

June 7, 2004

SUBJECT: Some thoughts on Iraq and how to think about it

Military commanders and other visitors to Iraq have confidence and conviction about the progress being made and what they see as the solid prospects for success. But, television and press reports in the United States and in much of the world generally focus on the problems and the difficulties, creating pessimism and even despair. And it is the media that is shaping public opinion here and across the globe.

It is fair to ask: Which of the two widely differing perspectives is correct, or more correct, and, therefore, which view ought to be shaping U.S. policy and world thinking on this important matter?

One reason for the disparity in perspectives may be the standard that one measures progress against. The dedicated volunteer soldiers engaged in the struggle against extremists are on the front lines. They see first-hand the extremists trying to hijack a religion from the majority of moderate Muslims. They see the terrorist insurgency that the Iraqi people face. They see, first-hand, ground truth. Further, they seem to understand that war has never been tidy, orderly or predictable.

Our troops recognize that conflicts have always been difficult, that people get killed and wounded. They see the Iraqis who courageously step forward and become targets of assassins. They know that the purpose of terrorism is to terrorize, to frighten and to alter behavior – and it works. There have always been those who, when terrorized, change course and seek to appease the terrorists. It has been so throughout history. So, those brave souls on the front line of this

11-L-0559/OSD/42255

struggle *see* the conflict for what it is, and their expectations tend to be realistic. Their perspectives are rooted in an understanding of history and their own personal experiences.

Conversely, those removed from the battle, who receive their information from the media, tend to see it differently. Their perspectives are shaped by those who seem to compare the many difficulties and challenges, not against history or personal experience, but against a false standard of countries that have already succeeded in their struggles for freedom, countries that today enjoy relative tranquility. The media report events in Iraq that are not tranquil and, in many cases, are ugly. So, our publics risk falling prey to the argument that all is lost, that the terrorists are sure to win, and that what is being done is imperfect, or wrong, or misguided, or even malevolent.

The more correct perspective, I believe, is to look to history, to consider the struggles that have taken place over the decades and the experiences of countries that have made that difficult and dangerous journey from dictatorship to civil societies. Only by considering history can one fully appreciate that the path to freedom has always been difficult, dangerous, and marked by ugliness. So, to measure the Coalition's progress against countries that have successfully achieved their freedom misses the point.

What is taking place in Iraq is not unusual. The Iraqi people are on a tough road, a road filled with lethal dangers. But, as tough as it is, it is the right road. It is a road that has been successfully, if perilously, traveled by a number of countries over the decades. So, despite understandable concerns, it can be done. It has been done. Our own country went through tough periods, surviving demonstrations, riots, battles, deaths – but we made it. We succeeded because the American people were steadfast and courageous and did not listen to counsels of despair.

Many contended that Japan, Germany and Italy could not successfully move from fascism to civil societies. But, although it was not easy, they made it. In each case, it was hard. It took time. But they succeeded, to the benefit of the civilized world.

For a people to achieve great things requires that they be purposeful and steadfast. They must have a concentration span of something greater than a 30-second sound bite. They need to appreciate why Thomas Jefferson said of the path to democracy, "One ought not to expect to be transported on a featherbed."

What is taking place in Iraq is hard, to be sure. It is far from perfect and certainly not predictable. But it should not be expected to be perfect or predictable. But is it failing? No. Is there a good chance it will succeed? You bet. One thing is certain. U.S. and Coalition forces cannot be defeated on the battlefield in Iraq. Coalition nations will suffer casualties, as they are, but they cannot be defeated. The only way this noble cause can be lost is if people become falsely persuaded that the struggle cannot be won or that winning it is not worth the cost.

Those who seek the truth should challenge any who would measure progress in Iraq against unrealistic expectations. Ask: When in history it has ever been easy or predictable? When has a country gone from a repressive dictatorship to a peaceful, stable, constitutional, civil society without difficulties or loss of life – "on a featherbed"? Why should Iraq be measured against an unrealistic standard?

What is taking place is tough. It is uncertain. It is dangerous. It is ugly. It is requiring the sacrifice of fine young men and women – each a volunteer – and may God bless them all. But the very least they deserve is a totally honest assessment by their countrymen of what it is they are doing. The least they deserve is an accurate, truthful recognition of the progress that has been and is being achieved in Iraq, as well as in Afghanistan – the hospitals built, the clinics

opened, the schools staffed and provided new textbooks and the economic progress. And the least the Iraqi people deserve is an appreciation of the courage they have demonstrated – by their security forces and by the hundreds of Iraqis who have stepped up to become governors, city council members and police chiefs, at risk to their lives.

The test of wills we face – and it is a test of wills, let there be no doubt – calls for balance and historical perspective. The American people deserve that. They deserve it from the media that benefits from the constitutional protections, and, with those protections, has a responsibility to be fair, honest, and accountable.

The Iraqi people want their freedom, their security and the opportunities that will flow from them. More than 80 percent of the Iraqi people say they want Iraq to be whole. They are opposed to a breakup of the country. We know, despite terrorist attacks, assassinations, and disruptions to services, and despite the fact that terrorists and extremists kill innocent Iraqi citizens by the dozens each week – and have killed some 400 Iraqi security forces – that 70 percent of Iraqis say that getting rid of Saddam Hussein was worth the hardships they face today. Over 90 percent of Iraqi Kurds and 80 percent of Shia agree. Even among the minority Arab Sunnis, many of whom governed the country under Saddam Hussein, the figure is only slightly below 50 percent. So the Iraqi people understand that their lives are better today, despite the drumbeat to the contrary.

It is instructive to ask: What might be the alternatives to the course we are on for the 25 million recently liberated Iraqis, for that troubled region, and for the United States? What alternatives do those who criticize and contend that all that is lost suggest? Some say leave. What if the coalition were to leave? The possibilities are not attractive. They include:

- **A failed state, anarchy, with terrorists taking over and creating a safe haven to attack the United States and other civil societies.**

- A civil war and ethnic cleansing, filling up still more of Saddam's mass grave sites.
- Takeover by a neighboring country and radical clerics.
- A split up of Iraq into several parts, or
- A new Saddam Hussein could take control and re-impose a vicious dictatorship.

Which of those options would any argue would be better than the goal of Iraq as a single country, at peace with its neighbors, not trafficking with terrorists and respectful of women and all ethnic, religious and minority groups within their borders?

We are on the right course. The difficulties we face are understandable, given the history of countries that have navigated through these difficult seas. There is no better alternative for the Iraqi people, for the region, for the United States or for the world.

I repeat: there is no way this struggle can be lost on the ground in Iraq. It can only be lost if people come to the conclusion that it cannot be done. This struggle is being waged during an era of 24-hour news, seven days a week – for the first time in history. And it is being waged during a Presidential election year, when there seems to be a suspension of civil discourse. So, we are in for a rough period of months. But, when we are successful, it will be a fresh 21st century demonstration of the good center of gravity of the American people, and their common sense ability to separate fact from fiction and perseverance from paralysis.

DHR:dh
Current MFRs/Thoughts on Iraq

January 2, 2004

TO: Dan Dell'Orto
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Judge Biester

[Handwritten initials]

*Turnover
2/17*

Would you please check to see if it is conceivable that someone like Pete Biester, who has a number of years of Federal service as a Congressman and now is a judge, would lose his Federal pension by serving on the Military Commission Review Board?

2/18

Please tell me precisely what will happen from the standpoint of his financial circumstance.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010204-8

Please respond by 1/23/04 *****

[Handwritten circle around the date 1/23/04]

*1/27
Dan Dell'Orto -
Do you have this
response?
D. R.*

*2/19
✓
Sir,
Response attached.
1st CDN Nosmy
2/19*

*Larry Di Rita
1/24*

OSD 09238-04

long e



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

✓
2/19

INFO MEMO

January 7, 2004, 3P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of Defense
SUBJECT: Judge Biester (Snowflake 010204-8)

- You asked what would happen to Judge Biester's financial circumstances (with respect to his federal retirement) if he is called to active duty under 10 U.S.C. § 603 to serve as an appointing authority.
- His military service would not affect his current entitlement, if any, to Federal retirement (under either the Civil Service Retirement System or the Federal Employee Retirement System), but he could not use his military service to increase his federal civilian retirement benefit.
- Judge Biester should check with Pennsylvania State retirement authorities to determine whether his military service would have any impact on his State pension. *We will speak with Judge Biester about this*

COORDINATION: None

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DH

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1/28

Prepared by: Paul S. Koffsky, DGC(P&HP)/DoD, (b)(6)

January 2, 2004

TO: Marc Thiessen
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Introduction

Here is the introduction from the Reagan Library *by Fred Ryan* ~~that someone gave me~~ You might want to keep it down there in case I am going to go speak someplace and someone is going to introduce me. I thought the first few paragraphs were interesting.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/10/03 Fred Ryan introduction of SecDef at Reagan Library

DHR:dh
010204-13

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Please respond by _____

350.0015D

John 01

OSD 09239704

SECRETARY DONALD RUMSFELD
ADDRESS TO REAGAN PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
- OCTOBER 10, 2003 -

Transcript of Introductory Remarks By Frederick J. Ryan, Jr.:

Thank you, and good morning everyone. I think it's still morning. Hey, this is the Reagan Library - it's always "Morning in America" here! It's my great pleasure to welcome you to the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.

Since first opening its doors 12 years ago, the Reagan Library has been host to many distinguished guests: ambassadors and emissaries, Cabinet Secretaries and Members of Congress, Fortune 500 CEO's and Captains of American Industry, Presidential Assistants and White House Chiefs of Staff ...

But, we've never had a single guest who distinguished himself in all those roles ... until today.

When I was given the honor to serve on President Reagan White House Staff, a very prominent man in Washington called to congratulate me. He said he would send me some essential reading material that I should fully digest and understand before beginning my job as Special Assistant to the President.

I assumed I would be receiving a large parcel in the mail loaded with Briefing Books and bundles of policy papers.

Instead, I received a letter-sized envelope and in it was a single document entitled "Rumsfeld's Rules". It was one of these documents that you may recall in the days before laser copiers, that bore the blémishes of dust particles, spots and hair line marks that were caused by repeated photocopying for passing on to the next recipient.

But its contents were crystal clear. In it, Don Rumsfeld, White House Chief of Staff, a few years before, had provided uncommon wisdom to guide his team and future generations of White House Staff in the ways to perform their jobs with dignity, efficiency, honor and ... a great sense of humor.

I know that to this day, "Rumsfeld's Rules" remains on the White House's "best sellers list". And, it is a wonderful source of guidance for anyone on government business, or life in general.

SECRETARY DONALD RUMSFELD
ADDRESS TO REAGAN PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
- OCTOBER 10, 2003 -

Don Rumsfeld is now in his fifth decade of service to his country, and all along the way he has blazed a trail often as the youngest and most always the boldest.

Elected in 1962 as one of the nation's youngest members of Congress, Don Rumsfeld's entire career runs parallel to the quests and challenges our nation has faced since that time.

For President Nixon, he directed the Office of Economic Opportunity and later headed our nation's Economic Stability Program.

In 1973, he was asked to direct our national interest in a different way, as our Ambassador to NATO during one of the most tumultuous periods of the Vietnam War.

When a different kind of tumult resulted in President's Nixon's resignation, Don Rumsfeld was called home from Brussels and asked to head the White House Staff of President Gerald Ford.

The next year, he became our nation's 13th – and youngest – Secretary of Defense.

While serving in the private sector in the years that followed, Don Rumsfeld was called back to service by Republicans and Democrats to play leading roles in developing America's most vital policy choices: Arms control, ballistic missile threats, U.S. – Japan relations, the Middle East and the global markets.

When George W. Bush became the 43rd President of the United States, he asked Don Rumsfeld to lead once again as our nation's 21st Secretary of Defense.

Since then, Don Rumsfeld has lead our military with force and vigor, vision and imagination, tenacity and determination.

Americans could not be more fortunate – or our enemies more unlucky – that Don Rumsfeld is the man at the helm of the Pentagon.

Please welcome, Secretary Don Rumsfeld.

January 2, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: LaPorte Memo

Please set **up** a meeting for someone to brief me on this LaPorte memo. I must say, I am not sure I agree with it.

DR

Thanks.

Attach.
12/31/03 LaPorte memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
010204-23

.....
Please respond by 1/23/04

OSD 09240704

to wife

Fm: Gen. LaPorte

Received via Email

December 31, 2003

Mr. Secretary,

The purpose of this email is to provide you an update with respect to **the** relocation of the United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command (UNC/CFC) headquarters from Seoul (Yongsan Relocation).

Bottom Line Up Front: The Republic of Korea Government (ROKG) desires UNC/CFC headquarters to remain in Seoul. ROK National Assembly approval of US proposal to move out of Seoul is doubtful in the current political environment. Ministry of National Defense (MND) has presented a counterproposal for UNC/CFC residual footprint. Overarching USFK realignment objectives **may** be at risk absent an accommodation that allows UNC/CFC headquarters to remain in Seoul.

Since the conclusion of the Security Consultative Meeting in November, there have been **several** developments that are noteworthy.

* On 8 December, LTG Campbell met with LTG Cha, the Deputy Defense Minister for Policy to formally convey our US proposal to relocate the UNC/CFC south of Seoul. LTG Campbell provided LTG Cha a detailed proposal which featured four principle elements:

- * 50-man UNC/CFC liaison team remain in Seoul
- * US retains the Dragon Hill Complex (**approx 20 acres**)
- * Ministry of Defense (MND) provide offices within the MND Complex for the Commander and Deputy Commander, CFC
- * ROKG defray all costs associated with the relocation

* On 29 December, LTG Cha met with LTG Campbell to present a ROK counterproposal and to communicate the MND and the ROKG's desire for the UNC/CFC to remain in Seoul because of political, economic, and psychological considerations. LTG Cha indicated that **the** MND proposal would provide for an end state US "residual footprint" in Seoul of less than 200,000 pyong (164 acres). Currently, Yongsan is 895 acres.

* On 30 December, National Security Planning Chief Suh Choo Suk, met with Deputy Chief of Mission, Mr. Mark Minton, US Embassy, to confirm the ROKG prefers the UNC/CFC headquarters remain in Seoul.

11-L-0559/OSD/42266

* Recently, 147 National Assembly members (more than half of the National Assembly) proposed a resolution to retain the UNC/CFC headquarters in Seoul. The National Assembly retains the monetary veto on USFK realignments.

The developments detailed above, coupled with my recent discussions with the Chairman ROK JCS and Minister of Defense Cho, make it clear, despite some mixed signals, the unified ROKG position is that the UNC/CFC headquarters should remain in Seoul. Discussions with a broad range of informed members of the government, the business sector, the faith community, and academia lead to the conclusion it is very unlikely that an "Umbrella Agreement" which includes the relocation of the UNC/CFC out of Seoul will be ratified by the National Assembly. Moreover, it may also impede our progress in achieving approval of an amended Land Partnership Plan, which is key to the relocation of the United States Forces Korea and Eighth US Army to include the 2d Infantry Division.

I have had my engineers evaluate the MND counterproposal for UNC/CFC to consolidate on a residual footprint of less than 164 acres. It is doable but it will require

* 30% reduction in the number of remaining military personnel (from 1000 to approx 700)

* Phased approach to the return of SOFA granted land to ROKG

ROKG commitment to the additional costs associated with the diminished use of existing facilities and more expensive vertical construction

* ROKG needs to publicly announce that they want the UNC/CFC to remain in Seoul. Not a US demand.

Given the overarching objectives of our USFK realignment plan, it may be in our best interest to make an accommodation on the residual US footprint in Seoul in order to advance the far more important objectives related to "enhancing, shaping, and aligning" the ROK/US Alliance. Absent an accommodation that allows for the UNC/CFC to remain in Seoul, our efforts to posture the ROK/US Alliance for the 21st Century may be at risk.

Recommend I work with the Ministry of Defense to assist in developing a plan which will be acceptable and can be agreed to at the Future of the Alliance VI talks 15-16 January.

Await your guidance.

Very Respectfully,
Leon LaPorte

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 5, 2004

SUBJECT: **OIF**

On OIF I-II there are a couple of issues that come up.

- 1. Airlift and the burden that puts on the system.
- 2. Equipment that is in limited supply to the extent we have left-seat right side seat going on, two people are going to need the limited supply equipment.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
10504.13

Please respond by: _____

C1/9

1/9

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DR

657

DATE: January 5, 2004

SUBJECT: OIF

When we get ready to do OIF II to III, the question is can we spread out the rotation so that they are not all occurring in a three or four month period.

Obviously, to do that means we have to shorten some peoples' tours or lengthen some other peoples' tours. We don't want to lengthen them past up to one year. Therefore, it means shorter tours, which means we are going to have less value time in Iraq, either in an existing OIF II group or in the OIF III group coming in.

Somebody better get their head into that, fast, so we know the answers.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
10504.14

OSD 09242-04

Please respond by:

1/10/04

7 Jan 2004

SIR, WE ARE ALREADY WORKING OIF III TO GET AHEAD OF THE PROBLEM. OUR J-3, JFCOM, CENTCOM AND THE SERVICES ARE WORKING THE EXACT ISSUE YOU RAISE IN YOUR SECOND PARAGRAPH. WE WILL NEED TO GIVE YOU PERIODIC UPDATES AND GET GUIDANCE STARTING IN ABOUT 45 DAYS. VR DICK

TEN
1/9

5:24 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: January 5, 2004
SUBJECT: Response

Get a response back to Barzani on this letter. Clear it with policy. This is the first nice letter I have received from anyone in Iraq that I can remember. I believe he also wrote that excellent article in *The Wall Street Journal* (or possibly it was Talibani who wrote it).

for

Let's get a decent answer out pretty fast and let me read it first.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
10504.20

Attach: 12/25/03 Letter to SD from Masoud Barzani

Please respond by:

1/8/04

get this to
Larry fast.
Thanks!

OSD 09243-04

1/8/04

(b)(6)

KDP USA

0111 001

KDP - USA
Kurdistan Democratic Party, Iraq
1015 18th Street, N.W. Suite 704
Washington, D.C. 20036

FAX COVER SHEET

TO: Ms Rachael

(b)(6)

FROM: Farhad Barezani

FAX: (b)(6)

TEL:

SUBJECT: A letter from Mr Barezani to H.F sec. of Defense Mr Rumsfeld.

DATE: 12-31-03

NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING THIS COVER SHEET: 2

MESSAGE:

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**KURDISTAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY
THE PRESIDENT**



**PARTIYA DEMOKRATA KURDISTANE
SEROK**

Salahaddin,
Kurdistan, Iraq

25 December 2003

**His Excellency Mr. Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
Washington, D.C.
USA**

Dear Mr. Secretary,

This has indeed been a most momentous year for all of us and we are pleased to have participated in the Coalition efforts lead by the United States that have caused the downfall of one of the cruelest regimes and the stunning capture of one of the most brutal dictators of our lifetime.

The course of history has been changed and the peoples of Iraq can dream and truly thrive. The end of the tunnel is becoming larger and brighter for millions here in Iraq and elsewhere in this troubled region of the world.

Our people greatly appreciate the work accomplished to date and remain strong supporters of the Coalition Forces. We are committed to working with you as your partners and allies to achieve our common goals in rebuilding a new and a better Iraq.

I especially acknowledge the sacrifices of your military personnel and civilian administrators who have been living and working among us here in Iraq.

On this happy occasion, I wish you a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year and the people of the United States progress and prosperity.

Please accept my deepest appreciation and assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,

Masoud Barzani

11-L-0559/OSD/42273

**KURDISTAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY
THE PRESIDENT**



**PARTIYA DEMOKRATA KURDISTANE
SEROK**

Salahaddin,
Kurdistan, Iraq

25 December 2003

**His Excellency Mr. Paul Wolfowitz
Deputy Secretary of Defense
United States of America
Washington, D.C.
U.S.A.**

Dear Mr. Deputy Secretary,

This has indeed been a most momentous year for all of us and we are pleased to have participated in the Coalition efforts lead by the United States that have caused the downfall of one of the cruelest regimes and the stunning capture of one of the most brutal dictators of our lifetime. We greatly appreciate your contribution to ending the era of dictatorship.

The course of history has been changed and the peoples of Iraq can dream and truly thrive. I would like to assure you of our continued support for Coalition efforts in Iraq and our commitment to achieving a federal, democratic, and a pluralistic state that respects the rights of all its citizens and no longer threatens its neighbours.

I want to thank you for the support and sacrifices made on our behalf to rehabilitate and reconstruct Iraq. I especially acknowledge the sacrifices of your military personnel and civilian administrators who have been living and working among us here in Iraq.

On this occasion, I would like to convey our Season's Greetings to you. I wish you all the very best and the people of the United States prosperity and progress. Merry Christmas and Happy New Year.

Please accept my deepest appreciation and assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,

Masoud Barzani

11-L-0559/OSD/42274

7:41 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

File Copy

DATE: January 7, 2004

SUBJECT: **Calendar**

Please set a meeting with David Chu, Larry Di Rita and Jerry Jones. I want to talk about DACOWITS. Here is the material.

*DSD #
+ Jayme*

Thanks.

DHR/azn
010704.09

Attach: Durnan Memo re: DACOWITS Membership

Please respond by: _____

cc: KATHY

3311 Documents

OSD 09245-04

1/5

SecDef -

- Dacovits membership memo to you from Dr. Chui - Red tab
- Jaymie had questions concerning the memo - sent back to Chui
- Response to Jaymie's question at Blue tab
- Note Chui's concern about getting a decision in first half of January - Yellow tab
- We can schedule Dr Chui to brief you on this if you desire

C



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2003 DEC 17 AM 11:20
DEC 16 2003

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

MEMORANDUM FOR JAYMIE DURNAN

SUBJECT: DACOWITS Membership

Secy of Defense - Sue Patane
Jaymie Durnan
Jan 10

Jaymie

As a follow-up to our discussions on Saturday, let me give you my views on several questions concerning the decision package with regard to the membership and leadership of DACOWITS.

First, Ms. Sue Patane. She was a member of DACOWITS under the previous Administration, but her views and her actions do not reflect the priorities and policies of that Administration. Ms. Patane is a Republican and has been very helpful to me, Charlie and DACOWITS. She was the interim Chair during the transition period and has been a strong source of assistance this past year. Her personal philosophy, to the degree that we can see evidence of such, is aligned with those of the Secretary and the new Charter. She willingly gives her time and energy to the efforts of the Committee. She is very supportive of General Mutter and the Committee Members. I believe it would be a mistake to relieve her this year. If the decision is that she should be replaced, I recommend that we make it clear to her now that we will look to replace her next year. — ?

Second, with regard to the proposed candidates for new membership, the White House Liaison Office submitted all save Ms. Hoffmann. Charlie Abell interviewed each of those on the list proposed by the White House Liaison Office and we are comfortable with any of these candidates. As noted in the attached package, several are out of the country and are not viable candidates this year. The fact that Ms. Donnelly suggested several of the candidates is not problematic. Based on Charlie's interviews, each would be able to work within the framework of the new Charter and do a good job for us. *right*

Finally, Lieutenant General Carol Mutter has done an excellent job as the Chair and I believe the best course of action is to retain her as the Chair during the next year. She quickly organized the Committee and its Members, prepared them for their work, and has produced an annual report that supports the Charter and is useful to me. General Mutter is attuned to the Secretary's priorities and has a plan in place to continue the Committee's work in 2004. I believe that it would be counterproductive to make a change at this point and might well raise a political issue that we neither seek nor want.



I should note that some have questioned General Mutter's associations with other external groups. Charlie and I have discussed those affiliations with General Mutter and find her responses quite satisfactory. She has demonstrated the ability to lead DACOWITS in accord with the Secretary's priorities and the Charter. General Mutter is a professional military officer and has proven that she can provide leadership to a diverse group of professionals without permitting outside agendas from diverting the focus of the Committee. I strongly recommend that the Secretary retain General Mutter for this next year and that we plan for a transition to a new Chair next year.

I would point out that the next meeting of DACOWITS is in early February. We need to have the decisions regarding the membership and the Chair made in the first half of January so that we can notify the new members and get them processed in time for the February meeting.

David S. C. Chu

12/18
1405



PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2003 DEC 17 AM 11:20

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be fine
...
LARRY DI RITA
12/22

INFO MEMO

December 12, 2003, 3:00 PM

Larry Di Rita
12/20

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. C., USD (&R)

David S. C. C. 12 Dec 03

SUBJECT: Status of Selection of FY04 Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) Members

- The FY 04 nomination package is currently with the WHLO. The WHLO has concerns about some of the recommendations for committee membership. Additionally, they would like a current member, Ms. Sue Patane, removed from the committee. Ms. Patane is the last remaining member from the 1999-2001 committee and the WHLO believes it is time to replace her.
- WHLO is the source of all the recommendations (TAB A), with the exception of Ms. Hoffman who was nominated by the SECDEF. The following is the "prioritized" list submitted by the WHLO for DACOWITS nominees including the alternates and the people that recommended them, respectively. One nominee and one alternate (*in italics*) were unavailable as both are living overseas. One alternate, Mr. Mersereau, was nominated in place of Ms. O'Flaherty and two new alternates were subsequently recommended by the WHLO. Background on all the nominees and alternates can be found at TAB B.

Lisa De Pasquale – Elaine Donnelly, President, Center for Military Readiness

(b)(6) – SECDEF – Membership completed

Page O'Flaherty – Living in Japan, not considered this year.

Martha Kleder – Elaine Donnelly, President, Center for Military Readiness

Adam Mersereau – Elaine Donnelly, President, Center for Military Readiness (originally an alternate)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SRI MA CRADDOCK	
MA-BUCCI	<i>Noyembo 12/29</i>
EXECSEC MARRIOTT	<i>12/17</i>



11-L-0559/OSD/42279

U20652 / 03

Alternates:

Zandra Krulak - Living in England, not considered this year.

Lisa Gutierrez – White House Liaison Office Staff

Joy Silverman – White House Liaison Office Staff

- A list of current committee members is at Tab C.
- All members, including Ms. Patane, had been encouraged to complete a three-year tour to limit turn over. This stability helps manage turnover and retain a core of experienced members.
- For FY04, we requested an additional two members be added to the committee. These additional members will keep a group of four seasoned members when the FY03 memberships expire in FY06.
- In Dr. Chu's first meeting with the Secretary reference DACOWITS **FY04** membership nominations, the Secretary asked that Ms. Hoffmann be appointed immediately. This has been accomplished. She attended her first DACOWITS business meeting 20 and 21 November (TAB D).
- This year the committee visited 15 installations and conducted **61** focus groups. Additionally, the chair visited the four Service Academies. The Annual Report has been completed and submitted.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Col Denise Dailey, USA, (b)(6)

Thaeler, Shannon E. M., LCDR, OSD - PB

From: Borman, Lance C, CTR, OSD
Sent: Wednesday, August 20, 2003 4:50 PM
To: Thaeler, Shannon E. M., LCDR, OSD - P&R
Subject: DACOWITS

LtCmdr Thaeler,

I've reviewed the files and spoke with many persons previously involved in this committee.

The Office of White House Liaison is eager to see only the following persons on the DACOWITS Board:

Lisa de Pasquale

(b)(6)

Martha Kleder

Judith Page O'Flaherty *(currently living in Japan)*

Alternates would include: (Future appointments)

Adam Mersereau

Zandra Krulak *(currently living in England)*

If you have any questions, I can be reached at (b)(6)

Thank you,

Lance "Chip" Borman

FY04 DACOWITS NOMINEES

#	NAME	GENDER	ETHNICITY/ RACE	REGION	EXPERTISE
1	(b)(6)	Female	White	Mid-Atlantic (McLean, VA)	<p>Retired</p> <p>Spouse of Former Secretary of the Army.</p> <p>MA Counseling Processes, English, and American Literature and Poetry. Trustee, Capital Partners for Education. Asst Admissions Officer, Washington International School. Former College Advisor and Counselor.</p>
2	Miss Lisa De Pasquale	Female	White	Mid-Atlantic (Herndon, VA)	<p>Program Director, Clare Boothe Luce Policy Institute</p> <p>Military daughter (Navy).</p> <p>BA Public Relations and Journalism. Wrote numerous articles on women's issues. Former Promotions Director and Disc Jockey, radio station.</p>
3	Mrs. Martha Kleder	Female	White	Mid-Atlantic (Manassas, VA)	<p>Policy Analyst, Concerned Women for America</p> <p>Military experience - 2 years active Air Force enlisted. Former military spouse (Air Force) - 4 years. Family work force experience.</p> <p>BS Business. Former Air Force E3, Radio Broadcast Journeyman. Washington Correspondent, Focus on the Family. Radio News Editor, United Press International. News Director and Morning Announcer, Family Radio.</p>
4	Mr. Adam Mersereau	Male	White	South (Tucker, GA)	<p>Associate Attorney, Long Aldridge & Norman LLP</p> <p>Military experience - 4 years active Marine Corps officer, 1 year reserve USMC enlisted. Father and brother were/are Army officers.</p> <p>ID, BS Business Administration. Communications Officer in the USMC. Written articles relating to gender and the military, advocating restricting women in combat positions.</p>

FY04 DACOWITS ALTERNATES

#	NAME	GENDER	ETHNICITY/ RACE	REGION	EXPERTISE
5	Miss Lisa Gutierrez	Female	Hispanic	Southwest (Santa Fe, NM)	<p>Director, Diversity Office, Los Alamos National Lab</p> <p>Women's and family work force experience.</p> <p>BS Business. At Lab, involved in many women's and family initiatives, including recruiting, childcare, and retention. Diversity Programs Director, Deloitte Consulting. Account Executive, Recruiting, Training, & Development Manager, Procter & Gamble.</p>
6	Ms. Joy Silverman	Female	White	Northeast (New York, NY)	<p>Father served in Army.</p> <p>Member, Mayor Gulliani's Commission to Combat Family Violence. National Spokesperson for the National Victim Center's Anti-Stalking Program; helped to found/pass legislation. Trustee, Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts.</p>

FY04 DACOWITS NOMINEES
(in priority order)

1. (b)(6)
2. Lisa De Pasquale
3. Martha Kleder
4. Adam Mersereau

FY04 DACOWITS ALTERNATES
(in priority order)

5. Lisa Gutierrez
6. Joy Silverman

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Telephone:
Facsimile:

(b)(6)

General Objective: To serve in the field of education at the secondary school or undergraduate college level, either as a counselor to students or in a staff position assessing and advancing new program and policy ideas and concepts for educational improvement in a school or school system.

Education

1992-1994 Harvard Graduate School of Education, Masters Degree in Counseling Processes.

Focus: **Human** Development and Psychology, concerning an application of remedial, psychological and pedagogical techniques to the at-risk adolescent population.

Qualified to administer, score and interpret, with clinical supervision, the Bender-Gestalt, **Kauffman** Assessment Battery, Stanford-Binet, WISC-R, WPPSI-R and WRAT.

1990-1992 Harvard Divinity School, Graded Auditor.

Focus: Study of the Development of **Cultural** Ethics.

Received Clinical Training in Pastoral Counseling, St. **Ann's** In The Fields, Lincoln, MA.

1955-1957 Bryn Mawr College, Masters Degree in English and American Literature and Poetry.

1950-1954 Bryn Mawr College, Bachelor of Arts in English Literature.

PROFESSIONAL/VOLUNTEER EXPERIENCE IN EDUCATION

1997-2002 CapitalPartners For Education, Washington, D.C.

Non-profit organization founded to fund a private school education and provide mentors for high school students who have been motivated to and have successfully applied to area private schools.

Trustee. **Chair** of the Schools Committee. Co-liaison to Community Organizations linked to youth assistance. Scholarship awardee interviewer.

1977-1982 Washington International School, Washington, D.C.

Assistant Admissions Officer. Compiled and reviewed academic

credentials for candidates from around the world to this bi-lingual program, K through 13, granting the International Baccalaureate.

- 1975-1977 U. S. Army, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.**
Consultant. **As** spouse of the Secretary of the Army, **while traveling**, reported on aspects of teaching and curriculum in **U.S. Army schools** in the U.S. and on bases abroad, offering observations to base **per-**sonnel and at the Pentagon.
- 1967-1968 Potomac School, McLean, Virginia (Pre-K through 9)**
and Trustee: **Diversity Committee; Parent/School Relations Committee;**
1970-1975 Expansion and Plant Development Committee.
- 1969-1970 St. Michael's and AU Angels Episcopal School, Dallas, Texas**
Trustee: Parent/Teacher Relations Committee and Development.
- 1966-1968 Mt. Vernon Seminary and Junior College, Washington, D.C.**
College Advisor and Counselor to Juniors and Seniors at the Seminary. Responsible for all social and academic counseling prior to applications and matriculations of each **senior** in classes of **50**; **wrote** individualized recommendations after counseling **families**.
Assistant to the Director of Admissions at the Junior College.
- 1962-1964 The Madeira School, Greenway, Virginia**
College Advisor and Assistant to the **Headmistress**. Responsible for college admissions counseling, writing all college recommendations. Represented School at national meetings. **As Family-in-Residence**, assisted in daily operation of the School; acted **as Assistant Head of the School** during the **search** for a new Head.
- 1959-1961 Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania**
Acting Director of Admissions. Responsible for selection of students, chairing faculty committee on admissions and directing an assistant in charge of financial aid. Traveled **the U.S., speaking** to students, parents and alumnae, attending NAJS meetings. **Freshman advisor.**
- 1958-1959 Bryn Mawr College, Assistant to the Director of Admissions.**
Conducted and reported interviews of prospective candidates for admission and aid; traveled the **U.S., visiting schools, interviewing** candidates and addressing alumnae.
- 1955-1957 Dormitory Warden.** Graduate student in Residence as Counselor to Undergraduates. Responsible for personal counseling/clinical referral.

Lisa De Pasquale

Herndon, Virginia

- Daughter of female military officer
- Program Director, Clare Booth Luce Policy Institute
- writer on women's issues

Notes: *Miss De Pasquale's mother raised her as a single parent and LTCR in the Navy. At age 25, she has written articles that have been published in The Washington Times, Journal Newspapers, The Houston Chronicle, The Philadelphia Daily News, and The New York Post.*

Attached: "Sacrificing Safety and Military Readiness in **the** Name of Safety" and "Feminists' Attack on Karen Hughes Shortchanges Women and Their Families" by Lisa De Pasquale from the *Clare Boothe Luce Policy Institute* newsletter.

Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services Nomination Addendum

Name: Lisa De Pasquale

Tell us how you meet the following DACOWITS selection criteria,

Military Experience (actual service in the military - state years of service and highest rank/rate obtained):

N/A

Military Family Member (member of immediate family in the service - state relationship):

Both my mother and father served in the **US** military. My mother is currently a lieutenant commander in the **Navy**. Additionally, she served in the **Air Force** and with the United Nations in Egypt and Morocco.

Women's Work Force Experience;

I am program director of the Clare Boothe Luce Policy Institute in Herndon, Virginia. We are a 501(c)(3) organization that focuses on women's issues, particularly free enterprise, gender sensitivity training in schools, coed military training, **school choice** and higher education. I have written numerous articles on these issues, many of which have been featured on the Rush Limbaugh Radio Show, the Dr. Laura Show and on many other programs.

Family-Related Work Force Experience;

I have first hand experience as a child of a military parent and a particularly unique one as the daughter of a female military officer. I grew up with a single, working mother in the **Air Force** and **Navy Reserves**. In 1995, my mother, LCDR Judith Ashe, went active duty for the **Navy** and served in Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Egypt, Germany and in the **States**. She currently works for the Defense Travel System in (b)(6)

Lisa Janine De Pasquale

(b)(6)

May 1993-present

Program Director, **Clare Boothe Luce Policy Institute**

- Write articles and disseminate to over 400 media contacts each month
- Notify media outlets of organization's activities and events
- Write editorials for national publications on issues affecting women and young people
- Appear as a media spokesperson for the Institute
- Organize monthly mentoring luncheons for professional women in the DC area
- Organize mentoring events for young women and annual student seminars
- Write and edit quarterly newsletter, issue papers and brochures
- Set-up and designed website; update and maintain website
- Manage the Conservative Women Speakers Program and other campus outreach programs
- Maintain office network and DSL connection

Aug 1998-Apr 1999

Promotions Director and **Disc Jockey, WFCF 88.5**

- Coordinated listener and staff events, including annual Spring Fling, which raises money for local charities
- Updated and published program guide
- Organized more than 3 times as many on-air giveaways and promotions than previous years
- Notified local media of station events
- Produced a variety of on-air content, including public service announcements and promotional spots

Sep 1998-Dec 1998

Account Team Member, **Flagler Public Relations Agency**

- Edited and published the first newsletter for Communication department
- Researched and produced an updated alumni list for Flagler College

Sep 1992-Nov 1993

Staff Writer, **Tallahassee Democrat** (circ. 150,000)

- Wrote biweekly movie reviews
- Wrote guest articles for the Tech Democrat until April of 1995

Other Professional Activities:

Aug 2000-present

Member, Washington Network Group

Feb 2000-present

Contributor and Advisory Board member, **Rightgirl.com**

Dec 1999-present

Public Relations Development Associate, Conservative Internet Network

Nov 1999-present

Contributing Commentator, Cybercast News Service

Media Appearances:

C-SPAN, *The Washington Times*, *The Houston Chronicle*, *St. Augustine Record*, *The New York Post*, *Journal Newspapers*, Dr. Laura Radio Show, Rush Limbaugh Radio Show, and more than a dozen other radio programs.

Education:

Bachelor of Arts, majors in public relations and journalism and minor in political science, Flagler College, April 1999



Clare Boothe Luce POLICY INSTITUTE

Taking conservative ideas to young women and mentoring them into effective leaders; and making parents preeminent in the education of their children.

Sacrificing Safety and Military Readiness in the Name of Safety

(August 17, 1999)

by Lisa De Pasquale

A divided congressional commission endorsed sex-integrated recruit training in the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Coed basic training was first implemented by the Clinton administration in 1994. Because the military leadership has capitulated to political correctness, the placement of some women in the services is creating an atmosphere that is diminishing morale and leading to dangerous situations in the event of conflict.

Dissenters from the endorsement wrote, "Not only is there evidence of serious problems in gender-integrated basic training, but there is also substantial evidence that gender-separate training produces superior results."

Consider a few facts showing the problems with a fully integrated military:

❖ In today's armed services women are forced to live beside men day and night in foxholes, tents, and other absurdly close quarters inevitably leading to a very visible number of servicemen and women to behave in inappropriate ways.

❖ Women have always served in our military with honor. It used to be commonsense separation of men and women in their living quarters and the natural privacy and modesty of men and women was the norm.

LINKS

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Boothe Luce Policy
Institute, 1995-
2001

☛ In preparing the report, commission members **visited** and talked with many female trainees on military bases around nation. Most of the female trainees told **the** commission th they enjoyed coed training because the men were **very** help The males would do things like lift heavy objects **and** in r the females would do the mens' ironing or some **other** domestic service. **As** written in the report, "Gender-integr training may be reinforcing, rather than **eliminating**, stereotypes."

0 1 5 2 3 7 9

☛ In a recent report by the Cogressional Commission on Mi Training and Gender-related Issues, military **trainers** were asked if discipline had declined during **the five years of co** training. Seventy-six percent of male **trainers** and **74 perc** of female trainers said discipline had either "somewhat" o "significantly" dropped.

America must ensure that the military is as cohesive **and** effective as possible and national security must **be the first** priority. These priorities must take precedence **over feminist** gameplaying about gender equity. Women can **bc effective** members of the military if decision-makers will **implement** commonsense policies rather than feminist nonsense. **The truth** that radical feminists and liberals do not want to accept **is that** the military is not a stage in which they can act out **their** latest political farce. It is a deadly serious world unto itself that **m u s t** be maintained at a high level of readiness.



Clare Boothe Luce POLICY INSTITUTE

Taking conservative ideas to young women and mentoring them into effective leaders; and making parents preeminent in the education of their children.

Feminists' Attack on Karen Hughes Shortchanges Women and Their Families

Lisa De Pasquale
Program Director

In late April Counselor to the President Karen Hughes announced that she and her family are moving **back** to Texas **so** they can spend more time together. "I guess we're a little homesick," said Hughes. While Washington insiders scratched their heads, feminists across the country turned red with rage.

Hughes has always maintained that her family was **her** priority. For 18 months Hughes "home-schooled" her son **while** on the campaign trail with George W. Bush. Not only did the **15** year-old get to spend more time with his mother, he also got **the** civics lesson of a lifetime. Those who know Karen Hughes aren't necessarily surprised by her decision to leave Washington. **She** frequently passed up evening events and avoided interviews **on** the Sunday morning talk circuit if they interfered with her family's church attendance.

During her announcement to the press, Hughes acknowledged George W. Bush's "family-friendly" administration for helping her make her decision. Feminists pounced and **declared** that the Bush Administration is emphatically unfriendly to families, especially to those on welfare. They also complained that **too** often women are the ones forced to make sacrifices for **the family**. **As** any parent will tell you, all parents make sacrifices, **not** just mothers.

The liberal National Organization for Women's President Kim Gandy seized the opportunity to criticize the news coverage given to Karen Hughes. "Women will have arrived **when** these kinds of decisions make the front pages as often **for** men as **for** women," said Gandy.

In *The New York Times*, liberal columnist Maureen Dowd bemoaned Hughes decision writing, “Women will **never** get anywhere in this boys’ administration, or this boys’ town, or this boys’ world, if they’re going to sacrifice prime West Wing **real** estate every time their husbands and kids kvetch.”

Maureen Dowd isn’t the first to profess **disdain** for women who choose to spend more time with their family. Feminist author Andrea Dworkin, whose books are required reading for thousands of Women’s Studies students, wrote “The home... is the most dangerous place in the world for women.”

Catherine MacKinnon, another author promoted by Women’s Studies departments wrote, “Feminism stresses the indistinguishability of prostitution, marriage, and sexual harassment.”

This anti-family attitude isn’t just perpetuated among fringe radical feminists. *Nightline*’s Ted Koppel once asked a group of women, “Dr. Laura [Schlessinger] calls herself her kid’s **mom**. Do you think she does that to be provocative?”

When did acknowledging motherhood become provocative? “That’s probably the only thing I don’t do to be **provocative!**” said Dr. Laura at a student conference in Washington, **DC**. In addition to talking about her most important role, Dr. Laura’s website (www.drjaura.com) provides resources for stay-at-home moms and dads. It includes articles on making money at home, tips on **living** on a budget and ideas for family activities.

Feminists are simply missing the point - **Karen Hughes**’ decision is testament to the enormous range of **choices women** have. Many women are examining their lives and **finding** out that the feminist definition of happiness and fulfillment **doesn’t** work for them. Author Sylvia Ann Hewlett recently conducted a **study** that found **49** percent of the “most successful women” (those **earning** \$100,000 or more) were childless. Many were unhappy about their unexamined lives and felt shortchanged by the **empty promises** made by the feminist movement.

Angry feminists are blind to the true values **and desires** of many women. The choice to leave a high paying, high profile job in order to have more family time is not proof of a patriarchal society or widespread social injustice toward women. It **is** evidence that women have more choices than ever before.

Youth Intelligence polled 3,000 single and married women between the ages of 18 and 34. Sixty-eight percent said that **if** they could afford to not work, they'd prefer to stay home with **their** children. Similarly, in a *Cosmopolitan* magazine poll of 800 women, two-thirds said they would prefer to stay home with **their** children. These polling results - and the decisions of **the many** women who choose to be stay-at-home mothers - scare the antiquated feminists. It negates decades of feminist doctrine urging women to make decisions based on **their** career and the good **of** the movement, not on what is best for their children **and** family.

Feminists have frequently attacked stay-at-mothers. **Their** recent behavior now shows the scorn they have for career women who also put their families first. Rather than condemn Karen Hughes' decision as a blow to equality, feminists **should rejoice** that a prominent, successful woman is saying her most important **job** - motherhood - is taking center stage in her life.

###

Martha Kleder

Manassas, Virginia

- Former Air Force Enlisted, military spouse
- Policy Analyst, Concerned Women for America
- Radio and television broadcast specialist **for** the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service from 1981-1984

Notes: *Mrs. Kleder was the Washington Correspondent **for** Focus on the Family, where she provided radio coverage of events impacting the family, covering Capitol Hill and the U.S. Supreme court.*

Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services Nomination Addendum

Name:

Martha **W.** Kleder

Tell us how you meet the following **DACOWITS** selection criteria.

Military Experience (actual service in the military - state years of service and highest rank/rate obtained):

USAF, E-3, 2 years 10 months in service.

Military Family Member (member of immediate family in the service - state relationship):

From 1982 to 1986 my husband at time was a USAF E-4.

Women's Work Force Experience:

Armed Forces Radio & Television Service 1981-1984. Radio & Television Broadcast Specialist.

Out-processed from the service but remained the wife of an active duty E-4 until 1986.

WDCT-AM, Fairfax, VA, 1987-1992, News Director.

United Press International, 1990-1996, radio news editor.

Focus On the Family, 1996-2001, Washington Correspondent for a daily radio news program, Family News In Focus,

Concerned Women for America, 2001-present, policy analyst with the Culture and Family Institute.

Family-Related Work Force Experience:

My first husband (b)(6) (1982-1986), served on active duty with the Civil Engineers, we were stationed both at Elmendorf AFB in Alaska and Plattsburgh AFB in New York, living both off-base and in base housing. (b)(6) was sent on numerous TDY's both for Operation Brim Frost and for advanced training.

Resume

Martha Wilmoth Kleder

(b)(6)

Employment:

2001 - present:

Concerned Women for America, 1015 15th St, N.W. Suite 1100, Washington, D.C. 20005. (202) 488-7000. Position: Policy Analyst. Researches and writes on topics impacting the family, specifically covering the Federal Communications Commission, pornography, occult and pagan influences, and military culture and families.

1996-2001:

Focus on the Family, 8605 Explorer Drive, Colorado Springs, CO 80995. (719) 548-4600. Position: Washington Correspondent. Provided radio coverage of events impacting the family, covering Capitol Hill and the U.S. Supreme Court. Duties included some travel to cover events at the United Nations in New York and Nicaragua.

1990-1996:

United Press International, 1510 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20005. (202) 898-8000. Position: Radio News Editor. Gathering sound bites and correspondent reports on news events. Package and provide hourly news and sports feeds to UPI anchors and clients.

1987-1992:

WDCT-AM, Family Radio, LTD., Suite 506, Fairfax, VA 22030. (703) 273-4000. Position: News Director and Morning Announcer. Provided news, sports, weather and traffic reports during the morning drive time programming. Voiced and produced commercials and hosted a daily ½ hour public affairs interview program.

1981-1984:

United States Air Force, Elmendorf AFB, Alaska. Attained Rank of E-3. Air Force Arctic Broadcasting Squadron. Originated radio news, interview programs, public service announcements and hosted music programs.

Education:

Liberty University, Lynchburg, VA. 1992 Awarded a Bachelors of Science Degree in Business.

Defense Information School, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indianapolis, IN.

1981 Completed the Basic Broadcaster Course.

Memberships:

Commemorative Air Force, National Capitol Squadron.

American Legion.

Prince William County Republican Committee, VA.

Martha Wilmoth Kleder

(b)(6)

Personal References:

Rev. & Mrs. Terry Overstreet
Believers Baptist Church & Leesburg Christian School
21336 Evergreen Mills Road
Leesburg, VA 20175

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Adam Mersereau

Tucker, Georgia

- Former US Marine Corps Captain, both single-sex and mixed-
- Author of many articles relating to gender and the military, such as “Women in Deadly Inefficiency of Current Law and “The Military Should Fight Wars, Not Sexism.”
- Past Appearances on FOX News Channel and CBS Radio to discuss military readiness issues

Notes: *Mr. Mersereau's father and brother both served in the U S Army. He is currently a corporate attorney with Long Aldridge, and Norman LLP in Atlanta.*

Attached: “The Military Should Fight Wars, Not Sexism” by Adam Mersereau from The Wall Street Journal, Tuesday, March 17, 1998.

ADAM G. MERSEREAU

(b)(6)

EMPLOYMENT

LONG ALDRIDGE & NORMAN LLP, Atlanta, Georgia August 1998-Present

Associate Attorney

General Corporate and Business Law Practice.

Emphasis on Intellectual Property and Technology.

Experience with drafting and negotiating contracts of all kinds, including complex service, manufacturing, and independent contractor agreements, confidentiality agreements, software, patent and other IP licensing agreements, Internet services agreements, domain name and IP transfer agreements, employment contracts and settlement agreements; experience with general corporate governance, handling IP in merger and acquisitions, and representation of start-up companies; intimate knowledge of trademarks, copyrights, and working knowledge of patent law; some experience with litigation and drafting demand letters, complaints, discovery documents; experience with advising litigators in IP disputes; responsible for the day to day operation of the firm's domestic and foreign trademark practice, consisting of over 450 trademarks; some experience with TIA litigation.

Member of the Georgia Bar Association (Computer Law Section), the Atlanta Bar Association, The Technology Alliance of Georgia, the International Trademark Association and the Federalist Society.

OFFICER, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS May 1991-April 1995

Summer Instructor to Naval Academy Midshipmen

Assisted in designing and implementing a summer education and training program for sophomores at the U.S. Naval Academy.

Instructed over 1000 Midshipmen in professional military subjects.

Communications Officer

Appointed legal officer for unit of 250 Marines. Acted as commander's liaison on all Civilian and military legal matters.

Selected to conduct two Judge Advocate General's Investigations (criminal).

Special staff officer to the commander of 1000 Marines for all matters involving communications and computers.

Commanded 48 Marines. Responsible for the training, administration and evaluation of all personnel.

Responsible for the operation and maintenance of \$5 million in communications equipment.

EDUCATION

JURIS DOCTOR, CUM LAUDE Georgia State University School of Law 1998

CALI Awards for Excellence in Legal Writing. Selected Topics in Jurisprudence and National Security Law.

Selected to Editorial Board, ARA Real Property, Probate and Trust Journal (USC).

Graduate Research Assistant, Department of Risk Management and Insurance, GSU College of Business Administration.

GRADUATE ECONOMICS STUDY, The University of Oklahoma GPA 4.0
(7 credit hours, taken for personal improvement and enjoyment)

11-L-0559/OSD/42300

03/2002 REL 0010 -
B.S. BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, College of Charleston 1991
Founder and President, Sigma Chi Fraternity (Iota Epsilon Chapter).
Omicron Delta Kappa National Leadership Society.

PUBLICATIONS

E. Gail Gunnells and Adam G. Mersereau, *Internet Jurisdiction* (Co-Author), **THE COMPUTER LAWYER**, vol. 16, no. 10, October 1999, p. 19.

Joan T. A. Gabel, *The New Relationship Between Injured Worker and Employer: A n Opportunity for Restructuring the System* (Research Assistant), 35 **AM. BUS.L.J.** 403 (1998).

Adam G. Mersereau, *The Military Should Fight Wars, Not Sexism*, **THE WALL STREET JOURNAL**, March 17, 1998, A20.

Adam G. Mersereau, *Women in Combat: The Deadly Inefficiency of Current Law and Policy*, 3 **THE HOLY CROSS JOURNAL OF LAW & PUB. POL.** 39 (1998).

Joan T. A. Gabel, *The Emerging Bad Faith Cause of Action Takes on the Exclusive Remedy Doctrine* (Research Assistant), 48 **MERCER LAW REV.** 63 (1996).

Adam G. Mersereau, *'Diversity' May Prove Deadly on the Battlefield*, **THE WALL STREET JOURNAL**, November 14, 1996, A20.

Adam G. Mersereau, *Republicans Should Overlook Dole's Superficial Shortcomings*, **THE STATE, COLUMETA, S.C.**, February 29, 1996, A9.

TEACHING/PUBLIC SPEAKING

J. Mack Robinson School of Business, Georgia State University, part time instructor for graduate course in "Law and Ethics in Business," Summer Session 2000.

Goizueta Business School of Emory University, guest lecturer on Corporations, Director and Officer Liability and Mergers and Acquisitions, June 22, 1999.

Center for Military Readiness 1938 Policy Conference on the Culture of the Military at the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C., guest speaker and panelist, October 21, 1998.

WCNN News Radio, Atlanta, guest on The Tom Hughes Morning Show, to discuss recent article in the Wall Street Journal, March 24, 1998.

FOX News Channel (Television), The Crier Report, interviewed by Ms. Crier with regard to military readiness issues, December 17, 1997.

CBS Radio, The Gill Gross Show, debated Brig. Gen. Wilina Vaught (USAF Ret.) on military readiness issues, November 18, 1996.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Date: Tuesday, March 17, 1998

The Military Should Fight Wars, Not Sexism

By Adam G. Mersereau

Today representatives of the Army, Navy and Air Force will testify before the House National Security Subcommittee on Personnel on the Pentagon's latest investigation of women's roles in the military. The investigators, a civilian panel led by former Sen. Nancy Kassebaum-Baker, spent much of 1997 researching sex-integrated training and related issues. The panel concluded that the integration of the sexes during basic training is not working, and recommended that the Army, Navy and Air Force resegregate basic training into single-sex platoons. Defense Secretary William Cohen has said he is still considering the issue, but he is likely to follow the recommendation of the service chiefs, who have already declared that they support the status quo and oppose the proposed reforms.

The reforms are indeed misguided -- but only because they do not go far enough in reversing the expansion of women's military roles. In hopes of winning Mr. Cohen's support, panel members assured him that their proposal mirrors the successful method the Marines already use. The truth is that the Marines keep male and female recruits totally segregated. In an attempt to get Marine-like results for the other services without resorting to the Marine method, the panel has stumbled upon a new arrangement that is drastically different -- and that would highlight the physical limitations of female recruits.

To understand how the Kassebaum-Baker plan differs from the Marine approach, one must understand the military's seemingly enigmatic unit structure. The largest relevant unit in recruit training is what the Army and Marine Corps call a battalion. A battalion contains roughly 800 soldiers divided into four companies. Each company consists of four platoons of about 50 recruits each. A recruit's daily life revolves around the platoon, but companies often come together to run, hike and conduct combat training

in the field. A significant aspect of recruit training is the healthy but fierce competition between platoons within each company. Drill sergeants foster that competition to build platoon unity and teamwork and to inspire recruits to stretch their physical abilities.

Historically, the services segregated the sexes into separate companies or battalions for basic training so that men and women rarely crossed paths. When sex segregation became politically unpopular, each service save the Marine Corps integrated basic training by thinly dispersing women throughout each platoon. That way, military leaders hoped, the burdens of women's physical limitations, injuries and pregnancies would be diffused, and no single unit would suffer disproportionately. Feminists like this arrangement because it obscures the detrimental effects women have on units during physical training. The method also pleases many at the Pentagon, in part because it allows the military to "train like it fights," and in part because it passes the enormous daily burdens of integration down the chain of command to small-unit leaders.

The Kassebaum-Baker panel recommends that basic training in the Army, Navy and Air Force be resegregated, but not totally. It suggests segregation at the platoon level. In other words, when 50 female recruits are assembled into a platoon, that platoon would be grouped with three all-male platoons to form a company. The panel members are adamant that men and women would train together 70% of the time under their plan, suggesting that companies would continue to run, hike, go to the field and compete together. The panel also stresses that physical standards, which have been lowered to accommodate women, should be restored to preintegration levels.

The net effect of the new proposal is that all-female platoons would train side-by-side with all-male platoons, while high physical standards are maintained for all. Day comparisons between the physical abilities of military men and women would be inescapable and irrefutable. This is what happened when the Marine Corps segregated the sexes by platoon at the Basic School, a physically demanding secondary school for Marine lieutenants. Even though the physical standards were more lenient for female platoons, women's physical shortcomings were highlighted at every turn. The Basic School abandoned the arrangement in 1991.

If platoon-level segregation were carried out throughout the other services, there would be no escaping the conclusion that the expansion of women's military roles into physically demanding combat and combat-support units has been a **mistake**. The Kassebaum-Baker panel probably didn't realize this, but Secretary Cohen and his advisers surely do. And the chances are slim that Mr. Cohen would allow a side-by-side comparison of military men and women. Since 1992, the Defense Department has worked diligently to shield recruits in basic training from all physical tests that illuminate the drastic physical differences between the sexes.

Although Mr. Cohen has announced his support for the panel's recommendation to abolish coed housing for recruits, he is unlikely to endorse the panel's central recommendation. It's likely that the status quo will prevail, with everyone evading responsibility. Mr. Cohen will defer to the service chiefs, who oppose **resegregation** -- but then, what kind of soldiers would they be if they waged an **unwinnable** war against their civilian leaders?

Will Mr. Cohen at least acknowledge that integration of the sexes in basic training is not working? Probably not. Such an admission would leave him **cornered**. After all, there are only three ways to organize the sexes in boot camp: total **integration**, segregation **at** the platoon level or total, Marine-style segregation. An admission that men and women do not train well together would rule out **all** options except total segregation. A president desperate to hold on to his feminist support **will never** endorse such a **move**.

Basic training is an environment designed to simulate the stresses and strains of **war**. So an admission that mixed-sex units are problematic in basic training is an admission that they will be problematic in combat. Mr. Cohen will not make such **an** admission unless he somehow finds the will to support a total re-evaluation of **women's military** roles.

Such a re-evaluation is urgently needed. Each day brings America nearer to its **next** military conflict. *If Mr. Cohen does not stand up for the truth in peacetime, America's* sons and daughters will one day have it forced upon them in war.

Lisa Gutierrez

Santa Fe, New Mexico

- Placed sales personnel in Saudi Arabia while working for Proctor & Gamble
- Delivered many workshops on gender in the workplace, including those entitled: “Women Supporting Women,” “Los **Alamos** Women in Science” and “Theme for the 90’s... Women Making Choices”
- Concentrated on Global Diversity Issues **as** Diversity Programs Director for Deloitte Consulting

Notes: *Ms. Gutierrez is currently the Diversity Officer Director for Los Alamos National Laboratory. She developed a working families website “Kid Calendar,” for the Los Alamos community, While at Proctor & Gamble, she managed over \$30M in sales volume.*

Lisa J. Gutierrez

(b)(6)

SELECTED ACHIEVEMENTS

- 9 Dean, Systems Management Workshop(SMW), Procter & Gamble 7996
- 9 Certified Trainer, Global Application Trainer Training (GAT), Procter & Gamble 7996
- 9 Certified Trainer, Diversity I, Procter & Gamble 1992
- 9 Certified Trainer, Interpersonal Managing Skills (IMS), Procter & Gamble 1990
- 9 Certified Trainer, BA-FA?BA-FA? Diversity Workshop, Procter & Gamble 1992
- 9 Director, INROADS-Los Angeles Training Board, 1991-92
- Director, University of Colorado Alumni Association Board, 1991-95
- Founder, Western Multicultural Resource Team (WMRT), 1993
- Diversity Consultant, Univ. of Michigan MBA Program, 1995
- Diversity Consultant, Kellogg Graduate School of Management, CIM Week, 1996
- 9 Consultant, Video Software Dealers Association, 1996
- 9 Director, Career Dreams Educational Foundation 1997
- 9 Candidate, The PhD Project, 1999
- 9 Director, CasaCultura Foundation 2001
- 9 Co-Founder, Univ. of Colorado Women in Business Diversity Scholarship (since 1990)
- 9 Member, J. Robert Oppenheimer Memorial Committee, (2002)
- 9 Recognition, State of NM, "Cerro Grande Fire: Diversity in Action for Deaf Employees," (2002)

EXPERIENCE

12/99
to

Present

LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY (LANL)
Administration Directorate
Los Alamos, NM

Diversity Office Director

Responsible for leading and managing four institutional strategies including Diversity; Zero People Mistreatment Incidents; Zero Ethics Incidents; and Quality of Work life while implementing existing safety and security responsibilities. Appendix F Measures score: "Excellent."

Diversity Awareness & Education:

- Diversity Stand down (4/00): Innovative design achieved 99.13% (-8800) of Lab employees and received an overall evaluation of 3.2 out of 5.0.
- Leading implementation & delivery of RDW & Associates "Leading a Diversity Workforce" diversity training for managers.
- Required Management Training: Redesigned, and implemented awareness module which is receiving above average score.
- Guest Speakers/Events: Developed strategy for consultant/guest speaker process to enhance alignment with diversity education goals, LANL strategic goals and Diversity Working Group goals. Has been implemented with 20+ speakers. Facilitated strategy with BUS and DOE to align diversity events with appendix F measures and revise the parameters for allowable costs and events to allow consistent decision-making parameters.
- Diversity Working Groups: Develop and align goals and results of 8 working groups with institutional strategies and initiatives including heritage months. Currently in the process of restructuring DWGs into a multicultural Diversity/Affirmative Action Board. Received positive recognition on this "Best Practice" from www.diversityinc.com (3102).
- STARS Recruiting Training: Consulted with vendor, Rainmaker Thinking, which now includes diversity subject matter in recruiting training.

Communication:

- Websites: Diversity (www.lanl.gov/orqs/dvo/); International Working Families; www.life@lanl.gov; Kids calendar; diversity calendar of global/cultural events (7102)
- External: Consulting on strategy and results to end APAHE boycott of National Labs with the Committee of 100, the Organization of Chinese Americans (OCA); APAHE, NNSA, SNL, LLNL, etc.

Diversity Consulting:

- Provide diversity consulting services to internal **groups** and organizations including team or individual problem **analysis**, intervention and issue resolution. Work in conjunction with **peer** organizations like HR, Ombuds, **OEO**, etc.
- Sub-contractor diversity consulting: Los Alamos Fire Dept., (2000); Los Alamos County (2001) (4100); PTLA, etc. Consulting services have saved these organizations approximately \$60,000 in diversity training/consulting fees.

Additional Strategies:

- Zero People Mistreatment: Working with UNM to **conduct focus** groups to help define concept and have developed **plans** to begin educating and communicating to achieve zero **goal**.
- Quality of Work Life: Working with the Women's **Diversity** Working Group, UC, DOE & HR to develop a childcare resolution in addition to providing other resources for working families including **the website** and referrals to childcare options.
- Office Management: Highest Upward Appraisal feedback among peer group of **42** in 2001. Through efficient negotiation and budget management, have returned approximately **10% annual** budget each FY. Have implemented process to **train and develop** staff on all core competency areas.

12/98
to

DELOITTE CONSULTING
National Human Resources
Chicago, IL

12/99

Diversity Programs Director, Americas

Responsible for defining, developing and implementing diversity programs to support the overall Deloitte & Touche diversity vision **and** the specific Deloitte Consulting strategies to achieve this vision including **plans** and programs in recruiting; education/awareness and coaching programs; retention **and** advancement, internal communication, **external recognition** and communications and performance management. **Scope of position** included Deloitte Consulting Americas Region (13,000 employees) focusing on the Diversity and Women's Initiatives and **reporting to 3** Partners.

- Member, Scoping & Planning Team: Developed and delivered Deloitte Diversity Education Strategy
- Designed and delivered innovative pilot diversity workshop within 3 weeks for global education team with no cost and an overall rating of meeting 70% of Deloitte's needs vs. external **diversity consulting** vendor who took 10 months and \$200,000 to provide a version which only addressed 20% of Deloitte needs.
- Improved design and delivered **at** Deloitte Difference **Global** Orientation (12199) with an overall score of **3.4/5.0**.

- Redesigned and implemented new and robust Knowledge **Net** (KNET) database and library for Diversity and Women's initiatives.
- Worked with Partner Diversity Leadership Network (DLN) to develop strategies, communications and diversity ideas to implement at local office level.
- Provided personal diversity consulting intervention advice to partners on issues including Global Diversity policy on Internet humor (So. Africa, etc.)

09/97
to

DELOITTE CONSULTING
Central Region
Chicago, IL

11/98

Central Region Learning Director (CRLD)

Accountable for the overall execution and continual improvement of the training programs for the 1100+ Deloitte Consultants located in the Central Region (6 states). Responsible for ensuring the learning curriculum and programs are effective in developing the skills and knowledge of consultants to service client needs and consistent with the Performance Development (C3) process.

- Designed and developed infrastructure, roles, **strategy** and measures for first ever Central Region Learning Director position and office to include smooth on boarding and assimilation of **new** hires; minimal downtime of consultants between clients and training; reduction in travel and other costs related to **training and** just in time (JIT) training for client assignments.
- Designed and facilitated innovative **new** hire orientation presentation linking recruiting, education and **performance** development processes.
- Assessed training delivery processes and recommended **changes** resulting in over \$100,000 savings in first 2 months of employment.
- Designed and developed one coordinated education **framework/curriculum** and process for IT education.
- Worked with multidisciplinary team to develop, design and begin to implement a technology solution to track education and development needs of 1100 Central Region employees.
- Developed relationships across Deloitte Practices to integrate **into** existing ICS and SAP processes by sharing an Oracle database at an overall cost savings of approx. \$100,000.
- Implemented knowledge transfer of role, strategies and **contacts** to Deloitte personnel and offices around the world to **minimize** re-work and enhance consistency and culture including **Canada**, Hong Kong, South Africa, etc.
- Elected as Deloitte Consulting representative to National Education & Development User Taskforce for **SAP** implementation during first 6 months of employment.

- Designed, developed and delivered workshop on **Adult Learning Principles** with Senior Manager to Central and Southern Regions.

07/96 **THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY**

Customer Business Development
Huntington Beach, **CA**

06/97 Account Executive, Lucky Stores

Laundry- & Cleaning Products/Food & Bev.

- Responsible for development of **11** categories of **business**.
- Provided category and strategic consulting to **Lucky Stores**
- Produced marketing and merchandising programs to **increase** total category sales.
- Managed over \$30 million in sales volume.

07/92 **THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY**

U.S. Recruiting, Training & Development
Irvine, **CA**

06/96 Group Manager

Recruiting, Training, & Development

Designed and implemented programs to staff, train and **develop** full and part-time sales employees in 6 states. Innovative programs **saved** P&G over \$100,000 in consulting fees. Programs helped retain **sales** employees at a savings equal to \$800,000 in 1995. Established globally recognized (1996) multicultural resource team to improve **minority** recruiting, retention, and advancement.

- Training experiences:
 - Staffed 5 Systems Management Workshops on **high** performing work systems (Appointed **Dean** in 1996).
 - Facilitated 14 Decision-Mapping strategic planning workshops.
 - Designed and facilitated over **10** workshops in **change/transition, diversity, and team building.**
 - Designed innovative mission workshop to **be** implemented in 4-6 hours versus company average of **3 days.**
 - Designed and delivered first ever National Latino Sales Conference with highest rating for any **conference in sales.**
 - Designed systems to coordinate 7 sales orientations **and** staff over 187 sales positions.

- 03/91 THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY
Commercial **Service** Products Group
to Irvine, **CA**
- 06/92 District Manager, National Accounts
 - Strategic planning and development of contract **sales** with Hilton Hotels, Taco Bell, American Restaurant Group, Caesar's Casinos, and Foodmaker, Inc.
 - Successfully defended competitive attacks and maintained contracts with Hilton and Foodmaker.
 - Managed over \$20 million in sales volume.
- 04/90 THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY
Sales Training & Development
to Cincinnati, OH
- 02/91 INROADS Program Manager
 - Designed and implemented internship program for 60 minority high school and college students.
 - Expanded program to 15 sales markets.
 - Coordinated with employees in all functions, markets, product sectors, and levels of the company; including **senior** management.
 - Identified and negotiated consultant programs.
 - Over 50% of freshman and sophomore classes continued on to full-time employment.
 - Recognized by INROADS as one of top 3 National Coordinators (1990); and Training Director (1991).
- 11/89 THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY
Sales Training & Development
to Cincinnati, OH
- 03/90 Training Specialist
 - Developed and implemented training programs for Foodservice & Lodging Products (FS&LP) Division of 220 Full-time sales personnel.
 - Identified and directed consultants to develop programs in persuasive selling, negotiation, time management, communication skills.
 - Redesigned existing programs to calibrate sales representatives from acquisitions to P&G training methods.
 - Facilitated grocery retail training programs for first and second level managers.

07/89 THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY
FS&LP Distributor Channels
to San Francisco, CA

10/89 Unit Manager, Sysco California

- Led development of business at three Sysco divisions in California.
- Implemented first sales "team" design aligned around customer.
- Managed and developed four direct reports; promoted one to next level.
- Managed over \$12 million in sales volume.
- Promoted to next assignment within 5 months.

03/86 THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY
Foodservice & Lodging Products Division
to San Francisco, CA

07/89 Unit Manager

- Responsible for all business activities in East Bay territory.
- Trained, developed, and managed three sales representatives.
- Led strategic development of CU-Boulder recruiting team.
- Managed over \$10 million in sales volume.
- Ranked among top 5 unit managers (48 total) in Western Region.
- Founding Member of Inaugural Women's Effectiveness Network (WEN), San Francisco District

09/85 THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY
Foodservice & Lodging Products Division
to San Francisco, CA

02/86 District Field Representative

- Coordinated special projects to develop business with strategic partner, Allied Sysco. Sysco Distributor Project rolled out nationally.
- Responsible for on-campus recruiting at ASU and CU-Boulder.
- Implemented field sales training for new hires.
- Managed vacant unit representing over \$5 million in sales.
- Promoted within 6 months versus average of 12 months.

12/83 **THE PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY**
Foodservice & Lodging Products Division
to San Francisco, **CA**

08/85 Sales Representative

- Produced marketing and promotion campaigns ~~for~~ local wholesale customers.
- Managed sales volume of \$4 million.
- Won 3 out of 5 sales contests among district of **ten**.
- Business indexed over 105%.
- Promoted to next level in 20 months versus, average of 30 months.

EDUCATION

- B.S., University of Colorado-Boulder, 12/83
- Majors: Marketing & Organizational Management
Minor: Psychology

OTHER TRAINING & EDUCATION

LANL:

- Science Day (4/02)
- Science Day (4/01)
- Univ. of California Management & Leadership Conference, **San Diego** (12/00)
- Institute for Applied Management and Law, Inc. (12/00)
- "Diversity in Science" Colloquium (9/00)
- Motorola Project Management Training (Intro) (7/00)
- DOE Contractors Annual Diversity Conference, **Atlanta** (5/00)

Industry:

- Lessons in Leadership: Stephen Covey, "Four Elements of leadership" (10/01)
- IQPC: Diversity Summit - Chicago (11/01)
- IQPC: Diversity Summit-Canada (4/01)
- IQPC: Diversity Summit-Canada (6/00)
- Lessons in Leadership: "Large Scale Simulation & Learning Design" (10/99)
- Project Impact, Atlanta (5/99)
- The Conference Board: Diversity (2/99)
- FASTRACWSAP 3.0 Certification (12/98)
- Lessons in Leadership: Peter Senge's "Leadership and the Learning Organization" (4/98)
- Men and Women as Colleagues (4/98)
- Fundamental Consulting Skills (3/98)

- Semco: Computers, Systems, Terms and Acronyms (10/97)
- World Class Recruiting Clinic (9/86)
- Sales Management Training School (9/86)
- New Representative Training Course (8184)

PRESENTATIONS & WORKSHOPS DESIGNED & DELIVERED:

Academia:

- California Universities & Colleges Staff Assembly (CUCSA) (3/02)
- Espanola Valley High School (10/00)
- Alcalde Elementary School (10/00)
- Dixon Elementary School (10/00)
- Northwestern University Kellogg Graduate School of Management, CIM Week, Global Kellogg Diversity Workshop (9/96)
- Los Amigos High School (12/95)
- University of Colorado Career Services, Staff Diversity Training Workshop (5/95)
- University of Michigan Business School, Executive Skills Diversity Workshop (9/95)
- UCLA, Anderson Graduate School of Management, Graduate Women in Business Western Region Conference, "Networking and Mentoring" (3/95)
- Oregon State University, Panhellenic Leadership Conference (3/95)
- University of Colorado Alumni Association, Board of Directors' Diversity Training Workshop (9/94)
- University of Colorado College of Business Speaker Series (1992)
- UT-Austin, Hispanic-Business Student Leadership Conference (3/91)

Industry:

- Hispanic Statement of Cooperation (9/01)
- Organization of Chinese Americans National Convention (7/01)
- IQPC: Diversity Summit-Canada: (4/01)
- Hispanic Scholarship Fund (HSF) Career Exploration Day (2/01)
- Southern Nevada Hispanic Program Council (8/00)
- Bechtel, Inc. (8/00)
- Northern New Mexico Human Resource Association (7/00)
- IQPC: Diversity Summit Canada (6/00)
- IMAGE-NM (4/00)
- Expanding Your Horizons (3/00) and (3/01)
- Los Alamos Women In Science (3/00)
- Deloitte Difference Global Orientation-Diversity Module (12/99)
- Adult Learning Principles (7/99)
- Deloitte Experienced Hire Orientations (11/97)
- Intern Sales Orientation (6/96)
- National Latino Sales Conference (5/96)
- Systems Management Workshop, (1992-1996)

- VSDA Regional Leader's Conference, "Effectively Working with Volunteers" Workshop (4/96)
- Sales College II (1/96)
- "Theme for the 90's...Women Making Choices" Seminar (9/90)
- "Diversity Today" Workshop, INROADS-Los Angeles (8/93)

Government:

- LANL Essentials of Supervision: Diversity Module (2001-02)
- NM Indian Affairs Legislative Committee (11/01)
- NNSA Tri-Lab Diversity Workshop: APIA Issues (co-designed & delivered with SNL, LLNL), (8/01)
- CIA Leadership Seminar (4/00)
- Foreign Service Seminar (4/00)

Community:

- Los Alamos Kiwanis Organization (11/00)
- Take Your Daughters to Work Day (1998-99)
- Espanola Valley Lions Club (7/96)

Media:

- KTAO Radio "Breakfast with Nancy" show (7/00)

AWARDS/RECOGNITION:

- State of NM, "Cerro Grande Fire: Diversity in Action for Deal Employees," (11/01)
- Training Advisory Task Force, INROADS-Los Angeles (9/93)
- Who's Who among Hispanic Americans (1991-92)
- Bay Valley District Business & Professional Women, "Young Careerist" Regional competition, Third Place (1/87)
- Todos Santos Business and Professional Women, "Young Careerist" Award (11/86)
- All-time Record Month Sales (1987)
- All-time Record Month Sales (7/84)
- All-time Record Month Sales (5/84)
- Volume Energizers Sales Award (1984)

MISCELLANEOUS:

- Q-Clearance status: ACTIVE
- *References available upon request*

Joy Silverman

New York, New York

- Member of Mayor Giuliani's commission to combat family violence
- National Spokesperson for the National Victim Center's Anti-Stalking Program
- Daughter of Army doctor (WWII)

Notes: *Ms. Silverman formed a committee of 1,500 women from around the state to work on Mayor Giuliani's Senatorial campaign for the 2000 elections. Her experience in woman and family related work has been mainly in the area of domestic violence.*

Experience

- 2000-** **Mayor Rudy Giuliani Senatorial Campaign**
- Formed a committee consisting of 1,500 + women from around the state.
 - Organized statewide fundraising events.
- 1998-** **Member of the Mayor's Commission to Combat Family Violence**
- Aided in a program developed to increase awareness of domestic violence in the teenage community.
 - Volunteered in the Queens, New York Criminal Courthouse, counseling female victims of domestic crimes.
- 1993-98** **National Spokesperson for the National Victim Center's Anti-Stalking Program**
- Served as keynote speaker at Threat Management Conferences and Stalking Conferences around the country promoting the model stalking statute published by The National Institute of Justice.
 - Aided in the conception and passing of the **New Jersey Stalking Bill (passed 1996)**. Testified before New Jersey Senate Judiciary Committee on behalf of said legislation.
 - Lobbied for and spoke on behalf of **New York Stalking Bill (passed 1999/2000)**.
 - Spoke in support of the **Federal Stalking Sill**, sponsored by Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison.
- 1992** **"Bush-Quayle" Election Campaign**
- Served as a National Vice Chairman
- 1990-2000** Served as a Trustee of **The Kennedy Center** for the Performing Arts on appointment of **President George Bush**
- 1989** **Nomiated by President George Bush to serve as the United States Ambassador to Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean**
- 1988** **"Bush-Quayle '88" Election Campaign**
- Served as a vice-chairman of various fundraising functions.
 - Served as one of four chairpersons of the **New York State Jewish effort**, fundraising, arranging surrogate speaking programs and traveling throughout **New York State** in connection with those programs.
 - Assisted **Russ Schriefer**, New York State campaign manager.
 - Worked for the "grass roots" effort in **New York State**.
- 1986** **Member, New York City Mayor's Commission for Protocol**

Current DACOWITS Members (Total of 12)

All appointed in October 2002 for a 3-year term, except for Mrs. Hoffmann who was appointed October 30, 2003.

Mrs. Catherine Aspy

Dr. Lynda Davis

Sen. J. P. Duniphan

Ms. ~~Bonnie Fuller Ford~~

Mrs. (b)(6)

LtGen Carol Mutter, USMC, Retired

Ms. Susan Patane

COL Darryl Ladd Pattillo, USAF, Retired

Ms. Margaret Robson

Ms. Virginia Rowell

Col Vance Shaw, USAFR, Retired

Ms. Rosalie (Ricky) Silberman

Members who Departed in October 2003

(due to personal commitments)

Ms. Julie Hamre

Mrs. Constance Homer



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000



OCT 30 2003

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

(b)(6)

Dear (b)(6)


I am pleased to inform you that you have been selected for membership on the Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS). While members serve at the pleasure of the Secretary of Defense, normally the term of membership is one to three years.

Since its establishment in 1951, **DACOWITS** has been providing recommendations to the Department of Defense on policies and matters relating to women in the Armed Forces. In 2002, the Committee charter added the realm of family issues related to the recruitment and retention of both men and women in the military. The Department of Defense needs dedicated citizens like you to build **upon** the past achievements of **DACOWITS** and to help us build the force **of** the future.

The Department of Defense will be releasing a press advisory shortly announcing the new members. Until then, I would appreciate your cooperation in refraining from speaking with the press.

Congratulations on your selection. I **look** forward to seeing you **at DACOWITS'** November business meeting.

Sincerely,


Charles S. Abell
Principal Deputy



11-L-0559/OSD/42319

EF-8784
04/0032218
7:40 AM
C3/15

TO: Doug\$ Feith
Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: February 12, 2004

SUBJECT: **Washington Times Article**

Larry Di Rita
3/15

The attached article on supposed major changes at the Pacific Command is troubling. Where could this be coming from?

✓
3/15
Parcom

3/15/04 → SD

Thanks.

The reporter wore together my general remarks about the global posture realignment (from the event where I gave the speech that you liked and then distributed worldwide) with some specific speculations about command structure. I don't know where the latter speculations came

DHR/azn
011204.06

Doug Feith

Attach: Washington Times, 2/2/04 "US Pacific Command Facing Sweeping Changes"

Please respond by: 2/27

OSD 09247-04

12 Feb 04

Washington Times
February 2, 2004
Pg. 11

U.S. Pacific Command Facing Sweeping Changes

Rumsfeld plan is designed to make forces more responsive

By Richard Halloran, The Washington Times

HONOLULU — Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld is planning a sweeping revision of the command apparatus through which U.S. military forces are controlled in Asia, in an effort to make them more responsive to contingencies from the Koreas to Australia.

Military officers said the revision would take place primarily in South Korea and Japan, but would affect deployments throughout the Pacific Command's area of responsibility, which runs from the West Coast across the Pacific and Indian Oceans to East Africa.

From its headquarters overlooking Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, it controls 300,000 military people and is the largest combatant command of the U.S. armed forces.

Among the command elements that will most likely be dismantled in South Korea are the U.N. Command (UNC), U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), the Combined Forces Command (CFC), and the Eighth U.S. Army. In Japan, United States Forces Japan (USFJ) will disappear, but a new operational corps headquarters led by a lieutenant general will be set up.

In addition, the position of the four-star general who commands the UNC, USFK and CFC will be abolished. At the same time, plans call for establishing a new billet for an Army four-star general at the headquarters of the U.S. Army Pacific at Fort Shafter in Hawaii. He will take control of Army forces in the Pacific region now under the command of a three-star general.

In response to a query, the spokesman for the Pacific Command, Navy Capt. John Singley said: "The Pacific Command is currently reviewing plans to strengthen our defense posture as part of a larger U.S. government global effort in that regard. We are currently consulting with our allies and partners in the region and will continue to do so before any decisions are made."

"Some of these plans are near-term," Capt. Singley said. "Others are further in the future. The aim of the global-posture review is to strengthen our defense relationships with key allies and partners, improve flexibility, enable action regionally and globally, exploit advantages in rapid power projection, and focus on overall capabilities instead of numbers."

Officers informed of the shakeup pointed to Mr. Rumsfeld's wider plan to "transform" the Pentagon and the armed forces.

Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith told an audience in Washington in December: "A key facet of transformation is realigning our global defense posture. That is, updating the types, locations, numbers and capabilities of our military forces and the nature of our alliances."

In Asia, the officers said, the intent was to eliminate crisscrossing chains of command that are legacies

of World War II, the occupation of Japan, the Korean War, the war in Vietnam, and the Cold War, which ended in 1989 when the Soviet Union collapsed.

These officers asked not to be identified because the review is still in process and no decisions have been made.

"When we get through," said one officer, "it will be seamless."

By removing layers of the current cumbersome military bureaucracy, they suggested, troops and ships and aircraft would be able to respond more quickly to any crisis on orders from the president and secretary of defense.

In addition, the revisions are intended to appeal to South Korean nationalism and to tamp down rising anti-Americanism. The United States and South Korea have already announced that the U.S. headquarters will move from a congested area in Seoul to a new site about 75 miles to the south. The 2nd Infantry Division will move from the heavily populated area north of Seoul to new bases farther south.

Disbanding the CFC is intended to lessen South Korean complaints that it diminishes Korean sovereignty, said officers with experience there.

The CFC controls both South Korean and U.S. forces, but is led by a U.S. general with a Korean general as second in command. Many Koreans have argued that it is their country and they furnish the bulk of the forces, and therefore, a Korean should command.

"This would reduce the misperception that the U.S. controls the Korean military," said an officer. It might also take away a North Korean charge that South Korean forces are lackeys of the Americans.

Disbanding the UNC, Mr. Feith said, "will undoubtedly be part of the whole discussion that we have regarding the realignment of our posture in Korea."

11-L-0559/OSD/42323

January 12, 2004

C/116

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: State of the Union

Andy—

Is there any chance the Cabinet spouses can get invited to the State of the Union?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
01 1204-30

urnan
1/15

1000

x 1/16

✓ 1/16

1/15

*Spoke to Melissa in Card's office.
Andy is travelling with the President.
She will work to get an answer.*

OSD 09250-04

Jaymie
urnan 1/15
hand C1

② Andy Card is controlling distribution of Draft State of the Union. He has not released it yet.

TO: Bill Winkenwerder

0000000000000000

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: Newt Gingrich

Take a look at this note from Newt Gingrich. **Any thoughts?**

Thanks .

DHR/azn
060604A.02ts

Attach: Gingrich email "New Approach" 3.23.03

Please respond by: _____ 6/21

OSD 09257-04

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: ThirdwaveP@aol.com
Sent: Sunday, November 23, 2003 5:55 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: a new approach to vaccine manufacturing-newt

from newt
11/23/03

we should **develop** a nanoscale approach thinking of a vaccine as a materials **assembling** problem rather than growing biologicals in eggs in the traditional **way**.

the ultimate threat of an engineered biological for which we have no vaccine (imagine an engineered flu so quarantining **is** not a possibility) **requires something** much more **powerful** and **realtime** than any biologically developed system

DARPA NSF and **NIH** should create a collaboration with **three** or four competing **teams** working to develop a solution at the nano level that could **be** scaled up to literally manufacture a vaccine.

this may seem **too far out** but it is **no further than** much of **what the labs** produced in **world war two** compared to capabilities at **the** beginning of **the** war.

11/24/2003

11-L-0559/OSD/42325



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

HEALTH AFFAIRS

INFO MEMO

JUN 17 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: New Approach to Vaccine Manufacturing – Email from Newt Gingrich

- This is in response to your June 6, 2004, inquiry regarding an email you received from former Congressman Gingrich regarding a new approach to vaccine manufacturing, namely using nanotechnology (TAB A). Nanotechnology is a tool that has received increased focus from the Federal government, academia and industry.
- Providing safe and effective medical countermeasures has been historically a lengthy process, often taking as long as 7-12 years to achieve licensure at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars. I am eager for the Department of Defense to embrace new techniques and methodologies that result in licensed, improved products that protect the health of our Service members. While the current armamentarium of countermeasures is based on traditional development practices, the next generation of medical countermeasures should exploit novel techniques, including nanotechnology.
- The Department of Defense is part of the National Nanotechnology Initiative, a consortium of Federal agencies headed by the National Cancer Institute dedicated to coordinate efforts in nanoscale science, engineering and technologies. New classes of antimicrobials, toxin inhibitors and diagnostic devices could emerge from their research efforts that support a number of homeland security capabilities within the medical defense arena.
- The National Cancer Institute and the National Institute for Allergy and Infectious Disease, both agencies of the Department of Health and Human Services, have operations at the Fort Detrick, Maryland campus, co-located with the Army's institute for infectious disease. A strong and growing partnership is emerging among these Federal partners. This campus should be considered as the cornerstone of our national biodefense effort.
- Another interagency group, the White House-established Weapons of Mass Destruction Medical Countermeasures Subcommittee, could take maturing and promising nanotechnology medical products and direct funding for their

OSD 09257-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42326

procurement through initiatives such as Project Bioshield. I serve as co-chair of this group, along with counterparts from the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Homeland Security.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: COL Carr, Medical CBRN Defense, (b)(6) PCDOCS
66064,66299

11-L-0559/OSD/42327

TO: Bill Winkenwerder

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: Newt Gingrich

Take a look at this note from Newt Gingrich. Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060604A.02ts

Attach: ~~Gingrich~~ email "New Approach" 3.23.03

Please respond by: _____

6/2)

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: ThirdwaveP@aol.com
Sent: Sunday, November 23, 2003 5:55 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: a new approach to vaccine manufacturing-newt

from newt
11/23/03

we need a radically **new approach** to **vaccine** manufacturing.

we should develop a nanoscale approach **thinking of a vaccine** as a materials **assembling problem** rather than growing biologicals in eggs **in the traditional way**.

the ultimate threat of an engineered biological for which we have no vaccine (imagine an engineered **flu** so quarantining **is not a possibility**) requires something much more **powerful and** realtime than any biologically developed system

DARPA NSF and **NIH** should create a collaboration with three or four competing teams working to develop a solution at the nano level that could **be scaled** up to literally manufacture a vaccine.

this **may seem** too far out but it **is** no further than much of **what** the labs produced in world **war** two compared to capabilities at the beginning of the war.

11/24/2003

11-L-0559/OSD/42329

New Approach to Vaccine Manufacturing from Newt Gingrich

COORDINATION

CoS, HA

COL Tom Kurlmel

Concurred, 6/17/04

USD (P&R)

Dr. David S.C. Chu

David S.C. Chu
18 June 04

Paul Butler

epg

TO: Bill Winkenwerder

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Dr.*

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: Newt Gingrich

*Bill W -
Newt G
Call
told him*

Take a look at this note from Newt Gingrich. Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060604A.02ts

Attach: Gingrich email "New Approach" 3.23.03

Please respond by: _____ 6/21

*Sir,
Response attached.
vr/CDR Nosenzo
6/30*

720
30 Jun 04
6 Jun 04

OSD 09257:04

Pub 6/30



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

201 JUN 01 11:13:03

INFO MEMO

JUN 17 2004

HEALTH AFFAIRS
Paul Butler

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*
William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: New Approach to Vaccine Manufacturing – Email from Newt Gingrich

6/29
Pub

- This is in response to your June 6, 2004, inquiry regarding an email you received from former Congressman Gingrich regarding a new approach to vaccine manufacturing, namely using nanotechnology (TAB A). Nanotechnology is a tool that has received increased focus from the Federal government, academia and industry.
- Providing safe and effective medical countermeasures has been historically a lengthy process, often taking as long as 7-12 years to achieve licensure at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars. I am eager for the Department of Defense to embrace new techniques and methodologies that result in licensed, improved products that protect the health of our Service members. While the current armamentarium of countermeasures is based on traditional development practices, the next generation of medical countermeasures should exploit novel techniques, including nanotechnology.
- The Department of Defense is part of the National Nanotechnology Initiative, a consortium of Federal agencies headed by the National Cancer Institute dedicated to coordinate efforts in nanoscale science, engineering and technologies. New classes of antimicrobials, toxin inhibitors and diagnostic devices could emerge from their research efforts that support a number of homeland security capabilities within the medical defense arena.
- The National Cancer Institute and the National Institute for Allergy and Infectious Disease, both agencies of the Department of Health and Human Services, have operations at the Fort Detrick, Maryland campus, co-located with the Army's institute for infectious disease. A strong and growing partnership is emerging among these Federal partners. This campus should be considered as the cornerstone of our national biodefense effort.
- Another interagency group, the White House-established Weapons of Mass Destruction Medical Countermeasures Subcommittee, could take maturing and promising nanotechnology medical products and direct funding for their

TSA SD	6/22/04
SRM SD 092	5/28/04
MA SD	N 6/30
EXEC SEC	6/21/04

11-L-0559/OSD/42332

procurement through initiatives such as Project Bioshield. I serve as co-chair of this group, along with counterparts from the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Homeland Security.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: COL Carr, Medical CBRN Defense,
66064,66299

(b)(6)

PCDOCS

11-L-0559/OSD/42333

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

From: ThirdwaveP@aol.com
Sent: Sunday, November 23, 2003 5:55 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: a new approach to vaccine manufacturing-newt

from newt
11/23/03

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we should develop a nanoscale approach thinking of a vaccine as a materials assembling problem rather than growing biologicals in eggs in the traditional way.

the ultimate threat of an engineered biological for which we have no vaccine (imagine an engineered flu so quarantining is not a possibility) requires something much more powerful and realtime than any biologically developed system

DARPA NSF and NIH should create a collaboration with three or four competing teams working to develop a solution at the nano level that could be scaled up to literally manufacture a vaccine.

this may seem too far out but it is no further than much of what the labs produced in world war two compared to capabilities at the beginning of the war.

11/24/2003

11-L-0559/OSD/42334

New Approach to Vaccine Manufacturing from Newt Gingrich

COORDINATION

CoS, HA

COL Tom Kurlmel

Concurred, 6/17/04

USD (P&R)

Dr. David S.C. Chu

David S.C. Chu
18 June 04



SECRET
2004 JUN 15 11:06

June 15, 2004
I-04/008105
EF-9878

TO: Peter Rodman
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: GWOT Paper

I got your memo with suggestions on my GWOT paper. Would you go ahead and edit the paper the way you think it ought to read, and give it back to me? Attached is the most recent version.

I would appreciate it if you could get it back to me by Thursday.

Thanks.

Attach.
6/14/04 What Are We Fighting? Is It a Global War on Terror?

DHR db
061504-3

.....
Please respond by 6/17/04

Sir,
Response attached.
vr / *CDR Nosinger*
6/17
Out 6/18

OSD 09262-04

15-35-34 15:33 IN

June 23, 2004

TO: Jay Garner
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Suggestions for Iraq

Attached are some more responses to the questions you raised on Iraq. Thanks so much.

Regards,

Attach.
6/21/04 CICS memo to SecDef [OSD 09337-04]

DHR:dh
062304-14

OSD 09337-04

11-0559

062304



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999
INFO MEMO

CM-1851-04
21 June 2004

004 6/23

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

70341 6/21

SUBJECT: Suggestions for Iraq

- **Issue.** "Which of these suggestions do you think we are not doing that we ought to be doing? Let's get going on them." (TAB)
- **Conclusion.** Many of the suggestions made by LTG(R) Jay Garner are currently being addressed.
- **Discussion**
 - Training for the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) is accelerated to achieve initial operation capability for one division in June 2004. IAF will consist of 9 brigades of 27 battalions by December 2004. Coalition mentors will be embedded in the IAF formations.
 - The Office of Security Transition led by LTG Petraeus now has responsibility for assisting the Iraqi Ministry of Defense.
 - Contractors will provide individual and collective skills training at the Kirkush Military Training Base for IAF trainees.
 - USCENTCOM is considering incorporating Peshmerga elements into the Iraqi Security Forces.
 - The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) organized grievance cells at the governorate level and determined that the system worked best at the local level.
 - Not later than 30 June 2004, the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) will assume authority for Iraqi sovereignty. The IIG will prepare for elections to a National Assembly by January 2005. The Transitional Administrative Law mandates that the Iraqi Transitional Government submit the draft permanent constitution for general referendum by October 2005.
 - The Iraqi Governing Council did not create a business development committee because CPA Order 64 allowed any Iraqi or foreign person to establish or own a company in Iraq.
 - Sister Cities International, a nonprofit organization, informed CPA that three US cities are in the process of setting up sister city relationships with Iraq. Three to five additional cities are interested in humanitarian efforts for Iraq. USAID Higher Education and Development Program awarded \$20.7 million in five grants for university partnerships between US and Iraqi universities.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: Lieutenant General Walter L. Sharp, USA, DJ-5; (b)(6)

0 SD 0 9337 - 04

TSA SD	<i>X</i>
SRMA SD	<i>CE/2</i>
MA SD	
EXEC SEC	<i>WLS/2</i>

11-L-0559/OSD/42338

***** -IND. XMT JOURNAL- ***** DATE JUN-24-2004 ***** TIME 14:35 *****

DATE/TIME = JUN-24-2004 14:53

JOURNAL No. = 25

COMM. RESULT = OK

PAGE(S) = 003

DURATION = 00:00:58

FILE No. =

MODE = TRANSMISSION

DESTINATION = (b)(6)

RECEIVED ID = (b)(6)

RESOLUTION = STD

-CORRES DIRECTIVES -

***** -UNCLASS SECTION - *****

(b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

June 21, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DoD Directives

Thanks for your memo on the status of DoD Directives. Are there units that are lagging on getting this work done?

Do you think we ought to establish a directive that requires that these directives be reviewed every two or three years?

Thanks.

Attach.

6/14/04 DuBois memo to SD re: Review of DoD Directives Status **Report** [OSD 08556-04]

DHR:dh
062104-10

.....
Please respond by 7/9/04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/42340

OSD 09417-04

7,400



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

104 JUN 14 PM 5:03

WASHINGTON, DC 20301

June 14, 2004 12:42 PM

INFO MEMO

Administration & Management

Paul Butler
4/18

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: RAYMOND F. DuBOIS, DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

Ray DuBois

SUBJECT: Review of DoD Directives Status Report

D. Raven
in (1) years
MA&M/AMOL

- Of a total of 653 DoD Directives, 388 were identified for revision or cancellation. Tab A shows their current status.
- Of the 388 Directives, 43% either have been approved or are in formal staffing.
 - 167 have been submitted for cancellation or revision (123 for revision, 44 for cancellation).
 - Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz has approved 48 of the 167 directives submitted.
- The above numbers reflect *only* the Directives either complete or in *formal* coordination.
 - For example, the attached status chart at Tab A indicates that USD(Policy) has only submitted two of its 51 Directives identified for revision. However, 19 additional Directives are drafted and in internal Policy coordination (Tab B). USD(AT&L) has submitted 29 of its 50 Directives for revision, with 16 of the remaining 21 currently in draft or internal coordination (Tab C). Progress also is evident in other components.
 - The same chart shows that DA&M has identified 45 Directives for revision, but 39 of these are Charter Directives, which require full and timely participation from Principal Staff Assistants and Components.
- Following the SecDef's February 13, 2004 memo expressing disappointment at the pace of this effort (Tab D), the weekly submission rate increased by over 60%.
- With regard to the OSD Review of Joint Staff Directives, a copy of Ryan Henry's April 8, 2004 memorandum to the Secretary is at Tab E.

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Mr. Dan Cragg, ES&CD, (b)(6)

TSA SD	6/17 AMO
SRMA SD	
MA SD	6/17 N
EXEC SEC	6/15

OSD 08856-04

**REVIEW OF DIRECTIVES
PROGRESS REPORT
FOR WEEK ENDING
6/4/04**

COMPONENT	NUMBER OF DIRECTIVES	CERTIFIED CURRENT	REVISIONS		CANCELLATIONS		SIGNED	
			Reported*	Submitted	Reported*	Submitted	Revisions	Cancellations
USD(AT&L)	113	38	50	29	25	22	10	5
USD(P)	64	11	51	2	2	0	0	0
USD(P&R)	193	103	79	41	11	5	13	3
USD(C)	15	9	6	5	0	0	0	0
USD(I)	58	8	45	8	5	3	0	2
ASD(NII)	40	19	12	5	9	8	1	3
ASD(PA)	14	11	3	3	0	0	0	0
ASD(LA)	3	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
DPA&E	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
IG, DoD	14	7	7	6	0	0	2	0
GC, DoD	36	19	16	9	1	0	4	0
DA&M	86	31	45**	7	10**	6	2	1
WHS/B&F	2	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
WHS/C&D	2	0	2	2	0	0	0	0
WHS/DPO	2	0	2	2	0	0	0	0
WHS/FOIA	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
WHS/FV	2	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
WHS/P&S								
TOTALS:	653	265	325	123	63	44	34	14

* Number identified by each Component in response to Mr. DuBois' memo of October 29, 2003.

** Of the 45 DA&M Directives identified for revision, 39 are charter Directives; 9 of the 10 cancellations are also charters. While DA&M is the agent for updating, coordinating, and maintaining these Directives, processing updates is a participatory endeavor and cannot be completed without full and timely input from the concerned PSAs and Component Heads.

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS	RESPONSE DATE	DATE RECEIVED IN D&RD	DATE OF NEW DIRECTIVE	NEXT REVIEW DATE
SOLIC											
U	2205.2	HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE (HCA) PROVIDED IN CONJUNCTION WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS	10/6/1994		X		SOLIC/HA&APL Policy estimated completion 6-8 wks, working w/DSCA. Per SOLIC about 60% completed, estimate 3wks to finish revision and another 3-4 for final coordination. POC: Todd Harvey (b)(6)	11/21/2003			
C	4500.51	DOD NON-TACTICAL ARMORED VEHICLE POLICY (U)	5/4/1987		X		SOLIC/AT Draft is 10% completed, working w/J34, estimated draft completion 15 Aug 04. Antiterrorism Standards (2000.16) must be completed before this directive can be updated. POC: COL Tennison (b)(6)	11/21/2003			
U	5100.46	FOREIGN DISASTER RELIEF	12/4/1975		X		SOLIC/HA&APL Policy estimated completion 6-8 wks, working w/DSCA. Per SOLIC about 40% completed, estimate 4-5 wks to finish revision and another 3-4 wks for final coordination.	11/21/2003			
PDUSD(P)											
U	2002.3	CLEARANCE OF RESEARCH AND STUDIES WITH FOREIGN AFFAIRS IMPLICATIONS	11/17/1997		X		PDUSDP/OM&S/MS&F (Ed Rader). Contacted Gwen Simpson @ State	1/21/2003			
U	2040.2	INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS OF TECHNOLOGY, GOODS, SERVICES, AND MUNITIONS	7/5/1985		X		ISP/TSP&CP/DTSA per Chester under revision				
U	2060.2	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COUNTERPROLIFERATION (CP) IMPLEMENTATION	8/8/1972		X		ISP/TSP&CP under revision	11/21/2003			
U	3100.1	SPACE POLICY	7/9/1999		X		ISP/FP COL TROTTER on HOLD pending issuance of NSPD in 2005				
	3230.3	DOD SUPPORT FOR COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH ACTIVITIES	3/7/1988		X		ISP/FP COL TROTTER on HOLD pending issuance of NSPD in 2005				
	5230.20	VISITS, ASSIGNMENTS, AND EXCHANGES OF FOREIGN NATIONALS	11/16/1983		X		ISP/TSP&CP - Pete Batter (b)(6) under revision	1/21/2003			
	6205.3	DOD IMMUNIZATION PROGRAM FOR BIOLOGICAL WARFARE DEFENSE			X		ISP/TSP&CPP under revision	11/21/2003			
	3020.36	ASSIGNMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (NSEP) RESPONSIBILITIES TO DOD COMPONENTS	1/15/1993		X		HD- under revision. POC: Donna Reuss/Chuck Adams (b)(6)	1/21/2003			

Proponent Responsibility: USD(P)

TAB B

Proponent Responsibility:USD(P)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS	RESPONSE DATE	DATE RECEIVED IN DBRD	DATE OF NEW DIRECTIVE	NEXT REVIEW DATE
U	3025.1	MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES (MSCA)	2/4/1994		X		Per Walter Washabaugh, directive will be incorporated into the new Defense Support of Civil Authorities directive.	11/21/2003			
U	3025.12	MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR CIVIL DISTURBANCES (MACDIS)	2/18/1997		X		Per Walter Washabaugh, directive will be included in the new Defense Support of Civil Authorities directive.	11/21/2003			
U	3025.15	MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES	7/9/1999		X		Per Walter Washabaugh, directive will be included in the new Defense Support of Civil Authorities directive.	11/21/2003			
U	5030.46	ASSISTANCE TO THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT IN COMBATING CRIME	4/13/1972		X		Per HD, will be included in the new Defense Support of Civil Authorities combatting crime directive.	11/21/2003			
U	5030.50	EMPLOYMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICES	12/4/1975		X		Per HD, will be included in the new Defense Support of Civil Authorities support of US Postal Services.	11/21/2003			
[REDACTED]											
I	2140.5	DEFENSE INSTITUTE OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT (DISAM)	6/2/1993		X		ISA/DSCA under revision 3d Qtr. POC: Freda Lodge (b)(6)	11/21/2003			
	2310.1	DOD PROGRAMS FOR ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR (POW) AND OTHER DETAINEES (SHORT TITLE: DOD ENEMY POW DETAINEE PROGRAM)	8/18/1994		X		ISA/DPMO POC LTC Dan Shea (b)(6) under revision.				
U	5410.17	INFORMATIONAL PROGRAM FOR FOREIGN MILITARY TRAINEES IN THE UNITED STATES	11/26/1993		X		ISA/DSCA - Forwarded to LTG Walters to sign coordination sheet. Should be completed 3d Qtr 04 POC Dawn Bulke (b)(6)	11/21/2003			

Proponent Responsibility:USD(P)

11-L-0559/OSD/42344

Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR REVISED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS	RESPONSE DATE	DATE RECEIVED IN DBRD	DATE OF NEW DIRECTIVE	NEXT REVIEW DATE
U	1315.6	RESPONSIBILITIES FOR MILITARY TROOP CONSTRUCTION SUPPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE OVERSEAS	8/26/1978 8/26/1978		X		INFORMALLY COORDINATED	12/1/2003			
U	2010.5	DOD PARTICIPATION IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM	6/24/1992 6/24/1992		X		REDRAFTED	11/24/2003			
U	3201.1	MANAGEMENT OF DOD RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT LABORATORIES	3/9/1981		X		REDRAFTED	12/1/2003			
U	3204.1	INDEPENDENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R&D) AND BID AND PROPOSAL (B&P) PROGRAM	5/10/1999		X		REDRAFTED	12/1/2003			
U	3222.4	ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW) AND COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE (C2W) COUNTERMEASURES	1/28/1994		X		REDRAFTED	11/24/2003			
U	3224.3	PHYSICAL SECURITY EQUIPMENT (PSE): ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TESTING, EVALUATION, PRODUCTION, PROCUREMENT, DEPLOYMENT, AND SUPPORT	2/17/1989		X		REDRAFTED	12/1/2003			
U	4100.15	COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PROGRAM	3/10/1989		X		REDRAFTED	11/24/2003			
U	4120.1.1	STANDARDIZATION OF MOBILE ELECTRIC POWER (MEP) GENERATING SOURCES	7/9/1993		X		REDRAFTED	12/8/2003			
U	4120.15	DESIGNATING AND NAMING MILITARY AEROSPACE VEHICLES	5/2/1985		X		REDRAFTED	12/8/2003			
U	4270.5	MILITARY CONSTRUCTION RESPONSIBILITIES	3/2/1982		X		REDRAFTED	11/24/2003			
U	4510.11	DOD TRANSPORTATION ENGINEERING	10/2/1995		X		REDRAFTED	11/21/2003			
U	4525.6	SINGLE MANAGER FOR MILITARY POSTAL SERVICE	5/5/1980		X		INFORMALLY COORDINATED	11/21/2003			
U	4700.3	MINERAL EXPLORATION AND EXTRACTION ON DOD LANDS	9/28/1983		X		INFORMALLY COORDINATED	12/8/2003			
U	4715.1	ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY	2/24/1996		X		REDRAFTED	11/24/2003			

Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)

TAB C

11-L-0559/OSD/42345

Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)

CL	NUMBER	DIRECTIVE TITLE	DATE LAST PUBLISHED, CHANGED OR RMSED	CURRENT	REVISE	CANCEL	REMARKS	RESPONSE DATE	DATE RECEIVED IN D&RD	DATE OF NEW DIRECTIVE	NEXT REVIEW DATE
U	5000.52	DEFENSE ACQUISITION EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND CAREER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM	10/25/1991		X		REDRAFTED	11/24/2003			
U	5134.5	DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY BOARD (DTB)	10/28/1992		X		REDRAFTED	12/8/2003			

Proponent Responsibility: USD(AT&L)

11-L-0559/OSD/42346



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

FEE 13 2004

MEMORANDUM **FOR** UNDER SECRETARIES **OF** DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST **AND** EVALUATION
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT **OF**
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS **AND** **EVALUATION**

SUBJECT: Review of DoD Directives

More than two months ago the Director, Administration and Management responded to concerns I have about the currency of DoD Directives and asked each of you to review those under your purview. You identified **384** Directives **that** you intend to revise or cancel. I expect these actions to be completed by **April 1, 2004**. I understand that, to date very few revisions or cancellations have been prepared.

Our policy directives must be kept updated to reflect **our** approach to meeting the ever changing national security environment or they are simply of no use. Therefore, I expect you to personally review all of the directives you earmarked **for** revision or cancellation and ensure those proposed updates be coordinated expeditiously.



11-L-0559/OSD/42347

OSD 01776-04

TAB D

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef _____

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

I-04/002818
EF-8656

FROM: Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *Henry* APR 8 2004
SUBJECT: OSD Review of Joint Staff Directives

- This responds to your question about the desirability of an OSD review of Joint Staff Directives. .
- The chairman transmits policy, procedures and guidance through CJCS instructions, manuals, notices, guides, handbooks, and pamphlets. Although not currently required by DoD Directive, a recent Joint Staff data call indicated that about two-thirds of these documents were coordinated with OSD prior to publication.
- As the Chairman mentioned to you, there is an ongoing effort to update CJCS publications, analogous to the OSD endeavor. Along those lines, Joint Doctrine Publications are staffed with OSD at the action officer level during the update process.
- There is a broad effort underway to update JCS and OSD instructions to reflect the post-9/11 environment and the transformation vision as it applies to existing capabilities.
 - o CJCS publications that apply to the Services, combatant commands, and Defense agencies are required to be formally coordinated with those organizations during update/revision.
- I believe that the formal and informal staff coordination that occurs throughout the review process provides requisite OSD visibility and oversight over Joint Staff publications.

Attachments: As stated

Prepared by: Pam Mircelson, WHS/Executive Services and Directives, (b)(6)
Steven Netisben, OPDUSD(P), (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Policy Info Memo Template
TAB E

In reply refer to EF-8656 & 04/002818-ES

4:05 AM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

DATE February 24,2004

SUBJECT: Directives

Attached is a memo I sent to Dick Myers and his response.

I wonder if we ought to think about having OSD review the Joint Staff Directives.

If so, who do you think ought to do it?

Thanks.

DHR/mzn
0202404.0123

Attach: Info Memo from Gen. Myers to SD 2/23/04 Re: Directives

Please respond by: 3/5

01-03-04 15:11 IN



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20316-0000

INFO MEMO

CM-1546-04

23 February 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RM/2/21*

DSD
Forward

SUBJECT: Directives

- **Question.** "Where do we stand on getting all of the Joint Staff and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs' directives reviewed and updated to reflect where we are today?"
- **Answer.** From January through March 2003, the Joint Staff conducted a special review of all 263 CJCS instructions and manuals to address the impact of organizational and policy changes. A total of 179 directives were identified for revision or cancellation action. To date, 127 (71 percent) of these actions are complete. Actions on the remaining 52 (29 percent) are scheduled for completion by May 2004.
- **Analysis.** The special review encompassed all CJCS directives, including those already undergoing a regularly scheduled assessment at the time. My staff continues to manage this regular scheduling system to keep guidance current, while monitoring the remaining out-of-cycle updates.

COORDINATION NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: MG Michael D. Maples, USA; Vice Director, Joint Staff;

(b)(6)

3

OSD 02613-04

12/17/00

720

In reply refer to EF-8406 & 04/001637-ES

February 8, 2004

~~Burns~~
2/18

TO SD

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Troops from India

Shouldn't we be trying to get India to send troops?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-33 (to computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 3/1/04

✓
2/19

Sir,
Response attached.
vr/CDR Nosy
2/19

India

8 Feb 04

OSD 09424-04

09-02-04 11:31 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/42351

rec'd 7/22 @ 2:30

July 27, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DK*
SUBJECT: Response to Congressman Wolf

IRAAQ

Did we ever answer this June 22 letter from Frank Wolf?

Thanks.

Attach.
6/22/04 Wolf ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
072704-7

.....
Please respond by 8/6/04

27 Jul 04

22 Jun 04

FRANK R. WOLF
10TH DISTRICT, VIRGINIA

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

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AND INDEPENDENT AGENCIES

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SECRET

2004 JUN 22 09:52

261 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
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(202) 225-4138

13873 PARK CENTER ROAD
SUITE 130
HERNDON, VA 20171
(703) 709-5800
(800) 945-8653 (IN STATE)

110 NORTH CAMDEN STREET
WINCHESTER, VA 22601
(540) 867-0800
(800) 650-3463 (IN STATE)

www.house.gov/wolf

Congress of the United States House of Representatives

June 22, 2004

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary, Department of Defense
The Pentagon Room 3E 880
Washington DC 20301

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

I want to share with you a copy of a letter I sent to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice asking that a Team B be quickly assembled to travel to Iraq, comprehensively review military operations there and report back to you, the president, the secretary of State and her.

As the handover of Iraq approach, I feel strongly that fresh eyes on the target could provide invaluable assistance to the administration in fighting the war on terrorism and securing a free Iraq.

Best wishes.

Sincerely,

Frank R. Wolf
Member of Congress

FRW:ses

ANYONE WITH A FAMILY
MEMBER SERVING IN IRAQ WOULD
THINK THAT THIS IS A GOOD THING
TO DO. IT WOULD SERVE THE
COUNTRY WELL. THANK YOU

OSD 09425-04

FRANK R. WOLF
10TH DISTRICT, VIRGINIA

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

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**TRANSPORTATION, TREASURY
AND INDEPENDENT AGENCIES**

**CO-CHAIR—CONGRESSIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS CAUCUS**



Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

June 17, 2004

241 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
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13673 PARK CENTER ROAD
SUITE 130
HERNDON, VA 20171
(703) 702-5800
(800) 945-9053 (IN STATE)

110 NORTH CAMERO IN STREET
WINCHESTER, VA 22601
(540) 867-0950
(800) 850-3463 (IN STATE)

www.house.gov/wolf

Ms. Condokezza Rice
National Security Adviser
1600 Pennsylvania Ave NW
Washington DC 20500

Dear Ms. Rice:

I write today to **thank you** for our recent meeting and again to reiterate my continuing **concern** about ensuring our nation's **success** in our operations in Iraq. As we discussed, I believe it is time for "**fresh eyes on the target**" to assist the administration in the ultimate goal of winning the **war** on terrorism and keeping America safe and secure.

The **success** of our efforts in Iraq are critical to the **war** against terrorism, and we must do everything possible to provide for **the** safety and **security** of our service personnel in **Iraq** who are on the front lines of **this** war. We must act quickly, however, as the transition to Iraqi self-government is approaching.

Needing the admonition in Proverbs – "for waging **war** you need guidance, and for **victory** many advisers," I recommend that the president quickly assemble a "**Team B**" for Haq composed of persons with distinguished records of service to the country. The **Team B** concept **has been** successful in previous administrations when **fresh eyes** were needed to give the commander-in-chief **objective** information. President Reagan had a **Team B** to fight communism.

Team B's mission would be to travel to Iraq to comprehensively review military operations from the north to the **south** and report **back** directly to the president about **its** findings. But it must be on the ground in Iraq soon as the handover of sovereignty to Iraq takes effect on June 30.

Team B would be formed to bring "fresh eyes" to our operations in Iraq and provide experienced counsel and advice to the president, to **you** and to the secretary of **Defense** as well as the secretary of State on how to reach the objective of stabilizing the country and quelling the **violence**, putting in place an Iraq **security** plan and a successful exit strategy, and **ensuring** self-government for the **Iraqi people**. For this operation to be successful, however, **the** president **must** personally direct the Department of **Defense** to cooperate fully with **Team B** and **its** mission,


Ms. Condoleezza Rice
June 17, 2004

Page 2

I am recommending in the enclosed list *the* names of several individuals with distinguished records of service to our country who could ably serve as Team B members. Of course, there are many more who would be similarly qualified for such an undertaking.

I ask you to take this action immediately. America and the world need the leadership and bold action of our president.

Sincerely,

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Frank R. Wolf', written over the typed name.

Frank R. Wolf
Member of Congress

FRW:jjj
enclosure

THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT

Thank You

Suggested Names for Team B

General Charles C. Krulak

Served as Commander of Marine Forces **Pacific** and 31st Commandant of **the** Marine **Corps**,

General John R. Galvin

Served as 'NATO **Supreme Allied Commander for Europe**, Commander-in-Chief of US. **Army, Navy and Air Forces in Europe**, and Ambassador during negotiations with Bosnia.

Robert M. Gates

Served as **Assistant** to the President and **Deputy National Security Adviser** from **1989-1991** and as Director of the CIA from 1991-1993,

John O. Marsh, Jr.

Longest serving Secretary of the **Army**. Served as Counselor to President **Ford** and as a representative in the House of Representatives. **Two sons in the** military, **one** served in Desert Storm, another **with Delta Force** in **Somalia**.

General Eric K. Shinseki

Served as Commanding General of US **Army Europe**, Commander of **Allied Land Forces Central Europe**, Coinmander NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 28th **Army Vice Chief of Staff** and 34* **Army Chief of Staff**.

General Gary Edward Luck

Served as Commander-in-Chief of United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command and Commander of the United **States Forces Korea**.

General Paul Gorman

Served as Commander-in-Chief of **the** United States Southern **Command**,

General Edward Charles ("Shy") Meyer

Served as **Chief of Staff** of the United States **Army**.

General John W. Foss

Served as **Army Chief of Infantry** and **Commanding General** for Training and Doctrine Command.

Brigadier General Terry Paul

Served as the **Marine Liaison Officer** in the U.S. **Senate** starting in **the** summer of 1989.

7/29
1600



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

July 29, 2004 1:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflake # 072704-7 regarding Response to
Congressman Wolf

333

Congressman Wolf wrote to you on June 22, 2004. You responded on July 2,
2004. Copies of the correspondence are attached.

Attachments:
As stated

Handwritten notes:
6/17
Exec Sec
I would
be drafting a
response. Perhaps for
Congress
Def Sec 5/9 - Jack
Please
D, R

LAITY DI
8/1/8

18 Aug 04

OSD 09425-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42357

220404

no



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

July 2, 2004

The Honorable Frank R. Wolf
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Wolf:

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter to Dr. Rice suggesting the creation of a "Team B" to assess the status of operations in Iraq.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

OSD 09425-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42358

1/20/04

2 Jul 04

7/29
1600



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

July 29, 2004 1:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

Powell A. Moore
IRAQ

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As stated

*SLH
7/29/04*
*I would
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Congressman
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Def Sec
Please
see
back
D.H.K.*
LAWY DI FILE
8/1/8

2974104

2974104

OSD 09425-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42359

FRANK R. WOLF
10TH DISTRICT, VIRGINIA



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TRANSPORTATION-TREASURY
AND INDEPENDENT AGENCIES

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

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WINCHESTER, VA 22601
(540) 867-0990
(800) 650-3463 (IN STATE)

CO-CHAIR—CONGRESSIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS CAUCUS

June 22, 2004

www.house.gov/wolf

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary, Department of Defense
The Pentagon Room 3E 880
Washington DC 20301

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:

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Member of Congress

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OSD 09425-04

FRANK R. WOLF

10TH DISTRICT, VIRGINIA

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

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INDEPENDENT TREASURY

CO-CHAIR—CONGRESSIONAL

HUMAN RIGHTS CAUCUS



Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

June 17, 2004

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13875 PARK CENTER ROAD
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(800) 945-9653 (IN STATE)

110 NORTH CAMERON STREET
WINCHESTER, VA 22601
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www.house.gov/wolf

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National Security Adviser
1600 Pennsylvania Ave NW
Washington DC 20500

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
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Ms. Condoleezza **Rice**
June 17, 2004
Page 2

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Frank R. Wolf
Member of Congress

FRW:jjjs
enclosure

THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT

Thank You

00/22/04, 16:01 PAA 0007/000

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Brigadier General Terry Paul

Served as the Marine Liaison Officer in the U.S. Senate starting in the summer of 1989.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

1/20/04

| July 2, 2004

The Honorable Frank R. Wolf
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Wolf:

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter to Dr. Rice suggesting the creation of a "Team B" to assess the status of operations in Iraq.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

2 Jul 04

USD 09425-04



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

8/29
OK
T.M.T.
July 14, 2004
Ab further
action required
I assume
J. A. H.

The Honorable Frank R. Wolf
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Representative Wolf:

I received a copy of your letter to Dr. Rice recommending a "Team B" to assess operations in Iraq. The transition to Iraqi sovereignty has now occurred, and our military operations there remain under constant and regular review by the Combatant Commander and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General George Casey, the new commander of Multinational Force-Iraq, and Lieutenant General Dave Petraeus, the new chief of the Office of Security Transition-Iraq, have just assumed their new positions and are taking a fundamental look at our military strategy for Iraq with a particular strong focus on how we can assist the development of Iraqi security forces. They're doing this in parallel with the new government of Iraq, which is undertaking some important new directions in the strategy for fighting what Prime Minister Allawi correctly calls "the evil enemy."

We've sent a number of assessment teams to Iraq at various junctures to provide what you correctly call "fresh eyes" to particular problems and would be prepared to do so again. However, I think right now the fresh eyes are being provided by the commanders and we should let them develop their plans. Moreover, I believe this kind of critical look is most successful when it is adopted and embraced by the commanders in the field—who operate under already challenging conditions—than when it appears to be outsiders writing a report card.

I appreciate your continued interest and support and would welcome the opportunity to discuss this with you.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



July 14, 2004

The Honorable Frank R. Wolf
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

OK to SOM

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11-L-0559/OSD/42366

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I appreciate your continued interest and support and would welcome the opportunity to discuss this with you.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

June 22, 2004

TO: Dr. William Schneider
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Admiral Ellis

Admiral Jim Ellis is one of the brightest people I have run across. He is retiring as
Combatant Commander at STRATCOM.

Is he an appropriate person for the Defense Science Board?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062104-23

.....
Please respond by _____

334 DSB

42 Jun 04

OSD 09427-04



7201
2004 JUN 23 12:00
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1 100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

INFO MEMO

June 23, 2004, 2:00 PM

COMPTROLLER

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Lawrence J. Lanzillo *L. Lanzillo*

SUBJECT: What Authorities We Should Ask For

- The Deputy Secretary asked for my comments on Mike Wynne's proposals to waive certain regulations (including color of money rules). While it is too late in the congressional cycle to seek expanded authorities regarding the color of money rules, we will pursue additional flexibility during the next cycle.
- Funds appropriated by the Congress are legally available to the Department only for the purposes for which they were appropriated. We follow established reprogramming procedures (prior approval) when we change the purpose for which funding has been provided.
- When we submit supplementals, we often ask for funds in transfer accounts to maximize our flexibility. Funding can then be provided quickly. The \$25 billion supplemental before the Congress contains such an account.
- Another approach that increases our flexibility is to increase the use of broadly defined line items, such as the Quick Reaction Special Projects program. This line item provides innovative solutions to the warfighter, and we should work to increase its funding.
- Mike suggests that the Services be required to identify \$50 million of "carryover" funding to be set aside for unknown emergent requirements of the warfighters.
- There will be programmatic impact to identify these offsets since "carryover" funding is not excess to requirements. I will work with the Services and the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics on identifying funding for additional emergent requirements.
- The Services have already financed more than \$3 billion of emergent requirements in fiscal year 2004 and are working with the Combatant Commanders on a daily basis to address their needs. We will continue to work with them to ensure that the warfighters' highest priority, executable requirements are funded.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: John P. Roth, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/42369

OSD 09449-04

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Military Assistant

28 May 2004 - 1945 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. WYNNE, ACTING USD / AT&L

SUBJECT: What Authorities We Should Ask For


Sir:

The Deputy Secretary **has** reviewed the attached 27May04 1200memo **for** SecDef and returns with the following comments:

“This should get a chop or a comment **from** USD(C), LA and GC.
It should move quickly. If the above offices have conflicting
views, just state them clearly and let SecDef decide. PW”

Thank you.

Very respectfully,



Stephen T. Ganyard
Colonel, USMC
Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachment:
As stated

Suspense: Friday, 4 June 2004



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

1614
5/27/04
STG

ACTION MEMO

May 27, 2004, 12:00pm

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: Michael W. Wynne, Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics)



SUBJECT: What Authorities We Should Ask For

You asked, in a snowflake, about what authorities we should ask for to better serve the deployed warfighter. Congress has given us tremendous authority and flexibility but too often we are reluctant to use that authority and flexibility — we desire “top cover” to do something different. Criticism comes too easily, even given the flexibilities allowed. Hence, I suggest you reinforce through “delegation” to the Vice Chiefs of Staff of the Services and to Director, Defense Research and Engineering the authority to waive any non-statutory regulation, requirement, or policy in support of quick reaction requests of the deployed warfighter, if the request comes from, or supports tactical operations of, deployed organizations, such as the Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF 7) and CJTF 180. The waiver authority would include:

1. Communications Waivers, including JTRS.
2. Requirements Waivers, including the process required by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.
3. Acquisition Waivers, including the process required by DoD Directive 5000.
4. Testing Waivers, especially for Commercial and Modified Commercial Products, including safety testing: any/all non-statutory testing can be devolved to the area of responsibility.
5. Procurement Waivers and Flexibilities, including using current flexibilities to bring innovative solutions to the deployed warfighters’ needs. Examples include use of urgent and compelling need, sole source justification, small business set aside, and commercial products procurement.



11-L-0559/OSD/42371

6. Color of Money Restrictions, including financial management regulations.

In addition, I recommend you direct the Service FMs to provide carryover funds, initially up to \$50M, to support the deployed warfighters' needs at the end of the fiscal year.

If you agree, I will take the lead within OSD and the Joint Staff and Services to make these changes happen.

RECOMMENDATION: That the Secretary of Defense approve or disapprove by initialing: Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Prepared by: Dr. Nancy Spruill, (b)(6)

SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL

Print Date: 6/23/2004

DOCUMENT TYPE: **INFO MEMO** ATTACHMENT:
OSD CONTROL **OSD 09449-04** DOC **6/23/2004** DOR **6/23/2004** SIGNATURECASE:
FROM **USC LANZILLOTA** TO **SECDEF**
SUBJECT **WHAT AUTHORITIES WE SHOULD ASK FOR**
KEYWORDS **COLOR OF MONEY RULES**
COMMENTS
FN SEC U OCN
REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
STATUS CODE DECISION DECISION DATE PRIORITY ACTION REPORT:
AGENCY ACTION ASSIGNED SUSPENSE DOC SUSPENSE:
SUSPENSE COMPLETE ACD COORDINATION
PAGES 1 ENCLOSURES 1 PACKAGE VIEW:
SUSPENSE STATUS INFO MEMO
FRONT OFFICE DOC

CREATED BY: **gordon**

DISTRIBUTION: OFFICE COPIES
ADC RWI
DSD RWI
ES OWI

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Military Assistant

28 May 2004 - 1945 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. WYNNE, ACTING USD / AT&L

SUBJECT: What Authorities We Should Ask For


Sir:

The Deputy Secretary has reviewed the attached 27May04 1200 memo for SecDef and returns with the following comments:

“This should get a chop or a comment from USD(C), LA and GC.
It should move quickly. If the above offices have conflicting
views, just state them clearly and let SecDef decide. PW”

Thank you.

Very respectfully,



Stephen T. Ganyard
Colonel, USMC
Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachment:
As stated

Response: Friday, 4 June 2004

0 SD 09449 - 04

11-L-0559/OSD/42374



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

1614
5/28
STG

ACTION MEMO

May 27, 2004, 12:00pm

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: Michael W. Wynne, Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics)



SUBJECT: What Authorities We Should Ask For

You asked, in a snowflake, about what authorities we should ask for to better serve the deployed warfighter. Congress has given us tremendous authority and flexibility but too often we are reluctant to use that authority and flexibility — we desire “top cover” to do something different. Criticism comes too easily, even given the flexibilities allowed. Hence, I suggest you reinforce through “delegation” to the Vice Chiefs of Staff of the Services and to Director, Defense Research and Engineering the authority to waive any non-statutory regulation, requirement, or policy in support of quick reaction requests of the deployed warfighter, if the request comes from, or supports tactical operations of, deployed organizations, such as the Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF 7) and CJTF 180. The waiver authority would include:

1. Communications Waivers, including JTRS.
2. Requirements Waivers, including the process required by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.
3. Acquisition Waivers, including the process required by DoD Directive 5000.
4. Testing Waivers, especially for Commercial and Modified Commercial Products, including safety testing: any/all non-statutory testing can be devolved to the area of responsibility.
5. Procurement Waivers and Flexibilities, including using current flexibilities to bring innovative solutions to the deployed warfighters' needs. Examples include use of urgent and compelling need, sole source justification, small business set aside, and commercial products procurement.



11-L-0559/OSD/42375

6. Color of Money Restrictions, including financial management regulations.

In addition, I recommend you direct the Service FMs to provide carryover funds, initially up to \$50M, to support the deployed warfighters' needs at the end of the fiscal year.

If you agree, I will take the lead within OSD and the Joint Staff and Services to make these changes happen.

RECOMMENDATION: That the Secretary of Defense approve or disapprove by initialing: Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Prepared by: Dr. Nancy Spruill (b)(6)

8:30 AM

TO: Jim Haynes
cc DOUG FEITH
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

DATE: February 25, 2004

SUBJECT:

I think we've got to go to Congress and ask for changes in legislation on their decision to cancel IME~~B~~ and FMC. Seems to me the one thing they ought never to cancel except in the most egregious circumstances is the educational exchange programs.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
022504.04

Please respond by: _____ 3/8 _____

OSD 09464-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42377

913

Dr. Johnson

12/18
1800

720

01/001623-05

EF-8400

February 8, 2004

TO: Mira Ricardel

CC: Doug Feith
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Invitation to Croatian PM

Croatian

How do we go ahead and push with State the idea of getting the Croatian Prime Minister an invitation to Washington?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-41 (ts computer).doc

Please respond by 20 Feb 04

FEB 18 2004

I RAISED THIS WITH DAN FRIED AT THE NSC. HE HAS NO OBJECTIONS, BUT SAYS HE HAS A LARGE PILE OF REQUESTS. TO MOVE THE CROATIAN REQUEST TO THE TOP WILL REQUIRE SECDEF OR DSD TO RAISE WITH CONDI RICE OR STEVE HADLEY.

OSD 09467-04

- MIRA

COMPLETED

*8 Feb 04
Cuz*

11-L-0559/OSD/42378

FEB 18 2004

8:10 PM

TO: Mira Ricardel
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: ~~February~~ ^{March 1} 26, 2004
SUBJECT: **Croatia**

Draft a memo from me on Croatia trying to get this moved to the top of the pile, please.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
022604.06

Please respond by: _____ 3 | 4 _____

Croatia

1 Mar 04

OSD 09468-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42379

2/18
1800

04/001623-ES

EF-8400

February 8, 2004

TO: Mira Ricardel
CC: Doug Feith
Paul Wolfowitz

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020604-41 (ts computer).doc

.....
Please respond by 20 Feb 04

FEB 18 2004

I RAISED THIS WITH DAN FRIED AT THE NSC. HE HAS NO OBJECTIONS, BUT SAYS HE HAS A LARGE PILE OF REQUESTS. TO MOVE THE CROATIAN REQUEST TO THE TOP WILL REQUIRE SECDEF OR DSD TO RAISE WITH CONDI RICE OR STEVE HADLEY.

- MIRA

OSD 09467-04
COMPLETED

Cyber

FEB 18 2004



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CH-1862-04
24 June 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 6/23*

SUBJECT: Seams

- **Issue.** "Let's discuss the problems of seams in the world. Seams between: Countries; AORs; Departments and Agencies; Existing authorities and existing walls; Policies. It might be worthwhile to think this through." (TAB)
- **Conclusion.** I concur in taking a broad look at seams, not only across geographic boundaries, but also within DOD. However, the greatest challenges are not seams within DOD, but those within the interagency. Fundamental interagency reform must be a high priority for the US government (USG). In this regard, a unique opportunity exists to leverage the next phase of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Study. CSIS is uniquely suited to assist in efforts to mitigate and eliminate seams across the USG; Phase Two of its charter should include this task.
- **Discussion.** Eliminating seams among combatant commands is evaluated continually at operational and strategic levels. Part of the assessment includes ongoing analysis of functional and geographic combatant commander responsibilities in the Unified Command Plan and alternative command structures better suited for 21st Century warfare. Additionally, the forthcoming Quadrennial Defense Review will provide an in-depth examination of functions, roles and missions of the Armed Forces.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

TO: Gen. **Dick** Myers
Gen. Pete Pace

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: **Seams**

Let's discuss the problem of seams in the world. Seams between:

-
-
- Departments and
- Existing authorities or existing
-

It might be worthwhile to **think** this through.

Thanks.

DHR:azn
060604E.03s

11-L-0559/OSD/42382



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CM-1862-04
24 June 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 6/23*

SUBJECT: Seams

- **Issue.** "Let's discuss the problems of seams in the world. Seams between: Countries; AORs; Departments and Agencies; Existing authorities and existing walls; Policies. It might be worthwhile to think this through." (TAB)
- **Conclusion.** I concur in taking a broad look at seams, not only across geographic boundaries, but also within DOD. However, the greatest challenges are not seams within DOD, but those within the interagency. Fundamental interagency reform must be a high priority for the US government (USG). In this regard, a unique opportunity exists to leverage the next phase of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Study. CSIS is uniquely suited to assist in efforts to mitigate and eliminate seams across the USG; Phase Two of its charter should include this task.
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COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; (b)(6)

OSD 09491-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42383

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: **Seams**

Let's discuss **the** problem of seams in the world. Seams between:

-
-
- Departments
- Existing authorities or
-

It might be worthwhile to **think** this through.

Thanks.

DJR/azn
060604E.03s

Please respond by: _____

6/21

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OFFICE OF
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2004 JUL 12 PM 1:27

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef

USD(P)

I-04/007812

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, PD Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

SUBJECT: Snowflake Response: Seams

- You asked the Chairman to address the issue of seams in the attached snowflake.
- In response, the Chairman suggests that we continue to examine seams in DOD. He also suggests leveraging CSIS's Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Study to address the greater challenge of interagency seams. I concur with the Chairman's recommendations.
- Andy Hoehn's effort on integrated global command structure, which was discussed at the 24-25 May Combatant Commanders' Conference, tackles many of the same issues.
- We will look to discuss this effort with you in the coming weeks.

Attachment: as stated

Prepared by: Lt Col Jim De Temple, OSD(P)/Strategy, (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/42385

06-07-04 13:06 IN

OSD 09491-04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CM-1862-04
24 June 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 6/25*

SUBJECT: Seams

- **Issue.** "Let's discuss the problems of seams in the world. Seams between: Countries; AORs; Departments and Agencies; Existing authorities and existing walls; Policies. It might be worthwhile to think *this* through." (TAB)
- **Conclusion.** I concur in taking a broad **look** at seams, not only across geographic boundaries, but also within DOD. However, the greatest challenges are not **seams** within DOD, but those within the interagency. Fundamental interagency **reform** must be a high priority for the US government (USG). In this regard, a unique opportunity exists to leverage the next phase of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Study. CSIS is uniquely suited to assist in efforts to mitigate and eliminate seams across the USG; Phase Two of its charter should include this task.
- **Discussion.** Eliminating seams among combatant commands is evaluated continually at operational and strategic levels. **Part** of the assessment includes ongoing analysis of functional and geographic combatant commander responsibilities in the Unified Command Plan and alternative command **structures better** suited for 21st **Century** warfare. Additionally, the forthcoming Quadrennial Defense Review will provide an **in-depth** examination of functions, **roles and** missions of the Armed Forces.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA; Director, J-S; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/42386

JUN 17 2004

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef _____
USD(P) *copy provided*
I-04/007812 *for [unclear]*
EF-9900

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, PD Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *Zimkey*

SUBJECT: Snowflake Response: Seams

- You raised the issue of seams in ~~the~~ attached snowflake.
- We believe seams can be divided into 3 broad categories: within DOD (includes ~~regions~~ and AORs), interagency, and coalition.
- Andy Hoehn's briefing on integrated global command structure, recently given at the Combatant ~~Commanders~~' Conference, addresses pieces of the first two areas.
 - We were scheduled to discuss this with you today but our meeting was postponed. ~~the [unclear]~~
- We also have thoughts on interagency and coalition matters, which we are developing as separate products.
- We will look to meet with you shortly.

Attachment: as stated

Prepared by: Lt Col Jim DeTemple, OSD(P)/Strategy (b)(6)

7/8
1030
Binolef - **FILE COPY**

INFORMATION RETENTION

PD

EF-9900
04/007812

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

~~Sec Del~~
DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: seams

Let's discuss the problem of seams in the world. Seams between:

- Countries;
- AORs;
- Departments
- Existing authorities or
-

It might be worthwhile to think this through.

Thanks.

DHR/mzm
060604E.03s

Please respond by: _____ 6/21 _____

COMPLETED

JUN 18 2004

11-L-0559/OSD/42388

INFORMATION RETENTION

09491-04

February 8, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Les Brownlee
Gen. Pete Schoomaker
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Senator Ensign

We might want to brief Senator Ensign on the Guard and Reserve when we brief Lindsey Graham.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-46 (1s computer).doc

4

Please respond by _____

3/6 @ 3/8
Response on last page.
D, R, H

~~Army Di File~~
3/8

OSD 09517-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42389

Army Di File
3/8

3/8

3/8 04

3/8
1400

72

February 8, 2004

TO: Les Brownlee
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
David Chu
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Senator Graham

I recall the questions I got from Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina in my hearing last week. Then I saw him in Munich at the Wehrkunde conference. He clearly needs time with the two of you. He is an officer in the National Guard. He is totally focused on the Guard and Reserve, mostly the Guard. I think he thinks much less about the active force, and I mentioned that to him. He wants to be helpful, but I think we are going to have to get him engaged and understanding what it is we are trying to do with the Guard and Reserve and rebalancing of the force.

Please have a session for him—maybe bring him down for lunch. I would be happy to participate. It is important that we focus on him. We can save ourselves a lot of problems down the road.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-37 (ts computer).doc

.....

Please respond by _____

OSD 03042-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42390



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

✓
3/9

March 4, 2004 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

Handwritten signature of Powell A. Moore

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflakes # 020804-46 and # 020804-37

- You asked about briefings for Senators Graham and Ensign on the Guard and Reserve and rebalancing of the force.
- Gen Schoomaker and Les Brownlee have scheduled two breakfasts with them (most recent was 24 Feb) and the Senators at the last minute cancelled both.
- We will continue to work with the Army to get the briefing to them.

Attachments:
SECDEF Snowflakes

OSD 03042-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42391

720

1041AM

TO: Paul Butler
Jim Haynes

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: February 25, 2004

SUBJECT: Kuwaiti Detainee @ **GTMO**

We want to get the name of the Kuwaiti detainee at GTMO to the government of Kuwait. Please work with Bill Luti on that.

We also want to think about whether or not we can transfer **some** of the Kuwaiti detainees at **GTMO** to Kuwait. The Prime Minister believes they have the legal authority to detain them. I question that, but **we** ought to look into it carefully.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
022504.a.06

Please respond by: _____ 3/5 _____

OSD 09518-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42392

3836

55-2004

10:41 AM

TO: Mira Ricardel
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: February 25, 2004
SUBJECT: **Kazak Meeting**

Would you please make sure that we have a reference to the private meeting that we had with the Kazaks in Marc Thiessen's POTUS memo and also a separate memo.

I made some notes if you need help on it, but I will leave it to you. You were busy making notes and I was busy talking.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
022504.a.04

Please respond by: _____

2/27

OSD 09519-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42393

KAZAKHSTAN

25 FEB 04

2/25

PM d Tokayer

3 in 2 -

1 Will fulfill all 6 months
due & in future

1 Put more
power.

2 Take all Dept
investigations -

3 Deep Green - investigate
why force in Sun Bank
Green + Brown -

John
Mr. H. H. - indictment - in New York
for Green Dept Law
before 4th - Do J. - Kgo
Used his influence -

Tell USA that Dept
concern

7201

4:05 AM

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: February 24, 2004

SUBJECT:

✓
3/4

You will recall they talked about the security force for the oil ministry, some 14,000 people. Let's find out if they are included in the site protection list.

Thanks.

Dray

DHR/azn
0202404.06ts

Please respond by: _____ *3/5*

SecDef -

As you heard at yesterday's meeting w/ Gen Abizaid, they are not counted in the totals we reflect.

Will get JS to footnote the charts to reflect all Ministry-hired FPS

24 MAR 04

11-L-0559/OSD/42395

OSD 09520-04

3/4

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: February 24, 2004

SUBJECT: **Police**

Do you remember who was going to do the mentoring of the police? They are now under the military but the military probably aren't the right people to do the mentoring, are they?

Thanks.

DHR/azn
0202404.05ts

3/5
Please respond by: _____

Jan F

OSD 09521-04

24 Feb 04

720

10:19 PM

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: February 21, 2004

SUBJECT: **Hospital in Kabul**

Let's keep trying to connect me with Bill Steiger. I want to find out what the heck is going on with that hospital in Kabul. In the meantime, call Winkenwerder and have him look into it and find out why it is falling apart like this.

Thanks.

DHR/uzn
022104.13ts

Please respond by: 2/23

OSD 09522-04 *6*

11-L-0559/OSD/42397

AFGHANISTAN

21 Feb 04

February 20, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Haiti

Haiti

Please sort through the Haiti issue for me and get back to me with respect to the responsibilities of the Department of State, the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
022004-20

Please respond by

2/25/04

*OB
3/2*

OSD 09523-04

20 Feb 04

11-L-0559/OSD/42398

February 21, 2004

TO: David Chu
c c : Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rurnsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Individual Ready Reserve

I am inclined to think we ought to begin tapping the Individual Ready Reserve for things like civil affairs and the like. What are your thoughts?

26

Thanks.

DHR:dh
022104-8

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 09524-04

01 Feb 04

720

10:19 PM

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

DATE: February 21, 2004

SUBJECT: **Briefing**

I probably ought to get briefed by Hadley or else have Wolfowitz or Feith brief me. Here's the note.

It is on the trip he made to Israel

Thanks.

DHR/azn
022104.05ts

Please respond by: 3/5

333

OSD 09525-04 8

21 Feb 04

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Senior Military Assistant

2/21

SecDef

- Steve Hadley called
- He is back from trip to Israel & meetings w/ Sharon
- has briefed the President on his trip
- is offering to brief you also upon return from your trip - future PC/NSC topic
- he will brief the Deputy & Doug Feith this coming week.

9

C

11-L-0559/OSD/42401

February 20, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA
SUBJECT: Foreign Troops

69

Please work with the Joint Staff to get more foreign troops engaged in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, and Bosnia to take our place.

In addition, we have to get more folks providing force protection and working in Kuwait, so we do not have to use so many of our folks. If people are looking for easier or less politically sensitive assignments, we can put them in the Kurdish area, put them in Kuwait, use them as force protection in the United States or in other countries, where we have forces to protect, or use them to help protect the UN when they go back into Iraq. We can find things that are less offensive or less sensitive from their standpoints. We need to have a person working this full-time, the way Dov has been tin-cupping the world for money. Please come back with a proposal.

If we leave DoD to its own devices, we will end up dipping into the taxpayers' money and using DoD military personnel because it is easier, they are there and it seems to be a bottomless pit—but it isn't, it can't be, and it shouldn't be.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
022004-26

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 09526-04

see Feb 04

2/23
1300

120

8:59 AM

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: February 10, 2004
SUBJECT: **Congress**

Larry Di Rita
3/11

I think we ought to be sure that every member of Congress gets this publication by the U.S. Agency for Int'l Development entitled "Mass Graves" either from State or from me, with a personal letter.

FRAQ

Thanks.

DHR/azn
021004.15

Attach: "Iraq's Legacy of Terror - Mass Graves" US Agency for Int'l Development

Please respond by:

_____ 2/25 ✓
2/29 3/2 C3/2

All has done so.
They are bringing it, too.

Larry Di Rita
3/1

OSD 09527-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42403

10 Feb 04

2/23
1300



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

February 20, 2004 6:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dan Stanley, Principal Deputy Secretary of Defense/
Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: SNOWFLAKE 021004.15, USAID PUBLICATION ON IRAQ'S
MASS GRAVES

- In the subject snowflake you mentioned that you thought every Member of Congress should get a copy of USAID's publication on Iraq's "Mass Graves."
- USAID informed us a hard and electronic copy of the publication was sent to every office on the Hill. Additionally, USAID has been briefing the publication at the various Policy Committee lunches.
- We also sent electronic copies to the Military Legislative Assistants encouraging them to take the time to read the article.
- USAID sent 25 copies to our office to distribute as we see fit. More are available on request.

(A)

Attachments:

1. Snowflake 021004.15.
2. Copy of USAID's publication "Iraq's Legacy of Terror - Mass Graves".

Prepared by: CDR Taylor Skardon, OSD/LA, Director Senate Affairs,

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/42404




Iraq's Legacy of Terror

MASS GRAVES

U.S. Agency for International Development

LOCATIONS OF FIRST MASS GRAVES DISCOVERED IN IRAQ



Mass Graves was edited by USAID Senior Writer Ben Barber with assistance from Stephen Epstein of USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives.

Cover: Iraqi search for relatives and friends among victims found in a mass grave in Musayyib, 75 kilometers southwest of Baghdad. The victims are thought to be from the 1991 uprising against the Iraqi government. The bodies, wrapped in linen shrouds, are being held in a makeshift morgue in a nearby youth center.

All photos by USAID/Thomas Hartwell except photo on inside back cover, which is by U.S. Department of State/Sandra L. Hodgkinson.

A Vast Human Tragedy

In a decade and a half of humanitarian work I have witnessed the aftermath of much human tragedy, including the Rwandan genocide and the killing fields of Cambodia. In June 2003, I visited Iraq's mass graves, the most recent addition to mankind's legacy of mass murder.

Rows of white bundles containing bones filled room after room. Families filed by, searching for signs of those who had disappeared, some stolen during the night, others taken in daylight. Even small children were not spared the butchery.

The graves that Saddam Hussein's henchmen dug and filled with human beings are a bitter sign that mankind still has a long way to go before every person has the basic human rights promised by all our religions and cultures—the rights of life and liberty.

Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari told the United Nations that under Saddam Hussein, Iraq was "a murderous tyranny that lasted over 35 years." "Today we are unearthing thousands of victims in horrifying testament," Zebari said.

I walked across the sandy plains of Iraq and saw the mass graves that were just found and are beginning to yield their tragic secrets. The bones tell a story of horror and shame: arms bound together, skulls pierced from behind. Hundreds in one long trench.

Those who survived inside Iraq, and those who watched helplessly from abroad, have joined together to begin the long, painful process of accounting for the dead. British Prime Minister Tony Blair said on November 20, 2003, that as many as 400,000 Iraqis lie in these mass graves.

They are Kurds, killed because of their ethnicity. They are Shiites, killed because of their religion. They are Sunnis, killed for their political views. They are Egyptians, Kuwaitis, and Iranians, killed because their lives meant nothing to Saddam Hussein, his sons, and their followers.

As Saddam's evil regime collapsed in April and May, 2003, and his Baath Party mass murderers retreated into the shadows, Iraqis began to act on their formerly hidden grief. They searched for their loved ones rounded up over the years in campaigns of terror. They had heard rumors about shots in the night, mass burials, and vanished prisoners. Now they followed those bloody trails to the mounds of earth they suspected entombed their beloved children and parents.


The new leaders in Al Hillah, Karbala, Najaf, and a dozen other cities and towns around Iraq worked with U.S. and British forces to try and protect some of the mass graves. We hope to preserve the evidence of these crimes against humanity.

Human rights groups have formed, assisted by USAID and working with the Coalition Provisional Authority, to urge people to record the names of those being exhumed and describe the circumstances under which they were seized and slain.

Yes—people want to find the remains of their loved ones and give them a proper burial in consecrated ground. But the Iraqi people also want justice—to punish those who callously killed their fellow citizens by the busload, day after day, year after year.


Above all, if people in Iraq and around the world hope to learn from the crimes of the past, the mass graves of Iraq must be documented, reported, and never forgotten or denied.

This booklet is a small, early marker on that path.



Andrew Natsios, Administrator
U.S. Agency for International Development
January 2004

Iraq's Mass Graves



A victim, still blindfolded, found in a mass grave in Musayib

A LEGACY OF TERROR

Since the Saddam Hussein regime was overthrown in May, 270 mass graves have been reported. By mid-January, 2004, the number of confirmed sites climbed to fifty-three. Some graves hold a few dozen bodies—their arms lashed together and the bullet holes in the backs of skulls testimony to their execution. Other graves go on for hundreds of meters, densely packed with thousands of bodies.

"We've already discovered just so far the remains of 400,000 people in mass graves," said British Prime Minister Tony Blair on November 20 in London. The United Nations, the U.S. State Department, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch (HRW) all estimate that Saddam Hussein's regime murdered hundreds of thousands of innocent people. "Human Rights Watch estimates that as many as 290,000 Iraqis have been 'disappeared' by the Iraqi government over the past two decades," said the group in a statement in May. "Many of these 'disappeared' are those whose remains are now being unearthed in mass graves all over Iraq."

If these numbers prove accurate, they represent a crime against humanity surpassed only by the Rwandan genocide of 1994, Pol Pot's Cambodian killing fields in the 1970s, and the Nazi Holocaust of World War II.

REPORTS OF MASS KILLINGS

Beginning in the 1980s, reports of mass murder began filtering out of Iraq. Saddam's Baathist loyalists and police rounded up members of the Dawa party—they were never heard from again. Human rights groups said 180,000 ethnic Kurds were rounded up and killed in the Anfal campaign in which hundreds of mountain villages were destroyed. Those left alive were moved into bleak collection cities that still dot the plains between Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah. It was a crime so staggering that, without hard evidence of bodies to back it up, many refused to believe it possible.

Then in 1988 came the use of nerve and mustard gas against Iraqi-Kurdish civilians in Halabjah. Five thousand were killed in a single day. The world was shocked, but still, the missing people rounded up over the previous months and years remained vanished.

After the 1991 Gulf War, Shiites and Kurds revolted, but the rebellion was quickly crushed by Iraqi tanks and troops loyal to Saddam Hussein. While Kurds got protection from U.S. and British aircraft, creating an autonomous region in northeastern Iraq where they were safe from persecution, the Shiites were brutally repressed in the south, and tens of thousands vanished.

The following pages include first-hand accounts from three Iraqis who survived the mass murders. Each tells what took place in a way that no formal report can match. Yet the world is duty-bound to learn the facts—cold, brutal, and numbing—of what happened over these years and how a modern government, equipped with the powers of a modern army and police, turned against its own people.

A HISTORY OF DENIAL

The reports of mass murder under Saddam Hussein had been made for years by the United Nations, the U.S. Government, HRW, independent journalists, and the families of people who were arrested and then vanished. But the Iraqi regime denied the reports, refused to allow U.N. investigations, and stonewalled human rights groups.

“As in previous years, the regime continued to deny the widespread killings of Kurds in the north of the country during the ‘Anfal’ campaign of 1988,” said the U.S. State Department’s 2002 human rights report. “Both the [U.N.] Special Rapporteur and HRW concluded that the regime’s policies against the Kurds raised questions of crimes against humanity and violations of the 1948 Genocide Convention.”

Finally, the regime was swept away by U.S., British, and other allied forces in May, 2003, and the truth emerged. It came as no surprise that once the country was thrown open to the world press and international organizations, they might find evidence of these crimes against humanity. But few imagined the full extent of the slaughter that came to light.

SEARCHING FOR THE GRAVES

In early May, Saddam’s police, paramilitary troops, and army fled from their prisons, barracks, and killing fields. Thousands of Iraqi men, women, and children began a grim trek to the forbidden places they feared they would find their missing children, parents, and friends.

Reports that mass graves had been discovered reached officials at the first U.S. administrative body in Iraq, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), which was later replaced by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). A human rights expert from the U.S. Agency for International Development was one of the first outsiders to follow the Iraqis to the site of their grim discoveries.

“South of Al Hillah in early May I heard about bones,” said Sloan Mann of USAID. “When I showed up, people

were randomly digging through the site. I went there two days after the mass grave was discovered.

“The site was very disturbed. Children walked barefoot in the grave. There were many families. Some were mourning. Some were curious onlookers.”

Mann stood on the edge of a ditch some 20 meters long and 2 meters wide. About 25 sets of remains were showing, all in neat piles, along with the clothes the victims had worn when they died. Some were the clothes of children.

THE UNITED STATES OFFERS TO HELP

To help the Iraqis exhume their loved ones, the CPA authorized Mann and other U.S. officials to assist. Mann was part of the first deployment of Abuse Prevention Units (APUs), created by USAID to protect human rights in emergencies or conflict. The teams offered quick grants to buy everything from shovels to exhume graves to computers for logging in victims as they were unearthed. Money was provided for training Iraqis in forensic medicine—the science of determining the legal cause of death—so that evidence might be obtained for prosecution of those responsible for the killings. Help was also given to several Iraqi human rights groups, including the Free Prisoners Association and the Lawyers Association. They began compiling lists of missing Iraqis, suspected mass grave sites, confirmed victims, and documents relating to disappearances.

In some cases, former Iraqi guards, burial workers, and even executioners themselves came forward to tell what had happened. Some said that if they had refused to arrest and kill as ordered, they would have been thrown into the pits themselves.

The CPA and USAID officials working with the Iraqis quickly decided to divide the mass graves into three groups:

- **Emotionally overrun sites**
These are sites that have already been overrun by people seeking the remains of their missing relatives and friends. Since the sites are disturbed—and it would be unthinkable to intervene to stop people from completing their search—U.S. aid is aimed to train Iraqis to assist the community emotionally and to collect whatever information is possible: victim names, circumstances of disappearance, etc.
- **Humanitarian exhumation sites**
In these sites, trained Iraqi professionals teach the community how to put together all the bones and

other remains from each victim, properly identify the remains, and help families obtain the best accounting of what happened to their loved ones. The primary purpose of these excavations is to identify missing persons, although some evidence will also be recovered by local forensic teams.

■ **Full criminal investigation sites**

Between eight and 20 sites are expected to be selected for full exhumation for accountability purposes in the Iraqi Special Tribunal, which was recently established by the Iraqi Governing Council to try cases of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide.

THE TASK AHEAD

At the donor conference held in Madrid in October, funding, forensic teams, equipment, mortuary assistance, and training programs were requested from the international community to assist the Iraqi people in uncovering mass graves. These donations and assistance will be necessary for many years to come as the Iraqis move forward in their reconciliation process, according to the CPA senior human rights official Sandy Hodgkinson. The CPA Office of Human Rights and Transitional Justice has sent out staff to communities and talked about the need to have patience, preserve the sites, and respect the dead. So far, 270 suspected mass grave sites have been found by Iraqis, the CPA, and the U.S. Army's Criminal Investigative Division. However, in some cases, mass grave reports have turned out to be either simply old cemeteries, or falsely reported to attract attention or to obtain funds.

Another difficulty facing the effort to find and document mass graves is that those who carried out the murders, and other supporters of Saddam's regime, have threatened the human rights groups collecting evidence of crimes against humanity. The Free Prisoners Association has been attacked, and two assassination attempts have taken place.

Another challenge is the weather—the rainy winter prevented the opening of most mass graves until February 2004. Nevertheless, the first of some 40 international investigators began arriving in January 2004. They will prepare evidence for the Iraqi Special Tribunal, an Iraqi institution that will prosecute some of the estimated 6,000 people linked to Saddam-era crimes. The plan is to begin prosecutions with Ali Hassan al-Majid (known as "Chemical Ali"), a cousin of Saddam Hussein accused of ordering the gassing of the Kurds in 1988.

CPA official Hodgkinson states that overall, the mass grave program will differ slightly from the process used in Bosnia, and will be specific to the needs in Iraq. Scientific methods of excavation for investigative purposes will be the same. Programs to identify the missing, however, will differ from Bosnia, where to date, only 8,000 of the 30,000 bodies believed to be buried as a result of the conflict have been recovered.

Mass graves are not evident to the untrained eye. Many are concealed under tons of earth or hidden in inaccessible military camps. Satellite and aerial imagery is being used to identify disturbed earth; ground-probing radar also helps locate remains.

When a possible site is identified, a team including an archaeologist, anthropologist, surveyor, geologist, crime-scene officer, and satellite image technician—plus military support—goes to assess the site.

The CPA's Office of Human Rights and Transitional Justice has compiled a list of 270 reported sites across the country. Many sites are in the southwest and central areas around the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Exhumations require heavy machinery as well as excavation, mortuary, security, military, and explosives experts. The team of 20–30 people will need living accommodations for four to six weeks.

Iraqi Human Rights Minister Abdul-Basit Turki said that in addition to families' need to find the bodies of missing relatives, excavating mass graves is important in building criminal cases against members of the former regime.

IRAQIS WERE NOT THE ONLY VICTIMS

It was not just Iraqi citizens who disappeared into the mass graves.

"Despite several well-publicized exchanges with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, the regime effectively ignored

Workers remove remains from a mass grave. After identification, bodies are wrapped in shrouds and carried to a makeshift morgue.



requests from those governments to account for those who disappeared during Iraq's 1990-91 occupation of Kuwait, and prisoners of war captured in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war," said the State Department report.

After the liberation of Iraq, reports surfaced that all 600 Kuwaitis carried into captivity in Iraq by retreating troops in 1991 were executed.

Egyptian officials also said they were seeking information about hundreds—possibly thousands—of Egyptian citizens who died or disappeared after they traveled to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war to take jobs. Many were returned home in coffins—without explanations of how they died.

A PLAN FOR ACTION

Iraqi and U.S. foreign aid officials have prepared a plan for a long-range process of excavation that will meet all the needs for humanitarian, emotional, and judicial resolution of the mass graves. First, Iraqis with skills in forensic anthropology or simply archaeology are being identified to receive training by international forensic experts. Second, communities are being asked to recommend academics and professionals who want to learn the basics of forensic science. They will undergo training in humanitarian exhumation and the fundamentals of basic skeletal anatomy to facilitate the identification process.

The nuts and bolts of the exhumation process have also been planned: exhumation protocols, nationwide standard operating procedures, administration, and logistical support. Construction is underway to renovate a storage facility into a centralized evidence repository. Local human rights organizations are being funded to increase their capacity to organize and collect documents, evidence, and names of the missing. This will eventually tie in to a national outreach program for families seeking information on missing relatives. Information on missing persons that local organizations are collecting will be moved to the central evidence repository. There a full-time Iraqi staff will work to compile a comprehensive database. The information will then be passed to human rights organizations in communities across Iraq.

There are ongoing efforts to collect, verify, and combine information on suspected mass grave sites. A Danish forensic team arrived in Iraq in October, and a Finnish team was expected soon after. Swedish and German governments have also offered varying levels of assistance. Until the international teams are in place,



Remains unearthed in a mass grave in Musayib are prepared for reburial by family members.

forensic site assessments are being used to prioritize 8-16 carefully selected mass graves for a full forensic exhumation based on the following criteria:

- the grave represents a main period of atrocity
- the grave is relatively untouched
- the grave may give evidence of crimes against humanity
- the local population permits securing and exhumation of the site

A media campaign has begun through the daily newspaper *Al Sabah*, Iraqi Media Network, and other media outlets to explain the need to preserve grave sites. Getting the word out on a national level will help identify the missing and encourage citizens to come forward with evidence of atrocities. Although there are few reports of local impatience with the exhumation process, local and religious leaders, nongovernmental organizations, and the media must be continually engaged on the need to protect grave sites and encouraged to have patience with the process.

The Iraqi Governing Council set a major marker on the path to resolving the issue of the mass killings when it announced there will be a national tribunal for criminals. This is the next, unwritten chapter of this story. ■

Survivor Stories

The following testimonials are from survivors of executions that occurred outside Mahawil, a city north of Al Hillah, approximately 60 miles south of Baghdad.

ALI'S STORY

Ali,* 36, an aircraft mechanic, was driving his family from Al Hillah to his farm in Mahawil on March 6, 1991, during the Shiite uprising after the end of the Gulf War. The city was being bombed.

Ali was stopped at a military checkpoint outside the city near a brick factory and ordered to get out. His wife, newborn baby, and handicapped mother were ordered to drive away.

Ali was ordered to remove his jacket, and uniformed men tied his hands and feet with his jacket and pieces of cloth and placed a blindfold over his eyes.

Ali could still see through the blindfold, however, and saw about 12 other people, including men, women, children, and elderly, pulled from cars, bound, and blindfolded.

They were dragged to a white Toyota Land Cruiser and piled on top of each other over the seats. No words were spoken, because when others attempted to speak they received severe blows to the head and body.

It was approximately 10 a.m. when they arrived at the Mahawil military camp on the outskirts of the city. There they were unloaded, registered, and escorted into a large assembly hall filled with approximately 200 people. Everyone was sitting on the floor with their hands

and feet tied. They were blindfolded and positioned facing the walls.

Ali was placed near the door and could see outside. At about 4:30 p.m., the military men built a large ring of tires about 20 feet wide and set it on fire. Next to the fire were large buses, and the soldiers began escorting people from the hall to the buses. At this time, people were also being carried out of the hall and thrown into the fire. Ali believes that because the military was in a hurry to execute them and not everyone would fit on the buses, they decided to burn some people alive. After about 30 minutes of witnessing this, he was escorted from the hall and loaded onto a bus.

At approximately 6 p.m., they were taken on a short drive to a swampy area behind the brick factory. It was dark and he saw headlights in front of the buses. He believes the lights were headlights from the Land Cruisers driven by Saddam's men. He could hear shots but not voices. Ali was paralyzed with fear. Everyone in the bus was blindfolded.

After about 15 minutes, the bus in front of his drove away and the headlights were directly on his bus. They pulled seven to 10 people off the bus. Shots rang out. Ali's group was the next to be pulled from the bus. In his group was a blind man, three brothers, a woman, and her five year old son. The group was led to the front of the bus where the headlights were directly on them.

* All names have been changed.



Iraqi women seek to identify remains of lost family members.

An identification card found in a mass grave in Musayib.

Remains unearthed in a mass reburial.

They were pushed to the ground and then were pulled up one at a time to be executed. They were pushed a couple of feet to the edge of the swamp and shot. Most would fall before being shot because they were overcome with fear. Ali does not remember any words being spoken—except the plea of the three brothers who begged that at least one be spared. They were executed one at a time. Next, the woman was shot in front of her five-year-old child. The child lunged at the legs of the executioner and was kicked away and shot in the face. The blind man was then executed and his chest exploded on Ali.

There were three executioners. They took turns shooting and reloading. Ali was last in the group to be shot, and the soldier who was to execute Ali shot between his legs. The soldier was then shot dead by another soldier. During this commotion, Ali turned to the swamp, jumped over bodies, and ran through the water. They shot after him. He was hit in the left hand and foot and fell, breaking his nose. He continued on and made it to the other side of the swamp.

A tractor with soldiers came in his direction looking for him, so he tossed his robe into the water and hid in a thicket of cane. The soldiers saw his robe and sprayed it with bullets thinking they had shot him. A bulldozer appeared next and began shoveling dirt on it to cover what they thought was his body. Ali was very near and

was knocked unconscious by falling rocks, but he was not completely buried. When the bulldozer left, he pulled himself out of the dirt and crawled to an empty canal. He could still hear shots in the distance: a third bus had arrived during his escape.

Ali crawled through the canal for about 30 minutes, making his way to a farmhouse. He knocked on the door, and was taken in by the family, which told him later that he "was a piece of blood." He doesn't remember much about the care they provided him except for the yogurt they fed him and the heater they placed near him. The family knew his uncles, so they clothed him, gave him a donkey and a cane, and told him to follow the canal to an uncle's house. Ali made it there, and his uncle cleaned him and took him to Baghdad the next day. He hid there for one month without telling anyone except his uncle. He returned home to discover his two brothers had been executed in similar roundups.

He left the neighborhood and changed his identity. He was also protected by an intelligence officer in his neighborhood. When Saddam was toppled, he resumed his identity after having been in hiding for over 12 years. He is a member of the Human Rights Association of Al Hillah. ■



grave are prepared for

After identification and preparation for reburial, a victim is moved from the morgue by family members

Iraqis look at lists of victims unearthed from a mass grave in Musayib

MUHANED'S STORY

Muhaned,* 32, is from Al Hillah. From 1984 to 1991, he worked as a nurse in the army. During the 1991 Shiite uprising he was stationed in the north. On March 5, he traveled by bus to Al Hillah to see his parents. It was winter and he arrived early in the morning. Upon entering the city near a brick factory, his bus encountered an army unit near the statue of Saddam. The army unit stopped the bus and would not allow entrance into the city. The bus driver was told there was a curfew and to return to Baghdad. Several people, Muhaned included, got off the bus to walk to Al Hillah. In his group were six men (all Army and in uniform), an old man, two children, and a woman. The army unit saw them approaching and took them into custody. One of the men refused to be taken and was beaten in front of the group. They were escorted to a military bus and loaded in the back. Those who spoke were beaten and called traitors.

They were taken to the Mahawil military camp, where their hands were tied behind their backs, and they were blindfolded. They were escorted into a large assembly hall. Muhaned could hear whispering, but he does not believe there were many people in the hall at that time. He sat on the floor and fell asleep. Around noon, somebody kicked him and took his name, and he fell asleep again. Around 3 p.m., he awoke to see that the hall was filled with well over 100 people. His ties had loosened and he was able to see. He saw his neighbor. He also saw Ali (see first survivor story). They spent the entire day without water, food, or toilets. People were forced to go to the bathroom where they sat.

* All names have been changed.

At about 5 p.m. they began loading people onto buses. Muhaned was at the back of the hall and was one of the last to be escorted out. There was no light in the hall, but through the windows, he could see the glow of a large fire. He could smell rubber burning.

People were being escorted out to the buses in groups of about 20 at a time. Some people, however, were picked up and thrown into the fire. Muhaned and those around him could hear the screaming. A woman yelled at a soldier, "Why are you burning these people?" She was told, "They are criminals." From this, Muhaned felt safe because he had done nothing wrong.

As the hall emptied, a soldier pointed at his group and said "Take them. Captain Abbar has signed for them." Muhaned did not understand what this meant and began crying and praying. When he exited the hall, the fire was only three to four meters from the entrance. Those who were walking slowly, or whose feet were tied, were thrown in the fire. The rest, including Muhaned, were escorted to the buses.

Around midnight, they drove to a muddy road next to the swamp behind the brick factory. On one side was a swamp and on the other side a canal. He saw a white Toyota Land Cruiser and a bulldozer on the edge of the swamp. The Land Cruiser's headlights acted as a spotlight on the front of the bus at the edge of the swamp.

Baath party members piled out of the Land Cruiser and another bus and began loading their weapons. Muhaned and the others were escorted off their bus and forced to crouch at the edge of the swamp in several rows of six. At their feet were dead bodies. A woman stood up and silently wrapped herself in her long black

An Iraqi holding the name of a victim on a scrap of paper, searches a list of victims.

iraqis dig for remains

Workers identity and some remains are wrapped in shrouds and t

robe in the same fashion people are wrapped for a funeral. Although he was blindfolded, Muhaned's hands were free, and he moved his ID card into an internal pocket, hoping to preserve it so that his body might be identified. Everyone was praying.

Six Baath party members lined up in front and to the side of the crouching rows. Muhaned was in the back row on the very edge of the swamp. Spotlights shone on them. A very large Egyptian man near Muhaned kept asking why they were being executed. At that moment, gunfire erupted and the man jumped to his feet. His body was sprayed with bullets and the force of his body knocked Muhaned back, flattening him and pushing him partially into the swamp. The Egyptian's body completely covered him. The shooting lasted for about 30 seconds. The soldiers surveyed the bodies and discovered one person was still alive and moaning. They killed him. They did not discover Muhaned.

The buses and Land Cruisers left the area. The bulldozer began to approach. At this point, Muhaned pulled himself out from under the dead Egyptian and hid in the cane so the bulldozer driver would not discover him. He could taste blood, but found no wounds on his body. He watched the bulldozer push the bodies into the swamp and cover them with mud.

After the bulldozer left, Muhaned made his way to the canal and followed it until sunrise. He ended up in Al Hillah near the courthouse. He went to the river to wash the remains of the Egyptian from his body. A man spotted him and questioned him about the human remains on his shoulder. Muhaned refused to tell him anything and the man offered to help. He provided

Muhaned with food and set him on the path to his house, telling him to stay within the farms. When Muhaned arrived home, he found that the army had bombed his house. Thankfully, his family had not been injured and he was reunited with them shortly afterward. He did not tell his family what happened, but his wife discovered through his recurrent nightmares.

Muhaned went to see a psychologist but did not tell the true story. A few months later he ran into Ali again, whom he had seen in the hall. Both believed the other had been executed. They agreed never to speak of what happened. "Our lives depend on our tongues now," they said. They made a pact to claim to dislike each other so that if either were caught and forced to speak about the other's capture and attempted execution, the other could claim it was a lie. They both forged documents, obtained new identities, and did not speak about their shared horror. They've lived in constant fear for over 12 years—fear of being discovered, recaptured, tortured, or killed. Muhaned was suspicious of everything. Any time a car parked in front of his house he felt panic.

Finally, out of fear, Muhaned left Iraq for Syria in 2000, but returned after the fall of Saddam. Now, Muhaned and Ali are close friends. "For the first time in over 12 years, I am free and living without fear in my country," says Muhaned, who is working with the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Al Hillah Human Rights Association. ■



When identified, victims taken to a makeshift morgue.



A victim found in a mass grave in Musayib still wears a blindfold.



Remains of Iraqis removed from a mass grave in Musayib lie wrapped in linen shrouds.

HAMID'S STORY

Hamid* was born in Al Hillah in 1963, left school after the ninth grade, and began working in his family's bakery. In 1982, like all Iraqi men, Hamid was required to join the military. He fought in the Iran-Iraq war, was wounded and disabled in 1985, but continued to serve in the army until 1991.

Hamid participated in the uprising that followed Saddam's retreat from Kuwait and southern Iraq. Many former army men participated in killing Baath party members in the south. In March 1991, Saddam's revenge was brutal: executions were carried out all over Iraq. Saddam sent forces throughout the country, imposing curfews and ruthless military rule.

Hamid recalled seeing a woman and child crossing a road after having received permission to do so. When the child dropped something and his mother went to pick it up, she was shot. Military planes flew over Al Hillah and dropped leaflets informing people to evacuate the city because chemical weapons would follow. People were in a state of panic. Military units patrolled the city with loudspeakers telling soldiers to return to their units and advising them that there would be an amnesty. No one believed it.

Hamid and his brother Hyder, then 19 and also a former soldier, decided to escape to Baghdad, where they believed it would be safer. As they were crossing a bridge leading into Baghdad they were stopped at a checkpoint, blindfolded, and had their hands tied behind their backs. They and 18 others were driven to the Mahawil military camp.

In the camp's yard, they could hear the sound of pipes and cables hitting people and of people's screams. His

group was forced to squat in the yard for hours. Anyone who fell or spoke was beaten. Then they were "lined up like cattle" and forced to march as the soldiers jeered at them.

Their blindfolds were removed near the entrance of a large hall. Hamid heard the sound of a skull cracking. He turned and saw an old man lying on the ground, blood gushing from his head. The man had fallen out of line during the march.

They were packed tightly into a hall with about 400 people. Hamid was in the corner of the hall and near a window. There was a fire outside—a large ring of burning tires. He saw a man he knew being led from another hall. The man was bleeding and stumbling in the yard. Soldiers surrounded him and beat him with cables. Soldiers from Hamid's hall went outside to join in the beating. The man fell to the ground and was knocked unconscious. The soldiers then picked him up and threw him into the fire.

Hamid could see an officer named Abu Diba in the yard. Abu Diba ordered the soldiers to throw one of his own men into the fire: the man had appeared to object to what was happening. Three soldiers grabbed him and shoved him into the fire. Hamid could see the soldier struggling to get up but his legs were tangled in the tires. Hamid blacked out.

After hours of standing in the hall, the soldiers filled the floor of the hall with about six inches of water. This prevented anyone from sitting on the floor or sleeping. It was winter and very cold. They stood like this for 24 hours. During this time, soldiers would enter and call out a name and say "Ahmed Hassan, your family is here for you. Please come forward." As the person came for-

* All names have been changed.



Aweda Abed Al Amer grieves over two members of her family found in a mass grave in Musayib.

Iraqis dig for remains from a mass grave in Musayib.

Amer identification and sorting bins shrouds and taken to a

ward, he would be escorted to the yard where his feet would be tied to a pole or a piece of wood. Then he would be suspended upside down and soldiers would whip his feet and back with cables. When the prisoner lost consciousness, the soldiers would splash him with water and continue the beating.

A soldier entered the hall and told them, "We have killed the criminals and we are taking you to your units." They were then blindfolded and escorted out. He could hear the buses. They were told to run straight ahead where someone would receive them. Those who fell or who did not run were beaten to death with pipes. He could hear people falling to the ground and the sound of bones cracking and of blood splattering. He could hear the screaming and moaning of people being beaten to death.

The 50 survivors were loaded onto the bus. The buses pulled out and traveled for approximately 15 minutes; the road was rough.

When they stopped, people were unloaded in groups of three or four and led to the tops of small mounds of dirt. He heard a guard ask if there were any more left and when another answered no, gunfire erupted. Hamid's neck was grazed by a bullet; he felt bullets entering his leg. The force of the shots knocked him backward into a hole—a grave. He landed upside down with his feet in the air. Other bodies fell on him and pushed him down a slope. The executioners fired another round of "mercy bullets" directly into the holes, trying to ensure that the people were dead. Then there was silence.

A few moments later the buses left and a bulldozer pushed dirt over the graves. Hamid's gravesite was on a slope that descended to a swamp. Because he slid down

the slope, he was only partially buried. He could hear someone near him moaning. The man, an Egyptian, told him that the soldiers had left and that he could see the headlights on the main road. Hamid asked the Egyptian where he was shot, and the man replied that only his toes were injured. Hamid couldn't move due to his injuries, and he was partially buried. The Egyptian, Muhammed, pulled him out of the mud and up the slope to the edge. Hamid's leg was severely broken—the bone had pierced through his skin.

They crossed the river. Muhammed helped him crawl up the bank by pulling him up with a cane. They hid in a canal. Hamid was very cold and thought he was dying. He asked Muhammed to go back and look for his brother. Muhammed confirmed that everyone at the site was dead.

They continued through the canal and then crossed some farmlands, drinking water from rivers. They traveled like this for days. A farmer discovered them on his land and shot at the Egyptian. Hamid convinced him to hold his fire. The farmer took them in and provided shelter in one of his buildings, but he told them they could not remain long. He left them and promised to return in one hour. Hamid and Muhammed were sure he would return with the military. Hamid urged Muhammed to leave to save himself, but he refused.

The farmer returned with food and hot tea. After they ate, he treated the wound on Hamid's neck but told him he couldn't treat the leg until the morning. At dawn he returned and said he couldn't sleep and was praying for him throughout the night. He gave Hamid a pillow to put over his face and proceeded to remove two bullets from Hamid's leg. He used a pair of rusty pliers and scissors to dig the bullets out. He removed fragments of



Remains are wrapped in makeshift morgue.



Workers search remains for identifying items.



After identification and sorting, remains are tagged, wrapped in linen shrouds, and taken to a makeshift morgue.

bone as well. He placed a splint on his leg and wrapped it with cloth. He gave them a donkey and a three-day supply of food.

Hamid rode on the donkey and Muhammed led the way. He lost track of time. They felt they were being followed.

They made it to a village near Al Hillah—where Hamid's aunt lived. The aunt took him to the family farm. Muhammed stayed the night and continued north the next day. Hamid received medical care from a family friend who came to the farm.

Hamid then decided he should return to his army unit. He went to Amara because he had many friends in the town. He put on his military uniform, and his family drove him to Amara. There were checkpoints all along the route, but they had no problems. Their car ran out of fuel and he saw a truck carrying regular army troops. He told them he had been injured but provided no details. He felt they had a good idea of what happened, and they viewed him as a hero and allowed him to join them. They took him to a military hospital where he was treated by Saddam loyalists. He told them he was in an accident and made no mention of bullets. When the x-ray showed that a third bullet remained in his leg, he became worried that he would be discovered.

Soon after, he was offered a job in Baghdad with the highest level of the party as a supervisor for a building contractor. He decided instead to buy a car and work as a taxi driver. He also opened a flower shop in Baghdad.

In 1994, the "economic police" arrested him and he was tortured for 34 days. He was beaten and given electric shocks on his ears, tongue, and nose. They wanted him to confess that he was a member of another party—all parties other than Baath were illegal. He was finally released, but his "criminal" file prevented him from gaining employment, so he returned to his flower shop.

Two years later, in 1996, he was arrested by the "intelligence police." He was beaten and tortured for 18 days and questioned about the uprising. He was finally released but was ordered to close his flower shop because he was accused of holding political meetings there.

Hamid closed the shop and returned to Al Hillah with his wife and two young children. Since the fall of Saddam's regime, he has helped the Al Hillah Human Rights Association identify suspected criminals and has assisted in the location of evidence pertaining to mass graves. ■



Logo for the volunteer grassroots organization, the Association of Free Prisoners and Missing Persons.



Volunteer takes a break from sorting documents to pray.



USAID Abuse Prevention Officer Jean Ceran, carries out an assessment of a mass grave site.

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PN-ACW-223
Arabic version: PN-ACW-224



9:02 AM

TO: Larry Di Rita
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
DATE: February 10, 2004
SUBJECT:

TO: George Rhyndance

I think you ought to see that every person in the press corps gets a copy of this publication.

You ought to also make sure you get it in the hands of every one of the Outreach groups we work with.

Iraq

Thanks.

DHR/azn
021004.16

Attach: "Iraq's Legacy of Terror - Mass Graves" US Agency for Int'l Development

Please respond by:

2/13

2/20
→

George Rhyndance -
Can we put this
on our website?

On line?

Larry Di Rita
2/23

OSD 09529-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42421


10 Feb 04



Iraq's Legacy of Terror

MASS GRAVES

U.S. Agency for International Development




Iraq's Legacy of Terror

MASS GRAVES

U.S. Agency for International Development

LOCATIONS OF FIRST MASS GRAVES DISCOVERED IN IRAQ



Mass Graves was edited by USAID Senior Writer Ben Barber with assistance from Stephen Epstein of USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives.

Cover: Iraqis search for relatives and friends among victims found in a mass grave in Musayib, 75 kilometers southwest of Baghdad. The victims are thought to be from the 1991 uprising against the Iraqi government. The bodies, wrapped in linen shrouds, are being held in a makeshift morgue in a nearby youth center.

All photos by USAID/Thomas Hartwell except photo on inside back cover, which is by U.S. Department of State/Sandra L. Hodgkinson.

A Vast Human Tragedy

In a decade and a half of humanitarian work I have witnessed the aftermath of much human tragedy, including the Rwandan genocide and the killing fields of Cambodia. In June 2003, I visited Iraq's mass graves, the most recent addition to mankind's legacy of mass murder.

Rows of white bundles containing bones filled room after room. Families filed by, searching for signs of those who had disappeared, some stolen during the night, others taken in daylight. Even small children were not spared the butchery.

The graves that Saddam Hussein's henchmen dug and filled with human beings are a bitter sign that mankind still has a long way to go before every person has the basic human rights promised by all our religions and cultures—the rights of life and liberty.

Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari told the United Nations that under Saddam Hussein, Iraq was "a murderous tyranny that lasted over 35 years." "Today we are unearthing thousands of victims in horrifying testament," Zebari said.

I walked across the sandy plains of Iraq and saw the mass graves that were just found and are beginning to yield their tragic secrets. The bones tell a story of horror and shame: arms bound together, skulls pierced from behind. Hundreds in one long trench.

Those who survived inside Iraq, and those who watched helplessly from abroad, have joined together to begin the long, painful process of accounting for the dead. British Prime Minister Tony Blair said on November 20, 2003, that as many as 400,000 Iraqis lie in these mass graves.

They are Kurds, killed because of their ethnicity. They are Shiites, killed because of their religion. They are Sunnis, killed for their political views. They are Egyptians, Kuwaitis, and Iranians, killed because their lives meant nothing to Saddam Hussein, his sons, and their followers.

As Saddam's evil regime collapsed in April and May, 2003, and his Baath Party mass murderers retreated into the shadows, Iraqis began to act on their formerly hidden grief. They searched for their loved ones rounded up over the years in campaigns of terror. They had heard rumors about shots in the night, mass burials, and vanished prisoners. Now they followed those bloody trails to the mounds of earth they suspected entombed their beloved children and parents.

The new leaders in Al Hillah, Karbala, Najaf, and a dozen other cities and towns around Iraq worked with U.S. and British forces to try and protect some of the mass graves. We hope to preserve the evidence of these crimes against humanity.

Human rights groups have formed, assisted by USAID and working with the Coalition Provisional Authority, to urge people to record the names of those being exhumed and describe the circumstances under which they were seized and slain.

Yes—people want to find the remains of their loved ones and give them a proper burial in consecrated ground. But the Iraqi people also want justice—to punish those who callously killed their fellow citizens by the busload, day after day, year after year.


Above all, if people in Iraq and around the world hope to learn from the crimes of the past, the mass graves of Iraq must be documented, reported, and never forgotten or denied.

This booklet is a small, early marker on that path.



Andrew Natsios, Administrator
U.S. Agency for International Development
January 2004

Iraq's Mass Graves



A victim, still blindfolded, found in a mass grave in Musayib.

A LEGACY OF TERROR

Since the Saddam Hussein regime was overthrown in May, 270 mass graves have been reported. By mid-January, 2004, the number of confirmed sites climbed to fifty-three. Some graves hold a few dozen bodies—their arms lashed together and the bullet holes in the backs of skulls testimony to their execution. Other graves go on for hundreds of meters, densely packed with thousands of bodies.

"We've already discovered just so far the remains of 400,000 people in mass graves," said British Prime Minister Tony Blair on November 20 in London. The United Nations, the U.S. State Department, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch (HRW) all estimate that Saddam Hussein's regime murdered hundreds of thousands of innocent people. "Human Rights Watch estimates that as many as 290,000 Iraqis have been 'disappeared' by the Iraqi government over the past two decades," said the group in a statement in May. "Many of these 'disappeared' are those whose remains are now being unearthed in mass graves all over Iraq."

If these numbers prove accurate, they represent a crime against humanity surpassed only by the Rwandan genocide of 1994, Pol Pot's Cambodian killing fields in the 1970s, and the Nazi Holocaust of World War II.

REPORTS OF MASS KILLINGS

Beginning in the 1980s, reports of mass murder began filtering out of Iraq. Saddam's Baathist loyalists and police rounded up members of the Dawa party—they were never heard from again. Human rights groups said 180,000 ethnic Kurds were rounded up and killed in the Anfal campaign in which hundreds of mountain villages were destroyed. Those left alive were moved into bleak collection cities that still dot the plains between Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah. It was a crime so staggering that, without hard evidence of bodies to back it up, many refused to believe it possible.

Then in 1988 came the use of nerve and mustard gas against Iraqi-Kurdish civilians in Halabjah. Five thousand were killed in a single day. The world was shocked, but still, the missing people rounded up over the previous months and years remained vanished.

After the 1991 Gulf War, Shiites and Kurds revolted, but the rebellion was quickly crushed by Iraqi tanks and troops loyal to Saddam Hussein. While Kurds got protection from U.S. and British aircraft, creating an autonomous region in northeastern Iraq where they were safe from persecution, the Shiites were brutally repressed in the south, and tens of thousands vanished.

The following pages include first-hand accounts from three Iraqis who survived the mass murders. Each tells what took place in a way that no formal report can match. Yet the world is duty-bound to learn the facts—cold, brutal, and numbing—of what happened over these years and how a modern government, equipped with the powers of a modern army and police, turned against its own people.

A HISTORY OF DENIAL

The reports of mass murder under Saddam Hussein had been made for years by the United Nations, the U.S. Government, HRW, independent journalists, and the families of people who were arrested and then vanished. But the Iraqi regime denied the reports, refused to allow U.N. investigations, and stonewalled human rights groups.

"As in previous years, the regime continued to deny the widespread killings of Kurds in the north of the country during the 'Anfal' campaign of 1988," said the U.S. State Department's 2002 human rights report. "Both the [U.N.] Special Rapporteur and HRW concluded that the regime's policies against the Kurds raised questions of crimes against humanity and violations of the 1948 Genocide Convention."

Finally, the regime was swept away by U.S., British, and other allied forces in May, 2003, and the truth emerged. It came as no surprise that once the country was thrown open to the world press and international organizations, they might find evidence of these crimes against humanity. But few imagined the full extent of the slaughter that came to light.

SEARCHING FOR THE GRAVES

In early May, Saddam's police, paramilitary troops, and army fled from their prisons, barracks, and killing fields. Thousands of Iraqi men, women, and children began a grim trek to the forbidden places they feared they would find their missing children, parents, and friends.

Reports that mass graves had been discovered reached officials at the first U.S. administrative body in Iraq, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), which was later replaced by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). A human rights expert from the U.S. Agency for International Development was one of the first outsiders to follow the Iraqis to the site of their grim discoveries.

"South of Al Hillah in early May I heard about bones," said Sloan Mann of USAID. "When I showed up, people

were randomly digging through the site. I went there two days after the mass grave was discovered.

"The site was very disturbed. Children walked barefoot in the grave. There were many families. Some were mourning. Some were curious onlookers."

Mann stood on the edge of a ditch some 20 meters long and 2 meters wide. About 25 sets of remains were showing, all in neat piles, along with the clothes the victims had worn when they died. Some were the clothes of children.

THE UNITED STATES OFFERS TO HELP

To help the Iraqis exhume their loved ones, the CPA authorized Mann and other U.S. officials to assist. Mann was part of the first deployment of Abuse Prevention Units (APUs), created by USAID to protect human rights in emergencies or conflict. The teams offered quick grants to buy everything from shovels to exhume graves to computers for logging in victims as they were unearthed. Money was provided for training Iraqis in forensic medicine—the science of determining the legal cause of death—so that evidence might be obtained for prosecution of those responsible for the killings. Help was also given to several Iraqi human rights groups, including the Free Prisoners Association and the Lawyers Association. They began compiling lists of missing Iraqis, suspected mass grave sites, confirmed victims, and documents relating to disappearances.

In some cases, former Iraqi guards, burial workers, and even executioners themselves came forward to tell what had happened. Some said that if they had refused to arrest and kill as ordered, they would have been thrown into the pits themselves.

The CPA and USAID officials working with the Iraqis quickly decided to divide the mass graves into three groups:

- **Emotionally overrun sites**
These are sites that have already been overrun by people seeking the remains of their missing relatives and friends. Since the sites are disturbed—and it would be unthinkable to intervene to stop people from completing their search—U.S. aid is aimed to train Iraqis to assist the community emotionally and to collect whatever information is possible: victim names, circumstances of disappearance, etc.
- **Humanitarian exhumation sites**
In these sites, trained Iraqi professionals teach the community how to put together all the bones and

other remains from each victim, properly identify the remains, and help families obtain the best accounting of what happened to their loved ones. The primary purpose of these excavations is to identify missing persons, although some evidence will also be recovered by local forensic teams.

■ **Full criminal investigation sites**

Between eight and 20 sites are expected to be selected for full exhumation for accountability purposes in the Iraqi Special Tribunal, which was recently established by the Iraqi Governing Council to try cases of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide.

THE TASK AHEAD

At the donor conference held in Madrid in October, funding, forensic teams, equipment, mortuary assistance, and training programs were requested from the international community to assist the Iraqi people in uncovering mass graves. These donations and assistance will be necessary for many years to come as the Iraqis move forward in their reconciliation process, according to the CPA senior human rights official Sandy Hodgkinson. The CPA Office of Human Rights and Transitional Justice has sent out staff to communities and talked about the need to have patience, preserve the sites, and respect the dead. So far, 270 suspected mass grave sites have been found by Iraqis, the CPA, and the U.S. Army's Criminal Investigative Division. However, in some cases, mass grave reports have turned out to be either simply old cemeteries, or falsely reported to attract attention or to obtain funds.

Another difficulty facing the effort to find and document mass graves is that those who carried out the murders, and other supporters of Saddam's regime, have threatened the human rights groups collecting evidence of crimes against humanity. The Free Prisoners Association has been attacked, and two assassination attempts have taken place.

Another challenge is the weather—the rainy winter prevented the opening of most mass graves until February 2004. Nevertheless, the first of some 40 international investigators began arriving in January 2004. They will prepare evidence for the Iraqi Special Tribunal, an Iraqi institution that will prosecute some of the estimated 6,000 people linked to Saddam-era crimes. The plan is to begin prosecutions with Ali Hassan al-Majid (known as "Chemical Ali"), a cousin of Saddam Hussein accused of ordering the gassing of the Kurds in 1988.

CPA official Hodgkinson states that overall, the mass grave program will differ slightly from the process used in Bosnia, and will be specific to the needs in Iraq. Scientific methods of excavation for investigative purposes will be the same. Programs to identify the missing, however, will differ from Bosnia, where to date, only 8,000 of the 30,000 bodies believed to be buried as a result of the conflict have been recovered.

Mass graves are not evident to the untrained eye. Many are concealed under tons of earth or hidden in inaccessible military camps. Satellite and aerial imagery is being used to identify disturbed earth; ground-probing radar also helps locate remains.

When a possible site is identified, a team including an archaeologist, anthropologist, surveyor, geologist, crime-scene officer, and satellite image technician—plus military support—goes to assess the site.

The CPA's Office of Human Rights and Transitional Justice has compiled a list of 270 reported sites across the country. Many sites are in the southwest and central areas around the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Exhumations require heavy machinery as well as excavation, mortuary, security, military, and explosives experts. The team of 20–30 people will need living accommodations for four to six weeks.

Iraqi Human Rights Minister Abdul-Basit Turki said that in addition to families' need to find the bodies of missing relatives, excavating mass graves is important in building criminal cases against members of the former regime.

IRAQIS WERE NOT THE ONLY VICTIMS

It was not just Iraqi citizens who disappeared into the mass graves.

"Despite several well-publicized exchanges with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, the regime effectively ignored

Workers remove remains from a mass grave. After identification, bodies are wrapped in shrouds and carried to a makeshift morgue.



requests from those governments to account for those who disappeared during Iraq's 1990-91 occupation of Kuwait, and prisoners of war captured in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war," said the State Department report.

After the liberation of Iraq, reports surfaced that all 600 Kuwaitis carried into captivity in Iraq by retreating troops in 1991 were executed.

Egyptian officials also said they were seeking information about hundreds—possibly thousands—of Egyptian citizens who died or disappeared after they traveled to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war to take jobs. Many were returned home in coffins—without explanations of how they died.

A PLAN FOR ACTION

Iraqi and U.S. foreign aid officials have prepared a plan for a long-range process of excavation that will meet all the needs for humanitarian, emotional, and judicial resolution of the mass graves. First, Iraqis with skills in forensic anthropology or simply archaeology are being identified to receive training by international forensic experts. Second, communities are being asked to recommend academics and professionals who want to learn the basics of forensic science. They will undergo training in humanitarian exhumation and the fundamentals of basic skeletal anatomy to facilitate the identification process.

The nuts and bolts of the exhumation process have also been planned: exhumation protocols, nationwide standard operating procedures, administration, and logistical support. Construction is underway to renovate a storage facility into a centralized evidence repository. Local human rights organizations are being funded to increase their capacity to organize and collect documents, evidence, and names of the missing. This will eventually tie in to a national outreach program for families seeking information on missing relatives. Information on missing persons that local organizations are collecting will be moved to the central evidence repository. There a full-time Iraqi staff will work to compile a comprehensive database. The information will then be passed to human rights organizations in communities across Iraq.

There are ongoing efforts to collect, verify, and combine information on suspected mass grave sites. A Danish forensic team arrived in Iraq in October, and a Finnish team was expected soon after. Swedish and German governments have also offered varying levels of assistance. Until the international teams are in place,



Remains unearthed in a mass grave in Musayib are prepared for reburial by family members.

forensic site assessments are being used to prioritize 8-16 carefully selected mass graves for a full forensic exhumation based on the following criteria:

- the grave represents a main period of atrocity
- the grave is relatively untouched
- the grave may give evidence of crimes against humanity
- the local population permits securing and exhumation of the site

A media campaign has begun through the daily newspaper *Al Sabah*, Iraqi Media Network, and other media outlets to explain the need to preserve grave sites. Getting the word out on a national level will help identify the missing and encourage citizens to come forward with evidence of atrocities. Although there are few reports of local impatience with the exhumation process, local and religious leaders, nongovernmental organizations, and the media must be continually engaged on the need to protect grave sites and encouraged to have patience with the process.

The Iraqi Governing Council set a major marker on the path to resolving the issue of the mass killings when it announced there will be a national tribunal for criminals. This is the next, unwritten chapter of this story. ■

Survivor Stories

The following testimonials are from survivors of executions that occurred outside Mahawil, a city north of Al Hillah, approximately 60 miles south of Baghdad.

ALI'S STORY

Ali,* 36, an aircraft mechanic, was driving his family from Al Hillah to his farm in Mahawil on March 6, 1991, during the Shiite uprising after the end of the Gulf War. The city was being bombed.

Ali was stopped at a military checkpoint outside the city near a brick factory and ordered to get out. His wife, newborn baby, and handicapped mother were ordered to drive away.

Ali was ordered to remove his jacket, and uniformed men tied his hands and feet with his jacket and pieces of cloth and placed a blindfold over his eyes.

Ali could still see through the blindfold, however, and saw about 12 other people, including men, women, children, and elderly, pulled from cars, bound, and blindfolded.

They were dragged to a white Toyota Land Cruiser and piled on top of each other over the seats. No words were spoken, because when others attempted to speak they received severe blows to the head and body.

It was approximately 10 a.m. when they arrived at the Mahawil military camp on the outskirts of the city. There they were unloaded, registered, and escorted into a large assembly hall filled with approximately 200 people. Everyone was sitting on the floor with their hands

and feet tied. They were blindfolded and positioned facing the walls.

Ali was placed near the door and could see outside. At about 4:30 p.m., the military men built a large ring of tires about 20 feet wide and set it on fire. Next to the fire were large buses, and the soldiers began escorting people from the hall to the buses. At this time, people were also being carried out of the hall and thrown into the fire. Ali believes that because the military was in a hurry to execute them and not everyone would fit on the buses, they decided to burn some people alive. After about 30 minutes of witnessing this, he was escorted from the hall and loaded onto a bus.

At approximately 6 p.m., they were taken on a short drive to a swampy area behind the brick factory. It was dark and he saw headlights in front of the buses. He believes the lights were headlights from the Land Cruisers driven by Saddam's men. He could hear shots but not voices. Ali was paralyzed with fear. Everyone in the bus was blindfolded.


After about 15 minutes, the bus in front of his drove away and the headlights were directly on his bus. They pulled seven to 10 people off the bus. Shots rang out. Ali's group was the next to be pulled from the bus. In his group was a blind man, three brothers, a woman, and her five year old son. The group was led to the front of the bus where the headlights were directly on them.

* All names have been changed.

11-L-0559/OSD/42430



Iraqi women seek to identify remains of lost family members.



An identification card found in a mass grave in Musayib.



Remains unearthed in a mass grave.

They were pushed to the ground and then were pulled up one at a time to be executed. They were pushed a couple of feet to the edge of the swamp and shot. Most would fall before being shot because they were overcome with fear. Ali does not remember any words being spoken—except the plea of the three brothers who begged that at least one be spared. They were executed one at a time. Next, the woman was shot in front of her five-year-old child. The child lunged at the legs of the executioner and was kicked away and shot in the face. The blind man was then executed and his chest exploded on Ali.

There were three executioners. They took turns shooting and reloading. Ali was last in the group to be shot, and the soldier who was to execute Ali shot between his legs. The soldier was then shot dead by another soldier. During this commotion, Ali turned to the swamp, jumped over bodies, and ran through the water. They shot after him. He was hit in the left hand and foot and fell, breaking his nose. He continued on and made it to the other side of the swamp.

A tractor with soldiers came in his direction looking for him, so he tossed his robe into the water and hid in a thicket of cane. The soldiers saw his robe and sprayed it with bullets thinking they had shot him. A bulldozer appeared next and began shoveling dirt on it to cover what they thought was his body. Ali was very near and

was knocked unconscious by falling rocks, but he was not completely buried. When the bulldozer left, he pulled himself out of the dirt and crawled to an empty canal. He could still hear shots in the distance: a third bus had arrived during his escape.

Ali crawled through the canal for about 30 minutes, making his way to a farmhouse. He knocked on the door, and was taken in by the family, which told him later that he "was a piece of blood." He doesn't remember much about the care they provided him except for the yogurt they fed him and the heater they placed near him. The family knew his uncles, so they clothed him, gave him a donkey and a cane, and told him to follow the canal to an uncle's house. Ali made it there, and his uncle cleaned him and took him to Baghdad the next day. He hid there for one month without telling anyone except his uncle. He returned home to discover his two brothers had been executed in similar roundups.

He left the neighborhood and changed his identity. He was also protected by an intelligence officer in his neighborhood. When Saddam was toppled, he resumed his identity after having been in hiding for over 12 years. He is a member of the Human Rights Association of Al Hillah. ■

11-L-0559/OSD/42431



grave are prepared for

After identification and preparation for reburial, a victim is moved from the morgue by family members.

Iraqis look at lists of victims unearthed from a mass grave in Musayib.

MUHANED'S STORY

Muhaned,* 32, is from Al Hillah. From 1984 to 1991, he worked as a nurse in the army. During the 1991 Shiite uprising he was stationed in the north. On March 5, he traveled by bus to Al Hillah to see his parents. It was winter and he arrived early in the morning. Upon entering the city near a brick factory, his bus encountered an army unit near the statue of Saddam. The army unit stopped the bus and would not allow entrance into the city. The bus driver was told there was a curfew and to return to Baghdad. Several people, Muhaned included, got off the bus to walk to Al Hillah. In his group were six men (all Army and in uniform), an old man, two children, and a woman. The army unit saw them approaching and took them into custody. One of the men refused to be taken and was beaten in front of the group. They were escorted to a military bus and loaded in the back. Those who spoke were beaten and called traitors.

They were taken to the Mahawil military camp, where their hands were tied behind their backs, and they were blindfolded. They were escorted into a large assembly hall. Muhaned could hear whispering, but he does not believe there were many people in the hall at that time. He sat on the floor and fell asleep. Around noon, somebody kicked him and took his name, and he fell asleep again. Around 3 p.m., he awoke to see that the hall was filled with well over 100 people. His ties had loosened and he was able to see. He saw his neighbor. He also saw Ali (see first survivor story). They spent the entire day without water, food, or toilets. People were forced to go to the bathroom where they sat.

* All names have been changed.

At about 5 p.m. they began loading people onto buses. Muhaned was at the back of the hall and was one of the last to be escorted out. There was no light in the hall, but through the windows, he could see the glow of a large fire. He could smell rubber burning.


People were being escorted out to the buses in groups of about 20 at a time. Some people, however, were picked up and thrown into the fire. Muhaned and those around him could hear the screaming. A woman yelled at a soldier, "Why are you burning these people?" She was told, "They are criminals." From this, Muhaned felt safe because he had done nothing wrong.

As the hall emptied, a soldier pointed at his group and said "Take them. Captain Abbar has signed for them." Muhaned did not understand what this meant and began crying and praying. When he exited the hall, the fire was only three to four meters from the entrance. Those who were walking slowly, or whose feet were tied, were thrown in the fire. The rest, including Muhaned, were escorted to the buses.

Around midnight, they drove to a muddy road next to the swamp behind the brick factory. On one side was a swamp and on the other side a canal. He saw a white Toyota Land Cruiser and a bulldozer on the edge of the swamp. The Land Cruiser's headlights acted as a spotlight on the front of the bus at the edge of the swamp.

Baath party members piled out of the Land Cruiser and another bus and began loading their weapons. Muhaned and the others were escorted off their bus and forced to crouch at the edge of the swamp in several rows of six. At their feet were dead bodies. A woman stood up and silently wrapped herself in her long black


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An Iraqi holding the name of a victim on a scrap of paper, searches a list of victims.



Iraqis dig for remains.



Workers identify and sort remains, which are wrapped in shrouds and taken to a burial site.

robe in the same fashion people are wrapped for a funeral. Although he was blindfolded, Muhaned's hands were free, and he moved his ID card into an internal pocket, hoping to preserve it so that his body might be identified. Everyone was praying.

Six Baath party members lined up in front and to the side of the crouching rows. Muhaned was in the back row on the very edge of the swamp. Spotlights shone on them. A very large Egyptian man near Muhaned kept asking why they were being executed. At that moment, gunfire erupted and the man jumped to his feet. His body was sprayed with bullets and the force of his body knocked Muhaned back, flattening him and pushing him partially into the swamp. The Egyptian's body completely covered him. The shooting lasted for about 30 seconds. The soldiers surveyed the bodies and discovered one person was still alive and moaning. They killed him. They did not discover Muhaned.

The buses and Land Cruisers left the area. The bulldozer began to approach. At this point, Muhaned pulled himself out from under the dead Egyptian and hid in the cane so the bulldozer driver would not discover him. He could taste blood, but found no wounds on his body. He watched the bulldozer push the bodies into the swamp and cover them with mud.

After the bulldozer left, Muhaned made his way to the canal and followed it until sunrise. He ended up in Al Hillah near the courthouse. He went to the river to wash the remains of the Egyptian from his body. A man spotted him and questioned him about the human remains on his shoulder. Muhaned refused to tell him anything and the man offered to help. He provided

Muhaned with food and set him on the path to his house, telling him to stay within the farms. When Muhaned arrived home, he found that the army had bombed his house. Thankfully, his family had not been injured and he was reunited with them shortly afterward. He did not tell his family what happened, but his wife discovered through his recurrent nightmares.

Muhaned went to see a psychologist but did not tell the true story. A few months later he ran into Ali again, whom he had seen in the hall. Both believed the other had been executed. They agreed never to speak of what happened. "Our lives depend on our tongues now," they said. They made a pact to claim to dislike each other so that if either were caught and forced to speak about the other's capture and attempted execution, the other could claim it was a lie. They both forged documents, obtained new identities, and did not speak about their shared horror. They've lived in constant fear for over 12 years—fear of being discovered, recaptured, tortured, or killed. Muhaned was suspicious of everything. Any time a car parked in front of his house he felt panic.

Finally, out of fear, Muhaned left Iraq for Syria in 2000, but returned after the fall of Saddam. Now, Muhaned and Ali are close friends. "For the first time in over 12 years, I am free and living without fear in my country," says Muhaned, who is working with the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Al Hillah Human Rights Association. ■

11-L-0559/OSD/42433



When identified, victims taken to a makeshift morgue.



A victim found in a mass grave in Musayib still wears a blindfold.



Remains of Iraqis removed from a mass grave in Musayib lie wrapped in linen shrouds.

HAMID'S STORY

Hamid* was born in Al Hillah in 1963, left school after the ninth grade, and began working in his family's bakery. In 1982, like all Iraqi men, Hamid was required to join the military. He fought in the Iran-Iraq war, was wounded and disabled in 1985, but continued to serve in the army until 1991.

Hamid participated in the uprising that followed Saddam's retreat from Kuwait and southern Iraq. Many former army men participated in killing Baath party members in the south. In March 1991, Saddam's revenge was brutal: executions were carried out all over Iraq. Saddam sent forces throughout the country, imposing curfews and ruthless military rule.

Hamid recalled seeing a woman and child crossing a road after having received permission to do so. When the child dropped something and his mother went to pick it up, she was shot. Military planes flew over Al Hillah and dropped leaflets informing people to evacuate the city because chemical weapons would follow. People were in a state of panic. Military units patrolled the city with loudspeakers telling soldiers to return to their units and advising them that there would be an amnesty. No one believed it.

Hamid and his brother Hyder, then 19 and also a former soldier, decided to escape to Baghdad, where they believed it would be safer. As they were crossing a bridge leading into Baghdad they were stopped at a checkpoint, blindfolded, and had their hands tied behind their backs. They and 18 others were driven to the Mahawil military camp.

In the camp's yard, they could hear the sound of pipes and cables hitting people and of people's screams. His

group was forced to squat in the yard for hours. Anyone who fell or spoke was beaten. Then they were "lined up like cattle" and forced to march as the soldiers jeered at them.

Their blindfolds were removed near the entrance of a large hall. Hamid heard the sound of a skull cracking. He turned and saw an old man lying on the ground, blood gushing from his head. The man had fallen out of line during the march.

They were packed tightly into a hall with about 400 people. Hamid was in the corner of the hall and near a window. There was a fire outside—a large ring of burning tires. He saw a man he knew being led from another hall. The man was bleeding and stumbling in the yard. Soldiers surrounded him and beat him with cables. Soldiers from Hamid's hall went outside to join in the beating. The man fell to the ground and was knocked unconscious. The soldiers then picked him up and threw him into the fire.

Hamid could see an officer named Abu Diba in the yard. Abu Diba ordered the soldiers to throw one of his own men into the fire: the man had appeared to object to what was happening. Three soldiers grabbed him and shoved him into the fire. Hamid could see the soldier struggling to get up but his legs were tangled in the tires. Hamid blacked out.

After hours of standing in the hall, the soldiers filled the floor of the hall with about six inches of water. This prevented anyone from sitting on the floor or sleeping. It was winter and very cold. They stood like this for 24 hours. During this time, soldiers would enter and call out a name and say "Ahmed Hassan, your family is here for you. Please come forward." As the person came for-

* All names have been changed.

11-L-0559/OSD/42434



Awoda Abed Al-Amer grieves over two members of her family found in a mass grave in Musayib.



Iraqis dig for remains from a mass grave in Musayib.



After identification and sorting, linen shrouds are taken to a...

ward, he would be escorted to the yard where his feet would be tied to a pole or a piece of wood. Then he would be suspended upside down and soldiers would whip his feet and back with cables. When the prisoner lost consciousness, the soldiers would splash him with water and continue the beating.

A soldier entered the hall and told them, "We have killed the criminals and we are taking you to your units." They were then blindfolded and escorted out. He could hear the buses. They were told to run straight ahead where someone would receive them. Those who fell or who did not run were beaten to death with pipes. He could hear people falling to the ground and the sound of bones cracking and of blood splattering. He could hear the screaming and moaning of people being beaten to death.

The 50 survivors were loaded onto the bus. The buses pulled out and traveled for approximately 15 minutes; the road was rough.

When they stopped, people were unloaded in groups of three or four and led to the tops of small mounds of dirt. He heard a guard ask if there were any more left and when another answered no, gunfire erupted. Hamid's neck was grazed by a bullet; he felt bullets entering his leg. The force of the shots knocked him backward into a hole—a grave. He landed upside down with his feet in the air. Other bodies fell on him and pushed him down a slope. The executioners fired another round of "mercy bullets" directly into the holes, trying to ensure that the people were dead. Then there was silence.

A few moments later the buses left and a bulldozer pushed dirt over the graves. Hamid's gravesite was on a slope that descended to a swamp. Because he slid down

the slope, he was only partially buried. He could hear someone near him moaning. The man, an Egyptian, told him that the soldiers had left and that he could see the headlights on the main road. Hamid asked the Egyptian where he was shot, and the man replied that only his toes were injured. Hamid couldn't move due to his injuries, and he was partially buried. The Egyptian, Muhammed, pulled him out of the mud and up the slope to the edge. Hamid's leg was severely broken—the bone had pierced through his skin.

They crossed the river. Muhammed helped him crawl up the bank by pulling him up with a cane. They hid in a canal. Hamid was very cold and thought he was dying. He asked Muhammed to go back and look for his brother. Muhammed confirmed that everyone at the site was dead.

They continued through the canal and then crossed some farmlands, drinking water from rivers. They traveled like this for days. A farmer discovered them on his land and shot at the Egyptian. Hamid convinced him to hold his fire. The farmer took them in and provided shelter in one of his buildings, but he told them they could not remain long. He left them and promised to return in one hour. Hamid and Muhammed were sure he would return with the military. Hamid urged Muhammed to leave to save himself, but he refused.

The farmer returned with food and hot tea. After they ate, he treated the wound on Hamid's neck but told him he couldn't treat the leg until the morning. At dawn he returned and said he couldn't sleep and was praying for him throughout the night. He gave Hamid a pillow to put over his face and proceeded to remove two bullets from Hamid's leg. He used a pair of rusty pliers and scissors to dig the bullets out. He removed fragments of

11-L-0559/OSD/42435



Remains are wrapped in shrouds at a makeshift morgue.



Workers search remains for identifying items.



After identification and sorting, remains are tagged, wrapped in linen shrouds, and taken to a makeshift morgue.

bone as well. He placed a splint on his leg and wrapped it with cloth. He gave them a donkey and a three-day supply of food.

Hamid rode on the donkey and Muhammed led the way. He lost track of time. They felt they were being followed.

They made it to a village near Al Hillah—where Hamid's aunt lived. The aunt took him to the family farm. Muhammed stayed the night and continued north the next day. Hamid received medical care from a family friend who came to the farm.

Hamid then decided he should return to his army unit. He went to Amara because he had many friends in the town. He put on his military uniform, and his family drove him to Amara. There were checkpoints all along the route, but they had no problems. Their car ran out of fuel and he saw a truck carrying regular army troops. He told them he had been injured but provided no details. He felt they had a good idea of what happened, and they viewed him as a hero and allowed him to join them. They took him to a military hospital where he was treated by Saddam loyalists. He told them he was in an accident and made no mention of bullets. When the x-ray showed that a third bullet remained in his leg, he became worried that he would be discovered.

Soon after, he was offered a job in Baghdad with the highest level of the party as a supervisor for a building contractor. He decided instead to buy a car and work as a taxi driver. He also opened a flower shop in Baghdad.

In 1994, the "economic police" arrested him and he was tortured for 34 days. He was beaten and given electric shocks on his ears, tongue, and nose. They wanted him to confess that he was a member of another party—all parties other than Baath were illegal. He was finally released, but his "criminal" file prevented him from gaining employment, so he returned to his flower shop.

Two years later, in 1996, he was arrested by the "intelligence police." He was beaten and tortured for 18 days and questioned about the uprising. He was finally released but was ordered to close his flower shop because he was accused of holding political meetings there.

Hamid closed the shop and returned to Al Hillah with his wife and two young children. Since the fall of Saddam's regime, he has helped the Al Hillah Human Rights Association identify suspected criminals and has assisted in the location of evidence pertaining to mass graves. ■


11-L-0559/OSD/42436



Logo for the volunteer grassroots organization, the Association of Free Prisoners and Missing Persons.



Volunteer takes a break from sorting documents to pray.



USAID Abuse Prevention Officer Jean Geran, carries out an assessment of a mass grave site.

For more information, contact
U.S. Agency for International Development
Washington, D.C. 20523-1000
Telephone: 202-712-4810
Internet: www.usaid.gov
PN-ACW-223
Arabic version: PN-ACW-224



February 20, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Copy of Resolution

Please get me a copy of the Daschle, Levin and Kerry 1998 war resolution referred to in this letter to the editor. I want to read precisely what they said.

381

Thanks.

Attach.
Washington Times letters to the editor, February 19, 2004.

DHR:dh
022004-12

.....
Please respond by 2/24/04

OSD 09531-04

20 Feb 04

trade agreement with Australia
that was concluded Feb. 8 demon-

by the knowledge that negotia-
tions are give-and-take and do

US Chamber of Commerce
Washington

Under Clinton, Democrats were hawks

With polls showing that an increasing number of Americans believe the Bush administration either lied or exaggerated Iraq's weapons potential, it is appropriate that the Senate Intelligence Committee investigate prewar claims by President Bush on the Iraqi threat ("Bush confers with Kay, sets appointment of panel," Nation, Feb. 3).

It is equally appropriate that the committee expand the probe to pinpoint the intelligence that prompted then-Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, South Dakota Democ-

rat, in 1998 to co-sponsor a war resolution urging President Clinton "to take all necessary and appropriate actions to respond to the threat posed by Iraq's refusal to end its weapons of mass destruction programs" and "that would send as clear a message as possible that we are going to force, one way or another, diplomatically or militarily, Iraq to comply with their own agreements and with international law" Sen. Patrick Leahy, Vermont Democrat, and Sen. John Kerry, Massachusetts Democrat, also were co-spon-

sors of this resolution.

Had the Clinton administration followed through with these Democratic Senate leaders' admonition in 1998, there may not have been the need for ranking committee member Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV, West Virginia Democrat, to insist that the intelligence panel "address the question of whether intelligence was exaggerated or misused" by Mr. Bush in 2004.

W. HUSTON SMITH
Indian Wells, Calif.

What's the source of outsourcing?

I have great respect for Bruce Bartlett, but his assertion that only "very low-end operations that require little skill or training" are being outsourced doesn't reflect what is going on in the marketplace ("Anxiety over each outsourcing," Commentary, Feb. 4). Since when are engineering, radiology, software development, accounting or architecture jobs considered "low end"? These are the types of jobs for which we encourage our children to get good educations but that are being transferred rapidly overseas. In one case, a high-aid, well-educated software engineer was sent to India by her company to train her replacements and, shortly thereafter, he and her entire team were red. Mr. Bartlett points out that Indians are competing on price and quality. With India specializing in technology, how can Mr. Bartlett say only low-end jobs are affected?

I also dispute the notion that displaced workers are being transferred into better jobs within the same company. Though I'm sure there are good corporate citizens out there, I know of more instances of companies laying off white-collar U.S. workers and replacing them with offshore workers. What higher level of education do you tell someone with a doctorate to aspire to? Even so, will doctorate holders get decent jobs in their specialties when they were too

"expensive" in the first place? Mr. Bartlett must come to grips with the fact that, as Hewlett Packard Chief Executive Officer Carly Fiorina stated "There is no job that is America's God-given right anymore." That includes the high-skilled, high-paying jobs on which Mr. Bartlett would like to believe we still have a lock.

REP. DONALD A. MANZULLO
Chairman
Committee on Small Business
Washington

Regarding Paul Craig Robert's column "Where did the jobs go?" (Commentary, Sunday): The trend to outsourcing and loss of manufacturing and knowledge jobs" is inevitable and, indeed, may escalate.

There are several reasons for this.

First, with high-speed communications (the Internet, etc.) and modern transportation, we are living in a global economy. We are not, nor can we afford to be, isolated from the rest of the world.

Second, we do not have a monopoly on technology or skilled workers, and many other countries have high-tech and semi-skilled people who are hard-working, dedicated and (most important) a lot cheaper. Inevitably, businesses will be attracted to those sources of labor.

Third, many countries are not saddled with restrictive laws and regulatory agencies (e.g., the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency etc.), high taxes or court decisions on employment practices. Though such restrictions certainly are well-intentioned, capital will tend to shun that type of business environment.

Fourth, free-trade agreements are too one-sided and do not recognize realities. An autoworker in Mexico making \$1.25 an hour (which is a handsome wage in that country) is not a good prospect for buying a \$999 computer with all the "bells and whistles," and any way, that computer probably is being made in Taiwan, mainland China, Malaysia or wherever. Maybe that Mexican autoworker will eventually catch up to American standards, but that could take a very long time and, until then, what happens to our people and our economy? Didn't Ross Perot warn us of the "giant sucking sound" of our good manufacturing jobs going south?

Meanwhile, we're running enormous deficits and generating economic "fault lines" all over the place, all of which are dangerous to our stability and, ultimately, our democracy.

L. BLOOM
Owings Mills, Md.

Editor's note: The Jordanian Embassy has taken issue with our headline yesterday on its letter regarding an op-ed on Israel's security fence. The headline on that

op-ed was "Jordan twists the fence." A more appropriate headline on the letter from the Jordanian ambassador would have been "Twisting reality."

We welcome your opinions. Op-eds and Letters to the Editor should be originals and exclusive to The Washington Times. We prefer opinion articles that are 750 words in length and Letters that are fewer than 350 words. Letters may be edited for clarity and length. Please include your name, address and daytime telephone number.

E-mail:
oped@washingtontimes.com
letters@washingtontimes.com

720

February 20, 2004

TO: Jaymie Durnan
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Scientists

Please figure out whether or not these folks are criticizing the Department of Defense. I cannot tell from this article. It may be that they are criticizing DOE.

Please advise.

If they are criticizing us, I want to know precisely why, I know several of those fellows quite well and I want to get it straightened out.

Thanks.

Attach.

Vergano, Dan. "Bush's Changes to Advisory Process Draw Scientists' Ire," *USA Today*, February 19, 2004, p. 10A.

DHR:dh
022004-8

.....
Please respond by _____

400.112

20 Feb 2004

OSD 09533-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42441

ington

Bush's changes to advisory process draw scientists' ire

By Dan Vergano
USA TODAY

A bipartisan, all-star roster of Nobel Prize winners and former federal science officials accused the Bush administration Wednesday of politicizing science.

"When scientific knowledge has been found to be in conflict with its political goals, the administration has often manipulated the process through which science enters into its decisions," charges a document signed by 60 scientists in an unprecedented joint effort by the leaders of the nation's science establishment.

They are calling for an independent congressional investigation of federal science-advisory policies.

Signers include 20 Nobel Prize winners and 19 recipients of the National Medal of Science, awarded by the president for outstanding contributions in the field. Nobel winners include former National Institutes of Health chief Harold Varmus to pioneering chemist Richard Smalley. Medal winners include H-bomb designer Richard Garwin and Harvard physicist Norman Ramsey, both advisers to Republican administrations.

"These are very distinguished scientists with years of public service," says science policy expert Al Teich of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

A separate, 46-page report from the Union of Concerned Scientists, a group that has been critical of administration defense policies, accompanied the statement. It details what the union says were politically influenced science findings in the areas of health, environment, agriculture and national se-



Garwin: Designer of the hydrogen bomb.



Smalley: Pioneering chemist, won Nobel.



Varmus: Ran National Institutes of Health.

curity, among others.

White House Office of Science and Technology Policy chief John Marburger dismissed the criticism as a "conspiracy report" of "disconnected issues that rubbed somebody the wrong way." He said the administration must better explain its processes to scientists.

From the Manhattan Project that created the atomic bomb to today's top-secret Pentagon programs, scientists have a long tradition of advising the federal government. But science has increasingly become the focus of political debate over the last decade.

President Clinton's failure to support needle-sharing programs to stop HIV transmission among drug addicts — despite recommendations from his science advisers that he do so — generated much criticism. So did President Bush's change of heart about a campaign promise to limit carbon dioxide emissions, which have been linked to global warming.

Researchers have been especially angry about administration moves to "peer review" federal regulations, excluding academic scientists while encouraging par-

ticipation by scientists representing the regulated industry.

The report lists the following as objectionable practices, echoing past complaints from former government researchers:

- The removal of highly qualified scientists from lead-poisoning, environment, health and drug-abuse panels and their replacement with industry representatives.

- Forbidding EPA, Health and Human Services, Agriculture, and Interior Department scientists from speaking publicly.

- Revisions to the Endangered Species Act that limit scientists from commenting on the protection of habitats.

- The disbanding of advisory panels on nuclear weapons and arms control.

- The dismissal of assessments by national lab experts on the likelihood that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.

Marburger declined to address the scientists' specific complaints. He said he does not plan to bring the report to Bush's attention but hopes to involve federal agencies in responding to it.

7:35 PM

TO: Secretary Gordon England

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Ken Kreig

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: February 18, 2004

SUBJECT: **SLRG**

Why don't you do some preparatory work in anticipation of a SLRG of how we can reduce manpower in the Department to avoid the problem you've talked about; namely, Bethlehem Steel.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
021804.18

Please respond by: _____


3/5

334

18 Feb 04

OSD 09535-04

7:35 PM

TO: Ken Kreig
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
DATE: February 18, 2004
SUBJECT: SLRG

Please work with Gordon England on the attached memo.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
021804.19


Attach: Snowflake 2/18/04 to Secretary England Re: SLRG

OSD 09536704

7:35 PM

TO: Secretary Gordon England

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Ken Kreig

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 


DATE: February 18, 2004

SUBJECT: **SLRG**

Why don't you do some preparatory work in anticipation of a SLRG of how we can reduce manpower in the Department to avoid the problem you've talked about; namely, Bethlehem Steel.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
021804.18

Please respond by: _____ 

OSD 09535-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42445

7:35 PM

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: February 18, 2004
SUBJECT: **Coast Guard**

Should we go ahead and get the Navy the authority to do what the Coast Guard can do to board ships? Isn't the 21st Century different from the 20th in **this** regard?

Thanks.

DHR/azu
021804.03

Please respond by: 2/28

OSD 09537-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42446

801.2

18 Feb 04

February 8, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Yemen

Yemen

As you know, John Abizaid met with the Yemeni foreign minister and felt it went well. Apparently they want a ship back Aden. I wonder if we ought to consider this and possibly even consider sending the USS COLE back and make an event of it. It would probably be seen as a victory for us and Yemen, versus bin Laden, and possibly have a positive regional impact.

Let's talk about this.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-73

OB

.....
Please respond by 2 / 13 / 04

8/4

8 Feb 04

OSD 09538-04

February 8, 2004

TO: Marc Thiessen
CC: Powell Moore
LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Charts in Congressional Testimony

032

In the future when we are doing charts in Congressional testimony or presentations, someone should put into my remarks the point where it is appropriate to show the chart. Otherwise, I go through my remarks and completely forget about the charts, and the people don't know when to put them up.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-10 (ts computer).doc



Please respond by _____

1 Feb 04

OSD 09539-04

February 8, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Brief for POTUS on Rebalancing

I think I have to put on the list to talk to the President what we are thinking about by way of rebalancing the Active and the Guard and Reserve. The Guard and Reserve are so sensitive that he needs to know what is coming.

Please ask somebody who is involved to begin to prepare a briefing. We should do it in the next month.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-94



Please respond by _____

*John:
Yours!
Thanks,
D*

326

8 Feb 04

OSD 09540-04

February 8, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Garner Memo

See who I should send this note to. I don't know if Kadish reports to me or whether he reports through STRATCOM now. In any event, it should certainly go to Jim Ellis, probably Steve Cambone should get a copy and then whoever else ought to and it ought to say:

373.24

*Attached is an interesting note **from** retired general Jay Garner.
I would appreciate you folks discussing his suggestions and
letting me know what you think we ought to do. Thanks.*

Attach.
1/23/04 Gamer memo to SecDef

DIR:dh
020804-63

.....
Please respond by _____

8-7-04

OSD 09541-04

✓
2/8

January 23, 2004

Dear Mr. Secretary

I read the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation's report on the ability to **assess the** mission capability of the Ballistic **Missile** Defense Initial Defense Capability. **The** report **is fair in its** concerns about assessing the system effectiveness, that "at this point in time, it is not clear what mission **capability will** be demonstrated and that assessments will be "based primarily on **modeling and simulation**" "not end-to-end operational testing **of** a mature integrated system." However, the **assessment is not** a "scorching **criticism**, and **we can** change it to a positive assessment as follows:

The Missile Defense Agency, DOT&E and STRATCOM can work together to tailor the **use of** the Initial Defensive Capability to provide an initial limited operational capability, and a developmental and operational test **bed**. This **cannot be** achieved if the system is tested using the **old** requirements based model of operational testing.

The Initial Defensive Capability is not the full operational capability and the system **has** not completed a holistic operational test. A capabilities based test approach can be used to characterize and document the system's initial operational **performance** capability. Flight-testing, simulations, command and control exercises **and** system integration checkouts completed prior to **Initial** Defensive Capability can be **used** to determine the system's initial performance capability **and** expected level of protection. The basis for this is:

Components of the initial Ballistic Missile Defense **System** have **undergone a series of** intercept flight tests demonstrating its ability to detect, track, intercept **and destroy** Intercontinental Ballistic **Missile** reentry vehicles.

The integrated functions of the system, to include battle management, command and control, communications, sensor performance **and** integration, ground-based interceptors, have been demonstrated.

Flight tests, simulations and command and control exercises have stressed the **systems** operational software and computer systems.

System Integration and Checkout ground testing (no flight intercept **test**: of the actual system hardware and **software will** be conducted **and should** provide a reasonable **level of** confidence that the system is integrated and operational.

The Initial Defensive Capability **is** the first increment **of** a capabilities **based** approach to developing and providing Ballistic Missile Defense. Trying to fake early limited operational advantage **of** the system's antimissile capabilities under development is prudent. After Initial Defensive Capability the Director Operational Test and Evaluation, working with the Missile Defense **Agency** and STRATCOM, should continue testing and assessing the initial Ballistic Missile System. **Further**, they collectively should **establish a** comprehensive **capabilities based** test program tailored to **increasingly stress the** system with operationally realistic testing, to achieve block capability enhancements **and** to grow the system to full Operational performance capability.

Thanks for the opportunity to respond.

Jay

11-L-0559/OSD/42451

February 8, 2004

TO: Dan Dell'Orto
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Jim Haynes
LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Subpoena

380.015

I would like to see a timetable and an assignment sheet as to who is doing what to comply with this subpoena from the Office of Special Counsel.

John Craddock, please set a meeting for me to get briefed on it.

Thanks.

Attach.
1/22/04 Subpoena

DHR:dh
020804-77

.....
Please respond by 2 / 13 / 04

OB
3/15

8 Feb 04

OSD 09542-04



Office of Special Counsel

✓
2/4

Patrick J. Fitzgerald
Special Counsel

Chicago Office: Dirksen Federal Building
219 South Dearborn Street, Fifth Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60604
(312) 353-5300

Washington Office: Bond Building
1400 New York Avenue, Ninth Floor
Washington, DC NW 20530
(202) 514-1187

Please address all correspondence to the Washington Office

JAN 22 2004


Mr. William James Haynes, II
General Counsel and Defense Legal Services Director
Department of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301-1600

Dear Mr. Haynes:

The attached subpoena duces tecum is being served in connection with the investigation by Special Counsel of the possible disclosure to unauthorized persons of classified information concerning Ambassador Joseph Wilson, his trip to Niger in February 2002, his wife, and matters relating thereto. To the extent the Department of Defense has previously produced documents in connection with this investigation that it believes may be responsive to the subpoena, the Department of Defense may provide notification that it intends to adopt prior production(s) as part of its response to the subpoena. However, any additional documents not yet produced that would be responsive should be produced pursuant to the attached subpoena.

Thank you for your cooperation on this matter. Please do not hesitate to call me if you have any questions.

Very truly yours,


PATRICK J. FITZGERALD
Special Counsel

11-L-0559/OSD/42453

United States District Court

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TO: Department of Defense
Washington, D.C. 2030.1-1600
ATTN: Mr. William James Haynes; II
General Counsel and Defense Legal
Services Director

SUBPOENA TO TESTIFY BEFORE GRAND JURY

SUBPOENA FOR:

PERSON DOCUMENT(S) OR OBJECT(S)

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear and testify before the Grand Jury of the United States District Court at the place, date, and time specified below.

PLACE United States District Courthouse 3 rd and Constitution Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20001	COURTROOM Grand Jury 03-3
	DATE AND TIME February 6, 2004

SEE ATTACHMENT A.

Please see additional information on reverse.

This subpoena shall remain in effect until you are granted leave to depart by the court or by an officer acting on behalf of the court.

U.S. MAGISTRATE IN CHIEF OF COURT Nancy M. Meyer-Whitaker, Chief (BY) DEPUTY CLERK <i>Margaret Casier</i>	DATE January 22, 2004
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	------------------------------

This subpoena is issued upon application of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.



NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NUMBER OF ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY

Ronald Roos
Deputy Special Counsel
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20005

RETURN OF SERVICE (1)

RECEIVED BY SERVER	DATE	PLACE
SERVED	DATE	PLACE

SERVED ON (PRINT NAME)

TRAVEL	SERVICES	TOTAL
--------	----------	-------

DECLARATION OF SERVER(2)

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing information contained in the Return of Service and Statement of Service Fees is true and correct.

Executed on _____
Date *Signature of Server*

Address of Server

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

In lieu of personal appearance before the grand jury, compliance with this subpoena may be made by providing the requested information to FBI Inspector John C. Eckenrode, 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Room 7847, Washington, D.C. 20535, telephone number (b)(6)

(1) As to who may serve a subpoena and the manner of its service see Rule 17(d), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, or Rule 45(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
 (2) "Fees and mileage need not be tendered to the witness upon service of a subpoena issued on behalf of the United States or an officer or agency thereof (Rule 45(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Rule 17(d), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure) or on behalf of certain indigent parties and criminal defendants who are unable to pay such costs (28 USC 1825, Rule 17(b) Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure)".

ATTACHMENT A

All documents, including but not limited to, all electronic records, written records, telephone records of any kind (including but not limited to any documents that memorialize telephone calls having been made), correspondence, computer records, e-mail, storage devices, notes (whether handwritten or typed or in any other format), memoranda, and diary and calendar entries in the possession of the immediate offices of the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Department of Defense, and the staff and employees of those offices, concerning any discussion of the following:

1. Ambassador Joseph Wilson or his wife;
2. Valerie Plame Wilson (or "Valerie Wilson" or "Valerie Plame");
3. A trip undertaken by former Ambassador Joseph Wilson to Niger in 2002 (even if the items/documents themselves do not refer to him by name); including, but not limited to: the origin of such trip (including the persons involved in deciding who would go); the findings or results of such trip by Ambassador Wilson; any relationship Wilson had with any employee at the CIA; contacts, attempted contacts, or discussion of contacts (directly or indirectly) with any members of the media concerning Wilson, his trip, or his wife, including but not limited to, the following media and media personnel:

Robert Novak, Crossfire, Capital Gang, Chicago Sun-Times, Knut Royce, Timothy Phelps, Newsday, Walter Pincus, Richard Leiby, Mike Allen, Dana Priest, Glenn Kessler, Washington Post, Matthew Cooper, John Dickerson, Massimo Calabresi, Michael Duffy, James Carney, Time Magazine, Evan Thomas, Newsweek, Andrea Mitchell, Meet the Press, Chris Matthews, Hardball, MSNBC, Tim Russert, Campbell Brown, NBC, Nicholas Kristof, David Sanger, Judith Miller, New York Times, Greg Hitt, Paul Gigot, Wall Street Journal, John Solomon, Associated Press, USA Today, Jeff Gannon, Talon News.

February 8, 2004

TO: Dan Dell'Orto
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Jim Haynes
LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Subpoena

I would like to see a timetable and an assignment sheet as to who is doing what to comply with this subpoena from the Office of Special Counsel.

John Craddock, please set a meeting for me to get briefed on it.

Thanks.

Attach.
1/22/04 Subpoena

DHR:dh
020804-77

.....
Please respond by 2/13/04

✓
3/1

Sec Def —

I was told this memo
(attached), w/ supporting documents,
precluded the need for a
briefing to you.

2/19
Rec'd 11 Feb
TC

11-L-0559/OSD/42457



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
 OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
 1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
 WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600



INFO MEMO

February 13, 2004, 12:00 P.M.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel *D J Dell'Orto*

SUBJECT: Response to Subpoena from the Special Counsel

- This responds to your request for a time line and status report on the Department's response to this subpoena. (Tab A)
- The subpoena was served on us on Friday, January 23. It sought documents from your office, the Deputy Secretary, Public Affairs and the Under Secretary for Policy. We reviewed it and noted that it did not specify a date limit or the extent of the coverage in the Public Affairs and Policy offices.
- We clarified these points late in the afternoon of January 23 and put out tasking memoranda to the four offices named in the subpoena on Monday, 26 January.
- The searches were conducted at various times during the week of 26 January and the beginning of the following week. We consulted with the action officers in each office as they went along. The searches were completed by the end of the day on Wednesday, February 4.
- We reviewed the responsive documents and reports on the searches, then provided the response to the Special Counsel through the FBI as the subpoena called for on the date specified, Friday February 6.
- A copy of the response is at Tab B.

380.015

13 Feb 04

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
 As stated

Prepared By: Stewart F. Aly, Acting DGC (Legal Counsel), (b)(6)



OSD 09542-04

TAB

A



Office of Special Counsel

Patrick J. Fitzgerald
Special Counsel

Chicago Office: Dirksen Federal Building
219 South Dearborn Street, Fifth Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60604
(312) 353-5300

Washington Office: Bond Building
1400 New York Avenue, Ninth Floor
Washington, DC NW 20530
(202) 514-1187

Please address all correspondence to the Washington Office

JAN 22 2004

Mr. William James Haynes, II
General Counsel and Defense Legal Services Director
Department of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301-1600

Dear Mr. Haynes:

The attached subpoena duces tecum is being served in connection with the investigation by Special Counsel of the possible disclosure to unauthorized persons of classified information concerning Ambassador Joseph Wilson, his trip to Niger in February 2002, his wife, and matters relating thereto. To the extent the Department of Defense has previously produced documents in connection with this investigation that it believes may be responsive to the subpoena, the Department of Defense may provide notification that it intends to adopt prior production(s) as part of its response to the subpoena. However, any additional documents not yet produced that would be responsive should be produced pursuant to the attached subpoena.

Thank you for your cooperation on this matter. Please do not hesitate to call me if you have any questions.

Very truly yours,


PATRICK J. FITZGERALD
Special Counsel

United States District Court

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TO: Department of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301-1600
ATTN: Mr. William James Haynes, II
General Counsel and Defense Legal
Services Director

SUBPOENA TO TESTIFY BEFORE GRAND JURY

SUBPOENA FOR:

PERSON

DOCUMENT(S) OR OBJECT(S)

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear and testify before the Grand Jury of the United States District Court at the place, date, and time specified below.

<p>PLACE</p> <p>United States District Courthouse 3rd and Constitution Avenue, NW Washington, DC 200.01</p>	<p>COURTROOM</p> <p>Grand Jury 03-3</p> <hr/> <p>DATE AND TIME</p> <p>February 6, 2004</p>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


SEE ATTACHMENT A.

Please see additional information on reverse.

This subpoena shall remain in effect until you are granted leave to depart by the court of by an officer acting on behalf of the court.

<p>U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE OF COURT</p> <p>Nancy M. [Signature]</p> <p>(BY) DEPUTY CLERK</p> <p>[Signature]</p>	<p>DATE</p> <p>January 22, 2004</p>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-------------------------------------

This subpoena is based upon application of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.



NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NUMBER OF ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY

Ronald Roos
Deputy Special Counsel
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20005

RETURN OF SERVICE (1)

RECEIVED BY SERVER	DATE	PLACE
SERVED	DATE	PLACE

SERVED ON (PRINT NAME)

SERVED BY (PRINT NAME)

TITLE

STATEMENT OF SERVICE FEES

TRAVEL	SERVICES	TOTAL

DECLARATION OF SERVER (2)

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing information contained in the Return of Service and Statement of Service Fees is true and correct.

Executed on

Day

Signature of Server

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

In lieu of personal appearance before the grand jury, compliance with this subpoena may be made by providing the requested information to FBI Inspector John C. Eckenrode, 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Room 7847, Washington, D.C. 20535, telephone number

(b)(6)

(1) As to who may serve a subpoena and the manner of its service see Rule 17(d), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, or Rule 45(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
 (2) Fees and mileage need not be tendered to the witness upon service of a subpoena issued on behalf of the United States or an officer or agency thereof (Rule 45(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Rule 17(d), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure) or on behalf of certain indigent parties and criminal defendants who are unable to pay such costs (28 USC 1825, Rule 17(b) Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure).

ATTACHMENT A

All documents, including but not limited to, all electronic records, ~~written~~ records, telephone records of any kind (including but not limited to ~~any~~ documents that memorialize telephone calls having been made), correspondence, computer records, e-mail, Storage devices, notes (whether handwritten or ~~typed~~ or in ~~any other~~ format), ~~memoranda~~, and ~~diary~~ and ~~calendar~~ entries in ~~the possession~~ of the immediate offices of ~~the~~ Secretary of Defense and ~~Deputy Secretary~~ of Defense, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public ~~Affairs~~, and ~~the Office of~~ the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy ~~Department~~ of Defense, and ~~the staff~~ and employees of those offices, concerning any ~~discussion of the following~~:

1. Ambassador Joseph ~~Wilson~~ or his wife;
2. Valerie Plame Wilson (or "Valerie ~~Wilson~~" or "Valerie Plame");
3. A trip undertaken by former Ambassador Joseph ~~Wilson~~ to Niger in 2002 (even if the items/documents ~~themselves~~ do not ~~refer~~ to him by name); including, but not limited to: the origin of such trip (including the persons involved in deciding who would go); the findings or results of such trip by Ambassador ~~Wilson~~; any relationship ~~Wilson~~ had with any employee at the CIA; contacts, attempted ~~contacts~~, or ~~discussion of contacts~~ (~~directly~~ or indirectly) with any members of ~~the media~~ concerning ~~Wilson~~, his trip, or his wife, including but not limited to, the following media and media personnel:

Robert Novak, ~~Crossfire~~, Capital Gang, ~~Chicago Sun-Times~~, ~~Knut Royce~~, Timothy Phelps, Newsday, ~~Walter Pincus~~, Richard Leiby, Mike Allen, Dana Priest, Glenn Kessler, Washington ~~Post~~, Matthew Cooper, ~~John Dickerson~~, Massimo Calabresi, Michael Duffy, James ~~Camey~~, Time Magazine, ~~Evan Thomas~~, Newsweek, ~~Andrea Mitchell~~, ~~Meet the Press~~, Chris Matthews, Hardball, MSNBC, Tim ~~Russert~~, Campbell Brown, NBC, Nicholas ~~Kristof~~, David ~~Sanger~~, Judith Miller, New York Times, Greg ~~Hitt~~, Paul ~~Gigot~~, Wall ~~Street Journal~~, John Solomon, Associated Press, USA ~~Today~~, Jeff Gannon, Talon ~~News~~.

TAB

B



**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1600**



February 6, 2004

Patrick J. Fitzgerald, Esq.
Special Counsel
Washington Office
1400 New York Avenue, Ninth Floor
Washington, DC 20530

Dear Pat:

This letter provides the response of the Department of Defense to the subpoena dated January 22, 2004, regarding your investigation into possible disclosure to unauthorized persons of classified information.

The Secretary and Deputy Secretary directed searches of their immediate offices; the documents located in these searches are attached (pages 1 through 53). Documents located in the search of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) are also attached (pages 54 through 78). No responsive documents were located in the search of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy).

The documents provided with this letter are described in the attached index. Each page bears a Bates number and a label, "CIA LEAKS SUBPOENA, which we have applied for identification purposes.

In accordance with my discussion with Ron Roos on February 3, I have retained here non-responsive documents in three categories: 1) articles published in the news media; 2) transcripts of broadcast media interviews, and 3) documents indicating contacts with individuals listed in paragraph 3 of the subpoena which did not refer to the subject matters listed in that paragraph and did not occur between June 1 and October 31, 2003. These materials were submitted to us as they were located during the searches described above, which were conducted using search terms somewhat more expansive than those in the subpoena to ensure that nothing was missed. The non-responsive materials are available for your review on request.

There is one other document which we have not provided to you in full: a transcript of a meeting Secretary Rumsfeld held with the Editorial Board of the Washington Post on January 30 of this year after we received your subpoena but before we completed our search. We have numbered the pages (Bates range 56 to 78) but have included in the material provided to you only the two pages which comprise the passing mention of Ambassador Wilson. The remaining pages of the transcript do not address the subject of your subpoena at all, and as they contain comments of Board members and Secretary Rumsfeld's comments made both on and off the record,



11-L-0559/OSD/42465


they are somewhat sensitive. I am retaining them and will make them available for you review on request.

These documents are provided in addition to those previously provided to the Department of Justice in response to a letter of October 24, 2003 from Deputy Assistant Attorney General Bruce Swartz. We adopt that response as part of our response to this subpoena. I still retain three pages described in my letter of November 5, 2003, to Deputy Assistant Attorney General Swartz. I will make these pages available to you for inspection and review at your convenience.

Some of the documents contain personal information of members of the public, such as private email addresses, and some pages contain information about friends and family members of senior officials. These are pages 1, 2, 11 and 12. We ask that you handle them accordingly, noting the security concerns related to family members.

If you have any questions, please call me at (b)(6) My email address is (b)(6)

Sincerely,


Stewart F. Aly
Acting Deputy General Counsel
Legal Counsel

INDEX OF RESPONSIVE DOCUMENTS

Office of Special Counsel Subpoena
January 23, 2003

<u>Documents Which Do Not Refer to the Wilsons or Trip to Niger</u>	<u>Bates Range</u>
Entries from Secretary Rumsfeld's Calendar	1 to 2
Entries from Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz's Calendar	3 to 6
Entries from Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz's Call List	7 to 10
Entries from Assistant Secretary Di Rita's Calendar	11 to 12
Entries from Assistant Secretary Di Rita's Call List	13 to 19
Emails from Office of the Secretary of Defense Computer System	20 to 53

<u>Documents Which Do Refer to the Wilsons</u>	<u>Bates Range</u>
DoD Press Guidance dated October 3, 2003	54 to 55
Excerpt of Transcript of Washington Post Editorial Board Interview with Secretary Rumsfeld	62 and 63

07/14/03,8:01 AM

Sunday 13 July 2003

(SA Erfurdt)

Wolfowitz returns 4:00pm

6:30am PA Prep w/Di Rita @ Residence
7:00am (T) Call w/Dr. Rice @ Residence
7:30am Depart Residence w/Di Rita (Hollen **Johnson** will meet @ NBC)
7:45am Arrive NBC Studio, 4001 Nebraska Avenue, N.W.
8:00am-8:25 Tape NBC Interview w/Tim Russert
8:30am Depart **NBC** Studio
8:50am Arrive ABC Studio, 1717 DeSales Street **N.W.**
9:00am-9:20 Live ABC Interview w/George Stephanopoulos
9:25am Press **Stakeout**
9:35am Depart **ABC** Studio
9:50am Arrive Residence
11:00am Church

JR, Marcy, Kailey, Lukas @ Richmond

Friday 29 August 2003

(SA Mike Erfurdt)

POTUS @ Crawford 2-31 Aug

Travel

8:30am (MT) PDB via SVTC

9:00am (MT) PA Prep w/Torie Clarke

9:30am-9:45 (MT) Newsweek Telephone Interview w/Evan **Thomas**, Di Rita

10:00am-10:45 (MT) John McWethy/ABC Interview

Dennys/Marshalls Visit

Keyword: Tim Russert

Search Mode: Entire Message

Case Sensitive: No

3/23/2003	9:00AM	S	SD Interview w/Tim Russert, Meet the Press
4/6/2003	9:00 AM	S	Live/NBC's Meet the Press (w/VCJCS) w/Tim Russert
7/27/2003	7:45 AM	S	Pretape Meet the Press w/Tim Russert, NBC Studios/Susan Wallace will join at NBC

Dep Sec Wolfowitz Calendar

Find Results Report

Keyword: Campbell Brown
Search Mode: Entire Message
Case Sensitive: No

4/29/2003	12:15 PM	S	Lunch w/Campbell Brown +, 3E912
10/19/2003	6:30 PM	S	Farewell Party iho Campbell Brown, TBD



Message: Pretape Meet the Press w/Tim Russert, NBC Studios/Susan Wallace will join at NBC

Category: Appointment/Meetings

Time: 7:45 AM to 8:10 AM

Alarm:

Date: 7/27/2003

Frequency: Single

Attribute: Normal

Message: HOLD/KK

Category: Appointment/Meetings

Time: 6:15 PM to 7:00 PM

Alarm:

Date: 6/4/2003

Frequency: Single

Attribute: Normal

Note: Dana Priest, Washington Post

Wolfowitz Call List

9/22, 1740, 2003	Paul Gigot	(b)(6)	COMPLETED
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Wolfowitr Call List

10/4, 1615,	Paul Gigot	(b)(6)	COMPLETED
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Wolfowitz Call List

10/29, 07 10, 2003	Newt Gingrich re Walter Pincus WP article	(b)(6)	WE OWE
10/29, 0915, 2003	Update: Wanted to make sure you had seen the article.		
10/30, 1410, 2003	Paul Gigot	(b)(6)	COMPLETED

Wolfowitz Call List

7/15, 1820, 2003	Paul Gigot	(b)(6)	COMPLETED
---------------------	------------	--------	-----------

Appointment/Meetings

(Dropoff Isabelle)
6:00 AM-7:00 AM Office/Phone Time
7:25 AM-7:45 AM Staff Meetingw/Cambone, et al. (3E880)
8:00 AM-8:30 AM HOST Exec **Sec** Staff Meeting (3E880)
8:15 AM-9:00 AM PA Staff Mtg (2E800)
9:00 AM-9:30 AM Bucci, Mainardi, Nestel, re: Schedule Meeting Prebrief (3E880)
☐ Murphy, Trip Coordinator
9:30 AM-10:00 AM [PA Conference Call w/Press Secretaries]
9:40 AM-9:55 AM Rhynedance (2E800)
9:55 AM-10:20 AM Eileen O'Connor, re: Interview (3E880)
1:00 AM-11:40 AM Holcomb, VCJCS w/SecDef, re: Personnel (3E880)
1:30 AM-12:00 PM PA Conference Call w/Press Secretaries
2:00 PM-1:00 PM Eric Ruff - Lunch (Gold Room)
1:00 PM-1:30 PM Executive Committee Meeting w/PA (2E800)
1:30 PM-2:00 PM PA Staff Time (2E800)
2:00 PM-2:30 PM Office/Phone Time
2:30 PM-3:00 PM Gary Thatcher w/Durnan, DuBois, O'Beirne, Nagelmann, re: Interview (3E880)
3:00 PM-3:30 PM Nelson Warfield, re: Interview (3E880)
3:30 PM-4:00 PM Evan Thomas, CDR Jeff Davis (3E880)
4:00 PM-5:00 PM Office Time
5:00 PM-5:30 PM David Cloud (WSJ), re: Interview (3E880)
5:30 PM-6:15 PM SLRG w/SecDef (3E928)
6:30 PM-7:00 PM DEPART Pentagon

Larry Di Rita
Friday, August 29, 2003
Time Printed: 1:24 PM

Appointment/Meetings

(Drop off Isabelle)
6:00 AM-7:25 AM Office/Phone Time
7:25 AM-7:45 AM Staff Meeting w/Cambone, et al. (3E880)
8:30 AM-8:45 AM PA Staff Mtg (2E800)
8:45 AM-9:30 AM Round Table w/DSD (3E944)
9:30 AM-10:00 AM AMB Ghougassian (3E880)
10:00 AM-10:30 AM Bucci, Mainardi, Nestel, re: Schedule Meeting Prebrief (3E880)
[E] Murphy, Trip Coordinator
10:30 AM-11:00 AM Henry, GEN Hawkins, Joanne Dickhow, re: Coord Team on Bombing (2E936)
11:00 AM-11:30 AM Office/Phone Time
11:30 AM-11:45 AM SecDef Newseek Telephone Interview w/Evan Thomas
12:00 PM-1:00 PM Lunch
1:00 PM-2:00 PM PA Staff Time (2E800)
2:00 PM-2:30 PM Office/Phone Time
2:30 PM-3:15 PM Luti, Bucci, et al, re: Trip Planning (3E880)

TELEPHONE LOG

2003

DATE	TIME	CALLER	NUMBER	REMARKS
7/8	1730	M. Bullingalea		Needs to talk <input type="checkbox"/>
7/8	1830	Mark Mykityshyn	(b)(6)	in DC 7/15 + 7/16 would like to stop by <input type="checkbox"/>
7/9	0820	Kevin Kellems		re: Maj Skelly <input type="checkbox"/>
7/9	0835	Michael Lalsky	(b)(6)	Wajud - next talk before 10:15 w/ Dina Powell <input type="checkbox"/>
7/9		Frank Gaffney	cell - (b)(6)	scheduling <input type="checkbox"/>
7/9	1205	Evan Thomas Newsweek (in Atlanta)	(b)(6) km - 2107	back on Thursday (b)(6) <input type="checkbox"/>
7/9	1450	Eric Ruff	(b)(6)	<input type="checkbox"/>

TELEPHONE LOG

2003

Mr. Di Rito

DATE	TIME	CALLER	NUMBER	REMARKS
	<u>Reminder</u>	Adm. G.	(b)(6)	re: phone <input type="checkbox"/>
7/4	1515	Harry Wertzel	(b)(6)	10 min. conversation <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Reminder</u>	Ann Hansen	(b)(6)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
7/10	1010	Jim Burns	(b)(6)	Saw you on Fox - <u>used to work</u> for dot com news svc - perhaps he could work here <input type="checkbox"/>
	<u>Reminder</u>	Mitch Semel	(b)(6)	<input type="checkbox"/>
7/10	1155	Bryan Whitman	(b)(6)	update on Sunday shows <input type="checkbox"/>
7/10		Paul Gigot WSJ Editorial Page	(b)(6)	Couple items - + permission to talk to <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

TELEPHONE LOG

2003

Mr. Di Rito

DATE TIME CALLER NUMBER REMARKS

7/10	1305	Frank Gaffney	(b)(6)	really needs scheduling <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> left msg
7/10	1330	Richard Pate	(b)(6)	as soon as possible <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
7/10	1335	Mr. Haynes		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
3/10	1410	Mr. Faith (on Hill)	thru office	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
7/10		Andre Hollis	(b)(6)	<input type="checkbox"/>
7/10	1520	Peter Kunkel	(b)(6)	follow-up <input type="checkbox"/>
7/10		Ever Thomas Newsweek	(b)(6)	tomorrow am or 300 Cover on Iraq <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

TELEPHONE LOG

2003

Mr. Di Rita

DATE	TIME	CALLER	NUMBER	REMARKS
7/21		Walter Pinkus Post	(b)(6)	re: Gen Alsadi - Fragi liaison LM Status? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
7/21	1730	Gen Casey Stopped by		<input type="checkbox"/>
7/21	1730	Dr. Cawson Stopped by		<input type="checkbox"/>
7/21	1730	Dr. Winkler Stopped by		<input type="checkbox"/>
7/21	1745	Mr. Duran		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
7/21	1820	Mr Haynes		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
7/22	0830	Mr Moore		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

TELEPHONE LOG

2003

Mr. Di Rita

DATE	TIME	CALLER	NUMBER	REMARKS
7/28				Mr. McNeil - you wants to present Dept. of Defense a Patriot Award in Aug - wants to discuss it.
7/28	1150	Jamie Bushman	(b)(6)	ret'd your call <input type="checkbox"/>
7/28	1235	Asst Secy Navy John Young	(b)(6)	Wants you to elect SA on the phone conversation re Lab of Chairman Hunter today re "Buy America" <input type="checkbox"/>
7/28	1510	Mrs. Di Rita		ret'd your call <input type="checkbox"/>
7/28	1525	Walter Cincus Wash. Post	(b)(6)	re your earlier conversation re Hon. Sasser <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
7/28	1530	Denny Fletcher AET	(b)(6)	Pls call <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
7/28		o/did Smith CPA-CMS	(b)(6)	Pls call <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

TELEPHONE LOG

2003

Mr. Di Rita

DATE	TIME	CALLER	NUMBER	REMARKS
9/10	1520	Evan Thomas Newsweek	(b)(6)	<input type="checkbox"/>
9/10	1930	Mr. Durnan	(b)(6)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
9/10	1005	Linda Cord		see call from 9/5 <input type="checkbox"/>
9/10	0825	Peter Flory	(b)(6)	re: mnnA <input type="checkbox"/>
9/11	0945	Richard Boucher	(b)(6)	<input type="checkbox"/>
9/11	1000	Dr. Croude	MLP	<input type="checkbox"/>
9/11	1009	Sen. Phil Graham	(b)(6)	ryc <input type="checkbox"/>

TELEPHONE LOG

2003

Mr. Di Rita

DATE TIME CALLER NUMBER REMARKS

12/16

12/16

1730

Tom Pickett
Post

(b)(6)

re: mtg w/ DSD?
time?

12/16

1610

Newt
Gingrich

(b)(6)

12/17

0955

Evan Thomas

(b)(6)

12/17

1030

Rowan
Scarborough

(b)(6)

12/17

1045

Mr. Moore

12/17

1105

Jackie
Arends

(b)(6)

just checking
in -
don't be

Unknown

From: Murphy, Mary Claire, CIV, OSD
Sent: Friday, August 01, 2003 4:11 PM
To: Di Rita, Larry, CIV. OSD

The SecDef ~~knows Evan~~ Thomas doesn't he -- thank **you** letter would be Dear **Evan**?

Mary Claire Murphy
Director of Protocol
Office of the Secretary of Defense

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/42487

Unknown

From: Alexander, Rebecca, MSgt., OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2003 4:49 PM
To: Crowder, Susan, CIV, OSD
Subject: FW: 10 Questions

Forwarded per Kevin's request

v/r
rebecca

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2003 3:02 PM
To: kevin.kellerns@osd.mil
Subject: 10 Questions

Kevin,

Jay Carney here. Was wondering whether Secretary Wolfowitz might be interested in being the **subject** of Time's interview **page**, called "10 Questions", for this **week**, given that he's just back from Iraq and **has** a heck of a **story** to tell. It's a straight up Q&A, of which **we** run 10 questions and answers, and it appears **close** to the front **of** the **magazine**. Recent **subjects** include Kofi Annan, **which** I did, Bill O'Reilly, Madeleine Albright and Rudy Giuliani. I can email you **some of these** for reference **if** you'd like.

Let me know. And thanks for considering it.

-Jay C.

.....
James Carney
Deputy Washington Bureau Chief
TIME Magazine
555 12th Street, NW
Suite 600
Washington, DC 20004

(b)(6)

This message is the property of Time Inc. or its affiliates. It may be legally privileged and/or confidential and is intended only for the use of the **addressee(s)**. No addressee should **forward**, print, copy, or otherwise reproduce this message in any manner that **would** allow it to **be** viewed by any individual not originally listed as a recipient. **If** the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any unauthorized disclosure, dissemination, distribution, copying or the taking of any action in reliance on the **information** herein is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication

in error, please immediately notify the sender and delete this message.
Thank you.

Unknown

From: Kellems, Kevin, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, September 02, 2003 7:19 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: Crowder, Susan, CIV, OSD
Subject: FW: A little bird..

Sir,
Do you wish to engage on this one through a surrogate -- or not at all?

V/r,
Kevin

-----Original Message-----

From: Mike Allen [mailto:allenm@washpost.com]
Sent: Tuesday, September 02, 2003 6:27 PM
To: Kellems, Kevin, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: A little bird...

... reports that there is movement towards going forward with a UN resolution that would give the UN a role with some of the international forces. I can get the basics elsewhere. But if you have a second, I was hoping you might be generous enough as a SAO to give some sense of how this came about. Hope the honor cordon went well. Appreciatively, Mike, 202-334-1215

Unknown

From: Kellems, Kevin, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Friday, September 12, 2003 1:23 PM
To: DeFrank, James, COL, OASPPA
Cc: Caldwell, Bill, MG, OSD; Sherline, Stephanie, CIV, OSD
Subject: AP on AJ Qaeda

Jay,

The latest (from Matt Kelly) is that he and/or John Salomon would be the ones who would see DSD if we can carve out a narrow slot and he approves.

They are faxing me something - perhaps a draft story or query.

I assume that synchs with what Pauline is saying?

V/r,
Kevin

Unknown

From: Kellems, Kevin, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, June 10, 2003 6:59 PM
To: (b)(6)
CC: Caldwell, Bill, MG, OSD; Crowder, Susan, CIV, OSD
Subject: FW: Dana Priest

-----Original Message-----

From: Dana Priest (mailto:priestd@washpost.com)
Sent: Tuesday, June 10, 2003 6:57 PM
To: kevin.kellems@osd.mil
Subject: Dana Priest

Kevin,

The Indonesia article describes in detail the ambush in Papua and the preliminary assessment on the part of State, Indonesian police and FBI that elements of the Indonesia military carried this out. It will detail an intelligence report implicating GEN Sutarto in the attack (Nov. 27 SEIB) and instructing subordinates to withhold evidence from the FBI (Feb., 22, 2003).

It also details the Defense Department's efforts to maintain the flow of training funds to the Indonesian military, despite foot-dragging on the investigation. As you know they were not so cooperative when the FBI came the first time. I am saying the DepSec Wolfowitz still dominates U.S. policy on Indonesia.

I would like to have him explain the rationale for continuing the CT and IMET funding. And I want to follow up on the "new intelligence" he said he was aware of that pointed in *some* other direction. Having queried my good sources after our conversation, I find no such intelligence.

Thanks for your time, Dana

(b)(6)

Unknown

From: Cantrell, Steven, CIV, ATSD(IO)
Sent: Thursday, October 03, 2002 5:04 PM
To: 'Dana Priest'
Subject: RE: Dana Priest

Importance: LOW

Dana,
I recently got back from travel...still catching up on my in basket and emails. I appreciate your interest in our office; however, since you are a member of the Press, I need you to make this request through Public Affairs. Cheers Steve

Steven A. Cantrell
Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense (Intelligence Oversight)

Phone: (b)(6)
DSN:
Unclass FAX: (b)(6)
Secure FAX:

-----Original Message-----

From: Dana Priest <mailto:pr,estd@was.gost.com>
Sent: Monday, September 30, 2002 6:03 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: Dana Priest

Steven,

I've been meaning to write to you for a while to see if I could drop by for a chat. I looked at your website and I have to say that having covered the Pentagon for eight years, I had no idea such an office with such a mission even existed. Better yet, could I take you to lunch out of the building anytime soon?

Thanks,
Dana Priest

(b)(6)

Unknown

From: Oleszewski, Richard, CIV, OASD-PA
sent Friday, October 17, 2003 4:08 PM
To: Caldwell, Bill, MG, OSD; Garyard, Stephen, COL, OSD
Cc: Crowder, Susan, CIV, OSD; Sherline, Stephanie, CIV, OSD
Subject: Dana Priest, Washington Post

Importance: High

Kevin asked that I apprise you of a phone call Dana Priest made here today regarding Patsy Spears. Priest is working on a profile of Patsy Spears and would like to speak with the Deputy on that topic. Kevin had no recommendation regarding whether to speak with Priest, but thought you should be aware that she is pursuing the story.

Priest's #:

Unknown

From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2003 1:19 PM
To: Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA
Subject: Friday

George,

Just so you are aware, SD has scheduled Torie as follows on Friday

9:00am - PA Pre-brief (for both Thomas and McWethy)

9:30 - Phone interview with Evan Thomas

10:00-10:45 - McWethy Interview

Can you please *give* Torie a head's up?

Thanks!

(b)(6)

Unknown



From: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD
Sent: Thursday, August 21, 2003 3:57 PM
To: Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: LTG Craddock w/Shanker, NYT - Friday 22 August

That is so weird, honestly don't understand it all.

-----Original Message-----

From: Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, August 21, 2003 3:57 PM
To: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD
Subject: RE: LTG Craddock w/Shanker, NYT - Friday 22 August

Your e-mails are about the only thing entrusted to me now for **SecDef...???????????????** I seem fine with DepSec's office.


From: 
Sent: Thursday, August 21, 2003 3:49 PM
To: Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: LTG Craddock w/Shanker, NYT - Friday 22 August



Thanks.

How is it going for you?

-----Original Message-----

From: Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, August 21, 2003 3:49 PM
To: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD
Subject: RE: LTG Craddock w/Shanker, NYT - Friday 22 August

10 is perfect for Thom.


From: 
Sent: Thursday, August 21, 2003 11:36 AM
To: Wheeler, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA; Krueger, Brent, CIV, OASD-PA; Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; Cooper, John, CIV, OASD-PA; Henderson, Hedy; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Willcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA; Murphy, Margaret, CIV, OASD-PA; Turenne, Jr, Bill, CIV, OASD-PA; Bucci, Steven, COL, OSD; Keck, Gary LTC OASD(PA); DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; Davis, Jeff, LCDR, OASD-PA; Kellems, Kevin, CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: Curcio, Sharon, CIV, OSD
Subject: RE: LTG Craddock w/Shanker, NYT - Friday 22 August

Thanks - let me know if time works.
Cathy.

-----Original Message-----

From: Wheeler, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, August 21, 2003 11:38 AM
To: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD; Krueger, Brent, CIV, OASD-PA; Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; Cooper, John, CIV, OASD-PA; Henderson, Hedy; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Willcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA; Murphy, Margaret, CIV, OASD-PA; Turenne, Jr, Bill, CIV, OASD-PA; Bucci, Steven, COL, OSD; Keck, Gary LTC OASD(PA); DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; Davis, Jeff, LCDR, OASD-PA; Kellems, Kevin, CIV, OASD-PA

Cc: Curcio, Sharon, CIV, OSD
Subject: RE: LTG Craddock w/Shanker, NYT - Friday 22 August

Bryan is on leave. DeFrank will prebrief and tape. No time set until now! Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD
Sent: Thursday, August 21, 2003 11:32 AM
To: Wheeler, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA; Krueger, Brent CIV, OASD-PA; Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; Cooper, John, CIV, OASD-PA; Henderson, Hedy; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Willcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA; Murphy, Margaret, CIV, OASD-PA; Turenne, Jr, Bill., CIV, OASD-PA; Bucc, Steven, COL, OSD; Keck, Gary LTC OASD(PA); DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; Davis, Jeff, LCDR, OASD-PA; Kellems, Kevin, CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: Curcio, Sharon, CIV, OSD
LTG Craddock w/Shanker, NYT - Friday 22 August

LTG Craddock said he would meet w/Thom Shanker w/NYT but wanted someone, he mentioned Bryan there to tape it. Should I still have Col DeFrank down as prebrief? Was a time set or should I set one, perhaps 10:00am w/prep 9:45am?

Let me know - thanks,
Cathy.

-----Original Message-----

From: wheeler, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, August 21, 2003 10:11 AM
To: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD; Krueger, Brent, CIV, OASD-PA; Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASDPA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; Cooper, John, CIV, OASD-PA; Henderson, Hedy; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Willcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA; Murphy, Margaret, CIV, OASD-PA; Turenne, Jr, Bill., CIV, OASD-PA; Bucc, Steven, COL, OSD; Keck, Gary LTC OASD(PA); DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; Davis, Jeff, LCDR, OASD-PA; Kellems, Kevin, CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: Curcio, Sharon, CIV, OSD
Subject: RE: PA Items @ TACS and others

Updates:

~SecDef will do phone interview with Evan Thomas next Friday. Mr. Thomas would prefer to avoid the times 12:00pm and 3:00 (Eastern),

~McWethy will not go to New Mexico. Mr. Di Rita Whitman will work with McWethy to find interview place

~Mark Thompson (TIME) interview is today at 2:30 tent.) and will take place en route to NM. More on this

~Thom Shanker (NYT) interview will likely tomorrow with Gen. Craddock. Col DeFrank will prebrief Gen.

-----Original Message-----

From: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD
Sent: Monday, August 18, 2003 3:04 PM
To: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD; Krueger, Brent, CIV, OASD-PA; Wheeler, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA; Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; ~~cooper~~ Cooper, John, CIV, OASD-PA; Henderson, Hedy; Abbott, Catherine, COL, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Wilcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA; Murphy, Margaret, CIV, OASD-PA; Turenne, Jr, Bill., CIV, OASD-PA; Bucci, Steven, COL, OSD
Cc: Curcio, Sharon, CIV, OSD
RE: PA Items @ TAOS

Per Col Bucci would like to try these time for Friday 29 August @ Taos:

9:30am (Mountain Time) - Larry Di Rita meets w/SecDef

10:00am-10:15 (MT) - Newsweek phone interview w/Evan Thomas

10:30am (MT) - In person ABC interview w/John McWethy

It is my understanding from Bryan that Larry Di Rita plans to fly to Taos to meet w/SecDef on Friday 29 August.

Let me know - thanks,
Cathy.

-----Original Message-----

From: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD
Sent: Monday, August 18, 2003 11:28 AM
To: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD; Krueger, Brent, CIV, OASD-PA; Wheeler, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA; Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASPPA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASDPA; DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; Cooper, John, CIV, OASD-PA; Henderson, Hedy; Abbott, Catherine, COL, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Wilcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA; Murphy, Margaret, CIV, OASD-PA; Turenne, Jr, Bill., CIV, OASD-PA; Bucci, Steven, COL, OSD
Subject: PA Items @ TAOS

SecDef has agreed to the Newsweek phone interview w/Evan Thomas

AND

In person interview @ TAOS w/John McWethy.

Before I get started, any thoughts as to when McWethy wants to fly out?
Would it make sense to do these either Thur 28 Aug or Fri 29 Aug?

Let me know what would be best,

Thanks - Cathy.

Unknown

From: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD
Sent: Thursday, August 21, 2003 3:56 PM
To: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD; **Krueger**, Brent, CIV, OASPPA; Wheeler, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA; Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA; **Rhynedance**, George, COL, OASD-PA; **DeFrank**, James, COL, OASD-PA; Cooper, John, CIV, **OASD-PA**; Henderson, Hedy; **Abbott**, Catherine, COL, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Wilcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA; Murphy, Margaret, CIV, OASD-PA; Turenne, Jr, Bill., CIV, OASD-PA **Bucci**, Steven, COL, OSD
Cc: **Curcio**, Sharon, CIV, OSD
Subject: RE: McWethy @ Taos w/SecDef Friday 29 August

PS - SecDef said Torie should come out to Taos w/McWethy.!! Over to you !

-----Original Message-----

From: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD
Sent: Thursday, August 21, 2003 3:47 PM
To: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD; **Krueger**, Brent, CIV, OASD-PA; Wheeler, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA; Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA; **Rhynedance**, George, COL, OASD-PA; **DeFrank**, James, COL, OASD-PA; Cooper, John, CIV, OASD-PA; Henderson, Hedy; **Abbott**, Catherine, COL, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Wilcox, Chris, CIV, OASPPA; Murphy, Margaret, CIV, OASD-PA; Turenne, Jr, Bill., CIV, OASD-PA; **Bucci**, Steven, COL, OSD
Cc: **Curcio**, Sharon, CIV, OSD
Subject: McWethy@ Taos w/SecDef Friday 29 August
Importance: High

I have been told to put this back on the SecDef schedule, per SecDef who just spoke with Torie. Will **plan** to do this Friday 29 August in Taos (all times below are MT):

9:00am - PA Prep in Taos w/Larry Di Rita

9:30am - Newsweek Telephone Interview w/Evan Thomas (already set)

10:00am-10:45 - In person interview w/John McWethy. ABC

Let me know soonest if this works - thanks,
Cathy.

11-L-0559/OSD/42499

Unknown

From: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD
Sent: Tuesday, August 26, 2003 3:10 PM
To: Wheeler, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: PA Items @ TAOS and others

FYI - just in from Taos - (b)(6) says SD will speak to Tone tomorrow on the phone, for now the Newsweek Telephone Interview w/Evan Thomas is (T) until SD talks to Torie - thanks, Cathy.

-----Original Message-----

From: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD
Sent: Tuesday, August 26, 2003 12:43 PM
To: Wheeler, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: PA Items @ TAOS and others

Col Bucci agrees that should work,

Cathy.

-----Original Message-----

From: wheeler, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, August 26, 2003 12:22 PM
To: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD
Subject: RE: PA Items @ TAOS and others

it did work for the *TIME one* last week, just wanted to make sure the rules don't change when he's in taos. thx!

-----Original Message-----

From: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD
Sent: Tuesday, August 26, 2003 12:18 PM
To: Wheeler, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: PA Items @ TAOS and others

You should contact cables to see if that would work, sounds right.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: Wheeler, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, August 26, 2003 12:19 PM
To: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD
Subject: RE: PA Items @ TAOS and others

We will need to record so can we get Evan to call cables, cables to conference in recording studio and then SecDef? Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD
Sent: Thursday, August 21, 2003 11:18 AM
To: Wheeler, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: PA Items @ TAOS and others

He should go through cables

-----Original Message-----

From: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD
Sent: Thursday, August 21, 2003 11:17 AM
To: Wheeler, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: PA Items @ TAOS and others

Thanks !

-----Original Message-----

From: Wheeler, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA
sent: Thursday, August 21, 2003 11:10 AM
To: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD; Krueger, Brent, CIV, OASD-PA; Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; Cooper, John, CIV, OASPPA; Henderson, Hedy; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Willcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA; Murphy, Margaret, CIV, OASD-PA; Turenne, Jr, Bill., CIV, OASD-PA; Bucci, Steven, COL, OSD; Keck, Gary LTC OASD(PA); DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; Davis, Jeff, LCDR, OASD-PA; Kellems, Kevin, CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: Curcio, Sharon, CIV, OSD
Subject: RE: PA Items @ TAOS and others

11:30 Eastern works for Mr. Thomas, Newsweek.

-----Original Message-----

From: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD
Sent: Thursday, August 21, 2003 10:25 AM
To: Wheeler, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA; Krueger, Brent, CIV, OASD-PA; Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; Cooper, John, CIV, OASD-PA; Henderson, Hedy; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Willcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA; Murphy, Margaret, CIV, OASD-PA; Turenne, Jr, Bill., CIV, OASD-PA; Bucci, Steven, COL, OSD; Keck, Gary LTC OASD(PA); DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; Davis, Jeff, LCDR, OASD-PA; Kellems, Kevin, CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: Curcio, Sharon, CIV,
Subject: RE: PA Items @ TAOS and others

We had the Evan Thomas interview on for 10:00am (MT) which which is noon our time. SD has a scheduled item at 9am and we had Larry Di Rita at 9:30, but I guess that is off now as McWethy is not going. So I would imagine we could move the call up to 9:30am - let me know if that works if not, it will not be convenient to do it later for SecDef.

Cathy.

-----Original Message-----

From: Wheeler, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, August 21, 2003 10:11 AM
To: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD; Krueger, Brent, CIV, OASD-PA; Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; Cooper, John, CIV, OASD-PA; Henderson, Hedy; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Willcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA; Murphy, Margaret, CIV, OASD-PA; Turenne, Jr, Bill., CIV, OASD-PA; Bucci, Steven, COL, OSD; Keck, Gary LTC OASD(PA); DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; Davis, Jeff, LCDR, OASPPA; Kellems, Kevin, CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: Curcio, Sharon, CIV, OSD
Subject: RE: PA Items @ TAOS and others

Updates:

~**SecDef** will do phone interview with Evan Thomas next Friday. Mr. Thomas would prefer to avoid the times between 12:00pm and 3:00 (Eastern), if possible.

~**McWethy** will not go to New Mexico. Mr. Di Rita and Mr. Whitman will work with McWethy to find an alternative interview place and time.

-Mark Thompson (TIME) interview is today at 2:30 (time tent.) and will take place en route to NM. More on this in a subsequent email.

~**Thom Shonker** (NYT) interview will likely take place tomorrow with Gen. Craddock. Col DeFrank will prebrief Gen. Craddock.

-----Original Message-----

From: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD
Sent: Monday, August 18, 2003 3:04 PM
To: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD; Krueger, Brent, CIV, OASD-PA; Wheeler, Hollen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA; Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; Cooper, John, CIV, OASD-PA; Henderson, Hedy; Abbott, Catherine, COL, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Wilcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA; Murphy, Margaret, CIV, OASD-PA; Turenne, Jr, Bill., CIV, OASD-PA; Bucci, Steven, COL, OSD
Cc: Curcio, Sharon, CIV, OSD
Subject: RE: PA Items @ TAOS

Per Col Bucci would like to try these time for Friday 29 August @ Taos:

9:30am(Mountain Time) - Larry Di Rita meets w/SecDef

10:00am-10:15 (MT) - Newsweek phone interview w/Evan Thomas

10:30am (MT) - In person ABC interview w/John McWethy

It is my understanding from Bryan that Larry Di Rita plans to fly to Taos to meet w/SecDef on Friday 29 August.

Let me know - thanks,
Cathy.

-----Original Message-----

From: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD
Sent: Monday, August 18, 2003 11:28 AM
To: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD; Krueger, Brent, CIV, OASPPA; Wheeler, Hllen Johnson, CIV, OASD-PA; Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASDPA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASPPA; DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; Cooper, John, CIV, OASDPA; Henderson, Hedy; Abbott, Catherine, COL, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-

PA; Willcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA; Murphy, Margaret, CIV, OASD-PA; Turenne, Jr, Bill., CIV, OASD-PA; Bucci, Steven, COL, OSD
Subject: PA Item @ TAOS

SecDef has agreed to the Newsweek phone interview w/Evan Thomas

AND

In person interview @ TAOS w/John McWethy.

Before I get started, any thoughts as to when McWethy wants to fly out? Would it make sense to do these either Thur 28 Aug or Fri 29 Aug?

Let me know what would be best,

Thanks - Cathy.

11-L-0559/OSD/42503

cc

Unknown

From: Wehner, Peter H. [Peter_H._Wehner@who.eop.gov]
Sent: Tuesday, September 30, 2003 4:09 PM
To: Crowder, Susan, CIV, OSD
Subject: RE: Paul Wolfowitz "Measured against any realistic standard, the progress that's been made in five months ... is extraordinary."

Thanks. Sending around something like his transcript is a pleasure. And people find it useful, I think

-----Original Message-----

From: Crowder, Susan, CIV, OSD [mailto:Susan.Crowder@osd.pentagon.mil]
Sent: Tuesday, September 30, 2003 4:05 PM
To: Wehner, Peter H.
Subject: RE: Paul Wolfowitz: "Measured against any realistic standard, the progress that's been made in five months ... is extraordinary."

Peter, this is just great. He'll be very interested to see who is getting the transcript, and I know he appreciates the job you're doing.

Susan

-----Original Message-----

From: Wehner, Peter H. [mailto:Peter_H._Wehner@who.eop.gov]
Sent: Tuesday, September 30, 2003 3:42 PM
To: Crowder, Susan, CIV, OSD
Subject: RE: Paul Wolfowitz: "Measured against any realistic standard, the progress that's been made in five months ... is extraordinary."

Susan:

Not a problem. Among the names (many of whom are friends, most of whom I know and/or correspond with) that would interest you/Secretary Wolfowitz: Tim Russert. David Von Drehle/Washington Post, Fred Hiatt/Washington Post, Gregg Easterbrook, Jon Rauch, Stuart Taylor. Bill Kristol, Bea Kristol, Charles Krauthammer, Paul Greenberg, David Brooks, David Frum, Kate O'Beime, Ramesh Ponnuru. Jonah Goldberg. William F. Buckley, Vin Weber, Newt Gingrich, Senators Frist and Santorum. Brit Hume, Fred Barnes. Mod Kondracke, Peggy Noonan, Roger Ailes, Mary Matalij, Karen Hughes, Ari Fleischer, Professors Jim Ceaser, Walter Bems, Bernard Lewis, Fouad Ajami, Francis Fukuyama, Hadley Arkes, Robby George, Jean Elshain, Peter Feaver, Victor Davis Hanson, and Leon Kass, Claudia Winkler, Steve Hayes, Terry Eastland, Tom Rose, Paul Gigot, Bill McGurn, Robert Bork, Sean Hannity, Adam Wolfson, Abigail Thernstrom, Midge Decter, Norman Podhoretz, Richard Perle, Ken Adelman, Bill Bennett, James Woolsey, Chris DeMuth, Ed Feulner, Ken Weinstein, Hillel Fradkin, George Will, Man Will, James Q. Wilson. Tony Blankley, Robed Pollock, Ben Wildavsky, Andrew Sullivan, Cal Thomas, Mona Charen, Charles Colson, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Jeff Bell, Jeff Jacoby, John Leo, John Podhoretz. Mark Step. George Weigel, Michael Novak, Richard John Neuhaus, Neal Kozodoy, David Makovsky, and others.

11-L-0559/OSD/42504

CIA LEAKS SUBPOENA

0000037

It's a eclectic list, isn't it? In any event, feel free to share the names w/ Secretary Wolfowitz. But if you could, please don't share it beyond him. In general I tend to keep quiet re: my dealings with folks.

As ever,

Pete

-----Original Message-----

From: Crowder, Susan, CIV, OSD [mailto:Susan.Crowder@osd.pentagon.mil]

Sent: Tuesday, September 30, 2003 2:46 PM

To: Wehner, Peter H.

Subject: RE: Paul Wolfowitz: "Measured against any realistic standard, the progress that's been made in five months ... is extraordinary."

You shouldn't go to any trouble. Just wondered.

-----Original Message-----

From: Wehner, Peter H. [mailto:Peter_H._Wehner@who.eop.gov]

Sent: Tuesday, September 30, 2003 2:36 PM

To: Crowder, Susan, CIV, OSD

Subject: RE: Paul Wolfowitz: "Measured against any realistic standard, the progress that's been made in five months ... is extraordinary."

You bet; my pleasure.

As for the mailings: I select names individually. I'll send it to you in a bit, since I'll need to reconstruct it.

-----Original Message-----

From: Crowder, Susan, CIV, OSD [mailto:Susan.Crowder@osd.pentagon.mil]

Sent: Tuesday, September 30, 2003 2:31 PM

To: Wehner, Peter H.

Cc: Kellem, Kevin, CIV, OASDPA

Subject: RE: Paul Wolfowitz: "Measured against any realistic standard, the progress that's been made in five months ... is extraordinary."

Peter, thanks so much. I don't suppose you have a copy of your mailing list that I could show to PW, do you?

11-L-0559/OSD/42505

c7

-----Original Message-----

From: Wehner, Peter H. [mailto:Peter_H_Wehner@who.eop.gov]

Sent: Tuesday, September 30, 2003 2:30 PM

Subject: Paul Wolfowitz: "Measured against any realistic standard, the progress that's been made in five months ... is extraordinary."

A week ago last Sunday, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz was interviewed by staff writer Jeffrey Goldberg as part of The New Yorker Festival. I am attaching a transcript.

The interview, which took place at the New School University in New York, covered a range of subjects related to the war to liberate Iraq and its aftermath. I found Secretary Wolfowitz's comments compelling and rooted in deep (and admirable) convictions. He also showed remarkable equanimity, given that (to take just one example) a protester rushed the stage, yelling, "Nazi war criminal!" (In all, six people were ejected from the event.)

Despite attempts to shout down Secretary Wolfowitz, the interview proceeded. I'm very glad it did. I think you'll find it noteworthy.

11-L-0559/OSD/42506

12

Unknown

From: Kellems, Kevin, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2003 5:37 PM
To: (b)(6)
cc: Caldwell, Bill, MG, OSD; Sherline, Stephanie, CIV, OSD; Crowder, Susan, CIV, OSD
Subject: FW: start spreading the news...

Sir,
I very strongly recommend that you stop by this send-off if possible. It is guaranteed to be a lively, bipartisan and extremely connected group of people who rarely gather in one place -- and who will be in good spirits and favorably impressed with your accessibility and sense of humor.

V/r,
Kevin

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, October 15, 2003 5:45 PM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: start spreading the news...

Well, it's probably already old news to most, but here it is again: Campbell is leaving DC to host NBC's Weekend Today show in New York.

Please join us in toasting her and bidding her farewell this upcoming Sunday evening, at her house, around 6:30 p.m. Let me know if you think you'll be able to make it, and call me on my cell phone with any questions. And yes, we'll have the World Series on somewhere in the house, for those who need it.

What: Farewell to Campbell Brown
When: Sunday, October 19, 6:30 p.m.
Where: 1842 Mintwood Place, NW, off Columbia Rd. in Adams Morgan
hers is the carriage house behind the main condo building at that address; to find it go down the second all on your left off Mintwood Place, after turning off Columbia Rd.
RSVP: Anne Kornblut, (b)(6) or (b)(6)

Anne E. Kornblut
The Boston Globe
phone: (b)(6)
cell: (b)(6)

Unknown

From: Kellems, Kevin, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Monday, July 28, 2003 6:08 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: Caldwell, Bill, MG, OSD; Ganyard, Stephen, COL, OSD; Sherline, Stephanie, CIV, OSD;
Crowder, Susan, CIV, OSD Oleszewski, Richard, CIV, OASD-PA
Subject: FW: The Laura Ingraham Show

Sir,
I recommend that -- unless there isn't a brief windown Friday between 7 and 10 p.m that isn't committed to family -- you consider doing this nationally syndicated radio program. We can make your Iraq trip and your Senate testimony the main focus. It is a large and very friends audience...and a similarly friendly host. And you're always saying you want to do more radio.

Tony D. can give you more insights into who she is and why this makes sense.

V/r,
Kevin

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, July 28, 2003 5:00 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: The Laura Ingraham Show

Kevin -- Thank you so very much for helping me out.

As I said, this Friday, August 1, I will be in Washington to host the The Laura Ingraham radio show. Running nightly from 7-10P.M. it reaches over 200 stations including top markets like Los Angeles, Boston, St. Louis, and Washington, and features, of course, telephone calls from listeners.

I would be completely thrilled and honored to have Mr. Wolfowitz as my guest for as much of the three hours as he would like -- that is, 15 minutes on up. Our conversation will be wide-ranging from the news of the week to the war on terrorism to wherever our dialogue -- and listener's questions -- takes us. If there's anything he would especially like to cover, just let me know.

Having long followed Mr. Wolfowitz's career -- and been a huge fan of his gutsy choices -- I am thoroughly excited to finally have the chance to speak with him. Though he is more than welcome to come into the Washington studio, we can also talk by phone -- his choice. Beyond that, please tell Mr. Wolfowitz that I promise he will enjoy himself...that we will have not only a spirited conversation but a lot of...fun... as well.

Enclosed is some information on me. If you have any questions please call me at (b)(6) or Cell: (b)(6)

Nancy Collins is a print and television journalist specializing in interviews. She has been a Contributing Correspondent for ABC's Primetime Live and 20/20 and her interviews -- ranging from President Bill Clinton to Yasser Arafat to Jack Nicholson to Linda Tripp -- have appeared on the covers of Vanity Fair, Rolling Stone, NewYork, Reader's Digest, Harper's Bazaar and George magazine. When John Kennedy died, she took over the monthly George Interview where her conversations included: Tim Russert, Chris Matthews, Bill Richardson, JC Watts, Helen Thomas and Linda Tripp among others.

Unknown

From: Kellems, Kevin, CIV, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, June 19, 2003 7:17 PM
To: (b)(6)
cc: Caldwell, Bill, MG, OSD; Sherline, Stephanie, CIV, OSD
Subject: FW: The Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz reform agenda

Sir,
Possible call for Friday - but we would need first to fulfill your commitment to Evan Thomas of Newsweek.

V/r,
Kevin

-----Original Message-----

From: Vernon Loeb (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2003 6:55 PM
To: torie.clarke@osd.mil
cc: kevin.kellems@osd.mil; larry.dirita@osd.mil
subject: The Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz reform agenda

Torie, Larry and Kevin:

I am working on a piece for this weekend about the extraordinarily ambitious reform agenda that you are pursuing at present, which includes civil service reform, the global footprint review, the reserve-active duty force realignment, reform of the *Army*, environmental relief at military ranges, NATO reform and the ongoing overhaul of SOCOM, not to mention transformation and all that entails.

I would love to speak with someone about your strategic thinking here:

Do you feel you must go for broke this year, with next year having all the distractions of an election year?

Is part of this ambitious agenda put forward to capitalize on Sec. Rumsfeld's success in Iraq, his popularity with the American people and his clout on Capitol Hill?

Can the U.S. defense establishment take so much simultaneous change?

And are you at all worried that, with so many huge initiatives being worked at the same time, the individual reforms won't get the attention and the staff work they need to be successful?

I couldn't let Torie go without asking at least one more round of annoying questions, right?

Thanks a lot.

Regards,

Vernon Loeb
Defense Correspondent
The Washington Post
1150 15th St. NW
Washington, DC 20071

(b)(6)

Unknown

From: Duman, Jaymie, CIV, OSD
Sent: Saturday, July 19, 2003 7:11 PM
To: Nagelmann, Sarah, CIV, OSD
Cc: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD; Korologos, Tom, CIV, OSD-POLICY; 'kennedyp@orha.centcom.mil'
Subject: WDC#6

SATURDAY, JULY 19

0715 Arrive Dulles

0800 Residence

1200 Lunch with ~~Secretary~~ Rumsfeld

Location: Pentagon

Duration: 1 hour 15 minutes

Attendees: CJCS, Feith, Korologos, Kennedy, Duman

1330 Briefing with ~~Members~~ of Congress

Location: Pentagon

Duration: 1 hour

Attendees: Senator Frist, Senator Warner

Accompanying: Korologos

1430 Preparation for Sunday news programs

Location: Pentagon offices

Duration: 45 minutes

1515 Meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld

Location: Pentagon

Duration: 45 minutes

SUNDAY, JULY 20

NOTE: OSD-PA is taping and transcribing all Sunday shows.

0730 Arrive FOX for meeting with Speaker

Location: 400 North Capitol, 5th Floor

0750 Make-up

0800 Pre-tape interview with *FOX News Sunday* with Tony Snow

Accompanying: Senor

0817 Depart for NBC

4001 Nebraska, NW

Washington, DC

0900 LIVE interview with *NBC Meet the Press* with Tim Russert

Accompanying: Senor

0920 Depart for CBS

2020 M Street, NW

Washington, DC

0935 Hold Time

1000 LIVE interview with CBS *Face the Nation* with Bob Schieffer.

Accompanying: **Senor**

1045 Depart CBS.

MONDAY, JULY 21

1015 Meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld, Josh Bolton, Robin Cleveland,
Lanzillotta

Location: **Pentagon, SecDef Conference Room**

Duration: 30 minutes

1045 Meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Snow, USec John Taylor, GC-David Aufhauser,
Chief of Staff Tim Adams, ~~Barry~~ MacDonal-Dir Iraq Task Force, Jim Fall, Iraq Task Force, Di Rita,
Lanzillotta,

Location: **Pentagon**

Duration: 30 minutes

1115 Office Time

Duration: 2 hours 45 minutes

1400 Meeting with retired military analysts and civilian defense experts.

Location: Pentagon, Room (b)(6)

Duration: 1 hour

Accompanying: Korologos

PA Contact, Brent Krueger, (b)(6)

-

TUESDAY, JULY 22

0830 Breakfast with House Leadership

Location: TBD

Duration: 1 hour

Accompanying: Korologos

1000 Meeting with Vice President Cheney

Location: White House

Duration: 1 hour

Tentative *Deputies Committee*

1200 Attend Swearing-In Ceremony for Ambassador Eric Edelman

1430 Meeting with US Senate

Location: S-407

Duration: 1 hour

Accompanying: Korologos

(sarah, Sen Frist has asked for more than an hour. Work with Tom K on this. He should aet it blessed by Jerry.)

1540 (Tent)-Press Stakeout on House Side

Location: TBD

Duration: 15 minutes

LA/PA Contact: Claude Chafin,

(b)(6)

1600 Meeting with US House

Location: House Armed Services Committee

Duration: 1 how

Accompanying: Korologos

(If you aive the Senate more than an hour. you will need to do so with the house.)

1715 Press Stakeout

Location: TBD

Duration: 15 minutes

Accompanying: Korologos/Senor)

LA/PA Contact: Claude Chafin,

(b)(6)

WEDNESDAY, JULY 23

0830 Depart Pentagon

0855 NSC

Location: White House

Duration: 45 minutes

0940 Meeting with POTUS and Secretary Rumsfeld

Location: White House

Duration: 20 minutes

1200 National Press Club Newsmaker Lunch

Location: National Press Club

Duration: 2 hours (**MAYHAVE TO BE SHORTER**)

Accompanying: Korologos, **Senor**

PA Contact: Hollen Johnson Wheeler, (b)(6)

1400 Foreign Press Center Briefing

Location: National Press Club

Duration: 45 minutes

Accompanying: Korologos, **Senor**

PA Contact: Hollen Johnson Wheeler, (b)(6)

TBD Meeting Spanish Foreign Minister

Location: Embassy of Spain (2375 Pennsylvania Ave. NW)

Duration: 45 minutes

1630 Taped interview with CNN Larry King Live (Senor)

Location: CNN Studio, 820 1st Street, NE, Washington, DC (behind Union Station)

Duration: 30 minutes

PA Contact: Hollen Johnson wheeler, (b)(6)

THURSDAY, JULY 24

0800 HOLD FOR POSSIBLE BREAKFAST (Korologos)

1030 ~~Coffee~~ Roundtable with Syndicated Columnists

Location: Pentagon

Duration: 45 minutes

Accompanying: Korologos

PA Contact: Susan Wallace, (b)(6)

1230 Press Briefing with Sec Def and CJCS

Location: Pentagon Briefing Studio

Duration: 30 minutes

Accompanying: Senor

1315 Lunch with Secretary Rumsfeld, Director Tenet

Location: Pentagon

Duration: 45 minutes

1430 Conference Call with Large Regional Print Editors

Location: Pentagon

Duration: 45 minutes

Accompanying: Korologos, Senor

PA Contact: Michelle Shortencarrier, (b)(6)

1600 (T) Live to Tape with PBS *Lehrer News Hour*

Location: WETA Studios, 3620 27th Street, South, Arlington, VA

Duration: 25 minutes

Accompanying: Korologos, Senor

PA Contact: Hollen Johnson wheeler,

(b)(6)

FRIDAY, JULY 25

DO NOT SCHEDULE - PRIVATE

SATURDAY, JULY 26

DO NOT SCHEDULE - PRIVATE

-

SUNDAY, JULY 27

DO NOT SCHEDULE - PRIVATE

-

MONDAY, JULY 28

0900 Depart Andrews AFB en route BIAP

FLIGHT TIME: 15 hours 30 minutes (estimate)

TIME CHANGE: + 8 hours

85

CIA LEAKS SUBPOENA 11- L-0559/OSD/42517 0000050

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-
TUESDAY, JULY 29

0800 Arrive BLAP
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-
-
-

Unknown

From: Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2003 2:06 PM
To: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD
Subject: RE: Writers Round Table w/SecDef - July

Yes.

From: Cathy, M., OSD
Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2003 2:03 PM
To: Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Writers Round Table w/SecDef - July

so the 19 July date is dear for me to work on something else - correct?

-----Original Message-----

From: Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2003 1:54 PM
To: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Writers Round Table w/SecDef - July

Bryan said for me to check the August 16 date. Two of them were not available on the 19th due to vacations.

From: Cathy, M., OSD
sent: Thursday, July 10, 2003 1:37 PM
To: Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASDPA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Writers Round Table w/SecDef - July

any word yet on either date, I do realize we looked at 19 July before but thought the might not want to wait until Aug. let me know -thanks,
Cathy.

-----Original Message-----

From: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD
Sent: Wednesday, July 09, 2003 2:23 PM
To: Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Writers Round Table w/SecDef - July

Sorry it has taken so long to figure out a new date - new options for this are: Saturday 19 July or 16 Aug. then after Labor Day. Realize this is not great. let me know what you think,
Cathy.

-----Original Message-----

From: Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA
Sent: Wednesday, July 02, 2003 4:24 PM
to: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA
Subject: RE: Writers Round Table w/SecDef - July

When I call and cancel the 12th, it would be good to have some hint of when we might reschedule, if possible. So I haven't called people yet. Bryan, want to try another day?

-----Original Message-----

From: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD
Sent: Wednesday, July 02, 2003 12:52 PM
To: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Krueger, Brent, CIV, OASD-PA; Johnson, Hollen, CIV, OASD-PA; Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; Cooper, John, CIV, OASD-PA; Henderson, Hedy; Abbott, Catherine, COL, OASD-PA; Wilcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: Brown, Diane, Capt, OSD; Little, Christopher J, Sgt, OSD; Gonzales, Elaine, TSgt, OSD; Deutsch, Mary, CIV, OSD; Haukedahl, John, CIV, OSD; Murphy, Mary Claire, CIV, OSD
Subject: RE: Writers Round Table w/SecDef - July

OK, poo on this one, just cannot win. There is a chance SD will be out of town on 12 July but we will not know until the last minutes so I believe we will have to cancel this. Let me know if we should try another date or wait until after Labor Day,

Cathy.

-----Original Message-----

From: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD
Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2003 11:07 AM
To: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Krueger, Brent, CIV, OASD-PA; Johnson, Hollen, CIV, OASD-PA; Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; Cooper, John, CIV, OASD-PA; Henderson, Hedy; Abbott, Catherine, COL, OASD-PA; Willcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: Brown, Diane, Capt, OSD; Lillie, Christopher J, Sgt, OSD; Gonzales, Elaine, TSgt, OSD; Deutsch, Mary, CIV, OSD; Haukedahl, John, CIV, OSD; Murphy, Mary Claire, CIV, OSD
Subject: RE: Writers Round Table w/SecDef - July

any word on which day - ??? I need to add something to 12 July so I would like to know if I need to worry on this event - let me know - thanks,
Cathy.

-----Original Message-----

From: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD
Sent: Thursday, June 12, 2003 9:54 AM
To: Mainardi, Cathy, CIV, OSD; Whitman, Bryan, SES, OASD-PA; Krueger, Brent, CIV, OASD-PA; Johnson, Hollen, CIV, OASD-PA; Wallace, Susan, CTR, OASD-PA; Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA; DeFrank, James, COL, OASD-PA; Cooper, John, CIV, OASD-PA; Henderson, Hedy; Abbott, Catherine, COL, OASD-PA; Willcox, Chris, CIV, OASD-PA
Cc: Brown, Diane, Capt, OSD; Lillie, Christopher J, Sgt, OSD; Gonzales, Elaine, TSgt, OSD; Deutsch, Mary, CIV, OSD; Haukedahl, John, CIV, OSD; Murphy, Mary Claire, CIV, OSD
Subject: Writers Round Table w/SecDef - July

Would like to try Saturday 12 or 19 July for this - can you let me know what works best?

w/SD, George Will, Jim Goagbnd. Charles Krauthammer, Paul Gigot.

Thanks,
Cathy

11:40- PA Prep
1200-1300 - Luncheon Round Table

DoJ Investigation
(Response to Query Only)
October 3, 2003

QUESTION: **Has** the Department of Defense received a letter from Department of Justice asking them to preserve **and** maintain records on former Ambassador Joseph Wilson **and his** wife?

ANSWER: Yes, the Department received a letter **from** DoJ with **this** request on Thursday, Oct 2 to preserve and maintain such records **as** we may have relating to their **ongoing** investigation.

QUESTION: Will DoD comply with the requests in the letter?

ANSWER: Yes, we are We are cooperating fully with the Justice Department in their investigation.

QUESTION: What specifically did the letter **ask** DoD to do?

ANSWER : Refer to DoJ.

QUESTION: May I have a copy **of** that letter?

ANSWER : **No**, you'll have to **ask** DoJ for a copy. However, you might take a look at the White House letter **on** their web site.

QUESTION: Did DoD issue a subsequent letter to the Department **staff**!

ANSWER : Yes, the General Counsel wrote **a** subsequent letter to the **staff** spelling out how the department **was** to comply with the DoJ request.

QUESTION: May I have a copy of that letter?

ANSWER : We will make the letter available in due time.

QUESTION: **Was** DoD asked to produce specific items for the investigation?

ANSWER: No, DoD **was** asked to preserve certain items **and** records **and** we **may** receive a subsequent request to produce **them** for investigators.

Source: OASD/PA
AO/Telephone #: Maj Shavers/ (b)(6)
Approved: OASDRA (DPO)

CLOSE HOLD . NOT FOR PUBLICATION

Q: But that the Administration now, it would be in the Administration and the country's interest now to say well it turns out that a lot of what was in that **NIE** was wrong. We'd like both for our credibility overseas **and** for the next time that there's issue like this, we'd like to go back and find out **why**. The President doesn't seem to be saying that.

Rumsfeld: Back **off** the record.

You're right. **My** Lord, anyone with any sense knows that what we've got here is a series of successes in the intelligence community, some of which we can talk about and some of which we can't; some of which are terrific and some of which are -- And we've got some things that are question **marks**. Then we've got some things that are not successes, that when **you** do get ground **truth** it **turns** out different than what **you** thought. Anyone with **any** sense is **going to** want to get lessons learned **from** both. What did we do **right in the cases where** we were **right**? What did we do wrong in the cases where it turns out **ground truth** is different **than** what we believed?

What does it mean in terms of analytical work? What does it mean in terms of investment priorities? Ought we to be investing in different things? What does it **mean** if we go back and look at the other places where we've used the same techniques **and** the same procedures **and** the **same** analytical people or techniques? Ought we to review some of **those** things?

You have **to** do that. And **my** goodness, we'll do it. **How** we'll do it is a question I'm sure is being debated over there. But it's **a**, **and** I haven't got conviction about what exactly the model ought to be, the format, to do that. There are certainly times when a commission, **an** outside commission **can** be a big help. For one thing in the case of **our** Ballistic Missile Commission we were able to just focus on one thing. The people in these jobs are focusing **on 50** things at **any** given time. They have the ability because of a desire to get to ground truth to slice through all the stovepipes. That's hard to do for people in government, to slice through -- Unless you're Tenet or Rumsfeld or the President and **can ask** for it and have time, the people down below tend to get stovepiped. **So** people on a commission can do that. There's a value to it, I believe.

Right **now**, my Lord, all the **stuff** going on. You've **got** the congressional

CLOSE HOLD . NOT FOR PUBLICATION

stuff, you've got the 9/11 Commission, we've got subpoenas flying all over the government on Ambassador Wilson, whoever he is, asking for all your sevens? Isn't that what they do in Hearts? **So** you get a list of 20 or **30** reporters and bunch of stuff, and I've got hundreds of people in this department digging through **stuff** like that instead of looking forward.

But no, the answer is absolutely. You're going to have to do it. How you do it, I don't know. The President will decide that, but there's no question but that you want to do it. We do it automatically in this department. We embedded **75** plus or minus people in the war on Iraq before it started, and ended up with the most intensive lessons learned effort I have ever seen in my life. I've been briefed on it now for probably seven or eight hours in four different settings. We then went, have gone back to the Iraqis in jail and interrogated them, **and** out of jail -- both places, and interrogated them and learned lessons learned from their perspective, got their view of it. I got briefed on that. It's fascinating **stuff**. That's something that you simply must do.

Now other departments tend not to do it **as** much. George and I did talk -- We're still **off** the record -- did talk about this before the war. He does have a group doing it. I don't know if he's announced it or not, but he's had a group --

Di **Rita**: There's been public reference to Don Kerrs.

Rumsfeld: Kerrs has got a group. **How** intensive that is, I'm **sure** it doesn't being, to approximate what we've done because we have a different set of issues, but George **knows** that.

Q: That simple sentence, you're going to have to do it, of course you want to do it. Why can't that be on the record? Why can't you say that?

Rumsfeld: I'm sure the President's thinking about it and he'll ask me my advice and here I'm out **prejudging** it. He may decide for whatever reason, something I don't **know** about, why he'd rather do it a different way or something. Of course it's going, to get done. It **has** to. It's just a matter of time, I suppose, **so** someone over there announces something and **says** gee, this is how we want **to** do it.

February 8, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: DSB Reports

Please schedule me to get briefed on these two Schneider pieces.

Set a meeting and give me a list of proposed attendees on the lessons learned task force. I want to do it this week.

Thanks.

Attach.
Undated memo Schneider memo to SecDef
1/2/04 DSB Lessons Learned Task Force

DHR:dh
020804-79



Please respond by _____

2, 3, 4 DSB

OSD 09543-04

8 Feb 04

C45



Memo

From the Chairman, Defense Science Board

To: Hon Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense

Subject: OIF Lessons Learned Reports

Secretary Rumsfeld,

I am forwarding you two items from the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Lessons Learned Task Force: the first is a briefing I have been trying to get to you on Quick Support Initiatives for Ongoing Operations in Central Command. This briefing was put together by the Task Force, following an 11 December 2003 VTC session they held with GEN Abizaid; the second document is a Limited Distribution report on OIF Stabilization and Reconstitution issues and recommendations.

Regards,

Bill Schneider

P.S. We would like to brief you @ your convenience as our interviews revealed quite a bit of interesting information that we did not try to capture in the text.



DEFENSE SCIENCE
BOARD

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

**DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD
LESSONS LEARNED TASK FORCE
Operation Iraqi Freedom**

**Quick Support Initiatives for
Ongoing Operations in Central Command**

January 2, 2004

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/42527



DEFENSE SCIENCE
BOARD

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Task Force Membership

Members:

General Jim McCarthy, USAF (Ret), Chairman

General Glenn Otis, USA (Ret)

General Larry Welch, USAF (Ret)

Admiral Bill Studeman, USN (Ret)

Vice Admiral Dave Frost, USN (Ret)

Major General Harry Jenkins, USMC (Ret)

Mr. Larry Lynn

Mr. Charles Gandy

Support Staff:

Brigadier General Mark O'Neill, USA, Executive Secretary

Lieutenant Colonel Scott Dolgoff, USA, DSB Representative

Dr. Tom Allen, Dr. Bill Knarr, IDA, Technical Support

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11-L-0559/OSD/42528



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Quick Support Initiatives for Ongoing Operations in CENTCOM

- Intensify support to CPA
- Improve the interagency process
- Develop a significant strategic message approach
- Lift funding restrictions on Iraqi support
- Establish a CENTCOM support office in DDR&E
- Focus intelligence on “manhunting” and other key activities

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DEFENSE SCIENCE
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Intensify Support to CPA

- **DoD is not equipped with all needed resources for this mission; interagency integration in the field is not effectively filling the gaps**
 - **CPA staffing requirements have grown significantly**
 - Target manning is approaching 2000
 - Filling billets and extending tours beyond 90 days are continuing issues
 - CPA's role will change over time, but will probably continue for several years
 - **CPA needs real experts in governance, finance, law enforcement, etc.**
 - Military officers fill most of these billets but often don't have needed skills
 - **CPA requirements can be partially filled with reach back**
 - **The Department needs more formal institutional support for this mission**

Recommendations:

- **Designate an FFRDC (such as IDA) to directly support CPA**
- **Potential tasking:**
 - Create, field and support a reach back pool of expertise for near-term CPA support
 - Form a center of expertise and innovation for stabilization operations
 - Develop into an enduring resource for this key dimension of military operations

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

4



DEFENSE SCIENCE
BOARD

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Improve the Interagency Process

- To secure the desired outcomes in Iraq, the US government needs to be on a war footing
- Interagency process is not producing the required support from most other non-DOD agencies
- This lack of support is impacting CPA effectiveness

Recommendations:

- Quietly create an NSC-sponsored, SecDef-led interagency executive council to intensify needed support
 - Involved Departments must provide knowledgeable senior staff
- Require Deputies review of issues bi-weekly

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11-L-0559/OSD/42531



DEFENSE SCIENCE

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Develop a Significant Strategic Message Approach

- **We are losing the perception war, particularly in regional countries/populations including Iraq**
 - Message during combat operations phase well presented but process basically abandoned in post-combat phase
 - Al Jazeera is the most powerful influence on regional perceptions
 - The US is the inventor of media and advertising concepts but has not effectively applied them in the region

Recommendations:

- **Hold** a high level conference/workshop with influential people from affected sectors including academia, media and foreign governments
 - **Validate the existence of the problem**
 - **Develop a strategic message and implementation approach**
- Use regional and commercial capabilities
- Use interagency advisory council to provide direction

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

6

11-L-0559/OSD/42532



DEFENSE SCIENCE
BOARD

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Lift Funding Restrictions on Iraqi Support

- **Combat forces do not have capability to comply with all funding limitations and accounting**
- **Limitations are impacting mission accomplishment**

Recommendations:

- **Review all limitations affecting forces in Iraq**
- **Provide waivers to DoD policies**
- **Seek Congressional Committee relief where necessary**

✓
✓
✓

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/GSD/42533



DEFENSE SCIENCE
BOARD

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Establish a CENTCOM Support Office in DDR&E

- We are in a long war in Iraq and Afghanistan but much of DoD, the Services and industry are on a peacetime basis
 - Normal processes for fielding needed and innovative technologies are not fast enough
 - Industry complaining about not knowing how to help
 - Some organizations initiatives stifled
 - Issues for immediate focus include vehicle vulnerability, detecting and diffusing improvised explosive devices, and S&T to support manhunt activities

Recommendations:

- Initiate a process to get immediate combat needs identified
- Designate **DDR&E** as CENTCOM support office and industry contact
- Attach **DDR&E** representative to CENTCOM staff to create a rapid response capability, help set priorities and articulate demand for technological support

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

8



DEFENSE SCIENCE
BOARD

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Focus Intelligence on Manhunting and Other Key Activities

- **Intelligence, especially HUMINT, needs to be more responsive and less bureaucratic**
 - Resources must be applied to OIF/OEF unique intelligence problems
 - Technical needs include improved cave detection, close attack means, and improved explosive detection/cache detection means
 - Personnel requirements include assigning people with regional language and cultural expertise for tours lasting longer than 90 days
 - Intelligence should be optimized to support Influence and Messaging Operations

Recommendations:

- USDI, DIRDIA, Services and DCI/CIA define a quick-fix plan for overall improved OIF intelligence and support
 - **Move to implement restructured DoD HUMINT initiatives ASAP**
 - **Ensure that currently collected information is quickly moved up the chain-of-command where appropriate**
- Define an Intelligence Community-wide technical improvement program focused on immediate technology solutions to CENTCOM requirements

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9



DEFENSE SCIENCE

BOARD

Task Force Recommendations

- **Iraqi Freedom needs stronger institutional support to CPA and fielded forces to achieve mission**
- **Task Force identified six areas that need immediate attention:**
 - **Intensify support to CPA**
 - **Improve the interagency process**
 - **Develop a significant strategic message approach**
 - **Lift funding restrictions on Iraqi support**
 - **Establish a CENTCOM support office in DDR&E**
 - **Focus intelligence on manhunting and other key activities**
- **Action could quickly generate significant improvement**

123
1430

February 8, 2004

TO: Les Brownlee
Gen. Pete Schoomaker

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Brief Senator McCain

Lenny Di Rita
3/1

340

I think you are going to have to go **up** and brief John McCain. He is absolutely convinced that the evidence shows that there is going to be a **mass** exodus from **the military** because of the stress on the force.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-92

.....
Please respond by 2/13/04

DA 4/19
Sir.
(4/2) Response attached. w/ previous response (4/12)
v/r.
LTC Swage

h0907 8

OSD 09544-04



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON DC 20310

*2 #15
add 4/15*

INFO MEMO

April 2, 2004, 4:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: R.L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army

*Brownlee
Hi - We will
keep trying -*

SUBJECT: Brief Senator McCain

- This responds to your recommendation that General Schoomaker and I meet with Sen. McCain to discuss potential shortfalls in recruiting and retention.
- Although we have been unable to meet with Sen. McCain, we have met with members of his staff on multiple occasions. Additionally, we have addressed his concerns on Recruiting and Retention during Posture Hearing Testimony on both 25 Feb and 3 Mar.
- We will continue to stay closely tied to Sen. McCain's staff in working this issue and are prepared to meet with him at his convenience.
- General Schoomaker and I continue to monitor our recruiting and retention indicators for any signs of potential shortfalls. We are confident, that should any negative trends emerge we have policies, procedures, and incentives identified to correct the shortfall.

*30
2 Copy of*

COORDINATION: NONE

CF:
DepSecDef
GEN Myers, CJCS
GEN Schoomaker, CSA
Dr. Chu
Mr. Powell Moore

Prepared By: LTC Stephen McHugh, (b)(6)

OSD 09544-04

8 4/20/04



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON
INFO MEMO

2/19
C2/13

February 12, 2004, 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: R. L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army

Brownlee

SUBJECT: Brief Senator McCain

- This responds to your recommendation to meet with Senator McCain and discuss his concerns about potential shortfalls in recruiting and retention.
- I met with a member of Senator McCain's staff on February 11, 2004 and General Schoomaker and I will jointly brief the Senator soon. I will provide you a summary of the meeting, once complete.
- General Schoomaker and I are closely monitoring any indicators that would foretell recruiting and retention shortfalls in both the Active and Reserve Component. I have directed the G1 and M&RA to develop policies, procedures and incentives to prevent or remedy the problem, if it occurs.

340

COORDINATION: NONE

CF: DepSecDef
GEN Myers, CJCS
GEN Schoomaker, CSA
Dr. Chu
Powell Moore

12 Feb 04

Prepared By: LTC Ed Palekas

(b)(6)

OSD 09544-04

8 Feb 04

June 24, 2004

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

c c : Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Bahrain

Are you concerned about Bahrain releasing people if they agree to not commit terrorist acts against Bahrainis? That is my understanding of what the government has done. It is worrisome.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
062404-8

.....
Please respond by 7/2/04

*u
w
o*

*1
2
3
4
5*

OSD 09551-04

2/13/300

720

February 8, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Expiration of Emergency

Downward
2/17

We have to make sure we don't let the emergency expire, or we will lose all our authorities to continue to conduct the global war on terror and the activities in Iraq and Afghanistan.

384

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-97

.....
Please respond by 2/13

2/19

Su,
Response attached.
v/c ODL Nancy
2/19

8 Feb 04

OSD 09564-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42541

Rec'd 11 Feb
TC



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

4.19

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel
SUBJECT: Extending the Declaration of National Emergency

WJ Haynes 2/12/04

• You sent me a note stating, "We have to make sure we don't let the emergency expire, or we will lose all of our authorities to continue to conduct the global war on terror and the activities in Iraq and Afghanistan."

• The President declared a national emergency due to the terrorist threat on September 14, 2001. In an executive order signed the same day, he delegated certain authorities to you that you may exercise during the national emergency.

• Those authorities include the partial mobilization authority, the authority to waive end strengths, and the authority to institute stop/loss. He later delegated additional authority regarding emergency construction to you.

• Under the National Emergencies Act, a national emergency ends after one year unless extended by the President. You forwarded proposed extensions of the September 14, 2001, declaration of national emergency to the President in 2002 and 2003. The President signed both extensions.

• My staff and the staff of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs will draft another extension this summer. We will forward the draft extension to you through the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness during July.

384

12 Feb 04

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared by: Jim Schwenk, (b)(6)

SECDEF
• We will not let the emergency expire.
• We will be sure that Judge Gonzales pays attention.
WJ Haynes

8 Feb 04



(b)(6)

72

(b)(6)


CAZCOS

February 8, 2004



✓
3/23

TO: Dov Zakheim
Ken Krieg

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rurnsfeld 

SUBJECT: **Stress** on Equipment

LOT'S GOT A
QUICK DRAFT
FROM SIMONS -
STARS W/  CAMP
PEASE 

We have talked a lot about the stress on the force. We need to look at what is happening with the stress on equipment. If the Services plan for X years life of certain pieces of equipment, and we end up using them at a much faster rate for a sustained period, at some point we are going to have to start budgeting to replace earlier.

400

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-96

.....
Please respond by 2/18 (for way ahead)

8 Feb 04


3/23
Response attached.
vr/CDR Nosenzo

OSD 09565-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42543

TO: SecNav
David Chu
Steve Cambone
Doug Feith
Mike Wynne
Larry Lanzilotta

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: June 6, 2004


SUBJECT: **Public Opinion Polls**

Attached is a metric that the government of Columbia is using. I would like to see the metrics your units are using.

Thanks.


DHR/azn
060604E.061s

Attach: Columbia US Cooperation Statistics



OSD 09598-04

**COLOMBIA - U.S. COOPERATION IS PAYING OFF
KEY FACTS AND FIGURES**



SOURCES: UN OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME; COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT

COLOMBIA - U.S. COOPERATION IS PAYING OFF KEY FACTS AND FIGURES

Colombia's War on Drugs and Terror

of reducing illegal coca crop by 50% from December 2000 levels met and surpassed. Five achieved two years ahead of schedule (2003 vs. 2005).

tons of cocaine - est. market value of \$8 billion - seized by Colombian authorities since early 2001. 2003 seizures were a record 114 tons, a 20% increase over 2002. More than 160 fugitives extradited to the U.S. since Jan. 2001.

Incidents of terrorism decreased by 48% during 2003, lowest since 1995. Homicides decreased in 2003 (5,800 lives saved) - lowest rate since 1987. Kidnappings decreased by 26% in 2003 over 2002, and by 41% from their high in 2000.

Arrests and captures of guerrillas and illegal self-defense forces increased 63% and 128%, respectively, in 2003. 1,841 guerrillas and 1,739 self-defense forces demobilized in 2003.

U.S. support key to security improvements

U.S. contribution to fight drugs and terrorism. Colombia has been \$3.2 billion (FY2000-FY2004). Colombian investment has been \$6.5 billion (8% of annual GDP).

Colombian Forces enlarged by 52,000 troops since Jan. 2001 - a 43% increase; mobility enhanced by U.S.-provided helicopters and planes. U.S. training produced more effective, professional military. Colombian government trained 73,000 soldiers in human rights and IHL in 2003.

U.S. presence established in every municipality in the country in Q1 2004 - a first for Colombia. Key precondition for delivery of government services.

Social Investments are making a difference

U.S. assistance: relief for 1.4 million internally displaced persons; 43,951 hectares of legal crops planted and 647 social projects funded, benefiting 33,399 families. Judicial strengthening: 30 courtrooms and 37 justice houses, 3,421 judges and 599 conciliators trained.

Colombian government achievements in 2003: 477,600 new slots in public schools; 1,061,651 affiliates to national health system; 5 million children received food aid; 21,135 families added to forest-ranger program; technical education provided to 2.3 million youths.

Increased confidence fuels economic recovery

Colombia's GDP grew by 3.6% in 2003 - the highest growth rate since 1995. Excluding illicit crop growth was 4%. 1.2 million new jobs were created.

U.S. boosted U.S.-Colombia bilateral trade by 10% in 2003, to a record \$10.1 billion.



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE; PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

COMPTROLLER

INFO MEMO

June 25, 2004 4:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Lawrence J. Lanzillotta

SUBJECT: DoD Financial Management Balanced Scorecard

- This is in response to your request to see what metrics my organization is using. We developed a Financial Management Balanced Scorecard (BSC) that supports the Department's BSC. Tab A reflects a list of our BSC performance measures; Tab B includes the actual metrics.
- We improved performance through the use of our BSC. Some examples include:
 - During the recent mid-year review, we analyzed service obligation rates against their spending plans as one of the ways of determining requirements and/or possible assets.
 - Tracking liquidity in working capital funds led to a cash asset of over \$1.5 billion being available for other uses.
- The percentages below reflect a sample of the progress made between April 2001 and April 2004 in managing our financial transactions:
 - Reduced travel card delinquency rates. Individual accounts declined 32 percent; centrally managed accounts declined 74 percent.
 - Purchase card delinquencies declined 50 percent.
 - Overdue payments to contractors declined 59 percent.
 - Interest penalties paid on invoice payments to contractors declined 52 percent.
 - Since FY 2002, we have reduced the average amount of time to process an Anti-deficiency Act Violation report by 10 months.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared by: Greg Kuechler,

(b)(6)

OSD 09598-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42547

TAB

A

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT BALANCED SCORECARD PERFORMANCE MEASURES

Force Management Risk	Operational Risk	Future Challenges Risk	Institutional Risk
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of employee performance plans that align appraisals with specific performance measurements • Number of training hours/ opportunities available • Number of employees participating in training • Number of employees with professional certifications • Number of employees with advanced degrees • Attrition rates • Manager to workforce ratio • Overtime and comp time • Employees rewarded 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduction of general ledger abnormal balances • Travel card delinquencies • Purchase card delinquencies • ADA Violations • Overaged suspense accounts • Overaged accounts receivable • Problem disbursements • In-transit disbursements • Electronic payments • Backlog of commercial payments • Interest penalties paid • Payment timeliness of non-credit card invoices • WCF: Cash, Liquidity, AOR, Work in Process; Fuel • Erroneous payments • Contract payments held for funding • Overaged accounts payable • Contract closeout timeliness • DFAS cost metrics • Current ratio (WCF only) • Inventory turnover rate • Quick ratio (WCF only) • Net cost operations • Overhead to total cost • Capital asset growth • Labor efficiency ratio • Uncovered liabilities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Program Assessment and Evaluation • Obligation rates • Appropriations with negative balances • Track budget request • Other execution metrics (readiness, cost, schedule performance, etc) • Funds subject to cancellation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unsupported accounting entries • Fund balance with Treasury • Environmental liabilities • Property, plant and equipment • Intragovernmental elimination • Inventory and related property • Reconcile budgetary obligations to net cost in the Statement of Finance • Present the Statement of net cost by specific program • Development of Business Architecture Modernization Program • Implementation of complementary accounting and finance systems and procedures • Implementation of complementary solutions for program planning and budget development

INCOMING

TO: SecNav
David Chu
Steve Cambone
Doug Feith
Mike Wynne
Larry Lanzilotta

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: Public Opinion Polls

Attached is a metric that the government of Columbia is using. I would like to see the metrics your units are using.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
060604E.06ts

Attach: Columbia US Cooperation Statistics


Please respond by: _____

6/25

0 SD 09598-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42551

**COLOMBIA - U.S. COOPERATION IS PAYING OFF
KEY FACTS AND FIGURES**



SOURCES: UN OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME; COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT

COLOMBIA – U.S. COOPERATION IS PAYING OFF KEY FACTS AND FIGURES

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DEPARTMENT of DEFENSE
COMPTROLLER



FINANCIAL INDICATO
PROGRAM

11-L-0559/OSD/42554

The Metrics Program is now on-line! This book only contains the current metric charts. All history and reference material now resides on the web. Access this material via:
HTTPS://DOD-METRICS.DFAS.MIL (You must have your CAC activated to enter).

<https://dod-metrics.dfas.mil/secure/index.shtml?>

DoD Financial Management Balanced Scorecard

Alphabetical Metric Index

Section I	<u>Strategy, Vision, and Mission</u>
Section II	<u>Financial Operations Metrics</u>
Section III	<u>Budget-Related Metrics</u>
Section IV	<u>Enterprise Architecture Metrics</u>
Section V	<u>Reserved</u>
Section VI	<u>Summary Scoring and Policy</u>
Section VII	<u>Balanced Scorecard</u>
Section VIII	<u>Reference Material</u>

The METRICS

In this book: { → → →

For visually impaired assistance, contact an OSD Metrics Analyst by email at hq.osd.metrics@osd.mil
Last Updated: March 17, 2004 at 09:06

We're On-Line !!

DoD FINANCIAL INDICATORS

Table of Contents

	Section I	Vision, Mission, Strategy, and Format
The METRICS	Section II	Financial Operations Metrics
	Section III	Budget-Related Metrics
	Section IV	Financial Management Enterprise Architecture Metrics
	Section V	Management Initiative Decisions (MIDs) Implementation Metrics
	Section VI	Summary Scoring and Policy
	Section VII	Cascading Scorecard for Military Services/Defense Agencies
	Section VIII	Reference



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

SECRET
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-3010

2004 JUN 23 11:26

INFO MEMO

June 25, 2004, 10:00AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec

FROM: Mr. Michael W. Wynne, Acting Under Secretary of Defense
(Technology and Logistics)

[Signature]
Chief, Acquisition,

JUN 25 2004

SUBJECT: Metrics

- This is in response to your request to see what metrics I am using (**TAB A**).
- I use the following metrics for major acquisition program performance, technology development, logistics responsiveness, and infrastructure. Specifically, these include:
 - Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) Cycle Time
 - Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) Acquisition Cost Growth
 - Maintain Balanced and Focused Science and Technology
 - Monitor the Status of Defense Technology Objectives
 - Customer Wait Time
 - Fund to a 67-Year Recapitalization Rate
 - Eliminate Inadequate Housing

Details for these metrics are at (**TAB B**).

- In addition, I have seven acquisition excellence goals with a mix of metrics and activity indicators. (**TAB C**) lists my goals and representative metrics or activities for each.
- For every major acquisition program, I also track and monitor ten key indicators as well as detailed cost and schedule trends. I review these with my staff and the Service Acquisition community each month. An example is provided at (**TAB D**).

COORDINATION: None.

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: Dr. Nancy L. Spruill/Director, ARA (b)(6)

OSD 09598-04



11-L-0559/OSD/42557

2004-2028-ATL

TAB

A

TO: SecNav
David Chu
Steve Cambone
Doug Feith
Mike Wynne
Larry Lanzilotta

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



DATE: June 6, 2004

SUBJECT: Public Opinion Polls

Attached is a metric that the government of Columbia **is** using. I would **like** to see the metrics your units are using.

Thanks.


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


**COLOMBIA - U.S. COOPERATION IS PAYING OFF
KEY FACTS AND FIGURES**


COCA CROP (hectares)




INCIDENTS OF TERRORISM




HOMICIDES




KIDNAPPINGS



SOLDIERS & POLICE



GDP GROWTH (%)



SOURCES UN OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME; COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT

COLOMBIA – U.S. COOPERATION IS PAYING OFF KEY FACTS AND FIGURES

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
.boosted U.S.-Colombia bilateral trade by 10% in 2003, to a record \$10.1 billion.

TAB


B

OUSD (AT&L) Metrics


New Start MDAP Cycle Time in Months




Annual Percentage Rate of Acquisition Cost Growth
Target - Zero Percent Growth Year to Year




President's Budget S&T Funding Percentages & Goals by Investment Area
■ Basic Research ■ Applied Research ■ Advanced Technology Development




Percentage of Defense Technology Objectives Evaluated as Progressing Satisfactory




Customer Wait Time (Days)



Facilities Recapitalization Metric (FRM) in Years



Percentage of Inadequate Family Housing Units
Goal is Zero Percent



Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) Acquisition Cycle Time

Acquisition Cycle Time (Months)	FY 2000 Actual	FY 2001 Actual	FY 2002 Target/ Actual	FY 2003 Target/ Actual	FY 2004 Target	FY 2005 Target
Acquisition cycle time (for new starts from FY 1992 through FY 2001) (months)	N/A ^a	102	103	<99/102 ^b	<99	<99
Acquisition cycle time (for new starts after FY 2001) (months)	N/A ^a	NIA	55	<66/76 ^b	<66	<66

Metric Description. Acquisition cycle time is the elapsed time, in months, from program initiation—when the Department makes a commitment to develop and produce a weapon system—until the system attains initial operational capability (IOC). This metric measures the average cycle time across all Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). During the 1960s, a typical acquisition took 7 years (84 months) to complete. By 1996, a similar acquisition required 11 years (132 months) from program start to IOC. To reverse this trend, DoD established an objective to reduce the average acquisition cycle time for MDAPs started since 1992 to less than 99 months, a reduction of 25%. We achieved that initial objective. We did so through rapid acquisition with demonstrated technology, time-phased requirements and evolutionary development, and integrated test and evaluation. To continue that improvement, the Department will seek to reduce the average cycle time to less than 66 months for all MDAPs started after FY 2001. To achieve that objective, the Department is introducing improvements to development and production schedules similar to those it initiated for managing system performance and cost. Rapid development and fielding of weapon systems—leveraging new technologies faster—will enable U.S. forces to stay ahead of potential adversaries.

Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) Acquisition Cost Growth

Metric	FY 2000 Actual	FY 2001 Actual	FY 2002 Actual	FY 2003 Target/Actual	FY 2004 Target	FY 2005 Target
Reduce annual rate of acquisition cost growth	N/A ^a	+13.9% ^a	+6.4%	Downward trend toward 0%/+5.0 ^b	Downward trend toward 0%	Downward trend toward 0%

Metric Description. Acquisition cost growth measures the difference between the acquisition costs in the current-year's President's budget and the previous-year's budget, divided by the acquisition costs for the previous-year's budget, expressed as a percentage. The population is all Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) common to both current-year and previous-year budgets. A dollar-weighted average is calculated for the common MDAPs and adjusted for changes in quantity or inflation. Acquisition cost growth can occur for various reasons, including technical risk, schedule slips, programmatic changes, or overly optimistic cost estimates. Our reform initiatives seek to reduce cost growth from all sources, providing an output target for procurement managers of individual systems, as well as for the aggregate procurement **programs** of the individual Services. The objective is to continue toward an ultimate goal of no acquisition cost growth. Managerial responses are expected to include both specific cost-control initiatives and process changes.

Maintain Balanced and Focused Science and Technology

President's Budget (%)	Goal	FY 2000	FY 2001	FY 2002	FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005
Basic Research	15	15.2	16.3	14.9	14.0	12.8	12.6
Applied Research	35	40.5	42.1	41.7	38.9	35.9	36.8
Advanced Technology Development	50	44.3	41.6	43.4	47.1	51.3	50.6

Metric Description. This metric sets objectives and tracks the percentage of funding in the three science and technology budget activities – basic research, applied research and advanced technology development – to maintain a balanced investment. This ensures a continual process of moving fundamental research to more applied applications which provide a better focus on national security requirements to advanced technology development which integrates technology into system prototypes for field experiments to determine military utility.

Monitor the Status of Defense Technology Objectives (DTOs)¹

Metric	FY 2000 Actual	FY 2001 Actual	FY 2002 Actual	FY 2003 Target/Actual	FY 2004 Target	FY 2005 Target
Percentage of DTOs evaluated as progressing satisfactorily toward goals	97	96	97	≥70/96	≥70	≥70
DTO evaluated in biannual review	166	180	149	163	NA	NA
Total number of DTOs	347	326	401	386	NA	NA

NOTE 1. Metric baseline changed for CY 2004 ADR; data should not be cross referenced to previous reports.

Metric Description. S&T investments are focused and guided through a series of Defense Technology Objectives (DTOs) developed by the senior planners working for the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Each of these objectives highlights a specific technological advancement that will be developed or demonstrated, the anticipated date the technology will be available, the specific benefits that should result from the technological advance, and the funding required (and funding sources) to achieve the new capability. This list of objectives also distinguishes specific milestones to be reached and approaches to be used, quantitative metrics that will indicate progress, and the customers who will benefit when the new technology is eventually fielded. This metric measures the percentage of DTOs that are progressing satisfactorily toward the goals established for them. Although actual performance continues well above target, the target will be maintained at 70% due to the inherent high risk of failure in technology development.

Customer Wait Time

Metric	FY 2000 Actual	FY 2001 Actual	FY 2002 Actual	FY 2003 Target/Actual	FY 2004 Target	FY 2005 Target
Customer Wait time (days)	NA ^a	18	16	16/19	15	15

Metric Description. Customer Wait Time (CWT) measures the number of days between customer order submission and customer receipt of an item. The customer's order may be filled from assets on hand at the customer's military installation or naval vessel, or through the DoD wholesale logistics system. For purposes of this Enterprise Level Metric, CWT includes orders for spare and repair parts ordered by organizational maintenance activities. CWT captured for orders considered below enterprise level are maintained by each of the Military Services and the Defense Logistics Agency.

Fund to a 67-year Recapitalization Rate

Metrics	FY 2000 Actual	FY 2001 Actual	FY 2002 Actual	FY 2003 Target/ Actual	FY 2004 Target/ Projected Performance	FY 2005 Target/ Projected Performance
Facilities recapitalization metric–FRM (years)	141	192	101	67/149	67/136 ^a	67/107
Facilities sustainment model–FSM (percent)	78 ^b	70 ^b	89	100/93	100/94 ^c	100/95

Metric Description. The facilities recapitalization metric (FRM) is a performance indicator that measures the rate at which an inventory of facilities is being recapitalized. The term “recapitalization” means to restore or modernize facilities. Recapitalization may (or may not) involve total replacement of individual facilities; recapitalization often occurs incrementally over time without a complete replacement.

The performance goal for FRM equals the average expected service life (ESL) of the facilities inventory (estimated to be 67 years, based on benchmarks developed by a panel of Defense engineers in 1997). The ESL, in turn, is a function of facilities sustainment. “Sustainment” means routine maintenance and repair necessary to achieve the **ESL**. To compute a normal ESL, full sustainment levels must be assumed. A reduced **ESL** results from less than full sustainment. For this reason, the metrics for facilities recapitalization and facilities sustainment are unavoidably linked and should be considered together.

Sustainment levels required to achieve a normal ESL are benchmarked to commercial per unit costs; for example, \$1.94 per square foot annually is needed to properly sustain the aircraft maintenance hangar inventory for a 50-year life cycle. The facilities sustainment model (FSM) adjusts these costs to local areas and assigns the costs to DoD Components and funding sources. For evaluating planned performance, both metrics (FSM and **FRM**) are converted to dollars (annual funding requirements) and compared to funded programs in the DoD Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).

Eliminate Inadequate Family Housing

Metric	FY 2000 Actual	FY 2001 Actual	FY 2002 Actual	FY 2003 Actual	FY 2004 Projected	FY 2005 Projected
Number of inadequate family housing units	182,246	170,314	143,608	129,955	115,830	77,012
Percentage of total family housing units	61	59	53	51	48	39

Metric Description. The Department of Defense has established a goal to eliminate all inadequate family housing by the end of FY 2007. Each Military Service has developed a Family Housing Master Plan that outlines the approach it will follow to achieve this goal. These plans identify the program requirements, by year, to eliminate inadequate family housing by FY 2007.

Inadequate housing, in general, is any unit that requires a major repair, component upgrade, component replacement, or total upgrade. Each Service has evaluated its housing and identified inadequate units and developed a plan to eliminate this inadequate housing through a combination of traditional military construction, operations and maintenance support, and privatization.

TAB

C

OUSD (AT&L) Top 7 Goals and Representative Metrics / Activity Indicators

1. Acquisition Excellence with Integrity

Metric / Activity – E-Commerce expansion with Standard Procurement System (award winner) and Wide Area Work Flow System (award nominee),

2. Logistics Integrated and Efficient

Metric / Activity – Introduces Unique Identification (UID), gaining an international standard – and mandating Radio Frequency Identification for In Transit Visibility

3. Systems Integration and Engineering for Mission Success

Metric / Activity – Activities to support this goal are designed to re-energize the systems view of integrated architectures, systems engineering, and re-invigorate the systems engineering environment.

4. Technology Dominance

Metric / Activity – Initiate 15 ACTDs each year, increase S&T across the Department to approximately 3% of budget.

5. Resources Rationalized

Metric / Activity – No specific metrics. Activities to support this goal are primarily related to the 2005 BRAC process.

6. Industrial Base Strengthened

Metric / Activity – Activities to support this goal included publishing industrial base capabilities studies, identifying industrial base and technology deficiencies and issues, and assessing the financial health of the aerospace/defense industry relative to the broader markets.

7. Motivated, Agile Workforce

Metric / Activity – The primary activity to support this goal is the strengthening of the Defense Acquisition University which has won several awards. This area also includes the forerunner to National Security Personnel System, the Acquisition Demonstration Project.

TAB

D

**Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES)
Global Broadcast Service (GBS)**

Program: GBS
Service: Air Force

Date: JUN 2004
Reviewed: Yes

	Perf	Test	Log	Cost	Fund	Sched	Cont	Prod	Mgmt	Interop
PM										
OSD										

Highlights:

General: The Global Broadcast Service continues to support deployed troops in Iraq and on other battlefields around the world. The TEMP update has been reviewed by DOT&E and signed by the PM. The services must aggressively staff this TEMP within three months to support all future government testing. The program successfully passed the Development Test/Operational Test (DT/OT) 1, phase 1, in March 2004. DT/OT 1 phase 2, scheduled for July 2004, will be a system-level test of the entire Internet Protocol architecture, evaluating the end-to-end performance of the Satellite Broadcast Manager and the final production Receive Suite configurations. NII has concerns about a possible disestablishment of the GBS program office in FY05. This would preclude development work on any upgrades or modifications, expected to be delineated in a planned ORD update and on any fielding issues extending beyond September 2005.

Cost: PA&E rates Yellow advisory because there are still no CAIG approved contract plans for the EMD phase.

Description of DAES Review Process

The extract above is a representative sample of output resulting from the DAES report process. The DAES provides standard, comprehensive summary reporting of acquisition category I programs (nearly 90 programs) between milestone decision points. It is designed to provide, on a regular and systematic basis (quarterly), indications of both potential and actual program problems before they become significant in ten major focus areas (Performance, Test, Logistics, Cost, Funding, Schedule, Contractual, Production, Management, and Interoperability). Recognizing that problems are expected to surface in these programs aids in communication and early resolution. The DAES is an internal report for the DoD submitted by Program Managers (PM) through their acquisition chain of command. The report is independently reviewed and evaluated by the OSD Staff, and their judgments are reflected in the OSD line.

The following guidelines are used in assessing the status of the program. The DAES review process is designed to understand the differences in opinion where they occur to assist decision-making and issue resolution.

- (1) **On-Track (Green):** All aspects of the program are progressing satisfactorily as evidenced by performance facts, schedule, costs, and contractor performance. Some minor problem(s) may exist, but appropriate solutions are available. Performance characteristics at the subsystem and system level are supporting program objectives and meeting threshold requirements. Milestone slippages, if any, can be rescheduled without requiring a significant amount of additional effort on the part of the program office or contractors. Costs are not expected to exceed approved funding levels and are not expected to exceed contract target costs by more than 5%.
- (2) **Advisory (Green, Yellow or Red):** Advisory indicates the program is either assessed to be between ratings, or is moving from one rating to another, thus this provides advance notification of shifting status. A Red (Advisory) indicates that a program with prior Red status requires higher echelon attention. The narrative will explain if the advisory means an improvement or a worsening in the status or area of risk.
- (3) **Potential or Actual Problem (Yellow):** Some event, action or delay has occurred that impairs progress against major objectives in one or more segments of the program. While appropriate solutions are within the Program Manager's ability to solve, timely action by the PEO, or by the DoD CAE, or by the USD(A&T) may also be required. Required actions may include activating a WPT to develop a revised test strategy, or decision, or similar type action. In the case of a potential risk to a major program objective or acquisition program baseline, the Program Manager should state this distinction in Section 3 (Program Manager's Comments). Early reporting is encouraged.
- (4) **Major Weakness (Red):** Some event, action, or delay has occurred that seriously impedes successful accomplishment of one or more major program objectives. Such a set-back to the program requires reorientation or reprogramming of the program effort, with the advice and consent of the PEO, and/or the DoD CAE, and/or the USD(A&T). Such a problem may be beyond the ability of the PM to resolve without significant action by the Component or DoD. A major weakness includes, but is not limited to, deviations from the acquisition program baseline that will result in a breach (see 6.2.1) or a unit cost breach (see 6.2.4).

7201

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

June 25, 2004

TO: General James Hill
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: El Salvador

Thanks so much for your note on El Salvador. We'll send off a letter to the MoD.

Regards,

DHR:dh
062504-2



Please respond by _____

El Salvador

062504-2

OSD 09603-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/42576

TAB A

May 20, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Doug Feith

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Reykjavik

Please give me the precise information on what is going to happen in Reykjavik that was brought up at this morning's meeting.

Thanks.

DHR:jh
052004 14

.....
Please respond by 6/4/04

Iceland

28 May 04

Tab A

OSD 09607-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42577

~~FOUO~~

June 25, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: Kurds and Sunnis

I think we need to have a briefing to the PC that tees up a proposal as to how the Iraqis are going to solve the problem between the Kurds and the Sunnis in terms of the properties that Saddam Hussein took from the Kurds, and the Kurds now want back.

It is a serious point of friction, and there are those who think it could lead to a major conflict as early as August. It merits our attention. The flash points could come soon, so I would think we would want to get a briefing in the next two weeks.

Thanks.

DHR:dn
062504-2 (3 computer) doc

Iraq

AS Sun 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 09612-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42578

2/17/200

720

10:45 AM

TO: Dov Zakheim
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
DATE: February 10, 2004
SUBJECT:

2/17/04
2/18

Why don't you write a letter to the Congressman, I think it was Vic Snyder, who asked about this chemical biological defense program and explain why.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
021004.20

37064

Please respond by: 2/16

2/19

2/17/04

Sir,
Response attached

2/2/19

DR

(b)(6)

10. Feb 04

OSD 09653-04

TEA 2/19

11-L-0559/OSD/42579



COMPTROLLER

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1100



FEB 13 2004

Honorable Marty Mechan
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Representative Mechan:

At the hearing last week you expressed concern that our Research and Development request for the Chemical Biological Defense Program (CBDP) had decreased by \$146 million from the fiscal year (FY) 2004 appropriated level. Secretary Rumsfeld has asked me to respond to your concern.

There are two reasons for the decrease. The first is that the CBDP research and development budget received an additional \$77.4 million in FY 2004 for congressional special interest items. These are one-time FY 2004 increases; when they are not considered, the decline between FY 2004 and FY 2005 funding levels is only \$69 million. The primary reason for the \$69 million decline in the base program is that several development programs are transitioning into production. Programs in this category include the Joint Service General Purpose Mask, the Joint Protective Aircrew Ensemble, and the Joint Biological Agent Identification and Diagnostic System. The CBDP procurement account actually increases by \$90 million in FY 2005.

Thank you for your continued support of our service men and women. You can be assured that the Department shares your concern that our troops receive the protection they need against chemical and biological threats.

Sincerely,

Dov S. Zakheim



11-L-0559/OSD/42580

7:35 PM

TO: LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: February 18, 2004

SUBJECT:

Give me that strategy paper so I can edit it myself please.

Thanks.

DIR/azn
021804 16

Please respond by: _____ *2/20*

3/24

*Response attached
C 2/20*

OSD 09655-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42581

1881

18 Feb 04

Coordination Draft (V.3.3) 20 February 04

DRAFT
National Defense Strategy
of
The United States of America



DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD/42582

Coordination Draft (V.3.3) 20 February 04

6



Table of Contents

FOREWORD	iv
I. AMERICA'S SECURITY IN THE 21 ST CENTURY.....	1
A. AMERICA'S ROLE IN THE WORLD	1
B. A CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT	2
1. Persistent and Emerging Challenges	2
2. Changing Relationships	4
3. Assumptions Framing the Strategy	6
II. A DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY	8
A. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES	8
1. Secure the United States from direct attack	9
2. Secure strategic access and maintain global freedom of action	9
3. Strengthen our alliances and partnerships to contend with common challenges.....	9
4. Establish security conditions conducive to a favorable international order.....	10
B. HOW WE ACCOMPLISH OUR OBJECTIVES.....	10
1. Assure allies and friends.....	10
2. Dissuade adversaries.....	10
3. Deter aggression and counter coercion.....	10
4. Defeat adversaries.....	11
C. IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES	12
1. Active Defense-In-Depth.....	12
2. Continuous Transformation.....	13
3. Capabilities-Based Approach.....	13
4. Managing Risks.....	14
III. DESIRED CAPABILITIES AND ATTRIBUTES	16
A. KEY OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES	16
1. Strengthening intelligence.....	16
2. Protecting critical bases of operation.....	17
3. Operating from the Commons: space, international waters and airspace, and cyberspace.....	17
4. Projecting and sustaining U.S. forces in distant anti-access environments.....	18
5. Denying enemies sanctuary.....	19
6. Conducting network-centric operations.....	19
7. Improving proficiency for irregular warfare.....	20
8. Increasing Capabilities of Partners—International and Domestic.....	20
B. ATTRIBUTES	21
1. Shape and Size of Military Forces	21
2. Global Defense Posture	23

FOREWORD

The attacks of September 11, 2001 initiated a new era of global conflict. The effectiveness of our sustained response across the government will determine the course of future events. Since 9/11, we are confronting new and fundamentally different challenges than those previously faced by the United States defense establishment. President George W. Bush is committed to meeting these new challenges before they become manifest and has defined a clear path for ensuring the security of the American people while, at the same time, advancing human freedom, democracy, and free enterprise worldwide.

The Department of Defense actively supports the President's commitment to the forward defense of freedom. Toward that end, *The National Defense Strategy* outlines our approach to effectively contending with those security challenges we will likely confront, not just those we are currently best prepared to meet. It further outlines our intent to create those favorable security conditions conducive to a broad, equitable, and enduring peace. Our experiences over the past few years have shown that we must continue to consciously transform how we think about our security environment, how we accomplish our strategic objectives, and how we adapt our military capabilities and attributes to ensure continued success.

This strategy takes an expansive view of the security environment as a means to better anticipate challenges and identify opportunities to influence strategic outcomes well before compelling challenges become more dangerous and less manageable. This strategy builds upon our efforts in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) to develop an adaptable, global approach that expects surprise and contends effectively with strategic uncertainty.

Events since the development of the QDR affirm the need to develop new and innovative ways to accomplish our strategic objectives by assuring our allies and friends; dissuading potential adversaries; deterring and countering aggression and coercion; and defeating adversaries. The Global War on Terrorism has uncovered not only new security challenges but also unprecedented opportunities to redefine the status quo, shape strategic outcomes, and create conditions for a favorable international order founded on responsible governance and the exercise of effective sovereignty.

The Department has already undertaken a number of organizational, process, and operational changes aimed at transforming how we prepare for and wage war. Our Armed Forces must have the capabilities and attributes they need to contend effectively with the range of persistent and emerging challenges—some notably different from those we faced in the past.

When President Bush took office three years ago, he charged all of us with a mission to prepare the Department of Defense to meet those threats our nation will face as the 21st century unfolds. *The National Defense Strategy* is focused on fulfilling this mission. As a witness to the dedication and determination of our uniformed men and women and of the civilians who support them, I have little doubt that we will succeed in meeting this mission.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

America is a nation at war.

Yet, we live in an era of historic American advantage and opportunity. Ours is a time where we both face a diverse set of gathering challenges and possess an unrivaled capacity to contend with them.

We are committed to a strategy focused on an active, layered defense of the nation and its interests, as well as the creation of those security conditions conducive to a broad, stable, and favorable international order that supports freedom, democracy, and opportunity. The *National Defense Strategy* promotes close cooperation with those committed to these principles and seeks to create opportunities, secure our collective interests, and contend effectively with persistent and emerging challenges.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

Four defense objectives will guide DoD's security activities.

Secure the United States from direct attack. We will counter—early and at a safe distance—those who seek to harm the United States.

Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action. We will underwrite the security, prosperity and freedom of action of the United States, its partners, and the wider international community by securing access to key regions, lines of communication, and the global commons.

Strengthen alliances and partnerships to contend with common challenges. We will expand the community of like-minded nations and help partners increase their capacity to defend themselves and collectively meet challenges to our common interests.

Establish security conditions conducive to a favorable international order. We will create conditions conducive to a favorable international

order by honoring our security commitments and working with others to bring about a broad, stable, and secure peace.

HOW WE ACCOMPLISH OUR OBJECTIVES

Four key activities will focus our efforts in the world.

Assure allies and friends. We will assure allies and friends by demonstrating our resolve to fulfill our defense commitments and protect common interests.

Dissuade potential adversaries. We will work to dissuade potential adversaries from adopting threatening capabilities and ambitions by refocusing our key military advantages.

Deter aggression and counter coercion. We will deter aggression and coercion by maintaining capable and rapidly deployable military forces and, when necessary, demonstrating the resolve to use them.

Defeat adversaries. At the direction of the President, we will defeat adversaries at the time, place, and in the manner of our choosing—setting the conditions for future security.

IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES

Four guidelines will structure our strategic planning and decision making.

Active, defense-in-depth. We will focus our military planning, posture, operations, and capabilities on the active, forward and layered defense of our nation, our interests, and our partners.

Continuous transformation. We will continually adapt how we approach and confront challenges, conduct business, and work with others.

Capabilities-based approach. We will strengthen our opportunity-oriented approach for addressing persistent and emerging challenges by setting priorities among competing capabilities.

Managing risks. We will consider the full range of risk associated with resources and operations to manage explicit tradeoffs across the Department.

THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

I. AMERICA'S SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

A. AMERICA'S ROLE IN THE WORLD

The United States is a nation at war, yet we still enjoy an historic position of strategic advantage. In spite of our substantial advantages, however, we remain vulnerable.

According to the President's *National Security Strategy*, we seek to use our unique position of strategic advantage "to build a safer, better world that favors human freedom, democracy, and free enterprise." Our security and that of our partners ultimately rests on an international order within which all nations enjoy the benefits freedom and prosperity.

In combination with our international partners, our great national strengths afford us a unique opportunity to secure collective interests and build that new, more favorable international order. If we are to succeed in this pursuit we must continue to rely on traditional allies and partners while seeking to expand our partnerships around the world. We must continue to grow the community of like-minded states committed to bringing about positive and enduring change to adverse security conditions likeliest to threaten the peace.

Despite our position of enormous advantage, we remain vulnerable to diverse security challenges. These challenges take many forms, ranging from direct attacks against the United States and its interests to indirect threats posed by aggression or dangerous

instability affecting others. Some may seek to terrorize our population and destroy our way of life, as al Qaeda did on September 11, 2001. Others may seek to limit our freedom of action globally or regionally, establish hostile dominance over key strategic regions, or attempt to make the costs of our continued worldwide commitment prohibitive.

Mindful of this diverse array of challenges, the United States and its international partners have, since September 2001, followed a clear, active, and principled strategy. This approach strives to defend, preserve, and extend peace and freedom throughout the world. The *National Defense Strategy* will help the United States achieve these broad goals by promoting an active, layered, and adaptive approach to securing the United States and its interests. While the *National Defense Strategy* retains elements of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report, it also reflects fundamental changes in the security environment and the lessons we have learned over the past few years.

The September 2001 attacks clarified our understanding of the fundamental changes occurring since the end of the Cold War. We realized that, without resolute action, we could experience far greater tragedies in the future. A purely defensive approach likely would fail to address the threat of attacks on an even greater scale. From that day forward, a more activist defense of the nation and its interests became the hallmark of our strategy. This approach is evidenced in the ongoing global war on terrorism. Indeed, since 9/11 the active defeat of terrorist organizations, like al Qaeda, and their sponsors is the defining security interest of our age.

The United States and its international partners have made significant progress in the global war on terrorism. This has been enabled by an unprecedented level of interagency and international cooperation. Over 170 countries are engaged in activities

ranging from freezing terrorist assets to sharing intelligence to providing combat forces for coalition operations. Our recent military successes in Afghanistan and Iraq are illustrative of this. In Afghanistan, a U.S.-led coalition defeated a Taliban regime that provided the world's principal haven for terrorists. In Iraq, an American-led effort toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein—a regime with a history of indiscriminately employing weapons of mass destruction, sponsoring and providing sanctuary to terrorists, and inflicting terror on its own people.

Our experiences fighting the global war on terrorism have underscored the need for a defense establishment postured to contend with this conflict for some time, while strengthening our ability to contend with a range of diverse challenges in the future. This reality calls for an adaptive strategy, predicated upon creating and seizing opportunities and contending with our most compelling security challenges through an active, forward defense in depth.

B. A CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Uncertainty is the defining characteristic of the current strategic environment. We cannot and will not know precisely where and when the interests of the United States will be threatened nor when the United States will come under direct attack. We can identify trends, but we cannot predict specific events with any precision. We seek to avoid surprise, but we also must learn to expect it.

We must adapt to uncertainty by adjusting quickly and decisively to changes in strategic circumstances—better anticipating the most adverse among them and influencing strategic outcomes on our terms. It is no longer enough to react to change. Thus, this strategy focuses on securing our most treasured national assets—our people and our

freedoms—while seeking to prevent the development of future challenges to them.

1. PERSISTENT AND EMERGING CHALLENGES

“America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few.” —The President's *National Security Strategy*

One of the clearest changes in the strategic landscape grows from our superiority in traditional forms of warfare. Our adversaries increasingly are foregoing challenging U.S. interests directly with traditional military means. Instead, they are adopting a range of asymmetric capabilities and methods intended to circumvent U.S. military advantages. Thus an array of catastrophic, irregular, disruptive, as well as continuing traditional methods and capabilities represent the four persistent and emerging challenges we must contend with to prevail in a new, more uncertain era. Individually, these challenges are characterized in the following ways:

- **Traditional** challenges are largely represented by states employing legacy and advanced military capabilities and recognizable military forces in long-established, well-known forms of military competition and conflict.
- **Irregular** challenges are unconventional methods adopted and employed by non-state and state actors to counter stronger state opponents.
- **Catastrophic** challenges involve the surreptitious acquisition, possession, and possible terrorist or rogue employment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or methods producing WMD-like effects.
- **Disruptive** future challenges are those likely to emanate from competitors

developing, possessing, and employing breakthrough technological capabilities that might supplant our current advantages in key operational domains.

There are often no hard boundaries distinguishing one of these categories from another. While the capabilities and methods within each differ, the most dangerous circumstances are those where we are facing, or will face, multiple challenges simultaneously.

For example, during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, U.S. and coalition forces contended with both *traditional* and *irregular* challenges, in part to keep *catastrophic* capabilities out of the hands of terrorists. Transnational terrorist groups like al Qaeda represent quintessential, *irregular* threats but are actively seeking to obtain *catastrophic* capabilities. North Korea at once poses *traditional*, *irregular*, and *catastrophic* challenges. Still other potential opponents—particularly rising great powers or rogue states—may seek to leverage breakthrough *disruptive* capabilities in combination with *traditional* forms of warfare to achieve decisive advantages in niche areas.

While the four challenges often combine, their distinctions are best appreciated when explained individually.

Traditional Challenges. *Traditional* challenges are well recognized forms of military competition employed largely by states—that is, armies, navies and air forces. While *traditional* forms of military competition remain important, recent history suggests that they likely will receive lesser priority in the planning of adversaries vis-à-vis the United States. This can be attributed, in part, to U.S. and allied superiority in *traditional* forms of warfare and the enormous cost to develop, acquire, and maintain conventional capabilities. But it is explained as well by the increasing

attractiveness of *irregular* methods, as well as the increasing availability of *catastrophic* capabilities.

Even where adversaries possess considerable capacity in *traditional* domains, they often seek to reinforce their position with *catastrophic*, *irregular*, and *disruptive* methods and capabilities. Therefore, some strictly *traditional* threats are giving way to hybrid challenges. Effectively contending with these challenges requires the active maintenance of sufficient combat overmatch in key areas of *traditional* military competition.

Irregular Challenges. *Irregular* methods of increasing sophistication—including terrorism, insurgency, civil war, and third-party coercion—will challenge U.S. security interests to a greater degree than they have in the past. Our adversaries are likely to exploit a host of *irregular* methods in an attempt to erode U.S. influence, power, and national will over time.

The adverse effects of most *irregular* challenges accrue cumulatively. We can expect opponents employing these methods to take a long-term view. They will not focus on individual battlefield victories, but rather, on the steady erosion of American patience and will over time. They will seek to exact increasing levels of human, material, financial, and political costs on the United States so as to force a strategic retreat from a key region or adopted course of action.

Two factors in particular have intensified the rapid growth and potential danger of *irregular* challenges: the rise of extremist ideologies and the erosion of traditional sovereignty. Worldwide political, religious, and ethnic extremism continue to fuel deadly and destabilizing conflicts. Particularly threatening are those extremist ideologies that sanction horrific violence—including the deliberate targeting of civilians and noncombatants.

The erosion of traditional sovereignty and the rapid growth of un-, under-, and ill-governed territory has provided havens for terrorists, criminals, insurgents, and other groups that threaten global security. Many states are unable or unwilling to extend effective control over their territory, thus increasing the areas available to hostile exploitation. This is most prevalent in an "arc of instability" that spans portions of Central and South America, Africa, the Middle East, and southern and Southeast Asia. *Irregular* challenges in and from these areas will grow more intense over time and are likely to challenge the security of the United States and its partners for the indefinite future.

Our ongoing global war on terrorism and our resulting operational experience call for a reorientation of our military capabilities to contend with these challenges more effectively.

Catastrophic Challenges. A number of state and non-state actors are vigorously seeking to acquire dangerous and destabilizing *catastrophic* capabilities—particularly weapons of mass destruction. Porous international borders, weak controls over weapons-related materials and expertise, and ongoing revolutions in information technology are increasingly enabling this trend. Particularly troublesome is the nexus of transnational terrorists, WMD proliferation, and rogue states. Unchecked, this confluence raises the prospect of direct WMD employment against the United States or our partners.

The continuing illicit proliferation of WMD technology and expertise makes contending with *catastrophic* challenges an enduring necessity. A single *catastrophic* attack against the United States is an unacceptable prospect. The strategic effect of a such an attack transcends the mere economic and social costs of mass destruction. It represents a more fundamental, existential threat to our

nation, our institutions, and our free society. Thus, new emphasis must be applied to capabilities that enable us to dissuade acquisition of catastrophic capabilities, deter their use, and finally, when necessary defeat them prior to their posing direct threats to us and our partners.

Disruptive Challenges. In rare instances, revolutionary technological developments and associated military innovation can change the nature of military competition itself and fundamentally alter our concepts of warfare. In the future, some capable competitors may exploit our perceived vulnerabilities with this type of revolutionary breakthrough. In doing so, they would seek to provide themselves new military options that offset U.S. military advantages in niche areas, and threaten our ability to operate from the strategic commons—space, international waters and airspace, and cyberspace.

Most such developments will afford opponents only temporary advantage. In a few instances, however, the United States could confront technological breakthroughs that would fundamentally alter our approach to security. These might include breakthrough developments in sensors, information processing, bio-technology, miniaturization, cyber-operations, space, directed-energy, and other emerging fields. Although such breakthroughs are unpredictable, we must be attentive to the consequences that such possibilities hold, and plan and invest accordingly.

2. CHANGING RELATIONSHIPS

Fundamental changes within the international system accompany the **four** security challenges:

- Our alliances and partnerships—a key source of strength—are adapting to meet common challenges.

- Key states are facing important decisions that will affect their strategic position in the world.
- Some rogue states will continue to pose significant long-term challenges, while others will realize that their role actually weakens their security in the long-run.
- A host of new actors — particularly those operating outside of traditional state control — have grown in the aggregate and are increasing their capabilities.

Allies and Partners. Our international relationships continue to be a source of America's strength. Shared principles, a common recognition of our security challenges, and a commitment to working together have allowed us and our allies and partners to collectively achieve greater security. Nowhere is this more evident than in our ongoing war on terrorism.

Yet, as our security challenges change, our alliances and partnerships must continue to adapt. Today, our nation and our collective interests are threatened less by the predictable *traditional* challenges of the past, and more by actors possessing and employing *catastrophic, irregular, and disruptive* capabilities and methods. As a result, our key, long-standing relationships in Europe, Asia, and the Western Hemisphere continue to grow in scope and function. In addition, we have broadened our circle of security partners around the world. This growth in our alliances and partnerships must continue apace and stay ahead of those challenges likeliest to threaten our collective interests.

Key States at Strategic Crossroads. Several key states face critical decisions about their roles in global and regional politics, economics, and security. These decisions have the potential to change their strategic positions in the world and their relationships with the United States. Their uncertain paths present us with significant opportunities but

also potential challenges. On one hand, we may be able to engage with them and assist them toward more favorable political change. On the other, should more adverse political and security circumstances prevail, some key states could evolve into capable regional competitors.

In particular, given requisite levels of investment over time, some states — particularly rising great powers — could eventually pose significant future *traditional* or *disruptive* challenges. They may ultimately generate the capacity to directly threaten the United States, rival us in key areas of military and technological competition, and hold a number of our interests at risk by pursuing dominance over key regions. In other cases, if adverse economic, political, and demographic trends continue, currently functioning and capable states could become dangerously unstable and increasingly ungovernable, thus presenting the United States and its partners with enormous future *irregular* and potentially *catastrophic* challenges.

We remain attentive to a possible renewal of old patterns of great power competition and the potential dangerous destabilization of large, capable states in the future. However, recent developments in large states like Russia, China, and India create strategic opportunities and encourage hope for the future of freedom and democracy. As the National Security Strategy states, "Today, the international community has the best chance since the rise of the nation-state in the seventeenth century to build a world where great powers compete in peace instead of continually prepare for war."

Persistent Rogue State Threats. Rogue states differ from one another in important ways. Yet each shares a number of common attributes. Foremost, these states reject basic human values. The elites of these countries squander national resources to benefit ruling cliques, foreign extremist clients, or their

armed forces; they disregard the demands of international law; and they serially violate international agreements. In addition, many seek WMD or other advanced military capabilities to coerce and intimidate neighbors, extort concessions, or offset key weaknesses. Some sponsor terrorists' activities and provide them safe haven. The most capable among these rogues—those possessing or close to possessing WMD—could collude with extremist actors and present the United States with unprecedented security challenges.

Nonetheless, there is reason for hope. Some rogue actors may recognize that their security is best assured by rejoining the community of responsible nations—demonstrated by positive developments in Libya.

New Actors of Strategic Significance. The United States can no longer merely counter the military capabilities of our state competitors to guarantee security. Indeed, the attacks of September 2001 and subsequent experiences indicate that fundamental threats to security emanate from a variety of both state and non-state sources. Therefore, our security will depend increasingly upon our ability to contend not only with threatening states but also with a range of challenges that operate outside the control of states. A diverse collection of terrorists, insurgents, paramilitaries, and criminals will pose significant *irregular* and *catastrophic* challenges to the United States and its interests well into the future. Further, these actors are increasingly likely to undermine the legitimate governance of some key states and exploit un-, under-, or ill-governed areas as sanctuaries.

3. ASSUMPTIONS FRAMING THE STRATEGY

The following broad assumptions about the security environment inform this strategy:

- The United States faces **an** extended period of persistent conflict — largely *irregular* and potentially *catastrophic* in character.
- The United States will not face a peer military competitor over the next decade; however, some prospective adversaries will continue to improve **and** adapt their military capabilities and **may pose** much broader *traditional* or *disruptive* challenges.
- **Status quo conditions** in some key regions and among some peoples are inherently unstable. **Rapidly** growing populations, the globalization of extremist ideas, inequitable development, increasing disaffection, and continued inadequate or irresponsible governance will contribute to rising instability and violence.
- Some friendly states will come under pressure from actors hostile to U.S. interests and could, under adverse circumstances, develop into rogue, criminal, or ungovernable entities. Likewise, some currently hostile states may choose courses more conducive to responsible international behavior.
- Un-, under-, and ill-governed areas will continue to generate grave security problems requiring U.S. and international involvement and, at times, military intervention.
- The grave danger resident in many *irregular* and *catastrophic* challenges portends the need for **an** activist approach to issues like proliferation and effective governance.
- Bringing about durable, favorable change in crisis regions will require new competencies and expanded capacities within the U.S. government **and the** international community.
- The United States will retain strong and expanding alliances and partnerships in a number of regions around the world.

- There is increasing diversity in the international community in gauging the severity of particular challenges. This diversity indicates that achieving past levels of collective involvement in the resolution of some security issues will be more problematic in the future.

- Europe will remain largely at peace and will continue to seek to define its role in global affairs. However, Europe will also be vulnerable to *irregular* and *catastrophic* challenges emanating from outside the region.

- The most significant current and future *traditional* and *disruptive* challenges likely reside in or will emanate from Asia.

- The most significant current and future *irregular* and *catastrophic* challenges likely reside in or will emanate from the Middle East, South Asia, and Southwest Asia.

- A combination of *irregular* challenges will continue to destabilize key states, undermine effective governance, and increase the likelihood of one or more significant failed or failing states in the Americas, Africa or the Middle East.

The challenges confronting us, combined with changing international relationships and the assumptions outlined here, indicate that we will face a period of uncertainty and instability well into the future. This calls for a strategic approach designed to endure through adversity, accommodate change, and exploit opportunity. Thus, these themes, combined with requisite flexibility and adaptability, should inform implementation of the *National Defense Strategy* across the Department.

11. A DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR THE 21st CENTURY

Our strategy seeks to create those security conditions conducive to a stable international order that supports freedom, democracy, and opportunity. We support an environment characterized by responsible and representative government; the peaceful, favorable resolution of regional disputes; open and competitive markets; and the protection and extension of effective sovereignty.

Cold War defense strategy was predicated on maintaining a stable and predictable status quo. Indeed, for the majority of the previous half century, American strategy focused on containing Soviet influence and expansionism in critical regions—certainly not on producing far-reaching and fundamental political change. We deliberately equated the status quo, for good reason, with that degree of stability necessary for the prevention of war between ourselves and the Soviet Union.

Today, our strategic circumstances are notably different. We live in an historic era of unprecedented American advantage and opportunity, yet, also of unique vulnerability. It is one where we face both a diverse set of gathering challenges and possess an unrivaled capacity to do something about them. These factors point to the need for a bold and principled strategy to secure the United States, its partners, and its interests.

A growing international consensus is emerging on the need for fundamental and favorable change to those adverse security conditions that today and in the future will produce grave common dangers. Uncertainty and an inherently destabilizing status quo in some regions indicate that our strategic approach to security can no longer rely on reacting only to manifest threats. We and our

allies cannot sit idly as terrorists plot against our citizens. Therefore, we must endeavor to defend ourselves before terrorists and their supporters are able to act on their designs. When called upon by the President to do so, we aim both to eliminate such threats and to bring about favorable, lasting change to preclude the development of like threats in the future.

The United States is fighting a complex and multifaceted war. Military operations are central to victory in this war, but so too is the effective employment of other elements of national power. Successes in the near-term are critical, but this conflict likely will persist for decades. In the end, while the United States can accomplish much by itself, we depend on the cooperation of allies and partners to effect meaningful change and remove the root sources of terrorist violence. This is especially the case in the Middle East where the United States and its partners are actively pursuing fundamental change today. The President has explicitly rejected the notion of sustaining the status quo in that vital region.

We are proceeding from this principle today, as the nation fights a global war against terrorism. Further, it will be imperative that we maintain this focus into the indefinite future. The nation's role in bringing about positive change argues for undertaking an active, forward strategy focused on defending human freedom, democracy, and opportunity while helping to develop a broader, more secure, and enduring peace around the world.

Our *National Defense Strategy* articulates objectives we seek to achieve; the actions we will take to accomplish our objectives; and finally, the underlying guidelines informing the strategy's implementation.

A. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

Four defense objectives will focus and organize all of the Department's efforts.

1. Secure the United States from direct attack. The sudden attacks of 2001 crystallized our appreciation of the challenges confronting us. From that moment, we were transformed into a nation at war for the long term. The enemy is a complex network of actors, united by common strategic goals and employing largely *irregular* and potentially *catastrophic* means to attack us. They seek to undermine our international relationships, erode our influence, and impose their own extremist views on civilized societies. This realization established a new strategic imperative for the United States.

We will counter — early and at a safe distance — those who seek to harm the United States.

2. Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action. The United States cannot impact that which it cannot reach or influence. Securing the nation's strategic access to key regions, lines of communication, and the global commons — international waters and airspace, space, and cyberspace — underwrites the security, prosperity, and well-being of the American people and guarantees maximum freedom of action. At the same time, securing access to these diverse strategic domains supports the broader security and prosperity of our partners around the world. Finally, our assuring the universal, open, and peaceful use of critical lines of communication and the global commons supports the broader security of both the international economic system and key regions.

We will underwrite the security, prosperity and freedom of action of the United States, its partners, and the wider international community by securing access to key regions, lines of communication, and the global commons.

3. Strengthen alliances and partnerships to contend with challenges. Bringing about a broad, stable, and secure order —

founded on responsible government and the exercise of effective sovereignty — is only possible through collective action. Thus, the United States relies on its allies and partners to help establish and maintain the wider peace, bring about favorable and durable change to the international order, and sustain the global influence and freedom of action we all collectively enjoy.

Toward these ends, we are adapting and expanding our international partnerships. Though forged during the Cold War, our traditional partnerships around the world are as valuable today as when they were formed. However, if we are to succeed in bringing about fundamental change to the security dynamics in key regions we must look to expand our partnerships.

Adequately addressing the security challenges of the future will require adaptable security relationships — combining both traditional and non-traditional partners and partnerships. This includes helping others become individually and collectively more capable of contending with common security challenges.

We will expand the community of like-minded nations and help partners increase their capacity to defend themselves and collectively meet challenges to our common interests.

4. Establish security conditions conducive to a favorable international order. The United States supports a stable and secure international order that favors freedom, democracy, and opportunity. Therefore, we will not tolerate overt aggression or coercion targeted at our international partners or interests. Further, we will not sit idly while effective, responsible governance or wider security in key regions are actively undermined by irresponsible leadership, dangerous instability, extremism, corruption, or criminal behavior.

The United States values its friendships and thus, the collective security of its friends.

Therefore, our foremost priority toward this end is our continued commitment to the security of our allies and friends around the world. However, our collective, long-term security interests cannot be achieved without bringing about a stable and secure order—founded on responsible government and the exercise of effective sovereignty in those regions likeliest to harbor the most dangerous security challenges. Achieving this broader mandate hinges on bringing about fundamental and enduring change to those security conditions that, left unchecked, will generate dangerous common security challenges now and in the future.

We cannot achieve this objective alone, nor can we do so everywhere at once. Thus, with our finite resources we must confront the most dangerous and compelling challenges first. Most frequently, the Department helps accomplish this objective through targeted bilateral and multilateral security cooperation activities—often in collaboration with other elements of the United States government. However, given more demanding, dangerous and urgent threats to us, our partners, or our interests, the establishment of favorable security conditions may require direct intervention and collective military action.

We will create conditions conducive to a favorable international order by honoring our security commitments and working with others to bring about a broad, stable, and secure peace.

B. HOW WE ACCOMPLISH OUR OBJECTIVES

Four key activities will focus our efforts around the world.

1. Assure allies and friends. For more than half a century, U.S. defense policy and military activities around the world underscored the nation's commitment to our allies and partners. We demonstrated our commitment during the Cold War by sharing

risks with our allies and physically assisting in their defense against possible Soviet aggression. Now, in light of the new challenges we face, we must assure a larger, growing, and more diverse community of allies and friends of that same enduring commitment to their security. Our supporting security cooperation activities will help reinforce the nation's deep and abiding commitment to **adapt and** expand our traditional **partnerships** to contend with emerging **challenges** of common concern, as well as **build new security** relationships to cope with **ever-changing** strategic circumstances.

We will assure allies and friends by demonstrating our resolve to fulfill our defense commitments and protect common interests.

2. Dissuade adversaries. It is critical that the United States guarantee its future military freedom of action by limiting the strategic options available to future opponents. We can shape future security competition in advantageous ways by operating forward with transformational concepts and capabilities. Particularly important is dissuading military competition in advanced *traditional* or *disruptive* capabilities, as well as dissuading would-be opponents from adopting *catastrophic* or *irregular* methods to offset our recognized superiority in *traditional* forms of warfare.

We will work to dissuade potential adversaries from adopting threatening capabilities and ambitions by refocusing our key military advantages.

3. Deter aggression and counter coercion. The dramatic events of the last few years underscore the requirement that the United States continue to actively deter aggression and counter coercion emanating from a range of potential hostile actors. Effective deterrence demands a multi-faceted and comprehensive approach. It rests on our

recognized, unmatched capacity and will to defeat adversaries' attacks, deny their objectives, dominate them at any level of potential escalation; and, finally, hold at risk that which they value most.

We will deter aggression and coercion by maintaining capable and rapidly deployable military forces and, when necessary, demonstrating the resolve to use them.

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may
seek to bring about more fundamental, far-reaching change.

ture our capabilities to seize the initiative and dictate the tempo, timing, and direction of military operations. Bringing such operations to a favorable and decisive conclusion demands that we use military and non-military actions to limit a hostile actors strategic freedom of action, deny them their ideological base of support, defeat their organized resistance, and establish security conditions conducive to a broad, stable, and secure peace. For the Department, this will entail a range of military activities from major combat operations against capable, organized opponents to the potential for extended stability operations — including combat operations of varying intensity.

The global war on terrorism illustrates this expanded conception of defeat. Our actions in the global war on terrorism are undertaken explicitly recognizing that attacking terrorist capabilities and physically defending the homeland alone will not produce strategic success. The comprehensive defeat of

terrorists with global reach has required that we:

- Disrupt and destroy terrorist networks capable of threatening the United States and its allies;
- Protect the homeland against further catastrophic attacks; and simultaneously,
- Actively combat extremist ideologies with mpelling ideas

Each of these efforts focuses on denying terrorists access to and the utility of the resources they value most: leadership, safe haven, weapons, finances, ideological and moral support, foot soldiers, and finally, exploitable targets. From a strategic perspective, the ideological struggle is the critical front in this war. Largely prosecuted outside the De

own government, this aspect of the war on terrorism seeks to make terrorism universally illegitimate, undermine terrorist recruiting and indoctrination, promote successful models of moderation to combat extremism, and finally, work to change ad institutions, and people among key populations.

Another aspect of the war on terrorism is denying terrorist organizations, like al Qaeda, access to catastrophic capabilities and their means of delivery. Such capabilities in irresponsible hands pose an unacceptable threat to the United States and its partners. Denying terrorists' access to WMD will include coercive and non-coercive measures. These include both the physical interdiction of prohibited materials and technologies, as well as preventive military actions when we are threatened. We also will strengthen our non-proliferation efforts in diplomacy, arms control, multilateral export controls, and threat reduction assistance — as exemplified by the President's Proliferation Security Initiative.

defeat adversaries at the time, place, and in the manner of our choosing – setting the conditions for future security.

C. IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES

Four guidelines will structure our strategic planning and decision making.

1. Active Defense-In-Depth. Our first priority must be the defeat of direct threats to the United States — whenever possible, before they become manifest. Terrorists have demonstrated that they can conduct devastating surprise attacks with no warning. Therefore, we can no longer rely on a reactive or defensive posture alone. Allowing opponents to strike first — particularly in an era of proliferation and catastrophic terrorism—is unacceptable. Therefore, the United States must defeat the most dangerous challenges at a distance, before they are allowed to fully mature.

This active approach to defense planning is predicated on seizing the strategic initiative in all areas of defense activity—assuring, dissuading, deterring, defeating—and affords us the greatest strategic freedom of action. To contend with the most compelling circumstances, it layers the nation’s defense capabilities, providing both redundancy and choice in deciding the time, place, and manner of defeat of those who would do us incalculable harm.

Prevention is a critical component of an active, defense-in-depth. Preventive actions include activities like routine security cooperation, forward deterrence, humanitarian assistance, targeted peace operations, and certain non-proliferation initiatives — including the active interception of illicit WMD transiting the commons. When directed by the President, preventive actions might also entail significant military operations. Under the most dangerous and

the preemptive use of force.

In crises, preventive action might involve the

capabilities to prevent increased tensions from becoming open hostilities or to help defend or restore a collapsing friendly government. Those preventative measures intended to preempt a devastating attack might involve disabling or destroying WMD in the possession of terrorists or rogue states, or striking time-sensitive terrorist targets capable of supporting direct attacks against the United States or its interests.

Our international partners are critical to our active, defense-in-depth. As indicated earlier, the United States cannot establish a favorable international order alone. Thus, among the key goals of the National Security Strategy is working with other nations to resolve regional crises and conflicts. In some cases, U.S. forces will be in a supporting role, lending assistance to others when our unique capabilities are needed. In other cases, U.S. forces will be supported by allies assuming critical roles.

The final layer of an active defense-in-depth is the physical defense of the homeland. At the direction of the President or the Secretary of Defense, the Department will undertake military missions at home to defend the United States, its population, and its critical infrastructure from external attack. In emergency circumstances, we will act quickly to provide unique capabilities to other federal agencies when required by circumstances or when the need surpasses the capacities of civilian responders. Under limited and more temporary circumstances, the Department will provide support to other federal agencies for one-time events of limited scope and duration.

We will focus our military planning, posture, operations, and capabilities on the active, forward and layered defense of our nation, our interests, and our partners.

2. **Continuous Transformation.** Continuous defense transformation is part of a wider governmental effort chartered by the National Security Strategy to “transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.” Recent experience and lessons learned, as well as an assessment of persistent and emerging challenges guide our broad defense transformation. Just as our challenges will change continuously over time, so too must our mix of military capabilities.

The purpose of transformation is to extend our key advantages and reduce our vulnerabilities in the face of an ever-changing strategic environment. Thus, transformation must focus both on contending with persistent and emerging security challenges and seizing opportunities created by changes in strategic circumstances. Defense transformation must proceed from the recognition that we are a nation at war, and we will be contending with persistent—but adaptive — challenges for some time to come.

Transformation is not about technological advance alone. Rather, it is about changing the way we think about our challenges and opportunities, adapting the defense establishment to that enlightened perspective, and refocusing our capabilities to meet the challenges we must confront versus those we are currently most prepared to meet.

Transformation should charter continuous, broad adaptation to new strategic circumstances, yet it is too often narrowly associated with offsetting future high-technology challenges with our own advanced technologies. Future challenges will span the continuum of catastrophic, irregular, disruptive, and traditional capabilities and methods. Thus, our continuous defense transformation needs to span this same continuum.

Making difficult choices lies at the heart of our transformation efforts. Not every capability we possess is relevant to the challenges of the future. Likewise, we currently are not fully prepared to contend with all the challenges we foresee. Therefore, one key in our transformation decision making will be the rigorous determination of the relationship between the current value of future capabilities and the future value of current capabilities.

War presents both real constraints and important opportunities for accelerating change and cultivating a culture of innovation. The global war on terrorism also imparts an urgency to defense transformation; we must transform to win the current war.

The Department has made some progress toward transformation. However, despite success to date, we still face irregular, catastrophic, disruptive, and advanced traditional challenges that demand a program of continuous, aggressive adaptation and change.

We will continually adapt how we approach and confront challenges, conduct business, and work with others.

3. **Capabilities-Based Approach.** Capabilities-based planning and operations focus more on how adversaries challenge us than on whom those particular adversaries might be or where exactly we may have to contend with them. It focuses the Department on the growing range of capabilities and methods we must possess and employ to effectively contend with an uncertain future. It seeks to center U.S. defense initiatives on reorienting our portfolio of military capabilities, linking them to joint operating concepts and functional capabilities across the broadest range of possible scenarios.

This approach represents the threat as the broad continuum of challenges addressed in Section I—not a single discrete threat actor. In the past, threat-based planning tended to result in quantitative planning solutions associated with narrowly defined and highly scripted scenarios. It was a program- and platform-centric approach to planning. Capabilities-based planning starts from a more fundamental departure point by first identifying desired effects to be generated and objectives to be achieved. It then derives the requisite military capabilities needed to achieve those effects and objectives, and identifies the best means for infusing those capabilities into the force.

Like the institutionalization of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System in the 1960s, the introduction and evolution of capabilities-based approach will be a long-term process. It will directly support the management of risks by the senior Defense leaders, revealing strategy-driven tradeoffs among cost, time, and military capability. Such an approach will be focused on achieving the key operational capabilities to be discussed in Section III. It will enable senior leaders to identify and assess the highly complex issues and decisions faced by the Department. Precisely because of the benefits of a capabilities-based approach, we will employ it as a foundation for Department-wide planning.

We will strengthen our opportunity-oriented approach for addressing persistent and emerging challenges—setting priorities among competing capabilities.

4. Managing Risks. Effectively managing a variety of complex defense risks is central to operationalizing the *National Defense Strategy*. The Department takes a comprehensive, strategic approach to integrated risk assessment and management. This approach demands that difficult, deliberate risk choices be made in defense planning.

Our approach to decision making will assess the likelihood of a variety of risk-sensitive consequences associated with particular strategic choices. Among the most notable of these is the likelihood of failure or prohibitive costs in pursuit of the strategic, operational, or management objectives imbedded within the strategy and its execution. Our approach explicitly recognizes that some objectives, though desirable, may not be attainable and others may not always be worth the human, material, financial, or strategic political costs associated with achieving them. Managing risks, once they are clearly identified, entails weighing their relative importance and making deliberate choices to accept, directly reduce, or indirectly mitigate them.

The integrated assessment and management of risks enables the Department to achieve its principal objectives more effectively. It allows for the continuous assessment and prudent adjustment of Department priorities relative to the risks involved. The defense risk framework established in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is the Department's vehicle for risk assessment and management and will be used for all reports and other correspondence dealing with risk matters. It focuses on the key areas critical for the evaluation of the size, shape, posture, commitment, and management of the force relative to the objectives of the *National Defense Strategy*. This framework reflects the lessons of the 1990s and the uneven success of the Department during that period in balancing strategy, force structure, and resources. It further allows the Department to consider tradeoffs between objectives and resource constraints.

In the 2001 QDR, the Department established a risk framework consisting of four dimensions: *operational, future challenges, force management, and institutional*. This framework serves as the basis for assessing and managing risks in areas that are central to contending with the range of challenges

today and extending U.S. advantages into the future.

By assessing and managing risks within and across these four dimensions, the Department can directly address the critical issues entailed in developing a more effective operational force, key enabling capabilities, and supporting infrastructure. In detail, the four dimensions of risk are the following:

- **Force management**—Those risks associated with the Department’s ability to manage its military forces as they fulfill the myriad missions associated with this strategy. Its primary concern is recruiting, retaining, training, and equipping a ready force and sustaining that readiness to achieve the objectives of the strategy within force planning parameters.
- **Operational**—Those risks most directly associated with the current force executing this strategy within acceptable human, material, financial, and strategic political costs. This entails assessing a full range of likely near-term contingencies and operations versus the array of *current traditional, irregular, and catastrophic challenges*.
- **Future challenges**—Those risks associated with the Department fulfilling this strategy within acceptable costs over the long-term. This entails assessing the development of future capabilities and operational concepts to assure allies, dissuade competition – across the spectrum of challenges – deter direct future threats, and if necessary, decisively defeat the range of future opponents.
- **Institutional**—Those risks associated with development of new command, management, and business practices and controls to efficiently use finite resources and promote the effective operation of the Defense establishment.

These four dimensions of risk cannot be assessed and managed independently, as choices in one area will have effects on others. Instead, to manage risks effectively, the Department will make deliberate risk choices within and across each broad category — maintaining a strategy-driven balance among them. Constant assessment and management will ensure that the most appropriate risk balance is adopted over time.

We will consider the full range of risk associated with resources and operations to manage explicit tradeoffs across the Department.

Ours is an age of instability, uncertainty, and peril. Yet, also one of enormous opportunity. Unlike our actions during the Cold War, the maintenance of a stable but adverse status quo will no longer suffice. Therefore, this strategy seeks to set the strategic conditions necessary for a favorable and enduring international order founded on responsible government and effective sovereignty. The Department sets the requisite conditions by redressing, when summoned, those adverse security circumstances likeliest to threaten the broader peace.

11. DESIRED CAPABILITIES AND ATTRIBUTES

Our strategy demands capabilities and attributes that enable our forces to contend effectively with our most pressing challenges today and at the same time extend the advantages that allow us to do so in the future.

For our strategy to be viable and sustainable, it needs to be supported by capabilities and attributes that contend effectively with persistent and emerging challenges while extending relevant current and future advantages. These dual purposes cannot be achieved without a continuing commitment to the maintenance of a quality joint force. Foremost, we remain committed to our people—both uniformed and civilian. In addition, the Department continues to drive the force toward increasing levels of joint competency and capability—our principle advantages in warfighting.

Our goal is not to be dominant in all areas of military capability, but to possess those military capabilities that allow us to prudently reduce our vulnerabilities while consolidating and fortifying key warfighting advantages. This mandates careful evaluation of those areas where we seek to reduce risks as well as the identification of those other areas where we are prepared to accept greater risk in light of new challenges. There are three areas where we will strategically leverage our advantages while simultaneously reducing vulnerabilities:

- Developing and sustaining key operational capabilities;
- Shaping and sizing our forces to meet the near- and mid-term needs of this Strategy; and,
- Strengthening our global defense posture to contend effectively with new strategic

circumstances, as well as the range of persistent and emerging challenges.

A. KEY OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES

The four security challenges addressed in Section I, either alone, but more dangerously in combination, require transformation of our operational capabilities. The eight operational capabilities discussed below provide an transformation focus for the Department.

1. Strengthening intelligence. A strong intelligence capacity underpins efforts across the Department to improve operational capabilities, support strategy, planning, and programming decisions; and inform the Department's risk management efforts. Critical defense intelligence objectives include:

- **Early Warning.** The most important aspect of strengthening intelligence is improving capabilities at the strategic, operational, and tactical level that enhance our ability to provide decision makers adequate early warning on the imminent development or employment of catastrophic capabilities by state and non-state actors. It is equally critical that intelligence is able to anticipate and assess complex irregular and disruptive challenges in sufficient time to enable adaptation in our joint capabilities.
- **Delivering Exacting Intelligence for Military Operations.** To improve support to intelligence consumers, the Department will transform Defense Human Intelligence, counterintelligence, and related capabilities. Programmed transformation efforts will support organizational and process changes necessary to increase capabilities relating to intelligence collection efforts, shift from a collector-centric to a mission-centric frame of reference, and incorporate competitive analysis to anticipate adversary behavior. Emphasis will be on predictive vice reactive

analysis, including a dedicated effort to evaluate and understand future advanced *traditional and disruptive* challenges.

- **Horizontal Integration.** Horizontal integration of intelligence capabilities across the Department and the broader intelligence community will enable us to responsively acquire, synchronize, correlate, and deliver critical intelligence of all types to the decision makers responsible for executing the *National Defense Strategy*.

We will strengthen our intelligence capabilities across the national security community to better support our strategic, operational, and resource planning and decision making.

2. Protecting critical bases of operation.

The capability to protect critical bases of operation is central to U.S. defense strategy – it helps underwrite our political and military freedom of action, reassures the American people and our partners, and enables the timely generation and deployment of military forces worldwide. **Protecting the United States from catastrophic attack** is the foremost responsibility of the Joint Force in this regard. Thus, it is our first priority in realizing this capability. Securing our critical bases of operation starts with adequate actionable intelligence and strategic warning, but will only be fully realized when we have the ability to defeat the spectrum of challenges to our critical bases before they are able to fully mature.

Future adversaries will attempt to threaten our homeland or our international partners with a range of *traditional, catastrophic, irregular*, and perhaps *disruptive* methods and capabilities. We can identify some of the more obvious of these, including ballistic and cruise missiles and WMD. However, others—more akin to 9/11 or subsequent bombings overseas—may be more prevalent for the foreseeable future. Thus, we will need to strengthen direct defenses against

these persistent and emerging challenges, even as we develop new capabilities to defeat them at a distance.

We will protect critical bases of operation, including, most importantly, the U.S. homeland, against the range of persistent and emerging challenges.

3. Operating from the commons: space, international waters and airspace, and cyberspace.

The ability of our military to operate in and from the global commons – space, international waters and airspace, and cyberspace – is an essential component to realizing the President’s vision for a safer and better world. The ability to leverage the commons is essential to our projecting power from critical bases of operation into crisis regions at the time, place, and manner of our choosing. It allows us on a more routine basis to assure allies, dissuade potential foes, and deter adversaries. Our superiority throughout the commons has a stabilizing influence in key regions as well. Finally, our ability to operate unimpeded in and from the commons is a critical component in the direct defense of the United States and its partners.

Control of the battlespace broadly – including unimpeded access to and use of the commons—provides the force with the operational freedom of action needed for warfighting success. For example, our military reliance on maritime superiority has been unquestioned for some time. However, the potential adverse consequences of effective future advanced *traditional* or *disruptive* challenges to U.S. maritime operations are so significant that we must continue to guarantee our long-term advantages in this arena.

Similarly, air and space power will remain important for enabling future joint and combined operations. The profound impact of space capabilities, in particular, on military operations has become increasingly evident. As the nation’s reliance on space-based

systems continues to grow, we must guard against new potential vulnerabilities. A key objective for us, therefore, is not only to ensure our access to and use of space for military purposes, but also to deny an adversary's hostile exploitation of space.

Finally, the emergence of cyberspace as a new theater of conflict has necessitated the transformation of information operations (IO) into a core military competency on par with air, ground, maritime, and special operations. For example, our military operations depend on the Department's ability to protect our information infrastructure and assure the security of the data that flows across it. This increased dependence on advanced information networks creates new vulnerabilities that potential adversaries may seek to exploit using *disruptive* capabilities and methods. Additionally, an adversary's use of information networks and technologies creates opportunities for our forces to conduct operationally and politically discriminate IO against them when appropriate. Maturing IO into a core military competency will involve a fundamental shift in the Department's processes, policies, and culture.

We will operate in and from the commons by enhancing our ability to overcome challenges to our global maritime, air, space, and cyberspace operations.

4. Projecting and sustaining forces in distant anti-access environments. Our capability to project ~~and sustain~~ military power in distant anti-access environments is central to supporting our role in the world. Fully realizing the capacity to do so is first predicated on our ability to protect our own critical bases of operation, as well as leverage the strategic commons to decisive advantage. The security of key regions and stability of allies and friends is supported by our forces' ability to project military power and prosecute effective military operations—often at strategic distances. Future

adversaries understand the importance of this capability and likely will seek to deny or thwart those advantages that enable us to rapidly project military power into crisis regions. Thus, it is essential that we continue to develop innovative approaches to overcome these challenges.

Future anti-access challenges could come from a variety of ~~advanced~~ and legacy capabilities ~~employed by~~ a diverse array of potential adversaries. Saturation with WMD of overseas bases and ports arriving via cruise or ballistic missile or surreptitious delivery might effectively delay or disrupt our access in some crises. In the littorals, anti-ship cruise missiles, advanced diesel submarines, high-speed small boats, and advanced mines might hinder the timely and effective employment of our maritime forces. In addition, regional opponents could employ space assets, over-the-horizon radars, and low-observable unmanned aerial vehicles for wide-area surveillance, tracking, and targeting of our forces. In the future, these advanced but *traditional* capabilities might be combined with truly *disruptive* technologies to further diminish our ability to project power effectively into a crisis region.

Some opponents may use less technologically sophisticated—but potentially no less effective—capabilities and methods to directly deny the United States strategic access to particular regions or intimidate friendly governments to do so. Their options are numerous. They might involve capabilities and methods ranging from the innovative employment of legacy systems, like shoulder fired surface to air missiles, to the threat of *traditional* military or *irregular* attacks that seek to exact unacceptable costs on or undermine the legitimate authority of friendly governments cooperating with the United States.

We will project and sustain our forces in distant anti-access environments in the face of a continuum of persistent and emerging challenges.

5. Denying enemies sanctuary. Adversaries will continue to secure their own critical bases by exploiting strategic depth to their advantage—including sanctuary in ungoverned territory. The more we are able to hold an adversary's bases of operation at risk, the more likely we are to limit their strategic options. Doing so demands the capability to surge military forces rapidly from strategic distances into any region of the world to effect swift and decisive results in future military conflicts. Thus, a key focus of this strategy is to develop the capability to deny sanctuary to any potential adversary wherever they might seek refuge.

In some cases, denying sanctuary may involve discrete attacks by special operations or precision strike capabilities on targets deep inside an adversary's territory. In other instances, this may require the comprehensive defeat of significant *irregular* or *traditional* threats operating in and from ungoverned sanctuary with sustained, decisive combat operations. Denying sanctuary likely will require the development of robust capabilities to conduct persistent and precise surveillance, precision strike, operational maneuver from strategic distances, and sustained joint military operations at varying operational depths—in and from austere geographic locations. Such capabilities will be needed to detect, locate, track, and destroy individual terrorist targets anywhere in the world; attack an adversary's military capabilities in remote locations; and finally, when necessary, permanently deny ungoverned sanctuary by assisting partner nations in the restoration of effective, responsible government.

We will deny our enemies sanctuary by conducting a range of effective military activities and operations in and from austere geographic locations and at varying operational depths.

6. Conducting network-centric operations. Our ability to bring decisive capabilities to

bear will increasingly rely on our capacity to harness, exploit, and protect our advantages in the realm of information. Rapidly advancing information and communications technologies hold promise for networking highly distributed joint and combined forces. Recent operations in the global war on terrorism have reinforced the need for joint, interoperable command, control, communications, computing and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. They have further underscored the asymmetric advantage that timely, accurate, relevant information provides our forces. Network-centric operational capability is generated by developing compatible systems, consumer-friendly data, and agile operational constructs. Effective application of network-centric operations enables rapid and decisive campaigns.

Beyond battlefield applications, the Department's transformation to a network-centric force will advance our ability to transparently manage risk across all four risk dimensions. It holds the potential for increasing efficiency and effectiveness across defense operations, intelligence functions, and business processes by enabling all users access to the latest, most relevant, most accurate information. Network-centric operations also will enable reach-back by more effectively employing people and capabilities without deploying them forward in crisis regions.

Transforming to a network-centric force requires a fundamental shift in processes, policy, and culture. By implementing such a fundamental shift, the Department can achieve the speed, accuracy and quality of decision-making that will ensure our military capabilities meet the full spectrum of future security challenges.

We will conduct network-centric operations with compatible information and communications systems, consumer-friendly data, and agile operational constructs.

7. Improving proficiency for irregular warfare. We will continue to face the challenges of *irregular* warfare under a variety of very complex circumstances throughout the coming decades. These challenges will transcend theaters and persistently manifest themselves across a diverse array of likely contingencies. Separately or in combination with the other challenges, the *irregular* challenge places unique demands on the force.

We must be able to employ the appropriate capabilities to counter *irregular* opponents under complex operational circumstances—and to sustain such operations over significant periods of time. Doing so will require forces capable of quickly foreclosing the options of *irregular* adversaries, denying their strategic and operational objectives, tracking and locating small groups and high-value individuals, comprehensively and decisively defeating these opponents, and finally, rapidly establishing and maintaining security conditions conducive to favorable conflict resolution. Accomplishing all of these operational tasks requires a degree of flexibility and adaptability not yet present across our current force. Success will also necessitate changes in our current capabilities, organizations, doctrine, concepts, and culture.

A decade of operational experience—including the global war on terrorism—indicates that past conceptions of “general purpose forces” are of limited applicability to the full array of challenges we will face. Future U.S. forces must be more modular, adaptable, and broadly employable. In particular, our forces must be better prepared for contending with persistent *irregular* challenges involving complex political, social, and security problems.

Warfighters must be capable of rapidly and effectively transitioning from one military activity to another—combat and non-combat—and back again should

circumstances change unexpectedly in an area of operations. Success under these circumstances may require extended stability operations—including substantial combat action, counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, and reconstruction. Today, these operations place unique stresses on specific components of the force and will require more comprehensive joint and total force solutions in the future.

We will improve our ability to contend with irregular challenges by developing more modular, adaptable, and broadly employable forces.

8. Increasing capabilities of partners—international and domestic. None of our strategic objectives is ultimately attainable without the decisive assistance of capable partners at home and abroad.

Abroad, the United States has been transforming its international security relationships. Further, it has been developing new partnerships, to effectively confront the continuum of challenges that confront us in a new century. As we reorient our own military capabilities to help underwrite those relationships, we also seek to improve the capabilities of current and future coalition partners, as well as harmonize those capabilities with our own.

One of the principal vehicles for strengthening our alliances and partnerships is our focused program of security cooperation. Security Cooperation serves to harmonize our thinking with that of our partners on key strategic issues and helps to strengthen key relationships by:

- Identifying areas where our common interests would be served better by partners playing leading roles;
- Encouraging partners to improve their capability to operate in coalition with our forces, as well as their willingness to do so;

- Reducing impediments to cooperation with partner militaries and ministries of defense across the range of matters; and finally,
- Spurring the military transformation of key allies through initiatives like joint, combined training and education; combined concept development and experimentation; development of interoperability standards; information sharing; and combined command and control.

Security cooperation is also a primary vehicle for building expanded global capacities to meet common security challenges. The President's *National Security Strategy* called for the United States to invest time and resources to build international relationships and institutions to help manage local crises when they emerge. Toward that end, the Department of Defense, in cooperation with other Departments within the U.S. government, aims to increase international capacity to conduct successful peace operations worldwide. Currently, well-trained and rapidly deployable military units for peace operations are in short supply. Therefore, the United States and its partners seek to expand the ready supply of international forces available for peace operations by better defining the roles and contributions required of potential contributing nations.

The role of enhanced partner capabilities is central to those strategic actions intended to dissuade future military competition as well. Advanced military exercises, particularly multi-national experimentation, can be decisive in this effort. They demonstrate to would-be competitors that potentially destabilizing capabilities will be ineffective versus a U.S.-led coalition possessing advanced, complementary capabilities intended to counter them.

At home, we are seeking ways to increase the capabilities of our domestic partners—local,

state, and federal. In order to better secure the United States from direct attack, the Department seeks to forge effective partnerships with domestic agencies that, in the event of significant irregular and catastrophic attacks against the homeland, are charged with point defense, security, and consequence management. In doing so, we seek to improve their ability to respond to these challenges effectively, while freeing up our own unique capabilities to focus on the early defeat of these challenges at a safe distance abroad.

Likewise, we seek to bolster the capabilities of civilian interagency and international partners to assist in bringing lasting and durable resolutions to complex crises overseas. In particular, the Department seeks to increase the capacity of interagency and international partners to undertake those non-core post-combat, stabilization, and reconstruction tasks that currently remain military responsibilities. Our intent is not to divest from post-combat responsibilities, but rather, to focus our efforts on those tasks most directly associated with establishing and maintaining the security conditions that enable more comprehensive and lasting conflict resolution.

We will assist our international and domestic partners in increasing their capabilities to contend with complex issues of common concern.

B. ATTRIBUTES

I. Shape and Size of Military Forces

The Department's force-planning construct shapes, sizes, and globally postures U.S. military forces to:*

* Four key concepts inform this approach.

- Homeland Defense activities represent the employment of unique military capabilities at home—at varying levels—to contend with those circumstances described at the conclusion of Section II, C., 1.

- Defend the U.S. homeland;
- Operate in and from four forward regions to assure allies and friends, dissuade competitors, and deter and counter aggression and coercion;
- Swiftly defeat adversaries in overlapping military campaigns while preserving for the President the option to call for a more decisive and enduring result in one of the two; and
- Conduct a limited number of lesser contingencies.

These force planning precepts help guide the Department in determining the needed mix of capabilities required in the force. Further, they are intended to inform decisions on the force's overall size, posture, patterns of

- Campaigns to "swiftly defeat" the efforts of adversaries are undertaken to achieve a circumscribed set of objectives aimed at altering an adversary's unacceptable behavior or policies, swiftly denying an adversary's operational or strategic objectives, preventing attacks or uncontrolled conflict escalation, and/or rapidly re-establishing security conditions favorable to the United States and its partners. "Swiftly defeating" adversary efforts could include a range of military activities—from stability operations to major combat that will vary substantially in size and duration. Examples of "swift defeat" campaigns include *Operation(s) Desert Storm* and *Allied Force*.
- Campaigns to "win decisively" are undertaken to bring about fundamental, favorable change in a crisis region and create enduring results. They likely entail lengthy periods of both major combat and stability operations, require regime change, defense, or restoration; and will include significant investments of the nation's resources and time. "Win decisively" campaigns will vary significantly in size and scope but will be among the most taxing scenarios. Examples of conclusive campaigns include *Operation(s) Just Cause* and *Iraqi Freedom*.
- Lesser Contingency Operations are undertaken to resolve or ameliorate a particular set of crisis circumstances and typically describe operations much more limited in duration and scope than those undertaken in conjunction with the more substantial undertakings outlined above. These operations include military activities like shows of force, strikes and raids, non-combatant evacuation operations, peace operations, and disaster relief or humanitarian assistance. Lesser contingency operations range in size from major undertakings like *Operation(s) Restore Hope* or *Provide Comfort* to the much smaller, episodic dispatch of U.S. forces around the world to contend with a variety of emergency conditions.

activity, readiness, and capacity to surge globally to meet required demands.

This force-planning framework is not focused upon specific types of conflicts, but rather is intended to provide a model for the capabilities required to adapt and contend with a broad range of scenarios. Rigorous analysis must determine the force requirements for the most likely, dangerous, and demanding circumstances. Assessments of the adequacy of U.S. capabilities will examine the breadth and depth of this construct, and not seek to optimize for any one area. Detailed assessment based on these principles will enable informed decisions on the specific size and shape of U.S. forces by highlighting areas where the Department might accept prudent risk, as well as those areas where risk might be reduced.

Importantly, the shape, size, and global posture of U.S. forces guided by this construct provide the capabilities needed to conduct the global war on terrorism. The global war on terrorism is integrated across the breadth of the construct. In the end, all U.S. military operations in the war on terrorism help to assure allies, dissuade competition in key areas, deter adversaries, and defeat both state and non-state opponents.

Defend the homeland. U.S. military forces must be able to defend the United States and its territory from direct attack. The need for an active, defense-in-depth, able to disrupt and defeat capable and diverse threats as far from our shores and allied territory as possible, is perhaps the critical component of sizing and shaping today. Tightly linking actions to provide for the direct defense of the homeland against external threats with activities of the overseas combatant commands to identify and interdict such threats before they can strike is the sine-qua-non of our nation's security.

Operate in and from four forward regions.

Our force planning construct calls for tailored forces, which are primarily rotational, to operate forward in and from four forward regions—Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian Littoral, and the Middle East-Southwest Asia. These forces are complemented by capabilities for prompt global action to assure allies and friends, dissuade military competition, and finally, deter and counter aggression and coercion.

In particular, effective forward deterrence requires adaptable forces that can respond to crises at their outset to manage escalation on our terms and eliminate threats at a safe distance. Such forces are complemented by immediately employable global strike, special operations, and information operations capabilities that provide additional military options for preventing and deterring attacks.

This does not imply that the United States does not or will not undertake a range of defense activities—including military operations—in other regions. Rather, it recognizes that the bulk of our forward presence is concentrated in four regions from which the United States can prosecute military operations worldwide.

Swiftly defeat adversaries. We will remain uncertain about where threats might become manifest and what adversaries might challenge us or our allies. Therefore, we will improve our ability to surge globally when needed to rapidly seize the initiative and swiftly defeat adversaries in overlapping military campaigns. This capability will also ensure that a large percentage of our force can surge anywhere in the world to achieve objectives in widely dispersed theaters.

Our operational experience in Iraq and Afghanistan reinforces the need for forces capable of rapidly and decisively foreclosing an adversary's options, achieving decisive results in major combat actions, and setting

the security conditions for an enduring post-conflict peace. Achieving these results requires the ability to transition one of two more limited military campaigns to a campaign that seeks more enduring results and to sustain operations in both over time. It also requires a force properly balanced and postured for rapid deployment and employment.

Extended missions likely will include large-scale stability operations that entail substantial combat below the threshold of major combat operations. Also, the rapid and decisive defeat of adversaries requires the ability to integrate fully other instruments of national power from across the U.S. Government and to leverage contributions of coalition partners.

Conduct lesser contingencies. The global nature of American interests may require our armed forces to perform a limited number of lesser contingency operations, perhaps for extended periods of time. Such operations may help prevent conflict by establishing and sustaining stable, secure conditions in key regions. Lesser contingencies also include smaller-scale, but high-intensity combat operations such as strikes and raids against state and non-state actors. Because lesser contingencies place demands on forces that are similar in kind, though not in scale, to the needs of the more demanding military campaigns outlined above, the Department will monitor closely the degree and nature of its involvement in lesser contingencies to be able to properly balance force management and operational risks.

2. Global Defense Posture

While our nation already has embarked on transforming its network of overseas alliances and partnerships and its military capabilities, it also must transform its global defense posture to better address new challenges. U.S. national security is closely linked to the security of our global partners.

The forward posture of our military capabilities and our demonstrated ability to bring force to bear to meet common security challenges are the most visible and tangible signals of American commitment to our friends around the world.

During the 1990s, our forces remained concentrated primarily in their Cold War locations, from which they have had to be deployed to deal with crises elsewhere. These deployments, along with operations in the global war on terrorism, underline the fact that we no longer expect our forces to fight in place; rather, their purpose is to project power rapidly into near or distant theaters. Such precepts, combined with rapid advances in technology, new concepts of operation, and lessons learned in recent operations, are driving a comprehensive, strategy-driven realignment of all aspects of U.S. global defense posture.

As the President stated, "A fully transformed and strengthened overseas force posture will underscore the commitment of the United States to effective collective action in the common cause of peace and liberty." Force posture changes seek primarily to strengthen our ability to meet security commitments more effectively in this new strategic landscape. As we do so, we will be guided by the following considerations:

- Developing flexibility to contend with uncertainty by emphasizing agility and by not concentrating military forces in a few locations;
- Encouraging transformation in allied roles and capabilities and developing supported/supporting relationships with allies;
- Focusing within and across regions by complementing tailored regional military presence and activities with capabilities for prompt global military action;

- Developing rapidly deployable capabilities by planning and operating from the premise that forces will not likely fight in place; and,
- Focusing on capabilities, not numbers by reinforcing the premise that the United States does not need specific numbers of platforms or personnel in various administrative regions to be able to execute its security commitments effectively.

Foremost, changes in global posture will both require and result in strong bilateral and multilateral relationships with partner nations around the world. Changes in posture aim to strengthen our commitment to collective action. We also will cultivate new relationships founded on common security interests. These relationships will both enhance our mutual security, as well as enable greater access to a number of new locations around the world. Our international agreements with both traditional and new partners must permit flexibility and freedom of action for US forces.

We need to invest ourselves in a process that guarantees the maintenance of strong and diverse international partnerships well into the future. Doing so will enable a flexible and adaptable global defense posture capable of contending with uncertainty and supporting an array of diverse military activities worldwide.

Key changes to global defense posture.

These considerations are driving changes to U.S. global defense posture in all of its five elements: *facilities, activities, global sourcing and surge, and prepositioned equipment and material.*

Facilities. A network of forward projection hubs and main operating bases, mainly in the four critical regions, provides the United States with unmatched ability to conduct a variety of missions worldwide. However, the destructive power of terrorists and rogue

states, and their willingness to unleash this power against U.S. and allied interests, place a high premium on even more rapid military action.

We require greater flexibility to move into and through strategic pivot points and remote locations. We also require a broader more diverse array of forward operating sites, cooperative security locations, and associated access arrangements to strengthen operational flexibility. Such sites and arrangements generally should not require a permanent combat presence, but only a modest support staff or reliance on host-nation support for logistics. They will be focal points for combined training with host nations, and will have an ability to expand and contract based on operational needs. Joint sea-basing concepts also hold promise for contributing to the broader transformation of our overseas military footprint.

Activities. Advances in speed, lethality, stealth, and information sharing mean that our forces are significantly more capable than were equivalent-sized units in the recent past. We can realize efficiencies in numbers of forward-stationed personnel while increasing the actual combined and joint military capabilities we can bring to bear in a crisis. In addition, a declining emphasis on forces designed to fight in place points to an increasingly rotational joint presence for U.S. forces in forward locations, and consequently, relatively fewer forces permanently stationed abroad. The size and character of physical presence and the character of our military activities in a given region will shift—subject to strategic and operational demands worldwide.

Joint presence around the world will be managed dynamically to ensure that the full benefits that the military services' capabilities provide can be employed to greatest effect. In cases where the United States can lower its forward presence while maintaining or increasing its overall military

capabilities, it will do so to minimize operational exposure, points of social and political friction, and the overall impact on host nations.

Global sourcing and surge. To best tailor presence to operational needs, the Department is transitioning to a global force management process with the ability to surge a greater percentage of the force where and when it is needed worldwide. This management process helps provide the most responsive and appropriate capabilities at the time and place of need—regardless of their theater of stationing. Under the process of global sourcing and surge, Combatant Commanders no longer “own” forces in their theaters. Such a process provides comprehensive insight into the global availability of U.S. forces, accounting for ongoing operations and constantly changing unit availability, as well as an assessment of the impact and risks associated with global sourcing.

Closely tied to the concept of global sourcing is the ability to position “early entry” capabilities forward for rapid action, while relying on surge capacity from the United States or other theaters to provide more robust, follow-on forces. In this manner, the United States can simultaneously maintain an economy of force; keep its state-of-the-art, transformational capabilities forward for combined training, security cooperation, and operational purposes; and provide tangible evidence of our continuing commitment to our alliance obligations.

Prepositioned equipment and materiel.

Greater reliance on joint prepositioned equipment and materiel for training and operational purposes is critical to an increasingly rotation and expeditionary presence. A significant lesson from operations during the past decade is the need for more widespread prepositioning of support materiel—rather than simply combat equipment and munitions—in critical regions and along key transportation routes. Further,

due to its inherent flexibility and mobility, afloat prepositioning can prove especially valuable in a strategic environment that features uncertainty and the likelihood of strategic surprise. We can no longer afford to view prepositioned equipment and material with a single service mindset. Rather, as in all other aspects of the Department's transformation, prepositioning, too, must increasingly take on a greater degree of "jointness."

Realizing the key capabilities and attributes outlined above will enable us to effectively seize opportunities and contend, on our terms, with persistent and emerging challenges. Our strategy is tailored to contend with uncertainty and create those favorable circumstances that contribute to a broad, stable, and enduring peace. Our key capabilities and attributes must complement this effort. They must conform to the demands of the environment while remaining adaptable to contend with future change.

February 19, 2004

703

TO: Gen. Dick Myers

cc: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Reuben Jeffery

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Installation Commander in Baghdad

Here is a memo from Mick Kicklighter. He thinks we need an Installation Commander to manage the footprint in Baghdad.

Why not get your head into it and give me a recommendation one way or the other?

Thanks.

Attach.
2/13/04 Kicklighter memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
021904-1

.....
Please respond by 2/26/04

OSD 09657-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42613

TRM

DR

✓
2/20

13 February 2004

Office of the DoD Iraqi Transition Team

MEMORANDUM FOR Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Iraq Trip Report

1. Ambassador Frank Ricciardone and I had a very productive trip to Iraq from January 30th to February 4th, 2004.

2. The troops and other personnel we saw in Iraq were magnificent, as you know better than most.

3. We are working to schedule a meeting to debrief you on our trip.


4. Even in advance of our debriefing, we urge you to consider the following two recommendations that would help greatly improve current operations and facilitate a good handoff to State:

a. Assign a Headquarters Commandant/Installation Commander to integrate the Palace/Green Zone requirements, including billeting, dining, security, etc. The Installation Commander would stay beyond transition.

b. Assign a strong CPA Chief of Staff to crosswalk issues, integrate the staff and set staff priorities. The Chief of Staff would stay through the establishment of a US Mission and hand off tasks to a State Deputy Chief of Mission/Chargé in a phased manner during the transition.

c. The Department of State concurs with these recommendations.

5. We look forward to the opportunity to discuss our trip with you.

VR,

Claude M. Kicklighter

12/11/04

15 Feb 04

to Perry

OSD 09657-04

2/2/12
420



INTELLIGENCE

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UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000

7

ACTION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(COUNTERINTELLIGENCE & SECURITY) *GA & Feb 04*

SUBJECT: US Army Investigations of Detainee Deaths and Abuse

- This memorandum was prepared to update the Secretary concerning Army investigations of detainee deaths and abuse in Afghanistan and Iraq. An initial memorandum on Army investigations of detainee deaths was provided in December 2003 (TAB A).
- The U. S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) investigates the death of any detainee who dies in Army custody. Detainees can be considered in two groupings. Those who are in custody on a military compound and those who are stopped for questioning or another reason off compound. The USACIDC does not receive all information on abuse investigations conducted by unit commanders. The following relates to investigations of detainee abuse on a military compound.
- **DEATHS:** The USACIDC has initiated investigations into the deaths of fourteen detainees in Iraq (11) and Afghanistan (3).
 - o Deaths occurred during the period December 2002 to January 2004.
 - o In six deaths, autopsies were not conducted and the bodies were released to the families so further forensic investigation was not possible. Cause of death was listed as "undetermined." Investigations continue; but without forensic evidence from an autopsy, complete resolution is unlikely.

383, 6

11 Feb 04

11-L-0559/OSD/42615

OSD 09659-04

Prepared by: Windell Courson, (b)(6)



- o In some of the fourteen deaths, investigations indicate physical maltreatment may have been a factor. A synopsis of each case is at **TAB B**.

- **ABUSE:** The USACIDC has ten investigations into alleged detainee abuse. Six involve physical assault and mistreatment of detainees, two involve the discharge of a weapon in proximity to detainees and two involve sexual assault as well as physical assault of detainees. A synopsis of each case is at **TAB C**.

- The aggregate 40 personnel presently under investigation by USACIDC include members of both reserve and active units of the Army, and one Other Government Agency (OGA) civilian contractor. The civilian contractor is being investigated by his organization's Inspector General and the Department of Justice, with assistance from USACIDC. The incident previously reported as potentially involving members of a Navy Seal Team has been determined to involve Army Special Forces personnel instead. The potential number of personnel under investigation could increase as additional subjects are identified.
 - Eleven are military intelligence interrogators
 - Twenty-two are military policemen, seven of which are reservists
 - Six are enlisted soldiers other than military intelligence or military police
 - One is an **OGA** civilian contractor

- o To date USACIDC has not discovered criminal involvement at the command level.

- HQ USACIDC currently has twenty-four off-post investigations. They are predominantly larceny and physical assault investigations.

Prepared by: Windell Courson,

(b)(6)

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- All of these matters are under active criminal investigation. Information related to these matters is law enforcement sensitive, dissemination of which is restricted. Any premature release of case-sensitive information could jeopardize the investigation and follow-on action; if any.
- A copy of this memorandum was sent to Mr. Paul Butler, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Program Support.

COORDINATION: Commander, USACIDC

Prepared by: Windell Courson,

(b)(6)

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11-L-0559/OSD/42617

INFO MEMO

DEC 23 2003

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTELLIGENCE)

**FROM: DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY)**

SUBJECT U.S. Army ~~criminal~~ Investigations of Detainee Deaths

- **The U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) is currently investigating the suspicious deaths of seven detainees in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a matter of policy, USACIDC investigates the death of any detainee who dies in Army custody.**
 - **Deaths occurred during the period December 2002 to November 2003.**
 - **In the seven deaths (three in Afghanistan and preliminary findings suggest that the physical treatment of the detainees may have been a factor.**
 - **An aggregate of 16 personnel are presently under USACIDC in the seven suspicious deaths. This number includes members of both reserve and active units of the Army, one CIA civilian contractor, and potentially, members of a Navy**
 - **Six are military intelligence interrogators (At least two of these interrogators also are suspects in the October 7, 2003 assault of an Iraqi female prisoner.)**
 - **Eight are military police**
 - **One is an enlisted soldier detention sentry (non-military police)**
 - **One is a CIA civilian contractor**

- To date USACIDC has not discovered **criminal involvement** at the command level in the seven suspicious deaths. Investigation is ongoing.
- An additional five detainee deaths are attributed to heart attacks **while in detention**. The cause and manner of death in these cases are not yet **determined**.
- HQ USACIDC will update the **Army leadership and the Counterintelligence Field Activity** on subsequent developments
- All of these matters are under active criminal investigation. All information related to these matters is law enforcement sensitive, dissemination of which is **restricted**. Any premature release of case-sensitive information could jeopardize the investigation and follow-on action, if any.

COORDINATION: HQ USACIDC.

SYNOPSIS OF WRONGFUL DEATH INVESTIGATIONS

- o On 4 December 2002, at the Bagram Detention Facility, Afghanistan, Mr. Ullah died while in US custody. **An** autopsy determined Ullah had suffered blunt force trauma, and the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) classified the death as a homicide. Investigation thus far has indicated three active duty enlisted Military Intelligence Soldiers and three United States Army Reserve enlisted **MP** Soldiers were involved at various times in assaulting and mistreating Mr. Ullah. Investigation is continuing with recent reinterviews of the Military Intelligence personnel **now** at Fort Bragg (Soldiers were redeployed from Iraq) and scheduled reinterviews of the reserve Military Policemen in Ohio and surrounding states (unit since demobilized) (0134-02-CID369).
- On 10 December 2002, also at the Bagram Detention Facility, Mr. Dilawar died while in custody. An autopsy determined **Mr. Dilawar** had suffered blunt force trauma, and the AFIP classified the death as a homicide. Investigation thus far has indicated five enlisted Military Intelligence Soldiers and four enlisted MP Soldiers were involved at various times in assaulting and mistreating Dilawar. Investigation is continuing with recent reinterviews of the Military Intelligence personnel **now** at Fort Bragg (Soldiers were redeployed from Iraq) and scheduled reinterviews of the reserve Military Policemen in Ohio and surrounding states (unit since demobilized) (0137-02-CID369).
- On 13 June 2003, at the Baghdad International **Airport** detention facility, **an** Iraqi detainee died while in **US** custody. **An** autopsy determined he died of a subdural hematoma to the head. Subdural hematomas are normally the result of a hard, fast blow. AFIP's preliminary classification of the manner of death was homicide. Investigation continues (0031-03-CID899).
- o **On** 21 June 2003, at a detention facility at the Asadabad Fire Base, Afghanistan, **an** Afghani detainee died while in **US** Army custody. Testimony from various Soldiers identified a civilian employee of **an** Other Governmental Agency (OGA) **as** being responsible for physically assaulting the detainee prior to his death. Investigation continues by the OGA's IG and the Department of Justice with CID assistance (0094-03-CID369).
- On 3 August 2003, at the Camp Cropper detention facility, **an** Iraqi detainee died while in US custody, no autopsy was conducted, and the body released for burial. The manner of death is currently classified **as** "undetermined" but since no forensic examination of the body was conducted, no greater clarity as to the cause of death is expected (0025-03-CID919).
- On 10, 13, & 20 August 2003, and again on 3 November 2003, all at the Camp Cropper detention facility, an Iraqi detainee died while in US custody,

no autopsy was conducted, and the body released for burial. The manner of death in each instance is currently classified as "undetermined" but since no forensic examination of the bodies was conducted, no **greater clarity as to the cause of death is expected** (0139-03-CID259, 0140-03-CID259, 0147-03-CID259 & 0235-03-CID259).

- On 11 September 2003, at the Forward Operating Base Packhorse detention facility, an Iraqi detainee died while in US custody. **An** enlisted Soldier while on guard duty, failed to follow the ROE and shot the detainee who was throwing rocks. Case closed and referred to the command for appropriate action. This **Soldier was reduced to E-1 and administratively discharged in lieu of trial by court-martial** (0149-03-CID469).
- On 4 November 2003, at the Abu Ghurayb detention facility, **an** Iraqi detainee died while in US custody. The detainee died during an interview process by OGA and Army Special Forces personnel. Allegedly, the detainee also resisted arrest and had to be physically restrained. A previous account of this investigation indicated involvement of a Navy Seal Team. That account was not accurate. **Investigation continues** (0237-03-CID259).
- **On** 26 November 2003, at the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment detention facility in Iraq, an Iraqi detainee and former Army Major General, died while in US custody. Testimony from various Soldiers indicated local national interviews of the detainee on 24 and 25 November 2003, had involved physical assaults. On 26 November 2003, the detainee died while undergoing "stress technique" interrogation by MI Soldiers. Evidence of blunt force trauma was present on the body. **Investigation continues** (0027-03-CID679).
- On 9 December 2003, at the 2d Brigade detention facility in Mosul, an Iraqi detainee died while in US custody. No autopsy was conducted, the body did not exhibit signs of abuse or foul play, and Criminal Investigation Division currently classifies the death as "undetermined" with no greater clarity as to the cause of death expected. **Investigation continues** (0140-03-CID389).
- On 9 **January** 2004, Criminal Investigation Division was notified of the suspicious death of an Iraqi detainee. The detainee, a former Iraqi Army Lieutenant Colonel, was taken into custody on 4 **January** 2004 and was subsequently placed in an isolation cell and questioned at least two times during ensuing days. **An** examination of the detainee's remains disclosed there was extensive bruising on his upper body. On 11 Jan 04, **an** autopsy was conducted by an Armed Forces Medical Examiner. His preliminary report indicates the cause of death as blunt force injuries and asphyxia, with the manner of death listed as homicide. **Investigation continues** (0009-04-CID259).

DETAINEE ABUSE INVESTIGATIONS

- Between 15 April and 1 July 2003, at the 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division detention facility in Samarra, Iraq, enlisted members of Detachment B, 223d Military Intelligence Battalion (California National Guard), allegedly physically abused Iraqi detainees during interrogations. According to a statement from one Soldier, the Military Intelligence Soldiers struck and pulled the hair of the detainees, and forced into asphyxiation numerous detainees in an attempt to obtain information. **Investigation continues** (0138-03-CID469).
- On 12 May 2003, at Camp Bucca, Iraq, ten United States Army Reserve (**USAR**) enlisted Military Policemen physically assaulted seven Iraqi detainees during in processing at the facility. Case closed and referred to the command for appropriate action (0031-03-CID519). The command initiated court-martial charges against the four Soldiers – all in the 320th Military Police Battalion(USAR). All four Soldiers requested an administrative disposition of their case in lieu of trial by courts-martial. **All four Soldiers were administratively separated from the Army; three of these Soldiers also received nonjudicial punishment.**
- On 12 May 2003, at Camp Bucca, Iraq, an enlisted Soldier fired a shot at the feet of an Iraqi detainee instead of in a safe direction as required by the Rules of Engagement, and the detainee suffered a facial wound **as** a result. Case closed and referred to the command for appropriate action. **The command disposition of this case (a PFC) is currently unknown** (0033-03-0519).
- On 20 August 2003, at Forward Operating Base Gunner, Iraq, an Iraqi being detained in US custody was physically assaulted and threatened by a battalion commander (Lieutenant Colonel West), three enlisted Soldiers and an interpreter after the detainee refused to provide information. Case closed and referred to the command for appropriate action (0152-03-0469). **The enlisted Soldiers received Article 15 punishment; LTC West was relieved of his command and, after an Article 32 hearing, received nonjudicial punishment. He also submitted a request to retire from active duty.**
- On 31 August 2003, at the Battalion Headquarters, 1/36th Infantry, 1st Armored Division, Baghdad, Iraq, an enlisted Soldier committed the offense of assault when he threatened to kill Iraqi detainees in US custody in an attempt to obtain information from them. Case closed and referred to the command for appropriate action (0129-03-CID899). **Soldier received nonjudicial punishment.**
- On 1 September 2003, at the Ammunition Collection Point, Baghdad, Iraq, enlisted Soldiers assaulted four Iraqi detainees who were in US custody. The four Iraqis, who were cuffed with their hands behind their backs, were kicked numerous times, and then dragged from the detention area to another area where they were thrown against a wall and assaulted. Case closed and referred to the

TAB C

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command for appropriate action (0117-03-CID899). **Three Soldiers are pending trial by Summary Court-Martial (a Sergeant First Class, a Staff Sergeant, and a Specialist. A fourth Soldier (Staff Sergeant) is pending a Special Court-Martial. All these cases are expected to be completed this month.**

- On 8 September 2003, at the Tikrit detention facility, **an** Iraqi detainee alleged he had been physically assaulted and struck repeatedly after being arrested by unknown 4th Infantry Division Soldiers. **Investigation continues**(0174-03-CID469).
- On 7 October 2003, at the Abu Ghurayb detention facility, three active duty male enlisted Soldiers assigned to Company A, 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, Ft Bragg, NC allegedly sexually assaulted and threatened a female Iraqi detainee. **Investigation continues** (0216-03-CID259).
- **On** 31 December 2003 during a "knock and search" operation, four Iraqi civilians were detained and guarded by a Military Policeman assigned to the 300th Military Police Company. The Military Policeman allegedly "**butt** stroked" one of the individuals when he refused to stay quiet and placed the muzzle of his M-14 rifle in the mouth of another detainee and "dry fired." He then removed the muzzle, charged the weapon, and fired the weapon into the ground near that detainee. **Investigation continues** (0006-04-CID259).
- **On** 13 January 2004, a Soldier assigned to the Abu Ghuraib Prison guard force provided Criminal Investigation Division an envelope containing a letter and Compact Disc (CD). The letter identified six Military Police guards allegedly involved in abusive acts against detainees. A review of the CD revealed photographs of approximately 10 Military Police Soldiers involved in abusive or degrading acts involving detainees. The acts included male detainees **naked** in the presence of female Soldiers; female detainees exposing themselves to male Soldiers; detainees performing indecent acts **with** each other in the presence of Soldiers; and photographs of Soldiers physically assaulting detainees. Most of the pictures appear **as if** **the** Soldiers are posing for the camera. Preliminary information indicates that a number of the Soldiers interviewed **thus** far have admitted to the acts. Further, a computer belonging to one of the suspects, which allegedly contains additional photographs of abusive acts, **was** seized **as** evidence. **Investigation continues**(0003-04-CID 149).

11-L-0559/OSD/42623

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE~~

February 20, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Jim Haynes
David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Detainee Deaths and Alleged Abuse

I am very concerned about these detainee deaths and alleged abuse. Please stay on top of this.

Thanks.

Attach.
2/11/04 DUSD (C&S) memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
022004-9

.....
Please respond by _____

3836

20 Feb 04

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

11 Feb 04

7201

February 20, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Notes **for** Commission

Please let me see the copies of the notes you are providing to the 9/11 Commission from you, Larry and Torie.

Thanks.

Attach.
2/13/04 USD(I) memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
022004-11

.....
Please respond by 2/23/04 ✓

FEB 25 2004

Sik-
As requested.
SK

✓
3/8

OS 5

90 7604

13 7604

OSD 09660-04



INTELLIGENCE

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000

Let me see this to see if I can add
FEB 13 2004

✓ 2/2

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
PUBLIC AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States

Attached is a copy of Document Request #24 from the General Counsel of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. This request seeks all handwritten notes that you may have taken on September 11, 2001, concerning the events of that day.

COO, 5-

Copies of your notes can be provided to the DoD Office of General Counsel document processing facility, Crystal Gateway 3, Suite 1000. The notes should include classification markings, as appropriate. Your staff can arrange for delivery by contacting Ms. Sharon Gainor at (b)(6)

My point of contact for this action is Ms. Pat Downs, (b)(6)

Stephen A. Cambone
Stephen A. Cambone

Attachment:
As stated

cc:
ASD (LA)
GC

*SECDEF -
I spoke with Steve Cambone on this request. He says this is the Commission wanting his notes from 9/11, as well as Larry's and Toric's notes.*

Steve says as we have no notes found, you have no response to this request. Steve wanted to ensure you are informed.

OSD 09660-04

2/13

13 2/13/04



Thomas H. Kean
CHAIR

Lee H. Hamilton
VICE CHAIR

Richard Ben-Veniste

Fred F. Fielding

Jamie S. Gorelick

Slade Gorton

Bob Kerrey

John Lehman

Timothy J. Roemer

James R. Thompson

Philip D. Zelikow
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

DoD DOCUMENT REQUEST NO. 24

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "Commission") requests that the Department of Defense (DoD or the "respondent") provide the Commission with copies of the following documents no later than February 23, 2004 (the "production date"):

1. All handwritten notes taken on September 11, 2001, by Secretary Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Stephen Cambone, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Lawrence DiRita, and former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Victoria Clarke.

The Commission requests that the documents requested above be provided as soon as they are available, even though all requested documents may not be provided at the same time, through means of a "rolling" production.

If any requested documents are withheld from production, even temporarily, based on an alleged claim of privilege or for any other reason, the Commission requests that the respondent, as soon as possible and in no event later than the production date, identify and describe each such document or class of documents, as well as the alleged basis for not producing it, with sufficient specificity to allow a meaningful challenge to any such withholding.

If the respondent does not have possession, custody or control of any requested documents but has information about where such documents may be located, the Commission requests that the respondent provide such information as soon as possible and in no event later than the production date.

If the respondent has any questions or concerns about the interpretation or scope of these document requests, the Commission requests that any such questions or concerns be raised with the Commission as soon as possible so that any such issues can be addressed and resolved prior to the production date.

February 9, 2004

Daniel Marcus
General Counsel

11-L-0559/OSD/42627

(b)(6)



INTELLIGENCE

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000

Let me see this we see
add
FEB 13 2004
✓
2/2

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
PUBLIC AFFAIRS

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Stephen A. Cambone
Stephen A. Cambone

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cc:
ASD (LA)
GC

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EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

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The Commission requests that the documents requested above be provided as soon as they are available, even though all requested documents may not be provided at the same time, through means of a "rolling" production.

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February 9, 2004

Daniel Marcus
General Counsel

11-L-0559/OSD/42629

(b)(6)

• ADDCI - Call

• M:1 - Oman & Mid-term program

• Physical Sec.

1023

VTC

SecDef / Dep Sec Def

ROE - VP from Prns

1025

Auth case of form

XDA 767 forward with

2 F-165 Budget

• Hold Expense (R) in Oman 1047

• 4 SOW 50 TLMS Oman

6 in Gulf 120

w/v?

Rec'd Def/Com 3

104F

Ask PW to Go Alkan

De laere Def/Com 3

1050

VPCS says State will notify &
will do so

D/As to call DATT

1053

Allies notice @

~ 1057?

VTC C

1255

Modified State of Warning to Allies / Remain
on Def Con 3

NRRC up & operating - will 1056
Communicate w/ Russ

Civilian A/C down north of Camp David 1059

FEMA mt. weather activated 1115

Call To Pieces:

10-14

Threat Con Delta

High Alert

@ 1050 to Def Con 3 - mid level
notified Russ not to Exercise
into ADZ

STATE notifying Allies

6 CAP A/C w/ Tanker

Controlled by AEWACS

2 CAP w/ AF-1

Scrambling Yarn

RDE - VP Ground use of force

- refining so pilots have
more guidance

- Alliant team n. of C. David
- CB teams on standby

· MAOC has left Jacksonville

- Worried about E/O attacks

V.P. @

Repeated Call to Pres

1113-

1146

6 Team Intercept - ?

Wt. Astin on 3 A/C -
Said to be inbound

1151

DR to FAA

1153

· 200 A/C

· A/C W/ need having difficulty

· FAA expediting evacs by air -

↳ working in NORAD -

3 A/C accounted for -

1155

1205 DCI Retrad Call

UBL Jopic from operation

Head "Heard good news"

3rd left left to come?

1210- Seek Opkin - to VCPCS
Link tgs

1215 FAA memo: 50 a/c

2 VFR A/C @ All @ Sub airport

1 left for desk in kin

1232 Clarke asks about Sringeras?

1237 FEMA to MO Weather

w/ Successors

Alt HMT - Domestic

↳ notified to standby

if go, go covert

Admin M:ed @ DofCom

NCPCS Rpt:

1257- 5 a/c bound from Orient

Can't turn around due to fuel

attempt to land Alaska

1 KAL w/ Hijack squawk

NORAD sector reserve call

for all units

Guard Interceptors around the US

VCQCS Report

1257 Coast Guard:

↳ Challenge authority

Looking @ hands, pants, etc

referring on case by case basis

rescue calling authorized

ROE: No good answer -
all means 1st

1249 Chief Justice

3 Perimeter Lines

Lower floor fire better; SPA not

Fairly sure to go in

Plane is obliterated.

TRINOE @ R1 7

Casualties: ~~Can't~~ 20 or more dropped in is
No better word

• Legal - Justification

• SPIG

• DIA Case

• CAP A/C with a short shot

1258: FAA Rpts Hijack Squawk

1259 Pres Calls -

DR: Prez going to place
fwd not contained
S&R in progress

AA flight w/ 56 people
flow at right into hlds.

Told Prez about KAL flight -
Tells of NORAD A3; receive call.
Tells of Coast Guard

Tells of legal just.
Antell basis

1306: NSC mtg before Powell Rtns -
roughly 2-3 hrs.

: Day of North Korea.

1318: Vietnam in Indian Ocean
Comair 3 days out of S. D.
Linda in part on Everett
Enterprise in Gulf

1:50 KAL being diverted to
small air field

Fulford says Alquin has 2 missing airplanes } toward
Beak

2:00: C. Allen called to say
2 airports
- one we heard of
- 2nd from Boston

CINCINNATI

2:00 KAL now over Canada - didn't land @ it
Went Scotiana - mod. sh. ed
Low priority for FAA

3:56: KAL
Safety on ground. no ID whether terror

1:35 p: Sec Def / VCJCS / A80/A

Rpts message from Pres -
"Come to you...."

Strikes:

- Public effect
- Substantively v. people concerned

Want it better than in the past

Intercept:

Vague - might not mean something
no good basis for hanging hat

Assess:

World class execution
some may not have happened

2:05 Sec Def to V.P.

Relates issue w/ KAL -

US Airspace C-1 - ?

Don't know about avail mil assets

2:25-2:35 / ^{See DfRUCGES} Spoke to CMC NORAD

1537 → ~~the~~ do-located to Phil
fanned around

2:40

Resume Statement:

Best info fast
judge whether good enough
judge w/ better

Hit Sit @ Sanction -
Not only UBL

Tasks Jim Haynes to talk w/ PW
for additional support v/u U.S. & IRAN
connection w/ UBL

Kohbar Tower - IRAN
- Sudan
- Libya
- Libya

- Hard to get a good case

- Need to move swiftly -

- Near term target needs -
- go massive - sweep it all up
- thing related & not

need to do so
to get anything
useful

255p: Sec Def w/ DCE

- want to do something fast

Force

- related Pres Conv.

You are

- VCPCS will cast wide net

key guy.

- lawyers will work

- if not wide enough, have
something we can do

George Brent guns

VCPCS

310: In Bound Madrid - Phila -

Fighters scrambled

Rpt from Fry -

100 mi. out -

no indications of Hijack

Micha

VIP Pres -

Families - Looking for Pres.

Director to suggest

stamp

for those on flights

→ DOT Mark Le Edger

Dep Adm. (EAA)

(b)(6)

Gene Branton to do

wait it til we settle

3:20 p w/ Prez

to verify authorization to use
force on a/c in bound
from Madrid

3:30 p Cwitz

FAT says no unaccounted -
only 4 - 3 NY

Posture - no things diminish spirit of US
 • Come back to DC as quickly as possible
 • no command can hold joint @ bay
 • Find out who - destroy - resources

Dick Clarke

- 1) Bas - LA → 1st Team
- 2) Bas - LA 2nd Team
- 3) Dallas - LA - Penlyn
 Keritok
- 4) Meak/St Johnston, PA

FAT closed DC A/Pats & diverted

Mil went to Theat Com

State
 Office Bldg

De/Com 3-

Coop/COG → all sites active

VP Report:

- 1) CIA - Intercept
- not geo located
9:53 EST - Afghan → Chaba → UBL
- ~~too~~ → to GA.
"Hans J"
"
Called GA # many times
- 2) AA 77 - 3 indiv have been followed
since Millennium + Cole
1 guy is assoc of Cole bomber
2 Entered US in early July
(2 of 3 pulled aside & interrogated?)
- 3) No M.O.

See Def:

- Threat Com D
- 1% casualty toll
↳ 180 people on 757
20-30 injured of ours
- KAL has landed
- Madrid flt formed back

VP:

Minneta's

Grounded in 200 more Wednesday
Coast Guard monitoring vessels in
navigable waters
Looking for transport for Civ.

VP: Congress leaders go to Mt. Weather
to update after CIV 2

Had to resume normal ops quickly

Plus to DCI:

Go to work in NYC tomorrow?

DCI: Multiple attacks simultaneous

This is same same total

Worry - Congress: maybe overseas

Judgment: seen it all

VP:

wants

Hesitant wants to resume

FBI..

Don't know how bad faxes get in planes
can't take corrective action action

DCI

Concurs -

NSA

wants special measures, not a long-term
shutdown -

FBI:

Thinks we can know by

Pres:

All city can be normal - ok

DoJ:

No more info

Treas:

US. shut down to FBI

MASDAA not sure

Banks in NY probably stay closed
↳ Nat'l Banks

DOD:

Commercial down until noon weekdays.

M.I. transport - 500-600 passengers
1-2K people

Not move until civilian up
once civilian a/c fly is better
↳ FEMA better

Pres:

Agrees w/ Sec Def

Call on all air lines to help.

Pres:

Pres wants to come home

NDA

How long for Security measures

Clarke - not make room Wed

Pres:

~~Commit~~

Cancel IMF -

UNGA?

Wall Street - NYC OK

Embassies - on Alert

State

Sec/Frame offer rescue help
Israel/EU Word

Pres:

Let's get coalition together v. terror

Rubin called right away

Have vision on Anti Terrorism

UK + Gen with in meeting conference

Sec Def:

S. Livanov called; talk @ 5:00 pm

Will tell Pres of Threat levels

6

Pres - Grateful for Rubin call, stand down -

⇒ NSC when pres & trans
in person

⇒ Doc Cooke
work tomorrow

⇒ Site R
↳ exercise until NSC is over

⇒ Cap until 1100m Wed for DC

5:05 pm Scanon

Sec Def / VC GCS

Said talked to Prez, Pray Asked:

say how much apprec. for call
grateful for statements

DR Thanks for DAI's response to
req. re: Exercises

Do appreciate

SI: Any help they have will give to us

DR: Don't know casualties -

- 450 in plane

• folks in holding, structure can't take

DR: Will do all humanly possible,
work under way

⇒ Talk ahead of Naples; 8/24-25?

↳ make statements well arranged.

SI want to cope on terror

DR Appreciates; will come to Wash.

5:20

AF - walking Manda

Navy - still short 100

SAP area

Army Short - 60-70

⇒ Deploy Back from Side R

Saturday: Condi-w/UP

Deputy mts -

Thinking about option

Al Quida

Pr

6:30pm

DC

Principal + 1

Clacke thinking w/ team

Pres shortly

CHN

Address @ 8:00 or 9:00

NESC offer address

What's happened

Ans

Up & leaving tomorrow
country

Smaller Group on option

(Next 24-48 hrs) /

What we are doing

Wed

8:30am: PC

NESC 1. to

NSPD Review -

Press Conf

Mil options

- Crisis Options / Allies Read-coalition /


• Camps

• Infrastructure

↳ countries

International - Banking

- Financing



SA: Tosts McLanlin to think about options for NSPD

PW: Cole - Al Qaeda } Acc open -
Koblar - Hizbollah
P. Am 103 - Libya

Two sources banking -

Doct Myers

- Threshold for action

↳ not perfect evidence

- Temporal dimension

OSD / JS

DCF

Obj: , options, evidence

DW: Go to UN + demand Taliban
Turn UBL over to us.

Items due in soon -

① ACC: NSPD

Adequacy?

Changes?

Financing in particular

Def FBI contribution

② OSD/STATE: Define Obj for Mil Action

③ JCS/CENTCOM: Mil Options

④ State: How do events change

diag environment; what we can
ask; build coalition; UNA

⑤ DCI: Look @ opportunities for kinetic
& use of other intel sources

⑥ OSD/STATE: Options for Dec. Policy
that reflects lessons

⑦ DCI: Review where involved

DDO/OSI Pattern across incidents; Ramsey Case

⑧ DCI: Count options - expand range

⑨ DCI/OSD/DAS - Threshold for action
given DOJ.
evidence.

⑩ Kohler ^{DOD/DAS} | Kohler/Cole

Pres @ 8:30 pm

NSC 9:00 pm

NSC Mtg

Supplemental -

- Reglement

- 11.e -

• Start of Study before

• Building

• Force Protection

• Telecoms -

- ESC

Lessons Learned

- No set chain of command

SecDef

DepSecDef

SecAsst

SpAsst

USDP

- Not shut down ventilation immediately

- 2 hrs to connect to ERT

- No breathing apparatus

- Comms not good

- 170" in" ZAD Site

- Connection to WH. ?

CTV Disalery v CRANE ?

~~Feet →
15K5 used by~~

900 PL

1130 Canyon Blvd

Area To Be Investigated

← Broad - dip
Harbor - per
LSP

Rule Unit ?

Evidence
found - 60' below
time - 60' below
Some in

Alfred
DeLoraine

Board

Deputy Sec Def

- Haynes - Declaration of War
- Haver, Flory - Paper

- Budget -

Victoria Clarke

(b)(6)

Memo

To: COL Rhynedance
From: Victoria Clarke
Subject: September 11,2001 Notes
Date: February 24,2004

Please give **my** handwritten notes taken on September 11,2001 to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks. **Thanks** for your assistance.

11-L-0559/OSD/42657

- C → DHE
Statement for the
UP to make publicly

★ Doing every thing appropriate
to prevent further
attacks.

★ Granted all commercial
aircraft and ordered
military to shoot down
any aircraft that
threaten.

★ Put all facilities
to (highest) level of alert.

★ It is very important
that people try to →

x7330

remain calm and
off the streets. Emergency
vehicles must be
~~be~~ able to get through.

Here's the Point:

We're taking care of our
own -- federal employees


We have not told
others -- real people --
what to do? Stay home?
Go to a basement?
What?

Recommendation:

- 1) Do the media availability in our briefing room downstairs demonstrate

we are up and working. How
would take 45 minutes to get them
here,
yes _____ no _____

- 2) Allow a small group to do walk around near the crime attack site.



IMMEDIATE RELEASE

September 11, 2001

No.
(703)695-0192(media)
(703)697-5737(public/industry)

EMERGENCY RESPONSE AT THE PENTAGON

The Department of Defense is continuing to respond to the attack that occurred this **morning** at 9:38 a.m. EDT. There **are** no casualty figures currently available. Injured personnel were taken **to several** area hospitals. Secretary of Defense Donald **S.** Rumsfeld **has** expressed his concern for the families of those **killed** and injured during **this** shameless attack and is directing operations from his command center in the Pentagon.

All personnel were evacuated from the building **as** emergency response personnel from the Department of Defense and surrounding communities responded to **fire** and medical emergencies. Initial estimates of the damage **are** significant; however, the Pentagon is expected to **be reopened** tomorrow morning. Alternate **worksites** for those affected parts of the building **are** currently **being** identified.

Family members may contact Service representatives: Navy and Marine **Corps** -- 1-877-663-6772, and **Air Force** -- 1-800-253-9276. Navy and Marine **Corps** personnel assigned to the Pentagon **are** also requested to call 1-877-663-6772 for accountability purposes. The Army number will be published **as** soon **as** one is available.

A DoD media operations center **has** been established at Marine **Corps Post** Henderson Hall. Media representatives **may** call 703-697-9988 after 8:00 p.m. EDT.

-END-

11-L-0559/OSD/42661

TC - a.m. 2 8:45
in L.D.'s office

Is he aware of it?

Who has talked with?

What happens now?

What will you do when
you determine who's
responsible?

What are threat conditions?

~~10:00~~ 9:30 → 10:00 in...

Secret moved out of office

10:00 a.m. Rec. from NSC
that Secret Dept moved to
secure spot. Refused

2:00 PM - 8:55 or 9:00 am. -
-any Di Rita... turned on CNN
- 11:00 a.m. moved from ESC to
MCC

11:00 DHR, Myers, Cantore, Di Rita,
Adm. G. Plu. TC

Disc. w/ Myers re:
moving up RetCon level.
Myers-- It's a huge
move, but it's appropriate.

11:00 CAP over DC

11:10 Rpt from FAA on status
of comm. aircraft
Myers: "Thank God."

~~FAA~~ F. mug. UFR target on
Pentagon. No knowledge of
who aircraft.

11:15 DHR -> POTUS call
highest alert status
10:50 - put in Section 3
notifying states for their exercise
state notify. utilities. We
noticed and heard
6 CAP aircraft over DC
ANAT

AOL-offer
state work

9/11/01
Cameron

2)

3) Hunter

*
initial Cameron → RTR get at
who's reported in:

FEMA to asked for support
get back from Mountain

DDMs → Dan DeVries

In CAP in vicinity of AF1.
Scandal 4/1/01
Re: DOE. up from
decis to use force
why to ratine that lay.
so a pilot has
refrain go-dye as to
when how he could take
some amp. quality about
in draft work.

Couple of chert Doo
rains needed yet.

NKOC - left J.ville
Can be sent anywhere
Here w/ Myers / bid tanks
am. w/ Stab, FBI, East.
Way.

11:12 Think it was a
cracked aircraft ...
A. Street poss. of
follow an aircraft.
11:15 Video conf w/ DoD, State, UP, etc.
Ed. G. came in w/ report.
11:20 25-30 casualties.
killed unknown.

11:22 Bumpfield vunkle calm.
Asked for water. Got a
diet coke.

11:28 DHR -- I am Doh. I'm the
Doc. I'd hate to be the
up there and not know exactly
what he should do.

11:30 DHR call w/ Cheryl. Report
what he said to POTUS.
"We have not gotten any
granularity on RBE ()"

Need for a public
statement, ~~reaster~~. Tell people
to stay off roads, etc.

- 1) 3 crashes (1-Pet
2-WTC)
- was out of Las Vegas
hotel on flight plan
- 2)

FRA divert. all flights
from Wash. DC.

All flights on ground --
stay on ground.

DTR → Cherry
Report on stature of Pentagon.

I was outside in the yard
saw pieces of metal that
looked like plane parts.

1:35 I kept one.
Pvt. - We need to get you
out of this building.

Larry/Ed Stew. - What are our
expectation routes discussion.
we need to discuss.

I want out of here. I wonder if we should care to ~~leave~~ stay.

1:40 DHR → PW. You need to go to S:R R.

1:41 Larry. We prob. don't have a heck of a lot of time to get out of here.

1:40 Physics. - Let me don't go, everyone else will stay and we'll drag this damn with us.

DHR 1:43 We're going to get out of here. Poss. go to ~~Hardison~~ Hall.

DHR → Myers. - I want you w/ me. DHR - Used to be on staff.

~~1:45~~ ~~1:50~~ DHR - Tent had intercept.....

"DHR" said "I was sitting w/ my CDA Director when it hit the plane... if it was a plane..."

1:55 DHR → FAA re: 700 aircraft ~~in the air~~.

17:00 hour - Ed 6 came in
and repeated too hard to get down to
Army Command center. Too smoky.

12:00 - DHR → Myers. "What about
the risk? 2 yielded units then
people at myself."

Myers - walked dir. then. ~~Then~~
DHR - That's a big judgment for
the people stay

17:03 - Ed 6. - - very heavy smoke
3) cloudy md.
my rec that we get you
out of fear.

Myers - Recognize steps to
prevent further attacks
and come back if we can.

12:05 DHR → Tent: What do you
know that I don't know?

2:08 DHR - prod. you to here to eval.
couldn't hear ~~DHR~~ Tent.

DHR - "My last"

2:10
WBL i. Capt - a keypad operation Al
Kadash - hello have you
heard the good news..."

to Myers - the fighter the crew
Detw. event in retrospect, the
happier 2 am..."

Sec 7

viewed damage

dump secure intell.

USA

Doc. 767

2 files intercepted.

BRIEFING CARD INDEX

9/11/01

ABAYA POLICY _____	TAB 1
ANTHRAX INNOCULATION PROGRAM _____	TAB 2
BLOOD DONATIONS _____	TAB 3
BUREAUCRACY TO BATTEFIELD _____	TAB 4
COLOMBIA DRUG SUPPORT _____	TAB 5
EHIME MARU _____	TAB 6
IRAQ _____	TAB 7
MACEDONIA _____	TAB 8
MISSILE DEFENSE _____	TAB 9
NAVY/MARINE CORPS INTRANET _____	TAB 10
NUCLEAR TESTING _____	TAB 11
RECRUITING _____	TAB 12
RUSSIA _____	TAB 13
VIEQUES _____	TAB 14

FINAL

To Torie
From Mary M.

12:15 - SecDef -- "I really want a casualty report."

Adm. G-

12:18 FAA -- approx. 50 aircraft in N. arsp. inst.

12:22 SecDef -- ask jt. staff -- CAP intercept or shot anything down?

12:27 () Liebow
brkt. covered up blood
() () () hit ~~2d~~ 2d 3rd floors

SecDef -- you saw
- the thing and for sure it was an airplane?

Liebow -- yes sr. Crew up in
Art. and know every ft. path

SecDef -- scene any dead?

Liebow -- yes sr.

Liebow went to hospital and came back to work.

3A - Wilson - DDT
response to R included our
secret to be received
positively.

Mrs. P. at quarters at
Bolling AFB. (note from
Sec Def ~~comment~~ Adm. G)

A. Detail 10:00 a.m. w/ SPT
Fest. Concussion
for. etc.

Ltd. out window...

Excused Denny... went down
hall (by himself) security caught
went down s. well - outside.
walked out on grass... saw
helped lift people onto
stretchers... helped lift
stretches over barrier/jerry.
wall... ambulance on
other side... got some
people to go back up 7Us...
I picked up a piece of
phone and gave to Jester.
I asked 3-4 people what
happened and nobody knew
I went to the

Joe
Wassel
went
with him

17:40 G - Casualty report.
27 inj. → hosp
2 ~~seravs~~ dead (not verified yet)
unknowns

17:41
Myan
Most serious problem is
jet fuel burning

5 aircraft in-bound
Hagan Orient. Try to
land in Alaska.
↓ A KAL #1 squawking
hijack code
(2 FIF)? Don't know if
that's

NORAD → msg to POTUS
for partial Guard call-up.
request will → Secret
to set up Guard
units -- air defense --
and Country.

Coast Guard -- given auth.
to "rescind" all ships to air

out per H. Giving real
close to gas/fuel ship.

Myers re: ROE... "comes a
point... if plane heads to
runway, do nothing...
users off to Pentagon, too
late... 20 miles out
from White House you're prob.
going to shoot it down.

12:47 -- Secret on UTC...
game update on status
of building -- fire still
burning...

prelim. report: 27 injured
2 ident. dead
no idea how many more
are dead or trapped...

Game report on W-band a/c, etc,
incl. KAT.

Want to
Secret: Tie up ROEs ...
(from Edley)

... not simple for a
pilot, particularly in
W.A.C. ... game
Scenarios of WH
vs. Runway vs. WH
Pentagon.

Report on R's. Feedback
that msg. deliv. and
that R's will deter
exercise and not
re-initiate ~~with~~
Coord. up us.

upout
12:57

John Dexter ... head
of oldy. security

5 lines
Five on 5th Fl. hard to
get to. Lower floors
some work covered.
Plane is obliterated.

FBI on scene.
Triage on rte. 27.
Some casualties

Probably 70 or more
people trapped in B ring.

~~later~~

- 1) get fire knocked down.
- 2)

DHR -- Any sense of how
many people -- based
on mtgs, etc.?

John -- no.

12:55 p.m.

DHR -- asked Myers for when
he would get what he
asked for -- etc (response)

Myers -- S. where detw.
1-3, 4 hour.

"We're going to need to
thank Dig. -- "

DHR - "You bet."

Camden → ~~DDA~~ Witsa...

We need to build
evidentiary base.
We need to do it right.

DHR → In your re: "loose ends"
- 1) project we asked you
to work on....

1:00
P.M.

2) legal case.

3) what CAP have
seen/done...

1:01
(approx)

Call from POTUS →
Secret.

DHR

just a few things...
you've got to
exad. H.I. plan
Pentagon. give not certain
looks like AA w/ some 50-
60 Regal.

that came in full a
power.... eyewitness report...
could be wrong...
full power |...
plane completely obliterated.
update on aircraft from
Orient... we -- KAH --
Squat. hijack code...
Try to divert to Alaska.
NOBDD thg. \approx partial
reserve call up to
relieve some of the
pilots... think it's the
work they to do...
C. Guard can intercept
and full in band ships...

Have started process.
Folks might do at what are
Request to build legal case.
(Fly in resp. to POTUS = retaliation).

done at 1:06 p.m.

DHR - - "He (POTUS) said
to thank all of you."
1) Full review being made
available to help shut hunt.
1:10 p.m.
1) Stop (taking all appropriate
2) hunt down & punish
3) those resp. for
these cowardly acts.
3) req. contact w/ VP
SecDef, NSC Team
4) Taken all appropriate
security coordination
taken here. Secty.
of Ins. to ensure
function. of govt.
Ask Amer. people to
say thanks... - Say prayer...

~~DAE~~ - you must have
hundreds. (mean people) POTUS say

SecDef → Campaign "I help inj. 100k
POTUS → SecDef "Thank all
for their
hard work"

"It will come to
you to deal with it."

1:15 - SecDef → PW --- you
can get back here ---

00 casualties.

10 deaths

PRR on scene

fires still on
4m/5m P1.

1:35

Asked for 2nd
time ~~for~~ sheet;

1:37

PM

Sec Ret / Myers
Campane / Hayes
Clarke in mind

AHR → Myers

" -- I'll come to
what you... (talking him
POTUS said).
The hist. of these
things has been a
part of. To stop we
of history inaccurate..

Reminded of
Beirut... threats not
fulfilled, etc...
Don't do a good job.

POTUS just done the
same thing. I am
care. \exists it. Enorm.
uncomfortable w/ it.
If you cook it, you'd
better be ready to
shoot.

Come at this w/ a
Horn for a great nation.
H. ful to Hunter/ Jones.

when we did do.

Clinton, it was Monica
related to...

Sudan, etc...

rel. unsuccessful
series of missteps...

makes me sad for my
country.

1) Prob. taken the biggest
hit since Civil War -
maybe Pearl Harbor.....

2) Pres who has been
v. explicit.

3) Amer. people have
parent. span of ~
50 sec. Every
minute passing hasinged.
One week from now, their

tolerance level will be
 $\frac{1}{2}$ of what it is now

4) Ev. time I've gone to
Shelton and asked for
packages, I have been
disappointed. Adm. Wilson
tells me we don't have
targets, can shut off, etc.
I expect the worst.

In anticip. of that,
useful to raise the
question fast. ...
want this (plans)
back to me fast!

5) One intercept is
vague.... might mean
something, might not...

No good bases for
being certain.
Could hang your hat
on it.

6) This was v. well
coordinated/ executed/
costly. Redundancies
built in.

Had to have been
well planned.

"coming to my
punch line" "Paul
call from TRAAA

1:45

DHR -- "we're wkg your
problem..."

"who gave it to you?"

- DHR

Who said what to whom...?"

"Who's Gen Hawkins?"

I'd like precision --- and
let me tell you what I
know. ---"

we're tracking a KAL...
squaking....

Adm. G - - came in w/
10 pr 7. of KAL... been
responsive to instructions...
just not sure at this
time.

DAR - you want to
call me back w/
precision - (to work)
1:52 pm. call Jan Rice

PW - said some rpts
that Belgians rptd. 2 aircraft
1:52 call from missing.

Rice - unclear.

AHE - Don't know if that's
the best sln. ... can
set down...

When you have positive
control over all FAA, etc.,
no more diff. to
track civilian or military
aircraft. -- you can
lift the shutdown on
military aircraft....

Need 2 be aware that
this is long term & you
already... way not be
as simple as you
think - moving families.

AHE → Myers... I told
Cand; it might not be
so easy to move families
of injured, etc....

S. Charles Allen said... to a
Intercept was to a
revenue in Ga. Appear
to have interests emg.
of airline that came off
the runway.

Myers - KAL overfly
squawk but over ~~the~~
base they wanted it to
land.... Everhardt has
bad feeling.... over
Canada....

JAR - want to talk
w/ OP that I have
operational command.

2:03 SecDef w/ PW

AHR - do you realize what a gamble that was?

OOOeee! double up that information.

2:10 cable from Fein
re: h

2:15 SecDef w/ Cheney
1) update on KAL flight

2) issue of control of
air space called: SCANTANT
(8?)

can chg from

FAA → EDVC NORAD

Myers chimed in...

Myers → UP re: Eberhardt.

2:20-

Status of blog:

SecDef - get as much
→ Hyman as info. as poss.
as quick. as possible.

not intor. in Jett.
a couple of sites.
empty trans. of sites.

my instrct is to
hit Saddam Hussein
at same time....

ought not to
look any at
WBL (?) and Iraq.

Instr - Haynes to talk
w/ Wedgerutz.

Buy in Jett (w/ hand)
Rames US (SP?)

plane calls back / from
the defense WTC embassy.
We've been dilatory
≡ extract. info from
him.....

SecDef (got Khobar Tower
back to Iran).....

We'll be quiet on
WBH.... (as this was
because we have
just one laundry note-
cept.)

If you screw around,
you won't be able to
do it.

Myer I think the
attr. span may
last longer.....

AAR — Have to go
massive --- look
at all state
places qtr.

We're going to have
so many things ruled
out by law, etc.

that it will —

POTUS will go alpha
Sierra.

God damn --- that is a
classic --- that call
from PW --- re: Hadley,
etc.

Call w/ POTUS
5:40 pm

Warner

Stand 4-59. w/ you

We're

Lewis

to firm, v. resd. . . .

be totally arm-in-arm.

look forward to join.

your leadership. . .

Focus
Threat Conditions -

Det Can -

4:35 pm

POTUS -

we will find them
people... and they will
be the consequences...

F. only needs to do
for our objectives.

Levin -- our enemy is
clear.

We're going to focus
on what ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~is~~ ^{is} us.
Warner -- ~~was~~ ^{there} ~~at~~ ^{at}
full-time right now.

Alaska
United
NY
DC
AFI

Warner/Lauren/Secret
5:30 pm.

Resi Conf.

6:50 -

Charlie - - intel tell you
something ^{is} this

Ivan - Kabul

Bob - casualties

People -- idk as
dead.

FBI second site.

Pam --

Chris -- act of war?

? - open for discussion --
what kind of assurance...

Tony -- what did you see?

Say to Amer. people who
might not have
confidence?

Charlie -- why Force P.A. Debtors
and need highest
alert... STM in force

John Bemy --
remains that US
shot down -- no info.
of that sort. --

Chambers -- Levin -- re:
defense budget. --

Pam -- Klobuchar,

What conf. that you
will find there?

Ivan --

7:05 -- wall of
Levin forward

7:25 met w/ Gov.
Gilman at site..

Statement for media:
at Citgo

* This is a ~~tragedy~~ ^{terrible} day for ~~the~~ America
Our thoughts and prayers are with the injured, ~~and~~ the casualties and their families.

* ~~What we're doing:~~
~~Essentially that is~~
- Taking every appropriate step and precaution to prevent further attacks.

- Making every effort to take care of the injured

and the casualties
in the building.

taking every appropriate
measure to determine
who is responsible.

~~and how we will
deal with them.~~

Sec Def ^{is} in the
building - ~~directing~~
~~our~~ ^{and} effort ^{why}
and ^{criticizing}
closely with the

Pres / VP, Use and
Joint Staff. ~~Zimmer~~ ^{responsible for}
^{fire} ^{rescue} ^{unit}
^{has}

1) I am pleased to be joined here by

- Chairman Cass Levin
- Sen John Warner
- Chairman Frank Stoffer
- & Vice Chairman Dick Myer

It is ~~an~~ indicator that the U.S. Government is functioning in the face of this terrible Attack on our Country.

2) I should add that the Pentagon is ~~is~~ operating this evening & we will be open for business

3) We do not have any solid casualty figures ~~at this time~~ yet but the reports are being rapidly checked and when we have some figures we will let you

Lamy / Adm. 6 / TE

1:10 p.m. (today)
~~Secret~~

The goal is
to make the
government do the
right thing.....

I hear people saying
~~off as they~~

11:00 Dylea: Need 2 find
out how hijacker get
on a diff. plane.

Jaymie How do we know that
people (on 100+ planes)
over in Canada - wait
get on and do the
same thing.

Steve Need to keep you
two separate.

9/11/01

2:00

2 m.

Powell -- go through list
SecDef's office

SecDef; Canbar; Hayes,
Clake.

Discus. upcoming NSC mtg
w/ POTUS (2 de after
speech...)

NSC mtg

1) CDA wanted

2) not focus > duty on
AI Kaitan...

3) ought to consider a
wide range of activities...

4) what are approx. cost
(mil. and o.wise)

Combination
of
Canbar/

Hayes - paper to SecDef

Argument over

10.22 - mtg. in Deplee's office.

Wolf / Hauer / CSP, Hayes, A. Rita, Jaymie Curran...

Hauer -- it's a ^{war} world of annihilation.

Wolf - start up declar. policy as we did w/ Pearl Harbor, and go from there.

Adm 6 M. Daniels will want a suppl. request

f. protos, e. thing.

disc. and table about what to ask for.

Hauer: explain should be an air means to take the war on terrorism on their turf.

Hauer / Wolf

Disc. \approx declaring war/punishable an terrorism an our strategy

10.35 Debrief from Camban
an NSC.

~~Call~~

Secretary did talk to
~~Secret~~ Ivana at 5:00
p.m. Said he wanted to
be helpful... ~~and~~

Camban

9:00 a.m. - Principals Office
12:30 a.m. - House FBI, DOJ,
14:00 p.m. - Senate State, etc.

(poss → POTUS here)

Secret made sure that
POTUS here

means

1) has broadly did he
want to think
if
POTUS - yes

incident
perpetrators

2) not just the but Khobar,
Coh, etc. POTUS - yes

3) not just those who

SecDef → POTUS --
any areas you want to
rule out

think \approx evidence ---
wait get better....

forming -- might take
60 days to get up and
running ^{view} rather than later.

Then turned to declaratory
policy.

Broad, comprehensive &
sustained

Steve/Dyke exchange \approx
how long we could go

SC - SecDef's inclination to go
up in 48 hours.

9/11/01 - Wed. 9/11/01

miss.
inf.
led

0630 - SecDef walked
around bldg. talked w/
Search/Rescue

0700 - SecDef office --
D. Rita; Candari; Durran; Adam G.
PW

Disc. \approx ops; likelihood of
another attack; resuming
civil air patrol.

SecDef - stay \approx Marmar/Berut ...

Line of questions:

- * Oslama bin Laden
- * casualties
- * what does this say \approx re intell.
capabilities
- * Have we focused too
much on missile def.

SecDef: Need to decide who's
doing what

- 1) response
- 2) OOD
- 3) nucl. post. review
- 4) supplemental

Rec Sec Det
to press to briefing
at Chicago

Recommendation:

- 1) Read attached statement to media and allow John Festi to brief on search rescue operations underway.
- 2) No speculation on who did it what we will do no confirmation of any casualty figures.

3 things

1) event this morning

2) f. up to things I
asked for?

3) want 2 wa. Erie by

February 8, 2004

TO: ~~Larry Di Rita~~ *Jamie*
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Churchill Speech

Please have someone get me a copy of the full text of this speech from the book, *Never Give In!* I want to see the rest of the speech.

Thanks.

Attach.

Churchill, Winston. "The Culture and Glories of the Arab Race" 14 June 1921, House of Commons

DHR:dh
020804-38 (ts computer).doc

.....

Please respond by _____

350.001

87604

OSD 09661-04

'THE CULTURE AND GLORIES OF THE ARAB RACE'

14 June 1921

House of Commons

Even in these early days, Churchill sees the dangers posed by the extremism of Saudi Arabia's Wahabi sect, which in recent decades has been responsible for the spread throughout the Muslim world of thousands of 'madrassas' (religious seminaries) dedicated to the propagation of extremist Muslim fundamentalism, combined with virulent hatred of Western values and culture.

Broadly speaking, there are two policies which can be adopted towards the Arab race. One is the policy of keeping them divided, of discouraging their national aspirations, of setting up administrations of local notables in each particular province or city, and exerting an influence through the jealousies of one tribe against another. That was largely, in many cases, the Turkish policy before the war, and, cynical as it was, it undoubtedly achieved a certain measure of success. The other policy, and the one which, I think, is alone compatible with the sincere fulfilment of the pledges we gave during the war to the Arab race and to the Arab leaders, is an attempt to build up around the ancient capital of Baghdad, in a form friendly to Britain and to her Allies, an Arab State which can revive and embody the old culture and glories of the Arab race, and which, at any rate, will have a full and fair opportunity of doing so if the Arab race shows itself capable of profiting by it. Of these two policies we have definitely chosen the latter.

If you are to endeavour so to shape affairs in the sense of giving satisfaction to Arab nationality, you will, I believe, find that the very best structure around which to build, in fact, the only structure of this kind which is available, is the house and family and following of the Sherif of Mecca. It was King Hussein who, in the crisis of the war, declared war upon the Turks and raised the Arab standard. Around that standard gathered his four capable sons - of whom the Emir Feisal and the Emir Abdulla are the two best known in this country - and many of the principal chiefs and notabilities of the Arab world. With them at our side we fought, and with their aid as a valuable auxiliary Lord Allenby hurled the Turks from Palestine.

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B RACE'

Both the Emir Abdulla and the Emir Feisal have great influence in Iraq among the military and also among the religious classes, both Sunni and Shiah. The adherents of the Emir Feisal have sent him an invitation to go to Mesopotamia and present himself to the people and to the assembly which is soon to gather together, and King Hussein has accorded his son permission to accept the invitation. The Emir Abdulla, the elder brother, has renounced his rights and claims. I have caused the Emir Feisal to be informed, in answer to his inquiry, that no obstacle will be placed in the way of his candidature, that he is at liberty to proceed forthwith to Mesopotamia, and that, if he is chosen, he will receive the countenance and support of Great Britain. In consequence, the Emir Feisal has already left Mecca on the 12th of this month, and is now on his journey to Mesopotamia, where he will arrive in about 10 days. We must see how opinion forms itself and what is the view of the National Assembly when it is elected. I cannot attempt to predict the course of events, but I do not hesitate to say that, if the Emir Feisal should be acceptable to the people generally, and to the Assembly, a solution will have been reached which offers, in the opinion of the highest authorities on whom I am relying, the best prospects for a happy and a prosperous outcome.

There has, however, lately arisen in Iraq and particularly in the Province of Basra, a considerable movement in the direction of continuing direct British rule. People always seem to want something different from what is actually being done. When we were giving them direct British rule a few years ago they rebelled against it. Now that we offer them the Arab State which was then demanded so ardently, there is a considerable feeling that perhaps after all British rule will be found to be most stable. It is one of the comparatively few compliments that we have been receiving in this part of the world. I think it reflects very much credit upon Sir Percy Cox that in so short a time he has effected such a considerable change in the public sentiment towards us. But I can hold out no hope that we shall be found willing to continue these direct responsibilities. Our object and our policy is to set up an Arab Government, and to make it take the responsibility, with our aid and our guidance and with an effective measure of our support, until they are strong enough to stand alone, and so to foster the development of their independence as to permit the steady and speedy diminution of our burden. I cannot say in regard to Mesopotamia that there are primary, direct, strategic British interests involved. The defence of India can be better conducted from her own strategic frontier. Mesopotamia is not, like



A12A

Egypt, a place which in a strategic sense is of cardinal importance to our interests, and our policy in Mesopotamia is to reduce our commitments and to extricate ourselves from our burdens while at the same time honourably discharging our obligations and building up a strong and effective Arab Government which will always be the friend of Britain and, I will add, the friend of France.

We are leaning strongly to what I may call the Sherifian solution, both in Mesopotamia, to which the Emir Feisal is proceeding, and in Trans-Jordania, where the Emir Abdulla is now in charge. We are also giving aid and assistance to King Hussein, the Sherif of Mecca, whose State and whose finances have been grievously affected by the interruption of the pilgrimage, in which our Mohanmedan countrymen are so deeply interested, and which we desire to see resumed. The repercussion of this Sherifian policy upon the other Arab chiefs must be carefully watched. In the vast deserts of Arabia, which stretch eastward and north-eastward from the neighbourhood of Mecca to the Persian Gulf and to the boundaries of Mesopotamia, there dwell the peoples of Nejd, powerful nomadic tribes, at the head of whom the remarkable chief Bin Saud maintains himself. This Arab chief has long been in a state of warfare, raid, and reprisal with King Hussein and with his neighbours generally. A large number of Bin Saud's followers belong to the Wahabi sect, a form of Mohammedanism which bears, roughly speaking, the same relation to orthodox Islam as the most militant form of Calvinism would have borne to Rome in the fiercest times of the religious wars. The Wahabis profess a life of exceeding austerity, and what they practise themselves they rigorously enforce on others. They hold it as an article of duty, as well as of faith, to kill all who do not share their opinions and to make slaves of their wives and children. Women have been put to death in Wahabi villages for simply appearing in the streets. It is a penal offence to wear a silk garment. Men have been killed for smoking a cigarette, and as for the crime of alcohol, the most energetic supporter of the temperance cause in this country falls far behind them. Austere, intolerant, well-armed, and bloodthirsty, in their own regions the Wahabis are a distinct factor which must be taken into account, and they have been, and still are, very dangerous to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and to the whole institution of the pilgrimage, in which our Indian fellow-subjects are so deeply concerned.

The Emir Bin Saud has shown himself capable of leading and, within considerable limits, of controlling these formidable sectaries.

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In reply refer to EF-8402 & 04/001628

February 8, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
SUBJECT: Croatia in NATO

Answer

Larry Di Rita
3/11

How do we do something to show that Croatia is a candidate for NATO? I don't know enough about the process. Why don't you get on the phone with Nick Burns.

They need to say something about the door remaining open for Croatia or possibly Croatia, Macedonia and Albania. Let's find out how we do it. I believe him when he says it would make his task a lot easier to get public support.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-39 (ts computer).doc

✓ 3/19

C3/2

Please respond by 3/1/04

SIR:

- NICK BURNS PROMISED TO GET US A NOTE ON THIS ISSUE BY THE END OF THIS WEEK.
- ATTACHED IS PREVIOUS LANGUAGE ON NATO'S "OPEN DOOR" POLICY FROM THE 2002 PRAGUE SUMMIT DECLARATION AND THE 1999 WASHINGTON SUMMIT DECLARATION.
- WE'LL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL IDEAS ONCE WE RECEIVE NICK'S SUGGESTIONS.

- IAN BRZEZINSKI

OSD 09662-04

FEB 20 2004

Croatia

020804

March 8, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
LTG John Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Meeting on CPA

I need a meeting with Kicklighter and Reuben Jeffery. The question is: does he think he is just supposed to follow up on the assessment teams, does he think he is in charge of the back office for CPA, or does he think he also has the responsibility to see that the transition to State takes place?

Let's get the Jones briefing first, and then have Kicklighter there. Then let's figure out what Kicklighter is supposed to be doing and make sure he is doing it.

Thanks

DHR:dh
030404-21

.....
Please respond by 3/19/04

020054

8 Nov 03

OSD 09663-04

February 8, 2004

TO: Mira Ricardel

CC: Doug Feith
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Invitation to Croatian PM

Croatia

How do we go ahead and push with State the idea of getting the Croatian Prime Minister an invitation to Washington?

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-41 (ts computer).doc



Please respond by _____

8 FEB 04

OSD 09664-04

February 8, 2004

OS
3/B

TO: Powell Moore
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Congresswoman Sanchez

000.715D

I think I better get Congresswoman Sanchez to lunch sometime, possibly with Ike Skelton or Duncan Hunter.

Please analyze her statement from the hearing, and take each piece, isolate it out and put down the correct answer. We can sit down and walk her through it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-42 (ts computer).doc



Please respond by _____

8 FEB 04

OSD 09665-04

February 8, 2004

TO: Dov Zakheim
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Budget Question

110.01

We got asked a question in the House hearing as I recall where you and I looked at the numbers, and it turns out that we had cut the budget. I think somebody said we should take money out of missile defense and add it back. Was it chemical warfare?

Let's **look** into it and figure out how that happened.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-43 (ts computer).doc

.....
Please respond by _____

8 Feb 04

OSD 09666-04

February 8, 2004

✓
3/19

TO: Powell Moore
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Ike Skelton Statement

IRAQ

Ike Skelton said something about not rushing out and separating something from security. I think he used the word "Indian territory" and that people were attempting to foment civil strife.

I would like to see that in the testimony.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-44 (ts computer).doc

.....

Please respond by _____

OSD 09667-04

8 FEB 04



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

✓
2/19

February 10, 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary Defense
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to Snowflake regarding Ike Skelton Statement

- Pursuant to your request of 8 February, attached is Congressman Ike Skelton's opening statement and a follow-up comment from your February 4 hearing before the House Armed Services Committee.

Attachment:
Snowflake # 020804-44

Attachment:
As Stated

OSD 09667-04

10 FEB 04

8 FEB 04

11-L-0559/OSD/42721

House Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on FY 2005 Department of Defense Budget

SKELTON:

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

And, Mr. Secretary, welcome back. It's good to see you. I'm sure you've gotten the fill of this room already today, as I understand it.

And General Pace, Mr. Zakheim, thank you.

And I see Dr. Chu here. We thank them very much for being with us.

Mr. Chairman, as you know, I have just returned from my second trip to Iraq and my first trip to Afghanistan about 48 hours ago. The impression that remains is again one of tremendous pride in our amazing American soldiers, just amazing.

The morale is high, and each are doing so very much every day to bring stability to those nations. And we just can't thank them enough. And I think, Mr. Secretary, you should know that.

We're facing real dangers, however. And I'm convinced, from my being there and talking with so many people, we will not be ready for transfer of the sovereignty by June the 30th.

We must not let our own timetable determine the future.

Rather, we should -- in my opinion, Mr. Secretary -- turn over the sovereignty when there is a stable and viable government and an adopted constitution, a stable security environment, fully restored services.

If we rush to judgment, rush to progress, I think -- and I hope I'm dead wrong -- I think there is a likelihood of a civil war among the Shia, the Sunni and the Kurds that could spiral out of control. And I'm very concerned about this.

SKELTON:

And I give you my best thought on this from talking with a lot of folks over there, having met with some of the governing council. In particular, I had a very interesting conversation with a Kurdish leader. And I don't say what I said lightly, Mr. Secretary.

Our efforts should be helped in Iraq by getting NATO involved, as they are in Afghanistan -- actually more so. The alliance would diminish the perception that this is primarily an American operation, while alleviating the burden on our troops.

Our partners in Europe have an interest in a strong and secure Iraq, even more so than we. NATO has certainly helped in Afghanistan, around the Kabul area and up in the Northeast corner. And they seems to be making progress under the NATO umbrella.

And the Taliban, the Al Qaida are security challenges as continues, and I think that we have to continue our efforts in Afghanistan.

I'd like to turn for a moment, if I may, Mr. Chairman, to the president's defense budget request. I applaud the increase it puts toward our national security and the funding, including the pay raise that is included for our troops.

But let me spell out a couple of concerns, if I may.

The budget does not account for the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, despite the fact that these have been ongoing for some time. And while I recognize it's very difficult to predict precise costs, our track record to date must give us some estimate, at least I think, of what we're likely to spend.

Also, the overall budget increases of \$26.4 billion, I applaud it. But I also see that the Army increased only \$1.8 billion, although they are carrying the large majority of the mission in Iraq, as well as being deployed in 130 countries. And the soldiers and their families, I think, deserve more of an increase.

In my opinion, the Army, as well as other services, need additional end-strength. And I commend General Schoomaker. He testified here a number of days ago. And I commend him for his efforts in undertaking to find the 30,000 additional soldiers.

I have to tell you, I disagree with his premise. The demand, in my opinion, is not a temporary spike.

SKELTON:

I would ask, Mr. Secretary, for your thoughts on this, in my opinion, extremely serious situation, please.

RUMSFELD:

Congressman Skelton, you have elevated an enormously important issue that is, as you suggested, currently being discussed in Washington, in the coalition countries that have exactly the same circumstance we do. There are 34 countries now with forces in there, and each of them have the same circumstance, the need to make sure that we have the ability to assure the status of our forces.

The decisions as to when sovereignty will pass will be a decision made by the president and the coalition. The target date is June 30th. The theory behind that was that it's a good thing to try to get the Iraqis taking a bigger role in their own lives and to have that responsibility.

No one wants to rush it. On the other hand, the feeling is that to the extent the Iraqi people see the Iraqis governing themselves, they're more likely to have a stake in how that's done and in the future of that.

So the desire has been to have governance move along a track, security move along a track -- and we are now up to 200,000 Iraqi security forces -- and to have the essential services, electricity, water, power and that type, all move along together because each is in one way or another dependent on the other.

RUMSFELD:

The subject of the status of forces agreement is something that's being discussed at the present time. I don't know that there is anything magical about March 31st. Obviously you have to have a timetable, so you set out dates. And to the extent it can be done then, fine.

In the last analysis, nothing would take effect until sovereignty transferred anyway. And so that takes you down to June 30th, or whenever that actually happens, depending on the facts on the ground.

I think your concern about civil strife is realistic. Historically, one looks at that country and we know they have had civil strife. And we also know that there are terrorists who would like to foment civil strife, because it's to their advantage.

Going back, Mr. Secretary, to the testimony in 1995 in this room by the head of the personnel of the army, Lieutenant General Stroup, there was a need for end-strength, according to his testimony then. And we were just going into the Balkans at that time. And we still have, of course, forces in Korea, Germany and the Balkans. And I think we should take a good hard look at the increase in end- strength.

But, Mr. Secretary, I must tell you, I really, really am proud of the young folks in uniform. And I know that you are, as well. I talked to any number of them, had lunch with them, had breakfast with them, talked to them on post. I didn't find a complainer. And they know their duty. And I talked to both active duty, guard and some reserve. You should be very proud of our troops, and I pass that on to you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HUNTER:

General, thank you very much.

And Mr. Secretary, General Pace and all your team, thanks for the great service over the last year. I appreciate your hard work and all the long hours -- we've spent tons of hours on briefings and keeping Congress up to speed as we move through this operation in Iraq and Afghanistan.

And Mr. Zakheim, thanks for your patient explanation over many, many months of -- in your shop. We thank you for what you're doing.

And I will reserve my questions and recognize the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. Skelton?

SKELTON:

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

SKELTON:

As all of us know, these are very difficult days for our country and for the challenges that we have. I have a deep concern -- let me speak, Mr. Secretary, about Iraq.

There are two Damocles swords that hang over this situation, and both of them are time tables. One time table is the transfer of sovereignty on June the 30th. The other is the March 31 deadline that's laid out for a status of forces agreement, which give us the guidelines from that moment on as to the limitations and the authorizations of our military in Iraq.

General Abizaid said last week that it's unlikely to get a status of force agreement by June the 30th, much less by the deadline of March the 31st.

The status of force agreement could be -- and I hope it's not -- could be a serious problem, if it limits the rules of engagement and limits our ability to go after the guerrillas in any manner, whatsoever. If it does that, it would put our forces in far more danger than they are now.

Looking to the June 30 transfer of sovereignty, in my opinion, I don't think it can happen by that time. We don't know what type of selection process we will have. And I think as we speak today and yesterday, I think the United Nations is sending a team in to see if what type of selection, elections, caucuses or a combination thereof would work and what could come to pass.

SKELTON:

And we don't know what the constitution will look like. We don't know what type of selection process, election or something like that. We don't know who the candidates may be. We don't know, of course, who will be the government, which as I understand it would be an 18-month government from that election, if I'm correct.

That government would also have the power to undo any status of force agreement that would be made earlier. So I just don't -- I think we may be rushing to judgment on this whole effort.

I do notice the present -- the administration -- let me see if I can get this right, Mr. Secretary: Administration sources say that the president may be willing to postpone Iraqi self-rule as a last resort.

I don't think there's any question about it. That has to be done. This is too serious to rush into something that may not work. If it doesn't work, I think there's a strong possibility of civil war, which no one wants.

And so what we are doing is we are sensitive to the points you've raised. They are terribly important. I can assure you we're not going to leave our forces and nor are the other 33 countries going to leave their forces in a circumstance that is disadvantageous.

SKELTON:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.



February 8, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
Larry Di Rita
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Edit Testimony re: Sen. Kennedy

I am going to want to take a look at my testimony and maybe make some edits in it when I see what Ted Kennedy asked me and how I answered. I want to be quite forceful that I never did blame the intelligence community, and he seemed to say I did. I also never went around the intelligence community.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-45 (ts computer).doc



Please respond by _____

OSD 09660-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42728

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3/4 1400

7201

February 8, 2004

C3/8
3/9

TO: Powell Moore
CC: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Correcting Testimony on Numbers

LARRY DI RITA
3/8

326

I want to correct my testimony on the numbers of people in the Active and Reserve components. Those numbers keep moving around on me. We ought to put in the correct numbers in the testimony in the House or Senate, whenever it came up.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-54

.....
Please respond by 2 / 12 / 04

2/12/04

OSD 09669-04



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

✓
319

March 4, 2004 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Snowflake # 020804-54

- You requested a correction to your HASC and SASC testimony responses on the Active and Reserve component numbers.
- OSD/P&R corrected the Guard and Reserve number as stated on line 235 of the transcript from 747,000 to 876,000 (atch 1).
- The SASC transcript numbers are correct.

Attachments:
SECDEF Snowflake
4 Feb 04 HASC Hearing Transcript

4 FEB 04

OSD 09669-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42730

STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES
Unrevised and Unedited
Not for Quotation or
Duplication

FISCAL YEAR 2005 NATIONAL DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Wednesday, February 4, 2004

House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, D.C.

Committee Hearings

of the

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES



OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Office of Official Reporters

11-L-0559/OSD/42731

225 | year. Force levels, we are allowed to fluctuate above and
226 | below during the year; and in the case of an emergency we can
227 | fluctuate substantially as we have. Clearly, if the war on
228 | terror demands it, we will not hesitate to increase force
229 | levels even more using the emergency authorities that you
230 | have already provided.

231 | But it should give us pause that even a temporary
232 | increase in our force levels was and remains necessary today.

233 | Think about it. At this moment we have a pool of 2.6
234 | million men and women, both Active and Reserve. That is to
235 | say that 1.4 Active, the ^{876,000}~~747,000~~ in the Guard and Reserve,
236 | the additional Individual Ready Reserve brings us up to a
237 | total pool of about 2.6 million. Yet the deployment of
238 | 115,000 troops in Iraq has required us to temporarily
239 | increase the size of the force by 33,000. That suggests
240 | strongly to me that the real problem may not be the size of
241 | the force, per se, but rather the way the force is being
242 | managed and the mix of capabilities that are at our disposal;
243 | and it suggests that our challenge is considerably more
244 | complex than simply adding more troops.

245 | Pete Schoomaker, the new Chief of Staff of the Army,
246 | compares the problem to a barrel of rainwater. When you have
247 | a spigot that is near the top and you turn the spigot on, all
248 | you can draw is the water at the top. If the spigot is at
249 | the bottom, you can draw the entire rain barrel.

February 8, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letters from Students of Kiron Skinner

Here are these letters we received written by students of Kiron Skinner. Unfortunately, they date back to November and have not been answered.

Would you please get an answer fast? Kiron Skinner is going to be in town this week for the Defense Policy Board. Please tell her you have them and here is the answer, or else you have them and you will get an answer to her, and that we apologize for the delay.

Thanks.

Attach.

11/19/03 Theories of International Relations students of Kiron Skinner letter to Sec Def
11/19/03 American Foreign Policy students of Kiron Skinner letter to Sec Def

DHR:dh
020804-25 (ts computer).doc

.....
Please respond by _____

OSD 09670-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42733

IRAD

01/22/04

Carnegie Mellon

International Relations Program

Department of History
Carnegie Mellon University
Baker Hall 240
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213-3890

(412) 268-2880
Fax: (412) 268-1019

November 19, 2003

Theories of International Relations Class

c/o Professor Kiron Skinner

Carnegie Mellon University

5000 Forbes Avenue

Pittsburgh, PA 15213

Via: Hand Delivery

Dear Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary Paul Wolfowitz:

We, as students of Carnegie Mellon University's Theories of International Relations class, very much appreciate this opportunity to share our thoughts on the situation in Iraq with you. Throughout our study of international relations this semester, American actions in Iraq have set the stage for theory application, discussion, and debate. This semester we have learned to view American foreign policy through many different theories that seek to explain and predict international outcomes. These various theories point to many different solutions, and we have engaged in an ongoing debate concerning America's proper role in Iraq. We would like to share some of our theory-based explorations with you and to conclude with some points upon which the class has reached consensus.

In considering real world applications of these theories, we have frequently analyzed American security and international terrorism. We commend you and the military for the quick and decisive military victory in Iraq. As stated earlier, there are several points upon which the class is in agreement. It is held in agreement that America's goal for remaining in Iraq until stability has been achieved, has been, and continues to be, crucial. America must prevent the country from falling into a state of anarchy and civil war. Theories of social identity have taught us that the differences in ethnic and religious backgrounds in Iraq make this a difficult, but important, task. The issues that affect Iraq also affect the whole region since there is a Muslim majority throughout the Middle East and because the Kurdish population is situated across several international borders in the region. We all realize that we are not privy to as much information as those in the administration that are making foreign policy decisions, but the changing rationales leading up to the war have left us all very uncomfortable. Reports indicating that no weapons of mass destruction or evidence of these weapons have been found despite the fact that reports prior to the war cited such weapons as justification for the war, serves to magnify our concerns. On these points, the class is unified.

Areas of tension within the class surface over the issue of whether we should have gone to Iraq in the first place. While a few of us believe that this was a justified war, most of us believe that this is not the case. This is because many of us feel that there was not a clear message, a clear indication of why we had to do this, of why anyone had to die for it. Many of us have strong suspicions (perhaps based primarily on media accounts that have

not been definitely proven to be true) that people within the administration had motives for going to war that were not fully consistent with national security. We have been skeptical about any connection between Iraq and terrorism or the horrible events of September 11th, but seek to be persuaded on the basis of hard evidence. Even here, we know that you are in the very sensitive position of having to hold intelligence in private for broad national security reasons. We would also like to hear more discussion about why the United States chose to liberate the Iraqi people who were under a horrible totalitarian regime, but not others in the world that are in a similar situation, like those living in Rwanda, the Congo, or North Korea. We are concerned about the persistent perception that this was a pre-emptive strike against a sovereign nation without the support and backing of the United Nations. We do not think that there can ever be too much discussion and clarification of these concerns by administration officials. For such discussion and clarification go to the heart of what is good about a democracy like ours, and what makes democracy durable.


On the other side of the debate, those of us that supported the decision to go to war in Iraq recognize that Saddam Hussein was a violent and volatile tyrant who had an extensive track record of flouting United Nations resolutions. We recognize that the war on terror is an extremely complex and difficult task. The war on terror is unlike any other conventional war we have fought. In light of this, we view the Bush administration's actions in Iraq as justified. Additionally, we also feel that this is a war of intentions. If Saddam Hussein had acquired these weapons, the results could have been disastrous. Because he had shown willingness to act in non-normative ways in the past, it is highly


unlikely that he would act responsibly with such power and it is quite probable that he could constitute a real threat to the United States and our allies.

To conclude, while many of us did not support the initial decision to go to war, we are all very concerned about withdrawing from Iraq prematurely. Security has not been assured as of yet, and is unlikely to become a reality without the guidance and expertise of the American military. The continuing instability in Afghanistan reaffirm our belief that we must remain in Iraq until the situation is stable. None of us want to see more American casualties in Iraq or in Afghanistan. We also care deeply about the civilian populations in these countries. They did not ask for war, nor did they contribute to the instigation of these wars. They deserve to have stability, opportunity, and access to the sorts of things that we, as Americans, find necessary such as health care, education, freedom of speech and religion. There is another strong moral rationale for remaining in Iraq until it's stable—we must fulfill our obligation to the Iraqi people. Because of these reasons, we feel that staying in Iraq and building it into a self-sufficient country is more important than partisan haggling over how much it's going to cost in money or in political capital.

Thank you for hearing our views.

Sincerely,


Bill G
Alex Ramirez, EMT-B
Hann Wauter


Tara Gusreath
Leigh Zannon
Dana Crook
Amy Jhansari

Case
Smith

M. [Signature]

Carnegie Mellon

November 19, 2003

American Foreign Policy Class
c/o Professor Kiron Skinner
Carnegie Mellon University
5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15213

Via: Hand Delivery

International Relations Program
Department of History
Carnegie Mellon University
Baker Hall 240
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213-3890
(412) 268-2880
Fax: (412) 268-1019

Dear Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary Paul Wolfowitz:

We realize that you have heard a full range of arguments for and against U.S. policy in Iraq. However, as undergraduates in Professor Kiron Skinner's course on American foreign policy, we thought you might appreciate hearing our views about the situation in Iraq.

The events of the next several months will be crucial to the development of a stable, self-governing Iraq. We believe that U.S. economic, military, and political support is critical to developing a new Iraq, a country that enhances peace and cooperation within and outside its borders. Finely-tuned economic, military, and political reforms must be combined with close attention to some of the perspectives about the United States present among the Arab public. It is our perception that the United States wants to be an honest broker in Iraq and throughout the Middle East; however, perceptions of American unilateralism fuel the efforts to undermine American policy in the region. With this in mind, we ask that you indulge our particular take on U.S. policy toward Iraq.

The establishment of a stable, lasting democracy in Iraq is feasible in the long run, but only with some necessary changes in the short term. These will provide a better environment for the development of such a regime, as well as foster key attitudes that will sustain it. There are three basic conditions that should be met:

1. **Involvement of the international community** and an emphasis on international cooperation in all aspects of the reconstruction, especially security and economic development;
2. **The fostering of secular venues** of political discourse and free assembly (separation of religion and state);
3. **The development of a self-sustaining economy.**

There are few, if any, real precedents for international involvement in the creation of a stable democratic state, but actions taken by the UN or with UN support bear the legitimacy of world opinion and democratic consensus, and the significance of this will not be lost on the Iraqi people. We must make the case to the United Nations that it is in the world community's best interest to come to the Iraqis' aid now by providing military peacekeepers as well as civilian diplomats, negotiators, and aid workers as we diminish our military presence. We think that a substantial international presence on the ground will do much to help stop the relentless terrorism seen thus far in post-Saddam Iraq. The international community, including the United Nations, is central to helping the Iraqi Interim Authority in its efforts to bring democracy to Iraq. Hostilities within the country

have undermined the efforts of coalition forces and the Interim Authority. Public opinion is by far the most effective weapon we have against future hostilities. The Iraqi people must see tangible efforts, such as this increased international presence and a greater empowerment of the Interim Authority. We believe that the terrorism against the Interim Authority and the coalition will lose momentum as these efforts are put into place. Such an authority under UN auspices can also be trusted, we hope, to have no conflicts of interest pertaining to economic reconstruction and to the political makeup of the future government. We recognize, though, that any body (a country like the United States or an international institution like the United Nations) responsible for restructuring a country will be open to all manner of criticism, some of which will be unjustified.

Historically, religious fundamentalism has not had as great an influence in Iraq as in its neighbors. Yet most recent political discourse in Iraq has taken place in mosques and been led by clerics. A secular government and freedom of religion, however, are central to forming a stable democracy in the Western style. This is not to say that certain religious values and norms have no place in government, but rather that no specific faith or sect must be either espoused or denounced by government. With religion more deeply ingrained in political tradition in the Middle East than in the United States, there may never be such a 'separation of church and state' to the degree that exists here, but there should at least be enough separation to prevent a fundamentalist, oppressive regime from taking hold.

The creation of a stable, self-sustaining economy in Iraq is also important. History shows that successful democratic nations tend to have a strong middle class and a healthy economy. In some ways, Iraq is unique among Middle Eastern nations because of its historically large, well-educated, relatively affluent middle class. It also has sufficient natural resources to sustain a stable economy. Foreign investment can help revitalize the Iraqi economy, provided such investment abides by international trade and development agreements, so as not to simply drain revenue and resources from the country. We must also encourage and protect local businesses and industries, to let Iraq reap the benefits of its own assets, and to restore a strong middle class.

We think that these steps will lead to a new and vital Iraq, and diminish the widespread perception of American unilateralism.

Thank you for taking the time to hear our views, and we respectfully request that you consider our comments as you forge a new defense policy in these upcoming months.

Sincerely,

ZAVEN GABRIEL
Ryan Didea
Fernando Zumburu
Mark Fitz
Sandra Cullen
be
Martese
JANUEMAYRA

Julia Myers
Dana Cole
Kim Wilton
Jaye Chiu
Eliza Friedland
David Yank
Melanie
Bethie Proch
Nicole Chian

Leigh Zane
Brynn
Kerem Olayun
Meredith
Karin W
James
Shirley

February 8, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Eritrea

I just read that piece on Eritrea again. It seems to me we just have to turn the State Department around and have them deal with Eritrea differently. We need Eritrea to cooperate with us in the global war on terrorism.

State is all hung up on some issue about a State Department employee. We have to find out if it is really serious enough that we want to risk losing the relationship with Eritrea and harm our activities with respect to GWOT. I find it tough to believe.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-13 (ts computer).doc

Please respond by _____

3/1

Eritrea

8 Feb 04

OSD 09671-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42743

720

XTRACOPY - JDP

9 Feb-0936
Scanned

February 8, 2004

TO: Jaymie Durnan
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Mike Wynne
Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Tanker Deal

Durnan
4/17

4527

Apparently Mr. Stonecipher wrote an article saying that when DoD suspended the tanker deal, we only suspended the last 80, not the first 20. That is **not** my understanding.

Please double-check and make sure I am right. If I am right, please make sure somebody tells the world what we actually did, and not what Stonecipher said we did.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020804-11 (ts computer).doc

.....

Please respond by _____

9 Feb 04

OSD 09672-04

MEMO TO: Jaymie Durnan

DATE: February 10, 2004

cc:

Durnan
2/17

Secretary Rumsfeld
Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz
Acting Under Secretary Mike Wynne
Larry DiRita

FROM:

Dave Patterson

Dave

SUBJECT: Tanker Deal

Reference: SD Snowflake, 9 Feb 04, same subject

Jaymie:

When I first became aware of the allegation that Harry Stonecipher may have stated that the tanker deal suspension applied only to the last 80 aircraft, I conferred with Cheryl Irwin in OSD/PA. After some investigation, the statement attributed to Stonecipher was an inaccurate quote by a Seattle-based reporter listening into a scheduled conference call that Boeing has with financial reporters. Boeing does understand that the suspension applies to the whole Tanker Leasing Program (all 100 aircraft).

February 8, 2004

TO: David Chu
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Unions' Objections

What are all these articles about unions objecting to the Pentagon's labor-management proposal? Here is an example.

Thanks.

Attach.
Zeller, Shawn. "Unions Object to Pentagon Labor-Management Proposal," *GovExec.com*, February 8, 2004.

DHR:dh
020804-3 (ts computer).doc

.....
Please respond by _____

OS5 09673-04

4,07

2780

(*Washington Post*)... Dana Milbank

President Bush and Vice President Cheney yesterday said the war in Iraq was justified because Saddam Hussein could have made weapons of mass destruction.

19. **In Rare Talk Show Interview, Bush Defends Decision On War**

(*New York Times*)...Richard W. Stevenson

President Bush said Saturday that he did not want the commission he appointed to be hurried in evaluating prewar intelligence about Iraq's banned weapons, and he said voters would have plenty of opportunity to evaluate the decisions he made about the war even though the commission will not report until nearly five months after Election Day.

20. **Member Of Sept. 11 Panel Praises Interview With Rice**

(*Washington Post*)...Associated Press

The commission reviewing the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks met with President Bush's national security adviser yesterday for an interview one commissioner described as cooperative and productive.

21. **Condi May Jilt George**

(*New York Daily News*)...Thomas M. DeFrank

Condoleezza Rice is supposed to be a slam dunk for secretary of state in a second Bush administration. But she may do the unthinkable and just say no. Friends and colleagues of the national security adviser report that the 49-year-old Rice is exhausted, approaching burnout and aching to return to her idyllic previous life as a tenured professor at Stanford.

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

22. **Unions Object To Pentagon Labor-Management Proposal**

(*GovExec.com*)...Shawn Zeller

A Defense Department memorandum aimed at kicking off discussions about the pending National Security Personnel System is prompting angry denunciations from labor union officials. Pentagon officials sent the memo to union representatives on Friday explaining the agency's thinking on labor-management relations under the new system.

ARMY

23. **To Spouses In Iraa, A Video Valentine**

(*Washington Post*)... Vikki Ortiz

...Whitehouse was one of dozens of military spouses who were offered the chance to record video valentines at Fort Meade yesterday during the installation's first National Manage Week Celebration. The event, held a week before the much-hyped holiday for couples, was organized by the Army post and Anne Arundel County, where it is located, as a way to recognize and comfort those whose spouses are deployed to Iraq and other countries.

24. **Army Starts New Inquiry In Iraq Shooting**

(*UPI.com*)...Mark Benjamin, United Press International

The Army has opened a new inquiry into a wartime shooting in Iraq by a Third Infantry Division battalion commander, eight months after he was exonerated in a separate Army investigation.

25. **Analyst's Report Criticizing Iraa War Draws Flak**

(*Philadelphia Inquirer*)...Andrew Maykuth

The folks at the U.S. Army War College expected that Jeffrey Record's opinions on Iraq might spark some debate, even disagreement. They did not expect a public firestorm. But since Record's essay came to light last month arguing that the Iraq invasion was "unnecessary" and a "detour" from the war on terrorism, the elite military college west of Harrisburg has come under an unaccustomed glare.

NAVY

26. **Radical Warship Takes Shape**

(*Washington Post*)...Guy Gugliotta

...With its backward-canted bow, its inward-angled hull and its pillbox superstructure, the project the Navy calls DD(X) bears scant resemblance to any surface warship any modern sailor has ever seen. But this new destroyer -- or

February 9, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Contracts

Iraq

We have to find some way to explain to the world that we don't control contracts out of Iraq, so that people don't think we are doing them damage by not enabling them to get contracts. We would go to jail if we messed around with contracts.

We need to explain it to all of our friends—like Spain, who brought it **up** at Wehrkunde.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020704-10(ts computer).doc

Please respond by

3/1/04

Due March 1

9 Feb 04

OSD 09674-04



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

DA 6/14

INFORMATION MEMO

USDP

*copy provided
10/6/04*

1-04/001602
EF-8396

Paul Butler

PWB →

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6))

Iraq
JWC 09 JUN 2004

SUBJECT: Contracts

- You asked for us to find some way to explain to our Coalition partners that we do not control reconstruction contracts for Iraq, and cannot influence the awarding of contracts beyond determination of eligibility.
- The Coalition Provisional Authority Program Management Office, the State Department, and the Department of Commerce have already addressed this issue through a series of "Subcontracting Outreach Events."
- These road shows/outreach conferences were designed to reach out to Coalition partners worldwide to inform the business community about the contracts in Iraq so that they would better understand the competitive process for subcontracting opportunities.
- These conferences were held between 14 April and 25 May in ten countries.
- Two additional outreach conferences are scheduled to take place on 15 June (Baghdad) and 20 June (Basra).

9 Jun 04

9 Feb 04



February 9, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock

CC: Trip Coordinators

(b)(6)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: April NATO-Russia Meeting

CLOSED
3/16

Apparently in April there is a NATO-Russia meeting in Norfolk, Virginia. Ivanov wants to know if I am going to attend. If I am going, he will go. I ought to think about doing that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020704-3 (ts computer).doc

.....
Please respond by 3/1/04

Passed guidance into Mira:
- SD to talk to person
MPS on 6th
- willing to do a pull
note of Ivanov then
- Inform Ivanov of this

C 3/17

2 Feb 6 04

OSD 09675-04

11-L-0559/OSD/42750

February 6, 2004

TO: LTG John Craddock

CC: Dov Zakheim
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Hearing Books

032

The big hearing book **does** not work well **for me**. It is **useful** for preparat .on beforehand, but I cannot find anything in it during the hearing.

In the future when I testify, we need to develop **an** abbreviated **book** to be used in **the** hearing **room**. I would need a list questions that **those** who are **with** me should **be** ready to handle, and a smaller book for me with backup papers for whatever areas I **am** covering. The hearing book **would** probably be one-tenth the size of the big **book**.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020504-10 (as computer).doc

.....

Please respond by _____

6 Feb 6 04

OSD 09676-04

2/6/04

To:

From:

ATTACHED SNOWFLAKE #020SD4-10
FOR DISTRIBUTION.

Thanks!

720

2/11
095

February 5, 2004

TO: Jaymie Durnan
 CC: Powell Moore
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: Information from Congressman Dinger

*Dur now
2/11*

I saw Congressman John Dingell last night at the D-Day event. He said he has a person who has a laser that will take out a SAM missile. He would like to talk to somebody about it.

Please get Ron Sega (if he is the appropriate person) and Powell Moore and set up a phone call today or tomorrow to find out the information. See what we can do to connect the person John Dingell knows with our people, and then in a month tell me what has happened.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
020504-5 (to computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 2/6/04

cc "ES"

*✓
2/19*

(Signature)

*Sir,
Response attached.
vr/cdr Nasimp
2/19*

OSD 09677-04



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

✓
2/19

February 10, 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to Snowflake regarding Information from Congressman Dingell

- In addition to raising Mr. Ed Schulak's laser with you on Wednesday evening, February 4, Congressman Dingell called me about it late Tuesday, February 3.
- At our request, Dr. Sega's Deputy, Dr. Charles Holland, spoke by phone to Mr. Schulak on Friday, February 6 and discussed the technical features of his advanced C02 laser technology and its potential applications.
- Dr. Holland agreed to review technical materials to be provided by Mr. Schulak in the near future.
- Legislative Affairs previously facilitated a meeting on January 14 between Mr. Schulak and Mr. Jay Kistler, AT&L, on the same subject at the request of Senator Levin's office.
- Mr. Schulak is currently in contact with members of the Air Force Research Laboratory working on counter SAM technology.
- The initial evaluation indicates the technology is not immediately applicable in a counter SAM role due to its lack of power out and wavelength agility.
- When I spoke to Congressman Dingell last week, I promised to report back to him after we put Mr. Schulak in contact with the appropriate Department personnel. I spoke with him this afternoon and he seemed appreciative.

Attachment:
Snowflake # 020504-5

Prepared by CDR Chris Aquilino, OSD/LA, (b)(6)

OSD 09677-04

10-2-04
57604