



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

JUL 25 2008

350.09

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

05 JUL 08

SUBJECT: *Designation of Reporting Office for Department of Defense Intelligence Oversight Reporting*

Executive Order 13462: President's Intelligence Advisory Board and Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB), signed on February 29, 2008, requires the head of each executive department with Intelligence Community elements to designate the office within their respective organizations that will submit Intelligence Oversight reports to the IOB and to inform the Chairman, IOB and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) of such designation.

The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD(IO)) will continue to be the Department of Defense (DoD) conduit for reporting both immediate and quarterly inputs to the IOB. DoD organizations will continue to submit reports directly to the ATSD(IO) who will provide the reports to the Chairman, IOB with copies for the DNI. The DoD point of contact is William Dugan, Acting ATSD(IO).

10 JUL 08



OSD 09262-08





DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010



JUL 25 2008

350.09

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

SUBJECT: Designation of Reporting Office for Department of Defense Intelligence Oversight Reporting

Executive Order 13462: President's Intelligence Advisory Board and Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB), signed on February 29, 2008, requires the head of each executive department with Intelligence Community elements to designate the office within their respective organizations that will submit Intelligence Oversight reports to the IOB and to inform the Chairman, IOB and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) of such designation.


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05 JUL 08

10 JUL 08

OSD 09262-08





DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

JUL 25 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Designation of Reporting Office for Department of Defense Intelligence Oversight Reporting

Executive Order 13462: President's Intelligence Advisory Board and Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB), signed on February 29, 2008, requires the head of each executive department with Intelligence Community elements to designate the office within their respective organizations that will submit Intelligence Oversight reports to the IOB and to inform the Chairman, IOB and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) of such designation.

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DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

JUN 17 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DoD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 08-052 – DoD Guidance for
Reporting Questionable Intelligence Activities and Significant or Highly
Sensitive Matters

References: See Attachment 1

Purpose. This DTM implements recent Executive Branch guidance in Director of National Intelligence and Chairman, Intelligence Oversight Board Memorandum (Reference (a)) concerning the criteria and requirements for reporting intelligence oversight matters and directs compliance with the guidance contained in Attachment 2. It establishes the procedures to ensure complete and standardized reporting by the DoD Intelligence Components and other entities involved in intelligence activities, which include both foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities. This DTM is effective immediately; it shall be incorporated into DoD 5240.1-R (Reference (b)) within 180 days. Nothing in this DTM is intended to alter reporting requirements established by statute or departmental policy.

Applicability. This DTM applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies,



ODNI/DOD

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the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities in the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components").

Policy. Questionable intelligence activities and significant or highly sensitive matters involving intelligence activities may have serious implications for the execution of DoD missions. It is DoD policy that senior leaders and policymakers within the Government be made aware of events that may erode the public trust in the conduct of DoD intelligence operations. Reference (b), DoD Directive 5148.11 (Reference (c)), and Executive Order (E.O.) 13462 (Reference (d)) require that such matters be reported to the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB), a component of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board, and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) as appropriate. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD(IO)) is the principal staff assistant for intelligence oversight matters and shall serve as the conduit for all reporting to the IOB.

Reporting Requirements and Procedures. Reporting guidance is contained in Attachment 2. The quarterly report to the ATSD(IO) is exempt from licensing in accordance with Chapter 4, subparagraphs C4.4.1 and C4.4.8, of DoD 8910.1-M (Reference (e)).

Releasability. UNLIMITED. This DTM is approved for public release and is available on the Internet from the DoD Issuances Web Site at <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives>.



Attachments:
As stated

ATTACHMENT 1

REFERENCES

- (a) Director of National Intelligence and Chairman, Intelligence Oversight Board Memorandum, "Intelligence Oversight Reporting Criteria," July 17, 2008¹
- (b) DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components That Affect United States Persons," December 1982
- (c) DoD Directive 5148.11, "Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD(IO)), " May 21, 2004
- (d) Executive Order 13462, "President's Intelligence Advisory Board and Intelligence Oversight Board," February 29, 2008
- (e) DoD 8910.1-M, "Department of Defense Procedures for Management of Information Requirements," June 30, 1998
- (f) Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," as amended
- (g) Department of Justice-DoD Memorandum of Understanding: "Reporting of Information Concerning Federal Crimes," August 1995²

¹ Available at: <http://www.defenselink.mil/atsdio>

² Contact ATSD(IO), 703-275-6550

ATTACHMENT 2

PROCEDURES FOR REPORTING QUESTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
AND SIGNIFICANT OR HIGHLY SENSITIVE MATTERS

1. REPORTING PARAMETERS

a. The DoD Components shall report the following matters to the ATSD(IO) in accordance with References (a) and (d).

(1) Questionable Intelligence Activity. An intelligence activity, as defined in Executive Order 12333 (Reference (f)), that may be unlawful or contrary to Executive order, Presidential directive, or applicable DoD policy governing that activity:

(2) Significant or Highly Sensitive Matters. A development or circumstance involving an intelligence activity or intelligence personnel that could impugn the reputation or integrity of the DoD Intelligence Community or otherwise call into question the propriety of an intelligence activity. Such matters might be manifested in or by an activity:

(a) Involving congressional inquiries or investigations.

(b) That may result in adverse media coverage.

(c) That may impact on foreign relations or foreign partners.

(d) Related to the unauthorized disclosure of classified or protected information, such as information identifying a sensitive source and method. Reporting under this paragraph does not include reporting of routine security violations.

(3) Crimes Reported to the Attorney General. Any intelligence activity that has been or will be reported to the Attorney General, or that must be reported to the Attorney General as required by law or other directive, including crimes reported to the Attorney General as required by Department of Justice-DoD Memorandum of Understanding (Reference (g)).

b. Unless extenuating circumstances exist, the ATSD(IO) will be notified prior to briefings of any congressional committee or member of Congress concerning intelligence matters identified in paragraphs 1.a.(1), 1.a.(2), and 1.a.(3) of this attachment. Should extenuating circumstances, in fact, delay notification to the ATSD(IO) until after the briefing, then the ATSD(IO) will be notified of the outcome of the briefing at the first opportunity thereafter.

c. The DoD Component assigned to or conducting intelligence activities may establish internal organizational reporting responsibilities pursuant to that Component's internal policies and regulations.

2. SUBMISSION OF REPORTS. DoD Components assigned to conduct intelligence and counterintelligence activities shall submit reports to the ATSD(IO) in accordance with the following guidance.

a. Report questionable intelligence activities of a serious nature and all significant or highly sensitive matters immediately. Such reports may be made by any secure means. Oral reports should be documented with a written report as soon as possible thereafter.

b. Report questionable intelligence activities not of a serious nature quarterly. Reporting periods shall be based on the calendar year. The first report for each calendar year shall cover January 1 through March 31. Succeeding reports shall follow at 3-month intervals. Quarterly reports are due to the ATSD(IO) by the 15th day of the month following the end of the quarter. Quarterly reports will describe all questionable intelligence activities as well as significant or highly sensitive matters identified during the quarter. Quarterly reports are routinely submitted to the ATSD(IO) through normal modes of routing and transmission (e.g., chain of command, hard or soft copy). Quarterly reports are required even if no reportable matters occurred during the reporting period.

c. Reporting DoD Components will format all reports as follows:

(1) Assignment of a Case Number for Each Incident. Except where the volume of incident investigations that have been reported and closed within the same reporting quarter makes the assigning of a case number to each case impracticable, a case number that runs consecutively and identifies the reported incident by reporting agency, Military Department, or Combatant Command and calendar year shall be assigned to each incident. For example: "DIA 2009 - 04" would indicate the fourth incident reported by DIA in calendar year 2009. Use this number each time the incident is mentioned in initial reports, and in update and close-out reports. A case number will be assigned to all reported incidents that, at a minimum, are the subject of an ongoing investigation.

(2) Information to be Included in Each Report. For each incident reported, include the following information as it becomes available.

(a) A narrative describing each incident reported.

(b) An explanation of why the incident is being reported either as a potential violation of law, potentially contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive, or a potential violation of Reference (b) and/or agency or Military Department procedures implementing Reference (f). Cite the portions of relevant law, order, policy, or regulation as it is determined.

(c) An explanation of why the incident is considered a significant or highly sensitive matter, if so reported.

(d) An analysis of how or why the incident occurred.

(e) An assessment of the anticipated impact of the reported incident on national security or international relations, as well as any mitigation efforts, including success and failures of such efforts. If there has been no impact or no impact is anticipated, the report should so state.

(f) Remedial action taken or planned to prevent recurrence of the incident.

(g) An assessment of any impact the reported incident may have on civil liberties or protected privacy rights.

(h) A description of actions taken if the incident concerns information improperly acquired, handled, used, or destroyed.

(i) Any additional information considered relevant for purposes of fully informing the Secretary and/or Deputy Secretary of Defense, the IOB, and the DNI and providing context about the incident.

d. Each quarterly report should be organized under the major headings of "New Incidents" and "Updates on Previously Reported Incidents." The latter heading includes incidents still under inquiry as well as those resolved and closed during the quarter.

e. Additionally, each quarterly report will contain a summary of gravity, frequency, trends and patterns of the questionable intelligence activities, and/or significant or highly sensitive incidents reported during that quarter, to the extent that they can be determined. Otherwise, the summary should be provided, as the information becomes available, in a subsequent quarterly report.

f. The quarterly report shall include a description of any inspection findings or intelligence oversight program developments, such as publication of a revised intelligence oversight regulation, that the reporting DoD Component believes is significant. Neither training reports nor inspection schedules shall be included in the

quarterly report to ATSD(IO). DoD Components shall monitor compliance with training requirements and inspection schedules.

g. Reporting shall not be delayed or postponed pending an investigation, command inquiry, or legal proceeding.

3. PROHIBITED USE OF THIS ATTACHMENT. This attachment shall not be used to prepare the Annual Intelligence Oversight Report to Congress, which is signed by the Secretary of Defense. Instructions for preparing the Annual Intelligence Oversight Report to Congress will be issued by the ATSD(IO) in November of each year; the Annual Report will be due to the ATSD(IO) January 31 of each year.

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

INFO MEMO

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

FROM: DIRECTOR, COLLECTION, CONCEPTS & STRATEGIES

SUBJECT: Update Regarding Senate Judiciary Committee Inquiry on NSA Allegations

- The Judiciary Committee sent a letter on October 10, 2008 to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and Director, National Security Agency (DIRNSA) expressing concern about claims from an Army Reservist (Ms. Adrienne Kinne) and a Navy linguist (Mr. David Murfee Faulk), who allege they were ordered to intercept and transcribe international communications between U.S. persons in the Middle East, including U.S. Service Members and their families in the United States. The letter requested:
 - Vigorous investigation of Ms. Kinne's and Mr. Faulk's allegations;
 - Delineation of steps taken to detect, deter and punish violations of law or regulations that are found to have occurred;
 - Written assurances that ill-gotten collection is being destroyed and purged from government databases; and
 - An agreement to provide the Senate Judiciary Committee with audits or reports resulting from the revelations.
- The DNI responded to the Senate Judiciary Committee's specific points on October 17, 2008, and the NSA Inspector General (IG) initiated an investigation into the allegations of Mr. Faulk. The NSA IG anticipates a draft report of investigation by the first week of June 2009.
- The U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command's (INSCOM) IG investigated Ms. Kinne's original allegations, determining that the 513th Military Intelligence Brigade's alleged violation of NSA/CSS directives and intelligence oversight shortfalls were unfounded.
- Based on allegations by Mr. Faulk and additional allegations from Ms. Kinne during an October 9, 2008, ABC News report, the INSCOM Commanding General directed the INSCOM IG to initiate a comprehensive new investigation into the activities of INSCOM personnel at Fort Gordon, Georgia during Ms. Kinne's mobilization.
- The INSCOM IG's report of investigation is currently under staff review prior to review by the Commanding General. INSCOM has not identified a target date for completion and subsequent forwarding to the Department of the Army IG.

Prepared By: (b)(6)

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- Thus far, neither investigation has uncovered evidence of ordered or deliberate intercept and transcription of international communications between U.S. persons in the Middle East, including U.S. Service Members and their spouses.

COORDINATION: TAB A

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By:

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Tab A

COORDINATION:

Office of the Director, National Intelligence

- Office of the Inspector General
- Civil Liberties Protection Officer

Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General

Assistant Secretary of Defense, Intelligence Oversight

Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Congressional Activities Office

Headquarters, Department of the Army

- Office of the Inspector General
- Office of the General Counsel
- Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2

National Security Agency/Central Security Services Inspector General

Headquarters, US Army Intelligence and Security Command

- Inspector General
- Staff Judge Advocate

Prepared By: (b)(6)

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
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(Security Classification)


| ROUTING | | | |
|-----------------------------------|------------------|----------------|----------|
| TO | NAME AND ADDRESS | DATE | INITIALS |
| 1 | | | |
| 2 | | | |
| 3 | | | |
| 4 | | | |
| ACTION | DIRECT REPLY | PREPARE REPLY | |
| APPROVAL | DISPATCH | RECOMMENDATION | |
| COMMENT | FILE | RETURN | |
| CONCURRENCE | INFORMATION | SIGNATURE | |
| REMARKS: | | | |
| FROM NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO. | | DATE | |
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| | | | |

CONTROL NO. _____

COPY 3 OF 4



Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:



~~TOP SECRET~~
(Security Classification)



~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED] ~~NOFORN~~
ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

7200 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-7200



Mr. Stephen Friedman
Chairman, Intelligence Oversight Board
New Executive Office Building, Room 5020
Washington, DC 20500

29 OCT 2008

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Department of Defense Intelligence Oversight Report for the period April-June 2008 is enclosed. The report consists of the Intelligence Oversight reports of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), DoD Inspector General (IG), Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Joint Staff (includes Combatant Commands), and military services.

Sincerely,

Daniel J. Dell'Orto
Principal Deputy General Counsel

William Dugan
ATSD(10)

Enclosure(s):
As stated

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS AND PHYSICAL
REMOVAL OF CODEWORDS AND CAVEATS

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED] ~~NOFORN~~

ODNI/DOD 15

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, DC 20340-5100



U-08-0264/IG

11 July 2008

To: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)
7200 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-7200

Subject: (U) Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Report for the Period Ending 30 June 2008

- References:
- a. Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," 4 December 1981
 - b. Executive Order 12863, "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board," 13 September 1993
 - c. Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5240.1, "DoD Intelligence Activities," 25 April 1988
 - d. DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect U.S. Persons," December 1982
 - e. ATSD (IO) memorandum, subject: Required Actions for the CY 2007 Intelligence Oversight Report to Congress, 15 November 2007

1. (U) As required by references, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is submitting the Quarterly Intelligence Oversight (IO) Report for the period 1 April through 30 June 2008. If further information is required, please contact the Office of the General Counsel (GC) at [redacted]

(b)(2),(b)(3):
10 USC 424

[redacted] or the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) at [redacted]

(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC
424

2. (U) The OIG opened the following intelligence oversight investigations this period:

a. [redacted] An allegation that [redacted] inappropriately [redacted]
[redacted]
(Project 2008-003107-MA)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ An allegation that a [redacted] and [redacted] convened and set up a [redacted]
[redacted] regarding the [redacted]
[redacted] allegedly then stated he would draft an [redacted]
[redacted] under his authority as a [redacted] (Project 2008-003106-MA)

(b)(1),1.4 (c),1.4 (d)

Classified by: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: 20330711

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

- 3. (U) All ongoing investigations from the last quarter were closed during this quarter (see paragraph 4).
- 4. (U) The OIG issued the following final intelligence oversight investigative reports during this period:

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ A review was initiated about circumstances leading to the [redacted] (b)(1), 1.4 (c)
[redacted] made of DIA [redacted] The [redacted]
requested that the GC and OIG review all types of media in possession of DIA, involving
[redacted] determine if agency personnel
used. [redacted]
[redacted] The review determined that no [redacted]
[redacted] were utilized. All [redacted] were
conducted in accordance with applicable policy. (Projects 2008-003089-MA, 2008-
003092-MA, and 2008-003093-MA)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted]

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] Directorate for Human Intelligence, may have
engaged in questionable activities involving the establishment of [redacted]
[redacted] The allegation was not substantiated and there were no
findings or recommendations reflected in the report. (Project 2008-003049-MA)

[redacted]

(b)(3):10
USC 424

cc:
DR
DD

UNCLASSIFIED

August 21, 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

During the Reporting period, the Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) was in the process of transitioning into and becoming a part of the Defense Intelligence Agency. As a result, CIFA did not submit a formal report covering this reporting period. However, their Acting General Counsel reported, in an email to this office, that no Questionable Intelligence Activities (Procedure 15s) were reported during this period. As of the reporting quarter beginning 1 July, DIA/IG will assume responsibility for reporting on both the personnel and activities that were formerly a part of or were conducted by CIFA



William Dugary


Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
For Intelligence Oversight

UNCLASSIFIED

ODNI/DOD

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Direct Response to the requester by NSA.



~~SECRET~~ [] ~~NOFORN~~ 725X1
NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

22 July 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT)

SUBJECT: National Reconnaissance Office Executive Order 12333
Quarterly Compliance Report

I have attached the National Reconnaissance Office's
quarterly compliance report for all Executive Order 12333
activities for the period of 1 April through 30 June 2008.

If you have any questions about this report, please call

(b)(6) [] Office of General Counsel at (b)(3) []

E. Page Moffett
General Counsel

Attachment:
Quarterly Compliance Report for the
Intelligence Oversight Board

cc:
Inspector General
Director Office of Security and
Counter-Intelligence


DECL ON: 20330722
DRV FROM: NRO Classification Guide, 21 May 2005

UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~ [] ~~NOFORN~~ 725X1

ODNI/DOD

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22 July 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT)

SUBJECT: National Reconnaissance Office Executive Order 12333
Quarterly Compliance Report

REFERENCES: (a) Executive Order 12333, 4 December 1981
(b) DoD Directive 5240.1, 25 April 1988

The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Office of General Counsel submits this report pursuant to the above references for the **Second Quarter of 2008**, covering the dates of **1 April through 30 June 2008**. Personnel at NRO facilities reported no instances of improper or unlawful intelligence activities, as defined by Executive Order 12333.

Intelligence oversight activities conducted in support of Executive Order 12333 during this quarter included the initial indoctrination and training of (b)(3) individuals assigned to the NRO. In addition, various NRO sites conducted training to re-indoctrinate (b)(3) NRO personnel on the requirements of Executive Order 12333. A separate report for a mission site is attached and their statistics are not included in the above figures. The current training program is a combined effort between the NRO Office of Security and Counter-Intelligence and the NRO Office of General Counsel.

Mary Rose McGuffey
Office of Security
and Counter-Intelligence

E. Page Moffatt
Office of General Counsel

Attachment:
Mission Site Report

cc:
Office of Inspector General
Office of Security and Counter-Intelligence

DECL ON: 20330722
DRV FROM: NRO Classification Guide 6.0, 21 May 2005

~~SECRET~~ [] ~~NOFORN~~ 725X1
NEVER WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE
ODNI/DOD

National Reconnaissance Office Executive Order 12333 Quarterly Compliance Report (1 APRIL THRU 30 JUNE 2008)

| Facility | Principal / Secondary POC | Request Sent/Rcvd | Newly Inspected | Re-Inspected | Total Inspected | USP Compliance | Disclose JSP Policy | Retrieve Files as USP ID | Any other questions/ambiguities | Any Intel activities v. JSP compliance | Any Intel Oversight Inspection Conducted | Any Changes to intel oversight processes | Any Changes to Intel Directives/Policy | Any Inquiries to Legal Intel activities |
|---------------|---------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|--------------|-----------------|----------------|---------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|--|--|--|--|---|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| (b)(1) | (b)(3)(6) | S-06/30/2008 R-07/14/08 | (b)(3) | | | NO | 0 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| CWMMH | | S-06/30/2008 R-07/14/08 | | | | NO | 0 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| (b)(1) | | S-06/30/2008 R-07/08/2008 | | | | YES | 1 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| (b)(1) | | S-06/30/08 R-07/09/08 | | | | NO | 0 | NO | NO | NO | YES | NO | NO | NO |
| Westfield | | S-06/30/08 R-07/10/08 | | | | NO | 0 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| Los Angeles | | S-06/30/08 R-07/10/08 | | | | NO | 0 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| (b)(1) | | S-06/30/08 R-07/10/08 | | | | NO | 0 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| (b)(1) | | S-06/30/08 R-07/10/08 | | | | NO | 0 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| CCAS | | S-06/30/08 R-07/09/08 | | | | NO | 0 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| VAFB | | S-06/30/08 R-07/08/08 | | | | NO | 0 | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO | NO |
| OGC | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| IG | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| CI | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| OS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Kelly AFB | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Fl. Meade | (b)(1) | | reports through AF | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Schriever AFB | | | reports through NSA | | | | | | | | | | | |
| (b)(1) | | | reports through AF | | | | | | | | | | | |
| (b)(1) | | | reports through NSA | | | | | | | | | | | |
| TOTALS | SITES REMAINING | | (b)(3) | | | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

DECL ON: 25X, 205800/24, RHG dated July 2005
 DRV FROM: NRO Classification C, dc 6 D.
 21 May 2005

*With consent of U.S. persons

**Separate report attached

IGB Summary Sheet

Name of Department or Agency: National Reconnaissance Office

CV Quarterly Report: Second Quarter (Apr-Jun) 2008

Date of Incident: N/A

Date of Report to IGB: 22 July 2008

Date of Report to Department, Agency: N/A

Date of Report Submitted to Other Entity (DIA, Congress, Civil Liberties Office, etc.): N/A

Possible violation of:

STATUTE (US Code Citation)

FISA (50 USC §1801)

Other (U.S.C. citation: _____)

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12958:

Section 2.3: collection and dissemination of USF info

Section 2.4: preamble: least intrusive collection

Section 2.4(a): CIA electronic surveillance within US

Section 2.4(b): non-consensual physical search within US

Section 2.4(c): physical surveillance of USF within US

Section 2.4(d): physical surveillance of USF abroad

Section 2.5: AG approval within US or against USF abroad

Section 2.6: assistance to law enforcement

Section 2.7: contracting

Section 2.9: undisclosed participation

Section 2.10: human experimentation

Section 2.11: prohibition on assassination

Section 2.12: indirect participation

AG APPROVED EO 12958 GUIDELINES (Guideline name and section: _____)

OTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER (SPECIFY)

Creation of unauthorized SAP (EO 12958, as amended)

Other EO citation: _____

PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE (SPECIFY)


COVERT ACTION FINDINGS/ MEMORANDUM OF NOTIFICATION

Other Presidential Directive Citation: _____

DEPARTMENT/ AGENCY ACTION: N/A

DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION: N/A

NARRATIVE: The NRO has nothing to report for this quarter.



E. PAGE MOFFETT
General Counsel

REF ID: A66154W 037

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NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

4600 Sangamore Road
Bethesda, Maryland 20816-5009

NGA-U-2008-2497

19 August 2008

**MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT)**

SUBJECT: (U) National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Quarterly
Intelligence Oversight Report for 1 April to 30 June 2008

1. (U) The Office of Geospatial Intelligence Management (OGM) is the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) Intelligence Oversight (IO) Program Management Office. OGM works in partnership with the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and the Office of the General Counsel (OGC) to administer the Agency's IO Program.

2. (U//~~FOUO~~) This document constitutes the consolidated NGA report for the third quarter of Fiscal Year 2008 (1 April to 30 June 2008). OIG is submitting information on two OIG activities for this IO reporting period.

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) The OIG completed one intelligence oversight (IO) inspection of the Acquisition Directorate (A), Acquisition Contracts Office (AC), Acquisition and Source Directorates Support Division (ACA). The inspection was conducted in Washington, D.C. and St. Louis, MO. The inspection was based on assessments of three key areas: mission relevance to IO, employee training, and employee awareness. The inspectors found that the ACA personnel they surveyed were familiar with IO reporting requirements and procedures, and that ACA personnel completed IO training as required. The inspectors did not identify any IO violations or questionable activities. Additionally, the inspectors conducted a follow-up IO inspection of the Acquisition Directorate, Acquisition and Source Directorates Support Division (ACA), Report Number OIGE-07-04, dated 18 July 2007. The inspectors determined that the contracts included the IO warnings and protective provisions required by NGA Instruction 8900.4R5, Intelligence Oversight, paragraph 6e, dated 30 March 2006. ACA was in the process of modifying nine additional long-term contracts to include the appropriate warnings.

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) The OIG completed one investigation on questionable intelligence activity at the request of the Office of General Counsel (OGC). The OIG reviewed account administration activities of the NGA Commercial Data Service (NCDS) as they pertained to the access of NGA personnel to domestic commercial imagery. Based on OIG's results, the OGC issued an opinion. The opinion stated that the current method of issuing NCDS accounts to NGA employees is not sufficient for NGA to comply with its responsibilities under IO authorities to protect the constitutional rights and privacy of US persons. The lack of sufficiency results from not using the proper use memorandum (PUM) process to validate the users' need to access domestic commercial imagery.

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ODNI/DOD

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c. (U//~~FOUO~~) In their response to the report on questionable intelligence activity, management stated that NCDS as an NGA service is not funded beyond 31 August 2008; however, as of this writing, NCDS is expected to be terminated on or about 1 October 2008. In its place, NGA plans to offer access to the existing Web-based Access and Retrieval Portal-Unclassified NGA Imagery Library (WARP-UNIL), which is supposed to have capabilities equivalent to NCDS and requires verification of a valid PUM before NGA users are granted access. If WARP-UNIL does not satisfy user needs, the Directors, Enterprise Operations Directorate and Acquisition Directorate will determine if NCDS should be continued under temporary funding until users agree that WARP-UNIL is acceptable. OIG will conduct a follow-up review on management's actions during the ongoing inspection of the PUM process.

3. (U//~~FOUO~~) Other Significant IO Activities:

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) There were no command level changes to published directives or policies concerning intelligence, counterintelligence or intelligence-related activities made during this reporting period.

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) A new updated list of NGA Intelligence Oversight Officers (IOOs) is being created and reviewed for accuracy and redundancy. Ensuring the IOOs have the necessary training, guidance governing their duties, and any job aids is our next step.

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) NGA continues to be involved with other agency components in discussing the enhancements to the Agency's IO program.

d. (U//~~FOUO~~) OGM is working with the Agency's Human Development Directorate (HD) to use our personnel system to track and report on annual IO training.

4. (U) The points of contact for this report are Ms. Pamela Stephens, (703) 735-2283 and Dr. Harry (Terry) Dawson, (703) 735-2286, Geospatial Intelligence Community Governance Division, OGMC.



MARY M. IRVIN
Director, Office of Geospatial
Intelligence Management

cc:
OIG (Mr. Burton)
(Ms. Bruce)
OGC (Ms. Ryan)

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INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

JUL 25 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT)

SUBJECT: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Report—Third Quarter, FY 2008 (U)

(U) As required in DoD Regulation 5240.1-R, "Proceedings Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components That Affect United States Persons," I am providing my office's quarterly intelligence oversight report for the second quarter, FY 2008.

(U) New Reports of Questionable Activities Reported

None.

(U) Updates of Previously Reported Cases

~~(S//NF)~~ On February 22, 2007, we announced a "Review of a Possible Procedure 15 Violation" (Project No. D2007-DINT01-0150). Subsequently the project title was changed to "Report on an Investigation of a Questionable Intelligence Collection Activity." The objective was to determine whether a DoD employee violated (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1) We also determined whether the activity and associated logistics were appropriate and approved.

~~(S//NF)~~ This project was the result of an issue previously referred to your office

(b)(1)(b)(7)(c)(f)

~~(S//NOFORN)~~ The final report was jointly signed by the DIA IG and Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence, DoD and issued on June 23, 2008. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

1. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Take appropriate personnel actions against two DIA employees in accordance with Defense Intelligence Agency Instruction 1-426.001, "Employee/Management Relations and Conduct", 28 September 2004

Derived from: DIA/DH Security Classification Guide
Dated: October 2004
Declassify On: MR20330122

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

ODNI/DOD

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2. ~~(S//NF)~~ Re-evaluate the (b)(2)
(b)(2) in this case.

3. ~~(U//NF)~~ Notify and instruct non-intelligence DoD overt sources of their responsibilities under Department of Defense Directive 5240.01, "DoD Intelligence Activities, August 27, 2007."

(U) Descriptions of Intelligence-related Activities that Violate Law, Regulation, or Policy

(U) None

(U) List of Intelligence Oversight Inspections Conducted

(U) None

(U) Substantive Changes to the Intelligence Oversight Program

(U) None.


(U) Changes to Published Directives or Policies

(U) None

(U) Other Matters

(U) None.

(U) Should you have any questions, please contact me at (703) 604-8812 or Mr. William Ramey at (703) 604-8873.



Patricia A. Brautin
Deputy Inspector General
for Intelligence



Defense Threat Reduction Agency

4725 John F. Kingman Road MS 6201
Ft Belvoir VA 22060-1601

JJA 21 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT)

SUBJECT: Quarterly Report (April - June 2008)

References: (a) Executive Order 12333, December 1981, "United States Intelligence Activities"
(b) DoD Directive 5240.1-R, December 1982, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons"

The following information is submitted for the period of 1 April through 30 June 2008.

a. Activities that are believed to be illegal or contrary to Executive Order or DoD policy: None

b. Actions taken regarding such activities: N/A

c. Significant oversight activities: The Security and Counterintelligence Directorate has placed renewed emphasis on Intelligence Oversight (IO) training. On 9 April 2008, (b)(6) and (b)(6) ATSD (IO), met with selected Security and Counterintelligence personnel to review DoD IO policy and procedures. On 28 May 2008, (b)(6) returned to DTRA Headquarters to conduct an IO Briefing for all agency CI Division personnel and intelligence personnel. The training was very well received and resulted in increased program awareness.

d. Suggestions for improving the intelligence oversight system: The ATSD-IO Intelligence Oversight briefing was conducted for DTRA Counterintelligence personnel during 3QTRFY08. Although on-line training provides a convenient and standardized training mechanism, it is important that agency Security and Counterintelligence personnel be brought together periodically in "all hands" settings for briefings from IO experts. Classroom training and briefings allow for interactive and more effective learning.

e. Descriptions of intelligence, counterintelligence, and intelligence-related activities that violate law, regulation, or policy substantiated during the quarter, as well as any actions taken as a result of the violations: None

f. Intelligence oversight inspections conducted and the results or trends from those inspections: None. DTRA IG is in the process of developing an IO Inspection Checklist for use.

- Questionable intelligence activities: N/A
- Familiarity of personnel with intelligence oversight requirements: N/A
- Adequacy of organization intelligence oversight training programs, oversight structure, and processes: N/A

g. Substantive agency-level changes to the Intelligence Oversight programs, including changes to supporting training programs, and the reason for the changes, with a copy of the directive or policy that directs the change: None

h. Agency-level changes to published directives or policies related to counterintelligence, or intelligence-related activities and the reason for the changes, with a copy of the directive or policy attached: None

(b)(5)

Deputy Inspector General



**THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC**

Reply ZIP Code:
20318-0300

10 July 2008

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT)**

Subject: Intelligence Oversight (IO) Report for Third Quarter, FY08

1. Below is a consolidated summary of all Combatant Commands (COCOMs) Intelligence Oversight (IO) Reports for the Third Quarter, FY08. Attached are all COCOM reports with further information. Service Component IGs will report IO information to their respective Service.

a) **USCENTCOM IG:** Augmentation forces for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM assigned to USCENTCOM at MacDill AFB are receiving initial intelligence oversight training. There were no questionable activities reported.

b) **USEUCOM IG:** Intelligence oversight training included 138 initial and 293 refresher briefings.

There was one questionable activity reported to the Joint Staff IG on 8 May 2008 and additional information to ATSD-IO on 9 May 2008. The case is still open and results will be submitted upon completion.

Internal assessments were conducted by EUCOM J2, SHAPE Survey, USNIC-Pristina, Northern Region JOIC, Southern Region JOIC, Joint Analysis Center, Special Operations Command, Europe and there were 183 personnel interviewed.

c) **USJFCOM IG:** USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) conducted refresher IO training for 47 personnel associated with JWFC intelligence enterprise.

The Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) Intelligence Directorate is cooperating with the Federal Bureau of Investigation on the Global Hostage-Taking Research and Analysis Project managed by the FBI's Behavioral Science Unit. Cooperation is established within the limits set by DOD 5240.1-R.

The USJFCOM IG's office conducted a unit command inspection of the Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) in Dahlgren, Virginia from 9 to 13 June

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

2008. JWAC was found to be in compliance with all appropriate regulations and maintained accurate training records for the command's intelligence oversight programs.

c) **USNORTHCOM IG:** The N-NC IG, completed Intelligence Oversight Inspections of JTF-CS and a Staff Assistance Visit of Fleet Forces Command. The organizations were found to have a good understanding of their requirements and responsibilities under applicable laws and regulations and to have strong IO programs. Only one minor recommendation for improvement was provided.

The N-NC IG conducted an IO visit to observe Operation Gulf Watch in Corpus Christi, TX on 19 May 2008. IO visitors included representatives from the N-NC IG, ARNORTH IG and SJA, and JTF-N-SJA IG and J2. The purpose of this visit was to conduct a review and assessment of IO requisite processes/procedures for implementing the Counter IED Operations Center (COIC) database system in the JTF-N mission set.

All N-NC Intelligence Directorates and subordinate commands have conducted initial and refresher training for personnel. 99% of personnel have been trained.

The N-NC- J2 and IG are undergoing an internal review of processes in an attempt to mitigate any future IO related information leaks. Main effort is focused on adding email searches as part of the oversight program, as well as additional emphasis in all training events on safe guarding classified and USPER information.

N-NC is heavily engaged in the upcoming National Conventions. The command J2 and IG have been working with the Colorado and Minnesota National Guard to ensure compliance with all IO requirements. To date, several policy letters have been signed between the TAGs of each state delineating the rules and policies that each respective organization will follow. A meeting is currently being planned between ATSD (IO), N-NC and the CO and MN National Guard during the week of 18-22 August 2008.

e) **USPACOM IG:** JIATF West, USFK, USFJ, ALCOM, PACOM/JIOC, SOCPAC and JPAC are conducting annual training via computer with certificates being sent to IO coordinator. New members are still receiving in-person indoctrination training.

PACOM/J2 is also the Commander of PACJIOC, the two merged into one program. All reporting will be done on one report. PACOM directive is being re-worked to incorporate organizations.

f) **USSOUTHCOM IG:** Automated training notifications go out monthly as a reminder to all personnel who are required to undergo training during that

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

month. Joint Task Force Bravo (*JTF Bravo*), Special Operation Command South (*SOCOSO-J2*), Joint Interagency Task Force-South (*JIATF-S J2 C1*), and Joint Task Force, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (*JTF-GTMO*) all submitted negative reports to any IO violations. Special Operation Command South (*SOCOSO-J2*) continues to provide IO training and current resource materials to designated intelligence personnel on a regular basis. Joint Interagency Task Force-South (*JIATF-S J2 C1*) training of newly arriving personnel assigned to intelligence activities, monitored *JIATF-S WebTas* Program to ensure US persons data meets authorized retainability under *JIATF-S* mission allowing for collection of information regarding drug trafficking. Reviewed all US persons in *WebTas* to ensure all IO requirements were met. The database is current with known traffickers and persons with prior criminal history.

g) **USSOCOM IG:** There were no questionable activities reported during this quarter.

USSOCOM-SCSO-J2 continues to operate the Intelligence Oversight Training Program through a computer based program. No changes to that program have occurred.

h) **USSTRATCOM IG:** Inspected the IO program at National Airborne Operations Center (*NAOC*) Intelligence. There were no questionable intelligence activities reported in *NAOC* and the *NAOC* IO program was found to be excellent. The program met all DoD requirements and all personnel interviewed were aware of the requirements of the DoD IO program.

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (*OATSD-IO*) completed the inspection of the IO program at *USSTRATCOM* by visiting four subordinate *USSTRATCOM* commands, *JFCC-ISR*, *JFCC-NW*, *SCC-WMD* and *JTS-GNO* during April and May. There were no discrepancies identified in any of these subordinate command IO programs.

i) **USTRANSCOM IG:** Conducted a quarterly review of command IO programs to assess compliance with Federal laws and national directives regarding intelligence activities. There were no questionable activities or violations reported this quarter.

In addition, *TCIG* and the Chief, Civil and Fiscal Law, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (*TCJA*), conducted an IO program inspection of the *USTRANSCOM* Joint Intelligence Operations Center in coordination with the *TCJ2* IO Program Monitor on 3 June 2008. The inspection consisted of a review of the unit IO program administration, to include documentation of annual IO training and an evaluation of the effectiveness of that training. As of 3 June 2008, 99% of available *TCJ2* personnel had received initial or refresher training for 2008. All personnel evaluated during the inspection demonstrated

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

a sound understanding of JO policies and the requirements for reporting questionable intelligence activities.

2. The point of contact for this action is the undersigned at (b)(2)



Deputy Inspector General

Enclosures:

- Enclosure A – Intel Report U.S. Central Command
- Enclosure B – Intel Report U.S. European Command
- Enclosure C – Intel Report U.S. Joint Forces Command
- Enclosure D – Intel Report U.S. Northern Command
- Enclosure E – Intel Report U.S. Pacific Command
- Enclosure F – Intel Report U.S. Southern Command
- Enclosure G – Intel Report U.S. Special Operations Command
- Enclosure H – Intel Report U.S. Strategic Command
- Enclosure I – Intel Report U.S. Transportation Command

ENCLOSURE A - USCENTCOM

(b)(2)



UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

CCJZ

20 June 2008

MEMORANDUM THRU:

STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE, HQCENTCOM, 7115, S. BOUNDARY BLVD.
MACDILL AFB, FL 33621

INSPECTOR GENERAL, HQCENTCOM, 7115, S. BOUNDARY BLVD.
MACDILL AFB, FL 33621

FOR DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE JOINT STAFF, 6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON,
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000

SUBJECT: 3rd Quarter, Fiscal Year 08, Intelligence Oversight (IO) Report

REF: (a) CJCSI 5901-01, 25 Mar 03, Subject: Oversight of Intelligence Activities.
(b) USCENTCOM Regulation 381-9, 17 Feb 05, Subject: Activities of USCENTCOM
Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons.

1. Service Components report through their Service channels. Augmentation forces for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM assigned to USCENTCOM at MacDill AFB, FL are receiving initial intelligence oversight training.
2. There were no questionable intelligence activities during the reporting period.
3. POC is SFC (b)(3)(b)(6) Special Security Office (SSO) Intelligence Oversight Officer,
DSN (b)(2) United States Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.

(b)(3)(b)(6)

COL, USA (b)(3)(b)(6)
Deputy Director of Intelligence

(b)(3)(b)(6)

Colonel, USA
Inspector General

(b)(2)

ENCLOSURE B - USEUCOM



HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND
UNIT 30400
APO AE 09131

ECIG

2 July 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Joint Staff Inspector General

SUBJECT: Intelligence Oversight (IO) Report, 3rd Quarter, FY08

1. This report provides information concerning intelligence oversight activities of the staff directorates and direct-reporting subordinate intelligence units of headquarters, US European Command.
2. Intelligence oversight training:
 - a. Initial briefings: 138
 - b. Refresher briefings: 293
3. Questionable activities (violations of law, regulation, or policy and action taken): EUCOM IG reported questionable intelligence activity to Joint Staff IG on 8 May 2008 and provided additional information to Mr. Michael Goodroe, ATSD-IO, on 9 May 2008. The subject is an Army O6 who met with foreign nationals at the (b)(2)(7)(e) and discussed classified information on at least one occasion. We received this case through the DoD IG Hotline and referred it to CID Netherlands. The case is still open and we will submit the results to ATSD-IO and DoD Hotline upon completion.
4. Intelligence oversight inspections.
 - a. By intelligence organizations.
 - (1) Activities conducting internal assessments: EUCOM J2, SHAPE Survey, USNIC - Pristina, USNIC-Sarajevo, AFRICOM, Joint Analysis Center, and SOCFUR..
 - (2) Personnel interviewed: 183
 - b. By USEUCOM Inspector General.
 - (1) Activities inspected or assessed: USNIC, Sarajevo
 - (2) Summary of results:
 - (a) Conducted Intelligence Oversight inspection per EUCOM Staff Memorandum 40-2, *Oversight of Intelligence Activities*.

(b)(2)

ECIG

SUBJECT: Intelligence Oversight Report 3rd Quarter, FY06

(b) Primary IO officer is (b)(3)(6) and alternate is (b)(3)(6) USAF. (b)(3)(6) had all appropriate documentation on-hand and easily passed the 17 specific areas of our inspection.

(3) Questionable intelligence activities discovered: N/A

(4) Familiarity of personnel with intelligence oversight requirements: We interviewed USNIC personnel and asked 13 questions pertaining to IO. The only question that individuals did not answer correctly was "How long can you store US person info before determining permanent storage is authorized?"

(5) Adequacy of organization intelligence oversight training program: (b)(3)(6) has one of the best IO programs in the EUCOM theater and we commended him on his program. (b)(3)(6) IO program is in compliance with standards in EUCOM Staff Memorandum 40-2, Oversight of Intelligence Activities.

(6) Corrective actions taken: N/A

5. Changes to intelligence oversight programs (including changes to supporting training programs and the reason for the changes: attach a copy of the directive or policy which directs the change). None.

6. Changes to published directives or policies concerning intelligence, counterintelligence, or intelligence-related activities (attach a copy of the directive or policy): None.

7. Status of ongoing Procedure 13 inquiries: None ongoing.

8. Other matters pertinent to USEUCOM intelligence oversight programs:

a. EUCOM IG will conduct at least one intelligence oversight inspection during 4Q FY06.

b. EUCOM IG will continue to report data from AFRICOM until their program is up and running. EUCOM SSO provided AFRICOM an Intel Oversight "starter book" on 12 June 2006 and discussed the requirements with their division chief. AFRICOM will continue to report through EUCOM until they establish their own command level program. After 1 October 2006 AFRICOM will report directly to the Joint Staff IG.

9. Point of contact is the undersigned at (b)(3)(6) or (b)(3)(6)

(b)(3)(6)

Chief, Assistance & Investigations

ENCLOSURE C - USJFCOM



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

COMMANDEER
 U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND
 1562 WYNSORER AVENUE SUITE 200
 NORFOLK, VA 23501-2448

5240
 J6OIG3
 7 Jul 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE JOINT STAFF

(ATTN: (b)(6))

Subject: U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) Intelligence Oversight Report for the
 3rd Quarter FY-08

1. Illegal or improper activities.

No intelligence activity has been identified which is reasonably believed to be illegal or contrary to Executive Order of Department of Defense instructions concerned with intelligence oversight.

2. Significant Intelligence Oversight activities:

a. USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center conducted refresher IO training for 37 personnel associated with the JWFC intelligence enterprise.

b. The Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) Intelligence Directorate is cooperating with the Federal Bureau of Investigation on the Global Hostage-Taking Research and Analysis Project managed by the FBI's Behavioral Science Unit. Cooperation is within the limits set by DOD 5240.1-R.

3. Results of Intelligence Oversight Inspections:

a. The USJFCOM Inspector General's Office conducted unit command inspections of the Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) in Dahlgren, Virginia from 9-13 June. This inspection included intelligence oversight. JWAC was found to be in compliance with all appropriate regulations and maintained accurate training records for the command's intelligence oversight program.

4. Suggestions for improvement: None

5. USJFCOM IG Intelligence Oversight point of contact is Major T. R. Powledge and can be reached at (757) 836-5941 0 or DSN 836-5941-0.

Timothy R. Powledge
 By Direction

ENCLOSURE D - USNORTHCOM



NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND
AND
UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND



MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE JOINT STAFF
(ATTN: (b)(6) USA)

FROM: NORAD and USNORTHCOM Inspector General

SUBJECT: US NORTHERN COMMAND (USNORTHCOM) Intelligence Oversight
Report for Third Quarter FY08

1. Illegal or Improper Activities

No intelligence activity has been identified which is reasonably believed to be illegal or contrary to Executive Order or Department of Defense directives concerned with Intelligence Oversight for USNORTHCOM or its subordinate joint commands during this quarter.

The possible IO issue mentioned in the last report is still being developed. A separate update was submitted last month through the Joint Staff IG office.

2. Significant Intelligence Oversight Activities

a. The N-NC IG completed an Intelligence Oversight Inspection of JTF-CS and a Staff Assistance Visit of Fleet Forces Command. The organizations were well versed in their duties and responsibilities, understanding constitutional constraints, and the laws and directives which govern the collection, dissemination and storage of sensitive information, especially that data which is constrained by Intelligence Oversight guidance or acquired on non-DOD persons. Their programs are strong, with only minor recommendations for improvement.

The N-NC IG conducted an IO visit to observe Operation Gulf Watch in Corpus Christi, TX on 19 May 2008. IO visitors included representatives from the N-NC IG, ARNORTH IG and SJA, and JTF-N SJA, IG, and J2. The purpose of the visit was to conduct a review and assessment of IO requisite processes/procedures for the implementation of the Counter IED Operations Integration Center (COIC) database system in the JTF-N mission set. The COIC employs a system of systems to query multiple data bases using analysts query profiles to assist in the development of a user developed operating picture. The issue is to ensure analysts' queries do not purposely target US persons, and in the event US person's information is gathered, a process is in place to identify, redact, or delete data that is otherwise not authorized for retention.

b. Training: All N-NC Intelligence Directorates and subordinate commands have conducted initial and refresher training for personnel. The percentage of personnel trained in the command is currently 99%, and all efforts will be made to maintain/increase this level. Due to the differing missions at each subordinate command within N-NC, training tools have been developed at each site that emphasize actual examples of what the individual analyst may see in the course of their day. The ATSD (IO) training tools (CD and website) are also used as needed.

c. Suggestions for Improvement: The N-NC J2 and IG are undergoing an internal review of processes in an attempt to mitigate any future IO related information leaks. Main effort is focused on adding email searches as part of the oversight program, as well as additional emphasis in all training events on safe guarding classified and USPER information.

N-NC is heavily engaged in the upcoming National Conventions. To prepare, the command J2 and IG have been working with the Colorado and Minnesota National Guard to ensure compliance with all IO requirements. To date, several policy letters have been signed between the TAGs of each state delineating the rules and policies that each respective organization will follow. A meeting is currently being planned between ATSD (IO), N-NC, and the CO and MN National Guard during the week of 18-22 August.

3. POC for this report is (b)(6) DSN 692-0989. commercial (719) 554-0989.

//////////////////ORIGINAL SIGNED//////////////////
STEVEN E. ARMSTRONG, Colonel, USAF
Inspector General

ENCLOSURE E - USPACOM



COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
(USPACOM)
CAMP H.M. SMITH, HAWAII 96861-4028

7 July 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Joint Staff, Inspector General, Attn: (b)(6)

Subject: QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT (IO) REPORT,
3rd QUARTER, FY 08

Ref: (a) USCINCPACINST 3800.11A, 31 Jul 96
(b) ASD Memo / December 8, 2006

1. This report provides Intelligence Oversight activity of USPACOM staff and subordinate commands for 3rd Quarter, FY08.
2. Description of violations (law, regulation, or policy during the quarter): None
3. List intelligence oversight inspections including:
 - a. List of organizations – JIATF West, USFK, USFJ, ALCOM, PACOM/JIOC, SOCPAC and JPAC
 - b. Summarize the results or trends – None.
 - c. Comment on questionable intelligence activities discovered - None
 - d. Familiarity of personnel with intelligence oversight requirements – Very high
 - e. Adequacy of organization intelligence oversight training program – Annual training now being conducted via computer with certificates being sent to IO coordinator and new members still receiving in-person indoctrination training
 - f. If inspections revealed deficiencies, note the corrective action taken – Establishment of better tracking methods for training records that include initial and recurring training accomplished associated with date of actual completion.
4. Summarize any COCOM/agency level changes to your intelligence oversight program including changes to supporting training programs and the reason for the changes. Attach a copy of the directive or policy which directs the change: PACOM/J2 is also the Commander of PAC/JIOC, the two merged into one program. All reporting will be done on one report. PACOM directive is being re-worked to incorporate the two organizations. ALCOM: NNCI 14-3 Domestic Imagery was released. It is available from the NORTHCOM website at: <https://halfway.peterson.af.mil/pubs/NNCformpub.htm>
5. Summarize any COCOM/agency level changes to published directives or policies concerning:
 - a. Intelligence – None
 - b. Counterintelligence – None
 - c. Intelligence-related activities – ALCOM instruction 3810.1 Intelligence Oversight was finalized and signed on 01 May 08.

6. Continue to report on the status of ongoing Procedure 15 inquiries and any additional matters pertinent to the agency/COCOM intelligence oversight programs are outlined in Procedure 15. All reporting commands are conducting indoctrination and refresher training.

7. Point of Contact for this report is Mr. David W. Prather, DSN 315-477-5101/5165 or COMM (808) 477-5101/5165


DAVID W. PRATHER
Acting Inspector General

JUL-17-2009 13:54

CS PRINT_GRAPHICS

(b)(2)

P.019

ENCLOSURE F - USSOUTHCOM

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
3511 NW 51ST AVENUE
MIAMI, FL 33172-1217

SCIG

7 July 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT STAFF INSPECTOR GENERAL, ROOM 2C962,
ATTN: JCS DOM (b)(6) JOINT STAFF INSPECTOR GENERAL,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-0300

SUBJECT: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report for the 3rd Quarter 2008

1. (U) Reference DOD Directive 5240.1R, dated December 1982.
2. (U) This report includes input from HQ U.S. Southern Command, Miami, Florida; Joint Task Force Bravo, Soto Cano AB, Honduras; Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; Special Operations Command South, Homestead ARB, Homestead, Florida and Joint Interagency Task Force-South, Truman Annex (NAS), Key West, Florida.
3. (U) United States Southern Command (US SOUTHCOM) - In accordance with the directive the following is provided:
 - a. No intelligence activity that is reasonably believed to be illegal or contrary to Executive Order 12333, DoD 5240.1-R, or USSOUTHCOM Regulation 381-5 has been identified.
 - b. Significant oversight activities.
 - (1) Publications: None.
 - (2) Training: Training notifications go out monthly. It is automated; e-mail is generated at the server level and is sent to all personnel who are required to undergo training during that month.
 - (3) Inspections: None.
 - (4) Files review: None
 - (5) Inquiries: None
 - c. Suggestions for improvement: None.
 - d. Other: None

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SCIG

SUBJECT: Intelligence Oversight Activities Report for the 3rd Quarter 2008

e. Point of contact for this section is: (b)(2)(6)
(b)(2)(6)

4. (U) Joint Task Force Bravo (JTF Bravo) - In accordance with the directive the following is provided:

LAW referenced directive, the following information is provided:

a. No intelligence activity has been conducted which may be reasonably construed as illegal or contrary to Directive Order 12333, DoD directives or US SOUTHCOM regulations.

b. Suggestions for improvement: None

c. Other: None

d. Point of Contact for this memorandum is (b)(2)(3)(6)
(b)(2)(3)(6)

5. (U) Special Operations Command South (SOC SO-J2) - In accordance with the directive the following is provided:

a. No intelligence activity has been identified which is reasonably believed to be illegal or contrary to Executive Order 12333 or DoD directive 5340.1-R.

b. Suggestions for improvement: Continue to provide IO training and current resource materials to designated intelligence personnel on a regular basis.

c. Other: None

d. Point of contact for HQs Special Operations Command South is (b)(2)(6)
(b)(2)(6)

6. (U) Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S J2 CI) - In accordance with the directive the following is provided:

a. No intelligence activity has been identified which is reasonably believed to be illegal or contrary to Executive Order or DoD Directives.

b. Significant oversight activities for this quarter include training of newly arriving personnel assigned to intelligence activities.

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(b)(2)

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SUBJECT: Intelligence Oversight Activities Report for the 3rd Quarter 2008

c. Monitored JIATF-S WebTas Program to insure US person data meets authorized retainability under JIATFS mission allowing for the collection of information regarding international drug trafficking.

d. Reviewed all US persons in WebTas and either eliminated them or left them in because of sustaining information. The database is current with known traffickers and persons with prior criminal history.

e. Point of contact for JIATF- is (b)(2)(6)

(b)(2)(6)

7. (U) Joint Task Force - GTMO, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba - In accordance with the directive the following is provided:

a. No intelligence activity that is reasonably believed to be illegal or contrary to Executive Order 12333, DoD 5240.1-R, or USSOUTHCOM Regulation 551-5 has been identified.

b. Significant oversight activities.

(1) Publications: None.

(2) Training: All JTF personnel receive IO training during initial inprocessing into the JTF.

(3) Files review: None.

(4) Inquiries: None.

c. Suggestions for improvement. None.

d. Point of contact for JTF-GTMO is IG, JTF-GTMO (b)(2)(3)(6)

(b)(2)(3)(6)

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(b)(2)

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SCIG

SUBJECT: Intelligence Oversight Activities Report for the 3rd Quarter 2008

8 Point of Contact at U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND IG's Office is (b)(2)(6)

(b)(2)(6)

(original signed)

(b)(6)

Deputy, Inspector General

CF:

IO Officer, USSOUTHCOM

IO Officer, JTF-Bravo

IO Officer, SOCSO

IO Officer, JIATF-S

Inspector General - GTMO

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JUL-10-2008 13:05

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(b)(2)

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ENCLOSURE G - USSOCOM

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UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
7781 TAMPA POINT BLVD.
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 34621-5723

SOIG

7 July 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL, JOINT STAFF,
ATTN: (b)(3)(6) SOD JOINT STAFF, PENTAGON,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-0300

SUBJECT: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report for 3rd Quarter, FY 2006

1. References:

- a. E.O. 12333, 4 December 1981.
- b. DOD Directive 5240.1, 25 April 1988.
- c. DOD Regulation 5240.1-R, 7 December 1982.
- d. CJCSI 5901.01A, 3 January 2007.

2. No violations of applicable laws, orders, directives, regulations, or DoD policies were reported.

3. During this quarter, there were no intelligence oversight inspections conducted.

4. The USSOCOM SCSO-J2 continues to operate the Intelligence Oversight Training Program through a computer based program. No changes to that program have occurred.

5. There were no changes to any published directives or policies concerning intelligence, counterintelligence or intelligence-related activities during this quarter.

6. Point of contact is (b)(2)(3)(6)

(b)(3)(6)

Captain, U.S. Navy
Inspector General

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ENCLOSURE B - USSTRATCOM



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, NEBRASKA 68113-6000

Reply to:
USSTRATCOM/J005
901 SAC BLVD, STE 1H9
OFFUTT AFB NE 68113-6005

20 Jul 08

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, JOINT STAFF

Subject: Intelligence Oversight (IO) Report for the period of Apr - Jun 2008

1. There were no intelligence, counterintelligence, or intelligence-related violations of law, regulation, or policy in USSTRATCOM this quarter.
2. During this quarter, the IG inspected the IO program at the National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC) Intelligence. There was no questionable intelligence activity in NAOC and the NAOC IO program is excellent. The program is meeting all DoD requirements and all personnel interviewed were well aware of the requirements of the DoD IO program. The IO training program is sound and meets the needs of NAOC intelligence personnel and the DoD.
3. There were no changes to the USSTRATCOM IO programs during this period.
4. There were no changes to USSTRATCOM IO directives or policies concerning intelligence or intelligence-related activities during this period.
5. Mr. Michael Goodroe from Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (OATSD-IO) completed his inspection of the IO program at USSTRATCOM by visiting four subordinate USSTRATCOM commands, JFCC-ISR, JFCC-NW, SCC-WMD, and JTF-GNO during April and May. There were no discrepancies in any of these subordinate command IO programs.

6. If you have any questions concerning this report, please contact the USSTRATCOM POC.

(b)(6)

Deputy Inspector General (b)(2)

(b)(6)

Deputy Inspector General



UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
508 SCOTT DRIVE
SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, ILLINOIS 62275-5357

1 Jul 08

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT STAFF, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

FROM: TCIG

SUBJECT: 3rd QUARTER, FY08, Intelligence Oversight (IO) Inspection Report

1. The USTRANSCOM Inspector General (TCIG) conducted a quarterly review of USTRANSCOM IO programs to assess compliance with Federal laws and national directives regarding intelligence activities. There were no questionable activities or violations reported this quarter.
2. In addition, CAPT Brad Carpenter, USTRANSCOM Inspector General (TCIG), and Mr. Dwight Moore, Chief, Civil and Fiscal Law, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (TCJA), conducted an IO program inspection of the USTRANSCOM Joint Intelligence Operation Center in coordination with the TCJ2 IO Program Monitor on 3 June 2008.
3. The inspection consisted of a review of TCJ2 IO program administration, to include documentation of annual IO training and an evaluation of the effectiveness of that training. As of 3 June 2008, 99% of available TCJ2 personnel had received initial or annual IO refresher training for 2008. Two (2) remaining personnel were scheduled to complete IO training within 90 days following the inspection. All personnel evaluated during the inspection demonstrated a sound understanding of IO policies and the requirements for reporting questionable intelligence activities.
4. There have been no changes to USTRANSCOM IO program activities, directives, or training programs this quarter.
5. Please contact this office at DSN 779-1781, or USTCIG@ustrancom.mil, for additional questions.

//signed//
BRADLEY A. CARPENTER
CAPT. U.S. Navy
Inspector General

cc:
USTRANSCOM/TCJ2, TCJ2-OA (Mr. Kris Campbell)
USTRANSCOM/TCJA-C (Mr. Moore)



~~SECRET//NOFORN//MR~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
US ARMY INSPECTOR GENERAL AGENCY
1700 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20315-1700

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SAIG-IC (381-106)

30 July 2008

[REDACTED]

MEMORANDUM THRU GENERAL COUNSEL ARMY *21 July 2008*

FOR OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT) (ATSD/IO)

SUBJECT: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report (3rd Quarter, Fiscal Year
(FY) 08) (U)

1 (U) REFERENCES

- a (U) Executive Order (EO) 12333, US Intelligence Activities, 4 December 1981, as amended
- b (U) Department of Defense (DoD) Publication 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons, December 1982.
- c (U) DoD Directive 5240.1, DoD Intelligence Activities, 21 August 2007
- d (U) Army Regulation (AR) 381-10, US Army Intelligence Activities, 3 May 2007.
- e (U) Unclassified memorandum, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 8 December 2008, subject: Annual Intelligence Oversight Report to Congress - New Requirement.
- f (U) Unclassified//FOUO memorandum, Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), 23 March 2008, subject: Request for Information and Coordination
- g (U) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ memorandum, Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG), 21 April 2008, subject: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report (2nd Quarter, FY 08) (U).
- h (U) AR 20-1, Inspector General's Activities and Procedures, 1 February 2007.
- i (U) AR 15-6, Procedures for Investigating Officers and Escorts, 30 September 1995

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SAIG-IO

SUBJECT: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report (3rd Quarter, FY 08) (U)

(U) AR 381-20, The Army Counterintelligence Program 15 November 1993

2. (U) SCOPE OF REPORT: In accordance with (LAW) the references listed above, this report provides information on:

a. (U) Questionable Intelligence Activities (QIAs) reported to the Intelligence Oversight Division, US Army Inspector General Agency (SAIG-IO), during 3rd Quarter, FY 2008.

b. (U) Updates to QIAs previously reported.

c. (U) Results of intelligence oversight (IO) inspections and other actions conducted by SAIG-IO during 3rd Quarter, FY 2008.

d. (U) Summary of substantive changes to the Army IO program during 3rd Quarter, FY 2008; and

e. (U) Summary of any changes to intelligence, counterintelligence (CI), and intelligence-related policies during 3rd Quarter, FY 2008.


3. (U) NEW QIA REPORTS: This office received 3 new reports of QIAs during 3rd Quarter, FY 2008.

a. (U) DAIG-08-016:



(2) (U) Current Status - 7 May 2008, the ACICA opened a preliminary investigation (ACIN: PI-08-034-V) into the matter. A final report will be rendered once that investigation is concluded. STATUS: Open.

b. (U) DAIG-08-017:



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
SUBJECT Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report (3rd Quarter, FY 08) (U)

2. (U) Current Status - The [REDACTED] of the 512nd MI Bde is currently investigating the incident STATUS: Open.

o (U) DAIG-08-018:

(1) (U) Background - On 15 May 2008, INSCOM reported two CIAs emanating from the 441st MI Bn, 500th MI Bde Camp Zama Japan, on 28 March 2008 and 1 April 2008 respectively.

(a) (U) On 28 March 2008, one civilian employee of the 441st MI Bn disseminated two Research and Technology Protection (R&TP) Information Reports (RTPIRs) containing US person (USP) information in violation of paragraphs 1-5 (limitations and restrictions) and 4-2.d. (dissemination criteria) AR 381-10. Completion of a commander's inquiry into the issue revealed the following information:



(c) (U) The following corrective actions are planned to mitigate similar future occurrences. First, the [REDACTED] will immediately cease production and dissemination of RTPIRs. Instead, the [REDACTED] will begin production of quarterly R&TP reports to quantify CI support to R&TP, evaluate the effectiveness of "covering agent" support to R&TP projects, and provide other pertinent details concerning the R&TP program. Second, the [REDACTED] 441st MI Bn, will work with the 500th MI Bde [REDACTED] to develop an R&TP standard operating procedure (SOP) for the 500th MI Bde to prevent recurring incidents. Third, the [REDACTED] will work with the 500th MI Bde [REDACTED] Army G2X, INSCOM, and [REDACTED] to revise and approve related CI support plans in order to provide oversight of CI support to the R&TP program in Japan.

(d) (U) On 1 April 2008, a junior Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) assigned to Alpha Company, 441st MI Bn allegedly disseminated a classified RTPIR containing USP information in violation of paragraph 4-2.d. (dissemination criteria), AR 381-10. It is believed that this error was the result of disseminating a RTPIR with the wrong serial number. Nevertheless, completion of a commander's inquiry has resulted in the following corrective actions: First, reports submitted by Alpha Company's Field Offices (FOs) and Resident Offices (ROs) now receive additional oversight from Alpha Company Operations section before dissemination. Second, the NCO and his immediate supervisor have received remedial intelligence oversight training. Third, the RTPIR was recalled. Alpha Company issued a message to all recipients with instructions to delete electronic copies of the report and to destroy hardcopies of the report, if any. Fourth, the NCO and his immediate supervisor were counseled on the intelligence oversight, reporting and dissemination procedures.

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SUBJECT Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report - 3rd Quarter FY 06 (U)

(2) (U) Current Status - This case regarding the two above mentioned incidences was submitted as an initial report by INSCOM. No further action is advocated by this office.
STATUS: Closed.


4. (U) UPDATES ON PREVIOUSLY REPORTED OIAs:

a. (U) DAIG-06-029:

(1) (U) Background - On 23 March 2006, the IG, DOD received an anonymous complaint concerning a MI officer's alleged misconduct in the performance of his intelligence duties while he was assigned to the US Army Task Force (TF) in Kosovo. On 15 June 2006, the IG, DOD referred the case to the US Army Inspector General Agency's (USAIGA) Assistance Director (SAIG-AC). On or about 17 July 2006, after notifying the SAIG-IO, SAIG-AC further referred the case to the TF IG for resolution (SAIG-AC case number: DAIG-06-0192). According to the initial report, the officer allegedly misused his position as a TF MI officer and ICF custodian/agent to make personal trips monthly to Headquarters, US Army Europe (USAREUR), Heidelberg Germany (GM), under the possible guise of recharging the ICF account with USAREUR. It was further alleged that the officer's supervisor would conceal the purpose of the trip(s) as official MI business.

(2) (U) Update - The TF has been directed to report its investigative results to SAIG-AC and SAIG-IO. SAIG-AC will also provide a copy of the investigative results to the DOD IG. A draft DOD Hotline Completion Report (CR), dated 10 October 2006, was provided to this office stating that all of the allegations raised were "NOT SUBSTANTIATED". However, this office referred the draft CR back to the originator on 24 October 2006 requesting that the allegations and leads as defined in the report be re-examined for accuracy and further clarity. A subsequent SAIG-IO Inspector requested an update regarding this case through our Agency's point of contact in SAIG-AC on 3 March 2006 and on 8 June 2006 after determining that this issue had lain dormant for far too long. To date, USAREUR has still not provided a final CR to SAIG-AC to allow proper closure of this procedure as and the DOD Hotline Report. SAIG-IO will seek guidance from the Army's Office of General Counsel during our quarterly reporting period to determine the best course of action in order to close this case. STATUS: Open.

b. (U) DAIG-06-081:





(2) (U) SAIG-IO noted a lack of clarity with regard to approval authority policy and SOP for US Army Intelligence organizations, other than the INSCOM and the 650th MI Group (MRGT), to

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SUBJECT: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report (3rd Quarter, FY 08) (U)

obtain NAIA as currently stated IAW AR 381-10 and the classified memo mentioned above. Additionally, there appears to be the ability for Army intelligence organizations to obtain NAIA through the DNI-CIO's browsing service, which may conflict with required approvals in documents referenced above. SAIG-IO recommended that the Army's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (ODCS) G2 examine the existing policy guidance for obtaining NAIA to ensure consistency and clarity and provide a report of findings. This action was completed 17 December 2007.



(4) (U) Update - On 11 June 2008, SAIG-IO received the results of the USAREUR AR 15-8 investigation into this matter. The AR 15-8 investigation concluded there were significant shortcomings in USAREUR's NAIA policy, and there were no procedures in place to obtain approvals at the required level. The investigator also noted that USAREUR personnel were unaware of this requirement. With regards to the allegations against the USAREUR G2 contract employee, the AR 15-8 investigation substantiated the allegations that the employee did not comply with US Government (USG) policies and regulations on the proper use of USG computer equipment or with AR 381-10 intelligence requirements in that he conducted electronic surveillance of non-US persons abroad without proper authorization, used his personal computer to access the internet for official USG business, and violated Procedure 14, Employee Conduct. Additionally, he violated information assurance requirements of AR 25-2, Information Assurance, 24 October 2007, by using a commercial internet proxy service on his USG computer. The following corrective actions were taken to resolve the above-mentioned allegations:

- a. (U) Corrective actions taken to resolve the violations of para 1-9, AR 381-10:

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SAIG-IO

SUBJECT Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report, 3rd Quarter FY 08 (U)

(1) (U) HQDA, DCS G2 noted the HQDA DCS G2 memo, 13 June 2008, "subject: Non-Attributable Internet Access (NAIA)" had limited approval of NAIA to INSCOM and the ESG MI Group and the 3 May 2007 version of AR 381-10 rescinded ASCC NAIA approval authority and limited it to INSCOM and the ESG MI Group. As a result, HQDA DCS G2 issued a policy memorandum to reinstate ASCC approval authority to grant NAIA on 17 December 2007, and on 20 May 2008, the GC USAREUR approved NAIA within USAREUR for non-INSCOM/ESG MI Group analysis.

(2) (U) USAREUR ensured 100 percent of USAREUR G2 personnel were provided updated intelligence oversight training emphasizing intelligence personnel responsibilities for internet use and NAIA UP of AR 381-10.

(3) (U) On 31 March 2008, USAREUR published a NAIA SOP to implement the process for requesting and approval of NAIA within USAREUR. The SOP includes a training requirement and ensures that NAIA for intelligence personnel will be granted in accordance with AR 381-10.

b. (U) Corrective actions taken to resolve the alleged AR 381-10 violation of the USAREUR G2 contract employee:


(1) (U) The senior members of the employee's supervisory chain were not aware of the employee's conduct; however when his actions were discovered, they took immediate action to include immediate suspension from duties and suspension of his security clearance.

(2) (U) The immediate USG supervisor who failed to maintain appropriate awareness of the USAREUR contract employee's activities and failed to take action was denied his request for an extension to remain in the USAREUR G2.

(3) As a result of the AR 15-6 investigation, the USAREUR G2 contract employee was removed from USAREUR G2 contracts. The employee will be utilized in an information assurance capacity, and will not be used in an intelligence capacity or activity. Credible derogatory information will be provided to the General Clearance Facility for clearance determination.

(4) (U) SAIG-IO considers this matter closed with no further action is anticipated.
STATUS: Closed.

c. (U) DAIG-08-008:



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SUBJECT Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report (3rd Quarter, FY 08) (U)



2. (U) Update - On 15 January 2008, SAIG-10 referred this issue to INSCOM to take appropriate action in order to facilitate an Amity response to the Member of Congress. INSCOM is currently conducting a command investigation into this issue. STATUS: Open.

3. (U) DAIG-08-011:




(2) (U) Update - The [redacted] 602d MIG's AR 15-8 investigation is pending legal review. The AR 15-8 investigation will ascertain the facts and determine appropriate action concerning the accusations against all three individuals. The AR 15-8 also explored the continued viability of the FCA Asslt. STATUS: Open.

5. (U) OTHER INVESTIGATIONS: The below listed QMs are part of CI or Criminal Investigations by the ACICA or the Criminal Investigation Division (CID), respectively. IAW paragraph 15-2 e, AR 381-10, SAIG-10 will provide updates on the following cases once they are closed



SAIG-IO

SUBJECT: Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report - 3rd Quarter FY 08/10.



a. (U) DAIG-08-002: On 12 October 2007, INSCOM released information with regard to alleged federal criminal activity by an Intelligence Soldier (97E-interrogator) assigned to Force Protection Detachment - Columbia. On or about 7 September 2007, a female Colombian citizen reportedly filed an official complaint of statutory rape against the Soldier. The 470th MI Battalion opened a AR 15-6 investigation on 6 October 2007 and informed the Fort Sam Houston CID of the alleged incident. CID opened an investigation (# 03-4-2007-CID044) on 11 October 2007. The 470th suspended its AR 15-6 investigation pending the results of the CID investigation. The Soldier was received to Fort Sam Houston, TX by the 470th MI Battalion. Upon review of the Initial 470th MIB report, [redacted] determined that allegations may violate UCMJ Articles 120 (Carnal Knowledge) and 134 (Indecent Assault). ODCS G2 and INSCOM will submit a final report upon completion of the CID investigation and the Command's review of those findings. STATUS: Open.




6. (U) INSPECTIONS: During the 3rd Quarter, FY 08 SAIG-IO conducted inspections of Army elements located in Hawaii, Japan, and Korea during the period of 25 April 2008 through 15 May 2008. No significant IO violations were discovered. Inspection results have been forwarded to the ACOM IG offices of the units that were inspected.

7. (U) IO PROGRAM CHANGES: Nothing Significant to Report. (NSTR)

8. (U) ITEMS OF INTEREST: NSTR.

9. (U) POINTS OF CONTACT: [redacted]




ALAN W. THRASHER
Major General, USA
Deputy The Inspector General

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SA/G-IC
SUBJECT Quarterly Intelligence Oversight Activities Report 3rd Quarter FY 08: (U)

CF
DCS G2
OTSAG

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
1251 9TH STREET SE
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD DC 20376-0001

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1921
349 N./1003
25 Aug 08

CONFIDENTIAL -- Unclassified upon removal of Enclosure 1.

From: Naval Inspector General (NAVINGEN)
To: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)

Subj: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT (QI) REPORT
END QUARTER CY 2008 (01 APR - 30 JUN 2008)

Ref: (a) Executive Order 12333
(b) DoD Directive S249.1
(c) DoD Regulation S240.1-R
(d) SECNAVINST 3220.3E
(e) DNI and IOB joint memo (insert) of 17 Jul 08
(f) NAVINGEN ltr N2/0661 of 10 May 07
(g) NAVINGEN ltr N2/2416 of 31 Oct 07
(h) NAVINGEN ltr N2/6489 of 06 May 08

Encl: (1) CMC-IGO 3803 of 28 Jul 08 - Supplemental Preliminary Inquiry Update (U)
(2) List of IO Inspections Conducted by Components

1. Per references (a) through (d), this report is submitted for the period 1 April-30 June 2008.
2. During this reporting period, NAVINGEN received no reports from Navy or Marine Corps intelligence components or activities that raise new questions of legality or propriety.

3. Significant activities this quarter:

a. Due to the I WEF incident (see para 4.1. below), the Marine Corps will conduct an assessment of internal controls and vulnerabilities with regard to insider threat of all Marine Corps SCIF's, developing an effective inspection checklist, and providing corrections for noted security deficiencies. This assessment will commence 11 August 2008 and be completed by the end of October.

b. The Secretary of the Navy published a new version of the instruction on Assignment of Responsibilities and Authorities in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAVINST 5430.7E). The assignment of responsibility to the Naval Inspector General with regard to intelligence oversight remains the same. NAVINGEN is charged specifically to "Provide oversight of intelligence and special activities." A significant change in the document is the addition of

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the Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy (DUSN). This document assigns to the DUSN the responsibility to advise the Secretary and Under Secretary of the Navy on intelligence issues, and to supervise, control, and direct the intelligence activities of the Department of the Navy. These instructions are being modified to reflect the new assignment of intelligence oversight responsibilities (previously assigned by the Under Secretary of the Navy) to the DUSN.

2. The DUSN passed to subordinate units the Intelligence Transition Reporting Criteria (ref a) from the Intelligence Oversight Board and the Director of National Intelligence. The anticipated completion revision of DoD Inst 5748.1-R (Procedure Governing the Activities of Non-Intelligence Components That Affect United States Persons) will likely require a revision to SECRETINUST 1970 3E (ref d).

3. Inspections were conducted by the following commands: NAVTHSSEM, Navy Non-Naval Warfare Group (NNWG), Navy Reserve Intelligence Command (NRIC), Naval Original Investigative Service (NOIS), and Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC). The Inspector General of the Marine Corps also conducted 10 inspections during this reporting period. No trends from inspections conducted this quarter were observed. Commands inspected were compliant with policy and regulation. Enclosure (ii) lists inspections conducted.

4. OIG of DoD team commenced an audit of U.S. persons information contained in DoD intelligence databases. Personnel from NAVTHSSEM, NIS and OIG participated. Databases at NCIS HQ and OIG were examined. No results of that audit have been noted.

4. Status of outstanding issues from previous reports

a. Further to refs f, g and h, USMC and NIS continue to investigate the B MRF questionable activity. Enclosure (ii) provides an updated preliminary inquiry report.

b. NAVTHSSEM completed its report to the General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on issues concerning intelligence oversight which were considered but not reported to the Intelligence Oversight Board. Item closed.

c. NAVTHSSEM continues the Procedure 35 inquiry review of an Office of Naval Intelligence Inspector General investigation of a report pertaining to a Foreign Intelligence Sharing Agreement concluded in 1975.

5. Recommendations for improvement to existing IO regulations: None.

A. J. Wynn

A. J. Wynn


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CNSC MEM. NO.
DGC
DNAG
USMC 13



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
DEPUTY NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR MARINE CORPS MATTERS/
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-1775

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


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
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
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
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Distribution List:

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Intelligence Oversight inspections conducted during the
period 01 April - 30 June 2008.

NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
Office of Naval Intelligence

NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
NCIS Northwest Field Office
Human Resources Directorate

COMMANDER, NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE COMMAND
Naval Special Warfare Group TWO

COMMANDER, NAVY NET-CENTRIC WARFARE GROUP
NF NIOC North Island
NR NIOC Pensacola
NE NIOC Camp Parks
NW NIOC Ogden

COMMANDER, NAVAL RESERVE INTELLIGENCE COMMAND
RIA Southeast, Fort Worth, TX
RIA Southeast, Atlanta, GA
RIA Mid-Atlantic, Norfolk, VA

INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE MARINE CORPS/DEPUTY, NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
FOR MARINE CORPS MATTERS
Marine Cryptologic Support Battalion, Fort Meade MD selected units

Enclosure 2

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**USAF Quarterly Report to the Intelligence Oversight (IO) Board
(April-June 2008)**

Refs: ATSLDIO Memo, dated December 8, 2006, Subj: Annual Intelligence Oversight Report to Congress - New Requirement and AFI 14-104, *Oversight of Intelligence Activities*

1. Description of Intelligence, counterintelligence, and intelligence-related activities that violate law, regulation, or policy substantiated during the quarter, as well as any action taken as a result of the violations. None reported.
2. A list of intelligence oversight inspections conducted and a paragraph summarizing the results or trends from those inspections.

a. Higher Headquarters (HHQ) Inspections:

- (1) HQ Air Combat Command (ACC). HQ ACC conducted five IO inspections this quarter with no discrepancies noted:

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> |
|----------------------------------|--------------------|
| 1st Fighter Wing | Langley AFB, VA |
| 3rd Air Support Operations Group | Fort Hood, TX |
| 917th Wing | Barksdale AFB, LA |
| 255th Air Control Squadron | Gulfport, MS |
| 127th Wing | Selfridge ANGB, MI |

- (2) HQ Air Education and Training Command (HQ AETC). HQ AETC conducted two IO inspections this quarter with no discrepancies noted:

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> |
|--------------------|---------------------|
| 314th Airlift Wing | Little Rock AFB, AR |
| 325th Fighter Wing | Tyndall AFB, FL |

- (3) HQ Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Agency (HQ AFISRA). HQ AFISRA conducted nine inspections this quarter, with three units receiving an unsatisfactory rating. AFISRA/IG inspectors evaluated initial and recurring IO training and documentation IAW AFI 14-104. Attachment 3 for the following units:

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> |
|--|--------------------------------|
| 303d Intelligence Squadron (IS) * | Osan AB, South Korea |
| Detachment 2, 18 IS | Osan AB, South Korea |
| Detachment 1, 18 IS | Wright Patterson AFB, OH |
| National Air & Space Intelligence Center | Wright Patterson AFB, OH |
| 488 IS | RAF Mildenhall, United Kingdom |
| 95th Reconnaissance Squadron (RS) ** | RAF Mildenhall, United Kingdom |
| Detachment 2, 25 IS * | RAF Mildenhall, United Kingdom |

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Detachment 4, 18 IS
426th Information Operations Squadron

RAF Feltwell, United Kingdom
Volgoweh AB, Germany

**ACC unit inspected by AF ISRA due to Service Cryptologic Element authority.

*Critical/Non-critical deficiencies noted in the units above included:

The 303 IS did not ensure at least 75 percent of the unit's records of accomplished IO training were available and current as outlined in AFI 14-104, paragraph A3.1.2. The reason for this discrepancy was because the Unit IO monitor relied on an expired records database which was no longer recognized-supported by the unit. **Corrective Action:** The IO monitor has created a unit IO database and matches it against the unit personnel database for accuracy on the regular basis.

The 303 IS did not meet 75 percent minimum requirement for unit members and staff personnel awareness of the circumstances under which intelligence can be collected, retained, and disseminated on US persons. Furthermore, the 303 IS did not meet the 75 percent minimum requirement for unit members and staff personnel awareness of knowledge to report questionable activities and also be aware that using the chain of command is the preferable reporting mechanism, as outlined in AFI 14-104 paragraph A3.2.2, and A3.2.5, respectively. This was due to a lack of sufficient IO training within the unit. **Corrective Action:** The 303 IS has begun a monthly IO tidbit dissemination as well as implemented a monthly random sampling of the squadron to track member's knowledge of IO and focus training accordingly.

The 95 RS did not meet the 75 percent minimum requirement for unit members and staff personnel awareness on the specific procedures and restrictions governing the collection of intelligence on US persons by methods such as electronic surveillance or physical surveillance. In addition, the 95 RS did not meet 75 percent minimum requirement for unit members and staff personnel for required awareness to report questionable activities and also be aware that using the chain of command is the preferable mechanism for reporting those questionable activities, as outlined in AFI 14-104, paragraph A3.2.3, and A3.2.5, respectively. These deficiencies were the result of personnel ill informed of their IO responsibilities. **Corrective Action:** The 95 RS has since taken action to educate unit members on their required knowledge of IO by updating their training with an increased focus on collection techniques and reporting questionable activities.

Detachment 2, 25 IS did not meet 75 percent minimum requirement for unit members and staff personnel for required awareness to report questionable activities and also be aware that using the chain of command is the preferable mechanism for reporting those questionable activities, as outlined in AFI 14-104, paragraph A3.2.5. This was due to unit members requiring further clarity of the chain of command when operational. **Corrective Action:** Detachment 2, 25 IS took immediate action to educate unit members and staff personnel and bolstered IO training with an increased emphasis on reporting questionable activities.

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- (4) HQ Air Force Materiel Command (HQ AFMC). HQ AFMC conducted no IO inspections this quarter.
- (5) HQ Air Force Office of Special Investigations (HQ AFOSI). HQ AFOSI conducted no IO inspections this quarter.
- (6) HQ Air Force Reserve Command (HQ AFRC). HQ AFRC conducted no IO inspections this quarter.
- (7) HQ Air Force Special Operations Command (HQ AFSOC). HQ AFSOC conducted twelve IO inspections this quarter with no discrepancies noted:

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> |
|--|----------------------|
| 720th Special Tactic Group | Hurlburt AFB, FL |
| 24 Special Tactics Squadron | Ft Bragg, NC |
| 21 Special Tactics Squadron | Pope AFB, NC |
| 23 Special Tactics Squadron | Hurlburt Fld, FL |
| 22 Special Tactics Squadron | Mc Coord AFB, WA |
| 10 CWS | Hurlburt Fld, FL |
| 10 CWS Det 5 | Ft Bragg, NC |
| 10 CWS Det 1 | Ft Lewis, WA |
| 1st Special Operations Wing | Hurlburt AFB, FL |
| 193d Special Operations Wing | Hurlburt AFB, FL |
| 125th Special Tactics Squadron, OR ANG | Portland ANGB, OR |
| 123d Special Tactics Squadron, KY ANG | Louisville, ANGB, KY |

- (8) HQ Air Force Space Command (HQ AFSPC). HQ AFSPC conducted two inspections this quarter with no discrepancies noted:

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> |
|------------------------------|------------------|
| 460th Space Wing | Buckley AFB, CO |
| 137th Space Warning Squadron | Greeley ANGS, CO |

- (9) HQ Air Mobility Command (HQ AMC). HQ AMC conducted two inspections this quarter with no discrepancies noted:

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> |
|---|----------------------------|
| 319th Operations Support Squadron (OSS) | Grand Forks AFB ND (18 AF) |
| 123d Operations Support Flight (OSF) | Louisville KY (ANG) |

- (10) HQ Pacific Air Forces (HQ PACAF). HQ PACAF conducted two IO inspections this quarter with no discrepancies noted:

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> |
|-------------|-----------------|
| 8 FW | Kunsan AB, ROK |
| 51 FW | Osan AB, ROK |

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(11) HQ United States Air Forces in Europe (HQ USAFE) HQ USAFE conducted one IO inspection this quarter with no discrepancies noted:

UNIT
31 FW

LOCATION
Aviano, Italy

b. Trends Noted.

ACC inspected units continue using the 15th Intelligence Squadron IO training material, primer and visual aids to augment AFI 14-104, Attachment Three as a guide for training emphasis and inspection preparation. This has resulted in zero critical non-critical deficiencies noted in the units above.

AF ISR Agency noticed a potential trend developing regarding intelligence personnel not aware that they are required to report questionable activities and that using the chain of command is the preferable mechanism for reporting questionable activities; reference AFI 14-104, paragraph A3.2.5. The HQ AF ISR Agency IO Monitor met with an IG inspector and devised an effort to counter this potential trend and has taken appropriate steps to educate AF ISR Agency units.

The AF ISR Agency IO Monitor recently paid staff assistance visits to the 70 IW and 480IW and pointed out some of the approaches they've taken at AF ISR Agency headquarters to ensure better awareness and requested both units employ these when they go on staff assistance visits to their groups and squadrons. These include hand outs/memore card for IO and periodic e-mails from either the commander or IO monitor focusing on a topic of interest. Such as "what is a US Person;" "under what circumstances can we support law enforcement;" Also, "what are questionable activities and how do we report them?"

c. Upcoming Inspections.

(1) HQ ACC has five inspections planned:

UNIT

144th Fighter Wing

23d Wing

110th Fighter Wing

158h Fighter Wing

119th Wing

LOCATION

Fresno, CA

Valdosta, GA

Battle Creek, MI

South Burlington, VT

Fargo, ND

(2) HQ AETC has one inspection planned:

UNIT

178th Fighter Wing (ANG)

LOCATION

Springfield, OH

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(3) HQ AFISR has three inspections planned:

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> |
|---------------------------|------------------|
| 373 Intelligence Group | Misawa AB, Japan |
| 373 Support Squadron | Misawa AB, Japan |
| 301 Intelligence Squadron | Misawa AB, Japan |

(4) HQ AFMC has no inspections planned.

(5) HQ AFOSI has 34 inspections planned:

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 3d Field Investigative Region | Scott AFB, IL |
| AFOSI Detachment 301 | Scott AFB, IL |
| AFOSI Detachment 303 | Travis AFB, CA |
| AFOSI Detachment 303 | OL-A Onizuka AFB, CA |
| AFOSI Detachment 303 | OL-B Los Angeles, CA |
| AFOSI Detachment 305 | McChord AFB, WA |
| AFOSI Detachment 306 | Dover AFB, DE |
| AFOSI Detachment 307 | McGuire AFB, NJ |
| AFOSI Detachment 310 | Charleston AFB, SC |
| AFOSI Detachment 311 | Moody AFB, GA |
| AFOSI Detachment 320 | Grand Forks AFB, ND |
| AFOSI Detachment 320 | OL-A Minneapolis/St Paul IAP, MN |
| AFOSI Detachment 321 | McConnell AFB, KS |
| AFOSI Detachment 322 | Fairchild AFB, WA |
| AFOSI Detachment 323 | MacDill AFB, FL |
| AFOSI Detachment 324 | Pope AFB, NC |
| AFOSI Detachment 340 | MacDill AFB, FL |
| 33d Field Investigative Squadron | Andrews AFB, MD |
| 53 FIS OL-B | Ft Meade, MD |
| AFOSI/PJ | Arlington, VA |
| AFOSI Detachment 701 | Las Vegas, NV |
| AFOSI Detachment 702 | Wright-Patterson AFB, OH |
| AFOSI Detachment 702 | OL-A Marietta, GA |
| AFOSI Detachment 703 | Eglin AFB, FL |
| AFOSI Detachment 703 | OL-A Tucson, AZ |
| AFOSI Detachment 704 | Hanscom AFB, MA |
| AFOSI Detachment 705 | Albuquerque, NM |
| AFOSI Detachment 706 | Washington D.C. |
| AFOSI Detachment 707 | Lancaster, CA |
| AFOSI Detachment 708 | Arlington, VA |
| AFOSI Detachment 708 | OL-A Las Vegas, NV |
| AFOSI Detachment 708 | OL-B Baltimore, MD |
| AFOSI Detachment 709 | Arlington, TX |

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INTELLIGENCE
OVERSIGHT

ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
7200 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-7200

ACTION MEMO

July 10, 2008

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William Dugan, Acting Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Intelligence Oversight)

SUBJECT: Designation for Intelligence Oversight Reporting

- On February 29, 2008, the President signed Executive Order (EO) 13462: President's Intelligence Advisory Board and Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) (at TAB I). EO 13462 replaced EO 12863 and established a role for the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in the Intelligence Oversight reporting process.
- Section 8.B.ii of EO 13462 requires that the head of each executive department with an element of the Intelligence Community designate the office that will submit reports to the Chairman, IOB with copies to the DNI. EO 13462 also requires heads of departments to inform Chairman, IOB and DNI of the designation.
- As previously designated in DoD Directive 5148.11, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD(IO)) continues to be the appropriate conduit for all DoD Intelligence Oversight reporting.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the three notification memoranda to the Chairman, IOB (TAB A), the DNI (TAB B), and DoD (TAB C)

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: (b)(2)(6)



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010



MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

SUBJECT: Designation of Reporting Office for Department of Defense Intelligence Oversight Reporting

Executive Order 13462: President's Intelligence Advisory Board and Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB), signed on February 29, 2008, requires the head of each executive department with Intelligence Community elements to designate the office within their respective organizations that will submit Intelligence Oversight reports to the IOB and to inform the Chairman, IOB and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) of such designation.

The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD(IO)) will continue to be the Department of Defense (DoD) conduit for reporting both immediate and quarterly inputs to the IOB. DoD organizations will continue to submit reports directly to the ATSD(IO) who will provide the reports to the Chairman, IOB with copies for the DNI. The DoD point of contact is William Dugan, Acting ATSD(IO).



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010



MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Designation of Reporting Office for Department of Defense Intelligence Oversight Reporting

Executive Order 13462: President's Intelligence Advisory Board and Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB), signed on February 29, 2008, requires the head of each executive department with Intelligence Community elements to designate the office within their respective organizations that will submit Intelligence Oversight reports to the IOB and to inform the Chairman, IOB and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) of such designation.

The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD(IO)) will continue to be the Department of Defense (DoD) conduit for reporting both immediate and quarterly inputs to the IOB. DoD organizations will continue to submit reports directly to the ATSD(IO) who will provide the reports to the Chairman, IOB with copies for the DNI. The DoD point of contact is William Dugan, Acting ATSD(IO).



ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

7200 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-7200




July 29, 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Intelligence Oversight Reporting Criteria

As you requested, this is to notify you that the Department of Defense (DoD) has received your Intelligence Oversight Reporting Criteria, dated July 17, 2008, and has begun a revision of its internal processes, guidelines, and training for reporting intelligence oversight matters to the IOB and the DNI to comply with your reporting criteria.

The revision will be conducted by the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD(IO)) who will continue to be the DoD conduit for reporting both immediate and quarterly reports to the IOB and DNI. DoD organizations will continue to submit reports directly to the ATSD(IO) who will provide the reports to you.


William Dugan
Acting