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# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

## REPORT

OF THE

### COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Res. 366

(81st Congress)

A RESOLUTION RELATING TO THE INTERNAL  
SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES

HEARINGS HELD JULY 25, 1951-JUNE 20, 1952 BY THE  
INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE



JULY 2 (legislative day JUNE 27), 1952.—Ordered to be printed

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

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JULY 2 (legislative day, June 27), 1952.—Ordered to be printed

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Mr. McCARRAN, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the following

REPORT

[Pursuant to S. Res. 366, 81st Cong., 2d sess.]

INTRODUCTION

The Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee was empowered on December 21, 1950, under the terms of Senate Resolution 366 of the Eighty-first Congress, to make a complete and continuing study and investigation of—

(1) The administration, operation, and enforcement of the Internal Security Act of 1950;

(2) The administration, operation and enforcement of other laws relating to espionage, sabotage, and the protection of the internal security of the United States; and

(3) The extent, nature and effects of subversive activities in the United States; its territories and possessions, including, but not limited to espionage, sabotage, and infiltration by persons who are or may be under the domination of the foreign government or organizations controlling the world Communist movement or any other movement seeking to overthrow the Government of the United States by force and violence.

This authority subsequently was extended under Senate Resolution 7 of the Eighty-second Congress, until January 31, 1952.<sup>1</sup>

Section 2 of the Senate Resolution 7 is as follows:

The committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such places and times during the sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Senate, to hold such hearings, to require by subpoenas or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and, within the amount appropriated therefor, to make such expenditures as it deems advisable. \* \* \* Subpoenas shall be issued by

<sup>1</sup> And by S. Res. 198, S. Res. 314.

the chairman of the committee or the subcommittee, and may be served by a person designated by such chairman.

Acting on this authority, the subcommittee took possession of certain back files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which were found on the Lee, Mass., farm of E. C. Carter, a trustee. The contents of these files became the preliminary basis for the committee's investigation. They were studied for 5 months before the first witness took the stand.

Ultimately, the committee took public testimony from 66 witnesses. Twenty-eight of these had had some connection with IPR, according to a compilation prepared by the subcommittee staff. Two had helped found the Institute (p. 3850, exhibit 1382). Two had filled the post of secretary-general (p. 6, 1150). Four had occupied the executive secretaryship of IPR's American Council (pp. 6, 80, 937, 2644). Thirteen were or had been trustees (pp. 264, 568, 713, 1313, 3969). Four had served in editorial capacities. Others were writers, research associates, and staff members.

The great majority of these IPR witnesses may be classified as defenders of the Institute. Some appeared at their own instance. Some presented voluminous statements, which were accepted into the record by the subcommittee.

Other witnesses included a former Vice President of the United States (p. 1297ff.), a former American Ambassador to the U. S. S. R. (p. 4521ff.), former Chief of Intelligence of the Far Eastern Command of the United States and the United Nations forces (p. 353), two former high officials of the Soviet Government (pp. 183, 4479), the director of a special investigation bureau of the Japanese Government (p. 499), the former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, the wartime Chief of Staff to Admiral King, Admiral Charles M. Cooke (p. 1491ff), and a number of State Department officials who had participated in America's far eastern affairs (pp. 703, 704, 1686, 1687).

In addition, the staff examined about 20,000 documents, including books, magazine articles, letters, memoranda, minutes, reports, and some supplementary publications from Government sources. Approximately 2,000 of these documents were put into the record as exhibits, to aid the subcommittee in reaching its conclusion.

The object of this investigation was to determine—

(a) Whether or to what extent the Institute of Pacific Relations was infiltrated and influenced or controlled by agents of the communist world conspiracy;

(b) Whether or to what extent these agents and their dupes worked through the Institute into the United States Government to the point where they exerted an influence on United States far eastern policy; and if so, whether and to what extent they still exert such influence;

(c) Whether or to what extent these agents and their dupes led or misled American public opinion, particularly with respect to far eastern policy.

Hearings began July 25, 1951. They ended June 20, 1952. The printed record of hearings totals over 5,000 pages.

# INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

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## WHAT IS IPR?

When W. L. Holland appeared before the Subcommittee on Internal Security, he declared:

I am speaking as the executive officer of both the international IPR and the American IPR, and as a person who has been closely connected with the institute's work and staff for a very long period (p. 1212).

Mr. Holland then gave the subcommittee this description of the institute:

The Institute of Pacific Relations is an association composed of national councils in 10 countries. Each national council is autonomous and carries on its own work in its own distinctive way. Together they cooperate in an international IPR program of research, publications, and conferences. This program is directed by a Pacific Council in which each national council is represented, and administered by a small international secretariat working in New York under the direction of the Pacific Council.

The institute at present consists of the following independent national councils:

- American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.
- Australian Institute of International Affairs
- Canadian Institute of International Affairs
- Comité d'Etudes des Problèmes du Pacifique (France)
- Indian Council of World Affairs
- Japan Institute of Pacific Relations
- New Zealand Institute of International Affairs
- Pakistan Institute of International Affairs
- Philippine Council, Institute of Pacific Relations
- Royal Institute of International Affairs (Great Britain)

The institute was founded in 1925 at a conference in Honolulu of religious leaders, scholars, and businessmen from various countries of the Pacific area, who, even then, realized the need for greater knowledge and frank discussion of the problems of Asia and the relations of Asia and the West. The impetus came in part from leaders of the YMCA.

At the first conference it was realized that intelligent discussion was impossible on many subjects because many basic facts were lacking about the peoples, resources, trade, and politics of the Pacific area. This led to the inauguration by the international IPR of a large and continuing research program which subsequently received generous support from the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corp. The IPR has played an important part in increasing available knowledge about Asia in the United States and other countries (p. 1215).

\* \* \* \* \*

The work of the international Institute of Pacific Relations is financed principally by contributions from its national councils and by grants from foundations. In the 26 years from 1925 through 1950 total receipts amounted to \$2,569,000, an average of about \$100,000 a year. Of this total, 48 percent came from the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corp., 40 percent from the national councils, 9 percent from sales of publications, and 3 percent from miscellaneous sources. The American IPR contributed 29 percent of the total receipts, the British and Canadian national councils 3 percent each, the China council 2 percent, and the Japanese council 1 percent; the eight other national councils each contributed less than 1 percent. Thus United States sources, including foundations, supplied 77 percent of the organization's income. If grants to the American IPR are included, the contribution of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie



Corp. to the work of the IPR through 1950 totals \$2,176,000. In 1950 the Rockefeller Foundation voted a new grant of \$50,000 to the international institute and \$60,000 to the American IPR.

The American Institute of Pacific Relations derives its funds from membership subscriptions, gifts from individuals and corporations, and grants from foundations. From 1925 through 1950 its total net income was \$2,536,000, of which 50 percent came from foundations (chiefly the Rockefeller Foundation, Carnegie Corp. and Carnegie Endowment), 33 percent from individual and corporate contributions, 12 percent from sales of publications, and 5 percent from miscellaneous sources. Leading contributors to the American IPR today include the Standard-Vacuum Oil Co., International General Electric Co., National City Bank, Chase National Bank, Bankers Trust Co., International Business Machines Corp., International Telephone & Telegraph Co., Electric Bond & Share Co., and the Rockefeller Bros. Fund. Lever Bros. (London) is a major contributor to the international IPR.

Among other large corporate contributors have been Alexander & Baldwin, American Trust Co., Castle & Cooke, Time, Inc., J. P. Morgan, Studebaker Corp., Reader's Digest, American President Lines, Matson Steamship Co., Bank of Hawaii, Pan American Airways, Bank of America, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., Shell Oil Co., National Cash Register, Wilbur Ellis Co., Bank of California, American Foreign Power Co.

Major individual contributors to the IPR have included the late Frank C. Atherton, Juan Trippe, Henry R. Luce, Jerome D. Greene, Mrs. Thomas W. Lamont, the late Joseph P. Chamberlain, Mrs. Frances Bolton, Joseph E. Davies, Mrs. Wallace Alexander, Mrs. Frank Gerbode, Arthur H. Dean, and Gerard Swepe (p. 1217).

No witness, nor any document in the record, disputed that part of Mr. Holland's testimony cited above.

Mr. Holland further characterized the institute thus:

- (1) The institute is an international organization.
- (2) It is a nonpartisan organization.
- (3) It has never tried to influence the actions of governments.
- (4) The character of its work has been determined not by Communists, but by the hundreds of eminent citizens and scholars who have taken an active part in the institute as officers of the organization, as delegates to its conferences, or as writers of books and articles which it has published (p. 1215).

Additional IPR spokesmen supported this latter statement (p. 3849 et seq.; p. 3862 et seq.). The statement was fundamentally challenged, however, by the testimony of other witnesses, including some former officers of the organization itself. Raymond Dennett, present director of the World Peace Foundation and once secretary of IPR's American Council, said this:

I do not think it was an objective research organization (p. 966).

Prof. Kenneth Colegrove of Northwestern University, who joined the Institute "in the early thirties," said this:

Behind the front, the Institute of Pacific Relations was nothing else than a propaganda organization supporting a (Communist) line (p. 916).

Prof. William M. McGovern, also of Northwestern University, asserted that he found "very clear evidence" that IPR's international quarterly, *Pacific Affairs*, was "trying to advocate the Stalinist approach" (p. 1013). Prof. David N. Rowe of Yale University characterized *Pacific Affairs'* editor, Owen Lattimore, as follows:

Within the field of far eastern studies, Asiatic studies, and particularly of Chinese studies, \* \* \* I consider him principal agent for the advocacy of Stalinist ideas (p. 3985).

Professor Rowe added that IPR's claim of "no propaganda, no point of view" was "completely irreconcilable with what happened" at an IPR international conference he had attended (p. 3974). Louis

Budenz, presently assistant professor at Fordham University, and former member of the American Communist Politburo, said he had heard IPR described in a Politburo meeting as "the Little Red Schoolhouse for teaching certain people in Washington how to think with the Soviet Union in the Far East" (p. 517).

Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, chief of intelligence for the Far East and United Nations Command, declared "the conclusion could be arrived at" that the Japanese branch of IPR was "used as a spy ring for Russian Communists and the Russian Red Army" (p. 364). Alexander Barmine, chief of the Russian unit in the State Department's Voice of America and former brigadier general of the Red Army, said he had been told by Soviet intelligence officers that IPR was "a cover shop for military intelligence work in the Pacific area" (p. 202). Igor Bogolepov, another refugee from Red tyranny who was once counselor of the Soviet Foreign Office, gave the following testimony:

\* \* \* As one of my former comrades expressed it, it (the IPR) is like a double-way track. On one line you get information from America through this institute. On the other hand, you send information which you would like to implant in American brains through the same channel of the institute. \* \* \*

Mr. MORRIS. When you talk about two-way track, do you mean that military intelligence was extracted from outside the Soviet Union through the medium of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. And on the other hand, by the out-way track you mean information that you wanted to impart to the outside world was transmitted through that medium?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes (p. 4491).

Senator EASTLAND. Propaganda, you mean. Soviet propaganda that the Foreign Office desired implanted in foreign minds would be sent through the facilities of the Institute of Pacific Relations. That is what you mean?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is mostly propaganda, but I would say even a little more than propaganda, because not only organizational propaganda but even the organization of a network of fellow travelers in your and other countries (p. 4492).

\* \* \* \* \*

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that the Soviet organization used the Institute of Pacific Relations to collect information not only in the United States but on other countries, such as Japan and China?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It was my impression that, at that time—I mean before the war—when I was in the Soviet Union, the Soviet intelligence was more interested not in the United States of America, but in Japan and other countries which were in direct conflict with the Soviet Union. It was also my impression that the Institute of Pacific Relations was merely used by Soviet intelligence in order to get, via America, the information on Japan and China and Great Britain (p. 4590).

Which of these descriptions of the Institute of Pacific Relations are the true ones?

This was the fundamental question to which the subcommittee addressed itself. In seeking the answer, it weighed the testimony of 66 witnesses, and studied the contents of approximately 20,000 documents, including letters, memoranda, pamphlets, magazine articles, and books.

#### STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

The subcommittee's open hearings began July 25, 1951, with the following statement by the chairman:

One of the lines of inquiry undertaken by the Internal Security Subcommittee concerned the extent to which subversive forces may have influenced or sought to influence the formulation and execution of our far eastern policy.

In this connection, the committee, acting on advice that certain files of the Institute of Pacific Relations had been removed to a barn in Lee, Mass., and that these files contained information bearing on matters of concern to the committee, took possession of the files in question, under subpoena, and relegated to its staff, under close supervision, the lengthy and arduous task of sifting those files.

The committee was aware, at the time, of the fact that the board of trustees of the institute had been studded with personalities of such respectability, and of such preeminence of capitalistic achievement, that the very presence of their names on a letterhead might have put at rest all suspicion of intrigue or subversive influence. The committee was also aware of the possibility that this aggregation of prominent individuals may have been used as a facade for Communists operating shrewdly behind the scenes. It has been done before. The committee knew that it is not possible to identify a Communist by his appearance or by his attire or by his station in life, or even by the size of his bank account.

The committee's staff was instructed to maintain, and the committee sought to maintain, a high standard of evidence, and to proceed with a truly objective approach. The committee did not want first impressions. It wanted facts.

It is virtually impossible to define fully and accurately, in the abstract, the components of disloyalty or subversion. The inner currents of the human mind are at best difficult to gauge. Motives are often so obscure that sometimes one does not fully comprehend his own impelling urges, and may completely misjudge the motives of an associate. Successful conspirators usually are consummate dissemblers; and thus the acts of such persons are often shrouded in the darkness of stealth, accompanied by acts of misdirection, or clouded by ambiguity of meaning.

The measurement of men's motives, the assessment of the strands of thought, and the elements of pressures which may have influenced another's behavior, is not a task to be sought. And yet if we are to do our full part to save our country and our way of life from subversion and erosion, we must make the effort. But we must withhold our judgment in all respects until the proper time. We must first make the record, so that the facts will be known.

In such an investigation as this, where a possible conspiracy is being examined, very often the only evidence obtainable derives from persons who once participated in the conspiracy. Only eyes that witnessed the deeds, and ears that heard the words of intrigue can attest thereto. Thus, ex-Communists, and agents of the Government who posed as Communists, often are the only sources of evidence of what transpired behind doors closed to the non-Communist world. Government agencies do not readily yield up their concealed agents. Fortunately, it is possible to verify the loyalty of an ex-Communist, in large part, by the very extent of his willingness to give full and frank testimony against the Communist Party. Many ex-Communists have labored loyally and valiantly to expose the intrigues of their former associates. They often have no illusions about the Communist Party and its purposes, and have developed antibodies against further infection.

"Once a Communist, always a Communist" has become, in effect, a Communist slogan; but no one who professes to comprehend the significance of transgression and repentance, of wrongdoing and contrition, can subscribe to such a shibboleth. These facts must be borne in mind as, later in these hearings, the testimony of ex-Communists is used to supplement the evidence found in the files.

It should be made clear that the committee was mindful at the outset that we had under subpoena only some of the files of the institute, and that we might for that reason run the risk of getting a distorted view of the workings of the organization. We, therefore, extended our subpoena and brought all the records of the institute under our scrutiny. We have, further, repeatedly asked the secretary general of the institute to be sure that everything that should be seen by us is made available to us.

The press and the public, as well as the committee, should bear in mind that the mere fact that a person is shown during the course of these hearings to have been associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations or to have been mentioned in certain letters which may be placed in evidence should give rise to no conclusions. Each bit of documentary evidence will speak with its own voice, but no such evidence should be weighed alone and without reference to the whole body of evidence which ultimately will comprise the record of these hearings. Neither should the testimony of any witness, standing alone and uncorroborated, be given undue weight, but, rather, the testimony of all witnesses should be weighed one against the other, after the record has been made, in an effort to sift the wheat from the chaff and arrive at the truth. Undoubtedly many good men will be



mentioned in the course of these hearings, and it is in the interest of such men so mentioned that I make this statement.

We begin these hearings making no charges. We propose to let the evidence precede our conclusions. We shall hear the witnesses and read letters and other documents. We shall strive to be fair. The first witnesses will be persons long associated with the institute and undeniably competent to testify from the standpoint of the institute itself. The first witness, Edward C. Carter, was secretary general of the IPR for some 16 years and is still a member of its executive board. He will tell us what the institute is. The next witness, Frederick V. Field, was national secretary for many years and is a former member of the executive committee of the institute.

Before we proceed with the first witness I want to say a word or two about the future conduct of these hearings. \* \* \*

The question has arisen, with regard to television, radio, and news pictures. The committee has specifically discussed these matters, and the ruling of the committee is that none of the proceedings of the committee will be televised and that no direct radio coverage of the proceedings of the committee will be permitted. News pictures may be permitted before and after the actual hearing sessions of the committee, but the taking of news pictures during the actual conduct of the hearings will not be allowed.

Neither will the committee permit the photographing of witnesses with members of the committee in the hearing room, nor the photographing of witnesses in the hearing room without the permission of the witnesses.

The committee has made these decisions because we are seeking facts, not publicity. We want to make a record, not to make headlines. Furthermore, we want to make it clear that no witness who is called here will be subjected to undue publicity against his will.

The committee has also discussed the matter of the submission of questions by Senators who are not members of the Internal Security Subcommittee. It is the order of the committee that any such questions should be submitted in writing to the chairman presiding at the hearing, to be asked by him at his direction.

Any witness called here may have the privilege of being accompanied and advised by counsel of his choice; but witnesses' counsel will not be permitted to testify nor to ask questions. This is not a trial, but an inquiry, and we intend to proceed in an orderly way. In the interests of expediting these hearings, members of the committee have agreed to refrain from filling the record with their own observations; and witnesses will be asked to limit their testimony to responsive answers to questions. However, after the conclusion of his testimony, any witness may file, for the record, any such supplementary statement as he may desire to make; and a reasonable time limit will be allowed, in any case, for the submission of such a statement (pp. 2-5).

Early in the investigation, there was discussion regarding the weight to be given to hearsay testimony. The discussion arose as a result of Mr. Budenz' assertion that he has been told by Alexander Trachtenberg, "cultural commissar of the Communists in this country," that the Institute of Pacific Relations was "the little red schoolhouse for teaching certain people in Washington how to think with the Soviet Union in the Far East" (p. 517).

Senator FERGUSON. You see, we hear a lot said about so much evidence in this conspiracy being hearsay. And I am trying to get at the point as to what weight this committee can give to hearsay of this nature. Are you able to tell the committee now that in your opinion this is, let us say, a hearsay that deserves consideration by a committee?

Mr. BUDENZ. This is an official communication between leaders of the conspiracy.

Senator FERGUSON. Among themselves?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right. An estimate of their work among themselves borne out, however, by other corroborating facts. The fact that Mr. Frederick Vanderbilt Field was secretary of the American Council, among other acts and other incidents of that sort which we cannot go into now in detail, support this judgment.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, there is so much supporting evidence around this hearsay that you feel absolutely certain this morning when you are giving this testimony that this was a fact?



MR. BUDENZ. Oh, I could not be more certain if I had heard this said within the Institute of Pacific Relations itself (pp. 517-518). \* \* \*

THE CHAIRMAN. Right at that point, Senator Ferguson's observation a few minutes ago dwelling on the subject of hearsay testimony brings my attention back to a remark that I heard over the radio the following morning from the date on which the chairman made reference to the fact that hearsay testimony may be received on certain conditions. The authorities are unanimous that hearsay testimony is not ordinarily to be received. One of the exceptions is in the establishment of a conspiracy. All of the authorities are unanimous that where a conspiracy is being established or has been established, then hearsay testimony under an exception to the rule may be received.

The remark made over the radio was to the effect that this was testimony of a nature which would never be received in any court of justice. The gentleman who made the remark might stand corrected by reading Wigmore on Evidence or any one of the other standard works on evidence.

SENATOR FERGUSON. Yes. I think I ought to put in the record the same idea that I have. And I do not wish to accuse any newspaper of misquoting what we said here, because I know the difficulty of giving accuracy on legal matters. As to those of us who are trained in the law, it is an easy matter for us, but sometimes we feel that there are misquotations. I felt there was a misquotation on the radio and in the press on this question of hearsay. I want it understood that I have said as a lawyer, and I say it now, that after a conspiracy has been established statements between co-conspirators are always admissible in evidence.

THE CHAIRMAN. As an exception to the rule.

SENATOR FERGUSON. As an exception to the hearsay rule. And that applies in criminal cases. As a former member of the bench, I applied the rule. It has been affirmed in Michigan decisions in conspiracy cases and in cases that I tried on the bench. So I feel that I have made a study of it and there is no question about it. But it has to be applied, that when the conspiracy has been established then the statements among the co-conspirators, as we find here in this case, are admissible in evidence even in courts of law. That is the reason I was asking my questions on what you felt about this hearsay, how it was, and what weight you were giving it. Because we, as members of this committee, must weigh all of the evidence.

\* \* \* \* \*

SENATOR WATKINS. May I observe that this is not a court, and nobody is actually being tried here. It is an investigation, and it is not bound by the same rules that a court of law would be bound by.

THE CHAIRMAN. No; you are entirely right, Senator. But it has been the desire of the chairman to follow what he deems to be orderly procedure under what he understands to be and knows to be court procedure as nearly as we can, so as not to get off into a wild field where there is no limitation.

SENATOR WATKINS. I greatly appreciate the chairman's statement on that, and I have admired his conduct of this hearing and the adherence to these rules of evidence, even though we are not required in this type of an investigation to observe them. I think it is being conducted on a very high plane. I say that as a former judge who has tried conspiracy cases and is acquainted with the rule just referred to by the chairman and Senator Ferguson (pp. 519-520).

#### THE FILES

The farm (mentioned heretofore) on which IPR files were found, was the property of E. C. Carter, secretary general of the Institute from 1933 to 1946. On February 9, 1951, a few days after the files were taken into the custody of the committee, Mr. Holland issued a press statement, in which he denied that the files "had recently been transferred" from New York, and declared that they had been moved in 1949, simply for reasons of overcrowding in the New York office. He added that—

The contents of these files had been well known to the FBI since the summer of 1950, at which time he and Mr. Clayton Lane, then an executive of the American IPR, wrote Mr. J. Edgar Hoover inviting the FBI to make a thorough investigation of all the IPR files and records, both in New York and in Lee. Holland said that he and Mr. Lane took this action because the IPR's work has always been

open in the matter of public record. During subsequent weeks a group of FBI agents made a thorough search of all the IPR files \* \* \* (p. 1173).

Mr. Holland took the witness stand on October 10. He was questioned at considerable length about the statement, and also about the location of all IPR files, Thus:

Mr. SOURWINE. \* \* \* I want to sum up and be sure I understand your testimony. These files were at either your own office, in the warehouse of which you speak, or at Lee, Mass., or enroute from one of those places to the other?

Mr. HOLLAND. To the best of my knowledge, they were (p. 1175). \* \* \*

Mr. SOURWINE. You made available to the FBI at that time (the summer of 1950) all of your files; that is, the ones in your office, the ones in the warehouse and the ones at Lee, Mass.?

Mr. HOLLAND. We did. The way it was done was this way: We notified the FBI of our wish to have them come and look. They learned from us some were in Lee. They asked if they might go there. Mr. Carter provided them with the key to the barn. They worked there for something like 3 weeks, a team of them. He provided them with a heater to keep warm, because it got cold up there. They took out several hundred documents which they thought were pertinent.

Mr. SOURWINE. They had access not only to your files at Lee but to all your other files?

Mr. HOLLAND. Of course. Another team worked for many weeks in our office in New York.

Mr. SOURWINE. You made available to the FBI all the files you had? You did not hold out anything?

Mr. HOLLAND. Not to my knowledge (p. 1176).

Later, this colloquy occurred:

Mr. HOLLAND. There is one important point, Mr. Chairman. I am trying to give you a full picture. Mr. Sourwine has not asked me the question, but I think it is only fair to say that this is what I have told the FBI: A few days later—I think it was 3 days later (after his February press statement)—Mr. Field came to my office on a Saturday morning and said—

Mr. SOURWINE. You finally figured out what I was driving at.

Mr. HOLLAND. I was not sure until you asked me about the date. I wish to tell you frankly that Mr. Field came to my office and said:

"I don't know whether you know it, but ever since 1941 or 1943 there have been some old files of the IPR sitting in my cellar. There were a number of old vouchers and accounts which were sent down there in 1941 or 1943 \* \* \* I have absolutely forgotten all about these until I read the news about this seizure. Then I looked through my own files because I was naturally curious to know what in the files there might be that would affect me. I found, along with a number of my own personal files in the cellar, several cartons—I think 20 or 24—of old Institute of Pacific Relations files."

I was considerably upset about this, and said, "Well, I hate to learn this now, but it seems to me the only thing to do is to bring them up to the IPR." This I did. They are still there in the IPR offices and I have asked the FBI to examine them, too \* \* \*

Mr. SOURWINE. Are they included in the files you have made available to representatives of this committee?

Mr. HOLLAND. They are right there in the office. I am glad to make them available at any time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have they before now been pointed out?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you tell the FBI about these files?

Mr. HOLLAND. I should think about 2 weeks ago.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that square up with all the other answers you have been giving here today?

Mr. HOLLAND. I think it does, Mr. Sourwine (pp. 1177-1178).

During the luncheon recess, Mr. Holland telephoned to his office, and that afternoon he offered further explanations.

Mr. HOLLAND. \* \* \* In 1943 the old American IPR files from about 1927, the beginning, right up to 1942—in other words, all except the current files which they needed—were moved to Mr. Field's cellar.

Mr. MORRIS. All of them were put there?

Mr. HOLLAND. All the IPR stuff at that time was sent to Mr. Field's cellar.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is somewhat different from what you told us this morning.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. \* \* \*

Mr. SOURWINE. \* \* \* You mean that from 1943 until 1947 all of the files of the American Council of IPR which you had felt you could get along without and which had, in 1943, been moved to Mr. Field's basement, remained there in his basement?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes \* \* \*.

Mr. MORRIS. How many people in the institute knew these files were there?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I can't say. Of my present staff I would say that probably—I think only two people.

Mr. MORRIS. How about the board of trustees? Did they know?

Mr. HOLLAND. I really cannot say \* \* \*.

Mr. MORRIS. But the fact here is that Mr. Field at that time was an open contributor to the Daily Worker and therefore an open Communist, and was it not of some concern to the institute that all their files were in his basement?

Mr. HOLLAND. So far as I know, no such concern was expressed (p. 1184).

\* \* \* Now in 1949 \* \* \* you had sent up to Lee the old International files from 1925 to 1945, and most of the old American IPR files from 1927 to 1943.

Now, the exception is that in going through these files in Mr. Field's cellar, the girls—I don't know who they were, junior typists, and so on—they went down and saw there were several cartons—I mean transfer cases—there of old vouchers and of stuff that looked like duplicates and which seemed to have no value whatever for historical purposes. This was left behind in Mr. Field's cellar (p. 1185).

Further questions regarding the files were raised during the testimony of William W. Lockwood, who was a member of the research staff of the American Council in 1935 to 1940 and executive secretary of the council in 1941 to 1943 (p. 3863). Mr. Lockwood identified the following memorandum, dated February 23, 1939, which he had written to Mr. Field, who was at that time executive secretary of the council:

Perhaps I am a Casper Milquetoast, but with all the investigations which have been carried on or are likely to be undertaken in Washington, I am a little nervous about any documents coming to rest in our files which suggest any questionable dealings between the American Council and private corporations, especially as regards the relations of those corporations with the Government. There are one or two passages in this file of correspondence which for a person who is out to get us might suggest something improper.

If you agree, I suggest destroying the compromising parts of Oakie's letters of February 14 (first paragraph) and January 23 (third paragraph, first sentence). In addition, Sherlock Holmes suggests that you throw this note in the wastebasket and direct Oakie to destroy the carbons of these two letters together with your letter of instruction to him.

Field replied to this by advising Mr. Lockwood—

We have a lot worse already filed—just remember where the bad stuff is for Der Tag (p. 3878).

Mr. Lockwood had no recollection of the episode referred to in this exchange of memoranda. He did offer a comment regarding it, however:

At this time [he explained] the American Council was engaged in a number of research studies relating to American trade and investment and other particularly economic subjects, that is, trade, investment, et cetera, in the Far East, and of course at the same time we were receiving contributions for the support of the council's general program from a number of prominent American corporations, including certain corporations on the Pacific Coast like the American President Lines, Crockett (Crocker) National Bank, and so on. For this reason we were always acutely conscious of the problem of preserving not only the substance of the integrity and independence in our research work with respect to the sources of financial donations, but also avoiding even the appearance of bias or control or influence of improper character. My inference, therefore, which I think is supported by the substance of this memorandum, is that certain passages in this



correspondence seemed to suggest or might be taken by some outsider to suggest an improper relationship with certain American business concerns. This was evidently the reason why I was uneasy about its going in the files (p. 3879).

#### WHAT IS A COMMUNIST?

As already indicated, the subcommittee's investigation revolved around the basic question of whether or not there was concealed Communist control of IPR, which acted in turn upon American foreign policy and American public opinion to the detriment of American interests. During the course of the hearings, 54 persons connected in various ways with IPR were identified by witnesses as participants in the Communist world conspiracy against democracy.<sup>1</sup> There was the sharpest disagreement between these witnesses and IPR spokesmen, however, as to just what a Communist is.

Mrs. Hede Massing, herself a former participant in the conspiracy, was asked by the chairman whether she distinguished "between being an actual member (of the party) and a member in spirit." This was her reply:

Why, Senator McCarran, I would believe that even then (1938), and of course much more today, there are many more members in spirit than actually card-holding party members, because, as I have explained very often—and I hate to do this but I think it is rather necessary—for many party members it is an order not to take out party membership. For example, my affiliation really lasted for many years and though I was a Soviet agent and was closely connected with the German party, only for 2 weeks by mere coincidence actually was I a party member. Still my affiliation dates from 1918 or 1919 to 1938, which is quite a long time, and this goes for many people (p. 225).

Another former German party member, Dr. Karl Wittfogel, who is now professor of Chinese history at the University of Washington in Seattle, explained underground Communists this way:

If you lay all your cards on the table, how can you play the game? (p. 310).

Prof. George Edward Taylor, director of the University of Washington's Far Eastern Institute, offered a method of identification for those who, like himself, were never party members.

You have to build up a frame of references as to what the Soviet Union is after in general, what its relationships are to parties in the rest of the world, how they operate in general and how they operate in particular. Then you have to study your own field. You have to find out—and there are ways of doing this, of course—you have to find out what the general party line is on a given subject at a given time.

Then in the areas you know best you examine a man's writings and by what he leaves out sometimes as well as by what he puts in you decide whether he is dealing with all the facts that he should know if he knows anything about it at all or whether he is angling them in any particular manner.

Obviously with that type of interpretation it is extremely difficult to say exactly where a man would be in the hierarchy, how far away from the sun he would be, but you can, I think, with reasonable assurance over a given length of time decide whether certain people are following a consistent line or whether they are not (pp. 343-344).

Mr. Holland and his IPR associates did not accept such definitions as those quoted above. Mr. Holland indicated his own views in a discussion with Senator Eastland:

Senator EASTLAND. You do not find evidence of a large swarm of Communists in your organization?

Mr. HOLLAND. I find evidence of a small number of people who are alleged to have been Communists.

<sup>1</sup> Cited as Communist Party members, 46. Cited as collaborating with agents of the Soviet intelligence apparatus, 11 of above plus 8, making a total of 54 (pp. 147-148 of this report).

Senator EASTLAND. Who were they? How many Communists were in your organization there?

Mr. HOLLAND. Sir, I can tell you the name of only one whom I feel positive was a Communist at the time that he either worked for IPR or is—

Senator EASTLAND. That is Field, is it not?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, sir; it is not.

Senator EASTLAND. You do not think Frederick V. Field is a Communist?

Mr. HOLLAND. I indicated in my last testimony that I regard him as a 100 percent fellow traveler but at the time he worked for the institute I did not so feel and even now I am not convinced that he was a Communist at that time. In his recent activities as I indicated I regard him as a decided pro-Communist.

Senator EASTLAND. You think he is a pro-Communist but not a Communist?

Mr. HOLLAND. I have no evidence, sir, that he was a party member, but his actions were such that I regard him as a 100 percent fellow traveler. \* \* \*

I wish also to register this fact—and I do this again because I think I should be frank with the committee—that I personally very much regret and deplore the action of the persons here who have refused to answer the question of whether they were or were not Communists. I know that their refusal to do this creates a suspicion in the minds of some people that (they) really were at some time—

Senator EASTLAND. That suspicion is reasonable, is it not?

Mr. HOLLAND. I have indicated that I recognize it does create a suspicion in the minds of some people.

Senator EASTLAND. It is a reasonable suspicion, is it not?

Mr. HOLLAND. I wish to state what I have—

Senator EASTLAND. No; I want you to answer my question.

Mr. HOLLAND. My answer, sir, is that in some of these cases it seems to be a reasonable suspicion and in some it does not. In particular I want to emphasize that suspicion is not proof of guilt, and at least in some cases I am myself certain that these people were not Communists when they worked for the IPR.

Senator EASTLAND. Wouldn't you think that man who is accused of treason to his country—that is what a Communist is—who is accused of being the very vilest and lowest creature that there is, when he is asked the question whether he is guilty or not, would be most anxious if he wasn't guilty to say he was not guilty?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is the way I myself would react, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EASTLAND. Why of course.

Mr. HOLLAND. But I do know that there are circumstances in which a person to whom it has been indicated that there are three or four witnesses who are prepared to testify against him to this fact, would decline to answer even though he himself felt that the accusation was untrue, simply because he would feel that in the event of a perjury suit his word would not stand up against the words of four or five other witnesses (pp. 3898-3901).

Another IPR spokesman, Mr. Lattimore, indicated doubt as to whether the Soviet Government itself is a part of the Communist conspiracy. When asked by Senator Ferguson as to whether he came to the conclusion "if you ever did, that it is a conspiracy and has in mind installing its form of government world-wide," Mr. Lattimore replied:

Senator, I believe that involves questions of relations between the Russian Government, the Comintern and the Communist Parties of various countries on which I am not versed (p. 3494).

Mr. Carter expressed the view that Earl Browder, former secretary of the American Communist Party, is "100 percent American" (p. 175).

#### EARLY YEARS

Looking backward over his 27 years with IPR, E. C. Carter told the subcommittee:

I have done my role. My role has been more to organize and secure experts than to pose as an expert myself. My position has been more managerial than highly trained research person (p. 52).

His function, he explained, was—

to distinguish scholars from nonscholars (p. 52).

Mr. Carter was secretary of the American Council, 1926-33.<sup>1</sup> He was its sole staff member until 1928, when he employed as his assistant a recent Harvard graduate, Frederick Vanderbilt Field (p. 79). Three years later Mr. Field's Harvard classmate and friend, Joseph Barnes, joined the growing American secretariat (p. 4035). Barnes' wife, Mrs. Kathleen Barnes, became an IPR employee in 1934 (p. 2600). Harriet Moore went to work for the council shortly after her graduation from Bryn Mawr in 1932 (p. 2561).

In 1929, Mr. Holland came from Australia to take a post as junior research assistant in IPR's Pacific Council office, which was then in Honolulu (p. 1213). The same year Lucy Knox joined the Pacific Council staff (p. 3906). (The council's office was later moved to New York, though the date of the move does not appear in the record. Minutes of an IPR meeting held in Moscow on April 12, 1936, note that Mr. Carter "explained the controversy between himself and the Honolulu group" (p. 3174), but the explanation itself is not recorded.)

In 1933 Mr. Carter became secretary general, and hence chief executive officer, of the Pacific Council, which is IPR's over-all international body (p. 6). The same year he established Owen Lattimore as editor of the Pacific Council's new international quarterly, Pacific Affairs. "I recruited him," Mr. Carter recalls (p. 21).

I was in constant contact with Lattimore throughout the times he was on the staff \* \* \* I am quite frank to say that I regarded him as a good American, a great scholar, and one of the best authorities on Asia (p. 59).

Mr. Field stepped into Mr. Carter's former post as executive secretary of the American Council (p. 80). Miss Hilda Austern, Miss Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley, and Miss Kate Louise Mitchell were added to the list of IPR personnel (exhibit 801).

The practice of holding periodic international conferences, begun in 1925, had been regularly observed through the years. At the 1933 conference held in Banff, Canada, a Chinese delegate named Chen Han-seng had made his bow to the IPR audience (p. 4590). In 1936 plans were being made for another international conference at Yosemite, which was to be attended by the members of the recently formed Soviet Council of IPR (p. 3139).

#### IPR AND U. S. S. R.

What was the relationship of the Soviet IPR to the American and Pacific Councils?<sup>2</sup> Secretary General Holland said this:

A Russian scientific society, the Pacific Institute, was admitted as a national council in 1934. \* \* \* The Russians were never active, however, except on one occasion, in 1936. \* \* \* After 1939 they took no part in the institute's activities, neglecting to answer even routine correspondence (p. 1225).

Ambassador Philip C. Jessup, who was chairman of IPR's American Council, chairman of its international institute, and chairman of its research committee in the late thirties and early forties, said this:

A national council was established in the U. S. S. R., the Soviet Union, in 1934, but did not participate at all in the activities of the Pacific council after 1939 (hearing before this committee on June 20, 1952).

<sup>1</sup> Secretary American IPR, 1926-33; honorary secretary and treasurer, U. S. group, second conference, 1927; secretary general, 1933-46; secretary, American Council, fifth conference 1933; trustee, 1936-51; acting secretary, American IPR, 1941; executive committee, 1941-46; nominating committee, 1941; corporate membership committee, 1941; executive vice chairman, 1944-47, Indian-American conference, 1949. (Source: Conference and annual reports for above years.)

<sup>2</sup> Voluminous data regarding the Soviet story was found in the institute's files. All of this data will be considered hereafter. For the moment, we confine ourselves to those items which touch on the spirit of the Soviet-American Pacific relationships.



Jerome D. Greene, a founder of IPR, who took the stand at the institute's own request, said this:

\* \* \* It was hardly surprising that Russian participation in the institute amounted to little, and was abandoned in 1939 \* \* \* (p. 3857).

W. W. Lockwood, present IPR trustee, and former executive secretary of the American council, another who appeared at the institute's request, also spoke of the Russians refusal to take any effective part in IPR work (p. 3867).

In December 1934 E. C. Carter, then secretary general, took his staff to Moscow for a series of conferences with the newly established Soviet council. On his return, he wrote a long letter to Frederick V. Field, then executive secretary of the American council, describing his impressions of the Soviet group. The letter contained handwritten instructions that it "may be shown to all in the office who are interested \* \* \* (p. 4569). It was not, however, "for general circulation" (p. 4569). These are some of Mr. Carter's observations:

From copies of letters which I have already sent you, you must have realized by now that the U. S. S. R. group could not have begun to work under better auspices. A majority of the members of the committee are members of the party. All are influential, all are operating large organizations that have very substantial funds. \* \* \* (p. 4567).

Their official hospitality was discriminating and yet overwhelming in its abundance. They realized that our main job was serious discussion, but their provision for entertainment was a striking demonstration of the fact that the whole machinery of the State and of the scientific world was at the disposal of the secretary general (p. 4569).

Mr. Carter also reported officially to the IPR staff that—

The atmosphere of the entire visit was one of the most friendly hospitality and cordial cooperation. It seemed evident that the Soviet group has determined to cooperate fully with the IPR, both in principle and in fact (p. 4507).

In 1937 Mr. Carter made another trip to the U. S. S. R. This was described in a letter to Owen Lattimore, which said:

Motylev (chief of the Soviet council) arranged for me to go several places in the Soviet Far East to which no non-Soviet citizen has ever been invited. The people in the British and American Embassies in Moscow were most envious and wanted to use my visit as a precedent to get permission to go to places like Komsomolsk themselves \* \* \*.

With reference to Pacific Affairs the atmosphere was totally different from that which characterized our discussions when you and I were in Moscow (in 1936). At that time, you will remember, Motylev was on the offensive, particularly because of the Isaacs article and relationship. This year Motylev and Bremman were not even on the defensive \* \* \*. They wanted me to explain to you that they were thoroughly ashamed of their failure to send articles and they made the most solemn kind of resolves to themselves (to) write and send you something \* \* \*.

You will have gathered by now that the Soviet IPR extended to me every possible facility and courtesy throughout my stay in the Soviet Union. The members of no council have made more comprehensive plans for a visit of an officer of the international secretariat or incurred as great expense (pp. 4570-4571).

In 1939 Mr. Carter again reported on a visit to the Soviet Union. The report this time was sent to Dr. Jessup, who was at that time chairman of both the American and Pacific councils. It referred to Motylev's—

\* \* \* deepening confidence in the value of the institute and a desire deeper than ever before to find ways and means of strengthening the work of the institute throughout the world \* \* \* (p. 2728).

\* \* \* Motylev and Voitinsky asked whether I thought we could get through our joint program of IPR and general discussion if 2 hours each day for 5 days were assigned for the purpose. I replied in the affirmative but the discussions became of such mutual advantage that we averaged 5 or 6 hours together each day during my visit (p. 2729).

Mr. Carter's final trip, as far as the record shows, took place in August 1945. Here is part of what he wrote about that trip to Mr. Lattimore:

I found that some highly placed official in every Commissariat that I had to work with, was broadly informed as to the work of the IPR, and fairly beamed that I had so timed my visit as to arrive in Moscow on the very day that the U. S. S. R. went to war with Japan (pp. 2591-2592).

There were other documents in the files which threw more light on the IPR-U. S. S. R. relationship. A letter from Mr. Carter to A. J. Kantorovich, of the Soviet Council, dated November 23, 1934, states:

\* \* \* there are always a considerable number of Soviet employees in the Soviet consulate and Amtorg, whom we have always found ready to assist the IPR whenever requested \* \* \* (p. 3929).

The report of a round-table discussion during the institute's international conference at Yosemite in 1936, records Mr. Lattimore as saying:

\* \* \* The rise of the Soviet Union has vindicated the efficiency and practice of an economic system quite different from that of the other powers \* \* \* (p. 578).

Several documents refer to the exchange of books and manuscripts between New York and Moscow. On April 18 Mr. Carter passed along a gift from Moscow to Chen Han-seng, a member of the IPR staff, with these words:

This is a big day in the life of the IPR for the first volume of Dr. Motylev's great Soviet World Atlas has today arrived. Two precious copies have come, one addressed to Holland and one addressed to me. Here, for your close perusal for a few hours is Holland's copy. Keep it safely and see that it is locked up at night (p. 2705).

On August 29, 1939, E. V. Harondar of the Soviet Council sent a number of volumes to Mrs. Kathleen Barnes of the Americal Council. They included an English edition of the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Mr. Louis Budenz commented on the receipt of the latter volume as follows:

If I am correct, this is an advance copy before the American Communists got it. We must understand the significance of this book, that it is the foundation stone today of Communist doctrine (p. 647).

Considerable data in reference to the Moscow purge trials was also found. An exchange of letters between Kate Mitchell of the IPR Secretariat and Mr. Holland, contained these references to the trial:

From Miss Mitchell to Mr. Holland:

Carter and I spent about 4 hours with Umansky at the Soviet Embassy on Saturday and got quite a lot of interesting side lights on the Moscow trials—particularly with regard to Romm (p. 4587).

From Mr. Holland to Miss Mitchell:

I'm intrigued by your tantalizing brief remark about Umansky's comments on Romm. Do tell (p. 4588).



Mr. Carter. wrote to Mr. Holland on March 5, 1937, as follows (p. 3932):

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,  
New York City, March 5, 1937.

Mr. WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,  
*Food Research Institute, Stanford University, Calif.*

DEAR BILL: You will, I think, be able to help people who have been perplexed by the recent Moscow trials to realize that they make sense by loaning them a copy of the verbatim report of the Proceedings of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court. January 23-30, 1937. I have just managed to secure a few copies and I am sending one to you under separate cover, as I know you will find it fascinating and will want to read it all the way through.

I think also that the very able law professor whom Alsberg so greatly admires will want to read it also.

The Trotskyists in this country are doing so much to play into the hands of Americans who are anti-Soviet that the appearance of this book is most timely. It looks to me as though those Americans who are delighting in the Trotskyists attack on the U. S. S. R. are ignorant of the fact that in supporting Trotsky they are supporting a war-maker, Trotsky's denials notwithstanding.

When the volume has been read by those whom you and Alsberg think would most appreciate it, it should be put in the library of the IPR in San Francisco.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

On March 24, 1938, Mr. Carter addressed a meeting in Mecca Temple, New York City, at which Soviet Ambassador Troyanovsky and others discussed the trials. Mr. Carter said:

When they (the Russian people) think of the trials, they are thankful that their Government has at last been firm in dealing with what they regard as Fascist-supported intrigue to overthrow the Government of the Soviet Union (p. 296).

A few days later, Mr. Carter and Mr. Jessup exchanged these letters (pp. 889-890):

Prof. PHILIP C. JESSUP,  
*Norfolk, Conn.*

DEAR JESSUP: Would you be interested in dining with me and a few others at the Century Club at 7:15 on the evening of Wednesday, April 20, to listen to a 100 percent Bolshevik view of the Moscow trials? I have invited Constantine Oumansky, the able, two-fisted counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, to come to New York that evening to speak to a little dinner of a dozen of my friends and then submit himself to the frankest questions that any of my guests care to put?

If it is possible to accept, I can promise you a provocative and interesting evening.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

BIRCHFIELD,  
*Norfolk, Conn., April 2, 1938.*

DEAR MR. CARTER: I accept eagerly and gratefully for Wednesday, the 20th. Many thanks.

Sincerely yours,

PHILIP C. JESSUP.

On pages 371-372, of the September 1938 issue of *Pacific Affairs*, Mr. Lattimore wrote:

The real point, of course, for those who live in democratic countries, is whether the discovery of the conspiracies was a triumph for democracy or not. I think that this can easily be determined. The accounts of the most widely read Moscow correspondents all emphasize that since the close scrutiny of every person in a responsible position, following the trials, a great many abuses have been discovered and rectified. A lot depends on whether you emphasize the discovery of the abuse or the rectification of it; but habitual rectification can hardly do

anything but give the ordinary citizen more courage to protest, loudly, whenever in the future he finds himself being victimized by "someone in the party" or "someone in the Government." That sounds to me like democracy.

Mr. Lattimore was in Europe at the time of the signing of the Hitler-Stalin pact, which precipitated World War II. The day after the signing of the pact, Mr. Carter sent him a cable from the United States, asking him to proceed immediately to Moscow. Mr. Lattimore did not receive the cable until after he had boarded ship for the voyage home (p. 68).

A few days after the sending of this cable, Mr. Carter forwarded an article on Soviet-German relations written by IPR staff member Harriett Moore to Dr. Motylev in Moscow.

On the following January 15, he wrote Dr. Motylev to inform him that—

\* \* \* the pen name of Dr. Chen Han-seng and Miss Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley are Raymond D. Brooke and Edith Cromwell (p. 50). (Dr. Chen Han-seng and Miss Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley were IPR staff members.)

On February 16, 1940, Mr. Carter wrote this to Mr. Motylev (p. 891):

DEAR MOTYLEV: You will, I think, be interested in the enclosed clipping from the New York Herald Tribune of February 15, 1940, giving the views of Dr. Philip C. Jessup with reference to the *City of Flint* at Murmansk.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

The clipping referred to contained this paragraph:

Dr. Jessup paid tribute to naval officers, who were, he said, the firmest supporters of international law at present. He declared that the Soviet Union had committed no violation of international law in holding the freighter *City of Flint* at Murmansk. The action of the British naval patrol, however, in forcing the *Mormacsun* to enter a belligerent port he described as contrary to the neutrality laws of the United States and to accepted principles of international law (p. 891).

#### THE APPROACH TO THE COMINTERN

Mr. Carter's predecessor as secretary general of the Pacific Council was J. Merle Davis. In the 1929 edition of the IPR publication, *Problems of the Pacific*, Mr. Davis gave this account of trips he had taken during the two preceding years:

\* \* \* In the autumn of 1927 and winter of 1927-28 the General Secretary visited Canada, the United States, England, and the Continent of Europe. He spent a month at Geneva studying the organization and program of the League of Nations and the International Labor Office and making contacts with their Secretariats. He then visited Moscow, met with Foreign Office officials and Third International leaders to whom he explained the Institute of Pacific Relations. Through the Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, he was able to hold a conference with a group of specialists representing the principal Russian scientific societies interested in far eastern and Pacific questions. Tentative plans were made with this group and a committee was formed for the purpose of cooperation with the Institute of Pacific Relations and participation in the 1929 conference (exhibit 1368).

Mr. Davis' efforts to arrange for Soviet participation in the 1929 conference did not bear fruit, but in 1931 the Soviet Union accepted membership in IPR. According to the institute's own account, how-

<sup>4</sup> The Third International to which Mr. Davis referred was, of course, the Communist International or Comintern, which was created and maintained by the Kremlin for the purpose of organizing the world revolution against democracy.

ever, "The committee which was formed existed only on paper" (p. 4577).

In 1932 Miss Lucy Knox, who had been employed in the institute's Honolulu office, went to the U. S. S. R. to join the staff of the Moscow Daily News. The editor of this paper was Michael Borodin. Several witnesses were questioned regarding the Moscow Daily News and its editor. They were in agreement that the News was "a Soviet publication" written in English, and Borodin was "the chief engineer" of the first Chinese Communist revolution, which was planned in 1919 by Lenin himself (pp. 2451, 2719, 4583).

On December 11, 1933, Mr. Holland wrote Miss Knox a letter, a copy of which he sent to Mr. Lattimore. The letter follows, in part:

[Copy to OL]

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,  
New York City, December 11, 1933.

MISS LUCY KNOX,  
*Moscow Daily News, Moscow, U. S. S. R.*

MY DEAR LUCY: Doreen and I were greatly cheered to get your charming exposition of latter-day Marxism. I took the liberty of showing it to a number of people in the New York office, to their great enjoyment. I am awfully glad that you are learning, however late in life, a little something about the economic foundations of history. Unfortunately, of course, you are in the wrong country for studying social revolutions, and I should advise you to hurry back to New York as soon as you can in order to witness the last vestiges of capitalism in this country before it is quietly buried under a pile of codes written at Washington by a bevy of young professors from Columbia. I say it in all seriousness because you simply have no realization of the way in which rugged individualism is being maltreated over here. Liquidation of the Kullak was a mere trifle compared to the liquidation of Wall Street by the new boys at Washington.

We are immensely interested at the office in your pleasant remarks about Borodine, so much so that I am asked by Owen Lattimore, who, as you perhaps know, has been made editor of the new Pacific Affairs, on a quarterly basis, to inquire whether you could discuss with Borodine the possibility of his writing an article for us of five or six thousand words on some aspect of his work in the Chinese Revolution, or on present-day opinion in the Soviet Union on the development of communism in China. If Borodine himself does not wish to write, would it be possible for you to interview him and let us have the article in that form? I do not need to tell you that we really do not mind what the subject is about so long as it has to do with the Pacific in some way. We really are crazy to get something from Borodine \* \* \*.

Joe Barnes expects to leave for Moscow in January to spend 4 months or so over there. If you could arrange it, I know he would be more than delighted to use you in some secretarial capacity. \* \* \* Now that Barnes is going to Russia and Field to London early next year and Mr. Carter, as new general secretary, is setting off on the first of his world tours in February, I have been ordered to remain in New York during the winter, so that I shall probably go directly out to Japan in the spring. I want, if possible, to remain there for 12 months and produce a colossal book on Japan's tottering economic framework \* \* \* (p. 2720).

Mr. Lattimore does not recall that he was "crazy to get something from Borodin," as reported by Mr. Holland to Miss Knox. When he appeared before the subcommittee, Mr. Lattimore said:

I certainly never had any dealings with Mike Borodin (p. 3506).

Negotiations with Moscow were continued more actively after Mr. Carter became secretary-general. Here is how he himself described it:

Oumansky was a Russian Communist, a militant Communist. He had been, I think, press officer for the Russian Foreign Office in Moscow. Later he came as Ambassador to this country.



It so happened in one of my several visits to Moscow, trying to get the Soviet scholars interested in the Orient to form a Soviet chapter of the IPR, I was finally channeled to Oumansky's office. I had a long talk with him.

The Soviet officials had been negative before Oumansky listened, asked for IPR documents; said that he thought the IPR had proved itself as a scholarly and useful organization and that he had no power to say whether or not a decision would be made to form a Soviet IPR, but he would take it up with the highest quarters.

You can guess who that was.

That I might never hear from him again, or I might be called back, he said.

A few months later I was called back and the Soviet IPR was organized.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it organized in the highest quarters at that time when you were called back?

Mr. CARTER. Apparently high quarters approved the idea. The people I met were so-called researchers on Asia and the Pacific.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you realize at the same time that Mr. Oumansky was an important intelligence agent for the Soviet Union?

Mr. CARTER. He was in the Foreign Office \* \* \* (p. 152).

Mr. Bogolepov, former counselor of the Soviet Foreign Office, said that Oumansky "came to the Foreign Office directly from the intelligence school, military intelligence" (p. 4584).

As noted in Mr. Holland's letter, Mr. Barnes was sent to Moscow in 1934. Mr. Carter joined him there in the spring. On May 26, they had an "informal conversation" at the Communist Academy in Moscow with two Soviet officials, Voitinski and Abramson.<sup>5</sup> During the conversation, according to the minutes thereof, "Both Mr. Voitinski and Mr. Abramson spoke with sincere appreciation of Mr. Barnes' helpfulness, his good command of Russian and his genuine acceptability" (p. 2702).

As a result of all this activity, the Soviet Council of IPR came into existence in July 1934. Here is Moscow's own account of the event, as printed in the Soviet quarterly *Tikhii Okean* (The Pacific Ocean):

#### INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS IN THE U. S. S. R.

The International Institute of Pacific Relations, at present, consists of the national Pacific institutes of the United States of America, Japan, China, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines. At its regular conference, held at Shanghai in 1931, a unanimous decision was passed to invite the U. S. S. R. to join the institute. This invitation was repeatedly reiterated in the name of the institute by its secretary-general. The scientific research and economic organizations of the U. S. S. R., which are interested in the problems of the Soviet Far East and of the Pacific Ocean, decided to accept the invitation of the international institute.

To this end, the said organizations resolved to combine their efforts directed to the study of the above-mentioned problems and to establish a special Pacific Institute.

The founding meeting of the Pacific Institute of the U. S. S. R. took place on July 28, 1934, in Moscow. Present at the meeting were representatives of the NII (Institute for Scientific Research) of the Great Soviet World Atlas, the All Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the Institute of Oceanography, the Administration of the Great Northern Sea Route, the Chamber of Commerce, the Institute of World Economics and World Politics, the Kamchatka Joint Stock Co., and the East Fish Trust.

Thus, the above-listed institutions become the founding members of the Pacific Institute of the U. S. S. R.

The following board of the institute was elected at the founding meeting:

- (1) President of the institute: Prof. V. E. Motylev (director of the Scientific Research Institute of the Great Soviet World Atlas).
- (2) Vice president: G. N. Voitinski (chief of the Pacific "cabinet" of the Institute of World Economics and World Politics).

<sup>5</sup> These 2 individuals, as well as the meeting itself, will be further discussed at another point in this report.

- (3) A. Ia. Arosev (Chairman of the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries).
- (4) K. A. Mekhonoshin (director of the Institute of Oceanography).
- (5) S. S. Ioffe (deputy chief of the administration of the Great Northern Sea Route).
- (6) A. S. Svandze (director of the Bank for Foreign Trade).
- (7) I. A. Adamovich (chairman of the Kamchatka Joint-Stock Co.).
- (8) Ia. D. Ianson (president of the chamber of commerce).
- (9) Ia. M. Berkovich (manager of the East Fish Trust).

Mr. A. Kantorovich was appointed secretary-general of the institute.

The chairman of the new institute, Comrade Motylev, addressed a letter to the secretary-general of the International Institute of Pacific Relations notifying him that the Pacific institute, which had been established in the U. S. S. R., was prepared to join the international institute as a member in response to the invitation extended by the conference of the international institute held in Shanghai in 1931.

At the beginning of September V. E. Motylev received a reply from Mr. Carter who welcomed the U. S. S. R. as a new member of the International Institute for Pacific Relations (pp. 189-190).

Some time after the founding meeting in Moscow, an unsigned, undated Report on Soviet Relations With the Institute of Pacific Relations was circulated among IPR's New York staff. The report was marked "Confidential—Not for Distribution Outside the Office." It contained these paragraphs:

*A. Pacific Council.*—The Soviet Union accepted membership in the IPR in 1931. The committee which was formed existed only on paper. More recently a new attempt has been made to organize a Soviet council, much more promising of success. The formulas of international cooperation are difficult for the Soviets to master, and our chances of getting the full substance of cooperation will decrease in measure as we put emphasis on the constitutional and organizational problems involved. \* \* \*

In the past, many of the institute's contacts in Moscow have been made with Narkomindel, the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Several IPR official invitations have been extended to the Soviet Union through this department. In the future, it is recommended that the institute be punctilious in treating the Soviet Foreign Office as it would the Japanese or British. This means that it is legitimate to cultivate it, and to make every effort to secure its unofficial support. At the same time, it would be well to recognize the same fiction of independence as in other countries.

The fiction is even more potent in the Soviet Union than, for example, in Japan, but it is quite apparent that the Soviet Union itself is going to maintain it. Several Soviet organizations, such as VOKS, the Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, and TASS, the Soviet news agency, have been established with very careful legal autonomy. Whether the Soviet council of the institute is established under VOKS, or as a separate organization, the institute would do well to regard it in correspondence, etc., as an entirely independent and unofficial organization.

Such a policy would have advantages outside of the field of institute relations with the Soviet Union. It is fairly important to take safeguards against any circumstances arising which might provide ammunition for these non-Soviet members of the institute who may suspect Bolshevik propaganda in the work of the Soviet council. If a clear distinction is established and maintained in institute circles between the Soviet council and Narkomindel, it will help in any such contingency. \* \* \*

*C. Program and conference.*—It is difficult to predict whether the Soviet council will be very much or very little interested in this aspect of the institute, or to decide which would be the more to be deplored. \* \* \*

The two most important institutions in the Soviet Union for cultivation are the Institute of World Economics and Politics, which is a part of the Communist Academy and which is itself a sort of holding company for the Institute on China, and the library of the Communist Academy. \* \* \*

*A. Exchange of publications.*—The shortage of valuta in the Soviet Union and the high legal price of rubles to foreigners makes exchange almost the only practicable way of building up resources in books and periodicals about the Soviet

Union. Arrangements for exchange of Pacific Affairs and the IPR memoranda are listed in the attached folder. A special file in Miss Austern's charge contains full details of exchange arrangements. \* \* \*

*B. Establishment of a research library.*—Except for the New York Public Library, there is no effective Russian library in New York. Especially on questions of current interest and involving the Pacific, there is really no good library at all. Such a library would not be hard to develop over a period of years and the demand for it would be very large. The present collection of the American Council constitutes an excellent nucleus. It has been built so far by exchange and gift, and very little support would be needed to catalog it and enlarge it.

The possibility of the Soviet authorities endowing or supporting a New York library to the extent of making it a depository for a very large number of Russian publications has been discussed frequently in recent months. If the American Council wished to pursue the idea, and were in a position to provide the necessary staff, there is no reason why it should not be made such a depository for books on international economic and political relations, on Siberia, etc. Such a move would have to be made jointly by the American Council in New York and Washington and by the Secretary General in Moscow (pp. 4577-4579).

Further Soviet-American meetings were scheduled for the end of the year. Miss Moore was sent ahead to prepare the ground work. Mr. Holland wrote her a letter, in which he said:

I quite envy you your job, and I look forward to seeing a swell report as a result of it. I hope, however, that you will not stay forever in Russia, but will at least find time to come and see Doreen and me in Japan or China. Perhaps this will easily be arranged when China and Japan have become dependent territories of the Soviet Union so that you can come here and study the nationality problems of the natives. "Here's to the day" (p. 3909).

When asked why he had hailed "the day when China and Japan have become dependent territories of the Soviet Union," Mr. Holland replied:

I cannot honestly remember, Mr. Chairman (p. 3908).

#### COVER-SHOP, DOUBLE-WAY TRACK OR ASSOCIATION OF SCHOLARS?

Meanwhile, what was actually going on inside the U. S. S. R.?

The answer to this question lies within a tangle of sworn testimony, letters, reports, memoranda, minutes of meetings, and selections from formal publications, which are scattered through the entire record. The correct evaluation of this data was important to the subcommittee's investigation, since it revolved around the question of what IPR actually was.

Was it a "cover-shop" (p. 202) and a "double-way track" (p. 4491), as Messrs. Barmine and Bogolepov asserted? Or was it an international association of scholarly inquiry?

The evaluation referred to necessarily involved the closest scrutiny of the qualifications of Messrs. Barmine and Bogolepov, in order to determine the credibility of their statements. In the case of Mr. Barmine, the chairman found it necessary to assure him for reasons that will become apparent:

You need be in nowise fearful of any reprisal being made on you by any agency of the Government or outside the Government (p. 181).

Alexander Gregory Barmine informed the subcommittee that he had told the story he was about to tell us, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, several years ago, but had never before told it on any witness stand (p. 211).

At present he is chief of the Russian unit of the State Department's Voice of America. He is a naturalized American who received his



citizenship in New York City on July 15, 1943, after honorable discharge from the United States Army, where he served as a private. He had been a brigadier general in Russia's Red Army, and was serving as Acting Ambassador of the Soviet Union to Greece in 1937, when he became a Russian refugee as a result of Stalin's great purge.

Mr. Barmine asserted that most of his former classmates in general staff school had been "accused and shot" during the purge, although he "knew well that they were innocent" (p. 184). He said that the Soviet secret police followed him to France in an effort to kill him (p. 207). He told this story of his efforts to fight Communist infiltration in the United States Government:

From the Army I was transferred to OSS and I remained in OSS, in the Office of Strategic Services, until the fall of 1944. At the same time I began to work as editorial adviser to Reader's Digest. In 1944 I wrote an article in the Reader's Digest about Communist infiltration in the Government apparatus in the United States.

When I was writing this article I had in mind the background of all the things I told you, but I was not considering it possible or proper to bring it out publicly. What I wanted, I wanted to warn the Government about infiltration, about the way, about the plans, and about the scope of the danger. I was discharged from the Office of Strategic Services after that (p. 212).

Mr. Barmine declared that following this incident, he remained with Reader's Digest in an editorial capacity and learned about a Chinese problem in relation with American foreign policy (p. 212). He said:

I was very much worried about the course that this development took, and about the propaganda that was spread at this time on China (p. 212).

He told of a book review he had written of Owen Lattimore's *Solution in Asia* in which he (Barmine) described Lattimore's advice as "camouflaged Communist propaganda" (p. 212). The review concluded thus:

This surrender of faith in democracy in favor of Soviet totalitarianism is permeating American public opinion. Under its influence America is in danger of adopting in Asia this same so-called realistic policy of appeasement and self-abdication which will not only abandon to totalitarianism several small nations, as in Europe, but hundreds of millions of Asiatics. This folly may ultimately spell the doom of democracy throughout the world (p. 215).

This appeared in the *New Leader* for April 7, 1945 (p. 213).

Mr. Barmine's qualifications for discussing the IPR were based on his former connections with Soviet military intelligence. He said that he had first heard of the IPR as a cover shop when he was engaged in an underground gun-running enterprise for the U. S. S. R., in the Chinese province of Sinkiang during the early 1930's (p. 195). His information about IPR came first from General Berzin, Chief of Military Intelligence (p. 202), and was supplemented by further discussions with other officers attached to Berzin's command (p. 203). Mr. Barmine also testified that he checked the IPR story during his flight to Paris in 1937 by several interviews with Gen. Walter Krivitsky (pp. 206-207). General Krivitsky was himself a high official of U. S. S. R. military intelligence who fled the purge (p. 207). Mr. Barmine's story regarding IPR will be detailed below.

Mr. Bogolepov also had a diplomatic and military intelligence career in the U. S. S. R. He testified that he was one of those who attempted to utilize the German invasion of Russia as a means for overthrowing Stalin and bringing freedom to the Russian people (p. 4487). He broadcast propaganda against Stalin from behind

the German lines (p. 4487). But his efforts at rebellion failed and he learned that the Germans, too, wanted "to enslave our people and to ruin our country" (p. 4581).

He stated that he had been "involved in some literary and scientific activities" in the Communist Academy, which brought him into direct personal contact with persons associated with the IPR (p. 4488). He said:

Actually I was working under the same roof, and with the same people, who were connected with the American Institute of Pacific Relations. Here was the chief source of my information \* \* \*. The second part of my information I got directly from the secret files of the Soviet Foreign Office (p. 4488).

Mr. Bogolepov is presently employed by the United States Government on an assignment which the subcommittee is not at liberty to disclose.

#### BARMINE'S STORY

Pertinent parts of Mr. Barmine's testimony follow (pp. 193-211):

Mr. BARMINE. I remained 1 year on this job. At this time for several years the Soviet Government was carrying the export of arms to the country of China. \* \* \*

The Politburo decision was to consolidate all of it in one organization under cover of the Foreign Trade Department. So there was the decision of the Politburo at the end of 1933 to organize a special corporation. The name of the corporation was Auto-Motor Export Corp. This is one of the corporations of the Foreign Trade Department. This corporation has an official charter approved by the Government for the export of automobiles and motors. \* \* \*

\* \* \* But there was a secret part of the charter which gave to this corporation full and complete control in the execution of all of the export of arms from the Soviet Union \* \* \*.

The War Department and Marshal Tukachevsky, who was Assistant Commissioner of Defense, offered my name as president of this corporation. \* \* \*

I held this position until the end of 1935, when I asked to be relieved. \* \* \*

I was president of the corporation and I was director of this motor department. I had to handle these things directly. With this work you had to be in daily contact with the War Department and with military intelligence because of the things you had to do in a hurry. \* \* \*

This job kept me not only in contact with the War Department but, besides that, that was the year of the most constant and close cooperation with General Berzin because he, from the War Department, was charged with handling this side of it. \* \* \*

Mr. MORRIS. In this connection did you ever hear of the organization Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes; I did. \* \* \* In order to come to it, I would like to mention the thing that brought the Institute of Pacific Relations in \* \* \*.

At the end of 1933, when I was taking over the job of the export of arms and delivery, one of the unfinished jobs we took was the export of arms in Sinkiang. That is a Province in western China. \* \* \*

The Governor of the Province was friendly. At this time there was a Moslem revolt in Sinkiang. We were delivering artillery, planes, ammunition, shells, and rifles for this government. In fact, the situation deteriorated so rapidly that, once a lot of these things arrived at the Sinkiang border, Uramchi, the capital, was surrounded by rebels. So, I was ordered to put the bombs on the planes. These bombs were delivered right on the heads of the rebels around Uramchi. Then the Chinese Governor was billed later for this ammunition as delivered \* \* \*.

We were dealing only with the Governor of West Sinkiang. At this time two brigades of the secret-police troops walked into Sinkiang. They participated and tried to liquidate the rebellion. This was never published in the press.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you speaking of Soviet troops?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes; two brigades of NVD troops crossed the border.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify NVD?

Mr. BARMINE. Ministry of Internal Affairs Security Police.

Mr. MORRIS. The Russian Security Police?



Mr. BARMINE. That is right. There were two full infantry brigades with artillery. When our artillery arrived to Sinkiang after this rebellion was dispersed, the NVD troops took over the new artillery pieces which I was delivering there and left the Chinese the old ones, which they used in suppressing the rebellion \* \* \*.

After the rebellion was suppressed, the central committee and the Chinese commission of the Politburo decided to send a commission to Sinkiang which would work up a large plan of reconstruction, of financial help, of military help, of building the roads, airdromes, the delivery of the means of transportation, and so on.

The president of this commission was appointed, and he was a brother-in-law of Stalin who went to Sinkiang and remained there several months.

Mr. MORRIS. He is the man we had previously identified?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right. I got in contact with Svanidze after they returned. They returned with the proposals which were discussed in the Sinkiang commission of the Politburo. They were approved by the Politburo. We had to equip completely 10,000 troops which would be independent under the orders of the governor of the Province. The son of the governor, the young colonel, came to Moscow and stayed and worked in contact with my office.

The plan included building of hangars, airdromes, roads, completing the aviation line established there, then completely equipping and organizing and training the 10,000 troops. Of course, it was not acknowledged, this question of dismemberment or complete separation of Sinkiang. It was still part of Nationalist China. So, among the equipment I had to deliver we even had to make Kuomintang stars, 10,000, which would be put on their hats. \* \* \*

This affair took several months, and during this affair the problem came up about China proper, about the Pacific coast of China. General Berzin inquired of me if I am doing something in the line of the automobile department and the export of cars in eastern China. I said we were only starting. \* \* \*

We had huge deliveries to Mongolia but nothing to China proper. \* \* \*

He asked me if it would be possible that the War Department and Military Intelligence would be interested in building on certain points along the China coast in eastern China the secret cache of arms and ammunition. \* \* \*

This is a delicate situation. The corporation belongs to the Foreign Trade Department. The decision about any operation was to be approved by the Politburo. I couldn't deliver any arms without special decision by the Politburo, signed by Stalin himself. \* \* \*

The first of my objections to General Berzin was that this is a very delicate affair. You have to have reliable people. Then you have to have competent people in charge of those branches.

Mr. MORRIS. When you use the term "reliable" you mean people loyal to your organization?

Mr. BARMINE. No. I mean people who would be trained in carrying this kind of secret operation out, who would have military training to take care of arms and who would be responsible enough not to let these things all open.

Senator FERGUSON. That was secret, the armed part of your corporation?

Mr. BARMINE. Always top secret.

Senator FERGUSON. Putting it in the warehouse, putting the motors and the automobiles in the warehouse, was secret because, after all, they were arms and ammunition?

Mr. BARMINE. The Soviet Government didn't care about it being known we are exporting arms. \* \* \*

General Berzin said, "We might give you our men."

Mr. MORRIS. They are members of the Soviet military intelligence organization?

Mr. BARMINE. When General Berzin said, "I might give you our men," I assumed that is the only thing he could mean. I didn't question him more.

In this connection several names were mentioned. Now I have to state here most of the personnel, except the top supervising jobs \* \* \* were used in underground work by military intelligence which was completely separate of what we were doing in the Foreign Office, and that work was carried by the foreigners, people with foreign passports, born in foreign countries, because they would not be so obvious as Russians. All the top controlling positions would be Russians and even not always that. Most of the personnel would be all professional intelligence people, recruited from the different groups, people recruited among the sympathizers of Communist causes or even men specially assigned by the foreign Communist Party for military intelligence work.

Of course, at the moment when they would be detached for the military intelligence work they would have to break any connection, formal connection, with the Communist Party. \* \* \*

When the question of using military men of the intelligence apparatus came to discussion, several names were mentioned of foreign nationalities. \* \* \*

Mr. MORRIS. Who were the Americans?

Mr. BARMINE. Owen Lattimore and Joseph Barnes.

Mr. MORRIS. They were mentioned as "Our people" by Berzin who could be assigned to this project you were complaining about where you did not have the personnel to staff.

Mr. BARMINE. We played with this idea. \* \* \*

We spent hours in long conferences on these. This was 15 or 16 years ago.

Senator FERGUSON. Just give it to us the best you can.

Mr. BARMINE. To tell you exactly what words, I would not like to say anything I don't remember very firmly.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us your recollection of that conversation and subsequent conversations?

Mr. BARMINE. All I can recollect is subsequent conversations, the question of the personnel or reliable people who ought to organize it or put in charge or to start this business \* \* \*

Senator EASTLAND. He spoke of Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Barnes as two agents of Soviet military intelligence.

Mr. BARMINE. He spoke of them as "our men."

Senator FERGUSON. Meaning Russian men?

Mr. BARMINE. It was my understanding meaning military intelligence.

Senator O'CONNOR. Had you ever heard of Owen Lattimore and Joseph Barnes before that?

Mr. BARMINE. No.

Senator O'CONNOR. Did you later hear of them?

Mr. BARMINE. They were the first American names that ever came to me.

Mr. MORRIS. These names came up not only once but they came up more than once?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes. \* \* \*

The CHAIRMAN. During a subsequent conversation did they tell you what organization these men were working with?

Mr. BARMINE. When it came to the second time, as I remember, that was the first time the Institute of Pacific Relations was mentioned. The question was that there were more important things and they would be more suitable with the plans in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations, the building up of the branches of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and the military using it for a cover shop for military intelligence work in the Pacific area. \* \* \*

I had not the faintest idea that the Institute of Pacific Relations had anything to do with this kind of affair. All I knew about it was what I read in the newspapers at this time in Moscow. My idea was that it was probably some kind of geographical, scientific organization, and I think that was probably correct at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. What year was that?

Mr. BARMINE. I think it was shortly before, probably in 1934 or 1935.<sup>6</sup>

Mr. MORRIS. How did General Berzin describe the Institute of Pacific Relations to you from this point of view? \* \* \*

Mr. BARMINE. \* \* \* he said that we had some important planning developments in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations and the men would be valuable more in connection with this, so let us forget about them.

Senator FERGUSON. What men would be valuable in that institute?

Mr. BARMINE. Lattimore and Barnes, Americans \* \* \*.

\* \* \* The idea was, as I was explained, that the Institute of Pacific Relations being an organization who can carry research work, who can open branches around the Pacific in the countries where we were not yet recognized—the Soviet Union at this time has no embassy all around the Pacific area—with this difficulty about contacts, the idea which I was given was that that is the idea, undercover work when you can have legal reasons and innocent reasons to travel to do specifically military research and reconnoitering work and gathering of information materials, because military intelligence is comprised of the gathering of printed material, classified and unclassified, of every kind. You have reason to keep the foreign members of the military network on the job, you can send them from

<sup>6</sup> This fixes the date of the conversation as 1935 or later. In executive session Barmine said of his conversation with General Berzin about Lattimore and Barnes, "Now I want to make the statement that that conversation was in 1935, 16 years ago \* \* \*" (exhibit 1331).

one area to another, you can have for them a legitimate reason to have their offices to gather information, to get in contact with people who know something about geography, topography, and many other things.

So the explanation I was given was that the Intelligence Division considered this a very valuable outlet, a very valuable cover organization, they have an important plan for it, because it would be extremely convenient. \* \* \*

\* \* \* at this time this was considered important for Russia, which was developing to use this and to build within this organization the convenient apparatus which could have this very innocent and respectable cover.

Senator EASTLAND. But to make it an agent of Soviet military intelligence was the plan, was it not?

Mr. BARMINE. You see, how you come to make an agent, it is not just that you hire somebody for a job the way you hire for any organization. Some of the people who would work in the institute would not know that they were working for military intelligence. Some of them will be drafted into it gradually, first given an assignment to make an expedition for research to go to China, Manchuria, Korea, and then there would be military topography, and finally the men would be drafted in and one moment the point will come when maybe there will be disclosed whom they are working for and they consider to be reliable and willing to do this job. That is a gradual process and different with every person.

Senator EASTLAND. Whether all the people knew it or not, the Soviet military intelligence planned that this organization would be its agent?

Mr. BARMINE. I would term it not as an organization as such but the organization would be infiltrated, then the organization would be used for recruiting, for bringing people into this organization, and gradually take some of them who came to this organization with an innocent purpose or scientific purpose.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you know at that time that Mr. Lattimore was in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BARMINE. No, I didn't.

Mr. MORRIS. You learned it in the conversations?

Mr. BARMINE. We had plans for them in the Institute of Pacific Relations. I couldn't ask who Mr. Lattimore was, what he was doing, was he on the job there or not.

I explained to you all this procedure. For me, I had by this time intelligence training. I went through special courses. It was not necessary to explain to me all this in detail, just mentioning the question we are going and we are planning to use this for our purpose; it would be not for me—all the rest I told you, the matter of operation would be something part of my training, I would know how it was done. It was not necessary to be explained to me in connection with the institute.

Senator EASTLAND. Later General Berzin told you to forget the plans for Lattimore and Barnes, that they had more important assignments for them?

Mr. BARMINE. In connection with the institute. Then I asked questions about the institute \* \* \*.

Of course you have sometimes what we call a cover shop. It was specially organized for the narrow military purpose. It was phony, it was a fake. There would be some import-export business or some kind of shop or some tourist office which would be built as a place for a rendezvous or a gathering and for giving the reason for legal residence in the area.

Now this of course was a different project to the extent they had an organization that existed already that was found to be ideally suitable for not just one local place but there was a whole Pacific area that they could give movement for people and open very large possibilities for intelligence work. So it was not especially built up from an organization which should be infiltrated, taken over at the most decided place. When the question of moving people, there would be enough people there who could report to the military network, work within the organization undisturbed for their operations for collection of material, for recruiting people and all.

Senator FERGUSON. So the Institute of Pacific Relations was the latter set-up that you were going to use and were using; is that right?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right; that is my understanding of it \* \* \*

At this time, as I understood it, it was already in process.

Senator FERGUSON. It was your understanding that these Americans were already in this service or would be put in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BARMINE. In the service generally. Whether they were at this time actively connected with the IPR and there were plans for them to do it, I wouldn't know it.

\* \* \* I was told we have plans for them in connection with the institute.



Mr. MORRIS. Did you recall the two names so that when you had a discussion with General Krivitsky some years later you asked him about those?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the time of the conversation?

Mr. BARMINE. It was in early 1938 when I was in France.

Mr. MORRIS. This is after you had separated yourself from the Soviet organization?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

\* \* \* after several Soviet attempts on me the French Government gave me special protection. I had two detectives day and night with me who were accompanying me wherever I would go in Paris, and also police in the night near my house. Once one of the detectives told me that the other two were guarding General Krivitsky in Paris, they kept him in the hotel room under constant guard. He told me he was very jittery and nervous, very depressed, and they were just worrying about him very much. Then my French friends who were in contact with him said that he asked if possible that I should go and see him probably to cheer him up, because I was maybe in a better mood. So it was arranged that I would go and see him in his hotel and talk.

Well, I had a personal interest in this rendezvous for other reasons because in 1937 in Paris when there was a special group assigned, sent partly from Moscow and partly organized in France, which had an assignment to kill Ignatz Reiss and me—

Mr. MORRIS. Krivitsky told you this?

Mr. BARMINE. I knew this, because the French police blew it up and they arrested several \* \* \*

\* \* \* Krivitsky participated in this conference in which the decision to liquidate me and Reiss was discussed. I wanted to know about it, to ask Krivitsky what was talked and what was going on and his part in it.

The CHAIRMAN. You wanted to know how you were going to be liquidated?

Mr. MORRIS. He had broken with the Soviet organization also.

Mr. BARMINE. \* \* \* the people who came from Moscow, had an assignment to liquidate both of us. That is what Krivitsky told. So when I went to see him I was interested not only in cheering him up but finding what this was all about.

Now subsequently I saw Krivitsky two or three times more, always at his request. At one of these meetings there was talk of he was planning to go to the United States, he was trying to get a visa to the United States and so I was planning to do the same thing \* \* \*

So we were talking about the people who would come here, who we might see, and who we can approach or who we should be careful about, too \* \* \*

\* \* \* I was checking him. In the first of my conferences with him and in the second time when I saw him we talked for hours and I was putting the question to confirm to me what he told about himself. I would ask him about people in the military intelligence, does he know this one or that one and whom he would know.

Mr. MORRIS. You asked him if he knew Barnes and Lattimore?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. You wanted to know whom to be careful of?

Mr. BARMINE. Not necessarily. I didn't know anything about this man except what I told you. I didn't know about whom I should be careful about, but I asked him what he knows. As I say, this conversation went for hours. There were many things to talk and many questions to ask about people who disappear, about people who work, about people whom we might meet, and when the two names and several others came back again then I remember I asked him about the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The thing I could only say was that he said this operation was very successful because he, who had contact with military intelligence people who worked in the United States, told me that. He was informed more than I was on what was going on in military intelligence work in the United States.

What he told me, I would be amazed how many very important contacts the people working in the institute got. \* \* \*

Mr. MORRIS. May I bring that out so it is clearly understood? In other words, when you discussed the Institute of Pacific Relations with General Krivitsky he told you that that particular Soviet operation, the cover shop in the institute, was doing very well and you would be amazed at what important contacts they were making in connection with their work?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes. \* \* \*

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Barmine, did he also confirm your impression of Barnes and Lattimore, your recollection of Barnes and Lattimore, that is?

Mr. BARMINE. He knew about them.

Senator O'CONNOR. He has not told us specifically what General Krivitsky told him about Barnes and Lattimore.

Mr. BARMINE. That they are working within the Institute of Pacific Relations and they are still, what he said, "They are still our men."

Senator JENNER. When the chief of the military intelligence says, "He is one of our men," would that leave the impression in your mind that he was a top Communist in America?

Mr. BARMINE. Not necessarily. That assumes it; that doesn't preclude it. \* \* \*

Senator O'CONNOR. You have been very fair in not attempting to overstate anything you do not know.

Mr. BARMINE. It is difficult for me because so many years passed and so many things happened since, before, during, and after. This was very accidental and not a substantial part of whatever I went through. So I am rather under strain trying to remember exactly and answer questions that would be truthful. I am afraid to say something that wasn't correct.

Senator O'CONNOR. You did not anticipate at that time you would be in this position and it would have so much importance.

Mr. BARMINE. I did not anticipate I would be in the United States and I did not anticipate I would ever have to talk about the Institute of Pacific Relations \* \* \*.

\* \* \* as I say, the process of becoming an active member is slow and gradual and different with every person, but as much as I can understand at this time, when I was told by General Berzin and repeated by Krivitsky my assumption was that they were in active and conscious participation.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you tell any agency of the United States Government what you knew about Lattimore and Barnes?

Mr. BARMINE. When I was asked by the FBI agent who came to me I told him exactly the same thing as I told you. I was asked about it several times \* \* \* and it was several years ago already and then they came repeatedly. So I couldn't tell you exactly the date.

Senator FERGUSON. During this last hearing when they were having hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee last year were you approached by the FBI?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you tell them that at that time?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you ever questioned by any of the committee members or the counsel about coming in as a witness?

Mr. BARMINE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Or giving this evidence?

Mr. BARMINE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. But the FBI did have that evidence that you have told here this morning about Mr. Barnes and Mr. Lattimore; is that right?

Mr. BARMINE. Well, if you call it evidence—

Senator FERGUSON. Well, your statements that you gave here.

Mr. BARMINE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean to count that as evidence, do you not? It is what happened?

Mr. BARMINE. I have to tell you that when I got this to the FBI, I just considered in the sense that I learned to understand the evidence, I was very reluctant that this thing should be used, because I think it is a very old story and since then many things could happen, and that was all that I knew, but it was after all not my direct knowledge from the workings.

Senator EASTLAND. You just told them what you have told us?

Senator FERGUSON. You understand what you are saying here today is evidence? You have been sworn to tell the truth.

Mr. BARMINE. I know that is the truth. I am not legally qualified to weigh how much evidence is this (pp. 193-211).

Mr. Lattimore commented as follows on the Barmine testimony:

Mr. LATTIMORE. Barmine was a conspicuously reluctant witness before you, and in spite of leading questions by Mr. Morris and members of this committee, and their repeated efforts to aid him in remembering conversations and events between him and other Reds, supposed to have taken place 15 or 18 years ago, his answers remained vague, apologetic, and full of qualifications.

Barmine said that the other Red general, named Berzin, in a discussion of the possibility of opening Soviet intelligence branches along the China coast, mentioned me and Joseph Barnes as "our men," whatever that means, in connection with the possible use of I. P. R. personnel in China.

Here Barmine made two slips. He referred to this discussion as taking place at the end of 1933—

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, if I might interrupt there, because of that date, would the witness indicate at what point in the transcript of the testimony Mr. Barmine said that this discussion took place at the end of 1933? It is the understanding of the committee staff that Mr. Barmine said it took place in 1935.

Senator SMITH. Will you point that out?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is taken up in the rest of the paragraph.

Senator SMITH. Can you point that out?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is referring to the fact that a correction was made later and therefore doubtless it doesn't appear in the final transcript of the committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean a correction in the testimony of Mr. Barmine, sir?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you intending to state or imply that this committee has doctored the transcript of Mr. Barmine's testimony in publication?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know whether the committee or its staff doctored the testimony, or whether Barmine made a request to alter his testimony, or what happened.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you making the charge that it was altered?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am making the charge that, if I may go on with the rest of the paragraph—I think it explains it clearly.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think you should answer that right now, sir. Are you making the charge that the testimony was altered after having been given, that the transcript was changed for whatever reason after the testimony had been taken down?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am making the charge that newspapermen who called me after the story—that newspapermen called me after the story appeared and Barmine's story was mysteriously updated in later editions of the evening papers.

Senator SMITH. What newspapermen called you? Let us get that fact now.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The man who called me was, as I remember, the United Press man. United Press desk man, in Baltimore.

Senator SMITH. What was his name?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember his name.

Senator SMITH. Who else called you, a newspaperman?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was the only one—no, there may have been a Baltimore Sun man who called me too.

Senator SMITH. You do not know who that was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you here when Mr. Barmine was testifying, sir?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I wasn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. You make the definite statement here, and a statement you are offering this committee under oath, that he, meaning Barmine, referred to this discussion as taking place at the end of 1933. Do you know that to be so?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am making reference to the fact that two different newspaper stories appeared.

Senator SMITH. You do not know it of your own knowledge? Just answer my question, do you know it of your knowledge or not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I don't know it of my own knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read the record of Mr. Barmine's testimony at that point?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what that record shows?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As the record now stands, it doesn't show 1933.

Mr. SOURWINE. What does it show?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am not—I would have to read it again to refresh my memory, but my impression is that it doesn't show very clearly what year.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean, sir, that you are stating here, on the basis of what one or two newspapermen, according to you, told you, that the testimony of this witness was different from what the record which you have read shows it to have been?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not what newspapermen told me, I am basing it on newspaper clips.



Mr. SOURWINE. Are you testifying here on the basis of newspaper clips—if you please, Mr. Lattimore—are you testifying here on the basis of newspaper clips that the testimony of Mr. Barmine was actually different from what the record before this committee shows it to have been?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am testifying that after the story appeared, I was called for comment because 1933 was mentioned and I said, "Why, my goodness, in 1933 I had nothing to do with the Institute of Pacific Relations." And the later stories carried the date 1935 or 1936.

Mr. SOURWINE. And are you presuming to conclude from that that the record of this committee was changed, rather than accepting the possibility that a newspaperman might have been mistaken?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't say that, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you say, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I say that when I pointed out to newspapermen who called me after the story appeared—

Mr. SOURWINE. Pointed out what?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That in 1933 I had no connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations and that I was in the United States and not in China from 1933 to the autumn of 1934, after this, after I had been called on this point, Barmine's story was mysteriously up-dated in later editions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of the evening papers, is that not what you said?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Either the evening papers or the morning papers, I can't recollect now.

Senator SMITH. How about the rest of the sentence, to refer to 1935 or 1936? You do not know now whether it was 1935 or 1936; do you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The record reads, page 194 of the printed record, that Mr. Barmine said that he was appointed to the presidency of some trust that he was working for at the end of 1933.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that the witness' interpretation of what the record says is of any particular value here.

If he has a portion of that record which he believes establishes his contention that Mr. Barmine said 1933, I think he should offer that portion of the record and let it go in now.

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Chairman, will you give a witness a minute to look at the record, since there is a question about the record?

Senator SMITH. I thought we had it there.

Mr. FORTAS. He hasn't had a chance to look at it since he has been asked the question.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Lattimore, do you have in your possession, I mean for your own use, a copy of that transcript?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I do.

Senator SMITH. Then I am going to suggest that if you can find any justification or statement about the 1933 and will send it out any time within the next 10 days, we will look it over and see it. That is to save time.

All right, Mr. Sourwine, have you some other questions?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; I have one more question.

Mr. Lattimore, you stated and stressed the fact that you had no connection with the IPR until 1934. As a matter of fact, did you not attend the IPR conference in 1933?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I attended it as a delegate. I was not an employee; no.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think the attendance at that conference was not a connection with IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I will accept your amendment, sir (pp. 3099-3101).

Mr. Holland added this:

The statement of Gen. Alexander Barmine before the McCarran subcommittee to the effect that in 1933 Soviet military intelligence officers used the institute as "cover" for obtaining secret military intelligence, was the rankest hearsay. There is not a shred of evidence to support it, much less to justify the outrageous insinuation that institute staff members would have been willing to act as agents for Soviet military intelligence. General Barmine himself clearly showed while giving his testimony that he had serious doubts as to the validity of this so-called evidence. When asked by a Senator whether the FBI had the "evidence" that Barmine had just given to the subcommittee, he replied, "Well, if you call it evidence \* \* \*" (p. 1225).

## OPERATION INFILTRATION

“\* \* \* if you learned the wrong things about the Soviet Union,” said Mr. Bogolepov, “your thoughts are also wrong” (p. 4512).

The subcommittee has given the gravest consideration to the thought that with these words, Mr. Bogolepov may have put his finger on the spinal nerve of recent world history. If it is true that the western world learned the wrong things about the Soviet Union, then it is certainly true that its thoughts were also wrong. If its thoughts were wrong, the actions it took in dealing with the Soviet Union, the agreements it signed, the compromises it agreed to, the concessions it allowed, were wrong too.

For these reasons, we present here extensive excerpts from Mr. Bogolepov's testimony, together with surrounding material that may help to evaluate its authenticity. The story he put into the record did not simply involve the Soviet Council of IPR. It involved an agency deliberately set up by the Soviet Government to fill the whole of western thought with lies about the USSR, which non-Soviet writers and “scholars” served like lackeys.

The Bogolepov thesis was built on this foundation:

\* \* \* you must understand that when I use the word “scholar,” you can't compare it with your American or western notion of scholar, because in our Soviet country a scholar is a politician who is working in the field of science. He is not a pure scientist. He does not know what objectivity is, and he doesn't care to be objective. He is carrying out the slogan of Lenin even before the revolution, saying that there is no impartial science, that there is only party science (p. 4490).

Professor Poppe added this:

In the Soviet Union everything is political because the scientists and the students were always told that there is no science outside of policies. All science is political and so also they considered the culture as part of their policies (p. 2706).

Here is Mr. Bogolepov again:

Once I read a memorandum written by Molotov in our secret files where the problem was discussed of our participation and utilization of the western press. I have to explain that before 1931 it was a general rule that the Communists should not write in the foreign press. It was a shame. It was a disgrace. But Trotsky was expelled from the Soviet Union and he had written articles against Stalin in the Daily Express, and these articles became very popular because they were written in the British newspaper. This gave the idea to the Soviet authorities that it was wrong to seek only the Communist papers. In the memorandum of Molotov, which evidently laid down the foundation for the new trend of Soviet policy, written in 1931, it was stated [reading]:

“Who reads the Communist papers? Only a few people who are already Communists. We don't need to propagandize them. What is our object? Who do we have to influence? We have to influence non-Communists if we want to make them Communists or if we want to fool them. So, we have to try to infiltrate in the big press, to influence millions of people, and not merely hundreds of thousands.”

Molotov made the report, and that completely turned over our policy. \* \* \*

(p. 4511).

In the Foreign Office we have had a special, I think you call it joint committee, where representatives of different branches of the administration were present. In this joint committee we present the members of the Foreign Office, then of military intelligence, executive committee of the Cominform, and a representative from the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This important body was responsible directly to the political commission of the Politburo for carrying out the infiltration of ideas and men through the iron curtain to the western countries. I have to make the point that the problem which we are discussing right now with you, the problem of the Institute of



Pacific Relations, to me in Moscow was only a small and not a greatly significant part of the activities. It was a very big business of ours.

Senator FERGUSON. What was? Propaganda?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The infiltration.

Senator FERGUSON. Infiltration in other countries.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. In other countries. Ideological infiltration, the creation of fellow travelers, inducing the western intelligentsia to write books and articles which were favorable to the Soviet Union.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that one of the missions of the Foreign Office?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. To get people in other nations to write articles and books in favor of Russia?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. In favor of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they ever pay any money to get that done?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The singular or the particular character of the situation is that the majority of the Soviet agents outside as well as inside are unpaid workers.

Senator FERGUSON. State that again. I did not quite get you.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I mean it is the general situation that we do not pay the agents. The agents work out of their sympathy toward the Soviet Union.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you get people to write books without paying them subsidies, and so forth?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Why do we have to pay for books? There are American publishers to publish the books and pay for them. Why do we spend our own money? (pp. 4496-4497).

We have had, as in the case of Institute of Pacific Relations, many cover organizations. For these things, on which I talked to Senator Ferguson, we had a special organization which name is Litag. That is the abbreviation for the name literary agent. This was a nonparty organization, independent organization, as you in the west like to have them. Very solid people were in the head of this organization, a Russian professor, and the Foreign Office used this organization in order to contact the foreign scientists, scholars, to give them materials or even, as in the case of the Webb mentioned books, the full text was sent to them \* \* \* (p. 4514).

Mr. MORRIS. Through the Foreign Office you had people in other countries write books favorable to the Soviet point of view.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. One British and one American. You certainly remember the British labor leaders, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, very reasonable people. They visited the Soviet Union in about 1935 or 1936, and the result of their visit was a two volume work, Soviet Communism and New Civilization.

Mr. MORRIS. That is, after the Webbs got back to England, having been in Soviet Russia—

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. They wrote a two-volume work on Russia or the Soviet?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right. \* \* \* The materials for this book actually were given by the Soviet Foreign Office.

Senator FERGUSON. Given to the Webbs.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. They had only to remake a little bit for English text, a little bit criticizing, but in its general trend the bulk of the material was prepared for them in the Soviet Foreign Office \* \* \* and I participated myself in part of this work. \* \* \*

An American example: You know perhaps Professor Hazard of Columbia University. He is an expert on the Soviet legal system, as you know. Professor Hazard before leaving the Soviet Union, where he spent 2 or 3 years, was given by the Soviet Foreign Office a bunch of papers concerning the Soviet law system and courts, which were later translated by him into English and published here in the United States as his own research work. Actually a lot of that material was presented to him in Moscow and is either Soviet propaganda or nonsense having no relation to the Soviet at all.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, the Foreign Office was careful to see that the Soviet line, the Communist line, was followed, and they could do that by preparing the information, and the American or the British or the other country's subject would take that and merely translate it and put it into books that would look as if it was the Webbs or the Hazards own material collected as facts, is that correct?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. How large a staff or how large an organization did you have in the Foreign Office to do that kind of work?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It wasn't necessary to have all these people in the Foreign Office itself. It worked this way. For example, we had to write for Hazard concerning the legal system, so we passed the order through the central committee of the party to the Soviet legal experts and they wrote it.

Senator FERGUSON. And they would prepare the material and pass it in to the Foreign Office and you would give it to Hazard?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What did the Webbs, of Britain, write on? What subject did the Webbs write on?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. They described the Soviet way of life, which they found better than the British way of life.

Senator FERGUSON. Where would they find that material? Where would that come from the Foreign Office?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. For example, the chapter concerning the very humanitarian way of Soviet detention camps and jails was written by the Soviet secret police itself.

Mr. MORRIS. You know that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I received it from the chief of one of the divisions of the NKVD, the Soviet secret police.

Senator FERGUSON. You personally received?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Personally I received from him when he came to my office in the Foreign Office, and then I gave this material to the chief of the western division of the Soviet Foreign Office, the vice chief of the western division, Veinberg, who was attached to the Webbs and who proceeded to translate that material.

Senator WATKINS. Did you read the English books after they were published, and you have compared the information with what was given out?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; when I came here to the west, I found this book and I read it with much interest. I found that the material which I prepared was so well done that the Webbs didn't change it any.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, the English people or the American people would take a book like that written by the Webbs, who were at least Socialists at the time, Marxists, and it was in fact prepared by the secret police of Russia.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. In that particular part.

Senator FERGUSON. In relation to the jails.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. So, the American people would get the idea that this was a British writing on a subject, and, therefore, at least it would be true facts.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That was the idea. \* \* \*

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any other example of an American coming to Russia and getting material and coming back and its being published?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; I do, but—

Senator FERGUSON. You are not rich enough to defend yourself in a libel suit?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I have named one American, and I am reluctant to call any more.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you understand, if you are telling the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth—

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Certainly, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (continuing). Testifying before this committee on question, you cannot be sued for libel?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No; I don't know that.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the law. With that in mind, now can you honestly state any other authors?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; I can.

Senator FERGUSON. Or any other books?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; I can.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you do it now?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Frederick Schuman, Soviet Politics Abroad and at Home.

Senator FERGUSON. What did he write on?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. He wrote a book which, in my opinion, is full of nonsense.

Senator FERGUSON. Outside of its being nonsense, what was it on?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It was very important nonsense. \* \* \* That was the idea, to sell nonsense to the foreign newspapers. \* \* \*

Senator FERGUSON. Give us an example of what was in the book.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. All right. For example, the book by Frederick Schuman stated that the unfriendly attitude of the Soviet Union toward the western world was not caused by Communist doctrine or any other consideration on the part of the Soviet leaders themselves, but it was caused by western intervention

during the civil war. Mr. Schuman lets the American readers of his book believe that it is only because the American, Japanese, French, and English peoples made their so-called intervention on the side of the Russian national against the Communist that the Communist Soviet Union is now reluctant to have good relations with the British. If you compare Schuman's book with the corresponding page of the official History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union you will very easily recognize that they say the same thing. Frederick Schuman got his ideas from the Soviet propaganda.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any others?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I recall Mr. Joseph Davies, the former American Ambassador to Moscow.

\* \* \* In the same book of Davies I found, for example, his considerations of the trials in Moscow in 1937 and 1938. Now I think about the book Mission in Moscow. There the point of view is represented that this big trial in Moscow should be considered by Americans in a favorable light, because Stalin got rid of the fifth column, and saw the forthcoming disposition against the forthcoming attack. It is not known to me whether Mr. Davies was instructed particularly on this.

Senator FERGUSON. You said "it is not known" to you.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Not known to me. But it is known to me. I read myself in the record that this explanation of the program should be implanted in western minds during the year.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any actual instructions like you gave on the Schuman book, and the Webb books, and the Hazard book, whether the material was prepared by the Foreign Office, and given for writing?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In the case of the Davies book, Mr. Bogolepov, you only know that you have seen a directive on that idea, and the same idea showed up in Davies' book. You don't know, as a matter of fact, that it was the same.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No; in this particular case, I don't know. Well, the first sample I can give you was a book of Kahn and Sayers, two American authors.

Senator FERGUSON. Albert Kahn.

Mr. MORRIS. And is it Manual Sayers? Michael B. Sayers?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right. I do not remember the title of this book. It was something about the spies or aggression against the East; something like that.

Senator FERGUSON. What is that book?

Mr. MANDEL. Conspiracy Against the Soviet Union, by Michael Sayers and Albert Kahn.

Senator FERGUSON. All right; go ahead.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The largest part of this book which is known to me was written by a certain Veinberg, who was a vice chief of the southwestern division of the Foreign Office in Moscow. \* \* \* I saw myself the Russian manuscript before it was sent to New York to be there \* \* \*

Senator FERGUSON. Have you read the book now?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I looked through it.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it the same as the manuscript?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; it was. They rearranged it, perhaps, but the facts and the ideas are the same. That is why I mentioned it (pp. 4509-4514).

#### IPR IN MOSCOW

The story now returns to IPR itself. It will be recalled that the 6-year efforts of two secretaries-general, Messrs. Davis and Carter, finally bore fruit in 1934. That was the year the Soviet institute was set up under a board of directors "a majority" of whom were party members (p. 4567). It was also the year in which Messrs. Carter and Barnes, and Misses Mitchell and Moore, made their missions to Moscow (pp. 2701, 4504).

Here is Mr. Bogolepov's recollection of that period:

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what was the Institute of Pacific Relations as you saw it at that time?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. First, it was not an institute, but a desk or a group of research workers on China, Japan and other far-eastern countries. \* \* \* At that time, I think it was the beginning of the thirties, they did literary research work. \* \* \*



They worked as Marxist and Communist scholars, but still as scholars. But in the course of time, toward the middle of the thirties, the situation became, in my opinion, changed. First, the people were changed who were working in our Institute of Pacific Relations. \* \* \* From the old people who were working in the twenties and the beginning of the thirties in this body about which I am speaking now, only one person remained. The other sinologists—

Mr. MORRIS. Sinologists? Experts on China?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. On China and Japan—had disappeared and were out, then instead of them came in the true Communists who had not very much to do with science, but very much to do with some other matters.

Mr. MORRIS. What other matters do you refer to?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I mean military intelligence and political intelligence.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you tell us who the one person who remained was?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That was Anatole Kantorovich. He was a nonparty man. He was a real scholar. \* \* \* (pp. 4488-4489).

As I told you before, with the change of personnel, the nature of the activities of our institute changed, too.

Senator EASTLAND. Military intelligence took it over, did it not? Soviet military intelligence?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Mostly Soviet military intelligence, also the Soviet Foreign Office.

Senator EASTLAND. It became an agency of the Soviet Government.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right (p. 4491). \* \* \* the members of the Soviet Institute of Pacific Relations by way of their personal meetings, by way of suggestions to solve the problems, by way of sending their own writings and in other ways tried not only to influence the American colleagues of their own but to make of these people media for infiltration of ideas favorable for Soviet foreign policy in the Far East. \* \* \* (p. 4496).

I got the impression from talks with my comrades working in the Soviet Institute of Pacific Relations, in the Foreign Office, that they considered this institute as a very valuable organization from two points of view. As one of my former comrades expressed it, it is like a double-way track. On one line you get information from America through this institute. On the other hand, you send information which you would like to implant in American brains through the same channel of the institute. \* \* \*

Mr. MORRIS. When you talk about two-way track, do you mean that military intelligence was extracted from outside the Soviet Union through the medium of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. And on the other hand, by the out-way track you mean information that you wanted to impart to the outside world was transmitted through that medium?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. Propaganda, you mean. Soviet propaganda that the Foreign Office desired implanted in foreign minds would be sent through the facilities of the Institute of Pacific Relations. That is what you mean?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is mostly propaganda, but I would say even a little more than propaganda, because not only organization propaganda, but even the organization of a network of fellow travelers in yours and other countries. \* \* \* (pp. 4491-4492).

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that the Soviet organization used the Institute of Pacific Relations to collect information not only in the United States but on other countries, such as Japan and China?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It was my impression that, at that time—I mean before the war—when I was in the Soviet Union, the Soviet Intelligence was more interested not in the United States of America, but in Japan and other countries which were in direct conflict with the Soviet Union.

It was also my impression that the Institute of Pacific Relations was merely used by Soviet Intelligence in order to get, via America, the information on Japan and China and Great Britain (p. 4590).

Mr. Bogolepov was asked if he had any comment on the fact, previously reported, that in 1936 Mr. Carter and Miss Mitchell spent 4 hours at the Soviet Embassy, discussing the Moscow purge trials with Ambassador Oumansky. This was Mr. Bogolepov's reply:

It means that these people were considered by Ambassador Oumansky as important people. He had lost 4 hours to give them his instructions (p. 4586).



## AGENCIES AND MEN

The Soviet quarterly, *Tikhii Okean* (p. 189), announced the formation of the U. S. S. R. Council of IPR in its issue of July-September, 1934 (p. 189). This announcement listed the constituent agencies that became members of the council. It also listed the council's directors.

## Constituent agencies:

NII (Institute for Scientific Research) of the Great Soviet World Atlas  
 All Union Society for Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries  
 Institute of Oceanography  
 Administration of the Great Northern Sea Route  
 Chamber of Commerce  
 Institute of World Economics and World Politics  
 Kamchatka Joint Stock Co.  
 East Fish Trust

## Directors:

1. President of the Institute: Prof. V. E. Motylev (director of the Scientific Research Institute of the Great Soviet World Atlas)
  2. Vice president: G. N. Voitinskii (chief of the Pacific "cabinet" of the Institute of World Economics and World Politics)
  3. A. Ia. Arosev (chairman of the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with foreign countries)
  4. K. A. Mekhonoshin (director of the Institute of Oceanography)
  5. S. S. Ioffe (deputy chief of the administration of the Great Northern Sea Route)
  6. A. S. Svandze (director of the Bank for Foreign Trade)
  7. I. A. Adamovich (chairman of the Kamchatka Joint-Stock Co.)
  8. Ia. D. Ianson (president of the chamber of commerce)
  9. Ia. M. Berkovich (manager of the East Fish Trust)
- Mr. A. Kantorovich \* \* \* secretary-general (pp. 189-190)

There is a mass of material scattered through the record, which describes both the agencies and men named above. It comes from three sources: (a) Official Soviet documents; (b) reports, memoranda, and letters found in the IPR files; (c) sworn testimony of Messrs. Barmine, Bogolepov, and Poppe. All pertinent passages from this material are included here below.

The record indicates that some, if not all, of these agencies were subsidiaries of the Soviet "Communist Academy" (p. 4560), and that preliminary American-Russian discussions were held there prior to the establishment of the Soviet Council (pp. 2701, 4492). The record contains the following testimony respecting the Communist Academy:

Mr. MORRIS. \* \* \* Did you know what the Communist Academy was?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What was it?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It was the highest scientific organization in the Soviet Union. If you speak of the science in the Soviet Union, you understand only the Marxist and Communist science. So it was the program where the Marxist theory was developed, where the Marxist scholars were prepared for different branches of Soviet administration, for Comintern, for different branches of Intelligence, for journalistic fields, and so on.

It was a very important organization which has been preparing the people for work in Soviet administration (pp. 4586-4587).

\* \* \* \* \*

Mr. MORRIS. Is the Communist Academy an organization run by the Comintern?

Mr. POPPE. No, by the central committee of the Russian Communist Party (p. 2723).

A document found in the IPR files contained this passage:

The Communist Academy is the citadel of the faith in Soviet Russia. It is charged with the task of training leaders for the next generation, and it is inevitable that these leaders should be trained essentially as political leaders. The theoreticians and the dogmatists are both trained here. It has of course immense political power, can commandeer funds or people more easily than any other research or educational organization, has access to materials and documents elsewhere unavailable.

It has had almost since its inception a section which dealt with China. It has been variously named and organized, according to the political fortunes of its leaders. At present it retains its old name of the China Institute, but is also known as the National and Colonial Sector of the Institute of World Economics and World Politics, which is itself a part of the Communist Academy (p. 4588).

Testimony concerning the Soviet agency VOX included this:

Mr. POPPE. V-o-k-s, spelled in Russian. This was the old union organization for the cultural relations with other foreign countries. Its aim is the purchase of foreign literature and publication of that literature in the Soviet Union; second, exportation of Soviet literature; third, invitation of important scholars, artists, painters, musicians, dancers, and so on, from other countries; let them travel and make their performances, and so on; and the same also for the Soviet dancers and singers going abroad.

This agency would not invite the first, the best, person, no matter how important or artistic he was. Of course, they checked him thoroughly and only after they got an approval from the NKVD, they could invite him and send him tickets and so on \* \* \*

Mr. MORRIS. You just know the general nature of Voks; is that right?

Mr. POPPE. I know the general nature, because I myself got my books from France and Germany through them.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, was that operation supervised by the Communist Party?

Mr. POPPE. Yes; of course it was (pp. 2705-2706).

\* \* \* \* \*

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The name of VOKS, the official translation of this abbreviation is Society for Cultural Relations Between Soviet Union and Foreign Countries. Actually it was one of the cover organizations for, again, these double tracks, getting information from abroad to the Soviet Intelligence, and sending infiltration of ideas and selling Communist ideas to the West.

Mr. MORRIS. He (Mr. Carter) talks here of distributing VOKS publications in the United States. Would that be Communist propaganda?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Certainly.

Mr. MORRIS. Would it necessarily be Communist propaganda?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Certainly. We have no other propaganda (pp. 4497-4498).

The following is quoted from The Report of the Visit of the Secretary General to Moscow, December 20-31, 1934 (p.4498):

Mr. KULIABKO (acting president) then described some of the work which VOKS is carrying on at the present time:

VOKS represents 218 institutions and societies in the Soviet Union, scientific, cultural, literary, musical and artistic. Its purpose is to establish relationships with similar organizations in foreign countries. It also maintains direct contacts with many universities and schools in other countries. It organizes exhibitions of the work being done in the Soviet Union and brings foreign exhibitions to the U. S. S. R. Its book exchange now amounts to many thousands of books each year. It furnishes facilities to foreign students. It publishes a journal and numerous special periodicals in English, French, and German. It arranged for the American Institute which was held in Moscow last summer and which is to be repeated in 1935 for all English speaking foreigners, etc. (p. 4505).

From the testimony of Mr. Poppe comes the following, concerning the Institute of Oceanography and one Mekhonoshin:

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know of the Institute of Oceanography?

Mr. POPPE. Yes. I knew that was a scientific organization whose head was first Chakalsky, a very famous scholar, who wrote a large book on the ice in the

polar seas. And this was a scientific organization and did not have anything in common with communism.

Mr. MORRIS. It did not?

Mr. POPPE. They studied only ocean seas, water, the plants in the waters, and so on and so on (p. 2723). \* \* \*

Mr. POPPE. It was in 1936 and 1937, in connection with Stalin's destruction of Zinoviev, Borodin, and all the other well-known Communists. A great purge was started in all the agencies \* \* \* (p. 2699).

A document found in IPR files supplies this information:

The Institute of Oceanography is similarly a very important body. It handles both the scientific and economic side of the entire U. S. S. R. fish industry. Its work is of immense scientific importance to the future food supply of the U. S. S. R. and has a direct political bearing on the situation in the Far East because of the constant friction between Japanese and Soviet fishermen and because of the scientific competition that exists between Japan and the U. S. S. R. in the development of the fish resources (Carter to Field, January 16, 1935) (p. 4567).

The testimony of Mr. Bogolepov supplies information about Mr. Mekhonoshin:

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bogolepov, do you know Mekhonoshin?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. May I see the name, myself?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Mekhonoshin is the right name. Yes; I know him.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was he?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Which year is that?

Mr. MORRIS. 1936.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. 1936? If I make no mistake, at that time he was the vice chief of naval intelligence of the Soviet Union (p. 4553).

From a document found in IPR files comes the following excerpt:

*Institutions connected with the IPR.* \* \* \*

Institute of Oceanography of the U. S. S. R. (K. A. Mekhanoshin) (p. 4503).

#### THE ATLAS

From the testimony of Mr. Poppe:

\* \* \* in general, mapping and publication of maps is controlled by the NKVD. The only agency publishing maps and permitted to do so is the chief geographic and geodetic department of the NKVD. They check all the maps and publish them, even an archaeological map. For instance, I added an archaeological map to one of my books, and that map had to get first an approval of the NKVD because the cities, the frontiers, and also some other points there were indicated there.

Mr. MORRIS. Well now, Professor, do you remember the rather large-scale project that was undertaken by the Soviet authorities, to produce a Soviet world atlas?

Mr. POPPE. Yes, I do remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about that, please?

Mr. POPPE. Well, the atlas is an enterprise on a very large scale, and a special publishing house was created to compile and publish that atlas. It was Professor Motylev who headed that atlas. \* \* \* It is a big Soviet world atlas, technically done very well, but, as anything in the Soviet Union, it had also to comply with the Marxist-Leninist line of thinking. \* \* \*

Senator WATKINS. Did you know about this work that he was doing through some personal contacts with it?

Mr. POPPE. Of course, I knew how they were doing this work because lots of people were working there, and I know also the publication itself. I have seen it. I have used it, and so on. I know what that atlas is.

Senator WATKINS. Do you have a copy with you?

Mr. POPPE. It is here. It is a wonderful piece of work, technically, very beautiful; and the work was started very early in the early 1920's, and at Lenin's request. Lenin ordered that a large atlas be published, which would go along the Marxist-Leninist line, which would show the world as divided by the imperialists and as exploited by the imperialists, and so on. \* \* \*



Mr. MORRIS. Where did you get this particular copy?

Mr. POPPE. Mr. Mandel gave it to me.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify where this volume came from?

Mr. MANDEL. This volume of the Soviet great atlas comes from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. \* \* \* (pp. 2697-2698).

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, could you tell us whether or not any elements of propaganda crept into the preparation of the atlas?

Mr. POPPE. Yes, of course, much propaganda.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us about that, please?

Mr. POPPE. Well, first of all the atlas gives not always a true picture of the world, and the maps themselves are propaganda. For instance, there is one which shows Outer Mongolia. It is my field. I know Outer Mongolia very well, and, therefore, I am entitled to mention this country in the first place.

One of the maps shows the world as economically dominated by various imperialist countries.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say "dominated" exactly what do you mean by that?

Mr. POPPE. Just exactly what they mean; that a country is economically being exploited by imperialist countries. The imperialist countries get raw material from their invested capital.

Mr. MORRIS. How does a chart or map show that?

Mr. POPPE. Various colors—red, green, blue, and so on.

Mr. MORRIS. Give us a concrete example.

Mr. POPPE. For instance, the United States is amber, and countries being exploited by the United States are also amber or they are striped with amber, and so on.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you indicate that on that particular page there?

Mr. POPPE. On this particular page, Outer Mongolia is a country completely absorbed and integrated in the Soviet economic and political system. It is a Soviet satellite, but instead of presenting it in the same color as the Soviet Union, they give it the yellow color, as China, with those amber stripes, which means that the United States import and export from Outer Mongolia.

This is not true. Outer Mongolia had a trade with the United States. By 1926 or very soon after—I even knew a man by the name of Carter. He was representative of one of the American firms there in Outer Mongolia. He was expelled by 1929 or 1930 from Outer Mongolia, just as all other foreigners were, and the atlas was published in 1937, after the last American had been expelled from Outer Mongolia. And Mongolia is shown as a country trading with the United States, for instance.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was that published?

Mr. POPPE. 1937. So it was 10 years after the expulsion of the foreigners from Outer Mongolia.

Mr. MORRIS. Are there other instances such as that?

Mr. POPPE. There are other distortions, of course. For instance, let us take one of the railroads which existed in reality here in the Soviet Union by 1935 or 1936, but which is not shown here, and that railroad was vital for the Soviets during the Hitler invasion. \* \* \*

Mr. MORRIS. Your testimony is that this is not an accurate atlas in that certain important and strategic railroads are not listed therein?

Mr. POPPE. I would formulate it so that things which should not be known to everybody are not shown here in this atlas (pp. 2704-2705).

### From documents found in IPR files:

The aim of the atlas is to give a Marxist-Leninist cartographical picture of the world, i. e., a comprehensive picture of the epoch of imperialism and particularly the period of the general crisis of capitalism. \* \* \*

The general underlying aim of the atlas is to present as fully as possible the contrasts between the two great systems of the world, capitalist and communist, in their social, economic, and political policies, objectives and achievements (report of the secretary-general's visit to Moscow, 1934) (p. 4507).

Mr. MANDEL. This is a memorandum from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, headed "ECC" presumably E. C. Carter, to CH-s, presumably Chen Han-seng, dated April 18, 1938:

"This is a big day in the life of the I. P. R. for the first volume of Dr. Motylev's great Soviet World Atlas has today arrived. Two precious copies have come, one addressed to Holland and one addressed to me. Here, for your close perusal for a few hours is Holland's copy. Keep it safely and see that it is locked up at night \* \* \*\*"



Mr. Morris, to show the importance of this atlas in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations, I have a review here of the atlas by Owen Lattimore and I would like to read a paragraph, if I may.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, do you think that appropriate at this time?

Senator WATKINS. You may do so.

Mr. MANDEL. This is from the September 1938 issue of Pacific Affairs, review of the Great Soviet World Atlas.

Senator WATKINS. Published by the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir; and this is a review signed by "O. L." and I read one paragraph:

"The historical message, in short, of which special mention is made in the introduction, is extended to demonstrate the superiority of socialism as practiced in the Soviet Union with the deliberate purpose of arrival at a future communism over the capitalism of the rest of the world. The method, it must be conceded, is formidable. It is not vulgar propoganda, but scientific argument on a plane that commands full intellectual respect" (p. 2703).

#### MEN

##### *Motilev*

From the testimony of Mr. Poppe:

Professor Motilev is a party member \* \* \* a Communist Party member, and an economist, not a physical geographer, a scientist of very little significance, but an outstanding party organizer, and a man who knows how to run an organization under Soviet conditions. He was trusted greatly. \* \* \* It was his general reputation. I did not know him personally. It was his general reputation that he was an outstanding organizer (pp. 2697-2698).

From the testimony of Mr. Bogolepov:

Motilev, Professor Motilev, the Red Professor, a party member charged by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for leading the project of Council for Pacific Relations (p. 4561).

From a document found in IPR files:

Dr. V. E. Motylev, the Chairman (of the Soviet Council of I. P. R.) as director of the Great Soviet World Atlas, has a budget of 12 million rubles per year, a large staff and the cooperation of every leading scientific institution and library in the U. S. S. R. (p. 4498). \* \* \* Dr. Motylev is an economist by training, but has wide background of experience in other social and physical sciences. He was formerly head of the Soviet Encyclopedia. He speaks English and German well and has traveled widely in both these countries (Report of the Secretary-General's Visit, 1934) (p. 4507).

##### *Varga*

From the testimony of Mr. Poppe (p, 2723):

He is a very well-known Soviet economist. He was the one who predicted among other things, a collapse of the capitalist system after World War II. He wrote books and articles on the economic depression imminent in the United States after 1945, but then it did not come true, and he fell in disgrace.

But Stalin, nevertheless, did not let him perish, and he is still the head of the Institute of Economics in Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he the director of the Communist Academy?

Mr. POPPE. Yes, he was. And he is also the director of the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences, a very important person, a Communist, Hungarian by origin.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he connected with the Comintern?

Mr. POPPE. He was; yes.

From the testimony of Mr. Bogolepov:

Varga, one of the most important people on this list, was the member of the executive committee of the Communist International (p. 4561).

From a document found in IPR files:

Varga is and has been for many years one of the principal theoreticians on foreign affairs in the Soviet Union (report on the Communist Academy, April, 1934) (p. 4589).

*Arosev*

From the testimony of Mr. Barmine:

I met him because he was my colleague in the diplomatic service. He was once Ambassador in Czechoslovakia. I knew him personally in Moscow as a friend. Then I met him on his job \* \* \* Arosev was an old Bolshevik. At this time he had the confidence of the central committee. He was one of the hierarchy of the party \* \* \* He was appointed as the president of the Society of Cultural Relations by the central committee of the party and, of course, he acted as such in his duties (p. 188).

From a document found in the IPR files:

Institutions Connected With the IPR \* \* \*

Voks (All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries)  
(A. J. Arosev) (p. 4508).

*Svanidze*

From the testimony of Mr. Barmine:

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Barmine, do you know anybody else on that list?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes; I knew Svanidze.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you know about him?

Mr. BARMINE. He is a Georgian. He is a brother-in-law of Stalin.

Mr. MORRIS. What else do you know about him?

Mr. BARMINE. Svanidze was also high up in the hierarchy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government. At this time he was director of the foreign trade bank, which means the organization which was in control of all financial exchange abroad.

Mr. MORRIS. In that capacity or holding that position he took a political assignment?

Mr. BARMINE. I knew about his other assignments, too, which he carried abroad besides being president of this bank (pp. 188-189).

(NOTE.—Svanidze's part in the Sinkiang episode has already been described.)

From the testimony of Mr. Bogolepov:

Svanidze, who is said to be a director of some kind of bank, in reality was one of the chiefs of the foreign administration of the Soviet secret police, NKVD (p. 4561).

From a document found in IPR files:

A. N. Svanidze is director of the Bank of Foreign Commerce, which finances all of the foreign trade of the Soviet Union. He is a graduate of the London School of Economics, speaks English perfectly, and is naturally extremely well-informed on the international relations of the U. S. S. R. (Report of the Visit of the Secretary-General to Moscow, December 20-31, 1934 (p. 4499).

*Abramson*

From the testimony of Mr. Bogolepov:

Mr. Abramson \* \* \* was a scholar \* \* \*. When I say that Mr. Abramson was a scholar, he was a Marxist and Communist scholar \* \* \*. He was clad in the uniform of the fourth division of the general staff of the Red Army, the military intelligence \* \* \*. I saw him in military uniform in his bureau in the fourth division of the general staff.

From documents found in IPR files:

Abramson studied in the university at Vladivostok, has lived in China, and speaks and reads Chinese (Memorandum of Conversation at Communist Academy May 26, 1934) (p. 2701).

Abramson has worked out an alphabet, together with a group of Chinese scholars \* \* \* (Report on the Communist Academy, April 1934) (p. 4589).

*Harondar and Janson*

From the testimony of Mr. Bogolepov:

Eugene Harondar, who is assigned here as being a secretary of the Soviet Council for Foreign Relations, actually is a man of political intelligence—I mean of the

secret police. Janson was also a member of the foreign administration of NKVD (pp. 4561-4562).

From documents found in IPR files:

Kantorovitch has as his assistant Eugene Harundar, who speaks English, French, and German fluently and can take dictation and type rapidly in all. Harundar was recently political, or foreign affairs secretary to the Commissar of Heavy Industries.

Janson, as head of the chamber of commerce, has a large organization at his command, which not only issues information on economic questions, but carries on extensive research work for the improvement of Soviet products (Report of the Secretary-General's Visit, 1934) (p. 4499).

*Kantorovich*

From the testimony of Mr. Bogolepov:

Kantorovich, as I told you yesterday, was a nonparty man and a real scholar. They introduced him in order to have somebody who could speak about some research work (p. 4562). Kantorovich was arrested and executed (p. 4490).

From the testimony of Mr. Poppe:

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. Kantorovich?

Mr. POPPE. I never met him, but I read many papers written by him, and articles. Later on he fell into disgrace and disappeared, was eliminated.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether he was an official of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. POPPE. Yes; he was (p. 2700).

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether or not Mr. Kantorovich, about whom you have given testimony today, was ever purged?

Mr. POPPE. He was purged and disappeared.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what you know about it?

Senator WATKINS. Let me ask you this question: When you say "purged," for the purposes of the record, does that mean he was killed?

Mr. POPPE. "Purged" is so to say, he evaporated and disappeared.

Senator WATKINS. In other words, he was just taken out and lost?

Mr. POPPE. He simply disappeared. Yesterday he was and today he is no longer. That is a purge (pp. 2714-2715).

From documents found in IPR files:

Kantorovich, the secretary-general, is able, frank, well informed, and speaks English rapidly and vigorously. He was a member of the Soviet Embassy in Peiping. He is not a member of the party but would never have been made secretary-general if he was not trusted implicitly by party members. His special field of study is American policy in China. He has just finished a big book on this subject which will shortly go to the printers. He knew personally a great many of our mutual Chinese and foreign friends in China. He has got an excellent critical faculty and is a really first-class administrator. The speed and precision with which he made engagements for us while we were in Moscow was in striking and refreshing contrast to the delays of former visits.

Kantorovich's office is in the office of the World Atlas (p. 4568).

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a carbon taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is undated, and it says, "Copies for W. L. H. for 'IPR notes'":

"In case Kantorovich did not write you direct, this is sent for your information. I do not think it means any change in U. S. S. R.-IPR policy, as I gathered last December that Kantorovich's appointment was only temporary"—

Then follows a letter signed by A. Kantorovich, to E. C. Carter headed—

"COUNCIL OF THE U. S. S. R.,  
"INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS.

"DEAR CARTER: This is to announce to you that both for personal reasons, and because of pressure of literary work which lately has been more and more insistent, I have decided to resign my position as secretary-general of the Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations \* \* \* (p. 2715)."



*Man With Two Names*

From the testimony of Mr. Bogolepov:

Then I can mention a man who has two names, Abolin, and the second name, Avorin.

Mr. MORRIS. You say that is one person?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. One person; yes. In Moscow he was known as Aborin, in Manchuria when he was for a time consul general either in Munkiang or Kirin, I don't remember, he was Avorin. He has a surname which I do not remember. Under this surname he was known to me in the same fourth division of the Red Army. \* \* \* This man succeeded Kantorovich. When Kantorovich was arrested and executed, then Avorin took up his functions of secretary general of the Soviet Council of Pacific Affairs (p. 4490).

There are no documents in the record from IPR files to indicate the identity of Kantorovich's successor as secretary of the Soviet Council.

*Voitinski*

From the testimony of Mr. Barmine:

Mr. BARMINE. When I returned from Bokhara in the fall of 1921 \* \* \* I met executives and high officials of the Foreign Office in Moscow. Among them was Voitinski, who at this time was in charge of the far eastern section of the Foreign Office. \* \* \* He came to the Foreign Office from the Comintern and when he was also in charge of far eastern affairs. He returned back from the Foreign Office a couple of years later again to the same work. \* \* \*

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you testify also, General, in the Comintern he was in charge of far eastern affairs?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right (p. 188).

From the testimony of Mr. Bogolepov:

Mr. MORRIS. Who were the people who came in and took the place of the scholars that you just described? \* \* \*

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. First of all was a certain Mr. Voitinsky. Mr. Voitinsky was known to me in different conferences as a man who in the 1920's was a big wheel, big cog, big shot in Siberia when he liquidated a lot of former officers. \* \* \* He was vice chief of the Siberian Cheka according to his own words. That is the first name of the secret police. \* \* \* For this he had the Order of the Red Banner which he displayed often to us. I can't tell you all of this, but at the time when I met him he was already an old hand in the Comintern. \* \* \* To me he was not a scholar and not a member of the institute with which I had been working, but first a man of the Comintern. He was carrying through the political line of the Comintern, and science was to him only a media to carry out his political Comintern line \* \* \*.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. Voitinsky a research man? Did he himself engage in research?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes, with the help of other people. He didn't work himself. He had a lot of secretaries and assistants to whom he gave directives to get him the data, and he arranged all this or more often it was that he put only his signature on articles which were written by other people (pp. 4489-4490).

From the testimony of Mr. Poppe:

Mr. POPPE. I know him very well. Voitinsky is an outstanding Communist, a member of the Comintern, a man who played a very important role in Chinese affairs. He in his youth was an organizer of parties of guerrillas against the White Russian armies in Siberia. Later on he became a member of the staff of the Soviet Foreign Office, and played a very important role in the far eastern development. Then he became one of the directors of the Communist Academy which later on was merged with the Russian Academy of Scientists, and became the nucleus of the future Academy of Scientists. He was also the director of various institutes in the Academy of Sciences, chief editor of the magazine *World Policies and World Economics*. He is the right hand of Stalin's No. 1 economist, Varga \* \* \*.

He was a party man, a member of the Comintern, and in 1936 and 1937, he conducted a purge of the Academy of Sciences, and many people who worked together with me in my institute, my assistants, were purged, simply in consequence of his accusations.



Senator WATKINS. What do you mean by purged? What was the purge?

Mr. POPPE. It was in 1936 and 1937, in connection with Stalin's destruction of Zinoviev, Borodin, and all the other well-known Communists. A great purge was started in all the agencies, and all the universities, and so on. I can only say, to give you an idea of what it was in my Institute of Oriental Study, that we had 94 scientists and 37 of them were arrested and disappeared forever; 37 out of 94. \* \* \*

Voitinsky delivered a speech in our institute where he severely criticized this man and that man, and so on, and a few days later there was the elimination of all those people. So he was the one who gave the green light for those arrests.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, do you know that this same Mr. Voitinsky was an official of the council of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. POPPE. He was; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you know that, Professor?

Mr. POPPE. It was known because he was listed among the members in printed editions of that institute, and also in the magazine published by the Institute of Pacific Relations here in the United States, the Pacific Affairs. There, among the members of the foreign directors, the managers of the foreign branches Voitinsky was mentioned as a member of the Soviet Union, the representative of the Soviet Union in the Pacific Relations Institute (pp. 2699-2700).

### From the Bolshevik Soviet Encyclopedia:

Voitinskii (Zarkhin), Grigorii Naunovich (born 1893), Communist, Comintern worker, writer. Son of a low-grade white-collar worker, Voitinskii completed only an elementary school and supplemented his further education by reading and self-study. In 1913 he emigrated to America and lived in a number of places in the United States and Canada as a student and worker. In the spring of 1918 Voitinskii returned to Russia, joined the Communist Party and began to work in the Krasnoiarsk soviet of workers' delegates. After Kolchak had taken over the government Voitinskii took part in the underground work and in the uprising against Kolchak at Omsk. After the failure of the uprising he was detailed to underground work at Vladivostok. There he was arrested in May 1919 and sentenced to hard labor for life on the island of Sakhalin. In January 1920, still prior to the overthrow of the Kolchak government in the Far East, Voitinskii together with other political prisoners, and with the help of an organization of sympathizers who were free, took part in the seizure of power on the island. From 1920 on, he worked at the order of the Comintern in the Far East. He worked for a number of years in the eastern secretariat of the Comintern. In the summer of 1920 he participated in the organization of the first Communist cells at Shanghai, Peiping, and Canton; he also took an intensive part in the further work of the Chinese Communist Party and, in particular, conducted the negotiation with Sun Yat-sen concerning the collaboration of the Kuomintang and of the Chinese Communist Party (p. 191).

### From documents found in IPR files:

Voitinsky served for a time in the revolutionary movement in China (Memorandum of Informal Conversation at the Communist Academy, Moscow, May 26, 1934 (p. 2701).

Voitinsky is a theoretician only by virtue of the refusal of the Chinese to make him an executive; he has a long and interesting career behind him in China. (Report on the Communist Academy, April, 1934 (p. 4589).

Not simply because of the purge, but \* \* \* because of a Nation-wide effort to increase efficiency in academic as well as in industrial and governmental work, a number of changes have been made in the personnel in the constituent scientific and other institutions that together make up the Soviet council. In view of these changes, it is necessary for Motylev and Voitinsky to reeducate some of the new officials. \* \* \*

Voitinsky, as you know, has a long background in China. He first attended Sun Yat-sen's lectures in Canton in 1920. \* \* \* In him we find a happy combination of the man of affairs and the very qualified scholar (from a letter written by Mr. Carter to Dr. Jessup, after the former's visit to Moscow in 1938) (p. 2729).

## SCHOLARLY EXCHANGE, OR I. P. R. "LITAG"?

EXHIBIT No. 441

(Penciled notation:) Please return to RDC

CARLSON COURT,  
 PALL MALL PLACE, LONDON S. W. 1,  
 June 29, 1939.

DR. PHILIP C. JESSUP,  
 Columbia University, New York City.

DEAR JESSUP: My report on Moscow will have to reach you piecemeal owing to pressure of engagements in Amsterdam, London, and Paris. This report will deal with Miss Moore's monograph on Soviet policy in the Far East. I must confess that I arrived in Moscow with a large measure of uncertainty as to what the attitude of the Soviet Council would be to a member of the secretariat writing on Soviet far-eastern policy. Without mentioning the author or the character of the contents I opened this section of our agenda by saying that we wished him<sup>7</sup> to criticize a manuscript which a member of the secretariat had written.

\* \* \* \* \*

MR. MORRIS. Now I would like to refer to our exhibit No. 499, which was introduced at the open session of March 1, 1952. This is a letter from Mr. Carter to Mr. Motylev, and it is dated February 10, 1936 (reading): \* \* \*

Does that suggest anything to you, Mr. Bogolepov? \* \* \*

MR. BOGOLEPOV. The last paragraph, in my opinion, is very interesting.

MR. MORRIS. What is the last paragraph?

MR. BOGOLEPOV (reading): "The American Council desires that I raise with you the question of arranging for the Soviet IPR representatives to meet influential groups of American citizens in New York, Washington, Chicago, Denver, and San Francisco."

To me, it looks like this organization was used by the Soviet Government as a channel to bring people to the United States who otherwise, perhaps, might have some trouble in getting in, under the cover of research work and scholarship, and under the sponsorship of one of the American leading scholar organizations. It would be easier to get American visas. And I know, from my experience, that it was the way on which we have been working, not only on this particular case. We were always trying to put our people not directly but through somebody else, through other channels as neutral as possible, and for this particular thing we plant agents in foreign organizations whose representation was particularly well fitted (p. 4571).

\* \* \* \* \*

EXHIBIT No. 478

MEETING ON PACIFIC AFFAIRS: APRIL 8; MOTILIEV, VOITINSKY, ECC (E. C. CARTER) OL (OWEN LATTIMORE); HARONDAR; HM (HARRIET MOORE)

Voitinsky said that the magazine had been reviewed twice in Tikhii Okean and there the general opinion about it had been stated. Such a magazine which is important should have a definite aim (p. 3136). \* \* \*

Motiliev said that even if the aim of PA was to characterize the general conditions, it was impossible to do this without a definite idea about them. When no definite idea is given for a magazine, the wrong idea is conveyed by it (p. 3137). \* \* \*

E. C. C. said that PA will be without focus until the Soviet members contribute to it regularly. PA has never received the article from Voitinsky on agrarian problems in China. When Soviet articles appear regularly, they will make the issues clearer and will show up the negative quality of many of the other articles (p. 3138). \* \* \*

O. L. said that if the Soviet group would show in their articles a general line—a struggle for peace—the other articles would naturally gravitate to that line. O. L. said that he had no organizational authority to tell the councils what kind of articles they should send in. \* \* \*

Motiliev said that it was a dangerous editorial mistake to publish the Chamberlain review. It is not because the review was about a book by Stalin, but because in the same review there was a review of a book by Chernavin. This is a very important political question for them here.

<sup>7</sup> Motiliev.

They have no objection to having Stalin's book reviewed and they are willing to answer a review, but the review must be done with due respect, to a person in Stalin's position. Motiliev asked why the book was given to Chamberlin who was known to be so anti-Soviet. \* \* \*

O. L. said that he had not realized Chamberlin's position, but as soon as he learned of the Soviet opinion about Chamberlin, he canceled an article on the Soviet press which he had asked from Chamberlin. \* \* \*

O. L. said that he was willing to have P. A. reflect such a line, but these positive ideas can only be started positively. He cannot dictate to the other councils what they must write. He must first have an original article taking a stand, and this will make the others write to that point. \* \* \*

E. C. C. said that the Isaacs and Chamberlin articles were great mistakes, and would not be repeated in the future. H. M. said that O. L. had nothing to do with the Chamberlin reviews. That was done on the responsibility of the New York Office (p. 3139).

\* \* \* \* \*

O. L. brought up the question of editing the vocabulary in left and Soviet articles. In regard to the Asiaticus article, he had to revise the vocabulary considerably or otherwise the article would have been discounted as propaganda. In the Kantorovich article, O. L. had edited out a number of things but the New York office had put them back in. Voitinsky said that that would be impossible with their articles because they cannot give in on their point of view. No such editorial changes could be made without their approval. He said that he understood the problem of PA and knew what sort of thing they would have to write for it (p. 3173).

\* \* \* \* \*

MR. LATTIMORE (reading): "Motiliev said that he would like to wait to discuss this"—I don't know what "this" is—"when Voitinsky was here. He said that he did not think there would be any critique of the general policy of the IPR. There would be definite questions about Pacific Affairs, not as to its policy and contents but as to its juridical position as to the instrument of the IPR. He said there would be discussions and negotiations in connection with the question of preventing the publishing of articles which are in some way harmful to the U. S. S. R. IPR position."

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you know at that time Mr. Voitinsky's position with the Communist International?

MR. LATTIMORE. No I don't believe I did.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, does your research of Pacific Affairs at this period of time indicate that anything appeared therein along the description I just gave?

MR. MANDEL. In the issue of September 1936 of Pacific Affairs—

MR. MORRIS. That is just shortly after the meeting you were discussing, Mr. Lattimore.

MR. MANDEL. Cited under the title "Literature on the Chinese Communist Movement" is the following notation of an article on British imperialism in China, from the Communist International, No. 6, November 1924, and another article by Mr. Voitinsky, entitled, "The Situation in China," from the Communist International, No. 21, April 1925.

This is taken from Pacific Affairs of September 1936, listing the writings of G. Voitinsky.

MR. MORRIS. And you were editor at that time, were you not, Mr. Lattimore?

MR. LATTIMORE. Of Pacific Affairs, yes (p. 3316).

### SCHOLARLY EXCHANGE, OR MILITARY INFORMATION?

MR. MORRIS. \* \* \* This is our exhibit No. 430 used in the open hearings of February 12, 1952:

"MEMORANDUM OF INFORMAL CONVERSATION AT THE COMMUNIST ACADEMY, VOLKHONKA 14, MOSCOW, MAY 26, 1934

"The following were present: Voitinsky, Abramson, Barnes, Carter. Voitinsky served for a time in revolutionary movement in China. Abramson studied in the university at Vladivostok, has lived in China, and speaks and reads Chinese.

"1. Carter and Barnes invited Abramson to write an article for the September Pacific Affairs on the romanization of Chinese. They invited Voitinsky to write



for the December issue on the land problems of Soviet China or the land problems of China generally."

I would like to skip down to paragraph 3, Mr. Chairman, and read this paragraph to the witness:

"3. Mr. Voitinsky said that he believed the IPR could be of very great help to him in getting information and printed reports on the following subjects:

"(a) The inner situation in Netherlands India—the economic interdependence of the peasant and the city worker, and also the interdependence of these on capital and trade in Holland. The whole situation as portrayed in official documents in Netherlands India and in Holland would be of the greatest interest to the Communist Academy. The academy would also welcome information on the nationalist movement in the Netherlands India. At the moment the academy has no Dutch-speaking member, but could easily get all Dutch documents translated.

"(b) He would appreciate"—

This is Voitinsky again—

"all the information the IPR can send him regarding the agrarian movement in Japan and the financial dependence of Japan on other countries. He would like to compare Lenin's theses on Japan, which he feels is stated in algebraic terms transformed into arithmetical terms, through a study of finance and trade. He would like very much more information than is at present available on the evolution of the labor movement and the close relation between the village and the city."

Mr. Chairman, he goes on at length, and it all indicates that Voitinsky, about whom we have been taking testimony, was asking in this meeting for information through the Institute of Pacific Relations (pp. 4492-4493).

\* \* \* \* \*

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. \* \* \* in the files of the Foreign Office I met more than once evidence that the people who were working in the Soviet Institute of Pacific Relations had been asked to ask their American counterparts to give some information concerning the fisheries in the Pacific area, and looking into the file I found always that as background for this information was always the request of naval intelligence \* \* \* (p. 4491).

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated January 16, 1935, addressed to "Dear Fred," with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter. It is a photostat of a carbon copy of the letter.

Mr. MORRIS. And it has been acknowledged, Mr. Chairman, by Mr. Carter as a document—that is what it purports to be on its face—namely, a letter from Mr. Carter to Field. \* \* \*

A later paragraph, Mr. Chairman, which I am now reading from, paragraph 8: "I am sending you a list of all of the fisheries publications which the Institute of Oceanography is receiving from the United States. I would be grateful if you would have this checked through to see whether there are any important publications not on this list which they should secure. Would you send this bibliographical information to them through Kantorovich? They would also like to get from you reports from the private commercial firms engaged in every aspect of the fish business in the United States and Canada. I told them that you and Mrs. Barnes would do your best to get these, but that the scientific work of American business corporations are not always very extensive and that their financial statements were sometimes intended to obscure rather than reveal the economic basis of commercial activity. It will, however, pay you to dragnet the two countries to get the reports of the various fish companies, for, about the time you get this letter, your library will receive about a cubic yard of the most important Soviet publications on every aspect of the fish industry. You should immediately notify the principal fishing authorities in Washington and elsewhere of the existence of this priceless and unique collection on your shelves."

Mr. Bogolepov, judging by what I have just read to you, does that seem to be the same project that you have given testimony about before? Namely, that the Soviets were using the IPR to collect information of interest to the naval intelligence under the cover of this fishing study?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It looks like so.

Mr. MORRIS. I mean, can you develop that any further?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. May I see the document, please?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, both Mrs. Barnes and Mr. Field, who are being asked to collect this information, have been witnesses before this committee and have refused to say whether or not they were Communists on the grounds that their answers might tend to incriminate them.



Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Well, sir, perhaps the best I can do is just to tell that from nine people mentioned here in this document, in this letter from Frederick Field to Mr. Carter—

Mr. MORRIS. That is from Mr. Carter to Mr. Field.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I am sorry; that is right. (Continuing:) There are only three names which I can identify as having something to do with research work. All of the rest of them are members either of military intelligence or of Comintern (pp. 4560-4561).

\* \* \* \* \*

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, headed "Meeting, April 2, 1936, Moscow: Mr. Carter, Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore, H. M. Harondar. \* \* \*"

Mr. Lattimore, will you read the sixth paragraph on the front page, which begins with "Motiliev." \* \* \*

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading): "Motiliev said that he was interested in receiving from the United States more material on the economic geography of the country; the official publications of Government departments, particularly the statistical reports."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did the IPR serve as a conduit for the Soviet officials to receive such information from the United States?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea.

Mr. MORRIS. I ask you to turn, Mr. Lattimore, to page 2 and take up the second item there on the top of the page. "II. In re: Pacific Affairs."

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading): "The discussion of this point was postponed until Voitinsky could be present."

Mr. MORRIS. Why should that discussion be postponed until Voitinsky was present, Mr. Lattimore? Did you know at that time Mr. Voitinsky was the head of the far eastern section of the Comintern?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I did not (p. 3315).

\* \* \* \* \*

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you offer to supply military information to the Soviet officials of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did (p. 3319).

\* \* \* \* \*

#### EXHIBIT NO. 519

MEETING APRIL 6: MOTILIEV; ECC (CARTER); OL (OWEN LATTIMORE); FD; HORANDAR; HM (HARRIET MOORE) \* \* \*

OL asked if there was any special interest in the U. S. S. R. about the question of air bases in the Pacific.

#### LATTIMORE AND OUTER MONGOLIA

Two brief passages regarding Outer Mongolia, which were found in two documents, provoked more testimony revolving around the Bogolepov characterization of IPR.

(1) Voitinsky \* \* \* suggested that there should be an article on aggression against Outer Mongolia, as this was so important now (p. 4574).

(2) DEAR OWEN: This is to report on my conversation with Motylev regarding your trip to Mongolia. Motylev is as eager as ever to have you make the trip (p. 4562).

The first of these appeared in the minutes of a meeting held in Moscow April 12, 1936, which was attended by representatives of both the American and Soviet institutes. Mr. Lattimore himself was among those present, along with Miss Moore, and Messrs. Carter, Voitinsky, Motylev, and Harondar.

The second was in a letter from Mr. Carter to Mr. Lattimore, dated September 12, 1937.

Mr. Bogolepov gave this comment regarding (1):

Starting with 1932 and 1933, the Soviet Government was pretty well concerned with the defense of Mongolia as well as the Soviet Far East against possible

Japanese aggression. It was the time, I remember, when in the high Soviet organizations the mood was rather close to panic because all thoughts indicated that the Japanese might every day start the attack against the Soviet Far East and Mongolia. Whereas, the particular military measures were taken at that time by the defense commissariat, the NKVD was to mobilize the public opinion of the west, especially in England and the United States, in order to make pressure on the Japanese Government and to create an international atmosphere which would disturb the Japanese plan of attack on Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Far East.

So the passage you quoted here and which perhaps might look to you as a discussion between two scholars actually was the carrying out by the Soviet of the political directive of the Soviet Government.

Mr. MORRIS. It says here that this was so important. Voitinsky said that was important—that was important to the Soviet Union.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Important to the Soviet Union (p. 4574).

Professor Poppe, who was once head of the Mongolian Department of the Soviet Academy of Science (p. 2692), added this:

Mongolia was completely wild, a nomadic country in 1919. The new revolutionary people's Government established by the Soviets and supported by the Soviets and getting orders from Moscow has achieved, of course, some positive achievement, such as they established schools, hospitals, and so on. And no matter who establishes schools or hospitals, in my opinion, does a good job, if there were no schools and hospitals before. But this is not the end of this story.

The deportation of the population of the Mongolian Buddhists, Lamaseries, the destruction and the annihilation of the Mongolian Government, the execution of the Mongolian ministers, forced collectivization, the deportation of many people to the Soviet Union, and so on, are rather negative phenomena, I would say.

Therefore, I cannot call such a system a democratic one. \* \* \*

In 1932 the entire population revolted against the Soviets. The Red Mongolian Army and many members of the Mongolian People's Army took the side of the revolt, and this rebellion was suppressed by the Russian Red Army, tanks and aircraft were rushed from Russia to Mongolia (p. 2724).

William C. Bullitt, first American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, also commented on the history of Outer Mongolia.

In 1921 the Communists had set up a Communist republic there, as much Communist as anything can be in a country largely inhabited by nomads. Then there had been a series of wars back and forth until 1924, when the Communists got pretty well on top. However, in 1924 the Soviet Government in a note which was signed I believe by Chicherin, recognized the Mongolian People's Republic as a part of the Republic of China, but stated in that note that it enjoyed autonomy.

If my memory is correct the Soviet Government got a bit disturbed, and I received information that Karakhan, one of the gentlemen referred to before, had been sent out to Outer Mongolia, the People's Republic, so-called, to finish off any signs of restiveness under Soviet control. When he returned from that trip he came to the Embassy—

Mr. MORRIS. Did he return in 1934?

Mr. BULLITT. He returned toward the end, I believe.

He came to the Embassy one day, and I said to him—I don't mind testifying about Karakhan because he has since been shot and therefore no harm can come to him from the testimony that I am to give.

I said to him that I heard he had been out there to finish off the People's Republic of Outer Mongolia or rather any signs of independence in it, and he said indeed he had, but it was a very small affair \* \* \*

He said that he had indeed been sent out to finish it off, but he had only been sent out at the last minute, that the Soviet Government first completely infiltrated the Outer Mongolia Army and police force with GPU agents and that when everything was prepared to liquidate the Mongols that the Soviet Government did not like there, that he had been sent out simply to oversee the operation, that he had gone out, and then he explained, "After all, in a country of nomads there are only 300 or 400 people that count, and all I did on a given night was to have about 400 people seized by the GPU agents in the army and police force, and I had them shot before dawn and installed the people that the Soviet Government wished to

have installed and Outer Mongolia is now completely ruled by the GPU"; that is to say, the Soviet secret police (pp. 4523-4524.).

Mr. Bullitt then went on to describe a conversation he had with Owen Lattimore, in the American Embassy at Moscow.

In the end of March 1936 I received a note from Mr. Carter, who was the secretary general, I believe, of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It was written from a Moscow hotel, and it said that Mr. Owen Lattimore was arriving \* \* \*.

I told one of the secretaries in the Embassy that I would see Mr. Lattimore after he arrived in Moscow. I also told him to invite Mr. Carter and Mr. Lattimore and the other members of their delegation—I think it can be called a delegation—there were a number of women, if my memory is correct, as well as men—to an Embassy meal at some time, and they did so. In the early days of April, Mr. Lattimore asked for a definite appointment, and I received him. He told me that he was there for this meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations with, I believe, the Soviet section of the institute, and that he wanted to meet the men in charge of Far Eastern Affairs for the Soviet Foreign Office, especially Stomonyakov and Karakhan \* \* \*.

Stomonyakov was assistant commissar in charge of far eastern affairs, and Karakhan had been for many, many years assistant commissar. Indeed when I was sent in to negotiate with the Soviet Government, sent in by the American Government in 1919, he was already an assistant commissar. Whether at that particular moment his title was assistant commissar I cannot say actually, but he was a man that I knew very well.

I told Mr. Lattimore that I would ask one of the secretaries of the Embassy to attempt to arrange such an appointment or appointments for him.

Mr. Lattimore then began to give me a long description of the situation in the Far East as he saw it. \* \* \*

He finally said that he had one very important matter that he wanted to take up with me, that a most inspiring thing had happened, that the Mongols had at last achieved full independence and he hoped they were once more going to start on the road to being a great nation as they had been many years in the past. He said that in his opinion the so-called People's Republic of Outer Mongolia was fully independent. I asked him if there was no Soviet control of the People's Republic of Outer Mongolia or rather they call it the Mongolian People's Republic. It is in Outer Mongolia not Inner Mongolia. And he replied that there was no Soviet control whatsoever. I asked him if the Red Army had no control there, and he said no. I asked him if the GPU which at that time was the title of the Soviet secret police, had no control there, and he said they did not, that the Mongolia People's Republic was independent, and that his advice, which he urged me to telegraph at once to President Roosevelt, was that the American Government should immediately recognize the independence of the Mongolian People's Republic.

This to me was a very extraordinary statement, and I therefore questioned him further on it, and he reiterated what he had said and reiterated his advice that the United States should recognize at once the Mongolian People's Republic.

I have said it was an extraordinary statement for several reasons. In the first place, Outer Mongolia, which was ruled at the moment by the so-called Mongolian People's Republic, was under Chinese sovereignty. It was a part of China \* \* \*.

On the 12th of March 1936, about a month before Lattimore arrived in Moscow, the Soviet Government and the Mongolian People's Republic Government, controlled by the GPU, signed a protocol of mutual assistance at Ulan Bator, which is the capital of the so-called Mongolian People's Republic. This was not revealed at the moment, but on March 27, before Mr. Lattimore's arrival in Moscow, there was a news dispatch from Ulan Bator saying that this protocol had been approved by the Little Khural, which is the legislative institution set up there. On the 2d of April 1936, this protocol was officially communicated to the Chinese Government. On the 7th of April the Chinese Government made the strongest kind of a protest to this infringement on the sovereignty of China. On the 8th of April the Soviet Government through Litvinov replied, "Neither the fact nor the signing of the protocol nor its separate articles violate in the slightest degree the sovereignty of China," et cetera.

Mr. Lattimore therefore at the time when the Soviet Government did not yet dare to come out and say that Outer Mongolia was no longer under Chinese sovereignty, was advocating to me that I should persuade the President of the



United States to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia and the cessation of Chinese sovereignty.

I was obliged to conclude that either Mr. Lattimore knew nothing about the subject on which he was supposed to be the leading American expert or that he was deliberately attempting to assist in the spread of Communist authority through Asia (pp. 4522-4525).

Mr. Bogolepov, too, told of a meeting with Mr. Lattimore which happened "in the spring or winter, I guess, of 1936."

Besides my work for the foreign office, I was also a member of the institute (of world economics and politics) a research worker, and I used to work two or three times a week in the library of this institute. \* \* \* When I was working in this library one of these mornings, a group of people entered the room, the library, headed by Eugene Varga, who was director of the institute. \* \* \*

There were in this group of people some of them which were known to me and some which were unknown to me. Among the people known to me I remember Mr. Abramson, Mr. Kantorovich, and Mr. Kara-Murza. \* \* \*

Varga was a member of the executive committee of the Comintern, the highest body. \* \* \* Kara-Murza was intelligence officer in charge of Mongolian relations. \* \* \* Abramson, as I told you, was a member of the Pacific group of this institute, and at the same time also intelligence officer. \* \* \*

Among them was Mr. Lattimore. And when they entered the room and while talking, they moved toward me, and I was sitting not far from my big map of central Asia, covering Sinkkiang, Mongolia, and a part of Manchuria. Mr. Kara-Murza just returned from a big trip to Mongolia on some other mission. \* \* \*

So the talk started between these people, who went into the room, concerning the Mongolian relations \* \* \*.

My memory retains two topics of conversation: One was discussion of the route through Mongolia from Manchuria, or to Manchuria, I do not remember whether it was discussing the way from the east to the west or vice versa. And while discussing this problem, Kara-Murza, who I mentioned before, observed that showing on this map, this route, saying that "this way is the best one for we are using it always in our relations with the Soviet parts of China."

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, Kara-Murza pointed out the route to the foreign visitors that they were using to deal with Soviet China.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that a secret fact?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Certainly it was not revealed anywhere.

Mr. MORRIS. That was not well known, what route they were using at that time?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No; to nobody it was never published. The nature of our relations with the Soviet region of China were never discussed in the press or anywhere. So I little bit wondered when I heard such observations in the presence of foreign visitors. Then Kara-Murza got explanations of how the sovietization of Mongolia is progressing, and he described how they are purging the Mongolian population from the parasitic class of clergymen.

Mr. MORRIS. They are purging the parasite class of clergymen from the Mongolian people?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. Explaining that our policy there is to get Mongolian people, get them from the feudal state to the communism, passing away this state of capitalism.

Mr. MORRIS. This is Kara-Murza's explanation to the foreign guests?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Lattimore, you say, was present at that time?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. He was present.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he engaging in the conversation?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; they talked. But I give you only the summary of the conversation which I remembered, because I couldn't follow each word. By the way, I was not standing by. I was a little two or three desks further. After the society left the room, I asked Kara-Murza to remain with me, and who were these people, Comintern people or not, bearing in mind that he told a little bit more than is advisable to tell to the foreign visitors. He said that "No, they are not Comintern, not Comintern people, not quite Comintern people, but that is quite all right with them. \* \* \*"

So perhaps 8 months or 9 months in 1937—7 or 8 months, I don't remember—I was reporting on the station of the collegium of the foreign office. Collegium,

that is the meeting of the foreign commissar and his other commissars, five people in all. This board of commissars is convened twice a week. \* \* \*

The problem was, which I have to report, of getting the so-called popular Republic of Mongolia into the League of Nations. The Soviet Union was very eager to get one voice more in the League of Nations. Mongolia was, just before the Second World War, just one satellite country of the Soviet Union. In the west there was a strong feeling that Mongolia is not an independent country, not a country at all. And when I reported the information which I received from our delegates to Geneva, then I asked in the meantime, by preparing my own report, the opinion of our Ambassadors in the United States, in Paris, and in London. And, summarizing all these unfavorable reports about the prospective of getting Mongolia as a member of the League of Nations, Litvinov said "Well, the situation is still not ripe. We have to prepare the terrain." \* \* \*

Senator EASTLAND. You mean you had to prepare public sentiment.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right. That is what I would like to say. "It is necessary," said Litvinov, "to mobilize the writers and journalists and other people, to describe for the Western World the progress which is achieved in Mongolian Popular Republic, to say how life is progressing," and so on and so on. This was the first decision which was taken after my report. The second part of decision, the second point, was considering who will make this in different countries, whom we have to charge with this—how do you say, sir?

Senator EASTLAND. You mean the man who will be placed in charge of mobilizing public sentiment in the west?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right, whom we have to ask to do the job.

Senator EASTLAND. Who was that man who was decided upon?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Litvinov asked the officer of Mongolian desk of the foreign office, who was present—

Mr. MORRIS. What was his name?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Parnoch, P-a-r-n-o-c-h—whom he would recommend, and before Parnoch could give his answer he asked "Lattimore, perhaps?"

Senator EASTLAND. Litvinov said "Lattimore"?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. "Lattimore, perhaps"? yes. And Parnoch answered, "Yes, we will try to do that."

Mr. MORRIS. Was there a formal decision made by that body?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. There was a formal decision which was obliging for the corresponding bodies of the Soviet foreign group to take measures in order to fulfill the decision (p. 4519).

You have to understand, gentlemen, that there is a big difference between the Soviet foreign office and the State Department, for example, for the role foreign policy of the Soviet Union isn't carried by the Soviet foreign office only but through other organizations, first of all through the executive committee of the Comintern, through the Soviet secret police, and other organizations. \* \* \*

All important suggestions which we make in the foreign office had to be submitted to the so-called political commission of the Politburo. This political commission took the decision and then assigned who was to fulfill, to carry out in life this decision, either the foreign office itself or the secret police, or the comintern, and so on. And on that particular matter which I am reporting now—I mean, making the people to do some propaganda in our account—that was not the foreign office in charge, but some other organization; in the first place, comintern and intelligence.

So all we did, we made our suggestion that the public opinions in the west must be worked out, must be changed in our favor.

And as far as concerns the United States, Litvinov's own suggestion was to put on this business Mr. Owen Lattimore, who was known to us as one of America's outstanding experts on the far-eastern matters. And so this decision was taken. How it was carried out or whether it was carried out, I don't know. \* \* \*

Mr. SOURWINE. To put it another way, Mr. Bogolepov, could this decision which was made by the collegium have been a decision merely to seek to hire an independent American writer to do something, or was it in the nature of a decision to send orders to the man who was subject to the orders or instructions of the collegium?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. But what I mean is that Litvinov proposes somebody to do some kind of business. Evidently he meant that this business will be done. That is what I mean. It was not a question that "we will go to Mr. Lattimore and ask him to be so kind and write this story, and maybe he will say "No."

In my opinion, it was said so short and in such a categorical form that there was no slightest doubt left to me that Mr. Lattimore was the right man who was to take this assignment (pp. 4516-4517).

The testimony quoted above led to questions regarding Mr. Carter's 1937 message to Mr. Lattimore that Motyliev "is as eager as ever for you to make the trip" to Outer Mongolia.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know what the regulations were to foreigners going in to Mongolia?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The same as for the Soviet citizens—no admission. \* \* \* There is no cases when somebody of the Soviet citizens on private business could go to Mongolia. To Mongolia we send only people in charge of military missions, of intelligence or on party duties, and then only on official business. But no one, private citizen, no scholar, nobody else could go to Mongolia, and certainly no foreigner (p. 4562). \* \* \*

Mr. MORRIS. Who would make a determination as to whether an individual should go to, say, Mongolia?

Mr. POPPE. It would be NKVD (the Soviet secret police) and the Russian foreign office (p. 2710).

Certain passages regarding Outer Mongolia, which were taken from Mr. Lattimore's book, *Solution in Asia*, were put into the record. The book was published in 1945.

In Asia the most important example of the Soviet power of attraction beyond Soviet frontiers is in Outer Mongolia. It is here that we should look for evidence of the kind of attraction that Russia might offer to Korea in the future. Outer Mongolia may be called a satellite of Russia in the good sense. That is to say, the Mongols have gravitated into the Russian orbit of their own accord (and partly out of fear of Japan and China); they have neither been subjected to a military conquest nor sold to the Russians by traitors among their own people. They have gone through their own revolution. They have taken away the titles, revenues, and powers of the hereditary princes and aristocrats; but the sons and daughters of these aristocrats are full citizens with full equality of opportunity, including government service.<sup>8</sup>

Soviet policy in Outer Mongolia cannot be fairly called Red imperialism. It certainly establishes a standard with which other nations must compete if they wish to practice a policy of attraction in Asia. Russo-Mongol relations in Asia, like Russo-Czechoslovak relations in Europe, deserve careful and respectful study. (Source: *Solution in Asia*, p. 144.)

Finally, Mr. Lattimore himself was questioned about the position he himself had taken in regard to Outer Mongolia.

Question. Did you ever take the position or argue that Outer Mongolia was an independent state free of Russian domination?

Answer. Yes, I think I did, before the war, describe it as free of domination.

Question. You have changed your view since then?

Answer. I think the situation has changed since then.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Have you changed your view?

Answer. I have changed my view, in line with what I consider to be a changing situation.

Question. When do you think the situation changed? Can you give an approximate date?

Answer. No. I should say some time after the war, if I had been able to get to Outer Mongolia, I might have a more sharp opinion on that, but it is very difficult to determine from outside.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: When do you think the situation changed? If you do not know, you can say so.

Answer. I don't know. Some time after the war.

Question. When did you first reach the conclusion that Outer Mongolia was an independent state and free of Russian domination? Do you know?

Answer. Some time in the 1930's. \* \* \* I would roughly characterize the 1920's and 1930's as a period when the close relations between Russia and Outer Mongolia could hardly be described as Russian domination, because it was largely or chiefly at the instance of the Mongol Government itself (p. 4528).

<sup>8</sup> Source: *Solution in Asia*, Owen Lattimore, pp. 141-142, 1945. On page 177 of that book Lattimore writes, "Finally we should enlarge our acceptance of a freedom bloc in Asia to include Outer Mongolia. We need take no initiative in identifying ourselves either with the Chinese claim that Outer Mongolia is Chinese territory or with the Russian policy of recognizing Outer Mongolia as independent. The important facts or us are that Outer Mongolia has long been independent in fact and \* \* \*."



THE IPR FUTURE OF AUSTERN, MITCHELL, MOORE, BARNES,  
LATTIMORE, AND CARTER

What part in IPR's future was played by those who either visited Moscow or handled matters arising out of the Moscow meetings?

KATE LOUISE MITCHELL, who was one of those arrested in the Amerasia case in 1945, rose from "a very minor capacity" to "research assistant" (p. 3926).

MRS. HILDA AUSTERN served as Mr. Carter's "administrative assistant" at least until 1945 (p. 957).

MRS. HARRIET MOORE GELFAN became a member of the board of trustees of the American Council, a member of the trustees' executive committee, and finally chairman of the nominating committee (p. 2561).

LATTIMORE remained as editor of Pacific Affairs until he became President Roosevelt's personal emissary to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in 1941 (p. 3052). He is still an IPR trustee (p. 2980). Prof. David N. Rowe, who was himself an IPR trustee, named Mr. Lattimore as one of "the people that really run the thing" (p. 3981).

JOSEPH BARNES was in intimate contact with top IPR officials down to the moment Mr. Holland appeared before us. His "competent advice" was sought when plans were being made for IPR's 1942 international conference at Mont Tremblant, Canada (p. 431). He conferred with Mr. Carter on the latter's way home from Moscow in 1945 (p. 178). It was at his New York City apartment that Mr. Holland stayed when he (Holland) was preparing the brief he presented to the subcommittee (p. 1210).

CARTER remained as secretary general of the Pacific Council until 1946, after which he became vice chairman of the American Council until retirement in 1949. He is still a trustee of the Institute (p. 6). He was custodian of most of the IPR's back files, which were stored on his farm at Lee, Mass. The remainder of these back files was in the possession of Mr. Field.

FREDERICK VANDERBILT FIELD

Mr. Field was executive secretary of the American Council from 1934 to 1940 (p. 82). He was a member of the trustees' executive committee during the following 7 years. He also served as a member of the trustees' nominating committee with Mrs. Harriet Moore Gelfan (p. 264).

A short while before Mr. Field's resignation, Mr. Holland inquired of Mr. Carter regarding IPR's plans in case the United States entered the war. Mr. Carter replied: "Field alone can speak for the American Council" (p. 3922).

On the eve of Mr. Field's departure in 1940, the American IPR was in the midst of a financial crisis. Mr. Carter, who was then secretary general of the international institute, told how Field handled it, in a letter written by Mr. Carter to Mr. Holland (p. 8).

Field [said Mr. Carter] decided that in addition to the salary cuts which I have already reported to you, very radical reductions should be made in rent, library purchases and staff.

Mr. Carter added this:

This letter is \* \* \* intended for you alone and nothing that is herein contained should be passed on to Alsberg, Wilbur, Oakie, or anyone else.

"Wilbur," presumably, is Dr. Ray Lyman Wilbur, who was then an IPR vice chairman and became chairman the following year.

When Mr. Field moved to resign, the staff urged him to "continue as secretary, exercising the maximum amount of guidance and determination of policy" (p. 122). Dr. Jessup, who was then chairman of the American Council, said:

"I share the view of the staff. \* \* \* I cannot acquiesce in his complete separation from the direction of the affairs of the American Council." Dr. Jessup further expressed the hope that "when his (Field's) new task was completed, it would be possible for him to go back to active leadership in the work of the IPR." The entire board of trustees promised that Field would be "eagerly welcomed back \* \* \* when he completes his present work."

Raymond Dennett, who became executive secretary of the American Council for a short time after Mr. Field retired from the post, testified that Mr. Field negotiated a union contract with the Book and Magazine Guild of the United Office and Professional Workers of America (p. 941).

UOPWA was later expelled from the Congress of Industrial Organizations because "the policies and activities of the UOPWA are consistently directed toward the achievement of the program and the purposes of the Communist Party."

The contract negotiated by Mr. Field, provided among other things, that "the last person hired in any particular capacity shall be the first to be laid off" (if reductions become necessary), and "whenever a vacancy occurs in any position the council agrees to fill such by promotion from among the employees already in the office, or \* \* \* it shall apply to the guild to fill such vacancy" (pp. 942-943).

Mr. Dennett told this story of his experiences with the staff left behind by Mr. Field:

I certainly had the impression that the staff had had a good deal more to do with the determination of policy than is generally accepted. \* \* \*

Difficulties arose as the method which I had set up for operations slowly deprived the staff, or tended to restrict the staff, in their normal, or what had been previously their normal, decisions \* \* \* as the staff found itself somewhat restricted it began to rely on the union contract as a method for, shall we say, getting rid of me \* \* \* (the issue) was whether the executive committee was going to control. \* \* \* It got to the point where I had to go to one of the members of the executive committee to dictate a memorandum to my own committee, because (if dictated in his own office?) my memorandum would go to the union before it got into the United States mails. \* \* \*

There was a tendency on the part of the staff to pick people as authors and to submit their manuscripts to other writers for critical comment, who by and large tended to agree with the point of view of the staff \* \* \* I wrote one article in regard to the Sino-Soviet treaties of 1945, in which I \* \* \* drew among other conclusions this was \* \* \* merely an example of Soviet imperialism \* \* \* It was the subject of very considerable criticism by some of the members of the staff, who didn't think I should refer to Soviet imperialism \* \* \* That was the kind of thing which I was running into periodically (p. 949).

#### FIELD AS TRUSTEE

In January 1942, during the period of Mr. Field's trusteeship, an IPR member named Roger S. Greene, of Worcester, Mass., wrote as follows to William W. Lockwood, who was then executive secretary of the American Council:

DEAR MR. LOCKWOOD: Before the next annual meeting, that is, the 1943 meeting—will you not consider changing the method of submitting nominations to the board of trustees of the IPR by presenting a larger number of vacancies to be filled?

The present system gives the members no chance to express their preference except by a highly organized electioneering process which few if any members would care to undertake.

For example, while I have had a high opinion of Fred Field's personal character, his judgment during the past 2 years has been so strange that it seemed to me that he must be almost in a psychopathic state. If a man like that is to be nominated, surely one ought to have a chance to pick an alternate instead of him. When Chinese of a not particularly conservative type think that too many of the IPR staff are too much under Russian Soviet influence, as I know that they do, it would appear to be time to be more cautious. I am not objecting so much to radical views on political, economic, and social subjects on which radical views may be called for, but to the tendency to follow a party line and to flop suddenly from one side to the other in accordance with a party directive. The latter habit is the reverse of encouraging intellectual freedom.

Yours sincerely,

ROGER S. GREENE.<sup>9</sup>

Here is Mr. Lockwood's reply:

DEAR MR. GREENE: Thank you very much for your note on the procedure followed in submitting nominations to the American council's board of trustees. I agree with you that the present method is not very satisfactory. Some people feel as you do: that it looks too much like a perfunctory "railroading" job. Others—for example, one of our most interested members, whom I saw yesterday—would prefer that we make the board self-perpetuating in some fashion and not bother them with a ballot at all. Some time this year I hope to be able to give the matter careful consideration and work out a more suitable plan. Frankly, since taking office late in 1941, I have been so preoccupied with immediate questions of wartime program that I have not been able to give this matter the attention it deserves.

I also am completely unable to understand and justify Fred Field's political reasoning during the past 2 years. At the same time, his long experience with the IPR and his high technical competence in the field make him, in my opinion, an exceedingly valuable trustee. As for the present staff, it is hard for me to see how anyone could believe that it merits the criticism you cite. Actually, the staff represents a wide range of political opinion, and in this respect it is quite representative of American public opinion at large. This is as it should be; don't you think?

With best regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, *Secretary*.<sup>10</sup>

#### FIELD AS INTERNATIONAL CONFEREES

Professor Rowe told of his experience with Mr. Field at an IPR conference in 1945. Professor Rowe said:

I was a member of the American council delegation at the Atlantic City conference—this was in early '45, I believe—and I was very much interested in trying to cooperate with the British. I found this extremely difficult because the automatic reaction of the British was that any member of the American delegation was not out for their good and they were hostile, unfriendly, and in a formal, cold sort of way; not, of course, in an overt fashion, but I couldn't get to first base trying to cooperate with the British.

MR. MORRIS. Was there a unity of outlook among the American delegation?

MR. ROWE. At the Atlantic City conference?

MR. MORRIS. Yes. In other words, did you caucus, or anything, there?

MR. ROWE. Oh, yes; there was a regular caucus system. I found myself very quickly in a rather embarrassing position. I had been invited to be a member of the American delegation by Mr. Carter, E. C. Carter; that is, when he visited us in New Haven one time, and I accepted.

At that time he asked me whether I would have any objection to Mr. Frederick V. Field being a member of the American delegation. I think this is a very interesting fact in itself, and I said no, but when I got to Atlantic City I found that Mr. Field was not only a member of the American delegation, but he was the spokesman for the delegation.

<sup>9</sup> P. 3870.

<sup>10</sup> P. 3871.



In these caucuses the point of view would be put up, Field would make the initial pronouncement at the open meetings, and then the American members were supposed to speak up in support.

I am afraid I proved rather uncooperative at this point. I refrained from supporting some of the things Mr. Field said, and I was taken to task for it at the time, but I am afraid that I was still rather obstinate and did not create a particularly good impression.

Senator WATKINS. Who were the other members of that delegation?

Mr. ROWE. Mr. Jessup was one of them. Mr. Carter, of course, was there. This was at the time when they were about to shift over from Carter to another general secretary of the American IPR. A guaranty that they would make such a shift was part of the arrangements which they made in an effort to placate the British, because the British recognized that Carter was the spearhead of the anti-British element in the American IPR (pp. 3975-3976).

Additional glimpses of Mr. Field's activities as a trustee were provided by Mr. Dennett. Mr. Dennett testified that on the eve of his departure for the U. N. Conference at San Francisco, he "suggested" to Mrs. Marguerite Ann Stewart, a staff member—

That, if she took over while I was away and did a good job, I would suggest her as assistant secretary upon my return. \* \* \* I went to the executive committee and suggested that she be appointed assistant secretary, was told by some members of the executive committee that they had not been satisfied with her work while I was away and they turned down the suggestion. The shop committee of the union immediately came in to protest \* \* \* that I had in fact promised Mrs. Stewart the job and insisted that I appoint her assistant secretary in any event. \* \* \* I found on my desk a communication from the shop committee to the executive committee, demanding that the executive committee reverse its decision. \* \* \* This seemed to me to put pretty clearly the question, who was running the organization, the staff or the executive committee, and in order to clear the air, I submitted my resignation. \* \* \* There was a special committee appointed to investigate. It consisted of Frederick Vanderbilt Field and Mrs. Ada Comstock Notestein. \* \* \* Mr. Field was rather consistently in favor of the union. \* \* \* Mrs. Stewart was not appointed assistant secretary. There was some face-saving formula developed (p. 940 ff.).

A short time later, however, she succeeded Mr. Dennett as full secretary.

#### FIELD AND IPR PAMPHLETS

Here is another of Mr. Dennett's recollections:

Early in 1945 I received word from the Washington office that Owen Lattimore believed that Mr. Wallace might be willing to write a pamphlet for a pamphlet series in regard to American postwar Pacific policy \* \* \* It was decided that we should go ahead with this. Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore was given the job of doing the writing for it. She had, I gather, three or four, two or three sessions with the Vice President, during which she took notes on his ideas. The pamphlet was then prepared by her and the manuscript subsequently approved by Mr. Wallace \* \* \*

The pamphlet was entitled, "Our Job in the Pacific." It approached the subject from this angle: "Free Asia will include first of all China and Soviet Asia, which form a great area of freedom."

When the matter was first brought up in the executive committee, there were some members of the committee who felt that Mr. Wallace \* \* \* was too controversial a figure for us to publish the pamphlet \* \* \*. There were others who felt very strongly that we ought to publish it any event \* \* \*. It was finally agreed that Mr. Wallace was to write the pamphlet. So far as I recall, there was no reading of what he had written or what Mrs. Lattimore had written, because we more or less felt that we were not in a position to edit the Vice President.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Dennett, who was the principal advocate of the publication of this pamphlet in these controversies within the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DENNETT. Frederick Field, I would say (p. 951 ff).

Subsequent testimony developed that in his Daily Worker column for June 24, 1944, Mr. Field said this:

Vice President Wallace's pamphlet, Our Job in the Pacific \* \* \* is a progressive and statesmanlike approach to problems of our foreign policy.

#### WHEN DID FIELD RESIGN?

In the brief he presented to the subcommittee on behalf of IPR, Mr. Holland said:

The officers of the American institute pressed him (Mr. Field) in 1947 to resign, not because of any unbecoming conduct on his part within the organization, but because his pro-Communist outside activities seemed likely to damage the institute's public reputation.

No documents were offered in support of this assertion. On the other hand, Mr. Morris introduced the following passages from an IPR trustees' meeting held on March 18, 1947:

With regard to Mr. Field, President Sproul had been of the frank opinion that the best way out might be for Mr. Field to agree to withdraw from the executive committee. During the course of the discussion, Mr. Dean and Mr. Gilchrist had pointed out that Mr. Field was one of the most valuable and objective members of the executive committee and that they had never known him to show any political bias whatever as far as the IPR had been concerned. They also argued that if Mr. Field were removed from the committee, it would be welcomed by Mr. Kohlberg, who would then concentrate his efforts on getting rid of other members who participate actively in the IPR. They had further pointed out that Mr. Field had been reelected to the board with a majority—that, in fact, he had received a majority of the votes of the California members. It was noted in this connection that the nominating committee in preparing the ballots for the new board of trustees informed the entire membership that Mr. Field was a member of the editorial board of the New Masses \* \* \*.

Then later on, on page 485:

Mr. Dean then called for a vote on the question of whether Mr. Field should be included in the executive committee for 1947. Fourteen trustees voted in favor of Mr. Field's serving on the executive committee for 1947 and one voted against.

#### FIELD'S COMMISSION <sup>11</sup>

Senator O'CONNOR. Mr. Field, what was the time or the date when you first undertook to make application for a commission in the Army Intelligence of the United States?

Mr. FIELD. The origin was the other way round. I was asked if I would accept a commission. \* \* \* It began very early in January of 1942. \* \* \* I was asked to come here to Washington to go through a series of rather prolonged interviews with the officers who were heading up \* \* \* this particular section, which was to be a research staff on certain problems. \* \* \* I spent some time down here and had long individual discussions with the various officers. The subject of the discussions was the question of my political views and whether they could be reconciled with the task which they wished me to undertake. We had very long talks, very full and frank talks on both sides. Finally, I was definitely offered a commission by this particular branch. \* \* \*

Senator O'CONNOR. Did you reveal to them fully your views?

Mr. FIELD. Yes; I did.

Senator O'CONNOR. \* \* \* Were you endorsed for the commission by Edward C. Carter, Owen Lattimore, and William T. Stone, among others? \* \* \*

Mr. FIELD. At one point I was. \* \* \* The whole thing was cleared in this particular Army set-up.<sup>1</sup> It then was blocked at some point, some undeterminable point outside the Army. \* \* \* I was notified of it and asked to come back to Washington, which I did. At the time it was suggested that it was impossible

<sup>11</sup> Pp. 106-112.

for the officers in question themselves to initiate any investigation as to what had gone wrong. They did suggest that I do so myself and see if I could eliminate the problem. It was at that point that I went to everybody. I knew whom I thought might be in a position to help me, and Mr. Carter was one of them. I remember that he did offer to help me. I believe he did take certain steps.

Senator O'CONNOR. How about Owen Lattimore?

Mr. FIELD. \* \* \* either I or somebody went on my behalf.

Senator O'CONNOR. And William T. Stone?

Mr. FIELD. I suppose he would have been one of the persons. \* \* \* I imagine he was interested indirectly through someone else, but I am not sure about that \* \* \*.

Senator O'CONNOR. Was he not a member of the board of Amerasia? \* \* \* you were chairman of the board and among its members were Owen Lattimore and William T. Stone?

Mr. FIELD. Then he was \* \* \*.

Senator O'CONNOR. You were consulted as to the strategic bombing of Japan, or rather, you were consulted as to taking a job which would have direct relationship with that problem?

Mr. FIELD. That is the way I understood it, sir.

Senator O'CONNOR. Were these persons with whom you consulted, including Mr. Carter, Owen Lattimore, William T. Stone, Lauchlin Currie, aware of the nature of the problems that were then under consideration, about which you were being considered for a commission?

Mr. FIELD. That I am certain of \* \* \*

Senator SMITH. \* \* \* did you disclose to that officer or those officers any connection with the Communist Party you may have had?

Mr. FIELD. I am sure this type of question came up. We had a full and frank discussion \* \* \*

Senator SMITH. You say whatever you told the Army officers at that time about your connections was true?

Mr. FIELD. Unquestionably.

Senator SMITH. Do you recall acquainting them with any connection you may have had with the Communist party?

Mr. FIELD. At this point, I would have to decline to answer \* \* \*

Senator FERGUSON. I want to ask you this question about Owen Lattimore and about Currie, that you don't remember going to, whether in this same letter you didn't say this; \* \* \* Presumably Currie is taking it up with Owen.

Mr. FIELD. That is unquestionably Owen Lattimore.

Senator FERGUSON. Who is Currie?

Mr. FIELD. That would be Lauchlin Currie. It carries out exactly the testimony that I gave recently that Mr. Currie had probably been reached indirectly.

Senator FERGUSON. Not only probably but was; he was reached by Lattimore.

Mr. FIELD. There isn't any question about it.

Senator FERGUSON. There is no doubt, is there?

Mr. FIELD. I never entertained or suggested any doubt \* \* \*

Senator FERGUSON. Would you have any objections to Army Intelligence turning over to this committee all that you told them and the recommendations and all the matters they have before them?

Mr. FIELD. None whatsoever. \* \* \* (pp. 106-112.)

Senator FERGUSON. The present Chair asked for that file, and all that is in it is merely a medical report \* \* \* (p. 388).

During the questioning of Mr. Carter, which took place before that of Field, two letters from Mr. Carter to Mr. Field were introduced. The first, dated December 15, 1941, stated:

I was all set to talk to two or three people in Washington when I got your letter of the 10th, at the Mayflower with Stone's rather surprising reaction. \* \* \* I am anxious to talk the whole situation over with you before I make the next move. I want very much to see your unusual gifts utilized to the fullest extent during the emergency \* \* \* (p. 26).

The second, dated May 4, 1942, said:

\* \* \* I am terribly sorry that my efforts on behalf of you and also on behalf of Uncle Sam have not as yet yielded any substantial result \* \* \* (p. 27).

Senator EASTLAND. You had intended, now, making some contacts?

Mr. CARTER. I certainly did.



Senator EASTLAND. To get Field a commission in Army Intelligence; had you not?

Mr. CARTER. Absolutely \* \* \* (p. 28).

Senator SMITH. Mr. Carter, after having your memory refreshed by these letters and conversations, will you tell us now whether or not you aimed at Lattimore, Mr. Currie and Mr. Stone to participate in securing a commission in the Intelligence for Mr. Field?

Mr. CARTER. Certainly it points that way very definitely \* \* \* (p. 29).

Senator SMITH. And you realized that each of those three gentlemen were in strategic positions to assist in that effort?

Mr. CARTER. That is quite clear \* \* \* (p. 30).

Senator SMITH. Mr. Carter, at that time, then, you were possessed with at least some degree of determination to get Mr. Field into that Intelligence job, if you could, even in spite of the fact that you knew there were questionable circumstances about his career up to that point?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator SMITH. You were still determined to try to get him into Government service?

Mr. CARTER. Yes. All the evidence points that out \* \* \* (p. 31).

Senator O'CONNOR. \* \* \* Now, I would like to ask you what other form of Government work you, Mr. Carter, suggested to Frederick Field that he could get, knowing that he was a Communist or had Communist sympathies.

Mr. CARTER. I think the obvious ones, I don't remember in detail, would have been OWI or OSS, or, because of his knowledge of the economics of both China and Japan, the Board of Economic Warfare \* \* \*.

Senator EASTLAND. What about the State Department, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember. It might have been (p. 34).

#### SUMMATION

The subcommittee attaches the greatest importance to the following sets of facts:

(1) IPR's first secretary general attempted as long ago as 1927 to establish a connection between his organization of "scholarly inquiry" and the Comintern. IPR's membership was officially informed of his actions. It is the commonest knowledge that the Comintern is and always has been the engine of the Communist world revolution against democracy. It has never had any connotation of scholarship. It was established by Lenin himself more than 30 years ago and has been under the absolute control of either Lenin or Stalin ever since (exhibit 1368).

(2) IPR's present secretary general, Mr. Holland, was the official who first sought to put the institute into contact—through one of his former IPR associates—with Borodin, who was the Comintern's "chief engineer" for the first Communist revolution in China (p. 4586).

(3) IPR's secretary-general, in the crucial days when its true character was being molded, was Mr. Carter. Mr. Carter was fully aware that the establishment of the Soviet council was approved "In the highest quarters" in Moscow (p. 152). He officially rejoiced over the fact that "nearly all" officers of the Soviet council were members of the Communist Party (p. 4567). He enjoyed the closest personal relationship with some of the most important officials of the Soviet Government; on at least one occasion he was granted privileges by the Government which were bestowed on no other foreigner (p. 4570), including our own American Ambassador. He described Earl Browder, former secretary of the American Communist Party, as "100 percent American" (p. 175). He used his IPR prestige, and the IPR staff to propagate the idea that the notorious Moscow purge trials "make sense" (p. 3932). He chose as his American lieutenants in U. S. S. R. matters, Owen Lattimore (p. 4555), Joseph Barnes (p.

2701), Frederick Vanderbilt Field (p. 4567), Mrs. Joseph Barnes (p. 3136), Kate Mitchell (p. 3934), Harriet Moore (p. 3934), and Hilda Austern (p. 4578). All of these have been identified as Communists by witnesses before the subcommittee. Two have refused to answer questions regarding their Communist connections on grounds of self-incrimination (pp. 2601-2659).

(4) Voitinski was first identified by Mr. Barmine, who was the third witness to come before the subcommittee (p. 188 ff). No subsequent witness appearing on behalf of IPR even mentioned Voitinski's name in any of their many official statements presented voluntarily to us. None saw fit to explain why their institute of international "scholarship" sought and was able to maintain such a cordial relationship with the Comintern's far eastern chief, who began working underground for the Chinese Communist revolution as far back as 1920.

(5) Svanidze, the brother-in-law of Joseph Stalin and a key agent of Soviet imperialism in Sinkiang, was also first identified by Mr. Barmine early in our hearings (pp. 188, 196). He, too, was conspicuously ignored by IPR spokesmen who appeared before us. The same can be said of all other members of the Soviet council, who were variously described by Messrs. Barmine, Bogolepov, and Poppe as members of the Comintern, the Soviet secret police, or the central committee of the Russian Communist Party.

(6) At the very beginning of the IPR-U. S. S. R. relationship, American IPR staff members were secretly warned that they should maintain the "fiction" that the Soviet council was independent of the Soviet Foreign Office (exhibit 761). They were secretly advised that this fiction was created in order to guard against future charges that the Soviet council was, in fact, an agency of Bolshevik propaganda. They were secretly advised that, despite the fiction, they were actually dealing with the Communist academy "the citadel of the faith in Soviet Russia" (p. 4588).

(7) Owen Lattimore obtained an audience in Moscow with Ambassador Bullitt through the good offices of IPR. During this interview he urged Mr. Bullitt to wire President Roosevelt, recommending the immediate recognition of Outer Mongolia as an independent state (p. 4523). Lattimore's own testimony, plus certain of his writings introduced in the record, bear witness to the fact that he described Outer Mongolia as an independent state in the 1930's (p. 4528). At the same time, documents found in IPR files fully establish that he sought Soviet permission to enter Outer Mongolia during the same years. No explanation was given as to why an American citizen needed Soviet permission to visit an "independent" state (p. 4562).

(8) General Willoughby's conclusion that the Japanese branch of IPR was "a spy ring for Russian Communists," appears on page 364 of our record. His testimony brought out that Hotsumi Ozaki and Kinkazu Saionji were officials of the Japanese IPR in the 1930's. Both were arrested as participants in Richard Sorge's Communist spy ring, and Ozaki was executed. As in the cases of Voitinsky et al., IPR spokesmen avoided mention of Ozaki and Saionji, when they came before us to defend the institute.

(9) Messrs. Holland and Green agreed on the witness stand that the U. S. S. R.-IPR relationship "amounted to little and was abandoned in 1939" (p. 1225). Documents found in IPR files establish

that there was constant communication with the Soviets and periodic visits to the U. S. S. R. by officials of the American institute. These visits continued at least until 1945, or 6 years after the Soviet institute is alleged to have been "abandoned" (p. 2591). Every report made by Mr. Carter after his Moscow visits, including that in 1945, testifies to the cordial and cooperative treatment he received from the Soviet council.

The inner circle of officers and staff members, including Carter, Field, Lattimore, Moore, and Mitchell, bound their organization to the Comintern in the 1930's.

It is reasonable to assume that they did so with the full knowledge of their present secretary-general, Mr. Holland. The foundations laid in the 1930's were built upon in the 1940's, as the subsequent record will show.



# THE EFFECT OF THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS ON UNITED STATES PUBLIC OPINION

## A. THE OSTENSIBLE AIMS OF THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

In its literature and in the words of its accredited spokesmen, the Institute of Pacific Relations has presented itself as an organization engaged in, and devoted exclusively to the interests of, objective, nonpartisan scholarship and research concerning the nations bordering the Pacific Ocean, more particularly concerning the Far East. It was upon the basis of this definition of aim that the IPR recommended itself to persons interested in the problems of the Pacific areas, to foundations, corporations, and individuals who might and in many cases did contribute funds to agencies and individuals of the United States and other governments, and to a certain section of the general public.<sup>1</sup>

In his "introductory statement" which has been made a part of the subcommittee record, Mr. William L. Holland, present secretary general of the Institute of Pacific Relations (Pacific Council) and executive vice chairman of the Institute of Pacific Relations (American Council), and associated with the IPR since 1929, makes such statements as the following concerning the aims of the IPR:

The autonomous national councils of the IPR \* \* \* are united \* \* \* by a belief that the unfettered nonpartisan collection of facts and discussion about the problems of the Far East and the Pacific area is important \* \* \* (p. 1213).

At this first conference (of the IPR, in 1925) it was realized that intelligent discussion was impossible on many subjects because many basic facts were lacking about the peoples, resources, trade, and politics of the Pacific area. This led to the inauguration by the international IPR of a large and continuing research program which subsequently received generous support from the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corp. The IPR has played an important part in increasing available knowledge about Asia in the United States and other countries. The Rockefeller Foundation has called the institute the most important single source of independent studies of the Pacific area and the Far East \* \* \* (p. 1215).

\* \* \* most of the leading American students of the contemporary Far East have during the past 25 years been associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations in one way or another. A list of Americans whose books, articles, or special studies have been published by the institute would almost constitute a Who's Who of the outstanding scholars in the field \* \* \* (p. 1230).

Prof. Kenneth Colegrove, of Northwestern University, testified as follows:

May I say that I joined the institute back in the early thirties because at that time the institute had the reputation of unbiased scientific system of investigation and many of the books that it published and the survey which it published were very excellent helps in teaching and in research.

It also purported at that time to be wholly unbiased, wholly scientific, and a very large number of professors and libraries subscribed to it \* \* \* (p. 906).

<sup>1</sup>Page citations refer to the printed record of testimony on the IPR, unless otherwise indicated.

In a subsequent statement submitted on March 19, 1952, Mr. Holland refers to the IPR as "a nonpartisan research organization" (p. 3891).

William W. Lockwood, assistant director of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, and for more than 15 years associated with the IPR, testified:

\* \* \* the preservation of free institutions depends upon knowledge and its wide dissemination. And knowledge depends upon free inquiry, such as the institute was organized to encourage in our relations with the vast, turbulent, and little understood continent of Asia. \* \* \*

\* \* \* From fairly extensive knowledge of its operations I believe it (the IPR) has remained true to its principles of nonpartisan investigation and free discussion \* \* \*

The outstanding fact about the institute is the tremendous contribution it has made to knowledge of the Pacific area. For this the whole free world is in its debt. It has striven to provide the first requirement of an intelligent and successful approach to Asia: an understanding of its basic facts and problems, arrived at by free inquiry \* \* \* (p. 3863).

Mr. Jerome D. Greene, active in the IPR since its inception, affirmed in his testimony his confidence in—

the integrity of the institute in adhering to its exclusive aims of competent, disinterested research, of fact-finding in the areas of possible conflict, and of conference in which divergent views could be frankly expressed and efforts made to reconcile them \* \* \* (pp. 3851-3852).

I wish most emphatically to place on the record with this committee my conviction that the institute has not departed from its declared principles \* \* \* (p. 3855).

If the description of the IPR as an organization devoted to objective, nonpartisan scholarship and research were true and adequate, this would imply, according to accepted canons, that the major portion of its activities, funds and energies would have been allotted to the discovery, assembling and publication of authentic facts and information concerning its avowed areas of interest. On subjects or problems with respect to which there are legitimate grounds for diversity of opinions, a scientific and scholarly approach requires that each relevant and informed view shall be fairly represented. It may be remarked that the canons of scholarship do not require that all opinions on all subjects must be given equal treatment. Qualified opinion within any field is able to dismiss many opinions out of hand, as merely silly, eccentric, unbacked by any proper evidence, or disqualified by obvious incompetence or bad faith. For example, it is not required from a scholarly standpoint that a journal of contemporary chemistry should publish a defense of the theory of "Phlogiston," or that a gathering of geophysicists should listen to a paper defending the theory that the earth is flat. When, however, there are genuine differences of view on a given subject among those qualified to speak on that subject, then the canons of objective scholarship demand that each conflicting view be given fair, equal and unbiased treatment.

The spokesmen for the IPR show themselves to be aware of the problems which arise in connection with the handling of controversial questions, and they give an answer seemingly more libertarian than is required by the canons of scientific scholarship. This professed IPR solution was twofold: On the one hand, the IPR, in its research, publications, conferences, etc., permitted all conflicting points of view to be pursued and defended without prejudice; on the other, the

IPR as such, as an organization, did not take any specific policy position whatever, or follow any "line" (p. 3867).

Mr. Holland, in the introductory statement just referred to, notes what he declares to be the united IPR belief that "it is wise to seek a diversity of opinions and interpretations, including the views of persons with whom one sharply disagrees." This same statement stresses at some length his version of the IPR interpretation of the meaning of "nonpartisan" (p. 1213):

At the outset of its existence, the institute adopted the principle of complete nonpartisanship. The constitutions of the international institute and of all its national councils provide that the organization shall advocate no policies and express no opinions on public issues. This does not mean that individual members of the institute, or delegates to its conferences, or writers for its publication, may not express their personal opinions. On the contrary, a major purpose of the institute is to provide a forum in which issues of the day may be debated from all points of view.

Thus the institute is not a society of like-minded people interested in advancing some particular philosophy or policy \* \* \* Its membership is very diverse \* \* \* This is true to a degree which would be hard to find in an organization promoting some particular cause or "line" \* \* \*

\* \* \* Because it has always recognized the importance of having the facts analyzed from a variety of viewpoints, it has never been identified with any one school of thought, with any political faction, or with any one national outlook \* \* \* (p. 1223).

Mr. Greene testifies to the same question:

To guard against any temptation for the institute as such to espouse one side of an international dispute, whether as between nations or as between political, economic, or social theories, the rule was established from the beginning and strictly adhered to that no resolutions should ever be passed concerning such matters. Neither the institute nor anyone purporting to speak for it could advocate one international or domestic policy or another. It merely sought to make available to the public in the several countries the facts bearing on a dispute, including such national or individual divergences of opinion or interest as a dispassionate judgment would take into account (p. 3852).

With reference to the possibility that the IPR's professed non-partisanship might have deviated in a pro-Communist direction, Mr. Greene's statement to the subcommittee is emphatic:

Your committee has been concerned about the possibility of Communist infiltration in the staff or among the writers of IPR publications \* \* \*.

\* \* \* I do not exclude the possibility that it has been attempted. Its results must have been disappointing to any who made the attempt. For I know no evidence that the institute has ever succumbed to any such insidious influence that may secretly have been brought to bear on it \* \* \* (p. 3855).

So far as the Institute of Pacific Relations is concerned, I do not believe that in the staff or among the members there were any individuals, whatever their relations with Russians or with subversive organizations may have been alleged to be, who succeeded, if they tried, in deflecting the institute by a hair's breadth from its principles as I have stated them. Even in the case of Frederick V. Field, who ceased to be employed by the IPR in 1940 \* \* \* his earlier excellent services in administration and research showed nothing but complete fidelity to the corporate policies of the institute \* \* \* (p. 3856).

Mr. Holland is equally emphatic:

\* \* \* no IPR publication has advocated communism or urged acceptance of Communist policies or programs (p. 1222).

It may be observed, in passing, that, if this statement is true, then the IPR failed in the purpose which Mr. Holland simultaneously attributes to it of providing "a forum in which issues of the day may be debated from all points of view." If pro-communism was excluded,



then it is not the case that the IPR permitted all points of view (p. 1223). Granted the IPR conception of "nonpartisanship," the necessary inference from Mr. Lockwood's combined statements is that the IPR showed in practice a strong and unjustified anti-Communist bias.

The remainder of this division of the report will answer, on the basis of the testimony and evidence which have been placed before the hearings certain questions concerning the ostensible and avowed aims of the IPR. Is it a fact that the IPR can be truly and adequately described as an objective, nonpartisan, scholarly and research organization? Has the IPR functioned also, or alternatively, as an organization affecting, influencing, or molding public opinion, in particular public opinion in the United States? If the latter, what has been the nature, direction, or tendency of the effect or influence which the IPR has had on public opinion in the United States, and what are typical means by which this effect or influence has been exercised? More specifically, has the effect or influence of the IPR on public opinion in the United States been in any degree or measure pro-Communist or pro-Soviet, such as has been of aid or comfort to Soviet or Communist interests and objectives?

#### B. THE PROBLEM POSED ON THE LIMITS OF INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS RESPONSIBILITY

Before proceeding to the answers to the questions listed at the end of the preceding section, it is advisable to clarify a preliminary difficulty which is raised in the testimony of those witnesses—Messrs. Greene, Holland, and Lockwood in particular—who have been most concerned to proclaim the exclusively scholarly character of the IPR, and the total absence of any pro-Communist influence in its activities.

In testimony already quoted, Mr. Holland insists that—

the constitutions of the international institute and of all its national councils provide that the organization shall advocate no policies and express no opinions on public issues.

He contrasts this constitutional restriction on the international institute and the national councils with the freedom given to "individual members of the institute, or delegates to its conferences, or writers for its publication" to express their personal opinions (p. 1223). Mr. Greene is at pains to stress the same formal point—

the rule was established from the beginning and strictly adhered to that no resolutions should ever be passed concerning such matters. Neither the institute nor anyone purporting to speak for it could advocate one international or domestic policy or another (p. 3852).

In substance, the contention here seems to be the following: (a) There was no pro-Communist influence acting in, or through, the IPR; (b) but if there was, the IPR "as such" was not responsible for it, and it cannot be charged against the IPR. This same argument is discovered not only in the testimony of Messrs. Greene, Holland, and Lockwood, but also in that of Messrs. Bisson, Carter, Fairbank, Lattimore, Mrs. Gelfan (Harriet L. Moore), and Mr. Rosinger, and is upheld by these last two alongside their refusals to answer the subcommittee's questions concerning their own Communist affiliations.

The obvious purpose of this argument is to shield the IPR from any blame for pro-Communist activities or influence. But it is noteworthy that the same witnesses who insist that the IPR cannot prop-

erly be blamed for any pro-Communist actions of individual IPR members, if there were any such actions, also persist in assigning credit to the IPR for scholarly, scientific and anti-Communist actions of individual IPR members. Mr. Holland, in his introductory statement, objects to any political characterization of the IPR on the grounds that "numerous persons, many of whom are alleged to be Communist agents or sympathizers, were associated or connected with the IPR" (p. 1217). Nevertheless, he seems in the next paragraph to find it relevant evidence to the IPR's political purity that "many \* \* \* Senators and Congressmen, including Senators Flanders, Elbert Thomas, Thomas Hart, and Representatives such as Mrs. Frances Bolton, have been IPR members \* \* \*" (p. 1218). It would scarcely be possible for Mr. Holland to contend that these eminent personages were more active and representative IPR members than, say, Frederick V. Field, Harriet Moore, Lawrence Rosinger or Chao-ting Chi, all four of whom have been identified as Communists in evidence presented before this subcommittee. Mr. Holland sees fit to list Twenty Distinguished Americans who have Actively Participated in the Work of the American Institute of Pacific Relations (pp. 1220-1221), and the list is indeed impressive. Presumably, by introducing this list into his sworn testimony, Mr. Holland implies that it is relevant to a determination of the IPR's political complexion. If so, another list featuring such names as Joseph Barnes, Len DeCaux, Chen Han-seng, Kathleen Barnes, Philip Jaffe, William Mandel, Guenther Stein, all of whom have been identified as Communists, and all of whom were far more active in the affairs of the IPR than those persons listed by Mr. Holland, would surely be equally relevant. Mr. Holland precedes another list of 30 IPR publications (1221-1222) with the comment: "The following titles, taken at random from the long IPR publications list, illustrate the character of its research and publications." Presumably Mr. Holland regards this list also as evidence relevant to the political bona fides of the IPR, and it is quite true that the overwhelming majority of the titles he cites are by non- or anti-Communist authors.

But if this list is relevant and is indeed "taken at random," it must remain something of a mathematical mystery why there do not appear on it any names such as Israel Epstein, or Chi Ch'ao-ting, or Frederick Field, each of whom has been repeatedly identified as Communist, and each of whom has published many titles under IPR auspices as against the merely one or two IPR titles of many of the authors named by Mr. Holland. Finally, Mr. Holland includes in his statement a partial list (47 names) of writers well-known for their active opposition to communism, whose work the IPR has published (p. 1222). What is the possible relevance of this or any other list if the IPR is in no way responsible for any advocacy of policies or expression of opinions on public issues?

The defense offered by these witnesses against the charge of Communist influence in the IPR is thus vitiated by an internal contradiction. It is quite possible, however, to make a more fruitful use of the evidence at hand. It seems plain that Mr. Greene, for example, is anxious to make a careful legal distinction in order to define the limits of the legal (and possibly financial) responsibility of the IPR as a corporate entity. Legal and financial responsibility, in the narrow sense, are not, however, primarily at issue in the present

context, where our concern is with the effect of the IPR on public opinion. The inquiry here is rather into what might be termed the social, political, and human or moral responsibility of the IPR.

Reasonable men, with the help of ordinary common sense, possess the key to relevance in such an inquiry. In judging an association or organization from a social, political, and human standpoint, the normal rule is: By their fruits ye shall know them. We observe what the individuals actively participating in the organization do or fail to do through their associated activities, and judge accordingly. In reality, and inevitably, in spite of their formal disclaimer, this is the implicit rule which is applied by the spokesmen for the IPR already cited. Mr. Holland himself, for example, very understandably argues in his statement:

The institute should be judged by its record as a whole, not by bits and pieces culled from its files. \* \* \* It should be judged primarily by what it has done \* \* \* (p. 1214).

He gives various lists of members as presumed indications of "the authentic picture of who controlled and shaped the institute's policies and programs" (p. 1218), and generalizes:

the character of its [the IPR's] work has been determined \* \* \* by the hundreds of eminent citizens and scholars who have taken an active part in the institute as officers of the organization, as delegates to its conferences, or as writers of books and articles which it has published (p. 1215).

Mr. Lockwood, also yielding to common sense, declares:

When we speak of the institute we speak mainly of these people, for they are the writers and members and contributors who have carried on its work (p. 3866).

#### C. WHO MAKES UP THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

The formal structure of what is referred to as the IPR is exceedingly loose. Says Mr. Holland:

The Institute of Pacific Relations is an association composed of national councils in 10 countries. Each national council is autonomous and carries on its own work in its own distinctive way. Together they cooperate in an international IPR program of research, publications, and conferences. This program is directed by a Pacific Council in which each national council is represented, and administered by a small international secretariat working in New York under the direction of the Pacific Council (p. 1215).

Membership in the IPR entails, of itself, virtually no obligation, and has been undertaken by most of those classified as "members" merely as the equivalent to subscribing for the IPR magazines and other literature. Kenneth Colegrove explained:

You joined the institute simply by paying your dues. That is all it amounts to \* \* \*. I think most of the members like myself became members in order to get the publications rather than to participate in the studies (p. 906).

Under these circumstances, it is difficult to be precise in delimiting just what is to be meant by the IPR or IPR activities. It would certainly be incorrect to assign responsibility to the IPR for the personal behavior and beliefs of a "member" who had only the purely "passive" relation to the IPR of receiving and perhaps reading some of its literature. The American IPR cannot be deemed responsible in detail for, say, the Australian or Pakistan or French affiliates of the international IPR, except where there might be a specific intersection of activities as at an international conference or in some particular



publication project—though the American IPR and each of the other national councils, by virtue of their voluntary linkage before their respective and the world public, and their practical assistance to each other, do mutually share a certain measure of general responsibility for each other and for the over-all character of the world association. Again, the IPR, its officers and the editors of its publications, may rightly disclaim corporate responsibility for the details of the views expressed in any given article, book, or lecture, or even for the entirety of the views of an individual writer or lecturer expressed on a particular occasion.

Granted these distinctions, it must at the same time be insisted that the IPR and its social nature may be legitimately defined and characterized in terms of the general pattern (if there is any) of its activities and of the activities carried on by its active members under IPR auspices or in direct or indirect connection with IPR aims and projects. Most of the activities of the IPR were in one or another sense verbal—articles, pamphlets, books, lectures, conversations, letters, dissertations, conferences. It is customary for many editors of magazines, or directing officials of other sorts of publishing projects, to disclaim specific responsibility for the details of individual articles or books which they publish. This does not absolve them from a basic responsibility, and credit or blame, for the general character and pattern of the material which is published. Everyone understands what it means to say, for example, that a particular newspaper or magazine or pamphlet series is on the whole “pro-Republican Party,” “pro-Democratic Party,” “pro-Socialist,” “Catholic,” or “Protestant,” and understands that this does not mean that each and every article in the given publication is explicitly pro — whatever particular cause is in question.

With reference to the IPR, then, the organization itself, and the activities carried out under its auspices or in relation to its aims and projects by its officers, staff, editors, and its active and influential members are rightly judged in terms of any general patterns, characteristics, and ideological or political biases which they may be found to manifest. Since the IPR professed to be an objective and non-partisan organization for scholarship and research, it and those who in fact have directed its affairs are in particular responsible for any violations of the accepted standards and criteria of scholarship, and for any pattern of partisan bias or prejudice.

The testimony shows (and there is no dispute on this point) that the bulk of the membership of the IPR as well as most of the members of the board of trustees, were inactive and “passive,” and obviously without any influence over the conduct of the organization and its affairs. The testimony, taken in its entirety, also reveals that there was a relatively small core of active members who carried the main burden of IPR activities and who, most of the time at any rate, directed its administration and policies.

Because the group, in the hundreds of letters and memoranda put in the record, show the ideological, social bonds among them, we shall borrow a term of their own and call them the IPR family.

The general subject of the present division of the subcommittee's report is the effect of the activities of the IPR on public opinion in the United States. It is not within the scope of the report to analyze the effect on public opinion elsewhere. The report does, however,

apply to activities emanating administratively from the Pacific council and the international secretariat as well as from the American IPR. In keeping with the realities, moreover, a precise distinction will not ordinarily be made between the two sets of activities, unless there is in a given instance some significant relevance to the distinction.

The group of IPR activists who comprised the IPR family did not by any means limit their sphere of action to the IPR framework. They were zealous in journalism, the universities, and in government, and they were found in especially heavy concentration in a number of organizations with interests and aims falling directly or indirectly within the sphere of interest of the IPR itself. The IPR was, indeed, one of a system or galaxy of organizations which were interrelated both by similarities of interest and by interlocking of active personnel. This system is dealt with elsewhere in this report (pp. 144-159). The other organizations in the system all in one way or another influenced United States public opinion. It is impossible to understand the nature of the IPR and the IPR family, or their relation to public opinion, without having in mind the system of which they were one part. A brief review of some of the interlocking organizations is therefore given here.

#### D. INTERLOCKING ORGANIZATION

##### 1. *Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy*

This committee published the magazine, *Spotlight on the Far East* (p. 772). Both this committee and its magazine have been identified by the Attorney General as subversive (Communist fronts) (pp. 771, 1017, 1334). Mr. Owen Lattimore admitted in testimony given at an executive session, which was subsequently introduced at the public hearings, that this committee "has become a fellow-traveling organization" (p. 3474). To Senator Eastland's question whether the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy was a Communist-front organization, Mr. W. L. Holland replied, "I regard it so, sir," (p. 3911). Exhibit No. 8 (pp. 55-56) is an official document of the Communist Party of New York State which calls on party members to support the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, and which advises them that "any inquiries in relation to further activity can be received by writing to the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy." The testimony of Dr. Max Yergan (p. 4595) describes in some detail the organization of this committee by the Communist Party. There has been placed in the record<sup>2</sup> an analytic chart showing in detail the interlocking of personnel between the IPR and the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy.

##### 2. *The China Aid Council*

This council began as a part of the American League for Peace and Democracy (p. 411, exhibit 100) and later combined with the American Committee for Chinese War Orphans (pp. 409-410, exhibits 98-99). Miss Elizabeth Bentley testified in the hearings (p. 407 ff) to the Communist control of the China Aid Council. Mr. Louis Budenz testified this council "was not just a Communist-controlled organization. It was a Communist-created organization, and was, therefore,

<sup>2</sup> Exhibit No. 1334, referred to on pp. 4610-4611.

also Communist-controlled. It is what is popularly known as a Communist front" (p. 677).

The American League for Peace and Democracy, successor to the American League Against War and Fascism, parent organization of the China Aid Council, has been repeatedly identified and characterized as subversive, and a Communist front by witnesses before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, and is so described by the Attorney General. Exhibits Nos. 98, 99, and 100 (pp. 409-411), here referred to, show in part the interlocking between the China Aid Council and the IPR.

### 3. *The magazine, Amerasia*

Amerasia was so closely linked into the IPR system that the IPR family ordinarily treated it as simply another of their own publications. When it ceased publication after the arrests in what has been known as the Amerasia case in 1945, the subscription list was taken over by the Far Eastern Survey, official publication of the IPR. Frederick V. Field was owner of 50 percent of the stock of Amerasia, and was for more than 3 years simultaneously chairman of its editorial board and executive secretary of the American IPR (pp. 114-115). Such intimate members of the IPR family as Owen Lattimore, Ch'ao-ting Chi, T. A. Bisson and Kate Mitchell were all on the Amerasia board of editors (p. 35, exhibit 3-D). Mr. Field explains quite candidly that "we" (presumably meaning himself and some of his IPR associates) started Amerasia in order to be able to draw conclusions from research and to "blow off steam" more freely than could be done in publications openly sponsored by the IPR. "This was one of the prevailing arguments which I think persuaded somewhat doubtful people in the institute about the advisability of undertaking this" (p. 115).

Articles and writers were readily shunted back and forth among Pacific Affairs, Far Eastern Survey and Amerasia. On more than one occasion, the question was raised of whether to make Amerasia an open IPR organ. In 1942, for example, Mr. Lockwood wrote, in a letter to Professor Colegrove:

The real reason I haven't withdrawn from the editorial board of Amerasia confidentially, is the hope that sooner or later some kind of combination could be made between Amerasia and the two IPR periodicals which would strengthen their total usefulness to the public \* \* \* (p. 911, exhibit 276).

An IPR office memorandum dated July 24, 1939, presumably from Mr. Field, refers to "negotiations regarding the taking over of Amerasia" (p. 4097, exhibit 649).

In 1945, hundreds of classified official United States documents were discovered in the Amerasia offices. In connection with that discovery, members of the editorial board and Mr. John S. Service of the State Department were indicted and two of them convicted. In 1952, Mr. Service was dropped from the State Department as the result of an adverse finding as to his security qualifications by the Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission.

Prof. Kenneth Colegrove described the "Kremlin line" of Amerasia, as a result of which he resigned his membership on its board (p. 907). Elizabeth Bentley identified Amerasia as Communist dominated (p. 439).



Mr. Louis Budenz testified as follows:

Amerasia was organized, according to official information given to me, under complete Communist auspices. As a matter of fact, the first copy of Amerasia when it first appeared was presented to me before it ever appeared to get my opinion. \* \* \* After I passed on it it went back to the Politburo. They said it had been submitted to me<sup>3</sup> first before publication (pp. 618-619). Mr. Budenz also testified that there was a joint Communist Party cell for both the IPR and Amerasia, with Mr. Field in charge and reporting to the Politburo of the Communist Party.<sup>3</sup>

Mr. MORRIS. \* \* \* will you tell us how this cell operated in connection with the Politburo, this cell that operated within the Institute of Pacific Relations? \* \* \*

Mr. BUDENZ. Of course, this cell, as all Communist cells, changed from time to time in personnel. It was largely, though, linked up with Amerasia and was a joint cell with Amerasia, and it was operated by Frederick Vanderbilt Field, an officer of the Institute of Pacific Relations, reporting to the Politburo \* \* \* (p. 518).

4. *The magazine China Today, published by the American Friends of the Chinese People*

Testimony by a number of witnesses, as well as lists of editors and contributors (p. 3169, exhibit 482), establish the close interlocking of China Today with the IPR. Such IPR activists as T. A. Bisson, Philip J. Jaffe, and Maxwell S. Stewart are listed as editors. When China Today ceased publication its subscription list was taken over by Amerasia. Mr. Holland testified (pp. 1155, et seq.) that to his knowledge, after 1945, Mr. Field was an editor of China Today under a pseudonym. This fact is also referred to by Mr. Budenz, who stated: "China Today was the Communist publication run by Frederick Vanderbilt Field and Philip Jaffe" (p. 653). Mr. Budenz went on to make a distinction, from the point of view of the Communists, between the functions of Amerasia and of China Today.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Amerasia a Communist publication?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; Communist-created, but in order to have a certain different function than China Today. China Today was clearly Communist from its inception. \* \* \* China Today was clearly a Chinese publication devised by the Communists in secrecy, to a degree, but with Communist policies very clearly defined for the purpose of influencing other agencies and organizations, penetrating them, and in that way working out the Communist program in the United States for China.

Senator FERGUSON. And it was more openly for the Communist cause than Amerasia?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes; that is correct (p. 653).

Mr. Lattimore seems to refer to this same difference in function when he writes, in a letter dated December 13, 1939, "\* \* \* China Today, which is more partisan, and more obviously partisan, than Amerasia" (p. 255, exhibit 54).

Dr. Karl Wittfogel identified the American Friends of the Chinese People and the magazine China Today as Communist-controlled (p. 285).

The American Friends of the Chinese People was also cited as a Communist front by the Special Committee on Un-American Activities (p. 1162).

<sup>3</sup> At that time, Mr. Budenz was managing editor of the official Communist newspaper, the Daily Worker.

### 5. *The American-Russian Institute*

The testimony of the hearings, and many of the documents introduced, show the intimate linkage between the Institute of Pacific Relations and the American-Russian Institute. Several members of the IPR family, including Edward C. Carter (p. 295, exhibit 69-A) and Kathleen Barnes (p. 645, exhibit 185) were directors of the American-Russian Institute. The key liaison was provided by Mrs. Gelfan, executive director of the American-Russian Institute (p. 267, exhibit 64) as well as a director and the editor of its publications (p. 296, exhibit 69-A), and at the same time was continuously active in the IPR, in various posts ranging from member of the international secretariat to trustee to delegate to delegate at conferences to chairman of the nominating committee to acting secretary (i. e., the principal officer of the staff) during part of the war period (p. 267, exhibit 64). Her book *Soviet Far Eastern Policy 1931-45*, was published as: "Sponsored by the International Secretariat of the IPR" (p. 2576). Other publications also linked the two organizations, such as William Mandel's book, *The Soviet Far East and Central Asia* (p. 664, exhibit 197).

Mrs. Gelfan, in her appearance before the subcommittee, February 6, 1952, refused to testify on any questions concerning her Communist or pro-Communist affiliations. The American-Russian Institute has been cited by the Attorney General as a subversive organization (p. 663). A special report prepared for the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (pp. 294-300, Exhibit 69-A) includes Mr. Carter and Harriet Moore (Mrs. Gelfan) among those "who have proven their sympathy with the Stalin regime in a network of propaganda organizations where they worked closely and harmoniously with outright Communists in furthering some particular aim of the Communist Party."

### 6. *The Allied Labor News*

This was an international organization syndicating news and articles chiefly to the labor press, and in practice primarily to the Communist and pro-Communist press. Louis Budenz testifies that it was "Completely controlled by the Communists" (p. 659). Among its principal links to the IPR were Anthony Jenkinson and Israel Epstein. Jenkinson, when he came from England to this country, became active in the IPR family, used *Allied Labor News* as his chief cover (p. 658). A number of Mr. Epstein's *Allied Labor News* articles which were carried in the *Daily Worker* are listed in the hearings (p. 662, exhibit 196). A photostat of the certificate of incorporation of the *Allied Labor News*, dated May 12, 1942, in which Anthony B. Jenkinson and Robert Terrall are recorded as the incorporators, is included in the record (p. 659).

The above-named organizations and publications by no means exhausts the list of those which were interlocked with the IPR. There have been included here the publications and organizations which had an important and particular function in influencing public opinion concerning the Far East. These, and others, are dealt with in other contexts elsewhere in this report.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> See, e.g., *Amerasia* in the index, p. 227.

## (E) WAS IPR A SCHOLARLY RESEARCH ORGANIZATION?

It is well known and undisputed that the IPR has initiated, sponsored, published, and otherwise presented various scholarly and research enterprises. With respect to some of these enterprises the role of the IPR itself has been more or less passive, and has consisted chiefly in finding a publisher for, or giving a forum or merely a label to, work that has been carried out by scholars or other institutions on their own instance. This seems to have been frequently the case with work done by or through national councils of the IPR other than the American Council. The projects associated with the American Council and many of those associated with the international secretariat were more fully IPR products, and often had active links with the IPR from their start as ideas to their finish as books, brochures, articles, or conference papers. The editing and publishing of the two magazines, *Pacific Affairs* (organ of the international IPR) and *Far Eastern Survey* (organ of the American Council), were of course active expressions of the IPR's prevailing policy and leadership.

As descriptive of at least part of the activities carried out under the name of the IPR, therefore, it is true that the IPR was, as its spokesmen declare, a "scholarly and research organization." However, even a cursory acquaintance with the record of these hearings is enough to show that this description, if true of a part, is by no means adequate to cover the whole of the nature and behavior of the IPR.

What the record quickly shows is that a considerable portion of the IPR activities operated not to discover, analyze, assemble and publish data (the normal primary concern of scholarship and research), but to influence public opinion. In fact, the pattern of IPR behavior conforms in most respects to that of typical organizations the chief purpose of which is to influence public opinion. The line of distinction here is of course not absolute. The published or spoken results of research inevitably have, and should properly have, a certain effect on the formation of public opinion. A research or purely scholarly organization must, moreover, seek the good will of at least a portion of the public in order to sustain its own work, find its own appropriate audience, and obtain sufficient financial support. Granted the overlapping here, there is nevertheless a wide gulf between a normal serious scholarly or research organization on the one side, and on the other organizations devoted to what is variously called promotion, public relations, lobbying, propaganda, etc.

The subcommittee noted throughout all the testimony and all the exhibits that so great a portion of the IPR energies went into public relations, lobbying, propaganda, and other activities, having the primary effect of influencing public opinion that it is not correct or adequate to describe the IPR as a scholarly and research organization. Its chief function was rather that of a crucible of United States public opinion on the Far East.

In comparison with other organizations, or governmental agencies, which are designed to influence public opinion, the expenditures of the IPR have been relatively low. According to Mr. Holland's statement, the gross income of the international IPR and of the American IPR has averaged approximately \$100,000 a year (p. 1217) for each, or a total of \$200,000 yearly at the disposal of the active



IPR family. It should be kept in mind that many of the activities associated with the IPR were unpaid and voluntary, or paid for in ways that did not go through the IPR books. Persons interested in the real or avowed objectives of the IPR channeled activities in an IPR direction, contributed to IPR programs, publicized the IPR, etc., without being paid. The IPR frequently acted as a "broker" in securing grants—for example, for scholarships (p. 1238), book publications, special research projects, or travels—in connection with which the name of the IPR did not formally appear. In the preceding section, we have observed a number of cases where the IPR was interlocked with other organizations which in turn had their own funds to be expended in ways which, because of the close interlocking, we may assume to be not inconsistent with the aims of the IPR. (It may be observed that all six of the interlocking organizations cited in the last section had propaganda and the influencing of public opinion as their unconcealed aim.)

It was not, however, the mere question of the available amount of money or its equivalent that made the IPR an effective operator on public opinion, but the flexibility, variety, and scope of the methods which it employed. The remainder of the present section will survey some of these methods. It will not, except incidentally, attempt to show the political or ideological direction and tendency of the IPR effect on public opinion, but only to establish that the IPR did in fact influence public opinion, did intend and purpose to do so, and to review some of the actual methods used to this intent, purpose, and effect. It may be further observed that there is nothing inherently reprehensible in the attempt to influence public opinion; that question is to be determined by the specific direction or goal toward which the influencing tends. Nevertheless, the restricted question whether the IPR was an organization operating on public opinion is of relevance and weight in this inquiry, because of the fact that the spokesmen of the IPR have denied that this is the case, and have contended that the IPR has been and is solely a scholarly and research organization.

A. Prof. John K. Fairbank quite candidly observed at one point in the hearings:

Mr. Carter has been associated with the IPR and has been so useful partly because he is a promoter by temperament (p. 3744).

This is indeed the impression that is consistently given by the scores of letters and memoranda from Mr. Edward C. Carter which have been placed in the record. He seems to have been indefatigable in getting and taking ideas, reaching out for contacts, looking for funds and new organizational connections, arranging luncheons and interviews, traveling and writing all over the world, pushing and shoving and exerting and encouraging. Mr. Carter has from the outset been at the hub of the IPR organization, a fact which has an inescapable significance in judging the character of the organization where such a type of person is able to fit and endure at the center. The general tone established by people like Mr. Carter is simply not that of scholarship and research.

Mr. Carter is not exceptional in this respect. Others of the IPR staff were also and obviously "promotional" in their approach. Exhibit No. 412 (p. 2593) is an instructive instance. In it, Harriet L.

Moore (Mrs. Gelfan) <sup>5</sup> as acting secretary, writes Miss Rose Yardumian of the IPR's Washington, D. C., branch about how "to take fullest advantage of the return of ECC and WLH" (presumably Messrs. Carter and Holland). Miss Moore's proposals include the typical "public relations" devices of press interviews, "dinner for about 40 Congressmen and other leading people," meeting with "Army and Navy education people" (p. 2593, exhibit 412), membership meeting, radio engagements (p. 2248, exhibit 396).

B. In the formation of public opinion, no area is of more crucial importance than the school system, and this area was heavily and continuously cultivated by the IPR. It would be natural and inevitable that an avowedly research organization dealing with the Pacific countries should establish close links with the universities, which are the principal home of scholars in our society. However, the IPR relations with the universities went considerably beyond mere mutual aid in research, and the IPR thrust its voice in the school system much deeper than the university level.

One reason for the extraordinary influence of the IPR was brought out in the questioning of Prof. Owen Lattimore. Referring primarily to the 1930's, Senator Watkins inquired:

\* \* \* We had a witness \* \* \* who said that they went to the Institute of Pacific Relations publications to get information because there were very few other sources from which they could get information on the Far East.

Do you care to comment on that, since you are a student of the Far East.

MR. LATTIMORE. There were very few in that period. There were very few publications devoted exclusively to the Far East. \* \* \* I believe that in those years, to the best of my recollection, the publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations were the only ones that not only specialized on the Far East but were confined to the Far East (p. 2917).

The IPR had, in short, a near monopoly on the presentation to the public of material dealing with the Far East. In university circles, this meant that teachers, scholars, or students who were or became interested in problems of the Pacific were in practice virtually compelled to become at least passive members of the IPR—that is, at least members in the minimum sense that meant subscribing to its publications—and that they were dependent in their field to a considerable extent on the work of the IPR.

In the universities, the IPR did not rest with the mere production and supply of published material. It actively intervened to establish close relations with the scholars and teachers in the field, and not a few of these joined the IPR family. It drew students or young scholars onto its staff, sent them to conferences or expeditions abroad, and then often aided them to get jobs elsewhere in business or Government. Messrs. Daniel Thorner, T. A. Bisson, Julian R. Friedman, Lawrence Rosinger <sup>6</sup> are examples of this process. It secured or helped to secure various sorts of fellowships, university research grants, and teaching appointments.

Toward this last function, the IPR was aided by the close working relations which it established with the Carnegie Corp., the Rockefeller Foundation (hearings, pp. 1215, 1217, 1236-1238), and with Mr. Mortimer Graves, administrative secretary of the influential American

<sup>5</sup> Harriet L. Moore was identified by sworn testimony (pp. 438, 549) as a Communist. Miss Moore refused to testify concerning Communist connections. Miss Yardumian is now an editor of a newspaper published in Communist China.

<sup>6</sup> All 4 were identified by sworn testimony as Communists (see pp. 147, 148 of this report). Messrs. Rosinger and Thorner refused to testify concerning Communist connections.

Council of Learned Societies.<sup>7</sup> David N. Rowe, professor of political science at Yale University, and lieutenant colonel in Military Intelligence Reserve, discussed these questions extensively in his appearance before the subcommittee. From his testimony may be quoted the following excerpts:

Now, this grant for Rockefeller for Grad [Andrew Grajdanzey], administered through IPR and then through us [Yale], was a very unsatisfactory result, because it was typical of a number of others done at that time \* \* \* There was a grant for T. A. Bisson,<sup>8</sup> secured by IPR from Rockefeller Foundation, and there was another one to help finance Rosinger, secured from Rockefeller Foundation through IPR \* \* \*

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, has the IPR been active in obtaining grants from the foundations?

Mr. ROWE. Oh, yes, indeed. A great amount of money has been spent this way by the foundations through IPR \* \* \*. Grad was, in effect, controlled by Holland of the IPR and not by us; with all that that implied in the nature of his work, approval of the product, further support. Because after Grad left us, with this bad mark we gave him, Holland went right back and got more money to keep on supporting him, and sent him up to Columbia and had him affiliated there \* \* \*.

Mr. Holland, at the outset of the Far Eastern Association, was on their relevant committee having to do with publications \* \* \*. At this point, the Institute of Pacific Relations, in coordination with the Far Eastern Association, has a great deal of influence in the field of publication. You see \* \* \* if you want to get your book published, you go to them, you see, and ask them for a subsidy to get it put out \* \* \* (pp. 4021-4023, 4026).

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Rowe, has Mortimer Graves, to your knowledge, been active in the Institute of Pacific Relations? \* \* \*

Mr. ROWE. He is very closely involved in anything having to do with the Far East field \* \* \*. He knows all the people.

For years, he used to keep a card file of people in the field at varying stages in their preparation, and during the time when universities were expanding in this field—that is, when the university would want to set up a department or get a man in this field—they would often be referred directly to Mr. Graves for recommendations of personnel \* \* \*.

Mr. MORRIS. Was any inducement ever made to you in connection with your membership in the Institute of Pacific Relations \* \* \*.

Mr. ROWE. \* \* \* in 1938 \* \* \* I was approached and invited, but I refrained from joining. And I will say that the only reason I ever did join was on account of a letter I got from Mr. Lockwood, \* \* \* the general tenor of which was that young people just starting out in the Far East field are "well advised to become a member of this organization." It was a very gentle letter, but the meaning of it was quite obvious. \* \* \* It is the sort of letter that a young man beginning in a profession can hardly afford to disregard. Five dollars a year to protect yourself? O. K. You pay. You join \* \* \* (p. 4027).

On November 9, 1937, Frederick V. Field wrote Miss Catherine Porter a letter in which he reported—

to you a part of the conversation which Carter and I had with Miss Walker of the Rockefeller Foundation. Miss Walker informed me that the Foundation was now prepared to appoint some of the recipients of its international fellowships through the Foreign Policy Association, the Council on Foreign Relations, and ourselves. She wishes each of these organizations to find and call to the attention of the Foundation persons who they believe will be promising \* \* \*.

As his preferred candidate for nomination by the IPR, out of a short list which also included Lawrence K. Rosinger, Field names "Theodore Draper who is now on the staff of the New Masses. \* \* \* The fact that he is on the board of the New Masses indicates that he is

<sup>7</sup> As an illustration of the intimaey of the IPR family, testimony of Mr. John Carter Vincent of the State Department, pp. 1750-1751, indicates that when the Amerasia indictments were handed down in 1945 it was Mr. Mortimer Graves who solicited a defense fund for Mr. John Stewart Service, and to which Mr. Vincent contributed "\$40 or \$50."

<sup>8</sup> Also identified by sworn testimony as a Communist (p. 534).



a Communist" (p. 4093, exhibit 645). This fact was, however, no draw-back in the eyes of Mr. Field.

For the schools below the university level, the IPR had an ambitious and vigorous program. Several groups of pamphlets and other study materials were published and distributed in the schools by the hundreds of thousands. According to a special report, covering 1943, prepared by Harriet Moore as acting secretary:

The American Council's school program<sup>9</sup> is meeting an ever more enthusiastic response both from school teachers and from educational organizations \* \* \*.

Two more pamphlets, the sixth and seventh of the Webster series of unit texts for high school classroom use, are now appearing \* \* \*. The gross income from sales of the first five titles amounted to \$45,000 in 1943.

A second series designed for the elementary school is now in preparation \* \* \*.

In an attempt to focus the attention of the individual school teacher on this area of study, the American Council in cooperation with the American Observer, a school magazine reaching 450,000 children, conducted a test on the Far East \* \* \* (p. 2579, exhibit 407).

In conjunction with the American Council on Education and the Foreign Policy Association, the IPR developed an elaborate program for distributing to the schools what were called Resources Packets (p. 2584, exhibit 408).

The official IPR report for 1944-46<sup>10</sup> states, of the series of school texts prepared in conjunction with the Webster Publishing Co., that—over a million copies have been sold in the 3½ years \* \* \* and the pamphlets have been placed on the "adopted" list of reading materials in more than 1,300 school systems in various parts of the United States.

C. The general publishing program of the IPR was varied in kind, range, and type of audience. According to Mr. Holland's statement, about 220 major volumes were brought out from 1925-51 (p. 1221). Several series of popular pamphlets were printed and sold in large quantities.<sup>11</sup>

A quarterly magazine, *Pacific Affairs*, was published regularly under the auspices of the international secretariat of the IPR. The bi-weekly journal, *Far Eastern Survey*, was issued as the organ of the American Council.

Another phase of IPR publishing was its supply of material to Government personnel and agencies, particularly to the armed services during the Second World War. In a letter dated Feb. 2, 1942, Mr. Holland comments:

Elisabeth is greatly excited at the colossal orders we continue to get from the War Department for our pamphlets (p. 660, exhibit No. 193).

Mr. Raymond Dennett, referring to the period when he was Secretary of the American Council, testified:

The Educational and Information Branch of the Army and the equivalent in the Navy purchased somewhere in the vicinity of several hundred thousand total of pamphlets issued by the American Council for use in orientation programs on the Far East (p. 959).

The 1944-46 official IPR report (*Windows on the Pacific*) states that "during the course of the war, over three-quarters of a mil-

<sup>9</sup> This school program was in charge of Mrs. Marguerite A. Stewart. The IPR report covering the years 1944-46 (*Windows on the Pacific*) states that 1,105,598 copies of the school pamphlets were sold in that 2-year period.

<sup>10</sup> *Windows on the Pacific*, p. 23.

<sup>11</sup> *Windows on the Pacific*, the official IPR report for 1944-46, states that 977,000 were sold in that 2-year period. For some years, Miriam S. Farley was editor of the IPR pamphlets (pp. 394, 2689). In 1942 and again in 1947 she was temporarily replaced by Maxwell S. Stewart. Stewart was identified in sworn testimony as a Communist (p. 563).

lion IPR pamphlets were purchased by the Government and sent to American troops in Asia and the Pacific area." Other IPR services to the Armed Forces are also mentioned, in particular the supplying of lecturers, documents, books, research materials. It would seem to be justified to say that the principal source, direct or indirect, of the indoctrination of the members of the armed services on the Far East was the IPR. Since the wartime Army was a mass citizen Army, most members of which returned to civilian status after the war, this meant the exerting of a major influence on general public opinion.

In estimating the weight of the IPR in the general field of United States publications, attention cannot be limited to books, magazines, pamphlets, and so forth, which appeared under the IPR imprint. We have noted in the preceding section that the IPR was interlocked, through members of the active IPR family, with a complex of other publications: Amerasia, Spotlight on the Far East, China Today, for example. Many articles under the names or pseudonyms of IPR activists appeared in these Communist-front publications, and not a few in outright Communist journals like the Daily Worker and New Masses. The IPR authors frequently wrote also for general magazines and for ordinary commercial book publishers. They were heavily concentrated in one particular journalistic area which is of the highest significance in the determination of public opinion: namely, the book-review pages of those journals which have the greatest effect on the sales and distribution of books. For some years, the IPR family held a near monopoly<sup>12</sup> on the reviews of books on the Far East published in the New York Times, the New York Herald Tribune, the Saturday Review of Literature, the New Republic, and the Nation.

An extensive list of book reviews written by active IPR members in important book review media during the years 1945-50 was prepared for the subcommittee by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress. (See Selected Reviewers Book Review Digest by Library of Congress. Exhibit No. 1412.)

Included are 286 reviews, from the New Republic, the New York Times, the Saturday Review of Literature, the Nation, the New York Herald Tribune, and other magazines. Most of these are written by the familiar IPR figures—Eleanor Lattimore, T. A. Bisson, Guenther Stein, L. K. Rosinger, Nym Wales, John K. Fairbank, and Richard Watts (who specialized in the reviewing task). All but one or two of the books reviewed concern the Far East and the problems of the Pacific.

Two conclusions are apparent from this list. On the one hand, the IPR stalwarts constituted for the American reading public during those years a virtual screening and censorship board with respect to books on the Far East and the Pacific. Second, a major preoccupation of the reviewers was the launching of each other's books. A remarkable number of the reviews were "in the IPR family"—that is, a review by an IPR activist of a book by another IPR activist. Owen Lattimore's *Solution in Asia*, for example, was reviewed by Edgar Snow in the New York Times, by Richard Watts, Jr., in the New Republic, and by T. A. Bisson in the Saturday Review of Literature. L. K. Rosinger's *China's Crisis* got its send-off from Owen Lattimore

<sup>12</sup> On June 5, 1951, Senator Owen Brewster inserted in the Congressional Record, p. 6301, a chart showing the results of this monopoly operation with respect to books on China reviewed during the years 1945-50 in the Times and the Herald Tribune book review sections.

in the New York Herald Tribune, Richard Watts, Jr., in the New Republic, and T. A. Bisson in the New York Times. Messrs. Watts, Peffer and Lattimore polished up Guenther Stein's Challenge of Red China; Rosinger, Fairbank, Snow, and Watts took care of Annalee Jacoby and Theodore White's Thunder Out of China. Messrs. Rosinger, Lattimore, Watts, and Miss Jacoby assessed for the reading public the worth of their IPR colleague John K. Fairbank's The United States and China; while Owen Lattimore's book, Pivot of Asia, was in 1950 entrusted to Theodore H. White, John K. Fairbank, and T. A. Bisson.

D. The IPR actively promoted lectures, tours, conferences (including the big-scale international conferences held biennially), public and semipublic luncheons and dinners, discussion groups. Much of the time these were handled not with the sobriety normally expected of scholarly and research enterprises, but with the help of public relations and promotional build-up.

At the international conferences, what research papers may have been included on the program were not permitted to deflect attention from the niceties of press relations, the amenities toward local officials and visiting dignitaries, the whole gamut of effects directed toward a public much wider than the delegates in attendance. The biennial reports make reference to regional conferences, forums, discussions, library services, and so on. Windows on the Pacific, at pages 32-33, displays an organizational chart which indicates the wide variety of public activities.

The opinion-forming influence of such activities as discussion groups should not be underestimated. Exhibit No. 113 (p. 440) indicates the care and prior preparation which went into a "private IPR discussion group on United Nations cooperation," planned for March 15, 1943, in Washington.

Mr. Edward C. Carter not only spoke frequently himself, but was always generous in arranging engagements for others. In October 1938, for example, he recommended Earl Browder, then secretary of the Communist Party of the United States, as a speaker for the Canadian Club in Montreal. In order to put to rest any doubts that might be in his correspondent's mind, he observed:

Earl Browder would give you an exceedingly interesting, pleasantly provocative, but a really important statement on the Roosevelt administration \* \* \*. He is really very well informed and, contrary to the public view, is 100 percent American (p. 180, exhibit 36).

Again, in February 1936, Mr. Carter was writing to V. E. Motylev, head of the Soviet IPR. He expressed his wish to arrange for the presence of Soviet representatives not merely at the general IPR conference scheduled for later that year, but before "influential groups of American citizens in New York, Washington, Chicago, Denver, and San Francisco" (p. 3244).

Movies and radio were also not altogether neglected in the plans of the IPR. Mr. Anthony Jenkinson<sup>13</sup> wrote a pamphlet, Know Your Enemy—Japan, which was among those widely distributed to the

<sup>13</sup> Identified by sworn testimony as a Communist (p. 658). He was coinceptorator of the Communist news syndicate front, Allied Labor News (p. 659). In 1940, Mr. Carter wrote to Chen Han-seng, also identified as a Communist by sworn testimony (p. 287) and now an official within Communist China, that "In a little while I hope to be able to send Tony Jenkinson to China for a few months on behalf of the international secretariat. You will find him an invaluable friend" (p. 661, exhibit 194).



Armed Forces during the war. The official IPR report for 1941-43 (IPR in Wartime, p. 32) explains how "a documentary film based on its popular pamphlet, Know Your Enemy—Japan!" was "prepared especially for labor groups." On the same page there is described an IPR weekly radio series, Spotlight on Asia, which was being carried on a national radio hook-up by the Columbia Broadcasting System.<sup>14</sup>

E. The modes for influencing public opinion are multiple, and few were omitted by the IPR. Great care was taken to increase the public significance and effect of key books by members of the IPR family through such devices as sending advance copies, or even manuscripts, to Government officials, editors, educators, etc. Exhibits No. 127 and No. 128 are letters referring to the sending of the manuscript of one of Lawrence Rosinger's books to, respectively, Mr. John Carter Vincent of the State Department, and Mr. John Fairbank, then also connected with the State Department.<sup>15</sup> Pressures were exerted to expand the sale and distribution of IPR family books. Two of Mr. Carter's letters provide good illustrations. Exhibit No. 116<sup>16</sup> is written, on June 12, 1947, to the publicity director of the publishing firm, Little, Brown & Co. It is full of suggestions for pushing Israel Epstein's book, *The Unfinished Revolution in China*.

\* \* \* Devise some means of getting it read at any early date among others by Secretary of State George Marshall, Senators Vandenberg, Morse, and Ives, John Foster Dulles and John Carter Vincent. \* \* \* The book is so full of profound understanding and admiration of the Chinese people. \* \* \* Would it be out of the question for you to consider at an early date printing a cheap paper cover edition. \* \* \* The book is not so much needed in the Communist areas in China as it is in the Kuomintang areas where its authoritative accounts would give new hope, as well as new methods \* \* \*<sup>17</sup>

Other testimony and exhibits (pp. 3312-3313) show part of the build-up, including a Soviet phase, for Owen Lattimore's book, *Solution in Asia*.

The Communists themselves have listed personal conversations first among "the principal forms of Communist propaganda and agitation."<sup>18</sup> There is no doubt, from a Communist or any other point of view, that often more is accomplished toward the influencing of opinion by personal conversation with key individuals than by all other methods combined. To what extent personal conversation is so used is always hard to determine, since there is seldom a record. The IPR activists seem, however, to have used this mode quite consciously and with planning beforehand, so that partial records did frequently turn up during the hearings.

The method can be illustrated by two among many examples. Exhibit No. 688 (p. 4130) consists of excerpts from a letter written in 1934 to Frederick V. Field by Newton D. Baker, former Secretary of War.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. also p. 481, exhibit 130.

<sup>15</sup> Pp. 478-479. Messrs. Rosinger, Vincent, and Fairbank were all identified by sworn testimony as Communists (pp. 313, 467, 625-629). Mr. Rosinger refused to testify concerning Communist connections (p. 2475).

<sup>16</sup> Pp. 464-465. The report deals with this same letter in other connections (pp. 1197, 3738).

<sup>17</sup> Israel Epstein was identified by sworn testimony as a Communist and a Soviet secret agent (pp. 590, 634). In March 1951, shortly prior to the opening of the hearings of the subcommittee, he left the United States aboard the Polish ship, *Batory*, on which the fugitive Comintern Representative Gerhardt Eisler sailed from New York, after jumping bail, to become Propaganda Minister of the Communist regime of Eastern Germany. (Cf. exhibit 160, p. 591.)

<sup>18</sup> The theses on the structure, methods, and activities of the Communist Parties, adopted in 1921 by the Third Congress of the Communist International (exhibit 1435).

I have just had a 2-day visit from Joe Barnes—  
writes Mr. Baker—

It was really a very delightful experience for me and I was flattered out of all description by the candor and completeness with which Joe permitted me to see the inside of his mind, and, as I gathered, to some extent, the inside of your mind. \* \* \* All of this is important so far as this note is concerned only because I want to urge you to consider the secretaryship of the American Council. \* \* \*<sup>19</sup>

In January 1938, WWL (presumably Mr. Lockwood) wrote a memorandum concerning the proposed IPR representative in Washington, D. C. (p. 3884, exhibit 572-D). He discusses at some length the "contact" functions which such a representative might perform.

The really important contacts in Washington—  
he observes—

are as follows: (1) Administrative officials and legislators; (2) newsmen; (3) private educational agencies (League of Women Voters, National Council, FPA, WIL, etc.) (4) embassies, especially Chinese and Japanese, and Filipino delegation; (5) universities. It would be the job of our representative there to work with these groups, first, to extract from them the information, aid, and support which they can give to our national program, and second, demonstrate the value of the IPR and of himself to them in a variety of ways \* \* \*. Our Washington man would doubtless have to spend a great deal of time drifting around among officials, Congressmen, and newsmen, developing personal contacts and making himself a person to whom individuals might turn when an issue of Pacific relations and policy arose \* \* \*.

Thus Mr. Lockwood expected individuals to turn, when a matter of policy arises, to the representative of the "objective, nonpartisan" IPR. "One more function of the IPR representatives \* \* \* would be to trundle foreign visitors around." But Mr. Lockwood, who professed to being guardian of scholarship and research, stressed above all in his memorandum, the significance of the journalists:

The importance of the Washington newspaper corps ought to be emphasized in this connection. The Washington correspondents are the most influential group of reporters in the country. Moreover, they have a wide editorial leeway in their dispatches. Also, they are fairly close knit and accessible as a group \* \* \*. An able IPR man could make himself useful feeding them stuff, prompting various stories, securing Washington releases on IPR studies, etc.

As an example of another among the informal but effective modes of influencing opinion may be cited the cocktail party, held in 1942 or 1943 at the home of "Mrs. Chamberlain," mother of the then Mrs. Frederick V. Field, at which Owen Lattimore was present, along with such a well-known Communist as Paul Robeson, and where the conversation—

dealt with the issue in China: Why does America continue believing in Chiang Kai-shek? Why doesn't America see that the real exponents of democracy in China are the Communist forces? (p. 4613).

Elaborate thought was given to the problem of public letters to the press, as in the case of the letter text which it was proposed that Thomas Lamont should sign, and which is discussed elsewhere in this report (p. 159, 169, 170).

Especially from 1940 on, increasing attention was given to the medium of radio, not only to the use of broadcasts openly in the IPR name, but to the furnishing of "information" and suggestions to other

<sup>19</sup> The probable significance of this little episode is suggested by the fact that Messrs. Field and Barnes were repeatedly identified by sworn testimony as Communists, Field as the Communist Party liaison between the party cell in the IPR and the Politburo of the American Party (p. 518).

broadcasters. Similarly, the IPR was always willing to give advice to the editors of and writers for magazines, to graduate students, libraries, etc.

Mr. Lockwood, in an official IPR letter dated September 4, 1952, appealing for contributions from Frederick V. Field's financial front, American People's Fund, stated, for example:

Editors, radio commentators, business firms, teachers, and students likewise call on the institute daily for library and information services.<sup>20</sup>

In dozens of exhibits introduced into the record, there is illustrated a method which was, apparently, almost obligatory on members of the IPR family: mutual, and extravagant public praise of each other's work—in short, building each other up in public esteem. Of the book of Israel Epstein, Owen Lattimore wrote in the New York Times Book Review:

From Edgar Snow's *Red Star Over China* to Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby's *Thunder Out of China* the list of names is distinguished—and most of these writers won their distinction solely or primarily by what they had to say about China. Israel Epstein has without question established a place for himself in that distinguished company \* \* \* (p. 465, exhibit 117).

In the Communist Party's official organ, the *Daily Worker*, Samuel Sillen wrote about the same book in nearly the same language, except for the inclusion of three more of the IPR authors in his honors list:

We have had many excellent books about China in the past few years, books by top flight reporters like Harrison Forman, Guenther Stein, Agnes Smedley, Theodore White, and Annalee Jacoby. At the top of this list belongs a book published today, Israel Epstein's *Unfinished Revolution in China* (p. 466, exhibit 117).

F. The conduct at and in connection with the subcommittee hearings on a number of the IPR spokesmen, in particular Messrs. Carter, Field, Holland, Lockwood, and Lattimore, and of the IPR New York office, was itself a refutation to the claim that the IPR is merely a scholarly and research organization.

A research organization would presumably have wished to aid the subcommittee and its staff in the careful sifting of all relevant data, and the objective determination of the truth. These spokesmen of the IPR appear to have attempted, in contrast, to avoid the scientific analysis of data, and to appeal with all the means of invective, emotion, evasion, distortion, and prejudice to the feelings of uninformed and indeed deceived public opinion. They have entered the committee room with copies of statements already released to the press before the members of the subcommittee and its staff have even seen them, and these statements have been demonstrated through the course of the hearings as being far removed from scholarly and scientific analyses. They have organized a vast pressure campaign against the subcommittee and its work, with public letters, testimonials, press statements by individuals devoid of any adequate knowledge of the facts, articles, editorials, lectures, and the rest, in the extreme manner of propaganda lobbyists.

In their candid moments, these men readily enough drop their public talk about "objective, nonpartisan scholarship and research." Frederick V. Field, for example, in a letter written to his friend and

<sup>20</sup> Exhibit 572-A, p. 3880. The entire exhibit contains an interesting survey of the scope of IPR activities.



colleague, Edward C. Carter, comments: "I don't think there is any such thing as impartial political writing" (exhibit 697, p. 4140).

In a letter quoted by Mr. Carter (p. 3791, exhibit 566-P), Owen Lattimore remarks with flippant and revealing irony:

I am making a general practice of submitting everything I write to Carter so that he can reprove me when I say anything unbecoming a propagandist and a gentleman.

The United States Government offered in its own way its judgment on the kind of activity in which the IPR family was trained when it established a virtual IPR monopoly over its wartime propaganda for the Far East. In the office of the Coordinator of Information, later transformed into the Office of War Information, Owen Lattimore, as a Deputy Chief, was in charge of Chinese affairs (p. 3785), and there served with him, among other IPR activists, Joseph Barnes, deputy director; John K. Fairbank, a writer; Hugh Deane, Jr., in the Radio News Division.

(F) THE PRO-COMMUNIST TENDENCY OF THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS OPERATION ON UNITED STATES PUBLIC OPINION

The preceding section has been concerned with the fact that the IPR cannot be truly and adequately described as a scholarly and research organization. On the contrary, the IPR has been an organization the chief function of which has been to influence United States public opinion. The preceding section was focused on the fact that the IPR did so function as to influence United States public opinion, and dealt only indirectly with the question of the specific cast, tendency, and ideological content of this influence.

Messrs. Lockwood, Holland, Greene, and other spokesmen for the IPR claim that the IPR has been "objective and nonpartisan" in its activities. Testimony and evidence presented during the course of the hearings do not substantiate that claim. The subcommittee concludes, on the contrary, that the IPR has been, in general, neither objective nor nonpartisan; and concludes further that, at least since the mid-1930's, the net effect of the IPR activities on United States public opinion has been pro-Communist and pro-Soviet, and has frequently and repeatedly been such as to serve international Communist, Chinese Communist, and Soviet interests, and to subvert the interests of the United States.

A. This report, in the first two sections of this division and elsewhere, has dealt with the contention of some witnesses that the IPR has been "objective and nonpartisan." In the present context it must be noted that this claim is either remarkably naive or disingenuous. Mr. Lockwood stated "that the Institute of Pacific Relations has never been subverted to Communist ends" (p. 3863). Mr. Greene declared: "I do not believe that in the staff or among the members here were any individuals \* \* \* who succeeded, if they tried, in deflecting the institute by a hair's breadth from its principles" (p. 3863). In his sworn statement introduced at the second public session at which he testified, Mr. Holland affirmed: "To some people, however, the testimony before the subcommittee may suggest that a good many years ago some Communists hoped or tried to use the IPR to spread disguised Communist propaganda. It does not show that they succeeded in this attempt. On the contrary, it can be

demonstrated that if such an attempt was made, it failed ignominiously \* \* \*” (p. 3893). And Mr. Holland defends without modification even those IPR staff members who refused to testify concerning Communist connections: “I can only reaffirm that their writing and other work for the IPR was good, and in their conduct as IPR employees there was no ground for criticism” (p. 3895).

All of the quotations in the above paragraph appear in the session of March 19, 1952, that is, in the late stage of the inquiry, after several dozen members of the active IPR family had been repeatedly and directly identified as Communists, after many had refused on the grounds of self-incrimination to testify concerning Communist affiliations, after detailed evidence had shown the role of IPR activists in a large number of recognized Communist fronts and in outright Communist institutions (such as New Masses, the Daily Worker, the Jefferson School), and after the pro-Communist content of many IPR publications, memoranda, and actions had been explicitly analyzed and established in the record—a record available to Messrs. Holland, Lockwood, and Greene, and by their own testimony at least in fair measure known to them.

Under such circumstances, this absolute refusal to admit any pro-Communist influence whatsoever on or in the IPR constitutes a display of either a close to invincible ignorance and naïvete, or bad faith to the subcommittee and through the subcommittee to the Congress, the country, and also to the majority of members and supporters of the IPR itself, who are the innocent victims of the subversive active minority.

Elsewhere in this report, some of the inadequacies, distortions, and internal contradictions of the earlier sworn statement of Mr. Holland (October 10, 1951) (pp. 1212–1231) have been discussed. Further reference is here made to two features of that statement which especially concern the content of IPR publications, and thereby the nature of the IPR effect on public opinion.

On pages 1221–1222 of the hearings, there is given Mr. Holland’s list of 30 publications which, according to his sworn statement, are “taken at random.” How does it happen that there does not appear on this list a single one of such names as Israel Epstein, Harriet L. Moore, Guenther Stein, Ch’ao-ting Chi, Chen Han-seng, Kathleen Barnes, Marguerite Stewart, Julian R. Friedman, Michael Greenberg, Andrew Grajdanzev (Grad), or even Owen Lattimore, every one of whom wrote repeatedly for IPR publications, whereas many of those listed by Mr. Holland appear only once on the IPR roster? It is impossible that this could have been a “random” list; it is in no respect whatever representative or a “fair sample.” The only reasonable conclusion is that this list was deliberately made up so as to exclude the names of those whose Communist connections had become publicly notorious: that is to say, the list was deliberately made up so as to deceive, not enlighten, the subcommittee and the public.

On page 1222 of the hearings, there appears Mr. Holland’s list of what he designates as “anti-Communist writers in IPR publications”—“a partial list,” as he puts it, “of writers well known for their active opposition to communism.” Now it is not at all the case that all of these writers were well known, at the period when they wrote for IPR publications, for “their active opposition to communism.” Quite apart from the question whether two or three of them may not

have been at one time at least mildly pro-Communist, there is no doubt that many of them have been non-Communist rather than anti-Communist, not directly concerned in what they wrote one way or the other with Communism rather than directly and actively opposing it. (This distinction is not trivial, since while an anti-Communist may in a sense counterbalance a pro-Communist, a pro-Communist plus a non-Communist leaves a Communist balance.) Still more gross, Mr. Holland in no way indicates that, though it is true that a good many years ago the IPR published an article by William Henry Chamberlin—at a time when he was definitely an anti-Communist—it simultaneously attacked what he had written, returned to the attack and dropped him from its authors' list.<sup>21</sup>

Finally, and apart from the above considerations, it may be inquired; where, since they existed and were published by the IPR, is the corresponding list of "pro-Communist writers in IPR publications"?

These two incidents, occurring as they do in a sworn, official statement of the principal present officer of the IPR, constitute a revealing commentary on the IPR standards of "objective, nonpartisan scholarship and research."

B. In their contention that the IPR was always "objective and nonpartisan" and that its publications advocated no policy or "line," the IPR spokesmen have appealed to the commendatory opinions of "specialists" and Far Eastern experts. It is true that some scholars in the field of Far Eastern affairs have supported, and some still support, their contention. This support, however, is by no means unanimous.

Among the sworn witnesses before the subcommittee, five of the leading Far Eastern scholars of this country, all of them thoroughly familiar with the history and activities of the IPR, testified unequivocally to the contrary, and affirmed that the IPR and its publications have been neither objective nor nonpartisan. These experts are Prof. Kenneth Colegrove of Northwestern University, Prof. William M. McGovern, also of Northwestern University, Prof. David N. Rowe of Yale University, Prof. George Edward Taylor, director of the Far Eastern Institute of the University of Washington, and Prof. Karl August Wittfogel, professor of Chinese History at the University of Washington and director of the Chinese history project at Columbia University.

In commenting on part of the letter written July 10, 1938, by Owen Lattimore—at that time editor of Pacific Affairs—to Edward C. Carter—at that time executive secretary of the international IPR—Professor Colegrove testified as follows:

Mr. COLEGROVE. \* \* \* That sentence, together with his whole letter, seems to me to be one of the most intellectually dishonest academic documents that I have ever seen. This is a complete negation of what the IPR said to professors and teachers all over the country that it was. In its solicitation for membership it had always emphasized the scholarly, scientific viewpoint that it was presenting, amplified by the fact that it was not trying to advocate the interest of any particular country but only giving us the benefit of their researches and their scholarship.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you thought it was an honest organization and this sentence indicates to you that it was really a fraud?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. This is fraudulent. This is one of the most contemptible things I know from the whole academic world. Thousands of university professors and hundreds of thousands of students all over the country who were beginning

<sup>21</sup> For a further discussion of this incident, see below, pp. 46, 90.



to study Asia looked upon this institute as an unbiased, wholly scientific institution engaged in research, \* \* \* and in not following any line.

I and other scholars would have been shocked if we knew that one official of the Institute of Pacific Relations was writing to the secretary-general telling him to follow a certain line with reference to China, Japan, with reference to Indonesia. \* \* \*

It was shocking. It is almost revolting to think that you yourself were misled by such an organization. This will have done a very great injury to organized scholarship in the United States. It is no wonder people are suspicious of the Rockefeller Foundation or of the Carnegie Corporation, which gives so much money to organizations of this sort. \* \* \*

This shows behind the front the Institute of Pacific Relations was nothing else than a propaganda organization supporting a line.

Senator EASTLAND. A Communist line?

Mr. COLEGROVE. In this case a Communist line (p. 916).

Professor McGovern commented as follows on this same letter from Owen Lattimore to Edward C. Carter:

Mr. MCGOVERN. I am not at all surprised. I did see this letter, but not until fairly recently when it came out in testimony. I am not surprised because I read Pacific Affairs rather closely and followed his editorials. That, I may say by way of comment, was the reason why I refused to join the IPR. \* \* \* After having read several copies of Pacific Affairs, I felt they were taking a line which I could not sponsor, directly or indirectly, and my membership might seem I was.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that would be advocating the Stalinist party line?

Mr. MCGOVERN. There is very clear evidence that he was trying to advocate the Stalinist approach (p. 1013).

The following are brief excerpts from Professor Rowe's lengthy testimony concerning the problem of the IPR's "objectivity":

Senator WATKINS. \* \* \* I think it has been explained here by so many witnesses from the IPR that this organization did not take up the matters of support for any international policies \* \* \*.

Mr. ROWE. I would like to present in the strongest possible terms my own belief that no such framework as that is adequate to explain the terrific friction that arose in the international IPR over this issue \* \* \*.

Senator WATKINS. You understand, do you not, that that is the claim of the officials that have testified here in these hearings? \* \* \* Do you take issue with that?

Mr. ROWE. I very definitely would take issue with it \* \* \* (p. 3974).

Mr. ROWE. There was growing dissatisfaction with the Institute of Pacific Relations because of the very large part it was playing on controversial issues and the part that it took in talking about policy, instead of acting as a straight scholarly organization with the interest of promoting research and study, serving the interests of the scholarly fraternity \* \* \*.

I was in favor of a scholarly organization which would be highly differentiated from the IPR, which I always considered had gone off the deep end on trying to make policy, indicate lines of policy, engage in propaganda, or you can call it education if you want to.

Senator WATKINS. Do you think they were actually engaged in propaganda?

Mr. ROWE. Oh, absolutely (p. 4013).

Elsewhere (p. 4022) Professor Rowe explains how Andrew Grajdanzev came to Yale with a research grant secured by the IPR from the Rockefeller Foundation.

The reason he left at the end of 1 year with us was that we disapproved of his work. \* \* \* We considered his work not to have sound scholarly method in it. \* \* \* After our unhappy experience with Dr. Grad, we decided that we would never accept any other such grant again.

Professor Taylor testified concerning the lack of objectivity and pro-Soviet bias of several IPR activists (Messrs. Field, Greenberg, and Rosinger) and, upon being asked why the local Seattle branch of the IPR left the organization, replied:

\* \* \* Another reason, I think, is that the group in Seattle has been at loggerheads to some extent with the main office in New York. \* \* \* Some of it is due to political differences, the sort of thing we are talking about now, the general feeling that there was far too much nonobjective scholarship getting into IPR publications.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the Communist line have anything to do with it?

Professor TAYLOR. That is what I meant to say then, sir (p. 347).

Professor Wittfogel testified at length and in detail as to IPR's pro-Communist partisanship. He states that as early as in 1937 he complained to Owen Lattimore, in connection with Lattimore's editing of Pacific Affairs, "Now there is a feeling that is a kind of unbalanced thing you have, too many Communists and pro-Soviet people." Later, when Michael Greenberg—whom Professor Wittfogel identified from personal knowledge as a Communist—was running Pacific Affairs, Professor Wittfogel recalled the following incident:

DR. WITTFOGEL. \* \* \* Then when we had a talk about another book which should be reviewed, I said why don't you let me review the book?

He said, "You know too much about the subject." I said, "Michael, I think when you come with this argument we are through. \* \* \* I mean, seeing the way you conduct this business, I think that I will never write a line for Pacific Affairs again," and I did not (p. 326).

Mr. Raymond Dennett, now director of the World Peace Foundation, was secretary of the American Council of the IPR from March 1944 to December 1945. He testified extensively on the problem of objectivity. There follow some excerpts from his testimony based upon his direct experience as the principal staff official of the American IPR:

MR. DENNETT. \* \* \* It was my feeling that in regard to periodical material and pamphlet material that there was a tendency on the part of the staff to pick people as authors and to submit their manuscripts to other writers for critical comment who by and large tended to agree with the point of view of the staff prior to the selection of either the authors or the readers of the manuscript, and that this tended over the whole period to give less than a complete objective picture. \* \* \* I recall very specifically one article which I wrote \* \* \*.

MR. MORRIS. Did you use the term "Soviet imperialism."

MR. DENNETT. I recall I did, and I recall it was the subject of very considerable criticism by some members of the staff who didn't think I should refer to Soviet imperialism (pp. 948-949).

Senator FERGUSON. Let me put a question to you. If you knew all that you know now, would you have taken the appointment with the institute?

MR. DENNETT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Why not?

MR. DENNETT. For precisely the reasons which I have been giving, Senator, that I do not think it was an objective research organization (p. 966).

It is curious, in the light of these comments, to read Mr. Holland's defense of the IPR pamphlet, *Land of the Soviets*, against the charge of pro-Soviet bias.

Since 1942 many things have happened which have changed the climate of American opinion about Russia. If Mrs. Stewart were to write, and the IPR to publish, a book about Russia in 1951, its content and tone would be different from those of a book published 9 years ago (p. 3942).

In Mr. Holland's judgment, fact and objective scholarship is apparently a function of the prevailing "climate of opinion."

There does exist today a theory for which scholarship is a function of the climate of opinion and quite specifically of the opinion of the controlling political leadership. The Soviet exile, Prof. Nicholas

Poppe, speaking from direct experience, explains the conception of scholarship which prevails within the Soviet Union:

In the Soviet Union everything is political because the scientists and the students were always told that there is no science outside of politics. All science is political and so also they considered the culture as part of their politics (p. 2706).

Another Soviet exile, Mr. Igor Bogolepov testified (p. 4490), from his direct experience in the Soviet Foreign Office, concerning the propaganda functions for which the Soviet Union used the IPR. At one point he explained:

Of course you must understand that when I use the word "scholar," you can't compare it with your American or western notion of scholar, because in our Soviet country a scholar is a politician who is working in the field of science. He is not a pure scientist. He does not know what the objectivity is, and he doesn't care to be objective. He is carrying out the slogan of Lenin even before the revolution, saying that there is no impartial science, that there is only party science.

Mr. Bogolepov testified further to the inner Soviet view of the IPR's objective scholarly function:

MR. BOGOLEPOV. I got the impression from talks with my comrades working in the Soviet Institute of Pacific Relations, in the Foreign Office, that they considered this institute as a very valuable organization from two points of view. As one of my former comrades expressed it, it is like a double-way track. On one line you get information from America through this institute. On the other hand, you send information which you would like to implant in American brains through the same channel of the institute \* \* \* The in-going channel was military intelligence.

SENATOR EASTLAND. \* \* \* Soviet propaganda that the Foreign Office desired implanted in foreign minds would be sent through the facilities of the Institute of Pacific Relations. That is what you mean?

MR. BOGOLEPOV. That is mostly propaganda, but I would say even a little more than propaganda, because not only organizational propaganda but even the organization of a network of fellow travelers in your and other countries \* \* \* (p. 4492).

The second part of our utilization as a media for propaganda infiltration of general ideas favorable to the Soviet Union and some particular problems which we would like to implant in American minds according to the aims of Soviet foreign policy. For this aim, the members of the Soviet Institute of Pacific Relations by way of their personal meetings, by way of suggestions to solve the problems, by way of sending their own writings and in other ways tried not only to influence the American colleagues of their own but to make of these people media for infiltration of ideas favorable for Soviet foreign policy in the Far East (p. 4496).

IPR's most renowned publicist does not appear to have differed with the Soviet conception of "objectivity," though his recorded view places Owen Lattimore in direct conflict with the contention of Messrs. Lockwood, Holland, and Greene that the IPR never had, or wished to have, a policy or "line." The minutes of the Moscow meeting of April 8, 1936, attended by Messrs. Lattimore and Edward C. Carter, Miss Harriet Moore, and three representatives of the Soviet IPR (all identified in sworn testimony as members of the Comintern and of Soviet intelligence) state:

VOITINSKY said that. \* \* \* Such a magazine (as Pacific Affairs) which is important should have a definite aim. Although different opinions are expressed in it, there should be a general line in it. \* \* \* At present the magazine has no line and this is the main weakness (p. 3136).

Four days later, at the Moscow meeting of April 12, 1936, the minutes disclose that Mr. Lattimore did not reject Voitinsky's pedagogical observations:

O. L. said that he would like to meet the Soviet suggestions as far as possible, as to having a more definite line expressed in PA (p. 3173).



H. The spokesmen for the IPR, attempting to support their argument that the IPR was nonpartisan and expressed no political or ideological "line," protested during the hearings that the IPR publications printed many articles by anti-Communist writers. When pressed for specific names, they often showed some backwardness in replying, but one name to which they always reverted was that of William Henry Chamberlin.

Senator WATKINS. Might I ask this question: Did you ever challenge the Communists, or write an editorial attacking communism and exposing it to the people of the United States and to the world, through this magazine?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I was not an expert on communism, even Chinese communism, although I lived in China, and I published a number of articles very hostile to the Soviet Union and communism, by others, in *Pacific Affairs*.

Senator WATKINS. You do not remember about when these articles were published?

(Brief recess.)

Senator O'CONNOR. The witness may proceed.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Let's see; I can remember William Henry Chamberlin (p. 2916).

Two other names that frequently pop up in this connection are those of the British economist, L. E. Hubbard, and of the American journalist, Harold Isaacs.<sup>22</sup> During the 1930's (the time when his writing for IPR was at issue), Mr. Hubbard wrote ordinarily as a nonpolitical scholar, though he also was regarded as "anti-Communist" by Soviet spokesmen who disliked his conclusions concerning the Soviet economy.

The treatment which these three writers received in and from the IPR is thus a critical test of the IPR's "nonpartisanship."

The treatment given Mr. Chamberlin, as well as the initiative from which it sprung, is shown by exhibit No. 478 (p. 3136). This exhibit consists of the minutes of a meeting at Moscow, April 8, 1936, attended by Messrs. Edward C. Carter and Owen Lattimore, Miss Harriet Moore, and three representatives of the Soviet IPR, Motylev, Voitinsky, and Harondar.<sup>23</sup>

The sworn testimony of the former Soviet citizens, Barmine, Bogolepov, and Poppe, establishes that these Soviet representatives were all not merely Communists but Comintern and intelligence operatives. Mr. Lattimore himself testified (p. 3325):

Of course, at the present time, I would generally assume that any Soviet citizen or subject is an intelligence agent or a potential one.

From these minutes, the following passages are instructive:

Motilev said that it was a dangerous editorial mistake to publish the Chamberlin review. It is not because the review was about a book by Stalin, but because in the same review there was a review of a book by Chernavin. This is a very important political question for them here.

They have no objection to having Stalin's book reviewed and they are willing to answer a review, but the review must be done with due respect, to a person in Stalin's position. Motilev asked why the book was given to Chamberlin who was known to be so anti-Soviet. \* \* \*

O. L. said that he had not realized Chamberlin's position, but as soon as he learned of the Soviet opinion about Chamberlin, he canceled an article on the Soviet press which he had asked from Chamberlin (p. 3139).

<sup>22</sup> Harold Isaacs is a somewhat special case. In the 1930's he wrote from a Trotskyist position—that is, in general favorable to the philosophico-political standpoint of communism, but opposed to Stalin and the Stalinist form of communism. As a Trotskyist he was anathema to all Soviet-oriented Communists.

<sup>23</sup> This and associated Moscow meetings are discussed elsewhere in the report. (Cf. pp. 164-168.)

These same minutes show that Voitinsky and Motiliev were also much concerned with Harold Isaacs:

Voitinsky said \* \* \* the Isaacs [sic] article, which is written at a very low level and is incorrect, is an attempt to show something about the internal situation in China \* \* \* (p. 3137).

Motiliev said \* \* \* the Isaacs article on Perspectives of the Chinese Revolution is written on a very low level and is incorrect. An article on this question by a bourgeois journalist of good standing would be interesting. But this is a Trotskyist article. \* \* \* A very serious answer to this article was published in China Today, but only extracts from this answer were printed in PA. \* \* \*

O. L. said \* \* \*. In the case of the Isaacs article, there was not enough material for that issue. \* \* \* O. L. did not know about the writer in China Today or he would have tried to get the answer published in PA rather than in China Today \* \* \* (p. 3139).

ECC said that the Isaacs and Chamberlin articles were great mistakes, and would not be repeated in the future \* \* \* (p. 3140).

However, even before Motiliev and Voitinsky reproved their erring colleagues, an eye watchful over the same interests which were of such concern to the Soviet representatives had caught the Isaacs' "mistake." On September 4, 1935, Frederick V. Field (identified (p. 518) by Louis Budenz as the liaison between the Communist Party fraction in the IPR and the Politburo of the United States Communist Party) wrote Owen Lattimore, then in China:

DEAR OWEN: Since I first learned that you had arranged for an article on the Chinese Communist movement from Harold Isaacs I hoped that it would be possible to find someone to write a reply. \* \* \* I would not like to see Pacific Affairs leave the Chinese Soviet movement go with a Trotskyist exposition. Certainly an orthodox Communist view is needed to counterbalance it.

I knew of no one in this country whom we would invite to reply to Isaacs. \* \* \* For Pacific Affairs to accept an article on this sort of subject by someone using a pseudonym would seem to me nonsense. \* \* \*

Happily what seems to me a solution is at hand. In the September issue of China Today, which as you know is published in New York by a left-wing group of Chinese, appears a reply to Isaacs' Pacific Affairs article by someone who signs himself Hansu Chan. I think the article is well written and the points he makes are certainly the correct orthodox Communist rebuttals to a Trotsky position. \* \* \*

My suggestion is that you incorporate excerpts from Hansu Chan's rebuttal in an extended editorial comment signed by yourself. \* \* \* I urge this simply because it seems to me that the subject of the Chinese Communist movement is of paramount importance and that therefore Pacific Affairs must analyze it from different angles \* \* \* (p. 4103).

Editor Lattimore published the excerpts from Hansu Chan's article (though not as an editorial), and it was these to which Motiliev referred in the Moscow meeting.

It is further worth observing that Mr. Field's feeling that it would be "nonsense" "to accept an article by someone using a pseudonym" is curious in the light of the facts. "Hansu Chan" was in fact the pseudonym of the Communist Chi Ch'ao-ting; Chi was an active member of the IPR family and, according to sworn testimony, of the Comintern apparatus; China Today was the organ of a Communist front (p. 653); and all of these facts one must presume to have been familiar to Mr. Field.

The guiding spirit of Motylev is also to be discovered in the case of L. E. Hubbard.<sup>24</sup> A letter dated December 13, 1937 (p. 3176) from

<sup>24</sup> In various documents of the record, the alternate spellings "Motylev," "Motilev," "Motiliev," all referring to the same man, are to be found. "L. E. Hubbard" is sometimes written, "L. M. Hubbard," through an error which was pointed out by his brother.

Owen Lattimore as editor of *Pacific Affairs* to Edward C. Carter, refers to "the Hubbard article on the Soviet 5-year plans" (there subsequently turned out to be two articles, or one published in two issues). The manuscript had, apparently, been forwarded to Moscow, inasmuch as Mr. Lattimore writes, "While waiting for whatever reaction it may detonate in Motylev \* \* \*" He explains to Mr. Carter why he probably cannot avoid publishing Hubbard, because "Chatham House" (the British IPR) wishes it.

As editor, I necessarily recall that I forced through an article by Asiaticus on British capitalist financial policy in China, against the protests of Chatham House. This would make it difficult for me to refuse the Hubbard article. \* \* \* It is true that Asiaticus has no connection with our Soviet council, but it is equally true that he is regarded by Chatham House as a representative Marxist spokesman.

("Asiaticus" was in fact the Communist, Hans Mueller.)

In a letter to Motylev, dated February 8, 1938, Mr. Lattimore explains his troubles, and his solution. This letter (p. 3434) is unusually revealing of Mr. Lattimore's editorial conceptions:

In regard to L. M. Hubbard's article, I have carefully noted your criticisms. I am sorry that I seem to have expressed myself clumsily in regard to the question of anti-Soviet articles in *Pacific Affairs*. The real difficulty is this: The membership of the IPR is predominantly of the "democratic nations." These nations continue to set great store by the principle of free speech. Many individual members of the IPR appeal to this principle for the purpose of criticizing the U. S. S. R. If I, as editor of *Pacific Affairs*, prevent them from doing so, they will criticize *Pacific Affairs* as "an organ of Soviet propaganda" and largely destroy its usefulness. [The quotation marks are in all cases Mr. Lattimore's.]

Realization of the urgent necessity for promoting all that is really democratic in the public life of the "democratic nations," and resisting the forces that favor imperialist aggression and fascism, is only gradually spreading. In the circumstances the only wise and constructive thing for me to do is to favor publication of positive and constructive articles, while not preventing entirely the expression of negative and defeatist views. This means that whenever we find it impossible to prevent publication of such an article as this one by Hubbard we should at least make sure that in the same number there shall appear an article which deals with the true values of the same questions, and deals with them constructively. \* \* \*

In the circumstances, I am taking the following course of action:

(1) I am deleting from the article one of its most objectionable paragraphs. \* \* \*

(2) I am writing to G. E. Hubbard (brother of the writer of the article, and official of the British IPR), or Chatham House, asking him to withdraw the article altogether, on behalf of Chatham House.

(3) Finally, I urge you to write immediately a reply to the article. \* \* \*

In concluding this letter I wish to concur with you in the sentiment that at this time of extreme crisis in the Far East, *Pacific Affairs* ought to find more suitable subjects for publication than anti-Soviet articles. \* \* \*

On February 10, 1938, a letter was written from the IPR office to Harriet Moore, head of the American-Russian Institute, an identified Communist (p. 438) who declined to answer questions concerning her Communist connections:

DEAR HARRIET: Has Owen Lattimore written you about Motylev's protest over the Hubbard article? In any event, here is a copy. Lattimore feels that our relations with London necessitate our publishing Hubbard's article, but we are asking Motylev to write for the same issue a rejoinder. Now, Motylev will probably refuse to do this, so Lattimore and I are considering getting both you and Grajdancev to collaborate in the most penetrating and masterly rejoinder that can possibly be produced \* \* \* (p. 3450).

The Hubbard article, or articles, did then finally appear, in the June and September (1938) issues of *Pacific Affairs*. Mr. Lattimore's



editorial work had been done with meticulous care. The title for the June part, apparently assigned by editor rather than author, was the very "nonpartisan": "A Capitalist Appraisal of the Soviet Union." To suggest that its contents were outdated, there is an initial footnote: "This article was written in October 1937."

A series of footnotes (printed as if part of the article, though added by the editorial office) discount Hubbard's statistics when these are unfavorable to the Soviet Union, and offer "better" statistics (though no source for these is given by that "scholarly and research organization," the IPR) (pp. 3443-3444). When Hubbard writes: "There is no doubt that the purchasing power of the peasants' money income now is less than prewar," a footnote contradicts. Another footnote observes: "This does not agree with the account in Soviet Communism, a New Civilization, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, second edition, London, 1937. — Ed." (According to the sworn testimony of Igor Bogolepov, this well-known book of Soviet apologetics was actually prepared in the Soviet Foreign Office (p. 4509)).

In the June 1938 issue there also appeared the prepared reply to Hubbard. This reply is signed with the new and unexpected name of "A. W. Canniff." This reply immediately follows the Hubbard article in the June 1938 issue, and is accompanied by an editorial note which includes the following:

We, accordingly, print the following article by an author who uses almost exactly the same figures as Mr. Hubbard, but comes to an entirely different conclusion. Mr. Canniff has recently been studying the agricultural economics of both the Soviet Union and Manchuria (p. 3453).

This last sentence was indeed a remarkable piece of research, since "Mr. A. W. Canniff" did not exist except in the lively imagination of Pacific Affairs. The name is a pseudonym, apparently for the redoubtable pair, Miss Moore and Mr. Grajdansev, who had been lined up for the article in the preceding February (p. 3451).

The Soviet mentors, it may be added, took good care that such remarkable editorial manipulation would not be applied to their own articles. We read in the minutes of the Moscow meeting of April 12, 1936:

\* \* \* Voitinsky said that these Soviet articles would be done on the same basis of the materials which had already appeared in Tikhii Okean [a Soviet magazine], but "would be polished for export." He said that the articles would have to be translated here [that is, in Moscow]. O. L. brought up the question of edicting the vocabulary in left and Soviet articles. \* \* \* Voitinsky said that that would be impossible with their articles, because they cannot give in on their point of view. No such editorial changes could be made without their approval. He said that they understood the problem of PA and knew what sort of thing they would have to write for it (p. 3174).

#### THE PRO-COMMUNIST EQUILIBRIUM OF THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

D. This report has already stated the committee finding on the basis of the evidence judged in its entirety, that the net effect of the IPR activities on United States public opinion has been pro-Communist and pro-Soviet, and has frequently been such as to serve international Communist, American Communist, Chinese Communist, and Soviet interests and to affect adversely the interests of the United

States. What might be called the political and ideological equilibrium within the IPR<sup>25</sup> was pro-Communist and pro-Soviet.

This report has also discussed in several contexts the attempts, at least in part deliberate, by Messrs. Holland, Carter, Lockwood, Greene, Lattimore, and other spokesmen for the IPR to hide these grave and consequential facts. In statements and testimony, these persons have played up non- or anti-Communist IPR members to an extent clearly unjustified by their actual roles; have juggled statistics concerning IPR publications; have obscured the intense activity of many Communists and pro-Communists in the IPR; have made such remarks, fantastic on the record, as that the IPR never departed from its nonpartisan principles (Jerome D. Greene (p. 3855)); that, apart from Russian contributions, Pacific Affairs never knowingly published an article by a Communist (Owen Lattimore (p. 3125)); have insisted that an active Communist like Frederick V. Field ceased being a Communist in all activities and writings done under the IPR label (William L. Holland (p. 3895)).

Prof. David N. Rowe made the following pertinent observation to the subcommittee:

It is very, very, very easy to manipulate these research programs in such a way that what you come out with is a homogeneous, unified, coordinated point of view, in spite of the fact that you can always go to the multifarious publications of as large an organization as the Institute of Pacific Relations and find something on the other side.

The problem here is not whether you can find something on the other side; the problem is what you have the most of and what is given prominent play and what the people talk about when they go into an international meeting such as was involved at Hot Springs (p. 3975).

In general, it is often not possible to discover the real political or ideological tendency of an organization or publication by a superficial and purely quantitative survey. The problem of analysis is particularly acute when a pro-Communist tendency is at issue, because one or another degree of concealment is of the essence of a Communist front or cover operation. The real political tendency of many organizations is determined by the conscious, dynamic, and active members, who may be a relatively small minority, rather than by the passive and inactive members, inarticulate, unpossessed of explicit conscious objectives, even if these passive members are quantitatively a substantial majority. Mr. Holland stated:

It is worth noting that most of the studies published by the institute are purely factual and descriptive, expressing no political judgments or sympathies (p. 1222).

In his formal statement to the subcommittee, Mr. William W. Lockwood insisted on the same point:

\* \* \* The great bulk of institute research and publication has consisted of nonpolitical studies of Pacific countries \* \* \* (p. 3867).

Owen Lattimore's conclusion about the contents of Pacific Affairs under his editorship is somewhat less extreme, but stated with extraordinary mathematical precision:

Of a total of 250 contributions, \* \* \* 143 either dealt with nonpolitical and noneconomic subjects or presented purely neutral points of view (p. 2981), quotation from Lattimore's own testimony before the Tydings committee.

<sup>25</sup> Here as elsewhere in the report, "IPR," unless otherwise qualified, refers to the activities of and closely associated with the American Council of the IPR and the international secretariat. Unless specifically mentioned, the national councils other than the American Council are not included.

The record does not give the basis for confidence in the statements of Messrs. Holland, Lockwood, and Lattimore concerning the distinction between "factual" or "neutral" on the one hand and "partisan" or "political" on the other. Nevertheless, even if we accept the estimates quoted in the above paragraph as roughly true, the fact to which they point would not support the conclusion which these IPR spokesmen wish to draw. The presence in the IPR literature of a considerable bulk of "neutral" writing, if along with it and on dynamically significant issues there is a body (even though relatively small in quantity) of tendentious writing weighted in a single main political direction, only gives added significance and effect to the latter. Non-Communist or "neutral" writing plus predominantly pro-Communist writing means, whatever the exact percentages, a net pro-Communist effect.

Even less than this can mean a net pro-Communist effect. It is not only that within an organization attempting to influence public opinion dynamic and active members count politically for more than passive members. Within an article or book or speech, dynamic issues count for more than passive issues. The distinction here is closely relevant to Communist propaganda techniques. Within each phase of their developing strategy, Communist propaganda always concentrates tactically on certain key issues. It may concentrate, for example, on the defense of the Moscow purge trials. If this is the focal issue, they are not concerned whether a writer praises capitalism or peace or religion or what not, so long as he has the "correct" view on the focal issue. From the Communist point of view, a given book or article may be to their interest, even designedly to their interest, though in quantity 95 percent of it is neutral or non-Communist.

In fact, within a Communist-front organization or an organization manipulated for propaganda purposes by Communists, the production of a considerable quantity of respectable, apparently scholarly, neutral and nonpartisan literature provides "cover," protection and camouflage in a way closely analogous to that of the presence on the board of trustees and public committees of a large percentage of respectable and eminent names.

Elsewhere this report has shown (pp. 144-159) that the IPR and its active members did not function as an isolated unit. The IPR was part of an interlocked system of organizations, and the individuals who comprised its inner core took part in an interlocked and mutually supporting set of activities, only one element of which was formally attached to the IPR.

These interlocked or associated organizations and these activities were in most cases such as to influence United States public opinion. Most of these organizations and many of the activities have been shown by repeated and convincing evidence given during the course of these hearings to be Communist initiated, Communist controlled, or used by Communists for pro-Communist or pro-Soviet objectives. This is in particular true of the journals *Amerasia*, *China Today*, and *Spotlight on the Far East* (together with their supporting organizations), the *American-Russian Institute* and its publications, and the news syndicates, *Allied Labor News* and *Federated Press*. In all of these, relatively large numbers of activists formed direct organizational links with the IPR. Many of the active IPR family, including



Israel Epstein, Harriet Moore, Frederick V. Field, wrote, in some cases frequently, for such outright Communist publications as the Daily Worker, New Masses, Soviet Russia Today, and Science and Society. Indeed, the Communist, James S. Allen (Sol Auerbach), an IPR writer and, by the evidence of a number of letters, a friend and associate of numerous members of the IPR family, was at one time foreign editor of the Daily Worker; and the IPR contributor Anna Louise Strong was for many years editor of the English language Soviet propaganda magazine, Soviet Russia Today.

The contention that these scores of active members of the IPR, who were intimately participating in these identified and recognizable Communist and pro-Communist propaganda activities, suddenly changed their Communist spots into nonpartisan wings every time that they entered the IPR office or wrote or talked under the IPR banner is, on the face of it, ridiculous.

To be a Communist entails a commitment to certain beliefs, a certain program and policy, a certain discipline, established in the last instance by the leadership of the world Communist movement, the high command of the Soviet Communist Party. Frederick V. Field was no less a Communist at his desk in the IPR office than when he reported to the Politburo of the American Communist Party, or handed in his column to the Daily Worker.

At the subcommittee session of May 29, 1952, Miss Elizabeth Bentley, Mr. Whittaker Chambers, and Mrs. Hede Massing gave from their direct experience in the Communist movement and apparatus testimony concerning the nature of the Communist commitment, and this was confirmed at that session by Mr. Herbert Philbrick, who entered the Communist movement under the direction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Miss Bentley stated:

I don't see how it is possible for a Communist to be objective anyway, whether he is a scholar or anything else \* \* \* a Communist who is under Communist discipline does not do his own thinking. He must accept a party line. (See hearing of May 29, 1952, before the subcommittee.)

Mr. Chambers agreed, saying:

It is scarcely possible to accept a doctrine such as the Marxist theory and apply it and be objective in the ordinary acceptance of the word (ibid.).

The point was confirmed by Mr. Philbrick from his experience (ibid.):

I would say it would be impossible for a Communist Party member to be objective. I saw so many examples \* \* \*.

Mrs. Massing added a point of direct relevance to the case of the IPR:

Of course he cannot be objective if he is a party member. If he is a good actor and these are his orders, he will certainly make every effort to appear objective \* \* \* but he will not be (ibid.).

The related question was put to these witnesses: "Is it conceivable that a person could be a Communist and not write in such a way as to reflect his Communist nature?" (ibid.). Mr. Chambers replied that though possible "it would be extremely difficult for any man, any Communist, to write without, in some degree, reflecting his political opinions. He might very consciously try to angle his opinions in such a way as to cover his real intentions \* \* \* (ibid.).

Miss Bentley confirmed that in his writing there "would be traces of the political line."

The fact shown by the record is that from the Communist point of view the IPR publications and the various other publications with which it was interrelated were distinguished not by the Communist objectives, which were the same with respect to all of them, but by the special audience which the Communists aimed to reach and influence through each, and the special mode and method of exerting influence which each brought to bear.<sup>26</sup>

The IPR itself was like a specialized political flypaper in its attractive power for Communists. On any interpretation of the evidence, and with a maximum discounting for doubtful and vague evidence, a remarkably large number of Communists and pro-Communists showed up in the publications, conferences, offices, institutions of the IPR, or in the letters and homes of the IPR family.

And this attractive power seemed to apply to Communists of any original nationality: British Communists like Michael Greenberg, Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley or Anthony Jenkinson; Chinese Communists like Chi Ch'ao-ting, Chen Han-seng, Chu Tong, Y. Y. Hsu; German Communists like Hans Moeller (Asiaticus) or Guenther Stein; Japanese Communists (and espionage agents) like Saionji and Ozaki; United States Communists like James S. Allen, Frederick V. Field, William M. Mandel, Harriet Moore, Lawrence Rosinger, and Alger Hiss.

Indeed, the difficulty with the IPR from the Communist point of view was that it was too stuffed with Communists, too compromised by its Communist connections. Elizabeth Bentley testified that her superior in the Soviet espionage apparatus, Jacob Golos, warned her away from the IPR because "it was as red as a rose, and you shouldn't touch it with a 10-foot pole."

"He felt, from the point of view of good undercover work," she said, "they were far too bungling and they were too much in the open, and it was far too dangerous to be associating with the Institute of Pacific Relations" (p. 437).

Louis Budenz testified to the discussion of this point in the Politburo of the American Communist Party:

\* \* \* There were a number of discussions within the Politburo that while they were pleased with the success that IPR was making in its contacts and in the infiltration and its influence in governmental agencies and in agencies of public opinion, they constantly criticized the Institute of Pacific Relations comrades for not spreading out more—that is, they felt that the institute was too much a concentration point for Communists; that control could be maintained without such a galaxy of Communists in it \* \* \* (p. 667).

In estimating the relative weight of Communist influence within the IPR operations that affected public opinion, it should be observed that many of the key posts in relation to these operations were occupied by Communists, pro-Communists, or persons who collaborated readily with Communists. That is to say, the Communists and their allies did not scatter themselves haphazardly about the organization, but carried through their infiltration on sound strategic principles.

For 7 years, 1934-41, Owen Lattimore was editor of Pacific Affairs. Those who succeeded him in acting editorship were Michael Greenberg and T. A. Bisson. (Dr. Wittfogel testified (pp. 280, 325) that he regarded Michael Greenberg as an organized Communist as far

<sup>26</sup> Cf. the subsequent section, the Language of Pro-Communist Propaganda, p. 112, et seq.

back as the early 1930's.) Miriam Farley not only was for many years the editor of *Far Eastern Survey*, and its most prolific contributor, but through her permanent position in the office could keep an active eye and hand on all the publications activities. Marguerite Stewart edited for many years the popular pamphlet series for the IPR, and in one of her temporary absences was replaced by her husband, Maxwell S. Stewart, who had extensive Communist connections.

Mr. Raymond Dennett testified how during his term as executive secretary of the American council, the staff, especially Marguerite Stewart, Miriam Farley, and Lawrence Salisbury, influenced the selection and editing of material for publication in a manner favorable to the Soviet Union (pp. 948-950).

But others besides those who were formally charged with tasks pertaining to publication were able to influence the IPR verbal output. Mr. Dennett's testimony (pp. 938 ff.) also shows how important was the role of the Communist-controlled Union of Office and Professional Workers of America, which had the IPR staff organized under a union-shop agreement. The record, again, contains numerous examples of Frederick V. Field's intervention to influence or change the content of articles, pamphlets, etc., and a number of such examples figure elsewhere in this report.

Many hundreds of persons wrote books, articles, pamphlets, or reviews under the name of the IPR. Indeed, approximately fourteen hundred names appear in the columns of *Pacific Affairs* and *Far Eastern Survey* during the years 1931-51.<sup>27</sup> The spokesmen of the IPR on occasion have denied that these magazines ever published Communist writers (except Russian Communist) or pro-Communist articles. Confronted with such facts as the numerous refusals by IPR activists to testify concerning Communist connections, some of them admitted in the latter days of the hearing that an attempt at Communist infiltration had been made. Mr. William L. Holland, on his second appearance (March 19, 1952), gave it as his "candid opinion" that around the IPR organization "there are possibly three or four people whom I can think of whose subsequent actions suggest to me that they may have been Communists, but whom I cannot feel there is certainty," and he went so far as to name Chi Ch'ao Ting, Y. Y. Hsu, and Israel Epstein as that conceivable three (p. 3899). Owen Lattimore (pp. 2952-2954), after considerable fencing over terms also admitted Communist penetration. But what these and other IPR spokesmen then argue in substance is that the presence of a small number of Communists is of no significance among such a crowd. Even if a few Communist writers slipped into the IPR magazines, what do they count in that roster of 1,390 names?

The record shows that there were considerably more than "three or four" Communists and pro-Communists active in and around the IPR and its publications. But it must be further and again observed that the unanalyzed juggling with the figures throws little light on the problem of the political tendency of the IPR writings.

It is a fact that 1,390 names appear in *Pacific Affairs* and *Far Eastern Survey*.<sup>28</sup> But it is also a fact that the very great majority

<sup>27</sup> This figure is taken from a study by the Library of Congress prepared for the subcommittee, and included in the record of the hearings (exhibit 1403).

<sup>28</sup> The statistics and quantitative summaries used in this paragraph are all based on the Library of Congress analysis referred to above.



of these names appear only once or twice, often only as writers who contributed one or two short (half-page or page) book reviews. When, in contrast, we turn to the names of persons identified in the hearings as Communists or pro-Communists, we discover such facts as these with reference to signed material in the publications:<sup>23</sup> Far Eastern Survey carried in the 20 years (1931-51) 75 separate items by Kathleen Barnes, totaling 132 pages; Pacific Affairs, 6 items totaling 18 pages. For T. A. Bisson: Far Eastern Survey carried 10 signed items totaling 29 pages; Pacific Affairs, 20 items totaling 114 pages. For Andrew Grajdanzev (Grad): Far Eastern Survey, 15 items totaling 61½ pages; Pacific Affairs, 31 items totaling 254½ pages. For Chen Han-seng: Far Eastern Survey, 16 items totaling 35½ pages; Pacific Affairs, 28 items totaling 71½ pages. For Harriet Moore: Far Eastern Survey, 21 items totaling 23½ pages; Pacific Affairs, 9 items totaling 46½ pages. Miriam Farley, as editor, published in Far Eastern Survey, 171 items and 315 pages, Pacific Affairs, 5 items, 21½ pages. Pacific Affairs carried 73 separate signed items by Owen Lattimore, totaling 289 pages, in Far Eastern Survey 2 items with 2½ pages.

These samples show graphically, how meaningless it would be, even from an arithmetical point of view to assess the content of IPR writings as a kind of neutral average of all its members and writers.

#### STATISTICAL STUDY OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO PACIFIC AFFAIRS AND THE FAR EASTERN SURVEY

(NOTE.—*This analysis, of course, does not take into account the relative importance of the contents of the contributions. Neither did Mr. Holland's lists referred to herein. No statistical study could encompass or reflect a qualitative appraisal.*)

In response to the subcommittee's request of April 3, 1952, Mr. Ernest S. Griffith, Director of the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, on June 16, 1952, transmitted a series of tables (exhibit 1403) giving, for each contributor to either the Far Eastern Survey or Pacific Affairs or both, the following data:

1. The total number of pages and the total number of items contributed to Far Eastern Survey during each year and during the entire period from 1931 to 1951.

2. The total number of pages and the total number of items contributed to Pacific Affairs during each year and during the entire period from 1931 to 1951.

Contributors are listed as: (a) Individuals writing under their own names or under a pseudonym; (b) groups, such as "staff members"; and (c) institutions, such as the Walter Hines Page School. Some contributions were signed with initials only and their true authors could not be identified. In treating the material statistically the committee staff listed under each author's own name all the material contributed by him whenever his pseudonymous or anonymous contributions could be reliably identified. Groups and institutions whose members could not be reliably identified, such as staff members, were not split up, and their total contribution was treated as if it came from a single author. Unidentifiable contributions signed with the

<sup>23</sup> There are a good many unsigned pieces. Presumably most of these were written by IPR editorial and staff members, among whom are some of the Communists and pro-Communists.

same initials were treated as if they had been contributed by one and the same author.

Thus, 564 contributors to the Far Eastern Survey and 1,027 contributors to Pacific Affairs were listed. Since a number of them contributed to both publications the total number of individuals and groups involved amounts, however, to only 1,390.

At least 59 of the individuals listed were identified by one or more witnesses testifying under oath before the subcommittee, or by documentary evidence on record before the subcommittee, as having been affiliated with one or more Communist-controlled organizations cited as such on page 146; and these, with one exception, have not been included in Mr. Holland's list of anti-Communists. In the statistical analysis they are treated as a special group and are referred to as the "P group" (pro-Communist).

The list of names in this group follows:

GROUP P (PRO-COMMUNIST)

Allen, James S.	Johnstone, William C.
Asiaticus	Keeney, Philip O.
Austern, Hilda	Kizer, Benjamin H.
Barnes, Joseph F.	Lamont, Corliss
Barnes, Kathleen	Lang, Olga
Barnett, Robert W.	Lattimore, Eleanor
Bidien, Charles	Lattimore, Owen
Bisson, T. A.	Lockwood, William W.
Bodde, Derk	Mandel, William M.
Borg, Dorothy	Mitchell, Kate
Brandt, William	Moore, Harriet L.
Bretholtz, Roy	Norman, E. Herbert
Carlson, Evans F.	Porter, Catherine
Carter, Edward C.	Rosinger, Lawrence K.
Chapman, Abraham	Roth, Andrew
Chen Han-seng	Salisbury, Lawrence
Chi, Ch'ao-ting	Snow, Edgar
De Caux, Len	Snow, Mrs. Edgar (Nym Wales)
De Jong, Ellen Van Zyll	Steiger, Andrew J.
Epstein, Israel	Stein, Gunther
Fairbank, John K.	Stewart, Marguerite
Fairfax, Elsie Cholmeley	Stewart, Maxwell S.
Farley, Miriam S.	Strong, Anna Louise
Field, Frederick V.	Thompson, Virginia
Friedman, Irving S.	Thorner, Daniel
Grajdanzev, Andrew	Van Kleeck, Mary
Graves, Mortimer	Watts, Richard
Greenberg, Michael	Winter, Ella
Holland, William L.	Yakhontoff, Victor A.
Hsu, Yung-ying	Yardumian, Rose

The exception mentioned above is Mr. William C. Johnstone, whom Mr. Holland claims to have known as an anti-Communist. However, Mr. Johnstone was not only a member of the board of Indusco which has been cited in the hearings as a Communist-controlled organization (p. 4003), but he was also the man who, on January 20, 1944, arranged the luncheon meeting at the Cosmos Club for the Tass correspondent, (pp. 4585, 4586), Vladimir Rogov (pp. 147, 161) who was identified as an agent of Soviet Military Intelligence. Mr. Rogov was the author of the articles published in War and the Working Class, a Soviet magazine, which inaugurated the change in the Communist Party line toward Chiang Kai-shek and which was

subsequently key-noted in the Far Eastern Survey by Mr. Bisson (p. 529).

On October 10, 1951, Mr. W. L. Holland submitted to the committee "a partial list of writers well known for their active opposition to communism whose work the IPR has published" (p. 1222). Only 39 of the 47 persons figuring in this list have contributed either to the Far Eastern Survey or to Pacific Affairs. Eight months later, on June 10, 1952—only a few days before this record went to the press—Mr. Holland submitted—

a supplementary list (still incomplete) of other IPR writers whom I know to have been anti-Communist when they wrote for the IPR (exhibit 1387).

This was divided into (1) American, 51 names, and (2) non-American, 59 names. As many as 40 of the first group and 41 of the second group were found to have contributed either to the Far Eastern Survey or to Pacific Affairs, or to both. However, one name in each group was eliminated therefrom because it already appeared on Mr. Holland's list of October 10, so that the total number of contributors newly listed by Mr. Holland, on June 10, as being anti-Communist, amounts to 118 only. This total must be still further reduced by one, since in view of the testimony before the subcommittee Mr. Johnstone's name has not been included in this list for purposes of the present computation. To the list of 117 names, thus arrived at, were added the names of 4 persons whom Mr. Lattimore, in his prepared statement before the subcommittee (p. 2981), described as anti-Communist. This gives a total of 121 persons. They are treated as a special group in the statistical analysis and are referred to as the "A group" (anti-Communist).

The list of names in this group follows:

#### GROUP A (ANTI-COMMUNIST)

(Part 1. Submitted by William L. Holland, October 10, 1951)

Ballantine, Joseph	Lin, Yutang
Bloch, Kurt	Linebarger, Paul M.
Broek, Jan O. M.	Masani, M. R.
Chamberlin, William H.	Maurer, Herrymon
Chang, C. M.	Millis, Walter
Condliffe, J. B.	Mills, Lennox A.
Corbett, Percy E.	van Mook, H. J.
Cressey, George B.	North, Robert C.
Eggleston, Sir Frederick	Purcell, Victor
Fahs, Charles B.	Rowe, D. N.
Friters, Gerald M.	Saks, Milton
Gould, Randall	Sanson, Sir George B.
Hsu, Shuhsi	Schwartz, Benjamin
Hu Shih	Steiner, H. Arthur
Hubbard, L. E.	Swearingen, Roger
Kerner, Robert J.	Taylor, George E.
Kirby, Stuart	Toynbee, Arnold J.
Langer, Paul	Washburn, John N.
Levy, Roger	White, Sir Frederick
Lieu, D. K.	



## GROUP A (ANTI-COMMUNISTS)—Continued

(Part 2. Submitted by William L. Holland, June 10, 1952)

Alsberg, Carl	Lower, Arm
Angus, H. F.	Mackenzie, Norman
Bain, H. F.	Maki, John
Ballis, William	Masland, John W.
Barton, Sir William	Michael, Franz
Bates, M. S.	Moll, J. T.
Bauer, Paul T.	McInnes, Edgar
Boeke, J. H.	Nitobe, Inazo
Borrie, W. D.	Orchard, John E.
Chapman, Royal N.	Parlett, Harold
Christian, John L.	Pelcovits, N. A.
Cohen, Jerome B.	Pelzer, Karl J.
Davis, Joseph S.	Pendleton, Robert L.
Dennett, Tyler	Penrose, E. F.
Dupuy, R. Ernest	Phillips, P. D.
Fisher, Galen M.	Quigley, Harold S.
Fong, H. D.	Robequain, Charles
Forsythe, W. D.	Royama, Massamichi
Fry, Th. P.	Rueff, Gaston
Go, Toshi	Schiller, A. Arthur
Gorou, Pierre	Shoemaker, James H.
Grattan, C. Hartley	Sitsen, P. H. W.
Greene, O. M.	Soward, F. H.
Gull, E. M.	Spencer, J. E.
Hailey, Lord	Spinks, Charles M.
Hart, George A. C.	Stewart, John R.
Hinder, Eleanor M.	Takayanagi, K.
Hinton, W. J.	Tamagna, Frank M.
Hsia, C. L.	Trewartha, Glenn T.
Hunsberger, Warren S.	Uyeda, Toigiro
Jones, F. C.	Vandenbosch, Amry
Kawai, Kazuo	Vinaeke, Harold M.
Keesing, F. M.	Visman, Frans H.
Kreps, T. J.	Wolf, Charles, Jr.
Kurahara, K.	Wood, J. W.
Latourette, K. S.	Wright, Quincy
Lew, Daniel H.	Wu, Chi-yuen
Li, Choh-ming	Yanaga, Chitoshi
Lind, Andrew	Yokota, Kisabura

(Part 3. Submitted by Owen Lattimore, February 26, 1952)

Bell, Sir Charles	Roosevelt, Nicholas
Hubbard, G. E.	Schumpeter, Elizabeth B.

(It should be noted that this listing, submitted by Mr. Holland as evidence that the IPR was free from Communist domination, includes the names of Profs. David N. Rowe and George E. Taylor, who have appeared as witnesses before the subcommittee and who, far from bearing out Mr. Holland's contention, have testified as to Communist influence in the IPR.)

This leaves an undistributed remainder of 1,210 names listed in the Library tabulation which is referred to as the "N group" (neutral) in the statistical analysis. Among this group are, no doubt, persons to whom the following statement by Mr. Holland appears to apply:

One could, of course, easily present an even longer list of reputable writers who may not have been known as "anti-Communist" but were certainly non-Communist and in most cases anti-Communist (exhibit 1415).

But this group also contains persons who in other connections, though not in sworn testimony before the subcommittee, have been

cited for their Communist sympathies and affiliations, and even persons such as Dr. Wittfogel, who have admitted former Communist affiliations and who were contributors while they were so affiliated.)

The Library of Congress tables list 2,318 items and 4,533½ pages of contributions to the Far Eastern Survey, and 2,385 items and 9,534 pages of contributions to Pacific Affairs. These figures omit reference matter, such as tables of contents or announcements of books. On the other hand they include not only articles but also editorials, comments, and book reviews. In consequence, the number of contributions listed as having appeared during the 7 years of Mr. Lattimore's sole editorship is counted as 771, more than 3 times as many as Mr. Lattimore mentioned in this statement before the Tydings committee.<sup>30</sup> The subcommittee felt that it would have been improper to exclude reviews of books and comments from the listing, seeing that the effect of a brief review or a pithy comment on the shaping of public opinion may far outweigh that of a lengthy article.

Generally speaking, as far as the molding of public opinion is concerned, frequency of contribution is more important than length of contribution. The statistical analysis shows that it has been the practice of the IPR to single out among a great number of contributors a very few whose names appear again and again. That is particularly true of the Far Eastern Survey where the average contribution of the 505 (out of a total of 564 contributors), authors who have contributed less than 5 items is 2.17 items while the 25 members of the P group, each of whom has contributed at least 5 items, show an average of 26.44 items each. But, the situation in Pacific Affairs is not very much different. There the contributors of less than 5 items (935 out of a total of 1,027 contributors), show an average of 1.46 items each, while the 22 members of the P group, each of whom has contributed 5 or more items show an average of 14.55 items each. By comparison, the 54 members of the A group who have contributed 5 or more items in the Far Eastern Survey show an average of 5.43 items each and the 32 members of the A group who have contributed to Pacific Affairs show an average of 7.03 items each.

If the share of the three groups in the number of contributions is examined, it is found that the P group is responsible for 30.33 percent, the A group for 12.64 percent, and the N group for 57.03 percent of the Far Eastern Survey. In Pacific Affairs the share of the P group is 15.71 percent, that of the A group 15.81 percent, and that of the N group 68.47 percent.

If instead of the number of items the number of pages contributed is examined the share of the three groups is as follows: Far Eastern Survey P group 33.73 percent, A group 15.18 percent, N group 51.09 percent. This corresponds roughly to their share of items. In Pacific Affairs the P group accounts for 19.44 percent of the pages, the A group for 18.39 percent, and the N group for 61.17 percent.

However, during the 7 years of Lattimore's sole editorship the share of the P group in Pacific Affairs shows a marked rise. In 1931-33 the P group had contributed 6.32 percent of the items, the A group 6.56 percent, and the N group 87.11 percent. During 1934-40 the proportions shifted as follows: P group 22.83 percent, A group 17.25

<sup>30</sup> "I have made a new tabulation for you of all material published in Pacific Affairs under my editorship. Of a total of 250 contributions \* \* \*" Quoted by Mr. Lattimore in his prepared statement to the subcommittee, p. 2981.

percent, N group 59.92 percent. The change in their share of pages is even more striking. In 1931-33 the P group had 6.40 percent, the A group 9.53 percent, and the N group 84.07 percent. In 1934-40 the share of the P group was over four times as high, namely 25.78 percent, that of the A group had risen to 18.50 percent, and that of the N group had sunk to 55.72 percent.<sup>31</sup>

An interesting sidelight on the relationship as well as on the proportion among contributions from members of the P group and those from members of the A group is furnished by the case of Mr. L. E. Hubbard, a British author, who, in 1938, contributed two items, totaling 19 pages in Pacific Affairs. Mr. Lattimore tried to suppress one of these because it was unwelcome in the Soviet Union, but failed because he could not risk antagonizing the British members of the IPR (p. 3434). But in order to counteract the effect of Mr. Hubbard's facts and conclusions, Lattimore not only "edited" the article but caused a pseudonymous rejoinder to be written by Mr. Andrew Grajdanzev (now Andrew Grad), who signed as "Andrew Canniff" (p. 3451). While Mr. Hubbard disappeared from the list of contributors Mr. Grajdanzev continued steadily. With a total of 36 items, he became the second most frequent contributor (Mr. Lattimore contributed 74 items), and with 296½ pages Grajdanzev became the largest contributor in Pacific Affairs (Mr. Lattimore himself reached only 289½ pages).

The years 1934-40, the time during which Owen Lattimore was sole editor of Pacific Affairs and Frederick Vanderbilt Field was executive secretary of the American council of the IPR were apparently the period during which Communist influence became entrenched in the two periodicals. During these years, a small clique of 12 persons contributed a total of 485 items to the two magazines, 357 to the Far Eastern Survey and 128 to Pacific Affairs. None of the members of that clique contributed less than 20 items; and their average contribution per head during the period named was 40.16, or 5.74 per year.

The members of this clique—the 12 chief contributors in the P group during the years 1934-40—comprise the following list: Joseph Barnes, Kathleen Barnes, Chen Han-seng, Miriam Farley, Irving S. Friedman, F. V. Field, Andrew Grajdanzev, Owen Lattimore, W. W. Lockwood, Catherine Porter, Lawrence Rosinger, and Virginia Thompson.

During the 7-year period in question, these 12 persons were responsible for 42.35 percent of the items and 38.27 percent of the pages of the

<sup>31</sup> It will be recalled the name of William C. Johnstone was placed in the P group for purposes of this analysis. Mr. Johnstone's contribution amounted to one item of 2 pages in Pacific Affairs, during Mr. Lattimore's editorship, and to 5 items totaling 27½ pages in Pacific Affairs and 8 items totaling 29½ pages in the Far Eastern Survey after 1940.

If Mr. Johnstone's name is removed from the P group and added to the A group the following changes result (the unchanged numbers in brackets):

Pacific Affairs:

P group items, whole period	percent	15.47	(15.72)
A group items, whole period	do	16.06	(15.81)
P group items, 1934-40	do	22.70	(22.83)
A group items, 1934-40	do	17.38	(17.25)
P group pages, whole period	do	19.19	(19.44)
A group pages, whole period	do	18.70	(18.39)
P group pages, 1934-40	do	25.72	(25.78)
A group pages, 1934-40	do	18.56	(18.50)

Far Eastern Survey:

P group items, whole period	do	29.98	(30.33)
A group items, whole period	do	12.99	(12.64)
P group pages, whole period	do	33.08	(33.73)
A group pages, whole period	do	15.83	(15.18)



Far Eastern Survey, and for 16.60 percent of the items and 16.23 percent of the pages in Pacific Affairs. The names of members of the group appeared on the average of 51 times a year in the Far Eastern Survey (26 issues—2 names per issue) and 18.29 times a year in Pacific Affairs (4 issues—4 to 5 names per issue).

To sum up, at least three-tenths of all the items that have appeared in the Far Eastern Survey in the period under study have come from pro-Communist sources. During the Field-Lattimore period (1934-40) almost half the material came from such sources.

Pro-Communist contributions in Pacific Affairs have been proportionately less. They amount only to about one-sixth. However, during his term as editor, Lattimore managed to raise the share contributed by such sources to nearly one-fourth of the total.

#### MAGAZINE FOCUS

Another important method by which IPR opinion was shifted dynamically was by the "focusing" of an issue of a magazine, or a conference. The ideological significance of an issue of the magazine or a conference was focused around and on a single article or a single main idea or "line." A number of examples of this method appear in the record.

For example, on June 11, 1940, Mr. Lattimore wrote to Frederick V. Field concerning the article by "William Brandt" which Mr. Field had originally recommended to him (calling it "straight Marxist" and then not to be altered):<sup>32</sup> "This article is a good stout core around which to build the whole of the September issue of Pacific Affairs," Lattimore wrote (p. 3250). This focusing seems to have been Mr. Lattimore's general practice. Part of what it can accomplish is indicated by the minutes of the Moscow meeting of April 8, 1936:

In the next issue of PA there is to be an article by a Communist writer which is antagonistic to the Chinese Council and the British Council. \* \* \* This will be a leading article (p. 3138). \* \* \* O. L. said that if the Soviet group would show in their articles a general line—a struggle for peace—the other articles would naturally gravitate to that line (p. 3139).

[Prof. David N. Rowe testified on the "focusing" of the IPR Atlantic City Conference, which took place in the winter of 1944-45. "There was a regular caucus system \* \* \* (p. 3976). Mr. Field was the leader, the spokesman, of the American delegation \* \* \* the other members of the American delegation would follow after and support what he said \* \* \*" (p. 3988)—and this while Field was running a column in the Daily Worker (p. 126).

[Another method of dynamic political concentration can be illustrated by two other projects of the IPR family, one of which succeeded whereas the other failed.

[In 1944, Mr. Raymond Dennett testified:

I received word from the Washington office that Owen Lattimore believed that Mr. Wallace might be willing to write a pamphlet for a pamphlet series in regard to American postwar Pacific policy. The question was taken up and discussed in the executive committee. It was decided that we should go ahead with this.<sup>33</sup>

Frederick V. Field, who was at that time writing regularly, under his own byline, for the Daily Worker, was the member of the executive committee who was the principal advocate of the publication of this pamphlet (pp. 953-954).

<sup>32</sup> For additional discussion of this incident, see below, p. 135.

<sup>33</sup> P. 951. Mr. Dennett here mistakenly gives the date as 1945. In Henry Wallace's testimony, and elsewhere, the correct date is given.

Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore was given the job of doing the writing for it. She had, I gather, three or four, two or three, sessions with the Vice President during which she took notes on his ideas. The pamphlet was then prepared by her \* \* \* (p. 951).

Mr. Dennett's account is corroborated in Henry Wallace's testimony (pp. 1298 et seq.). Mrs. Lattimore described her relation to the pamphlet as that of "ghost" (p. 951).

In the finished pamphlet, *Our Job in the Pacific*, published by the IPR in 1944, there appear such sentences as:

Free Asia will include first of all China and Soviet Asia, which form a great area of freedom. \* \* \* The Russians have demonstrated their friendly attitude toward China by their willingness to refrain from intervening in China's internal affairs. \* \* \* Russian interest in the Far East is not likely to be that of territorial expansion \* \* \* Russia's enlightened treatment of Asiatic minorities \* \* \* (pp. 952-953).

Not surprisingly, this pamphlet, initiated by Owen Lattimore, pushed by Frederick V. Field, written by Eleanor Lattimore, and signed by Mr. Wallace, was warmly hailed in the *Daily Worker*: "Vice President Wallace's pamphlet, *Our Job in the Pacific*, \* \* \* is a progressive and statesmanlike approach to problems of our foreign policy." The circle was here completed, inasmuch as it was Frederick V. Field himself who wrote the *Daily Worker* review (pp. 1307-1308).

In those days, Henry Wallace was himself in general an IPR concentration point. On his subsequent official mission to Soviet Asia, Owen Lattimore, John Carter Vincent, and their friend John Hazard accompanied him. A book, *Soviet Asia Mission* issued out of that trip, and in the author's note familiar IPR names appear:

In acknowledgment of invaluable assistance in preparing the manuscript of *Soviet Asia Mission*, my sincere thanks are extended to: John Hazard, Owen Lattimore, \* \* \*; Joseph Barnes, Harriet Moore, Albert Rhys William \* \* \* for reading the text and offering editorial suggestions; and to Andrew J. Steiger, who compiled the book from the diary I wrote during the trip. \* \* \*

HENRY A. WALLACE.<sup>34</sup>

The ghost writer of this book, Andrew J. Steiger, was writing orthodox Communist articles for the *Daily Worker* as early as 1934.<sup>35</sup> With the listed IPR aides and Mr. Steiger as writer, it is also not surprising that in the record of this trip, which covered the most extreme of the Soviet slave labor camp areas—the Kolyma and adjacent regions—there is not only no word of the camps, but such pretended descriptions as:

The people of Siberia today are a hearty, vigorous race, but not because they are whipped into submission \* \* \* they also know how to laugh and play and sing, as we learned during our leisure hours among them \* \* \* (pp. 1321 et seq.).

Harvey M. Matusow, who was in the Communist Party under the direction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, testified that during those years he was assigned by the party to various Communist book shops. He stated (p. 3827) that only Communist and pro-Communist books were sold, with "no deviations from the party line." Among a number of books by the IPR family (by Messrs. Lattimore, Epstein, Snow, and Evans F. Carlson, for example) was also to be found the Henry Wallace IPR pamphlet, *Our Job in the Pacific* (p. 3832).

<sup>34</sup> P. 1314.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. pp. 1316-1319.

In June 1945, Reader's Digest published an article<sup>36</sup> by Max Eastman and J. B. Powell which sharply attacked the Chinese Communists, and the position of Owen Lattimore and the IPR generally on China. At once the IPR family was roused to action. Exhibits No. 29 and 30 (pp. 168-169) show how Owen Lattimore, Edward C. Carter, T. A. Bisson and their friend, Corliss Lamont were moving. Mr. Lattimore drafted a letter to the influential newspaper, the New York Times. The text of the letter is not merely a defense, but a counterattack, calling in effect for a shift of United States support toward the Chinese Communists.<sup>37</sup> But their plan was for something more adroit than a public letter signed by one of their own more or less professional names. With Corliss Lamont's help, they aimed to get his father, the well-known partner of J. P. Morgan Co., Thomas W. Lamont, to sign the text which they had prepared. Mr. Thomas Lamont, however, proved a disappointment, and that part of the project collapsed. In a letter dated July 5, 1945 (pp. 169-170, exhibit 31), he declines:

In effect I think you are suggesting that I write to the Times a letter urging our Government to alter its present policy, and to make available lend-lease supplies to the so-called Communist armies. \* \* \*

As a test of the net pro-Communist tendency of its publications, the extremely small space occupied by clearly and concretely anti-Communist writers, and the sustained infrequency of the expression of clear and specific anti-Communist views are facts of notable significance. Genuinely and specifically anti-Communist writers, though extremely rare in the IPR universe, are not wholly absent. But it has been shown (cf. pp. 99-105 on the treatment of anti-Communist writers) that the way in which they were handled by the IPR insiders is itself an additional proof of the pro-Communist tendency. The same analysis would hold analogously for the expression of a specific anti-Communist point of view on concrete issues which the Communists, at each given phase, regarded as of tactical or strategic importance.

In contrast to the normal absence and occasional truncated or systematically negated expression of anti-Communist views, the general and prevailing policy expressed in the IPR publications reveals, from the early 1930's, a continuing parallel to and a support of each stage of the developing Soviet, Communist policy. This has been discussed in earlier sections of this report, and will be illustrated also in the subsequent section on the language of pro-Communist propaganda. Here, there may again be briefly reviewed some of the main stages in the political development with reference to which the prevailing IPR policy as expressed in its publications, has paralleled Communist policy, and has been such as to aid and abet Soviet and Communist interests:

From the early 1930's the IPR gave favorable, sympathetic and friendly publicity to the Chinese Communists, frequently repeating in its literature on the Chinese Communists the claims of Communist propaganda. From the beginning, the IPR was "anti-imperialist" in a mode which, according to Prof. David N. Rowe and other qualified witnesses, coincided with the Communist treatment of the issue of "imperialism" and "colonialism" (cf. pp. 3973-3976).

<sup>36</sup> Printed in full, pp. 3495-3506.

<sup>37</sup> The text of this letter is printed in the hearings, pp. 3353-3358.



Beginning not long after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria (1931), but especially after the Japanese invasion of China proper (1937), the IPR, in a manner identical in political substance to that of the open Communist propaganda of the corresponding periods called for resistance in China of such a sort that the Soviet position in Siberia, and the Communist strongholds in China, would not be endangered. From 1937-38 until 1943-44 in keeping with Communist policy, and also in response to the increase of the Japanese threat to the Soviet position, open Communist propaganda, and shortly after it the prevailing policy of the IPR publications, called for a united front between the Communists and Nationalists against the "aggressor" and the "invader," popularized the fiction that the Chinese Communists were not true Communists, but agrarians, peasant revolutionaries, native radicals, etc., and softened the tone of criticism against Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist regime.

From 1936-39, IPR activists, in and out of IPR publications, defended and favorably explained the Moscow purge trials. From 1939-41, IPR activists defended, or at least did not attack, the Nazi-Soviet pact, criticized the war as "imperialist," justified the Soviet operations in Poland, the Baltic States, and Finland, called for the United States to stay out of the war, and joined such Communist-front organizations as the American Peace Mobilization. After June 1941, in parallel to Soviet and international Communist policy, all or virtually all (the record indicates no exceptions) of the active IPR family became enthusiastic supporters of the war, which they found no longer "imperialist" but "democratic," and developed a special warmth for "our Soviet ally."

Following 1943-44, in a change jointly foreshadowed by the article of the Soviet agent Rogov and the IPR activist T. A. Bisson, the prevailing policy of the IPR, in parallel to Soviet, Chinese Communist, and international Communist policy, switched to an all-out (instead of indirect and hidden) attack on Chiang Kai-shek, the Kuomintang, and the Chinese Government, the use of the slogan for a "coalition government" as a means of weakening Chiang, the demand for withdrawal of military supplies to the Nationalist Government, and for no United States Government interference with the build-up of the Communist forces or with their later triumphant military campaign. In 1944-45, the chief IPR spokesmen called for the liquidation of the Japanese Emperor, and the reduction of Japan's economy and polity to impotence—that is, called for the neutralization of a potential threat to the Soviet Pacific position. In 1949, the principal IPR figures were calling for recognition of the Chinese Communists as the Government of China, for the abandonment of Formosa and Korea. "The thing to do, therefore," wrote Owen Lattimore in 1949 (p. 3022) in his familiar and recognizable style, "is to let South Korea fall—but not to let it look as though we pushed it."

#### U. S. S. R. AS A THEME

I. Mr. William L. Holland, in his sworn introductory statement to the subcommittee, stated:

It is worth noting also that very few of the institute's publications deal with Russia. The institute has not concerned itself with internal conditions in the U. S. S. R. as a whole, but only with Soviet Asia and Soviet relations with far-eastern countries (p. 1222).

In view of the IPR's professed field of interest, this restriction, if true, would seem to be most natural. But the statement is shown by the record to be by no means true. The IPR concerned itself often with Russia, and did not at all limit this concern to "Soviet Asia and Soviet relations with far-eastern countries." Somewhat analogous to the case of the IPR treatment of the few anti-Communist writers whom it published, the IPR handling of Russian and Soviet questions which do not relate to the Pacific and Far East is particularly significant as a test of IPR "nonpartisanship." From the point of view of the IPR's avowed purposes, such questions were arbitrarily dragged in, with no formal justification. It is impossible not to wonder why this should have been done. What aim—whose aim—was served by the IPR handling of these questions? A brief survey of examples from the record will provide the answer.

From 1934 to 1938 there took place within the Soviet Union the series of ruthless purges and purge trials that so startled the world.

The record of the hearings shows that the inner core of the IPR family concerned itself actively with the Moscow trials, both inside and outside of the IPR institutions. The positions taken by the IPR activists, were far removed from "nonpartisan scholarship and research," and represented a vigorous public and private defense of the line taken by Soviet propaganda.

In March 1937, for example, Edward C. Carter wrote from the IPR office to William L. Holland (then at Stanford University):

DEAR BILL: You will \* \* \* be able to help people who have been perplexed by the recent Moscow trials to realize that they make sense by loaning them a copy of the verbatim report of the Proceedings of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, January 23-January 30, 1937. I have just managed to secure a few copies and I am sending one to you under separate cover, as I know you will find it fascinating \* \* \*

The Trotskyists in this country are doing so much to play into the hands of Americans who are anti-Soviet that the appearance of this book is most timely \* \* \*

When the volume has been read by those whom you and Alsberg think would most appreciate it, it should be put in the library of the IPR in San Francisco (p. 3932, exhibit 591-B).

In March 1938, Edward C. Carter spoke at a public meeting in New York, along with Soviet Ambassador Troyanovsky, called by a committee under the chairmanship of Corliss Lamont for the purpose of explaining the Moscow trials in a manner favorable to the Soviet regime (p. 687, exhibit 218.) A special report prepared by the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (pp. 295-300) observes:

Mr. Carter's reliability for the Communist Party was publicly demonstrated a number of years ago when the Moscow trials were beginning to disgust an increasing number of American liberals who had been sympathetic to the Soviet Union. A group of "friends of the Soviet Union" arranged a meeting in Mecca Temple on March 24, 1938, where Ambassador Troyanovsky and others "explained" the trials. Edward C. Carter also addressed this meeting, saying:

"When they [the Russian people] think of the trials, they are thankful that their Government has at last been firm in dealing with what they regard as Fascist-supported intrigue to overthrow the Government of the Soviet Union."

His speech, which reveals a great deal about his point of view, was printed in full in Soviet Russia Today \* \* \*

On April 20, 1938, Mr. Carter held a dinner at the Century Club in New York, at which Constantine Oumansky, "the able, two-fisted

counselor of the Soviet Embassy" was invited to discuss the trials. Philip C. Jessup, among the invited guests, accepted "eagerly and gratefully" (pp. 889-890).

Harriet Moore, who divided her talents between the IPR and the American-Russian Institute (of which Mr. Carter was a director), published in the American Quarterly on the Soviet Union (which was under her direction) "beginning with the very first issue \* \* \* articles whitewashing the Moscow trials \* \* \*" (p. 296).

Editor Lattimore of Pacific Affairs collaborated fully with his colleagues on this critical issue. He published an article on the trials by Mary van Kleeck, who was identified during the hearings as a Communist. When he was placed in a position where it was necessary for him to publish another article on the trials by the anti-Communist writer, William Henry Chamberlin (cf. preceding discussion of Chamberlin), he immediately followed it, in the September 1938 issue, with an editorial statement of his own which countered Chamberlin and defended the procedures and substance of the trials.

The "gross discrepancies" in evidence to which Mr. Chamberlin refers appear to be subjective \* \* \*. I think that the distinguished personage of the IPR in whose company I called on Radek, and the British diplomat in whose house I met Rakovsky, would both agree that there was nothing out of character in the testimony of either man. Both of them not only gave perfectly coherent evidence, but psychologically convincing accounts of the way in which they were enmeshed.

The real point, of course, for those who live in democratic countries, is whether the discovery of the conspiracies was a triumph for democracy or not. I think that this can easily be determined. The accounts \* \* \* all emphasize that since the close scrutiny of every person in a responsible position, following the trials, a great many abuses have been discovered and rectified \* \* \*. That sounds to me like democracy (pp. 3466-3469).

In April 1938, Frederick V. Field wrote to Gregory I. Gokhman, the Soviet consul in San Francisco, expressing his thanks for Gokhman's having sent him the report of the March 1938, Moscow Trial Proceedings, from which, he says, "I learned a very great deal \* \* \* I wish it were possible to have more Americans read those first hand reports \* \* \*." He invited the consul to have lunch with Owen Lattimore and himself. Subsequently, the consul in turn invited Messrs. Field and Lattimore to lunch at the consulate (pp. 3270-3274).

The preceding month (March 1938), Mr. Field had written to Edward C. Carter to congratulate him on his agreeing to speak publicly on the trials. He went on, in part, as follows:

There are points which, it seems to me, have to be made over and over again to American audiences. They include:

(a) The fact that to anyone who will take the trouble to read the detailed proceedings of the famous Moscow trials and even to people who will read enough American newspapers to correct the obvious prejudices of any one of them, this whole series of trials makes sense. The story of the internal revolt against what is called the Stalin regime, but what is actually a large hierarchy of committees of which Stalin is the chief secretary, is to my mind a clear one and a consistent one \* \* \*. Obviously, the important thing is to stress the fundamental background on which, it seems to me, there should be general sympathy with what the Soviet Union is trying to do \* \* \* (pp. 4105, 4106, exhibit 660).

The Nazi-Soviet pact in August 1939, the Soviet-Finnish War of the winter of 1939-40 were issues, like the trials, which greatly troubled the general public, and especially those liberals who wished to be friendly to the Soviet Union. Here too the IPR activists jumped into the ideological breach. Harriet Moore's American-Russian Insti-



tute's Research Bulletin carried running defenses of the pact, of the Russian invasion of Poland, and of the Finnish War (p. 298). She expressed the same Communist views in the November 1940 issue of the American Quarterly on the Soviet Union, and the Annals of the American Quarterly on the Soviet Union, and the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. In the January 1940 issue of the IPR auxiliary publication, Frederick V. Field's Amerasia, she defended the pact at length. In the IPR fortnightly, Far Eastern Survey of March 12, 1941, she again defended Soviet policy under the pact. In the same magazine, a few months later (August 11, 1941), she has made the turn required for all Communists when the Nazi invasion of Russia began on June 21, 1941, and she then wrote of the "historical community of interest" between the United States and the Soviet Union, and criticizes those who thought that the pact showed any similarity between Russia and Germany (pp. 298-299).

In April 1940, Edward C. Carter appealed to Owen Lattimore for light on the Finnish war:

Where in English or French or Russian has there appeared the most convincing (I mean convincing to bourgeoisie readers) statement as to the U. S. S. R.'s justification for the Finnish campaign? \* \* \* Have you yourself written or are you are writing anything along this line? (p. 3423).

Plainly, Mr. Carter understood that if Mr. Lattimore had written anything, it would have been "along this line" of "justification." Mr. Lattimore promptly replied (with some plausible formulas which grant that the Russians "made a political blunder in attacking Finland") that what Russia did was no worse and not half so bad as what the British and French have been up to. Indeed, the scholarly Mr. Lattimore observes that—

as far as the evidence goes, the Russians stood by collective security and the honoring of treaties until these principles had been violated by some of the great powers with which Russia was dealing, and betrayed by others \* \* \* if justification be pleaded, the Russians can point out that they did not lead off in the scramble of aggression, and can claim that there is a difference between being the first to start aggression and committing what might be called an act of "self-protective aggression," after the general scramble had begun (pp. 3430, 3431)

Mr. Holland's declaration that "the institute has not concerned itself with internal conditions in the U. S. S. R." is not borne out by the record. The activists of the IPR family looked often on the internal conditions of the U. S. S. R., and almost always found them good. Of many possible examples, reference will here be made to a few that are typical.

One of the IPR pamphlets sold and distributed to the secondary school system in large quantities<sup>38</sup> was Land of the Soviets, written by Marguerite Ann Stewart, and edited by her husband, Maxwell S. Stewart. Exhibit No. 142 (pp. 566-567 of the hearings) gives a series of quotations from this pamphlet which amply justify the comment made on them by Mr. Budenz: "these phrases can be found almost in the same order in official Communist documents."

Because these Soviets were the organ which represented the people most widely \* \* \*. But while the Russians are quick to condemn those who display ambition for personal power, they have no praise too high for the person who devotes himself to the common good \* \* \*. An additional motive peculiar to the Russian system is the pride of ownership of the Soviet workers.

<sup>38</sup> P. 969.

They have a voice in running the factories \* \* \*. Each of these has its own village soviet, chosen at a village meeting not unlike our New England town meeting \* \* \*. The 1936 constitution also introduced into the Soviet Union many of the elements of democracy as we know them in this country \* \* \*

These and many other sentences of this pamphlet are, on the one hand, little more than repetitions of official Soviet propaganda, and are, on the other, in direct and often flagrant contradiction with historical fact. It was through such a pamphlet as this that the IPR was exerting its influence on the schools of the Nation.

Pro-Soviet books could almost invariably count on sympathetic reviews in *Pacific Affairs* or *Far Eastern Survey*. This was not surprising, since they were often written by IPR activists like Kathleen Barnes, identified as a Communist and among those of the IPR family who refused to testify concerning Communist connections. Kathleen Barnes found Albert Rhys Williams' *The Soviets*, for example, to be "absorbing reading \* \* \* impressive witness to the achievements of the country under consideration." Of *Soviet Communism*, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, quite openly and officially pro-Soviet in its point of view, she observes: "Slowly and with care the study proceeds to the consideration of the 'good life' at which the Soviets are aiming. 'The worship of God' is replaced by the 'service of man' \* \* \*" (p. 649).

In 1941, *Far Eastern Survey* published an article by Joseph Barnes and Harriet Moore, entitled "America and the Soviet Union." The IPR then reprinted and distributed this article as a pamphlet. The objectivity and nonpartisanship of its point of view is indicated by the fact that both authors were repeatedly identified by sworn testimony as Communists. Miss Moore not only refused to testify to Communist connections in general, but under questioning by Senator Ferguson, specifically refused to testify whether she had been a Communist at the time when she wrote the pamphlet (pp. 2559, 2584).

Owen Lattimore's feelings about the internal Soviet regime were often suggested in his writings, and summed up so late as 1945 in his book, *Solution in Asia*:

The fact that the Soviet Union always stands for democracy is not to be overlooked. It stands for democracy because it stands for all the other things. Here in America we are in the habit of taking a narrow view of foreign claimants to the status of democracy. \* \* \* The fact is that for most of the people of the world today, what constitutes democracy in theory is more or less irrelevant. What moves people to act, to try to line up with one part or country and not with another, is the difference between what is more democratic and less democratic in practice (pp. 3089, 3090).

#### *The language of pro-Communist propaganda*

Many, or even most persons believe that pro-Communist and pro-Soviet propaganda is always written in what might be called Communist language. They expect to find in pro-Communist propaganda words like "revolution," "class struggle," "proletariat," "civil war," etc., to have democracy called "democracy" and communism itself called "communism," and to get an open defense of the Communist program and Soviet interests. Because of this expectation, they believe that a given article or book or speech cannot be pro-Communist if it does not use such language. In the case of the IPR, the writing seldom makes use of "Communist language," and for many persons this seems to show that it therefore, cannot be in fact pro-Communist or pro-Soviet.

This belief about "Communist language" is altogether mistaken. The truth is that even in the public Communist press itself, there is comparatively little use of outright, open Communist language. In publications used as Communist fronts, and in the writings of disguised Communists the language is carefully and systematically camouflaged. The purpose of the camouflage is, of course, to hide from the untrained reader the true origin and aim of the writing, and to adjust its tone and wording so that it will be more likely to evoke the desired response.

The Communists have given careful attention to this problem of language, and many references to their approach came up during the course of the hearings. We also find abundantly illustrated in the record the attention given to the problem of language by the leaders of the IPR, especially by Owen Lattimore; and their solution and practice, the record shows, was identical to that which is part of Communist tradition.

Prof. William M. McGovern traced the Communist language practice as far back as Karl Marx. He commented (p. 1013) on a letter of Mr. Lattimore's that "There is very clear evidence that he was trying to advocate the Stalinist approach." When asked by Senator Ferguson whether it was normal that this should be done in a way to conceal the fact, and deceive the public, Professor McGovern replied:

That has been true from the time of Karl Marx himself. If you remember \* \* \* when he was the editor of the Rheinisch Zeitung in Cologne it had an open policy of liberal, and his secret policy of communism and he was keeping the two. From time to time he would throw in a few suggestions \* \* \* showing what his position was to fool people by false play, by pretending to be one and using camouflage (p. 1013).

According to the testimony of Igor Bogolepov, the Russian Bolsheviks, after taking power, at first seldom wrote for the non-Communist press (pp. 4509, 4510). This rule was sharply changed in 1931, in which year Molotov prepared a memorandum on the problem.

Who reads the Communist papers? [Molotov wrote]. Only a few people who are already Communists. We don't need to propagandize them. What is our object? Who do we have to influence? We have to influence non-Communists if we want to make them Communists or if we want to fool them. So, we have to try to infiltrate in the big press \* \* \* (p. 4511).

Mr. Bogolepov testified further to this point:

At the beginning of the operation infiltration, as I can call the big program of poisoning the western mind with the Soviet propaganda, \* \* \* the trouble arose because our people were rather cumbersome. They were accustomed to speak to the Communist-minded people in very rough and political language, and so our first effort to send abroad the article written by Soviet authors failed mostly because of the improper language, and the western reader couldn't digest the Soviet propaganda \* \* \*

And so there developed in the course of time a big branch of propaganda industry—I mean, the preparation of the propaganda material specially designated for western tasks \* \* \* (p. 4575).

Prof. David N. Rowe was asked about the resultant difficulty in detecting the Communist line, and replied:

\* \* \* you have to study it constantly to know what the words and phrases are, the way in which they are used at the moment in order to know what people are talking about. That is why it is so easy for an uninitiated person or group to be hoodwinked (p. 3990).

Professor Colegrove also testified (pp. 343-344) to the great difficulty of detecting the Communist line,



The Moscow discussions of 1936 between the Soviet representatives and Harriet Moore, Edward C. Carter, and Owen Lattimore, as representatives of the international IPR, frequently dealt with the language problem, as did correspondence between the Moscow and the New York IPR office. For example, the minutes of the Moscow meeting of April 12 note:

Voitinsky suggested an article on Japanese policy in Korea. This has already been done in *Tikhii Okean*. The same material could be used for another article for *Pacific Affairs*. O. L. said that this had been done in regard to the article on the Chinese land tax. A Chinese version of the article had appeared, but this was revised to meet the needs of a non-Chinese audience \* \* \* Voitinsky said that these articles would be done on the same basis of the materials which had already appeared in *Tikhii Okean*, but "would be polished for export." He said that the articles would have to be translated here. O. L. brought up the question of editing the vocabulary in left and Soviet articles. In regard to the Asiaticus article he had to revise the vocabulary considerably, or otherwise the article would have been discounted as propaganda (pp. 3173, 3174).

The Soviet representatives did not criticize Mr. Lattimore's linguistic skill as applied to non-Soviet writers, but, as was noted in another context, Voitinsky would not permit any tampering with the Soviet articles proper:

Voitinsky said that that would be impossible with their articles, because they cannot give in on their point of view. No such editorial changes could be made without their approval. He said that they understood the problem of PA and knew what sort of thing they would have to write for it (*ibid.*).

Voitinsky evidently chose the occasion to make clear who was master.

Experience seems to have shown the Soviet leaders that they had an apt set of pupils. Three and a half years after this Moscow meeting (June 29, 1939), Edward C. Carter writes in a letter to Philip C. Jessup:

They, the Soviet IPR Council members, are perfectly willing to send their manuscripts for the inquiry for editing and publication in New York. In fact, Motylev said that he hoped in editing their manuscripts the Secretariat would bear in mind that the Soviet method of expression was sometimes more vigorous than the best English usage and that the Secretariat in its editorial work would exercise full freedom in presenting the facts in such a way as to carry the greatest weight with English-speaking groups (p. 2728, exhibit 441).

This prudence about too vigorous rhetoric was widespread in the IPR. Miriam Farley of the IPR office, in a memorandum dealing with Maxwell Stewart's pamphlet, *Wartime China*, notes that John Fairbank, after reading the manuscript, "thought that these things should be said but in a more subtle manner" (p. 3796). Writing from the White House in the middle of the war (May 22, 1943), Lauchlin Currie informs Edward C. Carter:

I am enclosing some material on the plight of the intellectuals in China, mainly from the personal correspondence of John Fairbank \* \* \* I know that you will use this material discreetly \* \* \* (p. 3806).

Owen Lattimore seems to have been fond of the adjective "cagey" to describe the chameleon language of propaganda. In connection with his proposed trip to Outer Mongolia, for example, he testified:

I had put up to Mr. Motylev the suggestion that I might be able to make a visit to Outer Mongolia via Russia. Mr. Motylev, like all Russians, was extremely cagey on the subject, because it was my experience \* \* \* that the Russians would never have anything on the record to prove that they controlled who permitted people into or out of Outer Mongolia. Everybody knows that it depended on them, but they would never let anything get on the record to prove it (p. 3229).

Ambassador Bullitt's testimony showed that in this "cagey" endeavor Motylev had Mr. Lattimore's full cooperation:

Mr. BULLITT. This is Lattimore talking \* \* \* He said that in his opinion the so-called People's Republic of Outer Mongolia was fully independent. I asked him if there was no Soviet control of \* \* \* Outer Mongolia \* \* \* And he replied that there was no Soviet control whatsoever \* \* \* (p. 4523).

In a letter to Owen Lattimore, dated November 14, 1938, Edward C. Carter seems to appreciate the technique in an observation which he makes concerning a manuscript article of Mr. Lattimore's:

Of course, as you have written it, you are very cagey, for you simply say that the British are "talking about" investing (p. 3589).

Mr. Carter himself was not without some of this linguistic skill. The record (pp. 697-698) gives the correspondence dealing with a highly specialized instance in which he was involved. Harper & Bros., the publishers, sent him in 1946 a draft map of China which was to be included in a future book of theirs, and they asked for his comments. In his reply, on August 6, Mr. Carter writes:

I think you can improve on the designation of the Times map by using the word "Kuomintang" at the top and the bottom in place of "Nationalists."

Even in 1946, evidently, Mr. Carter did not recognize the Nationalist regime as the legitimate government of China.<sup>39</sup>

T. A. Bisson was another linguistically trained member of the IPR family. The July 14, 1943, issue of *Far Eastern Survey* published the very important article (to which other references have been made in this report) by Mr. Bisson entitled "China's Part in a Coalition War," the article in which, paralleling the article by the Soviet agent Rogov which was published during the same summer, the change in the Communist line on China was foreshadowed. Mr. Bisson, like so many of his Soviet and his IPR colleagues, apparently did not believe that American public opinion would easily incline in favor of Communist China as against Nationalist China or, simply and most correctly from an objective point of view, "the Communist rebellion" against "the legitimate government of China," since the distinction between Communist China and Nationalist China already represents a linguistic partial victory for the Communist propagandist. Mr. Bisson therefore wrote:

However, these are only party labels. To be more descriptive, the one might be called feudal China; the other, democratic China. (6) These terms express the actualities as they exist today, the real institutional distinctions between the two Chinas (p. 534, exhibit 134).

This 1943 juggle had an earlier and most important precedent when the Chinese Communists were rechristened for temporary and tactical purposes as "agrarians," not genuine Communists, independent of Moscow, etc. The mechanism for this earlier ceremony is a crucial demonstration of the Communist use of the IPR as an instrument of Soviet and Communist policy. The first edition of Edgar Snow's book *Red Star Over China* described the Chinese Communists as genuine Communists. The June 1938 issue of *Pacific Affairs* carried a criticism of this book by Asiaticus, identified in the hearings as the Comintern member Hans Moeller (or Mueller). Asiaticus lays down the official Comintern line of the period:

<sup>39</sup> Another exhibit showed that Carter was receiving the data on this map from Israel Epstein (exhibit 977-A).

The policy of the Chinese Communists makes it quite unmistakable that their only immediate aim was to carry through that Chinese revolution which was actually going on, which was not a Socialist but a nationalist revolution aimed at eradicating the powerful feudal remnants in rural China, and getting rid of the patriarchal, absolutist reactionaries \* \* \*. It is a mistake to suggest, as Snow does (p. 212), that the Chinese Communists used land redistribution merely as a maneuver to gain the power \* \* \*. The liberation of the Chinese peasantry was an aim in itself \* \* \*. The Chinese Communists today represent not only the workers and peasants of China but the entire nation in their fight for national liberation; and, therefore, they stand for democratic freedom as a whole \* \* \* (pp. 3182-3186).

Snow, in the same issue, makes an apologetic and feeble reply, and Asiaticus rebuts with a still firmer pedagogical hand. He reiterates that the Chinese Communists do not aim at a "proletarian" (i. e., Communist) revolution, but purely at a "bourgeois-democratic" revolution, "aiming at unification, centralization, and the national independence of China, as well as at peasant liberation and democratic victory" (pp. 3186-3190).

What gives this instance a special piquancy is that a spokesman of the Comintern (Asiaticus) used the pages of the official IPR journal *Pacific Affairs* in order to communicate to world Communist circles the orthodox Communist line on China. According to the testimony (p. 680), Edgar Snow obediently altered later editions of his book.

Soon the new terminology was further popularized and well established until, at any rate, it came time to alter it again when the Chinese Communists began their drive for the conquest of state power in all China, and were ready to take off their verbal wraps. In his IPR pamphlet *Wartime China*, Maxwell S. Stewart writes:

As China is not like any other country, so Chinese communism has no parallel elsewhere. You can find in it resemblances to Communist movements in other countries and you can also find resemblances to the grass-roots populist movements that have figured in American history \* \* \*. Raymond Gram Swing described Chinese Communists as "agrarian radicals trying to establish democratic processes" (p. 3798).

A reviewer (Mr. Peter Meyer) has this to say of Mr. Lawrence Rosinger's adaptation of the method in 1950:

This has all been said before in the resolution of the Indian Communist party. But did Mr. Rosinger say it? No; he did not—not in these words. He only, to use his favorite expression, "strongly suggested" it \* \* \*. Everyone has the right to criticize the policies of the Indian, American, and all other governments. But this method of underhand suggestion, vaguely formulated suspicion, cleverly dispersed innuendo—all under the mask of irreproachable objectivity—is trial by slander if there ever was one (p. 2531).

Seven years earlier, Owen Lattimore was still dissatisfied with Mr. Bisson's linguistic progress. In a letter dated July 1943 he states that he thinks Bisson's "main points" are "sound" in the article referred to above, but he laments: "Bisson's terminology will turn away a number of people whom he might have persuaded with use of a different terminology" (p. 3287).

It is, however, generally granted that Owen Lattimore is himself the linguistic master. Professor Rowe testified of him:

\* \* \* As of today, among Far East specialists in the United States, Lattimore is probably the principal agent of Stalinism \* \* \*. I am talking about ideologies and ideas and that he is promoting these ideas and ideologies \* \* \*. He is a specialized operator within the field of Far East studies, Asiatic studies, and particularly of Chinese studies, and in this field I consider him principal agent for the advocacy of Stalinist ideas (p. 3984).



But his special utility for the Communist cause was stressed by Louis Budenz:

His position from the viewpoint of the Communist Party was a very important one. It was particularly stressed in the political bureau that his great value lay in the fact that he could bring the emphasis in support of Soviet policy in language which was non-Soviet. And they consider that a very valuable asset (p. 523).

Commenting on a Lattimore letter, Budenz continued:

That is a typical Lattimore method which was approved by the Politburo. That is to not appear to be a Communist, but to forward the burden, as I have said, of the Communist line, to throw the weight into Communist support \* \* \* to influence people who are non-Communists by appearing to present it in non-Communist approaches and in non-Communist language (p. 525).

Others also paid tribute to Mr. Lattimore's special gift:

Mr. MORRIS. Doctor, have you found in Owen Lattimore's writings any terminology that would demonstrate his intrinsic devotion to Communist interpretation?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Generally speaking, he has avoided the jargon \* \* \*

Senator FERGUSON. What is your comment \* \* \*? You were talking about "jargon" and the use of language.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. It would show obviously how somebody tries to proceed along certain political lines without showing himself. There would be a technical term for it. Proceeding in a pro-Communist way without "exposing yourself" \* \* \* it is the method which would be used by those elements of the periphery who are really closely coordinated and integrated into the movement, but who try to promote the advantages of the movement without exposing themselves. As a matter of fact, I remember that once Owen said to me. "You know, Karl August, I never read Marx, because if I don't read the stuff nobody can ever accuse me of using the Marxist jargon when saying anything pro-Soviet."<sup>40</sup>

Former Soviet Gen. Alexander Barmine, in explaining that Mr. Lattimore's book, *Solution in Asia*, is Communist propaganda, similarly observed that this was presented—

in a very slick and smooth manner, in very devious ways. It never would be the direct statement of the author; it would be always related to people who think, people who say the other, but in fact it was telling the straight Communist line, camouflaged, I would say, very skilled (p. 215).

In a review of *Solution in Asia*, General Barmine had written:

Lattimore presents a picture of Soviet Russia which corresponds accurately with his picture of Communist China. As usual, he begins cautiously with what in his opinion the Soviet Union represents to Asiatic peoples: "In their eyes \* \* \* the Soviet Union stands for strategic security, economic prosperity, technological progress, miraculous medicine, free education, equality of opportunity, and democracy: a powerful combination." And then Lattimore adds his own opinion: "The fact that the Soviet Union also stands for democracy is not to be overlooked. It stands for democracy because it stands for all the other things" (p. 214).

Mr. Budenz further testified: In connection with—

Browder's bringing forward the idea that the Communists should be represented as democratic, as agrarian reformers, as Asians for the Asiatics, \* \* \* Lattimore's important role is indicated by his being given an assignment \* \* \* to be responsible for seeing that there was produced in the American publication market articles and books which would carry forward this point of view \* \* \* The very function of Pacific Affairs or the Institute of Pacific Relations was to have a non-Communist appearance and a non-Communist approach, but carrying the burden of the Communist viewpoint always \* \* \* (p. 551).

Examples from Mr. Lattimore's writings of all of the linguistic devices previously cited here are to be found abundantly in the record of the hearings, and there are some to which he was unusually partial.

<sup>40</sup> P. 333. In the pages immediately following, Dr. Wittfogel testifies to a number of specific examples.

One of these is the communication of a policy line by apparently attributing it to others. The above quotation from General Barmine gives an instance. Often the exact source of the attributions is left exceedingly vague. In a defense of the Soviet Union against the charge of being "expansive", Lattimore wrote:

In this connection a Canadian writer has recently pointed out that czarist Russia was expansionist in terms of both trade and political empire while the Soviet Union, because it changed the nature of its internal economy, is not (p. 3194).

Even more vague is the convenient source through which he attacks Harold Isaac's anti-Stalinist book on the Chinese revolution:

Mr. Isaacs, referring to China, writes of "the cold embrace of Communist totalitarianism"; but it appears from other accounts that it is in these areas that there really is a beacon of hope \* \* \* (p. 3628).

In trying to avoid the implications of a more recent statement from an article of his published in the New York Compass ("The thing to do, therefore, is to let South Korea fall—but not to let it look as though we pushed it") (p. 3025), Mr. Lattimore again took refuge in this device:

Well, I presume at that time—and remember, I am not stating my own opinion, I am quoting opinion in Washington \* \* \* (p. 3029).

In a 1940 letter to Edward C. Carter, Mr. Lattimore's scholar-colleague, Frederick V. Field makes a comment on the linguistic problem in his own manner, a comment which once more annotates the IPR meaning of "objective nonpartisan scholarship and research." "The new section," Mr. Field writes, "in the Far Eastern Survey is going to be an exceedingly difficult thing to handle because I cannot see how political subjects are going to be written in a way that our fancy friends will regard as 'objective'" (p. 4140).

Messrs. Field and Lattimore corresponded the record shows, on this same absorbing problem of language. As early as 1935, in the days when according to his reiterated testimony he knew nothing about Communism, Mr. Lattimore wrote to Mr. Field: "What I should like to suggest is that you yourself summarize the Hansu Chan article. \* \* \* You could do it in such a manner as not to draw any accusation of official American IPR approval of the Stalinist view" (p. 3205). It may be observed that Hansu Chan also known as Ch'ao-ting Chi, is identified by sworn testimony as a Communist, now in Communist China.)

A year later, in 1936, however, Mr. Lattimore discovered that Mr. Field had slipped up a bit in preparing a manuscript of Mr. Lattimore's for publication:

\* \* \* phrases like "imperialistic expansion," and "forces which cause capitalistic nations to seek foreign outlets" read a little out of character over my signature (p. 3192).

Mr. Field came to recognize Mr. Lattimore's linguistic mastery. On May 16, 1940, he wrote him about "an article on the Chinese market by a young German whom I had met, William Brandt." But, he observed—

this is going to be a very tough job of editing. I also have the impression that, while the analysis is a straight Marxist one and from that point of view should not be altered, there are a great many of those over used Communist words and phrases which will make most of your readers vomit and which can very easily

be paraphrased to the great benefit of the article. I am under the impression that this is a really very brilliant piece of work \* \* \* (P. 3249, exhibit 500).

Mr. Field was thus making himself quite clear: the content and substance of this article was the orthodox Marxist, i. e., Communist, line, and "should not be altered," but it has got to be polished editorially for digestion by non-Communist readers.

Mr. Lattimore agreed with his judgment, and accepted the assignment. In a letter dated June 6, 1940 (P. 3250, exhibit 501), he assured Mr. Field that "the ideas he works in are absorbingly interesting, to me at least," and remarks, "I hope you have warned the author of my Terrible Turk methods of editing, so that the shock won't be so great when he sees my draft edited version." The work was soon finished, and on June 11, 1940, Mr. Lattimore sent on the edited version (P. 3250, exhibit 502). So pleased was Mr. Lattimore with his spruced up linguistic coat for the Communist substance that he decided: "This article is a good stout core around which to build the whole of the September issue of Pacific Affairs." The article did, in fact, so appear in the September 1940 issue, and is reproduced in appendix I of the record.

The analysis of these linguistic methods of pro-Communist propaganda should make it easy to comprehend the exact meaning of Mr. Lattimore's letter<sup>41</sup> of July 10, 1938, to Mr. Edward C. Carter, of which mention has elsewhere been made in this Report. The "inquiry" referred to in this letter was a lengthy specially financed project of the IPR for the preparation and publication of a series of books:

\* \* \* I think that you are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the China section of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi. They will bring out the absolutely essential radical aspects, but can be depended on to do it with the right touch.

For the general purposes of this inquiry it seems to me that the good scoring position, for the IPR, differs with different countries. For China, my hunch is that it will pay to keep behind the official Chinese Communist position—far enough not to be covered by the same label—but enough ahead of the active Chinese liberals to be noticeable \* \* \* For the U. S. S. R.—back their international policy in general, but without using their slogans and above all without giving them or anybody else an impression of subservience \* \* \*

Owen Lattimore had good reason to judge it "cagey" to leave the China section of the inquiry in the skilled hands of Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi. "Asiaticus" is the pseudonym of Hans Moeller (Mueller), whom sworn testimony at the hearings showed to have been a Comintern operative since the 1920's; Chen Han-seng and Ch'ao-ting Chi were both also identified as Communists by sworn testimony and by the clear implications of their writings and activities. Asiaticus apparently is now dead. Chi and Han-seng (a former associate of Mr. Lattimore's at the Walter Hines Page School) are both now resident and working in Communist China.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>41</sup> The full text of the letter is reproduced as exhibit 4, hearings, pp. 39-41.

<sup>42</sup> Hearings, transcript, pp. 8108-8109.



## COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

In conformity with the authority granted by Senate Resolution 366 of the Eighty-first Congress,<sup>1</sup> the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee sought to determine to what extent, if any, the Institute of Pacific Relations was infiltrated and influenced by "persons who are or may be under the domination of the foreign government or organizations controlling the world Communist movement \* \* \* (p. 1).

In his statement before this committee on October 10, 1951, speaking as the executive officer of both the International IPR and the American IPR, Mr. William L. Holland, secretary-general of the institute and executive vice chairman of the American Institute of Pacific Relations (p. 1212) maintained that his organization consisted of a group of "autonomous national councils" originally formed in 1925 devoted to the " \* \* \* unfettered nonpartisan collection of facts and discussion about the problems of the Far East and the Pacific area \* \* \*" (p. 1213).

He further characterized the institute thus:

- (1) The institute is an international organization.
- (2) It is a nonpartisan organization.
- (3) It has never tried to influence the actions of governments.
- (4) The character of its work has been determined not by Communists, but by the hundreds of eminent citizens and scholars who have taken an active part in the institute as officers of the organization, as delegates to its conferences, or as writers of books and articles which it has published (p. 1215).

This general view has been supported by sworn statements before this committee by William W. Lockwood (p. 3863) former secretary of the American Council of the IPR (exhibit 801) and a member of the board of trustees (pp. 568, 3863); Edward C. Carter (exhibits 1382 and 1383), former secretary-general of the International IPR (exhibit 801); Owen Lattimore (pp. 2980, 2981), former editor of Pacific Affairs (exhibit 801) and member of the board of trustees (p. 568), Jerome D. Greene (pp. 3851, 3852), former chairman, American Council IPR (p. 1219) and member of the board of trustees (p. 264), and John K. Fairbank (p. 3742), former member of the board of trustees (p. 568).

On the other hand, we find that Kenneth Colegrove, professor of political science at Northwestern University and Far Eastern scholar, a former member of the IPR, has characterized the IPR as " \* \* \* a propaganda organization supporting a line \* \* \* a Communist line" (p. 916). David N. Rowe, former member of the board of trustees and a Far Eastern scholar, has denied that the IPR is " \* \* \* a straight scholarly organization with the interest of promoting research and study \* \* \*" (p. 4011).

<sup>1</sup> As amended and extended by S. Res. 7, 82d Cong., 1st sess., January 29, 1951. As amended and extended by S. Res. 198, 82d Cong., 1st sess., September 29, 1951. As amended and extended by S. Res. 314, 82d Cong., 2d sess., May 29, 1952.

Raymond Dennett, present director of the World Peace Foundation and once secretary of IPR's American Council, said this: "\* \* \* I do not think it was an objective research organization" (p. 966).

Prof. William M. McGovern, also of Northwestern University and former unofficial liaison with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Far Eastern matters (p. 1015), asserted that he found "very clear evidence" that Lattimore in editing the IPR's international quarterly Pacific Affairs was "trying to advocate the Stalinist approach" (p. 1013).

Louis F. Budenz, former managing editor of the Daily Worker, official organ of the Communist Party, U. S. A., testified that the IPR was looked upon by the Politburo of the Communist Party as a "\* \* \* captive organization, completely under the control of the Communist Party" (p. 516). He quoted Alexander Trachtenberg, the cultural commissar of the Communist Party, who is presently under indictment, as describing the IPR as "The little red schoolhouse for teaching certain people in Washington how to think with the Soviet Union in the Far East" (p. 517). He testified that Earl Browder, general secretary of the Communist Party, had designated the IPR as "\* \* \* an umbrella for Communist operations \* \* \*" (p. 593).

Miss Elizabeth T. Bentley, a former operator in the underground movement of the Communist Party, U. S. A., mentioned that her superior, Jacob Golos, referred to the IPR as "\* \* \* red as a rose \* \* \*" (p. 437). She also cited Mildred Price (a member of the IPR who refused on the ground of self-incrimination to answer questions regarding her past association with the Communist Party) as referring to the IPR as "\* \* \* one of our organizations in the sense that we exercised a control over it" (p. 412).

Alexander Barmine, former chargé d'affaires of the Soviet Union in Athens, Greece, and former brigadier general of the Red Army, testified that Soviet military intelligence, with which he had been connected, looked upon the IPR as "\* \* \* a cover shop for military intelligence work in the Pacific area" (p. 202). Igor Bogolepov, former colonel on the general staff of the Red Army and assistant to the Chief of the League of Nations Division of the Soviet Foreign Office, referred to the IPR as a "double way track" furnishing information from America to the Soviet military intelligence and on the other hand sending propaganda "to implant in American brains" in the interests of Soviet foreign policy (p. 4491).

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The in-going channel was military intelligence. We extracted military information.

\* \* \* \* \*

Mr. MORRIS. And on the other hand, by the out-way track you mean information that you wanted to impart to the outside world was transmitted through that medium?

\* \* \* \* \*

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is mostly propaganda, but I would say even a little more than propaganda, because not only organizational propaganda but even the organization of a network of fellow travelers in your and other countries (pp. 4491-4492).

Thus did the subcommittee, almost from the outset, find a great conflict in what the IPR officials said it was and what the evidence showed it was.

## PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

## THE RED SPECTRUM

In dealing with Communist penetration and influence, one must be aware of the various grades, shades and variations of those operating within the Communist orbit and serving the interests of Joseph Stalin. It is not merely a simple matter of locating an openly avowed card-carrying member of the Communist Party. In recognition of this fact, Senator McCarran, in his opening remarks, warned that—

successful conspirators usually are consummate dissemblers; and thus the acts of such persons are often shrouded in the darkness of stealth, accompanied by acts of misdirection, or clouded by ambiguity of meaning (p. 3).

Obviously among the best sources of information as to the nature of the Communist conspiracy are those who have actually participated therein, who have sincerely broken with the movement, and who are seeking to expose its true nature in their effort to combat that movement and serve the interests of the United States. Among the witnesses in this group are Louis F. Budenz, (pp. 513-701, 1077-1110), former managing editor of the Daily Worker, official Communist organ. Whittaker Chambers (pp. 487-497, May 29, 1952), Hede Massing (pp. 223-271, May 29, 1952), and Elizabeth Bentley (pp. 403-447, May 29, 1952). Testimony of these witnesses points to the need for distinguishing between rank and file Communists or Communist Party officials, who openly assert their beliefs in communism, and those who hold responsible positions elsewhere and who, while maintaining their fraternal relations with the party, may even repudiate the party openly. Individuals in the latter group may not be permitted to give any indication of association with Communists or the Communist apparatus (May 29, 1952). They may have been instructed not to display any Communist membership, and to avoid any public relations with Communists (May 29, 1952). Thus, Mr. Budenz declared most Communists do not carry party cards but are yet subject to Communist allegiance (p. 559). Mr. Budenz also called attention to what he termed "allies of the Communists" whom the Communists hail as liberals and progressives (p. 63).

Whittaker Chambers cited an instance of a man who served his apparatus and who "\* \* \* enjoyed being of the Communist Party but not in the party and not subject to its discipline" (p. 492). This man was willing to go to great lengths of assistance to the party, Chambers said (p. 492).

Witness Hede Massing declared: "\* \* \* there are many more members in spirit than actual card-holding party members \* \* \*" (p. 225). Those who were working for the Soviet espionage apparatus considered themselves as soldiers of the revolution chosen for a particularly difficult task of which they were proud (p. 226). It is important to note that such agents, as was true in Mrs. Massing's case, have been carefully trained—

\* \* \* in the form of conversation, regular meetings, training in behavior, training in approach, training in understanding, political issues, personal issues \* \* \* how to size up people (p. 227).

Actually, party credentials are seldom necessary for Communist operations. At times Communist operatives would be simply referred to, by official sources, as "our men" or "one of ours" (p. 201; May



29, 1952). For the initiate this was enough to inspire full confidence and cooperation (p. 201; May 29, 1952).

It was in view of these complexities that committee counsel, in questioning witnesses, often insisted the word "Communist" be used to connote a person under Communist discipline or who has voluntarily and knowingly cooperated or collaborated with Communist Party members in furtherance of Communist Party objectives. In other words, in weighing the degree and significance of Communist infiltration and influence in any organization, it is necessary to proceed from this broad basis.

From the standpoint of our national security it should be noted that a well-intentioned but fuzzy-minded fellow traveler can be almost as dangerous as a knowing conspirator. From the standpoint of Joseph Stalin, he can be equally fruitful merely by serving as an unwitting instrument of Communist trickery.

#### ATTITUDE OF IPR TOWARD INQUIRY

The inquiry into the Institute of Pacific Relations occurred in the midst of the period during which our Nation was at war with the forces of international communism in Korea. It might have been expected that the officials of the IPR would be seriously concerned about evidence of Communist penetration which the committee uncovered in the course of its hearings. Communist penetration, or infiltration into any organization should be occasion for concern if not actual alarm.

Despite these considerations, the attitude of the leading officials of the IPR who testified before this committee reflected equivocation, evasion, hostility, and efforts to mislead the committee. This attitude, it would seem, was expressed not only against the committee, but also against other agencies of the Government concerned with the question of loyalty and national security.

Fourteen individuals<sup>2</sup> connected with the IPR refused to answer questions regarding their own Communist affiliations and the Communist activities of others on grounds of self-incrimination.<sup>3</sup>

Nineteen individuals connected with the IPR who were by the evidence involved in subversive activity, including seven staff members, were either out of the country or otherwise unavailable for committee subpoena, namely: Hilda Austern Ray; Abraham Chapman; Chen Han-seng (in Communist China); Ch'ao-ting Chi (in Communist China); Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley (in Communist China); Lauchlin Currie; Ellen Van Zyll de Jong Atkinson; Israel Epstein (in Communist China); Talitha Gerlach; Michael Greenberg; Y. Y. Hsu (in Communist China); Anthony Jenkinson; Andrew J. Steiger; Ludwig Rajchman and Ella Winter. (Hotzumi Ozaki, Agnes Smedley, Hans Mueller (Asiaticus), and Evans F. Carlson are deceased.)

One witness, Philip O. Keeney, exercised his constitutional privilege in refusing, on grounds of possible self-incrimination, to answer questions dealing with (1) his being the principal speaker at an IPR luncheon (p. 2791); (2) his membership in the IPR (p. 2792); (3) his contributions to the Far Eastern Survey published by the IPR (p. 2792); (4) his service as treasurer of the Committee for a Democratic

<sup>2</sup> These ranged in importance in IPR activity from the executive secretary for 6 years to members whose activity turned up in evidence.

<sup>3</sup> This list is given on p. 149 of this report.

Far Eastern Policy (p. 2792); (5) and his contributions to the Far East Spotlight, official organ of the latter organization. Keeney also refused to answer other questions (p. 2792).

Because he was considered most representative of past IPR activity the first witness in the hearings was Mr. Edward C. Carter, secretary of the American Council from 1926 to 1933, secretary-general of the Institute of Pacific Relations from 1933 to 1946, and executive vice chairman of the American IPR until 1948. Though a voluble witness, generally speaking, yet he demonstrated throughout a very short memory.

Thus only after repeated denials, and after confrontation with documentary evidence, did Carter finally admit that he had very actively intervened in various ways to get an Army Intelligence commission for Frederick V. Field, the former executive secretary of the IPR (pp. 20-29), whose Communist associations were extensive.

Carter, from the outset, refused to concede in the face of evidence, any Communist infiltration in the institute, but as irrefutable documentary evidence came forth, and not until then, did he remember episodes and events that belied his disclaiming assertions.

At first Carter denied that Ch'ao-ting Chi, another Communist, played any part in the IPR Inquiry Series, but when confronted with irrefutable evidence, he tried to belittle Chi's importance on this project (p. 39).<sup>4</sup>

Carter conveniently forgot the alias of Chen Han-seng, IPR writer, until confronted with his own letter to the Soviet IPR apprising them thereof (p. 50).

According to Mr. Carter's initial testimony Alger Hiss, convicted perjurer and IPR trustee, was clearly not much more than a stenographer for Stanley Hornbeck in the State Department (p. 136).<sup>5</sup>

At first he denied any knowledge of the important policy-making article on China by Vladimir Rogoff, appearing in the (Soviet) publication War and the Working Class in 1943. When Carter was confronted with a reference to it in his own correspondence he acknowledged that he did recall it (pp. 128, 145). It would seem it turned out that Carter asked Grajdanzev to translate the Rogoff article in 1943 (exhibit 943).

Subsequently, Mr. Carter tried to make the committee believe that he had convinced David Dubinsky, president of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, that there was a case of mistaken identity in connection with charges made against Harriet Moore (p. 149). In a letter addressed to the committee, Mr. Dubinsky made prompt and vigorous denial (p. 293). In his letter to Dr. Goodwin Watson of Foreign Broadcast Intelligence dated August 24, 1942, E. C. Carter claimed Miss Moore was confused with another, a member of the Communist Party with the same name (p. 2565). When Miss Moore was given the opportunity under oath to affirm or deny her Communist Party membership, she refused to answer on grounds of possible self-incrimination (pp. 2561, 2563).

<sup>4</sup> William L. Holland, executive vice chairman of the IPR later testified that Chi had in fact taken an important part, hearings, p. 1158.

<sup>5</sup> Alger Hiss, Special Assistant to the Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, State Department Biographical Register, 1945, p. 138. Carter later admitted that "Mr. Hiss was Dr. Hornbeck's principal and valued assistant" (exhibit 1383.)

Mr. Carter told the committee concerning the American Peace Mobilization that “\* \* \* the Commies took it over” (p. 22). This organization has been cited as subversive by the Attorney General who indicated its origin was Communist in 1940 (p. 861).

In defense of his failure to realize that Frederick V. Field was a Communist, despite the latter's featured column and frequent articles in the Communist press, Mr. Carter stated that he “was told” that the *New Masses* and the *Daily Worker*, “\* \* \* two militant Communist publications, frequently asked nonparty members to write” (p. 9). In this connection it is worth noting Frederick V. Field's letter to Catherine Porter dated November 9, 1937 (p. 4093). Referring to Theodore Draper, whom he is recommending, Mr. Field says, “The fact that he is on the board of the *New Masses* indicates that he is a Communist” (p. 4093). Frederick V. Field was editor of *New Masses* in 1943 and on the editorial board in 1945 (p. 125).

In the course of the hearings, the question of Carter's promotion of Israel Epstein's *Unfinished Revolution* (p. 125) came up. He was asked what he meant by referring, in a letter, to Israel Epstein as a “special pleader.” He replied, “He was pleading for the Chinese people” (p. 454). Asked again whether he felt that Epstein was “advocating communism” in his book, Mr. Carter insisted that he wanted time to read the book again (p. 455). A few minutes later he admitted that he looked upon Epstein as a special pleader for Communist China (p. 456).

The case of Owen Lattimore, editor of *Pacific Affairs* from 1934 to 1941, who appeared before the committee for 13 days from February 26 to March 21, 1952, is instructive as another example of evasive tactics. At the close of his testimony, the chairman speaking for the entire subcommittee listed certain “patent” and “flagrant” untruths from the record: (1) That Lattimore had conferred with Soviet Ambassador Oumansky after the Stalin-Hitler pact (p. 3677); (2) that he had discussed his publicly announced appointment as adviser to Chiang Kai-shek (p. 3677); (3) that he had never read a Far Eastern Survey article by T. A. Bisson on “feudal” (Nationalist) versus “democratic” (Communist) China (p. 3677); (4) that he did not know Frederick V. Field as a Communist until sometime in the 1940's (p. 3677); (5) that he did not handle Lauchlin Currie's mail at the White House (p. 3678); (6) that he had made no prior arrangements to visit Communist China in 1937 (p. 3678); (7) that he did not know that Ch'ao-tung Chi was a Communist (p. 3678); and (8) that he did not know that a writer named Asiaticus was a Communist (p. 3679).

Testifying in executive session regarding his trip to Yenan, Mr. Lattimore declared that he made no prior arrangements with the Chinese Communists. It was only when confronted with an article he had written for the *London Times*, in which he declared he had sent a letter to the Chinese Communist authorities regarding the trip, that he admitted such a letter had been sent. He could not remember to whom it had been addressed (pp. 3288-3289).

The committee was presented with a curious spectacle when present or former officials of the IPR refused on grounds of self-incrimination to answer questions regarding IPR personnel. This occurred when Frederick V. Field, former secretary of the American Council and its former financial angel, refused to answer questions regarding his deal-



ings with the following: E. Herbert Norman, Ch'ao-ting Chi, Abraham Chapman, Mildred Price, Y. Y. Hsu, Israel Epstein, and Edgar Snow (pp. 4064, 4065, 4067, 4078, 4079, 4080, 4082). It occurred again when Lawrence K. Rosinger of the IPR research staff refused to answer questions regarding William M. Mandel, Harold Isaacs, Daniel Thorner, Alger Hiss, Andrew Roth, Julian R. Friedman, Frederick V. Field, T. A. Bisson, Harry Dexter White, and Mildred Price (pp. 2483, 2486, 2487, 2491-2493, 2508, 2509, 2529). Both John K. Fairbank and William L. Holland discounted the significance of these refusals.<sup>7</sup>

In this connection, it is pertinent to comment upon the testimony of Jerome D. Greene, a founder (p. 3850) of the IPR and a heavy financial contributor to the IPR (p. 1217), a member of the board of trustees (p. 3853) and former chairman of the American Council (p. 1219). He was a former member of the conservative banking firm of Lee Higginson & Co. (p. 1219). Appearing before the committee on March 19, 1952, Mr. Greene was asked whether he had read the evidence before the committee. He brushed this aside with the remark that he had read some of it (p. 3853). He insisted that even in the case of Frederick V. Field there was no sign of any Communist influence having been exerted in the IPR (p. 3856). Mr. Greene declared that an individual could be "extremely leftist" and yet be a competent secretary, clerk, or researcher for the IPR (p. 3861). He stated "positively" that neither Harriet Moore nor Frederick V. Field gave expression to any Communist ideas or Communist purposes (p. 3862).

He dismissed the question of Communist influence and penetration by referring to it as "youthful radicalism" (p. 3857). He discounted with unconcealed contempt the testimony of ex-Communists who had worked hand in hand in the Communist movement with some of the officials and workers in the IPR (pp. 3856, 3858).

Even when Frederick V. Field was resigning from the board of trustees in 1947 after his Communist activities were notorious (pp. 118, 119, 125, 126), the board voted to retain him by a 14-to-1 vote (p. 3920). It seemed that the IPR is ideologically opposed to the use of effective measures against Communists. Mr. Holland, for example, clearly stated that he considered "investigation of the political beliefs or affiliations \* \* \* alien to the traditions of American scholarly research" (p. 3893). Owen Lattimore also echoed this sentiment (p. 2982).

Mr. Carter also appears to have been dubious about the value of loyalty investigations in general. T. A. Bisson acknowledged with gratitude, on April 14, 1943, the "heartening" letters Mr. Carter had secured protesting against the investigation of Bisson's loyalty by the Kerr committee and the Dies committee of the House of Representatives (p. 4242). Bisson was included among the participants at the coming IPR conference. When Mr. Bisson returned from his assignment with the Army in Tokyo, Mr. Holland wrote to him on May 20, 1947, "Welcome back to the land of the loyalty tests" (p. 4225).

It was noted that when Bisson was asked whether, in connection with his employment by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey

<sup>7</sup> This occurred despite the fact that IPR officials, including Lattimore, Fairbank, and Holland expressed themselves as astonished, distressed, and regretting and deploring the conduct of those who refused to answer (pp. 3321, 3733, 3900, 3901).

under General MacArthur, he disclosed that he had written for a Communist publication under a pseudonym and his other Communist associations, he said that he had not done so (p. 4182).

A letter dated December 11, 1933, from Mr. Holland to Lucy Knox of the Moscow Daily News (p. 2720) recited that he was "greatly cheered" by her "charming exposition of latter-day Marxism" which he had shown to a number of people in the New York office of the IPR "to their great enjoyment." A copy of this letter was sent to Owen Lattimore (p. 2720).

In his statement of October 10, 1951, to the committee, Mr. Holland minimized the importance of individuals whose Communist connections have been cited (p. 1218). Yet, in his letter of October 9, 1940, to E. C. Carter, he specifically indicated the following on that list as among the "principal people" he wanted to see on his trip from Berkeley, Calif.: Ellen Van Zyll de Jong, Rosinger, Austern, Greenberg, Roth, Field, Lattimore, and Jaffe (pp. 476-477).

The group at the head of the IPR apparently was consistently opposed to efforts to combat Communist subversion (either in the IPR or in the Government). Mr. Lattimore contemptuously denounced a professor who, when asked, gave information to a congressional source as an "informer" (p. 3553). When Alfred Kohlberg, an IPR member and financial contributor, urged an investigation of Communist influences in the IPR in 1944, his proposal was turned over to a committee headed by Mrs. Stewart, who made no investigation whatever but prepared a refutation to Kohlberg (p. 974).

In the files of the IPR was found a letter from Frederick V. Field to John A. Pollard, coordinator of information, dated April 16, 1942, which stated:

\* \* \* I have yet to hear of a single person alleged by the FBI of having engaged in radical or liberal activities being assisted in obtaining a fair and open examination of the charges against him. \* \* \* I am also disturbed at the apparent fear of those in charge of Federal offices to take any steps whatsoever to terminate this witch hunt against those whose entire record is that of being anti-Fascist. \* \* \* (p. 27).

The Amerasia case, involving a number of persons connected with the IPR,<sup>8</sup> made headlines in the public press in June 1945. Mr. Dennett described that there was "consternation" in the IPR office with "conversation about practically nothing else for several days." Miss Rose Yardunian, secretary of the Washington office of the IPR, and Mrs. Betty Ussachevsky, her associate, were interviewed by the FBI (p. 956).<sup>9</sup>

#### ALIBI OF IGNORANCE

In evaluating the conduct of IPR representatives before this committee, cognizance must be given the plea of ignorance taken by IPR officials, in the course of the hearings, respecting the entire topic of

<sup>8</sup> Philip Jaffe, Andrew Roth, John Stewart Service, and Kate Mitchell.

<sup>9</sup> Subsequently Betty Ussachevsky, secretary of the Washington IPR office, in her letter of December 5, 1945, to Marguerite Ann Stewart, acting administrative secretary, warned that "this time-tailing, midnight raids, et cetera, tapping of wires might get started in an effort to establish a 'Communist ring' and that the IPR would definitely be on the list. \* \* \*" She characterized the entire procedure as "dirty" and charged that "every attempt to distort and twist facts will occur. \* \* \*" She referred to "red herrings that have cluttered up the perspective in the past" as "emerging again." She urged that "we take a belligerent stand if we are dragged in" (pp. 2116-2117).

communism as it affects both the Far East and the IPR. Such a plea of ignorance might be, hypothetically, either real or assumed; and, if real, might denote an unwillingness to learn the facts. The committee finds that this know-nothing attitude is remarkable when expressed by Far East policy makers and alleged scholars dealing with an area where the Communist problem is all-important. Such asserted ignorance is striking in the light of the fact that the Communist movement has existed throughout the world since 1917, has held at least 10 world congresses either under the name of the Communist International or its camouflaged modern version of the Cominform, and has published tons of literature in all principal languages.

Contra the claim of ignorance is the fact that in the September 1936 issue of Pacific Affairs appeared a list of at least 25 outstanding articles and books on the Communist movement in China and the Far East, a fairly extensive bibliography (exhibit 1363).

Consider the case of Owen Lattimore, a consultant for the State Department (p. 1551), Presidential appointee to the Chinese Nationalist Government (p. 3052), Deputy Director of the Office of War Information in the Pacific area (p. 3053), a chief economist of the Pauley mission (p. 3053) and also a member of the Wallace mission to China (p. 3053), editor of Pacific Affairs (exhibit 801), and member of the IPR board of trustees (p. 713). Lattimore has been recognized as an expert by John Carter Vincent (p. 1739), Henry A. Wallace (p. 1390), E. C. Carter (p. 3587), and others. The Library of Congress lists 11 of his books and over 40 magazine articles (pp. 4591, 4592). Yet, here is Lattimore's estimate of his knowledge in this field:

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I was not an expert on communism, even Chinese communism \* \* \* (p. 2916).

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I thought in the 1930's that communism was an extremely important subject in the Far East, but I did not have the same understanding of Communist conspiracy in long-range methods that I have today \* \* \* (p. 2916).

Senator FERGUSON. When did you come to the conclusion, if you ever did, that it is a conspiracy and has in mind installing its form of government worldwide?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I believe that involves questions of relations between the Russian Government, the Comintern, and the Communist Parties of various countries on which I am not versed.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, When did you come to the conclusion?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You said it was different than other governments; it was the only government of its kind.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you come to that conclusion? That is the question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The answer "is that I have not come to that conclusion. May I explain?"

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have not come to that conclusion because I don't know how the structure of international relations is set up as between the Russian Government and the various Communist Parties (p. 3494).

\* \* \* \* \*

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I must confess that one thing that did not enter my mind at that time was the North Korean armed aggression—marching into a country to conquer it by a force of arms and forcibly change the system of government (p. 3031).

\* \* \* \* \*



Mr. LATTIMORE. \* \* \* In those days it is regrettably true that nobody—I mean nobody—had a crystal ball that he could see into the future with unerring success. The nature of Communist infiltration was not known. It never entered our heads to set up a private FBI or security screening to determine the exact political affiliation of IPR staff members or contributors to IPR publications \* \* \* (p. 2982).

It is worth while to compare Mr. Lattimore's present intellectual humility with the assurance displayed by E. C. Carter in a note dated October 19, 1937, addressed to William L. Holland, Owen Lattimore, and other members of the IPR staff (p. 3481). Mr. Carter was giving an account of his discussion with V. E. Motylev and Y. P. Bremman, in Moscow, regarding possible developments in China. He declared, "The sketch made by VEM and YPB in August has thus far been proved both fundamental and accurately prophetic."

Mr. Vincent was asked whether he had ever heard of Georgi Dimitrov, former head of the Communist International, and replied he had never heard of Dimitrov (p. 1957). In further testimony Mr. Vincent declared that he had not been aware until after World War II that communism was a menace (p. 1949). Mr. Vincent admitted that he was not aware of the way Communists worked or of their technique of penetration (p. 1731). He said he did not know of any Communist-front organizations (pp. 2058, 2059). He said he had never read the G-2 report on the Chinese Communist Party, dated July 5, 1945 (pt. 7a), which included among its fundamental conclusions the following:

(1) The "democracy" of the Chinese Communists is Soviet democracy, (2) Chinese Communist movement is part of the international Communist movement, sponsored and guided by Moscow (p. 2305).

A scholar in the field of foreign relations must have some understanding of the degree of the reliability, and the bias, if any, of the individuals with whom he works. Owen Lattimore testified he did not consider as Communists the following individuals connected with the IPR: Alger Hiss (p. 3543), Philip Jaffe (p. 3543), Anthony Jenkinson (p. 3543), Mary Jane and Philip Keeney (p. 3545), James S. Allen (p. 3343), Harriet L. Moore (p. 3547), Lee Pressman (p. 3550), and Andrew Roth (p. 3552). Of this group Mary Jane (p. 2774) and Philip Keeney (p. 2792), James S. Allen (p. 2876), and Harriet L. Moore (p. 2559), refused on grounds of self-incrimination to answer questions regarding Communist affiliation, while Alger Hiss (pp. 497, 2799), Philip Jaffe (pp. 437, 653, 311, 2811), Anthony Jenkinson (p. 658), Lee Pressman (p. 2799; open hearing June 10, 1952), and Andrew Roth (p. 625) have been cited as Communists by witnesses under oath.

We considered the case of John Carter Vincent, formerly in charge of the Far Eastern Section of the State Department (p. 1716); trustee of the IPR (p. 713); and a man who possessed its full confidence (p. 2117). By his own testimony, Mr. Vincent is not a student of communism (p. 1705). Mr. Vincent said he did not know that the Chinese Communists were under the control and domination of the Soviet Union, that he only found out that fact in 1945 (p. 2062). He was asked whether he had read any of the principal works on communism by Stalin, Lenin, or Mao Tse-tung, or the resolutions of the Communist International, which had been listed in Pacific Affairs for September 1936. He replied that he had not done so (pp. 1689, 1690).

There had been evidence that Solomon Adler had been exposed as a Communist agent (p. 434) and that Andrew Roth had been arrested in connection with the Amerasia case (pp. 955, 1748). Vincent was asked about these two individuals and testified that he had no reason to suspect either of them of any Communist slant (pp. 1692, 1748). There was also a report made by the State Department<sup>11</sup> on the IPR which indicated that security matters involving the IPR had come up within the State Department. Vincent testified that he had not read this report (p. 2268).

Julian R. Friedman, labor attaché of the State Department (p. 710), assistant to John Carter Vincent (p. 1730), and a writer for the IPR (p. 711), who represented himself as a political scientist, testified he had no reason to believe when he knew them that either Y. Y. Hsu, Ch'ao-ting Chi, or Mildred Price was a Communist (pp. 4313, 4320, 4321).

William W. Lockwood, former secretary of the American Council, speaking of Frederick V. Field, whose Communist activities were a matter of public knowledge and comment (p. 3874), testified as follows:

So far as the period when I knew him on the staff of the American Council is concerned, I did not know then and do not know now of any Communist associations \* \* \* (p. 3874).

In the case of Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley, Mr. Lockwood declared that he "would not have had any basis for supposing that she was a Communist" (p. 3875).

Bearing on the question of the sincerity of the IPR plea of ignorance and its disclaimers of responsibility for past activity is William L. Holland's defense of the IPR pamphlet *Land of the Soviets* written by staff member Marguerite Ann Stewart, Holland declared:

Since 1942 many things have happened which have changed the climate of American opinion about Russia. If Mrs. Stewart were to write, and the IPR to publish, a book about Russia in 1951, its content and tone would be different from those of a book published 9 years ago (p. 3942).

Was Mr. Holland indicating that the IPR, despite its professions of scholarly objectivity, was not interested in presenting the true facts in regard to the Soviet Union but only in presenting propaganda suitable to a climate which the IPR was creating? Or was he implying that the true facts regarding the U. S. S. R. have changed fundamentally in the past 9 years? Mr. Holland insisted that the Stewart pamphlet was not slanted favorably to the Soviets, and yet he seemed to admit the justice of criticism made as to its pro-Soviet bias by declaring that it would not now be published. Although the pamphlet carried the IPR imprimatur clearly on its title page, Mr. Holland was willing to accept Mrs. Stewart's claim that the pamphlet represented no viewpoint but her own" (p. 3942).

#### OPERATION IPR

At the very outset of the hearings, the chairman stated that the committee was aware of the fact—

that the board of trustees of the institute had been studded with personalities of such respectability, and of such preeminence of capitalistic achievement, that the very presence of their names on a letterhead might have put at rest all suspicion

<sup>11</sup> A copy of this was denied to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

of intrigue or subversive influence. The committee was also aware of the possibility that this aggregation of prominent individuals may have been used as a facade for Communists operating shrewdly behind the scenes. It has been done before (p. 3).

Defending the IPR against allegations of Communist control, William L. Holland, executive vice chairman, declared:

The American institute is governed by a board of about 60 trustees who are elected by the membership and who in turn elect the officers and members of the executive committee which supervises the work of the staff (p. 1216).

Then Mr. Holland cited a long list of distinguished names of those who had been chairmen of the Pacific Council, and of the executive committee. In addition, he listed "20 distinguished Americans who have actively participated in the work of the American Institute of Pacific Relations" (p. 1220). He declared that the American Institute of Pacific Relations is a "nonprofit, nonpartisan organization composed of about 1,100 businessmen, scholars, teachers, journalists, government officials, community leaders, and others interested in contemporary far eastern problems" (p. 1216). The question is whether this distinguished group really ran the Institute of Pacific Relations or whether it simply served as a fig leaf for a small, conscious, purposeful group of Communists and pro-Communists inside. Mr. Holland has pleaded that as the executive officer of the IPR, he had "served many masters" (p. 1214). The subcommittee was interested in determining who these masters actually were.

In private conversation IPR officials looked upon their eminent sponsors primarily as sources of revenue, as indicated by some of their intimate correspondence. For example, speaking of some of the wealthy IPR contributors and prospects, Mr. Carter wrote to Frederick V. Field on December 3, 1936—

that we drop the idea at this time of roping in Colonel Stimson, but that at the right time, if he has not already contributed, you make a financial appeal to him (p. 4054).

Kathleen Barnes, writing to Frederick V. Field on August 21, 1937, declared:

Anything that can be turned out in written form or spoken will be of value both to dissemination of fairly correct information and to enhancing people's respect for the IPR; also it may be hoped to cause them to loosen the strings of their money bags (p. 2611).

On January 16, 1942, Roger S. Greene, an IPR writer and an official of Peking Union Medical College in China, wrote to William W. Lockwood, complaining about the method of selecting the board of trustees. He said:

Before the next annual meeting—that is the 1943 meeting—will you not consider changing the method of submitting nominations to the board of trustees of the IPR by presenting a larger number of vacancies to be filled? The present system gives the members no chance to express their preference except by a highly organized electioneering process which few, if any, members would care to undertake (p. 3870).

He objected particularly to the lack of opportunity to select an alternate to Frederick V. Field (p. 3870). Mr. Lockwood replied on January 20, 1942, agreeing with Mr. Greene that "the present method is not very satisfactory." He said some people feel that "it looks too much like a perfunctory 'railroading' job" (p. 3871).



When Jerome D. Greene was a witness before the subcommittee, the following interrogation took place:

Mr. MORRIS. You served on the nominating committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations in the year 1941, did you not, Mr. Greene?

Mr. GREENE. Probably; if that says so.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that the last time you served?

Mr. GREENE. I think so; yes. It must have been.

Mr. MORRIS. I am going to offer you this, which is a list of staff members and the make-up of the nominating committee in 1941, Mr. Greene.

The nominating committee in 1941 was made up of Miss Harriet Moore, chairman; Frederick V. Field; and you, Jerome D. Greene. We also have ex officio Edward C. Carter and Ray Lyman Wilbur. Can you recall that particular meeting, Mr. Greene?

Mr. GREENE. No; I certainly cannot. I must have been very dependent on my colleagues to suggest names of people that I didn't know. Some of them I did know.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the function of the nominating committee to your recollection?

Mr. GREENE. It was to prepare a list of nominations for action by the trustees.

Mr. MORRIS. Does this not indicate that Miss Moore, Mr. Field, and yourself made up a list of officers to serve?

Mr. GREENE. I think so; yes. I don't know how far Mr. Carter and Mr. Wilbur made suggestions.

Mr. MORRIS. Were the ex officio members actually present, do you know?

Mr. GREENE. I suppose so; but I don't know that Dr. Wilbur was. I suppose Carter must have been; I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. You cannot recall this particular meeting?

Mr. GREENE. I don't recall it particularly; no. These things are pretty formal things. A list of names is gotten together. Somebody draws up a list. Then somebody makes suggestions of additions or omissions. Then we agree, and the thing is done. That was 11 years ago. I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Greene, we have had testimony from several witnesses that both Miss Moore and Mr. Field were Communists. We brought both Miss Moore and Mr. Field down to answer the charges, and both of them elected to refuse to answer the question whether or not they had been Communists, on the grounds that their answer would incriminate them.

Mr. GREENE. I am ashamed of them for doing so (p. 3858).

This clearly showed the extent to which Miss Moore and Field were in a position of control of who were going to be officers of the IPR in the forthcoming year.

John Carter Vincent, Chief of the China Division of the State Department, described the circumstances surrounding his membership on the board of trustees in 1945 (p. 1832). He testified that he made no financial contribution to the American Council in that year (p. 1832). He was listed as a complimentary member (p. 1832). Asked why he thought he was chosen for the post, he declared it was likely that the organization "would like to have in it somebody from the State Department" (p. 2097). Mr. Vincent never asked what he was supposed to do on the board (p. 2097). His understanding was that "many people were trustees who never took any active part in the IPR trusteeship meetings" (p. 2097). He didn't even know whether the trustees held meetings (p. 2097). He declared he had never talked to anybody about a trustee meeting. He had no notion as to the size of the board of trustees (p. 2097). He assumed that General Marshall, a trustee in 1949 "didn't go to trusteeship meetings." He declared "from the character of the names on there, I would have assumed that not all of the trustees went to the meetings, but I don't know" (p. 2098). Mr. Vincent admitted that he had accepted the trusteeship with "no knowledge as to what the duties were and without inquiring of anybody of what the duties would be" (p. 2098).

He performed no duties as a member of the board of trustees of IPR. Nor had he read a confidential State Department report on the IPR before he accepted as a trustee (p. 2100). Asked whether it was apparently the IPR's aim to get big names, Mr. Vincent replied that was his assumption. Mr. Vincent was asked whether as a trustee he had anything to do with IPR policy. He said that he did not. He indicated he thought that the presence of General Marshall, Dr. Hornbeck, Henry Luce, and Henry Grady on the board was intended to add prestige to the organization (pp. 1845-1846). At the same time, however, Vincent was very active on the inside of the IPR. He was one of their trusted members (p. 2117).

John K. Fairbank, of Harvard University, a member of the board of trustees from 1944 to the present time, declared "There were 60 trustees scattered around the country and we met maybe once a year (p. 3749). He added that "most of the work of the IPR was done by the people who were on committees and who donated their time, people like research committees and others who were handling the publication," (p. 3750). He mentioned the fact that Edgar J. Tarr, of Canada, had once been the head man of the IPR. However, he said that Mr. Tarr did not move to New York at that time (p. 3751). Although first elected on the board of trustees on April 11, 1944, Mr. Fairbank admitted "no active participation in any trustee activities" (p. 3752).

Prof. David N. Rowe, of Yale University, became a member of the board of trustees on February 18, 1947, remaining until 1950 when he resigned. He did not attend meetings more than once a year (p. 3978). It was Mr. Rowe's opinion that the general membership of the IPR "has no influence at all" (p. 3981). As far as the board of trustees is concerned, he believed that people who were not insiders "have no real say in the American (council) policy" (p. 3981). "Important decisions," he said, "are always in the hands of an executive committee and the committee will operate so as to screen out the policy possibilities and then the results of the committee activity will be presented to the trustees and all boards of trustees tend to take on a rubber-stamp character" (pp. 3981-3982). Mr. Rowe described his experience at a meeting of the board of trustees of the American council in connection with the selection of an executive secretary to succeed Mr. Carter. It was explained to him that this was in the hands of the executive committee or a special committee and it was not advisable to mention the names of the various candidates (p. 3982).

Unknown to himself, Henry A. Wallace was placed on the board of trustees in 1946. He never attended any meetings (p. 1313).

The practice of using big names as a drawing card is indicated in the minutes of a meeting of the Washington IPR advisory committee held at the Lattimore home on March 25, 1946. The minutes show the intention—

That top sponsorship be provided by inviting Mr. Sumner Welles to be chairman of the Washington membership appeal; and that other leading foreign affairs personnel, in and out of the Government, be asked to lend their names and support also (p. 2248).

Considering the fact that in 1942 members of the board of trustees included individuals from Chicago, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Seattle, southern California, San Francisco, Cleveland, and other distant

points, it is understandable why attendance could not be regular or numerous. Also to be noted is the fact that members of the board like Frederick V. Field, Len DeCaux and Harriet L. Moore were ready at hand in either New York or Washington. Others who were easily available included Lauchlin Currie, E. C. Carter, and Owen Lattimore.

To what extent did the officials of the IPR alert the members of the board of trustees to the dangers of Communist infiltration? The fact is that members of the board were actually misled on this matter. On the question of the resignation of Frederick V. Field to take a position as executive secretary of the American Peace Mobilization (a Communist front formed during the Stalin-Hitler pact), Mr. Carter wrote as follows on October 1, 1940:

I have been wondering how your resignation and your new job can be announced both constructively to the board and membership of the American council, and most constructively for the purposes of you yourself and your new enterprise.

There is much in your new program that should appeal to the vast majority of the members of the American council. I wonder whether it isn't better for Jessup or me to consider an announcement which will put your new work in its appropriate setting instead of having the American council members one by one get garbled, prejudiced, and hostile accounts (p. 4074).

Mr. Carter therefore suggested that Field himself draft the announcement for the IPR, according to the minutes of the executive committee of the American council dated September 18, 1940, which records that—

Mr. Field indicated that he had been called to the secretaryship of a new society which was being created to strengthen the forces of democracy during the coming critical years (p. 123).

Present at this meeting were Philip C. Jessup, chairman, and Edward C. Carter.

When asked to explain under oath, his connection with the American Peace Mobilization, Mr. Field refused to answer on grounds of self-incrimination (p. 116).

Numerous instances have been cited in which information was withheld from the board of trustees. Mr. Lattimore testified that he did not report to the board regarding his conferences in Moscow in 1936. E. C. Carter's letter to W. L. Holland dated October 19, 1937, giving a report of the Moscow proceedings, declares that—

the Soviet council this year took care of all my expenses from the time I arrived in Vladivostok until I reached Moscow, and thus in fact added several hundred dollars to the Pacific council's income, though this item will not show in our books (p. 3483).

The actual way in which the board of trustees and the executive committee operated is disclosed by the incidents surrounding the charges of Communist influence brought by Alfred Kohlberg in 1944. Raymond Dennett, former secretary of the American Council of the IPR, testified there never had been any thorough investigation of Mr. Kohlberg's charges (p. 974). He said an answer to these charges had been prepared by Marguerite Ann Stewart, author of the IPR pamphlet, *Land of the Soviets*, which had been withdrawn from circulation (pp. 2653, 2654).

Mrs. Stewart was not herself a member of the board of trustees or of the executive committee. It was Mr. Dennett's opinion that she was not a person capable of making an objective investigation of the charges. Her answer to the Kohlberg charges was sent out to mem-



bers of the board of trustees without any mention of the name of Mrs. Stewart who had prepared it (pp. 974-977).<sup>12</sup> Prof. Colegrove, a one-time member of the IPR, characterized the investigation as a whitewash (p. 923).

The circumstances surrounding the publication of the pamphlet *Our Job in the Pacific* by Henry A. Wallace furnish another interesting example of the operation of the machine behind the board of trustees and the executive committee. Mr. Raymond Dennett testified that there was considerable opposition in the executive committee to the publication of the pamphlet since it was felt that Mr. Wallace was too controversial a figure. Mr. Dennett disclosed, however, that the principal advocate of the publication of the pamphlet was Frederick V. Field (p. 953). Mr. Field was at that time a member of the executive committee of about 10 or 11 members. His opinion was decisive, and it was agreed that the pamphlet was to be published (p. 953). Field's position at that time as a columnist for the *Daily Worker* was a matter of public record (p. 954).

Mr. Frederick V. Field declared that Mr. Wallace's pamphlet compared favorably with the writings of Earl Browder, general secretary of the Communist Party (p. 1308).<sup>13</sup>

The circumstances surrounding Mr. Edward C. Carter's promotion of Israel Epstein's book *The Unfinished Revolution* furnish another interesting example of what went on without the knowledge or approval of the board of trustees. In a letter dated June 12, 1947, Mr. Carter urged that the publishers—

devise some means of getting it read at an early date, among others by Secretary of State George Marshall, Senators Vandenberg, Morse, and Ives, John Foster Dulles, and John Carter Vincent of the State Department (p. 3738).

Mr. Fairbank characterized this book as "based on the hand-out stuff from the Chinese Communists." He said, "It quotes time after time the Chinese Communist radio and all their phony statistics \* \* \*" (p. 3739). He characterized the book as obviously pro-Communist (p. 3741). Mr. Fairbank declared that he was a member of the board of trustees at the time and that he was not consulted (p. 3742).

Since it is obvious that neither the long list of eminent trustees nor the hundreds of impressive financial contributors controlled the IPR, the question naturally arises who did control the organization. Some light on this question is furnished by the testimony of Mr. David E. Rowe, of Yale University, who was a member of the IPR board of trustees. He described what happened at an interim IPR conference at Atlantic City in 1945.<sup>14</sup> This was after Field's name appeared as a columnist in the *Daily Worker* (p. 126).

When Lawrence K. Rosinger was asked whether there was a Communist caucus preceding the 1949 conference at New Delhi, India, he claimed his privilege under the fifth amendment to the Constitution (p. 2497).

<sup>12</sup> In the summer of 1945 according to testimony Mrs. Stewart had attended one of the two founding meetings of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, a Communist-controlled organization (p. 4601).

<sup>13</sup> The pamphlet won the praise of Mr. Field in his *Daily Worker* guest column of June 24, 1944, p. 7 (p. 1089).

<sup>14</sup> " \* \* \* there was a regular caucus system. I found myself very quickly in a rather embarrassing position. I had been invited to be a member of the American delegation by Mr. Carter \* \* \* .  
"At that time he asked me whether I would have any objections to Mr. Frederick V. Field being a member of the American delegation \* \* \* but when I got to Atlantic City I found Mr. Field was not only a member of the American delegation, but he was the spokesman for the delegation.

"In these caucuses the point of view would be put up, Field would make the initial pronouncement at the open meetings, and then the American members were supposed to speak up in support" (p. 3976).

Another instance showing who were the actual brain trusters of the IPR is furnished by Mr. Dennett's testimony regarding a meeting of the American delegation of the IPR on October 28, 1944 (p. 990). Despite the fact that Mr. Jessup warned at the outset of this meeting that it was not called for the purpose of "formulating a party line for the delegation," nevertheless it was clearly evident that the purpose was to establish a definite consensus for the group (p. 991). At this meeting Lattimore took the floor at least nine times as against Field's three times and Frank V. Coe's three times (pp. 991, 992). Considerable criticism was expressed because T. A. Bisson, a member of the international secretariat, was permitted to speak (p. 995). He had aroused the opposition of the Chinese delegation by his article in 1943 condemning the Chinese Nationalists as feudal. Included among the American delegates to this conference were Len De Caux and Frederick V. Field (p. 995). Lawrence K. Rosinger, was a member of the secretariat at the conference (p. 997). Another member of the secretariat was Rose Yardumian (recently connected with a newspaper in Communist China) (p. 997). Frank V. Coe (p. 995), Owen Lattimore (p. 996), and John Carter Vincent (p. 996) were others in the group.

The memorandum of this preliminary meeting of the American delegation disclosed the following plans for the conference: (1) "A general statement by PCJ (Philip C. Jessup) of the nature of IPR conferences, and the purpose of this meeting." While the memorandum stated that there was no effort to establish a "line" to be taken by the American delegation, it did say that the delegation sought to discover whether "we can agree on a minimum American position which we will maintain if pushed into any corners by other delegations." (2) "A brief statement by Fred Field drawn from past conferences \* \* \*." (3) "Supporting comment by WCJ (W. C. Johnstone) on the basis of his attendance at Atlantic City \* \* \*." or (4) "PCJ, FVF or Owen Lattimore might be asked to give a brief statement of the internal situation, pointing out the line taken by the Chinese at Atlantic City, and saying that we have to be prepared to deal with this \* \* \*." (p. 4123). The memorandum, which was drawn up by Mr. Dennett, proposed that "Mrs. Stewart and Miss Farley might be called upon to lead off in a provocative manner" in the event that the discussion lagged (p. 4124).

A memorandum from E. C. Carter to William L. Holland dated June 4, 1940, during the period of the Stalin-Hitler pact further discloses where the real sources of leadership lay in the IPR. The memorandum declared:

Your letter of May 27 asking whether Field and I have been thinking of the effect on the program of the IPR of the United States entry into the war, I shall share with him and my colleagues of the secretariat. Field alone can speak for the American council (p. 3922).

A memorandum dated November 30, 1942 (p. 425), with the signature of William W. Lockwood, showed that Currie was slated to be head of the program committee at the conference at Mont Tremblant, with Field as an alternate. Mr. Lockwood wrote to Mr. Carter: "\* \* \* I understand you have Field in mind as program committee secretary, which would be excellent" (p. 426). Len De Caux was listed as the proposed head of the publications committee at the 1942 conference (p. 426), Harriet Moore and Frank Coe were also included (pp. 443, 444).

Another factor in considering the question of actual control of the IPR is the composition of the staff. Mr. Raymond Dennett pointed out that the IPR had a contract with the United Office and Professional Workers of America, local 18.<sup>15</sup> It should be noted that in the working agreement signed by the Book and Magazine Guild, local 18, UOPWA had a preferential hiring clause (p. 942).

Mr. Harvey M. Matusow, a former member of the Communist Party, testified before this committee that he had been a member of the United Office and Professional Workers, that it was controlled by the Communist Party and that its policy was to furnish Communist personnel under this clause to organizations where the party thought it would be expedient (p. 3841).

It was Mr. Dennett's opinion that Mr. Field was the man chiefly responsible for initiating the negotiations with local 18 (p. 947). Mr. Field's letter to Mr. Carter, dated April 25, 1939, corroborates this point. Mr. Field stated that he proposed to secure—

the approval of the executive committee, in addition, of certain other trustees, to any decision which I shall be inclined to recommend (p. 4111).

He proposed to recommend approval of the union contract. The proposal was carried through despite objections from members of the board and the executive committee, as disclosed in a letter dated April 29, 1939, from Mr. Carter to Mr. Field, reading in part as follows:

I was quite surprised for example to learn from Lockwood the evening I left New York that he anticipated difficulty with the board \* \* \*. Lockwood's remark was the first hint I had had that you had not been carrying the majority of your colleagues on the executive committee with you concurrently with the efforts of your immediate colleagues on the staff to get a majority of the staff to join the union (p. 4130).

Mr. Dennett was also very dubious about the advisability of the union contract because he felt there might be some writers whom he would not want to hire (p. 948).

Shortly a difficulty arose which sharply challenged the authority of the duly constituted officials of the IPR. Mr. Dennett had been planning to appoint Mrs. Maxwell S. Stewart as his assistant secretary (p. 940). However, she was not satisfactory to the executive committee and they opposed her appointment. The shop committee of the union sent a communication to the executive committee demanding that Mrs. Stewart's appointment be approved. "This seemed to me," said Mr. Dennett, "to put pretty clearly the question who was running the organization, the staff or the executive committee, and in order to clear the air I submitted my resignation at that time" (p. 940). Throughout the entire dispute Mr. Field consistently upheld the union (p. 940). The incident bears on the important question of the role of the staff in the actual conduct of the affairs of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Because of his distrust of the staff, Mr. Dennett decided to establish a series of outside committees, a research advisory committee and a publications committee (p. 939). On one of these he appointed Mr. Rowe, who was later dropped for unexplained reasons. Mr. Dennett pointed out that the executive committee during the period prior to his appointment had not been a particularly active group

<sup>15</sup> On February 14, 1950, the executive board of the Congress of Industrial Organization expelled this union on the ground that " \* \* \* the policies and activities of the United Office and Professional Workers of America are consistently directed toward the achievement of the program and the purposes of the Communist Party \* \* \*" (p. 947).



and that he had had a distinct impression "that the staff had had a good deal more to do with the determination of policy than is generally accepted" (p. 941). Mr. Dennett decided to refer more and more important matters to the executive committee and to his advisory committee. This restricted the functions of the staff to such an extent that they tried to get rid of Mr. Dennett, and ultimately they succeeded (p. 948).

Things reached a pass at one point where Mr. Dennett had to go to one of the members of the executive committee to dictate a memorandum to that committee, because he feared that his memorandum would reach the union before it got into the United States mails (p. 948).

Asked whether he thought the staff represented an objective and scholarly group of research workers. Mr. Dennett replied as follows:

It was my feeling that in regard to periodical material and pamphlet material that there was a tendency on the part of the staff to pick people as authors and to submit their manuscripts to other writers for critical comment who by and large tended to agree with the point of view of the staff prior to the selection of either the authors or the readers of the manuscript, and that this tended over the whole period to give less than a completely objective picture, \* \* \* (p. 948).

Mr. Dennett then gave another example of the lack of staff objectivity. He had written an article for the far eastern survey dealing with the similarity of some of the Czarist treaties with the Sino-Soviet treaties of 1945 and had shown that they were merely examples of Soviet imperialism. He had discovered that there were 14 or 15 identical articles in the Czarist and Soviet treaties. His point of view was the subject of considerable criticism by members of the staff who strongly objected to any reference to Soviet imperialism (p. 949). It was Mr. Dennett's opinion that the staff writers were definitely biased against the Chinese Nationalist Government and in favor of the Soviet Union. Among these staff writers he listed Mrs. Stewart, Miriam Farley, and Lawrence Salisbury (p. 950).

Mr. Rowe tended to corroborate Mr. Dennett's point of view. He said that he believed that the staff of the institute was "by and large fundamentally opposed to most of the things I stood for in the Far East" (p. 3970).

A similar point of view was expressed in a letter of Roger S. Greene to Mr. Lockwood dated January 16, 1942, in which he declared:

"When Chinese of a not particularly conservative type think that too many of the IPR staff are too much under Russian-Soviet influence, as I know they do, it would appear to be time to be more cautious" (p. 3870).

Mr. Greene here specifically refers to "the tendency to follow a party line and to flop suddenly from one side to another in accordance with a party directive" (p. 3870).

The testimony shows that the bulk of the membership of the IPR, as well as the membership of the board of trustees, were inactive and "passive," and obviously without any influence over the conduct of the organization and its affairs. The testimony, taken in its entirety, also reveals that there was a relatively small core of active members who carried the main burden of IPR activities and who, most of the time at any rate, directed its administration and policies.

The nominal or formal relations to the IPR of the individuals who made up this inner, active core were varied. Some of them, like Edward C. Carter, William L. Holland, Owen Lattimore, Frederick

V. Field, and Harriet L. Moore (Mrs. Gelfan), had active official relations with the IPR—though with changing posts and titles—from the early years of its existence. Others, like Daniel Thorner, Julian R. Friedman, Lawrence Rosinger, Andrew Grajdanzev, Michael Greenberg, or T. A. Bisson served on the IPR staff for a certain period, and before or after that went to universities on fellowships or appointments secured with IPR help, worked on IPR research, or in the editing of IPR publications, or held jobs elsewhere while continuing to contribute to IPR magazines or publications programs, and to collaborate actively with members of the IPR staff. Still others, like Guenther Stein, Edgar Snow, or John K. Fairbank, were never employees of the IPR, but were frequent contributors to IPR publications, in close touch with IPR staff members, or active on the executive, nominating, or other committees (though by no means all of the members of these committees were active). At an early stage in the hearings, the standard for determining active membership was defined roughly as follows:

Mr. MORRIS. I am going to read to you a list of names, which names turn up with great frequency in the files. This list has been compiled by the staff here as a condensation of many people, of the many names, who are interested in the institute.

I am going to read a name, and \* \* \* I will ask you \* \* \* if they were connected with the institute in any way.

Mr. CARTER. Well, do you mean if I wrote a letter to John Smith in Timbuktu?

Mr. MORRIS. No. The standard is this, Mr. Carter: They are either members of the staff, they were contributors to IPR publications, they were members of the executive board of trustees, or they performed substantial services in addition to their membership in the IPR (p. 69).

The names are given in the succeeding pages.

This active inner core of the IPR is a phenomenon of critical importance for an understanding of the IPR's nature and history. It is abundantly evident from the testimony and exhibits of the hearings that the main body of IPR activities constituted a concrete social grouping in a sense much more intimate than is usual in any ordinary business, publication, or research organization. The hundreds of letters and memoranda which were introduced in evidence show that the members of the inner core were a kind of ideological family. They were personally friendly, seeing each other, dining together, traveling together, visiting each other's houses and lending each other their apartments, corresponding actively not only about business but also about personal affairs, praising each other's writings, getting each other jobs and fellowships and governmental appointments, disputing occasionally but almost always within the framework of a shared set of basic ideas and objectives.

The testimony shows that an individual did not become a member of this active inner core merely by lending his name as a passive trustee or committee member, by passively making a financial contribution, or even the mere writing of an article or a book for IPR publication. Mr. Holland asks that the IPR and its activities be characterized and judged by his selective lists of "prominent persons" who have been members and IPR writers, and by complete lists of the executive committee and other committees.<sup>17</sup> Messrs. Greene, Lockwood, Carter, and others make similar proposals, and

<sup>17</sup> Cf. his statement, hearings, pp. 1212 ff.

refer frequently to eminent and respected names among past or present trustees. But in seeking to understand the real nature of the IPR and its activities, and of its actual effect on public opinion and governmental policy, such criteria do not prove illuminating.

Many prominent Americans, such as Messrs. Henry F. Grady (president, American President Lines, Ltd.), Paul G. Hoffman (president, Studebaker Corp.), Henry R. Luce (editor and publisher, Time, Life, and Fortune), or Juan Trippe (president, Pan-American Airways) have been members at one time or another of the IPR board of trustees.<sup>18</sup> But the long record of the hearings gives no indication of their active participation in the affairs of the organization. The name of Guenther Stein, member of the Sorge Soviet espionage network (pp. 353ff., 449ff.) and in 1950 expelled from France for espionage (p. 400), nowhere appears on formal listings of IPR trustees, employees or committee members. Nevertheless, he wrote at least 18 articles for IPR publications, spread over the years 1936-47 (p. 376); acted during the war as Chungking correspondent of the IPR (pp. 268-269, exhibit 65); was praised by Owen Lattimore (while Mr. Lattimore was editor of Pacific Affairs) as "by long odds<sup>7</sup> the best economic journalist in the Far East" (pp. 385-386, exhibit 87); and was in frequent and close communication with many leading members of the IPR family.<sup>19</sup> It seems reasonable to conclude that the nature of the IPR and the public results of its activities were more significantly affected by an individual like Guenther Stein than by any number of passive trustees who may or may not have attended the pro forma yearly meeting of the board.

The existence within the formal structure of an organization or public association of a board of trustees or directors or variously named public committees that are passive with relation to the organization, and that take little de facto part in the organization's activities is a well known and recognized fact of contemporary organizational life. In the case of the IPR, this passive relationship must be stressed because the description of the political nature of the IPR in terms of the eminent but passive associates suggested by certain of the witnesses is at variance with the facts which emerge from the testimony and evidence. In reality, the presence on the IPR roster of the names of such eminent but passive individuals served as a respectable and impressive screen behind which the active inner core of IPR staff, members, and friends was able to carry on virtually unchecked and unsupervised such activities as they might from time to time determine.<sup>20</sup>

One additional feature of the internal structure of the IPR requires clarification. Testimony already quoted from Mr. Holland<sup>21</sup> ex-

<sup>18</sup> Names taken from the 1946 list of trustees printed in *Windows on the Pacific*, the biennial report for the years 1944-46 of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., pp. 4, 5.

<sup>19</sup> The appropriateness of the word "family" to describe the active IPR group was recognized by those who belonged to it. In a letter to E. C. Carter, dated June 7, 1940 (p. 1982, exhibit 378), Owen Lattimore discusses the problem of securing a reviewer for a book, and proposes: "Do you know what I think would be an excellent idea, if you could persuade him to do it? Get Field to write the review. It's a little bit in the family, of course \* \* \*"

<sup>20</sup> The technique is typical of that employed by the Communists in defending a Communist front. During recent years the protest "Such-and-such an organization could not have been a Communist front because X and Y and Z (naming highly respectable persons) were also members!" has become an almost automatic response by those who are unwilling or unable to look the facts of political life in the face. The truth is that it is part of the very essence of a successful Communist front to surround the names of Communists and pro-Communists with a protective screening of publicly acceptable names, and thereby to pervert the Communists concerned in the given organization to go about their business in a seemingly legitimate and respectable way which thus deceives not only the public but their own duped associates.

<sup>21</sup> See p. 1215 of the report.



plains that the IPR is both a national and an international organization. The international organization is a loose association of 10 national bodies (the number has varied somewhat from time to time) formally represented in a "Pacific Council" and administered by an "international secretariat." Each national body is governed, formally, by its own national council, and is relatively autonomous.

A scrutiny of the record of these hearings shows that ordinarily, when the term "the IPR" is employed, the reference covers either the American IPR or the international IPR (that is, either the "American Council" or the "Pacific Council"), or both. In other words, little distinction is ordinarily made between the activities carried on in the name of the international IPR by or through its permanent secretariat and those carried on in the name of the American IPR. A few witnesses occasionally insist on the distinction between the international and national activities, as a rule in order to explain their professed ignorance on some point which has been raised in questioning (pp. 1184, 1185). In general, however, the seeming looseness of this terminology is justified.

In normal practice—except for some phases of the preparation and conduct of the large biennial international conferences—the distinction between the activities of the American IPR and of the international secretariat of the IPR was largely one of administrative and financial convenience. After the earliest period, the international secretariat and the American staff occupied the same physical premises. The sources of funds were for the most part the same (pp. 1217, 1236–1238).<sup>22</sup> The personnel of the two staffs were in continuous collaboration, and were more or less interchangeable. Mr. Holland himself, for example, is at the present time secretary-general of the international IPR and executive vice chairman of the American IPR (p. 1139). In listing publications, the Biennial Reports of the American Council usually did not bother to distinguish books or pamphlets published nominally by the American Council from those published by the international secretariat.<sup>23</sup>

The overlapping and interlocking of the Pacific (international) and American Councils of the IPR are repeatedly illustrated in the Record. Exhibit No. 582 (pp. 3917–3918), for example, includes a memorandum dated January 16, 1940, from "FVF" to "ECC." The former initials are presumably those of Frederick V. Field, at that time the principal officer of the American Council; the latter, those of Edward C. Carter, at that time the principal officer of the international secretariat. The memorandum discusses the question of who is to "list Wittfogel on his staff." The problem is clearly regarded as a minor administrative shuffle:

I shall be very glad, if you drop Wittfogel from the Pacific Council staff, to write him a letter telling him that he can henceforth \* \* \* regard himself as a research fellow of the American Council.

Exhibit No. 590 (pp. 3928–3929) consists of a letter, evidently written by Mr. Carter, which refers to "Mrs. Kathleen Barnes, who serves jointly on the staff of the American and Pacific Councils." In general, the staff of the American and Pacific Councils was easily

<sup>22</sup> United States sources contributed 77 percent of the total income of the international IPR, 87 percent of the total subsidy (p. 1217).

<sup>23</sup> Cf., e. g., *Windows on the Pacific*, pp. 48–50, and *IPR in Wartime*, pp. 45–48.

interchangeable. Mr. Carter himself began in 1925 as honorary and then executive secretary of the American IPR.

Then in 1933 I think it was I became secretary-general of what was called the Pacific Council \* \* \* Then in 1946 I retired as secretary general of the international organization and became executive vice chairman of the American section, the American IPR, which position I held until roughly, 2½ years ago when I retired. Since then I have been one of 50 trustees of American IPR (p. 6).

The record shows that it was the same group which has been referred to as "the active, inner core" or "the IPR family" which controlled and carried on the principal activities of both the international secretariat (of the Pacific Council) and of the American IPR. Occasionally the administrative distinction has practical or political significance. For example, the international secretariat was expected to undertake the publication of certain articles and books which developed out of the activities of national councils other than the American Council, even though these might not be in accord with the views of the inner core which directed the activities of the American Council. The magazine *Pacific Affairs* was formally the organ of the Pacific Council,<sup>24</sup> whereas *Far Eastern Survey* was the organ of the American Council. The non-American national councils expected, as a consequence, some voice for themselves and their members in *Pacific Affairs*. Certain clashes that arose out of the administrative distinction between the Pacific and American Councils are indicated in the record, and some that have a special significance are discussed elsewhere in this report.<sup>25</sup> In practice, these clashes seem to have been surprisingly infrequent. The reason for this probably lies in the fact that the same group was in effective control of both councils. In conducting the affairs of the Pacific Council, it had to take into account to a certain extent the opinions and occasional objections of the non-American councils, but these never seem to have reached a point which threatened the control equilibrium.

#### FREDERICK VANDERBILT FIELD

Frederick Vanderbilt Field concentrated within himself a varied and decisive influence within the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Prior to his assuming the role of executive secretary of the American Peace Mobilization, which picketed the White House in 1941, Field was a member of the Communist Party for a number of years, according to the testimony of witnesses before the committee (pp. 268, 415, 490, 517-519, 2804, 3844, 4180). However, IPR officials have testified that they were not aware of this fact. Mr. Holland has endeavored to convince the committee that it was only after Field resigned his institute job "that he began to engage in outside pro-Communist activity" (p. 1227).

In Communist ranks Field was known under an alias (p. 520). In the higher echelons of the party he was looked upon as the political commissar on far eastern matters (p. 415). When questioned regard-

<sup>24</sup> *Pacific Affairs* was, however, published only in English and from and only from New York. Cf. Lattimore testimony, p. 2913.

<sup>25</sup> The principal clashes emerging from the record seem to have been those: (1) With the Japanese Council, over elements of the anti-Japanese position which the international IPR took in relation to the Sino-Japanese War; (2) with the Chinese Council, over the pro-Chinese Communist and anti-Nationalist position of the IPR; (3) with the British Council (the Royal Institute of International Affairs), over the treatment of certain books and articles. The relation of the international secretariat and of the inner core to the Soviet IPR was, however, of a different order, and will be discussed elsewhere in this report. (Cf. pp. 450, 994, 3975, 3977, 3981.)

ing his Communist affiliations, Field refused to answer on the ground that it might incriminate him (p. 118).

In the course of the hearings the question was raised why Field decided in 1940 to come out openly associated with an organization completely identified with the Communist Party (p. 527). Mr. Budenz explained that it was felt by the party, that in the event of difficulties with the Government, during the period of the Stalin-Hitler pact, there would be some reluctance in prosecuting a man of Field's great wealth and social standing (p. 527).

Despite the clearly Communist nature of the American Peace Mobilization, the staff of the American Council stood loyally by Field and urged the executive committee to have him "continue as secretary of the council" (p. 122). As chairman of the American Council Mr. Jessup endorsed Mr. Field's services and recommended that he continue as staff adviser (p. 122).

Thereafter Field was open in his associations with the Communist Party. On December 16, 1941, he published an article under his own name in the Communist weekly, *New Masses*, and continued with numerous articles thereafter (p. 125). By 1944 his name began to appear as the author of articles in the *Daily Worker* and *Political Affairs*, a Communist monthly magazine (p. 126). In 1945 he was listed as an official speaker for the Communist Political Association, being advertised as a "member, executive committee, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, correspondent, *New York Daily Worker*" (p. 118). In 1949 he referred in an article in *Political Affairs* to "our task as American Communists" (p. 119). By this time there was no doubt that his Communist activities were open and notorious and that knowledge thereof was easily available to the IPR.

In 1950 Field registered with the Department of Justice as the agent for three foreign principals connected with the Chinese Communist Government, the China National Aviation, the Bank of China, and the Directorate General of the Postal Remittances and Savings Bank (pp. 83, 91-105). In testifying before the subcommittee, Mr. Field gave his occupation as "prisoner"<sup>25a</sup> and identified his wife as Anita Boyer Field, former wife of Raymond Boyer, a Canadian scientist convicted under the Canadian espionage laws (pp. 78, 79).

The Mont Tremblant conference of the IPR occurred in December 1942. It dealt with the important topic of wartime and postwar cooperation of the United Nations in the Pacific and the Far East (p. 641). The subcommittee found it significant that despite Field's previous record with the American Peace Mobilization—a record fully known to IPR officials—William W. Lockwood proposed that Field be the secretary of the program committee at that conference (p. 426).

It is notable that Mr. Field was in a key position to influence IPR policy since for a number of years he covered its deficits, contributing in all about \$60,000 to IPR funds (pp. 9, 81). In 1940 Carter admitted that Field had decisive say about very radical reductions in staff (p. 8).

Field was designated as a member of the nominating committee of the American Council in 1941, together with Harriet L. Moore

<sup>25a</sup> He was then serving a jail sentence in connection with failure to disclose information regarding bail funds for Communist leaders.



(p. 264). Miss Moore and Field exercised controlling influence in regard to nominations (p. 3858-3859).

In 1944 the publication of a pamphlet entitled "Our Job in the Pacific" was under discussion in the executive committee of the IPR. Field succeeded in overriding the objections voiced in this subcommittee to this project (p. 953). In an article in the *Daily Worker*, Field even went so far as to compare this IPR pamphlet favorably with the writings of Earl Browder, general secretary of the Communist Party (p. 1308).

Field was largely instrumental in negotiating a contract and maintaining relations with the Communist-controlled Book and Magazine Guild of the United Office and Professional Workers (p. 941).

At a highly important conference of the American Council delegation at Atlantic City in 1945 which discussed some highly controversial matters affecting the British Council, Mr. Field was selected as the official spokesman (pp. 3975-3976).

In 1944, Philip C. Jessup recommended Field as a member of the secretariat of the Hot Springs conference, which discussed the important question of security in the Pacific (p. 494). The proceedings of the conference showed that he was a member of the American delegation to the conference and listed him as having been a delegate to IPR conferences in 1929, 1931, 1933, 1936, 1939, and 1942.

Only in 1947 did the officers of the American Council press Field to resign from the board of trustees on which he had served since 1940. (He served as executive secretary from 1934 to 1940 (p. 1227).) The board of trustees voted 14 to 1 against his resignation (p. 3920). Mr. Holland explained that in private conversations people "frankly told Mr. Carter that they didn't see how they could continue to raise money for the IPR." It was as a result of this that Mr. Carter finally wrote the letter to Mr. Field asking him to resign (p. 3921). Field still remains a dues-paying member of the IPR (p. 80).

A further mark of IPR confidence was the fact that in 1943 certain files were stored in Field's basement. In 1947 some were taken away, but a substantial portion of them remained until 1951 (pp. 4033, 4034).

The volumes of *Pacific Affairs* from 1932 to 1952 show that Field wrote 10 articles, while he contributed nine articles during the same period in the *Far Eastern Survey*. He also wrote two major IPR publications, *American Participation in the China Consortium* (1931) and the *Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area* in 1934 (p. 1228).

Field was held in such high esteem in IPR circles that E. C. Carter, Owen Lattimore, William T. Stone, and Lauchlin Currie found it possible to recommend him unreservedly for the strategic bombing survey of the United States Army Intelligence (pp. 23-29). Mr. Carter assured Mr. Holland in 1940 that "Field alone can speak for the American Council" (p. 3922).

#### PATTERN OF INTERLOCKING RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST-CONTROLLED ORGANIZATIONS

It is significant to note the interlocking connection between outstanding individuals of the IPR and Communist-controlled organizations which have been cited as such in sworn testimony in our hearings. Each item of this table, when taken alone, is not necessarily of decisive importance. However, the table as a whole must be considered as

establishing a pattern which shows that a significant number of IPR individuals were connected with one or more of these Communist-controlled organizations.

Allied Labor News

- Epstein, Israel (p. 662)
- Jenkinson, Anthony (p. 658)

Amerasia

- Bisson, T. A. (p. 35)
- Chi, Ch'ao-ting (p. 35)
- Field, Frederick V. (p. 35)
- Jaffe, Philip J. (p. 35)
- Lattimore, Owen (p. 35)
- Mitchell, Kate (p. 35)
- Stone, Wm. T. (p. 35)
- Allen, James S.<sup>26</sup>
- "Asiaticus"<sup>26</sup>
- Austern, Hilda<sup>26</sup>
- Barnes, Kathleen<sup>26</sup>
- Barnett, Robert W.<sup>26</sup>
- Borg, Dorothy<sup>26</sup>
- Brandt, Wm.<sup>26</sup>
- Carlson, Evans Fordyce<sup>26</sup>
- Carter, Edward C.<sup>26</sup>
- Chen Han-seng<sup>26</sup>
- Deane, Hugh<sup>26</sup>
- Epstein, Israel<sup>26</sup>
- Fairbank, John K.<sup>26</sup>
- Farley, Miriam<sup>26</sup>
- Friedman, Irving<sup>26</sup>
- Grajdanzev, A. J.<sup>26</sup>
- Graves, Mortimer<sup>26</sup>
- Goshal, Kumar<sup>26</sup>
- Greenberg, Michael<sup>26</sup>
- Holland, Wm. L.<sup>26</sup>
- Hsu, Yung-Ying<sup>26</sup>
- Isaacs, Harold R.<sup>26</sup>
- Johnstone, Wm. C.<sup>26</sup>
- Kizer, Benjamin H.<sup>26</sup>
- Lang, Olga<sup>26</sup>
- Lockwood, William W.<sup>26</sup>
- Moore, Harriet<sup>26</sup>
- Norman, E. Herbert<sup>26</sup>
- Porter, Catherine<sup>26</sup>
- Rosinger, Lawrence K.<sup>26</sup>
- Roth, Andrew<sup>26</sup>
- Smedley, Agnes<sup>26</sup>
- Snow, Edgar<sup>26</sup>
- Stein, Guenther<sup>26</sup>
- Stewart, Maxwell<sup>26</sup>
- Strong, Anna Louise<sup>26</sup>
- Thompson, Virginia<sup>26</sup>

American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, also known as Indusco, Inc.

- Bisson, T. A. (p. 3793)
- Gerlach, Talitha (p. 3793)
- Lang, Olga (p. 3793)
- Lattimore, Mrs. Owen (p. 3793)
- Pruitt, Ida (p. 3793)
- Stewart, Maxwell S. (p. 3793)
- Wales, Nym (p. 3793)
- Watts, Richard, Jr. (p. 3793)
- Fairbank, John K. (p. 3794)
- Greenberg, Michael (p. 3794)

American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives—Con.

- Hersey, John R. (p. 3794)
  - Jaffe, Philip (p. 3794)
  - Johnstone, William C., Jr. (p. 3794)
- American Friends of the Chinese People, official organ: China Today
- Bisson, T. A. (p. 4272)
  - Chi, Ch'ao-ting (p. 14)
  - Field, Frederick V. (p. 116)
  - Jaffe, Philip (p. 4170)
  - Lamont, Corliss (p. 4170)
  - Stewart, Maxwell (p. 4272)
  - Terrill, Katherine (p. 4170)
  - Yakhontoff, Victor A. (p. 4182)

American Russian Institute

- Barnes, Kathleen (p. 645)
- Carter, E. C. (p. 296)
- Jaffe, Philip (p. 686)
- Mandel, William (p. 663)
- Moore, Harriet (p. 296)
- Graves, Mortimer (p. 4091)
- Van Kleeck, Mary (p. 4091)
- Watts, Richard, Jr. (p. 4091)

China Aid Council

- Chi, Ch'ao-ting (p. 410)
- Jaffe, Philip J. (p. 410)
- Price, Mildred (p. 410)
- Stewart, Maxwell (p. 411)
- Epstein, Israel (p. 1513)
- Fairbank, John K. (p. 1513)
- Friedman, J. R. (p. 1513)
- Gerlach, Talitha (p. 1513)
- Holland, William L. (p. 1513)
- Rosinger, Lawrence K. (p. 1513)
- Snow, Edgar (p. 1514)
- Terrill, Katherine (p. 1514)

Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, official organ, Far East Spotlight:

- Chen Han-seng (p. 52)
- Friedman, J. R. (p. 771)
- Strong, Anna Louise (p. 56)
- Bidien, Charles (p. 2789)
- Bisson, T. A. (p. 2789)
- Chapman, Abraham (p. 2789)
- Deane, Hugh (p. 2789)
- Epstein, Israel (p. 2789)
- Fairfax-Cholmeley, Elsie (p. 2789)
- Gerlach, Talitha (p. 2789)
- Goshal, Kumar (p. 2789)
- Jaffe, Philip (p. 2789)
- Keeney, Philip O. (p. 2789)
- Lindsay, Michael (p. 2789)
- Smedley, Agnes (p. 2789)
- Snow, Edgar (p. 2789)
- Sues, Iona Ralf (p. 2789)
- Bodde, Derk (pp. 4610-4611)
- Carlson, Evans F. (pp. 4610-4611)
- Field, Frederick V. (pp. 4610-4611)
- Mandel, William (pp. 4610-4611)

<sup>26</sup> Exhibit 1355.

- Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, official organ—Con.  
 Menefee, Selden (pp. 4610-4611)  
 Mitchell, Kate L. (pp. 4610-4611)  
 Salisbury, L. E. (pp. 4610-4611)  
 Snow, Mrs. Edgar (pp. 4610-4611)  
 Stewart, Maxwell (pp. 4610-4611)  
 Tewsbury, Donald (pp. 4610-4611)  
 Van Kleeck, Mary (pp. 4610-4611)  
 Watts, Richard, Jr. (pp. 4610-4611)
- Federated Press  
 Borg, Dorothy (p. 2634)  
 Chen, Han-seng (p. 2631)  
 De Caux, Len (p. 2627)  
 Farley, Miriam (p. 2628)  
 Field, Frederick V. (p. 4152)  
 Moore, Harriet (p. 2629)  
 Porter, Catherine (p. 2633)  
 Roth, Andrew (p. 2632)  
 Thompson, Virginia (p. 2630)
- Friends of Chinese Democracy, the  
 Bisson, T. A. (p. 622)  
 Epstein, Israel (p. 622)
- Friends of Chinese Democracy—Con.  
 Field, Frederick V. (p. 622)  
 Gerlach, Talitha (p. 622)  
 Salisbury, Lawrence E. (p. 622)  
 Snow, Mrs. Edgar (p. 622)  
 Sues, Ilona Ralf (p. 622)  
 Watts, Richard (p. 622)
- Japanese-American Committee for Democracy  
 Borton, Hugh (p. 2242)  
 Roth, Andrew (p. 2242)  
 Terrill, Katherine (p. 2242)
- Russian War Relief  
 Carter, E. C. (p. 295)  
 Field, Frederick V. (p. 295)  
 Moore, Harriet (p. 295)  
 Steffansson, Vilhjalmur (p. 295)  
 Terrill, Katherine (p. 295)
- Soviet Russia Today  
 Field, Frederick V. (p. 102)  
 Mandel, William (p. 662)  
 Moore, Harriet (p. 297)  
 Steffansson, Vilhjalmur (p. 299)
- Allied Labor News—Communist character cited on p. 658.  
 Amerasia—Communist character cited on pp. 439, 2813.  
 Friends of Chinese Democracy—Communist character cited on p. 621.  
 American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, also known as Indusco, Inc.—Communist character cited on pp. 3792, 4002, 4003, 4619, 4620.  
 American Friends of the Chinese People—Communist character cited on pp. 285, 4180, 4616.  
 American Russian Institute—Communist character cited on pp. 488, 3452, 3487.  
 China Aid Council—Communist character cited on pp. 407, 409, 677.  
 Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy and Far East Spotlight—Communist character cited on pp. 55, 771, 1017, 4604.  
 Federated Press—Communist character cited on pp. 668-669.  
 Japanese-American Committee for Democracy—Communist character cited on pp. 2242-2243.  
 Russian War Relief—Communist character cited on pp. 295, 438, 631.  
 Soviet Russia Today—Communist character cited on p. 3529.

The following IPR personalities appear as the signers of a statement in Soviet Russia Today for September 1939, reading in part as follows:

With the aim of turning antifascist feeling against the Soviet Union they have encouraged the fantastic falsehood that the U. S. S. R. and the totalitarian states are basically alike \* \* \*

The Soviet Union continues, as always, to be a consistent bulwark against war and aggression, and works unceasingly for the goal of a peaceful international order \* \* \*

The Soviet Union has affected one of the most far-reaching cultural and educational advances in all history \* \* \*

Mortimer Graves<sup>27</sup>  
 John A. Kingsbury<sup>27</sup>  
 Corliss Lamont<sup>27</sup>

Maxwell S. Stewart<sup>27</sup>  
 Mary Van Kleeck<sup>27</sup>  
 Ella Winters<sup>27</sup>

Individuals connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations are listed as the signers of a document published in China Today for February 1935, reading in part as follows:

United States, under the deceptive guise of the "open door policy" is playing a ruthless part in suppressing the Chinese masses and fomenting civil wars among

<sup>27</sup> Hearings, pp. 4256 to 4261.



them \* \* \* Today America is still staking its fortunes in China on Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalistic terroristic government.

T. A. Bisson (pp. 4169, 4170)  
 Corliss Lamont (pp. 4169, 4170)  
 J. W. Phillips (pp. 4169, 4170)<sup>28</sup>  
 Frederick Spencer (pp. 4169, 4170)<sup>29</sup>  
 Maxwell S. Stewart (pp. 4169, 4170)  
 Katherine Terrill (pp. 4169, 4170)  
 Victor A. Yakhontoff (pp. 4169, 4170)

#### COMMUNIST PARTY CONNECTIONS

The IPR was penetrated by and associated with a group of individuals who were the subjects of sworn testimony describing their affiliations with the Communist Party of the United States or another country. The exact association of each individual with the IPR is given in an accompanying table. (See pp. 151-159 of this report).

For the most part, this testimony has been given by one or more former members of the party, including Elizabeth T. Bentley, former member of the open party and of an underground Communist espionage ring; Louis F. Budenz, former managing editor of the Daily Worker and member of the national committee of the Communist Party; Whittaker Chambers, former member of the open Communist Party and of a Communist espionage ring; William M. Canning, former member of a teachers' group of the Communist Party; Hede Massing, former member of a Communist espionage ring; Nathaniel Weyl, a former member of the open Communist Party; Harvey M. Matusow, also former Communist Party member; Alexander Barmine, former member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Military Intelligence; Igor Bogolepov, former official of the Soviet Foreign Office; and Karl Wittfogel, former member of the German Communist Party. This testimony has been checked against the documentary evidence in the hearings and the testimony of other witnesses. Individuals listed should not be judged solely on the basis of any single item of evidence, or the statement of a single witness, but rather on the basis of the over-all pattern of behavior within the sphere of Communist activities.

The following individuals were identified as members of the Communist Party by the witnesses listed: Solomon Adler (Bentley, p. 434); Sol Auerbach, alias James S. Allen (Bentley, p. 440; Massing, p. 245; Budenz, p. 640; Matusow, p. 3843); Hans Moeller, alias Hans Mueller, alias Asiaticus, alias, M. G. Shippe (Wittfogel, p. 308; Carter, p. 37); Hilda Austern, also known as Hilda Austern Bretholtz and Hilda Austern Ray (Budenz, p. 641); Joseph Fels Barnes (Budenz, p. 541; Chambers, p. 490); Kathleen Barnes (Budenz, p. 644); T. A. Bisson (Budenz, p. 534) alias Frederick Spencer (Bisson, p. 4167); Evans F. Carlson (Budenz, p. 581); Abraham Chapman, alias John Arnold (Budenz, p. 643); Chen Han-seng, alias Raymond D. Brooke (Wittfogel, p. 287; Carter, p. 37; Holland, p. 3911); Ch'ao-ting Chi, alias Hansu Chan (Bentley, p. 434; Wittfogel, p. 276; Carter, p. 37; Bisson, p. 4180; Weyl, p. 2805); Harriet Levine Chi (Weyl, p. 2808); Frank V. Coe (Bentley, p. 440); Len De Caux (Chambers, p. 493; Budenz, p. 674); Israel Epstein (Budenz, pp. 590, 634; Matusow,

<sup>28</sup> Pseudonym for Philip J. Jaffe, hearings, pp. 285, 653.

<sup>29</sup> Pseudonym for Frederick V. Field, hearings p. 523.

pp. 3829-3834); John K. Fairbank (Budenz, p. 629); Frederick V. Field (Field, p. 119; Bentley, p. 415; Massing, p. 268; Chambers, p. 490; Budenz, p. 517; Weyl, p. 2804; Matusow, p. 3844; Bisson, p. 4180); Julian R. Friedman (Widener, p. 758); Talitha Gerlach (Budenz, p. 588); Alger Hiss (Chambers, p. 497; Weyl, p. 2799); Philip J. Jaffe (Bentley, p. 437; Budenz, p. 653; Wittfogel, p. 311; Weyl, p. 2811); Anthony Jenkinson (Budenz, p. 658); Corliss Lamont (Budenz, p. 673; Massing, p. 267); Olga Lang (Massing, p. 269); Owen Lattimore (Budenz, p. 521); William Marx Mandel (Budenz, p. 662; Matusow, p. 3835); Kate Mitchell (Budenz, p. 654); Harriet Lucy Moore (Bentley, p. 438; Budenz, p. 549); E. Herbert Norman (Wittfogel, p. 319); Hozumi Ozaki (Willoughby, p. 363; Yoshikawa, p. 503); Mildred Price (Bentley, p. 412; Budenz, p. 677); Lee Pressman (Weyl, p. 2799, open hearing June 10, 1952); Lawrence K. Rosinger (Wittfogel, p. 313; Canning, p. 467; Budenz, p. 1077); Andrew Roth (Budenz, p. 625); Helen Schneider (Budenz, p. 1077); Agnes Smedley (Massing, p. 256; Budenz, p. 677; Willoughby, p. 359); Mrs. Edgar Snow, alias Nym Wales (Budenz, p. 680); Andrew Steiger (Budenz, p. 699); Ilona Rolf Sues (Budenz, p. 698); Maxwell S. Stewart (Budenz, p. 563); Anna Louise Strong (Budenz, p. 688; Bogolepov, p. 4583); Daniel Thorner (Wittfogel, p. 322; Canning, p. 483); Mary Van Kleeck (Budenz, p. 682); Ella Winter (Budenz, p. 688); Kumar Goshal (Budenz, p. 655); John Carter Vincent (Budenz p. 625). This makes a total of 46 cited as Communist Party members, exclusive of the IPR members of the Russian Communist Party.

We have cited the testimony of Alexander Barmine and Igor Bogolepov to the effect that the IPR was used by Soviet Military and Naval Intelligence. In this connection, it should be noted that the following individuals associated with the IPR were named in sworn testimony as having collaborated with agents of the Soviet Intelligence apparatus: Solomon Adler (Bentley, p. 434; Chambers, p. 493); Joseph F. Barnes (Bentley, p. 441; Barmine, p. 200; Massing, p. 244; Chambers, p. 490; Budenz, p. 542); Frank V. Coe (Bentley, p. 440); Lauchlin Currie (Bentley, p. 419); Laurence Duggan (Massing, p. 234; Chambers, pp. 488, 490); Israel Epstein (Bentley, p. 435; Budenz, pp. 590, 634); Frederick V. Field (Chambers, pp. 488, 490); Michael Greenberg (Bentley, p. 414); Alger Hiss (Massing, p. 234; Bentley, p. 442; Chambers, p. 497; Weyl, p. 2799); Owen Lattimore (Barmine, pp. 200, 219; Bogolepov, p. 4519); Hozumi Ozaki (Willoughby, pp. 355, 363, 379; Yoshikawa, pp. 501, 503, 505); Fred Poland (Mandel, p. 999); Lee Pressman (Weyl, p. 2799); Kimikazu Saionji (Willoughby, p. 366; Yoshikawa, p. 506); Agnes Smedley (Massing, p. 256; Willoughby, p. 359; Yoshikawa, p. 506); Guenther Stein (Massing, p. 267; Willoughby, pp. 355, 359, 384; Yoshikawa, p. 506); Anna Louise Strong (Budenz, p. 688; Bogolepov, p. 4583); Harry Dexter White (Bentley, pp. 419, 420; Chambers, pp. 491, 492); Victor A. Yakhontoff (Field, p. 4120). This makes a total of 19 cited in sworn testimony as giving cooperation and aid to Soviet Intelligence services here or abroad. It excludes all Russians included in the IPR, presumably, according to Lattimore, serving Soviet intelligence. It excludes also the names of John Stewart Service, Andrew Roth, Kate Mitchell, and Philip Jaffe, connected with the Amerasia case, and who were also connected with the IPR.

Of the above, both groups, the following have denied these charges in statements before our committee: Hilda Austern (affidavit May 5, 1952; exhibit 1384), Joseph F. Barnes (executive session), John K. Fairbank, Julian R. Friedman, Corliss Lamont (affidavit), Owen Lattimore, Kate Mitchell (executive session), Maxwell S. Stewart, and John Carter Vincent.

Of the above list of names, including both groups, the following refused on grounds of self-incrimination to affirm or deny their affiliations with the Communist Party or its underground apparatus: Sol Auerbach (James S. Allen, p. 2876); Kathleen Barnes (p. 2601); Harriet Levine Chi (p. 3958); Len De Caux (p. 2621); Frederick V. Field (p. 2876); William M. Mandel (p. 2733); Harriet Lucy Moore (p. 2559); Mildred Price (p. 2644); Lawrence K. Rosinger (p. 2475); Helen Schneider (executive hearing Mar. 21, 1952); and Daniel Thorner (p. 3959). Mary Jane and Philip O. Keeney, and Hugh Deane, whose IPR connections are listed in the attached table, also refused to answer on grounds of self-incrimination all questions regarding their Communist affiliations (pp. 2775, 2786, 2792). This makes a total of 14 persons with IPR connections who refused to answer. (Mr. and Mrs. Catesby Jones, who assisted Owen Lattimore in preparing his defense, also refused to answer questions regarding their Communist affiliations.)

The following individuals reportedly are dead: Asiaticus, Evans F. Carlson, Hozumi Ozaki, Agnes Smedley, Laurence Duggan, and Harry Dexter White.

The following are either out of the country or otherwise unavailable for subpoena: Solomon Adler, Hilda Austern, Abraham Chapman, Chen Han-seng (in Communist China), Ch'ao-ting Chi (in Communist China), Michael Greenberg, Anthony Jenkinson, Israel Epstein, Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley, Talitha Gerlach, Olga Lang, E. Herbert Norman, Lauchlin Currie, Andrew Roth, Andrew Steiger, Guenther Stein, Mary Van Kleeck, Ella Winter, and Fred Poland.

In his report to W. L. Holland on his meetings in Moscow in 1937 (p. 3484), E. C. Carter said that VOX (All-Union Society for Cultural Relations), which is in charge of all arrangements for those visiting the Soviet Union, working closely on these matters with the Soviet secret police, laid down specific precautions to be followed. Smirnov, president of VOX, told Carter that it was important to know in advance the specific social opinions and interests of important Americans. The care exercised by Soviet authorities in admitting visitors has been described by Nicholas Poppe, Alexander Barmine, and Igor Bogolepov. It is therefore of some significance that the following IPR individuals made one or more trips to Communist territory, receiving extensive privileges there: Asiaticus to U. S. S. R. (p. 308); Joseph F. Barnes to U. S. S. R. (pp. 244, 1322, 2702, 3484); Kathleen Barnes to U. S. S. R. (pp. 2600, 3484); T. A. Bisson to Communist China (p. 304); Evans F. Carlson to Communist China (p. 793); E. C. Carter to U. S. S. R. (pp. 2701, 2713, 2716); Chen Han-seng to Communist China (p. 3510); Ch'ao-ting Chi to Communist China (pp. 84, 85, 86, 3949, 3950); Hugh Deane to Communist China (p. 397); Israel Epstein to Communist China (p. 634); Frederick V. Field to U. S. S. R. (p. 4035); Y. Y. Hsu to Communist China (p. 3877); Philip J. Jaffe to Communist China (p. 304); Lucy Knox to U. S. S. R. (pp. 3906, 3907); Corliss Lamont to U. S. S. R. (p. 268); Olga Lang to Communist



China (p. 269); Eleanor Lattimore to U. S. S. R. (p. 3315); Owen Lattimore to Communist China and U. S. S. R. (pp. 304, 657, 1323, 3315); William Mandel to U. S. S. R. (p. 2736); Kate L. Mitchell to U. S. S. R. (p. 3934); Harriet L. Moore to U. S. S. R. (pp. 260, 291, 2561, 3934); Ludwig Rajchman to Poland (p. 138); Agnes Smedley to Communist China (p. 256); Edgar Snow to Communist China (pp. 303, 681); Mrs. Edgar Snow to Communist China (pp. 682, 3295); Andrew Steiger to U. S. S. R. (pp. 1316-1319); Guenther Stein to Communist China (pp. 371, 377); Anna Louise Strong to Communist China and U. S. S. R. (pp. 3533, 3559); Rose Yardumian to Communist China (pp. 141, 142); Victor A. Yakhontoff to U. S. S. R. (p. 4120). This makes 30 individuals in all.

Included among IPR individuals are the following writers for official publications of the Communist Party or the Communist International or of a Communist government: James S. Allen (*Daily Worker*, the *Communist*, also known as *Political Affairs*, *New Masses* pp. 640, 1439, 1440, 2886, 2889); Asiaticus (*International Press Correspondence*, pp. 47, 48); Abraham Chapman (*Daily Worker*, p. 643); Hugh Deane (*Daily Worker*, *China Weekly Review*, *Shanghai Monthly Bulletin*, pp. 142, 397, 2790); Israel Epstein (*Daily Worker*, p. 662); Frederick V. Field (*Daily Worker*, *New Masses*, *Communist* or *Political Affairs*, pp. 119, 126, 540); Philip J. Jaffe (*New Masses*, p. 3304); Olga Lang (*Trud*, p. 269); Andrew Steiger (*Daily Worker*, p. 699); Maxwell S. Stewart (*New Masses*, p. 2662); Anna Louise Strong (*Moscow Daily News*, *New Masses*, *Sunday Worker*, *Workers Monthly*, p. 3529); Ella Winter (*Daily Worker*, p. 690); Rose Yardumian (*China Weekly Review*, p. 142). The following were writers connected with pro-Communist press services: Anthony Jenkinson (*Allied Labor News*, p. 658); Hugh Deane (*Allied Labor News* and *Tele-Press*, p. 2789); Israel Epstein (*Allied Labor News*, p. 662); Miriam S. Farley, Harriet L. Moore, Virginia Thompson, Chen Han-seng, Andrew Roth, Catherine Porter, Dorothy Borg, Len De Caux (*Federated Press*, pp. 2627-2639).

The records show that the following IPR individuals were the subject of action by either an agency of the American Government or a foreign non-Communist government on grounds involving loyalty or national security: T. A. Bisson (*Kerr and Dies committees*, pp. 4244-4245); Ellen Van Zyll De Jong Atkinson (*National Defense*, p. 1004); Israel Epstein (*Immigration*, p. 590); Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley (*Immigration*, p. 590); Frederick V. Field (*National Defense*, p. 27); Michael Greenberg (*Civil Service*, pp. 282, 4622); Alger Hiss (courts, p. 492); Philip J. Jaffe (courts, p. 1754); Michael Lee (*Commerce*, p. 4623); Hotzumi Ozaki (*Japan*, p. 363); Fred Poland (*Canada*, p. 999); Ludwig Rajchman (*Immigration*, p. 140); Andrew Roth (*National Defense*, *Navy*, p. 671); Kimikazu Saionji (*Japan*, p. 366); John S. Service (*State*, exhibit 1348A); Guenther Stein (*Japan*, *France*, pp. 369-401). This list does not purport to be complete.

## SUMMARY OF COMMUNIST AFFILIATIONS BY INDIVIDUALS WITH THEIR IPR FUNCTIONS

(Missing page references on affiliations are given above)

- ADLER, SOLOMON** (Schloma Adler), IPR supporter (p. 3594):  
 Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.  
 Collaborated with agents of the Soviet intelligence apparatus as shown by sworn testimony.  
 Out of the country or otherwise unavailable for subpoena.
- ALLEN, JAMES S.** (Sol Auerbach), writer (pp. 245-247, 249, exhibit 1383):  
 Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.  
 Refused to answer on the ground of self-incrimination.  
 Writer for official publications of the Communist Party or the Communist International or for a Communist government or for pro-Communist press services.  
 Affiliated with: Amerasia (exhibit 1355).
- ASIATICUS** (Heinz Moeller or Hans Mueller or M. G. Shippe), writer (pp. 47-50):  
 Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.  
 Made one or more trips to Communist territory.  
 Writer for official publications of the Communist Party or the Communist International or for a Communist government or for pro-Communist press services.  
 Deceased.  
 Affiliated with: Amerasia (exhibit 1355).
- AUSTERN, HILDA**, (Mrs. Nat Bretholtz, also Mrs. Jefferson Franklin Ray), assistant treasurer IPR (exhibit 801):  
 Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses. Denied.  
 Out of the country or otherwise unavailable for subpoena.  
 Affiliated with: Amerasia (exhibit 1355).
- BARNES, JOSEPH FELS**, secretary, American Council IPR (p. 209):  
 Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses. Denied.  
 Collaborated with agents of the Soviet intelligence apparatus as shown by sworn testimony. Denied.  
 Made one or more trips to Communist territory.
- BARNES, KATHLEEN** (Mrs. Joseph F.), research associate IPR (exhibit 801):  
 Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.  
 Refused to answer on the ground of self-incrimination.  
 Made one or more trips to Communist territory.  
 Affiliated with: Amerasia (exhibit 1355); American Russian Institute (p. 645).
- BARNETT, ROBERT W.**, research associate; secretary, Washington IPR (exhibit 801):  
 Affiliated with: Amerasia (exhibit 1355).
- BIDIEN, CHARLES**, writer (pp. 4610-4611):  
 Affiliated with: Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy (p. 2789).  
 Subject of action by agency of American Government or a foreign non-Communist government on grounds involving loyalty or national security (exhibit 1404).  
 Writer for official publications of the Communist Party or the Communist International or for a Communist government or for pro-Communist press services (exhibit 1405).
- BISSON, T. A.** (Frederick Spencer), associate editor, Pacific Affairs (p. 4188); research associate (exhibit 801):  
 Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.  
 Made one or more trips to Communist territory.  
 Subject of action by agency of American Government or a foreign non-Communist government on grounds involving loyalty or national security.  
 Affiliated with: Amerasia (p. 35); Friends of Chinese Democracy (p. 622); American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, also known as Indusco, Inc. (p. 3793); American Friends of the Chinese People, official organ: China Today (p. 4272); Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy (p. 2789).  
 Signer of a statement attacking the United States for "suppressing the Chinese masses and fomenting civil war among them."

- BODDE, DERK, writer (pp. 4610-4611):  
 Affiliated with: Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy (pp. 4610-4611).
- BORG, DOROTHY, staff member (p. 996); education secretary IPR (exhibit 801):  
 Writer for pro-Communist press services.  
 Affiliated with: Amerasia (exhibit 1355); Federated Press (p. 2634).
- BRANDT, WILLIAM, writer (p. 3254):  
 Affiliated with: Amerasia (exhibit 1355).
- CARLSON, EVANS F., writer (exhibit 1383); lecturer (p. 70):  
 Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.  
 Made one or more trips to Communist territory.  
 Deceased.  
 Affiliated with: Amerasia (exhibit 1355); Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy (pp. 4610-4611).
- CARTER, EDWARD C., secretary, American Council; secretary-general IPR; trustee; executive vice chairman (exhibit 801):  
 Made one or more trips to Communist territory.  
 Affiliated with: Amerasia (exhibit 1355); American Russian Institute (p. 296); Russian War Relief (p. 295).
- CHAPMAN, ABRAHAM (John Arnold), writer (p. 643); research associate (exhibit 801):  
 Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.  
 Writer for official publications of the Communist Party or the Communist International or for a Communist government or for pro-Communist press services.  
 Out of the country or otherwise unavailable for subpoena.  
 Affiliated with: Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy (p. 2789).
- CHEN, HAN-SENG (Geoffrey) (Raymond D. Brooke), research associate (exhibit 801):  
 Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.  
 Made one or more trips to Communist territory.  
 Writer for official publications of the Communist Party or the Communist International or for a Communist government or for pro-Communist press services.  
 Out of the country or otherwise unavailable for subpoena.  
 Affiliated with: Amerasia (exhibit 1355); Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy (p. 52); Federated Press (p. 2631).
- CHI, CH'AO-TING (Hansu Chan, T. B. Lowe), research associate (exhibit 801) writer (p. 17):  
 Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.  
 Made one or more trips to Communist territory.  
 Out of the country or otherwise unavailable for subpoena.  
 Affiliated with: Amerasia (p. 35); American Friends of the Chinese People, official organ: China Today (p. 14); China Aid Council (p. 410).
- CHI, HARRIET LEVINE, assistant to secretary-general (exhibit 801):  
 Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.  
 Refused to answer on the ground of self-incrimination.
- COE, FRANK V., attended IPR conference (p. 995):  
 Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.  
 Collaborated with agents of the Soviet intelligence apparatus as shown by sworn testimony.
- CURRIE, LAUCHLIN, attended conferences (p. 114, 133); trustee (p. 133):  
 Collaborated with agents of the Soviet intelligence apparatus as shown by sworn testimony.  
 Out of the country or otherwise unavailable for subpoena.



- DEANE, HUGH, writer (pp. 2780-2781; member (p. 2781):  
 Refused to answer on ground of self-incrimination (p. 2786).  
 Made one or more trips to Communist territory.  
 Writer for official publications of the Communist Party or the Communist International or for a Communist government or for pro-Communist press services.  
 Affiliated with: Amerasia (exhibit 1355); Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy (p. 2789).
- DE CAUX, LEN, trustee (p. 995); attended conferences (p. 995):  
 Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.  
 Refused to answer on the ground of self-incrimination.  
 Writer for official publications of the Communist Party or the Communist International or for a Communist government or for pro-Communist press services.  
 Affiliated with: Federated Press (p. 2627).
- DE JONG, ELLEN VAN ZYLL (Atkinson), research associate (exhibit 801):  
 Subject of action by agency of American government or a foreign non-Communist government on grounds involving loyalty or national security.
- DUGGAN, LAURENCE, supporter (pp. 240, 1218):  
 Collaborated with agents of the Soviet intelligence apparatus as shown by sworn testimony.  
 Deceased.
- EPSTEIN, ISRAEL, writer (exhibit 1334):  
 Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.  
 Collaborated with agents of the Soviet intelligence apparatus as shown by sworn testimony.  
 Made one or more trips to Communist territory.  
 Writer for official publications of the Communist Party or the Communist International or for a Communist government or for pro-Communist press services.  
 Subject of action by agency of American government or a foreign non-Communist government on grounds involving loyalty or national security.  
 Out of the country or otherwise unavailable for subpoena.  
 Affiliated with: Allied Labor News (p. 662); Amerasia (exhibit 1355); Friends of Chinese Democracy (p. 622); China Aid Council (p. 1513); Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy (p. 2789).
- FAIRBANK, JOHN K., trustee (p. 3742):  
 Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses. Denied.  
 Affiliated with: Amerasia (exhibit 1335); American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, also known as Indusco, Inc (p. 3794); China Aid Council (p. 1513).
- FAIRFAX-CHOLMELEY, ELSIE (Mrs. Israel Epstein) (pseudonym: Edith Cromwell) (p. 50) writer; assistant to secretary-general (exhibit 801):  
 Subject of action by agency of American Government or a foreign non-Communist government on grounds involving loyalty or national security.  
 Out of the country or otherwise unavailable for subpoena.  
 Affiliated with Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy (p. 2789).
- FARLEY, MIRIAM S., research associate and pamphlet editor; editor, Far Eastern Survey (exhibit 801):  
 Writer for official publications of the Communist Party or the Communist International or for a Communist government or for pro-Communist press services.  
 Affiliated with: Amerasia (exhibit 1355) Federated Press (p. 2628).
- FIELD, FREDERICK V., secretary, American Council (p. 995); executive (exhibit 801); trustee (p. 264):  
 Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.  
 Collaborated with agents of the Soviet intelligence apparatus as shown by sworn testimony.  
 Refused to answer on the ground of self-incrimination.  
 Made one or more trips to Communist territory.  
 Writer for official publications of the Communist Party or the Communist International or for a Communist government or for pro-Communist press services.

**FIELD, FREDERICK V.—Continued**

Subject of action by agency of American Government or a foreign non-Communist government on grounds involving loyalty or national security.

Affiliated with: Amerasia (p. 35); American Friends of the Chinese People, official organ: China Today, (p. 116); Federated Press (p. 4152); Friends of Chinese Democracy (p. 622); Russian War Relief (p. 295); Soviet Russia Today (p. 102); Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy (p. 4610-11).

Signer of a statement attacking the United States for "suppressing the Chinese masses and fomenting civil wars among them."

**FRIEDMAN, IRVING F., research associate (exhibit 801):**

Affiliated with: Amerasia (exhibit 1355).

**FRIEDMAN, JULIAN R., participant in conferences (p. 710); writer (p. 711).**

Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses. Denied.

Affiliated with: China Aid Council (p. 1513); Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy (p. 771).

**GERLACH, TALITHA, supporter (exhibit 1334):**

Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.

Out of the country or otherwise unavailable for subpoena.

Affiliated with: American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, also known as Indusco, Inc. (p. 3793); China Aid Council (p. 1513); Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy (p. 2789); Friends of Chinese Democracy (p. 622).

**GOSHAL, KUMAR, writer (exhibit 1334):**

Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.

Affiliated with: Amerasia (exhibit 1355); Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy (p. 2789).

**GRAVES, MORTIMER, trustee (p. 713):**

Affiliated with: Amerasia (exhibit 1355); American Russian Institute (p. 4091).

Signer of a statement defending the Soviet Union as "a consistent bulwark against war and aggression."

**GREENBERG, MICHAEL, managing editor, Pacific Affairs (exhibit 801):**

Collaborated with agents of the Soviet intelligence apparatus as shown by sworn testimony.

Subject of action by agency of American Government or a foreign non-Communist government on grounds involving loyalty or national security.

Out of the country or otherwise unavailable for subpoena.

Affiliated with: Amerasia (exhibit 1355); American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, also known as Indusco, Inc. (p. 3794).

**HISS, ALGER, trustee (p. 134):**

Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.

Collaborated with agents of the Soviet Intelligence apparatus as shown by sworn testimony.

Subject of action by agency of American government or a foreign non-Communist government on grounds involving loyalty or national security.

**HOLLAND, WILLIAM L., research secretary; secretary-general; editor, Pacific Affairs; executive vice-chairman (exhibit 801):**

Affiliated with: Amerasia (exhibit 1355); China Aid Council (p. 1513).

**Hsu, YUNG YING, research associate (exhibit 801):**

Made one or more trips to Communist territory.

Affiliated with: Amerasia (exhibit 1355).

**JAFFE, PHILIP R. (James W. Philips), conference participant (exhibit 1334); financial contributor (p. 71; exhibit 1383):**

Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.

Made one or more trips to Communist territory.

Writer for official publications of the Communist Party or the Communist International or for a Communist government or pro-Communist press services.

Subject of action by agency of American Government or a foreign non-Communist government on grounds involving loyalty or national security.

Affiliated with: Amerasia (p. 35); American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, also known as Indusco, Inc. (p. 3794); American

## JAFFE, PHILIP R.—Continued

Friends of the Chinese People, official organ: *China Today* (p. 4170); American Russian Institute (p. 686); China Aid Council (p. 410); Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy (p. 2789).

Signer of a statement attacking the United States for "suppressing the Chinese masses and fomenting civil wars among them."

## JENKINSON, ANTHONY, member (p. 71); writer (p. 2642); secretary of British group, IPR conference (p. 662):

Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.

Writer for official publications of the Communist Party or the Communist International or for a Communist government or for pro-Communist press services.

Out of the country or otherwise unavailable for subpoena.

Affiliated with: *Allied Labor News* (p. 658).

## JOHNSTONE, WILLIAM C., director, Washington IPR (exhibit 801):

Affiliated with: *Amerasia* (exhibit 1355); American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, also known as Indusco, Inc. (p. 3794).

## KEENEY, MARY J., member Washington IPR (p. 2776):

Refused to answer on the ground of self-incrimination (p. 2774). Indicted.

## KEENEY, PHILIP O., writer and speaker (exhibit 1334):

Refused to answer on the ground of self-incrimination. Affiliated with:

Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy (p. 2789).

## KIZER, BENJAMIN H., trustee (p. 264); vice-chairman, American IPR (p. 264):

Affiliated with: *Amerasia* (exhibit 1355).

Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses. Denied.

## LAMONT, CORLISS, supporter (p. 71):

Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses. Denied.

Made one or more trips to Communist territory.

Affiliated with: American Friends of the Chinese People (p. 4170).

Signer of a statement defending the Soviet Union as "a consistent bulwark against war and aggression."

Signer of a statement attacking the United States for "suppressing the Chinese masses and fomenting civil war among them."

## LANG, OLGA, writer (p. 270):

Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.

Made one or more trips to Communist territory.

Writer for official publications of the Communist Party or the Communist International or for a Communist government or for pro-Communist press services.

Out of country or otherwise unavailable for subpoena.

Affiliated with: *Amerasia* (exhibit 1355); American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, also known as Indusco, Inc. (p. 2793).

## LATTIMORE, ELEANOR (Mrs. OWEN), research associate, Washington office (exhibit 801):

Made one or more trips to Communist territory (p. 3315).

Affiliated with: American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, also known as Indusco, Inc. (p. 3793).

LATTIMORE, OWEN, Editor, *Pacific Affairs* (exhibit 801); trustee; (p. 568); executive committee (p. 1313):

Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses. Denied.

Collaborated with agents of the Soviet intelligence apparatus as shown by sworn testimony. Denied.

Made one or more trips to Communist territory.

Affiliated with: *Amerasia* (p. 35).

## LEE, MICHAEL, member ninth conference secretariat, 1945:

Subject of action by agency of American Government or a foreign non-Communist government on grounds involving loyalty or national security (hearings before subcommittee of Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, United States Senate, March 28, 30, and April 4, 1950).

## LOCKWOOD, WILLIAM W., research secretary and executive, American Council (exhibit 801):

Affiliated with: *Amerasia* (exhibit 1355).



MANDEL, WILLIAM MARX, writer (p. 4610-11):

Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.

Refused to answer on the ground of self-incrimination.

Made one or more trips to Communist territory.

Affiliated with: American Russian Institute (p. 663); Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy (p. 4610); Soviet Russia Today (p. 662).

MENEFEE, SELDEN C., proposed IPR conference delegate (p. 2809):

Affiliated with: Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy (p. 4610).

MITCHELL, KATE L., assistant to secretary-general (exhibit 801):

Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses. Denied.

Made one or more trips to Communist territory.

Affiliated with: Amerasia (p. 35) Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy (p. 4610).

MOORE, HARRIET L. (GELFAN), research associate; acting executive secretary (exhibit 801); chairman, nominating committee (p. 3858, 3859):

Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.

Refused to answer on the ground of self-incrimination.

Made one or more trips to Communist territory.

Writer for official publications of the Communist Party or the Communist International or for a Communist government or for pro-Communist press services.

Affiliated with: Amerasia (exhibit 1355); American Russian Institute (p. 296); Federated Press (p. 2629); Russian War Relief (p. 295); Soviet Russia Today (p. 297).

NORMAN, E. HERBERT, writer (p. 319):

Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.

Out of the country or otherwise unavailable for subpoena.

Affiliated with: Amerasia (exhibit 1355).

Canadian Friends of the Chinese People, affiliate of the American Friends of the Chinese People (p. 4065).

OZAKI, HOTSUMI, conference participant (pp. 363; 505) (exhibit 1383):

Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.

Collaborated with agents of the Soviet intelligence apparatus as shown by sworn testimony.

Subject of action by agency of American Government or a foreign non-Communist government on grounds involving loyalty or national security.

Deceased.

POLAND, FRED, attended 1945 IPR conference (p. 998):

Collaborated with agents of the Soviet intelligence apparatus as shown by sworn testimony.

Subject of action by agency of American Government or a foreign non-Communist government on grounds involving loyalty or national security (acquitted).

Out of the country or otherwise unavailable for subpoena.

PORTER, CATHERINE, research associate; editor, Far Eastern Survey; secretary (exhibit 801):

Writer for pro-Communist press services.

Affiliated with: Amerasia (exhibit 1355); Federated Press (p. 2633).

PRICE, MILDRED (COY), member (p. 1246):

Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.

Refused to answer on the ground of self-incrimination.

Affiliated with: China Aid Council (p. 410).

PRESSMAN, LEE, proposed IPR conference delegate (p. 2809):

Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.

Collaborated with agents of the Soviet intelligence apparatus as shown by sworn testimony.

PRUITT, IDA, writer (Far Eastern Survey 1945, vol. XIV):

Affiliated with: American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, also known as Indusco, Inc. (p. 3793).

Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy (p. 4600).

- RAJCHMAN, LUDWIG, proposed observer IPR conference (exhibit 1383):  
 Made one or more trips to Communist territory.  
 Subject of action by agency of American Government or a foreign non-Communist government on grounds involving loyalty or national security.
- ROSINGER, LAWRENCE K., research associate (exhibit 801):  
 Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.  
 Refused to answer on the ground of self-incrimination.  
 Affiliated with: Amerasia (exhibit 1355); China Aid Council (p. 1513).
- ROTH, ANDREW, member conference secretariat (p. 998); writer (p. 670):  
 Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.  
 Writer for pro-Communist press services.  
 Subject of action by agency of American Government or a foreign non-Communist government on grounds involving loyalty or national security.  
 Out of the country or otherwise unavailable for subpoena.  
 Affiliated with: Amerasia (exhibit 1355); Federated Press (p. 2632); Japanese-American Committee for Democracy (p. 2242).
- SAIONJI, KINKAZU, secretary, Japanese IPR (p. 364):  
 Collaborated with agents of the Soviet intelligence apparatus as shown by sworn testimony.  
 Subject of action by agency of American Government or a foreign non-Communist government on grounds involving loyalty or national security.
- SALISBURY, LAWRENCE, editor, Far Eastern Survey (exhibit 801); American Council IPR (p. 996):  
 Affiliated with: Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy (pp. 4610-11); Friends of Chinese Democracy (p. 622).
- SCHNEIDER, HELEN, business manager, Pacific Affairs (exhibit 801):  
 Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.  
 Refused to answer on the ground of self-incrimination.
- SERVICE, JOHN S., member and speaker (p. 788):  
 Subject of action by agency of American Government or a foreign non-Communist government on grounds involving loyalty or national security.
- SMEDLEY, AGNES, member (p. 73):  
 Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.  
 Collaborated with agents of the Soviet Intelligence apparatus as shown by sworn testimony.  
 Made one or more trips to Communist territory.  
 Affiliated with: Amerasia (exhibit 1355); Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy (p. 2789).  
 Deceased.
- SNOW, EDGAR, member and writer (p. 73, exhibit 1334):  
 Made one or more trips to Communist territory.  
 Affiliated with: Amerasia (exhibit 1355); China Aid Council (p. 1514); Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy (p. 2789).
- SNOW, MRS. EDGAR (Nym Wales), member and writer (exhibit 1334):  
 Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.  
 Made one or more trips to Communist territory.  
 Writer for official publications of the Communist Party or the Communist International or for a Communist government or for pro-Communist press services.  
 Affiliated with: American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Co-operatives, also known as Indusco, Inc. (p. 3793); Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy (pp. 4610-4611); Friends of Chinese Democracy (p. 622).
- STEIGER, ANDREW, writer (Pacific Affairs, 1941):  
 Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.  
 Made one or more trips to Communist territory.  
 Writer for official publications of the Communist Party or the Communist International or for a Communist government or for pro-Communist press services.

STEIN, GUENTHER, writer (p. 143; exhibit 1334):

Collaborated with agents of the Soviet Intelligence apparatus as shown by sworn testimony.

Made one or more trips to Communist territory.

Subject of action by agency of American Government or a foreign non-Communist government on grounds involving loyalty or national security.

Out of the country or otherwise unavailable for subpoena.

Affiliated with: Amerasia (exhibit 1355); Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy (p. 2789).

STEWART, MARGUERITE A. (Mrs. Maxwell Stewart), school secretary; administrative secretary (exhibit 801):

Attended founding meeting of Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy.

STEWART, MAXWELL S., pamphlet editor (exhibit 801):

Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses. Denied.

Writer for official publications of the Communist Party or the Communist International or for a Communist government or pro-Communist press services.

Affiliated with: Amerasia (exhibit 1355); American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, also known as Indusco, Inc. (p. 3793); American Friends of the Chinese People—official organ China Today (p. 4272); Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy (pp. 4610-4611).

Signer of a statement defending the Soviet Union as "a consistent bulwark against war and aggression."

Signer of a statement attacking the United States for "suppressing the Chinese masses and fomenting civil wars among them."

STRONG, ANNA LOUISE, writer (exhibit 1334):

Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.

Collaborated with agents of the Soviet Intelligence apparatus as shown by sworn testimony.

Made one or more trips to Communist territory.

Writer for official publications of the Communist Party or the Communist International or for a Communist government or for pro-Communist press services.

Affiliated with: Amerasia (exhibit 1355); Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy (p. 56).

SUES, ILONA RALF, writer (exhibit 1334):

Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.

Affiliated with: Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy (p. 2789); Friends of Chinese Democracy (p. 622).

TERRILL, KATHERINE, executive secretary IPR (p. 295):

Affiliated with: American Friends of the Chinese People, official organ: China Today (p. 4170); China Aid Council (p. 1514); Japanese-American Committee for Democracy (p. 2242); Russian War Relief (p. 295).

Signer of a statement attacking the United States for "suppressing the Chinese masses and fomenting civil war among them."

THOMPSON, VIRGINIA, writer (p. 1222):

Writer for official publications of the Communist Party or the Communist International or for a Communist government or for pro-Communist press services.

Affiliated with: Amerasia (exhibit 1355), Federated Press (p. 2630).

THORNER, DANIEL, writer (p. 3960); member (p. 3957):

Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.

Refused to answer on the ground of self-incrimination.

VAN KLEECK, MARY, member American Council (p. 683); writer (exhibit 1334):

Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.

Out of the country or otherwise unavailable for subpoena.

Affiliated with: American Russian Institute (p. 4091); Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy (pp. 4610-4611).

Signer of a statement defending the Soviet Union as "a consistent bulwark against war and aggression."



- VINCENT, JOHN CARTER, trustee (p. 713); conference participant (p. 113):  
Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses. Denied.
- WATTS, RICHARD, writer (exhibit 1334):  
Affiliated with: American Russian Institute (p. 4091); Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy (pp. 4610-4611); Friends of Chinese Democracy (p. 622); American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Co-operatives, also known as Indusco, Inc. (p. 3793).
- WHITE, HARRY DEXTER, proposed conference delegate (p. 444); recommended for conference secretariat (p. 494):  
Collaborated with agents of the Soviet Intelligence apparatus as shown by sworn testimony.  
Deceased.
- WINTER, ELLA, writer (exhibit 1383):  
Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses.  
Writer for official publications of the Communist Party or the Communist International or for a Communist government or for pro-Communist press services.  
Out of the country or otherwise unavailable for subpoena.  
Signer of a statement defending the Soviet Union as "a consistent bulwark against war and aggression."
- YARDUMIAN, ROSE, secretary, Washington IPR (exhibit 801); secretary-librarian (exhibit 801):  
Made one or more trips to Communist territory.  
Writer for official publications of the Communist Party or the Communist International or for a Communist government or for pro-Communist press services.
- YAKHONTOFF, VICTOR A., member (p. 73):  
Collaborated with agents of the Soviet Intelligence apparatus as shown by sworn testimony.  
Made one or more trips to Communist territory.  
Affiliated with: American Friends of the Chinese People, official organ: China Today (p. 4182).  
Signer of a statement attacking the United States for "suppressing the Chinese masses and fomenting civil war among them."

#### ROLE OF THE SOVIET IPR

The first invitation to the Soviet Union to join the IPR came in 1931, the result of a unanimous decision of an IPR conference held in Shanghai (p. 4035). The invitation was reiterated by Secretary-General Edward C. Carter from time to time. Three years later that formal affiliation took place as the result of a "founding meeting" held in Moscow on July 28, 1934. Carter had begun negotiations for this purpose in 1929 when he, Jerome D. Greene, J. Merle Davis, C. F. Loomis, Frederick V. Field, and others visited Moscow (pp. 11, 4035).

The Board members and officers of the Soviet IPR elected at this 1934 founding meeting were: President, Prof. V. E. Motylev, director of the Scientific Research Institute of the Great Soviet World Atlas; vice president, G. N. Voitinski, chief of the Pacific "cabinet" of the Institute of World Economics and World Politics; secretary-general A. Kantorovich; A. Ia. Arosev, chairman of the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries; K. A. Mekhonoshin, director of the Institute of Oceanography; S. S. Ioffe, deputy chief of the administration of the Great Northern Sea Route; A. S. Svandze, director of the Bank for Foreign Trade; I. A. Adamdovich, chairman of the Kamchatka Joint-Stock Co.; Ia. D. Ianson, president of the chamber of commerce; and Ia. M. Berkovich, manager of the East Fish Trust (pp. 189, 190).

Mr. Carter and his group evidently were exceedingly anxious to secure the affiliation. He described the steps he took to urge the establishment of a national council of the IPR in the Soviet Union. "I backed them," he declared, "I tried to get money for them. I tried to get publications. We tried to get them to write articles \* \* \*" (p. 11).

For its own members and the public at large, the IPR has its own version of the significance of this affiliation, which formally lasted until 1939. According to William L. Holland, the Soviet IPR consisted of "\* \* \* representatives of leading Soviet scientific societies concerned with the Far East. \* \* \*" He deprecates their role, stating that "The Russians were never active, however, except on one occasion, in 1936, they sent no delegates to Institute conferences, nor did they seem interested in cooperating in its research program." He adds that the Soviet IPR was reportedly dissolved in 1950 (p. 1225).

It was Mr. Carter's contention that Soviet scholars were scholars "in the true sense of the word" and that the IPR would have no hesitancy in employing them in the field of their special competence (p. 53).

According to Mr. Lattimore:

This whole situation was the very reverse of the Russians trying to infiltrate the Institute of Pacific Relations. The Institute of Pacific Relations as an international body was trying to get the Russians in (p. 3248).

The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee in the course of its investigations was enabled to get a deeper insight as to the background of Soviet participation in the IPR from those familiar with the motivations and mechanisms of the Soviet apparatus.

To properly evaluate Soviet participation in the IPR, some historic background is essential. Joseph Zack Kornfeder, a former member of the central executive committee of the Communist Party, U. S. A., and a former member of the Anglo-American secretariat of the Communist International in Moscow, testified on September 20, 1951, that Earl Browder, later general secretary of the Communist Party, U. S. A., had been previously a member of the body known as the Pan-Pacific secretariat, a subsidiary body of the Red International of Labor Unions then headed by S. A. Losovsky (p. 883). The aim was to concentrate upon the forces of labor in China and Japan. About 1931 Browder was replaced by Harrison George, who was instructed to move the secretariat to the United States because the Communists were having difficulties in the Far East. According to Mr. Kornfeder, the IPR was mentioned as a possible respectable front for Communist operations in the Far East. Mr. Browder is reported to have said that the Communist Party already had "\* \* \* important contacts in there at that time" (p. 883).

#### RELATION TO THE SOVIET FOREIGN OFFICE

In his biennial report as general secretary of the IPR for June 1930, J. Merle Davis described his visit to the various national councils abroad in the autumn of 1927 and the winter of 1928. He mentions his visit to Moscow where he—

met with Foreign Office officials and Third International leaders to whom he explained the Institute of Pacific Relations. Through the Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, he was able to hold a conference with a group

of specialists representing the principal Russian scientific societies interested in far eastern and Pacific questions. Tentative plans were made with this group and a committee was formed for the purpose of cooperating with the Institute of Pacific Relations and participation in the 1929 conference (exhibit 1368).

The picture is brought down to later years through the testimony of Igor Bogolepov, formerly attached to the general staff of the Red Army, former liaison officer between the general staff and the Soviet Foreign Office, secretary of the Soviet delegation at the Geneva Disarmament Conference in 1927-28, former assistant to the chief of the League of Nations division of the Soviet Foreign Office, Red Army liaison officer with the Spanish Republican forces in the Spanish Civil War, former foreign editor of French-language Journal aux Moscow, former chairman of the Soviet Foreign Broadcast System. While in the Soviet Foreign Office, Mr. Bogolepov was working in the premises of the Institute for World Economics and Politics, headed by Eugene Varga, under the same roof with the Soviet IPR. The Soviet IPR was an integral part of the Institute for World Economics and Politics, which was in turn a subsidiary of the Communist Academy (pp. 4487-4488, 4578, 4588 exhibit 1416).

Speaking of the Communist Academy, Mr. Bogolepov pointed out that although it was indeed the "highest scientific organization in the Soviet Union," it could not be properly compared with the scholarly and scientific institutions of our own country, since it was restricted to "Marxist and Communist science." Here officials were trained for activity in the Communist International and the various branches of Soviet intelligence, as well as other branches of the Soviet administration (p. 4587). As E. C. Carter characterized it, it was "the citadel of the faith in Soviet Russia" (p. 4588). According to Prof. Nicholas N. Poppe, a leading Mongolian scholar formerly attached to the University of Leningrad, the academy operated under the direct supervision of the central committee of the Russian Communist Party (p. 2723).

The Soviet IPR was not an autonomous body of scholars and scientists free to establish relations with its opposite number in the United States. Mr. Bogolepov was most explicit in denying the existence of any private, independent research organizations in the Soviet Union (p. 4573).

In a confidential memorandum found in the IPR files, marked "Not for distribution outside the office," Mr. Carter pointed out that "many of the institute's contacts in Moscow have been made with Narkomindel, the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs" (p. 4576). On December 24, 1934, Mr. Carter interviewed Maxim Litvinov at the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs which the latter then headed. Mr. Litvinov was "extremely gratified that the Soviet Union was to participate fully in the work of the IPR (p. 4506).

Carter indicated, however, that the Soviet Government was most punctilious in maintaining the "fiction" of the autonomy of VOX (the Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries) and TASS, the Soviet news agency, which were represented at the founding conference of the Soviet IPR (p. 4576). Mr. Carter emphasized the necessity of perpetuating this "fiction" as follows:

It is fairly important to take safeguards against any circumstances arising which might provide ammunition for these non-Soviet members of the institute who may suspect Bolshevik propaganda in the work of the Soviet council. If a clear



distinction is established and maintained in institute circles between the Soviet council and Narkomindel, it will help in any such contingency (p. 4577).

Writing to Philip C. Jessup on June 29, 1939, Mr. Carter disclosed how he cooperated with the Soviet Foreign Office in its strategy of make-believe:

Knowing how correct the U. S. S. R. IPR council is with reference to the strictest separation of their activities and those of the Narkomindel, I did not let Molotoff know that I was in Moscow until the day before I left \* \* \*. He was very anxious to have me see the Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Losovsky (p. 2729).

This was the same Losovsky who was formerly head of the Red International of Labor Unions, and who was in 1939 responsible to the Foreign Office for its Asian affairs. Mr. Losovsky declared that the participation of the Soviet IPR council in the conference at Victoria "would be followed with closest interest by the Narkomindel." Carrying the fiction one step further, Mr. Carter stated that Losovsky spoke in "his capacity as a private citizen of the Soviet Union" (p. 2729).

Even in the United States IPR officials maintained frequent and intimate contact with representatives of the Soviet Foreign Office, including Ambassador Constantine Oumansky (pp. 3264, 3677), Counsel Gokhman (p. 3272), G. G. Dolbin (p. 3646), of the Embassy staff and others. Field received frequent invitations to celebrations at the Soviet Embassy (pp. 4040-4042).

Mr. Bogolepov stressed the point that the Soviet Foreign Office was interested in the IPR for its " \* \* \* utilization as a media for propaganda infiltration of general ideas favorable to the Soviet Union." This work was conducted under the supervision of a joint committee in the Foreign Office directly responsible to the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (p. 4496).

Questioned regarding some of the organizations tied in with the Soviet IPR, Mr. Bogolepov referred to VOX and TASS as cover organizations for Soviet intelligence. But Mr. Carter, reporting his meeting with Kuliabko, acting president of VOX on December 25, 1934, described the organization as merely "scientific, cultural, literary, musical and artistic" (p. 4497).

#### SOVIET COMMUNIST CORE

It is worth while to take a biographical bird's-eye view of those who were active in the Soviet IPR to determine whether they were primarily objective scholars and scientists or hard-boiled Communist leaders.

Mr. Carter has described V. E. Motylev, president of the Soviet IPR, as "an economist by training, but has a wide background of experience in other social and physical sciences," and as former head of the Soviet Encyclopedia (p. 4507). This innocuous portrait is shattered by Professor Poppe, who presents Motylev as a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, " \* \* \* a scientist of very little significance, but an outstanding party organizer" (p. 2697).

Eugene Varga was the head of the Institute for World Economics and Politics, of which the Soviet IPR was a part, also director of the Communist Academy. Mr. Bogolepov has identified him as a former member of the executive committee of the Communist International

(p. 4561). He will be remembered as the Soviet economist who predicted the imminent collapse of American capitalism (p. 2723). Mr. Carter reported an extended discussion with Mr. Varga on December 24, 1934, in which the organization and program of the Communist Academy was described (p. 5404).

Another witness, Alexander Barmine, who once assisted Soviet Foreign Minister Chicherin, testified that he had met G. N. Voitinski, vice president of the Soviet IPR, when the latter was in charge of the Far Eastern Section of the Foreign Office, having come to that post from the Communist International (p. 188). The 1928 Soviet Encyclopedia lists Mr. Voitinski as one who from 1920—

worked at the order of the Comintern in the Far East. He worked for a number of years in the eastern secretariat of the Comintern \* \* \* he also took an intensive part in the further work of the Chinese Communist Party (p. 191).

The background of Voitinski was no secret to the IPR, as disclosed by the fact that the September 1936 issue of Pacific Affairs listed two of his articles published in the Communist International magazine (p. 191).

Mr. Poppe knew Voitinski very well as "an outstanding Communist, a member of the Comintern," and "right-hand of Stalin's No. 1 economist, Varga." Voitinski, according to Poppe, was responsible for a great purge in the Academy of Sciences in 1936-37. In Mr. Poppe's Institute of Oriental Study, 37 scientists out of 94 were arrested and disappeared (p. 2699). Mr. Bogolepov knew Voitinski as former Vice Chief of the Siberian Secret Police, who had received the Order of the Red Banner for his exploits. "To me," said Bogolepov, "he was not a scholar \* \* \* but first a man of the Comintern" (p. 4489). Mr. Carter characterized Voitinski as "a happy combination of the man of affairs and the very qualified scholar" (p. 2729).

A. I. Arosev, chairman of the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations (VOX), was characterized by Mr. Barmine as "an old Bolshevik" who "had the confidence of the Central Committee" of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and was one of its hierarchy (p. 188). Arosev was former Soviet Ambassador in Czechoslovakia (p. 188).

Listed among the founders of the Soviet IPR is A. S. Svanidze, director of the Soviet Bank for Foreign Trade, who was identified by Mr. Barmine as Stalin's brother-in-law and a man "high up in the hierarchy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government" (p. 188). Bogolepov referred to him as "one of the chiefs of the foreign administration of the Soviet secret police \* \* \* ." (p. 4561)

A fellow IPR founder was K. A. Menhonoshin, director of the Institute of Oceanography. Mr. Bogolepov recalled him as Vice Chief of Soviet Naval Intelligence (p. 4553).

According to exhibit 430, Mr. Abramson attended an informal conversation at the Communist Academy on May 26, 1934, with Voitinski, Barnes, and Carter. He was invited to write for Pacific Affairs. Mr. Bogolepov characterized Abramson as a scholar. He hastened to add his definition of a Soviet scholar as a "politician who is working in the field of science." Mr. Bogolepov declared that the Soviet scholar "does not know what objectivity is, and he doesn't care to be objective," for whom in line with Lenin's teachings "there is no impartial science, but there is only party science." Sometimes Bogolepov met Abramson outside of the Institute for World Economics and

Politics, clad in the uniform of the Fourth Division of the General Staff of the Red Army, the military intelligence (p. 4490).

Mr. Bogolepov also identified Avorin, and Kara-Murza, two officials of the Soviet IPR, as connected with Soviet Military Intelligence (pp. 4490, 4491, 4516).

(Mr. Bogolepov has given an explanation, more fully referred to elsewhere, that the IPR was used by Soviet military intelligence as a "double way track" on which the ingoing channel supplied information of military importance while the outgoing arm sought to implant in the minds of Americans certain ideas that would serve Soviet interests most advantageously) (p. 21, this report)

The IPR was of such import to Soviet authorities that Carter could write to Jessup in 1939 about Motylev's "deepening confidence in the value of the institute and a desire deeper than ever before to find ways and means of strengthening the work of the institute throughout the world" (p. 2728). It was evidently sufficiently valuable to warrant discussions 5 or 6 hours a day for 5 days, according to this letter. In his report to Frederick V. Field in 1935, Mr. Carter added that although the main job in Moscow was discussion, Soviet "\* \* \* provision for entertainment was a striking demonstration of the fact that the whole machinery of the State and of the scientific world was at the disposal of the Secretary General" (p. 4569).

Carter and the members of the inner core of the IPR who attended meetings in Moscow were not oblivious of their association with leading Communist stalwarts. In a letter to Frederick V. Field dated January 16, 1935, Mr. Carter gloats over the fact that "the U. S. S. R. group could not have begun to work under better auspices. A majority of the members of the committee are members of the party. All are influential" (p. 4560). He made no mention, however, about the presence of any objective scholars. It would seem that Carter, along with Harriet Moore and Kathleen Barnes, who attended a number of Moscow meetings, suffered no "academic jitters about bolshevism" (p. 647).

#### AMERICA PAYS, MOSCOW DICTATES

In his statement of October 10, 1951, Mr. William L. Holland has emphasized that from 1935 to 1939, the Soviet council contributed no more than 2 or 3 percent of the IPR annual budget of from \$90,000 to \$100,000 (p. 1225). From 1925 to 1950 United States sources, including the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corp., supplied 77 percent of the total IPR income of \$2,569,000 (p. 1217). The American IPR boasted of 1,100 members, including businessmen, scholars, teachers, journalists, Government officials, community leaders and others (p. 1216), while there is no sign of any membership organization in the U. S. S. R. IPR publications and headquarters were centered in New York City. An eyewitness, Bogolepov testified that the Soviet IPR was not really an institute in his day, "but a desk or a group of research workers on China, Japan, and other far eastern countries" (p. 4488). Despite overwhelming preponderance of American resources poured into the IPR, there is considerable evidence that Soviet officials exercised a dominating influence on a number of important occasions, in the face of which the American IPR representatives displayed the utmost servility. In this respect the minutes



of the conferences held in Moscow in April 1936 are most instructive (pp. 3136, 3172, 3316 ff., 3323 ff.). Present at these meetings were Motylev, Voitinski, Carter, Lattimore, Harondor, and Harriet Moore. Despite the IPR claim to being an "international" organization, the record of conferences in Moscow shows no delegation from any national council other than the U. S. S. R. and the U. S. A. This did not hinder the making of important decisions apparently binding upon the IPR as a whole.

IPR spokesmen have repeatedly announced to their American supporters that the organization advocates no particular line. At the October 28, 1944, meeting of the American delegation to the IPR conference, Mr. Philip C. Jessup denied any purpose of "formulating a party line for the delegation" (p. 991). Mr. Holland in his statement of October 10, 1951, insisted that "the institute is not a society of like-minded people interested in advancing some particular philosophy or policy," and that it expresses "no political judgments or sympathies." Nevertheless a very opposite note was sounded at IPR meetings in Moscow.

Speaking authoritatively on April 8, 1936, as the vice president of the Soviet Council, G. N. Voitinski said that Pacific Affairs had been reviewed in the Soviet magazine, *Tikhii Okean*, Pacific Affairs, and that such a magazine which is important should have a definite aim. Although different opinions are expressed, he declared, there should be a general line in it. At that time, prior to the signing of the Stalin-Hitler pact, the line of the Soviet Union and Communist Parties throughout the world was for collective security against the Fascist aggressors. Voitinski felt that the general tenor of the articles should be to show that collective security is the only possible way to peace. Voitinski remonstrated because "at present the magazine has no line, and this he called the main weakness" (pp. 3136-3137).

Motylev followed in the footsteps of Voitinski. He said that even if the aim of Pacific Affairs was to characterize the general conditions, it was impossible to do this without a definite idea about them. In order to satisfy most of the members of the institute, Motylev thought, it is necessary for Pacific Affairs to have a definite political position.

A letter from Mr. Carter dated October 19, 1937, copies of which were directed to Holland, Lattimore, Chen Han-seng, Harriet Moore, Catherine Porter, Kathleen Barnes, and other IPR insiders, told of proposals made by officers of the Soviet IPR for the "better equipment of the secretary general for his work" (p. 3481). Among these he listed the following:

Is it not possible for the American and British councils to make such a clear-cut analysis of the forces at work in the Far East as will reveal to their publics the nature and danger of the present aggression? Should not the institute in all countries be the foremost organization in making highly fundamental analyses?  
\* \* \* A special conference convened by the American council, if adequately reported and publicized, could give a fundamental analysis of the whole far eastern situation which might be of the greatest importance to public opinion throughout the world (p. 3486).

Mr. Lattimore's behavior in the face of this frank dictation from the representatives of a Communist totalitarian government was almost supine. According to the April 8th minutes, he admitted that the review of the magazine in *Tikhii Okean* was entirely correct when it said that Pacific Affairs reflects the chaotic conditions in capitalistic countries. He did not defend the publication of which he

was the editor (p. 3137). Mr. Carter assured his Soviet hosts that there was already a change in the attitude toward political questions in the IPR as reflected in the agenda for its fifth round-table conference. The question naturally arose as to who was to supply this definite line for Pacific Affairs and the IPR generally. Mr. Lattimore has supplied the answer in a letter dated June 2, 1937, to Dr. Motylev, from which we quote:

If I am to convert Pacific Affairs from a loose and unorganized collection of articles into a journal which has recognizable position and general point of view, I must rely very considerably on you. The Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations is more interested in this question of coherence than any of the others, all of which, by their composition and form of organization are more or less incoherent. If I could have from you an article in each number, and if these articles were planned to succeed each other in such a manner as to create a recognizable line of thought, it would be much easier to get other contributors to converge on this line. \* \* \* I conclude by begging you once more to start sending me the articles which you mentioned while I was still in London (p. 3241).

This letter was a reiteration of Lattimore's April 8, 1936, request for Soviet articles which would show a general line, around which other articles would naturally gravitate (p. 3139).

Carter added an almost suppliant bid for Moscow direction, stating that Pacific Affairs will be without focus until the Soviet members contribute to it regularly, in which event the issues would be clearer and would show up the negative quality of many of the other articles (p. 3137).

In line with this suggestion, Mr. Lattimore suggested to Motylev in a letter dated February 8, 1938, that the latter send him an article on the "possibilities of constructive international action, to be considered as part of a general defense against imperialist and fascist aggression," which would be used as the "leading contribution" in the June issue of Pacific Affairs (pp. 3434, 3435).

But the Communist commissars were not content with such general criticism and instruction. They proceeded to take the line of their American disciples apart piecemeal and in ruthless detail. In each case the free American delegates humbly accepted reproof from their Soviet mentors. Lattimore even came back for more in his June 2, 1937, letter to Motylev enclosing the June issue of Pacific Affairs for critical comment. He added the additional assurance:

I think we are in general agreement that the contents of Pacific Affairs ought to be planned fairly well in advance, so that the numbers will follow each other in regular sequence, developing a recognizable line of thought (p. 3241).

He had learned his lesson well.

Voitinski first took Pacific Affairs to task for its publication of an article on Japan by a British writer named Sir Frederick Whyte, claiming that he had not sufficiently depicted Japan as the aggressor. Lattimore asked if an article on the Japanese Monroe Doctrine did not meet the issue. But Voitinski was not satisfied (p. 3137).

Motylev deplored the fact that social and economic conditions in the Far East were not sufficiently described to show the causes of the rise of Red China and similar movements. Lattimore asked if Kathleen Barnes' article did not give something on this subject, but Motylev felt that it gave only one side of the picture of the Soviet Far East (*ibid.*).

Motylev attacked another article by Sir Frederic Eggleston on Japan, claiming that it justified Japan. Lattimore pointed out that

the article reflected a definite body of opinion in Great Britain while Carter stated that they had published a pamphlet by a Marxist (Chao-ting Chi) which would deal adequately with the questions raised. However, Motylev insisted that Pacific Affairs should have carried an analysis of the "contradictions" in Eggleston's article (*ibid.*).

Motylev had been greatly aroused by the publication of an article on the Perspectives of the Chinese Revolution by Harold Isaacs, a Communist of the Trotskyite variety (Trotskyism is the most detested anathema among the Soviet hierarchy.) Motylev was indignant because an answering article had not been published in full from *China Today*. Lattimore proffered most profuse apologies. He pleaded that at that time he did not want to determine a definite policy alone. He said he had accepted the Isaacs article because of the paucity of material for the issue of Pacific Affairs. It was then impossible, he declared, to get in touch with the Chinese Communists for a proper answer to the article. Had he known in advance of the Hansu Chan (Ch'ao-ting Chi) article in *China Today*, he said he would have tried to get the answer published rather in Pacific Affairs. He raised no question as to the possibility that Isaacs might be an objective scholar despite his Trotskyite sympathies. Finally Lattimore promised as a palliative, an article by a Communist writer which would be antagonistic to the Chinese Council and the British Council (*ibid.*).

Motylev particularly expressed indignation about a review, by the well-known anti-Communist writer, William H. Chamberlin, of a book by Stalin. Lattimore replied that he had not realized the writer's position, but that as soon as he learned of the Soviet's opinion of him, he had canceled an article he had ordered from Chamberlin (p. 3139).

Under date of February 8, 1938, Lattimore wrote to Motylev that he had "carefully noted your criticism" in reference to a mildly critical article on the U. S. S. R. by the British economic expert, L. M. Hubbard. Lattimore apologized for having "expressed myself clumsily" in his reply regarding anti-Soviet articles in Pacific Affairs. He explained that refusal of Hubbard's article would have alienated the British Council. He therefore promised (1) to delete from the article "one of its most objectionable paragraphs," (2) to make an effort to get the article withdrawn, (3) to publish Motylev's article in reply. Finally he pledged that in the future he would "publish only material which emphasized the true issues which the world is facing." Subsequent testimony and the files of Pacific Affairs disclosed that the deletions were made and an answering article by members of the IPR staff was published (pp. 3434-3439).

A passing comment is appropriate at this point. In his statement of October 10, 1951, Mr. Holland listed with considerable pride a number of "anti-Communist writers in IPR publications" (p. 1222). Among them are the very individuals whom the IPR repudiated in Moscow and in its own publications, namely Chamberlin, Hubbard, Eggleston, and Whyte.

Another example of IPR docility toward Moscow is to be found in Carter's letter to Motylev dated February 10, 1936, in which he asked that Motylev review, together with Harriet Moore and Lattimore, the relation between the U. S. S. R. IPR on the one hand and the International Secretariat and the other National Councils on the other, "with a view to discovering wherein we have made mistakes or failed



to carry out the plans which we formulated in December 1934." Mr. Carter also asked for Motylev's "criticisms of the preliminary round-table discussion outlines" of the IPR (p. 3243).

#### IMPLANTING IDEAS IN AMERICAN MINDS

Soviet cultivation of the IPR paid handsome dividends in the field of propaganda, which often was distantly removed from the far-eastern theater of IPR interests.

Leading IPR officials were seriously concerned over the mounting indignation in the United States in regard to the series of Moscow trials and purges. For example Frederick V. Field, writing to Miss Virginia Burdick, of the American Russian Institute, on March 9, 1937, expressed the opinion that bold action was necessary to counteract "the very confused and uninformed state of public opinion in this country during and since the recent Moscow trial." By way of reply Miss Burdick informed Field on March 30, 1937, that Mr. Carter had already written along this line for the March issue of the American Russian Institute Bulletin a review of the verbatim report of the "Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Center" (p. 4144). Carter took it upon himself to send out to prominent individuals the official reports of the Moscow trials (exhibit 1029). He invited distinguished guests to listen to Constantine Oumansky, "the able, two-fisted counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington" for a "hundred-percent Bolshevik view of the Moscow trials" (exhibit 1055). The June 1938 issue of Pacific Affairs published a vigorous defense of the trials by Mary Van Kleeck. A condemnation of the trials by William Henry Chamberlin was promptly answered by Owen Lattimore in the September 1938 issue in which he hailed the proceedings as having "discovered and rectified" many abuses and conspiracies, which he claimed was "a triumph for democracy" (p. 3467). Another individual active in the IPR, Philip R. Faymonville, condemned the defendants for "their betrayal \* \* \* of their country" (p. 3702). Even where the purges affected Kantorovich, the secretary-general of the Soviet IPR, and TASS correspondent, Romm, who had been closely associated with Field and Carter in the United States, there was no sound of protest from American IPR sources (pp. 2700, 2715). Kate Mitchell and Carter spent 4 hours with Oumansky in which they got "a lot of interesting side lights on the Moscow trials—particularly with regard to Romm" (p. 4587). According to Bogolepov and Poppe, it was the genuine scholars who were most disastrously affected by the purges in the Soviet IPR (pp. 2699, 4487). In a round-robin statement in September 1939, the following IPR members or writers condemned those who were "maligning" the Soviet government: T. A. Bisson, George B. Cressey, Mortimer Graves, John A. Kingsbury, Corliss Lamont, Maxwell S. Stewart, Mary Van Kleeck, and Ella Winter (p. 4256).

Issue after issue can be cited on which IPR spokesmen came forward in defense of the Soviet viewpoint of that particular period. Enough of these instances will be mentioned here to establish the point, without being exhaustive.

Mrs. William Henry Widener, a script writer for the Voice of America, brought to the subcommittee's attention an IPR book entitled "The Soviet Far East" by William M. Mandel, who has refused to affirm or

deny Communist Party membership, claiming the protection of the fifth amendment. After considerable study of source material, Mrs. Widener termed the book "largely Communist propaganda." The book formed part of an inquiry under the direction of I. W. Dafoe, chairman of the Pacific Council, and his successors Philip C. Jessup and Edgar J. Tarr. William L. Holland, Kate Mitchell, and Hilda Austern carried the major share of responsibility for research and editorial work (pp. 766-768).

John Carter Vincent, John N. Hazard, and Owen Lattimore, all having IPR associations, accompanied Henry A. Wallace on his trip which resulted in the book, *Soviet Asia Mission*. The actual writing was done by Andrew Steiger, IPR writer, cited as a member of the Communist Party, and a writer for the *Daily Worker* (pp. 699, 1316). Vincent, Lattimore, and Wallace had been members of the IPR board of trustees. The book speaks admiringly of a Soviet city built by slave labor (pp. 1321-1325). The book pays glowing tribute to "Marshal Stalin's wise leadership." Despite the Soviet purges, which included members of the Soviet IPR personnel, the book declared that Stalin had raised science, literature, and art "to unrivaled heights" (p. 1327).

On November 6, 1935, Frederick V. Field sent to the Soviet newspaper *Za Industrial-Izaci* a statement greeting "the tremendous strides that the Soviet Union has made in its economic development" (p. 4039).

In 1938 Carter, Holland, and the American Council received three copies of the *Soviet Atlas*, edited by V. E. Motylev. It was a "big day in the life of the IPR" (p. 2705). They "thumbed through it enthusiastically" according to Chen Han-seng, who wrote a review for *IPR Notes* characterizing the work as the "height of modern cartography" (p. 4146). Mr. Lattimore recommended the book in *Pacific Affairs* as "not vulgar propaganda, but scientific argument on a plane that commands full intellectual respect," despite the fact that it clearly proclaimed its aim "to give a Marxist-Leninist cartographic picture of the world, i. e. a comprehensive picture of the epoch of imperialism and particularly the period of the general crisis of capitalism" (p. 2703). Professor Poppe testified that the *Atlas* was not accurate and that it was propaganda. He specifically called attention to distortions in reference to Outer Mongolia (his special field of study), railroad lines, and the designations of certain countries as "imperialist" (pp. 2704-2705). Even IPR scholar George B. Cressey has criticized the *Atlas* because Manchuria and the Outer Mongolian People's Republic were not properly designated (p. 3481).

In 1936 or 1937 the Soviet Union was eager to add one more vote in the League of Nations through the admission of its satellite the Republic of Mongolia. According to the testimony of Bogolepov, he was advised by Litvinov, his superior, to "prepare the terrain" by mobilizing "writers and journalists and other people, to describe for the Western World the progress which is achieved in (the) Mongolian Popular Republic" (p. 4518). Lattimore was recommended for the task.

Corroborative testimony on this point comes from William C. Bullitt, former American Ambassador in Moscow, who declared that in 1936 Lattimore urged him to wire to President Roosevelt recom-

mending the immediate recognition of the independence of the Mongolian Peoples' Republic (p. 4523). Mr. Lattimore had insisted that there was no Soviet control of the territory. Mr. Bullitt was particularly shocked by this incident because in 1934, Soviet Assistant Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs Karakhan had described to him in detail how Outer Mongolia was terrorized by the Soviet secret police (p. 4524). Referring to Lattimore's writings on Outer Mongolia, Professor Poppe calls them "either superficial, or a distortion of the truth." By way of example he cited Lattimore's article in *Amerasia* for March-August 1938, to the effect that "Soviet Policy in Outer Mongolia cannot be fairly called Red imperialism" (pp. 2724-2725).

Writing to Mr. A. J. Gradjanzev in 1938 during the period prior to the outbreak of World War II, Mr. Lattimore, although deeply concerned about the situation all over the world, said he "cannot see any possibility of the simultaneous attack from east and west which alone could threaten the Soviet Union" (p. 3585).

The pattern jibed fully with a 1931 general directive of Molotov, Stalin's second in command, who brought out the point which the IPR propagandists have carried out so ably:

Who reads the Communist papers? Only a few people who are already Communists. We don't need to propagandize them. What is our object? Who do we have to influence? We have to influence non-Communists, if we want to make them Communists, or if we want to fool them. So, we have to try to infiltrate in the big press, to influence millions of people, and not merely hundreds of thousands (p. 4511).

Mr. Lattimore has also made his general technique plain in a letter to Carter on July 10, 1938:

for the U. S. S. R.—back their international policy in general, but without using their slogans and above all without giving them or anybody else an impression of subservience (p. 40).

Not the least insignificant of the pro-Soviet propaganda activities of the IPR was the scheme of having outstanding Soviet spokesmen meet influential Americans. The matter is mentioned by Mr. Carter in his letter to Motylev on February 10, 1936, in which he says:

The American Council desires that I raise with you the question of arranging for the Soviet IPR representatives to meet influential groups of American citizens in New York, Washington, Chicago, Denver, and San Francisco (p. 3244).

Thus in 1944 Carter tried to arrange a meeting with "my friend," TASS correspondent, Rogov, through Alger Hiss and Lauchlin Currie with Stanley K. Hornbeck of the State Department and other important Government officials (pp. 131, 132). All three (Hiss, Currie, and Rogov) have been charged with being connected with the Soviet intelligence apparatus. John Carter Vincent met Rogov at the Cosmos Club in Washington in 1944, at a luncheon arranged by William C. Johnstone of the IPR (p. 1747). Present also was C. F. Remer of the Office of Strategic Services (p. 1802). Previous mention has been made of the conferences arranged with Soviet Ambassador Constantine Oumansky to discuss the Moscow trials.

The hearings of this subcommittee record a long line of pro-Soviet articles, pamphlets, books, and letters, by such outstanding IPR characters as: Asiaticus, Kathleen Barnes, Joseph Barnes, Edward C. Carter, Frederick V. Field, John N. Hazard, Philip J. Jaffe, Corliss Lamont, Eleanore Lattimore, Owen Lattimore, William M. Mandel, Harriet L. Moore, Edgar Snow, Andrew Steiger, Marguerite



A. Stewart, Maxwell S. Stewart, Anna Louise Strong, Mary Van Kleeck, Ella Winter, Victor A. Yakhontoff, and others.

No claim is made here that the persons responsible for this marked devotion to Soviet interests were actually paid to do such work, although it is true that Miss Strong was actually employed by the Moscow Daily News. It is more conceivable that these individuals were motivated primarily by their complete acceptance of the Soviet philosophy to the point of subordinating themselves voluntarily to its will. As Bogolepov described the Soviet practice, "We do not pay the agents. The agents work out of their sympathy toward the Soviet Union" (p. 4497).

#### IPR AND SOVIET INTELLIGENCE

It will be remembered that Bogolepov and Barmine both referred to the IPR as a cover organization for Soviet military intelligence. Our subcommittee cannot claim sufficient access to the innermost depths of the world-wide Communist network in all its deviousness to be able to supply the full picture. We can only sketch the pattern as it unfolds from the witnesses and documents available to us as a Senate subcommittee.

This report already has indicated the number of officers and members of the board of the Soviet IPR who have been cited by witnesses as directly associated with Soviet military intelligence including A. S. Svanidze, G. N. Voitinski, Abramson, Mekhonoshin, Avorin, and Kara-Murza. Also previously mentioned have been those who have been listed among American IPR personnel as collaborating with agents of the Soviet intelligence apparatus including: Solomon Adler, Joseph F. Barnes, Frank V. Coe, Henry Collins, Lauchlin Currie, Laurence Duggan, Israel Epstein, John K. Fairbank, Frederick V. Field, Michael Greenberg, Alger Hiss, Owen Lattimore, Duncan C. Lee, Robert T. Miller, Hozumi Ozaki, Fred Poland, Lee Pressman, Kimikazu Saionji, Agnes Smedley, Guenther Stein, Anna Louise Strong, Harry Dexter White, and Victor A. Yakhontoff, plus those involved in the Amerasia case, namely John Stewart Service, Andrew Roth, Kate Mitchell, and Philip Jaffe. We propose to amplify this picture from the record.

When Lattimore was before the subcommittee, he was asked whether he assumed that the Soviet officials he had dealt with in Moscow were intelligence agents. He replied:

I assume they were all connected with the Soviet Government in one form or another. \* \* \* Of course, at the present time, I would generally assume that any Soviet citizen or subject is an intelligence agent or a potential one (p. 3325).

Nevertheless, he found nothing irregular in his having asked at the Soviet IPR conference on April 6, 1936, whether "there was any special interest in the U.S.S.R. about the question of air bases in the Pacific" (p. 3323).

Although the work of V. E. Motylev, president of the Soviet IPR, is presented as simply that of a geographer in charge of the Great Soviet World Atlas, Professor Poppe has advanced a somewhat different version. "Mapping and publication of maps" he declared, "is controlled by the NKVD (Soviet secret police). The only agency publishing maps and permitted to do so is the chief geographic and geodetic department of the NKVD" (p. 2697).

Asked how Soviet intelligence used the IPR for information purposes, Bogolepov stated that it was his impression from his vantage point in the Soviet Foreign Office that the Institute of Pacific Relations was "used by Soviet Intelligence in order to get, via America, the information on Japan and China and Great Britain" (p. 4590). Bearing on this point Voitinski, vice president of the Soviet IPR, told Carter and Barnes on May 26, 1934, that the IPR could be of very great help to him in getting information and printed reports on the inner situation in Netherlands India, the agrarian movement and the financial situation in Japan, economic and historical material on the Japanese colonies, Ludwig Rajchmann's League of Nations report on China and other matters (pp. 2701, 2702). According to Carter's letter to Lattimore dated July 11, 1939, Motylev was "eager for much more intimate factual details giving both very recent economic information and also personal observations as to what is going on in China and Japan" (p. 3331).

After Carter had made a trip covering among other areas the "highly strategical Japanese naval base at Rashin in the northern tip of Korea in 1937", he was, according to his own account, subjected to "very penetrating questions" by the praesidium of the Soviet IPR at its interim meeting on April 21-28, 1938 (p. 3481).

At the April 2, 1936, Moscow meeting Motylev also expressed an interest in receiving from the United States more material on the economic geography of the country, the official publications of Government departments, particularly the statistical reports (p. 3316). Some years later on August 29, 1939, E. V. Harondar on behalf of the Soviet IPR wrote to Kathleen Barnes for a copy of Panama Canal and Its Ports, United States War Department, United States Army Corps of Engineers, revised 1938. By way of reciprocation, Harondar sent an English edition of the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the publication about the Eighteenth Party Congress (p. 646).

Mr. Bogolepov remembered particularly that Soviet Military Intelligence had requested information concerning Alaska and the Aleutian Islands in 1936 or 1937. The minutes of the April 6, 1936 meeting in Moscow with Carter and Lattimore show that Motylev raised the question of receiving information regarding the economic development of the Aleutian Islands and Alaska and the Kurile Islands. He mentioned the strategic importance of these places as well as the fact that the Japanese have a fueling station near Kamchatka, which is a military base (p. 3323).

More than once, declared Bogolepov, there was—

evidence that the people who were working in the Soviet Institute of Pacific Relations had been asked to ask their American counterparts to give some information concerning the fisheries in the Pacific area, and looking into the file I found always the request of naval intelligence (p. 4491).

It will be remembered that Soviet IPR board member K. A. Mekhonoshin was director of the Soviet Institute of Oceanography and vice chief of naval intelligence. The importance of this field of intelligence to the Soviet government was brought out by Carter in his December 25, 1934, report of his meeting at VOX, when he stated that it is estimated that the Soviet Union's capacity to consume fish will always be greater than the capacity of all the lakes, rivers, and oceans to produce fish (p. 4505). This factor he declared has a direct political bearing on the situation in the Far East (p. 4498).

Under date of January 24, 1935, Carter wrote Field enclosing the list of American fisheries publications which the Institute of Oceanography already had and asking Field and Mrs. Barnes to send "any glaring omissions" including also those to be obtained from commercial fish firms (p. 648). At a meeting at the Institute of Oceanography with Carter and Lattimore, Mekhonoshin acknowledged gratefully the receipt of books sent them (p. 4555). A résumé of articles written for either Pacific Affairs or the Far Eastern Survey by Kathleen Barnes, and therefore available to the Soviet authorities, shows the following studies of fisheries: The Clash of Fishing Interests in the Pacific, Alaska Salmon in World Politics, and Fisheries, Mainstay of Soviet-Japanese Friction (p. 645). Mrs. Barnes was known in IPR circles as "our expert on the U. S. S. R." (p. 4096).

Alexander Barmine, former brigadier general in the Soviet Military Intelligence, testified that his superiors had proposed Owen Lattimore and Joseph Barnes to head a secret project for the export of Soviet arms to China, and that the two had been referred to as "our men." It was finally decided to forego the appointment, according to Barmine, because it was felt that "the building up of the branches of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and the military using for a cover shop for military intelligence work in the Pacific area," was more important (pp. 200, 202). He felt that the IPR was ideally suited for the purpose.

In 1938 after he had broken with the Soviets, Barmine checked his observations with General Walter Krivitsky in Paris, also a former member of Soviet Military Intelligence, and now deceased. Krivitsky described the influential contacts of the IPR and its importance to the Soviet intelligence apparatus. He rated the progress of this project as "flourishing" (p. 208).

Hede Massing, a former member of the Soviet espionage apparatus, reported seeing Joseph Barnes on the highly restricted NKVD tennis courts in Moscow. When she expressed alarm at being seen in such surroundings by an American newspaperman, Peter Zubelin, her superior and a very high Soviet intelligence official, told her not to worry about Barnes (pp. 234, 244).

Mr. Bogolepov described an incident at the Institute of World Economics and Politics in 1936. A group entered led by Eugene Varga, Comintern economist, together with Abramson and Kara-Murza, both of whom have been previously designated as officers of the military intelligence, the latter having just returned from Mongolia. With the group was Owen Lattimore. Kara-Murza pointed out, on a large map of central Asia, the route through Mongolia from Manchuria, a highly confidential piece of military information. He also described for Mr. Lattimore's benefit the progress of the mass purges in Mongolia. When Bogolepov expressed his alarm at divulging this important information to a foreign visitor, Kara-Murza assured him that it "is quite all right" (pp. 4516-4518).

Frank Farrell, a former major in the Marine Corps, and a former member of the prosecution staff in the case of Walther F. Heissig, a spy for the German High Command, presented to the subcommittee documents showing that Owen Lattimore had been in touch with Heissig and had actively intervened in Heissig's behalf. Baron Von Reichenau, a German general who had probed deeply into Soviet infiltration, told Mr. Farrell that there was reason to believe that



Heissig was a double agent for the Soviet and German Governments (pp. 4408, 4434).

It is within this background that certain IPR documents and activity should be judged. Was it without significance that Frederick V. Field, admitted by his own writings, by his former Communist associates, and by IPR spokesmen, to be a Communist Party member, in 1942 applied for a commission in Army Air Intelligence, his application being supported by E. C. Carter, Lauchlin Currie and Owen Lattimore (pp. 11, 19)? Or that on October 26, 1936, we find Field writing to Lattimore, then in London, for a "first-rate article on British communications with the Far East, both commercial and military" (p. 3589)?

William W. Lockwood, former secretary of the American Council, was apparently most anxious to feed information of military importance to Field. In a letter dated October 7, 1937, Lockwood passed on a report that "the Military Intelligence Division believes Japan to have 2,000,000 men under arms"; that there were "two American majors, retired or reserve, directing China's air operations" (p. 4127).

On January 5, 1937, Mr. Lockwood suggested to Field the idea of securing some competent person to make an analysis of the United States naval building since 1933, especially the construction and enlargement of naval and air bases in the Pacific (exhibit 766).

Charles F. Loomis, secretary of the IPR group in Hawaii, communicated with Field on July 2, 1937, as follows:

The Navy Intelligence Department tells me that H. C. Fornwall, one of du Pont's men (sic) in Japan who arrived yesterday, has the low-down on the military situation in Japan, so I have just asked him to have lunch with five or six of the keymen in our recent far eastern study group, giving them a chance to pump him (p. 4126).

On March 20, 1939, Earl H. Leaf, an IPR supporter, attached to his letter a report "compiled and written by the Shanghai branch of the British Army Intelligence Service," which he characterized as "strictly confidential." The letter introduced to Field, Lt. Arthur Read, who had just arrived from China (p. 4131).

Referred to in the record are several significant communications during the period of the Stalin-Hitler Pact, when Field headed the American Peace Mobilization, which picketed the White House. Field wrote to Philo W. Parker, president of the Standard Vacuum Oil Co., on April 9, 1940, asking for figures in connection with "the preparation of an article on aviation gasoline in the Far East." Toward this end, he solicited an interview for himself and Ellen Van Zyll de Jong (p. 4141).

The same Mr. Loomis wrote to Field on May 2, 1940, introducing Lt. Col. George E. Arneman, a G-2 intelligence officer at Schofield Barracks, T. H., stating that "he engineered the two Schofield conferences for us and has been a member of several of our study groups" (p. 4125).

An illuminating letter from Carter to Hilda Austern, cited as a Communist, dated September 1, 1941, was marked "Strictly confidential." Mr. Carter asked, "Would you like to tackle the following rush research job for the War Department?" The aim of the project according to the letter is to find "suitable space for landing fields" on a number of Pacific islands, including information on weather and wind conditions, transportation facilities, natural defenses, local

police and military organization, food and labor supply, health conditions, and so forth (p. 642).

A handwritten letter from Miriam Farley to Bill (unidentified), dated April 8, 1946, states that she has been put to work doing the political section of MacArthur's Monthly Report. "There will be a certain sporting interest" she adds, "in seeing how much I can get by with" (p. 395).

According to his own testimony, T. A. Bisson, who had spoken from the same platform as Earl Browder, general secretary of the Communist Party, U. S. A., and Communist leaders in China, was from October 1945 to March or April 1946, with the strategic bombing survey in Japan (p. 4161).

On March 27, 1942, W. W. Lockwood addressed a memorandum to the IPR staff, including KB and MG, presumably Kathleen Barnes and Michael Greenberg, in which he said that a School of Military Government had been organized and that the IPR had been asked for "suggestions on far eastern personnel available and competent to give instruction" (p. 2604).

#### SOVIET PRIVILEGES TO IPR PERSONNEL

IPR officials, especially E. C. Carter and Owen Lattimore, were accorded astonishing privileges and marks of distinction by the Soviet Government. These cannot be viewed as merely expressions of respect for American scholars since that Government, as has already been indicated, is interested primarily in Marxist-Leninist scholarship, in other words scholarship which serves Soviet ends. It is more plausible to assume that these honors were in fact proffered as tokens of appreciation for services rendered.

Here is Carter's description of the treatment he received in the land of the Soviets, as taken from his letter of October 19, 1937, to W. L. Holland.

\* \* \* Furthermore, the Soviet Council this year took care of all my expenses from the time I arrived in Vladivostok until I reached Moscow, and thus in fact added several hundred dollars to the Pacific Council's income, though this item will not show in our books \* \* \*.

When I reached Vladivostok, Bremman told me that Dr. Motylev hoped that it would be possible for me to take my family for a fortnight to the Crimea at the end of the Moscow visit \* \* \*.

Arrangements were made, however, for us to take a fascinating 3-day trip in the Moscow-Volga Canal, going as far as Kalinin. We made interesting visits to the parks, to the Red Army Club, to one of the big stadiums for a soccer game between Dynamo and the Red Army, and spent all of August 18 at the great aviation field outside of Moscow watching some hundreds of airplanes celebrating the annual Civil Aviation Day.

\* \* \* On August 21 Motylev gave a dinner, attended, among others, by Smirnov, the new head of VOX, Vinogradoff, Foreign Office referent for England and the United States, Wineberg, of the Anglo-American section of the Foreign Office, Miss \_\_\_\_\_, one of the editorial staff of *Isvestia* \* \* \*.

One evening Motylev took us to the movie *Na Vostoke*. This is a film version of Pavlenko's novel which has gone through edition after edition since its publication a few months ago \* \* \*.

We had a long session at VOX at the invitation of the new president, Smirnov. Motylev, Mrs. Carter, Miss Kislova, and myself were present \* \* \* (pp. 3483, 3484).

It should be noted at the outset that Mr. Carter pointed out in the letter we quoted in part above, that VOX paid careful attention to the

nature of all visitors particularly as "to who was entitled to a lot of time."

In his letter of September 12, 1937, to Owen Lattimore, Carter is equally informative:

\* \* \* Motylev arranged for me to go to several places in the Soviet Far East to which no non-Soviet citizen has ever been invited. The people in the British and American Embassies in Moscow were most envious and wanted to use my visit as a precedent to get permission to go to places like Komsomolsk themselves \* \* \* (p. 2712).

You will have gathered by now that the Soviet IPR extended to me every possible facility and courtesy throughout my stay in the Soviet Union \* \* \* (p. 2713).

A similar description is found in Carter's letter of August 15, 1937, to Albert Sarraut, head of the French IPR:

Mrs. Carter, Miss Ruth Carter, my secretary, and I have recently arrived in Moscow from North China. We saw in Peiping the beginning of this deplorable war between China and Japan. In the Soviet Far East the U. S. S. R. IPR gave me the very great privilege of visiting not only Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, and Birobidjan but also the new city of Komsomolsk, hitherto unvisited by any European or American foreigner \* \* \* (p. 2714).

Commenting on this letter Professor Poppe pointed out that these areas in the Far East—

were completely closed to everybody, and even the citizens of the Soviet Union were not permitted to go to those restricted areas \* \* \* because of their strategic importance and also because they were the main concentration camps and it was highly undesirable for the Soviet to let anybody see them (p. 2714).

In another letter to Mr. Lattimore as late as August 31, 1945, Carter gave an account of his reception in Moscow, despite the "terrific problem" of the housing shortage:

\* \* \* In almost every guest house my host remarked on pointing out my bedroom: "Willkie, Wallace, Lattimore, and Molotov slept here." \* \* \*

I found that some highly placed official in every commissariat that I had to work with was broadly informed as to the work of the IPR, and fairly beamed that I had so timed my visit as to arrive in Moscow on the very day that the U. S. S. R. went to war with Japan \* \* \*

The Soviet Ambassadors to China, Vinogradov, and Vostov, were in Moscow while I was there and made an appointment to meet me, but through no fault of theirs I had to forego the privilege of seeing them because of a conflict of dates \* \* \* (pp. 2591, 2592).

Mr. Carter evidently carried sufficient weight behind the Soviet iron curtain to enable him to write to Field on August 30, 1939, after the Soviet-Nazi pact had been signed, that he would "endeavor to furnish Carlson with the necessary Soviet credentials," referring to Maj. Evans F. Carlson (p. 588).

Under date of February 10, 1936, Carter wrote to Motylev urging that Harriet Moore be given permission to visit Buriat Mongolia (p. 3244). Motylev replied at the Moscow meeting of April 2, 1936, that he would be only too glad to arrange it, but that it was impossible due to the abnormal conditions there and the objections of the military authorities (p. 3318). Miss Moore had been permitted to work in Moscow in the winter of 1934-35 and the spring of 1936, according to her testimony (p. 2561).

In 1937 Lattimore sought to secure entry to Mongolia (pp. 2710-2711). Professor Poppe was asked about procedure in connection with such applications. He pointed out first of all, that all applications had to be passed upon by the NKVD and the Soviet Foreign



Office. After 1926 with the expedition of Roy Chapman Andrews from the American Field Museum, foreigners were not permitted to enter. Although he was head of Mongolian studies in Russia, Poppe was not allowed to go to Outer Mongolia (pp. 2710, 2711).

Mr. Bogolepov has also stated that the only persons allowed in Mongolia were members of Soviet military missions, intelligence personnel, or individuals on Communist Party missions (p. 4562).

But there was apparently no such impassable obstacle in the case of Lattimore. Motylev, according to Carter, was "as eager as ever" to have Lattimore make the trip. Motylev wanted to arrange things so that he could accompany Lattimore. Carter warned, however, that Motylev himself "May not find it easy to get permission \* \* \*" (pp. 4570-4571).

When asked about his travels in Mongolia, Lattimore declared that he had first visited that country in 1926, that is Inner Mongolia, and frequently until 1937. He was in Outer Mongolia once in 1944 (p. 3638).

In an article in the Far Eastern Survey for August 23, 1944, Mr. Lattimore depicts his "brief recent journey through the Soviet Far East and Central Asia," giving a glowing picture of Soviet policy toward the various Mongolian tribes (p. 3462).

It is interesting also that Lattimore was permitted to speak before the sacrosanct Academy of Science in Moscow in 1936 (p. 3604).

During the hectic days of 1939, the Soviet Union was in the midst of the most delicate maneuvering with the various foreign powers, which finally culminated in the Stalin-Hitler Pact. It was certainly not a period when visitors from the United States would be considered most welcome. But Lattimore could write on February 5, 1940, to Harrison Forman, as follows:

It was interesting enough being in Sweden on the eve of war; it must have been even more interesting to be in Moscow when the dam was beginning to crack.

As a matter of fact, I'd have been in Moscow myself when the Germans marched into Poland, if it hadn't been that a cable from my New York office was not delivered until we reached our boat in Norway (p. 3229).

Many more instances could be cited from IPR records to indicate the high esteem in which the leaders of the IPR were held in Moscow; but the point has been made. It was made much earlier by Sergei Arsenevich Goglidze, an intimate friend of Marshal Stalin, and president of the executive committee of the Khabarovsk's territory, when he offered this significant toast to two members of the IPR board of trustees:

Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, American experts on China, on whom rests great responsibility for China's future (p. 1107).

## THE EFFECT OF THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS UPON UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

The foregoing demonstrates the extent to which Communist forces operated within and about the Institute of Pacific Relations and how these forces affected public opinion. This section will consider the effect on United States policy that the Institute and the personnel around it were able to exert.

### A GROUP OF PERSONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS ATTEMPTED, BETWEEN 1941 AND 1945, TO CHANGE UNITED STATES POLICY SO AS TO ACCOMMODATE COMMUNIST ENDS AND TO SET THE STAGE FOR A MAJOR UNITED STATES POLICY CHANGE, FAVORABLE TO SOVIET INTERESTS, IN 1945

First of the leaders in the Institute of Pacific Relations to attain a place of influence in government was Owen Lattimore. The historical backdrop to his ascendancy was the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union which took place on June 21, 1941, and brought an abrupt termination to the Hitler-Stalin alliance.

At this crucial moment in history, Edward C. Carter was the secretary general of the institute (p. 6), Owen Lattimore was leaving his post of editor of Pacific Affairs to become, on President Roosevelt's nomination, adviser to Chiang Kai-shek (pp. 3052, 3265), Philip C. Jessup, chairman of the Pacific Council of the institute (p. 32), was in Chile (pp. 150, 3265), and Frederick V. Field was picketing the White House in connection with his duties as executive secretary of the American Peace Mobilization (p. 863).

#### CARTER AND LATTIMORE LUNCH WITH OUMANSKY

On June 18, 1941, while the Hitler-Stalin pact and the Japanese-Soviet alliance were still in force, Carter and Lattimore had a 2-hour luncheon in Washington with Constantine Oumansky, the Soviet Ambassador to the United States (pp. 150, 3264). Carter, writing on June 23, 1941, to Jessup, in Chile, described the luncheon, indicating he had thought it important that Lattimore come to Washington for a talk with Oumansky "in view of his job and the evolving world situation" (p. 3264) and characterized the 2-hour luncheon as "most illuminating." Lattimore, when questioned by the subcommittee, stated that the subject of conversation at this luncheon was his appointment as adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, that there had been a great deal of publicity about the appointment, and that Oumansky had expressed interest in it (p. 3262). There was, in fact, no publicity on the appointment until June 29, 11 days later, when it was formally announced (p. 3265). Even the Chinese Embassy did not learn of the appointment until more than a week after the luncheon (p. 3639). When Carter was asked about the luncheon he said at first that it was with two Chinese Nationalists. A letter from Carter to Lattimore, dated June 20, 1941, which showed on its face that Carter on that day

knew of Lattimore's appointment, made the following reference to the luncheon:

If you have time while in San Francisco, you and Bill Holland may want to arrange a private talk with Col. Philip R. Faymonville, whose present address is Headquarters of the Fourth Army, Presidio of San Francisco, Calif. He would, I think, have been thoroughly at home and at ease if he had lunched with us at the Mayflower on Wednesday. I think you get the idea. It may be that if you get the same favorable impression of him which Harriet Moore and I have, he might be someone who could be exceptionally useful to you and the Generalissimo at some future time in Chungking (p. 3263).

Lattimore could give the subcommittee no reasonable explanation as to why he should confer with the Ambassador of a country that had an alliance with both Germany and China's enemy, Japan, and was at political war with the United States.<sup>1</sup>

#### CURRIE SENDS LATTIMORE TO BE ADVISER TO CHIANG

It was Lauchlin Currie who first recommended the appointment of Lattimore as adviser to Chiang. Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, then adviser to the Secretary of State on Far Eastern Affairs, testified that when Currie told him Lattimore was to be appointed, he expressed opposition (p. 3209). Thereupon Currie not only acknowledged that he had made the recommendation, but said the reconsideration suggested by Hornbeck was impossible because the selection of Lattimore was an accomplished fact (p. 3210). Currie also acknowledged to Hornbeck that he had not even consulted the Secretary of State on the appointment (p. 3209).

Lattimore left for Chungking in July 1941, on the plane with Chi Ch'ao-ting, who had been made secretary general of the American-British-Chinese Currency Stabilization Fund.

After Lattimore arrived in China he had dealings with Chi. The record indicates that Lattimore knew at the time that Chi was a Communist.<sup>2</sup> Lattimore also acknowledged meeting Solomon Adler in China during this period.<sup>3</sup>

#### INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS PERSONNEL WORKED TO PREVENT UNITED STATES-JAPANESE TRUCE

In November of 1941 war and peace in the Pacific were at a precarious balance. Representatives of the Japanese Government were in Washington conferring with Secretary of State Hull regarding the issue which divided Japan and the United States. During the conversations a modus vivendi was proposed under which the two Nations would agree to a 90-day truce, while negotiations continued.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Lattimore's explanation:

"Mr. MORRIS. Does that not indicate, Mr. Lattimore, that 11 days before your appointment was announced, you had discussed this appointment with Mr. Oumansky in Washington?"

"Mr. LATTIMORE. This indicates, Mr. Morris, that owing to the fact that up to then I had been editor of Pacific Affairs, one of the earliest people informed about the fact that I was getting this appointment was Mr. Carter, and that Mr. Carter took the initiative in arranging for me to meet Mr. Oumansky at lunch" (p. 3266).

<sup>2</sup> Mr. MORRIS. Did you tell Mr. Lattimore about your experience with Dr. Chi in Germany in 1929?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. \* \* \* So, naturally, I told him (Lattimore) about the circumstances I had met him (Chi) under, and that Chi had worked in the Comintern \* \* \* (pp. 287-301).

See also testimony of E. Newton Steely, pp. 3159-3165.

<sup>3</sup> Miss Bentley knew that Chi was acting as a Communist in China; he was in contact with her agent Solomon Adler, who was a United States Treasury Department official (pp. 434-435). Miss Bentley had one Communist report complaining that Adler spent too much time playing bridge with Madame Chiang Kai-shek (p. 435).

<sup>4</sup> Joint Committee Investigating the Pearl Harbor Attack (1946), pp. 5176-5179. At this hearing General Marshall testified that if the 90-day truce had been adopted, the United States might never have become involved in the war at all. The reason for this view, as explained, was that during the 90-day period, the U. S. S. R. was victorious at Stalingrad, which changed the whole military picture around the world. It was argued that after this victory, Japan would never have dared an attack against the Allies.



As late as November 25, the *modus vivendi* was still under consideration. On the next day, however, Secretary Hull rejected the idea, and sent a strong note to the Japanese (*ibid.*). Twelve days later the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.

Beneath the surface of these well-publicized events, other things had been happening. To understand them, it is necessary first to understand that the fundamental long-time strategy of the U. S. S. R. to protect the "soft underbelly" of its eastern frontier against Japanese encroachment, was to turn the tide of Japanese advance southward, and involve Japan in a war with the United States, so that the United States and nations with possessions south of Japan would relieve the pressure on the Soviet frontier.

Richard Sorge, one of the ablest of the Kremlin's spies, was in Tokyo in pre-Pearl Harbor days as the head of an espionage ring which had two objectives:

(1) To obtain intelligence information regarding Japanese military intentions;

(2) To influence Japanese policy away from an attack on the Soviet Union and toward an attack on the United States, Great Britain, and the Dutch East Indies.<sup>5</sup>

Sorge was attached to the German Embassy in Tokyo. His assistant was Hotsumi Ozaki (p. 363), who was an adviser to the Japanese Premier (p. 363). Kinkazu Saionji, a descendant of a Japanese hero, aided Ozaki (p. 366). Saionji had been secretary of the Japanese Council of the IPR (p. 366) and Ozaki a delegate to the 1936 IPR conference in the United States (p. 362). Included in the ring were Guenther Stein, Chungking correspondent of the IPR (p. 370), and Agnes Smedley, a short-time member of the IPR (p. 370).

Lattimore was in Chungking with Chiang as the personal representative of the President of the United States, during the days when the *modus vivendi* was under consideration. On November 25 Lattimore wired Lauchlin Currie, executive assistant to the President, asking Currie to "urgently advise the President" (p. 156) of Chiang's opposition to the *modus vivendi*. His dispatch warned that Japan should not escape "military defeat by diplomatic victory" (p. 156).

At the same time, Edward C. Carter was in New York when he received a telegram from Harry Dexter White, then Under Secretary of the Treasury, asking him to come to Washington immediately. Carter testified that he had been called to Washington because White sought his aid to prevent a "sell-out of China," but by the time he reached Washington, the "sell-out" had been averted (p. 154).

On November 29 Carter wrote that he had seen Lauchlin Currie on the 28th. In that letter Carter expressed the feeling that Currie "probably had a terribly anxious time for the past week. For a few days it looked as though Hull was in danger of selling China and America and Britain down the river. Currie did not say this but I learned it from other high sources" (p. 157).

Elizabeth Bentley has testified that both Currie and White aided her in her work for Soviet Military Intelligence (pp. 418, 423).

<sup>5</sup> Mitsusada Yoshikawa, director of the special investigation bureau of the attorney general's office of the Japanese Government, testified (p. 504) that Sorge, working through Ozaki and Saionji sought to impress on the Japanese officials that if they struck north, their forces would encounter powerful Red armies, there would be little of value in Siberia, and she would probably meet greater difficulties than in her war with China. If Japan struck south, it was pointed out, she would find many useful resources and, besides, Japan historically has always failed in any military missions toward the north (p. 504).

Whittaker Chambers gave corroboration to her testimony about White (pp. 491-492).

Miss Bentley stated that George Silverman, another member of the ring, once brought word to her from Currie that the United States was about to break the Soviet code (pp. 423, 424). Silverman himself refused to answer when questioned by the subcommittee regarding this incident.<sup>6</sup> Miss Bentley also testified that White, while Under Secretary of the Treasury, devised a plan whereby his superior, Secretary Morgenthau, should be induced to effect exchange of all classified material between all sensitive agencies and the Treasury (p. 422). According to the testimony, this plan was carried out, and the secrets of all sensitive agencies were thus made accessible to the Soviets through White (p. 422). Notes in White's handwriting were found among the Chambers "pumpkin papers" (p. 492).

#### INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS IN THE WHITE HOUSE

After Pearl Harbor, Lauchlin Currie remained as executive assistant to the President and special adviser on far eastern affairs. Lattimore returned from China in February 1942, and used a desk in Currie's office in the State Department Building; thereafter, 4 days a week for a period of "3, 4, or 5 months," had a White House telephone extension, took care of Currie's mail and used White House stationery for correspondence (pp. 3199, 3200). During this time, Carter viewed Currie as an "intimate friend and admirer of Owen Lattimore" (p. 424). Lattimore made extensive efforts to conceal this relationship throughout his testimony before this subcommittee, as he had successfully done earlier before the Tydings subcommittee (pp. 3197, 3198, 3200, 3201).

Meanwhile Currie, from his vantage point in the White House, was acting in the role of a high adviser to the Institute of Pacific Relations. The files of the institute showed that Carter frequently conferred with Currie in Washington (pp. 428-431). When this relationship commenced, the record does not establish; but as early as February 18, 1941, a letter from Carter to Dr. Chi showed that the Institute of Pacific Relations was even then trying to shape policy through Currie. Carter asked Chi's advice on the advisability of sending a cable to Currie, then in China, suggesting that if the "press could report" that Currie, the President's representative in China, "had visited Chou En-lai," the Communist leader, that fact would help public opinion in view of the "present crop of ugly rumors" concerning the split of the Chinese unified resistance (p. 426).

Meanwhile Frederick V. Field, who had resigned as secretary of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations to become executive secretary of the American Peace Mobilization,<sup>7</sup> a Communist agitation organization, tried to obtain a commission as an Intelligence officer in the United States Army (p. 106).

<sup>6</sup> The following excerpt from the record, an executive session on April 2, 1952, is pertinent:

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever meet Elizabeth Bentley?

Mr. SILVERMAN. I refuse to answer that question on the same grounds. (That my answer might tend to incriminate me.)

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever meet Lauchlin Currie?

Mr. SILVERMAN. I refuse to answer that question on the same grounds.

<sup>7</sup> The American Peace Mobilization was indeed "a Communist agitative organization;" but it was far more than that. It was the key public instrument at that moment, in this country, of the prime Comintern policy of seeking to keep America acquiescent and inactive while the Comintern sought to foment bloody civil wars elsewhere, and to set non-Communist countries at war with one another (pp. 861, 863).

Edward C. Carter made sustained efforts to aid him in this project, so that as Carter put it, "his unusual gifts could be utilized during the war emergency" (p. 25). One letter dated February 18, 1942, written by Field, indicated that he understood that Lattimore had taken up the matter of the commission with Currie (p. 19), a fact which Field acknowledged while on the witness stand (p. 108).

Currie was responsible for setting up a conference in Washington, on October 12, 1942, between himself, Sumner Welles, then Under Secretary of State, and Earl Browder and Robert Minor, then officials of the Communist Party (p. 598 ff.). This conference terminated with Welles handing to Browder a memorandum declaring that the United States desired unity between the Chinese Government and the Communist forces in China; that the State Department felt that civil strife in China was at all times unfortunate; that both the armies of the Nationalist government and the Communist armies were fighting the Japanese; that the State Department viewed with skepticism alarmist accounts of the menace of communism in China (p. 599).

This memorandum was printed in full in the *Daily Worker* of October 16, 1942, and was used extensively by the Communists all over the world to give prestige to the Chinese Communists.<sup>8</sup>

The subcommittee found records in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations which showed that Currie used White House stationery in giving endorsements to the institute (exhibit 1229, p. 8).

On November 9, 1942, Michael Greenberg<sup>9</sup> was appointed to a position with the Board of Economic Warfare and was assigned to and shared an office with Lauchlin Currie in the White House. Greenberg made use of White House stationery in his correspondence (pp. 413-414).

Greenberg had succeeded Owen Lattimore in 1941 as the managing editor of *Pacific Affairs*.<sup>10</sup>

Elizabeth Bentley testified he was a Communist in the IPR cell when she recruited him for espionage work in Washington (p. 413). Prof. Karl Wittfogel testified that he told the security officers of Greenberg's Communist persuasions and was surprised that he turned up in the White House (p. 281). Prof. George Taylor, of the University of Washington, testified that Greenberg was so blatant in his beliefs that he (Taylor) was shocked when Greenberg obtained a White House position.<sup>10a</sup> As Taylor put it, a blind man would have perceived that he (Greenberg) was following the Communist Party line (p. 345).

Another influential IPR person who used the White House for a mailing address was John K. Fairbank (pp. 427, 3805). Fairbank explained he did this because Lauchlin Currie was assistant to the President in charge of far-eastern matters and was a focal person for

<sup>8</sup> Several years later it was shown that John S. Service mentioned this and asked that more such letters be issued by the U. S. Government (p. 826).

<sup>9</sup> Greenberg was a British Communist who had emigrated to the United States and became interested in the IPR (p. 281).

<sup>10</sup> Even though he bore the title managing editor, the IPR correspondence and the testimony revealed that Greenberg was the actual editor of *Pacific Affairs* and that he was running it "in the Lattimore tradition." Several controversies arose in *Pacific Affairs* which indicated that Greenberg was steering the publication along the Communist line (pp. 416-417).

<sup>10a</sup> Taylor testified that Currie was friendly and invited him to his office every Wednesday until he, Taylor, wrote a memorandum saying that the hope of Kuomintang-Communist cooperation was negligible and that the United States should provide arms to Chiang Kai-shek to shoot the Communists. After that not only was he never invited to come back, but he never again saw Currie (p. 348).



operations. Commencing in late 1941, Fairbank was with the Research and Analysis Branch of the OSS (pp. 3805, 3807). He later became head of the China Division of OWI and was subsequently returned to OSS (p. 3807).

#### INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS CONFERENCE AT MONT TREMBLANT

During the 1941-45 period, the IPR held two international conferences. The first of these was held at Mont Tremblant, Canada, in December 1942. Attending this conference were many leaders of the State Department who were then shaping United States policy, and those whom the Institute of Pacific Relations could influence.

They were: Maxwell M. Hamilton (Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State), Francis Burton Harrison (special adviser to the Philippines, 1942), Stanley K. Hornbeck (Adviser, Political Relations, Department of State), Leo Pasvolksy (special assistant to the Secretary of State), and C. F. Remer (Chief of Far Eastern Section, OSS). At the same time the American delegation, which numbered 26, included 7 persons who were identified during the current hearings as Communists.<sup>11</sup> Evidence in the record indicates at least five of these seven were handpicked, besides showing that the IPR persons on the inside closely controlled the program arrangements (pp. 425-426, exhibits 785, 787, 788). Department policy-makers who attended the conference had no organizational role. According to the record, it was Currie, Alger Hiss, Joseph Barnes, and Philip Jessup who, with Carter, made the selection of conferees (exhibits 785, 787, 788). It was a carefully planned project and required intimate knowledge as to who were the key people in Government (exhibit 785). Lockwood, the secretary of the American Council, as early as June 17, 1942, conferred with Currie regarding the conference. Currie's recommendations were very significant. They constituted a combination of persons who held influential positions and persons who were strong supporters of the point of view of the leaders of the institute (p. 432). By November 30, 1942, Lockwood had made the following recommendations subject to checking with Jessup: Jessup would be in the chair, with Benjamin Kizer representing the Pacific Council; Currie would be in charge of the program committee unless he felt it a burden, with Field for his alternate (exhibit 104, pp. 425-426).

An interesting episode in connection with the selection of representatives for this conference was revealed by documents in the IPR files. On November 17, 1942, Robert W. Barnett of the institute staff in Washington wired Carter saying "Hiss expresses admiration of Rajchman's incisive mind. Sees no objection his participating conference" (p. 137). This referred to Ludwig Rajchman. He was an important alien in the United States during the war, who passed as an adviser to the Chinese government (p. 137). When Poland came under Soviet power, Rajchman turned up as a leading member of the Polish Communist delegation to the United Nations (p. 138). On November 20, 1942, Carter wrote back to Barnett that the invitation was extended to Rajchman who believed it was "unwise" to accept. The explanation was that since the conference was being

<sup>11</sup> Frank Coe, p. 440; Lauchlin Currie, p. 419; Len DeCaux, pp. 493; 674, F. V. Field, pp. 490, 518; Kizer, p. 567; Lattimore, pp. 201, 522; Harriet L. Moore, pp. 260, 438, 549.

held in Mont Tremblant, Canada, a reentry permit would be necessary and that someone in Breckinridge Long's office (which handled visas) was not keen on him and would cause complications (p. 140). The last line of the memorandum from Carter to Barnett was: "You might pass this message on informally and orally to Hiss" (p. 140). Barnett later was chief economist in the Office of Chinese Affairs in the State Department.<sup>12</sup>

On December 28, 1942, Lockwood wrote to Currie concerning the conference:

The IPR now has the job of building on the foundation of this postwar discussion. In this connection we ought presumably to establish contacts with Governor Lehman's office—both to insure that full use is made of whatever value there may be in the conference documentation and discussions, and also to see what further IPR work would be most useful for the purpose of Governor Lehman's program. After the first of the year we would like to discuss this with you (p. 3887).

Ben Kizer, an IPR leader in Northwest United States, became head of the China Section of UNRRA (p. 571).

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS PRODUCES PAMPHLETS UNDERMINING  
THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT, AND IPR PERSONNEL IN GOVERNMENT  
PROMOTE THEM

The IPR vigorously supplemented its efforts to influence official Washington (p. 464, exhibit 116) and, in fact, the public generally (pp. 969, 971, 972, exhibit 290), by means of various publications.

Late in 1943 Maxwell S. Stewart finished the manuscript of a pamphlet called *War Time China* (p. 563). Stewart was shown to have had extensive Communist associations (pp. 2650-2669). The manuscript praised the Chinese Communists, argued that they were agrarian reformers and pointed out resemblances in the Chinese Communists to grass-root Populist movements in American history (p. 565). Correspondence showed that the manuscript had been read by John Fairbank and John Carter Vincent (p. 629), both of whom held high Government posts. Miriam Farley of the Institute of Pacific Relations staff wrote to Holland on February 4, 1944:

Vincent said (in confidence), with a certain emphasis, that he thought it good and well worth publishing. Fairbank thought these things should be said but in a more subtle manner, and recommended rather extensive rewriting. Without this, he thought the pamphlet might impel the Chinese to leave the IPR. Both Fairbank and Vincent also made a number of helpful suggestions on points of detail.

I am now editing the manuscript in the light of suggestions from Fairbank, Vincent, and others. I have also to consider the Author, who is not in favor of toning it down any more. Nevertheless, I am making some changes along lines recommended by Fairbank, though not very likely enough to satisfy him completely. My position is that I am willing—in fact, anxious—to go to any lengths to avoid offending Chinese sensibilities, providing this does not destroy the pamphlet's value for American readers. Our purpose in issuing it is to provide information for Americans, not to influence Chinese national policy. It would be useless for this purpose if it were written so subtly that ordinary Americans would not get anything out of it (p. 629).

Lawrence K. Rosinger was active in and was a prolific writer for the Institute of Pacific Relations (pp. 468-469).

Three of the Institute's propaganda volumes were turned out by him. Rosinger was called a Communist by three witnesses<sup>13</sup> during

<sup>12</sup> p. 27, 1950 Biographic Register, Department of State.

<sup>13</sup> Wittfogel, p. 313; Canning, p. 467; Budenz, p. 1097.

the subcommittee's hearings; and when called to testify claimed his constitutional rights and refused to say whether he is a member of the Communist Party (p. 2475).

State of Asia, the last large project of the Institute to be undertaken in 1950, was under Rosinger's direction (pp. 468-469).

During the war Rosinger wrote two books, *China's Crisis and China's Wartime Politics, 1937-44* (p. 468). Prof. George Taylor has made an analysis of these books, and submitted it to the subcommittee. Taylor, long active in the IPR, says of these books:

In the discussion of the role of the Communists in China and of their Russian background, there are endeavors to present both sides of a possible argument. However, the objectivity is apparent rather than real. The books of 1944 and 1945 both show him in a number of critical instances either disregarding the obvious connection with the U. S. S. R. or directly denying such connection when factual evidence to the contrary exists and must have been known to him (p. 349).

By late 1943, Mr. Holland had sent the manuscript of *China's Wartime Politics, 1937-44*, to John Carter Vincent (p. 478), Hiss (p. 482), and Fairbank (p. 482) for comment and criticism. All three were IPR men in Government. Fairbank's reply, bearing the return address of Lauchlin Currie, The White House, said of the manuscript:

It seems like a good job indeed. Can't something be done to send Rosinger to China sometime? The Government won't be happy about it but it is so well done they can hardly call it propaganda (p. 480).

This book was also sent by diplomatic pouch, through Wilma Fairbank, of the State Department, to China (p. 479).

In 1943 the Chinese vigorously protested an article in the *Far Eastern Survey* by T. A. Bisson discussing a China divided into Communist or "democratic" China and Nationalist or "feudal" China (p. 4282 ff.). Owen Lattimore, then head of Pacific Operations for the OWI, approved it, but expressed the view that its message could be expressed more adroitly or convincingly (p. 3287).

Guenther Stein was reporting to the IPR from Chungking in 1943 (exhibit 825). There was substantial evidence that he was a veteran Communist conspirator (pp. 267, 373). According to testimony, he was a member of the Sorge espionage ring (p. 371) and in 1950 was expelled from France for espionage (p. 371). On June 24, 1952, Lockwood gave this description of Stein's material:

JUNE 24, 1942.

W. W. L. to E. C. C., W. L. H.

A further comment on circulating Guenther Stein's stuff in Washington: When I mentioned it to John Fairbank, he expressed a great interest in seeing it and summoned together his China staff, who all voiced a similar interest. John also suggested that his office might be asked to trade certain information in return. I am leaving the matter for you to handle, however (p. 378).

At that time John K. Fairbank was head of the China Section of the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services (p. 3805). The record shows that Fairbank had carried messages from Madam Sun Yat-sen (pp. 3758-3760), whom the evidence shows to be a Communist (p. 437), to the China Aid Council, a Communist organization (p. 407), and from Chen Han-seng and Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley to Israel Epstein. Fairbank acknowledged this but denied he knew that the persons involved were Communists (p. 3791).

Guenther Stein made nineteen contributions to Institute of Pacific Relations publications (p. 376).



The institute sent reports of Stein's to William T. Stone, who was the Assistant Director of the Board of Economic Warfare. Stone expressed his appreciation and asked that the reports be sent regularly (p. 385). (Stone and Esther Brunauer of the State Department were signers of the certificate of incorporation when the American IPR was incorporated (see hearings of June 20, 1952)).

THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS MAKE KNOWN TO AMERICAN OFFICIALS  
WHAT THEY WANT

All during this period, 1941-45, it was the publicly expressed and clearly defined official policy of the United States to aid the Government of Nationalist China (p. 777). It was also United States policy to keep the armies of that Government fighting the common enemy, Japan. But, during this period there developed a distinct undermining of this policy.

Through three different approaches, efforts were made to bring pressure on the Nationalist Government, by the United States Government, to cause a change in the policies of the Chinese sovereign state.

They were: (1) The efforts of Foreign Service officers in the field, 1943-44; (2) the Henry A. Wallace mission; and (3) the directive to General Marshall and its implementation.

In November 1942, the Chinese Communist leader, Chou En-lai<sup>14</sup> wanted the United States Government to bring pressure to bear on the Chinese Government to "improve the situation" (p. 792). The American Foreign Service officers, John Carter Vincent and John S. Service, met with the Communist leaders, Chou En-lai and Lin Piao, about November 20, 1942, according to Service's own report (p. 1790). During the conversation the Communists told Vincent and Service what they would like the United States to do with respect to the "situation" in China (p. 792). The actions these Communist leaders wanted included: (1) The use of American influence on the Kuomintang to improve the situation; (2) emphasis by the United States, in its dealings with the Chinese and in its propaganda to China, on the political nature of the world conflict, namely "democracy against fascism"; (3) the reiteration of American hope of seeing real "democracy" in China; (4) recognition of the Chinese Communist Army as a participant in the war against fascism; (5) apportionment to the Communists of a share of American supplies sent to China. Service included a sixth point, namely the sending of an American representative to Yanan which his dispatch did not expressly say was a Communist objective (pp. 792, 1791 ff.). However, after an interview with Chou En-lai, in the spring of 1943, John Carter Vincent cabled the State Department from Chungking that Chou hoped American leaders would send an observer to North China (p. 2000 ff.).

Vincent, while testifying, acknowledged that the United States ultimately did emphasize the political nature of the Chinese conflict (p. 1792). He also acknowledged that it became United States policy to express the hope that real democracy would appear in China, and that such expressions were critical of the Chinese Government, since

<sup>14</sup> Chou En-lai is now Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Communist China.

they carried the implication that "no democracy did exist in China" (p. 1792).

This was at the same time the Communists were advocating "democracy" for China (pp. 1484, 1790). Thus Communist demands were neatly dovetailed with American demands.

As will be shown, the American Foreign Service officers were enthusing about the "democratic" origins of the Chinese Communist movement.<sup>15</sup> They were also stressing the value of democracy as a permanent political system (p. 825, exhibit 254) and they were asking for extension everywhere of such organizations as OWI (p. 825) to urge the very things which had been asked for by Chou En-lai and Lin Piao. John S. Service expressly wanted more declarations such as the one arranged through Browder and Sumner Welles which, he noted, was banned by the Chinese Government (p. 826). Thus Communist demands were also dovetailed with the demands of American Foreign Service officers.

#### REPORT OF FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS IN THE FIELD

The subcommittee encountered in its investigations the reports of John P. Davies<sup>16</sup> and John S. Service (pp. 785-825) as they were written from the field. Both Davies (exhibit 106, p. 427; exhibits 827, 833) and Service (exhibit 106, p. 427) performed services for the institute and Service had extensive association with the IPR upon his return to the United States (pp. 787, 788). The reports of Service in particular proved most effective in influencing the policy makers in Washington during this period (p. 2866). General Chennault, head of the Chinese Air Force during the war and one of the ranking United States military commanders in China, has written the following about American policy in China during 1944:

Since it was still official American policy in the summer of 1944 to support the Chungking Government, it was a common joke that Stilwell's headquarters<sup>17</sup> were definitely operating a private foreign policy with John Davies as Secretary of State (p. 3625).<sup>18</sup>

The Service-Davies reports extensively advocated interference with the internal affairs of the Chinese Government (exhibit 254, pp. 823-826; exhibit 255, p. 828); they undermined Chiang (exhibits 247, 252, pp. 785, 808-810); they stressed the need of democracy as a pretext for vitiating the authority of the government (exhibit 254, p. 825). They asserted the "democratic" nature of the Communists and declared that the Communists had their roots in the people (pp. 795-796) and were the real fighters against the Japanese (Service report No. 22, exhibit 1390). They exaggerated the weaknesses of the Nationalists (exhibit 252, p. 808; exhibit 254, p. 820); the unrest in China (exhibit 247, p. 785), the economic instability of the Government (exhibit 252, p. 810). Service said that any connection the Chinese Communists may have had to the Soviet Union was a thing of the past. (Service report No. 34, exhibit 1391.)

General Wedemeyer, who was the Commander of all American forces in the Far East in 1944-46 (p. 775), testified that it was his mission to support the Chinese Nationalist Government, keep it

<sup>15</sup> John S. Service's report No. 22, September 4, 1944, exhibit 1390.

<sup>16</sup> A special chapter on Davies appears later, p. 218 of this report.

<sup>17</sup> Where Davies and Service were political advisers.

<sup>18</sup> Chennault also testified on this point.

fighting the Japanese and supporting the American forces in the field (p. 777). When the subcommittee inquired about the political reporting of his advisers, Davies, Service, and Ludden, who were also advisers to General Wedemeyer's predecessor, General Stilwell, General Wedemeyer said that the reports of these officers played up the "shortcomings, maladministration and unscrupulousness of the Nationalist leaders" and "the orderliness or the potentialities" of the Chinese Communist forces in Yenan (p. 777). Wedemeyer further testified in contradiction of the Service-Davies reports that the Communists did very little fighting against the Japanese and made only a negligible contribution toward pinning down the Japanese in China (p. 782).

The recommendations that Service and Davies made to Washington clearly coincided with the requests made previously by the Communist leaders Chou En-lai and Lin Piao.

In June 1944, John S. Service recommended to Washington the following: (1) Stop building up Chiang (pp. 824-825); (2) high United States officials should make known the intent of our government as to "democracy and unity in China" (p. 825); (3) the OWI should point up "the values of democracy (in China) as a permanent political system and as an aid in waging war against totalitarianism." It should recognize and encourage "liberal and progressive forces" in China (p. 825); (4) "we should maintain friendly relations with the liberal elements" in China and the Communists (p. 826); (5) Madame Sun Yat-sen should be invited to the White House (p. 826); (6) "we should show an interest in Chinese Communists \* \* \* and give publicity on the 'blockade' " <sup>19</sup> (p. 826); (7) we should apply pressure on Chiang Kai-shek to dispatch observers to North China (p. 826); (8) we should train and equip provincial armies to fight the Japanese (p. 826); and (9) we should publicize statements by United States officials \* \* \*, such as the Sumner Welles memorandum to Earl Browder, which was disapproved by the Nationalists (p. 826).

It was not only with the Chou En-lai and Lin Piao requests that these reports were dovetailed. There were other coincidences. For instance, on August 20, 1944, the People's War quoted Mao Tse-tung as urging that the Communists should support Chiang but should call for more "democracy" (p. 1484, exhibit 346). And on December 2, 1944, in the Daily Worker, Frederick Vanderbilt Field demanded a coalition government in China (p. 1377). Such was the Communist program. On November 15, 1944, John P. Davies wrote:

We should not now abandon Chiang Kai-shek. To do so at this juncture would be to lose more than we could gain. We must for the time being continue recognition of Chiang's government.

But we must be realistic. We must not indefinitely underwrite a politically bankrupt regime. And, if the Russians are going to enter the Pacific war, we must make a determined effort to capture politically the Chinese Communists rather than allow them to go by default wholly to the Russians. Furthermore, we must fully understand that by reason of our recognition of the Chiang Kai-shek government as now constituted we are committed to a steadily decaying regime and severely restricted in working out military and political cooperation with the Chinese Communists.

A coalition Chinese Government in which the Communists find a satisfactory place is the solution of this impasse most desirable to us. It provides our greatest assurance of a strong, united, democratic, independent, and friendly China—our basic strategic aim in Asia and the Pacific. If Chiang and the Communists reach a mutually satisfactory agreement, there will have been achieved from our point

<sup>19</sup> A term used by the Communists in describing Chiang's effort to contain them.



of view the most desirable possible solution. If Chiang and the Communists are irreconcilable, then we shall have to decide which faction we are going to support (p. 806).

THE HENRY A. WALLACE MISSION TO CHINA

The mission of Vice President Wallace to China brought more pressure on the Chinese Government by the United States and this pressure also coincided with the recommendations of the Chinese Communists.

With Wallace on the mission were John Carter Vincent, Owen Lattimore, and John N. Hazard. Louis Budenz, who lived this episode from the vantage point of editor of the Daily Worker, and who was a member of the National Committee of the Communist Party, testified that the Wallace mission was an aid to the Communists in that the Communists had two men with Wallace, Lattimore and Vincent, who were guiding the mission along Communist lines (pp. 625, 626).

Vincent testified that he first heard of the mission from Lauchlin Currie in June 1944 (pp. 1805, 1806, 2032, 2033). And that he first met Wallace in connection with it in Currie's office (p. 1805). He acknowledged that he conferred with Wallace (p. 1805) and Lattimore (p. 1805) before the mission got under way and generally admitted that he made his 20 years experience in the State Department available to Wallace (p. 1810). On the question of exerting influence on Wallace, Vincent acknowledged directly that he did influence Wallace.

Mr. SOURWINE. Giving advice throughout the trip would be influencing him, would it not?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Talking with him one evening after having a conversation with Chiang and suggesting you take a certain line the next day is influencing him, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did that, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. On more than one occasion, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I was trying to consider specific instances.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a specific instance, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. I did talk to him and certainly he must have been to some degree influenced by me.

Mr. SOURWINE. You know he was, do you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. He changed his line at least on one occasion because you suggested it, did he not?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Breaking in on conversations with Chiang to steer him in particular directions was influencing the mission, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did that, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then there is not any question in your mind that you did influence Mr. Wallace in the course and direction of his mission, is there?

Mr. VINCENT. There certainly is no question (pp. 2030-2031).

The guiding and influencing of Wallace that Vincent acknowledged included the following: (1) He steered the conversations between Chiang and Wallace during the mission toward a settlement between Chiang and the Communists; (2) he had Wallace emphasize the desire of the United States that Chiang make peace with the Communists; (3) when Madame Chiang Kai-shek proposed during the

conversation that there be a North Pacific Conference, Vincent directed the conversation toward an insistence by Wallace that China and the U. S. S. R. settle first (p. 2062); (4) Vincent conceded he urged Wallace to press that the United States would not aid Chiang until he made his peace with the Soviet Union (pp. 2065-2066); (5) Vincent kept bringing the conversation back to the question of the United States sending a representative to Communist territory in Yen-an, and finally extracted a promise from Chiang that one would be sent (pp. 2060-2061); (6) when Chiang, recognizing the prestige such an act would give the Communists, argued against it (p. 2051), Vincent urged Wallace to stress that the United States was not interested in Chiang's opposition (p. 2052) from the Communists but were interested in the military intelligence such a representative would yield (p. 2055); (7) Later it was shown that Vincent again steered the conversation so that the promise given by Chiang for the representative to Yen-an was really nailed down.

Mr. SOURWINE. \* \* \* That was another occasion on which you swung the conversation back to the matter of sending observers into Communist-held North China. Is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And your purpose, I take it, was to be sure that the consent which Chiang had granted at the end of the morning session was nailed down, so to speak?

Mr. VINCENT. This was a summary of the morning conversation, and I inquired again whether I had correctly understood.

Mr. SOURWINE. That one point, you wanted to be sure there was no misunderstanding about it?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right (p. 2061).

Wallace testified he submitted two reports to the President on this mission (p. 1333). The first took the form of a cable from Kunming on June 28, 1944, in which he reported: (1) That Chiang did not have the intelligence to run postwar China; (2) that Chiang was imbued with prejudice against the Communists; (3) that there should be a united front of Communists and Nationalists; and (4) that he had urged on Chiang the necessity of coming to terms with the Soviet Union. In this report Mr. Wallace included a suggestion that General Wedemeyer succeed General Stilwell as commander of United States forces in China, either with autonomous status or under General Stilwell's over-all command (p. 1350).

The contention was raised that John Carter Vincent approved the recommendation in the Kunming cable with respect to General Wedemeyer and that this was a definitely anti-Communist act. At that time, according to all witnesses who testified on this point, Stilwell was a person whom the Communists favored, obviously because of his detestation of Chiang Kai-shek and his expressed fondness for the Chinese Communists (p. 1429). At that time also the official Communist Party policy was to keep Chiang Kai-shek in the field fighting the Japanese (p. 1432).

When the announcement of Stilwell's removal finally was made in October 1944, the Daily Worker and the official Communist Party press acquiesced that the decision was a wise compromise. In fact, the Daily Worker went out of its way to reprove a correspondent who had been favorable to the Communists, for expressing the view that the removal of Stilwell was an undesirable thing (p. 1376).

Wallace testified he gave to the President a report of his trip in addition to sending the Kunming cable and that this report bore the date July 10, 1944. It was headed "Summary Report of Vice President Wallace's Visit in China." Wallace could not testify to any of the incidents of his writing this report such as whether there was a typewriter on the plane on which it was typed; whether anyone typed it for him; or whether it was handwritten (pp. 1340-1341). Nor could John Carter Vincent account for the title of the report or explain why it was written in the third person (p. 2037).

The white paper, when it was published in 1949, had stated that Vice President Wallace had not made a report to the President. Wallace testified before the subcommittee (p. 1334) that he considered that it was secret and had not sent it to the State Department. He also testified that he released it for the first time in December 1949 when he gave a copy to Senator O'Connor<sup>19a</sup> (p. 1334). Yet the July-September 1949 issue of *Far Eastern Spotlight*, publication of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, a Communist organization (p. 1334), contained what purported to be a question-and-answer article by Henry A. Wallace quoting from the report. Wallace could not account for the article (p. 1335). The quotation from the report used by the Communist publication was:

Chiang, at best, is a short-term investment. It is not believed that he has the intelligence or political strength to run postwar China. The leaders of postwar China will be brought forward by evolution or revolution, and it now seems more likely the latter.

After Wallace's return from his mission, he published a book entitled "Soviet Asia Mission" (p. 1314). This book, even though published in Wallace's name with all the prestige of the office of Vice President behind it, actually was written by one Andrew J. Steiger (p. 1314), who was identified before the committee as a Communist (p. 699) and a writer for the *Daily Worker*. The draft of the book was sent to Lattimore before it was finished (p. 3652). The former Vice President admitted that he had written only the passages on agriculture and left the rest of the book, including the political aspects, to Steiger (p. 1314). In his introduction, Wallace gave acknowledgement to Lattimore, Barnes, and several other persons active in the Institute of Pacific Relations (p. 1314). This book contains the following revealing passage:

At dinner, after our return from China, Goglidze offered a significant toast to "Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, American experts on China, on whom rests great responsibility for China's future" (pp. 1328-1329).

According to Wallace, Goglidze was "the head of the whole Far East area. He was a Georgian who was said to be a close friend of Stalin \* \* \*. He was the top man in that part of the world" (p. 1328).

The former Vice President declared that the passage in the book which described this toast was written, not by himself, but by Steiger. It was Steiger, too, who found the toast "significant" (p. 1329).

The Institute of Pacific Relations also published a pamphlet by Henry Wallace entitled "Our Job in the Pacific." This pamphlet was initiated by Owen Lattimore (pp. 951, 3654). Eleanor Lattimore worked on the preparation of the pamphlet (p. 1298). Frederick V. Field was energetic in having the publication of it approved by the board of trustees of the institute (p. 953). When the pamphlet

<sup>19a</sup> Senator Herbert O'Connor, Democrat, of Maryland, had asked Mr. Wallace for a copy of this report (p. 1362).



finally was published, it was praised in the *Daily Worker* by Field (p. 1307), subsequently was sold in the Communist Party Book Shop and handed out as a guide to correct thinking for Communist Party members (p. 3832).

#### OWEN LATTIMORE'S INFLUENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Owen Lattimore was, during this period, a person of many official roles—alternately adviser to Chiang Kai-shek (pp. 390, 3262), associate of Lauchlin Currie (p. 3197), companion to Wallace (pp. 3053, 3112), and an official of the Office of War Information (pp. 3053, 3207). Early in 1945 Vincent tried to make Lattimore a consultant to the China Division of the State Department (p. 1738). Though this effort was unsuccessful, Lattimore soon thereafter turned up on the State Department payroll as a member of the Pauley Reparations Mission to Japan (p. 3054).

When Lattimore published his book entitled "Solution in Asia" in February 1945, he represented the following to be true about China: (1) The Communists were a minority but strong; (2) they had expanded the territory they controlled, not because they subdued by armed force but because the people supported them; (3) basic economic conditions as to food and clothing were better in Communist-controlled China than in Kuomintang-controlled China; (4) the incidence of conscription and taxation was more equally distributed in Communist-controlled than in Kuomintang-controlled territory; (5) progressive middle-class Chinese had "somehow got through the blockade" into Communist territory but not many had fled; (6) the political structure under the Communists was more nearly democratic than it was under the Kuomintang; (7) minor parties believed that the people had rights and political freedom in Communist territory only because the Communists had arms; (8) there existed a case for negotiating a political compromise before pressing military amalgamation; (9) political compromise would make necessary a coalition government (p. 3054).

A former Communist testified that Lattimore's book *Solution in Asia* was officially approved by the Communist Party. He was Harvey Matusow, a Communist who, upon intellectual defection from the party, stayed in its ranks and reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (p. 3824). Matusow said that *Solution in Asia* was officially sanctioned by the Educational Branch of the New York State Communist Party, and that the Communist book store where he was employed sold it as an orthodox Communist Party-line book (pp. 3829-3831). Advance copies of Lattimore's book were sent to Gromyko and a whole list of other Soviet officials (p. 3313). There was some evidence that the Soviet officials were prepared to put out special Soviet editions of the work (p. 3313).

Lattimore, according to the testimony of Prof. William McGovern in 1944 or 1945, was advocating the United States build its China policy on "the forward-looking people in Yen-an," referring to the Communists (p. 1021). Prof. Kenneth A. Colegrove testified that in December 1943 Lattimore in a conversation with him went so far as to say that Chinese Communists under Mao Tse-tung were real democrats and that they were really agrarian reformers and had no

connection with Soviet Russia (p. 913). Lattimore denied both of these statements (p. 3577).

Lattimore went along on the Wallace mission (p. 1360). He conferred three or four times with Chiang Kai-shek and Wallace (p. 1362). He conferred with Wallace before the party left, and he conferred with Vincent in connection with the trip (p. 1361). It is interesting to note that while on the Wallace mission Lattimore met G. G. Dolbin of the Soviet Foreign Office. Lattimore kept up this connection. He admitted that he telephoned Dolbin at the Soviet Embassy and made an appointment with him. Lattimore also admitted that Dolbin visited him at his Baltimore home and spent several hours in conversation with him alone some time in 1945 (p. 3646).

THE HOT SPRINGS CONFERENCE—PREFACE TO U. N. CONFERENCE AT  
SAN FRANCISCO

The ninth triennial conference of the institute took place at Hot Springs, Va., in January 1945 (p. 1004). Like the Mont Tremblant conference, it was a carefully manipulated assemblage. Many of the delegates, from countries other than the United States, also flocked out to San Francisco to attend the founding conference of the United Nations (p. 979). Raymond Dennett, who was at the time Secretary of IPR's American Council, described the conference as a trial balloon for the U. N. Conference at San Francisco (p. 979).

The official report of the Hot Springs conference, "Security in the Pacific," says:

The Hot Springs conference was a fitting prelude to the San Francisco Conference of the United Nations. It covered very many of the problems which will there call for decision. The members of the Hot Springs conference came, not as negotiators or policy makers, but as private citizens, laymen and experts in many fields, deliberating in unofficial capacities. They expressed important elements of both public and expert opinion from Pacific countries, or countries with interests and responsibilities in the Pacific area; views of which policy makers might well take account. Their emphasis was on the Pacific area, the source of many of those strains which may again shatter the peace everywhere if they are not removed or eased, but it was an emphasis which gave full recognition to the necessity for a wider harmony covering the whole world.<sup>20</sup>

According to Dennett, and the correspondence in the record, recommendations for delegates from the American Council to the Hot Springs International Conference came from Philip Jessup and Lauchline Currie (pp. 979-980). Dennett in arranging the conference saw Currie twice (p. 981). It was shown that Currie thought the conference important (p. 981), recommended that the American Council's delegates include Acheson, Vincent, Dooman "(the latter two in the technical level; the first in the over-all-policy level)," Will Clayton, Harry Dexter White, and Frank Coe (p. 981). Currie devised a proposal by which Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck could be bracketed out of the conference (p. 981). It appeared from the correspondence that the IPR was afraid that Under Secretary Joseph Grew would not allow John Carter Vincent or anyone from the State Department to attend because such persons would indicate the trend of the Department on postwar planning, which according to Grew, only the Secretary of State was authorized to do (p. 981). However, the institute relied on Currie to "handle this situation" (p. 981).

<sup>20</sup> Security in the Pacific, xi, xli.

Dennett also acknowledged that he knew of a few instances, during the pre-Hot Springs period, when Carter saw Currie (p. 982). Dennett further testified the institute wanted to get people from State and Currie helped get them (p. 984).

The other person making recommendations for delegates to the conference was Jessup (pp. 495, 979, 980, exhibit 132). Of the approximately 30 recommendations by Jessup, 10 were identified by witnesses as being associated with the Communist organization.<sup>21</sup>

It turned out that the State Department gave official recognition to the conference and not only did John Carter Vincent attend, but he was host at a reception in the Blair House, under State Department auspices, for 60 foreign delegates (pp. 2123, 2124). Julian Friedman, Vincent's assistant in the State Department, was assigned to the conference in pursuance of his official duties (p. 1730).

The American delegation caucused before the conference (pp. 991-993) to determine what position it should take vis-à-vis other delegations. A report of the caucus meeting showed that it considered the question of taking a position on intervention in the internal affairs of the Chinese Government. Jessup presided at the caucus and Lattimore was the most vocal and dominant conferee (pp. 991, 994). The conferees, who also included Frederick V. Field, Len De Caux, Frank Coe, and Miriam S. Farley (p. 993) agreed that their position should be one of pressing for changes in the internal situation of the Chinese Government (p. 991). The only exception taken to this conclusion was by Admiral Harry Yarnell (p. 992).

The conference discussions developed resentment on the part of the British, French, and Dutch delegates at the bitter attacks on colonialism uttered by Lattimore, Andrew Grajdanzev, and T. A. Bisson (p. 994). The latter two were members of the Secretariat and not delegates, and were, under the rules, speaking out of order (p. 994). Dennett quoted Lattimore as having said that "the world could not exist half slave and half free until the metropolitan countries had freed their colonial territories" (p. 994). Lattimore also urged that postwar plans for Japan ignore the Japanese Emperor.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>21</sup> 1. Benjamin Kizer: Budenz, p. 567.

2. Lauchlin Currie: Bentley, p. 419.

3. John Carter Vincent: Budenz, p. 625.

4. Harry Dexter White: Bentley, p. 419; Chambers, pp. 491, 492.

5. Owen Lattimore: Budenz, p. 521; Barmine, pp. 200, 219; Bogolepov, p. 4519.

6. Len De Caux: Chambers, p. 493; Budenz, p. 674.

7. Joseph Barnes: Budenz, pp. 541, 542; Chambers, p. 490; Bentley, p. 441; Massing, p. 244; Wittfogel, p. 323; Barmine, p. 200.

8. Frederick V. Field: Field, p. 119; Bentley, p. 415; Massing, p. 268; Chambers, p. 490; Budenz, p. 517; Weyl, p. 2804; Matusow, p. 3844; Bisson, p. 4180.

9. Alger Hiss: Chambers, p. 497; Weyl, p. 2799; Massing, p. 234; Bentley, p. 442.

10. Frank Coe: Bentley, p. 440.

<sup>22</sup> There was abundant evidence that Lattimore was constantly working to eliminate the Emperor. In his book *Solution in Asia* he called for the exile of Hirohito to China under U. N. supervision, together with the confiscation of his estates (p. 189). Even while Deputy Director of the OWI and operating under a directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff against impugning the Emperor, Lattimore continued to use a criticism by Sun Fo, son of Sun Yat Sen, of the Emperor, on OWI. Lattimore testified that he justified this on the basis that the prohibition was against an American criticizing the Emperor and not against an American citizen using a foreigner's criticism of him (p. 3598). In connection with postwar Japan, Lattimore called for the reduction of the industrialist class and "good old chaos" for the country (p. 561, exhibit 1413).

There was evidence in the spring of 1945 that Japan was willing to surrender if it could retain its Emperor, and he would not be punished as a war criminal. The heads of the State Department then in charge of Japanese matters were Joseph Grew and Eugene Dooman. In May, Dooman drew up an outline of policies that would in effect substitute, instead of unconditional surrender, a policy that provided that in the event of a Japanese surrender, the occupying forces of the Allies would withdraw after it was established that the Japanese had set up responsible, peace-loving government. This Government could include a constitutional monarchy under the then present dynasty. Dooman took this to the Policy Committee of the State Department which consisted of the Assistant Secretaries and the legal adviser. There it was objected to by Mr. Dean Acheson and Archibald MacLeish, Assistant Secretaries. However, it was approved by the President on May 28 and taken to a meeting of the then Secretary of War Henry Stimson, where 10 to 12 of the highest military people met. Stimson and everyone present approved it except Elmer Davis, who then was head of the Office of War Information. However, the document was temporarily pigeonholed when General Marshall stated it was "premature"; but it was promulgated at Potsdam and became the documentary basis of the subsequent Japanese surrender (pp. 727-730).



It is to be noted that 2 months later Alger Hiss recommended that copies of the report on the conference be made available to each of the delegations to the U. N. Conference (pp. 2138-2141, exhibit 384).

Thus did the IPR continue to establish pro-Communist influence at the Hot Springs International Conference. Thus were the various influential non-Communist delegates from the United States and foreign governments exposed to this influence.

#### INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS ACTIVE IN POSTWAR PLANNING

A witness before the subcommittee, Dr. Edna Fluegel (p. 2826), was a member of the Postwar Planning Staff of the State Department. Her testimony indicated that the publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations were almost the only publications on the Far East coming into the State Department (p. 2865). They were in ample supply in State Department reference rooms (p. 2865). She further testified that the dispatches of John S. Service were very influential, well written, and copiously distributed (p. 2866).

According to Dr. Fluegel, Alger Hiss became the head of postwar planning for the State Department and had access to every document, paper, and secret of the United States Government (p. 2838).

During the war period the association of Alger Hiss with the IPR often manifested itself (supra, pp. 183, 184, 185, 194). Edward C. Carter wrote to Hiss on February 5, 1947; "You have done so much for the IPR in cooperation and wise advice that I am hoping this fine relationship can continue in your new post" (p. 134). Hiss was then leaving the State Department to be President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (p. 134). In 1947 Hiss became a trustee of the institute (p. 134).

On March 5, 1945, Dennett, still secretary to the American Council of IPR, reported that he conferred with Alger Hiss and John Carter Vincent in connection with the U. N. Conference at San Francisco (p. 2138, exhibit 384). Dennett reported that Hiss indicated to him that the State Department would be very glad to receive a formal offer to cooperate from the IPR (p. 2138, exhibit 384). The cooperation intended involved library facilities and office facilities (pp. 2138-2141, exhibit 384). Hiss further recommended to Dennett that the report of the Hot Springs conference be available in appropriate numbers to each delegation in the course of the conference (pp. 2138-2141, exhibit 384).

John Carter Vincent, then head of the State Department's China section (p. 2138, exhibit 384), recommended that a series of dinners be held during the course of the conference for Far Eastern specialists among the delegates (p. 2138, exhibit 384). It was stated that the purpose of this was to bring together some of the technical people for informal discussion of matters on the agenda (pp. 2138-2141, exhibit 384). Both Hiss and Vincent thought the IPR could be helpful at the Conference (pp. 2138-2141, exhibit 384).

Even in connection with the postwar planning project of the State Department there is evidence that there was concurrent activity on the part of IPR (pp. 2867-2868). Postwar planning by the State Department commenced in 1942 (p. 2831, exhibit 451). On March 30, 1942, Roy Veatch of the IPR suggested to W. W. Lockwood, Secretary of the American Council of the IPR, that a group be formed to take the

lead in discussing postwar plans (pp. 2830, 2831). The IPR response to this took the form of correspondence between Carter and Lockwood. Carter stated that someone other than Veatch should do the job for IPR because he wasn't the "soundest person for us to tie to" (p. 2831, exhibit 451).

Correspondence from the file showed that by September 25, 1943, the institute was holding its second session of a round-table discussion on Chinese postwar reconstruction (p. 2832, exhibit 451A). (The subcommittee could find no evidence of the first session.) At that (second) session again the roster of persons in attendance showed the familiar pattern of, on the one hand, individuals concerning whom there was evidence of Communist activity, and on the other, persons influential in the State Department and other policy agencies (p. 2832). On this occasion Harry Dexter White was the chairman, according to the invitation to the meeting (*ibid.*).

In 1950 the State Department published a book entitled "Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation" which was a detailed description of postwar planning from 1939-45 (p. 2868). From this book the staff of the subcommittee prepared a memorandum on the activities of persons associated with IPR who were active in postwar planning. This showed the very extensive activity of Esther Brunauer, V. Frank Coe, Lauchlin Currie, Harold Glasser, Alger Hiss, Philip C. Jessup, William T. Stone, and Harry Dexter White (pp. 2868-2869).<sup>23</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Among those with IPR associations who played roles in Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation (p. 2868) were the following (page references are to the book):

Mrs. Esther C. Brunauer attended meetings of international organization group as an expert (p. 249). Became an assistant secretary (p. 303).

V. Frank Coe listed, as a representative at meetings of the interdepartmental group to consider postwar international economic problems and policies, representing the Treasury Department (p. 29). Attended meetings of the American Technical Committee representing the Foreign Economic Administration (p. 143n). Alternate member of the informal policy committee on Germany (p. 370).

Lauchlin Currie listed as a representative at meetings of the interdepartmental group to consider postwar international economic problems and policies representing the Executive Office of the President (p. 29n). Member for work on economic problems of the advisory committee (p. 76). Member, committee on postwar foreign economic policy (p. 139). Member, executive committee on economic foreign policy (p. 219).

Harold Glasser, one of the advisers to Dean Acheson at the Atlantic City UNRRA Conference, representing the Treasury Department as the Assistant Director of the Division of Monetary Research (p. 205n). Member, subcommittee to formulate recommendations within the framework of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference (p. 354).

Alger Hiss attended meetings of subcommittee on territorial problems, of the advisory committee (p. 119). Alternate member, policy committee (p. 209n). Appointed special assistant to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (p. 216). Attended meetings preparatory to Dumbarton Oaks Conference. Member, agenda group (p. 275). Alternate member, Armaments Committee (p. 275). Member of committee to allocate officers to work on the basic instrument of the general international organization preparatory to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference (p. 291). Responsible for developing administrative arrangements for Dumbarton Oaks (p. 292). Executive secretary, American Group, Dumbarton Oaks (p. 293). Present at preconference briefing, Dumbarton Oaks (p. 295). Executive secretary of executive secretariat of American group at Dumbarton Oaks (p. 297). Secretary in international capacity, Dumbarton Oaks meetings of heads of Great Britain, Russia, and United States (p. 305). Secretary, Steering Committee, Dumbarton Oaks (p. 312). Attended meetings for drawing up plans for a general international organization (p. 381). Member of committee preparing for Crimea Conference (p. 386). Attended meetings of the interdepartmental committee on dependent area aspects of international organization as State Department representative (p. 388). Accompanied President to Yalta (p. 392). In charge of arrangements for United Nations Conference at San Francisco (p. 415). Secretary, informal organizing group on arrangements for the San Francisco Conference (p. 439).

Philip C. Jessup, technical expert on proposals for the statute of the court, United Nations Conference at San Francisco (p. 419). United States adviser on committee to draft statute for United Nations Conference at San Francisco (p. 426). William T. Stone, attended advisory committee on postwar foreign policy meetings representing the Board of Economic Warfare (p. 77). Member, economic subcommittee, committee on postwar economic policy (p. 139).

Harry Dexter White, member, interdepartmental group to consider postwar economic problems and policies (p. 29). Attended international conferences (33 n., 241, 242 n., 418, 438). Member, advisory committee on postwar foreign policy (pp. 77, 81, 92, 135, 136). Member, Taylor Committee (p. 139). Attended meetings of Cabinet Committee (p. 141). Chairman, Stabilization Fund and Reconstruction and Development Bank Committee (pp. 142, 224). Attended Anglo-American economic conversations (pp. 191, 192). Member, executive committee on economic foreign policy (p. 219). Representative, informal policy committee on Germany (p. 370).

THE IPR BRINGS SOVIET AGENT VLADIMIR ROGOFF TO CONFER WITH  
IPR POLICY PLANNERS IN GOVERNMENT

Vladimir Rogoff was a Soviet intelligence agent who specialized in China (p. 128, exhibit 16; p. 4854). In August 1943 he wrote the authoritative article in "War and the Working Class," which signaled a change of Communist policy toward China (p. 530). In 1944 he was in the United States and had the credentials of a TASS correspondent.

The available evidence on this visit indicates that Edward C. Carter, then secretary general of the IPR, was in New York and was visited by Rogoff. On January 17, 1944, he wired Alger Hiss and Lauchlin Currie at the State Department and Foreign Economic Administration and notified each that his "friend" Rogoff was en route from Moscow to London and would be in Washington for 3 days and urged them to see him (p. 132). Carter also wrote to Rose Yardumian, secretary of the Washington IPR office (p. 140), and enclosed the telegrams to Hiss and Currie. Carter asked Miss Yardumian to call Hiss and Currie and to urge them to talk with Rogoff (pp. 144-145).

Miss Yardumian's reply to Mr. Carter on January 20 proved to be most revealing. She had, as instructed, called Alger Hiss, who told her he had received Carter's wire and was sure "that Carter would understand that he could not make the first advance in arranging a private talk with Rogoff" (p. 145). Hiss mentioned that Rogoff articles in "War and the Working Class" (p. 146) and "that Rogoff's materials had caused considerable controversy in circles here" (p. 146). He added that if Todd (the local Tass correspondent) "wanted to bring Rogoff to Hornbeck's office they would not refuse to see him" (p. 147). The letter also indicated that Currie had seen Rogoff at noon that day but that Rogoff had expressed the opinion that "he thought it would be unwise" (p. 147) for the IPR to hold a meeting with Rogoff present. The letter revealed that Rogoff, William C. Johnstone, of the Washington Office of IPR and who is now with the State Department, Carl Remer, head of the Far Eastern Division of OSS, Owen Lattimore, head of Pacific Division of OWI, and John Carter Vincent, head of the China desk of the State Department, had had a two and one-half hour conversation with Rogoff which was still continuing as the letter was written. Neither Vincent nor Lattimore while on the witness stand would tell the subcommittee what took place at the meeting (p. 1747).

## SUMMARY

This section shows how the leaders of the IPR and their advisers—Lattimore, Carter, Currie, Hiss, Vincent, Jessup, Field, and Fairbank—conducted their operations during the war. Through their influence in the White House, by reports from Foreign Service officers in the field, and through the Mission of the Vice President to China; they sought to bring pressure to bear to undermine the Chinese Government, and to exalt the status of the Chinese Communist Party first to that of a recognized force, and then to that of a member of a coalition government.

By 1945 they had not succeeded, because the top policy makers were maintaining United States policy so that it continued to support



Chiang Kai-shek. But the IPR efforts were not long delayed. These policymakers were being invited to conferences of the IPR and subjected to the programs and views of the leaders of the Institute on political affairs and on postwar organization. At the same time, the Chinese Soviet leaders Chou En-lai and Lin Piao were letting it be known what the Soviets wanted, and Oumansky and Rogoff were freely conversing with the leaders of the IPR.

Thus was the stage set for the third attempt to undermine the Chinese Government.

OWEN LATTIMORE AND JOHN CARTER VINCENT OF THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS WERE INFLUENTIAL IN BRINGING ABOUT A CHANGE IN UNITED STATES POLICY IN 1945 FAVORABLE TO THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS

Until late in 1945, United States policy with respect to China was one of support to the Chinese Nationalist Government (pp. 777, 1492; exhibit 1385). We sought to keep the Chinese army in the field to fight the Japanese. Officially, we took no hand in China's internal strife (p. 777, exhibit 1385). (The inroads described in the last chapter undermined this policy but it nevertheless remained nominally in force.)

In 1945 our policy changed to one of intervention; and our intervention thereafter was in aid of the Chinese Communists and in opposition to Chiang Kai-shek (exhibit 1385).<sup>1</sup> This new policy continued from 1945 until 1950 (exhibit 1385).

On June 10, 1945, Owen Lattimore wrote to the President of the United States and expressed his fear that United States policy of aiding the Chinese Government (through the party of Chiang Kai-shek) was aiding Chiang's party (the Kuomintang) in suppressing its rivals, and that such a policy would establish a precedent for Soviet aid to the Chinese Communists, thus causing division in China (exhibit 473). Lattimore urged a revision of the existing United States policy of aiding Chiang. At about the same time, Lattimore prepared a draft of a letter to the New York Times (which he had hoped would be signed by Thomas W. Lamont) which letter contained substantially the same recommendation as his letter to the President, with a protest contending that a share of United States lend-lease aid to China should go to the Chinese Communists. In this letter Lattimore also recommended that China should be strong, united, and independent (exhibit 527, p. 3353 et seq.).

Lattimore followed up his letter to the President with a visit to the White House on July 3 (pp. 3368-3369), at which time he left with the President a memorandum in which he stressed that Japan, then still at war, was hoping to make a come-back as a nation by causing a division between the Soviet Union and the United States. In this memorandum Lattimore further stated that China should be unified under a coalition government, with the Chinese Communists having real power within the coalition.<sup>2</sup>

On June 20, 1945, there was promulgated an official resolution of the National Committee of the Communist Party<sup>3</sup> of the United

<sup>1</sup> See next section.

<sup>2</sup> Owen Lattimore memorandum to the President (exhibit 530 D, p. 3387).

<sup>3</sup> Then calling itself the Communist Political Association (Political Affairs, July 1945, pp. 3414-3415).

States which declared, inter alia, that reactionaries in the United States were pursuing a dangerous policy of preventing a "strong, united, and democratic China," were "bolstering up the reactionary incompetent Chiang Kai-shek regime" and were lauding the idea of coming to terms with the Mikado "in the hope of maintaining Japan as a reactionary bulwark in the Far East".<sup>4</sup> This resolution charged that influential forces in the State Department were "seeking a compromise peace which will preserve the power of the Mikado after the war at the expense of China and other far eastern peoples and directed against the Soviet Union";<sup>5</sup> and that forces in the (U. S.) administration "plan to use the coming defeat of Japan for imperialist aims, for maintaining a reactionary puppet Kuomintang regime in China, for obtaining American imperialist domination in the Far East." This Communist Party resolution also asked that we "curb those who seek American imperialist control in the Far East"<sup>6</sup> and demanded that we "remove from the State Department all pro-Fascist and reactionary officials".<sup>7</sup> It also called for "full military aid to the Chinese guerrillas led by the heroic [Communist] Eighth and Fourth Armies".<sup>8</sup>

The Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held in Yen-an in the latter part of April 1945 (exhibit 253). It was described by the Communists as one of the most important events in the history of modern China (exhibit 253). In its report dated May 1, 1945, this Congress said its task was—

\* \* \* to rally people throughout China on the eve of the counter offensive to save the Nation from the crisis which is the consequence of the erroneous policy of the Kuomintang government, and so thoroughly to defeat and annihilate the Japanese aggressors and set up an independent, free, democratic, unified, strong, and prosperous new China.

The resolution of the Chinese Communist Party clearly stated what that party's objective was—coalition government. The resolution of the American Communist Party (of later date, above mentioned) differed mainly in viewpoint; it presented what the American Communists should do in attaining this objective asserted by the Chinese Communists. The extent to which these two Communist pronouncements and the Lattimore letter and memorandum coincided is most revealing.

Lattimore in his memorandum of July 3, 1945, commented that "Japan hopes that fear of Russia will induce Britain and America to be 'soft' with 'antirevolutionary' Japanese big business"; that "China, rather than Japan is now the key to far eastern policy as a whole"; and that "to counteract" Japan's policy regarding China, the American policy "must work steadily for 'peace, unity and modern political forms' (in China)."

Lattimore's letter and memorandum of June 10 and July 3, 1945, to the President, and his draft designed for the signature of Thomas W. Lamont, clearly reflect his position that United States policy toward exclusive support of the Nationalist Government in China should be halted, and his recommendation that the making of United States far-eastern policy should be put in new hands. The Lattimore

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., pp. 3414-3415.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., pp. 3414-3415.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., pp. 3414-3415.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

draft intended for Thomas W. Lamont clearly stated that "our interest in China is that China should be strong, united, and independent."

Lattimore also commented that—

In most Government agencies at the present time, the tendency is to find Japan-trained men in higher policy-making posts than China-trained men \* \* \* (exhibit 530-D).

Both Lattimore and the Communists were calling for a "strong, united, and democratic" China. Both were calling for curtailing rather than augmenting United States support of China's Nationalist Government. Both wanted military supplies sent to the Chinese Communists. Both wanted changes in the State Department.

At that time the persons most concerned in the Department of State with far eastern policy were Joseph Grew, Joseph W. Ballantine, and Eugene Dooman (pp. 704, 705, 708). Ballantine and Dooman were Japan-trained (exhibit 172), and Grew's background included many years of Japanese experience (State Department Register, 1945, p. 339). Within 4 months all three were out of the Department of State (exhibits 170, 172; p. 3377). They were replaced by officers who either had no far eastern training or who were China-trained. The position of Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs passed from Ballantine, Japan-trained, with experience in China, and in the Foreign Service continuously from 1919 to 1945;<sup>8a</sup> to John Carter Vincent, China-trained and in service from 1924 to date.<sup>8b</sup>

The Daily Worker of September 6, 1945, reported that Secretary of State Byrnes was shaping a stiff occupation policy for Japan and was replacing old-line Japanese policy makers with experts on China. Concerning Dooman, it pointed out he—

\* \* \* retired on August 31, it was revealed today, after 33 years of diplomatic service in the Japanese Department. He was born in Japan and has been criticized by liberal publications for a "soft" attitude toward Japan.

He had held a key spot in formulating occupation procedure for Japan as chairman of a joint State, Army, and Navy Department committee responsible for occupation policy.

John Carter Vincent, Chief of the State Department's Division of Chinese Affairs, was recalled hurriedly from his vacation to fill Dooman's place on the committee. Vincent also retained his China post (exhibit 172).

With respect to the recommendations for a "strong, united, and democratic China" and the recommendation that there be a settlement between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists and that a coalition government be set up, there were visible no direct developments until November of that year. On November 28, 1945, John Carter Vincent, then head of the Far Eastern Office of the State Department, recommended an outline of suggested course of action in China (p. 2207). It should be pointed out that Vincent has since testified that he was an intimate friend of Lattimore<sup>9</sup>; and that he frequently consulted with Lattimore.<sup>10</sup> In fact, John Carter Vincent endeavored early in 1945 to have Lattimore retained as a consultant

<sup>8a</sup> Biographical Registry of the Department of State, September 1, 1944, p. 9.

<sup>8b</sup> Biographical Registry of the Department of State, April 1, 1951, p. 451.

<sup>9</sup> P. 1740, 1930, 2120.

<sup>10</sup> P. 1738, 1765, 2029, 2120.



to the China Desk of the State Department (pp. 704, 1739). This effort was thwarted by Mr. Grew and Mr. Dooman (p. 705).

In the Vincent outline, the recital was made that the United States believes that it would be conducive to peace, unity and democratic reform in China if the bases of (the Chinese Nationalist Government) were broadened to include other political elements in the country, and that the United States strongly advocates steps toward that end. The outline stressed that the Nationalist Government was a one-party government and that the United States could not support that government by "military intervention in an internecine struggle."

The outline also called for a declaration of truce between the armies of the Nationalist Government and the armies of the Chinese Communists and other dissident Chinese armed forces, and stated that the United States was prepared to ask the U. S. S. R. and the United Kingdom to cooperate with the United States in the giving of such support. (Lattimore had affirmed in his recommendations to the President that, if the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on such a course, the Chinese Communists and Chiang would come together.) An analysis (p. 2210) of the President's declaration of policy dated December 15, 1945 (which became the cornerstone of United States policy toward China until June 1950) shows that it was in most of its substance the same as this draft of Vincent's, and Vincent has acknowledged that it was (pp. 2197, 2201).

Under date of December 9 Vincent drafted a memorandum for the War Department, which was signed by the Secretary of State (James F. Byrnes) December 10, and which set forth a policy and prescribed operations to be undertaken in furtherance thereof (p. 2199). This memorandum, like the President's policy declaration of December 15, 1945, also became one of the three documents which constituted General Marshall's directive for his mission to China; thus it appears that two of these three documents were drafted originally by Vincent.<sup>11</sup> In addition to policy, this memorandum dealt with the mission to be undertaken by Gen. George C. Marshall and also with directions to be given to Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer. The memorandum commenced with a statement "The President and the Secretary of State are both anxious that the unification of China by peaceful democratic methods be achieved as soon as possible." This was followed by quotation from a statement made by the Secretary of State on December 7, 1945, stating:

In relation to China, our longer-range goal \* \* \* is the development of a "strong united and democratic China."<sup>12</sup>

This memorandum continued to the effect that to achieve that goal it was essential that the "Central" Government of China and the various "dissident elements" show a willingness to compromise, and that "we believe" that the government of Chiang Kai-shek must be broadened to include "representatives of \* \* \* groups who are now without representation in the Government of China"; and it indicated that the United States would exert its influence "in such a way as to encourage concessions by the Central Government, by the so-called (sic) Communists, and by the other factions" (p. 2201).<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> The third document in the "Marshall directive" was the covering letter of transmittal.

<sup>12</sup> See also pp. 2207-2208.

Clearly this was calling for intervention. Clearly it was implying that the Chinese Communists were not really Communists. It went on:

The President has asked General Marshall to go to China \* \* \* for the purpose of bringing to bear the influence of the United States. \* \* \* Specifically General Marshall will endeavor to influence the Chinese Government to call a national conference of representatives of the major political elements, to bring about the unification of China and, concurrently, effect a cessation of hostilities, particularly in north China (p. 2201).

General Marshall was being sent as a special representative of the President for "bringing to bear" (p. 2201) upon the government of a sovereign country the influence of the United States toward achieving in that country objectives which the President and the Secretary of State of the United States had decided were desirable. The last paragraph of the memorandum of December 9 conveyed a request by the Department of State that the War Department arrange for directions to General Wedemeyer for action to be taken by him.

It is to be noted that the substance of the instruction which the Department of State in the memorandum of December 9 asked the War Department to give to General Wedemeyer was directly contrary to the recommendations which General Wedemeyer himself had submitted. Mr. Vincent, in his testimony, recognized this (pp. 2205-2207).

Thus the demand for support of the idea of a coalition government in China, made in May 1945 by Mao Tse Tung, taken up by the American Communist Party, and recommended to the President by Owen Lattimore, in his memorandum of July 3, 1945, was adopted and sponsored by Vincent; memoranda elaborating upon that idea were drafted by Vincent and were affirmed by the Secretary of State; these became the basis of the policy in relation to China which was announced by President Truman on December 15, 1945, and in pursuance of that policy General Marshall was sent to China to bring to bear upon the Chinese National Government the pressure of United States influence.

The subcommittee has obtained from the Department of State copies of a letter addressed by Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State, to Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck on May 19, 1950, respecting an alleged "turning point" and "change in policy" regarding China, and of the reply by Dr. Hornbeck, dated June 7.

Dr. Hornbeck served officially in connection with far eastern matters during most of the years from 1918 to 1944. He was Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs of the Department of State from 1928 to 1937; was an adviser on political relations from 1937 to 1944, was an Assistant of the Secretary of State in 1944, and was Ambassador to the Netherlands from 1944 to 1947.

In the course of his reply to Dean Rusk's inquiry, Dr. Hornbeck wrote:

It was then, in the year 1945—and not before then—that the Government of the United States, first having taken action inconsistent with tradition and commitment in regard to China, embarked upon what became a course of intervention in regard to the civil conflict, the conflict between the National Government and the Communists, in China. It was then that words and action of the Government of the United States began to be expressive of an "against" and a "for"

attitude; then and thereafter that the Government of the United States brought to bear pressures, pressures upon the National Government, pressures which were not "against" the Communists but were on their behalf, pressures not to the disadvantage of the Communists, but, in effect, to the disadvantage of the National Government.

To the circumstances of the "change," to the content and purport of the policy devised in 1945, proclaimed on December 15, of that year, and given expression in word and in deed since then, and to the gross and the net consequences thereof, there is no need for attention in the present context. There is, however, in my opinion, great need that, in the context of present American involvement, as a leading participant, in a third global conflict, wherein "Communist" totalitarianism is making war, both "cold" and "hot," on all states, governments, peoples, institutions, organizations and persons disinclined to accept domination by it—there is urgent need that the Government of the United States give solicitous attention to the question: Must the United States follow to the bitter, tragic and discrediting end the downward path, in relations with China, on which its feet were set in the fateful year of military victories and diplomatic vagaries and vitiations, 1945?

#### DURING THE PERIOD 1945-49, PERSONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS WERE INSTRUMENTAL IN KEEPING UNITED STATES POLICY ON A COURSE FAVORABLE TO COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES IN CHINA

##### A. IPR AGAINST AID TO CHIANG

Basically, the American Communist Party program for China for the period beginning with the Japanese surrender called for: (a) The discouragement of United States assistance to the Chinese National Government (p. 4602), and (b), encouragement of United States assistance to the Chinese Communists (pp. 4602-4604).

Dr. Max Yergan, who in 1945 had been present at the first two founding meetings of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy (pp. 4600-4604), an organization set up by the Communists to influence American public opinion on China (p. 4599), stated that the leader at these meetings was Frederick V. Field (p. 4601) who held high positions in the Institute of Pacific Relations until that very year and was then a member of its executive committee (p. 4601).<sup>1</sup> Field had been instructed by Eugene Dennis, chairman of the American Communist Party, to set up this organization and to promulgate this policy (pp. 4600-4602). Maxwell Stewart, his wife Marguerite S. Stewart (pp. 4600-4601)<sup>2</sup> and Mrs. Edgar Snow, all of the IPR, were also present at one or both of the meetings (p. 4600).

Almost simultaneously another group of IPR persons, including Frederick V. Field, T. A. Bisson, Israel Epstein, Mrs. Edward C. Carter, Lawrence E. Salisbury, Mrs. Edgar Snow, and Ilona Rolf Sues, together with a group of others signed a letter to President Truman which appeared in the Daily Worker of August 17, 1945 (p. 622, exhibit 174). The letter urged the President to avert civil war in China by not turning over equipment to Chiang, and deplored the use of American planes and other military equipment which had been made available to the Chinese Nationalists by General Wedemeyer and Ambassador Hurley (p. 4605).

<sup>1</sup> Budenz and Elizabeth Bentley had testified that Field was the commissar for far eastern policy for the American Communist Party.

<sup>2</sup> Marguerite S. Stewart was by 1946 secretary of the American council of the IPR.



There are other instances of this broad trend but only these few are cited to give a political backdrop to the historical events being shaped by the Marshall mission which as we showed in the preceding section was set in motion, at least to some extent by Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, both active and trusted members of the Institute of Pacific Relations. This section will relate how IPR people in and out of Government were instrumental in keeping United States policy on a course that was anti-Chiang and often pro-Communist in orientation.

#### B. GENERAL MARSHALL<sup>3</sup> INTERVENES IN CHINA

At the end of 1945 when General Marshall left for China, the balance of power was with the Chinese Nationalists (pp. 313, 314, white paper), and remained so until at least June 1946 (ibid.). Chiang's divisions were chasing the Communists northward and the prospect of victory by Nationalist China was at its highest (testimony before the subcommittee on May 29, 1952). However, when General Marshall arrived in China, he undertook to bring about the coalition government which his directive demanded (pp. 1717, 2201, 2215-2217, exhibit 389). And he commenced to bring pressure on Chiang in order to force his compliance (p. 155 white paper, pp. 1498, 2216).

There was a plan in 1946 approved by General Marshall that called for the reduction of the Chinese Nationalist Army to 50 divisions and the incorporation into that army of 10 Communist divisions all of which would have been armed by the United States. This plan failed when coalition failed (p. 3407, and pp. 141-143, white paper).<sup>4</sup>

Marshall was empowered to grant a \$500,000,000 loan to the Chinese. This was withheld pending the establishment of the coalition government; it was in fact, never granted (p. 3709, p. 691 white paper).

General Wedemeyer's mission to bring assistance to the Chinese Government was conditioned, by the terms of General Marshall's directive (pp. 2206-2207) on the outcome of Marshall's negotiations, the purpose of which was to bring about a coalition government (p. 2206).

Marshall instituted truce teams, each made up of one Chinese Nationalist, one Communist, and one American, who undertook to enforce truces between the (then) winning Nationalists and the losing Communists (p. 1717, pp. 690, 691 white paper). It was testified that the Communists, when sore beset, would agree to discuss a truce, and then, instead of coming to terms, would simply regroup, recover their strength and prepare for new offensives (pp. 1503, 3709).

The parallel between this procedure and the tactics of the Communists in Korea today was called to the attention of the subcommittee (pp. 1501, 3994).

<sup>3</sup> General Marshall is listed as a member of the board of trustees of the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1951 (p. 568) even though he was not in 1946.

<sup>4</sup> It is interesting to note that John Carter Vincent acknowledged before the subcommittee that the Communists never seriously intended to enter into a coalition with the Chinese Government (p. 2011).

## C. AMERICAN ASSISTANCE TO CHINESE GOVERNMENT STOPPED IN 1946

When the Chinese government did not effect coalition, by the summer of 1946 United States military assistance to China was brought to an end. Not only did the United States stop sending military supplies to the Chinese Government; the shipment of war materials actually purchased by the Chinese also was halted (pp. 1498, 1962; see hearings of May 29, 1952, transcript pp. 8006, 8007).

The Chinese also had purchased surplus equipment that remained on Okinawa and other Pacific Islands. Even the shipment of this was banned, according to General Chennault's testimony May 29, 1952. A complete embargo took effect in the summer of 1946 (p. 1498).<sup>6</sup> It was maintained at least until May 1947 (p. 1498).<sup>7</sup> General Chennault testified that the first shipment arrived in Shanghai in December 1948 (transcript p. 8020). Chennault further stated that the war material sent to China after the embargo did not arrive in time to aid the Chinese Nationalists in the field (transcript p. 8020).<sup>8</sup> Admiral Cooke who commanded the United States Seventh Fleet in Chinese waters in 1945-46 (p. 1496), testified that the Chinese had a number of divisions equipped with American arms (pp. 1494, 1495, 1496). When the flow of American ammunition was stopped, these divisions lost their fire power and were defeated. Even after the Eightieth Congress appropriated \$125,000,000 for aid to the Chinese (pp. 1504, 3711), shipments were delayed and when the guns finally reached the Chinese general in north China they were without bolts and therefore useless (p. 1504).

An official compilation prepared by the Department of Defense (exhibit 1344) showed that from June 30, 1946, the approximate time when the embargo went into effect, there was no appreciable assignment of arms to China until the authorization by the Eightieth Congress for arms aid of \$125,000,000 (pp. 1504, 3711). This report shows that only \$17,900,000 (exhibit 1344) in lend-lease aid was supplied between June 30, 1946, and the time the China Aid Act of 1948 became effective, many months after its enactment. In addition, the value of certain ammunition left behind by the Marines and which was picked up by the Chinese was given as \$4,300,000. The Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service has estimated the cost of the Korean War at \$7,931,000,000.

Admiral Cooke testified that while he was in China in 1946, in charge of United States naval forces, General Marshall said to him during a conversation that the United States had armed the Chinese but then was disarming them (p. 1495).

<sup>6</sup> John Carter Vincent testified that this occurred earlier.

<sup>7</sup> Testimony of Gen. George C. Marshall before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, February 20, 1948:

"Mr. VORYS. \* \* \* As I understand it, we had an embargo for 10 months on shipment of arms to China and then the ammunition that we did authorize to be shipped, which they purchased, has not gotten to the troops yet. Now, why is that?"

"Secretary MARSHALL. Do you mean the original embargo and then the later developments?"

"The embargo was in August 1946, and the release was in May of 1947."

"Mr. VORYS. That is about 10 months."

"Secretary MARSHALL. Yes" (U. S. Foreign Policy for a Post-War Recovery Program, The First Step Being Consideration of Proposals For a European Recovery Program, Including H. R. 4840, H. R. 4579, and Similar Measures, pt. 2, p. 1550).

<sup>8</sup> Chennault was in Shanghai at that time, when that city was the principal port of supply.

While this process of disarming China was under way and while the source of ammunition of the Chinese Nationalists was drying up, the Communists were arming themselves with Japanese arms which were turned over to them by the conquering Soviet army in Manchuria (p. 1496).

#### D. UNITED STATES POLICY DISCOURAGES AID TO CHIANG

Prof. William McGovern went to China in 1947 as a consultant to the Congressional Committee on Foreign Affairs. In China he was briefed by Raymond Ludden, who was the ranking United States Foreign Service officer in China. He stated that the briefing was favorable to the Communists and presented a dim picture of Nationalist prospects (p. 1026).

Professor McGovern further testified that while in China he was told by General Lucas, head of the United States Army Mission in China, that the Army mission was not allowed to give any effective aid or tactical assistance to the Chinese in their fight against the Communists (p. 1026). McGovern quoted General Lucas as saying he acted not from "personal choice" but by directive of the Defense Department (p. 1027).

When the Marines were being reduced in force in 1947, Admiral Cooke sought to have their obsolescent equipment dumped so as to allow the Chinese Nationalists to obtain it (pp. 1498, 1499). He testified that John Carter Vincent, then head of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department opposed this, but that General Marshall overruled Vincent (p. 1499). This testimony was contradicted by Vincent (pp. 1905, 2012).

#### E. JOHN CARTER VINCENT AGAINST CHIANG

John Carter Vincent acknowledged (pp. 2253-2254) having drafted in the fall of 1946, a memorandum that became a Presidential message to Chiang Kai-shek transmitted on August 10, 1946, wherein Chiang was charged with using force against Chinese "liberals" and with failure to understand the "liberal trend of the times" (pp. 2253-2254, white paper, p. 652). The letter threatened that unless the Chinese came to terms with the Communists it would become necessary "to redefine and explain the position of the United States to the people of America" (white paper, p. 652). Chiang's reply was to the effect that the Chinese were making every effort to come to terms with the Communists but that the latter kept breaking the truce to suit their own purposes (white paper, p. 653).

During the 1946-47 period John Carter Vincent was head of the Far Eastern Office of the State Department (p. 519, State Department Biographical Register) and as such was regarded as an official spokesman on United States foreign policy.

On November 12, 1946, speaking before the National Foreign Trade Council, and knowing that he would be understood as speaking of China trade (p. 2256), Mr. Vincent said:

What is unsound for private capital is unsound for government capital. It is unsound to invest private or public capital in countries where there is widespread corruption in business and official circles, where a government is wasting its substance on excessive armament, where the threat or fact of civil war exists,



where tendencies toward government monopolization exclude American business, or where undemocratic concepts of government are controlling (p. 2256).

Mr. Vincent's testimony respecting this statement, its validity, and its motivation, is extremely interesting (pp. 2260-2265).

On January 21, 1947, Mr. Vincent made a speech at Cornell University, which was reported in the press in part as follows:

John Carter Vincent declared tonight that the United States should avoid relying on the preservation of the status quo in China and other areas and that for the United States to throw its weight on the side of the status quo was short-sighted because it would fail to encourage progressive elements (p. 2255).

Though the news reports of his speech mentioned China, Mr. Vincent contended before the subcommittee that his reference was to Asia in general rather than to China in particular (p. 2255).

#### OTHER IPR LEADERS AGAINST CHIANG

During this period Mr. Philip C. Jessup expressed to Admiral Cooke opposition to United States aid for the Nationalist Government (p. 1506). General Chennault testified that he urged Jessup not to release the white paper as it would undermine the Nationalist Government (see hearings of May 29, 1952, transcript, p. 8021). The white paper was nevertheless released.

Jessup acknowledged before the Foreign Relations Committee that he edited the white paper, which was released July 30, 1949 (Jessup nomination hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee, p. 646).

A letter written by Edward C. Carter to Little, Brown & Co. in connection with Israel Epstein's book, *The Unfinished Revolution in China*, shows how Carter sought to use this book to influence the leaders of the State Department and Congress (pp. 452, 464-465).<sup>9</sup> Carter and Epstein were associated in the IPR. Carter was questioned at length about this letter, as was John K. Fairbank (p. 3738).<sup>10</sup> The letter, written June 12, 1947, is as follows:

[Private and confidential]

Miss ANNE FORD,  
Publicity Director, Little, Brown & Co.,  
Boston, Mass.

DEAR MISS FORD: This is to acknowledge Epstein's *The Unfinished Revolution in China*, which you so kindly sent me a few days ago. I have already read two-thirds of it and hope to complete it within a few days.

I think it's of the utmost importance that you devise some means of getting it read at an early date among others by Secretary of State George Marshall, Senators Vandenberg, Morse, and Ives, John Foster Dulles and John Carter Vincent of the State Department. You will know better than I how to make certain that they read it in the near future. A letter from me on the subject might lead a few of them to think that I was recommending it because I was an admirer of Epstein's and for that reason they might slightly discount my recommendation.

I have another suggestion to make. The book is so full of profound understanding and admiration of the Chinese people that I think it is equally important to find ways and means of getting a wide circulation in China. Have you thought of a Chinese edition? In the past there has been a tendency for Shanghai publishers to get out pirated editions in English. This would be all to the good if the printing was done accurately and the full text was reprinted. Sometimes, for mercenary reasons, they make substantial cuts.

Would it be out of the question for you to consider at an early date printing a cheap paper-cover edition for maximum circulation in India, the Philippines, and

<sup>9</sup> Epstein has been identified as a Communist agent (pp. 590, 634, 3829, 3834). The book is strongly anti Chiang Kai-shek and strongly in favor of the Communists (pp. 454, 458).

<sup>10</sup> Epstein was reported in Red China during the hearings.

China with the expectation that some orders would come in from Indochina, Siam, Burma, and the Netherlands East Indies?

The book combines in one volume several books. It is a penetrating history of China during the war years. It is a sociological document of importance, and it is a military handbook that might have been of enormous value to the Maquis in France and even to the little handful of anti-Hitler Germans in Germany. It might become a military and political handbook for Viet-Nam and in other Asiatic areas if the imperialist powers try to reassert their pre-Pearl Harbor domination.

The book is not so much needed in the Communist areas in China as it is in the Kuomintang areas where its authoritative accounts would give new hope, as well as new methods, to the millions of Chinese who are dissatisfied with the right wing Kuomintang domination. You have only to read the newspapers to discover what a large potential market for Epstein's book there is amongst non-Communist professors and students in the Chinese universities. The history of the last few decades proves conclusively that the Chinese student movements are far more influential in China than in many other countries in startling new and creative political and social movements.

More than at any other time in recent years, there is a large British public both in the United Kingdom, Canada, and also in Australia and New Zealand which would find the book illuminating, not only with reference to China, but in their thinking with reference to a great many movements in the Continent of Europe and elsewhere.

I congratulate Little, Brown & Co.'s unerring wisdom in deciding, not only to publish this book, but in leaving no stone unturned in getting a very wide circulation.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

P. S.—I have not consulted Epstein with reference to this letter. I hope, however, that it may meet with his approval and elicit further concrete suggestions from him. To that end I am taking the liberty of sending him privately a copy.

P. S. 2.—Referring to General Marshall, I wish you could find someone who would get him to read the book from start to finish and not simply the end with Epstein's analysis of Marshall. It seems to me he would need the cumulative effect of the preceding chapters to make him reassess objectively his own role.

I assume that John Carter Vincent would read the book with a very open mind. Probably he is generally acquainted with most of the material, but he has probably never seen it organized so logically. If he were sold on the book he might persuade General Marshall to read it from cover to cover.

Of course, many will say that Epstein is a special pleader. I think this is probably true, but I think he is pleading for a more sound analysis of the world than many of the other current special pleaders. I hear that the New York Times has asked Owen Lattimore to review the book. I hope other publications will make as wise a choice.

I imagine the Kuomintang government will put the book on the "forbidden" list for import in China. I would hope that you could get it into the hands of Ambassador Leighton Stuart and some of the American correspondents like Benjamin Welles, Christopher Rand, and Arch Steele, Sun Fo, Madame Sun Yat-sen and a few others, before the bronze curtain falls (exhibit 116, p. 464).

#### F. ELEANOR AND OWEN LATTIMORE

Both Owen and Eleanor Lattimore also were active during this period (pp. 327, 750, 996, 3053, 3585, 4591, 4592). Eleanor Lattimore was a staff worker and for a period ran the Washington Office of IPR (p. 996). In a pamphlet entitled "China Yesterday and Today," published by the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1946, she wrote:

When we speak of the Chinese Communists, we should remember that they stand for something rather different from what is ordinarily meant by the word "Communist." They are not advocating the Russian system for China, and, unlike the Russians, they maintain the rights of private property and enterprise in the areas under their control. Because their chief interest at the moment is in improving the economic conditions of the Chinese farmer and in increasing the number of people capable of taking part in political life, they are often described

as a peasant party. They have established a system of popular elections in the regions under their control; they favor extending the vote to the people of the rest of the country; and they have long declared that they would support a democratic republic in which not only they themselves but all other Chinese political parties would be represented.

At the time this is being written, negotiations are being carried on between the Chinese Government and the Communists which, it is hoped, will result in a more democratic government. For not until China achieves a government in which the Chinese people are adequately represented and which brings about agricultural reforms designed to give her farmers enough to live on will the underlying causes of communism be removed (p. 886).

Such representation that the Chinese Communists were not real Communists was paralleled in the memorandum setting forth United States policy for China, signed by the Secretary of State in December 1945, which referred to the Chinese Communists as "so-called Communists" (exhibit 389, p. 2201).

The record abounds with evidence of the fact that the Chinese Communist Party was at all times a full-fledged member of the Communist international organization directed from Moscow (pp. 867, 2726-2830, 2406, 2694 ff., exhibits 1392, 1360A, 1360B). There was testimony that Chinese Communists were trained in Moscow at the rate of between one thousand and twelve hundred per year, over a period of many years (p. 867). This training was supervised by Mao Tse-tung and leaders of the Chinese Party (pp. 2694, 2695). The Institute of Pacific Relations was officially aware of this relationship of the Chinese Communists to Moscow (exhibits 1360A, 1360B, 1363, and 1392). One document was found in the IPR files initialed for T. A. Bisson, Catherine Porter, Philip Jaffe, W. L. Holland, and the file, and which showed the tie-in between the Chinese Communist Party and the Comintern (exhibit 1392).

The Library of Congress received its copy of Owen Lattimore's book *Situation in Asia*, in March 1949. What he wrote—obviously at some time prior to that date—necessarily antedated the utterances and recommendations expressed at the round-table conference which was held in the fall of 1949 to review the policy for the United States State Department (p. 1551 ff.). The suggestions made by Lattimore in *Situation in Asia* proceed on the premise that China already had fallen and that a new direction was to be given to policy (*Situation in Asia*, p. 151). His recommendations are directed to a new situation calling for a new policy in view of the collapse of Nationalist resistance to the Communists on the Chinese mainland. Lattimore's comments on policy are set forth at some length below because they will appear again hereinafter, as expressed by advisers to the United States State Department.

In *Situation in Asia*, Lattimore wrote: that the Communists had conquered China; that one of the factors in this conquest was the spirit of revolutionary nationalism—a surge toward independence that the peoples of colonial Asia were inevitably experiencing (supra, pp. 160, 161); that the resulting government could not be a "Communist" government; that it would have to be a coalition government; that this coalition, unlike the one sought by General Marshall when the balance of power was on the non-Communist side, would be rather one with the balance of power on the Communist side (supra, p. 152); and that it was "imperative for the Communists, in order to consolidate their power, to give at least relative peace, order, and prosperity as a contrast to the long nightmare of war" (supra, p. 155).



Lattimore also postulated that if the New China obtained its supply of capital goods, its capital, and its technicians from America, the Communists would slow down their revolutionary consolidation to an evolutionary pace (*supra*, p. 162). Lattimore wrote:

There is a tendency to assume that China's relations with Russia will be determined by the fact that the Chinese Communists are a junior Marxist Party which will unquestionably accept the decisions of Moscow. The truth is that in China devotion to nationalism and national interests is more powerful among more peoples than devotion to Marxism and Russian interests. Attempts by the Russians to make the Russian interest override the Chinese interest could easily bring into being a Chinese Titoism (*supra*, p. 163).

Also:

The present top leadership of the Chinese Communists consists of men who, however closely they may study the Moscow line and however publicly they may proclaim their loyalty to Moscow, have built their own political machine \* \* \* and are not going to turn to foreigners \* \* \* (p. 166).

He then went on to urge, as a United States policy, that we should encourage acceptance of opportunities for American enterprise in China without imposing any conditions or reservations based on internal policies of the New Chinese Government (p. 178). He urged:

That we abandon the delusion that we can maintain footholds in Asia by supporting rump territories or rump governments \* \* \* (p. 179).

On the question of recognition of the Communist Government and its admission to the United Nations, Lattimore wrote that the new government would—

claim China's Big Five position in the United Nations including the right to veto. By the use of our veto, we could delay China in moving into the position—but only by some such *reductio ad absurdum* as pretending that the island of Formosa is China (p. 180).

In connection with Indochina, Lattimore wrote that Vietnamese, not Frenchmen, organized guerrilla resistance during the war; that the resistance organization was the medium for Frenchmen to join Free France; that by 1949 the Vietnamese Nationalist movement had won control of three-quarters of the country; that it was led by Ho Chi Minh "a veteran Communist educated in France"; that there were so few Communists in Indochina that Ho Chi Minh was sticking close to Nationalism and his movement had solid support even among upper classes living away from French-held cities and among Catholics; that all French efforts to split up the Nationalist movement failed because there were so few Communists; and that the "hard fact" was that Indochina would become independent, and any effort to help the French hold it would be a military absurdity and a political impossibility (*supra*, pp. 194, 195).

Of Mongolia, Lattimore wrote that it lay between Communist-ruled Russia and Communist-ruled China. He stated that it would be to the American interest to emphasize that there is a country between Russia and China and that this could best be emphasized by granting that country recognition and a seat in the United Nations (*supra*, p. 226).

Lattimore ended his book with the following:

Throughout Asia today there prevails an atmosphere of hope, not of despair. There is not a single country in Asia in which people feel that we are entering on an age of chaos. What they see opening out before them is a limitless horizon of hope—the hope of peaceful constructive activity in free countries and peaceful cooperation among free peoples. There will be disillusionments along the way

as these hopes unfold. They should not come from America, or as a result of American policy. A great part of Asia's hopes, however, will be fulfilled, and should be fulfilled, with American cooperation. We have everything to gain by being on the side of hope (*supra*, p. 238).

Thus did IPR members, during the 1945-49 period seek to put obstacles in the path of the Nationalist Government in its fight to survive. Thus also did they aid the Communist cause in China and in the world. In 1946 the Chinese Communists (after they escaped, with the aid of the truce teams, from the Nationalists) regrouped and were armed with Japanese equipment in Manchuria. Thereafter they did the attacking, and made their conquest, while their opponents, the Nationalists, were disarmed, undermined, and impugned by American action and inaction, both official and unofficial. The IPR policy makers, in and out of the United States Government, who did everything possible to subvert Chiang, must be said to have aided the Communists; when, as was the case in China, there are only two opposing forces in the field, those who obstruct, impede, disarm, impugn, and discourage one of such forces cannot fail thereby to give important assistance to the other.

#### HOW PERSONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE IPR WERE INFLUENTIAL IN 1949 SHAPING AND MOVING UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE DIRECTION OF COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES

By July of 1949 the Chinese Communists had overrun half of China (p. 1577). On July 27 of that year Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced that a review would be made of United States policy (p. 1038). Philip C. Jessup was announced as the chairman of a board of three men to undertake the review. The other two were Everett Case and Raymond D. Fosdick (pp. 917, 1144). Jessup had had extensive experience in the Institute of Pacific Relations, but there is evidence that up to the time when he became active in the institute he had in no way specialized in far eastern policy (p. 924). Everett Case had been active in the institute and Raymond Fosdick had not, but the reason given by Mr. Holland for Fosdick's nonparticipation was that he was active in the Rockefeller Foundation (p. 1146) and the institute was the recipient of many grants from the foundation (pp. 1151 ff., 1236-1238).

On August 5, 1949, the State Department issued its white paper blaming the Chinese Nationalists for the loss of China (pp. 1041, 1049, 2254). The mere issuance of the white paper jarred the morale of the Chinese Nationalists and was, in fact, determined upon by the State Department in the face of warnings that such a publication would aid the Communist conquest of China.<sup>1</sup> On August 6, Senator Vandenberg publicly expressed the hope that the review of policy to be undertaken by Jessup, Case, and Fosdick would not overlook reviewing ways and means of aiding non-Communists in Asia (pp. 1039, 1041, 1049).

By October, however, 60 percent of China was overrun by the Chinese Communists and on October 1, 1949, the Communists proclaimed the Chinese People's Republic, which was recognized the next day by the U. S. S. R. It was quickly recognized by Soviet

<sup>1</sup> See hearings, May 29, 1952, transcript (p. 8021).

Bulgaria and Rumania, and 2 days later by Soviet Poland and Czechoslovakia (p. 1041).

At this time Brig. Gen. Louis Fortier, intelligence officer for the United States Far Eastern Command, became concerned by the looming prospect of the Chinese Communists being able to consolidate militarily and posing a threat to the United States Command in the Far East (p. 854). It was his contention that recognition of the new People's Republic would give the Communists the moral and political support necessary for the consolidation of their position (p. 846).

Early in October, the first manifestation of action by the review board took the form of a 3-day conference held under the auspices of the State Department and presided over by Philip Jessup (pp. 918-1039). In attendance at this conference were 25 persons selected by the State Department, most of whom expressed their views on far eastern policy (p. 1551). Also present were several Department of State officials (p. 1063).

William L. Holland, secretary-general of the Institute of Pacific Relations, acknowledged that 17 of the 25 invitees to this conference, as well as Jessup and Case of the review panel, were then active in the Institute of Pacific Relations (pp. 1036, 1145).

The subcommittee obtained its information about the conference at the outset through the testimony of Prof. Kenneth Colegrove (p. 920) and of former Governor Harold Stassen (pp. 1037, 1050, 1252), both of whom had attended the conference. Both had testified that at the conference there was a prevailing group led by Owen Lattimore and Lawrence K. Rosinger (pp. 921, 1044, 1278), that the recommendations of this prevailing group were such as would tend to aid and facilitate the Communist expansion in Asia (p. 921), and that as a matter of fact such recommendations subsequently were followed by the State Department (p. 1047).

After receiving this testimony, the subcommittee endeavored to obtain from the State Department a copy of the official transcript of the conference (p. 1040), and after several requests (pp. 1075, 1129) (and after portions of the transcript had been released by individuals who had participated) (p. 1050), finally obtained such a copy (p. 1551). The subcommittee also obtained copies of memoranda submitted by some of the conferees, including those of Lattimore (p. 927) and Rosinger (p. 2500). Examination of the transcript itself establishes that the prevailing (majority) view at the conference advocated (a) the recognition of Communist China; (b) normal trade relations between the United States and Communist China; (c) encouragement of trade between Japan and Communist China; (d) economic assistance to Red China; (e) recognition that Communist conquest in Asia was a natural and inevitable consequence of revolutionary ferment in Asia with its Communist nature being incidental. The prevailing view at the conference also supported the position that Nationalist China was defeated and that all recommendations should recognize this as a fact. Also expressed at the conference, by some of the same persons who advocated the "prevailing views" mentioned above, were positions favoring (a) seating Red China in the United Nations; (b) withholding aid from Formosa; (c) looking upon Ho Chi Minh as a revolutionary patriot with only a color of



loyalty to Moscow; (d) withholding of approval of the Chinese embargo against supplies to the Communists. Attention is drawn to the close parallel between these recommendations and those of Lattimore early in 1949 in his book, *Situation in Asia*.

Witnesses pointed out that Jessup and the advisory board panel selected for the conference mainly persons whose views conformed to the pattern of action being followed by the State Department (pp. 922, 1071), a fact which Owen Lattimore seemed to recognize when he expressed, at the end of the conference the hope that the State Department felt that its hand had been strengthened (p. 1662).

Governor Stassen conferred with Dr. Jessup off-the-record between sessions and according to Stassen's testimony Jessup asserted that greater logic lay with the findings of the majority present who expressed their views (pp. 1046, 1063).

The committee obtained the memoranda submitted in advance of the conference by the two dominant conferees—Owen Lattimore (p. 928) and Laurence K. Rosinger (p. 2500). (By three credible witnesses during these subcommittee hearings, Rosinger was identified as a Communist (pp. 313, 467, 1077).) When he was given an opportunity to deny these allegations he elected to refuse to testify on the ground that his testimony would tend to incriminate him (p. 2475). At the same time his course of behavior and the nature of his associations subsequent to the time of the last identification of his Communist association remained constant and the tenor of his public expression of his views remained uniformly sympathetic to communism and Communists (pp. 473, 2529-2532).

Basically the Rosinger memorandum called for withholding aid to the Chinese Nationalist Government and Chiang Kai-shek, avoiding economic and military intervention in Formosa, returning Formosa to the Chinese Communist Government, imposing no impediments to normal trade with China with the exception of outright materials of war, avoiding any action which would tend to prolong what was called the Nationalist blockade, developing trade between Japan and China, normal trade between the United States and China, and de jure recognition of the New Chinese Government (pp. 2502-2503).

All of these points were expressed in the "prevailing views" on these subjects at the conference (p. 1049).

Lattimore's recommendations coincided with Rosinger's in almost every respect. His memorandum stressed the withdrawal of support from Chiang Kai-shek and from "the scattering of little Chiang Kai-sheks in Asia", avoidance of cutting off trade with Communist China, encouraging Japan to come to terms with Communist China, discontinuance of efforts to keep South Korea alive, and acceptance of a list of countries (which included Communist China) recommended for admission to the United Nations by Trygve Lie, together with admission of the Mongolian People's Republic (pp. 929-931).

At the conference the three points which received the greatest stress were the recognition of the Chinese Communist Government, the establishment of normal trade relations between Communist China and the United States, and the breaking of what the conference called the Nationalist blockade (p. 1045).

The committee finds that the October 1949 conference held in the State Department, and presided over by Philip C. Jessup, is a clear instance in which persons associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations became conspicuously influential in shaping American foreign policy. In the opinion of the committee, the selection of personnel, the events at the conference and the subsequent developments established clearly the influence of individuals associated with the IPR sought to exert on the foreign policy of the United States.<sup>2</sup>

Thus, on November 16, 1949, just 6 weeks after the conference, Secretary of State Dean Acheson protested Nationalist China's action in firing on the *Flying Cloud*, an American vessel that was running the blockade and taking supplies to the Communists (p. 1067). On December 3, 1949, Acheson said that the United States did not recognize the legality of the blockade (p. 1067). On December 23, two and a half months after the conference, the State Department sent a memorandum to Foreign Service personnel minimizing the importance of Formosa. This memorandum went all over the world (p. 1064). It appeared to be preparing the way for the surrender of Formosa (p. 1065). On November 29, 1949, Philip C. Jessup told Admiral Cooke that we were going to furnish no more munitions to Nationalist China (p. 1506). On January 5, 1950, 3 months after the conference, President Truman announced that the United States had no intention of providing military aid to the Nationalists on Formosa (p. 1065) and that Formosa should be returned to "China" in accordance with the Cairo agreement (p. 1062).

Gen. Louis Fortier testified that on January 6, 1950, Philip Jessup told him in Japan that the United States would recognize Red China in a period of about 2 or 3 weeks (p. 1062). Jessup has denied this. (See Hearings on the nomination of Philip C. Jessup before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee, p. 618.)

Senator H. Alexander Smith made a diary notation on November 23, 1949:

Went up to Assembly at Flushing. Lunch with Philip Jessup and Ray Fosdick. They are leaning toward the British who want to recognize Communist China. Also, they do not seem to see the dangers of the Formosa situation (see open hearings, June 20, 1952).

In May of 1950, all Americans were warned by United States officials to leave Formosa (p. 1540).

The direction thus given to policy by the October 1949 conference was maintained until June 29, 1950, when the North Korean Communists moved across the thirty-eighth parallel and began to overwhelm the hapless South Koreans.

#### OWEN LATTIMORE WAS FROM SOME TIME IN THE MIDDLE 1930'S A CONSCIOUS, ARTICULATE INSTRUMENT OF THE SOVIET CONSPIRACY

Throughout the hearings, Owen Lattimore's connections and association with the Communist international organization have been

<sup>2</sup> But Institute of Pacific Relations people on other occasions made suggestions which in effect would have aided the Communists in consolidating their conquest of mainland China. John K. Fairbank, for instance, wrote that the Chinese Communist Government was the best government that China ever had. He also wrote that recognition of Chinese Communist Government would be an act of realism on the part of the United States. He also contended that Chinese Communist aggression in China was a genuine civil war and not aggression from outside. Moreover he contended, in support of seating Communist China in the United Nations, that giving the Communists two vetoes in the Security Council would not be any more embarrassing to the United States or carry more effect than the existence of the U. S. S. R. veto alone (p. 3813)

shown to be so pronounced, and his misrepresentations before the subcommittee have been so frequent, that the committee has elected to devote a short section to him as a personality.

Owen Lattimore was one of the most influential public figures in the Institute of Pacific Relations.<sup>1</sup> His role within the IPR was of the highest importance. From 1934 to 1941, he was the editor of *Pacific Affairs*, the quarterly publication of the International IPR, being solely responsible for the editing of this official IPR magazine (p. 2905). Besides having the right to accept or reject articles, he himself wrote 73 items in the period from 1934 to 1950. These included articles and book reviews in *Pacific Affairs* and two items for the *Far Eastern Survey*, covering a total of 291 pages in all.<sup>2</sup>

Even while not holding an important position in the Institute, Lattimore was no ordinary member. For example, he spoke at least 9 times at the meeting of the American IPR delegation on October 28, 1944, preparatory to the Hot Springs conference, while Jessup, as chairman spoke only 11 times (pp. 991-993). Lattimore represented the IPR at its conferences in 1933, 1936, 1939, 1942, 1945, 1947, and in India in 1949, according to conference proceedings.

Lattimore's standing in the IPR may be estimated from the statement of Carter to Lattimore in a letter dated June 14, 1945: "You are a pretty big shot yourself and a great many people will listen to you" (p. 3355). Both Holland and Carter have referred to Lattimore's "role as expert" (p. 3587). Mr. Carter regarded him as a "good American, a great scholar, and one of the best authorities on Asia" (p. 59).

The literary output of Owen Lattimore may be an index of his influence upon public opinion in the United States. The Library of Congress lists 11 of his books and over 40 articles (pp. 4591, 4592). By his acclaim of certain books and his criticism of others, Lattimore, as a book reviewer, was in a position to exercise further influence on the success of books on the Far East. In 1945, he reviewed six books, including those by Lawrence K. Rosinger and Guenther Stein. In 1946, he reviewed three books and, in 1947, eight books, including that of Israel Epstein. In 1948, Mr. Lattimore passed judgment on three books, including that of John K. Fairbank; while in 1949, he reviewed Jack Belden's work (pp. 4591, 4592).

The former editor of *Pacific Affairs* has held high public office in the field of far eastern affairs. For an 18-month period in 1941 and 1942, he was political adviser to Chiang Kai-shek (pp. 390, 1014, 3052). In this connection, Carter considered Lattimore "an asset in Chungking, though not technically on the IPR staff" (p. 481).

From 1942 to 1944, Lattimore was Deputy Director of the Office of War Information in Charge of Pacific Operations (p. 3053). In 1944, as a representative of the OWI, he accompanied Henry Wallace on his mission to Siberia and China (p. 3053). In the winter of 1945-46, he spent 3 or 4 months in Japan with the Pauley mission, and he helped to draft the report on that mission (pp. 750, 3053, 3054). In October of 1949, he was a dominant figure among consultants called

<sup>1</sup> In 1944 he was a member of the board of trustees of the American Council of the IPR (p. 713) and was still listed as such in 1951 (*Understanding Asia*, the aims and work of the institute of Pacific relations, a non-partisan international organization for the study of far eastern problems, June 1951, pp. 2, 3, 15, 21).

<sup>2</sup> According to figures furnished to the research staff of this subcommittee by the Library of Congress on June 16 1952.



in by the State Department to advise on policy (p. 919, 1551). Owen Lattimore was a close friend and intimate associate of John Carter Vincent, State Department Director of Far Eastern Affairs, and Lauchlin Currie, Presidential executive assistant in charge of far eastern matters (pp. 424, 1931).

In 1945, John Carter Vincent proposed Lattimore as a State Department consultant but the appointment was rejected by Mr. Joseph Grew, then Acting Secretary of State (p. 1739). In 1942, Lattimore used White House stationery and gave the address where he could be reached 4 days a week as "Lauchlin Currie's office, room 228, State Department Building" (pp. 3199, 3200).

The record shows that Owen Lattimore contended many times that Outer Mongolia was a free and independent country (pp. 3634-3636, 4523, 4525). He contended it in 1936 (p. 4525) and he was contending it in 1945 (Solution in Asia, p. 177). In fact, when testifying before this subcommittee, he contended that Outer Mongolia was independent until after World War II (p. 3635). Yet the record shows conclusively that Lattimore knew in 1936 Outer Mongolia was Soviet-controlled, and that he repeatedly sought from Soviet authorities permission to visit it (pp. 3229, 3300, 3311, 3318, 3319, 4562).

The indisputable fact that Lattimore knew Outer Mongolia was Soviet-controlled (pp. 4518, 4519) (having, indeed, cooperated with the very persons who were exercising control over it) at a time when he was representing it as free and independent, was one of many facts which demonstrated to the subcommittee in sharp outline that Lattimore's many misrepresentations were not proceeding from ignorance or confused thinking.

Another such fact was the convincing showing that Lattimore had reason to know the Chinese Communist, Ch'ao-ting Chi, who operated within the Institute of Pacific Relations and in China, to be a Communist (pp. 301, 3126-3143, 3158-3166, 3194). Not only did Lattimore collaborate with Chi and work with him closely and intimately after receiving this knowledge; he did not tell the truth about this association to the subcommittee and he did, in the opinion of the subcommittee, testify untruthfully (pp. 1162, 3126, 3140, 3141, 3142, 3194).

The evidence also shows conclusively that Lattimore knew Frederick V. Field to be a Communist; that he collaborated with Field after he possessed this knowledge; and that he did not tell the truth before the subcommittee about this association with Field (pp. 180, 2985, 3145, 3190, 3249, 3250).

It was very apparent to the subcommittee that Lattimore, at the time that he was publishing in Pacific Affairs articles under the pseudonym of Asiaticus, knew that the writer was a Communist (pp. 309, 3128, 3130-3134, 3139, 3148, 3154-3158, 3167, 3170, 3174, 3175, 3177, 3180-3182, 3185-3188, 3190, 3236, 3324, 3330, 3452, 3453, 3679). Lattimore testified untruthfully about this fact before the subcommittee (pp. 3123-3133).

A graduate student at Johns Hopkins University, one Catesby Jones, was assigned by Mrs. Lattimore to cover the hearings of the subcommittee and did, in fact, cover the hearings when Louis F. Budenz was testifying about Owen Lattimore (p. 4359). Lattimore, when asked by the subcommittee about encountering Catesby Jones later that day, testified that he just ran into him and clearly gave the

impression that there was no prearrangement to his meeting with Catesby Jones. There was a direct conflict between the testimony of Catesby Jones and the testimony of Owen Lattimore on this subject. Even Jones admitted this (pp. 4384, 4385).

A former counselor to the Soviet Foreign Office testified concerning a conversation between Lattimore and a Soviet agent in Moscow in 1936, wherein the Soviet agent disclosed to Lattimore military and political secrets (pp. 4516-4518). This same witness testified he was present at a meeting in the Soviet Foreign Office in 1936 or 1937 when a board of Commissars presided over by Litvinov passed a formal resolution putting Lattimore in charge of a campaign to represent Outer Mongolia to the democratic world as a country entitled to membership in the League of Nations (pp. 4518-4520, 4564-4565). (Even in 1949, Lattimore recommended in his *Situation in Asia*, as well as in his recommendations to the State Department, that Outer Mongolia be admitted to the United Nations (*Situation in Asia*, pp. 226, 1663).)

At almost the same time as the meeting referred to in the preceding paragraph, William C. Bullitt, then United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union, received Lattimore and heard from him a recommendation that the United States recognize Outer Mongolia (pp. 4522, 4523). Bullitt protested on the grounds that Outer Mongolia was not in fact an independent state but a Soviet dominion (p. 4523). Lattimore argued with Bullitt and insisted that it was free and independent, and wanted Bullitt to wire President Franklin D. Roosevelt immediately (p. 4523). Bullitt knew, as a matter of fact, that it was a thorough Soviet police state (p. 4524).

Lattimore was not able to explain to the subcommittee why he conferred for several hours, during the Hitler-Stalin and Russo-Japanese alliances, on the subject of his approaching assignment as President Roosevelt's adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, with the then Ambassador for the Soviet Union, Constantine Oumansky (pp. 988, 3260-3268, 3328, 3329, 3638, 3639). Here again, Lattimore told untruths about significant facts. He testified there had been a great deal of publicity about his appointment; and yet it was shown conclusively that there was no announcement in the press until 11 days after the conversation (pp. 3260-3268) and there were indications that the Chinese Embassy did not know of it until more than a week later (pp. 3265-3268).

Lattimore could not explain to the subcommittee why he phoned the Soviet Embassy in 1945 and made arrangements to have G. G. Dolbin of the Soviet Foreign Office visit him at his home (pp. 3646-3648). Nor could he explain his association with General Feng Y'hsiang (Yu-shiang), whom he entertained at his home and with whom he traveled (pp. 3518, 3519, 4582). Feng Y'hsiang, according to the evidence, was a paid agent of the Soviet Union (pp. 4582, 4583).

Lattimore's book *Solution in Asia*, according to Harvey Matusow, a former Communist who kept the FBI informed of underground Communist activities, in 1948 was approved as a party-line book by the New York State educational department of the Communist Party, and was sold as such by Matusow in the official Communist book store (pp. 3829-3831). An advertisement appeared in the Communist publication, *Daily People's World*, June 1945, showing that the Communist book store in San Francisco advertised the Lattimore book, bore out Matusow's testimony (p. 3073).

The former editor of the Daily Worker, Louis Budenz, testified to five episodes which he experienced within the Politburo of the Communist Party that involved Lattimore as a full participant in the Soviet conspiracy. The episodes took place between 1937 and 1945, during which period Budenz was a high official in the Communist Party (pp. 521-526, 550-556).

A brigadier general in the Soviet military intelligence and one-time assistant to General Berzin, who was the head of Soviet intelligence during the 1930's, testified to a conversation that he had with General Berzin in 1935 wherein he was told that Lattimore was one of "our men" (p. 201). The general, Alexander Barmine, was told this again in 1937 by General Krivitsky who had been head of the Western European intelligence for the Soviets (p. 209).

On the basis of these facts and others, including (but without limitation) Lattimore's editing of Pacific Affairs; his recommendations on policy to the State Department, coinciding as they do with Lawrence Rosinger's (pp. 1662, 1663, 1665); his falsifications about his close association with Lauchlin Currie (p. 3678); his conference with the Soviet agent, Rogoff (pp. 147, 3274, 3280, 3310), and the Soviet Embassy official Gokhman (p. 3270 ff); and his subservience to Soviet officials in Moscow in 1936 (pp. 3136, 3172, 3323, 4555), the subcommittee can come to no other conclusion but that Lattimore was for some time, beginning in the middle 1930's, a conscious, articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy. And the committee further recommends that the Department of Justice submit to a grand jury the question of whether perjury has been committed by Owen Lattimore before the subcommittee.

#### JOHN P. DAVIES, JR., TESTIFIED FALSELY WITH RESPECT TO HIS RECOMMENDATION THAT CIA EMPLOY AND UTILIZE CERTAIN PERSONS WITH COMMUNIST ASSOCIATIONS

The subcommittee came into possession of a copy of a memorandum prepared by Lyle H. Munson, a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency, as follows:

APRIL 11, 1950.

I, Lyle H. Munson, make the following voluntary statement to Albert C. Hayden, Jr., and William S. Hyde, who have identified themselves to me as special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

On Wednesday, November 16, 1949, I participated in a conference with John P. Davies, Jr., of the Department of State. My memorandum for record, written subsequent to that meeting, reports the following as the substance of Mr. Davies' comments:

1. That as regards Chinese personnel, the persons most helpful to OPC would be Chinese with American wives or husbands, who consequently had close ties with this country.

2. That he (Davies) had discussed with other OPC staff members the matter of employing certain persons through appropriate cut-outs, to consult and guide OPC in certain activities affecting the Far East.

3. That the persons he had indicated to them should be used were Benjamin K. Schwartz, Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong, Prof. [John] Fairbank and wife.

Mr. Davies expressed the feeling that the above-mentioned persons should be used by OPC, and that the consultation and guidance and materials prepared by them would represent the proper approach. Mr. Davies said that he would be perfectly confident to put Professor and Mrs. Fairbank at the head of a unit charged with producing such materials. He said that he was aware that they were considered Communists by some uninformed persons, but that they were not Communists, but "only very (politically) sophisticated."



It was Davies' suggestion that the above persons be situated physically in an office or suite of offices somewhere other than Washington (probably New York or Boston), and that through a cut-out of OPC choosing, these persons provide not only guidance, but actually produce materials, for OPC utilization.

Davies was particularly insistent that Dr. Schwartz, of the Russian Research Institute at Harvard, be retained by OPC for policy guidance in certain fields of its activities, and noted that Dr. Schwartz had been most helpful to him as a consultant.

The suggestions and recommendations made by Mr. Davies did not constitute an order or directive, nor were they so interpreted by me or my superiors.

LYLE H. MUNSON.<sup>1</sup>

At that time John P. Davies, Jr., was a member of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department and Munson and one other CIA representative had been called in by Davies for the conference described in the April 11 statement.

Because five of the six persons recommended by Davies in the memorandum, (as well as Davies himself) appeared in evidence as having some connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations, the subcommittee felt it should go into the matter.<sup>2</sup>

Lyle H. Munson was subpoenaed to appear before the subcommittee on February 15, 1952, and testified that the statement set forth above appeared to be a copy of an original which he prepared on April 11, 1950. He also testified that there was nothing untrue in that statement.

During the course of his testimony Munson stated that OPC was a subordinate portion of CIA and that Davies made unsolicited recommendations to him and one other CIA representative about personnel for that subordinate portion of the CIA operation. Munson considered that Davies at the time was acting as an official of the State Department.

Munson proceeded to testify that Davies recommended that all six persons as a group or unit be employed by CIA to give guidance to, consult with and prepare materials for, the CIA. He testified that he did not understand that they were to be used as double agents: That they were to be used through a cut-out or a person officially connected with the CIA so that they would not be brought directly within CIA operations; that all six were to be used in the same way as part of the same team, performing one and the same function; that it was his recollection that Davies had said that Professor Fairbank and his wife were not Communist as some persons believed but were rather to be characterized as "very politically sophisticated" (p. 2763); that it was not his understanding Miss Smedley or Miss Strong were being recommended as Communists but that they could be used for "consultation and guidance" (pp. 2267, 2768).

Previously, on August 8 and August 10, 1951, Davies had been called to testify before the subcommittee, and had declined to tell the subcommittee about the recommendations he made to Munson and the other CIA officers on the ground that the operation bore a higher classification than "top secret". The subcommittee could not conclude on this issue although Munson testified that the recommended plan was never implemented. The subcommittee had classified information that the project had been dropped on the recommendation of Admiral Hillenkoetter after he had consulted with the FBI. How-

<sup>1</sup> P. 2753, exhibit 442.

<sup>2</sup> Of the six, three had been identified as Communists before the subcommittee. (Agnes Smedley, pp. 256, 359; 677, Anna Louise Strong, pp. 688, 4583; and John K. Fairbank, p. 629.)

ever Davies did give qualified answers and was able to give more than a hundred pages of testimony during which he made certain unqualified and categorical assertions. Davies' testimony was, for security purposes, kept in executive session.

After the testimony of Davies, the subcommittee, noting the discrepancies between that testimony and the sworn statement of Munson, had transmitted on September 21, 1951, a copy of the Davies transcript to the Department of Justice and asked that the Department determine whether it should take any action thereon. October 29, 1951, the Department of Justice replied that it appeared to the Department that there was insufficient evidence of perjury or any other Federal violation on Davies' part.

After Munson's testimony on February 15, 1952, the subcommittee again wrote to the Justice Department (on February 21, 1952) and enclosed the transcript of the Munson testimony and asked if the amplification of Munson's sworn statement, represented by the transcript, warranted action by the Department. The subcommittee at the same time enclosed a staff memorandum "citing seven (but by no means all)" of the conflicts between the Munson and Davies transcripts.<sup>3</sup> On February 27 the Department of Justice replied that it would review the matter in the light of the testimony. On February 28, the chairman of the subcommittee again asked that the Department examine the matter called to its attention by his letter of February 21, 1952. The letter of February 28 said in part, "The question is, What is the opinion of the Department of Justice, on the basis of an examination of the testimony to which attention has been directed, in connection with all information otherwise available to the Department?"

<sup>3</sup> See the following memorandum:

Memorandum.

To: Mr. Sourwine.

From: Mr. Green.

FEBRUARY 19, 1952.

Re: Testimony of John P. Davies, Jr. and Lyle H. Munson—Items contained in testimony appearing to be contradictory.

Below you will find some samples of apparently contradictory statements in testimony of John P. Davies, Jr. and Lyle H. Munson. All of the excerpts come from the confidential testimony of John P. Davies, Jr., of August 10, 1951, and the confidential testimony of Lyle H. Munson of February 15, 1952, except the last item which comes from the confidential testimony of Mr. Davies on August 8, 1951, and the open testimony of Mr. Munson dated February 15, 1952. The last item referred to is peculiar in that Mr. Davies tends to mislead the committee in believing the situation existed which, in fact, was contradicted as not existing by the witness Munson.

There are other statements throughout the records which are contradictory by inference as well as misleading in fact, and if it is desired that all of these statements be cataloged, I shall be very happy to do so. I do believe that in the main most of the material differences in testimony appear in this memorandum.

Item No. 1

(P. 38, Davies testimony August 10, 1951:)

"Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend that Dr. Schwartz be retained by another Government agency for policy guidance?"

"Mr. DAVIES. No sir; categorically."

(P. 4 Munson testimony February 15, 1952:)

"Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall that Mr. Davies recommended that the six people whose names I have mentioned work for the Central Intelligence Agency in a position where they would give guidance to a certain program of the Central Intelligence Agency?"

"Mr. MUNSON. It was Mr. Davies' recommendation in our conference with him that we, as officials of CIA, should avail ourselves of the knowledge and guidance and counsel that these six persons could provide us and that they should be used for consultation and guidance and for the preparation of materials that would be useful to us in our activities or responsibilities."

"Mr. MORRIS. It was your understanding that they were to give the guidance rather than to be guided?"

"Mr. MUNSON. That is correct."

"Mr. SOURWINE. The persons you are talking about are those named in the memorandum, that is, John K. Fairbank and wife, Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong, and Benjamin K. Schwartz; is that correct?"

"Mr. MUNSON. That is correct."

(P. 16, Munson testimony:)

"Mr. SOURWINE. Now, did the recommendations Mr. Davies made with regard to these persons or any of them involve the use of these persons as a part of the CIA operation or any CIA operation?"

"Mr. MUNSON. Mr. Davies recommended that we at OPC should consult with and procure guidance and materials from Professor Fairbank and his wife, Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong, and

On June 19, 1952, the subcommittee learned the whereabouts of the other CIA agent who heard Davies make his recommendations of November 16, 1949. He was subpoenaed by the subcommittee and his executive-session testimony was taken. It was not released because of the security involved in his identity. His testimony, however, confirmed the Munson testimony in all material respects and it was transmitted to the Department of Justice.

Benjamin K. Schwartz, and that these materials and guidance should be used by us and that they would represent a proper approach to effecting our responsibilities.

"Senator FERGUSON. And proper guidance?"

"Mr. MUNSON. And proper guidance.

*Item No. 2*

(P. 73, Davies testimony:)

"Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state she (Smedley) was not a Communist, but only 'very sophisticated,' or 'very politically sophisticated?'"

"Mr. DAVIES. No.

"Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever suggest that another agency of Government set her up in an office?"

"Mr. DAVIES. No."

(P. 18, Munson testimony:)

"Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Davies have any plans to have any contacts with these listed persons or they with the Government in any capacity?"

"Mr. MUNSON. It was Mr. Davies' suggestion that these persons be situated physically outside Washington in some other geographical location and that they should be contacted and made use of only through what he called cut-outs or a cut-out. This would seem to imply that these persons would not have been knowledgeable that they were furnishing guidance, counsel, and materials to the Central Intelligence Agency but that they were actually furnishing it to some intermediary who himself would have been knowledgeable of where it was going, but that the six persons would not have been.

(P. 25, Munson testimony:)

"Mr. SOURWINE. Was Agnes Smedley one of those recommended by Mr. Davies to be set up in this workshop or office somewhere away by themselves?"

"Mr. MUNSON. She was."

*Item No. 3*

(P. 38, Davies testimony:)

"Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to have a categorical answer, if we can get it, and let me recall to you in that connection that you have already testified on this record that Dr. Schwartz did not serve as a consultant to you at any time.

"Mr. DAVIES. He did not, certainly.

"Mr. SOURWINE. That being the case, sir, does that help you to answer the question as to whether at any time you told any person, a representative of another Government agency, that he had been helpful to you as a consultant?"

"Mr. DAVIES. Well, I could not have said that, because he was not my consultant.

"Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever say it?"

"Mr. DAVIES. No; I never did.

"Mr. SOURWINE. All right, sir. That is all I was trying to get at."

(P. 31, Munson testimony:)

"Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Davies, at the conference which is the subject of the questioning today, that is, which took place on November 16, 1949, discuss Dr. Schwartz's possible Communist or Communist-front affiliations other than as a part of the group?"

"Mr. MUNSON. No. Mr. Davies did urge that Dr. Schwartz should be used by us in certain fields of our responsibilities, again as a source of guidance and counsel.

"Mr. SOURWINE. He was recommending that Dr. Schwartz be retained by you for policy guidance; is that right?"

"Mr. MUNSON. In broad and general terms; yes.

"Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Davies state that Schwartz had been helpful to him as a consultant?"

"Mr. MUNSON. He did.

"Mr. SOURWINE. You are quite sure about that?"

"Mr. MUNSON. I am quite sure about that.

"Mr. SOURWINE. Would it make any difference to you that Mr. Davies has denied ever making such a statement? Would that change your testimony in any way?"

"Mr. MUNSON. It would not change my testimony in any way."

*Item No. 4*

(P. 79, Davies testimony:)

"Mr. SOURWINE. Other than in connection with top secret matters, did you ever state that materials prepared by her (Anna Louise Strong) would represent the proper approach?"

"Mr. DAVIES. No."

(P. 24, Munson testimony:)

"Mr. SOURWINE. Did you understand Mr. Davies' recommendation to be, his statement to be that the materials prepared by them would represent the proper approach?"

"Mr. MUNSON. Yes, I did so understand."

*Item No. 5*

(P. 89, Davies testimony:)

"Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend that Mr. Fairbank be used for consultation and guidance by an agency of the United States?"

"Mr. DAVIES. No."

(P. 37 Munson testimony:)

"Mr. SOURWINE. But he did recommend that Mr. Fairbank be used for consultation and guidance by CIA or OFC?"

"Mr. MUNSON. In the manner we have indicated; yes."

(P. 23, Munson testimony:)

"Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Davies ever state that materials prepared by Edgar Snow would represent the proper approach?"



The committee, on the basis of all of this, recommends that the Department of Justice submit to a grand jury the question of whether Davies perjured himself before the subcommittee. The matter is substantial. It involves a high official in the State Department who is Deputy Political Adviser to the United States High Commissioner in Germany. At the time of his testimony he was on the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department. Of six people recommended for employment or utilization, four have been shown to have had Communist connections, one had been exposed by November 1949, the time of the recommendations, as an International Communist agent. The committee feels that the internal security of the country calls for immediate adjudication of these matters.

"Mr. MUNSON. Yes; he did. Let me interrupt to say that it is not my recollection that he singled out Edgar Snow individually, but that he did recommend that these persons collectively would be supplying information and guidance which would represent a proper approach."

*Item No. 6*

(P. 91, Davies testimony:)

"Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend that Professor Fairbank be set up in an office by some agency of Government?"

"Mr. DAVIES. No.

"Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state that Professor Fairbank was a person ideally suited to provide consultation and guidance for another agency of the Government?"

"Mr. DAVIES. No."

(P. 24, Munson testimony:)

"Mr. SOURWINE. Did Davies recommend that Snow be set up in an office by an agency of the Government?"

"Mr. MUNSON. No; that Snow, along with the other afore-mentioned persons, should be provided quarters and space in which to function. This was not designated as an office. Again such limiting terms or refined terms were not used. It was simply suggested that these persons be situated physically in an office or suite of offices at some distant point from which they would function."

*Item No. 7*

(P. 11, Davies testimony, August 8, 1951:)

"Senator SMITH. You can say 'Yes' or 'No,' 'I did,' or 'I didn't.'"

"Then, if you wish to enlarge or explain, if you say 'I did,' then I can see how you might wish to go further and say, 'Here is the reason I did,' or 'Here is what they do.'"

"We are not asking you that at the moment. We are asking you now for the 'Yes' or 'No' answer."

"Did you recommend them for anybody?"

"Mr. DAVIES. Well, hypothetically, let us put it this way: Supposing—and this is completely hypothetical—I were to have recommended the employment of somebody as a double agent, and then I was charged with having recommended somebody who was known to have belonged in the other camp from us."

"The fact that I recommended the employment of a person as a double agent would be perfectly legitimate, and would be in the national interest of this country."

"But if I can only reply to questions on this, 'Yes, I suggested the utilization, not the employment, but the employment of so and so as a double agent.'"

(P. 424, Munson open testimony Feb. 15, 1952:)

"Mr. SOURWINE. Let me ask this question: Was there anything in his recommendation which could have been construed or which, in your opinion, was intended as a recommendation that these people, or any of them, be used as double agents?"

"Mr. MUNSON. At no time did I understand that Mr. Davies was suggesting the use of any one or all of these persons as double agents."

"Senator FERGUSON. They were to be used, were they not, according to this memorandum, as a unit?"

"Mr. MUNSON. They were to be used as a workshop team, or unit; yes, sir."

## CONCLUSIONS

The Institute of Pacific Relations has not maintained the character of an objective, scholarly, and research organization.

\* \* \*

The IPR has been considered by the American Communist Party and by Soviet officials as an instrument of Communist policy, propaganda and military intelligence.

\* \* \*

The IPR disseminated and sought to popularize false information including information originating from Soviet and Communist sources.

\* \* \*

A small core of officials and staff members carried the main burden of IPR activities and directed its administration and policies.

\* \* \*

Members of the small core of officials and staff members who controlled IPR were either Communist or pro-Communist.

\* \* \*

There is no evidence that the large majority of its members supported the IPR for any reason except to advance the professed research and scholarly purposes of the organization.

\* \* \*

Most members of the IPR, and most members of its Board of Trustees, were inactive and obviously without any influence over the policies of the organization and the conduct of its affairs.

\* \* \*

IPR activities were made possible largely through the financial support of American industrialists, corporations, and foundations, the majority of whom were not familiar with the inner workings of the organization.

\* \* \*

The effective leadership of the IPR often sought to deceive IPR contributors and supporters as to the true character and activities of the organization.

\* \* \*

Neither the IPR nor any substantial body of those associated with it as executive officers, trustees or major financial contributors, has ever made any serious and objective investigation of the charges that the IPR was infiltrated by Communists and was used for pro-Communist and pro-Soviet purposes.

\* \* \*

The names of eminent individuals were by design used as a respectable and impressive screen for the activities of the IPR inner core, and as a defense when such activities came under scrutiny.

\* \* \*

Owen Lattimore was, from some time beginning in the 1930's, a conscious articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy.

\* \* \*

Effective leadership of the IPR had by the end of 1934 established and implemented an official connection with G. N. Voitinski, Chief of the Far Eastern Division of the Communist International.

\* \* \*

After the establishment of the Soviet Council of IPR, leaders of the American IPR sought and maintained working relationships with Soviet diplomats and officials.

\* \* \*

The American staff of IPR, though fully apprised that the Soviet Council of IPR was in fact an arm of the Soviet Foreign Office, was simultaneously and secretly instructed to preserve the "fiction" that the Soviet council was independent.

\* \* \*

IPR officials testified falsely before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee concerning the relationships between IPR and the Soviet Union.

\* \* \*

Owen Lattimore testified falsely before the subcommittee with reference to at least five separate matters that were relevant to the inquiry and substantial in import.

\* \* \*

John Paton Davies, Jr., testified falsely before the subcommittee in denying that he recommended the Central Intelligence Agency employ, utilize and rely upon certain individuals having Communist associations and connections. This matter was relevant to the inquiry and substantial in import.

\* \* \*

The effective leadership of IPR worked consistently to set up actively cooperative and confidential relationships with persons in Government involved in the determination of foreign policy.

\* \* \*

Over a period of years, John Carter Vincent was the principal fulcrum of IPR pressures and influence in the State Department.

\* \* \*

It was the continued practice of IPR to seek to place in Government posts both persons associated with IPR and other persons selected by the effective leadership of IPR.

\* \* \*

The IPR possessed close organic relations with the State Department through interchange of personnel, attendance of State Department officials at IPR conferences, constant exchange of information and social contacts.

\* \* \*

The effective leadership of the IPR used IPR prestige to promote the interests of the Soviet Union in the United States.

\* \* \*



A group of persons operating within and about the Institute of Pacific Relations exerted a substantial influence on United States far eastern policy.

\* \* \*

The IPR was a vehicle used by the Communists to orientate American far eastern policies toward Communist objectives.

\* \* \*

A group of persons associated with the IPR attempted, between 1941 and 1945, to change United States policy so as to accommodate Communist ends and to set the stage for a major United States policy change, favorable to Soviet interests, in 1945.

\* \* \*

Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent were influential in bringing about a change in United States policy in 1945 favorable to the Chinese Communists.

\* \* \*

During the period 1945-49, persons associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations were instrumental in keeping United States policy on a course favorable to Communist objectives in China.

\* \* \*

Persons associated with the IPR were influential in 1949 in giving United States far eastern policy a direction that furthered Communist purposes.

\* \* \*

A chief function of the IPR has been to influence United States public opinion.

\* \* \*

Many of the persons active in and around the IPR, and in particular though not exclusively Owen Lattimore, Edward C. Carter, Frederick V. Field, T. A. Bisson, Lawrence K. Rosinger, and Maxwell Stewart, knowingly and deliberately used the language of books and articles which they wrote or edited in an attempt to influence the American public by means of pro-Communist or pro-Soviet content of such writings.

\* \* \*

The net effect of IPR activities on United States public opinion has been such as to serve international Communist interests and to affect adversely the interests of the United States.

\* \* \*

## RECOMMENDATIONS

### LEGISLATION

The committee recommends speedy enactment of an adequate statute to permit congressional committees to require the testimony of a witness when it is determined such testimony is sufficiently important to justify extending to the witness immunity from prosecution with respect to the matters concerning which he testifies.

## INVESTIGATIONS

The committee recommends:

(1) That a thorough study be made by the Committee on the Judiciary, in cooperation with the Department of Justice, of the Espionage Act and related legislation with a view to determining what revisions may be necessary to deal effectively with present-day security problems.

(2) That the Committee on Government Operations undertake an investigation to determine the need for and proper scope of legislation to require departments and agencies in the executive branch to make available to congressional committees upon proper request material from their files.

(3) That consideration be given to investigation by some appropriate agency of the following:

(a) Possible Communist infiltration into and influence upon the Treasury Department and other agencies forming and administering fiscal and monetary policies and affairs of the United States;

(b) The role of Alger Hiss in foreign affairs and the formulation of foreign policy of the United States and his influence on personnel decisions in the State Department;

(c) The extent to which persons actively associated with the pro-Communist core of the IPR have been employed by any agency of the Government, and the activities and influence of any such persons still so employed; and

(d) The extent to which contributions by American charitable, scientific, and educational foundations have aided Communist or pro-Communist activity in the United States.

## DEPARTMENTAL ACTIVITY

The committee recommends:

(1) That the Department of Justice submit to a grand jury the question of whether perjury has been committed before the subcommittee by Owen Lattimore.

(2) That the Department of Justice submit to a grand jury the question of whether perjury has been committed before the subcommittee by John P. Davies, Jr.

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