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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 10-2501

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Operations

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

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This publication implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 10-25, *Air Force Emergency Management Program*. This publication applies to the Regular Air Force (RegAF), United States (U.S.) Space Force (USSF), the Air Force Reserve (AFR), and the Air National Guard (ANG). It also applies to tenant units residing on Department of the Air Force (DAF) installations who are subject to local support agreements requiring involvement within DAF Emergency Management (EM) Programs. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) using the DAF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*; route DAF Forms 847 from the field through the appropriate functional chain of command. This publication may be supplemented at any level, but all major command (MAJCOM) and field command (FLDCOM) supplements must be routed to the OPR of this publication for coordination prior to certification and approval. Ensure all records generated as a result of processes prescribed in this publication adhere to Air Force Instruction (AFI) 33-322, *Records Management and Information Governance Program*, and are disposed in accordance with (IAW) the Air Force Disposition Schedule, which is located in the Air Force Information Management System. The authorities to waive wing, delta, and unit level requirements in this publication are identified with a Tier ("T-0, T-1, T-2, T-3") number following the compliance statement. For USSF, the field commander will be the authority for T-2 waiver requirements. See Department of the Air Force Manual (DAFMAN) 90-161, *Publishing Processes and Procedures*, for a description of the authorities associated with the Tier numbers. Submit requests for waivers through the chain of command to the appropriate Tier waiver approval authority, or alternately, to the publication's OPR for non-tiered compliance items. The use of the name or mark of any specific manufacturer,

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SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This publication has been substantially revised and needs to be completely reviewed. This revision (1) re-designates this AFI as a DAF Instruction (DAFI) 10-2501, *Emergency Management Program*; (2) establishes a systematic capabilities-based all-hazard/threat effects DAF EM Program; (3) supports the Secretary of the Air Force (SecAF) operational imperatives to operationally-optimize information, generate resilient installations, and account for combat support maneuver aspects needed to protect forces from all-hazards/threat effects and continue mission operations; (4) supports multiple AF/A4 basing and logistics enterprise strategy (BLES) priorities and objectives; (5) Once DAFMAN 10-2501 is published, this DAFI replaces and archives Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 10-2502, *Air Force Incident Command System (AFIMS) Standards and Procedures*; aligns language with updates from Presidential Policy Directives (PPD), the National Incident Management System (NIMS), and Department of Defense (DoD) Instruction (DoDI) 6055.17, *DoD Emergency Management (EM) Program*, requirements consistent with EM mission areas and common core capabilities to prevent, protect, prepare for, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the most concerning all-hazards/threats; (6) sets conditions to synchronize, integrate, and align DAF EM Program policy with DAFI 10-2503, *Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense Program*, regarding outside the continental United States (OCONUS) combat operations in a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-yield Explosive (CBRNE) environment (terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and adversarial CBRN attacks against the continental U.S. (CONUS) DAF installations are addressed by this instruction); (7) clarifies and defines the DAF EM program construct to generate interoperable information to and through planning and risk management, incident command and coordination, all operational levels, and along the DAF/DoD command and control (C2) continuum; (8) generates EM community interaction capabilities with joint and coalition partners as it relates to the competition continuum and enhancement of near-to-far term all-hazard/threat effects and risk information propagation, future plans, logistics, force development, and current plans/current operations; (9) aligns the DAF EM planning and risk management governance structure to focus key functional subject matter experts (SME) on achieving actionable EM mission area outcomes; (10) establishes a strategic planning and risk management approach regarding catastrophic natural disaster risk to enhance installation planning and risk management and DAF wide organize, train, and equip (OT&E), and exercise requirements; (11) specifies a systematic DAF EM planning and integrated risk management (IRM) cycle and actions; (12) establishes the ability to generate capability based hierarchical status information for units and installation EM Programs across the DAF and culminate a holistic DAF EM Program stakeholder preparedness review (SPR) to guide and enable installation, MAJCOM, FLDCOM, and DAF program adaptation via information; (13) clarifies EM Program education and training (E&T) audiences to include required and recommended EM mission area capabilities based E&T opportunities; (14) updates risk based EM exercise requirements and establishes a capabilities means to identify gaps between targeted and existing capabilities; (15) establishes EM planning necessities aligned with EM mission areas to include transition to a capabilities-based construct/model that continually prevents, protects, mitigates and then, responds to and recovers from all-hazards/threats; and (16) establishes a time-phased agile software development and

fielding of a DAF enterprise Information Technology (IT) Emergency Management Information System (EMIS) to operationally optimize EM information in support of tactical, operational, and strategic decision advantage, the DAF advanced battle management system (ABMS) campaign plan, and the Joint all domain command and control (JADC2) construct. Considerable aspects of the policy set-forth in this revision are designed to systematically investigate, consolidate, correlate, and propagate information along the conflict and C2 continuum event horizon and enable DAF EMIS, ABMS, and ultimately JADC2. **Note:** All references to USAF terminology, units, grades, and positions will also apply to the equivalent in the USSF, as appropriate. The term "installation commander" used throughout this document herein refers to the command of a DoD installation and encompasses USSF installation commanders (e.g., delta commanders). References to wings and installations will also apply to deltas/garrisons. Air Staff roles and responsibilities (e.g., AF/A1, etc.) may also apply to the equivalent Office of the Space Staff position or office (e.g., SF/S1, etc.), as deemed appropriate.

Chapter 1

OVERVIEW AND STRATEGY

1.1. Purpose. Establish cross-functional policy, standards, and actions to execute a systematic capabilities-based all-hazard/threat effects DAF EM Program to manage risk while continually building whole-of-community preparedness, resilience, and readiness. Primary policy objectives are to:

1.1.1. Specify and codify an interoperable DAF comprehensive EM planning framework and mission areas to protect personnel, key resources, facilities, infrastructure, and operational missions against all-hazard/threat effect categories of 1) natural, 2) technological, 3) human-caused unintentional and 4) human-caused intentional terrorism and adversarial nation state attacks.

1.1.2. Set conditions to synchronize, integrate, and align related Department of Homeland Security (DHS), DoD Joint and DAF doctrine; presidential directives; and DoDs/DAFIs/programs.

1.1.2.1. DAFI 10-2503 presents concepts, policy, standards, and actions to OT&E and employ combat and agile combat support (ACS) forces capable of surviving and operating in and through highly contested environments.

1.1.2.2. DAFI 10-2501 and DAFI 10-2503 are synchronized via the planning framework/mission areas; however, DAFI 10-2503 contains additive passive defense policy to shape capabilities to address non-terrorist CBRN attacks against human caused CBRN adversarial effects for OCONUS operating locations (OL) at greatest risk. **Note:** The term OL references both installations/main operating bases (MOB) and forward operating sites (FOS) associated with agile combat employment (ACE). Terrorist use of WMD and non-terrorist CBRN attacks against CONUS locations are addressed in this publication.

1.1.3. Support SecAF operational imperatives to operationally-optimize information, generate resilient installations, and account for combat support maneuver aspects needed to protect forces from all-hazards/threat effects and continue mission operations.

1.1.4. Adopt the standardized language used throughout the national/international EM profession. Standardized language is that used to describe all-hazard/threat effects/impacts to enable holistic DAF EM Program risk management at all echelons.

1.1.5. Reinforce a continuous robust IRM policy to inform DAF EM programmatic capability investment strategies (by mission areas and common core capabilities) and increase the ability of senior DAF leaders to mitigate risk.

1.1.6. Facilitate internal installation cross-functional integration and external interoperability with local, state, federal, joint, and host nation (hereafter referred to as mission partners) as it relates to NIMS Type 3 or higher incidents requiring multi-agency and/or multijurisdictional interoperability.

1.1.7. Synchronize DAF EM Program activities in support of the DoD and DAF mission assurance (MA) construct to address risk to DAF-owned assets supporting strategic missions world-wide.

1.2. Situation. Global all-hazard/threat effects to DAF personnel and OLs will continue to create substantial risk to tactical, operational, and strategic DAF operational capabilities in support of Combatant Command (CCMD) missions.

1.3. Mission. AFPD 10-25 establishes primary and ancillary missions of the DAF EM Program.

1.3.1. Primary Mission. Prevent, protect, prepare for, mitigate, respond to, and recover from all hazards/threats affecting DAF installations worldwide.

1.3.2. Ancillary Missions. Support homeland defense; provide support to civil and host nation authorities; antiterrorism (AT) programs; and the countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) enterprise.

1.4. Preparedness Goal. The EM Program will build secure and resilient personnel and installations with integrated, interoperable, and adaptable common core capabilities. These capabilities will apply across the range of military operations to prevent, protect, prepare for, mitigate, respond to, and recover from physical hazard/threat effects that pose the greatest risk to lives, key resources, facilities, infrastructure, and operational missions.

1.5. Operational Environment Applicability. The DAF EM Program structure and functioning will account for DAF warfighting operational contributions within the global operating model to 1) defend the homeland; 2) strengthen alliances and partnerships with preparedness, response, and recovery efforts; and 3) support joint force blunt and surge operations. DAF EM Programs at all echelons will integrate common core capabilities to support crisis response, limited contingency operations, and major combat operations (MCO).

1.6. Program Policy and Guiding Principles.

1.6.1. Coordinates activities and operations that are scalable, flexible, and adaptable, and consistent with PPD-8, *National Preparedness*, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5), *Management of Domestic Incidents*, to include the National Planning Framework/Mission Areas, the National Preparedness System, and the NIMS IAW DoDI 6055.17. **(T-0)**

1.6.2. Provides a single integrated program across the DAF for installations, facilities, and activities and associated off-installation areas subject to DAF jurisdiction.

1.6.3. Does not replace existing, single-agency and/or single-hazard-set programs, plans, or capabilities, but rather integrates and synchronizes existing functional capabilities while coordinating the development of cross-functional common core capabilities for effective management of multi-agency and/or multi-jurisdictional emergencies regardless of cause.

1.6.4. Creates resilience through cross-functional capabilities that support the ability to adapt to changing conditions, withstand, and rapidly recover from disruption due to emergencies.

1.6.5. Propagates cross-functional interoperable information to and from mission partners along the DoD/DAF C2 continuum through the DAF EMIS and associated IT and application platforms.

1.6.6. Maintains readiness and sustains MA by establishing and maintaining a comprehensive, all-hazards EM Program. **(T-0)**

1.6.7. Prioritizes force survivability and mission continuation.

1.6.8. Aligns and adapts DAF EM Program structure and functioning with emergent DAF senior leader guidance and strategies regarding SecAF operational imperatives, effectiveness, and strategic focus areas.

1.6.8.1. Implements the BLES for integrated Air Base (AB) C2 systems/information, integrated base defense (IBD), and integrated base response and recovery (IBRR) to address pacing challenges posed by nation state adversary threats.

1.6.8.2. Contributes to DAF organizational design for installation headquarters (HQ) to prepare for crisis before it occurs to prepare C2 combat forces for deployment.

1.7. Assumptions. The following greatest hazard/threat effect assumptions will guide strategic, operational, and tactical DAF EM Program concepts; tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); OT&E/exercise requirements; and shape overarching deliberate to adaptive planning and risk management activities.

1.7.1. Strategic. The functions of the DAF, as specified in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5100.01, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*, (e.g., global strike, precision attack, global mobility, space operations, C2, ACS, etc.) are interdependent and mutually susceptible to degrading all-hazard/threat effects. Authoritative and advanced DAF EM Program hazard/threat potential effects information guides DAF wide preparation of forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war.

1.7.2. Operational. All MAJCOMs, FLDCOMs, and Space Commands (e.g., Air Operations Centers) and Air Force Forces (AFFOR) staffs supporting CCMDs are susceptible to degrading all-hazard/threat effects and cascading impacts. The DAF EM Program generates shared battle space awareness along the C2 continuum (regarding realized effects) and enables DAF functions to deploy and employ in and through the global all-hazard/threat operational environment.

1.7.3. Tactical. No DAF installation, CONUS or OCONUS, and/or OL is a sanctuary from the greatest hazard/threat effects. No installation has sufficient resources and/or capabilities and/or capacity to prevent, protect, prepare for, mitigate, respond to, and recover from its own from the greatest hazards/threats. Reliance on mission partners and varying schemes of maneuver (i.e., avoidance, dispersal, return to operate, etc.) are essential and prioritized means to enable force survivability and mission continuation. Speed and timing of conflict continuum adversarial fires requires ability to quickly execute EM and CBRN passive defense capabilities to out-maneuver enemy fires effects.

1.8. Emergency Management (EM) Preparedness System. Collectively, the DAF EM Program at all levels will execute an adaptive DAF EM preparedness system to build resiliency through interoperable whole-of-nation/partner nation/community common core capabilities while supporting DAF contributions to global operations. **(T-0)** The system will consist of seven components summarized below, illustrated in **Figure 1.1**, and expanded on in subsequent chapters. **(T-0)**

Figure 1.1. Emergency Management (EM) Preparedness System Components.



1.8.1. **IRM.** Installation IRM assessments will identify protected assets (lives, key response/recovery resources, facilities, infrastructure, and missions), ascertain hazards/threats of greatest concern, determine protected asset vulnerability, describe consequences, express relative risk, and stipulate locally determined measurable needed/targeted common core capabilities. Installations will posture IRM information as the basis for other component actions (i.e., evaluate and identify capability gaps between targeted and existing common core capabilities through EM exercises, conduct planning to close capability gaps, and posture resultant information for use within each planning framework/actionable mission area).

1.8.2. **Planning Framework and Mission Areas.** The DAF EM Program will use the defined planning framework and mission areas identified in **Table 1.1** as a cornerstone component at all levels. **(T-1) Note:** This policy clarifies and synchronizes varying terms in fundamental documents such as PPD-8, DoDI 6055.17, and DAFTTP 3-2.83, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Emergency Management*. The planning framework and mission areas will:

1.8.2.1. Facilitate installation internal integration and mission partner interoperability through shared use of common terminology, standardized processes, and systematic methods. **(T-0)**

1.8.2.2. Serve as the basis for structure, functioning, and information integration and interoperability with mission partners across the spectrum of preparedness, response, and recovery. **(T-0)**

1.8.2.3. Serve as the means to adapt to changing conditions, withstand, and rapidly recover from disruption due to incidents/enemy attack. **(T-0)**

1.8.2.4. Unify integrated systematic organizational action along an all-hazard/threat incident/attack event horizon regarding risk information propagation, future plans, logistics, force development, and current plans and operations. **(T-1)** See **Attachment 1** for definitions and role responsibilities of propagation, future plans, logistics, force development, and current plans and operations.

Table 1.1. Planning Framework and Mission Area Description.

Mission Area	Primary Description and Actionable Output
Prevent[1,2]	Avoid or stop a threatened or an actual act of terrorism. Conveys terrorist and/or nation state adversary threat capability and intent to and through mission areas. Monitors hazards/threats and flows information into subsequent mission areas for action.
Protect[1,3]	Protect lives, key resources, facilities, infrastructure, and operational missions prior to and/or during all-hazard/threat incidents/attacks (if not prevented or mitigated). Includes a menu of physical and passive defense protective measures for application along the hazard/threat incident/attack event horizon (i.e., evacuation, sheltering, dispersal, hardening, etc.).
Mitigate[4]	Decrease the impact, severity, or consequences (for specific identified hazard/threat vulnerabilities) to fix the cycle of damage, reconstruction, and repeated damage. Strives to reduce future risks/recovery cost and build more resilient DAF installations.
Respond	Save lives; stabilize the incident; protect property, resources, facilities, infrastructure, and the environment; meet basic human needs; and set the stage to recover and restore mission capability.
Recover	Stabilize and restore lifeline systems (i.e., water, electrical systems, cyber systems, communications, shelter, and transportation), meet the needs of individuals/the installation community, and prioritize near and long-term mission generation ability.
Notes: 1. Relates to Joint Force Protection Active/Passive Defense for adversarial nation state attacks. 2. Executed primarily through implementation of DoDI O-2000.16, Volume 1, *DoD Antiterrorism Program Implementation: DoD Antiterrorism Standards*. 3. Capabilities for if/when mission partners cannot prevent or mitigate hazards/threats. 4. Although mitigation activities occur during all incidents, associated core capability execution primarily occurs well before and after initial recovery actions are complete.	

1.8.3. **Common Core Capabilities.** The DAF and installation EM Programs will synchronize DoDI 6055.17 and AFTTP 3.2-83 common core capabilities identified in **Table 1.2** and detailed throughout DAFI 10-2501 while accounting for derivative and evolving PPD-8 common core capabilities and related concepts. **(T-0)**

Table 1.2. Emergency Management (EM) Targeted Common Core Capabilities.

<table>
<tr><th>Prevent</th><th>Protect</th><th>Mitigate</th><th>Respond</th><th>Recover</th></tr>
<tr><td colspan="5">Integrated Risk Management[1,2]</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="5">Planning – Education & Training – Exercises[1,2]</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="5">Public Information and Warning[1]</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="5">Operational Command and Coordination[1]</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Intelligence and Info Sharing</td><td rowspan="5">Long-Term Vulnerability Reduction
Community Resilience[2]
Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment[2]</td><td colspan="2">Situational Assessment[3]</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Interdiction and Disruption</td><td colspan="2">Infrastructure Systems & Mission Restoration[3]</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2" rowspan="2">Screening, Search, and Detection</td><td rowspan="3">Operational Communications
On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement
Fire Management and Suppression
Emergency Medical Services, Public Health, and Healthcare
Environmental Response/Health and Safety
Evacuation and Critical Transportation
Mass Care Services
Mass Search and Rescue</td><td rowspan="3">Health and Social Services
Natural & Cultural Resources
Housing
Financial Programing</td></tr>
<tr><td>Forensics and Attribution</td><td>Access Control and Identity Verification
Cybersecurity
Physical Protective Measures
Risk Mgt for Protection Programs and Activities[2]
Supply Chain Integrity and Security</td></tr>
</table>

Prevent	Protect	Mitigate	Respond	Recover
			Operations Fatality Management Logistics and Supply Chain Management	

Notes:
1. Crosscutting capabilities applicable to (and to integrate) all mission areas.

2. The DAF EM Program consolidates community resilience within education/training and risk management/assessments within integrated risk management.

3. Expanded to include both response and recovery mission areas. Additive DAF core capability regarding mission restoration (operational and support) within infrastructure systems. Inclusive of IBRR.

1.8.4. **Capability Evaluation and Validation.** DAF EM Programs at all echelons will utilize EM exercises detailed in **Chapter 5** as the primary means to evaluate common core capabilities and identify gaps between targeted and existing common core capabilities. **(T-1)** Included is the use of select EM exercises to validate installation operational readiness via inspections. In this context, EM exercises will evaluate EM capabilities and validate readiness, when applicable for inspections governed by DAFI 90-302, *The Inspection System of the Department of the Air Force*.

1.8.5. **Program Management Reviews (PMR).** DAF EM Programs at all echelons will utilize EM PMRs detailed in **Chapter 4** to improve program administration, increase preparedness, and execute a holistic risk management capability across the DAF EM enterprise via comprehensive EM planning, resourcing, and related actions. **(T-0)**

1.8.6. **Capability Investment Strategy.** DAF EM Programs at all echelons will holistically advance functional area integration and interoperability across the DAF through resourcing and sustaining certain DAF EM Program crosscutting and common core capabilities. Functional areas remain accountable for their own investment strategies that generate functional specific capabilities that relate to and help advance overarching whole-of-community EM common core capabilities.

1.8.7. **Adaptation via Information Integration and Interoperability.** Through time-phased agile software development and fielding, DAF EM Programs at all echelons will employ an enterprise IT EMIS within the installation common operating picture (COP) (e.g., C2 Incident Management and Emergency Response Application). **(T-1)**

1.8.7.1. The installation COP is an intuitive and interactive EM platform which provides enhanced C2 capability to commanders at all echelons, Crisis Action Team (CAT), Emergency Operations Center (EOC), and control centers. The installation COP can be integrated within other functional communities (e.g., Command Posts, Maintenance Operations Centers, Base Defense Operations Centers [BDOC], Emergency Communications Centers [ECC], etc.) for unified and synchronized EM preparedness, response, and recovery activities.

1.8.7.2. DAF EMIS will operationally optimize EM information in support of tactical, operational, and strategic decision advantage, the DAF ABMS campaign plan, and the JADC2 construct as detailed in **Chapter 11**.

Chapter 2

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1. Purpose. Identify key officials who carry out DAF EM Program policy and/or guidance to include the overarching duties and obligations of each within the context of the DAF organizational structure as specified in AFI 38-101, *Manpower and Organization*. This DAFI applies to relevant support and assistance to the USSF unless separately provisioned by the USSF or through mutual coordination with the USSF.

Section 2A—Headquarters (HQ) Air Force

2.2. Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower, Personnel, and Services (AF/A1). The AF/A1 will provide strategy, guidance, and oversight to MAJCOMs, FLDCOMs, Air Force Personnel Center, and installation force support units and activities for the DAF EM Program IAW DoDI 6055.17 and this instruction. AF/A1 will:

2.2.1. Provide SME concerning mass care services (MCS), lodging services, social services, sheltering, emergency assistance, search and recovery support, mortuary/fatality management support, and housing assistance for evacuees or incident-displaced personnel.

2.2.2. Ensure the recovery, handling, and storage of human remains and associated personal items.

2.2.3. Provide guidance on installation shelter stocking activities.

2.2.4. Ensure use of media outreach to ensure personnel accountability and family member support actions.

2.2.5. Ensure integration and use of the Air Force Personnel Accountability and Assessment System (AFPAAS) as a component of situational assessment during response and recovery operations.

2.2.6. Provide guidance and oversight to Air Force Installation and Mission Support Center (AFIMSC) in their role as the technical and specialized reachback capability for MAJCOM/FLDCOM-level requests regarding sheltering, emergency lodging, and search and recovery.

2.3. Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and Cyber Effects Operations (AF/A2/6). AF/A2/6 will:

2.3.1. Advise SecAF, Chief of Staff (CoS), United States Air Force (CSAF), and other Air Force leadership on foreign threats to installations.

2.3.2. Provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support to the AF/A4 regarding adversary threats to shape DAF protection plans, EM future plans, current plans, and current operations.

2.4. Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (AF/A3). The AF/A3 will provide strategy, guidance, and oversight for aircrew flight equipment (AFE), operational reporting (OPREP), weather, and Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) for the DAF EM Program IAW DoDD 3025.18, *Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA)*, DoDI 6055.17, and this instruction. AF/A3 will:

2.4.1. Provide current and future year sustainment funding requirements for AFE to the AFIMSC by 1 October annually.

2.4.2. Provide command program and planning support of the Emergency Mass Warning and Notification System (MWNS) requirement throughout the Air Force IAW AFMAN 10-206, *Operational Reporting (OPREP)*.

2.4.3. Oversee Air Force wide training, organizing, and equipping of weather organizations responsible for providing weather support to EM related operations.

2.4.4. Establish and sustain the Air Force liaison for DSCA.

2.4.5. Synchronize DAF current operations situational awareness information into and through the DoD/DAF operational C2 continuum in support of DSCAs, battle management command and control, and adaptive Joint All Domain Operations.

2.4.6. Provide strategy, guidance, and oversight for AFE, OPREP, weather, MA, and DSCA for the DAF EM Program IAW DoDD 3025.18, DoDI 3020.45, *Mission Assurance Construct*, DoDI 6055.17, and this instruction.

2.4.7. Provide DAF MA guidance related to; capability provider and asset owner activities for DAF-owned defense critical infrastructure, DAF MA forum structure, and DAF MA specific E&T.

2.5. Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection (AF/A4). The AF/A4 will manage strategy, guidance, and oversight of the DAF EM Program pursuant to DoDI 6055.17, IAW authorities delegated to AF/A4 as set out in Headquarters Air Force (HAF) Mission Directive (HAFMD) 1-38, *Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection*. AF/A4 will:

2.5.1. Provide guidance, resource advocacy, and oversight to the Air Force Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection portfolio to:

2.5.1.1. Develop and implement the DAF EM Program.

2.5.1.2. Develop and implement nuclear accident and incident response capabilities pursuant to DoDD 3150.08, *DoD Response to U.S. Nuclear Weapon and Radiological Materials Incidents*.

2.5.1.3. Develop and implement procedures for funding, certifying, and reporting on U.S. nuclear weapon incident response task force (RTF) capabilities, pursuant to DoDI 3150.10, *DoD Response to U.S. Nuclear Weapon Incidents*.

2.5.2. The AF/A4, through directors and subordinate directors, will ensure all units and Airmen are organized, trained, and equipped as needed to ensure compliance with requirements of the DAF EM Program.

2.5.3. IAW HAFMD 1-38, ensure DAF MAJCOMs, FLDCOMs, and installations are supporting the USSF through implementation of the EM Program.

2.6. The Director of Civil Engineers (AF/A4C). The AF/A4C under the authority, direction, and control of the AF/A4, will serve as the OPR for development and implementation of the DAF EM Program. (T-1) AF/A4C includes, but is not limited to, the Readiness Division Chief (AF/A4CX), the EM Branch (AF/A4CXE) which includes the DAF EM Program manager, (Dual-hatted as the DAF emergency manager and the DoD EM Steering Group Representative), and EM career field manager (CFM). AF/A4C will:

2.6.1. Provide strategy, guidance, and oversight for the DAF EM Program IAW DoDI 6055.17 and this instruction.

2.6.2. Serve as the OPR for the development and maintenance of all DAF EM Program publications.

2.6.3. Provide strategy, guidance, and oversight to the DAF for:

2.6.3.1. Organization and strategic direction for the DAF EM Program.

2.6.3.2. Development of DAF EM education, formal training, and ancillary training program requirements.

2.6.3.3. Development and sustainment of current and future DAF EM technologies, capabilities, and equipment.

2.6.3.4. Use of program element codes (PEC) for WMD, CBRN defense, and contingency operations respective to the Total Force component. The full listing and definitions of the PECs outlined by the DoD for the Air Force can be found on the Air Force Financial Management Data Quality Service website.

2.6.3.4.1. RegAF: EM Program (27574F).

2.6.3.4.2. RegAF: CBRN Defense (27593F).

2.6.3.4.3. ANG: EM Program (55167F).

2.6.3.4.4. ANG: CBRN Defense (55165F).

2.6.3.4.5. AFR: CBRN Defense (55166F).

2.6.3.4.6. USSF: EM Program (27574S).

2.6.4. Serve as the Air Force lead for service component support to DoD during the development of DoD directives, instructions and or manuals and joint publications that are primarily focused on DAF EM Program equities and issues.

2.6.5. Represent the DAF in joint, DoD, and external EM governance activities.

2.6.6. Serve as the DAF Modernization and Sustainment Lead for CBRN Defense and the DoD Chemical and Biological Defense Program, as delegated by Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration (AF/A10) in AFPD 10-26, *Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction*. Advocate for Air Force modernization requirements via established joint processes for prioritization, development, acquisition, and sustainment of chemical, biological, and related defense capabilities.

2.6.7. Ensure changes to DoDI 6055.17, appropriate aspects of the National Planning Framework, and other applicable federal and DoD guidance are incorporated into DAF EM Program strategy and guidance.

2.6.8. Ensure current and accurate EM mission essential tasks (MET) are listed in the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS).

2.6.9. Serve as the DAF MA related program activities lead for EM IAW DoDI 3020.45.

2.7. Director of Security Forces (AF/A4S). The AF/A4S will provide guidance to MAJCOM, FLDCOM, and installation Security Forces units or activities for force protection, integrated defense, and AT initiatives to synchronize related protection programs with the DAF EM Program. AF/A4S will:

2.7.1. Coordinate observations and trends from DAF and DoD MA assessments to address noted deficiencies in relevant protection programs covered by DoD MA assessments benchmarks IAW DoDI 2000.16, Volume 1.

2.7.2. Coordinate on all-hazards threat assessment (AHTA) process to ensure Service-level product provides accurate risk picture. **(T-0)**

2.8. Directorate of Resource Integration (AF/A4P). The AF/A4P is responsible for resource and information integration across the DAF EM program IAW the authorities outlined in HAFMD 1-38.

2.9. Deputy Chief of Staff for Air Force Futures (AF/A5/7). The AF/A5 will incorporate DAF EM Program capabilities, equities, doctrine, guidance, and instructions into future Air Force operational strategies, concepts, and requirements, as appropriate.

2.10. Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs (AF/A8). The AF/A8 will incorporate DAF EM Program capabilities, equities, doctrine, guidance, and instructions into Air Force planning and program development activities, as appropriate.

2.11. Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration (AF/A10). The AF/A10 will provide support and oversight for CBRN Defense aspects within the CWMD portfolio IAW DoDI 6055.17, AFPD 10-26, and this instruction. AF/A10 will:

2.11.1. Serve as the DAF Operations Lead for CBRN Defense and the CBRN Defense Program IAW AFPD 10-26 to ensure DAF forces maintain the ability to survive and operate in a CBRN-contested environment.

2.11.2. Support AF/A4 participation in the DoD Chemical Biological Defense Program.

2.11.3. Advise HAF staff and capability developers on nuclear capability requirements and provide risk analysis on user-submitted chemical and biological requirements based on operational and technical analysis.

2.12. The Air Force Surgeon General (AF/SG). The AF/SG will provide support, guidance, and oversight for all medical aspects of the DAF EM Program IAW DoDI 6055.17, DoDI 6200.03, DAFI 10-2602, *Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Enterprise,* DAFI 41-106, *Medical Readiness Program*, and this instruction. The AF/SG will:

2.12.1. Provide Air Force medical services support to the DAF EM Program. Advise the Air Force Council, CSAF, SecAF and the Joint Staff on medical aspects of the DAF EM Program. Provide medical expertise to aid in the development of EM and response policies, guidance, and procedures.

2.12.2. Provide guidance for incidents of public health concern and exposure monitoring requirements.

2.12.3. Monitor and investigate suspected health threats to assess the extent and scope of the threat's impact on personnel and general population, such as CBRN material, toxic industrial biological, toxic industrial chemical, toxic industrial material, disease, disease vectors, and water and airborne contamination, where applicable.

2.12.4. Oversee installation medical response programs. Develop Medical Treatment Facility (MTF) guidance supporting an all-hazards response. As appropriate, plans and procedures will include MTF evacuation, the provision of patient care, quarantine and isolation, and mass casualty response.

2.12.5. Provide medical SME for aspects of all-hazards and consequence management projects and acquisitions. Monitor medical limiting factor(s) (LIMFAC) and shortfalls of MAJCOM/ FLDCOM EM Programs and equipment. Provide force health protection data in support of installation assessments (i.e., criticality assessment, AHTA, vulnerability assessment, capability assessments, etc.).

2.12.6. Ensure health focused EM exercises are coordinated with the Air Force Inspector General (IG) to meet DoDI 6055.17 requirements.

2.12.7. Provide SME on medical aspects of the DAF EM Program to the HAF staff, other service components, Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and congressional liaisons.

2.13. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (SecAF) for Environment, Safety, and Infrastructure (SAF/IEE). The SAF/IEE is responsible for all matters pertaining to DAF built and natural infrastructure, safety, occupational health, radiation safety and radioactive materials management interest. The SAF/IEE will:

2.13.1. Provide strategic direction, policy and oversight for installation energy, environment, infrastructure, occupational health and safety.

2.13.2. Support installation EM program mitigation activities with efforts to improve resilience of critical infrastructure and risk reduction as referenced in **Chapter 8**.

2.13.3. Support installation EM program recovery activities with efforts related to Occupational Health, Safety, Environmental and Built and Natural Infrastructure as referenced in **Chapter 10**.

2.14. Headquarters Space Force, Mission Sustainment Division (SF/S4O). The SF/S4O will provide oversight to ensure DAF EM Program requirements outlined in this publication are coordinated across the USSF where applicable. The SF/S4O will:

2.14.1. Ensure compliance with this publication by utilizing the DAF EM program support and services via the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) as the force provider IAW Program Action Directive (PAD) 20-01, *Establishment of the United States Space Force (USSF) and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration (SAF/SQ)*.

2.14.2. Coordinate with AF/A4C to ensure DAF EM Program policy and guidance addresses USSF Space Base Delta/Space Launch Delta OT&E requirements where applicable.

2.14.3. Coordinate DAF EM program support and service requirements with HQ, AFIMSC IAW AFMC Programming Plan 21-01, *Servicing Major Command for Airmen Assigned to the United States Space Force.*

2.14.4. Develop and publish DAF EM Program supplemental guidance to this publication for USSF Space Base Deltas/Space Launch Deltas where applicable.

Section 2B—Major Commands (MAJCOM) and Field Commands (FLDCOM)

2.15. Major Commands (MAJCOM) and Field Commands (FLDCOM). MAJCOMs/FLDCOMs will provide oversight and guidance for the DAF EM Program within their respective MAJCOM/FLDCOM IAW DoDI 6055.17 and this instruction. MAJCOMs/FLDCOMs will:

2.15.1. Prepare to perform assigned EM missions, including supporting IBRR within their command, in permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments. Coordinate with other service components, allies, and partners IAW applicable DoD Functional Campaign Plans and Theater Campaign Plans containing CWMD lines of effort.

2.15.2. Integrate EM (all-hazards/threats) and CWMD (including CBRN defense) METs into MAJCOM/FLDCOM-level exercises IAW CCMD guidance or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Universal Joint Task List, CJCS Manual 3500.04F, *Universal Joint Task Manual*, when such guidance is not available.

2.15.3. MAJCOMs/FLDCOMs will, for non-AFIMSC programs and in coordination with AFIMSC Detachments, identify, prioritize, and advocate for EM program requirements.

2.15.4. Oversee execution of DAF EM Program requirements in host nations IAW Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) (or other international agreement), Department of State (DoS) and combatant commander (CCDR) guidance, and applicable host nation standards. Ensure EM Programs on installations in host nations have clear guidance regarding how EM Program capabilities could support foreign consequence management, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief operations.

2.15.5. Component MAJCOMs/FLDCOMs and AFIMSC will provide EM expertise to:

2.15.5.1. Applicable boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups in support of EM operational planning teams and or operational planning groups.

2.15.5.2. Provide building partnership capacity, civil-military cooperation, and security cooperation programs within assigned areas of responsibility.

2.15.5.3. Provide EM planning support for sourcing efforts to CCMDs and MAJCOM/FLDCOM operational and or contingency plans. Provide EM expertise to the respective Air Force staff in support of current and future operations planning events.

2.15.5.4. Provide CCMDs EM support for local or host nation operations in assigned areas of responsibility.

2.15.5.5. Ensure assigned installations complete a SECRET-level AHTA annually and 30 days prior to receiving a MA assessments IAW DoDI 3020.45. DoDI 6055.17, DoDI O-2000.16, Volume 1, AFI 10-2402, *Critical Asset Risk Management Program*, and this document.

2.15.6. MAJCOMs with an RTF and initial response force (IRF) mission will establish a Nuclear Weapons Accident/Incident Program that organizes, trains, equips, and exercises an RTF for nuclear accidents or incidents according to geographic CCDR requirements.

2.15.7. MAJCOMs with an RTF/IRF mission will develop concept plans that outline RTF and IRF duties and responsibilities.

2.15.8. MAJCOMs with a CCMD-directed nuclear response mission will be responsible for providing specialized training and equipment to assigned services supporting Air Force nuclear operations. Coordinate installation and mission support (I&MS) requirements with AFIMSC.

2.15.9. Develop and manage a COP that collects and consolidates MOBs, collocated base and or forward operating base warfighter capability assessment data.

2.15.10. Component-MAJCOMs (C-MAJCOM)/FLDCOMs will establish EM Working Groups (EMWG) and meet quarterly, or more frequently, as required, to advise the MAJCOM/FLDCOM commander and staff on EM and WMD defense issues. AFIMSC provides the EMWG on behalf of all non-C-MAJCOMS/FLDCOMs.

2.15.11. Identify, prioritize, and submit current and future EM Program related requirements, gaps, and shortfalls IAW AFI 10-601, *Operational Capability Requirements Documentation and Validation*, and the AFIMSC governance process.

2.15.12. MAJCOMs/FLDCOMs with geographically separated units (GSU) will coordinate with AFIMSC to ensure the GSU(s) are integrated into the host installation's EM Program and IAW **Chapter 4** of this instruction. **Note:** MAJCOMs/FLDCOMs are encouraged to coordinate with other MAJCOMs/FLDCOMs/installations within the MAJCOM/FLDCOM to provide flexibility for EM Program support (e.g., staff assistance visits) and utilize the closest Installation Office of Emergency Management (IOEM), if feasible. For example, Spangdahlem AB's GSU (Ghedi AB) is located in Italy, the closest IOEM is Aviano AB, Italy. United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE)/A4CX should coordinate with Spangdahlem AB, Germany and Aviano AB, Italy to ensure support is provided.

Section 2C—Intermediate Headquarters (HQ) United States Air Force (USAF)

2.16. Air Force Installation and Mission Support Center (AFIMSC). AFIMSC will provide DAF EM Program integration and execution through I&MS advocacy, education, training, equipment, and resourcing IAW DoDI 6055.17 and this instruction. AFIMSC includes, but is not limited to, the Director for Installation Support, ACS enterprise manager, EM Program manager, EM resourcing manager, EM Program performance and compliance, and EM training allocation manager. AFIMSC will:

2.16.1. Provide support for DAF EM Program integration across the Air Force to include cross-functional reachback support for DAF EM program requirements and capabilities.

2.16.2. AFIMSC Expeditionary Support Directorate will manage execution of PECs 27593F, 27574F/S, and 28028F and develop execution year funding strategies and support Program Objective Memorandum (POM) development through coordination with HAF, MAJCOMs/FLDCOMs, direct reporting units, and installations. **Note:** The ANG and AFR program manager will manage execution of their respective PECs (55165F, 55166F, and 55167F).

2.16.3. Monitor DAF EM Program health indicators and Air Force wide trend analysis. This will be completed through database review (e.g., Automated Readiness Information System [ARIS], Inspector General Enterprise Management System [IGEMS], Management Internal Control Toolset [MICT], etc.) and AFIMSC site visits, where applicable. Reports identifying program gaps will be provided to respective owning commanders, AFIMSC Detachments, and MAJCOM/FLDCOM staffs (e.g., A4C, IG, etc.) to assist with remediation actions.

2.16.4. Integrate DAF EMIS requirements; resource and maintain a Program Management Office; and coordinate with ACC and Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC) to further develop and field a DAF EMIS enterprise IT solution in and through the installation COP.

2.16.5. Evaluate DRRS shortfalls and LIMFACs to validate requirements, advocate for and assist MAJCOMs/FLDCOMs and installations to resolve EM deficiencies.

2.16.6. AFIMSC in conjunction with the MAJCOM/FLDCOM IGs will track training trends to inform the evolution of policy, doctrine, guidance, and instructions.

2.16.7. Support AF/A4C with advocacy for initiatives to improve readiness, cost-effectively modernize, and drive innovation throughout the DAF EM programs.

2.16.8. Provide DAF EM Program SMEs and integrate cross-functional program solutions Air Force wide.

2.16.9. Provide DAF EM program integration support of policies, procedures, concept of operations (CONOPS), equipment, and training program development Air Force wide.

2.16.10. Provide DAF EM expertise and recommendations for force and equipment posturing to MAJCOMs/FLDCOMs to meet specific DAF EM Program objectives and MAJCOM/FLDCOM requirements for threat-designated areas.

2.16.11. Develop DAF EM Program cross-functional integration in support of continuous evaluation and OT&E analysis.

2.16.12. Provide augmentee support to MAJCOM/FLDCOM IGs for DAF EM Program exercises and inspections.

2.16.13. Support MAJCOMs/FLDCOMs as needed with preparation for, response to, and recovery from natural disasters, hazardous material (HAZMAT) incidents, WMD attacks, and other contingencies.

2.16.14. Ensure IRFs are equipped, resourced, and have access to training to perform installation duties required to respond to a nuclear weapons incident according to DoDD 3150.08 and DoDI 3150.10.

2.16.15. Perform capability-based assessments, requirements development (following Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System process) and coordinate with AFMC and respective AFMC centers on development of science and technology, research development test and evaluation, materiel acquisition, and Air Force Contract Augmentation Program supporting the DAF EM Program.

2.16.16. Coordinate and integrate protection capabilities across the AFIMSC portfolio and with other cross-functional programs (e.g., Force Protection and Medical Services).

2.16.17. Advocate and resource the DAF EM Program EM contract support for all DAF installations.

2.16.18. Ensure installation tenants participate in DAF EM Program training and exercises conducted by host installations.

2.16.19. Support IBRR guidance and execution (i.e., rapid airfield damage assessment, rapid airfield damage repair, damage assessment teams, collective protection [COLPRO], etc.).

2.16.20. Continually monitor and propagate risk information to inform and shape EM functions of future plans, logistics, force development, and current operational response/recovery.

2.16.21. Distribute EM Program threat/hazard updates to AF/A4C, AFMC, MAJCOMs/FLDCOMs, and IOEM when requested or as changes occur.

2.16.22. Conduct EM-related trend analysis (e.g., IGEMs, MICT, program reviews, etc.) and provide EM-related trend analysis data (reports) to leadership on MAJCOMs/FLDCOMs, installation, units, and IOEM CBRN defense threat/hazard requirements and mitigation efforts.

2.16.23. Develop EM-related TTPs, CONOPS, and concept of employment to ensure current threats/hazards are integrated into future operations.

2.16.24. Provide reachback support to installations to assist in preparedness and during response and recovery operations.

2.16.25. Account for EM related innovation, modernization, and logistical support to installation EM Programs.

2.16.26. Coordinate home station and wartime CBRN sustainment equipment requirements and information through DAF and joint service organizations, as required.

2.16.27. Sustain and continually modernize an Installation Emergency Management Plan (IEMP) 10-2 capabilities-based planning tool.

2.16.28. Collect and analyze CE after action reports (AAR) and produce corrective measures to generate lessons learned for application across the Air Force. Lessons learned will be submitted to the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) within 14 days.

2.16.29. Perform current operations studies and analysis to include manpower and material warfighting requirements and other special or emerging studies as directed.

2.16.30. Support the development of DAF EM program, CBRN defense, and consequence management doctrine, policy guidance instructions, and manuals.

2.16.31. Develop and maintain DAF EM E&T courses. Courses will align competencies and proficiencies with Air Force Force Generation and ACE schemes of maneuver under contested and/or degraded conditions. Reference DAFI 10-2503 for CBRN defense E&T.

2.16.32. Coordinate with the 3E9 CFM to develop EM credentialing and certification training, interface with the functional schoolhouse, and perform force development responsibilities.

2.16.33. Monitor formal training through Air Education and Training Command and provide guidance on other agencies and allied forces training courses.

2.16.34. Support development, review, and revisions to technical field guidance, in non-directive publications, and resolve enterprise technical issues while supporting AF/A4CX publication process.

2.16.35. Foster EM force development training requirements, products, curriculum, and web-based computer training.

2.16.36. Represent the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Hazard Management Panel, Knowledge Management Panel, Training and Exercise Panel, Personal Protection Panel, and the Detection, Identification, and Management Panel on behalf of the DAF.

2.16.37. Serve as the DAF voting member on multi-service writers working groups.

2.16.38. Provide for DAF EM Program execution across the Air Force, to include reachback support for DAF EM program requirements and capabilities.

2.16.39. Provide DAF EM expertise in support of policies, procedures, CONOPS, equipment, and training program development DAF-wide.

2.16.40. Develop and execute DAF EM Program studies and analysis.

2.16.41. Develop a performance work statement that standardizes EM contract support for all DAF installations.

2.16.42. Support DAF efforts to set policy, guidance, and procedures to protect from and mitigate kinetic hazards.

2.17. Headquarters Cyberspace Capabilities Center (HQ, CCC). The Air Force Network Integration Center director will coordinate with AF/A4C, the Air Force Operations Group (AF/A3OG) and Chief Information Officer (SAF/CN) to ensure emergency response automated communication systems are compatible with other agencies' systems.

2.18. Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center Director. The Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center director will support the Air Force CWMD Modernization Working Group with operational and test result data and reports from acquisition programs with DAF EM equities.

2.19. Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC) Director. The AFLCMC Director will coordinate with AF/A4P, AF/A4C, and AFIMSC to support development and fielding of a DAF EMIS enterprise IT solution in and through synchronization of digital and business enterprise IT systems.

2.20. Field Operating Agencies and Direct Reporting Units. The field operating agencies and direct reporting units will provide support for the DAF EM Program IAW DoDI 6055.17 and this instruction. The field operating agencies and direct reporting units will:

2.20.1. Ensure plans address Air Force, MAJCOM/FLDCOM, and host nation EM, to include protective actions appropriate for identified threats.

2.20.2. Ensure support and mutual aid meet local, state, federal, and SOFA requirements.

Section 2D—Installations

2.21. Whole-of-Community and Joint Force Organizational Landscape. All units, tenants, and functional areas have various roles and responsibilities to support execution of the EM Program. **Table 2.1** provides perspective for this section and represents DAF EM policy to allocate major roles and responsibilities for key participants to achieve internal installation integration and external whole-of-community/joint force interoperability through shared mission area actionable outcomes and common core capabilities. As such, additional roles and responsibilities are specified beyond this section in subsequent chapters and within the context of the DAF EM Program construct (i.e., working groups, teams, responders, specialized teams, control centers, etc.).

Table 2.1. Organizational Whole-of-Community/Joint Force Interoperability Generation.

Whole-of-Community Shared Mission Areas	**Internal**	**Interoperability**	
	DAF Organizational Structure AFI 38-101	DHS and DoD/Joint EM Structures	
		Installation DAF EM Program Construct	
Crosscutting **Prevent** **Protect** **Mitigate** **Respond** **Recover**	Units and Functional Areas	Planning and Risk Management	Operational Command and Coordination
Examples and Titles	- Key Units/Squadrons (i.e., Security Forces (SF), Civil Engineer (CE), Logistics Readiness, Force Support, Maintenance, etc.) - Functional Areas (i.e., Fire and Emergency Services (F&ES), Medical Readiness, Public Health, etc.) - Units and Functional Areas with supported and supporting roles	-IOEM -EMWG -Emergency Planning and Preparedness Team (EP2T) -Unit Emergency Preparedness Coordinators (UEPC) -Installation Inspection Team	- ECC/Dispatch - Incident Commander (IC) - First and Emergency Responders - Specialized Teams - Control Centers - EOC - CAT - Command Post

2.22. Installation Commander. The installation commander will administer the installation EM Program IAW DoDI 6055.17, DAFTTP 3-2.83, and this instruction. Installation commanders will:

2.22.1. Utilize the DAF EM preparedness system concept referenced in **paragraph 1.8** to generate whole-of-community (local, state, federal, joint, and partner nation) interoperability (as applicable).

2.22.2. Lead the EM Program governance structure and ensure it is supported by the installation emergency manager (IEM), UEPC, and the EMWG.

2.22.3. The installation commander and subordinate commanders (e.g., group commanders) will participate in an installation EM Program immersion briefing with the IEM and senior fire officer, if available, within 30 days upon assumption of command.

2.22.4. Develop and maintain a comprehensive all-hazards EM Program IAW the DoDI 6055.17 and DoDI 3020.45 to maintain readiness and sustain MA. MA leverages the work of EM to assess, risk manage, and monitor threats and hazards that endanger mission execution.

2.22.5. Develop and maintain comprehensive integrated all-hazards IEMP 10-2 and ensure the plan is reviewed/updated by the IEM annually IAW DoDI 6055.17.

2.22.6. Ensure the IEM uses the IEMP 10-2 Planning Tool to develop the IEMP 10-2. For access to the IEMP 10-2 Planning Tool contact the program owner, The Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC)/Emergency Management Division (AFCEC/CXR).

2.22.7. Coordinate the installation EM Program capabilities with other federal departments and agencies; state, tribal, and local governments; other service components; or host nation emergency response agencies and departments. This coordination will identify and update points of contact (POC), emergency protocols, and TTPs in the event of an all-hazards incident IAW DoDIO-2000.16V1_AFI31-245-O, *Antiterrorism (AT) Program Implementation*, DoDI 6055.06, *DoD Fire and Emergency Services (F&ES) Program*, DoDI 6200.03, *Public Health Emergency Management (PHEM) Within the DoD*, and DoDI 6055.17.

2.22.8. Ensure tenant units and personnel operating at off-installation locations (e.g., recruiting stations, reserve centers, and leased spaces) are identified in the IEMP 10-2 and participate in the installation EM Program to include developing Emergency Action Plans (EAP) IAW 29 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 1910.38, *Emergency Action Plans*, and integrating with the installation's mass warning and notification (MWN) process and exercises. Unit checklists supporting the IEMP 10-2 serve as EAPs for on-installation units.

2.22.9. Coordinate DSCA operations IAW AFI 10-801, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*. When imminently serious conditions exist and time does not permit prior approval from higher headquarters (HHQ), the installation commander and responsible officials of other DoD components use Immediate Response Authority consistent with AFI 10-801 to respond to civil authorities' requests. The installation commander must accomplish follow-on reporting through the appropriate command chain as soon as possible after the event to ensure compliance with AFI 10-801.

2.22.10. Develop a community profile that includes a comprehensive examination of the community's demographics, infrastructure, requirements, and resources. The profile should include any information on personnel that will aid in determining the proper employment and protection of personnel (e.g., categorizing essential/non-essential personnel, first and emergency responders, etc.). Include the community profile in the IEMP 10-2.

2.22.11. Appoint in writing the IEM. The IEM will be an EM Civilian, (GS-12/13 Civilian), the senior 3E9 assigned to the installation host unit (primary Air Force Specialty Code [AFSC] 3E9X1), or equivalent DoD Wage Grade employee assigned to the IOEM.

2.22.12. Appoint in writing a primary and alternate EOC director, EOC manager, and installation representative to the Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) IAW this instruction. **Note:** Reference **Chapter 9** for EOC definitions and requirements.

2.22.13. Establish the installation EMWG to guide DAF EM Program implementation on the installation IAW DoDI 6055.17. The installation commander may delegate the responsibility to chair the EMWG no lower than the installation CoS.

2.22.14. Convene a Recovery Working Group (RWG) prior to beginning the recovery phase. The RWG will evaluate, prioritize, and coordinate installation recovery operations IAW DoDI 6055.17. **Note:** Reference **Chapter 10** for more information on RWG.

2.22.15. Establish a risk-based Shelter Management Program IAW the Installation Risk Management Program and include sheltering procedures within the IEMP 10-2. Shelter plans must consider terrorist/adversarial use of CBRN at CONUS locations where individual/personal protective equipment is not available, especially at locations where mission critical operations must continue.

2.22.16. Establish an installation EOC IAW Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-141-04, *Emergency Operations Center Planning and Design*, to include sufficient command, control, communication, computers, and intelligence infrastructure to access classified materials where assigned missions dictate and ensure it has standard operating procedures (SOP) developed for incident management.

2.22.17. Ensure installation EM exercises are conducted IAW **Table 5.2** and **paragraph 5.8** of this instruction.

2.22.17.1. Exercise the components of the IEMP 10-2, and the installation EM Program capabilities listed in **Table 5.2** at frequencies prescribed in **paragraph 5.8**.

2.22.17.2. Exercise and evaluate multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, and multi-jurisdictional emergencies based on risks from identified hazards/threats, including incidents with cascading impacts.

2.22.17.3. Coordinate installation exercises and evaluations containing EM related education, training, and exercise (ET&E) competencies with interagency partners and state and local agencies within CONUS and component MAJCOMs/FLDCOMs, host nation, and DoS within OCONUS IAW this instruction.

2.22.18. Ensure disaster response force (DRF) members receive the appropriate level of incident command system (ICS) training consistent with the NIMS, **Chapter 5** and **Attachment 5** of this instruction.

2.22.19. Ensure the installation has Next Generation 911 (NexGen 911) capability (previously known as Enhanced 9-1-1) with advanced services features, including recording capabilities, and at a minimum are capable of the functions listed in **Chapter 9**.

2.22.20. Establish warning and reporting system capabilities IAW AFTTP 3-2.56, *Multi-Service Reference for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Warning and Reporting and Hazard Prediction Procedures*, AFMAN 10-206, and MAJCOM/FLDCOM direction.

2.22.21. Ensure the criticality assessment, AHTA, vulnerability assessment, and capability assessments are reviewed and updated annually during the installation IRM process IAW DoDI 3020.45, DoDI 3020.52, *DoD Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Preparedness Standards*, DoDI 6055.17, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) AHTA Guide, and AFI 10-2402. Assessments that affect installation MA defense/task critical assets will be reported IAW AFMAN 10-206.

2.22.22. Through the IOEM, the installation commander will use the installation EM Program METs to measure program health and in-garrison levels of capabilities to assess the installations EM Program's risk to force and risk to mission.

2.22.23. At joint bases where the Air Force is not the lead service, follow the supporting component's installation EM Program guidance and ensure additional Air Force requirements are addressed in Memorandums of Agreement (MOA), Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) and/or Mutual Aid Agreements (MAA).

2.22.24. Provide and support individual and community preparedness across the installation by actively participating in the national preparedness and the DAF "Be Ready" awareness campaigns IAW DoDI 6055.17.

2.23. Unit Commanders. Unit commanders will establish a unit EM Program as directed by the IEMP 10-2 and **Chapter 3** of this instruction. The unit commander will administer the unit EM Program IAW DoDI 6055.17 and this instruction. Unit commanders will:

2.23.1. Unit commanders with EM responsibilities outlined in this instruction will identify a primary and alternate UEPCs (formerly known as the unit EM representative) to manage, coordinate, and serve as POC(s) for unit requirements in support of the installation EM Program. **Note:** Units without EM responsibilities outlined in this instruction are not required to appoint EOC representatives, UEPCs, or categorize personnel.

2.23.2. Primary UEPC should be a minimum of an E-5, GS-05 or equivalent, or contract support. Specific UEPC responsibilities are as follows:

2.23.2.1. Receive training IAW **Chapter 5** and **Attachment 5**.

2.23.2.2. Create and maintain a unit EM continuity folder, either hard copy or electronic, containing a copy of the unit's quarterly EM Program report. The EM Program report will include appointment of unit's representatives, Commander's Inspection Program requirements, and the unit's monthly shortfall or LIMFACs report.

2.23.2.3. Ensure dissemination of EM Program training material throughout the unit to support the installation's "Be Ready" awareness campaign.

2.23.3. Appoint unit representatives to the EOC, Control Center, and/or specialized teams as required by this instruction and the IEMP 10-2. Once appointed, unit representatives must attend the applicable EM E&T course(s) IAW **Attachment 5** to receive the prescribed training prior to performing duties of the appointed position.

2.23.4. Receive an EM immersion brief from the IEM on the installation EM Program, EM policy, DRF structure, and unit commander's program responsibilities within 30 days of assumption of command.

2.23.5. Develop unit SOPs, supporting checklists, contingency response plans (CRP), and EAPs to support the IEMP 10-2 and meet the NIMS requirements listed for the unit in the IEMP 10-2 if determined necessary by the EMWG.

2.23.6. Ensure members assigned to the DRF are organized consistent with **Chapter 3** and trained consistent with **Chapter 5** and **Attachment 5** of this instruction.

2.23.7. Implement a shelter-in-place (SIP) program for unit facilities IAW the installation AHTA and IEMP 10-2.

2.23.8. Unit commanders or deputy commanders should attend the installation EMWG and is prepared to advocate for unit EM Program equities.

2.23.9. Identify unit requirements, budget, obtain, store, and maintain unit emergency response equipment.

2.24. The Installation Emergency Manager (IEM). The IEM, through leadership and task organizing of the IOEM:

2.24.1. administer the installation EM Program, through the IOEM IAW DoDI 6055.17.

2.24.2. Develop, implement, execute, and sustain the installation commander's EM Program IAW PPD-8 and DoDI 6055.17.

2.24.3. Manage the installation EM Program IAW this instruction and guidance in DAFTTP 3-2.83.

2.24.4. Serve as the installation commander's senior authority regarding EM matters to the installation commander and performs mission essential duties that are inherently governmental. The IEM is categorized as mission essential.

2.24.5. The IEM, installation EM planner, and DAF emergency managers (military 3E9 and civilians assigned to the IOEM) perform duties directly supporting DAF mission essential functions (MEF) listed in DAFI 10-208, *Continuity of Operations Program (COOP)*. EM duties are inherently governmental and support the DAF MEFs listed in DAFI 10-208. Contractors cannot be used to perform inherently governmental duties but may be used to provide contract support to the IEM and installation EM Program.

2.24.6. Develop and maintain the comprehensive IEMP 10-2 IAW the IEMP 10-2 Planning Tool. For access to the IEMP 10-2 Planning Tool contact the program owner, AFCEC/CXR.

2.24.7. Collaborate and coordinate with installation responders, state, local, and tribal governments, other service components, and host nation emergency managers to achieve IEMP 10-2 integration and interoperability.

2.24.8. Coordinate with the medical emergency manager (MEM) and Public Health Emergency Officer (PHEO) to develop the disease containment plan annex included in the IEMP 10-2. The EMWG will be the coordination platform for non-medical DCP annex support.

2.24.9. Ensure critical infrastructure risks, threats, hazards, vulnerabilities, consequence, and capability assessments are integrated into the IEMP 10-2 using the IRM process IAW HSPD-7, *Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection*.

2.24.10. Provide the EMWG statistics and metrics on DRF forces and teams training, certification, and credentialing.

2.24.11. Serve as the program coordinator for the installation EMWG.

2.24.12. Convene the installation EMWG once every six months or more frequently, as required, to develop meeting minutes and track the progress of EMWG actions.

2.24.13. Chair the EP2T once every quarter or more frequently, as required.

2.24.14. Provide EM expertise to the installation MA Working Group.

2.24.15. Establish, equip, and maintain an installation CBRN Control Center IAW DAFI 10-2503, if located within a CBRN threat environment.

2.24.16. Establish community awareness through national preparedness and a continuous installation "Be Ready" awareness campaign.

2.24.17. RegAF IEMs will use PEC 27574F and PEC 27593F to plan, program, and budget for EM and CBRN defense requirements IAW DoDD 7045.14, *The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process,* and DAFMAN 65-604, *Appropriation Symbols and Budget Codes (Fiscal Year 2023)*, DAFI 10-2503, or most recent version of DAFMAN for current fiscal year. The IEM will coordinate with the UEPC and unit resource advisors to review EM Program funding requirements before submission for PEC 27574F and PEC 27593F.

2.24.18. AFR IEMs will use PEC 55166F (CBRN Defense Program - Reserve) to plan, program, and budget for EM and CBRN defense requirements IAW DoDD 7045.14 and DAFMAN 65-604.

2.24.19. ANG IEMs will use PEC 55165F and PEC 55167F to plan, program, and budget for EM and CBRN defense requirements IAW DoDD 7045.14 and DAFMAN 65-604.

2.24.20. Provide EM expertise to the installation mission sustainment team.

2.24.21. Provide desired learning objectives and assist writing injects as needed for installation readiness assessment and exercises containing EM learning objectives.

2.24.22. Oversee the installations, DAF EMIS as a whole-of-community/nation multi-agency response and recovery COP for Type 3 and higher incidents.

Chapter 3

PROGRAM EXECUTION

3.1. Purpose. Define, establish, and unify the DAF EM Program construct and EM occupational functions at all levels of command to achieve the EM preparedness goal.

Section 3A—Cross-Functional Construct and Functional Area Execution Structure

3.2. Cross-Functional Emergency Management (EM) Program Construct. The EM Program construct will consist of personnel/organizations aligned in various roles as illustrated in **Table 3.1**. **(T-1)** The construct will generate interoperable information to and through 1) operational levels, 2) planning and risk management, 3) incident command and coordination, and 4) along the DAF/DoD C2 continuum. **(T-1)**

Table 3.1. Emergency Management (EM) Program Construct.

<table>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Op Levels</td><td colspan="3">Tactical</td><td>Operational[1]</td><td colspan="2">Strategic[1]</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Installation</td><td>MAJCOM/
FLDCOM</td><td colspan="2">DAF - DoD</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">Planning & Risk Management</td><td colspan="6">Advisory Committees at all DAF Levels and the DoD</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="6">Prevent, Protect, and Mitigate</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">IOEM[1,2]
EMWG[3]
UEPC
Installation IG</td><td>MAJCOM/A4
AFIMSC/CD[4]
AFMRA</td><td>AF/A4
AF/SG
SAF/IE
SAF/IGI</td><td>ASD(S)</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="6">Operational Command and Coordination[10]</td><td colspan="6">Respond and Recover</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Incident Command System</td><td colspan="4">Operational C2 Continuum</td></tr>
<tr><td>ECC[9]</td><td>EOC[5,6]</td><td>Command Post[9]</td><td>Air Operations Center[9]</td><td colspan="2" rowspan="3">National Military Command Center (NMCC)[9]

Air Force Service Watch Cell (AFSWC)[9]

Air Force Crisis Action Team (AFCAT)[6]</td></tr>
<tr><td>IC</td><td>Mission Partners[7]</td><td>CAT[6]</td><td rowspan="2">Air Force Forces Staff[6]</td></tr>
<tr><td>First and Emergency Responders</td><td>Specialized and Support Teams[6]</td><td>Control Centers[6]</td></tr>
</table>

Adaptation via Information in Support of ABMS and JADC2 for Decision Advantage[11]
Notes: 1. DAF wide EM Program execution through DoD/DAF organizational and C2 structures. 2. Coordinates planning and risk management with local communities/partner nation equivalents. 3. Includes a foundational cross-functional EP2T. 4. Executes integration actions on-behalf of the MAJCOMs/FLDCOMs; leverages Air Force, Space Operations Command, and AFCEC emergency response functional leads including major long-term recovery reconstruction efforts. 5. When activated, conducts information management, resource allocation and tracking, and planning support to on scene responders or other Local/State EOCs and partner nation equals. 6. Activated based on context of a hazards/threats. Some installation control centers are 24/7. 7. Local/host nation on-scene responders and supporting government/non-government elements. 8. Joint Operations Center and related C2 nodes (i.e., Joint Logistics Operations Center). 9. Typically active 24/7 node with additive surge capability. This C2 node includes the installation commander and key staff and links ongoing incident response actions with the execution of the installation mission operations and maintains linkage with HHQs. 10. NIMS component that describes the systems, principles, and structures via a standard national to local framework for incident response/management. 11. Authoritative two-way information into common operational pictures at all levels.

3.3. Functional Emergency Management (EM) Community Execution Structure. The IOEM, AFIMSC/IZ, C-MAJCOM/A4C, and FLDCOM EM total force functional/occupational community will task organizations regarding the functions identified in **Table 3.2**. **(T-1)** The functions will:

3.3.1. Synchronize horizontal and vertical integration of EM occupations to facilitate cross-functional integration and the ability to achieve EM Programmatic outputs of planning and risk management and command and coordination along the C2 continuum. **(T-1)**

3.3.2. Enable and support emergent internal DAF HQ A-Staff purpose to prepare for crises before they occur to include enhancing interoperability with other joint/host nation partners. **(T-1)**

3.3.3. Prioritize the collection and propagation of authoritative/attributable information to operationally-optimize EM functional and cross-functional information in support of ABMS and JADC2. In simple terms, if an installation/MOB/FOL experiences an all-hazard incident, threat, or attack that compromises and/or degrades operational capability, EM functional and cross-functional teams will provide validated and authoritative information to the installation command post. In turn, the installation command post, through the C2 continuum, will act to inform tactical, operational, and strategic levels as a foundational element to achieve decision advantage (e.g., adjust the air tasking order, force deployment flow, availability status of alternate OL(s), etc.). **(T-1)**

3.3.4. Support total force development adaptability regarding DAF EM OT&E and exercise actions as to increase preparedness and readiness in support of C-MAJCOMs and CCMD joint force protection EM operations. **(T-1)**

Table 3.2. Emergency Management (EM) Community Functions.

Cross-Functional EM Program Construct	Functional EM Community Functions
Planning & Risk Management (Prevent, Protect, Mitigate)	Risk Information Propagation[1]
	Logistics
	Future Plans (Deliberate Planning)[2]
	Force Development (Training and Exercises)
Command & Coordination (Respond and Recover)	Current Plans (Adaptive Planning) and Current Operations

Notes:
1. Deliberate capability to continually burrow into strategic, operational, and tactical organizations and associated IT systems/data sets to extract, fuse, and posture authoritative hazard/threat effect and risk information. EM SMEs assigned to this function will maintain and have access to related Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information.

2. Inclusive of requirement determination and resourcing to manage risk.

Section 3B—Planning and Risk Management Governance Structure

3.4. Overview. Advisory committees at all levels will produce a clear progression of horizontal/vertical coordination regarding common core capability issues/gaps aligned within the EM mission areas. **(T-1)** **Table 3.3** illustrates the arrangement and relationship between the DoD/DAF EM Program advisory committees to facilitate execution of AF/A4 related authorities and achieve the DAF EM preparedness goal.

Table 3.3. Emergency Management (EM) Program Advisory Committees/Governance Structure.

<table>
<tr><th>Level</th><th colspan="6">Emergency Management Advisory Committees</th><th>Chair via Authorities</th></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">Strategic</td><td colspan="6">DoD EM Steering Group</td><td>ASD(S)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="6">DAF EMWG</td><td>AF/A4CX
SAF/IE</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="6">DAF EM Panel</td><td>AF/A4CX
AFIMSC
AFCEC
C-MAJCOM/A4</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Operational</td><td colspan="6">C-MAJCOM EMWG[1]</td><td>C-MAJCOM/A4</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="6">AFIMSC EMWG[2]</td><td>AFIMSC/CA</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Tactical

Community Partners[5]</td><td colspan="6">Installation EMWG[3]</td><td rowspan="2">Installation Commander/
IEM[3]</td></tr>
<tr><td>Prevent[4]</td><td>Protect</td><td>Mitigate</td><td>Respond</td><td>Recover</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="7">Common Core Capability Integration</td></tr>
</table>

Notes:

1. Emphasis on adversarial nation state CBRN risk management through assigned EM/CBRN defense SMEs at USAFE-Air Force Africa (AFAFRICA), Pacific Air Force (PACAF), Air Force Central, and Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) to generate greater IBRR concepts and policy IAW DAFI 10-2503.

2. On-behalf of all MAJCOMs/FLDCOMs, provides DAF EM Program I&MS integration in support of AF/A4 EM authorities.

3. Includes a foundational cross-functional EP2T chaired by the IEM.

4. The SFS/S2 Threat Working Group (TWG) and EMWG interrelated working groups that share hazard/threat information to shape, target, and build protection, mitigation, response, and recovery capabilities.

5. Planning and risk management activities to identify common core capability gaps for senior leader risk management decisions; de-conflicts local command and coordination issues in and through EOCs.

3.5. Department of the Air Force (DAF) Headquarters (HQ) Emergency Management (EM) Program. The DAF HQ EM Program is supported by the DAF EMWG. The DAF EMWG will guide the DAF EM Program implementation across the DAF and serve as the mechanism to bring natural, technological, and human caused hazard/threat effect common core capability gaps and policy requirements to the DoD EM Steering Group for action. The DAF EMWG will meet at least quarterly or more frequently, as required, IAW DoDI 6055.17. **(T-0)**

3.5.1. AF/A4CX will chair the DAF EMWG. **(T-1)**

3.5.2. The DAF EM Program manager, on behalf of the DAF EMWG chairs, will coordinate, publish, and maintain a DAF EMWG charter. **(T-1)**

3.5.3. The DAF EMWG may convene to support other DAF corporate forums such as the CWMD Council, the CWMD Integration Group, the AF/A3O MA Working Group (and associated MA related program activities), the Security Enterprise Steering Group, the Force Protection Steering Group, and other associated working groups.

3.5.4. The DAF EMWG will be a 2-digit executive level oversight group with appropriate representation as specified in **Table 3.4**. **(T-1)** Required functional lead members will be responsible for addressing major issues pertaining to mission areas defined in **Table 1.1** and common core capabilities listed in **Table 1.2**. Included are recommended supportive functional area advisors and enduring topics of interest.

Table 3.4. Emergency Management Working Group (EMWG) Functional Lead Members and Recommended Advisors.

Mission Area	Functional Leads	Supportive Functional Advisors[2] & Topics
Integration[1]	DAF EM Program Manager, AF/A4P, SAF/IEE, SAF/IGI, SF/S4O	– AF/A1, CFM Lead – AF/A2/6, Emergent Threats (kinetic to CBRNE) – AF/A3, MA, Aircrew Flight CBRN Equipment, C2 Centers, and Operational Needs – AF/A5, Requirements and Force Posturing – AF/A8, Resourcing – AF/A6, Cyber Vulnerabilities – AF/A10, Ability to CWMD (e.g., Prevent) and Related Operational Analysis – Staff Judge Advocate, Authorities – Chaplain Corps, Post Incident Personnel Support – Public Affairs, Strategic Messaging – Safety, Accident Investigation – Weather, Climate Change – Mortuary Affairs – SAF/IGI, Readiness Inspection Trends – SAF/CN, Cybersecurity – SAF/SA, Red Force Modeling and Simulation – AFIMSC, Combat Support Integration – AFCEC/CXR advisory member
Prevent	AF/A4S, AF/A4C, SF/A4O	
Protect	AF/A4S, AF/A4C, AFMRA, AF/A4L, SF/S4O	
Mitigate	SAF/IEE, AF/A4C, SF/A4O	
Respond[3]	AF/A4C, AF/A4S, AFMRA, and AF/A3T, SF/S4O	
Recover	AF/A4C, AF/A1, AF/A4L, SAF/FM, SF/S4O	

		– AFMRA/SGX – Medical Readiness
Notes: 1. Although not a mission area, pertains to crosscutting common core capabilities that integrate and generate interoperability within and through mission areas and mission partners. 2. Provide support and advice from within the 3- or 4-digit Directorate as needed/requested. 3. First and Emergency Responders from AF/A4C, AF/A4S, and Air Force Medical Readiness Agency (AFMRA) (i.e., F&ES, Explosive Ordnance Disposal [EOD], and EM CBRN Defense, SF, and Medical). 4. Command Post (1C3 AFSC functional representative) regarding operational C2 to include warning and notification capabilities.		

3.5.5. The DAF EMWG will account for EM preparedness and defense near-to-far term all-hazard/threat risk information propagation, future planning, logistics, force development, current plans, and current operations. **(T-1)**

3.5.6. The DAF EMWG will develop EM Program executive strategy documentation to include an executive policy or vision statement for EM and a two-year strategic plan that defines the mission, goals, objectives, and milestones for the EM Program IAW DoDI 6055.17. **(T-0)**

3.6. Component-Major Command (C-MAJCOM) Emergency Management Working Group (EMWG). The C-MAJCOM EMWG will address cross-functional issues affecting EM capabilities within the MAJCOM. **(T-0)**

3.6.1. The C-MAJCOMs (USAFE-AFAFRICA), PACAF, Air Mobility Command, Air Force Special Operations Command, and AFGSC) EMWG will:

3.6.1.1. Identify, track, and close gaps within EM preparedness system components of IRM, EM planning framework/mission areas, associated common core capabilities, EM exercise evaluation results, and other information (i.e., local lessons learned reports and status of EM training, exercises, plans, etc.). **(T-0)**

3.6.1.2. Meet at least quarterly IAW DoDI 6055.17. **(T-0)**

3.6.1.3. Prioritize synchronization of cross-functional policy/concepts for MOB/FOL common core capabilities to survive and operate regarding human-caused CBRNE adversarial fires effects while accounting for CCMD operational plans/concepts IAW DAFI 10-2503. **Note:** AFGSC will focus policy/concepts regarding adversarial nuclear/radiological effects.

3.6.2. The C-MAJCOM EMWG will be at least a 3-digit working group with appropriate representation similar to the installation structure/representatives listed in **Table 3.5** to include enduring topics of interest listed in **Table 3.4**. **(T-1)**

3.6.3. The C-MAJCOM/A4C, or delegate, will chair the EMWG and will:

3.6.3.1. Advocate for and provide strategic guidance regarding posturing MOB/FOS EM preparedness/defense common core capabilities to support SecAF Operational Imperatives to optimize information (i.e., MOB/FOS status), generate resilient installations and account for combat support maneuver aspects needed to protect forces and operational capability from all-hazards/threat effects and continue mission operations. **(T-1)**

3.6.3.2. Provide executive level oversight to advance C-MAJCOM including Decision Advantage, Integrated AB C2 Systems/IBD, and IBRR to address pacing challenges regarding nation state CBRNE adversary hazard/threat effects IAW DAFI 10-2503.

3.6.4. The C-MAJCOM EM Program manager will:

3.6.4.1. Coordinate, publish, and maintain a C-MAJCOM EMWG charter. **(T-1)**

3.6.4.2. Monitor and brief the EMWG regarding the status of EM functional community event horizon near-to-far term all-hazard/threat risk information propagation to include status of future plans; logistics; force development; and current plans/current operations. **(T-1)**

3.6.5. AFIMSC will provide representation and prioritized support to C-MAJCOM EMWGs. **(T-1)**

3.7. Air Force Installation and Mission Support Center (AFIMSC) Emergency Management Working Group (EMWG). The AFIMSC EMWG is responsible for EM I&MS integration actions, on-behalf of the non-C-MAJCOMs/FLDCOMs. **(T-0)**

3.7.1. The AFIMSC EMWG will identify, assess, and monitor gaps within EM preparedness system components of IRM, EM planning framework/mission areas, associated common core capabilities, EM exercise evaluation results, and other information (i.e., local lessons learned reports and status of EM training, exercises, plans, etc.). **(T-1)**

3.7.2. The Director, AFIMSC Installation Support, or delegate, will chair the AFIMSC EMWG, with administration provided by AFIMSC and AFCEC/CXR. **(T-1)**

3.7.3. The AFIMSC EMWG will meet at least quarterly or more frequently, as required, to address enterprise-wide EM Program trends, shortfalls, and/or LIMFACs that require DAF, MAJCOM/FLDCOM, or AFIMSC enterprise attention for resolution. **(T-1)** The AFIMSC EMWG will consist of appropriate representation similar to the installation EMWG structure/representatives listed in **Table 3.5** to include enduring topics of interest listed in **Table 3.4**.

3.7.4. The AFIMSC EMWG will ensure MAJCOM/FLDCOM EM Program equities, including mission requirements and shortfalls, are incorporated into the AFIMSC EMWG governance process. **(T-1)**

3.7.5. The AFIMSC EMWG members will review the annual DAF EM SPR described in **paragraph 4.8** and the EMWG chair will approve the DAF EM SPR. **(T-1)**

3.7.6. The AFIMSC EM Program manager will coordinate, publish, and maintain an AFIMSC EMWG charter. **(T-2)**

3.7.7. AFIMSC will present trends and program gaps as identified through the continuous evaluation program. **(T-2)**

3.8. Installation Emergency Management Working Group (EMWG). The installation EMWG, under the leadership and guidance of the EMWG chair (and collaboration with relevant organizations) will identify, assess, and manage risk to enable decision-making that balances risk, cost, and mission requirements. **(T-0)**

3.8.1. The installation commander will establish the installation EMWG to guide DAF EM Program implementation on the installation IAW DoDI 6055.17. **(T-0)** The installation commander may delegate the responsibility to chair the EMWG no lower than the installation commander's CoS. **(T-1)**

3.8.2. For installations at greatest risk from catastrophic natural disasters and/or CBRNE incidents/attacks, the installation EMWG will not be combined with other similar working groups (reference **Table 4.1** for risk index). **(T-1)** For installations with less risk, the installation commander may approve the EMWG be combined with other similar working groups. **(T-3)**

3.8.3. The installation EMWG membership will consist of required mission area functional leads and other recommended members as specified in **Table 3.5**. **(T-2)**

3.8.3.1. Functional leads (e.g., unit or specific AFSC) will be responsible for addressing major issues/gaps pertaining to actionable mission area outputs defined in **Table 1.1** and related common core capabilities listed in **Table 1.2**. If functional leads are not assigned to the installation, the EMWG will account for related equities and actions regarding needed/targeted capabilities.

3.8.3.2. The EMWG will form an installation EP2T (formerly known as the All-hazards Response Planning Team). **(T-1)** The EP2T will consist of the functional leads identified in **Table 3.5** and chaired by the IEM. **(T-3)** The EP2T members will be responsible to the EMWG chair and supportive to the IOEM. **(T-3)** The EP2T mission area functional leads will participate in each activity of installation planning and risk management cycle illustrated in **Figure 4.1**. **(T-3)**

3.8.3.3. If the installation combines the EMWG with other similar working groups, functional leads are still required as part of the EP2T and will participate and contribute to the similar working group and be supportive to the IOEM. **(T-3)**

3.8.4. The IEM will facilitate EMWGs and chair the EP2Ts. **(T-1)**

3.5. Installation Emergency Management Working Group (EMWG) Membership.

Mission Area	Functional Leads[1]	Recommended Members
Integration[2]	IOEM, Installation IG	– Unit Commanders – Intelligence – Base Operations – Airfield Operations – MA – Mission Sustainment Team – AFE – Communications/Cyber – Contracting – Financial Management (Comptroller) – Installation Deployment Officer – Judge Advocate Representative – Maintenance Group – MEM – Public Health – PHEO – Bioenvironmental Engineering – Operations Group – Public Affairs – Safety – Tenant Units – Weather – IG – Wing/Delta Plans and Programs
Prevent	SFS/S2, IOEM	
Protect	SFS/S5, IOEM, SG[3], CES/CEN, LRS/LGR	
Mitigate	CES/CEN[4]	
Respond	CES/CEF, SFS/S5, SG[3], CES/CED, IOEM, Installation Command Post[5], CES/CEO[6]	
Recover	CES/CEO[7], CES/CEN, FSS/FSO, LRS/LGR, FM	

Notes:
1. See **Chapter 5** and **Attachment 5** for required and recommended training.
2. Although not a mission area, pertains to crosscutting common core capabilities that integrate and generate interoperability within and through mission areas and mission partners.
3. Due to organizational variations and assigned capabilities, if assigned, the PHEO and/or Bioenvironmental Engineers (BE) will be the medical functional lead. Additional medical EM Program equities (to include roles and responsibilities) are detailed in AFI 10-2519, *Public Health Emergencies and Incidents of Public Health Concern*, and AFI 41-106 and should be overseen by the medical EM representative for the installation.
4. Provides geospatial information system support to the EMWG and functional leads.
5. Although not a first or emergency responder, the Command Post functional lead is a critical aspect regarding the public information and warning common core capability.
6. Provides imperative infrastructure stabilization capabilities.
7. Accounts for RWG aspects and at least annually reviews predetermine recovery functions, roles, and priorities.

3.8.5. The installation EMWG will:

3.8.5.1. At a minimum, meet every six months while the EP2T will meet every quarter, or more frequently, as required, to consolidate risk information and formulate briefings regarding the overall status of installation core capabilities for EMWG risk management decisions. **(T-0)**

3.8.5.2. Monitor progress of the EP2T and provide necessary support throughout the deliberate planning and risk management process. **(T-2)**

3.8.5.3. Validate the functions associated with establishing and sustaining the installation EM Program are performed IAW DoDI 6055.17 and this instruction. **(T-0)**

3.8.5.4. Address cross-functional issues affecting the installation EM Program and elevate issues requiring I&MS advocacy to the AFIMSC EMWG. **(T-1)**

3.8.5.5. Determine the scope of the installation EM Program, utilizing factors such as assigned units, mission, and IEMP 10-2 roles and responsibilities, according to the guidelines set out in this instruction. At a minimum, the program scope will include the identity of units supporting the EM Program (to include tenant organizations), the size and composition of response and recovery capabilities, and required specialized teams. **(T-2)**

3.8.5.6. Prepares the installation AHTA in coordination with the installation TWG IAW DoDI 3020.45, DoDI 6055.17, AFI 10-2402, and this instruction. **(T-0) Note:** The AHTA should be developed with the active engagement of personnel familiar with local conditions and mission requirements.

3.8.5.7. Incorporate exercise and inspection trend analysis to identify possible organization, training, and equipment issues for submission to the MAJCOM/FLDCOM and AFIMSC. **(T-3)**

3.8.5.8. Prioritize and submit funding requests based on IRM assessments of criticality, hazard, vulnerability, capabilities shortfalls, and LIMFACs through the installation commander to the MAJCOM/FLDCOM and AFIMSC for resolution. **(T-2)**

3.8.5.9. Contribute to the Mission Sustainment Risk Report IAW AFI 90-2001, *Mission Sustainment*, through the mission sustainment chair.

3.8.5.10. Address the status of installation EM response equipment through the IEM (and appropriate unit stakeholders) action to gather data and present to the EMWG IAW DoDI 6055.17. **(T-0)**

3.8.5.11. Address unfunded EM response equipment requirements through IEM action to consolidate unfunded EM response equipment requirements and presentation to the EMWG. **(T-3)**

3.8.5.12. Incorporate local, state, tribal, federal, and host nation planning committees, councils, or groups. Representatives from civilian agencies may be invited to discuss functional issues (e.g., cross-jurisdictional issues, notification processes, interagency response procedures, and MAA at foreign [non-domestic] locations) the DoS, theater commander, and host nation agreements may provide additional requirements for the EMWG.

3.8.5.13. The EMWG, through the IOEM, will consolidate resource inventory entries and present to the EMWG on at least an annual basis to ensure Senior leader visibility regarding resources postured in support of multi-jurisdictional response. **(T-2) Note:** AFIMSC will deliberately track installation level inputs to the MAJCOMs/FLDCOMs for consolidation and subsequent analysis and incorporation into the annual DAF EM Program SPR.

Section 3C—Advancing Whole-of-Community Interoperability

3.9. Installation Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP). EM Program accreditation is voluntary; however, installation commanders are encouraged to seek accreditation of their EM Program.

3.9.1. EM Program accreditation is a quality assurance process consisting of self-assessment, documentation, and external review to validate the program meets laws, policies, regulations, and consensus standards.

3.9.2. The IEM, upon request of the installation commander, should execute the EMAP process leveraging existing accreditation programs such as EMAP.org or the National Weather Service Storm Ready Program. The IEM should notify AFIMSC upon application for assistance with achieving accreditation. **Note:** Only the Storm Ready Program accreditation is free, others may require a fee at the responsibility of the installation.

3.9.3. The accreditation process should leverage the American National Standards Institute-recognized EMAP.

3.9.4. AFIMSC should establish, coordinate, and maintain installation EM Program accreditation status and assist IEMs to achieve accreditation.

3.10. Professional Emergency Manager Certification.

3.10.1. Certification encourages EM occupational professionals to enhance their career development, broaden and expand their expertise of EM, and demonstrate requisite skills and knowledge. The DAF should encourage emergency managers to seek certification.

3.10.2. AFIMSC will establish, maintain, and execute a civilian and military professional emergency manager certification program. **(T-1)**

3.10.3. There are three levels of certification. Each level is a four-step process to include a completed application, submission, certification exam, and determination (concluded by AFIMSC).

3.10.3.1. All-Hazards Responder. Focuses on emergency response concepts and foundation for an emergency manager. Recommended for E1-E5 with two years as a 3E9 and GS with three years of EM experience.

3.10.3.2. Associate Emergency Manager. Focuses on a blend of responder and EM skills. Recommended for E5 with five years as a 3E9, CE Officer with two years EM experience, and GS with five years EM experience.

3.10.3.3. Certified Emergency Manager. Focuses on EM tenants: analysis, planning, decision-making, and assignment of resources. Recommended for E6 with eight years as a 3E9 and GS with eight years EM experience.

3.10.3.4. Reference Air Force Certified Emergency Manager Certification Program Guide (2 October 2017) for certification level requirements.

3.10.4. EM personnel (3E9, civilians serving in 0089 PD or equivalent, and EM contract support) are encouraged to obtain and maintain the appropriate level of EM certification.

Chapter 4

PLANNING AND INTEGRATED RISK MANAGEMENT (IRM)

4.1. Purpose. Specify installation deliberate EM planning and IRM concepts and policy to 1) support development of targeted whole-of-community common core capabilities needed for multi-jurisdictional response/recovery and 2) posture authoritative foundational risk information layers needed to execute the entirety of the DAF EM preparedness system described in **paragraph 1.8**.

Section 4A—Strategic Planning and Risk Management Approach

4.2. Program Administration. The DAF EM Program will document an ongoing method for program evaluation, maintenance, and revision. In coordination with the EM advisory committees, all EM risk management products, plans, procedures, and resource management products will be reviewed and updated at least annually. **(T-0)**

4.3. EM Program Execution Strategy. The scope and depth of risk from catastrophic natural disasters and/or adversarial nation state CBRNE attacks will regulate installation planning and risk management activities to include related OT&E and exercise requirements. **(T-0)**

4.3.1. The DAF installation CBRNE Risk Index and Natural Disaster Risk Index will inform and shape advanced EM and CBRN defense capabilities for in-place forces and deployment to include supporting ACE concepts. Requirements will align within the EM planning framework/mission areas and common core capabilities as to support interoperability with mission partners. **(T-1)**

4.3.2. Installations will reference **Table 4.1** and apply Tactical Emergency Management Program Execution Requirements (TEMPER) as a cornerstone DAF EM Program policy to holistically plan for and manage all-hazard/threat effects. **(T-1)**

Table 4.1. Installation Tactical Emergency Management Program Execution Requirements (TEMPER).

CBRNE Risk Index[2]	Natural Disaster Risk Index[1]
1 - High	A - High
2- Significant	B - Significant
3- Moderate	C - Moderate
4- Low	D - Low



Notes:
1. CONUS installations will reference the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) National Natural Disaster Risk Index and the DHS Resilience Analysis and Planning Tool to support natural disaster risk determination. For OCONUS installations, MAJCOMs/FLDCOMs should determine similar authoritative natural disaster risk determination tools and provide guidance to installations.
2. CBRNE risk index relates to adversarial nation-state CBRNE weapons/threats translated into effects and risk to lives, key resources, facilities, infrastructure, and operational missions (tactical to strategic) for OCONUS DAF installations/MOBs/FOSs. A risk index 1 represents high risk, a risk index 2 represents a significant risk, and a risk index 3 represents moderate risk, and a risk index 4 represents low risk for select installations. See DAFI 10-2503.

4.4. Risk Information Propagation. AFIMSC will publish, develop, maintain, and sustain an installation adversarial nation-state CBRNE risk index. The CBRNE risk index will:

4.4.1. Serve as authoritative and foundational event horizon function of risk information propagation as to inform installation EM and CBRN defense future plans, logistics, force development, and ultimately current plans and operational response/recovery functions. **(T-1)**

4.4.2. Consolidate and translate adversarial nation-state CBRNE weapons/threats into a holistic level of risk and effects regarding lives, key resources, facilities, infrastructure, and operational missions (tactical to strategic) for all DAF installations/MOBs/FOSs. **(T-1)**

4.4.3. Generate a holistic DAF protected asset profile that will involve the identification and prioritization of installations and facilities, along with associated tenants, to maximize preparedness, resilience, and readiness with limited fiscal resources. **(T-0)**

4.4.4. Source and account for OLs within the Enduring Location Master List and the Contingency Location Master List. Lists are managed by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (SecDef) for Policy, refer to DoDI 3000.12, *Management of U.S. Global Defense Posture (GDP)*, for more information. **(T-0)**

4.4.5. Support identification of additive installation passive defense, EM, and force health protection OT&E and deliberate planning assumptions requirements for specified installations as influenced by select CCMDs and associated Air Components/C-MAJCOMs. For context, deliberate planning assumptions will relate to estimates regarding casualties, level of damage/destruction, number of personnel requiring dispersal/relocation, CBRN contamination levels/hazard duration, etc. In addition, the risk index will inform additive planning and IEMP requirements for passive defense aspects such as dispersal, hardening, camouflage, concealment, and deception, COLPRO/shelters, and CBRN defense/consequence management. **(T-1)**

4.4.6. Employ operational assessments and geospatial modeling and simulation to isolate and correlate layered kinetic, electromagnetic, and individual to layered CBRNE hazard/threat predictive enemy/red attack effects on lives, key resources, facilities, infrastructure, and operational mission generation assets. **(T-1)** Outputs of this activity will:

4.4.6.1. Directly support DAF advancement of overarching ACE, passive defense, EM, and force health protection CONOPS. **(T-1)**

4.4.6.2. Support EM and CBRN defense counter effects materiel/non-materiel solution requirement development. **(T-1)**

4.4.6.3. Provide hazard/threat effects for collective training/exercise events and inspections (e.g., a 3-day operational readiness exercise with X percent of population killed in action; Y percent of population wounded in action; Z percent of resources and infrastructure damaged; and impacts on operational missions to include cascading effects). **(T-1)**

4.4.6.4. Inform synchronization and prioritization of operational targeting for counter WMD defeat/prevent/protect actions. **(T-1)**

4.5. Emergency Management (EM) Program Capabilities Based Planning. EM planning at all echelons will facilitate internal integration and mission partner interoperability through use of the common core capabilities identified in **Table 1.2** and detailed in **Attachment 3** and **Attachment 4**. **(T-0)**

4.5.1. Variations in assigned and/or resourcing of installation functional area assets/capabilities could result in a functional area not having the ability to execute/achieve an installation determined specified targeted core capability (e.g., resultant capability gap). Through this intentional PPD-8/national preparedness systematic design, the installation EMWG, in collaboration with mission partners, use common core capabilities as the basis to determine whole-of-community capability gaps and conduct planning to address risk (i.e., create functional and/or cross-functional MAAs with mission partners). In this context, installation commanders (through EMWG advisement) will implement risk management decisions to avoid, control, transfer, or accept risk. **(T-0)**

4.5.2. Functional areas are responsible for assessing, resourcing, and/or communicating gaps as informed through this policy and specific functional area policy/guidance.

4.6. Emergency Management (EM) Planning and Risk Management Cycle. EM Programs at all levels will collaborate and execute a continuous systematic EM planning and IRM cycle (example illustrated in **Figure 4.1**). **(T-1) Note:** Although the cycle generates critical information needed to develop portions of the IEMP 10-2, the primary purpose of the cycle is to continually build all-hazard/threat awareness and advance whole-of-community/DAF common core capabilities.

Figure 4.1. Emergency Management (EM) and Integrated Risk Management (IRM) Cycle.



4.7. Advisory Committee Emergency Management (EM) Program Management Reviews (PMR). To accomplish program administration and risk management across the DAF EM enterprise, the IOEM, on behalf of the EMWG, will conduct unit and installation EM PMRs. At the operational and strategic levels, the AFIMSC Emergency Services Division, on behalf of the AFIMSC EMWG and the DAF EMWG, will consolidate installation PMR data and conduct an annual comprehensive DAF EM Program SPR. Reference **Table 4.2** for level indications, program review activity, and frequency requirements.

4.7.1. Tactical Level. Both PMRs and the I&MS SPR enable DoD/DAF EM Program administration through DoD/DAF EM Program advisory and governance committees and do not constitute inspection and continual evaluation activities defined by DAFI 90-302, that specifies continual evaluation pertains to functional communities and DAFI 10-2501 is a cross-functional program. Installation and unit level PMRs will:

4.7.1.1. Apply a risk-based frequency cycle (presented in **Table 4.3**) as determined by the IOEM and approved by the EMWG. In this regard, the greater the risk from installation specific all-hazards/threats, the more TEMPER to the EMWG. **(T-1)**

4.7.1.2. Provide training and assistance to UEPC regarding specific requirements identified in the IEMP 10-2 and pertinent unit provided targeted common core capabilities (i.e., public information and warning, operational communications, situational assessment, mass care/shelter spaces available, evacuation, etc.). **(T-1)**

4.7.1.3. Operationally-optimize and validate information needed for incident/attack response and recovery is valid, current, and available. Includes review of unit level data/information postured within DAF EMIS/installation COP such as unit determined protection plans, control center checklists, and POCs. **(T-1)**

4.7.1.4. Provide the IOEM with means to review and understanding unit contributions to targeted capabilities, extrapolate existing capabilities, identify gaps/trends, and leverage results to inform the EMWG regarding risk management decisions. **(T-1)**

4.7.1.5. Include training and assistance to UEPCs/unit commanders regarding best practices to fulfill cross-functional (i.e., 10-series) policy. **(T-1)**

4.7.1.6. Generate common hierarchical information regarding status of unit level and installation EM Programs across the DAF and culminate in an annual holistic AFIMSC I&MS EM Program SPR to guide and enable operational and strategic EMWG program adaptation via information. **(T-1)**

4.7.2. Operational Level. To facilitate installation and unit level PMRs and DAF EM via information, AFIMSC will establish, maintain, and facilitate methods for unit commanders and advisory committees to collect, consolidate, and generate common matrixed information to include gaps within Installation EM Preparedness System components of IRM, planning framework/mission areas, associated common core capabilities, evaluation/validation results, and other information (i.e., local AARs/lessons learned and status of EM training, exercises, plans, etc.). **(T-1)**

4.7.3. Strategic Level. AFIMSC will provide a I&MS EM Program SPR to the DAF EMWG annually. The SPR will:

4.7.3.1. Express the scope and depth of near-to-far term all-hazard/threat risk trends to installations (i.e., climate change, morphing terrorist/nation state threats/weapons effects, etc.). **(T-1)**

4.7.3.2. Indicate the status of IEMPs, training, exercises, and equipment. **(T-1)**

4.7.3.3. Present overarching global EM Program common core capability gaps aligned within mission areas. **(T-1)**

4.7.3.4. Provide a summation of AFIMSC EM resource management activities and prioritized risk-based investment strategies (binned within DAF EM preparedness system components) for materiel/non-materiel solution procurement needed to close gaps/address most concerning trends and continually build resilience. **(T-1)**

4.7.3.5. Through collaboration with AFIMSC, consolidate and provide, by MAJCOM/FLDCOM, installation EM Program accreditation status. **(T-1)**

4.7.3.6. Include consolidated results of the inspection system of the DAF to inform the DAF EMWG regarding warfighting readiness. **(T-1)**

Table 4.2. Emergency Management (EM) Program Execution Review Level, Activity, and Frequency.

Level	Review Activity	OPR	Frequency
DAF	Operational & Strategic I&MS SPR	SAF/IEE & AF/A4C	Annually[1]
C-MAJCOM		MAJCOM/A4C	
AFIMSC[1]		AFIMSC/CD	
Installation	PMR	Installation Commander	
Unit		IOEM	See **Table 4.3**
Note: Primary information gathering from C-MAJCOMs, installations, and units for presentation to the DAF EMWG. **(T-0)**			

Table 4.3. Risk Index Cycle.

CBRNE Risk Index	Natural Disaster Risk Index[1]	Frequency
1 - High	A - High	12 Months
2 - Significant	B - Significant	18 Months[2]
3 - Moderate	C - Moderate	24 Months[2]
4 - Low	D - Low	36 Months[2]
Notes: 1. Reference **Table 4.1** for risk index. 2. EMWGs may determine a lesser frequency as necessary and as determined by the installation commander.		

Section 4B—Installation Planning and Risk Management Execution Roles

4.8. Overview. The IOEM, EMWG, EP2T, and UEPCs, will collaborate and prepare installations for hazards/threats of greatest concern. **(T-1)** Unit commanders should consider consolidating personnel within various roles to increase efficiency and contribution to installation resilience and preparedness. **Note:** Although not a specific part of the installation EM planning and risk management construct, the Installation Plans office (e.g., XP) or OSS/OSX for Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) host installations will support and assist the IOEM in the coordination and publishing of the IEMP 10-2. **(T-1)**

4.9. Installation Office of Emergency Management (IOEM). Under the leadership and guidance of the IEM, the IOEM will assist in management of the installation EM Program and facilitate cross-functional integration and mission partner interoperability through execution of the installation planning and IRM cycle indicated in **Figure 4.1** **(T-1)** Military, civilians, and contractors assigned to the IOEM as emergency responders will not be tasked with additional duties (e.g., facility manager, security manager, snow removal augmentee, antiterrorism representative, etc.). **(T-1)**

4.10. Installation Emergency Management Working Group (EMWG). As specified in **paragraph 3.8**, the EMWG will manage risk and prioritize protected asset categories (lives, facilities/resources, infrastructure, and missions) based on installation EP2T all-hazard/threat risk assessment results (and related outside agency risk assessments). **(T-1)** The EMWG senior level oversight will inform functional and cross-functional development of targeted/needed capabilities to protect assets and establish resourcing priorities to close identified capability gaps.

4.11. Unit Emergency Preparedness Coordinators (UEPC). The UEPC, on-behalf of the unit/squadron commander, will identify and prioritize the unit's protected assets (e.g., lives, key resources, infrastructure, operational missions, etc.). **(T-1)** The UEPCs will provide insight to unit protected asset vulnerability regarding installation specific all-hazards/threats and be prepared to advise and support the EP2T. The UEPC will manage the unit EM Program according to the direction of the unit commander and ensure distribution of EM related information. **(T-2)** The IOEM will maintain contact with the UEPC and emphasizes the responsibility to meet EM Program requirements.

4.12. Inspector General (IG). As depicted in **Figure 4.1**, the IG performs a pinnacle function within the installation planning and IRM cycle through evaluating mission area actionable outputs (defined in **Table 1.1**) and common core capabilities (identified in **Table 1.2**) during all-hazard/threat installation wide EM exercises. In this regard, the IG provides evaluation reports and input to the Commander's Inspection Management Board, EMWG, and the installation commander regarding the installation's ability to prevent, protect, prepare for, mitigate, respond to, and recover from physical hazard/threat effects that pose the greatest risk to lives, key resources, infrastructure, and operational missions.

Section 4C—Community Profile Process and Protected Assets

4.13. Concept Overview. The community profile process is an essential function that generates cornerstone information for the execution of the installation EM Program. The concept centers on identification and prioritization of protected assets and information layers for subsequent use while conducting IRM assessments, planning activities, and for use during response and recovery operations. The demographic analysis identifies and locates personnel, important facilities/resources, routine and critical infrastructure, and/or mission assets that require some type of protection (i.e., evacuation, sheltering, hardening, dispersal, etc.).

4.14. Roles and Responsibilities. The EMWG, through the EP2T, is primarily responsible for generating the community profile and identifying protected assets. The installation commander will review and approve the community profile and protected assets annually. All other units and tenants will support the EP2T and provide support as needed. **(T-1)** The IEM will facilitate generation of the community profile and a protected asset listing with direct support from the EP2T. **(T-1)**

4.15. Community Profile Requirements. The community profile will identify population demographics, density, and distribution to include characteristics and locations regarding protected assets of 1) lives/personnel, 2) key facilities/resources, 3) infrastructure, and 4) primary operational mission assets. Included will be shared protected asset category focal points as presented in **Attachment 2**. **(T-0) Note:** The term location is relative to the typical day-to-day fixed locality of protected assets. Planning teams should consider recruiting stations, reserve units, and other outposts that may be geographically separated as part of the community profile.

4.15.1. Accumulated data will consist of static and geospatial locality information regarding protected assets. Information generated will be included within the IEMP 10-2 and DAF EMIS (or other EOC COP IT applications employed).

4.15.2. Installations should take all community factors listed in **Table 4.4** into planning consideration.

Table 4.4. Key Community Planning Factors.

Geography	Property	Infrastructure	Demographics	Response Organizations
-Major geographic features -Typical weather patterns	-Numbers -Types -Ages -Building Codes -Critical facilities -Potential secondary hazards	-Utilities construction, layout, access -Communication system layout, features, backups -Road systems -Air and water support	-Population size, distribution, concentrations -Number of people in vulnerable zones -Special populations -Animal populations	-Locations -POCs -Facilities -Services -Resources

4.15.3. The community profile process will generate a prioritized listing regarding protection and initial recovery of facilities and infrastructure to include certain uniquely vulnerable populations (UVP) identified in **Attachment 2**. **(T-1)**

4.15.3.1. The facility and infrastructure priority lists should account for response/recovery from natural/technological incidents when operational mission demands are low and when response/recovery from adversarial nation state CBRNE attacks during MCO sortie generation and/or weapons systems demands are high.

4.15.3.2. The intent of this policy is to preposition decision advantage by specifying priorities aligned within anticipated hazard/threat effect categories (natural, technological, and human-caused) and executed within actionable mission areas.

4.15.3.3. Protected asset priorities will serve as a means to apply limited resources with respect to reducing risk before an incident/attack to prevent, protect, prepare for, mitigate, respond to, and recover from all-hazard/threat effects to protected assets. In contrast, protected asset priorities will serve as a means to apply limited resources to effectively respond to incidents/attacks, save lives, and recover installations while balancing force survivability and mission continuation demands.

4.15.4. The community profile process will account for task critical assets located on and/or supported by the installation. **(T-0) Note:** Compilation of the community profile and protected asset information is finalized after completion of IRM assessments.

4.15.4.1. Task critical assets (TCAs) pertain to global, trans-regional, multi-domain, or multi-functional missions designated by the SecDef as vital to national security and critical to the execution of strategic priorities and plans. DoDD 3020.40, *Mission Assurance (MA)*, provides the basis for Defense Critical Missions, Defense Critical Infrastructure, and Defense Critical Assets, to include CBRN survivability and energy resilience assets.

4.15.4.2. The Installation Mission Assurance Office (IMAO) will have the primary role regarding identification of these assets. The IMAO, IEM, EP2T, and EMWG will collaborate and ensure MA related assets are accounted for within the planning and risk management process to include actionable mission area outcomes. Although much of the information concerning MA assets is classified, installations will follow appropriate operations security safeguards.

4.15.4.3. TCAs are contained within each protected asset category. Consider a MA protected asset special identifier to highlight and segregate these assets for planning and risk management activities to include focusing operational response and recovery missions on these assets.

4.15.4.4. Include DAF protection level resources that relate to MA.

4.15.5. The DAF EMIS, through spiral development, will contain functionality to account for the community profile process described with resultant ability to assign and determine protected asset vulnerability attributes for the full range of installation (and mission partner) identified natural, technological, human-caused terrorism/nation state hazard/threat effects.

4.16. Output of Community Profile Information into Emergency Management (EM) Education, Training, and Exercises (ET&E).

4.16.1. The IOEM will incorporate local community profile protected assets and focal point information as a training course objective for senior leader orientation, base populace, CBRN defense, shelter management team (SMT)/mass care, and other courses as to provide localized and tailored information to improve situational awareness and enhance unit/individual protection of protected assets.

4.16.2. Exercise planners will use the local community profile and installation identified protected asset information to inform exercise related Master Scenario Events List (MSEL) inputs (e.g., inputs that target specific prioritized assets).

Section 4D—Integrated Risk Management (IRM)

4.17. Concept Overview. Installations will identify hazards/threats that have the greatest potential to impact their jurisdiction, the likelihood of their occurrence, and the vulnerability of supported missions, assigned personnel, property, facilities, infrastructure, the environment, and the jurisdiction as a whole to these hazards/threats. **(T-0)** Once hazards/threats are identified, installations will identify consequences, establish target/needed common core capabilities, and evaluate postured capabilities. **(T-1)** In this context, installations will attempt to prevent the hazard/threat from impacting the installation and mitigate the potential effects of identified hazards/threats to reduce the resulting consequences of those hazards/threats.

4.18. Roles and Responsibilities. The EMWG, through the EP2T, is primarily responsible for conducting IRM activities with the technical direction and facilitative support of the IEM and IOEM. The installation commander will annually review, acknowledge assessment results, and establish overarching EM Program priorities. **(T-0)** All other units and tenants will support the EMWG and EP2T and provide support as needed.

4.19. Risk Assessment Requirements. Risk assessments will provide the installation commander and the EMWG with the information and evaluation necessary to make risk decisions.

4.19.1. The IEMP 10-2 is a direct result of the installation commander and/or EMWG direction to develop cross-functional EM and functional area capabilities to respond to and recover from identified hazards/threats. As such, installations will complete the risk management process prior to the development of the IEMP 10-2. **(T-0)** A similar timeline exists for the development of the installation AT plan as detailed in DoDI 2000.16, Volume 1, with a notable exception the EM risk management process integrates all hazards/threats, vice solely terrorism, into the process.

4.19.2. Accumulated risk assessment data will be included within the IEMP 10-2 and DAF EMIS (or other EOC COP IT applications employed) to support responders and the EOC.

4.19.3. IRM activities and assessments detailed in **Attachment 2** will:

4.19.3.1. Identify and prioritize assets that need protection. **(T-1)**

4.19.3.2. Identify the most likely/most dangerous all-hazards/threats for 1) natural, 2) technological, and 3) human-caused unintentional and 4) human-caused intentional. **(T-1)**

4.19.3.3. Identify vulnerability of protected assets regarding the hazards/threats of greatest concern. **(T-1)**

4.19.3.4. Identify potential consequences/effects that a recognized hazard may have on protected assets, the installation as a whole, or a specific function based on the current level of installation EM common core capabilities. **(T-1) Note:** CONUS installations will reference to DHS Comprehensive Planning Guide (CPG) 201, National Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) to generate a metrics with a common language such as affected population, number of people requiring evacuation, or number of people requiring MCS to assist with whole-of-community interoperability.

4.19.3.5. Assess the installation's current level of EM common core capabilities based upon integrated non-materiel and materiel readiness of the supporting functional areas. Installations will conduct this action through a combination EMWG analysis, EM exercise evaluation, and PMRs. **(T-1)**

4.19.3.6. Establish capability targets (i.e., capability needed) based on estimated impacts/effects to protected assets from the identified hazards/threats of greatest concern. **(T-1)**

4.19.3.7. Determine relative risk in terms of vulnerability, consequence, and the capability of the installation to manage the resulting emergencies. Includes the need to identify, monitor, and track gaps between needed capabilities (targeted capabilities) and current capabilities. **(T-1)**

4.19.3.8. Conduct planning and adjust plans to address capability gaps (i.e., establish/update MOU/MOA) or present alternative means to manage the identified risk to the EMWG (i.e., risk avoidance, control, transfer, or acceptance). **(T-1)**

4.19.3.9. Evaluate combined vulnerability, consequence, and installation capability to manage realized hazard/threat effects. Since all hazards/threats are not equal in terms of probability or severity, installations will establish relative risk factors in order for the EMWG and the Installation Commander to conduct risk management across the entire jurisdiction vice solely based upon vulnerability and/or consequence of a specific hazard to a specific mission. **(T-1)**

4.19.3.10. Reference the DAFI 10-2503 and the DAF CBRNE Risk Index to identify and account for human caused adversarial nation state enemy fires effects and associated additive OT&E and planning requirements/assumptions. **(T-1)**

4.19.3.11. Identify, through the annual installation EM Program management review, the installations level of risk regarding hazard/threat effect categories. **(T-1) Note:** AFIMSC will consolidate this risk information and present it to the DAF EMWG during the annual operational and strategic SPR.

4.19.3.12. Use a holistic approach to assess each hazard/threat, to include criminal and terrorism hazards/threats, from the perspective of vulnerability, consequence, and the capability to prevent, protect, prepare for, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the hazard/threat. **(T-1)**

4.19.3.13. Account for risk management evolution as the installation identifies hazard/threat effects, develops and/or employs prevention/protection capabilities, completes mitigation actions, and matures common core capabilities to respond to and recover from identified hazards/threats. **(T-1)**

4.19.4. All DAF installations will develop and maintain a SECRET-level AHTA utilizing the DTRA AHTA methodology (as specified in DoDI 6055.17) to identify natural, technological, and human-caused threats/hazards (including terrorism and terrorist/adversarial use of WMD on DAF-led installations (CONUS/OCONUS) to shape planning and preparedness activities/requirements. **(T-0)**

4.20. Related Resources. IRM activities and assessments are complex activities that require use of valid and authoritative data.

4.20.1. Installations will reference DAFTTP 3-2.83, and the concepts contained within the DHS CPG 201 to assist with overall risk management and assessment activities as applicable. **(T-0)**

4.20.2. The installation EMWG and EP2T will use emerging validated and authoritative technology and threat sensing of publicly available information to help inform the criticality, hazard/threat, vulnerability, and capability assessments. **(T-1)** These tools will also provide commanders situational awareness in near-real time so that pre-defined hazards and threats can be detected and identified early enough to inform the decision-making process.

4.20.3. Installations within the CONUS will utilize the DHS National Risk Index and the associated natural disaster Resilience Analysis and Planning Tool to inform assessment, planning considerations, hazard mitigation (resilience) plans, and within the EOC to support response and recovery operations. **(T-1)**

4.20.4. Installations within the CONUS should utilize the DHS Homeland Infrastructure Foundation-Level Data to inform foundational level overarching geospatial data and assessment, planning considerations, hazard mitigation (resilience) plans, and within the EOC to support response and recovery operations. **(T-2)**

4.20.5. Installations will utilize the Installation Geospatial Information and Services Program (aka GeoBase) as the authoritative data source regarding the installation natural and built infrastructure for planning considerations, hazard mitigation (resilience) plans, and within the EOC to support response and recovery operations. **(T-1)**

4.21. Output of Integrated Risk Management (IRM) Information into Emergency Management (EM) Education, Training, and Exercises (ET&E).

4.21.1. The installation commander, through the IOEM, will incorporate risk assessment results as training course objectives for senior leader orientation briefings, base emergency preparedness orientation (BEPO), first and emergency responder training, CBRN defense, SMT, and other courses as determined locally. **(T-1)** The intent of this policy is to provide localized and tailored all-hazard/threat risk information to improve situational awareness and enhance unit/individual actions to respond to and recover from all-hazard/threat effects. The IOEM should provide geospatial visualization of information as illustrated in **Figure 11.1**.

4.21.2. Exercise planners will use integrated risk information for exercise planning, scenario development, and inputs (e.g., induce simulated hazard/threat effects targeting identified vulnerabilities for protected assets and associated focal points). **(T-1)**

Section 4E—Emergency Management (EM) Planning

4.22. Concept Overview. Generally, installation EM planning should concentrate planning efforts on NIMS Type 3 incidents defined in **Table 7.1**. Emergency planning is a continual process of (1) establishing the missions, requirements, and operational concepts for each EM mission area within a specific jurisdiction; (2) directing the development of identified EM capabilities within the jurisdiction, (3) synchronizing the actions of assigned functional areas with the established operational concept, and (4) determining the jurisdiction's actions specific to each identified hazard/threat.

4.23. Roles and Responsibilities. The EMWG and the EP2T are responsible for executing the emergency planning process with the technical direction and facilitative support of the IEM and IOEM. **(T-1)** All other units/agencies will support the EMWG, EP2T, IEM, and IOEM to include tenant units.

4.24. Emergency Management (EM) Planning Requirements. Information generated through EM planning activities will be incorporated in the IEMP IAW DoDI 6055.17. **(T-0)**

4.24.1. The EMWG, EP2T, and IEM will use the IEMP 10-2 planning tool (administered by AFCEC/CXR) to facilitate the development and maintenance of the IEMP for installations where the DAF is the lead. **(T-1)**

4.24.2. Information generated through EM planning activities will be incorporated into DAF EMIS (or other EOC COP IT applications employed). **(T-2)**

4.24.3. The EMWG chair and the IEM will ensure that use of the IEMP planning tool does not undermine the planning process. **(T-1) Note:** For austere locations with low bandwidth, consider downloading the tool, working offline, coordinate, and then upload when connectivity is available.

4.24.4. Installations will address EM planning requirements within the IEMP as summarized in **Table 4.5** and expanded on in **Attachment 3**. **(T-0)**

Table 4.5. Emergency Management (EM) Planning Necessities Summary.

Overarching Planning Functions	
Capabilities Based	Prevention
Operational Communications	Mitigation
Emergency Public Information & Warning	Recovery
Key Protection and Operational Response Planning Functions	
Emergency Lock-Down	Initial Damage Assessment
Specific Hazard Shelters	Mass Care Services[1]
Shelter-in-Place	Evacuation
Civilian Shelter Coordination	Safe havens (Installation and Remote)
Public Health Emergencies[2]	Mass Prophylaxis
Installation Biological Preparedness	Casualty Collection
Hazardous Material Incident	Community Lifelines
Nuclear Weapon Accident/Incident	Mail Facilities
Dispersal and Relocation Execution	Force Maneuver[3]
Common Core Capability Target Statements[4]	

Notes:
1. Includes mass feeding, family assistance, call centers, and points of distribution.

2. Includes restriction of movement and associated residential pandemic sheltering.

3. EM Program support for DAF combat forces executing ACE.

4. Measurable deliberate planning factors (DPF) regarding hazard/threat effects for select core capabilities (e.g., estimated casualties, key resources/facility damage/destruction, etc.). See **Attachment 4**.

4.25. Related Resources. Installations will use the planning process described in CPG 101, *Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans*, and CPG 201, *Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) and Stakeholder Preparedness Review (SPR) Guide*, to facilitate compatibility and interoperability with external response and recovery partners. **(T-0)** Additional EM planning guidance is found in DAFTTP 3-2.83.

4.26. Output of Emergency Management (EM) Planning Results into Education, Training, and Exercises (ET&E).

4.26.1. The installation commander, through the IOEM, should incorporate local planning results into training course objectives for the senior leader orientation briefings, BEPO, CBRN defense, SME, and other courses as determined locally.

4.26.2. Exercise planners and the IEM will use planning results for exercise planning, scenario development, and inputs (e.g., induce simulated hazard/threat effects to stress test EM planed functions and common core capabilities such as operational communications, public warning and notification systems, evacuation routes, dispersal, and relocation, etc.). **(T-1)**

Section 4F—Installation Emergency Management (EM) Plan Content

4.27. Concept Overview. The content of an IEMP 10-2 is focused on the development of EM common core capabilities within a jurisdiction and the coordination of such EM capability between supporting jurisdictions. The IEMP 10-2 cites its legal basis, states its mission, goals, objectives, and purpose, defines the plan development and maintenance processes, and acknowledges assumptions.

4.28. Roles and Responsibilities.

4.28.1. The installation commander will be the approval authority for the IEMP 10-2. **(T-1)**

4.28.2. The IEM will coordinate plans, where appropriate, with other federal departments and agencies; state, tribal, and local governments; other DoD components; or host nation emergency response agencies and departments to identify and update responsible POCs, emergency protocols, and expectations in the event of an incident on or affecting a DoD installation IAW DoDI 6055.17, DoDIO-2000.16V1_AFI31-245-O, DoDI 6055.06, DoDI 6200.03. **(T-0)**

4.28.3. Interagency coordination should include information sharing, pre-incident NIMS resource management typing, communications, incident management, and capabilities that may provide early warning of a potential hazard or threat. **Note:** Reference **Chapter 7** for more information on resource management.

4.29. Installation Emergency Management Plan (IEMP) Requirements.

4.29.1. The IEMP 10-2 will address and contain EM plan requirements IAW DoDI 6055.17, **paragraph 3.3**. **(T-0)**

4.29.2. An IEMP 10-2 must provide a detailed operational concept for the prevention of, response to, and recovery from all identified hazards based upon a common EM and incident management construct. **(T-0)**

4.29.3. Hazard/Threat-specific response plans (e.g., CBRN defense and response plans, terrorism response plans, and destructive weather plans) will be coordinated or integrated with the IEMP 10-2. **(T-0)** This integration is necessary to ensure that all existing hazard/threat-based planning efforts are consistent with the development and execution EM common core capabilities.

4.29.4. Planners will use the IRM process to focus the IEMP 10-2 properly and balance survivability and mission effectiveness before, during, and after an attack IAW this instruction and DAFI 10-2503.

4.29.5. Disease containment planning and procedures. The installation's PHEO and MEM will be responsible for the developing and maintaining the installation-level disease containment planning efforts IAW guidance provided within the IEMP 10-2 Planning Tool. **(T-1)**

4.29.6. The installation EMWG integrates disease containment planning and management functions. An EMWG sub-working group, the PHEM Working Group, can be used to assist with installation-level disease containment planning efforts. **(T-1)**

4.29.7. The MDG/CC-appointed PHEM Incident Lead (PHEM-IL) will oversee the IEMP 10-2 disease annex in coordination with the EOC Director, during a public health emergency IAW DoDI 6200.03, AFI 10-2519, and the IEMP 10-2. **(T-0) Note:** An appropriately trained fire representative will remain the IC for all incidents requiring a public health emergency response.

4.29.8. Units will create supporting checklists for each threat/hazard identified in the IEMP 10-2. **(T-1)**

Section 4G—Tenant and Geographically Separated Unit (GSU) Emergency Action Plans (EAP)

4.30. Concept Overview. The primary focus of the tenant and GSUs EAP is to synchronize tenant organizations actions during an emergency with the operations of the installation to execute protective action recommendations for assigned personnel and support response and recovery operations. Under 29 CFR 1910.32–39, the tenant EAP applies to all visitors, guest, contractors, and normally assigned personnel. As required by 29 CFR 1910.32–39, DoDI 2000.16, and DoDI 6055.17. **(T-0)**

4.31. Roles and Responsibilities.

4.31.1. Tenant and GSU commanders will ensure EAPs are reviewed/updated annually or within 60 days of change of command. **(T-0)**

4.31.2. The IOEM will centrally manage a repository of all signed tenant and GSU EAPs as part of the installation EM Program. **(T-1)**

4.32. Emergency Action Plan (EAP) Requirements.

4.32.1. Tenant and GSU EAPs will define how a specific command/unit residing within a specific jurisdiction (e.g., a DAF installation) will develop and employ required EM capabilities to support functions assigned and identified in the IEMP 10-2. **(T-1)**

4.32.2. EAPs will include, at a minimum, MWN procedures, evacuation, personnel accountability, SIP locations and requirements, primary and alternate UEPCs, and immediate emergency response actions. **(T-0)**

4.33. Department of Defense (DoD) Schools. Schools and their associated population present a unique challenge to an EM Program. All DoD schools residing on DAF installations will develop, organize to, train to, and exercise to a school EAP. **(T-0)** This applies to schools residing on DAF installations that are administered by DoD, DoS, local, or private authorities or organizations. A recommended online resource for such planning is multi-hazard emergency planning for schools (IS–362A) available at **https://training.fema.gov/is/crslist.aspx**.

Chapter 5

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT (EM) EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND EXERCISES (ET&E)

5.1. Purpose. Specify DAF EM related force development methodology, audiences, required/recommended E&T, and related EM exercise requirements as a crosscutting common core capability to generate mission area capabilities specified in **Table 1.2**. **Note:** Although CBRN Defense exercises fall under the DAF EM Program, Exercises pertaining to wartime/MCO in and through a CBRN environment during contingency operations OCONUS are provided in Chapter 7 of DAFI 10-2503. The EM E&T and exercise capabilities will:

5.1.1. Transition DAF EM E&T and exercises to a capabilities-based construct aligned and synchronized with mission areas and common core capabilities. **(T-1)**

5.1.2. Provide EM related knowledge, skills, and attributes (KSA) that produce the ability for installations to prevent, protect, prepare for, mitigate, respond to, and recover from all-hazard/threat effects. **(T-1)**

5.1.3. Complement and enhance functional KSAs towards collective action to achieve mission area outcomes through common core capabilities. **(T-1)**

5.1.4. Establish minimum EM E&T standards for effective management of multi-agency and multijurisdictional emergencies resulting from the spectrum of natural, technological, and human-caused incidents/attacks. **(T-1)**

Section 5A—Emergency Management (EM) Education and Training (E&T)

5.2. Concept Overview. The tactical, operational, and strategic DAF EM Program construct positions/functions/teams specified in **Table 3.1** constitute DAF EM Program E&T audiences. Personnel performing in these roles will obtain EM mission area and core capability related KSAs through completing various required and recommended courses (e.g., DoD/DAF functional community formal training, DAF specific EM courses, and/or DHS EM related courses).

5.3. Roles and Responsibilities.

5.3.1. Individuals assigned to EM Program roles will complete the prescribed DAF EM E&T courses listed in **Table 5.1** based on the course applicability listing in **Attachment 5**. **(T-1)**

5.3.2. Individuals filling various EM Program roles are encouraged to complete recommended DHS EM related E&T courses within the DHS National Preparedness Course Catalog. See **Attachment 5** for additional DHS EM E&T audience opportunities to advance their KSAs regarding opportunities aligned with mission areas and common core capabilities. **Note:** Multiple distance learning courses are available (at no cost to individuals/units) to include mobile and resident courses. Functional communities and installations are responsible for scheduling and costs associated with mobile and resident courses.

5.3.3. As part of localized targeted EM E&T, the EMWG will validate and specify if recommended DHS courses are required for EM Program audiences (based on local hazards/threats) every two years. **(T-2)** The EMWG, through the IEM, should reference the CBRNE Risk Index, Natural Disaster Risk Index, the Resilience Analysis Planning Tool, the DHS National Preparedness Course Catalog, and other sources as applicable to determine if recommended courses should be required for personnel filling EM Program roles. The IEM will identify local EM E&T requirements within the IEMP 10-2.

5.3.4. Functional CFMs are encouraged to evaluate recommended DHS EM E&T courses and establish courses as requirements within functional specific guidance and/or insert into the associated career field education and training plan (CFETP).

5.3.5. AFIMSC will, through DAF EM E&T course development efforts, address and prioritize crosscutting and response situational assessment capabilities into DAF specific courses (e.g., all-hazard/threat planning and IRM, EM exercises, public information and warning, operational coordination/NIMS, and situational assessment/EOCs). **(T-1)**

5.3.6. AFIMSC will conduct a DAF EM E&T gap analysis regarding existing DAF EM courses every two years. **(T-1)** AFIMSC will present findings to the DAF EMWG recommended DAF provided and/or DHS sourced required and recommended courses for DAF EM Program audiences identified in **Table 3.1**. **(T-1)**

5.4. Emergency Management (EM) Education and Training (E&T) Requirements.

5.4.1. Scheduling and Documentation. Installation and tenant unit deployment managers, unit training managers, or unit training schedulers will use the ARIS Unit Scheduler Module to schedule personnel for DAF EM E&T instructor led components or courses conducted by the IOEM. **(T-1)**

5.4.1.1. Unit schedulers must maintain a unit personnel roster to include adding and removing personnel upon moving from their organization (e.g., permanent change of station, permanent change of assignment, retirement/separation, etc.). Each unit is responsible for tracking completion and currency of their personnel. **(T-1)**

5.4.1.2. Deployment managers, unit training managers, or unit training schedulers will verify prerequisite(s) are completed prior to scheduling the instructor-led courses. **(T-2)**

5.4.1.3. Units must maintain documentation of DAF EM E&T course completion. **(T-2)**

5.4.2. Delivery Formats. DAF EM E&T courses are delivered using individual knowledge-based objectives, localized, and performance-based objectives.

5.4.2.1. Unless otherwise specified, the individual knowledge-based component of courses is found online via the Air Force myLearning website (**https://lms-jets.cce.af.mil/moodle/**). The online knowledge-based course component is an individual effort.

5.4.2.2. EM personnel will use traditional instructor-led classroom methods to deliver the localized and performance-based component of a course. **(T-1)** Presentations include localized mission and threat procedures and hands-on evaluation of a student's ability to perform applicable tasks.

5.4.3. Course Instructors. Unless otherwise specified, only personnel (Military 3E9, EM Civilians and Contractors) may teach the instructor-led components listed in **Table 5.1**. **(T-2)** ICS 300 and 400 may be taught by any individual that has completed the DoD Fire Academy or equivalent FEMA, ICS 300/400 Train-the-Trainer Course. The student-to-instructor ratio will be no more than 30 students to one instructor, with the exception of the BEPO briefing. **(T-2)**

5.4.4. Audiences and Course Requirements. The following summary of EM E&T course requirements in **Table 5.1** establishes baseline KSAs for various EM Program audiences. Reference **Attachment 5** for detailed course descriptions and additional requirements. **Note:** DAFI 10-2503 contains additional CBRN defense related E&T requirements.

Table 5.1. Overview of Required Emergency Management (EM) Education and Training (E&T) Courses.

Course Title [Audience]	Delivery Format[1]	Prerequisite for Course	Recurring Training
BEPO [Base Populace]	IL	No	No
DAF EM Program [Senior Leaders]	IL	No	No
DAF EM Program [as Assigned][2]	OL	No	No
UEPC (when developed) [as Assigned]	OL, IL	Yes	Yes
DAF Emergency Response Operations [First and Emergency Responders]	OL	Yes	No
ICS 300 and 400 [ECC, IC, select First and Emergency Responders]	IL	Yes	No
EOC [as Assigned]	OL, IL	Yes	No
EOC Director [as Assigned]	IL	Yes	Yes
Control Center Operations [as Assigned]	OL, IL	Yes	Yes
SMT [as Assigned for natural disaster response]	OL, IL	Yes	Yes
DAF CONUS RTF [select CONUS Installations]	OL	Yes	Yes
Contamination Control Station (CCS) Team [select CONUS and OCONUS installations with an IRF/RTF requirement]	OL, IL	Yes	Yes
Emergency Management Support Team [as Assigned]	IL	Yes	Yes

Notes:
1. Online (OL) and/or Instructor Led (IL).

2. Not applicable to overarching BEPO. See **Attachment 5** for specific audience applicability.

Section 5B—Emergency Management (EM) Exercises

5.5. Concept Overview. EM exercises provide installation commanders with a critical means to collectively evaluate installation functional EM mission area outputs and related crosscutting and common core capabilities. EM exercises also enhance external interoperability with other federal departments and agencies; state, tribal, and local governments; other service components; or host nation emergency response agencies and departments.

5.6. Roles and Responsibilities.

5.6.1. The installation IG, utilizing the installation inspection team, will plan, execute, and conduct mission area and common core capability evaluation and validation for EM exercises IAW DAFI 90-302.

5.6.2. IAW DoDI 6055.17, to the maximum extent possible, installation EM exercise design, conduct, and evaluation must use the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) that provides a set of fundamental principles for exercise programs, as well as a common approach to program management, design and development, conduct, evaluation, and improvement planning. **(T-0)**

5.6.3. Personnel that design, conduct, or evaluate EM functions and tasks will be certified to a level equal to or higher than those being evaluated and will be trained in HSEEP compliance by completing IS-120.c: An Introduction to Exercises (prerequisite) and IS-0146: HSEEP training. **(T-1) Note:** HSEEP training can be found through the National Preparedness Catalog at **https://www.firstrespondertraining.gov/frts/npccatalog**.

5.6.4. The IEM will provide advice and support to the wing/delta IGs and augmented installation inspection team personnel regarding overarching EM exercise planning, design, and evaluation as to identify gaps in crosscutting and mission area common core capabilities and present to the EMWG chair for corrective action (e.g., risk management decisions regarding resourcing, MAA adjustments, etc.). **(T-1)**

5.6.5. The IEM will review the MSEL to ensure the minimum learning and EM exercise evaluation objectives and EM capabilities are evaluated for all exercises listed in **Table 5.2**. **(T-1)**

5.6.6. Installation EP2T, wing/delta IGs and augmented installation inspection team personnel will reference **paragraph 5.7** and **paragraph 5.8** to include development of EM exercise common core capability evaluation objectives specified in **Attachment 6**, The planners and evaluators will account for and evaluate the applicable common core capability evaluation objectives specified in **Attachment 6**. **(T-1)** The IEM will provide desired learning objectives during exercise development which will inform and may be included in the MSEL for each exercise.

5.7. Installation Exercise Types. The EM exercise types defined in **Table 5.2** provide clarification and applicability to installation EM programs.

Table 5.2. Installation Exercise Types.

Type	Exercise Type Description
Discussion Based Seminar Exercise (DBSE)	Building block approach that highlights existing EM plans, policies, procedures, and support agreements. Used to familiarize key personnel/leadership with current or expected jurisdictional capabilities. Typically focus on strategic, policy-oriented issues, and operations-based exercises regarding installation specific all-hazard/threat tactical response and recovery related issues. The IEM, along with other functional areas, facilitates and lead the discussion, keeping participants on track while meeting the objectives of the DBSE. Use of geospatial and computer-based modeling, simulation, and game environments to enhance discussions is highly encouraged. Pertains to the installation EM program.
Tabletop Exercise (TTX)	Facilitated analysis of installation EM mission areas and common core capabilities identified in **Table 1.2** and **Attachment 6** through a discussion-based exercise designed to generate a dialogue of various issues to facilitate a conceptual understanding, identify strengths and area for improvement, and/or achieve changes in perceptions about plans, policies, or procedure. TTXs should identify where those plans need to be refined and identify resource management issues and needs to include potential common core capability gaps. Use of geospatial and computer-based modeling, simulation, and game environments to enhance discussions is highly encouraged. A primary tool to advance the installation EM program capabilities. At a minimum, involves the ECC, IC, first and select emergency responders, EOC director, EOC section leads/key support branch SMEs, key control centers, select CAT members, and Installation Command Post personnel. Includes scenario appropriate external mission partners (e.g., local first and emergency responders) to include specialized and support teams.
Functional Exercise (FE)	The role of FEs is to practice and perfect one part or components of the IEMP 10-2 regarding a tasked functional area and prepare for more extensive exercises where multiple functional areas will be coordinated and tested (e.g., Full Scale Exercise [FSE]). A fully interactive live exercise that exercises a single functional area and a specific operation. A coordinated, supervised activity, with minimal coordination with other organizations or activation of the installation EOC. Although a FEs pertain to the installation EM program, FEs are not required, coordinated, nor monitored/managed by the installation EM program.
FSE	An operations-based exercise that is typically the most complex and resource-intensive of the exercise types. Simulates a real event live field scenario as closely as possible. It is an exercise designed to evaluate the integration of EM mission areas and common core capabilities in an environment that simulates actual prevent, protect, prepare for, mitigate, respond to, and recover conditions. To

	accomplish this realism, FSEs requires the mobilization and actual movement personnel, equipment, and resources. The FSE, through EM exercise objectives, will test and evaluate installation EM mission areas and common core capabilities specified in **Table 1.2** and **Attachment 6**. The primary means to advance whole-of-community EM mission areas and common core capabilities. At a minimum, involves the ECC, IC, First and select Emergency Responders. Includes activation of the EOC, control centers, and CAT to include participation by Installation Command Post and mission essential personnel in addition to the majority of base populace. Includes scenario appropriate external mission partners (e.g., local/host nation first and emergency responders, EOCs, and other mission partners) to include specialized and support teams.

5.8. Emergency Management (EM) Exercise Category Requirements. Installations will conduct the following exercises and exercise types at the specified frequency to include use of common core capability evaluation objectives indicated in **Attachment 6**.

5.8.1. Terrorist use of CBRNE Preparedness Exercise.

5.8.1.1. Exercise Type. TTX, FE, FSE.

5.8.1.2. Frequency. Annually.

5.8.1.3. Remarks. Develop exercise scenarios that evaluate the installation's capabilities to respond, survive, operate, and recover in and through a contested environment. Installations should focus on exercising task qualification training. Reference DAFI 10-2503.

5.8.1.4. Reference. DoDI 6055.17, DoDI 3020.52, and this publication.

5.8.2. Natural Disaster Response Exercise (NDRE).

5.8.2.1. Natural Disaster Installation Risk (reference **paragraph 4.3**.), Exercise Type, and Frequency.

5.8.2.1.1. Risk Index A – Very High, FSE, annually. **(T-1)**

5.8.2.1.2. Risk Index B – Relatively High, FSE, every 18 months. **(T-1)**

5.8.2.1.3. Risk Index C – Relatively Moderate to Very Low, TTX, FE, every 18 months. **(T-1)**

5.8.2.2. Remarks. Develop exercise scenarios that evaluate the installation's capabilities required to respond to and recover from the most likely natural disaster threat IAW the IEMP 10-2 hazard assessment. **(T-1)**

5.8.2.3. Reference. DoDI 6055.17 and this publication.

5.8.3. Major Accident Response Exercise (MARE).

5.8.3.1. Exercise Type. FSE.

5.8.3.2. Frequency. Annually. **(T-1)**

5.8.3.3. Remarks. Aircraft or Spacecraft MARE.

5.8.3.4. Reference. DAFI 91-202, *The U.S. Air Force Mishap Prevention Program*, DAFMAN 21-201, *Munitions Management*, and DAFMAN 91-223, *Aviation Safety Investigations and Reports*.

5.8.4. Nuclear Accident Incident (NAI) Training Event.

5.8.4.1. Exercise Type. DBSE, FE, TTX, FSE.

5.8.4.2. Frequency. Annually. **(T-0)**

5.8.4.3. Exercise Objectives. See Table 7., MAJCOM/FLDCOM specific guidance, or as directed.

5.8.4.4. Remarks. NAIs are specific to AFGSC, USAFE, Air Mobility Command, AFMC, and any other unit providing direct support to a nuclear weapons accident/incident RTF or IRF. Nuclear Weapons Accident Incident Exercise is a whole of government DTRA-led event that will substitute for an annual NAI if conducted at an installation.

5.8.4.5. Reference. DoDD 3150.08, DoDI 3150.10, and DoDM 3150.08, *Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP)*.

5.8.5. Active Shooter Exercise.

5.8.5.1. Exercise Type. FE, TTX.

5.8.5.2. Frequency. Semiannually. **(T-1)**

5.8.5.3. Remarks. Must include, at a minimum, the Command Post, CAT, EOC, BDOC, ECC and other affected control centers. **(T-1)** Must evaluate unit EAPs, including accountability and lockdown capabilities, for on and off-installation locations during this exercise. **(T-0)**

5.8.5.4. References. AFTTP 3-4.6, *Active Shooter*.

5.8.6. Additional EM Exercise Evaluation Objective Requirements.

5.8.6.1. Specific CONUS Control System Resilience Readiness Exercise (CRRE) Objectives. Include a CRRE objective (e.g., electrical power grid blackout) during a CBRN defense or NDRE every five years. **(T-3)** SAF/IE will manage, maintain, and publish a CRRE schedule utilizing the AF Gatekeeper process for installations. **(T-1)**

5.8.6.2. Water Resilience Exercise Objectives. Every two years, in combination with either CBRN defense or NDRE (TTX or FSE), all installations will demonstrate the ability to continue installation mission requirements with the simulated loss of potable water (simulated notional time frame of two weeks to sufficiently evaluate the capability) and demonstrate the ability to respond to and mitigate the potable water issue while meeting the minimum water demands of the installation population. **(T-2)**

5.8.6.3. Conduct a DBSE or TTX for mutual aid support agreements annually. **(T-1)**

5.9. Emergency Management (EM) Exercise Evaluation and Validation Requirements. Installation EM exercises should be prioritized as 1) the primary means to evaluate and advance EM mission areas/common core capabilities, and 2) the primary means to validate installation operational readiness via inspections. In this context, EM exercises will train, educate, and evaluate mission areas/common core capabilities, and when applicable towards inspections governed by DAFI 90-302, validate readiness.

5.9.1. Evaluation. Installation EM exercises will be designed to evaluate the ability of installations to accomplish relevant mission area actionable outputs specified in **Table 1.1** and deliver associated common core capabilities listed in **Table 1.2**. **(T-1)**

5.9.1.1. Evaluation activities should primarily focus on identified greatest concern hazard/threat categories of 1) natural, 2) technological, and 3) human caused.

5.9.1.2. Exercise evaluation activities will identify gaps between targeted and existing capabilities as to inform corrective actions via comprehensive EM planning, resourcing, and related actions. Included are combined installation and local community/partner nation EM exercises to build interoperability/partnership capacity with a focus on corrective action to address identified core capability gaps (e.g., investments in public information and warning, adjusting planning/IEMP, training, operational coordination via new/adjustments to MOUs and/or MAAs, etc.). **(T-1)**

5.9.2. Validation. Exercise validation activities (inspection events) will primarily focus on determining installation operational readiness to include identifying installation functional area detailed findings/areas for improvement while accounting for overarching gaps between targeted and existing crosscutting and mission area common core capabilities as to inform corrective actions via comprehensive installation wide EM planning actions.

5.9.3. Evaluation/Validation Reports. EM exercise evaluation, validation, and AARs will be structured and aligned with the major graded areas as identified in DAFI 90-302 and AFI 1-2, *Commander's Responsibilities*.

5.9.3.1. The collective of the DAF EM enterprise (tactical, operational, and strategic levels) will use installation evaluation, validation, and AARs to track, analyze, and determine holistic corrective action for each EM mission area and related common core capabilities.

5.9.3.2. Included will be the ability to extract relevant information to support EM PMRs, capability investment strategies, and actions to adapt (via information) as to advance the DAF EM preparedness goal.

5.9.3.3. Installation IG will utilize the IGEMS/IGEMS-Classified as the system of record for exercise evaluation reporting IAW DAFI 90-302.

5.10. After Action Reports (AAR) and Lessons Learned. AARs and lessons learned serve as the primary vehicle for identifying observations, shortfalls, and limiting factors. When resolved, result in an improvement of military operations and/or activities.

5.10.1. AARs. Consolidated report that includes an executive summary covering the event information (e.g., dates, locations, and participants) together with lessons learned.

5.10.1.1. AARs will be required for the following:

5.10.1.1.1. Terrorist acts. **(T-1)**

5.10.1.1.2. HAZMAT response. **(T-1)**

5.10.1.1.3. Large Events (e.g., Air shows, base-wide celebrations of 500 or more, VIP visit with EOC activation). **(T-1)**

5.10.1.1.4. Natural disasters. **(T-1)**

5.10.1.1.5. Miscellaneous. This category provides an avenue for the IEM to analyze and report any incident that may be of educational value for the EM career field. **(T-1)**

5.10.1.2. The exercise planner will be responsible for developing the AAR for exercises and the Recovery Operations Chief (ROC) will be responsible for real-world events/incidents. **(T-1)** The IOEM will review AARs in coordination with the event participants. **(T-1)**

5.10.2. Security Classification. The overall classification of the AAR must be identified IAW AFPD 16-14, *Security Enterprise Governance*.

5.11. Lessons Learned. A validated knowledge derived from actual experience, observations, and analysis of training and operations that result in change through improved training, TTPs, and SOPs.

5.11.1. JLLIS. Automated solution supporting implementation of the Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) IAW guidelines established in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3150.25H, Joint Lessons Learned Program. JLLIS facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness of the joint force.

5.11.2. The IOEM will submit real-world AARs (or major exercise AARs upon request) to AFIMSC (cc: MAJCOM/A4CX) within 30 days of the end of even. **(T-1)**

5.11.3. AFIMSC will utilize JLLIS (**www.jllis.mil/USAF** [NIPRNET] and/or **www.jllis.smil.mil/USAF** [SIPRNET]) to input EM-related lessons learned within 14-days of receiving the AAR. **(T-3)**

Chapter 6

PUBLIC INFORMATION AND WARNING

6.1. Purpose. Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community using clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions to take, actions being taken, and the assistance being made available.

Section 6A—Emergency Public Information (EPI)

6.2. Concept Overview. Installation EM Programs support the development and dissemination of EPI to keep the protected populace informed before, during, and after an incident.

6.3. Roles and Responsibilities.

6.3.1. Installation commander through their supporting public affairs office or equivalent will coordinate with the IEM to provide EPI. **(T-1)**

6.3.2. The Command Post will monitor rapid on-set all-hazard/threat incidents/attacks and ensure timely activation/execution of appropriate EPI and MWN. **(T-0)**

6.4. Emergency Public Information (EPI) Requirements.

6.4.1. Installation EPI will ensure accurate, reliable, and actionable information regarding all-hazards/threats is available to Airmen, Guardians, DoD personnel, and the public. **(T-0)**

6.4.2. All means available should be used (e.g., including MWNS components, social media, television, commercial radio, media services, and similar systems) to communicate relevant, timely information with emergency response resources and stakeholders across the affected community, as appropriate. **(T-1)** Include all on and off-base agencies requiring support, to include swimming pools, golf courses, childcare centers, tenant units, etc. **(T-1)**

6.4.3. Installation EPI will include a comprehensive, integrated, and interoperable emergency communication capability, with an approved communications plan IAW DoDI 6055.17. **(T-0)**

6.4.4. Installations will include procedures for warning identified UVPs (e.g., personnel with disabilities including motor, sensory, cognitive, and psychiatric impairments). **(T-1) Note:** Due to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act constraints, the MEM should be the responsible person to identify affected populations of anyone with disabilities or requiring assistance.

6.4.5. Installations will develop procedures/systems to initiate alert notifications within two minutes of incident notification and verification and notify 100 percent of emergency essential (e.g., continuity of operations) to include first and emergency responder personnel within 10 minutes of incident verification via the installation ECC, dispatch center, and/or the Command Post. **(T-0)**

6.4.6. The installation Public Affairs Officer (PAO) will coordinate with the IEM to develop written procedures for establishing, maintaining, and executing an EPI function. **(T-1)** Procedures for media management and communicating risk related to emergencies will be consistent with the Office of the Assistant SecDef, Public Affairs (OASD-PA) and the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs guidance, AFI 35-101, *Public Affairs Operations*.

6.4.7. During catastrophic incidents, the installation PAO will include a central contact function (e.g., Joint Information Operations Center) for the media, pre-scripted information bulletins relevant to the installation's identified hazards, a method to coordinate and clear information for release, the capability of communicating with special needs populations, and protective action guidelines and recommendations. **(T-1)**

6.4.8. Installations will use the standardized DAF "Be Ready" training aids: Air Force Emergency Notification Signals, Air Force Attack Warning Signals for CBRN Threat Areas, and Mission Oriented Protected Posture (MOPP). **(T-2)** These training aids are available through the IOEM. Installations should display these visual aids in common and high traffic areas.

6.5. Supporting Emergency Public Information (EPI) All-Hazard/Threat Advisory Sources. Installations will identify and utilize valid and authoritative advisory source elements to generate EPI. At a minimum, use the following EPI elements.

6.5.1. Natural Hazard Warning Systems. These systems are addressed as part of the MWNS requirements in **paragraph 6.8**.

6.5.2. DoD Terrorist Threat-Level Classification System. Defense Intelligence Agency utilizes the threat-level classification system to identify the terrorist threat in a specified geographic area. Installation commanders should use this general threat-level as one basis for developing installation EPI regarding terrorism threats levels. **Note:** Threat levels are estimates with no direct relationship to specific force protection conditions (FPCON).

6.5.3. FPCONs. FPCONs are graduated categories of measures or actions that installation commanders will employ to protect personnel and assets from terrorism threats. Based upon factors such as anticipated changes in the threat, changes in the installation vulnerability, or guidance from HHQ, the installation commander may raise or lower FPCON levels. EM planning and procedures should be coordinated with applicable FPCON measures when applicable, such as with terrorism-specific guidance or actions.

6.5.4. Heath Protection Conditions (HPCON). HPCONs are used during an all-hazards emergency to communicate specific, stratified health protection measures to the affected population. The determination to change the HPCON level is made by the installation commander and PAO in consultation with the PHEO and MTF commander and should be synchronized with the installation FPCON level.

6.5.5. Center for Disease Control. The PHEO and/or MEM will monitor appropriate medical intelligence and surveillance, to include the Center for Disease Control website, to provide the PAO with current health information (e.g., health topics, traveler's health, outbreaks, etc.).

6.5.6. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Emergency planning zones around each nuclear power plant within the U.S. in coordination with state and local EM agencies. Protective action guides, such as guides from the NRC, are available which describe the necessary local population actions in detail. See **www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/radiation.html** for additional information.

6.5.7. Information Operations Conditions. Information operations conditions levels represent another hazard-specific threat-focused warning system, and resulting actions are the responsibility of the NRC.

6.5.8. DoS. International travel is often routine and part of daily life. Installation's must be aware of travel advisors between countries and ensure the base populace is aware of any increased travel restrictions and/or regional threats. The DoS is the OPR for maintaining current information on international travel rules and warning. Reference **https://travel.state.gov/content/travel.html** for additional information.

Section 6B—Mass Warning and Notification (MWN)

6.6. Concept Overview. Installations utilize a MWNS (e.g., family of systems and processes approach) to maximize the ability to rapidly notify/warn personnel and provide elements of EPI. **(T-1)**

6.7. Roles and Responsibilities. The installation commander will ensure the installation has an MWNS capable of rapidly and effectively disseminating emergency information to warn all personnel according to timelines established in DoDI 6055.17. **(T-0)**

6.8. Mass Warning and Notification (MWN) Requirements. Installations will develop MWN capabilities to rapidly warn and notify personnel in the event of an emergency/attack IAW DoDI 6055.17, DoDI 2000.12, *DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Program*, DoDI 2000.16, Volume 1, NIMS, and National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) 1600, *Standard on Continuity, Emergency, and Crisis Management*, for additional information. **(T-0) Note:** Refer to the AFIMSC Giant Voice Playbook to account for the various terms used to describe MWN and "Giant Voice" issues (this playbook is for informational purposes only and not authoritative in nature).

6.8.1. Time Constraints. For rapid on-set hazards/threats, installations will develop MWN capabilities with the ability to disseminate warnings to the installation protected populace immediately, but no longer than two minutes after incident notification and command verification. Within 10 minutes after initiation, MWNSs collectively, must reach a target audience of 90 percent or more of the protected population with specific protective action recommendations. **(T-0)** Reference DoDI 6055.17 for additional requirements.

6.8.2. Protective Action Recommendations. An effective warning will provide specific protective action recommendations. Protective action recommendations should be synchronized with prior IOEM provided E&T community awareness training or specify appropriate unique actions for the protected populace.

6.8.3. Warning Terminology. Effective warnings will use standard terminology and clearly communicate the immediacy, reliability, severity, and scope of the hazard and of the appropriate basic response. Installations in domestic locations will comply with DHS, FEMA, DoD Meteorology and Oceanography and/or the National Weather Service, the Emergency Alert System alerting terminology, methods, requirements, and capabilities. **(T-1)**

6.8.4. Standardized Warning Signals. The following standardized warning signals apply as shown in **Table 6.1**. Installations should coordinate use of these signals with local civil jurisdictions and, if incorporated into the IEMP 10-2 and supporting SOPs, these signals must be incorporated into the DAF "Be Ready" community preparedness materials to ensure recognition and appropriate actions by the protected populace.

Table 6.1. Standardized Warning Signals.

Emergency[1]	Signal	Meaning	Actions
Incident, Accident, or Disaster	3- to 5-minute steady tone on sirens or long steady blasts on horns, whistles, or similar devices.	A disaster/incident is Imminent or In Progress. Potential or confirmed hazard exists to public health, safety, or property.	Be Alert. Monitor smart phone, local radio, TV, or cable stations for emergency information. Listen to MWNSs for additional instructions. Be prepared to evacuate or immediately SIP, move to safe haven, or take other appropriate protective actions.
Active Shooter	"Lockdown (x3)"	Active shooter incident in progress.	Remain calm and hide, flight, or fight. Implement lockdown procedures based on location.
WMD or CBRNE Attack[2]	3- to 5-minute wavering tone on sirens or other devices.	WMD or CBRNE attack is imminent or in progress or the arrival of nuclear fallout is imminent.	Proceed immediately to designated safe havens, SIP, or take other appropriate actions. Listen for additional instructions.
All Clear	Declared verbally by local official agencies.	Immediate disaster or threat has ended.	Remain alert. Initiate recovery actions (e.g., report injuries, hazards, and damage) or resume normal operations as directed.

Notes:
1. In all instances, account for personnel.

2. See DAFMAN 10-2503 for detailed nation state CBRNE attack warning signals (e.g., alarm conditions with associated MOPP levels, protective actions, etc.).

6.9. Mass Warning and Notification System (MWNS) Components. The MWNS for installations will consist of components in **Table 6.2** **(T-1) Note:** Installations will develop alternate MWN procedures to augment vulnerable electronic MWNS components and document in the IEMP and supporting checklists within the ECC, control centers, EOC, and installation Command Post. **(T-1)**

Table 6.2. Mass Warning and Notification System (MWNS) Components.

Component	Remarks
Wide Area MWN Means[1]	Horns, Sirens, Public Address (PA) Speakers (commonly termed "Giant Voice"), Flags, and Portable PA systems/Bullhorns.
Interior Building Notification Means	PA Speakers (intercommunication systems) and visual notification systems (e.g., strobes, text signs, etc.).
Telephone Alert Messages	Capable of providing voice and/or data messages to multiple receivers (telephone, cellular phones, and pagers) with an interactive method to record receipt of notification/warning and a call-prioritization method compatible with dispersion modeling capability for call prioritization. Reverse 911.
Network-Based Notification Means	An administrative broadcast across the computer system network consisting of a notice from a central location that would override current computer applications, thus reaching all computer users nearly instantaneously. Includes e-mail and web-based notifications.
Alternate Procedures	Dispatch of message runners, emergency vehicle PA/siren systems, flags, radios, bullhorns, loudspeakers, telephone call-down lists, or similar procedures or mix of procedures.
Note: Designated Risk Index 1 and A installations must maintain and sustain wide area giant voice notification capabilities to include robust alternative procedures.	

6.10. Mass Warning and Notification System (MWNS) Information Dissemination. Overarching MWNS components will:

6.10.1. Provide watches, warnings, evacuation routes, and other alerting information to meet DoD and federal warning requirements outlined in DoDI 6055.17. **(T-0)**

6.10.2. Disseminate hurricane condition or tropical cyclone condition of readiness if in a threat area, IAW AFMAN 10-206.

6.10.3. Standardize DAF emergency notification signals specific to disaster warnings, attack warnings, and "all clear" procedures. **(T-1)**

6.10.4. Disseminate warning regarding dispersed operational assets/personnel engaged in contingency operations under the installation C2 umbrella (e.g., FOS and CL sites). **(T-2)**

6.10.5. Supplement signals compatible with the local, national, host nation, or theater systems. Follow command and theater guidance when more than one system applies. **(T-2)**

6.10.6. Interior Building Notification Means. Use DoD-required individual building notification systems to disseminate EM information. Capabilities will be developed IAW UFC 4-021-01, *Design and Operations and Maintenance: Mass Notification Systems*. **(T-0)** New and renovated buildings will install a notification system to meet the DoD AT requirements in UFC 4-010-01, *DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings*. **(T-0)** Per UFC 4-010-01, MWN capabilities are required in all new inhabited buildings since the FY04 construction program. MWN is required in existing primary gathering buildings and existing billeting when implementing a project exceeding the replacement cost threshold specified. **(T-0)**

6.11. Mass Warning and Notification System (MWNS) Preparedness, Readiness, and Evaluation.

6.11.1. Installations will test installation MWNS components IAW AFMAN 10-207, *Command Posts*, unless restricted by local or host nation ordinances.

6.11.2. Installations will develop, test, exercise, and evaluate an effective, timely, and multi-modal warning coordination process to provide effective EPI and warning to the protected population, including tenant organizations. **(T-2)**

6.11.3. Installations should evaluate the ability of MWNS components to disseminate warning and ensure personnel can directly hear and/or see status changes. **(T-2)**

6.11.4. Installations will conduct warning coordination with their supporting military and civilian meteorology and/or weather service, geological survey (depending upon hazards), and other warning providers as a routine part of their duties on a no less than semiannual basis. **(T-2)**

6.11.5. CONUS locations will coordinate warning information with the designated authorities responsible for release of weather and non-weather emergency messages via the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) to the greatest extent possible. **(T-2)**

6.11.6. CONUS locations will work with the city or county EM office to synchronize MWNS tests IAW DoDI 6055.17. **(T-0)**

6.11.7. CONUS installations will issue supplemental MWNS notifications in the event of a national emergency and an IPAWS is employed. **(T-3)**

Chapter 7

OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND COORDINATION

7.1. Purpose. Execute and maintain DAF EM Program operational command and coordination capabilities to support unified and interoperable whole-of-nation to local and installation EM mission area execution through application and use of the NIMS. **Note:** Operational command and coordination relate to multi-jurisdictional collaboration for EM mission areas (prevent, protect, prepare, mitigate, respond, and recover) whereas DoD/DAF operational C2 pertains to the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission (e.g., joint and DAF doctrinal application of C2 for fires effects). **Note:** The requirements within this chapter are foundational towards information standardization to consolidate operational command and coordination into DAF EMIS (or other EOC COP IT applications employed).

Section 7A—Overarching National Incident Management Construct

7.2. Concept Overview. NIMS guides all domestic levels of government, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and the private sector entities with the shared vocabulary, systems, and processes to work together to prevent, protect against, prepare for, mitigate, respond to, and recover from incidents. NIMS applies to all incidents, from traffic accidents, major disasters, to terrorist attacks. **(T-0) Note:** NIMS principles relate to MCO and adversarial nation state CBRNE attack effects OCONUS; however, these threats are addressed primarily through joint/DAF doctrinal force protection functions to include Joint METs/DAF METs and are outside the scope of NIMS. Reference DAFI 10-2503.

7.3. Overarching Operational Command and Coordination Requirements.

7.3.1. The DAF EM Program will utilize incident types, established within and through NIMS and the associated ICS, to relate incident size, scope, and/or complexity to resources needed. **(T-0)**

Table 7.1. Incident Types, Complexity, and Resources Involved.

Type[1,2]	Complexity Description	Resources
1	All Command and General Staff with Branches Written incident action plan (IAP) for Each Operational Period Beyond State and Local Capabilities 500 to 1000 Response and Support Personnel Example: Catastrophic Disaster or Terrorist WMD Attack	
2	Likely all Command and General Staff Written IAP for Each Operational Period Often Beyond State and Local Capabilities 200 to 500 Response and Support Personnel Example: Major Aircraft Crash or Natural Disaster	National Support to State and Local Jurisdictions
3	Some or all Command and General Staff Written IAP for Each Operational Period May Extend to Multiple Operational Periods Multiple Local Jurisdiction Resources Example: Aircraft Crash or HAZMAT Incident	State Support to Local Jurisdictions
4	Some Command Staff and General Staff No Written IAP Required Usually Contained within First Operational Period Example: More Complex Vehicle Accident and/or Injured Persons	Local Jurisdiction (Single or Multiple)
5	No Command Staff and Limited General Staff No Written IAP Required Contained within First Operational Period Example: Minor Vehicle Accident and/or Injured Person	

Notes:
1. All incident types have a certified and credentialed IC. Incident types are established by FEMA and U.S. Fire Administration as integral aspect to NIMS and ICS.

2. Adversarial nation state CBRNE attacks relate to incident types; however, these attacks are addressed through joint/DAF doctrinal functions to include Joint METs/DAF METs and are outside the scope of NIMS incident types. Reference DAFI 10-2503.

7.3.2. The tactical, operational, and strategic level DAF EM Program construct elements specified in **Table 3.1** will plan for and use NIMS command and coordination structures to provide DSCA IAW DoDD 3025.18. **(T-0)**

7.3.3. Installation EM Programs will be consistent with NIMS (and the associated ICS) IAW HSPD-5, the Office of the Deputy SecDef memorandum to implement NIMS, 29 November 2005, and DHS NIMS doctrine (Third Edition, Oct 2017). **(T-0) Note:** For off-installation response and recovery operations, OCONUS installations follow the host nation SOFA.

7.3.4. Installations will develop a comprehensive, integrated EM Program to successfully manage Type 3-5 incidents through the coordinated application of organic and pre-coordinated external resources. **(T-0)**

7.3.5. Managing Type 1 and Type 2 incidents requires additional resources, capabilities, and expertise beyond those of a single DAF installation and are addressed through close interagency coordination with supporting local, state, federal, regional, or host nation) governments and agencies across all levels of command. **Note:** The term "consistent with NIMS" expresses that the DAF: 1) as a whole is primarily a warfighting force; 2) retains control of personnel regardless of mission, assignment, or function; and 3) DAF personnel are not provided under ICS as an independent resource to a civil jurisdiction, but rather as a strike team or task force resource under the leadership and authority of a DoD representative, whether a uniformed service member or DoD civilian. In this context, use of NIMS is focused on the installation/regional environment and not the DAF warfighting force as a whole.

Section 7B—National Incident Management System (NIMS) Resource Management

7.4. Concept Overview. Most jurisdictions do not own and maintain resources necessary to address all potential hazards/threats. Employment of NIMS resource management guidance enables military and civilian organizational elements to collaborate and coordinate and systematically identify and manage resources prior to, during, and after an incident. As such, this section presents DAF EM Program policy regarding use of NIMS resource management preparedness, resource management during an incident, and mutual aid. **Note:** Reference NIMS for additional context.

7.4.1. All EM Programs will use NIMS-based resource management concepts and processes to coordinate the identification, prioritization, and allocation of EM resources regarding multi-jurisdictional response (specific NIMS resource elements are identified in **Figure 7.1**). **(T-1)** Reference DoDI 6055.17, paragraph 4.3.d for additional requirements.

7.4.2. DAF EMIS (or other EMIS applications employed) will include resource management processes and procedures consistent with NIMS resource management preparedness, resource management during an incident, and mutual aid information. **(T-2)**

Figure 7.1. National Incident Management System (NIMS) Resource Elements.

7.5. Resource Management Preparedness Requirements. In support of homeland defense and as a key enabler of defense support to civil authorities, the DAF EM Program and domestic installations will utilize NIMS resource management preparedness processes. **(T-1)**

7.5.1. Based on local hazards/threats, installations will use resource management processes and procedures consistent with NIMS to pre-identify key resources needed for response and initial recovery as executed through ICS and EOC constructs. The process will accurately identify: (1) what and how much is needed, (2) where and when it is needed, and (3) who will be receiving or using the resource(s). **(T-1)**

7.5.2. Installations will implement local procedures to identify, locate, acquire, store, distribute, maintain, test, and account for emergency related services, personnel, teams, resources, materials, and facilities. **(T-1)**

7.5.3. Installations should develop an Installation Resource Inventory System or, preferably, utilize the DHS Incident Resource Inventory System (IRIS). **Note:** The DHS IRIS is a centralized, secure, and cloud hosted resource inventory solution to increase resource data sharing (view only) across organizations to support preparedness, planning, and response.

7.5.3.1. For key installation resource elements identified, installation inventory entries will be consistent with NIMS resource typing definitions (RTD) and national qualification system (NQS). **(T-1)**

7.5.3.2. Installations will establish procedures for functional areas to nominate and approve resources prior to uploading into the DHS IRIS or installation-developed resource inventory system. **(T-1)** Consider using the EMWG or EP2T as the approval authority.

7.5.3.3. Installation functional areas are responsible for entering resources available for deployment under NIMS/multi-jurisdictional response into inventory systems.

7.5.3.4. The resource data will be made available to the installation ECC/dispatch center and EOC. Functional areas are responsible for resource and financial aspects related to life cycle management of assigned resources and this responsibility will not be transferred to EM Programs. **(T-1)**

7.5.3.5. The EMWG, through the IOEM, will consolidate resource inventory entries and present to the EMWG on at least an annual basis to ensure senior leader visibility regarding resources postured in support of multi-jurisdictional response. **(T-1)**

7.5.3.6. The ECC and personnel assigned to the EOC Logistics Section position(s) will be familiar with RTDs, the resource inventory system, and/or the DHS IRIS as to quickly translate local community requests for support/services and dispatch the resource. **(T-1)**

7.5.4. AFIMSC will provide NIMS resource management preparedness reachback-support and functional expertise to the IOEMs. **(T-1)**

7.6. Resource Typing Requirements. Installations will identify and align key response and initial recovery resource elements with NIMS RTDs. **(T-1)** For context, a resource "Type" expresses the level of minimum capability to perform its function and relates to incident types defined in **Table 7.1**. A type 1 resource represents a higher capability than type 2, which represents a higher capability than type 3 and so on. The level of capability depends on size, power, and capacity (for equipment) or experience and qualifications (for personnel and teams).

7.6.1. Installations should prioritize application of RTDs and NQS standards for first and emergency responders and applicable specialized response/recovery teams/assets that are widely used/deployable across jurisdictional boundaries through mutual aid/support agreements or contracts. Include considerations for unique installation mass care and transportation/evacuation core capability assets. The intent of this policy is to enable the installation ECC, IC, and/or the EOC and local mission partners to have a shared understanding of the capabilities and functions of each resource and can quickly and accurately share resources when necessary.

7.6.2. Generally, RTDs are applicable to teams, equipment, facilities, supplies, and personnel while NQS position qualifications are applicable to personnel. For instance, a HAZMAT response team and associated equipment has a RTD and the individual filling a position on the HAZMAT team has an applicable NQS position qualification.

7.7. Qualification, Certification, and Credentialing Requirements. The intent of NQS is to ensure personnel representing various jurisdictional levels and functional disciplines possess a minimum common level of training, currency, experience, and physical and medical fitness to support the position they are tasked to fill as it relates to incident management and emergency responder capabilities.

7.7.1. Unit commanders will establish incident response personnel qualification, certification, and credentialing procedures consistent with NIMS and the NQS. **(T-1)** Unit commanders will ensure incident response personnel deploying through mutual aid agreements have the knowledge, experience, training, and capability to perform the duties of their assigned roles. **(T-1)** In addition, unit commanders should ensure that personnel deploying outside of existing support agreements under immediate response authority of DoDD 3025.18 (imminently serious conditions) are qualified, certified, and credentialed consistent with NIMS and the NQS.

7.7.2. First and emergency responder CFMs are encouraged to align AFSC CFETP to reflect NQS and related qualification and certification for the most likely ICS position the AFSC will fill during incident response.

7.7.3. Qualification procedures should specify the process through which personnel meet the minimum established criteria—training, experience, physical and medical fitness, and capability—to fill specific ICS positions.

7.7.4. Certification/Recertification procedures will include methodology to document an individual has met and continues to meet established criteria and is qualified for a specific position. **(T-1)**

7.7.5. Credentialing. Credentialing procedures will be aligned with existing installation access control policy that identifies personnel and authenticates and verifies their qualification for a particular position. **(T-0)** Credentialing should be done during the planning phase. **(T-1)**

7.7.6. AFIMSC will evaluate the DHS provided "OneResponder" System secure cloud-hosted system designed for organizations to manage personnel qualifications for application across the DAF first and emergency responder communities. **(T-1)** The OneResponder System supports implementation NIMS resource management objective to qualify, certify, and credential incident personal and aid jurisdictions in implementing NQS.

7.8. Planning for Resources Requirements. Resource planning will include identifying resource requirements based on the hazards/threats to, and vulnerabilities of, the installation and the overarching local community and include alternative strategies to obtain needed resources. **(T-1)**

7.8.1. Resource planning should consider resources necessary to support all mission areas and related common core capabilities available throughout the multi-jurisdictional area.

7.8.2. The IOEM will coordinate with local mission partners (e.g., LEPCs) to develop plans for identifying, managing, estimating, allocating, ordering, deploying, and demobilizing resources. **(T-1)** Coordination with local jurisdictions should holistically inform mission partner interoperability resource planning.

7.8.3. Mission partner coordination activities should answer what to prepare for, the resources available to achieve shared common core capability targets, and resources that can be obtained and/or shared through mutual aid to be prepared to meet individual or multi-jurisdictional common core capability targets.

7.8.4. Resource management strategies to consider include stockpiling resources; establishing mutual aid agreements to obtain resources from neighboring jurisdictions; determining how and where to reassign existing resources from non-essential tasks; and/or developing contracts to acquire resources from vendors rapidly when needed.

7.9. Requirements for Resource Management During an Incident (RMDI). During multi-jurisdictional response, installations will use the NIMS RMDI processes that includes standard methods to identify, order, mobilize, and track resources as summarized in **Table 7.2** **(T-1) Note:** In some cases, the identification and ordering process is compressed, such as when an IC identifies the specific resources necessary for a given task and orders those resources directly. However, in larger, more complex incidents (e.g., Type 3 and higher), the IC relies on the resource management process within EOCs to identify and meet resource needs.

Table 7.2. Resource Management During an Incident (RMDI) Process.

Step & Action		Remarks
1	Identify Requirements	The IC, EOC, and supporting control centers should coordinate as early as possible, both in advance of and during incidents to identify resources needed in support of response and initial recovery.
2	Order and Acquire	Incident and/or EOC personnel request resources based on incident priorities and objectives. When applicable, consider the resource demands of other incidents. The organization providing resources will consent to the request and communicate discrepancies between requested resources and those available for delivery.
3	Mobilize[1]	Conduct incident specific deployment planning to include just-in-time training, incident site reporting instructions for teams/crews, designating assembly points, and delivery schedules.
4	Track and Report	Prepare to receive and/or use resources and track resource location(s) to facilitate the safety and security of personnel, equipment, teams, and facilities through effective resource coordination and movement.
5	Demobilize	Ensure orderly, safe, and efficient return of a resource to its original location and status; planning and logistics functions collaborate to plan how resources are rehabilitated, replenished, disposed of, and/or returned or restored to operational condition.
6	Reimburse and Restock	Payment of expenses incurred by resource providers for specific activities. Reimbursement processes include mechanisms for collecting bills, validating costs against the scope of the work, and

		replacing or repairing damaged equipment. Reimbursement procedures are often specified in mutual aid and assistance agreements.
Note: Mobilizing fixed facility resources, such as hospitals, EOCs, and shelters involves activation rather than deployment. Plans and systems to monitor resource mobilization status should be flexible enough to adapt to both types of resources.		

7.10. Mutual Aid Requirements. Installation commanders will develop resource management objectives and processes IAW DoDI 6055.17, DoDI 3020.52, DoDI 6200.03, and AFI 10-801. **(T-0)**

7.10.1. Installation commanders will develop and establish MAAs that address resources and partnership arrangements essential to the EM Program. **(T-1)**

7.10.2. The installation staff judge advocate will review all EM related MAAs for legal sufficiency and considerations. **(T-1)**

7.10.3. The EMWG should annually review all EM related MAAs.

7.10.4. For anticipated incident Type 4 and/or 5 response related resources, the unit commander that provides first and emergency responder capabilities/resources should develop and/or monitor effectiveness of existing MAAs on a reoccurring basis.

7.10.5. For anticipated incident Type 1, 2, or 3 response and initial recovery, the IEM, through the EMWG and the EP2T, should coordinate development and/or monitor effectiveness of existing MAAs on at least an annual basis.

7.10.6. Mutual aid should address participating entities' liability, compensation, and procedures, and include topics presented in **Table 7.3**.

Table 7.3. Recommended Mutual Aid Agreement (MAA) Topics.

Topic	Remarks
Reimbursement	Mutual aid services are either paid or unpaid (e.g., based on providing reciprocal services). Some mutual aid agreements specify reimbursement parameters.
Recognition of Licensure and Certification	Guidelines to ensure recognition of licensures across geopolitical boundaries.
Procedures for Mobilization	Specific procedures for parties to request and dispatch resources through mutual aid.
Protocols for Voice and Data Interoperability	Protocols that specify how different communications and IT systems share information.
Protocols for Resource Management	Standard templates for packaging resources based on NIMS RTDs and/or local inventory systems.

7.10.7. Prior to and/or during complex incidents/disasters/attacks, the installation commander will evaluate the provision of mutual aid requests to other jurisdictions against the installation capacity to accommodate the temporary loss of the resource(s) as it relates to overarching installation EM mission area outcomes and operational mission continuation requirements. **(T-1)**

7.10.8. Domestic installations will account for the emergency management assistance compact (EMAC). **(T-0) Note:** EMAC is a congressionally ratified mutual aid compact that defines a non-federal, state-to-state system for sharing resources across state lines during an emergency or disaster. EMAC's unique relationships with states, regions, territories, and federal organizations, such as FEMA and the National Guard Bureau (NGB), enable it to move a wide variety of resources to meet the jurisdictions' needs.

Section 7C—National Incident Management System (NIMS) Characteristics and the Incident Command System (ICS)

7.11. Concept Overview. The command and coordination component of NIMS describes the systems, principles, and structures that provide a standard, national to local level framework for incident management. This section presents DAF EM Program policy regarding application of NIMS management characteristics and the ICS. The interconnected EOC organizational structure, multiagency coordination (MAC) group, joint information system (JIS), and interconnectivity of tactical to strategic NIMS command and coordination structures are addressed in subsequent sections within this chapter.

7.12. National Incident Management System (NIMS) Management Characteristics. All levels of EM Programs (installation to DAF) will account for NIMS management characteristics outlined in **Table 7.4** and expanded upon in NIMS doctrine to include DoDI 6055.17. **(T-1)**

Table 7.4. Emergency Management (EM) Program Employment of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) Characteristics.

Characteristics	Remarks
Common Terms	Organizational functions with incident responsibilities are named and defined. Major resource descriptions are given common names and are typed to help avoid confusion and enhance interoperability. Incident support facilities/areas use common terminology.
Modular	Establishing and expanding ICS organizations on and off the incident site.
Management by Objectives	The IC or unified command (UC) establishes objectives that drive incident operations.
Incident Action Planning	The necessity for written plans depends on incident complexity, command decisions, and legal requirements. Formal IAPs are not always developed for the initial operational period of no-notice incidents. However, if an incident is likely to extend beyond one operational period, becomes more complex, or involves multiple jurisdictions and/or agencies, preparing a written. IAP becomes increasingly important to maintain unity of effort and effective, efficient, and safe operations.
Span of Control	The type of incident, nature of the task, hazards and safety factors, experience of the supervisor and subordinates, and communication access between the subordinates and the supervisor are all factors that influence manageable span of control.

Incident Facilities and Locations	Typical facilities, with common terminology, include the Command Post, incident base, staging areas, camps, mass casualty triage areas, points-of distribution, and emergency shelters.
Comprehensive Resource Management	Resources include personnel, equipment, teams, supplies, and facilities available or potentially available for assignment or allocation as described in **Section 7B**.
Integrated Communications	Incident level and in EOC communicate through the development and use of a common communications plan, interoperable communications processes, and systems that include voice and data links.
Establishment and Transfer of Command[1]	Clearly establish the command function at the beginning of an incident. The jurisdiction or organization with primary responsibility for the incident designates the individual at the scene responsible for establishing command and protocol for transferring command.
UC	UC manages the incident by jointly approved objectives.
Chain of Command and Unity of Command	Orderly line of authority within the ranks of the incident management organization.
Accountability	Effective accountability for resources during an incident is essential. Incident personnel should adhere to principles of accountability, including check-in/check-out, IAP, unity of command, personal responsibility, span of control, and resource tracking.
Dispatch/Deployment	Resources should deploy only when appropriate authorities request and dispatch them through established resource management systems.
Information and Intelligence Management[2]	The incident management organization establishes a process for gathering, analyzing, assessing, sharing, and managing incident-related information and intelligence.
Notes: 1. This characteristic relates to ICS and not the DoD concepts of "command" and "unity of command" that have distinct legal meanings for military forces and operations. 2. In NIMS, "intelligence" refers exclusively to threat-related information developed by law enforcement, medical surveillance, and other investigative organizations.	

7.13. Incident Action Plan (IAP), Incident Command System (ICS) Forms, and Operational Period Requirements.

7.13.1. IAP. ICs, through the ICS staff, will generate an oral or written IAP plan containing general objectives reflecting the overall strategy for managing an incident. **(T-1)** The IC will determine if a written IAP is required based on incident type complexity as specified in **Table 7.1**, except for HAZMAT incidents, which requires a written IAP. **Note:** An incident involving a nuclear weapon/material in DoD custody requires additional requirements as specified in DoDD 3150.08 and DoDI 3150.10.

7.13.1.1. The IC will ensure IAPs provide a coherent means of communicating the overall incident objectives in the context of both operational and support activities. The IAP should include the identification of operational resources and assignments and may include attachments that provide additional direction.

7.13.1.2. An IAP will enable tactical operations to be achieved based upon established principles and reflect a time-based operational period.

7.13.1.3. IAPs will be developed IAW NIMS and applicable incident-specific guidance. Use of the supporting ICS forms is required.

7.13.2. ICS Forms. The IC and ICS staff will have access to and utilize standard ICS forms. While the format and content are flexible, the form number and purpose should remain intact to maintain consistency, facilitate immediate identification and interoperability, and simplify use.

7.13.2.1. ICS Forms will be integrated into the installation COP for the creation of the IAP. **(T-1)** Installations located OCONUS will utilize ICS Forms to the greatest extent possible. **(T-3)** Reference the NIMS ICS Forms Booklet, FEMA 502-2, for a complete listing of forms.

7.13.2.2. The EOC manager will send the General Message (ICS Form 213) to their respective MAJCOM CFM and AFIMSC Detachment within 24 hours. **(T-1)**

7.13.2.3. The IAP normally consists of the Incident Objectives (ICS Form 202), Organization Assignment List (ICS Form 203), an Assignment List (ICS Form 204) for each division/group on the incident, and a map of the incident area. Larger incidents necessitate additional supporting attachments, such as a separate Incident Radio Communications Plan (ICS Form 205), a Medical Plan (ICS Form 206), and a Meeting Schedule (ICS Form 230). **Note:** Not all ICS forms are included in the IAP, some support the planning process or incident operations in other ways.

7.13.3. Operational Periods. The IC and ICS Staff should use professional judgement to determine the appropriate operation periods. The IC should consider a 12-hour operational period as an effective planning cycle for efficient response to technological hazards and terrorism incidents. Shorter or longer operational periods may be necessary for natural hazards and special events with specific time windows. ICs will use the operational period planning cycle defined in NIMS for complex multi-jurisdictional response incidents.

7.14. Incident Command System (ICS) On-Scene Requirements.

7.14.1. Installations will employ and use the ICS for on-scene incident management to include the UC concept, as needed, and as described in NIMS. **(T-1)** Installations in foreign countries should collaborate with host nation mission partners and apply NIMS ICS principles while accounting for host nation equivalent incident command concepts.

7.14.2. Installation application of ICS (incident command and UC constructs) will include five major functional areas, staffed as needed and determined by the IC or UC construct consisting of command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration as illustrated in **Figure 7.2**. **(T-1)**

Figure 7.2. Example Incident Command System (ICS) Organization with a Single Incident Commander (IC).



7.14.3. IC and UC. The initial first responder will assume command, in most incidents. A formal transfer of command to the senior fire officer will occur for any incident involving two or more agencies. **(T-0)** The senior fire officer will assume and serve as the IC until the scene is rendered safe and recovery operations may begin. **(T-0)** The IC must be qualified, trained, and certified individual with experience in the given type of emergency. **(T-0)**

7.14.3.1. For sudden on-set incidents within installation jurisdictional boundaries and without jurisdictional or functional agency overlap, the senior DoD first responder to arrive on scene will be the IC (e.g., vehicle accident). **(T-1)** Incident command will be transferred to a more senior and/or qualified first responder as he or she arrives on-scene. **(T-1)** The EOC will document each succession of IC transfer. **(T-1)**

7.14.3.2. Assignment as the IC for a specific incident is based upon qualifications, experience, and certification in addition to successful completion of the required training specified in **paragraph 5.4** and **Attachment 5** at a minimum. Example IC assignment criteria for the installation IC are described below.

7.14.3.2.1. The initial first responder will assume command in most incidents. **(T-0)** A formal transfer of command will occur for any incident involving two or more agencies to the senior fire officer on the scene who will assume command and serve as the IC. **(T-1)**

7.14.3.2.2. For environmental oil and hazardous substance spill response, the initial IC is the senior fire officer certified as HAZMAT IC. Once the release is secured, the IC may transfer to the appropriate environmental SME. ICs must have completed required training prior to appointment as the IC. **(T-0)**

7.14.3.2.3. For law enforcement related incidents, such as active shooters, barricaded suspect, and hostage situations, the initial IC is the senior security forces official. A formal transfer of command will occur once a senior fire officer arrives on the scene who will assume command and serve as the IC. The senior security forces official will assume the role of the Operations Section Chief to focus on continued tactical actions to render the scene safe from hostilities.

7.14.3.2.4. For public works incidents, such as infrastructure failure not involving release of HAZMAT, trench collapse, or high energy shock risk, the IC may be the senior civil engineer/public works official.

7.14.3.2.5. For covert incidents or incidents with gradual or slow onset and no defined incident scene, the IC may be the installation commander or designated representative.

7.14.3.2.6. In incidents regarding broad biological terrorism or other public health emergencies, including disease outbreaks, the IC should support the installation PHEM-IL, or designated representative from medical commander. For incidents specifically impacting operations within a facility or work center (e.g., targeted threats), the initial IC is the senior fire officer certified as HAZMAT IC. Once the specific risk or hazard is mitigated, the IC may transfer to the appropriate designated SME. **(T-0)**

7.14.3.2.7. A DoD/DAF military or civilian member may serve as the IC at an incident off a military installation based on provisions within existing MAAs with that jurisdiction, if applicable, or through agreement at the scene by the respective jurisdiction's senior authorities of the responding agencies. An incident involving a priority level 1 resource (e.g., presidential aircraft, nuclear weapons, etc.), or an incident once declared a National Defense Area by the appropriate authority will be established and managed by the closest responding DoD/DAF entity, as appropriate. **(T-1)**

7.14.4. Command Staff. The IC or UC will assign command staff as needed to support the command function. The command staff typically includes a PAO (identified as public information officer [PIO] via NIMS common terminology), a safety officer, and a liaison officer who report directly to the IC or UC and have assistants as necessary. **(T-0)** The IC or UC may appoint additional advisors as needed.

7.14.4.1. PAO. The installation PAO will provide on-scene support to the IC or UC construct as needed. **(T-1)** The PAO interfaces with the public, media, and/or with other agencies with incident-related information needs. The PAO gathers, verifies, coordinates, and disseminates accessible, meaningful, and timely information on the incident for both internal and external audiences.

7.14.4.2. Safety Officer. The safety officer monitors incident operations and advises the IC or UC on matters relating to the health and safety of incident personnel. The safety officer should be a first and/or emergency responder with KSAs pertaining to incident operational aspects to include hazards/threats.

7.14.4.3. Liaison Officer. The liaison officer is the incident command's POC for representatives of governmental agencies, jurisdictions, NGO, and private sector organizations that are not included in the UC.

7.14.5. General Staff. The IC or UC will assign general staff as needed to support incident response. The general staff will consist of the operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration section chiefs. These individuals will be responsible for the functional aspects of the incident command structure. **Note:** General staff functions default to the IC or UC until a section chief is assigned.

7.14.5.1. Operations Section. Key functions should include directing the management of tactical activities on the IC or UC's behalf; developing and implementing strategies and tactics to achieve incident objectives; organizing the operations section to best meet the incident's needs, maintaining a manageable span of control, and optimize the use of resources; and supporting IAP development for each operational period.

7.14.5.2. Planning Section. Key functions should include facilitating incident planning meetings; recording the status of resources and anticipated resource needs; collecting, organizing, displaying, and disseminating incident status information and analyzing the situation as it changes; planning for the orderly, safe, and efficient demobilization of incident resources; and collecting, recording, and safeguarding all incident documents.

7.14.5.3. Logistics Section. Key functions should include ordering, receiving, storing/housing, and processing incident-related resources; providing ground transportation during an incident, maintaining and supplying vehicles, keeping vehicle usage records, and developing incident traffic plans; setting up, maintaining, securing, and demobilizing incident facilities; determining food and water needs, including ordering food, providing cooking facilities, maintaining food service areas, and managing food security and safety (in cooperation with the safety officer); maintaining an incident Communications Plan and acquiring, setting up, issuing, maintaining, and accounting for communications and IT equipment; and providing medical services to incident personnel.

7.14.5.4. Finance/Administration Section. Key functions should include tracking costs, analyzing cost data, making estimates, and recommending cost savings measures; analyzing, reporting, and recording financial concerns resulting from property damage, responder injuries or fatalities at the incident; managing financial matters concerning leases and vendor contracts; managing administrative databases and spreadsheets for analysis and decision making; and recording time for incident personnel and leased equipment.

7.14.5.5. Intelligence/Investigation Function. The IC or UC should opt to reconfigure intelligence and investigations responsibilities to meet the needs of the incident to ensure that intelligence and investigative operations and activities are properly managed and coordinated. Key activities should include actions to prevent and/or deter potential unlawful activity, incidents, and/or attacks; collect, process, analyze, secure, and disseminate information, intelligence, and situational awareness with specific attention to WMD/CBRN threats; and identify, document, process, collect, create a chain of custody for, safeguard, examine and analyze, and store evidence or specimens. **Note:** Particular attention should address the safety and security of all response personnel, by helping to prevent future attacks or escalated impacts; and determine the source or cause of an ongoing incident (e.g., disease outbreak, fire, complex coordinated attack, or cyber incident) to control its impact and/or help prevent the occurrence of similar incidents.

7.14.6. Types of ICS Support Facilities/Areas. The IC or UC will determine the need for and should establish facilities in and around the incident area to house or support incident management functions. **(T-0)** The IC or UC determines the kinds and locations of facilities based on incident needs with support from EOC(s) as summarized in **Figure 7.3**. **Note:** The DAF EM Program will adopt these standardized terms/icons as a pivotal geospatial situational awareness capability regarding multi-jurisdictional response activities.

Figure 7.3. Types of Incident Command System (ICS) Facilities and Associated Functions.



7.15. Incident Complex – Multiple Incidents. Installations will account for ICS procedures to form an incident complex over two or more individual incidents located in the same general area through a single IC or a UC. **(T-0)** When relevant authorities establish an incident complex over several incidents, those incidents will become branches or divisions within the incident complex operations section.

7.16. Area Command. Installations will account for use of an area command to oversee multiple concurrent incidents or a very complex incident that requires the establishment of multiple ICS organizations as summarized in **Figure 7.4**. **(T-0)** Key responsibilities of the area command should include developing broad objectives for the affected area; coordinating development of incident objectives and strategies for each incident; allocating or reallocating resources as priorities change; and prioritizing needs for scarce resources. **Note:** Multiple EOCs from various jurisdictions will likely need to coordinate the resource needs.

Figure 7.4. Example Area Command with Multiple Incident Commands.



Section 7D—Installation Emergency Operation Center (EOC)

7.17. Concept Overview. Domestic jurisdictions and mission partners within the CONUS use interoperable EOC concepts and constructs as critical functions to address imminent or realized threats/hazards and to coordinate support to incident command, on-scene personnel, and/or other EOCs.

7.18. Overarching Emergency Operation Center (EOC) Requirements.

7.18.1. The installation commander will designate the primary and alternate EOC directors in writing. **(T-1)** Primary and alternate EOC directors may be any officer that has completed the EOC Director's course at Maxwell AFB, AL or the GS12/13 IEM assigned to the IOEM who holds an Air Force Certified emergency manager and meets all training requirements specified in **Attachment 5**. **(T-1)**

7.18.2. The installation commander appoints primary and alternate EOC managers in writing., The EOC managers will be the EM Civilian (GS-12/13 Civilian), EM SNCO (AFSC 3E9X1), equivalent DoD Wage Grade employee, or qualified contract support assigned to the IOEM. **(T-1)**

7.18.3. All DAF installations will form and employ EOCs across the competition continuum/ range of military operations both domestically and abroad/OCONUS.

7.18.4. All installations will establish, operate, and maintain a primary EOC. **(T-1)** The primary EOC should consist of a physical location organized, manned, trained, equipped, and exercised to effectively support on-scene incident response needs, force survivability, and recovery of operational mission generation capability.

7.18.5. The primary installation EOC should consist of a physical location organized, manned, trained, equipped, and exercised to effectively support on-scene incident response needs, force survivability, and recovery of operational mission generation capability.

7.18.6. For new EOC design (military construction [MILCON]), installations should refer to UFC 4-141-04.

7.18.7. For existing EOC infrastructure, installations should refer to UFC 4-141-04 when performing facility sustainment, restoration, and maintenance.

7.18.8. Installations will OT&E, exercise and maintain primary and alternate installation EOCs and supporting EOC staff as a prioritized requirement regarding the installation EM Program. **(T-2)**

7.18.8.1. Virtual EOC capability is permitted as long as the EOC supports the IC and oversees response and recovery effectively.

7.18.8.2. Virtual EOCs should be exercised to operate under emergency lockdown (ELD) and SIP incidents.

7.18.9. The installation commander will retain overall authority and responsibility for all response and recovery operations and employs the installation EOC to coordinate operations in support of the IC. **(T-0)**

7.18.10. The IEM will serve as the installation commander's principal advisor during activation of the installation EOC. **(T-1)**

7.18.11. Installation EOCs will be activated to support larger more complex incidents. **(T-0)**

7.19. Installation Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Organizational Construct.

7.19.1. Installations will implement a flexible EOC organizational design compatible with NIMS **(T-0) Note:** The use of emergency support functions; finance, logistics, operations, and planning; or a hybrid system based on staff organization and functions is permitted (e.g., A-Staff). For more information on A-Staff, reference AFDP 3-30, *Command and Control¸ Appendix C: The Air Forces (AFFOR) Staff.*

7.19.1.1. The EOC construct should generate interoperability with incident response/recovery mission partners while simultaneously promoting interoperability installation C2 functions, Numbered Air Forces (NAF), MAJCOMs/FLDCOMs, Component HQs, joint partners, and coalition partners.

7.19.1.2. The EOC construct should increase synchronization for crisis and contested conditions via a "train as you fight" approach while preparing Airmen and Guardians for integration with joint battlespace partners to include streamlining decision-making and responsiveness.

7.19.1.3. The installation EOC director will be directly responsible to the installation commander and the CoS (if appointed) that coordinates, prioritizes, and promulgates installation direction for steady state and crisis action activities.

7.19.2. The installation EOC will be organized based on **paragraph 7.19.1** and ensure:

7.19.2.1. The EOC will use the common NIMS/ICS terms for sections and branches to help enable interoperability for multi-jurisdictional response mission partners. **(T-0)**

7.19.2.2. The EOC construct will include application and assignment of flexible emergency support functions, SME branches (e.g., comptroller support branch, CBRN defense/cell support branch, security support branch, force support branch, logistics readiness branch, etc.), or staff organization based on incident needs. **(T-1)**

7.19.2.3. AFIMSC will account for the described EOC construct and adjust the IEMP 10-2 planning tool, training course content, and other DAF EM Program execution support products. **(T-1)**

7.20. Installation Emergency Operation Center (EOC) Formation Aspects. The installation EOC will be task-organized from existing resources and tailored to the incident and the IC/UC needs to include operational mission requirements. **(T-0)**

7.20.1. The installation EOC director for each EOC shift will be predesignated, in writing, by the installation commander and will be responsible to the installation commander for all EOC operations. **(T-1)**

7.20.2. The installation EOC will be staffed by representatives from command directorates, assigned functional areas, and liaison officers from appropriate tenant organizations, units, and local, state, federal, tribal, NGO/Faith Based Organizations, and private (or host nation) as determined by the EOC director and based on incident needs. **(T-0)**

7.20.3. The installation EOC staff will be trained, exercised, and evaluated as detailed in **Chapter 5** and **Attachment 5**. Installation EOC teams will be typed through the resource typing system. **(T-0)**

7.20.4. Personnel assignments should be by EOC position title, squadron/unit/tenant affiliation, and individual names (vice only individual assigned to the "EOC"). Regardless of personnel assignment methodology, the EOC must include a chain of succession for both sustained operations and times when the primary individual is unavailable. **(T-1)**

7.21. Installation Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Staffing. The installation EOC staff will consist of SMEs aligned within various sections prepared to execute timely and appropriate common core capabilities. **(T-0)**

7.21.1. EOC Director (and Management Staff). The EOC director, through coordination with all sections, should set EOC objectives and tasks, integrate stakeholders, work with senior officials to facilitate the development of policy direction for incident support, and ensure the dissemination of timely, accurate, and accessible information to the public.

7.21.1.1. The EOC management staff should include a PAO (e.g., PIO) and may include others such as a legal advisor and a safety officer depending on the size, scope, and complexity of the incident.

7.21.1.2. Based on incident support needs, the EOC director should determine the need for additional management staff positions, identify and appoint functional area personnel/SMEs to lead sections, and align functional SMEs to fill branch positions.

7.21.1.3. The EOC director should be responsible for timely and appropriate execution of all common core capabilities pertaining to the incident to include specific common core capabilities identified in **Table 7.5**.

7.21.2. EOC Staff. The EOC staff will focus on:

7.21.2.1. Financial, administrative, and cost analysis aspects of the incidents to include tracking expenditures, provision of resources, personnel accountability, and administrative support.

7.21.2.2. Situational awareness which includes the operability of the installation COP, collaboration internally with other EOC sections and external incident support (on-scene command, civilian EOCs, mission partners, host nation, etc.), provide warning and reporting regarding MCOs, provide communications capabilities and technology support.

7.21.2.3. Provide support to on-scene response personnel within their respective functions. Functional areas should coordinate to address resource needs, request for information, and request for support.

7.21.2.4. Monitor and account for cascading impacts to lifelines and coordinate with internal and external EOCs to stabilize lifelines (safety and security; food, water, shelter, health and medical; energy (power and fuel); communications; transportation; and HAZMAT response).

7.21.2.5. Determine damage to installation resources, facilities, and infrastructure. Provide the EOC director with a recommended prioritized listing of initial facility/infrastructure stabilization to address life safety issues and operational mission restoration. The EOC director should coordinate with the installation commander (or CAT) to approve the prioritization of initial stabilization/repair actions as to account for operational mission generation priorities.

7.21.2.6. Source, request/order, and track all resources. This includes supplies, equipment, and personnel acquired from departments and agencies represented in the EOC, other community organizations, mutual aid/EMAC sources, or nongovernmental partners, as well as items purchased or leased. This staff will coordinate closely with the finance and administration section to ensure accurate accounting of resource expenditures.

7.21.2.7. Execute timely and appropriate common core capabilities identified in **Table 7.5**.

7.21.3. Planning. Multiple functions/staffs within the EOC should be tasked to facilitate a standard planning process to achieve the EOC objectives and provide a range of current and future planning services to address current needs and anticipate and devise the means to deal with future needs. The staff should:

7.21.3.1. Assist in developing the shared goals of multiple jurisdictions and organizations involved in managing the incident and coordinate a standard planning process to achieve the objectives of the EOC leadership and foster unity of effort among all organizations represented in the center.

7.21.3.2. Work closely with personnel in the ICS Planning Section and/or other EOCs to collect, analyze, and disseminate incident and incident-related information, including integrating geospatial and technical information and developing reports, briefings, and presentation products for a variety of stakeholders.

Table 7.5. Installation Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Common Core Capability Execution.

Common Core Capability
Public Information and Warning
Physical Protective Measures[1,2]
Operational Command and Coordination
Financial Programing[1]
Integrated Risk Management
Situational Assessment
Operational Communications
Cyber Security[1]
On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement
Intelligence and Information Sharing[1]
Interdiction and Disruption[1]
Screening, Search, and Detection[1]
Forensics and Attribution[1]
Access Control and Identify Verification[1]
Fire Management and Suppression
Emergency Medical Services, Public Health, and Healthcare
Health and Social Services[1]
Occupational and Environmental Response/Health and Safety
Safety
Mass Search and Rescue Operations
Infrastructure Systems and Mission Restoration[3]
Evacuation and Critical Transportation
Mass Care Services
Fatality Management
Logistics and Supply Chain Management
Natural and Cultural Resources[1]
Housing[1]
Planning
Physical Protective Measures[2]
Notes: 1. Although not a response common core capability, the EOC remains responsible for execution and/or preparation to execute the common core capability (e.g., continue prevention and protection to include preparation for initial recovery). 2. The future plans section will advise the EOC director regarding adaptive physical protective measures for subsequent execution by other sections/branches.

7.22. Installation Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Basic Functions. Installations EOCs will account for the basic functions listed in **Table 7.6** that represents a compilation of information, tasks, and activities common to incident response. **(T-0)**

Table 7.6. Installation Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Basic Functions.

Item	Basic Function
1	Support the IC.
2	Receive, monitor, and assess emergency information.
3	Develop/disseminate EPI warnings and instructions, to include media coordination through Joint Information Center (JIC).
4	Monitor, assess, and track response units and resource requests.
5	Maintain an event log and post all key emergency information.
6	Develop emergency cost accounting codes and track and manage all response and recovery costs for submission to HHQ for supplemental funding requests and for reimbursement based upon local support agreements.
7	Receive, assess, track, and manage available resources.
8	Coordinate operations of all responding units, including all assigned functional areas.
9	Organize staging area and assignments for volunteer personnel.
10	Assess needs and coordinate evacuation and mass care operations.
11	Make policy decisions and issue installation disaster declarations, as needed.
12	Provide direction and control for center operations, set priorities, and establish strategies.
13	Support execution of tactical operations to implement policy, strategies, and missions, and monitor and adjust tactical operations, as necessary. Keep senior, subordinate, and tenant commands informed.
14	Keep local jurisdictions (tenants, installation, city, county, region, and state) informed.
15	Conduct preliminary damage assessment and maintain documentation on extent of damage.
16	Provide direction for recovery assistance missions in response to the situations and available resources.
17	Maintain security and access control of the ECC.
18	Provide for relief of and necessities for EOC personnel.
19	Coordinate and execute common core capabilities, as needed.

7.23. Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)/Checklists. Installation EOCs will have supporting SOPs to support the assigned functions and tasks identified in the IEMP and the installation EOC. **(T-0)** At a minimum, the installation EOC SOPs should address the topics identified in **Table 7.7**. **Note:** The term SOP is a NIMS common term. The DAF EM Program has historically used the term “checklists” as synonymous with SOPs.

Table 7.7. Minimum Installation Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Standard Operating Procedures (SOP).

Item	Topic
1	Weather, seismic, or other geophysical information affecting operations.
2	Status of MEFs and supporting personnel.
3	Status of critical infrastructure.
4	Status of supporting MTFs.
5	Status of transportation, energy, and utility systems.
6	Status of communications systems.
7	Special reoccurring events (e.g., airshows, sporting events, etc.).
8	Significant changes in demographic information due to disasters.
9	Personnel accountability of assigned personnel.
10	Establishment of incident command at one or more incident scenes.
11	Activation of the MWNS.
12	Activation of support agreements or support contracts.
13	Request for or receipt of mutual aid.
14	Evacuation or SIP of some or all assigned personnel.
15	Activation of installation EOC including relocation.
16	Overall strategic priorities for response.
17	Major issues and activities of activated functional areas.
18	Status of critical resources and resource shortfalls, and/or needs.
19	Hazard-specific information.
20	Estimates of potential impacts based on predictive modeling (as applicable).
21	Perimeter and/or cordon of the incident scene.
22	Number, condition, and overall prognosis for casualties.
23	Number and types of fatalities.
24	All injuries of first and emergency response personnel.
25	Status of evacuation and mass care operations.
26	Estimated number of personnel SIP.
27	Estimated number of evacuees displaced.
28	Estimated number of safe haven residents.
29	Estimated number of assigned personnel in civilian shelters.
30	Volunteer and donations management.
31	Requests for installation disaster declaration.
32	Status of local, state, and presidential disaster declarations.
33	Status and analysis of rapid needs assessment.
34	Status and analysis of initial (and follow-on) damage assessments.
35	Expected follow-on mass care, including bulk distribution and mass feeding requirements.
36	Status and analysis on recovery programs (human services, infrastructure).
Note: Information management systems supporting the EOC COP will provide the ability to track and display these topics.	

7.24. Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Recall Requirements. Installations will establish a continuous 24-hour/7-days a week/365-days per year designated EOC recall center, typically through the dispatch center/ECC or Command Post. **(T-0)** Nothing within the EM Program requires a 24-hour, continual watch within the installation EOC. The designated EOC recall center will establish effective procedures to receive and transmit recall of the EOC staff. **(T-0)**

7.25. Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Activation Levels. Installation EOCs will employ a tiered activation concept consisting of three activation levels IAW NIMS. **(T-1)** The IC, EOC director, and/or installation commander will determine the level of activation for EOCs. **(T-3)** Though an immediate increase from activation level 3 (normal) directly to activation level 1 (full activation) may be warranted in sudden onset incidents, gradual and slow onset hazards will require the capability for transitional activation moving steadily up or down the scale. Installation EM Programs will adopt these activation levels for their installation EOCs and include the appropriate level of detail to support this concept within their IEMP 10-2. **(T-1) Note:** These policy requirements and standards will provide the means to roll-up installation EOC activation status into overarching information systems in support of DAF wide EM situational awareness.

7.25.1. Activation Level 3 (Normal/ Steady-State). No emergency incident exists sufficient to warrant activation of the installation EOC. Activation level normal may include support of installation EMWG meetings, commander briefings, and threat working group or AT Working Group (ATWG) meetings.

7.25.2. Activation Level 2 (Enhanced Steady-State/Partial Activation). Certain EOC team members/organizations are activated to monitor a credible threat, risk, or hazard and/or to support the response to a new and potentially evolving incident, to include large-scale events. EOC members are simply notified of indications and warnings as to increase situational awareness. There is no EM Program requirement for a 24/7 watch officer during Activation level 2. Typical actions include reviewing and updating applicable SOPs, conducting operational checks, updating maps and Geographic Information System information, and updating resource availability information, additional planning, and coordination support, including some specialized assistance from members of the installation EOC team and/or threat working group. Typical causes for initiation and sustainment of Activation level 2 include bomb threats, biological threat warning, potential public health emergency, preliminary laboratory results indicative of a potential biological incident (terrorism or natural causes), special events, active hurricane warnings/watches posted 96-48 hours prior to landfall, and similar incidents.

7.25.3. Activation Level 1 (Full Activation). Potential or actual emergency condition(s) exist sufficient to warrant full activation of the installation EOC. Activation level 1 results in 24/7 situational awareness with establishment of defined operational period and associated reports. The installation EOC team establishes all organizational sections, establishes communications, and initiates coordination with appropriate local, state, federal, tribal, other Service, and/or private (or host nation) counterparts, begins information management support, including establishment of a JIC, determines the current status of all response and recovery resources, and initiates resource management support for the IC. Typical causes for initiation and sustainment of Activation level 1 include any evacuation, incidents having limited/partial

impact on some or all of a population (for example, flooding, winter storms), landfall of tropical storms, expected landfall of hurricanes (within 24-36 hours), earthquake, tsunami warning, tornados, sudden onset terrorism incident, moderate- to large-scale HAZMAT spill/release involving mutual aid or environmental spill response, all nuclear-related incidents, confirmed biological incident (terrorism or natural causes), wide-scale power blackouts, and similar incidents.

7.25.4. Installation EOC Capability Requirements. Installation EOCs will have fundamental capabilities identified below. **(T-0)** The actual layout and brands/types of capabilities provided to each position, section, branch, or the EOC will depend on the installation and unit resources, budget available, and anticipated incident management workload. **Note:** A virtual EOC capability is permitted as long as the EOC remains effective in supporting the IC and overseeing response and recovery efforts. **(T-2)**

7.25.5. EOC Facility Design. Installation EOC design should incorporate UFC 4–141–04. **Note:** CBRNE Risk Index 1 installations should consider increasing the primary EOC ability to survive and operate through long-term mitigation and/or expedient hardening.

7.25.6. Alternate and/or Secondary Installation EOC. An alternate EOC should be identified and maintained by installations. The physical location, size, layout, and capabilities will depend on the installation needs, resources, and budget available, and anticipated incident management workload.

7.25.7. Emergency Communications. Installation EOCs will develop, maintain, and manage emergency communications and an associated emergency communications SOP for all multi-agency and/or multi-jurisdictional emergencies. **(T-1)**

7.25.7.1. Emergency communication capabilities will provide the installation EOC team with the capability for timely and reliable communications with the Command Post, installation dispatch center, supporting JIC, supporting MTF, all supporting evacuation and mass care teams, and all other associated activities on the installation as well as pre-identified response and recovery partners in the local, state, federal, tribal, other Service, and/or private (or host nation) communities. **(T-0)**

7.25.7.2. Emergency communication capabilities will include all MWNSs, to include cell phones, and procedures as well as addressing recording needs and capabilities at the installation dispatch center and the installation EOC, at a minimum. **(T-0)**

7.25.7.3. To the extent possible within the fiscal and resource constraints present at DAF installations, these emergency communications should be interoperable in terms of language (NIMS), procedures, and equipment.

7.25.8. Event Log. All installations will have the capability to maintain an event log to record and document significant events throughout an incident(s) life cycle when the EOC is activated/active. **(T-2)** At a minimum, EOC event logs will include actions/events related to the items in **Table 7.8** **(T-2)** **Note:** Event logs are an important aspect to AARs, and lessons learned and support to potential legal investigations and should be stored/saved for records.

Table 7.8. Minimum Installation Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Event Log Documentation.

Item	Significant Action/Event throughout Incident Life Cycle
1	Activation of command and coordination elements and capabilities.
2	Strategic and tactical objectives by operational period.
3	All incident reporting activities.
4	All warnings to the protected populace.
5	All orders to evacuate, SIP, move to safe haven, or move to civilian shelters.
6	All EPI efforts.
7	All requests for installation disaster declaration.
8	Status of local, state, and Presidential disaster declarations.
9	All support agreement and support contract activations.
10	All resource management activities.
11	All personnel accountability reports.
12	All receipt of relevant hazard-specific information.
13	All predictive modeling results.
14	Number and types of casualties and fatalities.
15	Status and analysis of rapid needs assessment.
16	Status and analysis of initial (and follow-on) damage assessments.
17	Status and analysis on recovery programs (human services, infrastructure).

7.25.9. Electronic Chat Capabilities. The installation EOC will have access to internal installation unclassified and/or classified chat capabilities with the installation C2 construct (e.g., ECC, IC, control centers, EOC, Command Post) to include unclassified chat capabilities with local multi-jurisdictional EOC partners. **(T-3)**

7.25.10. Installation COP. Reference **Chapter 11** for requirements.

Section 7E—Additional National Incident Management System (NIMS) Command and Coordination Aspects

7.26. Concept Overview. Domestic whole-of-community/nation multi-agency response and recovery for type 3 and higher incidents relies on the Multi-Agency Coordination System (MACS), JIS, and the overarching tactical, operational, and strategic NIMS command and coordination structure. This section aligns domestic DAF EM Program policy as a foundational aspect to generating interoperability with mission partners at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. **Note:** Installations should account for equivalent host nation emergency response MACS, JIS, and command and coordination concepts.

7.27. Multiagency Coordination System (MACS) Requirements.

7.27.1. Installations will interface with domestic MAC groups (or host nation equivalents) and account for participation at central locations as needed for operational information-sharing and resource coordination in support of on-scene efforts as shown in **Figure 7.5**. **(T-0)**

Figure 7.5. Incident Expansion and Multiagency Coordination System (MACS) Roles.



7.27.2. Installation commanders and the EOC director will be prepared to and support the MACS concept and procedures established in NIMS for on and/or off-scene MAC group activities. **(T-0)**

7.27.3. During multi-agency response operations and the installation EOC is activated, the EOC director will collaborate with the IC liaison officer and monitor other EOCs (local, state, federal, and host nation equivalents) regarding formation of MAC groups. **(T-0)**

7.27.4. The installation EOC director, will make recommendations to the installation commander regarding MAC group interface that involves governors, tribal leaders, mayors, city managers, and county commissioners, regarding incident management to include priorities and strategies for dealing with incident response and recovery when competition for resources is significant. **(T-0)**

7.27.5. At a minimum, the installation staff judge advocate, PAO, EOC director, and IEM should be prepared to support the installation commander regarding attendance/interface with MAC Groups (or perform in the absence of the installation commander).

7.27.6. The DAF C2 continuum as a whole (e.g., installation EOC, Command Post, MAJCOM/FLDCOM AFFOR staff, AFSWC) will also monitor and support other MACS entities (or host nation equivalents) associated with the DoD/DAF EM Program regarding local, state, federal, tribal, DoD, other DoD services/components, and private (or host nation) operations centers, to include the National Operations Center, the FEMA regional response coordination centers, joint field office (when established), and state and local EOCs as dictated by incident size and scope (e.g., catastrophic type 1). **(T-0)**

7.28. Joint Information System (JIS) Requirements. Installation, MAJCOM/FLDCOM, and HQ DAF PAOs (identified as PIOs via NIMS common terminology) will perform as key enablers for the DAF EM Program common core capability regarding EPI. **(T-0)**

7.28.1. Installation PAOs should be familiar with NIMS JIS concepts and be prepared to support and perform PAO related key functions identified in **Table 7.9**.

Table 7.9. Installation Public Affairs Officer (PAO) Key Function.

Item	Function
1	Identify timely and appropriate EPI elements and communicate to the public using the most effective means available.
2	Advise the IC/UC, EOC director, and Command Post/CAT regarding public information matters relating to the management of the incident.
3	Monitor media and other sources of public information and transmit relevant information to the appropriate personnel at the incident, EOC, and/or MAC group.
4	Handle inquiries from the media, the public, and elected officials; public information and warnings; rumor monitoring and response; media relations; and other functions needed to gather, verify, coordinate, disseminate accurate, accessible, and timely information to the installation populace.
5	Through collaboration with functional area SMEs (e.g., PHEO, Medical, Fire, Security Forces), gather information and inform the installation populace regarding public health, safety, and protection.
6	Verify accuracy of information released to the installation populace and public.
7	Provide support to and perform duties within the JIC.

7.28.2. Installation EM Programs must have procedures for integration with the JIS (or equivalent host nation concepts), including procedures to establish and maintain a JIC with partner agencies as the primary means of releasing EPI to the media. **(T-0)**

7.28.3. Information-Sharing Ground Rules. AFPD 33-3, *Information Management*, and AFI 35-101 implements DoDI 5400.14, *Procedures for Joint Public Affairs Operations*, by providing documentation for DAF interaction and participation with a JIC. Commanders will adhere to standard operations security, communications security, and guidelines for release of classified information, during incident responses. **(T-0)**

7.28.4. In coordination with local civil jurisdictions, installation commanders, through the installation PAO, will pre-identify a JIC site near the installation for establishment of a JIC. **(T-0)**

7.28.5. The preferable site for a JIC, to support joint and interagency staffing with local, state, federal, and other authorities, is outside the jurisdictional boundaries of the installation. Locating the JIC outside installation boundaries is necessary to preserve the adequate exchange of public information when and if the installation is closed to the public during an emergency.

7.28.6. At installations without full-time public affairs staffing, installation commanders will designate staff to provide this function and ensure appropriate training based upon guidance from HHQ. **(T-0)**

Chapter 8

PREVENT, PROTECT, AND MITIGATE MISSIONS

8.1. Purpose. Specify DAF EM concepts and policy to integrate functional specific resources, information, programs, and related capabilities to generate whole-of-community/mission partner preparedness and interoperability aligned with DHS/DoD/DAF EM planning frameworks, mission areas, and common core capabilities.

Section 8A—'Prevent' Activities and Common Core Capabilities

8.2. Concept Overview. Within the DAF, prevent activities are executed IAW DoDI O-2000.16. **(T-0)** The DAF EM Program will account for prevention activities, actionable mission area output, and common core capabilities to inform planning, public warning, and operational coordination as to generate interoperability with local, state, federal, and host nation mission partners. **(T-0)** Prevent activities will be designed to avoid an incident or to intervene to stop an incident from occurring. In this regard, prevention actions will protect lives, resources, facilities, infrastructure, and missions though coordinated intervention.

8.3. Roles and Responsibilities.

8.3.1. AF/A4S is the primary OPR for the EM prevent mission area primarily through implementation of DoDI O-2000.16 and IBD. **(T-0)**

8.3.2. The installation Security Forces commander and AT program manager officer are responsible for coordination and execution of AT related prevention activities and related common core capabilities with the support of the EMWG, EP2T, and installation functional areas as needed. **(T-1)**

8.4. 'Prevent' Activities and Requirements.

8.4.1. AT and EM Program Integration. Key areas of concern regarding all-hazards/threat prevention activities should be identified through the planning and IRM processes identified in **Chapter 4** and include:

8.4.1.1. Coordination and support of assessment and assistance visits, including DoD Integrated Vulnerability Assessment. **(T-0)**

8.4.1.2. Integration of AT risk management process, results, and products into all-hazard/threat IRM process. **(T-0)**

8.4.1.3. Evacuation management and mass care security requirements. **(T-0)**

8.4.1.4. Law enforcement jurisdictional boundaries and associated restrictions. **(T-0)**

8.4.1.5. Alignment and coordination regarding FPCON levels. **(T-0)**

8.4.1.6. Prevention related support agreements with other DoD installations and local civil jurisdictions. **(T-0)**

8.4.1.7. Access control procedures and requirements during response and recovery operations. **(T-0)**

8.4.1.8. Terrorist incident response procedures. **(T-0)**

8.4.1.9. Resource management coordination. **(T-0)**

8.4.1.10. Potential additional duty manpower assignments in support of AT and physical security requirements (resource management issues). **(T-0)**

8.4.2. Mission Area Intersection Between Prevent, Protect, and Respond.

8.4.2.1. Steady-state information regarding prevention activities and common core capabilities (e.g., intrusion detection, intelligence and information sharing, interdiction, and disruption, etc.) will be provided to the ECC, IEM, and Command Post with respect to preparedness/readiness to execute/modify crosscutting public information and warning. Protection, and response related common core capabilities. **(T-1)**

8.4.2.2. During response and recovery operations, relevant information regarding prevention activities, threats, and common core capabilities will be provided to the installation/tactical DAF EM construct elements specified in **Table 3.1**. **(T-1)**

8.4.2.3. Prevention planning and execution activities will account for access and direction to external mutual aid responders while coordinating outbound and inbound movement of evacuation traffic and mass care resources. **(T-1)**

8.5. 'Prevent' Common Core Capabilities in Support of the Installation Emergency Management (EM) Program. EM Programs at all echelons will plan for, coordinate, track, and evaluate the described prevent crosscutting and common core capabilities as it relates to internal integration and interoperability with local, state, federal, and host nation partners. **(T-0)**

8.5.1. IRM. Reference **Chapter 4** for crosscutting prevention related IRM requirements.

8.5.2. Planning. The installation ATWG and the supporting MTF commander prevention plans, such as the installation AT plan, Integrated Defense Plan, Information Assurance Plan, and associated medical response plans, will describe prevention strategies that account for all-hazards/threats identified during the EM planning and IRM process described in **Chapter 4**. **(T-0)** Installations will posture prevention common core capabilities-based EM planning requirements described in **Attachment 3**, and standard core capability targets in **Attachment 4**. **(T-0)**

8.5.3. E&T. Reference **paragraph 5.4** for required E&T and **Attachment 5** for recommended specific prevention core capability E&T opportunities.

8.5.4. Public Information and Warning. Reference **Chapter 8** for crosscutting prevention execution requirements.

8.5.5. Consistent with intelligence oversight laws, policies, and practices, provide and receive timely, accurate, and actionable information resulting from the planning, direction, collection, exploitation, processing, analysis, production, dissemination, evaluation, and feedback of available information concerning physical and cyber threats to installation lives, key resources, facilities, infrastructure, and operational missions. Inclusive of the development, proliferation, an/or use of WMD and/or CBRNE weapons. Information sharing is the ability to exchange intelligence, information, data, or knowledge among government or host nation partners, as appropriate and where permitted by U.S. law and policy including any international agreements with host nation partners.

8.5.6. Interdiction and Disruption. Delay, divert, intercept, halt, apprehend, or secure threats and/or hazards to installation jurisdictions.

8.5.7. Screening, Search, and Detection. Identify, discover, or locate threats and/or hazards to installations through active and passive installation surveillance and search procedures. This may include the use of systematic examinations and assessments, bio surveillance, CBRNE and other sensor technologies, or physical investigation and intelligence.

8.5.8. Forensics and Attribution. Within domestic installations/jurisdictions, support local, state, and federal law enforcement forensic analysis and assist with attribution of terrorist acts (including the means and methods of terrorism) to their source, to include forensic analysis as well as attribution for an attack and for the preparation for an attack in an effort to prevent initial or follow-on acts and/or swiftly develop counter-options.

Section 8B—'Protect' Activities and Common Core Capabilities

8.6. Concept Overview. DAF EM Program activities and common core capabilities within the protect mission area apply continuously and will be implemented concurrently with prevent, protect, prepare, mitigate, respond, and recover mission areas based on all-hazard/threat situational awareness and assessment. **(T-0) Note:** The intent of the policy in this section is to operationalize protection activities and common core capabilities along the incident/attack event horizon from steady-state to crisis with the ability to escalate appropriate protection capabilities to and through incident/attack response and recovery. Historically, the DAF EM Program employed a pre, trans, and post attack action model only when hazards/threats increased. This policy looks to transition from that model to a capabilities-based construct/model that continually prevents, protects, mitigates and then, responds to and recovers from all-hazards/threats.

8.7. Roles and Responsibilities. The installation commander, through advice of installation DAF EM Program construct specified in **Table 3.1**, is responsible for adequate planning and timely execution regarding protect common core capabilities. Installations should consider the emergent installation HQ construct (e.g., Lead Wing and A-staff) to assess the most appropriate organizational design to effectively administer the EM program on-behalf of the senior DAF commander. Example: the IEM reporting directly to the CoS overseeing the A-staff.

8.8. 'Protect' Activities and Execution. Installations will establish steady state protocols for monitoring all-hazards/threats and ensure appropriate timing to escalate and execute protection common core capabilities. **(T-1)** When the EOC is activated, the EOC director will coordinate, monitor, and advise on execution of protection common core capabilities to the CAT, installation Command Post, and installation commander. **(T-1)**

8.9. 'Protect' Common Core Capability Requirements. DAF EM Programs at all echelons will identify, plan for, coordinate, posture, track, evaluate, and execute the following crosscutting and mission area common core capabilities to protect lives, resources, facilities, infrastructure, and missions. **(T-0) Note:** The DAF EM Program applies multiple physical protective measures (PPM) to account for the spectrum of all-hazards/threats to DAF world-wide OLs. Reference EM protection planning requirements described in **Attachment 3** and standard protection core capability targets in **Attachment 4**.

8.9.1. IRM. Reference **Chapter 4** for crosscutting protection related IRM requirements.

8.9.2. Planning. Installations will posture protection common core capabilities based on the EM planning and risk management process described in **Chapter 4**, EM planning requirements described in **Attachment 3**, and standard core capability targets in **Attachment 4**. **(T-0)**

8.9.3. E&T. Reference **Chapter 5** for required E&T and **Attachment 5** for recommended specific prevention core capability E&T opportunities.

8.9.4. Public Information and Warning. Reference **Chapter 8** for crosscutting protection execution requirements.

8.9.5. Access Control and Identify Verification. Execute physical, technological, and cyber measures to control admittance to critical locations and systems. Implement and maintain protocols to verify identity and authorize, grant, or deny physical and cyber access to specific locations, information, and networks. **(T-0)** Refer to DoDM 5200.08, Volume 3, *Physical Security Program: Access to DoD Installations*.

8.9.6. Cybersecurity. Protect (and, if needed, restore) electronic communications systems, information, and services from damage, unauthorized use, and exploitation. Implement risk-informed guidelines, regulations, and standards to ensure the security, reliability, integrity, and availability of critical information, records, and communications systems and services through collaborative cybersecurity initiatives and efforts. Implement and maintain procedures to detect malicious activity and to conduct technical and investigative-based countermeasures, mitigations, and operations against malicious actors to counter existing and emerging cyber-based threats, consistent with established protocols. **(T-1)** Refer to AFI 17-130, *Cybersecurity Program Management*.

8.9.7. Critical Infrastructure Protection PPMs. Ensure critical infrastructure sectors and protection elements have and maintain risk assessment processes to identify and prioritize assets, systems, networks, and functions. Ensure operational activities and critical infrastructure sectors have and maintain appropriate threat, vulnerability, and consequence tools to identify and assess threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. **(T-1)** Refer to AFI 10-2402.

8.9.8. ELD PPMs. Activate ELD as an announced emergency protocol procedure to rapidly enhance security of facilities and personnel from an active shooter incident (or other emergencies dictating lockdown).

8.9.9. SIP PPMs. Activate SIP as an announced emergency protocol procedure to generate a temporary protective position for personnel within structures or vehicles immediately before or after an incident/emergency.

8.9.10. Natural Disaster Shelters (NDS) PPMs. Activate and monitor installation NDSs prior to and/or after a natural disaster to protect personnel. Monitoring local capability and capacity and be prepared to provide reciprocal NDS capabilities.

8.9.11. MCS PPMs. Initiate MCS for installation personnel displaced due to any emergency. Be prepared to provide MCS for external populations (e.g., displaced populations from neighboring DoD installations, refugee evacuation operations, local to regional civilian populations, non-combatant evacuees, etc.).

8.9.12. Evacuation PPMs. Employ evacuation as an announced emergency protocol procedure to reduce the impact of identified hazards/threats on the protected populace by removing all or some of the population at risk to a safer location.

8.9.13. Installation Safe Haven (ISH) PPMs. Employ ISHs for a substantial portion of the population as needed and correlate MCS needs. This type of safe haven is designed to support government and/or non-government evacuees arriving from another DoD installation or civilian community (when directed by the SecDef) impacted by a natural or human caused disaster and who require temporary safe haven to temporarily stabilize the evacuee's living conditions. Refer to 5 CFR 550, *Pay Administration*.

8.9.14. Remote Safe Haven (RSH) PPMs. Employ RSHs for a substantial portion of the population needing relocation from the installation to a RSH (either civilian area and/or another DoD installation). Account for and correlate MCS needs. This type of safe haven is designed to support government evacuees departing from a DoD installation impacting natural or human caused disaster and who require temporary safe haven on another DoD installation or in a civilian community. Refer to 5 CFR 550.

8.9.15. Public Health PPMs. Employ HPCONs in response to a public health emergency or incident of public health concern IAW AFI 10-2519.

8.9.16. Expedient Hardening PPMs. Activate expedient hardening as an announced protocol procedure to increase survivability of personnel and pre-identified key facilities, resources, and mission assets (i.e., aircraft) regarding natural disasters and human-caused incidents/attacks.

8.9.17. Dispersal and Relocation Execution Concept Options (DRECO) PPMs. Execute DRECOs as an announced protocol procedure with task-organized forces capable of executing options to increase survivability of personnel and key resources/mission assets (i.e., aircraft) regarding human-caused incidents/attacks. **Note:** DRECOs differ from evacuation in that DRECOs focus on continued mission generation and survivability of the fighting/military force while evacuation pertains to the totality of the installation population more related to natural disasters and technological hazards/threats (e.g., combatants and non-combatants).

8.9.18. Supply Chain Resiliency. Use detection and monitoring capabilities to determine potential to actual status of critical supply chains and determine means to move supplies in and through geographical areas compromised by all-hazard/threat effects. Analyze key installation dependencies and interdependencies related to installation supply chain operations. Partake in installation IRM activities to identify, mitigate vulnerabilities of, and protect key assets, infrastructure, and support systems. Implement physical protections, countermeasures, and policies to secure and make resilient key installation supply chain nodes, methods of transport between nodes, and materials in transit.

Section 8C—'Mitigation' Activities and Common Core Capabilities

8.10. Concept Overview. DAF EM Program mitigation activities and common core capabilities pertain actions necessary to reduce loss of life and property by lessening the impact of all-hazards/threats. Mitigation capabilities should include, but are not limited to, community-wide risk reduction projects; efforts to improve the resilience of critical infrastructure and key resource lifelines; risk reduction for specific vulnerabilities from natural, technological, and human-caused all-hazard/threat effects and initiatives to reduce future risks after a disaster has occurred.

8.11. Roles and Responsibilities.

8.11.1. The Base Civil Engineer (BCE) is responsible for mitigation planning and execution to include CE response and recovery (e.g., Contingency Response Plan) in support of the IEMP 10-2, EAP, or equivalent.

8.11.2. The CE community planner should coordinate mitigation planning and execution activities with the EP2T, IEM, and EMWG will assist in planning.

8.12. 'Mitigate' Activities and Requirements.

8.12.1. Building Codes. The BCE will review and account for whole-of-community public works projects, to include installation new building construction (MILCON) and refurbishment or repairs of existing facilities, support the construction standards established in references UFC 4–010–01 and UFC 4–021–01, and applicable DHS, FEMA, and Air Reserve Component (ARC) guidance. **(T-0)**

8.12.2. Critical Infrastructure. Each critical infrastructure risk manager should meet on no less than a semiannual basis with the owners of critical infrastructure, such as specific utility, transportation, or other related providers or responsible agencies, to identify mitigation efforts being taken by these responsible agencies, including a review of applicable mitigation plans, if permitted by these responsible agencies. A best practice for this process is to coordinate this effort with existing regionally based government and/or sector coordinating councils established under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, when available. Critical infrastructure risk managers will ensure that their efforts are coordinated with the IEMs.

8.12.3. Utility Coordination. Each IEM will meet on an as-needed basis with owners of external utilities, such as power, communications, water, waste management, and sewer/wastewater companies, to identify mitigation efforts being taken by these utility owners, including a review of applicable mitigation plans, if permitted by these providers. **(T-3)** A best practice for this process is the use of a pre-coordinated mitigation committee session focused on this issue.

8.12.4. Technological Hazards Coordination. The same requirements exist for owners of specific technological hazards, such as dams, levees, airfields, rail transportation, mass transit systems, ferry systems, (petrol) chemical facilities and related manufacturing, storage, or transportation systems, with the potential or historical impact to the DAF installation. A best practice for this process is to coordinate these activities with the emergency managers of local civil jurisdictions as well as attend the LEPC meetings, where many of these agencies are represented.

8.12.5. Construction, Refurbishment, and Repair. Support the mitigation strategy for reducing the risk of facility and infrastructure damage due to flooding, destructive weather, seismic events, and other identified hazard/threats. Key areas of concern regarding mitigation activities should be identified through the processes identified in **Chapter 4**.

8.13. 'Mitigate' Common Core Capability Requirements. DAF EM Programs at all echelons will identify, plan for, coordinate, posture, track, evaluate, and execute the following crosscutting and mission area core capability to mitigate the effects from all-hazards/threats. **(T-0)**

8.13.1. IRM. Reference **Chapter 4** for crosscutting mitigation related IRM requirements.

8.13.2. E&T. Reference **Attachment 5** for recommended specific mitigation core capability E&T opportunities.

8.13.3. Planning. Installations will use the EM planning and risk management process described in **Chapter 4**, EM planning requirements described in **Attachment 3**, and standard core capability target in **Attachment 4** to execute mitigation activities.

8.13.4. Public Information and Warning. Develop redundant and resilient systems through long-term vulnerability reduction. Reference **Chapter 8** for crosscutting protection execution requirements.

8.13.5. Long-Term Vulnerability Reduction. Build and sustain resilient systems, communities, and critical infrastructure and key resources lifelines to reduce their vulnerability to natural, technological, and human-caused threats and hazards by lessening the likelihood, severity, and duration of the adverse consequences. Achieve a measurable decrease in the long-term vulnerability of DAF installations against current baselines amid a growing population base, changing climate conditions, increasing reliance upon information technology, and expanding infrastructure base.

Chapter 9

RESPOND MISSION OPERATIONS

9.1. Purpose. Specify DAF EM concepts and policy to integrate functional specific resources, information, programs, and related capabilities to generate whole-of-community/mission partner multi-agency and multi-jurisdictional response capabilities to save lives, mitigate resource loss, and continue missions.

9.2. Concept Overview. The DAF EM Program is generally concerned with and plans for Type 3 or greater incidents based on integrated risk assessment outcomes. Planning prepares and postures community common core capabilities. Through public information and warning, communities are continually informed. Mitigation reduces long and near-term hazard/threat effects. If prevention fails, the on-set of hazards/threats (delayed to immediate) escalates protection capabilities throughout. The DAF DRF, through the DAF EM construct aligned with NIMS and ICS, engages with tactical, operational, and strategic mission partners to coordinate assistance/resource requests in-support of the incident/UC.

Figure 9.1. Common Core Capabilities, Incident Types, Assistance, and the Department of the Air Force (DAF) Disaster Response Force (DRF).



Section 9A—Installation Disaster Response Force (DRF)

9.3. Concept Overview. The installation DRF Structure is an element of the DAF EM Program construct described in **Table 3.1** and aligns with NIMS, ICS, and common core capabilities as to conduct and sustain whole-of-community emergency response operations while simultaneously responding to and recovering from incidents/attacks that impede air, space, and cyberspace operations. This section describes and specifies requirements regarding each installation DRF element.

9.4. Emergency Communications Center (ECC). The ECC is a 24-hour a day, seven days a week operation and will incorporate the core functions of F&ES, security forces, and medical dispatch (where applicable). **(T-1)** ECC controllers should be selected for their ability to function under stress, communicate effectively with people, learn, and think quickly, use their leadership skills and for their maturity. The ECC controller must have the experience and ability to take control and direct functional operations when the need arises. **(T-1)**

9.4.1. Description. An ECC must address merging capabilities between F&ES communications, medical communications (typically performed by F&ES) and BDOC operations and functions IAW DoDI 6055.17, DAFI 32-2001, *Fire and Emergency Services (F&ES) Program*, DAFI 31-101, *Integrated Defense (ID)*, and NFPA 1221, S*tandard for the Installation, Maintenance, and Use of Emergency Services Communications Systems*. (**T-0)**

9.4.1.1. For those installations that have yet to achieve full operational capability or a consolidated ECC, installations will establish a consolidated ECC requirement planned and programmed withing the current year POM and will be fully mission capable within two years of date of publication. **(T-1) Note:** For new MILCON, installations will utilize PECs 91211F (RegAF) and 91211S (USSF), for existing MILCON, installations will utilize PEC 22176.

9.4.1.2. The ECC will incorporate the fire, security forces, and medical dispatch/control and emergency response and incident communications supporting operations. **(T-1)** ECC operations address the initial incident notification and response action responsibilities of those three disciplinary areas. The ECC is responsible for receiving initial incident notification, dispatching prescribed initial tactical response forces, initiating emergency operation plan protocols IAW installation directives, informing leadership of the situation, and maintaining communications and support actions with response forces. **(T-1)**

9.4.1.3. ECCs will provide emergency communications, alarm, sensor, and video monitoring, incident or event communications support, tactical channel assignments, emergency notification, responder reachback capability, and notification of an emergency to the receiving medical treatment facilities. **(T-1)**

9.4.1.4. A determination will be made to ensure an interdisciplinary approach and capability. Typically, F&ES functions and services both fire and medical dispatch and communications operations in support of incidents. The SFS functions and services for law enforcement and base defense activities will be consistent with requirements provided within DAFI 31-101 and applicable supplements.

9.4.2. Additional Requirements. All installations will establish, operate, and maintain an ECC capability. **(T-1)** The ECC will provide continuous receipt and processing of emergency calls to dispatch as well as sufficient resources to sustain incident communications and to mitigate an emergency. **(T-1)** The ECC will provide required follow-on communications related to the situation while meeting all applicable local, state, and federal policies and regulations as well as consensus standards, and applicable DoD and DAF policy. **(T-1) Note:** ANG bases will provide MOUs/MOAs with response agencies to ensure ECC capability intent is met.

9.4.2.1. NexGen911. All installations require the availability of NexGen911 services with recording capability through either government-owned and operated support or support from civilian authorities **(T-0) Note:** ANG bases will provide MOUs/MOAs with response agencies to ensure NexGen911 capability intent is met. DoD-owned NexGen911 systems must include the ability to receive:

9.4.2.1.1. NexGen911 calls directly from landlines on the installation. NexGen911 calls from wireless service providers as technology matures. **(T-0)**

9.4.2.1.2. Accurate physical location data including, as appropriate, a National Emergency Number Association, complaint street address or latitude and longitude. **(T-0)**

9.4.2.1.3. Latitude and longitude must be included for those cases of wireless calls coming from remote areas that are not in the vicinity of a geospatial feature such as a building polygon, street centerline, etc. **(T-0)**

9.4.2.1.4. The NexGen911 systems are interoperable with civilian authorities to allow incoming and outgoing transfers of voice and location data.

9.4.2.2. Facility. Physical space, communications, workstations, alarm receiving, power, physical provisions, and support provisions for an ECC to support fire and medical criteria will include all requirements within NFPA 1221. **(T-1)** Additionally, communications, workstations, systems and alarm controls, power and physical spaces will meet provisions within DAFI 31-101. **(T-1)**

9.4.2.3. Communication Systems. ECC controllers will be locally certified on installation specific communication systems to include but not limited to, fire alarm reporting systems, NexGen911, facility security alarm monitoring systems, event logging, dispatching resources, fixed/portable radio equipment, ECP gate monitoring systems, Criminal Justice Information Systems, Emergency Medical Dispatch (EMD) protocols, on/off base maps, cordon, and Hazmat map plotting. **(T-0)** Utilizing communications equipment, controllers must know and understand procedures on facility fire/security alarm monitoring, standard common terminology, responder call signs, radio etiquette and clear speech.

9.4.2.4. Personnel. DAFI 32-2001 provides five (5) positions to serve as F&ES dispatcher and communications specialists. F&ES personnel typically perform medical dispatch and communications support for medical response assets.

9.4.2.5. Individual Qualification and Training. At a minimum, personnel operating within the ECC will meet the minimum requirements for DoD certification to Telecommunicator I and II and HAZMAT Awareness. **(T-0)** Additionally, personnel assigned will meet the minimum provisions of NFPA 1221. In addition to NFPA 1221 requirements, personnel will complete FEMA ICS courses: 100, 200, 700 and 800. **(T-0)** At locations operating and funded as a Primary Service Answering Point, the controllers must be certified as EMD through the National Academy of EMDS. **(T-0)** Furthermore, DAFI 31-101 requires Air Force Security Forces Center and local users conduct functional and operational certification tests of intrusion detection systems to ensure they meet effectiveness standards compliance requirements. **(T-1)** See DAFTTP 3-2.83 for additional ECC descriptions.

9.4.3. ECC CONOPS. The ECC aids and supports emergency response missions improving both efficiency and effectiveness through interoperability and emergency response standardization.

9.4.3.1. All 911 emergency calls originating on the installation will be directed through selective routing to the ECC NexGen911 for emergency response action. **(T-0)** Fire alarm reporting systems and Security Forces resource protection alarm systems will be monitored by the ECC controllers. **(T-1)** Requests for initial incident mutual aid response from local, state, and federal agencies may be routed through the ECC; however, these requests must be coordinated for approval up through the chain of command as soon as it is practical.

9.4.3.2. ECC controllers will support and align priorities with the functional area in charge of an incident (IC). **(T-1)** As an example, the fire dispatchers will support C2 elements of Security Forces during a hostage incident and security dispatchers will support Fire C2 during all other incidents (not of a security priority nature) while maintaining functional missions.

9.4.3.3. Emergency-associated tasks that must remain within the ECC's responsibility include dispatch of emergency forces, communication links with other C2 elements, alarm monitoring, and maintaining 24/7/365 ID capability.

9.4.3.4. Non-emergency tasks may include tracking and documentation of perimeter checks, airfield security (when applicable) and building checks, funds escorts, fire inspections, and other tracked or documented activities performed by the emergency response community.

9.4.3.5. Some of the current non-emergency tasks completed by the controllers are still required and the individual installations will need to assess the options to maintain or operationally relocate these capabilities.

9.4.3.6. Alternate operating capability. The ECC will be capable of continuous operation long enough to enable the transfer of operations to the alternate communications center location in the event of a fire or other emergency in the communications center or in the building that houses the communications center. **(T-1)** The alternate ECC should mirror the primary's communications capabilities and is manned only when activated. **(T-1)**

9.5. Incident Commander. The IC must be experienced in incidents of the appropriate type and complexity. **(T-0)** They must meet the training requirements outlined in **Chapter 5** and **Attachment 5**, including training to manage multiple agency responses, if required. **(T-0)**

9.5.1. The IC responsible for all incident activities, including developing strategies and tactics and ordering and releasing resources. The IC has overall authority and responsibility for conducting incident operations and is responsible for the management of all incident operations at the incident site. The IC must be fully qualified to manage the response. **(T-0)**

9.5.2. The IC must be a certified HAZMAT technician before establishing and/or assuming command of a HAZMAT incident. **(T-0)**

9.5.3. The initial first responder will formally transfer incident command to the IC or remain IC if properly trained and qualified. **(T-1)** The senior fire officer on scene will serve as the IC for any incident involving two or more emergency response units. **(T-1)**

9.5.4. At a minimum, personnel operating as an IC will meet the minimum training qualification and certification requirements IAW 29 CFR 1910.120 and NFPA 472, *Standard for Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass Destruction Incidents*. **(T-0)**

9.6. First and Emergency Responders.

9.6.1. First responders include F&ES, medical, security forces, and other personnel who immediately engage in activities to save lives, stabilize the incident, and prevent further property damage. Installation first responders meet the federal statutory requirement for immediate response to all major accident and natural disaster emergencies involving federal installations, property, reservations, or operations. During incidents, first responders proceed to the scene and secure the immediate incident area, establish ICS, provide rescue and firefighting, identify, and contain hazards, and provide patient care, triage, medical monitoring, transport, and decontamination procedures.

9.6.2. Emergency responders are the response elements of a DRF that deploy after the first responders to expand IC capabilities and perform support functions. Emergency responders include but are not limited to the follow-on elements of EM, CBRN defense specialists, EOD personnel, physicians, nurses, medical treatment providers, and mortuary affairs personnel.

9.6.3. First and emergency responder duties have priority over other assigned duties. Do not assign first or emergency responders as augmentees or to additional duties that will conflict with their primary duties. **(T-1)**

9.6.4. At a minimum, first and emergency responders will meet the minimum training qualification and certification requirements IAW 29 CFR 1910.120 and NFPA 472. **(T-0)**

9.7. Specialized and Support Teams. Teams are formed from the existing installation and unit personnel to support emergency response and/or recovery operations. Team member duties become the team member's primary duty during the response/recovery, exercises, and training. Appoint enough team members for 24-hour operations.

9.7.1. Specialized teams are typically controlled directly from the EOC during response operations. Examples teams include EM support, post incident/attack reconnaissance, shelter management/mass care, evacuation support, ride out, CCS, contamination control area (CCA), and others.

9.7.2. Support and recovery teams are typically controlled directly by the functional control centers. Examples teams include Damage Assessment, Search and Recovery, Aircraft Crash Damaged or Disabled Recovery, Spill Response, Hydrazine Response Team, Emergency Family Assistance, Disaster Mental Health, Medical Response Teams, Contingency Contracting, Bioenvironmental Engineering, and others.

9.7.3. Specialized teams are formed from existing installation Airmen and Guardians to support mission operations.

9.7.4. Installation commanders will use existing installation and unit workforce resources to form specialized, support, and/or recovery teams in response to an emergency incident. **(T-1)**

9.7.5. Installation support teams formed to support wartime/contingency operations must be identified and trained before operations begin. **(T-1)** Use the installation AHTA to identify the required support team capability needed to respond to and recover from expected hazards.

9.7.6. At a minimum, follow-on emergency responders that conduct operations within the hot and warm zones will accomplish and maintain currency in HAZMAT operations level training according to **Attachment 5**. **(T-0)**

9.7.7. SMT. Responsible for shelter operations to include facility inspection, communication, registration, sustainment resources, and medical services. SMTs will consist of a shelter manager, shelter assistants, shelter finance and logistics, and medical support. **(T-3)**

9.8. Control Centers. Control centers will serve as the C2 node for all installation units tasked in the IEMP 10-2 with emergency response and recovery support responsibilities. **(T-1)**

9.8.1. Control centers are activated during EOC activation to provide expertise and resource support to the EOC director. **(T-1)**

9.8.2. Control centers are used to prioritize squadron activities and allocation of available resources in support of an emergency incident.

9.8.3. Unit commanders will assign knowledgeable personnel with tactical decision-making authority needed to execute C2 actions from the control centers to facilitate mission accomplishment. Members must meet the training requirements for control center personnel outlined in **Attachment 5**. **(T-1)** Appoint enough team members for 24-hour operations.

9.8.4. Control centers will have plans, SOPs, and status boards to account for and track status of resources (personnel, equipment, and materiel), report facility or infrastructure damage, identify functional requirements, prioritize recovery actions, and manage contamination control, recovery efforts and provide timely and accurate information to the EOC, as outlined in **paragraph 5.4**. **(T-1)**

9.8.5. Installations will identify control centers within the IEMP 10-2. **(T-2) Note:** Control centers include, but are not limited to, the Ground Transportation Operations Center, Maintenance Operations Center, Fuels Service Center, Airfield Management Operations Center, Medical Control Center and UEPCs.

9.8.6. Control centers will prioritize squadron operational activities, allocate available resources, and implement wartime functions or rapidly deploy forces in response to incidents or events affecting an installation’s mission. **(T-1)**

9.8.7. Control centers will have unit specific plans, checklists, and status boards to accurately account for and track the status of resources (personnel, equipment, and supplies) and will review/update them annually. **(T-1)**

9.8.8. Control centers will collect damage assessment information, identify work requirements, prioritize recovery actions, manage contamination control, recovery efforts and provide timely and accurate information to the EOC. **(T-2)** Installations should tailor their Control centers to fit the needs of each unique location and mission. Reference **Table 9.1** for control centers that should be established at all installations.

Table 9.1. Minimum Established Control Centers for Type 3, 2, and 1 Incidents.

Type of Control Center	Control Center Responsibility
Air Terminal Operations Center	Responsible for aerial port functions including cargo and passenger processing.
BDOC	Responsible for air and IBD and security measures.
CBRN Control Center	Controls CBRN reconnaissance teams, plots, and predicts hazards downwind, and reports CBRN contamination to the EOC. The CBRN Control Center coordinates with unit SMTs and contamination control teams (CCT). Reference DAFI 10-2503 for additional information.
CE Control Center	Responsible for base recovery after attack; damage assessment and recovery teams; coordinates priorities and monitors facility, infrastructure, runway, and taxiway repairs.
Command Post	Responsibilities are outlined in AFMAN 10-207 and plays a crucial role in EM.
Force Support Control Center	Responsible for controlling all services functions to include food services, billeting, laundry, recreation and fitness, mortuary affairs, personnel accountability, replacement, and managing manpower pool for the EOC.
Maintenance Operations Center	Responsible for the launch, recovery, service, parking, and maintenance of aircraft; tracking of priorities and missions of specific aircraft; and coordinates with fuels and supply functions.
Medical Control Center	Provides the medical status of the hospital or clinic, supports medical requirements including requisitioning supplies, establishes casualty collection points, dispatches ambulances, and coordinates patient movement via surface and air.
Operations Control Center	Responsible for aircrews, tactics, mission planning and other aspects of the flying mission.
Logistics Readiness Control Center	Controls the distribution of transportation assets (pick-up trucks, forklifts, etc.) and sets priorities for vehicle maintenance.

9.9. Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The EOC is the installation's critical function to address imminent or realized threats/hazards and coordinate support to the incident command, on-scene personnel, and/or other EOCs. Reference **Chapter 7**, **Section 7D** for overarching installation EOC requirements.

9.10. Command Post. The Command Post is a full-time, 24/7 C2 node, directly responsible to commander(s) and serves as the focal point of operations, including the receipt and dissemination of orders, information, and requests necessary for the C2 of assigned forces and operations.

9.10.1. CJCSM 3150.03E, *Joint Reporting Structure Event and Incident Reports*.

9.10.2. Refer to AFMAN 10-206 and AFMAN 10-207 for detailed information.

9.10.3. Connectivity to the 24/7 AFSWC.

9.11. Crisis Action Team (CAT). The CAT is the top echelon of installation mission continuation and sustainment. The CAT includes senior officers and senior enlisted leaders across the A-Staff and supporting units. Members of joint, civilian partners, and/or host nation partners may also be present. The CAT supports the installation commander by assessing the situation, determining mission priorities, and directing subordinate units. **Note:** The CAT is intended to focus on mission continuation and sustainment and not the management of the incident.

9.12. Senior Military Representative. The installation commander, or EOC director, may dispatch a senior military representative to the incident site on an as needed basis. This can also be accomplished through an IC request. The senior military representative's primary purpose is to liaise with media and outside agencies during high visibility incidents or to support the IC. A senior military representative is not required at the majority of incidents. On scene, unless a transfer of incident command authority occurs, the existing IC maintains tactical control.

Section 9B—'Respond' Common Core Capabilities

9.13. Concept Overview. DAF EM Programs at all echelons will identify, plan for, coordinate, posture, track, evaluate, and execute the following crosscutting and mission area common core capabilities to respond to the effects from all-hazards/threats, save lives, stabilize the incident, mitigate resource loss, support DSCAs, and set the stage for transition to initial recovery operations. **(T-0) Note:** Installation emergency response authorities should attempt to liaise and exercise with mission partners to maintain interoperability. DAF personnel should communicate capabilities and collaborate with mission partners, when mission allows, to coordinate joint ET&E, and exercises to prepare for real world response operations.

9.14. 'Respond' Common Core Capability Requirements. DAF EM Programs at all echelons will identify, plan for, coordinate, posture, track, evaluate, and execute the following crosscutting and mission area core capability to respond to all-hazard/threat effects. **(T-0)**

9.14.1. IRM. Reference **Chapter 4** for crosscutting response related IRM requirements.

9.14.2. Planning. Installations will posture response common core capabilities based on the EM planning and risk management process described in **Chapter 4**, EM planning requirements described in **Attachment 3**, and standard core capability targets in **Attachment 4**. **(T-0)**

9.14.3. E&T. Reference **paragraph 5.4** for required E&T and **paragraph 5.5** for recommended specific response core capability E&T opportunities.

9.14.4. Public Information and Warning. Reference **Chapter 8** for crosscutting response execution requirements.

9.14.5. Operational Coordination. Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of common core capabilities.

9.14.5.1. Mobilize all critical resources and establish command, control, and coordination structures within the affected community and other coordinating bodies in surrounding communities and across the nation and maintain as needed throughout the duration of an incident.

9.14.5.2. Enhance and maintain command, control, and coordination structures, consistent with the NIMS, to meet basic human needs, stabilize the incident, and transition to recovery.

9.14.6. Infrastructure Systems and Mission Restoration. Stabilize critical infrastructure functions, minimize health and safety threats, and efficiently restore and revitalize systems and services to support a viable, resilient community.

9.14.6.1. Decrease and stabilize immediate infrastructure threats to the affected population, to include survivors in the heavily damaged zone, nearby communities that may be affected by cascading effects, and mass care support facilities and evacuation processing centers with a focus on life-sustainment and congregate care services. Re-establish critical infrastructure within the affected areas to support ongoing emergency response operations, life sustainment, community functionality, and a transition to recovery.

9.14.6.2. Provide for the clearance, removal, and disposal of debris. Formalize partnerships with governmental and private sector cyber incident or emergency response teams to accept, triage, and collaboratively respond to cascading impacts in an efficient manner.

9.14.7. Situational Assessment. Provide all decision makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response.

9.14.7.1. Deliver information sufficient to inform decision making regarding immediate lifesaving and life sustaining activities and engage governmental, private, and civic sector resources within and outside of the affected area to meet basic human needs and stabilize the incident.

9.14.7.2. Deliver enhanced information to reinforce ongoing lifesaving and life-sustaining activities, and engage governmental, private, and civic sector resources within and outside of the affected area to meet basic human needs, stabilize the incident, and transition to recovery.

9.14.8. Operational Communications. Ensure the capacity for timely communications in support of security, situational awareness, and operations by all means available, among and between affected communities in the impact area and all response forces.

9.14.8.1. Ensure the capacity to communicate with both the emergency response community and the affected populations and establish interoperable voice and data communications between local, state, federal, and tribal first responders.

9.14.8.2. Re-establish sufficient communications infrastructure within the affected areas to support ongoing life sustaining activities, provide basic human needs, and transition to recovery.

9.14.8.3. Re-establish critical information networks, including cybersecurity information sharing networks, to inform situational awareness, enable incident response, and support the resiliency of key systems.

9.14.9. On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement. Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas and for response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life sustaining operations. Provide and maintain on-scene security and meet the protection needs of the affected population over a geographically dispersed area while eliminating or mitigating the risk of further damage to persons, property, and the environment.

9.14.10. Fire Management and Suppression. Provide structural, wildland, and specialized firefighting capabilities to manage and suppress fires of all types, kinds, and complexities while protecting the lives, property, and the environment in the affected area.

9.14.10.1. Provide traditional first response or initial attack firefighting services. Conduct expanded or extended attack firefighting and support operations through coordinated response of fire management and specialized fire suppression resources.

9.14.10.2. Ensure the coordinated deployment of appropriate local, regional, national, and international fire management and fire suppression resources to reinforce firefighting efforts and maintain an appropriate level of protection for subsequent fires.

9.14.11. Occupational and Environmental Response/Health and Safety. Conduct appropriate measures to ensure the protection of the health and safety of the public and workers, as well as the environment, from all-hazards in support of responder operations and the affected communities.

9.14.11.1. Identify, assess, and mitigate worker health and safety hazards and disseminate health and safety guidance and resources to response and recovery workers. Minimize public exposure to environmental hazards through assessment of the hazards and implementation of public protective actions.

9.14.11.2. Detect, assess, stabilize, and clean up releases of oil and HAZMATs into the environment, including buildings/structures, and properly manage waste. Identify, evaluate, and implement measures to prevent and minimize impacts to the environment, natural and cultural resources, and historic properties from all-hazard emergencies and response operations.

9.14.12. Evacuation and Critical Transportation. Provide transportation (including infrastructure access and accessible transportation services) for response priority objectives, including the evacuation of people and animals, and the delivery of vital response personnel, equipment, and services into the affected areas.

9.14.12.1. Establish physical access through appropriate transportation corridors and deliver required resources to save lives and to meet the needs of disaster survivors.

9.14.12.2. Ensure basic human needs are met, stabilize the incident, transition into recovery for an affected area, and restore basic services and community functionality.

9.14.12.3. Clear debris from any route type, (i.e., road, rail, airfield, port facility, waterway) to facilitate response operations.

9.14.13. MCS. Provide life-sustaining and human services to the affected population, to include hydration, feeding, sheltering, temporary housing, evacuee support, reunification, and distribution of emergency supplies.

9.14.13.1. Move and deliver resources and capabilities to meet the needs of disaster survivors, including individuals with access and functional needs.

9.14.13.2. Establish, staff, and equip emergency shelters and other temporary housing options (including accessible housing) for the affected population.

9.14.13.3. Move from congregate care to non-congregate care alternatives and provide relocation assistance or interim housing solutions for families unable to return to their pre-disaster homes.

9.14.14. Mass Search and Rescue. Deliver traditional and atypical search and rescue capabilities, including personnel, services, animals, and assets to survivors in need, with the goal of saving the greatest number of endangered lives in the shortest time possible.

9.14.14.1. Conduct search and rescue operations to locate and rescue persons in distress.

9.14.14.2. Initiate community-based search and rescue support operations across a wide geographically dispersed area.

9.14.14.3. Ensure the synchronized deployment of installation resources to local, regional, national, and international teams to reinforce ongoing search and rescue efforts and transition to recovery.

9.14.15. Fatality Management. Provide fatality management services, including decedent remains recovery and victim identification, working with local, state, tribal, territorial, insular area, and federal authorities to provide mortuary processes, temporary storage, or permanent internment solutions, sharing information with MCS for the purpose of reunifying family members and caregivers with missing persons/remains, and providing counseling to the bereaved. Establish and maintain operations to recover a significant number of fatalities over a geographically dispersed area.

9.14.16. Logistics and Supply Chain Management. Deliver essential commodities, equipment, and services in support of impacted communities and survivors, to include emergency power and fuel support, as well as the coordination of access to community staples. Synchronize logistics capabilities and enable the restoration of impacted supply chains.

9.14.16.1. Mobilize and deliver governmental, nongovernmental, and private sector resources to save lives, sustain lives, meet basic human needs, stabilize the incident, and transition to recovery, to include moving and delivering resources and services to meet the needs of disaster survivors.

9.14.16.2. Enhance public and private resource and services support for an affected area.

9.15. Cascading Impacts and Community Lifelines. The sprawling web of cascading consequences can be initiated by a single origin event that could start at a local level with gradual or fast past impacts to lifelines spreading across a region or national/international level. Community lifelines rely on multiple government entities, businesses, and infrastructure sectors to function. As a result, installation response operations to stabilize lifelines are unlikely to fit within a single jurisdiction, department, agency, infrastructure sector, or industry. In addition, because these sectors and the community lifelines they support are interdependent, failures in one will cascade across to others.

9.15.1. During emergency response operations, DAF EM Programs at all echelons will account for cascading impacts to lifelines as to lessen hazards/threats to public health and safety; security; and operational missions (safety and security; food, water, shelter; health and medical; energy [power and fuel]; communications; transportation; and HAZMAT). **(T-0)** Reference the DHS National Response Framework (NRF) for addition information pertaining to cascading impacts and a complete description of each community lifeline.

9.15.2. Installation IRM activities within the installation EOC will track and anticipate potential points of lifeline failures to include coordinated action to restore lifelines and/or otherwise reduce vulnerability due to degraded lifelines. **(T-0)**

9.15.3. DAF EMIS IT systems/applications supporting emergency response/recovery at all levels will provide sufficient detail regarding lifeline status from a holistic local, state, regional, and national/international lens. **(T-0)**

9.15.4. EM exercises will evaluate the ability of installations to collectively track, restore, and otherwise reduce vulnerability due to degraded lifelines. **(T-0)**

Section 9C—General First and Emergency Response Operations and Activities

9.16. Concept Overview. Initial response to all-hazards/threats requires a systematic yet flexible approach. The IC and the collective of first and emergency responders should collaborate to ensure operational incident planning accounts for specific hazards/threats to responders and the public.

9.17. General Actions, Activities, and Operations. The general actions presented in **Table 9.2** are provided to assist installation responders with understanding regarding the context and flow of initial to sustained response activities. Installations will account for and expand on these actions and activities. **(T-0)**

Table 9.2. General First and Emergency Response Operations and Activities.

Initial Response	
Establish Incident Command	Establish Initial Incident Perimeter (Cordon) and Entry Control Point
Conduct Site Assessment	Initiate Immediate Rescue
Respond to Hazards	
Establish Hazard Control Zones	Execute EOD Render Safe Procedures
Conduct Hazard Identification	Conduct Downwind Hazard Analysis
Command Post Monitoring	Conduct Plume Modeling
Reduce or Expand Perimeter (Cordon Reduction or Expansion)	Conduct Hazard Perimeter Survey
Conduct Ground Survey	Conduct Facility Assessment
Quantify Hazards	Control Spill, Hazard, or Both
Conduct On-Site and Victim Decontamination	Collect Samples and Manage Evidence
Sustained Operations	
Develop Incident Site Layout	Develop and Communicate Health Risk Assessment
Conduct Technical Rescue	Provide Situational Awareness Reports
Establish Staging Area	Conduct Resource Management
Establish JIC	Provide Public Information
Develop IAP	Establish Site Safety and Health Plan
Maintain Site Security	Responder Accountability
Sustain Incident Response	Transfer Command to Recovery Operations
Implement Protective Actions	
Develop and Communicate Operational Risk	Determine Responder Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and Individual Protective Equipment
Establish MTF In-Place Patient Decontamination	Initiate Public Protective Actions
Care for the Public	
On-Scene Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment	Disease Containment
Manage Fatalities	Conduct Mortuary Affairs

Section 9D—Nuclear Weapon Incident/Accident Response

9.18. Concept Overview. DoD NARP requires an IRF to establish security cordon and for EOD technicians to mitigate immediate effects of the incident and support weapon recovery and transportation process with the follow-on RTF.

9.19. Department of the Air Force (DAF) Response to United States (U.S.) Nuclear Weapon and Radiological Material Matters. The DAF organizes, trains, and equips AFFOR to support necessary actions in response to a U.S. nuclear weapon incidents in the Air Force's custody or when directed by the SecDef IAW DoDD 3150.08.

9.19.1. DAF MAJCOMs (e.g., AFGSC, USAFE, etc.) tasked to support a CCMD RTF will establish a MAJCOM-level program that organizes, trains, equips, and sustains an RTF and IRF program IAW DoDI 3150.08 and DoDM 3150.08-M, *Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP)*, and DoDI 3150.10. **(T-0)**

9.19.2. When directed, tasked MAJCOMs will deploy response forces (e.g., RTF, IRF) IAW DoDI 3150.10. **(T-0)**

9.19.3. Tasked MAJCOMs will ensure RTF and IRF readiness is reported IAW AFI 10-201, *Force Readiness Reporting*. **(T-0)**

9.19.4. Tasked MAJCOMs will supplement this instruction with MAJCOM-specific policy and guidance specifying how the MAJCOM and subordinate units with RTF/IRF support requirements will OT&E and sustain its capabilities. **(T-0)**

Chapter 10

RECOVER MISSION AND OPERATIONS

10.1. Purpose. Specify DAF EM concepts and policy to integrate functional specific resources, information, programs, and related capabilities to recover and restore installation infrastructure, essential public services, social support systems, and operational mission capability.

Section 10A—Installation Recovery Strategy

10.2. Concept Overview. Installation short term/initial recovery actions focus on restoration of lifeline systems to an acceptable standard and providing for basic human needs while balancing operational mission restoration needs. Once some stability is achieved, the installation begins longer-term recovery. **Note:** Recovery efforts may quickly exhaust installation capabilities and require the capabilities of local, state, federal, other Service, and/or private (or host nation) EM, public works, environmental, and mass care-related agencies and departments.

10.3. Roles and Responsibilities. The installation EOC will establish initial recovery objectives to ensure sustained resource management and coordination efforts. **(T-0)** Long-term strategic objectives may be developed through the EOC if still activated, the RWG when activated/formed, or other means as determined locally as to transition from initial to long-term recovery activities.

10.3.1. The installation commander will establish RWG recovery priorities consistent with the installation's supported missions. **(T-0)**

10.3.2. The BCE should be responsible for ensuring execution of initial and long-term recovery planning and operations.

10.3.3. The BCE should ensure continued and/or increased access to debris and trash removal services as well as restoration of sewage treatment and removal, water treatment and provision of water services to both recovery efforts and the community, and power generation and distribution to both recovery efforts and the community.

10.3.4. If circumstances warrant, medical personnel should issue health advisories IAW the circumstances surrounding the event.

10.3.5. Public affairs should be prepared to advise the general public, communicate risk, and provide information on measures being taken by the installation commander to address the situation and individual needs.

10.3.6. Recovery operations must be consistent with existing Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations, DHS guidance and Air Force Occupational Safety and Health standards.

10.3.7. Recovery efforts will ensure compliance with National Environmental Policy Act, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act and applicable Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) guidelines to include requirements within AFI 32-7001, *Environmental Management*. **(T-0)**

10.3.8. Special attention and planning must be focused on the fiscal and logistical impact of recovery efforts, especially those incidents requiring long-term displacement of the population, decontamination, restoration, and/or environmental remediation of affected areas.

10.3.9. Incident/Accident Site Control Transfer. Once an emergency is terminated and recovery starts, control of the site must be officially transferred from the IC to another individual or organization and assume command as the ROC.

10.3.9.1. The ROC will be appointed by the installation commander and must be a SME in the hazards or activities within the incident site. **(T-2)** For example, initiating actions to contain the hazard and clean up the site to restore the area to its condition before the incident. The person in charge of that work should have an environmental engineering background and be familiar with HAZMAT clean-up requirements.

10.3.9.2. The ROC must be a trained and qualified SME in the hazards or activities to be performed within the incident site. **(T-2)**

10.3.9.3. For aircraft incidents/accidents, the mishap site is controlled by the IC until officially transferred to the ROC. **(T-1)** Once the mishap site is determined to be safe, safety investigators should have unfettered access for the preservation of evidence and safety investigation. Recovery operations will not commence until safety board president deems that the evidence is no longer needed.

10.4. Recovery Focal Points. During recovery operations, installations will account for and execute the recovery focal points identified in **Table 10.1**. **(T-1)**

Table 10.1. Recommended Recovery Focal Points.

Recovery Focal Points	
Eliminate life-threatening conditions	Provide for public health and safety
Sustain and/or restore critical operations	Provide suitable housing conditions
Restore essential operations	Building codes, permits, and inspections
Restore essential services	Provide and/or manage financial assistance to all sectors of the DAF community
Provide EPI to the DAF community	Resume normal economic and social activity within the DAF community
Provide community planning and development	Return personnel to normal work schedules and assignments

10.5. Recovery Priorities. Consideration will be given to operational mission priorities and re-establishment of the normal operating environment. To assist the installation commander with this process, **Table 10.2** provides a time contingent priority list as it relates to catastrophic disasters/attacks (e.g., Type 1, 2, and 3 incidents). The IEMP 10-2 should contain a similar listing and the installation commander should modify priorities as local conditions warrant.

Table 10.2. Recommended Recovery Priorities and Estimated Timing.

Priority	Functions	Timeline
1	Obtain 100 percent accountability	Continuous
	Sustain critical operations	Continuous
	Sustain critical infrastructure	Continuous
	Restore and/or maintain essential operations	Continuous
	Restore and/or maintain essential services	Continuous
	Transportation (short-term)	Days 1 – 4 to 1 month+
2	Communications	Days 1 – 2 to 2 months+
	Casualty management	Days 1 – 15
	Search and Rescue	Days 1 – 15
	Local safe haven management	Days 5 – 7
3	Remote safe haven management	Days 1 – 14+
	Family Assistance Center	Days 1 – 15+
	Mass feeding and bulk distribution	Days 1 – 15+
	Special needs management	Days 1 – 15+
	Public health and mental health	Ongoing to 6 months+
	Damage assessment	Days 1 – 2 (Rapid) to 2 weeks
4	Fatality management	Day 4 to 1 month
	Animal needs management	Day 5 to 1 month
	Temporary housing	Day 5 to 6 months+
	Temporary facilities	Ongoing to 6 months+
	Supplemental funding requests	Ongoing to 6 months+
	Debris management	Ongoing to 6 months+
5	Utility reconstruction	1 – 6 months+
	Building code review and permits	1 – 6 months+
	Transportation (long-term)	1 – 6 months+
	Housing and/or facility construction	1 month to multiple years
	Community reconstruction	1 – 5 years
6	Environmental remediation	1 – 5 years
	Business reconstruction	1 – 5 years
	Mental health and/or counseling services	Ongoing
	Recovery plan review	Ongoing

10.6. Recovery Working Group (RWG) Organization. The RWG will be a task-organized group focused on the evaluation, prioritization, and coordination of recovery requirements. **(T-0)**

10.6.1. The installation commander will establish an RWG early in the recovery phase of every emergency where recovery operations require coordination in the judgment of the installation commander. **(T-0)**

10.6.2. The installation commander will determine the appropriate composition, including additional membership, and the frequency and desired outputs of the RWG depending upon the incident type, magnitude, and impacts. **(T-0)**

10.6.3. The BCE should be the RWG chair with representation from other functional areas based on the scope and magnitude of recovery operations. **Note:** In some instances, such as pandemic and/or biological warfare agent incidents/attacks, the senior medical representative could be the RWG chair or other functional area with appropriate knowledge, skills, and abilities/qualifications.

10.6.4. For long term recovery missions, the RWG should serve as an advisory subcommittee under the installation EMWG to provide coordination and oversight of the recovery process.

10.6.5. The RWG should be responsible for conducting recovery planning, developing reconstruction policies, establishing recovery and reconstruction priorities, identifying mitigation opportunities within the recovery process, developing policies for redevelopment, recommending modifications to building codes and permitting processes, and developing policies for temporary housing and associated long-term mass care operations.

10.6.6. For catastrophic disasters that displace a large portion of the installation population, installations should consider establishing an RWG Unmet Needs Committee (UNC). The purpose of the RWG-UNC should be to access and coordinate resources at the community level and consider community needs that are not being addressed or have been denied by other resources. If established, the RWG-UNC will be chaired by a FSS commander representative in coordination with the installation commander. **(T-1)**

10.7. Recovery Planning. Recovery planning will be conducted at the installation level. **(T-1)**

10.7.1. Recovery planning will be conducted by the RWG with the technical direction of the BCE or designated chair. **(T-1)**

10.7.2. While the IEMP 10-2 facilitates response and initial recovery, the recovery plan will provide detailed, incident-specific process and procedures for successful long-term recovery based upon the recovery priorities identified in **Table 10.2**. **(T-1)** The goals of recovery planning should be to define a phased, measurable recovery program with a sequenced priority of work specific to the incident requirements.

Section 10B—'Recover' Operational Requirements and Considerations

10.8. Concept Overview. This section contains operational requirements and considerations regarding limited to catastrophic incident recovery operations. At a minimum, the installation RWG should monitor and account for the activities identified in this section.

10.9. Initial Damage Assessment and Detailed Surveys. Damage assessment and impact analysis are essential to determining the magnitude, scope, scale, and extent of an emergency. The collective of unit post incident/attack reconnaissance to specialized civil engineer damage assessment conducted during response and detailed survey results conducted later in the response/recovery phases will guide the determination of priorities, identification of required resources, and justification for HHQ assistance and DoD supplemental funding requests.

10.9.1. The BCE will establish (pre-incident/disaster), activate, and manage one or more damage assessment teams (e.g., Rapid Damage Assessment, Damage Assessment and Response, etc.). **(T-1)**

10.9.2. The damage assessment process should begin as soon as possible after an incident occurs (e.g., within the response phase) to assess the level of human suffering, infrastructure impacts, operational mission impacts, and continue throughout the recovery phase.

10.9.3. Damage assessment teams will consist of task-organized civil engineers, including one or more structural engineer and additional duty personnel as needed. **(T-1)** The team organization and composition will be identified in the IEMP 10-2 and will be categorized as emergency responders. **(T-1)**

10.9.4. Damage assessment teams will conduct initial damage assessment and follow-on detailed damage survey reports encompassing structural evaluation. **(T-1)** Results will be geo-tagged and incorporated into DAF EMIS IT systems/applications supporting the EM construct and C2 continuum as to enhance situation awareness at the tactical and operational levels (e.g., runway destruction, critical mission damage, etc.). **(T-2)**

10.10. Debris Management. The debris management process should begin as soon as possible after an incident occurs to permit ground or air access to the incident site by designated personnel, remove life safety and environmental hazards, and mitigate further environmental contamination throughout the recovery phase.

10.10.1. Debris management provides initial clearance operations and the consolidation of debris at one or more sites (with the concurrence of environmental specialists).

10.10.2. The IEM will coordinate with the CE operations chief on the establishment, activation, and management of one or more debris management teams on the installation when requested by the installation EOC or activated as identified in the IEMP 10-2. **(T-2)**

10.10.3. The BCE will identify and create a storage site for asphalt and concrete debris that could be repurposed as aggregate for rapid airfield damage repair operations. **(T-2)**

10.10.4. The BCE will account for environmental considerations to include site planning and permitting for debris collection sites, guiding the separation of oil and hazardous substances, to include household hazardous and toxic waste, from the debris stream, identification of recycling and reuse options and opportunities, and guiding debris issues related to historic or protected structures. **(T-2) Note:** Consider pre-staging debris management teams and equipment for specific hazards with delayed onset known to generate significant debris management requirements (e.g., tropical cyclones/hurricanes).

10.11. Emergency Public Information (EPI). The installation PAO (in coordination with the RWG, IEM, and Command Post) will continue communication to displaced populations during recovery operations by providing pertinent information. **(T-1)** Consider a Town Hall venue with key leadership participation.

10.12. Public Safety. Security Forces will maintain public safety during the recovery phase through access control, enforcing installation (or impacted site) reentry procedures, to include reentry permitting. **(T-1)** Include traffic control and safety measures to account for lack of public infrastructure, such as lighting and signals along transportation routes, and hazardous conditions, such as sinkholes and debris piles.

10.13. Public Health. The Public Health office will monitor and coordinate public health considerations during recovery to include sanitary conditions for workers and residents, vector control, and public health issues resulting from lack of water treatment facilities, wastewater pumping and treatment, solid waste collection, and disposal. **(T-0)**

10.14. Occupational and Environmental Health Safety. Occupational Safety, in coordination with Public Health and Bioenvironmental Engineering, will monitor and provide advice regarding protection from primary and secondary occupational health hazards for personnel conducting recovery operations. **(T-1)** The RWG and immediate supervisors of recovery personnel will account for and enforce occupational safety to include:

10.14.1. Heat and Cold Stress Management. All heat and cold stress management and monitoring will be conducted IAW applicable portions of DAFI 48-151, *Thermal Stress Program*. **Note:** ICs should take into consideration the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health guidance and DAFI 48-151, Chapter 3, Table 3.1, *Work/Rest Times & Fluid Replacement Guide,* Technical Bulletin 507 (U.S. Army 2003) for work/rest cycles while conducting response and recovery operations.

10.14.2. Respiratory Protection. Recovery personnel will be equipped with appropriate respiratory protection as advised by BE. **(T-0)**

10.14.3. PPE. Recovery personnel dealing with incident debris, construction and demolition debris, and hazardous substances/waste, to include CBRNE contaminants, will be equipped with appropriate PPE. **(T-0)** Because of the difficulty in performing recovery operations in some levels of PPE, the RWG and/or supervisors must plan for work-rest rotation of recovery personnel and the need to request for additional resources required in sustaining recovery operations.

10.15. Fatality Management and Mortuary Affairs. The FSS will lead fatality management and mortuary affairs activities, in coordination with medical and Personnel Support for Contingency Operations representatives. **(T-1)** All mortuary affairs operations will be conducted IAW DoDI 1300.29, *Mortuary Affairs Program,* and DAFI 34-160, *Mortuary Affairs Program*. **(T-0)**

10.16. Psychological Health. The installation medical provider will provide for professional disaster mental health and conventional counseling services. **(T-0)**

10.17. Spiritual Health. The installation chaplain will provide for religious and spiritual health and coordinate with local capabilities. **(T-0)**

10.18. Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) Decontamination. Decontamination of areas, facilities, and/or assets contaminated with toxic industrial/material due to disaster is a long-term, complex recovery operation and must address resource management, safety, long-term health issues, environmental concerns, and effect on mission accomplishment. The RWG will coordinate decontamination requirements to include activities carried out by the designated state, federal, or private provider under 40 CFR 300, *National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan,* and applicable environmental laws. **(T-0) Note:** Reference DAFI 10-2503 regarding CBRNE decontamination requirements.

10.19. Environmental Remediation and Retrograde Operations. The scope and duration of remediation and retrograde operations depends on the hazardous substances involved and consists of a complex set of long-term coordinated actions depending on the hazardous substances released due to peacetime disasters.

10.19.1. Remediation is normally performed by civilian environmental consultant firms under contract to the DAF and/or under the supervision of the EPA, depending on the nature of the incident. The BCE should coordinate remediation requirements in support of the RWG.

10.19.2. The RWG will account for redeployment of personnel and equipment into impacted areas as soon as objectives are accomplished or the need for response resources diminishes. **(T-2)** Pre-retrograde movement considerations include a review of the incident and identified and potential hazards to ensure that equipment and material to be moved are safe for unprotected contact by assigned personnel.

10.20. Evacuee and Housing Recovery. The formal evacuation phase does not end until all personnel evacuated are relocated to their final location, which may be temporary housing, permanent housing, or even a geographically remote designated place under the Joint Travel Regulation (JTR). The BCE, through the housing office, is responsible for coordinating and planning for all housing issues during the recovery phase in support of the RWG with direct assistance from the FSS.

Section 10C—'Recover' Common Core Capabilities

10.21. Concept Overview. DAF EM Programs at all echelons will identify, plan for, coordinate, posture, track, evaluate, and execute the following crosscutting and mission area common core capabilities to recover installations from all-hazards/threats and execute DSCAs. **(T-0) Note:** Core capabilities are the bottom line and provide the means to roll-up capabilities from a holistic perspective to inform the DAF EM governance structure from tactical, operational, to strategic levels.

10.22. 'Recover' Common Core Capability Requirements.

10.22.1. IRM. Reference **Chapter 4** for crosscutting response related IRM requirements.

10.22.2. Planning. Installations will posture recover common core capabilities based on the EM planning and risk management process described in **Chapter 4**, EM planning requirements described in **Attachment 3**, and standard core capability targets in **Attachment 4**. **(T-0)**

10.22.3. E&T. Reference **paragraph 5.4** for required E&T and **Attachment 5** for recommended specific recover core capability E&T opportunities.

10.22.4. Public Information and Warning. Reference **Chapter 8** for crosscutting recovery execution requirements.

10.22.5. Operational Coordination. Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of recovery common core capabilities.

10.22.6. Situational Assessment. Provide all decision makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the hazard/threat, any cascading effects, impacting lives, resources, infrastructure, and operational missions.

10.22.7. Infrastructure Systems and Mission Restoration. Stabilize critical infrastructure functions, minimize health and safety threats, and efficiently restore and revitalize systems and services to support a viable, resilient community.

10.22.7.1. Restore and sustain essential services (public and private) to maintain community functionality.

10.22.7.2. Develop a plan with a specified timeline for redeveloping community infrastructures to contribute to resiliency, accessibility, and sustainability.

10.22.7.3. Provide systems that meet the community needs while minimizing service disruption during restoration within the specified timeline in the recovery plan.

10.22.8. Health and Social Services. Restore and improve health and social services capabilities and networks to promote the resilience, independence, health (including behavioral health), and well-being of the whole community.

10.22.8.1. Identify affected populations, groups, and key partners in short-term, intermediate, and long-term recovery.

10.22.8.2. Complete an assessment of community health and social service needs, and prioritize these needs, including accessibility requirements, based on the whole community's input and participation in the recovery planning process, and develop a comprehensive recovery timeline.

10.22.8.3. Restore health care (including behavioral health), public health, and social services functions.

10.22.8.4. Restore and improve the resilience and sustainability of the health care system and social service capabilities and networks to promote the independence and well-being of community members IAW the specified recovery timeline.

10.22.9. Financial Recovery Planning. Restore installation facilities and infrastructure in support of operational missions and the DAF community as a whole.

10.22.9.1. Conduct a preliminary assessment of inhibitors to fostering stabilization of the affected installation.

10.22.9.2. Ensure installation recovery and mitigation plan(s) incorporates near to long-term restoration of installation operational missions while simultaneously building more resilient installations and communities.

10.22.10. Natural and Cultural Resources. Protect natural and cultural resources and historic properties through appropriate planning, mitigation, response, and recovery actions to preserve, conserve, rehabilitate, and restore them consistent with post-disaster community priorities and best practices and in compliance with applicable environmental and historic preservation laws and executive orders.

10.22.10.1. Implement measures to protect and stabilize records and culturally significant documents, objects, and structures.

10.22.10.2. Mitigate the impacts to and stabilize the natural and cultural resources and conduct a preliminary assessment of the impacts that identifies protections that need to be in place during stabilization through recovery.

10.22.10.3. Complete an assessment of affected natural and cultural resources and develop a timeline for addressing these impacts in a sustainable and resilient manner.

10.22.10.4. Preserve natural and cultural resources as part of an overall community recovery that is achieved through the coordinated efforts of natural and cultural resource experts and the recovery team IAW the specified timeline in the recovery plan.

10.22.11. Housing. Implement housing solutions that effectively support the needs of the installation population and contribute to its sustainability and resilience.

10.22.11.1. Assess preliminary housing impacts and needs, identify currently available options for temporary housing, and plan for permanent housing.

10.22.11.2. Ensure housing recovery plans continue to address interim housing needs, assess options for permanent housing, and define a timeline for achieving a resilient, accessible, and sustainable housing capability.

10.22.11.3. Establish a resilient and sustainable housing capability that meets the needs of the community, including the need for accessible housing within the specified time frame in the recovery plan.

Chapter 11

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT (EM) INFORMATION OPERATIONS

11.1. Purpose. Specify DAF EM policy to synchronize and develop a DAF enterprise-wide EMIS IT application to optimize information operations to save lives, mitigate resource loss, and support mission continuation aligned with PPD-8, NIMS, SecAF operational imperatives, AF/A4 BLES, the AF ABMS campaign plan, and the JADC2 construct.

Section 11A—Time-phased Execution Policy, Authorities, and Governance

11.2. Time-Phased Department of the Air Force (DAF) Emergency Management Information System (EMIS) Execution Policy. Through a time-phased agile software development and funding approach, the DAF EM Program will field and sustain an enterprise-wide IT DAF EMIS capability within and through continued development of portions of the installation COP. **(T-1)**

11.3. Authorities and Capability Alignment. AF/A4C and AFIMSC will retain and execute ACS authorities through managing DAF EMIS capability requirements and funding for consolidation and development. **(T-1)**

11.3.1. HAFMD 1-38 assigns authority relating to directing worldwide management of Air Force Logistics, Engineering, Force Protection, and ACS. Included is implementing installation EM Programs and fulfilling related responsibilities, as delegated to the SecAF pursuant to DoDI 6055.17, to include the DAF CBRNE Defense Program IAW DAFI 10-2503. Within these authorities, AF/A4C is the requirement owner and is responsible for DAF EMIS policy, strategic messaging, and strategic integration within the AFCAT. **Note:** AF/A4C will coordinate with AF/A3O regarding integration with the Air Force Warfare Center.

11.3.2. AFMC Mission Directive (AFMCMD) 4-422, *Air Force Installation and Mission Support Center Mission*, assigns authority relating to globally integrated and threat-informed combat support. Within these authorities, AFIMSC is the requirement developer, integrator, and Program Management Office for DAF EMIS and is responsible for measuring the overall capability of DAF EMIS core capability information requirements and performance parameters identified in this policy and defined within the DAF EMIS capability needs statements. AFIMSC will also develop and maintain a comprehensive near to far-term Capability Development Plan. **(T-1)** AFIMSC will assist MAJCOM/FLDCOM AFFOR staffs in integrating DAF EMIS capabilities in and through the installation COP. **(T-1)**

11.3.3. Air Combat Command Mission Directive (ACCMD) 2, *Air Combat Command*, assigns authority relating to battle management command and control and lead for seven of the Air Force's twelve core functions including C2.

11.3.4. ACC will account for battle management command and control requirements while AF/A4 and AFIMSC will account for ACS and EM incident management and emergency response requirements in and through the installation COP. **(T-1)**

Section 11B—. Department of the Air Force (DAF) Emergency Management Information System (EMIS) Synopsis and Requirements

11.4. Concept Overview. DAF EMIS will, through execution of EM mission areas and core capability information targets identified in **Attachment 5**, provide the ability to stack static and geospatially referenced layers of information as illustrated in **Figure 11.1**. **(T-1)** Installations use DAF EMIS to geo-tag the natural and built environment layers and assign static informational attributes to select geospatial points/areas (i.e., shelter capacity, radiological protection factor, points of contact, etc.).

Figure 11.1. Department of the Air Force (DAF) Emergency Management Information System (EMIS) Taxonomy.



11.5. Application Structure and Functionality Alignment. DAF EMIS, as bundled in and through the installation COP, will provide distinct functionality through modules aligned with the standardized and systematic processes derived from PPD-8 (mission areas and common core capabilities), the NIMS, ICS, and policy expressed in this instruction to include DAFI 10-2503. **(T-1) Note:** This requirement is critical to enable interoperability with a diverse mix of EM mission partners. In this context, the DAF EM Program will shape the structure and functioning of the installation COP to leverage the required DHS, DoD, and DAF EM preparedness and response processes/systems to achieve interoperability.

11.6. Interoperability. DAF EMIS interoperability requirements will fall within three primary categories as defined below.

11.6.1. Operational Interoperability. Functionality through modules aligned with the standardized and systematic DHS/DoD/DAF EM processes, planning framework/mission areas, and core capabilities to the ability to share select static and geospatial information layers with local, state, federal, joint and host nation mission partners to include share information along the DAF C2 continuum described in **Table 3.1**.

11.6.2. Geospatial Interoperability. Interoperable through use of the AFIMSC-managed Geospatial Interoperability Reference Architecture. Geospatial DAF EMIS layers will conform to and align with DAFI 32-10112, *Installation Geospatial Information and Services (IG&S)*. **(T-1)** The geospatial DAF EMIS layers will comply with Spatial Data Standards for Facilities, Infrastructure, and Environment. **(T-1)**

11.6.3. Target System Data Integration and Interoperability. Able to input and output authoritative and validated data with identified and prioritized mission partner systems (e.g., system of systems interface). Entails the ability of EMIS users (within mission areas) to access and share authoritative info from a multitude of select systems/sensors (e.g., Security Forces Prevent/Defend Sensors; select Homeland Security Information Network – intelligence, Law Enforcement, EM, public health, DHS CWMD sensor networks, off installation critical and routine infrastructure status; DHS geospatial natural hazard risk index, DHS Resilience Analysis and Planning tool, etc.).

11.7. Operational Interoperability Requirements. DAF EMIS will provide DAF EM Program construct members defined in **Table 3.1** with an interoperable whole-of-community informational means to prepare for, prevent, protect, prepare, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the most concerning all-hazards/threat effects. **(T-1)** DAF EMIS will:

11.7.1. Systematically retain and posture foundational crosscutting and mission area common core capability information targets identified in **Attachment 6**. **(T-1)**

11.7.2. Investigate, consolidate, integrate, correlate, and propagate authoritative interoperable mission partner information needed to effectively prepare for and manage risk from the most concerning all-hazards/threats. **(T-1)**

11.7.3. Provide consistent, standardized, geospatially referenced, and situational awareness information to the installation ECC, IC, first responders, emergency responders, control centers, EOC, CAT, the Command Post, and tenant organizations to include NAFs, FLDCOMs, MAJCOM Air Operations Centers/AFFOR Staffs, and the AFSWC and AFCAT. **(T-1)**

11.7.4. Provide consistent, standardized, geospatially referenced, and situational awareness information to local civilian governments, municipalities, mutual aid partners, and first/emergency responders. **(T-1)**

11.7.5. Generate a comprehensive interoperable EM COP to support tactical, operational, and strategic response and recovery operations. **(T-0)**

11.7.6. Provide the capability to consolidate shared situational awareness for proper up-channeling IAW current DAF guidance as well as a lateral capability for an information sharing capability with civilian counterparts. **(T-1)**

11.7.7. Support actions required by the IEMP 10-2, the IC, resource management activities, and coordination of response and recovery operations. **(T-0)**

11.7.8. Generate a continuously updated overview of an incident compiled throughout an incident's life cycle from standard NIMS data (elements, definitions, etc.) shared between integrated and compatible systems for communication, information management, and intelligence and information. **(T-0)**

11.7.9. Provide consistency at all levels of incident management across multiple jurisdictions, as well as between various governmental jurisdictions, and account for private-sector organizations and NGOs/Faith Based Organizations providing incident response/recovery support. **(T-0)**

11.7.10. Interface, input and obtain data, directives, and information at the tactical level (responders, control centers) and the operational levels (EOC, CAT). **(T-1)**

11.7.11. Capture and consolidate all directives originating from the CAT or EOC during the incident and have the means to track completion. **(T-1)**

11.7.12. Provide a means to monitor checklist activation, execution, completion and the restoration of missions and support capabilities. **(T-1)**

11.7.13. Provide near real-time incident mapping display. **(T-1)**

11.7.14. Identify activated DRF elements. **(T-1)**

11.7.15. Provide resource management visibility for all resources requested, required, and utilized. **(T-1)**

11.7.16. Ability to list priorities for the current and next operational period. **(T-1)**

11.7.17. Align with the application user-based framework within the DAF EM Program construct defined in **Table 3.1** and allow for varying levels of permissions for various functional area individuals, working groups, teams, and centers to manipulate, interact, and view data. **(T-1)**

11.8. Department of the Air Force (DAF) Emergency Management Information System (EMIS) Support to United States Space Force (USSF) Garrisons. IAW the USSF MD, DAF EMIS, in and through the installation COP, will be fielded at USSF garrisons/delta where the USAF is, through the AFMC, the base operational support provider. **Note:** IAW PAD 20-01, AFMC is the EM capability force provider for USSF locations.

Section 11C—Installation Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Common Operating Picture (COP) Requirements

11.9. Concept Overview. The desired end state emergency response COP (i.e., EMIS) is intended to provide standardized, near real-time situational awareness of response forces, an incident, or event at the tactical, operational, and strategic level that can be shared and exchanged across the DAF as well as with partner agencies. **Note:** Installations that do not have a MAJCOM/FLDCOM-directed COP may procure other COP-like solutions to meet the minimum installation EM COP requirements and DAF installation EMIS standards until such time a COP is approved for DAF-wide fielding as long as it includes all capabilities required to comply with the core capability target areas IAW PPD-8 and the NIMS. Prior to procurement, installations will refer to the AFIMSC fiscal year financial guidance for submitting requirements for resourcing consideration and approval. **(T-2)**

11.10. Minimum Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Common Operating Picture (COP) Standards. An installation EMIS may be a single system solution, or a suite of systems tools used together to achieve the minimum standards in **Table 11.1**. **Note:** If installations choose to employ a suite of systems with multiple functional capabilities (e.g., maintenance and flying operations, facility and infrastructure status, AT status, etc.), the functional community is responsible for maintaining that capability.

Table 11.1. Minimum Installation Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Common Operating Picture (COP) Standards.

Item	Description
1	Provide installation leaders, the IC, and first and emergency responders with an interoperable means to prepare, respond and recover from all-hazards and the full spectrum of incidents. **(T-1)**
2	Provide consistent, standardized, and geospatially referenced information to:
2.1	Installation leaders, the IC, and first and emergency responders. **(T-0)**
2.2	HHQ (DAF, NAF, MAJCOMs/FLDCOMs). **(T-0)**
2.3	Tenant organizations and partner agencies. **(T-0)**
2.4	Local civilian governments, municipalities, mutual aid partners and first responders. **(T-3)**
3	Provide the capability to consolidate shared situational awareness for proper up-channeling IAW current Air Force guidance as well as a lateral capability for an information sharing capability with civilian counterparts. **(T-1)**
4	Interface, input and obtain data, directives, and information at the tactical level (responders, control centers) and the operational levels (EOC, CAT). **(T-1)**
5	Clearly articulate the situation, incident, and provide effective critical information sharing. **(T-1)**
6	Capture and consolidate all directives originating from the CAT or EOC during the incident and have the means to track completion. **(T-1)**
7	Display current status of installation warnings, alarm conditions, MOPP levels, hurricane condition and tropical cyclone condition, protective actions, evacuation status and orders, and personnel accountability. Notify users of changes in these conditions. **(T-1)**
8	Provide a means to monitor checklist activation, execution, completion and the restoration of missions and support capabilities. **(T-1)**
9	Provide near real-time incident mapping display. **(T-1)**
10	Identify activated DRF elements. **(T-1)**
11	Provide resource management visibility for all resources requested, required, and utilized. **(T-3)**
12	Ability to list priorities for the current and next operational period. **(T-3)**
13	Ensure ICS Forms are integrated into the Installation COP. **(T-3)**
Note: Sharing of installation EOC COP information with host nation partner/foreign nations will be determined locally. **(T-3)**	

TOM D. MILLER
Lieutenant General, USAF
DCS/Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection

Attachment 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

References

10 USC § 2679, *Installation-Support Services: Intergovernmental Support Agreements*, 3 January 2016

18 USC § 1385, *Use of Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Space Force as Posse Comitatus*, 3 January 2022

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Prescribed Forms

None

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ICS Form 201, *Incident Briefing*

ICS Form 202, *Incident Objective*

ICS Form 204, *Assignments List*

ICS Form 205, *Incident Radio Communication Plan*

ICS Form 205A, *Communication List*

ICS Form 208, *Safety Message Plan*

ICS Form 209, *Incident Status Summary*

ICS Form 213, *General Message*

ICS Form 214, *Activity Log*

ICS Form 215, *Operational Planning Worksheet*

ICS Form 219, *Resource Status Cards*

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAR—After Action Report

ABMS—Advanced Battle Management System

AB—Air Base

ACE—Agile Combat Employment

ACS—Agile Combat Support

AFCEC—Air Force Civil Engineer Center

AFE—Aircrew Flight Equipment

AFFOR—Air Force Forces

AFGSC—Air Force Global Strike Command

AFI—Air Force Instruction

AFIMS—Air Force Incident Management System

AFIMSC—Air Force Installation and Mission Support Center

AFLCMC—Air Force Life Cycle Management Center

AFMAN—Air Force Manual

AFMC—Air Force Materiel Command

AFMRA—Air Force Medical Readiness Agency

AFPAAS—Air Force Personnel Accountability and Assessment System

AFPD—Air Force Policy Directive

AFR—Air Force Reserve

AFRC—Air Force Reserve Command

AFSC—Air Force Specialty Code

AF/SG—The Air Force Surgeon General

AFSWC—Air Force Service Watch Cell

AFTTP—Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

AHTA—All-Hazards Threat Assessment

ANG—Air National Guard

ARC—Air Reserve Component

ARIS—Automated Readiness Information System

AT—Antiterrorism

ATWG—Antiterrorism Working Group

BCE—Base Civil Engineer

BDOC—Base Defense Operations Center

BE—Bioenvironmental Engineer

BEPO—Base Emergency Preparedness Orientation

BLES—Basing and Logistics Enterprise Strategy

C2—Command and Control

CBRN—Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

CBRNE—Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive

CCA—Contamination Control Area

CCDR—Combatant Commander

CCMD—Combatant Command

CCP—Casualty Collection Point

CCS—Contamination Control Station

CCT—Contamination Control Team

CE—Civil Engineer

CFETP—Career Field Education and Training Plan

CFM—Career Field Manager

CFR—Code of Federal Regulations

CJCS—Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

C-MAJCOM—Component-Major Command

COLPRO—Collective Protection

CONOPS—Concept of Operations

CONUS—Continental United States

COOP—Continuity of Operations

COP—Common Operating Picture

CoS—Chief of Staff

CPG—Comprehensive Planning Guide

CRRE—Control System Readiness Resiliency Exercise

CSAF—Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

CWMD—Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

DAF—Department of the Air Force

DAFI—Department of the Air Force Instruction

DAFMAN—Department of the Air Force Manual

DBSE—Discussion Based Seminar Exercise

DHS—Department of Homeland Security

DHS IRIS—Department of Homeland Security Incident Resource Inventory System

DoD—Department of Defense

DoDD—Department of Defense Directive

DoDI—Department of Defense Instruction

DoDM—Department of Defense Manual

DoS—Department of State

DRECO—Dispersal Relocation and Execution Concept Options

DPF—Deliberate Planning Factor

DRF—Disaster Response Force

DRRS—Defense Readiness Reporting System

DSCA—Defense Support to Civil Authorities

EAP—Emergency Action Plan

ECC—Emergency Communication Center

ELD—Emergency Lockdown

EM—Emergency Management

EMAC—Emergency Management Assistance Compact

EMAP—Emergency Management Accreditation Program

EMD—Emergency Medical Dispatch

EMIS—Emergency Management Information System

EMWG—Emergency Management Working Group

EOC—Emergency Operations Center

EOD—Explosive Ordnance Disposal

EP2T—Emergency Planning and Preparedness Team

EPA—Environmental Protection Agency

EPI—Emergency Public Information

E&T—Education and Training

ET&E—Education, Training, and Exercises

F&ES—Fire and Emergency Services

FE—Functional Exercise

FEMA—Federal Emergency Management Agency

FLDCOM—Field Command

FOS—Forward Operating Site

FPCON—Force Protection

FSE—Full Scale Exercise

FSS—Force Support Squadron

GSU—Geographically Separated Unit

HAF—Headquarters Air Force

HAFMD—Headquarters Air Force Mission Directive

HAZMAT—Hazardous Material

HHQ—Higher Headquarters

HPCON—Health Protection Condition

HQ—Headquarters

HQ, CCC—Headquarters, Cyberspace Capabilities Center

HSEEP—Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Program

HSPD—Homeland Security Presidential Directive

IAP—Incident Action Plan

IAW—In Accordance With

IBD—Integrated Base Defense

IBRR—Integrated Base Response and Recovery

IC—Incident Commander

ICS—Incident Command System

IEM—Installation Emergency Manager

IEMP—Installation Emergency Management Plan

IG—Inspector General

IGEMS—Inspector General Enterprise Management System

IL—Instructor Led

I&MS—Installation & Mission Support

IMAO—Installation Mission Assurance Office

IOEM—Installation Office of Emergency Management

IPAWS—Integrated Public Alert and Warning System

IRF—Initial Response Force

IRIS—Incident Resource Inventory System

IRM—Integrated Risk Management

IS—Independent Study

ISH—Installation Safe Haven

IT—Information Technology

JADC2—Joint All Domain Command and Control

JAG—Judge Advocate General

JIC—Joint Information Center

JIS—Joint Information System

JLLIS—Joint Lessons Learned Information System

JTTF—Joint Terrorism Task Force

JTR—Joint Travel Regulation

KSA—Knowledge, Skills, and Attributes

LEPC—Local Emergency Preparedness Committee

LIMFAC—Limiting Factor

LRS—Logistics Readiness Squadron

MA—Mission Assurance

MAA—Mutual Aid Agreement

MAC—Multiagency Coordination

MACS—Multiagency Coordination System

MAJCOM—Major Command

MARE—Major Accident Response Exercise

MCO—Major Combat Operation

MICT—Management Internal Control Toolset

MILCON—Military Construction

MSC—Mass Care Service

MEF—Mission Essential Function

MEM—Medical Emergency Manager

MET—Mission Essential Task

MOA—Memorandum of Agreement

MOB—Main Operating Base

MOPP—Mission-Oriented Protective Posture

MOU—Memorandum of Understanding

MPP—Mass Prophylaxis Plan

MSEL—Master Scenario Event List

MTF—Medical Treatment Facility

MTTP—Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedure

MWN—Mass Warning and Notification

MWNS—Mass Warning and Notification System

NAF—Numbered Air Force

NAI—Nuclear Accident Incident

NARP—Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedure

NATO—North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDRE—Natural Disaster Response Exercise

NDS—National Disaster Shelter

NFPA—National Fire Protection Agency

NGB—National Guard Bureau

NGO—Nongovernmental Organization

NIMS—National Incident Management System

NMCC—National Military Command Center

NQS—National Qualification System

NRC—Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NRF—National Response Framework

OAIS—Operational Analysis and Integration Section

OCONUS—Outside the Continental United States

OL—Operating Location/Online

OPR—Office of Primary Responsibility

OPREP—Operational Reporting

OT&E—Organize, Train, and Equip

PACAF—Pacific Air Force

PAO—Public Affairs Officer

PCCA—Postured Core Capability Assessment

PEC—Program Element Code

PHEM—Public Health Emergency Management

PHEO—Public Health Emergency Officer

PIO—Public Information Officer

PMR—Program Management Review

POC—Point of Contact

POM—Program Objective Memorandum

PPBE—Planning, Programming, and Budget Execution

PPD—Presidential Policy Directive

PPE—Personal Protective Equipment

PPM—Physical Protective Measure

RegAF—Regular Air Force

RMDI—Resource Management during an Incident

ROC—Recovery Operations Chief

RPS—Residential Pandemic Shelter

RSH—Remote Safe Haven

RTD—Resource Typing Definition

RTF—Response Task Force

RWG—Recovery Working Group

SecAF—Secretary of the Air Force

SecDef—Secretary of Defense

SHS—Specific Hazard Shelter

SIP—Shelter-in-Place

SMART—Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-Bound

SME—Subject Matter Expertise/Expert

SMT—Shelter Management Team

SOFA—Status of Forces Agreement

SOP—Standard Operating Procedure

SPR—Stakeholder Preparedness Review

TCA—Task Critical Assets

TEMPER—Tactical Emergency Management Program Execution Requirement

THIRA—Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment

TTP—Tactics, Techniques, and Procedure

TTX—Table-Top Exercise

TWG—Threat Working Group

UC—Unified Command

UEPC—Unit Emergency Preparedness Coordinator

UFC—Unified Facilities Criteria

UNC—Unmet Needs Committee

USAF—United States Air Force

USAFE-AFAFRICA—United States Air Forces Europe/Air Forces Africa

U.S.—United States

USC—United States Code

USSF—United States Space Force

UVP—Uniquely Vulnerable Population

WMD—Weapons of Mass Destruction

Office Symbols

SAF/IE—Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations, Environment & Energy

SAF/IEE—Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (SecAF) for Environment, Safety, and Infrastructure

SAF/IEI—Installations Directorate

SAF/CN—Chief Information Officer

SAF/SQ—Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration

AF/A1—Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower, Personnel, and Services

AF/A2/6—Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and Cyber Effects Operations

AF/A3—Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

AF/A3OG—Air Force Operations Group

AF/A4—Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection

AF/A4C—The Director of Civil Engineers

AF/A4CX—Air Force Civil Engineer Directorate Readiness Division

AF/A4CXE—Air Force Civil Engineer Directorate Readiness Division EM Branch

AF/A4P—Directorate of Resource Integration

AF/A4S—Director of Security Forces

AF/A5/7—Deputy Chief of Staff for Air Force Futures

AF/A8—Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs

AF/A10—Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration

AFCEC/CXR—Air Force Civil Engineer Center Emergency Management Division

AF/SG—Air Force Surgeon General

AFIMSC/CA—Air Force Installation and Mission Support Center/Civilian Advisor

AFIMSC/CD—Air Force Installation and Mission Support Center/Deputy Commander

AFIMSC/IZ—Air Force Installation and Mission Support Center/Installation Support Directorate

NGB/A4—National Guard Bureau Deputy Chief of Staff Logistics, Engineering & Force Protection

SF/S4O—Headquarters Space Force, Mission Sustainment Division

Terms

Ability to Survive and Operate—The ability for individual Airmen and Guardians and units to conduct and sustain operations while simultaneously responding to or recovering from deliberate, accidental, or naturally occurring events that impede air, space, or cyberspace operations.

Active Shooter—An individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area; in most cases, active shooters use firearm(s) and there is no pattern or method to their selection of victims.

Air Force Crisis Action Team (AFCAT)—AFCAT provides 24-hour situational awareness on crisis events to enable decision and communication by DAF senior leaders.

Air Force Service Watch Cell (AFSWC)—The mission of the watch cell is to conduct 24-hour monitoring of worldwide Air Force operations and facilitate situational awareness on global events to senior HAF leadership, enabling key decisions related to OT&E the force to include OPREP, connectivity to NMCC, assisting the execution of Joint Emergency Evacuation Plans, responding to senior leader request for information, publishing MAJCOM and HAF orders, and advises recommendation to AF/A3 leadership to activate the AFCAT, as needed.

Air National Guard (ANG) Special Mission Sets—Commonly referred to as Reachback Missions, encompass deployed in place (DP) coded ANG personnel performing Title 10 missions in Intelligence, Cyber and Space Operations; SAMs (Presidential and Diplomatic support); and Aerospace Control Alert Missions.

Air Reserve Component (ARC)—Refers to both the AFR and ANG.

All-Hazards—A methodology to develop EM strategies for all different types of potential incidents. "All-Hazards" include any incident, natural or manmade, that warrants action to protect the life, property, health, and safety of military members, dependents, and civilians at risk, and minimize any disruptions of installation operations.

Antiterrorism (AT)—Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include rapid containment by local military and civilian forces.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN)—Operations that include CBRN, either individually or in combination. Collectively known as WMD. TICs and TIMs are considered CBRN materials.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense—Measures taken to minimize or negate the vulnerabilities to, and/or effects of, a CBRN hazard or incident.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environment—An operational environment that includes CBRN threats/hazards and their potential resulting effects.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Incident—An emergency resulting from the deliberate or unintentional release of nuclear, biological, radiological, or toxic or poisonous chemical materials.

Combat Developer—Command or agency that formulates doctrine, concepts, organization, materiel requirements, and objectives. May be used generically to represent the user community role in the materiel acquisition process.

Combatant Command (CCMD)—A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the SecDef and with the advice and assistance of the CJCS.

Command and Control (C2)—The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.

Command Post—The Command Post serves as one of the installation's full-time 24/7 C2 nodes, directly responsible to the installation commander. The Command Post is a direct representative of the (installation) commander and serves as the focal point of the unit operation, and as such, receives and disseminates orders, information, and requests necessary for the C2 of assigned forces and operations.

Common Operating Picture (COP)—A continuously updated overview of an incident compiled throughout an incident's life cycle from standard data (elements, definitions, etc.) shared between integrated and compatible systems for communication, information management, and intelligence and information sharing across installation departments and responders. Helps with collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness. Provides consistency at all levels of incident management across jurisdictions, as well as between various governmental jurisdictions, and with private-sector organizations and NGO(s). Should include the minimum set of geospatial features (including imagery) necessary to provide a foundational map depicting the built and natural infrastructure of a typical installation, which are of common interest or importance during emergency response events. Installation geospatial data should be obtained from the authoritative data source for each installation as defined in DoDI 8130.01, *Installation Geospatial Information and Services (IGI&S)*.

Community Inter—Governmental Support Agreement—An agreement between the DAF and a state or local government entered into under the authority of 10 USC § 2679, *Installation- support services: intergovernmental support agreements*, and DoDI 4000.19, *Support Agreements*. This agreement requires approval from Installations Directorate (SAF/IEI) before it can be executed. These agreements are not covered by this AFI.

Community Profile—A community profile is information about the people and place the IEMP 10-2 is designed to protect, respond to, and help with recovery. It is the intended audience of the planning efforts.

Contamination—(1) The deposit, absorption, or adsorption of radioactive material or of biological or chemical agents on or by structures, areas, personnel, or objects, or in aerosolized clouds. (2) (DoD only) Food or water made unfit for consumption by humans or animals because of the presence of environmental chemicals, radioactive elements, bacteria, or organisms, the byproduct of the growth of bacteria or organisms, the decomposing material (to include the food substance itself) or waste in the food or water.

Contingency—A situation requiring military operations in response to natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or as otherwise directed by appropriate authority to protect U.S. interests.

Continuity of Operations (COOP)—An internal effort within each DoD component to ensure that essential functions continue to be performed during disruption of normal operations.

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD)—Efforts against actors of concern to curtail the conceptualizing, development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects of WMD, related expertise, materials, technologies and means of delivery.

Crosscutting—Crosscutting capabilities applicable to (and to integrate) all mission areas: prevent, protect, prepare, mitigate, respond, and recover. Examples include IRM, E&T, public information and warning, and operational C2. These examples may happen concurrently throughout each mission area.

Decontamination—The process of making any person, object, or area safe by absorbing, destroying, neutralizing, making harmless, or removing chemical or biological agents, or by removing radioactive material clinging to or around it.

Defense Critical Infrastructure—The composite of DoD and non-DoD assets essential to project, support, and sustain military forces and operations worldwide. It is a combination of task critical assets and defense critical assets.

Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA)—Support provided by U.S. federal military forces, DoD civilians, DoD contract personnel, DoD component assets, and National Guard forces (when the SecDef, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, USC, status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events.

Department of the Air Force Emergency Management Program—The single, integrated DAF program to coordinate and organize efforts to prepare for, respond to, recover from, and mitigate incidents and emergencies using an all-hazards approach.

Disaster Response Force (DRF)—The DAF structure that responds to disasters/incidents, establishing C2 and supporting response and recovery operations.

Next Generation 911 Capability—A telecommunications system consisting of networks, databases, and NexGen911 equipment that uses the single three-digit number "9-1-1" for reporting police, fire, medical, and other emergency situations to a central location, while automatically associating a physical location and calling party's telephone number. The physical location is correlated with the applicable emergency service number to route NexGen911 calls to the correct public safety answering point for servicing by the corresponding emergency service agency.

Emergency Management (EM) Propagation Function—Identify and monitor protected assets through facilitation and advisement of the EMWG and EP2T. Propagate protected asset all-hazard/threat risk and effects to facilitate installation planning and risk management activities to include increasing interoperability with joint mission partners. Posture information needed before and for incident response and recovery within DAF EMIS/installation COP. Maintain a listing of personnel assigned to various cross-functional teams/individual positions within the installation planning and risk management construct to include training status.

Emergency Management (EM) Future Plans Function—Facilitate EMWG meetings on behalf of the EMWG chair. Ensure EMWG members are advised regarding needed actions to close gaps within installation EM preparedness system components of IRM, planning framework/mission areas, common core capabilities, EM exercise evaluation results, and other information (i.e., local lessons learned reports and status of EM training, exercises, plans, etc.). Facilitate and develop the IEMP.

Emergency Management (EM) Logistics Function—Ensure CBRN response equipment, equipment unit type codes, individual protective equipment and PPE are properly accounted for, maintained, and operational before, during, and after response operations. Identify EM and CBRN requirements and allowance standards to prepare/manage budget for PECs 27593F and 27574F. Utilize ARIS for tracking equipment accountability, maintenance, condition code, serviceability, periodic inspections, and calibration. Coordinate with AFIMSC for EM and CBRNE equipment requirements.

Emergency Management (EM) Development Function—Provide EM and CBRN defense related force development individual training for the installation population as specified in **paragraph 5.4**. Provide EM and CBRN defense SMEs support and advice for installation wide exercise activities executed by the installation IG.

Emergency Management (EM) Current Plans Function—During response operations, consolidate and present interoperable EM and CBRN defense information to and from mission partners (local, state, federal, tribal, allied, and joint) through the EOC to the installation Command Post/Wing Operations Center and along the tactical, operational, and strategic C2 continuum. For CBRNE Risk Index 1 and 2 installations, the IOEM will establish and maintain a CBRN Control Center. **Note:** Depending on severity of an incident/attack, the IOEM will support recovery operations as needed/directed.

Emergency Management (EM) Operations Function—Perform as installation CBRN emergency responders to support CWMD deterrence, attribution, and consequence management activities.

Emergency Responders—Personnel performing prevention, response, and recovery tasks in support of first responders and first receivers while not physically located at the incident site. Includes related areas identified in the definition for "first responders."

Evacuation—(1) Removal of a patient by any of a variety of transport means from a theater of military operation, or between health services capabilities, for the purpose of preventing further illness or injury, providing additional care, or providing disposition of patients from the military health care system. (2) The clearance of personnel, animals, or materiel from a given locality. (3) The controlled process of collecting, classifying, and shipping unserviceable or abandoned materiel, U.S. or foreign, to appropriate reclamation, maintenance, technical intelligence, or disposal facilities. (4) The ordered or authorized departure of noncombatants from a specific area by DoS, DoD, or appropriate military commander.

Facility—A real property entity consisting of one or more of the following: a building, a structure, a utility system, pavement, and underlying land.

First Receivers—Healthcare workers at a medical facility that may be engaged in decontamination and treatment of victims during an emergency incident occurring at a site other than the hospital. First receivers are a subset of first responders.

First Responders—Personnel performing prevention, response, and recovery tasks at one or more incident scenes, including any area directly related to the incident site and therefore, under the authority of the incident or unified commander.

Force Protection—The Air Force defines force protection as the process of detecting threats and hazards to the Air Force and its mission, and applying measures to deter, pre-empt, negate, or mitigate them based on an acceptable level of risk and preventive measures taken to mitigate against DoD personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. Force protection is a fundamental principle of all military operations as a way to ensure the survivability of a commander's forces. A comparison of NATO, joint, and single Service definitions is instructive. NATO doctrine explains that "[t]he operational environment may have no discernable 'front lines' or 'rear area' and an adversary may be expected to target Allied vulnerabilities anywhere with a wide range of capabilities." Consequently, NATO defines force protection as "measures and means to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, materiel, operations, and activities from threats/hazards to preserve freedom of action and operational effectiveness thereby contributing to mission success. Reference NATO – Allied Tactical Publication 3.3.6., *NATO Force Protection Doctrine for Air Operations*.

Hazard Assessment—DoD, command, or unit-level evaluation (assessment) to identify hazards and associated risk to person, property, and structures and to improve protection from natural or manmade disasters or hazards. Hazard assessments serve as one of the foundational components for effective EM activities including planning, resource management, capability development, public education, and training and exercises.

Homeland—The physical region that includes the CONUS, Alaska, Hawaii, U.S. territories, and surrounding territorial waters and airspace.

Homeland Defense—The protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President.

Homeland Security—A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the U.S.; reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies that occur.

Host Nation—A nation that receives the forces or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory.

Hot Zone—An area that is considered to be dangerous, it generally entails special equipment to protect occupants, because there is high-risk exposure to contamination.

Incident—An occurrence or event, natural or human caused, that requires an emergency response to protect life or property. Incidents for example, can include major disasters, emergencies, terrorist attacks, terrorist threats, wildland and urban fires, floods, HAZMAT spills, nuclear accidents, aircraft accidents, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, tropical storms, war-related disasters, public health and medical emergencies, and other occurrences requiring an emergency response.

Incident Command Post—The field location where the primary functions are performed. The Incident Command Post may be co-located with the incident base or other incident facilities.

Incident Management Team or Emergency Response Team—is a group of professionals who are trained to prepare for, respond and recover from all-hazards and the full spectrum of emergency incidents such as a natural disaster or an interruption of business operations. Incident response teams are common in public service organizations as well as in organizations. This team is generally composed of specific members designated before an incident occurs, although under certain circumstances the team may be an ad hoc group of willing volunteers.

Incident of Public Health Concern—An infectious disease (natural, accidental, or deliberate) likely to significantly impact the ability of the DoD to maintain MA or likely to result in significant increases in request for DoD assistance.

Initial Response Force (IRF)—A tailored force dispatched from the closest military installation by the Joint Staff on behalf of the SecDef, immediately upon notification of a nuclear weapon incident or other nuclear or radiological material incident to establish security and mitigate immediate effects of the incident.

Integrated Base Response and Recovery—Restoration of the mission (operational and support) capabilities after an incident, which caused degradation of the missions. Mission impacting incidents ranging from natural disasters to man-made accidents (CBRN, kinetic) and cyber-attack(s). Military, civilian, contractors, or a combined force may fill response and recovery team positions to support on-going recovery if damages exceed organic capability.

Installation Commander—The military officer appointed to command of an installation or other senior DoD official responsible for all operations performed by an installation.

Joint Task Force Headquarters (HQ)—A combined Joint Task Force is a multinational Joint Task Force the commander commands from a multinational and joint HQ. The purpose of creating a combined Joint Task Force HQ is to provide flexible and efficient means to generate, at short notice, rapidly deployable combined Joint Task Forces with dedicated C2 capability and to facilitate operations in concert with partners.

Limited Contingency Operations—May be a single small-scale, limited-duration operations or a significant part of a major operation of extended duration involving combat.

Limiting Factor (LIMFAC)—A factor or condition that, either temporarily or permanently, impedes mission accomplishment.

Lock-down—An announced emergency protocol used as a security measure to enhance the level of security dramatically and rapidly in a facility. Confining and restricting movement during an active shooter incident.

Major Disaster—As defined by the Stafford Act, any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snow storm, or drought) or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood or explosion, in any part of the U.S., which in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this act to supplement the efforts and available resources of states, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby. Reference 42 USC § 5122(2).

Measure Domain—A group of evaluation points that make up the whole of the environment.

MAA—- A written or oral agreement between and among agencies/organizations and/or jurisdictions that provides a mechanism to quickly obtain assistance in the form of personnel, equipment, materiel, and other associated services. The primary objective is to facilitate the rapid, short-term deployment of support prior to, during, and/or after an incident.

Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)—A type of intra-agency, interagency, or National Guard agreement between two or more parties, which includes specific terms that are agreed to, and a commitment by at least one party to engage in action. It includes either a commitment of resources or binds a party to a specific action.

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)—A type of intra-agency, interagency, or National Guard agreement between two or more parties, which includes only general understandings between the parties. It neither includes a commitment of resources nor binds a party to any specific action.

Mission Assurance (MA)—A process to protect or ensure the continued function and resilience of capabilities and assets, including personnel, equipment, facilities, networks, information and information systems, infrastructure, and supply chains, critical to the execution of mission essential functions in any operating environment or condition.

Mission Essential Function (MEF)—Select functions directly related to accomplishing DoD's mission. Failure to perform or sustain these functions, which directly support primary mission essential function, would significantly affect the DoD's ability to provide vital services or exercise authority, direction, and control.

Mission Essential Tasks (MET)—A mission task selected by a joint force commander deemed essential to mission accomplishment and defined using the common language of the Universal Joint Task List in terms of task, condition, and standard.

Mission-Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP)—A flexible system of protection against CBRN contamination in which personnel must wear only that protective clothing and equipment appropriate to the threat level, work rate imposed by the mission, temperature, and humidity.

Mitigation—Activities designed to reduce or eliminate risks to persons or property or to lessen the actual or potential effects or consequences of an incident. Mitigation measures may be implemented prior to, during, or after an incident. Mitigation measures are often developed IAW lessons learned from prior incidents. Mitigation involves ongoing actions to reduce exposure to, probability of, or potential loss from hazards. Measures may include zoning and building codes, flood plain buyouts, and analysis of hazard-related data to determine where it is safe to build or locate temporary facilities. Mitigation can include efforts to educate governments, businesses, and the public on measures they can take to reduce loss and injury.

National Incident Management System (NIMS)—A set of principles that provides a systematic, proactive approach guiding government agencies at all levels, NGOs, and the private sector. This system is intended to work seamlessly to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of domestic incidents. These efforts are planned and executed regardless of the cause, size, location, or complexity of the incident and are intended to reduce the loss of life or property and harm to the environment.

National Planning Frameworks—As part of the National Preparedness System, guidance that describes how the whole community works together to achieve the National Preparedness Goal. There is one framework for each of the five preparedness mission areas addressed in PPD-8: prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery.

National Response Framework (NRF)—Guidance that documents the key response principles, roles, and structures that organize a unified, national, all-hazards response.

Natural Disaster—An emergency situation posing significant danger to life and property that results from a natural cause.

Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO)—A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society.

Participant Feedback—Solicits the following: Strengths and areas for improvement about the implementation of participating agencies and organizations' policies, plans, and SOPs; and impressions about exercise conduct and logistics. The Participant Feedback Form provides players the opportunity to provide constructive criticism about the design, control, or logistics of the exercise to help enhance future exercises. Information collected from feedback forms contributes to the issues, observations, recommendations, and corrective actions in the AAR/Improvement Plan.

Program Objective Memorandum (POM)—The final product of the programming process within the DoD, the DoD component's POM displays the resource allocation decisions of the Military Departments in response to and IAW planning and programming guidance.

Preparedness—The range of deliberate, critical tasks and activities necessary to build, sustain, and improve the operational capability to prevent, protect against, prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents. Preparedness is a continuous process involving efforts at all levels of government and between government and private sector and NGOs to identify threats, determine vulnerabilities, and identify required resources.

Prevention—Actions to avoid an incident or to intervene to stop an incident from occurring. Prevention involves actions to protect lives and property. It involves applying intelligence and other information to a range of activities that may include such countermeasures as deterrence operations; heightened inspections; improved surveillance and security operations; investigations to determine the full nature and source of the threat; public health and agricultural surveillance and testing processes; immunizations, isolation or quarantine; and, as appropriate, specific law enforcement operations aimed at deterring, preempting, interdicting or disrupting illegal activity and apprehending potential perpetrators and bringing them to justice.

Public Health Emergency—An occurrence or imminent threat of an illness or health condition that may be caused by a biological incident, manmade or naturally occurring; the appearance of a novel or previously controlled or eradicated infectious agent or biological toxin; natural disaster; chemical attack or accidental release; radiological or nuclear attack or accident; or high-yield explosives that poses a high probability of a significant number of deaths, serious or long-term disabilities, widespread exposure to an infectious or toxic agent, and/or healthcare needs that exceed available resources.

Public Health Emergency Officer (PHEO)—The PHEO is a clinician medical officer with experience in public health, preventative medicine, or emergency response such as the assigned Chief of Aerospace Medicine or Chief of Medical Services. PHEOs are designated in writing by the installation commander and provide EM recommendations in response to public health emergencies.

Recovery—The development, coordination, and execution of service- and site-restoration plans for impacted communities and the reconstitution of government operations and services through individual, private sector, nongovernmental, and public assistance programs that: identify needs and define resources; provide housing and promote restoration; address long-term care and treatment of affected persons; implement additional measures for community restoration; incorporate mitigation measures and techniques, as feasible; evaluate the incident to identify lessons learned; and develop initiatives to mitigate the effects of future incidents.

Resource Management—A financial management function that provides advice and guidance to the commander to develop command resource requirements.

Response—Activities that address the short-term, direct effects of an incident. Response includes immediate actions to save lives, protect property, and meet basic human needs. Response also includes the execution of emergency operations plans and of incident mitigation activities designed to limit the loss of life, personal injury, property damage, and other unfavorable outcomes. As indicated by the situation, response activities include: applying intelligence and other information to lessen the effects or consequences of an incident; increased security operations; continuing investigations into the nature and source of the threat; ongoing public health and agricultural surveillance and testing processes; immunizations, isolation or quarantine; and specific law enforcement operations aimed at preempting, interdicting or disrupting illegal activity and apprehending actual perpetrators and bringing them to justice.

Response Task Force (RTF)—A Military Department-specific DoD response force designed to direct DoD nuclear weapon incident and consequence management activities at a U.S. nuclear weapon incident site. CCDRs establish operational control of RTFs at an appropriate time in the response, when ordered by the SecDef.

Risk Assessment—The process of systematically identifying, assessing, and managing risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits as described in DoDIO-2000.16V1_AFI31-245-O. The end product of the risk management process is the identification of areas and assets that are vulnerable to the identified threat attack means. From the assessment of risk based upon the three critical components of risk management (threat assessment, criticality assessment, and vulnerability assessment), the commander determines which assets require the most protection and where future expenditures minimize risk of attack or lessen the severity of the outcome of an attack.

Risk Management—A continual process or cycle where risks are identified, measured, and evaluated; countermeasures are designed, implemented, and monitored to see how they perform, with a continual feedback loop for decision-maker input to improve countermeasures and consider trade-offs between risk acceptance and risk avoidance.

Safe Haven—(1) Designated area(s) to which noncombatants of the U.S. government's responsibility and commercial vehicles and materiel may be evacuated during a domestic or other valid emergency. (Reference JP 3-68, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*) (2) A protected body of water or the well deck of an amphibious ship used by small craft operating offshore for refuge from storms or heavy seas. (Reference Joint TTP 4-01.6, *Joint Logistics Over the Shore*).

Search and Rescue—The use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, and specialized rescue teams and equipment to search for and rescue distressed persons on land or at sea in a permissive environment.

Severe Weather—Any weather condition that poses a hazard to property or life.

Shelter-In-Place (SIP)—To have temporary protection in a structure during short or no-notice emergencies, (e.g., a HAZMAT incident or a tornado).

Specialized Teams—The teams formed from the existing installation and unit personnel resources to support emergency response operations.

Tenant—A tenant is an organization affiliated with the DAF that occupies the facilities of and/or receives support from another MAJCOM or host unit. This term may also apply to contract agencies who perform a DAF function for another MAJCOM.

Threat—A statement made, or action conducted by a state or non-state actor that reflects intentions, capabilities, or activities that have the potential to harm the U.S., our partners, or allies (including loss or damage, or harm to personnel, information, resources, facilities, equipment, or other interests).

Threat Assessment—In AT, examining the capabilities, intentions, and activities, past and present, of terrorist organizations as well as the security environment within which friendly forces operate to determine the level of threat.

United States (U.S.)—A North American country consisting of 50 states; a federal district; 124 territories, with 5 of them being major territories (American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands); various minor islands; and other areas such as international waters, territorial waters, and airspace, over which the U.S. government has complete jurisdiction and control or has exclusive authority or defense responsibility.

Vulnerability—(1) The susceptibility of a nation or military force to any action by any means through which its war potential or combat effectiveness may be reduced or its will to fight diminished. (2) The characteristics of a system that cause it to suffer a definite degradation (incapability to perform the designated mission) as a result of having been subjected to a certain level of effects in an unnatural (manmade) hostile environment. (3) In information operations, a weakness in information system security design, procedures, implementation, or internal controls that could be exploited to gain unauthorized access to information systems.

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)—CBRNE weapons capable of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties but excluding the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part from the weapon.

Attachment 2

INSTALLATION COMMUNITY PROFILE, PROTECTED ASSETS, AND RISK ASSESSMENTS

A2.1. Purpose. Provide additional policy requirements and recommendations to assist installations with conducting effective community profiling and IRM assessments.

A2.2. Protected Asset Requirements, Categories, and Focal Points. The categories presented (personnel, facilities/resources, and infrastructure) will inform deliberate planning regarding IRM assessments, content within the IEMP, and posturing of static and geospatial layers within IT systems used for response and recovery operations. Included will be common protected asset category focal points (MEFs, emergency response, protected populace, and initial recovery) that intersect with, synchronize, and link to each protected asset category to generate concentrated informational threads. The EMWG will determine the level and depth of information needed locally. **Note:** Community profile data points are applied to multiple categories and focal points as to generate relational data and multi-dimensional viewing of protected assets.

A2.2.1. Category 1, Personnel. The community profile will contain comprehensive, all-hazard/threat personnel category detailed in **Table A2.1** to assist EM and protection-related programs in developing effective, sustainable protective strategies. **(T-0)** Installations will prioritize protection of all personnel; however, certain UVPs require additional focus and assistance. **(T-1)** Information generated will inform proper employment of various capabilities to protect personnel. In addition, the categorization will assist the installation commander, AT officer, and IEM a means to identify personnel needing access to the installation during increased hazard/threat situations/conditions (e.g., FPCON Delta conditions) and/or for response/recovery operations. **Note:** Geospatial data layers pertain to the typical day-to-day locality/facility personnel work and/or reside.

Table A2.1. Personnel Category Examples.

Focal Points		Description
1	MEFs	Military, DoD civilians or DoD contractors providing direct roles supporting the installation's operational mission such as aircrews, aircraft maintenance, and base operations.
2	Emergency Response	Personnel (U.S. or non-U.S. citizens) designated to perform emergency responder tasks during an emergency resulting from one or more identified hazards/threats and require installation access during an emergency. Examples include first and emergency responders, personnel that operate within the ECC, select control centers, the EOC, and installation Command Post; select specialized team members; and other liaison officers.
3	Uniquely Vulnerable Populations	All U.S. personnel including family members living on and off base, essential military, nonessential military, DoD civilians, DoD contractors, and U.S. government personnel/animals that require additional deliberate planning considerations. Examples include disabled and special needs people, animal needs (i.e., military working animals, horse stables, family pets, etc.), detainee populations, schools, childcare centers, campgrounds, etc. These UVPs pertain to DoD-provided locations where UVPs are situated on or near an Air Force installation, when the installation has jurisdictional responsibility.
4	Initial Recovery	Personnel (U.S. or non-U.S. citizens) designated as mission essential to perform initial recovery tasks following a major disaster/attack. Should be a minimally manned force prepared to self-sustain across care, feeding, and other functions needed to restore vital capabilities to receive follow on recovery forces.

A2.2.2. Category 2, Facilities/Resources. The community profile will contain a comprehensive, all-hazard/threat facility/resource category detailed in **Table A2.2** **(T-0)** Installations are encouraged to include UEPCs in the process as to account for unit level facilities/resources that support response and/or initial recovery to include operational mission generation. **Note:** The term “resources” in this case is broad in nature and encompasses assets that are essential to prevention, protection, response, and initial recovery to include operational missions.

Table A2.2. Facility/Resource Category Examples.

Focal Points		Description
1	MEFs	Primary assets supporting the installation's mission such as aircraft, aircraft parking ramps/shelters, space launch assets, aircrew staging areas, aircraft maintenance, munitions storage, and base operations.
2	Emergency Response	Primary and alternate facilities/locations regarding the C2 continuum such as the ECC, control centers, EOC, and installation Command Post to include HHQ C2 facilities to include alternate locations/centers.
		MWN and EPI systems, communication hubs/towers, First and Emergency Responder facilities that store/posture primary response resources/capabilities (i.e., fire stations, medical facilities, CBRNE surveillance assets, etc.).
		Unit identified facilities/resources such as essential logistical supplies, post incident/attack reconnaissance routes, etc.
3	Population Protection	Protection related items such as shelters, designated safe havens, expedient hardening bunkers and/or facilities, etc. Includes environmentally sensitive areas.
		HAZMAT storage facilities that if impacted/breached could affect personnel (and other protected assets).
4	Initial Recovery	Dispersed or in-place locations and equipment identified to resource and sustain initial response element(s) following an incident.

A2.2.3. Category 3, Infrastructure. The community profile will contain a comprehensive, all-hazards infrastructure category detailed in **Table A2.3**. **(T-0)**

Table A2.3. Infrastructure Category Examples.

Focal Points		Description
1	MEFs	Installation primary mission generation related infrastructure (e.g., runways, taxiways, etc.).
2	Emergency Response	Locations of fire hydrants, gas-lines, water-run off, etc.
3	Population Protection (Lifeline Related)	Physical locations, information, and infrastructure functions that provide the protected population with safety and security; transportation; food, water, and sheltering; health and medical; energy (electric power and fuel); communications; and HAZMAT sites/routes that could threaten the protected population.
4	Initial Recovery	Electrical power lines, sub-stations, and fixed electric generators; communication lines and towers; water distribution network; fuel distribution network; wastewater distribution network; etc.

A2.3. Related Resources. Demographic information is available from multiple existing sources. Information sources include the installation Geo-Base program, DHS Resilience and Analysis Planning Tool, census data, school information, zoning maps, public works, veterinarian services, special interest groups, exceptional family member program, and supporting local community utility providers.

A2.4. Hazard/Threat Assessment. Installations will conduct annual AHTAs to generate a comprehensive list of hazards, threats, and identify probability of occurrence IAW DoDI 6055.17. **(T-0)** The AHTA will account for results of the community profile, protected assets, to include vulnerability, consequence, needs assessments. **(T-0)**

A2.4.1. Hazards. Hazard assessments will consider all natural, technological, and human-caused hazards and the likelihood of each type of hazard impacting the jurisdiction and protected assets. **(T-0)**

A2.4.1.1. The hazard assessment will consider the type and subcategory of event/capability, description, justification, probability/likelihood of impact, and a rating score. **(T-0)** Planners should take into consideration the onset of the hazard (sudden, gradual, delayed onset), the duration of the hazard (long, medium, short), the frequency of the hazard (if historical data is available), the severity of the hazard, and amount of warning (significant, limited, no warning) before the onset of the hazard.

A2.4.1.2. For DAF installations within the U.S., including its territories, and possessions, hazards assessments will be coordinated with state and local EM agencies and will incorporate existing hazard assessment information and results where applicable to the installation within the limits of applicable classification guidelines. **(T-1)**

A2.4.1.3. For DAF installations outside the CONUS, installations will coordinate with mission partners and incorporate hazard assessment information and results where applicable to the installation within the limits of applicable classification guidelines. **(T-1)**

A2.4.2. HAZMAT. Installations will:

A2.4.2.1. Identify TICs and TIMs located on the installation and within the surrounding local community (identify the specific hazard identification number, quantity, and location). **(T-1)**

A2.4.2.2. Identify facilities and transportation modes having the potential of releasing HAZMAT (accidental or intentional) that could impact the installation or surrounding community. **(T-1)** Areas to consider are HAZMAT manufacturing and/or using facilities, refineries, railroads, highways, petroleum, oil, and lubricants tank farms, commercial and government nuclear power plants/reactors, etc.

A2.4.2.3. Coordinate with the LEPC (or host nation equivalents) to identify the type and location of HAZMAT that could affect the installation following an accidental or intentional release. **(T-1)**

A2.4.2.4. Conduct modeling and simulation to comprehend catastrophic release of TIC/TIM and/or HAZMAT and impacts on protected assets. **(T-1)**

A2.4.3. The IOEM will maintain a copy of all risk management products for a period of no less than 3 years. **(T-1)**

A2.4.4. Threats. The ATHA will account for human-caused intentional terrorism including use of WMD and adversarial nation state CBRNE attacks. **(T-0)**

A2.4.4.1. The threat assessment will consider the threat actor, type and subcategory of event/capability, description, justification, probability/likelihood, and a rating score. **(T-0)** Planners should take into consideration the onset of the threat (sudden, gradual, delayed onset), the duration of the threat hazard (long, medium, short), the severity of the threat, and amount of warning (significant, limited, no warning) before the realization of threats.

A2.4.4.2. Human-Caused Intentional Terrorism. Assessment of physical, cyber, and other criminal and terrorist threats requires resources and technical expertise resident within the law enforcement community. The installation EMWG/EP2T will coordinate with the installation TWG and/or installation ATWG for the terrorist threat assessment portion of the risk management process. **(T-1)**

A2.4.4.3. Human Caused Intentional Adversarial Nation State. Installations will refer to the CBRNE risk index and DAFI 10-2503 to identify applicable chemical, biological, radiological/nuclear hazards/threats for the installation. **(T-1)**

A2.5. Vulnerability Assessment. Vulnerability assessments will indicate the potential vulnerability of an installation, specific functions, and protected assets to identified hazards/threats. **(T-0)** Vulnerability will consider the probability that existing prevention, safeguards, mitigations, or protection capabilities will fail against a specific hazard/threat. **(T-0)**

A2.5.1. Vulnerability assessments will be conducted annually IAW DoDI 6055.17 and the installation MA program. **(T-0)**

A2.5.2. Existing AT vulnerability assessments will be used to establish vulnerability of an installation, specific function, and protected assets to terrorist threats; however, the installation must still conduct a thorough vulnerability assessment for hazards/threats not included within the AT scope (i.e., natural, technological, human-caused unintentional, and human-caused adversarial nation state CBRNE hazards/threats). **(T-1)**

A2.5.3. Vulnerability assessments will account for surrounding community assets/lifelines the installation depends on during response/recovery operations (i.e., electrical power, water, medical support facilities, housing, etc.). **(T-1)**

A2.5.4. The installation EMWG will incorporate the results of other existing vulnerability assessments, such as food and water vulnerability assessments, into the all-hazards risk management process and should provide a representative to the applicable assessment teams, if requested. **(T-1)**

A2.5.5. Installations will maintain and safeguard cumulative IRM assessment information IAW operational security information standards. **(T-1)**

A2.5.6. Installations will use vulnerability assessment information to reduce the overall vulnerability of the installation through prevention, mitigation, and protection efforts. **(T-1)**

A2.6. Consequence Assessment. The consequence assessment will identify and estimate standardized impact statements as key quantifiable consequences associated with identified major hazards/threats and associated estimates of vulnerability for protected assets as specified in **Attachment 4**. For context, a standardized impact statement represents impacts/effects such as the estimated number of personnel that require evacuation, injured that require medical care, and/or fatalities that require fatality management services. Installations will use outputs of the consequence assessment as the basis for capability target assessment and capability development. **(T-1)**

A2.7. Capability Target Assessment and Development. The capability target assessment and development will identify standardized core capability target language for crosscutting, prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery common core capabilities. **(T-1)** Reference **Attachment 4** for a complete listing of core capability targets.

A2.7.1. Standardized capability targets will describe overarching timeframe metric, critical task(s), and standardized impacts as summarized in **Figure A2.1**. **(T-1)**

A2.7.1.1. Timeframe Metric. The timeframe metric will set a goal/target to manage the impact of the hazard/threat in a desired amount of time as to create a capability target. **(T-1)**

A2.7.1.2. METs.

A2.7.1.2.1. Installations will identify potential consequences/effects that a recognized hazard may have on protected assets, the installation as a whole, or a specific function based on the current level of installation EM common core capabilities utilizing the THIRA process. **(T-1) Note:** METs will measure a capability-based performance within the capability target statements. **(T-0)** The Air Force Universal Task List on AF/A3TR SIPR website provides additional information for MET development.

A2.7.1.2.2. MAJCOMs/FLDCOMs and installations will utilize AFI 10-201 as a reference for accomplishing and reporting METs. **(T-1)**

A2.7.1.3. Impact Statement. Impact statements developed during the consequence assessment process will be incorporated into the standardized capability target statement. **(T-1)**

A2.7.2. Installations will use the standard capability target statements to inform the development and sustainment of specified common core capabilities. **(T-1)**

Figure A2.1. Example Composition of a Standardized Capability Target Statement.



A2.8. Postured Core Capability Assessments (PCCA). Installations will conduct PCCAs to determine the current level of capabilities based on materiel and non-materiel readiness of supporting functional areas and to inform risk-reduction planning efforts IAW DoDI 6055.17. **(T-0)**

A2.8.1. The PCCAs will identify core capability gaps as a measure of targeted common core capabilities and actual common core capabilities (functional specific, installation, and whole-of-community). **(T-0)**

A2.8.2. Installations will utilize EM exercises (whole-of-community and installation), PMRs, and other means to assess common core capabilities. **(T-1)**

A2.8.3. Installations will prioritize gaps to reduce the most concerning consequences of a specific hazard/threat on the installation and protected assets. The process should capitalize on the vulnerability assessment process and identify additional costs in terms of financial and human resources necessary to develop and maintain any additional capabilities recommended through this process. **(T-0)**

A2.8.4. The assessment will produce a consolidated list of resource gaps associated with response and recovery operations to include but not limited to protective gear, CBRN detection equipment, F&ES equipment, active defense/Security Forces equipment, and medical response assets IAW DoDI 6055.17. **(T-0)**

A2.8.5. Installations should consider closing identified resource/capability gaps through establishing support agreements with federal, regional, state, tribal, local, voluntary and NGOs, private industry, and/or host nation partners when possible.

A2.8.6. Assessments should include analysis regarding needs for commercial support and the availability of that commercial support to rapidly augment base organic response and recovery efforts. Ensure mass care needs are evaluated to include, behavioral health, religious support.

A2.8.7. Emphasis should be placed on development of "defense in depth" capabilities which limit reliance on a single mechanism, procedure, or mitigation action to reduce vulnerability or consequence and/or increase capability. Consider classification of support agreements for critical infrastructure and special missions.

A2.9. Criticality Assessment. Installations will conduct criticality assessments focused on sustaining installation mission effectiveness by identifying and prioritizing mission essential functions. **(T-0)** Installations will conduct a criticality assessment IAW DoDI O-2000.16, DoDI 3020.45, and JP 3-07, *Stability*, and AFMAN 31-101, Volume 1, *Integrated Defense (ID) Planning*. **(T-0)**

A2.10. Other Assessments. Installations will account for energy resilience and water systems risk and resilience assessments IAW DAFI 90-1701, *Installation Energy and Water Management*, and AFMAN 10-246, *Food and Water Protection Program*. Results of these assessments will be addressed in risk-reduction planning.

Attachment 3

INSTALLATION EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT (EM) PLANNING REQUIREMENTS

A3.1. Purpose. The IEM will use the EM planning requirements listed below, (**paragraphs 2.10**). **(T-0)** Identify installation EM deliberate planning requirements and considerations to inform content within the IEMP and posturing of select information within information systems to support prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery operations. **Note:** AFCEC/CXR will update the IEMP planning tool to account for and reflect these requirements and considerations including guidance and requirements within CPG 101 and **Attachment 4** regarding target core capability statements/DPFs.

A3.2. Capabilities-Based Planning. The installation EMWG and EP2T will execute EM capabilities-based planning at the technical direction and facilitation of the IEM to effectively develop, sustain, and employ response and recovery capabilities applicable across all identified hazards/threats of greatest concern. **(T-0)**

A3.2.1. The IEMP 10-2 must be flexible enough for use in all emergencies, including unforeseen incidents, yet detailed enough to provide courses of action for installation commanders to proceed with preplanned responses to any incident/attack. **(T-0)**

A3.2.2. Capabilities-based planning will encompass IRM activities/assessments and generate a listing of installation specific capability target statements (e.g., deliberate planning factors) for each common core capability as specified in **Attachment 3**. **(T-0)**

A3.3. Interoperability Planning. The IEM, on behalf of the EMWG will coordinate interoperability requirements of sheltering, evacuation, safe havens, NIMS resource/equipment typing, communication strategies, and other EM capabilities through interagency collaboration and coordination with local/host nation EM equivalents. **(T-0)** The IEM will coordinate EM specific interoperability requirements and procedures in writing with local civil jurisdictions (e.g., shelter agreements, evacuation plans, use of civilian RSH areas, mass care operations, etc.). **(T-0)**

A3.3.1. Interoperability planning will include both the technical exchange of information and the end-to-end operational effectiveness of that exchange of information as required for actionable mission area outcomes. **(T-0)**

A3.3.2. EM Programs should account for EM capabilities available within local civil jurisdictions to ensure an effective and efficient planning, response to, and recovery from a multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional emergency.

A3.3.3. Interoperability planning will account for CONUS DSCA and OCONUS Foreign Humanitarian Assistance IAW DoDD 3025.18 and JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*. **(T-0)**

A3.4. Operational Communications Planning. The installation EMWG and EP2T will conduct operational communications planning with the technical direction and facilitation of the IEM and direct support from the installation communications representative. Communication planning will:

A3.4.1. Establish the processes, methods, and means to communicate vertically within the DAF and DoD and horizontally across the installation and with local civil jurisdictions supporting response and recovery operations. **(T-0)**

A3.4.2. Include the identification of all voice, data, visual, and any other types of communication, to include landline, radio, cellular, wireless, and web-enabled communications, and requirements for evacuation management and mass care operations access, to include special needs issues, in addition to traditional response agencies. **(T-0)**

A3.4.3. Address communications capabilities, limitations, redundant and/or alternate systems to include the dispatch center communications (911 or local emergency number plus all means of voice and data communications), MWNS, responder communications, and Land Mobile Radio systems (if employed) as well as voice and data recording systems and processes. **(T-0)**

A3.4.4. Address means to re-establish sufficient communications infrastructure within the affected areas to support ongoing life sustaining activities, provide basic human needs, and transition to recovery. **(T-0)**

A3.4.5. Address means to re-establish critical information networks, including cybersecurity information sharing networks, to inform situational awareness, enable incident response, and support the resiliency of key systems. **(T-0)**

A3.4.6. The IEM will meet on no less than a semi-annual basis with the supporting communications representatives to address execution requirements and support of the IEMP 10-2: MWNSs, continuity plans, installation dispatch center, installation EOC, predesignated mass care locations, and other pre-identified locations (e.g., recruiting centers). **(T-0)** These issues require careful, consistent, and constant coordination with the mission owners (for continuity), facility owners, and the applicable installation EMWG representatives to ensure that capabilities exist to include training and exercising of personnel on new systems. These systems include failover, failback, and remote storage and access capabilities for designated continuity programs, as well as the installation primary and alternate EOC locations.

A3.5. Emergency Public Information (EPI) and Warning Planning. The installation EMWG and EP2T will conduct EPI and warning planning with the technical direction and facilitation of the IEM and direct support from the PAO and the installation command post. EPI planning will be conducted at all applicable organization levels. **(T-0)**

A3.5.1. EPI planning will address the policy, procedures, and responsibilities for the coordinated development and release of EPI prior to, during, and after an emergency to all target audiences, civilian partners, and the general U.S. public. **(T-0) Note:** For OCONUS installations, release of EPI will require coordination IAW host nation support agreements.

A3.5.2. EPI planning will encompass the common core capability of public information and warning as described in **Chapter 6**. **(T-0)**

A3.5.3. EPI planning will address specific populace informational needs during execution of ELD and SIP actions to include activation and continued operations regarding pre-existing specific hazard shelters (SHS), ISH, RSH, evacuation, mass care operations, and public health emergencies. **(T-0)**

A3.5.4. Include procedures for the continuous broadcast and communication to evacuees during the entire evacuation process, throughout mass care operations, and during the return of evacuees to their residences or workplaces on the installation. **(T-0)**

A3.5.5. Establish procedures for non-English-speaking personnel and the visually and hearing impaired. **(T-0)**

A3.5.6. Plans should include processes, protocols, and procedures for developing draft news releases; media lists; and contact information for local elected/appointed officials, community leaders, private sector organizations, and public service organizations. **(T-0)**

A3.5.7. In coordination with local civil jurisdictions, pre-identify a site near the installation for establishment of a JIC. **(T-0)**

A3.5.8. Public information communications should also be included in training and exercises objectives to include specific exercise evaluation criteria. **(T-0)**

A3.6. Prevention Planning. The installation Force Protection Working Group will conduct prevention planning for terrorist threats and coordinate with the EMWG, the EP2T, and the IEM. **(T-0)**

A3.6.1. Prevention planning will specify appropriate courses of action in coordination with local, state, tribal, territorial, federal, host nation, and private sector entities to prevent an imminent terrorist attack. **(T-0)**

A3.6.2. Prevention plans will address criminal, terrorism, disease, and negligent human elements to the hazards identified during the risk management process. **(T-0)**

A3.6.3. The installation EMWG will develop and promulgate an installation prevention strategy, goals, plans, and procedures in coordination with the installation ATWG, information assurance staff, the MTF commander, and the F&ES fire chief. Examples of prevention strategies should include:

A3.6.3.1. Security Related: AT program, Law Enforcement, physical security prevention activities include crime prevention, terrorism prevention, surveillance detection, counter-surveillance, and community policing. **(T-0)**

A3.6.3.2. Medical Related: MTF prevention activities such as vaccinations, immunizations, syndromic surveillance, vector control, and preventive health procedures including isolation, or quarantine as appropriate (i.e., Occupational and Environmental Health Site Assessments for OCONUS locations). **(T-0)**

A3.6.3.3. Fire Related: F&ES prevention activities such as fire investigation and fire safety education. **(T-0)**

A3.6.4. For installations at greatest risk from nation state CBRNE hazards/threats, prevention planning will address limitations regarding active defense capabilities needed to prevent/defend against adversarial nation state fires effects. **(T-0)** The Force Protection Working Group will pass/communicate the inability and/or gaps identified to prevent attacks to the EMWG and the IEM as to facilitate development of CBRN specific protection, mitigation, response, and recovery capabilities. **(T-0)**

A3.7. Mitigation Planning. The installation EMWG and EP2T will conduct mitigation planning with the technical direction of the IEM and direct support from the appropriate CES representatives (i.e., CE operations and CE environmental community planners) to include coordination with the installation ATWG and IMAO representatives. **(T-0)**

A3.7.1. Mitigation planning will establish interim and long-term actions to increase resilience and reduce the physical and structural impacts of identified hazards/threats. **(T-0)** Included will be methods to prioritize and account for installation determined community profile and protected asset requirements/focal points. **(T-0)**

A3.7.2. Mitigation plans will describe the physical, IT, and non-materiel mitigation strategies associated with hazards/threats identified during the IRM process. **(T-0)**

A3.7.3. Mitigation plans will address interim and long-term actions to reduce impacts as it pertains to lives, key resources, facilities, infrastructure, and operational missions. **(T-0)**

A3.7.4. Mitigation plans will address interim and long-term actions to reduce cascading impacts to community lifelines as indicated in **Figure A3.1**. **(T-0) Note:** Lifelines are core functions that enable the continuous operation of a community/installation and failure of these functions can have significant cascading consequences for the entire community.

A3.7.4.1. A lifeline enables the continuous operation of critical government and business functions and is essential to human health and safety or economic security—the most fundamental services in the community that, when stabilized, enable all other aspects of society to function.

A3.7.4.2. When lifelines are disrupted during an incident, decisive intervention is required to stabilize them. Consequently, accounting for lifelines in the planning process can inform representation on the planning team and the content of Emergency Operations Plans. Although developed to support response planning and operations, community lifelines are relevant across the entire preparedness cycle protecting lifelines, preventing, and mitigating potential impacts to them, and building back stronger during recovery.

Figure A3.1. Community Lifelines.

A3.7.5. Mitigation plans will consider mitigation opportunities during the recovery phase, when hazard awareness is high and funds may become available, for the redesign and/or relocation of facilities and infrastructure to include improving lifeline resiliency. **(T-0)**

A3.7.6. Information generated through mitigation planning will be incorporated in the IEMP 10-2 IAW DoDI 6055.17. **(T-0)**

A3.8. Protection and Operational Response Planning. The installation EMWG and EP2T will conduct protection and operational response planning with the technical direction and facilitation of the IEM and direct support from identified functional planning lead representative(s). **(T-0)** Protection planning will establish the processes, methods, and specific actions needed to "respond" and "protect" lives, key resources, facilities, infrastructure, and operational missions at risk from identified all-hazards/threats prior to, during, or after an incident/attack. Commanders at all levels will ensure personnel utilize the AFPAAS during protection operations. **(T-0) Note:** Lead functional representatives are primarily responsible for development of IEMP 10-2 content and installation specific TTPs.

A3.8.1. ELD. Plan for and employ ELD as an announced emergency protocol procedure to rapidly enhance security of facilities and personnel from an active shooter incident (or other emergencies dictating lockdown). **(T-0)**

A3.8.1.1. Functional Planning Leads: Security Forces, IEM, UEPC, and unit facility managers/owners.

A3.8.1.2. ELD procedures will:

A3.8.1.2.1. Use the specific term "Lockdown, Lockdown, Lockdown." Include other relevant information as directed (i.e., impacted EM protection zone). **(T-0)**

A3.8.1.2.2. Confine and restrict movement of personnel, vehicles, and aircraft during and immediately following an active shooter incident or other incident as determined by Security Forces, the IC, and/or personnel threatened. **(T-0)**

A3.8.1.2.3. Inform all personnel to remain constrained inside the nearest vehicle, structure, or building that provides a measure of protection. **(T-0)**

A3.8.2. SIP. Plan for SIP as an announced emergency protocol procedure to generate a temporary protective position for personnel within structures or vehicles immediately before or after an incident/emergency. **(T-0) Note:** Depending on the emergency situation, personnel and/or commanders may execute SIP for personnel without direction from the installation command post.

A3.8.2.1. Functional Planning Leads: IEM, UEPC, and unit facility managers/owners.

A3.8.2.2. SIP procedures will:

A3.8.2.2.1. Use the specific term "SIP" followed by the appropriate hazard/threat description such as "HAZMAT Accident." Include other relevant information as needed. **(T-0)**

A3.8.2.2.2. Serve as temporary protection for personnel at risk from one or more hazards with a sudden onset and limited to no warning time, such as tornadoes, earthquakes, HAZMAT incidents/release, adversary nation-state WMD attacks on CONUS locations, and acts of terrorism involving WMD. **(T-0)**

A3.8.2.2.3. Consists of a temporary a short-duration protective action for minutes up to no more than 4 hours. **(T-0)**

A3.8.2.2.4. SIP locations are not required to be certified, insured, or maintained for sheltering purposes; the shelter is staffed only by those personnel present at the time of the incident. **(T-0)**

A3.8.2.2.5. Consider use of information checklist with identification of SIP locations within the facility/building (by hazard), procedures for the shutdown of heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems and exhaust fans, and procedures for closing and sealing windows and doors leading to the SIP location. **(T-0)**

A3.8.2.2.6. Consider an optional SIP kit consisting of towels or other barrier materials to place firmly against the bottom edge of doors or windows to reduce air flow, a light source, a first aid kit, and information on the relevant MWN signals and messages, preferred evacuation routes, and numbers for the dispatch center, installation EOC, and personnel accountability staff. SIP kits are not resourced by the EM Program and remain the sole responsibility of the facility owning unit, business, or residence owners. **(T-0)**

A3.8.3. SHS. Plan for SHSs as an announced emergency protocol procedure to protect personnel based on local hazards/threats and availability of adequate pre-existing facilities designated as shelters capable of protecting the populace for specific hazards/threats. **(T-1)**

A3.8.4. NDS. Identify and plan for shelters capable of providing personnel protection (i.e., tornado, hurricane, etc.). **(T-1)**

A3.8.4.1. Functional Planning Leads: IEM, UEPC, and unit facility managers/owners.

A3.8.4.2. Shelter procedures will:

A3.8.4.2.1. Identify capabilities, limitations, and occupancy capacity for all shelters. **(T-1)**

A3.8.4.2.2. Be assessed every 3-years by CE (structural engineers) to determine suitability. **(T-2)**

A3.8.4.2.3. When activated, be task-organized and staffed with trained personnel from the unit owning the facility/shelter. **(T-1)**

A3.8.4.2.4. Identify shelter supplies and resources. **(T-1)** The facility owner/unit commander is responsible for funding and resourcing of shelter kits/supplies and resources.

A3.8.4.2.5. For shelters anticipated to house greater than 30 personnel for longer than 24 days following a disaster, account for mass care operations (e.g., water, food, medical supplies, etc.). **(T-1)**

A3.8.4.2.6. Consider an optional emergency kit consisting of water, nonperishable food, first aid kit, filter masks, radio, etc. Emergency kits are not resourced by the EM program and remain the sole responsibility of the facility owning unit, business, or residence owners.

A3.8.5. Civilian Shelter Coordination. Plan for use of off installation civilian shelters as a part of the overall population protection strategy. **(T-3)**

A3.8.5.1. Functional Planning Leads: IEM and UEPC.

A3.8.5.2. The IEM should coordinate with local civil jurisdictions to determine the availability of civilian shelters for: (1) members of the DAF community residing in the civil jurisdiction on the local economy and (2) members of the DAF community residing on the installation.

A3.8.5.3. The IEM should account for civilian shelter availability within the IEMP 10-2 and incorporate information into relevant EM E&T courses (i.e., Air Force EM Program Senior Leader Brief, BEPO, UEPC, etc.).

A3.8.5.4. Unit commanders are responsible for ensuring that personnel utilizing local civilian shelters understand their responsibility under personnel accountability procedures to check in and account for the location and status at predetermined intervals.

A3.8.5.5. In foreign locations OCONUS, local civilian shelters may not be available or adequate for the needs of members of the DAF community. The installation Judge Advocate General (JAG) office will assist with local authority coordination to ensure compliance with host nation support agreements.

A3.8.6. Evacuation. Evacuation management planning and operational response will be an announced emergency protocol procedure to reduce the impact of identified hazards/threats on the protected populace by removing all or some of the population at risk to a safer location. **(T-1)** Planning and operational response actions will facilitate the movement of the protected populace to safe locations during an emergency. **(T-1)** Safe locations can either be at an on-base safe haven, a safe haven at an off-installation geographically remote location, or a civilian shelter off the installation. **Note:** IAW DoDI 6055.17, DoDI 2000.16, Volume 1, DoDI 3020.52, and NFPA 1600, evacuation, rather than the procurement and employment of protective equipment, is the primary means of addressing natural, technological, and certain human-caused hazards/threats faced by the majority of the protected populace.

A3.8.6.1. Functional Planning Leads: IEM and Logistics Readiness.

A3.8.6.2. Evacuation Context and Applicability. Evacuation management is the organized, phased, and supervised withdrawal, dispersal, or removal of civilians from dangerous or potentially dangerous areas, and their reception and care in safe areas (DoDI 6055.17). Medical patients; noncombatants; clearance of personnel, animals, or material; and/or unserviceable/abandoned material (DoD dictionary).

A3.8.6.3. Evacuation Types. Installations will account for three primary types of evacuations when conducting evacuation planning. **(T-1)**

A3.8.6.3.1. Spontaneous. A spontaneous evacuation occurs when residents or citizens in the threatened areas observe an incident or receive unofficial word of an actual or perceived threat and, without receiving instructions to do so, elect to evacuate the area.

A3.8.6.3.2. Voluntary. A voluntary evacuation is a warning to persons within a designated area that a threat to life and property exists or is likely to exist in the immediate future. Individuals issued this type of warning or order are not required to evacuate; however, it would be to their advantage to do so.

A3.8.6.3.2.1. Installations will designate, in advance, mission-critical and mission-essential personnel required/requested to remain on base for emergency response and recovery. **(T-1)**

A3.8.6.3.2.2. Release of DoD civilian personnel will be IAW established manpower and personnel procedures. **(T-2)**

A3.8.6.3.3. Mandatory. A mandatory or directed evacuation is a warning to persons within the designated area that an imminent threat to life and property exists and individuals must evacuate IAW the instructions of local officials. Installations will designate, in advance, mission-critical and mission-essential personnel exempt from mandatory evacuation for emergency response and initial recovery capabilities. **(T-1)**

A3.8.6.4. Evacuation Authority. The installation commander is the primary authority for ordering evacuations within the installation's jurisdiction (mandatory and voluntary). **(T-1)** **Note:** The IC will play a primary role based on incident hazards and make recommendations for immediate evacuation and/or or SIP actions.

A3.8.6.4.1. The installation commander may independently order the evacuation of all or a designated portion of the personnel within the installation's jurisdiction without consultation with other mission commanders or command that manages the installation for the benefit of life safety. In such cases, the installation will inform HHQ as soon as the situation presents via non-secure or secure voice or data.

A3.8.6.4.2. IAW the JTR, the following additional evacuation authorities may apply:

A3.8.6.4.2.1. Foreign Locations OCONUS. The employing command or agency has authority to order the evacuation of assigned military and DoD civilian personnel.

A3.8.6.4.2.1.1. The DoS has no authority to order U.S. personnel to evacuate an installation but is responsible for advising U.S. citizens on potential or actual emergencies and assisting, when possible, with the evacuation of U.S. citizens should they choose to follow DoS advice.

A3.8.6.4.2.1.2. The SecDef, the SecAF, and CCMD retains authority to direct DoD personnel to evacuate an OCONUS (foreign) location, as required.

A3.8.6.4.2.2. Domestic Locations. The following officials are responsible for ordering an evacuation for military and DoD civilian personnel, as well as their supported family members:

A3.8.6.4.2.2.1. The SecDef or designated representative (for example, the Under SecDef for Personnel and Readiness).

A3.8.6.4.2.2.2. The SecAF, or the Secretary's designated representative.

A3.8.6.4.2.2.3. The head of a DoD component or designated representative.

A3.8.6.4.2.2.4. The commander of a U.S. installation or designated representative.

A3.8.6.4.2.2.5. The commander, director, head, chief, or supervisor of an organization or office.

A3.8.6.5. Evacuation Orders.

A3.8.6.5.1. The order to evacuate an installation may pertain to all personnel who work, reside, and/or are visiting within the jurisdiction of the identified installation(s) (i.e., military, military family members, DoD civilian employees, DoD civilian employee family members, NAF employees, contractors, and any other civilian or military personnel).

A3.8.6.5.2. An evacuation order may include or specifically exempt designated personnel depending on the nature of the emergency and current operations.

A3.8.6.5.3. If the circumstance and time permits, when the installation commander orders an evacuation, specify RSHs or designated location(s)/shelters to facilitate personnel accountability, allow effective provision of assistance for evacuees, and prevent excessive travel for per-diem reimbursement considerations.

A3.8.6.5.4. Evacuation Orders Involving a host nation.

A3.8.6.5.4.1. OCONUS within host nations, the applicability and enforcement of evacuation will be dependent upon applicable host nation agreements and the requirements of such contracts or agreements. The installation EMWG should consult with the applicable DoS and JAG representatives to resolve this issue prior to an actual event. Evacuation orders differ from noncombatant evacuation operations in the following areas:

A3.8.6.5.4.1.1. Evacuation orders may direct the movement of personnel from one or more domestic location to another domestic location.

A3.8.6.5.4.1.2. Evacuation orders may direct the movement of personnel from one location within an OCONUS geographic region to another location within the same OCONUS geographic region if the identified locations reside within the same host nation and if such movement is permitted by the applicable host nation agreements.

A3.8.6.5.4.2. OCONUS from a host nation to a Different Area. IAW JP 3-68, evacuation orders directing the movement of personnel (1) from a host nation to a U.S. state, territory, or possession, (2) from one host nation to another, or (3) from a host nation to another foreign country must be coordinated and approved by DoS through the supporting U.S. Embassy as well as the supported CCMD.

A3.8.6.6. Evacuee Collection Points. Installation commanders should consider pre-designated evacuee collection points on and/or off the installation for the staging of personnel awaiting transportation for relocation to a remote safe haven or other areas.

A3.8.6.6.1. Installations will account for UVPs (i.e., disabled and special needs personnel, animal needs such as military working animals, detainee populations, schools, childcare centers, etc.) that are not capable of moving to designated evacuee collection points. **(T-0)**

A3.8.6.6.2. Collection point planning should account for appropriate support resources (i.e., personnel, transportation, signage, lighting, services, security, personnel accountability tools, and communications).

A3.8.6.7. Evacuation Route Management. Installations will designate primary and secondary evacuation routes for mass evacuation requirements. **(T-0)**

A3.8.6.7.1. Identify available transportation networks, capabilities, and limitations of each to include the carrying capacity. **(T-0)**

A3.8.6.7.2. For land-based proposed evacuation routes, determine likelihood of traffic bottlenecks caused either by traffic congestion, natural, technological, and/or human-caused incidents/attacks that could negate the ability of the route to support evacuation (i.e., occurrence of rising flood waters/high winds).

A3.8.6.7.3. Evacuation routes should include pre-incident/attack posting of evacuation route markers and/or signs.

A3.8.6.7.4. Ensure evacuation routes can accommodate the number of evacuating personnel and that the route limits exposing evacuating personnel to additional hazards.

A3.8.6.7.5. Include methods and means to ensure the evacuation route free of contamination through predictive plume modeling.

A3.8.6.8. Evacuation Zones. Installations susceptible to mass evacuation (i.e., hurricane storm surge) should analyze traffic movements and establish evacuation zones to promote efficient evacuation. Evacuation (vulnerability) zones provide a foundation to model traffic movements from one geographic area to another.

A3.8.6.9. Evacuation Clearance Time. Installations should estimate and publish the time needed for evacuees to complete movement to safe havens and/or shelters within the IEMP.

A3.8.6.10. Evacuee Tracking and Accountability. Commanders at all levels will ensure personnel utilize the AFPAAS during evacuation operations. Facilitate personnel accountability procedures IAW DoDI 3001.02, *Personnel Accountability in Conjunction with Natural or Manmade Disasters*. **(T-0)**

A3.8.6.11. Reentry Process. Installation commanders should plan for an orderly process for authorizing reentry by evacuees into one or more installation zones (or the entire installation). The installation commander will approve reentry by evacuees at the recommendation of the RWG for large-scale incidents. **(T-1)** For smaller scale incidents, the IC will approve reentry by evacuees. **(T-1)**

A3.8.6.12. Evacuation Reimbursement. Reference 5 CFR 550.

A3.8.6.13. Additional Evacuation Planning Factors.

A3.8.6.13.1. Develop, exercise, and maintain procedures for evacuation of all assigned personnel upon standing, verbal, or written orders of the installation commander. **(T-0)**

A3.8.6.13.2. Establish procedures and identify resources for the removal of debris and disabled vehicles from evacuation routes. **(T-0)**

A3.8.6.13.3. Establish procedures and identify resources for the provision of fuel, water, and emergency supplies to evacuees along established evacuation routes, if the situation warrants such actions. **(T-0)**

A3.8.6.13.4. Establish procedures for supporting and managing medical special needs for UVPs, as determined. **(T-0)**

A3.8.6.13.5. Establish procedures for providing transportation assistance to populations without access to transportation. **(T-0)**

A3.8.6.13.6. Address evacuation procedures during increased FPCONs, including FPCON Delta. **(T-0)**

A3.8.7. MCS. Plan for MCS and continued protection regarding personnel who have been displaced from their residence or workplace (or other populations displaced to the installation) as part of declared/directed EM protective actions (e.g., SIP, SHSs, ISHs, and evacuation to ISHs and/or RSHs). **(T-0)**

A3.8.7.1. Planning Functional Lead: IEM and FSS.

A3.8.7.2. MCS procedures will:

A3.8.7.2.1. Following catastrophic incidents/attacks, account for a notional 5-day planning factor regarding points of distribution and delivery of goods, services, water, and mass feeding operations. Consider mass feeding capabilities to provide food service basis of issue for two meals per day. **(T-0)**

A3.8.7.2.2. Consider resources for registration, personnel tracking/accountability, security, health services, volunteer management support services (legal, insurance, travel, temporary housing, school registration, counseling services, etc.), CE support services, shower and/or bathroom services, laundry services, child support and/or daycare services, and waste management services. **(T-0)**

A3.8.7.2.3. Consider establishing a call center (or information hotline) for the distribution of approved information to friends and family of evacuees, casualties, and fatalities.

A3.8.7.2.4. Incorporate mass care aspects addressed in the installation AT plan, installation F&ES plan(s), or other planning documents within the IEMP 10-2 on all matters related to mass care operations. **(T-0)**

A3.8.7.2.5. Develop, exercise, and maintain procedures for mass care operations for assigned personnel upon standing, verbal, or written orders of the installation commander. **(T-0)**

A3.8.8. ISHs. Plan for and identify on-base ISH locations/facilities/shelters and requirements for an installation-determined number of personnel including short-term MCS needs. Recommend identifying multiple locations (primary and alternate) on the installation. **(T-1)**

A3.8.8.1. Functional Planning Leads: IEM, CEO, Logistics Readiness Squadron (LRS), and FSS.

A3.8.8.2. ISHs should be a predesignate facility/location that is not publicly identified for use until immediately prior to or during an actual incident. **(T-1)**

A3.8.8.3. Activated pre-incident whenever possible (e.g., hurricanes) or immediately after an incident occurs to serve as temporary protection for displaced personnel and are used only for expedient sheltering purposes. **(T-1)**

A3.8.8.4. ISHs are not required to be certified, insured, supplied, or regularly staffed. Installations will place emphasis on the need for community preparedness for ISHs on the part of the individual or family for the provision of food, water, medicine, and urgent needs for a bare minimum of 72 hours post-incident. **(T-1)**

A3.8.8.5. ISH procedures will:

A3.8.8.5.1. Consider a notional planning factor of providing temporary ISH and mass care for five days. Include provisions for personnel that are completely dependent on mass care operations for aspects such as shelter space, security, feeding, emergency supplies, and shower and sanitary facilities.

A3.8.8.5.2. Consider the ability for ISHs to operate for a short period before available transportation to other, off-base accommodations (or RSHs).

A3.8.8.5.3. Consider special instructions to include ISH capacity; limits of the safe haven area/facility; proposed layout/beddown plans; communications capabilities, and potential special needs for UVPs inclusive of pets and animals (i.e., military working dogs).

A3.8.8.5.4. Be aligned to installation zones, geo-coded for rapid fielding in the installation EOC's Geographic Information System and information management systems and staffed by task-organized safe haven management teams.

A3.8.8.5.5. Consider potential reception and short-term MCS for displaced populations from other DoD installations and/or the local community, refugees, or other sizeable, displaced populations. The IEM will incorporate other DoD installations requesting a standing MAA to use the installation for their RSH purposes into the IEMP. **Note:** In some instances, the term safe haven may apply to other governmental movement of special weapons, explosive material, and other sensitive cargo (e.g., Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center for a secure holding request). Installations should account for routine and non-routine security of non-EM populace safe haven requirements.

A3.8.9. RSHs. Plan for and identify RSHs locations/facilities/shelters and requirements for an installation-determined number of personnel needing relocation from the installation to an RSH(s). **(T-1)**

A3.8.9.1. Functional Planning Leads: IEM, CEO, LRS, and FSS.

A3.8.9.2. Installations should coordinate with one or more geographically distant DoD installations or, if necessary due to the geographic conditions, civil jurisdictions to establish MOUs/MOAs for RSH capabilities.

A3.8.9.3. IAW the JTR, a RSH is a location anywhere in the world named in an evacuation order or subsequent modification to that order to which dependents are directed to relocate on a temporary basis to await a decision by competent authority to either return to the permanent duty station or proceed to a designated place. Personnel evacuated to a RSH are entitled to certain allowances as determined by the installation comptroller/personnel center.

A3.8.9.4. RSH procedures will:

A3.8.9.4.1. Consider and account for provision of mass care to displaced personnel, to include temporary lodging facilities, mass feeding, bulk distribution of goods, evacuee tracking, and personnel accountability.

A3.8.9.4.2. Consider the need to send installation personnel and assets in advance of the evacuees to establish mass care services and ensure coordination with the receiving jurisdiction.

A3.8.10. Medical Related Planning.

A3.8.10.1. Disease Containment Plan. Medical planners will incorporate actions installations must take before, during, and after a public health emergency or incidents of public health concern to slow or stop the spread of the disease to protect personnel and mission continuation into the IEMP 10-2 and IAW DoDI 6200.03 and AFI 10-2519. **(T-0)**

A3.8.10.1.1. Functional Planning Lead: MEM and/or PHEO.

A3.8.10.1.2. Disease Containment Plan procedures will:

A3.8.10.1.2.1. Include standard HPCON to define measures taken IAW DoDI 6200.03. **(T-0)**

A3.8.10.1.2.2. Follow a six-phase approach: prepare, protect, mitigate, respond, stabilize, transition, and recover. **(T-0)**

A3.8.10.2. Residential Pandemic Sheltering (RPS). Plan for RPS as an announced protocol procedure for ROM orders during pandemic and epidemic disease outbreaks to include biological terrorism incidents involving slow or gradual onset, medium to long duration, and medium to high impact hazards (e.g., Pandemic Influenza, Plague, Smallpox, etc.) IAW DoDI 6200.03. **(T-0)**

A3.8.10.2.1. Functional Planning Lead: MEM and/or PHEO.

A3.8.10.2.2. RPS procedures will:

A3.8.10.2.2.1. Identify actions the MEM or PHEO will take to recommend ROM orders be put in effect and identify the installation commander as the approval authority. **(T-0)**

A3.8.10.2.2.2. Account for on-base RPS needs at housing locations, especially barracks, dormitories, lodging, and recreational family camps.

A3.8.10.2.2.3. Consider support and services for personnel that are movement restricted.

A3.8.10.3. Mass Prophylaxis Plan (MPP). The installation PHEO and the installation EMWG, in coordination with the supporting MTF commander, MEM, and other stakeholders, will develop and maintain a MPP IAW DoDI 6055.17, DoDD 6200.04, *Force Health Protection*, AFTTP 3-42.32, *Installation Medical All Hazards Response (IMAHR)*, and AR 40-5, *Army Public Health Program*. **(T-0)**

A3.8.10.3.1. Functional Planning Lead: Pharmaceutical Team Chief, MEM and/or PHEO.

A3.8.10.3.2. MPP procedures will:

A3.8.10.3.2.1. Establish agreements with federal, DoD, state, and local providers, including state support agreements between the installation commander and the applicable state agency for access to the strategic national stockpile. **(T-0)**

A3.8.10.3.2.2. Request resources upon a disaster declaration by the installation commander or order from HHQ. **(T-0)**

A3.8.10.3.2.3. Account for receiving, securing, allocating, and distributing such pharmaceuticals. **(T-0)**

A3.8.10.3.2.4. Sustain such capabilities over a mid-to-long period.

A3.8.10.3.3. Installations without an assigned PHEO will develop an MOA with another installation within the MAJCOM/FLDCOM, another MAJCOM/FLDCOM, or a sister service to establish an alternate PHEO consultation. **(T-1)** The consulting PHEO must be fully qualified IAW AFI 10-2519 and DODI 6200.03. **(T-0)** As needed, MOUs/MOAs (e.g., Support Agreements) with local, state, or tribal government and civilian agencies for support (i.e., diagnosis, isolation and quarantine, passenger screening, mass prophylaxis, etc.) during public health emergencies and incidents of public health concern should be developed for all installations.

A3.8.10.4. Casualty Collection Points (CCP). Plan for CCPs announced protocol procedure to enhance gathering, triage, and transport of personnel during major conflict operations. **(T-1)**

A3.8.11. Mail Facility SOP.

A3.8.11.1. Functional Planning Lead: Postmaster.

A3.8.11.2. As identified in U.S. Postal Service Publication 166, *Guide to Mail Center Security*, mail facilities on DAF installations will have an approved, written SOP that addresses prevention and mitigation activities as well as procedures that personnel must take upon encountering a suspicious envelope or package. **(T-0)**

A3.8.11.3. The SOP will address how to notify the supporting dispatch center, isolate the suspect package, secure the immediate area, isolate/shut-down heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems and exhaust vents, evacuate the mail facility or applicable building, identify, and isolate potentially exposed personnel, and support detection and decontamination efforts. **(T-0)**

A3.8.11.4. If mail facility personnel are issued personal protective equipment, to include respiratory protection, for occupational use, then identified personnel will be (1) enrolled in the RPP through the Bioenvironmental Engineering office, (2) be trained and certified in HAZMAT awareness and operations IAW 29 CFR 1910.120Q, (3) equipped with no greater than Level C PPE with an air purifying respirator, (4) exercised and evaluated annually for proficiency in assigned tasks, and (5) resourced and sustained by the mail facility owner. **(T-0)**

A3.8.12. HAZMAT Incident. Plan for HAZMAT response and comply with CFR 1910.120 and the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act.

A3.8.12.1. Functional Planning Leads: IEM, CEN, and LRS (e.g., HAZMAT Pharmacy).

A3.8.12.2. HAZMAT procedures will:

A3.8.12.2.1. Incorporate AHTA determined HAZMAT locations, quantities, and other information. **(T-0)**

A3.8.12.2.2. Account for specific contingency plans and implementing instructions for the plan if HAZMAT sites/areas fall into one or more of the following categories:

A3.8.12.2.2.1. Possess threshold planning quantities of hazardous chemicals. **(T-1)**

A3.8.12.2.2.2. Possess hazardous chemicals that are part of the installation cumulative total which exceeds the threshold planning quantities. **(T-1)**

A3.8.12.2.2.3. Include sites with significant historical releases; or sites with the potential for "major" oil releases. **(T-1)**

A3.8.12.2.2.4. Include bulk HAZMAT loading and unloading sites. **(T-1)**

A3.8.12.2.2.5. Include hazardous waste 90- or 180-day accumulation sites. **(T-1)**

A3.8.12.2.2.6. Include storage sites containing liquid polychlorinated biphenyls awaiting disposal. **(T-1)**

A3.8.12.2.2.7. Include sites where local containment options or response equipment exist on site. **(T-1)**

A3.8.12.2.2.8. Include sites deemed by the HAZMAT emergency planning team to have significant release potential and/or the potential for serious health, mission impairment, or environmental impacts. **(T-1)**

A3.8.12.3. Account for the CE environmental officer as OPR for HAZMAT cleanup and site restoration operations in CBRN hazard environments. **(T-1)** Incident site control will not be transferred to cleanup and restoration operations until adequate capability is in place for safe and healthy operations provide site specific information to increase the efficiency of release response actions.

A3.8.13. U.S. Nuclear Weapons Incident.

A3.8.13.1. Functional Planning Lead: RTF manager (MAJCOM), IRF manager (Installation), or the IEM.

A3.8.13.2. Reference DoDD 3150.08, DoDI 3150.10, and DoDM 3150.08 for planning considerations.

A3.8.14. DRECOs. Plan for DRECOs as an announced protocol procedure with task-organized forces capable of executing options to increase survivability of personnel and key resources/mission assets (i.e., aircraft) regarding natural, technological, and human-caused incidents/attacks. **(T-1) Note:** DRECOs differ from evacuation in that DRECOs focus on continued mission generation and survivability of the fighting/military force while evacuation pertains to the totality of the installation population (e.g., non-combatants).

A3.8.14.1. Functional Planning Lead: IEM, EOD, and Intelligence Officer.

A3.8.14.2. Provide DRECOs for installation commanders based on anticipated singular all-hazard/threat effects to include sustained all-hazard/threat effects over time. **(T-1) Note:** Dispersal areas/sites can be either on the installation or relatively near the installation. Relocation areas are typically other installations within a theater of operation with a demand for forces.

A3.8.14.3. Implementation of DRECOs will consider operational mission output demands prior to, during, or after an incident/attack. **(T-1)**

A3.8.14.4. Installations will plan for and utilize standardized DRECO terminology to facilitate DAF wide EM Program ability to OT&E and exercise forces to increase force survivability and mission continuation through the following concepts. **(T-1)**

A3.8.14.4.1. Disperse then Return. Employ prior to a disaster/attack when there is ample warning/intelligence, permissive air/ground maneuver environment, and operational mission generation requirements are a lesser priority. Most personnel and unit identified key assets disperse to near-by pre-designated on or off installation sites and are prepared to immediately return and commence response/recovery actions to include operational mission generation as directed. Identify "ride-out teams" for mission essential personnel/functions needed for situational assessment.

A3.8.14.4.2. Stand and Sustain. Employ prior to, during, and after a disaster/attack when operational mission generation demands outweigh the anticipated effects of the incident/attack on personnel and key resources/assets. When a mostly non-permissive ground maneuver environment exists, dispersal of personnel and key resources will be limited to within the installation boundaries. Applicability of stand and sustain DRECO is limited for mass CBRNE attacks.

A3.8.14.4.3. Avoid and Endure. The applicability of avoid and endure DRECO is primarily applicable for adversarial nation CBRNE attacks. Employ prior to, during, and after a disaster/attack when operational mission generation demands outweigh the anticipated effects of the incident/attack on personnel and key resources/assets. Essential and non-essential personnel will continually maneuver between on and off the installation to geographically separated dispersal sites.

A3.8.14.4.3.1. Plan to address significant logistical and security issues involved with moving or prepositioning people, equipment, and consumables to support dispersal site operations and security. **(T-1)**

A3.8.14.4.3.2. Include CCA methods and procedures to ingress/egress potentially CBRN contaminated personnel/vehicles. **(T-1)**

A3.8.14.4.3.3. When possible, locate dispersal sites roughly six miles upwind of the installation to protect personnel from CBRNE hazards.

A3.8.14.4.4. Advance and Relocate. Employ following an attack(s) that reduce the installation's mission generation capability to unacceptable levels and the ability to recover installation operational capability is not achievable. Plan for base denial to deny adversary use of remaining assets/equipment. Identify transportation means, routes, and RSHs for staging of personnel and ultimate re-insertion at other installations for continued operations. The applicability of advance and relocate DRECO is primarily applicable for mass CBRNE attacks.

A3.8.14.5. Installations will specify and prioritize DRECO use inducing factors for adversarial nation state enemy mass fires effects. **(T-1)**

A3.8.14.5.1. Identify, model, and develop an assumed sum of a singular enemy attack (w/ a solitary munition or numerous munitions over a relatively short period) and the likely level effects of damage, destruction, death, and/or potentially CBRN contamination plus a level of operational capability decrease.

A3.8.14.5.2. Identify, model, and develop an assumed sum of enemy sustained attacks over time and the likely cumulative effects of damage, destruction, death, and/or potentially CBRN contamination plus decrease in the level of operational capability.

A3.8.14.6. The IEM will ensure the EMWG is aware of anticipated enemy fires effects and related considerations to assist decision makers in advance for determining what DRECO to implement when. **(T-1)**

A3.8.14.7. The installation commander is the decision authority to implement DRECOs. **(T-1)**

A3.9. Recovery Planning. The installation EMWG and EP2T will conduct recovery planning with the technical direction and facilitation of the IEM and direct support from the appropriate CES/CEO representatives. **(T-0)**

A3.9.1. The recovery strategy will provide the overarching guidance and priorities based on anticipated hazards/threats to include how recovery operations will be managed and the supporting capabilities needed for recovery operations. **(T-0)**

A3.9.2. Installations will plan for the formation of a RWG for post-incident actions. **(T-0)**

A3.9.3. While the IEMP 10-2 facilitates response and short-term recovery, the installation recovery plan will be developed following a major disaster/attack and provide the detailed, incident-specific process and procedures for successful long-term recovery. **(T-1)**

A3.9.4. Engineer led response and recovery planning and operations will be conducted IAW AFPAM 10-219, Volume 1, *Contingency and Disaster Planning*, AFPAM 10-219, Volume 2, *Civil Engineer Response and Recovery Preparations*, and AFPAM 10-219, Volume 3, *Civil Engineer Contingency Response and Recovery Procedures*.

A3.10. Emergency Management (EM) Planning Information Propagation for Response and Recovery. Installations will identify and preposition static and geospatial locality information related to physical protection layers such as shelters, evacuation routes, safe havens, and dispersal sites/areas as described in **Chapter 8**.

Attachment 4

INSTALLATION COMMON CORE CAPABILITY TARGET STANDARDS

A4.1. Purpose. Identify and consolidate installation standardized core capability targets (aka DPFs) to support EM planning, installation capability development, resourcing, MAAs need determinations, exercise evaluation requirements, and overarching ability to posture EM related capabilities across the DAF.

A4.2. Context. Core capability targets serve to inform internal functional areas and external mission partners regarding capability, capacity, and limitations as to enable others to account for cascading planning/resourcing requirements. For instance, if an installation only has the capacity to shelter 500 personnel following a disaster, then community mass care planners are triggered to make agreements/plans for additional capacity.

A4.3. Application. Installations, though the EMWG and EP2T, will tailor italicized/underlined core capability impact statements to include quantifying the statement (e.g., [#] [time]) in the subsequent tables in this attachment. Use of a range of quantification is encouraged as to communicate not only capability, but also capacity (e.g., provide sheltering for 500 to 750 displaced personnel). Installations will retain the DAF EM determined timeframe and critical task portions of core capability statements. **Note:** Core capability targets do not constitute a requirement for any functional area to procure, acquire, stock, or otherwise advance the functional area core capability, the targets represent what a unit can provide.

A4.4. Crosscutting Capability Targets. Crosscutting capability targets identified in **Table A4.1** are necessary to the success of the other 29 common core capabilities. IRM targets risk information propagation in support of all core capabilities. Planning supports the EMWG to identify approaches to deliver each targeted core capability. EM ET&E are tailored to local hazards/threats and exercises serve to identify core capability gaps for EMWG actions to manage risk. Public information and warning provide clear, actionable, and accessible information to the protected populace before, during, and after incidents. Operational coordination, through NIMS and ICS constructs, ensures multi-jurisdictional mission partner actions are organized and effective.

Table A4.1. Crosscutting Capability Target Statements and Deliberate Planning Factors (DPF).

Capability	Target Statements and Deliberate Planning Factors (DPF)
IRM	Annually identify and account for installation personnel relative to community profile process and protection core capabilities for *(#) total of protected populace*, *(#) mission essential personnel*, *(#) first and emergency responders*, *(#) UVPs,* and *(#) initial recovery personnel*. **OPR: EMWG, EP2T** Annually conduct an AHTA (or after identifying emergent hazards/threats of great concern), model the *impacts of (#) threat and hazard scenarios*, and incorporate results into EM planning, EM E&T, EM exercises, public information, and operational coordination core capability efforts. **OPR: IOEM, EMWG, EP2T** Annually review relevant hazards/threats, vulnerabilities, and strategies relevant to *(#) critical infrastructure assets and (#) prioritized facilities*. **OPR: SF, IOEM, EMWG**
EM Planning	Annually, review and/or update the IEMP and responsibilities of *(#) partner organizations* involved in incident management across *(#) jurisdictions potentially affected*, and the sequence and scope of tasks needed to prevent, protect, prepare for, mitigate, respond to, and recover from incidents. **OPR: IOEM, EMWG**
EM E&T	Provide EM related KSAs for *(#) installation personnel* through *(#) of EM E&T courses*. **OPR: IOEM** Monitor and track EM E&T course completion status regarding EM Program E&T audiences and maintain installation wide compliance for EM E&T course completion at no less than *(#) percent*. **OPR: IOEM** Annually update and tailor EM E&T course content/objectives to reflect local hazards/threats, incorporate IRM results, and convey planned protection actions to the protected populace (e.g., specific hazard shelter availably/locality, dispersal sites, safe haven locations, etc.). **OPR: IOEM**
EM Exercises	Conduct required EM exercises at the required frequency. **OPR: IOEM, IG, EMWG** Annually review EM exercise evaluation results, identify common core capability gaps, and communicate gaps to senior leaders/the EMWG for risk management decisions (e.g., update MOUs/MOAs, update the IEMP, program for resources, adjust E&T, etc.). **OPR: IOEM, IG, EMWG**
Public Information and Warning	Within 2 minutes after notice of an incident, deliver reliable and actionable information to *(#) people/protected populace.* **OPR: Command Post, PA** Within 10 minutes after initiation, reach a target audience of 90 percent or more of the protected population with specific protective action recommendations. **OPR: Command Post, PA**
Operational Command and Coordination	Within *(#) (time)* of a potential or actual incident, establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process across *(#) jurisdictions affected* and with *(#) partner organizations* involved in incident management. Maintain for *(#) (time)*. **OPR: IC (F&ES, SFS)**

A4.5. 'Prevent' Capability Targets. The following capability targets in **Table A4.2** will sense hazards/threats and flow information into subsequent mission areas for action. **(T-0)**

Table A4.2. 'Prevent' Capability Target Statements and Deliberate Planning Factors (DPF).

Capability	Target Statements and Deliberate Planning Factors (DPF)
Intelligence and Information Sharing	During steady state, and in conjunction with applicable fusion centers and/or Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), *every (#) (time)*, review ability to effectively execute the intelligence cycle, including the planning, direction, collection, exploitation, processing, analysis, production, dissemination, evaluation, and feedback of available information, and identify the *(#) personnel* assigned to support execution of the intelligence cycle. **OPR: Intel, OSI** Then, *within (#) (time)* of the identification or notification of a credible threat, identify/analyze local context of the threat for the respective area of responsibility, and facilitate the sharing of threat information with (#) priority intelligence stakeholder agencies/entities IAW the intelligence cycle, and all dissemination protocols. **OPR: Intel, OSI**
Interdiction and Disruption	*Within (#) (time)* of the identification or notification of a credible threat, conduct outreach to the fusion center and JTTF in the community and identify *(#) personnel* assigned to support follow up interdiction and disruption activities that may be undertaken against identified suspects and/or contraband. **OPR: OSI**
Screening, Search, and Detection	*Within (#) (time)* of notice of a credible threat, conduct screening, search, and detection operations for *(#) people* requiring screening. **OPR: OSI, SFS**
Forensics and Attribution	*Within (#) (time)* of a suspected terrorist attack, conduct outreach to the fusion center and JTTF in the community and identify *(#) personnel* assigned to support follow up information sharing, intelligence analysis, and/or investigative actions associated with the collection, examination, and analysis of evidence, as well as the identification of perpetrators. **OPR: OSI**

A4.6. 'Protection' Capability Targets. The DAF applies many additive PPMs to account for DAF unique requirements as specified in **Table A4.3**.

Table A4.3. 'Protection' Capability Target Statements and Deliberate Planning Factors (DPF).

Capability	Target Statements and Deliberate Planning Factors
Cybersecurity	*Every (#) (time)*, review and update cyber incident plans/annexes based on evolving threats covering *(#) publicly managed and/or regulated critical infrastructure facilities*. **OPR: CS**
PPM: Critical Infrastructure Security Plans	*Within (#) (time)* of completing a risk and vulnerability assessment, review and update physical security plans covering *(#) publicly managed and/or regulated critical infrastructure and facilities* to incorporate new information from the assessment. **OPR: AT, SFS, IOEM**
PPM: ELD	*Within # (time)*, all protection level assets are locked down. *Within # (time)*, all occupied facilities are locked down. *Within # (time)* of lockdown accomplished, facility occupants report status to control center (if active) or unit leadership **OPR: SFS**
PPM: SIP	*Within # (time)* of notification to SIP, complete pre-identified actions (where established) to enhance protection for all occupants. *Within # (time)* of executing SIP action, facility occupants report status to control center (if active) or unit leadership. **OPR: IOEM**
PPM: NDSs	Provide suitable personnel shelter space and supplies for *(#) of installation personnel* through use of *(#) of pre-identified installation shelter facilities*. **OPR: FSS** Coordinate suitable personnel shelter space for *(#) of installation personnel* through use of *(#) pre-identified local civilian shelter facilities*. **OPR: FSS** *Within # (time)* of pending hazard, activate installation shelters and confirm number spaces available. *Within # (time)*, complete shelter stocking operations. *Within # (time)* of projected hazard arrival, gain and maintain 100 percent accountability of all active shelters. Report accountability and resourcing levels on a recurring basis not to exceed every *(#) (time)*. **OPR: FSS**
PPM: Evacuation	For slow moving hazards, within *(#) (time)* prior to hazard arrival, implement phased evacuation of *(#) people*. **OPR: FSS**
PPM: ISHs	Provide safe haven, account for, and track *(#) displaced installation personnel* or *(#) near-by DoD installation displaced personnel, refugees, or other displaced populations*. **OPR: FSS**
PPM: RSHs	Identify and track status *(#) installation personnel* displaced to a RSH. **OPR: FSS**
PPM: Public Health Emergencies	Directly upon declaration of a public health emergency by the commander, report the declaration to MAJCOM/SG, AF/SAM, and appropriate state and local public health agencies IAW AFI 10-2519.
PPM: Casualty Collection	Within *(#) (time)* of notification of an incident involving casualties, first responders establish a CCP situated in the hot zone or at its boundaries to immediately manage, rescue, triage, and/or evacuate casualties IAW DAFI 36-3002, *Casualty Services*. **OPR: F&ES, MTF**

Capability	Target Statements and Deliberate Planning Factors
PPM: HAZMAT Incident	Within *(#) (time)* of notification of a significant HAZMAT release impacting the installation and/or local community jurisdiction(s), initiate appropriate protection measures, isolate the hazard area, and deny entry. **OPR: F&ES, IOEM, BE**
PPM: Nuclear Accident/Incident	Within *(#) (time)* of notification, deploy an IRF to secure the scene, establish security, establish C2 and contact with HHQ extinguish fires, rescue, stabilize, and evacuate casualties, establish a National Defense Area (if required), and begin Public Affairs procedures. **OPR: IOEM, IRF, RTF**
PPM: Mail Facilities	Within *(#) (time)* after notification of a suspicious package, isolate the mail facility and sequester all current occupants for medical screening. Within *(#) (time)* conduct hasty decontamination of facility occupants (as required). Within *(#) (time)* responds to the incident using an all-hazards approach. **OPR: Postmaster**
PPM: Expedient Hardening	Within *(#) (time)* after notification of an imminent hazard/threat, implement the installation barrier plan. **OPR: CES** Within *(#) (time)* after notification of an imminent hazard/threat, complete expedient hardening actions for prioritized facilities, resources, and infrastructure. **OPR: CES** Within *(#) (time)* after notification of an imminent hazard/threat, complete expedient hardening regarding installation lifelines. **OPR: CES**
PPM: DRECOs	Within *(#) (time)* of the order to execute DRECOs, maneuver and disperse *(#) personnel* and critical mission assets to pre-identified or adaptively identified location(s). **OPR: CES** Within *(#) (time)* of the order to execute DRECOs, phase return *(#) personnel* needed to initiate response and initial recovery of primary mission generation capability to include mission generation personnel and assets. **OPR: CES**
Supply Chain Integrity and Security	Every *(#) (time)*, engage *(#) partner organizations* involved in incident management to promote awareness of threats, dependencies, vulnerabilities, and strategies to support restoration of private sector supply chains. **OPR: LRS, FSS, CES, SFS, Medical**

A4.7. 'Mitigation' Capability Targets. The mitigation target capability statement in **Table A4.4** pertains to long term vulnerability reduction.

Table A4.4. 'Mitigation' Capability Target Statements and Deliberate Planning Factors (DPF).

Capability	Target Statements and Deliberate Planning Factors
Long-Term Vulnerability Reduction	Every *(#) (time)*, review building codes, and, if necessary, enact or update risk-appropriate, disaster resilient building codes. **OPR: CES** Every *(#) (time)*, assess and coordinate with *(#) jurisdictions* to increase resiliency of community lifelines regarding Safety and Security; Food, Water, Shelter; Health and Medical; Energy (Power and Fuel); Communications; Transportation; and HAZMAT. **OPR: LRS, FSS, CES, SFS, Medical**

A4.8. 'Response' Capability Targets. Response mission area target statements identified in **Table A4.5** will encompass capabilities installations require to save lives, protect property and the environment, meet basic human needs immediately after an incident, and continue mission operations. **(T-0)**

A4.8.1. Critical transportation operations include clearing debris from roads, airports, ports, and other transportation nodes to allow survivors to evacuate and response personnel to enter an affected area. After an incident, personnel deliver traditional and atypical mass search and rescue operations to save the greatest number of endangered lives in the shortest time possible. During mass fatality incidents, fatality management services provide remains recovery, victim identification, and bereavement counseling. On-scene security, protection, and law enforcement, occupational and environmental response/health and safety, and fire management and suppression efforts all work to protect responders, survivors, and the environment. Throughout the response, officials use Operational Communications and Situational Assessment to share information and make informed decisions.

A4.8.2. After an incident, public, private, and non-profit organizations provide MCS and public health, healthcare, and emergency medical services to address the basic needs of survivors. Logistics and supply chain management ensure that essential commodities, equipment, and services reach affected communities and assist owners and operators of infrastructure systems in restoring systems and services for the community while transitioning to the recovery phase. A number of these infrastructure systems are referred to as community lifelines. Lifelines provide indispensable services that enable continuous operation of critical functions and would risk human health and safety or national economic security if compromised or not promptly restored. The four infrastructure systems targets focus on major lifelines, such as electrical power, communications, water service, and wastewater service.

Table A4.5. 'Response' Capability Target Statements and Deliberate Planning Factors (DPF).

Capability	Target Statements and Deliberate Planning Factors
Infrastructure Systems	Within *(#) (time)* of an incident, restore minimal installation primary mission generation related infrastructure (e.g., runways, taxiways, control tower, etc.). **OPR: CES** Within *(#) (time)*, prioritize and stabilize infrastructure systems and facilities that provide community lifelines (safety and security; food, water, shelter; health and medical; energy (power and fuel); communications; transportation; and HAZMAT). **OPR: LRS, FSS, CES, SFS, Medical**
Situational Assessment	Within *(#) (time)* of incident, and on a *(#) (time)* cycle, thereafter, provide notification to leadership and *(#) partner organizations* involved in incident management of the current and projected situation. Maintain for *(#) (time)*. **OPR: F&ES, SFS** Within *(#) (time)* of incident, identify (#) dead, (#) injured, (#) missing; damage to (#) facilities, key resources, and infrastructure. **OPR: F&ES, FSS, SFS, CES**
Operational Communications	Within *(#) (time)* of an incident, establish interoperable communications across *(#) jurisdictions* affected and with *(#) partner organizations* involved in incident management. Maintain for *(#) (time)*. **OPR: CS**
On-scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement	Within *(#) (time)* of an incident, provide security and law enforcement services to protect emergency responders and *(#) people* impacted. **OPR: SFS**
Fire Management and Suppression	Within *(#) (time)* of an aircraft mishap/accident, conduct aircrew rescue operations and suppress and extinguish *(#) fires*. **OPR: F&ES** Within *(#) (time)* of an incident, conduct firefighting operations to suppress and extinguish *(#) structure fires*. **OPR: F&ES**
Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	Within *(#) (time)* of an incident, complete triage, begin definitive medical treatment, and transfer to an appropriate facility *(#) people* requiring medical care. **OPR: PHEO, MEM, Medical**
Occupational and Environmental Response/Health Safety	Within *(#) (time)* of an incident, assess, contain, and begin cleaning up HAZMAT releases from *(#) HAZMAT release sites*. **OPR: CES, LRS, Safety** Within *(#) (time)* of a hazmat incident, complete decontamination procedures for *(#) exposed* individuals (hazmat-related incidents). **OPR: F&ES** Within *(#) (time)*, identify, mark, and isolate *(#)* unexploded ordnances. Within *(#) (time)*, render safe *(#)* unexploded ordnances. **OPR: EOD**

Evacuation and Critical Transportation	Within *(#) (time)* notice of an incident, complete the evacuation of *(#) people* requiring evacuation, including *(#) people* with access and functional needs (requiring evacuation). **OPR: FSS, LRS** Within *(#) (time)* of an incident, clear *(#) miles of road* affected, to enable access for public, private, and non-profit emergency responders. **OPR: CES**
MCS	Within *(#) (time)* of an incident, provide emergency sheltering, food, and water for *(#) people* requiring shelter and *(#) people* requiring food and water, including *(#) people* with access and functional needs (requiring accessible shelter) and *(#) people* with access and functional needs (requiring food and water), and *(#) animals* requiring shelter, food, and water. Maintain for *(#) (time)*. **OPR: FSS** Within *(#) (time) of an incident*, move *(#) people* requiring temporary, non-congregate housing, including *(#) people* with access and functional needs (requiring accessible, temporary, non-congregate housing), from congregate care to temporary housing. **OPR: FSS, CES**
Mass Search and Rescue Operations	Within *(#) (time)* of an incident, conduct search and rescue operations for *(#) people* requiring rescue. **OPR: F&ES, CES**
Fatality Management Services	Within *(#) (time)* of an incident, complete the recovery, identification, and mortuary services, including temporary storage services, for *(#) fatalities*. **OPR: FSS**
Logistics and Supply Chain Management	Within *(#) (time)* of an incident, identify and mobilize life-sustaining commodities, resources, and services to *(#) people* requiring shelter and *(#) people* requiring food and water. Maintain distribution system for *(#) (time)*. **OPR: LRS**

A4.9. Recovery Capability Targets. The recovery mission area has six common core capabilities that work together to repair and restore infrastructure and services needed to support the physical, emotional, and financial well-being of survivors and disaster areas identified in **Table A4.6**. The repair and restoration of infrastructure systems reestablishes essential community services and minimizes health and safety threats. In turn, re-establishing health and social services allows for the restoration of healthcare facilities and networks to promote the resilience, independence, health (including behavioral health), and well-being of the whole community. Implementing temporary and permanent housing solutions for displaced residents moves survivors out of emergency shelters and transitions them into long-term recovery. Experts work with the community to preserve, conserve, rehabilitate, and restore natural and cultural resources. In the long-term, communities lead economic recovery programs to return economic and business activities, including food and agriculture, to a healthy state.

Table A4.6. 'Recover' Capability Target Statements and Deliberate Planning Factors (DPF).

Capability	Target Statements and Deliberate Planning Factors
Situational Assessment	Within *(#) (time)* of incident, and on a *(#) (time)* cycle, thereafter, provide notification to leadership and *(#) partner organizations* involved in incident management of the current and projected situation. Maintain for *(#) (time)*. **OPR: Command Post** Within *(#) (time)* of incident, identify (#) dead, (#) injured, (#) missing; damage to (#) facilities, key resources, and infrastructure. **OPR: F&ES, FSS**
Infrastructure Systems	Within *(#) (time)* of an incident, restore and improve installation primary mission generation related infrastructure (e.g., runways, taxiways, control tower, etc.). **OPR: CES** Within *(#) (time)* of an incident, restore service to *(#) customers* without communication service. **OPR: CS** Within *(#) (time)* of an incident, restore service to *(#) customers* without power service. **OPR: CES** Within *(#) (time)* of an incident, restore service to *(#) customers* without fuel service. **OPR: LRS** Within *(#) (time)* of an incident, restore service to *(#) customers* without water service. **OPR: CES** Within *(#) (time)* of an incident, restore service to *(#) customers* without wastewater service. **OPR: CES** **Note:** Targets are related to initial recovery.
Financial Recovery Planning	Consolidate all reimbursable expenditures related to multi-jurisdictional response and recovery support to civil authorities. **OPR: CPTS** Conduct financial planning and account for prioritization of initial recovery costs to restore mission capability, lifelines to include damage, emergency protective measures, debris management, timely tracking and reporting of costs and long-term disaster recovery funding streams. **OPR: CPTS**
Health and Social Services	Within *(#) (time)* of an incident, restore functions at *(#) affected healthcare facilities* and social service organizations. **OPR: Medical** Within *(#) (time)* of an incident, provide religious support to *(#) affected personnel.* **OPR: HC**
Housing	Within *(#) (time)* of an incident, *(#) people* requiring long-term housing, including *(#) people* with access and functional needs (requiring accessible long-term housing), find and secure long-term housing. **OPR: CES**
Natural and Cultural Resources	Within *(#) (time)* of an incident, restore *(#) damaged natural and cultural resources and historic properties* registered in the jurisdiction. **OPR: CES**

Attachment 5

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT (EM) TRAINING AND EDUCATION (T&E) SPECIFICATIONS

A5.1. Purpose. This attachment identifies required DAF EM E&T course details for audiences, highlights recommended DHS EM E&T courses, and correlates DAF EM Program audiences to mission areas and common core capabilities to assist personnel in seeking out optional DHS EM E&T courses.

A5.2. Department of the Air Force (DAF) Emergency Management (EM) Education and Training (E&T) Course Descriptions and Requirements.

A5.2.1. BEPO. IEMs will provide localized emergency preparedness information to all newly assigned personnel, including civilians, contractors, and dependents during newcomer's orientation. **(T-1)** This information ensures personnel and family members comprehend the types of actions to consider before, during, and after a disaster. IEMs will provide recurring emergency preparedness information as part of the installation's "Be Ready" awareness campaign. **(T-1)**

A5.2.2. Air Force EM Program Senior Leader Brief. This instructor-led brief educates and equips installation senior leaders (installation, group, and squadron commanders) with the guidance and tools necessary to effectively implement the installation's EM Program at their level. This includes how the Air Force EM Program is organized and implemented on the installation as well as local polices, structure, and responsibilities IAW MAJCOM/FLDCOM and local EM Program directives such as the IEMP and other plans or requirements.

A5.2.2.1. There are no prerequisites identified for this course; however, familiarization with the Air Force EM Program; Senior Leader Guide is highly recommended prior to brief.

A5.2.2.2. Installation commanders/unit commanders must complete this briefing within 60 days (or six regularly scheduled drills for ARC members) of arrival. **(T-1)** Chief Master Sergeants, Senior Enlisted Leaders, and First Sergeants are highly encouraged to attend.

A5.2.2.3. This brief is only required upon initial arrival to an installation.

A5.2.2.3.1. Recurring education is not required while assigned to the same installation unless the senior leader's roles and responsibilities change, or major program changes occur.

A5.2.2.3.2. Only provide a new briefing as needed based on senior leader transition.

A5.2.3. Air Force EM Program. This on-line course consists of individual knowledge-based objectives that provide students the ability to identify the program's purpose, policies, and structure along with the NIMS.

A5.2.3.1. This course serves as the foundation for follow-on specialized area training. There are no prerequisites or instructor-led components identified for this course.

A5.2.3.2. Individuals assigned to the installation's DRF or other supporting positions within the installation's EM Program will complete this course. **(T-3)**

A5.2.3.3. This course is a one-time requirement upon initial position assignment and no recurring training is required unless major program changes occur. **(T-3)**

A5.2.3.4. This course meets the requirements of FEMA's independent study (IS) courses, IS-100 and IS-700, while ensuring military unique C2 requirements remain sound to execute critical mission operations.

A5.2.4. UEPC (when developed). This two-part course consists of individual knowledge-based and localized objectives that provide students the knowledge and skills necessary to manage their unit EM Program. It emphasizes the UEPC roles and responsibilities, unit E&T to include the installation's "Be Ready" awareness campaign, equipment requirements, planning responsibilities, and emergency response at the unit level.

A5.2.4.1. Prerequisite. Air Force EM Program Course.

A5.2.4.2. UEPCs must complete this course within 60 days (or four regularly scheduled drills for ARC members) of initial assignment as a primary or alternate UEPC. **(T-3)**

A5.2.4.3. The online course is a one-time requirement upon initial position assignment.

A5.2.4.4. The instructor-led component is required only upon appointment as a UEPC at each new installation.

A5.2.4.5. Accomplish recurring training by attending at least one annual UEPC meeting held by the IOEM. This meeting is in addition to established program review requirements. Document and maintain attendance using localized procedures.

A5.2.5. Air Force Emergency Response Operations First and Emergency Responders. This online course consists of individual knowledge-based objectives that provide students the ability to identify the purpose, policies, structure, roles, responsibilities, and procedures for conducting Air Force emergency response operations.

A5.2.5.1. Prerequisite. Air Force EM Program Course.

A5.2.5.2. Air Force first responders and emergency responders must complete this course within 60 days (or four regularly scheduled drills for ARC members) of initial assignment as an IC, or by those individuals fulfilling the role of a first or emergency responder. **(T-3)**

A5.2.5.3. The online course is a one-time requirement upon initial position assignment.

A5.2.5.4. Accomplish recurring training through performing first or emergency response duties during an exercise or actual emergency response annually. Documenting participation is accomplished and maintained using localized procedures.

A5.2.5.5. The unit in which Air Force first responders and emergency responders are assigned will provide additional localized and performance-based training as part of unit or functional area training and qualifying. **(T-3)**

A5.2.5.6. All Air Force first responders and emergency responders must accomplish and maintain HAZMAT training IAW 29 CFR 1910.120(q), *Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response*. **(T-0)** Air Force first responders and emergency responders should train to the appropriate level based on the duties and functions as outlined in their CFETP. **(T-1)** Contact the installation's F&ES flight for HAZMAT training information.

A5.2.5.7. This course meets the requirements of FEMA's IS courses IS-200 and IS-800 while ensuring military-unique C2 requirements remain sound to execute critical mission operations.

A5.2.6. ICS 300 and 400. This instructor-led course consists of individual knowledge-based and performance-based objectives to provide students the knowledge and skills necessary to assume supervisory roles in expanding incidents where multiple functions and agency resources are needed to ensure life safety, incident stabilization, and property preservation (ICS 300) and perform in a management capacity within a MACS (ICS 400). This course is required for personnel IAW the functional CFETP.

A5.2.6.1. Prerequisites. The Air Force EM Program Course and the Air Force Emergency Response Operations: First and Emergency Responders Course.

A5.2.6.2. ICS 300/400 courses are available in the following three options:

A5.2.6.2.1. An in-residence Air Force formal training course (X3AZR3EXXX 0N1A for enlisted/civilians or X8OZR32XX 0N2A for Officers) conducted at the DoD Fire Academy. Personnel will work through the AFIMSC to obtain a course slot. ANG personnel will request course slots through NGB/A4X. **(T-2)**

A5.2.6.2.2. An installation course taught by qualified ICS 300/400 instructors.

A5.2.6.2.3. A local course (e.g., community training) that qualifies for reciprocity.

A5.2.6.3. Individuals appointed as an IC must complete this course. **(T-2)**

A5.2.6.4. All members assigned to a DRF positions (e.g., CAT, EOC, on-scene ICS, control centers, response teams, etc.) should consider attending this course.

A5.2.6.5. The in-residence course is a one-time requirement.

A5.2.6.6. This course meets the requirements of the FEMA's ICS courses ICS 300 and ICS 400 while ensuring military unique C2 requirements remain sound to execute critical mission operations.

A5.2.7. EOC Operations. This two-part course consists of individual knowledge based, localized and performance-based objectives that provide students the ability to conduct EOC operations.

A5.2.7.1. Prerequisite. The Air Force EM Program Course.

A5.2.7.2. EOC members must complete this course within 60 days (or four regularly scheduled drills for ARC members) of assignment as an EOC member. **(T-3)**

A5.2.7.3. The online course is a one-time requirement upon initial position assignment.

A5.2.7.4. Instructor-led component is required only upon appointment as an EOC member at a new installation.

A5.2.7.5. Accomplish recurring training through participation in EOC operations during an exercise or actual EOC activation annually. Documenting participation is accomplished and maintained using localized procedures.

A5.2.7.6. This course meets the requirements of the FEMA's IS and state-delivered (G) courses IS-701, IS-706, IS-775, and G-191 while ensuring military-unique C2 requirements remain sound to execute critical mission operations.

A5.2.8. EOC Director. This instructor-led course consists of individual knowledge-based and performance-based objectives that provide students the knowledge and skills necessary to perform EOC C2 functions effectively during emergency and contingency situations.

A5.2.8.1. Prerequisites. The Air Force EM Program Course and the EOC Operations Course.

A5.2.8.2. This course is an in-residence course conducted at the Air University's College of Professional Development.

A5.2.8.3. This course must be completed by individuals appointed as primary and alternate EOC director. **(T-3)**

A5.2.8.4. The individual requiring the training will coordinate with their unit training manager. The unit training manager will then coordinate with AFIMSC to obtain course slots for the EOC Director, to ensure there are always trained and qualified personnel on the installation. ANG personnel will request course slots through NGB/A4XD. AFR personnel will request course slots through RegAF Senior Leader Management Office. **(T-3)**

A5.2.8.5. The in-residence course is a one-time requirement; however, personnel who have not performed DRF duties for five or more years and have been placed in a position identified in **paragraph 5.4** must repeat this course. **(T-3)**

A5.2.9. Control Center Operations. This two-part course consists of individual knowledge-based, localized and performance-based objectives that provide students the ability to conduct response operations in a control center.

A5.2.9.1. Prerequisite. The Air Force EM Program Course.

A5.2.9.2. This course must be completed within 60 days (or four regularly scheduled drills for ARC members) of assignment as a control center member. **(T-3)**

A5.2.9.3. The online course is a one-time requirement upon initial position assignment.

A5.2.9.4. Instructor-led component is required only upon appointment as a control center member at a new installation.

A5.2.9.5. Accomplish recurring training through participation in control center operations during an exercise or actual emergency annually. Documenting participation is accomplished and maintained using localized procedures.

A5.2.9.6. Accomplish additional localized and performance-based training as part of unit or functional area training and qualifying as appropriate.

A5.2.10. USAF CONUS RTF Course. This online course consists of individual knowledge-based objectives that provide students the ability to coordinate actions necessary to control and recover from a radiological accident.

A5.2.10.1. Prerequisites. The Air Force EM Program Course and the Air Force Emergency Response Operations: First and Emergency Responders Course.

A5.2.10.2. This course must be completed within 90 days (or four regularly scheduled drills for ARC members) of assignment to CONUS RTF as directed by the AFGSC Plan 10-1. **(T-2)**

A5.2.10.3. The online course is a one-time requirement upon initial assignment to CONUS RTF.

A5.2.10.4. Accomplish additional localized and performance-based training as part of unit or functional area training and qualifying, as appropriate.

A5.2.10.5. This course meets the requirements of the FEMA's IS course IS-836 while ensuring military unique C2 requirements remain sound to execute critical mission operations.

A5.2.11. USAF OCONUS RTF Course. Once developed, this online course will consist of individual knowledge-based objectives, specific to overseas response, that will provide students the ability to coordinate actions necessary to control and recover from a radiological accident of U.S. assets in a foreign country or international waters.

A5.2.11.1. This course will have a one-time requirement upon initial assignment to OCONUS RTF and will not be waived for personnel that were previously assigned to a CONUS RTF position.

A5.2.11.2. RTF members are required to accomplish localized training as part of unit or functional area training and qualifying, as appropriate.

A5.2.12. SMT. This two-part course consists of individual knowledge-based, localized and performance-based objectives that provide students the ability to conduct and manage shelter operations.

A5.2.12.1. Prerequisite. The Air Force EM Program Course.

A5.2.12.2. This course must be completed IAW the following guidance **(T-3)**:

A5.2.12.2.1. Members assigned to natural disaster shelters will accomplish training within 60 days (or four regularly scheduled drills for ARC members) of assignment. **(T-3)**

A5.2.12.2.2. Members assigned to other shelter types will accomplish "just-in-time" training when threat posture increases. **(T-3)**

A5.2.12.3. The online course is a one-time requirement upon initial position assignment.

A5.2.12.4. Instructor-led component is required only if the student is appointed as a SMT member at a new installation.

A5.2.12.5. Accomplish recurring training through participation in shelter operations during an exercise or actual emergency annually. Documenting participation is accomplished and maintained using localized procedures.

A5.2.12.6. Additional localized and performance-based training will be provided by the individual's assigned unit as part of unit or functional area training and qualifying as appropriate. **(T-3)**

A5.2.12.7. Depending on shelter type, CE may provide training on shelter systems such as power generation, filter changes, and owner-user maintenance.

A5.2.12.8. Training will include COLPRO system if systems exist on the installation. **(T-3)**

A5.2.13. CCT. This two-part course consists of individual knowledge-based, localized and performance-based objectives that provide students the ability to identify the purpose, policies, structure, roles, responsibilities, and procedures for conducting CCT operations.

A5.2.13.1. Prerequisite. The Air Force EM Program Course.

A5.2.13.2. This course must be completed within 60 days (or four regularly scheduled drills for ARC members) of assignment as a CCT member. **(T-3)**

A5.2.13.3. The online course is a one-time requirement upon initial position assignment.

A5.2.13.4. Instructor-led component is required only if the student is appointed as a CCT member at a new installation.

A5.2.13.5. Accomplish recurring training through participation in contamination control operations during an exercise or actual emergency annually. Documenting participation is accomplished and maintained using localized procedures.

A5.2.13.6. The individual's assigned unit will provide additional localized and performance-based training as part of unit or functional area training and qualifying. **(T-3)**

A5.2.14. CCS Team. This two-part course consists of individual knowledge-based, localized and performance-based objectives that provide students the ability to conduct CCS operations.

A5.2.14.1. Prerequisite. The Air Force EM Program Course.

A5.2.14.2. This course must be completed within 60 days (or four regularly scheduled drills for ARC members) of assignment as a CCS team member. **(T-3)**

A5.2.14.3. The online course is a one-time requirement upon initial position assignment.

A5.2.14.4. The instructor-led component only if the student is appointed as a CCS team member at a new installation.

A5.2.14.5. Accomplish recurring training through participation in CCS operations during an exercise or actual emergency annually. Documenting participation is accomplished and maintained using localized procedures.

A5.2.15. Emergency Management Support Team. This instructor-led training consists of individual knowledge-based, localized and performance-based objectives that provide students the ability to support the IOEM during emergency operations.

A5.2.15.1. Prerequisite. The Air Force EM Program Course.

A5.2.15.2. This one-time training requirement must be completed within 60 days (or four regularly scheduled drills for ARC members) of assignment as an EM support team member. **(T-3)**

A5.2.15.3. Re-accomplished the course only if the student is appointed as an EM support team member at anew installation.

A5.2.15.4. Annually accomplish recurring training through participation in supporting IOEM operations during an exercise or actual emergency. Document and maintain participation records using localized procedures.

A5.3. Additional Recommended Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Emergency Management (EM) Education and Training (E&T) Courses. The intent of this policy is to advance whole-of-nation/community interoperability and spur functional area understanding and advancement regarding their important role within DHS/DoD/DAF EM preparedness framework/mission areas.

A5.3.1. The following DHS EM related courses identified **Table A5.1** provide recommended courses for DAF EM Program audiences. Audiences identified are also recommended.

A5.3.2. The EMWG, through the IEM, should use these recommendations to specify additional hazard/threat specific EM Program audience E&T course requirements.

A5.3.3. Reference the DHS National Preparedness Online Course Catalog for course details (e.g., applicable core capability, description, duration, registration, etc.) to include an expanded listing of courses. The catalog provides searchable, integrated information on courses provided or managed by FEMA's Center for Domestic Preparedness, the Emergency Management Institute, the National Fire Academy, and the National Training and Education Division. **Note:** Reference **paragraph A5.4** that correlates installation DAF EM E&T audiences to applicable mission areas and specific common core capabilities to assist functional areas/personnel in identifying additional DHS EM related E&T opportunities.

Table A5.1. Crosscutting Core Capability Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Emergency Management (EM) Education and Training (E&T) Recommend Courses.

Recommended Course Title	Recommended Audience
'Prepare' DHS EM E&T Recommended Courses	
AWR-401-W, Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment and SPR	-IEM
PER-378, Coastal Hazard and Vulnerability Assessment Tools	-IEM
E0190: ArcGIS for Emergency Managers	-IEM -Installation GeoBase Officer
IS2002: Introduction to FEMA Operational Planning E0103	-EP2T
Planning: Emergency Operations	-EP2T
G0290: Basic PIO Course	-PAO
IS0271.a: Anticipating Hazardous Weather and Community Risk, 2nd Edition	-IEM - EP2T
E0105: Public Information Basics	-Command Post -PAO
IS0328: Plan Review for Local Mitigation Plans	-CE Community Planner
IS0251.a: IPAWS for Alerting Administrators	-Command Post
IS0042: Social Media in EM	-PAO
MGT-409: Community Healthcare Planning and Response to Disasters	-PHEO -MEM

	-IEM
E0360: Preparing for Emergencies: What School Staff Need to Know	-DoD School Staff on DAF Installation
IS0102.c: Preparing for Federal Disaster Operations: FEMA Response Partners	-CONUS MAJCOM AFFOR Staffs -AFCAT
HSEEP	-IEM -Installation Inspection Team Chief
'Prevent' DHS EM E&T Recommended Courses	
IS2500: National Prevention Framework, an Introduction	-IEM -SF -AT Officer
AWR-122: Law Enforcement Prevention and Deterrence of Terrorist Acts	-SF -AT Officer
AWR-160-W: WMD/Terrorism Awareness for Emergency Responders	-First and Emergency Responders
AWR-313: Homemade Explosives: Awareness, Recognition, and Response	-First and Emergency Responders
PER-222: Public Safety CBRNE Response Sampling Techniques and Guidelines	-CBRN Defense Specialists
PER-220: Emergency Response to Domestic Biological Incidents	-CBRN Defense Specialists -BEs -PHEO
'Protect' DHS EM E&T Recommended Courses	
IS2600: National Protection Framework, An Introduction	-IEM -CE Operations
IS0915: Protecting Critical Infrastructure Against Insider Threats	-CE Operations
MGT-384: Community Preparedness for Cyber Incidents	-IEM -Cyber Officer
IS0913.a: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience: Achieving Results through Partnership and Collaboration	-CE Operations
MGT-385: Community Cyber Security Exercise Planning	-Cyber Officer -IEM -Installation Inspection Team
L8540: Basic Interagency Logistics Seminar/Logistic Center Tour	-Logistics Readiness
'Mitigate' DHS EM E&T Recommended Courses	
IS2700: National Mitigation Framework, An Introduction	-CE Community Planner -IEM -SAF/IE Staff
MGT-342: Strategic Overview of Disaster Management for Water and Wastewater Utilities	-CE Operations -Bioenvironmental Engineer
IS0556: Damage Assessment for Public Works	-CE Operations

AWR-310: Natural Disaster Awareness for Community Leaders	-Installation Commander
MGT-345: Disaster Management for Electric Power Systems	-CE Operations
IS0328: Plan Review for Local Mitigation Plans	-CE Community Planner
'Respond' DHS EM E&T Recommended Courses	
IS-800.D: NRF, An Introduction	-DRF Personnel
G0400: ICS 400: Advanced ICS for Command and General Staff-Complex Incidents	-DRF Personnel
MGT-360: Incident Command: Capabilities, Planning, and Response Actions for All Hazards	-IC
AWR-900: Framework for Healthcare Emergency Management	-PHEO -MEM -IEM
MGT-901: Healthcare Leadership for Mass Casualty Incidents	-PHEO -MEM -IC
MGT-414: Advanced Critical Infrastructure Protection	-CE Community Planner -IEM -SAF/IE Staff
E0987: NIMS ICS All-Hazards Introduction to Air Operations	-IEM -Air Operations Staff
AWR-345: Unmanned Aircraft Systems in Disaster Management	-IEM -Air Operations Staff
G0191: EOC/ICS Interface	-IEM -EOC Director/Manager -IC
E0948: Situational Awareness and COP	-IEM -Command Post
G0386: Mass Fatalities Incident Response Course	-MEM -F&ES/IC
G0358: Evacuation and Re-Entry Planning Course	-IEM -F&ES/IC -SF/IC
IS0405: Mass Care/Emergency Assistance Overview	-MEM
'Recover' DHS EM E&T Recommended Courses	
IS-2900.A: National Disaster Recovery Framework	-CE -IEM
IS2905: Coordinating Health and Social Services Recovery	-MEM -Force Support
E0202: Debris Management Planning for State, Tribal, Territorial and Local Officials	-CE
E0210: Recovery from Disaster: The Local Community Role	-CE -IEM

A5.4. Installation Department of the Air Force (DAF) Emergency Management (EM) Education and Training (E&T) Audience Correlated to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Common Core Capabilities. The following tables enable personnel to relate their assigned installation EM role/position and pursue recommended/optional EM E&T within and through DHS provided emergency preparedness courses. In addition, the tables serve to shift future DAF EM E&T methodology to a capabilities-based construct synchronized and aligned to advance 1) DSCA; 2) homeland defense partnership capacity, 3) interoperability with local, state, federal, and host nation mission partners; and 4) joint force protection functions of active defense (prevent), passive defense (protect), EM (framework), and force health protection.

A5.4.1. Crosscutting/Integration Common Core Capabilities. **Table A5.2** correlates installation level EM Program E&T audiences to crosscutting common core capabilities.

Table A5.2. Crosscutting Common Core Capabilities Correlated to Emergency Management (EM) Education and Training (E&T) Audiences.

Core Capability	Audience (Position/Function/Team)
IRM	Senior Leaders (Installation Commander, Installation HQ A-Staff, Squadron Commanders), EMWG, Ep2T, IEM, MEM, CBRN Defense Specialists, SF, Air Tasking Order, and IMAO
Planning	
Public Information and Warning	Base Populace, UEPC, PAO, IEM, First and Emergency Responders, and Installation Command Post
Collective Exercises (Planning, Execution, and Evaluation)	Installation Inspection Team, IEM, and EP2T
Operational Coordination (NIMS)[1]	ECC, IC, First Responders, Emergency Responders, Designated Emergency Support Responders, Control Centers, EOC, Installation Command Post, and IEM
Note: Functional areas are responsible for personnel qualification, certification, and credentialing as specified within NIMS. Functional areas are encouraged to use the DHS One Responder System to qualify and certify personnel.	

A5.4.2. 'Prevent' Common Core Capabilities. **Table A5.3** correlates installation level EM Program E&T audiences to the prevent mission area common core capabilities.

Table A5.3. 'Prevent' Capabilities Correlated to Emergency Management (EM) Education and Training (E&T) Audiences.

Core Capability	Audience (Position/Function/Team)
Intelligence and Information Sharing	SF, Air Tasking Order, IEM, CBRN Defense Specialists, PHEO, BE, Medical Commander, and EP2T
Interdiction and Disruption	Assigned Combat Air Patrol Units/Capabilities, Security Forces, IEM, CBRN Defense Specialists, EOD
Screening, Search, and Detection	SF, IEM, CBRN Defense Specialists and EOD, BE, and PHEO
Forensics and Attribution	SF, IEM, CBRN Defense Specialists, EOD, BE, and PHEO

A5.4.3. 'Protect' Common Core Capabilities. **Table A5.4** correlates installation level EM Program E&T audiences to the prevent mission area common core capabilities.

Table A5.4. 'Protect' Capabilities Correlated to Emergency Management (EM) Education and Training (E&T) Audiences.

Core Capability	Audience (Position/Function/Team)
Access Control and Identify Verification	SF and Cyber [Comm]
Cybersecurity	Base Populace and Cyber
Physical Protective Measures	SF, CE Operations, CE Community Planner, IEM, Logistics Readiness, Force Support, CBRN Defense Specialists, and EOD
Supply Chain Integrity and Security	Logistics Readiness

A5.4.4. 'Mitigate' Common Core Capabilities. **Table A5.5.,** correlates installation level EM Program E&T audiences to the prevent mission area common core capabilities.

Table A5.5. 'Mitigate' Capabilities Correlated to Emergency Management (EM) Education and Training (E&T) Audiences.

Core Capability	Audience (Position/Function/Team)
Community Resilience	Base Populace and all EM E&T Audiences
Long-Term Vulnerability Reduction	CE Engineering Assistance, CE Community Planner
Note: The DAF EM Program consolidates the DHS Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment within the crosscutting IRM capability.	

A5.4.5. 'Respond' Common Core Capabilities. **Table A5.6** correlates installation level EM Program E&T audiences to the prevent mission area common core capabilities.

Table A5.6. 'Respond' Capabilities Correlated to Emergency Management (EM) Education and Training (E&T) Audiences.

Core Capability	Audience (Position/Function/Team)
Situational Assessment – Information and Decision Advantage[1]	EOC[2], Control Centers, Disaster Ride Out Teams, Unit Post Attack Reconnaissance Teams, CE Airfield Damage Assessment Team(s), CBRN Defense Specialists, and EOD
Infrastructure Systems and Mission Restoration[1]	CE Operations and Damage Assessment Teams
Operational Communications	Cyber [Comm Sq], PAO, and Command Post
On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement	SF
Fire Management and Suppression	F&ES
Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	Medical (BE and Public Health), PHEO, and F&ES
Evacuation and Critical Transportation	Logistics Readiness, CE Operations, and IEM
Occupational and Environmental Response/Health and Safety	HAZMAT Incident Response Team, Nuclear Weapon Incident/Accident RTF, CCS, CE Environmental, BE
Mass Care Services	Force Support, Logistics, CE Operations, Public Health Officer, and Shelter Management Teams
Mass Search and Rescue	Air Operations [Mission Planners]
Fatality Management Services	Medical, Force Support, and Chaplin
Logistics and Supply Chain Management	Logistics Readiness
Notes: 1. Applicable to both Response and Recovery. 2. Inclusive of the CBRNE Control Center for CBRNE Risk Index 1 and 2 installations.	

A5.4.6. 'Recover' Common Core Capabilities. **Table A5.7.,** correlates installation level EM Program E&T audiences to the prevent mission area common core capabilities.

Table A5.7. 'Recover' Capabilities Correlated to Emergency Management (EM) Education and Training (E&T) Audiences.

Core Capability	Audience (Position/Function/Team)
Infrastructure Systems and Mission Restoration	ROC, Recovery Operations Cell, CE Operations, Airfield Damage Recovery Team, Debris Removal Teams, IEM
Health and Social Services	Medical, Force Support, and Chaplin
Economic Recovery	Comptroller
Natural and Cultural Resources	CE Environmental and Historian
Housing	Force Support and CE Housing

Attachment 6

INSTALLATION EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT (EM) EXERCISE EVALUATION OBJECTIVES

A6.1. Purpose. Identify and establish capabilities-based EM exercise evaluation objectives to evaluate common core capabilities and assist commanders at all levels to manage all-hazard/threat risk while continually building whole-of-community preparedness, resilience, and readiness.

A6.2. Emergency Management (EM) Exercise Common Core Capability Evaluation Objective Development. EM exercise planners and unit evaluators with assistance from EP2T will develop specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound (SMART) exercise objectives for each mission area and each associated common core capability. **(T-1)** Reference HSEEP for additional details.

A6.2.1. Installation EM exercise planners and unit evaluators with assistance from EP2T will incorporate and translate common core capability target statements developed during the planning process and IAW **Attachment 4** into SMART objectives. **(T-1)** For instance, under the response mission area and the common core capability of fatality management services, the target common core capability translated to an exercise objective would read, "Evaluate the ability of the FSS to complete the recovery, identification, and mortuary services, including temporary storage services for 30 fatalities with 4 days." In this case, the number of fatalities and the length of time to execute and complete the action is an installation determined target capability. This would then drive EM exercise planners to ensure the MSEL contains at least 30 fatalities as to evaluate the capability and identify capability gaps for issue resolution by the EMWG (or functional area).

A6.2.2. Installation EM exercise planners will also develop SMART objectives for specific items in **Table A6.1** with the associated mission area and targeted common core capability SMART objectives. **Note:** Exercise planners should also identify and develop SMART EM exercise objectives aligned with mission areas and core capabilities for other locally determined high interest items as determined locally.

A6.2.3. The EM installation inspection team representative will review final EM exercise objectives, as determined by the Installation IG. **(T-1)**

Table A6.1. Emergency Management (EM) Exercise Common Core Capability Evaluation Objectives.

Core Capability Exercise Objective	CBRN	NDRE	MARE	NAI	Active Shooter[1]
IRM	R	O	O	O	-
Planning	R	R	O	R	-
E&T	R	R	O	R	R
Exercise Planning and Execution	R	O	O	O	O
Public Information and Warning	R	R	R	R	R
Operational Command and Coordination	R	R	R	R	R
ELD	-	-	-	-	R
SIP	O	O	R	O	O
NDS	-	O	-	-	-
CBRN Survivability	R	-	-	-	-
HAZMAT Incident	O	O	R	R	-
Expedient Hardening	R	R	-	-	-
Dispersal and Relocation Execution	R	-	-	-	-
Supply Chain Integrity and Security	R	O	-	-	-
Situational Assessment	R	R	R	R	R
Infrastructure Systems and Mission Restoration	R	R	O	-	-
Operational Communications	R	R	R	R	R
On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement	R	R	R	R	R
Fire Management and Suppression	R	R	R	O	O
Emergency Medical Services, Public Health, and Healthcare	R	R	R	O	R
Occupational and Environmental Response/Health & Safety	R	R	R	R	O
Evacuation and Critical Transportation	R	R	O	O	-
MCS	R	R	O	O	-

Core Capability Exercise Objective	CBRN	NDRE	MARE	NAI	Active Shooter[1]
Mass Search and Rescue Operations	R	R	O	O	-
Fatality Management	R	R	O	O	O
Logistics and Supply Chain Management	R	O	O	O	-
Health and Social Services	R	R	O	O	R
Natural and Cultural Resources	R	R	O	O	-
Housing	R	R	-	-	-
Financial Programing	O	R	O	O	-

Key	
R	Evaluation required for the exercise(s) and **T-0**
O	Evaluation optional for exercise(s); scenario may drive evaluation as determined locally
-	Not Applicable to the exercise(s)

Note:
Active Shooter 1: Must include, at a minimum, the Command Post, CAT, EOC, BDOC, ECC, and all other control centers. **(T-1)**

Active Shooter 2: Must evaluate lockdown capabilities during this exercise. **(T-0)**

A6.3. Crosscutting Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-Bound (SMART) Emergency Management (EM) Exercise Objectives. Develop objectives for the following capability targets in **Table A6.2**.

Table A6.2. Crosscutting Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-Bound (SMART) Emergency Management (EM) Exercise Objectives.

Capability	Objective Development Item
IRM	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s)
EM Planning	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s) EAPs for Facilities Located Off-Installation **(T-0)** Tenant EAP Activation and Integration with the IEMP **(T-0)**
EM (E&T)	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s) Identify and Attribute Inability of Installation to Achieve Mission Areas and Common Core Capabilities to Specific EM E&T courses and/or Functional Specific E&T.
EM Exercises	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s) Evaluate the ability of EM exercise planners to effectively plan for and execute EM exercises.
Public Information and Warning	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s) **(T-0)** EPI **(T-0)** Execution of incident reporting protocols, internal (e.g., installation personnel, tenant organizations) and external (e.g., HHQ, federal, regional, state, tribal, local, voluntary and NGO, private industry, or host nation partners) **(T-0)**
Operational Command and Coordination	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s) **(T-0)** ECC Initial Dispatch and Sustained Operations IC General Response Operations and Activities **(T-0)** IC Incident Action Planning Control Center Activation and Sustained Operations Qualification, Certification, and Credentialing Requirements EOC Overarching Requirements EOC Organizational Construct EOC Basic Functions EOC Resource Management During an Incident EOC Standard Operating Procedures/Checklists EOC Recall and Activation Requirements EOC Facility Design **(T-0)** EOC Alternate EOC Communications **(T-0)** EOC Common Operating Picture **(T-0)** Activation of Local Support Agreements **(T-0)** COOP Capabilities **(T-0)** Local Commercial Support Capabilities **(T-0)**

A6.4. 'Prevent' Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-Bound (SMART) Emergency Management (EM) Exercise Objectives. Develop objectives for the following capability targets in **Table A6.3**.

Table A6.3. 'Prevent' Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-Bound (SMART) Emergency Management (EM) Exercise Objectives.

Capability	Objective Development Item
Intelligence and Information Sharing	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s)
Interdiction and Disruption	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s)
Screening, Search, and Detection	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s)
Forensics and Attribution	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s)

A6.5. 'Protect' Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-Bound (SMART) Emergency Management (EM) Exercise Objectives. Develop objectives for the following capability targets in **Table A6.4**.

Table A6.4. 'Protect' Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-Bound (SMART) Emergency Management (EM) Exercise Objectives.

Capability	Objective Development Item
Cybersecurity	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s)
PPM: Critical Infrastructure Security Plans	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s)
PPM: ELD	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s) **(T-0)**
PPM: SIP	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s) **(T-0)**
PPM: NDS	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s)
PPM: ISH	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s)
PPM: RSH	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s)
PPM: Public Health Emergencies	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s)
PPM: Casualty Collection	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s)
PPM: HAZMAT Incident	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s)
PPM: Nuclear Accident/Incident	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s)
PPM: Mail Facilities	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s)
PPM: Expedient Hardening	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s)
PPM: DRECOs	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s)

Supply Chain Integrity and Security	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s)

A6.6. 'Mitigate' Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-Bound (SMART) Emergency Management (EM) Exercise Objectives. Develop objectives for the following capability targets in **Table A6.5**.

Table A6.5. 'Mitigate' Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-Bound (SMART) Emergency Management (EM) Exercise Objectives.

Capability	Objective Development Item
Long-Term Vulnerability Reduction[1]	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s)
Note: Not required for EM exercises; however, installations are encouraged to evaluate the ability to holistically mitigate the effects of all-hazard/threat incidents/attacks.	

A6.7. 'Response' Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-Bound (SMART) Emergency Management (EM) Exercise Objectives. Develop objectives for the following capability targets in **Table A6.6**.

Table A6.6. 'Response' Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-Bound (SMART) Emergency Management (EM) Exercise Objectives.

Capability	Objective Development Item
Infrastructure Systems	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s) **(T-0)**
Situational Assessment	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s)
Operational Communications	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s) **(T-0)**
On-scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s) General Response Operations and Activities **(T-0)**
Fire Management and Suppression	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s) General Response Operations and Activities **(T-0)**
Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s) General Response Operations and Activities **(T-0)** Medical, veterinary, and public health response and recovery operations, including disaster mental health and mass casualty management **(T-0)**
Occupational and Environmental Response/Health Safety	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s) General Response Operations and Activities **(T-0)**
Evacuation and Critical	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s) **(T-0)**

Transportation	
MCS	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s) **(T-0)**
Mass Search and Rescue Operations	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s)
Fatality Management Services	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s)
Logistics and Supply Chain Management	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s)
Note: Develop SMART objectives for EM exercise relevant specialized and support team activation and operations.	

A6.8. 'Recover' Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-Bound (SMART) Emergency Management (EM) Exercise Objectives. Develop objectives for the following capability targets in **Table A6.7**.

Table A6.7. 'Recovery' Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-Bound (SMART) Emergency Management (EM) Exercise Objectives.

Capability	Objective Development Item
Situational Assessment	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s)
Infrastructure Systems	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s) **(T-0)** **Note:** Targets are related to initial recovery.
Financial Recovery Planning	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s)
Health and Social Services	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s) Religious Support Response **(T-0)**
Housing	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s)
Natural and Cultural Resources	Common Core Capability Target Statement(s)

A6.9. Applicable Exercise Objectives to Exercise Categories. Installation EM exercise planners and unit evaluators will evaluate the common core capability exercise objectives for the EM exercise categories identified in **Table A6.1**. **(T-1)**