl. Ven. b. Tub. Vind. 1. 4. 6. 7. Flor. h.
 Huet. Par. D S. οὔτως αἰσχρῶς. The better reading has been
 preserved by Bodl. in the margin.

ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσει—] Commonly πάντας ἀνθρώπους βιώσει,
 which is changed from Bodl. Ven. b. Vat. Huet. Par. D S.
 Vind. 1. 4. 6. 7. Tub. Further on Vat. Flor. d. δουλείων καὶ τί
 ποιῶν. Vind. 6. for ἐν Θετταλία has εἰς Θετταλίαν, the same words
 being omitted after ἀποδεδημηκῶς. See note.

περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε] τε is added from Bodl. Coisl. Vat. Ven. b.
 Tub. Vind. 1. 4. 6. 7. Flor. d. h. Huet. Par. D S. It was wanting
 in the common editions.

πότερον ἔαν εἰς Θεττ.] Editt. have πότερον ἔαν μὲν εἰς Θ.



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τούτων τῶν λόγων βομβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ δύνασθαι
 τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν· ἀλλὰ ἴσθι, ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ
 δοκοῦντα, εἴαν τι λέγῃς παρὰ ταῦτα,^b μάτην ἐρεῖς.
 ὅμως μέντοι εἴ τι οἶει πλέον ποιήσειν, λέγε. ΚΡ.
 Ἄλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν. ΣΩ. Ἐὰ τοίνυν,
 ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ πράττωμεν ταύτη, ἐπειδὴ ταύτη ὁ
 θεὸς ὑφηγεῖται.

XVII. τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν] Tub. omits τῶν.

NOTES.

1

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ἔργῳ. The word *ὀπωστιοῦν* is said by Phavorinus and Thom. Mag. to have been used by the Attics for *ὀπωσοῦν*. *ὀπωσοῦν* is, however, sometimes used by Attic writers. See Ducker ad Thucyd. VII. 49. The signification of *μηδ' ὀπωστιοῦν* is *not even a very little, in no sense, in no degree*. So *οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν*, Chap. XIV. Xenoph. Œcon. XIII. 12. Cyrop. VIII. 4, 9. Memorab. I. 6, 11. and elsewhere. A little further on, the student will observe the formula *εἰ μὴ ἄρα*, which signifies *unless perhaps*.

ε οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ] Socrates in these words declares that he is of the same opinion with his accusers concerning the duty of an orator, namely, that he should speak the truth; but that he does not act like them by speaking falsely. Therefore the meaning of *οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ* is: *that I am an orator unlike them, since I speak truth, not falsehood*.

ἠ ἢ τι ἢ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς εἰρήκασιν] That is, have said scarcely anything true; have said little or nothing true. See Valckenaer ad Herodot. III. 149. who compares Xenoph. Cyrop. VII. 5, 45. *τούτων τῶν περιεστηκότων ἢ τινα ἢ οὐδένα οἶδα*. Ælian de Nat. Anim. VI. 50. *ἴσασιν Αἰγυπτίων ἢ τις ἢ οὐδεὶς*. VII. 8. *θαυμάζει τις ἢ οὐδεὶς*. See Matth. Gr. §. 487. 8. *πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν* has been correctly rendered by Fischer in Latin *omnem rem*.

ἰ κεκαλλιεπημένους γε λόγους—] Καλλιεπεῖν, on which word see Valckenaer Diatrib. p. 291, is to speak gracefully and elegantly. Therefore *λόγοι κεκαλλιεπημένοι ῥήμασι τε καὶ ὀνόμασι* are speeches composed both of graceful sentences and elegant words. For *ῥήματα* and *ὀνόματα* differ in this, that the latter are *words*, but the former, *sentiments expressed by words*. See Theaetet, 190. E. and there, Heindorf. p. 449. Moreover, Socrates mentions *λόγους κεκοσμημένους*, that is, speeches ornamented with tropes, figures, &c.—*εἰκῆ*, extemporaneously.—*τοῖς ἐπιτυχούσιν ὀνόμασι*, that is, without any set selection of words. For *τὰ ἐπιτυχόντα ὀνόματα* are not *common and trite words*, as Fischer interprets, but words which, as it were, offer themselves of their own accord.

῀ δίκαια εἶναι ἃ λέγω] That is, that I can do this rightly, namely, speak without ornament or premeditation.—*τῆδε τῆ ἡλικίᾳ*, that is, it would not become an old man, such as I am. The abstract for the concrete, which also appears from the addition of *ἔσπερ, μεираκίῳ*. Socrates was 70 years of age when he was publicly accused. See further on in this Chap.—*πλάττειν λόγους* is to speak in a rhetorical manner; see Ernesti Lexicon Techn. Græc. Rhetor. p. 267 sq., where the words *πλάσις* and *πλάσμα* are explained.

Demosth. de Coron. p. 268. ed. R. τί λόγους πλάττεις; — For εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι might have been put εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον εἰσιέναι.

^l καὶ παρίεμαι] Timæus Glos. Platon. p. 207. παρίεμαι· παραιτοῦμαι: at which place Ruhnkenius says: “The reason of this construction depends on the nature of the middle voice. As ἵημι and ἐφίημι is *I send*, ἴεμαι and ἐφίεμαι is *I wish to be sent to me*, that is, *I desire, I seek*; so παρίημι *I permit*, παρίεμαι *I wish to be permitted to me*, that is *I pray, I entreat*.”

^m καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν] The words καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν correspond to those following καὶ ἄλλουθι. The reading καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν was not correct, because αἱ τραπέζαι were in the market place. See Salmatius de Usur. p. 510. The words ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν are added for the purpose of explanation. So in Hippias min. p. 368. B. ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ ταῖς τραπέζαις. We are here to understand the tables of the bankers, which elsewhere, as in Demosthen. Vol. II. p. 470. p. 472. p. 946. Isocrat. p. 449. p. 450. p. 704. ed. Reisk. are called simply αἱ τραπέζαι; and thence the bankers are called οἱ τραπεζῖται.

ⁿ καὶ ἄλλουθι] That is, in the shops and gymnasia. Compare Aristid. Orat. Platon. II. p. 223. Vol. II. ed. Ieb. ὅτι πλείστα Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν καὶ τῶν ἐργαστηρίων διελέγετο.

^o μήτε θορυβεῖν] The verb θορυβεῖν is said of bustle and confusion of every kind, as when the judges murmur to one another, and speak loud enough to be heard. Μὴ θορυβεῖτε is an established formula of the orators, when they are about to say any thing which may be displeasing to their auditors. See Chap. V. in two places.

^p ἔτη γεγονὼς πλείω ἑβδομήκοντα. There is no necessity that ἦ should be added after πλείω. See Matth. Gr. §. 455. 4. Serranus translates “more than sixty years old;” so that he appears to have read πλείω ἑξήκοντα.

^q ξένως ἔχω] On this use of the genitive see Matth. §. 337.—ἡ ἐνθάδε λέξις, style of speaking customary in courts of justice.

^r ὥσπερ οὖν ἂν, εἰ—] So Gorg. p. 447. E. p. 451. A. Protag. p. 311. B. In these passages ἂν must not be referred to the opening, but to the conclusion of the proposition. It is, however, rightly repeated at the conclusion. In such passages the reader is prepared in the beginning of a sentence pronounced with some emphasis, for what the construction is to be, so that, a complete clause being interposed, ἂν is repeated anew. This passage is, therefore, to be understood, as if it were written: ὥσπερ οὖν ἂν ξυνεγιγνώσκετε δήπου μοι, εἰ τῷ ὄντι ξένος ἐ. ὢν.

^a ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ φωνῇ—ἐτεθράμμην] That is, the vernacular language, which differed from the style of speaking customary in courts of justice. τοῦτο δίκαιον is the same as τοῦτο ὡς δίκαιόν τι. See Matthiæ Gr. §. 470. There are many proofs that strangers were allowed to plead their own causes in the courts of justice. In the same manner in C. 5. ταυτί μοι δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων.

^c αὕτη ἀρετή] If the article is preserved, the words are to be thus connected: αὕτη ἡ ἀρετή (that is, that he see whether the truth be spoken or not) δικαστοῦ ἐστίν. If the article is omitted: *for this is the virtue of a judge.* For when the pronoun is the subject, and the substantive the predicate, the article is omitted.

II. ^a δίκαιός εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι] On this construction see Matth. §. 296. A little further the construction is πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα κατηγορημένα μου ψευδῆ.

^b καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη] The words πολλὰ ἔτη are added for the purpose of determining more precisely the meaning of πάλαι; since πάλαι is not always used of time long since past, but often also of a short space of time, of years, months, days, &c. The Latin *dudum* and *jamdudum* are used in the same manner. The words are to be thus connected: καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη λέγοντες καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς λέγοντες, the sense being: *For there have been many accusers of me before you, who, though they have accused me for some time,—for many years now,—have not brought forward anything true.*

^c ἡ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον] That is, Anytus and his associates, Meletus and Lycon. See Matth. §. 272. Anytus, in particular, is mentioned, because he was the most formidable enemy of Socrates; for he had acquired great popularity by his conduct during the time of the Thirty Tyrants. See Xenoph. Hellen. II. 3, 42.

^d ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοι δεινότεροι—] Socrates appears to refer to the accusations which Aristophanes and the other comic poets, as Eupolis, &c., had brought against him.

^e τὰ τε μετέωρα φροντιστῆς κ. τ. λ.] φροντιστῆς having the same signification as φροντίζων, takes the accusative. On this accusation, see Aristoph. Nubb. v. 100. v. 189 foll. v. 359. Xenoph. Sympos. VI. 7. Compare Ruhnken. ad Mem. I. 2, 31. Socrates appears, in his youth, to have devoted considerable attention to physical studies; as he informs us himself in the Phædo p. 97 foll. Compare Xenoph. Memorab. IV. 7.

^f καὶ τὸν ἤττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν] See Aristoph. Nubb. v. 99 foll. Cicero in Brutus, c. 8. docere, quemadmodum causa



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opinion, suspicion, produced by false accusations. Hesychius: Διαβολή· ὑπόπτεισις ἢ ὑπόληψις. But since Socrates, by removing this ill opinion of the judges concerning him, consulted his own advantage, and did himself a service, it is easy to see why Plato wrote ἐξελέσθαι, not ἐξελεῖν. In the words ταύτην ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ is to be observed the emphasis of the sentence, which is partly in the pronoun ταύτην, partly in the opposition of the words ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ and ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ. Compare C. X.

τ τοῦτο οὕτω γενέσθαι] The words οὕτω γενέσθαι are more accurately defined by the following words: καὶ πλέον τί με ποιῆσαι ἀπολογούμενον, *that I might do something more, that is, to cause you to throw aside your bad opinion of me and conceive a good one.* On the formula ἄμεινόν ἐστιν, see observations on Crito, C. XVI, note (d).

III. ^a Μέλητός με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην] See Euthyphro, p. 5. where is found γραφὴν σέ τις, ὡς ἔοικε, γέγραπται. For it is correct to say, γράφεσθαι γραφὴν: also to say γράφεσθαί τινα: and hence, by the union of both constructions, has arisen γράφεσθαι γραφὴν τινα.

^b ὥσπερ οὖν κατηγορῶν—αὐτῶν] The sense is: *their accusation, as the information of accusers properly so called, ought to be recited.* Ἀντωμοσία is properly the oath, either of the plaintiff, when he swears that he brings the accusation for just causes and without calumny; or of the accused, when he swears that he is innocent. Further, this term is applied to the written declaration of the accusation, which is given in to the judge by the plaintiff: in which signification it is also found in C. ΣI.

^c περιεργάζεται] περιεργάζεσθαι is properly *to treat any subject minutely*, and hence to bestow too much attention on any thing. Hence it signifies, as in this passage, *to attend to those things which do not in any way belong to you*; to attend to frivolous, vain, and useless things.

^d ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κωμῳδίᾳ] “The Clouds” of Aristophanes was acted B. C. 423; but was unsuccessful notwithstanding its great merit as a work of art. The poet not only failed in obtaining the first prize, but was placed below Ameipsias as well as Cratinus. He appears to have brought it forward again in the following year, with some alterations; but this fact has been disputed by many critics.

^e οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρόν] This is a proverbial saying, See Herm. ad Viger. p. 720. 78. Compare C. VI. and XIII.

Remark the preposition *περὶ* removed a good distance from its noun. The word *ἐπαίειν* is constructed either with a simple genitive or with the preposition *περὶ* and a genitive. Compare Heindorf ad *Hippiam maj.* p. 289. E.

^f *καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀτιμάζων—*] The words are to be taken ironically in this sense: *I do not despise and reject that knowledge of celestial things and of the art, by aid of which the worst cause may be made the better: and may I never be accused by Meletus of such great injustice.* The form *δίκην φεύγειν* is to be accused, to be prosecuted, and is opposed to the word *διώκειν* which signifies to accuse. But since *φεύγειν* is the same as *διώκεσθαι* it is easy to see why it should be translated as a passive. The words *ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τ.—μέτεστι* are to be interpreted: *ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει· οὐ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων οὐδὲν μέτεστι.* Compare Herm. ad Viger. p. 811.

^g *καὶ ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς—*] that is, *I wish or request that you yourselves would explain to one another.*

^h *καὶ ἐκ τούτων γνώσεσθε*] Namely, *ἐκ τοῦ διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν κ. τ. λ.*

IV. ^a *Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε τούτων οὐδὲν ἐστὶν οὐδέ γ'—*] He proceeds to another accusation made against him by his adversaries, that he gave instruction and exacted money from his pupils. See Aristoph. *Nub.* v. 98. *οὐδέ γέ* is properly inserted after *οὔτε*, since the following clause is emphatic. There is, therefore, no necessity to read, with Fischer, *ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδὲ τούτων*, nor with Bekker, *οὐτέ γ' εἴ τις κ. τ. λ.*

^b *καὶ χρήματα πράττομαι*] Is the same as *μισθὸν τῆς συνουσίας πράττεσθαι* in Xenoph. *Mem.* I. 2, 60., in which passage Xenophon bears witness that Socrates never received any remuneration from his pupils.

^c *ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτό γέ μοι—*] It would not have been necessary to remark that this is said in order to stigmatise and ridicule the avarice of the Sophists; if there had not been some persons who have supposed that it was said seriously.

^d *εἴ τις οἶός τ' εἴη*] On this construction, Matth., §. 524. Obs. 3. Gorgias, (B. C. 459.) a disciple of Empedocles and preceptor of Isocrates, was a native of Leontini, a town in Sicily. He did much to raise the study of rhetoric by his discoveries; according to Suidas, he first reduced it into the form of a science. He was so much distinguished by his eloquence in extemporaneous speaking, that he received great honours from all Greece, but particularly from Athens, where he resided for many years. He is said, after

the example of Protagoras, to have exacted a hundred minæ from each of his pupils. See Diog. Laert. 9. 52. Cic. de Orat. I. 22. III. 32. Brut. 8. de Fin. II. 1. Paus. VI. 17. Philostr. I. 1. Vit. Sophist. p. 487. ed Morell. Dorvilli Sic. c. 9. p. 169. and especially the dialogue of Plato, inscribed Gorgias. *Prodicus* [B. C. 435.] was a native of Ceos, one of the Cyclades. He bestowed much labour on distinguishing and explaining the signification of words. *Hippias* was a native of Elis, a city in the Peloponnesus; Cicero has given some particulars concerning him in the De Orat. III. c. 32. and Brut. c. 8. Compare also Plato's dialogue inscribed with the name of Hippias.

^e τούτους πείθουσι] These words afford a remarkable instance of ἀνακολουθία. For as οἶός τ' ἐστίν goes before, an infinitive ought now to follow. But πείθουσι is placed as if οἶός τ' ἐστίν did not go before. ξυνεῖναι and ξυνουσία refer to learning and instruction, as is frequently the case: whence disciples are constantly called οἱ ξυνόντες.

^f ἀνὴρ ἐστὶ Πάριος] Namely, Evenus, of the Isle of Paros. The subsequent words, δὲν ἐγὼ ἤσθόμην ἐπιδημοῦντα, are to be understood thus: *whom I once understood to be staying in our city.* Socrates means that he had not seen Evenus himself, but had heard from Callias what he is about to say of him.

^g ὅς τετέλεκε πλ.] That is, *who has paid more money to the Sophists than all among us who study philosophy.* The common reading τετέλεκει was bad, being altogether opposed to the construction of the sentence.

^h Καλλία, τῷ Ἰππονίκου] The riches of Callias were so great, that he was called, according to Plutarch, Vol. I. p. 165., simply ὁ πλούσιος. It is evident from many passages that the Sophists were greatly enriched by him, as Protagor. p. 479. ed. Heind. p. 314. B. C. Hipp. Maj. p. 218. B. Xenoph. Sympos. 1. 5. An account of this wealthy family is given in Boeckh's 'Public Economy of Athens,' Vol. II. p. 242. foll. (*Eng. Trans.*)

ⁱ μισθώσασθαι] μισθοῦν *to let or hire to another, μισθοῦσθαι to procure services for hire, to purchase.*

^k πέντε μνῶν] An Attic mina consisted of 100 Attic drachmæ, see Pollux, IX. 59. 86. Evenus, therefore, demanded a very small remuneration for his wisdom, since it is recorded that Protagoras, Gorgias, and others, received 100 minæ.

εἰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔχει] Concerning the construction, see Matth. §. 529. 3. The words καὶ οὕτως ἐμμελῶς seem to have reference to the moderate price τῶν πέντε μνῶν. For ἐμμελές is said of any



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Livius II. 1. has used *regium metum* for *metu regis*; and III. 16. *terrorem servilem* for *terrore servorum*.

^h μέγα λέγειν] That is, *to say something to be wondered at*.

ⁱ ἀξιόχρεων] Which is properly said of one who is solvent, and, therefore, worthy to have money intrusted to him. In the same manner *locuples* in Latin is used of a witness worthy of credit. Hesych.: ἀξιόχρεως, ἀξιόπιστος. Suid.: ἀξιόχρεως· ἰκανός, ἐχέγγυος, ἀξιόπιστος.

^k τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς—καὶ οἷα] That is, *παρέξομαι γὰρ ὑμῖν τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς μάρτυρα τῆς ἐμῆς σοφίας, εἰ δὴ τίς ἐστίν, καὶ οἷα ἐστίν*.

^l Χαιρεφῶντα γὰρ—]: Chærephon's character is described by Aristoph. *Nubb.* v. 104. v. 501 sq. and there scholiast. *Anv.* 1570. Xenoph. *Memorab.* II. 3. Plat. *Charmid.* p. 153. B.

^m καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἑταῖρος] Reference is made to the flight of the Athenians in the time of the Thirty Tyrants. The words *κατιέναι, κατέρχεσθαι* are very often used in speaking of those who return to their native country from exile. See Aristoph. *Ran.* 1274; Herodo. III. 45. and Porson. on Eurip. *Med.* 1011. Further on ἐφ' ὃ τι ὀρμήσειε is said more emphatically for εἰ ἐπὶ τι ὀρμήσειε.

ⁿ ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο μαντεύσασθαι] *μαντεύεσθαι* here is, to require an oracle to be delivered to him, that is, *to consult, to inquire*, as in Xenoph. *Memor.* I. 1, 6. *περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδήλων, ὅπως ἂν ἀποβήσοιτο, μαντευσσομένους ἔπεμπεν, εἰ ποιητέα*.

^o ἤρετο γὰρ δὴ, εἴ τις] Respecting this act of Chærephon, see Xenoph. *Apolog.* 14. and Laert. II. 37.

^p ἀνεῖλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία] The words of the Pythian priestess were, according to Laert. II. 37. Ἄνδρῶν ἀπάντων Σωκράτης σοφώτατος. In Schol. Aristoph. *Nubb.* v. 144. they appear thus: Σοφὸς Σοφοκλῆς, σοφώτερος δ' Εὐριπίδης· Ἄνδρῶν δὲ πάντων Σωκράτης σοφώτατος.

^q ὁ ἀδελφὸς—αὐτοῦ] Chærecrates. See Xenoph. *Mem.* H. 3.

VI. ^a ξύνοιδα ἑμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὢν] In another manner, C. VIII. ἑμαυτῷ ξυνήδειν οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένῳ. See Matth. §. 548. 2.

^b οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ] See De *Republ.* II. p. 383. B. Æschyl. *Prom.* v. 1032. Pindar. *Pyth.* III. 29. IX. 44 foll. ed Bœckh.

^c ἠπόρου, τί ποτε λέγει] Fischer thought it ought to be written λέγοι. But there is no occasion for this; since he passes from the *oratio obliqua* to a direct address: whence also τί, not ὃ τι, is used. See Matth. §. 529. 3.

^d καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἔδοξέ μοι] . This usage of the participle in the nominative case with the verb ἔδοξε, where the strict grammatical construction would require the dative, is not uncommon. De Legg. III. p. 686. D. ἀποβλέψας γὰρ πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν στόλον, οὗ περὶ διαλεγόμεθα, ἔδοξέ μοι πάγκαλος εἶναι. Xenoph. Hell. VII. 5, 18. ἐνθυμούμενος, ὅτι—ἔδόκει αὐτῷ. Cyrop. VI. 1, 18. βουλόμενος πέμψαι—ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ. In the same way in Latin. Hirt. De bello Afric. c. 25. Dum hæc ita fierent, rex Iuba, cognitis difficultatibus copiarumque paucitate, non est visum, &c.

^e πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν—ἐλογιζόμενον] That is, *I reasoned with myself*. as Phædo c. 45. πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν σκεψάμενος, and Euthyphro, p. 9. B. πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν σκοπῶ. On the words ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, See Matthiæ Gr. §. 625.

^f μικρῶ τινι αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφώτερος εἶναι] Cic. Academ. I. 4. Socrates—ita disputat, ut—nihil se scire dicat nisi id ipsum, eoque præstare ceteris, quod illi quæ nesciant scire se putent, ipse se nihil scire id unum sciat; ob eamque causam se arbitrari ab Apolline omnium sapientissimum esse dictum, quod hæc esset una hominis sapientia, non arbitrari sese scire quod nesciat. Fischer is wrong in thinking that the words μικρῶ τινι are explained by the words αὐτῷ τούτῳ. For the sense is: *I think that I am a little wiser than this man at least by this very thing, because what I am ignorant of, I do not even think that I know.*

VII. ^a ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμενον] The words belong not only to δειδώς, but also to αἰσθανόμενος and λυπούμενος. Wolf has correctly rendered them: *seeing indeed and grieving that I was becoming hated and for that reason fearing.* On the words τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, see Matth. §. 284.

^b ἰτέον οὖν, σκοποῦντι] Socrates relates to the judges what he said and thought at the time spoken of. *I must go then, I said to myself* (for this is implied in the preceding ἔδόκει), *to find out what is the meaning of the oracle, &c.* The reading καὶ ἰένα σκοποῦντι, which appears in the old editions, gives a feebleness to the sentence, and might easily have arisen from a correction. I have, therefore, rejected it with Bekker. In one Vindob., which has preserved the true reading, we find in the margin καὶ ἰένα.

^c καὶ νῆ τὸν κύνα] There are various opinions respecting Socrates' swearing *by the dog* and other animals, which have been collected by Menagius, Laert. II. 40. p. 92. foll. and Pet. Petitus Observatt. Miscell. 4.7., who thought that *by the dog* was understood

the *dæmonium* of Socrates. Ioach. Camerarius Opusc. de R. R. p. 28, thought that the dog was the symbol of faith, and, therefore, that the oath *νῆ τὸν κύνα* nearly answered to the Latin *medius fidius*. But, on this obscure subject, I am inclined to agree with those who think that Socrates swore by the dog, the goose, and also the oak (see Cyrill. Alexandr. c. Julian. 6. p. 190. A.), because he was unwilling to swear by the gods themselves. See Porphyr. de Abstin. III. 16.

^d ἔπαθόν τι τοιοῦτον· οἱ μὲν μάλιστα—] Those sentences, which are subjoined to others for the purpose of explanation, are often added without connective particles. Gorg. p. 450. A. καὶ μὴν καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι, ᾧ Γοργία, οὕτως ἔχουσι· ἐκάστη αὐτῶν περὶ λόγους ἐστὶ τούτους, οἳ τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες κ. τ. λ. Ibid. p. 465. D. τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου ἂν πολὺ ἦν, ᾧ φίλε Ἡῶλε, — ὁμοῦ ἂν πάντα χρήματα ἐφύρετο. Compare Phædo p. 68. E. τί δ' οἱ κόσμιοι αὐτῶν; οὐ ταῦτῶν τοῦτο πεπόνθασιν· ἀκολασία τινὶ σώφρονές εἰσι; Legg. I. p. 635. D. ἔνεκα τῆς γλυκυθυμίας τῆς πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ταῦτῶν πείσονται τοῖς ἡττωμένοις τῶν φόβων· δουλεύσουσι τρόπον ἕτερον καὶ ἔτ' αἰσχίω. Gorg. p. 513. A. Phædr. p. 251. D. Menex. p. 235. B. Eurip. Heraclid. v. 179. μὴ πάθης σὺ τοῦτο, τοὺς ἀμείνονας παρὸν φίλους ἐλέσθαι, τοὺς κακίονας λάβης. Eurip. Iphig. Aul. v. 366. Compare Heindorf on Phædo p. 57. Matth. on Eurip. Hecub. v. 777.

^e ἵνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἡ μαντεία γένοιτο] Socrates says, that he did all things in order to refute the oracle; but, that after much trouble on his part, he even confirmed its truth so completely, that it was ἀνέλεγκτος, that is, *incapable of being convicted of error*.

^f ἃ μοι ἐδόκει—πεπραγματεῦσθαι αὐτοῖς] That is, *which appeared to have been composed by them with most diligence*. The imperfect διηρώτων joined with ἂν, denotes the repetition of the action. See Matth. §. 599. 1.

^g οἱ παρόντες ἂν βέλτιον ἔλεγον περὶ ᾧ αὐτοὶ ἐπεποιήκεσαν] *All who were present used to think best of those poems which they themselves had composed*. The imperfect ἔλεγον with ἂν denotes in this passage also the repetition of the action.

^h ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμφοδοί] Ion. p. 533. E. πάντες γὰρ οἷ τε τῶν ἐπῶν ποιηταὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ οὐκ ἐκ τέχνης, ἀλλ' ἔνθεοι ὄντες καὶ κατεχόμενοι πάντα τὰ καλὰ λέγουσι ποιήματα, καὶ οἱ μελοποιοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ὡσαύτως.—καὶ οὐ πρότερον οἶός τε ποιεῖν (ὁ ποιητής), πρὶν ἂν ἔνθεός τε γένηται καὶ ἔκφρων



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The article with δὲ indicates so opposed to some other thing, that it ought to be accounted true. In this passage after τὸ δὲ is put τῷ ὄντι, in order that the force of that form, τὸ δὲ, may be increased and made more apparent.

^d ὀλίγου τινός — καὶ οὐδενός] Here καὶ before οὐδενός increases and corrects the meaning of ὀλίγου τινός, in this sense: *human wisdom is of little value — I should rather say, of no value at all.* In the same way μικρὰ καὶ οὐδὲν in Demosth. p. 790. 20. and p. 260. 26. ed. Reisk. There is, therefore, no occasion to write ἢ καὶ οὐδενός. The Latin writers use *atque* in exactly the same manner. See Matth. on Cicer. II. Catil. XII. 27. Manil. XVIII. 54.

^e καὶ φαίνεται τοῦτ' οὐ λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη] That is, *and he appears not to say this of Socrates.* The pronoun τοῦτο refers to what has gone before τὸ σοφὸν εἶναι. On the construction compare Crito C. VIII. φροντιστέον, τί ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς. Menon. p. 77. A. ὅπερ φασὶ τοὺς συντρίβοντάς τι. Aristoph. Acharn. v. 593. ταυτὶ λέγεις σὺ τὸν στρατηγόν; Ibid. v. 580. τί δ' εἶπας ἡμᾶς; οὐκ ἐρεῖς; Sophoc. Electr. v. 984. τοιαῦτά τοι νῶ πᾶς τις ἐξερεῖ βροτῶν. Eurip. Iphig. Taur. v. 340. θαυμάστ' ἔλεξας τὸν φανένθ'. Andromach. v. 646. τί δῆτ' ἂν εἶποις τοὺς γέροντας ὡς σοφοί; Heyne on Homer, Vol. V. p. 285. The Attics use the form λέγειν τινά, for λέγειν περί τινος. For it is usual to say, λέγειν τινά τι, λέγειν τινὰ ὅτι, ὡς, εἰ αὐτός, as λέγειν τινὰ ὅτι ἐσθλός ἐστι.

^f ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἶποι] On the construction of the words ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ, see C. I. note (r). In this passage the complete sentence would be ὥσπερ ἂν ποιοῖτο, εἰ εἶποι. Therefore I have no doubt that Stephens, Heindorf, and Bekker have correctly inserted εἰ.

^g καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ τῶν ξένων] These genitives depend on the following τινά.

^h τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι] That is, *acting in such a manner that the response of Apollo may appear to be true.* The word ἀσχολία, Thom. Mag., interprets: ἡ περί τι ἀναστροφή, that is, *attention bestowed on any thing.*

ⁱ ἀλλ' ἐν πενίᾳ μυρία εἶμι —] Πενία differs in the same manner from πτωχεία, as Lat. *paupertas* from *egestas*. Therefore πενία is applied to artisans and other men of that description, who live by the labour of their hands; but πτωχεία to beggars. See Aristoph. Plut. v. 552 sqq. and the commentators on the passage. μυρία πενία is *the greatest poverty*: which expression has been illustrated by Valckenaer on Phœniss. v. 1480. The extreme poverty of Socrates is spoken of by himself, in Xenoph. Œconom. II. 3., where

he says that he would sell his house and all his other property for 5 Attic minæ. Whence he was also commonly called πένης, as we learn from Xenoph. Œcon. II. 3.

X. ^a οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων] This is added by Socrates, that the cause of the odium against himself may more clearly appear. Protagor. p. 328. C. καὶ ταῦτα μάλιστα ποιούσιν οἱ μάλιστα δυνάμενοι, (i. e. take care that their sons should be instructed,) μάλιστα δὲ δύνανται οἱ πλουσιώτατοι.

^b ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται, εἶτα ἐπιχειροῦσιν] It is well known that εἶτα and ἔπειτα are often put for καὶ εἶτα, and καὶ ἔπειτα after a finite verb. See Theætet. p. 151. C. Euthyd. p. 295. C. D. Phædr. 63. C., in which passage it signifies *then, afterwards*. The construction in this passage is a little different, in which εἶτα is *and then, καὶ τότε*. It is used in the same manner, Cratyl. p. 411. B., on which Heindorf, besides this passage, has compared Rep. p. 336. B. Fischer, therefore, has badly corrected it μιμούμενοι.

^c εἰδόντων δὲ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν] This is more emphatic than the common reading ἢ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν. For ἢ used in this manner, signifies *or rather*; which is not the case in the form ἢ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν. Plat. Phædr. p. 224. B. βραχέα ἢ οὐδέν. Alciphron. III. 4. ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν διαφέρουσι.

^d ἀλλ' οὐχ αὐτοῖς] This is said ironically. *They are enraged*, he says, *with me, when they ought rather to be angry with themselves for allowing themselves to be refuted by those lads*. The common reading οὐκ αὐτοῖς, has much less of ironical elegance, and would probably have been rather οὐκ ἐκείνοις.

^e ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς] These words depend upon διδάσκων, which must be repeated at the end of the sentence.

^f ὅτι κατάδηλοι—προσποιούμενοι] On the construction see Matth. §. 296. compared with 549.

^g καὶ σφοδροὶ καὶ πολλοί, καὶ ξυντεταγμένως καὶ πιθανῶς. λ.] This is a metaphor taken from soldiers arrayed in line of battle; who are said to attack the enemy ξυντεταγμένως, when they assault them in regular line. Therefore, the calumniators of Socrates are here said ξυντεταγμένως λέγειν, since they assailed him with calumnies as it were in regular array; that is, *in such a manner as it appeared that they had come to an agreement among themselves as to the best and most efficacious mode of calumniating*. πιθανῶς, that is, *in a manner adapted to persuade*.

^h ἐμπεπλήκασιν ὑμῶν τὰ ὦτα] Compare Plat. Lysis. p. 204. C. ἡμῶν γοῦν ἐκκεκώφωκε τὰ ὦτα καὶ ἐμπέπληκε Λύσιδος. Lucian.

Lucian. Amor. §. I. T. V. p. 256. ed. Bip. ἐρωτικῆς παιδιᾶς ἐξ ἑωθινοῦ πεπλήρωκας τὰ ὦτα.

ⁱ Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν] MELETUS, who brought the cause of Socrates, by a regular form of accusation, before the Archon, as appears from Euthyphr. p. 2. B. and other passages, was a tragic poet, who was not very celebrated or successful in his art. See the scholiast on Aristoph. Ran. v. 1337., and Thirlwall's 'History of Greece,' vol. 4. p. 274, note 5. At the time he accused Socrates, he was very young, but puffed up with pride and arrogance, as may be understood from Euthyphr. p. 2. B. C. Meletus is said to have been one of the Four, who by order of the Thirty Tyrants, brought Leon of Salamis to Athens. The affair is related by Andocides De Myster. p. 46. Orat. T. IV. ed. Reisk. Compare c. XX.—ANYTUS, son of Anthemion, a βυρσοδέψης, or tanner (as appears from Epist. VII. Socr. p. 30. and Schol. on Plat. Men. p. 90. A. compare Xenoph. Apol. 39), was by far the most powerful and inveterate of the accusers of Socrates, so that Horace, Satyr. II. 4., not without justice, called Socrates *Anyti reum*. Being a man of great wealth and political influence, and opposed to the aristocratical party, he was exiled by the Thirty Tyrants; he returned to Athens with Thrasybulus, after holding the rank of general at Phyle. See Xenoph. Hellen. II. 3. Plat. Epist. VII. about the middle. In the dialogue of Plato entitled Meno, "Anytus is introduced as violently offended with Socrates on account of the turn which his discourse had taken, and as quitting him with a threat, which, if it was ever uttered, was fulfilled by this indictment."—Thirlwall's 'History of Greece,' Vol. IV. p. 275; see Meno, 92—94. E. Other causes of his enmity against Socrates have been realised by Xenoph. Apolog. Socr. §. 29. Libanius Apol. Socr. p. 11. ed. Reisk. Plutarch Vit. Alcib. c. 4. Anytus is said to have been a man of bad character; see Aristot. ap. Harpocr. under the word δεκάζειν. Plutarch Vit. Coriol. c. XIV. Diod. Sicul. XIII. 64. Compare Plut. Amator. p. 276. C. D.—LYCO was one of the ten orators, who according to the law of Solon were to plead and conduct the public causes. See Diog. Laert. II. 38., and the commentators on the passage.

^k Ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρ. Ἀθ., τὰληθῆ] That is, *these are the things which I before said that I would relate to you with truth*. He refers to the words, C. I., ὑμεῖς δ' ἐμοῦ ἀκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

^l οὐδ' ὑποστειλάμενος] ὑποστέλλεσθαι is properly *to withdraw one's self, to depart privately*: hence *to dissimulate*, as in this



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For Meletus, in casting such an unfounded imputation on Socrates, and pretending that he himself cared for the education of youth, appeared *χαριεντίζεσθαι*, that is, *to sport and joke*; but, because he accused Socrates of corrupting youth, and prosecuted that accusation seriously and zealously, he is said *σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεσθαι*. Further on, *ῥαδίως rashly*. See Heindorf on Charmid. §. 44.—*εἰς ἀγῶνα καθιστάναι*, means *to accuse*. See Euthyphr. c. 3.

XII. ^a Καί μοι δεῦρο, —εἰπέ] Bekker Anecd. I. p. 88. δεῦρο ἀντὶ τοῦ ἔρχου. Aristoph. Ecclesiaz. v. 989. ἄλλ' οὕτως γὰρ αὐτός, οὗ μεμνήμεθα. δεῦρο δὴ, δεῦρο δὴ, φίλον ἐμόν, πρόσελθε, καὶ ξύνευνός μοι τὴν εὐφρόνην ὅπως ἔσει. Plato's Rep. IV. d. 445. C. V. p. 477. D. Lysid. p. 203. B.

^b Ἄλλο τι περὶ π. π.] See Hermann. on Viger. p. 730. n. 110. On ὅπως used with a future, see Herm. on Viger. p. 851. Euthyphr. p. 2. D. ὀρθῶς γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶν νέων πρῶτον ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως ἔσονται ὅτι ἄριστοι.

^c μέλον γέ σοι] On the construction, see Matth. § 564. Buttm. §. 132. 6. obs. 7.

^d ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις τουτοισί] The verb εἰσάγειν is said either of the magistrate, when it signifies *to permit an accuser to indict a person on some law, to grant permission to bring an action*; or of the prosecutor, when it means *to bring into court, to accuse*, as here. In both significations, either εἰς δικαστήριον, as c. 17., με εἰσάγοι τις εἰς δικαστήριον, or something of the kind is understood. In this passage the word τουτοισί is added, and supplies the place of that expression. See Meier and Schœmann 'Der Attische Process,' p. 709. not. 19.

^e ὀρᾶς, ᾧ Μέλητε] The word ὀρᾶς, prefixed in this manner, is used in derision. Compare Aristoph. Nubb. v. 662. 669. Vesp. v. 393. Pac. v. 330. Rann. v. 1136. 1245. Eurip. El. v. 1121. The whole of the following passage is expressed rather in the Socratic style of argument, than of a speech in a court of justice.

^f νῆ τὴν Ἑραν] This oath is also used by Socrates in Xenoph. Mem. I. 5, 5; III. 10, 9; III. 11, 5.

^g τῶν ὠφελούντων] That is, τῶν βελτίους ποιούντων.

^h Τί δαί οἱ βουλευταί] Concerning the βουλευταί, see note (b) on C. XX. There were two senates at Athens: the Areopagus, βουλή ἡ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου, and *the senate of five hundred*, βουλή ἡ τῶν πεντακοσίων, instituted by Solon. Either may be meant here. On the words Ἄλλ' ἄρα — μὴ οἱ ἐν τ. ἐκκ. see Protag. p. 312. A. ἄλλ' ἄρα, ᾧ Ἰππόκρατες, μὴ οὐ τοιαύτην ὑπολαμβάνεις;

Euthydem. p. 290. E. ἀλλ' ἄρα, ὧ πρὸς Διός, μὴ δὲ Κτήσιππος ἦν ὁ ταῦτ' εἰπών.

ⁱ τοὺς νεωτέρους] No one was permitted to be present at the assemblies until he had attained the age of at least 18 or 20. See Schoemann 'De Comitibus Atheniensium,' p. 76 sq. Hence it is obvious that οἱ νέοι and νεώτεροι were young men under 18.

^k ἐμοῦ κατέγνωκας δυστυχίαν] The construction has been explained by Matthiæ §. 378. Æsch. adv. Ctesiph. §. 12. τίς ἂν οὖν ὑμῶν πολήσειε τοσαύτην ἀνελευθερίαν καταγνώναί τοῦ δήμου;

^l οἱ μὲν βελτίους — ὁ διαφθείρων] Το πάντες ἄνθρωποι we must understand δοκοῦσι, from what has preceded; exactly as Hipp. min. p. 379. D. Lysis. p. 212. D. These words contain the explanation of the words οὕτω δοκεῖ σοι ἔχειν, and therefore are added without connective particles. Gorg. p. 479. B. κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ — τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν καὶ οἱ τὴν δίκην φεύγοντες, ὧ Πῶλε· τὸ ἀλγεινὸν αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ὠφέλιμον τυφλῶς ἔχειν καὶ ἀγνοεῖν.

^m ἔάν τε—οὐ φῆτε] Grammarians commonly say that after εἰ, ἔάν, ἵνα, ὅφρα, ὅπως, and other words of the same kind, μὴ and not οὐ ought to be used. We may, however, correctly say εἰ οὐ, when οὐ is so closely joined in signification with the verb, as in reality to form with it only a single idea, as Hermann says, on Viger. p. 833. But this is the case in the form οὐ φάναι, which from its literal signification, *to say not*, becomes equivalent to *to deny*. When it retains this meaning, οὐ φάναι is always used, although preceded by conditional particles.

ⁿ εἰ εἷς—διαφθείρει] C. XXVII. πολλὴ μὲντ' ἂν με φιλοψυχία ἔχοι, — εἰ οὕτως ἀλόγιστος εἶμι. C. XVII. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων διαφθείρω τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη βλαβερὰ. Theæt. 171. B. οὐκοῦν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἂν ψευδῆ συγχωροί, εἰ τὴν τῶν ἡγουμένων αὐτὸν ψεύδεσθαι ὁμολογεῖ ἀληθῆ εἶναι; where see Heindorf. Sympos. p. 208. C. Phæd. p. 69. E. Alcibiad. I. p. 122. B. Ibid. p. 109. C. p. 114. E. p. 116. D. Protagor. p. 340. E.—on which passage Heindorf has given more examples. Compare Matth. §. 524. 1. and on a similar form of the Latin writers, Heindorf Horat. Satir. H. 3, 154. Socrates speaks on the supposition, that what Meletus had before affirmed, was true. In English: *For it would be very fortunate for the youth, if in reality (as you say) one alone corrupted them.*

XIII. ^a ὧ τᾶν, ἀπόκριναι] A contraction of ὧ ἐτᾶν, see

Hermann on Sophocle. Philoctet. v. 1373. Compare Bast. on Gregor. Corinth. p. 904. Lobeck. on Phryn. p. 196. Apollonius in Bekker. Anecd. I. p. 569. 11. Etym. Magn. 825. 11. On the accent, see Dionys. Thrax in Bekker Anecd. p. 949. 21.

^b τοὺς ἀεὶ ἐγγυτάτω—ὄντας] That is, *those who are at any time nearest to them.* See Valcken. on Herodot. II. 98. on Theocrit. Adonias. p. 273. Toup. on Longin. p. 417. ed. Weisk, Compare Buttman. §. 137.

^c καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι] The very words of the law to which Socrates here refers, are found in Demosth. c. Steph. orat. II. p. 1131. Νόμος. τοῖον ἀντιδίκου ἐπάναγκες εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι ἀλλήλοις τὸ ἐρωτώμενον, μαρτυρεῖν δὲ μή.

^d τηλικούτου ὄντος] For Meletus was a young man. See c. X. note (1). Compare C. XIV.

^e εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἤκω] On this construction see Matth. §. 341. Compare 504. 1. 2.

^f οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλον—οὐδένα] That is, πείσεσθαί σοι, by a usual ellipsis after οἶμαι δὲ καί, Euthyphro p. 3. E. ἀλλὰ σύ τε κατὰ νοῦν ἀγωνιεῖ τὴν δίκην, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τὴν ἐμήν.

^g παύσομαι ὃ γε ἄκων ποιῶ] The participle ποιῶν must be understood. For it is not correct to say παύεσθαί τι. Heindorf. conjectured that ποιῶν ought to be restored to the text.

XIV. ^a οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν] Compare C. VI. οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ξύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὢν.

^b ἢ δήλον δὴ, ὅτι—] Here ἢ is put as it were to correct what he has before said. The sense is this: *But, why do I ask? it is evident—or: is it indeed evident?*

^c ὅτι κατὰ τὴν γραφήν] Understand ἐμὲ φῆς διαφθείρειν τοὺς νεώτερους.

^d οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις] We are to connect ταῦτα with the participle διδάσκων.

^e ὧν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν] The genitive ὧν is governed by λόγος, and we are not to understand the preposition περί, which has been done by some. For as we can say not only λέγειν περί τινος, but also sometimes λέγειν τινά, (on which construction some remarks have been made on C. IX. note (e)) we may also correctly say both λόγος περί τινος and λόγος τινός. For he might have said οὗς νῦν λέγομεν, which would have been more in accordance with the meaning than the other construction περί ὧν νῦν λέγομεν. The same construction is found in Charmid. p. 156. A. οὐ γὰρ τί σου ὀλίγος λόγος ἐστίν. Demosth. de Cor. p. 281. ed. R. τοὺς λόγους αὐτῶν,



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the only one that Athens then possessed, the scaffolding would break; and this accident, in fact, took place; to avoid which evil, it was determined to let the seats: the phrase used to express this was *θέαν ἀπομισθοῦν* and *θέαν ἀγοράζειν*. The seats were let by the farmers or lessees of the theatres, who were called either *θεατρῶναι*, or *θεατροπῶλαι*, or *ἀρχιτέκτονες*, as in Demosth. de corona p. 234, 23. Vol. I. Compare Casaubon on Theophrast. Char. 2.; and two oboli was the general price paid by each person, according to Demosthenes in the passage referred to; sometimes a drachma, according to Casaubon in the passage referred to. Compare Bœckh 'On the Public Economy of Athens,' Vol. I. p. 293 foll. *Engl. Transl.* But since, according to Harpocration and Suidas, under the word *θεωρικά*, and Schol. on Lucian's Timon. Vol. I p. 6., a drachma was the greatest sum that could ever be demanded by the lessee, it is evident why Socrates said *ἂ ἔξεστιν, εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, δραχμῆς πρῆσθαι*.—But how could these doctrines of the philosopher be learned in the theatre? It is certain that the dramatic poets often inserted the opinions of the philosophers in their plays; either to praise them, as Euripides, who frequently alluded in his tragedies to the opinions of Anaxagoras, as is shown by Valcken. *Diatribē in Fragm. Eurip.* p. 29 foll., or to condemn and ridicule them, which we know to have been done by Aristophanes. That Socrates principally alludes to Euripides in this passage, appears from the circumstance that he was the first who introduced on the stage the doctrine of Anaxagoras concerning the sun and moon. See what has been said on this by Valcken. in the work above cited, p. 31., and Porson on Eurip. Orest. v. 971. p. 192. ed. Lips. sec. The sense of the whole passage is this: *Meletus declares that I affirm the sun to be a stone, and the moon earth. But surely the judges know that this is the doctrine of Anaxagoras; and if I were to pretend that I introduced this opinion, the young men could discover, even from the plays of the dramatic poets, my vanity in appropriating it to myself, and would justly ridicule me.*

^m *καὶ νεότητι*] He alludes to the youth of Meletus. See C. XIII.

ⁿ *ὡςπερ αἰνίγμα ξυντιθέντι διαπειρωμένῳ*]. Ficinus has correctly interpreted this: *videtur enim ceu ænigma quoddam componere, tentans, an Socrates, &c.* There is no need of *καὶ*, which is commonly inserted before *διαπειρωμένῳ*. Gorg. p. 464. C. and p. 479. D. Ἄρχελαον εὐδαιμονίζων τὸν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικοῦντα, δίκην οὐδεμίαν δίδόντα, where *καὶ* is commonly inserted after *ἀδικοῦντα*,

Republ. IV. 440. D. Politic. p. 273. D. Phædr. p. 251. D. and Phileh. p. 53. Euthyphr. p. 27.—On the use of the word *ἔοικεν* joined with a participle, see Phædon p. 87. E. *ἔοικεν ἀπτομένῳ*.

^ο γνῶσεται—ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζ.] The construction has been explained by Matthiæ §. 349. 1.—*ὁ σοφὸς δὴ, that wise man forsooth*, said ironically.

XV ^α ἥ μοι φαίνεται] That is, *in what way, how he appears to me*. For Socrates begins to show that Meletus is so inconsistent as both to deny and to affirm that Socrates believes in the existence of gods.

^β ὑμᾶς παρητησάμην] Etymol. Magn. παραιτεῖσθαι οὐκ εὐρηται ἐν χρήσει ἐπὶ τοῦ σημαυνομένου τοῦ ἀρνεῖσθαι καὶ ἀποβάλλεσθαι καὶ μὴ δέχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῦ αἰτεῖν, ὡς παρὰ Μενάνδρῳ παραιτοῦμαί σε γνώμην ἔχειν. ὥστε περιττὴν εἶναι τὴν πρόθεσιν. Aristoph. Equitt. v. 37. ἐν δ' αὐτοῖς παραιτησώμεθα. Compare Ruhnk. on Tim. under the word. See also Burmann on Quint. Institt. Orat. III 6. Müller on Cic. de Orat. I. 20, 90. Bremi on Nep. Attic. XII. 2.

^γ δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει—δαίμονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει] Τὸ δαιμόνιον in Plato appears to be an adjective, as Cicero also understood, de Divinat. I. 54. Esse divinum quiddam, quod dæmonion appellat, cui semper pareat. See Schleierm. on this passage; Vol. II. p. 432 foll. Schneid. on Xenoph. Memor. I. 1, 2. Narey in the Classical Journal for 1817. N. XXX. p. 105.

^δ Ὡς ὄνησας,—ἀναγκαζόμενος] *How much have you obliged me by giving me an answer at length!* Casaubon has observed on Pers. Sat. L v. 112. that ὀνήσασθαι, like the Latin *juvare*, often has the meaning of *delectare* and not *βοηθεῖν*.

^ε ἀλλ' οὖν δαιμόνιά γε νομίζω] These words are to be referred to what goes before, εἴτ' οὖν καινὰ εἶτε παλαιά.

^ς διωμόσω ἐν τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ] Ἀντιγραφῆ is here the same as ἀντωμοσία, in C. III. (note ^β) that is *the bill of accusation*. The plaintiff, on delivering the bill of accusation to the judges, was obliged to swear that he did not bring the accusation through malice. Meletus had taken this oath.

^ε ἦτοι θεοὺς γε ἠγούμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας] Phædo p. 76. A. ἦτοι ἐπιστάμενοί γε αὐτὰ γεγόναμεν—ἢ ὕστερον—ἀναμιμνήσκονται. Gorg. p. 460. A. ἦτοι πρότερον γε ἢ ὕστερον μαθόντα παρὰ σοῦ, Ibid. p. 476. E.

^η ὧν δὴ καὶ λέγονται] Gorg. p. 453. E. πάλιν δ' εἰ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τεχνῶν λέγομεν, ὧν περ νῦν δὴ κ. τ. λ. Phædo p. 76. A.

ἢ ἐν τούτῳ (χρόνῳ) ἀπόλλυμεν. ᾧ περ καὶ λαμβάνομεν. Laches p. 192. B. See Matth. Gr. §. 595.

ⁱ ὡς οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ—οὐδεμία μηχανὴ ἐστίν] The sense is: *you will in no wise be able to persuade any one, that one and the same man believes in spiritual and divine things, and at the same time disbelieves in the existence of spirits, gods, and heroes.* It is evident from the preceding argument that the adjectives are opposed to the nouns substantive.

XVI. * Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ᾧ ἄνδρες] Socrates, having concluded the material part of his defence, now commences the discussion of other points which bear upon the subject. He first complains of the danger of his being sacrificed to the hatred of the multitude; but, at the same time maintains, a good man ought to consider virtue and justice as of more importance than life itself.

^b ὃ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει] That is, *which will cause my condemnation.* For αἰρεῖν δίκην and αἰρεῖν τινά τινος signify *to gain a suit against a party.* Whence οἱ ἐλόντες and οἱ ἐαλωκότες, are opposed in Demosthen. in Midiam. p. 518. ed. Reisk. p. 15. ed. Buttm.

^c ἀλλ' ἢ—διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος] Fischer has observed that these words might have been omitted, since the preceding pronoun τοῦτο already expressed the same idea; but they are added to express the former idea with more emphasis.

^d οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν, μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στηῆ] That is, *there is no danger of my being the last who will be condemned by the envy and hatred of the multitude.* Compare Phædo p. 84. οὐδὲν δεινὸν, μὴ φοβηθῆ.

^e εἴτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνει] On the particle εἴτα used in interrogations to indicate astonishment and indignation, see Valcken. on Phœn. v. 549. Viger. p. 395. Buttman Gr. §. 136.

^f εἰ οἶει δεῖν κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι—] Crito. c. 8. κὰν φαινόμεθα ἄδικα αὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι, μὴ οὐ δέη ὑπολογίζεσθαι οὐτ' εἰ θνήσκειν δεῖ παραμένοντας καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας οὔτε ἄλλο οὐκ οὖν πάσχειν πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν. Compare the conclusion of this character.

^g ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελός ἐστιν] Euthyphro p. 4. E. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν μου ὄφελος εἴη. Legg. IX. p. 856. C πᾶς γὰρ ἀνὴρ, οὐ καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελος. Crito c. 5. εἴ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ἡμῶν ὄφελος. See Hemsterh. on Lucian, Timon. c. 55. Kuster. on Aristoph. Eccles. v. 53. Valcken. on Herodot. VIII. 68.

^h καὶ δὲ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός] Allusion is here made to Iliad. σ'. v. 90 foll. —παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν τι ὑπομεῖναι, *in comparison with enduring any thing disgraceful—rather than submit to any thing*



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κρίσεις ἀκριβεῖς εἰσι, παρὰ τούτοις μὲν διαφθείρεσθαι καὶ τὰς ἐπιεικεῖς τῶν φύσεων· ὅπου δὲ μήτε λαθεῖν τοῖς ἀδικοῦσι ῥάδιόν ἐστι, μήτε φανεροῖς γενομένοις συγγνώμης τυχεῖν, ἐνταῦθα δ' ἐξιτήλους γίνεσθαι τὰς κακοηθείας. Observe the difference of moods, ἔμενον καὶ ἐκινδύνευον, and λίπομι. The indicative refers to a matter which really happened; the optative to one which may possibly happen.

^c καὶ ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ — Δηλίῳ] On the campaigns of Socrates see Laert. II. 22 foll. Athenæus IV. 15. Ælian. III. 17. Cicero de Divin. I. 54.

^d ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ] That is, τοῦ θεοῦ.

^e δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναί — οἶδεν] The phrase at full length would be: ἔστι γὰρ ἐκεῖνο (namely, τὸ θάνατον δεδιέναι) δοκεῖν εἰδέναί & οὐκ οἶδεν. On the third person, οἶδεν, put indefinitely, see Hermann on Viger. p. 725. Schæfer on Lambert. Bos. p. 476. Porson on Eurip. Orest. v. 308. and Matth. §. 294. 2. Charmid. p. 167. B. εἰ δυνατόν ἐστι τὸ & οἶδε καὶ μὴ οἶδεν εἰδέναί. Rep. VI. p. 506. C. οἰόμενον ταῦθ', & οἶεται, ἐθέλειν λέγειν. Lysis p. 212. B. Crito, C. X., about the middle.

^f καὶ τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἄμ.] καὶ is in this passage to be pronounced with emphasis, as is often the case in sentences indicating opposition. Fischer erroneously thought that τοῦτο was put for διὰ τοῦτο: it is the nominative case. A little further on, the words ἡ τοῦ οἶεσθαι εἰδέναί signify, *which consists in one's thinking that he knows what he does not know*.

^g τούτῳ ἐν] With these words φαίην εἶναι or εἶην may be understood. Further on, οὕτω is used, because οὐκ εἰδῶς has the same signification as ὥσπερ οὐκ οἶδα.

^h πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν — οὐδὲ φεύξομαι] This construction is remarkable. For φοβεῖσθαι and φεύγειν πρὸ τῶν κακῶν — & μὴ οἶδα, are used instead of φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον τὰ κακὰ & οἶδα ὅτι κακὰ ἐστίν ἢ ταῦτα & μὴ οἶδα εἰ ἀγαθὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει. On this use of the preposition πρὸ see C. XVI. note (°).

ⁱ ὥστε οὐδ' εἴ με νῦν ἀφίετε — τὴν ἀρχήν] Ἀρχήν is *at all*. See Hermann on Viger. p. 723. A little further on, ἀποκτεῖναι, as in C. XVIII., is *to condemn to death by their votes*: in which sense ἀποκτείνειν is also used by Xenoph. Mem. IV. 8, 5., where it is opposed to ἀπολύειν. The structure of the sentence is remarkable, εἰ — ἀφίετε, εἴ μοι — εἵποίτε, εἰ οὖν ἀφίοιτε, the particle οὖν indicating that the speaker returns to what he has been saying

before, on which use of the word, see Sturz. Lexic. Xenoph. III. p. 358. Schweigh. Lexic. Polyh. p. 416.

^k Ἄνύτω ἀπιστήσαντες] Ἀπιστεῖν, ἄπιστος, ἀπιστία, are said not only of those *who do not believe, who have no faith in others,* but also of those *who refuse to comply with the demands of others, because they disbelieve them.*

^l ἐφ' ᾧτε—φιλοσοφεῖν] On this construction see Matthiæ §. 479.

^m ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλω] Ἀσπάζεσθαι is *to salute with an embrace, φιλεῖν to salute with a kiss.* In this passage these words signify: *with grateful and joyful mind I salute and reverence your kindness and clemency.* Lysid. p. 217. B. ἀναγκάζεται δέ γε σῶμα διὰ νόσον ἰατρικὴν ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν. Legg. III. 689. A. τὸ δὲ πονηρὸν καὶ ἄδικον δοκοῦν εἶναι φιλεῖ τε καὶ ἀσπάζεται.

ⁿ καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος] This word is used in the same manner in C. IX. at the end, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφός.

^o εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν] ἰσχύν is used here not in the sense of power, but of greatness and strength of mind. For the subsequent words show that ἰσχύν is opposed to a desire of riches, honours, and praise.

^p καὶ νεωτέρῳ—ποιήσω] On this rather uncommon construction, see Matth. §. 415. obs. 1. Buttm. §. 120. 2. 3. Compare Viger. p. 259.

^q μάλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστοῖς, ὅσῳ μου ἐγγ.] Compare C. XXX. about the middle, καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἔσονται, ὅσῳ νεώτεροί εἰσι Gorg. p. 458. A. μεῖζον γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἠγούμαι, ὅσῳ περ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν αὐτὸν ἀπαλλαγῆναι κακοῦ τοῦ μεγίστου ἢ ἄλλον ἀπαλλάξαι, where likewise before μεῖζον we may understand τοσούτῳ. Xenoph. Cyrop. I. 3, 14. Aristoph. Nubb. v. 1415. ed. Wolf. Rep. V. p. 472. A. ὅσῳ ἂν, ἔφη, τοιαῦτα πλείω λέγῃς, ἥττον ἀφεθήσει ὑφ' ἡμῶν, where before ἥττον we must understand τοσούτῳ. The same construction is used by the Latin writers. Liv. II. 51. Quo plures erant, major cædes fuit. Ovid's Epist. IV. 19. Venit amor gravius, quo serius.

^r τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν] See C. IX. διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν, which might also have been διὰ τὴν τῷ θεῷ λατρείαν, since verbal nouns are frequently constructed with the same case as the verb from which they are derived. See Matthiæ, §. 367. 1.

^s μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα] Μηδὲ is here introduced after μήτε, because these words form, as it were, a new member of the sentence.

The common reading μήτε ἄλλου τινὸς οὕτω σφόδρα, appears to have been inserted by some grammarian to explain the sense. Compare C. XXVI. at the end, οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅ τι μᾶλλον—πρέπει οὕτως ὡς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι, and the note on that passage.

[†] καὶ τᾶλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα] The common reading, καὶ τᾶλλα τὰγαθά, is a very bad one, for it signifies: *and all the other things, namely, those which are good and useful to men;* which is opposed to the whole scope of the passage.

^υ εἰ μὲν οὖν — διαφθείρω —, ταῦτ' ἂν εἶη βλ.] See C. XII. note (^υ).

^κ ἢ πείθεσθε—ἢ μὴ] Gorg. p. 476. D. ἢ φάθι ἢ μὴ ἂ ἐρωτῶ. Ibid. p. 475. E. Rep. V. p. 475. B. τοῦτο δὴ φάθι, ἢ μὴ.

^γ οὐκ ἂν ποιήσοντος] Οὐ ἂν construed with a future, see note, page 28. Compare Matth. §. 598. D.

^β οὐδ' εἰ μέλλω πολλάκις τεθνάναι] That is, *not even if I were to be several times dead.* It is worthy of remark that the Greeks, when they wish to lay stress on the bitterness of death, use the state and condition of death itself for the pains which precede it. Crito, C. I. ἢ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφίικται ἐκ Δήλου, οὐ δεῖ ἀφικομένου τεθνάναι με; which is a more emphatic expression than ἀποθνήσκειν με. Crito, C. XIV. ὡς οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν; εἰ δέοι τεθνάναι σε. Apol. C. XXIX. πολὺ μᾶλλον αἰροῦμαι ὧδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι ἢ ἐκείνως ζῆν. C. XXXI. οὐπω ἔρχομαι οἱ ἐλθόντα με δεῖ τεθνάναι. C. XXXII. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ πολλάκις ἐθέλω τεθνάναι, εἰ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ. Compare Demosth. Philipp. IV. p. 138. De rebus Chersones. p. 102. De Coron. p. 301. πῶς οὐκ ἀπολωλέναι πολλάκις ἐστὶ δίκαιος.

XVIII. ^α μὴ θορυβεῖτε] Socrates now enters upon another subject. He proceeds to show that his condemnation and death will be a great loss and injury to the Athenian state.

^β οὐ γὰρ οἶομαι θεμιτὸν εἶναι] That is, *I do not think it consistent with the laws of divine wisdom.* ἀμείνονι ἀνδρὶ is used instead of the common construction ἀμείνω ἄνδρα, because these words are closely joined with θεμιτὸν εἶναι.—ἀποκτείνειν is to *cause a person to be condemned and executed*: ἐξελαύνειν to *cause a person to be punished with exile*: ἐτιμάζειν to *cause a person to lose either the whole, or at least, the most important, rights and privileges of citizenship.* There were three kinds or degrees of ἀτιμία, as is shown by Ed. Meier de Bonis Damnata. p. 101 sqq. 137 sqq.

^γ ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον] Understand οἶομαι μέγα κακόν.



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that of others. On the construction of ἀνέχεσθαι with a genitive, see Matth. §. 358. Compare 550.

¹ ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα] Lest any difficulty should arise from the article, it may be remarked that these words are to be taken thus: ὁ μάρτυς, ὃν παρέχομαι, ἡ πενία, ἱκανὸς μάρτυς ἐστίν, ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω.

XIX. ² ἐπικωμῶδῶν ἐγράψατο] Socrates alludes to the words of the ἀντωμοσία, Ἔτερα δὲ δαιμόνια. Ἐπικωμῶδειν is to laugh, to mark for ridicule, since κωμῶδειν and διακωμῶδειν have the same signification as διασύρειν, σκώπτειν, χλευάζειν. See Pollux IX. 148. The reason is, that in the old comedy the vices of men were marked out, and the men as it were, stigmatised.

^b πάλαι ἂν ἀπολ.—οὔτ' ἂν ὑμ. ὦφ —οὔτ' ἂν ἐμαυτόν] Socrates gives a similar account of his δαιμόνιον in Theag. p. 128. Compare Apol. C. XXXI. Xenophon Mem. I. 1. Cicero de Divin. I. 54. Hoc nimirum est illud, quod de Socrate accepimus, quodque ab ipso in libris Socraticorum sæpe dicitur, esse divinum quiddam, quod dæmonion appellat, cui semper ipse paruerit, nunquam impellenti, sæpe revocanti. The reading οὔτ' αὖ ἐμαυτόν is erroneous. For in such sentences ἂν is frequently repeated. Phileh. p. 43. Α. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτό γε, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὡς οὔτε ἡδονὴ γίγνοιτ' ἂν ἐν τῷ ποιούτῳ ποτέ, οὔτ' ἂν τις λύπη; Xenoph. Hier. V. 3. ἄνευ γὰρ τῆς πόλεως οὔτ' ἂν σώζεσθαι δύναίτο οὔτ' ἂν εὐδαιμονεῖν.

^c καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὀλ. χρ.] Herm. on Viger. p. 832. has shown a distinction between καὶ εἰ and εἰ καὶ. He says that “καὶ εἰ is even if; the καὶ refers to the condition, which is thus indicated to be uncertain: even then, if. Therefore καὶ εἰ is used of what we suppose true, not of what we declare to be true, for in the latter case εἰ καὶ is used. On the other hand, εἰ καὶ is although; and καὶ, being put after the conditional particle, is not referred to it and does not indicate that the condition itself is uncertain. Therefore εἰ καὶ signifies that the thing exists actually, and is not merely supposed. But εἰ καὶ is also taken, not as although, but as if even, in which case καὶ ought not to be joined with εἰ, but with some of the following words. The Latin etiam si is used in a similar manner.”

XX. ² φορτικά μὲν καὶ δικανικά] Φορτικά properly signifies heavy and troublesome: hence things spoken with arrogance. Hesychius: φορτικά: τὰ γελοῖα. — Δικανικὸς is interpreted by ancient glossaries, a speaker in courts of justice, a pleader. But since advocates usually exaggerate, embellish, and even speak presumptuously, δικανικά was applied to what was disagreeable, troublesome,

presumptuous, absurd, as Theaet. p. 128. E. Lucian. Somn. 17. ὡς μακρὸν τὸ ἐνύπνιον καὶ δικανικόν. The common translation, *forensic, judicial*, is without meaning.

^b ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν — ἤρξα] That is, *I never filled any public office*. βουλευεῖν signifies, as in many other passages, *to be a member of the senate of five hundred*. Fifty members were chosen from these five hundred to preside over the senate for thirty-five days, under the name of πρυτάνεις. Ten of these fifty were chosen by lot to preside over the senate for a week. These were called προέδροι, and their chief either ἐπιστάτης or ἐπιστάτης τῶν προέδρων, as in Æschines against Ctesiph. p 380. Vol. II. or ἐπιστάτης ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, as Xenoph. Mem. I. 1, 18., or ἐπιστάτης ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις, as Memor. IV. 4, 2. The matter has been more fully discussed by Schoemann de Comitiiis Atheniensium, cap. VII. Socrates was ἐπιστάτης of his tribe, Antiochis, when the question was brought forward of punishing the generals. How he acquitted himself in this office is related in Xenophon, Hellen. I. 7, 14. 15. 38. The generals alluded to are the ten (which was the usual number in a war) who gained a naval victory over the Lacedæmonians off the Arginusæ Islands, B. C. 406. After the battle, instead of attending in person to the burial of the slain, they left for that office ταξιάρχαι. For this they were publicly prosecuted and condemned to death. See Xenoph. Hellen. Lysias c. Eratosth. p. 72, ed. Brem. As to whether they all suffered death, see Valckenar. on Xenoph. Mem. I. 18, p. 316. ed. Schneid. — ἀναιρεῖσθαι, *to take up the bodies of the dead for burial*,—τοὺς ἐκ ναυμαχίας is said instead of τοὺς ἐν ναυμαχίᾳ. For in phrases like this, compounded of the article and a noun with a preposition, that preposition is used which is most suitable to the verb connected with the phrase.

^c ἡμῶν ἢ φυλῆ Ἀντιοχίς] Perhaps one might have expected ἡ Ἀντιοχίς, the article being repeated, as Schæfer wished it to be corrected, in Demosth. Appar. T. H. p. 386. But compare Menon. p. 70. B. οἱ τοῦ σοῦ ἐταίρου Ἀριστίππου πολῖται Λαρισσαῖοι. Phædon. p. 57. A. τῶν πολιτῶν Φλιασίων οὐδεῖς, in which also the proper name is added without the article.

^d ἀθρόους κρίνειν] That is, *to collect the votes at the same time respecting all the accused*, μιᾷ ψήφῳ (see Memor. I. 1, 88.), whereas the law ordered the votes to be given separately for each, κρίνειν δίχα ἕκαστον, as we are told by Xenophon. Hellen. I. at the end. Therefore he adds παρανόμως, i. e. παρὰ τοὺς νόμους, as Xenoph. Mem. I. 1, 18. IV. 4, 2.

^e ὡς ἐν τ. ὑστ. χρ.—ἔδοξε] Xenoph. Hellen. I. 7, 12. καὶ οὐ πολλῶ χρόνῳ ὕστερον μετέμελε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις.

^f ἠναντιώθην] He would not put it to the vote. See Xenoph. Mem. IV. 4, 2. Hellen. I. 7, 9. 14. 15.

^g ἐτοίμων ὄντων—τῶν ῥητόρων] The words ἐνδεικνύναι and ἀπάγειν signify to denounce to the magistrates (ἐνδεικνύναι), and lead away (ἀπάγειν), a person caught in the act of committing an offence, in order that he may be immediately punished: which acts are called ἐνδειξις and ἀπαγωγή. That the reading ἀπάγειν is to be preferred to the common reading ὑπάγειν, which Fischer endeavoured to defend, appears by those passages in which ἐνδειξις and ἀπαγωγή are joined. Demosthen. against Leptin. p. 504. 24. ed. Reisk. εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἐνδείξεις καὶ ἀπαγωγάς. Against Timocrat. p. 745. οὐδ' ὅσων ἐνδείξις ἐστὶ τινὶ ἢ ἀπαγωγή, προσεγέγραπτ' ἂν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, τὸν δ' ἐνδειχθέντα ἢ ἀπαχθέντα δησάντων οἱ ἔνδεκα ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ. Against Theocrin. p. 1325. 9. ἐάν τις ποιῇ τὰ τῶν συκοφαντούντων, ἐνδείξιν αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ ἀπαγωγήν.

^h οἱ τριάκοντα—μεταπεμψάμενοί με πέμπτον αὐτόν] When the Athenians were conquered by Lysander at Ægospotami, and the city seized on, in the first year of the 94th Olympiad (B.C. 404), he appointed thirty tyrants, who are sometimes called οἱ τριάκοντα, as here, and in Xenoph. Mem. IV. 4. 3.; sometimes τριάκοντα πάντων ἄρχοντες αὐτοκράτορες, as in Plato ep. VII.; sometimes οἱ περὶ Κριτίαν, as in Laert. II. 24.—πέμπτον αὐτόν, that is, *me with four others*. Xen. Hellen. 2. 17. ἠρέθη—δέκατος αὐτός, that is, *he himself with nine others*. Thucyd. I. 46. πέμπτος αὐτός, where the scholiast says: ἀντὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετ' ἄλλων τεσσάρων. Meletus was among the number, according to Andocid. De Myster. p. 46. ed. Reisk. The circumstance is spoken of by Lysias adv. Agorat. p. 106. Brem. ἴστε μὲν γὰρ τοὺς ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος τῶν πολιτῶν κομισθέντας οἷοι ἦσαν καὶ ὅσοι, καὶ οἷφ' ὀλέθρῳ ὑπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα ἀπόλοντο. Also c. Eratosthen. p. 77. ὁ δὲ—ἐλθὼν μετὰ τῶν συναρχόντων εἰς Σαλαμίνα καὶ Ἐλευσίνα δὲ τριακοσίους τῶν πολιτῶν ἀπήγαγεν εἰς τὸ δεσμοτήριον καὶ μιᾷ ψήφῳ αὐτῶν ἀπάντων θάνατον κατεψηφίσατο.

ⁱ εἰς τὴν θόλον] The θόλος was a public building near τὸ βουλευτήριον τῶν πεντακοσίων, according to Pausan. I. 5., in which the Prytanes dined and sacrificed every day. It derived its name from its resemblance to a tortoise. See Harpocration and Hesych. under the word, and Pollux. On. VIII. 155.—Leon, born at



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rightly be attributed to me. Αἰτίαν ὑπέχειν is properly used in a bad sense, of one who is deservedly blamed. Τούτων, masculine, is joined with τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχοιμι.

XXII. ^a τοῦτο — προστέτακται] That is, τὸ ἐξετάζειν.

^b καὶ εὐέλεγκτα] Εὐέλεγκτα is generally applied to *what may easily be refuted*. But here it means *what may easily be examined to find out whether it is true or false*. For ἐλέγχειν not only signifies *to refute*, but also *to examine with the design of convicting another of error*. The word may therefore be rendered (after Serranus) *easy to be refuted if they are not true*.

^c εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἤθελον] Fischer has erroneously written εἴ γε μὴ. For εἰ δὲ may follow εἴτε, in the same manner as δὲ by itself may come after τὲ, and οὐδὲ after οὔτε. In C. XXXI. we have: καὶ εἴτε δὴ μηδεμία αἴσθησις ἐστίν — εἰ δ' αὖ οἶον ἀποδημηῆσαι.

^d πάρεισιν — ἐνταυθοῖ] Hesychius: ἐνταυθοῖ· ἐνταῦθα. Erroneously. For as παρῆναι εἰς τινα τόπον is not merely said for παρῆναι ἐν τινι τόπῳ, but is used in such a manner as if two sentences were joined together; that is, it signifies *to come to a place and be engaged there*; so ἐνταυθοῖ by itself is not put for ἐνταῦθα but παρῆναι ἐνταυθοῖ signifies *to come hither and be present here*. Examples of this construction are given by Valcken. on Herod. I. 21. Heind. on Phæd. p. 4. Protagor. p. 310. A. τί οὖν οὐ διηγῆσω ἡμῖν τὴν ξυνουσίαν, εἰ μὴ σέ τι κωλύει, καθιζόμενος ἐνταυθοῖ that is, *taking your seat to this place and sitting here with us*.

^e Κρίτων οὔτοςί] Crito is the same person whose name is given to the following dialogue of Plato. He is called ἡλικιώτης, or of the same age of Socrates; and δημότης, that is, of the same *demus*, namely, Ἀλωπεκὴ. See Harpocration, Hesychius and Stephanus Byzant. under Ἀλωπεκὴ.

^f Λυσανίας] Lysanias, father of the Socratic Æschines, is called δ Σφήττιος, from δῆμος Σφηττός, which was δῆμος φυλῆς Ἀκαμαντίδος. See Harpocrat. Hesych. Stephan. under that word. — Antipho is called Κηφισιεύς, from δῆμος Κήφισος, which was φυλὴ Ἐρεχθίδος. See Harpocrat. under Κηφισιεύς.

^g ἄλλοι τοίνυν οὔτοι —] Heindorf remarks that τοίνυν, *therefore*, makes the sentence unintelligible. He conjectures that the better reading would be ἄλλοι τε ἐνταυθοῖ. There is no occasion for any change, for τοίνυν, as the Latin jam vero, is often used, not συλλογιστικῶς, but καταβατικῶς.

^h Νικόστρατος] Respecting this person and Theodotus nothing has been recorded, as far as we are aware. — Respecting Demodocus,

father of Theages, see Theages, p. 127. E. Of Paralus, who is not to be confounded with his namesake, the son of Pericles, nothing is known.—Adimantus is the brother of Plato, often mentioned in the Rep. See II. p. 357—368. VIII. p. 548. D. E. and elsewhere.—Of Æantodorus nothing is known.—Apollodorus is known to have been most devoted to Socrates. See Phædo p. 59. A. p. 117. D. Xenoph. Mem. III. 11, 17.—καταδεῖσθαι is *to overcome and persuade any one by entreaties*. For the sense is this: *Theodotus cannot beseech his brother Nicostratus, not to accuse me and bear testimony against me.*

ⁱ ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ] That is, *I yield to him the privilege of doing this*. For no one was permitted to interrupt the accused while defending himself, and by irrelevant matters to abridge the time granted for his defence; which was measured by the clepsydra. The accuser was bound to go through all that had reference to his side of the question, before the defendant commenced his answer to the charge.

^k τῷ διαφθείροντι] The apposition here marks the ironical tone of the speaker, C. XII. Crito: καὶ σύ—φήσεις ταῦτα ποιῶν δίκαια πράττειν, ὃ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελόμενος; Euthypr. p. 3. A. Μέλητος ἴσως πρῶτον μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐκκαθαίρει τοὺς τῶν νέων τὰς βλάστας διαφθείροντας, ὡς φησι. More examples are given by Valcken on Phœniss. p. 752.

^l λόγον ἔχοιεν βοηθοῦντες] That is, *would have some object to attain in defending me*: namely, that they might not appear to have been intimate with an impious and depraved man, and that they might not be accounted wicked themselves.

^m οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες] A participle joined with a genitive like a substantive: on which construction see Lobeck on Ajax. v. 358. Schæfer on Gregor. Corinth. p. 139.

ⁿ ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν ὀρθόν τε καὶ δίκαιον] The form ἀλλ' ἢ is well known to be used in the sense of *unless*, generally when a negative goes before. See Bergler on Aristophan. Equitt. v. 777. An excellent explanation of this construction is given by Herm. on Viger. p. 812.

XXIII. ^a τάχα δ' ἂν τις ἀγανακτήσειεν] Socrates now proceeds to give his judges an explanation of the grounds of his firmness and fortitude; and he shows why he will not follow the example of others by attempting to move their pity. For, first, he says that such a course would be unworthy of the estimation in which he is held by men; secondly, that it would be against the laws.

^b ἐλάττω — ἀγῶνα ἀγωνιζόμενος] That is, engaged in a trial attended with less danger. So Euthyphro p. 3. E. ἀγωνίζεσθαι δίκην. It was the custom at Athens for the defendants to bring into court their children, and even their wives, to excite the pity of the judges; as is also evident from Aristophan. Plut. v. 383. Vesp. v. 566 sq.

^c ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τ. π.] δὲ ἄρα in such passages indicates that to do contrary to what has been already mentioned is absurd, and by no means to be approved of. The expression involves what logicians call the *reductio ad absurdum*, whether the speaker enunciates his own opinion or that of another person. Examples have been collected by Heindorf on Phæd. p. 68. A., to which the following may be added: Crito c. 12. ἢ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα σοι τὸν πατέρα οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου ἦν τὸ δίκαιον καὶ πρὸς δεσπότην, εἴ σοι ὧν ἐτύγχανεν, ὥστε ἄπερ πάσχοις ταῦτα καὶ ἀντιποιεῖν.—πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἄρα καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἐξέσται σοι; compare Crito C. VI. and C. XII. Rep. X. 600. D. ἀλλὰ Πρωταγόρας μὲν ἄρα—καὶ Πρόδικος — — ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ σοφίᾳ οὕτω σφόδρα φιλοῦνται—, Ὀμηρον δ' ἄρα οἱ ἐπ' ἐκείνου—ἢ Ἡσίοδον ραψοδεῖν ἂν περιῦντας εἶων; Apol. C. XXVII. πολλὴ μέντ' ἂν με φιλοψυχία ἔχοι, εἰ οὕτως ἀλόγιστος εἶμι—· ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα αὐτὰς οἴσουσι ῥαδίως.

^d αὐθαδέστερον ἂν πρὸς με σχοίῃ] This is said of judges who should refuse to acquit a defendant, although they might be expected to do so from the goodness and justice of his cause, because he would not implore and supplicate their mercy. Further on, after εἰ δ' οὖν understand τις ἐμῶν οὕτως ἔχει.

^e τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου] Odys. XIX. v. 162., where Penelope asks Ulysses, whom she had not recognised, to relate from what race he is sprung, adding to her request the words οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ δρυὸς ἔσσι παλαιφάτου οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης.—καὶ υἱεῖς γε. In enumerating several things, it is customary to add γὰρ to that noun to which the most weight and emphasis is attached: of which, examples have been collected by Heindorf on Hipp. Mai. §. 47. Buttmann on Crito §. 7. n. 2. It is, therefore, incorrectly omitted by some MSS. in this passage. The three sons of Socrates were Lamprocles, Sophroniscus, Menexenus. The eldest was Lamprocles, who is here called μαιράκιον, a youth, but, in Phædo 65., μέγας. See Xenophon, Mem. II. 2, 1.; but the other two, whom their father here calls παῖδια, are called by Plato also (Phædo 65.), μικροί. Compare Valcken. on Theocrit. Adon. p. 349., who says that τὸν μικρὸν παῖδα was commonly called παιδίον.



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Ibid. VII. p. 538. D. τοὺς καὶ ὀπηθοῦν μετρίους. The common reading καὶ ὀπητιοῦν εἶναι is bad, since τι thus does not belong to the verb εἶναι, but is placed as in ὀπωστιοῦν.

¹ τὰ ἐλεεινὰ ταῦτα δράματα εἰσάγοντος] Ἐλεεινὰ δράματα means tragedies in which the pity of the spectators is excited. εἰσάγειν, *to bring forward into the court*, that is, when the accused introduces his wife, children, and relations, in tears, to dispose the minds of the judges to mercy.

XXIV. ^a Χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης] That is, *but apart from reputation: putting my own reputation out of the question*. Crito, C. III. ἀλλὰ χωρὶς μὲν τοῦ ἐστερηῆσθαι τοιοῦτου ἐπιτηδείου — ἔτι δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς δόξω κ. τ. λ., where see note. Legg. p. 814. C. οὐδαμῶς εὐσχημον γίγνοιτ' ἂν τοῦ κακοῦ χωρὶς τοῦτο ἐν πόλει ὅπου γίγνοιτο. Sympos. p. 173. C. χωρὶς τοῦ οἴεσθαι ὠφελεῖσθαι ὑπερφυῶς ὡς χαίρω. Ibid. 184. B. Herodot. I. 93. χωρὶς τῶν Αἰγυπτίων ἔργων.— ἀποφεύγειν is *to escape in safety, to be acquitted*.

^b ἐπὶ τούτῳ — ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσθαι τ. δ.] Gorg. p. 474. E. οὐ δήπου ἐκτὸς τούτων ἐστὶ τὰ καλά, τοῦ ἢ ὠφέλιμα εἶναι ἢ ἡδέα ἀμφοτέρω. Lysid. p. 219. E. Compare Matth. §. 468. b. — καταχαρίζεσθαι τὸ δίκαιον is *to sacrifice justice to favour, to neglect justice in order to bestow a favour on another*.

^c καὶ ὁμώμοκεν] Demosth. against Timocrat. p. 747. ed. Reisk. ψηφιοῦμαι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῆς βουλῆς τῶν πεντακοσίων. Pollux. Onom. VIII. 122. ὁ δὲ ὄρκος ἦν τῶν δικαστῶν· περὶ μὲν ὧν νόμοι εἰσὶ, κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ψηφιεῖσθαι· περὶ δὲ ὧν μή εἰσι, σὺν γνώμῃ δικαιοσύνη.

^d μὴ οὖν ἀξιοῦτε] That is, *do not then think*. A little further on the collocation of the words is worthy of remark: ἀ μήτε ἡγοῦμαι καλὰ εἶναι. The common order would be: ἀ ἡγοῦμαι μήτε καλὰ εἶναι.

^e ἄλλως τε πάντως — μάλιστα μέντοι καὶ —] That is, *both at other times by all means, and most particularly now, when I am accused of impiety by Meletus*.

^f εἰ πείθοιμι — βιαζοίμην] Understand χαρίζεσθαί μοι τὰ δίκαια. In the following clause the words should be connected thus, διδάσκοιμι ἂν ὑμᾶς μὴ ἡγεῖσθαι θεοὺς εἶναι.

XXV. ^a Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν] The preceding part of the 'Apology' is supposed to have been spoken before the judges gave their first votes concerning him; the remaining part after he was found guilty of the crime imputed to him by Meletus. For now the

question of the punishment due to his offence was to be determined. There were two kinds of causes, the one ἀτίμητος, in which the punishment was already appointed by the laws; the other τιμητή, in which the judges were allowed by the laws a discretionary power as to the punishment. We must always, therefore, when we read of causes in antient writers, be careful to distinguish to which of these two kinds the case belongs. There is no doubt that the cause of Socrates ought to be referred to the kind called τιμητή. In a cause of this kind, the following mode of proceeding appears to have been adopted in the courts of justice. After the accuser and the defendant had made their speeches, the Judges determined, by their first votes, whether they condemned or acquitted the accused. Then if the crime was not capital, and the punishment was not fixed by law, they proceeded to determine the punishment; that is, the defendant was asked what punishment he considered himself to deserve, whether that which the prosecutor wished, or another more just. This was said, ἀντιτιμᾶσθαι. See Meier and Schoemann “Der Attische Process” p. 724 foll. This having been done, the judges again gave their votes, and decided the cause. On these two kinds of causes, ἀτίμητος, and τιμητή, see Meier and Schoemann Att. Proc. p. 171—193.—But since Socrates was accused of impiety, as is indicated by his own words: μὴ οὖν ἀξιούτέ με—τοιαῦτα δεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πράττειν—ἀσεβείας φεύγοντα ὑπὸ Μελήτου τουτουῖ, it is naturally asked whether that accusation belonged to the causes called τιμητόν, or not. For one would naturally suppose that a capital punishment would be awarded by law against those who attacked the religion of the country; especially since we know that several had already suffered death who had been accused of impiety. But that this was not the case, is evident, not only from this Apology of Socrates, but also from Demosth. Timocr. p. 702. 5: ἀσεβείας γραφὴν κατασκευάσας εἰς ἀγῶνα κατέστησεν. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων οὐ μεταλαβὼν ᾤφλε χιλίας.

^b καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστον γέγονε] That is, *has not happened to me contrary to my expectation*. For ἐλπίς, ἐλπίζειν, and their derivatives, are used either in the sense of hope or of fear. See commentators on Thom. Mag p. 299. Observe the brevity of the expression. At full length, it would be: καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γ.—οὕτω παρ’ ὀλίγον ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολὺ is correctly translated by Fischer: *I did not think that the number of votes acquitting me would differ so little from the number condemning me; on the contrary, I thought that the number of votes in my favour*

would be far exceeded by the number against me. On which use of the forms *παρ' ὀλίγον*, and *παρὰ πολὺ*, see Budaëus Comment. L. Gr. p. 209. Viger p. 647. and Matthiae §. 588. n. 2.

^c *εἰ τρεῖς μόναι μετέπεσον*] *Μεταπίπτειν*, is to fall otherwise, to fall into another balloting-box, as Fischer correctly translates, quoting Aeschin. c. Ctesiph. 461. Vol. II. ed. Taylor. *εἰ δὲ μίᾱ μόνον μετέπεσεν*. The reading *τρεῖς* Stephans from Bas. 2. has changed into *τριάκοντα*, after the best MSS. Süvern, in his essay "on the Clouds of Aristophanes," quotes the following opinion of Böckh; who remarks on the passage in Diog. Laert. II. 41, that there were 281 votes against Socrates; "As the passage in Plato is clear, it does not appear to me very important what notions we form on that in Diogenes Laertius, regarding the trial of Socrates, and the judgment of his contemporaries respecting it. It is clear that this author's expression is of doubtful meaning, for he speaks as if 281 was the difference between the votes for and against Socrates. If this notice of Diogenes be correct, we must conclude from the two passages taken together, 1. Either (in conformity with the *Bibliot. der alten Literatur und Kunst*, II. p. 10; *Matthiä*, Misc. Philol. I. p. 252; and with Fischer on the *Apology of Plato*, §. 25.) that 556 judges decided the question; for if from the 281 votes three are reckoned on the other side, there then remains an equality of 278 votes, by which Socrates would have been acquitted: there must consequently have been 275 judges who voted for him. 2. Or the whole number was 557, and Socrates had 276, and then if three had been taken from the 281, he would have had a majority of 279 against 278. Schömann, on the contrary (See *Att. Process*, s. 139), makes the number 559; but this must be wrong.

"Now as it can scarcely be imagined that a court of 556 or 557 judges could have been seated, there are only two ways, in my opinion, of explaining the circumstance.

"As we find tribunals not only of 500, 1000, 1500, etc., that is, simple, double, triple, and so on, 500 being the simple regular number (i. e. an aliquot section of the judges), but also those of 200, 400, 700, or what I consider as tantamount, 201, 401, 701, by which this aliquot arrangement is broken, there is no reason why we may not suppose also a tribunal of 600. But 556-557 is so much below this last number, that if we assume that the tribunal before which Socrates was tried, properly consisted of 600 judges, the number of absentees could not have been merely accidental. We may therefore conceive the following solution of this difficulty. By the



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^d εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων] Since Anytus and Lyco were συνήγοροι or σύνδικοι of Meletus, who had instituted the prosecution, it was permitted to them, as well as to Meletus, to speak against Socrates on the trial. See Meier and Schömann "Attische Process," p. 707 foll.

^e κὰν ὥφλε χ. δρ.—τῶν ψήφων] Unless the accuser obtained a fifth part of the votes he was fined one thousand drachmæ, was branded with infamy (ἀτιμία), and was forbidden to become an accuser again. See Demosth. in Mid. p. 529. 23., in Timocrat. p. 702. 5., in Theocr. p. 1323. 19., Harpocrat. in δώρων γραφή, Meursius Lectt. Attic. V. 13., Themid. Att. II. 21., and Meier and Schömann "Attische Process," p. 734 foll. Socrates here says that Meletus without the aid of Anytus and Lyco, would not have obtained the fifth part of the suffrages, since his own influence was not great enough to obtain a verdict against Socrates. The passage, which has been misunderstood by Fischer, has been correctly interpreted by Schleiermacher.

XXVI. ^a Τιμᾶται δ' οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου] The accuser always inserted in his declaration the punishment which he thought the accused deserved, if the punishment were not already fixed by the laws.

^b ἢ δῆλον, ὅτι τῆς ἀξίας] That is, *but why do I ask?* or, *is it indeed evident?* etc. The reading ἢ is therefore erroneous.

^c τί ἄξιός εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι] This was a regular phrase in trials, παθεῖν referring to the punishment of the body, ἀποτίσαι to the fine. See Meier and Schömann "Attische Process," p. 739 foll.—On the expression ὅ τι μαθῶν, of which examples have been collected by Heindorf on Euthydem. p. 339 foll., see Hermann on Viger. p. 759. foll., Praefat. ad Aristoph. Nub. p. xlvi. ed. sec. The sentence may be thus translated: *How then? What ought I to suffer or to pay for having on no occasion in my life kept quiet, but—etc.*

^d ἀλλ' ἀμελήσας ὧν περ οἱ πολλοί] Understand ἐπιμελοῦνται. For when a negative verb precedes in sentences opposed to one another, the affirmative verb is frequently omitted. See Heindorf on Gorg. §. 29. Matth. §. 634. 2. Ruhnken. on Rutil. Lup. p. 47 and 131. and the authors quoted by Heindorf on Horat. Satir. I. 1. Compare Ruddimann's Instit. L. L. T. II. p. 361.—καὶ δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν. Δημηγορία in this passage means the occupation of him who makes speeches in the assemblies of the people. Although this was not one of the magistracies, yet it is not

incorrect to add τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν. For ἄλλος is used here as in Gorg. §. 64. ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων, that is, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ξένων ὕντων. Where see Heindorf. Therefore the sense of the words is this: *because I have cared nothing for gain, domestic affairs, military commands, influence with the people, and moreover also public offices, and conspiracies, and seditions.* Fischer therefore is wrong in defending the other reading δημιουργιῶν, especially since he has by no means proved, that δημάρχοι were also called at Athens by the name δημιουργοί.—The factions and seditions which arose after the Peloponnesian war throughout all Greece, and particularly at Athens, are well known.—Ἐπιεικῆς is frequently opposed to φαῦλος, and signifies *good, liberal, just.*

^e ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἦα] Remark this use of ἐνταῦθα, which occurs again a few lines below in ἐνταῦθα ἦα. Phileh. p. 57. B. δοκεῖ τοίνυν ἔμοιγε οὗτος ὁ λόγος—ἐνταῦθα προβεβηκέναι. Rep. p. 445. B. ἐπεὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐληλύθαμεν. Ibid. C. ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα ἀναβεβήκαμεν τοῦ λόγου. Menexen. p. 248. C. ἐνταῦθα τὸν νοῦν τρέποντες. Xenoph. Anab. I. 10, 13. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ἐνταῦθ' ἐχώρου οἱ Ἕλληνες. Sophocl. Philoctet. v. 377. ὁ δ' ἐνθάδ' ἦκων, καίπερ οὐ δύστοργος ὢν, δηχθεὶς πρὸς ἃ ἐξήκουσεν ᾧδ' ἠμείψατο. Gorg. p. 494. E. Ammonius p. 51. ἐνταυθοῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἐνθάδε διαφέρει. ἐνταυθοῖ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἐν τόπῳ (leg. εἰς τόπον) σημασίαν δηλοῖ ἐνταῦθα δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐν τόπῳ καὶ τὴν εἰς τόπον. ὁμοίως καὶ τὸ ἐνθάδε. This mode of expression is exactly the reverse of that which has been spoken of in C. XXII. note (^d). For in the same manner as it was shown there that verbs signifying rest are joined with adverbs of motion to a place, the two ideas of rest and motion being united in a single proposition: so, conversely, verbs indicating motion are added to adverbs which properly signify rest, and not motion. This must be explained by the mental activity of the Greeks, who were accustomed to unite many different notions in the same member of a sentence.

^f ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον ἰὼν—ἦα] This redundancy is remarkable. It is evident that the participle ἰὼν might have been omitted.

^g οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον] These words also are put ἐκ παραλλήλου. Similar examples have been collected by Astius ad Legg. p. 24.

^h ἀνδρὶ πένητι εὐεργέτῃ] A person who had deserved well of the state was honoured with the name εὐεργέτης. Dorvill on Chariton.

p. 317. ed. Lips. says: "Great men, nay, even kings, sought as a distinguished honour *εὐεργέτας τοῦ δήμου γραφήναι* of Athens." Xenoph. de rehit. 923. Lysias 20. p. 365. Suidas in *στήλη*. Antient inscriptions supply many examples.

ⁱ *μᾶλλον πρέπει οὕτως, ὡς*—] The common expression would have been either, *ὅ τι μᾶλλον πρέπει ἢ τὸν τ. ἄ. κ. τ. λ.* or *ὅ τι πρέπει οὕτως, ὡς τὸν τ. κ. τ. λ.* But, uniting both constructions, he said *μᾶλλον οὕτως ὡς*, in conformity with that free mode of speaking which the Greeks very often used. So, C. XVII., *μήτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε χρημάτων πρότερον οὕτω σφόδρα, ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς*. See also, Rep. VII. p. 526. C. *καὶ μὴν, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἃ γε μείζω πόνον παρέχει μανθάνοντι καὶ μελετῶντι, οὐκ ἂν ῥαδίως οὐδὲ πολλὰ ἂν εὖροις, ὡς τοῦτο*. Min. p. 318. E. *οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅ τι τούτου ἀσεβέστερόν ἐστιν, οὐδ' οὕτω χρὴ μᾶλλον εὐλαβεῖσθαι, πλὴν εἰς θεοὺς καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ ἐξαμαρτάνειν*. Eryx. p. 392. C. *ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν σμικρῶν τούτων ἂν μᾶλλον ὀργίζοιντο οὕτως, ὡς ἂν μάλιστα χαλεπώτατοι εἴησαν*.

^k *ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι*] The Prytaneum was a place in the citadel where the laws of Solon were kept; see Pausan. I. 18.: and a daily allowance of provisions was given to the citizens who had deserved well of the republic, called *σιτεῖσθαι*: which was accounted among the Greeks a very great honour. See Cic. Orat. I. 54. Demosthen. de falsa leg. p. 231. Aeschin. de f. leg. p. 267. T. II. Tayl. Pollux. IX. 40. Gruter Inscrip. p. 460. I. and Schol. Aristoph. Equitt. p. 199. Bas.—"*ἵππος* is the same as *κέλης*, a single horse, guided by one driver, see Scheffer. de re vehic. I. 8. p. 85. *Ξυνωρίς* is a chariot with two horses, and *ζεῦγος* one with three or four horses. See Suidas, Hesychius, Phavorinus under these words. *νενίκηκεν Ὀλύμπια* is generally used for *νενίκηκεν Ὀλυμπιάσι*. But the same construction is also used by Isocrat. de Big. p. 351. C. and p. 357. *Ὀλυμπιάσιν ἐνίκησεν*.

XXVII. ^a *ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ οἴκτου καὶ τῆς ἀντιβολήσεως*] He refers to his saying, in C. XXIII., that he would not follow the example of other accused persons, who tried to move the pity (*οἴκτον*) of the judges, and that he would not implore the judges as a suppliant. This is the *ἀντιβόλησις* or *ἀντιβολία* which he speaks of. For as *ἀντιβολεῖν* is the same as *ἰκετεύειν*, so *ἀντιβόλησις* is the same as *ἰκετεία*. See Thom. Mag. p. 75.

^b *ἐκὼν εἶναι*] That is, *as far as depends on my own intention*. For it is not the same as *ἐκὼν* by itself. See Herm. on Viger. p. 888. Compare Lobeck on Phrynich. p. 273 sq., who informs us



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ⁱ εἰ οὕτως ἀλόγιστός εἰμι] On this use of the indicative see C. XII. note (n).—A little further on ζητεῖν is *to wish, to desire*.

^k ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα] On this expression see C. XXIII. note (c). These words do not depend on the preceding ὅτι, but the sentence begins anew.

^l καλὸς οὖν ἂν μοι ὁ βίος εἴη—ζῆν] This is said ironically.—The verb ἐξέρχεσθαι, not φεύγειν, is said of going into exile, as has been well observed by Fischer.—ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης πόλιν πόλεως ἀμείβεσθαι is *to change, or go, from one state to another to take up his residence*.—The infinitive ζῆν is added to the preceding words καλὸς—ὁ βίος εἴη, to give additional force to the expression; which is frequent after demonstrative pronouns. Compare Matth. §. 535. γ. and §. 468.

^m κὰν μὲν τ' ἀπελαύνω] That is, do not admit them to hear my discourses.—On the Attic future ἐξελῶσι, see Buttm. §. 86.

XXVIII. ^a τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν οὖν] The participle οὖν is restored from the best MSS. But Heindorf, after Erfurdt, has shown that the verb τυγχάνειν may also be used absolutely, Gorg. §. 124. See also Lobeck on Phrynich. p. 277.

^b ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος—ἄνθρωπῳ] These words also depend on the preceding ὅτι, and are not introduced as a parenthesis, as was thought by Fr. A. Wolf.—On the particle δὲ in the words ταῦτα δ' ἔτι ἦττον πείσεσθε, which contain the apodosis expressed with emphasis, see Hermann on Viger. p. 784 and 845.—On the expression βίος βιωτός, *a life having the properties of life*, see Crito, C. VIII. note (a).

^c νῦν δέ—οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν] After νῦν δέ understand οὐ δύναμαι μοι τιμήσασθαι χρήματων. Some supposed that the words ought to be read without a pause: νῦν δέ οὐ γὰρ ἔστι, since the Greeks, from the rapidity with which their thoughts followed one another seemed also in this expression to have united two members of a sentence.

^d αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυᾶσθαι] Understand φασί, which is contained in the preceding word κελεύουσι. For illustrations of this expression, Fischer refers to Hemsterh. on Lucian, T. I. p. 492. Valcken. on Herodot. VII. 104. IX. 9.—Etymol. M. Ἐγγυητής· ὁ ἀναδεχόμενος δίκην. On the word ἀξιόχρεως see C. V. note (i).

^e XXIX. ^a Οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἔνεκα χρ.] The remainder of the “Apology” is spoken by Socrates after the judges had condemned him on the second vote. In this part of the oration, also, we observe

an admirable liberty of speech, courage, and evenness of soul, so that Cicero most truly observed that Socrates spoke, not like a suppliant, or accused person, but like the master or superior of his judges.—The words οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἔνεκα χρόνου have been rendered by Stephens, *on account of no long space of time*, that is, as Fischer correctly explains, *the remainder of my life*. For Socrates had now arrived at old age; and therefore could live but a short time longer.—ὄνομα ἔχειν properly, in a good sense, *to be praised, to be celebrated*, but, in this passage, *to be censured or blamed*. Αἰτίαν ἔχειν, is properly *to be accused, to be an accused person*: hence, as in this passage, *to be reprehended or blamed*. Yet it is very often also used, in a good sense, *to be praised to be celebrated*. See Casaubon on Athen. IX. 2.—Since the expression ὄνομα καὶ αἰτίαν ἔχειν has a passive signification, it is construed with ὑπό.

^b ὑμῖν τοῦτο ἐγένετο] That is, ἐμὲ τεθνάναι δὴ, an addition, which appears to have crept into the text from several MSS. Heindorf wished it to be retained, but thought that it should be read, τὸ ἐμὲ τεθνάναι δὴ, in which he was wrong, as may be seen from the observations of Matthiæ, §. 468 b.—ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου, *of its own accord, even if you had not condemned me to death*.

^c πόρρω ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου] That is, *that my age is now so advanced that no long space of life is remaining*. Similarly Plutarch, in the “Life of Demosth.” p. 846. E. ὀψέ ποτε καὶ πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας ἠψάμεθα Ῥωμαϊκοῖς γράμμασιν ἐντυγχάνειν.

^d οἷς ἂν ὑμᾶς ἐπεισα] That is, *by which I might have persuaded you*.—ἀπορία λόγων, by want of words, or as Cicero calls it, Orat. I. 54., inscientia dicendi.

^e τεθνάναι ἢ ἐκείνως ζῆν] With ἐκείνως understand ἀπολογησάμενος. On the use of the word τεθνάναι, see C. XVII. note (z).—A little before, τότε is before you condemned me.—πάντα ποιεῖν, ἀπαντα ποιεῖν, πᾶν ποιεῖν, means *to leave no stone unturned, to leave nothing untried*. Euthyphron. p. 8. C.

^f εἰάν τις τολμᾷ] That is, if any one can prevail on himself to do this, if any one goes to so great a pitch of impudence, that—Xenoph. Mem. II. 1, 3. τίς ἂν εὖ φρονῶν τοῦ σου θιάσου τολμήσειεν εἶναι; Plat. Crit. C. XV. ἐτόλμησας οὕτω γλίσχρως ἐπιθυμεῖν ζῆν.

^g θάνατον ἐκφυγεῖν] On the infinitive subjoined for the purpose of explanation to the pronoun τοῦτο, see Matth. §. 468. b.—With πονηρίαν, a little further on, understand ἐκφυγεῖν.

^b ἄτε βραδὺς ὤν καὶ πρ. He alludes perhaps to Odys. VIII.

329. κίχάνει τοι βραδὺς ὤκύν.—δεινοὶ καὶ ὀξεῖς, that is, *strong and quick*. We might perhaps have expected καίπερ δεινοὶ καὶ ὀξεῖς. But Socrates plays on the ambiguity of the verb ἀλῶναι, which is applied both to one who is overtaken in running, and to one who has lost his cause and been condemned.

ⁱ θανάτου δίκην ὕφλων] That is, *condemned to the punishment of death*. This expression, which is not uncommon, has been illustrated by Ruhnken, Tim. Gloss. p. 262. and Pierson, Moer. p. 426. Playing on the word, he adds ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας ὠφληκότες μοχθηρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν, that is, *you are convicted and condemned by Truth to the reproach of wretchedness and injustice*.—τῷ τιμήματι ἐμμένω, that is, *I am prepared to undergo the punishment which has been ordained by you*.—μετρίως ἔχειν the same as εὖ, ὀρθῶς. For μέτρια is applied to *whatever is suitable or becoming to any one*. See Graevius and Heinsius on Hesiod's "Works and Days," v. 306.

XXX. ^a ἐν ᾧ μάλιστα ἄνθρωποι χρησμοδοῦσιν] That the ancients were of opinion that the mind became more divine on the approach of death, and that dying persons foresaw and predicted future events, is shown by Cicero, Divin. I. 30. where see commentators. The subject has also been treated by Eustath. on Iliad. π'. p. 1089. ed. Rom. See also Phaedo c. 53.

^b ἢ ὅταν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε] That is, *than the punishment which ye have inflicted on me in condemning me to death*.—τοῦ δίδοναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου, that is, *from your life being examined, and therefore censured*. For these words follow: πλείους γὰρ ἔσονται ὑμᾶς οἱ ἐλέγχοντες.

^c καὶ καλεπώτεροι] On the omission of τοσοῦτω, see C. XVII., note (9). A little further on, ἀποκτείνοντες ἀνθρώπους is, *because ye put men to death*. Fischer was wrong in supposing that the aorist was required.

^d μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολούειν] Κολούειν is properly *to amputate; to mutilate*: hence, *to prevent any thing from being accomplished; to stop a person's undertaking; to restrain a person, so that he may not be able to do what he attempts*, as in this passage.

XXXI. ἐν ᾧ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἄγουσι] That is, while the Eleven are occupied. The judges were accustomed to deliver to the Eleven those who were condemned to be punished. It was the duty of the Eleven to order their assistants to lead away the culprit to prison, and to inflict on him the prescribed punishment.—On ἐν ᾧ, *in the mean time, while*, see on Rep. VI. p. 498. B. Theæt.



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and answer their own questions. A little further on, οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως, is, *by no means*. Compare Matth. §. 482. 2. On the words immediately following, compare Euthydem. p. 272. E. ἀντισταμένου δέ μου ἐγένετο τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον.

XXXH. ^a Ἐννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῆδε—] The greater part of this chapter has been transcribed by Eusebius Praepar. Evang. p. 661. ed. Viger. and Stobaeus Sermon. 119. p. 606. Cicero also translates it, Tuscul. Disput. I. 41. The beginning of it is quoted with approbation by Theodoret. Therapeut. Serm. XI. p. 651.; and it is also referred to by Plutarch, in Consolat. ad Apollon. p. 107.

^b ἢ γὰρ οἶον μηδὲν εἶναι] That is, τοιοῦτόν τι ὥστε μηδὲν εἶναι, as a little lower down: εἰ δ' αὖ οἶον ἀποδημησαί ἐστιν ὁ θάνατος. Eusebius and Theodoretus have μηδέν τι εἶναι, whence Heindorf conjectured that the reading ought to be μηδὲν ἔτι εἶναι.

^c καὶ μετοίκησις τῇ ψυχῇ—] On the dative instead of the genitive, see Matth. §. 389. 1.—For μετοίκησις τοῦ τόπου might have been said μετοίκησις ἐκ τοῦ τόπου. Yet the former is no less usual. For since the verb μετοικεῖν is not only construed with prepositions, but also governs an accusative of the place, from which one person goes to another, as in Pausan. IV. 40. Ἀκαρνανίαν μετοικῆσαι therefore μετοίκησις τόπου is no less correct than μετοίκησις ἐκ τόπου.—A little further on, τοῦ ἐνθένδε is put for τοῦ ἐνταῦθα, because the verbal substantive signifies motion to a place. We have before spoken of a similar use of prepositions: the construction of the adverbs has been illustrated by Heindorf on Gorgias, p. 472. B. where we find: ἡ Περικλέους ὄλη οἰκία ἢ ἄλλα συγγένεια. ἦντιν' ἂν βούλη τῶν ἐνθένδε ἐκλέξασθαι. Compare also Buttmann's Gr. §. 138. 8.

^d καὶ εἴτε δὴ μηδεμία—] To the particle εἴτε correspond, after a long interval, the words further on: εἰ δ' αὖ. On εἰ δέ after εἴτε see C. IV., note (a).

^e ἐγὼ γὰρ ἔν οἶμαι] Ἄν belongs to the infinitive εὐρεῖν. It is repeated on account of the long parenthesis; on which usage, see Hermann on Viger. p. 780. For the same reason, the words δέοι and οἶμαι are subsequently repeated. Heindorf wished also the word εἰ to be repeated before the words δέοι σκεψάμενον, for the sake of perspicuity. It is written so in Eusebius. But as the construction of the sentence is not altered from the beginning, this repetition does not appear to be necessary.

^f μὴ ὅτι ιδιώτην] That is, *not to say any private man*. See Hermann on Viger. p. 804.

ε εὐαριθμήτους ἐν εὐρεῖν αὐτὸν τ.] The pronoun αὐτὸν is to be connected with τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα, and increase the force: *the great king himself*.—Εὐαρίθμητοι ἡμέραι, that is, *days which may be easily counted*, here means *very few*, and πρὸς indicates comparison: *if they be compared with other days and nights*. So, a little further on: τὰ ἑμαυτοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων.

^h καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν πλείων] Fischer, from Eusebius, has written πλείον. But the more correct reading is πλείων, meaning *longer*, οὐδὲν being used for οὐ, as is frequently the case. Cicero has thus translated these words: *perpetuitas consequentis temporis similis futura est uni nocti*.—Compare Eurip. Med. v. 25. τὸν πάντα συντήκουσα δακρύοις χρόνον. Ibid. 1096. τρυχομένους τὸν πάντα χρόνον. Rep. X. p. 618. B. ὁ πᾶς κίνδυνος. Gorg. p. 470. E.

ⁱ Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθους, κ. τ. λ.] These words are placed in apposition in the same case as the relative pronoun; whereas the first part of the sentence requires them to be in the accusative. So Phaedo, p. 66. E. καὶ τότε—ἡμῖν ἔσται οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν,—φρονήσεως, where Fischer ought not to have preferred φρόνησις. Hipp. Mai. p. 281. C. τί ποτε τὸ αἴτιον, ὅτι οἱ παλαιοὶ ἐκείνοι, ὧν ὄνόματα μεγάλα λέγεται ἐπὶ σοφία, Πιπτακοῦ τε καὶ Βίαντος,—φαίνονται ἀπεχόμενοι τῶν πολιτικῶν πράξεων. More examples of this kind have been collected by Wolf, on Demosthen. Lept. §. 15. Heindorf, on Hipp. Mai. §. 2. on Phaedo, §. 30. Similarly Sulpicius in Cicer. Epp. IV. 5. *genus hoc consolationis miserum est, quia, per quos ea confieri debet, propinquos ac familiares, ipsi pari molestia afficiuntur*.—Respecting the judges of the infernal regions, and their duties, there is a remarkable passage in Gorg. p. 523. E. sqq. It appears to have been the opinion of the common people in Attica, probably derived, by rumour, from the Eleusinian mysteries, that Triptolemus, and other heroes who had lived a just and pious life, became judges in the infernal regions. For Triptolemus was said not only to have taught the Athenians agriculture, but also to have given them very wise laws, whence he was called θεσμοφόρος.

^k ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἂν τις δέξαιτ' ἂν ὑμῶν] Cicero: *quanti tandem aestimatis?* Xenoph. Mem. II. 2, 8. ἀλλὰ νῆ Δία λέγει, ἃ οὐκ ἂν τις ἐπὶ τῷ βίῳ παντὶ βούλοιτο εἶναι. Compare Matthiæ, §. 585. B.

^l ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ πολλάκις ἐθέλω τεθνάναι] On this use of the verb τεθνάναι see C. XVII. note (2). Eusebius has: ἐγὼ μὲν

καὶ πολλάκις: whence Heindorf suspected that Plato wrote: ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ καὶ πολλάκις, etc. But there is no need of change. On this use of the word γὰρ, by which reference is made to a sentence easily understood from what goes before, see Buttmann on Sophocl. Philoctet. v. 756., who thinks that it ought to be translated, *truly, indeed*.

^m ἡ διατριβὴ αὐτόθι] Wolf has well rendered this: *delightful conversation, if I may converse with P., etc.*—Respecting Palamedes, who was stoned by the Greek army, having been suspected of treason through the arts of Ulysses, see Heyn. Excurs. ad Virgil Æneid. II. 81. Valckenar. Diatrib. de fragm. Eurip. p. 190 sq.—Ajax Telamonius, the bravest of all the Greeks after Achilles, became mad and killed himself, from having been deprived of the arms of Achilles by the unjust judgment which conferred them on Ulysses. See Homer Odys. λ'. v. 545 sqq.

ⁿ ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι—ἀηδὲς εἶη] I think these words added for the purpose of explanation to the foregoing: θαυμαστὴ διατριβὴ κ. τ. λ., and therefore there is no reason why we should read, after Viger, on Eusebius in the place cited, καὶ ἀντιπαρ. or alter the passage in any other manner. This view has also been taken by Fischer. Some may prefer thinking, with A. Matthiæ, §. 636. that, through negligence, the apodosis is repeated. For we might safely omit the words. ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὐκ ἔν ἀηδὲς εἶη.

^o τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἀγαγόντα] That is, Agamemnon.

^p ἢ ἄλλους μυρίους ἂν τις εἴποι] Stephens preferred ἢ ἄλλους μυρίους, οὓς ἂν τις εἴποι, not paying attention to that brevity by which several sentences are sometimes united in one clause. See Gorg. p. 483. D. ἐπεὶ ποίῳ δικάῳ χρώμενος Ξέρξης ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐστράτευσεν; ἢ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τοὺς Σκύθας; ἢ ἄλλα μυρία ἂν τις ἔχοι τοιαῦτα λέγειν. Phædo, p. 94. B. λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιοῦδε, ὡς εἰ καύματος ἐνόητος καὶ δίψους ἐπὶ τοῦναντίου ἔλκειν, ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ πίνειν· καὶ πείνης ἐνούσης ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ ἐσθίειν. καὶ ἄλλα μυρία που ὁρῶμεν ἐναντιούμενην τὴν ψυχὴν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα. Sophist. p. 226. B. Legg. XII. p. 944. A. Demosth. Mid. c. 7.

^q ἀμήχανον ἂν εἶη εὐδαιμονίας] Similarly Theætet. p. 175. A. ἄτοπα αὐτῷ καταφαίνεται τῆς μικρολογίας, *monstrous degree of stupidity*. Compare Erfurdt on Sophocl. Antigone. v. 1194.

XXXIII. ^a Ἄλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς χρῆ] Cicero: vos, iudices, qui me absolvistis. Correctly.

^b καὶ ἔν τι τοῦτο διανοεῖσθαι ἀληθές] The circumstance that



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NOTES ON THE CRITO.

1. ^a Πηνίκα μάλιστα;] *What hour is it at most?* For μάλιστα is here to be taken as if put after numbers; on which usage see Bastius Epist. Crit. p. 37 sq.

^b ὄρθρος βαθύς] Crito defines the time more accurately in these words, for πρῶ and ὄρθρος differ from one another, as in Latin *mane* and *diluculum*, of which the former is the part of the day extending from twilight to about the third hour, according to the antient division of the day; but the latter is the twilight itself, when *nox abiit, nec tamen orta dies*, according to Ovid. *Amat.* I. 5, 6. Phrynichus: ὄρθρος τὸ πρὸ ἀρχομένης ἡμέρας, ἐν ᾧ ἔτι λύχνῳ δύναται τις χρῆσθαι. The adjective βαθύς is used by the Greeks in reference to time as the word “depth” is used in the phrase “the depth of winter.” *Protagor.* p. 310. A. τῆς παρελθούσης νυκτὸς ταυτησί, ἔτι ὄρθρου βαθέος. *Lucian.* *Asin.* 34. νύξ βαθεῖα, where see Reitz. *Polyæn.* *Strateg.* I. 28, 2. *βαθείας ἑσπέρας.*

^c θαυμάζω, ὅπως ἤθέλ.— *I wonder how it came to pass that.* Compare *Xenoph.* *Mem.* I. 1, 20. θαυμάζω οὖν, ὅπως ποτὲ ἐπέισθησαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι. *Eurip.* *Med.* v. 51. πῶς λείπεσθαι θέλει; On this construction, which is frequent, see *Coraius* on *Isocrat.* II. p. 23. So a little further on: πῶς οὐκ ἐπήγειράς με εὐθύς; Socrates wonders that Crito was admitted so soon by the jailor, because οὐ πάνυ πρῶ ἀνεφύγετο. *Phaedo* c. III.—ὑπακούειν, which is properly said of a porter who hears persons knocking (τοῖς κρούουσιν), is also used in the signification of *opening the door and letting a person in.*

^d καί τι καὶ εὐεργέτηται] The reading καί τοι καί, *and indeed also*, which some have preferred, appears inconsistent with the modesty of Crito, who does not wish to boast of benefits conferred on the man, but merely to state the cause of his being admitted. Therefore καί τι καὶ, is preferable, not only from the authority of MSS., but also from the whole scope of the passage. For Crito

speaks with modesty, and with a careful regard to the feelings of his high-minded friend, when he says that he was accustomed to give a trifle to the jailer. Τι is connected with εὐεργέτηται; on which construction, see Matth. §. 415. Buttmann, §. 118. 4. 5. The accusative separated from its verb is usual, the common construction being: καὶ τις καὶ, καὶ τινες καὶ, καὶ τι καί. See Ducker. on Thucyd. p. 309. Poppo Observ. Critt. in Thucyd. p. 196. Buttmann and others preferred εὐεργετείται, the present tense, as indicating that Crito, frequently coming to the prison, usually gives a gratuity to the keeper. But Crito is reciting the causes which procured his admission at a *former time*; and therefore rightly uses the perfect, by which he indicates both that the man formerly received benefits from him, and was still mindful of them. On the form εὐεργέτηται see Matth. §. 169. note; compare §. 167. n. 6. The omission of the augment gave rise to the reading εὐεργετείται and ηὐεργέτηται.

^e Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι] That is, *pretty long since*, or, *a good while ago*. Theaet. near the beginning, Ἄρτι, ὦ Τερψίων, ἢ πάλαι ἐξ ἀγροῦ; Terps. Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι. Phaedo, p. 80. C. ἐπιεικῶς συχνοῦν ἐπιμένει χρόνον. Grammarians interpret ἐπιεικῶς, when so placed, by πάνυ, λίαν. See Eustath. on *Il. d.*, p. 547. Hesych. under the word.—Immediately afterwards, the interrogative εἶτα indicates wonder and annoyance. See Apolog. Socr. C. XVI.

^f οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἤθελον—] *I should not myself have liked to be in such a state of watchfulness and grief, if I were in your place; for since so grievous a calamity threatens you, it would have been wrong to disturb your rest*. The particle ἂν used with the imperfect indicates the supposition of a case contrary to that which in reality exists. See Hermann on Viger. p. 820.—For ἐν τοσαύτῃ τε ἀγρυπνίᾳ καὶ λύπῃ the ordinary construction would be ἐν τοσαύτῃ ἀγρυπνίᾳ τε καὶ λύπῃ, which is found in some MSS. But the other reading is explained by understanding τοσαύτῃ again after καί. For τε is put immediately after τοσαύτῃ to show that that word belongs to λυπη as well as to ἀγρυπνία. Phaed. p. 94. D. τὰ τε κατὰ γυμναστικὴν καὶ τὴν ἰατρικὴν, i. e. τὰ τε κ. γ. καὶ τὰ κατὰ τ. ἰ. Legg. VII. p. 796. D. εἰς τε πολιτείαν καὶ ἰδίου οἴκου, i. e. καὶ εἰς ἰδ. οἴκ. Herodot. VII. 106. οἳ τε ἐκ Θράκης καὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου, i. e. καὶ οἱ ἐκ τοῦ Ἑλλ. More examples are given by Schaefer. Indic. ad Brunkii. Poetas Gnomie. p. 367. The subject has also been fully explained by Hartung Lehre von den Partikeln der griech. Sprache P. I. p. 116 sqq.



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particle. Therefore the words may be thus translated: *But old age, however, does not render them free as regards this, namely that they should not be troubled at death.* It may be also understood from this, how τὸ μὴ οὐ may generally be rendered by the Latin *quominus*. On the accusative see Eurip. Hippolyt. v. 48. τὸ γὰρ τῆς δ' οὐ προτιμήσω κακόν, τὸ μὴ οὐ παρασχεῖν τοὺς ἐμοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἐμοὶ δίκην τοσαύτην, where some MSS. have τοῦ μὴ οὐ. Æschyl. Prometh. v. 243. ἐξερυσάμην βροτοὺς τοῦ μὴ διαβῆραισθέντας εἰς Ἄιδου μολεῖν, where some MSS. have τὸ μὴ. Plato, Rep. III. p. 354. B. οὐκ ἀπεσχόμην τὸ μὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἐλθεῖν ἀπ' ἐκείνου.

^l ἀλλὰ τί δή —] That is, *but, to return to the former subject, why then, etc.*

^m οὐ σοί, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται] There is much beauty in the addition of these words. *Not to thee, he says, will that news be terrible, or produce any anxiety, whom I know to be superior to human troubles, and even death itself, but to us, etc.* For ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται is: *as appears to me, that is, as I am fully persuaded.*

ⁿ ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατα] That is, ἐν τοῖς φέρουσιν ἐγὼ βαρύτατα ἂν ἐνέγκ. See Matth. §. 289.

^o Τίνα ταύτην;] Understand φέρεις, i. e. τίς ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ ἀγγελία, ἣν φέρεις. See Matth. §. 264. So Euthyphro, p. 14. D. τίς ἡ ὠφέλεια τοῖς θεοῖς τυγχάνει οὕτα ἀπὸ τῶν δώρων; In such sentences the article indicates that mention has before been made of the thing spoken of.

^p ἢ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφίκεται] This has been erroneously translated by Schleiermacher: “is the ship perhaps arrived from Delos,” etc. For the particle ἢ, which used generally to be put in the first member of an interrogative sentence of two parts, afterwards began to be so taken that the first member was suppressed, and the ἢ had a restricting and correcting force. Therefore this passage is to be thus understood: *but why do I ask? the ship has certainly arrived, on the return of which, etc.*—On the use of the infinitive τεθνάναι, where ἀποθνήσκειν might be expected, see Apolog. Socrat. C. XVII, note (²).—The Athenians, in gratitude for Apollo's sending Theseus and his companions back in safety from Crete, sent annually a public embassy to Delos, to offer sacrifice to Apollo, and celebrate his praises in hymns. These ambassadors were called θεωροί, or θεωρία, from the verb ὠρεῖν, i. e. φροντίζειν, θεραπεύειν, and the noun θεός, i. e. Apollo. From the time when the sacred ship was ornamented with a laurel crown until its return, it was unlawful to

inflict punishment on condemned persons. See Xenoph. Mem. IV. 8, 2. Since it happened, that the ship was ornamented with the laurel crown the day before the condemnation of Socrates, and returned thirty days after, Socrates was thirty days in prison after his condemnation. See Phædo, at the beginning. Xenoph. *ut supra*.

^a ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἥξειν] After the verbs οἶμαι, δοκεῖ, and others, μὲν is often placed without being answered by δέ. See Hermann on Viger, p. 800. and Heindorf on Phædo, p. 5. But the sentence, which should be opposed to the other, is always easily understood. The usual mode in which the deficiency is supplied is by understanding: σαφῶς δ' οὐκ οἶδα. But since Crito says afterwards: δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν ἀγγέλων, ὅτι ἥξει τήμερον, it must be evident that something very different is required by the sense, and even that the words δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἥξειν τήμερον are used with the delicacy of Attic speech to signify ἥξει τήμερον, which use of the verb δοκεῖν, very common among the Socratic speakers, has been illustrated with examples by Bergler, on Aristoph. Plut. v. 422. Ruhnken, on Tim. p. 281. In the same manner Phædo, p. 61. C. ἀπειμι δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, τήμερον. This being the case, I think that the sentence to which μὲν is referred is contained in the preceding words οὗτοι δὲ ἀφίκται, so that it might have been written thus: τὸ πλοῖον ἥξει μὲν τήμερον, οὗτοι δὲ ἀφίκται.—Immediately afterwards ἐξ ᾧ ἀπαγγέλλουσιν is the same as ἐκ τούτων ἀ ἀπαγγέλλουσι: according to those things which they report Cicer. Epist. XVI. 22. ex tuis epistolis.—Σούνιον, a promontory of Attica, situate in that part which faces the Cyclades and the Ægæan Sea.

II. ^a τύχη ἀγαθῇ] A well known form used by the Greeks as a good omen, when they themselves or others were undertaking any thing. It answers to the Latin *quod bene vertat, quod felix faustumque sit*. See Sympos. p. 177. E. Thucyd. IV. 118. Therefore Socrates, hearing that he must die, is so far from fearing death, that he even considers it to be an object to be sought for as a blessing.

^b ἢ ἢ ἂν ἔλθῃ] After ὑστεραία the particle ἢ is put, because that word has all the force of a comparative. Sympos. p. 173. A. τῇ ὑστεραία ἢ ἢ τὰ ἐπινίκια ἔθυσεν αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ χορευταί. See Wytttenbach on Phædo, p. 314 sq. and Bast. Append. Epist. Crit. præf. p. VII. Instead of the optative ἔλθοι we have adopted the subjunctive: for the meaning is: *on whatever day it may have returned*. Compare Matth. §. 527.

^c Φασί γέ τοι δὴ οἱ τούτων κύριοι] That is, the Eleven, οἱ ἔνδεκα, who had the office of imprisoning and punishing those who were condemned by the public tribunals. These punishments are referred to by ταῦτα. See note on Apolog. Socr. C. XXVII.—On the particles γέ τοι δὴ, which have the force of an affirmation with some restriction, see Hermann on Viger, p. 790.—τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἔκ τινος—This is a common mode of using the verb τεκμαίρεσθαι, where τοῦτο or αὐτὸ must be understood. See Rep. III. p. 406. D. Gorg. p. 484. B. Phædo, p. 108. A. Lysid. p. 204. E. Hippias mai. p. 288. C. and elsewhere. The words ὀλίγον πρότερον are added, because dreams seen after midnight were thought true. See Homer's Odys. IV. v. 842 sqq. XX. v. 82—91. Hor. Satir. I. 10, 33. Quirinus post mediam noctem visus, quum somnia vera.

^d ἐν καιρῷ τινι] *Very opportunely.* On the word κινδυνεύειν, which among the Attic writers signifies *to seem*, Timæus Gloss. p. 159. κινδυνεύει ἐγγίζει, where see Ruhnken. Compare also Valckenar on Herodot. IV. 105. Hindenburg on Xenophon, Mem. IV. 2, 34.

^e Ἐδόκει τίς μοι γυνή πρ.] Δοκεῖν is a verb used respecting dreams and visions. Euripid. Iphig. Taur. v. 44. ἔδοξ' ἐν ὕπνῳ. Orest. v. 402. ἔδοξ' ἰδεῖν τρεῖς νυκτὶ προσφερεῖς κόρας. Aristoph. Vesp. p. 31. ἔδοξέ μοι περὶ πρῶτον ὕπνον ἐν τῇ πυκνῇ ἐκκλησιάζειν, κ. τ. λ.—As persons appearing in dreams were believed to be divine, they are generally represented as more beautiful, large and august than human beings. Hence the woman, who appeared to Socrates, is called καλὴ καὶ εὐειδής, *beautiful and well formed*, and she is also spoken of as λευκὰ ἱμάτια ἔχουσα, *having white garments*, since the ancients thought that spectres were arrayed in white apparel, on which see Commentators on Pliny's Epist. VIII. 27.—λευκά is the same as λαμπρά, i. e. *white* or *shining*. See Thom. Mag. p. 566 sq.—The verse, which the woman is said to have recited, is taken from Iliad. IX. 363. They are the words of Achilles, in which he says that, being enraged by the insults of Agamemnon, he will return home, which he hopes to reach on the third day. In Homer the word is therefore ἰκοίμην. Cicero de Divinat. I. 25, where he mentions this passage, thus translates the verse: Tertia te Phthiæ tempestas læta locabit.—Fischer has correctly remarked that we are to understand Socrates to refer to that other life which he hoped for.

^f Ὡς ἄτοπον—] That is, *how wonderful*, ὡς θαυμαστόν καὶ παράδοξον, as the word is correctly interpreted by Thomas M.,



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§. 468. c. C. XV. of Crito, βεβαιώσεις — τὴν δόξαν, ὥστε δοκεῖν, κ. τ. λ. A similar redundance is found, Herodot. VIII. 4. παρὰ δόξαν — ἢ ὡς αὐτοὶ κατεδόκουν.

^d αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα] The reading δημοῖ, adopted by Stephens from the conjecture of Cornarius, although at first sight it may appear the true one, is unnecessary. We ought also to reject Fischer's notion, derived from some misunderstood or corrupted passages of Theophrastus and Antoninus, that δῆλον has an active force and signification, and is equivalent to δηλατικόν. For the writer passes, by a kind of anacoluthia, from a passive to an active construction. When Crito was about to add: ὅτι ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐξειργασμένα ἐστίν, he suddenly changed the construction, and expresses his idea much more emphatically, saying: ὅτι οἱοί τε εἰσιν οἱ πολλοί, κ. τ. λ.

^e ἵνα οἱοί τε ᾔσαν] On this kind of construction, see note on Sympos. p. 181. B. Hermann on Viger. p. 850. The sense of the words is this: *in order that they might also effect the greatest good, which is not in their power.*

^f τοῦτο, ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι] That is, *they do not follow reason, but a certain blind impulse of their mind.* Further on, C. V. ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι, τοῦτο πράξουσι. Protagor. p. 353. A. τὴν τῶν πολλῶν δόξαν ἀνθρώπων, οἱ ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι, τοῦτο λέγουσι. Sympos. p. 181. B. ὅθεν δὴ ξυμβαίνει αὐτοῖς, ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι, τοῦτο πράττειν.

IV. ^a ἀρά γε μὴ ἐμοῦ προμ.] These particles ask a question, with a kind of suspicion of what we are unwilling should be the case: *surely you are not concerned,* etc. See Hermann on Viger. p. 842. Compare Schæfer. Melett. Critt. p. 66. — πράγματα παρέχειν, *to give trouble, or create annoyance to any one.* This is often said of persons who annoy by accusations. For the word πράγματα is sometimes used simply in the sense of *law-suits and quarrels.* See Commentators on Aristoph. Plut. v. 20.

^b ἢ καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν ἀποβαλεῖν, ἢ συχνὰ χρ.] That is, *to lose either even all our property, or at least a great part of our wealth.* It is easy to see why καί is put in the first member of the sentence, and omitted in the second. In the third it is again added, because a new kind of danger is mentioned: for ἄλλο τι παθεῖν is: *lest we should ourselves be thrown into chains, punished by exile, or put to death.*

^c ἔασον αὐτὸ χαίρειν] That is, *dismiss this fear.* This construction has been illustrated by Valckenar on Herodot. IX. 41. on

Eurip. Hippolyt. v. 113. and Heindorf on Theætét. p. 441.—Respecting the construction of the words *ἡμεῖς γάρ που δίκαιοι ἐσμεν*—*κινδυνεύειν*, see Matth. §. 296. Buttman, §. 138. 5.

^d *καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει*] So C. V. at the end, *πείθου μοι καὶ μηδαμῶς ἄλλως ποίει*.

^e *Μήτε τοίνυν ταῦτα φόβου*] The thread of discourse, which is here broken, is resumed a little further on with the words: *ἔστε—μήτε ταῦτα φοβοῦ*. It may be understood from this, why the copyists changed *μήτε* into *μή*.

^f *τούτους τοὺς συκοφάντας*] This is said contemptuously. Further on C. IX. *τούτων τῶν πολλῶν*. Demosthen. Philipp. I. p. 41. *παραδείγμασι χρώμενοι τῇ τε τότε ῥώμῃ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων—καὶ τῇ νῦν ὕβρει τούτου* Apolog. Socr. C. I. Rep. III. p. 403. A. Sympos. p. 181. E. Gorg. p. 452. E.

^g *ἐπ' αὐτούς*] That is, *to bribe them*.

^b *ὑπάρχει μὲν τὰ ἐμὰ χρήματα*] *My wealth is ready for you, is at your disposal*: for *ικανά* is added by apposition. See Sturtz's Lexic. Xenophont. T. IV. p. 363.

ⁱ *ξένοι οὗτοι ἐνθάδε*] On this use of the pronoun *οὗτος*, see Matth. §. 471. Buttm. §. 114. 1., and Schæfer. Melett. Critt. p. 77. foll.—Simmias and Cebes, Thebans and intimate friends of Socrates, are introduced disputing with him in the Phædo. Some few particulars concerning them are given in their lives by Laert. II. 124 and 125, and Suidas. A slight mention of them is also made, Epistol. Platonic. XIII. Both are said to have written something, but the Tabula, which goes under the name of Cebes, appears to be undeservedly ascribed to him.

^k *μήτε—ἀποκάμης*] That is, *be not despondent as to consulting your safety*. For Crito, in his exceeding love towards his friend, forgot the principles of virtue, and imagined that Socrates himself was willing to consult his safety by flight.

^l *ὃ ἔλεγες ἐν τῷ δικ.*] See Apolog. C. XXVII.

^m *ὅ τι χρῆο σαυτῷ*] As we say: *what to do with yourself*. So Gorg. p. 486. A. Sympos. p. 216. C. Xenoph. Anab. III. 1, 41. Jacobs compares Lucian. Accusat. 27. *ὅ τι χρῆσαιτο ἑαυτῷ οὐκ εἰδώς*. Necyom. §. 3. *οὐκ εἰδώς ὅ τι χρῆσαιμην ἑμαυτῷ*. Harmonid. *ὅπως μοι χρηστέον κάμαυτῷ καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ*. So Æschin. adv. Ctesiphont. p. 76. ed. Bremi: *ἀπορῶν δ' ὅ τι χρῆσαιτο αὐτῷ—μίαν ἐλπίδα λοιπὴν κατείδε*.

ⁿ *καὶ ἄλλοσε ὅποι ἂν ἀφίκη*] The ordinary construction would require *ἀλλαχοῦ*. But since *ὅποι* follows, that which has been

called attraction, by the later grammarians, produces ἄλλοσε. On which subject see Buttm. §. 138. 1. 4. I have therefore removed the comma from between ἄλλοσε and ὅποι.

γ. ἂ ἐξὸν σωθῆναι] *When you have it in your power to escape.* See Matth. §. 264.

δ οἰχῆσει καταλιπών] The word οἰχεσθαι indicates, I think, the quickness of the action, and the eagerness of the agent. It might be rendered in Latin by *confestim desereres*. Other examples have been collected by Matthiæ, §. 559. c.

ε τὸ σὸν μέρος] *As far as in you lies, as far as you are concerned,* as C. XL and XVI.

ς ὃ τι ἂν—πράξουσι] That is, *they will undergo that lot which the will of fortune may assign to them; whatever may happen to them.* For the word πράττειν is taken in the sense of having good or ill fortune, as in the phrases εὖ πράττειν and κακῶς πράττειν. Remark the use of the pronoun τοῦτο, for which, according to the usual construction, some adverb would be substituted. But in the same manner Eurip. Troad. v. 700. πράξειν τι κεδνόν, where Seidler says, that phrase is employed for εὖ πράξειν. Eurip. Iphig. Aul. v. 345. πράσσειν μεγάλα the same as μάλ' εὐτυχεῖν.

ζ τὰ ῥαθυμότατα αἰρεῖσθαι] ῥάθυμα means, *those things which are worthy of a trifling, slothful, and inconstant person.* Serranus has well rendered the sentence thus: Tu autem mihi videris ea, quæ cum maxima pigritia atque supinitate conjuncta sunt, elegisse.

η ὑπὲρ σοῦ—αἰσχύνομαι] Theæt. p. 490. E. αἰσχυνοίμην γὰρ ἂν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν.

θ καὶ ἡ εἴσοδος τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον. Forster and others, observing that the words τῆς δίκης, were not translated by Ficinus, suspected that they were a gloss. But since ἡ δίκη is very frequently said εἰσιέναι or εἰσέρχεσθαι, on which point see Casaubon on Theophrast. p. 157. also Buttm. index ad Demosthen. orat. Midian, under this word,—why should it not be correct to say ἡ εἴσοδος τῆς δίκης? Fischer, Schleiermacher, and Buttmann defend the common reading in the same manner. The words εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, which Schleiermacher thought ought to be rejected, are sometimes added when the cause itself is said, εἰσιέναι or εἰσέρχεσθαι. Demosthen. adv. Phormion. T. II. p. 912. 27. μελλούσης τῆς δίκης εἰσιέναι εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον. The phrase ἡ εἴσοδος τῆς δίκης, is used when the prosecutor and the accused are admitted to plead the cause before the judge. See Schömann and Meier's



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ὑπερ ἄρτι, ἐξεῖναι ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὃ ἂν δοκῆ αὐτῷ, ποιεῖν τοῦτο, where Heindorf incorrectly suggests the reading τὸ ἐξεῖναι. Phædo, p. 78. C. ἄρ' οὖν τῷ μὲν συντεθέντι τε καὶ συνθέτῳ ὄντι φύσει προσήκει τοῦτο πάσχειν, διαιρεθῆναι ταύτῃ, ἥπερ συνετέθη.— The infinitive διαπεφευγέναι is put absolutely, τὸν κίνδυνον being understood. This usage is frequent, as may be seen from the Lexicons to Thucydides and Xenophon.—The infinitive δοκεῖν, after μη δόξη ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα—πεπρᾶχθαι, might appear on a first view to be added by a kind of negligence or redundancy, such as we perceive, in C. III., in the words: καὶ τοι τίς ἂν αἰσχίων εἶη ταύτης δόξα ἢ δοκεῖν χρήματα περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι ἢ φίλους; but, considering the matter more closely, it appears that the word δοκεῖν could not well be omitted in this passage. For if Crito said: διαπεφευγέναι ἡμᾶς, he might appear to admit the truth of the reproach which, he says, will be urged against himself and the other friends of Socrates; especially since he has been enumerating circumstances which were really true. For it was true that Socrates had appeared before the tribunal, and also that he had made his defence, which is called ὁ ἀγὼν τῆς δίκης.—Hence it appears that the passage needs no emendation, and that there is no anacoluthia in it, as some have supposed.

¹ οὐδὲ σὺ σαυτόν] These words at first seem to destroy the sense. For Crito is now speaking, not of the carelessness of Socrates himself respecting his safety, but of the apparent carelessness and apathy of his friends, who would seem to have deserted their master, and consulted nothing but their own safety. But these words contain an excuse or defence against the view which will be taken of the conduct of the friends of Socrates; and this defence consists of a gentle reproach of Socrates, of whom Crito complains, with generous indignation, for not availing himself of the means of escape provided by his friends. The passage may be thus rendered: *who have not saved you (nor would you save yourself), when it might have been done.*

^m εἴ τι καὶ—ἡμῶν ὄφελος ἦν] See Apolog. Socrat. C. XVI. note (g). Compare Hemsterhus. on Lucian's Tim. c. 55. A little further on ἅμα τῷ κακῷ is used in the same manner as πρὸς τῷ κακῷ.

ⁿ μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ βουλ] Μᾶλλον δέ is, or rather, nay indeed. *It is no longer the season to deliberate, but to have already deliberated, i. e. to have come to a resolution.*

VI. ^a ἡ πραθυμία σου—ὀρθότητος εἶη] That is, *Your zeal*

for my preservation is very much to be approved of and praised, if it were joined with rectitude of principle. With ἀξία is to be understood ἐστί, which is often omitted, on which point see Schæfer on Lambert. Bos. p. 605. Matth. §. 304.—On the optative εἴη after the indicative, see Matth. §. 524. 8.

^b οἶος τῶν ἐμῶν —] That is, ὥστε — πείθεσθαι. See Matth. §. 479. 2, 3.—Τὰ ἐμά, *the things which belong to me, as well passions and inclinations of the mind, as things extrinsic.*

^c οὐ δύναμαι ἐκβαλεῖν] That is, *to reject, to repudiate.* For the words are opposed to τιμᾶν and πρεσβεύειν. Ἐκβάλλειν is properly *to cast out, to throw away*, and is said of things that are useless, which we do not care about: hence it often means *to spurn, to despise.*

^d πρεσβεύω καὶ τιμῶ] Pollux Onom. II. 12. πρεσβεύειν, τὸ τιμᾶν παρὰ Πλάτωνι. Sympos. p. 186. B. ἵνα καὶ πρεσβεύωμεν τὴν τέχνην. Ibid. p. 187. C. ἐὰν μή — μηδὲ τιμᾶ τε αὐτὸν καὶ πρεσβεύῃ. Æschyl. Chæph. v. 480. Eumenid. v. 1. Eurip. Hippolyt. v. 5. Alcest. v. 282.

^e ὅτι οὐ μή σοι ξυγχωρήσω] *That I certainly will not yield to you.*

^f οὐδ' ἂν πλείω τῶν νῦν παρόντων —] According to Buttman, the order of the words is: οὐδ' ἂν ἡ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις μορμολύττηται ἡμᾶς ὥσπερ παῖδας, ἐπιπέμπουσα πλείω, δεσμούς, κ. τ. λ. This I do not agree with. For πλείω is to be connected with μορμολύττηται, and is an accusative absolute put for an adverb: the collocation of the words confirms this view. So further on, C. XIV. near the end, ἐλάττω ἀπεδήμησας. Rep. III. p. 396. C. Μορμολύτ-εσθαι is *to frighten children by gestures and by pronouncing the word Μορμῶ*, as is correctly remarked by Gesner, on Claudian. Carm. XXXI. v. 111. Hence it means *to terrify or frighten a person by objects calculated to inspire fear; or generally, to terrify, to intimidate*, but the terror meant is generally groundless. The active μορμολύττειν is only found in the works of grammarians: the Attic writers always say μορμολύττεσθαι.—The word ἐπιπέμπειν, like the Latin *immittere*, is said of what is suddenly and forcibly presented before a person, as is remarked by Hemsterhus. on Lucian. T. I. p. 208.

^g καὶ θανάτους — καὶ ἀφαιρέσεις] The plural number is used for the sake of greater emphasis. Nouns of this kind, when violence and cruelty are indicated, are often put in the plural. Compare Seidler on Eurip. Electr. v. 479. Achilles Tat. VIII. 8. καὶ

θανάτοις καὶ δεσμοῖς παραδοθέντας. Plat. Laches. p. 191. D. ὅσοι πρὸς πενίας ἀνδρείοι εἰσι. So *mortes* in Cicer. Tusc. III. 4, de Fin. I. 8, *neces* Catil. I. 7.

^h Πῶς οὖν ἂν μετριώτατα σκοποῖμεθα] Μετρίως σκοπεῖσθαι is *to inquire as is proper, as agrees with the matter under consideration, as the matter demands, i. e. well, correctly.* So μετρίως λέγειν is used, and other phrases of the kind, as Theæt. p. 180. C. Rep. IV. p. 421. C. VI. p. 484. B. and elsewhere.— These words are commonly assigned to Crito, but the question does not come appropriately from him. Moreover, the speakers in Plato are wont to put questions to themselves, and immediately afterwards to give the required answers; by which the style is enlivened. See Gorg. p. 457. E. Protagor. p. 343. B.

ⁱ τὸν λόγον ἀναλάβοιμεν —] The word ἀναλαμβάνειν is *to treat anew, to resume the investigation.* Fischer is wrong in translating it simply *to inquire, to examine, to investigate.* For reference is made to what had been previously said by Socrates on the same subject; which investigation he now proposes to renew. For the words πότερον καλῶς ἐλέγτο ἑκάστοτε ἢ οὐ, are to be understood thus: *Whether on the several occasions when we formerly argued this point, was it correctly said, or not, that "some opinions of men are to be regarded, others not."*

^k ὃν σὺ λέγεις] That is, *which you mention*, namely in C. III. and V.

^l νῦν δὲ κατάδηλος ἄρα ἐγένετο] On this construction see Matth. §. 296. Buttman, §. 135. 5. On the use of the particles δὲ ἄρα, see *Apology*, C. XXIII. note (e).

^m ἄλλως ἔνεκα λόγου] These words are used ἐκ παραλλήλου. For ἄλλως, i. e. *rashly, without reason*, is explained by the phrase ἔνεκα λόγου, *for form's sake.* On which see Heindorf, on Theætet. p. 452.— ἐπειδὴ ὧδε ἔχω, *Since the danger of death threatens me, after I have come to be in danger of my life.*— The form τὶ λέγειν is opposed to φλυαρεῖν and ληρεῖν, whence it is easy to determine its signification. See Viger, p. 731.

ⁿ ὅσα γε τὰνθρώπεια] That is, *as indeed human affairs are, i. e. as far at least as may be conjectured from what usually happens to men.* The word παρακρούειν Hesychius interprets ἐξαπατᾶν, πλανᾶν. Which signification has arisen from the artifice in wrestling τοῦ παρακρούειν ἢ ποδὶ ἢ χειρὶ. See Etym. Magn. under the word, and Buttman on Phædr. p. 383. 2nd. ed. Heind. The sense



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c ὃ τῷ μὲν δικάῳ βέλτιον — ἀπόλλυτο ;] I am surprised at Buttmann's finding so much difficulty in accounting for the imperfects in this passage. He quotes Theodoret, who has copied this passage, *Curr. Affect. Græc. II. p. 27.*, as an authority for reading ἐγένετο — ἀπόλετο, so that the aorist may indicate customary acts. But this mode of using the aorist does not apply to this passage, and moreover Theodoret does not write ἀπόλετο, but ἀπόλλυται, which has been violently changed by Buttmann. I think that the imperfect may be easily accounted for; since Socrates before used the imperfect when he opened the present disquisition, saying πῶς αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐλέγετο; why should he not here also use the same tense, to indicate that he was referring to the remarks which he had formerly made on the same topic with his friends? The common reading may therefore be thus paraphrased: ὃ τῷ μὲν δικάῳ βέλτιον γίνεσθαι, τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπόλλυσθαι ἐλέγετο ἐκάστοτε ὑφ' ἡμῶν περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαλεγομένων. The imperfect is here correctly employed to indicate the repetition of an action, but in a very different sense from that in which the aorist could be used for that purpose. See *Matth. §. 503.*

VIII. ^a πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαϊόντων δόξῃ] Fischer has a long dissertation on this passage concerning the inversion of the order of words in the best writers by some such figure as synchysis or hyperbaton: but he appears to have overlooked the reason of the arrangement of the words in this passage. But it has been correctly remarked by Langius that μὴ is put before the words τῇ τῶν ἐπαϊόντων δόξῃ, because another sentence in opposition, to be connected by ἀλλά with what goes before, must be understood. We may account in like manner for a passage in Xenoph. *Memor. III. 9, 6.* τὸ δὲ ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν καὶ μὴ ἂ οἶδε δοξάζειν τε καὶ οἶεσθαι γινώσκειν, ἐγγυτάτω μανίας ἐλογίζετο εἶναι, although the later editors have written, contrary to the MSS., ἂ μὴ οἶδε. The following passages are also similar to the present. Xenoph. *Symp. IV. 16.* μαίνονται δὲ καὶ οἱ μὴ τοὺς καλοὺς στρατηγούς αἰρούμενοι. Understand ἀλλὰ τοὺς αἰσχροὺς. *Legg. XII. p. 943. A.* εἰ δέ τις ἐκλείπη τιλὶ κάκη, μὴ στρατηγῶν ἀφέντων, γραφὰς ἀστρατείας εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμικοὺς ἄρχοντας, ὅταν ἔλθωσιν ἀπὸ στρατοπέδου. *Phædo, p. 77. E.* μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ ὡς ἡμῶν δεδιότων. — ἄρα βιωτόν. That is, *whether life is worth living for, i. e. agreeable and pleasant.*

^b Ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐκείνου ἄρα] Here ἀλλά — ἄρα is used in the same manner as δέ — ἄρα in C. VI.

^c φ τὸ ἄδικον μὲν λωβᾶται] In conformity with all the best MSS. I have retained φ , which all the more recent editors, except Bekker, have changed into δ , as it is written in Eusebius. For the verb λωβᾶσθαι may also be joined to a dative, as appears from Phrynich. in Bekker's Anecd. T. I. p. 50. who writes: Λωβᾶσθαι τόνδε καὶ τῷδε, αἰτιατικῇ καὶ δοτικῇ. Aristoph. Equitt. v. 1413. Ἴν' ἴδωσιν αὐτόν, οἷς ἐλωβᾶσθ', οἱ ξένοι, where the common reading was οὔς, which Dindorf corrected from the Ravenna MS. Other examples are quoted by Creuzer on Plotinus de Pulcritud. p. 244., among others Dionys. Halic. Antiq. Rom. VII. 77. fin. p. 1501. ed. Reisk. (ἡ βουλή) ἀναζητήσασα τὸν τῷ θεράποντι λωβησάμενον. The reason why the dative is changed by Eusebius into the accusative is easily accounted for. The word ὀνίνησιν immediately follows, and this is never used with any case but the accusative. But it is not unusual to put the relative pronoun before verbs of different constructions. Menexen. p. 239. C. ὧν δὲ οὔτε ποιητῆς πω δόξαν ἀξίαν— λαβῶν ἔχει, ἔτι τε ἐστὶν ἐν μνηστείᾳ. Sympos. p. 201. B. ὠμολόγηται, οὗ ἐνδεής ἐστι καὶ μὴ ἔχει, τοῦτον ἐράν. Compare Matth. §. 428. 2.

^d ἢ φαυλότερον] Timæus rightly interprets φαῦλον by εὐτελής. For it is here opposed to τιμιώτερον. See Ruhnken on Tim. p. 268.

^e φροντιστέον, τί ἐροῦσιν] The common reading δ τι ἐροῦσι, may have originated with the grammarians, in consequence of the δ τι which occurs in the next line. Phileh. p. 17. B. ἀλλ' ὅτι (ἴσμεν) πόσα τέ ἐστὶ καὶ ὅποια. Gorg. p. 500. A. ἀρ' οὖν παντὸς ἀνδρός ἐστὶν ἐκλέξασθαι ποῖα ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων ἐστὶ καὶ ὅποια κακά; Ibid. p. 448. E. ἀλλ' οὐδεὶς ἐρωτᾷ, ποῖα τις εἶη ἢ Γοργίου τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τίς, καὶ ὄντινα δέοι καλεῖν τὸν Γοργίαν. Phædr. p. 271. A. Charmid. p. 160. D. Republ. III. p. 414. D. IX. p. 578. E. Legg. I. p. 632. C. VI. p. 767. C. VII. p. 803. A. Alcibiad. I. p. 111. E. p. 114. A. Demosth. De Coron. p. 275, extr. R. Æschin. adv. Ctesiph. §. 14. Xenoph. Mem. I. 1, 13, Other examples have been collected by Lobeck on Phrynichus, p. 57. On the verb ἐροῦσιν with two accusatives, see Apology, C. IX. note (e).

^f οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἰσηγεῖ] Εἰσηγεῖσθαι is said of those who propose and urge any law or condition; hence, those who are advisers of any thing. See Sturtz's Lexicon. Xenophont. under this word.

^g Δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα· φαίη γὰρ ἂν, ᾧ Σ. The MSS. vary much in this passage. The principal doubt is whether the words

δηλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα belong to the speech of Socrates, or to Crito's answer. The former opinion, on the authority of Ald. Bas. 1.2, is held by Buttmann; the latter by Cornarius and Stephanus, who think that the words ought to be written: Δηλαδὴ καὶ ταῦτα φαίη γ' ἂν τις, ᾧ Σ. The first reading is objected to from the want of force, which would certainly be felt, if Socrates first were to affirm that the thing was manifest; then Crito to confirm this assertion; and Socrates finally again to express his approbation of the same opinion. But the reading suggested by Cornarius and Stephanus is inadmissible, since all the MSS. have γάρ, and δηλαδὴ does not suit well with the remainder of the sentence. Wherefore we prefer the reading already restored by Im. Bekker, by which all difficulty is removed. For after Socrates has said that some may urge that the opinion of the vulgar is to be regarded on account of their power being so great as to enable them even to deprive of life whomsoever they please; Crito eagerly answers that this is manifest, for that certainly it might occur that some person would offer this objection. To this Socrates answers: Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, that is, you are very right in saying that this is evident, but —; and he proceeds to show the groundlessness of the objection.

^b ἀλλ' — ὅμοιος εἶναι τῷ καὶ πρότερον] That is, *what we before said, that all opinions of men are not to be regarded and followed, but only the opinions of persons deservedly reputed wise, still remains certain, and has not been shaken by any argument.* For what Socrates had affirmed (C. VI. near the beginning), before entering on the discussion, respecting the opinions of men, namely, that even under his present circumstances he ought to be guided by the same principles which had actuated him during the former part of his life, he now repeats and confirms in a few words at the close of the discussion. Therefore οὗτος δὲ λόγος, ὃν διεληλύθαμεν means the discourse on the opinions of the vulgar, which discourse, he says, ἔτι ὅμοιον εἶναι τῷ καὶ πρότερον, i. e. differs not from the sentiments to which he had formerly given utterance in conversation with his friends on the same subject, before he was prosecuted and condemned. For there can be no doubt that ὁ καὶ πρότερον λεχθεὶς λόγος refers to a discussion he had formerly had with his friends on the same topic. Since this is the case, it is easy to see how the words, καὶ τόνδε αὖ σκόπει, εἰ ἔτι μένει ἡμῖν, ought to be understood. For since Socrates intended to speak respecting the love of life, and the desire of preserving it, he desires Crito to consider



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apposition, with a kind of contempt, on which use of the pronoun οὗτος see C. IV. note (1), on the words ἔπειτα οὐχ ὁρᾶς τούτους τοὺς συκοφάντας.

ἃ ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἰρεῖ] *Since reason so dictates.* See Heindorf, on Euthydem. p. 232. Gataker, on Anton. IV. 24. Dorvill, on Charit. p. 645. — A little further on, with χάριτας, which properly depends on τελοῦντες, we must understand ἔχοντες or εἰδότες, on which construction see Wesseling on Diodor. IV. p. 270. Dorvill on Chariton. p. 440 foll. Ernesti on Xenoph. Mem. II. 1.

ἱ μὴ οὐ δέη ὑπολογίζεσθαι—πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν] Apolog. C. XVI. μηδὲν ὑπολογιζόμενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ. The sense is this: *See whether it is not improper to consider whether death or other calamities may result from our remaining here, previously to considering whether we shall do right or not.* Παραμένειν is *to remain in custody, and not to escape*: it is used principally of faithful slaves, παραμόνοι, to whom are opposed οἱ ἀποδιδράσκοντες, *fugitives*. See Xenoph. Oec. III. 4.

κ ὡς ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ—ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκουτος Various attempts have been made to explain this passage; but none of them appear perfectly satisfactory. The principal point in dispute is whether Socrates or Crito is the *subject* of the infinitive πείσαι. If we take Socrates as the subject, ταῦτα πράττειν must signify παύεσθαι λέγοντα πολλάκις τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, and to ἄκουτος we must supply σοῦ. The sense would then be: *I am very desirous to persuade you (Crito) not to repeat again and again the same thing, provided this be not done against your will.* But although this interpretation is approved of by Buttman and Wernsdorf, it appears to me very objectionable. For, besides the fact that no example of such a use of the verb πράττειν has been produced, it appears inconsistent with the character of Socrates to wish to press his opinion on Crito in so urgent a manner.—If Crito be considered the subject, we must understand μου with ἄκουτος. The meaning will then be: *I esteem it a great favour that you again and again attempt to persuade me to do this (i. e. to escape), only do not do so against my will.* This, if carefully considered, means: *I indeed prize highly your generous friendship, which prompts you to urge this counsel on me repeatedly (for the aorist indicates this repetition); but do not leave out of consideration my own will and opinion, since I am accustomed to be influenced not by motives, derived from external things, but solely by considerations of truth and virtue.* This interpretation is

confirmed by what goes before, εἴ πη ἔχεις ἀντιλέγειν ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, κ. τ. λ.; for what is said there, εἰ δὲ μή, παῦσαι ἤδη — πολλάκις μοι λέγων τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, is here more briefly expressed by the words, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος. The verb πράττειν is therefore used in its proper signification. Socrates says emphatically that Crito is attempting to persuade him *to do this*, i. e. to contrive the means of escaping.—Before μή repeat πείσης, from the preceding sentence; which expression cannot be regarded as harsh, when we recollect the frequent occurrence of the phrases μή μοι, μή μοι οὕτως, μή μοι ταῦτα, which have been explained by Heindorf, on Protagor. p. 494.—Instead of μὴ ἄκοντος the proper construction would have been μὴ ἄκοντα, which is extant in some MSS., but perhaps this passage is to be numbered amongst those in which the genitive is used without regard to the preceding verb. A passage very like this is in Thucyd. VII. 48.: χρημάτων μὲν ἀπορία αὐτοὺς ἐκτροχώσειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον ἤδη ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις ναυσὶ θαλασσοκρατούντων. Compare Matth. §. 563.

X. ^a ἐκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι] The grammarians commonly state that verbals require a dative of the person; but an accusative also is used with them. The reason is, that they contain the notion of the verb δεῖν or χρῆναι, so that ἀδικητέον εἶναι is the same as ἀδικεῖν δεῖν. See Matth. Gr. §. 447. a.

^b ἐκκεχυμέναί εἰσί] *Have been poured out, i. e. thrown away.* Jacobs appropriately compares the expression with ἐκχεῖν πλοῦτον, ἐκχεῖν χρήματα. The words γέροντες ἄνδρες, which might have been omitted, are inserted in consequence of the strong opposition to παίδων.

^c ἢ παντὸς μᾶλλον] Παντὸς μᾶλλον, instead of which πάντων μᾶλλον, is also used.—It means; *most of all, beyond all dispute.* See Hemster. on Lucian. I. p. 173.

^d ὅμως τό γε ἀδικεῖν —] Compare Gorgias, p. 469., where being asked, σὺ ἄρα βούλοιο ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀδικεῖν, he gave this most excellent answer: βουλοίμην μὲν ἂν ἔγωγε οὐδέτερα· εἰ δ' ἀναγκαῖον εἴη ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἐλοίμην ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν.

^e ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται] Archilochus in Theophil. ad Autolyc. II. 37. ἐν δ' ἐπίσταμαι μέγα, τὸ κακῶς τι δρῶντα δεινοῖς ἀνταμβεσθαι κακοῖς: Solon in Brunck's Poet. Gnom. p. 73. εἶναι δὲ γλυκὴν ὧδε φίλοις, ἐχθροῖσι δὲ πικρὸν· τοῖσι μὲν αἰδοῖον, τοῖσι δὲ δεινὸν ἰδεῖν. Fragment Eurip. in Valcken. p. 157. ἐχθρὸν κακῶς

δρᾶν ἀνδρὸς ἠγοῦμαι μέρος. That this was the general opinion is shown by the works of most ancient writers. For to revenge an injury was regarded as the characteristic of a brave spirit.

^f οὐδ' ἂν ὀτιοῦν πάσχη ὑπ' αὐτῶν] That is, *even if he be subjected to the most grievous injuries*. After πάσχη Eusebius and Theodoret insert τις, without any necessity, since in the preceding δεῖ ἀνταδικεῖν there is a latent signification of an indefinite person.

^g σκόπει δὴ οὖν κ. σ. εὖ μάλα] Οὖν δὴ and δὴ οὖν are not used indiscriminately. Euthyph. c. IV. ταῦτα δὴ οὖν. Phædo, p. 61. E. κατὰ τί δὴ οὖν ποτε οὐ φασι. Theæt. p. 148. A. τίς δὴ οὖν, ὦ παῖ. λείπεται λόγος. Men. p. 92. A. On the other hand, οὖν δὴ is found in Protag. p. 333. A. Sophist. p. 261. D. and elsewhere.

^h ὡς οὐδέποτε ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος] That is, *taking it never to be right*. Rep. IV. p. 437. A. ὑποθέμενοι ὡς τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος. Protagor. p. 323. E. ἔνθεν δὲ πᾶς παντὶ θυμοῦται καὶ νοθετεῖ δῆλον ὅτι ὡς ἐξ ἐπιμελείας καὶ μαθήσεως κτητῆς οὔσης. A little further on ἀρχή is *the principle of the discussion*, on which everything else is based. This is a very common use of the word. Τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, i. e. the conclusions drawn from that principle, as Euthyphro, p. 12. D. Cratyl. p. 402. D.—ἐμμένειν here means *to abide by and retain your former opinion*. Phædo, 92. A. ἐγὼ μὲν—καὶ τότε θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπείσθην ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ νῦν ἐμμένω ὡς οὐδενὶ λόγῳ.

XI ^a Ἐκ τούτων δὴ ἄθρει] That is, *if this is true, that it is wrong to injure any one in any manner, see what follows from it*.

^b μὴ πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν] That is, ἀκόντων Ἀθηναίων or μὴ ἀφιέντων Ἀθηναίων, as in C. IX.

^c οἷς ὠμολογήσαμεν δ.] On the construction, see Matth. §. 473. 2.

^d εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνθένδε—] Since the verb ἀποδιδράσκειν is generally used of run-away slaves, he adds, in order to soften the expression, εἴθ' ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάσαι τοῦτο, i. e. *or by whatever other name we are to call it*. Legg. I. p. 633. A. εἴτε μερῶν εἴθ' ἅττα αὐτὰ καλεῖν χρεῶν ἐστίν.

^e τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως] *The community of the state*. Cicero uses the same construction, Verrin. II. 46, 63. commune Siciliæ. So τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως, is said in Protag. p. 319. D. Rep. VII. p. 519. E. Lysias, Apol. Manth. p. 158. Accus. Philon. p. 161.



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in this passage, that *πρῶτον* is not followed by *ἔπειτα*. But the force of that word is in the following words: Ἄλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροφήν τε καὶ παιδείαν, κ. τ. λ. For this might also have been written in the form: ἔπειτα οὐ καλῶς προσέταττον οἱ ἐπὶ τῇ τροφῇ τε καὶ παιδείᾳ τεταγμένοι νόμοι παραγγ. — παιδεύειν; ἢ καὶ τούτοις μέμφει; A little further on Buttman substitutes *ἐλάμβανε* for the common reading *ἔλαβε*. Buttman maintains that the imperfect indicates not only the act of marriage, but also that it was performed according to law; but this assertion cannot, I think be proved. For since the words: καὶ δι' ἡμῶν ἔλαβε—καὶ ἐφύτευσέ σε, contain the explanation of the preceding words: οὐ πρῶτον μὲν σε ἐγεννήσαμεν, it appears impossible to doubt the correctness of *ἔλαβε*, which rests on the authority, if not of the best, at least of the most numerous MSS.—On the laws of the Athenians respecting marriages, see Meursius's Them. Attic. I. 14. II. 6.

^c τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς περὶ τοὺς γάμους] These words are added to explain more fully the preceding clause, and do not appear to me to be of doubtful authority, although I was formerly of opinion that *τοῖς νόμοις* arose from a gloss.

^d τροφήν τε καὶ παιδείαν] Phileb. p. 55. D. οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν τὸ μὲν, οἴμαι, δημιουργικόν ἐστὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ μαθήματα ἐπιστήμης, τὸ δὲ περὶ παιδείαν καὶ τροφήν; Xenoph. Mem. III. 5, 10. τὴν Ἐρεχθέως γε τροφήν καὶ παιδείαν.

^e ἢ οὐ καλῶς, κ. τ. λ.] The laws repeat with great emphasis the same question which they had previously put, in the words: Ἄλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τ. τ. γ.—ἐπαιδεύθης; The passage may be thus translated: *But do you find fault with the laws respecting the rearing and education which you have received. Have not those of us (i. e. laws) which have been enacted for these purposes enjoined well, etc.* The common reading *ἢ οὐ κ.* is incorrect.

^f ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν;] On the customs and laws of the Greeks, and principally of the Athenians, on these subjects, consult Aristot. Polit. VIII. 3. Demosthen. c. Timarch. p. 261. Petit. in Legg. Attic. p. 162. and Spanh. in Aristoph. Nubb. v. 961. and 969. Protagoras, p. 325. C.—p. 326. D. and Isocrat. Paneg. II. p. 195—197.

^g ἐγένου τε καὶ ἐξετράφης καὶ ἐπαιδεύθης] So Alcibiad. I. p. 122. B. τῆς δὲ σῆς γενέσεως καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας—οὐδενὶ μέλει. Legg. XI. p. 920. A. ὅσοι γενέσει καὶ τροφαῖς εὖ πεπαιδευνται.

^h καὶ δούλος, αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ σοὶ πρόγονοι;] Remark this mode of opposition. Sophocl. Œd. Col. v. 452. ἐπάξιος μὲν Οἰδίπους κατοικτίσαι, αὐτός τε παῖδές θ' αἴδ'. Ibid. v. 864. τοιγὰρ σέ, καὐτὸν καὶ γένος τὸ σὸν, θεῶν δὲ πάντα λεύσσων Ἕλιος δοίη βίον τοιοῦτον. See Apolog. Socr. C. XXXIII. note (d).

ⁱ καὶ σὺ ταῦτα ἀντ.] Most MSS., and amongst them Bodl., have καὶ σοὶ τ. ἀντ., which has been received into the text by Bekk.; but I do not think that examples of such an expression as: δίκαιόν μοί ἐστι ταῦτα ποιεῖν, will be found. This σὺ is referred to the verb οἶει, when common usage would require σέ, which would refer to the infinitive εἶναι. It is not difficult to account for this construction. For by the use of σὺ, the opposition is more emphatic; and, besides, the perspicuity of the passage would be injured, if we were to write: καὶ σὲ ταῦτα ἀντιπ. Protagor. p. 316. C. ταῦτ' οἶν ἤδη σὺ σκόπει, πότερον περὶ αὐτῶν μόνος οἶει δεῖν διαλέγεσθαι πρὸς μόνους ἢ μετ' ἄλλων: where see Heindorf. Demosthen. de Male Gest. Legat. p. 414. 15. ed. Reisk. ἡγούμην ἐν τούτοις πρῶτος αὐτὸς περιεῖναι δεῖν αὐτῶν καὶ μεγαλοψυχότερος φαίνεσθαι. Fritsch. Lectt. Lucian. p. 102 foll. Schæfer Demosth. Appar. T. V. p. 626. A few words further on, σοὶ belongs to ἐξ ἴσου ἦν.

^k οὔτε κακῶς ἀκούοντα ἀντιλέγειν—] These words are added for the purpose of explaining ταῦτα καὶ ἀντιποιεῖν: I mention this lest it might be supposed that a clause is wanting. It has been already remarked that connectives are not used with sentences which are added for the purpose of explanation.

^l πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἄρα —] Compare Apolog. Socrat. C. XXIII. note (c).—A little further on, instead of καὶ σὺ ἡμᾶς simply, we have καὶ σὺ δὲ ἡμᾶς, in order to add to the force of the opposition. The words: ὁ τῆ ἄλ. τ. ἄρ. ἐπιμελόμενος, added by apposition, are ironical.

^m τιμιώτερόν ἐστι πατρίς] There is no need of the article before πατρίς, which is found in some MSS. For the nouns πατήρ, μήτηρ, παῖς, ἀδελφός, γῆ, πόλις, ἀγρός, and others, when not used in reference to a certain and definite individual, but to a whole class, are usually put without the article. See Schæfer. Melett. crit. p. 45. p. 62 foll. p. 116. on Sophocl. Œd. Tyr. v. 630. Buttmann, on Meno. §. 7. So, further on: καὶ σέβεσθαι δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον —πατρίδα χαλεπαίνουσαν ἢ πατέρα. There is also an example in the preceding words: μητρός τε καὶ πατρός.

ⁿ καὶ ἐν μείζονι μοίρα] Ἐν μείζονι μοίρα εἶναι is said of that

which is estimated more highly, which is in greater estimation and honour. Compare Valcken, on Herodot. III. 172. αὐτὸν ἐν οὐδεμίᾳ μεγάλῃ μοίρῃ ἦγον.

ο καὶ ἢ πείθειν, ἢ ποιεῖν] Wolf translates it, *aut persuadendo contendere oportere*. For πείθειν is to conciliate by speaking, representing how the matter stands; to show a better way of proceeding. See Apolog. C. XXIV., where διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν are joined. A little further on: πείθειν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε.

ρ ἢ πείθειν αὐτὴν ἢ τὸ δ. πέφ.] The infinitive πείθειν is used as if it had been preceded by ποιεῖν δεῖ, which construction is very frequent. Gorg. p. 492. D. τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας φῆς οὐ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει τις οἶον δεῖ εἶναι, ἐὼντα δὲ αὐτὰς ὡς μεγίστας πλήρωσιν ἄλλοθὲν γέ ποθεν ἐτοιμάζειν. On which Heindorf remarks: "We are to supply δεῖν, the force of which is contained in κολαστέον." Rep. IV. p. 424. B. Xenoph. Mem. I. 5. 5. ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ—ἐλευθέρῳ ἀνδρὶ εὐκτέον εἶναι μὴ τυχεῖν δούλου τοιούτου, δουλεύοντα δὲ—ἰκετεύειν τοὺς θεούς, κ. τ. λ. Lucian. Hermotim. c. 23. T. I. p. 761. πάντων μάλιστα ἐπὶ τούτῳ σπουδαστέον, τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἀμελητέον, καὶ μηδὲ πατρίδος—πολὺν ποιεῖσθαι λόγον, μήτε παίδων ἢ γονέων—ἐπικλᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν κακείνους παρακαλεῖν, κ. τ. λ.

XIII. ^a τῷ ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι] Stephan. erroneously conjectures τὸ. For, as Fischer remarks, the verb προαγορεύομεν is connected with the infinitive ἐξεῖναι, and the words τῷ ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι signify by what means the laws proclaim that they allow any citizen, who chooses, to emigrate,—namely, by means of having made an enactment to that effect. Hence it is plain why the perfect tense is employed, and why προαγορεύομεν is used, which some have translated: *we proclaim, we order*.

^b ἐπειδὴν δοκιμασθῆ καὶ ἴδῃ] This is the reading of all the MSS., with one exception; and there is no reason why it should be changed into δοκιμάση, which is approved of by all the editors. For the sense is this: *After he has become his own master, has arrived at years of discretion, and has become acquainted with public affairs; that is, when he has arrived at that age, in which he is most capable of judging about matters relating to the commonwealth. This passage is illustrated by Æschin. adv. Timarch. p. 26. ed. Bremi. ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἐγγραφῆ τις εἰς τὸ ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον, καὶ τοὺς νόμους εἶδῃ τοὺς τῆς πόλεως, καὶ ἤδη δύνηται διαλογίζεσθαι τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ, οὐκ ἔτι ἑτέρῳ διαλέγεται (ὁ νομοθέτης).* We are now to consider what was the δοκιμασία εἰς ἄνδρας. The names of



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from which is derived ἔνοχος, *obnoxious, liable to a charge*. Therefore the sense is: *We say that you also will be liable to these accusations, or, will be guilty of these crimes.*

^b ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα] Understand ἐνεχομένοις.

^c δικάως καθάπτοιιντο] Hesychius: καθάπτεσθαι· λοιδορεῖσθαι, ὀνειδίζειν. See Heindorf on Phædo, p. 132.

^d τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων διαφερόντως] That is, *more than the other Athenians*. See Phædo, p. 64. E. On the subject here spoken of, see Phædr. p. 230. D.

^e ἐπὶ θεωρίαν] That is, *to witness the solemn games, namely, the Olympian, Nemæan, Isthmian and Pythian, which were attended by persons from every part of Greece.*

^f εἰ μὴ ποιστρ.] When he fought at Potidæa and Amphipolis, towns of Thrace, and at Delium, a town of Bœotia. See Apolog. C. XVII. and Laert. II. 22.

^g οὐδ' ἄλλων—εἰδέναι] That is, ὥστε εἰδέναι αὐτούς. We are informed by Seneca, Laertius, Libanius, and others, that Socrates resisted the inducements of Archelaus, king of Macedonia, and other princes, who invited him to settle in their dominions.

^h ὁμολόγεις καθ' ἡμᾶς πολιτεύεσθαι] The infinitive which is here put in the present tense, was changed by Stephens, against the MSS., into πολιτεύσεσθαι. In the same manner, C. XIII. near the end: καὶ ὅτι ὁμολογήσας ἢ μὴν πείθεσθαι οὔτε πείθεται οὔτε πείθει. And, further on in this chapter: φάσκοντές σε ὁμολογηκέναι πολιτεύεσθαι, and καθ' ἃς ἡμῖν ξυνέθου πολιτεύεσθαι, where Stephens likewise corrected to πείσεσθαι and πολιτεύσεσθαι. Legg. p. 937. B. ἐὰν ἐγγυητὴν ἀξιόχρεων ἢ μὴν μένειν καταστήσῃ: where Ast, with Stephens, wrote μενεῖν. Herodot. IX. 106. πίστι τε καταλαβόντες καὶ ὀρκίοισι ἐμμένειν τε καὶ μὴ ἀποστήσεσθαι: where Wesseling, against the MSS., substituted ἐμμένειν. Xenophon. Cyrop. VI. 2, 39. ἐμοὶ προσαγαγῶν ἐγγυητὰς ἢ μὴν πορεύεσθαι: where Stephens preferred πορεύσεσθαι. Anabas. II. 3, 27. ὁμόσαι ἢ μὴν πορεύεσθαι: where Schneider, after Stephens, gave πορεύσεσθαι. Eurip. Med. v. 750. ὄμνυμι—ἐμμένειν, ἃ σου κλύω: where see Schæfer. It certainly is not indifferent whether the future or present tense is used. If the future is employed, the speaker indicates an action not yet present, but which will take place at some future time, and promises that he will perform it at a future time. As in Xenophon. Hellen. II. 4. 30. ὁμόσαντες ὀρκούς ἢ μὴν μὴ μνησικακήσειν, could not be expressed in any other manner, since not a present, but a future vengeance

is thought of. But if the present is used, the speaker refers to a state of things, not simply in futurity, but now present, although it may continue longer. When a person says: ἡ μὲν, ἐμμένω; he declares by these words that, from the very moment of his giving the oath, he will abide by what he promises, since the circumstances are now present which call for its fulfilment. If this is a correct view, it must be easy to determine whether the present is to be retained in this passage, or the future form substituted. Let us imagine a citizen swearing that he will direct and govern his life, manners, and pursuits, according to the laws and ordinances of the state, in which he is about to live. Which will be the most correct: ἡ μὲν ὁμολογῶ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους πολιτεύσεσθαι; or ἡ μὲν ὁμολογῶ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους πολιτεύεσθαι? It appears to me, that the second form of the oath is preferable; since it indicates that from the moment of taking it he will obey the laws. It cannot then be wrong to use the same law of construction *in obliqua oratione* (i. e. in reciting a speech in the third person), as is used *in directa oratione* (i. e. in the speech as it comes from the speaker). Therefore, in all the passages before quoted, to which many others might be added, I think the reading of the MSS. ought to be preserved, as being singularly adapted to the meaning. For as to the addition of καὶ μὴ ἀποστήσεσθαι, the passage may be easily understood, without changing ἐμμένειν into ἐμμενεῖν. For the sense of the word is: *Affirming that they both now are willing to abide by their promises, and will never violate them at a future time.*—The next words: τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ παιδας ἐν αὐτῇ ἐποιήσω, are added as if they were preceded by καὶ ἐπολιτεύου, i. e. *and you conducted yourself as a citizen as well in other things, as also in this, that, &c.* This construction arises from the free formation of sentences often employed by the Greeks, who paid in such cases more regard to the sense, than to the grammatical construction.

¹ ἐξῆν σοι φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι] When the judges gave their first votes on his case. For, as we have mentioned in a note on Apolog. Socrat. C. XXV. the accuser always fixed the punishment in the indictment, if no punishment was already fixed by the laws. This was called τιμᾶν, which governs a dative of the person, and a genitive of the punishment. After the pleadings had been gone through, and the judges had by the first vote found the accused person guilty, he was asked what punishment he thought that he had deserved: τί ἄξιος εἶη παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι. This was τιμήσασθαι or ἀντιτιμήσασθαι, Apolog. Socr. C. XXVI. and XXVII., or ὑποτιμήσασθαι,

as in Xenophon, Apolog. Soc. C. XXIII. Therefore Socrates, on this question being put, might have answered that he had deserved exile.—καλλωπίζεσθαι, according to Hesychius, is properly κοσμεῖσθαι, *to adorn, or deck one's-self*: whence καλλωπίστρια, *a female who adorns others, a lady's-maid*. But in a metaphorical sense it signifies: *to be haughty like persons who are proud of their dress, to be elated, to swagger*, as here. Protagor. p. 333. D. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἐκαλλωπίζετο ἡμῖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας — ἔπειτα μέντοι ξυνεχώρησεν ἀποκρίνεσθαι. Respecting the infinitive τεθνάναι, for which θνήσκειν might have been expected, see Apolog. Socrat. C. XVII. note (2).

^k Ἄλλο τι οὖν ἂν φαίεν] The particle ἂν was commonly omitted; but it is by no means improperly inserted in this sentence. Aristoph. Pac. v. 137. ἀλλ' ὦ μέλε ἂν μοι σιτίων διπλῶν ἔδει. Demosth. p. 1445. 14. ed. Reisk. τί οὖν ἂν εἴποι τις σὺ παραινεῖς; Olynth. p. 14. 5. ed. R. τί οὖν ἂν τις εἴποι σὺ γράφεις; Plato, Phæd. p. 87. B. τί οὖν ἂν φαίη ὁ λόγος ἔτι ἀπιστεῖς;

^l ἄς δὴ ἐκάστοτε φῆς εὐνομ.] The laws and institutes of these states are spoken favourably of by Socrates, Republ. VIII. p. 544. C. Legg. I. p. 634 foll. Protagor. p. 342. C. D. Alcibiad. I. p. 121. In this place δὴ is equivalent to the Latin *scilicet*, on which use of the word see Valcken. on Herodot. V. 20. — ἐκάστοτε, *as often as you speak of them*.

^m οὐδὲ τῶν βαρβαρικῶν] This is the correct reading, being opposed to πόλεων Ἑλληνίδων. If βαρβάρων were read, τῶν Ἑλλήνων πόλεων would have been used.—Πηροί and ἀνάπηροι are applied to *those who are deficient in any part or member of the body, or at least deprived of its use*, as is correctly observed by Fischer on this passage.

ⁿ οἱ νόμοι δῆλον ὅτι.] These words appeared to Stephens to have arisen from a gloss. But Fischer has correctly observed that, if they were removed, what follows would lose almost all its force: τίνι γὰρ ἂν πόλις ἀρέσκοι ἄνευ νόμων; Besides δῆλον ὅτι or, as it was commonly written, δηλονότι, refers not only to οἱ νόμοι, but to the whole of the foregoing sentence, as if the passage stood thus: δῆλον ὅτι οὕτω διαφερόντως σοι ἤρεσκεν ἢ πόλις τε καὶ οἱ νόμοι.

^o ἔὰν ἡμῖν γε πείθῃ] In these words the laws answer themselves. At the close of the sentence we are to understand: ἀλλ' ἐμμενεῖς, being a repetition of the expression, which was employed in asking the question.



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ἐνδύομαι. A garment which covers the whole body appears to be understood, as appears from the verb περιτίθεσθαι.

^h σχῆμα] That is, *habit* or *clothing*. Hesychius: σχῆμα—*ἱματισμός*. This use of the word has been noticed by Buser, on Suidas, T. I. p. 192. The words are thus connected: σκευήν τε περιθέμενος καὶ τὸ σχῆμα μεταλλάξας. But the words: ἡ διφθ. λ. ἡ ἄλλα, κ. τ. λ. indicate the different kinds of τῆς σκευῆς.

ⁱ ἐτόλμησας οὕτω γλίσχρως] Here *τολμᾶν* is *to endure*, *not to blush at*, οὐκ αἰσχύνεσθαι. See Jacobs *Addit. ad Athenæum*. p. 309.

^k εἰ δὲ μή] *But if otherwise; but if you should be troublesome to the Thessalians*. See *Matthiæ Gr.* §. 617. *Buttmann*, §. 135. 10. Compare *Eurip. Alcest.* v. 707. εἰ δ' ἡμᾶς κακῶς ἐρεῖς, ἀκούσει πολλὰ κοῦ ψευδῆ κακά.

^l ὑπερχόμενος δὴ—πάντας—καὶ δουλεύων.] *Schleiermacher* considers *τί ποιῶν* introduced in so awkward a manner, and *δουλεύων* so superfluous, that he regards the latter as a gloss on *ὑπερχόμενος*, and would read the sentence: *ὑπερχόμενος δὴ π. ἀνθρ. βιώσει καὶ τί ποιῶν*.—*Buttmann*, disliking the introduction of *ἐν Θεσσαλία*, towards the end of so long a sentence, and having seen in one of the *Vindob. MSS.*, *εἰς Θεσσαλίαν*, omits these words after *ἀποδεδημ.*, and thus remodels the whole passage. *ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσει πάντας ἀνθρώπους, καὶ τί ποιῶν ἢ εὐωχούμενος, εἰς Θεσσαλίαν ὥσπερ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἀποδεδημηκῶς*; But, to say nothing of the objections which might be offered to this correction, it does not appear necessary to alter the common reading. For *καὶ δουλεύων* is by no means without a distinct signification; it expresses the meaning more forcibly than the preceding *ὑπερχόμενος*. For the meaning is: *You will live indeed studying how to insinuate yourself into the favour and companionship of others, and even being a slave to them*. The second reproach, therefore, is much stronger than the first, especially when directed against a man, who had so utter an aversion to every thing servile. It does not appear necessary to insert *καὶ* before *τί ποιῶν*, as *Schleiermacher* has done. For these words are not closely connected with what goes before, although the interrogation only begins here. I have therefore considered it sufficient to put a shorter stop after *δουλεύων* than the common full point. The sense of the whole passage is: *You will therefore live the flatterer, and even the slave of other men: how else employed, pray, than banquetting in Thessaly, as if you had gone to*

Thessaly from your own country to some feast? The repetition of *Thessaly* is not without force. On what follows, compare Axioch. p. 124. Ἀξίοχε,, τί ταῦτα; ποῦ τὰ πρόσθεν αὐχήματα; Soph. Œd. T. v. 940. ὦ θεῶν μαντεύματα, ἴν' ἐστέ; Ibid. 946. τὰ σέμν' ἴν' ἤκει τοῦ θεοῦ μαντεύματα; Eurip. Supplic. v. 127. τὸ δ' Ἄργος ὑμῖν ποῦ ἔστιν; ἢ κόμπει μάτην;

^m Ἀλλὰ δὴ τῶν παιδῶν ἕνεκα β] Here ἀλλὰ δὴ, like the Latin *at enim*, may be translated: *But perhaps you will say that*. It is used for the purpose of refuting an objection by anticipation. Republ. X. p. 600. Α. ἀλλὰ δὴ εἰ μὴ δημοσίᾳ, ἰδίᾳ τισὶν ἡγεμῶν παιδείας αὐτῶς ζῶν λέγεται Ὅμηρος γενέσθαι. Protag. p. 338. C. ἀλλὰ δὴ βελτίονα ἡμῶν αἰρήσεσθε. Where see Heindorf. Compare C. VIII. of Crito, near the end.

ⁿ ἵνα καὶ τοῦτό σου ἀπολαύσωσιν;] The verb ἀπολαύειν, which is properly said of things good and pleasant, is often employed with Attic εἰρωνεία in a bad sense. Legg. p. 910. Β. καὶ πᾶσα οὕτως ἢ πόλις ἀπολαύη τῶν ἀσεβῶν τρόπον τινὰ δικαίως. Lucian. Dialog. Deor. X. Sol. τοιαῦτα ἀπολαύσονται τῶν Διὸς ἐρώτων. Mercur. Σιώπα, ὦ Ἥλιε, μὴ τι κακὸν ἀπολαύσης τῶν λόγων.

^o αὐτοῦ] That is, *At Athens*.—Immediately afterwards θρέψονται καὶ παιδεύονται are to be taken παθητικῶς. Compare Matth. §. 496. note 4. Buttm. §. 123. 3.

^p πότερον ἐὰν εἰς Θ.] Lest the reader might find a difficulty in the want of a conjunction to connect this sentence with the preceding, it may be remarked that sentences placed in strong opposition are often without any particle. Therefore there is no reason for reading with Eusebius, πότερον δὲ ἐάν. — On the words εἰ τι ὄφελος, see C. V. note (^m).

XVI. ^a πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου] See C. IX. note (ⁱ).

^b οὔτε γὰρ ἐνθάδε] That is, *in this life*.

^c ταῦτα πράττοντι] *Which Crito has proposed to you*.

^d ἄμεινον εἶναι] ἄμεινον εἶναι is constantly used instead of ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. Compare Apolog. Socr. C. II., near the end. Phædo, p. 115. Α. Gorg. p. 468. Β. D. Republ. III. p. 410. D. But since the comparative ἄμεινον is frequently used in this manner, οὐδὲ δικαιοτέρον οὐδὲ δσιώτερον are also added by a kind of attraction. In the same manner Phædo, p. 98. E. The sense is: *Neither you, nor any of your friends will be, or be considered, happier, juster, or holier, if you make your escape*.

^e ἀλλὰ νῦν μὲν] That is, *But if you do not comply with the suggestions of Crito, you will depart, &c.*

XVII. ^a ὅτι ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκ.] The Corybantes were priests of the Mother of the Gods in Phrygia, and they leaped or danced under the influence of the divinity. See Strabo. X. p. 725. Almelov. Whence κορυβαντιᾶν is, *to be affected with the disease called κορυβαντιασμός*, in which the person imagines he hears the sound of flutes in his ears: which disease was supposed to come from the Corybantes. See Scaliger on Catull. XLII. 8. and Langbaen. on Longin. p. 209. Toll. Compare also Ruhnken on Tim. p. 163.—ἦχή, for ἦχος, is an Attic word. See Mœris and Thomas M. under the word.—βομβεῖν, *to buzz*, is here said of the voice of the laws resounding in his ears. Synesius Epist. 123. ἐμβομβεῖ μου ταῖς ἀκοαῖς ἡ θαυμαστή σου τῶν σοφῶν λόγων ἦχώ.—A little further on ἴσθι—μάτην ἐρεῖς is used as in Apolog. Socr. C. V. εὖ μέντοι ἴστε, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐρῶ. Ibid. C. XVII. ταυτα γὰρ κελεύει—, εὖ ἴστε.

^b ἐάν τι λέγῃς παρὰ ταῦτα] Phædr. p. 107. A. οὐκ οὐκ ἔγωγε ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι λέγειν. Phædo, p. 80. B. ἔχομέν τι παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο λέγειν.



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ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ.

Char. I. ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Αὐτός, ὦ Φαίδων, παρεγένου^α Σωκράτει ἐκείνη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, ἧ τὸ φάρμακον ἔπιεν ἐν τῷ δεσμοτηρίῳ, ἢ ἄλλου του ἠκουσας; ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Αὐτός, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες. ΕΧ. Τί οὖν δὴ ἐστὶν ἄττα εἶπεν^β ὁ ἀνὴρ πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου; καὶ πῶς ἐτελεύτα; ἠδέως γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσαιμι. καὶ γὰρ οὔτε τῶν πολιτῶν Φλιασίων^γ οὐδεὶς πάνυ τι ἐπιχωριάζει τὰ νῦν Ἀθήναζε, οὔτε τις ξένος ἀφίικται χρόνου συχνοῦ ἐκεῖθεν, ὅστις ἂν ἡμῖν σαφές τι ἀγγεῖλαι οἶός τ' ἦν^δ περὶ τούτων, πλήν γε δὴ ὅτι φάρμακον πιὼν ἀποθάνοι τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδὲν εἶχε φράζειν. ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης ἄρα ἐπύθεσθε^ε ὃν τρόπον ἐγένετο; ΕΧ. Ναί, ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν ἠγγειλέ τις,^ς καὶ ἐθαυμάζομέν γε, ὅτι, πάλαι γενομένης αὐτῆς, πολλῶ ὕστερον^ς φαίνεται ἀποθανών. τί οὖν ἦν τοῦτο,^δ ὦ Φαίδων; ΦΑΙΔ. Τύχη τις αὐτῷ, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, συνέβη· ἔτυχε γὰρ τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης ἡ πρύμνα^ι ἐστεμμένη^κ τοῦ πλοίου, ὃ εἰς Δῆλον Ἀθηναῖοι πέμπουσιν.^λ ΕΧ. Τοῦτο δὲ δὴ τί ἐστὶν; ΦΑΙΔ. Τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ πλοῖον, ὡς φασιν Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐν ᾧ Θησεύς^μ ποτε εἰς Κρήτην τοὺς δὶς ἑπτὰ ἐκείνους ὦχετο ἄγων καὶ ἔσωσέ τε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη. τῷ οὖν Ἀπόλλωνι εὗξαντο, ὡς λέγεται,

τότε, εἰ σωθεῖεν, ἐκάστου ἔτους θεωρίαν ἀπάξειν^π εἰς Δῆλον· ἦν δὴ αἰεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι^ο ἐξ ἐκείνου κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν τῷ θεῷ πέμπουσιν. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἄρξωνται^ρ τῆς θεωρίας, νόμος ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρῆναι τὴν πόλιν καὶ δημοσίᾳ μηδένα ἀποκτιννύναι, πρὶν ἂν εἰς Δῆλόν τε ἀφίκηται τὸ πλοῖον καὶ πάλιν δεῦρο· τοῦτο δ' ἐνίοτε ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ γίνεταί, ὅταν τύχωσιν ἄνεμοι ἀπολαβόντες αὐτούς.^α ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶ τῆς θεωρίας, ἐπειδὰν ὁ ἱερεὺς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος στέψη τὴν πρύμναν τοῦ πλοίου· τοῦτο δ' ἔτυχεν, ὡς περ λέγω,^ε τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης γεγονός. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολὺς χρόνος ἐγένετο τῷ Σωκράτει ἐν τῷ δεσμοτηρίῳ ὁ μεταξὺ τῆς δίκης τε καὶ τοῦ θανάτου.

II. ΕΧ. Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν τὸν θάνατον, ὦ Φαίδων; τί ἦν τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ πραχθέντα, καὶ τίνες οἱ παραγενόμενοι τῶν ἐπιτηδείων τῷ ἀνδρὶ; ἢ οὐκ εἶων οἱ ἄρχοντες^α παρεῖναι, ἀλλ' ἔρημος ἐτελεύτα φίλων; ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ παρῆσάν τινες, καὶ πολλοί γε.^β ΕΧ. Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα προθυμήθητι ὡς σαφέστατα ἡμῖν ἀπαγγεῖλαι, εἰ μὴ τίς σοι ἀσχολία τυγχάνει οὔσα. ΦΑΙΔ. Ἀλλὰ σχολάζω γε, καὶ πειράσομαι ὑμῖν διηγήσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ τὸ μεμνήσθαι Σωκράτους καὶ αὐτὸν λέγοντα καὶ ἄλλου ἀκούοντα ἔμοιγε αἰεὶ πάντων ἡδιστον. ΕΧ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὦ Φαίδων, καὶ τοὺς ἀκουσομένους γε τοιούτους ἑτέρους ἔχεις.^γ ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ὡς ἂν δύνῃ ἀκριβέστατα διελεῖν πάντα. ΦΑΙΔ. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε θαυμάσια ἔπαθον παραγενόμενος. οὔτε γὰρ ὡς θανάτῳ παρόντα με ἀνδρὸς ἐπιτηδείου ἔλεος εἰσῆει.^δ εὐδαίμων γάρ μοι^ε ἀνὴρ ἐφαίνετο, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων, ὡς ἀδεῶς καὶ γενναίως^ε ἐτελεύτα, ὥστ' ἔμοιγ' ἐκεῖνον παρίστασθαι μηδ' εἰς Ἄιδου ἰόντα ἄνευ θείας



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καὶ ἡ δίκη ἐγένετο· πλησίον γὰρ ἦν^α τοῦ δεσμοτηρίου. περιεμένομεν οὖν ἐκάστοτε, ἕως ἀνοιχθείη^β τὸ δεσμοτήριον, διατρίβοντες μετ' ἀλλήλων·^γ ἀνεώγετο γὰρ οὐ πρῶ· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀνοιχθείη, εἰσῆμεν παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη καὶ τὰ πολλὰ διημερεύομεν μετ' αὐτοῦ. καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε πρωϊαίτερον ξυνελέγημεν. τῇ γὰρ προτεραίᾳ ἡμέρᾳ ἐπειδὴ ἐξήλθομεν ἐκ τοῦ δεσμοτηρίου ἐσπέρας, ἐπυθόμεθα, ὅτι τὸ πλοῖον ἐκ Δήλου ἀφυγμένον εἶη παρηγγείλαμεν οὖν ἀλλήλοις ἦκειν ὡς πρωϊαίτατα εἰς τὸ εἰώθος. καὶ ἦκομεν, καὶ ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ὁ θυρωρός, ὅσπερ εἰώθει ὑπακούειν,^δ εἶπε περιμένειν καὶ μὴ πρότερον παριέναι, ἕως ἂν αὐτὸς κελεύσῃ. Λύουσι γάρ, ἔφη, οἱ ἔνδεκα Σωκράτη καὶ παραγγέλλουσιν, ὅπως ἂν τῆδε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τελευτήσῃ. οὐ πολὺν δ' οὖν χρόνον ἐπισχῶν^ε ἦκε καὶ ἐκέλευσεν ἡμᾶς εἰσιέναι. εἰσιόντες οὖν κατελαμβάνομεν τὸν μὲν Σωκράτη ἄρτι λελυμένον,^ς τὴν δὲ Ξανθίππην, γιγνώσκεις γάρ, ἔχουσάν τε τὸ παιδίον αὐτοῦ καὶ παρακαθημένην. ὡς οὖν εἶδεν ἡμᾶς ἡ Ξανθίππη, ἀνευφήμησέ^ς τε καὶ τοιαῦτ' ἄττα εἶπεν, οἷα δὴ εἰώθασιν αἱ γυναῖκες, ὅτι ὦ Σώκρατες, ὕστατον δὴ σε προσερούσι νῦν οἱ ἐπιτήδειοι καὶ σὺ τούτους. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης βλέψας εἰς τὸν Κρίτωνα, ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, ἀπαγαγέτω τις ταύτην οἴκαδε. Καὶ ἐκείνην μὲν ἀπῆγόν τινες τῶν τοῦ Κρίτωνος^β βοῶσάν τε καὶ κοπτομένην· ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἀνακαθιζόμενος ἐπὶ τὴν κλίνην^ι συνέκαμψέ τε τὸ σκέλος καὶ ἐξέτριψε τῇ χειρὶ, καὶ τρίβων ἅμα^κ ὦς ἄτοπον,^ι ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔοικέ τι εἶναι τοῦτο, ὃ καλοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἡδύ· ὡς θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν^μ ἐναντίον εἶναι, τὸ λυπηρόν, τῷ ἅμα μὲν αὐτῷ μὴ ἐθέλειν παραγίγνεσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἰ δὲ τις διώκῃ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ λαμβάνῃ, σχεδόν τι ἀναγκάζεσθαι αἰεὶ λαμβάνειν

καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ὥσπερ ἐκ μιᾶς κορυφῆς συνημμένω δύ' ὄντε. καὶ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, εἰ ἐνενόησεν αὐτὰ Αἴσωπος, μῦθον ἂν συνθεῖναι, ὡς ὁ θεὸς βουλόμενος αὐτὰ διαλλάξαι πολεμοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἠδύνατο, ξυνῆψεν εἰς ταῦτόν αὐτοῖς τὰς κορυφάς, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ὧ ἂν τὸ ἕτερον παραγένηται ἐπακολουθεῖ ὕστερον καὶ τὸ ἕτερον. ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἔοικεν, ἐπειδὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ^α ἦν ἐν τῷ σκέλει πρότερον τὸ ἀλγεινόν, ἦκειν δὴ φαίνεται ἐπακολουθοῦν τὸ ἡδύ.

LXIV. Ταῦτα δὴ εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ, ὁ Κρίτων, Εἶεν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· τί δὲ τούτοις ἢ ἐμοὶ ἐπιστέλλεις^α ἢ περὶ τῶν παίδων ἢ περὶ ἄλλου του, ὃ τι ἂν σοι ποιοῦντες ἡμεῖς ἐν χάριτι μάλιστα ποιοῖμεν;^β Ἄπερ αἰὲν λέγω, ἔφη, ὦ Κρίτων, οὐδὲν καινότερον^γ ὅτι ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι^δ ὑμεῖς καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς^ε καὶ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν χάριτι ποιήσετε ἅττ' ἂν ποιῆτε, καὶ μὴ νῦν ὁμολογήσητε· εἰ δὲ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἀμελήητε, καὶ μὴ θέλητε ὥσπερ κατ' ἴχνη κατὰ τὰ νῦν τε εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ζῆν, οὐδ' εἰ πολλὰ ὁμολογήσητε ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ σφόδρα, οὐδὲν πλέον ποιήσετε.^ς Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν προθυμηθησόμεθα, ἔφη, οὕτω ποιεῖν· θάπτωμεν δέ σε τίνα τρόπον; Ὅπως ἂν, ἔφη, βούλησθε, εἴανπερ γε λάβητέ με καὶ μὴ ἐκφύγω ὑμᾶς. Γελάσας δὲ ἅμα ἡσυχῆ καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀποβλέψας εἶπεν, Οὐ πείθω, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, Κρίτωνα, ὡς ἐγὼ εἶμι οὗτος ὁ Σωκράτης, ὁ νυνὶ διαλεγόμενος^β καὶ διατάπτων ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων, ἀλλ' οἶεταί με ἐκείνον εἶναι, ὃν ὄψεται ὀλίγον ὕστερον νεκρὸν, καὶ ἐρωτᾷ δὴ, πῶς με θάπτῃ.^η ὅτι δὲ ἐγὼ πάλαι πολὺν λόγον πεποίημαι, ὡς, ἐπειδὴν πῖω τὸ φάρμακον,

οὐκέτι ὑμῖν παραμενῶ, ἀλλ' οἰχήσομαι ὑπιῶν εἰς μακάρων δὴ τινὰς^ι εὐδαιμονίας, ταῦτά μοι δοκῶ αὐτῶ ἄλλως λέγειν,^κ παραμυθούμενος ἅμα μὲν ὑμᾶς, ἅμα δ' ἑμαυτόν. ἐγγυήσασθε^λ οὖν με πρὸς Κρίτωνα, ἔφη, τὴν ἐναντίαν ἐγγύην ἢ ἣν οὗτος πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἠγγυᾶτο. οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἢ μὴν παραμενεῖν.^μ ὑμεῖς δὲ ἢ μὴν μὴ παραμενεῖν ἐγγυήσασθε, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνω, ἀλλὰ οἰχήσεσθαι ὑπιόντα, ἵνα Κρίτων ῥᾶον φέρῃ, καὶ μὴ ὄρων μου τὸ σῶμα ἢ καόμενον ἢ κατορυττόμενον ἀγανακτῆ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ, ὡς δεινὰ πάσχοντος, μηδὲ λέγῃ ἐν τῇ ταφῇ, ὡς ἢ προτίθεται Σωκράτη ἢ ἐκφέρει ἢ κατορύττει.^ν εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὦ ἄριστε Κρίτων, τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν οὐ μόνον εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο^ο πλημμελές, ἀλλὰ καὶ κακόν τι ἐμποιεῖ ταῖς ψυχαῖς. ἀλλὰ θαρρεῖν τε χρὴ καὶ φάναι τοῦμὸν σῶμα θάπτειν, καὶ θάπτειν οὕτως, ὅπως ἂν σοι φίλον ἢ καὶ μάλιστα ἠγῆ νόμιμον εἶναι.

LXV. Ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἀνίστατο εἰς οἴκημά τι^α ὡς λουσόμενος, καὶ ὁ Κρίτων εἶπετο αὐτῶ, ἡμᾶς δ' ἐκέλευε περιμένειν. περιεμένομεν οὖν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διαλεγόμενοι περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ἀνασκοποῦντες, τοτὲ δ' αὖ περὶ τῆς ξυμφορᾶς διεξιόντες, ὅση ἡμῖν γεγονυῖα εἴη, ἀτεχνῶς ἠγούμενοι, ὥσπερ πατὴρ στερηθέντες, διάξιν ὀρφανοὶ τὸν ἔπειτα βίον. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐλούσατο, καὶ ἠνέχθη παρ' αὐτὸν τὰ παῖδιά — δύο γὰρ αὐτῶ υἱεῖς^β μικροὶ ἦσαν, εἰς δὲ μέγας — καὶ αἱ οἰκεῖαι γυναῖκες ἀφίκοντο,^γ ἐκείναις ἐναντίον τοῦ Κρίτωνος διαλέχθεις τε καὶ ἐπιστείλας ἅττα ἐβούλετο, τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας καὶ τὰ παῖδιά ἀπιέναι ἐκέλευσεν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἦκε παρ' ἡμᾶς. καὶ ἦν ἤδη ἐγγὺς ἡλίου δυσμῶν. χρόνον γὰρ πολὺν διέτριψεν ἔνδον. ἔλθων δ' ἐκαθέζετο λελουμένος, καὶ οὐ πόλλ'



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οὐδενὸς ἔτι ἐνόητος. ἀλλ' ἴθι, ἔφη, πιθοῦ καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει.

LXVI. Καὶ ὁ Κρίτων ἀκούσας ἔνευσε τῷ παιδί πλησίον ἐστῶτι. καὶ ὁ παῖς ἐξελθὼν καὶ συχνὸν χρόνον διατρέψας ἤκεν ἄγων τὸν μέλλοντα δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον, ἐν κύλικι φέροντα τετριμμένον. ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης τὸν ἄνθρωπον, Εἶεν, ἔφη, ὦ βέλτιστε,^a σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἐπιστήμων, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν; Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἔφη, ἢ πίνοντα περιέειναι, ἕως ἂν σου βάρος^b ἐν τοῖς σκέλεσι γένηται, ἔπειτα κατακεῖσθαι· καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ ποιήσει.^c Καὶ ἅμα ὤρεξε τὴν κύλικα τῷ Σωκράτει. καὶ ὅς λαβὼν καὶ μάλα ἴλεως,^d ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, οὐδὲν τρέσας οὐδὲ διαφθείρας οὔτε τοῦ χρώματος οὔτε τοῦ προσώπου, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἰώθει, ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας^e πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, Τί λέγεις, ἔφη, περὶ τούδε τοῦ πώματος πρὸς τὸ ἀποσπείσαι τινι; ἔξεστιν, ἢ οὔ; Τοσοῦτον, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τρίβομεν, ὅσον οἴομεθα μέτριον εἶναι^f πιεῖν. Μανθάνω, ἢ δ' ὅς· ἀλλ' εὐχέσθαι γέ που τοῖς θεοῖς ἔξεστί τε καὶ χρὴ τὴν μετοίκησιν τὴν ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε εὐτυχῆ γενέσθαι· ἂ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ εὐχομαί τε καὶ γένοιτο ταύτη. Καὶ ἅμα εἰπὼν ταῦτα ἐπισχόμενος^g καὶ μάλα εὐχερῶς καὶ εὐκόλως ἐξέπτε. καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ τέως μὲν ἐπιεικῶς οἰοίτε ἦσαν κατέχειν τὸ μὴ δακρύειν,^h ὡς δὲ εἶδομεν πίνοντά τε καὶ πεπωκότα, οὐκέτι, ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ γε βία καὶ αὐτοῦ ἄστακτὶ ἐχώρει τὰ δάκρυα, ὥστε ἐγκαλυψάμενοςⁱ ἀπέκλαον ἐμαυτόν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκεῖνόν γε, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ τύχην, οἴου ἀνδρὸς^k ἐταίρου ἐστερημένος εἶην. ὁ δὲ Κρίτων ἔτι πρότερος ἐμοῦ, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ οἴός τ' ἦν κατέχειν τὰ δάκρυα, ἐξανέστη. Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ οὐδὲν ἐπαύετο δακρύων, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε ἀναβρυχησάμενος, κλάων καὶ ἀγανακτῶν

οὐδένα ὄντινα οὐ κατέκλασε¹ τῶν παρόντων, πλήν γε αὐτοῦ Σωκράτους. ἐκεῖνος δὲ, Οἶα, ἔφη, ποιεῖτε,^m ὦ θαυμάσιοι. ἐγὼ μέντοι οὐχ ἤκιστα τούτου ἔνεκα τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπέπεμψα, ἵνα μὴ τοιαῦτα πλημμελοῖεν· καὶ γὰρ ἀκήκοα, ὅτι ἐν εὐφημίᾳ χρὴ τελευτᾶν. ἀλλ' ἡσυχίαν τε ἄγετε καὶ καρτερεῖτε. Καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀκούσαντες ἡσυχύνθημέν τε καὶ ἐπέσχομεν τοῦ δακρῦειν. ὁ δὲ περιελθὼν, ἐπειδὴ οἱ βαρύνεσθαι ἔφη τὰ σκέλη, κατεκλίθη ὑπτίος· οὕτω γὰρ ἐκέλευεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. καὶ ἅμα ἐφαπτόμενος αὐτοῦ οὗτος ὁ δοὺς τὸ φάρμακον,ⁿ διαλιπὼν χρόνον^o ἐπεσκόπει τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰ σκέλη, καῖπειτα σφόδρα πῖεσας αὐτοῦ τὸν πόδα ἤρετο, εἰ αἰσθάνοιτο· ὁ δ' οὐκ ἔφη. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὐθις τὰς κνήμας· καὶ ἐπανιὼν οὕτως^p ἡμῖν ἐπεδείκνυτο, ὅτι ψύχοιτό τε καὶ πήγνυτο. καὶ αὐτὸς ἤπτετο^q καὶ εἶπεν, ὅτι, ἐπειδὴν πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ γένηται αὐτῷ, τότε οἰχθήσεται. ἤδη οὖν σχεδὸν τι αὐτοῦ ἦν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἦτρον^r ψυχόμενα; καὶ ἐκκαλυψάμενος, ἐνεκεκάλυπτο γάρ,^s εἶπεν, ὁ δὴ τελευταῖον ἐφθέγγετο, ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν^t ἀλεκτρύονα. ἀλλ' ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσητε. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα, ἔφη, ἔσται, ὁ Κρίτων· ἀλλ' ὄρα, εἴ τι ἄλλο λέγεις.^u Ταῦτα ἐρομένου αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον χρόνον διαλιπὼν ἐκινήθη τε καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐξεκάλυψεν αὐτόν, καὶ ὡς τὰ ὄμματα ἔστησεν·^v ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Κρίτων ξυνέλαβε τὸ στόμα^w τε καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς.

LXVII. "Ἦδε ἡ τελευταῖα, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, τοῦ ἐταίρου ἡμῖν ἐγένετο, ἀνδρός, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαῖμεν ἄν, τῶν τότε ὧν ἐπειράθημεν^a ἀρίστου καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου.



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τῶν πολιτῶν τῶν Φλιασίων. Therefore some commentators thought that the word Φλιασίων ought to be removed as superfluous; and others, that the article τῶν ought to be inserted after πολιτῶν, which reading is found in one of L. Bekker's MSS. But since this reading greatly weakens the sentence, and Φλιασίων is not omitted in a single MS., it seems proper to resort to another explanation. It appears to me that proper names, being in themselves sufficiently definite, and forming only a single notion with their substantives, do not require the article. Apolog. Socrat. C. XX. καὶ ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ Ἀντιοχίς πρυτανεύουσα, where no MS. has the article. In Meno, *init.* καὶ οὐχ ἤκιστα οἱ τοῦ σου ἑταίρου Ἀριστίππου πολῖται Λαρισσαῖοι. — The verb ἐπιχωριάζειν, *to sojourn*, is joined with Ἀθήναζε, *to Athens*; since the Greeks frequently join verbs of rest to words signifying motion to a place; so as to unite two sentences in a single clause. Therefore the sense is this: *for none of the Phliasian citizens now goes to Athens and sojourns there.* Xenoph. Anab. I. 2, 2. παρῆσαν εἰς Σάρδεις, i. e. *went to Sardis, and were there.* Stephens therefore is wrong in interpreting ἐπιχωριάζειν by the word “ventitare” *go frequently.*

^d ὅστις ἂν ἡμῖν—οἶός τ' ἦν] The sense being that *no one was able to give us any certain information on that subject*, Heindorf appears to have been correct in reading οἶός τ' ἦν. Reisingius commentat. de ἂν particula, p. 113., considered ὅστις ἂν—ἦν less elegant on account of the preceding perfect, ἀφίκται. This, however, may be thus explained: οὔτε τις ἔστι τῶν ξένων τῶν ἐκεῖθεν ἀφικομένων, ὅστις—οἶός τ' ἦν. In the same manner, Euripid. Medea, v. 1306. οὐκ ἔστιν ἥτις τοῦτ' ἂν Ἑλληνίς γυνὴ ἔτλη ποθ'. The words immediately following seem to confirm this construction: πλήν γε δὴ ὅτι φάρμακον πιῶν ἀποθάνοι.

^e Οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης ἄρα ἐπ.] Instead of τὰ περὶ τὴν δίκην, because, as Fischer has rightly observed, περὶ with a genitive case is used, on account of the verb ἐπύθεσθε. See note (b) on Apolog. Socrat. C. XX. Compare Matthiæ, §. 595. 5. a. b.

^f ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν ἠγγειλέ τις] μὲν is used without δὲ following, because the idea, which would be contained in the corresponding clause of the sentence, is already expressed by the preceding words. See Crito, C. I. note (9), on the words: ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἤξειν.

ε πολλῶ ὕστερον] *Thirty days afterwards.* This also appears from Xenoph. Mem. IV. 8, 2.

η τί οὖν ἦν τοῦτο] That is, *why was this so?*

ι ἡ πρύμνα ἐστ. τ. πλοίου—πέμπουσι] See Crito, C. I.

κ ἐστεμμένη] That is, ornamented with laurel, which was sacred to Apollo.

λ πέμπουσι] *Send with solemnity.* The word is peculiarly applied to this ceremony. See Spanh. on Callimach. Hymn to Del. v. 279.

μ ἐν ᾧ Θησεύς—] Minos, King of Crete, in order to avenge the death of his son Androgeus (see Plutarch's Life of Theseus, p. 6. Pausan. I. 27. at the end), is said to have besieged Athens, and to have at length consented to depart, on condition that every ninth year the Athenians should send to Crete, instead of tribute, seven virgins, and as many youths (ἡϊθέους ἑπτὰ καὶ παρθένους τοσαύτας, Plutarch. παρθένους ἑπτὰ καὶ παῖδας ἴσους, Pausan.), to be devoured by the Minotaur, in the Labyrinth. These are, οἱ δὲ ἑπτὰ ἐκεῖνοι. Theseus, being among the number of victims at the third period of tribute, killed the Minotaur, and returned safe with his companions, that is, καὶ ἔσωσέ τε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη. See Plutarch's Life of Theseus, p. 6 foll. Pausan. I. 27. p. 67. Meursius Thes. 16. Compare Catullus Epithal. Pelei et Thetid. v. 76. Virgil Æn. VI. 20. Ovid. Metamorph. VIII. 170.

ν θεωρίαν ἀπάξειν] Thom. Mag. p. 446. says that θεωρία is ἡ θυσία, which agrees with the scholiast on this passage. The word indicates both the embassy itself, and its solemn accompaniments, as may be collected from Plutarch Nic. p. 525. A., where Nicias is said, ἀγειν τὴν θεωρίαν, when he is preparing the Chorus, providing victims, and attending to the other preparations of festivals. Compare Valcken. on Ammon. p. 92.—These Δήλια, which were celebrated annually, are not to be confounded with those festivals which are mentioned by Thucyd. III. 104., and which took place every fifth year, to commemorate the purification of the Island of Delos by Pisistratus.

ο ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι] This custom was continued to the times of Demetrius Phalerius, according to Plutarch, Theseus, p. 10. C.

ρ Ἐπειδὴν οὖν ἀρξωνται—] That is after the stern of the vessel had been ornamented with the laurel crown, as Phædo himself informs us. A little further on, the common reading, καθαριεύειν, is erroneous; since that verb, if used at all, which is very doubtful, is derived from καθάριος, *cleanly*; and can therefore signify nothing

else than *to be cleanly*; which sense is quite inappropriate in this passage. Therefore the better MSS. are correct in giving καθαρεύειν, i. e. *to be pure, and not to be polluted by punishments*, which is approved of by all the more recent commentators. The addition of τὴν πόλιν, is to indicate that this law refers to the state in general, and not merely to the citizens individually.

^a αὐτούς] That is, τοὺς πλείοντας, which is implied in the preceding word, πλοῖον. Homer Odys. α'. 930. καὶ κεν τοῦτ' ἐθέλοιμι, Διὸς γε διδόντος, ἀρέσθαι, where τοῦτα means βασιλεύειν which is applied in the noun βασιλεύς. Aristoph. Plut. 502. πολλοὶ πλουτοῦσι—ἀδίκως αὐτὰ συλλέγουσι; where with αὐτὰ we must supply χρήματα from the preceding πλουτοῦσι.

^r ὡςπερ λέγω] This expression is frequently used respecting any thing already mentioned. We say: *As I said before*. See Apology, C. V. ὅπερ λέγω.

II. ^a οἱ ἄρχοντές—That is, οἱ ἕνδεκα. See Apolog. Socr. C. XXVII. note (ε). At the beginning of C. XXXI. of the Apology, they are also called οἱ ἄρχοντες.

^b τινὲς καὶ πολλοί γε Xenoph. Hellen. I. 5, 22. καὶ τινὰς ἀπέκτειναν οὐ πολλούς. Plat. Gorg.: p. 455. C. ὡς ἐγὼ τινὰς σχεδὸν καὶ συχνούς αἰσθάνομαι. In such sentences, καὶ adds force to the following clause. See Apolog. Socrat. C. IX. note (d). The sense therefore is: *some, nay many, were present*.

^c τοιοῦτους ἑτέρους ἔχεις] That is, *But those who are going to hear you have also the same feeling*.

^d παρόντα με—εἰσῆει] The verbs εἰσιέναι and εἰσέρχεσθαι, like the Latin *subire*, are used of hope, joy, sorrow, pity, etc., taking possession of the mind. Eurip. Med. 931. εἰσῆλθέ μ' οἴκτος. Iphig. Aul. 491. μ' ἔλεος εἰσῆλθε. A little further on, a different construction is used: οὐδὲν πάνυ μοι ἔλεινδον εἰσῆει, on which see Matth. §. 401. C.

^e εὐδαίμων γάρ μοι] Compare with this passage, Crito, C. I. note (ε) on the words, ὡς ἠδέως καθεύδεις.

^f γενναίως] *With intrepidity*. Plutarch Cimon, C. XIII. ὑποστάντων δὲ τῶν Ἡερσῶν καὶ δεξαμένων οὐκ ἀγεννῶς, κρατερὰ μάχη συνέστη.—The verb παρίστασθαι is often used in speaking of thoughts suggested by the circumstances in which a person may be placed. See, on this subject, Hemsterh. on Lucian. Contempl. §. 13. Dorvill, Charit. p. 438. ed. Lips. Taylor, on Lysias, p. 83. ed. Reisk. = p. 42. edit. pr., who has collected several



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manly steadiness and fortitude. Therefore he received the surname τοῦ μανικοῦ. See Sympos. p. 173. D. On the occasion of the death of Socrates, he not only wept much, but loudly wailed and cried out. See C. LXVI. It is related by Ælian, V. H. 1. 16., that he brought to the prison a tunic and cloak, to array Socrates for death.

^m καὶ Κριτόβουλος—] Crito, of whom an account is given in the notes on that dialogue, is said to have had four sons, Critobulus, Hermogenes, Epigenes, Ctesippus. See Laert. II. 121. But the Hermogenes here mentioned appears to have been the son of Hipponicus, and brother of Callias. Respecting him, see Heindorf on Cratyl. §. 3., and the remarks of Schneider on Xenoph. Memor. IV. 8, 4. on Sympos. I. 3. Compare also Proclus, Schol. on Cratyl. p. 10. ed. Lips. Neither is Epigenes here to be understood as Crito's son, as there is no doubt of his being the same person as is mentioned in Apolog. Socrat. C. XXII. and Xenoph. Mem. III. 12, 2., and whose father was Antiphon the Cephisian.—Respecting Æschines, the disciple of Socrates, see Diogen. Laert. II. 60—64.—Antisthenes is well known as a distinguished imitator of Socrates' fortitude and contempt of pleasure, and as the Founder of the sect of Cynics. Respecting him, see Laert. VI. 1—19. Ælian, V. H. IX. 35. and elsewhere.—Ctesippus the Pæanian, i. e. belonging Παιανιᾷ δήμῳ τῆς Πανδιονίδος φυλῆς, is known from Euthydem. p. 273. A. and Lysid. p. 206. B. foll.—Menexenus is distinguished by the book bearing his name, written, as it appears, by Plato. He was of noble extraction (see Lysid. p. 207. C.), and in his mature age applied himself to the study of philosophy, and was a follower of Ctesippus, and other sophists. See Lysid. p. 206. This accounts for Ctesippus and Menexenus being here mentioned together.

ⁿ Πλάτων δέ, οἶμαι, ἡσθένει] The conjecture of Forster is not improbable, that by these words Plato meant to signify the sorrow which overwhelmed him at the approaching death of his illustrious master.—The circumstance of Xenophon's name not being mentioned here, is enumerated by Athenæus, XL. 15., among the arguments to prove that Plato and Xenophon were not on good terms. There is a learned discussion on this point by A. Bœckh, in commentat. academ. De simultate, quæ Platoni cum Xenophonte intercessisse fertur. Berol. a. 1821. It has been rightly observed by Fischer that Xenophon could not with propriety have been mentioned here, since he had gone to Asia the year before the death

of Socrates, and was still there. — For ἦν δὲ καὶ Κτήσιππος, Heindorf preferred παρῆν δὲ καὶ Κτ., but without necessity. For it is usual with the Greeks, when verbs compounded with prepositions are to be repeated, to omit either verb or preposition in the repetition. The omission of the verb is of very frequent occurrence in the Poets and Herodotus. There is an example of the omission of the preposition in Eurip. Bacch. 1062. λαβῶν γὰρ ἐλάτης οὐράνιον ἄκρον κλάδον κατῆγεν, ἦγεν, ἦγεν εἰς μέλαν πέδον; and many similar passages have been collected by Elmsley on Eurip. Medea, v. 1219. Nearly similar is Eurip. Orest. 1100. *Pyl.* πιθοῦ νιν, ἀνάμεινον δὲ φασγάνου τομάς. *Orest.* μενῶ, τὸν ἐχθρὸν εἴ τι τιμωρήσομαι. Plat. Phædr. p. 248. A.

ο Σιμμίας τέ γε—] Simmias and Cebes, the Thebans, are said to have been disciples of Philolaus, a celebrated Pythagorean, who is mentioned by Plato further on in this dialogue, as well as in many other places. They were familiar associates of Socrates (see Crito, C. IV.). It is therefore evident why Plato introduces them in a discussion with Socrates on the immortality of the soul. Compare Diogen. Laert. II. 124. 125.—Phædo appears to have been a Theban, not a Cyrenean. See Ruhnken. on Xenoph. Mem. I. 2, 48.—Euclides was the founder of the School of the Megareans, also called Eristici and Dialectici. See Laert. II. 106—110. He relates to Terpsion, of whom no particulars have been handed down, the conversation of Socrates with Theætetus, in the dialogue of Plato, which is known by the name of the latter.—Aristippus, the founder of the Cyrenaic sect, is too well known to require any mention here. The name of Cleombrotus the Ambraciot, is also well known. It is said that, on reading this dialogue, he threw himself into the sea; on which subject there is extant an elegant epigram of Callimachus, n. 24., which is also mentioned by Cicero, Tuscul. I. 34. For, even from what follows, it may correctly be doubted whether another Cleombrotus is referred to in this passage. For the suspicion of some antient writers seems not groundless, that a reflection is here intended to be cast on Aristippus and Cleombrotus, for being so forgetful of Socrates through self-indulgence and luxury, as not to be present on this occasion; although the island of Ægina was only about 200 stadia from Athens, to which city they might easily have crossed over. See Diogen. Laert. II. 65. III. 36. Athenæus, XII. p. 544. D. Demetrius Rhetor. de Elocut. §. 306. Compare Mueller's Æginetica. p. 186.

III. ^a πλησίον γὰρ ἦν—] The prison was near the market-place, where the Court of the Heliastæ was held. Compare Plat. Legg. X. p. 908. A.

^b ἕως ἀνοιχθείη] On this optative, which indicates a thing frequently repeated, see Matth. §. 521. Buttm. §. 126. 14. In the same manner, a little further on: ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀνοιχθείη: *every time, as soon as it was opened*: which words Fischer misunderstood.

^c διατρίβοντες μετ' ἀλλήλων] That is, διαλεγόμενοι πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, as he says in C. LXV.—On the word ἀνεψέγετο, see Scholiast on Lucian ad Solœc. T. II. p. 54. τὸ ἀνεψέγε βούλονται μὴ λαμβάνεσθαι ἐπὶ παθητικῆς διαθέσεως· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀκριβῶς τοῦτο. χρῆται γὰρ μετὰ καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν ὁ Πλάτων παθητικῶς ἐν Φαίδωνι, ἀνεψέγετο, λέγων, ἡ θύρα οὐ πάνυ πρῶτ', whence Fischer wrote, οὐ πάνυ πρῶτ', against all the MSS., and without the sense requiring it. For the words οὐ πρῶ are to be pronounced emphatically.—On the form of this imperfect, see Matth. §. 168.—On the form πρῶταίτερον, Thom. Mag. πρῶταίτερον καὶ πρῶτατον· ἀμφοτέρω γὰρ Θουκυδίδης·—κρίττω γὰρ ταῦτα τοῦ πρῶταίτερον καὶ πρῶτατον. But this opinion is successfully controverted by Ruhnken on Timæus. Glossar. p. 227. Compare Buttmann. Ausführ. Griech. Grammatik. T. I. p. 264.

^d ὅσπερ εἰώθει ὑπακούειν] On the signification and use of the verb ὑπακούειν, see Crito, C. I. note (c).—Immediately afterwards, instead of the common reading, ἐπιμένειν, we have restored περιμένειν from the best MSS. The meaning of both words has been examined by Bekker, Lectionn. Philostratt. p. 89., and is thus explained, by Fr. A. Wolf, on this passage: “ἐπιμένειν is *to wait, to await patiently the result of any thing*; περιμένειν is generally *to stay waiting for a person, to await the arrival of a person*. Hence the latter is commonly used absolutely, whereas the former is much more frequently joined with ἕως ἂν.” I am therefore surprised that this commentator approved of ἐπιμένειν, and rejected περιμένειν, which seems to be used here with singular propriety. Further on, C. LXV. ἡμᾶς δ' ἐκέλευε περιμένειν. περιεμένομεν οὖν. A little before: περιεμένομεν οὖν—ἕως ἀνοιχθείη τὸ δεσμωτήριον. Sympos. in. οὐ περιμενεῖς; καὶ γὰρ ἐπιστὰς περιέμεινα. Rep. I. at the beginning, ἐκέλευσε—τὸν παῖδα περιμεῖναι ἐκέλευσαι. Xenoph. Cyropæd. IV. 2, 9. καὶ τοὺς Ὑρκανίους περιμένειν ἐκέλευσε, ἵνα ἅμα ἴοιεν. Ibid. VII. 5, 39. ἄνδρες φίλοι, περιμένετε, ἕως τὸν ὄχλον διωσώμεθα, in which passage remark the omission of ἂν.



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ⁱ ἀνακαθ. ἐπὶ τὴν κλ.] That is, *raising himself on the bed*. For Socrates, who had been freed from his chains at the first dawn, was not yet risen from his bed; he now sits up in the bed. A little afterwards, καθῆκε τὰ σκέλη ἀπὸ τῆς κλίνης καὶ καθεζόμενος οὕτως ἤδη τὰ λοιπὰ διελέγετο. The common reading, εἰς τὴν κλίνην, is bad, since ἴζεσθαι and καθίζειν εἰς τι mean *to go and sit down somewhere*, as is clearly shown by Valckenar, on Herodot. VIII. 71.

^k τρίβων ἄμα] *While rubbing*. Herodot. I. 179. ὀρύσσοντες ἄμα τὴν τάφρον ἐπλίνθειον. Xenoph. Anab. III. 3. 7. φεύγοντες ἄμα ἐτίτρωσκον. Republ. VII. p. 521. C. τόδε ἐννοῶ λέγων ἄμα.

^l Ὡς ἄτοπον—] Thom. Mag. ἄτοπον οὐ μόνον τὸ ἄλογον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ θαυμαστὸν καὶ παράδοξον. Πλάτων ἐν Φαίδωνι. See Crito, C. II. note (1).

^m ὡς θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρὸς τ. δ.] *How wonderful is the relation between pleasure and pain in this, that they will not be present with a man at once, etc.* For τῷ, with an infinitive, is *in this that*, or *because that*, as in Rep. V. p. 471. D. II. p. 361. C. IV. p. 429. C.

ⁿ ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἔοικεν, ἐπειδὴ ὑπὸ τ. δ.] The colon, commonly put after ἔοικεν, is erroneous, as is well remarked by Heindorf, Sophist. p. 306. For ἔοικέ μοι is never used instead of φαίνεται μοι, δοκεῖ μοι. Even after these words: αὐτῷ μοι ἔοικεν, φαίνεται is added by a kind of negligence in the construction. Sophist. p. 225. D. δοκῶ μὴν τ. γ. δ.—καλεῖσθαι κατὰ γνώμην τὴν ἐμὴν οὐχ ἕτερον ἀδολεσχικοῦ. Laches. p. 192. C. τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔμοιγε φαίνεται, ὅτι οὐ πᾶσά γε, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, καρτερία ἀνδρία σοι φαίνεται. Phileh. p. 32. C. οἶμαι—κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν ἐμφανὲς ἔσεσθαι. Lys. p. 221. E., where after ὡς ἔοικε we find ὡς φαίνεται. Theocr. VII. 30. καίτοι, κατ' ἐμὸν νόον, ἰσοφαρίσθην ἔλπομαι. Aristoph. Plut. v. 827. δῆλον ὅτι τῶν χρηστῶν τις, ὡς ἔοικας, εἶ.

LXIV. ^a ἢ ἐμὸν ἐπιστέλλεις] The verb ἐπιστέλλειν is properly used concerning the last will of the dying. See Valcken. on Hippolyt. p. 255. The common reading, ἐπιτέλλη, does not appear to be in accordance with the usage of prose writers. Homer uses it in a similar sense, Iliad. XXIII. 95. and 107.

^b ἐν χάριτι ποιοῖμεν] Xenoph. Œcon. VIII. 10. ὅτῳ ἂν δέη—ἐν χάριτι διδόναι. Theocrit. V. 69. τὸ δ' ὦ ἄγαθέ, μήτ' ἐμέ, Μόρσων, ἐν χάριτι κρίνης, μήτ' ὦν τύ γα τοῦτον ὀνάσης.

^c οὐδὲν καινότερον] This comparative is not used simply for the positive. See Euthyphro, *in. τί νεώτερον γέγονεν*; Nitzsch. in Append. to Plat. Ion. p. 56 foll.

^d ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμ.] So as to improve in virtue and wisdom.

^e ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς] To me and mine.

^f οὐδ' ἐὰν πολλὰ ὁμολ.—ποιήσετε] That is, *even if you promise much, you will avail nothing*. For οὐδὲν πλέον ποιήσετε is the same as οὐδὲν ὄφελος ὑμῖν ἔσται. See Viger, p. 138.

^g οὗτος ὁ Σωκρ. ὁ νυνὶ διαλ.] The words are to be construed thus: ὡς οὗτος ὁ Σωκράτης ὁ νυνὶ διαλ. καὶ δ. ἕκ. τ. λ. ἐγὼ εἰμι. “I cannot persuade Crito,” he says, “that the Socrates who is now conversing with him and you, and who arranges and determines what is said, i. e. who is endued with spirit and intellect, is myself.” This passage is spoken of by Cicero, Tuscul. I. 43.

^h ἐρωτᾷ δὴ, πῶς με θάπτῃ] If the common reading, πῶς δεῖ με θάπτειν, was found in any MSS. by Stephanus, there can be no doubt that it arose from an interpretation of what is called the deliberative subjunctive, of which the use in the third person is rather uncommon. Crito had before asked Socrates: θάπτωμεν δὲ σε τίνα τρόπον; and Socrates now, as it were, putting himself in the place of Crito, repeats his expression, saying: πῶς με θάπτῃ, i. e. *how he is to bury me*. Plat. de Legg. p. 719. E. πότερον οὖν ὁ τεταγμένος ἐπὶ τοῖς νόμοις μηδὲν τοιοῦτον προσαγορεύῃ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῶν νόμων—καὶ μὴ φράξῃ τε καὶ ἐπαπειλήσας τὴν ζημίαν ἐπ' ἄλλον τράπηται νόμον, παραμυθίας δὲ καὶ πειθοῦς—μηδὲ ἐν προσδιδῶ; Sophist. p. 225. A. τῷ δὲ λόγοις πρὸς λόγους τί τις, ᾧ Θεαίτητε ἄλλο εἶπη; Meno, p. 92. E. ἀλλὰ σὺ εἶπέ, παρὰ τίνας ἔλθῃ Ἀθηναίων. Protag. p. 348. D. περιῶν ζητεῖ, ὅτῳ ἐπιδείξεται καὶ μεθ' ὅτου βεβαιώσεται. Rep. I. p. 348. E. οὐκέτι ῥάδιον ἔχειν ὃ τί τις εἶπη. Aristoph. Nubb. 438. ποῖ τις φύγη; Sophoc. Œd. Col. 170. θύγατερ, ποῖ τίς φροντίδος ἔλθῃ; Compare Matthiæ Gr. §. 516. 3.

ⁱ εἰς μακάρων δὴ τινὰς] Compare p. 107. D. οὗτος ἄγειν ἐπιχειρεῖ εἰς δὴ τίνα τόπον.

^k ἄλλως λεγ.] i. e. μάτην.

^l ἐγγυήσασθε οὖν με πρ. Κρ.] Ἐγγυᾶσθαι τίνα is to undertake to deliver up a person to another, to become bail for a person, to pledge one's-self for another. Demosthen. p. 609. ed. Reisk. ταῦθ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ γυναικὸς ὀρώτο ποιᾶν, ἣν ὡς ἐλεύθερους ἐγγυήσατο. Ibid. 899. μάρτυρας ὑμῖν παρασχέσομαι, ὡς οὐκ ἠγγυησάμην ἐγὼ τὸν Παρμένοντα. Ibid. p. 1349. ἐγγυῶντα τὰς ἐτέρων θυγατέρας

ὡς ἑαυτοῦ οὔσας.—As the Greeks use the phrases μάχην μάχεσθαι, ἔχθος ἔχθαίρειν, and others of the kind, so we here find ἐγγυᾶσθαι ἐγγύην. And since ἐγγυᾶσθαι takes an accusative of the person, it is also correct to say ἐγγύην ἐγγυᾶσθαί τινα, in a similar manner as ἔχθος ἔχθαίρειν τινά, μῖσος μισεῖν τινα, and other expressions of the same nature are used.

^m οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἢ μὴν παραμενεῖν] Understand ἠγγυήσατο.—ἀγανακτῆ, *be indignant, troubled, or grieved.* Further on, C. LXVI. Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ οὐδὲν ἐπαύετο δακρύων, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε κλάων καὶ ἀγανακτῶν οὐδένα ὄντινα οὐ κατέκλασε.

ⁿ ὡς ἢ προτίθεται — κατορύττει] The verbs ἐκφέρειν, κατορύττειν and προτίθεσθαι are here used in their proper sense as applied to funerals. See Kirchmann, de Funerib. Roman. lib. II. c. 1. and I. 12. The middle verb is accounted for by referring it to Crito himself as conducting the arrangements of the funeral, which he had undertaken to do. See Eurip. Alcest, 378, where Admetus, being about to die, reproaches in these words his father, who refuses to die in his stead: τοιγὰρ φυτεύων παῖδας οὐκέτ' ἂν φθάνοις, οἱ γηροβοσκήσουσι καὶ θανόντα σε περιστελοῦσι καὶ προθήσονται νεκρόν. The Athenian law, in Demosthen. in Macart. p. 1071. R. τὸν ἀποθανόντα προτίθεσθαι ἔνδον, ὅπως ἂν βούληται. Lucian. de Luctu. §. 27. μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ λούσαντες αὐτὸν καὶ μύρω τῷ καλλίστῳ χρίσαντες τὸ σῶμα καὶ στεφανώσαντες τοῖς ὠραίοις ἄνθεσι προτίθενται.

^o οὐ μόνον εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο] Not only in that respect, that is, in respect τοῦ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν.—With πλημμελὲς understand ἔστιν.

LXV. ^a ἀνίστατο εἰς οἴκημά τι] That is, *he rose and went into a certain chamber.* Aristoph. Plut. 683. ἐπὶ τὴν χύτραν τὴν τῆς ἀθάρης ἀνίσταμαι. Eurip. Heraclid. 59. ἀνίστασθαί σε χρὴ εἰς Ἄργος. These words are to be explained in the same manner as we explained ἐπιχωριάζειν Ἀθήναζε, C. I. On the word οἴκημα, which is used for separate parts of a building according to circumstances, see Valckenar on Ammon. III. 4. and Dorvill. on Charit. p. 587.—Further on, the fuller construction would have been: περιεμένομεν οὖν ποτὲ μὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς δ.—τοτὲ δέ—. But τοτὲ μὲν is often omitted before τοτὲ δέ, in the same manner as ὁ μὲν is sometimes omitted before ὁ δέ. See Hermann Viger. p. 768.

^b δύο γὰρ αὐτῷ υἱεῖς] Compare note on Apol. Socr. C. XXIII.



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more accurately the meaning of ὀφλεῖν γέλωτα, which signifies *to incur ridicule either with others, or with one's self*. Therefore it was almost necessary to add παρ' ἑμαυτῶ, i. e. *in my own mind*. The meaning then is: *I think that by drinking the hemlock a little later I gain nothing else than this, that I shall appear ridiculous in my own eyes*. In the words φειδόμενος οὐδενὸς ἔτι ἐνόητος, allusion is made to the verse of Hesiod, Works and Days, 367. μεσσοῦθι φείδεσθαι, δειλὴ δ' ἐνὶ πυθμένι φειδώ. Seneca Epist. I. Nam ut visum est majoribus nostris: Sera parsimonia in fundo est.

LXVI. ^a εἶεν, ἔφη, ᾧ β.] Heindorf's assertion that εἶεν has always the meaning of trying or proving, cannot be satisfactorily proved. This meaning does not come from the word itself, but rather from the next sentence or turn of the discourse, as in this passage.—The words σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἐπιστήμων, are put first, because the Greeks usually put that part of the sentence first, which contains the reason of what is about to be said. The particle γὰρ is prefixed in such cases. Æschyl. Agam. 1077. ἐγὼ δ', ἐπικτεῖρω γὰρ, οὐ θυμώσομαι. Sympos. p. 175. C. τὸν οὖν Ἀγάθωνα, τυγχάνειν γὰρ ἔσχατον κατακείμενον, μόνον, δεῦρ' ἔφη φάνει, Σώκρατες, παρ' ἐμὲ κατάκεισο. Ibid. p. 204 C. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, εἶεν δὴ, ᾧ ξένη, καλῶς γὰρ λέγεις· τοιοῦτος ᾧν ὁ Ἔρως τίνα χρεῖαν ἔχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις;

^b ἕως ἄν σου βάρος.] Σου is not to be changed here into σοι. See note on Crito, C. XV. Rep. VII. p. 518. C. Symp. p. 215. E.

^c καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ ποιήσει] “*And thus, while you are walking, it will operate of itself, so as to require nothing else.*” Ποιεῖν, like the Latin *facere*, is used respecting the operation of medicines. See Dioscorides, C. I. 95. ποιεῖ πρὸς φάρμακα, *is efficacious against poisons*.

^d καὶ μάλα ἴλεως] *Very cheerfully*. This use of καὶ μάλα is frequent, καὶ having an intensive force. A little further on, καὶ μάλα εὐχερῶς καὶ εὐκόλως ἐξέπτε.

^e ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας] That is, *looking at him with firm countenance, fixing his eyes steadily on him*. See Wyttenb. Epist. Crit. p. 46. The sense of the subsequent words is: *Is it lawful to pour forth to any God a libation from this potion?*

^f μέτριον εἶναι π.] That is, *to be sufficient*.

^g ἐπισχόμενος] *Having put the cup to his lips*, which is the force of the middle voice. For ἐπέχειν τινὶ πιεῖν is *to offer, or present a potion to any one*, as Arist. Nubb. 1385. Apoll. Rhod. I.

472. ἦ καὶ ἐπισχόμενος πλέον δέπας ἀμφοτέρησι πῖνε. Stesichor. in Athen. XI. p. 499. B. σκύφιον δὲ λαβὼν πῖεν ἐπισχόμενος.

^h κατέχειν τὸ μὴ δακρ.] *Scarcely could we refrain from weeping.* Soph. Philoctet. 349. οὐ πολὺν χρόνον μ' ἐπέσχον μὴ με ναυστολεῖν ταχύ. See Hermann on Viger. p. 810 foll.

ⁱ ἐγκαλυψάμενος] *Covering my face with my cloak.* See Dorvill on Charit. p. 274.

^k οἴου ἀνδρός] That is, ὅτι τοιούτου

^l οὐδένα ὄντα οὐ κατέκλασε] This reading κατέκλασε, which is found in the best MSS., was restored by a conjecture of Stephanus, instead of the common reading, κατέκλαυσε. It is supported by the usage of the language, for Wyttenb. was wrong in asserting that κατακλᾶν could not be taken thus simply. It is used in exactly a similar manner by Plutarch, Life of Pericl. c. 37. ἡ παροῦσα δυστυχία τῷ Περικλεῖ περὶ τὸν οἶκον, ὡς δίκην τινὰ δεδωκότι τῆς ὑπεροψίας καὶ τῆς μεγαλαυχίας ἐξείνης, ἐπέκλασε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους. Life of Demosthen. c. 17. ὄρωντες ἐπικλῶντα πολλοὺς καὶ ἀποθηλύνοντα τὸν Αἰσχίνην τῷ λογῷ τούτῳ πρὸς οἶκτον. And κατακλᾶν. Achill. Tat. III. 10. ληστήν μὲν καὶ Ἑλληνα καὶ φωνὴν κατέκλασε καὶ δέησις ἐμάλαξεν, where see Jacobs, and in Addit. ad Athen. p. 277.

^m οἶα ποιεῖτε] This is an expression of wonder and displeasure. Euthyphr. p. 15. E. οἶα ποιεῖς, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀπ' ἐλπίδος με καταβαλόν. Charmid. p. 166. C. Alcibiad. I. p. 113. E.

ⁿ οὗτος ὁ δοὺς τὸ φ.] These words are thought by some critics to be a gloss, but without sufficient reason. For in familiar discourse, such a repetition, when consistent with perspicuity, is not inadmissible. Besides, if these words were omitted, the collocation would be: καὶ ἅμα οὗτος ἐφαπτόμενος αὐτοῦ.

^o διαλιπῶν] *Leaving some interval, he now and then looked at.* Further on, ὀλίγον χρόνον διαλιπῶν ἐκινήθη. The word διαλιπῶν is also used simply, see Bast. Epist. Crit. p. 178.

^p ἐπανιῶν οὕτως] *Advancing his hand higher and higher towards the vital parts.*

^q αὐτὸς ἤπτετο] *Socrates himself also touched his limbs as they were becoming cold, and said that he should die when, etc.* For so these words are to be understood with Fischer. Others refer them to the attendant, but incorrectly; at least Forster's conjecture, αὐθις, must be adopted in that case. On the euphemism τότε οἰχθήσεται, see Bergler on Alciph. I. 232.

^r περὶ τὸ ἦτρον] Mœris: ἦτρον. τὸν ὑπὸ τὸν ὀμφαλὸν τόπον

Ἑλληνικῶς ὑπογάστριον Ἑλληνικῶς. Timæus: ἤτρον ὁ μεταξὺ ὀμφαλοῦ τε καὶ αἰδοίου τόπος.

^s ἐνεκεκάλυπτο γάρ] After the manner of dying persons. See Xenoph. Cyrop. VIII. 7, 28. Livius IV. 12., VIII. 9.: where the death of Decius is narrated. Sueton. Cæsar. c. 82.

^t τῷ Ἀσκλ. ὀφ.] This is beautifully said. For the sick were wont, on the recovery of their health, to sacrifice a cock to Æsculapius. Socrates thus indicates that being now at length released from the chains of the body, he shall attain true health.

^u εἴ τι ἄλλο λέγεις] *If you have any other commission to give me.*

^v τὰ ὄμματα ἔστησεν] *Had fixed his eyes, his eyes had become fixed.* See Dorvill on Charit. p. 404.

^w ξυνέλαβεν. στ.] *Closed his mouth.* See Kirchmann. de Funeribus, I. 6. p. 45.: and Casaubon on Suet. Octav. 99.

LXVII. ^a τῶν τότε ὧν ἐπειράθ.] This passage is considered corrupt by Wyttenbach and Heindorf. The former suggested the reading τῶν πρόποτε. The latter thought that the whole passage ought to be remodelled thus: ἀνδρός, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαῖμεν ἄν, πάντων, τότε ὡς ἐπειράθημεν, ἀρίστου καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου. The MSS. give no assistance. One of them, however, omits τῶν τότε, in which words there must be some corruption. Perhaps we ought to write. ἀνδρός, ὡς φαῖμεν ἄν, τότε θ' ὧν ἐπειράθημεν ἀρίστου, καὶ ἄλλως φρ. *a man both then, when he was dying, the best of all, and through his whole life the wisest and most just.* Thus the praise of courage and endurance, which were most conspicuous towards the end of his life is given to Socrates: for ἀριστος is well known to be peculiarly applicable to a man of courage and fortitude. Wisdom and justice are also attributed to him as virtues which he cultivated through his whole life-time. In which words an animated picture is placed before the eyes of the reader, of all the virtues for which this illustrious sage was distinguished. Therefore καὶ ἄλλως is referred to the foregoing τότε θ', as in C. LXV. σὲ δ' ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλως ἔγνωκα ἐν τούτῳ χρόνῳ γενναιότατον—καὶ δὴ καὶ τῶν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐμοὶ χαλεπανεῖς. Others have referred τῶν τότε to the contemporaries of Socrates; and applied ἄλλως to all posterity.



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LIFE OF SOCRATES.

CHAPTER I.

SOCRATES was the son of Sophroniscus, a sculptor of considerable merit, and of Phaenarete, a midwife, who is called by Socrates, in the *Theaetetes* of Plato, a very noble-minded woman. He was born at Athens, on the 5th of the month of Thargelion, about the middle of April or May, in the year 469. B. C. (Ol. 77. 4.);¹ and belonged to the tribe of Antiochis and the deme of Alopece. His features, and indeed his appearance altogether, were anything but handsome, and seemed well adapted for the ironical character which he maintained. Alcibiades, in Plato's *Symposium*,² compares him to the Sileni and to Marsyas, the Satyr: "And I may also compare Socrates to the Satyr Marsyas. As for thy appearance, thou canst not deny it thyself, Socrates; to what other things thou art like, thou shalt quickly hear. Thou art a scoffer, art thou not? If thou dost not

¹ [More probably in B. C. 468. See Clinton's "*Fasti Hellenici*," Vol. II. *Introduction*, p. xx.—EDITOR.]

² Page 215. ed. Steph.

willingly own it, I will bring forward witnesses." One of the principal passages of the ancients, which bear on this point, is in Xenophon's Symposium,¹ in which Socrates engages in a playful dispute with Critobulus as to which of them is the handsomer. Socrates there tries to prove that his prominent eyes, his depressed nose, and his large mouth must, on account of their greater usefulness, be the handsomer. Several other particulars, which however may be exaggerated, for the purpose of indicating the ugliness of Socrates, are mentioned in the same Symposium.²

Notwithstanding the limited means of his father,³ Socrates was educated according to the manner of the times. Music in the Greek sense of the word, *i. e.* music and poetry, and gymnastic exercises formed the principal part of the education of an Athenian youth; and in these Socrates was instructed.⁴ In addition to which he received instruction in the art of his father; and if we may credit the report of Pausanias, who says that the three Graces made by Socrates had found a place on the walls of the Acropolis of Athens, close behind the Minerva of Phidias, he must have made considerable progress in the art.⁵

¹ V. § 5.

² Ἡ τὸδε γελάτε, says Socrates, chap. II. § 19, εἰ μείζω τοῦ καιροῦ τὴν γαστέρα ἔχων, μετριωτέραν βούλομαι ποιῆσαι αὐτήν;

³ That his father was by no means a wealthy man is evident, from the fact that Socrates, though very economical, was always poor.

⁴ Plat. Crito, c. XII.

⁵ Paus. I. 22, and IX. 35. Compare Diog. II. § 19. and the



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roof. In the same manner Plutarch,¹ among other things, relates, that the father of Socrates had been warned not to compel his son to follow any particular pursuit, as he had a guardian spirit who would lead him in the right way.

Thus Crito was the first who raised Socrates into a higher sphere. Whether he had before this time enjoyed the instructions of Archelaus, a disciple of Anaxagoras, cannot be decided by historical evidence, although it is asserted by Porphyry that he was a disciple of Archelaus as early as his seventeenth year. The first study that engaged the attention of Socrates, and to which he applied with great zeal, was that of physics. "When I was young," says he in Plato's *Phaedo*,² "I had an astonishing longing for that kind of knowledge which they call physics." He sought after wisdom where his fellow-citizens sought it; — in the schools of the vaunting sophists, and of the most celebrated philosophers of his age, as well as in the writings and songs of former sages. Parmenides, Zeno, Anaxagoras and Archelaus among the philosophers, Evenus of Paros, Prodicus and others among the sophists, are recorded as his teachers.³

¹ De genio Socratis. *Francfort*, Ed. 1620. Tom. II. p. 889.

² Page 96. A.

³ Zeno of Elea, about the year 460. B. C., at the age of about 40, undertook with his teacher Parmenides, a journey to Athens, for the purpose of meeting Socrates. Whether Socrates ever heard Anaxagoras himself, or only studied his writings, cannot be asserted with historical certainty. That he heard Archelaus is attested by Cicero, *Tuscul.* V. 10. Evenus of Paros instructed Socrates in poesy. Compare Fischer's remark on the 5th chap-

Assisted by these masters he made considerable progress in mathematics, physics, and astronomy; the value of which he afterwards confined to very narrow limits.¹ Some of his opinions in natural philosophy, which Aristophanes distorts to suit his purpose, must perhaps be referred to this early period of his life. In the instance in which the comic poet² makes him say, that the sky is a furnace, and men the coals in it, the real assertion probably was, that the sky was a vault covering the earth — quite in accordance with the spirit of the cosmological systems of the time; and that he had studied the cosmological system of Anaxagoras with particular attention, is evident; for he himself³ tells us, that he hoped to find in it information concerning the origin of things. As Socrates himself gives us

ter of Plato's Apology. He had also read the writings of Heraclitus. "What I did understand, was excellent; I believe also that to be excellent which I did not understand." Diog. Laert. II. 22. Plato, *Cratylus*, p. 402. A. foll. Prodicus taught him the art of speaking. Plat. *Meno*, p. 96. D. Aeschines III. C.: καὶ ταῦτα δὲ ἀ λέγω Προδίκου ἐστὶ τοῦ σοφοῦ ἀπηχήματα (reminiscences). A long register of teachers of Socrates which, however, must not be taken strictly, occurs in Maxim. Tyr. *Diss.* XXII. [It would appear, however, from a statement in Xenophon's Symposium, that Socrates never received any direct instruction in philosophy; since Socrates is introduced as saying to Callias, who was a great friend and patron of the sophists, αἰ σὺ ἐπισκώπτεις ἡμᾶς καταφρονῶν, ὅτι σὺ μὲν Πρωταγόρα τε πολὺ ἀργύριον δέδωκας ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ καὶ Γοργία καὶ Προδίκῳ καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς, ἡμᾶς δ' ὀρᾶς αὐτουργοῦς τινὰς τῆς φιλοσοφίας ὄντας. *Symp.* I. 5 —ED.]

¹ Xenoph. *Mem.* IV. 7.

² *Clouds*, v. 94.

³ Plat. *Phaedo*, p. 97. B. foll.

in this passage an explanation of the reasons, which afterwards induced him to think so little of this system, he shall speak for himself. "I once heard a person reading in a book which he said was written by Anaxagoras, and saying that reason arranged all things, and was the cause of them. With this cause I was much delighted, and in some manner it appeared to me quite correct, that reason should be the cause of all things. If it be true, I thought, that reason arranges all things, it arranges and places every thing in the place where it is best. Now if any body wanted to find the cause by which every thing arises, perishes, or exists, he must find the manner in which a thing exists, suffers or acts best. For this reason I thought only that investigation the object of which is the most excellent and the best, to be adapted for man both for himself as well as other things; and he who succeeded in this, must at the same time know that which is bad, for both are objects of the same science. Reflecting upon this subject I was delighted, as I thought I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher after my own heart, who could open my eyes to the causes of things. Now he will first tell thee, I thought, whether the earth is flat or round; and after he has done this, he will also show thee the cause and the necessity of it, and whichever is the better, he will prove that this quality is the better one for the earth. If he tell thee the earth is in the centre, he will at the same time show thee that it is better for it to be in the centre. I was willing, if he would show me this, not to suppose any other kind of causes, and hoped



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obtained some instruction, from whomsoever it might have proceeded, concerning the nature of this cause. But as I did not succeed, and as I was unable to find it out by myself, or to learn it from any one else, I set out on a second voyage in search of the cause." The rest are Plato's own thoughts.

Besides this, Socrates was greatly attracted by the intercourse of women of talent, and courted their society for the higher cultivation of his own mind and heart. He, like that powerful demagogue on whom his contemporaries bestowed the highest admiration for the power of his eloquence, was instructed in the art of speaking by Aspasia;¹ and Diotima of Mantinea taught

¹ Plat. *Menex.* p. 235. E. She is also said to have written a poem to Socrates. Athen. V. p. 219.

[It is doubtful whether any historical weight can be attached to the passage in the *Menexemus*. The whole may probably be looked upon as a fiction; although it can hardly be supposed according to Ast, that Plato meant to deride Pericles and Aspasia. Plato's real object appears to be to ridicule those demagogues, who think themselves equal to Pericles, although they cannot compose a speech for themselves, and are obliged to learn by heart such as have been composed for them by others. All the other passages of the *antients*, in which Socrates is said to have learnt the art of speaking from Aspasia, are probably taken from this passage of the *Menexemus*, and therefore prove nothing. Reiske, on Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, II. 6. § 36, likewise considers the statement in the *Menexemus* to be made ironically; in which opinion he is supported by Stallbaum and Loers, the late editor of the *Menexemus*. As for the influence Diotima is said to have had over Socrates, it seems just as uncertain. It is only mentioned by Plato, and those who copied from him, and is probably of the same nature as the story about Aspasia.—
ED.]

him love ;¹ by which as Fr. Schlegel justly observes,² we must not understand transient pleasures, but the pure kindness of an accomplished mind ; a circumstance which is of importance in forming a proper estimate of many peculiarities in the doctrine and method of Socrates.

¹ Plat. *Sympos.* p. 201. D. That Diotima is not to be ranked among the *ἑταίραι*, has been shown by Fr. Schlegel *Griechen und Römer*.

² *Griechen und Römer*, p. 254.

CHAPTER II.

SOCRATES, however, was unable to obtain any satisfactory knowledge from the philosophers and teachers of his time. Dissatisfied with the pretended wisdom of the cosmologists and sophists, he entirely abandoned all speculative subjects,¹ and devoted his attention to human affairs, according to his own expression,² *i. e.* to researches in practical philosophy. He, therefore, in

¹ Diog. II. 21. "When he saw that the science of physics (*φυσικὴ θεωρία*) was not adapted for us, he began to philosophize on moral subjects in the workshops and in the markets, and said he was seeking

"Ὅττι τοι ἐν μεγάροισι κακὸν τ' ἀγαθὸν τε τέτυκται."

The latter is a verse of Homer (*Od.* IV. 392), which, as we are told by Sextus Empiricus *contra Mathematic.* VII. 21., Socrates was constantly in the habit of quoting.

² Ἀνθρώπεια, *res humanæ*, are here opposed to δαιμονίους, *rebus divinis* (*Xenoph. Mem.* I. 1. 12 and 16), which he also calls οὐράνια (*Mem.* IV. 7. 6.) Ἀνθρώπεια are things which directly relate to man as such, as questions on the destination of man, his duties, hopes, and in short all moral subjects; δαιμόνια, *res divinæ*, are of a speculative nature, and comprehend either physical or metaphysical questions, and have no direct relation to man as such. This distinction must be well borne in mind, as otherwise many assertions of Socrates might appear very paradoxical. Cicero *Acad.* I. 15.—"ut—cœlestia vel procul esse a nostra cognitione censeret, vel si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene (morally) vivendum conferre."



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These men, descendants of the Eleatic school, exerted their utmost power to shake the foundations of knowledge, to unsettle the ideas of right and wrong, of virtue and vice, to confound the moral power of judgment by scholar in its widest sense—for even artists were comprehended in it. Protagoras was the first who adopted the name of σοφιστής to distinguish more decidedly one who makes others wise, especially one who taught eloquence, the art of governing, politics, or in short any kind of practical knowledge. From that time the word sophist acquired that odious meaning which it retains in the present day. Afterwards in the times of the Roman emperors, the name of sophist again became an honourable appellation, and was applied to those rhetoricians who had established schools of rhetoric, in which they treated on any chosen subject for the sake of exercise. Libanius, for instance, belonged to this class of sophists. Though the latter class in a certain point of view differed from the former, yet covetousness was common to both. Themistius, because he received no money, protested against his being called a sophist (*Orat.* 23.). The description of a Greek sophist of the time of Socrates is taken from the Protagoras of Plato. In reading, however, the writings of the philosophers of the Socratic school, it must not be forgotten that they had imbibed from their master a profound hatred of the sophists, and may consequently have now and then been rather too severe in their remarks upon them. With the description given above, all Greek writers agree, and the sophists themselves by their own actions sufficiently characterize themselves as such. Speusippus *Defin. ad calcem Opp. Plat.*: Σοφιστής νέων πλουσίων ἐνδόξων ἔμμισθος θηρευτής. *Arist. de Sophist. Elench.* I. 11. *Xenoph. Mem.* I. 6. §13.: Καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὡσαύτως τοὺς μὲν ἀργυρίου τῷ βουλομένῳ πωλοῦντας, σοφιστὰς ἀποκαλοῦσιν. *Isocrat. in Hellen. Encom.* II. 116 and 117. Later writers, as Philostratus do not draw any precise distinction between sophists, philosophers, and orators. Philostratus thus mentions Carneades among the sophists. Moreover, not only Socrates but Anaxagoras are called sophists by Libanius (*Apolog. Socr.* p. 54 and 55, edit. Reiske), perhaps in order to raise thereby his own dignity. Compare Carus's graphic description of the sophists in his *Ideen zu einer Geschichte der Philosophie*, p. 493. foll.

dialectical illusions, and to declare a thing to be right at one time, and wrong at another, as their interest dictated. Instead of being teachers of wisdom, they were mere dialectic quibblers, who made no man wiser or better, and who by the spirit of quibbling, which they diffused among their disciples by such questions, as whether virtue could be taught, &c., paralyzed the power of the moral feelings. Socrates discovered the irretrievable injuries inflicted by these people on intellectual advancement and morality, and witnessed the distressing results of it among his contemporaries. Filled with vain pride, the disciples of the sophists returned from their schools, persuading themselves they had discovered the most recondite truths; they thought themselves unequalled in the art of disputing, and were constantly seeking opportunities of displaying their subtleties. Thus they wandered far from the only path of true wisdom, the knowledge of themselves. But the instructions of the sophists were still more injurious, since by their defending what was wrong, those moral principles, which are the supports of public peace and happiness, were artificially undermined. Socrates, therefore, firmly resolved to devote his life to the moral improvement of his fellow-citizens, and at the age of about thirty,¹ he made it his sacred duty to counteract the sophists, who perplexed good sense, corrupted public

¹ I say *about* thirty. It is indeed generally believed that the public teaching of Socrates commenced precisely at his thirtieth year. But I do not believe that any passage of the antients can be pointed out in support of this belief. However, that Socrates, even when a young man, had chosen the office of a general teacher,

morality, and brought down upon philosophy the reputation of being the art of disputing, nay of being dangerous and injurious. He endeavoured to exhibit them in their naked deformity, and thus directly as well as indirectly, by the doctrines and example of solid virtue, to contribute as much as lay in his power to the moral improvement of mankind.

This noble resolution he faithfully maintained throughout his life, until in his seventieth year he met his

has been proved with great sagacity from several historical facts by Meiners in his *Geschichte der Wissenschaften* &c. II. p. 353.

[Ritter, however, remarks in his *History of Antient Philosophy* (Vol. II. p. 20. Engl. Trans.), that “from the constitution of the mind of Socrates, which proceeding through many attempts in the discovery of truth, could only at a late period have attained to certainty, it is not improbable that he had arrived at a ripe age before he began to incite others to the study of philosophy. In the more detailed accounts, he is almost without exception depicted as an old man. There are other reasons also, which scarcely admit of a supposition that he devoted himself suddenly and all at once to this vocation; for though it be true that his observation of man, with a view to the science of humanity, has been referred to an oracle for its occasion, even the oracle itself implies his having previously pursued philosophical studies in common with Chærephon; and it is quite consistent with the nature of the case to suppose, that a sense of his peculiar fitness for the education of youth gradually opened upon his mind, as he observed the improvement and instruction which others derived from his society.” In a note on this passage, Ritter observes, “The assumption of Wiggers that Socrates commenced teaching in his thirtieth year is wholly unfounded. That of Delbrück (*Socrates* § 34), that he had openly philosophized five or six years before he was brought upon the stage by Aristophanes (B. C. 423), which would make him about forty at his first appearance as a teacher, is not improbable; although the anecdote of Eucleides, (Gell., *Noct. Att.* VI. 10.) is apparently inconsistent with it.”—ED.]



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and that the Pythia replied, that there was none wiser.

It is, indeed, surprising that Chærephon, a friend and disciple of our philosopher, who besides is described both by him and by Plato in the Charmides¹ as a violent and passionate man, should have received this answer to his question. Plessing,² therefore, ventures the bold conjecture, that Socrates himself had contributed to this imposition, in order thereby to gain authority, and to prepare his plan for changing the form of government in Athens: for this was, according to him, the end for which Socrates was constantly and deliberately striving. This hypothesis, however, is too derogatory to the character of Socrates to be admitted without further reasons. The passionate nature of Chærephon renders it more probable that he was guilty of an untimely and extravagant zeal to raise the fame of his master. But on the other hand, it is also possible, that Socrates, even at that time had acquired so great a reputation, that his favour was no longer a matter of indifference to the crafty Pythia.

This declaration of the god of Delphi, together with the application which Socrates made of it, is unquestionably the most important fact in the history of his life, as it gives us a clew to his whole subsequent conduct and mode of thinking. From this time Socrates considered himself as a messenger peculiarly favoured by the Deity, standing under its immediate guidance, and

¹ p. 153. B.

² In his *Osiris und Sokrates*, p. 186, foll.

sent to the Athenians, as he expresses himself in the Apology of Plato, to instruct and improve them.¹ “But that I was sent,” says he,² “as a divine messenger to the state, you may see from what I will tell you. Assuredly it is not a human feature in me that I have neglected all my own interests, and for a great number of years, have not concerned myself about my domestic

¹ [Delbrück, in his *Sokrates* laments that there should be many even among the admirers of Socrates in the present day, who, like some of his contemporaries and his judges, take the oracle for a fiction, and his appeal to it for irony. With as much reason, Mr. D. thinks, might Thomas à Kempis, or Pascal, or Fenelon, be suspected of an affectation of humility, when they confirm their convictions on sacred subjects by quotations from the Bible. Like them, Socrates was in the best sense of the word a mystic; and the answers of the Delphic oracle exercised an influence on the weal and woe of Greece, similar to that which the Bible exerts on the destinies and proceedings of Christendom. But Mr. Thirlwall remarks in the sixth number of the “*Philological Museum*” (p. 587), from which the preceding quotations from Delbrück’s work have been taken, “that it may be readily conceived, and seems to be confirmed by several authentic accounts, that Socrates really considered himself as fulfilling a divine mission by his life and labours. But that this idea was first suggested to him by the Delphic oracle is, to say the least, extremely improbable, though such an accidental occurrence (for who but a sincere Pagan can believe it to have been more) may have contributed to confirm the impression, and may have given it a definite form in his mind. But surely his character and pursuits had been already fixed, before Chærephon could have ventured to inquire whether any man better deserved the title of wise. No additional dignity is imparted to his self-devotion, by considering it as the effect of such a casual inspiration. It was the spontaneous, necessary, result of his moral and intellectual constitution, and needed not to be connected with the eternal order of Providence by a tie so frail as a perishable superstition.”—ED.]

² Plato, *Apolog.* c. xviii.

affairs, and am only anxious for your welfare, going to every one of you and admonishing you, like a father or elder brother, to follow the path of virtue.”¹ The same oracle had, perhaps, some influence on his belief in a dæmon, which restrained him in doubtful cases; of the existence of which, he himself, as well as his friends, were firmly convinced, and whose nature we shall now proceed to examine more closely.

¹ Compare Plat. *Alcib.* II. and *de Re publ.* VI.



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natural way ; and can it be wondered at, if the results were mere absurdities ? Such an hypothesis is preserved by Plutarch in his essay on the dæmon of Socrates, in which it is said to have been a mere divination from sneezing ; an hypothesis which even in modern times has found an advocate in M. Morin.¹ Socrates himself certainly did not understand by it a mere prudence acquired by experience, as has been asserted by others, for the very name of dæmon, which, according to the definition of Aristotle,² means either the Deity itself, or a work of the Deity, suggests to us something beyond the sphere of common experience. To suppose with Plessing,³ that the dæmon of Socrates was a fiction, which would enable him, by the high opinion he would thereby acquire, to realise his plan of changing the form of government in Athens, is an hypothesis which rests on too arbitrary grounds, and is too contrary to the veracious character of Socrates, ever to be adopted by any intelligent scholar.

But notwithstanding these opposite modes of explanation, it may not be so very difficult to arrive at a just view of the genius of Socrates by an historico-psychological mode of enquiry. It was perhaps nothing more than a strong presentiment, which being directed by an accurate knowledge of things, led him to form his

¹ In the *Mémoires de littérature tirés des Registres de l'Académie Royale des inscriptions et des belles lettres*, Tome IV. p. 333. à Paris 1723.

² *Rhetor.* II. 23. ἡ θεὸς ἢ θεοῦ ἔργον.

³ *Osiris und Sokrates*, p. 185. foll.

conclusions from cause to effect by analogy, without his being perfectly conscious of the process. Such an exalted feeling of presentiment is often found in persons of a lively imagination and refined organization; and that Socrates belonged to this class will be seen hereafter. But Socrates himself actually considered it as an inward divine voice that restrained him from engaging in unpropitious undertakings. This hypothesis seems to be fully confirmed, not only by the universal belief of antient Greece and Rome in guardian-spirits, who attended men from their birth, but also by the manner in which Socrates himself speaks of this dæmon, and by the examples which are recorded of its influence. The principal passages which refer to this dæmon are in the *Theages*¹ and *Apology*² of Plato, and in the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon.³ Plato and Xenophon seem to

¹ In the *Theages* he says: "Ἔστι γάρ τι θεία μοῖρα παρεπόμενον ἔμοι ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον δαιμόνιον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο φωνή, ἣ ὅταν γένηται, αἰεὶ μοι σημαίνει, ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, τούτου ἀποτροπήν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐδέποτε. p. 128. D. Compare Cicero *de Divinat.* I. 54. Ast indeed (in the *Journ. Philol.* by Hauff, Stuttgart, 1803. p. 260.) asserts that the *Theages* is spurious, but, — even if we could admit this, — we must yet confess that, considering the agreement with the other passages of Plato, Platonic thoughts, at least, constitute its basis."

² In the *Apology* he speaks almost in the same manner: "Ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνή τις γιγνομένη, ἣ ὅταν γένηται, αἰεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τούτου, ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὔποτε. c. xix. Compare Plat. *Phædr.* p. 242. B.

³ Σωκράτης, says Xenophon, ὡςπερ ἐγίγνωσκεν, οὕτως ἔλεγε. τὸ δαιμόνιον γάρ, ἔφη, σημαίνειν. καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν ξυνόντων προηγόρευε, τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖν, ὡς τοῦ δαιμονίου

contradict each other on this point; for Plato states that the dæmon only used to restrain him, but Xenophon represents the genius as disclosing to him the future in general, what should not be done as well as what should be done. But both statements, though apparently contradictory, can, as Charpentier¹ and Tennemann² observe, be very well reconciled. For Plato only expresses himself more decidedly in saying that the voice had only restrained, and never impelled him. Actions from which he was not restrained, were lawful to him, and unattended with danger. In the Apology of Plato³ he concludes from the silence of the voice during the latter period of his life, that whatever then happened to him, was for his good. But Xenophon does not draw a precise distinction between that which the voice directly commanded, and that which Socrates concluded from its silence.³

Our view of the nature of the dæmon of Socrates is thus confirmed by the manner in which he himself is represented as expressing himself upon it, both by Xenophon and Plato. But the probability is still

προσημαίνοντος. Καὶ τοῖς μὲν πειθομένοις αὐτῷ συνέφερε, τοῖς δὲ μὴ πειθομένοις μετέμελε. Memorab. I. 1. 4.

¹ *La vie de Socrate*, p. 104.

² *Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. II. p. 33.

³ c. xxxi.

⁴ [Mr. Thirlwall, in the "Philological Museum," No. VI. p. 583, also remarks, "that there is really no inconsistency between the passage in Xenophon, and the assertion in the Apology and in the Phædrus. For it is evident, that a sign which only forbade might, by its absence, show what was permitted, and thus a positive kind of guidance might not improperly be ascribed to it." — ED.]



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every-day experience would lead him; and many things, on the other hand, must be attributed to chance. It is not likely that the voice of which Socrates speaks, should have been a mere figurative expression: he was indeed convinced of its reality, which is sufficiently accounted for by his mental organization. This conviction of Socrates was moreover facilitated by the belief of the ancients in the direct influence of the Deity on man, and in guardian spirits who accompanied man from his birth; and more especially by his own belief in the close connection between the human race and the Deity, as well as by his ignorance of mental philosophy.¹

¹ [Schleiermacher, however, argues from a passage in the *Memorabilia* (I. 1. § 2.3.) of Xenophon, that Socrates himself could never have considered his δαιμόνιον, in the light of a specific supernatural being. For Xenophon there speaks of it as something resembling in kind the ordinary instruments of divination, as birds, voices, omens, sacrifices. See "Philological Museum," No. 6. p. 582. Ritter, in his "History of Antient Philosophy," (Vol. II. p. 37 — 39.) observes, "We shall not perhaps be far wrong, if we explain the *dæmonium* of Socrates as nothing more than excitability of feeling, expressing itself as a faculty of presentiment. It must not, however, be supposed that we seek thereby to screen Socrates from the imputation of superstition; for his opinion of demoniacal intimations was in unison with his veneration, not merely of the Deity, but of the gods. This is apparent from his recommendation of divination as a remedy for the deficiency of our knowledge of the future and of contingent events, his advice to Xenophon that he should consult the Delphic god as to his Asiatic expedition, his disposition to pay attention to dreams, and lastly, his constant sacrifices, and his command to make all due offerings to the Gods of House and State. Now in this superstition there are two points to be distinguished; that which he derived from the common opinion of his nation, and that which was founded on his own experience. In both phases it is equally

It thus appears that the dæmon of Socrates merely related to things the consequence of which was uncertain; but whenever the morality of an action was discussed, Socrates never referred to his dæmon. He was perfectly convinced that in order to know what is

superstitious, but venial, if not commendable. For, in respect to the former, he who, brought up in the olden creeds and traditions of his country, adheres to them so long as nothing better is offered for his adoption, and so far as they are not opposed to his own reason and enlightenment, is, to our minds, a better and a wiser man than he who lightly or hastily turns into ridicule the objects of public veneration. As to the demoniacal intimations of Socrates, they were, in common with his other superstitions, the good foundation of his belief, that the gods afford assistance to the good, but imperfect endeavours of virtuous men, and prove the scrupulous attention he paid to the emotions and suggestions of his conscience. Among the various thoughts and feelings which successively filled and occupied his mind, he must have noticed much that presented itself involuntarily, and which, habituated, as he was, to reflect upon every subject, and yet unable to derive it from any agency of his own, he referred to a divine source. This is particularly confirmed by the exhortation he gives, in Xenophon, to Euthydemus, to renounce all idle desire to become acquainted with the forms of the gods, and to rest satisfied with knowing and adoring their works, for then he would acknowledge that it was not idly and without a cause that he himself spoke of demoniacal intimations. By this Socrates evidently gave him to understand that this demoniacal sign would be manifest to every pious soul, who would renounce all idle longing for a visible appearance of the Deity. Still, in spite of all this, he cautiously guarded against the danger of that weak and credulous reliance upon the assistance of the Deity which necessarily proves subversive or obstructive of a rational direction of life; for he taught that those who consult the oracles in matters within the compass of human powers, are no less insane than those who maintain the all-sufficiency of human reason." — ED.]

right and wrong, reason is the only unerring principle.¹ Among all the instances mentioned in the Theages of Plato, there is not one in which the rectitude of an action was decided by the dæmon. Hence many authors, such as Buhle, go too far, when they extend the influence of the dæmon to moral feeling. Respecting things imposed upon us as duties, according to the opinion of Socrates, oracles ought not to be consulted.²

But it is interesting to see how this conviction of a genius acted on Socrates, and how, together with the external causes above mentioned, it led him to a careful observation of his own mind. On every occasion he listened to the voice of his genius. Whenever a person desirous of improvement wished to have his instructions, Socrates ascertained whether his genius would not dissuade him; and whenever he was requested to do something which was not at variance with morality, his genius was consulted. It will be needless to explain how

¹ Plutarch *de genio Socratis*, Tom. III. p. 482. says, the dæmon of Socrates only enlightened him on obscure subjects into which human prudence could not penetrate. But it is surprising that Socrates did not make use of this genius in all doubtful cases. When Xenophon had received letters from his friend Proxenus, persuading him to go into Asia, and to enter into the service of Cyrus the younger, he communicated them to Socrates, and asked for his advice. Socrates referred him to the oracle of Delphi. See Xenoph. *Anab.* III. 1. 5. Cicero, *de divinat.* I. 54. says: Xenophonti consulenti, sequereturne Cyrum, posteaquam exposuit, quæ sibi videbantur, Et nostrum quidem, inquit, humanum est consilium: sed de rebus et obscuris et incertis ad Apollinem censeo referendum, ad quem etiam Athenienses publice de majoribus rebus semper retulerunt.

² Epictetus, *Enchiridion*, p. 118. edit. Jacobi.



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CHAPTER IV.

SOCRATES never established any particular school; he taught wherever chance led him, and wherever he found men to whom he thought he might be useful by his instructions, or, — to speak the language of Socrates, — wherever his genius did not prevent him: in public walks, in the gymnasia, porticos, markets, &c.¹

In the same sense in which Socrates established no school, he had no disciples; hence he asserts in the *Apology*,² he had taught none; yet a circle of inquisitive men and youths were soon assembled around him, and, charmed with his conversation and instruction, were attached to him with incredible affection. Such were Plato, Xenophon, Aristippus, Cebes, Simmias, Euclides and others; and it was, properly speaking, from his school, i. e. from the instructions which he had occasionally given, that all the distinguished Greek philo-

¹ Plat. *Apolog.* C. I. Xenoph. *Mem.* I. 1. 10. Libanius, *Apolog. Socrat.* p. 7. edit. Reiske: τοιοῦτος ὦν καὶ διάγων, ὡς ἔφην, ὡςπερ τις κοινὸς πατήρ καὶ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης κηδεμῶν περιενόσκει τὰς παλαίστρας, τὰ γυμνάσια, τὸ λύκειον, τὴν ἀκαδημίαν, τὴν ἀγορὰν, ὅποι μέλλει ἐντεύξεσθαι κ. τ. λ.

² *Apolog.* XXL: Ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτ' ἐγενόμην. Compare Plutarch, *An Seni sit gerenda res publ.* Tom. II. p. 796.

sophers subsequently proceeded. He gave his instructions gratis, a disinterestedness which formed the most striking contrast to the covetousness of the sophists.¹

Socrates never delivered any complete discourse, but conversed with his hearers in a friendly manner on topics just as they were suggested by the occasion.²

His method of teaching, however, had something peculiar to himself, which will be more fully developed in the following remarks.

The peculiarity of his method consisted in questions, the nature of which, however, was different according to the persons with whom he conversed.

Whenever Socrates had to deal with sophists, who were puffed up with their pretended wisdom, he used that admirable kind of *irony* which Cicero translates by “*dissimulatio*,”³ — a translation which Quinctilian

¹ Xenoph. *Mem.* I. 2. § 6 foll. and *chap.* 6.

² Οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ, he says to Alcibiades, τοιοῦτον τὸ ἐμόν. viz. εἰπεῖν λόγον μακρόν. (Plat. *Alcib.* I. p. 106. B.) — To Antiphon, the sophist, he says: Ἐάν τι σχῶ ἀγαθόν, διδάσκω, καὶ ἄλλοις συνίστημι, παρ’ ὧν ἂν ἠγῶμαι ὠφελήσεσθαί τι αὐτοῦς εἰς ἀρετήν. Καὶ τοὺς θησαυροὺς τῶν πάλαι σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὓς ἐκεῖνοι κατέλιπον ἐν βιβλίοις γράψαντες, ἀνελίπτων, κοινῇ σὺν τοῖς φίλοις διέρχομαι· καὶ ἂν τι ὀρῶμεν ἀγαθόν, ἐκλεγόμεθα, καὶ μέγα νομίζομεν κέρδος, ἐὰν ἀλλήλοις ὠφέλιμοι γιγνώμεθα. Xenoph. *Mem.* I. 6. § 14.

³ *Academ.* II. 5.: Socrates de se ipse detrahens in disputatione plus tribuebat iis, quos volebat refellere. Ita quum aliud diceret atque sentiret, libenter uti solitus est ea dissimulatione quam Græci εἰρωνείαν vocant. — Quinctil. *Institut. Orat.* IX. 2., says: Ironia est totius voluntatis fictio apparens magis, quam confessa, ut illinc verba sint verbis diversa, hic sensus sermonis, et joci, et tota interim causæ confirmatio, tum etiam vita universa ironiam habere videatur. C. 20. Dum enim vita universa ironiam habere

did not approve of¹ — and which is nothing more than the contrast of the half-ridiculing and half-sincere confession of his ignorance with the boastings of those who thought themselves to be wise. In this manner conceited pride was exposed by questions; and the distinguishing characteristic of the ridicule consisted in Socrates pretending that he could not form an opinion in any other manner; and this I conceive to be the principal difference between the Socratic and Platonic irony. That of Socrates, which is described by Xenophon in its purity, has nothing of Plato's bitterness; its playfulness only instructs, but never enrages. A more minute comparison of the conversation of Socrates

videatur; qualis est vita Socratis. Nam ideo dictus est εἰρων, i. e. agens imperitum et admirator aliorum tamquam sapientum. — The later academicians understood this irony of Socrates in a wrong way, and therefore represented him as the founder of their scepticism. *Acad.* IV. 23. They also endeavoured to imitate the form of the Socratic method of disputing. *Tuscul.* I. 10. I need hardly remind the reader that we are here only speaking of that kind of irony which is peculiar to Socrates. For on other occasions he often employed that kind of ridicule which we usually call irony, and which was peculiar to the Athenians in general, viz. that contrast between the literal meaning of the expression with the thought conveyed by it, by which a meaning is conveyed to the minds of the hearers totally different from the literal sense of the words. Instances of this irony are to be found in the celebrated dialogue with Theodota, and in the conversation with Pericles the younger, on whom Socrates bestows much praise for his talents as a general. “I know very well,” replies Pericles to Socrates (*Memorab.* III. 5. 24), “that thou dost not say this thinking that I am actually striving after this kind of knowledge, but in order to suggest to me that a future general ought to try to acquire all this kind of wisdom.”

¹ *Institut. Orat.* IX. 2.



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didactic form ; but he applied the same method of asking which is called after him the Socratic method, and which owes to Socrates, if not its origin, at least its cultivation and perfection. He himself called this method the *τέχνη μααιευτική* (*ars obstetricia*), and on that account compared himself to his mother Phaenarete, who though not fruitful herself, was yet admirably skilled in bringing to light the children of others. “ I am an accoucheur of the mind,” says he, in the *Theaetetes* of Plato, “ just as my mother is an accoucheur of the body.” By this comparison Socrates sufficiently characterises the nature of his method. It is nothing else but an analytical development of the undigested materials existing in the minds of his hearers, and as such it is applicable only as far as the materials are already in the possession of the pupil, or previously communicated to him by synthesis. As regards the form, we have an example of this Socratic method of asking in the *Meno* of Plato ; where Plato makes Socrates apply his method in order to prove his own (Plato’s) doctrine of ideas. Socrates there asks quite an ignorant boy some geometrical questions, to which the boy gives correct answers. From this, Plato draws the conclusion that the boy could not have answered in that manner, if his soul had not acquired, in a state previous to its being united to its body, a knowledge of the nature of things ; but he seems to have overlooked one important fact, that this knowledge had been previously communicated to the lad by Socrates, in the way of synthesis.

This method of asking, which is usually called the

Socratic method in a limited sense of the word, is in its character often similar to irony, but is different in its object and effect. It differs from our catechetical method in as much as it was confined almost exclusively to adult persons, in whom a tolerable share of knowledge might be supposed to exist, so that they not only answered, but also asked, and thus carried on a lively conversation. But what formed its characteristic feature, was its aiming at leading men to knowledge by reflecting upon themselves, and not upon external objects. This line of demarcation must not be overlooked, and it would be rashness to introduce the Socratic method into our elementary schools. ¹

Socrates applied this method with great skill,² and in modern times he has justly been considered as the supreme master of it. He accommodated himself to the individual dispositions, and to the peculiar wants, of each of his disciples, and connected his instructions with the most ordinary events of the day. He rather appeared to instruct himself than to pretend to instruct others, rather called forth ideas than communicated them. The questions were clear and concise ; however absurd the answers might be, he knew how to make

¹ See Steuber's dissertation: *Kann die Katechese über moralisch-religiöse Wahrheiten zu einer freien Unterredung zwischen dem Lehrer und den Katechumenen erhoben werden?*—in Löffler's *Magazin für Prediger*, vol. V. part I. p. 220 foll.

² Cicero, *de finib.* II. 1. Socrates percontando atque interrogando elicere solebat eorum opiniones, quibuscum disserebat, ut ad hæc quæ hi respondissent, si quid videretur, diceret. — Hence the invention of dialogues is attributed to Socrates.

them subserve his purposes. In his conversation he commenced with the most undisputed propositions which even a person with any sagacity might understand and comprehend.¹ He omitted no intermediate ideas, but went on carefully from one to another. If in his researches Socrates sometimes appears to have entered too much into detail,² we must not forget that by the want of precision in Greek expressions this apparent diffuseness was often necessary. He introduced a great degree of clearness into his conversations; which he accomplished both by his placing a thing in a point of view the best suited to the person to whom he spoke, and by viewing it in all its relations, by returning to it in various ways, by accurately dissecting the simple qualities of an idea, until the truth which Socrates intended to teach, became evident to his disciples, and, as it were, their own. He knew how to interest those who conversed with him and who seemed to have no wish to enter into any further discussion with him — as Alcibiades — by describing their own character, and by appealing to their peculiar wishes and hopes.³

This is the favourable side of the Socratic method; if however we examine it with impartiality, we must acknowledge that his art of asking was not altogether free from sophistry; yet this tinge of it did not constitute him a sophist, as he never substituted one idea for another, or confounded dissimilar ideas. Neither did

¹ Xenoph. *Mem.* IV. 6. 15. *Æcon.* 6. § 2 foll.

² As in Xenoph. *Mem.* I. 2. 57; IV. 6. 3., 4, 13 & 23.

³ Plat. *Alcib.* I. p. 104, E. foll.



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the ideas of the beautiful and useful, which are both implied in the Greek word *καλός*; and also the ideas of virtue and happiness, the *bene beateque vivere* of Cicero, which the Greek expressed by the word *εὐπραξία*. In this manner he attributed to the expressions of those with whom he conversed, a meaning which was not intended.¹

A second peculiarity of the Socratic method of teaching is, that Socrates himself never gives a definition of the subject in dispute, but merely refutes the opinion of the person with whom he converses. Thus he awakened the true philosophical spirit; and by throwing out doubts, stimulated the mind of his hearer to further examination. In the *Meno* of Plato, Socrates does not, properly speaking, define what virtue is, but only what it is not, and thus merely refutes the definition given by Meno; and the conclusion that it is a *θεία μοῖρα* is rather ironical:² Meno therefore compares Socrates to a cramp-fish³ which paralyzes every one that

¹ Xenoph. *Mem.* III. 8; IV. 2. 26. The Socratic manner of asking questions is, however, a dangerous instrument in the hands of a sophist, as it is so very easy to take words in different senses, and thus to oblige the person who answers to make assertions which but for the application of those sophisms, he would never acknowledge as his own. Protagoras, who perceived this, combined the Socratic method with that of the sophists. Diog. IX. 8. 4.

² I should at least not like to infer with Carus (*Geschichte der Psychologie*, p. 254.) from this passage that Socrates had looked at virtuous men as inspired by the deity. Besides it would be incompatible with the assertion of Socrates that virtue can be taught.

³ p. 80. A.

comes in contact with it.¹ This mode of disputing (*in utramque partem disputare*) descended to the school of Plato,² and constituted the *academica ratio disputandi*,³ though Socrates did not employ it in the sense in which the later academy made use of it. Socrates was far from philosophical scepticism; he was unconcerned about speculation; and the truths of practical philosophy had for him positive evidence.

By this mode of disputing, Socrates acquired a considerable advantage over the sophists; for as he did not openly express his own opinion, they could not lay hold of his views, but were obliged to allow him to attack and to refute their dogmatical assertions. “Thou shalt,” says Hippias, the sophist, to Socrates,⁴ “not hear my opinion, before thou hast explained to me what thou meanest by the *just*. For it is enough that thou laughest at others in proposing to them questions and refuting them; but thou never givest any account or answer thyself, nor wishest to express thy opinion on any subject.”

As Socrates did not deliver any complete discourse, the form of his philosophical lectures cannot be spoken of, and consequently there are no complicated conclusions, corollaries, &c., which abound in the writings of other philosophers.

¹ Οὐ γὰρ, he says in the same dialogue (p. 80. C), εὐπορῶν αὐτὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ποιῶ ἀπορεῖν, ἀλλὰ παντὸς μᾶλλον αὐτὸς ἀπορῶν οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιῶ ἀπορεῖν.

² Cicero *de Nat. Deor.* I. 5.

³ Cicero *Tuscul.* I. 4.

⁴ Xenoph. *Mem.* IV. 4. § 9.

A third peculiarity of the Socratic method was the inductive mode of reasoning. "Two things," says Aristotle (*Metaph.* XIII. 4.), "are justly ascribed to Socrates, induction and illustration by general ideas." Cicero¹ also mentioned it as something peculiar to Socrates and Aspasia. Instances of such inductions are most numerous in the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon.² Thus he tried to prove by induction, to Chærecrates, who did not live on the most friendly terms with his brother Chærephon, what he ought to do to gain the affections of his brother;³ to his friend Diodorus that he must support poor Hermogenes;⁴ to timid Charmides, who had too great a diffidence in his own talents; that he must endeavour to obtain public appointments.⁵

A fourth and last peculiarity of the Socratic method of teaching was the palpable and lively manner in which he delivered his instructions, leading his hearers from the abstract to the concrete by similes, allegories, fables; apophthegms, passages from poets, and sayings of wise men. A peculiar talent of Socrates was the power he possessed of demonstrating the correctness or incorrectness of general assertions by applying them to individual cases. It is evident that a distinctness of conception

¹ *De Invent.* I. 51 foll. *Topica.* 10.

² Ὅποτε δὲ, says Xenophon (*Mem.* IV. 6. 15.), αὐτός τι λόγῳ διεξίει, διὰ τῶν μάλιστα ὁμολογουμένων ἐπορεύετο, νομίζων ταύτην τὴν ἀσφάλειαν εἶναι λόγου.

³ Xenoph. *Mem.* II. 3. 11 foll.

⁴ *Ibid.* II. 10.

⁵ *Ibid.* III. 7.



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The ironical character of the method of Socrates was principally directed against the sophists, whom he combated very successfully with this weapon: and indeed sharp weapons were necessary to humble these men who undeservedly enjoyed so great an authority among the Greeks. There were however among the sophists some very superior men, who only wanted the true spirit of philosophy, the love of truth and science, in order to accomplish great things. We cannot therefore rank all the sophists in the same class, and must carefully distinguish a Protagoras or a Gorgias, who deserve our sincere respect for their talents, and who were celebrated as orators, and made the first researches into the nature of language, — from á Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, whom Plato, in his *Euthydemus*, describes as true logomachists. Socrates took the field against these two classes of sophists, and established moral consciousness, founded on common sense, in opposition to their moral scepticism; and notwithstanding their sophistical stratagems, often extorted from them the shameful confession of their own ignorance. His disciples, encouraged by his example, carried the irony of their master against the sophists further than himself. “The sons of the richest people,” says Socrates, in Plato’s *Apology*,¹ “who necessarily have the greatest leisure, follow me of their own accord, and are pleased when they hear me refuting these men. Yea, they themselves often follow

and Porphyry. Theodoret. ad Græcos infideles, Serm. IV. p. 56.

¹ C. X.

my example, and undertake to examine others." No wonder that Socrates gained for himself the perfect hatred of these people, and that they left no means untried to effect his ruin. But of this hereafter.

CHAPTER V.

SOCRATES lived in the simplest manner; and it was from this circumstance that he was enabled to maintain his philosophical independence, notwithstanding his limited means.¹ He despised the luxurious mode of living, which had greatly increased in his time at Athens, as well as all those sensual enjoyments that destroy the health both of body and mind.² Yet Socrates did not violate the laws of taste and propriety; but observed a nice distinction, by the neglect of which the Cynics destroyed all that genuine humanity, which rendered Socrates so amiable, notwithstanding the austerity of his manners.³

¹ “I think,” says Socrates to Critobulus in the *Œconomicus* of Xenophon (II. § 3.), “if I could find a reasonable purchaser, I should perhaps get five minæ for all my property, including my house.”

² Ζῆς γοῦν οὕτως, says Antiphon, the sophist, to Socrates (Xenoph. *Mem.* I. 6. 2.), ὡς οὐδ’ ἂν εἰς δοῦλος ὑπὸ δεσπότηρ διαιτώμενος μείνειε, σιτία τε σιτῆ, καὶ ποτὰ πίνεις τὰ φαυλότατα, καὶ ἱμάτιον ἠμφίεσαι οὐ μόνον φαῦλον, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ θέρους τε καὶ χειμῶνος, ἀνοπόδητός τε καὶ ἀχίτων διατελεῖς.

³ The statement, in the *Symposium* of Plato, that Socrates bathed but seldom, is to be understood of warm baths, which Socrates considered as tending to make the body effeminate. The



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come best skilled in horsemanship, do not select the most obedient, but the most spirited horses. For they believe that after being enabled to bridle these, they will easily know how to manage others. Now as it was my wish to converse and to live with men, I have married this woman, being firmly convinced that in case I should be able to endure her, I should be able to endure all others.”¹ By Xanthippe Socrates had several sons; on the eldest of whom, called Lamprocles, he enjoins, in Xenophon’s *Memorabilia*,² obedience to his mother. At his death he left behind him three sons, one of whom was a youth, but the other two were still children.³

¹ [Ritter remarks (*History of Philosophy*, II. p. 33, 34.) “Socrates was a perfect Greek in his faults and his virtues; hence he always regarded morals under a political aspect. In such a political view of virtue, the relations of domestic life fall naturally enough far into the back ground; the notorious bad feeling of his wife Xanthippe to her husband and child, prevents the supposition of a very happy home; and when we remark the degree to which, in his devotion to philosophy, he neglected his family duties, and the little attention he paid his wife and child, we are justified in ascribing to him, together with his countrymen, little respect for domestic life in comparison with public duties.”—
ED.]

² II. 2. 7.

³ Plat. *Apolog.* c. XXIII. — Whether Socrates, as some think, had also been married to Myrto, cannot be decided with historical certainty. The contrary opinion, however, is far more probable, as appears from Meiner’s examination (*Geschichte der Wissenschaften*, vol. II. p. 522). Even Panætius Rhodius in Athenæus (XIII. init. p. 555.) was of this opinion, which is also adopted by Bently in his *Dissertat. de Epistolis Socratis*, § 13. Luzac in his discourse *de Socrate Cive*, p. 7. supposes that Socrates had had two wives, first Myrto, and after her death Xanthippe. He at the

Socrates performed military service in three different battles, of which he gives us an account himself in the *Apology of Plato*.¹

The first time that Socrates performed military service, was in the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, in the thirty-seventh or thirty-eighth year of his age; at the siege of Potidæa, an Athenian colony in Thrace, in the years 431 and 430 B. C. The inhabitants of Potidæa had revolted from the Athenians, to whom they were tributary, and were supported by the Corinthians, and other Peloponnesians. In this campaign,

same time combats the opinion of those who think that Socrates had been married to two women at once. He assigns a different meaning to the Athenian law which was passed in the time of Pericles, and according to which, as is commonly supposed, it was lawful to contract a double marriage, — a law which the advocates of that opinion usually quote in support of it. The subject is still more minutely discussed by Luzac in the above-mentioned *Lectiones Atticæ*, especially against Mahne's *Diatribæ de Aristoxeno*.

¹ C. XVII.—Athenæus (*Deipnosoph.* V. 15) the bitter opponent of philosophers, and more especially of Plato, declares the whole narrative of the military services of Socrates to be a fiction, and observes that philosophers do not always strictly adhere to historical truth. Plato, he says, contradicts himself, since he asserts in the *Crito* that Socrates had never been out of Athens, except once, and that on a visit to the Isthmian games, and yet in the *Apology*, and *Symposium*, he makes Socrates say that he had fought in three battles. But this passage shows how little reliance is to be placed on the remarks of Athenæus, for in the *Crito* he has overlooked the following words: εἰ μὴ ποὶ στρατεύσομενος. We are acquainted with too many instances of the carelessness of antient grammarians (see Wesseling on *Diodorus Siculus*, vol. I. p. 527. and Hutchinson on Xenophon's *Anabasis*, p. 301.) to have recourse to the hypothesis, that these words were omitted in the edition which Athenæus had before him.

Socrates endeavoured to harden his body, and to steel himself against the effects of hunger, thirst, and cold. Though Potidæa was besieged during the severest cold of a Thracian winter, Socrates, in his usual clothing, walked bare-foot through snow and ice.¹ He distinguished himself so much by his bravery, that the prize was awarded to him, which he, however, gave up to Alcibiades, his favourite follower, (whom he himself had saved in this battle, as we are told by the latter, in the Symposium of Plato²), with the object of encouraging him to deserve from his country such honours in future by his own personal merits. Various anecdotes are preserved respecting this campaign of Socrates; to which, however, we cannot attach any importance. Thus we are told by Gellius, Diogenes, and Ælian, that while the plague raged in the Athenian camp, and in Athens itself, Socrates was the only person who escaped the general infection. It is also said that he once stood for twenty-four hours on the same spot before the camp, absorbed in deep thought, with his eyes fixed on an object, as if his soul were absent from his body.³

In his second campaign we find Socrates at Delium, a town in Bœotia, where the Athenians were defeated by the Bœotians.⁴ This battle was fought 424 B. C., when Socrates was at the age of forty-five, in the same

¹ Diog. II. § 12. Thucyd. I. 58 foll.

² p. 220. D.

³ Aul. Gellius, *Noct. Att.* II. 1; Diog. II. § 25; Ælian, *Nat. Hist.* XIII. 27.

⁴ Thucyd. IV. 96.



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LIFE OF SOCRATES.

in the Theætetes of Plato to Theodorus, a mathematician of Cyrene, who taught at Athens.¹ This partiality for Athens, which at that time presented a picture of the great world on a small scale, combined with a feeling of independence, were perhaps the principal reasons which determined him not to accept the flattering invitations of Archelaus, Scopas, and Eurylochus.² “He smiled upon three tyrants,” says Libanius in his apology,³ “at their presents, their manner of living, and their exquisite pleasures.” The riches, and the manner in which the great lived, had no attractions for him; not even the sovereign of Asia was happy in his opinion.⁴ He did not wish to go to a man, he told Archelaus, who could give more than he himself could return; at Athens, he said, four measures of flour were sold for one obolus, the springs yielded plenty of water, and he lived contented with what he possessed.⁵

Socrates did not like a country-life, for man attracted him more than nature. “Forgive me, my friend,” he once said to Phædrus,⁶ who preferred a country-life,

¹ Compare Plato, *Apol.* XVII. — These expressions of Socrates seem to raise a doubt as to the statement of Cicero (*Tuscul.* V. 37.) and Plutarch (*de Exilio*, vol. VIII. p. 371.), that Socrates had said he was no Athenian, no Greek, but a citizen of the world. Compare Meiners' *Geschichte der Wissenschaften*, vol. II. p. 361.

² Diog. II. 25. Aristot. *Rhetor.* II. 23.

³ p. 58 and 59. edit. Reiske.

⁴ Cic. *Tuscul.* V. 12.

⁵ Seneca *de Benef.* V. 6. Epictet. *Fragm.* 174. edit. Schweighäuser.

⁶ Plat. *Phædr.* p. 230. D.

and who accused Socrates of being almost unacquainted with the neighbourhood of Athens, "I am very anxious to learn something; and from fields and trees I can learn nothing; but I can indeed from the men in town." Thus we do not read of his being absent from Athens, except on the expeditions mentioned above, and on some short journeys, such as to the Isthmian games and to Delphi; and as some think, on a journey to Samos, with Archelaus his teacher.¹

After Socrates returned to Athens from those expeditions, he was regarded by his countrymen and by the Greeks in general, as an eminent teacher and practical philosopher. But his activity as a citizen, was exerted in a still different sphere, for in his sixty-fifth year he became a senator. "I have," says he in the apology of Plato, "held no state-office, men of Athens, with the exception of having been a senator."

In order to understand fully the conduct of Socrates in this office, it is necessary to have a clear idea of the constitution of the Athenian senate. The Athenian senate usually called *ἡ βουλή τῶν πεντακοσίων*, consisted of five hundred senators, who were elected from the ten tribes established by Cleisthenes. Every month, viz. every thirty-fifth or thirty-sixth-day, (for the Athenian year consisted of ten months), one tribe had the presidency, and this tribe was called *φυλή πρυ-*

¹ Plat. *Crito*, c. XIV. The journey to Samos is mentioned by Diogenes, II. 23, on the authority of Ion of Chios. This, however, contradicts the statement made in the passage of the *Crito* which Diogenes had shortly before (22.) confirmed.

τανεύουσα; and its members πρυτάνεις. Of these fifty prytanes ten had the presidency every seven days, under the name of πρόεδροι. Each day, one of these ten enjoyed the highest dignity, with the name of ἐπιστάτης. His authority was of the greatest extent: he laid every thing before the assembly of the people, put the question to the vote, examined the votes, and in fact conducted the whole business of the assembly. A senator was only elected for one year; and a man could only be epistates once, and only for one day.¹ He, who was invested with this office, had the keys of the citadel and the treasury of the republic entrusted to his care.

Socrates was epistates² on the day when the unjust sentence was to be passed on the unfortunate admirals, who had neglected to take up the bodies of the dead, after the battle of Arginusæ. How did Socrates behave on that occasion? This is an event which shows Socrates to us, in such an active and indeed important office, that it is of the greatest importance in forming a proper estimate of his character, to observe his conduct on this occasion with the greatest attention.

In the battle off the islands of Arginusæ, (B. C. 404,) the Athenians had obtained a complete victory, under the command of ten admirals, among whom Pericles, an adopted son of the celebrated demagogue of that name, and Diomedon possessed considerable reputation. To take care of the burial of the dead was regarded by

¹ Pollux, VIII. 9.

² Xenoph. *Mem.* I. 1. 18. See Luzac, *de Socrate Cive*, p. 91 foll.



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appointed Thrasybulus and Theramenes as taxiarchs, and therefore, if it were necessary for anybody to suffer punishment, it should be inflicted on them. This statement produced its natural effect on the people; and they would probably have been acquitted at once, if the question had been put to the vote. But by such an act, the design of their enemies would have been frustrated. They therefore managed to adjourn the assembly till another day, alleging that it was too dark to count the show of hands.

In the meanwhile, the enemies of the admirals set all their engines at work, to inflame the people against them. The lamentations and the mournful appearance of the kinsmen of the slain, who had been hired by Thrasybulus and Theramenes for this tragic scene, during the festival of the Apaturia,¹ which happened to fall on the day on which the assembly was held, were intended to inflame the minds of the people against the unfortunate admirals. The votes were to be given on the general question, whether the admirals had done wrong, in not taking up the bodies of those who had been left in the water after the battle; and if they should be condemned by the majority, (so the senate ordained,) they were to be put to death and their property to be confiscated.²

¹ The Ἀπατούρια were solemnized for three days. The most probable interpretation of the word is to consider it synonymous with ὁμοπατόρια, as the children came with their fathers to register their names in the phratries. See Weiske on Xenoph. *Hellen.* I. 7. 8.

² Xenoph. *Mem.* I. 1. 18. *Hellen.* I. 7. 34.: ἡ δὲ τῆς βουλῆς γνώμη ἦν μιᾷ ψήφῳ ἅπαντας κρίνειν. In this same passage the

But to condemn all by one vote, was contrary to an ancient law of Cannonus, according to which the vote ought to have been given upon each individual separately. Hence the prytanes, and Socrates at their head, refused to put the illegal question to the votes of the people. Yet, when the latter, enraged against the prytanes, loudly demanded that those who resisted their pleasure, should themselves be brought to trial, they yielded to the general clamour with the exception of Socrates, who alone remained unshaken.

Notwithstanding all the threatenings that were used against him, he could not be induced to desist from his resolution, but boldly declared he would do nothing which he considered contrary to his duty. In consequence of this refusal, the question could not be put to the vote, and the assembly was therefore adjourned; another epistates and other πρόεδροι were chosen, and the enemies of the admirals obtained what they had wished for. The admirals were condemned to death, and the six, who were in Athens, were executed.¹

This was the only civil office that Socrates ever held ;

ancient law of Cannonus is mentioned, which enjoined κρίνεσθαι δίχα ἕκαστον. [On the decree of Cannonus see Appendix II. to the fourth volume of Mr. Thirlwall's "History of Greece."—ED.]

¹ They were sentenced to death B. C. 404. Luzac, in his *Disquisitionis de Epistatis et Proedris Atheniensium*, p. 114, which is added to his discourse *de Socrate Cive*, has considered the subject very carefully. The principal passages of the antients are: Xenoph. *Hellen.* I. 7. and Æsch. *Axiochus*, c. 12. Though Æschines may not be author of this dialogue, yet the agreement existing between him and Xenophon, proves its authenticity with regard to historical facts.

and we cannot be surprised when so many acts of injustice were committed, which he alone could not possibly have prevented, that he entirely withdrew from public business. He mentions this himself, as the reason of his living a private man. “Be assured, men of Athens, if in former times, I had wished to engage in public affairs, I should have perished long ago, without being either useful to you or myself.”¹

Socrates himself lived to see the injurious consequences, which the unjust condemnation of those admirals brought down upon Greece, in the mournful issue of the Peloponnesian war. The very year after their condemnation, (405. B. C.) the Athenians for want of able generals were entirely defeated by the Lacedæmonians under Lysander; their fleet was destroyed, Athens besieged, and reduced to the necessity of surrendering at discretion to the victors. Lysander after this established the government of the Thirty Tyrants, whose memory is branded in history; and Socrates was one among the many who had to struggle with their injustice. Freret indeed has endeavoured² to prove that Socrates supported these hateful oligarchs, and that by this circumstance we must account for his condemnation immediately after their fall. But this assertion is at variance with everything recorded, respecting the history and opinions of Socrates. He was indeed favourably disposed towards an aristocratical govern-

¹ Plato, *Apolog.* c. XIX.

² *Magazin Encyclopédique*, Seconde Année, Tom. V. p. 474 foll.



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young men, and show them the path of real wisdom, Critias, who moreover entertained an old aversion to Socrates for having censured his sensual pleasures with Euthydemus and Charicles, summoned him before their tribunal, and altogether forbade him from conversing with or instructing young men. Socrates in his usual manner had used a simile, which gave great offence to the Thirty, who felt its truth. "I should indeed wonder," Socrates had said, "if a cow-herd under whose care the cows grow fewer and thinner, would not own that he was a bad cow-herd, but it is still more astonishing to me, if a state-officer who diminishes the number of citizens and renders them unhappy, is not ashamed and will not own, that he is a bad officer of the state." Charicles added the significant words: "By god, pray, do not speak of the cow-herd! take care that thou dost not thyself diminish the flock by speaking again of them." "Now it was evident," adds Xenophon, "that after the simile of the cows had been reported to them, they were enraged against Socrates."¹

Thus Socrates, far from supporting the tyrants, was a declared enemy of these base and cruel men, and none of their edicts had the effect of inducing him to abandon that course which he considered his duty. Entertaining no fear of them, he did not leave Athens, which is duly appreciated by Cicero.² The Thirty summoned him with four others to the Tholos, the place in which the

¹ *Memorab.* I. 2. 29.

² *Ad Attic.* VIII. 2: "Socrates, quum triginta tyranni essent, pedem porta non extulit."

prytanes used to take their meals ; and commanded him to bring Leon of Salamis to Athens, who had obtained the right of citizenship at Athens, but had chosen a voluntary exile, fearing that the tyrants might execute him, as he was a wealthy and distinguished man.¹ “Then indeed,” says Socrates in Plato’s apology, “I showed by my actions and not merely by my words, that I did not care (if it be not too coarse an expression) one jot for death ; but it was an object of the greatest care to me to do nothing unjust or unholy. For that government, though it was so powerful, did not frighten me into doing anything unjust ; but when we came out of the Tholos, the four went to Salamis and took Leon, but I went away home. And perhaps I should have suffered death on account of this, if the government had not soon been broken up.”

In this manner Socrates most effectually refused taking any part in the unjust acts of the Thirty,² who were very anxious to gain him over to their interest, as

¹ Τότε μέντοι ἐγὼ οὐ λόγῳ, ἀλλ’ ἔργῳ αὐτῷ ἐνεδειξάμην, ὅτι ἐμοὶ θανάτου μὲν μέλει, εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἦν εἰπεῖν, οὐδ’ ὀτιοῦν κ. τ. λ. c. XX. — Οὐδ’ ὀτιοῦν seems to be an expression which only people of the lower classes made use of, hence the addition of Socrates: εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἦν εἰπεῖν, “quamvis forte rudior loqui videar.” Libanius, the imitator of the Attic idiom, on this account adds before οὐδ’ ὀτιοῦν the softening ὡς εἰπεῖν. *Apol.* p. 8. The courage and intrepidity of Socrates before the Thirty is often mentioned. Seneca *Epist.* 28: “Triginta tyranni Socratem circumsteterunt, nec potuerunt animum ejus infringere.” Diog. II. 24: Ἦν δὲ (Σωκράτης) δημοκρατικός, ὡς δῆλον ἔκ τε τοῦ μὴ εἶξαι τοῖς περὶ Κριτίαν κ. τ. λ.

² Plat. *Epist.* VII. ad Dionis propinquos.

they wished in general to have as many of the citizens as possible accessory to their crimes. When he declared that he would never assist them in any unjust act, Charicles said: "Dost thou indeed wish to be at liberty to say what thou pleasest, and not suffer anything at all for it?" "I am willing to suffer any calamity," said Socrates, "but I will not do wrong to any one." Charicles was silent, and his associates looked at each other.

According to Diodorus, Socrates undertook the defence of Theramenes, a man of a very equivocal character.¹ This account has been copied by other writers, but is not established on sufficient historical evidence being mentioned neither by Plato, by Xenophon, nor any other contemporary writer.²

Theramenes was himself one of the thirty tyrants. When he was sent on an embassy by his fellow-citizens, who had placed great confidence in him, to enter into

¹ Diod. Sic. XIV. 5. Aristotle, Cicero, and Diodorus, speak of Theramenes in the highest terms. Aristotle (in Plutarch, III. p. 337.) and Cicero, who seem to have been prejudiced in his favour by the constancy with which he suffered death, declare him to have been the best citizen of Athens. Cicero (*Tuscul.* I. 40.) speaks in terms of the highest admiration of his courage during his execution, and ranks him with Socrates; Diodorus (I. p. 640 foll. edit. Wesseling.) describes him as a very superior man. But from the records of history we must consider him as a weak, mean, vain, and selfish person. See Thucyd. VIII. 68 foll.; Lysias (edit. Markland), p. 210 & 215.; and Xenoph. *Hellen.* II. 2 & 3. We are informed by the latter that he was nick-named *Kόθορνος*, a word expressive of the fickleness of his character. See Weiske on this passage.

² Among the writers of a later time, the author of the biographies of the ten orators, ascribes the defence of Theramenes to Isocrates, p. 836. F.



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flew to the altar of Vesta ; and Socrates, Diodorus says, undertook his defence. Supported by two other citizens, he used every exertion to save him, until Theramenes entreated him to desist from an undertaking, which was as dangerous for him, as it was useless to himself. Theramenes after this, drank the poisoned cup with great composure and serenity.

If Socrates actually undertook the defence of Theramenes, it was unquestionably a noble action ; as the reason for which the Thirty punished their colleague, and the manner in which it was done, were equally detestable. Plato's silence respecting this occurrence may be accounted for ; as in his seventh letter he evidently avoids every opportunity of speaking of Critias, who was his kinsman¹ on his mother's side. But perhaps Plato as well as Xenophon may have considered Theramenes unworthy of the defence of Socrates, and on that account passed over it in silence. However, the works from which Diodorus compiled his history, especially where he does not mention his authorities, are not entitled to so much confidence as to justify us in having recourse to these hypotheses. It seems also contrary to the character of Socrates, that he should have been deterred by the representations of Theramenes, that his exertions would be fruitless and dangerous to himself ; for Socrates did not easily desist from a resolution once taken up, as he cared little about personal danger, unless he was restrained by his genius.

¹ Diogenes, III. 2.

CHAPTER VI.

WE now come to the most interesting period in the life of Socrates; his accusation, defence, condemnation, and execution. We know that all this took place a few years after the abolition of the oligarchy by Thrasybulus, in the year 400, or according to others, 399 B. C. Anytus, Lycon and Meletus brought the accusation in a writ, (*ἀντωμοσία*) before the tribunal of the people,¹ charging him with introducing new divinities and corrupting the

¹ That it was the tribunal of the people, or the court of the Heliastæ (*ἡλιασταί*), or Dicastæ (*δικασταί*), by which Socrates was condemned, has been proved by Bougainville, in his essay, "On the priests of Athens," in the *Memoires de l'Académie des Inscriptions et des Belles Lettres*, and by Meiners in his *Gesch. d. Wiss.* vol. ii. p. 482, against Meursius, who thought that Socrates had been condemned by the Areopagus. This usual supposition is also advocated by Patter and Stollberg in the remarks on the Apology. But Bougainville's arguments for substituting the Heliastæ seem to be convincing. The Heliastæ were elected from the whole body of the people without any regard to the different classes, and received a pay for their services. Their name arose from the circumstance of their assembling immediately after sunrise, and in a sunny place. [This etymology is too absurd to need any refutation. *Ἡλιαία*, the name of the place where the *Ἠλιασταί* assembled, is another form of *ἀλίη* (*an assembly*), a word which frequently occurs in Herodotus. — It is also connected with *ἀλής*, and *ἀλίζομαι*. — ED.]

young; Anytus, on behalf of the demagogues, Lycon on behalf of the orators, and Meletus on behalf of the poets.¹ Socrates was sentenced to death. The circumstances of the trial are sufficiently known, and are accurately explained by Tychsen in the *Bibliothek für alte Literatur und Kunst*.² But the real causes of the condemnation of Socrates are not yet accurately ascertained; and for this reason, as well as on account of the light which they must throw on his character, the whole particulars of his trial seem to require careful examination. He is generally considered as a victim of the intrigues and hatred of his enemies, especially of the sophists; and in modern times, his death has sometimes been represented as a well-deserved punishment for his anti-democratical and revolutionary ideas.

Both these views, however, take only one side of the question, and I am convinced, that several causes must be taken together in order to judge impartially and to account satisfactorily for the condemnation of Socrates.

The causes which led to his condemnation appear to be of two kinds, partly *direct* and partly *indirect*. I call those indirect causes which led to the accusation of Socrates, and those direct which, independent of the points contained in the accusation, disposed the judges to pronounce the sentence of death.

The indirect causes will easily be seen, as soon as we have obtained a clear insight into the character of the

¹ Plat. *Apol.* c. X. Diog. Laert. II. 39.

² Part I. and II. Göttingen, 1786 and 87.



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act of injustice to which he could not be accessory, must have increased the enmity of Meletus. Libanius¹ besides, describes him as a venal accuser, who for a drachma would accuse any one, whether he knew him or not. To this report, however, we cannot attach any great importance, as we are ignorant of the source from which it was derived.

Lycon was a public orator. We know that, according to a law of Solon, ten persons were elected to this office; whose duty was to advise the people and to maintain public justice. But these orators were very often individuals, who entirely neglected their high calling; and merely attended to their own private interests, and persecuted the most honest persons, whenever their personal advantage required it. Can we wonder that the name of an orator should be despised by every honest man? Can we wonder that a man like Socrates, whose whole heart was benevolence towards mankind, should hate these corrupters of morality and often censure their conduct in the strongest terms, when they hurried the people into the most unjust and revolting actions? On the other hand what was more natural than that Socrates should render these men his bitterest enemies, who became the more dangerous, as they scrupled not to employ any means to get rid of such a troublesome censor of their conduct.²

Anytus was the most powerful among the accusers of

¹ *Apolog.* edit. Reiske, p. 11 and 51.

² Προητοίμασε δὲ πάντα Λύκων ὁ δημαγωγός, says Diogenes, II. 38.

Socrates ; whence the latter in an expressive manner is called by Horace¹ *Anyti reus*. Plato in his seventh letter ranks him with Lycon, among the most influential citizens. He had been driven into exile by the Thirty ; and from this circumstance alone he would have been an interesting personage to his fellow-citizens, after the restoration of the democratical government. But his influence as a demagogue and a statesman must have been still more increased, since he himself had co-operated with Thrasybulus in expelling the Thirty.² He carried on the business of a tanner, whereby he acquired great importance ; for after the changes introduced by Cleisthenes into the constitution of Solon, every tradesman or artizan could rise to the highest honours of the state. Socrates often censured the principle, that people totally ignorant of the constitution and of public business, should have an influence in the management of state-affairs. His examples were often derived from artizans. “Thou must,” said Critias in the above mentioned conversation between himself, Charicles and Socrates,³ “no longer speak of shoemakers and other artizans, for I indeed think that they are tired of thy foolish talk, by which their trade has become so notorious.” In the *Meno* of Plato, Socrates expresses a doubt as to whether a son could be taught virtue by his parents ; and uses the example of shoemakers and other artizans, who, according to his view, are themselves

¹ *Sat.* II. 4. 3.

² *Xenoph. Hellen.* II. 3.

³ *Xenoph. Mem.* I. 2. 37.

ignorant of virtue. Hence the multitude were not much disposed in his favour, and Anytus in the *Meno* declares, that he would avail himself of the influence which he possessed, to make Socrates repent of his expressions. But there werè causes still more personal, which drew down upon Socrates the hatred of Anytus. The latter had entrusted two of his sons to the instructions of Socrates with the intention of educating them as orators, which was the principal way to authority and wealth in Athens at that time. In one of these young men Socrates observed superior talents, which might raise him to something better than the profession of his father, and he told him, that he must give up the trade of his father and pursue a higher course.¹ This exceedingly offended the vanity of a man, who, as a member of the popular assembly, wished to be thought a very important personage. The account of Libanius² is therefore in itself not very improbable when he says, that Anytus after having accused Socrates, promised him, that he would desist from his accusation, if the latter would no longer mention tanners, shoemakers, &c., and that Socrates refused the proposal; but we cannot place much reliance on this account, since we are ignorant of the source from which Libanius derived it, and know besides

¹ Xenoph. *Apolog.* § 29. Although this Apology in its present form was not written by Xenophon, it appears to express his views; the greater part of it, at least, is a compilation from the *Memorabilia*.

² The author of the seventh of the Socratic letters, p. 30, says: Πῶς ἂν οὖν, ὦ Ξενοφῶν, τὴν μιανίαν τοῦ βυρσοδέψου Ἀνύτου γράφοιμι καὶ τὸ θράσος αὐτοῦ;



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it will be easier to discover the true causes of the accusation of Socrates; for at first sight it is surprising, that so many other Greek philosophers, though they gave much greater offence to the popular religion, were yet allowed to live at Athens free from persecution; and that such a violent accusation should have been raised against Socrates alone. Epicurus, for instance, died in the seventy-first year of his age, highly lamented by his disciples without having ever been accused on account of his religious opinions.¹ The causes, which led to the accusation of Socrates, may be fairly classed under four divisions which will form the subject of the following chapter.

¹ [The assertion of Wiggers that Greek philosophers, who gave offence to the popular religion, were allowed to live at Athens free from persecution, is contrary to all historical evidence. Although sceptical opinions on religion had for many years previous to the death of Socrates made considerable progress among the upper classes at Athens, it is nevertheless certain that the lower orders were strongly attached to the popular religion, and highly resented any attempts which were made to question its truth. Anaxagoras was compelled to leave Athens, notwithstanding the powerful support of Pericles, on account of his religious opinions; and Diagoras of Melos was proscribed at Athens on account of his impiety, and a reward offered to any one who should either kill him, or bring him to justice. Protagoras, also, was accused and condemned to death for having read a work, at Athens, on the nature of the gods, in which he declared that he was unable to determine whether the gods existed or not. He escaped, however; but the book was publicly burnt, and all who possessed copies were ordered to give them up. — ED.]

CHAPTER VII.

1. EVERY great man, especially under a democratical government and in a period of moral corruption, excites the envy of others; for it is the fate of the truly great to be envied by those who feel their own comparative inferiority. Even a superficial knowledge of the human heart shows how much we are inclined to envy those we cannot equal. Who does not remember the answer which that citizen of Athens gave to Aristides, when the latter asked him why he voted against him! If such a man be distinguished by his talents, others endeavour to degrade him, or if they do justice to his genius, speak in a derogatory manner of his feelings. But should he be a man distinguished by unusual moral goodness, by rare qualities of heart, and by a high enthusiasm for virtue and morality, he is still more in danger of being misunderstood by his contemporaries; for there are always persons mean enough to suppose, because their own hearts cannot comprehend such virtues, that the low objects of vanity and selfishness influence the actions and the noble philanthropic views of the man of superior morality, and ready enough to stigmatize the teachers and benefactors of mankind, as corruptors of the people and

seducers of the young. This must be the case principally in democratical states. The more numerous the relations and combinations in a state, and the more various the conflicts of the parties with each other, the less can a man be tolerated, who rises by his superior talents and virtues above the ordinary class of men. In a monarchical state in which his influence is not so great, and the various conflicts of different powers are not so numerous, he may live, if not more honoured, at any rate more peaceably. But the greater the immorality of the citizens in a democratical state, the less likely is a man of great moral excellence to be tolerated. The contrast between him and their own corruption is a sufficient reason to excite against him their hatred and persecution. Socrates was one of these superior beings, who are born not only to enlighten his own age, but mankind in general. Virtue and humanity had descended upon him in their sublime purity, and had excited his unbounded veneration. Could he be otherwise than offensive to the wise and the learned of his age, to the narrow-minded quibbling sophists, the selfish demagogues and the conceited poetasters? Hence Socrates himself in Plato's Apology mentions the hatred of the multitude as the cause of his fate.¹

Socrates always lived under a democratical form of government,² with the exception of the eight months, during which the Thirty possessed the supreme power.

¹ C. XVI.

² [An oligarchical form of government was established for a short time in B. C. 411. — ED.]



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properly speaking, of Aspasia, who had, it is true, done very much to diffuse a taste for the fine arts, vices of every description had gained the ascendancy. During the Peloponnesian war, the neglect of all moral and religious cultivation had kept pace with the decay of external worship; the spirit of the times had taken a sophistical tendency, and selfishness had so evidently become the motive to action, that even Athenian ambassadors unblushingly declared to the Spartans and Melians, that it was lawful and right for the better and stronger to oppress and rule over the weak and helpless, asserting that not only all tribes of animals, but whole cities and nations acted according to this principle.¹ It was a very common opinion that after death the soul ceased to exist; the religious phantoms of a future state were laughed at by an age so full of conceit, that nothing but a conscience disturbed in the last moments of life, could excite an apprehension, lest those ridiculed phantoms might still not be wholly fictitious.² But it is

foll.) might be mentioned as authorities, but it is evident that they have only copied the comic poets, without being much concerned about historical truth. Besides, their authority is little, compared with that of Thucydides, the impartial adversary of Pericles, who declares the desire to extend the power of Athens, and to humble the Spartans, to have been the true causes of the war. (I. 23. 24. 56 and 88, and II. 1. Compare Wyttenbach's review of the *Lectiones Andocidæ* of Sluiter in the *Biblioth. Crit.* vol. iii. P. iii. p. 79.)

¹ Thucyd. I. 76; V. 105.

² Plat. *Phæd.* and *de Republ.* VI. That free-thinking at that time generally prevailed, is evident from the tenth book *de Legibus*. These principles were chiefly and eagerly adopted by young people, who made such an application of the astronomical hypo-

obvious how completely every seed of virtue must have been crushed by the government of such corrupt men as the thirty tyrants.¹

theses of Anaxagoras, that they not only denied the divinity of the stars, but at the same time hazarded the assertion, that the gods being changed into the dust of the earth, were unconcerned about human affairs.

¹ [Those persons, however, who are disposed to join in the common declamations against the vices of the Athenian constitution, would do well to weigh the following just and eloquent remarks of Niebuhr, before they pronounce an opinion. "Evil without end, may be spoken of the Athenian constitution, and with truth; but the common-place, stale declamation of its revilers would be, in a great measure silenced, if a man qualified for the task should avail himself of the advanced state of our insight into the circumstances of Athens, to show how even there the vital principle instinctively produced forms and institutions by which, notwithstanding the elements of anarchy contained in the constitution, the commonwealth preserved and regulated itself. No people in history has been so much misunderstood, and so unjustly condemned as the Athenians: with very few exceptions the old charges of faults and misdeeds are continually repeated. I should say: God shield us from a constitution like the Athenian! were not the age of such states irrevocably gone by, and consequently all fear of it in our own case. As it was, it shows an unexampled degree of noble-mindedness in the nation, that the heated temper of a fluctuating popular assembly, the security afforded to individuals of giving a base vote unobserved, produced so few reprehensible decrees: and that on the other hand the thousands, among whom the common man had the upper hand, came to resolutions of such self-sacrificing magnanimity and heroism, as few men are capable of except in their most exalted mood, even when they have the honour of renowned ancestors to maintain as well as their own.

"I will not charge those who declaim about the Athenians as an incurably reckless people, and their republic as hopelessly lost, in the time of Plato, with wilful injustice; for they know not what they do. But this is a striking instance, how imperfect

2. The accusation and trial of Socrates was also in part occasioned by the hatred which the sophists bore towards him, and by the freedom with which he always expressed his opinions. How revolting must it have been to a man of correct habits of thinking, that persons assuming the venerable appellation of the wise, should have

knowledge leads to injustice and calumnies; and why does not every one ask his conscience whether he is himself capable of forming a sober judgment on every case that lies before him? A man of candour will hear the answer, in a voice like that of the genius of Socrates. Let who will clamour and scoff: for myself, should trials be reserved for my old age, and for my children, who will certainly have evil days to pass through, I pray only for as much self-control, as much temperance in the midst of temptation, as much courage in the hour of danger, as much calm perseverance in the consciousness of a glorious resolution, which was unfortunate in its issue, as was shown by the Athenian people, considered as one man: we have nothing to do here with the morals of the individuals: but he who as an individual possesses such virtues, and withal is guilty of no worse sins in proportion than the Athenians, may look forward without uneasiness to his last hour.

“The antient rhetoricians were a class of babblers; a school for lies and scandal: they fastened many aspersions on nations and individuals. So we hear it echoed from one declamation to another, among the examples of Athenian ingratitude,—that Paches was driven to save himself by his own dagger, from the sentence of the popular tribunal. How delighted was I last year, to find in a place where no one will look for such a discovery, that he was condemned for having violated free women in Mitylene at its capture. The Athenians did not suffer his services in this expedition, or his merit in averting an alarming danger from them, to screen him from punishment.

“The fathers and brothers who, in the epigraph of the thousand citizens who fell as freemen at Chæronea, attested with joy that they did not repent of their determination, for the issue was in the hands of the Gods, the resolution, the glory of man,—who



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clared, was folly, and the civil laws were at variance with the laws of nature; moderation and temperance were enemies to pleasure, and contrary to the precepts of good sense.¹ Socrates too deeply felt the corruption of his age not to oppose its authors in every way, and to express his indignation as loudly as possible. Their dazzling sophistries he opposed with weapons, which must have been very painful to conceited people, who loved anything better than the truth. Pretending to be a disciple, anxious to learn something, he attentively listened to the wisdom which flowed from the lips of the sophists; and perhaps praised it exceedingly, whilst he lamented his own dullness, and at the same time willingly admitted the truth of the greater part of their doctrines, and only now and then indulged in a little modest question, which they could not refuse to answer to an industrious disciple, and which appeared to them so insignificant, that it could not contribute in the least to refute their assertions. But he went gradually further, and traced things to their ultimate causes, and thus extorted from them the confession of their ignorance. He perhaps even followed them as he did Euthydemus, until he could engage them, with propriety in a conversation which would humble their pride. The

¹ Compare Plato, in the *Gorgias*, and *de Republ.* II. The beautiful allegory of Prodicus, "Hercules at the cross-way," which has acquired such celebrity, and perhaps owes its perfection to Xenophon, at least as far as its form is concerned, was only a declamation, and probably belonged to those show-speeches which this sophist delivered in the cities of Greece. Philostr. *de vit. Sophist.* p. 482 foll.

method of examining and refuting (*ἐξετάζειν* and *ἐλέγχειν* according to the expression of the Socratic philosophers), with which his disciples, imitating their teacher, tried every one who gloried in his wisdom, was still more disagreeable to the sophists. But the indignation of those who had been tested in this manner did not fall on the disciples, but on Socrates himself, as he asserts in the *Apology*.¹ It cannot be denied that the sophists, who before enjoyed a high degree of estimation, were deprived by Socrates of a considerable portion of their influence in Greece, and especially at Athens. And in revenge they did every thing to degrade him in the eyes of his fellow-citizens, and to prove that the real motives of his actions were bad. “He seduces the young, and introduces new gods:”² — these were the hateful calumnies by which they attempted to injure his reputation with the people, and which were faithfully repeated by Meletus in his accusation; — calumnies which must have represented Socrates to the people in a more odious light, as the constitution of Athens was intimately connected with its religion, and the interest of the one was necessarily involved in that of the other.

But in general it was by too freely expressing what

¹ C. X.

² Xenoph. *Mem.* I. 2. § 49: *Σωκράτης τοὺς πατέρας προπηλακίζειν ἐδίδασκε*: a charge which had been brought against Socrates by Aristophanes. Excellent remarks on the ironical manner in which Socrates treated the sophists, are found in Reinhard's essay: *De Methodo Socratica*, in the first vol. of his *Opuscul. Academ.*, edited by Pölitz. Lipsiæ, 1808.

he thought, that Socrates made enemies, and brought on his accusation. He not only combated the fallacies and the perversity of the sophists, but every kind of vice and folly, and called them by their true names; he attacked every error, and that the more zealously, the closer it was connected with morality. Thus not only sophists, but poets, orators and demagogues, soothsayers and priests, became his enemies. He despised the comic poets who delighted the multitude at the expense of morality; and bad poets and sophistical orators felt the sting of his irony. The demagogues hated him because he was the opponent of their teachers, the sophists, from whom many among them had learnt the art of deceiving the people. What could indeed be more absurd in the eyes of reason, than that persons totally ignorant of the constitution and public business, such as artizans, tanners, shoemakers, &c., should have an influence on the conduct of public affairs? These he made the objects of his satire, and exposed the absurdity of their pretensions. Socrates had, besides, a prejudice against mechanical arts, which he sometimes expressed too indiscreetly and offensively. Thus he says to Critobulus:¹ “Mechanical arts are despised, and indeed it is not with injustice that they are little valued by states; for they are injurious to the bodies of the workmen as well as to the superintendents, since they render it necessary for them to sit, and to remain constantly in-doors; and many of them pass all the day near the fire. And whenever the body is languid, the mind loses its energy. Besides

¹ Xenophon, *Æconom.* IV. 2.



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manded the greatest submission, as their religious system did not bear a free examination. The analogy of history and daily experience shows this sufficiently, even if we leave out of consideration the facts stated in the accusation.

3. The odious light in which Socrates was represented by Aristophanes, created enemies to the former, and contributed to his accusation. The assertion founded on the report of Ælian,¹ that Aristophanes had been bribed by the enemies of Socrates, especially by Meletus and Anytus, to represent him in a ridiculous light, though it was in former times almost generally believed, is certainly destitute of any historical evidence. Meletus was a young man when he accused Socrates (νέος, βαθυγένειος, he is called in the Euthyphron of Plato): how is it possible that twenty-three years² before that time he should have bribed Aristophanes? On the first representation of the Clouds, Anytus was only fourteen years old, and on good terms with Socrates, as we are told by Plato. With our present accurate knowledge of the nature of the so-called old Attic comedy, we cannot even suppose that Aristophanes was a personal enemy of Socrates,³ though he represented him to

¹ *Var. Hist.* II. 13.

² The Clouds were performed 423 B. C., on the festival of Dionysus.

³ The scholiasts, endeavouring to account for the odious light in which Socrates is represented in the Clouds, are of different opinions, some ascribing it to the inveterate hatred of the comic poets against the philosophers, others to personal jealousy, since Socrates had been preferred by king Archelaus to Aristophanes,

the Athenian people in the manner we see in the *Clouds*. The manner in which Socrates lived was a subject too tempting for a comic poet not to have introduced, though he might not have been provoked by any external causes. How many truly comical scenes might be derived from Socrates gazing at one object for twenty-four hours, and from the many anecdotes which were told of him; in addition to which, we must not forget his resemblance to a Silenus, and many other peculiarities in his conduct.¹ On the other hand, however, it would

&c. But all these hypotheses can easily be dispensed with. The comic poet took up any subject which did not appear to be wanting in comical interest, and made it suit his purpose. Besides, Aristophanes was not the only one who brought Socrates on the stage. Eupolis and Amipsias did the same (see Diog. Laert. II. 18. Schol. *ad Nub.* 96 and 129.), and Socrates shared this fate with all the distinguished men of his age, Pericles, Alcibiades, and Euripides. Thus the *Frogs* of Aristophanes were a satire upon Euripides, and, to a certain extent, upon Æschylus also. These comedies gave great delight to the multitude, as they considered it an essential part of their democratical liberty to laugh with impunity at the most eminent men of the age; even their demagogues, the adored Pericles and Cleon, were not spared. To attack the *People* was, properly speaking, not allowed, — though Aristophanes made occasional exceptions, — for it was sacred; but every individual might be brought on the stage by the comic poet. Xenoph. *De Republica Athen.* c. 2. The first archon, whose name could not be profaned on the stage, formed the only exception. Compare the Schol. on the *Clouds*, l. 32.

¹ Plat. *Sympos.* p. 220. C. “Meditating on some subject, he once stopped somewhere, early in the morning (viz. during the expedition against Potidæa), and as he did not succeed in his search, he remained in deep thought, standing on the same spot. When it had become noon-time, he attracted the attention of the people, and one said to another: ‘Socrates has been standing there, on the same spot, thinking about something, from an early

be going too far to assert that the ridiculous representation of Socrates had no influence on his fate. Even a cursory perusal of the *Clouds* of Aristophanes must convince the reader that every thing is calculated to exhibit Socrates in an odious light, as seducing the young, introducing new gods, and consequently as highly injurious to the commonwealth; and it is surprising to see these charges, twenty-three years afterwards, repeated by Meletus. Socrates himself, in the *Apology*, says that Aristophanes, and his party, were enemies far more dangerous to him than his accusers, and that Meletus in reality had only repeated the charges of the former.²

hour in the morning.' In the evening when he was still standing, there some of the Ionian soldiers, after supper, took out their carpets, partly to repose on them in the refreshing evening air (for it was a summer night), partly to watch whether Socrates would actually pass the night in that position. And he actually remained standing till day-break, and then addressed his prayers to the rising sun, and hastened away."—Aul. Gellius, *Noct. Att.* II. 1.

² Ἐμοῦ γὰρ πολλοὶ κατήγοροι γεγόνασι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, says he, καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς λέγοντες· οὐς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι ἢ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον, καίπερ ὄντας καὶ τούτους δεινούς. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοι δεινότεροι, ὦ ἄνδρες, οἱ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παίδων παραλαμβάνοντες ἔπειθόν τε καὶ κατήγόρουν ἐμοῦ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς, ὡς ἔστι τις Σωκράτης, σοφὸς ἀνὴρ, τὰ τε μετέωρα φροντιστής, καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ἅπαντα ἀνεζητηκῶς, καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν.* οὔτοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,

* A man who investigates all things above and below the earth (μετεωροφροντιστής, is the expression of Aristophanes,) was an atheist, according to the ideas of the Athenian people, for a natural philosopher and an atheist were synonymous appellations. These natural philosophers were also called μετεωρολέσχαι. A sophist is a person who gives to a bad cause the appearance of a



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tus would perhaps not have ventured to come forth with an accusation against Socrates, had not a favourite poet of the Athenian people paved the way, and indirectly undertaken his accusation. "Let us go back," says Socrates, in the Apology, "to the commencement, and the first charge from which the calumny has arisen, relying on which, Meletus has brought the present charge against me." That the Clouds of Aristophanes did not obtain the prize, but a play of Cratinus, who contested for it with him and Amipsias, cannot surprise us; nor should it lead us to the conclusion, that the Clouds of Aristophanes were unfavourably received by the Athenians.¹ It was not the applause of the people which decided the prize, but judges were especially appointed for that purpose; who were often biassed by opposite motives, and who may have been influenced in this instance by circumstances unknown to us.²

¹ Argum. II. ad Nubes edit. Herm. says that Alcibiades and his party had prevented the success of this piece. According to Ælian's account (Var. Hist. II. 13.) the people were so much pleased with the Clouds of Aristophanes, that they exclaimed: "No one but Aristophanes ought to be rewarded with the prize." Aristophanes himself considered it the most perfect of his comedies (Nub. v. 522, and Vespæ, v. 1039). The account of Ælian, however, deserves just as little credit as the anecdote which he relates immediately after it, that Socrates knowing that he would be the object of bitter satire, was not only present during the performance, but that having heard that many strangers were present, and were inquiring who Socrates was, he came forth in the midst of the comedy, and remained standing in a place where he could be observed by all, and compared with the copy.

² [For an account of the Clouds of Aristophanes, see a note at the end of this chapter. — Ed.]

4. Socrates was not in favour of a democratical form of government: this must also have contributed to his accusation. Socrates, like the sages of antiquity in general, approved of an aristocracy in the original sense of the word, viz. a constitution which entrusted the supreme power to the hands of the best in a moral point of view.¹ Socrates was aware how dangerous it is to intrust the supreme power to the hands of an uneducated populace; his own experience taught him how easy it was for selfish demagogues to gain favour with an in-

¹ An aristocracy, according to the conceptions of the Athenians before the time of Alexander the Great, was not opposed to democracy, but to oligarchy. In an aristocracy the people always had great influence, but in an oligarchy they were entirely deprived of it. One of the principal passages relating to this point is in the *Menexenus* of Plato, p. 238. C. Plato there represents Socrates as repeating a funeral discourse of Aspasia, in honour of those who had died for their country. Πολιτεία γὰρ τροφή ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ, says Aspasia, καλὴ μὲν ἀγαθῶν, ἢ δὲ ἐναντία κακῶν. ὡς οὖν ἐν καλῇ πολιτείᾳ ἐτράφησαν οἱ πρόσθεν ἡμῶν, ἀναγκαῖον δηλῶσαι, δι' ἣν δὴ κάκεῖνοι ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ νῦν εἰσὶν, ὧν οἶδε τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες οἱ τετελευτηκότες. Ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ πολιτεία καὶ τότε ἦν καὶ νῦν, ἀριστοκρατία, ἐν ἣ νῦν τε πολιτευόμεθα καὶ τὸν αἰεὶ χρόνον ἐξ ἐκείνου ὡς τὰ πολλά. καλεῖ δὲ ὁ μὲν αὐτὴν δημοκρατίαν, ὁ δὲ ἄλλο, ᾧ ἂν χαίρη. ἔστι δὲ τῆ ἀληθείᾳ μετ' εὐδοξίας πλήθους ἀριστοκρατία. βασιλεῖς μὲν γὰρ αἰεὶ ἡμῖν εἰσὶν· οὗτοι δὲ τοτὲ μὲν ἐκ γένους, τοτὲ-δὲ αἰρετοί· ἐγκρατὲς δὲ τῆς πόλεως τὰ πολλά τὸ πλῆθος, τὰς δὲ ἀρχὰς δίδωσι καὶ τὸ κράτος τοῖς αἰεὶ δόξασιν ἀρίστοις εἶναι, καὶ οὔτε ἀσθενεία, οὔτε πενία, οὔτε ἀγνωσία πατέρων ἀπελήλαται οὐδεὶς οὐδὲ τοῖς ἐναντίοις τετίμηται ὡς περ ἐν ἄλλαις πόλεσιν, ἀλλὰ εἰς ὄρος, ὁ δόξας σοφὸς ἢ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι κρατεῖ καὶ ἄρχει. Compare with this Xenoph. *Mem.* IV. 6. § 12: "Whenever public offices were held by persons who executed the will of the law, Socrates considered the government to be an Aristocracy." More arguments in support of this opinion are given by Luzac. l. c. p. 67.

constant multitude, and to carry plans into execution, which were often highly injurious to the whole nation. Hence, he frequently spoke in a sarcastic manner of the Athenian constitution, and satirised their bean-archons.¹ Socrates said to Charmides, an able young man, who, however, was too timid to speak in the public assembly,² “Is it the fullers that thou art afraid of, or the shoemakers? the carpenters, or the smiths? the peasants, or the merchants, or the higglers who exchange things in the market, and think of nothing else but how they may sell at the highest price, what they have bought at the lowest? for of such people the assembly is composed.” Still more forcible is the account given by Ælian,³ who appears to have confounded Charmides with the more celebrated Alcibiades: “Thou surely art not afraid of that shoemaker?” When Alcibiades denied this, he

¹ Xenoph. *Mem.* I. 2. § 9. The archons were elected by beans: white beans were used in voting *for* a candidate, black ones in voting *against* him. The names of the candidates for the βουλή were put into one vase, and into another an equal number of beans, fifty of which were white, the remainder black. Simultaneously with the name of a candidate drawn from one vase, a bean was drawn from the other. A white bean accompanying the name made the candidate a senator. Hence the expression κναμευτοὶ ἄρχοντες for senators. That Socrates was averse to the democratical constitution of the Athenians, is also stated by Ælian, *Var. Hist.* III. 17: Σωκράτης ἐν τῇ μὲν Ἀθηναίων πολιτείᾳ οὐκ ἠρέσκετο. τυραννικὴν γὰρ καὶ μοναρχικὴν ἑώρα τὴν δημοκρατίαν οὖσαν. This sentiment was also maintained by his successors. Plato and Xenophon, although differing in their principles and opinions on other subjects, agree with each other on this point.

² Xenoph. *Mem.* III. 7. § 6.

³ II. 1.



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which had been proposed by Archinus, and was established after the banishment of the Thirty.¹ And yet Xenophon, the most trustworthy of all the writers who has transmitted to us accounts of Socrates, says² that the ridicule of Socrates on the election of magistrates by lot, his having instructed Critias, and quoted passages from the most eminent poets, which bestowed praise on tyranny, were the principal articles in the second charge which accused Socrates of seducing the young.³ The account of Xenophon strongly confirms the supposition, that the connection between Socrates and Critias, whose cruelties were still well remembered by the democratical party, must have contributed to his accusation, and is indeed very probable, when we only consider the state of affairs. A passage of Æschines, the orator, might also be adduced to confirm this opinion, but we have reason to doubt the veracity of Æschines, whenever it is his object to bring charges against his adversary, Demosthenes. This passage occurs in the speech against Timarchus,⁴ which Æschines delivered before the assembly of the people. “You who have put to death Socrates, the sophist, whom you knew to have educated Critias, one of the Thirty Tyrants who abolished your democracy, will you allow yourselves to be moved by the

¹ Plat. *Menexen.* p. 234. B.

² *Memorab.* I. 2.

³ Xenophon clearly seeing that he could not refute the first of these facts, namely, the ridicule on the *κναμεντοί*, wisely avoids mentioning it.

⁴ In the third volume of Reiske's edition of the “*Oratores Græci*,” p. 168.

private interest of an orator like Demosthenes?" The name of sophist, which Æschines must surely have known not to have belonged to Socrates, but which orators frequently applied to philosophers to express their contempt of them, and the mention of Critias, are sufficient to prove the intention of Æschines, who wished by these sentiments to hurt the feelings of Demosthenes, a disciple of Plato, and a kinsman of Critias.

[THE CLOUDS OF ARISTOPHANES.]

IN the Clouds of Aristophanes, which was exhibited B. C. 423, Socrates is introduced as the great master of the school of the Sophists. A plain, simple citizen of Athens, named Strepsiadēs, engaged in husbandry, having married into a family of distinction, and having contracted debts through the extravagance of his wife (v. 49. sq. 437. sq. ed. Dindorf) and his son's (Pheidippides) fashionable love of horses, in order to defeat the impending suits of his creditors, wishes to place his son in a school of philosophy and rhetoric, where he may learn the arts of oratory, and of turning right into wrong, in order thereby to repair the ills which he had chiefly brought upon himself. On the son's refusal, the father applies in person to the master of the school, who is named Socrates: by him he is solemnly initiated, instructed, and examined, but being found too old and stupid to learn, he is dismissed; upon which, after he has given his son some samples of the new philosophy, he forces him much against his will into the school: here the young man makes such great and rapid progress in learning, that he is able to teach his father, who exults at his brilliant success, the most extraordinary tricks for the attainment of his object; but as he is now himself enlightened, and has raised himself above con-

siderations of right and duty, he denies and scorns in the coarsest manner the relation in which he stands both to his father and mother; he defends his new opinions with the refinements of sophistry, and retorting upon his father the good lessons he had before received from him, pays him in the same coin. Upon this the father, cured of his error, in wishing to get rid of his embarrassments by dishonesty and sophistical chicanery, returns to take revenge upon the school of that pernicious science and upon its master, who is obliged to receive back all the subtle arguments and high-flown words, which he had himself made use of, and the old man levels the establishment to the ground.

From this connected view of the story, we see that it is throughout directed against that propensity of the Athenians to controversies and law-suits, which was eminently promoted by their practice of getting into debt; and against the pernicious, sophistical and wrangling oratory, which was ever at the service of this disposition, in the courts of justice, and particularly in the discussion of all public transactions; and Aristophanes never loses an opportunity of combating these two vices.

Moreover, as the story is set in action by the perverse purpose awakened in Strepsiades, as it comes to an end when he is cured, and as this change arises from the unexpected and extravagant result of the experiment upon Pheidippides, who is to be the instrument of the father's design; the school of sophistry in which the youth is to be formed, is clearly the hinge on which the whole action turns; for its influence on Pheidippides decides the success or failure of the views of Strepsiades, and consequently the issue of the story of the drama.

This, therefore, is the view which we must take of the relation of the several parts to each other; namely, that the principal character to which the whole refers, is not Socrates, who has generally been considered to be so, in consequence of the story lingering so long at his shop, and of his being the sufferer at the conclusion, but Strepsiades himself; whereas Socrates is the intermediate party who is to instruct Pheidippides for the vicious purposes of the father; and this he executes so perfectly, that the old gentleman is at first deceived; but he soon reaps fruits, the nature of which opens his eyes to his own folly, and to the destructive tendency of this system of education.

In "The Clouds" the poet introduces us to the original source,



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the good old time, working out its own destruction by the abandonment of the laborious, frugal, peasant's life, by illustrious marriages, and female influence, by the extravagant life which his son leads in consequence of it, and by the debts and lawsuits which this occasions, all of which open the door to sophistical eloquence; or if you will, he is the representative of the elder portion of the Athenian people, in this dangerous crisis of their affairs. As in some other characters of the comedies of Aristophanes, which present the people under different aspects, for example, the Demos himself in "The Knights," and Philocleon in "The Wasps," there is always a groundwork of truth and honesty, but which is alloyed with falsehood, and led into error, and whose cure and restoration to a healthy and vigorous state and a right view of things, form the end and aim of the dramas; so likewise in "The Clouds," a sickly disposition of the people, the nature and bent of which are portrayed under the character of Strepsiades, in the most lively colours of caricature, is represented as the school, in which that personage seeks the means of obtaining the object of his desires, but is cured the moment that the full operation of those means is unexpectedly brought to light. Pheidippides, on the other hand, is the picture of the new or modern times, in the young men of fashion just coming out into the world, whose struggle with the older generation is pointed out by words of derision and raillery. The fashionable and chevaleresque passion for horses and carriages in the young men of the time, was accompanied by *λαλιὰ* (loquaciousness) and her whole train of vicious propensities; and yet how much better would it be, as Aristophanes implies, to leave the youth to these pursuits, and honourably bear up against the lesser evil of the debts, which had grown out of them, than that from selfish and dishonest motives encouragement should be given to what was calculated to poison the youths in their hearts' core, and thereby to bring disorder into all domestic and political relations! In this sense, when Pheidippides expresses his delight and satisfaction with what he had gained from the art of oratory, as it put him in a situation to prove that it was right for a son to correct his father, Strepsiades retorts upon him in these words:—

“ Ride on and drive away, 'fore Jove! I'd rather keep a coach and four, than be thus beat and mauled.”

This, then, is the lesson, which Aristophanes would give to his

contemporaries in Athens, by "The Clouds." If one of the two must have its way, let the young men indulge themselves in their horses and carriages, however it may distress you; but check the influence of these schools, unless you wish to make a scourge for yourself and for the state; exterminate in yourselves that dishonest propensity which entangles you in lawsuits, and which, by means of those schools, will make your sons the instruments of your ruin! The younger population he strives to deter from the same fate by a display of the manners of the school, and of the pale faces and enervated limbs which come out of it (v. 102, 504, 1012, 1171).

We cannot, therefore, say that the play of "The Clouds" is pointed at any one definite individual; but it reproves one general and dangerous symptom of the times, in the whole habits and life, political and domestic, of the Athenians, developing it in its source, in every thing which fostered it, and made it attractive, in the instruments by which it was established, and which gave to it its pernicious efficiency; and thus whilst he strictly and logically deduces real effects from real causes, as far as this development is concerned, the personages which bear a part in the action, are consequently one and all historical. Hence we can very well understand the striking references in particular characters to certain individuals; and I think it more than probable, that such reference is intended, not merely in the personage which bears the name of Socrates, but also in that of Pheidippides; whilst in the character of Strepsiades the poet only meant to point to the people in general.

The excessive love of horses exhibited in Pheidippides, and the extravagance consequent upon it, the rapid strides too, which he makes in readiness of speech, in debauchery, and in selfish arrogance, and the relation in which he stands to Socrates, evidently point, without further search, to Alcibiades, in whom we find all these features united, on whom all the young men of the higher classes of his time pinned their faith, and whom they assisted a few years afterwards, in carrying through his political projects.

In "The Clouds," Aristophanes introduces Alcibiades as a ready orator and a debauchée, as the fruit of that school, from which, as the favourite pupil of Socrates, he seems to have issued, in short, as the type of Pheidippides; although all the traits attributed to the latter are not to be looked for individually in

Alcibiades, and although his name does not occur in the course of the drama. Moreover, the supposed lineage of Pheidippides, whose mother (v. 46) was the niece of a Megacles, the frequent mention of that uncle (v. 70, 124, 825), and that of his descent from a celebrated ancient lady of the name of Κοισύρα,¹ distinctly point to Alcibiades, whose mother, Deinomache, was herself a daughter of Megacles,² and from whose family the Alcmaeonidæ, to which Κοισύρα belonged, he had inherited his strong passion for a well-furnished stable.³ This passion is, indeed, brought forward in the care taken by Pheidippides' mother, that the word ἵππος should be introduced somehow or other into his name; as in truth it did occur also in Ἰππαρέτη,⁴ the daughter of Hipponicus, and wife of Alcibiades. With all these circumstances to point it out, the part of Pheidippides in the play could not have failed to remind the Athenians of Alcibiades, who, about this time, or somewhat earlier, began to neglect, as Isocrates says,⁵ the contests of the gymnasia (and this is an important matter in reference to the play of "The Clouds"), and to devote himself to those equestrian and chariotteering pursuits, to which he was indebted for his victory at the Olympic games. The very name of Pheidippides, is not a pure invention of Aristophanes; but forms at once a connecting link between the youth himself, and that Pheidippus, son of Thessalus,⁶ who was one of the ancestors of the Thessalian Aleuadæ, famous for their breed of horses; and, at the same time, by its final syllables, it keeps up the allusion to Alcibiades, who had likewise learned the science of the manège, both in riding and driving, in Thessaly; and the same comparison with the Aleuadæ is implied, which we find also in Satyrus,⁷ who tells us that Alcibiades spent his time in Thessaly,

¹ V. 48 and 800.

² Plut. Alcib. c. 1.

³ Herodot. VI. 121.

⁴ Plut. Alcib. c. 8. Isocr. Or. de Bigis, p. 509, ed. Bekker.

⁵ L. c. compare Plut. Alcib. c. 11.

⁶ Homer Il. II. 678.

⁷ In Athenæus XII. c. 9, p. 534—6. Ἐν Θεσσαλίᾳ δὲ ἵπποτροφῶν καὶ ἡνιοχῶν, τῶν Ἀλευαδῶν ἵππικώτερος.



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Aristophanes selected Socrates, not only because his whole exterior, and his mode of life offered a most appropriate mask for comic representation ; but also (and this was his chief reason) because in these circumstances, as well as in many other points, the occupations of Socrates, and his mode of instruction bore a great resemblance to those of the natural philosophers and of the sophists. The poet thus found abundance of subject-matter, which composed a picture suited to his views ; namely, to exhibit to the public, a master of the school, whence the mischief he strove to put down, was working its way into the hearts of the Athenian youths. We must also take into our consideration the important fact, that several individuals, such as Euripides, Pericles, Alcibiades, Theramenes, and Critias, who supported the modern system of education, were in close habits of intimacy with Socrates, and in part, too, with the natural philosophers and sophists : and this helped to give additional relief and light to the portrait of the man, who was the centre around which they moved.

It should be recollected that it was not the object of Aristophanes to represent Socrates as he appeared to his confidential pupils, to Xenophon, to Plato, to Phædo, to Cebes, and others ; but how he might be represented to the great mass of the Athenian people, that is, how they comprehended and judged him from his outward and visible signs ; and how they understood and appreciated the usual extravagancies of the comic poets ; in short, how it was to be managed, that whilst his name, and his mask, caricatured to the utmost, were kept together by fundamental affinities, the former might appear sufficiently justified, and be not improperly placed in connection with individuals, who were displaying before the eyes of the public the germs which were developed in Alcibiades, and the early results to which they had given birth. But as the people saw Socrates for ever and deeply employed, either in meditations, like the natural philosophers, *φροντίζειν*, or like the sophists in instructive intercourse with the youth, *σοφίζεσθαι*, as Pericles called it, and as Socrates was frequently engaged in conversation with those sophists, (besides many palpable points of resemblance, calculated to mislead even those who observed him more closely), it would necessarily follow, that they reckoned him one of that community, as Æschines himself does when¹ he calls

¹ In Timarch. p. 346, ed. Bekker.

him a sophist; judging then as they did from outward appearances, they placed him in the same category with those of his associates, whom they knew to be most engaged on the theatre of public life. Aristophanes himself seems to have had no other notion of Socrates; at least the whole range of his comedy furnishes us with many characteristic traits perfectly similar to the picture we have of him in "The Clouds." In "The Birds" (v. 1282) the poet expresses by ἔσωκράτου the ideal of a hardy mode of life, and neglect of outward appearances; and in v. 1554 he represents Socrates, who is there called the unwashed (ἄλουτος,) as ψυχαγωγός, conductor of souls, maker of images, conjurer-up of spirits, who is obeyed by the shadowy forms of his scholars, amongst whom Chærephon is particularly designated, the same who is assailed also in "The Clouds," and on various other occasions by the comic poets, as the confidential friend of his youth. And not only in "The Clouds," but in "The Frogs" also, near the end, the Socratic dialogues are ridiculed, as solemn twaddle, and empty nonsense. Although therefore the chief purpose of Socrates' appearance in "The Clouds" is on account of Alcibiades, who is principally aimed at in the character of Pheidippides, and though this motive for introducing him necessarily influenced the formation of that character, yet it is evident that the picture of Socrates and his school, as portrayed in "The Clouds," was not created by Aristophanes merely for the purposes of this comedy, but that he had for his groundwork a definite and decided model.—*Abridged from Süvern's essay on "The Clouds," translated by Mr. W. R. Hamilton.*

"There are two points with regard to the conduct of Aristophanes, which appear to have been placed by recent investigations beyond doubt. It may be considered as certain, that he was not animated by any personal malevolence towards Socrates, but only attacked him as an enemy and corrupter of religion and morals; but on the other hand it is equally well established, that he did not merely borrow the name of Socrates for the representative of the sophistical school, but designed to point the attention, and to excite the feelings of his audience against the real individual. The only question which seems to be still open to controversy on this subject, concerns the degree in which Aristophanes was acquainted with the real character and aims of Socrates, as they are known to us from the uniform testimony of his intimate friends and dis-

ciples. We find it difficult to adopt the opinion of some modern writers who contend that Aristophanes, notwithstanding a perfect knowledge of the difference between Socrates and the sophists, might still have looked upon him as standing so completely on the same ground with them, that one description was applicable to them and him. It is true, as we have already observed, that the poet would have willingly suppressed all reflection and enquiry on many of the subjects, which were discussed both by the sophists and by Socrates, as a presumptuous encroachment on the province of authority. But it seems incredible, that if he had known all that makes Socrates so admirable and amiable in our eyes, he would have assailed him with such vehement bitterness, and that he should never have qualified his satire by a single word indicative of the respect which he must then have felt to be due at least to his character and his intentions. But if we suppose what is in itself much more consistent with the opinions and pursuits of the comic poet, that he observed the philosopher attentively indeed, but from a distance which permitted no more than a superficial acquaintance, we are then at no loss to understand how he might have confounded him with a class of men, with which he had so little in common, and why he singled him out to represent them. He probably first formed his judgment of Socrates by the society in which he usually saw him. He may have known that his early studies had been directed by Archelaus, the disciple of Anaxagoras; that he had both himself received the instruction of the most eminent sophists, and had induced others to become their hearers: that Euripides, who had introduced the sophistical spirit into the drama, and Alcibiades who illustrated it most completely in his life, were in the number of his most intimate friends. Socrates, who never willingly stirred beyond the walls of the city, lived almost wholly in public places, which he seldom entered without forming a circle round him, and opening some discussion connected with the object of his philosophical researches; he readily accepted the invitations of his friends, especially when he expected to meet learned and inquisitive guests, and probably never failed to give a speculative turn to the conversation. Aristophanes himself may have been more than once present, as Plato represents him, on such occasions. But it was universally notorious, that, whenever Socrates appeared, some subtle disputation was likely to ensue; the method by which he drew out and



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CHAPTER VIII.

THESE causes sufficiently account for the accusation of Socrates ;—but why was it delayed till he had reached his seventieth year ?

The hatred against Socrates, as an enemy of the democracy, did not dare to display itself previous to the banishment of Alcibiades, the powerful friend of Socrates, who still remained his friend even after he had given up his intimate acquaintance. Besides this, during the Peloponnesian war the attention of the people was engaged by more important affairs than the accusation of Socrates, and his enemies who belonged for the most part to the democratical party, had not sufficient influence during the government of the Thirty, to attempt anything against him. On the other hand, the Thirty in spite of their own corruption, could not deny him their esteem, and they also probably dreaded his friends, whose number was not small, and therefore endeavoured, but unsuccessfully, to gain him over to their interest, as we have seen in the affair of Leon of Salamis. But there was hardly a moment more favourable to the accusation of a man suspected of anti-democratic senti-

ments,¹ than that which the accusers of Socrates actually chose. After the recovery of democratical liberty, the Athenians still feeling the consequences of the unfortunate issue of the Peloponnesian war, which their superstition ascribed to the profanation of the mysteries and the mutilation of the Hermes-busts by Alcibiades, and remembering the horrors with which the government of the Thirty Tyrants was branded, became more jealous of their constitution than ever, and more inclined to punish persons against whom such plausible charges could be brought, as those against Socrates, the teacher of Critias and Alcibiades.

But the old charge, so often repeated against philosophers,² that they introduced new gods and corrupted the young, and which was also employed against Socrates, was not followed by his immediate condemnation. We know from the Apology of Plato,³ that Meletus

¹ That Socrates was not considered as a friend of the people according to the notions of the multitude, we also see from the Apology ascribed to Xenophon, in which great pains are taken to represent him as a *δημοτικός*. Compare the Apology of Libanius, p. 17: "Socrates hated democracy, and would have liked to have seen a tyrant at the head of the republic, &c." "He is an enemy of the people, and persuades his friends to despise democracy. — He praised Pisistratus, admired Hippias, honoured Hipparchus, and called that period the happiest of the Athenians," &c. These are the charges against which Socrates is defended by Libanius.

² The accusation of impiety was so comprehensive, that the greatest and best men, on whom not a shadow of any other crime could fall, were charged with it. The tribunal before which they were tried, was not the same at all times, as the cause might be pleaded before the Areopagus, the senate, or the Heliaea.

³ C. XXV.

requested the assistance of the party of Anytus and Lycon, in order to induce the judges to pronounce the preliminary¹ sentence of guilty. Had Meletus not been supported by them, he would, as Socrates himself says, have failed in his accusation, and been fined one thousand drachmas ; for an accuser who failed in obtaining

¹ *A preliminary sentence*; for a proper condemnation in matters, which were not considered criminal, only took place after a counter-estimate had been made by the defendant; and wherever a punishment was stated by the law, it was inflicted according to the law, and not left to the discretion of the judges. We find one irregularity in the trial of Socrates, for which we can only account by supposing that some expressions of Socrates were considered by the judges as personally insulting to themselves. But although the accuser thought the matter criminal (*τίμημα θανάτου*, he added, according to Diog. II. 40.), yet it was not treated as such by the judges. The first estimate of the punishment was made by the plaintiff, and this kind of estimating was called *τιμᾶν*; the counter-estimate was made by the defendant, and the terms for it were *ἀντιτιμᾶν*, *ἀντιτιμᾶσθαι* (Plat. *Apol.* C. XXVI. Compare Pollux, VIII. 150.), or *ὑποτιμᾶσθαι* (Xenoph. *Apol.* § 23.). The positive decision of the punishment was the privilege of the judges, and to fix the punishment was called *προστιμᾶν*. The calculation of votes which Fischer has made, in a remark on the passage of Plato, is too artificial; a more simple interpretation, which is adopted by Schleiermacher and others, is that the union of the party of Anytus and Lycon was required in order to obtain, in combination with that of Meletus, a fifth part of the votes. The number of the judges in the trial of Socrates is said to have been 556. 281 voted against him, 275 for him. If Socrates had had three votes more in his favour, the numbers would have been equal on both sides, and in this case he would have been acquitted. Tychsen, by correcting Diogenes, endeavours to reconcile him with Plato, for they contradict each other with regard to the number of votes. He accordingly increases the number of judges to 559, of whom 281 condemned, and 278 acquitted him. [For an account of the number of judges who were present at the trial of Socrates, see note (c) on C. XXV of the Apology, p. 134—Ed.]



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the republic," says Xenophon¹, "he refused doing the slightest thing contrary to the laws, although others, in opposition to the law, were accustomed to implore the compassion of the judges, and to flatter and entreat them, which frequently procured their acquittal. On the contrary, however easy it might have been for him to have been acquitted by the judges, if he had chosen to act in the usual manner, he preferred death in consonance with the laws, to a life maintained by their violation." Instead of trying to make a favourable impression upon the judges, he pronounced these proud words. "If I must estimate myself according to my desert, I estimate myself as deserving to be maintained in the prytaneum at the public expense."² This was the highest honour and was conferred on the prytanes, i. e. the fifty senators belonging to the presiding tribe, on the conquerors of the Olympian games, on youths whose fathers had died in defence of their country, on foreign ambassadors, &c., and at the end of his speech he ironically adds: "If I had had money, I would have estimated myself at as high a sum as I should have been able to pay, for that would not have injured me; but now I cannot do so, for I have nothing, unless you will fine me in such a sum, as I can pay. But perhaps I might be able to pay a mina of silver: that shall therefore be my estimate. But Plato here, men of Athens, and Crito, and Critobulus, and Apollodorus are persuading me to fine myself thirty minæ, and they themselves

¹ *Memorab.* IV. 4. § 4.

² Plato *Apolog.* C. XXVI.

are ready to answer for me : that therefore shall be my estimate, and they will be satisfactory guarantees for this sum.”¹ Such a proud answer, and the language in general which Socrates used,² inflamed all the judges against him, and eighty of those who at first had been favourably disposed towards him, now voted for his death.³ The real cause of his condemnation was therefore the noble pride, the “*libera contumacia*,” as Cicero⁴

¹ *Apolog.* C. XXVIII. The account in the Apology ascribed to Xenophon (§ 23.), that Socrates did not fine himself, nor allow his friends to do so, because this would have been acknowledging his crimes, may be reconciled with the statement of Plato quoted above ; for the estimate mentioned by the latter, as appears from the whole context, is pronounced in quite an ironical tone ; it is in reality no estimate. Tychsen doubts the authority of Plato, thinking that it was only the intention of Plato to immortalise the offer which he and his friends had made to Socrates. But for this supposition we have no reason whatever. Tychsen in his account of this affair follows Diogenes, who differs from Plato, in as much as he states that the estimate of the thirty minæ preceded the proud assertion that he deserved to be maintained in the Prytaneum. But the authority of Plato is surely more important. The source from which Diogenes derived his account, is unknown.

² Cic. *de Orat.* I. 54 : Socrates in judicio capitis pro se ipse dixit, ut non supplex aut reus, sed magister aut dominus videretur esse judicum.

³ Cic. *Ibid* : Cujus responso sic iudices exarserunt ut capitis hominem innocentissimum condemnarent.

⁴ Cic. *Tuscul.* I. 24 : Socrates nec patronum quæsit ad iudicium capitis, nec iudicibus supplex fuit, adhibuitque *liberam contumaciam*, a magnitudine animi ductam, non a superbia. This *libera contumacia* is expressed by the author of the Apology ascribed to Xenophon by *μεγαληγορία*. Diog. II. 24. also says of him : *ἦν δὲ ἰσχυρογνώμων* (*contumax*). We see from the Apology of Plato (see also Xenoph. *Apol.* § 14.) that the judges had

calls it, which he displayed during his trial. He fell, properly speaking, as a voluntary victim. It would, however, be improper to suppose that the proud language, which he made use of before his judges, proceeded wholly and alone from a consciousness of his own worth. The reason, for which Socrates did not wish to defend himself, and rather did every thing to dispose the judges for his condemnation, was of a religious nature, as appears from several passages of the Socratic philosophers.¹ He was not restrained by his dæmon—this was the reason to which he referred the calmness of his mind and the omission of all that he might have done for his defence. Socrates considered himself as a man destined

taken it very ill of Socrates that he mentioned the declaration of the Delphic god, and that he spoke of a genius by whom he was guided. But they were most bitterly enraged by the manner in which he estimated his punishment. The author of the *Xenoph. Apology* attributes to Socrates one other expression, which must have excited the indignation of the Athenians. Socrates there tells them, that Apollo had expressed himself still more strongly in favour of Lycurgus, the legislator of the Lacedæmonians (who were so much detested by the Athenians), and had declared him to be the noblest, justest, and most moral of men. See § 15 and 16.

¹ Plat. *Apol.* C. XVII: "Whatever you may think of my conduct and my instructions, I shall change the one as little as the other, and I will rather obey the commands of the god who sent me as your teacher, than those of men." Xenoph. *Memorab.* IV. 8. 5: "Dost thou not know," Hermogenes says to Socrates, "that the judges at Athens, when offended by one word, have often condemned innocent men to death, and acquitted many criminals?" "Yes, indeed, they have; but, by Zeus, dear Hermogenes," he answered, "when I was thinking of my defence before the judges, my genius opposed and warned me." Compare Xenoph. *Apol.* § 4.



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whom it was considered equal to perpetual exile, and was inflicted for crimes of a less serious nature.¹

Socrates was thus condemned to drink the poisoned cup. A guarantee was demanded that he might not escape from punishment by flight; and Crito became answerable for him. According to the form then customary, as it is expressed in Plutarch's life of Antiphon, the sentence must have run thus: "Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus, of the tribe of Antiochis and the deme of Alopece, has been condemned to be surrendered to the Eleven." *To be surrendered to the Eleven* was an euphemism of the Attic language instead of, *to be condemned to death*; since the Athenians wished to avoid the word death, which was considered ominous. The Eleven formed a commission, which consisted of the executioner and ten individuals, named respectively by each of the ten tribes. The superintendence of the prisons was intrusted to them, and they carried into execution the sentence of the courts. After the sentence had been pronounced and made publickly known by the herald, they seized the condemned person; and after putting him in fetters, accompanied him to his prison. We must

¹ The Athenian laws in this respect were very much like the English. Xenoph. *Mem.* I. 2. 62. says: "If a man proves to be a thief, to have stolen clothings from a bath, to be a pickpocket, to have broken through a wall, to have enslaved free citizens, or robbed a temple, he is punished with death according to the laws." If the value of things stolen in a bath exceeded ten drachmas, death was inflicted, as is observed by Hindenburg on this passage from Demosthenes in *Timocrat*.

suppose that these formalities were likewise observed with regard to Socrates.

After the sentence had been pronounced, Socrates once more addressed the judges who had condemned him, and with great resignation and intrepidity, spoke of the evil which they inflicted upon themselves by his punishment; and to those, who had voted for his acquittal, he spoke upon subjects, which at that moment were of the greatest interest—death and immortality. The last words of this address are particularly beautiful, and have found in Cicero¹ an enthusiastic admirer. “However, it is time for us to go,—for me to die, for you to live; which is the better, is unknown to all except to God.”

When Socrates had spoken these words, he went with cheerfulness to the prison, where death awaited him. “*Magno animo et vultu,*” says Seneca,² “*carcerem intravit.*” He consoled his weeping friends, who followed him; and gently reproached Apollodorus, who uttered loud complaints respecting the unjust condemnation of his master.³

¹ *Tuscul.* I. 41.

² *Consol. ad Helviam,* c. XIV.

³ The author of the so-called Apology of Xenophon perfectly agrees with Plato on these facts, which are in themselves credible enough. See Plat. Phædo. The former however adds (§ 29 foll.) that Socrates said, whilst Anytus passed by: “That man is perhaps very proud, as if he had performed something very great and sublime by having caused my death. Oh, the unhappy man, who does not seem to know that he is the conqueror who has been active for all futurity in the best and most useful manner! Homer has ascribed to some, who were near the end of their life,

The next day Socrates would have been executed, had not a particular festival, which was then celebrated at Athens, postponed it for thirty days. It was the time when the Athenians sent to Delos a vessel with presents for the oracle of Apollo, as a grateful acknowledgment for the successful expedition of Theseus against the Minotaurus. This great festival was solemnized at Athens every year, and from the moment when the vessel was adorned with a garland of laurel for its departure till the moment of its return, no criminal was allowed to be executed. The festival itself called *θεωρία*, was a kind of propitiation, during which the city was purified. The vessel in which the presents were conveyed to Delos, was called *θεωρίς*. As the vessel had been crowned the day before the condemnation of Socrates, the whole interval between this and the return of the vessel was at the disposal of Socrates to prepare himself for his death. This interval lasted, as we have said, thirty days.¹

Although he was confined in irons, Socrates passed these thirty days with his usual cheerfulness, in conversation with his friends, in meditations on his future existence, and in the exercise of the power of foreseeing the future. Therefore I will also prophecy. For a short time I had intercourse with the son of Anytus, and he appeared to me to be of rather a strong mind: I therefore say that he will not long remain in that servile occupation which his father has chosen for him; but as he has no honest guide, he will be led away by some evil propensity, and carry his wickedness to a great extent." A malicious prophecy, and contrary to the well-known character of Socrates.

¹ The passages upon which these statements rest, may be found in the *Crito* of Plato, and in Xenoph. *Mem.* IV. 8. § 2.



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Æsop. Socrates undertook these on account of an admonition given him in a dream. But the reason for his choosing fables of Æsop, was probably that this kind of poetry which has such a decided moral tendency, particularly agreed with his own inclinations.¹

The vessel returned from Delos; the Eleven announced to Socrates the hour of his death, and one of their executioners was ready to prepare the poisoned cup which Socrates was obliged to empty after the sun had set. At a very early hour of the day his friends had assembled around him in great numbers, and Xanthippe with her children was also present. His friends were in the deepest distress; which, according to their different characters, was more or less loudly expressed. Apollodorus wept aloud, and moved all to tears except Socrates. Xanthippe, the violent and passionate woman, was inconsolable at the prospect of the death of her husband. Without fortune, without support, without any consolation, she saw herself and her children, of whom two were still at a tender age,

¹ Πολλάκις μοι φοιτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνύπνιον, he says (Phædo, p. 60. E. foll.), ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ, ἄλλοτ' ἐν ἄλλῃ ὄψει φαινόμενον, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ λέγον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, μουσικὴν ποίει καὶ ἐργάζου. καὶ ἐγὼ ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ, ὅπερ ἔπραττον, τοῦτο ὑπελάμβανον αὐτό μοι παρακελεύεσθαι τε καὶ ἐπικελεύειν, ὡς περ οἱ τοῖς θεοῖσι διακελευόμενοι, καὶ ἐμοὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ὅπερ ἔπραττον, τοῦτο ἐπικελεύειν, μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὐσης μεγίστης μουσικῆς, ἐμοῦ δὲ τοῦτο πρᾶττοντος. νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἢ τε δίκη ἐγένετο καὶ ἢ τοῦ θεοῦ ἑορτὴ διεκώλυέ με ἀποθνήσκειν, ἔδοξε χρῆναι, εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις μοι προστάττοι τὸ ἐνύπνιον ταύτην τὴν δημώδη μουσικὴν ποιεῖν μὴ ἀπειθῆσαι αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν, κ. τ. λ.

left in want and misery. Socrates, probably with the intention of sparing her the distressing sight of her dying husband, requested Crito to send her home.

The executioner entered the prison, and offered the poisoned cup to Socrates: he took and emptied it with the intrepidity of a sage who is conscious of his virtuous life; and even at the moment when he held it in his hand, he spoke, according to Cicero's expression,¹ in such a manner that he appeared not to die, but to ascend into heaven. "The lower part of his body had already grown cold, he then uncovered himself, (for he had before been covered) and spoke his last words: "Crito," said he, "I owe a cock to Æsculapius. Offer one to him as a sacrifice; do not forget it." Socrates alluded in these words to the happiness he should enjoy after being delivered from the chains of his body. Crito asked, whether he wished anything else to be done. To this question Socrates made no reply, and a short time afterwards became convulsed. His eyes became dim — and he expired.² He died in the year 400, or

¹ *Tuscul.* I. 29.

² All this is more circumstantially related in the *Phædo* of Plato. The above interpretation of the words at the end of the *Phædo*: "Crito, I owe a cock to Æsculapius," &c., — which is also adopted by Olympiodorus, appears to be the most suitable. It is well known, how many undeserved reproaches have been inflicted upon Socrates for this expression. The ecclesiastical fathers Origen, Eusebius, Chrysostom and others pretended to discover in it the real belief of Socrates in polytheism. ["It is extremely difficult to determine the precise relation in which the opinions of Socrates stood to the Greek polytheism. He not only spoke of the gods with reverence, and conformed to the rites of

according to others 399, B. C. under the Archon Laches,¹ or Aristocrates.

the national worship, but testified his respect for the oracles in a manner which seems to imply that he believed their pretensions to have some real ground. On the other hand he acknowledged one Supreme Being, as the framer and preserver of the universe;* used the singular and the plural number indiscriminately, concerning the object of his adoration,† and when he endeavoured to reclaim one of his friends, who scoffed at sacrifices and divination, it was according to Xenophon, by an argument drawn exclusively from the works of the one Creator.‡ We are thus tempted to imagine, that he treated many points to which the vulgar attached great importance, as matters of indifference, on which it was neither possible, nor very desirable, to arrive at any certain conclusion: that he was only careful to exclude from his notion of the Gods, all attributes which were inconsistent with the moral qualities of the Supreme Being; and that, with this restriction, he considered the popular mythology as so harmless, that its language and rites might be innocently adopted. The observation attributed to him in one of Plato's early works,§ seems to throw great light on the nature and extent of his conformity to the state religion. Being asked whether he believes the Attic legend of

* *Mem.* IV. 3. § 13. ὁ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον συντάπτων τε καὶ συνέχων.

† οἱ θεοὶ, ὁ θεὸς, τὸ θεῖον, τὸ δαιμόνιον.

‡ *Mem.* I. 4. If the conversation has been faithfully reported by Xenophon, Aristodemus shifted his ground in the course of the argument. But he suggests no objection to the inference drawn by Socrates, from the being and providence of God, as to the propriety of conforming to the rites of the state religion, and Xenophon himself seems not to have been aware that it might be disputed. He thinks that he has sufficiently refuted the indictment which charged Socrates with disbelieving the existence of the gods acknowledged by the state, when he has proved that he believed in a deity.

§ *Phædrus*, p. 229.



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ΔΙΟΓΕΝΟΥΣ ΛΑΕΡΤΙΟΥ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ ΒΙΟΣ.

I. (18.) Σωκράτης Σωφρονίσκου μὲν ἦν υἱὸς λιθουργοῦ, καὶ Φαιναρέτης μαίας (ὡς καὶ Πλάτων ἐν Θεαιτήτῳ φησὶν) Ἀθηναῖος, τὸν δῆμον Ἀλωπεκῆθεν.

II. Ἐδόκει δὲ συμποιεῖν Εὐριπίδῃ. Ὅθεν Μνησίλοχος οὕτω φησί·

Φρύγες ἐστὶ καινὸν δράμα τοῦτ' Εὐριπίδου,
ᾧ καὶ τὰ φρύγανα ὑποτίθησι Σωκράτης.

καὶ πάλιν,

Εὐριπίδης, σωκρατογόμφους.

καὶ Καλλίας πεδήταις,

Ἦδη σὺ σεμνή, καὶ φρονεῖς οὕτω μέγα.
Ἐξεστι γάρ μοι. Σωκράτης γὰρ αἴτιος.

Ἀριστοφάνης νεφέλαις,

Εὐριπίδης δ' ὁ τὰς τραγωδίας ποιῶν
Τὰς περιλαλούσας οὗτός ἐστι τὰς σοφάς.

III. (19.) Ἀκούσας δὲ Ἀναξαγόρου, κατὰ τινος, ἀλλὰ καὶ Δάμωνος, ὡς Ἀλέξανδρος ἐν διαδοχαῖς, μετὰ τὴν ἐκείνου καταδίκην διήκουσεν Ἀρχελάου τοῦ φυσικοῦ· οὗ καὶ παιδικὰ γενέσθαι φησὶν Ἀριστόξενος.

IV. Δουρὶς δὲ καὶ δουλεῦσαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐργάσασθαι λίθους. εἶναι τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς ἐν ἀκροπόλει Χάριτας ἐνιοί φασιν, ἐνδεδυμένας οὔσας. Ὅθεν καὶ Τίμων ἐν τοῖς Σίλλοις εἶπεῖν,

Ἐκ δ' ἄρα τῶν ἀπέκλινε λιθοζόος, ἐννομολέσχης,
Ἑλλήνων ἐπαιδὸς, ἀκριβολόγους ἀποφήνας,
Μυκτῆρ, ῥητορόμυκτος, ὑπαπτικός, εἰρωνευτής.

V. Ἦν γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς δεινὸς, ὡς φησι καὶ Ἰδομενεύς. Ἄλλὰ καὶ οἱ τριάκοντα αὐτὸν ἐκώλυσαν τέχνας διδάσκειν λόγων, ὡς φησι Ξενοφῶν. (20.) Καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης αὐτὸν κωμωδεῖ, ὡς τὸν ἤττω λόγον κρείττω ποιοῦντα. Καὶ γὰρ πρῶτος (ὡς φησι καὶ Φαβωρίνος ἐν παντοδαπῇ ἱστορίᾳ) μετὰ τοῦ μαθητοῦ Αἰσχίνου ῥητορεύειν ἐδίδαξε. Λέγει δὲ τοῦτο καὶ Ἰδομενεὺς ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν Σωκρατικῶν. Καὶ πρῶτος περὶ βίου διελέχθη· καὶ πρῶτος φιλοσοφῶν καταδικασθεὶς ἐτελεύτα. Φησὶ δ' αὐτὸν Ἀριστόξενος ὁ Σπινθάρου καὶ χρηματίσασθαι· τιθέντα γοῦν τὸ βαλλόμενον κέρμα ἀθροίζειν· εἴτ' ἀναλώσαντα, πάλιν τιθέναι. Κρίτωνα δ' ἀναστῆσαι αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐργαστηρίου, καὶ παιδεῦσαι, τῆς κατὰ ψυχὴν χάριτος ἐρασθέντα, Δημήτριός φησιν ὁ Βυζάντιος.

VI. (21.) Γνόντα δὲ τὴν φυσικὴν θεωρίαν μηδὲν εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, τὰ ἠθικὰ φιλοσοφεῖν ἄρξαι ἐπὶ τε τῶν ἐργαστηρίων καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ· κἀκεῖνα δὲ φάσκειν ζητεῖν,

“Ὅ,ττι τοι ἐν μεγάροισι κακὸν τ' ἀγαθὸν τε τέτυκται.

Πολλάκις δὲ βιαιότερον ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεσι διαλεγόμενον, κονδυλίζεσθαι καὶ παρατίλλεσθαι, τὸ πλεόν τε γελαῖσθαι καταφρονούμενον· καὶ πάντα ταῦτα φέρειν ἀνεξικάκως. “Ὅθεν καὶ λακτισθέντα, ἐπειδὴ ἠνέσχετο, τινὸς θαυμάσαντος, εἶπεῖν, Εἰ δέ με ὄνος ἐλάκτισε, δίκην ἂν αὐτῷ ἐλάγχανον; Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ὁ Δημήτριος.

VII. (22.) Ἀποδημίας δὲ οὐκ ἐδεήθη, καθάπερ οἱ πλείους, πλὴν εἰ μὴ στρατεύεσθαι ἔδει. Τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν αὐτόθι μένων, φιλονεικότερον συνεζήτει τοῖς προσδιάλεγομένοις, οὐχ ὥστε ἀφελέσθαι τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦς, ἀλλ' ὥστε τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐκμαθεῖν πειραῖθαι. Φασὶ δ' Εὐριπίδην αὐτῷ δόντα τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου συγγραμμά, ἔρεσθαι, Τί δοκεῖ; Τὸν δὲ φάναι, “Α μὲν συνῆκα, γενναῖα· οἶμαι δὲ, καὶ ἂ μὴ συνῆκα· πλὴν Δήλιου γέ τινος δεῖται κολυμβητοῦ. Ἐπεμελεῖτο δὲ καὶ σωμασκίας, καὶ ἦν εὐέκτης. Ἐστρατεύσατο γοῦν εἰς Ἀμφίπολιν· καὶ Ξενοφῶντα ἀφ' ἵππου πεσόντα ἐν τῇ κατὰ Δήλιον μάχῃ, διέσωσεν ὑπολαβών. (23.) ὅτε καὶ πάντων φευγόντων Ἀθηναίων, αὐτὸς ἠρέμα ἀνεχώρει, παρεπιστρεφόμενος ἡσυχῇ, καὶ τηρῶν ἀμύνασθαι, εἴ τις οἱ ἐπέλθοι. Ἐστρατεύσατο



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ξῆσαι τὸ πλῆθος, ψηφίσασθαι, Γαμῆν μὲν ἀστὴν μίαν, παιδοποιεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἑτέρας· ὅθεν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι καὶ Σωκράτην.

XI. Ἦν δ' ἱκανὸς καὶ τῶν σκωπτόντων αὐτὸν ὑπερορᾶν. (27) Καὶ ἐσεμνύνετο ἐπὶ τῇ εὐτελείᾳ. Μισθὸν τε οὐδένα εἰσ-επράξατο. Καὶ ἔλεγεν, ἡδίστα ἐσθίων, ἡκιστα ὄψου προσδεῖσθαι· καὶ ἡδίστα πίνων, ἡκιστα τὸ μὴ παρὸν ποτὸν ἀναμένειν· καὶ ἐλαχίστων δεόμενος, ἔγγιστα εἶναι θεῶν. Τοῦτο δ' ἐνέσται καὶ παρὰ τῶν κωμωδοποιῶν λαβεῖν, οἳ λανθάνουσιν ἑαυτοὺς, δι' ὧν σκώπτουσιν, ἐπαινοῦντες αὐτόν. Ἀριστοφάνης μὲν οὕτως,

ὦ τῆς μεγάλης ἐπιθυμήσας σοφίας, ἄνθρωπε, δικαίως,
ὦς εὐδαίμων παρ' Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοισι διαζῆς.

εἶτα,

Μνήμων καὶ φροντιστῆς, καὶ τὸ ταλαίπωρον ἔνεστιν
Ἐν τῇ γνώμῃ, κούκ ἔτι κάμνεις, οὔθ' ἐστῶς, οὔτε βαδίζων,
οὔτ' αὐ ριγῶν ἄχθη λίαν, οὔτ' ἀριστᾶν ἐπιθυμεῖς,
οἴνου τ' ἀπέχρη καὶ ἀδδηφαγίας, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνονήτων.

(28) Ἀμειψίας δ' ἐν Τρίβωνι παράγων αὐτόν φησιν οὕτως,

Σώκρατες, ἀνδρῶν βέλτιστ' ὀλίγων, πολλῶν δὲ ματαιόταθ',
ἡκεις

Καὶ σὺ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, καρτερικός τ' εἶ. Πόθεν ἂν σοι χλαῖνα
γένοιτο;

Τουτὶ τὸ κακὸν τῶν σκυτοτόμων κατ' ἐπήρειαν γεγένηται.

Οὗτος μέντοι πεινῶν οὕτως, οὐ πώποτ' ἔτλη κολακεῦσαι. Τοῦτο δ' αὐτοῦ τὸ ὑπεροπτικὸν καὶ μεγαλόφρον ἐμφαίνει καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης, λέγων οὕτως,

Ὅτι βρενθύη τ' ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς, καὶ τὸ ὄφθαλμῷ παραβάλλεις,
Κᾶνυποδητεῖς, κακὰ πόλλ' ἀνέχρη, καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν σεμνοπρο-
σωπεῖς.

Καὶ τοι ἐνίοτε πρὸς τοὺς καιροὺς ἀρμοττόμενος, καὶ λαμπρὰ ἠμπίσχετο· καθάπερ ἐν τῷ Πλάτωνος συμποσίῳ παρ' Ἀγάθωνα βαδίζων.

XII. (29) Ἰκανὸς δ' ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἦν καὶ προτρέψαι καὶ ἀποτρέψαι. Ὡσπερ τὸν Θεαίτητον, περὶ ἐπιστήμης διαλεχθεὶς, ἐνθεὸν ἀπέπεμψε, καθὰ καὶ Πλάτων φησίν. Εὐθύφρονα δὲ τῷ

πατρὶ γραψάμενον ξενίας δίκην, περὶ ὁσίου τινὰ διαλεχθεὶς ἀπήγαγε. Καὶ τὸν Λύσιον δὲ ἠθικώτατον ἐποίησε προτρέψας. Ἦν γὰρ ἰκανὸς ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων τοὺς λόγους εὐρίσκειν. Ἐνέτρεψε δὲ καὶ Λαμπροκλέα τὸν υἱὸν τῇ μητρὶ ἀγριαινόμενον, ὡς πού καὶ Ξενοφῶν εἶρηκε. Καὶ Γλαύκωνα μὲν τὸν Πλάτωνος ἀδελφὸν θέλοντα πολιτεύεσθαι, ἀπέστησε, διὰ τὸ ἀπείρως ἔχειν, ὡς φησὶν ὁ Ξενοφῶν. Χαρμίδην δὲ τούναντίον ἐπέστησεν, οἰκείως ἔχοντα. (30) Ἐπῆρε δὲ καὶ εἰς φρόνημα Ἰφικράτην τὸν στρατηγὸν, δείξας αὐτῷ τοῦ κουρέως Μίδου ἀλεκτρούνας ἀντίον τῶν Καλλίου πτερυξαμένους. Καὶ αὐτὸν Γλαυκωνίδης ἠξίου τῇ πόλει περιποιεῖν, καθάπερ φασιανὸν ὄρνιν, ἢ ταῶ. Ἐλεγε δὲ ὡς Θαῦμα, τὰ μὲν ἕκαστον εἰπεῖν ἂν ῥαδίως ὅσα ἔχοι, φίλους δ' οὐκ ἂν ὀνομάσαι ὀπόσους κέκτηται· οὕτως ὀλιγώρως ἔχειν περὶ αὐτούς. Ὅρων δ' Εὐκλείδην ἐσπουδακότα περὶ τοὺς ἐριστικούς λόγους, Ὡ Εὐκλείδη, ἔφη, σοφισταῖς μὲν δυνήσῃ χρῆσθαι, ἀνθρώποις δὲ οὐδαμῶς. Ἄχρηστον γὰρ ᾤετο εἶναι τὴν περὶ ταῦτα αἰσχρολογίαν, ὡς καὶ Πλάτων ἐν Εὐθυδήμῳ φησί.

XIII. (31) Χαρμίδου τε οἰκέτας αὐτῷ διδόντος, ἴν' ἀπ' αὐτῶν προσοδεύοιτο, οὐχ εἴλετο· καὶ κάλλος ὑπερεΐδεν Ἀλκιβιάδου, κατὰ τινάς.

XIV. Καὶ ἐπῆνει σχολὴν, ὡς κάλλιστον κτημάτων, καθὰ καὶ Ξενοφῶν ἐν συμποσίῳ φησίν. Ἐλεγε δὲ καὶ ἐν μόνον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὴν ἐπιστήμην· καὶ ἐν μόνον κακὸν, τὴν ἀμαθίαν. Πλούτων δὲ καὶ εὐγένειαν οὐδὲν σεμνὸν ἔχειν· πᾶν δὲ τούναντίον κακὸν. Εἰπόντος γοῦν τινος αὐτῷ ὡς εἶη Ἀντισθένης μητρὸς Θράττης, Σὺ δ' ᾤου, ἔφη, οὕτως ἂν γενναῖον ἐκ δυοῖν Ἀθηναίων γενέσθαι; Φαίδωνα δὲ δι' αἰχμαλωσίαν ἐπ' οἰκήματος καθήμενον προσέταξε Κρίτωνι λυτρώσασθαι, καὶ φιλόσοφον ἀπειργάσατο.

XV. (32) Ἀλλὰ καὶ λυρίζειν ἐμάνθανεν, ὅτε καιρός· μηδὲν λέγων ἄτοπον εἶναι, ἅ τις μὴ οἶδεν ἰκμανθάνειν. Ἐτι τε ὠρχεῖτο συνεχές, τῇ τοῦ σώματος εὐεξία λυσιτελεῖν ἠγούμενος τὴν τοιαύτην γυμνασίαν, ὡς καὶ Ξενοφῶν ἐν συμποσίῳ φησίν.

XVI. Ἐλεγε δὲ καὶ προσημαίνειν τὸ δαιμόνιον τὰ μέλλοντα αὐτῷ. Τό τε εὖ ἄρχεσθαι, μικρὸν μὲν μὴ εἶναι, παρὰ μικρὸν δέ. Καὶ εἶδέναι μὲν μηδέν, πλὴν αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἶδέναι. Τούς τε τὰ ὠρία πολλοῦ ἐωνημένους, ἀπογινώσκειν ἔλεγεν εἰς τὰς ὥρας ἐλθεῖν. Καὶ ποτε ἐρωτηθεὶς, τίς ἀρετὴ νέεν; Τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν, εἶπεν. Ἐφασκέ τε δεῖν γεωμετρεῖν, μέχρι ἂν τις μέτρῳ δύνηται

γῆν τε παραλαβεῖν καὶ παραδοῦναι. (33) Εὐριπίδου δ' ἐν τῇ Αὔγῃ εἰπόντος περὶ ἀρετῆς,

Κράτιστον εἰκῆ ταῦτ' ἔαν ἀφειμένα,

ἀναστάς ἐξῆλθε· φήσας, γελοῖον εἶναι, ἀνδράποδον μὲν μὴ εὐρισκόμενον, ἀξιοῦν ζητεῖν ἀρετὴν δ' οὕτω ἔαν ἀπολωλέναι. Ἐρωτηθεὶς, πότερον γῆμαι ἢ μή; ἔφη, "Ὁ ἂν αὐτῶν ποιήσῃς, μεταγνώσῃ. Ἐλεγέ τε θανμάζειν τῶν τὰς λιθίνους εἰκόνας κατασκευαζομένων, τοῦ μὲν λίθου προνοεῖν, ὡς ὁμοιότατος ἔσται αὐτῶν δ' ἀμελεῖν, ὡς μὴ ὁμοίους τῷ λίθῳ φαίνεσθαι· ἡξίου δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους συνεχῶς κατοπτρίζεσθαι, ἵν' εἰ μὲν καλοὶ εἴεν, ἄξιοι γίγνοιντο· εἰ δ' αἰσχροὶ, παιδείᾳ τὴν δυσείδειαν ἐπικαλύπτουεν. (34) Καλέσας ἐπὶ δεῖπνον πλουσίους, καὶ τῆς Ξανθίππης αἰδουμένης, ἔφη, θάρρει· εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἴεν μέτριοι, συμπεριενεχθεῖεν ἂν· εἰ δὲ φαῦλοι, ἡμῖν αὐτῶν οὐδὲν μελήσει. Ἐλεγε, τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ζῆν, ἵν' ἐσθίοιεν· αὐτὸν δὲ ἐσθίειν, ἵνα ζῶῃ. Πρὸς τὸ οὐκ ἀξιόλογον πλῆθος ἔφασκεν, ὅμοιον εἶ τις τετράδραχμον ἐν ἀποδοκιμάζων, τὸν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων σωρὸν ὡς δόκιμον ἀποδέχοιτο. Αἰσχίνου δὲ εἰπόντος, Πέννης εἰμί καὶ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν ἔχω, δίδωμι δὲ σοι ἑμαυτόν. Ἄρ' οὖν, εἶπεν, οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ τὰ μέγιστα μοι διδούς; Πρὸς τὸν ἀποδυσπετοῦντα ἐπὶ τῷ παροραῖσθαι, ὁπότε ἐπανέστησαν οἱ τριάκοντα, Ἄρα, ἔφη, μή τι σοι μεταμέλει; (35) Πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα, Θάνατόν σου κατέγνωσαν Ἀθηναῖοι, Κἀκείνων, φησὶν, ἡ φύσις. Οἱ δὲ τοῦτ' Ἀναξαγόραν φασὶν εἰπεῖν. Τῆς γυναικὸς εἰπούσης, Ἀδίκως ἀποθνήσκεις, Σὺ δὲ ἔφη, δικαίως ἐβούλου; Ὄναρ δόξας τινὰ αὐτῷ λέγειν,

"Ἡματί κεν τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἴκοιο·

πρὸς Αἰσχίνην ἔφη, Εἰς τρίτην ἀποθανοῦμαι. Μέλλοντί τε αὐτῷ τὸ κώνειον πίεσθαι, Ἀπολλόδωρος ἱμάτιον ἐδίδου καλόν, ἵν' ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἐναποθάνῃ· καὶ ὅς, Τί δ', ἔφη, τὸ ἕμὸν ἱμάτιον ἐμβιῶναι μὲν ἐπιτήδειον, ἐναποθανεῖν δὲ οὐχί; Πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα, Κακῶς ὁ δεῖνά σε λέγει· Καλῶς γὰρ, ἔφη, λέγειν οὐκ ἔμαθε. (36) Στρέψαντος Ἀντισθένης τὸ διερρώγος τοῦ τρίβωνος εἰς τοῖμφανές, Ὁρῶ σου, ἔφη, διὰ τοῦ τρίβωνος τὴν κενοδοξίαν. Πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα, Οὐ σοὶ λοιδορεῖται ὁ δεῖνα; Οὐχί, ἔφη· ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐ πρόξεστι ταῦτα. Ἐλεγε δὲ τοῖς κωμικοῖς δεῖν ἐπίτηδες



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κράτους. Ἐν αὐτῷ γάρ, φησὶ, μνημονεύει τῶν ὑπὸ Κόνωνος τειχῶν ἀνασταθέντων, ἃ γέγονεν ἐν ἔτεσιν ἕξ τῆς Σωκράτους τελευτῆς ὕστερον. Καὶ ἔστιν οὕτως ἔχον.

XIX (40.) Ἡ δ' ἀνθρωμοσία τῆς δίκης τοῦτον εἶχε τὸν τρόπον. Ἀνάκειται γὰρ ἔτι καὶ νῦν (φησὶ Φαβωρίνος ἐν τῷ Μητρῷ). Τάδε ἐγράψατο καὶ ἀνθρωμολογήσατο Μέλιτος Μελίτου Πιτθεύς, Σωκράτει Σωφρονίσκου Ἀλωπεκῆθαι. Ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης, οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσηγούμενος· ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων. Τίμημα θάνατος.

XX. Ὁ δ' αὖ φιλόσοφος, Λυσίου γράψαντος ἀπολογίαν αὐτῷ, διαγνοὺς, ἔφη, Καλὸς μὲν ὁ λόγος, ὦ Λυσία, οὐ μὴν ἀρμόττων ἐμοί. Δηλαδή γὰρ ἦν τὸ πλεον δικανικὸς, ἢ ἐμφιλόσοφος. (41) Εἰπόντος δὲ τοῦ Λυσίου, Πῶς, εἰ καλὸς ἔστιν ὁ λόγος, οὐκ ἂν σοι ἀρμόττοι; ἔφη, Οὐ γὰρ καὶ ἱμάτια καλὰ καὶ ὑποδήματα εἴη ἂν ἐμοὶ ἀνάρμοστα; Κρινομένου δ' αὐτοῦ, φησὶν Ἰοῦστος ὁ Τιβεριεύς ἐν τῷ στέμματι, Πλάτωνα ἀναβῆναι ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα, καὶ εἰπεῖν, Νεώτατος ὢν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῶν ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα ἀναβάντων· τοὺς δικαστὰς ἐκβοῆσαι, Καταβάντων, τουτέστι κατάβηθι.

XXI. Ὅτ' οὖν κατεδικάσθη, διακοσίαις ὀγδοηκονταμιᾶ πλείοσι ψήφοις τῶν ἀπολυουσῶν· καὶ τιμωμένων τῶν δικαστῶν, τί χρησθεῖν αὐτὸν ἢ ἀποτίσαι; πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν ἔφη δραχμὰς ἀποτίσειν. Εὐβουλίδης μὲν γάρ φησιν, ἑκατὸν ὁμολογήσαι. (42) Θορυβησάντων δὲ τῶν δικαστῶν, Ἐνεκα μὲν, εἶπε, τῶν ἐμοὶ διαπεπραγμένων τιμῶμαι τὴν δίκην τῆς ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτήσεως. Καὶ οἱ θάνατον αὐτοῦ κατέγνωσαν, προσθέντες ἄλλας ψήφους ὀγδοήκοντα. Καὶ δεθεῖς, μετ' οὐ πολλὰς ἡμέρας ἔπιε τὸ κώνειον, πολλὰ καλὰ καὶ γαθὰ διαλεχθεῖς, ἃ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνί φησιν.

XXII. Ἀλλὰ καὶ παιᾶνα κατὰ τινὰς ἐποίησεν, οὗ ἡ ἀρχή·

Δήλι' Ἀπολλον, χαῖρε, καὶ Ἄρτεμι, παῖδε κλεινώ.

Διονυσόδωρος δὲ φησὶ, μὴ εἶναι αὐτοῦ τὸν παιᾶνα. Ἐποίησε δὲ καὶ μῦθον Αἰσώπειον, οὐ πάνυ ἐπιτετευγμένως, οὗ ἡ ἀρχή·

Αἰσωπος ποτ' ἔλεξε Κορίνθιον ἄστρῳ νέμουσι,
Μὴ κρίνειν ἀρετὴν λαοδίκῳ σοφίῃ.

XXIII. (43) Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἦν. Ἀθηναῖοι δ' εὐθύς μετέγνωσαν, ὥστε κλεῖσαι καὶ παλαιστράς καὶ γυμνάσια. Καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐφυγάδευσαν· Μελίτου δὲ θάνατον κατέγνωσαν. Σωκράτη δὲ χαλκῆς εἰκόνοσ ἐτίμησαντο, ἦν ἔθεσαν ἐν τῷ πομπείῳ, Λυσίππου ταύτην ἐργασαμένου. Ἄνυτόν τε ἐπιδημήσαντα αὐθημερόν ἐξεκήρυξαν Ἡρακλεῶται. Οὐ μόνον δὲ ἐπὶ Σωκράτους Ἀθηναῖοι πεπόνθασι τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πλείστων ὄσων. Καὶ γὰρ Ὀμηρον (καθὰ φησιν Ἡρακλείδης) πεντήκοντα δραχμαῖς, ὡς μαινόμενον, ἐτίμησαν· καὶ Τυρταῖον παρακόπτειν ἔλεγον, καὶ Ἀστυδάμαντα πρῶτον τῶν περὶ Αἰσχύλον ἐτίμησαν εἰκόνι χαλκῆ. (44) Εὐριπίδης δὲ καὶ ὄνειδίζει αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ Παλαμήδει, λέγων,

Ἐκάνετ' ἐκάνετε τὰν πάνσοφον

Τὰν οὐδέν' ἀλγύνουσαν ἀηδόνα μοῦσαν.

Καὶ τάδε μὲν ὧδε. Φιλόχωρος δὲ φησι, προτελευτῆσαι τὸν Εὐριπίδην τοῦ Σωκράτους. Ἐγεννήθη δὲ (καθὰ φησιν Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τοῖς χρονικοῖς) ἐπὶ Ἀψεφίωνος, ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ ἔτει τῆς ἑβδομηκοστῆς ἑβδόμης Ὀλυμπιάδος, Θαρρηλιῶνος ἕκτῳ, ὅτε καθαίρουσι τὴν πόλιν Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τὴν Ἄρτεμιν γενέσθαι Δήλιοί φασιν. Ἐτελεύτησε δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ ἔτει τῆς ἐννενηκοστῆς πέμπτης Ὀλυμπιάδος, γεγονῶς ἐτῶν ἑβδομήκοντα. Καὶ ταῦτά φησι καὶ Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεύς. (45) Ἐνιοὶ γὰρ ἐξήκοντα ἐτῶν τελευτῆσαι αὐτόν φασιν.

XXIV. Ἀμφότεροι δὲ ἤκουσαν Ἀναξαγόρου, καὶ οὗτος καὶ Εὐριπίδης, ὃς καὶ τῷ πρώτῳ ἔτει τῆς ἑβδομηκοστῆς πέμπτης Ὀλυμπιάδος ἐγεννήθη ἐπὶ Καλλιάρχου. Δοκεῖ δὲ μοι καὶ περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν ὁ Σωκράτης διειλέχθαι. Ὅπου γε καὶ περὶ προνοίας τινὰ διαλέγεται, καθὰ φησι καὶ Ξενοφῶν, καὶ τοὶ περὶ μόνων τῶν ἠθικῶν ποιῆσθαι τοὺς λόγους αὐτόν εἰπών. Ἀλλὰ καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῇ ἀπολογία μνησθεὶς Ἀναξαγόρου καὶ ἄλλων φυσικῶν, ἃ Σωκράτης ἀρνεῖται, περὶ τούτων αὐτὸς λέγει, καίπερ ἀνατιθεὶς πάντα Σωκράτει. Φησὶ δ' Ἀριστοτέλης, μάγον τινὰ ἐλθόντα ἐκ Συρίας εἰς Ἀθήνας, τὰ τε ἄλλα καταγνῶναι τοῦ Σωκράτους, καὶ δὴ καὶ βίαιον ἔσεσθαι τὴν τελευτὴν αὐτῷ. (46) Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡμῶν εἰς αὐτόν οὕτω.

Πῖνέ νυν ἐν Διὸς ὄν, ὦ Σώκρατες. Ἦ σε γὰρ ὄντως

Καὶ σοφὸν εἶπε θεός, καὶ θεὸς ἢ σοφίη.

Πρὸς γὰρ Ἀθηναίων κώνειον ἀπλῶς μὲν ἐδέξω,
 Αὐτοὶ δ' ἐξέπιον τοῦτο τεῦ στόματι.

XXV. Τούτῳ τις, καθά φησιν Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τρίτῳ περὶ ποιητικῆς, ἐφιλονεῖκει Ἀντιόλοχος Λήμνιος, καὶ Ἀντιφῶν ὁ τερατοσκόπος, ὡς Πυθαγόρα Κύδων καὶ Ὀνάτας· καὶ Σάγαρις Ὀμήρῳ ζῶντι, ἀποθανόντι δὲ Ξενοφάνης ὁ Κολοφώνιος· καὶ Κέρκωψ Ἡσιόδῳ ζῶντι, τελευτήσαντι δὲ ὁ προειρημένος Ξενοφάνης· καὶ Πινδάρῳ Ἀμφιμένης ὁ Κῶος· Θάλητι δὲ Φερεκύδης, καὶ Βίαντι Σάλαρος Πριηνεύς· Πιπτακῶ Ἀντιμενίδας καὶ Ἀλκαῖος, Ἀναξαγόρα Σωσίβιος, καὶ Σιμωνίδῃ Τιμοκρέων.

XXVI. (47) Τῶν δὲ διαδεξαμένων αὐτὸν, τῶν λεγομένων Σωκρατικῶν, οἱ κορυφαῖότατοι μὲν Πλάτων, Ξενοφῶν, Ἀντισθένης. Τῶν δὲ φερομένων δέκα οἱ διασημότετοι τέσσαρες, Αἰσχίνης, Φαίδων, Εὐκλείδης, Ἀρίστιππος. Λεκτέον δὲ πρῶτον περὶ Ξενοφῶντος· εἶτα περὶ Ἀντισθέλους ἐν τοῖς κυνικοῖς· ἔπειτα περὶ τῶν Σωκρατικῶν, εἶθ' οὕτω περὶ Πλάτωνος· ἐπεὶ κατάρχει τῶν δέκα αἰρέσεων, καὶ τὴν πρώτην Ἀκαδημίαν αὐτὸς συνεστήσατο. Ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀκολουθία τοῦτον ἐχέτω τὸν τρόπον.

XXVII. Γέγονε δὲ Σωκράτης καὶ ἕτερος, ἱστορικὸς, περιήγησιν ἄργους γεγραφώς· καὶ ἄλλος, περιπατητικὸς, Βιθυνός· καὶ ἕτερος, ἐπιγραμμάτων ποιητής· καὶ ὁ Κῶος, ἐπικλήσεις θεῶν γεγραφώς.



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assumed a new form under his hands, or at least that he materially widened their range. But if we enquire how the same writers describe Socrates as an individual, we find nothing that can serve as a foundation for the influence they assign to him. We are informed, that he did not at all busy himself with the physical investigations which constituted a main part even of Greek philosophy, but rather withheld others from them, and that even with regard to moral inquiries, which were those in which he engaged the deepest, he did not by any means aim at reducing them into a scientific shape, and that he established no fixed principle for this, any more than for any other branch of human knowledge. The base of his intellectual constitution, we are told, was rather religious than speculative, his exertions rather those of a good citizen, directed to the improvement of the people, and especially of the young, than those of a philosopher; in short, he is represented as a virtuoso in the exercise of sound common sense, and of that strict integrity and mild philanthropy, with which it is always associated in an uncorrupted mind; all this, however, tinged with a slight air of enthusiasm. These are no doubt excellent qualities; but yet they are not such as fit a man to play a brilliant part in history, but rather, unless where peculiar circumstances intervene, to lead a life of enviable tranquillity, so that it would be necessary to ascribe the general reputation of Socrates, and the almost unexampled homage which has been paid to him, by so many generations, less to himself than to such peculiar circumstances. But least of all are these qualities which

could have produced conspicuous and permanent effects on the philosophical exertions of a people already far advanced in intellectual culture. And this is confirmed, when we consider what sort of doctrines and opinions are attributed to Socrates in conformity with this view. For in spite of the pains taken to trick them out with a show of philosophy, it is impossible after all to give them any scientific solidity whatever: the farthest point we come to is, that they are thoughts well suited to warm the hearts of men in favour of goodness, but such as a healthy understanding, fully awakened to reflexion cannot fail to light upon of itself. What effect then can they have wrought on the progress, or the transformation of philosophy? If we would confine ourselves to the well-known statement, that Socrates called philosophy down from heaven to earth, that is, to houses and market-places, in other words, that he proposed social life as the object of research in the room of nature: still the influence thus ascribed to him is far from salutary in itself, for philosophy consists not in a partial cultivation either of morals or physics, but in the co-existence and inter-communion of both, and there is moreover no historical evidence that he really exerted it. The foundations of ethical philosophy had been laid before the time of Socrates, in the doctrines of the Pythagoreans, and after him it only kept its place by the side of physics, in the philosophical systems of the Greeks. In those of Plato, of Aristotle, and of the Stoics, that is, of all the genuine Socratic schools of any importance, we again meet with physical investigations, and ethics were ex-

clusively cultivated only by those followers of Socrates who themselves never attained to any eminence in philosophy. And if we consider the general tendency of the above-named schools, and review the whole range of their tenets, nothing can be pointed out, that could have proceeded from a Socrates, endowed with such qualities of mind and character as the one described to us, unless it be where their theories have been reduced to a familiar practical application. And even with regard to the elder Socratics, we find more satisfaction in tracing their strictly philosophical speculations to any other source rather than to *this* Socrates; not only may Aristippus, who was unlike his master in his spirit as well as his doctrines, be more easily derived from Protagoras, with whom he has so much in common, but Euclid, with his dialectic bias, from the Eleatics. And we find ourselves compelled to conclude, that the stem of Socrates, as he is at present represented to us, can have produced no other shoot than the Cynical philosophy, and that, not the cynism of Antisthenes, which still retains many features which we should rather refer to his earlier master, Gorgias, but the purer form, which exhibits only a peculiar mode of life, not a doctrine, much less a science: that of Diogenes, the *mad Socrates*, as he has been called, though in truth the highest epithet due to him is that of *Socrates caricatured*. For his is a copy in which we find nothing but features of such an original: its approximation to the self-contentedness of the deity in the retrenchment of artificial wants, its rejection of mere theoretical knowledge, its unassuming course of going



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diffused Socratic doctrines, while the doctrines themselves do not appear to him worth making the beginning of a new period. — Ast had previously arrived at the same result by a road in some respects opposite.* With him Plato is the full bloom of that which he terms the Athenian form of philosophy, and as no plant begins with its bloom, he feels himself constrained to place Socrates at the head of this philosophy, but yet not strictly as a philosopher. He says, that the operation of philosophy in Socrates was confined to the exercise of qualities that may belong to any virtuous man, that is to say, it was properly no philosophy at all; and makes the essence of his character to consist in enthusiasm and irony. Now he feels that he cannot place a man endowed with no other qualities than these at the head of a new period, and therefore he ranges the sophists by his side, not indeed without some inconsistency, for he himself sees in them the perverse tendency which was to be counteracted by the spirit of the new age; but yet he prefers this to recognizing the germ of a new gradation in Socrates alone, whose highest philosophical worth he makes to consist in his martyrdom, which however cannot by any means be deemed of equal moment in the sphere of science, as in that of religion or politics. Though in form this course of Ast's is opposite to Krug's, in substance it is the same: its result is likewise to begin a new period of philosophy with Plato. For Ast perceives nothing new or peculiar in the struggle Socrates made against the Sophists, only

* Grundriss einer Gesch. der Philos.

virtue and the thirst after truth, which had undoubtedly animated all the preceding philosophers; what he represents as characteristic in the Athenian philosophy, is the union of the elements which had been previously separate and opposed to each other; and since he does not in fact show the existence of this union in Socrates himself, and distinctly recognizes their separation in his immediate disciples, Plato is after all the point at which according to him that union begins.

But if we choose really to consider Plato as the true beginner of a new period, not to mention that he is far too perfect for a first beginning, we fall into two difficulties. First as to his relation to Aristotle. In all that is most peculiar to Plato, Aristotle appears as directly opposite to him as possible; but the main division of philosophy, notwithstanding the wide difference between their modes of treating it, he has in common with Plato, and the Stoics with both; it fits as closely and sits as easily on one as the other, so that one can scarcely help believing that it was derived from some common origin, which was the root of Plato's philosophy as well as theirs. The second difficulty is to conceive what Plato's relation to Socrates could really have been, if Socrates was not in any way his master in philosophy. If we should suppose that Plato's character was formed by the example of Socrates, and that reverence for his master's virtue, and love of truth, was the tie that bound him, still this merely moral relation is not a sufficient solution of the difficulty. The mode in which Plato introduces So-

ocrates, even in works which contain profound philosophical investigations, must be regarded as the wildest caprice, and would necessarily have appeared merely ridiculous and absurd to all his contemporaries, if he was not in some way or other indebted to him for his philosophical life. Hence we are forced to abide by the conclusion, that if a great pause is to be made in Greek philosophy, to separate the scattered tenets of the earlier schools from the later systems, this must be made with Socrates; but then we must also ascribe to him some element of a more strictly philosophical kind than most writers do, though as a mere beginning it needs not to have been carried very far toward maturity. Such a pause as this, however, we cannot avoid making: the earlier philosophy which we designate by the names of Pythagoras, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, &c. has evidently a common type, and the later, in which Plato, Aristotle, and Zeno are the conspicuous names, has likewise one of its own, which is very different from the other. Nothing can have been lost between them, which could have formed a gradual transition: much less is it possible so to connect any of the later forms with any of the earlier, as to regard them as a continuous whole. This being so, nothing remains to be done, but to subject the case of Socrates to a new revision, in order to see whether the judges he has met with among posterity have not been as unjust, in denying his philosophical worth, and his merits in the cause of philosophy, as his contemporaries were in denying his worth as a citizen, and imputing to him imaginary



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dress; whereas a work of mere narrative — and such these dialogues would be, if the whole of the matter belonged to Socrates — would necessarily show a fainter tone of colouring, such as Xenophon's conversations really present. But as on the one hand it would be too much to assert that Socrates actually thought and knew all that Plato makes him say: so on the other hand it would certainly be too little to say of him, that he was nothing more than the Socrates whom Xenophon represents. Xenophon, it is true, in the *Memorabilia*, professes himself a narrator; but, in the first place, a man of sense can only relate what he understands, and a disciple of Socrates, who must have been well acquainted with his master's habit of disclaiming knowledge, would of all men adhere most strictly to this rule. We know, however, and this may be admitted without being harshly pressed, that Xenophon was a statesman, but no philosopher, and that beside the purity of his character, and the good sense of his political principles, beside his admirable power of rousing the intellect, and checking presumption, which Xenophon loved and respected in Socrates, the latter may have possessed some really philosophical elements which Xenophon was unable to appropriate to himself, and which he suffered to pass unnoticed; which indeed he can have felt no temptation to exhibit, for fear of betraying defects such as those which his Socrates was wont to expose. On the other hand, Xenophon was an apologetic narrator, and had no doubt selected this form for the very purpose, that his readers might not expect him to exhibit

Socrates entire, but only that part of his character which belonged to the sphere of the affections and of social life, and which bore upon the charges brought against him; every thing else he excludes, contenting himself with showing, that it cannot have been anything of so dangerous a tendency as was imputed to Socrates. And not only *may* Socrates, he *must* have been more, and there must have been more in the background of his speeches, than Xenophon represents. For if the contemporaries of Socrates had heard nothing from him but such discourses, how would Plato have marred the effect of his works on his immediate public, which had not forgotten the character of Socrates, if the part which Socrates plays there stood in direct contradiction with the image which his real life left in the reader's mind? And if we believe Xenophon, and in this respect we cannot doubt the accuracy of the contemporary apologist, that Socrates spent the whole of his time in public places, and suppose that he was always engaged in discourses which, though they may have been more beautiful, varied, and dazzling, were still in substance the same with these, and moved in the same sphere to which the Memorabilia are confined: one is at a loss to understand, how it was that, in the course of so many years, Socrates did not clear the market-place, and the work-shops, the walks, and the wrestling-schools, by the dread of his presence, and how it is that, in Xenophon's native Flemish style of painting, the weariness of the interlocutors is not still more strongly expressed, than we here and there actually find

it. And still less should we be able to comprehend, why men of such abilities as Critias and Alcibiades, and others formed by nature for speculation, as Plato and Euclid, set so high a value on their intercourse with Socrates, and found satisfaction in it so long. Nor can it be supposed, that Socrates held discourses in public such as Xenophon puts into his mouth, but that he delivered lessons of a different kind elsewhere, and in private; for this, considering the apologetic form of Xenophon's book, to which he rigidly confines himself, he would probably not have passed over in silence. Socrates must have disclosed the philosophical element of his character in the same social circle of which Xenophon gives us specimens. And is not this just the impression which Xenophon's conversations make? philosophical matter, translated into the unphilosophical style of the common understanding, an operation in which the philosophical base is lost; just as some critics have proposed, by way of test for the productions of the loftiest poetry, to resolve them into prose, and evaporate their spirit, which can leave nothing but an extremely sober kind of beauty remaining. And as after such an experiment the greatest of poets would scarcely be able exactly to restore the lost poetry, but yet a reader of moderate capacity soon observes what has been done, and can even point it out in several passages, where the decomposing hand has grown tired of its work: so it is in the other case with the philosophical basis. One finds some parallels with Plato, other fragments are detected in other ways: and the



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tediousness, but it will be impossible in this way to discover any properly philosophical basis in the constitution of Socrates. For if we exclude all depth of speculation, nothing is left but results, without the grounds and methodical principles on which they depend, and which therefore Socrates can only have possessed instinctively, that is without the aid of philosophy. The only safe method seems to be, to inquire: What may Socrates have been, over and above what Xenophon has described, without however contradicting the strokes of character, and the practical maxims, which Xenophon distinctly delivers as those of Socrates: and what must he have been, to give Plato a right, and an inducement, to exhibit him as he has done in his dialogues? Now the latter branch of this question inevitably leads us back to the historical position from which we started; that Socrates must have had a strictly philosophical basis in his composition, so far as he is virtually recognized by Plato as the author of his philosophical life, and is therefore to be regarded as the first vital movement of Greek philosophy in its more advanced stage; and that he can only be entitled to this place by an element, which, though properly philosophical, was foreign to the preceding period. Here however we must for the present be content to say, that the property which is peculiar to the post-Socratic philosophy, beginning with Plato, and which henceforward is common to all the genuine Socratic schools, is the co-existence and inter-communion of the three branches of know-

ledge, dialectics, physics, ethics. This distinction separates the two periods very definitely. For before Socrates either these branches were kept entirely apart, or their subjects were blended together without due discrimination, and without any definite proportion: as for instance ethics and physics among the Pythagoreans, physics and dialectics among the Eleatics; the Ionians alone, though their tendency was wholly to physics, made occasional excursions, though quite at random, into the region both of dialectics and of ethics. But when some writers refuse Plato himself the honour of having distinguished and combined these sciences, and ascribe this step to Xenocrates, and think that even Aristotle abandoned it again; this in my opinion is grounded on a misunderstanding, which however it would here lead us too far to explain. Now it is true we cannot assert, that Socrates was the first who combined the characters of a physical, ethical, and dialectic philosopher in one person, especially as Plato and Xenophon agree in taking physics out of his range; nor can it be positively said that Socrates was at least the author of this distribution of Science, though its germ may certainly be found from the Memorabilia. But we may surely inquire whether this phenomenon has not some simpler and more internal cause, and whether this may not be found in Socrates. The following observation will, I conceive, be admitted without much dispute. So long as inquirers are apt to step unwittingly across the boundaries that separate one province of knowledge from another, so long,

and in the same degree, does the whole course of their intellectual operations depend on outward circumstances: for it is only a systematic distribution of the whole field that can lead to a regular and connected cultivation of it. In the same way, so long as the several sciences are pursued singly, and their respective votaries contentedly acquiesce in this insulation, so long, and in the same degree, is the specific instinct for the object of each science predominant in the whole sphere of intellectual exertion. But as soon as the need of the connexion and co-ordinate growth of all the branches of knowledge has become so distinctly felt, as to express itself by the form in which they are treated and described, in a manner which can never again be lost; so far as this is the case, it is no longer particular talents and instincts, but the general scientific talent of speculation, that has the ascendant. In the former of these cases it must be confessed, that the idea of science as such is not yet matured, perhaps has not even become the subject of consciousness, for science as such can only be conceived as a whole, in which every division is merely subordinate, just as the real world to which it ought to correspond. In the latter case, on the contrary, this idea has become a subject of consciousness; for it can have been only by its force that the particular inclinations which confine each thinker to a certain object, and split science into insulated parts, have been mastered. And this is unquestionably a simpler criterion to distinguish the two periods of Greek phi-



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his admirers. For if he went about in the service of the god, to justify the celebrated oracle, it was impossible that the utmost point he reached could have been simply to know that he knew nothing; there was a step beyond this which he must have taken, that of knowing what knowledge was. For by what other means could he have been enabled to declare that which others believed themselves to know, to be no knowledge, than by a more correct conception of knowledge, and by a more correct method founded upon that conception? And every where, when he is explaining the nature of non-science (*ἀνεπιστημοσύνη*), one sees that he sets out from two tests: one, that science is the same in all true thoughts, and consequently must manifest its peculiar form in every such thought: the other, that all science forms one whole. For his proofs always hinge on this assumption: that it is impossible to start from one true thought, and to be entangled in a contradiction with any other, and also that knowledge derived from any one point, and obtained by correct combination, cannot contradict that which has been deduced in like manner from any other point; and while he exposed such contradictions in the current conceptions of mankind, he strove to rouse those leading ideas in all who were capable of understanding, or even of divining his meaning. Most of what Xenophon has preserved for us may be referred to this object, and the same endeavour is indicated clearly enough in all that Socrates says of himself in Plato's *Apology*, and what Alcibiades says of him in his eulogy. So that if we

conceive this to have been the central point in the character of Socrates, we may reconcile Plato and Xenophon, and can understand the historical position of Socrates.

When Xenophon says (Mem. IV. 6. 15.): that as often as Socrates did not merely refute the errors of others, but attempted to demonstrate something himself, he took his road through propositions which were most generally admitted: we can perfectly understand this mode of proceeding, as the result of the design just described; he wished to find as few hindrances and diversions as possible in his way, that he might illustrate his method clearly and simply; and propositions, if there were such, which all held to be certain, must have appeared to him the most eligible, in order that he might show in their case, that the conviction with which they were embraced was not knowledge; since this would render men more keenly sensible of the necessity of getting at the foundation of knowledge, and of taking their stand upon it, in order to give a new shape to all human things. Hence too we may explain the preponderance of the subjects connected with civil and domestic life in most of these conversations. For this was the field that supplied the most generally admitted conceptions and propositions, the fate of which interested all men alike. But this mode of proceeding becomes inexplicable, if it is supposed that Socrates attached the chief importance to the subject of these conversations. That must have been quite a secondary point. For when the object is to elucidate any subject,

it is necessary to pay attention to the less familiar and more disputed views of it, and how meagre most of those discussions in Xenophon are in this respect, is evident enough. From the same point of view we must also consider the controversy of Socrates with the Sophists. So far as it was directed against their maxims, it does not belong to our present question; it is merely the opposition of a good citizen to the corrupters of government and of youth. But even looking at it from the purely theoretical side, it would be idle to represent this contrast as the germ of a new period of philosophy, if Socrates had only impugned opinions which were the monstrous shapes into which the doctrines of an earlier school had degenerated, without having established any in their stead, which nobody supposes him to have done. But for the purpose of awakening the true idea of science, the sophists must have been the most welcome of all disputants to him, since they had reduced their opinions into the most perfect form; and hence were proud of them themselves, and were peculiarly admired by others. If, therefore, he could succeed in exposing their weakness, the value of a principle so triumphantly applied would be rendered most conspicuous.

But in order to show the imperfection of the current conceptions both in the theories of the Sophists, and in common life, if the issue was not to be left to chance, some certain *method* was requisite. For it was often necessary in the course of the process to lay down intermediate notions, which it was necessary to define to



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sults from the testimony of Aristotle (Metaph. I. 6. XIII. 4.): that what may be justly ascribed to Socrates, is that he introduced induction and general definitions; a testimony which bears every mark of impartiality and truth. Hence there is no reason to doubt that Socrates taught this art of framing and connecting notions correctly. Since however it is an *art*, abstract teaching was not sufficient, and therefore no doubt Socrates never so taught it: it was an art that required to be witnessed and practised in the most manifold applications, and one who was not firmly grounded in it, and left the school too early, lost it again, and with it almost all that was to be learned from Socrates, as indeed is observed in Plato's dialogues. Now that this exercise and illustration was the main object of conversations held by Socrates even on general moral subjects, is expressly admitted by Xenophon himself, when, under the head—What Socrates did to render his friends more expert in dialectics,—he introduces a great many such discourses and inquiries, which so closely resemble the rest, that all might just as well have been put in the same class.

It was with a view therefore to become masters in this art, and thereby to keep the faster hold of the idea of science, that men of vigorous and speculative minds formed a circle round Socrates as long as circumstances allowed, those who were able to the end of his life, and in the meanwhile chose to tread closely in their master's steps, and to refrain for a time from making a systematic application of his art in the different depart-

ments of knowledge, for the more elaborate cultivation of all the sciences. But when after his death the most eminent among them, first of all at Megara, began a strictly scientific train of speculation, and thus philosophy gradually ripened into the shape which, with slight variations, it ever after retained among the Greeks: what now took place was not indeed what Socrates did, or perhaps could have done, but yet it was undoubtedly his will. To this it may indeed be objected, that Xenophon expressly says (Mem. I. 1. 11.): that Socrates in his riper years not only himself gave up all application to natural philosophy, but endeavoured to withhold all others from it, and directed them to the consideration of human affairs; and hence many hold those only to be genuine Socratics, who did not include physics in their system. But this statement must manifestly be taken in a sense much less general, and quite different from that which is usually given to it. This is clearly evinced by the reasons which Socrates alleges. For how could he have said so generally, that the things which depend on God ought not to be made the subject of inquiry, before those which depend on man have been despatched, since not only are the latter connected in a variety of ways with the former, but even among things human there must be some of greater moment, others of less, some of nearer, others of more remote concern, and the proposition would lead to the conclusion that before one was brought to its completion, not even the investigation of another ought to be begun. This might have been not unfairly turned by a sophist against Socrate

himself, if he had dragged in a notion apparently less familiar, in order to illustrate another; and certainly this proposition, taken in a general sense, would not only have endangered the conduct of life, but would also have altogether destroyed the Socratic idea of science, that nothing can be known except together with the rest, and along with its relation to all things beside. The real case is simply this. It is clear that Socrates had no peculiar talent for any single science, and least of all for that of physics. Now it is true that a merely metaphysical thinker may feel himself attracted toward all sciences, as was the case with Kant; but then this happens under different circumstances, and a different mental constitution from that of Socrates. He on the contrary made no excursions to points remote from his centre, but devoted his whole life to the task of exciting his leading idea as extensively and as vividly as possible in others; his whole aim was, that whatever form man's wishes and hopes might take, according to individual character and accidental circumstances, this foundation might be securely laid, before he proceeded further. But till then his advice was, not to accumulate fresh masses of opinions; this he for his part would permit only so far as it was demanded by the wants of active life, and for this reason he might say, that if those who investigated meteoric phenomena had any hope of producing them at their pleasure, he should be more ready to admit their researches: language, which in any other sense but this would have been absurd. We cannot therefore conclude from this that



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make up a whole, and as to other subjects, let him not lose sight of the above quoted passage of Aristotle, who confines Socrates' philosophical speculations to principles. The first point therefore to examine would be, whether some profound speculative doctrines may not have originally belonged to Socrates, which are generally considered as most foreign to him, for instance, the thought which is unfolded by Plato in his peculiar manner, but is exhibited in the germ by Xenophon himself (Mem. I. 4. 8.), and is intimately connected with the great dialectic question as to the agreement between thought and being: that of the general diffusion of intelligence throughout the whole of nature. With this one might connect the assertion of Aristocles (Euseb. Præp. XI. 3.), that Socrates began the investigation of the doctrine of ideas. But the testimony of this late Peripatetic is suspicious, and may have had no other foundation than the language of Socrates in the Parmenides.

But whether much or little of this and other doctrines belonged to Socrates himself, the general idea already described cannot fail to suggest a more correct mode of conceiving, in what light it is that Plato brings forward his master in his works, and in what sense his Socrates is to be termed a real, or a fictitious personage. Fictitious, in the proper sense, I hold, he is not, and his reality is not a merely mimic one, nor is Socrates in those works merely a convenient person who affords room for much mimic art, and much cheerful pleasantries, in order to temper the abstruse investigations with this

agreeable addition. It is because the spirit and the method of Socrates are everywhere predominant, and because it is not merely a subordinate point with Plato to adopt the manner of Socrates, but is as truly his highest aim, that Plato has not hesitated to put into his mouth what he believed to be no more than deductions from his fundamental ideas. The only material exceptions we find to this (passing over several more minute which come under the same head with the anachronisms) occur in later works, as the Statesman and the Republic; I mean doctrines of Plato foreign to the real views of Socrates, perhaps indeed virtually contradicting them, and which are nevertheless put into his mouth. On this head we must let Plato appeal to the privilege conferred by custom. But on the whole we are forced to say, that in giving Socrates a living share in the propagation of that philosophical movement which took its rise from him, Plato has immortalized him in the noblest manner, that a disciple can perpetuate the glory of his master; in a manner not only more beautiful, but more just, than he could have done it by a literal narrative.



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