



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

DEC 15 2004

311.3

Mr. Bill Timmons
Chairman Emeritus
Timmons and Company, Inc.
1875 Eye Street, N.W.
Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Bill,

Thanks for the heads up about the calling card
issue. It is important, and we are looking into it.

I'll be in touch with you.

Sincerely,

15 APR 04

1 APR 04

OSD 19346-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038554

~~FOUO~~

2007 08 31 10:23

August 31, 2004

092

TO: Gen Richard Myers
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*,
SUBJECT: Common Global Environment Assessment

I think we should have a common global environment assessment, and use DoD's Regional Centers and Combatant Commanders to help communicate with the rest of the world so they share our assessment. We need to show them the intelligence and our analysis. We need to get them thinking about the world the way we are thinking about it, or learn from them about what they are thinking.

Only if we have a common understanding of the global environment - the threats and capabilities we face -- will we be likely to end up singing off the same sheet of music.

Please come back to me with a proposal as to how we should proceed.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
083104-15

.....
Please respond by 9/14

31 AUG 04

~~FOUO~~

0 SD 19347 - 04

CONFIDENTIAL

Policy Executive Secretariat Note

FEB 16 2005


I-04/0 11748/ES-0626

Reference: 083104-15, Common Global Environment
Assessment

Captain Marriott,

Ryan Henry briefed SecDef on October 20, 2004 on
DoD Regional Centers. Attached is the October 20 briefing.

Respectfully request consideration that the
October briefing answers the snowflake action.

VA.

June Bartlett
Deputy Director
Policy Executive Secretariat

~~FOUO~~

August 31, 2004

I-04/011748
ES-0626

TO: Gen Richard Myers
Doug Feith

FROM:

SUBJECT: Common Global Environment Assessment

I think we should have a common global environment assessment, and use DoD's Regional Centers and Combatant Commanders to help communicate with the rest of the world so they share our assessment. We need to show them the intelligence and our analysis. We need to **get** them thinking about the world the way we are thinking about it, or learn from them about what they are thinking.

Only **if** we have a common understanding of the global environment - the threats and capabilities we face -- will we be likely to **end up** singing **off** the same sheet of music.

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DHR:ss
083104-15

.....
Please respond by 9/14

~~FOUO~~

OSD 19347-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038557

DoD Regional Centers – Post 9/11 Transformation



**SecDef Briefing
20 October, 2004**

DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only.
Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA)

11-L-0559/OSD/038558



DoD Regional Centers **Overview**

POLICY

- Assumptions
- Background
- Evolving Vision
- Implementing the Vision
- Next Steps

Bottom Line

- To maximize our Regional Centers' contribution to national security we need to transform**
 - the way we think about Regional Centers
 - the way we **employ** them
 - how we support them



POLICY


DoD Regional Centers **Assumptions**

- ❑ DoD's five Regional Centers for Security Studies were designed before 9/11 to address the strategic challenges we then faced.
 - And the Marshall Center has largely accomplished its **original mission**
- ❑ In a post-9/11 world, the Regional Centers can now do more to strengthen U.S. national security and international support by
 - ⑨ Harmonizing views on the nature of common security challenges
 - Serving **as a key USG tool** in countering ideological support for terrorism
 - ⑨ **Educating** on the role of defense in civil society (current focus)
- ❑ The value of a collaborative set of centers with a coherent message exceeds the sum of their individual contributions.
 - No one Regional Center is inherently more important than any other
- ❑ Properly fashioned, Regional Centers can be a test bed for experimentation in interagency "jointness".
 - ⑨ Focusing all elements of USG power
 - ⑨ Proving ground for low-key **joint interagency** initiatives
 - ⑨ Routine liaison and **outreach activities with NGOs, particularly humanitarian organizations, to inform decision-making in crises**
- ❑ If the Regional Centers assume a leadership role within the USG security cooperation community, investing in them can have a multiplier effect.



DoD Regional Centers

Areas of Responsibility



(DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under E.O. 13526)

20-Oct-04


11-L-0559/OSD/038561



DoD Regional Centers Background

POLICY

| Regional Center | Year | Service | Command | Budget | Participants | Participant Days | Spent |
|--------------------------------|------|---------|----------|---------|--------------|------------------|---------|
| Marshall Center | 1993 | Army | EUCOM | \$26.9M | 2,304 | 64,566 | \$416 |
| Asia-Pacific Center | 1995 | Navy | PACOM | \$13.8M | 1,012 | 27,732 | \$498 |
| Center for Hemispheric Defense | 1997 | NDU | SOUTHCOM | \$5.5M | 862 | 5,953 | \$924 |
| Africa Center | 1999 | NDU | EUCOM | \$10.3M | 905 | 2,913 | \$3,530 |
| Near East-South Asia Center | 2000 | NDU | CENTCOM | \$6.8M | 1,458 | 5,543 | \$1,227 |
| Total | | | | \$63.3M | 5,940 | 106,000 | |




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Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA.




DoD Regional Centers Background

POLICY

Regional Center budgets



Regional Center participants



investment roughly equates to impact



POLICY

DoD Regional Centers

Evolving Vision for the Centers

Objective

Yesterday:

- Influence thinking in immediate post-Cold War era
- Educate on the role of military in civil society

Today:

- Inform thinking on 21st century security challenges
- Educate on the role of defense in civil society

Tomorrow:

- Become USG vanguard in:
 - Harmonizing threat awareness
 - Countering ideological support for terrorism
 - Educating on the role of defense in civil society

Target audiences

- Defense

- Government national security

- Public and private national security; other "thinkers"

How they operate

- "Autonomous," not coordinated

- "Autonomous, but cooperative"

- "Cooperative and coherent," working in an integrated fashion with SecDef agenda



DoD Regional Centers

Moving Toward “Tomorrow”

- What is required to transition to “Tomorrow”?
 - 9 Mission
 - 9 Governance
 - 9 Metrics
 - 9 Resources



Mission

POLICY

Today:

- Education and outreach – forums for exchanging views

- Primarily concerned with regional security issues

- Limited target audience
 - 9 Defense elites, primarily military

- Few cooperative programs with government security cooperation organizations

Tomorrow:

- “Strategic communication” – immersion and outreach activities
 - 9 Harmonize threat awareness
 - 9 Counter ideological support for terrorism
 - 9 Educate on role of defense in civil society

- Balanced treatment of global and regional security matters

- Expanded target audience
 - 9 Security elites, including government, “think tanks,” media, NGOs

- Broader cooperative programs
 - 9 Among Regional Centers
 - 9 Interagency “joint” experimentation centers
 - 9 Foreign government-sponsored think tanks

- Colleges and universities



DoD Regional Centers Governance

POLICY

Today:

- Regional Centers independent institutions, now starting to collaborate
- Various governance models
 - Conflicting directives
 - Different practices regarding Boards of Visitors
 - Multiple and not always optimal Executive Agents
 - Fragmented, limiting legislation
 - *Hit or miss audits*
 - Few arrangements between centers and potential enabling organizations
- Directors semi-connected to SecDef
 - DoD only staffing

Tomorrow:

- Harmonized, collaborating institutions
- Unifying governance model
 - One Directive consolidating oversight and support
 - One Board of Visitors
 - Single Executive Agent
 - Common, enabling legislation
 - *USDP-initiated audits*
 - Memoranda of agreement, e.g., between Regional Centers and Defense Security Cooperation Agency, NDU, or other institutions
- Directors more directly connected to SecDef through USD(P)
 - "Joint" interagency staffing – DoD Director, DoS Deputy, interagency staffing



Metrics

POLICY

Today:

- Metric formulation and data collection are ad hoc
- Existing metrics not used to guide center activities

Tomorrow:

- Consistent metrics for measuring:
 - Effectiveness of generating attitudinal shifts of participants
 - *Entry and exit surveys*
 - Policy insights gained from exchanges and research
 - *Ability to feed the OUSD(P) policy process*
 - Quality of product
 - *Demand for product*
 - Operational effectiveness and efficiency
 - *Outside support (money, staff, facilities, etc.)*
 - DoD and interagency value added
 - *Venue of choice for security cooperation outreach activities*



DoD Regional Centers Support

POLICY

Today:

The newer centers have smaller budgets but equal potential value

➤ Newer centers responsible for strategically important regions

Asymmetric resources

➤ The largest budget is ~6x the size of the smallest

Funding fluctuations complicate planning

Few visits from officials

➤ Minimum participation by US military

Uneven technology applications

Tomorrow:

Centers have equal DoD

Roughly symmetric (within 25%)

Stable funding with
➤ Discretionary funding is a performance

Robust participation
➤ Increased DoD and wide

Learning technology



Next Steps

POLICY

- Work with Center Directors to develop a model for post 9-11 Regional Centers
 - Generate an execution plan to transform mission and roughly equalize Centers
 - Develop roadmap for making Regional Centers interagency “jointness” labs
 - Make initial inquiries with USAID, DOS, and DOE
 - Identify Regional Centers’ post 9-11 path and support/resource needs
 - Develop integrated post 9-11 curriculum
 - Develop program for Senior OSD participation at Regional Centers

- Approve establishment of a single Executive Agent


- Approve establishment of a single Board of Visitors

- Follow through on requested legislation



POLICY

DoD Regional Centers **Future Role**



(DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only.
Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA)




POLICY

DoD Regional Centers
Backup



DoD Regional Centers Background

Dollars Spent per Participant Day



* Asia-Pacific FY96 discrepancy caused by first year start-up costs



DoD Regional Centers
Background

POLICY

Measures of Efficiency

| | Particular Days Year Begun | Particular Days Year End | % Change | Dollars Spent per Day | Dollars Spent per Month | Net % Change in Dollars Spent per Month |
|---------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|----------|-----------------------|-------------------------|---|
| Marshall (1993) | 22,680 | 64,566 | +185% | \$338 | \$416 | + 23% |
| Asia-Pacific (1995) | 3,290 | 27,732 | +743% | \$912 | \$498 | - 45% |
| CHDS (1997) | 2,055 | 5,953 | +190% | \$1,036 | \$924 | - 11% |
| Africa (1999) | 2,918 | 2,913 | -0.2% | \$1,668 | \$3,530 | + 112% |
| NESA (2000) | 825 | 5,543 | +572% | \$1,521 | \$1,227 | - 19% |



DoD Regional Centers

Consolidated Legislative Proposal

- ❑ Reinforces unified governance model
 - Gives all Regional Centers the same authority

- ❑ Broadens participant base to include
 - Foreign security elites (not just defense elites)
 - Variety of **USG** participants
 - Other security “thinkers”

- ❑ Allows Regional Centers to accept gifts and donations
 - Increases accounting transparency by creating a gift fund
 - Permits foreign and domestic gifts and donations

- ❑ Authorizes Regional Centers to charge for education and training
 - Allows Foreign Military Sales (FMS), International Military Education and Training (IMET), and other security assistance funds to be used for Regional Center programs



DoD Regional Centers

USG Educational Institutions with International Participants

POLICY

Regional Centers (5)

- Africa Center
- Asia-Pacific Center
- Center for Hemispheric Defense
- Marshall Center
- Near East-South Asia Center

Senior DoD Institutions (11)


- National Defense University
- Naval Postgraduate School
- Service War Colleges (3)
- Air Force Institute of Technology

DoD Institutions (65)


- Service academies
- Education and training in warfighting, support skills, and intel

USG Programs (218)

- DoS
- DoE
- USAID
- 51 Other Federal Agencies




FY03 Funding



*FY04 funding

Annual Participants



(DELIBERATIVE DOCUMENT: For discussion purposes only. Draft working papers. Do not release under FOIA)

20-Oct-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038576



POLICY

Senior DoD Institutions with International Students

- 5 Regional Centers for Security Studies
- National Defense University
- Naval Postgraduate School
- Air Force Institute of Technology
- Army War College
- Naval War College
- Air War College

~~FOUO~~

~~SENSITIVE~~
~~ATTACHMENT~~

August 31, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: 9/11 Commission Recommendation

000.5

Please read the attached on the 9/11 Commission Recommendation on paramilitary activity.

Thanks.

Attach
08/30/04 O'Connell Info Memo to SecDef

DHR:ss
083104-17

.....

Please respond by _____

~~SENSITIVE~~
~~ATTACHMENT~~

31Aug04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 19348-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038578

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~~SENSITIVE~~

INFO MEMO

SIR → 0131
Rec'd pass
to GEN
CRADDOCK.
AUG 30 2004 VI

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Thomas W. O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC)

Downall
30 Aug 04

SUBJECT: 9/11 Commission Recommendation for Consolidated Paramilitary Activities

At a recent roundtable, you asked me to contact 9/11 Commissioner John Lehman about the above subject. You wanted to know the basis for the recommendation.

John said the Commission's time with CIA (including Director) led them to conclude:

- Agency had "haphazard" approach to paramilitary missions.
- Common thread throughout Agency approach was "unwillingness to take risk". They insisted on legal review at every step. CIA was "reluctant to pull the trigger when opportunities were presented."
- Commission thought entire Agency approach was "muddled, at best."
- Commission sees Agency/DOD mismatch – DOD has capability, CIA has authorities.
- Commission believed SECDEF's post 9-11 actions vis-a-vis SOCOM and Special Ops in general placed DoD in far superior position to conduct these operations.
- Commission was reluctant to cite Agency/national weaknesses in unclassified report.
- Mr. Lehman asked to bring Commissioner Kerrey to the Pentagon for SO/LIC overview.

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11-L-0559/OSD/038579

August 30, 2004

TO: Peter Rodman
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: VOA Broadcasts to Iran

IRAN

Please talk to Seth Cropsey personally, for me, on this matter.

Thanks.

Attach.
8/8/04 Feith Memo on VOA; 8/26/04 Rodman Info Memo to SecDef; 10/24/03 Rodman Action Memo to SecDef (018009/03)

DHR:ss
083004-10

.....
Please respond by 9/17

30AUG04

~~FOUO~~

August 9, 2004

I-04/010681
ES-0418

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: VOA Broadcasts to Iran

Here is a memo from Seth Cropsey and the U.S. International Broadcasting Bureau broadcasts to Iran.

Please take a look at it and get back to me with your suggestions.

Thanks.

Attach.
7/14/04 Cropsey memo to SecDef

J 8/30

DHR dh
080904-17

.....
Please respond by 8/27/04

Sir,
Response attached.

v/r
Lt Col Lengyel
8/30

~~FOUO~~

10-03-04 15:30 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/038581

19314-04

af
AUG 26 2004

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef *af*
USD(P) *af* *PDUSA/P* 8/27
I-04/010681-ES
ES-0418

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) *PR* 26 AUG 2004

SUBJECT: VOA Broadcasts to Iran (SecDef Snowflake)

- You asked for my suggestions regarding International Broadcasting Bureau Director Seth Cropsey's request that DoD supply the funds for an increase in VOA's TV broadcasts to Iran.
- We supported this proposal when it was submitted to the Deputy last year (memo attached).
- As was the case then, there still does not appear to be any legal way to transfer DoD funds to VOA for this purpose.
- If the IBB goes to OMB for this funding increase, we should be prepared to support it.

DUSD (NESA) *af*

PDASD(ISA) *af*

UST

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

EF-7313
11/3
10/29/03 L&A

SECURITY AFFAIRS

ACTION MEMO

DEP SEC DEF HAS SEEN

PW Decision: OTHER
NOV 6 2003
w/ Cmts

I-03/014800

USDP

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
(Peter Rodman, (b)(6))

24 OCT 2003

SUBJECT: Proposal to Fund IBB Farsi TV to Iran

Background:

Seth Cropsey, Director of the International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB), submitted a proposal to us to fund an increase in IBB TV broadcasting to Iran from one half hour per day to three hours per day, for the period of one year. (TAB A) The cost is nearly \$10 million. The amount is included in the IBB's fiscal year 2005 budget request, but the IBB would like to begin the increased broadcasts now.

- We support this proposal. As Iran increases its propaganda broadcasts into Iraq to destabilize the situation there, we should improve our ability to counter Tehran's dis- and mis-information campaigns by speaking directly to the Iranian people, who are receptive to our broadcasts.
- OGC advises that the Department of Defense cannot under any circumstances fund this program directly or transfer funds to the IBB to fund this initiative.
- The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller has evaluated this proposal, and has forwarded it to OMB to see if OMB has funding sources that can be used for this purpose.

Recommendation: That you phone Robin Cleveland to express our support for this program and to see if OMB has resources that can be used for this purpose.

Attachments: As stated

| | |
|-------------------------|-------|
| SPL ASSISTANT IN CHARGE | 11/3 |
| SR SA CALDWELL | 11/3 |
| EXECSEC MARRILLI | 10/29 |

DEPSECDEF DECISION:

APPROVED: _____

DISAPPROVED: _____

OTHER: IBB can say that it looks like a good idea to us.

(b)(6)

They will have to argue their own case, how

for DUSD NESA (b)(6) 2003

Prepared by: Robert Reilly/NESA/NG

11-L-0559/OSD/038583

*Broadcasting Board of Governors***INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING BUREAU**

MEMORANDUM for SECDEF

FROM: Seth Cropsey, Director, U.S. International Broadcasting Bureau

SUBJ: Voice of America Broadcasts to Iran

14 July '04

This memo responds to your request of 8 June for information about VOA's Persian language television broadcasts.

VOA Television to Iran

VOA inaugurated a one-half hour daily primetime television news program, *News & Views*, in July 2003. The new program brought to six the number of hours that VOA broadcasts on television to Iran *per week*; (vice Iran's four 24/7 international TV broadcast operations); all VOA TV broadcasts to Iran are transmitted via satellite. The Iranian government admits that there are about three million households that can receive television signals through satellite dishes. Our research places the figure at approximately 15 percent of the adult population or nearly seven million households; satellite broadcasts are a highly effective way of reaching the Iranian people.

News & Views offers a mixture of international, regional, and local news geared to its audience's interests, as well as current affairs programming addressed to viewers' oft-stated thirst for information about human rights, democracy, and civil society.

Iranian Response

Over the previous month and in addition to its regular news stories, *News & Views* featured an interview with Justice Sandra Day O'Connor who told how her appointment by President Reagan as the first female Supreme Court justice "opened many doors to women in the U.S. and the rest of the world." Other features included an interview from London with a journalist and dissident recently released from an Iranian prison who argued that the U.S. mission in Iraq helps guarantee peace and stability in the region as it promotes democratic change. The ruling mullahs' fear of these broadcasts is clear. A panel discussion on the future of democracy that aired the first week in July featured participation by phone from Tehran of a young woman who is the spokesman for a group called "Women For Democracy." The police arrested her and her mother less than a day after the broadcast aired.

In the absence of other accurate and relevant Persian-language television news broadcasts *News & Views* established a large audience immediately. A telephone poll conducted less than two months after the program went on the air last summer determined the audience at about 13 percent of the viewing public. Since then, the program has received similar phone poll results of over 17 percent.

News & Views is a solid and established TV news program that receives a tremendous volume of email from its growing audience—and shares representative emails with its viewers thus establishing a dialogue among Iranians who are unhappy with their rulers and have no other means of communicating this dissatisfaction with fellow citizens. A

recent email asked 'why VOA couldn't air more emails from other listeners on the air?' The answer is that VOA doesn't have the funds to broadcast more than a daily half hour news program.

What Is to Be Done?

The purpose of this memo is to ask your assistance in securing the approximately \$10 million it would take to increase *News & Views* to a three-hour daily program of news and current affairs programming for a single year. The expanded show would cover in-depth such subjects as the extraordinary corruption of the ruling mullahs, their diversion of Iranian taxpayers' revenue to finance international terrorism, the lessons of east and central Europe in throwing off the communist yoke; and extensive reporting on women's issues, separation of church and state, and the different forms of democratic governance that emails from our audience make it clear they desperately want.

The precedent exists for the transfer of DoD funds to international broadcasting in the assistance DoD provided—in approximately the same amount—to build and install radio transmitters in Afghanistan following the defeat of the Taliban. This assistance was highly successful. It increased the security of our deployed forces, and of the U.S. in the same way that longer and more in-depth broadcasts to Iran would divert that country's rulers' sponsorship of terror and efforts in Iraq while it helped advance the cause of democracy in Iran.

A specific and detailed plan for increasing TV news and current affairs programming to Iran from its current level of one-half hour daily to three hours each day appears immediately below. The costs are annual.

TV Requirements

| | |
|--------------------------|--------------------|
| Salaries | \$2,386,088 |
| AP Graphics | \$40,000 |
| Acquired Video | \$200,000 |
| Regional News Feeds | \$100,000 |
| Transmission and Remotes | \$500,000 |
| Overtime | \$100,000 |
| Subtotal | \$3,326,088 |

Persian Service Requirements:

| | |
|----------------------------|--------------------|
| Salaries | \$2,377,000 |
| Overseas stringers | \$150,000 |
| Domestic stringers | \$50,000 |
| Travel | \$200,000 |
| Telephone Toll | \$10,000 |
| Simultaneous Translators | \$100,000 |
| Office Supplies | \$30,000 |
| Misc expenses | \$20,000 |
| Other Contractual Services | \$50,000 |
| Subtotal | \$2,987,000 |

(b)(6)

| | |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------|
| IBB | |
| Satellite Transmission services | \$2,300,000 |
| Research | \$50,000 |
| Advertising | \$100,000 |
| Subtotal | \$2,450,000 |
| | |
| One Time Costs: | |
| Graphic Equipment | \$230,000 |
| Edit Suites Equipment | \$175,000 |
| Open/Sets | \$100,000 |
| Avstar Licenses | \$45,000 |
| VJ Equipment | \$200,000 |
| Minicam Cameras | \$80,000 |
| Cairo Polycom | \$30,000 |
| Library Shelving | \$75,000 |
| Furniture/Computers | \$350,000 |
| Subtotal | \$1,285,000 |
| Total Requirements for FY'04 | \$10,048,088 |

Conclusion

Bernard Lewis observes that Ayatollah Khomeini's spoken words communicated directly to Iran by phone and by cassettes was the first electronically engineered revolution in history. U.S. international broadcasting also reaches the Iranian people directly.

Both ratings and audience response in the form of email, phone calls, and letters from Iran to the Persian language service here in Washington show that Iranians are watching VOA's broadcasts because they are meaningful to their lives. To quote again from VOA's Iranian viewers, Mohammad A's email from Tehran of 31 May sums the audience response best: "We do not have credible and trustworthy media in Iran and all the media is censored. You are now carrying a very significant responsibility and you are the hope of the Iranian youth."

We have an experienced and invigorated management structure in place; the modest plan outlined above responds both to the United States' need to address the Iranian audience, and the latter's clearly expressed desire for more programming that offers hope for a freer and democratic future. All we ask is for the means.

August 30, 2004

320.2 Strategic

TO: Larry Di Rita
Matt Latimer
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Force Posture Testimony

The testimony I will present in mid-Sept to the SASC on Force Posture is terribly important. I would like to get the first half by this Friday.

Please get an outline from Dr. Cambone to get started. We need to discuss transformation in the broadest sense and then bring it down to force posture because the force posture arrangements are a direct result of our ability to use greater flexibility and agility.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
083004-5



Please respond by 9/3

30 AUG 04

August 30, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Geren Paper

Please take a look at the attached, from Pete Geren, and see me on it tomorrow.

Thanks.

Attach.
Abu Ghraib paper by Pete Geren

DHR:ss
083004-6

.....
Please respond by 9/1

0.9.28

0.9.28

“Mr. Chairman, I know you join me today in saying to the world, judge us by our actions, watch how Americans, watch how a democracy deals with the wrongdoing and with scandal and the pain of acknowledging and correcting our own mistakes and our own weaknesses.”

-- Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
May 7, 2004 before the Senate Armed Services Committee

Lost in the public conversation about the recently released reports on Abu Ghraib is a powerful and important message for the world and for Americans – for Baby Boomers who cut their political teeth on Watergate and Generation X’ers who did so on Whitewater.

It is an important message for Americans who have grown to expect accountability for public officials to be a game of semantic dodge ball, who have watched people they wanted to trust hide behind clever spin, hair-splitting, high fences and legal technicalities.

These reports came forward in a world of low expectations. Many, if not most, expected a whitewash from the Rumsfeld-appointed Schlesinger Panel and a team of Generals investigating Generals. It is understandable that Americans, with their civic morality numbed by Whitewater, Watergate and various other “Gates”, expected no more than whitewash from the people they have placed in positions of trust.

On May 7, 2004 in a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Secretary of Defense invited the world’s scrutiny of our handling of this grave affair. He said:

“Mr. Chairman, I know you join me today in saying to the world, judge us by our actions, watch how Americans, watch how a democracy deals with the wrongdoing and with scandal and the pain of acknowledging and correcting our own mistakes and our own weaknesses.”

He offered this view of American values:

“We value human life. We believe in individual freedom and in the rule of law. For those beliefs, we send men and women of the armed forces abroad to protect that right for our own people and to give others who aren’t Americans the hope of a future of freedom.

Part of that mission, part of what we believe in, is making sure that when wrongdoings or scandal do occur, that they're not covered up, but they're exposed, they're investigated, and the guilty are brought to justice."

The events of the last week proved the Secretary true to his words. They proved that this Administration will follow the facts where they lead, put the full story before the American people, and stand accountable.

Let me add further, this was done in a Presidential election year, in a close election, two months before election day, a period during which even the most virtuous could be tempted to stray from their convictions.

Over one-hundred and seventy years ago, an adopted son of Texas, Sam Houston, lived by the creed, "Hew to the line and let the chips fall where they may." Today, President Bush, another adopted son of Texas, has demonstrated that his Administration will live by those words.

Abu Ghraib is a painful chapter in American history. It was, as Secretary Rumsfeld described it, a "body blow" to our country. As terrible as the cost has been, the crimes of Abu Ghraib would have been compounded had the world seen politics as usual, had America done anything but what this Administration has done.

On May 7, with calls for his resignation echoing in the Senate Armed Services Committee chamber, Secretary Rumsfeld announced the standard for this Administration's review of Abu Ghraib:

"And there's no question but that the investigations have to go forward... And it does not matter one whit where the responsibility falls. It falls where it does."

Sam Houston could not have said it better nor meant it more. The events of the last week bear witness to that fact. Let the world take note and watch how this democracy deals with wrongdoing and scandal.

August 27, 2004

TO: Pete Geren
Gen. Maples
cc: Ryan Henry
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld @-
SUBJECT: Wrapping Up

383.6

It seems to me we are at a point where we ought to begin wrapping up the prison abuse issues.

Specifically, why don't we make a list of all the problems that have been found in the various investigations and reports, and then list what we have done or are doing to correct each one.

The fact is that, as we get into new circumstances, things have to be reviewed and adjusted. Problems occur and, as they occur, we will fix them. In each case, show whose responsibility the problem was and who has been assigned the task of fixing it. In almost every case, it will be the Army. The Army has to fix the training, fix the military intelligence, etc.

Please come up with a format and talk to me about this.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
082704-5 (ts computer).doc

.....
Please respond by 9/10/04

23 AUG 04

7201

file

August 21, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
cc: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Response to Senator McCain

Please get an answer to John McCain on the attached letter he sent to John Handy.

Thanks.

Attach.
8/20/04 McCain ltr to Gen. Handy

DHR dh
082604-4 (1st computer) doc

.....
Please respond by 9/3/04

4527

W774904

*Classified.
Gen Handy replied
to copy to Sen McCain
See attachment*

SIR --- 8/25
FYI.
VIR
Jan

JOHN MCCAIN
SENATOR
CHAIRMAN
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS

G
SCI
OD
CD

1

United States Senate

241 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0300
(202) 224-3336
4400 SOUTH RAYAL ROAD
SUITE 3-120
TUCSON, AZ 85716
(520) 947-2300
3400 EAST ARIZONA
BILTMORA CROSS
SUITE 1100
PHOENIX, AZ 85016
(602) 884-6410
390 WEST FALLO RIVERROAD
SUITE 100
TUCSON, AZ 85741
(520) 470-8304
TELEPHONE FOR HEARING LOCATIONS
(202) 224-7132
(202) 224-0170

August 20, 2004

General John W. Handy, USAF
Commander
Air Mobility Command

(b)(6)

Dear General Handy:

I write regarding your statements recently reported in *U.S. News and World Report* that "I am not a muscle man, but I have stuck my finger through significant pieces of metal," and "I could poke a hole into the corroded areas of the airplane." The quotes were characterized as supporting the acquisition of new air refueling tankers for the Air Force.

As you are aware, the Secretary of Defense has ordered a thorough analysis of alternatives regarding the tanker replacement program. As you also know, this was precipitated by findings of a Defense Science Board task force that, among other things, there is no evidence that corrosion poses an imminent catastrophic threat to the KC-135 fleet mission readiness and that the Air Force's maintenance regime is well poised to deal with corrosion and other aging problems. In fact, the findings indicate that the Air Force's claims of unmanageable corrosion problems and cost growth were overstated. It also found that the KC-135E can fly to 2040. These findings disproved assertions to the contrary repeatedly made by *civilian* Air Force leadership regarding the purportedly urgent need to lease 100 Boeing 767s. In other words, the 'dominating rationale' cited by the Air Force to Congress for having taxpayers pay billions of dollars more for leasing Boeing's KC-767A tankers than they would for buying them outright, has been conclusively shown to be without merit. The Air Force's representations on this issue remain a matter of continuing investigative concern. I discussed my concerns about such misconduct in a letter to the Secretary, dated July 28, 2004.

Aspects of that deal, ranging from the how the original Air Force proposal passed through Congress outside the normal budget process to the improper conduct of senior executives at the Boeing Company, have been exhaustively reviewed and fundamentally criticized by the Senate Committee on Armed Services; the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation; the Department of Justice; the Defense Department's Office of the Inspector General; the Defense Science Board; the Congressional Budget Office; the General Accounting Office; the Congressional Research Service; the Office of Management and Budget; the Defense Department's Office of Programs, Analysis and Evaluation; the Institute for Defense Analyses; the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University and others. Notably, White House Chief of Staff Andy Card and former Defense Department Comptroller General

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

2

2 p. 188 ON

Aug 25 2004 10:49 AM

Gov Zakheim have also weighed in with serious concerns about various aspects of the tanker program. Regretably, your comments reflect a disturbing trend that I recently noted in my letters of March 12, 2004 and July 28, 2004 to the Secretary of Defense, whereby Air Force *uniformed* officers continue to publicly support an acquisition strategy that has been conclusively shown to be a folly.

I hope that you will agree that the path forward on the tanker replacement program that the Secretary of Defense ordered needs to be conducted objectively, independently, and free from political pressure. As such, it is not well-served by such commentary.

Sincerely,

John McCain
John McCain

cc: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

NO 881 P. 3

AUG 25 2004 10:43AM

3

OSD Copy

9/23



UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

508 SCOTT DR
SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE IL 62225-6357

A.O. _____
ACTION JOR
COORD _____
DUE _____

SECRET

2004 SEP 23 11:17
14 September 2004

The Honorable John McCain
United States Senate
Washington DC 20510-0505

Dear Senator McCain

Thank you for your letter regarding tanker recapitalization, 20 Aug 04. I was disheartened to read the *U.S News and World Report* account of a "fight between the Air Force and the Senate" in the sentence leading into my quote regarding the health of our KC-135Es. I share your eagerness to learn the results of the KC-135 Recapitalization Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) and the OSD-led Mobility Capability Study (MCS). Rest assured I have no preference or agenda regarding an acquisition strategy or a particular tanker platform. I continue to take very seriously my responsibilities to provide robust aerial refueling capabilities to combatant commanders around the globe in support of our nation's objectives.

Sincerely,

John W. Handy
JOHN W. HANDY

Commander

cc:
The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld

OSD 14471-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038595

D&D

August 25, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DFI Fund Response

IRAQ

Please draft a response to these three Senators' letter on the CPA and DFI, and let me see your proposed draft from you to them before it goes.

Thanks.

Attach.

8/19/04 Senators Wyden, Harkin, and Dorgan ltr to SecDef [OSD #12458-04]

DHR:dh
082504-28 (ts computer) doc

.....
Please respond by 9/3/04

25 Aug 04

OSD 19357-04



23 AUG 2004

**From the Desk of
Paul Wolfowitz**

8/23

Sec Def -

*This could be a big
issue -*

*I will call you about
it.*

Paul W.

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

August 19, 2004

2004 AUG 20 PM 2:34
OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:


We are writing about recent press reports that indicate \$8.8 billion in Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) money cannot be accounted for. The reports indicate that the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which was in charge of the money throughout the period in question, allocated the money to Iraqi ministries earlier this year, prior to the termination of the CPA. The CPA apparently transferred this staggering sum of money with no written rules or guidelines for ensuring adequate managerial, financial or contractual controls over the funds.

Among the disturbing findings are that the payrolls of the ministries, under CPA control, were reportedly padded with thousands of ghost employees. In one example, the report indicates that the CPA paid for 74,000 guards even though the actual number of guards couldn't be validated. In another example, 8,206 guards were listed on a payroll, but only 603 real individuals could be counted. Such enormous discrepancies raise very serious questions about potential fraud, waste, and abuse.


The reports raise anew very serious questions about the quality of the CPA's oversight and accountability in the reconstruction of Iraq. Iraq is now a sovereign nation, but it is clear that the United States will continue to play a major role in the country's reconstruction. It is therefore imperative that the U.S. government exercise careful control and oversight over expenditures of taxpayer dollars. Continued failures to account for funds, such as the \$8.8 billion of concern here, or Halliburton's repeated failure to fully account for \$4.2 billion for logistical support in Iraq and Kuwait, and the refusal, so far, of the Pentagon to take corrective action are a disservice to the American taxpayer, the Iraqi people and to our men and women in uniform.

We are requesting a full, written account of the \$8.8 billion transferred earlier this year from the CPA to the Iraqi ministries, including the amount each ministry received and the way in which the ministry spent the money, as well as a date certain for when the Pentagon will finally install adequate managerial, financial and contractual controls over taxpayer dollars and DFI expenditures in Iraq. We look forward to hearing from your office in the next two weeks.

Sincerely,


Ron Wyden


Tom Harkin


Byron Dorgan

OSD 12458-04

7201

RA 9/28



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

SEP 10 2004 10:05

INFO MEMO

September 10, 2004 2:25 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz *PW* SEP 27 2004

SUBJECT: CIO for DoD

- You asked me to pull together a small group to address issues raised by Ken Krieg in his Aug. 13, 2004 memo to you regarding the roles and authority of CIOs.
- Such a group is being assembled and will meet on Oct. 1st in your conference room. The agenda and attendee list are attached. We are working with your schedule and hope you will be able to attend the last session.
- As Ken noted, the Department has a CIO. John Stenbit occupied that position when he was here, and Lin Wells is acting in that capacity now.
- The question remains, how do we move the Department to use this person/role effectively? Ken pointed out, "In leading private sector companies, the CIO is one of the key business leaders. The position is the strategic leader on information inside the enterprise and has significant authority in partnership with the senior sector leaders (equivalents of service secretaries, service chiefs, etc.)".
- Independently, Art Cebrowski has proposed a change to the charter for the ASD(NII)/CIO to enhance his role; a revised charter along these lines is being staffed.
- In addition, various net-centric transformational initiatives are coming to fruition. Information-based approaches are proving their operational worth in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.

COORDINATION: Ken Krieg *JK*

Attachments: As stated

020000

1052004

25 AUG 04

OSD 19370-04

DRAFT

Agenda
Department of Defense Meeting with Industry Chief Information Officers
October 1, 2004
The Pentagon, (b)(6)

- 0800 – 0820** **Arrival**
- 0820 – 0830** **Welcome & Introductions**
- *Mr. Pete Geren, Special Assistant
Office of the Secretary of Defense*
 - *Mr. John Kasich
Managing Director, Lehman Brothers
Former Chairman, U.S. House of Representatives Budget Committee*
- 0830 – 0845** **Meeting Goals and Expectations**
- *Mr. Ken Krieg
Director, Program Analysis & Evaluation
Office of the Secretary of Defense*
 - *Mr. Mark Kvanme
Partner
Sequoia Capital*
- 0845 – 9030** **DoD Briefing - VADM (Ret) ~~At~~ Cebrowski**
- *DoD CIO Perspective Lin Wells, Acting DoD CIO/ASD(NII)*
 - *Why IT is Crucial to the Warfighter and DoD Key Challenges
Mr. John Garstka
Assistant Director for Concept and Operations for Force Transformation
Office of the Secretary of Defense*
 - *Netcentric Operations Experience – Global War on Terrorism
Senior Military – BG Cone preferred*
- 0930 – 0945** **Break**

DRAFT

0945 – 1145

Moderated Discussion: Role of CIO in a Netcentric Enterprise

Mr. Ken Krieg

Industry CIO Organization Structure, Challenges, and Perspectives

- 1000 – 1010 *Mr. Robert B. Carter, Executive Vice President,
Chief Information Officer, Federal Express*
- 1010 – 1020 *Mr. Brad Boston, Senior vice President and
Chief Information Officer, Cisco Systems*
- 1020 – 1030 *Ms. Carol Kline, Chief Information Officer,
America Online*
- 1030 – 1040 *Mr. Robert DeRodes, Executive Vice President and
Chief Information Officer, Home Depot, Inc.*
- 1040 – 1050 *TBD
Chief Information Officer – Johnson & Johnson*
- 1050 – 1100 *Large Transition Company Representative
(i.e. Automotive, GE, or CitiGroup, etc.)*

1145 – 1200

Break

1200 – 1300

Working Lunch

- *Round Table Discussions and Recommended Actions*

1300 – 1315

Break

1315 – 1400

Discussion with Department of Defense Leadership-Ken Krieg

- *Secretary of Defense*
- *Deputy Secretary of Defense*
- *Service Secretaries*
- *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*
- *DoD CIOs/Private Sector CIOs*

DRAFT

Department of Defense Meeting with Industry Chief Information Officers
Updated as of: September 10, 2004

Attendee List (Defense)

| | Name | Title/Organization |
|-----|---------------------------|--|
| 1. | Boutelle LTG, Steven | Chief Information Officer, Department of Army. |
| 2. | Cebrowski VADM (Ret), Art | Director, Office of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense. |
| 3. | Geren, Pete | Special Assistant, Office of the Secretary of Defense |
| 4. | Gilligan, John | Chief Information Officer, Department of the Air Force |
| 5. | Guthrie, Priscilla | Deputy, Chief Information Officer, Department of Defense |
| 6. | Krieg, Ken | Director, Program Analysis & Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense |
| 7. | Lentz, Robert | Director, Information Assurance, Department of Defense, Chief Information Office |
| 8. | Myers, Margaret | Principal Director, Chief Information Officer, Department of Defense |
| 9. | Shea LtGen, Robert | J-6, Joint Chiefs of Staff |
| 10. | Wells II, Linton | Acting, Chief Information Officer, Department of Defense |
| 11. | Wennergren, Dave | Chief Information Officer, Department of the Navy |

Attendee List (Industry)

| | Name | Title/Organization |
|-----|-----------------|--|
| 12. | Banahan, Tom | Managing Director, Lehman Brothers |
| 13. | Boston, Brad | Senior Vice President and Chief Information Officer, Cisco Systems |
| 14. | Carter, Robert | Executive Vice President, Chief Information Officer, Federal Express |
| 15. | DeRodes, Robert | Executive Vice President and Chief Information Officer, Home Depot |
| 16. | Kline, Carol | Chief Information Officer, America Online |
| 17. | James, Wilber | Partner, Rockport Capital |
| 18. | Kasich, John | Managing Director, Lehman Brothers |
| 19. | Kvamme, Mark | Partner, Sequoia Capital |
| 20. | Schlein, Ted | General Partner, Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers |
| 21. | TBD | Chief Information Officer, Johnson & Johnson |
| 22. | TBD | Chief Information Officer, Large Transition Company |

DRAFT

Other Attendees

| | Name | Title/Organization |
|-----|--------------------|--|
| 23. | Bollinger, Terry | Contractor, Defense Venture Catalyst Initiative Support |
| 24. | Cocca, Vivian | Information Assurance Transformation Leader, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Networks and Information Integration |
| 25. | Dingman, Michael | Contractor, Defense Venture Catalyst Initiative Support |
| 26. | Garstka, John | Assistant Director for Concept and Operations for Force Transformation Office of the Secretary of Defense |
| 27. | Goldman, Harriet | Contractor, Defense Venture Catalyst Initiative Support |
| 28. | Holland, Charles | Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Science & Technology |
| 29. | King, Steve | Associate Director for Information Assurance and Defense Venture Catalyst Initiative |
| 30. | McVaney, Ed | Defense Business Board* |
| 31. | Sega, Ronald | Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary for Acquisition Technology & Logistics |
| 32. | van Tilborg, Andre | Director, Information Systems, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Science & Technology |

**Request from Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)*

Wrap up with Additional Senior Invitees

Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Service Secretaries
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

BACKGROUND



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000

NETWORKS AND
INFORMATION
INTEGRATION
(ACPIUS)

1255
a/10
D/20

Sep 10, 2004

Dep Sec Def,

This responds to your request of
Aug 30 for a memo you could send
to Sec Def about CIO issues. We're
making good progress, and I think
the meeting on Oct 1 will be valuable

Jim



UNCLASSIFIED

Revised

9/10
BACK
1855
9/10

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Military Assistant


30 August 2004 - 1030 Hours

20923
9/21

SUBJECT: CIO

Sir,
The DSD has asked that you please prepare a response that DSD can send to SecDef.
Also, please coordinate the response with Mr. Ken Krieg. Please see attached document.

Very respectfully,



Stephen T. Ganyard
Colonel, USMC
Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Suspense: 8 September 2004

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/038606

ALL 8/13/04

August 13, 2004

Memorandum for: Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense

From: Ken Krieg *JK*

Cc: Pete Geren

Subject: Snowflake Response on CIO

Several months ago you asked me to think about whether we should have a CIO in the Department. The easy answer is yes.

By responsibility and title you have one in the Assistant Secretary for Network and Information Integration - who is dual-hatted as CIO. Lin Wells serves in that capacity on an acting basis until either Fran Harvey or an alternate is confirmed by the Senate.

The harder answer is that there is still a wide gap in the standard view of the role of the CIO between that in the private sector and the government. In leading private sector companies, the CIO is one of the key business leaders. The position is the strategic leader on information inside the enterprise and has significant authority in partnership with the senior sector leaders (equivalents of service secretaries, service chiefs etc.) to create a joint, enterprise approach to information. In DoD's case, converting to an approach like this will require significant changes in the roles and behaviors of Services, Agencies, and OSD alike.

Interestingly, Pete Geren informed me that the Kasich Group has identified this as a significant issue of interest. Pete is arranging a seminar on October 1 in the Pentagon with John Kasich and a number of leading private sector CIOs to think about the question of how DoD might adapt the role given the breadth and complexity of our enterprise.

It might be useful to get a number of the senior leaders of the Department in this seminar. If you are interested, I will work with Pete to keep you informed.

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36



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE
HAS BEEN
APPROVED - PW
JUL 1 2004

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

TRANSFORMATION
OFFICE

ACTION MEMO

June 24, 2004, 10:30 AM

Butler

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: A. K. Cebrowski, Director, Office of Force Transformation

AKC 6/24

SUBJECT: Transformation and ASD(NII)/DoD CIO Charter

Since the stand-up of **ASD(NII)/DoD CIO** a little over a year ago, the organization's charter **has** been in **staffing**. The Department **is** missing a significant transformational opportunity if the charter **goes** forward in its present form. I suggest the Department leverage the NII charter development to adopt an enterprise-wide approach to information **management**, in lieu of the fragmented, piecemeal processes we now have.

The key issue is if we are to have a CIO, how do **we** do it right.

Defense Transformation hinges on the successful development of a net-centric capable force and the recognition that information and communications technology (ICT) and information **activities** are our **great source of power**, yet we **seem** to be poorly organized for it. **This is a** governance issue which requires us to craft new organizational relationships to exploit **this** new source of power **effectively**. Specifically, the broad relationship between **owners** of the processes that **ICT** supports and the DoD CIO must be crafted for success using demonstrated effective commercial business models.

Unlike successful firms, DoD lacks an enterprise-wide approach to the management of its **ICT** resources. Services' authorities, fragmented ICT oversight by **various** acquisition executives and bureaucratic legacies **all** impede the development of an integrated approach to information management. **This was** one of the concerns and recommendations I presented in my Strategic Transformation Appraisal to the **SLRG**. During my briefings to the individual Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs it continually surfaced **as an** issue of frustration.

To serve you and the Secretary best, the DoD CIO should perform four roles, as is done in successful firms, with authorities appropriate to each:

- Principal staff assistant and advisor on ^(IT) ~~IEE~~ and information management, networks, and related areas
- Enterprise-level strategist from the **ICT** perspective
- **ICT** architect for the DoD enterprise
- DoD-wide **ICT** executive

| | |
|-------------------------|---------|
| TSA SD | 6/28 |
| SA DSD | |
| SPMA DSD | 4/28/04 |
| O-389 SAC 563-04 M/9/05 | |

Implementing these roles will involve technical, organizational, cultural and operational change. There is no good time for this fight, but there is a significant chance for success under you and the Secretary. I'm prepared to work with Lin Wells and others. I have discussed this with Fran Harvey.

I'm asking your concurrence to begin this approach, since there will be significant resistance from some quarters.

Pursue the approach FW Non Concur _____ Other _____
1 JUL 2004

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared by: A. K. Cebrowski, Director, Force Transformation,

(b)(6)

file

response

1400
8/28

August 25, 2004

SECURITY INFORMATION
2004 07 28 11 05

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: CIO for DoD

Please put together a small group to address this question that Ken Krieg discusses in the attached memo, and get back to me with a report by October 1.

Thanks.

Attach:
8/13/04 Krieg memo to SecDef/DepSecDef re: memo #042704-6

DRH:dh
082304-20 (in computer).doc

.....
Please respond by 10/1/04

DR 9/28

Sir,
Response attached.
✓R,
Lt Col Lengyel

020000

25 AUG 04

OSD 19370-04

(b)(6)

Aug 25 12 3:12

August 25, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis

CC: **Larry** Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Information Needed Today

Please get me that piece of **paper** I had that **shows** how **many** courts martial there *are* per year (there were four categories) at any given time.

Also, get me:

- the total number of active, guard, reserve and civilian employees in the Department of Defense, separately
- the total number of prisons under the jurisdiction of DoD and overseas, separately
- who (what organizations) in DoD is responsible for managing the people in the **prisons**
- who is responsible for training the people who work in the prisons—MPs and MI
- who is responsible for training the military intelligence people
- the total number of people involved with prisons—the guards, the military police, **and** also the **interrogation people**
- the total number of detainees that have existed from the time I came in (on a chart)—what the total number was at the **peak** and what it is now.

I need all the answers to these questions before tomorrow morning.

Thanks.

DHR:dfn
082604-6 (to computer) doc

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Please respond by 8/26/04

OSD 19380-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038612

2504

25AUG04


August 25, 2004

SEC. 7

082104-2 01 2: 13

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Transforming the USG

310.1

Attached is a short draft presentation on transforming the U.S. Government for the 21st century. This brief is obviously in an early stage.

Andy, it seems to me that these are the kinds of national security, homeland security and other issues that you folks in the White House are considering. Clearly, they don't fit neatly into the responsibilities of any single department or even into any one of the White House councils. But then, the problems we face in the world don't fit neatly into any one department or into any one of the various White House councils.

In any event, we have folks in DoD who have been thinking about some of these things. If anything here is of interest to you, the Vice President or Condi, let me know. We would be happy to try to be helpful. If you would like to talk about any of these ideas, let me know.

Thanks.

Attach.
8/20/04 Transforming the U.S. Government for the 21st Century

DIIR.dh
082104-20 (rs computer).doc

25Aug04

OSD 19381 -04

11-L-0559/OSD/038613

Transforming the U.S. Government for the 21st Century

23 August 2004

**This briefing is classified
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~**

Draft Working Papers Not Subject to FOIA

Purpose

- Public attention generated by 9/11 Commission report and Congressional hearings have focused Nation on need to improve national security
- Opportunity for Administration to:
 - Go beyond 9/11 Commission recommendations
 - Go beyond the issue of terrorism
 - Prepare for broader challenges of 21st century
- Consider whether the USG might:
 - Restructure ***institutions***
 - Create or realign ***authorities***
 - Take further ***action***

~~FOUO~~

Restructure Institutions – Illustrative Ideas

- **Domestic intelligence** – Go beyond law enforcement approach and integrate with foreign intelligence while duly preserving civil liberties?
- **Strategic Communications** – Create entity in the USG that draws on US private sector prowess in media, IT, advertising, and entertainment?
- **NSC and HSC** – Restructure organizations?
- **US Country Teams** – Transform US Embassy Country Teams for 21st century operations?
- **UN and other international institutions** – Reorganize to prevent crises and assist member states that lack capacity for effective governance?
- **National Guard** – Organize, train and equip the National Guard for homeland defense?

~~FOUO~~

~~FOUO~~

Create or Realign Authorities – Illustrative Ideas

- **Interagency “Jointness”** – Increase through “Goldwater-Nichols” for whole USG?
- **Build Local Capacity** – Help international partners build their capacity to counter enemies and replace US forces
 - Seek additional authorities for: “Train and Equip,” Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), Global Peace Operations Initiative
- **Homeland Security** – Is it time for review of how USG responsibilities and authorities are allocated to ensure right capabilities and assets address key problems?
- **Congress** – Streamline Congressional oversight (e.g., Joint Committees; smaller committees; merged authorization and appropriation committees) and speed nomination/confirmation process?

~~FOUO~~

~~FOUO~~

Take Action – Illustrative Ideas

- **Bio-Defense** – Launch Strategic Bio-Defense Initiative?
- **Common Threat Assessments** – Implement initiative to develop common threat assessments with key allies and partners?
- **Non-Governmental Action** – Mobilize private philanthropies and utilize public-private partnerships to promote educational reform and economic development in Muslim world?
- **Civilian/Military Recruiting and Retention** – Review incentives/disincentives for public/military service?

~~FOUO~~

Way Ahead

- Assign tasks to refine ideas and develop action plans (assign duties, set deadlines, develop metrics, track progress)
- Recommend to Congress actions requiring new legislation
- Develop draft Executive Orders where appropriate

Back-up Slides

11-L-0559/OSD/038620

~~FOUO~~

Additional Illustrative Ideas

- Establish standing USG planning function for building & maintaining coalitions
- Establish “National Security University” educational system for interagency
- Expand unconventional warfare, civil affairs and foreign internal defense capabilities
- Establish Deputy National Intelligence Director to serve as all-source intelligence “archivist” and Chief Information Officer for Intel Community
- Re-evaluate USG national roles and missions (as USG)
- Build civilian reserve for international stability & reconstruction operations security and intelligence
- Strengthen weak governments that they can increase legitimacy and authority in “ungoverned” territory via civic action projects

8/20/2004

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/038621

7201

August 21, 2004

2004-08-21 13:28

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: PA on Global Posture

320.2

Attached is Andy Hoehn's memo on the global force posture summary. Your folks ought to get a full court press on it.

Thanks.

Attach.
8/20/04 DASD (Strategy) memo to SecDef re: Global Posture: Reaction to POTUS Speech

DHR:dh
082104-11 (ts computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 8/27/04

21 AUG 04

OSD 19382-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038622

0287

INFO MEMO

I-04/011142-STRAT

DepSecDef

AUG 20 2004

USD/P

PDUSD/P

[Handwritten signature]

AUG 20 2004

J 8/20

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Andy Hoehn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy *Andy H.*

SUBJECT: Global Posture: Reaction to **POTUS** Speech (U)

Here is an update on recent reactions to the President's posture announcement on August 16. Public Affairs reports that coverage overall has been 90% positive.

- Foreign reaction, especially official statements, has been almost universally positive, while domestic reaction has been somewhat more mixed.
 - Domestic media tends to emphasize US politics, while foreign media gives more prominence to the strategic value of the review.
- In general, those who have done sufficient fact-finding (e.g. Wall Street Journal and BBC) have responded very positively.

DOMESTIC

- Op-eds offer expected election-season political commentary, such as Ron Asmus's critical Aug 18 piece in the Washington Post.
 - But op-eds Charles Krauthammer in the Post and Marcus Corbin in the Baltimore Sun were highly supportive.
- Most editorials – like the Washington Post, Boston Globe, and Detroit Free Press – offer a generally understanding, if mixed, viewpoint. Some common themes are:
 - Credit for the Administration's strategic rationale;
 - Support for long-overdue moves in Europe;
 - Concern about impact in Korea; and
 - Criticism for announcing the changes at a campaign event.
- Only a few editorials have been decisively positive or negative:
 - The Wall Street Journal's good piece was the result of time **we** invested with their editorial writers.
 - The New York Times' negative editorial was expected – they wrote a similarly negative piece on US-German relations last **May**.
 - The Philadelphia Inquirer produced an oddly negative and speculative editorial, which we have responded to via a letter to the editor.

FOREIGN

- Foreign official reaction has been positive – testimony to our consultation efforts over the past 9 months.
 - Ranges from very positive (Australia, Italy) to surprisingly benign (Russia).
- In foreign media, the review's strategic aspects have received significant attention, along with **stones** on local impact and speculation about US political motives.
- See the attached paper for samples of both official and press statements from allies and interested parties.

WAY AHEAD

- Your op-ed is being finalized.
- We will continue to respond to negative editorials via letters and to **push** out op-eds like Doug Feith's **piece** in the August 19 Washington Post.
- We will encourage combatant commanders to speak out.
- We will approach selected Defense Policy Board members – such as Harold Brown, James Schlesinger, and Barry Blechman – to write op-eds and take interviews.
- SASC plans a hearing on 20 September.

ATTACHMENT: As stated.

Prepared by: Mike Brown and Sean Smeland, Strategy, (b)(6)

See DEF → WE'VE ASKED DIA IF THEY CAN PROVIDE ANY INSIGHT INTO REACTIONS FROM N. KOREA, CHINA, OR FRANCE. *J. [unclear]*

SAMPLE OF FOREIGN REACTION

Official

- Karsten Voight, German PM Schroeder's coordinator for US relations: "This is positive... a success story."
- UK MoD: "The UK government and NATO have been consulted ... but it is too early to say what impact there will be on US deployments in the UK"
- Italy MFA: "Absolutely not [a symbol of a weaker commitment]. The Cold War is a thing of the past."
- Japan MFA: "Japan welcomes the review of the US military framework that will better suit the global security environment and further contribute to peace and stability."
- South Korea MFA: "The South Korean government has been well aware of this plan."
- Australia MoD: "It will improve the US capability to contribute to international efforts to defeat global threats."
- Russia's MoD: "I don't see anything alarming in these **plans**."

Note: No official commentary reported yet from China, France, Singapore, or India.

Press

- Germany: *Deutsche Welle* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine* – likely negative impacts on the German economy and local affinities for US troops, but also the need for NATO to improve its own capabilities.
- UK: *BBC* and *Financial Times* – largely favorable discussion of the strategic rationale and implications, but speculation on the fate of UK-based F-15s.
- Japan: *Japan Times* and *Asahi* – praise for the strategic rationale, and detailed reporting on specific proposals for posture in Japan.
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- France: Minimal exposure in French press, mostly quotes from the President and critics.

Note: Little press commentary to date from China or Russia.

SECRET
201 478 -2 Fri 2:30

August 21, 2004

TO: Matt Latimer
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Operation OVERLORD

Germany

Here are some interesting thoughts about Operation OVERLORD you might want to take a look at.

Thanks.

Attach.
8/18/04 Historian memo "OVERLORD What Ifs"

DIIR:dh
082104-16 (ts computer).doc

.....
Please respond by _____

21 Aug 04

OSD 19384-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038626



HISTORICAL OFFICE

**OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1777 NORTH KENT STREET
ARLINGTON, VA 22209-2165**

August 18, 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR: R. F. DUBOIS

SUBJECT: OVERLORD What Ifs

In response to your E-Mail, "what went wrong with Operation Overlord", herewith some of the more obvious observations.

Operation OVERLORD was an operational plan for the first 90 days (D + 90) of a campaign to defeat the Germans in Northwest Europe in 1944. Retrospective analyses of the campaign have identified what are considered errors in planning and execution.

Planning:

1. Concentration on knowledge of coastal area landing sites to relative neglect of inland areas.
2. Insufficient attention to problem of bocage or hedgerow areas which became major obstacles to operations.

Execution:

1. Inadequate intelligence on German unit disposition. Presence of German 32nd Division at Omaha Beach not previously detected; made Omaha landing a bloodbath for U.S. forces on 6 June.
2. Landing at wrong places – U.S. 4th Division landed one kilometer south of where it was supposed to on Utah Beach. This caused delays in advance inland.
3. Failure to take Caen as early as planned. Caen was a key objective, the gateway to Paris. Instead of a few days it took the better part of two months to capture it.
4. Hedgerow fighting. These obstacles held up advances for weeks. U.S. forces not properly prepared in advance to cope with them.



11-L-0559/OSD/038627

5. Failure to close the Falaise – Argentan gap in August. British and American forces missed the opportunity to bag more than a dozen German divisions by leaving open a 25-mile gap in the planned encirclement. Most of the Germans escaped. Success of this maneuver might have shortened the war by months, since it is unlikely that the Germans could have stopped what probably would have been a much more rapid Allied advance to the German border.



Alfred Goldberg
OSD Historian

SECRET
2004 FEB -2 01 28 33

August 21, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Global Posture Reaction

Mr. President—

Attached is a summary of some of the immediate reactions to your announcement with respect to global posture adjustments. I thought you might like to see it.

We look forward to seeing you on Monday.

Respectfully,

Attach.

8/20/04 DASD (Strategy) memo to SecDef re: Global Posture: Reaction to POTUS Speech

DHR:dh
082104-10 (ts.computer).doc

320.2 STRATEGIC

20 Aug 2004

0 SD 19385 - 04

11-L-0559/OSD/038629

08/21

INFO MEMO

1-04/011142-STRAT

DepSecDef

AUG 20 2004

USD/P [Signature] AUG 20 2004

PDUSD/P [Signature]

J 8/20

Andy H.

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Andy Hoehn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy

SUBJECT: Global Posture: Reaction to POTUS Speech (U)

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Prepared by: Mike Brown and Sean Smeland, Strategy (b)(6)

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TAB A

~~FOUO~~

OCT 29 2004 11:26
October 29, 2004

890

35009

TO: Gen Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Tracking Ideas

I think we need to put more discipline into the task of tracking individual human beings. We need to get a Manhattan Project going that integrates a variety of intelligence disciplines and military capabilities.

Please see me with some ideas.

Thanks.

DHR:aa
102904-16

.....
Please respond by 11/30/04

2900704

0 SD 19409-04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

December 2, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

cc: ADM Giambastiani

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Joint Task Force HQ Brief

I was impressed with Ed Giambastiani's concept for the JTF HQ. Clearly a lot of good work by his staff and the Joint Staff as well went into it.

I do want to see you carefully think through whether it ought to be an active cadre of folks instead of reserves. I cannot see any reason whatsoever to use reserves. Once you think that through, I'd like to see an implementing document that I can sign in the next two weeks. We need to move out on this.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
120204-10

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

Thanks.

322

2 Dec 04

December 3, 2004

TO: The Honorable Andrew H. Card
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Prepaid Calling Cards for Military

Attached is a note from my friend, Bill Timmons, raising a matter of importance and concern on telephone credit cards for the military. It is self-explanatory.

The solution lies totally outside the Department of Defense, as I read it. I would very much appreciate your interest in this.

Thank you, sir.

Attach.
12/1/04 Memo to SecDef from Bill Timmons

DHR:ss
120304-3

311M

3 Dec 04

VIA FAX

Memorandum for the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld

From: Bill Timmons *Bill*

Date: 1 December 2004

Subject: Prepaid Telephone **Calling Cards** for Military

Request your personal assistance on an issue of importance to our servicemen and women and their families. In the next few weeks the FCC intends to issue an order concerning prepaid *calling cards* that threatens to increase rates on the military and other users of this low-cost telephone service by as much as 20%.

Ten years ago calling card service that contained promotional advertisements (*called* enhanced cards) was placed in service. Telephone calls using these enhanced cards are informational and outside regulated service and therefore not subject to intrastate access or universal service fees. After all these years the FCC intends to make these cards fall in a revenue category that will cause troops and other card users to contribute more so others may contribute less.

Consistent with the goals of universal service, the cards today provide low-cost calling for those who need it most - military, senior, rural, minority, and low-income users. The USO provides free pre-paid cards to service personnel as part of "Operation Phone Home program." Wal-Mart, Sam's Club, drug stores, military exchanges, and other retail outlets sell the inexpensive calling cards. Members of Congress have communicated with FCC Chairman Powell not to take money out of soldiers' pockets while they defend our country. In fact, in the closing days of this Congress through report language for the final budget legislation Congress directed the FCC "not to take any action that would directly or indirectly have the effect of raising the rates charged to military personnel or their families for telephone calls placed using prepaid phone cards." On 23 July of this year the Pentagon weighed in when Charles Abell wrote the FCC pointing out the increased costs to service personnel and families if this order were implemented. The FCC chairman put off official action until after the election but now intends to go forward.

Don, about the only avenue open seems to be White House involvement to protect the low-cost prepaid calling cards for the military. May I suggest you call Andy Card and ask him to help?

Thanks a bunch.



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
SECURITY INFORMATION

INFO MEMO

2004 DEC -3 PM 5:41

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE *12/9/04*

FROM: Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Command Sergeant Major (CSM) James R. Jordan's Retention
Beyond Retention Control Point (RCP)

- This information memorandum is in response to your inquiry concerning the November 28, 2004, Fayetteville Observer article regarding CSM Jordan.
- CSM Jordan is the Brigade CSM for the 35th Signal Brigade (Airborne), XVIIIth Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The above-mentioned article reported that CSM Jordan had requested to extend beyond his mandatory retirement date in order to deploy with his unit to Iraq, but did not clearly report the status of his request.
- The Army Human Resources Command approved CSM Jordan's request on September 13, 2004. His request was approved as an exception to policy in accordance with Army Regulation 601-280, paragraph 3-10. The approved 14-month exception, thru August 2006, will allow CSM Jordan to deploy with his unit and then retire upon completion of redeployment processing.
- This was a good news / personal interest story.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: LTC David R. Alexander III

(b)(6)

Fayetteville (NC) Observer
November 28, 2004

Senior NCO Jordan Decides To Stay With His Team

By Henry Cunningham, Military editor

Command Sgt. Maj. James R. Jordan asked to stay in the Army for a year beyond his mandatory retirement date so he could complete a deployment to Iraq with the 35th Signal Brigade.

"We are currently at war," Jordan said. "We are doing things, and it requires leaders to do certain things. That's what I am, a leader."

Like his younger brother, retired basketball star Michael Jordan, James Jordan loves his job, believes in helping his team, expects maximum effort from those around him, and will leave on his own terms.

The sergeant major stands 5-foot-7. His brother is about 6-foot-6. At Fort Bragg, the older brother has kept a low profile and avoided calling attention to his family connection.

Command Sgt. Maj. Jordan and about 500 soldiers of the brigade are scheduled to depart today for a year in Iraq.

Under normal conditions, the 47-year-old Jordan, who entered basic training in June 1975 and had three assignments in Korea, would start winding down his Army career in the spring as he approached the 30-year mark.

His colonel promised to support whatever decision he made, but Jordan had no intention of getting on an airplane April 29, flying home and leaving his brigade.

"That's not the way you want to end a 30-year career," Jordan said.

"People ask, 'Why?'" said Col. Bryan Ellis, the brigade commander. "The answer is, he is completely selfless. We all want to see it go well."

No-nonsense

Jordan is a no-nonsense noncommissioned officer with a shaved head and a wry sense of humor. In his job, he advises the commander as the senior enlisted soldier in the brigade of 2,450. Many of them are young specialists and sergeants facing back-to-back extended tours overseas.

"If you don't believe in selfless service, you are not going to make it in this business," Jordan said.

It's not your age that counts, it's your mind, said Jordan, the oldest person in the brigade. He went to airborne school, where most soldiers are in their teens or early 20s, as a 36-year-old first sergeant. At 47, he will run eight miles for physical training and expects soldiers to be alongside him, not lagging behind.

Three years of Junior ROTC at New Hanover High School in Wilmington helped convince Jordan that the Army was for him.

"I figured I wanted to be a soldier, plus I was the oldest of five kids," he said. "I wanted to get out of the house and do something myself."

In the early 1990s, he, as a sergeant first class, was the noncommissioned officer in charge of the team fielding the Mobile Subscriber Equipment, the Army's cell phone system.

"You would ask senior people for the answers to questions," said Ellis, the brigade commander. "They would always say, 'Talk to Sgt. 1st Class Jordan.' He was the one that had the answers about anything - the training, the fielding, the maintenance."

As Jordan sees it, his job is to help get the brigade to Iraq and back and resume the hectic work of providing communications for the 18th Airborne *Corps* around the world.

"The brigade has got to be prepared to do the mission when we return," Jordan said. "Quite a few critical people are preparing to get out of the Army when they return."

Preparing for danger

In recent months, he has been focused on preparing his soldiers for the dangers of Iraq.

"One of the things we found out is you've got quite a few soldiers who are technically smart," Jordan said. "They can make a computer do everything you want it to do."

But the computer-savvy soldiers also must know what to do on a Fort Bragg firing range or when a convoy is ambushed in Iraq.

"Your technical skills ain't going to help you be able to put steel where it needs to be," he said. "Technical' ain't got nothing to do with it out there. You've got to be 'tactical' -just as qualified as the infantry."

And don't tell the command sergeant major that a soldier can't pass the marksmanship test.

"That's the wrong answer," he said. "You'll stay at that till you get it done. If you don't get it done today, you're going back tomorrow. Then tomorrow you get a little bit of love because I'll be standing over top of you, making sure you get it right."

That's what a sergeant major is for, he said.

A noncommissioned officer can't be effective sitting in an office or standing back with hands on hips, he said.

"Some of my family really don't even know what I do," he said. "They know I'm in the Army. That's about it. My immediate family and my wife, my kids, not extremely happy, but they are on the team. They say, 'Daddy, do what you've got to do.'"

Jordan said his mother told him he has "been in it forever."

"I've been doing this by myself for so long, being my own person, being my own soldier," he said. "I'm going to continue doing it the same way until the day I feel like I need to hang it up, not when they feel like I need to hang it up."

~~FOUO~~

NOV 30 2004
November 30, 2004

11-0559-03 01 5:41

TO: Fran Harvey
CC: GEN Pete Schoomaker
Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Extension

I take it there is a way for Chief Master Sergeant Jordan to stay in the service for an extra year, as he has requested. Please advise.

Thanks.

DHRdh
113004-1

.....
Please respond by 12/9/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/038640

OSD 19544-04

~~FOUO~~

SECRET
November 30, 2004

1000 070 -3 PM 5:41

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CC: GEN Pete Schoomaker
Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Extension

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DHRdh
113004-1

.....
Please respond by 12/9/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/038641

OSD 19544-04

~~FOUO~~

Handwritten notes: 9/7/04

September 7, 2004

11-L-0559-03 11 27

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: E-mail from Ron Arons

Please take care of the attached e-mail regarding an idea to disarm Al-Sadr's people.

Thanks.

Attach.
08/18/04 E-mail from Ron Arons to SecDef re: HIDA technology

DHR:es
090704-10

.....
Please respond by _____

Vertical handwritten notes: Iraq, 7 Sep 04, 26 Aug 04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/038642

OSD 19580-04

(b)(6)

ASPT

From: Ron Arons (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, August 26, 2004 11:10 AM
To: Donald Rumsfeld
Subject: A couple of ideas

2004 08 26 - 3 11:10:23

Dear Mr. Secretary,

Maybe I'm missing something but.....

Why can't we use HyperSound technology, already in the Defense Department's hands, to disarm Al-Sadr's people guarding the mosque? I direct you to the following article: <http://www.raven1.net/hssweapon.htm>

Why can't we throw a couple of smoke or stink bombs at Al-Sadr's people guarding the mosque.

Just some thoughts

Ron Arons
Princeton '78

✓
Suz -
I've emailed him back looking for his email address. I'll let you know when I get it.

9-1-04

ATTACH.
NY TIMES MAGAZINE ARTICLE RE: HIDA (02/23/02)

ATC HyperSonic Sound as a Weapon

By Marshall SELLA New York Times March 23, 2003
5035 words, Late Edition - Final , Section 6 , Page 34 , Column 3

Original link:

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/23/magazine/23SOUND.html>

For the moment, though, HSS is unfinished business. As night must follow day, there are Defense Department applications. Norris and A.T.C. have been busy honing something called High Intensity Directed Acoustics (HIDA, in house jargon). It is directional sound -- an offshoot of HSS -- but one that never, ever transmits Handel or waterfall sounds. Although the technology thus far has been routinely referred to as a "nonlethal weapon," the Pentagon now prefers to stress the friendlier-sounding "hailing intruders" function.

In reality, HIDA is both warning and weapon. If used from a battleship, it can ward off stray crafts at 500 yards with a pinpointed verbal warning. Should the offending vessel continue to within 200 yards, the stern warnings are replaced by 120-decibel sounds that are as physically disabling as shrapnel. Certain noises, projected at the right pitch, can incapacitate even a stone-deaf terrorist; the bones in your head are brutalized by a tone's full effect whether you're clutching the sides of your skull in agony or not.

"Besides," Norris says, laughing darkly, "grabbing your ears is as good as a pair of handcuffs."

Nimble holding a big black plate, Norris stands with me in an A.T.C. sound chamber. Since he's poised behind the weapon, he will hear no sound once it's powered up: not a peep. "HIDA can instantaneously cause loss of equilibrium, vomiting, migraines -- really, we can pretty much pick our ailment," he says brightly. "We've delivered a couple dozen units so far, but will have a lot more out by June. They're talking millions!"

(Last month, A.T.C. cut a five-year, multimillion-dollar licensing agreement with General Dynamics, one of the giants of the military-industrial complex.)

Norris prods his assistant to locate the baby noise on a laptop, then aims the device at me. At first, the noise is dreadful -- just primarily wrong -- but not unbearable. I repeatedly tell Norris to crank it up (trying to approximate battle-strength volume, without the nausea), until the noise isn't so much a noise as an assault on my nervous system. I nearly fall down and, for some reason, my eyes hurt. When I bravely ask how high they'd turned the dial, Norris laughs uproariously. "That was nothing!" he bellows.

"That was about 1 percent of what an enemy would get. One percent!" Two hours later, I can still feel the ache in the back of my head.

7201

HOLD



ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

ACTION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

Ray DuBois 12/7/04

SUBJECT: Services/Non-OSD Directives Review

- In your attached snowflake of November 17, 2004, you requested information on what the Services and non-OSD elements of DoD are doing to update their directives. You asked for an analysis of their directive systems, and for a memo prompting a comprehensive review of their directives.
- Defense Agency/Activity directives promulgate their DoD-wide policy through the WHS-administered directives systems. Their parent USDs and ASDs oversee the content.
- The Services have their own procedures for publication of directives, regulations, and instructions, which vary widely. WHS reviewed the Services' policy level publications and identified the following sample data reflecting publications in selected functional areas that are older than January 1999:
 - o Air Force: 14 of 21 Directives in the Manpower/Organization series (66%).
 - o Army: 28 of 29 Regulations in the Organization/Functions series (97%).
 - o Navy: 18 of 22 Instructions in the Operations/Readiness series (82%).
 - o Marine Corps: 92 of 126 Orders in the General Admin/Mgmt series (73%)
- All four services have actions ongoing to modernize their publications programs in various stages of development.
- The Joint Staff is actively managing its Directives Program, with only 27 out of 267 publications (10%) older than five years. Updates to many of these older publications are awaiting release of updated DoD issuances.
- The memorandum to the Service Secretaries is attached at Tab A, with courtesy copy provided to the CJCS.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the memorandum at Tab A

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment: As stated

Prepared By: Mr. John C. Krysa, WHS/ESCD, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/038645

OSD 19721-04

300.8

7 DEC 04

17NOV04



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

SUBJECT: Review of Service Directives

In recent years, we have adopted significant changes in DoD and Service policies, programs, missions, organizations, and responsibilities. World events, current and emerging threats, and evolving technologies have all helped drive these changes. It is imperative that we codify in our policy level directives, regulations, and instructions the decisions we make to guide our departments through these changing times.

At my direction, OSD Components conducted a comprehensive review of DoD Directives to ensure that they are current with today's defense posture. Of 653 DoD Directives, 259 were certified as current, 317 required revision, and 77 will be cancelled. A sample review of your directives, regulations, and instructions indicates your Service requires a similar review. In selected functional areas, the majority of your policy level issuances are older than five years.

Therefore, I request that you conduct a thorough review of your publications to ensure that they are current with Service guidance and consistent with their counterpart DoD Directives. As DoD Directives are revised or cancelled, these changes will be posted on the following web site: <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/>. I direct your attention to this web site because revisions and cancellations of DoD Directives may guide your prioritization of effort.

Please provide me an assessment of your policy level publications by February 1, 2005 to include your plan of action.

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff



11-L-0559/OSD/038646

How

1/19
2/13



ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

ACTION MEMO

2004 DEC 17 15:19

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director, Administration and Management

SUBJECT: Services/Non-OSD Directives Review

Paul Butler
2/13 pub

Ray DuBois 12/7/04

Thanks

- In your attached snowflake of November 17, 2004, you requested information on what the Services and non-OSD elements of DoD are doing to update their directives. You asked for an analysis of their directive systems, and for a memo prompting a comprehensive review of their directives.
- Defense Agency/Activity directives promulgate their DoD-wide policy through the WHS-administered directives systems. Their parent USDs and ASDs oversee the content.
- The Services have their own procedures for publication of directives, regulations, and instructions, which vary widely. WHS reviewed the Services' policy level publications and identified the following sample data reflecting publications in selected functional areas that are older than January 1999:
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 - o Army: 28 of 29 Regulations in the Organization/Functions series (97%).
 - o Navy: 18 of 22 Instructions in the Operations/Readiness series (82%).
 - o Marine Corps: 92 of 126 Orders in the General Admin/Mgmt series (73%)
- All four services have actions ongoing to modernize their publications programs in various stages of development. AD Since QDR-1/2003.
- The Joint Staff is actively managing its Directives Program, with only 27 out of 267 publications (10%) older than five years. Updates to many of these older publications are awaiting release of updated DoD issuances.
- The memorandum to the Service Secretaries is attached at Tab A, with courtesy copy provided to the CJCS.

2-02

2451

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the memorandum at Tab A.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment: As stated

| | | | |
|----------|---------|--------|--|
| MA SD | SMA DSD | 3/3/06 | |
| TSA SD | SA DSD | 12/10 | |
| EXEC SEC | M 12/9 | | |
| | 8/21/8 | 7/2/8 | |

Prepared By: Mr. John C. Krysa, WHS/ESCD, (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/038647

OSD 19721-04



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

SUBJECT: Review of Service Directives

In recent years, we have adopted significant changes in DoD and Service policies, programs, missions, organizations, and responsibilities. World events, current and emerging threats, and evolving technologies have all helped drive these changes. It is ~~imperative~~ that we codify in our policy level directives, regulations, and instructions the decisions we make to guide our departments through these changing times.

At my direction, OSD Components conducted a comprehensive review of DoD Directives to ensure that they are current with today's defense posture. Of 653 DoD Directives, 259 were certified as current, 317 required revision, and 77 will be cancelled. A sample review of your directives, regulations, and instructions indicates your Service requires a similar review. In selected functional areas, the majority of your policy level issuances are older than five years.

2

Therefore, I request that you conduct a thorough review of your publications to ensure that they are current with Service guidance and consistent with their counterpart DoD Directives. As DoD Directives are revised or cancelled, these changes will be posted on the following web site: <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/>. I direct your attention to this web site because revisions and cancellations of DoD Directives may guide your prioritization of effort.

Please provide me an assessment of your policy level publications by February 1, 2005 to include your plan of action.

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff



11-L-0559/USD/038648

~~FOUO~~

November 17, 2004

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: DoD Directives

300.8

I just looked over **this** "DoD Directives Review Update." It really is disappointing that we are **only** at 50% after four years.

What about the Services? What about other non-OSD elements of DoD?

Why don't you get **a** list of all of those **and** draft a memo for me to send to all of them to get them **to** do the **same thing**. Let's stay on top of **this**.

Thanks so much.

Attach.

11/12/04 Dir, A&M memo to SecDef re: DoD ~~Directives~~ Review Update [OSD 18207-04]

DHR:dh
111704-3

.....
Please respond by 12/3/04

17 Nov 04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/038649

OSD 19721-04

~~FOUO w/CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

November 11, 2004

2014 ETC I-04/015082
ES-1376

TO: Doug Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: Iceland

Please take a look at this Reykjavik cable and tell me what you think we ought to do.

Thanks.

Attach.

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK Cable O 090748Z NOV 04: "Iceland: How to Get Started"

DHR:sh
111104-9

.....
Please respond by 12/3/04

ICELAND

~~FOUO w/CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

2-11-04 P04:46 IN

OSD 19751-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038650

11 Nov 04

7201

~~FOUO~~

November 29, 2004

TO: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Afghanistan

According to Abizaid, with respect to the drug strategy for Afghanistan, it appears not to be synchronized -- no one's in charge. Department of State has to develop a strategy. Other countries in the region want to get involved - Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, along with Afghanistan. Why don't you see what you can do about that.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
112904-23

.....
Please respond by 12/23/04

AFGHANISTAN

DG M...y

OSD 19788-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038651

~~FOUO~~

~~FOUO~~

~~SECRET~~

October 29, 2004
I-04/014576
ES-1235

SECRET
2004 FEB 10 11 0:13

TO: Doug Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: Chinese MOD Invitation

China

In my meeting with the Chinese CHOD yesterday, he reiterated the Chinese MOD's invitation for me to come to China.

DHR:ss
102904-8

.....
Please respond by _____

11-L-0559/OSD/038652

0 SD 19845-04

Upon removal of attachments
this document becomes

~~FOUO~~

~~FOUO~~
~~SECRET~~

29-10-04 18:06 IN

29 OCT 04

TAB A
~~FOUO~~

October 29, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
SUBJECT: Location of Civil Affairs

What is taking so long in deciding where Civil Affairs ought to be located? If they don't agree I want it kicked up to me and I will figure it out. Let's get it moving.

Thanks.

DHR:ls
102904-25

.....
Please respond by 11/5/04

322

29 OCT 04 9 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 19857-04

~~059-13900-01~~

11-L-0559/OSD/038653



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

704 500 10 AM 6:30
CM-2228-04
9 December 2004

322

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBW/12/7*

SUBJECT: Location of Civil Affairs (SF-888)

- **Answer.** The following is an interim response to your question (TAB A). My staff has requested USSOCOM schedule an OpsDeps Tank session during December to review three concepts for the assignment of Civil Affairs (CA) forces under either USSOCOM or the Army.
- **Analysis.** On 26 August, an Army CA Tiger Team briefed the Army Vice Chief of Staff on three concepts for the assignment of CA units (TAB B). On 8 November, USSOCOM recommended CA forces supporting USSOCOM be assigned to USSOCOM, others should be assigned to the Army. The Army, however, recommends all CA forces be assigned to USSOCOM. The purpose of the OpsDeps Tank is to develop a recommended course of action for your decision.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: LtGen James T. Conway, USMC; Director, J-3; (b)(6)

9 Dec 04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/038654

OSD 19857-04

TAB B



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ACTION MEMO

CH-2043-04
13 September 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 9/10*

SUBJECT: Location of Civil Affairs (CA)

- **Question.** "When are we going to get closure on where **the Civil Affairs** functions ought to be located? What is **the** pacing item there? Is it getting on my schedule?" (**TABA**)
- **Answer.** The **Army** has completed its study of the issue. **VCSA** was briefed on 26 Aug and approved a recommendation that all CA and **PSYOP** Units remain assigned to US **Army** Special Operations **Command** (**USASOC**).
- **Analysis.** TAB B summarizes **Army staff briefing** to the **VCSA**. **TAB C** is a **VCSA** memorandum giving the **USASOC** Commander his recommendation.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve the scheduling of a meeting **with** you, USD(P), CSA, **CMC**, **CDRUSSOCOM** and me to review the **Army** recommendation.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Other _____

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Lt Gen Norton A. Schwartz, **USAF**; Director, J-3;

(b)(6)

Tab B

APR 27 2004

755

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Location of Civil Affairs

When *are we going to get* closure *on where* the Civil Affairs functions ought to be located? *What is the pacing item there? Is it getting on my schedule?*

Thanks.

DHR:dh
042304-14

.....
Please respond by 5/9/04

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/038656

30 August 2004

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: **Army** "Tiger Team" Briefing to Vice Chief of Staff

1. Purpose. To summarize latest **Army** briefing on Civil Affairs (CA) issues.
2. Key Points. On 26 August, the CA/PSYOP Tiger Team (CAPOTT) briefed the Vice Chief of Staff, Army (VCSA) on **options** for the assignment of CA **units**.
 - The CAPOTT presented the following findings:
 - **CA (and PSYOP)** forces can best **support** operations by remaining under US **Army** Special Operations **Command (USASOC)** . Reassigning **CA** to *Army* Forces Command **would** not increase **Army** interest in these activities, improve the **transition** to post-combat stabilization operations, nor **support** the **Army** Campaign Plan.
 - Addressing **CA and PSYOP** challenges requires partnership between US **Army** Forces Command and **USASOC**.
 - Operations **would** benefit from creation of a full-time strategic-level **Civil Military Operations (CMO) planning/coordination capability**.
 - The **Army should** consider elevating CMO to a doctrinal "battlefield operating system."
 - **USASOC must** redesign the current **CA and PSYOP** force structure for **modularity** and **use Total Army Analysis** to review AC/RC mix.
 - **Extending the** Reserve Component **CA** branch to the Active Component and creating a **PSYOP** branch **would** promote the management, professionalism and availability of those officers.
 - **VCSA** approved the findings **and** gave the following guidance:
 - Continue to work the force structure for **CA and PSYOP**.
 - Determine **how** to integrate **CA, PSYOP and supported units** per the **Army Campaign Plan**. This should **include** Combat **Training Centers**.
 - Return in 90 days to brief the implementation plan.

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/038657



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE WCE CHIEF OF STAFF
201 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0201

26 AUG 2004

**MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY,
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (AIRBORNE), FORT BRAGG, NC 28310**

**SUBJECT: Results of G-3 Directed Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations
Tiger Team (CAPOTT)**

1. As per our meeting and your request for assistance on 29 April 2004, I convened a Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Tiger Team (CAPOTT) to analyze your Civil Affairs and PSYOP "Way Ahead" concept. The Team **also** analyzed **two** additional concepts for points of comparison. The team consisted of members of the **Army** Staff, selected Army major commands, and selected outside agencies. It ensured all doctrinal, organizational, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities issues were reviewed and considered.
2. The Tiger Team determined civil affairs and psychological operations forces **could** best support the Army **by** remaining under the Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). The Army's Force Generation Model's emphasis on **modularity** will assure that this capability is realized as CA and PSYOP staff planners will be assigned down to the BCT UA level. The Tiger Team recommends that USASOC should redesign the current CA and PSYOP force structures for modularity and **relook** the AC/RC mix.
3. During the conduct of the Tiger Team review and assessment the following three concepts were developed:
 - a. **Concept 1** - USACAPOC with all currently **assigned** forces, remains assigned to USASOC and transforms to support modularity.
 - b. **Concept 2** - **HQ USACAPOC** with all **CA** and PSYOP Forces reassigned to **JFCOM**.
 - c. **Concept 3** - **SOF** supporting forces assigned to USASOC and conventional forces assigned to FORSCOM.
4. Recommendation: The CAPOTT endorses **Concept 1** by utilizing the comparison criteria of Training/Readiness, Modularity, Flexibility, and Predictability. Recommend USASOC begin coordination with **FORSCOM** to support transformation and support modularity IAW Concept 1.


Tab B

SUBJECT: Results of G-3 Directed Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Tiger Team (CAPOTT)

5. Although this constitutes the closure of this Tiger Team, the members are available to assist in any capacity. We need to continue to build on the momentum gained thus far. Furthermore, USASOC's pursuit of branches for CA and PSYOP will help to increase professionalism, management, and availability of the officers in those branches.

6. The POC for this action is COL Jose Olivero, HQDA, G-3, MOSO-SOD, DSN (b)(6)

(b)(6) Comm: (b)(6)



RICHARD A. CODY
General, United States Army
Vice Chief of Staff

TAB C

COORDINATION PAGE

| Unit | Name | Date |
|------------|----------------|------------------|
| USA | MG Robinson | 23 November 2004 |
| USMC | COL Van Dyke | 23 November 2004 |
| OSD(SOLIC) | COL Romano | 3 November 2004 |
| USSOCOM | Col Buckmelter | 2 November 2004 |
| USJFCOM | COL Milburn | 23 November 2004 |

~~FOUO~~

December 9, 2004

TO: Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.

CC: Dina Powell

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Jim Denny - Proposed Candidate for the President's Commission on Tax Reform

012

Attached is a background sheet of James M. Denny. He is world-class - a brilliant lawyer and financial expert.

As you will see from his background sheet, he has broad experience. He is a solid Republican. He would be a superb member of the President's Commission on Tax Reform.

Please let me know if I can provide any additional information.

Thanks.

Attach.
 Jim Denny Background Sheet
 Denny political contributions

DHR:dh
 120504-18

9/22/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 19861-04

November, 2004

James M. **Denny** is a retired Vice Chairman of Sears, Roebuck and Co. He joined Sears in 1986 as Vice President-Finance, became Chief Financial Officer in 1988, Vice Chairman in 1992 and retired in 1995 upon completion of the program to unbundle the financial services/retail conglomerate through a series of spin-offs and sales of its financial services businesses. Earlier positions include Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Office with G.D. Searle and Co., Chairman of Pearl Health Services, Inc., a publicly held Searle-affiliated company, and Treasurer of the Firestone Tire & Rubber Company. He began his career as a lawyer, practicing in New York and Paris with the firm of Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer and Wood.

Denny is a director of ChoicePoint, Inc., GATX Corporation, and Gilead Sciences, Inc., where he also serves as Chairman, and several private companies. Previous board memberships include Allstate Corporation, Astra AB, General Binding Corporation, General Instrument Corporation, The Principal Financial Group, and Sears, Roebuck and Co. Since his retirement from Sears, he has been engaged in investment related activities including serving on the advisory Board of Evanston Capital Management and as an advisor to William Blair Capital Partners, LLC. from 1995 to 2000 and as a trustee of the Searle Family Trusts.

Denny is a director and a past Chairman of Northwestern Memorial Healthcare Corporation and is current Chairman of Northwestern Memorial Foundation. He is a member of the Board of Directors of Georgetown University and the Board of Trustees of DePaul University. He also serves as a member of the boards of the Catholic Extension Society and the

November, 2004

Catholic Theological Union, a member of The Bernardin Center National Advisory Board, and as a Vice **Chair** of the Finance Council of the Archdiocese of Chicago. **He** received the Princeton Club of Chicago's Community service award in 1999, an honorary degree from Catholic Theological Union in **2003**, and was the American Ireland Fund 2002 Chicago Dinner Honoree.

Denny attended Princeton University from 1950 to 1954 **and**, following completion of military service in Korea, graduated **from** the University of Minnesota **in** 1957 and the Georgetown University law Center in 1960 where **he** was **an** editor / officer of the **law** review.

Denny was born in (b)(6) He is married to the former Catherine Florance. (b)(6)

James M. & Catherine M. Denny
1999 through 2004 Political Contributions

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Name</u> | <u>Paid Amount</u> |
|---|---|---------------------|
| 05/28/1999 | Porter for Congress | 500.00 |
| 05/28/1999 | Governor George W. Bush Presidential Exp. | 1,000.00 |
| 12/17/1999 | Empower America Supporter | 1,000.00 |
| 05/04/2000 | Abraham Senate 2000 | 1,000.00 |
| 06/09/2000 | Mark Kirk for Congress | 1,000.00 |
| 06/09/2000 | McCollum for U.S. Senate | 2,000.00 |
| 06/09/2000 | McCollum for U.S. Senate | 2,000.00 |
| 09/22/2000 | Mark Kirk for Congress | 1,000.00 |
| 10/20/2000 | Illinois Victory 2000 | 5,000.00 |
| 11/16/2001 | Bill Simon for Governor | 250.00 |
| 11/16/2001 | Citizens For Corinne Wood | 1,000.00 |
| 10/03/2002 | Illinois Republican Party | 5,000.00 |
| 04/08/2003 | Illinois Republican Party | 25,000.00 |
| 06/23/2003 | Andy McKenna for Senate | 2,000.00 |
| 09/09/2003 | Bush - Cheney '04 | 2,000.00 |
| 09/09/2003 | Bush - Cheney '04 | 2,000.00 |
| 05/11/2004 | Illinois Republican Party | 10,000.00 |
| 07/26/2004 | RNC Presidential Trust | 5,000.00 |
| 09/21/2004 | CITIZENS FOR KARMEIER | 1,000.00 |
| 10/07/2004 | Martinez for U.S. Senate | 1,000.00 |
| Total Political Contributions | | <u>68,750.00</u> |
| TOTAL | | <u>\$ 68,750.00</u> |
| Additional Family Contributions to Bush - Cheney '04 | | |
| 09/09/2003 | Andrew Bowyer | 2,000.00 |
| 09/09/2003 | Catherine Denny Bowyer | 2,000.00 |
| 09/09/2003 | James M. Denny Jr. | 2,000.00 |
| 09/09/2003 | Katherine Denny | 2,000.00 |
| 09/09/2003 | Mathew Denny | 2,000.00 |
| 09/09/2003 | Catherine Q. Denny | 2,000.00 |
| 09/09/2003 | Norton O'Meara | 2,000.00 |
| 09/09/2003 | Sarah Denny O'Meara | 2,000.00 |
| | | <u>\$ 16,000.00</u> |
| Consolidated Denny Family Contributions | | \$ 84,750.00 |

December 10, 2004

TO: GEN John Abizaid
CC: Gen Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
GEN George Casey
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Militia Theory

IRAO

Attached is an e-mail I received on militias. What do you think of it?

Thanks.

Attach.
11/16/04 Pickard e-mail to SD re: Militia Theory

DHR:dh
120904-49

.....
Please respond by 1/6/05

10 Dec 04

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
 Sent: Wednesday, November 17, 2004 4:02 PM
 To: (b)(6)
 Subject: FW: Militia theory

From DR's email

-----Original Message-----

From: Ronn S. Pickard (b)(6)
 Sent: Tuesday, November 16, 2004 11:51 PM
 To: Donald Rumsfeld
 Subject: MILITIA THEORY

Don,

The Department of Defense has no militia theory.

Fundamentally, the term "militia" refers to a citizenry voluntarily mobilized for the common defense.

The strategy of terrorism is ultimately simple. A community is criminally attacked. The folks in the community naturally organize to defend themselves. Terrorist allies within the government block the government from passing proper laws to enable the community to defend itself lawfully and openly. Terrorist allies within the community attacked promote the formation of illegal militias and, thus, control the linkage between illegal militia units. The illegal militia units are then run up against each other and the government. Totalitarianism results. A well regulated militia would make such shenanigans impossible.

Things immediately became unglued in Iraq after Allawi stated that there would be "no militia laws". How could the people of Iraq possibly support a government that seeks to disarm and disorganize them in the face of such violence? Without a lawful self-defense how much easier could it be for terrorists to dominated communities?

The Kurdish militia had repelled Saddam Hussein and his agents when they were in power with a minimum of support from the United States. The Allawi government with U.S. support has sought to stand down the Kurdish militia and replace them with government paid police. The result as with the situation in Mosul was predictable. The militia has to be properly regulated not eliminated.

There is a world of difference between a well regulated militia, a poorly regulated militia, an unregulated militia, and an illegal militia. The Department of Defense has no analysis of the difference.

The principles of a well regulated militia are universal, although unknown to the D.O.D.

1. The basic militia unit must be neighborhood based so that the members are first defending their own families and neighbors. This makes the militia unit naturally conservative and responsible. It would be extremely difficult for a neighborhood based militia unit under proper regulations to sustain illegal activities because everyone in the neighborhood would know what they were doing. It would be too easy for authorities to investigate reports of misbehavior and provide remedial discipline.
2. The members of the basic militia unit elect their own sergeant. This makes the militia unit a bulwork of democracy and assures community support for the unit.
3. The militia sergeants must swear into "the regular uniformed officer corps" -- in municipalities this means the local police station. Sergeants serve, in effect as reserve police officers. They are always subject to the martial laws. No law commands individual militia members to mobilize unless the order comes from a governor or the president. However, the social conditions of the basic militia unit effectively require members to mobilize at the call of their sergeants unless there are exceptional political conditions afoot.

11/17/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/038666

Once mobilized, militia members are under the martial laws.

Our Constitution gives it to the Congress to write the militia code for the nation and leaves it to the states to implement that code. The President becomes commander-in-chief of the militia if he declares a state of emergency.

The Congress never wrote the appropriate militia code. The lack of a national militia code resulted in the militias of the individual states becoming independent only state organs -- which was the necessary precondition if not the ultimate cause of the Civil War.

It would be easy to implement a good Standard Militia Code in Iraq. Provide the form for neighborhoods to form units and elect sergeants. Assign local police officers to the units and ex-military personnel to drill them. This would put an immediate end to the insurgency because it would give the citizenry the mechanism to lawfully root it out and also prevent the only course to power the insurgency depends upon.

If even the weak PLA issued a Standard Militia Code, the Palestinian people would immediately and openly establish neighborhood militia units. These units would put a prompt end to the petty crime in the neighborhoods that is the necessary precursor to the gangs and larger illegal militia organizations. Once the Palestinian neighborhood militias were up and properly regulated, they would quickly put an end to any intimidation by the existing illegal militias such as that of Hamas and the al Aqsa Martyr's Brigade. What seems so difficult from a centralized political perspective is essentially simple on the neighborhood level.

The political opposition to well regulated militias is simply motivated. If folks in a neighborhood had a well regulated militia unit, they would use different but similar neighborhood based organization to address other political concerns. The well regulated militia entrenches the principles of freedom, democracy, and good government.

This is evident in urban American. Good neighborhood watches use the natural principles of a well regulated militia. Where the good neighborhood watch exists, the community is safe. Governing urban Democratic Parties actively and systematically oppose those who independently select their neighborhood leadership for any purpose. We have the common phenomenon of Democratic politicians pulling back their opposition to a neighborhood's self-organizing when crime surges and then pouncing back in after the the crime is reduced. The meetings are flooded out with public employees, etc., when the crisis is solved. In minority areas where the Democrats' hold is especially strong, gangs can simply take over. Although the American neighborhood watch rarely displays arms, they are present in the background.

The well regulated militia simply formalizes the rights and procedures that are natural and appropriate. The well regulated militia, of course, also instructs and disciplines the use of arms.

The problems with militias around the world are predictable when we look at how the individual principles of the well regulated militia are manifest or absent. In Iraq, even urban militias are tied to family and tribes rather than being neighborhood based. Local unit leaders are appointed not elected. The regular uniformed officer corps plays no role. It would be easy to replace these structures with a well regulated militia structure.

The well regulated militia requires that the regular uniformed officer corps is under local civil authority except for states of emergency.

It should be expected that members of a well regulated militia in their individual capacity as citizens would form civic associations and have political impacts. It would be best for such associations to follow the principles of American non-profit organizations.

It is also proper that militias have communications and joint operational infrastructures by which they can operate if their regular uniformed officers are absent. Those communications and joint operational infrastructures should develop under the law and the supervision of the regular uniformed officer corps. For instance, in case of strife, a police department headquarters could be compromised or officers might need to be sent to particular hotspots. The neighborhood militia should still be able to mobilize and communicate. When regular officers return, their authority should be immediately recognized.

It is common in America for citizens to take action to apprehend a suspect, and for those citizens to immediately follow the orders of police officers when they arrive on the scene. The principles involved are natural.

Under our Constitution, our Congress should enact legislation that gives our citizens the specific right and regulations to form neighborhood militia units, elect sergeants, and be assigned officers. If we had a Standard Militia Code, the neighborhoods across the America would form militia units virtually overnight. Street crime and neighborhood gangs would vanish in a few short weeks. This is not a pipe dream. It is based on practical experience. I served as chair of an ad hoc community neighborhood watch in a high crime minority area in Los Angeles. At one point we dissolved what had become the heaviest drug trafficking intersection in Los Angeles in two weeks without arrests -- then the politicians swept in.

My concern is with applying the natural principles of a well regulated militia without written regulations and formal structures. Although this immediately pacifies neighborhoods, the corruption of these structures looms.

We should take advantage of the crises in this country and abroad to enact the full regulatory structures that would govern appropriately long after the crises are past. Parties will always seek to dominate and exploit any neighborhood structures (let alone militia) for other political purposes. Only by good regulations can militia be properly governed and sustained.

Presently, the D.O.D. position is against any militia because it has no theory of regulation let alone the regulations themselves.

Citizens have the natural right to mobilize for the common defense. It is essential that this be properly regulated. The alternative is untenable.

At the time our Constitution was written the wisdom of the following words of the Second Article of the Bill of Rights was self-evident:

"A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."

Your D.O.D. has analysts who would be willing to work on the development of militia theory and a Standard Militia Code. Would you care for names?

It would be easy to have the assistance in doing this from police departments across America. The people would support, the Congress would pass, and the President would sign such a code.

Sincerely yours,
Ronn S. Pickard

(b)(6)



72

OCT 15 2004
I-04/013802
ES-1049

TO: Doug Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: Post-Election Plan

I need a report on how the U.S. Government is going to hold the Coalition together after the Iraq election, and keep the troops we need in there. We must get ahead of the curve.

I need to be persuaded that you and the Department of State are doing what we need to do to see that that happens.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
101404-5

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

-04 15:54 16

OSD 19871-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038669

720

~~FOUO~~

October 19, 2004

I-04/013970

ES-1093

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM:
SUBJECT: Coalition Members

I want a report as to what countries we're working with to help them pare down their coalition forces slightly, so they don't pull out completely.

We can afford to have some smaller countries take 50 or 100 people out and still manage the problem. But losing them completely would be harmful.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
101904-4

.....
Please respond by 11/5/04

OSD 19872-04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/038670

19-10-04 18:46 IN



7201
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

2004 DEC 10 AM 11: 26

COMPTROLLER

December 9, 2004, 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Tina W. Jonas *TWJ*

SUBJECT: Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report on Defense Department's Failure to Track Personnel Spending

- You asked me to look into an Early Bird article referencing a GAO report regarding oversight of Military Personnel appropriations. (TAB A)
- The GAO report cited in the article criticized the Department for insufficient oversight of the use of Military Personnel appropriations.
- We do have proper controls in place to ensure that we properly use funds appropriated for Military Personnel. In addition, we agree with the GAO report that the Department would benefit from increasing oversight and having greater visibility into the execution of the Military Personnel appropriation.
- We have drafted explicit guidance that requires reviews that will provide greater visibility and will monitor compliance through our financial metrics program. This guidance is under review by other agencies prior to its incorporation in the Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation.
- It may be appropriate in some cases to make changes to current accounting systems to gain this visibility. I have asked the Military Departments to do a cost benefit analysis of making changes to current systems. If the analysis shows that these changes would provide increased visibility and improved internal controls, and that they are cost effective, we will pursue them through our financial system improvement effort.

COORDINATION: None.

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: Terri McKay, (b)(6)

110.01

9 Dec 04

TAB

A

December 1, 2004

TO: Tina Jonas
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: GAO Report

What is this item about in today's *Early Bird* referencing a GAO report that says DoD is not providing proper oversight to ensure that military personnel appropriations are directed to cover pay, benefits and expenses?

Thanks.

Attach.

McGlinchey, David. "Defense Department Not Tracking Personnel Spending, Report Says," *GovExec.com*, November 30, 2004.

DHR:dh
120104-17

.....
Please respond by 12/9/04

GovExec.com
November 30, 2004

Defense Department Not Tracking Personnel Spending, Report Says

By David McGlinchey

The Defense Department is not providing sufficient oversight to ensure that military personnel appropriations actually are directed to cover pay, benefits and expenses, according to a new Government Accountability Office report.

As a result of the report, the Office of the Secretary of Defense **has** ordered a study on the cost and time needed to modify the relevant financial systems to comply with regulations.

GAO released **similar** findings to lawmakers in **2003**, and the fiscal **2004** conference report on defense appropriations called on the Pentagon to "strengthen the **annual** review process" and "provide transparency of disbursements at the same level **as** the budget submission."

In the report released **this** week, however, GAO announced that the Pentagon is not following congressional direction on oversight.

"**The military** services are not matching obligations to disbursements at the individual disbursement transaction level in all the years that disbursements can occur **as** required by the Financial Management Regulation," the report (GAO-05-87R) said. "Additionally, the services are not reporting the obligation balances at the budget submission level **as** directed by congressional conferees."

In their report, GAO noted that military personnel appropriations, also **known as MILPERS**, make up a significant amount of the Defense Department's budget. In fiscal **2003**, MILPERS accounted for more than \$109 billion. That figure also includes allowances, housing, travel and reserve training. GAO investigators said the insufficient budget review is stopping lawmakers from making informed decisions on funding.

"**This has** made it difficult, if not impossible, for decision-makers to oversee how the services actually use MILPERS funds," the GAO report said.

The investigators took the Office of the Secretary of Defense to task for failing to implement the reforms from the top.

"OSD **has** not provided the services with explicit instructions in the Financial Management Regulation requiring them to review MILPERS obligations," the report said. "Moreover, OSD has not effectively monitored the services' compliance with the Financial Management Regulation's requirement to review obligation balances. Unless the services strengthen their year-end reviews and certification processes, the actual **use** of MILPERS funds will continue to be masked, and the baseline for future budget requests may be inaccurate."

GAO did note that the Army **has** made some progress in developing prior year financial reports with great detail. In a Nov. **23** directive, top Defense officials ordered the Air Force, Navy and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service to complete a feasibility study on recording and reporting detailed

11-L-0559/OSD/038674

disbursements for prior years' spending. That study is scheduled to be completed by Jan. 31, 2005.

7201
~~FOUO~~

ES-1644
04/016678

December 9, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: Defense Policy Board

Please send me the complete list of Defense Policy Board members. I want to make some changes.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120904-33

.....
Please respond by 12/10/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 19898-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038676^{-1 -2}

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

POLICY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT NOTE

December 10, 2004
I-04/016678
ES-1644

To: CAPT Marriott, Executive Secretary

Subject: Defense Policy Board - Snowflake #120904-33

In response to the SecDef's note, attached is the current list of Defense Policy **Board** members.


William G. Mock
Director, PES

cc: PDUSDP
USDP/SA

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 19898-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038677

ES-1644
04/016678

~~FOUO~~

December 9, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: Defense Policy Board

Please send me the complete list of Defense Policy Board members. I want to ~~make~~ some changes.

Thanks.

DHR:db
120904-33

.....
Please respond by 12/10/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 19898-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038678

**Defense Policy Board
as of October 2004**

Members:

| | |
|--------------------------|---|
| Dr. Kenneth Adelman | Senior Counselor, Edelman Public Relations |
| Honorable Richard Allen | Senior Counselor, APCO Worldwide |
| Dr. Martin Anderson | Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution |
| Dr. Gary Becker | Professor, University of Chicago |
| Dr. Barry Blechman | President & Chairman, DFI International |
| Dr. Harold Brown | Counselor, CSIS Partner, Warburg Pincus & Co |
| Ms. Victoria Clarke | Comcast |
| Dr. Eliot Cohen | Professor, Johns Hopkins University |
| Ms. Devon Cross | President, Donors' Forum on International Affairs |
| Gen(Ret) Ronald Fogleman | Chairman and CEO, Durango Aerospace, Inc |
| Amb Thomas Foley | Partner, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld LLP |
| Hon Tillie Fowler | Partner, Holland & Knight LLP |
| Hon Newt Gingrich | CEO, The Gingrich Group |
| GEN (Ret) Charles Horner | Consultant and Author |
| Dr. Fred Ikle | Chairman of the Board, Telos Corporation and CMC Energy Services |
| ADM (Ret) David Jeremiah | President Technology Strategies & Alliances |
| GEN (Ret) John Keane | URS Corporation |
| Dr. Henry Kissinger | Chairman, Kissinger Associates, Inc |
| VP Dan Quayle | Investment Banker, International Consultant |

Dr. James Schlesinger

Senior Advisor, Lehman Brothers

Dr. Kiron Skinner

Assistant Professor, Carnegie Mellon
University and Research Fellow, Hoover
Institution

Dr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt

Guest Scholar, Brookings Institution

Dr. Ruth Wedgwood

Professor of International Law and Diplomacy
and Director of International Law and
Organization, Johns Hopkins

Mr. Christopher Williams

Partner, Johnston and Associates

Honorable Pete Wilson

Former Governor, California

Mr. R. James Woolsey

Partner, Shea & Gardner

December 10, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
The Honorable Colin Powell
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Iraqi Security Forces Update

Dear Mr. President,

Attached is the latest update on Iraqi Security Forces. I'm sending a copy along to UK's Minister of Defense Geoff Hoon, so that he can provide one to Prime Minister Blair.

Respectfully,

Attach.
12/06/04 Iraqi Security Forces Update

DHR:ss
121004-4

OSD 19907-04

Handwritten initials: DR

Handwritten initials: DR

For Official Use Only

Iraqi Security Forces Update

6 December 2004

Data as of: 06 DEC 04 Version M1

11-L-0559/OSD/038682

Grand Total all Iraqi Security

For Official Use Only


| | |
|--|--|
| • <u>Ministry of Interior Forces</u> (Police, Civil Intervention, Emergency Response, Border Enforcement, Highway Patrol, Dignitary Protection) | <u>Trained & Equipped</u> 69,310 |
| • <u>Ministry of Defense Forces</u> (Army, National Guard, Intervention Force, Special Operations, Air Force, Coastal Defense Force) | <u>Trained & Equipped</u> 46,930 |
| | <hr/> 116,240 |

Data as of: 06 DEC 04


11-L-0559/OSD/038683

Trained and Equipped Iraqi Security Forces

For Official Use Only



May 2003=
0 Iraqi Security
Forces



- Does not include approximately 74,000 in Facilities Protection Service trained by Ministry Of Interior but employed by other ministries.

Ministry of Interior Forces-Projection

For Official Use Only

Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, and Equipped) Units on hand over time

| Security Force Element | Current Targeted End State | 06 DEC 04 | 1 FEB 05 | 1 MAY 05 | 1 AUG 05 | 1 JAN 06 | 1 MAY 06 |
|---|----------------------------|-----------|-------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Regular Iraqi Police ⁽¹⁾ | 135,000 | | | 46% | 59% | 70% | 78% |
| Special Police Regiments | 1,200 | | 50% | 86% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| Public Order Battalions | 3,600 | | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| Emergency Response Unit | 270 | 54% | 85% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| Iraqi Highway Patrol ⁽²⁾ | 6,300 | | UNDER DEVELOPMENT | | | | |
| Bur. of Dignitary Protection | 500 | 97% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| Special Police Commando Battalions | 2,019 | 45% | 78% | 85% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| Dept of Border Enforcement ⁽³⁾ | 29,360 | 46% | 54% | 66% | 74% | 84% | 94% |

Notes

1. Police figures reflect trained and equipped individuals, not units
2. On 23 October, Iraqi Highway Patrol authorizations were expanded from 1,500 to 6,300 officers. Training timelines for the expanded force are under development.
3. Border Police considered trained based on training by coalition forces; capabilities are uneven

Data as of: 06 DEC 04

| Legend | |
|---------------|-----------------------------|
| | 70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT |
| | 40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT |
| | 39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT |

Ministry of Defense Forces-Projection




For Official Use Only

Projected Percentage of goals of Capable (Manned, Trained, and Equipped) Units on hand over time*

| Security Force Element | Current Targeted End State | 06 DEC 04 | 1 FEB 05 | 1 MAY 05 | 1 AUG 05 | 1 JAN 06 |
|-------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Iraqi Regular Army | 27,000 | 39% or less | 88% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| Iraqi Intervention Force | 6,584 | 39% or less | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| Iraqi National Guard | 61,904 | 39% or less | 74% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| Commando Battalion | 1,516 | 58% | 67% | 82% | 100% | 100% |
| Iraqi Counter Terrorism Force | 451 | 39% or less | 40% | 58% | 76% | 100% |

*Based on achievement of Limited Operational Capability

Data as of: 06 DEC 04

| Legend | |
|---|-----------------------------|
|  | 70-100 % OF REQUIREMENT |
|  | 40-69 % OF REQUIREMENT |
|  | 39 % OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT |

MNF-I and Iraqi Security Forces

For Official Use Only

| MNF-I = 32 Countries | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------|----------|-------------|-------|-------------|-------|-----------------|----------|----------------|----------------|
| Albania | 73 | El Salvador | 381 | Korea | 3,109 | Norway | 9 | Tonga | 44 |
| Australia | 389 | Estonia | 58 | Latvia | 120 | Poland | 2,488 | Ukraine | 1,587 |
| Armenia | 0 | Georgia | 300 | Lithuania | 101 | Portugal | 135 | United Kingdom | 9,207 |
| Azerbaijan | 151 | Hungary | 272 | Macedonia | 33 | Romania | 744 | US | 139,397 |
| Bulgaria | 320 | Italy | 3,109 | Moldova | 11 | Singapore | 33 | | |
| Czech Rep | 98 | Japan | 792 | Mongolia | 132 | Slovakia | 103 | | |
| Denmark | 392 | Kazakhstan | 30 | Netherlands | 1,622 | Thailand | 0 | Total | 165,213 |

| IRAQI FORCES ON HAND | 190,838 |
|------------------------------------|---------|
| IRAQI POLICE SERVICE | 92,777 |
| CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE | 3,277 |
| EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT | 245 |
| BUREAU OF DIGNITARY PROTECTION | 576 |
| HIGHWAY PATROL | 521 |
| SPECIAL POLICE COMMANDO BATTALIONS | 3,900 |
| DEPT OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT | 18,109 |
| ARMY | 11,718 |
| NAT'L GUARD | 41,850 |
| INTERVENTION FORCE | 6,424 |
| SPECIAL OPS FORCES | 674 |
| AIR FORCE | 206 |
| COASTAL DEFENSE | 611 |

| IRAQI FORCES TRAINED AND IN TRAINING | 135,051 |
|--------------------------------------|---------|
| IRAQI POLICE SERVICE | 55,075 |
| CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE | 2,641 |
| EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT | 245 |
| BUREAU OF DIGNITARY PROTECTION | 576 |
| HIGHWAY PATROL | 141 |
| SPECIAL POLICE COMMANDO BATTALIONS | 2,830 |
| DEPT OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT | 15,518 |
| ARMY | 10,340 |
| NAT'L GUARD | 42,128 |
| INTERVENTION FORCE | 4,063 |
| SPECIAL OPS FORCES | 674 |
| AIR FORCE | 206 |
| COASTAL DEFENSE | 611 |

Notes

Armenia & Thailand pending deployment of their forces

Other Forces

Facilities Protection Service

73,992

NATO Training Team = 59



Iraqi Forces On Hand
 MNF-I



Trained Iraqi Forces
 MNF-I

Data as of: 06 DEC 04

11-L-0559/OSD/038687

For Official Use Only

Back Up

Data as of: 06 DEC 04

11-L-0559/OSD/038688

Iraqi Security Forces MoI Update

For Official Use Only

| COMPONENT | AUTHORIZED | ON DUTY | TRAINED & EQUIPPED | TRAINED & EQUIPPED ON 31 JAN '05 | 100% OF AUTHORIZED TRAINED & EQUIPPED |
|-----------------------------|----------------|----------------|--------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| POLICE | 135,000 | 92,727 | 50,798* | 52,800 | JUL '06 |
| CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE | 3,720 | 3,277 | 1,091 | 3,121 | JUL '05 |
| EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT | 270 | 245 | 147 | 270 | FEB '05 |
| BORDER ENFORCEMENT | 29,360 | 18,590 | 14,999 | 16,107 | AUG '06 |
| HIGHWAY PATROL | 6,300 | 521 | 141** | 141 | TBD |
| DIGNITARY PROTECTION | 500 | 576 | 484 | 500 | DEC '04 |
| SPECIAL POLICE COMMANDO BNS | 4,450 | 3,900 | 1,650 | 4,450 | JAN '05 |
| TOTAL | 179,600 | 119,355 | 69,310 | 77,389 | AUG '06 |

*Increase in police from last report due to inclusion of updated training data (from last two month's graduations) on the 3-week Transition Integration Program. Trained police include 34,801 from the three-week TIP training, and 15,997 8-week academy graduates.

** Drop from last week due to losses from intimidation of Iraqi Highway Patrol in the Anbar Province.

Data as of: 06 DEC 04

Iraqi Security Forces MoD Update*

For Official Use Only

| COMPONENT | AUTHORIZED | OPERATIONAL* | 31 JAN '05 | 100% FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY |
|--------------------|---------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| REGULAR ARMY | 27,000 | 3,428** 4 BNS | 13 BNS | JUL '05 |
| NATIONAL GUARD | 61,904 | 40,115*** 39 BNS | 45 BNS | SEP '05 |
| INTERVENTION FORCE | 6,584 | 2,062 3 BNS | 9 BNS | MAY '05 |
| SPECIAL OPS | 1,967 | 674 2 BNS (-) | 2 BNS(-) | SEP '05 |
| AIR FORCE | 502 | 167 1 SQDN (-) | TBD BASED ON AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT | TBD BASED ON AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT |
| COASTAL DEFENSE | 582 | 484 2 SQDNS | 2 SQDNS | TBD BASED ON PATROL BOAT PROCUREMENT |
| TOTAL | 98,539 | 46,930 48 BNS 3 SQDNS | 69 BNS 3 SQDNS | MAR '06 |

- * Operational: unit is conducting security operations.
- ** Includes trained Army personnel above battalion level, as well as in operational battalions.
- *** Drop from last report reflects losses due to intimidation in Anbar Province.
- **** Drop of five battalions due to moving the training location of three battalions from a base that suffered construction delays caused by AIF attacks to another training base, and due to delay in starting two battalions' training because unexploded ordnance caused delay in making training space available at Numiniyah. Two battalions will complete training by 6 Feb, and the last three by 27 Feb.

Data as of: 06 DEC 04

Iraqi Security Forces Training

For Official Use Only

| COMPONENT | TRAINING | NUMBER IN TRAINING |
|---|--|-----------------------------|
| Iraqi Police Service | 3 Week TIP Training 8 Week Academy Specialized Training | 371 4,277 177 |
| Civil Intervention Force | 5 Week Specialized Training | 1,550 |
| Emergency Response Unit | 8 Week Specialized Training | 98 |
| Dept of Border Enforcement | 4 Week Academy Specialized Training | 519 |
| Highway Patrol | 3 Week TIP Training 8 Week Academy Training | 0 NA (Prior Service IPS) |
| Bureau of Dignitary Protection | 3 Week Initial Training 2-3 Week Advanced Training Mentoring by US Contractors | 92 |
| Special Police Commandos | Specialized Training (Tadji Base) | 1,180 |
| Iraq Regular Army | Cadre: 4 Weeks Basic Training: 8 weeks Collective Training: 4 Weeks | 6,912 |
| Iraqi National Guard | Basic Training: 3 Weeks Collective Training: 4 Weeks | 2,013 |
| Iraqi Intervention Force | Cadre: 4 Weeks Basic/Collective Training: 8 Weeks Urban Operations Training: 5 weeks | 2,001 |
| Iraqi Special Ops Force - Commando Battalion - Counter Terrorist Task Force | Field Training Provided by US Special Forces (Small Unit tactics Ranger type training) 12 Week course on Close Quarter Combat | |
| Air Force | Varies by specialty: 1-6 months | 39 |
| Coastal Defense Force | Basic Training: 8 Weeks followed by specialized Training at Umm Qasr (In Progress) | 130 |
| TOTAL | | 19,359 |

Data as of: 06 DEC 04

Iraqi Security Forces Missions

For Official Use Only

| Unit | Mission |
|----------------------------------|---|
| Police | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide law enforcement, public safety and internal security |
| Civil Intervention Force | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide a national level, high end, rapid response police capability to counter large scale disobedience and insurgents. |
| Special Police Commando Bns | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide a direct action, special operations, and counter insurgency capability in support of Ministry of Interior. |
| Emergency Response Unit | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide a special operations police capability in support of the Iraqi Police Service. |
| Department of Border Enforcement | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protect the integrity of Iraq's border and monitor and control the movement of persons and goods |
| Highway Patrol | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide law enforcement, public safety, and internal security, and convoy security along Iraq's Highways. |
| Bureau of Dignitary Protection | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide close protection, convoy security, and fixed-site security for Iraqi key political leaders. |
| Regular Army | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Defend Iraq against external threats. • When directed, assist the Ministry of Interior in providing defense against internal threats to national security. |
| National Guard | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct stability operations to support the achievement of internal security, including (as required) support to Ministry of Interior elements. • Conduct Constabulary duties in support of internal security |
| Intervention Force | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct operations in order to defeat anti-Iraqi forces in Iraq, with primary focus on urban areas • Assist in the restoration of a secure and stable environment in which the Iraqi Police Services and Iraqi National Guard can maintain law and order |
| Commando Battalion | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support for Iraqi Counter Terrorist Force. Similar in organization, training, and mission to US Army Ranger Battalion |
| Counter-Terrorist Task Force | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Direct action counter-terrorism similar in organization, mission, and training to US Special Operations Forces with counter-terrorist function |
| Air Force | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide aerial reconnaissance, and rotary and fixed wing transport for Iraqi Security Forces and authorities |
| Coastal Defense Force | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct security operations on the Iraqi coastline and over territorial waters, including gas and oil platforms out to 12 nautical miles • In conjunction with DBE, conduct police operations on the Iraqi coastline and out to 12 nautical miles to counter piracy, smuggling and other unlawful activities |

Data as of: 06 DEC 04

Significant Events Since Last

For Official Use Only

Manning:

- 1000 recruits report to training for the Regular Army.
- 128 soldiers reported to the 1st Transportation Regiment after completing training with the Iraqi Training Battalion
- 500 recruits are starting the Border Enforcement Course in Jordan

Training:

- 2,486 begin eight week training course at Jordan Training Facility
- 743 Public Order Battalion personnel, and 807 Police Mechanized Battalion (formerly called Special Police Regiment) started their 5-week initial training program
- 760 direct recruited soldiers completed training with the 1st Division and are assigned throughout the Division

Equipping:

- Issued 2,442 weapons, 6,900 body armor vests, 1 million rounds of ammunition and 6,220 set of uniforms to Ministry of Interior Forces
- Issued 2,000 and uniforms, 122 vehicles 1.02 millions rounds of ammunition to Ministry of Defense Forces.

Data as of: 06 DEC 04

11-L-0559/OSD/038693

Significant Events Since Last Report

For Official Use Only

Building:

- **\$775M worth of construction work continues; Some slippage due to security situation in Sunni areas.**
- **Assessment of damage to police infrastructure is ongoing; submitted bids for work on five previously assessed stations valued at \$1.5 million, and began construction at eight others valued at \$2.5 million.**

Mentoring/Employing:

- **7th Battalion , 3 Brigade (Iraqi Intervention Force) is conducting local security operations and force protection mission in Samarra.**
- **Both 1st and 2nd Brigades (Iraqi Intervention Force) are conducting operations in vic Fallujah.**
- **Four battalions in the An Bar province have become ineffective due to intimidation and losses; new timeline reflects adjusted estimate to equip and base new battalions based on estimated contracted delivery dates for equipment; infrastructure timeline pending.**
- **1st Special Police Commando Battalion has elements operating in Mosul, 2nd Special Police Commando Battalion has elements operating in , North Babil, Baghdad and Sammara and 3rd Special Police Commando Battalions is operating in Baghdad.**

DEC 16 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Incentive Pay for SOF

322

Please have a meeting between Doug Brown and David Chu regarding this memo. Then come to me with a proposal as to what you think we ought to do for incentive pay for Special Operations Forces.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/10/04 USD (P&R) memo to SD re: Incentives to Increase Retention of Special Operations Forces

DHR:dh
121504-16


.....
Please respond by 1/13/05

16 Dec 04

10 Dec 04



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

December 10, 2004, 11:57 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPSEC _____

FROM: David S.C. Chu, USD (P&R)

David S.C. Chu 10 Dec 04

SUBJECT: Incentives to Increase Retention of Special Operations Forces (SOF)

- We worked closely with the SOCOM staff and Services to develop an optimal compensation package that focuses on retention of highly trained/experienced SOF special operators.
- The Services recognize the need to increase targeted retention incentives for special operators. However, Services viewed SOCOM's initial proposed set of incentive pays as excessive. Instead, the Services agreed that favorable retention results could be attained with a more conservative incentive package.
- A balance of special duty pay, retention bonuses, and assignment pay will comprise the following retention incentive package, effective January 1, 2005.
 - o Special Duty Assignment Pay: \$375/mo for SOF enlisted in MFP-11 billets
 - o Selective Reenlistment Bonus: Services determine use based on retention needs
 - o Critical Skills Retention Bonus: Creative contracts maximize retention potential

| | | | | | | |
|--|-----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|---------|
| | \$150,000 | \$75,000 | \$50,000 | \$30,000 | \$18,000 | \$8,000 |
|--|-----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|---------|

* 1 year contract option for members who have completed 24 years of service only.

- o Assignment Incentive Pay: \$750/mo for enlisted with 25 or more years of service
- We will closely monitor SOF retention to ensure timely adjustments in compensation are implemented.

COORDINATIONS: NA

Prepared By: Lt Col Melissa Applegate, ODUSD(MPP)/Compensation, (b)(6)

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

TO Tom O'Connell
From Paul Butler

Not sure if you'd see
this but thought you would
be interested.



Paul Butler
12/14

OSD 19962-04

322


14 Dec 04

10 Dec 04

2/13
1600



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

2004 DEC 13 AM

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

December 10, 2004, 11:57 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPSEC _____

Pub

FROM: David S.C. Chu, USD (P&R)

David S.C. Chu 10 Dec 04

SUBJECT: Incentives to Increase Retention of Special Operations Forces (SOF)

- We worked closely with the SOCOM staff and Services to develop an optimal compensation package that focuses on retention of highly trained/experienced SOF special operators.
- The Services recognize the need to increase targeted retention incentives for special operators. However, Services viewed SOCOM's initial proposed set of incentive pays as excessive. Instead, the Services agreed that favorable retention results could be attained with a more conservative incentive package.
- A balance of special duty pay, retention bonuses, and assignment pay will comprise the following retention incentive package, effective January 1, 2005.
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 - o Critical Skills Retention Bonus: Creative contracts maximize retention potential

| | | | | | | |
|------------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|---------|
| [REDACTED] | \$150,000 | \$75,000 | \$50,000 | \$30,000 | \$18,000 | \$8,000 |
|------------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|---------|

1 year contract option for members who have completed 24 years of service only.

- o Assignment Incentive Pay: \$750/mo for enlisted with 25 or more years of service
- We will closely monitor SOF retention to ensure timely adjustments in compensation are implemented.

COORDINATIONS: NA

Prepared By: Lt Col Melissa Applegate, ODUSD(MPP)/Compensation

(b)(6)

| | | | |
|----------|---------|-------|--|
| MA SD | SMA DSD | | |
| TSA SD | SA DSD | 12/14 | |
| EXEC-SEC | M 12/13 | | |
| ESR MA | 2/13 | | |



11-L-0559/OSD/038698

OSD 19962-04

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

NOV 04 2004 *TLA*

NOV 03 2004
NOV 9 2004

TO: David Chu

CC: Mike Wynne

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: SMART Program for Math and Science Education

As you work on the idea of increasing the number of young Americans who study math and science subjects, please ensure that any incentive program you create includes an associated obligation. For example, if we are going to pay for some years of education in math or science, we should expect a commitment on their part to serve in the Department using the education the taxpayers have paid for. Please don't move forward on a plan that doesn't include a return on the taxpayers' investment.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110304-3

.....

Please respond by 12/5/04

| | |
|-------|-----------|
| USD | PDUSD |
| RA | HA |
| PI | Readiness |
| MPP | CPP |
| PLANS | MC&FP |
| CCO | |

~~FOUO~~



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

2004 DEC 13 AM 9:26

December 8, 2004 - 1:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, USD(P&R)

SUBJECT: SMART Program for Math and Science – Snowflake (attached)

- You asked that the SMART Program include an associated obligation for payment of a student's education.
- We've done just that. The Program has a payback component, both for service and funding. Scholars and Fellows will be required to sign a written service agreement to serve in the Department of Defense for a time equal to their scholarship/fellowship, and refund the government if they do not honor their obligation.
- The financial obligation may be waived by you, or in a case of bankruptcy.
- The conditions of a service agreement requirement are currently in law and are being applied in other training and scholarship programs for employees seeking to obtain an academic degree.

ATTACHMENT: As stated

Prepared by: Janice Thigpen, ODUSD(CPP),

(b)(6)



11-L-0559/OSD/038700


OSD 19965-04

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

NOV 04 2004 

NOV 03 2004
15 09:26

TO: David Chu
CC: Mike Wynne
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: SMART Program for Math and Science Education

As you work on the idea of increasing the number of young Americans who study math and science subjects, please ensure that any incentive program you create includes an associated obligation. For example, if we are going to pay for some years of education in math or science, we should expect a commitment on their **part** to serve in the Department using the education the taxpayers have paid for. Please don't move forward on a plan that doesn't include a return on the taxpayers' investment.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
110304-3

.....
Please respond by 12/5/04

| | |
|-------|-----------|
| USD | PDUSD |
| RA | HA |
| PI | Readiness |
| MPP | CPP |
| PLANS | MC&FP |
| CCO | |

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/038701

OSD 19965-04

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

11/4

To Mike Wynne -
From Paul Butler

Mike -

Snowflake came out on
this topic which I'm sure
you will see shortly. Probably
better to do a quick snowflake
response and attach this. Just
consolidates to one doc and
we can close out the snowflake.

Regards



Paul Butler

11/4



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY & LOGISTICS

Nov 3, 2004

Sec. Rumsfeld.

Wanted to assure you
that there is a Service Req
for Defense Education.

Sorry I didn't have
specifiers - wanted to be sure.

This satisfies a desire
to get a pool of 'clearable'
Grads in Science and Tech.
The trends have been
bad for 10-15 years in
critical areas.

Best
Mike Wynne

“(e) SERVICE AGREEMENT FOR RECIPIENTS OF ASSISTANCE.—“(1) To receive financial assistance under this section—

“(A) in the case of an employee of the Department of Defense, the employee shall be required to enter into a written agreement to continue in the employment of the department for the period of obligated service determined under paragraph (2) of this subsection; and

“(B) in the case of a person not an employee of the Department of Defense, the person shall be required to enter into a written agreement to accept employment in the Department of Defense for the period of obligated service determined under paragraph (2) of this subsection.

“(2) For the purposes of this section, the period of obligated service for a recipient of a scholarship or fellowship shall be determined by the Secretary of Defense. Generally, the period of obligated service may not be less than the total period for which the recipient was provided financial assistance. The period of obligated service is in addition to any other period for which the recipient is obligated to serve in the civil service of the United States.

“(3) An agreement entered into under this subsection shall include any terms and conditions that the Secretary of Defense determines necessary to protect the interests of the United States or otherwise appropriate for carrying out this section.”

“(f) REFUND FOR PERIOD OF UNSERVED OBLIGATED SERVICE.—(1) A person who is not an employee under this program, but who receives financial assistance under this section and who voluntarily fails to complete the educational program for which financial assistance has been provided, or fails to maintain satisfactory academic progress as determined in accordance with regulations issued by the Secretary, shall refund to the United States an appropriate amount, as determined by the Secretary;

“(2) A person who is an employee under this program who—

“(A) voluntarily fails to complete the educational program for which financial assistance has been provided, or fails to maintain satisfactory academic progress as determined in accordance with

11/3/2004

regulations issued by the Secretary; or

“(B) before completion of the period of obligated service required—

“(i) voluntarily terminates his or her employment, or

“(ii) is removed from his or her employment on the basis of misconduct, shall refund to the United States an appropriate amount, as determined by the Secretary of Defense.

“(3) An obligation to reimburse the United States imposed under paragraph (1) is for all purposes a debt owed to the United States.

“(4) The Secretary of Defense may waive, in whole or in part, a refund required under paragraph (1) of this subsection if the Secretary determines that recovery would be against equity and good conscience or would be contrary to the best interests of the United States.

“(5) A discharge in bankruptcy under title 11, United States Code, that is entered less than five years after the termination of an agreement under this section does not discharge the person signing such agreement from a debt arising under such agreement or under this subsection.”

NOV 30 2004

November 30, 2004

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Changing Force Structure in Guard

Please report back to me after you have had that December 3 meeting with Blum on how to change force structure in the National Guard.

Thanks.

Attach.

11/17/04 SecDef memo #111704-10, USD (P&R) memo to SecDef#OSD 18887-04

DI:R:dh
113004-11

.....
Please respond by 12/9/04

11/18/04

November 17, 2004

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

NOV 23 PM 6:31

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
SUBJECT: Virginia National Guard

I understand that the Virginia National Guard is not good. Everywhere I turn, someone tells me they are resigning or that they are not recruiting and so forth.

What do we do about fixing it? Should someone talk with the Governor? Does it need new leadership? What do you propose?

Thanks.

DHR:ab
111704-10

.....
Please respond by 12/17/04

DR 11/20

~~FOUO~~

TOTAL P.01

11/29



PERSONNEL AND READINESS

OFFICE OF THE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000
NOV 23 PM 6:31



11/29

INFO MEMO

November 22, 2004 - 15:00

Paul Butler
11/29

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: David S. C. Chu, USD(P&R)
SUBJECT: Virginia National Guard — SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- The Virginia Army National Guard achieved only 65 percent of its FY 2004 recruiting mission, but 94.8 percent of its strength mission.
- The Virginia Air National Guard is performing better, achieving 98.3 percent of its FY 2004 strength mission.
- Virginia Army National Guard is one of nine that have missed their ARNG recruiting missions for the past four years.
 - o They are: CT, DE, HI, IL, LA, MA, MD, VA and VI.
 - o Overall, the Virginia Army National Guard missed its FY 2004 recruiting mission of 56,002 by 7,209 and its authorized strength of 350,000 by 7,081.
- We have engaged the Guard leadership to look at a rebalancing of structure.
 - o We will meet with LTG Blum and his Directors on December 3 to establish the "way ahead".

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Mr. Rich Krimmer, OASD/RA(M&P), (b)(6)

| | |
|----------|----------|
| TSA SD | 11/29 |
| SRMA SD | |
| MA SD | X 11/29 |
| EXEC SEC | M 11/24 |
| ESR | ES 11/24 |





UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

December 10, 2004 - 10:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, USD (PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

SUBJECT: *David S. C. Chu 10 Dec 04*
Guard Realignment—SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- Initial meeting with LTG Blum on December 1st; more work is needed before we can provide you with a plan.
- General Blum has already alerted the state adjutants general (in writing) that future force structure will flow to states with sustained recruiting and retention success, at the expense of states that fall short.
- This is an opportunity to rebalance the Guard, building units of the type we now need, shedding those less necessary.
- We will lay out a plan that plots by state how strength should move, and the numbers and types of new units that should be established. I anticipate forwarding this to you by the end of next week.

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

Attachment:
As stated

cc: General Myers



OSD 19971-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038709

11/29



PERSONNEL AND READINESS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2004 NOV 23 PM 6:31



INFO MEMO

November 22, 2004 - 15:00

Paul Butler
11/29

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: David S. C. Chm, USD(P&R)
SUBJECT: Virginia National Guard — SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- The Virginia Army National Guard achieved only 65 percent of its FY 2004 recruiting mission, but 94.8 percent of its strength mission.
- The Virginia Air National Guard is performing better, achieving 98.3 percent of its FY 2004 strength mission.
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- We have engaged the Guard leadership to look at a rebalancing of structure.
 - o We will meet with LTG Blum and his Directors on December 3 to establish the "way ahead".

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Mr. Rich Krimmer, OASD/RA(M&P), (b)(6)

| | |
|----------|-------|
| TSA SD | 11/29 |
| SRMA SD | |
| MA SD | 11/29 |
| EXEC SEC | 11/24 |
| ESR | 11/24 |



7201
~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

November 17, 2004

ES-1436
04/015594-ES

CENTRAL AMERICA

TO: Peter Rodman
CC: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Central American Cooperative Security

Should we think about encouraging and helping the Central American countries form a cooperative security organization that is more robust than the entity they currently have? It wouldn't be a Central American NATO, but it could be better organized, trained and equipped than it currently is.

Why don't you think about it and let me know what you come up with.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111704-5

.....
Please respond by 12/3/04

17 Nov 04

November 17, 2004

ES-1436
04/015594-ES

TO: Peter Rodman
CC: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Central American Cooperative Security

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Why don't you think about it and let me know what you come up with.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111704-5

.....
Please respond by 12/3/04


10 Dec 04
knowflake Response
Handcarry to OSD
CCD
Policy
ES

→ Sec Def
we have begun
consultations with State
and NSC staff on
this idea.
PWR

DEC 14 2004

TO: Commanding Officer, USS John F. Kennedy

c c : Gordon England
ADM Vern Clark

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Return of JFK to Homeport

Welcome home from an exceptional combat cruise. You did a superb job during our Ministers of Defense meeting afloat, and the excellence you showed in that event clearly was reflected throughout the cruise.

Well done!

DHR:ss
121304-30

.....
Please respond by _____

5601

14 Dec 04

OSD 20042-04

720
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~FOUO~~

ES-1372

04/015276-ES

November 11, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
VADM Jim Stavridis

SUBJECT: Phone Calls to MoDs

We need a project to have me systemtically call MoDs. I should probably do one or two per week -NATO allies, countries helping in Afghanistan and Iraq, countries doing something for Haiti or Liberia, countries we are trying to get to do something, countries who have experienced casualties, etc.

If I did one or two per week, it seems to me we could work through the list every six months. It would be a very good thing to do and would make a difference.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111104-4

.....
Please respond by 12/3/04

~~FOUO~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Attached

12-11-04 04:46 IN

Upon removal of attachments
this document becomes

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20061-04

002

11/11/04

1 Jul-14-04
Scanner

June 30, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Comptroller 6/25/04 Weekly Report

Please get on these issues raised in Lairy Lanzillotta's attached letter.

Thanks.

Attach.
6/25/04 USD(C) memo to SecDef re: Weekly Report 06/25/04 [OSD 09611-04]

DHR:dh
063004-2

.....
Please respond by 7/19/04

020 USC

30 Jun 05



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

DEC 15 2004

332.1

Mr. William B. Magrath

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. Magrath,

Thank you for your recent letter regarding your brother, Private First Class John Magrath, and his Medal of Honor **flag**.

You raised an important question, and I have passed it along to the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness, Mr. David Chu. He will be in touch with you.

I do appreciate your brother's service to our nation.

Sincerely,

15 DEC 04

OSD 20087-04

22 NOV 04

11-L-0559/OSD/038716

Mr. William B. Magrath

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. Magrath,

Thank you for your recent letter regarding your brother, Private First Class John Magrath, and his Medal of Honor flag.

You raised an important question, and I have passed it along to the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness, Mr. David Chu. He will be in touch with you.

I do appreciate your brother's service to our nation.

Sincerely,

51007A M


GOM

Paul Butler
12/14

9/11 -
CIS tasked this to UPR, David Chu.
This will serve as an interim
response

Thx
CSL 12/14

November 22, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Letter from Bill McGrath

Please **look** into this letter from Bill Magrath regarding the Congressional Medal of Honor flag and follow **up** with him.

Let me know what was done.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/8/04 Letter from Bill McGrath

DHR:ss
112204-4

.....
Please respond by 12/10/04

CSC
NGBD INTERIM from
SD TRS TRSL FULL
RESPONSE

3M2.1

22 NOV 04

OSD 20087-04

William B. Magrath

(b)(6)

Nov. 8, 2002

Dear Mr. Rumsfeld:

I have been **told** by the "Congressional Medal Of Honor Society" that Congress approved, and President Bush signed a **Bill** approving a " Medal Of Honor" flag.

My brother PFC John Magrath was killed in action in **Italy** in 1945 and awarded the "Medal Of Honor" posthumously. The only one in the 10th Mountain division so honored.

I would like to fly a **MOH flag** in **his memory**, but the "Congressional **Medal** Of Honor **Society**" **told me** this past week that only recipients of the "Medal Of Honor" from July of 2002 can have one.

Is John less deserving of having one **because** he gave his life for **his Country** in 1945? The least his Country *can do for him* is to **let him** have a **MOH Flag** fly in his **honor**.

I understand that the Department of Defense is responsible **for distributing the flags**.

We have John's MOH displayed in our home here in Martingham. We would be honored if **you could spare the time** to visit **us**, and read his citation.

Awaiting your comments, I am,

Respectfully yours,

Bill
Bill Magrath



OSD 20087-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038719



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000

007 107-1 01 05 10

INFO MEMO

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

February 17, 2005, 9:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)

David S. C. Chu 2/18/05
(Signature and date)

SUBJECT: Letter from Bill Magrath

- This responds to your note, "Please look into this letter from Bill Magrath regarding the Congressional Medal of Honor Flag and follow up with **him**. Let me know what was done". (Tab A).
- Our staff responded directly to **Mr.** Magrath on December 22, 2004 (Tab B).
- The flag is a new entitlement and authorized for only those individuals who receive the Medal of Honor after October 23, 2002. The statutory sections, initiated by Congress, do not allow issuance of flag to those who received the Medal of Honor prior to this date.
- We will seek, in coordination with the Services, a change in legislation to also authorize the presentation of a flag to current living Medal of Honor award recipients and those living primary next of kin of deceased Medal of Honor award recipients.

COORDINATION: Tab C.

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: Lt Col Tim Donohue, ODUSD (MPP) OEPM

(b)(6)

November 22, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[initials]*
SUBJECT: Letter from Bill McGrath

Please look into this letter from Bill McGrath regarding the Congressional Medal of Honor flag **and follow up with him.**

Let me **know** what was done.

Thanks.

*ESR - LTC FENZEL
PER ISSUES - PLS
SEE WMBRG THIS IS*

Attach.
11/8/04 Letter from Bill McGrath

DHR:ss
112204-4

*M
1/11*

.....
Please respond by 12/10/04

*Exec Sec
Could you check on
this and see what was
done.
Thanks*

Paul Butler
[initials]

William B. Magrath

(b)(6)

Nov. 8, 2002

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I have been told by the "Congressional Medal Of Honor Society" that Congress approved, and President Bush signed a Bill approving a "Medal Of Honor" flag.

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I understand that the Department of Defense is responsible for distributing the flags.

We have John's MOH displayed in our home here in Martingham. We would be honored if you could spare the time to visit us, and read his citation.

Awaiting your comments, I am,

Respectfully yours,

Bill
Bill Magrath



11-L-0559/OSD/038722

OSD 20087-04

CORRESPONDENCE TASKER

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Date: 1/27/2005

Control Number: 0117959

Route To: USD ADMIN/CCO

External Reference: OSD 20087-04

Controlling Organization: ADMIN/CCO

Document Date: 11/8/2004

Original Suspense Date: 12/28/2004

Document Originator: MCGRATH, W.

Current Suspense Date: 12/28/2004

Create Date: 12/14/2004

Signature Level:

Subject: WOULD LIKE TO FLY A CONGRESSIONAL MEDAL OF HONOR FLAG HONORING HIS BROTHER WHO DIED IN ITALY 1945

Action: Reply Direct

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS:

COORDINATIONS

Signature: _____

Date/Time: _____

Printed Name: _____

11-L-0559/OSD/038723



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



22 DEC 2004

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

William B. Magrath

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. Magrath:

Thank you for your recent letter to the Secretary of Defense regarding the Medal of Honor flag. Since my office is responsible for the Department's military awards policy, I was asked to respond.

The Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2003, section 903, required the Secretary of Defense to design and designate a flag as the Medal of Honor Flag. Pursuant to this law and codified in title 10, United States Code, the Medal of Honor Flag shall be presented each person to whom a medal of honor is awarded after the date of the enactment of the law, which was October 23, 2002.

It is clearly not our intent to slight those, including your belated brother, who have given unselfishly in service to their Nation and no doubt added immeasurably to the defense of our nation. However, under the provisions of this law, the Department does not have the authority to grant the flag to prior recipients of the Medal of Honor or their next of kin. While the requirement may seem stringent, the past and current awards system provides for suitable recognition of individual members' acts of valor and the sacrifices made by all Service men and women.

I hope this information is helpful. I appreciate your personal interest in this matter and concern for the recognition of those who have faithfully served the United States of America.

Sincerely,

Terry L. Miatz
Acting Deputy Director, Policy
Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management
(Military Personnel Policy)

Donohue, Tim S., Lt. Col., OSD-PB

Subject: FW: Snowflake: MOH Flag Request

-----Original Message-----

From: Hall, Nikki, LTC, DoD OGC
Sent: Wednesday, January 19, 2005 1:10 PM
To: Donohue, Tim S., Lt. Col., OSD-P&R
Subject: RE: Snowflake: MOH Flag Request

Tim -

The statutes are pretty clear. The specific language is "after October 23, 2002..." To award a Congressional Medal of Honor flag to anyone who was awarded the MOH prior to October 23, 2002 will take a change in the legislation authorizing the presentation. This may be a situation where a change would be beneficial to pursue.

Cheers

Nikki

Lieutenant Colonel Nikki A. Hall
Associate Deputy General Counsel
(Personnel & Health Policy)

(b)(6)

CAUTION: This message may contain information protected by the attorney-client, work product, deliberative process, or other privilege. Do not disseminate without the prior approval of the Office of the DoD General Counsel.

-----Original Message-----

From: Donohue, Tim S., Lt. Col., OSD-P&R
Sent: Wednesday, January 19, 2005 11:27
To: Hall, Nikki, LTC, DoD OGC
cc: Mintz, Terry L, CIV, OSD-P&R; Earle, Sheila M, CIV OSD-P&R
Subject: Snowflake: MOH Flag Request

Nikki,

Ref past discussions, we're beginning to see some inquiries on MOH flag eligibility and we're hamstrung by the 23 Oct 02 and future forward date. Do we have any leeway with policy to alter award of flag -- for all past MOH recipients, all living members only?

Specifically, here's most recent inquiry and our reply. We now have a SecDef snowflake, "Pls look into this letter from Bill McGrath regarding the Congressional Medal of Honor flag and follow up with him. Let me know what was done." DR. Appreciate your assist
Thanks, Tim

<< File: MoH Flag Request - McGrath.doc >>

-----Original Message-----

From: Sprance, William, Mr, DoD OGC
Sent: Tuesday, August 17, 2004 12:59 PM
To: Donohue, Tim S., Lt. Col., OSD-P&R
Subject: RE: MOH Flag

Tim,

Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 3755 (Army), 6257 (Navy) and 8755 (Air Force), as well as 14 U.S.C. 505 (Coast Guard), the Medal of Honor flag is authorized for those individuals who receive the MOH after October 23, 2002. The statutory sections do not authorize those who received the MOH before October 23, 2002, to receive the flag.

R/
Bill

11-L-0559/OSD/038725

William R. Sprance
Associate Deputy General Counsel
(Personnel and Health Policy)
Department of Defense, Office of the General Counsel
(b)(6)
sprancew@dodac.osd.mil <<mailto:sprancew@dodac.osd.mil>>

This message may contain information protected by the attorney work product, attorney-client, deliberative process or other privilege. Do not disseminate without the approval of the Office of the General Counsel

-----Original Message-----

From: Donohue, Tim S, Lt. Col., OSD-P&R
Sent: Monday, August 16, 2004 10:51 AM
To: Sprance, William, Mr, DoD OGC
Cc: Link, Ryan A, CPT, OSD-P&R; Loo, Bradford G, CIV, OSD-P&R
Subject: FW: MOH Flag

Bill,

We're working on creating a Medal of Honor Flag and a question has come up on which MOH recipients are entitled to receive the flag. The attached P.L. **107-248** at bottom, contains a reference for each Service -- Sec **3755** covers Army is below. Here's our questions:

- 1- Are all past MOH recipients, prior to legislation enactment (23 Oct **2002**), entitled to receive the MOH flag?
- 2- Or does President give flag to just those MOH recipients after enactment of this legislation (23 October **2002**)?

Appreciate your interpretation/advice on who gets -- as it will affect policy development and flag distribution.

Thanks, Tim

<< OLE Object: Picture (Device Independent Bitmap) >>

3/4
1130



UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2005 MAR -2 PM 4:48

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

INFO MEMO

February 17, 2005, 9:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (P&R) *David S. C. Chu 2/17/05*
(Signature and date)

SUBJECT: Letter from Bill Magrath

- This responds to your note, "Please look into this letter from Bill Magrath regarding the Congressional Medal of Honor Flag and follow up with him. Let me know what was done" (Tab A).
- Our staff responded directly to Mr. Magrath on December 22, 2004 (Tab B).
- The flag is a new entitlement and authorized for only those individuals who receive the Medal of Honor after October 23, 2002. The statutory sections, initiated by Congress, do not allow issuance of flag to those who received the Medal of Honor prior to this date.
- We will seek, in coordination with the Services, a change in legislation to also authorize the presentation of a flag to current living Medal of Honor award recipients and those living primary next of kin of deceased Medal of Honor award recipients.

COORDINATION: Tab C.

Attachments:
As stated


Prepared by: Lt Col Tim Donohue, ODUSD (MPP) OEPM, (b)(6)

Paul Butler
Paul Butler
3/4

| | | | |
|----------|---------|-----|--|
| MA SD | SMA DSD | | |
| TSA SD | SA DSD | 3/4 | |
| EXEC SEC | M 3/4 | | |
| ESR MA | 7 3/3 | | |



November 22, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Letter from Bill McGrath

Please **look** into this letter from Bill McGrath regarding the Congressional Medal of Honor flag and follow **up** with **him**.

Let me know what was done.

Thanks.

ESIL - LTC FENZGL
PER ISSUES - PLS
SBS WMBRG THIS IS
M 1/11

Attach.
11/8/04 Letter from Bill McGrath

DHR:as
112204-4

.....
Please respond by 12/10/04

Spec Sec
Could you check on
this and see what was
done.
Thanks

Paul Butler


William B. Magrath

(b)(6)

Nov. 8, 2002

Dear Mr. Rumsfeld:

I have been told by the 'Congressional Medal Of Honor Society' that Congress approved, and President Bush signed a Bill approving a "Medal Of Honor" flag.

My brother PFC John Magrath was killed in action in Italy in 1945 and awarded the "Medal Of Honor" *posthumously*. The only one in the 10th Mountain division so honored.

I would like to fly a MOH flag in his memory, but the "Congressional Medal Of Honor Society" told me this past week that only recipients of the "Medal Of Honor" from July of 2002 can have one.

Is John less deserving of having one because he gave his life for his Country in 1945? The least his *Country* can do for him is to let him have a MOH Flag fly in his honor.

I understand that *the* Department of Defense is responsible for distributing the flags.

We have John's MOH displayed in our home here in Martingham. We would be honored if you could spare the time to visit us, and read his citation.

Awaiting your comments, I am,

Respectfully yours,

Bill
Bill Magrath



11-L-0559/OSD/038729

OSD 20087-04

CORRESPONDENCETASKER

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Date: 1/27/2005

Control Number: 0117959

Route To: USD ADMIN/CCO

External Reference: OSD.20087-04

Controlling Organization: ADMIN/CCO

Document Date: 11/8/2004

Original Suspense Date: 12/28/2004

Document Originator: MCGRATH, W

Current Suspense Date: 12/28/2004

Create Date: 12/14/2004

Signature Level:

Subject: WOULD LIKE TO FLY A CONGRESSIONAL MEDAL OF HONOR ~~FLAG~~ HONORING HIS BROTHER WHO DIED IN ITALY 1945

Action: Reply Direct

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS:

COORDINATIONS

Signature: _____

Date/Time: _____

Printed Name: _____ **11-L-0559/OSD/038730**



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



22 DEC 2004

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

William B. Magrath

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. Magrath:

Thank you for your recent letter to the Secretary of Defense regarding the Medal of Honor flag. Since my office is responsible for the Department's military awards policy, I was asked to respond.

The Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year **2003**, section **903**, required the Secretary of Defense to design and designate a flag **as** the Medal of Honor Flag. Pursuant to this law and codified in title 10, United States Code, the Medal of Honor Flag shall be presented each person to whom a medal of honor is awarded after the **date** of the enactment of the law, which was October **23, 2002**.

It is clearly not our intent to slight those, including your belated brother, who have given unselfishly in service to their Nation and no doubt added immeasurably to the defense of **our** nation. However, under the provisions of this law, the Department does not have the authority to grant the flag to prior recipients of the Medal of Honor or their next of kin. While the requirement may seem stringent, the past and current awards system provides for suitable recognition of individual members' acts of valor and the sacrifices made by all Service men and women.

I hope this information is helpful. I appreciate your personal interest in this matter and concern for the recognition of those who have faithfully served the United States of America.

Sincerely,

Terry L. Mintz, Director, Policy
Acting Deputy Director
Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management
(Military Personnel Policy)

OSD 20087-04

11-L-0559 SD/038731

SUBJECT: Medal of Honor Flag

Office of General Counsel

Lt Col Nikki Hall, 19 January 2005



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



22 DEC 2004

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

332.1

William B. Magrath

(b)(6)



Dear Mr. Magrath:

Thank **you** for **your** recent letter to the Secretary of Defense regarding the **Medal of Honor** flag. Since my office is responsible for the Department's **military** awards policy, I **was asked** to respond.

The Department of Defense Appropriations **Act for Fiscal Year 2003**, **section 903**, required the Secretary of Defense **to design and designate a flag as the Medal of Honor Flag**. Pursuant to **this** law and codified in **title 10**, United States Code, the **Medal of Honor Flag** shall be presented each person to whom a **medal** of honor is awarded after the date of the enactment of the **law**, which was **October 23, 2002**.

It is clearly not **our** intent to slight those, including **your** belated **brother**, who have given unselfishly **in** service to **their** Nation **and no doubt** acted immeasurably **to the defense** of our **nation**. However, under **the** provisions of **this** law, the Department **does** not have the **authority** to grant the flag to prior recipients of the **Medal of Honor** or their next of kin. **While the** requirement **may** seem **stringent**, the past and current awards **system** provides for suitable **recognition** of **individual members'** acts of valor and the **sacrifices made by** all Service men and women.

I hope **this information** is helpful. I appreciate **your** personal interest in this matter and concern for **the recognition** of those who have faithfully served **the United States of America**.

Sincerely,

Terry I. Mintz
Acting Deputy Director, Policy
Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management
(Military Personnel Policy)

(8 Nov 04)

9/11/7959
OSD 20087-04



11-L-0559/OSD/038733

December 14, 2004

TO: Dr. Condolcezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Iceland

Condi,

I'm ready to go and start the process on Iceland, along the lines of the memo I gave you. I need a yes or no. It is \$281 million/year, and we just had our budget reduced by \$10 billion.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121404-4

12/14/04

12/14/04

~~FOUO~~

November 19, 2004
I-04/015675
ES-1454

TO: Doug Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: Japanese

Please coordinate with me on dates when we do the Japanese 2+2.

Thanks.

DHR ss
111904-22

.....
Please respond by 12/3/04


~~FOUO~~

19-11-04 17:37 IN

OSD 20130-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038735

December 13, 2004
DEC 15 PM 1:45

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Withdrawal of Marine from Romania

Tell me legally what went on with respect to the quick withdrawal of that Marine from Romania, Was that part of our SOFA agreement? Is it unusual, is it normal?

Thanks.

DHRss
121304-7

.....
Please respond by 12/22/04



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

SECURITY INFORMATION
CONFIDENTIAL

INFO MEMO

December 14, 2004, 6:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel

SUBJECT: Withdrawal of Marine from Romania


- You asked what the legal basis was for the quick withdrawal of the Marine Security Guard (MSG) detachment commander from Romania, whether his removal was pursuant to the SOFA, and whether this action was unusual.
- MSG personnel are accredited members of the Administrative and Technical (A&T) staff of the Embassy.
 - This status – pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations -- gives them immunity from host nation criminal jurisdiction, and from civil jurisdiction for acts relating to official duties (the same immunity that foreign embassy staff personnel have in the U.S.).
 - As part of the Embassy **staff**, he was not covered by NATO/Partnership for Peace Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).
- The decision to remove the Marine from Romania was made at the Embassy in Bucharest (by the Ambassador, in consultation with the Deputy Chief of Mission and the Regional Security Officer).
 - His removal was consistent with government practice in similar situations involving embassy staff, and was not done pursuant to the SOFA.
- The Vienna Convention does not explicitly provide for removal of Embassy staff from a host country, but removal is consistent with the immunity afforded to them.
- This purpose of providing immunity is not to benefit individuals, but to have consistent rules for how countries should treat diplomatic personnel stationed in their territory. A country may waive a person's **immunity**. We are not aware, however, of any past **U.S.** waiver of the immunity of an MSG member.



~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
December 13, 2004

2004 DEC 15 PM 1:49

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Withdrawal of Marine from Romania

Tell me legally what went on with respect to the quick withdrawal of that Marine from Romania. Was that **part** of our SOFA agreement? Is it unusual, is it normal?

Thanks.

DHRss
121304-7

.....
Please respond by 12/22/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/038738

OSD 20142-04

~~FOUO~~

November 17, 2004

ES-1435
04/01559Z-ES

TO: Peter Rodman
Roger Pardo-Maurer

CC: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Options for Haiti

Steve Herbits gave me a paper on Haiti, which I then gave to either Peter Rodman or Roger Pardo-Maurer. I forget who I gave it to.

I would like it **back**, but I would like to know from whomever I gave it to what their opinion is about it, and whether or not there is anything we could do about it or whether Millennium Challenge would fit.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111704-11

.....
Please respond by 12/3/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20178-04
18-11-04 P12:14 GUT

11-L-0559/OSD/038739

HAITI

17 Nov 04



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400



USDP *[Signature]*
DepSecDef _____
ES-1435
DEC 14 2004

INFO MEMO

1-04-016494-WH

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) *[Signature]* DEC 2004

FROM: Roger Pardo-Maurer, DASD- Western Hemisphere Affairs

SUBJECT: HAITI PROPOSAL EVALUATION (U)

You asked for views on the attached proposal to help Haiti.

Our analysis is immediately under, with a summary. These impressions are based on informal discussions with people at State, AID, and various Haiti experts.

Attachment

Haiti

8 Dec 04
17 Nov 04

OSD 20178-04

Evaluation of Proposal

“An Initiative for the Revitalization of Haiti: an Interdisciplinary Project”

Summary:

The project carries a big price tag, and there is plenty of competition for donor funds.

- On the plus side, it addresses the full spectrum of Haitian governance problems which are a high priority to international donors, and identifies credible experts to be recruited for execution.
- The project would be more competitive if it had a narrower focus (e.g. on a region, or on the connection between security, investment, and the Diaspora).
- A clearer statement of the mission, value-added, and benchmarks for success would also be helpful.
- The interdisciplinary approach which is the basis of the proposal is an appropriate analytical tool, but in terms of implementation there is a risk of overstretch.
- A more narrowly tailored interdisciplinary approach (e.g. public health + economic opportunity, education + sanitation) might be more successful.

Discussion:

1. Relevance. There is increasing urgency in the international community on the need to help the Interim Government of Haiti overcome crippling personnel and policy weaknesses. These weaknesses are jeopardizing every aspect of the country's governance and of international programs to support Haiti, and may derail the disbursement of approximately \$1.2 Billion pledged to support Haiti. This proposal, “An Initiative ~~for~~ the Revitalization of Haiti”, addresses the full spectrum of Haitian governance problems, including problems which are of critical interest to international donors, and identifies credible experts to be recruited for execution.

The proposal needs to be considered in the context of existing efforts to improve conditions in Haiti. The US. and the international community draw on over four

hundred Haiti-focused NGOs, dozens of international donors, dedicated academic programs at various colleges and universities, and international institutional support from the United Nations, the Organization of American States (OAS), and others.

There is little to specifically distinguish this proposal from scores of other projects, both completed and proposed, intended to provide expert advice on Haiti. New proposals, especially of this magnitude (\$4 M budget), are far more likely to find sponsors if they have a clear comparative advantage by offering clear value-added and definite benchmarks for success.

2. Timeliness. This proposal was evidently developed in early 2004 to respond to conditions prevailing under the Aristide regime, and would have to be updated in light of Haiti's current circumstances: including the rebellion, the fall of the Aristide government, the UN intervention forces (MIFH and MINUSTAH), the formation of Haiti's Interim Government, and the continuing lack of legitimate governance in the countryside. While many of Haiti's problems are endemic, and transcend regime change, any successful proposal must respond to current political and economic realities.

3. Value-Added and Benchmarks. The proposal's likelihood of finding a sponsor would probably increase if it had a narrower focus. As examples (drawn from the proposal itself) one could suggest an initiative narrowly centered on:

- *a region*
- *land-titling*
- *integrity in government*
- *the Diaspora*

The interdisciplinary approach which is the basis of the proposal is an appropriate analytical tool, but in terms of implementation runs a risk of overstretch.

A more narrowly tailored interdisciplinary approach might be successful, e.g.:

- *public health + economic opportunity*
- *education + sanitation*
- *security + investment + the Diaspora.*

A clearer statement of the mission, value-added, and benchmarks for success would also be helpful. The proposal should be narrowed to address specific, measurable, programmatic goals. Instead of describing broad challenges to sustainable development — all of which are generally known — a successful

proposal must identify achievable outcomes and the unique qualifications of the project performers to pursue those objectives. *“Featurestall, but benefits sell”*.

Also, this proposal would likely be more competitive if it provided a more compelling methodology for dealing with the myriad practical challenges to a functioning, democratic Haiti. The “Plan Process” (p. 7) and “Task Force Projects” (p. 9) are a start; they need more detail. As outlined, they are menus from which the details of the project and associated methodologies would be determined *after* funding is secured.

4. Sponsorship/Funding. The obvious source of funding for this proposal would be the Millennium Challenge account, which is intended to reward poor countries for attempting good governance. Unfortunately, this is not an option since Haiti does not yet qualify for such funding. The qualification process is a function of measurable steps a country is taking to improve governance. Haiti has yet to get on that treadmill. This in fact, suggests the usefulness of an initiative to advise Haiti on what it needs to do to qualify for Millennium Challenge funding.

Nor in its current form would the project qualify for PEPFAR funding, since it does not focus on delivery of medical services, or other support services. A more narrowly crafted proposal might qualify for such funding.

The goal of the initiative, *“to develop a plan that is comprehensive, interdisciplinary, and of sufficient scale to be implemented for the purpose of revitalizing Haiti,”* is laudable, but far too broad and diffuse either to produce deliverables for identifiable sectors in Haiti or sponsors in the donor community. For the same reason, various experts agreed that without substantial revisions it is unlikely to qualify for U.S. government funding as an unsolicited offer.

An Initiative for the Revitalization of Haiti
An Interdisciplinary Project
(Draft: January 2, 2004)

Contents

Vision

Description of the Current Situation

Short History of Helping Haiti

Goal of the Initiative

Potential Project Sponsors/Co-Sponsors

Guiding Principles

Plan Process

Task Force Projects

Potential Participants

Collateral Benefits

Timeline

Budget

Appendix

References

S. Herbits

Vision

Haiti is a country of vibrant, enthusiastic, optimistic, artistic people.

It is also a nation of profound economic poverty and societal deprivation.

Haiti is a democracy, according to its constitution, but most of its people are only free to subsist.

The world's market democracies, which now encompass hundreds of millions of people possessed of trillions of dollars in wealth, should be able to prompt the creation of one more market democracy – a liberal democracy in Fareed Zakaria's words – in a place that occupies roughly half a Caribbean island and 8 million people.

The incentives, if needed, begin with the humanitarian instinct – the comfortable millions will not abide children in slavery a few hundred miles from their shores. There is also the economic incentive – three centuries of growth around the world have surely taught the lesson that bringing humans into true productivity is the best wealth production engine available to serve all mankind.

What is needed is a compelling strategy – a scheme to achieve what governments cannot order and dollars cannot purchase – to bring about a modern Haiti.

Such a strategy can direct the many interests in preventing Haiti from continuing on its current course because those interests touch every element of the country's life. The achievement should take less than a decade.

The market economy in the new Haiti will not only end the humanitarian horror, best personified by children in slavery, but will create a source of productive manpower for the 21st century that the West will sorely need. While Haiti may be the toughest case today, the lessons of a successful new model of international action will have an impact on comparable challenges in the rest of the world.

Description of the current situation in Haiti

Haiti's political system is frozen.

Large numbers of citizens, protesting the 2002 election have promised not to participate in another election as called for by the Organization of American States unless there are sufficient safeguards to protect them and its accuracy. President Aristede is accused of supporting violence in response to the protesters and promises to remain in office until his term expires in 2006. The stability of the government is in question.

There is both a governmental and an informal system of thuggery that keeps large segments of the population in fear and danger and diminishes the opportunity for democracy.

Corruption is pervasive. Transparency International rates it the 3rd worst in the world, outdone only by Bangladesh and Nigeria. (12)

The health and well-being of Haitians is calamitous – equal to the worst in the world.

Unemployment may be as high as 70% (6)(12)

More than half the population is illiterate (12)

Wages are the equivalent to \$1 a day (6), \$375 per year.

Life expectancy is the shortest in the Western Hemisphere; 45 for males; 49 for females

Infant Mortality is 81 per 1000 births; 125 per thousand for those under 5 years old.

Estimated AIDS cases at 300,000 (6) are the world's highest outside sub-Saharan Africa (12)

There are an estimated 300,000 child slaves in Haiti (3)

Infrastructure and finances are not positioned to help cure Haiti's ills.

Potable water is available to less than half the population

Electricity is available to six percent of the population. (13)

Haitian debt is estimated at \$1.1 billion, approximately 40% of GNP.

The United States retains economic sanctions because of the political situation.

Haiti may be responsible for at least 15% of the \$60 billion in cocaine reaching the US.

History of US and International Efforts to Help Haiti

Haiti is the world's oldest black republic and the second oldest republic in the Western Hemisphere after the United States.

Since obtaining its independence from the French in 1807, Haiti has undergone continuing political upheaval through to today. The United States military intervened in 1915 and stayed until 1934. Following the dictatorship of the Duvalier family in 1991, a series of provisional governments ruled until a military take-over later that year. The United Nations Security Council authorized a multilateral force. The US-led force entered in September, 1994 and restored civilian government. OAS-led efforts have not overcome the claims of election fraud accompanied by growing violence that exist today. The crises continues to grow. (For a more detailed description, please see Appendix C)

Of note, US AID is widely distrusted in Haiti, with claims that the United States has consistently "pulled rug out from underneath" reconstruction efforts. Specific review of the history of US economic and humanitarian aid, as well as military and political intervention is warranted.

For the purposes of this study, it is valuable to note that President Aristede's first Administration (early 90s) created a series of task forces to study Haiti's problems and make recommendations.

Enormous pressures on Haiti continue: enormous power of US interests and international financial institutions, entrenched prerogatives of the elite and its corruption of the political class, and the rapidly rising expectations of the people and their champions among the intellectuals and NGOs." (6)

For perspective, Haiti's problems are less than 250 years old. As the United States, they need not be entrenched, not endemic. We know how to create economic opportunity and find the people who want it.

Goal of The Haiti Initiative

The goal of this Initiative is to develop a plan that is comprehensive, interdisciplinary and of sufficient scale to be implemented for the purpose of revitalizing Haiti. The plan seeks to incorporate the collaborative efforts of international and multinational organizations, Western Hemisphere governments, and their private sectors, both for-profit and not-for-profit.

Potential Project Sponsors/Co-Sponsors

University of Miami (President Donna Shalala; UofM medical program in Haiti)
Florida International University, Miami (President
(Just signed partnership with Rand for Latin American Studies) (2)
American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C.
Freedom House
Director, Net Assessments, DoD
Florida Atlantic University (Boca Raton)

Guiding Principles

The moment in history has arrived when it is time to generate a sustained effort to prompt a new Haiti. The principles of the strategy to be written are informed by an understanding of the opportunity presented by that moment. Consider:

There are no Cold War distractions or competitions. Cuba is nearby and yet irrelevant.

The world's economies are rebounding and the long-term need for human resources in the West is about to mushroom.

The importance of democracy to the world is in sharp relief. Ultimately all the world's people must be free in fact as well as in name. But it is particularly important that our country's first sphere of influence achieve that goal – now.

And now is just when the role of freedom and the rule of law in true, liberal democracy is gaining greater appreciation. Again, freedom will arrive in many places in the world after, in Secretary Rumsfeld's words, "a hard slog." It should be simpler in Haiti

In a brilliantly succinct history of liberal democratic developments since Constantine left Rome in A.D. 324 to create a new capital at the mouth of the Black Sea, Fareed Zakaria catalogues in his 2003 book, *The Future of Freedom*, the necessary elements for success in this venture. First and foremost, the book demonstrates that there must be competing centers of power in the society.

Haiti has a culture that has been burdened by the absence of this competition.

Colonialism was one obstacle to developing a civil society, but so was the military. And even in the years when the Haitian people were nominally free of authoritarians, political instability and unrest produced 32 governments in 70 years. Yet, there are in this island nation a vibrant people proud of a history that has repelled colonial powers, rebelled against slavery, and formed the hemisphere's second independent nation. Akin to the earliest day of European civil societies, there is a strong church, a creative culture and an optimistic outlook.

Today, we believe, a concerted strategy can be developed to introduce a variety of civil institutions among Haitians that can balance each other, competing and cooperating in the development of a free people, a democratic state and a liberal society.

A set of ideas can change a country long before it changes its structure or governance. While this has not happened often in the history of the world, it has happened: See Revolutions, America.

The philosophical underpinning of a strategic plan for Haiti is to achieve long-term freedom, security, prosperity and health by creating mechanisms of opportunity rather than shorter-term treatment of victims and to do so in a comprehensive manner in order to achieve scale of effectiveness.

As Zakaria continues, history teaches that building economic strength with its concomitant benefits to extending liberty provides a much greater likelihood that democracy

itself will succeed. A guiding principle of this plan will be to strengthen the economy of Haiti as the underpinning of its future.

Maximizing private sector participation and minimizing government micromanagement, the model would seek to transform the poor into citizens with access to and ownership of capital, collateralizing opportunities and economic prospects.

Enormous mechanisms of communications, even to and among the poorest, provide an opportunity to empower the bulk of the citizens to help shape their future.

Plan Process

Phase 1. Preparation/Development of the Plan outline (3 months)

Phase one of the Planning Process develops a set of Project Descriptions designed to set in motion each of the projects. Development of each project descriptions would include an overview of the relevant conditions in Haiti and some thoughts about solution topics to be considered. The collection of these Project Descriptions will serve only as a starting point, but no limitation for each Project Task Force.

During this period, members of each Task Force would be recruited.

Phase 2. Task Force Projects (8 months)

Each Task Force will be chaired by an individual selected by the Project Director with the Advice of the Co-Chairs.

Other members of the task force will be recruited as described in the Section on Project Participants.

Each Task Force would be expected to:

- a. conduct a close analysis of the challenges facing Haiti relevant to the work of that Task Force.
- b. an inventory of current efforts addressing each issue
- c. draw up a range of recommendations for addressing those challenges
- d. evaluate those recommendations
- e. cost-out those recommendations
- f. produce a report and set of recommendations, with costs and priorities, for the larger project.

Phase 3. Plan Integration (3 months)

The combination of the Task Force Reports would be melded into a larger Strategic Plan, including the following:

- a. a set of priorities
- b. proposed roles for those implementing the Plan
- c. a timetable for implementation
- d. costs associated with each Project
- e. resources available for funding each Project.

Phase 4. Government reviews (4 months)

Upon completion of the draft Strategic Plan, it would be circulated for comment among a number of government experts covering a broad selection of country and multilateral agencies for further evaluation.

Phase 5. Plan completion (2 months)

The final draft of the plan would be prepared during this period.

Potential project leaders/institutions and sponsors for its implementation would be identified.

A Communication Plan will be developed.

Phase 6. Communication Plan (4 months)

A plan to communicate the results of the completed project to various audiences would be implemented with the goal of recruiting commitments for implementation.

- a. Project Implementers, e.g. corporations, government agencies, not-for-profits, etc.
- b. Publication: informing the media
- c. Presenting at Congressional Hearings, especially if US Government funds are sought

Task Force Projects

Specific projects are identified below. Additional projects may be added.

A Task Force will be assigned to each. Over the eight months, each Task Force will develop a specific plan of action in its designated area, and include delineation of those steps required to implement the plan. The plan for each project must be delineated with sufficient precision to provide evaluators with enough information to assess its potential for being implemented and the identification of resources available for such implementation. In each instance, various sectors will be included where they have a role, e.g. governments, including multilateral organizations (OAS, IMF, World Bank, Inter American Development Bank, UN Agencies), the for-profit sector, and the not-for-profit sector.

1. Private Ownership

- a. Explore the 1815 Property Law and its consequences for individual property ownership
- b. Examine the progress of the Hernando DeSoto private property project in Haiti. (*The Mystery of Capital*, New York: Basic Books, 2000)
- c. If applicable, describe steps necessary to implement.
- d. Study related capital needs

2. Commerce

- a. Review and update laws and regulations of commerce, including its judicial system, to bring them into line with other OECD nations.
- b. Review and update currency policies
- c. Review and update for foreign investment.
- d. Develop an export promotion program.
- e. Review banking structure, particularly related to new private ownership

3. Infrastructure

- a. Enhance internal commerce by assuring adequate roadways throughout the nation.
- b. Enhance healthcare by assuring potable water to and proper sanitation for all citizens (11). Study rainfall patterns and questions of storage.
- c. Assure power generation throughout most of the country. Study alternative energy sources, including solar, wind, storage, transmission for long-term.
- d. Inventory Housing needs and prepare a plan for adequate housing. Pre-fab (10)

4. Agriculture

- a. Understand what is possible given the range of topography, from desert to mountains, from forest to beach
- b. Consider possibilities given resources, water, education, arable land, consumer behavior, export opportunities
- c. Understand the constraints and opportunities with Haiti's tradition of private ownership of small plots of land.
- d. Study current crises in loss of arable land and deforestation.

5. Education

- a. Develop practical education programs for work-skills
- b. For K-12, develop a plan for implementation of a country-wide, all-student voucher system.
- c. For higher education, develop a plan for creating partnerships with universities in other countries, whose exchange programs of students and faculty will benefit both institutions.
- d. Develop a “virtual” curriculum for students at all levels to both supplement and supplant other education. RADIO, TV, on-line (See India model) (7)
- e. Develop citizenship and “values” elements of curricula, including freedom, prosperity, safety, and individual responsibility.
- f. Develop a system of exchange for K9-12 Diaspora students to return to Haiti to gain a sense of their own history and to contribute a broader perspective for students in Haiti.
- g. Consider plans to prevent brain drain of those most accomplished.

6. Health

- a. Explore a new national model based on creative work now underway for restructuring the US healthcare system. Its fundamental ingredients include minimizing paperwork and administration, preventive education and care, adequate system of distribution for pharmaceutical and medical supplies.
- b. Develop a specific plan for attacking the HIV/AIDS crises, referencing the recent experiences in Africa
- c. Consider resources such as: Project Medishare, U of M.(projectmedishare.org); Haitian Health Foundation, (Jeremie, Haiti) (haitianhealthfoundation.org); Jefferson College of Health Professions (sister city between Cardenas, Cuba and Philadelphia)

7. Security

- a. Screen and retrain a single national police force.
- b. Create a Special Crime Unit to investigate and prosecute instances of physical abuse by government employees or groups associated with the government or political parties
- c. Embargo private weapons importation
- d. Install an effective border police
- e. Examine program of the International Red Cross in non-lethal crime fighting tactics training. (8)
- f. Explore resources such as: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Washington, D.C.; Inter American Court of Human Rights (OAS), Costa Rica; OAS Special Representative, David Lee; UN. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program (Afghan); Bureau of International Advocates (BAI) (group of Haitian and international attorneys; assisting the judiciary with human rights cases. Brian Concannon (6)

8. Democracy

- a. Review the recent history of political institutions and the political process.
- a. Make recommendations to rebuild the operation of and confidence in the political process, utilizing outside supervision where necessary.
- c. Establish a program of teaching democracy

9. Integrity in Government/Corruption

- a. The fight against corruption is a necessary element in building an effective economy. Daniel Kaufmann (head of World Bank's anti-corruption drive) claims that research shows that "if a poor country with a high level of corruption manages to reduce corruption to a median level, it will enjoy a 400% improvement in its per capita income." (1)
- b. Consider recent efforts:
 - World Bank (Daniel Kaufmann), Integrity Pacts
 - UN General Assembly's Convention Against Corruption
(12/9-11, 2003. Mexico City signing)
 - OECD Convention
 - OAS Convention
 - Council of Europe Convention
 - African Union Convention
- c. Create a Special Investigative Unit and pair it with a special team from the OAS with subpoena power to strengthen the integrity of government officials.
- d. Create a judicial watch and a system to remove judges.
- e. explore expertise: Transparency International (US/Germany)

11. The Arts

- a. Examine the hypothesis that Haiti is among the highest producers of visual and performing art per capita in the Hemisphere.
- b. Examine possibilities of export
- c. Explore the US import of Haitian art teachers for our public schools

12. Foreign Sanctions

- a. Study the impact of the current sanctions to the health and welfare of Haiti versus its achievement in its goals of political change.

Plan Participants

The Plan is designed to capitalize on a broad range of expertise. Starting with a small core -- a director, strategic advisors, administrator, writer, and clerical support -- the project would search out and arrange for small teams to focus on specific projects. The Core would be full or part-time; the experts would be part-time and would be paid stipends for their contributions.

1. Project Management

The Project would be directed by Stephen Herbits.
Bill Roesing will be a consulting strategist.
Bio's attached.

2. Co-Chairs

Three leading Haitian or Haitian-Americans will Chair the project.

Their responsibilities will be to assure that a broad spectrum of views is considered, to facilitate the attraction of expert participants, and to contribute as policy experts.

3. The role of Haiti and its citizens

Central to the project, of course, will be those members of the leadership community in Haiti who wish to participate. It is intended that each specific task force have at least one knowledgeable participant from Haiti.

4. The role of the Haitian Diaspora

The wealth of experience and knowledge among Haitians living in the United States provides another pool for project members.

5. The role of academics

Also participating will be experts from academia and think-tanks.

6. The role of international and regional governments

Each international and regional organization that may have an interest or possible future role in implementation will be asked to participate as advisors to the project.

7. The role of the business community

Individual companies, trade associations and business organizations will be invited to support this project. They may perceive specific business opportunities in a strong Haitian economy or simply believe in the benefit of developing a strategic model for broad-scale national improvement. They will be invited to join as contributors to the planning process itself with a concomitant opportunity to participate in the project work.

8. The role of the not-for-profit community

The not-for-profit community has much to offer any nation, any time. They bring skills, knowledge, personnel and support mechanisms for a wide variety of projects. Their participation in the project development would add value. It is important from the beginning, however, to understand that the strategic model being developed in this plan does not provide for institutionalizing a central role for not-for-profits over the long term.

While there will always be a need for charitable activities; the plan would hope to capitalize on their contributions primarily for transitional purposes, with a draw-down as the economic benefits of the plan begin to become widespread.

Candidate Participants

Eric Behrmann (Kim Green)

M. Bubishi (KG)

Yolly Roberson (Fla. State Rep.) (KG)

Aldy Castor, MD. (KG)

President Human Resource Development Foundation (HRDF.org)

Vice President, Haitian-American Republican Caucus (?)

Mark Rogers (KG)

Director of Development, FAUACA.org

Patrick Prosper (KG)

Ambassador at large for war crimes

Dr. Rudy Moise (KG)

University of Miami

Owns Radio Carnivale

Dr. Laurence Pierre (KG)

Center for Haitian Studies

John Rendon, The Rendon Group (PR) (KG)

Terry Rey

FIU, Professor, Haitian Studies Class

Gepsie M. Metellus, ED

Sant La-Haitian Neighborhood Center

Marleine Bastien

Haitian American Women Foundation

Tom Reeves, former director of the Caribbean Focus Program, professor of history at Roxbury Community College, Boston. Founding Member of the New England Observer delegations to Haiti on democracy.

Jim Obestar (D. Minn. Former?) Peace Corps in Haiti. (NG)

II. Benefits of the Initiative

1. Were there to be a demonstrable improvement in its condition, other nations may be encouraged to take steps to address their own poverty.
2. Haiti has a substantial expatriate community in the United States that can provide an important resource of advice, counsel, and perhaps relationships for future growth.
3. The pervasiveness of poverty in a world that also contains incredible wealth begs for working models that address institutionalized or intractable poverty. It is the compassionate thing to do, because it will ultimately improve the population's economic well-being. It is important for everyone's security, because it will diminish opportunities for radicalism and improve governance.
4. As Haiti is neither white nor non-white Hispanic, a successful model may have application throughout black inner cities in the US and across Africa.
5. Given its presence in the Caribbean, there may be regional entities – such as the Organization of American States – that will take the lead, rather than the United States Government, increasing chances that other regional organizations throughout the world can apply similar efforts.
6. Haiti is of a size that enhances the opportunity to take risks. Most laws are both national and local simultaneously.
7. Haiti's location is an invitation to substantial expert advice from around the Caribbean as well as the United States.
8. A successful plan will reduce illegal emigration efforts and thereby reduce one of the largest illegal immigrant-seeking populations challenging the United States, thus reducing pressure on the US government's inconsistent policy towards Haitians and Cubans.

The USG ties illegal Haitian immigration to terrorism. "If we are going to start to win that aspect of the war on terrorism we call the "war for minds," we should begin at home, with our own behavior, our own justice, our own Justice Department. I fear we are creating the motivation for terrorists; not educating the world of the incompatibility of terrorism and civilization. (4)

9. Modern nation building: a necessary in the 21st century war on terrorism, including the reduction or elimination of ungovernable areas as hosts for terrorist bases and training.
10. US Annual Assessment of the cooperation of major drug producing and transiting countries (2003) says that Haiti had "failed demonstrably" to meet international obligations to fight drugs. (5) It is estimated that 15% of the \$60 billion worth of cocaine reaching the US is handled by Haitian traffickers and that Aristide himself earns from the process. (12)
11. A successful effort will be a model for close-by Jamaica and Cuba.

Plan 1 Summary

| | |
|--|-----------|
| 1. Phase 1 – Preparation/Development of the Plan outline | 3 months |
| 2. Phase 2 – Task Force Projects | 8 months |
| 3. Phase 3 – Plan Integration | 3 months |
| 4. Phase 4 – Government Reviews | 4 months |
| 5. Phase 5 - Plan Completion | 2 months |
| 6. Phase 6 - Plan Communication | 4 months |
| Total time | 24 months |

Plan Budget (24 Months)

Cash

| | |
|--|-------------|
| Director: | \$600,000 |
| Strategic Advisor | 480,000 |
| Strategic Advisor | 360,000 |
| Administrator: | 120,000 |
| Writer: | 50,000 |
| Clerical: | 44,000 |
| Participant Stipends | |
| Co-Chairs (3) \$2kx21 | 126,000 |
| Task Force Chairs (12) \$6x21 | 852,000 |
| Task Force Members (12x5) \$5x8 | 48,000 |
| Travel | 360,000 |
| Other overhead, payroll taxes, etc. (phone, copier, supplies) | 480,000 |
| Media Advisor (three months) | 90,000 |
| Total Project | \$3,610,000 |

In-Kind

(To be provided by one of the sponsors)

Office suite, including two private offices, a clerical space, and conference room seating up to 12, parking
Access to faculty; stipends to be paid by the project.

Appendix 1: A view towards economic sancti

- a. Study of the recent history of the role of sanctions towards Haiti by the United States, other governments and international organizations.
- b. Analyze their effectiveness
- c. Study other possible approaches
 1. flooding the nation with currency
 - a. flooding the country with communications, e.g. satellite dishes and radios and programming; cell phones; web access; aid packed with messages.
 - b. ruthless humiliation of leaders – at the UN and its organizations, in public, in communications above, use cell phone information collection; increase investment in intelligence
 4. Embargoing items that support the dictatorship, e.g. weapons importation.
 5. Encourage and support exile participation in their native country.

Appendix 2: A new model of foreign AID.

- a. governmental
- b. best-practices shared
- c. bureaucracy versus evaluation
- d. band-aids or cures

Appendix 3: A Short History of US and International Efforts to Help Haiti

Haiti is the world's oldest black republic and the second oldest republic in the Western Hemisphere after the United States.

“The native Arawak Amerindians - who inhabited the island of Hispaniola when it was discovered by Columbus in 1492 - were virtually annihilated by Spanish settlers within 25 years. In the early 17th century, the French established a presence on Hispaniola, and in 1697, Spain ceded to the French the western third of the island - Haiti. The French colony, based on forestry and sugar-related industries, became one of the wealthiest in the Caribbean, but only through the heavy importation of African slaves and considerable environmental degradation. In the late 18th century, Haiti's nearly half million slaves revolted under Toussaint L'OWERTURE and after a prolonged struggle, became the first black republic to declare its independence in 1804.” (13)

From 1822 to 1844, Haiti occupied the entire Island until the Dominican Republic was formed. The following is an edited version of the US State Department Background Note on Haiti (14): “With 22 changes of government from 1843 to 1915, Haiti experienced numerous periods of intense political and economic disorder, prompting the United States military intervention of 1915. Following a 19-year occupation, U.S. military forces were withdrawn in 1934, and Haiti regained sovereign rule.

“From 1986--when the 29-year dictatorship of the Duvalier family ended--until 1991, Haiti was ruled by a series of provisional governments. In March 1987, a constitution was ratified that provides for an elected, bicameral parliament; an elected president that serves as head of state; and a prime minister, cabinet, ministers, and supreme court appointed by the

president with parliament's consent. The Haitian Constitution also provides for political decentralization through the election of mayors and administrative bodies responsible for local government.

"In December 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a charismatic Roman Catholic priest, won 67% of the vote in a presidential election that international observers deemed largely free and fair. Aristide took office on February 7, 1991, but was overthrown that September in a violent coup led by dissatisfied elements of the army and supported by many of the country's economic elite. Following the coup, Aristide began a 3-year exile in the U.S. Several thousand Haitians may have been killed during the de facto military rule. The coup contributed to a large-scale exodus of Haitians by boat. The U.S. Coast Guard rescued a total of 41,342 Haitians at sea during 1991 and 1992, more than the number of rescued boat people from the previous 10 years combined.

"From October 1991 to September 1994 an unconstitutional military de facto regime governed Haiti. Various OAS and UN initiatives to end the political crisis through the peaceful restoration of the constitutionally elected government, including the Governor's Island Agreement of July 1993, failed. The military and de facto authorities couldn't agree on a return to constitutional government, even though the economy was collapsing and the country's infrastructure was deteriorating from neglect.

"On July 31, 1994, the UN Security Council authorized member states to use all necessary means to restore Haiti's constitutionally elected government to power.

"In the weeks that followed, the United States took the lead in forming a multinational force (MNF) to carry out the UN's mandate by means of a military intervention. In mid-September, with U.S. troops prepared to enter Haiti by force, President Clinton dispatched a negotiating team led by former President Jimmy Carter to persuade the de facto authorities to step aside and allow for the return of constitutional rule. With intervening troops already airborne, Gen. Raoul Cedras and other top leaders agreed to accept the intervention of the MNF. On September 19, 1994, the first contingents of what became a 21,000-member international force touched down in Haiti to oversee the end of military rule and the restoration of the constitutional government. By early October, the three de facto leaders--Cedras, Gen. Philippe Biamby, and Police Chief Lt. Col. Michel Francois--and their families had departed Haiti. President Aristide and other elected officials in exile returned on October 15.

"Under the watchful eyes of international peacekeepers, restored Haitian authorities organized nationwide local and parliamentary elections in June 1995. A pro-Aristide, multi-party coalition called the Lavalas Political Organization (OPL) swept into power at all levels. With his term ending in February 1996 and barred by the constitution from succeeding himself, President Aristide agreed to step aside and support a presidential election in December 1995. Rene Preval, a prominent Aristide political ally, who had been Aristide's Prime Minister in 1991, took 88% of the vote, and was sworn in to a 5-year term on February 7, 1996, during what was Haiti's first-ever transition between two democratically elected presidents.

"In late 1996, former President Aristide broke from the OPL and created a new political party, the Lavalas Family (FL). Elections in April 1997 indicated victories for FL candidates in most races, but were plagued with allegations of fraud and not certified by most international observers. Partisan resulted in almost total governmental gridlock until early January 1999, when President Preval dismissed legislators whose terms had expired--the entire Chamber of Deputies

and all but nine members of the Senate--and converted local elected officials into state employees. The President and Prime Minister then ruled by decree. Following several delays, the first round of new elections took place on May 21, 2000. The election drew the participation of a multitude of candidates from a wide array of political parties and a voter turnout of more than 60%. Controversy mired the good start. Nonetheless, on August 28, 2000, Haiti's new Parliament, including the contested Senators accorded victory under the flawed vote count, was convened.

"Through a number of diplomatic missions by the OAS, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the United States, the international community had sought to delay Parliament's seating until the electoral problems could be rectified. When these efforts were rebuffed, Haiti's main bilateral donors announced the end of "business as usual." They moved to re-channel their assistance away from the government and announced they would not support or send observers to the November elections. Concurrently, most opposition parties regrouped in an alliance that became the Democratic Convergence. The Convergence asserted that the May elections were so fraudulent that they should be annulled and held again. Elections for President and nine Senators took place on November 26, 2000. All major opposition parties boycotted these elections in which voter participation was estimated at 5%. Jean-Bertrand Aristide emerged as the easy victor of these controversial elections, and the candidates of his FL party swept all contested Senate seats. He was inaugurated on February 7, 2001.

"It did not, however, put an end to the political stalemate. OAS-mediated negotiations began in April 2001 to find a resolution, focusing on the on possible makeup of a new electoral council, a timetable for new elections, security for political parties, and other confidence-building measures. These negotiations made some progress, but were suspended in mid-July without a final agreement. On July 28, 2001, unknown gunmen attacked police facilities in Port-au-Prince and the provinces. A subsequent government crackdown on opposition party members and former soldiers further increased tensions between Lavalas and Convergence. On December 17, 2001, unidentified gunmen attacked the National Palace in Port-au-Prince. Following the assault, pro-government groups attacked the offices and homes of several opposition leaders. One opposition member was killed. Negotiations between FL and Democratic Convergence, already on hold following the July violence, were suspended indefinitely.

"In January 2002, the OAS Permanent Council adopted Resolution 806 on Haiti that called for government action to address the political stalemate, growing violence, and deterioration in respect for human rights. It also authorized OAS establishment of a Special Mission in Haiti to support implementation of steps called for in Resolution 806. The OAS Special Mission began operations in March 2002, working with the government on plans to strengthen Haiti's democratic institutions in security, justice, human rights, and governance. Nevertheless, the climate of security deteriorated and a rapidly weakening economy created risks of a humanitarian disaster. The OAS Permanent Council adopted Resolution 822, September 4, 2002, which set a new course for resolving the crisis by: committing the Haitian government to a series of steps leading to an improved climate of security for free and fair elections in 2003; supporting Haiti's resumption of normal relations with the International Financial Institutions; and strengthening the mandate of the OAS to monitor as well as support GOH efforts to comply with OAS resolutions. It also conferred new mandates related to conduct of elections and disarmament.

"Protest strikes and attacks on opposition demonstrations by government-supported gangs between November 2002 and February 2003 hardened attitudes on both sides. The

opposition issued a public call for Aristide's removal and announced plans for a transitional government. In March, 2003, a high-level joint delegation of the OAS and Caribbean Community (CAFUCOM) presented specific demands to President Aristide to restore public security and create confidence necessary to move toward elections: select new leadership for the Haitian National Police in consultation with the OAS; arrest Amiot Metayer, a notorious gang leader; and disarm the security forces used by government politicians to intimidate opponents. Since then, a new police chief, appointed June 9 in consultation with the OAS, resigned and fled the country June 23 after being ordered to give up his authority over budget and personnel; government-paid thugs violently disrupted a civil society public ceremony July 12 in Cite Soleil; police attacked civil society marches in Cap Haitien August 30 and September 14 and prevented an opposition march scheduled for October 5. Amiot Metayer was murdered September 21 (it is widely believed the government ordered the murder to prevent release of compromising information). The government announced August 13 that it was re-activating a defunct CEP in what many have interpreted as a move toward holding elections outside the framework of OAS Resolution 822. The OAS and other foreign observers, including the U.S., have denounced these steps. To re-invigorate the process envisioned in Resolution 822, the OAS designated a Special Envoy for Dialogue in Haiti, Terence Todman, a retired U.S. Career Ambassador. Todman, a native of the U.S. Virgin Islands, undertook three negotiating missions to Haiti in September-October 2003. The political stalemate and violence continues." (14)

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~~FOUO~~

November 17, 2004

ES-1435
04/015592-ES

TO: Peter Rodman
Roger Pardo-Maurer

CC: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Options for Haiti

Steve Herbits gave me a paper on Haiti, which I then gave to either Peter Rodman or Roger Pardo-Maurer. I forget who I gave it to.

I would like it back, but I would like to know from whomever I gave it to what their opinion is about it, **and** whether or not there is anything we could do about it or whether Millennium Challenge would fit.

Thanks.

DHR:gh
111704-11

.....
Please respond by 12/3/04

~~FOUO~~

18-11-04 P12:14 OUT

11-1-0559/OSD/038764

12/14
1130

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

10/29

2004 DEC 15 PM 4:16

October 29, 2004

TO: Gen Pete Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: MP Training

J-3 - action
PA.

230

Please dig into this subject David Chu comments on regarding MPs. I guess I want to be persuaded.

Thanks.

Attach
9/27/04 SecDef Memo to USD (P&R) re: Training of MPs
10/22/04 USD (P&R) Memo to SecDef re: Potential Further Consolidation of Military Police Training

DHR:ss
102904-11

353

.....
Please respond by 11/12/04

10/29 → TO SecDef

Paul Butler
12/20

Sir,
Response attached
12/21

V/R, Col B
12/20

(29 Oct 04)

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 20182-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038765



THE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE VICE CHAIRMAN
OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
701 N. W. 15th St. # 16

INFO MEMO

CM-2236-04
14 December 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Peter Pace, VCJCS *VP/Pace 14 Dec 04*

SUBJECT: Military Police (MP) Training

- **Answer.** In response to your question (TAB A), based on today's missions and force structure, I concur in Dr. Chu's reply that the Services already benefit from joint training of MPs and pursuing further "jointness" in current MP training would likely not yield major benefits. However, we should explore standardization of MP skills across services. To ensure we are maximizing our common skills and training opportunities, we will establish a Joint Integrated Process Team to completely analyze the issue.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Major General Jack J. Catton, Jr., USAF; Director, J-7;

(b)(6)

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

SECRET 10/29
201 872 13 00 45 16

October 29, 2004

TO: Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: MP Training

J-3 — action
P.S.
230

Please **dig into** this subject David Chu comments on regarding MPs. I guess I want to be persuaded.

Thanks.

Attach.

9/27/04 SecDef Memo to USD (P&R) re: Training of MPs

10/22/04 USD (P&R) Memo to SecDef re: Potential Further Consolidation of Military Police Training

DHR:ss
102906-11

.....
Please respond by 11/12/04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/038767

OSD 201 82-04



PERSONNEL AND READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

October 22, 2004 - 6:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

pub ↑

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

David S. C. Chu (et al)

SUBJECT: Potential Further Consolidation of Military Police Training—
SNOWFLAKE (attached)

- * We have already achieved substantial "jointness" in MP training
- Army and Marine Corps train together at Fort Leonard Wood
- Air Force and Navy train together at Lackland Air Force Base
- Guard and Reserve train with their respective service at these joint locations
- Skill sets for Army/Marine Corps differ substantially from Air Force/Navy, since principal responsibility of Air Force and Navy personnel is protection of "places." Curriculum overlap is only about 20 percent.
- Unless it is decided to change the mission of Air Force and Navy personnel, further consolidation would not yield any important benefits (and might engender some unnecessary complications).

None

?

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock, (b)(6)

| | |
|----------|----------------|
| TSA SD | <i>10/27</i> |
| SRMA SD | |
| MA SD | <i>5/23/07</i> |
| EXEC SEC | <i>M 10/25</i> |



OSD 16867-04

Tab. A

12/14
132

SEP 28 2004

~~FOUO~~

September 27, 2004

TO: David ~~Cru~~
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Training of MPs

Should **we** have a **program** to get all Military Police **joint and** trained all at the same place with the **same** rules? (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Guard, Reserve?)

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092704-25

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

JB See Det

Paul Butler
10/27

~~FOUO~~

Tab A


TAB B
COORDINATION PAGE

| Unit | Name | Date |
|------|----------------------|------------------|
| USA | COL John Chappell | 4 November 2004 |
| USN | CAPT Curt Goldacker | 18 November 2004 |
| USAF | Col Shelby Ball | 18 November 2004 |
| USMC | Col Anthony Van Dyke | 10 November 2004 |

December 15, 2004

TO: GEN Leon LaPorte

CC: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Progress

The progress in South Korea is impressive. Congratulations!

DHR:dh
121504-2

.....
Please respond by _____

Korea

15 Dec 04



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3000 MARINE CORPS PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-3000

001 002 16 01 11: 56

INFORMATION PAPER

16 December 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General M. W. Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps *WMA for*

SUBJECT Response to Komatsu Snowflake

- Komatsu Armored vehicle
 - The Marine Corps has procured no armored vehicles from Komatsu Defense LTD.
 - However, the Komatsu armored vehicle (at Tab A) was considered twice as a candidate for procurement, once for a Convoy Escort Vehicle and the second time for a Hardened Engineer Vehicle. In both instances the vehicle was identified as a "developmental item" and therefore not considered a viable candidate for urgent requirements that targeted fielding time lines of six months or less.
 - Of note, a third opportunity to evaluate the Komatsu is on going; a Request for Information was released for a Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle requirement last Friday, 10 Dec. All vendor responses, domestic and foreign, are due NLT 15 Jan 05. Komatsu, along with other foreign vendors, will be made aware of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle RFI.
 - We will continue to investigate foreign products, like the Komatsu vehicle, that can be rapidly procured to support OIF requirements.
- Organizing, Training, and Equipping the Forces
 - I MEF deployed to Iraq in March 2004 for OIF II. This force was well prepared for operations – 100% of its vehicles had armor protection and each Marine had the best personnel protective equipment available.
 - Attached is an earlier memo from Assistant Secretary Young (Tab B) that highlights the successful efforts to equip Marine forces.

Tabs: as stated

Prepared by: Mr. Steven J. Manchester, Director, International Programs,

(b)(6)

TAB (A) – Komatsu Armored Vehicle Photos



December 14, 2004

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld / General Myers

FROM: - John Young



SUBJECT: MARINE CORPS VEHICLE ARMOR

BEFORE the Marine Corps I MEF force crossed the line of departure into Iraq in March, 2004, the Marine Corps had armor for 100% of its 3000+ vehicles. The armor, a quick fix application of 3/16" steel, was installed on 90% of the HMMWV's and MTRV's. The Marine Corps also had 37 up-armored HMMWV's. The Marine Corps acquisition and logistics system assembled over 1,800 sets of the interim 3/16" armor kits within six weeks of receiving the execute order to provide armor for the MEF prior to its rolling across the line of departure. Similarly, all Marine Corps helicopters were equipped with Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE) countermeasures for deployment. Finally, every Marine in Iraq has, and has always had, personal protection gear (Outer Tactical Vests, Small Arms Protective Insert (SAPI) plates, ear plugs, and safety glasses).

The Department next identified additional reprogramming funds and upgraded all vehicle armor kits to Marine depot built 3/8" rolled homogeneous armor (RHA) by September, 2004. We used an effort called Operation Respond, supplemented by the Marine Corps' Urgent Universal Needs Statement process, to identify the urgent needs of the Marines as well as to force the naval enterprise to identify funds. In excess of \$520 million was reprogrammed to meet over 120 requirements for deployed Marines. These initiatives included additional armor kits, IED jamming devices, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) robots, dogs for IED detection, gunner's shields, unmanned air and ground vehicles, ballistic goggles, body armor extensions for extremity protection, communications gear, and language translation equipment. Through dedicated leadership and Operation Respond, the naval acquisition team equipped the Marines with every needed, available solution.

--

cc: Secretary England

11-L-0559/OSD/038774

ACTION MEMO

DepSecDef

USE (P) ~~SECRET~~

I-04/014171-ISP

ES-1171

DEC 15 2004

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mira Ricardel, ASD/ISP (Acting) *John Rood for* DEC 1 2004

SUBJECT: Discussing Operation of Initial Missile Defense System

- You asked Policy to draft a declaratory policy to describe the operation of our initial missile defense capabilities once the current "shakedown period" has been completed.
- Attached at Tab A is a draft declaratory policy which has been coordinated with the Missile Defense Agency, General Counsel, the Joint Staff, NORTHCOM, PACOM, and STRATCOM.
 - o Steve Cambone also offered a number of comments, each of which we incorporated.
 - o The draft declaratory policy is intended to put our missile defense efforts into context, to deter potential adversaries, and to make clear that the U.S. is working with friends and allies.
- You specifically asked us to consider how best to address the possibility of a missile attack under the guise of a pre-announced space launch.
 - o The draft declaratory policy addresses this and other potential circumstances through use of a formulation that is clear, simple, and broad in its coverage:

"The missile defense system is available to engage launches that we determine are on a trajectory that threatens the United States or its deployed forces. Such events include deliberate, unauthorized, or accidental launches."
- In crafting this formulation, we attempted to avoid phrases that could be viewed as overly muscular or mischaracterized as a means of forcibly controlling access to space.
- We expect it will be necessary to update this declaratory policy as we develop greater capabilities, and reach agreements on the circumstances under which other nations would receive protection and their respective contribution.

373.24

1 Dec 04

RECOMMENDATION: Review and approve draft declaratory policy attached at Tab A. Attachment: a/s

Prepared by: John Rood, DASD Forces Policy (b)(6) 30 November 2004

~~SECRET~~ DECISION:

APPROVED: _____

DISAPPROVED: _____

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
DRAFT

Missile Defense Declaratory Policy

Introduction

- Today, many nations, including some of the world's least responsible states, possess ballistic missiles of increasing range and complexity.
- To address the growing threat of ballistic missile attack, President Bush directed the development and fielding of an initial set of missile defense capabilities that would begin operating in 2004.

Description of Today's Capability

- The U.S. has begun operating a set of missile defense capabilities.
- The system's capability will be improved continually through additional testing and the insertion of additional or new capabilities as they become available and are needed to meet mission objectives.
- The U.S. will continue a robust research, development, testing, and evaluation program while conducting operations of the missile defense system.
 - Through these continuous efforts and the fielding of additional capabilities, the performance of the initial system and its ability to defend against more complex threats will continue to improve.

Purpose of the System

- The purpose of the missile defense system is to deter and defend against a deliberate missile attack, as well as to counter unauthorized or accidental missile launches.
- The Department of Defense is developing and deploying missile defenses capable of protecting not only the United States, but also our friends and allies, and is pursuing cooperative relationships with a number of countries.
- As the President stated on June 17, 2002, "[b]ecause these threats endanger our allies and friends around the world, it is essential that we work together to defend against them..."
- The participation of friends and allies will, over time, extend to them the benefits of missile defense.

Use of the System

- The missile defense system is available to engage launches that we determine are on a trajectory that threatens the United States or its deployed forces. Such events include deliberate, unauthorized, or accidental launches.
- U.S. missile defenses will be integrated with offensive capabilities to improve the ability to defeat and defend against potential attacks, deter and dissuade potential foes, and assure the American people and allies.
 - Regardless of whether a missile attack is successfully intercepted, the United States will consider the full range of its response options in light of the circumstances surrounding such an event.
- To ensure that peaceful launches are not construed as hostile acts, the United States encourages the public announcement of upcoming launches, as many countries do so today.

Conclusion

- We are fielding an initial missile defense system that will continue to evolve and become increasingly more capable over time.
- We intend to continue to pursue the most promising technologies and basing modes to strengthen this system.
- The message to potential adversaries is clear: We are determined to make the pursuit of ballistic missiles designed to threaten or deter the United States, its deployed forces, or friends and allies an increasingly costly and ineffective proposition.

December 21, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Missile Defense Declaratory Policy

Please make sure this declaratory policy is staffed out to Policy, Di Rita and Cambone.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/1/04 ASD(ISP) memo to SecDef re: Missile Defense Declaratory Policy.

DHR:dh
122104-15

.....
Please respond by 1/13/05

373.24

21 Dec 04

1 Dec 04

12/17
1030

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

ACTION MEMO OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSecDef

2004 DEC 16 PM 12:03

USDP (POLICY) **LAUSD**

I-04/014171-ISP

DEC 15 2004

ES-1171

Paul Butte
12/20
Pro

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mira Ric *Read for* el, ASD/ISP (Acting) DEC 1 2004

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RECOMMENDATION: Review and approve draft declaratory policy attached at Tab A.
Attachment: a/s

Prepared by: John Rood, DASD Forces Policy, (b)(6) November 2004

SECDEF DECISION:

APPROVED: _____

DISAPPROVED: _____

OTHER: _____

| | | | |
|--------------|-----------|--------------|--------------|
| MA SD | 8MA DSD | <i>SR</i> | <i>12/20</i> |
| <i>SA SD</i> | SA DSD | <i>TR</i> | |
| EXEC SEC | <i>TR</i> | <i>12/17</i> | |
| ESR MA | <i>TR</i> | <i>12-16</i> | <i>-04</i> |

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/038779 01-12-04 **USDP 20228-04**

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

DRAFT

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~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD/038780

Use of the System

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7201
~~FOUO~~

TAB A

November 8, 2004 51

898

TO: Gen Dick Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: War Phases

We need to see that war plans have a zero, as well as a four phase. What do you propose?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
110804-12

.....
Please respond by 12/5/04

381

8 Nov 04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

DEC 16 2004

Mr. Michel Richard
Citronelle
3000 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20007

Dear Mr. Richard,

I understand that you participated in the USO "Holiday for the Troops" Dinner on December 13th.

Thank you for your role in this special event. It was a fitting recognition of our fine U.S. forces. I do appreciate all the work that must have gone into that evening.

Sincerely,

335 SD

16 Dec 04

3 Dec 04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

DEC 16 2004

Mr. Bob Kinkead
Kinkead's
2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Mr. Kinkead,

Thank you for the work you put into last week's USO
"Holiday for the Troops" Dinner.

You used your talents to make **an** important contribution
to our service members, and I do appreciate it.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "R. M. Gates", written in a cursive style.

0SD 20232-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038784



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

DEC 16 2004

Mr. Darren Jolley
Fat **Punk's** Restaurant
9103 Andrew Drive
Manassas, VA 20111-8248

Dear Mr. Jolley,


Thanks for your efforts in the USO "Holiday for the Troops" Dinner. I hear that the troops thoroughly enjoyed the evening.

This event was a great morale builder, and I do appreciate your role in honoring these fine men and women.

Sincerely,

0 SD 20232-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038785



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

DEC 16 2004

Mr. Christopher Clime
Ceiba
701 14th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20005

Dear Mr. Clime,

I understand that the "Holiday for the Troops" Dinner was a great success.

Thank you for using your talents to brighten the season for these fine men and women. I do appreciate it.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. M. Gates", written in a cursive style.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

DEC 16 2004

Mr. Todd Gray
Equinox
818 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Mr. Gray,

Thank you for your role in the USO "Holiday for the Troops" Dinner last week.

I understand that the evening was a great success, and I appreciate the work that you put into this event.

Sincerely,

OSD 20232-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038787

December 3, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Note to Chefs

9

Someone ought to draft a nice note from me to the chefs of each of the restaurants listed on the attached invitation, thanking them for helping out the troops.

Thanks.

Attach.

12/13/04 Invitation to USO Holiday for the Troops Dinner

DHR:ss
120304-7

335 SD

.....
Please respond by 12/5/04

3 Dec 04

(b)(6)

0507210930

002/002

We would like to cordially invite you and a guest to join the service members from Walter Reed Army Medical Center and the National Naval Medical Center at Bethesda for the

"HOLIDAY FOR THE TROOPS" DINNER

Chefs from:

Ceiba
Citronelle
Equinox
Fat Punk's
Kinkead's

Marcel's
Melrose
Poste Brasserie
Rocklands BBQ
Tosca

7/11

Will be cooking a very special dinner on
MONDAY, DECEMBER 13TH
6:00-9:00 PM

Mologne House Dining Room
Walter Reed Army Medical Center

Please RSVP to Lisa Marie at (b)(6)



of Metropolitan Washington



Fax

To: Honorable Donald Rumsfeld and guest

Fax Number: (b)(6)

From: Elaine Rogers ; President, USO of Metropolitan Washington

Number of Pages including Cover Page: 2

Message: We are pleased to invite you to celebrate the holiday season with our wounded service members. Please RSVP no later than December 8, 2004. Thank you!

HAPPY HOLIDAYS

11-L-0559/OSD/038790

~~FOUO~~

December 9, 2004
I-04/016688
ES-1646

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM:
SUBJECT: Indian Air Show

An issue has come up as to what kind of aircraft and what participation the US should have at the Indian air show. We have to do it very fast.

Are you familiar with the issue? If not, please get your head into it.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120904-13

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

Sir,
Response attached.
v/R
Lt Col Lengyel

DEC 17 2004

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20305-04

10-12-04 09:33 11

DEC 22 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Don Haider

Attached is a letter from an excellent person, Don Haider, who is a possibility for the Base Closing Commission.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/3/04. Letter from Do Haider to SecDef

DHR:ss
122104-6

.....
Please respond by 1/20/05

323.3

22 Dec 04

3 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~



J.L. Kellogg School of Management
Center for Nonprofit Management
Donald P. Jacobs Center
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, Illinois 60208-2001

Phone 847-491-3416
Fax 847-491-8525
www.kellogg.northwestern.edu

CE
2004 FEB 03 11:03 AM



NORTHWESTERN
UNIVERSITY

December 3, 2004

Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Enjoyed seeing you at the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in August where, once again, you were headed to Afghanistan. I do hope you have the energy and support to see us through this a while longer. We need you.

I enjoyed my brief tenure on your DOD Financial Management Reform Study Team with Stephen Friedman so much that I am compelled to volunteer for more. If you have an opening on the Base Closing Commission and you would be so inclined to recommend me, I'll do whatever lifting is required at this end for support. I not only have the passion for this but also, I hope, the credentials.

Best to you, Joyce and family for the holidays. Stay the course.

Sincerely,

Don Haider
Professor of Management

OSD 20355-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038793



J.L. Kellogg School of Management
Center for Nonprofit Management
Donald P. Jacobs Center
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, Illinois 60208-2001

Phone 847-491-3416
Fax 847-491-8525
www.kellogg.northwestern.edu



NORTHWESTERN
UNIVERSITY

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Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense
Washington, DC 20301

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Best to you, Joyce and family for the holidays. Stay the course.

Sincerely,

Don Haider
Professor of Management

OSD 20355-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038794



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

DEC 21 2004

323.3


Mr. Don Haider
Professor of Management
J.L. Kellogg School of Management
Northwestern University
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-2001

Dear Don,

Thanks so much for your note. I appreciate it and will feed that into the process.

Best to you and your family for Christmas and the New Year.

21 Dec 04

Warm regards,


OSD 20355-04

3 Dec 04

September 7, 2004

2004 SEP 07 11:37:19

TO: Andy Marshall
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Alternative Futures

I was just re-reading your February 24, 2004 memo (attached). Have you gone ahead and attempted to flesh out several alternative futures? If so, I'd like to see them.

Thanks.

Attach.
02/24/04 Memo from Andy Marshall to SecDef re: Assumptions for Next Two or Three Years

DHR:ss
090704-14

.....
Please respond by 9/10

351

17 Sep 04



DIRECTOR OF
NET ASSESSMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1920 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1920

9/17

R¹

24 February 2004

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Andy Marshall *Acum*

SUBJECT: Assumptions for Next Two or Three Years

Here are my thoughts:

1. Major geo-political structure of the world will be as it is now. A possible Economic/banking crisis in China could affect its relative position some. Therefore, the main uncertainties that should be taken account of in DoD planning concern:

- How the situations in Iraq, Afghanistan, N. Korea play out over the next few years.
- The fate of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Indonesia, Philippines; where governments could change or internal unrest increase. Some changes could be very favorable and others create major problems.
- Large casualty terror events in the U.S., Western Europe.
- Constant high rate of scientific and technological advance leading to some surprises.

2. An effort to flesh out three to four alternative futures could be mounted. A team of people is needed to cover the wide range of knowledge necessary for intelligent speculation.

3

72

W 11- small like class
I-04/012253.
ES-0729

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Military Assistant

14 Sep 04 - 0930


MEMORANDUM FOR USD(P)

SUBJECT: Iraqi calls to Coalition Countries

Sir,

Request proposed "Way Ahead" for DSD to respond to the attached SD snowflake.

Very respectfully,



Sean E. O'Connor
Captain, USN
Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

SUSPENSE 23 Sep 04

cc: DJS

copy to and from

18049

14/ Sep 04

13 Sep 04

14-09-04 12:16 IN

11 sep 2004
scanned

September 13, 2004

2004 SEP 21 11:13:02

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Iraqi calls to Coalition Countries

We need to find opportunities for the Iraqis to call all the Coalition countries and set up a process whereby we can help them do it. They need to connect and say thank you - it is important.

Thanks . .

DHR:as
091304-1

.....
Please respond by _____

1/2/04

13 Sep 04

~~TOP SECRET~~

I-04/016419
ES-1598
December 6, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: Ireland Result

This is inexcusable that this woman caused \$1.5 million in damage but doesn't have to pay for it. I think we ought to look for some alternative places to stop instead of Ireland.

Thanks.

Attach.
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN Cable O 031613Z DEC 04

DHR:dh
120504-13

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

~~TOP SECRET~~

05-12-04 19:00 1H
OSD 20464-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038800

OFFICE OF
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
December 20, 2004
2004 DEC 21 PM 5:10

SUBJECT: Exchange Program

There's an exchange program Ted Stevens is involved in with Jim Billington. It is for young people who are interested in politics. We might want to think about inviting them to the Pentagon sometime and I could talk to them.

DHR:ss
122004-32

000,1

20 DEC 04

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

OFFICE OF
SECRETARY

2004 DEC 21 PM 5:10

000.1

To Powell Moore
From Paul Butler

Powell -

Could you please see
if you can find out what
Secret is referring to here

Thanks

Paul

04

OSD 20499-04

20 DEC 04

DEC 21 2004

TO: Dina Powell
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Joe Rothenberg

040 NASA

Dina,

I don't know this fellow, Rothenberg, but here's a note from Pete Conrad's widow. Pete Conrad was a friend of mine from college and an astronaut, and his wife, Nancy, wrote with this recommendation.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/17/04 Nancy Conrad Letter to SecDef

DHR:ss
122004-48

21 Dec 04

Det 12/20

17 December 2004

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

The purpose of this note is to request your assistance. Let me begin by saying I believed in and admired NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe, and am saddened by his resignation.

There are several names being discussed for his replacement. Among those being discussed is former Associate NASA Administrator for Space Flight Joe Rothenberg. Joe is an old friend of Pete's, and is currently serving as President of our company Universal Spacenetwork. I know Pete discussed this company with you and it gives me great pleasure to tell you the company is alive and well and thriving. I know Pete would want me to do everything possible to bring as much to bear on Joe's appointment as possible. I would therefore like to take this opportunity to briefly state why we (Pete and I) endorse the appointment of Joe Rothenberg.

Joe has the right depth and breadth of NASA experience to deal with the Agencies current challenges. He has the skills and capability to ensure that NASA pursues an appropriately balanced scientific, exploration and aeronautics NASA program that is fiscally responsible, consistent with the President's vision and gains support from a broad constituency. He is a consensus builder and has the respect of the Congress as well as the NASA family and would make an outstanding Administrator.

I appreciate your help in bringing Joe Rothenberg to the attention of the proper parties.

Again thank you for your gracious help with Pete's book and have a wonderful holiday season.

Best regards,

Nancy Conrad

Joseph H Rothenberg
President
Universal Space Network

(b)(6)

Joseph H. Rothenberg's 40-year career spans 21 years in industry and 19 years with NASA. Rothenberg is currently the President and a member of the Board of Directors of Universal Space Network (USN). He was elected to the Board of Directors in 2002 and named President of USN in February 2003. USN is a commercial space operations company that owns and operates global satellite tracking stations for commercial and Government customers. In addition, Rothenberg is an Independent Consultant providing management consulting services to NASA, Universities and Aerospace firms.

Joseph H. Rothenberg retired from NASA in 2001 as the Associate Administrator for Space Flight, a position he held from January 1998. In this position he was responsible for establishing the policies and direction of NASA's space flight and operations programs including the Space Shuttle and International Space Station, space communications, expendable launch services and human exploration of space. In addition, he was responsible for the operation and oversight of NASA's Johnson Space Center, Kennedy Space Center, Stennis Space Center and Marshall Spaceflight Center. Under his tenure the International Space Station began orbital assembly and Human operations, a new Space Shuttle upgrade program was initiated, and a Space Exploration Plan and Technology initiative was put in place. He in partnership with the Associate Administrator for Space Science co-directed the development of a NASA Vision and Strategy for NASA's robotic and Human exploration of space in the 21st century which put in place a conceptual foundation for the 2004 Presidential initiative.

Prior to his assignment as Associate Administrator for Space Flight he was Director of the Goddard Space Flight Center. Rothenberg returned to NASA in April of 1995 as Deputy Director of the Goddard Space Flight Center and was appointed the Director in July of 1995. He was responsible for the space systems development, operations and the scientific research program execution for NASA's Earth orbiting science missions. During his tenure at Goddard he developed a new Strategic Plan for the Center and led the restructure of the Center to transform Goddard from an internally focused organization to a customer focused one. Under his leadership significant changes in organization structure, engineering, procurement and management practices which streamlined the way Goddard carried out it's mission were implemented. He directed a number of new mission technology initiatives including the next generation of Earth Science Satellites, and the Next Generation Space Telescope. In addition he established a large number of new outreach activities which leverage NASA's programs to help increase the math and science literacy of America's students.

Prior to joining Goddard in April 1995, Rothenberg served as Executive Vice President of Computer Technology Associates, Inc., Space Systems Division, McLean, Virginia, and a position he held from February or 1994 to April of 1995. In his short tenure at CTA he successfully led the effort to both acquire business and restructure CTA Space Systems to transform it from a low-technology satellite builder into a high-technology satellite developer.

From 1990 to 1994, he was Associate Director of Flight Projects for the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) at Goddard. In this position, he was responsible for directing all aspects of the HST Project. He is widely recognized in the Aerospace and Space Science community for leading the development and execution of the highly successful first HST on-orbit servicing mission which corrected the telescope's flawed optics.

In 1983, Rothenberg joined NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center as Operations Manager for the HST. He led the NASA team responsible for integrating the ground systems and developing the orbital operations of the HST. In April 1987, he was appointed Chief of the Mission Operations Division under the Mission Operations and Data Systems Directorate at Goddard. In September 1989, he was appointed Deputy Director of Mission Operations and Data Systems at Goddard followed by the 1990 appointment as Associate Director for Flight Projects for the HST. In these positions, he was responsible for the development and operations of the ground and space operational systems from NASA's Scientific Satellites.

From 1981 until 1983, Rothenberg was with Computer Technology Associates where he managed all of the ground system test and operations systems engineering projects. These projects included HST, Solar Maximum Repair Mission, and Space Tracking and Data System Architecture projects.

Rothenberg was with Grumman Aerospace from 1964 until 1981 where he held a variety of project engineering and management positions for hardware development, systems engineering, test and operations for spacecraft, aircraft and submersible research vehicles.

Rothenberg holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Engineering Science and a Master of Science degree in Engineering Management from C. W. Post College of the Long Island University. In addition, in 1997 he was awarded an Honorary Doctorate in Engineering from Stevens Institute of Technology and in 1999 an Honorary Doctorate of Science from the C.W. Post College. He is a member of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics and past president of the Long Island Section of the Instrument Society of America. He was recipient of the NASA Exceptional Service Medal in 1990, in 1994 and 2000 he received NASA Distinguished Service Medals, and, in 1996 and 2001 he received the NASA Outstanding Leadership Medal, in 1994 and 2000 he received Senior Executive Service Presidential Rank Meritorious Executive Awards. In 1997, he received the Presidential Rank Distinguished Executive Award. Rothenberg has also received the National Aviation Association Collier Trophy, the AIAA Goddard Astronautics Award, the National Space Club's Nelson P. Jackson Award, and was inducted into the Smithsonian's Aviation Week and Space Technology Hall of Fame.

DEC 22 2004

TO: Ambassador Zal Khalilzad
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Art Laffer

Art Laffer was in the other day, and he has certainly offered to be of assistance with economic advice in Afghanistan if you think that would be helpful. He is a brilliant economist who was, of course, the author of *The Laffer Curve*. His contact points are attached.

Let me know if he can be helpful.

Thanks.

Attach.
Contact information

DHR:dh
122104-12

Afghanistan

22DEC04

DEC 22 2004

TO: Ambassador John Negroponte

CC: Honorable Colin Powell
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Art Laffer

IRAQ

Art Laffer was in the other day, and he is willing to assist in any way possible with economic advice in Iraq. His contact points are attached. He is a brilliant economist and, of course, the well-known author of *The Laffer Curve*.

Let me know if he can be helpful.

Thanks.

Attach.
Contact information

DHR:dh
122104-10

22 Dec 04

Dr. Art Laffer

POC: Ian McDonough

(b)(6)

DEC 22 2004

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DeA [signature]*
SUBJECT: NID

040

I think that Larry Silberman would be world-class as NID. I don't know if he would do it, but he would be terrific. I believe Studeman is under consideration and is a good man, but Silberman has a background that is broader and deeper.

DHR:ss
122104-5

22 Dec 04

OSD 20511-04

72

file

ATTACHMENT

September 13, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Update on the Jenkins Case

If I am meeting with the President this week, I will need an update on the Jenkins Case.

Thanks.

Attach.
Jenkins Case with President, 09/07/04

DHR:ss
091304-19

.....
Please respond by 9/14/04

DR 9/13

SIR —

You are not meeting w/ POTUS this week, but we'll include for next one-on-one.

Attached is the latest.

v/r Jim

ATTACHMENT

OSD 20530-04

04 9/13

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef _____
USD(P) _____
I-04/012004-AP

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

SUBJECT: Update on SGT Jenkins

- This responds to your September 13 request for an update.
- SGT Jenkins voluntarily surrendered to military control at Camp Zama, Japan on September 11, accompanied by his family and his assigned military defense counsel.
- In-processing is going smoothly.
 - No significant health issues have been noted during initial in-processing.
 - Jenkins and family have been provided temporary lodging on base.
 - Military intelligence officials are available to conduct debriefings.
- Disposition of the charges against SGT Jenkins.
 - Charges against Jenkins for desertion, soliciting other service members to desert, aiding the enemy, and encouraging disloyalty will be referred to trial by court-martial this week. The trial date is unlikely to be before mid-October or early November.
 - Jenkins likely will attempt to negotiate a pre-trial agreement with the court-martial convening authority through his assigned counsel, or choose to contest the charges and stand trial.
- Media interest in SGT Jenkins remains intense, primarily as a human interest story.
 - The public affairs line remains:
 - SGT Jenkins faces serious charges;

- Charges against him will be processed under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
- SGT Jenkins will be afforded all the benefits, rights, and privileges to which he is entitled.

COORDINATION: OGC (pending)

PDASD/ISA _____

DUSD/AP _____

Prepared by: Suzanne Basalla, OSD/ISA-AP,

(b)(6)

December 21, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

cc: GEN John Abizaid
GEN George Casey
Fran Harvey
GEN Pete Schoomaker

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D. A. Rumsfeld*

SUBJECT: Armored Vehicles

451

I would like a report at least three times a week, in writing, setting out what is being done to see that we don't have U.S. Military personnel driving around in Iraq, outside of protected compounds, with vehicles that are not properly armored and protected. The reports should state what the current situation is, what is being done to get to our goal, progress against the goal, and what help is needed to assure the urgency needed.

We know that our troops are vulnerable in much of the country. That being the case, they need appropriate protection. If at any time, in any place, enough armored vehicles are not available, for whatever reason, it is the responsibility of the Commanders to change their tactics, techniques and procedures to fit the armored vehicles available.

If it looks as if they will need more armored vehicles than are available at a given time, they should anticipate that to the extent possible and consider a variety of options, including:

- 1) Putting together a large team of people -- from Iraq or elsewhere -- to bolt armor plate on every vehicle they will need to take outside a protected compound area.

31 Dec 04

- 2) Mounting a massive "Berlin Airlift"-type effort and move a much greater amount of material by air.
- 3) Hiring many more contractors to convoy in materials that may be needed, etc.
- 4) Reducing the number of locations that need to be supplied until the armored vehicles needed are available.
- 5) If nothing else works or if there is a gap, then sharply changing tactics so that fewer vehicles are needed for that period of time.

I am very uncomfortable with the pace at which this is going. We know that vehicles are vulnerable and we know they are less vulnerable with armor. We have known it for some time. It is the task of commanders to adjust tactics, techniques, and procedures to fit the circumstance they find. It is the job of the Services to meet the Commanders' needs as they arise, as promptly as possible. And it is our job to see that we all do our jobs.

I look forward to receiving the reports. I expect the efforts to be significant and executed urgently. I need a date certain – soon – when no U.S. Forces will be traveling in Iraq, outside of protected compounds, in vehicles without appropriate armor.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
122004-16

.....
Please respond by 12/30/04

720
~~FOUO~~

November 5, 2004

2005 OCT 10 11 5:11

TO: David Chu
C C Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Selective Service for the 21st Century

Please take a good look at what they are doing with Selective **Service**, including general registration, maintenance of specific skill lists, and anything else they **are** doing. As we move forward, we may want to significantly change the approach.

327

Please show me some options, including ending it entirely.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
101904-19

.....
Please respond by 12/5/04

~~FOUO~~

5 Nov 04

OSD 20567-05

11-L-0559/OSD/038816

December 21, 2004

TO: ADM Tom Fargo
CC: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Philippine Relief Operations

Your folks have done some good work moving hundreds of thousands of pounds of relief supplies to the Philippines after the tropical storm and associated flooding.

Please pass along my thanks to your team for a job well done.

DHR:dh
122104-20

.....
Please respond by _____

Philippines

OSD 20617-04

21 Dec 04



PERSONNEL AND READINESS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2004 DEC 23 AM 10: 41



ACTION MEMO

December 20, 2004, 12:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: *fa* David S. C. Chu Under Secretary of Defense (P&R)

Charles Bell 12-22-04
(Signature and date)

SUBJECT: Managing Air Force Strength, and Supplemental Funding

- Wanted to offer perspective regarding your October 7 snowflake (Tab A). I believe that a requirement for AF to effect accelerated drawdown would provoke intolerable risk in enlisted accessions (falling from 22K to 12K against a normal 34K intake).
- We are continuing to work with AF to define a range of imaginative programs to balance its force, including needed legislative authority (NDAA'06) to permit shaping of more senior cohorts (years of service 14 plus) approaching retirement.
- Those aberrantly large senior cohorts are a legacy of the way AF executed its early-nineties defense reductions – a strategy that also depressed accessions in favor of careerists -- something we want to avoid in the management of this drawdown.
- I believe that the Department should look for ways to assist the Air Force with financing its end strength in FY 05, to permit a soft yet sure landing at end-FY.05, without further truncating recruiting and generating another legacy of imbalances for the AF of the future.

320.2
20 DEC 04
7 Dec 04

RECOMMENDATION: Allow me, Tina Jonas, and the Air Force to work on funding to avoid the intolerable risk of shrinking enlisted accessions from 34K to 12K.

Attachment
As stated

Prepared by: Mr. Bill Carr Acting DUSD (Military Personnel Policy),

(b)(6)

SECDEF DECISION:
APPROVED *DC* DEC. 30 2004
DISAPPROVED _____
OTHER _____

| | | | |
|----------|----------------|----------------|--|
| MA SD | SMA DSD | 12/29 | |
| TSA SD | SA DSD | 12/28 | |
| EXEC SEC | <i>E</i> 12/27 | <i>E</i> 12/30 | |
| ESR MA | <i>E</i> 12/27 | | |



OSD 20653-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038818

12/27
1030
10/8/04

~~FOUO~~

October 7, 2004

TO: Jim Roche
Gen John Jumper

CC: Gen Dick Myers
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: USAF End Strength

Please give me a monthly update on your efforts to reduce excess end strength, showing me how you are doing relative to the goals you have set for the months ahead.

It would be helpful for me to see the progress on a regular basis.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
100704-12

.....
Please respond by MONTHLY

Paul Butler TO Sec Def
12/28
PUB

~~FOUO~~

~~FOUO~~

10/8/04

October 7, 2004

TO: Jim Roche
Gen John Jumper

CC: Gen Dick Myers
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: USAF End Strength

320.2

Please give me a monthly update on your efforts to reduce excess end strength, showing me how you are doing relative to the goals you have set for the months ahead.

It would be helpful for me to see the progress on a regular basis.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
100704-12

.....
Please respond by MONTHLY

7 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

~~FOUO~~

December 20, 2004

TO: ~~VADM Jim Stavridis~~ LARRY DIRITA
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: List of SOM'd Items

The list you gave me as to what we SOM did not include everything. Please get back to be with a complete list of everything we are SOMing, so I can decide whether or not I want to do that.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
122004-26

.....
Please respond by 12/22/04

Exec Sec ^{12/22}
Capt. Marrioff ~~←~~
Can you assist? This [←] Don B
Capt. Ramby ₁₁

4/13

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20658-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038821

20 Dec 04

TAB A
~~FOUO~~

December 13, 2004 10:08:10

TO: Gen Dick Myers
CC: Fran Harvey
Gordon England
GEN Pete Schoomaker
Gen Mike Hagee
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Komatsu

Attached is an article on Komatsu. It apparently has small armored vehicles.
Please look into it and **get** me an answer fast.

I have obviously been laboring under the delusion that the Services were
responsible for organizing, training and equipping the forces.

Thanks.

Attach.
Brown, Peter. "Need Armor Fast?" *Washington Times*

DHR:dh
121304-13

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/038822

OSD 20709-04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

2004 12 23 10 09 10
CM-2248-04
23 December 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

RAM 12/23

SUBJECT: Komatsu (SF 914)

- **Answer.** In response to your issue (TAB A), the Army (TAB B) and Marine Corps (TAB C) have examined several foreign armored vehicles, to include the Komatsu light armored combat vehicle, for use in Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM.
- **Analysis.** During the review, the Komatsu vehicle was evaluated as a source for rapid procurement. The Army and Marine Corps concluded that the vehicle was in its initial stages of production and there was insufficient data to make an informed procurement decision. Foreign products will continue to be assessed--including the Komatsu--for rapid procurement in support of USCENTCOM requirements.

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments:

As stated

*This is a good issue to put in our J-4's in-basket.
VZ Dick*

Prepared By: Lt Gen Duncan J. McNabb, USAF; Director, J-4;

(b)(6)

December 13, 2004 7:00 PM

TO: Gen **Dick** Myers

CC: Fran **Harvey**
Gordon England
GEN Pete Schoomaker
Gen Mike Hagee

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Komatsu

Attached is an article on Komatsu. It apparently has small armored vehicles. Please look into it and get me an answer fast.

I have obviously been laboring under the delusion that the Services were responsible for organizing, training and equipping the forces.

Thanks.

Attach.

Brown, Peter. "Need Armor Fast?" *Washington Times*

DHR:dh
121304-13

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON DC 20310

INFO MEMO

December 22, 2004, 1:00 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter J. Schoomaker, General, Chief of Staff rmy

For Richard Alody 22/12/04

THRU: Richard B. Myers, General, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Peter Brown Article, "Need Armor Fast?"

- The Army considers all known foreign and domestic sources in satisfying materiel solutions for needed capabilities. To date, we have not found a better alternative than the M1114 Up-Armored HMMWV (UAH) and Armored Security Vehicle (ASV) for the Convoy Protection Platform (CPP) and other selected roles.
- The following vehicles have been/are being considered by the Army for their related mission essential roles:
 - Casspir, RG-31, and Meerkat; South Africa. Procured for current operations.
 - Cougar and Buffalo; Canada. Procured for current operations.
 - Cobra; Turkey. Evaluated, but not used.
 - VBL; France. Evaluated, but not used.
 - Dingo, Mungo and Husky; Germany. Husky procured for current operations. Information requested on Dingo and Mungo manufacturers.
- Limited information is available on the JGSDF (Japanese Ground Self Defense Force) Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) produced by Komatsu Ltd. The JGSDF LAV is in the early stages of production and its characteristics are unknown. The Army will continue to pursue contacting Komatsu to properly assess the vehicle's capabilities.
- PM Tactical Vehicles published an armor sources sought in the FedBizOps on October 1, 2003.
- Since October 2003, the Army has tested 207 different armor solutions from 40 vendors. The Army evaluated and is producing 12 add-on-armor (AoA) kits for our Light, Medium, and Heavy truck fleet. The 12 kits are in production at six depots and

11-L-0559/OSD/038825

SUBJECT: Peter Brown Article, "Need Armor Fast?"

five corporate locations. As of December 15, 2004 we have produced 13,845 kits. In addition, the Army projected production of 8,105 UAH vehicles by April 2005 with the current production rate of 450 per month. The recent modification to accelerate production to 550 per month provides additional UAH vehicles beginning in March.

- In addition to armoring solutions, the Army continues to modify tactics, techniques, and procedures to preclude Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks.
- Additional information regarding the other vehicles procured and those evaluated but not procured is provided as follows:
 - o Casspir, RG-31, and Meerkat; South Africa. One Casspir and one RG-31 have been purchased and are being evaluated by the Army's Rapid Equipping Force (REF). PM Close Combat Systems (PM CCS) is purchasing 148 RG-31s as a medium mine protected vehicle. There are 2 in Iraq, 5 in Afghanistan and 141 systems yet to be produced. PM CCS is purchasing 39 Meerkat vehicles as the Interim Vehicle Mounted Mine Detector (IVMMD). There are 6 in Iraq, 3 in Afghanistan and 30 systems yet to be produced.
 - o Cougar and Buffalo; Canada. The USMC purchased 16 Cougars. The PM CCS is purchasing 46 of the Buffalo as the Ground Standoff Mine Detection System (GSTAMIDS Block 0). There are 11 in Iraq, 3 in Afghanistan and 32 systems yet to be produced.
 - o Cobra; Turkey. The Cobra was formally evaluated for Special Operations. The vehicle did not meet payload and survivability requirements and was not purchased.
 - o VBL; France. The Army evaluated the VBL. The VBL was similar to the HMMWV. The VBL was evaluated but due to human factor issues was not considered for additional analysis.
- Dingo, and Mungo; Germany. The Army has contacted the Dingo and Mungo producers and requested information on these products. Textron, under license from KWI, is going to produce a Dingo2 that they would like the U.S. Army to consider. However, Textron does not yet have the production line up and running. The Mungo is a light armored airborne vehicle that would require additional armor protection for US Army application.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: LTC Jeffrey Voigt,

(b)(6)

CF: Secretary of the Army

TAB C



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3000 MARINE CORPS PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-3000

INFORMATION PAPER

16 December 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General M. W. Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps *WHL for*

SUBJECT: Response to Komatsu Snowflake

- Komatsu Armored vehicle
 - The Marine Corps **has** procured no armored vehicles from Komatsu Defense LTD.
 - However, the Komatsu armored vehicle (at Tab A) was considered twice as a candidate for procurement, once for a Convoy Escort Vehicle and the second time for a Hardened Engineer Vehicle. In both instances the vehicle was identified as a "developmental item" and therefore not considered a viable candidate for urgent requirements that targeted fielding time lines of six months or less.
 - Of note, a third opportunity to evaluate the Komatsu is on going; a Request for Information was released **for** a Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle requirement last Friday, 10 Dec. All vendor responses, domestic and foreign, are due NLT 15 Jan 05. Komatsu, along with other foreign vendors, will be made aware of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle RFI.
 - We will continue to investigate foreign products, **like** the Komatsu vehicle, that can be rapidly procured to support OIF requirements.
- Organizing, Training, and Equipping the Forces
 - 1 MEF deployed to Iraq in March 2004 for OIF II. This force was well prepared for operations - 100% of its vehicles had armor protection and each Marine had the best personnel protective equipment available.
 - Attached is an earlier memo **from** Assistant Secretary Young (Tab B) that highlights the successful efforts to equip Marine forces.

Tabs: as stated

Prepared by: Mr. Steven J. Manchester, Director, International Programs,

(b)(6)

Tab C


11-L-0559/OSD/038827

TAB (A) – Komatsu Armored Vehicle Photos



Japan has gone to Iraq with a new armored vehicle called, the "Light Armored Combat Vehicle." The 4.5 ton vehicle has been in development until recently. The vehicle is 13.8 feet long and normally carries four troops. It can mount a 12.7mm machine-gun or an automatic 40mm grenade launcher.

December 14, 2004

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld / General Myers
FROM: - John Young 
SUBJECT: MARINE CORPS VEHICLE ARMOR

BEFORE the Marine Corps I MEF force crossed the line of departure into Iraq in March, 2004, the Marine Corps had armor for 100% of its 3000+ vehicles. The armor, a quick application of 3/16" steel, was installed on 90% of the HMMWV's and MTRV's. The Marine Corps also had 37 up-armored HMMWV's. The Marine Corps acquisition and logistics system assembled over 1,800 sets of the interim 3/16" armor kits within six weeks of receiving the execute order to provide armor for the MEF prior to it rolling across the line of departure. Similarly, all Marine Corps helicopters were equipped with Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE) countermeasures for deployment. Finally, every Marine in Iraq has, and has always had, personal protection gear (Outer Tactical Vests, Small Arms Protective Insert (SAPI) plates, ear plugs, and safety glasses).

The Department next identified additional reprogramming funds and upgraded all vehicle armor kits to Marine depot built 3/8" rolled homogeneous armor (RHA) by September, 2004. We used an effort called Operation Respond, supplemented by the Marine Corps' Urgent Universal Needs Statement process, to identify the urgent needs of the Marines as well as to force the naval enterprise to identify funds. In excess of \$520 million was reprogrammed to meet over 120 requirements for deployed Marines. These initiatives included additional armor kits, IED jamming devices, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) robots, dogs for IED detection, gunner's shields, unmanned air and ground vehicles, ballistic goggles, body armor extensions for extremity protection, communications gear, and language translation equipment. Through dedicated leadership and Operation Respond, the naval acquisition team equipped the Marines with every needed, available solution.

cc: Secretary England

Tab C

TAB (5)

11-L-0559/OSD/038829

TAB D

COORDINATION PAGE

| Name | Agency | Date |
|---------------------------------|---------|------------------|
| The Honorable Francis J. Harvey | SECARMY | 16 December 2004 |
| General Schoomaker | CSA | 16 December 2004 |
| General Hagee | CMC | 16 December 2004 |

7201

~~FOUO~~

cc: [unclear]

December 9, 2004 5:48

I-04/016724
ES-1660

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Powell Moore
FROM:
SUBJECT: Congressional ~~Letter~~

Please see if you can find out why Lantos and Shays sent this letter on Jordan to me instead of to Colin Powell.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/3/04 Lantos and Shays ltr to SecDef

DFR:dh
120904-24

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

~~FOUO~~

A
SECURITY INFORMATION
2004 DEC 27 PM 5:47

INFO MEMO

I-04/016724
ES-1660

DepSecDef
USDP For Rodman
DEC 27 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) PR 22 DEC 2004

SUBJECT: Letter on Jordan from Congressmen Lantos and Shays

- You asked us why Congressmen Lantos and Shays sent you a letter about additional funding for Jordan border security, instead of sending it to SecState Powell.
- Based on our discussions with Lantos' office and (previous discussions) with the Jordanian Embassy we understand that the letter was sent to you because the Jordanians believe that the most likely source of additional U.S. funding for the integrated border security program they seek (known as C4ISR) is the FY04 \$25B Iraq Supplemental.
- A similar letter may eventually be sent to SecState Powell.
- We have been told by ^{OSD} ExecSec that a response to Congressmen Lantos and Shays is being drafted by ASD Wells' office (Networks and Information Integration).

Prepared by: David Schenker, Levant Director, (b)(6)

DUSD (NESAS) [Signature]

PDASD (ISA) aw DEC 22 2004

~~FOUO~~

December 9, 2004 5:48

I-04/016724
ES-1660

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Powell Moore
FROM:
SUBJECT: Congressional Letter

Please see if you can find out why Lantos and Shays sent this letter on Jordan to me instead of to Colin Powell.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/3/04 Lantos and Shays ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
120904-24

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

~~FOUO~~

(b)(6)

0001
12/3/04

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

December 3, 2004

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
The Pentagon 20301

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

As you know, Jordan is making outstanding contributions to the war on terrorism. Thanks to these efforts and to its programs of political, economic, and educational reform - Jordan is emerging as a Middle Eastern model in fighting terror root-and- We, the undersigned, are particularly impressed with Jordan's initiatives to prevent terrorism on both its Iraqi and Israeli borders.

Accordingly, we are deeply disturbed by reports that there has been an increase in arms-smuggling and terrorist infiltration on Jordan's other borders this year and, moreover, that Jordan lacks adequate means to deal with this problem as effectively as possible. Needless to say, terrorist infiltrators into Jordan from these borders pose a serious threat to U.S. interests, whether transiting on their way to Israel or seeking to attack Jordan itself. It would hardly be surprising that Jordan's very achievements in the war on terrorism would make the kingdom a desirable target for destabilization by extremists. The incident last April in which Jordanian security forces interdicted Syria-origin, Zarqawi-affiliated terrorists plotting to attack multiple sites in Jordan, including the U.S. Embassy, is only the best-known example of this problem.

As strong supporters of both Jordan and the war against terrorism, we would like to urge that the United States Government, and you personally, do whatever is possible to assist Jordan in combating this growing scourge. In particular, we suggest that the U.S. help to secure Jordan's borders by supporting a comprehensive security approach, including increased support for an ongoing project to establish the technology-based, integrated border security system known as C4ISR.

| SECDEF CABLES DISTRIBUTION | | | | | |
|----------------------------|--|--|--|--|-------------------------------------|
| SECDEF | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DEPSIC | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SPL ASST | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DDC/SEC | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> USDP | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
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| CAF | | | | | |

(b)(6)

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
December 3, 2004
Page Two

As you prepare to meet King Abdullah next week, we want you to know that you have our encouragement and support to exercise your authority to expend such sums as necessary and appropriate, consistent with U.S. interests, in order to accomplish this goal expeditiously.

Thank you for consideration. We would welcome the opportunity to work with you on this issue.

Sincerely,



CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, MC



TOM LANTOS, MC

December 8, 2004
04/016556
ES-1614

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM:
SUBJECT: Trainers for NATO in Iraq

Iraq

I saw the Secretary General of NATO. He said he wants 10 to 15 trainers for Iraq and have the US supply them. Would you please take a look into it and get back to me?

Thanks.

DHR:db
120804-8

.....
Please respond by 12/21/04

SD SNOWFLAKE
RESPONSE FROM
POLICY
Ln CCB - What is
?
OSD 20788-04 *thx Tim*

8 Dec 04

03-12-04 A OSD 20788-04

720
TAB

~~FOUO~~

DEC 20 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
CC: Fran Harvey
Gordon England
Jim Roche
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT Troops and Equipment

I'd like to have you recommend a team we could put together to continuously monitor whether the troops in the field have the equipment they need;

It's the responsibility of the Services to organize, train and equip the troops. They need to see that it is done well.

When the President asked the Combatant Commanders if they had everything they needed and were prepared, they all answered that they had everything they needed and were prepared.

If the circumstances on the ground change and they need additional things, they need to say so, the Services need to respond, and you and I need to be told.

Please let me know what you feel we should do to see that that happens.

Thank you.

DHR:ms
121304-29

.....
Please respond by 12/22/04

~~FOUO~~

Tab

OSD 20815-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038837



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

OK
7/14

INFO MEMO

December 23, 2004, 7:00 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSecDef Action _____

FROM: Francis J. Harvey

SUBJECT: Troops and Equipment, 20 December 2004

- Over the course of the Global War on Terrorism, the Army has developed a number of complementary organizations and associated processes to rapidly address the warfighter's critical Operational needs. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) aggressively solicits from deployed/deploying commanders their operational requirements. Field commanders submit these requirements to HQDA and their entire chain-of-command utilizing Operational Needs Statements (ONS).
- On a weekly basis, the Army Requirements and Resourcing Board (AR2B), composed of Army Staff 3-star principals validates and prioritizes requirements from the field; immediately develops resourcing strategies; and monitors execution. The AR2B has processed 2,598 ONS since October 2002. The peacetime average is less than 12 a year.
- The AR2B also provides the Army's connectivity to the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, as this body works to address immediate warfighter needs.
- The Army G-3/5/7 chairs a weekly Secret Video-Teleconference, which brings together HQDA 3-star principals with the leadership of every Army Major Command and Central Command (CENTCOM). This senior leader forum clarifies theater warfighting issues and identifies emerging operational requirements.
- Complementing this effort, HQDA has established liaison teams with deployed/deploying Army Divisions to provide continuous communication with the Army Staff. These teams are responsible to insure the Army addresses unit requirements in a timely and effective manner.
- Over the past several years, the Army has proceeded with a series of initiatives to meet the field's requirements:
 - o The Rapid Equipping Force (REF) has the broad charter of rapidly increasing the mission capability of the warfighter while reducing the risk to Soldiers and others. One half of the REF is forward in theater, with teams dispatched to every division in Iraq. They take their operational guidance from the Army G-3/5/7 and report directly to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.

SUBJECT: Troops and Equipment, 20 December 2004

- o In October 2003, the Army G-3 established an Army Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Task Force to lead the Army's effort against the IED threat. This Task Force formed the basis for the Joint IED Defeat Task Force. It is heavily engaged in theater and is already providing significant solutions for Joint and Coalition forces.
- o The Army established a Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM) program to develop an integrated solution to this problem and distribute it to the force by the 2nd quarter of fiscal year 2005. This solution will be integrated across existing Army, as well as Air Force and Marine, command and control systems.
- o The Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) leverages current programs and commercial off-the-shelf technology to provide the Soldier with increased capabilities. The Army has prioritized the RFI equipment list directly from Soldier feedback. Since June 2004, all brigade combat teams and nearly 85% of other units are being fielded RFI equipment at home station 70-80 days prior to deployment.
- a The recently formed Armoring Task Force, led by the Army G-8, has the mission of identifying and anticipating armoring requirements, and then determining ways to accelerate production/installation of armor solutions, to include expanding the supplier base.
- In the last several months, the Chief of Staff of the Army directed a team of HQDA 3-star principals, led by the Army G-3/5/7, to visit all divisions (Active and Reserve) as they prepare to deploy. The purpose of these visits is to ensure the Army Staff shares a common operating picture of what equipment, personnel, and command and control systems these units will receive prior to deployment, and what they will receive once they arrive into theater. Capability gaps identified are addressed immediately with the AR2B process.

RECOMMENDATION Since the Army Requirements and Resourcing Board (AR2B) is the Army's synchronizing body for these multiple efforts that continuously monitor what the Soldier in the field needs, I recommend this board should be the Army element in any joint team that is formed.

COORDINATION: NONE.

Prepared By: LTC Aidis Zunde, (b)(6)

CF: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CM-2250-04
27 December 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS ~

McNabb ~ ~ ~ ~

SUBJECT: Troops and Equipment (SF 917)

- **Answer.** In response to your issue (TAB), and consistent with your 22 December meeting with Lt Gen McNabb, the Director for Logistics/DJ-4 is forming a Fusion Cell/Engine Room to integrate the efforts of my staff, combatant commanders, Services and Defense agencies to rapidly support urgent warfighting needs.
- **Analysis.** The new cell will achieve mission success by:
 - Integrating all efforts to resource and protect deployed troops.
 - Reporting critical wartime requirements from identification through final resolution.
 - Ensuring a sense of urgency across all production and industrial base capabilities, technology initiatives, acquisition avenues, transportation assets and concepts of operation.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General Duncan J. McNabb, USAF; Director, J-4;

(b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

-TAB

~~FOUO~~

DEC 20 2004

TO: Gen ~~Dick~~ Myers

CC: ~~Fran~~ Harvey
Gordon England
~~Jim~~ Roche

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Troops and ~~Equipment~~

I'd like to have you recommend a team we could put together ~~to continuously~~ monitor whether the troops in the field ~~have~~ the equipment they need.

It's ~~the~~ responsibility of the Services ~~to organize, train~~ and equip the troops. They need to see ~~that it is~~ done well.

When ~~the~~ President asked the Combatant Commanders if they had ~~everything~~ they needed ~~and were~~ prepared, they ~~all~~ answered ~~that~~ they had everything ~~they~~ needed and were ~~prepared~~.

If ~~the~~ circumstances on the ~~ground~~ change ~~and they~~ need additional ~~things~~, they need to ~~say so~~, the Services need to respond, ~~and you~~ and I need to be told.

Please let ~~me know what~~ you feel we should do to see ~~that that~~ happens.

Thank you.

DHR:es
121304-29

.....
Please respond by 12/22/04

~~FOUO~~

Tab

OSD 20815-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038841

31
6627

~~FOUO~~

February 28, 2005

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Response to the Gavriels

Please have someone draft an appropriate post-Iraqi election letter to the Gavriels, if we have not already done so.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/12/04 Gavriel ltr to SecDef [OSD 20826-04]

DHR:dh
022805-10

.....
Please respond by 3/10/05

293

28 Feb 05

12 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

Chris & Penelope Gavriel

(b)(6)

December 12, 2004

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Parents want to watch their children grow, mature, and create their own legacy. Losing them along the way is almost an alien thought.

In Dimitri, both his Mom and I were blessed to watch a smart, restive boy grow into a man of substance, a disciplined goal-setter, a loving son, a brother, a friend, an accomplished athlete, an occasional prankster, a lover of life and challenges, a poet, a dreamer, an intellectual, an idealist, a leader, a true patriot and now an American hero.


Dimitri was accomplished. From an honor student and stellar athlete in high school, to an Ivy League and Division I wrestler, to the best in Wall Street, and finally *Semper Fidelis*, the honor of the Marines and service to our country, volunteered unselfishly in the midst of two wars, he forged his legacy.

As a first generation American, he wanted to give back to his country for the blessings he and his family received. He became a marine's marine and wanted to validate his courage, honor, and valor. He was affected by the September 11 attack, having lived it in New York City as it was unfolding, losing fraternity brothers in the towers as they collapsed. Great honor was bestowed upon him by our country and all who knew him for he proudly served us all and made the ultimate sacrifice. He was awarded two Purple Hearts. He is now forever in the Marines family and in our hearts; he will be missed.

In this, the darkest time of our lives, we are ever grateful for your overwhelming support, thoughts, and kindness. Your letter provides solace to us for he has touched your heart.

Please, keep Dimitri and all who have sacrificed for our country in your prayers. As parents of a fallen soldier, we look forward to see a Democratic Iraq become a reality, a noble cause worthy of their sacrifice. As he never questioned the war but strongly felt the calling of his country in that mission, we can only hope that it will become "mission accomplished" so that his and so many other souls sacrificed may rest in peace.

Sincerely,



Chris & Penelope Gavriel

OK
2/28



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

November 29, 2004

Mr. and Mrs. Chris Gavriel

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Gavriel,

I am very sorry to learn of the loss of your son. There is nothing anyone can do or say to ease your pain, but please know that you are in my thoughts during this difficult time.

Lance Corporal Dimitrios Gavriel made lasting contributions to the cause of freedom. He served his nation with honor. His devotion and integrity will not be forgotten.

I extend my heartfelt condolences.

With deepest sympathy,

OSD 19169-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038844



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JAN 28 2005

Mr. and Mrs. Chris Gavriel

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. & Mrs. Gavriel,

Senator Kennedy was kind enough to send me a copy of the letter you wrote him about your son, Lance Corporal Dimitri Gavriel. It is clear from your words that he was a remarkable young man who lived his life with integrity and honor, whether on Wall Street or on the battlefield.

His efforts came at a most important moment in our history, reminding us that America is free because so many are willing to serve. I count Lance Corporal Gavriel among the noble ranks of those who fought to preserve and protect that freedom, and join a grateful nation in saluting him.

Please know that I continue to keep you and your family in my thoughts and prayers.

Sincerely,

this
ltr
answers
SAMPLE

3355D

28

05

4 JAN 05

OSD 01091-05

11-L-0559/OSD/038845

Mr. and Mrs. Chris Gavriel

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. & Mrs. Gavriel,

I know that this is a most difficult time for you and your family, and it was so thoughtful of you to send me a letter.

As I said in my earlier correspondence, your son was an honorable man who was dedicated to the cause of freedom. Lance Corporal Dimitri Gavriel played an important part in helping make it possible for Iraqis to vote in their first free elections in over three decades. Now, their nation is on the road to building a democracy. Your son's service has historic meaning, for with the spread of democracy comes the promise of a safer world. His sacrifice was not made in vain.

Please know that I continue to keep you and your family in my prayers.

With my very best wishes,

Sincerely,

*Prep for
Sealed
signature*

Paul Brown
3/11

* to [unclear] [unclear]
to [unclear] [unclear]
to [unclear] [unclear] Kennedy (he sent a
message to them from them to him)
to [unclear] [unclear] from [unclear] in
response to Kennedy [unclear]

James
CSC 3/11



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JAN 28 2005

335 SA

The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy

(b)(6)

Dear Ted:

I received your note forwarding Chris and Penelope Gavriel's letter about their son, Lance Corporal Dimitri Gavriel. Lance Corporal Gavriel was an outstanding young man and dedicated Marine – truly one of America's finest.

Thank you for sharing it with me.

Sincerely,

28

05

4

5

OSD 01091-05

11-L-0559/OSD/038847

Chris & Penelope Gavriel

(b)(6)

December 12, 2004

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Parents want to watch their children grow, mature, and create their own legacy. Losing them along the way is almost an alien thought.

In Dimitri, both his Mom and I were blessed to watch a smart, restive boy grow into a man of substance, a disciplined goal-setter, a loving son, a brother, a friend, an accomplished athlete, an occasional prankster, a lover of life and challenges, a poet, a dreamer, an intellectual, an idealist, a leader, a true patriot and now an American hero.


Dimitri was accomplished. From an honor student and stellar athlete in high school, to an Ivy League and Division I wrestling, to the best in Wall Street, and finally *Semper Fidelis*, the honor of the Marines and service to our country, volunteered unselfishly in the midst of two wars, he forged his legacy.

As a first generation American, he wanted to give back to his country for the blessings he and his family received. He became a marine's marine and wanted to validate his courage, honor, and valor. He was affected by the September 11 attack, having lived it in New York City as it was unfolding, losing fraternity brothers in the towers as they collapsed. Great honor was bestowed upon him by our country and all who knew him for he proudly served us all and made the ultimate sacrifice. He was awarded two Purple Hearts. He is now forever in the Marines family and in our hearts; he will be missed.

In this, the darkest time of our lives, we are ever grateful for your overwhelming support, thoughts, and kindness. Your letter provides solace to us for he has touched your heart.

Please, keep Dimitri and all who have sacrificed for our country in your prayers. As parents of a fallen soldier, we look forward to see a Democratic Iraq become a reality, a noble cause worthy of their sacrifice. As he never questioned the war but strongly felt the calling of his country in that mission, we can only hope that it will become "mission accomplished" so that his and so many other souls sacrificed may rest in peace.

Sincerely,



Chris & Penelope Gavriel

~~FOUO~~

DEC 28 2004

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D. Rumsfeld*

SUBJECT: Richard McCormick

I received this letter from Richard McCormick at CSIS. He is clearly interested in doing something in the Administration - I wouldn't know where, but he seems to feel that you know him.

I'll leave it in your hands.

Thank you.

Attach.
10/04 McCormack Letter to SecDef

DHR:as
122704-8

230,02

28 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20863-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038849



Center for Strategic & International Studies
Washington, DC

OK 12/28



The Hon-Donald Rumsfeld


Oct, 2004

Dear Don:

Remembering our trip to China together four years ago, I thought you might be interested in the results of a trip that Herman organized in August involving Newt Gingrich and myself.

I later went to Japan and Taiwan and presented this report at **CSIS**.

With every good wish;

Sincerely:

Richard McCormack

P.S. Thank you also for your past efforts to involve me in the Administration. Don, this will never happen unless it is handled directly at the level of the Vice President. At the lower levels, there are simply too many people protective of the status quo.



Center for Strategic & International Studies
Washington, DC

Presentation to CSIS Sept. 28, 2004.

Richard McCormack*

UNCERTAINTIES IN CHINA'S ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND THE
BROADER PROBLEM OF GLOBAL IMBALANCES.

SUMMARY

China's problems and vulnerabilities cannot be understood unless viewed in a broader economic and political context.

Unsustainable economic imbalances, including those involving **China**, are gradually increasing the dangers to the long-term health of the world economy. Other economic and **political** problems, including rising **oil** prices and America's 700 billion dollar **annual** trade deficit, add to these uncertainties. Wise statesmanship and some important policy changes are needed.

KEY ISSUES INVOLVING CHINA

Earlier **this** spring, there was a lot of discussion in **Washington** about whether China would experience a hard or **soft** landing of its overheated economy. **So** to take a deeper look at this question, I visited **China** in August, with **former** speaker Newt Gingrich, to talk with central **bankers**, members of the Central Committee, **key** officials and investors.

This was my 8th trip to China since 1983. To **see** the continual improvement in ordinary peoples' lives **since** those early years is a heartening confirmation of **many** hopes **and** the result of much hard work, both in **Washington** and much more importantly in **China** itself. The large number of **hungry** and ill-dressed children that you earlier saw in every city in China is now largely a thing of the past. *All* involved need to make sure it stays that way.

After visiting China in early **August**, I traveled to Japan and **Taiwan** to meet with other senior people from the public and private sectors to learn how **China's** prospects looked **from** the perspective of these neighboring locations.

1800 K Street Northwest • Washington DC 20006 • Telephone 202/887-0200 Fax: 202/775-3 199 • WEB:
<http://www.csis.org/>

11-L-0559/OSD/038851

The bottom line **from** these consultations suggested **that** China would, in fact, engineer a **soft** landing, with growth falling from its present **9-13** per cent rate, depending on whose numbers **you** believe, to somewhere near **7%** in 2005.

But many of these experts reported an **unusually** large number of downside possibilities that could result in a Chinese economic crash landing. I'm going to list some of these wild cards in the deck for your own evaluation.

There are obvious **strains** in global oil markets. A spike in oil prices would cause serious problems for China. **China has** only **15** days of reserve oil supplies, **as** opposed to **90** days' reserve in the **U.S.** strategic stockpile. Any spike in global oil prices **that was sustained** for any length of time would obviously savage global equity markets, including those in the **U.S.**, China's **principal** export market. For an economy so massively driven by foreign trade, the economic health of **China's** overseas markets will have a critical impact on China's economy.

There are serious tensions in China between the experts in the **central bank** and **finance ministry** and many of the **regional** political leaders over the pace and direction of the cooling off process. Leaders in the central and western parts of China, where living standards **are** only about **1/10** those of the richer coastal province, resent the pressure **from** Beijing to cancel or delay their own investment and growth plans **as** part of the **national** campaign to prevent overheating and over capacity **problems from** spiraling out of control. The result of this tension **has** been a delay in the **full** implementation of Beijing's overall economic program to address the overheating problem.

China doesn't have the financial instruments of more advanced economies, **such as** deep bond and other financial markets, to fine-tune economic growth. They have to depend upon reserve requirements in banks and credit allocation by category and by geographical area. They **also** have to rely on compliance by **unruly** and sometimes corrupt regional leaders to carry out **the** edicts from the Center. But forbidden steel factories and golf courses are still emerging in China, according to Morgan Stanley's Andy Xie, which **add** up to more credit and monetary creation than China's Central **Bank** would like, generating more overheating **and** excess capacity problems.

Statistics in **China** are not always reliable, although they are better than they were ten years ago, thanks to help from the IMF and **other** experts mobilized by the Central **Bank**. The problem comes not just from bad news that the government considers a crime to report in the **media**, but more pervasively, **from** the distortions that flow **from** reporting **from** the provinces and are collected at the center. Naturally, provincial authorities wishing to **keep** their **jobs**, like to report to Beijing that edicts **and** goals are being fully complied with. **This**, however, is often not true. When you add up the individual inaccuracies and fudging, to produce a national statistic on growth, or even monetary creation, you can get major distortions in your statistical base.

There are 150,000 State owned enterprises in **China**. If you think Enron's **books** were not always models of probity, can you imagine the disparities between the published statistics on **these** companies, and the actual economic health of many of them? **Can you also** imagine what collective distortions appear when you multiply the fudging in **the** reports of individual companies by 150,000? **This** is particularly true of profit and loss statements, asset estimates, company debt and contingent liabilities, pension problems, etc. according to many close observers of the scene. **This has** important implications for **China's** banks, which for decades have **been** providing loans to these state **owned** enterprises to keep them afloat. These bad loans continue to accumulate inside the Chinese banking **system**. It is not clear that the published statistics dealing with **this** problem are totally candid, nor that the problems involving **China's** overall banking system are going to be improved a year or two from now, notwithstanding Chinese efforts to purge some of the bad loans from certain categories of banks.

IMPORTANT CURRENCY ISSUES

The Chinese currency **has** been pegged to the dollar at a **fixed** rate **since 1995**. **This** currency peg is favorable to China **as an** export platform, and linked **as** it is to currency regimes elsewhere in Asia, helps undermine the whole purpose of the floating exchange rate system, which was to permit an orderly, **gradual** and automatic adjustment between surplus and deficit countries on trade accounts. By **contrast**, **China's** present **highly** competitive currency **situation** and its impact on other currencies is intensifying the global imbalances and creating **an** ultimately unsustainable situation. In the case of **China**, a dollar-linked currency, -combined with the inexpensive labor, **has** resulted in a massive **annual** increase in exports and foreign and domestic investment. Investment **and** exports **at** this rate are seen by the Chinese **as** critical to **sustain** **China's** over all economic growth and stability. Additional export-linked investment also increases the **already** existing dependence of this huge **national** economy on foreign trade **as** the primary driver of China's growth.

What are the problems with this arrangement?

Because of the central role of **China as** the hub and assembly point for much of the East **Asian** economy, neighboring countries like Thailand are forced to intervene massively in the **currency** markets to **maintain** their own de facto dollar **pegs**. In Thailand's case, **this** is generating excess monetary creation, **and** growing inflation. Thailand is not an isolated example.

Many of the countries of East Asia are thus being pushed into **a** de facto currency bloc, regardless of the local economic circumstances in each of the different countries. **Price** competition in **China's** inter and **intra** regional trade is incredibly fierce, **and** profit margins very narrow. **Those** countries now part of the growing hub and spokes economic system built around China **are** forced to toe the currency line imposed by **China's** standard to keep their products competitive. Even Japan is not immune from **this** pressure and will be more **so** in the **future as** **China** produces more **and** more high technology products for the global market. China **will** **also** inevitably gradually increase

its share of value added with the products now assembled from regional imports for export market destinations.

The bottom line here is that any currency adjustments in Asia will have to begin with one involving China. Until that happens, mounting pressures may continue to build at a different rate in different parts of this China centered system. The great value of a floating exchange rate is that it allows pressures to be released at a gradual pace. Otherwise you have a pressure cooker with the safety valve stuck, and this is a dangerous utensil, as history has repeatedly demonstrated.

Distortions and monetary policy problems from the current dollar peg also impact China directly. Last year over a 12 month period, intervention by the Bank of China to sustain the dollar peg in the face of market pressures exceeded 200 billion dollars. This eventually drew the wrath of the U.S. Treasury, which became uncomfortable with the vulnerabilities of direct Central Bank intervention on this scale. The Japanese Central Bank adopted similar tactics on a similar scale. In China, however, this massive Central Bank activity, which was not sterilized by contractions elsewhere, had the result of generating excessive monetary creation, with M2 exceeding 25% for a period of time. This was a sure recipe for overheating and potential future inflation. The Central Bank eventually found other market related means to sustain the dollar peg, namely encouraging local insurance companies and others with surplus cash or credit to invest abroad, or purchase such assets as commodities to soak up excess dollars.

This favorable exchange rate has helped allow China to expand her exports by 46%, year on year from June of 2004. This massive compound annual increase in exports has continued at an ever-expanding pace for years. This explosive increase in exports contributes to both economic and political problems for China's main export destination country, namely the U.S. If President Bush loses this presidential election, disaffected, unemployed, and worried manufacturing workers and their families in places like Ohio and Pennsylvania will be an important reason for his defeat. If present relative currency and competitiveness conditions continue, these economic and political pressures are unlikely to ease in the years ahead. That means future problems in Congressional and Presidential elections, and steady increases in the political pressure on Washington to deal with this situation.

There are safeguard provisions in China's WTO access agreement which could allow countries like the U.S. to limit the future pace of export expansion in some situations. Even the articles of the IMF have a balance of payments provision allowing countries with dangerous payments problems to take special measures to correct the situation.

China's overall trade is of course in balance. The problem is that neither China's nor the Asian regional trade nor the rest of the world's trade with America is balanced. This comes partly from the Chinese currency linkage to the dollar that prevents China's competitors and component suppliers from allowing their own currencies to float.

SOARING AMERICAN TRADE DEFICITS

The U.S. current account deficit is now approaching 700 billion dollars per year, nearly 6 % of **our** GNP(See attachment). That means the **U.S. must** attract each and every day two billion dollars in loans and investments to fill the gap in its current accounts. Concern over how much longer a current account deficit of **this** magnitude is sustainable is rapidly rising around the world. **What** will happen to **China's** growth and highly leveraged new export oriented factories if a future Secretary of Treasury repeats what Secretary Baker did in 1985 when he deemed the then 90 billion dollar **U.S. current** accounts problem dangerous for the long term economic and political health of the **united** states.

Long term, massive, current accounts deficits create long term debt to foreigners that must be **serviced**, ultimately by exports of goods and services. President Reagan and Secretary Baker moved vigorously to implement a program to address this problem. They began by **talking** down the dollar and gradually added a number of important but **controversial** macro and micro economic measures **aimed** strengthening U.S. competitiveness and its current **'accounts'** position. These **measures** and others, for a time, brought U.S. current accounts into balance. There were **also** unintended consequences **from** part of this major **shift** in policies, which included a linkage between **G-7** monetary policies and relative currency rates that may have contributed to the 1987 stock market crash. During the decade that followed, a **far** worse long term deterioration resumed. After more than **a** decade of neglecting this problem, America's net debt now **amounts** to **trillions** of dollars. New trade agreements provided little help, notwithstanding all the speeches to the contrary.

Looking at this problem, officials from the Treasury Department **and** those **from** the White House Trade Office sometimes privately point to each other **as** being mainly responsible for America's out of control trade deficits. The one side cites inappropriate macro economic and currency policies. The other points to weakly enforced and poorly crafted trade deals. Many neutral observers believe that America needs both macro and micro economic remedial measures.

At least, on currency ratios, the **status** quo seems very unlikely to continue much longer. Should a future dollar crisis develop, **China** is unlikely to be allowed to retain its current dollar **peg**, forcing **the** full brunt of the adjustment onto the **Euro** and **other** currencies which freely float.

If existing relative competitive conditions continue, including currency ratios and inadequate enforcement of WTO rules, additional investment decisions relocating **U.S. manufacturing** plants and crating new export facilities in **China** and elsewhere will undoubtedly occur. **This** means even more pressure on **U.S. current** accounts and more long term debt. When any eventual **dollar** crisis does come, perhaps triggered by loss of faith in future macro economic policies, or by a sudden economic shock of some **kind**, the adjustment difficulties for all involved could be very great indeed.

FACING THE PROBLEMS

No one should underestimate for a moment the complications and difficulties that could accompany an effort by officials to deal with global economic **imbalances**, including possibly some highly negative unintended consequences. At the very least, adjustment pain **and** transitional impact on **financial** markets **could** be highly unsettling. It **is**, however, unlikely to be any less painful if we wait until the **U.S.** accumulates another trillion or two dollars of net debt through continuation of the **status quo**. It just means that the **U.S.** will have a deeper hole **to dig out of**, and more newly **constructed** export facilities abroad will have to find other markets, or close. Additional production facilities to serve **an** unsustainable export market also makes more likely a final burst of deflation in products with excess capacity. These and other adjustment problems that could **flow** from **an** effort to deal **with** global imbalances and excess debt building up in the United States, may not **fully** unfold, but officials need to be mindful that they easily could.

If policy measures addressing the **U.S.** relative competitive situation are implemented, there will undoubtedly be a new burst of investment in manufacturing in the **U.S.** itself. After the Baker reforms, for example, more **and** more foreign auto makers built **cars** and **car parts** in America, rather **than** importing them. The same presumably would happen **again**.

Other longer-term **U.S.** deficiencies may also need to be addressed if the longer term problems are to be corrected. For example, after the shock of Sputnik in the Eisenhower and Kennedy years, the United **States** undertook a number of measures to make its young people more competitive in science and technology, including revamping the entire educational system. The influence of **this** effort was felt in one degree or another in nearly every school in America. The intellectual capital which grew from those early government funded and encouraged efforts not only put a man on the moon in ten years, but **America's** entire economy profited **from** the technological breakthroughs and spin offs that resulted. **This** historical experience should not be altogether forgotten **as** we address our current problems.

If we mobilize ourselves **again** to become more competitive internationally, and devote additional hundreds of billions of dollars in public and private funds to education, research and development, and science and technology, we **will** need to intensify our efforts to capitalize commercially on **this** national effort. **Part** of **this** must involve **more** effective curbing of out of control theft of intellectual property in **many** parts of the world where potential markets exist, including **China**. No matter how much money you spend on research, and how innovative your scientists, if the product of **your** money and work is simply stolen and marketed by others, gradually the **inventive** for **this** activity will be **drained** away.

The preferred solution to the problem of global economic imbalances by some academic economists is an explosion of new economic growth world-wide. In theory, this new growth could absorb additional production and imports **from** the **U.S.** and elsewhere.

Looking, however, at all the political and economic obstacles likely to delay **this** wonderful day, causes others to conclude that a new dollar Crisis is far more likely to come long before the rest of the world restructures itself to permit new growth on the scale needed. Moreover, today economic growth in many parts of the world is largely export driven, **and** largely at the expense of long term **U.S.** trade deficits and debt. More of this kind of **growth** will only make America's long-term adjustment difficulties even greater.

Increasing oil prices will also serve to push any automatic adjustment in global markets even farther **into** the future. More and more countries will be seeking **additional** export markets to cover their increased oil import costs. They will be looking **first** and foremost at the **U.S.** market to accomplish **this**.

As one reflects upon China's economy, it is important also to remember that while **China's** nominal per capita income is \$1000, the internal purchasing power parity of **this** \$1000 is five times **as** great, namely equal to \$5000 per person. **This** disparity is **caused** by many factors, including uneven conditions in the vast Chinese economy, the low price of services and wages, and some administered prices. Some of **this** results in distorted market pricing signals. China **imports** less and exports more than otherwise would be the case. By internal purchasing power calculations, China is already the world's second largest economy.

ENFORCING **THE** WTO AGREEMENTS: THE **PLEASURES** AND **PERILS**

There are other neuralgic elements involving China and her **trading** partners that are likely to put additional political pressure on China's current economic **situation**. Secretary of Treasury **Snow** told 500 members of the **Economic** Club of New **York** two weeks ago that **China** had passed the required laws to enter the **WTO**, but was not enforcing many of them, including the intellectual property related items. Enforcement problems worsen the farther you travel in China **from** Beijing. In some provincial cities, Beijing's **writ** on WTO related matters barely exists. **You** can therefore expect increasing pressure from the **WTO** on China in the **years** ahead to carry out obligations. Failure to succeed in this effort could fatally discredit the **WTO** itself, and send global trade officials **back** to the drawing boards for other solutions. The other problem is that there are **thousands** of individual violations, ranging **from** Zippo lighter's trademark piracy to far **more** complex issues. The entire **WTO** and the tiny Chinese legal structure assigned to handle such cases could be consumed for decades without **making** much of a dent in **this** massive pattern of violations

There are also political problems for the Chinese Government in carrying out some of their **WTO** commitments. Some of these **WTO** obligations, for example, provisions allowing much greater future access of cheap foreign agricultural imports to China, will generate more pressure on the **rural** economy in China, **as** happened with Mexico's corn farmers after **NAFTA**. **This** is likely to accelerate an already serious demographic **shift** in China of surplus people moving **from** the farms to the cities looking for **jobs**.

Providing jobs for tens of millions of displaced former agricultural workers **has** been and will continue to be one of the regime's main preoccupations. Political stability in China hinges in part **upon** their success. But there may be both economic and political **limits** abroad to the degree to which these tens of **millions** of new workers can be deployed in ever more export producing industries. **This** constitutes a serious policy dilemma for **China** and her trading partners.

Coping with **regional** political opposition to other unpopular or inconvenient WTO commitments **will** also not be easy for Beijing.

OTHER POTENTIAL TIME BOMBS

The Communist Party has lost a great deal of **its local** reputation in recent years in part because **of** corruption problems. In some ways, **the** current Chinese system combines the worst evils of both socialism and capitalism: namely, the inherent **corruption** problems of a vast bureaucratic establishment, plus exploitation of workers in some places on a scale that **has** not been seen **since** the darkest days of the industrial revolution in England. **This** too is potentially explosive.

The over heated Chinese economy **has** also generated shortages of energy, water, port and transportation facilities and environmental systems that already act **as** a brake on future growth. Supply has to catch up with demand. **This** will take time and investment.

Finally, China's leaders have painted themselves into a political corner, whereby if the Taiwanese ever declare full independence, Chinese leaders may have to go to **war** to avoid massive loss of face, and even their positions. Chinese leaders expressed to Gingrich and myself their great concern ~~that~~ Taiwan's president would move toward independence later **this** year.

Any conflict between Taiwan and China would be massively destabilizing to the economies of **both** places, **and** a meltdown of China's already **strained financial** system could **easily** be one consequence. Since much of the production is concentrated in China and Taiwan, shortage **of** computer chips **could** also impose real dislocations in the broader global economy, should any conflict over Taiwan get out of hand. There are already discussions in the **U.S.** about the need for more diversification of sources of supply of critical industrial and defense components, because of potential instabilities across the **Straits** of Taiwan. The **just** in time procurement policies of many companies, make **this** potential disruption even more worrisome to many thoughtful policy makers in Washington.

Based on **what** I heard from my subsequent visit **to** Taiwan, I doubt *that* present Taiwanese leaders will, **in fact**, go **far** enough in the year or two ahead with their independence aspirations to provoke Beijing into a military response. Today, however, Taiwan is a democracy and **85%** of the people are native Taiwanese, **as** opposed to **only 15% from** the mainland. Many will not willingly allow absorption of Taiwan by China.

Still, Taiwanese investors have placed perhaps **as much as** \$140 billion **dollars** of investment in China. It is **potentially** hostage to Beijing's good will.

Aware of these and other vulnerabilities, Taiwan is no longer the confident little island of ten years **ago**. There is a lot of nervousness **among** investors, those facing competition from China, and the ordinary native Taiwanese who like their present liberty. These conflicting economic and political pressures will have to work their way out in **Taiwan's** robust new democracy. No one can really predict how this tension will eventually end. Much depends upon Hong Kong's subsequent experience with the one **state** two systems situation, and the conclusions that **the** people of Taiwan draw **from** it.

THE UNPREDICTABLE **FUTURE**


A few weeks before he died, former President Nixon assembled a couple dozen of **Washington's** foreign policy experts at Jackson Place near the White House, to hear his views on Russia. He had **just** completed a trip there. He spoke for more than **an** hour without notes, which was his custom. Later during the question period, he was **asked** about his medium and long-term assessment of the direction **China** would take. He paused for **a** few seconds, and then said: "I **am** generally hopeful about long term trends in **China**, but I have only visited China seven or eight times, and I don't consider myself an expert on China." **This** was Nixon's way of **telling** us that there were huge complexities in China that made predicting the **future** difficult.

I **can** only agree with the former President's assessment


China's economy seems likely to continue its upward long term trend, producing higher living **standards** for the people of the country in the decades **ahead**. Presumably also the Taiwan/China issue **will** ultimately find a peaceful solution, since neither party **has an** interest in economic chaos.

There are, however, a lot of downside local, regional, and global risks at play just now, some political, some economic. Governments are notoriously slow in **dealing with** even obviously dangerous financial problems. **This** is partly because any major change in the **status** quo inevitably inflicts pain on powerful domestic constituencies. For that reason, any major change usually requires sufficient deterioration to generate a crisis of some kind to provide policy makers with the needed political **cover**.

Current global imbalances, including **U.S.** fiscal policies, and the regional ones involving **China**, pose trends that seem unsustainable to more and more informed people. Before they are corrected, however, we may see once again the **truth** of **that** old Wall Street saying: "The bigger the **boom**, the bigger the bust".



FINANCIAL TIMES WEDNESDAY OCTOBER 13 2004





Center for Strategic & International Studies
Washington, DC

Ambassador Richard McCormack

Former Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Richard McCormack, **is** currently senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, one of Washington's leading policy research institutes.

Within the past year, **Mr.** McCormack has carried out projects in Russia, China, Iran, Argentina, Brazil, West Africa, Japan, Israel, Jordan, and Western Europe. These visits involved meetings with Presidents, Central Bank Governors, and other leading financial and political figures from the public and private sectors. **Some** of the confidential reports from missions of this kind were reviewed at the highest levels of the American Government. He **has** also served as an advisor to the IMF's Managing Director.

During **the** Administration of President George H.W. Bush, **Mr. McCormack** **served as** Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. He was also President Bush's principal "sherpa" coordinator for the President's involvement in the G-7 economic summits, receiving high praise from the former President for **his** contributions. He was awarded the State Department's highest award, the Distinguished Service Award, from Secretary of State James A. Baker;

In President **Reagan's** administrations, Mr. McCormack served as United States Ambassador to **the** Organization of American States, and received the Superior Honor Award for outstanding sustained performance. Prior to that, he was Assistant Secretary of State for Economics and Business.

Earlier in his career, **Mr. McCormack** was an advisor to a Senator on the Foreign Relations Committee, deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, and senior staff on the President's Council on Executive Organization at the White House, with lead responsibilities for developing plans for the Council on International Economic Policy at the White House under President **Nixon**.

He received **his** PM, Magna cum Laude, from **the** University of Fribourg, Switzerland in 1966, and his BA from Georgetown University in 1963. In 1992, as guest scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington D.C. he delivered a paper in Jerusalem on potential micro economic reforms in the Israeli economy, and wrote a widely quoted paper on the Japanese financial crisis.

In 1975-77 he was a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Until recently, he **was** Counselor at the Center for the Study of the Presidency and a member of the State Department's advisory **commission** on Africa. He **is** a member of the Economic Club of New **Pork**.

Mr. McCormack **is** married to Karen Hagstrom, a policy analyst for the Environmental Protection Agency. They live with their three children in McLean, Virginia.



Remarks by Vice Chairman Roger W. Ferguson, Jr.

At the Conference on Trade and the Future of American Workers, Washington, D.C.
October 7, 2004

Free Trade: What Do Economists Really Know?

Arguments against Free Trade

If the benefits conferred by international trade are reasonably straightforward, **how** can we explain the apparent ambivalence toward trade picked **up** by recent surveys? Clearly, many people view the benefits of free trade **as** being outweighed by its perceived costs.


One **concern** about **free** trade may **be** that it **has** given rise to large trade and ~~current account~~ deficits, thereby **adding** to the **nation's** debt and putting future prosperity at **risk**. Now at more **than 5** percent **of GDP**, the current account deficit is in record territory, it is growing, and it cannot be sustained indefinitely. We cannot foresee when the deficit will stop **growing** and return to more-sustainable levels, **through** what mechanisms this adjustment will occur, or whether this adjustment will be **smooth** or disruptive for financial markets and the economy more generally. No matter how a correction of the **external** imbalance

proceeds, however, it will involve a range of adjustments to investment, **saving**, and asset **prices**, **both** for the U.S. economy **and** for our trading partners. Research suggests that past corrections of large external imbalances in industrial countries generally have occurred without crisis.¹² Whether or not **this** will remain the case, I **am** confident that protectionism is not the appropriate response to **our** growing current account deficit. The amount of current account adjustment that would be gained **from** a given tightening of import controls is questionable. Yet, it is **certain** that such actions would impose **costs** on the economy that would persist long after concerns about the deficit dissipated.

Don: This statement is absolutely untrue. The effort the U.S. made to deal with our 90 billion dollar payments deficit in 1985/86 led to the Louvre Agreement, and various Japanese policies, measures which directly contributed to the 1987 crash and the later disastrous Japanese bubble. McCormack

P.S. our current account problem today is 8 times the size of the 1985 problem that had Baker and Reagan so concerned about the longer term economic and political implications.

US Current account balance
% of GDP



FINANCIAL TIMES WEDNESDAY OCTOBER 13 2004

A Widening Imbalance

The nation's current account deficit, a broad measure of the trade balance, has widened to a record \$664 billion annually.

664 billion dollars annually

ACCOUNT

PERCENTAGE

OF GROSS

DOMEST

PRODUCT

The New York Times

~~FOUO~~

November 12, 2004

I-04/015285/16
ES-1378

TO: Peter Rodman
CC: Doug Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: El Salvador and Nicaragua

What can we do for El Salvador and Nicaragua in terms of helping them with their forces?

Thanks.

DHR:sh
111204-7

.....

Please respond by 12/3/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20864-04

~~FOUO~~

DEC 29 2004

TO: Lt Gen Duncan McNabb

CC: Gen Dick Myers *GEN John Abizaid*
Gen George Casey

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Steel to Iraq

There has to be a way to push steel into the country faster. Please talk to Gen Casey about the briefing he gave me in the car and the importance of doing that.

Thanks.

DHR:sl
 122704-26

.....
 Please respond by 1/21/05

Terry

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20907-04

29 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

OCT 15 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Notes from Kicklighter

Here are the notes Kicklighter gave me in his out-call. You should be sure someone is following up on this.

Thanks.

Attach.
10/7/04 Kicklighter Notes: Iraq Transition Follow-Up Issues

DHR:es
101404-25

.....
Please respond by _____

Lead

15 Oct 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20910-04

IRAQ TRAF OW ISSUES

Notes from LTG(R) Kickliehter

Integration of MNF-I and U.S. Mission

- MNF-I / U.S. Embassy cooperation and integration is strong, effective and a model for future operations.
- MNF-I has just completed an organizational reevaluation and is moving the main **headquarters** to co-locate with the U.S. Embassy in the Palace.
- The new MNF-I Campaign Plan is guiding the U.S. team.
- "Strongest, most integrated DoD/State team that I have ever witnessed."

Regional Embassy Offices & State Embedded Teams

- **IRMO** plans to establish Reconstruction teams in Baghdad and ten (10) field locations: at the 4 REOs and 6 SETs.
- The Tikrit SET is the model to follow:
- **Recommend IRMO be given responsibility for integration and oversight of USG Regional Operations.**

IRMO & PCO Structure Changes

- The State Department decided to **assign** Program Management for reconstruction to IRMO; to accomplish **this**, PCO's Strategic Analysis Office is being transferred to **IRMO**.
- **Both PCO & IRMO are** heavily committed. Any additional resources required for **IRMO** will have to come from other sources.
- **MNF-I** is providing personnel to **IRMO** to strengthen its capability. MNF-I's Director of Engineers has been embedded within **IRMO** as the Deputy for Strategic Operations with responsibility for oversight of Regional Operations.
- Commander, USACE Gulf Region Division (GRD), is now the Deputy for Construction at **PCO**.
- **When** PCO phases down in the future, the GRD will take the lead in reconstruction. PCO is developing a phase-down plan.

Step to streamline the acquisition process

- Acquisition process is slow, cumbersome and not based on the speed required in a combat **zone**.
 - **PCO** is required to use peacetime contracting rules in a wartime environment.
- While in Iraq, received three suggestions for improvement (since then the Acquisition **Community** in Iraq **has** expanded the list to twenty):
 - Raise the Simplified Acquisition Threshold from \$500,000 to \$1M. Action underway.
 - Reduce the response times for federal acquisition activities **as** required under Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). Action underway.
 - Streamline the Export License approval process for the transfer of critical military equipment to the **Traq** Security Forces. Action underway.
 - DoD & State have established a joint team to oversee the 20 improvement recommendations.

Strategic Communications

- Inadequate staffing levels are hindering the effectiveness of the strategic communications effort and straining team integration.
 - MNF-I staffing level: approximately **50%** of newly approved JMD.
 - State Public Affairs Office (PAO) staffing level: approximately **42%**.
- **Staffing problems are hindering the USG's** ability to assist the Interim Iraqi Government in developing its strategic communication capability.
- **Recommend State's PAO & MNF-I's Stratcom co-locate and integrate staff, as appropriate.**

U.S. Mission

- **Recommend placement of U.S. Advisors within the Iraqi Ministry of Defense to include one with the experience and background to be Senior Advisor to the Iraqi Minister of Defense.**

Multi-National Security Transition Command - Iraq (MNSTC-I)

- MNSTC-I is working hard to improve Iraqi leader selection and training for the Iraqi Security Forces, National Guard and local Police forces.
- Staffing level is currently at **47%** of approved JMD with a level of **75%** expected by late Nov. **04**.

Reconstruction Operations Center

- A Reconstruction Operations Center (ROC) has been established to focus on logistics operations.
- Logistics operations are rapidly approaching full capacity.
 - Warehouse capacity is strained.
 - The process for tracking material movement, which currently includes truck transport, needs to expand to railroad, air and sea.
 - The reallocation of \$1.8B from equipment and construction material to Iraqi Security Force expansion will increase demands on logistics capacity.
 - To manage the resulting logistics surge, there is a requirement of \$70M for operations and 7-8 additional logistics management personnel.
- Accountability of equipment and supplies must be maintained.
 - **Recommend MNF-I's Deputy Chief of Staff for Sustainment partner with PCO and be given oversight responsibility for this huge logistical effort.**
 - A small logistics command may be required to coordinate this mission.



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1000

SECRET
2004 09 29 11 11 25

DEFENSE SUPPORT OFFICE-IRAQ

29 December 2004

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: Director, Defense Support Office - Iraq *JMB*
SUBJECT: Follow-up on Kicklighter Recommendations

Listed are recommendations that LTG Kicklighter presented to you upon his departure. His principal recommendations with brief status updates are as follows:

Recommendation: *Give IRMO responsibility for integration and oversight for Regional Embassy Operations (REO) in Iraq.*

- IRMO now has responsibility for REO integrative task.
- IRMO established a 'Deputy for Operations' to provide integration and oversight over regional programs and is staffing twelve provincial coordination offices. Whether these organizations have real horsepower remains to be seen.

IRMO

Recommendation: *Integrate MNF-I Strategic Communications and Embassy PAO.*

- Embassy and MNF -I Public Affairs Operations have co-located personnel and assets. MNF-I StratComm remains a separate office within MNF-I, but MNF-I and State PAO do hold daily coordination meetings.

Recommendation: *Increase the number of U.S. advisors within the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, including one as Senior Advisor to the Iraqi Minister of Defense.*

- Remains an open issue: Only 9 of 22 IRMO MoD advisory positions are currently filled. US provides only two advisors. While willing to convert the position of Minister's Personal Secretary from British to US position, State Department appears to want the Senior Advisor position to remain a UK slot.
- DSO-Iraq suggests considering the merit of a more traditional construct after January elections where DoD assumes from State the responsibility for operating the MoD advisory function and staffing it with DoD personnel and contractors.

29 Dec 04

Recommendation: *Assign responsibility for reconstruction logistics to ensure accountability of equipment and supplies.*

- Remains an open issue: Accountability, integration and sustainability for logistics operations require attention.
- Assistant SecArmy and DSO-Iraq are attempting to define specific requirements for improvements. Formal meeting of all relevant players, including MNF-I and PCO, will be held January 5, 2005 at Logistics Management Institute (LMI).

15 Oct 04

COORDINATION: NONE
Attachments: As Stated

OSD 20910-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038869

~~FOUO~~

OCT 15 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Notes from Kicklighter

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Attach.
10/7/04 Kicklighter Notes: Iraq Transition Follow-Up Issues

DHR:ss
101404-25

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/038870

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 - **Recommend MNF-I's Deputy Chief of Staff for Sustainment partner with PCO and be given oversight responsibility for this huge logistical effort.**
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OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Military Assistant

~~4~~ January 2005 - 11 15 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HOWARD BURRIS, DIRECTOR, DSO-IRAQ

SUBJECT: Follow-up on Kicklighter Recommendations


Sir:

Please see Mr. Patterson's note to you on the attached:

"Howard - Please take a look at this and provide
a memo to the SD/DSD on how these recommendations
will be handled. Thanks, Dave"

Thank you.

Very respectfully,


Sean E. O'Connor
Captain, USN
Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachment:
OSD 20910-04

Suspense: Monday, ~~16~~ January 2005

1826

4 JAN 05

/5 OCT 04

113

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

To Dave Patterson 11/3
From Paul Butler

Take a look at this and see what we need to do. I'm sure SecDef will want the Deputy to get in to it first

Thanks
Paul

DSD - Iraq. (David Bass) Paul Butler
Howard - Please take a look at this and provide a memo to the SD/DSD on how these recommendations will be handled. Thanks.
Dave

J. David Patterson
The Special Assistant to
The Deputy Secretary of Defense



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1000

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

113

2004 DEC 29 AM 11:35

DEFENSE SUPPORT OFFICE-IRAQ

29 December 2004

TO: *Leahy* SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: Director, Defense Support Office - Iraq *gmb*
SUBJECT: Follow-up on Kicklighter Recommendations

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COORDINATION: NONE
Attachments: As Stated

11-L-0559/OSD/038875

| | | | |
|----------|--------------------|----------|--------------------|
| MA SD | SMA DSD | | |
| (TSA SD) | SA DSD | 11/29 | <i>[Signature]</i> |
| EXEC SEC | <i>[Signature]</i> | 12/29 | |
| ESR MA | <i>[Signature]</i> | 12-29-04 | |

OSD 20910-04

~~FOUO~~

OCT 15 2004

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FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
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Attach
10/7/04 Kicklighter Notes: Iraq Transition Follow-Up Issues

DHL:as
101404-25

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/038876

IRAQ TRANSITION FOLLOW-UP ISSUES

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IRMO & PCO Structure Changes

- The State Department decided to assign Program Management for reconstruction to IRMO; to accomplish this, PCO's Strategic Analysis Office is being transferred to IRMO.
- Both PCO & IRMO are heavily committed. Any additional resources required for IRMO will have to come from other sources.
- MNF-I is providing personnel to IRMO to strengthen its capability. MNF-I's Director of Engineers has been embedded within IRMO as the Deputy for Strategic Operations with responsibility for oversight of Regional Operations.
- Commander, USACE Gulf Region Division (GRD), is now the Deputy for Construction at PCO.
- When PCO phases down in the future, the GRD will take the lead in reconstruction. PCO is developing a phase-down plan.

Steps to streamline the acquisition process

- Acquisition process is slow, cumbersome and not based on the speed required in a combat zone.
 - PCO is required to use peacetime contracting rules in a wartime environment.
- While in Iraq, received three suggestions for improvement (since then the Acquisition Community in Iraq has expanded the list to twenty):
 - Raise the Simplified Acquisition Threshold from \$500,000 to \$1M. Action underway.
 - Reduce the response times for federal acquisition activities as required under Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). Action underway.
 - Streamline the Export License approval process for the transfer of critical military equipment to the Iraqi Security Forces. Action underway.
 - DoD & State have established a joint team to oversee the 20 improvement recommendations.

Strategic Communications

- Inadequate **staffing** levels are hindering the effectiveness of the strategic **communications effort** and straining team integration.
 - MNF-I staffing level: approximately **50%** of newly approved JMD.
 - State Public Affairs Office (PAO) staffing level: approximately **42%**.
- **Staffing problems** are hindering the USG's ability to assist the Interim Iraqi Government in developing its strategic communication capability.
- **Recommend State's PAO & MNF-I's Stratcom co-locate and integrate staff, as appropriate.**

U.S. Mission

- **Recommend placement of U.S. Advisors within the Iraqi Ministry of Defense to include one with the experience and background to be Senior Advisor to the Iraqi Minister of Defense.**

Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I)

- **MNSTC-I** is working hard to improve Iraqi leader selection and training for the Iraqi Security Forces, National Guard and local Police **forces**.
- Staffing level is currently at 47% of approved **JMD** with a level of **75%** expected by late Nov. **04**.

Reconstruction Operations Center

- A Reconstruction Operations Center (ROC) has been established to focus on logistics operations.
- Logistics operations are rapidly approaching full capacity.
 - Warehouse capacity is strained.
 - The process for tracking material movement, which currently includes **truck transport**, needs to expand to railroad, air and **sea**.
 - The reallocation of **\$1.8B** from equipment and construction material to Iraqi Security Force expansion will increase demands on logistics capacity.
 - To manage the resulting logistics surge, there is a requirement of **\$70M** for operations and 7-8 additional logistics management personnel.
- Accountability of equipment and supplies must be maintained.
 - **Recommend MNF-I's Deputy Chief of Staff for Sustainment partner with PCO and be given oversight responsibility for this huge logistical effort.**
 - A small logistics command may be required to coordinate **this** mission.

~~FOUO~~

ES-1694
04/016920

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

December 14, 2004

2004 DEC 29 PM 12:12

TO: Mira Ricardel

SUBJECT: Letter to Buckovski

Shouldn't we write Buckovski of Macedonia a letter congratulating him?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121404-7

.....
Please respond by 12/22/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20914-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038879

15-12-04 A10:56 IN

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Policy Executive Secretariat Note

2004 DEC 29 PM 12:12

December 28, 2004

Reference: 121404-7, Letter to Buckovski

Captain Marriott,

Please find attached a congratulatory letter to Prime Minister Buckovski that Policy/Mira Ricardel submitted separately.

SecDef signed the letter on December 22.



June Bartlett
Deputy Director
Policy Executive Secretariat

OSD 20914-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038880

720
~~FOUO~~

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: September 1, 2004 - FGH HC 9/2
0700

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz *PW*

SUBJECT: Redrafted Memo on USG Responsibilities for Homeland Security

384

Don.

I met with the recipients of the attached snowflake and we produced the redraft you requested.

I'm available to discuss it further if you wish.

15 Sep 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20954-05

11-L-0559/OSD/038881

~~FOUO~~
DRAFT WORKING PAPERS

SUBJECT: USG Responsibilities for Homeland Security

Situation Today:

Since September 11, 2001, the Administration has made substantial progress to protect America from terrorist attacks. Among other measures, we have established:

- The Department of Homeland Security.
- A National Bio-Defense Strategy and stockpiles of biological vaccines.
- United States Northern Command.
- The Terrorist Threat Integration Center.

As a result of these and other initiatives, America is safer today **than** it was prior to the 9/11 attacks, although we must continue to improve America's homeland security.

Homeland Security Roles and Responsibilities:

However, in the event of another major terrorist attack, we will certainly ask ourselves what else we might have done to prevent it or mitigate its consequences. One issue that concerns me is that roles and responsibilities for homeland security are still not as clearly defined **as** they might be. Now that we have almost **two** years of experience with the Department of Homeland Security and the new USG organization for homeland

DRAFT WORKING PAPERS
~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/038882

security, it may be an appropriate time to evaluate the assignment of roles and responsibilities for homeland security. We also need to consider how we can better educate the American people about those roles and responsibilities. It is important for the American people to have realistic expectations about the role the U.S. Armed Forces might play in dealing with terrorist attacks inside the United States, as defined both by law and executive policy. I am reminded of the polls taken in the 1990s which showed that Americans believed erroneously that we have a capability to shoot down a ballistic missile targeting the U.S. There is a great deal the U.S. military can do in the event of a terrorist attack, but there are limits on that capability and—as a matter of law and policy—there may be things we should not do.

Across the USG, there have been several major homeland security exercises over the past several years. We could use their results to evaluate where gaps may exist in the USG homeland security concept and determine if changes are warranted with respect to statutes, authorities, policies, missions, resources and training, etc. Evaluations, moreover, could help to identify any legal considerations that might limit the military from providing support to any Lead Federal Agency and that could impede effective command and control.

Homeland security roles and responsibilities are spread among the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, State, the FBI, the CIA and various other U.S. agencies:

- To stop terrorists from coming across our borders.
- To stop terrorists from coming through U.S. ports.
- To stop terrorists from hijacking aircraft inside or outside the United States.

- To seek out or arrest terrorists inside the United States.

DOD does not have primary responsibility for any of those functions. Its traditional role has been largely restricted to the following:

- Defend the U.S. homeland against foreign threats and attacks from outside the U.S. (NORTHCOM/NORAD/PACOM).
- Protect U.S. DoD military forces and facilities located within the United States.
- Support designated lead federal agencies, as specifically directed by the President, to include:
 - **“Render safe” a nuclear weapon located inside the United States.**
 - Provide support for designated “National Special Security Events,” such as the G-8 Summit, Democratic and Republican Conventions, the Super Bowl, etc., and
 - Serve as a sector-specific agency for the U.S. defense industrial base in accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7.

Comment:

In the event of a catastrophic nuclear or biological attack on the territory of the United States, the following would likely occur, as it did on September 11, 2001:

- 1) The first calls for help will be to DoD to immediately take action, but

technically not in the lead role, only in a supporting role. Specifically, DoD may be asked to undertake the very responsibilities DoD has not been assigned or funded to do, and therefore may not have organized, trained or equipped to do, and

- 2) When the dust settles, the American people may well ask why DoD did not:
- Prevent the attack, even though that is the legal responsibility of others and it is not DoD's assignment;
 - Instantaneously respond to mitigate the attack after it occurs.

Recommendation:

Given this situation, the Administration may wish to undertake a quick review to provide recommendations for the following types of questions:

- What might be done to better organize, allocate and rearrange responsibilities among USG agencies to ensure that the right capabilities and assets will address key problems?
- Should we further organize, train and equip the National Guard and the reserves for homeland defense?
- Has DoD allocated sufficient force structure to homeland defense, particularly to prevent or mitigate the consequences of a catastrophic attack?
- What might be done to better inform the Members of Congress, the press, and

the American people of the decided upon allocation of responsibilities, so the current confusion as to roles and responsibilities can be **reduced?**

TAB A

RE X

August 27, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
Larry Di Rita
Powell Moore
Paul McHale
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D. Rumsfeld*

SUBJECT: DoD Responsibilities Paper

Please take a look at the attached paper. It is a problem that concerns me, and I don't know the answers. If you have thoughts or suggestions on it, let me know.

My thought is to send it to the Vice President, Andy Card, Condi Rice and Fran Townsend to get them thinking about these issues.

Let me know what you think soon.

Thanks.

Attach.
Department of Defense Responsibilities

DESI:dk
082604-2 (to computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 9/1/04

August 27, 2004

SUBJECT: U.S. Department of Defense responsibilities for homeland security, prior to September 11, 2001, on 9-11, and today

Homeland Security Assignments and Responsibilities:

DOD never has had, and does not have today, primary U.S. Government responsibility:

- To stop terrorists from coming across our borders.
- To stop terrorists from coming through U.S. ports.
- To stop terrorists from hijacking aircraft inside or outside the United States.
- To seek out or arrest terrorists inside the United States.

Responsibility for those functions rests with the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice and the FBI, the Department of State, CIA and various other U.S. agencies.

Not only does DOD not have primary responsibility for any of those functions, DoD is expressly limited by federal law, including the Posse Comitatus Act, from participating in most U.S. law enforcement activities.

DOD's role has been, and is today, restricted to the following:

more than that

- Defend the U.S. homeland against foreign threats and attacks from outside the U.S. (NORTHCOM/NORAD/PACOM)
- Protect U.S. DoD military forces and facilities located within the United States.
- Support designated lead federal agencies, as specifically directed by the President, to include:
 - "Render safe" a nuclear weapon located inside the United States.
 - Provide support for designated "National Special Security Events," such as the G-8 Summit, Democratic and Republican Conventions, the Super Bowl, etc., and
 - Serve as a sector-specific agency for the U.S. defense industrial base in accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7.

overstated

August 27, 2004

Comment:

I am deeply concerned that the September 11th Commission, the press, Members of the U.S. Congress, and many Americans are not aware of the very limited role of the U.S. Armed Forces in dealing with terrorist attacks inside the USA, by law and Executive Order.

However, notwithstanding DoD's limited role and the general misunderstanding about its role, it is clear that, in the event of a chemical, biological or nuclear attack on the U.S. from within the U.S., the following would occur, as it did on September 11, 2001:

- 1) The first calls for help will be to DoD to immediately take charge, but technically not in the lead role, only in a supporting role; specifically, DoD will be asked to undertake the very responsibilities DoD has not been assigned or funded to do, and therefore has not organized, trained or equipped to do, and
- 2) When the dust settles, blame will be placed on DoD for:
 - Not preventing the attack, even though that is the legal responsibility of others and is not DoD's assignment;
 - Not instrumentally responding to mitigate the attack after it occurs, even though DoD is not authorized, funded or permitted by law to organize, train, equip or deploy to do so.

This unusual situation raises some questions:

Does the current USG arrangement and allocation of responsibilities still make sense?

If not, what might be done to better organize, allocate and rearrange responsibilities among USG agencies?

In either case, what might be done to better inform the Members of Congress, the press, and the American people of the decided upon allocation of responsibilities, so the current confusion as to roles and responsibilities can be reduced?

~~FOUO~~

720

~~FOUO~~

December 29, 2004
2004 DEC 30 AM 6:17

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Principi *DR*

Just to close the loop, I received a call from Tony Principi saying he really didn't think he should have lunch with me and talk, because he's decided to go outside.

DHR:as
122904-2(ts)

0001.71 50

29 DEC 04

~~FOUO~~

~~FOUO~~

SECDEF December 29, 2004

2004 DEC 30 AM 6:40

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Don Rumsfeld*

SUBJECT: Vehicle Armor

Mr. President,

I listened to your statement after our NSC meeting this morning. You were asked about armor. You responded as indicated on the top of this attached page. I checked with our folks, and have attached more current information. I now have the military committed to not having U.S. Servicemen driving any vehicles in Iraq that do not have the appropriate armor after February 15, except for those vehicles that are used solely within protected military compounds.

451

I'm pushing them to accelerate the February 15 date to January 30.

The way we are doing it is:

- 1) To get more steel and more people in Iraq to bolt the protective armor on the vehicles;
- 2) changing tactics, techniques and procedures, so fewer vehicles have to be out;
- 3) reducing the number of locations that materials have to be dispersed to, and/or hiring more contact drivers.

The long and the short of it is, by February 15, 2005, or sooner, the goal is to not have any U.S. military vehicles in Iraq, outside of a protected military compound, unless they have appropriate armor. I'll keep you posted.

Respectfully,

Attach.
Information Paper on Vehicle Armor

DHR:ms
122904-15 (m)

~~FOUO~~

29 Dec 04

OSD 20959-04

The statement made by the President at the press conference is factually correct...but the amendment below offers a more complete view.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I have looked at the statistics on that, and we have stepped up the production of armored Humvees significantly. The other issue is the rearmament of existing - of vehicles that are now in theater, vehicles that require a different armament structure than that which they initially were manufactured with. And I am told that those vehicles will be armed up by mid-summer of 2005. And what I know is, is that the Defense Department is working expeditiously with private contractors and with our military to get these vehicles armed up.

A MORE COMPLETE STATEMENT

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I have looked at the statistics on that, and **SINCE MAY OF 2003** we have stepped up the production of armored Humvees significantly. The other issue is the rearmament of existing - of vehicles that are now in theater, vehicles that require a different armament structure than that which they initially were manufactured with. And I am told that those vehicles **WILL HAVE FACTORY BUILT, INTEGRATED ARMOR AND BALLISTIC GLASS** be armed up by mid-summer of 2005. **IN THE INTERIM, BY 15 FEB 05 OR SOONER, WE WILL ARMOR - WITH BOTH FACTORY BUILT AND LOCALLY INSTALLED ARMOR PLATE - ALL VEHICLES WHICH OPERATE OUTSIDE A PROTECTED COMPOUND.** And what I know is, is that the Defense Department is working expeditiously with private contractors and with our military to get these vehicles armed up.

~~SECRET~~
~~Attachments~~

September 7, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Defense Science Board Summer Project

If you have not seen the Defense Science Board Summer Project, I think you should. (See page 33 of their briefing papers.)

I think we should ask **DIA** to come back to us with a proposal as to how they are going to make better use of open source information.

Thanks.

Attach.
08/31/04: Defense Science Board Summer Project (page 33)

DHR:ss
090704-22

.....
Please respond by 9/17

334058

750704

~~SECRET~~
~~Attachments~~



Recommendations: Open Source

- USD(I) designate DIA as Executive Agent for oversight, planning and (most) direct execution
 - Separately budget so that it does not compete with “core business” of the Executive Agent
 - Fund for the central procurement resolution of intellectual property rights
 - Consider “industrial funding” model for open-source-analytic and other value-added products; Executive Agent would qualify the vendors
- Fund demonstrations of linking and e-business paradigms on Intelink TS and S
- Change the lanes in the road so that every single source agency produces two-source integrated product ...e.g., SIGINT and open source, or geo-spatial and open source
- Design the enterprise-wide data architecture to support and exploit linkages provided by open source

September 7, 2004

TO: Matt Latimer
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DR
SUBJECT: Thoughts on Iraq Papers

Here are some papers I have worked on. Please sort through them and, after talking with Larry and Tony, come back to me with a recommendation as to what I should do with them, if anything.

Iraq

Thanks.

Attach.

- 6/10/04 ASD(ISA) Memo to SecDef re: Thoughts on Iraq,
- 06/09/04 Suggested Insert from Dr. Wolfowitz
- 06/21/04 memo from SecDef to Rodman re: Edits on Thoughts on Iraq.

DHR:ss
090704-43

.....
Please respond by 9/17/04

75 Sep 04

September 10, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Briefing Paper for POTUS

We need to see that the President has a briefing paper before he meets with Prime Minister Koizumi showing what we are doing in Japan, and why the deterrent will not be weakened.

Japan

Please read the attached.

Thanks.

Attach.
FBIS Report Re: Koizumi to discuss USFJ Realignment on 9/21

DHR:ss
091004-2

.....
Please respond by _____

1050904

Japan: Koizumi Expected To Discuss USFJ Realignment With Bush in NY on 21 Sep

JPP20040909000004 Tokyo Nikkei Telecom 21 WWW-Text in English 2056 GMT 08 Sep 04

[Unattributed report: "Koizumi, Bush To Discuss US Base Issue in New York on 21 September"; English version of report attributed to Tokyo Nihon Keizai Shimbun in Japanese 9 Sep 04 Morning Edition]

[FBIS Transcribed Text]

TOKYO (Nikkei) -- Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi is expected to discuss the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan when he meets with U.S. President George W. Bush in New York on Sept. 21.

Koizumi is scheduled to travel to New York to attend the annual U.N. General Assembly following visits to Brazil and Mexico.

Specifically, Japan will seek to have local interests reflected in these plans through such measures as reducing the burden borne by communities hosting U.S. military installations. In addition, Koizumi will ask that U.S. military forces in Japan maintain their deterrence capabilities.

In bilateral director-general-level discussions with foreign affairs and defense officials at the end of August, Japan expressed its intention to present as early as this year a policy response to the planned U.S. military realignment.

The meeting between Koizumi and Bush is expected to establish a foundation for discussions before the bilateral military realignment talks begin in earnest.

On the expansion of the U.N. Security Council, Koizumi will explain Japan's bid to seek entry into the group without changing the country's war-renouncing Constitution. Koizumi hopes to win Bush's support on the matter.

[Description of Source: Tokyo Nikkei Telecom 21 Text-WWW in English -- on-line database service owned by Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc., containing flash news, the main Tokyo newspapers, business, technical, and regional newspapers, weekly magazines, plus various business-oriented databases]

file

September 16, 2004

TO: Les Brownlee
Lt. Gen. Lovelace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: General Officer Memos of Reprimand

At the detainee brief, you said there were 13 GO Memos of Reprimand.

I would like more detail on the implications of the memos -- how many will be in service jackets and how those that are not in service jackets will affect the individual's careers.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091604-14

.....
Please respond by 9/23/04

Sir, *DR 9/24*
Response attached.

✓/r
Lt Col Lengyel 9/23

383.4

16 sep 04

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DA 9/24

The Senior Military Assistant

9/23

SIR _____

My Army sources,
including Col Bucci,
tell me these are
essentially all career
terminal.

V/R Jim



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0200

OSD 9/24

INFO MEMO

September 22, 2004, 9:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: R.L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army

Brownlee

SUBJECT: General Officer Memos of Reprimand

- You were informed that Headquarters, Department of the Army, has received reports of 13 administrative reprimands imposed in connection with incidents of detainee abuse. Since that time, we have received reports of two additional administrative reprimands imposed for incidents of detainee abuse. Of these 15 reprimands, seven were imposed by general officers and eight were imposed by other officers. All of these reprimands were filed in local unit files, and may be considered by the recipient's commander when making assignments, promotions, or selections for schooling.
- We have also received reports of two additional reprimands for related misconduct that were imposed by a general officer as nonjudicial punishment under the provisions of Article 15, Uniform Code of Military Justice. Both of these actions will be filed in the Official Military Personnel Files (OMPF) of the recipients, which are maintained by the Department of the Army.
- In addition, six Soldiers have been reprimanded by a general officer for dereliction of supervisory duties and similar neglects in connection with the administration of the detention facility at Abu Ghraib. All of these reprimands were filed in the OMPF of the recipients.

383.6

22 Sep 04

16 Sep 04

COORDINATION: NONE

PREPARED BY: COL William Barto, (b)(6)



Printed on Recycled Paper

OSD 20975-04

11-L-0559/OSD/038901

September 16, 2004

TO: Gen. Pete Schoomaker
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DRM*
SUBJECT: Note from Newt Gingrich

Here are some interesting e-mails from Newt Gingrich. I would appreciate it if you would talk to him sometime and explain what you are doing. He is interested and knowledgeable. I think it would be helpful.

Thanks.

Attach.
E-mails from Gingrich (6/4, 6/21, 7/9/04)

DHR:ss
091604-11

.....
Please respond by _____

322.2

1650904

(b)(6)

LD's response to
Newt's ad (below)cc Craddock
Butler

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Sunday, June 20, 2004 5:31 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(6); CIV, OSD; Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD; (b)(6); Patterson, Jack D, CIV, OSD
Cc: peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil; stephen.cambone@OSD..mil; Thornhill, Paula, Col, JCS SJS
Subject: RE: the army is too small-newt

could it be that the army is the right size, but too much of it is in the reserves?

that's a much more transformational matter than simply adding bodies.

for years, for all the right reasons at the time (maybe) we have been putting what has become critical capability into the reserves.

it's time to change that.

put another way, adding two new divisions and not fixing the imbalance will not solve the problem.

i'm not stubborn on the point, but you shouldn't be, either. your comments suggest that you have not had the chance to consider the matter as carefully as you might.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, June 04, 2004 8:27 AM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil; John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6)@jack.patterson@osd.mil
Cc: peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil; stephen.cambone@OSD..mil; paula.thornhill@js.pentagon.mil
Subject: the army is too small-newt

for secdef, depsecdef
 from newt 6/04/04

it is untenable to argue the Army is the right size

it is a direct contradiction of the Secretary's warning at West Point that we are in the early stages of a long war

it is impossible for average Americans to believe that the Army is the right size but we have to rely on reservists and guardsmen on a continuing basis and we now have to extend service involuntarily

I do not care what the studies and higher ups are telling you as an Army brat who went through the Eisenhower reductions in forces in the late 1950s as a child this combination of events is going to weaken the Army

finally, it is impossible to explain to the American people why the Army is the right size when their neighbors are called up and service is involuntarily extended

I cannot defend the current size and when asked I am going to say the Army should be larger

Kerry will win this debate

this is a repetition of the 1960 Nixon mistake of defending America's strength against Kennedy's charge of a missile gap--the country decided Kennedy was right even though he was wrong

for the first time in decades Republicans are now on the weakness side of a defense issue and giving the Democrats an easy way to be on the pro-defense side of more strength.

You should call for a significant increase in Army end strength and a significant increase in the Army budget to cover that cost without eating into the rest of the Army's program

if this is a long war then let's start acting like its a real war and budget accordingly.

to repeat: I personally cannot defend the smaller Army position and I would support a substantial increase in both Army strength and the Army budget

this is both a national security and a political issue and the administration is wrong on both

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

cc: Butler
LTG Craddock

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, June 21, 2004 8:02 PM
To: larry.dirita@osd.pentagon.mil; (b)(6); John.Craddock@osd.mil;
 (b)(6); Jack.Patterson@osd.mil
Cc: peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil; stephen.cambone@OSD.mil; paula.thornhill@js.pentagon.mil
Subject: Re: the army is too small-newt

there is a theoretical army in which total manpower including reserves and national guard, mobilization depots, division overhead, etc all can be converted to a lean fighting army.

we are in a war

we are making decisions about troops in Korea and troops in Germany which may effect our long term influence in those regions forever.

we have an army which is very strained and in which we do not have enough area specialists with language skills, we do not have enough civil affairs units, we do not have enough information officers with even a minimum level of information strategy skills

in a societal war against an embedded opponent the army will end up being the primary carrier of the war

it is too small

you are being told it is adequate only because we have imposed a budget cap on it

if you asked the combatant commanders and the army to assess a long war strategy and the current tempo they would need a much bigger system.

this is not about divisions it is about rotatable units, sustaining the force, developing adequate specialties

in peacetime we can wait until we reform the guard, reserve and overhead

in a war we would insist on adequate troops and then try to reform.

which are we in?

newt

LD's response to
Newt's email

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA

Sent: Tuesday, June 22, 2004 7:09 AM

To: (b)(6) Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA (b)(6) CIV, OSD; Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD; (b)(6)

Subject: RE: the army is too small-newt

Because we are in a war we can do things we knew we needed to for a long time but always found a reason not to.

This is not an argument against more end strength, although I am not persuaded that's the right answer and I only have to listen to the chief of staff of the army on that one.

But if we did get an increase in end strength, we would lose some of the impetus to do the very things that we are doing because we never had an impetus until now.

Restructuring in Europe and Korea are good things, and long overdue.

Restructuring the active and reserve balance is overdue, although we probably did not know that until now.

Getting our civil service system redesigned to make it more flexible and less dependent upon activity duty military is a good thing, although we never would have achieved that legislative initiative without the pressure on end strength.

I don't know if we need more end strength or not. If after we have done all these other things, we find we still do, then we should ask for it. But even accepting your argument that simply being in a war demands a larger army, it is not clear to me how we would use it if we had it and I know that if we had it a lot of these other things might not happen.

If your concern is our footprint in Europe and Korea, then we just have a basic difference of views on whether it makes sense for us to continue maintain all those divisions so committed. That is a quite different consideration, it seems to me.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)

Sent: Monday, June 21, 2004 8:02 PM

To: larry.dirita@osd.pentagon.mil; (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; John.Craddock@osd.mil;

(b)(6) Jack.Patterson@osd.mil

Cc: peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil; stephen.cambone@OSD..mil; paula.thornhill@js.pentagon.mil

Subject: Re: the army is too small-newt

there is a theoretical army in which total manpower including reserves and national guard, mobilization depots, division overhead, etc all can be converted to a lean fighting army

we are in a war

we are making decisions about troops in Korea and troops in Germany which may effect our long term influence in those regions forever.

6/22/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/038906

we have an army which is very strained and in which we do not have enough area specialists with language skills, we do not have enough civil affairs units, we do not have enough information officers with even a minimum level of information strategy skills

in a societal war against an embedded opponent the army will end up being the primary carrier of the war

it is too small

you are being told it is adequate only because we have imposed a budget cap on it

if you asked the combatant commanders and the army to assess a long war strategy and the current tempo they would need a much bigger system

this is not about divisions it is about rotatable units, sustaining the force, developing adequate specialties

in peacetime we can wait until we reform the guard, reserve and overhead

in a war we would insist on adequate troops and then try to reform

which are we in?
newt

Unit

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, July 09, 2004 7:58 AM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6) jack.patterson@osd.mil
Cc: peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil; paula.thornhill@js.pentagon.mil
Subject: the army is too small and it is starting to make us lookg silly

from newt 7/9/04
army size

the contortions we are going through with the Army are going to **be** politically very expensive this **fall**

it is impossible to **be** doing all the different things the army is doing to hold itself together and argue that it is not too **small**

involuntarily retaining people, involuntarily calling people back, reaching out to recruit from the other services

everything indicates **we** are in a system that is too small and that is wearing down'

it is like watching a company starting to kite checks to cover cash flow problems

there may be **good** management answers but politically the country is not going to believe the army is big enough

the **sooner we** decide to **expand** the army the **less** it will **cost us** this **fall** in the debates

September 17, 2004

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: "Stress on the Force" Memo - Update

I would like to see an update to our "Stress on the Force" Memo very soon. My sense is that we have made some good progress and I am looking forward to hearing the specifics.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091704-1

.....
Please respond by 9/24/04

320, 2

17 Sep 04

720
~~FOUO~~

file

September 20, 2004
ES-0826
04/012625-ES

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld **DR**
SUBJECT: Pakistan

What more can we do for Pakistan on getting money for those madrassahs?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092004-31

Pakistan

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

SSD

9/23/04

~~09/28~~ 9/28

Paul Butler
9/23

fwb →

I'm working this on two levels.
I'll continue pushing Hadley and Grossman on how best to use current ESF and other accounts for Pak education.

The greater issue is that we (the USG) need billions more from Congress to fight the War on Terrorism on the ideological front. I am working with Tina Jonas and Powell more on a plan to brief Congress systematically on our GWOT Strategy and make case for a different approach to funds and authorities. You discussed this with us last Friday at the three-hour session.
Doug Feith

20 SEP 04

~~FOUO~~

September 22, 2004

TO: Paul McHale

CC: Jim Haynes
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
ADM Vern Clark

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Navy – Coast Guard Authorities

As we move forward toward creating a Maritime NORAD structure to deal with homeland security on the seas, it makes sense to sort out the specific authorities between the Navy and Coast Guard.

Please do a thorough review of the current relationship, with particular focus on homeland defense, and send up proposals that make the most sense for both departments. We should also look at the larger relationship between the Sea Services across the board – combat coordination, interaction overseas, acquisition, command and control arrangements and so forth.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092204-5

.....
Please respond by 11/30/04

384

22 Sep 04

September 23, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Satellite Photo of Iraq

Please get me a copy of a satellite photograph of Iraq before the war and a photo today. I would like to see an image taken at night, so we can see the difference in electricity generation from then to now.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092304-2

.....
Please respond by 10/7/04

Sir,

The first photo is the average lights during a 1½ month period before the war. The second is a one month average after the war. The third is a one night image that shows the night after the attack on the oil line that closed down the Bayji Power plant. It shows how quickly the majority of power was restored.

VIR, COL B

060

23 sep 04

September 23, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
CC: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Overhead Costs for Pentagon Memorial



I am a little worried about overhead costs related to the Pentagon Memorial fundraising effort. I think we better get a very good grip on exactly how much people are being paid to help raise money for the fund.

As you know, there have been problems in New York over this issue, and it has been the case in other instances related to charitable activities.

Once you tell me that, we may want to see if we agree that that is an appropriate percentage or amount. If it is not, we will want to fix it. If it is – it may be that we will want to get one or two people – possibly me – to pay all of the overhead, so we can say that every dollar anyone gives will go directly toward the Memorial, because the overhead has been covered separately.

Let me know what you think.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092304-6

.....
Please respond by 10/8/04

0200.4

23 Sep 04

file

September 24, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: List of SASC and HASC Subcommittees

Please give me a copy of the subcommittees of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. I want to look at how they are organized. And maybe privately suggest some different organizations at some point to Duncan Hunter and John Warner.

032

I have a feeling they are organized for the way we used to look at the Department of Defense, instead of the way we ought to be looking at it. Maybe that would help.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092404-3

.....
Please respond by 9/24/04

DR
AW 9/27

24 Sep 04



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

DA 9/27

September 24, 2004 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Inquiry

032

- Attached is the information you requested regarding SASC and HASC subcommittees.

2 Attachments:

1. SASC Full Committee and Subcommittees
2. HASC Full Committee and Subcommittees

24 Sep 04

24 Sep 04

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

FULL COMMITTEE

Jurisdiction: Defense and defense policy generally; aeronautical and space activities peculiar to or primarily associated with the development of weapons systems or military operations; the common defense; the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force, military research and development; national security aspects of nuclear energy; naval petroleum reserves, except those in Alaska; pay, promotion, retirement, and other benefits and privileges of members of the Armed Forces, including overseas education of civilian and military dependents; selective service system; and strategic and critical materials necessary for the common defense; comprehensive study and review of matters relating to the common defense policy of the United States. The chairman and ranking minority member are non-voting members ex officio of all subcommittees of which they are not regular members

Republicans (13)

John W. Warner, Va. - *chairman*
John McCain, Ariz.
James M. Inhofe, Okla.
Pat Roberts, Kan.
Wayne Allard, Colo.
Jeff Sessions, Ala.
Susan Collins, Maine
John Ensign, Nev.
Jim Talent, Mo.
Saxby Chambliss, Ga.
Lindsey Graham, S.C.
Elizabeth Dole, N.C.
John Cornyn, Texas

Democrats (12)

Carl Levin, Mich. - *ranking member*
Edward M. Kennedy, Mass.
Robert C. Byrd, W. Va.
Joseph I. Lieberman, Conn.
Jack Reed, R.I.
Daniel K. Akaka, Hawaii
Bill Nelson, Fla.
Ben Nelson, Neb.
Mark Dayton, Minn.
Evan Bayh, Ind.
Hillary Rodham Clinton, N.Y.
Mark Pryor, Ark.

Republican Staff Director: Judith A. Ansley

Democratic Staff Director: Rick DeBobes

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AIRLAND

Jurisdiction: All Army and Air Force acquisition programs (except strategic weapons and lift programs, special operations and information technology accounts); all Navy and Marine Corps aviation programs, National Guard and Army and Air Force reserve modernization, and ammunition programs.

Republicans (7)

Jeff Sessions, Ala. - *chairman*
John McCain, Ariz.
James M. Inhofe, Okla.
Pat Roberts, Kan.
Jim Talent, Mo.
Saxby Chambliss, Ga.
Elizabeth Dole, N.C.

Democrats (6)

Joseph I. Lieberman, Conn. - *ranking member*
Daniel K. Akaka, Hawaii
Mark Dayton, Minn.
Evan Bayh, Ind.
Hillary Rodham Clinton, N.Y.
Mark Pryor, Ark.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

Jurisdiction: Policies and programs to counter emerging threats such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, illegal drugs, and other asymmetric, threats, information warfare programs; technology base programs, special operations programs; emerging operational concepts; Foreign Military Sales (FMS); technology export policies; Nunn-Lugar issues; DOE non-proliferation programs; doctrine and R&D supporting non-traditional military operations, including peacekeeping and low-intensity conflict; budget accounts for technology base RDT&E for DOD and DOE counterterrorism and chemical and biological warfare defense; DOD funding for the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction program; DOE funding for non-proliferation programs; DOD command and agencies including Defense Advance Research Project Agency (DARPA); Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA); Defense Security Cooperation Agency (SSCA); SOCOM

Republicans (9)

Pat Roberts, Kan. - *chairman*
Wayne Allard, Colo.
Susan Collins, Maine
John Ensign, Nev.
Jim Talent, Mo.
Saxby Chambliss, Ga.
Lindsey Graham, S.C.
Elizabeth Dole, N.C.
John Cornyn, Texas

Democrats (8)

Jack Reed, R.I. - *ranking member*
Edward M. Kennedy, Mass.
Robert C. Byrd, W.Va.
Joseph I. Lieberman, Conn.
Daniel K. Akaka, Hawaii
Bill Nelson, Fla.
Evan Bayh, Ind.
Hillary Rodham Clinton, N.Y.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PERSONNEL

Jurisdiction: Policies and end strengths for military and civilian personnel; military health care; compensation; force structure; Morale, Welfare and Recreation; Professional Military Education; military nominations; DODDS/Section 6 schools, Civil-military programs; POW/MIA issues; family housing policy; Armed Forces Retirement Home; budget accounts for military personnel; military retirement; Defense Health Care; AAFES

Republicans (4)

Saxby Chambliss, Ga. - *chairman*
Susan Collins, Maine
Elizabeth Dole, N.C.
John Cornyn, Texas

Democrats (3)

Ben Nelson, Neb. - *ranking member*
Edward M. Kennedy, Mass.
Mark Pryor, Ark.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS AND MANAGEMENT SUPPORT

Jurisdiction: Military readiness, training, logistics and maintenance issues and programs, all military construction, installations and family housing issues, including the base closure process.

Republicans (9)

John Ensign, Nev. - *chairman*
John McCain, Ariz.
James M. Inhofe, Okla.
Pat Roberts, Kan.
Wayne Allard, Colo.
Jeff Sessions, Ala.
Jim Talent, Mo.
Saxby Chambliss, Ga.
John Cornyn, Texas

Democrats (8)

Daniel K. Akaka, Hawaii - *ranking member*
Robert C. Byrd, W.Va.
Bill Nelson, Fla.
Ben Nelson, Neb.
Mark Dayton, Minn.
Evan Bayh, Ind.
Hillary Rodham Clinton, N.Y.
Mark Pryor, Ark.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER

Jurisdiction: Naval and U.S. Marine Corps programs less tactical aviation; strategic lift programs; U.S. Coast Guard; maritime issues; TRANSCOM; budget accounts for USN; USMC procurement and RDT&E less tactical aviation; Army and Air Force strategic lift programs; National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF).

Republicans (4)

Jim Talent, Mo. - *chairman*
John McCain, Ariz.
Susan Collins, Maine
Lindsey Graham, S.C.

Democrats (3)

Edward M. Kennedy, Mass. - *ranking member*
Joseph I. Lieberman, Conn.
Jack Reed, R.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

Jurisdiction: All strategic forces (except deep strike systems), space programs, ballistic missile defense and Department of Energy national security programs (except non-proliferation programs).

Republicans (6)

Wayne Allard, Colo. - *chairman*
James M. Inhofe, Okla.
Jeff Sessions, Ala.
John Ensign, Nev.
Lindsey Graham, S.C.
John Cornyn, Texas

Democrats (5)

Bill Nelson, Fla. - *ranking member*
Robert C. Byrd, W.Va.
Jack Reed, R.I.
Ben Nelson, Neb.
Mark Dayton, Minn.

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

FULL COMMITTEE

Jurisdiction: Ammunition depots; Army, Navy, and Air Force reservations and establishments; conservation, development, and use of naval petroleum and oil shale reserves; Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; Merchant Marine Academy, and State Maritime Academies; military applications of nuclear energy; tactical intelligence and DoD intelligence related activities; national security aspects of merchant marine, including financial assistance for the construction and operation of vessels, the maintenance of the U.S. shipbuilding and ship repair industrial base, cargo preference and merchant marine officers and seamen as these matters relate to the national security; all benefits and privileges of members of the armed forces; scientific research and development in support of the armed services; selective service; size and composition of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force; soldiers' and sailors' homes.

Republicans (33)

Duncan Hunter, Calif. - *chairman*
Curt Weldon, Pa.
Joel Hefley, Colo.
James Saxton, N.J.
John M. McHugh, N.Y.
Terry Everett, Ala.
Roscoe G. Bartlett, Md.
Howard P. "Buck" McKeon, Calif.
William M. "Mac" Thornberry, Texas
John Hostettler, Ind.
Walter B. Jones, N.C.
Jim Ryun, Kan.
Jim Gibbons, Nev.
Robin Hayes, N.C.
Heather A. Wilson, N.M.
Ken Calvert, Calif.
Rob Simmons, Conn.
Jo Ann Davis, Va.
Ed Schrock, Va.
Todd Akin, Mo.
J. Randy Forbes, Va.
Jeff Miller, Fla.
Joe Wilson, S.C.
Frank A. LoBiondo, N.J.
Tom Cole, Okla.
Jeb Bradley, N.H.
Rob Bishop, Utah
Michael R. Turner, Ohio
John Kline, Minn.
Candice S. Miller, Mich.
Phil Gingrey, Ga.
Mike D. Rogers, Ala.
Trent Franks, Ariz.

Democrats (28)

Ike Skelton, Mo. - *ranking member*
John M. Spratt Jr., S.C.
Solomon P. Ortiz, Texas
Lane Evans, Ill.
Gene Taylor, Miss.
Neil Abercrombie, Hawaii
Martin T. Meehan, Mass.
Silvestre Reyes, Texas
Vic Snyder, Ark.
Jim Turner, Texas
Adam Smith, Wash.
Loretta Sanchez, Calif.
Mike McIntyre, N.C.
Ciro D. Rodriguez, Texas
Ellen O. Tauscher, Calif.
Robert A. Brady, Pa.
Baron P. Hill, Ind.
John B. Larson, Conn.
Susan A. Davis, Calif.
Jim Langevin, R.I.
Steve Israel, N.Y.
Rick Larsen, Wash.
Jim Cooper, Tenn.
Jim Marshall, Ga.
Kendrick B. Meek, Fla.
Madeleine Z. Bordallo, Guam
Tim Ryan, Ohio
Charles W. Stenholm, Texas

Republican Staff Director: Robert S. Rangel

Democratic Counsel: Jim Schweiter

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PROJECTION FORCES

Jurisdiction: Navy and Marine Corps programs (except strategic weapons and space programs, special operations and information technology accounts), deep strike bombers and related systems, strategic lift programs and naval reserve equipment.

Republicans (9)

Roscoe G. Bartlett, Md. - *chairman*
Rob Simmons, Conn.
Jo ~~Ann~~ Davis, Va.
Ed Schrock, Va.
James Saxton, N.J.
John Hostettler, Ind.
Ken Calvert, Calif.
Jeb Bradley, N.H.
John Kline, Minn.

Democrats (7)

Gene Taylor, Miss. - *ranking member*
Neil Abercrombie, Hawaii
Ellen O. Tauscher, Calif.
Jim Langevin, R.I.
Steve Israel, N.Y.
Jim Marshall, Ga.
Charles W. Stenholm, Texas

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TOTAL FORCE

Jurisdiction: Military personnel policy, reserve component integration and employment issues, military health care, military education and POW/MIA issues. In addition, the subcommittee will be responsible for Morale, Welfare and Recreation issues and programs.

Republicans (8)

John M. McHugh, N.Y. - *chairman*
Tom Cole, Okla.
Candice S. Miller, Mich.
Phil Gingrey, Ga.
H. James Saxton, N.J.
Jim Ryun, Kan.
Ed Schrock, Va.
Robin Hayes, N.C.

Democrats (6)

Vic Snyder, Ark. - *ranking member*
Martin T. Meehan, Mass.
Loretta Sanchez, Calif.
Ellen O. Tauscher, Calif.
Jim Cooper, Tenn.
Madeleine Z. Bordallo, Guam

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

Jurisdiction: Military readiness, training, logistics and maintenance issues and programs, all military construction, installations and family housing issues, including the base closure process.

Republicans (16)

Joel Hefley, Colo. - *chairman*
Howard P. "Buck" McKeon, Calif.
John Hostettler, Ind.
Walter B. Jones, N.C.
Jim Ryun, Kan.
Robin Hayes, N.C.
Heather A. Wilson, N.M.
Ken Calvert, Calif.
J. Randy Forbes, Va.
Jeff Miller, Fla.
Tom Cole, Okla.
Rob Bishop, Utah
Candice S. Miller, Mich.
Mike D. Rogers, Ala.
Trent Franks, Ariz.
John M. McHugh, N.Y.

Democrats (14)

Solomon P. Ortiz, Texas - *ranking member*
Lane Evans, Ill.
Gene Taylor, Miss.
Neil Abercrombie, Hawaii
Silvestre Reyes, Texas
Vic Snyder, Ark.
Ciro D. Rodriguez, Texas
Robert A. Brady, Pa.
Baron P. Hill, Ind.
John B. Larson, Conn.
Susan A. Davis, Calif.
Rick Larsen, Wash.
Jim Marshall, Ga.
Madeleine Z. Bordallo, Guam

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

Jurisdiction: All strategic forces (except deep strike systems), space programs, ballistic missile defense and Department of Energy national security programs (except non-proliferation programs).

Republicans (8)

Terry Everett, Ala. - *chairman*
William M. "Mac" Thornberry, Texas
Curt Weldon, Pa.
Heather A. Wilson, N.M.
Rob Bishop, Utah
Michael R. Turner, Ohio
Mike D. Rogers, Ala.
Trent Franks, Ariz.

Democrats (6)

Silvestre Reyes, Texas - *ranking member*
John M. Spratt Jr., S.C.
Loretta Sanchez, Calif.
Ellen O. Tauscher, Calif.
Kendrick B. Meek, Fla.
Tim Ryan, Ohio

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES

Jurisdiction: All Army and Air Force acquisition programs (except strategic weapons and lift programs, special operations and information technology accounts); all Navy and Marine Corps aviation programs, National Guard and Army and Air Force reserve modernization, and ammunition programs.

Republicans (16)

Curt Weldon, Pa. - *chairman*
Jim Gibbons, Nev.
Todd Akin, Mo.
Jeb Bradley, N.H.
Michael R. Turner, Ohio
Phil Gingrey, Ga.
Terry Everett, Ala.
Howard P. "Buck" McKeon, Calif.
Walter B. Jones, N.C.
Jim Ryun, Kan.
Rob Simmons, Conn.
Ed Schrock, Va.
J. Randy Forbes, Va.
Joel Hefley, Colo.
Joe Wilson, S.C.
Frank A. LoBiondo, N.J.

Democrats (14)

Neil Abercrombie, Hawaii - *ranking member*
Ike Skelton, Mo.
John M. Spratt Jr., S.C.
Solomon P. Ortiz, Texas
Lane Evans, Ill.
Jim Turner, Texas
Adam Smith, Wash.
Mike McIntyre, N.C.
Robert A. Brady, Pa.
John B. Larson, Conn.
Steve Israel, N.Y.
Jim Cooper, Tenn.
Kendrick B. Meek, Fla.
Charles W. Stenholm, Texas

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

Jurisdiction: Defense Department counterproliferation and counter terrorism programs and initiatives; Special Operations Forces, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, information technology policy and programs, force protection policy and oversight, and related intelligence support.

Republicans (12)

H. James Saxton, N.J. - *chairman*
Joe Wilson, S.C.
Frank A. LoBiondo, N.J.
John Kline, Minn.
Jeff Miller, Fla.
Roscoe G. Bartlett, Md.
William M. "Mac" Thornberry, Texas
Jim Gibbons, Nev.
Robin Hayes, N.C.
Jo Ann Davis, Va.
Todd Akin, Mo.
Joel Hefley, Colo.

Democrats (10)

Martin T. Meehan, Mass. - *ranking member*
Jim Turner, Texas
Adam Smith, Wash.
Mike McIntyre, N.C.
Ciro D. Rodriguez, Texas
Baron P. Hill, Ind.
Susan A. Davis, Calif.
Jim Langevin, R.I.
Rick Larsen, Wash.
Jim Cooper, Tenn.

September 27, 2004

TO: Matt Latimer
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: P.M. Blair Statement

UK

Here are some interesting words by Tony Blair that are worth keeping -- he says it well.

Thanks.

Attach. 7/15/04 Statement on Butler Report

DHR:ss
092704-11

.....
Please respond by _____

27 Sep 04



10 DOWNING STREET

Print this page

Statement on Butler Report

Prime Minister Tony Blair has given his response to the Butler Review in the House of Commons.

- **Download the Butler Report on the Directgov website**

Read the Prime Minister's statement in full below.

[check against delivery]

Lord Butler's Report is comprehensive, thorough; and I thank the members of his Committee and their staff for all their hard work in compiling it. We accept fully the Report's conclusions.

The Report provides an invaluable analysis of the general threat in respect of WMD; of the potential acquisition of WMD by terrorists; and though it devotes much of its analysis to Iraq, it also goes into detail on the WMD threat posed by Iran, Libya, North Korea and A Q Khan. Some of the intelligence disclosed is made available for the first time and gives some insight into the reasons for the judgements I and other Ministers have been making. I hope the House will understand if I deal with it in some detail.

The hallmark of the Report is its balanced judgements.

The Report specifically supports the conclusions of Lord Hutton's inquiry about the good faith of the intelligence services and the Government in compiling the September 2002 dossier.

But it also makes specific findings that the dossier and the intelligence behind it should have been better presented, had more caveats attached to it, and been better validated.

It reports doubts which have recently arisen on the 45 minute intelligence and says in any event it should have been included in the dossier in different terms; but it expressly supports the intelligence on Iraq's attempts to procure uranium from Niger in respect of Iraq's nuclear ambitions.

The Report finds that there is little - if any - significant evidence of stockpiles of readily deployable weapons.

But it also concludes that Saddam Hussein did indeed have:

- a. "the strategic intention of resuming the pursuit of prohibited weapons programmes, including if possible its nuclear weapons programme, when United Nations inspection regimes were relaxed and sanctions were eroded or lifted.
- b. In support of that goal, was carrying out illicit research and development, and procurement, activities, to seek to sustain its indigenous capabilities.
- c. Was developing ballistic missiles with a range longer than permitted under relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions;"

Throughout the last 18 months, throughout the rage and ferment of the debate over Iraq, there have been two questions.

One is an issue of good faith, of integrity.

This is now the fourth exhaustive inquiry that has dealt with this issue. This report, like the Hutton inquiry, like the report of the ISC before it and of the FAC before that, has found the same thing.

11-L-0559/OSD/038925

BLAIR:

No-one lied. No-one made up the intelligence. No-one inserted things into the dossier against the advice of the intelligence services.

Everyone genuinely tried to do their best in good faith for the country in circumstances of acute difficulty. That issue of good faith should now be at an end.

But there is another issue. We expected, I expected to find actual usable, chemical or biological weapons shortly after we entered Iraq. We even made significant contingency plans in respect of their use against our troops. UN Resolution 1441 in November 2002 was passed unanimously by the whole Security Council, including Syria, on the basis Iraq was a WMD threat. Lord Butler says in his report:

"We believe that it would be a rash person who asserted at this stage that evidence of Iraqi possession of stocks of biological or chemical agents, or even of banned missiles, does not exist or will never be found."

But I have to accept: as the months have passed, it seems increasingly clear that at the time of invasion Saddam did not have stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons ready to deploy.

The second issue is therefore this: even if we acted in perfectly good faith, is it now the case that in the absence of stockpiles of weapons ready to deploy, the threat was misconceived and therefore the war was unjustified?

I have searched my conscience, not in a spirit of obstinacy; but in genuine reconsideration in the light of what we now know, in answer to that question. And my answer would be: that the evidence of Saddam's WMD was indeed less certain, less well-founded than was stated at the time. But I cannot go from there to the opposite extreme. On any basis he retained complete strategic intent on WMD and significant capability; the only reason he ever let the inspectors back into Iraq was that he had 180,000 US and British troops on his doorstep; he had no intention of ever co-operating fully with the inspectors; and he was going to start up again the moment the troops and the inspectors departed; or the sanctions eroded. And I say further: that had we backed down in respect of Saddam, we would never have taken the stand we needed to take on WMD, never have got the progress for example on Libya, that we achieved; and we would have left Saddam in charge of Iraq, with every malign intent and capability still in place and every dictator with the same intent everywhere immeasurably emboldened.

As I shall say later: for any mistakes, made, as the Report finds, in good faith I of course take full responsibility, but I cannot honestly say I believe getting rid of Saddam was a mistake at all. Iraq, the region, the wider world is a better and safer place without Saddam.

The Report begins by an assessment of intelligence and its use in respect of countries other than Iraq. It points out that in respect of Libya, the intelligence has largely turned out to be accurate especially in respect of its nuclear weapons programmes; and those are now being dismantled. In respect of Iran, the Report says Iran is now engaged with the IAEA, though there remain 'clearly outstanding issues about Iran's activities'.

About North Korea, the Report concludes that it 'is now thought to be developing missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons as far away as continental US and Europe'.

The Report goes on at para 99: 'North Korea is a particular cause for concern because of its willingness to sell ballistic missiles to anyone prepared to pay in hard currency'.

The Report also discloses the extent of the network of A Q Khan, the Pakistani former nuclear scientist. This network is now shut down largely through US and UK intelligence work, through Pakistani cooperation and through the dialogue with Libya.

The Report then reveals for the first time the development of the intelligence in respect of the new global terrorism we face. In the early years, for example, in the JIC assessment of October 1994, the view was that the likelihood of terrorists acquiring or using chemical, biological or nuclear weapons was, whilst theoretically possible, highly unlikely.

However, as the name and activities of Usama Bin Laden became better known, the JIC started to change its earlier assessment. In November 1998, it said:

[UBL] has a long-standing interest in the potential terrorist use of CBR materials, and recent intelligence

11-L-0559/OSD/038926

suggest his ideas about using toxic materials are maturing and being developed in more detail. ... There is also secret reporting that he may have obtained some CB material - and that he is interested in nuclear materials.

And in June 1999:

Most of UBL's planned attacks would use conventional terrorist weapons. But he continues to seek chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear material and to develop a capability for its terrorist use.

By mid-July 1999 this view hardened still further:

There have been important developments in [Islamist extremist] terrorism. It has become clear that Usama Bin Laden has been seeking CBRN materials The significance of his possession of CB materials is that, in contrast to other terrorists interested in CB, he wishes to target US, British and other interests worldwide.

A series of further assessments to the same effect issued in January 2000, again in August 2000, and in January 2001.

To anyone who wants to know why I have become increasingly focused on the link between terrorism and WMD, I recommend reading this part of the Report and the intelligence assessments received.

It was against this background of what one witness to Lord Butler called the 'creeping tide of proliferation' that the events of September 11th 2001 should be considered. As the Report says, following September 11th, the calculus of the threat changed:

I said in this House on the 14th September 2001:

"We know, that the terrorists would, if they could, go further and use chemical or biological or even nuclear weapons of mass destruction. We have been warned by the events of 11 September. We should act on the warning."

I took the view then and stand by it now that no Prime Minister faced with this evidence could responsibly afford to ignore it. After September 11th, it was time to take an active as opposed to reactive position on the whole question of WMD. We had to close down the capability of the rogue states - usually highly repressive and unstable - to develop such weapons; and the commercial networks such as those of A Q Khan helping them.

Again my clear view was that the country where we had to take a stand was Iraq. Why?

Iraq was the one country to have used WMD recently. It had developed WMD capability and concealed it. Action by UN inspectors and the IAEA had by the mid to late 1990s reduced this threat significantly; but as the Butler Report shows at paras 180-182, by the time the inspectors were effectively blocked in Iraq (at the end of 1998) the JIC assessments were that some CW stocks remained hidden and that Iraq remained capable of a break-out chemical weapons capability within months; a biological weapons capability, also with probable stockpiles; and could have had ballistic missiles capability in breach of UN Resolutions within a year.

This was the reason for military action, taken without a UN Resolution, in December 1998.

Subsequent to that, the Report shows that we continued to receive the JIC assessments on Iraq's WMD capability. For example, in respect of chemical and biological weapons it said in April 2000:

Our picture is limited.

It is likely that Iraq is continuing to develop its offensive chemical warfare (CW) and biological warfare (BW) capabilities.

In May 2001, the JIC assessed, in respect of nuclear weapons:

Our knowledge of developments in Iraq's WMD and ballistic missile programmes since Desert Fox air operations in December 1998 is patchy. But intelligence gives grounds for concern and suggests that Iraq is becoming bolder in conducting activities prohibited by UNSCR 687.

There is evidence of increased activity at Iraq's only remaining nuclear facility and a growing number of

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reports on possible nuclear related procurement.

In February 2002, the JIC said:

Iraq ... if it has not already done so, could produce significant quantities of BW agent within days. ...

The Report specifically endorses the March 2002 advice to Ministers which states that though containment had been partially successful and intelligence was patchy, Iraq continues to develop WMD:

Iraq has up to 20 650km range missiles left over from the Gulf War. These are capable of hitting Israel and the Gulf states. Design work for other ballistic missiles over the UN limit of 150km continues. Iraq continues with its BW and CW programmes and, if it has not already done so, could produce significant quantities of BW agents within days and CW agent within weeks of a decision to do so. We believe it could deliver CBW by a variety of means, including in ballistic missile warheads. There are also some indications of a continuing nuclear programme.

The point I would make is simply this. The dossier of September 2002 did not reach any startling or radical conclusion. It said, in effect, what had been said for several years based not just on intelligence but on frequent UN and international reports. It was the same conclusion that led us to military action in 1998; to maintain sanctions; to demand the return of UN Inspectors.

We published the dossier in response to the enormous Parliamentary and press clamour. It was not, as has been described, the case for war. But it was the case for enforcing the UN will.

In retrospect it has achieved a fame it never achieved at the time. As the Report states at para 310:

It is fair to say at the outset that the dossier attracted more attention after the war than it had done before it. When first published, it was regarded as cautious, and even dull. Some of the attention that it eventually received was the product of controversy over the Government's further dossier of February 2003. Some of it arose over subsequent allegations that the intelligence in the September dossier had knowingly been embellished, and hence over the good faith of the Government. Lord Hutton dismissed those allegations. We should record that we, too, have seen no evidence that would support any such allegations.

The Report at para 333 states that in general the statements in the dossier reflected fairly the judgements of past JIC assessments.

The Report, however, goes on to say that with hindsight making public that the authorship of the dossier was by the JIC was a mistake. It meant that more weight was put on the intelligence than it could bear; and put the JIC and its Chairman in a difficult position.

It recommends in future a clear delineation between Government and JIC, perhaps by issuing two separate documents. I think this is wise, though I doubt it would have made much difference to the reception of the intelligence at the time.

The Report also enlarges on the criticisms of the ISC in respect of the greater use of caveats about intelligence both in the dossier and in my foreword and we accept that entirely.

The Report also states that significant parts of the intelligence have now been found by SIS to be in doubt.

The Chief of SIS, Sir Richard Dearlove has told me that SIS accepts all the conclusions and recommendations of Lord Butler's report which concern the Service. SIS will fully address the recommendations which Lord Butler has made about their procedures and about the need for the Service properly to resource them. The Service has played, and will continue to play, a vital role in countering worldwide the tide of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, its successes are evident in Lord Butler's report.

I accept the Report's conclusions in full. Any mistakes made should not be laid at the door of our intelligence and security community. They do a tremendous job for our country.

I accept full personal responsibility for the way the issue was presented and therefore for any errors made.

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As the Report indicates, there is no doubt that at the time it was genuinely believed by everyone that Saddam had both strategic intent in respect of WMD and actual weapons.

I make this further point. On the sparse, generalised and highly fragmented intelligence about Al Qaida prior to September 11th, it is now widely said policy-makers should have foreseen the attacks that materialised on September 11th 2001 in New York. I only ask: had we ignored the specific intelligence about the threat from Iraq, backed up by a long history of international confrontation over it, and that threat later materialised, how would we have been judged?

I know some will disagree with this. There are those who were opposed to the war, remain so now and will forever be in that position.

I only hope that now, after two detailed Parliamentary Committee reports, a judicial inquiry more exhaustive than any has ever been in examining an allegation of impropriety against Government and now this voluminous report, people will not disrespect the other's point of view but will accept that those that agree and those that disagree with the war in Iraq, hold their views not because they are war-mongers on the one hand or closet supporters of Saddam on the other, but because of a genuine difference of judgement as to the right thing to have done.

There was no conspiracy. There was no impropriety.

The essential judgement and truth, as usual, does not lie in extremes.

We all acknowledge Saddam was evil and his regime depraved. Whether or not actual stockpiles of weapons are found, there wasn't and isn't any doubt Saddam used WMD and retained every strategic intent to carry on developing them. The judgement is this: would it have been better or more practical to have contained him through continuing sanctions and weapons inspections; or was this inevitably going to be at some point a policy that failed? And was removing Saddam a diversion from pursuing the global terrorist threat; or part of it?

I can honestly say I have never had to make a harder judgement. But in the end, my judgement was that after September 11th, we could no longer run the risk; that instead of waiting for the potential threat of terrorism and WMD to come together, we had to get out and get after it. One part was removing the training ground of Al Qaida in Afghanistan. The other was taking a stand on WMD; and the place to take that stand was Iraq, whose regime was the only one ever to have used WMD and was subject to 12 years of UN Resolutions and weapons inspections that turned out to be unsatisfactory.

And though in neither case was the nature of the regime the reason for conflict, it was decisive for me in the judgement as to the balance of risk for action or inaction.

Both countries now face an uncertain struggle for the future. But both at least now have a future. The one country in which you will find an overwhelming majority in favour of the removal of Saddam is Iraq.

I am proud of this country and the part it played and especially our magnificent armed forces, in removing two vile dictatorships and giving people oppressed, almost enslaved, the prospect of democracy and liberty.

This Report will not end the arguments about the war. But in its balance and common sense, it should at least help to set them in a more rational light; and for that we should be grateful.

SEP 28 2004

TO: Ken Krieg
cc: Gen Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Tina Jonas
Steve Cambone
Ryan Henry
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Paper from Newt Gingrich

381

Attached is a paper from Newt Gingrich on strategic planning for 2004 and beyond. It is interesting and, in thinking about the Quadrennial Defense Review and our upcoming SLRG work, you folks ought to take these thoughts into account.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/13/03 Strategic Planning for 2004 and beyond

DHR:ss
092704-28

.....
Please respond by 10/22/04

2854044

from newt 12/13/03

Strategic Planning for 2004 and beyond

National Security planning should always begin with capabilities rather than intentions.

After more than two years of intense effort there is much we still do not know about our opponents, their resources, their capabilities, and their organizational systems.

We have made a lot of progress from 9/11/01 if measured from where we were.

We have an even longer way to go if measured against the scale of the opposition:

- the still growing Wahhabist-Deobandi movement in Islam,
- the continued spread of terrorism as a system of war,
- the existence of huge ungoverned areas,
- the continued growth of the Gray world of people smuggling, illegal transportation, traditional international crime, narcotics trafficking, and illegal arms dealing,
- the continued efforts of dictatorships to develop capabilities that threaten America and her allies (including North Korea, Libya, Syria, Iran),
- the instability of Pakistan with its implications both for Afghanistan and for nuclear weapons proliferation and use,
- the rise of societal warfare in both Iraq and Afghanistan,
- the continuing drift of European popular opinion and a number of European governments away from the US,
- the United Nations Secretariat's reluctance to cooperate with the US
- and the continuing evolution of weapons of mass murder and weapons of mass destruction.

This is a formidable list of challenges and at the historic level of grand national strategy (to use the World War 2 term) it is not clear whether, with all our efforts, we are making progress toward real security or falling further behind the curve of the challenges.

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2004

11-L-0559/OSD/038931

Given the uncertainties, it is necessary to plan for a September-October 2004 which could be either violent and painful or peaceful and triumphant. We have no way of knowing which will happen although the uncertainties after 27 months effort make it more likely it will be violent and painful.

This means we should be prepared to offer "blood, sweat, toil and tears" (in Churchill's phrase) so that people are prepared to endure and prevail.

This would require a much more sober and serious State of the Union outlining the long term scale of the conflict and the possibility that it will take a decade to two generations to fully achieve our goal of a safe, healthy, prosperous and free worlds in which America is relatively safe and secure.

People need to be prepared for the possibility of much more violence and much more disruption over time.

If we are measured against a goal of winning by Labor Day 2004, we will have a very difficult argument to make and be politically and in the news media on the defensive for the entire year.

If we are measured against determination to prevail and an honest acceptance that this is hard and going to remain hard we will be able to put our critics on defense because their strategic vision is incompatible with modern reality.

Put simply, if the American people have to choose between an embattled Eagle (even one that is occasionally wounded) and an Ostrich they will choose the Eagle.

Daily and weekly events in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere have to be consistently put in this larger, worldwide, and long term struggle against the forces that would destroy our way of life.

PLANNING AND BUDGETING FOR WAR OR PEACE?

One of the principles emerging from this grimmer, longer range view is that both planning and budgeting have to evolve to take these challenges into account.

This war will last for at least a decade. Therefore supplemental budgeting is profoundly misleading.

Planning on a campaign by campaign basis is also an inadequate basis for thinking through needed structures and needed funding.

We desperately need planning for the entire war leading to strategies and structures appropriate to winning the larger, longer conflict.

Budgeting should follow the strategies and structures and force priority setting after the initial thinking has been done. In war time budgeting cannot precede the planning and establish the boundaries of thoughtful planning.

Maintaining a peacetime budgeting process sends the signal to everyone at mid level that it is business as usual despite the hawkish speeches by the political leadership.

Even more dangerously, budgeting within a peacetime framework means that the experts never show the political leadership what is really needed because the budget constraints inhibit planning and establish invisible boundaries of what is politically permissible and therefore what career officials will raise.

We are on the edge of budgeting decisions in defense, intelligence, public information capabilities, and societal assistance that will lengthen the war, weaken our ability to win the war, and increase the risks we are running in the out years. These are peace time rather than war time calculations.

BUDGETING AND AUDITING IN WARTIME

The same peacetime attitudes in budgeting carry over to a system of red tape, auditing and micromanagement which will make victory in Iraq and elsewhere vastly more difficult.

At the battle of Isandlwana in 1879 the Zulus massacred over 1500 British and auxiliary troops because they ran out of ammunition. They ran out of ammunition because the quartermaster would not open the oak boxes in advance because they were afraid bullets would be wasted or lost and they would be audited and punished.

Wars are best won quickly and decisively. Societal wars require substantially different capabilities than professional military wars but the goal of winning as rapidly as possible persists.

A societal war requires a lot of decentralized decisions including spending decisions. A lot of these spending decisions will inevitably be on non-military activities in a societal campaign.

To the degree an isolated, entrenched bureaucracy can focus on process, paperwork, and audit trails it can destroy the decentralization, flexibility and application of localized judgment that is vital to winning a war.

MOVING TO A SOCIETAL WARFARE STRATEGY IN IRAQ

Our strategy in Iraq must shift to an Iraqi-centric strategy and a decentralized implementation system.

Today we have an American-centric strategy and the CPA is trying to micromanage and to be 'fiscally prudent.'

These characteristics could lead to a catastrophic decline in support for the Americans during 2004.

Societal wars have a dynamic which is always dangerous for the dominant force.

The burden of safety is on the dominant force.

The burden of prosperity and convenience is on the dominant force.

The burden of psychological acceptance is on the dominant force.

The insurgent simply has to survive to still potentially win and that victory could come with startling speed.

The 'feel good' briefings on 'progress' are symptoms of sincere people who simply do not understand the historic dynamics of societal warfare.

AFGHANISTAN

The strategy in Afghanistan is essentially right but under resourced.

With adequate resourcing and continuing attention to the cross border sanctuary problem in Pakistan Afghanistan should be able to grow into a success story.

The resourcing issue is important both to offset the damage done by the Taliban and to offset the growing illegal resources available through the increase in heroin production.

The civilizing modernizing forces around Karzai have to have more resources than the warlords can aggregate illegally and have to have enough resources to drown the insurgency in the south.

The strategy In Afghanistan is fine but without more resourcing it could still fail.

A SOCIETAL WARFARE DOCTRINE

Societal warfare is the natural response of a determined enemy who cannot compete in the professional military arena.

The American military focuses so intently on winning high technology, high tempo theater campaigns that it has failed to develop a modern doctrine for societal wars.

Societal warfare is inherently Integrated (see below) and operates at a different rhythm and pattern than professional military warfare.

Developing and implementing a societal warfare doctrine should be one of the highest priorities for 2004.

INTEGRATED OPERATIONS

Integrated operations are those activities which reach beyond the military and involve other governmental and non-governmental actors in a systematic manner.

Integrated operations are a much more explicit, coordinated, and accountable system than the current 'interagency process' which is failing to achieve the energy, drive, and decisiveness needed in winning wars.

Creating an Integrated Doctrine and getting it accepted by all the major players and implemented by them would be a major step forward in American capability to win societal wars.

SOCIETAL TRANSFORMATION VERSUS STABILITY OPERATIONS

The American Goal in many countries is not a 'stability operation'. The American goal is to transform the society.

The President's calls for democracy in the Middle East are calls to transform civil society in every country in the region.

American goals in subSaharan Africa, Afghanistan, Iraq, and a host of other places are to bring about profound change so people live in safety, health prosperity, and freedom. We need to develop a doctrine and system for 'societal transformation;' to replace the inadequate model of 'stability operations.'

This requires combining the Societal Warfare Doctrine and the Integrated Doctrine with other needed attributes that will be discovered as our efforts progress in this field.

URBAN WARFARE/POLICING

One of the most consistent requirements of the future will be a level of sophisticated urban warfare and urban policing that is currently beyond our reach.

Developing this doctrine and capability for urban warfare/policing should be a major goal of DoD in 2004.

INFORMATION AND PEOPLE TO PEOPLE OPERATIONS

One of our greatest current strategic weaknesses is the inability to communicate our values and concerns to the world at large.

A component of that inability is the absence of the kind of sophisticated people to people relationships which would take

advantage of the extraordinary diversity of American society (51,000 Pashtun speaking Americans even more Iraqi Americans for example).

In the age of the internet, cell phone, videoconference and jet airplane America could do stunningly more to mobilize our capabilities as a people and to communicate with and relate to the world.

America is too powerful to ignore.

If America is not effectively communicating and networking, the world will assume the worst about our goals and intentions.

This is one of the highest value areas which the White House should direct and which should bypass all the current bureaucracies to bring in civilian experts and move to a dynamic, high energy, long term strategy in both information and people to people networking.

HOMELAND SECURITY

Homeland Security remains an underestimated challenge.

The rise of weapons of mass murder (largely biological) and the continuing spread of weapons of mass destruction (largely nuclear) makes it imperative that the intensity and drive for Homeland Security match that of combat operations overseas.

It is a fact that we would be hit at home at any time.

It is a fact that the weapons could be biological or nuclear and the casualty rates could be two or three orders of magnitude greater than 9/11 or even higher.

That means America could face losing hundreds of thousands or even millions of people in the very near future.

There is no sense of urgency comparable to that threat.

There are two areas in particular that need dramatic upgrading: responding to a nuclear event and responding to a biological event. Each should have its own focus and its own metrics for success.

In addition the Department of Homeland Security should be developing a much more high technology visa and visitation-work card system Secretary Ridge is absolutely on the right track but needs reinforcement to communicate urgency and very high standards of change to the bureaucracies he has now assembled into one agency.

NUCLEAR REACTION AND RECOVERY IN THE UNITED STATES

Some major decisions need to be made about the scale of a potential nuclear event or series of events and the standards of response and recovery we want to establish. There is a direct correlation between rigorous, grim realism before the event and the opportunity to save lives and accelerate the recovery.

The most likely lead agency in this process is a restructured National Guard and Reserve force that has some forces dedicated to homeland security and some forces available for overseas use.

The Defense Department is clearly trying to avoid this responsibility.

If the President prefers to create new civilian capabilities reporting directly to Homeland Security that would be an acceptable solution.

If the National Guard and Reserve are reshaped to ensure they can meet the crisis of one or more nuclear events that is an acceptable solution.

Everyone should be uncomfortable about the current limited understanding of the amount of engineering, policing and medical resources that would be absorbed in nuclear events here at home.

Lack of clarity in preparation, responsibility and developing the necessary forces will lead to many more American deaths if a nuclear event occurs.

Every day that we fail to clarify this is a day Americans are at risk.

BIOLOGICAL THREATS

Biological threats are the greatest threats America faces.

An engineered flu could potentially kill tens of millions of Americans. The 1918 flu epidemic killed more people than the First World War.

There must be three major steps toward surviving a biological threat:

1. the health system including veterinarians and retired doctors and nurses must be connected into an information system in an investment modeled on Eisenhower's National Defense Interstate Highway system (but radically smaller in expense). This investment will dramatically help with every day health requirements and will both improve healthcare and lower costs. Far more important, this investment will make it possible to detect a biological attack at the earliest moment, analyze it in the shortest time, educate the nation's health personnel in virtually real time and minimize the loss of American life;
2. There are currently two or three paths toward accelerating vaccine development and production. All should be invested in at the highest rate the research system can absorb the resources. A breakthrough in any of these areas would save a tremendous number of lives if an engineered virus were unleashed in the United States.
3. There is a potential within a decade to develop a nanomaterial approach to vaccine production that would enable the United States to respond literally overnight to an attack by mass producing a vaccine in a manner now impossible. Because of the number of lives potentially at risk this should receive the highest possible funding priority and should be monitored at the highest levels in a manner reminiscent of the Manhattan Project (although with far fewer resources).

October 1, 2004

TO: John Rood
cc: Mira Ricardel
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Progress in Missile Defense

We've been seeing a great deal of progress in Missile Defense over the past few months. The policy side of the work is moving along, especially with the working relationship you have established with the new Commander at STRATCOM.

We're clearly on the cusp of doing some important things, and your work has been an important part of that - thanks.

DHR:ss
093004-5

.....
Please *respond* by _____

373.24

1 OCT 04

~~FOUO~~

DEC 30 2004

W
1
2

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Draft Memo

Condi,

Thanks for sending me the draft memo. Please hold up on it until I get back to you. I want to think through the implications of it, and how I would respond.

Thanks.

DHR:as
122904-17 (tr)

~~FOUO~~

30 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

November 11, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld ^{A.}
SUBJECT: Letter

Someone may want to write this person Brendan McCluskey at Convent Station a letter. It is nice.

Thanks.

Attach: 1021/04 Star Ledger (Lincoln, NEW JERSEY?)

DHR: 111104-20

.....
Please respond by 11/26/04

33551

12/1

Capt Marriott
Mr Di Rita asked that we get this to Carrie Sue for action. This.
George Rhynders

CSC
Forsc
M

11 Nov 04

20996-04

STOL... 10/24/01

A losing battle

It's reported that many Sunni Muslims have declared a jihad to rid Iraq of all American armed forces. Among the methods they will use, as we have already seen, are kidnappings, beheadings and bombings. This news couldn't be any sadder for our forces in Iraq.

All along it seems we've been fighting a losing battle in Iraq. Major portions of the country are not under allied control, there are growing American casualties, there is rampant unemployment, terrorists can strike at will, Iraqis don't believe the United States is aiding their country and this administration is in a quandary as to how to conduct the "peace."

With this in mind, how can President Bush and members of his administration travel around the country proclaiming the situation is rosy? Exactly what source is he reading to make him believe the war in Iraq is proceeding smoothly?

Even now, Republican senators are questioning this president's competence. The choice in this election comes down to which candidate is competent. The way the Iraq war is being handled is a sure sign of the incompetence of this administration.

- Ronald Lieberman, Millburn

...bile off more than it can show. The United States must act in concert with the international community to the maximum extent to resolve perceived security threats from abroad.

Ferdinand Capozzi, Westfield
one of my frequent critics!

Answer to defecation

Your editorial "Have we passed history? Yes" suggests that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld should receive the coveted "You've got to be kidding" award for his "cheerful assertion" when speaking of the upcoming election in Iraq that "Nothing's perfect in life, as you have an election that's not quite perfect. Is it better than not having an election? You bet."

Your award selection might be premature. Here's another "I serve" quote: "The election is a necessity. We cannot have a free government without elections; and if the rebellion could force us to forgo, or postpone, a national election, it might fairly claim to have already conquered us."



ABRAHAM LINCOLN

This was the reply President Abraham Lincoln made to his aides who urged him to suspend the elections of 1864, this during the Civil War, when there was every expectation that he would lose. If you are going to reopen nominations for the award, I suggest your editorial writer be put in contention.

- Brendan McCluskey, Concord Station

...had the intent that the war would pay for itself with Iraq's oil revenues. President Bush had the intent that it was "mission accomplished" more than a year ago on that aircraft carrier. How well did all those intentions work out?

I feel like we've moved from politics into the world of science fiction. It's like we've strayed into that Tom Cruise movie, "Minority Report," in which the state imprisons people for crimes they haven't committed but is sure they will commit in the future.

- Shelley Mathies, Bloomfield

War powers

I have just reread Article 2 of the Constitution. Would Sen. John Kerry or adviser Richard Holbrooke please refer me to the section that requires the president to consult with our allies before going to war?

- Arthur F. Clarke Jr., Andover

Backwards strategy

Reader Archie Sajano's Sept. 28 suggestion that we had to invade Iraq to keep Saddam Hussein out of the race for nuclear weapons with Iran is the ultimate in backwards, nonsensical, non-diplomatic Republican strategy.

If Iran was and is the more immediate nuclear threat, why didn't we neutralize the nuclear threat in Iran and thereby convince the entire Middle East that we were not going to allow any proliferation in the region? Unfortunately, both Bushes let the Saudis play both sides of the fence and diverted U.S. attention to Iraq. Didn't the Saudis notice that most of the 9/11 hijackers were Saudis?

- William T. Fidurski, Clark

Salute sacrifice

We cannot begin to explain our disappointment when we opened your Oct. 10 edition to look for coverage of the "Salute the Troops" deployment ceremony that took place the previous day in Trenton. As we turned page after page until we reached the 41st page, we wondered: Does anyone care about the 2,800 men and women embarking on a dangerous mission to Iraq? If the placement of the article is any indication of just how much people care, we are deeply saddened.

Our son, Chris, is one of the citizen soldiers who will risk his life in the name of liberty. He is a captain in the 642nd Aviation Support Battalion, which has joined six other battalions to form the 42nd (Rainbow) Infantry Division. This division is made up entirely of National Guardsmen and women and will be the first of its kind deployed to Iraq. It represents...

Glory days, for some

On Oct. 8, 1998 parents jammed the gym at Rumson-Fair Haven High School to try to get an explanation of why their school's safety response program was found on a computer CD in Iraq. Parents were assured there was no terrorist intent, but then why the bomb-sniffing dogs, significant increase in police presence and review of years of police records? Since Bruce Springsteen lives in Rumson, I would have paid the \$100 he is charging for his concert to see him stand in front of parents and tell them there was nothing to worry about, and if only the United States hadn't entered Iraq we would never have found their school's data anyway. Then again, this was a public school and "working class" Bruce would never send his kids there.

Fair? No, but the world isn't fair, otherwise it would allow each of us to have two mansions in neighboring towns with full-time security details. Springsteen can afford to insulate himself from the elements we have to face every day, and then he sings about the plight of the "common man" and charges \$100 a ticket. Glory days for sure, but for whom?

- Ken Robinson, Ocean Township

Bow out with regrets

Right to serve

It was my son's choice. He is in the Navy and has just returned from Iraq. He is stationed on the USS George Washington, an aircraft carrier. Leonard Pitts Jr.'s Oct. 11 column ("A measure of success in the draft bill"), Michael Moore's movie and John Edwards' comments -- along the lines of "Would you let your kid die in Iraq?" and "What if it was your kid?" -- do little to help our servicemen and women. This is a volunteer military. When my son told me he wanted to join the Navy, I asked him why and he said, "Dad, you did it. Now it's my turn to serve." It's people like my son who make it possible for the Moores of the world to have freedom of speech. Could you imagine what would have happened if Moore's attitude prevailed during the Second World War? It was my son's choice to join, and I am so very proud of him. I pray for him and all other servicemen and women now in harm's way during this very necessary war on terror.

Fran Dunton emailed Hymedane 12/14
NJ - 14 for ledger

John Surich

FJ 973 392 1536
John Jared -> 1771
vmail 12/8
elektise@stulder.com

11-L-0559/OSD/038943 - left vmail 12/15
-talked to erica 12/15

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



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
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11-L-0559/OSD/038944



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON.

DEC 30 2004

Mr. Brendan McCluskey

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. McCluskey,

I saw your article in *The Star-Ledger*. It was top notch – thank you! Keep it up.

Sincerely,

33551D

30 Dec 04

11 Dec 04

OSD 20996-04

Feith

May 17, 2004

John

Scob down

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Future of the ISG

General Dayton raised an interesting issue when we were in Baghdad. He asked what the future is of the ISG.

TRAP

When Duelfer leaves and it ends, could it be converted to something else? Is it a model that ought to be patterned for the future? Are there other problems he could turn his attention to? Will it belong to the multi-national force? That needs to be thought through.

Please get with the right group and tell me what you think.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051704-17

.....

Please respond by 6/4/04

Dme

17 May 04

FEBRUARY 2
January 29, 2004

326

TO: David Chu
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Statistics on Reserves

I didn't want to take the paper at the breakfast meeting this morning because it is so complicated, and so poorly presented in terms of its utility and usability, that I didn't want to try to plow my way through it.

Could you please take it and re-present it with just the key 6, 8, 10 or 12 points on a single piece of paper with bullet points — not on your letterhead, not with sentences, but just the key things we ought to know.

I would also like you to do the same thing with the rebalancing the forces paper just produced by the DASD for Reserve Affairs, Readiness, Training and Mobilization. There ought to be a way to take one or two pages and just have hullet points, so that it is usable in a hearing or a speech.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012904-12



Please respond by 2/2/04

2 Feb 04

OSD 21022-05

7201

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000



POLICY

INFO MEMO

04/017598

DepSecDef
USD(P) *file POLICY*

DEC 14 2004

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, PD Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *3* DEC 14 2004

SUBJECT: Defense Policy Board Members' Term Expiration Dates

- As you consider the list of Defense Policy Board members, I have attached their term expiration dates for your information (Tab A).

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: Ann Hansen, Defense Policy Board, (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



11-L-0559/OSD/038948

Policy Info Memo Template

OSD 21034-04

| | DPB Member | Board Term Expiration |
|----|----------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1 | Dr. Kenneth Adelman | Mav-05 |
| 2 | Hon Richard Allen | May-05 |
| 3 | Dr. Martin Anderson | July-05 |
| 4 | Dr. Garv Becker | |
| 5 | Dr. Barry Blechman | November-05 |
| 6 | Dr. Harold Brown | July-05 |
| 7 | Ms. Victoria Clarke | June-06 |
| 8 | Dr. Eliot Cohen | January-06 |
| 9 | Ms. Devon Cross | January-06 |
| 10 | Gen (Ret) Ronald Fogleman | November-05 |
| 11 | Honorable Thomas Foley | January-06 |
| 12 | Honorable Tillie Fowler | Mav-05 |
| 13 | Honorable Newt Ginarich | January-06 |
| 14 | Gen (Ret) Chuck Horner | November-05 |
| 15 | Dr. Fred Ikle | November-05 |
| 16 | ADM (Ret) David Jeremiah | November-05 |
| 17 | GEN (Ret) John M. Keane | February-06 |
| 18 | Dr. Henry Kissinger | November-05 |
| 19 | Former VP Dan Quavle | Mav-05 |
| 20 | Dr. James Schlesinaer | July-05 |
| 21 | Dr. Kiron Skinner | May-05 |
| 22 | Dr. Hal Sonnenfeldt | November-05 |
| | | |
| 24 | Mr. Chris Williams | June-05 |
| 25 | Honorable Pete Wilson | Mav-05 |
| 26 | Hon R. James Woolsev | November-05 |

ES-1644
04/016678

~~FOUO~~

December 9, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: Defense Policy Board

Please send me the complete list of Defense Policy Board members. I want to make some changes.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120904-33

.....
Please respond by 12/10/04

~~FOUO~~

~~FOUO~~

Local Xxxx

November 24, 2004

1415
11
24

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Edits to Division of Labor Paper

Please fax your edits to the Division of Labor document to me this week.

Thanks.

Attach.
Division of Labor Paper

DHR:ss
112404-11

.....
Please respond by _____

See attached.

*I'm not sure what you have in mind
by separating PA+E from all the stuff
in the right-hand column.*

Paul W.

02050

24NOV04

OSD 21054-05

11-L-0559/QSD/038951

~~FOUO~~

DIVISION OF LABOR - SECDEF & DEPSECDEF

| SECDEF | BOTH | DEPSECDEF |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------|---|
| Iraq / Afghanistan | Sr Civilian Personnel | Procurement |
| SLRG | Sr Military Personnel | Inspector General |
| Contingency | Planning | Budget/Acquisition - Are you sure about this one? |
| POTUS Interaction | Pentagon Renovation | Medical Affairs |
| COCOM Interaction | Global Posture | Defense Agencies |
| SRO | Legislative Affairs | Reserve Affairs |
| Deployment Orders | Public Affairs | Missile Defense |
| Special Operations | NSC Process | Defense Business Board |
| Intelligence | General Counsel | Defense Science Board |
| PA&E ? | OMB | DACOWITS |
| Service Secretary Interaction | Outreach Meetings | AT&L |
| | Defense Policy Board | Comptroller |
| | Homeland Defense | Military Commissions |

DRAFT

September 21, 2003
7:10 AM

| Order | Secretary | Deputy | Both/Spilt |
|-------|---|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1 | CJCS/VCJCS/ Combatant Commanders | Homeland Defense | General Counsel |
| 2 | End Strength | AT&L | Iraq |
| 3 | Contingency Plans | Comptroller | Public Affairs |
| 4 | SRO | PA & E | Legislative Affairs |
| 5 | Deployment Orders/ Force/Rotation/Morale | Air Force/NRO | SLRG |
| 6 | Army | Navy / Marines | Outreach Meetings |
| 7 | Special Ops/SOLIC | Medical Affairs | Defense Policy Board |
| 8 | Footprint | NI2 | Personnel |
| 9 | Intel - Steve Cambone | SROC | OMB |
| 10 | PC with Doug Feith as +1 | Military Commissions | Defense Science Board |
| 11 | Defense Business Council | Detainees | Afghanistan |
| 12 | | Inspector General | |

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Military Assistant

08 Jun 2004-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR USD(P)


Subject: MEK

Sir,

The Deputy request that Dr. Luti take him through the briefings that have been provided on the MEK. Please call Stephanie to schedule a time for today.

Thank You.

Very Respectfully



Stephen T. Ganyard
Colonel, USMC
Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Suspense: COB 8 Jun 04

cc: DJS
VCJCS EA

OSD 21139-05

383.6


8 Jun 04

8 Jun-04
Scanned

June 7, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

CC: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: MEK

Let's get hot on the MEK and figure out what to do. My instinct is to get them passed over to the Iraqis.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060704-1

.....
Please respond by 6/18/04

720



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JAN 2 2004

His Excellency General Thammarak
Isarakun na Ayutthaya
Minister of Defence
Ministry of Defence
Bangkok, Thailand

293

Dear Minister Thammarak:

I offer my condolences on the deaths of the **Thai** soldiers killed in Karbala. We were saddened by the tragic loss in these recent terrorist attacks.

Please convey my sympathies to the families of the victims.

We are grateful for the continued commitment Thailand is making in the global war on terror and to the reconstruction efforts in **Iraq**.

With deepest sympathy,

Sincerely,

25 Jan 04

U21497 / 03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JAN 2 2004

The Honorable Nikolay Svinarov
Minister of Defense
Ministry of Defense

(b)(6)

Dear Minister Svinarov:

I offer my condolences on the deaths of the **Bulgarian** soldiers killed in Karbala. We are saddened by the tragic loss in these recent terrorist attacks.

Please convey my sympathies to the families of those lost. They **are** in our thoughts during **this** difficult **time** and we wish those who were injured a speedy recovery.

We are grateful for the continued commitment Bulgaria is making in the global war on terror and to the reconstruction efforts in **Iraq**.

With deepest sympathy,

Sincerely,

U21497 /03

His Excellency General Thammarak
Isarakun na Ayutthaya
Minister of Defence
Ministry of Defence
Bangkok, Thailand

Dear Minister Thammarak:

I offer my condolences on the deaths of the Thai soldiers killed in Karbala. We were saddened by the tragic loss in these recent terrorist attacks.

Please convey my sympathies to the families of the victims.

With deepest sympathy,

Sincerely,

We are grateful for the continued commitment Thailand is making in the global war on terror, and to the reconstruction efforts in Iraq.

army Di Riv

*TSA:
Thai letter
for final review.
v/R Slim*

LEADERSHIP
112

(30m)



EF-7934
I-03/017528

December 27, 2003

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Letter to Bulgarian Mo

*TSA,
Proposed Bulgaria
letter v/a Stim*

*JEM
12/27/03
1/2*

If we lost some Bulgarians in Iraq, I ought to get a letter off to the Minister of Defense of Bulgaria.

Thanks.

DIR:af
123703-10 (to computer)

*SD
Snowflake*

.....
Please respond by 12/30/03

Policy ExecSec's Note

December 31, 2003

CDR Nosenzo,

- The attached letter was forwarded electronically to Bill Marriott and Monica Generous on 30 Dec 03 in response to this SecDef note.

C. L. O'Connor

Colonel C. L. O'Connor, USMC
Director, Policy Executive Secretariat

29-12-03 13:49 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/038959

Generous, Monica, CIV, OSD

From: Marriott, William P, CAPT, OSD
Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2003 5:57 PM
To: Generous, Monica, CIV, OSD; Lohse, John A, CIV, OSD
Subject: FW: Bulgarian condolence

John or Monica or Carrie (b) (6) please turn this into a good condolence letter-perUSD(P) for Mr D's approval...thx, m

-----Original Message-----

From: Haber, Lauren, CIV, OSD-POLICY
Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2003 5:52 PM
To: Generous, Monica, CIV, OSD; Marriott, William P, CAPT, OSD
Subject: Bulgarian condolence



The Honorable
Nikolay Svinarov...

The Honorable Nikolay Svinarov
Minister of Defense
Ministry of Defense

(b)(6)

Dear Minister Svinarov:

I ~~offer~~ my condolences on the deaths of the Bulgarian soldiers killed in Karbala. We are saddened by the tragic loss in these recent terrorist attacks.

Please convey my sympathies to the families of those lost. They are in our thoughts during **this** difficult time and we wish **those** who were injured a speedy recovery.

We **are** grateful for the continued commitment Bulgaria is making in **the** global war on ~~terror~~ and to the reconstruction efforts in Iraq.

With deepest sympathy,

Sincerely,



CNN.com

PRINT THIS
 Powered by **Clickability**

Karbala attacks kill 12, wound dozens

Bulgarians, Thais suffer first deaths

BAGHDAD, Iraq (CNN) --Insurgents struck three targets in the holy city of Karbala in Iraq on Saturday, killing four Bulgarian soldiers, two Thai army engineers and six civilians, and wounding dozens of troop and civilians, coalition authorities said.

At least 37 troops, including five U.S. soldiers, were hurt in attacks that targeted a police station, the town's city hall and Karbala University, where the six killed soldiers were living in barracks. More than 100 civilians were injured in the closely coordinated strikes, coalition authorities said.

The Bulgarian and Thai troops, the first from those countries to be killed in the Iraqi war, were part of a Polish-led multinational coalition force patrolling south-central Iraq.

In Sofia, the Bulgarian Defense Ministry reported the four Bulgarian deaths and said several other soldiers were wounded. In Bangkok, a Thai military spokesman told CNN that two army engineers were killed. Thailand has a noncombatant force in Iraq.

In Iraq, a Polish military spokesman said the attackers used four suicide car bombs, machine guns and mortars. The strikes hit two coalition compounds and the provincial governor's office.

Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, deputy chief of operations for U.S. forces, said the insurgency responsible for such attacks appears to be small, loosely coordinated cells throughout the country.

"It takes a very few number of people in the country to create the kind of damage we are seeing," said Kimmitt.

Local police and witnesses said they saw a booby-trapped truck carrying gasoline slamming into a Karbala University building at 12:30 p.m. local time. There were many casualties, the Polish military headquarters in Karbala said.

Police and witnesses said that 15 minutes later, rockets were fired at the provincial governor's office, also referred to as city hall. It was packed with people on what is a regular business day in Iraq. Casualties were numerous, a witness told CNN.

The city south of Baghdad had suffered under Saddam Hussein, who oppressed the Shiite community

7201



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JAN 6 2004

248.7

The Honorable Jim Ramstad
United States House of Representatives
Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC 205 15-2303

Dear Representative Ramstad:

Thanks for the copy of your recent letter concerning the rest and recuperation leave program for U.S. forces serving in Iraq.

You may know that Charles Abell, Principal Deputy for Personnel and Readiness, signed the Memorandum on Funding Onward Transportation for Rest and Recuperation Leave on the 19th of December.

Mr. Abel is available to brief you or your staff in greater detail if you desire.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

6 Jan 04

U21538 /03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.
WASHINGTON.

JAN 6 2004

The Honorable Dennis Moore
United States House of Representatives
Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515-1603

Dear Representative Moore:

Thanks for the copy of your recent letter concerning the rest and recuperation leave program for U.S. forces serving in Iraq.

You may know that Charles Abell, Principal Deputy for Personnel and Readiness, signed the Memorandum on Funding Onward Transportation for Rest and Recuperation Leave on the 19th of December.

Mr. Abel is available to brief you or your staff in greater detail if you desire.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "D. Moore".

U21538 /03

11-L-0559/OSD/038964

December 11, 2003

TO: ~~Jaymie Dornan~~ Larry Di Rita

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
David Chu
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Expenses for Soldiers to Get Home

At the President's Congressional Ball, one of these two Congressmen handed me the attached "Dear Colleague" letter on soldiers still paying their own way home.

Would you please read it, develop an appropriate answer, tell me if you think we ought to fix the law and then let's get back to them in an appropriate way.

Thanks.

Attach.

12/8/03 Congressional "Dear Colleague" letter signed by Ramstad and Moore

12/12/03 letter to SecDef

DHR:dh
121103-16

.....
Please respond by 1/9/04

12/15

12/22
Carrie Lee
Please draft
response to
just report what
the policy is not
say Dr. Chu
is available for
additional info.

xxxx Sec
Please get no the
info on this

DR
LARRY DI RITA
12/22

Larry Di Rita

11-L-0559/OSD/038965

U21545 ^{12/16} 03

Marriott, William P, CAPT, OSD

From: Harrison, Richard A, CPT, OSD
Sent: Thursday, December 18, 2003 1:26 PM
To: Marriott, William P, CAPT, OSD
Subject: FW: snowflake: expenses for soldiers to get home

Sir,
Below is an update on the R&R travel snowflake from SD to Mr. DiRita. I'm still awaiting for a response on the policy memo that Mr. Abell will sign. More information to follow.

v/r
Rich

Richard A. Harrison
CPT, USA
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Executive Secretariat
Comm: (b)(6)
Room 3D853

-----Original Message-----

From: Loo, Bradford G, CIV, OSD-P&R
Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2003 5:09 PM
To: Harrison, Richard A, CPT, OSD
cc: Ellison, Lisa, CIV, OSD-P&R; Mack, Paris COL Army G1; Pendleton, Chris L, CDR, OSD-P&R; Darden-Ogbonnah, Chenetta Dr., CIV, OSD-P&R
Subject: snowflake: expenses for soldiers to get home

cpt.harrison, because my office has policy for leave and liberty, lisa ellison passed me the snowflake for action for payment r&r travel.

the short answer is the department of defense, iaw p.l. 108-106, will start paying service members air fare from the aerial port of debarkation (apod) to the airport nearest the service member's leave destination. the policy memorandum will be sent today or tomorrow to mr abell, pdusd (p&r) for approval.

the army is executive agent for the centcom r&r leave program and to date, has not set the date for implementation -- but it will be sooner than later.

if you need something more let me know.

brad
Acting Director, OEPM
Room 28265, the Pentagon

(b)(6)

12-8-03

Mr. President -
If you could make
this happen, it would
be a wonderful gift
to our military
personnel!!
Merry Christmas!
Dennis Moore

Soldiers Are Still Paying their Own Way Home!

December 8, 2003

Dear Colleague:

We are sure you are as concerned as we are to find out that our soldiers are still paying their own way home from Iraq and Afghanistan. This is especially concerning after Congress amended the FY 2004 Iraqi supplemental appropriations bill (P.L. 108-106) to include \$55 million in funding to reimburse soldiers who qualify for rest and recuperation (R&R) leave for their U.S. domestic travel.

According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS) our "language is not law, and is permissive and not mandatory in nature." But it does allow the Department of Defense (DOD) to provide assistance for travel-related expenses (such as emergency hotel accommodation for service members or travel to their homes) not otherwise specifically authorized in law.

In a letter regarding R&R domestic travel Rep. Moore received November 4, 2003, from Bradford Loo, Acting Director for Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management at DOD, "the unprogrammed additional cost to the Army would be \$16 million." CRS, however, quoted an unnamed defense official as saying the R&R program total cost would be \$1 billion.


We need to make our intentions very clear to the Defense Department that we want our soldiers to be reimbursed for their domestic travel while on R&R. Please join us in sending the attached letter to Secretary Rumsfeld, respectfully requesting that our soldiers be reimbursed.

This is not a Democratic idea or a Republican idea; it is just the right thing to do for the men and women of the Armed Forces who put their lives on the line for our country and our freedom.

Very truly yours,



JIM RAMSTAD
Member of Congress



DENNIS MOORE
Member of Congress

Please join us -
for our troops!

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

U.S. House of Representatives

December 12, 2003

THE HONORABLE DONALD H. RUMSFELD
SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
THE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20350-0001

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We are writing today to clarify Congress' intent with regard to funding domestic travel for soldiers returning to the U.S. on rest and recuperation (R&R) leave from Iraq or Afghanistan.

The intent of our recommendations in the FY 2004 Iraqi appropriations supplemental (P.L. 108-106) is to reimburse soldiers who qualify for R&R leave for their domestic travel. This R&R reimbursement should also include those soldiers who have already taken qualified R&R leave. The reimbursement includes air travel, bus, train, ferry, and vehicle rental expenses incurred in getting to and from the port-of-entry (Baltimore, Atlanta, Dallas, Frankfurt, or Los Angeles) to the soldier's choice of home-of-record or current military base of residence (*i.e.*, wherever his or her spouse resides at this time). In addition, personal vehicle mileage may be paid for the distance between an airport, or a train or bus depot, and that home. If travel distance is longer than 50 miles and extends over meal times, reasonable per diem expenses should be reimbursed. If travel is overnight and requires a hotel stay, that should be reimbursed.

Given that all the forms, procedures, and staff are already in place to reimburse soldiers, we see no reason that this policy cannot be made effective immediately, and retroactive to October 1st. If the Department of Defense (DOD) wishes to create a procedure for directly buying plane tickets in the future, that is understandable.

We appreciate that the DOD may have concerns about this program due to its significant change in leave policy, but we feel that our troops should not have to bear any more burdens – financial or otherwise – than their extended service to our country already demands. It is our intention that the federal government covers all travel and transportation costs necessary to return military personnel to their homes and families. In a letter received on November 4, 2003, Bradford Loo, Acting Director for Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management wrote, “the unprogrammed additional cost to the Army would be \$16 million.” Congress has provided \$55 million to assist soldiers in covering domestic travel expenses. We respectfully request that you to use those funds as we intended.

Thank you for your consideration.

Very truly yours,

cc: General Richard Meyer, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
cc: Army Chief of Staff
cc: Admiral Vernon E. Clark, Chief of Naval Operations
cc: John P. Jumper, USAF Chief of Staff
cc: General Michael W. Hagee, Marine Corps Commandant

11-L-0559/OSD/038968



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



DEC 19 2003

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

SUBJECT: Funding Onward Transportation for Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Leave Program

References: (a) Congressional Conference Report 108-337, 30 October 2003, "Making Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2004, and for Other Purposes."

(b) USD (P&R) Memorandum, 29 September 2003, subject: Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Leave Program for USCENTCOM

As recommended in reference (a), the R&R destination for a military member on active duty (Active and Reserve Components) serving in a contingency location providing support to Operations ENDURING or IRAQI FREEDOM is changed to the Aerial Port of Debarkation and then onward to the airport nearest the member's R&R leave destination. This change will also apply to a civilian authorized R&R leave in accordance with reference (b).

In accordance with reference (b), as Executive Agent, the Army is responsible for managing implementation in coordination with the DoD Comptroller, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), and the Joint Staff.


Charles S. Abell
Principal Deputy





Force Management
Policy

THE OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(Personnel and Readiness)
4000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-4000

Facsimile Cover Sheet

| | |
|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| From: <i>CPT Albrycht</i> | To: <i>Mr. Lohse</i> |
| Office: OUSD(P&R) | Office: <i>ERIC SEC</i> |
| Phone: (b)(6) | Phone: (b)(6) |
| Fax: | Fax: |

Number of Pages with Cover: _____

Comments:

As requested. Sorry for the delay.

1/2
1/20

C&D
SMOOTH & S&S

Mr D: SOM
FOR REVIEW
M 1/2
purman
1/5

The Honorable Jim Ramstad
United States House of Representatives
Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515-2303

Dear Representative Ramstad:

Thanks for the copy of your recent letter concerning the rest and recuperation leave program for U.S. forces serving in Iraq.

You may know that Charles Abell, Principal Deputy for Personnel and Readiness, signed the Memorandum on Funding Onward Transportation for Rest and Recuperation Leave on the 19th of December.

Mr. Abel is available to brief you or your staff in greater detail if you desire.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

The Honorable Dennis Moore
United States House of Representatives
Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515-1603

Dear Representative Moore:

Thanks for the copy of your recent letter concerning the rest and recuperation leave program for U.S. forces serving in Iraq.

You may know that Charles Abell, Principal Deputy for Personnel and Readiness, signed the Memorandum on Funding Onward Transportation for Rest and Recuperation Leave on the 19th of December.

Mr. Abell is available to brief you or your staff in greater detail if you desire.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

2 ITRS
- Ramstad
- Moore

The Honorable Jim Ramstad
United States House of Representatives
Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515-2303

Dear Representative Ramstad,

Thanks for the copy of your recent letter on P.L. 108-106.

*concerning the rest and recuperation
leave program for
US forces serving
&*

You may know that
~~I am happy to report that~~ Charles Abell, Principal Deputy for
Personnel and Readiness, signed the Memorandum on Funding
Onward Transportation for Rest and Recuperation Leave on the 19th of
December.

~~If you would like additional information in the matter,~~ Mr. Shell ~~is available~~
~~I appreciate your strong support of our troops.~~ *to brief you on your staff's
greater detail if you desire.*

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,



Larry Di Rita
12/30

Note: ITR from JCS asks this to be
retroactive to 1 Oct. - it appears
this did not happen.

The Honorable Dennis Moore
United States House of Representatives
Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515-1603

Dear Representative Moore,

Thanks for the copy of your recent letter on P.L. 108-106.

I am happy to report that Charles Abell, Principal Deputy for Personnel and Readiness, signed the Memorandum on Funding Onward Transportation for Rest and Recuperation Leave on the 19th of December.

I appreciate your strong support of our troops.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,



720
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1525-04

17 February 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

RBMY 2/14

SUBJECT: Getting Joint

- **Question.** "Do you feel we are pursuing these 'getting joint' items I mention in the attached memo? We have to figure a way to get joint earlier, to get responsibilities from the Joint Staff down to Joint Forces Command, to develop initiatives and suggestions, and to instruct the Service Secretaries." (TAB A)
- **Answer.** We have made significant progress in each of these areas, and are pursuing meaningful, relevant answers. "Getting joint" is the focus of on-going actions and initiatives in the Service headquarters, selected combatant commands, and the Joint Staff. Specific details concerning on-going actions are contained in the information paper at TAB B.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments
As stated

Prepared By: Lt Gen Norton A. Schwartz, USAF; Director J-3;

(b)(6)

322

17 FEB 04

July 30, 2002 7:05 AM



SUBJECT: Getting Joint

We have to figure out a way to get joint earlier.

Some thoughts:

- 1. Get the joint responsibilities from the Joint Staff down to Joint Forces Command.**
- 2. Instruct the Service Secretaries.**
- 3. The best joint service is with the CINC, rather than the Joint Staff.**
- 4. Ask Cebrowski for initiatives.**
- 5. Ask Buck Kernan to give us a series of suggestions.**

DHR:dh
073002-1

Tab A

28 January 2004

TAB B
INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Getting Joint

1. Purpose. To provide additional information the SecDef's questions concerning "gettingjoint."

2. Key Points

- SecDef memo dated 30 July 2002 articulated a need to "figure out a way to get joint earlier," and articulated several thoughts along those lines.
- Pursuing meaningful, relevant answers to the "gettingjoint" items listed by the SecDef is the focus of related, on-going projects/actions in the Secretariat, Service headquarters, selected combatant commands, and the Joint Staff. They include:
 - US Strategic Command: Unified Command Plan (UCP) assumption of responsibility for Global Strike, C4ISR, integrated missile defense, and DOD Information Operations.
 - US Special Operations Command: When approved, UCP assumption of responsibility as the supported combatant commander for planning selected global war on terrorism missions and for exercising command and control of missions in support of selected campaigns if directed to do so by the President or the Secretary of Defense.
 - US Transportation Command: When approved, UCP assumption of responsibility for global patient movement, redeployment, terminal management and joint distribution process ownership.
 - US Joint Forces Command:
 - Developing a capability to monitor and report to OSD the status of Operational Availability capability packages in support of providing immediate response, focused and conclusive campaign forces to the combatant commanders. This initiative directly supports the CJCS efforts on Global Force Management/Joint Force Manager.

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/038977

- Standing Joint Force Headquarters. To improve combatant command joint warfighting capabilities, USJFCOM is fielding the Standing Joint Force Headquarters prototype to the five regional combatant commands by FY05, to include enabling prototypes for joint command and control that push jointness to operational level and below.
- Developing the Joint Manpower Exchange Program, a Permanent Change of Station exchange of officers and senior enlisted personnel among USJFCOM Service component operational headquarters (e.g., Marine Expeditionary Forces, Army Corps, Navy Fleets and numbered Air Forces), designed to improve joint expertise in training, planning, and operations, as well as provide a “jump start” in response to potential tasking to establish a Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters.
- To further improve joint warfighting at the combatant command and lower levels, USJFCOM is undertaking a concerted effort to collect, assess and disseminate joint lessons learned from on-going operations. Once validated, joint lessons learned are utilized to improve concept development, training, integration, and deployment.
- USJFCOM UCP designation as:
 - Lead joint force integrator, including responsibility for:
 - Supporting the development and integration of fully interoperable C4ISR systems and capabilities for joint warfighting.
 - Serving as the DOD executive agent for Joint Concept Development & Experimentation, including development and integration of Joint Operating Concepts and associated Joint Integrating Concepts that improve future joint warfighting and coordinate the joint experimentation efforts of the combatant commands and Services.
 - Serving as the Joint Deployment Process Owner, responsible for maintaining the global capability for rapid and decisive military force power projection, including collaborative efforts to improve joint, multinational and interagency deployment operations. This initiative effectively moves responsibility for joint deployment from the Joint Staff to USJFCOM.
 - The lead agent for joint force training, including combatant command battlestaffs, JTF headquarters, JTF functional component

commands and their staffs, as well as interoperability training of forces that are to operate as part of joint/combined task forces (including interagency and multinational participation in current and future training). In 2004, USJFCOM will establish the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) by linking previously independent Service ranges together in a network that can be used for joint training and experimentation.

- Joint force provider of assigned CONUS-based forces, responsible for deploying trained and ready joint forces in response to supported combatant command requirements.

- CJCS with Joint Chiefs

- Developing the Global Force Management (GFM) process that integrates apportionment, assignment, and allocation methodologies to better align planning and defense strategy requirements.

- Working the GFM-related effort to designate an organization as the single Joint Force Manager responsible for executing the GFM process.

- Developing force allocation processes based on articulating capabilities desired to achieve effects and outcomes rather than requests for troops or platforms. As these processes are developed, they will be codified through development of the *Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System* and CJCS Instruction 3170.01C.

- Developing and implementing changes in how we educate and train the joint force. This includes enhancements to Joint Professional Military Education, to include programs designed to foster an understanding of joint warfighting earlier in a Service member's career as well as programs to increase the number of senior officers skilled in joint operational art and campaign planning through the establishment of a Joint Advanced Warfighting School. Senior general/flag officer courses are also in development. Changes in joint force training include, in conjunction with USJFCOM, establishing the JNTC in FY04.

- Maintaining a robust Chairman's Exercise Program that directly supports combatant command joint exercises, and promotes joint, interagency, and--where possible--multilateral participation.

- Secretariat
 - OSD(P&R): Developing the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) to establish a capabilities-based, adaptive, near real-time readiness reporting system. DRRS will have an initial operating capability in FY04, and full operating capability in FY07.
- Services
 - Developing modular force design concepts that describe the Service capabilities required to drive modular design at appropriate levels within each Service and develop options for implementation and integration.
- Pursuing answers and developing implementation plans for these multiple, crosscutting initiatives will inevitably create seams and friction points among the multiple stakeholders that are responsible for these actions. The Joint Chiefs are committed to minimizing these points of friction.
- Full implementation of selected long-term solutions to these “getting joint” items may require statutory changes, regulatory changes, or delegation of Secretarial authority.

TAB A

December 27, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Getting Joint

Do you feel we are pursuing these "gettingjoint" items I mention in the attached memo?

Thanks.


Attach.
7/30/02 SecDefMFR [073002-1]

DHR:dh
122703-35 (to computer)

.....
Please respond by 1/31/04

7201
~~FOUO~~

December 31, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Article by Victor Davis Hanson

Mr. President,

Attached is an article I hesitated to send to you, but when we talked on the phone yesterday, this subject came up. Fortunately, there are thoughtful folks who agree with what we are doing and are willing to put it down on paper with some historical context.

I believe you read some of Victor Davis Hanson's books.

Happy New Year.

Respectfully,

Attach.
12/23/04 *National Review* article by Victor Davis Hanson

DHR:es
123004-15 (ts)

ITM

31 DEC 04

~~FOUO~~

USD 00001-05

11-L-0559/OSD/038982

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Victor Davis Hanson
NRO Contributor



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
December 23, 2004, 8:21 a.m.

Leave Rumsfeld Be
He is not to blame for our difficulties.

The *Washington Post* recently warned that doctors are urging interested parties of all types to get their flu shots before the "scarce" vaccine is thrown out. But how is such a surfeit possible when our national media scared us to death just a few months ago with the specter of a national flu epidemic, corporate malfeasance, and Bush laxity? That perfect storm of incompetence and skullduggery purportedly combined to leave us vulnerable to mass viral attack. So how can the *Post* now characterize something as "scarce" that is soon to be discarded for a want of takers? Was there too much or too little vaccine?

The answer, of course, is the usual media-inspired flight from reason that overwhelms this country at various times — hype playing on our fears and groupthink to create a sudden story when there really is none. And now with the renewed attack on Donald Rumsfeld we are back to more of the flu-shot hysteria that has been so common in this war. Remember the pseudo-crises of the past four years — the quagmire in week three in Afghanistan or the sandstorm bog-down in Iraq?

Let us not forget either all the Orwellian logic: Clinton's past deleterious military slashes that nevertheless explained the present win in Afghanistan, or his former appeasement of bin Laden that now accounts for the successful doctrine of fighting terror. Or recall the harebrained schemes we should have adopted — the uninvited automatic airlifting of an entire division into the high peaks of Islamic, nuclear Pakistan to cut off the tribal fugitives from Tora Bora? Or have we put out of our memories



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NR TODAY

[Dennis: Holiday \(Thanksgiving\) 12/23 12:57 p.m.](#)

the brilliant trial balloons of a Taliban coalition government and the all Islamic post-Taliban occupation forces?

So it is with the latest feeding-frenzy over Donald Rumsfeld. His recent spur-of-the-moment — but historically plausible — remarks to the effect that one goes to war with the army one has rather than the army one wishes for angered even conservatives. The demands for his head are to be laughed off from an unserious Maureen Dowd — ranting on spec about the shadowy neocon triad of Wolfowitz, Feith, and Perle — but taken seriously from a livid Bill Kristol or Trent Lott. Rumsfeld is, of course, a blunt and proud man, and thus can say things off the cuff that in studied retrospect seem strikingly callous rather than forthright. No doubt he has chewed out officers who deserved better. And perhaps his quip to the scripted, not-so-impromptu question was not his best moment. *But his resignation would be a grave mistake for this country at war, for a variety of reasons.*

First, according to reports, the unit in question had 784 of its 804 vehicles up-armored. Humvees are transportation and support assets that traditionally have never been so protected. That the fluid lines in Iraq are different not just from those in World War II or Korea, but even Vietnam, Gulf War I, Mogadishu, and Afghanistan became clear only over months. Yet it also in fact explains why we are seeing 80 to 90 percent of these neo-Jeeps already retrofitted. In an army replete with Bradleys and Abramses, no one could have known before Iraq that Hummers would need to become armored vehicles as well. Nevertheless all of them will be in a fleet of many thousands in less than 18 months. Would that World War II Sherman tanks after three years in the field had enough armor to stop a single *Panzerfaust*: At war's end German teenagers with cheap proto-RPGs were still incinerating Americans in their "Ronson Lighters."

Second, being unprepared in war is, tragically, nothing new. It now seems near criminal that Americans fought in North Africa with medium Stuart tanks, whose 37-millimeter cannons ("pea-shooters" or "squirrel guns") and thin skins ensured the deaths of hundreds of GIs. Climbing into *Devastator* torpedo bombers was tantamount to a death sentence in 1942; when fully armed and flown into a headwind, these airborne relics were lucky to make 100 knots — not quite as bad as sending fabric Brewster *Buffaloes* up against *Zeros*. Yet FDR and George Marshall, both responsible for U.S. military preparedness, had plenty of time to see what Japan and Germany were doing in the late 1930s. Under the present logic of retrospective perfection, both had years to ensure our boys adequate planes and tanks — and thus should have resigned when the death toll of tankers and pilots soared.

Even by 1945 both the Germans and the Russians still had better armor than the Americans. In the first months of Korea, our early

Robbins: You
Have to Believe
12/23 12:33 p.m.

Novak: The Power
of Christmas
12/23 11:43 a.m.

Woodlief: My
Christmas Story
12/23 11:39 a.m.

Kaza: Kaza: A
Merry Corporate
Christmas 12/23
11:09 a.m.

Levin: RE: Mark
R. Levin, A Great
But Misguided
American 12/23
10:41 a.m.

Derbyshire: 2004
Sing Along 12/23
10:33 a.m.

Q&A: Good Stu:T
12/23 9:57 a.m.

Norman: A
Christmas Brawl
12/23 9:54 a.m.

Loconte: They All
Want Him... 12/23
9:51 a.m.

Bashyn: All
Secure at
Christmas 12/23
9:45 a.m.

Campbell: What
Child Is This?
12/23 9:42 a.m.

Goldberg: Down
With the French!
12/23 9:38 a.m.

Tammy: The
Savings-Rate
Myth 12/23 9:30
a.m.

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squadrons of F-80s were no match for superior Mig-15s. Early-model M-16 rifles jammed with tragic frequency in Vietnam. The point is not to excuse the military naiveté and ill-preparedness that unnecessarily take lives, but to accept that the onslaught of war is sometimes unforeseen and its unfolding course persistently unpredictable. Ask the Israelis about the opening days of the Yom Kippur War, when their armor was devastated by hand-held Soviet-made anti-tank guns and their vaunted American-supplied air force almost neutralized by SAMs — laxity on the part of then perhaps the world's best military a mere six years after a previous run-in with Soviet-armed Arab enemies.

Third, the demand for Rumsfeld's scalp is also predicated on supposedly too few troops in the theater. But here too the picture is far more complicated. Vietnam was no more secure with 530,000 American soldiers in 1968 than it was with 24,000 in 1972. How troops are used, rather than their sheer numbers, is the key to the proper force deployment — explaining why Alexander the Great could take a Persian empire of 2 million square miles with an army less than 50,000, while earlier Xerxes with 500,000 on land and sea could not subdue tiny Greece, one-fortieth of Persia's size.

Offensive action, not troop numbers alone, creates deterrence; mere patrolling and garrison duty will always create an insatiable demand for ever more men and an enormously visible American military bureaucracy — and a perennial Iraqi dependency on someone else to protect the nascent democracy. Thus if the argument can be made that Rumsfeld was responsible for either disbanding the Iraqi army or the April stand-down from Fallujah — the latter being the worst American military decision since Mogadishu — then he deserves our blame. But so far, from what we know, the near-fatal decision to pull-back from Fallujah was made from either above Rumsfeld (e.g., the election-eve White House) or below him (Paul Bremmer and the Iraqi provisional government).

In truth, the real troop problem transcends Iraq. Our shortages are caused by a military that was slashed after the Cold War and still hasn't properly recouped to meet the global demands of the war against Islamic fascism — resulting in rotation nightmares, National Guard emergencies, and stop-order controversies. The amazing victories in Afghanistan and Iraq not only set up unrealistic expectations about the ease of implementing post-bellum democracy among tribal Islamic societies, but also allowed the public, the Congress, and the president not to mobilize to confront the strategic challenges facing the United States that now pose a more serious threat than did the 1980s Soviet Union.

We are left with an unhinged nuclear dictatorship in North Korea



threatening an increasingly appeasing and pacifistic South. Taiwan could be swallowed up in days or destroyed in hours by a bullying, resource-hungry China staking out a new co-prosperity sphere in the Pacific, one every bit as ambitious as imperial Japan's. Iran's nukes will soon be able to hit a triangulating Europe, and Islamists seek our destruction at home while we implement liberal governments in Iraq and Afghanistan.

All this peril came on us suddenly and without warning — at a time of recession and following the vast arms cuts of the 1990s, a trillion in lost commerce and outright damage from 9/11, oil spikes, huge trade deficits, increased entitlements, and tax cuts. If Mr. Rumsfeld is responsible for all that, perhaps then we can ask him to step aside as culpable for our present absence of enough soldiers in the U.S. military.

In reality, he has carefully allotted troops in Iraq because he has few to spare elsewhere — and all for reasons beyond his control. If Senator Lott or kindred pundits first show us exactly where the money is to come from to enlarge the military (tax hikes, cuts in new Medicare entitlements, or budgetary freezes?), and, second, that Mr. Rumsfeld opposes expanding our defense budget — “No, President Bush, I don't need any more money, since the Clinton formula was about right for our present responsibilities” — then he should be held responsible. So far that has not happened.

Fourth, we hear of purportedly misplaced allocations of resources. Thus inadequate Humvees are now the focus of our slurs — our boys die while we are wasting money on pie-in-the-sky ABMs. But next month the writs may be about our current obsession with tactical minutiae — if Iran shoots off a test missile with a simultaneous announcement of nuclear acquisition. So then expect, “Why did Rumsfeld rush to spend billions on Humvee armor, when millions of Americans were left vulnerable to Iran's nukes without a viable ABM system come to full completion?”

Fifth, have we forgotten what Mr. Rumsfeld did right? Not just plenty, but plenty of things that almost anyone else would *not* have done. Does anyone think the now-defunct Crusader artillery platform would have saved lives in Iraq or helped to lower our profile in the streets of Baghdad? How did it happen that our forces in Iraq are the first army in our history to wear practicable body armor? And why are over 95 percent of our wounded suddenly surviving — at miraculous rates that far exceeded even those in the first Gulf War? If the secretary of Defense is to be blamed for renegade roguery at Abu Ghraib or delays in up-arming Humvees, is he to be praised for the system of getting a mangled Marine to Walter Reed in 36 hours?

RIGHT
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CRUISE 2
BUCKLEY
O'BRIEN
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 LONDON • EMM
 WATERFORD • B
 DUBLIN • LIVER
 DOVER • GLEN

Thorn
Burge
 Your little
 will prize it
 click

And who pushed to re-deploy thousands of troops out of Europe, and to re-station others in Korea? Or were we to keep ossified bases in perpetuity in the logic of the Cold War while triangulating allies grew ever-more appeasing to our enemies and more gnarly to us, their complacent protectors?

The blame with this war falls not with Donald Rumsfeld. We are more often the problem — our mercurial mood swings and demands for instant perfection devoid of historical perspective about the tragic nature of god-awful war. Our military has waged two brilliant campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. There has been an even more inspired postwar success in Afghanistan where elections were held in a country deemed a hopeless Dark-Age relic. A thousand brave Americans gave their lives in combat to ensure that the most wicked nation in the Middle East might soon be the best, and the odds are that those remarkable dead, not the columnists in New York, will be proven right — no thanks to post-facto harping from thousands of American academics and insiders in chorus with that continent of appeasement Europe.

Out of the ashes of September 11, a workable war exegesis emerged because of students of war like Don Rumsfeld: Terrorists do not operate alone, but only through the aid of rogue states; Islamicists hate us for who we are, not the alleged grievances outlined in successive and always-metamorphosing loony fatwas; the temper of bin Laden's infomercials hinges only on how bad he is doing; and multilateralism is not necessarily moral, but often an amoral excuse either to do nothing or to do bad — ask the U.N. that watched Rwanda and the Balkans die or the dozens of profiteering nations who in concert robbed Iraq and enriched Saddam.

Donald Rumsfeld is no Les Aspin or William Cohen, but a rare sort of secretary of the caliber of George Marshall. I wish he were more media-savvy and could ape Bill Clinton's lip-biting and furrowed brow. He should, but, alas, cannot. Nevertheless, we will regret it immediately if we drive this proud and honest-speaking visionary out of office, even as his hard work and insight are bringing us ever closer to victory.

— *Victor Davis Hanson is a military historian and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. His website is victorhanson.com.*

• • •

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~~FOUO~~

December 31, 2004

TO: Gen Pete Pace
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DL*
SUBJECT: Possibilities for the Team

I got a call from Antonio Martino, the MOD of Italy. He said he's got a retired three star who has been in Iraq, speaks perfect English, who is excellent, and he'd like to put him on the team. He also has a brigadier general who does not speak English, but is very good. He is Carabinieri and he's very good on the mafia aspect of it, and he thought maybe he should send both of them. Why don't you talk to Gary Luck and see what they think?

Italy

I
DHR:ms
123104-9 (ts)

.....
Please respond by _____

31 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 00002-05

11-L-0559/OSD/038988

~~FOUO~~

DEC 21 2004
I-04/017321
ES-1771

TO: Ken Krieg
Ryan Henry

FROM:

SUBJECT: Ed Giambastiani's Views on the QDR

Have you taken into account Ed Giambastiani's **views** on the QDR?

Thanks.

Attach.

12/17/04 ADM Giambastiani memo to SecDef re: QDR Issues

DHR:ss
122004-41

.....
Please respond by 12/29/04

~~FOUO~~

22-12-04 08:10 0458

0 SD 00017-05

11-L-0559/OSD/038989



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
COMMANDER
U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND
1562 MITSCHER AVENUE SUITE 200
WORFOLK, VA 23051-2000

DB 12/20

17 December 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Issues

I appreciate the opportunity to provide you my thoughts on key issues for consideration during the upcoming QDR. The following issues are proposed for study in the 2005 QDR to move toward a coherently integrated Department of Defense.

- **Integrate Tactical Aviation Across DOD**
 - DoD should integrate tactical aviation capabilities to eliminate excess capacity.
- **Integrate Ground Forces Across DOD**
 - DoD should assess overall ground requirement (Army, USMC, Special Operations) to deliver the proper military capability.
- **Improve Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) for the Joint Warfighter**
 - Operational commanders require a timely, adaptive, and responsive capability.
 - DoD should deliver a flexible, persistent, and responsive ISR capability that balances space-based, theater-based, and organic assets.
- **Review Special Operations Forces Capabilities and Force Structure**
 - Call out Special Operations Forces force structure separately in the QDR when assessing Service and Joint force capabilities
 - Integrate Special Operations Forces capabilities with conventional forces in joint warfighting concepts, planning, and joint training.
- **Develop Special Access Program Concepts to Inform DOD's Acquisition Strategy**
 - Special access program concepts are not included within Joint Operating Concepts and therefore they are not translated into an acquisition strategy.
- **Implement Goldwater-Nichols Type Reforms for Acquisition**
- **Formalize Joint Processes and Authorities for Oversight and Management of the Acquisition of All Command and Control Systems**

The following subjects, although more narrow in scope, should also be addressed in QDR 2005:

- **Charter Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) at each Combatant Command** with adequate manning resources from across the US Government
 - Implement an operational JIACG at each regional combatant command with interagency and DoD agency personnel to execute plans in consonance with approved policies.
- **Increase the Level of Effort in Combatting Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)**
 - While we have made progress in this area since my last report to the Chairman, we haven't gone far enough.
 - IEDs are the "weapons of precise destruction" that the US and its Allies will face for decades to come. We need a "Manhattan Project"-like program to tackle this threat.

QDR 2005 should focus on a small number of key issues such as those forwarded above.


E. P. GIAMBASTIANI
Admiral, U.S. Navy

~~FOUO~~

ES-1693
04/016918

December 14, 2004

TO: Ken Krieg
Ryan Henry

SUBJECT: QDR Items from Paul Wolfowitz

Let's make sure Paul Wolfowitz's QDR items are featured.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/12/04 DSD Memo to SecDef re: QDR Issues

DHR:sa
121404-11

.....
Please respond by 12/22/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 00018-05
15-12-04 A10:56 IN


11-L-0559/OSD/038991

~~FOUO~~

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: December 12, 2004

CC: General Myers
General Pace
Ryan Henry
Ken Krieg

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz 

SUBJECT: Request for QDR Issues

Don,

The following are my proposed Top 5 QDR issues, in more or less priority order:

1. What capabilities does the Department (and the **USG**) need to have **for** counterinsurgency warfare (as opposed to peacekeeping):
 - Focus particularly on: intelligence issues **and** on building capacity of indigenous security forces (including funding, training and language capabilities).
2. What is the right balance of **risks** between capabilities needed **for** the Global **War** on Terrorism **and** capabilities needed to manage the emerging military competition in East **and South** Asia.
3. **What** capabilities should should DoD have for homeland security, particularly to prevent or deal with a catastrophic attack
 - Particular emphasis on biological terrorism.
4. Persistent surveillance is taking precision targeting to a new level.
 - What capabilities should we have in manned, unmanned and space systems for persistent surveillance;

~~FOUO~~

11-I -0559/OSD/038992

~~FOUO~~

- What changes are needed in organization, decision processes, force capabilities, etc. to properly exploit this development.
5. **What** is the right balance **of** investment in tac air relative to other DoD needs.

~~FOUO~~

7201

~~FOUO~~

DEC 28 2004

020 FT/D

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
CC: PAUL BUTLER
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
SUBJECT: Art Cebrowski

Please draft a note to Art Cebrowski, then return this letter to me and let's talk about it at Roundtable some morning, how we ought to move forward.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/22/04 Letter from A.K. Cebrowski to SecDef

DHR:as
122704-11

.....
Please respond by 1/7/04

28 Dec 04

SIR —
Draft letter
at tab. I'll
tickle the topic
for personnel meeting
~~FOUO~~ + roundtable.

22 Dec 04

VIR Jim

Vice Admiral Art Cebrowski, USN (Ret)

Director, Office of Force Transformation

Address

OLL

Dear Art,

With both regret for your departure and admiration for your accomplishments, I accept your request to be relieved of duties as Director of Force Transformation on 31 January 2005.

You can be justifiably proud of all you have done for the Department and the Nation, and your work to embed the idea of transformation into the Department's efforts will endure – especially your vision of Network-Centric Warfare.

I wish you the very best in the time ahead, and thank you for a job well done.



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

OSD 12/27

FORCE TRANSFORMATION
OFFICE

December 22, 2004

020 FYD

Dear Mr. Secretary,

This letter is to request that I be relieved of my duties as Director, Force Transformation as of 31 January, 2005.

Working under your dedicated leadership in pursuing the President's transformation objectives has been rewarding and professionally satisfying. However, I must step aside due to personal commitments and health issues.

The Office of Force Transformation is successful for several important reasons. First, without your personal strong commitment to leadership of transformation the task would be impossible. Second, we report directly to you and the Deputy, and you allow us to work outside the normal course in an organizational arrangement that protects powerful ideas from bureaucratic tyranny. Finally, we have assembled a small, but talented inter-disciplinary team, both uniformed and civilian. And we have built a virtual team of vast dimensions. While there is much to be done, the accomplishments of the office are what we had hoped from the beginning. For example:

- Transformation is now integral to national strategy and DoD corporate strategy.
- Network-Centric Warfare has emerged across the Department as the theory of war for the information-age and well supported by rigorous analysis.
- The culture is changing. Transformational leadership chairs and research projects have been established across the WAC colleges and service academies

OSD 00054-05

22 WAC 04

11-L-0559/OSD/038996

- Powerful new concepts are in prototype or experimentation, including a new business model for space, Sense and Respond Logistics, controlling engagement timelines in urban combat, high speed distributed capabilities for naval forces, redirected energy for both lethal and non-lethal applications, and many others.

Our latest assessment of the Transformation Roadmaps is encouraging. I will provide you with an overall strategic transformation appraisal soon.

My interest in advancing national security policy and the President's transformation agenda is enduring. I hope to be able to continue to contribute in some capacity.

Sincerely,



A. K. Cebrowski

Director, Force Transformation

cc:
Deputy Secretary of Defense



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JAN 3 2005

020 FTD

Vice Admiral Art Cebrowski, USN (Ret)
Director, Office of Force Transformation

(b)(6)

Dear Art,

With both regret for your departure and admiration for your accomplishments, I accept your request to be relieved of duties as Director of Force Transformation on January 31, 2005.

You can justifiably be proud of all you have done for the Department and the Nation. Your work to embed the idea of transformation into the Department's efforts will endure – especially your vision of Network-Centric Warfare.

I wish you the very best in the time ahead. Thank you for a job well done.

Sincerely,

3 JAN 05

OSD 00054-05

22 DEC 04

January 3, 2005

TO: **Vice** President Richard B. Cheney
Dr. Condoleezza Rice
Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Strategic Communications Report

We have all been concerned about the absence of a fully-coordinated, comprehensive U.S. Government strategic communications effort. And we have all been concerned about the resulting strong opposition to U.S. efforts in the world. Because of those concerns, some ten months ago I invited Dr. Ed Feulner, Mr. Joe Duffey and Mr. Lewis Manilow to dinner. They had been active in the U.S. Information Agency's Advisory Board over the past several decades, prior to its being abolished.

Attached is a private report to me they prepared as a result of that discussion. I found it interesting.

Attach.
11/2/04 Private Report to the Secretary of Defense

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*Private Report to the
Secretary of Defense*

Submitted Respectfully by:
Joseph Duffey
Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.
Lewis Manilow

November 2004

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Executive Summary

To win the War on Terror, the United States must capture, **kill**, or deter more terrorists than our extremist allies can win over to their side. Moreover, it is crucial that we convince a significant number of people to be actively on our side. As such, the challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a vital **and** central component of the War on Terror. Dozens of studies offering prescriptions for the deficiencies in America's foreign communication effort have **already** been produced. This paper does not seek to add to this cacophony of voices. **Rather**, we present two substantial **and** vital recommendations, which will allow America to bring to bear the full force of the greatest communications society in the history of the world to **the** challenge of shaping hearts and minds and changing viewpoints in the **War** on Terror.

It is important to note from the start, however, that any attempt at changing the attitudes and behaviors of foreign publics towards the United States is futile unless it enjoys the full support of the President. Just as the President serves as commander-in-chief of the United States military, he must similarly **view** himself as the lead spokesman for the United States to the citizens of foreign nations beyond foreign government leaders. This role must be a priority commitment that is followed through on a day-to-day basis and is an integral component of each of the President's decisions.

In order to communicate with foreign publics in a manner that changes attitudes and behavior towards America, the United States government should:

1) Establish a Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis

OBJECTIVE: Listen, ask questions, and analyze foreign public opinion as well as test the effectiveness of various USG messages.

It is startling how little the **U.S.** government (USG) currently engages in public opinion polling and how irrelevant much of the research it does **do** is. An effective public diplomacy effort must monitor how the opinions of various demographic groups are changing over time and then inform policymakers of these changing sentiments. **By** listening to the opinions of various groups **and** tailoring our message **and** – to an

appropriate degree – our policies to the information they are giving us, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world.

Winning the War on Terrorism will require unprecedented use of America's technology, broadcast, market research, and communications resources. To this end, the Administration should establish a private sector institution **similar** to RAND charged with gathering the information required by the USG to advance America's position in the communications aspect of the War on Terror.

The mission of this "Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis" (CFOA) will be to use the resources and capabilities of the United States of America to fully engage in a long-term market research effort aimed at better understanding foreign public opinion. It will be tasked with contracting with specialist firms around the world to listen, ask questions, and analyze foreign public opinion in a manner that is not being done today, as well as test the effectiveness of various USG messages. Crucially, **CFOA** would only provide the research product – coordination of **message** and broad strategic decisions must be made through the National Security Council, the Departments of State and Defense, and relevant agencies.

2) Prepare the Government Bureaucracy to Apply Information

OBJECTIVE: Provide senior policy makers with immediate input so they are aware of the effect an impending policy action or statement will have on foreign public opinion.

Because the USG has so many official messengers, the need to have **all** of them singing off the same sheet is especially important. **CFOA** will provide the data that allows America to both formulate a comprehensive communications strategy and constantly reevaluate and refine the U.S. government's message into the future. The USG must create a mechanism by which it can utilize **this** information effectively.

As such, a new staff position on the National Security Council should **be** created and charged with coordinating the U.S. government's overall communications strategy. This staff member would be charged with providing senior policy makers with immediate input based on **CFOA** data so that they are aware of the effect an impending policy action

or statement will **have** on foreign public opinion. Further, a senior interagency group should be created that brings the **NSC** staff member charged with the U.S. government's foreign public opinion programs **together** with the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, representatives of USAID, all other relevant members of the Executive Branch, and other participants on an ad hoc **basis**.

A dialogue between America and the rest of the world must be seen as a long-term commitment central to America's vital national interest. The creation of a private institution, performing government contract work, charged with constantly measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of America's message, and the impact of American policy on foreign public opinion would give the USG the real-time information necessary for effective communication with the rest of the world. Further, bringing public diplomacy to the highest level of NSC deliberation will ensure that we communicate our message more effectively in the future.

Introduction

Shortly after the American Revolution, John Adams **was** asked who supported it and who didn't. He said about a third of the population had supported it; about a third had opposed it; and about a third was waiting to see who won. **In many ways**, this is the situation America is faced with today in the court of world opinion – and of particular importance in the Arab and Muslim World. The scorecard in the **War** on Terror, however, is not simply one of battles or casualties. The simple (in theory) challenge of the War on Terror is to capture, kill, or deter more terrorists than our extremist **adversaries** can win over to their side. **As** such, the communications challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a vital and **central** component of the war.

As the 9/11 commission bluntly stated, "The small percentage of Muslims who are fully committed to Usama Bin Ladin's version of Islam are impervious to persuasion." To win the War on Terror, America needs a **strong** policy **aimed at** increasing the ranks of our supporters, decreasing the small percentage of Muslims who are "impervious to persuasion," and impacting those who, while not actively supportive of extremists, have sat on the sidelines **dire** to resentment of America. Put bluntly, **America** needs to **embark** on a long-term project to improve her **standing** in the public opinion of individuals in other nations around the world.

There have **been** a number of recent studies looking at the problem of public diplomacy. All have acknowledged a problem exists and there is significant agreement that there must be reform of the **U.S.** government's public diplomacy infrastructure.² Yet just as the War on Terror has required a rethinking of many aspects of American foreign policy, it similarly justifies a strategic reevaluation of our public diplomacy efforts. Changing foreign public opinion is not simply a matter of **allocating more** resources or reshuffling bureaucratic boxes. Rather, the U.S. government needs to consider **all** available tools of public diplomacy – old and new – and how they can be properly **targeted at various** audiences in order to reach them **effectively**.

¹ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, "The 9/11 Commission Report," pg. 375.

² Studies by The Heritage Foundation (including Heritage Backgrounder 1645 as well as a section in the 2005 *Mandate for Leadership*), The Brookings Institution, The American Enterprise Institute, The Council on Foreign Relations, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency, along with the U.S. Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World have all come to the same conclusion that there is a need to improve Islamic world perceptions of the United States and that there is inadequate structure to the U.S. public diplomacy effort.

This project must be whole-heartedly embarked upon by the Administration not because it will play well in the American media or because of a philosophical commitment to Wilsonian multilateralism. Rather, it is a challenge that lies at the very core of America's **own** vital national interest.

I. Wow America Is Viewed Abroad

America's standing in the rest of the world has taken a beating in recent years. In the Republic of Korea, for example, 50% of respondents to a poll taken by the Pew Research Center in May 2003 have a negative view of the United States. This negative view of the U.S., however, is sharply divided based on the respondent's age: only 30% of respondents over 50 had a negative view of the U.S. while 71% of respondents between the ages of 18 and 29 view America unfavorably.³ This stark contrast suggests that older Koreans are perhaps more cognizant of the North Korean threat - and, therefore, look more favorably on the security provided by the United States - than the younger generation, and that older Koreans remember the shared sacrifices of the United States and South Korea in the 1950s.

America's standing is also highly negative in the Arab and Muslim World. A Zogby International Poll taken in March 2003 finds only 14% of Egyptians, 11% of Jordanians, 9% of Moroccans, 3% of Saudis, and 11% of citizens of the United Arab Emirates hold a favorable view of the United States.

These numbers are particularly shocking in light of the fact that in that same month Zogby found strong similarities between the citizens of the Arab World and Americans. Arabs, for example, list "Quality of Work," "Family," and "Religion" as the three most important concerns of their personal life; Americans list "Family," "Quality of Work," and "Friends" as their three most important values. "Foreign policy," seen by many as an important cause of the strained view many Arabs hold of the United States, is only the eighth most important concern for Arabs.

In addition to sharing values on a personal level, Americans and Arabs share core political values. 92% of respondents in Turkey, 92% in Lebanon, 53% in Jordan, and 79% in Uzbekistan and Pakistan feel it is important to be able to criticize their

³ "International Public Concern About North Korea," *The Pew Research Center*, August 22, 2003.

government. There is also strong support among **Arabs** for honest elections, a fair judicial system, and **freedom of the press**.⁴ The question these statistics beg is: "Why, **given** the amount **we** have in common, **is** the United States seen in such a negative light in the **rest** of the world?" While each of us could come up with a **number** of answers to this question – some of which might **even** prove accurate – the **best way** to reverse this troubling **trend** of anti-Americanism is to **comprehensively** study the question and formulate policy based on accurate, scientific data. Collecting these data is a crucial first step towards engaging the rest of the world in a public diplomacy dialogue.

II. If It Isn't Measured, It Won't Be Improved

It is startling how little the U.S. government currently does by way of public opinion polling. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. government only spends **\$5** million annually on this type of analysis.⁵ Further, much of the **research** the **U.S.** government does fails to address important questions. For example, *The Washington Post* has reported on a draft report prepared by the State Department's inspector general on the effectiveness of Radio Sawa, a key organ of the United States government's Middle East public diplomacy effort:

The draft report said that while Radio Sawa has **been** promoted as a "heavily researched broadcasting network," the research concentrated primarily on gaining audience share, not on measuring whether Radio Sawa was influencing its **audience**. Despite the larger audiences, "it is difficult to **ascertain** Radio Sawa's impact in countering anti-American views and the biased state-run media of the **Arab** world," the draft report said.⁶

Comprehensive research into how foreign audiences feel about America, specific American policies, and how the United States can best change attitudes and behavior needs to be conducted.⁷ Doing so would require a significant increase to the miniscule

⁴ Hady Amr, "The Need to Communicate: How To Improve U.S. Public Diplomacy with the Islamic World," *The Brookings Institution*, January 2004.

⁵ 2004 Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. 6.

⁶ Glenn Kessler, "The Role of Radio Sawa in Mideast Questioned," *The Washington Post*, October 13, 2004, page A12. The draft report was leaked to the *Post* "by a source who said he feared that the inspector general's office was buckling under pressure and would water down the conclusions."

⁷ U.S. foreign opinion polling and analysis is fragmented and poorly focused. Senior State Department managers moved USIA's Office of Research and Media Reaction out of the public diplomacy hierarchy when the agency was folded into the Department in 1999. Today, it sits in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) where it contributes more to all-source intelligence reports than to strategic communication efforts. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has contracts with Intermedia, a private firm, which conducts surveys of audience share. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) collects and assesses print,

budget public diplomacy research currently receives. This investment is essential to building an effective program.

An effective public diplomacy effort would monitor how the opinions of various demographic groups are changing over time and would inform policymakers of these changing sentiments. Public diplomacy experts have long sought to have public diplomacy present at the “takeoff” as well as the “crash landing” of American policy. Rather, public diplomacy should be seen as a crucial component of the aircraft itself.

At its best, information gathered by public diplomacy researchers would be passed along to policymakers in relevant agencies. As a result, policymakers would be aware of the implications of policy decisions and statements on foreign public opinion and public diplomacy officers would be able to honestly inform foreign publics that their opinions were considered – if not always agreed with – in the formation of American policy.

Clearly, American officials should be making public policy decisions based on America’s vital national interest; they should, however, recognize that it is conceivable the benefits of a policy might in fact be outweighed by the negative impact that policy has on foreign public opinion. Informing policymakers of how an issue will “play” in foreign public opinion can help them determine whether a seemingly beneficial policy will unintentionally create more terrorists than it deters, captures, or kills.

Up-to-date information on foreign publics is not only important for policy makers, but also for public diplomacy officers. With a wide variety of tools at their disposal – from visas to speeches, advertisements to interviews, and so forth – information about the people with whom they are communicating can only help public diplomacy officers in applying the correct tools to the correct audience at the right time and in the right proportion. In this way, public diplomacy research allows for a dialogue between America and the rest of the world by seeking feedback from foreign audience. Public diplomacy is not just about getting our message out, but also listening to the sentiments

radio, TV, and Internet-based publications. Some U.S. Embassies, individual military commands, and the CIA also engage in limited opinion and media research. None of these products are combined and analyzed in ways for policymakers to use. Many are available to restricted user sets. Collection takes precedence over analysis and “issue of the day” polling often trumps media content and trend assessments. See the “Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication,” Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Washington, DC, September 2004, p. 26-27.

of foreigners. By incorporating a serious research component into the overall public diplomacy effort of the U.S. government, we can truly engage in a dialogue with the rest of the world. It is a dialogue that has been ignored for too long.

III. A Serious Reevaluation of Public Diplomacy in the War on Terror

The U.S. government might be well-advised to remember the words of MIT professor Norbert Wiener, who said "I never know what I say until I hear the response." This is certainly not the case for the U.S. government, which consistently fails to attempt to research the reasons for anti-Americanism abroad or to use research in formulating a clear communication strategy that engages foreign audiences in a dialogue. As the General Accounting Office found in its 2002 analysis of the State Department's public diplomacy efforts, "State Lacks a Strategy for Public Diplomacy Programs."⁸ America is the best in the world at market research – it is a crucial part of domestic politics – but we are notably uninformed about audiences abroad. Changing this situation must be an immediate priority of the U.S. government.

In trying to improve America's standing in the eyes of the rest of the world American public diplomacy officers need to understand that public opinion cannot be changed either solely on the basis of reason nor solely on the basis of emotion. Rather, it requires the foundation of reason to persuade people and the associated emotional relevance to motivate their decision-making and behavior. Further, the bottom line of public diplomacy ought to be changing the attitudes and behavior of foreign publics. If the end product of a particular program is only a change in mental state, it is not effective public diplomacy.

Underlying this change in behaviors is an exchange process between the U.S. (including the U.S. government as well as the private sector) and foreign audiences. To be successful, foreign audiences must believe that the ideas advocated by the United States are better than any reasonable alternative – including world views promoted by their governments, other segments of the population they are exposed to, and extremists who can often be quite persuasive. This relationship between the United States and foreign audiences can only be cultivated if the United States pursues a broad strategy that

⁸ U.S. General Accounting Office, "U.S. Public Diplomacy," September 2003, pg. 13

identifies what audiences we are trying to persuade and what tools we have at our disposal to attempt to influence these audiences as well as how and when these tools should be utilized.

In order to convince foreign audiences to support America's vision of freedom and prosperity under the rule of law (or, at the very least, oppose extremist visions of death and destruction), we must begin by identifying the different segments that exist around the world that we are trying to persuade. That is, a one-size-fits-all public diplomacy effort is less likely to be successful than one that recognizes that the arguments that are successful in the Muslim world might be different from the persuasive arguments we should highlight in Asia. Further, we might package our message differently to one religious or ethnic group within a country than we would another group. The same could be true for different age groups - older Koreans who remember the Korean War, for example, will be persuaded by a different message than their younger countrymen who only know of the war from distorted history books accounts.

Crucially, this does not mean America should be delivering contradictory messages to different groups. Not only does delivering false messages or propaganda go against many of the basic principles our country stands for, but also it would be unwise from a practical standpoint, as audiences worldwide would quickly catch on to any contradictions. Rather, America should simply recognize that our message should be delivered differently to different groups.

To spread our message, the U.S. government should employ all available tools of public diplomacy. This would include utilizing the President, the Secretary of State, and other Cabinet officers and senior government officials as well as Americans in the private sector, including teachers, students, journalists, business people, and so forth. These "public diplomacy ambassadors" can speak to foreign audiences using a variety of promotional tools such as advertisements, speeches, interviews, lectures, and educational exchanges. The key is for the U.S. government to invest in the research necessary to effectively pair a message with a messenger and a medium.

The U.S. government should also not be hesitant to use the private sector in doing research into foreign audiences and their reactions to the United States. As an Independent Taskforce sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations noted in 2003:

The "U.S. private sector leads the world in most of the **key** strategic areas required for effective public diplomacy: technology, film and broadcast, marketing research, and communications."⁹ Ultimately, effective communication with the rest of the world will require not only the tools of traditional government-run public diplomacy (though these tools will remain vital), but also the resources and expertise of the American **private** sector.

IV. Incorporating Research Into the US Government Bureaucracy

A vital part of this new framework for engaging the public opinion aspect of the War on Terror is making sure that American policy makers and advocates **have the most** accurate and up-to-date information about foreign audiences available to them at **all** times. Doing so requires two important actions from the Administration that will **allow** the **U.S.** government to bring the best work of the American public and private sectors to bear in the fight to shape the attitudes and behavior of foreign publics.

The U.S. Government should create an independent foreign public opinion institution

At the conclusion of World War II, the **Commanding** General of the Army Air Force, Hap Arnold, wrote to Secretary of War Henry Stimson:

"During this war the Army, Army Air Forces, and the Navy **have** made unprecedented use of scientific and industrial resources. The conclusion is inescapable that we have not yet established the balance necessary to insure the continuance of teamwork among the military, other government agencies, industry, and the universities. Scientific planning **must** be years in advance of the actual research and development work."¹⁰

Out of this understanding of the importance of technology research and development for success on the battlefield, representatives of the War Department, the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and **private** industry established Project RAND, the precursor of today's RAND Corporation. The Articles of Incorporation bluntly set forth RAND's purpose: "To further and promote scientific, educational, and charitable purposes, all for the public welfare and security of the United States of **America.**"

⁹ Peter G. Peterson, et al., "Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy Toward the Middle East", The Council on Foreign Relations, 2003, pg. 6.


¹⁰ The Rand Corporation, "History and Mission" (<http://www.rand.org/about/history/>)

Similarly, winning the War on Terrorism will require unprecedented use of America's technology, broadcast, market research, and communications resources. In order to best utilize those resources it is vital to insure the teamwork of the State Department, Defense Department, other government agencies, universities, and the private sector. To this end, the Administration should push for the creation of a private sector institution similar to **RAND** charged with gathering the information required by the **U.S** government to advance America's position in the ideological aspect of the War on Terror.

The mission of this "Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis" (**CFOA**) would be to use the resources and capabilities of the United States of America to **fully** engage in a long-term market research effort aimed at better understanding foreign public opinion. It would be tasked with contracting with specialist firms around the world to listen, ask question, and analyze foreign public opinion in a **manner** that is simply not done today. There are knowledge gaps with regard to issues of anti-American sentiment and this institution would be tasked with reviewing **all** existing data plus contracting for any original research needed to fill remaining knowledge **gaps**."

There are a number of significant advantages to creating this corporation. First, the corporation's independence avoids creating bureaucratic fights over what budget the money for foreign public opinion research **comes** from, who controls **the focus** of the research, and so forth. Second, **CFOA** would provide a useful product for consumption across many areas of government - **from** the Broadcasting Board of Governors to the National Security Advisor - and keeping it independent would allow its resources to be used by a wide-may of interests. Finally, it would provide a method for coordinating different aspects of government engagement with **the** rest of the world while **still** maintaining crucial separation between various entities. **That is, given how** vital it is that public diplomacy **be** differentiated from public affairs, public relations, information warfare, and psyops, creating an independent corporation would allow each to continue to work completely in its own sphere while still having access to research when necessary.

¹¹ See the testimony of Keith Reinhard, President of Business for Diplomatic Action, Inc., before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations (August 23, 2004) for an excellent analysis of how America's communications expertise can be applied to the communication aspect of the War on Terror



Create a mechanism for using CFOA

Because *the* U.S. government has so many official messengers, the need to have all of them singing off the same sheet is especially important. Yet, over recent years, public diplomacy coordination has deteriorated.¹² CFOA will provide the data that allows America to both formulate a comprehensive communications strategy and constantly reevaluate and revise that strategy into the future. The U.S. government **must** create a mechanism by which it can utilize **this** information effectively.

A vital first step is to make sure that someone is empowered with coordinating all activities, behaviors, and messages so that they are aligned with the U.S. government's overall communication strategy. The current Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy position is clearly not this empowered individual as he or she lacks authority over both budgets and personnel assignments. It is also vital that this individual have the ability to easily get information to the highest levels of government.

As such, a new staff position on the National Security Council should be created and charged with coordinating the U.S. government's overall communications strategy. This staff member would be charged with receiving information from CFOA and disseminating it to policy makers so that they are aware of the effect a policy action will have on foreign public opinion. This coordination does not currently exist. As the 2004 report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy states, "Along with the White House and the Department of State, nearly all government agencies engage in

¹²The former U.S. Information Agency had a Director and senior staff that coordinated with other government agencies, and a budget to accomplish its mission, even though it declined toward the end of the Cold War. Moreover, a public diplomacy coordinator position was staffed in the National Security Council during the Reagan Administration. Since President Clinton issued PDD 68 (Presidential Decision Directive on International Public Information) April 30, 1999, there has been no Presidential directive on public diplomacy. The NSC terminated it in 2001 pending a review of U.S. public diplomacy policy. Since then, the Department of Defense created and abolished the Office of Strategic Influence. The State Department has had two Under Secretaries for Public Diplomacy with large gaps in service. In June 2002, the White House created the Office of Global Communications which keeps U.S. officials "on message" but does not direct, coordinate, or evaluate public diplomacy activities. And in September 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice established the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee to coordinate inter-agency activities. It reportedly met twice and has had little impact. A small inter-agency working group was created within the State Department Under Secretariat for Public Diplomacy, but lacks a budget, contracting authority, sufficient communications support, and attention from State and other Cabinet agency leaders. "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," p. 25, 26.

some public diplomacy efforts. While a few structures link federal officials, coordination often does not extend to embassy practitioners.””

In order to keep all parts of the government bureaucracy moving towards **the same** goal, a senior interagency group (SIG) should be created that brings **the NSC** staff member charged with the U.S. government's foreign public opinion programs together with the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, representatives of USAID, all other relevant members of the Executive Branch, and other participants on an ad hoc **basis**. This formal consulting mechanism would encourage closer cooperation **among** the **various** parties involved. Acting on the information provided by CFOA, this SIG would allow the relevant Under Secretaries to **implement** the government's long-term communications strategy.

The NSC staff member would also be responsible for ensuring that all U.S. **government messengers are given** the information required to effectively communicate with their audiences. Something similar to the daily "Talking Points **from** the Department of Defense Office of Public Affairs" or "The Global Messenger" produced by the White House Office of Global Communications should be **disseminated** to all U.S. government messengers as well **as** information that is specific to particular audiences.¹⁴ Thus, a U.S. government public diplomacy officer in the Republic of Korea should be **given** instructions as to what information the U.S. government communication strategy calls for him or her to communicate to young Koreans, old Koreans, businessman, opinion makers, **and** so forth. Once again, it is vital that each of these segments only be **given** accurate information **from** the U.S. government, but the style and tone of **America's** message **must** be fine-tuned for various foreign audience segments. **Importantly**, this fine-tuning **must** be **based** on continuous research.

A Serious Commitment From the President

Regardless of how well-structured the **U.S.** public diplomacy apparatus is, however, it will only be effective if changing foreign public opinion is signaled **as a**

¹³ 2004 Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, pg. 8.

¹⁴ The effectiveness of these talking points would be drastically improved by comprehensive audience research allowing them to explain not only what America wants to say, but how it should be said as well as what questions audience segments around the world are looking for America to answer. Further, it is striking that the State Department does not appear to produce any daily talking points.

national security **priority** by the President. Just as the President serves as commander-in-chief of the United States military, he must similarly **view** himself as the lead spokesman for the United States to foreign nationals beyond foreign governmental leaders. This commitment must be made not only through public statements and **private** consultation and analysis within the White House, but also in the President's continuing contacts with Department of State officials, including diplomatic **Chiefs** of Mission. It must be a **priority** commitment that is followed through on a day-to-day basis and in each of the **President's** decisions. Foreign public opinion is no less important to American national security than American public opinion is to an election.

Conclusion

While one might be understandably skeptical of a proposal for "**further study**" of a problem, in the case of altering foreign beliefs and behavior a short pause to hammer out a comprehensive strategy is called for. The temptation of **many** in Washington – including many who have written reports on how to revitalize public diplomacy – is to **try** and rekindle the glory years of the United States Information Agency (USIA) during the Cold War. While USIA-type programs are important – and should be seen as **vital** components of the War on Terrorism – it is far more important for the **U.S.** government to fully understand and conceptualize a long-term communications program with the rest of the world. **America** needs to do more than broadcast our **message** to foreign audiences; we need to **listen** to their complaints and respond to them appropriately.

The framework **laid** out in this **paper** does just that. It **starts** with an intense stage of information gathering where American government officials – with the help of the private-sector – evaluate all of the information currently **available** and procures whatever other information is needed to accurately and fully understand **foreign** public opinion at a specific point in time. This baseline is then given to policy **makers**, so prior policy **can** be reevaluated and future policy evaluated in light of the benefits **America** gains and the cost it may or may not have on foreign public opinion. Further, this information is **given** to American public diplomacy and public affairs officials – under the guidance of a newly created NSC staff member chairing a **SIG** – who **use** this information to craft an effective, informed, **and** flexible communications effort for America.

Finally, this dialogue between America and the rest of the **world** – and the responsive framework established that incorporates government and the private sector – is seen as a long-term commitment. The creation of a private institution charged with constantly measuring foreign public opinion, the effectiveness of **America's message**, and the impact of American policy on foreign public opinion would give the **U.S.** government the real-time information necessary for effective communication with the rest of the world.

As John **Adams** famously observed, “The Revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people.” For a small, extremist segment of the world population values like freedom and prosperity are meaningless. Yet the vast majority of people around the globe is more interested in security for themselves and their families than *war* and destruction. America has a peaceful message and strives to be a force for Freedom and prosperity around the world. Yet we are doing incredible harm to ourselves by **not** advocating for ourselves effectively. **As** the 9/11 commission stated: “If the United States does not act aggressively to define itself in the Islamic world, the extremists will gladly do the job for us.”¹⁵ Richard Holbrooke put it best, “How can a man in a cave **out** communicate the world's leading communications society?”¹⁶

American national security requires that we harness the wealth of resources we have available to communicate **with** the rest of the world. We must **speak and listen to** the rest of the world clearly, accurately, and effectively. If we do so, we will prevail.

¹⁵ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States. “The 9/11 Commission Report,” pg. 377.

¹⁶ Richard Holbrooke, “Get the Message Out,” *Washington Post*, Oct. 28, 2001, p. B7.

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January 2, 2004

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TO: Gen. John Abizaid

c c : Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Counterinsurgency

I read your November 11 memo on elements of successful counterinsurgency.
You are right—it is interesting.

What do you propose?

Thanks.

Attach.
11/11/03 CENTCOM memo to SecDef

DHR:dh
010204-22

.....
Please respond by 1/31/04

2 Jan 04

OSD 00108-04

CCCC

November 11, 2003

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FROM GEN ABIZAID

Mr. Secretary:

Counter-Insurgency

Sir, our doctrine states: "Counterinsurgency—those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency." (Joint Pub 1-02) Clearly we must integrate elements of national power in any effort to defeat an insurgency.

Attached is 'Elements of Successful Counterinsurgency' [Low Intensity Conflict] worthy of your time to digest'

VIR

John

Copy to: CJCS

②
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Elements of Successful Counterinsurgency (U)

Counterinsurgency (COIN) practitioners and academic experts on insurgency generally agree on an interrelated set of prerequisites for a successful counterinsurgency strategy:

Separate the insurgent cadre from the rank and file by addressing local grievances that feed the insurgency. Calculated reforms, such as infrastructure and social service enhancements and land reform, that address material grievances are widely viewed as effective in undercutting insurgent appeal and gaining support for the government.

Strengthen the rule of law. To bolster legitimacy, experts maintain that COIN operations and policies must be legal. Emergency measures should be proportionate to the threat with appropriate legal safeguards established.

Develop a coordinated, integrated plan based on an accurate assessment of the insurgency's goals, techniques, and strategies. Successful plans blend political, judicial, administrative, diplomatic, and economic policies with appropriate security and military measures and clearly delineate roles and responsibilities.

Unify COIN management. Although experts differ over the degree of centralization necessary, all prescribe development of an organizational infrastructure capable of coordinating all aspect-civilian and military-of the COIN effort.

Demonstrate a will to win by devoting adequate resources to the COIN effort, assigning the best and brightest to work on COIN, and exhibiting a willingness on the part of the public and government to sacrifice to support the COIN effort.

Enhance political legitimacy and develop a peaceful path for political resolution. Accomplishing these goals, according to COIN experts, often requires open and honest elections.

Ensure civilian oversight and authority over military operations. Experts insist that successful COIN campaigns require that political goals take precedence over military goals if they conflict. An apolitical military, concentrating on the military aspects of the conflict, and healthy political-military relationship are required.

Control troop behavior and firepower, ill-disciplined troops using indiscriminate firepower drive the population into backing the insurgency. Precise control of firepower and troops to prevent damage and injury to the civilian population will minimize inadvertently feeding the insurgency.

Employ sound COIN tactics. An insurgency relying on low-level guerrilla tactics is best confronted, according to COIN experts, by employing unconventional strategies and tactics that emphasize small-unit operations, sustained and aggressive patrolling, and rapid-reaction forces.

Establish an effective intelligence apparatus that targets the insurgent organizational and leadership structure and shares intelligence among the military services and echelons and the police.

Employ integrated psychological operations that are tailored to domestic, insurgent, and international audiences.

Field popular militia. Firmly controlled and adequately equipped local defense forces free up regular forces and increase security for local officials and a government presence.

Eliminate the insurgents' foreign support. Through diplomacy, international information operations, and possibly military action, deny the insurgents foreign sanctuary and material assistance.



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

ACTION MEMO

12/19/2004 3:04 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes*

SUBJECT: Letter to Senator McCain Regarding Changes to Joint Ethics Regulation

- Attached for your signature is a letter to Senator McCain describing the recent changes to the Joint Ethics Regulation to strengthen our programs to prevent violations of conflicts of interest statutes by personnel who are leaving public service for employment by private enterprise.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the letter

COORDINATION: Legislative Affairs

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DECISION: Disapprove
JAN 5 2005
Approve and sign letter

Prepared by Steve Epstein (b)(6)

*Sir,
I recommend Army D. Reta have an opportunity to provide his views on the letter.
WJ Haynes*

252
19 Dec 04

17 Dec 04

OSD 00202-05





SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

The Honorable John McCain
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator McCain:

I am writing to apprise you of recent changes the Department of Defense has undertaken to strengthen our programs to prevent violation of conflicts of interest statutes, particularly those dealing with the transition of DoD personnel from public service to private enterprise.

On October 25, 2004, the ~~Deputy Secretary of Defense~~ ^{Assistant} implemented changes to three sections of DoD Directive 5500.7-R, Joint Ethics Regulation. The first change requires all senior DoD personnel (civilian and military) who file the public financial disclosure report (SF 278) to certify annually that they are aware of the disqualification and employment restrictions of 18 U.S.C. 207 (which bars certain activities after leaving public service), **18 U.S.C. 208** (which bars Federal personnel from participating in official actions that involve a private enterprise in which that employee is negotiating employment), and **41 U.S.C. 423** (the Procurement Integrity Act.) This certification, which is already in effect, also requires senior DoD officials to attest that they have not violated the above statutes.

The second change modifies the requirements for annual ethics training: adding a new requirement to expand the training on post-Government service employment restrictions included in all annual ethics training, regardless of other topics presented in that training.

The third change mandates that all DoD personnel, when leaving Federal service, receive guidance on post-Government service employment restrictions. Although many DoD commands and other organizations currently provide this guidance as part of their out-processing, this change in the Joint Ethics Regulation will require such guidance.

I am enclosing a copy of the change to our regulation along with a copy of a recent press release discussing these initiatives.

Sincerely,

Encl: As stated



ANNUAL CERTIFICATION

As a member of the Department of Defense who files a public financial disclosure report (SF 278), DoD 5500.7-R, Joint Ethics Regulation (JER), requires you to certify each year that you are aware of the restrictions that three statutes place on you during your Federal service when you are negotiating employment and after you leave Federal service. You are also required to certify that you have not violated these statutes.

The statutes, with brief definitions of terms, are summarized below. If you have any questions, please contact your ethics counselor.

18 U.S.C. 208: Restrictions On Negotiating Employment:

Federal employees are prohibited from participating personally and substantially in an official capacity in any particular matter in which, to their knowledge, they, or any person or organization with whom they are negotiating or have any arrangement concerning prospective employment, have a financial interest, if the particular matter will have a direct and predictable effect on that interest.

“Particular Matter” - matters that involve deliberation, decision, or action that is focused on the interests of specific persons or a discrete and identifiable class of persons. These matters may include a contract, claim, application, judicial or other proceeding, request for a ruling or other determination, controversy, investigation, or charge. A “particular matter” could even include legislation or policy-making that is narrowly focused on the interests of a discrete and identifiable group of parties or organizations, e.g., DoD policy affecting only military aircraft manufacturers.

“Personal and Substantial” Participation – To participate “personally” means to participate directly. It also includes the direct and active supervision of the participation of a subordinate. Participation is substantial if it is of significance to the matter, and may occur through decision, approval, recommendation, investigation, or advice. One act, such as approving a critical step, may be substantial, but an entire series of peripheral acts may not be.

“Direct and Predictable Effect” - a close, causal link between **any** action taken on the matter and **any** expected effect of the matter on the potential employer’s financial interest. An effect may be direct even though it does not occur immediately, although effects on the general economy are not direct. There must also be a real, not speculative, possibility that the matter will affect the financial interest, but the size of the gain or loss is not relevant.

“Negotiating” - any discussion or communications with the organization or **an** agent, with the mutual view of reaching an agreement regarding possible employment. It is not limited to just discussing specific terms and conditions of employment in a specific position.

Please note that regulations place similar restrictions when you are seeking employment. Please also note that your disqualification remains in effect until it may be withdrawn or your participation is authorized by appropriate authority.

11-L-0559/OSD/039021

41 U.S.C. 423: Restrictions On Seeking Employment:

DoD personnel may not participate personally and substantially in a DoD procurement valued at more than \$100,000 when seeking employment with a bidder or offeror. The rules require that personnel file written disqualification statements with the contracting officer, source selection authority, and immediate supervisor. They must identify the procurement, describe the nature and specific dates of participation in the procurement, and identify the bidder or offeror and describe its interest.

DoD personnel must promptly report, in writing, to their supervisors and ethics officials, any employment contact with a bidder or offeror in a DoD procurement valued at more than \$100,000, even when they promptly reject the employment contact.

“Seeking employment” - includes inquiries regarding potential future employment, including negotiations, and responses, other than immediate and clear rejections, to unsolicited communications regarding possible employment. It does not include requesting a job application, but does include a 2-month period after forwarding a resume unless the possibility of employment is rejected prior to that time.

“DoD Procurement Valued at More Than \$100,000” - DoD acquisition, using competitive procedures and appropriated funds, for a contract in excess of the simplified acquisition threshold, currently \$100,000.

“Personal and Substantial Participation” - active and significant involvement in any of the following activities directly related to the procurement:

- drafting, reviewing, or approving the specification or statement of work;
- preparing or developing the solicitation;
- evaluating bids or proposals;
- selecting a source;
- negotiating price or terms and conditions; or
- reviewing and approving the award.

Unless and until you have received written authorization from the Head of the Contracting Authority, you will remain disqualified.

18 U.S.C. 207: Post-Government Service Employment Restrictions:

Senior Officials -

For 1 year after leaving a senior position, they may not make any communications or appearances on behalf of any other person before any officer or employee of the agency or agencies in which they served within 1 year prior to leaving the senior position, with the intent to influence in connection with any matter on which official action is sought by the other person.

For 1 year after leaving a senior position, they may not aid, advise, or represent a foreign government or foreign political party with the intent to influence any officer or employee of any Federal department or agency, or Member of Congress.

"Senior Officials" - flag and general officers, and civilian personnel whose basic rate of pay is at or above 86.5% of the basic rate for Executive Schedule Level II (at or above \$136,757 in 2004).

"Agency" -

For Presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed appointees: all of DoD, including the Military Departments and DoD Agencies.

For general and flag officers and all other covered civilian personnel: their component within DoD: the Military Departments, DISA, DIA, DLA, NGA, NRO, DTRA, and NSA. For flag and general officers assigned outside of their Military Department, their agency will include their Military Department in addition to other components in which they served during the last year of service.

Very Senior Official (Secretary of Defense) - additional 1-year ban on communications or appearances before all employees in positions on the Executive Schedule in all agencies of the executive branch.

All Personnel -

Forever after terminating Federal service, they may not make a communication or appearance on behalf of any other person before any officer or employee of any Federal agency or court with the intent to influence in connection with a particular matter in which they personally and substantially participated, which involved a specific party at the time of the participation and representation, and in which the U.S. is a party or has a direct and substantial interest.

"Specific Parties" - identifiable parties other than the Federal Government.

For 2 years after terminating Government service, Government officers and employees may not make a communication or appearance on behalf of any other person before any officer or employee of any Federal agency or court with the intent to influence in connection with a particular matter which they reasonably should have known was actually pending under their official responsibility within 1 year before they left Government service, which involved a specific party at that time, and in which the U.S. is a party or has a direct and substantial interest.

"Official Responsibility" - direct administrative or operating authority to approve, disapprove, or otherwise direct, Government actions. It includes a supervisor at any level having responsibility for the actions of a subordinate employee who actually participates in a matter.

For 1 year after terminating Government service, they may not represent, aid, or advise someone else on the basis of covered information concerning any ongoing trade or treaty negotiation in which they participated personally **and** substantially in their last year of Government service.

“Trade Negotiations” - those undertaken pursuant to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (19 U.S.C. 2902).

“Treaties” - international agreements that require the advice and consent of the Senate.

“Covered Information” - agency records accessible to the employee but exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.

There are exceptions to the restrictions of 18 U.S.C. 207.

41 U.S.C. 423 Post-Government Service Employment Restrictions :

For 1 year after a designated date, covered DoD personnel may not accept compensation from the prime contractor on a DoD contract valued in excess of \$10,000,000.

“Designated Date for Covered Personnel” – Date of selection or award of contract for service by procuring contracting officers, source selection authorities, members of source selection evaluation boards, and chiefs of financial or technical evaluation teams;

Last date of service on the contract for program managers, deputy program managers, and administrative contracting officers;

Date of decision for officials who personally made any of the following decisions:

- 1) to award contracts, subcontracts, or modifications of contracts or subcontracts, or task or delivery orders in excess of \$10,000,000,
- 2) to establish overhead or other rates valued in excess of \$10,000,000,
- 3) to approve issuance of a contract payment in excess of \$10,000,000, or
- 4) to pay or settle a claim in excess of \$10,000,000.

“Valued in Excess of \$10,000,000”-

contract, including all options: value or estimated value at the time of award

indefinite-delivery/indefinite quantity or requirements contract: total estimated value of all orders at the time of award

any multiple award schedule contract: estimate, unless contracting officer documents a lower estimate

Basic Ordering Agreement: value of delivery order, task order or order

claims: amount paid or to be paid in settlement

negotiated overhead or other rates: estimated monetary value, when applied to the Government portion of the applicable allocation base.


They may accept compensation from any division or affiliate of the contractor that does not produce the same or similar products or services as the entity responsible for the contract.

“Same or Similar” - a product or service must be “dissimilar enough” from that under the contract to warrant use of the exception.

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I certify that I am aware of the restrictions set forth above. I further certify that I have not knowingly violated those statutes that apply to Federal personnel while they are in Federal service.

Donald H. Rumsfeld
Printed Name


Signature

Dec. 10, 2004
Date

g://socgc/1-gail/Annual Certification/doc
Rev: 12/6/2004 4:40 PM

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IMMEDIATE RELEASE

No. 1309-04

December 20, 2004

Post-Government Service Employment Restriction Changes Announced

The Department of Defense recently modified its ethics regulation to ensure DoD personnel, when leaving federal service, do not inadvertently violate federal "revolving door" statutes.

In a memorandum dated Oct 25, 2004, Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz directed three changes to the departmental ethics regulation, DoD Directive 5500.7-R.

The first change requires senior personnel, including admirals, generals, and senior civilian officials, to certify annually that they are aware of the requirements of three statutes, and have not violated them. The three statutes bar conflicts of interests by procurement officials, all federal employees when negotiating for employment, and all federal employees after they leave the department.

The second change mandates that information on these post-government employment restrictions be included in the annual ethics training program for DoD personnel. This amplifies the current requirements for annual training.

The third element establishes a requirement that all DoD personnel who are leaving federal service receive guidance on the restrictions that will affect them during and after their transition. Many DoD organizations already provide this information as part of the personnel checkout process and briefings.

According to William J. Haynes II, the general counsel and chief ethics officer of the department, "These changes should further strengthen our program of ethics education to help DoD personnel know and appreciate how our ethics laws apply to them."

The modified regulation is available online at: http://www.defenselink.mil/dodgc/defense_ethics/

Printer-friendly Version

Email A Copy

11-L-0559/OSD/039026

<http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20041220-1882.html>

12/20/2004

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11-L-0559/OSD/039027

INFORMATION FOR PRESS RELEASE ON RECENT CHANGE TO DOD
REGULATION INVOLVING POST-GOVERNMENT SERVICE EMPLOYMENT
RESTRICTIONS

POC: Steve Epstein, DoD Standards of Conduct Office
epsteins@dodac.osd.mil

(b)(6)

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According to William J. Haynes II, the General Counsel and chief ethics officer of the Department, “These changes should further strengthen our program of ethics education to help DoD personnel know and appreciate how our ethics laws apply to them.”

G:socgc\1-steve\04 press release JER chg.doc
Rev: 12/10/2004 10:26 AM



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

OCT 25 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE **MILITARY** DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM **ANALYSIS** AND EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: Prevention of Violations of Post-Government Service Employment
Restrictions

This directive-type memorandum establishes additional procedures to ensure that DoD personnel are aware of and comply with statutes and regulations that apply to their transition from Federal service to private employment.

Annual Certification: Starting immediately, DoD personnel who file Public Financial Disclosure **Reports** (SF 278) shall certify annually that they are aware of the disqualification and employment restrictions of 18 U.S.C. 207 and 208, and 41 U.S.C. 423, and that they have not violated those restrictions.

Annual Ethics Briefing: DoD Components shall include training on relevant Federal and DoD disqualification and employment restrictions in Annual Ethics Briefings.

Guidance for All Departing DoD Personnel: DoD Components shall provide guidance on relevant Federal and DoD post-Government service employment restrictions, as part of out-processing procedures, to all DoD personnel who are leaving Federal service.

This memorandum is effective immediately. Changes to DoDD 5500.7-R, Joint Ethics Regulation (JER), incorporating the substance of this memorandum, shall be issued within 180 days. **Terms used** in this memorandum are defined in the JER.

Attachments
cc: Directive Division, C&D, WHS

OSD 15517-04

11-L-0559/OSD/039030

- a. Civil Penalties. Individual violators may be subject to a civil fine not to exceed \$100,000. Violators, other than individuals, may be subject to a civil fine not to exceed \$1 million.
- b. Administrative Sanctions. See subsection 10-300 through 10-304 of this Regulation.

SECTION 4. Annual Certification

8-400. Annual Certification. DoD employees who file the Public Financial Disclosure Report (SF 278) shall certify annually that they are aware of the disqualification and employment restrictions of 18 U.S.C. 207 and 208, and 41 U.S.C. 423 (references (b) and (c)), and that they have not violated those restrictions.

SECTION 5. DoD GUIDANCE

8-500. Appearances. DoD employees shall:

- a. Ensure that the prospect of employment does not affect the performance or non-performance of their official duties;
- b. Ensure that they do not communicate inside information to a prospective employer; and
- c. Avoid any activity that would affect the public's confidence in the integrity of the Federal Government, even if it is not an actual violation of the law.

8-501. Written Guidance. DoD employees may obtain counseling and written advice concerning restrictions on seeking other employment from their Ethics Counselor:

a. Although the counseling and advice are given by DoD attorneys and involve the interpretation of law and regulation and rendering of legal opinion, no attorney-client or other confidential relationship is created. Communications made to an Ethics Counselor in seeking such advice are not privileged.

b. This counseling and advice is personal to the current or former DoD employee. It does not extend to the individual's business, employer, or prospective employer.

SECTION 6. REFERENCES

8-600. References

- (a) Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 2635, "Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch," current edition
- (b) Title 18, United States Code, Sections 207 and 208
- (c) Title 41, United States Code, Section 423
- (d) Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 3.104, current edition

Communications made to an Ethics Counselor in **seeking** such advice are not privileged.

b. Ethics counseling **and** advice are personal to the current **or** former DoD employee. They **do not extend** to anyone else, including **his** business, employer, or prospective employer.

9-501. Delegation of Authority. The DoD Component **DAEO** may specifically delegate authority **in** writing for Ethics Counselors within **the** DoD Component to provide **written** advice under **41 U.S.C. 423** (reference (e)). In any case where the local Ethics Counselor does not have the authority **by** written delegation, he **shall** provide the counseling and **obtain** the request for advice and necessary supporting information **from** the DoD employee and forward it **to** the DoD Component **DAEO** or designee who **has** been specifically delegated the authority **in** writing to issue the written advice.

9-502. Guidance for Departing DoD Employees: DoD Components shall provide guidance on relevant Federal and DoD post-Government service employment restrictions, as part of out-processing procedures, to DoD employees who are leaving Federal service.

SECTION 6. RESTRICTIONS RESULTING FROM PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES

9-600. 41 U.S.C. 423 (reference (e))

a. **Restrictions.** This **statute restricts** a former DoD employee **who was** a procurement official with respect to a particular procurement from knowingly:

(1) Each DoD Component is encouraged to provide 1 hour of official duty time to review a Written AEB and to supplement the written AEB, including but not limited to, verbal briefings, in person or by telecommunications, computer-based methods, or recorded means, and ethics ~~related~~ articles in command communications, newsletters, and ethics electronic bulletin board systems.

(2) An IEO described in subsection 11-300.f., above, may satisfy the requirement for a written AEB for the same calendar year in which given.

(3) For DoD Components that verbally brief all of their other covered employees during 1 year of a consecutive 3-year period, 1997 shall be the first year of such briefings. Thereafter, verbal briefings shall follow in 3-year increments; e.g., 2000, 2003, 2006; etc.

(4) The following exceptions to verbal AEBs may apply:

(a) The DoD Component DAEO, or designee, may make a written determination that it is impractical to provide a verbal AEB once every 3 calendar years, under section 2638.704(d)(3)(iii)(A) of reference (a) in subsection 11-100., above, An IEO described in subsection 11-300.f., above, may satisfy the requirement for this exception for the same calendar year in which given.

(b) DoD employees who are special Government employees, who are officers in the uniformed services who serve on active duty for 30 or fewer consecutive days, or who are designated employees (subsections 2638.704(d)(3)(iii)(B), 2638.704(d)(3)(iii)(C), and 2638.704(d)(3)(iii)(D) of reference (a)), in subsection 11-100., above, may be given written AEBs, in accordance with section 2638.704(d)(3)(i) of reference (a). An IEO described in subsection 11-300.f., above, may satisfy the requirement for this exception for the same calendar year in which given.

c. Each DoD Component shall maintain records to track that the requirements of section 2638 of reference (a) in subsection 11-100., above, including the method of training provided to covered employees, have been met.

d. DoD Components shall include training on relevant Federal and DoD disqualification and employment restrictions in Annual Ethics Briefings.

11-302. Annual Ethics Training Plans. Each DoD Agency (see definition of "Agency" in subsection 1-201., above) shall develop a written plan for annual ethics training for a calendar year by the beginning of that year, in compliance with section 2638.702(c) of reference (a) in subsection 11-100., above. The DoD Components that are not Agencies shall submit annual ethics training plans to DoD SOCO by December 31st of the prior year for approval and inclusion in SOCO's ethics training plan.

~~FOUO~~

07
305 111-0 1111 #5

December 17, 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Status of Items

Please **find** out the status of these items Jim Haynes owes me.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/9/04 MFR

DHR:as
121704-7

.....
Please respond by _____

250

17 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

December 9,2004

SUBJECT: Ethics

I am due from Jim Haynes the following:

- o **My ethics certification to sign.**
- **A statement from Larry Di Rita that has been released to the press about the changes made in our ethics procedures.**
- **A letter from me to John McCain enclosing the statement on changes in the ethics rules.**

DHR:dh
12090442



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JAN 5 2005

The Honorable John McCain
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator McCain:

I am writing to apprise you of recent changes the Department of Defense has undertaken to strengthen our programs to avoid violation of conflicts of interest statutes, particularly those dealing with the transition of DoD personnel from public service to private enterprise.

On October 25, 2004, the Department implemented changes to three sections of DoD Directive 5500.7-R, Joint Ethics Regulation. The first change requires all senior DoD personnel (civilian and military) who file the public financial disclosure report (SF 278) to certify annually that they are aware of the disqualification and employment restrictions of 18 U.S.C. 207 (which bars certain activities after leaving public service), 18 U.S.C. 208 (which bars Federal personnel from participating in official actions that involve a private enterprise in which that employee is negotiating employment), and 41 U.S.C. 423 (the Procurement Integrity Act.) This certification, which is already in effect, also requires senior DoD officials to attest that they have not violated the above statutes.

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The third change mandates that all DoD personnel, when leaving Federal service, receive guidance on post-Government service employment restrictions. Although many DoD commands and other organizations currently provide this guidance as part of their out-processing, this change in the Joint Ethics Regulation will require such guidance.

I am enclosing a copy of the change to our regulation along with a copy of a recent press release discussing these initiatives.

Sincerely,

Attachment
cc: Honorable John Warner
Honorable Carl Levin

250
5
press

17 DEC 04

DRAFT

Subject to changes based on P/B FY 2006 President's Budget Guidance Memo

FY 2006/FY 2007 Biennial Budget Estimates
Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide
President's Budget Submission Guidance

1. This guidance applies to the Operation & Maintenance, Defense-Wide (O&M,D-W) agencies.
 - a. It supplements the OUSD(C) Program/Budget memorandum, December 2, 2004, Updates of the Procurement, Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E), Construction, Operation and Maintenance (O&M), and Military Personnel Databases for the FY 2006/2007 President's Budget.
 - b. The submission date for O&M,D-W agency exhibits, **JANUARY 19, 2005**, is earlier than submission dates for other entities, to allow the O&M,D-W team time to review and compile the submission books for the total appropriation. This is in contrast to Army, Navy, and Air Force O&M appropriations, which prepare their consolidated books before submitting them to their OSD analysts.
 - c. The O&M,D-W analysts at OSD will review, mark and return the exhibits to you for editing by February 4. Fully revised, FINAL version of all exhibits is due by February 11. The OSD team will assemble and send to the printer by February 18, to meet the required March 1 delivery date to Congress.
2. Use the four-year format (FY 2004 is prior year; FY 2005 is current year; FY 2006 is budget year; FY 2007 is budget year plus one).
 - a. Include FY 2004 Supplemental in FY 2004 actuals.
 - b. Include approved PBD actions (to include FY 2005 transfers identified in PBDs).
 - c. Ensure transfers in and out are each identified on a separate transfer line. Do NOT show transfers as a program change.

Volume I exhibits (PBA-19, OP-5, OP-32, PB-31D, PB-31R), as detailed below, are due to your analyst by close of business **January 19**. These are required for the OSD staff to prepare the appropriation summary and overview data.

- Submit each exhibit as a separate Microsoft Word file, labeled as *Agencyacronym FY 2006 Exhibitname.doc* (e.g. DISA FY 2006 PBA-19.doc).
- In the event that exhibits must be revised after initial submission, add a *version number* after the *Exhibitname* (e.g. DISA FY 2006 PBA-19 v2.doc).
- Your submissions should be printer-ready.
 - a. Obtain security clearance for the submission. Please scan in the clearance document and provide it electronically along with the exhibits.
 - b. Please examine exhibits for line and page breaks, proper headers and footers, and alignments (left-align all text; right align all dollar amounts within columns).
 - c. Delete all "POC" notations. There should be no individual's name, no phone number on any exhibit.
 - d. Use CourierNew 12 throughout all documents (with exceptions for use of CourierNew 10 when absolutely necessary to fit all columns on the page).

DRAFT

Subject to changes based on P/B FY 2006 President's Budget Guidance Memo

- e. Center your agency's acronym (e.g., DISA) in the bottom margin. The O&M,D-W team will add the page numbers.
- a. **PBA-19 Appropriation Highlights:**
 - i. This introductory statement should highlight key programmatic or thematic changes that warrant attention. Note that increases/decreases *per se* are shown on the OP-5 rather than on the PBA-19.
 - ii. The goal is one page that begins and ends with a "take-away" message emphasizing the role or value the agency contributes to national defense.
 - iii. Footnote the amount of Supplemental funds received in FY 2004 and anticipated in FY 2005 at the bottom of the PBA-19 table.
 - iv. Include Title IX Supplemental funds and approved FY 2005 Supplemental requests in FY 2005 column on the PBA-19.
- b. **OP-5 Detail by Subactivity Group:**
 - i. Prepare a single OP-5 for each agency. Now that each agency reports its entire program in a single Budget Activity, your OP-5 should reflect all the subactivities your agency previously reported in separate OP-5's.
 - ii. Integrate and incorporate the same level of detail that has been presented in multiple OP-5s in previous years.
 - iii. Section I. Description of Operations Financed: Include a summary of the key changes after the general paragraph. Group the changes if that will lead to a better understanding of what the proposed changes will accomplish.
 - iv. Section III. Financial Summary part A. Subactivity Group
 - 1. Ensure this section includes all the specific programs that have been presented in previous years, and fully accounts for your budget authority/request in all years. If there is a significant change in program funding between years, the change should be highlighted and explained in Section I. Description of Operations Financed.
 - 2. For clarity, it may be useful to create "groups" that correspond to the breakouts presented in previous budget exhibits (e.g., DLA's OP-5, Section III, Financial Summary part A. Subactivity Group list could be divided into Other Logistics Services, Other Logistics Programs, and Warstoppers. Each division has a complete list of subactivities within the division. For other agencies, there may be a Training division that corresponds to the old BA-3 OP-5, and an Operations and Administration division that corresponds to BA-4. Division titles are discretionary.)
 - v. Section III. Financial Summary part C. Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases
 - 1. Ensure that the trail includes, for each change, the previous year's baseline amount. This is a **mandatory congressional requirement**.
 - 2. Identify Supp funding separately for each change.
 - 3. Ensure that descriptions are communicative rather than cryptic. Spell out acronyms. One-liners are seldom satisfactory. Where possible, indicate the related OP-32 line number.

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Subject to changes based on P/B FY 2006 President's Budget Guidance Memo

- vi. Be sure to identify program transfers and show them in the correct section. If transfers are included in the program increases/decreases section, Congressional staffers may incorrectly interpret them as program growth and make them targets for reduction.
- vii. Provide a measurable metric for each performance criteria described in the Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary. Provide analysis to indicate whether performance as measured is good, bad, improving, etc.
- viii. Since OMB expects that each agency has a strategic plan from which goals and objectives flow, make reference to your agency's strategic plan as often as appropriate.

c. OP-32 Appropriation Summary of Price/Program Growth:

- i. Consult OMB Circular A-11 for general guidance:
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a11/04toc.html>
- ii. Consult PBDs 604,606 and 426 for DoD-approved inflation, pay, and WCF rates. A table of approved rates will be provided separately for your convenience.
- iii. Consult OMB Circular A-11 regarding use of object classes.
- iv. Pay close attention to the definitions of subsets within object class 25 Other Contractual Services and crosswalk your contracts appropriately to the OP-32 lines.
 - 1. OC 25.1 is also known as Contract Advisory and Assistance Services (CAAS) (OP-32 Lines 931 Contract Consultants, 932 Management & Professional Support Services, 933 Studies, Analysis, & Evaluation, and 934 Engineering & Technical Services).
 - a. Include:
 - i. Management and professional support services,
 - ii. Studies, analyses, and evaluation, and
 - iii. Engineering and technical services.
 - b. EXCLUDE contracts for:
 - i. Financial statement audits (OC 25.2),
 - ii. Information technology consulting services that focus on large scale systems acquisition and integration or large scale software development (OC 31.0),
 - iii. Personnel appointment and advisory committees (OC 11.3),
 - iv. Operation and maintenance of information technology and telecommunication services (OC 25.7),
 - v. Architectural and engineering services as defined in the FAR,
 - vi. Research on theoretical mathematics and basic medical, biological, physical, social, psychological, or other phenomena (OC 25.5),
 - vii. Services classified in OC 25.2 Other contractual Services with non-Federal sources or 25.3 Other purchases of goods and services from Government accounts.
 - 2. Object Class 25 Other contractual Services also includes:
 - i. OC 25.2 Other Services includes contractual services with non-Federal sources that are *not otherwise classified* in OC 25, such as financial

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- statement audits performed by independent public auditors (OP-32 lines 926,989,991, and 998). Agencies that report more than 15% of their total OC 25 budget under OC 25.2 must, per 10 U.S.C. §2212, **submit an itemized list of contracts** with justification as backup material to the OUSD(C) O&M,D-W team. This input will be used in explanations to congressional staffers;
- ii. OC 25.3 Other purchases of goods and services from Government accounts for purchases that are not otherwise classified (OP-32 lines 600-699, 701-770,901,902, 987). Do not use this object class if a more specific object class applies;
 - iii. OC 25.4 Operation and maintenance of facilities when done by contract with the private sector or another federal account (OP-32 line 923);
 - iv. OC 25.5 Research and development contracts for conduct of basic and applied research and development (OP-32 line 989);
 - v. OC 25.6 Medical care for payments to contractors for medical care (OP-32 line 989);
 - vi. OC 25.7 Operation and maintenance of equipment when done by contract with the private sector or another federal agency (OP-32 lines 922 and 927-930);
 - vii. OC 25.8 Subsistence and support of persons for board, lodging, and care of persons (OP-32 line 998).
- v. If applicable to your agency, show the foreign currency impact in a separate column.
 - vi. Prepare a detailed listing that documents specifics of growth in 998 Other Costs and 989 Other Contracts lines.
- d. **PB-31R Personnel Summary:** follow guidance provided by Operations & Personnel point of contact (703 697-9317, Jan Soares, x 129 for civilian personnel or Kevin Lannon, x 131 for military personnel). Note that there is a new CIS Report, R19 Civilian FTE and Cost Display, that lists the direct-funded and reimbursable-funded FTEs, the personnel compensation object class amounts, and then derives average costs for direct-funded and reimbursable-funded FTEs.
- e. **PB-31D Summary of Funding Increases and Decreases:** where possible, identify the related program line shown in the OP-5 Section III. Financial Summary **part A**. Subactivity Group for each increase or decrease.
- f. **0-1 Operation & Maintenance Funding by Budget Activity** will be submitted electronically IAW guidance provided by Program & Financial Control (POCs are Manju Goel and Paul White, 703 697-0021)
4. **Contact your analyst** for additional information or explanation (table follows).

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Subject to changes based on P/B FY 2006 President's Budget Guidance Memo.

| | | | |
|--------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------|-------------|
| Marcia Case | <u>Marcia.Case@osd.mil</u> | | (b)(6) |
| AFIS | American Forces Information Service | 0100 0100 0100 | Marcia Case |
| DFAS | Defense Finance & Accounting Service | 0100 0100 0100 | Marcia Case |
| DHRA | Defense Human Resources Activity | 0100 0100 0100 | Marcia Case |
| DLSA | Defense Legal Services Agency | 0100 0100 0100 | Marcia Case |
| DPMO | Defense POW/MIA Office | 0100 0100 0100 | Marcia Case |
| SOCOM | Special Operations Command | 0100 0100 0100 | Marcia Case |
| | Classified Agencies | 0100 0100 0100 | Marcia Case |

| | | | |
|--------------------------|---|----------------|-------------------|
| Gretchen Anderson | <u>Gretchen.Anderson@osd.mil</u> | | (b)(6) |
| CMP | Civil Military Programs | 0100 0100 0100 | Gretchen Anderson |
| DAU | Defense Acquisition University | 0100 0100 0100 | Gretchen Anderson |
| DCAA | Defense Contract Audit Agency | 0100 0100 0100 | Gretchen Anderson |
| DCMA | Defense Contract Management Agency | 0100 0100 0100 | Gretchen Anderson |
| DISA | Defense Information Systems Agency | 0100 0100 0100 | Gretchen Anderson |
| DLA | Defense Logistics Agency | 0100 0100 0100 | Gretchen Anderson |
| DSCA | Defense Security Cooperation Agency | 0100 0100 0100 | Gretchen Anderson |
| DoDDE | DoD Dependents' Education | 0100 0100 0100 | Gretchen Anderson |
| NDU | National Defense University | 0100 0100 0100 | Gretchen Anderson |
| OEA | Office of Economic Adjustment | 0100 0100 0100 | Gretchen Anderson |
| TJS | Joint Chiefs of Staff | 0100 0100 0100 | Gretchen Anderson |
| COURT | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces | 0100 0100 0100 | Gretchen Anderson |
| OIG | Office of the Inspector General | 0100 0100 0100 | Gretchen Anderson |
| CD/CN | Counternarcotics | 0100 0100 0100 | Gretchen Anderson |

| | | | |
|-----------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| Keith Anderson | <u>Keith.Anderson@osd.mil</u> | | (b)(6) |
| DSS | Defense Security Service | 0100 0100 0100 | Keith Anderson |
| DTRA | Defense Threat Reduction Agency | 0100 0100 0100 | Keith Anderson |
| DTSA | Defense Technology Security Admin. | 0100 0100 0100 | Keith Anderson |
| OSD | Office of the Secretary of Defense | 0100 0100 0100 | Keith Anderson |
| WHS | Washington Headquarters Services | 0100 0100 0100 | Keith Anderson |
| CTR | Conventional Threat Reduction | 0100 0100 0100 | Keith Anderson |

| | | | |
|-------------------------|---|--|------------------|
| Cara Abercrombie | <u>Cara.Abercrombie@osd.mil</u> | | (b)(6) |
| Volume II | Data Book Exhibits | | Cara Abercrombie |
| PB-31Q | Manpower Changes in FTEs | | Cara Abercrombie |
| PB-22 | Major DoD Headquarters Activities | | Cara Abercrombie |
| PB-55 | International Military Headquarters | | Cara Abercrombie |
| PB-24 | Professional Military Education | | Cara Abercrombie |
| PB-15 | Advisory and Assistance Services | | Cara Abercrombie |
| OP-34 | Appropriated Fund Support for MWR Activities | | Cara Abercrombie |
| Env-30A-C | Defense Environmental Restoration Program | | Cara Abercrombie |
| PB-28/28A | Summary of Budgeted Environmental Projects | | Cara Abercrombie |
| PB-34A | Revenue from Leasing out DoD Assets | | Cara Abercrombie |
| PB-34B | Proceeds from Transfer or Disposal of DoD Real Property | | Cara Abercrombie |



U.S. Department of Defense
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

News Release

On the Web:

<http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?>

<http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20041220-1882.html>

Media contact: +1 (703) 697-5131.

Public contact:

<http://www.dod.mil/fag/comment.html>

or +1 (703) 428-0711

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

No. 1309-04

December 20, 2004

Post-Government Service Employment Restriction Changes Announced

The Department of Defense recently modified its ethics regulation to ensure DoD personnel, when leaving federal service, do not inadvertently violate federal "revolving door" statutes.

In a memorandum dated Oct 25, 2004, Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz directed three changes to the departmental ethics regulation, DoD Directive 5500.7-R.

The first change requires senior personnel, including admirals, generals, and senior civilian officials, to certify annually that they are aware of the requirements of three statutes, and have not violated them. The three statutes bar conflicts of interests by procurement officials, all federal employees when negotiating for employment, and all federal employees after they leave the department.

The second change mandates that information on these post-government employment restrictions be included in the annual ethics training program for DoD personnel. This amplifies the current requirements for annual training.

The third element establishes a requirement that all DoD personnel who are leaving federal service receive guidance on the restrictions that will affect them during and after their transition. Many DoD organizations already provide this information as part of the personnel checkout process and briefings.

According to William J. Haynes II, the general counsel and chief ethics officer of the department, "These changes should further strengthen our program of ethics education to help DoD personnel know and appreciate how our ethics laws apply to them."


The modified regulation is available online at: http://www.defenselink.mil/dodgc/defense_ethics/

<http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20041220-1882.html>

11-L-0559/OSD/039043

Via Facsimile

TO: Amb. Zalmay Khalizad

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

DATE: January 5, 2004

SUBJECT:

Congratulations on the successful work of Loya Jirga. I know your involvement made a big difference, and I thank you so much for your selfless contribution.

Please extend my warm congratulations to President Karzai on the successful role he played in moving his country forward. It is an impressive accomplishment.

Also, please give him my very best wishes for the New Year.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
010504.19

Afghanistan

5 Jan 04

OSD 00245-04

720

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

SECRET
LJES

November 22, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers
Larry Di Rita
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Strategic Communications Paper

W
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/

Attached is a paper that was prepared at my request. It resulted from a dinner I had with the three authors, Joe Duffey, Ed Feulner and Lew Manilow. Please read it and let me know what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/2/04 Private Report to the Secretary of Defense

DHR:ss
112204-5

.....
Please respond by 12/10/04

22 Nov 04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/039045

OSD 00278-05



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20316-9999

CM-2263-05

4 January 2005

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

RBMY 1/4

SUBJECT: Strategic Communications Paper

- **Answer.** In response to your request (TAB A), I reviewed the subject document. The paper correctly addresses communications shortcomings, but its solution is too conservative. The Heritage paper proposes a RAND-like, private-sector company to do necessary analysis. The long-term answer is a new agency that has the responsibility, clout and resources to attack larger communications issues. It should include robust, well-trained career public diplomacy professionals deployed worldwide to tell the US story in the local dialect and analyze the feedback. Recommend the agency's leader hold a position on the National Security Council and have an independent voice to the President.
- **Analysis.** Currently, there is an NSC advisor for communications who has his hands full doing interagency work. The proposed senior agency group is unlikely to make any difference, as two already exist: PCC for Strategic Communications and the Muslim World Outreach PCC. The private sector currently spends more than \$6 billion a year on overseas marketing; the USG spends about \$5 million on opinion surveys. This is far too little, and without definitive evidence, it is a guess as to what the US message should be. Information paper at TAB B provides more details.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Mr. Paul Hanley, OCJCS, Director of Strategic Communications,

(b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/039046

OSD 00278-05

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

SECRET
LJCS

2005 JUN 20 10 30 AM
November 22, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers
Larry Di Rita
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Strategic Communications Paper

Attached is a paper that was prepared at my request. It resulted from a dinner I had with the three authors, Joe Duffey, Ed Feulner and Lew Meilow. Please read it and let me know what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/2/04 Private Report to the Secretary of Defense

DHR:ss
112204-5

.....
Please respond by 12/10/04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/039047

OSD 00278-05

14 December 2004

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Review of "Private Report to the Secretary of Defense" on Strategic Communications

1. Purpose. To provide comments and recommendations on subject document.
2. The report's fundamental premise is that the United States Government (USG) must do a better job of assessing foreign public opinion and using that data in message development. The report makes two primary recommendations:
 - Establish a corporation for foreign opinion analysis to "listen, ask questions and analyze foreign public opinion as well as test the effectiveness of various USG messages."
 - Prepare the government bureaucracy to apply information by providing senior policy makers "with immediate input so they are aware of the effect an impending policy action or statement will have on foreign public opinion."
3. To implement the second recommendation, the report recommends creating a new staff position on the National Security Council (NSC) to coordinate the USG overall communications strategy. It also recommends creating a Senior Interagency Group (SIG) that brings the NSC with the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; representatives from the United States Agency for International Development and other relevant members to encourage closer cooperation and to help implement the USG long-term communications strategy.
4. Policy comments:
 - General: Concur in the report's premise that the challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a vital and central component to the WOT—and that this challenge "lies at the very core of America's own vital national interest." The USG should greatly increase the amount of resources applied to strategic communication activities, to include foreign opinion polling. It is critical that the JSG must view the dialog between America and the rest of the world as a long-term commitment and respond with strength of purpose equal to the information efforts of the Cold War.

- Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis. While any new organization that focuses on solving America's image problem is better than none at all, the recommended Defense Science Board (DSB) Center for Strategic Communications (CSC) is a better concept than the Center for Foreign Opinion Analysis (CFOA) recommended in this report. The CSC is much broader in scope, while the CFOA is focused primarily on foreign public opinion polling—something that could be achieved by increasing the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) polling budget and scope of work. The CFOA, like the CSC, would be a nonprofit, bipartisan, federally-funded independent organization similar to RAND Corporation. However, the DSB report recommends the CSC conduct polling, analysis and assessment and also develop mandated self-initiated plans, themes, products and programs (such as children's TV series and video games). The CSC would also work closely with the private sector and nongovernment organizations, foster cross-cultural exchanges, mobilize nongovernment initiatives, recruit private sector experts for short-term assignments and deploy temporary communications teams. The solution to improve America's image abroad must be matched to the magnitude of the problem—a robust CSC is the best option.
- Senior Interagency Group. Establishing the SIG as recommended in this report is appropriate. There is great need for such a group that has authority to speak for its organizations, set strategic communications objectives and priorities, commit resources and quickly adjudicate new proposals for programs and products.
- NSC Communications Staff Position. In November 2003, the NSC created a new position for the Deputy National Security Advisor for Communications. Therefore, the position recommended in the report already exists. However, the duties of this individual must be more focused on strategic, international issues, not with tactical or domestic political issues to be effective in the areas described in the report.

Tab B

1/6/04

9:14 AM

TO: David Chu
Dov Zakheim
Gen. Pete Pace

c c : Marc Thiessen
Paul Wolfowitz
Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 5, 2004

SUBJECT: **Increase in End Strength**

Please prepare a draft reply to the members of Congress on their End Strength letter. This is an important policy issue.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
10504.05

Please respond by: 1/15/04

320.2

STANBY

OSD 00283-04

1:58 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. John Abizaid
L. Paul Bremer
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: January 7, 2004

SUBJECT: **Terminology**

Iraq

As we discussed, the terminology we use is enormously important. The fact that so many of our folks are talking about the situation in Iraq as a "guerrilla war," with the word "guerrilla" having a positive connotation in some people's minds, is unfortunate. So too, the use of the phrase "former regime loyalist" is unfortunate in that "loyalist" has a positive connotation. The use of the phrase "Sunni Triangle" in a negative sense is harmful to our efforts with the Sunnis.

We have to do a better job of using words that are well thought through and calculated to express exactly what we mean. The word "fanatic" has a negative connotation. The word "terrorist" has a negative connotation in most cases.

I hope you will continue thinking through what words we ought to use to describe the people who are causing us the difficulties in Iraq and come back with some suggestions that we can all then use.

Thanks.

DHR/azn
010704.16

Please respond by: _____

7 Jan 04

OSD 00284-04

7/14/04

7201

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~


CC- 117104
NDP

July 13, 2004

TO: David Chu

CC: Gen. Dick Myers Jim Roche
 Paul Wolfowitz Gen. Pete Schoomaker
 Gen. Pete Pace ADM. Vern Clark
 Les Brownlee Gen. John Jumper
 Gordon England Gen. Mike Hagee

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: 2004 Voting


Prior to the Congressional recess at the end of next week, I would like to be briefed on the range of activities involving the military absentee voter program.

As I recall, the Department conducted a study at Secretary Cohen's direction after the last election that revealed some shortfalls in our processes.


I would like to know what progress has been made and what more needs to be done to ensure we are discharging our responsibilities in this area.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071304-1



.....
Please respond by 7/20/04



D14.35

130704

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OSD 00325-05

11-L-0559/OSD/039052

July 23, 2004

Friday

July 2004

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August 2004

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| 29 | 30 | 31 | | | | |

Ms. McGinn on Leave
DR. CHU - VACATION

7^{am}

8⁰⁰ 8:15am-8:45am P&R Update (3E752)

9⁰⁰ 9:20am-9:50am SD Military Voting - UCS, Service Chiefs, Service Secretaries

10⁰⁰ ISG BRAC Imperatives Meeting - Principals (3D1019)

10:00am-10:45am SD Future OIF Rotations

11⁰⁰

12^{pm} Lunch

1⁰⁰ Hold

2⁰⁰

Car to Hill (Marvin)

3⁰⁰ SASC/SGAC Staff NSPS Briefing (SR-228 Library)

4⁰⁰ Car to Pentagon (Marvin)

PDUSD Wrap-up

5⁰⁰ Leave for the day - Anniversary Dinner in Fairfax

6⁰⁰