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AN INTRODUCTION TO
ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS

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AN INTRODUCTION TO
ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS

BOOKS I—IV.

(BOOK λ. CH. VI—IX. IN AN APPENDIX)

WITH A CONTINUOUS ANALYSIS AND NOTES

Intended for the use of Beginners and Junior Students

BY THE

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FOURTH EDITION, REVISED

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P R E F A C E.

THE object of this work is to provide a simple introduction to the subject of the Ethics for beginners generally, and especially for those who are commencing it with a view to the Oxford Final Examination. It may also perhaps be found useful in the Upper Forms of Public Schools. The chief aim throughout has been clearness and simplicity, even at the risk of occasional repetition and diffuseness. Technical phraseology has been as far as possible avoided, and the principal technical terms occurring are explained in a Glossary.

The author hopes that this specific object of the work will be borne in mind throughout the whole of it.

Thus the Introductory Sketch, which simply aims at giving a beginner an intelligent notion of the subject upon which he is entering, makes no pretence to be exhaustive. Several important systems and writers are omitted altogether. The object has been to select systems which have a distinct

(perhaps one-sided) character: such as are typical of some well-defined bias or direction of thought. In fact names and references have been added in the notes almost as an after-thought, to give the clue to further inquiry to those who may desire it.

In the Glossary likewise, the explanations given of some of the more important technical terms of Aristotle's philosophy are altogether popular and rudimentary. To have attempted anything like an adequate account of such difficult words as ἀρχή, φύσις, ψυχὴ, δύναμις, etc., would have defeated the purpose of the work altogether, and repelled those for whose benefit it is intended.

The same considerations must serve as an apology for language sometimes consciously loose and unphilosophical in the Analysis and Notes. The attempt to put such a treatise as that of Aristotle into such a 'modern' light as may be intelligible to a reader *ex hyp.* unacquainted with philosophical phraseology, seems necessarily to involve the sacrifice of technical accuracy. This desire to appeal as far as possible to modern sympathies has occasioned a certain amount of diffuseness in parallel quotations from recent popular writers.

The best thanks of the author are due to several friends who have kindly assisted him by their advice in various parts of the work: and he will feel grateful for any further criticisms or suggestions that may be offered to him.

The difficulty of the task has become more apparent on
further acquaintance with it, and this experiment is now made
not without hesitation and a full consciousness of its
difficult execution.

EDMUND HALL, OXFORD,
June 1871.

PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION.

A NEW edition of this work being now called for, I take
the opportunity of introducing several corrections, and
making considerable additions to the Glossary and Notes.

The additional matter (except in the case of actual cor-
rections or obvious improvements of detail) has been for the
most part either embodied in the Glossary or collected in
'Supplementary Notes and Illustrations.'

The reasons for adopting this method have been (1) to
disturb as little as possible the existing arrangement of
Text, Analysis, and Footnotes; (2) to admit of the occa-
sional introduction of discussions and references, which may
make the Book (as I venture to hope) more useful to a
higher class of Students, especially in the earlier stages of
their acquaintance with so difficult an author as Aristotle;
(3) to allow of a considerable enlargement of the illustra-
tions from modern authors. This kind of illustration,
while interesting to all students, is, I believe, especially

valuable for Passmen, because calculated to impart something of a living interest to what they are apt to consider as empty formulæ, and mere 'dry bones' of speculation. Most of these illustrations are from Shakespeare, as it seems to me that the numerous and striking coincidences between these two of the greatest observers of human nature and life are especially instructive from the certainty of their complete independence. I have also allowed myself some liberty in introducing illustrations from Dante for the opposite reason, that his phraseology and theories are, so to speak, saturated with Aristotelian language and lore. We can thus trace the influence on one of the greatest minds, intellectual and imaginative, that the world has yet seen, of one whom he regarded as his master and guide both in Speculative and Practical Philosophy, of one who was to him not only '*il Maestro di color che sanno,*' but also '*il Maestro di nostra vita.*'

I am indebted to several friends for kindly suggesting corrections and improvements. My especial thanks are due to the Rev. J. R. Magrath, Senior Fellow and Tutor of Queen's College, for much valuable advice and assistance throughout the work.

E. M.

S. EDMUND HALL, OXFORD,
October 1877.

INTRODUCTION.

MUCH difficulty is sometimes felt, especially by beginners, in distinguishing the spheres of Ethical and Religious teaching. A dilemma like that which traditionally proved fatal to the Alexandrian library represents not inaptly the feeling with which the Science of Ethics is regarded in its relations to Religion. It is thought that if its conclusions agree with those of Religion they are superfluous, if they differ from them they are wicked. We will first then endeavour to gain a clear conception of the purpose and limits of the Science of Ethics, as contrasted with those of Religion.

We may consider this and kindred sciences to have their origin somewhat as follows.

Man is obviously compounded of two distinct natures, which may be roughly described as Body and Soul. He desires to know more of each of these natures. The nature of his Body is investigated by the Science of Physiology, which reveals to him that it is composed of Bones, Nerves, Muscles, etc. His Soul (using the word broadly for the immaterial side of man's nature) is similarly discovered by the Science of Psychology to contain Reasoning, Imaginative (or Artistic), Moral, and other powers. Further inquiries in each of these last-named departments give rise to the practical Sciences of

Logic, Æsthetics, Ethics, etc., which are *Sciences* because their main object is to ascertain the laws and facts of these several portions of our compound nature; *practical* because the enunciation of these laws and facts, when discovered, constitutes *ipso facto* practical rules for the direction of the faculties to which the investigation refers. In each case notice that the process is one of a careful but simple observation of *facts*, followed by a judicious enunciation of the laws which bind those facts together. In a word the method is what logicians call Inductive. This cannot be too clearly insisted upon. Let us therefore explain it a little more fully in each of the cases mentioned. The primary object of Logic is to ascertain under what laws, principles, limits, men do, *as a matter of fact*, reason and think. The statement of these laws becomes the groundwork of practical rules for reasoning. The primary object of Æsthetics is to ascertain what constitutes, *as a matter of fact*, good and bad taste in art of all kinds according to the decision of those competent to judge. The enunciations of these principles become the practical rules to which the Sculptor, Artist, Poet must conform. So, lastly, the primary object of Ethics is to ascertain, as a matter of fact, what are the principles, feelings, or motives which regulate men's conduct as moral agents, what is the distinction which men do actually draw between Right and Wrong? by what faculty or faculties are they enabled to draw such a distinction? on what sanction do such distinctions rest? The answers to such questions, when formulated, become *ipso facto* practical rules for the conduct of life. But in all these cases the practical rules are as it were adjuncts to the

science strictly so called. The main object of the science is to discover, and group under general laws, the *facts* in each department of human nature, by the ordinary powers of accurate observation. It is due to the nature of the subject-matter in each case that the facts when formulated become practical rules. Now we see how the spheres of Ethics and Religion do not interfere. The object of Ethics is to ascertain the facts of a certain department of human nature so far as they are matters of observation. Practical rules of conduct are secondary, and in a manner accidental. On the other hand the main object of Religion is generally thought to be to provide us with practical rules of conduct and an adequate sanction for obeying them. The discovery of facts of, or theories about, our moral nature is in this case what is secondary and accidental. Again, if Science (whether Ethics or any other Science) accepts a proposition as true which does not rest upon observation but on authority, it ceases so far to be Science. On the other hand Religion, or at least revealed Religion (and it is about this only that we are now speaking), often claims our obedience on the grounds of the authority to which it can appeal. Consequently the aim, the purpose, the fundamental principles, of Religion and Ethics are perfectly distinct. One does not supersede or clash with the other. It is now a trite saying that Revelation is not meant to teach us Physical Science; it is equally true that it is not designed to teach us Ethical or Moral Science.

Let us now suppose the Science of Ethics started on its independent career. What will be the main question or questions which it will seek to answer? It finds mankind, as

a matter of fact, approving, and, as it would seem, instinctively approving, certain actions, and condemning others. Not, be it observed, the same actions universally. Very far from it. But it finds the same sentiment of approbation and disapprobation however variously applied in detail; a sentiment which is reflected in language by the words Right and Wrong.

And (to recur for a moment to the question above discussed) these phenomena are just as conspicuous when revealed religion is unknown: they are indeed in that case more important, scientifically speaking. They arise independently of religion, and therefore call for a solution independent of it. What then are these notions of Right and Wrong, asks the Science of Ethics, which, apart from external aid and instruction, the human mind spontaneously and universally recognises? What is the exact meaning of the distinction? What precisely constitutes the difference between Right and Wrong in actions? Further, by what faculty or faculties do we recognise it? Again, by what motive are we impelled to regulate our practice by these notions? What is the nature and sanction of the Feeling of Duty? Or once more, as Aristotle himself puts the question, What is the Chief Good for man? What is the ultimate aim of all his efforts and aspirations? What is he living for? What is he hoping to attain to?

Such are the main problems which present themselves for solution to the Science of Ethics, and they arise (let it be noticed) from observation of the actual facts and phenomena of that department of human nature with which the

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recognition of Right and Wrong to depend upon a calculation of Utility or Advantage. The latter are called Intuitive Systems because they refer the perception of Right and Wrong to a special faculty which simply approves and disapproves without being able always, or even usually, to assign its reasons: in other words to an *Intuitive Faculty*. But we must not encroach upon our second question. We will now therefore illustrate these two divergent theories as to the nature of Right and Wrong in themselves.

(A) UTILITARIAN SYSTEMS.

(α) Some assert that all Morality is a thinly-disguised selfishness, that man has and can have, no motive for action but self-interest¹, and that even benevolence, gratitude, and love are but forms of the desire of power, the wish to exhibit our superiority, the appreciation of possible advantages to be derived from the goodwill of others. (β) Others again that virtuous actions are simply the observance of the varying enactments of law, framed at first by the rulers in their own

¹ Hobbes, Mandeville, La Rochefoucauld, etc. Take as a specimen Hobbes's account of Love—'a conception a man hath of his need of the person desired.' Or Mandeville's statement that 'men do not really admire such actions as those of Regulus or Decius, but only observe that men of such dispositions are very useful for the defence of any state, and therefore by panegyrics, etc., encourage such tempers in others.' Or La Rochefoucauld (Maxime 264): 'Pity is a clever foresight of ills into which we may ourselves fall. We assist others in order to secure their services for ourselves under similar circumstances: and the services we render are strictly speaking conferred upon ourselves in advance'!

interest¹, and observed afterwards by others from fear of civil punishments or hope of rewards, *i.e.* from a calculation of self-interest. (γ) Others², that ‘honesty is found by experience to be the best policy,’ that virtue conduces to health of body, and peace of mind, that it secures the honour and goodwill of society, and, as some add³, above all the friendship and goodwill of Heaven. Hence taking a far-sighted view of their best interests in this world, and still more, regarding the overwhelming balance in favour of virtue in the probable arrangements of the next, men prudently choose virtue and avoid vice. (δ) A more refined system⁴ teaches us that human nature is by its very constitution endowed with so strong a feeling of sympathy that it cannot but experience pleasure and pain at the happiness and misery of others, and that it is thus impelled to strive after what makes for the general welfare, to dislike whatever has a contrary tendency; and that this

¹ The ancient Sophists, Hobbes, Mandeville, etc. *e.g.* Hobbes says, ‘The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there (*i.e.* in a state of nature) no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law, where no law, no injustice.’

² Butler to some extent—See especially *Anal.* pt. i. c. iii.—though his Utilitarianism is qualified by the frequent assertion that ‘duty’ and ‘conscience’ are really supreme, yet ‘Conscience and self-love, if we understand

our true happiness, always lead us the same way. Duty and interest are perfectly coincident,’ etc. See Summary at the close of Sermon iii.

³ Especially Paley.

⁴ Hume and Hutcheson maintain that Right is what conduces to Utility in general, as contrasted with mere personal and selfish Utility, as Hobbes would say. Hume, Adam Smith, and Bentham in different ways connected these opposing theories through the medium of the feeling of Sympathy.

instinct of sympathy overrides the instinct of self-interest: in a word, that Right is that which tends to produce the greatest aggregate amount of happiness, 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number;' Wrong, the reverse of this. (ε) Finally we ought to notice a theory¹ which serves as a sort of connecting link between the Utilitarian and Intuitive systems—viz., that originally Virtue was chosen for its advantages, but that soon it came to be sought without a conscious sense of the advantage to be derived from it. It had been found from the first so uniformly to be advantageous that the calculation whether it was so in any special case was omitted, and virtue as such, and so apparently for its own sake, was chosen. Just in the same way that money is sought after, first with a view to its use, and then, as the habit of hoarding grows, for its own sake, and without any thought of using it.

Such are some of the answers given by various systems of Ethics, which resolve Right and Wrong into some form of Utility or the reverse. We pass on now to the

(B) INTUITIVE SYSTEMS.

The following will serve as specimens of this type of solutions. It is said that Right and Wrong are distinctions *sui generis*. They cannot be further analysed or explained. They differ from any other notion as much, for example, as Light differs from Sound. All we can do is to recognise them and accept them simply as we do the phenomena of Light, Sound, etc. Thus Right is something which commends itself necessarily and naturally to us. To explain this (α) some

¹ Hartley, Mackintosh.

maintain that it exhibits a certain propriety, and an accordance with 'the fitness of things'¹ which we cannot choose but recognise, though we cannot analyse the feeling, or explain the grounds of our approbation. The distinction between Right and Wrong would thus be eternal and invariable. (β) Or if 'accordance with the fitness of things' be thought vague and beyond the reach of verification, at least it is said there is in Right and Wrong a conformity or suitableness (and the reverse) to the *nature of Man*² in the truest sense and highest development of that nature; very much in the way that fresh and bracing air is naturally wholesome to our bodily constitutions provided they are in a sound and healthy state, or that certain tastes and smells are agreeable *to us*, whatever they may be to other animals or organisms, from some suitableness to our organs of sense which we are unable to explain.

Thus these and similar systems regard the distinction between Right and Wrong as a specific and essential difference in the nature of things, which we must simply recognise *as a fact*, just as for instance we recognise the contrast between Hot and Cold, Black and White, Bitter and Sweet.

It is no part of our purpose to criticise the merits of these several systems, but only to state them in outline: we will therefore now proceed to our second question, viz. :—

II. By what faculty in ourselves is the distinction between Right and Wrong recognised?

The answers given to this question fall under two general

¹ Cudworth, Clarke. Plato's 'Ideal' System. [e.g. Plato in the *Euthyphron* contends that a quality or act is not holy because it is loved by the gods, but is loved by the gods because it is holy.]

² Butler.

types, as is pointed out by Hume. The one, that the recognition of Right and Wrong is derived from Reason; the other, that it is derived from Sentiment. To these may be added the view which Hume himself maintains, that 'Reason and Sentiment concur in almost all moral determinations and conclusions.' To illustrate these types:—

Those who (as we have seen) maintain that Right and Wrong consist in an immutable 'conformity to the nature of things' hold further that Reason in general (*i.e.* Intuitive Reason), or a special department of Reason (*i.e.* Practical Reason), is the faculty by which such distinctions become known to us¹.

Those who refer the origin of the notions of Right and Wrong to Sentiment in some form or another may again be divided into two classes, (1) those who trace it to some already recognised Sentiment, such as Self-Love or the Desire of Utility; and (2) those who assert that the notions of Right and Wrong, being primary and fundamental notions, require a special sense or faculty for their recognition. The latter class, with whom we are chiefly concerned, argue somewhat as follows. Looking at the case of our bodily senses we observe that differences of Colour, Sound, Taste, Smell, Touch, can only be appreciated each by a special sense. If any of those senses be wanting the distinction of objects corresponding to it is lost. One sense cannot do the work of another, except perhaps in a very slight degree and by artificial training. Thus each sense has a special and appropriate object of its own. Another characteristic of the Senses is

¹ Cudworth, Clarke, Whewell, etc.

that they are 'Intuitive,' *i.e.* they tell us *as a fact* that one object is green, another red, that one sound is loud, another soft, and so on; but they cannot say *why* the rose is red or the leaf green, much less inform us as to the essential distinction in the nature of things between red and green. Here then we have an exact parallel (it is argued) to the recognition of the distinction between Right and Wrong. That distinction we feel to be *sui generis*, and whether the feeling be, as the Utilitarian would say, a deception or no, at any rate we do feel that we mean by it something different from the distinction between Advantageous and Disadvantageous or any other such antithesis that might be suggested; just as the difference between a good and bad Smell is distinct from the difference between a good and bad Taste. If this be so, then, on the analogy just explained of the bodily senses, it will require a special faculty for its recognition, just as much as Taste and Smell require different faculties; and further, that faculty must be Intuitive, because it is clear that we continually apply the terms Right and Wrong instinctively, and without being able to say exactly *why* we apply them, much less to explain what constitutes the precise difference implied by the words. Hence this faculty is not inaptly described as the Moral Sense¹. But, it is said by

¹ Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, (e.g. Honesty, Generosity, etc.) etc. The latter insists on the in reference to which he sums up his theory as follows:—
 fundamental distinction between
 'Natural' Good (e.g. Riches, (i.) 'That some actions have to
 Health, etc.) which we pursue men an immediate goodness;
 from a view of Interest or from or that by a superior sense,
 Self-Love, and 'Moral' Good which I call a Moral one, we

others, this Moral faculty not only affirms Right and Wrong of certain acts, but it also involves a sentiment of approbation and disapprobation of them. The Senses in fact suggest here a further analogy. To recognise the distinction between Harmony and Discord so as to derive satisfaction or the reverse from sounds, it is necessary not only that we have the sense of hearing, but also that we have to some extent what is called 'a musical ear.' To appreciate harmonious and inharmonious combinations of colour it is necessary not only to possess the sense of sight, but also to have what is called 'an eye for colour.' Hence, it is urged, the recognition of Right and Wrong, involving as it does also the approbation and disapprobation of them, is analogous to the operation of the cultivated ear and eye rather than to that of the simple Senses of hearing and seeing. In a word the element of Taste is so conspicuous in the operations of this moral faculty that some have preferred to describe it as a Moral¹ *Taste* rather than a Moral *Sense*. Others observing

perceive pleasure in the contemplation of such actions in others, and are determined to love the agent (and much more do we perceive pleasure in being conscious of having done such actions ourselves) without any view of further *natural* advantage from them.

(ii.) That what excites us to these actions, which we call virtuous, is not an intention to obtain even this sensible plea-

sure, much less the future rewards from sanctions of laws, or any other *natural* good, which may be the consequence of the virtuous action, but an entirely different principle of action from Interest or Self-Love.'

An Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil—Introduction.—
See further § I. viii.

¹ *e.g.* Hume: 'As virtue is an end and is desirable on its own account, without fee or reward,

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prudential regard for our own interest, or as an instinctive benevolent desire for the good of our fellow-men, or as a combination of both these impulses. Those also who adhere to the theory of a Moral Taste give a somewhat similar answer to the question, viz., that the *pleasure* derived from the gratification of that Taste disposes us to act so as to secure it, as naturally as a musician would seek for the enjoyment of good music. So far then the answer given would deny the existence of Duty or Moral Obligation in any distinctive sense. It is merely a phase, or a special application, of some other familiar instinct.

Many Intuitive Moralists however claim for this feeling of Duty a character perfectly distinct and independent. They affirm it to be different from a sense of approbation, or of gratification; from a desire of self-interest, or of general expediency. It is declared to be a primary fact of our nature¹, and as primary, to some extent inexplicable, just as is the case with the axioms of Mathematics or the fundamental Laws of Thought. That it is so is evidenced by an appeal to the various languages of men² which provide a distinct word for the idea of 'Duty,' 'Ought,' 'Obligation,'—distinct that is from Self-

¹ *e.g.* Kant.

² Compare the following argument of Hume for the reality of our conceptions of Moral distinctions:—'Had Nature made no such distinction founded on the original constitution of the mind, the words "honourable" and "shameful," "lovely" and "odious,"

"noble" and "despicable," had never had place in any language; nor could politicians, had they invented these terms, ever have been able to render them intelligible, or make them convey any idea to the audience.'—*Inquiry concerning Principles of Morals*, § 5.)

Interest, Benevolence, Utility, Approbation, or any other motive that can be assigned—while each and all indicate it by a metaphor, the imperfect applicability of which bears witness to the difficulty of expressing the thing signified. Two metaphors generally occur—that of a *debt due*, or that of a *binding* or *compelling* force. Of the former, $\chi\rho\epsilon\iota\acute{\alpha}$, $\chi\rho\eta$, ‘debeo,’ ‘due,’ ‘duty,’ ‘ought’ (owed), are examples: of the latter, $\delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}$, ‘religio,’ ‘obligation,’ ‘bound.’ Imperfect metaphors they are, because a *debt* implies a creditor, as well as some service received from him which is to be repaid: *obligation* implies a superior power by which the compulsion is exercised. But in the case before us, though we feel that there is a ‘due’ or ‘debt,’ we have no distinct conception of the accessory circumstances just enumerated, or at least not necessarily so: and the ‘obligation’ is one which is not strictly binding or compulsory. The debt is one which we are free to repudiate, the obligation one which we are free to neglect. These metaphors thus indicate efforts on the part of the mind to express a feeling which it cannot adequately explain to itself or others because it is *sui generis*, the effort to do so however evidencing the real existence of some such feeling.

Thus we see the same broad twofold division runs through the various answers given to the three questions we have now discussed, a division depending on the consideration whether (1) the distinction of Right and Wrong in themselves, (2) the faculty by which it is appreciated, (3) the motive by which it is acted upon, *are, or are not, sui generis*. It is not however the case that systems which adopt either of these

opposed lines in answer to any one of the questions necessarily adopt the same line in regard to the others.

IV. Whatever be the character of the motive power of our moral nature, whether it be a calculation of self-interest, or a desire for the good of others, or the instinctive gratification of a Taste, or a Sense of Duty generically distinct from other motives, the question still remains open, What is the ultimate end to which our moral nature tends? What is it, by the conduct which it adopts, struggling or hoping to reach at last as its ideal consummation? or, as Aristotle phrases it, 'What is the Chief Good for man?' This is a question scarcely, if at all, inferior in importance, and certainly not so in practical interest, to the three already considered. Aristotle, as we have seen, regards it as *the* main question of Ethical Science.

We cannot then do better than answer this question in his own words. That final end and aim is Happiness, *i.e.* a state in which there shall be no deferred hopes, no unsatisfied desires. All are agreed upon this, high and low, learned and unlearned, but the conceptions of the conditions constituting such a state are as various as the varieties of human aims and human characters. Each selects his own favourite desire or pursuit, and considers the state of Happiness to depend mainly upon *its* gratification. (It will be remembered that we are now speaking of Man apart from the influence of revealed Religion on his aspirations or his conduct.) Still in the midst of this variety certain leading types may be noticed, which are generally speaking characteristic of different

stages of growth in Society or in the Individual. (See Ethics, I. v.)

1. The whole occupation of savage life (where society means little more than local proximity of habitation), is to secure by hunting and fishing the precarious support of daily life. The highest happiness conceivable is the abundant supply of the best food without toil, trouble, or anxiety. Heaven is a perpetual banquet. The full and free gratification of Bodily pleasure (*ἡδονή*) constitutes Happiness.

2. When the growth of civilisation (by organization of labour, mechanical improvements, etc.) is able to secure the supply of these simple wants of the community, then the desire for power over others and social distinction (*τιμῆ*) becomes the ruling passion. Successful kings, rulers, generals, are the ideals which command the admiration of mankind at large. Nobler spirits however regard these distinctions as deriving their value from Active Virtue and Goodness of Character (*ἀρετῆ*), and endeavour to persuade themselves and others that the desires of human nature would all be satisfied if this type of Character were fully attained.

3. In a state of still more advanced cultivation and refinement, this divergence between higher and lower natures, the one pursuing *ἀρετῆ*, the others *τιμῆ*, becomes yet more marked. The former—experience having shown the practical attainment of their ideal standard (*ἀρετῆ*), at least on any large scale, to be hopeless—take refuge in literature, philosophy, intellectual cultivation (*θεωρητικὸς βίος*). The latter, and the majority, —finding out of the pursuit of distinction and power that ‘the quest is not for them,’—betake themselves to the accumulation

of wealth (*χρηματιστικὸς βίος*). Hence the familiar remark that both high literary cultivation, and also wealth with its natural accompaniment of luxury, are signs in societies of full maturity verging towards decay.

In the life of the Individual we may trace a somewhat similar progress in his various conceptions of Happiness. Pleasure is the sole thought of youth; Ambition to excel, in its lower or its higher forms, is the characteristic of manhood; and the closing scene is marked either by 'years that bring the philosophic mind,' or by 'avarice, the prevailing passion of old age.'

Such are the chief types of that aim or end of life which men are found, as a mere observation of fact (see p. xiv.), to place before themselves as the Chief Good, the attainment of which they think would wholly satisfy the desires of their nature. In this last, as in the case of the other three questions, it becomes the office of the Science of Ethics to judge of the merits of these conflicting theories, and if all must be pronounced imperfect, to point out if possible 'a more excellent way.'

¹ We are now in a position to explain the broad features of Aristotle's system of Ethics in particular, as delineated in the following Treatise. We may perhaps notice these three distinctive characteristics:—

(1) His attention is directed to the *external* rather than to the *internal* aspect of morals². The central question of this

¹ The student may omit pp. xxx. to xxxv. until he has acquired a certain familiarity with the text of the Ethics.

² This idea will be found clearly worked out in Grant's *Ethics*, vol. i. Essay vii.)

system is, What is the Chief Good for Man? What is the Final End of action, the End-in-itself? So again it will be seen that a large portion of Books II. III. and IV. is occupied with the distinction between Virtues and Vices as manifested in outward actions, while we hear little or nothing of the faculty in ourselves by which that distinction is apprehended further than that it is 'right reason' (*ὀρθὸς λόγος*); and the sense of Duty or Obligation is scarcely touched upon (Cf. perhaps III. i. 24 *ὦν δεῖ ὀρέεσθαι*). So again we find a full discussion of Voluntary and Involuntary actions (B. III. chaps. i.—v.), but not of the Nature of the Will in itself or of its relation to the other parts of our moral constitution.

It must be clearly understood that this is no depreciation of Aristotle's system. It simply amounts to a statement of the totally different standpoint of ancient and modern times. The accumulated experience of more than two thousand years, together with the influence of Christianity pervading, even when not explicitly recognised, all modern thought, has given us an utterly different position *at starting* in Ethical Science, just as in Natural Science now-a-days a schoolboy starts with appliances and discoveries at his disposal which enable him to leave the wisest of the ancients far behind before he has mastered the very alphabet of his subject.

(2) The *political* or rather *social* character of Aristotle's system of Morals will also attract our notice. The science of Ethics is regarded at the outset as a branch of Political or Social Science (*πολιτική τις* I. ii. 9), while at the close of B. λ. it is said absolutely to require the sanction and compelling powers of Civil Government to enforce its precepts in

practice. Throughout the treatise the discussion of various moral questions is justified by the argument that Statesmen have employed or might employ such knowledge (*e.g.* ἀρετὴ in I. xiii. 2-4; ψυχὴ *ib.* § 8; add I. ix. 8, II. i. 5, and III. v. 7, etc.). This characteristic again is due to the circumstances of the writer's age and country. If we consider (1) the absence, comparatively speaking, of domestic life among the Greeks; (2) the fact that in the ancient Greek states, which were *cities* and not *countries*; representative government was comparatively unnecessary, and practically regarded with disfavour¹; (3) the practical disabilities and general contempt visited upon trading and commerce; we can see how, under all these circumstances, a man's social and political life acquired an importance which it is difficult for us, with our domestic habits, our vast empires, and our commercial pursuits, at all to realize. It was in fact the only avenue to distinction. Poets, philosophers, artists, were almost always statesmen or soldiers. The wealthy did not merely pay a larger sum to the aggregate of national taxation. A rich man raised and equipped so many horsemen, or he fitted out a vessel of war (which was usually commanded by himself), or he undertook the expenses of an embassy, or of a public festival. Hence the prominence of civic virtues in Aristotle's² and other

¹ Aristotle says in the *Politics* that one who does not himself share in political life might as well be a resident alien (ὡσπερ μέτοικος γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ τῶν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχων).

² *e.g.* The primary importance

of Courage, which is, in Aristotle's conception, almost restricted to military Courage. With the Spartans this Virtue was so pre-eminent that others were entirely subordinate to it: *e.g.* Theft was encouraged because of the cour-

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should have a 'political' hue is almost as much a necessity of his age and country as that the language in which he wrote should be Greek¹; that this colouring but seldom disguises important moral questions is a merit peculiarly his own.

(3) Thirdly, the attentive student will be struck by a tendency in Aristotle to regard Virtue very much on its *intellectual* side. This again was an inheritance from the times in which he lived², and with his master Plato it is found in a vastly greater degree. With Plato Virtue is Knowledge and Vice is Ignorance. No man, according to his system, can deliberately act *against* knowledge. When any man chooses the Wrong he must do so with the conviction, at least for the moment, that it is preferable to secure the forbidden pleasure and risk the future consequences than to undergo the present pain of the self-denial. This is simply a miscalculation, and Vice is due therefore to an error of

Senect. xii. § 40, denouncing sensuality on the main ground that it leads to actions politically dangerous.

¹ 'Every nation, from its peculiar circumstances and position, tends to some particular type, both of beauty and of virtue, and it naturally extols its national type beyond all others.'—(Lecky, *Hist. Eur. Morals*, vol. i. p. 82.)

² 'If we compare the different virtues that have flourished

among Pagans and Christians, we invariably find that the prevailing type of excellence among the former is that in which the will and judgment, and among the latter, that in which the emotions are most prominent. Friendship rather than love, hospitality rather than charity, magnanimity rather than tenderness, clemency rather than sympathy, are the characteristics of ancient goodness.'—(Lecky, *Eur. Mor.* vol. i. p. 200.)

judgment, a mistake, an intellectual blunder, and is consequently with Plato, at least in theory, involuntary. We find no such exaggeration of the intellectual portion of moral action in Aristotle, but on the contrary frequent protests against it. But we do find, as compared with our modern ideas, little account taken of the emotional or impulsive side of Virtue. Though Aristotle insists in III. ii. at much length on the compound character of Moral Choice (*προαίρεσις*)—which is an essential condition of all Moral Action (see II. iv. 3)—as involving an element of Impulse (*ὄρεξις*) as well as of Judgment (*δόξα*), yet in his detailed account of the Virtues it often strikes us that he makes the Moral Agent too self-conscious¹; there is a sort of cold and studied propriety, an absence of impulse and enthusiasm, even in virtues which seem to involve a large element of impulse in actual practice, such as Courage, Liberality, Benevolence, and High-Mindedness.² No doubt it might be said that this unruffled philosophic self-control is his ideal of Moral perfection. We are not now discussing the merits of such an ideal. We are simply noting that Aristotle's conception of Moral Virtue does in a marked way, compared with our modern habits of thought, fall under this type.

Finally, the beginner should be warned of the difficulties

¹ The often-noted absence of humility in Aristotle's ideal character, the High-Minded Man (IV. iii.), is an instance of this. Humility viewed on its *intellectual* side (as a Greek would view it) becomes a low estimate of one's-self and especially of one's moral character, which, if undeserved, is mere folly; if deserved, implies the reverse of a Virtuous condition.

² See notes on IV. i. 27, ii. 10, iii. 24.

which lie before him in the way of (i.) literal translation, (ii.) analysis and distinction of argument, in this Book.

i. It is difficult, or rather in many cases impossible, to translate the technical language of Aristotle by any precisely equivalent terms in English. It is very rare to find two technical words in different languages precisely agreeing in their significance, in their extent, and still more in their associations. The words of different nations, like their coinage or their weights and measures, are often incommensurable. We cannot exactly translate francs into shillings or kilomètres into miles. Hence we must not be startled if we read that it is absurd to 'praise' (ἐπαινεῖν) the gods (I. xii.), or if we find physical functions such as nutriment and growth attributed to the 'soul' (ψυχή) (I. xiii.), or if we are told that moral science is a branch of 'political' science (πολιτική) (I. ii.). The explanation is that our words 'praise,' 'soul,' 'political,' have different meanings and associations from those of the most nearly corresponding Greek terms. Still more impossible is it to translate passages the force of which depends on the double meaning of a Greek word or phrase (*e.g.* ἀκόλαστος in III. xii., λόγον ἔχειν in I. xiii., τέλειος 'final' and 'perfect,' I. vii. 4), or upon the etymology of a technical term (*e.g.* ἠθικὴ in II. i. 1).

In all such cases as we have mentioned, we must either (1) paraphrase, *i.e.* describe rather than translate the words in the text (*e.g.* this will be found recommended in I. ii. for πολιτική), or (2) adopt different English words at different times for the same Greek word according to the particular side of the complex idea which is for the time prominent, *e.g.*

we may sometimes translate $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ 'soul,' sometimes 'mind,' sometimes perhaps 'vital principle.' It must always be borne in mind that the object of translation is not 'verbum verbo reddere,' but to convey to a modern hearer as far as possible the same ideas and impressions as the original would have produced in a contemporary.

ii. It would be an error to regard this work in the light of a modern treatise carefully written and revised by its author, put forth as the formal result of his labours in one special field of knowledge, and intended by him to occupy a definite position among his collected works. So far is this from being the case that the Nicomachean Ethics as they have come to us are generally thought to consist of fragments of two or more distinct treatises which were never intended to form parts of one whole. And more than this, they have sometimes been regarded as merely notes of different courses of oral lectures, taken down by one or more pupils, perhaps, and perhaps not, revised by Aristotle himself. We find (1) promises of subsequent discussion unfulfilled, or announced arrangements departed from¹; (2) inconsistent theories or statements in different Books²; (3) confusion in the grouping of arguments or in the statement of single arguments³; (4) sometimes a series of arguments appears in a sort of skeleton form, as if they were merely heads or memoranda⁴; (5) sometimes arguments in support of a point from which the discussion has passed on, seem to be added like after-thoughts, just

¹ See II. vii. 16.

³ As perhaps in I. viii. 10

² This applies chiefly to other Books than I.-IV.

etc., I. ix. 4.

⁴ See II. iii., v.; III. ii.

as they occurred to the author, instead of being placed in their natural position¹; (6) misquotations occur from well-known authors, which have evidently been cited from memory and not verified²; (7) perhaps the note-theory might explain occasional instances of confusion, such as that in respect of *φθόνος* and *ἐπιχαιρεκακία* (II. vii. 15); or the sudden collapse of an unfinished discussion, as in IV. ix.³ These blemishes, and especially the last four, are just such as might be expected in oral lectures, or notes from such lectures, but not in a revised or finished treatise. Hence the student must not expect to be always able to analyse satisfactorily, or distinguish quite clearly, the several arguments in the text, as it stands; nor to develop a finished plan of treatment for each subject under discussion.

¹ e.g. I. viii. 12, etc.; II. iii. 7; III. iii. 14, etc.

² e.g. Calypso for Circe, II. ix. 3; and perhaps the illustration from Homer about Thetis, IV. iii. 25; but see *Suppl. Notes*.

³ To the arguments given above might be added two considerations derived from the diction: (i.) the frequent use of *ἀκροαταὶ*, *ἀκούειν*, etc. Shilleto (note on Thuc. i. 90) remarks on this: 'If the Nic. Ethics and some other works of Aristotle were not syllabuses of lectures, what is the meaning of more than once calling *ὁ πεπαιδευμένος* (the pupil) *ἀκροατῆς*, and of the expression *ματαίως ἀκούσεται καὶ*

ἀνωφελῶς?' He proceeds to defend the reading *πρῶτην* for *πρότερον* in Eth. II. iii. 5 = 'as we said in our lecture the other day,' and suggests that the frequent use of *ἀλλὰ νῆ Δία* in the Politics [*i.e.* the Ethics *continued*] points in the same direction. (ii.) The use of *accusative* and *infinitive* without any strict grammatical construction; which quasi-remembrance of *Or. Obl.* is suggestive of the process of jotting down notes. This is very common in the *Politics*, and in the *Ethics* we may cite as examples, IV. iii. 25 (*διὸ καὶ κ.τ.λ.*), *ib.* § 28 (*εἴρωνα δὲ κ.τ.λ.*), etc.

GLOSSARY.

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THESE NOTES.

cf. '*confer*,' 'compare.'

q.v. '*quod vide*,' 'to which refer.'

sc. '*scilicet*,' 'namely.'

s.v. '*sub voce*' (e.g. 'see Glossary s.v. *τέλος*' means 'see the Glossary under the word *τέλος*').

l.c. '*loco citato*,' 'in the passage quoted.'

h.l. '*hoc loco*,' 'in this passage.'

ib. '*ibidem*,' 'in the same place or passage.'

κ.τ.λ. '*καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ*,' 'et cetera.'

The references to Books, Chapters, and Sections are made in different figures, thus : II. iii. 5 means Book II., Chapter iii., Section 5.

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πρᾶξις—ποίησις.

Πρᾶξις (1) has the general sense of outward action, in contrast with inward and mental activity (*θεωρία*, for which see below). (2) It is applied to a particular kind of outward actions, viz., such as have no tangible result distinct from the action itself; where our aim is not at *making* something but at *doing* something. e.g. The practice of the Art of Navigation, or the Art of Healing: for the safety of the ship or the health of the body is not a result of a distinct and tangible character. (3) Since the most important cases of such actions are Moral Actions, where either the action itself is the result in view, or the character which it tends to form, πρᾶξις acquires the still more limited sense of Moral Action.

Ποίησις is applied to actions which leave some definite and tangible result, actions which aim at *making* something; as is the case in most of the Arts: e.g. in house-building or ship-building the house or the ship is such a result, in composing poetry (*ποίησις*), the poem (*ποίημα*); in sculpture or painting, the statue or the picture.

The adjectives *πρακτικῆ*, *ποιητικῆ*, *θεωρητικῆ*, naturally follow the same distinction. See in illustration, X. viii. 7. So in *Pol.* I. iv. 4, Aristotle describes a Shuttle as *ὄργανον ποιητικόν*, its value consisting in its *productions*, but a Bed or Clothing as *ὄργανα πρακτικά*, their value consisting in their *use*.

θεωρία.

Θεωρία is grouped with *ποίησις* and *πρᾶξις* by Aristotle, and he regards these three as the only possible forms which intelligent activity can take. Observe they are all forms of *activity* (*ἐνέργεια*). Activity of the productive or artistic powers is *ποίησις*. Activity of the powers of action, and especially moral action, is *πρᾶξις*. Activity of the powers of intellect or contemplation is *θεωρία*. In the first, there is outward action and a tangible result; in the second, there is outward action but no tangible result; in the last, there is neither outward action nor tangible result; still it is not a passive state, but one of internal, mental activity, 'the depth, and not the tumult of the soul' (Wordsworth). (See *Pol.* IV. (VII.) iii. *sub. fin.*) As Pope writes (*Essay on Man*, ii. 106), the 'strength of mind is exercise, not rest.' But further, it must be distinguished from

the mental activity displayed in the pursuit or acquisition of knowledge. It is the active fruition of knowledge already possessed. (See X. vii. 5, οὐδὲν ἀπ' αὐτῆς γίνεται πλὴν τὸ θεωρῆσαι.) It is, to use a homely illustration, like 'chewing the cud' of knowledge, dwelling upon it, assimilating it. Persuasion, or discovery, of a truth leads to belief or knowledge of it; if it be a matter of personal interest, faith in it follows; finally it may become as it were a part of our very selves, our intellectual food, the thought upon which our minds for ever dwell and meditate. This last condition would constitute *θεωρία* of it. These stages are admirably expressed by Wordsworth:

One in whom persuasion and belief
Had ripened into faith, and faith become
A *passionate intuition*.

This 'passionate intuition' is *θεωρία*. It is this intellectual energy in repose, this active yet tranquil contemplation and enjoyment of Truth and Knowledge already possessed, that, under the name of *θεωρία* (in B. X.), Aristotle considers to be perfect and ideal Happiness, as realized only in the life of the gods.

Art—Science.

Science is knowledge for its own sake (*scire ut sciamus*). Art is knowledge for some practical end (*scire ut operemur*). It is objectionable to say that Art is 'Science turned to account,' because an Art is generally prior in time to its related Science. In fact the existence of an Art in a rude state is generally the stimulating cause of the study of the related Science. *e.g.* The Science of Astronomy was originally cultivated with a view to the Art of Navigation, or the Art (or practical Science) of Astrology: the Science of Anatomy with a view to the Art of Surgery: the Science of Chemistry with a view to the Art of Alchemy.

So much for the general distinction of the terms. There is however an ambiguity about the word 'practical,' which causes some difficulty in the application of the words Art and Science (*e.g.* Logic, Grammar, Rhetoric, Astrology, Navigation, etc., are called by either title). This makes it desirable to have an intermediate term, 'practical Science.' Let the reader refer to the difference already explained (p. xli.) between *πραξις* and *πολιησις*, and he will then understand the following distinction: 'Art' is strictly applicable to cases of *πολιησις*, 'Practical Science' to cases of *πραξις*, 'Science' (as above explained), to knowledge for its own

sake. Hence Logic, Grammar, Rhetoric, Ethics, and Politics are 'practical Sciences.' (See further, Introduction, p. xiii.)

Speaking broadly, *ἐπιστήμη* corresponds with Science, and *τέχνη* with Art. We find however *ἐπιστήμη* used in reference to practical applications of knowledge (*e.g.* I. i. 5, vi. 15, II. vi. 9, III. iii. 8) and *τέχνη*, at least by implication, referred to Moral action, *i.e.* *πρᾶξις*, not *ποίησις* (II. i. 4, vi. 9, etc.). We must not therefore press the correspondence too closely.

Also it must be observed that *τέχνη* and *ἐπιστήμη* with Aristotle more usually refer, not to Art and Science regarded as external results of man's genius (*i.e.* a body of practical rules, or a system of abstract knowledge), but rather to the *mental states* by which we stand related to the objects of practical or theoretic knowledge respectively.

a priori— a posteriori.

These terms refer to what is prior, or posterior, to observation and experience.

An *a priori* argument means one which starts from principles which are (or were thought to be by those who invented these terms) prior to, and independent of, experience. Such for instance are Mathematical and other Axioms. These have been held to be prior to experience, either as being 'innate ideas,' or as not depending *for proof* on experience. Without entering into this controversy further, we may assert that the phraseology *a priori*, having arisen in this manner, is now used to describe arguments starting from general principles.

An *a posteriori* argument, on the other hand, is one that derives its whole force from experience and observation of facts. Its premisses are not general principles or obvious truths, but statements of facts of experience.

Consequently the Mathematical Sciences are purely *a priori* Sciences. They start from general principles such (*e.g.*) as Euclid's Axioms, and end in particular, or at any rate less general, statements, such as Euclid's Propositions. They proceed, as Aristotle would say, *ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν*.

On the other hand the Physical Sciences are purely *a posteriori* Sciences. They assume no general principles, but start from observed facts, and end in the discovery of general laws, *e.g.* that of gravitation. They proceed *ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς*.

As to the Science of Ethics, or Morals, both methods have at different times been advocated and adopted. See note on I. iv. 5.

δύναμις—ἐνέργεια.

We first explain the principal meanings of *δύναμις*, which may be connected thus:—*δύναμις* is (1) power or capacity, in a literal or general sense; (2) power *merely*, *i.e.* power existent, but not exercised; dormant, not in operation (see below); (3) power regarded as the source and spring of practical results, such as is given us by Arts in contradistinction to Sciences (see p. xlv). Hence *δύναμις* is sometimes used as a sort of equivalent term for *τέχνη*, *e.g.* *τίνος τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δυνάμεων*, I. ii. 3; and again *ib.* §§ 5 and 6. See also V. i. 4.

The most important of the usages of the word is (2). In this sense it stands in contrast with *ἐνέργεια*, somewhat as 'potential' and 'actual,' 'latent' and 'developed,' are contrasted in English. Take these illustrations. The flower exists potentially but not actually (*δυνάμει* but not *ἐνεργείᾳ*) in the bud, or in the seed; the ear of corn in the 'bare-grain'; the oak in the acorn. So the photographic picture, which exists *potentially* on the collodion film, becomes *actual* when brought out by the developing fluid. Again, an infant has not actually the power of speaking or reading any more than a horse or a dog. Still there is an important difference between the two cases, because experience tells us that there is that in the infant which may be developed into these powers, whereas no amount of training would develop anything of the sort in the lower animals, any more than cultivation could produce an oak from an imitation acorn though undistinguishable to the eye from a real one. It is convenient therefore to say that these powers exist in the infant potentially (*δυνάμει*), in distinction to cases where they do not exist at all. So again if we have information given us in cipher, or in sympathetic ink, or in a sealed document, we have the information *δυνάμει* but not *ἐνεργείᾳ*. This distinction is also sometimes indicated by the antithesis of *ἔξις* and *ἐνέργεια*, or of *κτῆσις* and *χρῆσις*. Passages in illustration will be found in I. viii. 8, II. i. 4. See also the use of *δύναμις* in contrast with *πάθος* and *ἔξις* in II. v. 2.

Again, the distinction may be applied both to *existence* and *action*. As regards the former, *δύναμις* is applied to that which *can be, but is not*: as regards the latter to that which *can do, but does not*. See especially the use of *δύναμις* in I. xii.

τέλος, τέλειος.

Τέλος = our word 'End' (1) in its literal sense of a 'termination'; and (2) in its other sense of a 'motive' or 'aim': of which the latter use is much more common in Aristotle. (3) It is also used in reference to his doctrine of the 'end-in-itself,' or 'final end' of all human action, described in other words as 'the Chief Good.' Often however these meanings are combined in a manner which it is all but impossible to represent in translation, e.g. I. ix. 3, τὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀθλον καὶ τέλος. Similarly τέλειος means 'complete,' 'perfect,' and also 'final': e.g. in I. vii. it is difficult to retain this double signification in translation.

Aristotle's doctrine of the 'end-in-itself' may be thus explained:— There must be an end or purpose (in sense (2)) for which man exists in the world, as there is for everything else (see I. vii. 11). There must also be an end or limit (in sense (1)) to man's desires and efforts, else they would be in vain and useless (see I. ii. 1). That end once attained, man would 'rest and be satisfied.' There could be nothing further to look to or to wish for. Hence it is called the 'absolute end,' or the 'end-in-itself.' To discover this in theory, and to secure the attainment of it in practice, is regarded by Aristotle as the main object of Ethics. This is spoken of as τὸ τέλος, e.g. III. ix. 5. Also as to τὸ τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος, I. vii. 8, and τὸ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων τέλος, X. vi. 1.

ἀρχή.

'Αρχή means literally a 'starting-point' or 'beginning,' or, as Aristotle himself explains it, ἣ ἐστὶν ἣ γίγνεται ἣ γιγνώσκεται τὸ πρᾶγμα, 'that by which anything exists, or is produced, or is known.' Thus it is a very general term.

As a cause of *existence* or *production*. In this sense it may be used for any of the Four Causes (explained p. li); see *Metaph.* I. iii. We find it in the *Ethics* for Efficient Cause, as when man is said to be the ἀρχή of his own actions (III. v. 5); and when Volition is described as the ἀρχή of the movement of the limbs (III. i. 6); for Final Cause, as when Happiness is said to be the ἀρχή of our actions (I. xii. 8).

As a cause of *knowledge*. At either end of the scale of knowledge there must be a starting-point (ἀρχή), which is taken for granted with-

out demonstrative proof, otherwise *πρῆσειν οὕτω γ' εἰς ἀπειρον*. Hence the general principles or axioms, at the top of the scale, and the particular facts of perception or observation, at the bottom, must be *assumed* to start with, and hence both are sometimes called *ἀρχαί*. Hence (says Aristotle) *νοῦς τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπ' ἀμφότερα*, 'There is an intuitive faculty for the truths we start with in both directions.' An example of one kind would be, 'Two straight lines cannot enclose a space.' An example of the other, 'This is a straight line, a triangle,' 'This magnet attracts iron,' etc. See the following passages in illustration: I. vii. 20, *τῶν ἀρχῶν αἱ μὲν θεωροῦνται κ.τ.λ.*, 'Of the truths we start from some are *apprehended*, etc.; the last word, purposely vague, expresses at any rate an *immediate* apprehension, independent of proof. Again, *τὸ δ' ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή* (*ib.* and I. iv. 7), 'The fact is a beginning and a point to start from.'

In the quotation, I. vii. 21, *ἀρχή . . . πλεῖον ἢ ἡμισυ παντός*, we have *ἀρχή* in its literal meaning, but the *dictum* is applied by Aristotle to the technical sense of the word also.

Since the Greeks seldom employed any other than the *a priori* method (see p. xlv) in the pursuit of knowledge, *ἀρχή* comes to stand often for 'general principle,' 'first principle,' or 'axiom.' This will explain its use in I. iv., where *λόγοι ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν* = 'arguments starting from general principles'; *λόγοι ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς* = 'arguments leading up to general principles.'

ψυχή.

This word, generally translated 'Soul,' has no precise English equivalent. It stands for all that is immaterial in man, including Mind, Desires, Will, and even Life. On the one hand, 'Soul' includes too much. It is impossible to disconnect theological and religious ideas from the word 'Soul,' which are quite foreign to the conception of Aristotle: *e.g.* To employ such expressions in translation as 'the life of the Soul,' 'the good of the Soul,' would be misleading. On the other hand, 'Soul' includes too little, as it does not reach to mere physical life, such as Animals and even Plants possess (see I. xiii. 11). Again, the word 'Life,' or Vital Principle, is too narrow, excluding Reason, Moral action, etc. So also is 'Mind,' excluding all else beside Reason.

The following passages will serve to show how impersonal, and how widely different from our notion of 'Soul' is Aristotle's conception of *ψυχή*. 'If the eye were a living creature, sight would be its *ψυχή*'

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GLOSSARY.

applied to the eye, and to the horse, in II. vi. 2; to a musician (by implication) in I. vi. 14; and by Plato to the dog, to a pruning-knife, etc. etc. in short, to anything that has any work or function to perform; the ἀρετὴ in each case consisting in the good performance of that work. We cannot describe this general sense of the term better than in Aristotle's own words in II. vi. 2: 'Every excellence (ἀρετὴ) perfects that of which it is the excellence, and causes its work to be well performed.'

There are however two special kinds of excellence to which the word ἀρετὴ is most frequently applied:—(1) Excellence of our *intellectual* or *rational* nature. Instances of such excellences are, prudence, wisdom, intelligence, argumentative power, retentive memory, acuteness, etc. etc. (2) Excellence of our *moral* nature; *i.e.* a well-regulated condition of the appetites, passions, and desires. Instances of such excellences are, temperance, courage, gentleness, high-mindedness, etc. etc., in other words, the *moral virtues*. It is in this restricted sense of the term that we translate it by 'Virtue.' These two kinds of excellence will be found in I. xiii. 20.

In this case, as in others that have been mentioned, the meanings are often so blended in Greek that we cannot translate by one word in English.

προαίρεσις.

In any deliberate action the following steps or processes may be traced:—

(1) Desire or *wish* for some *end* to be attained (βούλησις).

(2) Reflection or *deliberation* upon the several *means* by which the end may be reached (βούλευσις).

(3) *Deliberate Choice* of some one means or series of means as the most eligible (προαίρεσις). This choice once made, the *action* follows accordingly.

Thus the distinction between βούλησις, βούλευσις, and προαίρεσις resembles that with which we are familiar between 'holy *desires*, good *counsels*, and just *works*' (or at least *resolutions* to act).

προαίρεσις sometimes corresponds nearly with 'purpose,' or 'resolution,' or even 'will,' but as these translations, and especially the last, would often be misleading, it seems best to adopt 'deliberate choice.' This translation has the further advantage of displaying the composite nature of the process, which Aristotle constantly insists upon, it being not merely 'choice' or 'purpose,' nor merely 'deliberation,' but a choice succeeding upon deliberation.

The following passages from the *Ethics* may be referred to in illustration. For a general account of *προαίρεσις*, especially in its compound character, and its relation to processes or faculties more or less similar to it, see III. ii. and III. iii. 17, 18. (Compare also VI. ii. 5, where *προαίρεσις* is described as *ἡ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἡ ὀρεξις διανοητική*.) It has to do with the Means, not (like *βούλησις*) with the End in action, III. ii. 9. It is coupled with *πρᾶξις* in I. i. 1 and I. vii. 1. It occurs in the sense of 'purpose,' or a 'particular state of the Will,' in contrast with 'action' or 'performance,' in II. iv. 3, VIII. xiii. 11, X. viii. 5; and similarly in IV. vii. 12 (on which see *Suppl. Note*). It is an essential condition of a Virtuous Act, see II. iv. 3, and the Definition of Virtue as *ἔξις προαιρετική κ.τ.λ.*, in II. vi. 15. It can only be good under the guidance of φρόνησις, VI. xiii. 7. Finally, in two passages it seems to waver between the ordinary sense of 'purpose' or 'intention,' and 'the design or plan purposed' ('id quod disputatione propositum est,'—*Bonitz*); viz., I. xiii. 4, *κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς προαίρεσιν*; X. ix. 1, *τέλος ἔχειν τὴν προαίρεσιν*.

The Four Causes.

A complete knowledge of any Being or Object implies an acquaintance with Four different Causes to which its Existence is in different senses due.

- (1) The *Matter* of which it is composed. The *Material Cause*.
- (2) The *Form* by which it is distinguished. The *Formal Cause*.
- (3) The *Force* which has brought about the particular combination of Matter and Form which constitute the Being or Object under consideration. The *Efficient Cause*.
- (4) The *Purpose* or *Object in View* in such a combination. The *Final Cause*.

(2) and (4) require further explanation.

(2) 'Form' is to be taken not merely for external shape, but for whatever is characteristic or essential. The same *Matter* may be made into a hundred different objects, but the same *Form* (within certain limits) belongs to one class of objects only, and hence 'formal' came to mean 'essential'; and the 'formal cause' = 'the essential nature'; i.e. the group of such qualities or characteristics as are essential to the existence of anything in its barest form, or to the simplest conception we can have of it; which qualities are therefore always present in all different types

or developments of it.¹ Thus the 'formal cause,' when described in words, becomes the *Definition* of the object.

In Aristotle's phraseology, 'Formal Cause' is identical with *οὐσία* (when = essence), and with *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*, which will be found explained in note on II. vi. 17. See *Metaph.* I. iii. 1.

Hence to take a single example—a Statue:—

The Material Cause is the marble or metal of which it is made.

Its Formal Cause is in one sense the shape by which we recognise it as a statue, and in another, the qualities which would constitute the scientific definition of 'Statue.'

Its Efficient Cause is in one sense the Artist, in another the Chisel, or the Furnace.

Its Final Cause the purpose with which it was made, *e.g.* the gain of the artist, the decoration of some public place, honour to be paid to some great man, etc. etc. Again, the Final Cause of a clock is to mark time. As soon as a certain combination of wood, brass, etc., fulfils this condition, we call it a clock, and thus 'marking time' may be said to be the *cause* of its being a clock rather than anything else.

(4) The Final Cause (an expression familiar to us from the theological 'Argument from Final Causes,' or 'Argument from Design'), is the Purpose, End, or Object-in-View of anything. In all cases however we may trace (as Aristotle shows, B. I. c. i. and c. ii. *init.*) both proximate and ultimate purposes. All purposes if traced far enough resolve themselves into this one, that there is some *good* to be gained by the action; or, in more technical language, all ends ultimately converge to the Chief Good or *τὸ ἀγαθόν*. Thus, strictly speaking, there is only one really Final Cause. The term however is applied to any subordinate end or inducement to act. (See further *s.v.* τέλος, τέλειος.)

It will further follow that the Efficient Cause must be *prior to*, but need not be *simultaneous with*, its Effect; the Formal Cause must be *simultaneous* but need not be *prior*; the Material Cause must be *both*. (Cf. *Post. Anal.* II. xi.)

θεὸς—φύσις.

It may be worth while to explain very briefly once for all Aristotle's conception of God and Nature in relation to the world, as several passages

¹ In this sense Bacon speaks of the *Form* of Light and of Heat. Compare Wordsworth's use of the word in the passage:—

For the Man
Who in this spirit communes with the *Forms*
Of Nature,
i.e. the great essential types of Nature's
varied operations.

in the Ethics would mislead those who adopted without some precaution the two English words in question.

Aristotle's philosophical conception of God excludes the ideas of the Creation, the Moral Government, and even the Providential Government, of the world. *Creation* and *providential government* are excluded, since Aristotle maintains that the world is eternal, and distinctly asserts (in X. viii. 7) that *ποίησις* (creative energy) of any kind is unworthy of God, and also in B. X. and elsewhere, that God is absolutely unmoved, unchangeable, unaffected by anything external to himself; his existence consisting in thought thinking upon itself (*νόησις νοήσεως νόησις*), or in a conscious fruition of perfect knowledge (see above *s.v.* *θεωπλα*). *Moral government* is excluded, partly for the same reasons; and also because *πραξις* (or moral action) is likewise in the same passage of B. X. distinctly stated to be unworthy of the divine nature. Also in VII. i. 2, it is asserted that the condition of excellence in *θεός* is *τιμιώτερον ἀρετῆς*. (Cf. the distinctions made in I. xiii.)

In short, any kind of *agency* was held by Aristotle to be unworthy of the Divine perfection. Such action would be *ἀναγκαῖος, βλαβὸς τις* (see note on I. v. 8). This was the main point of the much misunderstood theory of Epicurus as to the gods. (See Grote's *Aristotle*, ii. p. 436.)

Yet Aristotle maintains that God, though unmoved, is the cause and source (*αἰτίον καὶ ἀρχὴ*) of all motion. This paradox is thus explained: God is not the *efficient* but the *final* cause of all motion (see above, *s.v.* 'The Four Causes'). In other words, the universe moves under the attraction of, and by striving after, the supreme Good, which is God: in its endeavours thereafter, it for ever, so to speak, circles and revolves about God as a centre, who thus, himself unmoved, becomes

The one far-off divine Event
To which the whole Creation moves.

So Dante :—

(Dio) Solo ed Eterno che tutto il cielo move
Non moto, con amore e con disio.

(Parad. xxiv. 131.)

Still it should be noted that Aristotle often speaks popularly of Divine agency, feelings, etc., in a manner quite inconsistent with his formal theories, *e.g.* *Eth.* I. ix.; X. viii. 13; ix. 6. Cf. *Rhet.* II. ix. 2, *τοῖς θεοῖς ἀποδίδομεν τὸ νευμεσῶν*. It should be added also that Aristotle (like Plato), following the popular usage, speaks indifferently of 'God' and 'Gods' (*e.g.* I. xii. 3; X. viii., etc.), yet his conception of the nature of God, taken strictly, excludes altogether the idea of plurality of Gods.

The precise meaning of *φύσις*, and its relation to *θεός*, in Aristotle, is perhaps as difficult to define as it would be to formulate accurately our own conception of Nature. Aristotle doubtless would not, in strict speaking, regard Nature as a personal or rational agent (see *Eth.* III. iii. 7, note), though he often (as we do) uses language which would imply it. Confining our attention chiefly to such passages as occur in the Ethics, or obvious illustrations of them, we may note :—

(1) Optimism in Nature. See *Eth.* I. ix. 5, εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς οἶόν τε κάλλιστα ἔχειν, οὕτω πέφυκεν. [Compare *De Caelo*, I. iv. fin., ὁ θεός καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν μάτην ποιοῦσιν. Also *Pol.* I. ii. 8-10. Again, in various passages cited by Bonitz, *s.v.*, ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν μάτην ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ περιεργον οὐδὲ ἐλλείπον, οὐδὲ ἀτελές, ἀλλὰ πάντα πρὸς τὸ ἀριστον ἀποβλέπουσα.]

In regard to this Optimism we may observe :—

(α) It is assigned to a conscious and intelligent purpose in Nature in such passages as *De An.* II. iv. 5, ὡς περ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς ἐνεκά του ποιεῖ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἡ φύσις, etc. etc. Also such expressions as *δημιουργεῖ*, *βούλεται*, *ἀποδίδωσιν*, and many others, are frequently applied to *φύσις*.

(β) Nature, like Art, often falls short of its aim, being thwarted by Necessity, or Chance, or the Matter it has to work upon. Hence the limitation ὡς οἶόν τε κάλλιστα ἔχειν above. Cf. *De Caelo*, II. v. 3, ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων τὸ βέλτιστον, and see *Pol.* I. vi. 8, ἡ φύσις βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο ποιεῖν πολλάκις οὐ μέντοι δύναται. With this we may compare the exquisite simile of Dante—

‘La natura . . .
Similmente operando all’ artista,
C’ha l’abito dell’ arte e man che trema.’—(*Par.* xiii. 75.)

‘Nature . . .
Resembling thus the Artist in her work,
Whose faltering hand is faithless to his skill.

(2) *φύσις* is the source of order, fixity, and regularity in the Universe (*e.g.* seeds and animals reproducing their like), being intermediate to Necessity on the one side (implying the impossibility of any variation), and Chance on the other (implying the absence of any law). Cf. *De Caelo*, III. ii. 8, ἡ τάξις ἡ οἰκεία τῶν αἰσθητῶν φύσις ἐστίν.

Hence we may perhaps explain τὰ φύσει ἡδέα, I. viii. 11, and φύσει βουλητὸν, III. iv., as contrasted with the irregular tastes of individuals. [Comp. *Rhet.* I. xi. 3, where ἡδέα φύσει, and ἡδέα ἔθει are contrasted, especially, ἔστιν ἡ μὲν φύσις τοῦ ἀεὶ τὸ δὲ ἔθος τοῦ πολλάκις.] So *Eth.* I. iii. 2, καλὰ καὶ δίκαια φύσει as opposed to νόμῳ. (Cf. φύσει opposed to κατὰ

συμβεβηκός, *De An.* I. iii. 3.) See also the distinction between φυσικόν and νομικόν δίκαιον, as explained in *Eth.* V. vii. 1; the former, however, not being rigidly invariable (as though due to ἀνάγκη; see note on III. iii. 7), though exceptions are so comparatively rare as 'to prove the rule'; just as (Aristotle adds) the right hand is φύσει stronger than the left in spite of the existence of ἀμφιδέξιοι. So again, γνώριμα τῇ φύσει elsewhere occurs as synonymous with γνώριμα ἀπλῶς in *Eth.* I. iv. 5. Under this head also compare *Eth.* II. i. 2, οὐθὲν τῶν φύσει δυνατῶν ἄλλως ἐθίζεται.

(3) φύσις and θεός seem sometimes almost identified, as our own usage might lead us to expect; e.g. in *Eth.* X. ix. 6, that which belongs to us φύσει is said διὰ τινος θείας αἰτίας ὑπάρχειν. Many passages occur elsewhere in which direct creative and providential functions are attributed to φύσις.

(4) φύσις is often used in reference to the operations of Nature in a limited sphere, such as the constitution of Man, or of some other Animal, or class of Objects. Though it is difficult to discriminate such a usage precisely, yet something like 'human nature' seems to be the prominent idea in the following:—*Eth.* II. i. 3, etc., ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ neither φύσει nor παρὰ φύσιν; III. v. 18, 19, whether our end and aim in action φύσει ἢ ὅπωςδὴποτε φαίνεται καὶ κείται. See X. ix. 14, in reference to πατρικοὶ λόγοι, children προϋπάρχουσι στέργοντες καὶ εὐπειθεῖς τῇ φύσει. Compare further with this usage the sense in which some moralists have held that Human Virtue consists in 'following Nature.'

(5) φύσις and τέχνη are frequently put into relation and comparison, e.g. *Eth.* I. ix. 6; II. vi. 9. These passages may be illustrated by others in which it is more definitely laid down that Art follows and supplements Nature; and also that the mode of their operations is similar, e.g. πᾶσα τέχνη . . . τὸ προσλείπον τῆς φύσεως βούλεται ἀναπληροῦν (*Pol.* IV. (VII.) xvii. 15); ἡ τέχνη τὰ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖ ἃ ἡ φύσις ἀδυνατεῖ ἀπεργάσασθαι, τὰ δὲ μιμεῖται (*Phys.* II. viii. 8). Dante, referring to the *Physics* by name (*Inf.* xi. 101), amplifies this Aristotelian idea by making Nature the child of God, and Art the child of Nature (si che vostr' arte a Dio quasi è nipote), and therefore includes in the same punishment those who have offered violence to God, or Nature, or Art.

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ΗΘΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ

I.

[N.B.—The marginal figures on the left-hand side denote Sections, and on the right the lines in the page. See the first page of the Glossary for an explanation of the references to Books, Chapters, and Sections occurring in the Notes.]

I I. ΠΑΣΑ τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πράξις τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ διὸ

CHAP. I.—*Explanation of Terms, 'End,' 'Good,' 'Chief Good'*
—*Different kinds of Ends, and their degrees of finality.*

I ALL human action, of whatsoever kind, implies an end or purpose, *i.e.* the attainment of some good. The Chief

The *summum bonum* may be described as the ultimate end of all our actions.

The main purpose of the Science of Ethics is, in Aristotle's conception, the discovery of the Chief Good, or Final End of all man's actions and aspirations, the attainment of which would leave him nothing to desire: He commences, therefore, in this chapter with first laying down broadly the conception of the Chief Good, and points out the *primâ facie* difficulty in accepting such a conception of it. Next (in ch. ii. and iii.), having asserted that it is a reality notwithstanding (*i.e.*, that there is a Chief Good or Final End), he settles some preliminary points as to the utility, scope,

method, etc., of its investigation. Then, in ch. iv., he passes on to the question, *What* is the Chief Good? and finding that the general agreement that it is Happiness vanishes as soon as we further ask, In what does Happiness consist? he usually puts the main question thenceforth in the modified form, What is Happiness?

1. μέθοδος is strictly a method or process of science, and is therefore contrasted with τέχνη, which stands for a process of art. (See Glossary, *s. v.* Art and Science). πράξις = action, and especially moral action. προαίρεσις = purpose or resolve which

2 καλῶς ἀπεφώνησαν τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται. Διαφορὰ δέ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ εἰσὶν ἐνέργειαι, τὰ δὲ παρ' αὐτὰς ἔργα τινά· ὧν δ' εἰσὶ τέλη τινά

But it appears that there is a vast difference of ends;

2 Good is well described as the ultimate end of *all* our actions and desires. Ends differ from one another in a

precedes action. The opening sentence then amounts to this:— Whether we are working to *produce* anything (τέχνη), or to *know* anything (μέθοδος), or to *do* anything (πράξις), or even are forming *resolutions* to act (προαίρεσις), in all these cases we must have an end or purpose (in other words, some *good*), in view.

1. τὸ ἀγαθόν, literally 'the good,' i.e. the chief good, 'or *summum bonum*.' 'End' and 'good' are nearly synonymous. The 'end' of an action is the 'good' we hope to secure by the action; it being obvious that every end must at least *appear* good or desirable, at the time it is chosen, to the person choosing it. "'Tis real good or seeming moves us all.'—*Pope*. See III. iv. and III. v. 17. The first words of the next chapter assert the identity of the Final End (the conception of which is developed in this chapter) and the Chief Good, the definition of which is the main object of the whole treatise.

1. Διαφορὰ δέ τις φαίνεται κ.τ.λ.] Though the general conception of a Chief Good can be readily explained, as has just been done in the words οὗ πάντ'

ἐφίεται, yet the variety of our ends and aims (διαφορὰ τῶν τελῶν) is such that we cannot assume that all things *do* converge to any one such end; in other words, that there is a Chief Good, much less say *what* it is. The former point is established in ii. 1; the solution of the latter is the subject, more or less, of the whole treatise. See especially, however, iv. 1 and vii. 1.

2. If we take a walk simply for the sake of walking, or to 'kill time,' the action (ἐνέργεια) of walking is itself so far the end that we look for no *ulterior* result (ἔργον). If we walk to get an appetite, or for the sake of health, then the appetite or health is a further end beyond the action of walking, and is therefore, as Aristotle proceeds to point out, an end of higher value to us than the act of walking. In this passage, however, Aristotle is thinking chiefly of acts of ποίησις, which are distinguished from acts of πράξις by having definite and tangible products resulting from the action. (See Glossary.)

3. τέλη obviously correspond with ἔργα, and πράξεις with ἐνέργειαι, in the previous sentence.

παρὰ τὰς πράξεις, ἐν τούτοις βελτίω πέφυκε τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τὰ ἔργα. Πολλῶν δὲ πράξεων οὐσῶν καὶ τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν πολλὰ γίνεται καὶ τὰ τέλη· ἰατρικῆς μὲν γὰρ ὑγίεια, ναυπηγικῆς δὲ πλοίου, στρατηγικῆς δὲ νίκη, οἰκονομικῆς δὲ πλοῦτος. Ὅσαι δ' εἰσὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὑπὸ μίαν τιὰ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ὑπὸ τὴν ἵππικὴν ἢ χαλινοποιικὴν καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τῶν ἵππικῶν ὀργάνων εἰσὶν· αὕτη δὲ καὶ πᾶσα πολεμικὴ πρᾶξις ὑπὸ τὴν στρατηγικὴν· τοῦ αὐτοῦ δὲ τρόπου ἄλλαι ὑφ' ἑτέρας· ἐν ἀπάσαις δὲ τὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν τέλη πάντων ἑστὶν αἰρετώτερα τῶν ὑπ' αὐτά· τούτων γὰρ χάριν κακείνα

variety of ways. (α) They differ in kind: sometimes the action is itself the end; sometimes a definite result beyond the action. And notice that when there is such an end beyond the action it is obviously something better than the action itself, which is subordinate to it. (β) But further, the character of ends is as various as the character of the actions of which they are ends: e.g. health, victory, wealth, a boat, a house, the equipments of a horse, etc. etc., are all ends of different actions, and differ *inter se* accordingly. (γ) In the midst of this variety, however, we may trace a relation of subordination, or degrees of finality, in ends. One art often embraces a variety of others, and their ends being subservient to the production of its end are of inferior value; for the ends of the higher and more comprehensive arts are

(α) In kind.
(β) in general character;
(γ) but many of these are connected in the way of subordination.

6. δύναμις is here equivalent to τέχνη. Art, differing from Science in that it supplies the power to produce practical results, is not unfrequently described as δύναμις. See in next ch. § 3. τίνος τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δυνάμεων, i.e. 'of which of the sciences or arts.' (See Glossary

under δύναμις, and also under Art and Science.)

10. ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ] i.e. master-science, or arch-science, if we allowed such a compound. ἀρχιτέκτων is literally a ruler or director of workmen. (See next chapter, § 4, and esp. the expression αὕτη διατάσσει in § 5.)

5 διώκεται. Διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτὰς εἶναι τὰ τέλη τῶν πράξεων ἢ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλο τι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθεισῶν ἐπιστημῶν.

I II. Εἰ δὴ τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ὃ δι' αὐτὸ βουλόμεθα, τὰλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ μὴ πάντα δι' ἕτερον 5 αἰρούμεθα (πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ' εἰς ἄπειρον, ὥστ' εἶναι κενὴν καὶ ματαίαν τὴν ὄρεξιν), δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη

5 obviously more final than those of the subordinated arts. In regard to this relation of subordination, it will make no difference whether the ends compared together are actions themselves or the results of actions.

CHAPS. II. AND III.—*There is such a thing as a final end of action, i.e. a Chief Good. If so,*

(a) *It will be practically useful to define it.*

(β) *The Political (or Social) Science is the Science which treats of it.*

(γ) *This is not an exact Science.*

(δ) *Its study requires special training and conditions.*

However, this subordination must stop somewhere; i.e. there must be some Final End.

Now we may safely infer that this subordination of ends cannot go on *ad infinitum*, because we should in that case be endued with a desire (viz. of finality) which would be objectless and useless: in other words, we may infer that there is

3. τῶν λεχθεισῶν ἐπιστημῶν] ἐπιστήμη appears to be used here, as elsewhere sometimes, for τέχνη. (See Glossary.)

7. κενή, empty, i.e. objectless. ματαία, vain and useless. This passage resembles what is called the argument from design. The major premiss is (as Aristotle elsewhere phrases it) οὐδὲν μάτην ἢ φύσις ποιεῖ, 'Nature does no-

thing in vain;' or, as we read in ix. 5, τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς οἶον τε κάλλιστα ἔχειν, οὕτω πέφυκε, 'All things are by nature ordered in the best possible way.' The fact that human nature is created with a desire for some final good proves that such a good must exist. That it should not exist is as inconceivable as that nature should have created an animal re-

2 τὰγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον ἢ
 γνῶσις αὐτοῦ μεγάλην ἔχει ῥοπὴν, καὶ καθάπερ τοξόται
 3 σκοπὸν ἔχοντες, μᾶλλον ἂν τυγχάνοιμεν τοῦ δέοντος; εἰ
 δ' οὕτω, πειρατέον τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν αὐτὸ τί ποτ'
 4 ἐστὶ καὶ τίνας τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δυνάμεων. Δόξειε δ' 5
 5 ἂν τῆς κυριωτάτης καὶ μάλιστα ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς. Τοι-
 αὕτη δ' ἡ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται. Τίνας γὰρ εἶναι χρεῶν.

one supreme and Final End, to which all other ends converge; If so,
 2, 3 and that is, in fact, the Chief Good. (α) If this be so, it know.
 must be useful to define it, because we shall be more likely to of it w
 4 hit the mark when we have a distinct view of it. (β) The be pr
 science to which pertains the knowledge of the Chief Good is cally u
 naturally the supreme of sciences, and this is the Science of It is
 5 Social Life. We argue this supremacy on two grounds—(1) Scienc
 Social] which t
 of it,

quiring a particular sort of food, and then have placed it where that sort of food could not be procured. Take as another illustration the precisely similar argument for a future state (which is still often regarded as the strongest, apart from revelation) based upon the aspirations of mankind for immortality, and for a higher ideal than can be reached in this life. 'It is not at all probable (says Dr. Clarke) that God should have given men appetites which were never to be satisfied, desires which had no objects to answer them, and unavoidable apprehensions of what was never really to come to pass.'

1. καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον] 'even upon life.' These words are emphatic. The knowledge of the Chief Good might perhaps be thought to be theoretically

interesting, but not practically important—just as Optics and Acoustics increase our knowledge, but do not help us to see and hear better. The objection here implied may be compared with that sometimes made to the utility of the study of Logic, viz., that men do reason correctly without it. The answer would be similar to that given in the text.

5. δυνάμεων] See note on i. 4.

6. κύριος = authoritative or supreme—as explained by the first argument in § 5.

ἀρχιτεκτονικῆ] (see note on i. 4). This epithet is justified by the second argument in § 6. § 7 merely sums up the two preceding arguments, inverting their order.

7. πολιτικὴ is difficult to translate, because both 'Politics' and

τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ ποίας ἐκάστους
 6 μανθάνειν καὶ μέχρι τίνος, αὕτη διατάσσει. Ὀρῶμεν δὲ
 καὶ τὰς ἐντιμοτάτας τῶν δυναμῶν ὑπὸ ταύτην οὔσας,
 7 οἷον στρατηγικὴν οἰκονομικὴν ῥητορικὴν. Χρωμένης δὲ
 ταύτης ταῖς λοιπαῖς πρακτικαῖς τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἔτι δὲ 5
 νομοθετούσης τί δεῖ πράττειν καὶ τίνων ἀπέχεσθαι, τὸ
 ταύτης τέλος περιέχει ἀν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστε τοῦτ'
 8 ἀν εἴη τὰνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν. (Εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτόν ἐστιν
 ἐνὶ καὶ πόλει, μείζον γὰρ καὶ τελεώτερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως
 φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σῶζειν ἀγαπητόν μὲν γὰρ καὶ 10
 ἐνὶ μόνῳ, κάλλιον δὲ καὶ θεϊότερον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν.)
 9 Ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτικὴ τις
 οὔσα.

this
 y be
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 be the
 ipreme
 science.

6, 7 this science regulates the study of all the other sciences in a community; and (2.) it employs their results, even in the case of the most esteemed of them, in its own service, and 8 thus their ends are subordinated to its end. (If it be argued that the good of society, which is the end of this science, is only another name for the good of the individual men who constitute society, we reply that the science which secures 9 this good on a large scale is still the supreme science.) Hence the Science of Ethics is a branch of the Science of Social Life.

'Social Science' have acquired a technical and inappropriate meaning. Paraphrased, it means the science which investigates the conditions of the perfection of social life, or of man living as a member of a well-ordered community. Aristotle remarks elsewhere, Man is created by nature a social animal, and

therefore unless he lives in a society a portion of his nature is undeveloped. We cannot therefore treat of the well-being of man without considering him as a member of a society, nor therefore without also considering the conditions of the well-being of society. See further note on vii. 6.

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τύπῳ τᾷληθές ἐνδείκνυσθαι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεραίνεσθαι.

Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἀποδέχεσθαι χρεὼν ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοσούτου τᾶκριβές ἐπιζητεῖν καθ' ἕκαστον γένος, ἐφ' ὅσον ἢ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθηματικοῦ τε πιθανολογοῦντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικὸν ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν. Ἐκαστος δὲ κρίνει

our premisses, such must also be our conclusions, in respect of exactness.

ica-
requi-
in the
ent of
science

(δ) The aims of the teacher being thus qualified, so also must be the demands of the learner. He must neither require too rigid accuracy, nor be content with any needless generality. Such exactness as is admitted by the subject-matter, neither more nor less, should he demand. But this discrimination

1. ὡς-ἐπὶ-τὸ-πολὺ is equivalent to one word, and means 'general' or 'variable.' τὰ ὡς-ἐπὶ-τὸ-πολὺ γιγνόμενα are things which happen as a general rule in such and such a way; 'generalities' as opposed to 'certainties.'

3. ἀποδέχεσθαι means 'to allow,' in the old English sense of 'to approve' (e.g. 'The Lord alloweth the righteous'); hence *h. l.* 'to accept as satisfactory,' 'to acquiesce in.' See IV. vi. 3, where ἀποδέξεται, 'he will allow,' stands in opposition to δυσχερανεῖ, 'he will disapprove.'

6. παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται κ.τ.λ.] It would be equally absurd to be satisfied with plausible arguments from a mathematician, as to insist upon rigid

demonstration from an orator. Mathematics being an exact science, no considerations of the probability of a theorem being true, however great, are of the slightest use. Rhetoric being the 'art of persuasion,' the logical value of its arguments is entirely subordinate to their persuasiveness.

8. ἕκαστος δὲ κρίνει κ.τ.λ.] 'Cuique perito credendum est in sua arte.' The right of criticism in any subject depends on special training in that subject. We bow to the dictum of the painter in painting, to that of the musician in music. In general matters we look, in like manner, to the man of general knowledge and cultivation. This is evidently the sense re-

καλῶς ἂν γινώσκει, καὶ τούτων (ἔστιν ἀγαθὸς κριτής) ^{μυρία}
 Καθ' ἕκαστον ἄρα ~~ὁ~~ πεπαιδευμένος, ἀπλῶς δ' ὁ περὶ
 πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος. Διὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκείος
 ἀκροατῆς ὁ νέος· ἀπειρος γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον
 6 πράξεων, οἱ λόγοι δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ περὶ τούτων. Ἔτι 5
 δὲ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολουθητικὸς ὢν ματαίως ἀκούσεται
 καὶ ἀνωφελῶς, ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἔστιν οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ
 7 πράξις. Διαφέρει δ' οὐθέν νέος τὴν ἡλικίαν ἢ τὸ ἦθος
 νεαρός· οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὸν χρόνον ἢ ἔλλειψις, ἀλλὰ διὰ
 τὸ κατὰ πάθος ζῆν καὶ διώκειν ἕκαστα. Ἐπι 10
 τοῖς ἀνόνητος ἢ γνῶσις γίνεται, καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρατέσιν·

implies special education and special qualities in the learner, else he will have neither the right nor the power of exercising such a judgment. The young therefore are not fit students of (1.) mature age;
 6 Ethical Science, partly from their ignorance of life and its ex-
 periences, and partly from the strength of their passions, which
 7 they have not yet learned to master. And we must further (2.) well-regulated passions.
 exclude all who, however old in years, are but children in

quired; and so the following passage would certainly be clearer if it read thus:—Καθ' ἕκαστον ἄρα ὁ [καθ' ἕκαστον] πεπαιδευμένος, ἀπλῶς δὲ κ.τ.λ., the words in brackets being supplied. Some critics suppose this to have been the original reading.

3. The young should be taught the *practice* of morals before they attempt the *theory*. Their duty is to obey, without asking questions, without criticising the principles of what they have to obey, until the habit of obedience is gained. Then they may be trusted to

look into the theory and principles of conduct, and indeed, unless they would always be children, they ought to do so. 'Oportet discentem credere, edoctum judicare' (Bacon). For the latter point see the end of § 7, where εἰδέναι is emphatic; for the former see X. x., where Aristotle maintains that moral teaching will be lost labour unless either parental authority or State laws can be relied on to enforce this preliminary work of training and discipline.

11. ἀκρατέσιν] The following explanation of terms may be useful:—

τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον τὰς ὀρέξεις ποιουμένοις καὶ πράτ-
 8 τουσι πολυωφελὲς ἂν εἴη τὸ περὶ τούτων εἰδέναί. Καὶ
 περὶ μὲν ἀκροατοῦ, καὶ πῶς ἀποδεκτέον, καὶ τί προτι-
 θέμεθα, πεφροimiάσθω τοσαῦτα.

1 IV. Λέγωμεν δ' ἀναλαμβάνοντες, ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γνῶσις καὶ 5
 προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ὀρέγεται, τί ἐστὶν αὐτῷ λέγομεν

8 character; all, that is, who live under the sway of passion and not reason. For Ethics is a science in which right knowledge profits nothing unless it is accompanied by right practice; while right practice will ever derive the greatest advantage if supplemented by right knowledge.

CHAP. IV.—*What is the Chief Good?—Conflicting opinions—
 Determination of the method to be adopted.*

All allow 1
 that 'Hap-
 piness' is
 the Chief
 Good.

After these preliminary explanations we recur to the ques-
 tion, What is the aim of this Science of Social Life? or,

ἀκρατῆς is a man who acts
 wrongly after a struggle be-
 tween good and bad desires.

ἐγκρατῆς is a man who acts
 rightly in a similar case.

ἀκόλαστος is one in whom vice
 has become a habit, and the
 desire of good is eradicated;
 he does wrong without a
 struggle.

σώφρων is one in whom virtue
 has become a habit; bad
 desires are conquered; he
 does right without an effort;
 or, as Bishop Butler expresses
 it, 'particular affections be-
 come absolutely coincident
 with the moral principle.'
Anal. p. 101 (Angus's edit.).

See, in illustration, I. xiii. 15;
 III. ii. 4. Hence the ἀκρατῆς is
 precisely in the case described
 in the text: he *knows* right but
does wrong.

IV. Compare Pope, *Essay on
 Man*, iv. 1:—

Oh Happiness! our being's end and aim!
 Good, Pleasure, Ease, Content, whate'er
 thy name—

That something still which prompts the
 eternal sigh,
 For which we bear to live, or dare to die.

Or again, line 21, etc.

Some place the bliss in action, some in
 ease,

Those call it Pleasure, and Contentment
 these;

Some, sunk to beasts, find pleasure end
 in pain;

Some, swelled to gods, confess ev'n
 virtue vain:

τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐφίεσθαι καὶ τί τὸ πάντων ἀκρότατον τῶν
 2 πρακτῶν ἀγαθῶν. Ὀνόματι μὲν οὖν ἴσχεδὸν ὑπὸ τῶν
 πλείστων ὁμολογεῖται τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ
 καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες λέγουσιν, τὸ δ' εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν
 ταῦτον ὑπολαμβάνουσι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν. Περὶ δὲ τῆς 5
 εὐδαιμονίας, τί ἐστίν, ἀμφισβητοῦσι καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως οἱ
 3 πολλοὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς ἀποδιδόασιν. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν
 ἐναργῶν τι καὶ φανερῶν, οἷον ἡδονῆν ἢ πλοῦτον, ἢ τιμὴν,
 ἄλλοι δ' ἄλλο, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἕτερον νοσήσας
 μὲν γὰρ ὑγίειαν, πενόμενος δὲ πλοῦτον συνειδότες δ' 10
 ἑαυτοῖς ἄγνοιαν τοὺς μέγα τι καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς λέγοντας
 θαυμάζουσιν. Ἐνιοὶ δ' ᾤοντο παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα
 ἀγαθὰ ἄλλο τι καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι, ὃ καὶ τοῖσδε πᾶσιν

2 as we put it at first, What is the Chief Good? In name all
 alike agree that it is Happiness: but when we further ask
 3 What is Happiness? one says one thing, and one another,
 and even the same person says differently at different times.
 Pleasure, wealth, honour, health, some abstract ideal of good,

But there is
 endless vari-
 ety of opin-
 ions as to
 what Happi-
 ness consists

Or indolent, to each extreme they fall,
 To trust in everything, or doubt of all.
 Who thus define it, say they more or less
 Than this, that Happiness is Happiness?

2. *πρακτῶν* is emphatic. See
 note below on line 13.

4. *χαρίεντες*] 'men of culture.'

6. This divergence of opinion
 may be illustrated by the fact
 that an ingenious writer (Varro)
 claimed to have counted 285
 different theories on this subject.

10. *συνειδότες κ.τ.λ.*] We
 always value that most which
 for the time we want. In sick-
 ness we think no good can com-
 pare with health; in poverty
 we think nothing would make

us so happy as money; when
 conscious of ignorance ourselves
 we are dazzled by a display of
 knowledge which is beyond us.

13. This is Plato's theory of
 the 'Idea' of Good, criticised by
 Aristotle at length in chapter vi.
 The Chief Good, according to
 Plato, is the Quality or Condi-
 tion invariably present in every-
 thing Good, the possession of
 which causes the same term
 'Good' to be applicable in each
 case. We speak of a good man,
 or horse, or poem, or poison, or
 antidote, etc. etc. We should
 not apply the same term 'Good,'

4 αἰτιόν ἐστι τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθά. Ἀπάσας μὲν οὖν ἐξετάζειν
 τὰς δόξας ματαιότερον ἴσως ἐστίν, ἱκανὸν δὲ τὰς μάλιστα
 5 ἐπιπολαζούσας ἢ δοκούσας ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον. Μὴ λαν-
 θανέτω δ' ἡμᾶς, ὅτι διαφέρουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι
 καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς. Εὖ γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἠπόρει δ
 τοῦτο καὶ ἐζήτηι, πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς
 ἀρχάς ἐστιν ἡ ὁδὸς, ὡσπερ ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλο-
 θετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρασ ἢ ἀνάπαλιν. Ἀρκτέον μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ
 τῶν γνωρίμων, ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ

4 are some of these various answers. We shall not attempt to
 do more than investigate the more obvious or more reason-
 5 able of these conflicting views. At the very outset we must
 determine the *method* of our inquiry. Shall we start *a priori*
 from general principles, or shall we start *a posteriori* from
 observed facts? One thing is clear: we must argue from the
 known to the unknown; and that in reference to our human
 knowledge, not in reference to any abstract or ideal system of
 knowledge. Now, in the order of *our* knowledge, facts come

We deter-
 mine the
 method of
 our inquiry
 to be from
 facts of ob-
 servation to
 general prin-
 ciples, and
 not vice
 versa.

All a
 that
 pines:
 the
 Good.

unless the same idea were pre-
 sent in all these various cases.
 Whatever that be which is thus
 the one cause of Goodness, where-
 ever it is found, is itself the
 Chief Good of all. This Plato
 termed the 'Ἰδέα of Good.
 Notice the contrast between the
 search for this 'Idea' of Good,
 and Aristotle's carefully limited
 inquiry for the Chief Good *for*
man, the Chief Good of *human*
action, etc.

3. ἐπιπολή is a 'surface' or
 'superficies'; ἐπιπολάζω is 'to lie
 on the surface; hence *h.l.* either
 'obvious' (the reverse of 're-
 condite'), or 'widely-spread.'
 (See *Suppl. Note.*)

4. See the Glossary on the
 terms *a priori* and *a posteriori*,
 and also *s.v.* ἀρχή.

9. γνωρίμων διττῶς]
 Aristotle elsewhere explains that
 general laws are better known
 than particular facts in the *per-*
fect or *ideal* order of knowledge
 (γνωριμώτερα φύσει or ἀπλῶς),
 but particular facts are better
 known than general laws in the
 order of *human* knowledge (γνω-
 रिμώτερα ἡμῖν). We are more
 familiar with the fall of an apple,
 or the motion of a particular
 star than with the law of gravi-
 tation. A being with more
 perfect knowledge would be
 more familiar with the general

δ' ἀπλῶς. Ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν
6 γνωρίμων. Διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἡχθαι καλῶς τὸν περὶ

before general laws. We must therefore start from facts.
6 But seeing that the very facts of moral science are unintel-

laws governing the universe, than with particular instances of their application. As we ascend in the scale of intelligence 'the individual withers and the world is more and more.' Hence, practically, γνώριμα φύσει come to be Laws, Principles, Universals; γνώριμα ἡμῖν, Facts, Particulars.

1. Observe the emphasis on ἡμῖν γε. 'Perhaps then *we* at any rate must begin from what is known *to us*.' Aristotle does not assert that there may not be a more ideally perfect way of approaching the subject. Compare the two methods of ethical teaching explained by Bishop Butler (Introd. to Sermons): 'There are two ways in which the subject of Morals may be treated. One begins from inquiring into the abstract relations of things (ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν), the other from a matter of fact, namely, what the particular nature of man is, its several parts, etc. (ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς). . . . The first seems the most direct *formal* proof: . . . the latter is, in a peculiar manner, adapted to satisfy a fair mind, and is more easily applicable to the several particular relations and circumstances in life.' So also Hume (*General Principles of Morals*, p. 221, ed.

1800): 'As this is a question of fact, not of abstract science, we can only expect success by following the experimental method, and deducing general maxims from a comparison of particular instances (λόγοι ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς). The other scientific method, where a general abstract principle is first established (λόγοι ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν), and is afterwards branched out into a variety of inferences and conclusions, may be more perfect in itself, but suits less the imperfection of human nature' (ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων). To begin with γνώριμα ἡμῖν is, of course, to proceed ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, and not ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν.

2. Διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἡχθαι] The *facts* of morals (in the sense of this passage) are the notions (in their most simple and rudimentary form) of right, wrong, just, unjust, duty, etc. The study presupposes that these notions are, at least to some degree, intelligible to us; that when the terms are used they convey some sort of meaning to us (τὸ ὄτι), though we may not be able to define them accurately, or to say *what constitutes* rightness, wrongness, etc. (τὸ διότι), or even to prove that there are any real distinctions in the

καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὅλως τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀκουσόμενον
7 ἱκανῶς. Ἄρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρ-

ligible without some preliminary training in good habits, we
7 must further presuppose such a training. Nor is it necessary

nature of things corresponding to the notions expressed by these and similar words. Still, even such a dim appreciation as this implies some training in good habits, and it would scarcely be found in a perfectly untutored savage. Nay more, even in civilized life it is only experience of a virtue (τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἦχθαι) which can make it intelligible to us individually. Hence the idea of 'humility' was unintelligible to the Greeks; it was never practised, and so their language had no word for it. Missionaries find it impossible to explain or express to savages some of the fundamental ideas of the Christian religion for the same reason. The condition 'τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἦχθαι' has not been fulfilled.

2. Ἄρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι] 'For the *fact* is a starting point;' or, 'the assumption of moral *facts* (without their reason or theory) will enable us to make a start.' All that we need presuppose, and that much we must presuppose, is the *primâ facie* fact of moral distinctions, and a capacity for their recognition in the learner, though he may not at first know how to apply them to the details of action. Without this much, Ethics would have no *raison d'être*

(see *Introd.* p. xvi); there would be no subject-matter for the science to treat of, or faculties to which it could appeal. This will appear plainly if we look at the case of one or two other sciences. The Science of Painting (1) assumes, or does not question, the existence of colours; and (2) presupposes that the learner is able to distinguish colours—that he is not blind. The Science of Music (1) assumes the existence of harmonious and discordant sounds; and (2) presupposes that the learner can appreciate the difference—that he is not deaf. That would be the meaning of ἀρχὴ τὸ ὅτι as applied in these two cases. Similarly the Science of Morals assumes (1) a distinction between Right and Wrong; and (2) a capacity in the learner to recognise that distinction (hence δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἦχθαι). The grounds in Nature which constitute differences of colours, or harmony and discord of sounds, or the essential distinction between Right and Wrong,—these lie not at the threshold, but in the inmost shrine of the respective sciences. These questions would correspond with τὸ διότι, with which, as Aristotle says, we have nothing to do at the commencement.

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3 μένος καὶ ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ τρίτος ὁ θεωρητικός. Οἱ μὲν
 οὖν πολλοὶ παντελῶς ἀνδραποδώδεις φαίνονται βοσκη-
 μάτων βίον προαιρούμενοι, τυγχάνουσι δὲ λόγου διὰ τὸ
 πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις ὁμοιοπαθεῖν Σαρδανα-
 4 πάλλω. Οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες καὶ πρακτικοὶ τιμῆν· τοῦ γὰρ 5
 πολιτικοῦ βίου σχεδὸν τοῦτο τέλος. Φαίνεται δ' ἐπι-
 πολαιότερον εἶναι τοῦ ζητουμένου· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς
 τιμῶσι μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ, τὰγαθὸν δὲ
 5 οἰκεῖόν τι καὶ δυσαφαίρετον εἶναι μαντευόμεθα. Ἔτι δ'
 εἰκόμασι τὴν τιμὴν διώκειν, ἵνα πιστεύωσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἀγα- 10
 θοὺς εἶναι· ζητοῦσι γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν φρονίμων τιμᾶσθαι,
 καὶ παρ' οἷς γινώσκονται, καὶ ἐπ' ἀρετῇ· δῆλον οὖν ὅτι

3 contemplation. As to the *first*, it is the life of mere animals,
 though the ignorant have the example of the great and
 4 powerful to justify their choice. As to the *second*, we object:
 β) Honour; —(1) Honour is precarious, being dependent upon others,
 5 who may refuse it however well it be deserved; and (2)
 Honour is only sought as a kind of recognition of merit, and
 on the ground of virtue. And if so, Virtue is, according to
 the principles already laid down, a more final end than

4. Sardanapalus was the last king of Nineveh, whose name became proverbial for luxury and effeminacy.

5. πρακτικοὶ] 'of an active turn.'

6. ἐπιπολαιότερον] 'too superficial.' See note on iv. 4.

7. ἐν τοῖς τιμῶσι] Compare Pope—

What's fame? A fancied life in others' breath,
 A thing beyond us, e'en before our death.

And with the next clause compare—

All fame is foreign, but of true desert.

9. οἰκεῖόν τι] 'something peculiarly one's own.'

10. Compare Bacon's *Essay on Praise*, which commences,— 'Praise is the reflection of Virtue (ἵνα πιστεύωσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι), but it is as the glass or body which giveth the reflection. If it be from the common people it is commonly false and naught, and rather followeth vain persons than virtuous' (ζητοῦσι γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν φρονιμῶν τιμᾶσθαι κ.τ.λ.)

12. ἐπ' ἀρετῇ] 'on grounds of merit.' We do not care to be held in honour by worthless

6 κατὰ γε τούτους ἢ ἀρετὴν κρείττων. Τάχα δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον
 ἂν τις τέλος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ βίου ταύτην ὑπολάβοι. Φαί-
 νεται δὲ ἀτελεστέρα καὶ αὕτη· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνδέχασθαι καὶ
 καθεύδειν ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἢ ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίου, καὶ
 πρὸς τούτοις κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν τὰ μέγιστα· τὸν δ' 5
 οὕτω ζῶντα οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδαιμονίσειεν, εἰ μὴ θέσιν δια-
 7 φυλάττων. Καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλως· ἱκανῶς γὰρ καὶ
 ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις εἴρηται περὶ αὐτῶν· τρίτος δ' ἐστὶν
 ὁ θεωρητικὸς, περὶ οὗ τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν ἐν τοῖς ἐπομένοις
 8 ποιησόμεθα. Ὁ δὲ χρηματιστῆς βίαιός τις ἐστὶν, καὶ ὁ 10
 πλοῦτος δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν· χρήσιμον

6 Honour, which cannot therefore be the Chief Good. If it be
 further asked, Is Virtue itself the Chief Good? we reply, No: (γ) Virtue;
 because a man may be virtuous and yet through various
 accidents lead a life of forced inactivity or of positive suffer-
 ing, and this could not without paradox be called a happy
 7 life. As to the *third*, we reserve what we have to say for the
 8 present. We ought perhaps to add that wealth cannot be
 the Chief Good, because wealth is obviously a means and not

(δ) Philoso-
 phical con-
 templation:
 (ε) Riches.

men, or upon trivial or discreditable grounds. Cf. IV. iii. 17.

6. θέσιν διαφυλάττων refers to the discussions in the rhetorical schools, where, a subject or thesis (θέσις) being proposed, the pupils took different sides of the question to defend (διαφυλάττειν) as an exercise, irrespective of their own views on the subject.

8. ἐγκυκλίοις] sc. λόγοις. i.e. 'Popular treatises,'—such as might be met with in the ordinary round of life.

9. ἐπίσκεψις] 'a thorough investigation.' This will be found in B. X.

10. βίαιός τις may be explained either (1) 'under a sort of constraint,' opposed to ἐκούσιος (as in III. i., etc.), because no one would toil for wealth if he could secure the luxuries etc. which wealth procures without this toil; (ἀναγκαῖος is used to express the same idea in X. vi. 2); or (2) 'unnatural' (= παρὰ φύσιν), because it is a perversion of the nature of things to make an end of wealth, which is essentially a means, as much as it would be (e.g.) to accumulate railway-tickets without any intention of travelling.

γὰρ καὶ ἄλλου χάριν. Διὸ μᾶλλον τὰ πρότερον λεχθέντα τέλη τις ἂν ὑπολάβοι· δι' αὐτὰ γὰρ ἀγαπᾶται. Φαίνεται δ' οὐδ' ἐκεῖνα· καίτοι πολλοὶ λόγοι πρὸς αὐτὰ καταβέβληνται. <

1 VI. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω· τὸ δὲ καθόλου βέλτιον δ ἴσως ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ διαπορῆσαι πῶς λέγεται, καίπερ προσάντους τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως γινομένης διὰ τὸ φίλους ἄνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἶδη. Δόξειε δ' ἂν ἴσως βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεία ἀναιρεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ φιλοσόφους ὄντας· 10

an end, and, as such, men seek it of compulsion and not of free choice, in order to secure the results to which it leads.

CHAP. VI.—*Criticism of the Platonic Theory that the Chief Good is the abstract 'Idea' of Good.*

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Finally, I the Chief Good has been held to consist in a 'transcendental idea' of Good.

I We proceed to the last of the important theories as to the nature of the Chief Good above mentioned (iv. 3), viz., that it is some one abstract ideal entering into each several manifestation of 'good.' Respect for the authors of this theory makes the discussion unwelcome, but the love of truth renders

4. καταβέβληνται] 'have been constructed.' The metaphor is probably from καταβάλλειν θεμέλια, 'to lay down the foundations of a building.'

CHAP. VI.—This chapter simply continues the proposed examination of the theories of the Chief Good selected in ch. iv. as being the most important and worthy of notice. See note on iv. 3 for a brief explanation of the theory criticised in this chapter.

5. τὸ καθόλου] literally 'the Universal,' i.e. the theory of one abstract and universal Good present in all particular manifestations of Good, and yet separable from them. This was called by Plato the 'Idea' of Good.

8. τὰ εἶδη] much the same as τὰς ἰδέας, i.e. the theory of 'Ideas.'

φίλους ἄνδρας] Especially Aristotle's own master and teacher, Plato.

ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντων φίλοι ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.
 2 Οἱ δὲ κομίσαντες τὴν δόξαν ταύτην οὐκ ἐποίουν ἰδέας ἐν
 οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον ἔλεγον, διόπερ οὐδὲ τῶν
 ἀριθμῶν ἰδέαν κατεσκεύαζον· τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν λέγεται καὶ
 ἐν τῷ τί ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῶ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι, τὸ δὲ 5
 καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ οὐσία πρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ πρὸς τι
 παραφυάδι γὰρ τοῦτ' εἴκει καὶ συμβεβηκότι τοῦ ὄντος,
 3 ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινή τις ἐπὶ τούτων ἰδέα. Ἐπι ἐπεὶ

2 it necessary. We argue against it as follows:—(i) There We object to
 can be no one abstract 'Idea' of several objects of which this—
 some are necessarily prior or posterior to others. (This is That Good
 allowed by the authors of the theory, who on this account is predicated
 denied its application to *numbers*.) Now this is evidently the (1) of ob-
 case with the numerous objects called 'Good,' since we have jects prior
 Good in Substance and Good in Relation, etc. Therefore and poste-
 3 there cannot be one abstract-Idea of 'Good.' (ii) If all Good rior to one
 another in
 nature ;

1. Hence the well-known saying, 'Amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas.'

6. πρότερον τῇ φύσει.] Aristotle (Categ. xii. 1, 2) distinguishes πρότερον κατὰ χρόνον and πρότερον in the following sense (which practically amounts to πρότερον τῇ φύσει): When two things, A and B, are so related that the existence of B necessarily implies the existence of A, but not *vice versa*, then A is πρότερον 'in the order of Being' as compared with B. He gives as an instance the numbers 1 and 2, which stand in this relation to one another. On this ground (he argues in the text) the Platonists made no 'Idea' of Numbers, such an

interdependence in respect of essential priority and posteriority being out of the question among phenomena partaking of one 'Idea' (see further note on § 6). Thus the major premiss would be granted by his opponents. In the minor premiss Aristotle contends that such an essential priority (πρότερον τῇ φύσει) belongs to Substance as compared with Accident or Relation, and as Good is predicated of each, there cannot be a common Idea of Good in these cases.

8. This second argument is little more than a repetition of the first, clothed in more technical Aristotelian phraseology, and worked out into more detail.

(2) of objects falling under various Categories ;

ταγαθὸν ἰσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι (καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τί λέ-
 γεται, οἷον ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῶ αἱ ἀρεταί,
 καὶ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ τὸ μέτριον, καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι τὸ χρή-
 σιμον, καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ καιρὸς, καὶ ἐν τόπῳ δίαιτα καὶ
 ἕτερα τοιαῦτα), δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινόν τι καθόλου 5
 καὶ ἐν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐλέγερ' ἐν πάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις,
 4 ἀλλ' ἐν μιᾷ μόνῃ. Ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τῶν κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν μία
 καὶ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπάντων ἦν ἂν μία τις
 ἐπιστήμη· νῦν δ' εἰσὶ πολλαὶ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ μίαν κατηγο-
 ρίαν, οἷον καιροῦ ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν στρατηγικὴ ἐν νόσῳ δ' 10

were included under one 'Idea,' it ought to be predicated under one Category only: but it can be predicated under all and each of the Categories. Hence again it cannot be reduced to one 'Idea.' (iii) The knowledge of things reducible to one Idea must be one and indivisible, whereas of things Good there are many divisions of knowledge, and that even of Goods

(3) of ob- 4
 jects treated
 of by Vari-
 ous divisions
 of know-
 ledge.

1. ἰσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι] 'can be predicated in as many ways as Being itself.' The expressions which follow are taken from the phraseology of Aristotle's Categories. Only the first six out of the ten usually given are mentioned in the text. They have been variously held to be a classification of things, words, or thoughts. For a clear and succinct account of Aristotle's Categories, and the controversy respecting their nature, the student is referred to Dean Mansel's edition of Aldrich's Logic. Note B. in the Appendix (Ed. iii.) The argument in the text is, that as 'good' may be predicated of each and all of the

several modes of existence classified in the Categories, such variety cannot be reduced under one 'Idea.'

7. Ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ] Aristotle now argues that the divisions of Knowledge relating to the various manifestations of Good indicate a still further subdivision even than the distinction of Categories. It should be remembered that ἐπιστήμη in Aristotle refers rather to a mental state (see VI. ii., and Glossary, s.v. Art, Science) than to a concrete body of knowledge. He argues therefore that if the various manifestations of Good were reducible to one 'Idea,' the knowledge of one would be the knowledge of all.

ιατρικὴν, καὶ τοῦ μετρίου ἐν τροφῇ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ἐν πόνοις
 5 δὲ γυμναστικὴ. Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις τί ποτε καὶ βού-
 λονται λέγειν αὐτοέκαστον, εἴπερ ἐν τε αὐτοανθρώπῳ
 καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώ-
 6 που ἢ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲν διοίσουσιν· εἰ δ' οὕτως, 5
 οὐδ' ἢ ἀγαθόν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῷ αἰδίῳ εἶναι μᾶλλον
 ἀγαθὸν ἔσται, εἴπερ μηδὲ λευκότερον τὸ πολυχρόνιον
 7 τοῦ ἐφήμερου. Πιθανώτερον δ' εἰκόσιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι

5 which can be brought under one Category. (iv) Again, What is this abstract 'Idea' of anything? and how does its definition differ from that of any object in which it is embodied? and if there is no difference how can the 'Idea' lay
 6 claim to a separate existence? We cannot admit the answer that the 'Idea' is eternal, while the objects in which it is embodied exist only in time, for mere length of duration does
 7 not alter the intrinsic nature of anything. In short we pre-

Further we object (4) That this 'Idea' is indistinguishable from the phenomena which embody it.

2. Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις] Aristotle now argues, 'There is no difference between the Definition of anything and the Definition of its 'Idea,' and conceptions with one and the same definition are not to be distinguished.

3. αὐτοέκαστον] 'the ideal of anything,' or more literally, 'the abstract-anything.'

6. τῷ αἰδίῳ εἶναι] Aristotle here assumes that 'duration of time' and 'eternity' are identical. This at any rate would be repudiated at once by Plato, who held that time and eternity were different in kind, and that time was created, so to speak, when the material world was created. Moreover, he held the Abstract Ideas to be eternal and uncreated,

and therefore prior to and independent of all relations of time. They existed independently of the Deity himself, and were voluntarily adopted by Him as the types which the created world should embody. Another, but later, view of the Platonists was, that they existed only in the Divine Mind, as His ideas (in the modern sense) of what creation should be. In either case, however, they would be independent of relation to Time.

8. Πιθανώτερον κ.τ.λ.] There is not exactly a logical opposition between the theory of the Pythagoreans and that of Plato. They deal with the question of the relation between Unity and Goodness from somewhat differ-

λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ
τὸ ἕν· οἷς δὲ καὶ Σπεύσιππος ἐπακολουθήσαι δοκεῖ.
8 Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος, τοῖς δὲ λεχ-
θείσιν ἀμφισβήτησις τις ὑποφαίνεται διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ
παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ τοὺς λόγους εἰρησθαι, λέγεσθαι δὲ καθ' 5
ἐν εἶδος τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ διωκόμενα καὶ ἀγαπώμενα, τὰ δὲ
ποιητικὰ τούτων ἢ φυλακτικά πως ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυ-

fer the Pythagorean formula (apparently adopted even by
Speusippus) that 'All Unity is Good,' rather than that of
8 Plato, that 'All Good is one.' (v) If our opponents take
the ground of distinguishing 'Goods' into two classes, ac-
cording as they are (1) desired for their own sake, (2)

(5) If the theory be limited to Goods desired *per se* only, we deny that even they can be reduced to one Definition.

ent, though not hostile, points of view. Aristotle merely says that if he had to choose one of them, he would rather adopt the Pythagorean formula.

1. ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ] συστοιχία is literally 'a standing together in a row' (στοῖχος), then a 'co-ordinate arrangement,' a 'series' (L. and S.) Some Pythagoreans held that all the variety of Existence in the Universe might be divided into two antithetical or opposed classes, and that in ten different ways, the one set being the συστοιχία of Good, the other set the συστοιχία of Evil: in other words, they held that the Universe exhibits everywhere a conflict or opposition between Good and Evil, and that ten various forms of each may be distinguished. Among the manifestations of Good (ἐν τῇ συστοιχίᾳ τῶν ἀγα-

θῶν) is found Unity (ἕν); among those of Evil is found Multiplicity (πληθος). All that is One is Good; all that is multiplex, that lacks unity, is Evil. The former involves the idea of order, the latter of confusion.

2. Speusippus was Plato's nephew, and his successor as head of the Academy, and yet even he (καὶ Σπεύσιππος) abandoned the theory; which is a strong point against it.

3. τοῖς δὲ λεχθείσιν] Aristotle now deals with an objection that might be taken to his previous arguments, that they assume an extension of the Ideal theory to *relative* Goods, whereas it was meant by its author to apply only to *absolute* Goods.

5. τοὺς λόγους apparently refers to Plato's language or arguments. καθ' ἐν εἶδος means 'in one class or species' (*Grant*).

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λόγοι ταύτη ἢ ἀγαθά. Οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν κοινόν
 12 τι κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν. Ἄλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; οὐ γὰρ
 εἴκει τοῖς γε ἀπὸ τύχης ὁμωνύμοις. Ἄλλ' ἄρά γε τῷ
 ἀφ' ἑνὸς εἶναι, ἢ πρὸς ἓν ἅπαντα συντελεῖν, ἢ μᾶλλον
 κατ' ἀναλογίαν; ὡς γὰρ ἐν σώματι ὄψις, ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς, 5
 13 καὶ ἄλλο δὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ. Ἄλλ' ἴσως ταῦτα μὲν ἀφετέον
 τὸ νῦν· ἐξακριβοῦν γὰρ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἄλλης ἀν εἴη φιλο-
 σοφίας οἰκειότερον. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἰδέας εἰ

(6) If asked for a theory ourselves, we prefer to say that Goods are called by a common name, by analogy.

12 the case, we conclude that there cannot be one 'Idea' even of this limited class of Goods. (vi) If asked ourselves to account for the application of the one term 'Good' to such a variety of objects (which of course cannot be a mere coincidence), we should suggest that it is in virtue of a certain
 13 analogy between them, though we cannot now pause to fully investigate or justify such a theory. (vii) Finally, such a

2. πῶς δὴ λέγεται;] These words represent a supposed attempt on the part of the Platonist to shift the burden of establishing a theory on his opponent. 'If you reject my theory, how do you account yourself for the acknowledged

fact of a unity of name for the diverse manifestations of Good?'

3. ὁμωνύμοις] When the same word was applied to different objects in more than one sense, they were termed ὁμώνυμα. The following classification of ὁμώνυμα is implied in the text:

ὁμώνυμα	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{ἀπὸ τύχης} \\ \text{accidental} \\ \text{ἐκ διάνοιας} \\ \text{intentional} \end{array} \right.$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{i.e. equivocal words, e.g. νέω; Gallus; page, etc.} \\ \text{ἀφ' ἑνὸς coming from one source.} \\ \text{πρὸς ἓν tending to one result.} \\ \text{κατ' ἀναλογίαν by virtue of resemblance or analogy.} \end{array} \right.$

The last-named abound in every language as a means (*inter alia*) of economizing the number of words—e.g. 'foot' of an animal and of a mountain, 'hand' of a man and of a clock, etc. etc. Aristotle here asserts his preference for some such explanation as this in reference to the various applications of the word 'Good.'

8. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἰδέας] In short, a theory respecting an abstract Ideal of good belongs to Metaphysics (*ἄλλης φιλοσοφίας*), and its truth or falsehood is indifferent to Ethics, which deals with the *practical* well-being of Man. We may therefore dismiss the subject as far as this treatise is concerned.

γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἓν τι τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον ἀγαθὸν ἰ
χωριστόν τι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη
πρακτὸν οὐδὲ κτητὸν ἀνθρώπῳ· νῦν δὲ τοιοῦτόν τι ζητεῖ-
14 ται. Τάχα δέ τῳ δόξειεν ἂν βέλτιον εἶναι γνωρίζειν
αὐτὸ πρὸς τὰ κτητα καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οἷον γὰρ 5
παράδειγμα τοῦτ' ἔχοντες μᾶλλον εἰσομεθα καὶ τὰ ἡμῖν
15 ἀγαθὰ, κἂν εἰδῶμεν, ἐπιτευξόμεθα αὐτῶν. Πιθανότητα
μὲν οὖν ἔχει τινὰ ὁ λόγος, ἔοικε δὲ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις
διαφωνεῖν· πᾶσαι γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφιέμεναι καὶ τὸ
ἐνδεῆς ἐπιζητοῦσαι παραλείπουσι τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ. 10
Καίτοι βοήθημα τηλικούτου ἅπαντας τοὺς τεχνίτας ἀγ-
16 νοεῖν καὶ μηδ' ἐπιζητεῖν οὐκ εὐλογον. Ἐποροῦν δὲ καὶ τί
ὠφελήσεται ὑφάντης ἢ τέκτων πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ τέχνην

theory as this, whether true or false, may be dismissed from
further consideration in a treatise which is rigidly limited to
the inquiry into that which is *practically* useful to and attain-
14 able by man. And if it be argued that the knowledge of the
abstract Idea of Good will advance us towards the knowledge
15 of human good, we reply that this argument though plausible
is unsupported by experience. The Sciences, pursuing each
the knowledge of some special good for man, know nothing of
16 this abstract 'Idea' of Good. Still more striking is it that

(7) In any case this 'Ideal' theory, if true, is not of any practical use.

3. τοιοῦτόν τι ζητεῖται] See ii. 1 note.

6. παράδειγμα] 'model,' or 'exemplar.' Compare Aristotle's own argument in ii. 2. Plato frequently maintains the practical utility of the 'Idea' as a παράδειγμα—e.g. *Rep.* p. 484 C, p. 501 B, etc. etc. As a question of *fact*, Plato and Aristotle would of course admit that men *do not* avail themselves of these abstract Ideals in prac-

tice. As to whether they *might* do it, Aristotle asserts that it would be impossible, but Plato maintains the reverse, and declares that all real progress is hopeless until this shall be the case.

10. τὸ ἐνδεῆς ἐπιζητοῦσαι] 'seeking to supply that which is lacking.' Science is ever seeking to supply defects of knowledge, Art defects of practical power. (See Glossary, s.v. Art, Science.)

εἰδὼς αὐτὸ τἀγαθόν, ἢ πῶς ἰατρικώτερος ἢ στρατηγι-
κώτερος ἔσται ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν αὐτὴν τεθεαμένος. Φαίνεται
μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν ὑγίειαν οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν ὁ ἰατρὸς,
ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὴν τοῦδε καθ'
ἕκαστον γὰρ ἰατρεύει.

5

I VII. Καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω·
πάλιν δ' ἐπανέλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν, τί ποτ'

the Arts, with their practical aims, derive no help from it, nor, as far as we can see, could they ever do so.

CHAP. VII.—*Construction of the Definition of the Chief Good.*

§§ 1-8.—*Certain positive characteristics of the Chief Good stated with a view to its Definition.*

§§ 9-16.—*A Definition constructed out of another such characteristic.*

§§ 17-21.—*The Definition not to be treated as mathematically exact.*

In seeking now to build up a Definition of the Chief Good we observe—
(1) That it is τελειότατον.

After these refutations of others we must now endeavour ourselves to answer the question, What is the Chief Good?

3. οὐδὲ τὴν ὑγίειαν] Not only does the physician disregard the abstract 'Idea' of health, but he does not aim at producing even health in any general sense, but the health of the one particular individual whom he has in hand. This, it must be admitted, is captious. Indeed, here and elsewhere in the Chapter, in spite of the profession of § 1, Aristotle shows little sympathy with, scarcely even fairness to, the theory he is criticising. This argument, if it proved anything,

would be a defence of empiricism against scientific knowledge.

CHAP. VII.—Here commences the constructive part of the treatise. Ch. iv. having set forth the conflicting theories on the subject before us, and chapters v. and vi. having been destructive, *i.e.* having shown which of these theories are *not* true, or in other words, What the Chief Good is *not*, we now proceed to inquire What the Chief Good is. The chapter naturally falls into three divisions—(1) §§ 1-8, (2) §§ 9-16,

ἂν εἶη. Φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῃ πράξει καὶ τέχνῃ· ἄλλο γὰρ ἐν ἰατρικῇ καὶ στρατηγικῇ καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς ὁμοίως. Τί οὖν ἐκάστης ἀγαθόν; ἢ οὐ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πράττεται; τοῦτο δ' ἐν ἰατρικῇ μὲν ὑγίεια, ἐν στρατηγικῇ δὲ νίκη, ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ δ' οἰκία, ἐν ἄλλῳ δ' ἄλλο, ἐν ἀπάσῃ δὲ πράξει καὶ προαιρέσει τὸ τέλος· τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα τὰ λοιπὰ πράττουσι πάντες. "Ὡστ' εἴ τι τῶν πρακτῶν ἀπάντων ἐστὶ τέλος, τοῦτ' ἂν εἶη τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, εἰ δὲ πλείω, ταῦτα. Μεταβαίνων

One characteristic of it is this: The *good* of any art, science, action, or purpose, is always the *end* in each several case, however many other points of difference there may be between them. So that the *Chief Good* of action will also be the *Final* End of action. This however is the same conception as that

(3) §§ 17-21. [§§ 1-8]—In this part Aristotle enumerates certain positive characteristics, or conspicuous qualities, of the Chief Good, which any Definition must embody, in order, if possible, to construct a Definition upon them. Three such characteristics are suggested, which however prove too vague for this purpose.

In the 2d Division [§§ 9-16] another more specific characteristic is found, upon which Aristotle then builds his own Definition of Happiness or the Chief Good.

In the 3d Division [§§ 17-21] he renews the protest of ch. iii. against demanding mathematical exactness in such a Definition.

This chapter, and especially the 2d portion of it, is one of the most important in the treatise. It contains, in fact, the answer

to the main question with which the Book opened. All that follows is simply the confirmation and defence of the Definition here given.

9. Μεταβαίνων κ.τ.λ.] 'By a different course then the argument has come round to the same point,' viz. the same point as in ch. i. The conclusion in each case is the identity of the Chief Good and the Final End. The slightly *different courses* are as follows:—In this passage we argue, The 'good' and the 'end' are identical in all *individual* cases, and therefore the *Chief Good* and the *Final End* will be identical also. Thus ἐκάστης in l. 3 and ἀπάντων in l. 8 are the emphatic words. In ch. i. we argued, Every action, etc., aims at some Good, and therefore the

* }

δὴ ὁ λόγος εἰς ταῦτόν ἀφίκεται. Τοῦτο δ' ἔτι μᾶλλον
 3 διασαφήσαι πειρατέον. Ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείω φαίνεται τὰ τέλη,
 τούτων δ' αἰρούμεθά τινα δι' ἕτερα, οἷον πλούτον
 αὐλοῦς καὶ ὅλως τὰ ὄργανα, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πάντα
 τέλεια· τὸ δ' ἄριστον τελειόν τι φαίνεται. Ὡστ' εἰ μὲν 5
 ἔστιν ἓν τι μόνον τέλειον, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ζητούμενον,
 4 εἰ δὲ πλείω, τὸ τελειότατον τούτων. Τελειότερον δὲ
 λέγομεν τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ διωκτὸν τοῦ δι' ἕτερον, καὶ τὸ
 μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο αἰρετὸν τῶν καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ καὶ διὰ
 τοῦθ' αἰρετῶν, καὶ ἄπλῶς δὴ τέλειον τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ 10
 5 αἰρετὸν αἰεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο. Τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ εὐδαι-
 μονία μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ ταύτην γὰρ αἰρούμεθα αἰεὶ
 δι' αὐτὴν καὶ οὐδέποτε δι' ἄλλο, τιμὴν δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴν
 καὶ νοῦν καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν αἰρούμεθα μὲν καὶ δι' αὐτά
 (μηδενὸς γὰρ ἀποβαίνοντος, ἐλοίμεθ' ἂν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν), 15

with which we started. We may however further explain
 3 this idea of Finality. Any End which is itself but a means
 to a further End, or indeed which ever can be such a means,
 4 cannot be final. And hence we obtain this conception of the
 Chief Good, that it is something always desired for its own
 5 sake, and never with a view to anything beyond it. Obviously,
 Happiness fulfils this condition, and we can think of nothing

Chief Good is what all things aim
 at, *i.e.* it is the ultimate aim or
 Final End of all things; and hence
 again the Chief Good and the
 Final End are identical.

5. We cannot adequately
 translate τέλειον, which com-
 bines the meanings of 'perfect'
 and 'final.' (See Glossary *s. v.*
τέλειος.) That the Chief Good
 fulfils this positive condition
 follows from the primary con-

ception of it given in the opening
 words of the Book, and in the
 beginning of ch. ii.

11. τοιοῦτον δὲ κ.τ.λ.] Thus
 the steps of the argument are:—
 The Chief Good is τελειότατον:
 then (after the notion of τελει-
 ότης has been expounded) Har-
 piness is shewn to fulfil this con-
 dition: the result of which is,
 that Happiness, as before, is
 found to constitute the Chief

αἰρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν, διὰ τούτων
 ὑπολαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονήσειν. Τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν οὐ-
 6 δεῖς αἰρεῖται τούτων χάριν, οὐδ' ὅλως δι' ἄλλο. Φαί-
 νεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν· τὸ
 γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὐταρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ. Τὸ δ' αὐταρ- 5
 κες λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ τῷ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην,
 ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γυναικὶ καὶ ὅλως τοῖς
 φίλοις καὶ πολίταις, ἕπειδι φύσει πολιτικὸς ἄνθρωπος.
 7 Τούτων δὲ ληπτέος ὅρος τις· ἐπεκτείνονται γὰρ ἐπὶ τοὺς
 γονεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀπογόνους καὶ τῶν φίλων τοὺς φίλους 10

else which does. This however will not help us to a clearer
 6 Definition of the Chief Good. The same may be said of (2) It is αὐ-
 another characteristic of the Chief Good, viz. that it is entirely ταρκέστατον.
Self-sufficient, by which we mean that it needs nothing besides
 itself to make life all that we could desire. (We must not
 however understand this to mean that it would enable a man
 to be independent of his fellow-men and live happily in isola-
 7 tion. That would be a spurious self-sufficiency, being a
 mutilation, not an elevation, of human nature.) Happiness

Good, but we are not as yet any nearer to a Definition of it. In §§ 7, 8 similar steps occur.

4. ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας] That the Chief Good fulfils this condition as it is defined in § 7 *fin.*, follows again from ii. 1. For if we desire everything else only for the sake of Happiness, the possession of it would render all such minor desires superfluous: we should be 'μηδενὸς ἐνδεεῖς.'

5. τὸ δ' αὐταρκες λέγομεν κ.τ.λ.] 'When we use the term "αὐταρκής," we do so not in reference to a man's self alone, in the case of one living a life of isola-

tion, but also in reference to his parents, etc.'

8. φύσει πολιτικὸς ἄνθρωπος] 'Man is by nature a social animal.' Nature intended man for society as much as she intended him to use two hands or to walk on two feet. A man who should accustom himself to live out of all relation to his fellow-creatures would not have gained in real independence any more than one who should go always on one leg, or should use only one hand. The error thus protested against by Aristotle was conspicuous in the teaching of the Cynics.

εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν. Ἄλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσαῦθις ἐπι-
 σκεπτέον, τὸ δ' αὐταρκες τίθεμεν ὃ μονούμενον αἰρετὸν
 ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ μηδενὸς ἐνδεᾶ τοιοῦτον δὲ τὴν εὐδαι-
 8 μονίαν οἰόμεθα εἶναι. Ἐπι δὲ πάντων αἰρετωτάτην, μὴ
 συναριθμουμένην, συναριθμουμένην δὲ δῆλον ὡς αἰρετω- 5
 τέραν μετὰ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὑπεροχὴ γὰρ
 ἀγαθῶν γίνεται τὸ προστιθέμενον, ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὸ μείζον
 αἰρετώτερον αἰεί. Τέλειον δὲ τι φαίνεται καὶ αὐταρκες
 ἢ εὐδαιμονία, τῶν πρακτῶν οὔσα τέλος.

9 Ἄλλ' ἴσως τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν 10
 ὁμολογούμενόν τι φαίνεται, ποθεῖται δ' ἐναργέστερον
 10 τί ἐστίν ἔτι λεχθῆναι. Τάχα δὲ γένοιτ' ἂν τοῦτ', εἰ

again fulfils this condition of Self-sufficiency, but we cannot
 yet advance to a Definition of the Chief Good. Once more,
 8 the Chief Good is *sui generis*. If it were only the chief good
 of a class, the addition to it of any other good in the class,
 however small, would make it better, which is inconsistent
 with the supposition that it is itself the Chief Good. Happi-
 ness is then perfectly Final and Self-sufficient, and is the end
 of all human action.

(3) It is
*sui gene-
 ris.*

(4) But
 more par-
 ticularly,
 it con-
 sists in
 the ful-
 filment
 of Man's
 proper
 function.

9 All this, however true, is too vague to construct a defini-
 tion upon. Another consideration may perhaps serve this
 10 purpose. Could we ascertain the proper function of man

5. μὴ συναριθμουμένην κ.τ.λ.]
 'provided it be not counted in
 the same class with other Goods;
 but if it be so counted in,' etc.
 The expression 'Chief Good,' by
 which we are obliged to translate
 the simple τὸ ἀγαθόν is mislead-
 ing. τὰγαθόν must be held to
 include in itself all other Goods,
 such as health, wealth, honour,
 etc., in the most perfect degree,
 i.e. the utmost amount of them
 really desirable. Clearly if A

be only the principal Good of a
 class made up of the Goods A,
 B, C, D, etc., then A + B, or
 even A + Z, is a greater good
 than A alone. Therefore no
 single member of the Class can
 ever be the Chief Good. It must
 be something *sui generis*, in a class
 by itself.

12. The conception now started,
 that Happiness consists in the
 fulfilment of man's proper func-
 tion (or as we might say, the

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τὸ ἴδιον. Ἀφοριστέον ἄρα τὴν θρεπτικὴν καὶ αὐξητικὴν
 ζωὴν. Ἐπομένη δὲ αἰσθητικὴ τις ἂν εἴη, φαίνεται δὲ
 13 καὶ αὕτη κοινὴ καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ βοῖ καὶ παντὶ ζῳῷ. Λείπε-
 ται δὲ πρακτικὴ τις τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος. (Τούτου δὲ τὸ
 μὲν ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ, τὸ δ' ὡς ἔχον καὶ διανοούμενον.) 5
 Διττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν
 14 θετέον· κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι. Εἰ δ'
 ἐστὶν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον ἢ

From this
 point of
 view we
 may now
 define it
 as

peculiar to, and characteristic of, man. This excludes that
 mere existence which he shares with the animal and vegetable
 world, and also that conscious life (or life endued with sensa-
 13 tion) which is common to the brute creation. There remains
 then what we may call a life of action belonging to the rational
 part of our nature; including by the term 'rational' that
 which recognises the sway of Reason as well as that which
 exerts Reason. This being the function of man, we now seek
 the perfection of that function. First it must be in active
 operation. Hence the Chief Good from this point of view
 will be 'An active condition of the soul guided by, or not
 14 opposed to, Reason.' But further, such an active condition

Ψυχῆς ἐνέρ-
 γεια,

4. *πρακτικὴ* is easier to explain than translate; 'moral,' 'active,' 'practical,' being in different ways misleading. Man is sometimes said to be the only animal that can form a conception of actions as distinguished from events. *πρακτικὴ* is co-extensive with 'action' in the sense here indicated. 'Tis' implies that the expression in the Greek is felt to be not quite satisfactory.

Τούτου δὲ κ.τ.λ.] This distinction is more fully explained in ch. xiii. Its relevancy here has been thought so questionable, that some Editors have

treated the sentence as an interpolation, though against MS. evidence.

6. κατ' ἐνέργειαν] as opposed to κατὰ δύναμιν or καθ' ἔξιν. See Glossary, p. xlvi., also viii. 9. The various steps by which each term of the Definition is gained should be carefully noted.

7. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν] The apodosis to this εἰ is found in § 15 *init.*, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν κ.τ.λ. We are reminded that the sentence is still unfinished by the twice repeated εἰ δ' οὕτω in l. 6 and l. 9 of the next page.

8. ψυχῆς is translated 'soul'

μὴ ἄνευ λόγου, τὸ δ' αὐτὸ φάμεν ἔργον εἶναι τῷ γένει
 τοῦδε καὶ τοῦδε σπουδαίου, ὡς περ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ σπου-
 δαίου κιθαριστοῦ, καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων, προσ-
 τιθεμένης τῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν ὑπεροχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἔργον·
 (κιθαριστοῦ μὲν γὰρ τὸ κιθαρίζειν, σπουδαίου δὲ τὸ εὖ) 5
 —εἰ δ' οὕτως, ἀνθρώπου δὲ τίθεμεν ἔργον ζωὴν τινα, ταύ-
 την δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου, σπου-
 δαίου δ' ἀνδρὸς εὖ ταῦτα καὶ καλῶς, ἕκαστον δ' εὖ
 15 κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν ἀποτελεῖται.—εἰ δ' οὕτω, τὸ ἀν-

admits of various degrees of excellence. The function of a good or of an ordinary artist is *generically* the same, only by one it is well performed, and by the other not necessarily so.

15 We must therefore include this condition of excellence in our κατ' ἀρετὴν

in the Analysis for want of a better word (see Glossary s. v. ψυχῆ). It seems to stand here as a sort of substitute for πρακτική above, because πρακτικὴ ζωὴ must belong to this part of man (as Aristotle plainly states in viii. 3), in contrast with θρεπτικὴ and αἰσθητικὴ ζωὴ, which belong to the body. Similarly κατὰ λόγον corresponds to τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος above.

1. τῷ γένει] This is the emphatic idea in the sentence. 'The work of anyone and of a good anyone are the same *in kind*.' . . . the superiority in respect of excellence being (in the latter case) added to the description of the work. e.g. If the 'anyone' be a musician, 'to play' in the former case, 'to play well' in the latter case, would describe the work of each. 'Well' is the

ὑπεροχὴ κατ' ἀρετὴν which is added.

3. δὴ = as it obviously is. Supply εἰ again before ἀπλῶς.

9. οἰκεία ἀρετὴ] 'appropriate excellence.' It should be remembered that ἀρετὴ is simply 'excellence,' though it is most frequently applied to a particular sort of excellence, viz. moral excellence, and so is translated Virtue: just as πράξις and πρακτικὴ come to be similarly restricted in meaning (see Glossary under ἀρετὴ and πράξις). This general meaning of ἀρετὴ is explained by Plato's Definition, that the appropriate excellence (οἰκεία ἀρετὴ) of anything is that quality by which it is able to perform its own function well. Aristotle's account of ἀρετὴ in II. vi. 2 should also be referred to.

- θρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ' ἀρετὴν,
 εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταὶ, κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειο-
 16 τάτην. Ἔτι δ' ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ. Μία γὰρ χελιδὼν ἔαρ'
 οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ μακάριον καὶ
 εὐδαίμονα μία ἡμέρα οὐδ' ὀλίγος χρόνος. 5
- 17 Περιγεγράφθω μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ταύτη· δεῖ γὰρ ἴσως
 ὑποτυπῶσαι πρῶτον, εἶθ' ὕστερον ἀναγράψαι. Δόξειε
 δ' ἂν παντὸς εἶναι προαγαγεῖν καὶ διαρθρῶσαι τὰ καλῶς

ἀρίστην

ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ.

Too much
 precision is
 not to be
 expected in
 such a De-
 finition.

- 16 Definition; and as there are various kinds and degrees of excellence, we must also specify the highest excellence. And so the Chief Good becomes 'An active condition of the soul in accordance with its highest excellence.' One other condition: it must be a permanent settled state, the habit of a life, not the accident of a moment. We add then the words 'in a complete life,' and so our Definition stands thus: Happiness is 'An active condition of the soul in accordance with its highest excellence in a complete life.' Let this serve as an outline sketch at any rate of our conception of the Chief Good

3. βίος τέλειος] 'a complete life,' not necessarily 'a completed life;' or 'life as a whole,' though not necessarily 'a whole life;' else we get into the difficulty raised at the beginning of ch. x. 'Can we not call a man happy till his life is completed?' We should not describe a man as having good spirits, or excellent health, unless we had known him for a certain time, and had had opportunities for observing him under various circumstances; in fact, till we can judge of his life *as a whole*. Sometimes even a few observations enable us to form such a judgment, and for practical purposes these represent

βίος τέλειος. So it is in the case of Happiness. All we need is a sufficiently complete period of duration to be sure that it is a settled habit of life, and not a momentary or transient gleam of joy. It is a well-known point of distinction between 'pleasure' and 'happiness,' that pleasure is perfect at any moment, whereas happiness implies duration and permanence.

7. ὑποτυπῶσαι is a metaphor from sculpture, ἀναγράψαι from painting: but it should be remembered that ancient statues were frequently painted.

8. παντὸς is emphatic here and in l. 3, next page. In *Morals*, as in

✓
Aristotle
Ethics
Book VII

ἔχοντα τῇ περιγραφῇ, καὶ ὁ χρόνος τῶν τοιούτων εὐρε-
 τῆς ἢ συνεργὸς ἀγαθὸς εἶναι. "Ὅθεν καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν
 γεγονάσιν αἱ ἐπιδόσεις· παντὸς γὰρ προσθεῖναι τὸ ἐλ-
 18 λείπον. Μεμνήσθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν προειρημένων χρή, καὶ
 τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασιν ἐπιζητεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐν 5
 ἑκάστοις κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον
 19 ἐφ' ὅσον οἰκείου τῇ μεθόδῳ. Καὶ γὰρ τέκτων καὶ γεω-

or Happiness. Time and individual experience will fill in
 further details in a subject like this, just as they advance our
 18 knowledge of the Arts. We make however two provisos:
 1. Exactness of treatment (as we have already said) must not
 be indiscriminately demanded. 2. The reason, as well as the
 fact, must not in all cases be required. As to the first, let
 us not forget that two considerations limit the amount of
 precision to be required in any case. (1) The nature of the
 subject-matter, of which we have spoken already (iii. 2); and
 19 (2) our immediate object in handling it: as for instance a car-

the Arts (both being [1] *practical*,
 and [2] *not*, like Mathematics,
exact), every one's experience may
 contribute something to their pro-
 gress, and every additional fact
 adds something in confirmation
 of their very principles; and
 moreover, every one is interested
 in their progress, and in the sub-
 jects of which they treat. In
 the exact science of Mathematics,
 on the other hand, though pro-
 gress in the knowledge of facts
 and the efficiency of methods is
 continually being made, nothing
 can ever add to the clear-
 ness and certainty of its funda-
 mental Definitions and Axioms.
 Besides, it is not every one (*παν-
 τὸς*) who can understand or

feel interest in such a subject.

6. κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην] 'dependent on the subject-mat-
 ter;' e.g. a model in cork or
 deal could never be finished like
 one in ivory.

7. οἰκείου τῇ μεθόδῳ] 'suitable
 to the process in hand;' e.g. it
 would be possible perhaps to
 make the corner of a deal table
 precisely 90°, but there would be no
 object gained by such exactness.
 It would not be οἰκείου τῇ μεθόδῳ.
 Cf. restrictions on discussion of
 ψυχὴ in c. xiii. §§ 8, 10, 16.

Both these considerations apply
 to the case of morals. The sub-
 ject-matter does not admit of
 exactness, and the practical pur-
 pose in view does not require it.

μέτρης διαφερόντως ἐπιζητοῦσι τὴν ὀρθήν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ
 ἐφ' ὅσον χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ ἔργον, ὁ δὲ τί ἐστὶν ἢ ποιόν
 τι θεατῆς γὰρ τ' ἀληθοῦς. Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐν
 τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιητέον, ὅπως μὴ τὰ πάρεργα τῶν ἔργων
 20 πλείω γίγνηται. Οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον δ' οὐδὲ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐν 5
 ἅπασιν ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἱκανὸν ἐν τισὶ τὸ ὅτι δειχθῆναι
 καλῶς, οἷον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς· τὸ δ' ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ

penter does not always make the most perfect square even
 20 that the wood admits of, if he is engaged on rough work. As
 to our second proviso, some propositions, *e.g.* certainly first
 principles, are exempt from the necessity of demonstrative

As in the former, we may compare Bp. Butler, *Analogy*, p. 105 (ed. Angus): 'Observations of this kind cannot be supposed to hold universally in every case. It is enough that they hold in general.'

1. ὀρθήν] Understand γωνίαν, *i.e.* a right angle.

6. τὸ ὅτι (the *fact* that a thing is so and so) is constantly opposed to τὸ διότι (the *reason* why it is so); *e.g.* In Euclid's Axioms and Definitions the fact alone is stated (τὸ ὅτι); in his Propositions the reasons for asserting the fact are given (τὸ διότι).

τὸ δ' ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή] 'The fact is something primary and a starting-point.' It is so at any rate in *Morals*, where the *fact* that we feel sentiments of approbation or disapprobation on certain occasions forms the starting-point of the inquiry. See note on iv. 7 ('*Ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι*'), and Introduction, n. xiv. Trans-

lation fails to preserve the full meaning of ἀρχή, including not only 'first principle,' but also 'beginning' or 'starting-point' (see Glossary). Indeed all sciences require to make assumptions independent of demonstrative proof (as Aristotle points out elsewhere), at *both* the higher and the lower ends of the scale of knowledge. General principles rise above, and facts of observation fall below, the limits of such proof; and both are sometimes called ἀρχαί. *e.g.* the Mathematician assumes the Axioms on the one hand, and on the other assumes the existence of triangles, circles, and other figures, the properties of which he investigates. In the latter case, τὸ ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή applies.

7. Axioms or first principles rest upon such grounds as the *universality* of their belief, the *necessity* of their belief, and the *greater certainty* attaching to

ἀρχή: τῶν ἀρχῶν δ' αἱ μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεωροῦνται, αἱ δ'
 1 αἰσθήσει, αἱ δ' ἐθισμῶ τινι, καὶ ἄλλαι δ' ἄλλως. Με-
 τιέναι δὲ πειρατέον ἐκάστας ἢ πεφύκασιν, καὶ σπουδα-
 στέον ὅπως ὀρισθῶσι καλῶς· μεγάλην γὰρ ἔχουσι ῥοπὴν
 πρὸς τὰ ἐπόμενα. Δοκεῖ γὰρ πλείον ἢ ἥμισυ παντὸς 5
 εἶναι ἢ ἀρχή, καὶ πολλὰ συμφανῆ γίνεσθαι δι' αὐτῆς
 τῶν ζητουμένων.

proof, and the primary facts themselves of any science are in
 1 some sense first principles. Now first principles rest upon
 evidence of different kinds in different cases; and though
 never *demonstratively* proved, they must be, each in its own
 appropriate way, fully established and clearly defined. This
 is of the utmost importance, and it is just an instance in which
 'well begun is half done.'

them than to any other principles that could be alleged in their support (Sir W. Hamilton). If any higher principles could be found (the necessary condition of demonstrative proof), the others would *ipso facto* cease to be *first* principles.

1. ἐπαγωγῇ] *h.l.* probably = 'by appeal to experience': *i.e.* (as VI. iii. 3 seems to show) 'that amount of experience which is the *condition*, not the *cause*, of necessary truths' (Grant's note *l.c.*): *e.g.* in Mathematics we need *some* experience to comprehend what is meant by straight lines, right angles, etc.; but the ἀρχαί, or Axioms relating to them, are not (like Physical Laws) *proved* by such experience.

2. αἰσθήσει] 'by perception'; probably referring to the *facts*

of Physics, which are 'the truths we start from' (ἀρχαί) in such subjects.

ἐθισμῶ τινι] 'by a kind of habituation.' We become so familiar by frequent repetition with some truths, that by a sort of 'unconscious induction' (Grant *h. l.*) we come to believe them as axioms. This is especially common in the case of principles of conduct. 'Numberless little rules of action and conduct, which we could not live without, . . . are learned so insensibly and so perfectly as to be mistaken perhaps for instinct, though they are the effect of long experience and exercise' (ἐθισμὸς) Butler, *Anal.* pt. i. ch. v. p. 95 (ed. Angus). In all these three cases, it will be observed, there is no *demonstrative* proof.

3. Μετιέναι δὲ πειρατέον ἐκασ-

- 1 VIII. Σκεπτέον δὴ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμ-
περάσματος καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγο-
μένων περὶ αὐτῆς· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖ πάντα συνάδει
τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, τῷ δὲ ψευδεῖ ταχὺ διαφωνεῖ τὰ ληθές.
2 Νευεμημένων δὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τριχῆ, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐκτὸς 5

CHAP. VIII.—*Other views, popular and philosophical, on the subject of Happiness compared with the above Definition.*

Certain familiar general beliefs about Happiness fall in with our Definition; e.g.

- 1 We will now compare our Definition with the views held by
2 others, and test it by the facts of experience. (α) It is a

τας ἢ πεφύκασι] ‘We must endeavour to investigate them, each in its natural way.’

Chapters viii.-xii. form a sort of parenthetical section, in which Aristotle compares his Definition just found with various received opinions on the subject, and considers its bearing upon certain popular difficulties and questions of the day (esp. ch. ix. x. and xi.). His object throughout is to show how much there is in common between his own theory and others, while he asserts the superiority of his own. The latter consideration justifies a new treatment of the subject; the former not only conciliates opposition, but is itself an argument in favour of any new theory on the ground explained in § 7. This is a truth generally forgotten in controversy. The following are the contents of the five chapters:—ch. viii. Sundry popular and philosophical notions about Happiness compared with Aristotle's Definition; ch. ix.

Common views as to the acquisition of Happiness, on what it depends; ch. x. xi. The popular difficulty whether a man cannot be called happy (as Solon said) while still living, with questions arising therefrom, considered from the point of view of Aristotle's Definition; ch. xii. The relation of Happiness, upon Aristotle's theory, to another familiar classification of Goods.

1. ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος] ‘We must not only consider this question from the point of view of our conclusion and of our premisses.’ We had similar expressions in ch. iii. § 4.

4. τὰ ὑπάρχοντα] *h.l.* ‘all facts’ from ὑπάρχειν in the sense of ‘to exist.’ If a general theory is true, all the facts of experience in detail must be consistent with it.

5. The words Νευεμημένων . . . ἀγαθὰ state the popular opinion which is to be compared with Aristotle's Definition given

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6 μονίαν ἅπανθ' ὑπάρχειν τῷ λεχθέντι. Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ
 ἀρετῇ, τοῖς δὲ φρόνησις, ἄλλοις δὲ σοφία τις εἶναι δο-
 κεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ἢ τούτων τι μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ
 ἡδονῆς· ἕτεροι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν συμπαλαμ-
 7 βάνουσιν. Τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ παλαιοὶ λέγου- 5
 σιν, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγοι καὶ ἔνδοξοι ἄνδρες· οὐδετέρους δὲ
 τούτων εὐλογον διαμαρτάνειν τοῖς ὅλοις, ἀλλ' ἐν γέ τι ἢ
 8 καὶ τὰ πλείστα κατορθοῦν. Τοῖς μὲν οὖν λέγουσι τὴν
 ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀρετὴν τινα συνωδός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος· ταύτης
 9 γὰρ ἐστιν ἢ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνέργεια, Διαφέρει δὲ ἴσως οὐ 10
 μικρὸν ἐν κτήσει ἢ χρήσει τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν,
 καὶ ἐν ἔξει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ. Τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἔξιν ἐνδέχεται
 μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀποτελεῖν ὑπάρχουσαν, οἷον τῷ καθεύδοντι
 ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἐξηρηγηκότι, τὴν δ' ἐνέργειαν οὐχ οἷον

under limi-
 tations, in
 accordance
 with our
 Definition:
 such as

(a) That
 Happiness
 consists in
 Virtue:

6 it is Virtue, Prudence, Wisdom, Pleasure, or that it cannot
 7 exist without external prosperity. Now all these views,
 whether popular or philosophical, are likely to have some
 element of truth in them. We will therefore consider some
 8 of them. (a) That Happiness consists in Virtue. Without
 going so far as this, our Definition asserts that it *implies*
 9 Virtue, and it adds the important condition that that Virtue

2. φρόνησις is practical, and
 σοφία speculative, wisdom. σο-
 φία is in fact nearly = philosophy.
 The distinction is fully explained
 by Aristotle in B. VI. These
 two theories are not referred to
 again in the discussion which
 follows here.

6. οὐδετέρους] 'neither of them
 (the many or the philosophers)
 are likely to be entirely at
 fault, but rather to be right in
 some one point at least, or even
 in most points.' There is no

error but it contains some germ
 of truth, however distorted or
 obscured.

11. κτήσει ἢ χρήσει . . . ἔξει
 ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ] See Glossary, p. xlvi.
 Though at the Olympian games
 there may be better men among
 the spectators than among the
 combatants, yet they are not
 crowned, because their prowess
 is not proved or exhibited. It
 is latent, it exists δυνάμει and
 not ἐνεργείᾳ.

τε· ἰπράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ εὖ πράξει. "Ὡσπερ δ'
 Ὀλυμπίασιν οὐχ οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι στεφά-
 νοῦνται ἀλλ' οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι (τούτων γὰρ τινες νικῶσιν),
 οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν καγαθῶν οἱ πράττοντες
 10 ὀρθῶς ἐπήβολοι γίνονται. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος αὐτῶν 5
 καθ' αὐτὸν ἡδύς. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἡδεσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν,
 ἐκάστῳ δ' ἐστὶν ἡδὺ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται φιλοτοιοῦτος, οἷον
 ἵππος μὲν τῷ φιλίππῳ, θέαμα δὲ τῷ φιλοθεώρῳ· τὸν
 αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῷ φιλοδικαίῳ, καὶ ὅλως
 11 τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν τῷ φιλαρέτῳ. Τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς 10
 τὰ ἡδέα μάχεται διὰ τὸ μὴ φύσει τοιαῦτ' εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ

10 must be not dormant, but in active exercise. (b) That Har- (β) That
 piness implies Pleasure. This we agree to, and moreover it implies
 claim that our Definition asserts it in a far higher and more Pleasure:
 real sense than that usually intended. (1) Because a virtu-
 ous life (ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν in our Definition) is necessarily
 one of pleasure, seeing that every one who is really virtuous
 takes pleasure in acting virtuously, and so the pleasure is
 11 inherent in the very actions themselves. (2) Because the

5. §§ 10-12] The emphatic words are καθ' αὐτὸν (l. 6) and φύσει (l. 11). The superiority of the pleasures derived from Virtue to other pleasures is argued, because (1) the former are intrinsic or inherent in the acts themselves (l. 5-10), and (2) they are natural and not artificial (l. 10, to l. 3, on next page). But in the statement of his conclusion in p. 42, l. 3—5, having repeated the words καθ' αὐτὰς and ἐν ἑαυτῷ, Aristotle recurs to his former argument, stating it, however, more strongly, and then again summing up in p. 43, l. 4.

5. ἐπήβολοι] See x. 14 (note).
 6. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἡδεσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν] 'For the feeling of pleasure is something internal,' i.e. it is not separable from the occasion which causes it, as two external objects might be separated. The pleasure and the act which is its source are separable in thought but not in fact (λόγῳ δύο ἀχώριστα πεφυκότα, as Ar. says in xiii. 10). Hence the pleasure of Virtuous acts is inherent in, and inseparable from, the acts themselves. ψυχικῶν (cf. ψυχικάς, § 2) clearly refers to ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια in the Def. of Happiness.

φιλοκάλοις ἐστὶν ἡδέα τὰ φύσει ἡδέα. Τοιαῦτα δ' αἱ
κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις, ὥστε καὶ τούτοις εἰσὶν ἡδέαι καὶ
12 καθ' αὐτάς. / Οὐδὲν δὲ προσδεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς ὁ βίος
αὐτῶν ὡσπὲρ περιάπτου τινός, ἀλλ' ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν
ἑαυτῷ. Πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις γὰρ οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς 5

pleasures of Virtue, being natural pleasures, never clash or interfere with one another, as our artificial pleasures do; and further, being both natural, and also, as we just now said,
12 inherent in the very actions themselves, there is no need of any adventitious pleasure besides (as the theory we are con-

4. περιάπτου] literally 'something fastened round'; so an appendage, a charm, or amulet. It here indicates an arbitrary reward (which Hegel irreverently described as a 'Trinkgeld') for Virtue.

ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ] This touches upon a very important question in Morals, the relation of Virtue to the Pleasure or Satisfaction which its practice involves. The view in the text is admirably expressed by Seneca: 'We do not love Virtue because it gives us pleasure, but it gives us pleasure because we love it' (Non quia delectat placet, sed quia placet delectat); and again, 'Pleasure is not the motive, but the accompaniment of virtuous action' (Non dux sed comes voluptas). Again, 'Honesty is the best policy, but he who is governed by that maxim is not an honest man' (Whately). We must carefully distinguish between the *conscious aim* and the *actual tendency* of actions.

Happiness (according to Aristotle) *must* be the actual tendency of Virtue, but it *cannot* be its conscious aim. In fact, when it is the conscious aim, we run the risk not only of destroying the Virtue of the act, but even of losing the Happiness. The pleasure of Virtue is one which can only be obtained on the express condition of its not being the object sought. There are many other things which exhibit the same phenomenon (see some good remarks on this in *Ecce Homo*, ch. x. p. 113, 3d ed.) Just as in speculation, 'Wisdom is oftentimes nearer when we stoop than when we soar,' so in practice, Happiness is best secured by those who least consciously aim at it. Aristotle discusses at length in III. ix. an apparent exception to the statement of the text which occurs in the case of Courage, the exercise of which is accompanied by pain and loss.

5. Πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις] The addition to the former statement

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14 ὡς εἶπομεν. Ἄριστον ἄρα καὶ κάλλιστον καὶ ἥδιστον ἢ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οὐ διώριστα ταῦτα κατὰ τὸ Δηλιακὸν ἐπίγραμμα·

Κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιοτάτον, λῦστον δ' ὑγιαίνειν·
ἥδιστον δὲ πέφυχ' οὐ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν.

5

ἅπαντα γὰρ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα ταῖς ἀρίσταις ἐνεργείαις·
ταύτας δὲ, ἢ μίαν τούτων τὴν ἀρίστην, φαμέν εἶναι τὴν
15 εὐδαιμονίαν. Φαίνεται δ' ὅμως καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν
προσδεομένη, καθάπερ εἶπομεν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἢ οὐ ρά-
16 διον τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ὄντα. Πολλὰ μὲν 10
γὰρ πράττεται, καθάπερ δι' ὀργάνων, διὰ φίλων καὶ
πλούτου καὶ πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως· ἐνίων δὲ τητῶμενοι
ῤυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον, οἷον εὐγενείας εὐτεκνίας κάλ-

14 by the judgment of the best among men, and also that in
Happiness this combination is found. The last opinion we shall
15 consider is this:—(c) That external prosperity is a condition
of Happiness. This we are also disposed to agree to, up to
16 a certain point, partly because many noble actions cannot be
performed without means or appliances; and partly because
(as we have already admitted) the absence of certain con-

(γ) That
it cannot
dispense
with
external
prosperity.

appeals in a similar way to the decision of the σπουδαῖος as final in III. iv. 5, and still more emphatically in X. vi. 5, and to the decision of the φρόνιμος in his Definition of Virtue, II. vi. 15. (See note in each case.)

7. μίαν τὴν ἀρίστην] Though they are all inseparably united in Happiness, yet if one be more prominent or characteristic than the rest we might select it alone for the purpose of Definition.

9. εἶπομεν] viz. v. 6 (τὸν δ' οὕτω κ.τ.λ.).

10. ἀχορήγητον] lit. 'unfurnished with a chorus,'—and so generally 'without appliances.' The state provided the chorus for dramatic performances. This duty (called χορηγία) was one of the λειτουργίαι at Athens. (See note on IV. ii. 11.) Cf. conversely κεχορηγημένος in x. 15. The same statement is more fully illustrated in X. vii. 4.

14. εὐδαιμονικὸς] Observe the force of the termination—'adapted for happiness.' Compare πρακτικὸς, 'apt to do,' in ix. 8.

λους· οὐ πάνυ γὰρ εὐδαιμονικὸς ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν παναίσχης ἢ δυσγενῆς ἢ μονώτης καὶ ἄτεκνος, ἔτι δ' ἴσως ἦττον, εἴ τῳ πάγκακοι παῖδες εἶεν ἢ φίλοι, ἢ ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες τεθνήσκουσιν. Καθάπερ οὖν εἶπομεν, ἔοικε προσδεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης εὐημερίας· ὅθεν εἰς ταῦτ' ἵκνουσιν ἔνιοι τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἕτεροι δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν.

I IX. "Ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται πότερόν ἐστὶ μαθητὸν ἢ

17 ditions of prosperity is enough to mar Happiness. Some have even identified Happiness with external prosperity just as others have identified it with Virtue. It will be seen that we cannot go so far as this in either case.

CHAP. IX.—*On what does the acquisition of Happiness depend?*

I Such being our views as to the connexion of Happiness with external circumstances and internal conditions of character,

Various causes have been suggested for the acquisition of Happiness

4. Some degree then of external prosperity is demanded on two grounds, (1) because it assists towards the active exercise of Virtue. From this point of view too much of it is almost as great a hindrance as too little, and indeed always it is more or less a source of danger (as Aristotle explains elsewhere, *e.g.* X. viii. 6). Compare Bacon on Riches: 'As the Baggage is to an Army, so is Riches to Virtue: it cannot be spared or left behind, but it hindereth the March.' (2) The other ground is, that the total absence of it in important particulars is obviously enough to interfere with Happiness. See x. 12, where the same two rea-

sons are repeated (λύπας τε γὰρ ἐπιφέρει κ.τ.λ.). Also ix. 7 (Τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν κ.τ.λ.).

7. "Ὅθεν καὶ κ.τ.λ.] As Happiness has just been shown to imply both Virtue and also external prosperity in some degree, the former consideration would imply that its acquisition was in our own power (μαθητὸν, ἐθιστὸν, ἀσκητὸν), the latter that it was independent of ourselves (κατὰ θείαν μοῖραν, διὰ τύχην). Taking the latter first, Aristotle indicates somewhat hesitatingly that θεία μοῖρα cannot be the immediate cause of human Happiness, apart from all effort or conduct of our own. He then excludes τύχη at once, on the

ἔθιστόν ἢ ἄλλως πως ἀσκητόν, ἢ κατὰ τινα θείαν μοί-
 2 ραν ἢ καὶ διὰ τύχην παραγίνεται. Εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ
 ἄλλο τι ἐστὶ θεῶν δῶρημα ἀνθρώποις, εὐλογον καὶ τὴν
 εὐδαιμονίαν θεόσδοτον εἶναι, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἀνθρω-
 3 πίνων ὅσω βέλτιστον. Ἄλλα τοῦτο μὲν ἴσως ἄλλης ὅ
 ἂν εἴη σκέψεως οἰκειότερον, φαίνεται δὲ καὶ εἰ μὴ
 θεόπεμπτός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ δι' ἀρετὴν καὶ τινα μάθησιν ἢ
 ἀσκησιν παραγίνεται, τῶν θειοτάτων εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ τῆς
 ἀρετῆς ἀθλον καὶ τέλος ἄριστον εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ θείου

it is natural to inquire upon what its *acquisition* depends:—
 whether it be on learning; on moral, or other, training; on
 2 Divine dispensation; or on chance. The best of all human
 goods is certainly the most likely of all to be the gift of
 3 Heaven; and whether thus given directly, or through the
 medium of instruction or discipline, to be of all human things

Relation of
 Happiness
 to Divine
 Providence.

ground that it is clearly better
 that the Chief Good should not
 depend on chance. Arguments
 are then adduced in favour of
 considering Virtuous action as the
 main cause, or at least as an
 indispensable condition, of Hap-
 piness.

1. μαθητόν refers to intellectual
 teaching; ἔθιστόν to moral
 training; ἀσκητόν to any sort of
 training or practice.

5. ἄλλης σκέψεως] *i.e.* it is a
 question rather for Theology
 than Ethics. The Science of
 Ethics only notes the observed
fact that Happiness depends in
 different degrees both on our own
 efforts and on external circum-
 stances. It leaves to Theology
 the question whether theories of

'Natural Laws' or 'Special Pro-
 vidence' will best explain the
 facts.

6. εἰ μὴ θεόπεμπτος . . . τῶν
 θειοτάτων] The interventiⁿ of
 natural laws does not exclude
 Divine agency, which, having
 first established the laws, works
 through them as means. 'If He
 thunder by Law, the thunder is
 yet His Voice' (Tennyson).

This paragraph seems added
 to conciliate religious prejudices,
 which might be shocked by the
 bare statement that Happiness
 is secured by our own efforts, to
 the apparent exclusion of Divine
 help. It need be none the less
 a gift of God, though He wills
 only to 'help those who help
 themselves.'

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εἰ δὲ λοιπῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον, τὰ δὲ
 8 συνεργὰ καὶ χρήσιμα πέφυκεν ὀργανικῶς. Ὁμολογού-
 μενα δὲ ταῦτ' ἀνείη καὶ τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ: τὸ γὰρ τῆς
 πολιτικῆς τέλος ἄριστον ἐτίθεμεν, αὕτη δὲ πλείστην
 ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖται τοῦ ποιούσ τινας καὶ ἀγαθοὺς τοὺς 5
 9 πολίτας ποιῆσαι καὶ πρακτικῶς τῶν καλῶν. Εἰκότως
 οὖν οὔτε βούν οὔτε ἵππον οὔτε ἄλλο τῶν ζώων οὐδὲν
 εὐδαιμον λέγομεν. οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οἷόν τε κοινωνῆσαι,
 10 τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας. Διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν οὐδὲ παῖς

ance with Excellence or Virtue, though we do not deny the
 necessity of other goods as aids and instruments even towards
 8 that excellence. (2) Our original conception of the Chief
 Good as the End of the Science of Social Life points in the
 same direction, the primary object of that Science being to
 secure the virtuous life of all the members of society. (3)

(2) in our
 original
 conception
 of Ethical
 Science:

(3) and in
 the common
 language of
 men.

9 Lastly, we derive an argument from the use of language, which
 does not apply the term Happiness (in its full and proper
 10 sense) either to the lower animals or to children, both being

1. λοιπῶν] *i.e.* Goods other than
 Virtue just mentioned. These it
 is true are not wholly under our
 control. Observe the same two
 grounds as before (viii. 15, 16)
 for the need of some measure of
 external Goods.

3. τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ] *viz.* ii. 5.

4. Hence πολιτικὴ has a wider
 sense than the 'science of go-
 vernment,' because it aims at
 making good *men*, as well as
 good *citizens*. See note on xiii. 3.
 The point of the argument here
 is that πολιτικὴ aims at securing
 Happiness through the means of
 Virtuous conduct and character,
 and this implies that the acqui-

sition of Happiness depends
 mainly on ourselves.

7. If it sound strange to say
 that neither the lower animals
 nor children can be called happy,
 we must remember the full
 meaning attached to the term in
 the Definition of ch. vii., and not
 be misled by the popular appli-
 cation of the word 'happy' in
 English. See further, X. vi. 8
 (note).

9. τοιαύτης] *viz.* πρακτικῆς
 τῶν καλῶν from l. 6.

οὐδὲ παῖς] 'not even a child.'
 This is a stronger case than that
 of the lower animals just cited,
 because a child has Happiness ἐν

εὐδαιμόνων ἐστίν· οὐπω γὰρ πρακτικὸς τῶν τοιούτων διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν· οἱ δὲ λεγόμενοι, διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα μακαρίζονται. Δεῖ γὰρ, ὥσπερ εἵπομεν, καὶ ἀρετῆς τελείας καὶ βίου τελείου. Πολλαὶ γὰρ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται καὶ παντοῖαι τύχαι κατὰ τὸν βίον, καὶ ἐνδέχεται τὸν μάλιστα 5 εὐθηνούντα μεγάλας συμφοραῖς περιπεσεῖν ἐπὶ γήρως, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἡρωικοῖς περὶ Πριάμου μυθεύεται· τὸν δὲ τοιαύταις χρησάμενον τύχαις καὶ τελευτήσαντα ἀθλίως οὐδεὶς εὐδαιμονίζει.

I X. Πότερον οὖν οὐδ' ἄλλον οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων εὐδαι- 10

characterized by incapacity for Virtuous practice,—the former absolutely, the latter temporarily: for both Virtue and Happiness are imperfect unless exhibited in 'a complete life'; the changes and chances to which life is exposed being so many and so various.

CHAPS. X. XI.—*What is the relation of Happiness to the varying fortunes of life, especially in reference to a well-known dictum of Solon's.*

I Hence arises the question, Must we (as Solon used to say) wait till we see the end of a man's life before we can call him Solon's dictum stated.

δυνάμει though not ἐν ἐνεργείᾳ (See Glossary, p. xlv.), and hence διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα μακαρίζονται, whereas a brute has it not in any sense, either δυνάμει or ἐνεργείᾳ.

CHAPS. X. and XI.—The mention of βίος τέλειος at the end of the last Chapter, and the statement made in reference to it, suggests the popular question said to have been first raised by Solon, 'Can we not call a man happy till his life is completed?' In §§ 1-5 Aristotle points out

the difficulties involved in every solution or interpretation of this question, especially as it cannot be separated from the wider question of the condition of the departed. In § 6 he returns to the consideration of the dictum of Solon, proposing afterwards to apply its solution (gained by the help of his own theory of Happiness) to that of the wider question just mentioned. It is so applied in ch. xi.

10. οὐδ' ἄλλον οὐδένα] i.e. even

μονιστέον ἕως ἂν ζῆ, κατὰ Σόλωνα δὲ χρεῶν τέλος ὄραν ;
 2 Εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ θετέον οὕτως, ἀρά γε καὶ ἔστιν εὐδαίμων
 τότε ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνῃ ; ἢ τοῦτό γε παντελῶς ἄτοπον,
 ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῖς λέγουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνέργειάν τινα τὴν
 3 εὐδαιμονίαν ; εἰ δὲ μὴ λέγομεν τὸν τεθνεῶτα εὐδαίμονα, ε
 ζῆ μὴδὲ Σόλων τοῦτο βούλεται, ἀλλ' ὅτι τηνικαῦτα ἂν τις
 ἀσφαλῶς μακαρίσειεν ἄνθρωπον ὡς ἐκτὸς ἤδη τῶν κακῶν
 ὄντα καὶ τῶν δυστυχημάτων, ἔχει μὲν καὶ τοῦτ' ἀμφισ-
 βήτησίν τινα· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τι τῷ τεθνεῶτι καὶ κακὸν
 καὶ ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ καὶ τῷ ζῶντι μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ δὲ, οἷον 10
 τιμαὶ καὶ ἀτιμίαι καὶ τέκνων καὶ ὅλως ἀπογόνων εὐ-
 4 πραξίαι τε καὶ δυστυχίαι. Ἀπορίαν δὲ καὶ ταῦτα

2 happy? Those who say this mean, *either* that he is happy when
 dead—which is absurd, especially if happiness consists in ac-
 tivity (*ἐνέργεια*) as our Definition asserts, and indeed Solon pro-
 3 bably never meant this ;—*or* that we can then safely apply the
 term 'happy' to him, as being now beyond the reach of trouble.
 But are we so sure that he is beyond its reach? Do not the for-
 tunes of the family or friends that he has left behind affect him
 4 still? But this again opens another difficulty. If we suppose

any other than ὁ Πριαμικαῖς ξυμ-
 φοραῖς περιπεσών. This might
 be thought an exceptional case,
 and so the question is put, 'Can
 we not then call even any ordi-
 nary man happy while he lives,
 by reason of the changes and
 chances of life?'

9. δοκεῖ] 'It is supposed,'
 see note on iii. 2.

δοκεῖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] 'It is
 thought that both good and evil
 may occur to the dead, if indeed
 they can to the living without
 his being conscious of it.' Œdi-
 pus for instance would not have

been considered a happy man
 even if he had never discovered
 his incestuous marriage, but had
 gone on till death in 'happy'
 ignorance of it. His 'ignorance'
 would not have been 'bliss' from
 the Greek point of view. This
 at least is assumed in the text,
 and the argument drawn from it
 is, that it is equally natural to
 suppose that the happiness of a
 dead man, even though he be
 unconscious, is marred by misfor-
 tunes occurring to his family on
 earth. Aristotle however is only
 stating a popular belief.

It involves
 the further
 question
 of the con-
 dition of the
 dead in refer-
 ence to the
 living, which
 is full of dif-
 ficulties.

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7 ἔξ ἐκείνου. Εἰ δὴ τὸ τέλος ὄραν δεῖ καὶ τότε μακαρίζειν
 ἕκαστον οὐχ ὡς ὄντα μακάριον ἀλλ' ὅτι πρότερον ἦν; πῶς
 οὐκ ἄτοπον, εἰ ὅτ' ἔστιν εὐδαίμων, μὴ ἀληθεύσεται κατ'
 αὐτοῦ τὸ ὑπάρχον, διὰ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι τοὺς ζῶντας
 εὐδαιμονίζειν διὰ τὰς μεταβολὰς, καὶ διὰ τὸ μόνιμόν τι 5
 τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπειληφέναι καὶ μηδαμῶς εὐμετάβολον,
 τὰς δὲ τύχας πολλάκις ἀνακυκλείσθαι περὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς;
 8 δῆλον γὰρ ὡς εἰ συνακολουθοίημεν ταῖς τύχαις, τὸν
 αὐτὸν εὐδαίμονα καὶ πάλιν ἄθλιον ἐροῦμεν πολλάκις,
 χαμαιλέοντά τινα τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἀποφαίνοντες καὶ σα- 10
 9 θρῶς ἰδρυμένον. Ἡ τὸ μὲν ταῖς τύχαις ἐπακολουθεῖν
 οὐδαμῶς ὀρθόν; οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τὸ εὖ ἢ κακῶς, ἀλλὰ
 προσδεῖται τούτων ὁ ἀνθρώπινος βίος, καθάπερ εἶπαμεν,
 κύριαι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας,

The diffi-
 culty is due
 to making
 changing
 circumstances the
 test of
 Happiness
 which is
 most stable,

7 man happy while still *living*? Now surely if we can ever say with truth that a man *has been* happy, it must have been possible at some time or another to say that he *is* happy.
 8 The supposed difficulty in doing so is that Happiness is most
 9 stable, and the chances of Fortune most variable. The solution is obvious. These chances ought never to be made the test of Happiness at all. The fact is that external prosperity, however necessary a *condition* of Happiness (and this we have amply admitted before), cannot be its *cause*. We say again, as we said in our Definition, that Virtuous Actions are the true cause of Happiness, as Vicious actions are of misery.

which question arose out of attempts to explain that dictum.

4, 5. διὰ three times repeated is somewhat awkward. It will be seen that the first διὰ explains μὴ ἀληθεύσεται: the second and third explain τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι εὐδαιμονίζειν.

13, 14. Observe the contrast between προσδεῖται = 'has further need of' (*i.e.* this is not a *primary* condition of Happiness) and κύριαι εἰσὶ = they 'test' or 'determine.' Compare προσδεομένη, viii. 15, and προσδεῖσθαι in viii. 17 and iv. 7.

10 αἱ δ' ἐναντίαι τοῦ ἐναντίου. Μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ
 τὸ νῦν διαπορηθέν. Περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ὑπάρχει τῶν
 ἀνθρωπίνων ἔργων βεβαιότης ὡς περὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς
 κατ' ἀρετὴν· μονιμώτεραι γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὗται
 δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. Τούτων δ' αὐτῶν αἱ τιμιώταται μονο- 5
 μώταται διὰ τὸ μάλιστα καὶ συνεχέστατα καταζῆν ἐν
 αὐταῖς τοὺς μακαρίους· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔοικεν αἰτίῳ τοῦ μὴ
 11 γίγνεσθαι περὶ αὐτὰ λήθην. Ὑπάρξει δὲ τὸ ζητούμενον
 τῷ εὐδαίμονι, καὶ ἔσται διὰ βίου τοιοῦτός· αἰεὶ γὰρ ἢ
 μάλιστα πάντων πράξει καὶ θεωρήσει τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν, 10
 καὶ τὰς τύχας οἴσει κάλλιστα καὶ πάντῃ πάντως ἐμ-

10 To the truth of that Definition in this respect, the very dif-
 ficulty that has now arisen bears witness. It is the recognised
 stability of Happiness that makes us so cautious in our appli-
 cation of the term. But what is there so stable as Virtuous
 action? Not intellectual knowledge. This may be forgotten.
 But active Virtue *vi nominis* must be in continual practice,
 and is thus necessarily permanent and stable, and the more so
 11 as it exists in its noblest forms and highest degree in perfect
 Happiness. How then will a man who thus lives stand in

whereas
 Virtue is
 the real
 test;
 and Virtue
 is in fact
 more stable
 than any-
 thing else.

1. τῷ λόγῳ] 'our Definition,'
 which asserts Happiness to be
 κατ' ἀρετὴν. The present diffi-
 culty (τὸ νῦν διαπορηθέν) turns
 upon the universally believed
 stability of Happiness, which
 makes us reluctant to apply the
 name where change may come.
 But this stability is intelligible
 if Happiness depends on Virtue,
 as our Definition asserts, be-
 cause Virtuous practice is more
 stable than anything else, as the
 reasons now to be adduced suffi-
 ciently prove. Thus the difficulty

itself is a support to the Defini-
 tion.

4-8. This may suggest one
 reason among others why
 'Knowledge (ἐπιστήμαι) shall
 vanish away, but charity (ἐνέρ-
 γειαι κατ' ἀρετὴν) never faileth.'

5. Τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν] is 'of
 Virtues in active exercise,' ἐνερ-
 γειῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν.

8. τὸ ζητούμενον] 'the quality
 we are seeking for,' viz. stability.

10. Happiness being according
 to the Definition κατ' ἀρετὴν
 ἀρίστην.

μελῶς ὅ γ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τετράγωνος ἄνευ
 12 ψόγου. Πολλῶν δὲ γινομένων κατὰ τύχην καὶ διαφε-
 ρόντων μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι; τὰ μὲν μικρὰ τῶν εὐτυ-
 χημάτων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, δῆλον ὡς
 οὐ ποιεῖ ῥοπήν τῆς ζωῆς, τὰ δὲ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ, 5
 γιγνόμενα μὲν εὖ, μακαριώτερον τὸν βίον ποιήσει (καὶ
 γὰρ αὐτὰ συνεπικοσμῆν πέφυκεν, καὶ ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῶν
 καλὴ καὶ σπουδαία γίγνεται), ἀνάπαλιν δὲ συμβαίοντα-
 θλίβει καὶ λυμαίνεται τὸ μακάριον· λύπας τε γὰρ ἐπι-
 φέρει καὶ ἐμποδίζει πολλαῖς ἐνεργείαις. "Ὁμως δὲ καὶ 10
 ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν, ἐπειδὴν φέρη τις εὐ-
 κόλως πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυχίας, μὴ δι' ἀναλγησίαν,
 13 ἀλλὰ γεννάδας ὦν καὶ μεγαλόψυχος. Εἰ δ' εἰσὶν αἱ
 ἐνέργειαι κύριαι τῆς ζωῆς, καθάπερ εἶπομεν, οὐδεὶς ἂν

How then
 does the
 virtuous
 man stand
 related to
 the changes
 of fortune?

12 relation to the gifts of Fortune? If they be *small*, whether good or bad, they will not affect the balance of his life. If they be *great*, and also good, they will naturally add a lustre to his happiness; but if evil, they will mar it, inflict on him pain, and impede his activity in virtue. Still the very greatness of such troubles affords scope for nobleness of character, when they are keenly felt and yet complacently endured.
 13 Hence we conclude that if (as we have said) Virtue and Vice

1. τετράγωνος ἄνευ ψόγου] 'a cube without flaw,'—a mathematical metaphor to express perfection. Squares, cubes, circles, spheres (*i.e.* 'regular' figures and solids), are familiar metaphors to express perfection in various languages.

7. αὐτὰ] 'of themselves.' This parenthesis is explained by viii. 15. For the converse statement in l. 8 [ἀνάπαλιν δὲ συμβαίοντα

θλίβει καὶ λυμαίνεται κ.τ.λ.] see viii. 16.

9. λύπας τε γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] See these two reasons expounded in viii. 15, 16 (note).

11. εὐκόλως] Contrast δύσκολος in IV. vi. 9.

12. δι' ἀναλγησίαν] Such was the view of the Stoics. Aristotle on the contrary maintains that natural feelings, though under control, are not to be crushed or eradicated.

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ἂν γένοιτο πάλιν εὐδαίμων ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' εἴπερ,
 ἐν πολλῷ τινὶ καὶ τελείῳ, μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν ἐν αὐτῷ
 15 γεινόμενος ἐπήβολος. Τί οὖν κωλύει λέγειν εὐδαίμονα
 τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν ἐνεργοῦντα καὶ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀγα-
 θοῖς ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένον, μὴ τὸν τυχόντα χρόνον 5
 ἀλλὰ τέλειον βίον; ἢ προσθετέον καὶ βιωσόμενον οὕτω
 καὶ τελευτήσοντα κατὰ λόγον, ἐπειδὴ τὸ μέλλον ἀφανὲς
 ἡμῖν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ τέλος καὶ τέλειον τίθεμεν
 16 πάντη πάντως; Εἰ δ' οὕτω, μακαρίους ἐροῦμεν τῶν
 ζώντων οἷς ὑπάρχει καὶ ὑπάρξει τὰ λεχθέντα, μακαρί- 10
 'ους δ' ἀνθρώπους.

I XI. Καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διωρίσθω τὰς.

moved; and that as it will take a great deal to mar happiness,
 so it will take a great deal to restore it if once disturbed.

Solon's
 question
 may now be
 answered.
 We can call
 a man still
 living
 'happy.'

15 Finally then we ask, granted the conditions of perfect virtue,
 a sufficient supply of external goods, and both these for an
 adequate duration of time, why may we not call a man happy
 while he still lives? Some may desire that in view of the
 uncertainty of the future, and the perfect finality of happiness,
 we should add, provided such a life be crowned by a fitting
 16 death. Still it must be remembered that in calling men happy,
 we of course mean only happy as mortal men can be.

How far
 then is the
 condition of
 the dead
 affected
 by the for-
 tunes of
 the living?

I CHAP. XI.—Now we can return to the solution of the other

3. ἐπήβολος] (ἐπὶ, βάλλω)
 'having hit upon.' ἐν αὐτῷ, viz.
 χρόνῳ.

9. Thus then the question
 raised by Solon is answered. We
can call men happy while still
 alive, but happy as men, and
 not as gods; being as men
 still liable to the dangers inci-
 dent to humanity; and *this*
being understood, we need not
 explicitly add 'καὶ βιωσόμενον

οὕτω κ.τ.λ.' (l. 6), when we
 apply the term 'happy,' any more
 than when we apply the terms
 'healthy,' 'rich,' 'wise,' etc.;
 any of which conditions are
 similarly liable to the possi-
 bility of disturbance. τὰ λεχ-
 θέντα are the three conditions
 specified at the beginning of § 15,
 viz. Virtue, External Goods in
 sufficiency, and Stability.

CHAP. XI.—In this Chapter

δὲ τῶν ἀπογόνων τύχας καὶ τῶν φίλων ἀπάντων τὸ μὲν
μηδοτιοῦν συμβάλλεσθαι λίαν ἄφιλον φαίνεται καὶ ταῖς
2 δόξαις ἐναντίον· πολλῶν δὲ καὶ παντοίας ἐχόντων δια-
φορὰς τῶν συμβαινόντων, καὶ τῶν μὲν μᾶλλον συνικ-
νουμένων, τῶν δ' ἥττον, καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν διαιρεῖν μακ- 5
ρὸν καὶ ἀπέραντον φαίνεται, καθόλου δὲ λεχθὲν καὶ
3 τύπῳ τάχ' ἂν ἰκανῶς ἔχοι. Εἰ δὲ, καθάπερ καὶ τῶν περὶ
αὐτὸν ἀτυχημάτων τὰ μὲν ἔχει τι βρίθος καὶ ῥοπὴν

difficulty, viz. whether the happiness of the dead can be altered
by the fortunes of the living. To suppose the dead *wholly*
untouched by these fortunes seems cold, and runs counter to
2 received beliefs. To estimate accurately the various *degrees*
of influence exercised by such occurrences great and small
would be endless. This then may serve as a general solution.
3 —*In life itself*, different circumstances affect us in very different

Aristotle returns to the question of the condition of the dead in relation to the fortunes of the living. He applies to its solution (as he promised in x. 6) the results arrived at in reference to Solon's problem thus:—if the fortunes of life are no obstacle to our calling a man happy while still alive and still exposed to their full force, *a fortiori* they cannot seriously interfere with the happiness of the dead who are removed from their immediate influence.

7, to l. 8 next page. Εἰ δὲ . . . ἀντικειμένων] The sentence is somewhat complicated. Two conditions are stated:—(1) If misfortunes even in this life differ in degree when they concern ourselves, and similarly when

they concern our friends (εἰ δὲ . . . ἀπάντας); (2) If absence from the actual scene of their occurrence in this world, and *a fortiori* if removal to another world altogether, dull their effect upon us (διαφέρει . . . πράττεσθαι); then the result (the apodosis of the sentence) is,—These points, and especially the latter (ταύτην τὴν διαφορὰν), must be taken into consideration (συλλογιστέον δὲ) in determining the question before us. Unless indeed we go further still, and make the question not one of degree but of fact, i.e. not *How far* are the dead affected? but *Are they affected even at all?* (μᾶλλον δεῖ ἴσως τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι κ.τ.λ.). τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι = 'the utter doubt and uncertainty.'

πρὸς τὸν βίον, τὰ δ' ἐλαφροτέροις ἔοικεν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ
 4 περὶ τοὺς φίλους ὁμοίως ἅπαντας, διαφέρει δὲ τῶν
 παθῶν ἕκαστον περὶ ζῶντας ἢ τελευτήσαντας συμβαί-
 νειν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ παράνομα καὶ δεινὰ προὔπάρχειν
 5 ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις ἢ πράττεσθαι, συλλογιστέον δὲ καὶ 5
 ταύτην τὴν διαφορὰν, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι
 περὶ τοὺς κεκμηκότας εἴ τινος ἀγαθοῦ κοινωνοῦσιν ἢ τῶν
 ἀντικειμένων· ἔοικε γὰρ ἐκ τούτων εἰ καὶ διῖκνείται πρὸς
 αὐτοὺς ὀτιοῦν, εἴτ' ἀγαθὸν εἴτε τοῦναντίον, ἀφαιρόν τι
 καὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐκείνοις εἶναι, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τοσοῦτόν 10
 γε καὶ τοιοῦτον ὥστε μὴ ποιεῖν εὐδαίμονας τοὺς μὴ ὄντας
 6 μηδὲ τοὺς ὄντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὸ μακάριον. Συμβάλλεσ-
 θαι μὲν οὖν τι φαίνονται τοῖς κεκμηκόσιν αἱ εὐπραξίαι
 τῶν φίλων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ δυσπραξίαι, τοιαῦτα δὲ
 καὶ τηλικαῦτα ὥστε μήτε τοὺς εὐδαίμονας μὴ εὐδαίμονας 15
 ποιεῖν μήτ' ἄλλο τῶν-τιοῦτων μηδέν.

degrees, when they concern ourselves, and naturally also when
 4 they concern our friends. *After our death*, such circumstances,
 being acted on another stage, must affect us infinitely less.
 5 We must then make full allowance for this difference, even
 supposing we grant the general question that they do affect us
 6 somewhat. Hence we conclude that the dead are influenced
 by such occurrences, if at all, only slightly, and certainly not
 to such a degree as to change Happiness into Misery, or
vice versâ.

5. The lines in Hor. *A. P.*
 180-2 will occur to every one:—
 Segnius irritant animos demissa per aures
 Quam quae sunt oculis subjecta fide-
 bus, et quae
 Ipse sibi tradit spectator.

(See *Supplementary Notes*.)

10. ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐκείνοις] 'Either
 in itself, or to them.' Referring

to the two conditions respectively
 in §§ 3 and 4. The influence of
 these occurrences, if they do
 reach the dead, must be trifling
 anyhow, either in itself (as ex-
 plained in § 3), or at least trifling
 in the effect produced upon the
 dead (as explained in § 4).

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φυκέναι καὶ ἔχειν πῶς πρὸς ἀγαθόν τι καὶ σπουδαῖον.
 3 Δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπαίνων·
 γελοῖοι γὰρ φαίνονται πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀναφερόμενοι, τοῦτο
 δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους δι' ἀναφο-
 4 ρᾶς, ὡς περ εἶπαμεν. Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἔπαινος τῶν τοιού-
 των, δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀρίστων οὐκ ἐστὶν ἔπαινος, ἀλλὰ
 μείζον τι καὶ βέλτιον, καθάπερ καὶ φαίνεται· τοὺς τε γὰρ
 θεοὺς μακαρίζομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν, καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν
 τοὺς θειοτάτους μακαρίζομεν. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀγα-
 θῶν οὐδεὶς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐπαινεῖ καθάπερ τὸ
 δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ὡς θειότερόν τι καὶ βέλτιον μακαρίζει.
 5 Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ Εὐδόξος καλῶς συνηγορῆσαι περὶ τῶν ἀρισ-

in reference to their results, and because they are well adapted
 3 to produce these results. Hence it is applied to justice,
 courage, strength, etc. Hence also we cannot employ the
 term 'praise,' involving this notion of commendation, to the
 4 Gods, nor is it applicable to the highest goods, which are not
 desired for their results, but for themselves; nor consequently
 5 can it be applied to Happiness. When Eudoxus claimed that

2. ἔπαινος involves the idea of commendation. In this sense it is clear we cannot 'praise' the Deity.

6. δῆλον ὅτι κ.τ.λ.] If praise is always applied with a view to results, and if results are necessarily higher than the actions or means which lead to them (see i. 2), then there must be something better than praise to apply to the results themselves. For we must suppose some results to be final (otherwise πρόεισιν οὕτω γε εἰς ἄπειρον ii. 1), and these at any rate cannot *ex hyp.* be subjects for praise.

8. Observe the distinction between μακαρία and εὐδαιμονία, 'felicity' and 'happiness.' See x. 14 (note). Both belong to the Gods, the former only in rare instances to men.

9. Ὁμοίως δὲ κ.τ.λ.] The same remark applies to the best among good things. Ἀγαθῶν is in the gen. after some superl. understood from τοὺς θειοτάτους, perhaps the word θειότατα itself, as it is so applied in ix. 3.

12. καλῶς συνηγορῆσαι] 'to have put in a good claim for the first place.' He was *right* in supposing that the fact of praise

τείων τῇ ἡδονῇ; τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπαινέσθαι τῶν ἀγαθῶν
 οὐσαν μηνύειν ᾧετο ὅτι κρείττον ἐστὶ τῶν ἐπαινετῶν,
 τοιοῦτον δ' εἶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ τ' ἀγαθόν· πρὸς ταῦτα γὰρ
 6 καὶ τ' ἄλλα ἀναφέρεσθαι. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔπαινος τῆς ἀρετῆς·
 7 πρακτικοὶ γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἀπὸ ταύτης· τὰ δ' ἐγκώμια τῶν 5
 ἔργων ὁμοίως καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ τῶν ψυχικῶν.
 7 Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως οἰκειότερον ἐξακριβοῦν τοῖς
 περὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια πεπονημένοις, ἡμῖν δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν
 εἰρημένων ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τῶν τιμίων καὶ τε-
 8 λείων. Ἐοικε δ' οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἀρχή· 10
 ταύτης γὰρ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα πάντες πράττομεν,

Pleasure was the Chief Good because though good it was not
 praised, as being above praise, the principle at least of his ar-
 6 gument was sound. 'Praise' then is peculiarly appropriate to
 virtuous *habits*, in consideration of the results to which they
 lead, just as 'panegyric' is appropriate to great *deeds*. But these
 7 refinements of language are carrying us too far. We decide
 then that Happiness belongs to the third class mentioned
 8 above, viz. things admirable, and this we might have at once

not being applied to some ac-
 knowledged good indicated a
 high degree of excellence: but
wrong in supposing that only
 God and the Chief Good (l. 3)
 corresponded to that description.

5. Thus ἐγκώμιον belongs to
 noble *acts*; ἔπαινος to virtuous
habits, which result from, and
 tend to reproduce, such acts;
 μακαρισμὸς to Happiness, which
 results again from those virtuous
 habits.

5. πρακτικοὶ γὰρ] This reason
 is explained by the first words
 of § 2.

10. ἀρχή] This sense of the

word is a little unusual. It is
 here almost the same as τέλος,
 just as in English we can speak
 indifferently of a *primary* or an
ultimate principle in the same
 sense. The ultimate motive is
 also the primary motive of an
 action. If we desire money with
 a view to obtain a certain luxury,
 that luxury is the ultimate, and
 also the primary, motive for the
 effort to procure money. (See
 Glossary, s.v. ἀρχή). Ἀρχή is
 in fact here equivalent to 'final
 cause.' (See Glossary, s.v. The
 Four Causes.)

τὴν ἀρχὴν δὲ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν τίμιόν τι καὶ θεῖον τίθεμεν.

I XIII. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν, περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκεπτέον· τάχα γὰρ οὕτως ἂν βέλτιον καὶ περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας θεωρήσαιμεν. 5

inferred from the consideration of its being an ultimate principle of action, not chosen for its results, but itself the motive and result for which all else is chosen.

CHAP. XIII.—*Commencement of the elucidation of the several terms in the Definition of Happiness, and especially of the word Soul (ψυχή).*

The Definition of Happiness implies the knowledge (1) of the nature of Virtue,

I We now proceed to a detailed analysis of our Definition of Happiness. Happiness was said to involve the highest degree of Virtue. We cannot therefore fully understand Happiness without a complete investigation of Virtue. We premise one

CHAP. XIII.—It is worth while now to review the position we have reached. Chaps. i—iii were introductory; ch. iv—vi criticised the principal existing theories about Happiness; ch. vii. constructed a new Definition of Happiness, which, if accepted, would close the treatise at once with a Q.E.D. All that follows now is the defence of that Definition. Ch. viii—xii contrast it with the principal received opinions on the same subject, in order to claim as much accordance with them as possible. Ch. xiii. commences a more formal analysis of the Definition itself. Two words in that Definition require special elucidation, ἀρετὴ and

ψυχή. ψυχή is explained, as far as is practically necessary, in this chapter. It is found to contain two parts at any rate which are capable of degrees of excellence (ἀρετῆ), viz. an *appetitive* and a *rational* part. The excellence of the former is Moral (ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ). The excellence of the latter is Intellectual (διανοητικὴ ἀρετὴ). These two kinds of excellence are discussed at length, the former in Bks. II—V., the latter in Bk. VI.

3. ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία . . . τελείαν] This is simply a recapitulation of the Definition in ch. vii. omitting only 'ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ.'

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τὸν ὀφθαλμοὺς θεραπεύσοντα καὶ πᾶν σῶμα, καὶ μᾶλλον
ὄσῳ τιμιωτέρα καὶ βελτίων ἢ πολιτικὴ τῆς ἰατρικῆς.
Τῶν δ' ἰατρῶν οἱ χαρίεντες πολλὰ πραγματεύονται περὶ
8 τὴν τοῦ σώματος γνῶσιν. Θεωρητέον δὲ καὶ τῷ πολι-
τικῷ περὶ ψυχῆς, θεωρητέον δὲ τούτων χάριν, καὶ ἐφ'
ὅσον ἱκανῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ζητούμενα· τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ πλείον
ἐξακριβοῦν ἐργωδέστερον ἴσως ἐστὶ τῶν προκειμένων.
9 Λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις
ἀρκούντως ἔνια, καὶ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς. Οἷον· τὸ μὲν
10 ἄλογον αὐτῆς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λόγον ἔχον. Ταῦτα δὲ πότε- 10
ρον διώριστα καθάπερ τὰ τοῦ σώματος μέρη καὶ πᾶν
τὸ μεριστὸν, ἢ τῷ λόγῳ δύο ἐστὶν ἀχώριστα πεφυκότα,
καθάπερ ἐν τῇ περιφερείᾳ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον,

both how-
ever within
the practical
limits which
we have
already im-
posed on
ourselves.
The Soul is
commonly
divided into
a Rational
and an
Irrational
part.

8 the Science of Social Life, provided the inquiry be confined
within the limits of what is practically necessary to throw
9 light upon the subject of Virtue. For our present object the
ordinary popular treatises will suffice. We there find it stated
that the Soul consists of two parts, a rational part and an
10 irrational part. Whether these parts be literally separate, like
the limbs of the body, or separate in thought only, like the
concave and convex sides of a curve, is indifferent for our

1. After πᾶν σῶμα under-
stand again the words 'δεῖ εἰδέναι
πως.' As the Oculist must study
also to some extent the condi-
tions of health of the whole body,
so must the social philosopher
acquaint himself in some degree
with the whole ψυχῆ, though his
own practice is limited to a por-
tion of it.

3. χαρίεντες] 'accomplished.'
Opp. to οἱ πολλοὶ in iv. 2, and
somewhat similarly in v. 4.

8. ἐξωτερικὸς means what is
adapted for the world outside
(ἐξω), ἐσωτερικὸς what is adapted
for the inner (ἐσω) circle of
philosophic students. Hence
'exoteric' 'esoteric' refer to
'popular' and 'scientific' meth-
ods respectively. Some have
supposed οἱ ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι to
refer to a division of Aristotle's
own works. It is more probable,
however, that they denote ordi-
nary popular treatises.

- 11 οὐθὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ παρόν. Τοῦ ἀλόγου δὲ τὸ μὲν
 ἔοικε κοινῶ καὶ φυτικῶ, λέγω δὲ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ τρέφεσ-
 θαι καὶ αὔξεσθαι· τὴν τοιαύτην γὰρ δύναμιν τῆς
 ψυχῆς ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς τρεφομένοις θείη τις ἂν καὶ ἐν
 τοῖς ἐμβρύοις, τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην καὶ ἐν τοῖς τελείοις. 5
- 12 εὐλογώτερον γὰρ ἢ ἄλλην τινά. Ταύτης μὲν οὖν κοινή·
 τις ἀρετὴ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη φαίνεται· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν
 τοῖς ὕπνοις ἐνεργεῖν μάλιστα τὸ μόριον τοῦτο καὶ ἡ
 δύναμις αὕτη, ὃ δ' ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς ἤκιστα διάδηλοι
 καθ' ὕπνον, ὅθεν φασὶν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ 10
- 13 βίου τοὺς εὐδαίμονας τῶν ἀθλίων. Συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο·
 εἰκότως ἀργία γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ ὕπνος τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ λέγεται·
 σπουδαία καὶ φαύλη, πλὴν εἴ πη κατὰ μικρὸν διῴκνου-
 ταί τινες τῶν κινήσεων, καὶ ταύτη βελτίω γίνεται τὰ
- 14 φαντάσματα τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἢ τῶν τυχόντων. Ἄλλὰ 15
 περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλοις, καὶ τὸ θρεπτικὸν ἑατέον, ἐπειδὴ

- 11 present purpose. 1. Let us first consider the *irrational* part.— (1) The
 (a) One portion of this is the source of nutriment and growth irrational
 which is found wherever there is life, in all creatures, and part is also
 even in plants, in the foetus as well as in the full-grown animal. twofold,
 including—
- 12 There can be no specially human Virtue in this part. In fact (a) the
 13 it acts with most vigour in sleep, when good and bad men source of
 and growth;
- 14 differ not at all, or else in a manner which is of no conse-

4. ψυχῆς] Observe the wide use of ψυχῆ, which makes it so difficult a word to translate. We should scarcely regard the 'soul' as the seat of physical life, growth, and nutriment. (See Glossary on ψυχῆ.)

5. There is no difference in that which is the source of growth and nutrition in the embryo and in the full-grown animal. If there

were, when did the change occur? Aristotle insists upon this identity in order to show that this part of our nature is out of all relation to Virtue, Moral or Intellectual (see § 14), as there can of course be nothing of the kind in the embryo. This absence of change or progress cannot be asserted of the other two parts of the ψυχῆ, the Appetitive and the Rational.

15 τῆς ἀνθρωπικῆς ἀρετῆς ἄμοιρον πέφυκεν. Ἐοίκε δὲ
καὶ ἄλλη τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογος εἶναι, μετέχουσα
μέντοι πῆ λόγου. Τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς τὸν
λόγον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λόγον ἔχον ἐπαινοῦμεν ὀρθῶς
γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ βέλτιστα παρακαλεῖ· φαίνεται δ' ἐν 5
αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκὸς, ὃ μάχεται
16 τε καὶ ἀντιτείνει τῷ λόγῳ. Ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ καθάπερ τὰ
παραλελυμένα τοῦ σώματος μόρια εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ προαι-
ρουμένων κινῆσαι τὸναντίον εἰς τὰ ἀριστερὰ παραφέρε-
ται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτως· ἐπὶ τὰναντία γὰρ αἱ 10
ὄρμαὶ τῶν ἀκρατῶν. Ἄλλ' ἐν τοῖς σώμασι μὲν ὀρώμεν
τὸ παραφερόμενον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐχ ὀρώμεν.
Ἴσως δ' οὐδὲν ἦττον καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ νομιστέον εἶναί τι
παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐναντιούμενον τούτῳ καὶ ἀντιβαῖνον.
17 Πῶς δ' ἕτερον, οὐδὲν διαφέρει. Λόγου δὲ καὶ τοῦτο 15

the
petites
l desires,
ich are
tly and
some
ise
ional.

15 quence to our present inquiry. (β) There is however another
division of the irrational part, which seems to partake of reason
in some degree. This is evidenced by the phenomena of
Contenance and Incontinence, terms which we technically
apply to cases where either right or wrong is done *after a
conscious inward struggle*. This struggle occurs between
Reason and something opposed to Reason. In the continent
man we applaud the triumph of Reason. In the incontinent
16 him which causes him to do the reverse, just as a paralysed
limb refuses to obey the control of the Will. We conclude
therefore from this that there is something in the Soul distinct
17 from Reason (though in what precise way distinct we need

1. ἀνθρωπικῆς ἀρετῆς] to
throw light upon *that* being the
sole object of this inquiry
about ψυχῇ. See § 8.

3. ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς]
See the precise meaning of these
terms explained in note on iii. 7.

6. ἄλλο τι κ.τ.λ.] 'We find
another law in our members,
warring against the law of our
mind' (Rom. vii. 23).

15. Λόγου δὲ καὶ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ.]
Otherwise it could not even op-
pose Reason, as it does in the case

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τῶν φίλων φαμὲν ἔχειν λόγον, καὶ οὐχ ὡςπερ τῶν
 μαθηματικῶν. "Ὅτι δὲ πείθεται πως ὑπὸ λόγου τὸ
 ἄλογον, μηνύει καὶ ἡ νουθέτησις καὶ πᾶσα ἐπιτίμησις
 19 τε καὶ παράκλησις. Εἰ δὲ χρὴ καὶ τοῦτο φάναι λόγον
 ἔχειν, διττὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως 5
 καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, τὸ δ' ὡςπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι.
 20 Διορίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην·
 λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς μὲν διανοητικὰς, τὰς δὲ ἠθικὰς,

wholly irrational, the latter only partially so, because it is at any rate amenable to Reason.

Hence (2) the Rational part also may be regarded as twofold if the Appetites should be rather referred to it.

19 2. Let us now consider the *rational* part.—Here we have simply to determine the degree of strictness with which we will use the word 'rational.' If we use it so as to include the partially-rational *appetites*, then this part of the Soul may be considered as twofold, viz.—(α) The Reason itself; (β) The appetitive part. Thus the assignment of the appetitive part to the Rational or to the Irrational division of the Soul is a question of words, or of arrangement merely.

Corresponding to the division of the Soul into Rational and Appetitive is the twofold division of Virtue into Intellectual and Moral.

20 Now to apply this to the question it was intended to elucidate,

σοῦτον ὥστε αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔχειν. He adds that the lower animals (like τὸ φυτικόν in the text here) οὐδὲ λόγου αἰσθάνεται.

The result is, that it becomes to some extent a question of words to which of the two divisions of the Soul, Rational or Irrational,

we assign the Appetites. The main point is that, in either case, we recognise the three distinct parts φυτικόν, ἐπιθυμητικόν, λογιστικόν. The following scheme will exhibit the two methods of arrangement by which this result may be reached:—

I.	ψυχὴ {	ἄλογον μέρος	{	(i) wholly ἄλογον	}	τὸ φυτικόν.
(ii) τὸ ἀντιτείνον τῷ λόγῳ				τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν.		
		λόγον ἔχον μέρος		(which τὸ φυτικόν is not)		τὸ λογιστικόν.
II.	ψυχὴ {	ἄλογον μέρος	{	(i) a part amenable to reason,	}	τὸ φυτικόν.
(ii) a part in full possession of reason,				τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν.		
		λόγον ἔχον μέρος		and so λόγον ἔχον in sense (2)		τὸ λογιστικόν.
				λόγον ἔχον in sense (1)		

8. We speak of Intellectual equally for both. (See Glossary, *Excellences* and *Moral Virtues*. s.v. ἀρετή.)
 In Greek ἀρετὴ could be used

σοφίαν μὲν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν διανοητικὰς, ἐλευθεριότητα δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην ἠθικὰς. Λέγοντες γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἠθους οὐ λέγομεν ὅτι σοφὸς ἢ συνετὸς ἀλλ' ὅτι πρᾶος ἢ σώφρων, ἐπαινοῦμεν δὲ καὶ τὸν σοφὸν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν· τῶν ἕξεων δὲ τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς 5 λέγομεν.

viz. the nature of Virtue. The part of the Soul relating to nutriment, etc., has nothing to do with Virtue, as we have already seen. The perfection of the purely Rational part gives rise to Intellectual Virtues or Excellences, *e.g.* Wisdom, Prudence, Intelligence. The perfection of the Appetitive part gives rise to Moral Virtues, such as Gentleness, Liberality, Self-restraint. The term 'Virtue' we apply to any permanent state or habit which is praiseworthy.

1. φρόνησις is inadequately translated by 'Prudence,' which indicates more or less a *Moral* Virtue. It is explained in B. VI. to be the intellectual element of right judgment which is essential to all moral virtue: 'essential,' because mere blind 'earnestness' without a reasonable exercise of judgment is not Virtue: or (as Dr. Johnson phrased it) 'intellectual imbecility is no excuse for moral perversity.' Aristotle thinks that we are bound to have 'a right judgment in all things,' and would have no sympathy with 'imbecile virtue.' In B. IV. he frequently insists on the necessity of applying intellectual judgment to the details of moral action (*e.g.*

esp. in μεγαλοπρέπεια, εὐτραπεία, etc.). For proof that φρόνησις itself is an Intellectual and not a Moral quality, see *Supplementary Notes, h.l.*

5. κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν] 'in reference to his state,' *i.e.* if his wisdom is a settled state or habit.

Thus the *essential* or *fundamental* difference between Intellectual and Moral excellence is, that they belong to different parts of the Soul; the former being the perfection of the Rational, and the latter of the Appetitive, part. Upon this follows a *practical* difference in the manner of their acquisition or cultivation, which is pointed out in the beginning of the next Book.

II.

1. Διττῆς δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐσης, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς δὲ ἠθικῆς, ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὐξήσιν, διόπερ ἐμπειρίας δεῖται καὶ χρόνου, ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται, ὅθεν καὶ τοῦνομα ἔσχηκε μικρὸν παρεκκλῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους. 5

CHAP. I.—*Moral Virtue is not implanted in us by Nature.*

Moral Virtue 1
differs from
Intellectual
Excellence,
in that it is
not innate:
because—

IT is an essential difference between Intellectual Excellence and Moral Virtue, that the former is acquired and developed mainly by *instruction*, and the latter (as its name in Greek indicates) by *practice*. Dismissing the former, we proceed

1. See note at the beginning of I. xiii. for the connexion of the argument. The divisions of ψυχή led us to a corresponding division of ἀρετή into Moral and Intellectual (I. xiii. 20). These further exhibit an essential difference in the mode of their acquisition, which is first positively stated, and after this statement, the subject of Intellectual Excellence is tacitly dropped (to be resumed in B. VI.), and the discussion proceeds to establish the assertion just made so far as it relates to Moral Virtue, viz. that it is not implanted in us by nature.

2. τὸ πλεῖον] 'for the most part.' This qualification is meant to allow for the exceptional case of great natural genius.

5. This etymological argument is of course untranslatable. ἔθος (Lat. *mos*) is a habit or custom. ἠθος (Lat. *mores*) is character which is the result of habits. The value of this and similar arguments, such as that derived from the practice of men in legislation in § 5 and III. v. 7, is simply this:—They show the general belief of mankind as reflected in language, but they do not prove that the belief in

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4 ἔθους. "Ἐπι ὅσα μὲν φύσει ἡμῖν παραγίνεται, τὰς δυνάμεις τούτων πρότερον κομιζόμεθα, ὕστερον δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδίδομεν. "Ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων δῆλον οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις ἰδεῖν ἢ πολλάκις ἀκοῦσαι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐλάβομεν, ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν, ἔχοντες ἐχρησά-5 μεθα, οὐ χρησάμενοι ἔσχομεν. Τὰς δ' ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν· ἃ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιῶντες· μαθησόμενοι, οἷον οἰκοδομοῦντες οἰκοδόμοι γίνονται καὶ κιθαρίζοντες κιθαρισταί. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὰ μὲν δίκαια 10 πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονες, 5 τὰ δ' ἀνδρεία ἀνδρεῖοι. Μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν· οἱ γὰρ νομοθέται τοὺς πολίτας ἐθίζοντες ποιῶσιν ἀγαθοὺς, καὶ τὸ μὲν βούλημα παντὸς νομοθέτου τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ὅσοι δὲ μὴ εἰς αὐτὸ ποιῶσιν 15 ἀμαρτάνουσιν, καὶ διαφέρει τούτῳ πολιτεία πολιτείας 6 ἀγαθῆ φαύλης. "Ἐπι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν

(2) Its existence does not precede its exercise in practice.

(3) Practical legislation proceeds on the assumption that Moral Virtue is not innate.

4 (2) In the case of natural faculties (*e.g.* the senses), we have them before we use them. In the case of Moral Virtues (as in artistic skill), we develop them by use, *i.e.* by trying to practise them: *e.g.* Temperance is acquired by acting temperately, Courage by acting bravely and so on. (3) The action of legislators bears witness to the general belief of mankind that Moral Virtue is to be acquired by practice. (4) While

7. τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν] Virtue is often regarded by Plato and Aristotle as a kind of Art (*e.g.* iii. 10, iv. 3, vi. 9).

14. τὸ βούλημα κ.τ.λ.] See note on I. xiii. 3.

17. ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν] 'from the same causes and by the same means.' The argument is, that *Natural* phenomena differ from *Moral* phe-

nomena in that, in the former case, the antecedents being the same, the consequents are always the same, whereas in Moral phenomena, from the same antecedents, so far as outward circumstances go, *opposite* results follow. This difference then must arise from something contributed by the moral agent himself.

καὶ γίνεται πᾶσα ἀρετὴ καὶ φθείρεται, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
 τέχνη· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ καθαρίζειν καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοὶ
 γίνονται καθαρισταί. Ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ οἱ οἰκοδόμοι καὶ
 οἱ λοιποὶ πάντες· ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ εὖ οἰκοδομεῖν ἀγαθοὶ
 7 οἰκοδόμοι ἔσονται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κακῶς κακοί. Εἰ γὰρ μὴ 5
 οὕτως εἶχεν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τοῦ διδάξοντος, ἀλλὰ πάντες
 ἂν ἐγίνοντο ἀγαθοὶ ἢ κακοί. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἀρετῶν ἔχει· πράττοντες γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι
 τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γινόμεθα οἱ μὲν δίκαιοι οἱ δὲ
 ἀδικοὶ, πράττοντες δὲ τὰ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς καὶ ἐθιζόμενοι 10
 φοβεῖσθαι ἢ θαρρεῖν οἱ μὲν ἀνδρείοι οἱ δὲ δειλοί.
 Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ
 τὰς ὀργὰς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ σώφρονες καὶ πρᾶοι γίνονται, οἱ
 δ' ἀκόλαστοι καὶ ὀργίλοι, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ οὕτως ἐν αὐ-
 τοῖς ἀναστρέφεισθαι, οἱ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ οὕτως. Καὶ ἐνὶ δὲ 15
 8 λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται. Διὸ

in nature the same causes invariably produce the same results, in the case of Moral Habits, as in the Arts, the same circumstances and courses of action produce opposite results; *i.e.* they produce both good artists and bad, just men and unjust, 7 brave men and cowards. This difference of results then must be due to a difference *in ourselves*, in fact to the different ways in which different people act under the same circumstances. In short, as are our *acts*, so are the *habits* which 8 spring from them. Hence it is important what sort of acts

(4) Out of the same circumstances are developed opposite results in respect of Moral Virtue and Vice.

7. ἐγίνοντο is emphatic. 'every one would have been both a good or bad craftsman,' and so all apprenticeship and practice would have been useless.

16. 'All habits have their origin in courses of action similar to themselves.' Habits are simply the result of repeated acts. *Why* acts from repetition

should become easier we cannot say. *What* is the precise change that has taken place in us when (*e.g.*) the laborious acts of spelling out each word have grown into the easy habit of reading we cannot explain. We really know little more of the phenomena of the formation of habits than Aristotle here states; as a

δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιάς ἀποδιδόναι· κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ ἕξεις. Οὐ μικρὸν οὖν διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως εὐθύς ἐκ νέων ἐθίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν.

I II. Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ παρούσα πραγματεία οὐ θεωρίας ἕνεκά 5 ἔστιν ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι (οὐ γὰρ ἴν' εἰδῶμεν τί ἔστιν ἢ

we become familiar with from earliest youth; for to the character of the resulting habits it makes simply all the difference in the world.

CHAP. II.—*Some general characteristics of such Habits as are Virtuous.*

Virtuous habits differ fr^{om} others in being in accordance with Right Reason:

I In a practical treatise like ours we at once follow up what has now been proved by asking, What is the definite character

[fact, all habits grow from the repetition of acts similar to themselves.

ὁμοίων] There is no contradiction between this and the statement in § 6 *init.*, viz. That similar acts produce opposite results. Acts and circumstances may be externally the same and yet very different to different people. And it is on the latter consideration, viz. their relation to the individual doing them, that their influence on resulting habits depends. *e.g.* A subscription of precisely the same amount would be liberal in one man and mean in another. Thus the same act has a tendency to form a *habit* of liberality in the one case, and of stinginess in the other.

CHAP. II.—This Chapter holds a somewhat similar position in the investigation of a Definition

of Virtue to that of I. vii. 1-8, in the investigation of the Definition of Happiness. Aristotle feels his way towards a Definition in each case by first laying down certain broad and general characteristics of the thing to be defined. Two such are arrived at in this Chapter. Next, Chapters iii. and iv. consider questions arising out of the statements here made. Then Chapters v. and vi. contain the systematic construction of the Definition of ἀρετή, and so far may be compared with the formal construction of the Definition of Happiness in I. vii. 9-16.

6. αἱ ἄλλαι] Either 'the rest of treatises on this subject,'—it being a complaint of Aristotle's elsewhere that this is a general fault of the systems of his time (τῶν χρησιμῶν διαμαρτάνουσι,

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τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τὰκριβές· οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ
 τέχνην οὔθ' ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν οὐδεμίαν πίπτει, δεῖ δ'
 αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν σκοπεῖν,
 ὡσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰατρικῆς ἔχει καὶ τῆς κυβερνητικῆς.
 5 Ἀλλὰ καίπερ ὄντος τοιούτου τοῦ παρόντος λόγου πει- 5
 6 ρατέον βοηθεῖν. Πρῶτον οὖν τοῦτο θεωρητέον, ὅτι τὰ
 τοιαῦτα πέφυκεν ὑπὸ ἐνδείας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς φθείρεσθαι,
 (δεῖ γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίοις
 χρῆσθαι) ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας ὁρῶμεν
 τὰ τε γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ ἐλλείποντα 10

5 cially in matters of detail. With this proviso we may now make
 two general statements which hold good of Virtuous Habits.

6 Both are suggested by the analogy of bodily habits, such as
 health and strength. (i) The first is:—*Excess and defect are
 injurious, moderation is beneficial, to the formation of such habits.*
 This is true of bodily health in reference to the amount of

but, more
 definitely,
 like good
 bodily
 habits,
 (1) in their
 formation,
 they in-
 volve an
 avoidance
 of excess
 and defect,
 and aim at
 moderation:

vii. 17, etc., also (and esp. in
 reference to the words of I. 10,
 p. 75) see I. iii. 2-4.

2. παραγγελία] 'body of
 rules.' αὐτοὺς in the next line
 is of course emphatic.

8. δεῖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] This is the
 clue to the line of thought pur-
 sued in this Chapter. It is *the
 analogy existing between the Body
 and Soul* in respect of their habits
 or acquired capacities. In ch. vi.,
 where the formal Definition of
 Virtue is investigated, the argu-
 ment proceeds from another
 analogy, viz. that existing be-
 tween Virtue and Art. The
 words in the parenthesis express
 very well the principle of what
 is generally called 'the Argu-
 ment from Analogy.' e.g. In

Butler's 'Analogy' the 'φανερὰ'
 are the obvious arrangements of
 the *Natural* world, the 'ἀφανῆ'
 the arrangements of the *Moral*
 world, as indicated to us by
 Religion, Natural or Revealed.
 The point of similarity is that
 the arrangements in both cases
 proceed from the same Author,
 and the 'Argument from Ana-
 logy' is, that they are therefore
 likely to resemble one another.
 So in the present passage the
 φανερὰ are bodily habits, the
 ἀφανῆ habits of the Soul: the
 point of similarity that they are
 parts of the same complex Being:
 and the 'Argument from Ana-
 logy' is that they are likely to
 resemble one another in their
 nature and growth.

φθείρει τὴν ἰσχὺν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ποτὰ καὶ τὰ σιτία, πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω γινόμενα φθείρει τὴν ὑγίειαν, τὰ δὲ (7
 7 σύμμετρα καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ αὖξει καὶ σώζει. Ὅτως οὖν
 καὶ ἐπὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας ἔχει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 ἀρετῶν ὅ τε γὰρ πάντα φεύγων καὶ φοβούμενος καὶ 5
 μηδὲν ὑπομένων δειλὸς γίνεται, ὅ τε μηδὲν ὅλως φοβού-
 μενος ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντα βαδίζων, θρασύς. Ὅμοίως δὲ
 καὶ ὁ μὲν πάσης ἡδονῆς ἀπολαύων καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ἀπεχό-
 μενος ἀκόλαστος, ὁ δὲ πάσας φεύγων, ὡσπερ οἱ ἀγροῖ-
 10 κοι, ἀναίσθητός τις φθείρεται γὰρ ἢ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἢ
 ἀνδρεία ὑπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, ὑπὸ δὲ 10
 8 τῆς μεσότητος σώζεται. Ἄλλ' οὐ μόνον αἱ γενέσεις
 καὶ αἱ αὖξήσεις καὶ αἱ φθοραὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπὸ
 τῶν αὐτῶν γίνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς
 ἔσονται καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν φανερωτέρων
 οὕτως ἔχει, οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος γίνεται γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ 15
 πολλὴν τροφήν λαμβάνειν καὶ πολλοὺς πόνους ὑπομέ-

7 food, drink, and exercise; and so it is of Temperance in
 respect of pleasure, and of Courage in respect of fear, and
 similarly of other Virtues, in respect of the subject-matter
 8 with which each is concerned. (ii) Our second point is:—
Virtuous habits when formed reproduce the acts by which
they were formed. Bodily habits suggest this law also: e.g.
 Strength is gained by taking food and exercise, and when

(2) when
 formed, they
 reproduce
 the acts
 which form
 them.

9. ἀγροῖκοι] perhaps 'ascetics,'
 or 'boors,' with probable ref. to
 the Cynics. ἀναίσθητός τις, 'A
 sort of insensible man.' Τις is a
 kind of apology for the term 'in-
 sensible,' because, as stated else-
 where, such phenomenon scarcely
 exists. See vii. 3 and III. xi. 7.

12. οὐ μόνον αἱ γενέσεις κ.τ.λ.]

Observe that the former charac-
 teristic of Virtuous Habits had
 reference to their formation and
 growth (γενέσεις καὶ αὖξήσεις),
 the present characteristic has
 reference to their operation
 (ἐνέργειαι) when formed.

14. φανερωτέρων] is explained
 by the parenthesis in § 6 above.

9 νειν, καὶ μάλιστα δύναται ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὁ ἰσχυρός. Οὕτῃ
 δ' ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· ἕκ τε γὰρ τοῦ ἀπέχεσθαι
 τῶν ἡδονῶν γινόμεθα σώφρονες, καὶ γενομένοι μάλιστα
 δυνάμεθα ἀπέχεσθαι αὐτῶν. Ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς
 ἀνδρείας· ἐθιζόμενοι γὰρ καταφρονεῖν τῶν φοβερῶν καὶ
 ὑπομένειν αὐτὰ γινόμεθα ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ γενομένοι μάλιστα
 δυνησόμεθα ὑπομένειν τὰ φοβερά.

1 III. Σημεῖον δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἕξεων τὴν ἐπι-

9 gained enables us to take more food and exercise. So Tem-
 perance is acquired by resisting pleasure, and when acquired
 exhibits itself in the resistance of pleasure. Similarly of
 Courage and other Virtues.

CHAP. III.—*The test of the formation of Habits is the pleasure
 or pain by which acts are accompanied.*

A habit is I
 formed
 whenever
 we do the
 acts related
 to it with
 pleasure.

We can judge at once whether a *habit* is already formed
 or is only in process of formation, by the pleasure or pain

CHAP. III.—If the statement
 at the end of the last Chapter be
 true, how can we tell *when* a
 habit is formed? If we become
 brave by doing brave acts, and
 when we have become brave we
 still do brave acts, how are we
 to know whether our brave acts
 are tending to form the habit, or
 are results of the formed habit?
 Are they in the relation of cause
 or effect to the habit of bravery,
 and when do they pass the line
 from cause to effect? The
 answer is simple. If the acts
 are done with pain and difficulty
 the habit is not yet formed. If
 they are done with pleasure and
 ease they are the result of a
 habit already formed. When

then we feel pleasure in doing
 any act, if it be a right act we
 have formed a habit of Virtue,
 if a wrong act we have formed a
 habit of Vice. When we do any
 act, right or wrong, with pain or
 without pleasure, we have not
 yet formed a habit either Vir-
 tuous or Vicious in that respect.
 It would thus appear that Moral
 Virtue is an affair of pleasure and
 pain: that Virtue and Vice may
 be resolved into a question of
 feeling pleasure and pain when
 we ought. And so after § 1 the
 discussion proceeds upon this text
 as it were, the immediate question
 with which the Chapter opened
 having been sufficiently answered.

8. ποιεῖσθαι] the middle voice

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4 ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας. ^{πολλὰ κινῶν} Μηνύουσι δὲ καὶ αἱ κο-
 λάσεις γινόμεναι διὰ τούτων· ἰατρεῖαι γάρ τινές εἰσιν,
 αἱ δὲ ἰατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι.
 5 Ἔτι, ὡς καὶ πρότερον εἶπομεν, πᾶσα ψυχῆς ἕξις, ὑφ'
 οἴων πέφυκε γίνεσθαι χείρων καὶ βελτίων, πρὸς ταῦτα 5
 καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν φύσιν ἔχει δι' ἡδονᾶς δὲ καὶ λύπας
 φαῦλαι γίνονται, τῷ διώκειν ταύτας καὶ φεύγειν, ἢ ἂς
 μὴ δεῖ ἢ ὅτε οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὡς οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὅσαχῶς ἄλλως ὑπὸ
 τοῦ λόγου διορίζεται τὰ τοιαῦτα. Διὸ καὶ ὀρίζονται τὰς
 ἀρετὰς ἀπαθείας τινὰς καὶ ἡρεμίας· οὐκ εἶ δὲ, ὅτι ἀπλῶς 10
 λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ ὅτε, καὶ
 6 ὅσα ἄλλα προστίθεται. Ὑπόκειται ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ

4 by pleasure or pain. (iii) The infliction of punishment by means of pain (all remedies being through the medium of contraries) proves that it is intended to remedy an excess of pleasure: in other words, that vice consists in pleasure out of place. (iv) As we saw in ch. ii., whatever promotes or hinders the formation of a Virtuous habit is the sphere of its operation when formed. Now Moral habits are formed (not, as some suppose, by indifference to pleasure and pain, but) by feeling

2. διὰ τούτων] 'by means of these,' viz. pleasure and pain, though the latter only is strictly speaking referred to. The use of διὰ with the accus. = 'because of' must not be confused with this. It occurs just below in l. 6.

On κόλασις see note III. v. 7.

4. πρότερον] viz. in c. ii. § 8.

10. ἀπαθείας τινὰς καὶ ἡρεμίας] The Cynics and Stoics held this view. Cf. Pope, *Essay on Man*, ii. 101:—

In lazy apathy let Stoics boast
 Their virtue fix'd: 'tis fix'd as in a frost.

12. ὑπόκειται ἄρα κ.τ.λ.] 'Virtue

therefore is established to be,' etc. This seems to close the discussion, but Aristotle adds three supplementary arguments.

ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ τοιαύτη] This collocation of article, adjective, and substantive always denotes an epithet added emphatically, or by way of limitation, to the substantive. Transl. 'Virtue, at least Virtue of this kind,' i.e. Moral Virtue (ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ), for the statement here made would not be true of διανοητικὴ ἀρετὴ. Compare a similar limitation in vi. 10.

7 τοιαύτη περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας τῶν βελτίστων πρακτικῆς
 ἢ δὲ κακία τούναντίον. Γένοιτο δ' ἂν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκ τούτων
 φανερόν ἔτι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. Τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν
 εἰς τὰς αἰρέσεις καὶ τριῶν τῶν εἰς τὰς φυγὰς, καλοῦ
 συμφέροντος ἡδέος, καὶ τριῶν τῶν ἐναντίων, αἰσχροῦ 5
 βλαβεροῦ λυπηροῦ, περὶ πάντα μὲν ταῦτα ὁ ἀγαθὸς
 κατόρθωτικός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἀμαρτητικός, μάλιστα δὲ
 περὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· κοινή τε γὰρ αὕτη τοῖς ζώοις, καὶ
 πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἴρεσιν παρακολουθεῖ· καὶ γὰρ τὸ
 8 καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον ἡδὺ φαίνεται. Ἐπι δ' ἐκ νηπίου 10
 πᾶσιν ἡμῖν συντέθραπται· διὸ χαλεπὸν ἀποτρίψασθαι
 τοῦτο τὸ πάθος ἐγκεχρωσμένον τῷ βίῳ. Κανονίζομεν

pleasure and pain when we ought. Hence the *exercise* of
 Moral habits when formed (*i.e.* of Moral Virtue) will be ex-
 hibited in feeling pleasure and pain when we ought. In the
 case of Vicious habits this just relation to pleasure and pain
 7 is reversed. We may further add the following arguments:
 —(v) We choose things because they are either good, useful,
 or pleasant. We avoid things because they are either bad,
 harmful, or painful. Now though Virtue goes right and Vice
 goes wrong in all these motives, yet this is pre-eminently the
 case in regard to pleasure and pain, which in some sense in-
 8 clude all the other motives. (vi) Regarded as *feelings* pleasure

3. Observe the position of the articles, making τριῶν the predi-
 cate. 'The inducements for choosing being three in number,
 and the inducements for avoid-
 ing also three.'

9. πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπὸ κ.τ.λ.]
 'accompanies all the motives
 which come under the head of
 choice.' For both the 'good' and
 the 'useful' are also 'pleasant.'
 In III. ix. 2-5, the argument im-

plies that τὸ καλὸν is a kind, and
 indeed a most exalted kind, of ἡδύ.

12. Observe the antithesis be-
 tween τοῦτο τὸ πάθος and καὶ
 τὰς πράξεις, —πάθη and πράξεις
 being, as we were reminded in
 § 3, the sphere of the operation
 of Moral Virtue. Also καὶ τὰς
 πράξεις = 'even our actions,' or
 'our actions also,' the continual
 presence of pleasure and pain as
 regulating *action*, being at first

δὲ καὶ τὰς πράξεις, οἱ μὲν μᾶλλον οἱ δ' ἦττον, ἡδονῇ
 9 καὶ λύπῃ. Διὰ τοῦτ' οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι περὶ ταῦτα
 τὴν πᾶσαν πραγματεῖαν· οὐ γὰρ μικρὸν εἰς τὰς πράξεις
 10 εὖ ἢ κακῶς χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι. Ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον
 ἡδονῇ μάχεσθαι ἢ θυμῷ, καθάπερ φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος, 5
 περὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον αἰεὶ καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἀρετὴ
 καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὖ βέλτιον ἐν τούτῳ. Ὡστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
 περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας πᾶσα ἡ πραγματεία καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ
 καὶ τῇ πολιτικῇ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὖ τούτοις χρώμενος ἀγαθὸς
 ἔσται, ὁ δὲ κακῶς κακός. 10

11 Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας,
 καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν γίνεται, ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ αὖξεται καὶ φθεί-
 ρεται (μὴ ὡσαύτως γινομένων) καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο,
 περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐνεργεῖ, εἰρήσθω.

and pain have been more ingrained into our lives, so to speak,
 by familiarity than any others; and regarded as *motives for*
action also they are constantly present, though in varying
 9 degrees, with all of us. With them therefore our whole
 10 treatise must be concerned. (vii) Finally, nothing is so hard
 to contend with as pleasure; nothing is therefore more meri-
 torious, and consequently more virtuous, than to bring pleasure
 and pain under due control.

11 On all these grounds therefore we argue that Moral Virtue
 consists in the proper regulation of the feelings of pleasure
 and pain.

sight less obvious than the fact
 of our constant susceptibility to
 them as mere *feelings*.

5. Heraclitus was an Ionian
 philosopher who flourished at

Ephesus about 150 years before
 Aristotle.

6. περὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον]
 This principle is again applied by
 Aristotle in III. ix. 2, IV. i. 8, 9.

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σθαι τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα οὐκ ἔαν αὐτά-
 πως ἔχη, δικαίως ἢ σωφρόνως πράττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔαν
 ὁ πράττων πως ἔχων πράττη, πρῶτον μὲν ἔαν εἰδῶς,
 ἔπειτ' ἔαν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτὰ,
 τὸ δὲ τρίτον καὶ ἔαν βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων 5
 πράττη. Ταῦτα δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ τὰς (ἀλλὰ) τέχνας ἔχειν
 οὐ συναριθμεῖται, πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ εἰδέναί· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς
 ἀρετὰς τὸ μὲν εἰδέναί μικρὸν ἢ οὐδὲν ἰσχύει, τὰ δ' ἄλλα
 οὐ μικρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶν δύναται, ἅπερ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις
 4 πράττειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα περιγίνεται. Τὰ μὲν 10
 οὖν πράγματα δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα λέγεται, ὅταν ἦ τοι-

Special con-
 ditions are
 required to
 constitute
 an act as
 moral.

But in Moral Excellence we further require in the agent him-
 self, (α) Knowledge of what he is doing. (β) Deliberate
 choice so to act, and moreover, a pure and disinterested choice.
 (γ) Resolute and unflinching purpose. Of these conditions
 knowledge is of the least weight, while it is the first and only
 requisite in the case of the Arts. The two latter conditions, on
 the other hand, are everything, and they can only be secured
 4 by often *doing* acts of justice, temperance, etc. Hence neither
 to actions nor to individuals can the terms 'just,' etc., be

1. So Pope (*Moral Essays*):—
 Not always actions show the man: we find
 Who does a kindness is not therefore kind.

6. Ταῦτα δὲ κ.τ.λ.] The
 artistic or technical merit of a
 work of art is not affected by the
 motive of the artist, whether
 good or bad, *e.g.* whether his
 work may have been done with
 a religious or charitable purpose,
 or from jealousy or spite. In
 judging of a moral act, such
 considerations would be all-im-
 portant.

7. With πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρε-
 τὰς supply ἔχειν from l. 6.

8. Knowledge, though an
 essential requisite, of itself ad-
 vances us but little in the way
 of virtuous character. This is
 explained by §§ 5 and 6 below.
 See also ii. 1.

τὰ δ' ἄλλα] *i.e.* the other con-
 ditions mentioned, *viz.* deliberate
 choice and unflinching purpose.

10. πράττειν is the emphatic
 word. See § 1, above. Also
 πράγματα μὲν δίκαια (*just acts*) in
 the next line stand in contrast
 with δίκαιος δὲ (*just character*)
 in the following clause.

αὐτὰ οἷα ἂν ὁ δίκαιος ἢ ὁ σώφρων πράξειεν· δίκαιος δὲ
καὶ σώφρων ἐστὶν οὐχ ὁ ταῦτα πράττων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ
οὕτω πράττων ὡς οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ οἱ σώφρονες πράττουσιν.
5 Εὖ οὖν λέγεται ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ δίκαια πράττειν ὁ δίκαιος
γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τὰ σώφρονα ὁ σώφρων· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ 5
μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδὲ μελλήσειε γενέσθαι
6 ἀγαθός. Ἄλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττουσιν,
ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες οἴονται φιλοσοφεῖν
καὶ οὕτως ἔσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι, ὅμοιόν τι ποιοῦντες τοῖς
κάμνουσιν, οἳ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀκούουσι μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ποι- 10
οῦσι δ' οὐθὲν τῶν προσταττομένων. Ὡσπερ οὖν οὐδ'
ἐκείνοι εὖ ἔξουσι τὸ σῶμα οὕτω θεραπευόμενοι, οὐδ'
οὔτοι τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτω φιλοσοφοῦντες.

strictly applied, unless there be, beside the outward act, the
inward spirit and purpose of the formed habit in the doing of
5 it. We were right then in saying that only by *doing* just acts
6 can we become just. Mere theories of Virtue without practice
can no more form virtuous habits, than physicians' prescrip-
tions if not followed can restore health. And yet this truth
is very commonly forgotten.

Above all,
knowledge
without
practice is,
in Morals,
useless.

7. This is well expressed by
Bp. Butler, *Anal.* ch. v. (p. 91
Angus's ed.), 'Habits of the
mind seem to be produced by
repeated acts, as well as habits
of the body. And in like
manner as habits belonging to
the body are produced by exter-
nal acts, so habits of the mind
are produced by the exertion of
inward practical principles, *i.e.*
by carrying them into act, or
acting upon them. . . .
But going over the theory of vir-
tue in one's thoughts, talking

well, and drawing fine pictures
of it; this is so far from neces-
sarily or certainly conducing to
form a habit of it in him who
thus employs himself, that it
may harden the mind in a con-
trary course, and render it
gradually more insensible to all
moral considerations.'

8. τὸν λόγον (in contrast with
οὐ πράττουσι) means theory as
opposed to practice.

13. φιλοσοφοῦντες] The word
φιλοσοφία in Greek has a much
wider significance than that

I V. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτέον. Ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία ἐστὶ, πάθη, δυνάμεις,

CHAP. V.—*The Genus of Virtue determined.*

All attributes of the Soul (including therefore Virtue) are either πάθη, δυνάμεις, or ἕξεις.

I We have now to investigate the formal Definition of Virtue, and first, in natural order, to determine its Genus. It is evidently connected with the soul and not with the body.

which 'Philosophy' would convey to us. In the absence of any revealed Religion, and the admitted inadequacy of the popularly received system of Religion, Philosophy would to a thinking Greek supply to some extent the place of Religion. To it alone he could look not only for theories of morality, but for practical rules for the guidance of life. Thus when Plato speaks of men ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετειληφότες (*Rep.* p. 619), he would convey nearly the same notion, as if we should say 'men who have lived a life of morality without religion.'

CHAP. V.—We now commence the formal construction of the Definition of Virtue. And as all Logical Definition consists in assigning the Genus and the Differentia, we first ascertain the Genus of Virtue (τί ἐστὶν) in ch. v., and then its Differentia (ποιόν τι) in ch. vi. Now there are two ways in which we may hunt (θηρεύειν) for a Definition, according to Aristotle. (1) We may take a wide Genus or class which is sure to include the object to be defined besides a good deal more,

and then narrow that class by adding qualities or conditions till it becomes co-extensive with the thing to be defined; or we may exclude one by one such members of the class as are obviously beside our purpose. *e.g.* In this Chapter to define Virtue Aristotle takes the wide Genus τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ—and since all attributes of the soul may be divided into πάθη, δυνάμεις, and ἕξεις, and as Virtue cannot (for reasons assigned) be either πάθος or δύναμις, we thus obtain ἕξεις as the proper Genus of Virtue. (2) The other method of 'hunting' for a Definition is to take a number of concrete instances in which the quality to be defined is found, and then ascertain what it is which they have in common. *e.g.* On this plan Aristotle's course would have been to take the several virtues and find what they have in common in the midst of their various distinctions and individual peculiarities, and that common element would account for their being called by the common name Virtue, and would in fact constitute the Definition of Virtue.

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4 Ἐπι ὀργιζόμεθα μὲν καὶ φοβούμεθα ἀπροαιρέτως, αἱ δ' ἀρεταὶ προαιρέσεις τινὲς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ προαιρέσεως. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη κινεῖσθαι λεγόμεθα, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας οὐ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ διακεῖ-
5 σθαί πως. Διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲ δυνάμεις εἰσὶν· οὔτε γὰρ 5 ἀγαθοὶ λεγόμεθα τῷ δύνασθαι πάσχειν ἀπλῶς οὔτε κακοὶ, οὔτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα. Καὶ ἔτι δυνατοὶ μὲν ἐσμὲν φύσει, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ ἢ κακοὶ οὐ γινόμεθα φύσει εἰ-

4 we obviously do apply them to virtue and vice. (β) There is no deliberate choice in Emotions, as we have already stated (ch. iv.) that there is in Virtue. (γ) We are said to be 'moved' by our Emotions, but 'disposed' by virtue and vice, and this difference of language implies a difference of fact.
nor δύναις. 5 ii. Virtue is not a mere 'Capability,' because—(α) The argument above as to the application of praise, blame, etc., applies to Capabilities as well as to Emotions. (β) Capabilities come

1. ἀπροαιρέτως] = 'without purpose,' 'spontaneously.' The objects corresponding to particular passions or emotions being present, the emotion must be *felt* (though not necessarily encouraged or indulged), as necessarily as heat must be felt on approaching a fire. No reason or deliberation can prevent this.

Compare Butler's *Analogy*, pt. i. ch. v. (p. 98, ed. Angus). 'The principle of Virtue can neither excite them (viz. such affections) nor prevent their being excited. On the contrary, they are naturally felt when the objects of them are present to the mind, not only before all consideration whether they can be obtained by lawful means, but after it is

found they cannot. For the natural objects of affection continue so.' . . . And again, 'Particular propensions (by which name Butler describes such affections) from their very nature must be felt, the objects of them being present' (p. 100).

2. προαιρέσεις] The authority for this statement at present is iv. 3. It is afterwards embodied in the formal Definition of Virtue in vi. 15.

4. οὐ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ διακεῖσθαι] Not 'moved' but 'disposed.' The latter word implying a more permanent affection. The distinction being made in language is a proof that such a distinction is commonly believed to exist. See note on i. 1.

6 πομεν δὲ περὶ τούτου πρότερον. Εἰ οὖν μήτε πάθη εἰσὶν αἱ ἀρεταὶ μήτε δυνάμεις, λείπεται ἕξις αὐτὰς εἶναι.

1 VI. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τῷ γένει ἡ ἀρετὴ, εἴρηται· δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἕξις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποία τις.

2 Ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι πᾶσα ἀρετὴ, οὐκ ἂν ἢ ἀρετὴ, αὐτό τε εὖ 5 ἔχον ἀποτελεί, καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδίδωσιν, οἷον ἢ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετὴ τὸν τε ὀφθαλμὸν σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ· τῇ γὰρ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετῇ εὖ

by nature, Virtue does not, as we have fully proved in ch. i.
6 iii. Hence we argue that if Virtue is neither an Emotion nor a Capability it must be a Habit.

Therefore
Virtue is
a ἕξις.

CHAP. VI.—*The differentia of Virtue determined, and thus its full Definition arrived at.*

1 The next point will be to show *what sort* of a Habit Virtue
2 is. Now speaking generally Excellence (ἀρετὴ) of whatever kind perfects that of which it is the excellence, and causes

We next ask,
What sort
of a habit
is Virtue?
We conceive
of Excel-
lence gene-
rally as
perfecting
any work.

CHAP. VI.—In this Chapter Aristotle discovers what sort of a Habit Virtue is, as follows. First he lays down the broad general conception that Excellence (ἀρετὴ) of any kind perfects the work of that of which it is the Excellence (§§ 1-3). Next he asks, In what then consists the perfection of *Man's* works? (§ 4). Having noted that all things capable of division at all can be taken in excess, defect, or moderation, he states that the perfecting of all human work, scientific, artistic, and therefore still more, moral, consists in securing the mean or moderate

amount (neither too much nor too little) of that with which it has to deal (§§ 5-9). He then explains that this is true only of Moral and not of Intellectual Excellence (§§ 10-13). After another argument pointing to the same conclusion derived from there being in all cases only one right and many wrong courses (§ 14), the formal Definition of Virtue is enunciated (§ 15), and the Chapter concludes with removing two possible misconceptions of, or objections to, the theory that all Virtue is a 'mean' state (§§ 16, etc.).

ὀρώμεν. Ὅμοίως ἢ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετὴ ἵππου τε σπου-
 3 δαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ ἀγαθὸν δραμεῖν καὶ ἐνεγκεῖν τὸν ἐπι-
 βάτην καὶ μείναι τοὺς πολεμίους. Εἰ δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ
 πάντων οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἢ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ εἴη ἂν
 4 ἕξις ἀφ' ἧς ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται καὶ ἀφ' ἧς εὖ τὸ 5
 ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον ἀποδώσει. Πῶς δὲ τοῦτ' ἔσται, ἤδη μὲν
 εἰρήκαμεν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ᾧδ' ἔσται φανερόν; εἰ θεωρή-
 σωμεν ποία τις ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς. Ἐν παντὶ δὴ
 5 συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῶ ἔστι λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλεῖον, τὸ δ'
 ἔλαττον, τὸ δ' ἴσον, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ κατ' αὐτὸ ὁ πρᾶγμα, 10
 ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὸ δ' ἴσον μέσον τι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλεί-
 ψεως. Λέγω δὲ τοῦ μὲν πρᾶγματος μέσον τὸ ἴσον

3 its peculiar function to be well performed. Hence Moral
 Virtue (*i.e.* human Excellence) will perfect human nature
 and cause the proper function of human nature to be well
 4 performed. How this will be has been already hinted at (in
 ch. ii.) from the analogy existing between the functions of the
 body of man and of his soul and of their respective Excel-
 lences, but we now proceed to discuss the question on more
 general principles. In everything which is capable of divi-
 sion at all, whatever be the nature of the connexion of its
 parts, we can have an excessive, a defective, and a just amount.
 These amounts may be taken either absolutely or relatively,
 and the just amount is always a *mean* in respect of the
 excess and defect, *i.e.* it lies somewhere between them. An
 5 'absolute' mean then is that which is precisely half-way

Whenever
 different
 degrees of a
 thing are
 possible,
 Excellence
 consists in
 securing
 a mean or
 moderate
 amount,
 and that
 judged in
 relation to
 circum-
 stances.

4. καὶ marks the conclusion of the argument.

9. *ξυνεχῆς* is applied to that whose parts are continuous or in close connexion, *e.g.* a stick or stone; *διαιρετὸς* to that whose parts are not so connected, *e.g.* a heap of stones, a handful of sand

or gravel. In either case it is possible to take varying amounts of the things in question. Another interpretation explains *ξυνεχῆς* of geometrical magnitudes, line, figure, etc.; *διαιρετὸς* of arithmetical numbers.

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ἐπιστήμη οὕτω τὸ ἔργον εὖ ἐπιτελεῖ, πρὸς τὸ μέσον
 βλέπουσα καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἄγουσα. τὰ ἔργα (ὅθεν εἰώθασιν
 ἐπιλέγειν τοῖς εὖ ἔχουσιν ἔργοις ὅτι οὐτ' ἀφελεῖν ἔστιν.
 οὔτε προσθεῖναι, ὡς τῆς μὲν ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλεί-
 ψεως φθειρούσης τὸ εὖ, τῆς δὲ μεσότητος σωζούσης), 5
 οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ τεχνῖται, ὡς λέγομεν, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέ-
 ποντες ἐργάζονται, ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα
 καὶ ἀμείνων ἔστιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις, τοῦ μέσου ἂν εἴη
 10 στοχαστική. Λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικὴν. γάρ ἐστι περὶ
 πάθη καὶ πράξεις, ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἔστι ὑπερβολὴ καὶ 10
 ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. Οἷον καὶ φοβηθῆναι καὶ θαρ-

neither excessive nor defective, but in due moderation, it is this *relative mean* that is always intended. And since then to attain to this relative mean is the end of every art or practical science, much more will it be so in the pre-eminent practical science of morals. Therefore it will be the characteristic feature of Moral Virtue that it perfects the work of man by aiming at a relative mean (in other words, at moderation) in all that it is concerned with. *Moral Virtue*, be it observed (for all this does not apply to *Intellectual Excellence*),

Hence it is
 only with
 Moral Ex-
 cellence or
 Virtue.

This applies to
 Moral
 Excellence
 only, not to
 Intellectual.

tute excellence in the other sort of work (Moral). This analogy must be carefully distinguished from that between the body and the soul of man in ii. 5-7.

8' ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις] *i.e.* Virtue is better than Art, just as Nature also is better than Art. Virtue is often regarded by Plato and Aristotle as a species of art, as has been noticed before, and indeed as its most perfect exemplification.

9. The argument only applies to ἠθικὴ ἀρετή, because it alone

comes within the general case upon which the whole argument is based (see § 4, ἐν παντὶ κ.τ.λ.), as being concerned with something (*viz.* πάθη and πράξεις) admitting of excess, mean, and defect. Such is clearly not the case in regard to Intellectual Excellence. That this is so with πάθη is proved in §§ 10 and 11, and similarly (ὁμοίως) it is asserted of πράξεις in § 12. πάθη and πράξεις are again thus united as forming the groundwork of Virtue in § 16 and also in iii. 3.

ρῆσαι καὶ ἐπιθυμῆσαι καὶ ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἐλεῆσαι καὶ
 ὄλως ἡσθῆναι καὶ λυπηθῆναι ἔστι καὶ μάλλον καὶ ἥττον,
 11 καὶ ἀμφοτέρωθεν οὐκ εὖ· τὸ δ' ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς καὶ πρὸς
 οὓς καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα καὶ ὡς δεῖ, μέσον τε καὶ ἄριστον; ὅπερ
 12 ἔστι τῆς ἀρετῆς. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἔστιν 5
 ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. Ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ περὶ
 πάθη καὶ πράξεις ἔστιν, ἐν οἷς ἢ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἀμαρτάνεται
 καὶ ἢ ἔλλειψις ψεύγεται, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται
 13 καὶ κατορθοῦται· ταῦτα δ' ἀμφω τῆς ἀρετῆς. Μεσότης
 τις ἄρα ἔστιν ἢ ἀρετῆς, στοχαστικὴ γε οὖσα τοῦ μέσου. 10
 14 Ἐτι τὸ μὲν ἀμαρτάνειν πολλαχῶς ἔστιν (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν
 τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι εἰκάζουσι, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν
 τοῦ πεπερασμένου), τὸ δὲ κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς· διὸ καὶ

for Moral Virtue has for its object emotions and actions, both
 11. 12 of which admit of excess, defect, and moderation. This
 moderation will consist in a due regulation of time, occasions,
 objects, motives, manner, etc., in regard to emotions and
 actions; and such regulation of emotions and actions is con-
 13, 14 fessedly a characteristic of Virtue. Once more, it is possible
 to go wrong in many ways, right in one way only: just as we
 may miss a mark in any and every direction and can hit it

That Wrong
 is manifold,
 Right is one,
 points to
 the same
 conclusion.

9. ταῦτα ἀμφω] viz. both
 praise and success (ἐπαινεῖται καὶ
 κατορθοῦται) are characteristics
 of Virtue, as they have just been
 shown to be of moderation
 (μέσον). Compare ὅπερ ἔστι τῆς
 ἀρετῆς above in l. 4, where ὅπερ
 similarly refers to excellence
 (ἄριστον) as being a characteris-
 tic of virtue.

12. The Pythagoreans ex-
 pressed their teaching on Moral
 and other subjects by mathe-
 matical metaphors, which how-
 ever have been often taken lite-

rally. The doctrine quoted in
 the text is a specimen. All that
 is infinite (involving the notion
 of indefinite) is bad; the finite
 is good. Aristotle's inference
 from this, that right lies inter-
 mediate to the various courses of
 wrong, somewhat resembles the
 argument which is called the
 'Principle of Sufficient Reason'
 in Mathematics, as it is applied,
 e.g. to establish what is called the
 first Law of Motion. See fur-
 ther, note on I. vi. 7.

ἐπιστήμη οὕτω τὸ ἔργον εὖ ἐπιτελεῖ, πρὸς τὸ μέσον
 βλέπουσα καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἄγουσα τὰ ἔργα (ὅθεν εἰώθασιν
 ἐπιλέγειν τοῖς εὖ ἔχουσιν ἔργοις ὅτι οὐτ' ἀφελεῖν ἔστιν.
 οὔτε προσθεῖναι, ὡς τῆς μὲν ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλεί- 5
 ψεως φθειρούσης τὸ εὖ, τῆς δὲ μεσότητος σωζούσης),
 οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ τεχνῖται, ὡς λέγομεν, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέ-
 ποντες ἐργάζονται, ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα
 καὶ ἀμείνων ἔστιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις, τοῦ μέσου ἂν εἴη
 10 στοχαστική. Λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικὴν αὕτη γάρ ἐστι περὶ
 πάθη καὶ πράξεις, ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ 10
 ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. Οἶον καὶ φοβηθῆναι καὶ θαρ-

neither excessive nor defective, but in due moderation, it is
 this *relative mean* that is always intended. And since then
 to attain to this relative mean is the end of every art or
 practical science, much more will it be so in the pre-eminent
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9. The argument only applies
 to ἠθικὴ ἀρετή, because it alone

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 upon which the whole argument
 is based (see § 4, ἐν παντὶ κ.τ.λ.),
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 thing (*viz.* πάθη and πράξεις)
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 serted of πράξεις in § 12. πάθη
 and πράξεις are again thus united
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18 ἀρετὴ, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης. Οὐ πᾶσα δ' ἐπιδέχεται πρᾶξις οὐδὲ πᾶν πάθος τὴν μεσότητα· ἔνια γὰρ εὐθὺς ὠνόμασται συνειλημμένα μετὰ τῆς φαν-
 λότητος, οἷον ἐπιχαίρεκακία, ἀναισχυντία, φθόνος, καὶ
 ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων μοιχεία, κλοπή, ἀνδροφονία· πάντα δ'
 γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ψέγεται τῷ αὐτὰ φαῦλα εἶναι,
 ἀλλ' οὐχ αἰ ὑπερβολαὶ αὐτῶν οὐδ' αἰ ἐλλείψεις. Οὐκ
 ἔστιν οὖν οὐδέποτε περὶ αὐτὰ κατορθοῦν, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἀμαρ-
 τάνειν· οὐδ' ἔστι τὸ εὖ ἢ μὴ εὖ (περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα) ἐν τῷ

itself and in the abstract that Virtue is a 'mean.' Considered in a special aspect and in reference to a special standard, viz. that of Excellence or Goodness, it is no longer a mean but extreme, i.e. it includes not a moderate, but the greatest possible, amount of good. (2) Conversely it must not be thought that because Virtue consists in moderation that a mean or moderate amount of *anything* is good simply because it is moderate. In respect of things essentially bad the right

means the 'essence' (i.e. the simplest form, or notion, of the existence) of anything.

(2) τί ἦν εἶναι = 'what was the essence of anything?'

(3) τὸ τί-ἦν-εἶναι = 'the what the essence [of anything] was'; or 'that which the essence was'; or in other words again, 'the essence' [of anything].

(4) τὸν λόγον τὸν τί-ἦν-εἶναι λέγοντα, 'the definition stating the essence'; i.e. the 'essential' or 'logical' Definition of anything: quite literally 'the Definition which says what [the] essence [of a thing] was.' Thus the whole expression is nearly equivalent to οὐσία occurring just before, which also means the

'being' or 'essence' of anything, 'essentia' being the exact Latin equivalent of οὐσία.

It remains to explain ἦν and not ἔστι being used. This is done to indicate that the Essence of a thing is *prior to* the existence of the thing itself. e.g. Before any individual man existed the essence of man, i.e. humanity, or the ideas constituting humanity, existed as the type after which man was created, just as the idea of a house exists on paper or in the architect's mind before the house itself is built.

3. εὐθὺς ὠνόμασται συνειλημμένα κ.τ.λ.] 'involve the notion of badness the moment they are named.'

2) Not all moderation is Virtue.

ἦν δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὡς μοιχεύειν, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς τὸ ποιεῖν
 19 ὅτιοῦν τούτων ἀμαρτάνειν ἐστίν. "Ὁμοιον οὖν τὸ ἀξιοῦν
 καὶ περὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ δειλαίνειν καὶ ἀκολασταίνειν
 εἶναι μεσότητα καὶ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν· ἐστὶ γὰρ
 οὕτω γε ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως μεσότης καὶ ὑπερ- 5
 20 βολῆς ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἐλλείψεως. "Ὡσπερ δὲ
 σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας οὐκ ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ
 ἔλλειψις διὰ τὸ μέσον εἶναι πῶς ἄκρον, οὕτως οὐδὲ
 ἐκείνων μεσότης οὐδὲ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, ἀλλ' ὡς
 ἂν πράττηται ἀμαρτάνεται· ὅλως γὰρ οὐθ' ὑπερβολῆς 10
 καὶ ἐλλείψεως μεσότης ἐστίν, οὔτε μεσότητος ὑπερβολὴ
 καὶ ἔλλειψις./

1 VII. Δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ μόνον καθόλου λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ
 καὶ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα ἐφαρμόττειν· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς περὶ τὰς

amount is no longer a mean or moderate amount, but the least
 19 possible amount or rather none at all. If a thing is in itself
 bad, it is *already*, according to our theory, in excess or in
 defect, and therefore we cannot again have excess mean and
 20 defect of it. If it is itself good, it is, according to our theory,
already a mean, and therefore we cannot again have excess
 mean and defect of it.

CHAP. VII.—*A Table or Catalogue of Virtues with their
 related Vices.*

1 In order to prove that our Definition holds good of all the
 Virtues in detail, we proceed to classify them, shewing the
 List of
 Virtues
 and Vic^{es}
 in detail.

8. πῶς] 'in some sense,' i.e. as
 is explained in § 17 *fin.*, Virtue if
 regarded in its special relation to
 the standard of excellence is an
 extreme and not a mean.

CHAP. VII.—Aristotle's plan
 now is to prove the correctness

of this Definition of Virtue, by
 showing it to apply in the case
 of every individual Virtue in
 detail. This is clearly expressed
 again in § 11, ῥητέον οὖν κ.τ.λ.
 With a view to this it is neces-
 sary to have an exhaustive Cata-

πράξεις λόγοις οἱ μὲν καθόλου κενώτεροί εἰσιν, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ μέρους ἀληθινώτεροι· περὶ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα αἱ πράξεις, δεόν δ' ἐπὶ τούτων συμφωνεῖν. Δηπτέον οὖν 2 ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς διαγραφῆς. Περὶ μὲν οὖν φόβους καὶ θάρρη|ἀνδρεία μεσότης· τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν 5 τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος (πολλὰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμα), ὁ δ' ἐν

subject-matter in reference to which each Virtue is a mean state, together with its related Vices of excess and defect. Arranging them in the order of—1. Excess, 2. Mean, 3.

i. Courage. 2 Defect, we have—i. In reference to Confidence and Fear

logue of the Virtues. This is therefore given in the present Chapter, and it forms a sort of 'Table of Contents' for the discussion which follows to the end of Bk. IV.; though the actual order here indicated is not always observed.

2. ἀληθινώτεροι = 'more real,' not to be confused with ἀληθέστεραι = 'more true.'

4. διαγραφῆς] the table or catalogue. This will be found in an Appendix at the end of this Book, together with a note on the probable principle of classification upon which it is constructed.

Περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη] Observe that in each case Aristotle first lays down the morally-indifferent (*i.e.* neither good nor bad in itself, see note on vi. 17) subject-matter, upon the excess, defect, or mean amount, of which the related Virtue and Vices in each case depend. Observe further that this subject-matter is in several cases described by a pair

of words converse to one another, *e.g.* Confidence and Fear, Pleasure and Pain, Giving and Receiving, etc. Now of either member of these pairs we may have excess, mean, or defect, and therefore theoretically there would be *two* Virtues, *each* with two related Vices, belonging to each pair. But as excess of confidence is much the same as defect of fear, and *vice-versa*, (and similarly in the case of the other pairs), the subdivision in each case is a needless refinement, like the distinction between D \sharp and E \flat commonly in Music. Hence it is only carried out in two cases, *viz.* Courage and Liberality, and no stress is laid upon it in the fuller discussion of Bks. III. and IV.

6. πολλὰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμα] It must often be the case that refinements of theory are not of sufficient practical importance to be represented by distinct words in common language, *e.g.* though in *theory* excess of confidence (*ἐν τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλειν*) and

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ἄλλαι διαθέσεις εἰσὶ, μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοπρέπεια (ὁ γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπῆς διαφέρει ἐλευθερίου· ὁ μὲν γὰρ περὶ μεγάλα, ὁ δὲ περὶ μικρὰ), ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ βαναυσία, ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροπρέπεια· διαφέρουσι δὲ αἷται τῶν περὶ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, πῆ δὲ διαφέρουσιν, 5
 7 ὕστερον ῥηθήσεται. Περὶ δὲ τιμῆν καὶ ἀτιμίαν· μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοψυχία, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ χαυνότης τις λεγομένη, 8
 8 ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροψυχία· ὡς δ' ἐλέγομεν· ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, περὶ μικρὰ διαφέρουσιν, οὕτως ἔχει τις καὶ πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν, 10

v. High-mindedness.

vi. Laudable Ambition.

Wealth on a large scale—(1) Vulgar Display, (2) Magnificence, (3) Paltriness. v. In reference to honour and dishonour on a grand scale—(1) Vaingloriousness, (2) High-mindedness, (3) Littlemindedness. vi. In reference to the same in ordinary matters language supplies us only with the terms 'Ambition' and 'Ambitious' on the one hand, and 'Want of Ambition' and 'Unambitious' on the other. As

1. ἄλλαι διαθέσεις] The distinction between Liberality and Magnificence, and between High-mindedness and Laudable Ambition respectively, derives its value partly from the political or social aspect in which the Virtues were regarded by Greek philosophers. Socially the difference is considerable; morally (in the proper sense of the word, *i.e.* in reference to the character of the agent), the difference, though not perhaps wholly unreal, is less important. The term *διάθεσις* is here used as equivalent to *ἔξις*, though it is sometimes distinguished from it as indicating a disposition or tendency only, in contrast with a formed

habit (*ἔξις*), *e.g.* ἐγκράτεια is a *διάθεσις* related to σωφροσύνη as a *ἔξις* (see note I. iii. 7).

3. ἀπειροκαλία] 'bad taste;' literally 'inexperience of what is beautiful.' βαναυσία = βανναυσία (from βαννος a forge and αὔω to burn), 'the practice of a mechanical art,' and hence 'vulgarity' generally. (Liddell and Scott.)

7. Translate 'As we said that Liberality was related to Magnificence, differing from it in that it is on a small scale, so also there is a certain Virtue related to High-mindedness, the latter being concerned with great honours, while the Virtue in question deals with small honours.'

περὶ τιμὴν οὔσαν μεγάλην, αὐτὴ περὶ μικρὰν οὔσα ἔστι
 γὰρ ὡς δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἡττον,
 λέγεται δ' ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλον ταῖς ὀρέξεσι φιλότιμος, ὁ
 δ' ἑλλείπων ἀφιλότιμος, ὁ δὲ μέσος ἀνώνυμος. Ἀνώνυ-
 μοι δὲ καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις, πλὴν ἡ τοῦ φιλοτίμου φιλο- 5
 τιμία. "Οθεν ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης χώρας.
 Καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τὸν μέσον φιλότιμον καλοῦμεν
 ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἀφιλότιμον, καὶ ἔστιν ὅτε μὲν ἐπαινοῦμεν
 9 τὸν φιλότιμον, ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν ἀφιλότιμον. Διὰ τίνα δ'
 αἰτίαν τοῦτο ποιούμεν, ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς ῥηθήσεται νῦν δὲ 10
 περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν λέγωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον.
 10 "Ἔστι δὲ καὶ περὶ ὀργὴν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἑλλειψις καὶ
 μεσότης, σχεδὸν δὲ ἀνωνύμων ὄντων αὐτῶν, τὸν μέσον
 πρᾶον λέγοντες τὴν μεσότητα πραότητα καλέσομεν τῶν
 δ' ἄκρων ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλον ὀργίλος ἔστω, ἡ δὲ κακία 15
 ὀργιλότης, ὁ δ' ἑλλείπων ἀόργητός τις, ἡ δ' ἑλλειψις
 11 ἀόργησία. Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι τρεῖς μεσότητες, ἔχουσαι

however excess and defect are thus recognised there must
 clearly be a mean state, though, in the absence of a settled
 name, either of the above pairs of terms are, according to
 10 circumstances, applied to it. vii. In reference to the regula-
 tion of the Temper—(1) Passionateness, (2) Meekness, (3)
 11 Impassionateness (if there be such a word to describe a
 state which rarely exists). Three Virtues follow relating to

vii. Meek-
 ness.

Three Social
 Virtues, viz.,

5. διαθέσεις] 'The habits as well as the individual characters corresponding are nameless; (or, the abstract as well as the concrete terms are nameless)—except the term "ambition," corresponding with "ambitious". Similarly in English we have no word 'unambition,' to correspond with 'unambitious.'

6. ἐπὶ in Composition has a reciprocal force, e.g. ἐπαμοιβαδία, ἐπιμαχία (offensive and defensive alliance) (see *Suppl. Note*), etc.

10. ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς ῥηθήσεται] See IV. iv. 4.

16: ἀόργητός τις] A sort of 'impassionate' man. 'τις' as it were apologizes for the uncouthness of the term employed: as it

μέν τινα ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλας, διαφέρουσαι δ' ἀλ-
 λήλων· πᾶσαι μὲν γάρ εἰσι περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων
 κοινωνίαν, διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι ἢ μὲν ἐστὶ περὶ τᾶληθές
 τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς; αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐν
 παιδιᾷ, τὸ δ' ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον. ῥητέον οὖν 5
 καὶ περὶ τούτων; ἵνα μᾶλλον κατίδωμεν ὅτι ἐν πᾶσιν ἢ
 μεσότης ἐπαινετὸν, τὰ δ' ἄκρα οὔτ' ὀρθὰ οὔτ' ἐπαινετὰ
 ἀλλὰ ψεκτά. Ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτων τὰ πλείω
 ἀνώνυμα; πειρατέον δ', ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων,
 αὐτοὺς ὀνοματοποιεῖν σαφηνείας ἕνεκεν καὶ τοῦ εὐπαρ- 10
 12 ακολουθήτου. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀληθές ὁ μὲν μέσος
 ἀληθής τις, καὶ ἢ μεσότης ἀλήθεια λεγέσθω, ἢ δὲ
 προσποίησης ἢ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον ἀλαζονεία καὶ ὁ ἔχων
 αὐτὴν ἀλαζών, ἢ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον εἰρωνεία καὶ εἰρών.
 13 Περὶ δὲ τὸ ἡδύ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ ὁ μὲν μέσος εὐτράπε- 15
 λος καὶ ἢ διάθεσις εὐτραπελία, ἢ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βωμολοχία
 καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν βωμολόχος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἀγροϊκός
 τις καὶ ἢ ἕξις ἀγροικία. Περὶ δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἡδύ τὸ ἐν
 τῷ βίῳ ὁ μὲν ὡς δεῖ ἡδύς ὢν, φίλος, καὶ ἢ μεσότης φιλία,

our conduct *in* and *towards* Society—and here we must
 apologize for having to employ somewhat inadequate names
 to describe our meaning. viii. As regards Truth—(1) Boast-
 12 fulness, (2) Truthfulness, (3) Self-Depreciation. ix. As
 13 regards pleasantness in times of relaxation—(1) Buffoonery,
 (2) Geniality, (3) Boorishness. x. As regards general

viii. Truth-
fulness.

ix. Genia-
lity.

x. Friend-
liness.

does elsewhere for its inadequacy,
 when it does not express the
 precise shade of meaning desired:
e.g. χαυνότης τις in § 7, ἀληθής
 τις in § 12, ἀγροϊκός τις in § 13,
 ἀναίσθητός τις in ii. 7.

4. ἐν αὐτοῖς] *i.e.* ἐν λόγοις
 καὶ πράξεσιν.

14. εἰρωνεία = *dissimulatio*,
i.e. a concealment of what you
 are; ἀλαζονεία = *simulatio*, *i.e.* a
 pretension to what you are not.
 εἰρωνεία is a difficult word to
 translate; see further note on
 IV. vii. 3.

19. φίλος and φιλία are not to

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ἢ ὁ μὴδὲ ὅλως ἀναίσχυντος· ὁ δὲ μέσος αἰδήμων. Νέ-
 15 μεσις δὲ μεσότης φθόνου καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας. Εἰσὶ δὲ
 περὶ λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴν τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσι τοῖς
 πέλας γινομένας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νεμεσητικὸς λυπεῖται ἐπὶ
 τοῖς ἀναξίως εὖ πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ φθονερός ὑπερβάλλων 5
 τοῦτον ἐπὶ πᾶσι λυπεῖται, ὁ δ' ἐπιχαιρέκακος τοσοῦτον
 16 ἑλλείπει τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι ὥστε καὶ χαίρειν. Ἄλλα περὶ
 μὲν τούτων καὶ ἄλλοθι καιρὸς ἔσται· περὶ δὲ δικαιο-

i. Sense
of Shame.

ii. Resent-
ment.

Finally,
iii. Justice
in its several
types.

pared with their opposites: viz. xi. In reference to shame felt
 at our own conduct—(1) Excessive Bashfulness, (2) Sense of
 15 Shame, (3) Shamelessness. xii. In reference to indignation
 felt at the success, deserved or undeserved, of others—(1)
 16 Envy, (2) Resentment, (3) Malevolence. xiii. Finally,
 Justice is a word of such various meanings that we must

6. τοῦτον] viz. τὸν νεμεσητικόν.

ὁ δὲ ἐπιχαιρέκακος κ.τ.λ.] This
 account of ἐπιχαιρεκακία is very
 confused. (1) There is no real,
 but only a verbal, opposition
 between grieving at the pros-
 perity of others (φθόνος) and
 rejoicing at the misfortunes of
 others (ἐπιχαιρεκακία). These
 two habits are related like those
 which arise from excess of confi-
 dence or defect of fear, which
 are not really two but one, and
 are called by the common name
 θρασύτης, as was explained in
 § 2. (2) The mean (νέμεσις) con-
 sisting in grieving at the pros-
 perity of others, when it is
 undeserved, and the excess
 (φθόνος) in grieving at the pros-
 perity of others in *all* cases,
 whether deserved or undeserved,
 —the defect *ought* to consist in
 never grieving at the prosperity

of others in any case, but in
 either rejoicing at it or being
 indifferent to it. But in order
 to make any sense of the words
 as they stand, we must under-
 stand with χαίρειν in l. 7 ἐπὶ
 τοῖς κακῶς πράττουσιν or some
 similar words, about which
 nothing has been said or im-
 plied. (See *Suppl. Notes.*)

8. ἄλλοθι καιρὸς ἔσται] On
 referring to the end of B. IV. it
 will be seen that the subject of
 νέμεσις is not referred to in the
 fuller discussions which follow.
 Otherwise the confusion of the
 present passage would probably
 have been corrected in some way.

δικαιοσύνη is a difficult word
 to translate. It not only means
 'justice' in the limited sense
 (though even this, as Aristotle
 shows in Bk. V., is used in two
 or three distinct applications),

σύνης, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς λέγεται, μετὰ ταῦτα διελόμενοι περὶ ἑκατέρας ἐροῦμεν πῶς μεσότητές εἰσιν· [ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀρετῶν].

1 VIII. Τριῶν δὲ διαθέσεων οὐσῶν, δύο μὲν κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν, μιᾶς δ' ἀρετῆς 5 τῆς μεσότητος, πᾶσαι πάσαι ἀντίκεινταιί πως· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαί εἰσιν, ἡ 2 δὲ μέση ταῖς ἄκραις· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἴσον πρὸς μὲν τὸ

hereafter distinguish them, and then show of each kind separately how the law of the mean is applicable to it. The discussion on Intellectual Excellence will follow after that.

CHAP. VIII.—*The nature and degrees of the opposition existing between Virtues and the Vices related to them.*

1 Excess, mean, and defect are all opposed to one another in 2 various degrees. Compared with the excess, the mean appears

but it has also the general sense of 'uprightness' or 'righteousness,' divested of the religious or theological savour attaching to these words. In this application, Aristotle in Bk. V. describes it as συλλήβδην πᾶσα ἀρετή, *i.e.* Virtue in the aggregate. Bk. V. is occupied with distinguishing and defining these several senses of δικαιοσύνη, and, as is promised here, showing how to each of them separately the law of the 'mean' is applicable in different ways.

2. ὁμοίως κ.τ.λ.] The words in brackets are probably interpolated by some copyist who thought it might be well to give the contents of Bk. VI., as well as those of Bks. IV. and V.

The objections to them are: (1) ὁμοίως is not true; for the Intellectual Excellences are in no sense 'mean' states, and Aristotle never suggests or attempts to prove anything of the kind (see note on vi. 10). (2) Aristotle never speaks of λογικαὶ ἀρεταὶ in this sense, but always of διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταὶ, *e.g.* see I. xiii. 20, II. i. 1, etc. If we retain the words we must attach a very loose sense to ὁμοίως and translate—'similarly we shall speak about the Intellectual Excellences also:' in fact understanding ἐροῦμεν only, and not ἐροῦμεν πῶς μεσότητές εἰσιν.

CHAP. VIII.—The fact that Virtue is a *relative* and not an *absolute* mean (*i.e.* not always

The opposition of the two extremes *inter se* is greater than that of either of them to the mean.

ἔλαττον μείζον, πρὸς δὲ τὸ μείζον ἔλαττον, οὕτως αἰ
μέσαι ἕξεις πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἐλλείψεις ὑπερβάλλουσι, πρὸς
δὲ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς ἐλλείπουσιν, ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ
ταῖς πράξεσιν. Ὁ γὰρ ἀνδρείος πρὸς μὲν τὸν δειλὸν
θρασύς φαίνεται, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θρασὺν δειλός· ὁμοίως δὲ 5
καὶ ὁ σώφρων πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀναίσθητον ἀκόλαστος,
πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀναίσθητος, ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος πρὸς
μὲν τὸν ἀνελεύθερον ἄσωτος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἄσωτον ἀνε-
3 λεύθερος. Διὸ καὶ ἀπωθοῦνται τὸν μέσον οἱ ἄκροι
ἐκάτερος πρὸς ἐκάτερον, καὶ καλοῦσι τὸν ἀνδρείον ὁ μὲν 10
δειλὸς θρασὺν, ὁ δὲ θρασύς δειλὸν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων
4 ἀνάλογον. Οὕτω δ' ἀντικειμένων ἀλλήλοις τούτων,
πλείων ἐναντιότης ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς ἀλλήλα ἢ πρὸς
τὸ μέσον· πορρωτέρω γὰρ ταῦτα ἀφέστηκεν ἀλλήλων ἢ
τοῦ μέσου, ὥσπερ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μικροῦ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν τοῦ 15
5 μεγάλου ἢ ἄμφω τοῦ ἴσου. Ἐπι πρὸς μὲν τὸ μέσον ἐνίοις
ἄκροις ὁμοιότης τις φαίνεται, ὡς τῇ θρασύτητι πρὸς τὴν

in defect; compared with the defect, it appears in excess.

3 A man who is in either extreme, reserving to himself the title
of the mean, applies to the true mean the name of the ex-
4 treme opposite to his own. Obviously however the opposition
between the extremes (excess and defect) is greater than that
between the mean and either of them;—partly because the
interval between them is greater in actual distance, as we
5 might say; and partly because sometimes one extreme appears

The mean is
nearer some-
times to the
excess, some-
to the defect.

half-way between the extremes
to which it is related) implies
that it will sometimes be nearer
to one extreme than the other,
and hence that the degrees of its
opposition to them will differ in
different cases. The main re-
sults of this chapter are;—(1)
There is a greater opposition

between the extremes *inter se*
than between either of them and
the mean. (2) Sometimes the
excess and sometimes the defect
is more opposed to the mean. (3)
The degree of this divergence
may depend either upon the
nature of the case or upon our
own dispositions in reference to it.

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ἀνομοιότερον δ' ἢ δειλία, ταύτην μᾶλλον ἀντιτίθεμεν· τὰ
 γὰρ ἀπέχοντα πλείον τοῦ μέσου ἐναντιώτερα δοκεῖ εἶναι.
 8 Μία μὲν οὖν αἰτία αὕτη, ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, ἑτέρα
 δὲ ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν· πρὸς ἃ γὰρ αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκα-
 μέν πως, ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἐναντία τῷ μέσῳ φαίνεται. 5
 Οἷον αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμεν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς, διὸ
 εὐκατάφοροί ἐσμεν μᾶλλον πρὸς ἀκολασίαν ἢ πρὸς κοσ-
 μιότητα. Ταῦτ' οὖν μᾶλλον ἐναντία λέγομεν, πρὸς ἃ ἢ
 ἐπίδοσις μᾶλλον γίνεται· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἢ ἀκολασία
 ὑπερβολὴ οὐσα ἐναντιωτέρα ἐστὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ. 10

I IX. "Οτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἢ ἀρετὴ ἢ ἠθικὴ μεσότης, καὶ

'errors on the right side,' and therefore nearer the mean.

ii. Our own
 dispositions
 and inclina-
 tions.

8 ii. *Our own dispositions.*—If our natural bent or inclina-
 tion is to one extreme rather than the other, then that extreme
 appears more opposed to the mean than the other. Its indul-
 gence would carry us further from the Virtuous mean than
 would the practice of the opposite extreme.

CHAP. IX.—*The difficulty of Virtue—Practical rules for attain-
 ing the Virtuous Mean—The liberty of private judgment
 in points of detail.*

Difficulty
 of Virtue.

I The various points now established concerning Virtue

4. ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν] This fol-
 lows because virtue is a relative
 mean (ἐν μεσότητι τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς).
 Theories of the most absolute
 morality (see Introd. p. xxi.)
 must allow some variation in its
 application to practical details.
 Within certain limits what is
 right for one man is not neces-
 sarily right for another. The
 fallacy of Casuistry is that it ig-
 nores the considerations pointed

out in this section. Conversely
 it might be said that theories
 which make moral distinctions
 purely relative err in overlooking
 the considerations of § 7.

9. ἐπίδοσις] lit. 'increase' or
 'addition,' hence, probably,
 'bias' or 'inclination.'

CHAP. IX.—Another result
 from the mean in Virtue being
 relative and dependent on cir-
 cumstances, and also from the

πῶς, καὶ ὅτι μεσότης δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβο-
 λὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν, καὶ ὅτι τοιαύτη ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ
 στοχαστικὴ τοῦ μέσου εἶναι τοῦ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς
 2 πράξεσιν, ἱκανῶς εἴρηται. Διὸ καὶ ἔργον ἐστὶ σπου-
 δαῖον εἶναι· ἐν ἐκάστῳ γὰρ τὸ μέσον λαβεῖν ἔργον, οἷον 5
 κύκλου τὸ μέσου, οὐ παντὸς ἀλλὰ τοῦ εἰδότος. Οὕτω δὲ
 καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀργισθῆναι παντὸς καὶ ῥάδιον, καὶ τὸ δοῦναι
 ἀργύριον καὶ δαπανῆσαι· τὸ δ' ὧ καὶ ὅσον καὶ ὅτε καὶ
 οὐ ἔνεκα καὶ ὡς, οὐκέτι παντὸς οὐδὲ ῥάδιον· διόπερ τὸ
 3 εὖ καὶ σπάνιον καὶ ἐπαινετὸν καὶ καλόν. Διὸ δεῖ τὸν 10
 στοχαζόμενον τοῦ μέσου πρῶτον μὲν ἀποχωρεῖν τοῦ
 μᾶλλον ἐναντίου, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ Καλυψὼ παραινεῖ

) τούτου μὲν καπνοῦ καὶ κύματος ἐκτὸς ἔεργε
 νῆα·

τῶν γὰρ ἄκρων τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀμαρτωλότερον, τὸ δ' ἤτ- 15
 4 τον· ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦ μέσου τυχεῖν ἀκρῶς χαλεπὸν, κατὰ
 τὸν δευτέρον, φασί, πλοῦν τὰ ἐλάχιστα ληπτέον τῶν
 κακῶν· τοῦτο δ' ἔσται μάλιστα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὃν

2 plainly show that it is difficult to become Virtuous, and a
 complicated matter to attain the accurate mean. Three
 3 practical rules are obvious. i. *Avoid the extreme most*
 4 *opposed to the mean in the nature of things.* If we must
 err, it is at any rate best to choose the lesser of two evils.

Three Rules
 for attaining
 the mean.
 Rule i.

varying degrees of opposition be-
 tween it and its related Vices
 explained in the last Chapter, is
 that it is hard to hit the exact
 mean in all cases. Hence (1)
 practical rules for this purpose
 are suggested, and (2) the right
 of individual liberty of action
 within certain moderate limits is
 maintained.

12. Καλυψὼ] There is a slip
 of memory here. Advice similar
 to this was given to Ulysses by
 Circe (*Od.* xii. 108). The actual
 words, however, occur in the sub-
 sequent admonition of Ulysses to
 his pilot (*Od.* xii. 219).

17. δεύτερος πλοῦς corresponds
 to our expression 'a second-best
 course,' or a 'pis-aller.'

λέγομεν. Σκοπεῖν δὲ δεῖ πρὸς ἃ καὶ αὐτοὶ εὐκατάφοροί
 5 ἔσμεν· ἄλλοι γὰρ πρὸς ἄλλα πεφύκαμεν. Τοῦτο δ'
 ἔσται γνώριμον ἐκ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς λύπης τῆς γινο-
 μένης περὶ ἡμᾶς. Εἰς τοῦναντίον δ' ἑαυτοὺς ἀφέλκειν
 δεῖ· πολὺ γὰρ ἀπαγαγόντες τοῦ ἀμαρτάνειν εἰς τὸ μέσον 5
 ἤξομεν, ὅπερ οἱ τὰ διεστραμμένα τῶν ξύλων ὀρθοῦντες
 6 ποιοῦσιν. Ἐν παντὶ δὲ μάλιστα φυλακτέον τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ
 τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ ἀδέκαστοι κρίνομεν αὐτήν. Ὅπερ
 οὖν οἱ δημογέροντες ἔπαθον πρὸς τὴν Ἑλένην, τοῦτο
 δεῖ παθεῖν καὶ ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὴν ἡδονήν, καὶ ἐν πάσι τὴν 10
 ἐκείνων ἐπιλέγειν φωνήν· οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀποπεμπό-

Rule ii.

ii. *Avoid the extreme to which our natural inclination*
 5 *tends.* The pleasure we derive from actions affords a simple

Rule iii.

6 test of this inclination. iii. *Beware above all of allowing the*
pleasure of actions to bias our judgment respecting them.

1. αὐτοῖ] Thus for example although as a general rule the Virtue of Courage would be gained rather by acts of Rashness than by acts of Cowardice, yet there may be fearless and hot-brained persons who would arrive at it best by acts of what would seem to them cowardice. Again, in order to arrive at the just mean in the way of spending money (ἐλευθεριότης) this rule would probably direct a Scotchman to aim at prodigality (ἀσωτία), but an Irishman to practise what he would consider sordidness (ἀνελευθερία).

6. διεστραμμένα κ.τ.λ.] Straightening a roll of paper by rolling it the opposite way would be another familiar illustration.

8. ἀδέκαστοι] from δεκάζω (and this from δεκάς, a body of ten),

=decuriare, to tamper with the 'decuriæ,' and so generally 'to bribe.' ἀδέκαστοι therefore = 'impartial,' literally 'unbribed.'

9. δημογέροντες] The reference is to *Il.* iii. 158:—

“ On Ilion's towers
 Sat the sage chiefs and councillors of
 Troy.
 Helen they saw, as to the tower she
 came;
 And, 'tis no marvel, one to other said,
 The valiant Trojans and well-greavèd
 Greeks
 For beauty such as this should long en-
 dure
 The toils of war; for goddess-like she
 seems;
 And yet, despite her beauty, let her go,
 Nor bring on us and on our sons a
 curse.”—*Lord Derby's Translation.*

Similarly, says Aristotle, we must dismiss pleasure from our consideration, while we are deliberating, else unbiassed judgment will be out of the question.

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The principle of Classification in the Catalogue on the opposite page appears to be (for Aristotle never explicitly states it) the *degree of relationship to society* implied by the different Virtues: a natural principle in a treatise which regards Ethics as a branch of the Science of Social Life (*πολιτική*, I. ii. 8). From this point of view the Catalogue breaks up into five divisions:—

I. (i and ii) Courage and Temperance are Virtues bearing no *necessary* relation to society. They might be practised on a desert island. They belong to the lowest part of our nature, which we have in common with the brutes, who are incapable of Society. (In III. x. 1 Aristotle hints that this is his reason for treating of these two Virtues first.)

II. iii—vi) These four Virtues can only be exercised in a society of men, and yet they belong rather to ourselves and to our personal character than to our behaviour towards society. This is so especially from Aristotle's point of view, in which Benevolence and such feelings are scarcely, if at all, recognised. See notes on IV. i. 27, IV. iii. 24, etc. Hence the personal element still predominates.

III. (vii) The regulation of the passions forms a sort of connecting link with the purely social virtues which follow. The personal and social elements in this case are nearly balanced.

IV. (viii—x) Three Social Virtues which derive their whole force and meaning from society, and relate simply to our conduct *in* and *towards* society. The social element now preponderates over the *personal*.

V. (xi—xii) Supplementary. Two virtuous states which (as is explained in the text) are not in the fullest sense Virtues, but yet under certain circumstances are commended.

III.

- 1 I. Τῆς ἀρετῆς δὴ περὶ πάθη τε καὶ πράξεις οὔσης, καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἐκουσίοις ἐπαίνων καὶ ψόγων γινομένων,

CHAP. I.—*Voluntary, Involuntary, Mixed and Non-Voluntary Actions distinguished and discussed.*

- 1 The discussion of the difference between Voluntary and Involuntary actions is important (1) in reference to the

Recalling the Definition of Virtue in II. vi. 17 (ἔξις προαιρετικὴ ἐν μεσότητι οὔσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὠρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσειεν), we shall obtain the clue to the plan of what follows to the end of Bk. VI., the whole of which portion of the treatise consists of the illustration of this Definition in detail.

(1) ἔξις—This was sufficiently explained in II. v.

(2) προαιρετικὴ—This has been rather assumed than proved as yet (see II. iv. 3 and v. 4, etc.). Consequently the nature of προαίρεσις is now discussed at length in its relation to Moral action, ch. i—v.

(3) ἐν μεσότητι οὔσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς—This point is next proved

of each of the Virtues in the list given in II. vii. in detail, from III. vi. to end of IV., and of δικαιοσύνη in each of its various senses (for which see II. vii. 16) in Bk. V.

(4) ὠρισμένη . . . ὀρίσειεν—The intellectual powers by which the variable relative mean is to be determined form the subject of Bk. VI., and this completes the discussion of the various terms in the Definition of Virtue.

The discussion of προαίρεσις or Deliberate Choice is approached by determining first the more comprehensive notion of voluntariness; since all that is deliberately chosen must of course be Voluntary, though not *vice versa* (see ii. 16). The contents of the

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προσάττοι αἰσχρόν τι πράξαι κύριος ὢν γονέων καὶ
 τέκνων, καὶ πράξαντος μὲν σώζονται, μὴ πράξαντος δ'
 ἀποθνήσκουσιν, ἀμφισβήτησιν ἔχει πότερον ἀκούσια ἔστιν
 5 ἢ ἐκούσια. Τοιοῦτον δέ τι συμβαίνει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἐν
 τοῖς χειμῶσιν ἐκβολάς· ἀπλῶς μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀπο- 5
 βάλλεται ἐκὼν, ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ δ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν
 6 ἅπαντες οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες. Μικταὶ (μὲν οὖν) εἰσὶν αἱ τοι-
 αῦται πράξεις, εἰκάσι δὲ μᾶλλον ἐκουσίοις· αἴρεται
 γὰρ εἰσὶ τότε ὅτε πράττονται, τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως
 κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν ἔστιν· καὶ τὸ ἐκούσιον δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀκού- 10
 σιον, ὅτε πράττει, λεκτέον. Πράττει δὲ ἐκὼν· καὶ γὰρ
 ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ κινεῖν τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις
 πράξεσιν ἐν αὐτῷ ἔστιν· ὢν δ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρχὴ, ἐπ'
 αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ πράττειν καὶ μή. Ἐκούσια δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα,
 ἀπλῶς δ' ἴσως ἀκούσια· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἔλοιτο καθ' αὐτὸ· 15

6 some greater evil, or the hope of some greater good. But such actions are, so to speak, mixed, being neither purely voluntary nor purely involuntary. They are rather voluntary however, (1) because they are deliberately chosen *at the moment of performance*; and (2) because it is always physi-

Such mixed acts are rather voluntary than involuntary.

motive cause of the action: speaking technically, the Efficient Cause (see Glossary p. xlvii.).

9. τὸ δὲ τέλος κ.τ.λ.] The object or motive of an act is to be determined in reference to the time of its performance; so (δὴ) whether the action were voluntary or involuntary is to be determined in reference to the moment of action. If a conscious motive determined the action *then*, the action itself must have been voluntary, and that fact cannot

be altered by regrets or after-thoughts when the danger is past. That such is the case in the actions we are considering is evident, because the movement of the limbs at least is perfectly free at the moment of action (see l. 12).

12. ὀργανικὰ μέρη] the limbs which are instrumental in the performance of the act.

15. ἀπλῶς] *i.e.* simply or abstractedly, *i.e.* considered apart from surrounding circumstances.

7 τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν. Ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσι δὲ ταῖς τοιαύ-
 ταις ἐνίοτε καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται, ὅταν αἰσχρὸν τι ἢ λυπηρὸν
 ὑπομένωσιν ἀντὶ μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν· ἂν δ' ἀνάπαλι,
 ψέγονται, τὰ γὰρ αἰσχισθ' ὑπομεῖναι ἐπὶ μηδενὶ καλῶ
 ἢ μετρίῳ φαύλου. Ἐπ' ἐνίοις δ' ἔπαινος μὲν οὐ γίνεται, 5
 συγγνώμη δ', ὅταν διὰ τοιαῦτα πράξῃ τις ἃ μὴ δεῖ, ἃ
 τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ὑπερτείνει καὶ μηδεὶς ἂν ὑπομεί-
 8 ναι. Ἐνια δ' ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι, ἀλλὰ
 μᾶλλον ἀποθανετέον παθόντι τὰ δεινότατα· καὶ γὰρ τὸν
 Εὐριπίδου Ἀλκμαίωνα γελοῖα φαίνεται τὰ ἀναγκάσαντα 10
 9 μητροκτονῆσαι. Ἔστι δὲ χαλεπὸν ἐνίοτε διακρίναι ποῖον
 ἀντὶ ποίου αἰρετέον καὶ τί ἀντὶ τίνος ὑπομενετέον, ἔτι
 δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἐμμεῖναι τοῖς γνωσθείσιν· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ
 τὸ πολὺ ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν προσδοκώμενα λυπηρὰ, ἃ δ' ἀναγ-
 κάζονται αἰσχρὰ, ὅθεν ἔπαινοι καὶ ψόγοι γίνονται περὶ 15

7, 8 cally in our power to abstain from them. Their *moral* and their
 character is various. We praise, blame, or make allowance moral char-
 9 for them, according to circumstances; but it is impossible to with circum-
 stances.

1. Regarded in their moral aspect these mixed actions fall into three classes. (Note, it is due to their *mixed* character, and so far as they have an element of *voluntariness* about them, that they admit of a moral aspect at all.)

(1) *Praise* is accorded, when something painful or humiliating (*αἰσχρὸν*) is endured from a noble motive, *e.g.* the case of martyrdom, and the legends of Scævola, Regulus, Lady Godiva, etc.

(2) *Blame*, when shame or disgrace is accepted without ade-

quate reason; *e.g.* the conduct of a traitor who betrays his country or friends to secure his own release from prison.

(3) *Allowance* is made, when the pain or danger is such as to overstrain (*ὑπερτείνει*) human endurance, *e.g.* confessions or revelations wrung out by torture. Aristotle adds that there are some acts so disgraceful that no torture could secure allowance for them, *e.g.* matricide.

11. τὰ ἀναγκάσαντα μητροκτονῆσαι] viz. his father Amphiaraus's injunctions to do so, under pain of his displeasure.

10 τοὺς ἀναγκασθέντας ἢ μή. Τὰ δὲ ποῖα φατέον βίαια;
 "Π ἀπλῶς μὲν, ὁπότ' ἂν ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἢ καὶ ὁ
 πράττων μηδὲν συμβάλληται; "Α δὲ καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν
 ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε αἰρετὰ, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ
 ἐν τῷ πράττοντι, καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ 5
 καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε ἐκούσια. Μᾶλλον δ' ἔοικεν ἐκουσίοις·
 αἱ γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα, ταῦτα δ' ἐκούσια.
 Ποῖα δ' ἀντὶ ποίων αἰρετέον, οὐ ρᾶδιον ἀποδοῦναι πολ-
 11 λαὶ γὰρ διαφοραὶ εἰσὶν ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα. Εἰ δέ τις
 τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ φαίη βίαια εἶναι (ἀναγκάζειν γὰρ 10
 ἔξω ὄντα), πάντα ἂν εἴη οὕτω βίαια· τούτων γὰρ χάριν
 πάντες πάντα πράττουσιν. Καὶ οἱ μὲν βία καὶ ἄκουστες
 λυπηρῶς, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ καλὸν μεθ' ἡδονῆς. Γε-
 λοῖον δὲ τὸ αἰτιᾶσθαι τὰ ἐκτὸς, ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτὸν εὐθή-

- 10 lay down any general rules on such a subject. We reserve then the term Involuntary for cases of physical compulsion.
- 11 Under no circumstances, however, must the violent desire for what is pleasurable or honourable be regarded as causing such compulsion as would make an act involuntary, for (1) This would make all our actions compulsory, and so would prove too much; (2) Such actions are pleasurable, while compulsion is painful. The fault really rests with those who allow themselves to be so easily 'compelled,' who wish to escape the responsibility of their bad actions and yet retain

The violent pleasure of actions is in no case to be considered as a source of compulsion which can excuse them.

10. No emphasis is to be laid on τὰ καλὰ here, because *practically*, no one does argue against the voluntariness of noble acts on the ground that the intense pleasure to be derived from them forces us on. (This is clear from the concluding words of this ch., and also from ch. v.) *Logically*, however, the higher pleasure of

τὸ καλὸν and the lower pleasure of τὸ ἡδὺ stand on the same footing, so far as they affect the voluntariness or involuntariness of actions. Indeed, as Ar. argued in II. iii. 7 (fin.), τὸ καλὸν as a motive for action is in some sense included under τὸ ἡδύ. This reference also illustrates what follows, τούτων γὰρ χάριν κ.τ.λ.

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οὐντα ποιεῖν· ὁ γὰρ μεθύων ἢ ὀργιζόμενος οὐ δοκεῖ δι'
 ἄγνοιαν πράττειν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τι τῶν εἰρημένων, οὐκ εἰδὼς
 δὲ ἀλλ' ἀγνοῶν. Ἐγνοεῖ μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὁ μοχθηρὸς ἃ δεῖ
 πράττειν καὶ ὧν ἀφεκτέον, καὶ διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀμαρτίαν
 15 ἄδικοι καὶ ὅλως κακοὶ γίνονται. Τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον βούλεται 5
 λέγεσθαι οὐκ εἴ τις ἀγνοεῖ τὸ συμφέρον· οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἐν τῇ
 προαιρέσει ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου, ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθη-
 ρίας, οὐδ' ἢ καθόλου (ψέγονται γὰρ διὰ γε ταύτην) ἀλλ'
 10 ἢ καθ' ἕκαστά, ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ἃ ἡ πράξις· ἐν τούτοις
 γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ συγγνώμη· ὁ γὰρ τούτων τι ἀγνοῶν 10
 16 ἀκουσίως πράττει. Ἴσως οὖν οὐ χεῖρον διορίσαι αὐτὰ,
 τίνα καὶ πόσα ἐστὶ, τίς τε δὴ καὶ τί καὶ περὶ τί ἢ ἐν τίνι·
 πράττει, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ τίνι, οἷον ὀργάνῳ, καὶ ἔνεκα τίνος,

principles of conduct, but only to the *details*, or *acts*: else a
 drunkard or a passionate man, or indeed any one who does
 wrong, might plead ignorance in some sense, and hence in-
 voluntariness. Therefore, for the sake of distinction again,
 we shall say that one who acts in ignorance of the general
 principles of conduct, or of what is befitting, or in ignorance
 affecting the deliberate choice of his actions, acts '*ignorantly*,'
 16 but not '*through ignorance*,' nor involuntarily. But one who
 acts in ignorance of some of the details or circumstances
 accompanying his action, we shall say acts '*through ignor-*
ance,' and involuntarily. *e.g.* Ignorance of 'fact' or of

voluntary. If the ignorance could
 have been avoided at the outset,
 the agent is fully responsible for
 it, and also for all and any con-
 sequences that it may lead to.

2. διὰ τι τῶν εἰρημένων] *i.e.*
 μέθη or ὀργή understood from
 μεθύων ἢ ὀργιζόμενος.

12. περὶ τί ἢ ἐν τίνι refers to
 the object upon which or whom
 the act takes place, *e.g.* a man

slaying his son or his father
 in battle unwittingly. The
 murder of Laius in ignorance did
 not make Œdipus, morally
 speaking, a parricide.

13. ἔνεκα τίνος (like οὐ ἔνεκα in
 § 18) has not its usual meaning
 of 'motive' (of which ignorance
 would be out of the question),
 but that of 'tendency,' as the
 examples show.

17 οἷον σωτηρίας, καὶ πῶς, οἷον ἡρέμα ἢ σφόδρα. Ἐπαντα
 μὲν οὖν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν ἀγνοήσκει μὴ μαινόμενος, δῆλον
 δ' ὡς οὐδὲ τὸν πράττοντα· πῶς γὰρ ἑαυτὸν γε; Ὁ δὲ
 πράττει, ἀγνοήσκειν ἂν τις, οἷον λέγοντές φασιν ἐκ-
 πεσεῖν αὐτοὺς, ἢ οὐκ εἰδέναί ὅτι ἀπόρρητα ἦν, ὥσπερ 5
 Αἰσχύλος τὰ μυστικά, ἢ δεῖξαι βουλόμενος ἀφείναι, ὡς
 ὁ τὸν καταπέλτην. Οἰηθείη δ' ἂν τις καὶ τὸν υἱὸν πολέ-
 μιον εἶναι ὥσπερ ἡ Μερόπη, καὶ ἐσφαιρῶσθαι τὸ λελογ-
 χωμένον δόρυ, ἢ τὸν λίθον κίσσηριν εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ
 15 σωτηρία παίσας ἀποκτείνειν ἂν καὶ δεῖξαι βουλόμενος, 10 θίξει
 18 ὥσπερ οἱ ἀκροχειριζόμενοι, πατάξειεν ἂν. Περὶ πάντα
 δὴ ταῦτα τῆς ἀγνοίας οὔσης ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις, ὅ τούτων
 τι ἀγνοήσας ἄκων δοκεῖ πεπραχέναι, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν
 τοῖς κυριωτάτοις· κυριώτατα δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ ἐν οἷς ἡ

'detail' may apply to the agent, the act itself, the object,
 17 the instrument, the tendency, or the manner of the act. Of
all of these at once, and especially of the first, none but a
 18 maniac could be ignorant. But ignorance of one or more of
 such details, and especially of the object or of the tendency
 of the act, may well occur, and cause the act to be an in-

4. οἷον κ.τ.λ.] 'as men in conversation say that they made a slip ('let the cat out of the bag'), or else that they did not know that it was any secret.' These are of course two different excuses, either of which would illustrate what is meant by ignorance of the act itself. So also would the other case mentioned, viz. when a gun goes off accidentally and kills some one.

8. ἐσφαιρῶσθαι τὸ λελογχωμένον δόρυ] 'believing the spear to be rounded at the end when

it was actually pointed,' *i.e.* like a foil with a button for fencing.

9. κίσσηριν] pumice-stone, and therefore not likely to hurt any one. This illustrates ignorance of the instrument.

ἐπὶ σωτηρία] 'with a view to save;' *e.g.* if William Tell had hit his son, when aiming at the apple. (In ref. to ἔνεκα τίνος above.)

11. ἀκροχειριζόμενοι] 'sparing.' This example explains ignorance of the manner or degree of force of an act (πῶς, οἷον ἡρέμα ἢ σφόδρα, § 16).

- 19 πράξις καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα. Τοῦ δὲ κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἄγνοιαν ἀκουσίου λεγομένου ἔτι δεῖ τὴν πράξιν λυπηρὰν εἶναι καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ.
- 20 ὄντος δ' ἀκουσίου τοῦ βία καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τὸ ἐκούσιον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὐ ἢ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότε τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς ἢ πράξις. Ἴσως γὰρ οὐ καλῶς λέγεται ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν. Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἐκουσίως πράξει, οὐδ' οἱ παῖδες· εἴτα πότερον οὐδὲν ἐκουσίως πράττομεν τῶν δι' ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ θυμὸν, ἢ τὰ καλὰ μὲν ἐκουσίως τὰ δ' αἰσχρὰ ἀκουσίως; ἢ γελοῖον ἐνός γε αἰτίου ὄντος; ἀτοπον δὲ ἴσως τὸ ἀκούσια φάναι ὧν δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι.

19 voluntary one 'through ignorance'; provided always that subsequent sorrow attends the discovery of what has been thus done through ignorance.

Voluntary acts defined.

20 Having now explained the nature of both kinds of involuntary actions, we may define Voluntary acts conversely to be 'those originating from the agent himself, he having a full knowledge of the circumstances under which he is acting.'

Arguments to prove that acts done through anger or strong desire are Voluntary.

21 This definition must be defended against the false view (which it in fact condemns) that acts done from anger or desire are involuntary, though originating in the agent himself. (1) They are not so, because all the acts of the lower animals and even children would then be involuntary. (2) Take this dilemma:—*Either* it is meant that *all* acts of anger and desire are involuntary, *or* that the bad ones are involuntary and the good voluntary. The latter supposition is absurd, because the motive cause (anger and desire) is the same in both cases.

24 The former is absurd because there are occasions when we

6. Ἴσως γὰρ] The force of γὰρ is to indicate that the following class of actions (viz. τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν), which are intentionally excluded by the Definition just given from

involuntary actions, are rightly so excluded. (See *Suppl. Notes.*)

12. δεῖ is of course the emphatic word. The sense of 'duty' excludes the notion of involuntariness. If we 'ought' to do.

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περὶ προαίρεσεως ἔπεται διελθεῖν· οἰκειότατον γὰρ εἶναι
 δοκεῖ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἤθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων.
 2 Ἡ προαίρεσις δὲ ἐκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταῦτόν δέ,
 ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πλεόν τὸ ἐκούσιον· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐκουσίου καὶ
 παῖδες καὶ τᾶλλα ζῶα κοινωνεῖ, προαίρεσεως δ' οὐ, καὶ 5
 τὰ ἐξαίφνης ἐκούσια μὲν λέγομεν, κατὰ προαίρεσιν δ'
 3 οὐ. Οἱ δὲ λέγοντες αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ θυμὸν ἢ βού-
 λησιν ἢ τινα δόξαν οὐκ εἰκάσιν ὀρθῶς λέγειν. Οὐ γὰρ

1. It is not
 merely an
 impulse,
 because—

(1) It is not
 the same as
 Desire.

3 ously is a particular case of voluntary action. i. Some con-
 sider deliberate choice to be a matter of impulse. If so, it
 must be either Desire, Anger, or Wish, this being admitted
 as a complete list of our Impulses. (1) It is not the same as
 Desire, because—(a) Irrational animals have desires but do

chapter is to establish the *compound* character of προαίρεσις or deliberate choice, as consisting of an element of impulse and an element of judgment. This is done by proving that it is not identical with any sort of impulse singly, or of judgment singly. If it were identical with impulse, it must be either desire, spirit, or wish (these being assumed as an exhaustive classification of impulse (ἄρεξις), as Aristotle elsewhere (*De An.* II. iii. 2) explains). That it is not any of these, is shown in §§ 3—9. If it were identical with judgment (δόξα), or the expression of an opinion merely, it must be either judgment generally (δόξα ἀπλῶς), or judgment when exercised in a certain sphere, viz. matters of practical interest (δόξαις). That this is not so is

shewn in §§ 10—15. It is then affirmed to be a choice resulting from deliberation, thus combining both impulse and judgment.

1. οἰκειότατον γὰρ] 'It (viz. προαίρεσις) appears to be very closely connected with Virtue, and to be a better test of moral character than actions.' The question whether the intention or the outward act is more important in morals is again referred to, X. viii. 5.

6. τὰ ἐξαίφνης] Acts done 'on the spur of the moment.'

7. The principal difference between ἐπιθυμία (for which 'desire' is too wide, and 'appetite' too narrow) and βούλησις, or 'wish,' is that ἐπιθυμία is in connexion with a body, while βούλησις is not. A spirit could experience βούλησις, but **not** ἐπιθυμία.

κοινὸν ἢ προαίρεσις καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων, ἐπιθυμία δὲ καὶ
 4 θυμός. Καὶ ὁ ἀκρατῆς ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν πράττει, προαι-
 ρούμενος δ' οὐ· ὁ ἐγκρατῆς δ' ἀνάπαλιν προαιρούμενος
 5 μὲν, ἐπιθυμῶν δ' οὐ. Καὶ προαιρέσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία
 ἐναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυμία δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ. Καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐπι- 5
 θυμία ἠδέος καὶ ἐπιλύπου, ἡ προαίρεσις δ' οὔτε λυπηροῦ
 6 οὔθ' ἠδέος. Θυμὸς δ' ἔτι ἤττον· ἠκιστα γὰρ τὰ διὰ θυ-
 7 μὸν κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἶναι δοκεῖ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ
 βούλησις γε, καίπερ σύνεγγυς φαινόμενον· προαίρεσις
 μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, καὶ εἴ τις φαίη προαι- 10
 ρεῖσθαι, δοκοίη ἂν ἡλίθιος εἶναι· βούλησις δ' ἔστι τῶν

not act with deliberate choice. (This argument applies to
 4 Anger also.) (b) The incontinent act in accordance with
 their desires, but against their deliberate choice; the con-
 5 tinent, *vice versa*. (c) Desire is not opposed to desire, but
 to something else, viz. deliberate choice, which checks or
 resists it. (d) Desire is limited to what is pleasurable and
 6 painful, but deliberate choice is not. (2) Still less can it be
 Spirit, for impetuous actions are the very last we should
 7 describe as done through deliberate choice. (3) It is not the
 same as Wish, though not very dissimilar to it. (a) We may
 wish for impossibilities, but we cannot deliberately choose

(2) nor
Spirit;(3) nor
Wish.

4. The third argument seems to rest on the notion (found also in Plato) that conflict or opposition can only occur between two *different* parts of our constitution, e.g. between desire and reason, between impulse and resolution, etc., but that no department, whether that of reason or desire, or any other, can be 'divided against itself.' In fact, it follows from the 'law of contradiction' that nothing can do or suffer contraries at the same

time in reference to the same part of itself, etc. A similar argument was employed in I. xiii. 15, etc., to show the distinctness of the appetitive and rational parts of the soul. Also it should be remembered that *ἐπιθυμία* (as was explained above), like 'appetite,' implies a physical or bodily affection, such as thirst, hunger, etc., of which the statement in the text is clearly true.

7. For θυμὸς see *Suppl. Note*.

8 ἀδυνάτων, οἷον ἀθανασίας. *Καὶ* ἡ μὲν βούλησις ἐστὶ
καὶ περὶ τὰ μηδαμῶς δι' αὐτοῦ πραχθέντα ἂν, οἷον
ὑποκριτὴν τινα νικᾶν ἢ ἀθλητὴν προαιρεῖται δὲ τὰ
τοιαῦτα οὐδεὶς, ἀλλ' ὅσα οἴεται γενέσθαι ἂν δι' αὐτοῦ.
9 Ἔτι δ' ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ μάλλον, ἢ δὲ ὅ
προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον ὑγιαίνειν βουλόμεθα,
προαιρούμεθα δὲ δι' ὧν ὑγιανοῦμεν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν
βουλόμεθα μὲν καὶ φαμέν, προαιρούμεθα δὲ λέγειν οὐχ
ἀρμόζει. ὅπως γὰρ εἴκειν ἡ προαίρεσις περὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν
10 εἶναι. Οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα ἂν εἴη· ἡ μὲν γὰρ δόξα δοκεῖ περὶ 10
πάντα εἶναι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἥττον περὶ τὰ αἴδια καὶ τὰ ἀδύ-
νατα ἢ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν· καὶ τῷ ψευδεὶ καὶ ἀληθεὶ διαιρεῖται,
οὐ τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ἢ προαίρεσις δὲ τούτοις μάλλον.
11 Ὅπως μὲν οὖν δόξῃ ταῦτόν ἴσως οὐδὲ λέγει οὐδεὶς. Ἄλλ'

8 them. (b) We may wish for things which, though not im-
9 possible, are out of our own power. (c) Wish refers to ends,
deliberate choice to means. Hence deliberate choice is no
10 sort of impulse singly. ii. Secondly, it is not judgment, or
expression of opinion, merely. (a) Judgment or opinion may
be on *all* subjects, whether in our power or out of it. (b) The
excellence, or the reverse, of judgment consists in its being
true or false to fact; that of deliberate choice in its being
11 morally good or bad. It might however be thought to be

ii. It is not
merely a
judgment
or opinion,
either gene-
rally,

or limited
to the
sphere of
morals and
practice.

1. ἀθανασίας] 'exemption from death.' This, like vi. 6 (see note), is an allusion of too passing a kind to bear on the question of Aristotle's belief in a future state.

8. καὶ φαμέν] 'we use the expression wish to be happy;'—an appeal to common language.

10. δόξα here stands for an intellectual decision, the mere pronouncing of an opinion as to a

fact, apart from any impulse or desire for action. Though it would be hardly supposed that προαίρεσις could be identical with this generally (§ 11), yet it might be thought identical with such an expression of opinion on practical or moral subjects. This is the δόξα τις or particular application of opinion referred to in §§ 11, etc.

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16 ἔστι δόξη τινί. Τί οὖν ἢ ποῖόν τι ἔστιν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν
 εἰρημένων οὐθέν; ἐκούσιον μὲν δὴ φαίνεται, τὸ δ' ἐκού-
 17 σιον οὐ πᾶν προαιρετόν. Ἐλλ' ἀρά γε τὸ προβεβου-
 λευμένον; ἢ γὰρ προαίρεσις μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας.
 Ὑποσημαίνειν δ' ἔοικε καὶ τοῦνομα ὡς ὄν πρὸ ἐτέρων 5
 αἰρετόν.

1 III. Βουλευόνται δὲ πότερα περὶ πάντων, καὶ πᾶν βου-
 2 λευτόν ἔστιν, ἢ περὶ ἐνίων οὐκ ἔστι βουλή; (λεκτέον δ'
 ἴσως βουλευτόν οὐχ ὑπὲρ οὗ βουλεύσαιτ' ἂν τις ἡλίθιος
 3 ἢ μαινόμενος, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ νοῦν ἔχων.) Περὶ δὲ τῶν 10
 αἰδίων οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται, οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἢ τῆς
 4 διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς, ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι. Ἐλλ' οὐδὲ

16 only maintain that they are not identical. We have then ad-
 vanced thus far. Deliberate choice is voluntary and some-
 17 thing more. In fact, as the name indicates, it is 'a choice
 following upon deliberation.'

CHAP. III.—*The proper objects of Deliberation* (βούλευσις).

Proper 1, 2 We now inquire what are the proper objects for deliberation,
 objects of De- which is, as we have seen, the first stage in deliberate choice.
 liberation 3 (1) *Negatively*, we do not deliberate about (a) Things eternal
 determined. 4 and immutable; (b) Things changeable, which change accord-
 (§§ 1—11).

5. Thus the compound char-
 acter of deliberate choice is
 established, *choice* implying an
 element of impulse, *deliberation*
 an element of intellect or judg-
 ment.

CHAP. III.—Deliberate Choice
 having been shown in the last
 chapter to consist in choice after
 deliberation, we now inquire (1)
 what are the proper objects and
 limits of deliberation, and (2)

how its objects are related to, or
 distinguished from, those of the
 compound, deliberate choice?

12. διαμέτρου κ.τ.λ.] We do
 not deliberate about the incom-
 mensurability of the side and
 diameter of a square, because we
 cannot alter it. The diameter =
 the side $\times \sqrt{2}$, and as $\sqrt{2}$ can-
 not be exactly found, the dia-
 meter and side are incommensur-
 able.

περὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει, αἰεὶ δὲ κατὰ ταῦτὰ γινομένων, εἴτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἴτε καὶ φύσει ἢ διὰ τινα αἰτίαν ἄλλην, οἷον 5 τροπῶν καὶ ἀνατολῶν. Οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλοτε ἄλλως, οἷον ἀνύχμων καὶ ὄμβρων. Οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης, 6 οἷον θησαυροῦ εὐρέσεως. Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρω- 5 πικῶν πάντων, οἷον πῶς ἂν Σκύθαι ἄριστα πολιτεύοιτο οὐδεὶς Λακεδαιμονίων βουλευέται. Οὐ γὰρ γένοιτ' ἂν 7 τούτων οὐθὲν δι' ἡμῶν. Βουλευόμεθα δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν πρακτῶν ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἔστι λοιπά. Ἀίτια γὰρ

5 ing to a fixed law; (c) Things changeable, which change according to no discoverable law; (d) Things depending on 6 pure chance where there can be no law; (e) In short anything whatever which is not in our own power. (2) *Positively*, we 7 *do* deliberate (a) about things in our own power; and each

3. τροπῶν] 'solstices.' The accent shows that it comes from τροπή, not τρόπος.

9. αἴτια γὰρ δοκοῦσι κ.τ.λ.] This must be considered as a popular classification of causes familiar to his hearers (such current opinions being often introduced, as we have seen, by the verb δοκεῖν—see note on I. iii. 2), rather than one for which Aristotle would hold himself responsible.

With this proviso, we may suppose the classification to have originated from the observation that causes naturally distinguished themselves as either irrational or rational. The former were further divided into φύσις, ἀνάγκη, τύχη, perhaps on some such notion as the following—

i. Some phenomena, varying

within fixed limits, seem to imply the existence of law, yet tempered, as it were, by some power behind it (φύσις), regulating and modifying its applications: *e.g.* The relations between seed and crop; the variations of hot, cold, wet or dry seasons, subject to the invariable distinction between the seasons themselves; the preservation of the species in the reproduction of animals, notwithstanding endless minor differences in the individuals. Such operations would probably be assigned to Nature (φύσις).

ii. Some events seem to recur under a law invariable and inviolable, as if it worked itself mechanically: *e.g.* The rising and setting of the sun, the succession of summer and winter, day and night. Such phenomena

δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἔτι δὲ νοῦς
καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου. Τῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστοι
8 βουλευόνται περὶ τῶν δι' αὐτῶν πρακτῶν. Καὶ περὶ
μὲν τὰς ἀκριβεῖς καὶ αὐτάρκεις τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, οὐκ ἔστι
βουλῆ, οἷον περὶ γραμμάτων (οὐ γὰρ διστάζομεν πῶς 5
γραπτέον) ἀλλ' ὅσα γίνεται δι' ἡμῶν, μὴ ὡσαύτως δ'
ἀεὶ, περὶ τούτων βουλευόμεθα, οἷον περὶ τῶν κατὰ ἰα-
τρικὴν καὶ χρηματιστικὴν, καὶ περὶ κυβερνητικὴν μάλ-
9 λον ἢ γυμναστικὴν, ὅσῳ ἥττον διηκρίβωται, καὶ ἔτι περὶ

man about what is in *his* own power ; (b) about the practical
8 arts and about some sciences, though not all (the amount of
9 deliberation being in inverse proportion to their precision), and,

would appear to be caused by
Necessity (ἀνάγκη).

iii. In other cases no law or
reason or method can be traced
by us in the sequence of events,
e.g. a 'windfall,' or a 'godsend,'
as we term it, or the production
of 'monsters.' Such occurrences
would be referred to Chance
(τύχη). Anaxagoras in fact de-
fined τύχη to be ἄδηλος αἰτία
ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῶ. Compare
Pope, 'All chance (is) direction
which thou canst not see.'

It is scarcely necessary to
point out that such distinctions
are unphilosophical, being liable
to disturbance upon every addi-
tion to our physical knowledge.
(For Aristotle's own view of
φύσις see Glossary p. liv.)

The class of rational causes is
subdivided into νοῦς and πᾶν τὸ
δι' ἀνθρώπου. The former appa-
rently refers to Intelligence or
Design as displayed in the physi-

cal world, which in a modern
system would be described as
Providence, or, still more per-
sonally, as God. πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀν-
θρώπου includes all results
brought about by human agency.
This last group alone falls within
the sphere of Deliberation.

4. ἐπιστημῶν] The word is used
loosely for knowledge generally,
including arts, for strictly speak-
ing it would follow from what
is said throughout the Chapter
that Deliberation is only con-
cerned with *practical* and not
theoretical subjects, and therefore
strictly speaking not with Sci-
ences but Arts only (see Glossary,
Art and Science). The instances
given by Aristotle of such ἐπισ-
τῆμαι as we do deliberate about,
viz. ἰατρικὴ, κυβερνητικὴ, χρημα-
τιστικὴ, are evidently in the strict
sense not ἐπιστῆμαι but τέχναι.

ἀκριβεῖς καὶ αὐταρκεῖς] ἀκρι-
βῆς means 'accurate' or 'pre-

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
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12 ὡσπερ διάγραμμα. (Φαίνεται δ' ἡ μὲν ζήτησις οὐ πᾶσα
 εἶναι βούλευσις, οἷον αἱ μαθηματικαὶ, ἡ δὲ βούλευσις
 πᾶσα ζήτησις, καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει πρῶτον
 13 εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει.) ▲ Κὰν μὲν ἀδυνάτῳ ἐντύχωσιν, ἀφί-
 στανται, οἷον εἰ χρημάτων δεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ οἷόν τε 5
 πορισθῆναι· ἐὰν δὲ δυνατὸν φαίνηται, ἐγχειροῦσι πράτ-
 τειν. Δυνατὰ δὲ ἅ δι' ἡμῶν γένοιτ' ἄν· τὰ γὰρ διὰ τῶν

and so on as long as may be necessary, until we arrive at some
 12 means in our own power. This last step in the deliberation
 is the first in the practical effort of securing the end desired.
 If some necessary means prove impossible to secure, the
 13 deliberation ceases and the project is abandoned. If on the
 other hand the means prove feasible, then too, deliberation

1. ὡσπερ διάγραμμα] like a geometrical figure. We might take for an instance Eucl. i. 10. It is desired to draw a perpendicular to a given line from a given point in the line (θέμενοι τέλος τι).

(1) Asking ourselves what conditions will secure this (πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται), we observe that making the adjacent angles equal would do so.



(2) Next, how can we make the adjacent angles equal (πῶς διὰ τούτων ἔσται)? By causing them to be parts of two triangles

either with two sides and the included angles equal (Prop. 4), or with all three sides equal (Prop. 8).

(3) Choosing the latter as preferable (διὰ πλειόνων μὲν φαινομένου διὰ τίνος ῥᾶστα κ.τ.λ.), how can we secure a triangle with equal sides (κάκεινο διὰ τίνος)? We see this to be in our power by taking any points in AB, viz. D and E, equidistant from P, erecting on DE an equilateral triangle DFE (by Prop. 1) and joining FP.

The problem being thus brought back to steps within our power (ἕως ἂν ἔλθωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον), our investigation is at an end (ἐν τῇ εὐρέσει ἔσχατόν ἐστι), and we at once proceed with the construction of the Proposition as given by Euclid, and thus 'ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει' becomes 'πρῶτον ἐν τῇ γενέσει.'

14 φίλων δι' ἡμῶν πῶς ἐστίν· ἢ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν. Ζητεῖ-
 ται δ' ὅτε μὲν τὰ ὄργανα, ὅτε δ' ἢ χρεῖα αὐτῶν ὁμοίως
 δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς ὅτε μὲν δι' οὗ, ὅτε δὲ πῶς ἢ διὰ
 15 τίνος. Ἐοικε δὴ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, ἄνθρωπος εἶναι ἀρχὴ
 τῶν πράξεων ἢ δὲ βουλὴ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶ πρακτῶν, αἱ 5
 16 δὲ πράξεις ἄλλων ἔνεκα. Οὐκ ἂν οὖν εἴη βουλευτὸν
 τὸ τέλος ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη. Οὐδὲ δὴ τὰ καθ'
 ἕκαστα, οἷον εἰ ἄρτος τοῦτο ἢ πέπεπται ὡς δεῖ· αἰσθή-
 σεως γὰρ ταῦτα. Εἰ δὲ αἰ βουλεύσεται, εἰς ἄπειρον
 17 ἥξει. Βουλευτὸν δὲ καὶ προαιρετὸν τὸ αὐτὸ, πλὴν ἀφω- 10
 ρισμένον ἤδη τὸ προαιρετὸν· τὸ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς
 προκριθὲν προαιρετὸν ἐστίν. Παύεται γὰρ ἕκαστος ζη-
 τῶν πῶς πράξει, ὅταν εἰς αὐτὸν ἀναγάγῃ τὴν ἀρχὴν, καὶ
 αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἡγούμενον· τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ προαιρούμενον. ||
 18 Δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχαίων πολιτειῶν, ἃς 15
 Ὀμηρὸς ἐμιμείτο· οἱ γὰρ βασιλεῖς ἂ προέλοιντο ἀνήγ-

14 ceases and action begins. Sometimes deliberation seeks to
 15 discover instruments, sometimes the way to employ them (in
 all cases implying, as we have maintained before, that a man
 is the originating cause of his actions about which he delibe-
 16 rates), and it is concerned with means and not with ends; nor
 finally does it deal with questions of fact, which are matters
 of observation. Deliberation cannot of course be prolonged
 indefinitely, but must be terminated by decision or choice of
 17-19 means. The object of Deliberation and of Deliberate Choice

We can now distinguish Deliberation and Deliberate Choice.

4. ἔοικε δὴ] The process of deliberation affords another proof that man is the originating cause of his actions.

5. αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἄλλων ἔνεκα] Aristotle is of course speaking of such actions only as form subjects of deliberation.

14. προαιρούμενον is of course middle and not passive; 'that which chooses.'

16. The kings determine upon action, the people carry it out without further deliberation. So when προαίρεσις or τὸ προαιρούμενον which leads (τὸ ἡγούμενον)

- 19 γέλλον τῷ δήμῳ. Ὀντος δὲ τοῦ προαιρετοῦ βουλευτοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις ἂν εἴη βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν· ἐκ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι γὰρ κρίναντες ὀρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν.
- 20 Ἡ μὲν οὖν προαίρεσις τύπῳ εἰρήσθω, καὶ περὶ ποιῶν 5 ἐστὶ, καὶ ὅτι τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη·
- 1 IV. Ἡ δὲ βούλησις ὅτι μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶν εἶρηται, δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φαινομένου

are therefore the same, except that the latter is already resolved upon as the *result* of the deliberation. When the choice is made, the deliberation ceases.

- 20 Thus we define deliberate choice to be 'a choice following upon deliberation of something in our power.'

CHAP. IV.—*The proper objects of Wish (βούλησις).*

The proper objects of Wish (βούλησις) have been thought to be either what is really good or whatever *pro temp.* appears good.

1 As we should not deliberate about *means*, unless we had first conceived of some *end* as desirable, we next inquire into the nature of that faculty, viz. 'wish' or 'desire,' which sets

'in this little kingdom, man,' has made its decision, deliberation is over and action succeeds.

1. βουλευτοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ] This recalls the compound character of προαίρεσις described in ch. ii., βουλευτοῦ indicating the intellectual, and ὀρεκτοῦ the impulsive, element of the compound process.

CHAP. IV.—In this Chapter we inquire into the nature of the faculty which sets up the *end* in the first instance as desirable, with a view to which end deliberation (βούλευσις) discusses the *means*, and deliberate choice (προαίρεσις) decides upon them.

In other words we ask what are the proper objects of wish (βούλησις)? Thus every deliberate act implies the three stages βούλησις, βούλευσις, and προαίρεσις. See Glossary, *s.v.* προαίρεσις.

This Chapter contains a criticism of the two extreme theories, (1) that the objects of wish are things really good, and so, ultimately, the Absolute or Chief Good (Plato); (2) that they are any things that appear at the time good (the Sophists), and also a solution of the question by Aristotle upon an intermediate ground, since the former theory contradicts facts, and the latter, feelings.

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κρίνει ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις τᾶληθές αὐτῷ φαίνεται.
 5 Καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ ἕξιν ἰδιά ἐστι καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα, καὶ
 διαφέρει πλείστον ἴσως ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ τᾶληθές ἐν
 ἐκάστοις ὀρᾶν, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὄν. Τοῖς
 πολλοῖς δὲ ἢ ἀπάτη διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἔοικε γίνεσθαι οὐ 5
 6 γὰρ οὔσα ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται. Αἰροῦνται οὖν τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς
 ἀγαθόν, τὴν δὲ λύπην ὡς κακὸν φεύγουσιν.

1 V. Ὀντος δὴ βουλευτοῦ μὲν τοῦ τέλους, βουλευτῶν δὲ

5 desirable, and that in the midst of the aberrations and per-
 versions of individual men, who simply follow pleasure and
 6 avoid pain, the desires of the good man are an index to us of
 what is thus naturally and *per se* desirable.

CHAP. V.—*A refutation of the theory that Virtue is voluntary,
 but Vice involuntary.*

Virtue
and Vice
are equally
voluntary.

1 Now we have seen that the choice of means to a given end
 is both voluntary and a matter of deliberate choice, conse-

1. τᾶληθές αὐτῷ φαίνεται] Thus the real standard is an absolute and not a relative one. The σπουδαῖος does not fix the standard, but his known conformity to the standard enables us to use him as a substitute for it. Similarly it is not the barometer but the pressure of the atmosphere which regulates the weather; the barometer is only a convenient index of the phenomena which it does not itself influence. It is in this restricted sense, therefore, that the σπουδαῖος is said in l. 4 to be κανὼν καὶ μέτρον τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. Compare, 'He that is spiritual judgeth all things.'

CHAP. V.—Aristotle concludes

this part of his subject with a sort of supplementary Chapter to refute a theory which, owing to Plato's advocacy, had obtained considerable prominence, viz. that Virtue is voluntary but Vice involuntary. The theory seems to have arisen thus:—In all cases of right or wrong action where a conscious struggle takes place, the two alternatives are presented to us, present pleasure involving future pain and regret, or present pain (of self-denial) with subsequent pleasure and satisfaction. Thus it becomes a matter for calculation, Is the present pleasure so great as to counterbalance the future pain? Is it so great as to make it worth

καὶ προαιρετῶν τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, αἱ περὶ ταῦτα πρά-
 ξεις κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἀν εἶεν καὶ ἐκούσιοι. Αἱ δὲ τῶν
 2 ἀρετῶν ἐνέργειαι περὶ ταῦτα. Ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ,
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία. Ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὸ πράτ-
 τειν, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μὴ, καὶ τὸ ναί 5
 ὥστ' εἰ τὸ πράττειν καλὸν ὄν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ μὴ

quently the practice of Virtue involving (as we have seen) a
 2 deliberate choice of means must be voluntary, and so likewise
 we maintain must Vice be voluntary. This latter point being

while to risk the consequences? If a man decides that it is, and does wrong accordingly, he has simply (it is argued) made a mistake in his calculation, he has committed an error of judgment merely, and all wrong-doing, since it arises out of such a mistake, is therefore involuntary. No one ever deliberately chooses anything but what *at the time* appears to him the better choice (τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν ἐστίν as we read in i. 6), and what is more, he cannot help its so appearing to him (see § 17 of this Chapter) any more than he can help an object's appearing red or green to him. Thus when a man chooses the right he chooses knowingly and voluntarily for the best: when he chooses the wrong he chooses it still under a mistaken impression that he is choosing for the best: he acts under an illusion and therefore involuntarily.

There seem to be four main arguments in the Chapter:—

(1) §§ 2—4. An *argumentum ad*

hominem against the position of those half-necessitarians who maintain that though Vice is involuntary, Virtue is voluntary.

(2) §§ 5—16. Against the more logical and thorough-going necessitarians who argue that *all* our actions, virtuous as well as vicious, are merely the necessary result of causes and circumstances external to ourselves.

(3) §§ 17, 18. Against the principal argument by which the half-necessitarians supported their position.

(4) §§ 19, 20. Against a modified form of the same argument.

1. περὶ ταῦτα in l. 1. I obviously refers to 'means' (τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος). περὶ ταῦτα in l. 3 must have the same reference, and the argument is, that as the exercise of Virtue involves the choice of means, it must be voluntary. This, however, is generally admitted, and the purpose of the Chapter is rather to show that the same inference applies to Vice.

πράττειν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔσται αἰσχροὺν ὄν, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὴ πρᾶτ-
 τειν καλὸν ὄν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸ πρᾶττειν αἰσχροὺν ὄν ἐφ'
 3 ἡμῖν. Εἰ δ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὰ καλὰ πρᾶττειν καὶ τὰ αἰσχροὰ,
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ πρᾶττειν, τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ ἀγαθοῖς
 καὶ κακοῖς εἶναι, ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα τὸ ἐπιεικέσι καὶ φαύλοισ 5
 4 εἶναι. Τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὡς

οὔδεις ἐκὼν πονηρὸς οὔδ' ἄκων μάκαρ,

ἔοικε τὸ μὲν ψευδεῖ τὸ δ' ἀληθεῖ· μακάριος μὲν γὰρ
 5 οὔδεις ἄκων, ἢ δὲ μοχθηρία ἐκούσιον. ἝΠ τοῖς γε νῦν
 εἰρημένοις ἀμφισβητητέον, καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐ φατέον 10

i. 'That
 Virtue is
 voluntary
 and Vice
 involuntary'
 refuted.
 (§§ 2—4).

3, 4 disputed, we prove it as follows:—i. If it is in our own power
 to act, it must also be in our own power not to act (else our
 action was not really in our power but was compulsory), and
vice versâ. Now if acting (or not acting) in any case be
 right, the reverse would be wrong. Consequently if to do
 right is in our power, so also is to do wrong: in a word, if
 5 Virtue is voluntary, so is Vice. ii. If, in order to escape
 this conclusion, it be denied outright that man is himself the

ii. The more
 general posi-
 tion 'That
 our actions
 originate in
 causes be-
 yond our
 control'
 refuted
 (§§ 5—16)

4. ἦν = 'this was admitted to
 constitute our being good or bad.'
 ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς is in attraction
 with ἐφ' ἡμῖν. See another in-
 stance of ἦν thus used in viii. 14.

9. τοῖς γε νῦν εἰρημένοις refers
 to the previous conclusions about
 the voluntary nature of βούλευ-
 σις and προαίρεσις, with the
 assertion of which this Chapter
 opens.

Aristotle now turns to the
 more thorough-going and more
 logical position that *all* our
 actions, good and bad alike, are
 the *necessary* result of our condi-
 tion and circumstances; in other

words, that we are not free and
 responsible agents at all. His
 first argument against it consists
 in what is called 'shifting the
 burden of proof.' It is not for
 those who *accept*, but for those
 who *deny*, what is *prima facie*
 true, to bring arguments in sup-
 port of their position. The
prima facie truth in this case is
 that man himself originates his
 own acts, and until some other
 origin for them can be proved,
 we have a right, without further
 argument, to maintain that he
 does so originate them. Hence
 φαίνεται is emphatic.

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κολάζουσιν, εἴαν αἴτιος εἶναι δοκῆ τῆς ἀγνοίας, οἷον τοῖς
 μεθύουσι διπλᾶ τὰ ἐπιτίμια· ἢ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ κύ-
 ριος γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυσθῆναι, τοῦτο δ' αἴτιον τῆς ἀγ-
 νοίας. Καὶ τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντάς ~~π~~ τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, ἃ δεῖ
 9 ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μὴ χαλεπά ἐστι, κολάζουσιν. Ὅμοίως 5
 δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅσα δι' ἀμέλειαν ἀγνοεῖν δοκοῦσιν,
 ὡς ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὄν τὸ μὴ ἀγνοεῖν τοῦ γὰρ ἐπιμεληθῆναι
 10 κύριοι. Ἄλλ' ἴσως τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὥστε μὴ ἐπιμελη-
 θῆναι. Ἀλλὰ τοῦ τοιούτους γενέσθαι αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι ζῶντες
 ἀνειμένως, καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκους ἢ ἀκολάστους εἶναι, οἱ μὲν 10
 κακουροῦντες, οἱ δὲ ἐν πότοις καὶ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις διά-
 γοντες· αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνέργειαι τοιοῦτους ποιού-
 11 σιν. Τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν μελετώντων πρὸς ἡντινοῦν
 12 ἀγωνίαν ἢ πρᾶξιν διατελοῦσι γὰρ ἐνεργοῦντες. Τὸ μὲν
 αὖν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν περὶ ἕκαστα αἱ ἕξεις 15
 13 γίνονται, κομιδῆ ἀναισθήτου. Ἔτι δ' ἄλογον τὸν ἀδι-
 κοῦντα μὴ βούλεσθαι ἀδικον εἶναι ἢ τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα
 14 ἀκόλαστον. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοῶν τις πράττει ἐξ ὧν

ing ignorance as rendering Vice involuntary and therefore
 excusable, that they even punish *for ignorance itself*, when-
 ever it is such as could have been avoided. *e.g.* (a) Double
 penalties for offences committed in drunkenness. (b) Punish-
 ments for not knowing an offence to be forbidden by the law.
 9, 10 (c) Or for any other sort of careless ignorance. (d) Or even
 for ignorance through incapacity if the incapacity be the
 11 result of previous Vice; for single acts repeated form perma-
 12 nent habits. Every one who is not a downright idiot *must* know
 13 this much from daily experience, and it cannot avail to say
 14 that he did not wish it to be so in his case: nor does it follow.

1. τοῖς μεθύουσι κ.τ.λ.] a law facti non nocet.
 of Pittacus of Mytilene.

4. Compare the maxim 'Ignoratio juris nocet, ignoratio
 12. αἱ γὰρ περὶ κ.τ.λ.] 'Actions
 of any kind make us similar in
 character.' See II. ii. 8.

ἔσται ἄδικος, ἐκὼν ἄδικος ἂν εἴη, οὐ μὴν εἰάν γε βού-
 ληται, ἄδικος ὧν παύσεται καὶ ἔσται δίκαιος· οὐδὲ γὰρ
 ὁ νοσῶν ὑγιής. Καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, ἐκὼν νοσεῖ, ἀκρα-
 τῶς βιοτεύων καὶ ἀπειθῶν τοῖς ἰατροῖς. Τότε μὲν οὖν
 ἐξῆν αὐτῷ μὴ νοσεῖν, προεμένῳ δ' οὐκέτι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ὅ-
 ἀφέντι λίθον ἔτ' αὐτὸν δυνατὸν ἀναλαβεῖν· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἔ-
 π' αὐτῷ τὸ βαλεῖν καὶ ρίψαι ἢ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ.
 Οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ καὶ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν
 ἐξῆν τοιούτοις μὴ γενέσθαι, διὸ ἐκόντες εἰσὶν· γενομέ-
 15 νοις δ' οὐκέτι ἔξεστι μὴ εἶναι. Οὐ μόνον δ' αἱ τῆς 10
 ψυχῆς κακίαι ἐκούσιοί εἰσιν, ἀλλ' ἐνίοις καὶ αἱ τοῦ
 σώματος, οἷς καὶ ἐπιτιμῶμεν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ διὰ φύσιν
 αἰσχροῖς οὐδεὶς ἐπιτιμᾶ, τοῖς δὲ δι' ἀγυμνασίαν καὶ
 ἀμέλειαν. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀσθένειαν καὶ πῆρωσιν·
 οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἂν ὀνειδίσειε τυφλῷ φύσει ἢ ἐκ νόσου ἢ ἐκ 15
 πληγῆς, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐλεήσαι· τῷ δ' ἐξ οἰνοφλυγίας ἢ
 16 ἄλλης ἀκολασίας πᾶς ἂν ἐπιτιμήσῃ. Τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸ
 σῶμα κακιῶν αἱ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐπιτιμῶνται, αἱ δὲ μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῖν

that he can arrest the formation of the habit at any step after
 the first. The first steps of moral, as often of physical, disease
 are voluntary, and though its progress soon passes out of our
 power, yet as we are responsible for its beginning, we are also
 15 answerable for all that it afterwards becomes. (e) The same
 remarks apply to bodily defects, which we pity if of natural
 or accidental growth, but visit with reproach if traceable to
 16 neglect, excess, or any other avoidable causes, and we may
 reasonably suppose that defects of body and of soul are blamed
 on the same principle, viz. when men believe them to be

1. οὐ μὴν εἰάν γε κ.τ.λ.] 'It thrown away his health' (Grant).
 does not however follow that if, ' προιέσθαι is the word used for
 etc. squandering money in IV. i,

5. προεμένῳ] 'When he has etc.

οὔ. Εἰ δ' οὕτω, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἱ ἐπιτιμώμεναι τῶν
 17 κακιῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἂν εἶεν. Εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι πάντες
 ἐφίενται τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ
 κύριοι, ἀλλ' ὁποῖός ποθ' ἕκαστός ἐστι, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ
 τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ. [εἰ μὲν οὖν ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ τῆς
 5 ἕξεως ἐστὶ πῶς αἴτιος, καὶ τῆς φαντασίας ἔσται πῶς
 αὐτὸς αἴτιος.] εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐθεὶς αὐτῷ αἴτιος τοῦ κακὰ
 ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀγνοίαν τοῦ τέλους ταῦτα πράττει. διὰ
 τούτων οἰόμενος αὐτῷ τὸ ἄριστον ἔσεσθαι, ἢ δὲ τοῦ

iii. The argu- 17
 ment 'that
 we are not re-
 sponsible for
 the impressions
 which external
 objects make
 upon us, nor
 therefore for
 acting accord-
 ingly,' is re-
 futed

(1) by denying
 its truth;

(2) by showing
 that it proves
 too much, as
 it applies to
 Virtue as well
 as Vice.

voluntary. iii. It is sometimes argued, 'We all desire what appears to us good, and we are not responsible for the appearance presented, or impression made upon us, by external objects.' To this we reply (1) that if we are responsible for our general condition, we must be so in some sense for the impression which things make upon us, for this depends upon our condition to a great extent; (2) if we are not so responsible, then all that our opponents say is true: we are not

2. εἰ δέ τις κ.τ.λ.] The argu-
 ment now returns to the first
 class of opponents who maintain
 that Virtue is voluntary and Vice
 involuntary, and it attacks the
 favourite argument on which
 they mainly relied. This was
 explained in the note at the
 commencement of this Chapter.

3. φαντασία here has its ori-
 ginal signification of 'appear-
 ance,' and is little more than a
 repetition of φαινομένου just
 before.

5. Observe the alternatives εἰ
 μὲν οὖν . . . εἰ δὲ μὴ. The con-
 sequences following on the latter
 supposition are enumerated as
 far as the end of § 17, and the
 results of those consequences as

bearing on the argument in hand
 are introduced by εἰ δὲ ταῦτ'
 ἐστὶν ἀληθὴ in § 18.

6. ἕξις has the simple meaning
 of 'state' or 'condition.' The
 impression which things make
 on us, morally as well as physi-
 cally, depends very much on our
 condition, and for this we are in
 some degree (πῶς) responsible.
 Compare Butler: 'When we say
 that men are misled by external
 circumstances of temptation, it
 cannot but be understood that
 there is somewhat within them-
 selves to render those circum-
 stances temptations, or to render
 them susceptible of impressions
 from them' (*Anal.* p. 78, ed.
 Angus).

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αὐτόν ἐστιν, εἴτε τὸ μὲν τέλος φυσικόν, τῷ δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ
 πράττειν ἐκούσιως τὸν σπουδαῖον ἢ ἀρετὴν ἐκούσιόν
 ἐστιν, οὐθὲν ἤττον καὶ ἢ κακία ἐκούσιον ἂν εἴη· ὁμοίως
 γὰρ καὶ τῷ κακῷ ὑπάρχει τὸ δι' αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι
 20 καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ τέλει. Εἰ οὖν, ὡς περ λέγεται, ἐκού- 5
 σιοί εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταί (καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἕξεων συναίτιοί πως
 αὐτοί ἐσμεν, καὶ τῷ ποιοί τινες εἶναι τὸ τέλος τοιόνδε
 τιθέμεθα), καὶ αἱ κακίαι ἐκούσιοι ἂν εἶεν· ὁμοίως γάρ.
 21 Κοινῇ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἴρηται ἡμῖν τό τε
 γένος τύπῳ, ὅτι μεσότητές εἰσιν, καὶ ὅτι ἕξεις, ὑφ' ὧν 10
 τε γίνονται, καὶ ὅτι τούτων πρακτικαὶ καθ' αὐτὰς, καὶ
 ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκούσιοι, καὶ οὕτως ὡς ἂν ὁ ὀρθὸς
 22 λόγος προστάξῃ. Ὁὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ αἱ πράξεις ἐκούσιοί

voluntary in
 the choice of
means even
 if we are not
 responsible
 for the *end*,
 is shown
 to apply
 equally
 to Vice.

Recapitula-
 tion.

that while the *end* (or the appearance of things to us as desirable) is fixed for us by natural causes, whether it be good or bad, yet that there is scope for the voluntariness of Virtue in the right choice of the *means*. To this we reply at once that
 20 the wrong choice of means, which would constitute Vice, is equally voluntary. Our position is now proved, that if Virtue is voluntary so also is Vice voluntary.
 21 The point we have now reached is this:—We have asserted
 Virtues to be mean states; we have shown how they are formed, and that they are in our own power and voluntary,
 22 and under the guidance of reason. The states or habits it is

vulgarism 'along of himself.'
 Cf. vi. 11. *παρὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν*
 'depending on their experience.'

1. *φυσικόν*] 'fixed by nature.'
τὰ λοιπὰ 'all the rest,' i.e. the
 means to the end.

6. *συναίτιοι*] 'partly responsible
 for.' Notice that Aristotle ad-
 mits that our habits are to
 some extent the result of causes
 over which we have no control.

7. *τῷ ποιοί τινες εἶναι κ.τ.λ.*]
 'The condition in which we are
 regulates the character of the
 end which we set before us.'

8. *ὁμοίως γὰρ*] *sc.* ἔχουσι,
 'they are on the same footing.'

10. *ὑφ' ὧν τε γίνονται*] This
 refers to such passages as II. i. 6,
 II. ii. 8, etc.

11. *τούτων πρακτικαὶ καθ' αὐ-
 τὰς*] Explained by II. ii. 8.

εἰσι καὶ αἱ ἕξεις· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πράξεων ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τοῦ τέλους κύριοί ἐσμεν, εἰδότες τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, τῶν ἕξεων δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς, καθ' ἕκαστα δὲ ἢ πρόσθεσις οὐ γνώριμος, ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν· ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἦν οὕτως ἢ μὴ οὕτω χρήσασθαι, διὰ τοῦτο ἔκούσιοι.

1 VI. Ἀναλαμβάνοντες δὴ περὶ ἐκάστης, εἴπωμεν τίνας εἰσὶ
καὶ περὶ ποῖα καὶ πῶς· ἅμα δ' ἔσται δῆλον καὶ πόσαι
2 εἰσίν. Καὶ πρῶτον περὶ ἀνδρείας. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης
ἐστὶ περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη, ἤδη καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται·
φοβούμεθα δὴ δῆλον ὅτι τὰ φοβερά· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὡς 10
ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν κακά· διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον ὀρίζονται προσ-

true are not voluntary in the same sense as the single acts which form them. As however their beginnings, though not the subsequent stages of their growth, are in our own power, the habits themselves are really in our own power.

CHAP. VI.—*The proper sphere and objects of Courage.*

1 Proceeding now to the consideration of the Virtues in
2 detail, we commence with Courage. This we have already
described as a mean state in regard to Fear and Confidence.
Fear may be defined as the anticipation of Evil of any kind,

Courage, though it is, speaking generally, a due moderation of fear, does not relate to all objects of fear,

CHAP. VI.—We now return to a discussion of the Virtues in detail as given in the (presumed) exhaustive Catalogue of II. vii., in order to show how the law of the relative mean is applicable to every Virtue in detail, and so to justify its prominent position in our Definition of Virtue as a whole.

The discussion of Courage occupies four Chapters, of which the subjects are as follows:—

vi. The proper sphere and objects of Courage.

vii. Courage considered as a mean state, and in reference to its motive, together with the related Excess and Defect.

viii. The distinction between genuine and spurious Courage, of which latter five types are described.

ix. Courage, though involving pain and loss, is no exception to the rule that all Virtue has pleasure in itself.

3 δοκίαν κακοῦ. Φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα τὰ κακὰ, οἷον
 ἀδοξίαν, πενίαν, νόσον, ἀφιλίαν, θάνατον· ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ
 πάντα δοκεῖ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι ἕνια γὰρ καὶ δεῖ φοβεῖ-
 σθαι καὶ καλόν, τὸ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρὸν, οἷον ἀδοξίαν· ὁ μὲν
 γὰρ φοβούμενος ἐπιεικῆς καὶ αἰδήμων, ὁ δὲ μὴ φοβού- 5
 4 μενος ἀναίσχυντος. Λέγεται δ' ὑπὸ τινων ἀνδρεῖος κατὰ
 μεταφοράν· ἔχει γάρ τι ὅμοιον τῷ ἀνδρείῳ· ἄφοβος
 γάρ τις καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος. Πενίαν δ' ἴσως οὐ δεῖ φοβεῖ-
 σθαι οὐδὲ νόσον, οὐδ' ὅλως ὅσα μὴ ἀπὸ κακίας μηδὲ δι'
 αὐτόν. Ἄλλ' οὐδ' ὁ περὶ ταῦτα ἄφοβος ἀνδρεῖος. Λέ- 10
 γομεν δὲ καὶ τοῦτον καθ' ὁμοιότητα· ἐνιοὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς
 πολεμικοῖς κινδύνοις δειλοὶ ὄντες ἐλευθέριοί εἰσι καὶ
 5 πρὸς χρημάτων ἀποβολὴν εὐθαρσῶς ἔχουσιν. Οὐδὲ δὴ
 εἴ τις ὑβριν περὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκα φοβεῖται ἢ φθόνον
 ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων, δειλός ἐστιν· οὐδ' εἰ θαρρεῖ μέλλων 15
 6 μαστιγοῦσθαι, ἀνδρεῖος. Περὶ ποῖα οὖν τῶν φοβερῶν
 ὁ ἀνδρεῖος; ἢ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα; οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὑπομενετι-
 κώτερος τῶν δεινῶν. Φοβερῶτατον δ' ὁ θάνατος· πέρασ

3 but we speak of Courage in reference to *some* only of the
 4 objects of fear. *e.g.* We do not call a man courageous for
 5 having no fear of disgrace, poverty, sickness, insults to
 himself or his friends, envy, or even bodily *chastisement.
 6 Though the term Courage may sometimes be applied to
 these cases, yet, strictly speaking, it has reference only to the

5. ἐπιεικῆς] 'a man of proper feeling.'

16. μαστιγοῦσθαι] This is in allusion to the Spartan custom of whipping their youths to make them fearless of pain, and so brave soldiers.

17. After ὑπομενετικώτερος supply ἢ ὁ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἄφοβος.

18. πέρασ γὰρ] This passage is

sometimes quoted as a proof that Aristotle had no belief in any sort of life after death. He seems however here to be speaking popularly in reference to the circumstances and prospects of ordinary life, and therefore the passage cannot fairly be pressed into the above controversy.

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1 VII. Τὸ δὲ φοβερὸν οὐ πᾶσι μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ, λέγομεν δέ
 τι καὶ ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον. Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν παντὶ φοβερὸν τῷ
 γε νοῦν ἔχοντι, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἄνθρωπον διαφέρει μεγέθει
 καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα.
 2 Ὁ δὲ ἀνδρείος ἀνέκπληκτος ὡς ἄνθρωπος. Φοβήσεται 5
 μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὡς δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος ὑπο-
 μενεῖ, τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα· τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς.
 3 Ἔστι δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον ταῦτα φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ ἔτι
 4 τὰ μὴ φοβερά ὡς τοιαῦτα φοβεῖσθαι. Γίνεται δὲ τῶν
 ἀμαρτιῶν ἢ μὲν ὅτι οὐ δεῖ, ἢ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὡς δεῖ, ἢ δὲ 10
 ὅτι οὐχ ὅτε, ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ
 5 θαρραλέα. Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀ δεῖ καὶ οὐ ἕνεκα ὑπομένων καὶ
 φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν,

CHAP. VII.—*Courage considered as a mean state, with its
 related excess and defect.*

Courage in
 its objects,
 degrees, and
 occasions is
 regulated by
 Reason and
 stimulated
 by desire for
 the ideally
 noble (τὸ
 καλόν).
 (§§ 1—6.)

1 The objects of terror and its degree differ with different indi-
 2 viduals, though some things there are which no human being
 3 in his right senses could regard without terror. Within these
 4 limits of human endurance the truly brave man is unshaken;
 5 his confidence as well as his fears, in respect of their objects,
 degrees, and occasions (in all of which points error is possible),
 being regulated by Reason, and his motive being always (as in
 all the other virtues) the ideally noble. Such are the charac-

to be a sort of a *fortiori* compari-
 son of καὶ ἀνδρίζονται with the
 more passive condition ἀδεής ἐστι
 in the last section. Observe also
 that some force is due to the con-
 nexion both in etymology and
 thought between ἀνδρίζομαι and
 ἀνδρεία.

ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ἀλκῆ] Either
 'where there is opportunity for
 the display of prowess:' or (as

in the analysis) 'some defence or
 security for others,' which is
 the case in war when a man dies
 to defend his country: in fact
 = βοήθεια, as elsewhere in Aris-
 totle.

5. ὡς ἄνθρωπος] *i.e.* within
 human limits, as far as a man
 can be. Cf. μακαρίους δὲ ἀνθρώ-
 πους in I. x. 16, and the note on
 ὡς ἀλαζῶν in IV. vii. 11.

ἀνδρείος· κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ, καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος, πάσχει
 6 καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρείος. Τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ
 τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν. Καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἡ ἀνδρεία καλόν.
 Τοιοῦτον δὲ καὶ τὸ τέλος· (ὀρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ
 τέλει). Καλοῦ δὲ ἔνεκα ὁ ἀνδρείος ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει 5
 7 τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν. Τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν τῇ
 ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος (εἴρηται δ' ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς πρότερον ὅτι
 πολλά ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμα), εἴη δ' ἂν τις μαινόμενος ἢ ἀνάλ-
 γητος, εἰ μὴθὲν φοβοῖτο, μήτε σεισμὸν μήτε τὰ κύματα,

6 teristics of Courage. And not only the formed habit, but also
 each individual act of Courage, will be guided by this one
 motive, the attainment of the ideally noble.

7 Now both confidence and fear admit of excess. Excess of fear-
 lessness (if we may so speak) *i.e.* a total absence of fear under

The Excess
 and Defect
 are Rash-
 ness and
 Cowardice.
 (§§ 7—12.)

2. The following points should be noticed in explaining this difficult section. (1) There is a marked opposition between ἐνεργεια (act) and ἔξις (habit) on which the argument turns. Compare IV. ii. 6 for a similar antithesis and somewhat similar argument. (2) ὀρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει is a parenthetical argument (or prosyllogism) supporting one of the premisses of the main syllogism. The main argument is:—

{ The end of the formed habit (τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν (τέλος)) is also the end of each individual act (πάσης ἐνεργείας). τὸ καλόν is the end of the formed habit of Courage (τοιοῦτον δὲ καὶ τὸ τέλος). Therefore it is the end of each act of Courage (καλοῦ δὲ ἔνεκα κ.τ.λ.).

The parenthesis supports the minor premiss thus:—

{ That which characterizes anything is its end (ὀρίζεται ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει). τὸ καλόν characterizes the habit of Courage (τῷ ἀνδρείῳ ἢ ἀνδρεία καλόν). Therefore τὸ καλόν is the end of the habit of Courage (τοιοῦτον δὲ τὸ τέλος).

6. The complication of the extremes here is rather confusing. In *theory* four (*viz.* Excess of Confidence, Defect of Confidence, Excess of Timidity, Defect of Timidity), in *fact* they reduce to two. For Excess of Confidence and Defect of Timidity are the same, and constitute Rashness; while Defect of Confidence and Excess of Timidity are also identical, and constitute Cowardice. See further, note on II. vii. 2.

καθάπερ φασὶ τοὺς Κελτούς. Ὁ δὲ τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερ-
 8 βάλλων περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ θρασύς. Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἀλαζῶν
 εἶναι ὁ θρασύς καὶ προσποιητικὸς ἀνδρείας. Ὡς οὖν
 ἐκεῖνος περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ ἔχει, οὕτως οὗτος βούλεται
 9 φαίνεσθαι ἐν οἷς οὖν δύναται, μιμείται. Διὸ καὶ εἰσὶν 5
 οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν θρασύδειλοι· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ θρασυνό-
 10 μνοι τὰ φοβερὰ οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν. Ὁ δὲ τῷ φοβεῖσθαι
 ὑπερβάλλων δειλός· καὶ γὰρ ἂ μὴ δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ,
 καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτῷ. Ἐλλείπει δὲ
 καὶ τῷ θαρρεῖν· ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς λύπαις ὑπερβάλλων μάλ- 10
 11 λον καταφανής ἐστιν. Δύσελπις δὴ τις ὁ δειλός· πάντα
 γὰρ φοβεῖται. Ὁ δ' ἀνδρείος ἐναντίως· τὸ γὰρ θαρ-
 12 ρεῖν εὐέλπιδος. Περὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὅ τε δειλὸς
 καὶ ὁ θρασύς καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος, διαφόρως δ' ἔχουσι πρὸς
 αὐτά· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν, ὁ δὲ 15

all circumstances, exists rather in idea than in fact. Excess of
 8 confidence gives rise to the extreme of Rashness. The Rash
 man has also a tendency to swagger, and he makes an ostenta-
 tion of Courage. To secure the reputation of Courage, for which
 he is anxious, he imitates its external signs as far as he can.
 9 In real danger however such characters are often found want-
 10 ing. Excess of timidity (which implies defect of confidence)
 gives rise to the other extreme of Cowardice, which is mani-
 11 fested by over-sensitiveness to pain and by despondency.
 12 Thus Rashness, Cowardice, and Courage relate to the same
 objects and circumstances; but Rashness and Cowardice
 manifest excess and defect, while Courage is a mean state,
 respecting them. We might add that *before* the danger comes

4. ἐκεῖνος, i.e. ἀνδρείος. οὗτος,
 i.e. ὁ θρασύς.

6. θρασύδειλοι] Falstaff would
 be a familiar example. See espe-
 cially *Henry IV.*, Part I. Act ii.
 Sc. 4; Act v. Sc. 4, etc.

ἐν τούτοις] i.e. ἐν οἷς δύναται.

9. 'The coward is also defi-
 cient in confidence, but his char-
 acter is more usually displayed
 by an excessive sensibility to
 pain.' Cf. x. 1 (fin.), xi. 5.

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φεύγοντα πενίαν ἢ ἔρωτα ἢ τι λυπηρὸν οὐκ ἀνδρείου, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δειλοῦ· μαλακία γὰρ τὸ φεύγειν τὰ ἐπιπύονα, καὶ οὐχ ὅτι καλὸν ὑπομένει, ἀλλὰ φεύγων κακόν.

I VIII. Ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀνδρεία τοιοῦτόν τι, λέγονται δὲ καὶ ἕτεραι κατὰ πέντε τρόπους, πρῶτον μὲν ἡ πολι- 5
τική· μάλιστα γὰρ ἔοικεν· δοκοῦσι γὰρ ὑπομένειν τοὺς κινδύνους οἱ πολῖται διὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἐπιτίμια καὶ
2 τὰ ὀνειδέη καὶ διὰ τὰς τιμάς. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνδρειότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι παρ' οἷς οἱ δειλοὶ ἄτιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἔντιμοι. Τοιοῦτους δὲ καὶ Ὀμηρος ποιεῖ, οἷον τὸν Διο- 10
μήδην καὶ τὸν Ἐκτορα.

Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει·
καὶ Διομήδης,

Ἐκτωρ γάρ ποτε φήσει ἐνὶ Τρώεσσ' ἀγορεύων
" Τυδείδης ὑπ' ἐμεῖο."

15

faces death not because it is noble, but because he regards death as a less evil than that from which he seeks to escape.

CHAP. VIII.—^{πυθαγορεῖα}Spurious forms of Courage described.

Five spurious forms of Courage arise severally from i. Fear of society. This may be due to either moral compulsion,

I In contrast with genuine Courage now described, there are five spurious forms which must be distinguished from it.
1. *The courage of compulsion*, which may perhaps be called
2 'Social' courage, because it arises from fear of society. Its nobler type is that which is due to fear of loss of character, or of the good opinion of those among whom we live, or even
3 to the influence of the rewards and punishments by which

'forbids a man to desert his post without the order of his commander, who is God.'

(Several other quotations from ancient moralists will be found in Lecky, *Hist. Eur. Morals*, i. p. 223, etc.)

3. ὑπομένει] Understand θάνατον from the general sense of the context. See vi. 12.

15. The whole line runs, *Il. viii. 149*:

Τυδείδης ὑπ' ἐμεῖο φοβούμενος ἔκετο νῆας.

Thus the Courage of Dio-

3 Ὡμοίωται δ' αὕτη μάλιστα τῇ πρότερον εἰρημένη, ὅτι
 δι' ἀρετὴν γίνεται δι' αἰδῶ γὰρ καὶ διὰ καλοῦ ὄρεξιν
 4 (τιμῆς γὰρ) καὶ φυγὴν ὀνειδούς, αἰσχροῦ οντος. Τάξαι
 δ' ἂν τις καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἀναγκαζομένους
 εἰς ταυτό· χεῖρους δ' ὅσω οὐ δι' αἰδῶ ἀλλὰ διὰ φόβον 5
 αὐτὸ δρῶσι, καὶ φεύγοντες οὐ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ λυ-
 πηρόν· ἀναγκάζουσι γὰρ οἱ κύριοι, ὥσπερ ὁ Ἑκτωρ
 ὃν δέ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης πτώσοντα νοήσω,
 οὐ οἱ ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν κύνας. ●

5 Καὶ οἱ προστάττοντες κὰν ἀναχωρῶσι τύπτοντες τὸ 10
 αὐτὸ δρῶσι, καὶ οἱ πρὸ τῶν τάφρων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων
 παρατάττοντες· πάντες γὰρ ἀναγκάζουσιν. Δεῖ δ' οὐ δι'
 6 ἀνάγκην ἀνδρείον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν. Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ

3 civil society encourages Bravery, and thus, the motive being
 noble, in some cases this type approximates very nearly to
 4 the genuine virtue. A baser form may be seen in the courage or physical
 5 of troops who are driven to battle with the lash, or drawn up compulsion
 6 in positions where retreat is impossible. 2. *The courage of* ii. Experi-
ence.

mede is represented as due to the fear that Hector would triumph over him, if defeated. Conversely to the case in the text it has been said, 'Perfect Courage is doing without witnesses all that one could do if the world were spectators' (La Rochefoucauld, *Max.* 216).

1. Aristotle here touches upon a question of the greatest interest in moral science, How far does a system of rewards and punishments destroy the character of Virtue by reducing it to a calculation of self-interest? It depends greatly on the character of the rewards and punishments

themselves. If they consist in physical pleasure or pain, no true virtue can be developed by them. If however they be themselves moral (*e.g.* testimony of a good conscience, dread of shame or self-reproach, etc.), the stimulus to action which they afford is but a form of the love of Virtue and hatred of Vice in themselves. The case described in § 3 would illustrate the latter case, that in §§ 4 and 5 the former.

10. *τύπτοντες*] *e.g.* as Herodotus (vii. 223) says was the case with the Persian soldiers at the invasion of Greece.

ἡ ἐμπειρία ἢ περὶ ἕκαστα ἀνδρεία τις εἶναι ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ὤηθη ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. Τοιοῦτοι δὲ ἄλλοι μὲν ἐν ἄλλοις, ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς δ' οἱ στρατιῶται· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ἀ μάλιστα συνεωράκασιν οὔτοι φαίνονται δὴ ἀνδρεῖοι, 5
7 ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασιν οἱ ἄλλοι οἷά ἐστιν. Εἶτα ποιῆσαι καὶ μὴ παθεῖν μάλιστα δύνανται ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας, δυνάμενοι

experience, which Socrates thought the truest type of Courage. Experience enables soldiers, for example, so to estimate the real danger that they are not alarmed by circumstances that 7, 8 would terrify the inexperienced. Thus experience as it were

1. ἡ ἐμπειρία ἢ περὶ ἕκαστα] 'Experience in any special subjects.' This is further explained by τοιοῦτοι (*i.e.* ἐμπειροὶ) ἄλλοι ἐν ἄλλοις in l. 3. Aristotle shows that experience cannot constitute courage—for if the danger be *unreal*, experience, which tells us that it is so, takes away the sphere for the exercise of courage (§§ 7, 8); while if the danger be *real*, experience, which reveals this, tends to make cowards of those who know it (§ 9).

2. Socrates defines Courage (in Plat. *Rep.* p. 429) as 'the power of preserving in danger the *right opinion* as to what is to be feared and what is not.' Or again in the *Protagoras*, 'Courage is the knowledge of what is terrible and what is not,' ἡ σοφία τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀνδρεία ἐστίν.

4. πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου] *i.e.* many dangers in war are unreal, *e.g.* the ferocious aspect and

savage cries of barbarians, which are most alarming to the inexperienced, but which make no impression on the veteran. It was said that at the commencement of the war between France and Prussia, there were served out to the young German troops pictures of the Turcos and their mode of fighting, in order to give them that ἐμπειρία which would render them proof against such terrors. Another reading is *καινὰ*, *i.e.* there are many 'surprises' in war; but this evidently spoils the sense.

5. φαίνονται δὴ ἀνδρεῖοι κ.τ.λ.] This would be further illustrated by the example introduced in vi. 11. The indifference of sailors in an ordinary gale is regarded by a landsman as courage (ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασιν οἱ ἄλλοι οἷά ἐστιν), whereas in truth their ἐμπειρία reveals that there is no danger, and therefore no occasion for courage.

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10 ὁ δ' ἀνδρείος οὐ τοιοῦτος. Καὶ τὸν θυμὸν δ' ἐπὶ τὴν
ἀνδρείαν ἐπιφέρουσιν· ἀνδρείοι γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσι καὶ
οἱ διὰ θυμὸν ὡσπερ τὰ θηρία ἐπὶ τοὺς τρώσαντας φε-
ρόμενοι, ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρείοι θυμοειδεῖς· ἰτητικώτατον
γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, ὅθεν καὶ "Ομηρος 5

σθένος ἔμβαλε θυμῷ

καὶ

μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἔγειρε

καὶ

δριμὺ δ' ἀνὰ ρίνας μένος 10

καὶ

ἔξεσεν αἷμα·

πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔοικε σημαίνειν τὴν τοῦ θυμοῦ
11 ἔγερσιν καὶ ὄρμην. Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρείοι διὰ τὸ καλὸν
πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ θυμὸς συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς· τὰ θηρία δὲ 15
διὰ λύπην· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πληγῆναι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ εἴαν
γε ἐν ὕλῃ ἢ ἐν ἔλει ἢ, οὐ προσέρχονται. Οὐ δὴ ἐστὶν
ἀνδρεία διὰ τὸ ὑπ' ἀλγηδόνοσ καὶ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα
πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον ὀρμᾶν, οὐθὲν τῶν δεινῶν προορῶντα,
ἐπεὶ οὕτω γε καὶ οἱ ὄνοι ἀνδρείοι εἶεν πεινῶντες· τυπ- 20
τόμενοι γὰρ οὐκ ἀφίστανται τῆς νομῆς· καὶ οἱ μοιχοὶ
12 δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πολμηρὰ πολλὰ δρῶσιν. Οὐ δὴ
ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία τὰ δι' ἀλγηδόνοσ ἢ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα
πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον. Φυσικωτάτη δ' ἔοικεν ἢ διὰ τὸν

iii.
High
Spirit.

10, 11 Courage. 3. *The courage of high spirit.*—It is true that the
courageous are high-spirited, and that the outward signs of
courage and high spirit are similar, and also that high spirit
12 is a stimulus to courage. But they are not identical, else

4. ἰτητικὸς] 'apt to advance,'
connected with εἶμι (*ibo*) through
the verbal ἰτέον.

24. φυσικωτάτη] 'more purely
physical than other sorts of
Courage.'

θυμὸν εἶναι, καὶ προσλαβοῦσα προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ οὐ
 ἔνεκα ἀνδρεία εἶναι. Καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι δὴ ὀργιζόμενοι
 μὲν ἀλγοῦσι, τιμωρούμενοι δ' ἡδονταί· οἱ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα
 μαχόμενοι μάχιμοι μὲν, οὐκ ἀνδρείοι δέ· οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ
 καλὸν οὐδ' ὡς ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πάθος· παραπλή- 5
 13 σιον δ' ἔχουσί τι. Οὐδὲ δὴ οἱ εὐέλπιδες ὄντες ἀν-
 δρείοι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πολλάκις καὶ πολλοὺς νενικηκέναι
 θαρροῦσιν ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις. Παρόμοιοι δὲ, ὅτι ἄμφω
 θαρραλέοι· ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἀνδρείοι διὰ τὰ προειρημένα
 θαρραλέοι, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ οἶεσθαι κρείττους εἶναι καὶ 10
 14 μῆθεν ἀντιπαθεῖν. Τοιοῦτον δὲ ποιοῦσι καὶ οἱ μεθυσκό-
 μενοι· εὐέλπιδες γὰρ γίνονται. "Όταν δὲ αὐτοῖς μὴ
 συμβῆ τοιαῦτα, φεύγουσιν· ἀνδρείου δ' ἦν τὰ φοβερὰ
 ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντα καὶ φαινόμενα ὑπομένειν, ὅτι καλὸν καὶ
 15 αἰσχρὸν τὸ μῆ. Διὸ καὶ ἀνδρειοτέρου δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ 15
 ἐν τοῖς αἰφνιδίοις φόβοις ἄφοβον καὶ ἀτάραχον εἶναι
 ἢ ἐν τοῖς προδήλοις· ἀπὸ ἕξεως γὰρ μᾶλλον, ἢ καὶ ὅτι
 ἦττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς· τὰ προφανῆ μὲν γὰρ κἂν ἐκ

some of the lower animals, or men of violent passions, would afford the highest examples of courage. High spirit appears to be the natural *substratum* of courage, and requires only deliberate choice and a right motive to transform it from mere

13 pugnacity to true courage. 4. *The courage of a sanguine disposition.*—This results from a confident belief in success; in other words, from a belief that there is no serious danger
 14 to fear. A drunken man exhibits this sort of courage. It
 15 fails when danger appears contrary to expectation. Hence

11. τοιοῦτον δὲ ποιοῦσι κ.τ.λ.] This would be an instance of what is sometimes called 'Dutch courage.' Falstaff's encomium on 'Sherris' as the source of Courage in *Henry IV.*

Part II. Act iv. Sc. 3, may be quoted, under the influence of which 'the heart great and puffed up . . . doth any deed of courage; and this valour comes of sherris.'

*cheerful
 disposition*

iv. Sanguine disposition

λογισμοῦ καὶ λόγου τις προέλοιτο, τὰ δ' ἐξαίφνης κατὰ
 16 τὴν ἔξιν. Ἀνδρείοι δὲ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες,
 καὶ εἰσὶν οὐ πόρρω τῶν εὐελπίδων, χείρους δ' ὅσῳ
 ἀξίωμα οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν, ἐκείνοι δέ. Διὸ καὶ μένουσί
 τινα χρόνον· οἱ δ' ἠπατημένοι, εἴαν γνῶσιν ὅτι ἕτερον 5
 ἢ ὑποπτεύσωσι, φεύγουσιν ὅπερ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἔπαθον
 17 περιπεσόντες τοῖς Λάκωσιν ὡς Σικυωνίοις. Οἱ τε δὴ
 ἀνδρείοι εἴρηται ποῖοί τινες, καὶ οἱ δοκοῦντες ἀνδρείοι.
 1 IX. Περὶ θάρρη δὲ καὶ φόβους ἢ ἀνδρεία οὕσα οὐχ
 ὁμοίως περὶ ἄμφω ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερά· 10
 ὁ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἀτάραχος καὶ περὶ ταῦθ' ὡς δεῖ
 ἔχων ἀνδρείος μᾶλλον ἢ ὁ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. Τῷ δὴ
 τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν, ὡς εἴρηται, ἀνδρείοι λέγονται.

v. Ignorance. 16, 17 sudden dangers are a better test of real courage than those which are foreseen. 5. *The courage of ignorance.*—This form, which results from ignorance of the existence of danger, is not unlike the last mentioned, but is inferior to it as not implying any self-reliance. Such courage vanishes at once if the ignorance on which it depends is dispelled.

CHAP. IX.—*How can the exercise of Courage, which involves pain and loss, have a 'pleasure in itself'?*

Courage relates to objects of

1 Thus Courage is a due regulation of confidence and fear, but more especially of the latter, because Courage implies

4. ἀξίωμα] 'self-reliance,' literally 'estimate of themselves.' The sanguine rely so strongly upon the estimate which they have formed of their own prowess or good fortune, that they can face danger in the strength which it gives them.

6. ὅπερ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι κ.τ.λ.] This

incident is described by Xenophon (*Hell.* iv. 10). The Argives attacked with contemptuous boldness certain Spartans whom they mistook for Sicyonians owing to the Spartans having assumed some Sicyonian armour. The Argives fled at once on the discovery of their mistake.

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ἢ, μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῷ θανάτῳ λυπηθήσεται τῷ τοιούτῳ γὰρ
 μάλιστα ζῆν ἄξιον, καὶ οὗτος μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ἀποστε-
 5 ρεῖται εἰδώς· λυπηρὸν δὲ τοῦτο. Ἄλλ' οὐδὲν ἥττον
 ἀνδρείος, ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον, ὅτι τὸ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ
 καλὸν αὐτ' ἐκείνων αἰρεῖται. Οὐ δὲ ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς 5
 ἀρεταῖς τὸ ἠδέως ἐνεργεῖν ὑπάρχει, πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον τοῦ
 6 τέλους ἐφάπτεται. Στρατιώτας δ' οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει μὴ

nary man), deliberately preferring to it the glory of death in
 5 battle. In such cases then pleasure is possible only so far
 as the attainment of the end and ideal of his being is felt and
 6 realized. Nor need we deny that a more reckless, though less
 brave, man might perhaps make a better rank-and-file soldier.

Jeremy Taylor says 'A great man is *naturally* a coward, as indeed most men are, knowing the value of life; but the power of reason enables him when required to conduct himself with uniform courage and hardihood.' This passage like that in the text would go far to excluding mere animal spirit (*θυμὸς* ch. viii.) from the highest form of courage. The recent successes of the civilian soldiers of Germany over the professional soldiers of France, with the further supposed advantage of natural *élan* on the part of the latter, would support Aristotle in assigning more importance than is popularly allowed to the rational or calculating element in true Courage.

4. μᾶλλον] *i.e.* because the sacrifice is greater and more difficult. See note on § 2. Grant quotes Wordsworth, whose 'Happy Warrior' is
 'More brave for this, that he hath much
 to lose.'

6. τοῦ τέλους ἐφάπτεται] To understand this we must recall what was said in I. i. about the 'final end' of all human efforts and aspirations, and its identification with 'Happiness.' So far as the brave man secures for himself a result so really noble (compare vii. 6), he attains to something of the final end (τοῦ τέλους ἐφάπτεται) of human existence, and therefore to Happiness; but *only* so far, because the accompanying circumstances of his actions are otherwise painful. He has what a modern religious writer would call 'a foretaste of heaven,' in this supreme act of self-sacrifice. We may even compare the language of the Apostle of a yet higher Ideal 'who *for the joy set before Him* endured the cross, despising the shame.'

7. Observe the emphatic position of στρατιώτας, 'As mere rank-and-file soldiers the most

τοὺς τοιούτους κρατίστους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἡττον μὲν ἀνδρείους, ἄλλο δ' ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν ἔχοντας· ἔτοιμοι γὰρ οὗτοι πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, καὶ τὸν βίον πρὸς μικρὰ κέρδη καταλλάττονται.

7 Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρείας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· τί δ' 5
ἔστιν, οὐ χαλεπὸν τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

1 X. Μετὰ δὲ ταύτην περὶ σωφροσύνης λέγωμεν· δοκού-

CHAP. X.—*The proper objects of the Virtue of Temperance.*

1 The other Virtue of our lower and irrational nature is Temperance. Theoretically, it is a mean state in reference

Temperance consists in the due regulation of our pleasures.

truly brave may not be so good as those who have little or nothing to lose by death.' Mere recklessness of life is not courage. The savage Turcos may be the most serviceable soldiers in a bloody war, or for certain operations of war, but no one would say that they were therefore the bravest men.

CHAP. X.—The discussion of the Virtue of Temperance, with its related vices, occupies three Chapters (x—xii).

In ch. x. the proper objects of Temperance are determined by a method precisely similar to that employed in the case of Courage in ch. vi. It is first broadly stated that Temperance deals with Pleasures, and then by successive limitations we arrive at the precise class of Pleasures to which it properly refers.

In ch. xi. the excess and de-

fect are described and contrasted with the mean state.

In ch. xii. the comparative voluntariness of Cowardice and Intemperance is discussed; and some supplementary remarks added concerning the nature of Intemperance as illustrated by its etymology.

7. σωφροσύνη is usually, though inadequately, translated by 'temperance.' 'Self-control' or 'self-mastery' would perhaps be nearer to it. The derivation of σῶφρων, or σαόφρων, from σῶς (σάος) and φρήν, shows that the original idea of the word was that of a man who never 'loses his head,' but keeps his mind clear and calm, however assaulted by pleasure or passion. Conversely the ἀκόλαστος is one subject to no restraint: κόλασις (see note on v. 7) being the technical word for chastisement, or punishment for the purpose of

σι γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὐταὶ εἶναι αἱ ἀρεταί. "Οτι
 μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονὰς ἢ σωφροσύνη, εἴρηται
 ἡμῖν· ^ἡτον γὰρ καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας·
 2 ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία φαίνεται. Περὶ
 ποίας οὖν τῶν ἡδονῶν, νῦν ἀφορίσωμεν. Διηρήσθωσαν 5
 δὲ αἱ ψυχικαὶ καὶ αἱ σωματικαί, οἷον φιλοτιμία, φιλο-
 μάθεια· ἐκάτερος γὰρ τούτων χαίρει, οὐ φιλητικός ἐστίν
 οὐθὲν πάσχοντος τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς δια-
 νοίας· οἱ δὲ περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς οὔτε σώφρονες
 3 οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται. Ὅμοίως δ' οὐδ' οἱ περὶ τὰς 10
 ἄλλας ὅσαι μὴ σωματικαὶ εἰσιν· τοὺς γὰρ φιλομύθους
 καὶ διηγητικούς καὶ περὶ τῶν τυχόντων κατατρίβοντας
 τὰς ἡμέρας ἀδολέσχας, ἀκολάστους δ' οὐ λέγομεν, οὐδὲ
 4 τοὺς λυπουμενοὺς ἐπὶ χρήμασιν ἢ φίλοις. Περὶ δὲ τὰς
 σωματικὰς εἴη ἂν ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐ πάσας δὲ οὐδὲ 15
 ταύτας· οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες τοῖς διὰ τῆς ὄψεως, οἷον

to pleasures and pains (as we have already said); but, practi-
 2 cally, its operation is limited to pleasures. Next, we limit it
 Not however of mental pleasures. further to certain kinds of pleasures. First, pleasures being
 3 either *mental* or *bodily*, we exclude the whole of the former
 from the sphere of Temperance, as well as certain others, such
 as love of gossip, idling, love of money or friends, which,
 though not exactly mental, are not at any rate bodily pleasures.
 4 Secondly, among bodily pleasures, it is not concerned with

Nor all bodily pleasures.

reformation. The derivation of the word ἀκολασία is discussed by Aristotle in xii. 5, etc.

1. τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν] This (as was remarked in II. vii.) is almost the only hint as to the principle of arrangement in the Catalogue of Virtues.

3. ἦττον] This was noticed by

Aristotle in passing in II. vii. 3. οὐχ ὁμοίως will be found explained in the next Chapter, § 5. Intemperance is shown not so much in avoiding pain, as in feeling pain at the loss of pleasure, or in excessive sensibility to pain.

7. ἐκάτερος γὰρ] i.e. both ὁ φιλότιμος and ὁ φιλομαθής.

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Ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' ἰδὼν ἢ εὐρὼν ἔλαφον ἢ ἄγριον αἶγα,
 9 ἀλλ' ὅτι βορὰν ἔξει. Περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δὲ ἡδονὰς ἢ
 σωφροσύνη καὶ ἢ ἀκολασία ἐστὶν ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα
 κοινωνεῖ, ὅθεν ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται
 10 αὐταὶ δ' εἰσὶν ἀφή καὶ γεῦσις. Φαίνονται δὲ καὶ τῇ 5
 γεύσει ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ οὐθὲν χρῆσθαι τῆς γὰρ γεύσεώς
 ἐστὶν ἢ κρίσις τῶν χυμῶν, ὅπερ ποιούσιν οἱ τοὺς οἴνους
 δοκιμάζοντες καὶ τὰ ὄψα ἀρτύοντες· οὐ πάνυ δὲ χαί-
 ρουσι τούτοις, ἢ οὐχ οἷ γε ἀκόλαστοι, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀπο-
 λαύσει, ἢ γίνεται πᾶσα δι' ἀφῆς καὶ ἐν σιτίοις καὶ ἐν 10
 ποτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις λεγομένοις. Διὸ καὶ ἡϋ-
 ξατό τις ὀψοφάγος ὧν τὸν φάρυγγα αὐτῷ μακρότερον
 11 γεράνου γενέσθαι, ὡς ἡδόμενος τῇ ἀφῆ. Κοινοτάτη δὲ
 τῶν αἰσθήσεων καθ' ἣν ἢ ἀκολασία καὶ δόξειεν ἂν
 δικαίως ἐπονείδιστος εἶναι, ὅτι οὐχ ἢ ἀνθρωποὶ ἐσμεν 15
 ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' ἢ ζῶα. Τὸ δὲ τοιούτοις χαίρειν καὶ

or Taste 9, 10
 (except slightly),
 but only those of
 Touch, and the
 lower types even
 of these.

9, 10 prey; (δ) nor pleasures of *taste*, except to a slight extent, viz. so far as by prolonged or artificially-stimulated contact of the food with the throat the sense of Touch is excited. (ε)
 11 The sense of *touch* alone remains. We have thus limited Temperance to the regulation, and Intemperance to the indulgence, of the pleasures of the sense of Touch, and we must
 12 further and finally limit it to the commonest and most ignoble

6. Aristotle regards the primary function of taste (as of the other senses) to be the discrimination of objects; the transmission of information to the mind concerning things external to it, rather than the communication of pleasure:—in a word, he looks at their powers of *perception* rather than their powers of *sensation*. Hence to judge of wine (as a trader), or of seasoned

dishes (as a cook), would be the most proper function of the sense of taste as such; but it is not in such an exercise of it that pleasure is conveyed. That depends, according to Aristotle, upon the prolonged contact of the thing tasted with the throat; *i.e.* upon a particular application of the sense of Touch. It is of course true (though not quite in the sense intended by Aristotle) that

12 μάλιστα ἀγαπᾶν θηριῶδες. Καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐλευθεριώταται τῶν διὰ τῆς ἀφῆς ἡδονῶν ἀφήρηται, οἷον αἱ ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις διὰ τρίψεως καὶ τῆς θερμασίας γινόμεναι οὐ γὰρ περὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ἢ τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἀφή, ἀλλὰ περὶ τινα μέρη.

5

1 XI. Τῶν δ' ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν κοιναὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, αἱ δ' ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι οἷον ἢ μὲν τῆς τροφῆς φυσική· πᾶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ ἐνδεὴς ξηρᾶς ἢ ὑγρᾶς τροφῆς, ὅτε δ' ἀμφοῖν, καὶ εὐνῆς, φησὶν Ὁμηρος, ὁ νέος καὶ ἀκμάζων τὸ δὲ τοιᾶσδε ἢ τοιᾶσδε, οὐκέτι πᾶς, οὐδὲ 10
2 τῶν αὐτῶν. Διὸ φαίνεται ἡμέτερον εἶναι. Οὐ μὲν ἀλλ'

kinds of pleasures even of this, which is itself the lowest and most animal of all our senses.

CHAP. XI.—*The excess and defect related to the Virtue of Temperance.*

1 The pleasures spoken of in the last chapter admit of a further division into those which are common and natural, such as the desire of food generally; and those which are peculiar and acquired, such as the desire of some particular 2 kind of food; the latter depending (within certain broad

These pleasures are further divided into Natural and Acquired.

the sense of Taste depends upon Touch, but such is also the case with all the other senses.

1. ἐλευθεριώταται] 'the noblest pleasures,' a converse metaphor to ἀνδραποδώδεις in § 3 and elsewhere.

CHAP. XI.—This Chapter treats of (1) the Excess of Intemperance (α) in reference to natural and artificial Desires (§§ 1-4), (β) in reference to Pleasure and Pain generally (§§ 5, 6); (2) The Defect of Insensitiveness

(§ 7); and (3) adds a few words on the Mean of Temperance in contrast with both.

6. τῶν μὲν ἐπιθυμιῶν] Plato (*Rep.* p. 558) makes a similar distinction of ἐπιθυμίαι, and adds that the gratification of the natural or necessary desires is always beneficial, that of the artificial desires not generally so.

7. ἐπίθετοι] 'acquired' or 'artificial.'

8. ξηρᾶς ἢ ὑγρᾶς τροφῆς] 'either solid or liquid food.'

ἔχει γέ τι καὶ φυσικόν· ἕτερα γὰρ ἑτέροις ἐστὶν ἡδέα,
 3 καὶ ἕνια πᾶσιν ἡδίω τῶν τυχόντων. Ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς
 φυσικαῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ὀλίγοι ἀμαρτάνουσι καὶ ἐφ' ἑν,
 ἐπὶ τὸ πλείον· τὸ γὰρ ἐσθίειν τὰ τυχόντα ἢ πίνειν ἕως
 ἂν ὑπερπλησθῇ, ὑπερβάλλειν ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ 5
 πλήθει ἀναπλήρωσις γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας ἢ φυσικὴ ἐπι-
 θυμία. Διὸ λέγονται οὗτοι γαστρίμαργοι, ὡς παρὰ τὸ
 δέον πληροῦντες αὐτήν. Τοιοῦτοι δὲ γίνονται οἱ λίαν
 4 ἀνδραποδώδεις. Περὶ δὲ τὰς ἰδίας τῶν ἡδονῶν πολλοὶ
 καὶ πολλαχῶς ἀμαρτάνουσιν· τῶν γὰρ φιλοτιοῦτων 10
 λεγομένων ἢ τῷ χαίρειν οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον, ἢ ὡς
 οἱ πολλοὶ, ἢ μὴ ὡς δεῖ, κατὰ πάντα δ' οἱ ἀκόλαστοι

Errors in the
 former are
 rare, and
 always in
 the direction
 of excess;
 4 in the latter,
 common and
 various in
 character.

3 natural limits) upon individual taste. Now in *natural* desires
 error is rare, and must always take the form of supplying in
 excess what is in itself a natural want; and this, when it is
 4 found, indicates a degraded and almost brutish nature. In
 the case of *acquired* desires, error is very common and multi-
 form, extending to the object, manner, degree, etc., of the

2. ἕνια πᾶσιν] 'Some things
 there are which give every one
 more pleasure than things ordi-
 nary and indifferent.' i.e. How-
 ever much individual tastes dif-
 fer, there are still some things
 naturally more pleasant than
 others to every one.

3. ὀλίγοι κ.τ.λ.] e.g. Exces-
 sive eating is not likely to occur
 in regard to bread, or any simple
 food which is desired merely to
 supply a natural appetite, and
 not for any special pleasure to
 be derived from eating it, but
 rather in regard to some parti-
 cular viand or favourite

'Gluttony on oatmeal porridge'
 οὐ πάνυ γίνεται.

9. ἀνδραποδώδεις] 'degraded,'
 a metaphor converse to ἐλευθέ-
 ριος, both words having passed
 from a *social* to a *moral* signifi-
 cation. See last Ch. § 12, note.

11. ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ] In some
 editions ὡς is omitted, and if so,
 ἢ = 'than,' after the comparative
 μᾶλλον. If ὡς be retained, the
 sense may be explained by what
 is said in I. v. 3 about the excès-
 sive and exclusive devotion of
 οἱ πολλοὶ to Pleasure. See also
 the concluding words of this
 section.

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καὶ γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα διακρίνει τὰ βρώματα, καὶ τοῖς
 μὲν χαίρει τοῖς δ' οὐ· εἰ δέ τῳ μηθέν ἐστὶν ἠδὺ μηδὲ
 διαφέρει ἕτερον ἑτέρου, πόρρω ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
 εἶναι· οὐ τέτευχε δ' ὁ τοιοῦτος ὀνόματος διὰ τὸ μὴ
 8 πάνυ γίνεσθαι. Ὁ δὲ σώφρων μέσως περὶ ταῦτ' εχει 5
 οὔτε γὰρ ἠδέεται οἷς μάλιστα ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἀλλὰ μάλ-
 λον δυσχεραίνει, οὔθ' ὅλως οἷς μὴ δεῖ· οὔτε σφόδρα
 τοιούτῳ οὐδενὶ, οὔτ' ἀπόντων λυπεῖται οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ,
 ἢ μετρίως, οὐδὲ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ'
 ὅλως τῶν τοιούτων οὐθέν· ὅσα δὲ πρὸς ὑγίειάν ἐστὶν 10
 ἢ πρὸς εὐεξίαν ἠδέα ὄντα, τούτων ὀρέξεται μετρίως καὶ
 ὡς δεῖ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἠδέων μὴ ἐμποδίων τούτοις ὄντων
 ἢ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν ἢ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν. Ὁ γὰρ οὕτως
 ἔχων μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς τοιαύτας ἠδονὰς τῆς ἀξίας· ὁ
 δὲ σώφρων οὐ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος. 15

The mean
 stands in
 contrast
 with both.

bility to pleasure, is only imaginary, for not only all men, but even all animals, must have some tastes and preferences.
 8 The Temperate man, as we have seen, holds a mean position between excessive devotion and utter insensibility to pleasures. He enjoys them in moderation, and with due regard to the various considerations as to objects, degree, occasions, and consequences which right reason suggests.

be rather a physical than a moral defect. The practical non-existence of ἀναισθησία and of ἀφοβία (see vii. 7) is a comment on the statement of x. 1, that the virtues of Courage and Temperance relate to feelings which are purely animal and instinctive (belonging to ἄλογον μέρος). In the case of all the other virtues of the catalogue (except perhaps to some extent ὀργή—see the simi-

lar difficulty about ἀοργησία in IV. v. 5), it is perhaps conceivable that a man might be without the feelings, or be altogether removed from the circumstances, in which the sphere of the exercise of the virtues lies. In sensibility to fear and to pleasure a man could hardly be wanting without ceasing to be human.

13. οὕτως] i.e. ἢ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν ἢ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν.

1 XII. Ἐκουσίῳ δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἡ ἀκολασία τῆς δει-
 λίας. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἡδονὴν, ἡ δὲ διὰ λύπην, ὧν τὸ μὲν
 2 αἶρετόν, τὸ δὲ φευκτόν. Καὶ ἡ μὲν λύπη ἐξίστησι καὶ
 φθείρει τὴν τοῦ ἔχοντος φύσιν, ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ οὐδὲν τοι-
 οὔτον ποιεῖ, μᾶλλον δ' ἐκούσιον διὸ καὶ ἐπονιδιστό- 5
 τερον. Καὶ γὰρ ἐθισθῆναι ῥᾶον πρὸς αὐτά· πολλὰ γὰρ
 ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ οἱ ἐθισμοὶ ἀκίνδυνοι. Ἐπὶ
 3 δὲ τῶν φοβερῶν ἀνάπαλιν. Δόξειε δ' ἂν οὐχ ὁμοίως

CHAP. XII.—(a) *Is the external compulsion stronger in Cowardice or in Intemperance?*

(β) *The nature of ἀκολασία is illustrated by its etymology.*

1 The question may be asked, Which is more voluntary (and therefore more blameable), Intemperance or Cowardice? We
 2 reply, Intemperance:—(1) because the pressure arises from pleasure, whereas in Cowardice it arises from pain; (2) be-
 3 cause it is both easy and safe to practise resistance against temptations to Intemperance; while the reverse is the case with temptations to Cowardice. A distinction however must be

Intemperance is more voluntary than Cowardice, if we consider single acts, though perhaps the reverse is the case if we regard the settled ha-

CHAP. XII.—We have seen in ch. v. that no vice is really involuntary, still the degree of external pressure, though it never amounts to compulsion, varies in different cases. It is naturally greatest in regard to these two Virtues which relate to those feelings of our *animal* nature (x. 1) which are ever present, and *must* be excited under given external circumstances whenever they arise. The object of this Chapter is to determine in which of these two cases there is more external

pressure, and, so far, less of voluntary action.

6. καὶ γὰρ] 'and what is more,' introducing, as usual, a fresh argument.

αὐτὰ from the context, though it has no grammatical antecedent, evidently refers to pleasurable objects, or temptations to Intemperance. ✓

8. δόξειε δ' ἂν κ.τ.λ.] e.g. A man may resolve that he will give up his property, and offer himself as a prisoner, or indeed do anything, rather than face the enemy in fight. That would

έκούσιον ἢ δειλία εἶναι τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον· αὐτὴ μὲν γὰρ ἄλυπος, ταῦτα δὲ διὰ λύπην ἐξίστησιν, ὥστε καὶ τὰ ὄπλα ρίπτειν καὶ τᾶλλα ἀσχημονεῖν· διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ
 4 βίαια εἶναι. Τῷ δ' ἀκολάστῳ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μὲν καθ' ἕκαστα ἐκούσια, ἐπιθυμοῦντι γὰρ καὶ ὀρεγομένῳ, τὸ δ' 5 ὄλον ἦττον· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκόλαστος εἶναι.

5 Τὸ δ' ὄνομα τῆς ἀκολασίας καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς παιδικὰς ἀμαρτίας φέρομεν· ἔχουσι γὰρ τινα ὁμοιότητα. Πότερον δ' ἀπὸ ποτέρου καλεῖται, οὐθὲν πρὸς τὰ νῦν διαφέρει, δῆλον
 6 δ' ὅτι τὸ ὕστερον ἀπὸ τοῦ προτέρου. Οὐ κακῶς δ' ἔοικε 10 μετεννεχθαι· κεκολύσθαι γὰρ δεῖ τὸ τῶν αἰσχυρῶν ὀρε-

drawn according as we regard the *single acts*, or *general habits*. In the case of *acts* of Cowardice the violence of the present pain (of which there is none in Intemperance) is often such that a man hardly knows what he is doing. But looking at these Vices as *habits*, a man never de-
 4 liberately resolves to be habitually intemperate, as he does sometimes to be an habitual coward. Thus in Cowardice the general habit is more voluntary than the single acts,
 5 but in Intemperance the reverse is the case.

The etymology of the Greek word ἀκολασία throws light upon the nature of the vice.

The Greek term for Intemperance (ἀκολασία), or, as we might translate it, Wantonness, involves the idea of absence of restraint, and it is also familiarly applied to the errors of childhood. Without deciding which is the primary meaning of the term, we may assert that its application is in both cases appropriate.
 6 No things need restraint more than desires of pleasure, and

imply a deliberate and voluntary *habit* of cowardice. Another may resolve to fight to the last, but when he sees actual bloodshed be overpowered with horror and throw down his arms. That would be the half-involuntary cowardice of *particular acts*. (See *Supplementary Notes*.)

1. αὐτῇ] *i.e.* δειλία 'Cowardice

in itself.' ταῦτα δὲ, *i.e.* τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον 'the surroundings.'

10. τὸ ὕστερον ἀπὸ τοῦ προτέρου] not 'the latter from the former,' but 'the later in conception from the earlier.'

11. Two conditions are noted as requiring κόλασις, *viz.* tendency to what is vicious, and capacity for rapid growth. Both

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ἐπιθυμητικὸν συμφωνεῖν τῷ λόγῳ· σκοπὸς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν
τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ σώφρων ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ
10 ὅτε οὕτω δὲ τάττει καὶ ὁ λόγος. Ταῦτ' οὖν ἡμῖν εἰ-
ρήσθω περὶ σωφροσύνης.

of self-control is formed, reason and desire are in harmony,
10 and both tend towards one goal, the ideally noble. So much
then for the Virtue of Temperance or Self-control.

IV.

1 I. Λέγωμεν δ' ἐξῆς περὶ ἐλευθεριότητος, δοκεῖ δ' εἶνα:
 ἢ περὶ χρήματα μεσότης· ἐπαινεῖται γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος
 οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, οὐδ' ἐν οἷς ὁ σώφρων, οὐδ'
 αὖ ἐν ταῖς κρίσεσιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ
 2 λήψιν, μᾶλλον δ' ἐν τῇ δόσει. Χρήματα δὲ λέγομεν ὅ
 3 πάντα ὅσων ἢ ἀξία νομίσματι μετρεῖται. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ
 ἢ ἀσωτία καὶ ἢ ἀνελευθερία περὶ χρήματα ὑπερβολαὶ

CHAP. I.—*On Liberality.*

1 Our next subject is the Virtue of Liberality. Prodigality, Use of terms defined.
 . Liberality, and Sordidness relate, simply to the giving and
 2 taking of property, but chiefly the former. By 'property'
 3 we understand whatever can be exchanged for money. The
 term 'sordid' is generally restricted to the sense just indi-

CHAP. I.—The discussion of the Virtues in detail proceeds as in the order given in II. vii. Liberality occupies the next place. Refer to note on II. vii. for the principle of this arrangement.

This Chapter falls under three heads:—

1—5. Preliminary—The use of terms explained.

6—27. Liberality described in its various practical details.

28—45. Prodigality and Sordidness described.

4. κρίσεσιν] 'decisions,' in reference apparently to the Virtue of δικαιοσύνη discussed afterwards, as the words ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς and ἐν οἷς ὁ σώφρων refer to the two Virtues already treated of in the last Book.

7. ἀνελευθερία] I have, after some hesitation, adopted 'Sordidness' rather than 'Illiberality' for ἀνελευθερία, as being more applicable to the various types of ἀνελευθερία distinguished in §§ 38-45.

καὶ ἐλλείψεις· καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀνελευθερίαν προσάπτομεν
 ἀεὶ τοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ περὶ χρήματα σπουδάζουσι, τὴν
 δ' ἄσωτίαν ἐπιφέρομεν ἐνίοτε συμπλέκοντες· τοὺς γὰρ
 ἀκρατεῖς καὶ εἰς ἀκολασίαν δαπανηροὺς ἄσώτους καλοῦ-
 4 μεν. Διὸ καὶ φαυλότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι· πολλὰς γὰρ 5
 5 ἅμα κακίας ἔχουσιν. Οὐ δὲ οἰκείως προσαγορεύονται·
 βούλεται γὰρ ἄσωτος εἶναι ὁ ἔν τι κακὸν ἔχων, τὸ φθεί-
 ρειν τὴν οὐσίαν· ἄσωτος γὰρ ὁ δι' αὐτὸν ἀπολλύμενος,
 δοκεῖ δ' ἀπώλειά τις αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἡ τῆς οὐσίας φθορὰ,
 ὡς τοῦ ζῆν διὰ τούτων ὄντος. Οὕτω δὲ τὴν ἄσωτίαν 10
 6 ἐκδεχόμεθα. Ὡν δ' ἐστὶ χρεία, ἔστι τούτοις χρῆσθαι
 καὶ εὖ καὶ κακῶς· ὁ πλοῦτος δ' ἐστὶ τῶν χρησίμων·

cated; but 'prodigal' is often used in a wider sense, and
 applied to the intemperate generally, who do in fact spend
 4 money upon their lusts. Hence it is a comprehensive term
 5 of reproach. We prefer however to use the word in its strict
 6 and limited sense. Now whatever admits of being used may
 be used well or ill, and a virtue related to any such object

Liberality
 has more
 to do with
 giving than
 taking.

4. 'Prodigal' is commonly so applied in English (*e.g.* The Prodigal Son), but scarcely the abstract term 'prodigality.' Reasons are given for this connexion between ἀκολασία and ἄσωτία in § 35 of this Chapter. 'Profligate' has a similar double meaning.

7. βούλεται] 'means'; like the French *veut dire.* Much of the force of this section depends on the etymological connexion of ἄσωτος and ἄσωτία with σώζειν, and is consequently difficult to reproduce in a translation.

12. 'The very essence of property is its use.' This would be

explained by what is said in I. v. 8, or by Plato's remark in *Rep.* p. 333 B, that money laid by is as useless as a pilot on shore or a physician in health. Wealth is an instrument as much as a spade or any other tool, and in like manner, when not being used is for the time useless. The following passage from Bacon's Essay on Riches offers several points of comparison with this and the following Chapter: 'Riches are for spending, and spending for Honour and Good Actions (τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα, § 12). Therefore extraordinary expense must be limited by the worth of the occasion (ii. 11, 15, etc.), but

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10 τὸ ἀλλότριον. Καὶ ἐλευθέριοι δὲ λέγονται οἱ δίδόντες·
οἱ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνοντες οὐκ εἰς ἐλευθεριότητα ἐπαινοῦν-
ται, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἤττον εἰς δικαιοσύνην· οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες
11 οὐδ' ἐπαινοῦνται πάνυ. Φιλοῦνται δὲ σχεδὸν μάλιστα
οἱ ἐλευθέριοι τῶν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς· ὠφέλιμοι γὰρ, τοῦτο δ' ἐν 5
12 τῇ δόσει. Αἱ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις καλαὶ καὶ τοῦ
καλοῦ ἕνεκα. Καὶ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὖν δώσει τοῦ καλοῦ
ἕνεκα καὶ ὀρθῶς· οἷς γὰρ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα καὶ ὅτε, καὶ
13 τᾶλλα ὅσα ἐπεται τῇ ὀρθῇ δόσει. Καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως

10 than to decline to take wrongly. Those who give rightly are called liberal; those who refrain from taking wrongly are called honest and just, but not liberal; while those who merely
11 take or receive rightly are scarcely praised at all. (γ) Liber-
12 ality is one of the most popular of virtues, and that because of its usefulness, and this consists in giving, not in taking.
13 However, as all virtue has a noble end in view, mere giving freely is not enough to constitute Liberality. Regard must be had to certain conditions, of which we specify three:—
1. A noble motive. 2. Due consideration of the recipients,
13 the amount, and the occasion of the gift. 3. Cheerfulness on

Yet liberal giving must fulfil certain conditions.

kindest cut of all.' Translate, 'Men are less inclined to spend their own money, than merely to refrain from taking that which belongs to others.' In other words, 'it is easier to be honest than to be generous.' Many men who are very reluctant to part with their money, and anxious to hoard, would yet scorn to gain anything by dishonest or suspicious means. Avarice is not necessarily accompanied by dishonesty.

4. οὐδ' ἐπαινοῦνται πάνυ] The virtue is in fact too common and

easy to deserve commendation. Praise on such grounds would be almost derogatory (φορτικὸς ὁ ἔπαινος, as Aristotle says in X. viii. 7).

8. οἷς γὰρ δεῖ κ.τ.λ.] These words are explanatory of ὀρθῶς.

9. ἡδέως ἢ ἀλύπως] This condition is explained by such passages as I. viii. 10-12 (No one is virtuous unless he takes pleasure in virtuous actions); II. iii. 1 (The test of the formation of any habit (ἔξις) is that the actions to which it is related are done with pleasure); or by the

ἢ ἀλύπως· τὸ γὰρ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢδὲ ἢ ἄλυπον, ἦκιστα
 14 δὲ λυπηρόν. Ὁ δὲ δίδους οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ μὴ τοῦ καλοῦ
 ἔνεκα ἀλλὰ διὰ τιν' ἄλλην αἰτίαν, οὐκ ἐλευθέριος ἀλλ'
 ἄλλος τις ῥηθήσεται. Οὐδ' ὁ λυπηρῶς· μάλλον γὰρ
 ἔλοιτ' ἂν τὰ χρήματα τῆς καλῆς πράξεως, τοῦτο δ' οὐκ 5
 15 ἐλευθερίου. Οὐδὲ λήψεται δὲ ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ· οὐδὲ γάρ
 ἔστι τοῦ μὴ τιμῶντος τὰ χρήματα ἢ τοιαύτη λήψις.
 16 Οὐκ ἂν εἴη δὲ οὐδ' αἰτητικός· οὐ γάρ ἔστι τοῦ εὖ
 17 ποιούντος εὐχερῶς εὐεργετεῖσθαι. Ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ, λήψε-
 ται, οἷον ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων κτημάτων, οὐχ ὡς καλὸν ἀλλ' 10
 ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, ὅπως ἔχη δίδοναι. Οὐδ' ἀμελήσει τῶν
 ἰδίων, βουλόμενός γε διὰ τούτων τισὶν ἐπαρκεῖν. Οὐδὲ
 τοῖς τυχοῦσι δώσει, ἵνα ἔχη δίδοναι οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ

/ the part of the giver. There is no grudging or hesitation in
 14 true liberality. The absence of any of these conditions would
 15 destroy the liberality of the act. *Taking* however as well as
giving is subject to certain conditions: for—(1) The truly
 liberal man does not care so much for money as to be indif-
 16 ferent to the *source* from which it comes. (2) He will
 17 be *reluctant to ask* for this as for other favours. (3) His *mo-*
tive in taking is to secure not the money itself but the
 means of giving. Hence he will *not neglect his own affairs,*

So also
 must be
 liberal
taking of
 money.

distinction regularly drawn be-
 tween ἐγκράτεια and σωφροσύνη,
 the outward acts of which are
 the same; for this see note on
 I. iii. 7.

4. ὁ λυπηρῶς] Understand
 δίδους.

8. οὐ γάρ ἔστι κ.τ.λ.] See
 ch. iii. 24-26 for this trait in the
 character of the μεγαλόψυχος.

10. οὐχ ὡς καλὸν κ.τ.λ.] Cf.
 § 20 just below. There is no-

thing noble in taking or re-
 ceiving, but it is none the less
 necessary with a view to giving;
 for liberality is one of those
 virtues which cannot be exer-
 cised without appliances, 'ἀχο-
 ρήγητον ὄντα,' as we read in
 I. viii. 15. (See further on this
 point X. viii. 4.) With the
 statement in the text compare,
 'It is more blessed to give than
 to receive.'

18 οὐ καλόν. Ἐλευθερίου δ' ἐστὶ σφόδρα καὶ τὸ ὑπερ-
βάλλειν ἐν τῇ δόσει, ὥστε καταλείπειν ἑαυτῷ ἐλάττω
19 τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπιβλέπειν ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν ἑλευθερίου. Κατὰ
τὴν οὐσίαν δ' ἢ ἑλευθεριότης λέγεται· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ
πλήθει τῶν διδομένων τὸ ἑλευθέριον, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ τοῦ 5
διδόντος ἕξει, αὕτη δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δίδωσιν. Οὐθὲν
δὲ κωλύει ἑλευθεριώτερον εἶναι τὸν τὰ ἐλάττω δίδοντα,
20 εἴαν ἀπ' ἐλαττόνων διδῶ. Ἐλευθεριώτεροι δὲ εἶναι
δοκοῦσιν οἱ μὴ κτησάμενοι ἀλλὰ παραλαβόντες τὴν
οὐσίαν· ἀπειροί τε γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας, καὶ πάντες ἀγαπῶσι 10
μᾶλλον τὰ αὐτῶν ἔργα, ὥσπερ οἱ γονεῖς καὶ οἱ ποιηταί.
Πλουτεῖν δ' οὐ ῥάδιον τὸν ἑλευθέριον, μήτε ληπτικὸν
ὄντα μήτε φυλακτικὸν, προετικὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ τιμῶντα δι'

18 nor scatter his gifts indiscriminately (though his *tendency*
would be rather in this direction than the opposite), for thus
he would cut himself off from the power of giving on proper
19 occasions. Liberality is always to be measured, not by the
absolute amount given, but by the proportion which it bears
to the means of the giver. We conclude this part of our
subject with some general considerations upon Liberality. }
20 Liberality is more often found in those who have inherited,
than in those who have made, their money. This is partly
because the former do not know what it is to want money, and
partly because they have not that sort of parental love to
it which men feel for anything which they have themselves

The *relative*
not the *absol-*
ute amount
given is to be
considered.

Sundry prac-
tical points
of detail
about Libe-
rality
(§§ 20—27).

Liberality is
more com-
mon with
inherited
than with
acquired
wealth.

3. κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν] 'in pro-
portion to one's means.'

6. ἕξει] 'the disposition of the
giver.' Cf. 'Non donum sed
dantis animum.'

οὐθὲν δὲ κωλύει κ.τ.λ.] The
'widow's mite' affords a familiar
illustration of this.

11. ἔργα is used in the sense of
'productions.' So Bacon speaks
of the children of men who have
first founded a family, as being
'both Children and *Creatures*
(ἔργα), a continuation not only
of their kind, but of their *work*.'

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τητος οὔσης περὶ χρημάτων δόσιν καὶ λήψιν, ἐλευθέ-
 ριος καὶ δώσει καὶ δαπανήσει εἰς ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ,
 ὁμοίως ἐν μικροῖς καὶ μεγάλοις, καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως· καὶ
 λήψεται δ' ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ. Τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ περὶ
 ἄμφω οὔσης μεσότητος, ποιήσει ἀμφοτέρα ὡς δεῖ· ἔπε-
 ται γὰρ τῇ ἐπιεικείᾳ δόσει ἢ τοιαύτῃ λήψις, ἢ δὲ μὴ
 τοιαύτῃ ἐναντία ἐστίν. Αἱ μὲν οὖν ἐπόμεναι γίνονται
 25 ἅμα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, αἱ δ' ἐναντίαι δῆλον ὡς οὔ. Ἐὰν δὲ
 παρὰ τὸ δέον καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἔχον συμβαίῃ αὐτῷ ἀνα-
 λίσκειν, λυπήσεται, μετρίως δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ· τῆς ἀρετῆς 10
 γὰρ καὶ ἡδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ.
 26 Καὶ εὐκοινώνητος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος εἰς χρήματα·
 27 δύναται γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι, μὴ τιμῶν γε τὰ χρήματα, καὶ
 μᾶλλον ἀχθόμενος εἴ τι δέον μὴ ἀνάλωσεν ἢ λυπού-

and that
 both in
 giving and
 taking.

The liberal
 man may
 make oc-
 casional
 mistakes,
 especially
 as he is
 not keen in
 driving a
 bargain or
 in measur-
 ing the
 precise
 amount
 he spends.

such proprieties must not be disregarded either in giving or
 taking, in great matters or in small: and though we have
 admitted propriety in giving to be the more important, yet
 25 the two habits will naturally be found together. If the liberal
 man should have made a mistake in any of these points, he
 will feel regret in due measure and moderation. And such
 26 mistakes may occur, for the liberal man will not be hard to
 27 deal with in money matters, nor is he by any means proof
 against fraud, partly on account of his low esteem for money,
 and partly because he will always regret more keenly having

5. ἔπεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] Libe-
 rality, though mainly concerned
 with giving, cannot exist com-
 bined with dishonesty in taking.
 If money were gained unfairly,
 it would not be liberality to
 spend a part, or even the whole
 of it, in charity.

7. ἐπόμεναι] sc. ἔξεις or ἀρεταί.

11. καὶ ἡδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι]
 For this see II. iii.

12. εὐκοινώνητος] 'an easy
 man to have dealings with.'

14. μᾶλλον ἀχθόμενος κ.τ.λ.]
 Hence he will rather cheat him-
 self than cheat others even in-
 voluntarily. Or again, he would
 rather find that he has given
 money to an impostor than that
 he has turned a deaf ear to a
 case of real distress. This of
 course might arise from a true

μενος εἰ μὴ δέον τι ἀνάλωσε, καὶ τῷ Σιμωνίδῃ οὐκ
 28 ἀρεσκόμενος. Ὁ δ' ἄσωτος καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαμαρτάνει
 οὔτε γὰρ ἤδεται ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ, οὔδ' ὡς δεῖ, οὔτε λυπεῖται
 29 ἔσται δὲ προῖουσι φανερώτερον. Εἴρηται δ' ἡμῖν ὅτι
 ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις εἰσὶν ἡ ἀσωτία καὶ ἡ ἀνελευ- 5
 θερία, καὶ ἐν δυσὶν, ἐν δόσει καὶ λήψει· καὶ τὴν δαπά-
 νην γὰρ εἰς τὴν δόσιν τίθεμεν. Π μὲν οὖν ἀσωτία τῷ

28 spent too little than having spent too much. This and other
 characteristics of the liberal man are wanting in the prodigal.
 29 Both in giving and in taking he will err, and so will the
 sordid man. Strictly speaking, the former exceeds in spend-

Prodigality
 under two
 types (§§ 28-
 36).

The first
 type unites
 excess in
 spending
 with defect
 in taking
 (§§ 29—32).

feeling of benevolence, but the assertion in the text probably has reference to the same sort of feeling which makes the magnanimous man prefer giving to accepting benefits (iii. 24). The error on the side spoken of has more of τὸ καλὸν in it. It accords better with that self-esteem, not to say pride, which forms so large an element in an ideal Greek character. Benevolence occupies a very subordinate place in the character of Aristotle's liberal man. There is a strong vein of self-consciousness running through all the manifestations of this strictly speaking unselfish virtue.

1. Simonides was the type of a courtly poet, a sort of embodiment of common-sense worldly wisdom. He figures thus in the introduction to Plato's *Republic*. Among his recorded sayings we find one that 'it is better to be rich than to be wise, because

philosophers are dependent upon the patronage of the rich, and not *vice versa*.'

7. Two types of prodigals are described. One exceeds in giving and falls short in taking; the other exceeds both in giving and in taking. The former perhaps may be styled the liberal prodigal, and the latter the mean prodigal. The former is an indolent *laissez-faire* sort of character, who spends freely, but is either too careless or thoughtless to trouble himself about replenishing his wasting resources: *e.g.* the typical Irish landlord of the close of the last century. The latter is a selfish and unprincipled man who cares not how or whence the money comes so long as he has it to spend. This is said in § 33 to be the commoner type, because indiscriminate giving soon necessitates unscrupulous receiving.

30 *διδόναι καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὑπερβάλλει, τῷ δὲ λαμβάνειν
 ἐλλείπει, ἢ δ' ἀνελευθερία τῷ δίδοναι μὲν ἐλλείπει, τῷ
 λαμβάνειν δ' ὑπερβάλλει, πλὴν ἐπὶ μικροῖς. Τὰ μὲν
 οὖν τῆς ἀσωτίας οὐ πάνυ συνδυάζεται (οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον
 μηδαμόθεν λαμβάνοντα πᾶσι δίδοναι· ταχέως γὰρ ἐπι- 5
 λείπει ἢ οὐσία τοὺς ἰδιώτας διδόντας, οἷπερ καὶ δοκοῦσιν
 ἄσωτοι εἶναι). ἐπεὶ ὁ γε τοιοῦτος δόξειεν ἂν οὐ μικρῷ
 31 βελτίων εἶναι τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου. Εὐίατός τε γὰρ ἐστὶ
 καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπορίας, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ
 μέσον δύναται ἐλθεῖν. Ἐχει γὰρ τὰ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου 10
 καὶ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ οὐ λαμβάνει, οὐδέτερον δ' ὡς δεῖ
 οὐδ' εὔ. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἐθισθείη, ἢ πως ἄλλως μεταβάλοι,*

ing (*i.e.* giving) and falls short in taking, the latter exceeds
 30 in taking and falls short in spending. True, both these condi-
 tions are not generally united in prodigality. Should they be
 so, prodigality under this type becomes vastly superior to sor-
 31 didness, for (1) it tends to work its own cure as life advances
 and means fail; and (2) its outward actions resemble those
 of liberality, and judicious training may complete the resem-

3. *πλὴν ἐπὶ μικροῖς*] 'only in reference to small matters.' Similar conduct on a large scale is otherwise characterized; see § 42.

4. The first *γὰρ* explains *οὐ πάνυ συνδυάζεται*, the second *γὰρ* (in line 5) explains *οὐ ῥάδιον*. *ἐπεὶ γε* (L. 7) appeals to the consideration that such prodigality as should unite both characteristics would be vastly superior to the opposite vice of sordidness, and that it would be a very little way removed from liberality itself. This, however, is not usually the case in actual

life. See § 33, etc. Consequently the statement *οὐ πάνυ συνδυάζεται κ.τ.λ.* holds good of prodigality generally speaking.

6. *οἷπερ καὶ κ.τ.λ.*] 'who (*i.e.* ἰδιώται) are in point of fact prodigal.' This is explained by the exclusion of *τύραννοι* from the class, for which see § 23.

9. *ἡλικίας*] It is a matter of common observation that avarice (*i.e.* the reverse of prodigality) is the characteristic vice (or as Simonides is said to have called it, 'the proper pleasure') of old age.

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τὸ μὴθὲν τοῦ καλοῦ φροντίζειν ὀλιγώρως καὶ πάντοθεν
λαμβάνουσιν· διδόναι γὰρ ἐπιθυμοῦσι, τὸ δὲ πῶς ἢ
35 πόθεν οὐθὲν αὐτοῖς διαφέρει. Διόπερ οὐδ' ἐλευθέριοι
αἱ δόσεις αὐτῶν εἰσὶν· οὐ γὰρ καλαί, οὐδὲ τούτου αὐ-
τοῦ ἔνεκα, οὐδὲ ὡς δεῖ· ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε οὐς δεῖ πένεσθαι, 5
τούτους πλουσίους ποιοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς μὲν μετρίοις τὰ ἥθη
οὐδὲν ἂν δοίεν, τοῖς δὲ κόλαξιν ἢ τιν' ἄλλην ἡδονὴν πο-
ρίζουσι πολλά. Διὸ καὶ ἀκόλαστοι αὐτῶν εἰσὶν οἱ πολ-
λοί· εὐχερῶς γὰρ ἀναλίσκοντες καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀκολασίας
δαπανηροί εἰσι, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῆν πρὸς 10
36 τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποκλίνουσιν. Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄσωτος ἀπαιδα-
γώγητος γενόμενος εἰς ταῦτα μεταβαίνει, τυχῶν δ' ἐπι-
37 μελείας εἰς τὸ μέσον καὶ τὸ δέον ἀφίκοιτ' ἂν. Ἡ δ'
ἀνελευθερία ἀνιάτος ἐστίν· δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ γῆρας καὶ πᾶσα
ἀδυναμία ἀνελευθέρους ποιεῖν. Καὶ συμφυέστερον τοῖς 15

concern themselves as little where the money comes from as
35 they do where it goes to. They are neither honest nor gene-
rous; for money spent at hazard or squandered on pleasures,
flatterers, and other unworthy objects, may be spent lavishly,
but not liberally. Hence it is not difficult to see how a pro-
digo in the proper and limited sense of the word becomes a
prodigo in the wider sense noted at the beginning of the
36 chapter. This in fact is what prodigality comes to if it runs
its course unchecked, though, as we have pointed out, it is a
37 condition admitting of remedy and guidance. The condition
of Sordidness however is incurable: for—(1) Age and want
of means, so far from curing the habit, tend to produce it;
(2) It seems in some way a more natural vice among men

Sordidness
under three
types
(§§ 37—45).

1. ὀλιγώρως] thoughtlessly,
indifferently, unscrupulously.

6. τοῖς μετρίοις τὰ ἥθη] this
being opposed to κόλαξιν appa-

rently means 'persons of a fair
disposition.'

15. ἀδυναμία corresponds to
ἀπορία in the converse case of
the prodigo (see § 31).

ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀσωτίας· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ φιλοχρήματοι
 38 μᾶλλον ἢ δοτικοί. Καὶ διατείνει δ' ἐπὶ πολὺ, καὶ πο-
 λυειδές ἐστίν· πολλοὶ γὰρ τρόποι δοκοῦσι τῆς ἀνελευ-
 θερίας εἶναι. Ἐν δυσὶ γὰρ οὔσα, τῇ τ' ἐλλείψει τῆς
 δόσεως καὶ τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τῆς λήψεως, οὐ πᾶσιν ὀλό- 5
 κληρος παραγίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε χωρίζεται, καὶ οἱ μὲν
 τῇ λήψει ὑπερβάλλουσιν, οἱ δὲ τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσιν.
 39 Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις προσηγορίαις οἶον φειδω-
 λοὶ, γλίσχροι, κίμβικες, πάντες τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσιν,
 τῶν δ' ἀλλοτρίων οὐκ ἐφίενται οὐδὲ βούλονται λαμ- 10

38 than prodigality; (3) It is also widespread, and has many forms. (a) Its complete development implies (as in the case of prodigality) error both in giving and taking. In taking it exceeds, in giving it falls short. But besides this perfect growth of the vice, we have two other forms of it. (b) We find Sordid men who are niggardly in spending, without being

(a) Excess in taking and defect in giving both combined.
 (b) Defect in giving only.

5. ὀλόκληρος] 'in completeness.' The same expression occurs in v. 7 in reference to various types of Anger. Cf. James i. 4, τέλειοι καὶ ὀλόκληροι 'perfect and complete.' Add 1 Thess. v. 23.

8. Οἱ μὲν corresponds to οἱ δὲ in the first line of § 40. The class introduced by this οἱ μὲν is subdivided (and the subdivision marked by another οἱ μὲν and οἱ δὲ in l. 1 and l. 6, p. 186)

before we come to the οἱ δὲ belonging to it. The sentence is further complicated by an explanatory parenthesis attached to the first of these subdivisions, Δοκοῦσι . . . ἂν δοῦναι. The following analysis may be found useful:—

Full-blown Sordidness (ὀλόκληρος) implies both (a) falling short in giving and (β) excess in taking. There are two imperfectly developed types:

(a) only is found in	{ φειδωλοὶ γλίσχροι κίμβικες κυμνοπρίσται }	who do not necessarily err in respect of (β)	{ some from natural shame, others from fear of reprisals, § 39.
(β) only is found in	{ πορνοβοσκοὶ τοκισταὶ, etc. add also λησταὶ κυβενταὶ λωποδύται }	who do not necessarily err in respect of (a). Such people are in fact often extravagant, and their 'ill-gotten gains fly apace.'	

βάνειν, οἱ μὲν διὰ τινα ἐπιείκειαν καὶ εὐλάβειαν τῶν
 αἰσχροῶν (δοκοῦσι γὰρ ἔνιοι ἢ φασί γε διὰ τοῦτο
 φυλάττειν, ἵνα μὴ ποτ' ἀναγκασθῶσιν αἰσχρόν τι πρά-
 ξαι. Τούτων δὲ καὶ ὁ κυμινοπρίστης καὶ πᾶς ὁ τοιοῦτος·
 ὠνόμασται δ' ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ μηθενὶ ἂν δοῦναι). 5
 οἱ δ' αὖ διὰ φόβον ἀπέχονται τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ὡς οὐ
 ῥάδιον τὸ αὐτὸν μὲν τὰ ἑτέρων λαμβάνειν, τὰ δ' αὐτοῦ
 ἑτέρους μὴ ἀρέσκει οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸ μήτε λαμβάνειν μήτε
 40 δίδόναι. Οἱ δ' αὖ κατὰ τὴν λῆψιν ὑπερβάλλουσι τῷ
 πάντοθεν λαμβάνειν καὶ πᾶν, οἷον οἱ τὰς ἀνελευθέρους 10
 ἐργασίας ἐργαζόμενοι, πορνοβοσκοὶ καὶ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦ-
 τοι, καὶ τοκισταὶ κατὰ μικρὸν ἐπὶ πολλῷ. Πάντες γὰρ
 41 οὔτοι ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ὅπόσον οὐ δεῖ. Κοι-
 νὸν δ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἢ αἰσχροκέρδεια φαίνεται πάντες γὰρ
 ἕνεκα κέρδους, καὶ τούτου μικροῦ, ὀνειδέη ὑπομένουσιν. 15

unprincipled in taking, money :—some from a natural sense of shame, others from fear of reprisals. This class we characterize as stingy, close, niggards, cheeseparers, and by other similar appellations. (c) We have again another class of sordid men, utterly unprincipled in the source from which

40, 41
 (c) Excess in
 taking only.

1. διὰ τινα ἐπιείκειαν κ.τ.λ.] A sort of honesty may accompany meanness and excessive devotion to money. See note on § 9.

4. κυμινοπρίστης] *i.e.* a man so stingy that he would split a cummin seed. Compare our metaphors 'skinflint,' 'cheeseparer,' and Juvenal's 'one who counts the fibres of a leek' (*Sat.* xiv. 133).

6. διὰ φόβον κ.τ.λ.] This according to the Sophists was the sole ground and principle of

Justice between man and man, and the cause of the very existence of society. See Plato, *Rep.* p. 358, πλέονι κακῷ ὑπερβάλλειν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀγαθῷ τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

12. τοκισταὶ κατὰ μικρὸν ἐπὶ πολλῷ] 'Money-lenders in small sums at a large rate'; ἐπὶ with dative expressing the conditions of the act.

15. μικροῦ is no contradiction to ἐπὶ πολλῷ above, for though the rate of interest is very large, yet the absolute amount is small.

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κακὸν τῆς ἀσωτίας, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ ταύτην ἀμαρτάνου-
 σιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν λεχθεῖσαν ἀσωτίαν.
 45 Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων
 κακιῶν τοσαῦτ' εἰρήσθω.
 1 Π. Δόξειε δ' ἂν ἀκόλουθον εἶναι καὶ περὶ μεγαλοπρε- 5
 πείας διελθεῖν· δοκεῖ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴ περὶ χρήματά τις
 ἀρετὴ εἶναι. Οὐχ ὡσπερ δ' ἡ ἐλευθεριότης διατείνει
 περὶ πάσας τὰς ἐν χρήμασι πράξεις, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰς
 δαπανηρὰς μόνον· ἐν τούτοις δ' ὑπερέχει τῆς ἐλευθεριό-
 2 ^{τητος} μέγεθι. Καθάπερ γὰρ τοῦνομα αὐτὸ ὑποσημαίνει, 10
 ἐν μέγεθι πρέπουσα δαπάνη ἐστίν. Τὸ δὲ μέγεθος πρὸς
 τι οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ δαπάνημα τριηράρχῳ καὶ ἀρχιθεωρῷ.
 3 Τὸ πρέπον δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ α'. 'Ο δ'

Liberality than Prodigality is, as being both more mischievous
 45 and more common. So much then for the Virtue of Liberality.

CHAP. II. — *On the Virtue of Magnificence.*

Use of terms
 explained
 (§§ 1—4).

1 Magnificence, as the name implies, differs from Liberality
 2 in the largeness of the sums with which it deals. Its general
 3 characteristic is magnitude, but this must be in relation

1. μᾶλλον ἐπὶ ταύτην] Obvi-
 ously men in general are more
 ready to take than to give.

8. τὰς δαπανηρὰς μόνον] 'only
 the expensive ones,' i.e. those in
 which the expenditure is *grand*:
 this being the point of difference
 between μεγαλοπρέπεια and ἐλευ-
 θεριότης. Here and elsewhere
 throughout the Chapter the ar-
 gument turns upon the etymo-
 logy of the word μεγαλοπρέπεια,
 which implies a combination of
 greatness and propriety. (See
Supplementary Note.)

12. τριηράρχῳ] The duty of
 equipping a trireme, and (as was
 usual) commanding it in person,
 was the most important of the
 λειτουργίαι at Athens. Cf. note
 on § 11 below.

ἀρχιθεωρῷ] θεωρία was a
 state embassy or deputation to a
 festival or public games. ἀρχι-
 θεωρὸς was the head of such an
 embassy, who defrayed its ex-
 penses. This duty was one of
 the *lesser* λειτουργίαι. See
 further § 16.

13. ἐν ᾧ perhaps refers to the oc-

ἐν μικροῖς ἢ ἐν μετρίοις κατ' ἀξίαν δαπανῶν οὐ λέγεται
 μεγαλοπρεπῆς, οἷον τὸ "πολλάκι δόσκον ἀλήτην" ἀλλ'
 ὁ ἐν μεγάλοις οὕτως. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπῆς ἐλευ-
 θέριος, ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος οὐθὲν μᾶλλον μεγαλοπρεπῆς.
 4 Τῆς τοιαύτης δ' ἕξεως ἢ μὲν ἔλλειψις μικροπρέπεια 5
 καλεῖται, ἢ δ' ὑπερβολή βαναυσία καὶ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ
 ὅσαι τοιαῦται, οὐχ ὑπερβάλλουσαι τῷ μεγέθει περὶ ἃ
 δεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ λαμπρυνόμεναι
 5 ὕστερον δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐροῦμεν. Ὁ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπῆς
 ἐπιστήμονι ἔοικεν τὸ πρέπον γὰρ δύναται θεωρῆσαι καὶ 10
 6 δαπανῆσαι μεγάλα ἐμμελῶς. Ὡσπερ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶ-
 πομεν, ἢ ἕξις ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ὀρίζεται, καὶ ὧν ἐστίν.

to three things:—the person who gives, the circumstances of
 the gift, and its object. Hence every magnificent man is
 4 liberal, but not every liberal man is magnificent. The vice
 of defect is Paltriness. The vice of excess, which we describe
 as Bad Taste and Vulgarity, errs not in the greatness of the
 amount spent, but in the inappropriateness in different ways
 5 of the expenditure. But of these hereafter. There is a sort
 of scientific skill implied in Magnificence. This is needed to
 6 decide under what various circumstances, as they actually

Conditions
 required for
 the exercise
 of Magnifi-
 cence
 (§§ 5—9).

cation and accompanying circum-
 stances, περὶ ἃ the objects; but
 the distinction is not very marked
 in itself, nor carefully retained
 in the text. Another reading is
 ἃ instead of περὶ ἃ, i.e. the
 amount spent.

1. The widow's mite was an
 act of liberality but not of magni-
 ficence, Mr. Peabody's donations
 an example of both. The Vice-
 roy of Egypt's gift of a doll, with
 dress, jewels, etc., valued at
 £2000, to the Sultan's child,

was neither one nor the other,
 for the reasons explained in § 11,
 etc.

6. βαναυσία καὶ ἀπειροκαλία]
 see note on II. vii. 6.

11. ἐμμελῶς] 'harmoniously,'
 literally 'in tune' (ἐν, μέλος),
 just as πλημμελές (πλήν, μέλος)
 is what is out of tune (cf. I. ix.
 6, etc.).

12. ἢ ἕξις ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ὀρίζε-
 ται] 'The habit is determined by
 its outward acts, and by the ob-
 jects on which it is exercised.'

Αἰ δὴ τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς δαπάναι μεγάλαι καὶ πρέ-
 πουςαι. Τοιαῦτα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἔργα οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται μέγα
 δαπάνημα καὶ πρέπον τῷ ἔργῳ. Ὡστε τὸ μὲν ἔργον τῆς
 δαπάνης ἄξιον δεῖ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ δαπάνην τοῦ ἔργου, ἢ
 7 καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν. Δαπανήσει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁ μεγαλο- 5
 πρεπῆς τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα· κοινὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ταῖς ἀρεταῖς.
 8 Καὶ ἔτι ἠδέως καὶ προετικῶς· ἢ γὰρ ἀκριβολογία μι-
 9 κροπρεπές. Καὶ πῶς κάλλιστον καὶ πρεπωδέστατον,
 How?

There must be a scientific appreciation of the just relation between expense and its object; the motive must be noble; and the action ready and cheerful.

occur (for action is the only real test of disposition in this as in other Virtues), great expenditure is befitting and appropriate. The occasion must be worthy of the expenditure, and 7 the expenditure of the occasion. There must also be the same motive as in all the other virtues, viz. the desire for 8 what is noble. Again the magnificent act must be done cheerfully and ungrudgingly: there must be no close calculations; 9 no considerations of 'How much, or how little, will it cost?'

In the following sentence the δαπάναι correspond to the ἐνέργειαι, and the ἔργα to the ὧν ἐστὶ (which = περὶ ἀ of § 2) in the particular case under consideration, viz. Magnificence. Compare a similar passage in III. vii. 6 (and note there); and in explanation of the necessity of action (ἐνέργεια) for the perfect determination of a moral habit (ἔξις) see further X. viii. 4, 5. The δὴ in l. 1 and l. 2 marks the application of the general principle to the particular case. Divested of technical language the passage in §§ 5 and 6 means: 'Magnificence, to be determined and recognised as such, must be actually put in practice on certain definite occasions. It con-

sists, as we have seen, in large expenditure on a befitting occasion. Hence there must actually occur both the expenditure and the occasion: and to form a correct judgment of these in practice implies a sort of scientific skill.'

2. ἔργα] the 'works' or 'results.'

5. We had similar conditions insisted on in the case of liberality, i. 12-14.

6. Here, as in the case of liberality, we miss any recognition of benevolence or the desire to do good. See note on i. 27.

7. ἀκριβολογία μικροπρεπές] as is explained in § 21. σκοπῶν πῶς ἂν ἐλάχιστον κ.τ.λ.

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περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος οὔσης, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης
 δαπάνης τὸ ἔργον ποιήσῃ μεγαλοπρεπέστερον. Οὐ γὰρ
 ἢ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ κτήματος καὶ ἔργου κτῆμα μὲν γὰρ τὸ
 πλείστου ἄξιον τιμιώτατον, οἷον χρυσὸς, ἔργον δὲ τὸ
 μέγα καὶ καλόν. Τοῦ γὰρ τοιούτου ἢ θεωρία θαυμαστή, 5
 τὸ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὲς θαυμαστόν. Καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου ἀρετὴ
 μεγαλοπρέπεια ἐν μεγέθει. ζ

11 Ἔστι δὲ τῶν δαπανημάτων οἷα λέγομεν τὰ τίμια,
 οἷον τὰ περὶ θεοῦς ἀναθήματα καὶ κατασκευαὶ καὶ θυσίαι,
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅσα περὶ πᾶν το δαιμόνιον, καὶ ὅσα πρὸς 10

parts a special lustre to the acts of a magnificent man beyond what would be achieved by mere liberality even with the same expenditure. For a work and a possession are not to be estimated in the same way. In the latter case there is only a question of intrinsic value; in the former we must take into consideration the grandeur and the moral effect produced on the beholders. The perfection of any work or action is its magnificence, and that must be exhibited on a grand scale.

11 We pass on now to the occasions which are fitting for the display of Magnificence. We notice first, the service of re-

words οἷον μέγεθος . . . οὔσης. The sense will then be, 'The greatness of the magnificent man, being a sort of greatness of Liberality (or Liberality on a large scale),—Liberality having reference to the same objects,—even from an equal expenditure,' etc.

This however seems rather to mar the force of καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δαπάνης. It is probable that there is some corruption in the text. οἷον μέγεθος looks like a gloss.

7. μεγαλοπρέπεια combines the ideas of 'magnificence' indicated in its etymology, and

'munificence' implied by its technical limitation to money matters in this Chapter. As we have no one word exactly co-extensive with this, we may adopt 'munificence' or 'magnificence,' according to the idea most prominent in the context, but see Suppl. Notes, p. 289.

9. κατασκευαὶ] probably refers to the adornment and permanent furniture of the temples. κατασκευη denotes permanent, and παρασκευη temporary and moveable, decorations. Compare κατάσκευασθαι just below, § 16.

τὸ κοινὸν εὐφιλοτίμητά ἐστιν, οἷον εἴ που χορηγεῖν
οἴονται δεῖν λαμπρῶς ἢ τριηραρχεῖν ἢ καὶ ἐστιᾶν τὴν
12 πόλιν. Ἐν ἅπασιν δ' ὥσπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρὸς τὸν πράτ-
τοντα ἀναφέρεται τὸ τίς ὢν καὶ τίνων ὑπαρχόντων· ἄξια
γὰρ δεῖ τούτων εἶναι, καὶ μὴ μόνον τῷ ἔργῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ 5
13 τῷ ποιῶντι πρέπειν. Διὸ πένης μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη μεγαλο-
πρεπής· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀφ' ὧν πολλὰ δαπανήσει πρεπόν-
τως· ὁ δ' ἐπιχειρῶν ἠλίθιος· παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ καὶ
14 τὸ δέον· κατ' ἀρετὴν δὲ τὸ ὀρθῶς. Πρέπει δὲ καὶ οἷς
τὰ τοιαῦτα προϋπάρχει δι' αὐτῶν ἢ διὰ τῶν προγόνων 10
ἢ ὧν αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν, καὶ τοῖς εὐγενέσι καὶ τοῖς ἐνδόξοις
καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα μέγεθος ἔχει καὶ
15 ἀξίωμα. Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτος ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής,
καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δαπανήμασιν ἢ μεγαλοπρέπεια,

12 ligion, and next, great public or patriotic services. In all these cases however regard must be had to the social position, and to the means, of the doer, as well as to the work done.
13 It would be out of place for a man of small or moderate means
14 to aspire to be magnificent. It is a virtue reserved for those of great wealth, inherited or acquired, good birth, high station,
15 and so forth. To these cases we may add great and rare

Occasions appropriate for Magnificence (§§ 11—19) are chiefly public, such as the service of Religion or of the State;

1. εὐφιλοτίμητα] 'objects of laudable ambition.'

χορηγεῖν . . . τριηραρχεῖν . . . ἐστιᾶν] These λειτουργίαι at Athens resembled High Sheriffs' duties among ourselves, being imposed without remuneration on the rich citizens. καὶ joined with ἐστιᾶν implies that this office of providing a feast for the citizens was less costly than the others. See § 2 for other references to these offices, and note there.

4. τὸ groups the words that follow into one idea forming grammatically a sort of nominative to ἀναφέρεται. (Compare τὸ τί-ἦν-εἶναι in II. vi., etc.) 'There is also a reference made to the agent, viz. who he is, and what are his means.'

11. ὧν αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν] 'their relations or connexions.'

12. μέγεθος καὶ ἀξίωμα] 'grandeur and dignity.'

14. τοιούτοις] i.e. the two classes of objects already men-

ὡσπερ εἴρηται μέγιστα γὰρ καὶ ἐντιμώτατα τῶν δὲ
 ἰδίων ὅσα εἰσάπαξ γίνεται, οἷον γάμος καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον,
 καὶ εἰ περί τι πᾶσα ἡ πόλις σπουδάζει ἢ οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι,
 καὶ περὶ ξένων δὲ ὑποδοχὰς καὶ ἀποστολὰς, καὶ δωρεὰς
 καὶ ἀντιδωρεάς· οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἑαυτὸν δαπανηρὸς ὁ μεγαλο- 5
 πρεπῆς, ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ κοινά· τὰ δὲ δῶρα τοῖς ἀναθήμασιν
 16 ἔχει τι ὅμοιον. Μεγαλοπρεπούς δὲ καὶ οἶκον κατα-
 σκευάσασθαι πρεπόντως τῷ πλούτῳ· κόσμος γάρ τις καὶ
 οὗτος. Καὶ περὶ ταῦτα μᾶλλον δαπανᾶν ὅσα πολυχρόνια
 17 τῶν ἔργων· κάλλιστα γὰρ ταῦτα. Καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις 10
 τὸ πρέπον· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα ἀρμόζει θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις,
 οὐδ' ἐν ἱερῷ καὶ τάφῳ· καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δαπανημάτων
 ἕκαστον μέγα ἐν τῷ γένει, καὶ μεγαλοπρεπέστατον μὲν
 τὸ ἐν μεγάλῳ μέγα, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ ἐν τούτοις μέγα.

but also
 some occur
 in private
 life.

occasions in private life, such as a wedding, works of public
 or general interest, entertaining strangers, making and return-
 16 ing presents, and so on: or again, the furnishing and orna-
 ments of one's house, and generally, permanent, rather than
 17 perishable, objects. In all cases however the expenditure
 must be fitting to the occasion, whatever it be. There is a
 greatness in any work when it is perfect of its kind, even in

tioned, viz. the service of Religion and the service of the State, as contrasted with the less striking cases which follow, viz. great and rare occasions in private life.

2. ὅσα εἰσάπαξ] Compare 'A man ought warily to begin charges, which, once begun, will continue; but in matters that return not he may be more magnificent' (Bacon).

3. εἰ δὲ περί τι πᾶσα ἡ πόλις] The entertainment of the Vice-roy of Egypt by Lord Dudley in

1867 would be an instance in point.

οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι] 'the leading men in it.'

6. τὰ δὲ δῶρα] 'presents have something of the nature of offerings,' which have been specified already in § 11 as occasions fitting for Magnificence.

14. ἐνταῦθα δὲ κ.τ.λ.] 'It is possible to do a thing handsomely though it be no great matter in itself: but the handsomest actions are naturally those

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πορφύραν εἰσφέρων, ὥσπερ οἱ Μεγαρεῖς. Καὶ πάντα τὰ
 τοιαῦτα ποιήσει οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα, ἀλλὰ τὸν πλούτου
 ἐπιδεικνύμενος, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οἰόμενος θαυμάζεσθαι,
 καὶ οὐ μὲν δεῖ πολλά ἀναλώσαι, ὀλίγα δαπανῶν, οὐ δ'
 21 ὀλίγα, πολλά. Ὁ δὲ μικροπρεπῆς περὶ πάντα ἐλλείψει, 5
 καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλώσας ἐν μικρῷ τὸ καλὸν ἀπολεῖ,
 καὶ ὅτι ἂν ποιῆ μέλλων, καὶ σκοπῶν πῶς ἂν ἐλάχιστον
 ἀναλώσαι, καὶ ταῦτ' ὀδυρόμενος, καὶ πάντ' οἰόμενος

attention to himself. When he ought to spend much, he will
 spend little; and when he ought to spend little, he will spend
 21 much. On the other hand, the Paltry man always spends too
 little. If ever he does spend largely, he will spoil everything
 by some petty economy. He will be always hesitating and
 calculating how cheaply he can get off, and will be continually

The Defect,
 Paltriness.

entrance. The emphatic word
 here is *κωμωδοῖς*, comedy natu-
 rally requiring less splendour
 than tragedy.

4. οὐ μὲν δεῖ κ.τ.λ.] This
 follows naturally, because his
 only object being to display
himself and his riches, he pays
 no regard to the proprieties of
 circumstances and expense,
 which it needs a careful scientific
 discernment (§ 5) to observe pro-
 perly. Consequently if a proper
 occasion for great expense hap-
 pens to be one for little personal
 display, the *βάνανσος* holds aloof.

6. τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλώσας] This is a point of difference be-
 tween *ἀνελευθερία* and *μικροπρέ-
 πεια*. The latter being the
 defect where great expenditure
 is in question, the Paltry man is
 one who tries to combine cheap-

ness and display. He wishes to
 make a show and yet hates to
 part with his money. The Sor-
 did (*ἀνελεύθερος*) cares only for
 keeping his money on any terms.

ἐν μικρῷ τὸ καλὸν ἀπολεῖ] e.g.
 If a man should make a hand-
 some donation to a Charity and
 send in the bill for the carriage
 and packing. Or, as Theophras-
 tus says, 'He will give a grand
 feast and stint the supply of
 wine, and the dishes will hardly
 go round; or 'when he is cele-
 brating a marriage feast, he will
 hire the waiters on condition
 that they find their own food,'
 and so on. He is the sort of man
 who cannot feel that in reference
 to such cases it is better 'to do
 the thing well, or not at all.'

7. μέλλων] 'with hesitation
 or reluctance.'

22 μείζω ποιεῖν ἢ δεῖ. Εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν αἱ ἕξεις αὐταὶ κακίαι, οὐ μὴν ὀνειδέη γ' ἐπιφέρουσι διὰ τὸ μήτε βλαβεραὶ τῷ πέλας εἶναι, μήτε λίαν ἀσχήμονες.

1 III. 'Π δὲ μεγαλοψυχία περὶ μεγάλα μὲν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἔοικεν εἶναι, περὶ ποῖα δ' ἐστὶ πρῶτον λά-
2 βωμεν. Διαφέρει δ' οὐθὲν τὴν ἕξιν ἢ τὸν κατὰ τὴν
3 ἕξιν σκοπεῖν. Δοκεῖ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος εἶναι ὁ μεγάλων

22 grumbling that whatever he does spend is excessive. Still, vices as these are, they are not of the worst dye, for they are neither very injurious, nor very offensive, to society.

CHAP. III.—*On the Virtue of Highmindedness or Self-Esteem.*

1 The very name Highmindedness, which we give to the virtue of well-grounded Self-esteem, implies that there is
2 something great about it—(whether we consider the habit in the abstract or portray an individual character in the concrete
3 is indifferent)—and that greatness may be described as great

High-
mindedness
Vainglori-
ousness,
and Little-
mindedness
are con-
cerned with
the relation
between a
man's merits
and his own
estimate of
them :

CHAP. III.—μεγαλοψυχία is another very difficult word to translate. The exact etymological equivalent 'Magnanimity' has by the usage of language acquired too restricted a sense. Perhaps we must content ourselves with the awkward compound, 'Highmindedness.' On the inadequacy of this and the related terms see further the Supplementary Note at the end of this Book.

The groundwork of this and the related types of character described in this Chapter is the amount of, and the relation between, a man's merits and his own estimate of them. A

more tangible and practically applicable test is substituted in § 10, viz. his relation to Honour (τιμῆ).

The Chapter falls under the following divisions:—

§§ 1—8. Terminology explained.

§§ 9—17. Highmindedness described generally as the desire to deserve, and to secure, Honour.

§§ 18—34. The characteristics of Highmindedness in reference to sundry practical details of life.

§§ 35—37. The related vices of Excess and Defect.

6. διαφέρει δὲ κ.τ.λ.] In this case the latter method is con-

αὐτὸν ἀξιῶν ἄξιος ὢν· ὁ γὰρ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτὸ ποιῶν
 ἡλίθιος, τῶν δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐδεὶς ἡλίθιος οὐδ' ἀνόητος.
 4 Μεγαλόψυχος μὲν οὖν ὁ εἰρημένος. Ὁ γὰρ μικρῶν
 ἄξιος καὶ τούτων ἀξιῶν ἑαυτὸν σώφρων, μεγαλόψυχος
 5 δ' οὐ· ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἢ μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ 5
 κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δ' ἀστεῖοι καὶ
 6 σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὐ. Ὁ δὲ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιῶν
 ἀνάξιος ὢν χαῦνος· ὁ δὲ μειζόνων ἢ ἄξιος οὐ πᾶς
 7 χαῦνος. Ὁ δ' ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἄξιος μικρόψυχος, εἴαν
 τε μεγάλων εἴαν τε μετρίων, εἴαν τε καὶ μικρῶν 10
 ἄξιος ὢν ἔτι ἐλαττόνων αὐτὸν ἀξιῶι. Καὶ μάλιστα
 ἂν δόξειεν ὁ μεγάλων ἄξιος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει, εἰ

self-esteem based upon great merits. In the absence of great
 4, 5 merits such self-esteem would be mere folly: and in such a
 case an adequate estimate of ourself, being necessarily a low
 6 one, is not Highmindedness, but rather sober judgment. A
 too high estimate of self is Vaingloriousness, provided it be
 7 not only too high but also high absolutely. Conversely a
 lower estimate than facts would warrant, be it small or great
 in itself, is Littlemindedness, and above all when a man's
 merits are really great, because then the contrast is more

spicuously adopted. We have almost an individual portraiture of a *μεγαλόψυχος* in this Chapter. Pericles has even been suggested as the original.

6. According to the Greek estimate beauty implied bulk. Perhaps our word 'handsome,' as used in contrast with 'beautiful,' conveys the same idea. Comp. *Pol.* IV. iv. 8, τὸ καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει εἴωθε γίνεσθαι.

8. ὁ δὲ μειζόνων κ.τ.λ.] A man may estimate himself at a

low rate and yet more highly than he deserves, in which case he would hardly be called 'vain.' e.g. Whately says of his tutor at College that 'he would be generally described as an eminently modest man. He never rated himself high either in abilities or attainments, and yet he overrated himself to a great degree, else he never would have undertaken the office of a College tutor.' This is just the case described in the text. See

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μικρόψυχος ἐλλείπει καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ
 13 μεγαλοψύχου ἀξίωμα. Ὁ δὲ χαῦνος πρὸς ἑαυτὸν μὲν
 14 ὑπερβάλλει, οὐ μὴν τὸν γε μεγαλόψυχον. Ὁ δὲ μεγα-
 λόψυχος, εἴπερ τῶν μεγίστων ἀξίος, ἄριστος ἂν εἴη·
 μείζονος γὰρ αἰὲν ὁ βελτίων ἀξίος, καὶ μεγίστων ὁ ἄρι- 5
 στος. Τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρα μεγαλόψυχον δεῖ ἀγαθὸν
 εἶναι. Καὶ δόξειε δ' ἂν εἶναι μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἐν ἐκάστη
 15 ἀρετῇ μέγα. Οὐδαμῶς τ' ἂν ἀρμόζοι μεγαλοψύχῳ
 φεύγειν παρασείσαντι, οὐδ' ἀδικεῖν· τίνος γὰρ ἔνεκα
 πράξει αἰσχρὰ, ᾧ οὐθέν μέγα; καθ' ἕκαστα δ' ἐπισκο- 10
 ποῦντι πάμπαν γελοῖος φαίνοιτ' ἂν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος μὴ
 ἀγαθὸς ᾖν. Οὐκ εἴη δ' ἂν οὐδὲ τιμῆς ἀξίος φαῦλος
 ᾖν· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ ἄθλον ἢ τιμὴ, καὶ ἀπονέμεται τοῖς
 16 ἀγαθοῖς. Ἔοικε μὲν οὖν ἡ μεγαλοψυχία οἶον κόσμος

estimate of himself both in reference to his own merits and
 13 also in reference to the standard of the Highminded. In
 reference to that standard the Vainglorious man on the other
 hand cannot exceed, but in reference to his own merits he
 14 does so. Highmindedness, being based upon merit, implies
 the possession of the other virtues, and that in the highest
 15 degree. Undignified flight, for example, or injustice of any
 kind, would be utterly incompatible with a well-merited self-
 16 respect. True Highmindedness is, as it were, 'the head and

High-
 mindedness
 implies all
 other virtues
 in the high-
 est degree.

2. ἀξίωμα] The vainglorious man's estimate of himself cannot of course exceed the highminded man's estimate of himself, but it does exceed the estimate which his own merits warrant.

7. Καὶ δόξειε κ.τ.λ.] He not only possesses every Virtue, but every one on a grand scale, just as the μεγαλοπρεπῆς was explained (in ii. 10) to possess the particular virtue of Liberality on a grand scale.

9. παρασείσαντι] understand τὰς χεῖρας, i.e. 'swinging the hands in precipitate flight.'

οὐδ' ἀδικεῖν κ.τ.λ.] His high sense of the dignity of his moral nature is such (πάμπαν γελοῖος φαίνεται μὴ ἀγαθὸς ᾖν) that he scorns to do an unjust or base action. This has sometimes been censured as if it was mere pride, but we should not forget that *mutatis mutandis* Christianity

τις εἶναι τῶν ἀρετῶν· μείζους γὰρ αὐτὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ ἐκείνων. Διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλόψυχον εἶναι οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε ἄνευ καλοκαγαθίας.

17 Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν περὶ τιμᾶς καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστι, καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν ταῖς μεγάλαις καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων 5 μετρίως ἡσθήσεται, ὡς τῶν οἰκείων τυγχάνων ἢ καὶ ἐλαττόνων· ἀρετῆς γὰρ παντελοῦς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀξία τιμῆ· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἀποδέξεταιί γε τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοὺς μείζω αὐτῷ ἀπυμένειν. Τῆς δὲ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων καὶ ἐπὶ μικροῖς πάνπαν ὀλιγωρήσει· οὐ γὰρ τούτων ἀξίος. 10

18 Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται δικαίως περὶ αὐτόν. Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὁ μεγαλόψυχος περὶ τιμᾶς, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ πλοῦτον

crown' of all the virtues. Need we wonder that it is rare and
 17 difficult to attain to? The Highminded man, when he re-
 ceives high honour from good men, will feel pleasure, though
 in a moderate degree, for he knows that he is obtaining his
 due, or rather, less than his due, but still the best it is in
 their power to give, and as such he is willing to accept it.
 The paltry homage of ordinary men he will despise as un-
 worthy of him, and so he will also their contempt, which he
 18 knows is undeserved. With the same dignified attitude will

The High-
minded man
is sober and
discriminat-
ing in re-
gard to the
honour
paid him
by others.

Minor prac-
tical charac-
teristics of

appeals to a somewhat similar motive, *e.g.* Rom. vi. 2, 11, 21, etc. etc. So Plat. *Rep.* p. 486 A.

1. μείζους . . . ποιεῖ] High-mindedness is not so much a separate virtue as a combination of all virtues in one perfect character, each and all being enhanced by the full consciousness of their possession, or (as a modern might phrase it) 'the testimony of a good conscience' in respect of them. (See *Suppl. Note.*)

3. καλοκαγαθίας] 'Nobility' seems to hit the double significance of this word. καλοκάγαθος, if it has not (like 'optimates' in Latin) passed from a moral to a social significance, yet implies the latter in combination with the former.

5. ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων] He only cares 'laudari a laudatis viris.' Comp. I. v. 5.

10. ἐπὶ μικροῖς] 'on trivial grounds.'

καὶ δυναστείαν καὶ πᾶσαν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν μετρίως ἔξει, ὅπως ἂν γίνηται, καὶ οὐτ' εὐτυχῶν περιχαρῆς ἔσται, οὐτ' ἀτυχῶν περίλυπος. Οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τιμὴν οὕτως ἔχει ὡς μέγιστον ὄν. Αἱ γὰρ δυναστεῖαι καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος διὰ τὴν τιμὴν ἔστιν αἰρετά· οἱ γοῦν ἔχοντες 5 αὐτὰ τιμᾶσθαι δι' αὐτῶν βούλονται. Ὡς δὲ καὶ ἡ τιμὴ μικρόν ἐστι, τούτῳ καὶ τᾶλλα. Διὸ ὑπερόπται δοκοῦσιν 19 εἶναι. Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ εὐτυχήματα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν. Οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς καὶ οἱ

the High-minded man (§§ 18—34). His estimate of riches, power, prosperity, etc. Conversely the influence of these on High-mindedness.

19 he regard riches, power, and prosperity and adversity generally. Riches and power are but means to honour, and he who estimates *it* so soberly will not be dazzled by *them*. Hence 19 men think him supercilious. Indeed these very advantages are thought to tend to Highmindedness because they secure

8. Men expect to receive, and do receive, honour in respect of riches, power, or good birth. Hence the possession of these advantages will in fact help the Highminded man to that honour which is his due, though he deserves it on higher grounds. Hence too, as honour intensifies self-respect, Highmindedness itself is thought to be fostered by any of those external advantages which in the opinion and practice of mankind entitle their possessor to honour. In strict truth, however, goodness, and goodness alone, is the proper ground for self-respect, or for the esteem of others. In § 21 it is added that superciliousness, which is an external accompaniment of Highmindedness, is also a result of the

possession of such advantages as these.

It is interesting to notice that the Greek words for moral excellence are generally derived from those which express outward beauty, good birth, strength, ability, etc. The primitive import of such words is generally found in Homer, and their ethical meaning can scarcely be said to be fixed before Socrates. *e.g.* καλὸς and αἰσχρὸς (cf. ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν παναίσχης, I. viii. 16), γενναῖος, ἐσθλὸς (*i.e.* ἐθλὸς = 'edel' 'noble') χρηστός. This bears witness to the confusion noticed in the text between material prosperity and moral worth. The other side of the picture appears in the dictum of Tennyson's Farmer, 'The poor in a loomp is bad.'

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ἔστι δὲ μικροκίνδυνος οὐδὲ φιλοκίνδυνος διὰ τὸ ὀλίγα
 τιμᾶν, μεγαλοκίνδυνος δὲ, καὶ ὅταν κινδυνεύῃ, ἀφειδῆς
 24 τοῦ βίου, ὡς οὐκ ἄξιον ὄν πάντως ζῆν. Καὶ οἷος εὖ
 ποιεῖν, εὐεργετούμενος δ' αἰσχύνεται. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ
 ὑπερέχοντος, τὸ δ' ὑπερεχομένου. Καὶ ἀντευεργετικὸς 5
 πλειόνων· οὕτω γὰρ προσοφλήσει ὁ ὑπάρξας καὶ ἔσται
 25 εὖ πεπονθώς. Δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ μνημονεύειν οὓς ἂν ποιή-

not court danger, but if it be great and worthy of him he will
 face it without regard to his life, which he does not think
 24 worth preserving at the cost of honour. He loves to confer
 and is ashamed to receive benefits, and he hastens to requite
 25 them with increase. In fact men are apt to remember those

His be-
 haviour in
 respect of
 conferring
 or accepting
 benefits

haps a corollary to the somewhat
 over-conscious self-respect incul-
 cated as the basis of the Virtue
 under consideration. The fol-
 lowing passage from an Essay of
 Archbishop Whately on 'Gene-
 rosity' perhaps exhibits this
 trait in the more favourable
 aspect in which it appeared to
 Aristotle:—'If a man who feels
 himself capable of generous and
 exalted conduct, measures others
 by his own standard, he must
 be first disappointed, and then
 dissatisfied' (from which 'con-
 tempt' would be an easy step)
 'with almost all the world: for
 very few have even any con-
 ception of real heroic generosity.
 As a celebrated ancient once
 said, "As he never excused a
 fault in himself, he could not
 tolerate any in others."'

6. προσοφλήσει ὁ ὑπάρξας]
 'the one who began it will be
 left in his debt besides'; and so

debtor and creditor will change
 places.

7. Δοκοῦσι used thus imper-
 sonally seems to refer to mankind
 generally, not to the *μεγαλόψυ-
 χος* in particular, though he so
 far shares the feeling as to
 hasten to requite benefits re-
 ceived, and so to wipe out the
 feeling of obligation.

So remarks Thucydides, II. xi.
 § 7, 'He who has conferred a
 benefit is glad to keep alive the
 obligation by renewed acts of
 kindness: while he who has re-
 ceived one is less keen about it,
 knowing that any service he may
 render will be regarded as pay-
 ment of a debt, and not as an act
 of favour.' The point is further
 worked out by Aristotle himself
 in IX. vii. In the same spirit
 remarks La Rochefoucauld (*Max-
 imes* 238), 'It is not so danger-
 ous to do harm to the majority
 of men, as to go too far in doing

σωσιν εὖ, ὧν δ' ἂν πάθωσιν οὐκ ἐλάττων γὰρ ὁ παθὼν
 εὖ τοῦ ποιήσαντος, βούλεται δ' ὑπερέχειν. Καὶ τὰ μὲν
 ἠδέως ἀκούει, τὰ δ' ἀηδῶς· διὸ καὶ τὴν Θέτιν οὐ λέγειν
 τὰς εὐεργεσίας τῷ Δίῳ· οὐδ' οἱ Λάκωνες πρὸς τοὺς
 26 Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλ' ἂ πεπόνθεσαν εὖ. Μεγαλοψύχου δὲ 5
 καὶ τὸ μηθενὸς δεῖσθαι ἢ μόγισ, ὑπηρετεῖν δὲ προθύμως,
 καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἐν ἀξιώματι καὶ εὐτυχίαις μέγαν
 εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μέσους μέτριον· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπερ-

whom they have benefited, but when they have received a
 benefit they are glad to forget it, because such a position is
 26 one of dependence and inferiority. He is reluctant to ask a
 favour, though ready to confer one. With great men he
 carries his head high, while with ordinary men he is unaffected,

His com-
 portment
 towards
 others.

them good.' 'There is scarcely
 any one who is not ungrateful
 for great benefits' (*Max.* 299).
 An Eastern despot is said to
 have beheaded a man who had
 saved his life in order to avoid
 remaining under an obligation
 which nothing could ever re-
 pay.

Again notice the absence of
 the recognition of Benevolence,
 or any desire to benefit *others*.
 (See Introduction, p. xxxv.) Both
 Aristotle and Thucydides look
 mainly at the pleasurable sense
 of superiority on the part of one
 who confers a benefit.

3. διὸ καὶ τὴν Θέτιν] Passing
 illustrations of this sort are ap-
 parently introduced by Aristotle
 from memory, and are not un-
 frequently incorrect. This would
 not be unnatural if they occurred
 to the author during an extem-
 pore Lecture. (See Introduction,

p. xxxvii.) Thetis (Homer, *Il.*
 i. 503) seems to do the reverse—

Ζεῦ πάτερ, εἶποτε δὴ σε μετ' ἀθανά-
 τοισιν ὄνησα
 * Ἡ ἔπει ἦ ἔργω.

(See *Supplementary Note*.)

The reference in the case of
 the Lacedæmonians is uncertain.
 A case is related by Xen. *Hell.*
 VI. v. 33, in which however
 benefits conferred as well as re-
 ceived by themselves are men-
 tioned by the Spartans.

6. δεῖσθαι here means, 'to
 ask for,' not 'to stand in need
 of,' as we judge from the High-
 minded man being said to do so
 reluctantly (*μόγισ*) and also from
 the natural contrast between
 seeking and conferring favours
 (*ὑπηρετεῖν*). Compare *δεητικὸς* in
 § 32.

7. τοὺς ἐν ἀξιώματι] 'men of
 repute.' See § 15 of the last
 Chapter.

ἔχειν χαλεπὸν καὶ σεμνὸν, τῶν δὲ ῥάδιον, καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις
 μὲν σεμνύνεσθαι οὐκ ἀγεννῆς, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ταπεινοῖς φορ-
 27 τικὸν, ὥσπερ εἰς τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς ἰσχυρίζεσθαι. Καὶ εἰς
 τὰ ἔντιμα μὴ ἰέναι, ἢ οὐ πρωτεύουσιν ἄλλοι καὶ ἀργὸν
 εἶναι καὶ μελλητήν, ἀλλ' ἢ ὅπου τιμὴ μεγάλη ἢ ἔργον. 5
 Καὶ ὀλίγων μὲν πρακτικὸν, μεγάλων δὲ καὶ ὀνομαστῶν.
 28 Ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ φανερόμισον εἶναι καὶ φανερόφιλον
 τὸ γὰρ λαυθάνειν φοβουμένου. Καὶ μέλει τῆς ἀληθείας
 μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς δόξης, καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν φανερώς·
 παρρησιαστῆς γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφρονεῖν. Διὸ καὶ ἀλη- 10
 θευτικὸς, πλὴν ὅσα μὴ δι' εἰρωνείαν· εἰρωνα δὲ πρὸς
 29 τοὺς πολλούς. Καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν ἀλλ'
 ἢ πρὸς φίλον· δουλικὸν γὰρ, διὸ καὶ πάντες οἱ κόλακες
 θητικοὶ καὶ οἱ ταπεινοὶ κόλακες. Οὐδὲ θαυμαστικός·

for there is nothing grand in giving one's-self airs before them.

He is only
roused to
action on
great occa-
sions.

27 He is not roused to exertion by any but the greatest objects
 of ambition, and is therefore generally in a state of dignified
 28 inaction. He is open in his hatreds and his friendships, cares
 for truth more than the opinion of men, scorns concealment
 in words or actions, and speaks the plain truth except when
 he shrinks from asserting his full rights, as he does in fact
 29 with the majority of people. He cannot conform himself to

His plain-
spokenness.

His inde-
pendence,
undemon-
strativeness,

4. ἔντιμα] 'objects of com-
mon esteem.' ἀργὸν καὶ μελλη-
τήν = 'inactive and hesitating.'

11. εἰρώνεια is explained after-
wards in ch. vii. to be a consci-
ous depreciation of one's own
merits or powers, and must not
be mistaken here for 'irony.' A
man of such pre-eminent dignity
and merit as the μεγαλόψυχος
must 'let himself down' with the
majority of those he meets. He
therefore consciously lowers his

own pretensions on most occa-
sions, and this would be εἰρώ-
νεια. The word ἀληθευτικὸς is of
course to be supplied again after
ὅσα μὴ.

14. θητικοὶ] 'slavish' (θῆς),
ταπεινοὶ = 'mean' or 'grovelling.'
The word (as has been noted
elsewhere) has a bad meaning in
classical Greek, though no better
word could be found by Christian
writers to express the new idea
of 'humility' as a virtue.

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καὶ ἡ ταχυτῆς διὰ τούτων. Τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μεγαλό-
 ψυχος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων μικρόψυχος, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων
 35 χαῦνος. Οὐ κακοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι οὐδ' οὔτοι· οὐ
 γὰρ κακοποιοὶ εἰσιν ἡμαρτημένοι δέ. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ
 μικρόψυχος, ἄξιός ὢν ἀγαθῶν, ἑαυτὸν ἀποστερεῖ ὢν 5
 ἄξιός ἐστι, καὶ ἔοικε κακὸν ἔχειν τι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἀξιούν
 ἑαυτὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ ἀγνοεῖν δ' ἑαυτόν· ὠρέγεται γὰρ
 ἂν ὢν ἄξιός ἦν, ἀγαθῶν γε ὄντων. Οὐ μὲν ἠλίθιοί γε
 οἱ τοιοῦτοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀκνηροί. Ἐπι-
 10 τοιαύτη δὲ δόξα δοκεῖ καὶ χείρους ποιεῖν ἕκαστοι γὰρ

his voice, and his manner of speech will be grave, dignified,
 35 and deliberate. Such is the Highminded man. The related
 characters who are in excess and defect in the matter of self-
 estimation are, as we have seen, the Vainglorious and the Little-
 minded. They are misguided, rather than actively vicious.

The related
 Vices are—
 Little-
 minded-
 ness,

4. There is an obvious contrast between *κακοποιοί* (actively vicious) and *κακὸν ἔχειν τι* (having something wrong about them). Aristotle means to say that men would hardly form so low an estimate of themselves unless there was something to partially justify it. 'There cannot be so much smoke without some fire.'

9. *ὀκνηροί*] 'wanting in energy,' 'diffident.'

10. *ἡ τοιαύτη δόξα κ.τ.λ.*] In other words, the absence of moral aspiration is most injurious. The moral influence of a man's estimate of himself is very important. Witness the elevating effect of a conscious feeling that a man has powers beyond the perhaps humble sphere in which he finds himself placed, and con-

versely the depressing effect of the feeling (whether due to constitutional indolence, despondency, etc.), that one will never accomplish the task in hand. Many thus fail, simply because they have made up their minds that they cannot succeed. It is remarked by Nassau Senior in his Notes on Turkey, that the general spread of corruption among Turkish officials seems to date from the time when an oath of office was first imposed, in which the strictest integrity was promised; and he accounts for this by the supposition that the officials, unable to keep the oath completely, became reckless when they had once broken it. In other words, the conscious degradation of perjury (leading

ἐφίενται τῶν κατ' ἀξίαν, ἀφίστανται δὲ καὶ τῶν πράξεων
 τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὡς ἀνάξιοι ὄντες,
 36 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν. Οἱ δὲ χαῦνοι ἠλίθιοι
 καὶ ἑαυτοὺς ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐπιφανῶς ὡς γὰρ
 ἀξιοὶ ὄντες τοῖς ἐντίμοις ἐπιχειροῦσιν, εἶτα ἐξελέγχονται. 5
 καὶ ἐσθῆτι κοσμοῦνται καὶ σχήματι καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις,
 καὶ βούλονται τὰ εὐτυχήματα φανερὰ εἶναι αὐτῶν, καὶ
 λέγουσι περὶ αὐτῶν, ὡς διὰ τούτων τιμηθησόμενοι.
 37 Ἀντιτίθεται δὲ τῇ μεγαλοψυχίᾳ ἢ μικροψυχία μᾶλλον
 τῆς χαυνότητος· καὶ γὰρ γίγνεται μᾶλλον καὶ χεῖρον 10
 ἐστίν.

We note however that there is probably some ground at the bottom of even undue self-depreciation; and also that such characters have a tendency to sink to their own standard.

- 36 The Vainglorious man is conspicuous by his ignorance of himself, and seeks by a vulgar display of such external advantages as he does possess to secure for himself that admiration to
 37 which his merits do not entitle him. Littlemindedness is more opposed to Highmindedness than Vaingloriousness is. It is a worse error, and also a commoner one.
- and Vain-
glorious-
ness.

Little-
mindedness
is the worse
extreme.

to μικροψυχία, or a low moral estimation of one's-self), extinguished all scruples as to minor offences, and all desire to avoid them, and so the *whole* character settled down to the level of the estimate of itself already formed.

We may extend the remark to the moral influence of the estimation of society on the character of individuals. Recovery from some sins is rendered all but hopeless, out of all proportion to their relative guilt, simply by the arbitrary ban of society upon them. The offender in fact

acquiesces himself in this estimate of his degradation and soon comes to deserve it. Thus ἡ τοιαύτη δόξα χείρους ποιεῖ. This is familiarly expressed in the proverb, 'Give a dog a bad name,' etc.

5. τοῖς ἐντίμοις] See note on § 27.

10. χεῖρον ἐστίν] Though Aristotle gives no reasons for this statement, we may suggest, (1) Its tendency to make men grow worse (§ 35), and (2) Its outward aspect being the reverse of that of Highmindedness. Both

1 IV. Ἡ μὲν οὖν μεγαλοψυχία περὶ τιμὴν ἐστὶ μεγάλην,
 ὥσπερ εἴρηται ἔοικε δὲ καὶ περὶ ταύτην εἶναι ἀρετή τις,
 καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐλέχθη, ἢ δόξειεν ἂν παρα-
 πλησίως ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ
 ἐλευθεριότης πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν. Ἀμφω γὰρ ὁ
 αὐτὰι τοῦ μὲν μεγάλου ἀφεστᾶσι, περὶ δὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ
 2 τὰ μικρὰ διατιθέασιν ἡμᾶς ὡς δεῖ. Ὡσπερ δ' ἐν λήψει

CHAP. IV.—*On Ambition.*

The proper
 objects of
 Ambition
 and its
 relation to
 High-
 minded-
 ness.

1 We may now descend to the level of ordinary life, and
 describe another Virtue which, with its related Vices, has for
 2 its object Honour on a moderate scale, just as we before dis-

these reasons were given in ch. i.
 for preferring Prodigality to
 Sordidness.

Further, *χαυνότης* and *μικρο-
 ψυχία* must be carefully dis-
 tinguished from *ἀλαζόνεια* and
εἰρώνεια which are discussed
 in ch. vii. *Inter alia*, note that
 while *μικροψυχία* is here said
 to be worse than *χαυνότης*,
 Aristotle regards *εἰρώνεια* as a
 less evil than *ἀλαζόνεια*. See vii.
 17. Hence too we must not con-
 fuse *μικροψυχία* with Humility,
 though it is true that the char-
 acter of Highmindedness as de-
 scribed in this chapter shows that
 Humility would find no place as
 a Virtue in Aristotle's system.

γίγνεται μᾶλλον] The deficiency
 of moral aspiration is much more
 common than vaingloriousness.
 The dignity of our moral nature,
 the worth (*ἀξία*) that belongs to
 man as man, and the motive for
 moral action supplied by such a
 reflection, is totally unrecognised

by the majority of mankind.
 [See further a Supplementary
 Note, too long to be introduced
 here, on the character of the
μεγαλόψυχος, p. 234.]

CHAP. IV.—In this Chapter
 habits are discussed differing
 from those in the last chapter in
 degree rather than in kind; just
 as Liberality was related to, and
 yet differed from, Munificence.
 We must recollect that the *real*
 subject-matter to which High-
 mindedness refers was explained
 to be 'Self-Esteem in relation to
 merits' (last ch. § 3); but that
practically it might be viewed as
 concerned with the pursuit of
 honour on a grand scale (§ 10).
 In this chapter Aristotle takes
 the latter point of view at once
 as his starting-point, with the
 proviso that only honour on a
 moderate and ordinary scale is
 now in consideration.

3. *ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις*] Referring
 (as in § 4 below) to II. vii. 8.

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αὕτη, μεσότης οὖσα περὶ τιμὴν ἀνώνυμος. Φαίνεται δὲ
 πρὸς μὲν τὴν φιλοτιμίαν ἀφιλοτιμία, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀφι-
 λοτιμίαν φιλοτιμία, πρὸς ἀμφοτέρωθεν δὲ ἀμφοτέρωθεν πῶς.
 6 Ἔοικε δὲ τοῦτ' εἶναι καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. Ἄντι-
 κείσθαι δ' ἐνταῦθα οἱ ἄκροι φαίνονται διὰ τὸ μὴ ὄνο- 5
 μάσθαι τὸν μέσον.

1 V. Πραότης δ' ἐστὶ μὲν μεσότης περὶ ὀργᾶς, ἀνωσύμου
 δ' ὄντος τοῦ μέσου, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄκρων, ἐπὶ τὸν
 μέσον τὴν πραότητα φέρομεν, πρὸς τὴν ἔλλειψιν ἀπο-
 2 κλίνουσαν, ἀνώνυμον οὖσαν. Ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ ὀργιλότης 10
 τις λέγοιτ' ἄν. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ πάθος ἐστὶν ὀργή, τὰ δ'

(and the latter in both directions) *in fact*, though our phraseo-
 6 logy may not sufficiently indicate it; and this defect of lan-
 guage is the sole cause that we have apparently in this case
 the opposition of two extreme habits *inter se*, without a settled
 mean state in contrast with both of them.

CHAP. V.—*On the regulation of the Temper.*

No settled
 phraseology
 exists in re-
 gard to this
 Virtue.

1 Due moderation in the regulation of the Temper may be
 termed Meekness. There is no one term in settled use to de-
 scribe this virtue, nor indeed the related vices. We may per-
 haps employ the term 'Meekness,' though it suggests rather a
 2 deficiency in this respect. The excess we may describe as a

CHAP. V.—See what was said
 in the note on the Catalogue of
 Virtues, at the end of B. II. on
 the position occupied in the list
 by *πραότης*, as being intermediate
 between the *personal* virtues that
 precede and the *social* virtues
 which follow it.

10. ὀργιλότης τις] 'Passionate-
ness' and 'impassionateness'
 seem to express the ideas re-

quired, and their somewhat
 uncouth character reproduces
 that of the Greek originals for
 which Aristotle apologizes by
 adding *τις* here and in § 5.

11. τὸ μὲν πάθος ἐστὶν ὀργή] It will be remembered that all
 Virtue and Vice are held by
 Aristotle to consist in the
 moderate, excessive, or defective
 indulgence of some feeling in

3 ἐμποιοῦντα πολλὰ καὶ διαφέροντα. Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐφ' οἷς
 δεῖ, καὶ οἷς δεῖ, ὀργιζόμενος, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ ὅτε,
 καὶ ὅσον χρόνον, ἐπαινεῖται· πρᾶος δὲ οὗτος ἂν εἴη,
 εἴπερ ἢ πραότης ἐπαινεῖται. Βούλεται γὰρ ὁ πρᾶος
 ἀτάραχος εἶναι, καὶ μὴ ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, ἀλλ' 5
 ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος τάξῃ, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦ-
 4 του χρόνον χαλεπαίνειν. Ἀμαρτάνειν δὲ δοκεῖ μᾶλλον
 ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν· οὐ γὰρ τιμωρητικὸς ὁ πρᾶος, ἀλλὰ
 5 μᾶλλον συγγνωμονικός. Ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις, εἴτ' ἀοργησία
 τίς ἐστίν, εἴθ' ὅτι δὴ ποτε, ψέγεται. Οἱ γὰρ μὴ ὀργιζό- 10
 μενοι ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ ἠλίθιοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ οἱ μὴ ὡς δεῖ,
 6 μὴδ' ὅτε, μὴδ' οἷς δεῖ· δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐδὲ
 λυπεῖσθαι, μὴ ὀργιζόμενός τε οὐκ εἶναι ἀμυντικός. Τὸ δὲ
 προπηλακιζόμενον ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους περιορᾶν

sort of Passionateness, Anger being the feeling in itself morally
 3 indifferent in which the excess or defect takes place. We shall then apply the term 'Meek' to a man who, though he
 is roused to anger on right occasions and in due measure, is naturally of a tranquil disposition, and never allows his
 4 anger to get the better of his reason. His leaning is towards a deficiency in the feeling of anger, and forgiveness of injuries
 5 comes more naturally to him than revenge. That deficiency, impassionateness (if we may venture so to call it), is a fault.
 6 It leads to a neglect of self-defence, and a submission to insult

General characteristics however may be given of Meekness, which tends towards defect rather than excess in Anger. The defect itself is a sort of impassionateness.

itself morally indifferent, neither good nor bad. See note on II. vii. 2. That feeling is in this case Anger. We are accustomed to give a bad sense to 'Anger,' and to describe the nobler forms of the passion by 'Indignation.' That 'Anger' had not always this restricted sense in English may be seen from such passages

as 'Be ye angry and sin not,' and S. Mark. iii. 5, where 'anger' is attributed to our Lord.

1. ἐφ' οἷς] 'on right occasions' (ἐπὶ with dative as usual expressing the conditions of the action).

2. οἷς δεῖ] 'with right persons' (dative of reference).

- 7 ἀνδραποδῶδες. Ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ κατὰ πάντα μὲν γίνεται καὶ γὰρ οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ θάττον, καὶ πλείω χρόνον· οὐ μὴν ἅπαντά γε τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει. Οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτ' εἶναι τὸ γὰρ κακὸν καὶ ἑαυτὸ ἀπόλλυσι, κἂν ὀλόκληρον ἦ, ἀφόρητον γίνεται. 5
- 8 Οἱ μὲν οὖν ὀργίλοι ταχέως μὲν ὀργίζονται, καὶ οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, παύονται δὲ ταχέως· ὃ καὶ βέλτιστον ἔχουσιν. Συμβαίνει δ' αὐτοῖς τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ κατέχουσι τὴν ὀργὴν ἀλλ' ἀνταποδιδόσιν ἢ φανεροί εἰσι διὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα, εἴτ' ἀποπαύονται. 10
- 9 Ὑπερβολῇ δ' εἰσὶν οἱ ἀκρόχολοι ὀξεῖς καὶ πρὸς πᾶν ὀργίλοι καὶ ἐπὶ παντί· ὄθεν καὶ τοῦνομα. Οἱ δὲ πικροὶ δυσ-

directed against one's-self or one's friends, which is slavish.

The excess falls under four types (§§ 7—11):

7 The vice of excess is exhibited in every variety of detail, *e.g.* in the objects, the occasions, the degree, the amount of provocation, the endurance of the feeling, etc. Errors in all these respects would scarcely be united in one instance, and if so, would be intolerable. Hence we have several types of the

The passionate.

8 excess in question. (1) The *passionate*, who are soon angry, without due cause, and in too violent a degree, but soon come round. Their passion, being utterly unrestrained, speedily ex-

The quick-tempered.

9 hausts its force. (2) The *quick-tempered*, who are angry in a moment and at anything and everything—hence their name.

The sulky.

10 (3) The *sulky*, who are hard to appease; and their anger,

5. ὀλόκληρον] see note above on i. 38.

6. The four classes described in §§ 8—11 have naturally many points in common. Their characteristic features seem to be respectively, (1) Violence and ungovernableness of temper (ὀργίλοι) — (2) Extreme irritability and touchiness (ἀκρόχολοι), — (3) A sulky and irreconcilable temper (πικροί)—(4) General ill-

nature and revengefulness (χαλεποί).

8. ὃ καὶ βέλτιστον ἔχουσιν] 'and that is the best point about them.'

10. ἢ φανεροί εἰσι] 'in a way that one may see,' *i.e.* 'openly;' as opposed to διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπιφανές in § 10.

11. ὑπερβολῇ . . . ὀξεῖς] 'The quick-tempered are also excessive in their irritability:' taking ὑπερβολῇ as qualifying ὀξεῖς.

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πρότερον εἴρηται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ
 ῥάδιον διορίσαι τὸ πῶς καὶ τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ
 πόσον χρόνον ὀργιστέον, καὶ τὸ μέχρι τίνος ὀρθῶς ποιεῖ
 τις ἢ ἀμαρτάνει. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν παρεκβαίνων οὐ
 ψέγεται, οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἥττον· ἐνίοτε 5
 γὰρ τοὺς ἐλλείποντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ πράους φαμέν, καὶ
 τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρώδεις ὡς δυναμένους ἄρχειν. Ὁ
 δὲ πόσον καὶ πῶς παρεκβαίνων ψεκτὸς, οὐ ῥάδιον τῷ
 λόγῳ ἀποδοῦναι· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ τῇ αἰσ-
 14 θήσει ἡ κρίσις. Ἀλλὰ τό γε τοσοῦτον δῆλον, ὅτι ἡ μὲν 10
 μέση ἕξις ἐπαινετὴ, καθ' ἣν οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμεθα καὶ ἐφ'
 οἷς δεῖ, καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, αἱ δ' ὑπερ-
 βολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις ψεκταὶ, καὶ ἐπὶ μικρὸν μὲν γινόμε-
 ναι ἡρέμα, ἐπὶ πλεόν δὲ μᾶλλον, ἐπὶ πολὺ δὲ σφόδρα.
 Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τῆς μέσης ἕξεως ἀνθεκτέον. Αἱ μὲν οὖν 15
 περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ἕξεις εἰρήσθωσαν.

to lay down precise rules as to the right objects, degree, dura-
 tion, etc., of anger. Small errors on either side are not
 serious, and indeed often gain our approbation on account of
 14 the element of good which may be traced in them. That there
 however is a virtue to be cultivated and that there are vices
 to be avoided in the regulation of temper is abundantly clear.
 The practical details must be left to individual feeling and
 judgment.

where nearly the same words occur. ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων, 'from what we are now saying.'

8. τῷ λόγῳ] see note II. ix. 7, 8.

9. αἰσθήσει] 'individual feeling.' Questions of casuistry such as these cannot be determined by scientific rules. So much depends upon the infinite variety of circumstances bearing upon

any given action, and even granting all such circumstances could be taken into accurate account, so much still depends on the physical and moral constitution of the agent, that individual feeling (αἰσθήσει) or, as a modern writer might say, 'each man's conscience,' must in the last resort decide such points.

1 VI. Ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀμιλίαις καὶ τῷ συζῆν καὶ λόγων καὶ
 πραγμάτων κοινωνεῖν οἱ μὲν ἄρεσκοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οἱ
 πάντα πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ οὐθὲν ἀντιτείνοντες,
 2 ἀλλ' οἰόμενοι δεῖν ἄλυτοι τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν εἶναι· οἱ δ'
 ἐξ ἐναντίας τούτοις πρὸς πάντα ἀντιτείνοντες καὶ τοῦ 5
 λυπεῖν οὐδ' ὀτιοῦν φροντίζοντες δύσκολοι καὶ δυσέριδες
 3 καλοῦνται. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν αἱ εἰρημέλαι ἕξεις ψεκταί εἰσιν,
 οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ἡ μέση τούτων ἐπαινετὴ, καθ' ἣν
 ἀποδέξεται ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δυσχερανεῖ.
 4 Ὅνομα δ' οὐκ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῇ τι, ἔοικε δὲ μάλιστα 10
 φιλία· τοιοῦτος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν μέσην ἕξιν οἶον
 βουλόμεθα λέγειν τὸν ἐπιεικῆ φίλον, τὸ στέργειν προσ-

CHAP. VI.—*On Friendliness, or Amiability.*

1 In their conduct and deportment in society some men, whom
 we may perhaps describe as 'obsequious,' shrink under any
 circumstances from making things unpleasant; they would
 rather sacrifice a principle than say or do anything disagree-
 2 able. Others again seem to enjoy running counter to every
 one and every thing, and care not how much pain they cause.
 3 These we may call 'cross-grained and quarrelsome.' In an
 intermediate position are those whose approbation and dis-
 approbation are regulated upon principle, who love to give
 pleasure, though they do not shrink from inflicting pain when
 4 it is needful: characters whom we may describe as 'friendly,'

Phraseology
 and general
 nature of
 the habit
 explained
 (§§ 1—5).

CHAP. VI.—We now come to
 the group of Virtues, three in
 number, which relate to our con-
 duct in and towards society. The
 order of the Catalogue in II. vii.
 is departed from. There it was
 ἀλήθεια — εὐτραπελία — φιλία.
 Here it is φιλία—ἀλήθεια—εὐ-
 τραπελία. The order is not of
 much importance, but it seems

unnatural to separate εὐτραπελία
 and φιλία (both dealing with τὸ
 ἡδύ), by interposing between
 them ἀλήθεια (dealing with τὸ
 ἀληθές). This would appear
 from Aristotle's own summary
 in viii. 12, below.

9. ἀποδέξεται] 'to approve.'
 See note on I. iii. 4.

11. τοιοῦτος γάρ ἐστιν κ.τ.λ.]

5 λαβόντα. Διαφέρει δὲ τῆς φιλίας, ὅτι ἄνευ πάθους ἐστὶ
καὶ τοῦ στέργειν οἷς ὀμιλεῖ· οὐ γὰρ τῷ φιλεῖν ἢ ἐχθαί-
ρειν ἀποδέχεται ἕκαστα ὡς δεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιοῦτος εἶναι.
Ἵμοίως γὰρ πρὸς ἀγνώτας καὶ γνωρίμους καὶ συνήθεις
καὶ ἀσυνήθεις αὐτὸ ποιήσει, πλὴν καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις ὡς 5
ἀρμόζει· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως προσήκει συνήθων καὶ ὀθνείων
6 φροντίζειν, οὐδ' αὖ λυπεῖν. Καθόλου μὲν οὖν εἴρηται
ὅτι ὡς δεῖ ὀμιλήσει, ἀναφέρων δὲ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ
συμφέρον στοχάζεται τοῦ μὴ λυπεῖν ἢ συνηδύνειν.
7 Ἐοικε μὲν γὰρ περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας εἶναι τὰς ἐν ταῖς 10

5 and their disposition as 'friendliness.' That disposition differs from 'friendship,' because it has not its root in affection, but in a *natural inclination* to give pleasure and avoid giving pain: and moreover because it is not limited to particular persons, but is felt towards all in due measure and proportion.
6 This natural tendency to please is controlled however by
7 several considerations, such as the following:—(1) Can it be

For he that holds the mean position is just such a man as we should wish to call 'a good friend,' if the element of affection were superadded. Friendliness + Affection = Friendship. In Greek, however, there are no two words exactly corresponding to this distinction between 'friendliness' and 'friendship,' and so *φιλία* has to be employed for both.

3. τῷ τοιοῦτος εἶναι] 'because it is his nature to do so.' He makes himself generally pleasant and agreeable (or if necessary the reverse), not because he likes (or dislikes) you, but because it comes naturally to him under certain circumstances, and it

makes no difference whether he knows you personally or not, except so far as acquaintanceship introduces some element of feeling (see § 8 below, and cf. § vii. of next Chapter, τῷ τὴν ἕξιν τοιοῦτος εἶναι). See also Bacon's Essay on 'Good Nature' throughout, and especially 'Neither is there only a habit of goodness directed by right reason (cf. ἕξις . . . κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον), but there is in some men, *even in Nature, a disposition towards it*: as on the other side there is a Natural Malignity. The lighter sort of malignity turneth to a crossness or frowardness' (cf. δύσερις καὶ δύσκολος).

9. συνηδύνειν] 'to contribute

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μὲν αἰρούμενος τὸ συνηδύνειν, λυπεῖν δ' εὐλαβούμενος, τοῖς δ' ἀποβαίνουσιν, εἰ μὴ μείζω, συνεπόμενος, λέγω δὲ τῷ καλῷ καὶ τῷ συμφέροντι. Καὶ ἡδονῆς δ' ἕνεκα τῆς εἰσ-
 9 αὐθις μεγάλης μικρὰ λυπήσει. Ὁ μὲν οὖν μέσος τοιοῦ-
 τός ἐστιν, οὐκ ὠνόμασται δὲ, τοῦ δὲ συνηδύνοντος ὁ μὲν 5
 τοῦ ἡδύς εἶναι στοχαζόμενος μὴ δι' ἄλλο τι ἄρεσκος, ὁ
 δ' ὅπως ὠφέλειά τις αὐτῷ γίγνηται εἰς χρήματα καὶ ὅσα
 διὰ χρημάτων, κόλαξ· ὁ δὲ πᾶσι δυσχεραίνων εἴρηται

(3) Ulterior consequences must always be taken into consideration. Great subsequent pleasure or profit may some-
 9 times be secured by slight momentary pain. The Excess has two types, distinguished by their motives. If it be merely an exaggerated and disinterested desire to please, we call it 'Obsequiousness.' If it be adopted from motives of self-interest, we term it 'Flattery.' The Defect has been sufficiently characterized already. Owing to the want of a definite

The Excess and Defect. Of the former there are two types, Obsequiousness and Flattery.

2. τοῖς δ' ἀποβαίνουσιν κ.τ.λ.] 'but regulating his conduct by the consequences if they be on a larger scale,' as compared, that is, with the present circumstances (see Analysis).

3. ἡδονῆς . . . τῆς εἰσαὐθις μεγάλης] 'for the sake of a pleasure that will presently be a considerable one.'

6. ἄρεσκος] The ἄρεσκος is what we should call an *insincere* or *unreal* man: one who professes to take the greatest interest in you, and uses the most friendly and even affectionate language, when he really cares nothing about you. Theophrastus graphically describes him as 'a man who when he enters a house at once asks to see the

babies; the moment he sees them he declares that they are the very image of their father, and kisses and fondles them, though he cares nothing about them.'

8. κόλαξ] The ancient 'Parasite' and the Mediæval Courtier would be typical instances. e.g. Polonius and Osric in *Hamlet*, Act III. Sc. ii. (l. 393), and Act V. Sc. ii. (l. 98, etc.). It is recorded that one of the courtiers of Philip of Macedon wore a shade over his left eye and walked lame, because the king had lost the sight of his left eye and been wounded in the leg. The modern servility of 'the Alexandra limp' shows that the race is not extinct.

ὅτι δύσκολος καὶ δύσερις. Ἐντικεῖσθαι δὲ φαίνεται τὰ ἄκρα ἑαυτοῖς διὰ τὸ ἀνώνυμον εἶναι τὸ μέσον.

- I VII. Περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ σχεδὸν ἔστι καὶ ἡ τῆς ἀλαζονείας μεσότης· ἀνώνυμος δὲ καὶ αὐτή. Οὐ χεῖρον δὲ καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπελθεῖν· μᾶλλον τε γὰρ ἂν εἰδείημεν τὰ περὶ 5 τὸ ἦθος, καθ' ἕκαστον διελθόντες, καὶ μεσότητος εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς πιστεύομεν ἂν, ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχον συνιδόντες. Ἐν δὲ τῷ συζῆν οἱ μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ὁμιλοῦντες εἴρηνται, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀληθευόντων τε καὶ ψευδομένων εἴπωμεν ὁμοίως ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεσι 10

and recognised name for the mean state, the excess and defect sometimes appear to be opposed to one another immediately.

CHAP. VII.—*On Straightforwardness or Truthfulness.*

- I Turning now to the behaviour of men in regard to the pre- General ex-
 1. Ἐντικεῖσθαι δὲ φαίνεται κ.τ.λ.] So it was also in the case of φιλοτιμία, iv. 6. ration in respect of boastfulness.' In II. vii. 12 ἀλήθεια and ἀληθής τις were suggested (the 'τις' showing some doubtfulness about the application of the word). ἀλήθεια, however, is 'truth' rather than 'truthfulness.' ἀληθινός, i.e. 'genuine,' 'real,' would more nearly express what we want in the adjectival form at any rate, but there is no abstract substantive to correspond. (See note on II. vii. 2.)
 CHAP. VII.*—We next proceed to consider the virtue of Truthfulness or Straightforwardness in words and actions considered out of any relation to the pleasure or pain caused to others. The excess and defect here must not be confused with χανότης and μικροψυχία in ch. iii. See further note on iii. 37 and also that on μεγαλόψυχος, p. 235. 4. ἀνώνυμος κ.τ.λ.] otherwise Aristotle would hardly have had recourse to the strange description ἀλαζονείας μεσότης, 'mode-

General explanation of the Habits in question and their phraseology (§§ 1—6).

* See Supplementary Notes on this Chapter, passim.

2 καὶ τῷ προσποιήματι. Δοκεῖ δὴ ὁ μὲν ἀλαζῶν προσποι-
 ητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὑπαρχόντων καὶ μείζο-
 3 νων ἢ ὑπάρχει, ὁ δὲ εἴρων ἀνάπαλιν ἀρνεῖσθαι τὰ ὑπάρ-
 4 χοντα ἢ ἐλάττω ποιεῖν, ὁ δὲ μέσος αὐθέκαστος τις ὢν
 ἀληθευτικὸς καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, τὰ ὑπάρχοντα 5
 ὁμολογῶν εἶναι περὶ αὐτὸν, καὶ οὔτε μείζω οὔτε ἐλάττω.
 5 Ἔστι δὲ τούτων ἕκαστα καὶ ἐνεκά τινος ποιεῖν καὶ μηθε-
 νός. Ἐκαστος δ' οἷος ἔστι, τοιαῦτα λέγει καὶ πράττει

2 tensions which they make in society, we observe that the
 Braggart lays claim to qualities which he does not possess at
 3 all, or possesses in a degree below his claims; the Dissembler
 4 disclaims or depreciates his own merits; the Truthful man, with
 a genuineness that embraces his whole life and conversation,
 5 represents himself just as he is, neither more nor less. The
 Simulation or Dissimulation thus described may be practised
 with or without a special motive; but, generally speaking,
 men's words, acts, and lives are a true reflex of their charac-
 ter and disposition, unless there be some special motive for

1. προσποίημα] 'pretensions.'

3. εἴρων is a very difficult word to translate. As ἀλαζῶν is one who boastfully lays claim to qualities that do not belong to him, so εἴρων is the reverse of this, and εἰρώνεια therefore is a conscious and intentional concealment or disclaiming of good qualities that really belong to one. 'Irony' is too wide, it may take this form among others. 'False Modesty' and 'Reserve' are too unconscious and often unintentional. 'Dissembler' and 'Dissimulation' are too closely allied with deceit, at least in modern English, though it does not seem that they were always used with this bad connotation:

e.g. in Bacon's Essay on 'Simulation and Dissimulation.' Perhaps on the whole either 'Dissimulation' or 'Self-Depreciation' come nearest to what we want: but the word in Greek itself is used in different senses, as we see from § 14-16 of this Chapter.

7. This distinction is further discussed in § 10, etc. With some persons the habits of bragging or of self-depreciation are so ingrained that they are exhibited even when it is impossible to imagine a motive, and where detection seems inevitable, and, as Aristotle proceeds to remark, except there be a definite motive such conduct is a true index of a character corresponding.

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προσποιούμενος μηθενὸς ἔνεκα φαύλῳ μὲν ἔοικεν (οὐ γὰρ
 ἂν ἔχαιρε τῷ ψεύδει), μάταιος δὲ φαίνεται μάλλον ἢ
 11 κακός. Εἰ δ' ἔνεκά τινος, ὁ μὲν δόξης ἢ τιμῆς οὐ λίαν
 ψεκτός, ὡς ὁ ἀλαζών, ὁ δὲ ἀργυρίου, ἢ ὅσα εἰς ἀργύ-
 12 ριον, ἀσχημονέστερος. Οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δ' ἐστὶν ὁ 5

coming naturally as it were to a man. In that case it is
 11 rather foolish than actually vicious. (β) It may be assumed
 with a view to secure honour, or with a view to make, gain;
 12 the latter being the worse form. And observe that Boast-
 fulness is a moral state, the character of which is deter-
 mined mainly by its motive or purpose. For the force of

1. φαύλῳ μὲν ἔοικε] 'is a bad man in some sense.' This is in natural contrast with the statement in § 8, δόξειε δ' ἂν κ.τ.λ.

4. ὡς ὁ ἀλαζών] As the ἀλαζών is the character whose different types Aristotle is now distinguishing, it seems out of place to give as an example of one of them 'ὁ ἀλαζών.' Two other readings are proposed (α) ὡς ἀλαζών (omitting ὁ), i.e. 'he is not very much to be blamed, for a braggart' (=considering that he is a braggart): (β) ὁ ἀλαζών (omitting ὡς), i.e. 'He who does it for the sake of honour is not very much to be blamed—he who boasts, I mean.' Thus the words supply the place of the participle προσποιούμενος which must be understood with ὁ, and if the sentence were written in full would follow τιμῆς. It is most probable however that the words ὡς ὁ ἀλαζών represent a marginal gloss that has crept into the text.

5. Οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει κ.τ.λ.] Boastfulness as a reprehensible habit consists not so much in the mere capacity (δύναμις) or propensity to boast. That may arise in a manner from natural constitution (τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι—with which compare a similar statement as regards Friendliness, vi. 5, τῷ τοιοῦτος εἶναι κ.τ.λ.), or from force of habit (κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν—with which again compare τῷ τὴν ἔξιν τοιοῦτος εἶναι in § 7 above). The moral depravity of Boastfulness depends rather upon the motives for which it is adopted (προαίρεσις), the distinction between some of which motives has just been pointed out. The distinction is in fact the same as that which discriminates ἀρεσκος and κόλαξ in the last Chapter.

The remark is introduced in the text to show that the classification just made of boasters according to their motive indicates a real moral difference.

ἀλαζών, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει· κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν γὰρ καὶ
 τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι ἀλαζών ἐστιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ψεύστης ὁ
 μὲν τῷ ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρων, ὁ δὲ δόξης ὀρεγόμενος ἢ
 13 κέρδους. Οἱ μὲν οὖν δόξης χάριν ἀλαζονεύομενοι τὰ
 τοιαῦτα προσποιούνται ἐφ' οἷς ἔπαινος ἢ εὐδαιμονισμὸς, 5
 οἱ δὲ κέρδους, ὧν καὶ ἀπόλαυσις ἐστὶ τοῖς πέλας καὶ ἀ
 διαλαθεῖν ἐστὶ μὴ ὄντα, οἷον μάντιν σοφὸν ἢ ἰατρόν.
 Διὰ τοῦτο οἱ πλείστοι προσποιούνται τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ
 14 ἀλαζονεύονται· ἐστὶ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ εἰρημένα. Οἱ δ'
 εἴρωνες ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον λέγοντες χαριέστεροι μὲν τὰ 10
 ἦθη φαίνονται· οὐ γὰρ κέρδους ἕνεκα δοκοῦσι λέγειν,
 ἀλλὰ φεύγοντες τὸ ὀγκηρόν· μάλιστα δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τὰ
 15 ἔνδοξα ἀπαρνοῦνται, οἷον καὶ Σωκράτης ἐποίει. Οἱ δὲ

habit or natural disposition may make a man boastful, just as
 some men have a natural propensity for lying, and others
 adopt it for a special purpose. In the case of Boastfulness
 the special purpose is the main point by which we judge the
 13 habit. To return to the two last-mentioned types of Boast-
 fulness. The manner in which they are displayed varies with
 the difference of motive. If the motive be honour, pretension
 is made to qualities which are praised or envied by men. If
 it be gain, pretension is made to qualities that are useful, and
 the absence of which is not likely to be detected; *e.g.* quackery
 14 and fortune-telling. This is the commoner type. The Dis-
 semblers, on the other hand, disclaim their own merits, and
 this in moderation is not altogether unattractive, as in the
 15 case of Socrates. The same habit in an extreme form is very

The Defect,
 Dissimula-
 tion, falls
 under the
 two types of
 Self-Depre-
 ciation and
 Affectation

7. οἷον μάντιν σοφὸν κ.τ.λ.]
e.g., weather-prophets, fortune-
 tellers, quack-doctors, etc.

12. φεύγοντες τὸ ὀγκηρόν]
 'wishing to avoid (the appear-
 ance of) giving themselves airs.'
 ὀγκηρός means literally 'bulky' or

'swollen,' and thence 'pompous'
 (L. and S.).

13. The εἴρωνεία of Socrates is
 well known. It consisted in a
 profession of ignorance, doubt,
 and a desire to be instructed, by
 which unwary opponents were

καὶ τὰ μικρὰ καὶ τὰ φανερὰ προσποιούμενοι βαυκοπανοῦργοι λέγονται καὶ εὐκαταφρόνητοί εἰσιν. Καὶ ἐνίοτε ἀλαζονεία φαίνεται, οἷον ἢ τῶν Λακώνων ἐσθῆς· καὶ
 16 γὰρ ἢ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἢ λίαν ἔλλειψις ἀλαζονικόν. Οἱ
 δὲ μετρίως χρώμενοι τῇ εἰρωνείᾳ καὶ περὶ τὰ μὴ λίαν 5
 ἐμποδῶν καὶ φανερὰ εἰρωνευόμενοι χαρίεντες φαίνονται.
 17 Ἀντικεῖσθαι δ' ὁ ἀλαζῶν φαίνεται τῷ ἀληθευτικῷ χείρων γάρ.

I VIII. Οὔσης δὲ καὶ ἀναπαύσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ διαγωγῆς μετὰ παιδιᾶς, δοκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἶναι 10 ὁμιλία τις ἐμμελής, καὶ οἷα δεῖ λέγειν καὶ ὡς, ὁμοίως δὲ

contemptible, and is often nothing but Boastfulness in disguise, in short 'the pride that apes humility.' In moderation
 16 however it is not (as we said) offensive, and in any case is
 17 preferable to the other extreme of Boastfulness.

CHAP. VIII.—On Geniality.

Explan-
 ation of
 terms.

I Some part of life being necessarily spent in recreation, there must be in that part also a propriety of conduct, and this will apply, though in different degrees, both to speakers

lured on to discomfiture in argument.

I. προσποιούμενοι] This clause stands in contrast with τὰ ἔνδοξα ἀπαρνοῦνται, and therefore we may understand some such words as μὴ δύνασθαι to complete the sense. 'Those who disclaim small merits, and such as they obviously possess.'

Thus we have two types of εἰρωνεία distinguished:—(1) the more favourable type of 'Self-

Depreciation,' of which Socrates is an instance, and which is exhibited also by the μεγαλόψυχος (see iv. 28, note); and (2) the more unfavourable type of 'affectation,' which often is a mere disguise of 'Boastfulness.'

βαυκοπανοῦργοι] 'affected knaves.' βαῦκος = 'prudish or affected.'

II. ὁμιλία τις ἐμμελής] 'a graceful way of conducting one's self in society.'

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δεξιότης ἐστίν· τοῦ δ' ἐπιδεξίου ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν οἷα τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ καὶ ἐλευθερίῳ ἀρμόττει· ἔστι γάρ τινα πρέποντα τῷ τοιούτῳ λέγειν ἐν παιδιᾷς μέρει καὶ ἀκούειν, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου παιδιὰ διαφέρει τῆς τοῦ ἀνδραποδώδους, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πεπαιδευμένου καὶ ἀπαιδευ- 5
6 του. Ἰδοὶ δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐκ τῶν κωμωδιῶν τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ τῶν καινῶν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἦν γελοῖον ἢ αἰσχρολογία, τοῖς δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπόνοια· διαφέρει δ' οὐ μικρὸν ταῦτα 7 πρὸς εὐσχημοσύνην. Πότερον οὖν τὸν εὖ σκώπτοντα ὀριστεῖον τῷ λέγειν ἢ πρέπει ἐλευθερίῳ, ἢ τῷ μὴ λυπεῖν 10 τὸν ἀκούοντα, ἢ καὶ τέρπειν; ἢ καὶ τό γε τοιοῦτον ἀόρι- 8 στον; ἄλλο γὰρ ἄλλῳ μισητόν τε καὶ ἡδύ. Τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ ἀκούσεται· ἢ γὰρ ὑπομένει ἀκούων, ταῦτα καὶ ποιεῖν 9 δοκεῖ. Οὐ δὲ πᾶν ποιήσει· τὸ γὰρ σκῶμμα λαιδόρημά τι

is another characteristic, which insures that its possessor, whether speaking or listening, shall never forget what it is becoming for a gentleman and a man of refinement, even in 6 the way of recreation, to speak or to listen to. As an obvious instance of the application of such 'tact,' we note what a difference there is between coarseness and innuendo. 7 Whether then he draws the line at what is becoming to a gentleman, or at what will give pleasure, or at least no pain, 8 to his hearers, is perhaps not easy to define. But in any case he will not willingly listen to anything which he would shrink 9 from saying himself. For though law does not restrain ridi-

2. ἐλευθέριος here means 'a gentleman,' just as conversely ἀνδραποδώδης means 'a low and vulgar man.'

7. αἰσχρολογία] 'outspoken obscenity,' ὑπόνοια 'innuendo.' The difference would be well illustrated by the contrast between Rabelais and Sterne, or

between the coarseness of Aristophanes and the 'intrigue' of a modern French play.

9. εὐσχημοσύνην] 'decency.'

13. ποιεῖν . . . ποιήσει] in the sense of σκώπτειν or λέγειν. As there are certain jokes which he would not himself make, so he will also refuse to listen to them.

ἐστὶν, οἱ δὲ νομοθέται ἕνια λαιδορεῖν κωλύουσιν· ἔδει δ'
 ἴσως καὶ σκώπτειν. Ὁ δὲ χαρίεις καὶ ἐλευθέριος οὕτως
 10 ἔξει, οἷον νόμος ὦν ἑαυτῷ. Τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μέσος
 ἐστὶν, εἴτ' ἐπιδέξιος εἴτ' εὐτράπελος λέγεται· ὁ δὲ βωμο-
 λόχος ἡπτων ἐστὶ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τῶν 5
 ἄλλων ἀπεχόμενος, εἰ γέλωτα ποιήσῃ, καὶ τοιαῦτα λέγων
 ὦν οὔθεν ἂν εἴποι ὁ χαρίεις, ἕνια δ' οὐδ' ἂν ἀκούσαι. Ὁ
 δ' ἄγριος εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας ὀμιλίας ἀχρεῖος· οὔθεν γὰρ
 11 συμβαλλόμενος πᾶσι δυσχεραίνει. Δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ ἀνάπαυ-
 12 σις καὶ ἡ παιδιὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον. Τρεῖς οὖν 10
 αἱ εἰρημέται ἐν τῷ βίῳ μεσότητες, εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι περὶ

cule as it does personal abuse, yet a true gentleman is a law
 10 to himself in such matters. The Buffoon however can never
 resist a joke. No consideration for persons or regard for
 proprieties ever restrains him. The Boor on the other hand
 is quite useless in social intercourse. He contributes nothing
 11 to it himself, and acts as a continual damper: and yet some
 rest and recreation is a real necessity in life.

12 This concludes our account of the three Social Virtues.

2. σκώπτειν] Understand 'ἕνια κωλύειν' from the preceding.

οὕτως] i.e. as if actually restrained by law.

4. εἴτ' ἐπιδέξιος εἴτ' εὐτράπελος λέγεται] There being no settled name for this Virtue, Aristotle hesitates by which of its two principal characteristics (see §§ 3—5) he shall describe it.

7. Observe the emphatic contrast between οὔθεν and ἕνια, because there are some things which a man of refinement (χαρίεις) would not say himself, which however he would not think it necessary to protest

against if he heard them (see § 1 διοίσει δὲ κ.τ.λ.)

8. ἄγριος corresponds with ἀγροῖκος in the Catalogue of II. vii. It describes a man who is deficient in humour and the sense of the ludicrous, and one who acts as a sort of kill-joy in convivial society. In the former aspect he resembles Sydney Smith's Scotchman who needed a surgical operation to get a joke into his head; and in the latter he recalls Thackeray's description of the 'usual English expression of suppressed agony and intense gloom.'

The Excess is Buf-foonery.

The Defect, Boorishness.

λόγων τινῶν καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν. Διαφέρουσι δ' ὅτι ἢ μὲν περὶ ἀλήθειάν ἐστιν, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ. Τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ μὲν ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς; ἢ δ' ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὁμιλίαις.

1 IX. Περὶ δὲ αἰδοῦς ὡς τινος ἀρετῆς οὐ προσήκει λέγειν 5
 2 πάθει γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἢ ἔξει. Ὅρίζεται γοῦν φόβος
 τις ἀδοξίας, ἀποτελεῖται δὲ τῷ περὶ τὰ δεινὰ φόβῳ
 παραπλήσιον ἐρυθραίνονται γὰρ οἱ αἰσχυνόμενοι, οἱ δὲ
 τὸν θάνατον φοβούμενοι ὠχριῶσιν. Σωματικὰ δὲ φαί-
 νεταιί πως εἶναι ἀμφότερα, ὅπερ δοκεῖ πάθους μᾶλλον ἢ 10
 3 ἔξεως εἶναι. Οὐ πάσῃ δ' ἡλικίᾳ τὸ πάθος ἀρμόζει, ἀλλὰ
 τῇ νέᾳ· οἴομεθα γὰρ δεῖν τοὺς τηλικούτους αἰδήμονας
 εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάθει ζῶντας πολλὰ ἀμαρτάνειν, ὑπὸ τῆς
 αἰδοῦς δὲ κωλύεσθαι. Καὶ ἐπαινοῦμεν τῶν μὲν νέων

CHAP. IX.—*On the quasi-virtue, 'Sense of Shame.'*

The 'Sense of Shame' is not properly a Virtue for several reasons.

1 Shame cannot strictly be called a Virtue, for (1) it is an
 2 occasional feeling rather than a permanent state. It may be
 defined as 'a fear of disgrace,' and its outward marks resemble
 those of fear. Shame makes us blush, Fear makes us pale,
 3 and these are similar physical and transient effects. (2) It

CHAP. IX.—The subject of this concluding Chapter is the Sense of Shame. The Chapter is evidently fragmentary, for we hear nothing of the Excess of the feeling, the embodiment of which was described as ὁ καταπλήξ in II. vii. 14. In fact the discussion ends abruptly at the words ἀλλά τις μικτή in § 8, after which a few words have been added to connect this Book with the Books that follow.

which are thought to be not Aristotle's, or at any rate not to belong to this treatise.

6. πάθει μᾶλλον ἢ ἔξει] If so, not properly a Virtue. See II. v.

φόβος τις ἀδοξίας] αἰδῶς has a variety of meanings in Homer, but in all cases it is 'a sentiment which has ultimate reference to the standard of public opinion' (Gladstone, *Juv. Mundi*. p. 384). In *Odyss.* ii.

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8 τὸ τοιαῦτα πράττοντα αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐπιεικές. Οὐκ ἔστι δ' οὐδ' ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετὴ, ἀλλὰ τις μικτή· δειχθήσεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον. Νῦν δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης εἴπωμεν.

8 to call Shamelessness a Vice. We do not describe even Continence as a Virtue, because of the mixture of bad desires which it necessarily implies. But of this hereafter. We now proceed to discuss Justice.

though he will not regard him as virtuous on the strength of this. To do so would be to encourage 'doing evil that good may come,' or 'continuing in sin that grace may abound.'

2. οὐδ' ἡ ἐγκράτεια] For an explanation of ἐγκράτεια see note on I. iii. 7. The point here is that as not even ἐγκράτεια is called a Virtue because it implies strong bad *desires*, though they

are successfully combated, *a fortiori* Shame cannot be called a virtue, which presupposes actual *wrong-doing*.

3. ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον] viz. in B. VII.

νῦν δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης] Thus not only is the subject of *αἰδῶς* unfinished, but that of *νέμεσις* and *ἐπιχαιρεκακία*, of which we had so confused an account in II. vii. 15, is not even alluded to.

NOTE ON CHAPTER III.

THE CHARACTER OF THE μεγαλόψυχος.

SEVERAL questions arise in reference to this important character, some of which are inserted here to avoid making the notes too bulky. We have in this chapter Aristotle's conception of a perfect and ideal character (see especially § 16), combining the full social and moral conditions of καλοκάγαθία.

The definition from which the whole discussion starts is that the Virtue of μεγαλοψυχία consists in 'a well-grounded self-esteem' (ὁ μεγάλων αὐτὸν ἀξιῶν ἀξίος ὢν, § 3), and hence the whole character is, according to our modern ideas, somewhat disfigured by self-consciousness. It may be worth while to state some of the principal objections which are commonly made against it.

(1) The pervading *selfishness* of the character. He has no thought for others (§ 29): even his Benevolence is referred to himself and resolved into a desire for superiority (§ 24). (Compare Hobbes's celebrated theory that Benevolence is simply the love of power and the desire to exercise it.) His courage is based upon a somewhat selfish calculation likewise (§ 23). His love of Truth is similarly quali-

fied (§ 28): so also is his forgiveness of injuries (§ 30).

(2) The conspicuous *pride* of his character, and the total absence, not to say of humility (on which see note § 37), but even of modesty (§§ 18, 22, 28).

(3) That such a man would be practically an *offensive*, unamiable, unsociable character (§§ 27, 29, 31).

Such are some of the criticisms commonly made on the character before us. We may feel sure however, after making all allowance for the difference between the ancient Greek and the modern Christian point of view, that a character so palpably defective and repulsive could never have appeared to Aristotle, not to say admirable, but ideally perfect. Hence, without attempting a defence of all its details, it may be worth while to endeavour to arrive at a somewhat more sympathetic view of this ideal character.

1. The first point would seem to be, as we have already hinted, that it is an *ideal* character. It implies the combination of all the virtues in such perfection as never is actually found (τὸ ἐν ἐκάστη ἀρετῇ μέγα, § 14). Just as Plato and others have con-

structed ideal States, so Aristotle has here delineated an ideal Man. In both cases alike some allowance must be made for the difference between theory and fact in a world where things, as they are, are not ideal. Within certain limits we may say, '*tant pis pour les faits.*'

2

2. Aristotle had a strong sense of the dignity of Human Nature; of the grandeur and worth of Man as Man, in contrast with all the rest of animate and inanimate creation. He felt something of what a modern writer has called 'the Enthusiasm of Humanity.' (See further, *Ecce Homo*, 3d ed. p. 162, etc.) This seems to be the key to his conception of the *μεγαλόψυχος*. The *μεγαλόψυχος* is one who is deeply conscious of the dignity of his Human Nature, and penetrated by this consciousness is elevated thereby to live a life in all respects worthy of such an ideal. 'He becomes a law unto himself' (*ὡσπερ νόμος ὦν ἑαυτῷ*, as we read in viii. 10). Doubtless this intense self-reliance of the *μεγαλόψυχος* appears from our modern Christian point of view an inadequate foundation on which to build the whole structure of the moral character. But it may well be asked whether, apart from revelation, any nobler or more effective stimulus to Virtue can be suggested than the feeling that any other conduct is unworthy of the dignity of human nature. We may also remember that S. Paul

appeals in a very similar manner to the feeling that sin is unworthy of, and inconsistent with, our Christian profession and renewed nature, and argues that we should therefore scorn to commit it. A well-known saying of Goethe's recognises the value of this self-estimate: 'If you would improve a man, it is best to begin by persuading him that he is already what you would have him to be.'

In contrast with the character we have described, the *χαύνος* is one who unworthily lays claim to such a dignity. He desires 'the loaves and fishes' of virtue and worth. So long as he can secure the honour and glory accorded to merit, he is more or less indifferent to the grounds on which he obtains it (§ 36), since it is obvious that it can be obtained from men on secondary and morally indifferent grounds (see §§ 19, 20). The *μικρόψυχος* on the other hand is one who has no noble aspirations at all. He is quite content with low and grovelling aims, and has therefore no chance of moral elevation. Hence Aristotle declares Littlemindedness to be a worse type of character than Vaingloriousness. The Vainglorious man does not shrink from grand and difficult tasks, he rather courts them, and his unbounded self-confidence may sometimes even carry him through (*e.g.* Cleon at Sphacteria, if we accept the estimate of him in Thucydides and Aristophanes).

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root of personal Vanity, by which he is so blinded in his estimate of things, so 'clouded with his own conceit,' that he regards all occasions merely as opportunities for self-display; and this of course especially applies to great occasions—these being a preliminary condition of *χαυνότης*, *μεγαλοψυχία* and *μικροψυχία*.

It should be further observed that Aristotle attributes *frequent εἰρωνεία* to the *μεγαλόψυχος* (IV. iii. 28), which plainly shows that *εἰρωνεία* is widely different from *μικροψυχία*.

2. It has sometimes been argued (e.g. by Aquinas and others) that *μεγαλοψυχία* is not inconsistent with Christian Humility. Without going so far as this, we ought at any rate to take into consideration the following points:

(a) *μικροψυχία* must on no account be confounded with Humility, which has nothing in common with it, as has been already sufficiently explained. See note on IV. iii. 37.

(β) The modern popular notion of Humility is a very false one, in two ways especially:—

(i) Humility is generally thought to consist in a conscious (not to say, often insincere) self-depreciation. In that sense it somewhat resembles *εἰρωνεία* both in its better and worse phases (see note on IV. vii. 15). Now the Humility of true greatness is a *just* estimate of its power, not a depreciatory one. If it be consciously depreciatory,

it is simply the 'pride of modesty' (see IV. vii. 15). It only appears depreciatory to those who are lost in admiration of a standard above their own reach or aspirations. When Sir Isaac Newton said that in his highest efforts he felt as if he were only a child picking up pebbles on the shore of the boundless ocean of knowledge, that was a humble and yet a just estimate of the powers of human genius, though to an ordinary man it might seem unduly depreciatory. The Greeks, on the other hand, not having yet learnt how limited are man's powers in the universe, could not understand how a low estimate of unusual powers could still be a just one.

(ii) The popular notions of Conceit and Humility are simply a high or a low self-estimate, without any regard to the relation between the estimate and the merits: just as Liberality and the reverse are often popularly judged by the amount spent, without regard to the relation which it bears to the means of the giver.

At the same time, looking at several expressions in the chapter under consideration, we must admit that the modern notion of Humility as a Virtue was foreign, and perhaps necessarily so, to the Greek mind. As we have said, a low estimate, which is also a genuine and sincere one, of human power and human virtue, can come only from the consciousness of defeat and failure; and it would be as much out of

place amidst the first daring flights and as yet unbaffled efforts of the Greek mind, as melancholy would be in the sanguine years of childhood, which have not yet been sobered by disappointment.¹

At the same time some sort of recognition of a feeling akin to humility occurs in the commendation allowed to the better type of *εἰρωνεία* in IV. vii. 14.

It is interesting to contrast with this picture what has not inaptly been described as S. Paul's delineation of an ideal character in 1 Cor. xiii., especially vv. 4, 5, and 7. Also the total divergence of the ancient and modern conceptions of a perfect character is curiously illustrated by the following statement of a recent moralist, whether we accept it or not:— 'Were the perfect man to exist, he himself would be the last to know it; for the highest stage in advancement is the lowest descent in humility' (Archer Butler).

It may be worth while to compare with Aristotle's ideal sketch an actual instance of a character embodying many of the traits here depicted. Lord Macaulay in his *Life of Pitt*, p. 181 (*Bio-*

graphies, edition 1867), observes that Pitt may be considered as in many respects a noble embodiment of Aristotle's conception of the *μεγαλόψυχος*. We may compare the following traits or incidents with the portraiture in this chapter:

'No person could hear Pitt without perceiving him to be a man of high, intrepid, and commanding spirit, proudly conscious of his own rectitude and of his own intellectual superiority, incapable of the low vices of fear and envy, but too prone to feel and show disdain (§§ 18, 22). Pride pervaded the whole man, . . . was marked by the way in which he walked, in which he sate, in which he stood, and above all, in which he bowed (§ 34). Several men of note (§§ 26, 28) who had been partial to Pitt . . . were so much irritated by the contempt with which he treated them that they complained in print of their wrongs. . . . His ambition had no mixture of low cupidity. There was something noble in the cynical disdain with which the mighty minister scattered riches and titles to right and left among those who valued them, while he spurned them out of his own way' (§§ 18 fin., 33, etc.). At the age of twenty-two he was offered 'one of the easiest and most highly paid places in the service of the Crown. The offer was at once declined, for the young statesman had resolved to accept no post which did not entitle him

¹ Compare the grounds on which Arist. (*Rhet.* II. xii. 11) states that the young are *μεγαλόψυχοι*,—*οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ βίου οὐπω τεταπεινώνονται ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἄπειροί εἰσιν*, and the old are *μικρόψυχοι* for the converse reason (II. xiii. 5). Also Mansel (*Gnostics*, pp. 22-24) notes the little attention paid in Greek Philosophies to the problem of Evil, and accounts for the fact somewhat similarly.

to a seat in the Cabinet, and announced that resolution in the House of Commons,' and that at a time when the Cabinet was usually restricted to about seven members, and even Burke was not included in it (*εἰς τὰ ἔντιμα μὴ ἰέναι ἢ οὐ πρωτεύουσιν ἄλλοι*, §§ 27, 33).

Lastly, it should be noted (and this perhaps increases our difficulty in taking an appreciative view of Aristotle's sketch in this chapter), that now-a-days the habit of mind indicated by *μεγαλοψυχία* is far less common than formerly, and even in comparatively recent times, and that anything approaching to self-assertion is viewed with increasing repugnance. Mr. Mill in his *Essay on Liberty* protests against the English dislike for eccentricity or conspicuousness of any kind, and deplors the tendency to a dull and dead level of mediocrity which society at present fosters. But be the cause what it may, the fact is undeniable. What would be thought now-a-days of such a title-page to a book, once so common, as 'A most learned and edifying discourse by . . .'? The late Lord Dalling writes, 'One of the absurdities of the English character of the present day, is that no one has an estimate of his intrinsic value.' Yet it may well be doubted whether any great reform, religious or political, has been effected, or any deep impression left in the world's history or literature, by any one who did not display the

self-confidence and even self-assertion of Aristotle's *μεγαλόψυχος* in a considerable, and often, to our modern notion, a somewhat distasteful degree. There is no more remarkable instance of this than that of Dante. This spirit breathes throughout the whole of his *Divine Poem*. He promises immortal fame to those who are named by him in it: to be mentioned there, even for censure, is no small argument of distinction: he fears lest a timid statement of truth, though perhaps increasing his present fame, should injure it with those 'who shall call these days ancient': he boldly ranks himself among the six great poets of the world; and so on in innumerable other passages. Nor was this bold self-reliance limited to mere flights of poetry. Boccaccio relates that when appointed to go from Florence on an embassy to Boniface VIII., Dante hesitated, and assigned as his reason, 'If I go, who remains? and if I remain, who goes?' So in the *Convito* (I. x.) he does not shrink from saying, 'fidandomi di me più che d'un altro.' Whatever may have been thought of this self-reliance at the time, the verdict of posterity has fully justified it; and may we not apply the reflection of Aristotle in a similar case, and ask, If this be so, *πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον εἶ ὅτ' ἔστιν . . . μὴ ἀληθεύσεται κατ' αὐτοῦ τὸ ὑπαρχον*; (I. x. 7.) 'There was a time' (says Dean Church) when great men dared to claim their great-

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APPENDIX.

BOOK X. CHAPTERS VI—IX.

ARISTOTLE now reverts to the subject of Happiness, the various questions arising out of the Definition in I. vii. having been disposed of. In two respects especially the following discussion differs from that in B. I. (1) The object now is not so much to give a formal Definition of Happiness, as to prove its general character to be contemplative (*θεωρητική*). (2) Happiness is here considered in the abstract and in its highest ideal development, as it is found in the life of the gods, and no longer under the practical limitations by which it is modified in the life of man (vii. 8). Thus in B. I. we were frequently reminded that it was not ideal Happiness and ideal Virtue but human Happiness and human Virtue that we were in search of. (See especially I. vi. 13 and xiii. 5, 6.) Now however it is argued that human Happiness is not the highest form of Happiness (viii. 1—3, etc.). Hence while Happiness is still affirmed to consist in an active state of Excellence (*ἐν ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείαις*, vi. 8), yet, since Excellence (*ἀρετὴ*) may be either Moral or Intellectual, it is proved (ch. vii. and viii.) that the latter is superior to the former on various grounds, and especially because Moral Excellence (implying, as it does, imperfection and the liability to evil) cannot be attributed to the gods (viii. 7). Consequently the Happiness of the gods, which is naturally the highest and most perfect, must depend on Intellectual activity. Hence we conclude generally that the perfection of Happiness consists in Intellectual activity (*θεωρία*—for which see Glossary, p. xli.). Practically none but the best of men, and these only

imperfectly, can ever approach to such perfection of Happiness. Most men can never rise above that which constitutes peculiarly *human* Happiness (*εὐδαιμονία ἀνθρωπινή*, I. xiii. 5), viz. the Excellence not of the higher portion (*τὸ λόγον ἔχον*) of the Soul, but of the subordinate part (*τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν*).

Let this distinction then be borne in mind in reading these Supplementary Chapters. Aristotle has shown in the previous Books that man's Happiness in this world consists in the due regulation of his actions and passions under the control of Reason. His purpose now is to show that the most perfect Happiness consists in the full development and activity of Reason itself, unfettered by the necessity of exercising any such control over the lower nature. In a word, if we might venture on such a modernism, we might say that hitherto he has discussed the Happiness of earth; now he is describing the Happiness of heaven. (See *Supplementary Notes*.)

- 1 VI. *Εἰρημένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς τε καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονὰς, λοιπὸν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας τύπῳ διελθεῖν, ἐπειδὴ*

CHAP. VI.—*Happiness does not consist in Amusement, but in Active Excellence.*

Happi- 1, 2
ness is
a condi-
tion which
is
(1) active,

We have before proved (1) that Happiness is not a passive but an active condition; and (2) that it is a condition which

CHAP. VI.—The following is a brief outline of the argument in the next three Chapters. (Ch. vi.) Happiness having been already shown (I. vii.) to be something sought for its own sake, and it being conceivable that either Amusement or active Virtue might be alleged as answering to that description, ch. vi. is devoted to proving that not Amusement, but Active Virtue, constitutes Happiness. (Ch. vii.)

This Active Virtue, or rather Excellence, being either Moral or Intellectual, Happiness is shown to belong to the latter. (Ch. viii.) Several reasons are given for thus asserting the superiority of Intellectual over Moral Excellence; and the Chapter concludes with some remarks of practical detail.

1. *ἀρετὰς*, viz. Books II—VI. *φιλίας*, Books VIII. and IX. *ἡδονὰς*, Appendix to Book VII.

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ροῦνται βλάπτονται γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελοῦν-
 ται, ἀμελοῦντες τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῆς κτήσεως. Κατα-
 φεύγουσι δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διαγωγὰς τῶν εὐδαιμονιζο-
 μένων οἱ πολλοὶ, διὸ παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις εὐδοκιμοῦσιν 5
 οἱ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς εὐτράπελοι. ὧν γὰρ ἐφί-
 ενται, ἐν τούτοις παρέχουσι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἡδέϊς· δέονται
 4 δὲ τοιούτων. Δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν εὐδαιμονικὰ ταῦτα εἶναι διὰ
 τὸ τοὺς ἐν δυναστείαις ἐν τούτοις ἀποσχολάζειν, οὐδὲν δὲ
 ἴσως σημεῖον οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ δυναστεύ-
 ειν ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐδ' ὁ νοῦς, ἀφ' ὧν αἱ σπουδαῖαι ἐνέργειαι 10
 οὐδ' εἰ ἀγευστοὶ οὗτοι ὄντες ἡδονῆς εἰλικρινοῦς καὶ ἐλευ-
 θερίου ἐπὶ τὰς σωματικὰς καταφεύγουσιν, διὰ τοῦτο ταύ-

But Happi-
 ness cannot
 consist in
 Amusement,
 because—
 (a) Those
 who say so
 are incom-
 petent
 judges,
 knowing
 no higher
 pleasure
 than Amuse-
 ment.

sarily, or even usually, beneficial; and partly because princes
 and their associates, whose happiness the world envies, devote
 their lives to amusement. Our first object then must be to
 4 show that Happiness cannot consist in Amusement. (a) First,
 those who, as we have said, find their happiness in Amuse-
 ment have no experience of any higher pleasure. They are
 no more fit to judge therefore what pleasures are the highest
 than children are, who for the very same reason prefer Amuse-

tised merely as a duty, e.g. because necessary to health, as
 when they are prescribed to an overworked student by physi-
 cians, in which case there is an ulterior result in view and the
 remarks which follow would not apply. (See *Supplementary Note*.)

3. τῶν εὐδαιμονιζομένων οἱ πολλοὶ] 'The majority of those
 who are commonly reputed happy.' This was noticed also
 in I. v. 3.

5. οἱ ἐν ταῖς κ.τ.λ.] 'Those
 who are skilful in such pastimes,'

i.e. those who have the art of
 ministering to their amusement,
 e.g. courtiers, poets, musicians,
 court-fools, or worse characters.

5, 6. Το ἐφίενται and δέονται
 the nominative is οἱ τύραννοι.
 Το παρέχουσι the nominative is
 οἱ εὐτράπελοι.

10. σπουδαῖαι ἐνέργειαι] 'active
 states of excellence,' which may
 be either Moral or Intellectual
 (as we have often seen before).
 ἀρετὴ is here named as the source
 of the former, νοῦς as that of the
 latter, condition of activity.

τας οἰητέον αἰρετωτέρας εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ οἱ παῖδες τὰ παρ'
 5 αὐτοῖς τιμώμενα κράτιστα οἴονται εἶναι. Εὐλόγον δὴ,
 ὡςπερ παισὶ καὶ ἀνδράσιν ἕτερα φαίνεται τίμια, οὕτω
 καὶ φαύλοις καὶ ἐπιεικέσιν. Καθάπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρη-
 ται, καὶ τίμια καὶ ἡδέα ἐστὶ τὰ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τοιαῦτα 5
 ὄντα· ἐκάστῳ δὴ ἢ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἕξιν αἰρετωτάτη ἐν-
 6 ἔργεια, καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ δὲ ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν. Οὐκ ἐν
 παιδιᾷ ἄρα ἢ εὐδαιμονία· καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον τὸ τέλος εἶναι
 παιδιᾶν, καὶ πραγματεύεσθαι καὶ κακοπαθεῖν τὸν βίον
 ἅπαντα τοῦ παίξεν χάριν. Ἄπαντα γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἑτέρου 10
 ἔνεκα αἰρούμεθα πλὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας· τέλος γὰρ αὕτη.
 Σπουδάζειν δὲ καὶ πονεῖν παιδιᾶς χάριν ἡλίθιον φαίνεται
 καὶ λίαν παιδικόν· παίξεν δ' ὅπως σπουδάζῃ, κατ' Ἀνά-
 χαρσιν, ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκεῖ· ἀναπαύσει γὰρ ἔοικεν ἢ παι-
 διᾷ, ἀδυνατοῦντες δὲ συνεχῶς πονεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δέονται. 15

ment to anything else. And as there is a difference between
 the objects held in esteem by childhood and manhood, so there
 is naturally a difference between the objects held in esteem by
 5 good and bad men. The decision of good men (to whom, as
 often before, we appeal) is, that Happiness depends not on
 Amusement, but on Virtuous Action, and therefore we con-
 6 clude that it does so depend. (β) Besides, is it not absurd to
 say that we labour and toil all life long for the sake of Amuse-
 ment, as would be the case if Amusement were Happiness (or
 the Chief Good)? It is far more rational to regard Amuse-
 ment as existing for the sake of work (relaxation being some-
 times necessary) than work as existing for the sake of Amuse-

(β) Amuse-
ment is with
a view to
work, not
work with
a view to
Amusement

4. πολλάκις εἴρηται] *e.g.* I. viii. 13, and passages quoted in note there.

10. Ἄπαντα γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] Since we may say that Happiness only is desired for its own sake, and *everything* else ultimately for the

sake of Happiness, it will follow that if Happiness and Amusement are identical, *everything* we do is with a view to Amusement, which seems a *reductio ad absurdum*.

Οὐ δὲ τέλος ἢ ἀνάπαυσις γίνεται γὰρ ἔνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας. Δοκεῖ δ' ὁ εὐδαίμων βίος κατ' ἀρετὴν εἶναι οὗτος δὲ μετὰ σπουδῆς, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν παιδίᾳ. Βελτίω τε λέγομεν τὰ σπουδαῖα τῶν γελοίων, καὶ τῶν μετὰ παιδείας, καὶ τοῦ βελτίονος ἀεὶ καὶ μορίου καὶ ἀνθρώπου σπουδαιοτέρων τὴν ἐνέργειαν· ἢ δὲ τοῦ βελτίονος κρείττων καὶ εὐδαιμονικωτέρα ἤδη. Ἀπολαύσειέ τ' ἂν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν

ment: and if so Amusement ceases to be itself a final end.

(γ) Amusement has no necessary connexion with what is most noble in man.

7 (γ) Again Happiness has been shown to be dependent on Virtue. Now Virtue is a matter not of Amusement but of Earnestness, and every one admits that what is earnest is better than what is amusing, and if it be better, its practice must be nobler and more likely to lead to Happiness. This applies not only to our better, as distinguished from our lower, nature, but also to the better natures among men as distinguished from the inferior. It is clear however that if 8 Happiness should consist in Amusement, the lowest of man-

1. οὐ δὲ τέλος ἢ ἀνάπαυσις] Thus Amusement is in fact after all not even an end desired for its own sake. Recreation is needed for the sake of work, and (as Aristotle says elsewhere) the busier we are the more we need amusement.

ἐνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας] 'in order that we may be able to work.'

3. μετὰ σπουδῆς = σπουδαῖος, in its literal sense, i.e. 'serious,' or 'earnest'; see note on I. viii. 13. Compare Archbp. Whately:— 'Happiness is no laughing matter, gay spirits and love of amusement (παιδιά) are commonly spoken of as if a proof of Happiness, whereas the reverse is very often, perhaps generally, the case.' They

are in fact rather an indication of the absence of repose either of Body or Mind, for which, as Aristotle has just pointed out, Amusement acts as a sort of compensation. This does not apply to the case of children, to whom παιδιά is natural, as is admirably expressed by the etymology of the word. Compare also Addison in the *Spectator* (No. 381): 'I have always preferred Cheerfulness to Mirth. The latter I consider as an *act*, the former a *habit*, of the mind. Mirth is short and transient, Cheerfulness fixed and permanent.' (Cf. note on βίος τέλειος, I. vii. 16.)

7. ἤδη here almost = *ipso facto*.

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Εἴτε δὴ νοῦς τοῦτο, εἴτε ἄλλο τι, ὃ δὴ κατὰ φύσιν δοκεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἔννοιαν ἔχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ θείων, εἴτε θείον ὄν καὶ αὐτὸ, εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον, ἢ τούτου ἐνέργεια. κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν εἴη ἢ ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία. Ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ θεωρητικὴ, εἴρηται. 5
2 Ὅμοιολογούμενον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς πρότερον καὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ. Κρατίστη τε γὰρ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ τῶν γνωστῶν, περὶ

Excellence of the noblest part of our nature in its highest developement, whether we call it Intellect or whatever else it be which is most divine in man. Hence to prove that the highest Happiness consists in Intellectual activity we have the following arguments:—(a) Intellect is the noblest part of our

(a) It is the excellence of the noblest part of man (κρατίστη).

4. κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν] As Aristotle said in I. vii. 14, *fin.* ἕκαστον εὖ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν ἀποτελεῖται.

5. θεωρητικὴ] The student must endeavour to form a clear conception of what Aristotle means by θεωρία, θεωρητικὴ, θεωρεῖν, etc., before proceeding further. No one word in English adequately represents the idea. See Glossary under θεωρία, p. xli.

εἴρηται] The nominative is ἡ τούτου (τοῦ νοῦ) ἐνέργεια. The reference is very doubtful. Possibly, speaking from memory, Aristotle may be referring to B. VI., where the functions of νοῦς and of Intellectual Excellence generally are described.

6. καὶ τοῖς πρότερον perhaps refers to I. v. 7, where βίος θεωρητικὸς is mentioned as one of the chief types of life to which Happiness has been held to be-

long. Though Aristotle does not there assert that this is true, and in fact expressly reserves the consideration of the question, yet as he proves in that chapter that Happiness cannot belong to any of the other types of life enumerated, it may by implication be assigned to this type, viz. βίος θεωρητικός. At any rate it is only said that the statement in the text is 'consistent with' (ὁμοιολογούμενον) what was said before.

8. νοῦς has been explained in B. VI. to be the faculty by which we are capable of seeing intuitively the truth of Axioms or General Principles. These are the principles from which all demonstrative proof starts, and they are the foundations upon which all scientific knowledge rests. Thus νοῦς is the highest of our intellectual faculties, because it deals with the highest

3 ἀόνοῦς. Ἔτι δὲ συνεχεστάτη θεωρεῖν τε γὰρ δυνάμεθα
 συνεχῶς μᾶλλον ἢ πράττειν ὄτιοῦν, οἴομεθά τε δεῖν ἡδο-
 νὴν παραμεμίχθαι τῇ εὐδαιμονία, ἡδίστη δὲ τῶν κατ'
 ἀρετὴν ἐνεργειῶν ἢ κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμολογουμένως
 ἐστίν· δοκεῖ γοῦν ἡ φιλοσοφία θαύμαστὰς ἡδονὰς ἔχειν 5
 καθαριότητι καὶ τῷ βεβαίῳ, εὐλογον δὲ τοῖς εἰδόσι τῶν

3 nature, and its objects are also the noblest. (β) Intellectual activity is able to be more *continuous* than any other form of activity. (γ) *Pleasure* is confessedly an ingredient of Happiness, and the palm among pleasures, for purity and perma-

(β) It is most continuous in its activity (συνεχεστάτη).
 (γ) It has the purest and most lasting pleasure (ἡδίστη)

and most important of all truths. Moreover it does not *discover* or prove them, but it *recognizes* them, it *sees into* them (θεωρεῖ). Hence the statement made above (see the note on εἴρηται, § 1) that the operation of νοῦς is θεωρητική.

1, 2. θεωρεῖν and πράττειν are emphatic and in contrast.

3. παραμεμίχθαι] It was explained in I. viii. 10—14 in what sense Aristotle considers pleasure to be an ingredient in Happiness.

ἡδίστη δὲ κ.τ.λ.] Observe the contrast between σοφία and φιλοσοφία. The pleasures of philosophy, or the *pursuit* of Truth, are commonly thought (δοκεῖ) to be of a very high order: confessedly, therefore, the pleasure of the *possession* of Truth (σοφία) must be higher still; for possession (as he proceeds) must be better than pursuit; fruition better than aspiration. Φιλόσοφος was a title first assumed by Pythagoras

as being a more modest one than σοφός. He would not call himself 'a wise man,' but a 'lover of wisdom.'

6. εὐλογον τοῖς εἰδόσι κ.τ.λ.] 'It is reasonable to suppose that those who have attained knowledge pass their time more pleasantly than those who are still seeking it.' This, however, is a point much disputed, and the balance of general opinion is perhaps the other way. The saying of Lessing is well known: 'Did the Almighty, holding in his right hand, Truth, and in his left, Search after Truth, offer me the choice, I should prefer in all humility, but without hesitation, Search after Truth.' Pascal (*Pensées*, I. ix. 34) compares the pleasures of the acquisition and the pursuit of knowledge to the pleasures of having won a game, and of actually playing the game. Similarly Butler, (*Sermons*, xv.), 'Whoever will in the least attend to the thing will see that it is the gain-

4 ζητούντων ἡδίων τὴν διαγωγὴν εἶναι.† "Π τε λεγομένη
 αὐτάρκεια περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη· τῶν μὲν
 γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαίων καὶ σοφὸς καὶ δίκαιος καὶ οἱ
 λοιποὶ δέονται, τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις ἰκανῶς κεχορηγημένων
 ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δεῖται πρὸς οὓς δικαιοπραγήσει καὶ μεθ' ὧν, 5
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 ἕκαστος, ὁ δὲ σοφὸς καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν ὧν δύναται θεωρεῖν,
 καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν σοφώτερος ᾖ, μᾶλλον βέλτιον δ' ἴσως συν-
 5 εργοὺς ἔχων, ἀλλ' ὅμως αὐταρκέστατος. Δόξαι τ' ἂν

nence, is allowed to belong to the pleasure of the *pursuit of knowledge*. Still greater then must be the pleasure of the conscious *possession of knowledge*. (δ) Intellectual activity is most *self-sufficient* and independent of external appliances. 5 (ε) This is the only sort of activity which can be truly said to

(δ) It is most independent of circumstances (αὐταρκεσ-
 γάτη).

ing, not the having of it (knowledge), which is the entertainment of the mind.' Shakespeare again,—

'All things that are,
 Are with more pleasure chased than enjoyed.'

Superior as the pleasures of knowledge are, it may perhaps be true of them as of lower pleasures, that 'pleasure unattained is like the hare we hold in chase, . . . pleasure attained is the same hare hanging up in the sportsman's larder, disregarded, despised, dead' (Horace Smith). Or, once more, in the familiar words of Pope,

'Man never is, but always to be, blest.'

It should, however, be remembered that Aristotle uses the words 'possession of knowledge' here in reference to his own doc-

trine of *θεωρία*, i.e. an *active* fruition not a *passive* possession of it. See this fully explained in the Glossary under *θεωρία*.

3. σοφὸς is taken as the type of *διανοητικὴ ἀρετὴ*, δίκαιος καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ represent ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ.

4. *κεχορηγημένων*] See note on I. viii. 15, ἀχορήγητον ὄντα.

6. The cases of σώφρων and ἀνδρείος are further explained in § 4 of next chapter.

7. σοφὸς is not 'wise' in the popular sense, but one who has attained σοφία in the technical sense of the last section, one who has reached the goal of philosophy. The full fruition of σοφία is that *θεωρία* already explained.

9. In §§ 5-8 Aristotle in the last place argues the superiority of intellectual activity to all

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δυναστείας καὶ τιμὰς ἢ τὴν γε εὐδαιμονίαν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς
 πολίταις, ἑτέραν οὖσαν τῆς πολιτικῆς, ἣν καὶ ζητοῦμεν
 7 δῆλον ὡς ἑτέραν οὖσαν. Εἰ δὲ τῶν μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς
 πράξεων αἱ πολιτικαὶ καὶ πολεμικαὶ κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει
 προέχουσιν, αὐταὶ δ' ἄσχολοι καὶ τέλους τινὸς ἐφίενται 5
 καὶ οὐ δι' αὐτὰς αἰρεταί εἰσιν, ἢ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια
 σπουδῇ τε διαφέρειν δοκεῖ θεωρητικὴ οὖσα, καὶ παρ'
 αὐτὴν οὐδενὸς ἐφίεσθαι τέλους, ἔχειν τε ἡδονὴν οἰ-
 κείαν (αὕτη δὲ συναύξει τὴν ἐνέργειαν), καὶ τὸ αὐτάρκες
 δὴ καὶ σχολαστικὸν καὶ ἄτρυτον ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ὅσα 10
 ἄλλα τῷ μακαρίῳ ἀπονέμεται, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν
 φαίνεται ὄντα. Ἢ τελεία δὲ εὐδαιμονία αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἀν-

self or one's country power, honour, or in short Happiness. Happiness then, if an ulterior aim of political life, cannot be
 7 identified with it. Intellectual activity then unites all the qualities now enumerated, and, if it be life-long, is the perfect.

1. γε draws attention to τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. If Happiness itself is an ulterior end of the Statesman's activity, we have the clearest proof that it is not identical with it.

2. ἑτέραν οὖσαν τῆς πολιτικῆς] explained by παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι in l. 13, p. 249. The prosperity which is secured by Statesmanship is obviously something different from the practice of Statesmanship itself: even as peace, the object of war, is different from war. In θεωρία or intellectual activity there is no such result separate from the activity itself.

3. § 7 is a recapitulation. Εἰ δὲ must be understood with each

clause up to that which commences with καὶ τὸ αὐτάρκες δὴ, which is the apodosis of the sentence.

7. σπουδῇ] 'earnestness,' or 'intensity.'

9. αὕτη συναύξει τὴν ἐνέργειαν] 'This (i.e. the pleasure of it) helps to intensify the activity itself.'

10. σχολαστικὸν] 'capability of affording repose,' in reference to § 6; ἄτρυτον (from τρύω, to wear) 'freedom from weariness.' See § 3 (init.) and last chapter § 6 (fin.). ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ, 'so far as is possible for man.' Compare the limitation at the end of I. x. μακαρίους δ' ἀνθρώπους, 'happy as men.'

^ε
^ετος τοῦτο, εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον ἄτοπον οὖν γί-
 νοιτ' ἂν, εἰ μὴ τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον αἰροῖτο ἀλλὰ τινος ἄλλου.
 Τὸ λεχθέν τε πρότερον ἀρμόσει καὶ νῦν· τὸ γὰρ οἰκείου
 ἐκάστῳ τῇ φύσει κράτιστον καὶ ἡδιστόν ἐστιν ἐκάστῳ.
 Καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος, εἴπερ τοῦτο ⁵ ^{νῦν}
 μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος. Οὗτος ἄρα καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος.

¹ VIII. Δευτέρως δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν· αἱ γὰρ
 κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνέργειαι ἀνθρωπικαί· δίκαια γὰρ καὶ ἀνδρεία
 καὶ ἄλλα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους πράττομεν
 ἐν συναλλάγμασι καὶ χρεῖαις καὶ πράξεσι παντοίαις ἐν ¹⁰
 τε τοῖς πάθεσι διατηροῦντες τὸ πρέπον ἐκάστῳ. Ταῦτα δ'
² εἶναι φαίνεται πάντα ἀνθρωπικά. Ἐνία δὲ καὶ συμβαί-
 νειν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος δοκεῖ, καὶ πολλὰ συνωκειῶσθαι

this point of view no other life could be so truly natural to man, nor, by consequence, so truly happy.

CHAP. VIII.—*Secondary position of Moral Excellence.*

Conversely, ¹
 we may show
 that Moral
 Excellence
 holds a
 secondary
 place, for—
 (i) It is
 essentially
 human, and
 never can
 be more
 than this.

Thus far we have shown how Intellectual Excellence holds the first place. We can also bring positive arguments to prove that Moral Excellence as compared with it holds a secondary place in regard to Happiness. (i) First, it is essentially human, and bound up with all the imperfections of man's composite nature. In proof of this—(α) Justice, Courage, and other Moral Virtues in detail, have for the sphere of their action the circumstances of ordinary human ² life. (β) Some Moral Virtues would have no meaning apart

each man's self,' 'to constitute personality.' Not a man's features, or his body, or his appetites, or his passions, but his intellect, is his proper self, which distinguishes him from all other men, and all other beings whatsoever.


τοῦτο μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος in l. 5
 has the same meaning.

2. τινος ἄλλου is neuter, 'of something else.'

3. τὸ λεχθέν πρότερον] viz. I. ix. 5.

7. Δευτέρως δὲ . . . ἀρετὴν] Understand βίος εὐδαίμων ἐστίν.

13. πολλὰ συνωκειῶσθαι τοῖς πάθεσι] 'has many points of connexion with the feelings.'



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κεχωρισμένη τοσοῦτον γὰρ περὶ αὐτῆς εἰρήσθω διακρι-
 4 βῶσαι γὰρ μείζον τοῦ προκειμένου ἐστίν. Δόξειε δ' ἂν
 καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς χορηγίας ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἐπ' ἔλαττον δεῖσθαι
 τῆς ἠθικῆς· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων ἀμφοῖν χρεία καὶ
 ἐξ ἴσου ἔστω, εἰ καὶ μᾶλλον διαπονεῖ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὁ 5
 πολιτικὸς, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· μικρὸν γὰρ ἂν τι διαφέροι·
 πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας πολὺ διοίσει. Τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευ-
 θερίῳ δεήσει χρημάτων πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τὰ ἐλευθέρια,
 καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ δὴ εἰς τὰς ἀνταποδόσεις (αἱ γὰρ βουλή-
 σεις ἀδελφοί, προσποιοῦνται δὲ καὶ οἱ μὴ δίκαιοι βούλεσ- 10
 θαι δικαιοπραγεῖν), τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ δυνάμεως, εἴπερ ἐπι-
 τελεῖ τι τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν, καὶ τῷ σώφρονι ἐξουσίας·
 5 πῶς γὰρ δῆλος ἔσται ἢ οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις; ἁμφισ-
 βητεῖται δὲ πότερον κυριώτερον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἢ προαίρεσις

lence can never be more than merely human Happiness.
 4 ii. While under no circumstances can the body and its wel-
 fare be wholly neglected, yet Moral, as compared with Intel-
 lectual, Excellence has much greater need of external cir-
 cumstances, regarding at any rate the active exercise of each.
 Moral Virtue cannot be practised, nor Moral Character mani-
 5 fested, without favourable circumstances; and the more ex-

(ii) It is more or less dependent on external circumstances.

2. This is the converse aspect of the argument in § 4 of the last ch.

7. πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας] 'for their respective activities, there will be a great difference,' viz. for those of Moral and Intellectual Excellence.

11. δυνάμεως] 'power' or 'strength,' e.g. a cripple or paralytic could not display active courage (ἐπιτελεῖν τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν).

12. ἐξουσία] 'opportunity' or 'license to indulge.' There would be no outward difference

between the teetotaller and the drunkard if there were nothing but water to be had.

14. ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ πότερον κ.τ.λ.] The importance of intention (προαίρεσις) was insisted on in III. ii. 1, μᾶλλον τὰ ἥθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων. '(Intention) is a greater test of character than actions are.' So also in II. iv. 3, where the conditions necessary to a virtuous act were enumerated; and among them is a deliberate resolution arising from pure motives, etc.

ἢ αἱ πράξεις, ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν οὔσης. Τὸ δὲ τέλειον δῆλον·
 ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν ἀνείη. Πρὸς δὲ τὰς πράξεις πολλῶν δεύ-
 ται καὶ ὅσῳ ἀν μείζους ὡσι καὶ καλλίους, πλειόνων.
 6 Τῷ δὲ θεωροῦντι οὐδενὸς τῶν τοιούτων πρὸς γε τὴν
 ἐνέργειαν χρεία, ἀλλ' ὡς εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐμπόδιά ἐστι πρὸς 5
 γε τὴν θεωρίαν· ἢ δ' ἄνθρωπος ἐστι καὶ πλείοσι συζῆ,
 αἰρεῖται τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράττειν· δεήσεται οὖν τῶν
 7 τοιούτων πρὸς τὸ ἀνθρωπεύεσθαι. ἼΙ δὲ τελεία εὐδαι-
 μονία ὅτι θεωρητικὴ τις ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἀν
 φανείη. Τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπειλήφμεν μακα- 10
 ρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι· πράξεις δὲ ποίας ἀπονεῖμαι
 χρεῶν αὐτοῖς; πότερα τὰς δικαίας; ἢ γελοῖοι φανοῦν-

cellent the Virtue, the more numerous are the circumstances
 6 required for its full development. All such circumstances
 are to Contemplation only hindrances, even when they cannot
 7 be dispensed with. iii. Finally, only Intellectual Excellence (iii) It can-
 can be attributed to the gods: for—(a) There are no circum- not be
 stances under which they could exercise some of the Moral attributed
 to the gods.

4. Observe the limiting and emphasizing force of γε here and in l. 6.

6. ἢ δ' ἄνθρωπος κ.τ.λ.] In actual human life intellectual activity cannot rightly be severed from moral practice. So that the philosopher, like others, stands in need of these external appliances for the exercise of Virtue. He does not however need them as a philosopher, but as a man among men, nor with a view to his peculiar work, intellectual activity. On the contrary, though otherwise necessary, to it they are only impediments.

8. ἀνθρωπεύειν 'to be a man,'

ἀνθρωπεύεσθαι 'to act one's part as a man.' The same difference exists between the active and middle of many similar words, e.g. δουλεύω, πρεσβεύω, πολιτεύω, etc. So in III. vi. 12 ἀνδρίζεσθαι 'to play the man.'

9. ἐντεῦθεν] The outline of the argument is—All activity must be either πρακτικὴ, or ποιητικὴ, or θεωρητικὴ. The two former cannot be assigned to the gods who are supremely happy, and yet they live, and live actively too. Hence their activity must be θεωρητικὴ, an intellectual or contemplative activity.

ται συναλλάττοντες καὶ παρακαταθήκας ἀποδιδόντες καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα; ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους, ὑπομένοντας τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ κινδυνεύοντας, ὅτι καλόν; ἢ τὰς ἐλευθερίους; τίνι δὲ δώσουσιν; ἄτοπον δ' εἶ καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῖς νόμισμα ἢ τι τοιοῦτον. Αἱ δὲ σώφρονες τί ἂν εἶεν; ἢ φορτικὸς. 5 ὁ ἔπαινος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσι φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας; διεξιούσι δὲ πάντα φαίνοιτ' ἂν τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις μικρὰ καὶ ἀνάξια θεῶν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῆν τε πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν αὐτοὺς, καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν ὡσπερ

Virtues: (β) They have none of those moral imperfections which others presuppose: (γ) If moral activity, and *a fortiori* productive activity, be excluded, there is only intellectual activity left. Therefore the activity of the gods, whose life is essentially a most blessed one, is contemplative or intellectual.

5. φορτικὸς] 'gross,' or 'degrading'; see note on I. v. 1.

6. διεξιούσι δὲ πάντα κ.τ.λ.] Of the precise sense in which these Virtues are exercised in our experience the statement in the text is obviously true, Virtue being, as has been said, 'goodness in a state of warfare.' Whether there may not be a higher sense and a different sphere of action in which analogous Moral Virtues may be attributed to the Deity is another question, which the argument here leaves untouched. After all it is to some extent a question depending (1) on the precise meaning of the Greek words δίκαιος, σώφρων, etc., as was the case in reference to ἔπαινος being inapplicable to the gods—see I. xii. 3. Also (2) still

more on the Greek conception of the Divine nature, for which see Glossary s.v. θεός and φύσις. We may well compare Butler's argument, Anal. i. c. v. (p. 97, Angus's edition). 'Nor is our ignorance what will be the employments of that happy community, nor our consequent ignorance what particular scope or occasion there will be for the exercise of veracity, justice, and charity amongst the members of it with regard to each other any proof that there will be no sphere of exercise for those virtues. Much less, if that were possible, is our ignorance any proof that there will be no occasion for that frame of mind or character which is formed by the practice of those particular virtues and which is a result of it,' etc

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- 9 Δεήσει δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς εὐημερίας ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντι· οὐ γὰρ αὐτάρκης ἡ φύσις πρὸς τὸ θεωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὸ σῶμα ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τροφήν· καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν θεραπείαν ὑπάρχειν. Οὐ μὴν οἰητέον γε πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων δεήσεσθαι τὸν εὐδαιμονήσοντα, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ τῶν 5 ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μακάριον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τὸ αὐτάρκες οὐδ' ἡ πρᾶξις, δυνατὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ ἄρχοντα γῆς·
- 10 καὶ θαλάττης πράττειν τὰ καλά· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ μετρίων δύναιτ' ἂν τις πράττειν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν. Τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐναργῶς· οἱ γὰρ ἰδιῶται τῶν δυναστῶν οὐχ ἥττον 10 δοκοῦσι τὰ ἐπιεικῆ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον. Ἰκανὸν δὲ τοσαῦθ' ὑπάρχειν, ἔσται γὰρ ὁ βίος εὐδαίμων τοῦ
- 11 κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐνεργοῦντος. Καὶ Σόλων δὲ τοὺς εὐδαίμονας ἴσως ἀπεφαίνετο καλῶς, εἰπὼν μετρίως τοῖς ἐκτὸς κεχορηγημένους, πεπραγότας δὲ τὰ κάλλισθ', ὡς ᾤετο, 15

Happiness and Intellectual activity. And therefore again we assert that the highest Happiness is Intellectual.

- 9 To descend once more to practical details. For man this continuous activity of Intellect only is a practical impossibility. He cannot be independent of some amount of external advantages. That that amount, however, is not excessive, but moderate, theory, experience, and the teaching of the wisest among

mirable,' a characteristic proved to belong to Happiness also in I. xii.

§§ 9-13. The concluding Sections recur to some practical questions connected with the conclusion now reached: the relation of Happiness to external circumstances; the concurrence of Aristotle's theory with those of previous philosophers, and, what is still more important, with facts; the superiority of

Happiness as now defined, owing to the good-will of heaven favouring that life which is 'likest God's.'

3. τὴν λοιπὴν θεραπείαν = 'the other care that the body needs,' besides the securing of mere health and sustenance. μὴν in the next sentence is corrective. We must not take this 'θεραπεία' to include too much.

6. ὑπερβολῇ] Understand τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν.

Human Happiness cannot dispense with a moderate degree of external prosperity.

καὶ βεβιωκότας σωφρόνως· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ μέτρια κεκτη-
 μένους πράττειν ἂ δει. Ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας οὐ
 πλούσιον οὐδὲ δυνάστην ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰπὼν
 ὅτι οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσειεν εἴ τις ἄτοπος φανείη τοῖς πολλοῖς·
 οὗτοι γὰρ κρίνουσι τοῖς ἐκτός, τούτων αἰσθανόμενοι ^{μό-} 5
 12 νον. Συμφωνεῖν δὴ τοῖς λόγοις εἰκάσιν αἱ τῶν σοφῶν
 δόξαι. Πίστιν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει ^{τιγὰ,} τὸ δ'
 ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τοῦ βίου κρι-
 νεται· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τὸ κύριον. Σκοπεῖν δὴ τὰ προει-
 ρημένα χρῆ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὸν βίον ἐπιφέροντας, καὶ 10
 συναδόντων μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις ἀποδεκτέον, διαφωνούντων δὲ
 13 λόγους ὑποληπτέον. Ὁ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργῶν καὶ τοῦ-
 τοῦ θεραπεύων καὶ διακείμενος ἄριστα καὶ θεοφιλέστατος
 ἔοικεν εἶναι· εἰ γάρ τις ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ
 θεῶν γίνεται, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἴη ἂν εὐλογον χαίρειν τε 15

12 men, combine to show. Still whatever weight we may assign
 to the authority of the wise, the last appeal must be to facts,
 and to the practical experience of life. To this tribunal we
 would refer all that has been asserted in the course of this
 13 treatise. One more practical consideration we subjoin. If,
 as is generally believed, the gods regard the affairs of men,
 they will naturally love and favour those who are most like

Those whom
 the gods love
 best, viz.
 the wise, are
 naturally
 the happiest

2. Ἀναξαγόρας οὐ πλούσιον] Anaxagoras of Clazomenæ, in Ionia, resigned all his property to his relations and gave himself up to philosophical study for some thirty years at Athens.

6. τοῖς λόγοις = our definitions or theories.

7. μὲν οὖν, as usual, fixes a strong emphasis on the preceding word, and thus marks a contrast between πίστιν and τὸ ἀληθές.

‘Some ground for belief may be afforded by such a consensus, but the test of actual truth is to be derived in practical subjects from facts and from life.’ Cf. Shakespeare, *Henry V.* Act. I. Sc. i.:

So that the art and practice part of life
 Must be the mistress to this theoretic.

12. λόγους ὑποληπτέον] ‘we must take them to be mere theories.’

αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ τῷ συγγενεστάτῳ (τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ νοῦς) καὶ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας μάλιστα τοῦτο καὶ τιμῶντας ἀντευποιεῖν ὡς τῶν φίλων αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ὀρθῶς τε καὶ καλῶς πράττοντας. "Ὅτι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα τῷ σοφῷ μάλισθ' ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἄδηλον. Θεοφιλέστατος 5 ἄρα. Τὸν αὐτὸν δ' εἰκὸς καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατον ὥστε καὶ οὕτως εἴη ὁ σοφὸς μάλιστ' εὐδαίμων.

1 IX. Ἄρ' οὖν εἰ περὶ τούτων καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονῆς ἱκανῶς εἴρηται τοῖς τύποις, τέλος ἔχει οἰητέον τὴν προαίρεσιν, ἢ καθάπερ λέγεται, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν 10 τοῖς πρακτοῖς τέλος τὸ θεωρῆσαι ἕκαστα καὶ γινῶναι, ἀλ-

themselves. Such are those in whom Intellect and Wisdom are most developed. And all will admit that the greatest Happiness will be found in those whom the gods love best. Therefore from this practical point of view also, the highest Happiness is linked with Wisdom or Intellectual Activity.

CHAP. IX.—*Conclusion of the Treatise on Ethics, and transition to the Complementary Science of Politics.*

In conclu-
sion we
must apply
our theories
to practice.

1 This sketch of Virtue and subjects akin to it might now be concluded, except that no theory on such matters can be con-

CHAP. IX.—This Chapter forms a general conclusion to the whole treatise. When we turn from theory to practice, Ethics must look for some authority to enforce its injunctions on those who will not hear. Failing the intervention of the State, Parental authority must take its place. In either case a scientific study of Politics or of the principles of Statesmanship is a necessary sequel to that of Ethics, if theory is to be carried on to practice

at all. In the absence of any accessible means for such a study Aristotle proposes to write a treatise on the subject himself, and the concluding words of the Book lead us at once to the commencement of his treatise on Politics.

. 10. οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς κ.τ.λ.] Compare I. iii. 6, τὸ τέλος οὐ γινῶσις ἀλλὰ πράξις: also II. ii. 1, and many other passages.

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μένα λόγῳ μεταστήσαι. Ἀγαπητὸν δ' ἴσως ἐστὶν εἰ
 πάντων ὑπαρχόντων δι' ὧν ἐπιεικῆς δοκοῦμεν γίνεσθαι,
 6 μεταλάβοιμεν τῆς ἀρετῆς. Γίνεσθαι δ' ἀγαθοῦς οἴονται,
 οἱ μὲν φύσει, οἱ δ' ἔθει, οἱ δὲ διδαχῇ. Τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς
 φύσεως δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διὰ τινος 5
 θείας αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν ὑπάρχει· ὁ δὲ
 λόγος καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ μή ποτ' οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἰσχύη, ἀλλὰ
 δέη προδιεργάσθαι τοῖς ἔθεσι τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ ψυχὴν
 πρὸς τὸ καλῶς χαίρειν καὶ μισεῖν, ὥσπερ γῆν τὴν θρέ-
 7 ψουσάν τὸ σπέρμα. Οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσειε λόγου ἀποτρέ- 10
 ποντος οὐδ' αὖ συνέιη ὁ κατὰ πάθος ζῶν· τὸν δ' οὕτως

The acquisition of Virtue depends on Disposition, Training, Teaching.

6 Now there are three courses, as it is commonly held, by which men arrive at Virtue. (1) Natural disposition; (2) Moral training; (3) Intellectual teaching. The first is clearly beyond our control. As to the last, its influence varies in different cases, and depends on the hearer's mind having been previously prepared,
 7 like soil for the seed. Passion when supreme will not hear, and indeed cannot understand, any argument but that of force.

'firmly fixed in the character.' For a similar statement cf. II. iii. 8, χαλεπὸν ἀποτρίψασθαι πάθος ἐγκεχρωσμένον τῷ βίῳ. Also compare the expression συνειλημμένα μετὰ τῆς φαυλότητος in II. vi. 18.

4. φύσει . . . ἔθει . . . διδαχῇ] We might compare the various causes suggested in I. ix. for the acquisition of Happiness: πότερόν ἐστι μαθητὸν (= διδάχη), ἢ ἔθιστόν ἢ ἄλλως πως ἀσκητόν (= ἔθει), ἢ κατὰ τινος θείαν μοῖραν ἢ καὶ διὰ τύχην (= φύσει).

6. τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν] 'those who are in the truest sense fortunatē.' Compare III.

v. 17, τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἢ τελεία καὶ ἀληθινῇ ἂν εἴη εὐφυΐα.

7. ἡ διδαχῇ] Aristotle is perhaps led to lay stress on the inadequacy of mere intellectual teaching in Morals, on account of the undue prominence given to it by Plato, who held all Virtue to be (1) intellectual, (2) διδακτόν. The words μή ποτ' οὐ introduce the statement in a suggestive form, and almost = 'perhaps,' or 'it would seem that.'

8. προδιεργάσθαι] διεργάζομαι is similarly used by Theophrastus for the 'tilling' of land.

11. οὐδ' αὖ συνέιη] 'he could

ἔχοντα πῶς οἶόν τε μεταπείσαι ; ὅλως τ' οὐ δοκεῖ λόγῳ
 8 ὑπείκειν τὸ πάθος ἀλλὰ βία. / Δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἦθος προῦ-
 πάρχειν πῶς οἰκείου τῆς ἀρετῆς, στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ
 δυσχεραῖνον τὸ αἰσχρὸν. Ἐκ νέου δ' ἀγωγῆς ὀρθῆς
 τυχεῖν πρὸς ἀρετὴν χαλεπὸν μὴ ὑπὸ τοιούτοις τραφέν- 5
 τα νόμοις· τὸ γὰρ σωφρόνως καὶ καρτερικῶς ζῆν οὐχ
 ἦδὺ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἄλλως τε καὶ νέοις. Διὸ νόμοις
 δεῖ τετάχθαι τὴν τροφήν καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα· οὐκ
 9 ἔσται γὰρ λυπηρὰ συνήθη γινόμενα. Οὐχ ἰκανὸν δ'
 ἴσως νέους ὄντας τροφῆς καὶ ἐπιμελείας τυχεῖν ὀρθῆς, 10
 ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀνδρωθέντας δεῖ ἐπιτηδεύειν αὐτὰ καὶ
 ἐθίζεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα δεοίμεθ' ἂν νόμων, καὶ ὅλως
 δὴ περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ ἀνάγκη μᾶλλον
 10 ἢ λόγῳ πειθαρχοῦσι καὶ ζημίαις ἢ τῷ καλῷ. Διόπερ
 οἶονταί τινες τοὺς νομοθετοῦντας δεῖν μὲν παρακαλεῖν, 15
 ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ προτρέπεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ χάριν, ὡς

8 The second of the courses above named therefore alone re-
 mains : Moral training is our necessary starting-point in the
 formation of ~~moral character~~; such training moreover must
 begin in childhood, and it can only be secured by the authority
 of Law ; for it must always be a painful process till we become
 9 accustomed to it, and especially so in youth. Moreover the
 majority of men (who yield only to force and to the fear of
 punishment) need to have their conduct and occupations thus
 regulated for them not in youth only but all through life.
 10 Hence it has been thought to be the duty of a legislator to

We must
 begin with
 Moral train-
 ing, and that
 must be
 enforced by
 external
 authority.

not even understand.' See note
 on I. iv. 6 (διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν
 ἦχθαι κ.τ.λ.), and cf. οὐδ' ἔννοϊαν
 ἔχουσιν, ἀγευστοὶ ὄντες, in § 4 of
 this Chapter.

13. περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον] For,
 as Aristotle says in I. iii. 7, δια-
 φέρει δ' οὐθὲν νέος τὴν ἡλικίαν ἢ

τὸ ἦθος νεαρός· οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὸν
 χρόνον ἢ ἔλλειψις.

14. διόπερ οἶονταί τινες κ.τ.λ.]
 Ancient and modern views of
 legislation are in marked con-
 trast in this respect. See note
 on I. xiii. 3, and cf. V. xi. 1,
 ὁ νόμος ἂ μὴ κελεύει ἀπαγο-

ὡς ὑπακουσομένων τῶν ἐπιεικῶς τοῖς ἔθεσι προηγμένων, ἀπει-
 θοῦσι δὲ καὶ ἀφυστέροις οὔσι κολάσεις τε καὶ τιμωρίας
 ἐπιτιθέσθαι, τοὺς δ' ἀνιάτους ὅλως ἐξορίζειν· τὸν μὲν γὰρ
 ἐπιεικῆ καὶ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντα τῷ λόγῳ πειθαρχήσειν,
 τὸν δὲ φαῦλον ἡδονῆς ὀρεγόμενον λύπη κολάζεσθαι ὡς- 5
 περ ὑποζύγιον. Διὸ καὶ φασι δεῖν τοιαύτας γίνεσθαι τὰς
 λύπας αἰ μάλιστ' ἐναντιοῦνται ταῖς ἀγαπωμέναις ἡδοναῖς.
 11 Εἰ δ' οὖν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, τὸν ἐσόμενον ἀγαθὸν τραφῆ-
 ναι καλῶς δεῖ καὶ ἐθισθῆναι, εἴθ' οὕτως ἐν ἐπιτηδεύμασιν
 ἐπιεικέσι ζῆν καὶ μήτ' ἄκουτα μήθ' ἐκόντα πράττειν τὰ 10
 φαῦλα, ταῦτα δὲ γίγνοιτ' ἂν βιουμένοις κατὰ τινα νοῦν
 12 καὶ τάξιν ὀρθήν, ἔχουσαν ἰσχύν. Ἡ (μὲν οὖν) πατρικὴ
 πρόσταξις οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, οὐδὲ
 δὴ ὅλως ἢ ἐνὸς ἀνδρὸς, μὴ βασιλέως ὄντος ἢ τινος τοι-
 ούτου· ὁ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, λόγος ὦν 15

appeal to the nobler instincts of those in whom nature or good
 training has implanted such instincts, but to compel obedience
 from all others by pains and penalties, and, speaking gene-
 rally, by inflicting such pains as are most opposed to the
 11 offending pleasures. All this implies a guiding Intellect,
 with power to enforce its decrees. Where then is this to be
 12 found? Parental authority, and indeed that of any single
 individual, except he be an absolute monarch, lacks that

Parental
 authority
 cannot ade-
 quately en-
 force it.

ρεύει, i.e. 'quod lex non jubet
 vetat.'

2. κολάσεις τε καὶ τιμωρίας]
 For this distinction see note on
 III. v. 7.

7. αἰ μάλιστ' ἐναντιοῦνται κ.τ.λ.]
 Compare the argument in II. iii.
 4, αἰ δὲ ἰατρῆαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων
 πεφύκασιν γίνεσθαι.

11. ταῦτα δὲ γίγνοιτ' ἂν] δὲ
 marks the apodosis or conclusion
 of the sentence.

15. λόγος ὦν κ.τ.λ.] 'being a
 declaration proceeding as it were
 from wisdom and intelligence.'
 i.e. Law expresses in an imper-
 sonal form the conclusions of
 human wisdom. As expressing
 such conclusions, it commands
 our obedience, as doing so im-
 personally and in the abstract,
 it does not excite our resentment.
 Aristotle in the *Politics* describes
 Law as νοῦς ἀνευ ὀρέξεως.

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ἐπὶ μουσικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευ-
 μάτων. Ὡσπερ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐνισχύει τὰ νόμιμα
 καὶ τὰ ἔθη, οὕτω καὶ ἐν οἰκίαις οἱ πατρικοὶ λόγοι καὶ τὰ
 ἔθη, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν καὶ τὰς εὐεργε-
 σίας· προϋπάρχουσι γὰρ στέργοντες καὶ εὐπειθεῖς τῇ 5
 15 φύσει. Ἐτι δὲ καὶ διαφέρουσιν αἱ καθ' ἕκαστον παιδεῖαι
 τῶν κοινῶν, ὡσπερ ἐπὶ ἰατρικῆς· καθόλου μὲν γὰρ τῷ
 πυρέττοντι συμφέρει ἡσυχία καὶ ἀσιτία, τινὶ δ' ἴσως οὐ,
 ὃ τε πυκτικὸς ἴσως οὐ πᾶσι τὴν αὐτὴν μάχην περιτίθη-
 σιν. Ἐξακριβοῦσθαι δὲ δόξειεν ἂν μᾶλλον τὸ καθ' ἕκασ- 10
 τον ἰδίας τῆς ἐπιμελείας γινομένης· μᾶλλον γὰρ τοῦ
 προσφόρου τυγχάνει ἕκαστος. Ἄλλ' ἐπιμεληθεῖη μὲν ἂν
 ἄριστα καθ' ἕνα καὶ ἰατρὸς καὶ γυμναστής καὶ πᾶς ἄλλος
 ὃ τὸ καθόλου εἰδῶς, ὅτι πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς τοιοῖσδε τοῦ κοι-
 16 νοῦ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι λέγονταί τε καὶ εἰσίν. Οὐ μὲν 15
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐνός τινος οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει καλῶς ἐπιμελη-
 θῆναι καὶ ἀνεπιστήμονα ὄντα, τεθεαμένον δ' ἀκριβῶς τὰ
 συμβαίνοντα ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ δι' ἐμπειρίαν, καθάπερ καὶ
 ἰατροὶ ἔνιοι δοκοῦσιν ἑαυτῶν ἄριστοι εἶναι, ἑτέρῳ οὐδὲν

act on the
 same prin-
 ciples as
 those which
 should guide
 State legis-
 lation.

The special
 advantages
 so netimes
 claimed for
 private in-
 struction do
 not super-
 sede the use
 of such
 general
 knowledge.

that the moral training of society—the main object of all good
 legislation—and that of individuals must be guided by the
 same principles, and also that parental authority is to the
 family what laws are to the State. The former has indeed
 the advantage of resting upon natural affection and mutual
 15 good-will; and this home-training has the further merit that
 it can adapt its treatment better to the special circumstances
 of individuals, and that it can enter into minuter details. But
 even so it is best dealt with by those who have studied the pro-
 blem in its general form; just as the scientific physician sur-
 16 passes the empiric, although the latter may occasionally effect

9. οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν μάχην περιτί-
 θησι] 'does not impart the same
 style of fighting.' Περιτιθέναι is

similarly used in the sense of
 'conferring' or 'imparting,' with
 κράτος, τιμὴν, ἐλευθερίαν, etc.

ἂν δυνάμενοι ἐπαρκέσαι. Οὐδὲν δ' ἤττον ἴσως τῷ γε βου-
 λομένῳ τεχνικῶ γενέσθαι καὶ θεωρητικῶ ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου
 βαδιστέον εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν, κακείνο γνωριστέον ὡς ἐνδέ-
 17 χεται· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τοῦθ' αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι. Τάχα-
 δὲ καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ δι' ἐπιμελείας βελτίους ποιεῖν, εἴτε 5
 πολλοὺς, εἴτ' ὀλίγους, νομοθετικῶ πειρατέον γενέσθαι, εἰ
 διὰ νόμων ἀγαθοὶ γηνοίμεθ' ἂν. "Οὐτινα γὰρ οὐ καὶ τὸν
 προτεθέντα διαθεῖναι καλῶς οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ τυχόντος, ἀλλ'
 εἴπερ τιμῶς, τοῦ εἰδότης, ὡσπερ ἐπ' ἰατρικῆς καὶ τῶν
 18 λοιπῶν ὧν ἔστιν ἐπιμέλειά τις καὶ φρόνησις. "Ἀρ' οὖν 10
 μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτέον πόθεν ἢ πῶς νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ'
 ἂν τις; ἢ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, παρὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν;
 μόριον γὰρ ἐδόκει τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι. "Ἢ οὐχ ὅμοιον
 φαίνεται ἐπὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐπιστημῶν τε
 καὶ δυνάμεων; ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις οἱ αὐτοὶ φαίνονται 15

17 startling cures. On the same principle then we maintain that
 the best educator in private life is he who understands the
 18 general principles of legislation. Next we ask—How is such
 knowledge to be acquired? At first we should be inclined
 to answer—From Statesmen: but strange to say in Politics
 theory and practice are dissevered. Those profess to teach
 who do not practise, viz. the Sophists: others practise but do

These prin-
 ciples can-
 not be learⁿ
 at present
 either from
 Statesmen,
 who are
 empirics,

7. τὸν προτεθέντα] 'any given case that may be put before you.' This is the great point of difference between scientific and empiric knowledge. The latter may chance to achieve great success in one or two single cases (see § 16 *init.*), the former alone can deal with any case.

10. ἐπιμέλεια] 'attention' or 'practice.' See I. ix. 4, διὰ τινος μαθήσεως καὶ ἐπιμελείας.

Φρόνησις also is specially *practical* wisdom. See note on II. vi. 15 and B. VI. c. v. throughout.

13. ἐδόκει] The nominative apparently is νομοθεσία understood from νομοθετικὸς, and the reference is probably (as Grant suggests) to I. ii. 7, or it may be to VI. viii. 2.

14. ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων] See note on I. i. 4.

τὰς τε δυνάμεις παραδιδόντες καὶ ἐνεργοῦντες ἀπ' αὐτῶν,
 οἷον ἰατροὶ καὶ γραφεῖς· τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ ἐπαγγέλλονται
 μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταὶ, πράττει δ' αὐτῶν οὐδεὶς, ἀλλ'
 οἱ πολιτευόμενοι, οἱ δόξαιεν ἂν δυνάμει τινὶ τοῦτο πράτ- 5
 τειν καὶ ἐμπειρία μᾶλλον ἢ διανοία· οὔτε γὰρ γράφον-
 τες, οὔτε λέγοντες περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φαίνονται (καίτοι
 κάλλιον ἦν ἴσως ἢ λόγους δικανικούς τε καὶ δημηγορι-
 κούς), οὐδ' αὖ πολιτικούς πεποιηκότες τοὺς σφετέρους
 19 υἱεῖς ἢ τινὰς ἄλλους τῶν φίλων. Εὐλόγον δ' ἦν, εἴπερ
 ἐδύναντο· οὔτε γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄμεινον οὐδὲν κατέλι- 10
 πον ἂν, οὔθ' αὐτοῖς ὑπάρξαι προέλοιπ' ἂν μᾶλλον τῆς
 τοιαύτης δυνάμεως, οὐδὲ δὴ τοῖς φιλτάτοις. Οὐ μὴν
 μικρὸν γε ἔοικεν ἢ ἐμπειρία συμβάλλεσθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ
 ἐγίγνοντ' ἂν διὰ τῆς πολιτικῆς συνηθείας πολιτικοί· διὸ
 τοῖς ἐφιεμένοις περὶ πολιτικῆς εἰδέναί προσδεῖν ἔοικεν 15
 20 ἐμπειρίας. Τῶν δὲ σοφιστῶν οἱ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι λίαν

not profess to teach, viz. Statesmen. As to the latter, they
 seem to act by a sort of instinct and from experience rather
 than on fixed principles; they never write or speculate upon
 Politics; they cannot even train their children and their
 19 friends in their own profession, as they doubtless would if
 they could. Still we would not depreciate the value of ex-
 perience, which is an essential condition of the knowledge of
 20 Statesmanship. As to the former (viz. the Sophists), they

or from
 professed
 teachers (the
 Sophists),
 who are
 charlatans.

4. After οἱ πολιτευόμενοι under-
 stand πράττουσιν.

6. καίτοι κάλλιον κ.τ.λ.] Not
 improbably a sneer at the states-
 man and orator Demosthenes, all
 of whose writings are oratorical
 and not political.

12. οὐ μὴν μικρὸν γε κ.τ.λ.]
 This is to correct the apparent
 depreciation of the value of ex-
 perience involved in the above

censure of practical statesmen.

14. πολιτικῆς συνηθείας] 'fami-
 liarity with political life.' The
 fact that this, apart from a body
 of fixed and conscious principles
 (l. 4), makes men statesmen, is
 a proof of the importance of prac-
 tical experience.

15. προσδεῖν]. On the force
 of this compound see note on
 I. x. 9.

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συγγραμμάτων γίνεσθαι. Καίτοι πειρῶνται ~~γε~~ λέγειν οὐ μόνον τὰ θεραπεύματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς ἰαθεῖεν ἂν καὶ ὡς δεῖ θεραπεύειν ἑκάστους, διελόμενοι τὰς ἕξεις. Ταῦτα δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἐμπείροις ὠφέλιμα εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δ' ἀνεπιστήμοσιν ἀχρεῖα. Ἴσως οὖν καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ συναγωγαὶ τοῖς μὲν δυναμένοις θεωρῆσαι καὶ κρίναι τί καλῶς ἢ τούναντίον καὶ ποῖα ποίοις ἀρμόττει, εὐχρηστ' ἂν εἴη· τοῖς δ' ἄνευ ἕξεως τὰ τοιαῦτα διεξιούσι τὸ μὲν κρίνειν καλῶς οὐκ ἂν ὑπάρχουσι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα αὐτόματον, εὐσυνετώτεροι δ' εἰς ταῦτα τάχ' ἂν γέ-
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22 Παραλιπόντων οὖν τῶν προτέρων ἀνερεύνητον τὸ περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας, αὐτοὺς ἐπισκέψασθαι μᾶλλον βέλτιον ἴσως, καὶ ὅλως δὲ περὶ πολιτείας, ὅπως εἰς δύναμιν ἢ
 23 περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα φιλοσοφία τελειωθῆ· Πρῶτον μὲν 15

laws can never make a man a Statesman. The most we can say is that such a study may be useful to those who have already gained something of the Statesman's mind.

Hence we propose to investigate the subject of Politics for ourselves.

22 The field then is still open: a fresh and independent investigation of the true principles of Statesmanship is called for to complete the subject of the Science of Human Life. We propose therefore to undertake such an investigation,
 23 availing ourselves of the labours of our predecessors in that

1. *συγγραμμάτων*] 'treatises,'—not, as it is sometimes translated, 'prescriptions'—as is clear from what follows.

10. *εὐσυνετώτεροι*] 'more intelligent.' Though the study of medical treatises, or of collections of laws, can never make men physicians or statesmen, it may make them more intelligent and 'appreciative' in such subjects respectively.

15. *ἢ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα φιλοσοφία*] This term was considered by Aristotle to include Ethics, Economics, and Politics—three practical Sciences dealing with the life and conduct of man in reference to himself, to his family, and to society respectively. The subject of Economics, though not mentioned here, occupies the first Book of the so-called 'Politics' of Aristotle.

οὐν εἴ τι κατὰ μέρος εἴρηται καλῶς ὑπὸ τῶν προγενε-
 στέρων πειραθῶμεν ἐπελθεῖν, εἶτα ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων
 πολιτειῶν θεωρήσαι τὰ ποῖα σώζει καὶ φθείρει τὰς
 πόλεις καὶ τὰ ποῖα ἐκάστας τῶν πολιτειῶν, καὶ διὰ τίνας
 αἰτίας αἱ μὲν καλῶς, αἱ δὲ τοῦναντίον πολιτεύονται. 5
 θεωρηθέντων γὰρ τούτων τάχ' ἂν μᾶλλον συνίδοιμεν καὶ
 ποῖα πολιτεία ἀρίστη, καὶ πῶς ἐκάστη ταχθεῖσα, καὶ
 τίσι νόμοις καὶ ἔθεσι χρωμένῃ. Λέγωμεν οὖν ἀρξά-
 μενοι.

field, as well as of the experience supplied by constitutions that have already existed. Hence we may perhaps gather what is the most perfect form of government, and also what laws and customs are best suited to each particular form.

2. συνηγμένων πολιτειῶν] 'collections of constitutions;' in reference to such συναγωγὰι as are mentioned above in § 21; or else, as some suppose, in reference to a collection framed by Aristotle himself. Fragments said to belong to such a work still exist.

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Hence in IV. ix. 8 Aristotle denies that *ἐγκράτεια* is, strictly speaking, a Virtue, but only *ἀρετή τις μικτή*.

The distinction given in the Notes between *ἀκόλαστος* and *ἀκρατής* may be further illustrated by the statement in VII. viii. 1, *ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος οὐ μεταμελητικός . . . ὁ δὲ ἀκρατής μεταμελητικός πᾶς*. Also *ἀκολασία* is described as *συνεχῆς πονηρία* like consumption, etc., *ἀκρασία* as *οὐ συνεχῆς* like epilepsy, etc.

P. 12, I. iv. 4. *ἐπιπολαζούσας*] The former of the two explanations given in the Notes seems preferable, viz., that which is 'obvious,' or 'on the surface,' = Latin '*in promptu esse*.' This suits the two other places where the expression occurs in the *Ethics*, viz., I. v. 4, IV. viii. 4. Also the phrase *ἐπιπολῆς εἶναι* occurs in *Rhet.*, etc., in the sense of 'to be obvious.'

— 5. What is stated in the note on *γνωρίμων . . . διττῶς* is not only true of 'a being of more perfect knowledge,' but also of ourselves in the higher and more advanced stages of our knowledge. As Grote says, 'Even facts are then employed, directed, modified, by an acquired intellectual capital, and by the permanent machinery of universal significant terms in which that capital is invested.' Compare the distinction in the text with that drawn by Pope, *Essay on Man*, iv. 361-2, between Human and Divine *Love*:—

'God loves from whole to parts: but human soul
Must rise from individual to the whole.'

P. 13, I. iv. 6. As a further illustration of the necessity of personal experience for the appreciation of Moral facts or ideas, add John vii. 17, 'If a man *will do* (*θέλη ποιεῖν*) his will he shall *know* of the doctrine.'

P. 15, I. iv. 7. *Ὡς δὲ μηδέτερον, i.e.* neither the *ὅτι* nor the *διότι*. The lines from Hesiod which follow are embodied by Livy (xxii. 29), in a speech of Minucius when acknowledging his bad treatment of Fabius.

P. 16, I. v. 3. *βοσκημάτων βίον προαιρούμενοι*] Compare *Hamlet*, Act iv. Sc. iv.—

— 'What is a man,
If his chief good and market of his time
Be but to sleep and feed?—a beast, no more.'

P. 17, I. vi. 5. *θέσιν διαφυλάττων*] Perhaps it would be more correct to give *θέσις h.l.* the more technical sense of a 'paradox,' which is assigned to it by the Definition in *Topics*, I. ii., *θέσις ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις παράδοξος τῶν γνωρίμων τινὸς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν*.

— 7. *ἐγκυκλίαις*] Cf. *Pol.* I. vii. 2, where *ἐγκύκλια διακονήματα* are the ordinary daily duties of slaves.

P. 37, I. vii. 20. The explanation of '*ἀρχαὶ* derived from 'experience'

given in the notes, is different from that adopted in the earlier edition, and, I believe, more correct. Under any circumstances, ἐπαγωγή *h.l.* is not to be confused with the logical process of Induction, which (1) itself starts from ἀρχαί, and does not give them; and (2) is a process to which θεωροῦνται (denoting immediate apprehension) would not apply. Ἀρχή here is simply 'what one starts with,' not necessarily (as in I. iv. 5) 'a general principle' (see Glossary, *s.v.* ἀρχή). It *may* be 'a general principle,' as in Mathematics, which a reference to (sometimes) a single fact of experience is sufficient to establish without further or formal proof. Such a reference to experience would be ἐπαγωγή in the sense of this passage. Or it *may* be a simple fact, as the facts of observation in Physics and other *a posteriori* sciences, where again no further proof is required, *e.g.* 'This body falls with a definite accelerating velocity;' or as in Morals (so this passage asserts), *e.g.* 'This action is right,' or 'This approves itself to me,' or *vice versa*.

P. 37, I. vii. 21. Μετιέναι δὲ κ.τ.λ.] Observe the generality and vagueness of this word (lit. 'to go after'), as also of θεωρεῖν ('viewed' or 'perceived'), and of ἀλλὰ δ' ἄλλως. Aristotle's object here is not to enter upon the thorny subject of the nature of the evidence on which ἀρχαί rest, but only to insist on the *negative* point, that at any rate there is never *demonstrative* proof or a direct establishment of the διότι. Grote (*Fragments*, p. 131) translates, 'We ought in all our investigations to look after the ἀρχή in the way which the special nature of the subject requires, and be very careful to define it well.'

P. 42, I. viii. 12. It may be worth while to quote at length the passage in *Ecce Homo* referred to in the note:—'Those who think that we should not make pleasure our chief object, yet commonly maintain that he who lives best will actually attain the greatest amount and the best kind of pleasure. . . . The practical objection to Epicureanism is not so much that it makes pleasure the *summum bonum*, as that it recommends us to keep this *summum bonum* always in view. For it is far from being universally true that to get a thing you must aim at it. There are some things which can only be gained by renouncing them. . . . Now a practical survey of life seems to show that pleasure in its largest sense—a true and deep enjoyment of life—is also not to be gained artificially. . . .' So Mill, *Autobiography*, p. 142: 'Those only are happy (I thought) who have their minds fixed on some object other than their own happiness. . . . Aiming at something else, they find happiness by the way. . . . Ask yourself whether you are happy and you cease to be so.' [The same is true of *bodily* health, etc.]

P. 54, I. x. 11. τὰς τύχας οἶσει . . . τετράγωνος] Cf. Dante, *Par.* xvii. 24, 'Ben tetragono ai colpi di ventura.'

— 12. διαλάμπει τὸ καλὸν] Cf. a similar metaphor in Shakespeare's *Taming of the Shrew*, Act iv. Sc. iii.—

'And as the sun breaks through the darkest clouds,
So honour peereth in the meanest habit.'

P. 58, I. xi. 4. προὔπαρχειν . . . ἢ πράττεσθαι] This corresponds with the distinction in Hor. *A. P.* 179, 'Aut agitur res in scenis aut acta refertur.' Compare the use of προὔπαρχειν in IV. ii. 14, also in *Rhet.* I. ii. 2. Aristotle describes unartificial proofs as being ὅσα μὴ δι' ἡμῶν πεπόρισται ἀλλὰ προὔπηρχεν. In the *Poetics* Aristotle several times refers to incidents which are ἔξω τῆς τραγωδίας, or ἔξω τοῦ δράματος (cf. esp. the phrase ὅσα πρὸ τοῦ γέγονεν, in xv. 7), and gives precepts for the management of such incidents, which rest on the fact noticed in this passage, viz., that they make a less distinct impression upon us; e.g. in reference to such incidents, a *deus ex machina* is less objectionable (xv. 7): improbability generally is more admissible, e.g. the circumstances connected with the murder of Laius and the marriage of Jocasta by Œdipus (xv. 7; cf. xiv. 6).

— 5. συλλογιστέον] Owing to the almost invariably technical use of this word in Aristotle for a logical conclusion or inference, this passage is frequently translated, 'we must conclude.' This does not however suit the general context, or the combination of particles δὴ καί. It should be rather, 'we must take into our calculation then this difference also,' viz., the difference resulting from our being present to, or absent from, the scene of action, as well as the difference in weight among troubles themselves, even when we *are* present. On this latter difference cf. x. 12. This sense of συλλογίζεσθαι occurs in Hdt. ii. 148, and in a passage still more closely parallel in Dem. *de Fals. Leg.* p. 356, ἐπειδὴν τοὺς καιροὺς συλλογισηταί τις ἐφ' ὧν ἐγράφη, καὶ τὰς ὑποσχέσεις, κ.τ.λ.

P. 59, I. xii. 1. Thus these three classes of Goods correspond to those in vii. 4, δυνάμεις being good as means; τίμια good always *per se* as ends; ἐπαινετὰ good *per se* as ends, and also good as means. In § 2, τὸ ποῖόν τι εἶναι refers to the former condition of ἐπαινετὰ, and τὸ πρὸς τι πῶς ἔχειν to the latter.

P. 62, I. xiii. 8. ἐξωτερικὸς] Besides the explanations of this word given in the note two others deserve notice—(1) It has been thought to mean simply any discourse or treatise *other than* that in hand. (2) Grote (*Aristotle*, i. 69) maintains the view that it means *outside* the regular method of Philosophy; i.e. discussion conducted in the method

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Thro' life 'tis followed, ev'n at life's expence;
 The merchant's toil, the sage's indolence;
 The monk's humility, the hero's pride;
 All, all alike, find reason on their side.'

Also by La Rochefoucauld (quoted by Pattison, *l.c.*), 'Il n'y a pas de violente passion qui n'ait sa raison pour s'autoriser.' Again, the 'so-called dictates of conscience and reason are sometimes only passions in the form of a syllogism' (Ugo Foscolo). In B. VII. c. iii. Aristotle explains at length how Reason may help a man to go wrong *selon les règles*.

P. 95, II. vi. 17, etc. The refutation of the misconceptions of Aristotle's theory contained in these sections affords an answer also to another objection sometimes brought against it, that it makes the difference between Virtue and Vice to be *quantitative* only, and not *qualitative*; a question of *degree* merely, and not of *kind*; so that Virtue is a little more or less of Vice, and Vice a little more or less of Virtue; or, as it has also been put, that 'Virtue is only Vice a little exaggerated or a little controlled.' Take the following illustration:—Excess or defect of temperature will (so to speak) destroy Water by converting it either into Steam or Ice; a moderate degree (though within considerable limits) will preserve it in the form of Water: but Water is not a little more Ice or a little less Steam. The difference, though *quantitative* in respect of temperature, is *qualitative* in respect of the resulting material. So Virtue differs from Vice *qualitatively*, and is not Vice increased or Vice diminished, though in respect of the *πάθη* and *πράξεις*, with which they deal, the difference may be mainly, or even wholly, *quantitative*.

P. 97, II. vii. This proof of the Definition of Virtue (as explained in the Notes) is a good instance of 'Inductio per Enumerationem simplicem,' or (as it is sometimes called) 'Perfect Induction': since if the Catalogue of Virtues is complete, all the possible cases to which the Conclusion can refer have been examined in the Premisses. By the same method, any general proposition relating to a *limited and ascertainable* number of cases may be established, as, *e.g.*, 'all the Popes (until the present) have reigned less than twenty-five years.'

P. 99, II. vii. 3. 'Ἐλλείποντες δέ] In VII. ix. 5 it is stated that *ἀκρασία* and *ἐγκράτεια*, like *ἀκολασία* and *σωφροσύνη*, are defective in a third related term, and for a similar reason.

P. 101, II. vii. 8. ἐπιδικάζονται] A legal term, relating to a double claim for some disputed object. Similarly, in IV. iv. 4, *ὡς ἐρήμης ἔοικεν ἀμφισβητεῖν τὰ ἄκρα*. Still it is clear that if there is Excess and Defect there *must be* a Mean, else how could the transition occur from the one

to the other of these extremes? If the balance has turned, there must have been a point when it was even. This is admirably put by Pope (*Essay on Man*, ii. 207, etc.), when, speaking of 'extremes,' he says—

'Tho' each by turns the other's bound invade,
As in some well-wrought picture light and shade,
And oft so mix, the diff'rence is too nice,
Where ends the virtue or begins the vice.
Fools! who from hence into the notion fall,
That vice or virtue there is none at all.'

P. 104, II. vii. 15. ὁ δὲ ἐπιχαιρέκακος, κ.τ.λ.] It should be noted that Aristotle corrects himself on this point in *Rhet.* II. ix. 5, 'Ὁ γὰρ αὐτός ἐστιν ἐπιχαιρέκακος καὶ φθονερός. In fact, they are (to borrow his illustration in c. xiii.) like the convex and concave sides of a circumference, τῷ λόγῳ δύο ἀχώριστα πεφυκότα. The true defect of the feeling of *νέμεσις* would be a sort of moral indifference, such as is typified in the popular (though perverted) conception of 'a Gallio.' Also we might illustrate the feeling implied in *νέμεσις* by Ps. lxxiii. 3, etc., 'I was grieved at the wicked; I do also see the ungodly in such prosperity.' In the present day the recognition of the virtuous side of Resentment (*νέμεσις*), as well as that of Anger, Self-Esteem, and perhaps Ambition, has rather fallen into the background. (See further, note p. 238.) The following passage from Dr. Abbott's most suggestive *Bible Lessons* (p. 175), on the Virtue of Resentment, is worth quoting:—'Anger is indifferent, being sometimes right and sometimes wrong; vindictiveness gives a selfish character to anger, and is always wrong. But there is an anger that is always right, such as one feels at the sight of cruelty, injustice, and oppression, a moral recoil of sentiment from evil.' After pointing out the etymological significance of Resentment as 'recoil of sentiment,' he proceeds, 'Resentment then is a Virtue, and a man who feels no resentment at the sight of injustice is destitute of a true sense of sin. There is almost as great a deficiency of resentment in the world as there is an excess of vindictiveness.'

It may be worth while to compare the *νέμεσις* of Aristotle with Resentment as depicted by Bishop Butler, and to contrast both with Anger in its legitimate manifestation by the *πρᾶος*, as in *Eth.* IV. c. v.

Νέμεσις, both in *Eth.* and *Rhet.*, is emphatically connected with the undeserved *prosperity* of the wicked, rather than with the mere *fact* of their turpitude. See esp. *Rhet.* II. ix. 1, 7. Hence (1) it 'marches with' Envy; (2) it is in some sense the converse to Pity, which is aroused by undeserved *adversity* (*Rhet.* II. ix. 1).

Resentment is (according to Butler) of two kinds, 'Sudden Anger,' and 'Settled Resentment.' The latter is Resentment proper, and in that aspect it is aroused 'not by natural but moral evil,' not by suffering, pain, or loss, but by injury; 'it is never occasioned by harm as distinct from injury.' So again, 'its natural object is one who has been in a *moral* sense injurious to oneself or others.'

Anger, on the other hand, (1) may be aroused (as Butler says) by mere harm as distinct from injury; [though no doubt the 'harm' is often spontaneously assumed to be also 'injury.' Cf. *Eth.* V. viii. 10, ἐπὶ φαινομένην ἀδικίαν ἢ ὀργή ἐστιν, also VII. vi. 1, ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἢ ἡ φαντασία, ὅτι ὕβρις ἢ ὀλιγωρία, ἐδήλωσεν ὁ δὲ [θυμὸς] ὥσπερ συλλογισάμενος ὅτι δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ πολεμεῖν χαλεπαίνει δὴ εὐθύς]; (2) it is more of a *personal* feeling [Aristotle's *Rhet.* II. ii. 1, ἔστω ἡ ὀργή ὀρεξις μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας φαινομένης διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν τῶν εἰς αὐτὸν ἢ εἰς αὐτοῦ τινα μὴ προσηκόντως. So, *ib.* II. iv. 30, Ὀργή ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτόν. Compare Butler, Sermon viii. p. 437, ed. Angus]; (3) 'its reason and end (says Butler) is to prevent and resist sudden force, violence, and opposition, considered merely as such.' Similarly, Aristotle (*Eth.* IV. v. 6) notes that in its absence a man is not ἀμυντικός.

In *Rhet.* II. iv. 31, etc., Aristotle describes the feeling of μῖσος, in contrast with ὀργή, in terms which bring it into close resemblance to Butler's Resentment, e.g. ὀργή περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, . . . τὸ δὲ μῖσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη τὸν γὰρ κλέπτην μισεῖ καὶ τὸν συκοφάντην ἅπασ· καὶ τὸ μὲν λατὸν χρόνῳ (cf. *Eth.* IV. v. 8, etc.) τὸ δ' ἀνίατον—καὶ τὸ μὲν λύπης ἔφεσις, τὸ δὲ κακοῦ—Ὁ μὲν ὀργιζόμενος λυπεῖται ὁ δὲ μισῶν οὐ, κ.τ.λ.

P. 106, II. viii. 2. ἀνδρείος . . . πρὸς τὸν θρασὺν δειλός] As, for instance, Fabius in the estimate of Minucius: 'Pro cunctatore segnem, pro cauto timidum, affingens vicina virtutibus vitia, compellabat' (Livy, xxii. 12 *fin.*)

P. 107, II. viii. 7. Speaking generally, we may say that the Excess is better when the Virtue mostly relates to the *encouragement* of the Feeling with which it is concerned, and the Defect when the Virtue mostly relates to its *repression*.

P. 110, II. ix. 4. We might illustrate εὐκατάφοροι *h.l.* by an expression applied in Athenæus to Chæremon, that he was ἐπικατάφορος ἐπὶ τὰ ἀνθη, i.e. 'fond of dwelling on descriptions of flowers.'

P. 111, II. ix. 8. ὁ μὲν μικρὸν, κ.τ.λ.] Hence it follows that the Virtuous mean is not like a straight line without breadth, but a moderately wide path, not to be too closely defined, although after all—

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definite and positive than that of a Voluntary act. Hence Involuntary is investigated first (as in Book V. Injustice is discussed before Justice, cf. V. i. 8), and this Definition of 'Voluntary' simply *excludes* the two conditions which have been shown to constitute Involuntariness, viz., βία and ἡ καθ' ἑκάστα ἀγνοια. The words οὐ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ refer to the former, and εἰδότε τὰ καθ' ἑκάστα ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις to the latter. In V. viii. 6, 7, Involuntary acts βία are described as ἀτυχήματα, those δι' ἀγνοίαν as ἀμαρτήματα.

The supplementary §§ 21, etc., contain an argument similar to that in §§ 11, etc. : as it was there shown that the *violence* of pleasure is not such as to constitute the involuntariness of *compulsion*, so it is contended here that the *blindness* of passion or desire does not constitute the involuntariness of *ignorance*.

P. 123, III. i. 25. ἀκούσια λυπηρὰ] This is true in all cases, for ἀκούσια βία are of course λυπηρὰ at the moment (κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν, § 6), and ἀκούσια δι' ἀγνοίαν are ἐπὶ λυπα (§ 13) as soon as we discover what we have done.

— 27. φευκτά μὲν] The converse of the argument from δεῖ in § 24. In that case we ought to *do* something; in this case we ought to *avoid* something.

Ἄτοπον δὴ, κ.τ.λ.] The reason for this assertion seems to be that so many of our actions proceed rather from unreasoning impulse than conscious and deliberate purpose, that we should have to relegate too large a proportion of our lives to the sphere of involuntary action on the supposition in question. The opponent's contention would prove too much, as in § 22. Τὰ ἀλογα πάθη refer to θυμὸς and ἐπιθυμία; cf. *Rhet.* I. x. 8, ἀλογοὶ δὲ ὀρέξεις, ὀργὴ καὶ ἐπιθυμία.

P. 124, III. ii. 3. Compare I. xiii. 18, τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὀλως ὀρεκτικὸν, which shows that ἐπιθυμία falls under ὀρέξις as its genus.

P. 125, III. ii. 6. It is difficult to find a precise equivalent for θυμὸς, but we can gather its meaning (1) from Plato's use of θυμὸς or τὸ θυμοειδὲς as the element of Spirit, or Will, or Resolution, or whatever it may be called, which gives practical effect to the abstract decisions of Reason, in its conflict with the ἐπιθυμιαί, and causes the man's action to follow *it* rather than *them*; (2) From Aristotle's use of the word elsewhere, e.g. the description of the Spurious Courage of θυμὸς (High Spirit or Impetuosity) in III. viii. 10, etc.; also the opposition of impulsive to deliberate action, τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ . . . τὰ ἐκ προνοίας, *Eth.* V. viii. 9; also from its occasional interchange with ὀργή, e.g. *Rhet.* I. x. 8, etc.,

Eth. III. i. 24, V. viii. 9; also from the greater evil of ἀκρασία τοῦ θυμοῦ as compared with ἀκρασία τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, *Eth.* VII. vi. (cf. II. iii. 10, χαλεπώτερον ἡδονῇ μάχεσθαι ἢ θυμῷ). Hence I have ventured, though with much hesitation, to translate it *h.l.* 'Spirit,' in the sense of an impulsive and resolute, but unreflecting, source of action. St. Hilaire, though translating the word by 'colère' in i. 27, paraphrases it in this chapter 'la passion que le cœur inspire.'

P. 131, III. iii. 11-13. θέμενοι τέλος τι . . . ἀφιστανται] Shakespeare has described the process similarly in 2 *Henry IV.* Act I. Sc. iii.—

'When we mean to build,
We first survey the plot, then draw the model;
And when we see the figure of the house,
Then must we take the cost of the erection;
Which if we find outweighs ability,
What do we then, but draw anew the model
In fewer offices; or, at least, desist
To build at all?'

P. 136, III. iv. 4. In technical language, the σπουδαῖος is related to τάληθές as the *causa cognoscendi*, not the *causa essendi*. Such a relation is similar to that claimed by the Vatican Council towards Papal Infallibility, as *declaring*, but not *constituting*, the Popes infallible.

P. 137, III. v. 1. As a further illustration of Plato's theory of the involuntary error of Vice, we might say that he regards a vicious choice as like that of a man who should take poison mistaking it for wholesome medicine. *At the time* he takes what he thinks is good for him, though it is in reality bad. He does not however choose it as such, and so he commits not a 'crime,' but a 'blunder,' which, in Plato's estimate at any rate, was better. Aristotle, in V. ix. 6, adopts language very similar to that of Plato, when he says οὔτε γὰρ βούλεται οὐθὲις δὲ μὴ οἶεται εἶναι σπουδαῖον. So also in *Rhet.* I. x. 8.

P. 138, III. v. 4. οὐδεὶς ἐκῶν πονηρός, κ.τ.λ.] It should be noted that πονηρός has the double sense of 'wretched' and 'wicked' (compare 'cattivo' in Italian),—language, in this and many other words, reflecting the natural tendency to connect physical and moral imperfections. The former sense was doubtless intended by the unknown author of the line quoted in the text, as the antithesis with μάκαρ would show.

P. 139, III. v. 7-15. The general argument of these sections is that legislators never punish except for what is voluntary, and they are so careful about this as to follow up to their sources vicious acts, which might seem *prima facie* involuntary, and if they can trace them, however remotely, to an *avoidable* cause, they treat them as voluntary, and

punish accordingly. So fully, therefore, do *mankind generally* hold the voluntariness of Vice, that we are treated as responsible not only for our immediate actions, but also for all the demonstrable and inevitable results of our actions, however little we may have contemplated those results. If we fire a train of gunpowder, we are responsible for the damage done at the other end, though it may be far beyond our reach.

P. 143, III. v. 17. δ παρ' ἐτέρου . . . εὐφύτα] Compare *Poet.* c. xxii. § 9, μόνον γὰρ τοῦτο [τὸ μεταφορικὸν εἶναι] οὔτε παρ' ἄλλου ἔστι λαβεῖν, εὐφύτας τε σημείων ἔστιν.

P. 147, III. vi. 10. ὑπόγυια δντα] Lambinus translates, 'iis impendentibus atque instantibus quæ mortem afferunt.' The following illustrations are in favour of the interpretation 'handy,' or 'close at hand,' rather than 'sudden.' In *Pol.* VII. (VI.) viii. 3, Commerce is said to be ὑπογυιότατον πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν, the readiest or most handy means for securing independence. And *Rhet.* II. iii. 12, κεχρονικότες, καὶ μὴ ὑπόγυιοι τῇ ὀργῇ δντες· παύει γὰρ ὀργὴν ὁ χρόνος, where ὑπόγυιος means 'while they are still close at hand to the feeling of anger': 'quum non recentes ab ira sumus' (Muretus). [Compare τῷ παθεῖν δτι ἐγγυτάτω κείμενον, *Thuc.* III. xxxviii. 1.]

Twice in the *Rhet.* (I. i. 7, II. xxii. 11) the adverbial phrase ἐξ ὑπογυίου occurs = 'suddenly,' 'on the spur of the moment.' It seems probable that Aristotle would have employed it here if that had been the sense intended. His meaning seems rather to be that courage is exercised not only when death actually occurs, but also in dangers like those of war, when it appears imminent or close at hand, even if it be ultimately escaped. Thus a prisoner may be actually led out ὡς ἐπὶ θάνατον, or βάσανον, and even if he were released unhurt, might have displayed courage as genuine as if he had actually died. The passage will thus be very similar to that in *Rhet.* II. v. 2, where, after defining those things which are, strictly speaking, φοβερά, Aristotle adds, καὶ τὰ σημεία τῶν τοιούτων φοβερά· ἐγγυὲς γὰρ φαίνεται τὸ φοβερόν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔστι κίνδυνος, φοβεροῦ πλησιασμός.

P. 148, III. vii. 1, 2. Compare *Macbeth*, Act I. Sc. vii.—

'I dare do all that may become a man;
Who dares do more is none.'

P. 150, III. vii. 7, 8. Observe the two characteristics of the θρασύς here indicated—(1) his excess of confidence (§ 7); (2) his desire to *display* his courage; he wishes 'to appear unto men' to be brave (§ 8). So

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of *facility of retreat* in diminishing the courage of soldiers: 'Et propinqua Cremonensium mœnia, quanto plus spei ad effugium, tanto minorem ad resistendum animum, dabant.'

— 6. κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου] Another illustration of this might be found in the strange and dazzling costumes adopted by the Samnites, in B.C. 308, to strike terror into the Romans. The Dictator Papirius Cursor forewarned his troops of the unreality of such a display, 'horridum militem esse debere . . . illa prædam verius quam arma esse,' etc.— (Livy ix. 40.)

P. 156, III. viii. 11. θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα . . . προορῶντα] Compare Shakespeare, *Ant. and Cleop.* Act III. Sc. xiii.—

'To be furious

Is to be frightened out of fear; and in that mood,
The dove will peck the estridge; and I see still,
A diminution in our captain's brain
Restores his heart.'

— 12. φυσικωτάτη, κ.τ.λ.] In reference to the comparative amount of the elements of θυμὸς and προαίρεσις in Courage, Professor Mahaffy (*Rambles in Greece*, p. 146) remarks that the ordinary Greek Courage involved more θυμὸς than accords with our notions, but that these again seem to allow more of that element than Aristotle's ideal of Courage. [See Introduction, p. xxxvi, etc., and note on ix. 4.] Greek generals, instead of advising coolness, specially incite to rage, ὀργῇ προσμίξωμεν, etc., as if a man not in this state would be sure to estimate the danger and run away.

P. 158, III. viii. 16. ἀξίωμα] In *Pol.* II. v. 25, οἱ μηδὲν ἀξίωμα κεκτημένοι ['peu jaloux de leur dignité' (St. Hilaire)] are opposed to θυμοειδεῖς καὶ πολεμικοὶ ἄνδρες. See *inf.* p. 234 *fin.*, on the advantage gained by even the χαῦνος in this respect.

P. 161, III. ix. 6. ἔτοιμοι γὰρ οὗτοι κ.τ.λ.] Like the 'Luculli miles in Horace *Ep.* II. ii. 26-40.

P. 162, III. x. 3. φιλομύθους καὶ διηγητικούς, κ.τ.λ.] This seems to be precisely the type of character assigned to the Athenians in Acts xvii. 21, 'who spend their time in nothing else but to hear and tell some new thing.'

P. 169, III. xii. 3. δόξειε δ' ἄν, κ.τ.λ.] The former of the cases mentioned in the note would, in fact, be exactly that of Falstaff in his well-known soliloquy on Honour, 1 *Henry IV.* Act v. Sc. 1; or again in Sc. 3 (*fin.*), 'Give me life: which if I can save, so; if not, honour comes unlooked for, and there's an end.'

P. 171, III. xii. 6. The absence of *κόλασις*, indicated by the word *ἀκόλαστος*, is expressed by the Latin 'improbus.' Compare with this passage I. iii. 7, where those who live *κατὰ πάθος* are described as children in character.

P. 182, IV. i. 30-32. A good illustration of this better type of *ἄσωτος* will be found in Timon of Athens, as depicted by Shakespeare in the first two Acts of the play. Compare especially with § 31 *fin.* Timon's reflection in Act II. Sc. ii.—

'No villainous bounty yet hath pass'd my heart;
Unwisely, not ignobly, have I given.'

Dante also recognises two somewhat similar classes of Prodigals, whose moral turpitude he considers to be so different that he places those corresponding to Aristotle's better type (§ 31) in the fourth circle of Hell, but the latter in the seventh circle, ranking them, in fact, with the Suicides. Cf. *δοκεῖ δ' ἀπώλειά τις αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἡ τῆς οὐσίας φθορά, ὡς τοῦ ζῆν διὰ τούτων ὄντος* (§ 5). He also connects the Vice of the former with *ἀκρασία*, that of the latter with *κακία* (*Inf.* xi. 70, etc.)

P. 188, IV. ii. *Μεγαλοπρέπεια*. I am inclined now, on the whole, to prefer the translation 'Magnificence' for *μεγαλοπρέπεια*. That word is not, it is true, in our usage limited to the expenditure of money; but, on the other hand, it is not so restricted to the notion of mere amount as *Munificence* would seem to be. It is important to observe that the *conspicuousness* and *grandeur* of the expenditure and its occasion is the essential point of difference between *μεγαλοπρέπεια* and *ἐλευθεριότης*. Naturally, greatness of amount is an almost necessary accompaniment of such conditions. Still it is only *one* form of the *grandeur* implied in *μεγαλοπρέπεια*. Cf. *οἶον μέγεθος* (§ 10); also, *διαφέρει τὸ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ μέγα τοῦ ἐν τῷ δαπανήματι* (§ 18). We see also in both the Excess and Defect that *display* and *showiness* are an essential element in this group of habits. The *βάνανσος* thinks *most* of the display, and that in reference to himself chiefly (§ 20). The *μεγαλοπρεπῆς* thinks worthily and adequately of the display, and not exclusively in reference to himself. (Contrast *ἐμμελῶς* in § 5 with *λαμπρύνεται παρὰ μέλος* in § 20. See also *πῶς κάλλιστον καὶ πρεπωδέστατον*, § 9, etc. etc.) The *μικροπρεπῆς* does not rise to a grand occasion at all. He is 'paltry' rather than merely 'sordid.' Note that he too is described as *τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλώσας* sometimes (which could scarcely be said of the 'Sordid' man), but that he wishes to make a display and keep his money too; and so *ἐν μικρῷ τὸ καλὸν ἀπολεῖ* (§ 21). He lacks that almost 'scientific instinct' (see §§ 5, 10) by

which the μεγαλοπρεπὴς sets off with a 'grand style' (§ 19) all that he does.

P. 193, IV. ἡ. 14. προῖτάχῃ . . . διὰ τῶν προγόνων] Compare Shakespeare's *Henry VIII.* Act I. Sc. i.—

'Fropp'd by ancestry, whose grace
Chalks successors their way.'

P. 193, IV. ἡ. 19. οἷς εὐπρέπῳ ληστῶ] Cf. ἡ. 24. It is related of Lorenzo de' Medici, surnamed 'the Magnificent' (μεγαλοπρεπὴς), that even in his childhood, having received as a present a horse from Sicily, he at once sent the donor in return a gift of much greater value, remarking, when reproved for profuseness, that there was nothing more noble than to overcome others in acts of generosity.—(Roscoe's *Life*.)

P. 193, IV. ἡ. 5. τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι] This notion enters into the Greek ideal even of female beauty, e.g. Homer, *Od.* xiii. 252, δέμας δ' ἦεντο γυναικὶ καλῇ τε μεγάλῃ τε; *Od.* xviii. 245, ἐπεὶ περιεσσι γυναικῶν εἶδός τε μέγας τε (a sort of S. Barbara after Palma Vecchio). So Aristotle, *Rhet.* I. c. 6, says, ὀφθαλμῶν δ' ἀρετὴ, σώματος μὲν, κάλλος καὶ μέγεθος.

P. 201, IV. ἡ. 16. μέγας . . . καί] Hence the relation of μεγαλοψυχία to the other virtues is somewhat like that of the Chief Good to the other Goods, as described by the words κατῶν αἰρετωτέρῃ καὶ συνεπισημμένη (L. vii. 8). Μεγαλοψυχία unites and includes them all, and it also gives them an additional lustre, 'οἷον κίρκος τις,' very much as μεγαλοπρέπεια 'sets off' expenditure, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἰσῆς δαπάνης.

— 17. We might illustrate this lofty indifference of the μεγαλόψυχος to the opinions of others, by a saying of Angelo Politiano (*Ep.* iii. 24), 'I am no more raised or dejected by the flattery of my friends or the accusations of my enemies, than I am by the shadow of my own body; for although that shadow may be somewhat longer in the morning and the evening than in the middle of the day, I do not think myself a taller man at those times than I am at noon.'

P. 203, IV. ἡ. 21. Ἄριστ' γὰρ ἀρετῆς, κ.τ.λ.] Cf. La Rochefoucauld *Max.* 25: 'Il faut de plus grandes vertus pour soutenir la bonne fortune que la mauvaise.'

P. 204, IV. ἡ. 25. Δακρῶσι δέ, κ.τ.λ.] Demosthenes contends that the reverse ought to be the case (*De Cor.* p. 316):—ἐγὼ νομίζω τὸν μὲν εὖ παθόντα δεῖν μεμνησθαι πάντα τὸν χρόνον, τὸν δὲ παθόντα οὐδὲ ἐπιλελησθαι, εἰ δεῖ τὸν μὲν χρηστοῦ, τὸν δὲ μὴ μικροψύχου ποιεῖν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου τὸ δὲ τὰς ἰδίας εὐεργεσίας ἐπαμνησθεσθαι καὶ λέγειν μικροῦ δεῖν ὁμοίον εἶναι τῷ ὀνειδίσειν.

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ἀνευ πάθους καὶ τοῦ στέργειν οἷς ὀμιλεῖ (*ib.* § 5). But if the μεγαλόψυχος does in any degree conform his words or actions to suit another, it will be for the sake of a friend.

P. 206, IV. iii. 30. οὐδὲ μνησίκακος] Compare *Coriolanus*, Act v. Sc. iii.—

‘Thinkst thou it honourable for a noble man
Still to remember wrongs?’

P. 207, *ib.* 31. οὐδ’ αὖ ἀνθρωπολόγος] Contrast the χαῦνος, § 36 (*fin.*), λέγουσι περὶ αὐτῶν. Wordsworth’s well-known four sonnets on ‘Personal Talk’ may also be referred to in illustration.

οὐδ’ αὖ ἐπαινετικός] Compare what Thackeray says of Addison, ‘He did not praise, because he measured his compeers by a higher standard than most people have.’ Pope describes the same trait in Addison, ‘Alike reserved to blame or to commend,’ but with a cynical imputation.—(*Prologue to Satires*, l. 205.)

δι’ ὕβριν] Compare the account of ὕβρις, given in *Rhet.* II. ii. 5, as being τὸ βλάπτειν καὶ λυπεῖν ἐφ’ οἷς αἰσχύνη ἐστὶ τῷ πάσχοντι, μὴ ἵνα τὶ γίγνηται αὐτῷ ἄλλο . . . οἱ γὰρ ἀντιποιοῦντες οὐχ ὑβρίζουσιν ἀλλὰ τιμωροῦνται. So (*ib.* § 4) ἐπηρεασμὸς (as resulting from καταφρόνησις) is οὐχ ἵνα τὶ αὐτῷ, ἀλλ’ ἵνα μὴ ἐκείνῳ. The grotesque and sometimes coarsely comic treatment of his subject adopted by Dante in that part of Hell called Malebolge (where various types of fraud are punished) is an indication of his utter contempt for sinners of that class. He is κακολόγος δι’ ὕβριν.

— 33. μᾶλλον τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἄκαρπα] A constant demand for *utility* Aristotle would apparently regard as a mark of rank ‘Philistinism.’ Cf. *Pol.* V. (VIII.) iii. 12, τὸ ζητεῖν πανταχοῦ τὸ χρήσιμον ἥκιστα ἀρμόττει τοῖς μεγαλοψύχοις καὶ ἐλευθέροις.

— 34. κίνησις βραδεία . . . καὶ λέξις σάσιμος] So Malvolio in *Twelfth Night*, Act III. Sc. iv., proposes to assume ‘a sad face, a reverend carriage, a slow tongue, in the habit of some sir of note.’

P. 208, IV. iii. 35. ἐαυτὸν ἀποστερεῖ, κ.τ.λ.] Compare Shakespeare, *Merchant of Venice*, Act II. Sc. vii.—

‘And yet to be afeard of my deserving
Were but a weak disabling of myself.’

Or again, *Henry V.* Act II. Sc. iv.—

‘Self-love, my liege, is not so vile a sin
As self-neglecting.’

So Dante on the demoralising effects of 'viltate' (*μικροψυχία*), *Inf.* ii. 45, etc. (Cary's translation),—

' Which oft
So overcasts a man, that he recoils
From noblest resolution, like a beast
At some false semblance in the twilight gloom.'

And La Rochefoucauld similarly of 'faiblesse : '—' La faiblesse est le seul défaut que l'on ne saurait corriger' (*Max.* 130). 'La faiblesse est plus opposée à la vertu que le vice' (*Max.* 445).

P. 208, IV. iii. 35. *ὠρέγεται γὰρ, κ.τ.λ.*] The more so perhaps as Aristotle (*Rhet.* II. xiii. 9) states that a too great regard for self is a mark of *μικροψυχία*—*μικροψυχία γὰρ τις καὶ αὐτῆ* [sc. *ἡ λίαν φιλαυτία*].

P. 213, IV. v. 3. With this definition of *πραότης* compare Dante's conception of it as being 'not so much unresisting gentleness to evil as the righteous indignation which repels it *without any feeling of personal irritation.*'—(M. F. Rossetti.) [See Supplementary Note on IV. iii. 31.] So in the *Convito* (iv. 17) he gives as a description of the *πραότης* of Aristotle, 'The Virtue which moderates our anger and our too great patience against our external ills.' If we look only at the former aspect of it (see § 6, *fin.*), the *πρᾶος* might degenerate to Hamlet's description (Act II. Sc. ii.), and become

' Pigeon-livered and lack gall,
To make oppression bitter.'

Further, Dante punishes this vice of defect (Accidia) in the same Circle with the vice of Excess (Iracundia). These habits are distinguished from *νέμεσις* with its related vices, in that the former involve the notion of *personal* injury (including that of friends, *ὁ γὰρ φίλος ἕτερος αὐτός*); also that they include what Bishop Butler calls 'harm' as well as injury. See also Supplementary Note on II. vii. 15.

P. 214, IV. v. 8. *παύονται δὲ ταχέως*] Cf. Shakespeare, *Henry VIII.* Act I. Sc. i.—

' Anger is like
A full-hot horse, who being allowed his way
Self-mettle tires him.'

ἢ φανεροί εἰσι] Cf. VII. vi. 3, *ὁ θυμώδης οὐκ ἐπίβουλος, . . . ἀλλὰ φανερός.*
— 8, 9] The first two classes here mentioned resemble the 'passionate' and the 'peevish' of Bishop Butler's eighth Sermon (p. 440, ed. Angus):—'As to the abuses of Anger, which, it is to be observed, may be in all different degrees (*ἢ ὑπερβολὴ κατὰ πάντα μὲν γίνεται*, § 7), the first which occurs is what is commonly called passion. . . . This dis-

temper of the mind seizes men upon the least occasion in the world, and perpetually without any reason at all, and by means of it they are plainly every day, every waking hour of their lives, in danger of running into the most extravagant outrages (§ 8). Of a less boisterous but not of a less innocent kind is peevishness (cf. *οἱ ἀκρόχολοι ὀξεῖς*), which I mention with real pity for the unhappy creatures who . . . are obliged to be in the way of it (cf. *τοῖς μάλιστα φίλοις*, § 10). That which, in a more feeble temper, is peevishness, and languidly discharges itself upon everything which comes in its way (*πρὸς πᾶν ὀργίλοι καὶ ἐπὶ παντὶ*), the same principle in a temper of greater force and stronger passions becomes rage and fury.'

P. 217, IV. vi. 2. *δύσκολος*] Equivalent to *difficilis* in Horace's description of Old Age, *A. P.* 173. Conversely, Dante mentions 'Affability' (by which word he translates Aristotle's *φιλία*) as one of the four Virtues peculiarly appropriate to Old Age (*Conv.* iv. 27).

P. 220, IV. vi. 8, *fin.* With this characteristic of *φιλία* compare 'Let the righteous rather smite me *friendly*, and reprove me' (Ps. cxli. 5). Also Shakespeare, *Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Act III. Sc. i.—

'Thus for my duty's sake, I rather choose
To cross my friend in his intended drift,
Than, by concealing it, heap on your head
A pack of sorrows,' etc.

IV. vi. 9. (As another illustration of the habits of the *κόλαξ*)—Swift in his *Journal to Stella* writes: 'Did I ever tell you that the Lord Treasurer hears ill with the left ear, just as I do? I dare not tell him that I am so, for fear he should think that I counterfeited to make my court.' A striking, though exaggerated, illustration of the Churl (*ὁ πᾶσι δυσχεραίνων*) may be found in Apemantus (*Timon of Athens*), who stands in vivid contrast with the herd of *κόλακες* who surround Timon in his prosperity.

P. 222, IV. vii. 5. *ἐὰν μὴ τινος ἔνεκα πράττη*] Some special motive may intervene as a disturbing force, and then the resulting act may not be a true index of general character, of what the man is *ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ*. *e.g.* one who is *δύσερις καὶ δύσκολος* by nature, may occasionally be transformed by self-interest into a *κόλαξ*.

P. 223, IV. vii. 7. *Οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς ὁμολογίαις, κ.τ.λ.*] Hence one 'who sweareth to his neighbour and disappointeth him not, though it were to his own hindrance,' would be classed as *δίκαιος* rather than *ἀληθής*.

ἐν οἷς . . . *ἀληθεύει*] There is an abrupt change of construction here

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La Rochefoucauld attributes to human nature generally this characteristic of βαυκοπανουργία—‘On ne se blâme que pour être loué’ (*Max.* 33).

P. 227, IV. viii. 3. εὐτροποι] This quickness of intellectual movement in the εὐτράπελος stands in contrast with the afterthought-wit so happily described in the French phrase, ‘l’esprit de l’escalier;’ and it is similar in kind to the power of employing metaphor (τὸ γὰρ εὖ μεταφέρειν τὸ τὸ ὁμοιον θεωρεῖν ἐστίν), stated by Aristotle (*Poet.* xxii. § 9) to be a mark of genius.

P. 228, IV. viii. 6. τῶν καινῶν] This expression (as in the *Poetics*) does not refer to what is technically known as the ‘New,’ but the ‘Middle’ Comedy. The ‘New’ had not yet arisen. (See Donaldson, *Theatre of the Greeks*, sixth ed., pp. 63, etc.)

πρὸς εὐσχημοσύνην] It does not, however, therefore follow that the latter method has the advantage from the point of view of morality. It is quite possible to maintain the reverse. Speaking of Shakespeare’s occasional αἰσχρολογία, Coleridge writes:—‘It may sometimes be gross, but I boldly say that he is always moral and modest. (?) In our day, decency of manners (εὐσχημοσύνη) is preserved at the expense of morality of heart, and delicacies for vice are allowed (ὑπόνοια), whilst grossness against it is hypocritically, or at least morbidly, condemned.’

— 7. τὸν εὖ σκώπτοντα] Compare with this expression the definition of εὐτραπέλια in *Rhet.* II. xii. 16, as πεπαιδευμένη ὕβρις.

P. 229, IV. viii. 9. ἔδει δ’ ἴσως καὶ σκώπτειν] Juvenal (iii. 153) regards liability to ridicule as the hardest part of the lot of poverty; and La Rochefoucauld remarks, ‘Le ridicule déshonore plus que le déshonneur’ (*Max.* 326).

— 10. πᾶσι δυσχεραίνει] Compare *Merchant of Venice*, Act I. Sc. i.—

‘And other of such vinegar aspect
That they’ll not show their teeth in way of smile,
Though Nestor swear the jest be laughable.’

P. 240 (Introductory Note to Book x.) The same distinction, derived doubtless from Aristotle, between the Active and the Contemplative Life, constantly reappears in Mediæval writers. With Dante especially it is a favourite subject. He symbolises the antithesis in the *Commedia* by Leah and Rachel, and also (in a somewhat different aspect) by Matilda and Beatrice, and in the *Convito* by Martha and Mary. The following passage especially may be quoted in illustration,—‘In truth it should be known that we can have in this life two kinds of Happiness, according as we follow two different good and excellent paths which lead us thither;

the one is the Active Life and the other the Contemplative. The latter (though by the Active we arrive, as has been said, at true Happiness) leads us to the highest Happiness and Felicity [compare *εὐδαίμων* and *μακάριος* in I. x. 14], as the Philosopher proves in the tenth Book of the Ethics.—*Convito*, iv. 17.

P. 243, X. vi. 3. *τῶν παιδιῶν αἱ ἡδεΐαι*] Such recreations as are suggested in the Note would fall under the head of *συμφέροντα* rather than *ἡδέα* (see II. iii. 7). A higher class still might deserve the title of *καλὰ* (see VII. iv. 5), and such the *σπουδαῖος* would take pleasure in (§ 5), since he, like all men, needs *ἀνάπαυσις* (§ 6). To such Aristotle would rather apply the term *διαγωγή* [cf. *Pol.* V. (VIII.) v. 10, *τὴν διαγωγὴν ὁμολογουμένως δεῖ μὴ μόνον ἔχειν τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν*], and he would consider Music as fulfilling such a condition. The whole passage in *Pol.* V. (VIII.) v. 10-13, should be compared where Aristotle again explains why *παιδιά* is often thought to be *τέλος*, and why it is not really so.

P. 246, X. vi. 6. *οὐ δὴ τέλος ἡ ἀνάπαυσις*] Cf. *Pol.* V. (VIII.) v. 10, *ἡ γὰρ παιδιά χάριν ἀναπαύσεώς ἐστι . . . [ἡ δ' ἀνάπαυσις] τῆς διὰ τῶν πόνων λύπης λατρεία τίς ἐστιν*.

P. 253, X. vii. 8. *Οὐ χρὴ κατὰ, κ.τ.λ.*] This standard of Happiness, though superhuman (*κρείττων ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπου*), is still human, in the same way that the Christian standard of moral perfection is a true standard to set before men, even though the highest human efforts can never be otherwise than an asymptote in reference to it.

P. 255, X. viii. 3. *συνέξευκται δὲ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις, κ.τ.λ.*] Hence the *ἀκρατής* cannot be *φρόνιμος*, though he may be *δεινός*, see VII. x. 1. Also in VI. xiii. 6 we read, *οὐχ οἶδόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως ἀνευ φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ φρόνιμον ἀνευ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς*, and in VII. ii. 5, *πρακτικὸς γε δὲ φρόνιμος*.

P. 256, X. viii. 4. *αἱ γὰρ βούλησις ἀδηλοί, κ.τ.λ.*] Compare *Measure for Measure*, Act I. Sc. i.—

‘For if our virtues
Did not go forth of us, ’twere all alike
As if we had them not.’

— 5. The dispute as to the relative importance of intention or act, ‘will’ or ‘deed,’ in Morals, twice referred to by Aristotle, may remind us of the later theological controversy respecting the rival claims of Faith and Works.


P. 261, X. viii. 11. κλίνουσι τοῖς ἐκτὸς τούτων αἰσθανόμενοι μόνον] Compare *Merchant of Venice*, Act II. Sc. ix.—

‘What many men desire! that “many” may be meant .
By the fool multitude, that choose by show,
Not learning more than the fond eye doth teach;
Which pries not to the interior.’

— 13. εἰ γὰρ τις ἐπιμέλεια, κ.τ.λ.] Compare Addison, *Cato*, Act v. Sc. i.—

‘If there ’s a power above us
(And that there is all nature cries aloud
Through all her works), he must delight in virtue,
And that which he delights in must be happy.’

The following scheme will show at a glance the connection of Ch. vi.-viii.



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are not acquainted with, neither is it the proper object of valour.' Comp. *inf.* c. ix. § 6.

P. 151, III. vii. 12. Add to the illustrations in the note the graphic contrast drawn by Livy (vii. 10) between the Gaul and Torquatus before engaging in single combat. He says of the latter, 'pectus animorum iraeque tacitae plenum, omnem ferociam in discrimen ipsum certaminis distulerat.' Conversely, Tacitus ascribes both to the Gauls and Britons the habit censured by Aristotle in the text: 'in deprecandis periculis eadem audacia, et ubi advenere, in detractandis eadem formido.' (*Agricola*, c. xi.)

Pp. 152-3, III. viii. 2, 3. In the following passage Dante recognises this form of courage due to *αἰδώς*:

But shame soon interposed her threat, who makes
The servant bold in presence of his lord.

Inf. xvii. 89, 90. (Cary's Translation.)

P. 176, IV. i. 11. τῶν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς] We may compare with this periphrasis the following expressions in the Epistle to the Romans: οἱ ἐξ ἐπιθελίας (ii. 8), οἱ ἐκ περιτομῆς (iv. 12), οἱ ἐκ νόμου (iv. 14).

Pp. 205, 291, IV. iii. 25. Compare further Tac. *Ann.* v. 18 (*fin.*): 'Nam beneficia eo usque lacta sunt dum videntur exsolvi posse: ubi multum antevenere, pro gratia odium redditur': which is thus commented on by Oldbuck in Scott's *Antiquary*: 'from this a wise man may take a caution not to oblige any man beyond the degree in which he may expect to be requited, lest he should make his debtor a bankrupt in gratitude.' In *Germ.* xxi. (*fin.*) Tacitus mentions as a proof of the generosity of the German barbarians, 'nec data imputant, nec acceptis obligantur.'

P. 206, IV. iii. 28. εἴρωνια δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς] Most MSS. read εἴρωνεια (*auct.* Grant) which certainly avoids the great difficulty of finding any construction for the accusative εἴρωνια.

P. 214, IV. v. 8. ἀνταποδιδάσιν κ.τ.λ.] Thus Cleon (*ap.* Thucyd. III. xxxviii. 1) remarks that summary vengeance is always most effective and satisfactory; and conversely (in illustration of § 10) Tacitus says of Domitian (*Agricola*, c. 42) that he was 'praeceps in iram, et quo obscurior eo irrevocabilior.'

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