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57
Deeply, Contributing Originally
Thinking
An interview with
[l'zamothy
Williamson
Timothvv WILLIAMsoN'
Key
(2009)57K87
Vol.18
Chen Bo"
and
Agnosticism, AnLi-realism, Epistemic Paradox, Philosophy
words:
ef
Language
7L}LeeditoT'
this ,iou・T'naZ
asked
of
.t'or
'in Japan.
article
,Japanese
readeTs
Tne
to
uJT'ite
a
short
fbr'ward
ofthis
how its originat Engtish version
goes back to rrby Oxford days in the summe'r'
to
ea;pZain
It all
pmblished
met
P7ofttssor'
crLeTeBo foT'
the fi・r'st
time in
thc fir'st
lectuT'c
o.f'the
hi7ni'nthe gecttLre
Tz}om
on
the
tvheT-
.Johrt
a
tectur'etheater
Lock;eLectureserties
secoTtcl
was
near
inte7n)ieuJ
came
to be
2008. I
St. Cross CoZlege,
of
delivered.Later,Ifoun[l
.fiooT'at 10 Mar'torb wher'e
Pr'ofkssoT'Ti7n,othy
Hlilliamsonconducted
his senLinar' on philosophy of tanguage, C7ben Bo anci I then
began to discussvario'us kinds ofprobZems
in phigosophyin various pgacesin OuifoT'ct.
Sorrietim,es
our discussiontook place in his o,tfice iTt.
the base・rrbent
o,f'the philosophy
buigdiny.
foculty
On
svmc
other
occasions,
he invited
rne
to his house to
continue
discussionsover the dinner table. When we met and discussedphigosophy, J had
occasions
to lookthroztgh the drojZ's
a'rticle. At first
the drcoft
ofthe present i・nte7"vie・w
was
??,ot so long. [lihen,graduatly, i,tbecame gonger anci cleeper.
PVIien the droftwas
・rrLc
atmDst
co77ipleted,
Che・n Bo told
that thc C7Linesetrunslatio・nuJas c'urrentZy being
prepared, and pToposcd topublish the original English version i・nJa・pan.Through him,
o・ur
l obtained
agreemenl/
I thank both ofthem
fro7nPrcLfessor Wtlli・amson con,cerning itspubtication in Japan.
fortheirkind offkr. Jt is 7ny pZea,sureto see th,eo7tiginal English
puubtishedin thisp'ournal.
This paper is a p'ointcollaboration
versi,on
structured
as
a
guestion
7ihe reader
and
ansu,reT
between tu)o phitosophers.77),eintervi,ew is
session.
CTLenBo asks guestions and U"itliamsoTe
ho?llthe questions are carofully
and
skit4flLlly
aTv'anged,
so that the ansuJers
sometimes
go [leep, and becorTie
.f'ar-reaching.Jt takes the foTTrt・
discussions uJhi・ch occ?tTy'ed
betuJeen one phitosopheT' in OxfoTd an{l thc
ofh,s/pothetical
o,nswers.
wilt
see
Jt consists
o.f questions and
anszc,ers
whi・ch
were
curphilosopheT' in Beby'ing,
with the tacit assumption
that the readers
are pramariZy students,
Tesearchers
otheT'
ried
out
'
"*
Oxibrd Universlt・y
Peking IJniversit・y
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and
Timothy
puhitosophers in
VIJ'
ILLpxMsoN
and
Chi・na.As a
intended to be addressed
contemporary
Chen
resuit,
to
Bo
Vol. 18
there
a fe7v
phTases and
in jmpan. However,
are
not
paTagraphs which
I thought it was oppropriate not to modalv
any puart of the discu,ssions
between the
two philosophers, f hope tt will be u・sojhtl and intellectuatly
sti7nutating
forrea,ders in
Japan as welg to read the interoiewarticle in its original form.it wiZZ he(p thern,to
are
their unders'tanding
make
ofcurrent
readers
issues i・nphilosophy
wider
and
deeper.
Koji Nakatogafvai
TW] has been the Wykeham Professor of
WILLIAMSON
[hereafter
I,ogic at Oxforclsin(te 2000, is a fellowof thc BritishAcaderr]y,a foreignhoiiorary
alld etc. His main
research
meinber
ef the AmericanAcadeiiryo{' Artsalld Seiences,
interestsa,re iiiphilosophical logic,epistemology,
metaphysics
and
philosophy of lan1990), ii}zgueness
guage. He isthe auther of Identitgyand DiscriTrLination(Blac;kwell
1994), KnouJledgeand its LiTTLits
2000), 7"hePhilosophzlofPhiCRoutledge
(Oxford
'
2007) and ovcr 120 articles.
losophy (Blackwell
CHEN BO [hereafter
CB], PhD, Professorof Philosophy at・ PekiiigUniversity,
August, 2008.
China,;academie
visitor at Oxford between August, 2007 and
T'IMOTHY
to
CB: ProfessorTimothy Williamson, I'm very glad te ha\e this opportunity
interviewyou. AsIknow, you arejust two years older than rne, but you are internationally known as a preeminent philosopher: I myself have few Englishpublications,
not
This isso,Ithink,,
because of my laziiiessand stupidity, ...
TW: Certainlynot!
CB: . .,but because of a aseries of complicated
reasons,
Ijust meiitieii itin pass-t
to
m.y
forrnal
inter"view
go
questions,
Chinese philosophers a-d logicialls
kiiow only a little
about
you personally txnd
works
int・roduceyourselfbrieflyto Chinese readso far. Could y.ou first・
your academic
ers?・ For example,
career,
your edueation,
your academie
your main rcsear ¢ h field$,
illg,let me
family,
some
your
amateur
hobbies,
something
]ikethese?
T"r: Although I'm Brit,ish,
I was born in Sweden (in1955),becaiJsemy parent・s
were
teaching English there. Both of them went on to teach English Literature at
OxfoTd University., so I grew up iiLan academie
at・mosphere,
I too was a student, at
Oxford. My firstdegree was in mathematies
and
docphilosophy. My subsequent
toral thesis was on Karl P.opper's idea of verisirnilitude,
according
te which
seientifie
theories can approximat,e
better and better to the truth without
ever being perfeetly
t・rue.After that I taught phi]osoph,y at [Ilrrinity
CollegeDublin f'rom1980 to 1988 and
i
Department
of
Philosophy,
Hokkaido
University
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59
Oxfbrd University from 1988 to 1994. Then I moved
to be Prefessoref Logie and
Metaphysics at・ Edinburgh Universitybeforereturning
to Oxford in my presentpositiou, I've been a visiting
at )v・{IT,
Princ¢ ton, the Austra]ian
professor or researcher
Hon.or
Kong
and
elsewhere.
If I had
NatiorialUnjversity,the Chinese Universityof
to pick out one central theme in my research,
l'd say: the g'ap bet・weenwhat istruc
many
related
and
what
can be known, That has led m.e to jnvest・iga,te
questions,
both technicalones in logic and broad philosophieal questions, such as the nature of
knowledge, As forrny non-acadernic
life,I'm married
to Ana )・Iladenovic,
a pianist
from Belgrade in SerbiaiI was previousiy married
t・oan Italian. I have a daughter
of l5 and
sons of 11 and
3. My work and family lifekeep me pretty busy, I used
often to go wa]king
in the mountains,
but these days,alas, I rarely find time for that,
and
net even
enough
t・ime forthe poetry, iiovels and filmsI love,A,Iyphilosophy, has
to visit count・ries in many, part・sof the world aiid to some
given me the opportunity
extent
t,o see them not just・
as a t,ourist but from the inside, through the intcllig,eiit・
at
t,hephilosophers
liuve been
hosts.
eyes
of
also
as a
CB: Ybu have an aeademic
background in mat・hematics
alld philosophy, you are
in a,n atomic energi.J reseaxch
st・ation
a logician,
a,nd be/Eb/re
universj,t/y you worked
computer
cont・ribution
all this background
programmer. I'd !iketo know what
and
training made
"rho
iity
to your phi!osophical career?
[I]W: Computcr programming provided useFul t・ra,ining
in how to clarify initially
vague
ideasto the point where the.v can be rn,ade formallyprecise. It also gave me
a concrete
understanding
of what・
was
meant/
by models of the mjnd as a comput・er.
From mathematics
of problems, alld
I learntthe importance of thinking about the abstract structure
of discerningsuch
st]ruct・ure by means
of an elegantly
suitable
con'fra/mework.
I learnt,such as probabilit・ytheory, is
ceptual
Some of t・hemat・hernatics
directlyre!cvant to philosophy. Logic was strongly emphasized
in my undergraduate
bridge between
philosoph/y degre¢ bccaus¢ it provides the widest and most natural
mathema,tics
and
philosophy. pt・Iyphilosophical trainiiigwas firmlyiiithe tradition
of analytic
that there isa fbrmal aspect
philosophy. Altogether,iVs not surprising
work,
even
though
most
of
it is iiot purely formal. At
to most of my philosophical
itssimplest, the fbrmai method
involves giving inibrinal arguinents
forsomc 'Fbxmally
expressed
formallyfrom those premises t・oa collclusion,
premises, and then arguing
These structural ways of thinking are useful in more ways than many philosophers realize. For inst,ance,
they.make itmuch easier to firid
counterexamples
to philosophical
t・heories,,hecause one can werk
out in advance
what・
sorts of struct}ire
itmust have.
I was lucky in the qualityof my training. Oxford was (audis) a wonder'ful
place t,o
my
tutor
for
all
hour
once
study
I met
philosophy. As an undergraduate
philosophy
a week,
either
by,myself or with one other student/; I had to write an essay for each
on. Similarll,r,
one has long individua] supervimeeting,
whic:h
the tuLer commented
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WiLLIAMsoN
Timothy
sioiis
on
written
one's
knows that
every
werk
sentenee
as
a
graduate
olle writ・es
Chen Bo
able
VbL18
There isno place te hide: one
student.
bc
must
and
to withstand
scrutiny.
Besides
my
fellow-students
weTe
very. able, and I learntmueh
firomtalking
them.
I
also
eonfidence
to
fbllow
through
original
ideas from
philosophy
gained
working
in a world centre of philosoph.v,where many
of t,heteachers had international reputatlons
ancl were
makin.g
new
contrjbutioiis
as it were
in l'ro.
nt ef my
eyes,
teachers, many
of my
with
"Xhen I was a student, the leadersof Oxford philosophy and logicincludedMichael
Dummett, Peter Str,awson,A.J. Ayer, Dana Scott,Gareth Evans, John )icDoweil,
John Mackie, R,M. Hare, Derek Parfitand CrispinVLrright.
I thought: I can do that
too.
CB: Whell you
'Ybu
called.
in 2005,
said
programme
That stntement
was
coinmen.ts
on
studied
pursued
Oxford, yeu
at
"The
struck
exc
me,
¢
met,
the
[`Davidsonic
sses of the manner
and
still strike
me,
in which
as an
abuse
boom" as it was
the Davidsonian
of
formalization."
is quite bold, directand irnpressive.
I'd iiketo know your
Darvridson's
phi]osophy.
TVSJ: Donald Davidson
made
irnpor'tantcontributions
to
current
philosophy,In the 1960s
he played a major role in stirnulatillg research
of more
const・ructive
aDd
systernatic kinds,and
acted
a,s a corrective
to some
aspects
of t・heinfluence of
ullfortunate
Wittgensteinand ordinary language philo$ophy. In the philosophy of mind, Davidsen
emphastzed
the causal significance of explanatioiis
of act・ioii in terms of the agellt's
beliefsand desires.In the philosophy of lai!guage,he laid out the programme of
truth-condit.ionalsemantics,
by which the truth-conditions of all sentences of the Iancontributions
of their censtituent
guage can be derivedfrornthe seinantic
phrases,
which
requires
a systematic
approach
to the language as a whole.
He also made
many
highlyinfluent・ial
contributions
on specific problems: for instance, his account
of selfdecept・ion
a,nd his t・heory of adverbs,
according
t・owhich
most
sentences
are
implicitly talking
about
events.
so that itwas often
to quest,ionsor objectiens,
he
clliptical,
On the
unclear
negativc
side,
hisclaims
what
his
style
or arguments
was
too
were.
cryptic
and
In response
dcfensive and guarded,doii)glittle
to articulaie his
ideasmore explieitly, Uiifbrtunately,
some
allowed
him
to
people
get away with that
by treating him liko a guru, [I]hereNN[as also a tendency in the Davidsenian tradition
to laydown founal constraints
in a dogmatic rather than experim.ental
spii'it,, without
the justification
forthem, and to use these const・raints
to dismiss
properly explaining
legitimate theoretic:al alternatlvcs.
It・didn't help t・hatsom,e of the people involved
had a rather amateur
knowledge of logie
lit・tle
Iearningisa dangerous thing").
was
(L`A
i,oofar towards a refusal of the scientifie spirit
obstructed
progress. Fortunately, that quasi-religiousattitude
much
less coTnmon
now
than it once was,
tThis
all went
--
60
of opei]
debate, and
tewards Davldson is
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CB: Let
61
1990).
(Blackwell
go to your firstbook, ldentityand Discrimination
Could you out・line the most importaiit ideas prese]t,ed in this book?
us
TVVi: I was
oi'
interested in situations
identity for objects
properties. For example,
same
species
ifand only
of
can't
up
you might
ifthey call
a
want・
to
can
suc ¢ essfully
group Z -
interbreed with
large genet・icdifference.By
say
in which
cases
contrast,
want・ed
criterion
successfuIIy
are
successfully
to
one
kind, but the
some
doesn'twork, because there
with
group Y, and group Y
where
to give a part・tcularcriterion
didn't have the right logical
that two groups of
interbreed with each
group X
interbreed
sevei"a]
can
with
sma]1
identitycan't
animals
other.
successfully
are the
But that,
illt・erbreed
greup Z, but group X
genetic differencescan add
have tliatstructure; it has
to be transitive,in the logicalsense: if U i$ idcnt・icalwith V, and V isidentical
with
W, then it Iogica]lyfo11ovtTs
that U is identical
with
VLi.By set-theoretic
reasoning,
I showed
that there is always a
approximation'
to the original criterion t・hat,
Cbest
unlike
the
of
this problem
(inthe
te
original
say
one,
(ioeshave the logicalpruperties required foridentity. One can
best thingi. I was part・icularlyinterestedi
in instances
fa,11
back to that
therefore
where
cognitive
sense,
that two
objects
`next
the problematic original criterion was one of indiscriminability
not
in the purely logical
soiise), For instance,
you might want
have t・hesame apparen,t colour if and oiily ifthe subject
can't
That・doesn'twork because there are some
cases
in which t・he subject can't sce any difference
in colour between A alld B, aiid
can't see airy difference
in colour between B and C, but cau see a difference in colour
between A and C
several
invisiblc
differcnces
caii add
up to a visible
difference.
Again, genuine identitycan't have that llon-trallsitive structure, I applied the saine
st・ructural approach
to those cases, but I also became interested
in the nature of indiscriminability
itself.I arguecl t・hat the indiscriiriinability.
of t・wo t・hings is a matter
of the subject
not・ being ab]e to know that they are not identicaL I showed
hew to
form,alize
that idea and cxplore itslogicalconsequences
rigorously,
within
the setting
of epistemic
logic.A!though ldentityand Discrimination is similar to my later books
in quality of argument,
it doesn'treach tl.Lesort of clear, siinple conclusions
they do.
As a result, i,thas had lessimpact t,hallthey hEwe, although
there has been a recent
increaseof interestin itsaccount ef indiscriminability,
see
any
difference
between thcm in colour.
CB: Leibniz'sprinciples includeboth the indiscriminabilityof identicalsand the
`indiscriminability'
ident・it,y
of indiscriminables (where
is understood
in the legical
sellse); in syinbels
tos,ether:
VmVy(x
It seems
to
mathematics,
his childhood,
me
=
y
e
that these principles only
and
are
youth,
VF(Fm
e
to
apply
inapplicableto cross-tcmporal
middle
age,
and
old
age:
and
Fy))
abstract
object・s,
are
also
objects
like numbers
in
person across
inapp}icable to physical
such
as a
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Timothy
objeets
which
exist
X・VILLmMsoN
Chen Bo
XVhat do you think
.
cross-spatially.
and
the identityof t・hoseobjects in space
to think
that
about;
this? How to determine
time?
and
TVSJ':
The indiscrirninability
of identieals
applies
tlon. It・is tempting
child, the very
same
Vel. 18
to
the old man
although
all objects
without
is ident・icalwith
excep-
the young'
human being,thcy arc discrimjnablebecause the old rnall has
IIowever,such apparent
preperties that the young boy lacks, such as being wrinkled.
The old man
dissolveonce one isaccurate
about・
time references.
counter-exainples
but he
is identicalwith the person who was a y.oung boy; the old mall is wrinkled
when
he was a young boy, It js fa].se
that the youiig boy st・ill is
wasn't wrinkled
unwrinkled,
DaVid Wiggins has given an excellcnt dcfence of t・he indiscriminability
these 1ines. The spatial case is similar.
One and the same river,
of identicals alollg
the Thames, ruiis t・hroiigh0xforcland then L・onden;itiswide iiiLondon but not in
Oxford. Thus different,parts uf the same river have incompatible properties -- the
through London iswide, the st・retch of the Thames
stretc;h of the Thames that・runs
but that does not imply a count,erexample
that ruiis through Oxford isnot wide
The identity of indiscrirninablesalso applies to
to the indiscriminabilityof identic;als.
all objects
without
exception,
provided t・hatthe preperty F cari be iion-qualitative,
which
applies
for example
the p,roperty
of being one ancl t,hesame
person as II/bd,
to
to Ted but iiot t・o his twin brother Fred. Leibniz himselfintended a restriction
of two exactly
sirnilar
whic:h
apply to both or neither
purely qualitat・iveproperties,
objects,
but I assume
t・hat y.uu havc in mincl the more
liberalmodern
iiiterpret・ation
the
modern
interpret・ation,
both
are
of the identity
of indiscriminables,
On
principles
iogical trut・hs. Of course, logicby itselfcan't t・ellus whether
object・s we
encounter
identical;we need tu know something
about
in different
times
places at differenL
the
qre
too!
objects
CB: Ip your
view
rance:
non-heap,
strange
it? Why
there really
hut we
and
everi
and
T"": The
straightfoi"ward.
book, 1,ligw,eness
1994), you developan epistemic
(Routledge
on which
vagueness
is an epistemic
phenom ¢ non, a kind of ignois a specific grain of salld whose reinova,1 turns thc heap into a
secoi)d
'vagueness,
of
a
cannot
know
which
lit,tle
bitwild,
arguihent
It,cembines
it is. It
Collldyou
how do you develep
centra]
enc
such
clarify
a, concept,ion
fOr epistemicism
standard
souiLds
quite
counter-intnitive,
your position and
fer
arguinents
of vagueness?
about
vagueness
priiiciples of classical
is very
logic and
simple
semairkics
and
with
that・almost everyone
accepts.
For instance, 10,OOO grains
make
a heap but O graiiismake
a heap, It fo11ows by quite ordillary
logicalor mathis
a
natural
llumber
n,
between
10,OOO and
einatical
rcasoni,ng
that t,here
soiiiewhere
O, such t・hatn+1 gra・indoes not Tnake a 1]eap but ri grains do not make
a hea,p.By
a standard
t,ruth,w・e ean acld that it is true to say of n+1
princ:iple about
common
seTise observations
`That,
62
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grains
many
it is obvious
that
t・herelevant・ vague
niake
a heap
and
by
heapT and
iri,ake a
a numeral
of
n
tThat
grains do
many
63
not
ma,ke
a
heap'. But
That is,
' in
idea how to findeut which
number
js n.
sense
of
w・e arc in no position to know that n+].
grains
n graiiis
do not make
a heap, where
the number
n
is ident・ified
have
we
no
`heap:,
such
as
Cunsequerit,ly,
the
`29'.
extensioll
of
Lheap'
has
a
boimdary
that bozindaryis, This solves
t・heancient
position to know where
sorites paradox: it appears
that subt,racting
a
justone grain from a heap stil], ],eaves
heapl therefore if you subtract grains one by one from a heap of 10,OOO grains there
is st,ill a heap vLihen no gra,ills
are
Ieit. The principle i/ha,tsubtracting
a grain from
but
we
are
no
leavesa heap isfalse,but,we cannot know exactly
to be a heap. Of course,
many
dislikethat eoncliision,
philosophers
it by ehanging
classical
or somehow
principles of logicor msemantics
application, That uilwillingness to apply. basicprinciples as soon
a
heap
in
alway, s
encount・ered
strikes
the suggested
ine
inethodologically
alternatives
non-classica].
includinganalogues
to the
as
as
i""ie"r
of
the
a result
of
I
unsound.
introduce
all sorts
also
of
there
when
ceased
try to
and
restrict・iiig
their
diMcukies are
as
in the book that
difficulties
of their own,
epistemicisrn.
I came
show
their proponeiits use against
Identity an(l Disc・r'iTrLination.
writ・ing
In explaining
ones
airoid
the
discriininabilit.v,
I bad forrnula,ted
what
I call thc
for error
which
says roughly
t・hatin erder to know in a givell situatien
princip],e',
you must
avoid
faJseb ¢ liefin relevantly, similar situations, otherwise
in the original
your belieL'
sit・uatioll is too unsafe
to constitute
knowledge. I reaiized tha,t the margin
forerror
how,
also explain
have sharp boundaries,
principle would
given that vague concepts
we
still cannot
know wh,ere they arc, Such an explanation
makes
epistemicism
a
mueh
mere attractive theoretica] optiell. Those ideascame
to mc latein Lhe writing
of Jdentityand
Discrimination. My conception
of vagueness
was
st・il] evolviiig
as I
I did r]ot arrive at a full.v・
wroi,e, and
unt・il shortly
after
gencral t・heoryof epistemicisrn
noll-t,rans/itivit・y
it was
`inargin
of
pubiished.
CBi "F'hat・
isthe problem
fuzzy logic and supervaluationism
vagueness
classical
What diMcultiesdo many-valued
logic,
haye to fac:ewhen
they arc used to deal with
dees
paradox (the
paradox of the heap)? VLrhatadvant,ages
and the sorites
logic have whcn
it is used
T"J: The
vague
of vagueness?
words
central
and
problein
c:oncepts,
includingscientific
wor'ds
inelude
concepts;
thein?
ishow logicand
of vagueness
which
and
to deal with
virtually
although
semantics
should
all eur
words
and
t・hey are
ofteii
inore
treat
concepts
precise than
perfectly precise. Does elassieal logicur
need
or restricted
in some way
for vaguelless?
lf so, how?
semantics
to be modified
for
lii]guist・s
Ifnot, why not? The problem arises not, enly fbr philosophers but・also
and
for computer
scientists-who
sNTant to buildcomput,ers
that can communicate
with
thrce of the most・ popular
human beings in vague language, Ybu have mentioncd
every,
da"・'words
and
cencept・s,
they. are not
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1]imothy WTLLIAMsoN
noii-classical
Many-valued
approaches.
inst・ance,they imply that
ceunted
a
Vol. 18
fuz7y logicschange
alld
contradictions
Chen Bo
it says
that
heap:can be true
a・iiexistential
claim
such
as
classical
is a
[There
t・rueinstance --
having a
which
it is true
without
logie,Fbr
they should be
elassical
be half-truc, whereas
can
definitely
false.Supervaluationismcha,nges
as
stallce,
and
semantics,
For in-
point for being
cut-off
to supervaluation-
according
is a, cut-off point for being a
heap', Classicallogicautoma,tically
avoids
A major
these diMculties.
difi,culty
for
most
non-classical
approaches
ishigher-ordervagueness:
bordeirline
cases
of borderline cases and so on. I argue in the book that they do not・ treat it in a satisfact・ory
way.
By contrast, epistemicism
can
easily
handle higher-ordervagucness,
which
it
interprets as limits on our knowledge about
limits on our knowledge. The margin
for
error prillciplepredicts exactly
such higher-order
Iimitsen knowledge. C}assieallogic
ists there is ne
is standardly,
point
used
of
in logic, mathemat,ics
Philosopherswbe
suceessfuI,
reject
CThat
to say
it bas proved immensely
the diMcultiesthat・such a rcvi-
science,
and
it raTely
where
confront
fbr science. In Englishthere isa saying "A bad workman
blames his
tools". Classlca]
logic and semantics
are
amongst
the philosophical workman's
iools.
sien
would
make
CB: As Dumunett
stat・e
of
the
world
that
bivalencepresupposes
says,
makes
some
sentences
some
true
and
kind
oth
¢
rs
of
realism:
it is the
false. But the intu-
itionists
and
Dummett claim that truth issome kind of epistemic
coricept
concerned
w'ith provability
or knowability; it is ollly when
we are able (at
least in pr'inciple)
to
know
t・he
truth-values
of
a
sentence
that
we
can
say
it
is
either
true
or
l'alse,
prove gr
about
such
claims?
What is your eomment
t・hattruth is any kind of epistemic
collcept.
There is no cont,radictiorL
whatseever
in the hypothcsis that there are truths about
our world
that nobody
eould
ever be in a pesit・iento know. The fimdamental nature
of truth and falsity
is eaptured
in Aristotle's
principle that to say of what isthat itis
T"i: I
cornpletely
thc cla,im
reject
of what・
is not that it is,is fa,lse,
while
to say of what・ is that it is,or ot' what
is llot that it is not, ist,rue. For instance,the proposition that itisraining istrue if
and
only ifitisrailling.
That equivalence
isstated iriterms none of which scems to
be epistemic.
The burden of proof lson thDse who claiiii that truth is an epistemic
not・, or
coiicept:
iiisome
alLer
sense.
all, on
・Wheii
their own
ene
view,
analyses
if their view
attempt・s
is t/ruethen it should
be provable
for am epistemic
conception
Iiituitienistic
mathema,tics,
developed by
t,o argue
truth, they turn out te be ver}r・ weak.
Brrouwer as an alternative
to classical mathemaLies
on the basis of' his rejection
of
bivalence,has remained
utterly
inarginal
withiii mathematics.
Attempts to extelld
tihe intuitionisticprogrammc
to the nat・ural sciences have had no serious success.
of
CB: It is said that yeur epistemic
view
picion by maiiy people, but has become a
of vagiieness
relativcly
was
mainstream
at
firstviewcd
view,
at
vgTith
sus-
lca,stquite
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Decply, ContributingOriginally
'lihinking
infiuentialolle
By the waty', what
in
an
on
research
standards
or
vagueness
criteria
paradox. Is that true?
the sorites
and
shou]d
65
we
Ibllowto
evaluate
phi],osophical
a
work?・
T"i: Before I.published iiZLyueness,
epistcmicism
was
as too
generally regarded
crazy
to be takcn seriously, even theugh a fow people had defended lessdeveloped
versions
of it. My initial
hope for the book was that・itwould forcepeople to take
the vicw seriously.
It has certainly
had t・hat cffect: episteinieism
is now
normally
list・ed
as one of the main
theories of vagueness.
In view of itssimple, classical nature,
theory of vaguencss,
yoimger philosophers regard it as the de/Fault
be rejected oiily, on the basisof strong
arguments.
Illgeneral terins,the
bc foIlowedin evaluating
a philosophical work
or not so differentfrom
the
many
iiisome
one
to
to
standards
evaluatiiig
a
Are therevalid arguments
foritfroinpremises that we
can
indepenclent]y evaluate
as true? Are there val,id arguments
from it te con ¢ lusions
'"Jhat
that we can independer]tl,yevaluate
as false?
cxplanat・ory
power does it have?
Does ithave the in'Lrinsie
virtues
of simpiicity
and
elegance?
work
other
science,
CB: I'd also likete know why metaphor
porary philosophy oE' language.Could you
TP"i: Metaphor
and
porary sernantics
the
meanin.v.
constituellt
cxplanation
encoulltered
of
a
censtituLes
phi,losophy o-anguage,
linguistic expressien
humans:
iiitalking
ability
such
a
hoi/t,opi,c
in eontern-
that t・o me?
tntriguing challenge
to understand
befbre (fbT
instance, in reading
of
explaiii
t・oa
compositionality,
central
idea in contem-
according
is builtout
coinplex
(asI mentioned
words
aii
has become
about
new
of the meanings
Davidson). '[I]hatis the
sentepces
which
they
out
of
standard
have
never.
this interview), provided tha,tthcy are
words,
Metaphor doesn'twork
previously encountered
IfI tellyou that・ aii actor is a pea,cock,you can prebably work
out wbat
mind, evcii though itisisn'tsimply
the result ot' combining
t,hemeanings
eonstructed
t・owhich
of its
like t,ha,t.
I have in
my
words
had. Some people have postulateda special kiiidof iiietaphorical
meaning
to explain the phenomenon.
Perhaps the most importa,iitsiiigle work
on the t・opic
is an article by Donald Davidson, whom
you were asking about before,in whjch he
argues
that there isno such thing as metaphorical
ineaning;
there are justt・heliteral
rnea-ings
of the expressions,
and
the effects they ¢ ausc in hearers,Although hisview
may
be too simple, it provides a beautifu11},
simple
and
powerfu] basis for further
discussien
ef the topic,
already
CB: In 1997, you were e]ected as fellowof the BritishAcademy. I guess rnany
Chinese readers arc TJot c].ear what kind of academic
institut・ionthe British Academy
is. XVha,t difference is there bet,ween the Royal Society Emd it? Could y,ou explain
somethillg
te them?
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"・'II,LmMsoNand
66
Chen Bo
Vb].18
The Royal Societywas fbunded iitLondon in 1660 as a seientific society alld
for t・henatural sciences and mathematics.
became t・hena,t・ienal academy tt in Brit/ain
Since it did llot cover the humaiiitiesand social sciences, the BritishAcademy was
Philosophy, including
for those axeas,
founded in 1902 to be the national academy,
philosophieal logic,fallswithin the domain of the British Academy rather than the
a feIlowof the
Royal Society.On ar"erage one British philosopher a year is elected
BritishAeademy. It is not a job,justaii hoiiour.The BritishAcademy distributes
represent・s
the humanitiesaiid social sc]iences in llavarious
serts of research
a,cademies
in ot・her
on
educat・i.on
and research,
cooperates
with national
tienal dcbat/・es
'IiW:
.ffrant,
countries,
and
se on.
'
Professor
of
Logjc,
Uiiiversity
of
OxCB: In 2000, you were appointed
Wykehain
is
irriportant.
XVho are your predecessoys, could you
ford.I think this positioll quite
briefiy.
iiiti'oduce
them te Cltinesereaders?
What duties do you haMe on this position?
who
is best kllown for his
My, immedlat・e predecessor was Dayid "J'iggins,
and
un
ethies.
Before "]iggills,
the
work
on the logicand
metaplrysics
of iident・ity
his famous books
chair was
hcld by Michael Dummctt, the defenderof anti-realism;
Philosophy ofMathematics, 7}'?tth
and
include l7b'ege:
PhiZosophy ofl]anyuage,Fleeger
TW:
and
The Seas of Language, AlOtheT Enigm,as, 1ihe Logicai Basis ofAcletaphysics
are much
closer
iny philosophical views
though Dummett was one of riry supervisors,
to those of VLriggills,
but they, are both important figures,Dummet,t's predecessor was
A,J,Aycr,whose book Language, 7V'uthand Logic played a major role in introducing
The teaching dutiesof the chair mainly
concern
logicalpesitivisrrit・oBrit・aill.
gradwit・h
me; I try, to teach
their doctoraldisserta・tions
uate students. A・Iany are writing
of rigour
aiid precision by.criticizing
what
them how to work to the higheststandards
they write Iilleby line and discussing with thern the best ways to developtheir ideas,
1 am very, proud of my st・udents, who have gone on to t・each philosoplty theinselves
in rnany parts of the world. I also give classes, in which I sometiines
present・my own
well
as the students
recent
research.
The point of such classes isfor the professor as
to learn from t・hediscussion.A,Iostof my artic].es ancl books were presented at olle
tiine or another
in graduate classes aild benefitedfrem that process.Akhough iiry,
to plopr a, leadership
pi'ofessorshipis not・ tm administrative
position,I am expected
but・ b}.rservillg
on committ/ees
role
in the Philosophy Faculty,not justby example
amd
so on. Of eourse
there are ot・her established
ehairs
of philosophy
in Oxford too,
Davics ls Professor
CurrentlyJohn Broeme is T'refessorof Moral Philosophy, rvrart・in
'[I]erence
is
of
]Vletaphysics
and
Irwin
of Mental Philosophy,
Hawtborne
Professor
is ProfessoT of the History of PhilosophLv.
.lohn
CB: Also in 2000, you published yoi.irthird book, KnoiL,ledge and itsLin'bits
highly evaluat,ed
It seenis
that/ 1,his book has been warm].y
wdcomed
and
(Oxford),
.
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Thinking
by English philosophieal
to
epist,emology
circles.
out
come
ContributingOrt.ginally
Deeply,
since
I read
1975".
such
[[It
comrnents
sets
t,heagcnda
decade ancl beyond." IX,1'v.
question is the $imilar.
t,hernost important ideas preser]ted iu this beok?/
next
T"[: 'The
of
knowledge.
slogan
of
the book is
as a starting-poinL
on
as
67
it is "t,he
best book in
for epistenhology
forthe
Could you
as abovc:
first'. Itadvocates
'`Knowlcdge
the basis of which
to
summarize
t,akillg
t,he notion
undorstand
ot・her
rather
than vjce versa. Knowledge is a mental
phenomena,, such as belief,
its own right. Be]iefis a more
state
that・ aspires to the
generalmental
cognitive
in
state
condition
knowledge. Successfulbeliefconstitutes
knowledgel belieft/hat・doesn't coiist・it・ut・e
'The
knowle{ige is defective.
llotjon
of
knowledge can't be analysed
in inore basie
terms, It is also used to explain the nat,uxc of justification,
evidcnce
and
assertion,
The view is a radical
form of externalism,
because it implies that・our mest basiccegnitive
states
are constituted
by relatioiis to oiir external environmont.
Fof'instance,
the cat sat・ oii the mat only ifthe eat really did sit oii the mat
.. .,
yuu kitow t,hat,
of
CB: As far as I know, there isa
tradition
rooted-deeply.
to which knowled.creimplics truth. Quincadvocates
"the
tic t,heory about
web
of belief,i',
and
a]so insistsoii a
he even dees not accept
knowledge as a legitimate concept,
according
What is your opillion
t・herebetween your conceptien
edge.
TXNJ:Surel>,.
the
one
claims
to know
common
that there is iio
c]aiming
true beliefwarrantcdto vary. ing degrees,Although
t・hingas kno"Tledge,
but only
I wil,1 not・ go that far,I have some
such
that knowledge implies truth,
from Plato'sTheatetu,s
an eiripirical and holisquiteradica,1 fallibilism;
sympat,hy
"Ji'th
him. I strongly
is against
the commoii-sense
about/ t・histopic? "]hat similariti/gs
of knowledge
and
Quine's?
which
sense
view
suspect・
the thesis
collcept・
of
and
kiiow].-
(iiffbreiices
are
isthat knowledge does eutail trut・h.Ifsome-
thaL Beijing is in Japan, his
c;lai,rn is
justfalse. He
may
t,hillk
that・he knows that,]]eijing
is in,Japaii,but he iswroug; he doesn'treally, know that
Beijillgis in Japan, for Beijillgis rtot in Japan, He i's igriora,ntof his own
ignorance
as he
just,
is ignorantof geography. I don't think Quinewould disagreewith that.
Even radical
fallibilists
can agree
tha,tknowledge enLai]s t・ruth,since we are fallible
about
whet・her
we know. Even ext,reme
skept,ics
agree
that knowledge'enLa,i]s truth,
and
often
nssume
as
much
in t・heir argmnentsi
suc/h
skeptics
are
radical
fallibilist・s.
Actually,it is quite dificultt・ogiv・ean accura,te, precise defi,nition
of
but
itisat least clear that the clairn that knowledge ent・ails trut・hisperfectly coinpatible
`fallibilism',
the claiin that there is no ge'neraltype of
infallible.I acc;ept
both claims.
If yon are happy
with
subject
with
degrees,tl'teiiy,ou could define
t,oa high degree,and knowledge in i,hatsense would
ranted
view
t・ovarying
I defend in Knowledge
the
concept・
about
of
wliich
we
are
true beliefwar-
t・ruebel{efwarranted
autematically
ent,ail truth. The
itsLirllits
is t・hat tlie concept
of knowledge is at leasi/・
`knowledge'
aTid
mat・ter
as
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68
Timothy
basic as the concepts
knowledge was based on
as
of
WmT,TAMsoN
belief and
Chen Bo
and
distastefbr the
Quine's
warrant.
uiiwarranted
Vbl.18
reductionist
opposing
basic than knowledge
other
factors.I'm also
tries to
and
them?
against
that takes beliefas
epistemology
knowledge in terms
analyse
in this book?
/Eight
rnore
belief,truth
of
and
doct・rinesof internalism, which
give
te
internal
stat・es
of
tbe
subject
as
the
st・arting-poiiit
primacy
purely.
Another target is skepticism,
the arguments
for whieh presuppose
episternological
of epistemology.
some
long tradition in
a
of
assumptions,
CB: "[hat are the oppostte doctrinesxsrith whom
you illtendto
How do you object・ them? Could you outlinc >rour main arguments
T"・i: I'm
concept
arguing
against
relat・ed
internalism even when
they appear
not to. One argument・
against
tbe
to analyse
knowleclge in tcrms of bcliefisthat Iit,erally
hundreds of attempts
sort
atternpt
of
have been
far alld all of them have fai]edl
either
there ar:e counterexamplcs
it
The
view
I
defend
explains
why
to the analysis or
is circular,
all such attempts
must
fail.I also argue that thc motivation
foriiiterna]ismhas becn the assumptiou
that there isa core of ment・al
states t・hatare luminous in the sense
that whenever
one
made
so
is in. For instance, internaliststend
t・othink that・thc state of being in pain isluminous,in that whenever
one isin pain,
one is in aposition
to know that one is in paiu Iargue that the only. Iuminous states
is ii].
them,
arc
oue
is in
trivial,in the
non-trivial
state,
to know ghat
aposition
isalways
is in paiiiat
that
beeause one
scnse
one
being in pain isa non-Iuminous
state:
to know that one is in pa,in. Thus the
CB: The
argument
agaillst
. Could yeu
your
epistemology.
thaL
epistemology
cannot
[I]NV:The
anti-lurninesity
lead you iiitoor
one
one
in them. For instance,pain isa
or never
times
some
importan't functiooin
forus? ",'hy do you claim
to haye an
this argumerit
again
be fullyoperationalized?
argumeiit
Could you
considers
a
forthat briefi,y?
ar.crue
process by
which
slow
the mental
st・ate in questioll. For inst・ance,
an
comfortab!e.
I
gradually.diminishes unt,il you are coinpletely
out
o/F
pain very
of the margin
forerror principle to show that
if the state is not luminous; for instancc, at
near
the botmdary between being iiipain
such
a
seme
er
not
retajriing
obeys
one
aecepts
by that I
epistemology,
a]']d re,iccting
t',herule
one
epiastemicism
mea,n
are
use
a versioii
not
about
operational
is in a poslt/ionto know t,hat one
-68
excruciating
being in pain, there must come a
in a position te know that you are in pain.
and
vagueness.
turi]irig it into the evaluation
beliefisthat
challges
gradual transition can occur bitly
int/ermediate stage in the precess,
point at which you are in pain but are not
Thus the argurnents
of Knowtedge
and
itsLimits are closely
'l/?zguaness.
og.v
However, I show
of
t・hatone can accept, the
whether
1]herefore
Tiot・ at・ others.
be in pain without・ being in a position
foriiiternalismis unsound.
ca,n
inotivatioii
luminesityseems
clarify
and
in the
isobeyirig
to the epistemol-
related
anti-luminosity
As for
of
sciise
argument
`operationalixirig'
for
rules
that
acquiring,
whenever
iL.Of coursc
olle
that "[ould
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Thinki]]g Deep]y, Contributing Origiiia]ly
make
the
obeyiiig
a,nti-luminosity
of
the sort
be
can't
a
luminous
argument,
that
state,
it is not a trivialstate, But, by the
are ]uminous. Thus there are no st・at・es
requires.
Conscquently,epistemo]ogy
and
trivialstates
only
operat・ionalized
episteinology
operationalized.
CB: Ybu
bols,E
kind of
rule
69
=:
identit'}i
a person:s total evidence
K. Such
evidcnce
a concept
of evidence
still objectix,e
TNV: 1 regard
E
K
=
or
seerns
subjective?
as a very
natural,
wiLh
the person knows, tn sym-
what
to be quite counter-intuit・ive.
Could it still serve us t,oreach
common
sense
view
Is this
trut・h?
It does
of evidence.
independent of your persenal situation, for what
yeur evidence
you know
-depeiidson your personal situat・ion
forinstance, on what events you happened to
turn y.our head and noticc
yesterday, But equally it,does not iiiake evidence
purely
±
subjective,
forsince knowledge requires truth, E
K ensures that all evidence
conmake
not
(although all
Thus evidellce eaii serve us t・o
truths are esiidence).
reach
truths. The probabilit・y.
of truths we
don't know can be evaluated
on t・hebasis
of the truths we do kno"r.Of course
we are not always
in a position to know whether
'al,wai}Js
something
const・itutcs
in a position to
part of our ev・idencc, since we are not
kllow whether
we know it,but the anti-luminosity
argument
shows
that that is not
sists
an
oE t,ruths
net
to E
objection
=
K,
since
whatever
evidence
is,the
state
of
having
a specified
wil] not・ be luminous. Therefore,one can haye
pr:opositionas part of one's evidence
that propositioll
as part of o'ne's evidence
without
being in a positioii
t,o kncfiN that
itispart of one's evidcnce.
VLJemust simpl}r learnto livewit・h that fact.
CB: Does
conceptien
new
of
knowledge have
logieV.Wliat is y.our coniments
log'ic?Could you predict tlieprospccts of
velopment
of epistcmic
epistemic
TW:
of
your
On
the
new
conception
epist・emic logic known
as
of
`positive
kiiowledge,
we
implications for the de-
any
tb,ccurreiit・
logic?
about
epistemic
should
introspection' and
reject
Lnegative
situat・ion
of
two of the axioms
introspection'.ex-
in drast・ically,
idealizedsit・uatiolls. Positiveintrospect・ion
says that ifyou know
semethin.ff,
you kllow that you know it. Negative introspection says that ifyou don't
know tiomething,
know it.The fouiiderof formal epistemic
},/euknow that you don't・
legic,Jaakko Hintikka, already gave decisive reasons
ibr rejecting negative
introspectioll,but he hold on to positive intrespection, I argue iiiKno・wlectyeand its L'ivLits
that pesitlve iiitrospectioufails,
by a special case of the anti-luminosity
argumeiit.
Much of the i'ecent development,of epistemic
logichas been in cornputer
science
and
knowledge,where
theoretical econoTnics,
both of which are concerned
with eommon
knows that everybody,
kllows it,and so
everybody
knows something,
and
everybedy,
on. Epistemic ]ogicturns out to be a good setting
fbrthe study of comm, on knowlcept
edge.
[I]'he
discussion there tends to be teclinically
]'La'ive.
I'm trying t,oencourage
epistemologists
to
but philosophiea].ly
sophisLicated
make
more
use
of epist・emic
logjc
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Timothv
X・V'IT,T,IAMsoN
and
Chan Bo
1loL,18
The techniciallshave much to learii
problems in which they are interested.
from philosophers and vice versa, but it,is hard to overcome
the barriers to commurtication
t・hatari$e from differences
in t・rainingand goals.
to
model
CB: Ybu
are
that the gap between trut・h and knowabi!iLyis pervasivelthci'e
truths. Could you sum,merize
forthem here? Could
your arguments
about
the paradox of the surprise
and
cxamination
the
your vicws
claim
unknowable
you
also
outline
paradox
knowability,
?
of
rl-VLJ'
Epjstemicisrn
:
about・
t,heaiiti-luminosity
ueness,
vas,
argumellt
the rejecbe known,
and
tien of posj,tivcand negative
introspectionall involve truths that cannot
at least in the relevant
circumstances.
",Iy treatrrientof the surprise
exarnination
is
similar,
An example
isa teacher who infbrms her pupils t・hat on justone
paradox
day in the }rearthe.v wi,]]be given an e.xaminat・ion, and that,t,heywill did kiiow oii the
morning
of the exainination
that it will be that day. The argumcrit, ist・hatit camiot
be on t]ie Iast day, sinee t・hat morning
they will know that it is the only day. Iefl,
fbr thc
Thcreforethey can rule out an examination
on the lastday in
advance.
[f]hereforet,he day before the last is the last possibility.But・ t・hen they can
,ruleout an examination
on that da:}r
too, by an analogous
axgument.
By conCinuing
in advance
the ar.ffument
for each day of the year, the pupils can
that there
eannot
But clearly, ifthe teacheris trustworthy the pupils can
be such an argument.
know in advaiice t・hat・there will be a surprise examination.
[Vhe solution is to see
t・hateven if one knows something
t,oday, it・
does not, fbllowthat one knows toda}rthat
one will still know ittomorrow.
[[ihis
issimpiy to reject a diachronicversion of thc
positiveintrespection principle. In Knowledge and ・itsLimit,s I also defend against
recent
criticisms
a very
differellt
sort of argument.
for the existei]ee of unknoxyable
examination.
tprove'
The
devised by the logician Alonzo Church. It goes "ke this.
There are uuknown
trut・hs.Fer instance, either t・he number
of books in my
oMce
on
1,stJalluary 2{}08 was edd or it,was even.
Since I did not count・ thcn, and too much
'which it was.
has changcd
sillce,, nobody
will ever know
Thus either it is all always
truths.
argument
was
unknown
truth t・hat the riumber
that the
number
ways
a,re
unknowll,
known
one
unknown
books
ef
them by counting
t・rut・hthat the rnimbeJ'
alway.
always
after
odd
al]
unknown
know
always
sincc
unknown
that the number
an
knowledge requires
(since
odd
alwa>・.s
or
caTL allew
itis an always unkno"rn
truth
t・hatthose truths, alt・hough
al-
1,stJanuary 2008
en
the books in
of
books was
that the nnmber
that it was
was
We
t,ruth t・hat the
s unknown
knew t,hatitxnras an
would
thercby know
books
evell.
unknowable,
noa/
of
that it is aii
be
of
wa,s
my・
However, if it is all
then it is an unknowable
of
books was
truth that the number
of
of
books
books
ullknown
t・ruLh;the
wholc
was
odd,
which
case
trut・ht・hat the
number
odd,
argument
uses
was
7'eductio
t,ruth
odd,
they
it would
case
iiiwhich
was
always
fbrif any. body
odd,
beoks
of
in
have
could
room.
odd,
number
semebody
they
of
ad
would
books
not
not
was
abs?srd?tm).
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Thinking Deeply, Coiitributing
Originally
Simi,larly,
ifitis an
always
trut,ht・hatthe
unlcnowii
number
of
71
books
vLras everi,
t,hen
it is an unknowable
truth that it is an alwa}・rs uiiknown
truth that the llumber
of
books was even. [I]hus,eitherway,
there is an miknowable
trTith,Anti-realists
often
call the argument
the paradox of knowabj]ity,
because thcy don't likethe conclusion.
In m;vr view it,
isnot a paradox, justa surprisingly, neat argument
from true premises
to
a
true
conclusion,
CB: I'm
that your epistemicism
about
vagueness
and your claiin that there
are unknowable
truths will imply semc
kinds of agnosticism,
which
means
that we
are imable
i,nprineiple t・o know some
parts or some aspects of the world, c,g,, in bor'What
derlille
cases.
de you think? Is agnosticism
acceptable
or not in episternology?
If vcs, how to draw out the boulldarvbetween the knowablc and t,heunkiiowable?
afraid
-tt
o
My
TW:
cept
we
t・hatthere
can
know -
priiiciples
I see
do
views
are
entail
truths
some
even
]imit・
¢ d
a
about
te
iio objectioii
such
In some
very
clear
introspect・ionjustmeans
cisrn,
can't
cases
sorne
us
and
we
cases
when
we
kllow,we
don't know, Arguments
unknowabi,lity,
ac-
truths
mally
epistemologica}
know that "re know;
ever know t・hat・
we know. Similarly,
that・ when
we
don't know, we can't
can't
that
always
when
we
don't know,
we
can't
I have been explaining
give
the locatioiiof the boundary bet"Jecii
knowability
show
t,ha,t
we
cannot
have coinplete
knowledge of
about
but thoy
its location. That7s what
also
must
provided that it does not turn into skept,iknow that we kno"i things. The failureol' positive
we
that
knowledge
considerable
we
agnosticism,
mean
that when
we know, we can:t
the failurcof ne.crative !ntrospection
justmeans
always
know that we don't know; it does not mea,n
know that
which
the possibilityuf knowledge in others,
and
it does rLot
ever
to
aceording
know. Howes,er, there are
there is a god. Thc vcry same
we
whether
ignorance in
explain
agnosticism,
also
of
the
sorts
lifeisIike,
CB: In 2007, Lyou were elect・ed as foreignhonorary member
of the Amerieaii
Academy, of Artsand Sciences,Congratulat・ions!
I'dliketo kllow,how many members
from philosophy are in that academy?
Take some eminent, philosophcrs forexample?
TW:
The AAAS
tion, although
combines
philosophers
seem
Philosophy and ReligiousStudiesinto a singl ¢ secto be in the ma.jority, . The section has almost
150
probably include all the inost distiiiguishedsenior
American members,
who
would
American philosophers. Tbe sect・ion has 28 foreignhoncn'arymembers
ft'omeutside
t・heUSA, as a separate
category,
of whom
a quarter are Oxford
philosophers.The
other
six are Michael Dummett, Anthony Kenny, Leszek Kolakowsld, Dcrek Parfit,
David Peanrsand David Wiggins,
CB: Recent].y I read y,our new
2e07),Ithink it is quite important,
book
original
The Philosophy
and
also
o,1'Phitosophy
provocative.
ButIalso
(BIackwell
find it is
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Tiinothvv WILLIAMsoN
aiid
Cheii Bo
Vol. 18
bccause itstopies and ideasa,rc quit,encw,
Could you summarize
quitecomplica,ted.
importa]t・ ideas presented in this book?
not
to
so easy
most
read
and
TVLJ': Olle inain
chair
understand,
some
quitetechiiical, its arguments
chapters
method
likethose
of
tho book is to defend the lcgitirn
acy
philosophical
of
of
aiin
the natural
reasoning
the traditionalarm-
ph!losophers don't do
most
but
scicnces
of
deingso by
without
the
experiments
the subjeet
restricting
I regard philosophy as part of our
philosophy to our own words or concepts,
overall
atteTnpt
to llndcrstand
the world in gencral and our place in itin particulai.
Thus the question arises: how can armchair
met・hods
give us knowledge of the world
is encouraging,
outside
our armchairs?・
The example
of mathematics
because ituses
matter
of
knowledge of the world. I argue that the
armchair
methods
of philosophy are developinents
eut of quite ordinary
methods
of
of the werld.
For instance, the thought experirnents
that give tts
gainingknowled.ffe
armc;hair
knowledge
special
but still givesus
methods
about
cases
and
possibilit,y
ability to evaluate
metaphysical
ofour
ordinaJry
metaphysieal
uecessity
counterfactual
arc
just
really
(such
conditionals
a$
tl'C'
to the party, itwould
have been a feLilure;)
by,a disciplined
use
of the irnagination. It is wroiig
to thiiik of thc imaginat・ion as primarily a rcalm
of
role.
log,ie
capriciious
fantasy.
Naturally,
also plaiysan
; itp}ays a significant cogni.tive
ten people
oiily
important
role
had
valuable
come
in armchair
In defendingarmchair
reasening,
that the resu].ts of scicntific
experiments
are nQver
relcvant
I don't mean
methods,
te philosophical questions,
justthat
in principle does not undermine
the use uf arrnchair
meththeirrelevance
ods too. After all, even
though
the resuks
of experiments
are in principle re]evant・
to mathematical
methodology
is still usually t・he most
questionstoo, an armchair
eMcient
way
of dec:iding
a inathemat・ic:al
question. For seme philosophiqal questioiis
-- fbr instance, abeut
time - experimental
perception or the phllosophy of space
results
are important,
For others - for iristance,about
- they do not help.
between possibilityand existence
relation
the philosophy
of
and
the
turn,' are past and
CB: Ybn assert that t・he
turn' and the
should
be leftbehind,because they are wrong,
Could y・ou explain these claims
more
'"Jhy
c:learly?・ For example,
what
is the linguistic
turll? Wha,t is the concept・ual
turll?
`Iinguistic
are
of,
t,hey wrong?
For
wliat,
`conceptual
Especially.
, coul(l
reasons?
you
explain
the
rnore
aboutness
language and theuglit・?
TW:
The linguisticturn
tury phllosopl]y.It wa,s the
by,which
languagebecame
was
one
ofthc
in both
movemeiit,
the central
most
important features ef twentieth
analytic
largcly of
applying
the competence
one
has
structure
-- the
as
itssubject
of our
cen-
traditions,
non-analytic
fbcusof philosophy,eithcr
-- the idea that philosephy studies the llature and
or of artificial formal languages --or as itsmethod
consists
and
actual
mat・ter
language
idea that philosophizing
as a speaker
of such
a
languas.e.
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Thinking Deeply, Conti'lbuting Originally
Philosopherssuch as Ludwig Witt・g'enstein,
Rudolf Carnap
'tutediverse
t・urn on the analytic
paradigms of the lillguistic
regarded
as
subst・itutes
an
exainple
the
on
non-analyt・ic
thought for language and
guisti¢ turn, and
of thought over
the
turn is similar
in the central
conceptual
concepts
who
much
as
the priority of the
advocat・ed
language in philosophy
of
analysis
J.L. Austineonstiside; Derrida might
be
and
forwerds
the conceptual
turn as
mental
P,eter Strawson represeRted
these likeGareth Evans
In his later work,
The
side.
73
but
role.
the linanalysis
further,
Both the linguis-
went・
be interpretedas defencesof the armchair
methodolos.y
of philosophyby restricting thc ambitions
of philosophyto what・ we still have in the
armchair:
our ewn
language and tbought, The linguistic
turn alld t,he conceptual
turn are elosely
related
because a very pertillellt
foatureof both words and concepts
is their illtentionality,
their aboutness,
in t・hesense of their c:apacity to refer. For
t・icand
turns
cor]eeptual
instance, both the
One
of
`water'
for writing
motivation
inuch
word
can
and
the book
t,othe substance
water.
that it has become increasingly clear that
the concept
was
water
philosophy doesn'tfiteither
:space'
primarily study the words
t・urn. For instanee,philosophers
`tiine'
and
or the concepts
space
analytic
recent
physic:sdo
iiot
refer
themi they primarlly,study
space
and t・imethemselves,
Nor do t,hcy priinarily rely on their eompetencc
simply,
as
'They
speakers
of a language or possessors of the concepts
in their methodology,
rely
the
results
of
thought
I
on
both
experiments
and of physicists'experimeiit・s.
argue
and
tlme, or eveii what・
words
or concepts
shoulcl
through detailedcase-study
that t]'iere
isa
concepts
even
in parts of philosophy where
replacc
similar
shift of
fbcusaway
from words and
do not, play sucl] a
physicalcxperiinent・s
role.
CB: 1'dliketo know what herit・age
Lhe last・
century
Anglo-American philosophy,
left/
us. XVhat advantages
and
disadvantageshas aiialytic: phi]osophy hadteVLrhatcan
we learnfiromit,whet・her
good or bad? XNrouldyou still likeLo cal] yourself an analytjc
philosopher,
sin
¢
e
you
are
a
philosopher
and
at
thc same
time
a
]ogician?
T"i: I'm happy Lo call rx'i:y'selfan analytie philosopher,,be ¢ ause lt is obviDus that
I beloiigto t・hattraditioii.But・I den't・regard the labelas very iiifbrmative,since
t,here is se rnuch
both
counL
other.
Of
as
variety
analytic
course,
the tradition, For iiistanee,"[ittgeiisteinand Quine
firom each
philesophers, even though thcy are very Ctiffbrent,
within
not・ all analyLic
American philosophers
philosophers
are
Anglo-American
and
not
all
Anglo-
Severalgiants of early analytic philosophy, such
as Gottlob FTege and
Carnap, were Geririall.Some Anglo-Ainer'ican
philesophers are
not tee many).
One
post-modernists rather than analytic philosophers (fortunatc]y,,
of the inost iinportEmt,developinents
jn recellt/ decades has beeiithe rapid gi:owth of
are
anal}・'tic.
Eng!ish-spcaking
philosophers in China. I
It seeins to mc t・hatt・hereare
t・ensionbetween being a, phi]osophilosophy have been logicians.
analytic philosophy outside
countries,
now
see
ph,er
many
and
analytic
being a logieian,Many leadersof
no
analytic
73
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74
s・tseN
1]tmothy VgJiLLrix
Chen
and
Bo
Vbl. 18
Their logicis just・
the morc
Nrege,Russell,Quineand Kripke are obvious exalliples.
formal part of their philesophy. At one time rriaiiy analytic philosophers regarded
the
of analyt,ic
As I've said, I regard
linguistic
turn as the eentra,1 achievement
philosophy.
it as a mistake.
Nevertheless,
when
one looksback over the past century,
one sees that
analytic
philosophy over that period has lefta huge positive heritage,and not one
that・requires us to scaie down the arnbitioiis of phllosophy in the wa}r the linguistic
turn
the
and
but・I'11single
properly,
rize
First,the
turn did, T.he achievement
conceptual
refinement
of
la,nguage with
ordinary
fu11ypresented
spirit
Second, t・heapp!ieation
and
to
sys.tematically
the
evaluate
clearly
validity
few
of
itsmost
that
of
the
semanties
semantic
articulated
counter-exampleas
encourages
the
the
stylc
sense
of
and
to
varied
surnmaaspects,
in plajn
arguments,
care-
imaginat/ive theughr
discussionof disagreements.
lallguages to refleet more deeply,
reasoned
natural
philosophical theses,
of
structure
and
important methodological
reasoning'
of philosophical
theses,,explieitly
stat・ed
common
of
on
a
a st・raightforward
evidence,
in a
experimcnts,
out
is too huge
informalphilosophical
arguments
more
and
accurately
thereby.
is
(this
in the linguistic
instrumentalrole for semantics, not・ the primary, role envisaged
t・urn).Third, the use ef formal languagesand logicsto provide more precise versiolls
an
somet・imes
under
judiciously
philusophical theses and to elicit their conscquences,
idealized assumptions,
Pburth,t・heintegrationof scientific knowledge -- forinstanee,
refiectioii
from mathematics,
physics, biology aud psychology - into philosophical
on the relevant
dornains,None of thesc trends originated
wit・h analytic
philosophy - of
they have a!l been taken
findearly versions of a]1 of them in Aristotle birt・
significantly
furtherin anal,v. tic philosophy than evei' befbre.Of course, we also have
specific
knowledge from the past hundred years ef analyt・ic
a huge Iegacy of more
but also of the variety of theoret,ica]opphilosophy, not, justof logicand semantics
in
respect
various
t・hedificultiesthose
tions available
of
philosophical problems and
options
face.
one
can
CB: Ybu
subject-matter,
sophical
some
with
wor!d,
and
methodolegy,
exceptionalism,
shadows
of
that
science,
Quine's
about
philosophy
'Yt)u
are
as
a,11 the
isn't reducible
over
other
and
explain
the
relation
right;
that
with,
exception
criteria
et
also
detect
that phi]bsophy is eontinuous
belongs to the totality of our knewledge of the
similarity
and
between philosophy
view
or even
of
difference
bet・weenyour position
and
seiences?
in regarding
philosophy is similar to Quine's
overlapping,
other
branches of human knowl-
dlflerence is t・hat Quineprivileges natuTal
science,
branches of lmma,n knowledge. He tends to
to
I can
his cenception
e.g,
what
my
fl]omt・he other sciences,
illits
al. Ybu fiercely
criticize
philo-
that it is false.
Er'om your arguments
argue
philosophy
continuous
[[iherriain
evaluation
views,
Quine's
Could you
etc.
TW:
edge.
that philosophy is no
argue
fundamental physics. I'm
much
physics,
]-eject aiiyt・hiiig that
lessreduct/ionist, than Quine.R/}r
especialiy
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ThinkiTig Deep]y, Contributing' Original]}r
instance, he thinks
that
the concepts
ultima,tely
75
beliei'
and
desireare
of
not
scient,ig
ically respectable,
because they can't be expressed
irithe language of phy.sies, But
the lan,guage of phy・sics was
never
intended to be a tmiversal
languagc, It rna;yr be
the best language for the questions of physies, and physicists are the best pcople to
ask about the answers
to these questions, but not all good quest・ioiisare questions of
physics; other words
there are things of a
are
for other
lleeded
questions, If physics does
kind (such
as inusical
not
ent・ail
that・
itdoes not followthat
physics eiitails that there are not things of that kiiid,I take our kllowledgeof history
and matheinatics
justas seriously as I take our knowledge of physics, Philosophytoo
has sorne limitedautonomy:
itcan't ignoreconsidera,tions
frornphysics, but・it・inust
also
pay duc
rcspect
CB: Ybu
seem
cert,ain
to armchair
is subst.`mLial,
Could you
different・
ways.
TX4r: According to
form
one
point forphilosophy, consisLs
we
ask
must
physically
one
Lhat/meaning
means
if it is true
analytic
of
simply
rnetaphysical
four cate.vo' ries:
or
Ytm
also
truths
are
true in
not
cl.early?
1,helinguistic or
conceptual
truths. To
or conceptual
in thcm. Roughly speaktng,
in v・irtue of its meanillg.
analyt・icity;
metaphysical,
that, analyt,icity
argue
synthetic
tihisrnore
explain
of ana3ytic
`analytic'
what
of clariE'ying
way
reasoiiing.
to divideanalyticit,y intothree
and
modal
or Fregean analyticities.
not
insubstantial; analytic truths and
epistemological,
radically
syinphollies)
a sentence
turn, the
starting
such
c]aims
assess
a sentence
is meta",lodal aiia'ly,
ticityis
ismodal-analytic
ifl)aving'
beiiig true, I allow that sorne t,mit,hs,
such
as truths of logic
-analytic,
rriathemat・ics,
and
are modally,
but deny that this shows that the}r cxprcss
something
epistemolo.ffica]].y
or metaphysicall},
obvious
or iiisubst・antial,
for it is not
gi,venthat
mologicall},
argue
necessitat・es
analytic
t・hatno
ieal error
isepistemologically
grounds;even
sentence
di$seiit
on
aiways
themselvcs are in any
if assenting
to it is a necessary
truths
necessary,
does
amount
or
are
because a
of
understanding
eompetent
is episteit. I
speaker
can
ifthosc ground$ are mistakcn,,
a theorett,olingui$ticincompetence. A scntence
isFtegc-analyt・ic
logicaltruth. I allow that some
truths, such
as
truths of
if it is synonymous
"rith a
logic,are Frege-analytic, but again
logicaltr'uths
colldition
sentenee
theoretical
not
epistemologically
ana,lytic,
A
wab・r obvious.
metaphysically
in any
way
deny that
ebvious
obvious,
that they,express
irisubst・antial,
for it is not
this shows
or'
In genera], ideasof
of philosophy in th ¢
analy,
ticor
something
given that
cunceptual
t,ruth
do not i,1]uminatethe epistemology
way
that proponents of the
linguistic
or concep. tual turn had hoped, They do not deflat・e
or explain
philosopbic:al
knowledge. [[b argue that supposedly
analytic
and
supposedly
synthetic
trut,hsare
way,
I show
true in the same
that their trut,h is handled in a uniform
way
by logic
and
seinantics,
the two discipliiies
most
conce:ned
with
the concept
of truth,
CB: I'd like t,o know your
view
of
t,he nature
of
logica]tr'uth:Vklhatis a・ logical
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Tirnot,hy WILmAMsoN
trutli? Are logicaltruths a priorl and
Ifso, how to revise it? Do you agree
logic? XVhy?
TW: In my
and
In
necessary?
with
Chen
Bo
what
revisionism
lvbl. 18
Is IQgic revisablc?
sense?
fallibilism
in philosophy
or
of
the PolishIogician Alft'ed
Tarski gave the best accou]t
of Iogical truth, It,is ene
that has proved immensely fruitfu1
in the developinentof logicas
a discipline
ever the past sevei!ty
of the
years, First we dividet-hebasic vocabulary
`non-logical'.
ClogicaY
]anguage into the `logical'
and
the
The
vocabulary,
typically
consists
of words
specific
structural
every
such
words
`is',
as
in a
is st・ructural,
meaning
more
view,
such
fbatures.Then
`not',
that
sense
as
`or:,
be
can
iu
;know'
`all',
made
epistemic
Csome',
m,ore
meanirig
of
that is,words
precise;wc
!ogic if we
isa legicaltruth ifalld
a sentence
interpretation that keeps the
the interpretation
of the
[and',
t・he logicalwords
arc
only
may
also
whosc
include
interestediiitheir
if it is true
fixed but may
urider
vary
Ibr installce,
grass is green then grass is
`grass'
`green'
truth because it is true no rn a,tter what
and
refer to,
green; isa logical
`if'.
`Gra,ss
of
isgreen' it・self
is a truth but not a logical
truth,
s.iventhe fixedmeaning
`grass'
`green'
since itisfalse
under
the interpretation on which
refers
to water and
t・o
ot・her
words.
`If
dry things. The factthat t,hisdefinition
is freeof epistemological
or modal
elements
is an advanLage,
l)ecauseit makes the concept
of logical truth pure alld simple,
as
a basic coiiceptual
instrument should
be. The inclusion of sueh epistemelogical
or
modal
elements
in thc definition
of logicaltruth would
have severely obstructed
the
dev¢ lopment ef modern
logie.It is not aut・ornatic that logicalt,ruthsin Tarski's sellse
are a priori or necessary.
Some people don't li]{e
that consequence
but I see nothing
wrong
with
it.Logic is in some sense c:ollcerned with formal or structural
matters;
why
shou].d it be t・aken for granted that・ the answers
to such questions are a priori or
necessary?・
XVhen we restrict ourselves to the most elernentary
branches of logic,such
as propositional logi
¢
we ean a:gue on more
specific grounds that all logical
truths
in Tarski'ssense are a priori,in the scnse of provable, and metaphysically
necessary.
For lesselementary
branches of logic,the picture changes.
Ybr instance,second-order
loglc which allows us to generalize intopredicate position as well as into namc position
is esseiriially ineomplete; it is impossible to have a fbrmal systcm
o/E proofs
in which
all and
only t,helogical
trutlisof sec:ond-order
logicare provable, Thus one
cannot
expect
all iogicaltruths of second-order
logicto be knowable a priori. In
-- the logicofpossibility
modaHogic
and iiecessity
one can inc].udea special
operator
analogous
to
in tcmse logic,and doing so results
in Iogicaltruths
that don't express
necessary
truths. An example
is
is raining
if and enly if it is
actually
raining',
which
is a lo.ifical
truth because it ist・ruello matter
hew
is lnterpretedi but it is iaot a nec:essary
trut・h becailse it cou]d have rained
even
if
it is not raining
in the actual woi'ld.
Tarski's conception
of logical
truth nicely fits
fa11ibilism
about
logic,since it makes
it possible in priiicipleto think t・hata seiLtence
,
`actually',
`now;
`It
`raining'
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77
is a logicaltruth when in factit isn't. In practice we know what the logiealtrut,hs
are iiielementary
loglc,justas know what the arithmetical
truths are iiielemcntary
arithmetic.
Iiilesswell understood
branches of logic, wc may
wel! be in error
about
whether
some
our opinparticular sentollce is a logica}trut・h,and be forcedto revise
ion, wkhout
any
chaiige
in what
the sent,ence
means.
Such changes
wottld
not be
radically
dissimilarte changes of theory in other sciences.
CB: By the way, what・ du you think about Quinc's
paper
and
its
influeiice
in
analytic
)i,Ioreover,
what
pi]'i'cisin"
philosophy?
"Two
evaluation
of
TXN:
Quiiie's
philosephy, especially
criticism
Quine's
has been immensely
and lesscompelling.
his naturalized
the analytic-synthetic
infiuent・ial,
but his arguments
of
epistemology?
distinctionin
a,gainst
Doglliasof Emis your general
[CTwe
Dogmas"
t・he distinction look less
Alt・houghhe showed
that attempts
to defineit invelve other
he didn'tshow what iswrong with semantic
concepts
such
as
--- in general. Aft・er.
s.v,
nonyrny
all, they are used
iiiseinantics
as
a branch
of
linHis objection
to them seems Lo bc that thcy are t・oounclear
because
guistic science,
they,c:aii't・be reduced
to purely behaviouralterms, but few philesephers these days
would
accept
his implicit rcductionist
or behEw!ouristpremise. Nevert・heless,
what
surprised
me
in writing on analyt・icity was t・osee how well Quine's
conclusions
about
the analytic-synthetic
distinetion
stand
up even
ifone rejects his skepticism
about
rneanillg.
No such dist・i]ctioncan do the work
that philosopherssuch as Carnap exor metaphy,
sics of a bunch of truths ¢ alled
pectedi itcari't trivializethe epistemology
There are indications in Quine:s
owii writings
of that aiternative,
lessideological critique of an analytic-synt・hetic
distinction.
Other aspect・s of, Quine's
work
seem
very
dat・ed,foriiistancehis behaviourism: fifty.vearsago Noarn Chomsky demolished the pretensions of behaviourismt,obe the scientific approach
to mind.
Quine;s
reductionism
looks far t・oonarrow
ancl
some
But
of
his
comments
on
preconc:eived.
logi¢ still come as a breath of fresh air. As fbr Quine's
naturalized
epistemology:
I agree with him that the a,cquisitioii of knowledge is a process wit・hin the natura]
world,
but t,hat・point by itselfhas comparative}y
few methodological
consequences,
if one doesn;t・
combine
it with his extreme
reductioiiisin.
Fbr instanee,it cloes not
forceone to try to tran$late the werds
and
into the language of
fundamental physics. That language probably can;t express any interesting
episternological
naturalized
episteinolo.cry
questionsat all. However, on.e can see Quine's
as an extreme
manifestation
of a more
away
from a
general shift in epistemology,
Cartesianinternalistapproach,
on which
the start,ing-point
is restricted to what the
semantic
concepts,
"anal"rtic'.
`knowledge:
subject
knows.
In
studyj.ng
someone's
knowledge of the world,
that・know]edge. For instance, we
all our
psychology
of
perception.
This
even
can
niore
`belief';
t・heoristsc:an use
if the person we are st・udy, ing doesn't share
use knowledge gained frornexperiments
on the
has been
externalist
approach
to epistemology
epistemi,c
situation,
we
as
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TirnothvttXny・TILLI,NMsoN
78
Bo
Vbl. 18
importalltdevelopments in the period since 1960. 0ne sees it in
episternolo.ffists such as Alvin Goldman, GilbertHarman, Robert Nozick and Hilary
and
it is at least par't of what
Kornblith and in Knowledge and d,tsL・imi,ts,
Quine
for
by
naturalized
episteniology.
I
use
it
in
Th,e
Phitosophy
o,f
I'hilosophy
too,
meant
of reasoning
instance whell I a,ppeal te t}'teresults of experimeiits
on the psychology
of logic.
in discussing the epistemology
one
the
of
most
CB: Ybu
that・ like all
philosphyalso needs thought experi6aid,
will benefitfrom an attitude
that looks more acmellt・s. Ybu also
how to apply thought
tively foropportunit・ies
forinodel-building."
Could you explain
and
Tnodel-building
inet,hodology
in phi!osophy? Pleasegive some examexpcriments
argue
sciences
other
`CPhilosophy
plc(s).
is ]3ertrand Russell'simagiT",':A famous example of a t・hought experiment
clock
that by luck shews
the
uary
example
of Iooking for a moment
at a stopped
correct
time. The person acquires
a true belief,
even
a justified
true belief,
about
what
timc itis,but the beliefdees llot constitute
kiiowledge.It followsthat iieithcr
true belicfis sufficient lbrkiiowiedge,In irnagilling
thc
t・ruebeliefnor evell justified
not・
know the time one is perexample
and judgingthat the person involvedwould
thought・ experiment.
One learnssomething
about
what
weuld
be
fbrrnjng'
a simple
from which we caii infcrsomething about
the case in a specific possib]e situation,
in
thought
experiynent
in t・hiscasc, a,bout the nature
the properties involved th,e
of knowledge. Epistemologists
alld other
philosophcrs use such thought experiments
from thought experiment・s,
Typically,models
use
continually,
. )・Iodels
are difft)rent
of
a, forma] desc:ription
a possisimplifications and idealizations in order to achieve
by forma,1reasoning
rather
than by
bilitywhose consequences
can
then be elicited
imagination-based judged.For instance, we can set up a model
in epistcmic
]ogiea6
is a subset
fo].lows.
The
worlds'
are the numbers
O, 1 and 2, A
`possible
of
{O,1, 2}.
the set
member
`propesition'
A proposit・ioiiis
`true'
at
the pToposition. A Telatioll ca]led
if the numerical
difference
betwecm them
of
and only
a vLrorld
isat
ifand
most
only
if the world iasa
holds betweeiiworlds
if
1. The proposition that
a givenworld
only ifevery world accessible
propositien X contains
brom that oitc is a niember
of X. Thus if X is the propesition
1}, the proposition
aecessible
from O are O itselfand
1,
t・hat oiie knows X is just{O}.IIbr the worlds
one
knews
if and
[aecessibility:
a
{0,
both
does
of whicli
not
belong to
belor;g to
{O,1}, wherea・s
{O,1}.
One
can
world
then
2 isaccessible
conc]ude
from worlds
the proposit・ioni,hatone
which
is the empt・y
{O},
'Thus
knows X isthe prepositioiitl]at
is ne world from which only worlcl O is acccssible,
knows X without
knowing tliat,
olle knows X. In other
words,
that
sinee
one
there
fbrmal
axiom
one
to the positive in'trospectionaxiem.
counter-exainple
failsin the
knows
model
is purely
Tnat,hemat,ical.
1 and 2 and
[I]hatis an
at
we
The
advantage
knows
set
O
world
{},
one
have constructed
tha,t the
argument
over
a
a
thought
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Aiiotheradvant・a,gc
experimellt.
from the
in
way
it was
which
79
of the
ist・hatthe formal consistency
specified.
A disadvantageis that the
scenario
is clear
model
builclsin
of
idealizedassumption
that ene knows all the logical consequences
what
one knows. One has to argue
that the idealizationis irrelevant to the point we
is surncicntly
are currently
interestedin,pesitive introspection,
and that the cxample
realistic
in rnore relevallt respects.
Those sorts of issue arise for models
in nat,ural
science
too and c;an ofteii be resolved
by good judgment
wit,hout
destroyingthe value
the um'ealist/ic,
Sueh a
of the model.
is applicable
methodology
to philosophy Loo.
CB: Ybu argue tha,tphilosophy needs and uses evideiice as all intelleetualdiscicensists
of factsor true propositions. I want
to know,
plines do, amd that evidence
on
earth
is
a
fact?
Is
a
fact
ob.iective
or
subjective?・
How te
in your opinion, what
individuate facts,in other words, how to couiit them, e,s,,
are t・alkingabout
your
alld
tongues are making
soupds;',
are
ncw
book':,
are sittiiig in armchairs",
ef a saine
factor different
facts?How to discriminateth ¢ m?
they different
versions
`:"i'e
"Vtt'e
"()ur
[I]"J':
[I]hediscussioi]
of
in The PhiZosopuhy of Philosophy ls oiie of the
of Kno?vZedgeand its LiTnits,
cmphasizing
pla ¢ es in whi ¢ h I;m using t・heepistemology
is part of our evithat・we are not always in a position to know whet・her
somethin.cr
dence. The equation
E
K applies to philosophy too. As forthe notion of a, fact,I
don't appeal t・oa hjghlymet,aphysical
conceptioii
of facts.
It suffices formy purposes
treat
facts
as
true
Since
truth
is
an
ob.iective
mat・ter,
so is being a
to
proposit,ions.
my
new
book iiithe normal
way
while
sltt・ing in armfact.If we are t・alkingabout
chairs
then the proposition that we are talking about my, new book, the proposition
evidence
=
that
we
sounds
are
are
none
of
making
armchairs
t・rue,so they
is neeessarily
all
them
book
new
in
sitting
without
sollnds:
sitting
are
t・he proposition that eur tongues are making
facts. They. arc tln'eedistii]ctpropositions because
and
all
equivalent
to
in armchairsl
we
t,ongues could
our
make
any
of
con]d
sounds
t・alk about
rriy
t・beothers. "・'ecould
sit in arnnchairs
"dthout
our tQngues
without
our
talking
about
iny
iiew
book. Thus they are three dist/jnct・
faet・s.Although more
questions can be asked
of facts,
the epistemology
of 7ihePhilosophy o,t'Philosophy
about the individuat・ioii
is compatible
CB: Ybu
and
enabli,ng.
with
any
I'ast experiellce
mathematical
has
t・hatexperieiice
claim
the habitsof
imaginati,on,
our
answer
reasonablc
could
abilit・ies
intuition,has some
leasttwo different・
fuiietions:
evideiitial
have the functionof mouldiiig,
res,ulating
our
of judg,ement,
so all knowledge, cvcii including
with
The
distantconnect・ions
past experiences.
thc cat・egories of the a priori and
produces littleinsight,in fact,it is wrong.
iise
of
you
an
euipiricist
to them.
at
a
our knowledge
posLerori to characterize
Could you explain further?Could I call
iiTepistemology?
T"J: In playing
an
evidential
role,
experiencc
supplies
us
with
new
evidence:
for
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Tamothy
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W'II.I.IAMsoN and
V6I.18
instance, the faetthat a man
in a red shirt iswalking past is added to my.
I
that
a
man
in
a
red
shirt is walking
when
see
past. In play,ing an enabling
suppl:
ing us with new
pericnce ena,bles us to acquire new coiicepts without
foTjnstanee,we
by others to visibly
distinctionbet・ween priori'and
of
`a
kiiowledge in
no
evidential
role.
but
role
A posteriori kiiewledgeis knowledge in whi'ch
R)r instance, on that coiiception,
one can know
role.
experience
of
evidence:
the applicatioll
red
Ca
plays
experience
which
through
red
role, ex-
things. Oll the standard
way
of drawing
posterioriTkiiowledge, a priorlknowledg'eis
`red'
of th ¢ word
a
the concept
acquire
may
evidence
may
play
an
plays an
experience
ena,bling
ei[idential
priori that all red t,hingsare
because
to acquire
the concept
of red,
kno"r a post・eriorithat a man in th,red
a
even
though one needed
experienee
is a purely eiiablillg role, One can only
shirt is walking
isthat experience
of
past, Thc problem I raise for this distinction
krigwledge t,hat is neit,her purely enablillg nor strictly
ten play,s a role in armchair
coloured,
that
In doing thought
evidential.
relevant
clock,
concepts
our
ski]1
oMine,
in
properly we use our skill in apply. ing the
in the imagination - forinstance, in the case of the st,opped
applying
exper;iments
the
c;oncept・
of
knowledge. We
are
net
really
experiencing
lookinga,t a stopped clock. Experience is playing a lessthan evidential role
here. But even if the concept・ has an inna,tebasis,our skill iiia,pplying i-t - which
- "Tas devcluped through
to possess the coneept
exceeds
what
is required
merely
online experience in perceptionof a ¢ tual cases of knowledge and ignorance or relat・ed
and actual
uses of the word
That isa more than enabling role for
phenomena
experience,
I argue in T7be Philosophy ofPhilosophy that ho"iever one triesto fitthe
a priori f a posterieri distinctiQn
te such examples,
itdoes not work in the intended
and
obscures
underlying
similai'ities and
diff'ercllces
between cases. I den'tt・hink
way,
of rnyself
as an empiricist,
but rather as someoiie
trying to finda middle
way
between
empiricisin
alld rationalism.
Ernpiricists emphasiz・e
a posteriori
knowledgel
rationalists
emphasize
a priori knowledge. I'm emphasizing
knowledge that doesll't
into
.
Anoth
r
respeet
in
which
I'm not・ particularly
fit・
comfortably・
either category.
¢
einpiricist
isthat I believeon thc basisof evidence
from linguisties
and
psychology
that there is a large innate element
in human cognition.
someone
Cknow'.
CB: Could you bricflyexplain
epinion
aboiit
philosophy
of
mind,
the
role
of
iirtuition
in pltilosophy? "ihat isyour
the
especially
studics
on
intentionalityin
cont,em-
porary philosophy?
TXK,'
: Some philosophers talk as though ii!t・uit・ion
i'sa separate
type cognition,
eiie
nced
to de thought experimems,
for instance.When I ca,me te analyse such
supposed
examples
of intuition, I realized
that what
was
going on was lessstrange
tha,twe
aBd
ment
distinctivethan that. IJiorinstanee, in
whose
if certain
eontellt
conditiuns
is a
coullterfact・ual
obt・ained:
"If
a
thought
conditional
those
conditions
expcriu]ent
about
obtained.
onc
what・
' he
makes
would
wollldn't・
be
ajudg-
the case
know
the
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t・ime".I re,ieet・ the
are
intuitlonas misleading,
Ybiiare right that these issues
Few philosephers of mind usc thc concept of
philesophy of mind,
concept
to the
related
81
of
lntuition.Parts of Knowledge and itsLimits concerii the philosophy
I discuss how an agent's knowledge and other environment-involving
can
causally
why
they
environment
as
explain
in the
external
states
of affairs
in the
external
ternalist,success-oriented
as falsebeliefs and
ernpty
a central
mind,
where
mental
states
they did. Just as I take reference to objects
case of intentionality,
so I talkeknowlcdge of
environment
as a central
in which
phi!osophy of mind,
names)
ls understood
inrelation
malfunctioning
as
aeted
of
to l'unctioning.
By
in
case
of
t・hought. It is an
unsuccessfu1
relatiell
cogn!tion
to suecessful
ex-
(such
cognition,
internalists
take as basicmenfailure,
su ¢ h as belief (which
be
may
contrast,
between success and
true or false)and apparent
referenee.
From a methodological
point of view, the philosophy of mirid raises fascillating
questions. In the l980s many,
people thought that
it was taking over from the philesephy of language in the drivillg-seat
of philosopliy,
in some
cases because they thought that the coiieeptual
turn vgias more fundamental
than the linguistic
turn, in ot・her cases hecause they thought t・hat breakthroughs in
cxperimental
would
transform philosophy. Philosephy
psychology and neuroscience
tal states
that
ol' mind
are
neutral
then hasn't
since
rcally
lh,ed up
to Lhat promise, Indeed, no
branch
ene
of
even
ifsome are more peripheral than
philosophy iselearl,v, centr,al to the subject,
others:
instead, ],ikeinost・ oLher acadeinic
discipliries,
philosoptiy has become more
specialized.
Experimcritalwork has ccrtaii)ly, contributed
to our philosophical understanding
of the mind,
and will continuc
to do so, but the idea that we could just
read
our philosophy of mind
off the experimentalists'
conclusions
was
always
iiadl've.
CB:
be
'Ybu
said,
is a branch of bot・h phtlosophy
i`Logic
iiitumutually
6eparatcd
exclusive
contributions
and
from
it cannot
matheinatics;
mathematics
and
phjloso-
Recelltlyyou finisheda new paper
and
philosophy
Chinese
translat・ion
will
be
on
The
Jts
published
ofPeking
University.Could }rou claxiCy' the rclationship
betweeu logicand philosophy in 21t・h
century?
X・V'hat
ean logicdo forphilosophy, and
what
caii philosopl]y do for logicin
I agree
ph.y"
ill21th
with
"Logic
y,ou.
century"
.JowirbaZ
this eentury?
TVKr:Logic isnecessary
but not
forsolving
suMcient
to use long chains
progress in philosophy we need
it is very hard to distinguishvalid from inva].idreasoiiing,
make
more
to
Logic hclps us to do that
logic enables
For installce,
the developriient
of quantified modal
us
far more securcly than belbre about possibility,necessit・y and existence.
reliably.
reason
Secondly,logic plays a
talking abeut before
t/ributesspecific
of
philosophical problems. To
of reasoning
iiiareas whei'c
rrLat・herxiatics.
central
I gave
role
an
illthe
exauiple
sort
of
from
activity
inudel-building
epistemic
logic.
rl"hirdly,
that I was
legic con-
to many
branches of philosophy, not only to the philosophy,
]Jbr inst/・ance,
oiie of the inost
active
and
fl]uitful
areas
of researc:h
results
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on
and
Chen Bo
WILLIi",Isorv
Timothy
t・ruth coiicerlls
solutiolls
isnot truc?'
saying
iswhat
important too, with
In the
science,
t・othe paradox of the liar,who says
he issaying true? Most of t・hatwork
froiiimathernatical
t,echniques
solve.
concerns
but then
happen in other
phcrs
possible examp]e
can
sometimes
epistemic
of action
is the logic of
completely
diMcult
and
teehnical
autonomous
now
to computer
supply
ncw
problems for logicians
logicerr]crged from philosophical
generality,which
unrest・ricted
logicof generalizations about, absolute],y everythin.cr. Thc
but many of the problems are tricky teehnical elles.
CB: Ybu
requires
development,the saniLe
Logician$are on the look-outfbrnew problems, which
see because they are lookingfrom new,
unexpected
underwent
areas.
logicand
moda,]
will
I am
C`What
is becoiiiing illcreasing!y
action
both to t・hephilosophy
direction, philosophy
Just as
to try to
logie. The logic of
applicatiens
reverse
V61.]8
thing
will
philoso-
A
an.gles.
co]'Lcerns
the
isphilosophical
motivation
formalmethods
extensively
in your philosophical research. But you
also e]aiin,
should
be clea,r t・hatinformal methods
ai'e also esselltial to philosephy,
forforinalmetheds, likeall others, easily mislead wheii applied witheut good informal
I agrec wit,h you strongly. Could you explain more about these cla,ims?
judgement.';
use
"it
T"i
Most philosophical problems initiallypresent thernselves in vague
informa]
terms, To apply forinal
rnethods,
one must
formaliz・e
t・heproblem, express it in precise
fbrmal terrns. One needs
to determine whether
the fbrmalgood informal judgment
:
is most・ important about t・heorigillal problem,
For instance,
in the process of formalizin.ff.
the sirnplifications
or idealizations made
harrnless,
do thcy omit the heart of t/hedifficulty?Judging the plausibilityof foriiialized
izatien eaptures
are
or
premises is also
whose
solut・ion
skcptical
of
what
an inforrr]al
mattcr,
fbrmal method$
have
And
nothing
se
T'herernay
on.
at all
to
contribute,
eveii
be problems t・o
although
I'ni a bit
that・.
CB: Ceuld you listteu iniportant acafleinic
far`['
Could you describe t・heir main coiLtributions
papers from
justin one
all of
sent・ence
your papers
so
separately?
TW: I revised many of my best-kiiownarticles forincorporat・ioninto my books.
It will be more interestingfor nie to describeten t,hathave not undergone
that proThey
he!p
cess.
will
te give a better sense of the variety of m}r work.
My. very
firstpvtblished art・icle was
Disproved?; (Analysis,
1982), a short piece
`Iiituitionisrn
in
which
I
showed
t・hat the
argument
of
the
`paradox'
of
knowability
against
the
knowable doesn't・
work
by itselfagainst an
anti-realist
who
fo1,lows
rvIichael
Dummett's proposal that intuitionism is the right
logic fbr anti-rea],ism; of course, I reject the anti-realist princip]e, but I think more
argumeiit
against・ it isnceded.
In
Relations'(Phitosophical
Review, 1985)
I argued tha,t pa,irssuch as kicking and being kicked by, er above
alld
below correspond
to t/hesa,me language-independent feat・ure
of reality
and
explained
some
of
anti-realist
principle thaL
a]1
truths
arc
`Cenverse
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DcepLy, Coi]tributing
OriginaUy
Thin{dng
the
logicaland
paraLive
problems
seinaiitie
Siml]arity.
Damc
(IVotre
by that idea. `Flrst Order Legics forCornoffuT'malLogtc,1988) discusscsthe logic
raised
'
of sentences
such
as
.rournal
is more
LAima
83
t・o Betty than
similar
Chris is te David',
L'[I]wo
ofSymbolic Logic,1990)
(Journat
Incomplete Anti-RcalistMedal Epistcmic Logics'
explores
what
the logjc of an anti-rea]ist theory in
possibilityof
the theory not
oTy
some
specified
to
Iigentthan
cemputers,
conception
that
the
have t・oleok likein
would
the Knowledge
co-authored
a colleague
allows
to
one
between
of
for
order
Turing Machines'
(The-
of
with
mine
defend the Barcan ferrnula,a
principle
cont・roversial
that great!y simplifies
quantified
tiie Structureof IIigher-OrderVagueiiess'(Mind,
1999) takes the
relation
logic.`On
existence
p,ossibility
and
iiim},, book Vkegucncssfurtherb}・r
showillg
of vagueness
analysis
to the
the theoretical economist
Hyun Song
in Oxford; it concerns
the way
in vThich
be constrained
by t・heassumption
that agents are not more intel[Bare
Possibilia?(Erkenntnis,
1998) develeps a metaphysical
logiccan
epistemic
modal
collapse.
then
was
status
[Representing'
Decision,1994) was
and
Shin, who
about
epistemic
truth is equlvalent
which
borderlinecases
article is
of
and
so on
have
obey
hew borderlineeases
logicalprinciples.My
unexpected
most
cited
How' (,Journal
o.fPILilosophy,
2001),co-authored
with
t・heAmerican philosopher Jaseil Stanley (whomI firstmet・ whell
he was assigned
to be my
teaching assistant at・ MI[I]);
ituses evidence firomt・hesemantics
of Englishindirect・ly
to ar.vue that krtowing how to do sornething
is a form of knowing that something
is t・he
`Kiiowi-g
GilbertRy.Iea,nd many other authors bad claiined
sorncone
said that people react・ed to tbe paper as though
they had just
diseovercdthat Santa
Claus does not exist.
Existents'(in
a volume
edited
by Anthony O:Hear,
Logic, V'lhoughtand Lang7tage, CambridgeUniver$it・y
Press, 2002) is a fo11ow-up
to
Possibilia';
I show
liow simple, plausible principles about existence, proposicase,
to
contrary
what
`Necessary
[Bare
tions, truth and necessity
given iiidividualexist,s -- a
entail
the
(:enc:lusioii
t・hatit is not
conclusion
contingent
whether
first
but iuakes sense
that itinvolvesfroiii
inure
t・hat souiids
crazy
at・
the purely logicalnotion of existeiice
you distillguish
cret・e iiotions of existerice,
such as beirigin space
or tiinc.
a
oiice
coii-
(PhiZosophical
CEverythiiig'
Perspectives,20e3) is a defence of the int・elligibility
ot' generalizing simultaneoiisly
about
absolutely
everything
to geiieralizewithout
paradox
of
agaillst
w・hatsoever,
restrictions
who
'that the
argue
leadsto paradoxes in set theory. su ¢ h
,
the set of all sets that are not
itself?);
I show
critics
members
how dangerous such paradoxes
are,
of
themse]vcs
it a
(is
as
attempt
Russellis
meinber
but/also how t・oavoid them
of
at
t・he
last rriinutc.
CB: Could you tell me something
hope to aehieve in the near future?
TXV: I
recelltly
its Limits; the
fillished
writin.cr
articles
and
my
replies
about
replies
will
your
current
research?
to fifteen articles
soon
on
be published in
"rhat do y,ou
Knowtedge
a volume
and
called
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Witliamson
and
on
University
(Oxford
Knou;ledge
Duncan Pritchard.Now I'vehad to
ofPhilesophy,
Zosophy
fbr
symposia
on
in doing somet・hing
iiew
about
in articles
possibility,
existence
and
and
-
and
";'im,JAts・fsoN
Chen Bo
Timothy
Press),
sta,rt writ・ing
that・ book.
My
eonstructive.
of
iiext
inine
edited
repljes
XJOI,18
by Patrick Greenough
to articles on The Phi-
I'm rnore
interested
Of course,
boek will be based on the ideas
such
Pessibilia;and
`Bare
as
CNeces-
Existent・s;,
which
Ijustmelltioned.
I hope to strengthen
the a]cguments
by using
formal
sy,
second-erder
modal
logic.
Parts
of
stem,
the book wili be
powerfu1
rather
techiiical,but I hope that some cent・ral parts will be accessible to ull analytic
ii].ctaphysicians.
The working
.Rigidity;it will be published by
titleis Ontologi・cat
0xforclUlliversityI'ress,After t・hat who knows?
sary
a
rnore
CB: AsItalked with you befbre,although
Iadmit that Kripkc is a v ¢ ry. great
objections
to hisbook Naming and Necessity.
philosepher I still hatresome systematic
AsI know, you are a strong Kripkean. Could you say something
about
Kripke and
his works?
Saul Kripke give the prestigious John Locke lecturesin Oxford; my tutor had describedhim as Lhe brilliant
was
t・hen in his early, 30s). AlthoughI
yoimg llsan of Amerieaiiphi!osophy (Kripke
didn'tunderstand
everything
he said, l was hugely impressed -- by his clarity, acTW:
As
a
first-yearundergraduate,
I
went
to hcar
discrimination, logical power, ima.ffinationand
curate
sense,
common
all combined
huinour, Evey siuce he has beella uiedel te me ef how phi!o$ophy
should
be done, He probably influencedme more than any of the Oxtbrd teachers
did. I especially
liked,and like, his insistence oit keeping metaphysical
questions
scparate
fr'omepisteinological
isthe basisof hisfamous examples
of
questioiis,which
the contingent
a priori and
the neces$ary
a posteriori. Although some
of the deta,ils
in Naming and Necessitymay not be quit・eright・, the plcture he presents there strikes
a
with
me
as
touch
of
basically correct
books. Of
-
which
i.snot
something
I;d
say
about
inany
phi}osophical
hisear]y t・echnicalwork on moda,] logichas also beeu of fLindamental importance. Even if one disagrees with seme
aspect・s of it (as
I de, for instance
on the Barcaiiforinula
ment・iolled
al)ove),
jt'sstill the bcst starting point forthinking about
the metaphysical
issues raised
by quantified modal
logic. Hi'sarticle en
tT.'ut・h
has illspired
inuch
of the leadiiig
techiiical work
on ti'ut/h
over the past thirty
Kripke's
later
book
Wittgenstcin
ort
RttZes
and
Private
Language
was rejeeted
years.
by most foIlowers of XVittgenstein as a misinterpret・at・ion
ef him, Mayh.e it was,
as a
mat・ter
of historical
scholarship,
but what they rnay not have realized is that Kripke
was
effer'ing VL[ittgenstein
a sort of lifeline.
In the 1970s t・he positiollwas roughly
this.
VK・)ittgenst,ein's
followers held that X]Vitt・geiistein's
central
contribution
to philosophy
his
was
argurnent
against
the possibilit・}r
of a private language.The private language
'appeared
argument
of selltcnccs
course
to
ascribillg
rest on
a verificationist
mental
states
consisted
premise, to the
in their method
effect
th4t the
of verification.
meaning
Since
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Thinking Deeplb,,
CentribuLingOt'iginally
forsome
(except
philosophers
ited, it was widely
most
anti-realists)
regarded
premise, it was
held t,hat it did indeed rest, on
a verificationist
unsound
and
discreddid rest oll
Ant・i-"iittg'ensteinians
verifieationism
if the privatelanguage
that
agreed
85
argument
uninterestiiig.
as
really
premise. "['ittgensteiniansinsist・ed
to expla,in coiiviiicingly. hew it could work without
way
of iiitcrpretingthe argument
that explained
a
verificatienist
that・itdidn't,but were never able
such
a premise. Kripke offk]red a
how it could work without
a verifieationist
premise, which
,younger generation
"VLrit・t・genstein's
made
work
for philosophers of a
who
wercn't
iinpressedby
"J'ittgensteinian
defencesof the private language argument,
Once it was agreed that
Kripke's interpretation didn'tfitWitt/genstein's
intentiolls,,
the private language arlost
most
of
its
int・erest,
except
to
committed
"J'ittgcnsteinians,
As a result,
gument
"Tittgensteiii's
work
has become illcTeasingly
marginal
te the development・of ana,lytic
much
of Kripke's irnportant work
remains
unpublished,
philosophy. Unfortuiiately,
foriiistaiice
en identityover time and
on some
epis'temolog/i.cal
questions, but many
of the ideashave been absorbed
by the philosophicalcomrn,unity
froinhis lectures
and
samizdat
transcripts of them. It isa great pity that he hasn'tpublished more.
relevant
again
CB: There is a familyof
:realit,y',
phers
Cactuality',
et,c.,
sometimes
be',`to
`to
as
exist',
`being(s)?,
`exist・ellce;,
Chinese philosodelicatediffe:ences
bctwcen them in philesophical
tell the
cannot
such
is very
which
Could yoii c:larify
context,s.
concept,s
import・ant in
met,aphysics.
them for us?
T",':Nat,iveEnglish speakers
gct
often
eonfused
about
the differencesbetween
them in philosophical context・s t・oo!Each of those terms is itself
used
iiia vaxiet・y of
diflerentways. Often,whcn
subtle
distinctions with them, they
philosophers make
are not
simp]y, relying
en a clear but subtle
differcn
¢ e in t・hcir
usual
meaningsi
rather,
they are harnessingthem as technical terms fortheir own
theoretiicalpurpo6es. For
illstance,
ifa philesopher says
entities have being but not existence"
itishard
to knew what distinction
is being made
until one hears the rest of t,he philosopher's
[CSome
,
discourse. In
`exist・;
papeT
my
is axnbiguous
}ogicalrcadiiig,
`cxisti
`Bare
between a logicalreadiug aiid a
is equivaleiit to
soinethiiig'
tEverythiiis,
to t,helogicalti'uth
alent
more
is obviously
exists:
is soinethiiig',
`Everythillg
I suggest
coiicrete
(inthe
Cbe
in t・hissense,
[soinethiiig')i
Possibilla'(ment・ioned
above),
On
that the
readiiig.
word
Oll the
general sense
tr'ue, because it is equivmost
the inore
coitcrete
of
reading,
like
in spa ¢ e or time'; in thissense,
to something morc
erything
existst makes
the highlycontroversial
claim
that・everything
is in space er
is
false
set
is
somethillg
that is not in
time
arguably,
it, a
cla,im because the empty
and
in philosspac:c er time. Tb bi'ing
out・ the difference
between
ophy,
it is helpfulto notice that
is typieally contrasted
with
or
is equivalent
iexist'
`be
LEv-
;reality'
`actualit/y'
`reality'
`pretence'
one
would
whereas
naturally.
`actua]ity'
say.
CIf
`appearance;
is typical]y contrasted
with
I had eaten
much
less,I wuul.d
-
]Jbr instance,
much
less
`possibility:.
have
weighed
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Ttmothv v NNilT,uAMsoNand
86
I actually do' ra,ther than
I had
I really. de': tli¢ comparisoll
is between
`If
than
not
love scei)e
in love with
a
other',
appears
each
other'
or
rcaders
they
when
the
nuances
see
of
are
possibility,but
Converse]y,if one js watching
`Those
to say
not
actors
actually
that it is,while
are
not
really
iiilove with
cacb
with
the fictionthat they are in loverather
in love.But in many
very
centexts it matters
`Did
say
either
)Iacbeth actually
murder
his
murder
Englishusage,
a
hi$predecessor?'. My
text is not
philosophical
but rather
to t・ryto work
out
to Chinese
tDo much
advice
to
worry
this part・icular
what
the terms,
CB: How do you dcfineyour ewn philosophica,lposition? In
beliefsL?
your majn philosophical
T"r: I st・art・ with
not
really
these terms in
philosopher' isdoing wlth
less than
a non-a,ct・ual
case.
are
have weighed
would
and
a,ctors
VbL 1.8
the eontrast
Maebeth
CDid
predecessor?'
about
than
rather
`Those
thc possibilitythat they. are
term ene uses; one could
little
whieh
actuality
or
sillce the fbcus is on
thaii with
less,I
eaten
is pretended to be the
in thc theatre, it would
be natural
that
one
Cheii Bo
classical
other
words,
what
logic and
truth is saying
is
the principle that falsityis sarsrillg of what
what
isthat it is.What istrue depends little
on
of
world,
with
no
special
humans. "Je form just,
a tiny bit ef the natural
privileges.
But, despit,ehuge areas of ignorance, some accidental,
some
necessary,
we haNe signifi
systematic
inquiry.
icant knowledge of' t・heworld, from bet・hcommon
scnse
and
more
everything
is what
it is and not another
thing. I reI'm suspicious
of reductionism;
jectall religious beliefas consisting largelyof falsehoodshuiuanityshould have growiN
out of but can"t.
We should regulate our belief by the evidence, however diMcu]t it/
isto do so, and not give way to wishful thinking, Aii anti-realist・ philosopher once
us
described
me
as
a
`rottweiler
realist'.
I'm happy
that description,
with
CB: In your opinion, what are the most impertant cha.racteristics ef a suceessful
philosopher?"rhat kinds of basictraining, abilities and knowledge should he have?
XVhen a young scholar intends to involve himself in a research
project・in philosophy,
what
elements
has he to consider' carefully? Ibr example,
how sheu!d he choose his
topic? Hew should
he do hisresearch?
TW: It;shard to give general
no
one
and
other
size
Nevertheless,olle
forsuccess in .iustabout
wonit
succeed unless you
other.
that
suits
other
one
foxNr
obvious
diings. Some qualjties are needed
any academic
field.Naturally,hewever clever you are, you
work
hard. YOu need the boldnessand imaginationto think
t,hepatience, persistence and aecuracy
to developthem properly.
can
say
thoughts, and
If you have neither the power
from others,
wi,11 never
your wo]'k
new
young philosophers because
in temperament・,
skills
philosopher doesn't suit an-
to ambitious
differfrom each
advice
fitsali: good philosophers
of working
qualities. A way
of
a
self-criticism
improve. Ybu
nor
must
to
the modesty
be
able
to
accept
recognize
eriticism
when
your
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Deeply, Contributimg OriginalLy
FI]hinkin.[.r
teacher has made
87
but ifyou are too willing to attribute mistakes you will
not learnenough
from them, It'sdiMcult・to findthe iniddle
way,.
Y6u must
learn
to write clearly, precisely and unpretentiously,,
Don;t・worry about whether
what
is deepF,worry
abeut
whether
it;strue, I Iike philosophers who rnove
you arc saying
slow].y and
carefully,
one
step at a time, but of course
they will not・ get・allywhere
unless
have
a
sensc
of
where
A
they
they are g.oing.
good basictraining in philosophy,
includessome logicaiid some hist・ory
of philosophy, and
lotsof pra,cticeiiiwriting
abeut
and critieiz・irigalteriiative
problems in you,rown words, analyzing
philosophical
solutions
amd having your analyses
and
criticisms
analyzed
and criticized
illdetailby
your teaehers, Choose a research topic tha,t jnterestsyou and on whieh
you feelthat
te say; it should be small enough
to be manageab]e
is
you might have something
(it
much
more
a mistake,
to choose
common
It・doesn;t・
matter
topic that is t・oolarge than
M)u
you say
intelligible
to them, but it is boring
conversatioxL,
must
one
that
is too
sn]all).
the topic is fashionable the most fashionab!eareas are
should
have been some
on
it te definethe
previous work
Contributingto the published discussionof
starting-poinL.
sa'icl, and
whether
but there
over-crowded
a
make
what
relevant
uiiless
to
you
a
wh,at
add
topic is likejoining
a
thc
others
somcthirig
o'
have just
f your
own.
t,o t,alk with m, e. I
CB: Professor Timethy "['illiamson,
tha,nk you for agreeing
work
guess Chinese rcaders have got a letof inforinationabout you and your academic
from this talk. I personally appreciat・e your supervision,
advice,
help and t'riendship
forme while I have been an academic
visitor at Oxford Facultyof Philosophybetween
Aug,ust,2007 and August, 2C)08.]N,Iay.
to succccd in yeur philosophical
you continue
endeavors!
T"・J: Alld mabg
ing':,our
of
and
analytic
you teo, Dr Chen! It・has been a pleasure to get to kllow you durst・ay in Oxfoi'd.
Ybur work is an important contribution
to the development
between Chinese philosophers
philosophy in Chiria,and to cerninunication
philesophers
i'romthe
rest
of
the
world.
2009.4.27; Aecepted 2009.6.14)
(Received
-87-
NII-Electronic Library Service