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DELHI, 1911-1922

Society and Politics in the New Imperial
Capital of India


by

Donald W. Ferrell

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy in the
Australian National University
Canberra

11 July 1969

This thesis is my own work.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Donald W. Ferrell". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, sweeping initial "D".

Donald W. Ferrell

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KEY TO ABBREVIATED REFERENCES

D.I.C., I	<u>Disorders Inquiry Committee, 1919-1920,</u> Minutes of Evidence, Volume I (Delhi)
NAI	National Archives of India
RDDA	Record Department, Delhi Administration

GLOSSARY

Bakr-Id	See <u>Id.</u>
Bigha	Unit of land; somewhat smaller than an acre.
Choudhri	Traditional leader.
Fatwa	Religious document of the Muslim community; usually contains a clarification, interpretation, or injunction of Muslim law by one or more Muslim divines.

Gali	Narrow dead-end lane.
Gurukul	Centre for traditional Hindu learning.
Id	<u>Id-ul-Fitr</u> - day on which the fast of Ramadan is broken; <u>Id-ul-Zuha</u> - occurs one month and ten days after <u>Fitr-Id</u> and is celebrated by performing <u>qarbani</u> (also called <u>Bakr-Id</u>). See page 161, note 1 for Muslim 'festival cycle'.
Idgah	Large mosque in which the <u>Id</u> prayers are said.
Karewa	Widow-marriage.
Karkhandars	A social group in the Muslim community which includes both the industrial labourer and the employer.
Khutba	Religious sermon delivered in the mosque on Fridays after the mid-day prayers.
Kotwal	Police station; head of the police force.
Lathi	Wooden stave which has one end capped with brass.
Madrassah	Muslim college.
Mohalla	Area within traditional Indian city with its own shops, leaders, etc.; unit of urban administration under the Moguls.
Qarbani	Sacrifice of cattle, sheep, or goats on <u>Id-ul-Zuha</u> .
Sanatana	Orthodox (Hindu).
Sanatana Dharma	Orthodox religion (Hindu).
Shariah	Corpus of tradition and knowledge from which all Muslims derive guidance and inspiration.
Sharif	Well-born (Muslim).
Swadeshi	Of one's own country; native; indigenous.
Swaraj	Self-government; independence.

INTRODUCTION

'Delhi, 1911-1922' stems from a discussion with Ravinder Kumar in April 1966. The investigation which arose from that discussion rested on the hypothesis that the transfer of the imperial capital from Calcutta to Delhi, a transfer which took place on 1 October 1913, resulted in significant social and political changes in the city. The major drawback to such a study lay in the fact that there were no extant local newspapers for the period. The major advantage lay in the fact that in view of Delhi's special relationship with the Government of India, a larger number of communications on matters of policy and action passed between the Delhi Administration and the Government of India, than was the case for many similar administrative areas.

The material available did not prove conducive to substantiating or disproving this hypothesis. What the available material does substantiate is the thesis that nationalism in Delhi transformed the limited horizons of a restricted number of educated persons who participated in politics in the city prior to 1911 into a movement which drew upon new classes and communities and which focussed upon issues of all-India significance. The corollary to this thesis is that the growth of political consciousness contributed to a heightened awareness of parochial issues.

The thesis, then, is most concerned with who participated in nationalist politics in the city of Delhi between 1911 and 1922 and why they did so. The

work of George Rudé on the French Revolution offers the greatest methodological insight into the problem of assessing mass participation in political movements. It will become obvious to the reader, however, that nothing like the detailed evidence upon which Rudé depends is available to the historian of modern India. Three devices have been adopted to circumvent this difficulty and to add another dimension to such a study. The first is to analyse the social structure and social values of the various communities in the city; the second is to analyse the political state of mind of the members of various communities; and the third is to analyse collections of people in terms of whether they were an audience, a crowd, or a mob. These terms are defined in the following manner:

- audience - an assembly of listeners that usually collects for a specific purpose (i.e. to hear a speaker on a known subject).
- crowd - a collection of people that has a focus of interest, but usually has little cohesion, and has no proclivity to violence.
- mob - a collection of people that has a focus of interest, coheres, and will follow spontaneous leadership. It usually proceeds to activities of a violent nature.

By analysing social values, states of mind, and the manner in which people gathered, it is possible to make qualified assertions about who was drawn into political activity and why those people responded to the issues that were raised.

Some mention should be made of the use of particular terms in this study. The word 'Delhi' always denotes the rural and urban portions of the Province of Delhi as constituted on 1 October 1912. Delhi Province refers to the rural areas only and the Delhi urban area refers to the Delhi Municipality plus Delhi City. Delhi City refers to the new imperial area, the New Cantonment, and the Civil Lines.

The words 'provincial', 'national', and 'parochial' are used frequently and deserve to be noted. The word provincial is used to denote an attitude or issue which depends upon a restricted geographical context, narrow intellectual horizons, and limited participation. The word national is used to denote a sentiment or ideal which depends upon the widest possible geographical context, unlimited intellectual horizons, and mass participation. The word parochial is used to denote a susceptibility which stems from a rigid adherence to group identity, and can depend upon religion, social origin, birth, occupation, and so forth.

And finally the words 'Moderate' and 'Extremist' call for some comment. These words are taken over completely from the official records. The term Moderate is used to denote those who accepted a slow pace of political change with a goal as some type of responsible government. The term Extremist denotes those who wished to increase the pace of political change and who sought some form of complete self-government. The Extremists in turn disagreed upon the pace of political change and divided into moderate Extremists and radical Extremists. The Moderates believed in a homogeneous political

community of the educated élite while the radical Extremists sought to gain support from the illiterate and poor. The moderate Extremists were never sure which type of community they supported, but their élite origins and responsible positions in the society usually decided them against the radicals.

The study that follows is divided into two parts: society in Delhi and politics in Delhi. The first three chapters which make up Part One, describe the physical environment, the social structure and the social values of the inhabitants of Delhi. These three chapters lay the foundation for the five chapters which follow and provide the basis for a discussion and analysis of political events. The three chapters which describe political life in the new imperial capital of India between 1911 and 1919 concentrate upon political crises which occur in May 1915, October 1917, and April 1919. These crises reveal the variety of response which resulted from the evocation of nationalist sentiments and parochial issues. The last two chapters concentrate on the first non-co-operation movement and its corollary, the civil disobedience campaign. The movement witnessed the gradual disenchantment with politics by the inhabitants of the city, a disenchantment which reinforced the reaction to the Rowlatt Satyagraha of April 1919, and which heightened parochial attitudes among the citizens of Delhi.

PART ONE

DELHI ACQUIRES IMPERIUM

Society in the New Imperial Capital of India

'We are pleased to announce to Our people that...We have decided upon the transfer of the seat of the Government of India from Calcutta to the ancient capital of Delhi...'

Announcement of George V
Imperial Durbar, Delhi,
12 December 1911.

Chapter One

CONDITIONS IN DELHI ON THE BRINK OF IMPERIUM

I

The Milieu

II

The Administration

III

Education and Literacy

IV

The Economy


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
INDIA AND CEYLON 1911-22



DELHI PROVINCE
And Surrounding Districts




DELHI AND SURROUNDING AREAS - 1919



From Handbook for Travellers in India, Burma and Ceylon (10^{ed}), London: John Murray, 1919, p. 249.

SHAHJAHANABAD - 1919

(THE WALLED CITY OF DELHI)



From Final Report (2nd) of the Delhi Town Planning Committee Regarding the Selected Site.
Map II, Parliamentary Papers, 1913, XX (6829)

The area between the River Sutlej and the River Ganges was the marchland of India. The area was a marchland because it marked the southeast boundary of the fertile plains of the Indus River system, and it also marked the northwest extremity of the expansive plains of the Ganges River system.¹ This area, which acted as a geographic divide, also acted as a divide in terms of the population of the respective river systems. The population to the northwest of this marchland was predominantly Muslim in religion while the population on the southeast was predominantly Hindu.

A series of cities arose at the junction of the Aravalli Ridge and the River Jumna which lay in the heart of the marchland. They were the capital cities of successive dynasties which sought to exercise control over the north of India, and to protect their territories

1

O.H.K. Spate and A.T.A. Learmonth, India and Pakistan: A General and Regional Geography (3rd edition; London, 1967), pp. 541-2. 'It is hardly necessary to emphasize the larger nodality of Delhi: the gateway between the Thar-Aravalli barrier and the Himalaya; the marchland position between the northwest, ever accessible to new waves of invasion and cultural intrusion, and the shock-absorbing Gangetic Plains: the convergence of the routes from the ancient Cambay ports and the Deccan by Rajputana and Malwa. But not only is the general area thus marked out as the great crossroads of the sub-continent: the pattern is reproduced in detail by the famous Ridge, the worn and arid last spur of the Aravallis, pointing like a lean but wiry finger straight to the Yamuna.' Another aspect of the marchland has been studied in A.S. Jauhari, 'Growth and Development of Urban Settlement in the Sutlej-Yamuna Divide' (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1961).

from subsequent invasions along the same route.¹ The Mogul Emperor Shah Jehan (1627-1658) built the most recent but one of these capitals in 1648. This was the city of Shahjehanabad which became one of the centres of resistance during the Mutiny of 1857. Slightly altered, it was the same city that George V named as his new imperial capital on 12 December 1911.²

I

The Delhi Municipality was composed of three distinct units in 1911: the Civil Lines, the walled city and the suburbs outside the walled city, all of which covered 16.7 square miles. By 1921 the Civil Lines area had grown to such an extent that it formed a separate notified area, as had two new administrative units, the Imperial Area (that is, New Delhi), and the New Cantonment which enlarged the Delhi urban area to 65 square miles. These three notified areas receive short shrift in this study since they do not enter into the political story.

1

For a description of the various cities that arose near Delhi see S.S. Bhatia, 'Historical Geography of Delhi', Indian Geographer, I (August 1956), 17-43; H. Bullock, Fifteen Cities of Delhi (Delhi, 1951); G. Hearn, The Seven Cities of Delhi (2nd edition, Calcutta, 1928).

2

The city of Delhi is located at 28° 38' north latitude. This is approximately the same latitude as that of Cairo and Canton. It is between Tampa and Jacksonville, Florida and between Brownsville and Houston, Texas.

The Delhi Municipality which our political story does concern covered 10 square miles and was composed of the four suburbs outside the walled city and the walled city itself. The four suburbs outside the walled city were Pahargunj, Sadar Bazaar, Sabzimandi and Karol Bagh. Pahargunj was located to the southwest of the city. It was a slum which had grown up in the proximity of the Idgah [large mosque in which the Id festival is held]. The houses of Pahargunj were of kaccha [mud and straw or unbaked bricks] construction and the impecunious and undernourished inhabitants were predominantly Muslim. The noticeable lack of sewage drains, adequate streets, and water supply led the Deputy Commissioner to agree with the Health Officer that the suburb of Pahargunj was in a 'very backward state.'¹ The population of this suburb tended to grow very quickly with the development of the new imperial capital. A stone quarry at Jhandewal and the railway station for the new capital impinged upon its borders. These works attracted labourers who resided in temporary bastis [frail tent-like structures of thatch or straw] and were responsible for transforming what was already a slum into a filthy pest hole.

Sadar Bazaar was situated directly to the west of the walled city and nestled between the two heights of the ridge. It was the centre of the wholesale trade. With the convenience of a railway goods station, the merchants were able to receive, store, and despatch products from the three ports of India.² The largest

¹ RDDA, Education File 265 Part B 1915, 'Annual Report on the Working of the Municipal Committee, Delhi'.

² Delhi was 940 miles by rail from Karachi, 950 miles from Calcutta, and 960 miles from Bombay.

single group of wholesalers living there were the Panjabian.¹ There was a solid air of prosperity about Sadar Bazaar, although its merchants displayed little of their wealth.

Further west lay the suburb of Sabzimandi on the western side of the ridge. The suburb was two miles from the Kabul Gate of the city and had its own railway station. It began originally as the vegetable market for the city, but later major industries developed in this area. The employees of the factories lived in very cheap sub-standard housing in dirty galis that lacked any sewage drains. This coupled with the congestion to give the suburb a very unprosperous air.

The fourth suburb was Karol Bagh, which too lay on the western side of the ridge, opposite Pahargunj. This area was the centre of the leather tanning industry and as such the Khatiks and Chamars were its inhabitants. It was small and had the dejected air which hung over any outcaste cluster.

The walled city of Delhi was irregularly shaped to follow the original course of the Jumna River. The river wall measured $2\frac{1}{4}$ miles. The distance from the Water Bastion at the north-east corner to the Mori Bastion on the north-west corner was $\frac{3}{4}$ of a mile. The distance from the Mori Bastion to the Wellesley Bastion which was in the extreme south-east was $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles. There were four gates on the river wall, the most notable of which was the Rajghat Gate. The northern wall contained

1

The Panjabian, a group of Muslim merchants, are described below in Chapter III.

the Kashmiri and the Mori gates. The western and southern wall contained the following gates, going from north to south: the Kabul, Lahore, Farrashkhanna, Ajmer, Turkman, and Delhi gates.

There were three categories of thoroughfares in Delhi Municipality: the gali, the street and the bazaar. The gali [a narrow, dead-end lane] was the smallest of these. It emptied onto a wider 'street', which in turn emptied onto an even wider avenue called a bazaar. The latter constituted the main thoroughfare for each mohalla. The wealthiest citizens maintained impressive houses on the main bazaars and some of the select streets and galis. The wealthier merchants lived on the streets and the major bazaars¹ in houses which included their business premises on the ground floor and their living quarters on the first and second floors. Merchants dealing in similar commodities tended to concentrate in the same bazaars or mohalla; thus the cloth merchants lived in Chandni Chauk, the jewellers in Dariba, and the grain merchants in Naya Bans. The petty industrialists and petty shopkeepers tended to follow the same residential pattern as the merchants and lived above their shops. They were more than likely located on the streets and on the less important bazaars. The more important artisans also had their workshops on the ground floor and lived in the upper stories. They tended to be located primarily on the streets, and less generally on the galis, but they rarely lived on the bazaars. The

1

The major bazaars were Chandni Chauk, Dariba, Faiz Bazaar, Nai Sarak [Egerton Road], Ballimaran, Lal Kua, Sita Ram, Chowri Bazaar, Urdu Bazaar, Naya Bans, Kashmiri Gate, and Mori Gate.

petty artisans usually worked at home. They lived almost exclusively in the galis, and turned the lanes into workshops during the day. The artisans, large and small, who worked at the same handicraft, lived in the same area.

The galis presented a stark appearance to the observer. The building ordinances required that the gali should remain at least eight feet wide. But the two- and three-storied buildings on each side, and the open-drained sewers along both edges (or down the middle) made the ill-ventilated and ill-lighted buildings almost as dark and foul-smelling as the gali itself.¹ The petty artisans, labourers, minor clerks, and such groups that could not afford the larger, lighter, more airy residences on the streets and bazaars, lived in the gali. Others lived there by inclination because their families had always lived there. This meant that the gali was rarely homogeneous in terms of caste or sect, or occupation. But the gali was usually homogeneous in terms of the incomes, and the intellectual horizons, of its residents.

The living conditions in the galis in Delhi exacerbated all the other causes of the high mortality

1

An observer noted that: 'Most of the lanes [galis] are absolutely unfit for human habitation....Some of them are so dark and dingy that artificial light is needed even during the day.' A.N. Agrawal, Economic Conditions and Problems of Delhi Province (n.d., 1943), p. 59.

rate in the city.¹ The open sewers, the lack of sanitary facilities for a large proportion of the population,² the large number of animals quartered within the city,

1

The mortality rate in the Punjab over the decade was 36.2 per mille, with the rate for those aged 0-5 at 44.7 and for those aged 6-60+ at 20.0. Census of India, 1921, XV (Punjab and Delhi), Part II (Tables). The mortality rate in Delhi in 1912 was 43.74 per mille, with infant mortality at 284 per 1,000 male births, and mortality of those aged 1-60+ at 30.4. Government of India Commercial Intelligence Department, Statistical Abstract for British India from 1911-12 to 1920-21 (Calcutta, 1923), pp. 375-97. Table 1-A lists the natality rate and mortality rates for the decade.

2

When Delhi became the imperial capital of India, the Administration launched a large number of improvement schemes designed to ameliorate the most noticeable abuses of sanitation. One such abuse was the presence in some houses of a small two-story tower which permitted the passage of night soil from the first floor to the ground floor to be cleaned out in the morning by sweepers. These were gradually replaced during the decade. It also attempted to provide more facilities for garbage, and to provide latrines in areas where population was most dense, and the facilities most lacking. Land acquisition was a slow process, and on at least one occasion the Municipal Committee divided on communal lines about the acquisition of property on Chandni Chauk. RDDA, Education File 155 Part B 1913, 'Question of the Acquisition of Land for the Erection of Latrines in the Chandni Chauk at Delhi.' The process of modernisation caused a great deal of turmoil in the city throughout the decade. See especially RDDA, Education File 8 Part A 1921, 'Development of the Kadam Sharif Area with Respect to the Improvements to Roads and the Locality in and about the Vicinity.'

the prevalence of flies,¹ the shortage of clean water, and the lack of ventilation in the galis compounded the incidence of cholera, smallpox, typhus, and malaria.² The disease that caused the highest mortality, however, was tuberculosis.³ The lack of ventilation in the foetid galis increased the harm caused by the cow-dung fires, the smoke from which hung like a pall over the city.

1

A very large number of cows inhabited the city. Most of these were for milk, but there was also a substantial number of devoted Hindus who kept cows for religious merit. The cows caused an especially acute problem as there was no adequate system of sewage in the city, since they drew a large number of flies which was mainly responsible for the spread of diarrhoea among infants, and since the cows were fed garbage a large proportion of which was manure, because it was cheapest. The number of cows increased in the city during the decade as more land was acquired for the new capital. The Administration sought to impose a tax on cattle to drive them out, with which the Deputy Commissioner disagreed since it might arouse those Hindus who kept cows out of religious sentiment. RDDA, Education File 41 Part B 1916, 'Proposed Imposition of a Tax on Female Buffaloes Maintained within the Delhi Municipal Limits.'

2

The Administration worked very hard to reduce the incidence of all these diseases. They sprayed wells and the Bela in order to reduce malaria, in which they succeeded to a large degree by the end of the decade. They also carried out a large number of vaccinations during the decade, but since the programme was voluntary, they still experienced a high incidence of death from this disease. Cholera and typhus were much more difficult problems, since they prevailed in unsanitary conditions. The Administration could guarantee a fairly high standard of purity in its water system. But large numbers of people still depended upon local wells, the purity of which was highly questionable.

3

RDDA, Confidential File 106 (1916), 'Report on Tuberculosis in India by A. Lankster.'

The confinement of women inside the house in purdah and the very tight clothing worn by Muslim boys also contributed to the high incidence of tuberculosis. In such conditions it was no surprise that an influenza epidemic wiped out 7,000 people in three months in 1918.¹

A bazaar, together with the streets and the galis associated with it, formed a mohalla. The mohalla was the unit of urban administration during Mogul rule. The mohalla had its own set of shops and amenities, police and leaders. The British combined several mohallas into administrative and electoral wards of which there were nine within the walled city in 1921.²

Ward I north of Queen's Road predominantly housed the affluent families and businesses of Delhi. The kacheri nestled along the eastern wall and banks and churches were scattered throughout. This area had a high status value as it was closest to the Civil Lines (the European suburb), and because it contained the shops of the Europeans. It also had a number of hotels. Ward I looked northward rather than southward and was

1

RDDA, Home File 33(a) Part B 1919, 'Report and investigations in Connection with the Influenza Epidemic.'

2

There were 12 administrative wards within the walled city in 1911. These made up the eight electoral wards. There were in addition four administrative wards outside the walls, the combination of which formed three electoral wards. There were thus 15 administrative wards and 11 electoral wards. In 1922 the number of electoral wards was increased to 12, with nine of those within the walled city.

separated from the rest of the city by the railway tracks over which there were only two bridges. It was largely Hindu in its population.

Although the Queen's Gardens occupied a large portion of Ward II north of Chandni Chauk and Khari Baoli, a great number of Hindu merchants were concentrated there. The grain market flourished in Naya Bans; and the grain merchants along with the cloth merchants of Chandni Chauk formed the most prosperous class in Delhi. This ward also had a predominantly Hindu population.

Chandni Chauk, which formed the boundary of four wards, epitomised the gaiety and bustle of the city. It was known predominantly for its cloth shops, although shops of all sorts were found there. Chandni Chauk had churches, banks, cinemas, mosques, a gurdwara, the Town Hall, and above all, an over abundance of people. The rich and the poor, the lame and the blind thronged its footpaths. Beggars, tourists, and businessmen walked shoulder to shoulder along its length. E.M. Forster was entranced by the Chauk when he came to Delhi in 1913:

We [Forster and the Rajah of Dewas State, Senior Branch] drove into the City, and came across his brother and various members of the court who had been shopping. Much excitement, and we drove on, but no sooner had we gone twenty yards than he thought it would be fun to have them all with us. But they had got into the electric tram to have the experience, which was new to them, and we followed madly in their wake, blocked by buffaloes and camels and goats and cows and sweetmeat sellers and pariah dogs. The tram was disappearing, but the coachman, at the Rajah's orders, leapt from the box and pursued it on foot, shouting. After five minutes he came back,

leading the whole procession who got in, together with their purchases of briar-pipes, tobacco, mechanical monkeys for the children, writing-paper, ink, paper parcels of every size and shape.¹

Sidney Low, who toured northern India in 1905, described Chandni Chauk in the same graphic terms. He saw the main street of the city 'swarming with eager life.' He noted the 'laden bullock-carts, the carriages, and the tongas, pushing their way through the broad crowded street'; and he heard the buzz of voices that rose from the 'chattering multi-coloured throng.'²

The Red Fort was at one end of the Chauk and the Fatehpuri Mosque at the other. The Town Hall (with the Clock Tower immediately in front) and the Northbrooke Fountain served as foci for people to gather and talk, and for hawkers to peddle their wares.

Ward III (Dariba) had a large number of craftsmen and handicraft shops. Jewellery, and ivory and wood carving was a speciality. T. L. Pennell, an English

¹ E.M. Forster, The Hill of Devi (Hammondsworth, 1965), p. 27.

²

Sidney Low, A Vision of India (London, 1911), pp. 168-9. Another description is not so complimentary: 'The Chandni Chauk "Moon Light Square", the principal street of Delhi, which was once supposed to be the richest street of its time, has fallen from its high estate....Now it is the abode of the jewellers, silver smiths, ornament-sellers, shoes and general merchants and ivory workers of Delhi, but the jewels are seldom valuable and the carving has lost much of its old delicacy.' H. Mokkaddas Mirza, The Delhi Visit (Delhi, [1924?]), pp. iv-v.

medical doctor who toured India in 1911, described it as follows:

Pass on into the old 'dariba' so famous in the days of the Mughals, down picturesque, old-fashioned little streets, crowded with a motley assembly, jostling one another in the narrow ways. Do not be deterred by the unattractive, almost squalid, appearance of the shops, but enter a few, and you will find arrayed before you a wealth of silver ornaments and ivory carvings which would be enough to set up a shop in Regent Street. There are no tables or chairs, but there is a clean white sheet spread over the mats on the floor, and a profusion of cushions and pillows, and round the walls is a picturesque dado of hand-painted cloth, Oriental in design and bizarre in execution. The silver and ivory work which is perfected in these dark little dens cannot be rivalled anywhere. In these same streets you hear the musical rhythm of the beating out of the gold and silver foil for the confectioners, which is done by men beating in unison on marble slabs.¹

This ward was predominantly Muslim in population, but the shopkeepers were mostly Hindu.

Ward IV (Malewara), and Ward V (Gali Qasim Jan), were predominantly Hindu and commercial. They were fairly prosperous wards with many wealthy men, Hindus and Muslims, living there.

Ward VI (Farrashkhanna), Ward VII (Bazar Sita Ram), Ward VIII (Churiwalan), and Ward IX (Faiz Bazar) comprised the rest of the walled city. These wards contained the majority of the poor and labouring classes in the city, especially along the walls. The Muslims had a slight

1

T.L. Pennell, Things Seen in Northern India (London, 1912), pp. 158-9.

numerical majority in the wards but the poorer Rajputs, Jats, Chamars, Chuhras, karkhandars¹ and artisans all lived here. Their energies were wholly absorbed in the struggle for survival in the petty industries and handicraft centres that were located there. The small flour mill, iron foundry, and tinsel factory, were scattered throughout with iron founders of note living on Chaori Bazaar.

Urdu Bazaar rivalled Chandni Chauk as one of the focal points in the city. The Bazaar surrounded the Jama Masjid, which formed the boundary for three electoral wards. It provided the Muslims in Delhi with a social, cultural, and religious meeting ground in addition to a thriving market. Huge throngs of people converged daily on the Bazaar from late afternoon onwards. Many ate at the restaurants and halwai shops and then remained 'in the immediate vicinity for hours together, gossiping with their friends over their tea cups.'² The hopeless confusion of traffic and the crush of the gathered crowds greatly resembled a fair.

The variety of the shops in Urdu Bazaar matched the kaleidoscopic nature of the people they served. Some traders rented stalls around the massive base of the great mosque. Others exhibited their wares on handcarts, while still others sold their wares from trays hung around their necks or from cloths spread

¹ The karkhandars are explained below in Chapter Three.
²

Aziz-ur-Rahman, History of Jama Masjid Delhi, And Interpretation of Muslim Devotions (2nd edition, Delhi, 1956), pp. 39-45. The description of Urdu Bazaar is based on this pamphlet.

on the ground. Everything imaginable was sold around the four sides of the mosque. Some traders sold one type of commodity while others sold an assortment of articles at one price, such as five pice and so forth. Vendors sold food, clothing, hardware, pigeons, and medicines, and their cries added to the general hubub of bargaining and gossiping. The jugglers, snake charmers, magicians, and popular preachers also competed for space, and the attention and money of the gathered multitudes. The cows, the beggars, the confusion, the congestion, the noise and the smells all contributed to the spice of life for the urban dweller of Delhi.

II

Delhi was an independent enclave from 1803 to 1857 but after its part in the Mutiny of 1857, the city was incorporated into Punjab Province.¹ The area around Delhi was made into a district and the city became the centre of the Delhi Division.² The city remained a quiet divisional and district centre from 1857 to 1911, during

1

Colonel Lake defeated the Mahrattas at Delhi in 1803. The Mogul Emperors resided there with their court and governed with the advice of a Resident.

2

Delhi Division consisted of the following seven districts: Delhi, Rohtak, Gurgaon, Hissar, Karnal, Amballa, and Simla.

which time its preeminence in the field of education and culture declined, while its importance as a commercial centre increased.¹

The revenue officials in the District of Delhi in 1911 had charge of the subdivisions of the District. A deputy commissioner who was also the district magistrate was in charge of the District. Subordinate to the deputy commissioner were three tahsildars in charge of the three tahsils of the District: Sonapat in the north, Delhi in the middle and Ballabgarh in the south. Within each tahsil there were two zails [subordinate revenue units] which were under the charge of zaildars, and within each zail were the numerous villages which came under the jurisdiction of village headmen or lambardars.² Distinct from the revenue officials and their territorial jurisdictions were the police thanas [subordinate units of police administration]. A quasi-representative body, the District Board, was responsible for the disbursement of funds. The members of the Board

1

There were large and impressive Imperial Darbars in Delhi in 1877, 1903, and 1911, and there were visits by various members of the Royal Family to the city. There was, in addition, a very violent communal riot in 1886 when the Moharram and Ram Lila festivals coincided. And there were famines in 1892-3 and 1899-1900. The greatest blows to the Islamic culture of the city were the death of Ghalib in 1869 and the closure of the Delhi College in 1877. The commercial importance of the city grew as more railways intersected at Delhi. The city was the junction for six railways in 1911.

2

The villages also had kanungos, patwaris, and chaukidars.

were either elected on a limited franchise, appointed by the deputy commissioner, or nominated from the civil service. This entire administrative edifice was wholly staffed by Indians with one European civilian, the deputy commissioner, in overall charge of the city and its associated territories.

The population of the District of Delhi in 1911 was 657,000, which made it eighteenth in population out of the 45 districts and native states in the Punjab Province. The District had an area of about 1,300 square miles, which gave it a mean density of 510 people per square mile. This density was the third highest in the Province. The District had a net loss in population between 1901 and 1911. The decrease of 32,000 was due mainly to the poor state of agriculture in the District which depended largely upon an erratic rainfall.¹

On 1 October 1912 the Province of Delhi officially came into existence. The Province included all of the Delhi Tahsil and the Mahrauli Police Thana from the Ballabgarh Tahsil.² The rest of the Ballabgarh Tahsil went to Gurgaon District and all of the Sonapat Tahsil went to Rohtak District. The Province was then 557

1

Census of India, 1911, XIV (Punjab), Part II (Tables).

2

It was originally planned to take the whole of Delhi District as the new province, but Sir Louis Dane, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, argued against it on the grounds that Washington, D.C. and Canberra had shown that an excess of land was more of an encumbrance than an asset. RDDA, Home File 19 Part A 1913, 'Scheme for the Administration of the Province of Delhi.' The Government of India Act 1912 (2 & 3 George V, c. 6) provided the enabling legislation for the administrative changes.

square miles in area with a population of 391,828. In 1915 Delhi Province acquired the Shahdara Police Thana from the District of Meerut in the United Provinces.¹ Delhi Province then encompassed 591 square miles with a population of approximately 412,000. The Province included 314 villages, in which approximately 150,000 people lived, and the Delhi urban area of 16 square miles, in which a population of approximately 260,000 resided.² The rural areas retained the lambardars, zaildars and tahsildar and the police thanas that had existed previously. The new area from the United Provinces operated under the law from that Province, and the rest of Delhi Province retained the law of the Punjab. The Province also retained the government prosecutor and the treasurer from the old Delhi District. Most of the other functions remained under the Government of the Punjab. The inspector of factories and boilers, the inspector of schools, the management and staff of the Lunatic Asylum and Jail, the judiciary, and the civil service cadre all came from the Punjab.³

1

The reason for this acquisition was to provide land to pasture cattle, and to provide a garden area for the city. RDDA, Education File 42 Part B 1916.

2

Table 1-B contains the population statistics for the various administrative units.

3

RDDA, Home File 1 Part B 1913, 'Constitution of Delhi Province'; Home File 18 Part A 1913, 'Limitations of the Period for which a Chief Commissioner May Hold the Same Office'; Home File 29 Part A 1913.

A chief commissioner took control of the new Province.¹ There were several reasons for appointing a chief commissioner the head of the new province, the most important of which was the fact that a chief commissioner was an ex official member of the Imperial Legislative Council. Many of the officials in the Government of India felt that the Morley-Minto Reforms had reduced the official majority in the Council too quickly and too drastically, and the appointment of a chief commissioner redressed the balance somewhat.² The first chief commissioner of the Province of Delhi was William Malcolm Hailey.³

The executive, protective, and judicial functions in Delhi City remained as they had been when the city was a part of Delhi District.⁴ The deputy commissioner

1

It is interesting to note that the Central Provinces and Berar had an area of over 100,000 square miles and a population of 14,000,000. It too was under the direction of a chief commissioner.

2

RDDA, Home file 29 Part A 1913.

3

William Malcolm Hailey, later Lord Hailey, O.M., was born in 1872, I.C.S. 1895, Secretary Punjab Government 1907, Chief Commissioner Delhi 1912-8, Finance Member Government of India 1919-22, Home Member 1922-24, Governor Punjab 1924-9, Governor United Provinces 1929-34, author of An African Survey 1938, member of the Permanent Mandates Commission 1935-9. There is a short polemic against him in Joachim Alva, Men and Supermen of Hindustan (Bombay, 1943), pp. 151-72.

4

The establishments of the various departments are listed in Table 2-A. The number of people registered in the Census as government servants are listed in Table 2-B.

still handled the local administrative problems. He was also the district magistrate and the ex-officio president of the Municipal Committee. The city had a tahsildar and a naib-tahsildar and each mohalla had a leader who was called a choudhri or a mohalladar. The tahsildar, among other duties, reported to the Municipal Committee on the infringements of its bye-laws. The mohalladar, a person who had declined in prestige and influence under British rule, had virtually no power, but he was responsible for reporting births and deaths. Under Mogul rule he had been a person of high social status and had acted as a vehicle of communication between the mohalla residents and the city administration. There is no indication why the position declined in prestige and power, but it was probably because the British tried to use the mohalladar as a reporter for police intelligence. By the 1890s they had almost become nonentities.¹

The police force in the city of Delhi did not carry any more prestige than the mohalladars. The inhabitants of the city thoroughly disliked the men entrusted with their protection and refused to cooperate with them at the best of times.² Much of the antipathy which the public showed toward the police was the result of the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the force. These characteristics arose as a result of the fact that the

1

RDDA, Records of the Chief Commissioner of Delhi Division, Number 48, 'Id and Muharram Celebrations 1890'.

2

RDDA, Home File 181 Part B 1917, 'Annual Police Report of Delhi Province for 1916'.

force was illiterate, understaffed, and underpaid.¹ The police force always had a European as senior superintendent, and a European as deputy superintendent in charge of the Criminal Investigation Department.² These officials were faced, however, with a subordinate staff that was overwhelmingly illiterate.³ This was because

¹ RDDA, Home File 248 Part B 1913, 'Annual Police Administration Report of the Delhi Province for 1912'; Home File 223 Part B 1914, 'Annual Police Administration Report of Delhi Province for 1913'; Home File 317 Part B 1914, 'Annual Criminal Justice Report of Delhi Province for the Year 1913'; Home File 297 Part B 1915, 'Annual Criminal Justice Report of Delhi Province for 1914'; Home File 304 Part B 1915, 'Annual Civil Justice Report of Delhi Province for the Year 1914'; and Home File 181 Part B 1917.

²The police in Delhi were divided into three areas: the Criminal Investigation Department, traffic and patrol. The C.I.D. dealt with crimes of a penal and seditious - or potentially seditious - nature. They spent a good deal of time and energy on translating newspaper articles, investigating presses and journals, compiling a weekly Police Abstract, and recording speeches at meetings. Muslims were usually in charge of the traffic and patrol divisions. The police supplied the fire brigade, a particularly inefficient and ineffective organisation. Once a fire was reported it took at least 45 minutes for the engine to get up steam. In 1916 there were 42 fires reported and only 14 attended as the fires were out before the engine left the station. It is more than probable that many fires were not reported since little purpose was served. To rectify this matter the Chief Commissioner ordered that steam should be kept up at all times to reduce the time lag to five minutes. There was no vehicle to transport the policemen accompanying the engine, and they had to run alongside the engine with a hand cart of coal to feed the engine. After running two miles they were in no condition to fight a fire.

³

Table 2-C contains the number of police who were literate and illiterate and who were Muslim and Hindu.

the force drew its recruits from the rural areas surrounding the Delhi urban area, the majority of whom were illiterate (75 per cent in 1913). The problem of illiteracy was never solved since the conditions of work and the pay were not designed to attract qualified and intelligent persons. The result was an impossible situation in which a constable on traffic duty was unable to record what he witnessed for subsequent investigation.

The weakness in numbers of the police force in Delhi also contributed to its inefficiency and ineffectiveness. There were less inspectors, sergeants, and sub-inspectors in Delhi in proportion to the subordinate staff than in most other cities in India. The fact that the C.I.D. utilised a large number of the inspectors and sergeants, those members who were most literate, exacerbated the problem as it left more of the traffic and patrol duties to head constables and constables than was usual elsewhere.

The police force in Delhi faced one more problem. Delhi was supposed to have a reserve force of up to 20 per cent to handle unusual demands, such as riots, the 31 annual processions, and visits to the capital by important persons. It was not until 1920 that this reserve strength was achieved when the administration was able to hire 200 ex-soldiers to assist during the non-co-operation movement. Since the force was understaffed both in terms of distribution and numbers, those who should have been employed in normal activities had to be detailed to different duties, which in turn left portions of the city unpatrolled, traffic uncontrolled,

and large numbers of the force overworked as increasingly unusual demands were made of them.

The low scale of remuneration of the police contributed directly to the problems of illiteracy and understaffing. A member of the police force received from Rs. 9 to Rs. 12 per mensem with a Rs. 1 City Allowance in 1912, the same pay as an unskilled coolie. The Administration in Delhi had to compete with the Punjab Police Force which instituted pay scales of a more attractive nature. This accounted to a large degree for the 102 resignations in 1914. It also contributed to the fall in the number of recruits from 304 in 1912 to 200 in 1913 and to 145 in 1916.

The judiciary in Delhi did not suffer from the same problems with which the police force had to contend. It was adequately staffed with a district sessions judge and subordinate judges and magistrates. The district judge, who was always a European, was under the jurisdiction of the Punjab High Court and handled both civil and criminal cases. Under the district judge there was a judge of the Small Causes Court who was usually an Indian. There was also a system of magisterial courts which handled civil and criminal cases as stipulated by the Criminal and Civil Procedure codes. The deputy commissioner was the chief magistrate. An additional commissioner either European or Indian (in Delhi usually European) helped relieve him of his load and an extra additional commissioner (usually Indian) further alleviated the judicial load. Below these were the honorary magistrates, second class and first class.

Honorary magistrates (second class) were appointed in Delhi under section 12 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898. They were appointed for a term of three years with no restrictions on reappointment. There were 14 such magistrates within the Municipality: seven of whom were Hindu and seven Muslim. The appointees were men who commanded prestige and influence and who supported government. They were active in public life; represented some substantial interest in the city; and usually had no legal experience.

There were two honorary magistrates (first class) in Delhi. They could try more important cases and usually came from the ranks of the more experienced and more successful second-class magistrates. There was normally one Hindu and one Muslim first-class magistrate, but in 1922 two Hindus were appointed which gave rise to a certain amount of parochial feeling.¹

The above system had to contend with 4,350 criminal cases and 6,873 civil cases in 1914. Yet the number of people who were tried did not reflect the prevalence of crime in the city. Rather, it indicated the perseverance and success of the police who sought to improve the conditions in the city through a high standard of sanitation and traffic control consequent to the improved status of the city.²

¹ RDDA, Home File 427 Part B 1913, 'Appointment of Haji Abdul Ghani and S. Nathu Ram as Honorary Magistrates Delhi'; Foreign File 10 Part B 1919, 'Celebration of Peace at Delhi'; Home File 3 (7) Part B 1922, 'Grant of Magisterial Powers to Honorary Officials in Delhi Province.'

² Table 2-D indicates the number of people who encountered the judicial system in Delhi in 1913 and 1914.

The proportion of those convicted to those who were brought to trial was always under 50 per cent, a ratio which reflected several problems confronted by the judiciary. The first problem, which the Deputy Commissioner criticised harshly, arose from the indiscriminate issue of summons by Indian magistrates. The Indian magistrates demanded much less evidence to issue warrants than European magistrates, with the consequence that the former gave 'themselves a lot of extra work and the people unnecessary worry.'¹

A second problem arose from the fact that people projected personal disagreements and vendettas into the legal system. A third problem was the reluctance of the ordinary citizen to have anything to do with the police. Their response to appeals from the police ranged from reticence to a 'systematic withholding' of evidence.² The Deputy Commissioner complained bitterly that considering this factor, 'the courts before daring to convict expect a standard of evidence which in India is really unobtainable.'³

The Administration in Delhi recognised a definite ranking of a status in the province. Europeans who were civilians and Europeans in business and in the professions formed two sections of a small elite. The

1

RDDA, Home File 317 Part B 1914.

2

RDDA, Home File 248 Part B 1913.

3

Ibid.; He was referring to European judges.

rest of Indian society was then accorded status in the following descending order: darbaris, title-holders, honorary magistrates, active Indian civilians and retired Indian civilians, municipal commissioners, and finally members of the District Board. The Administration relied upon this élite as the thin edge of a wedge pointed downward into Indian society. They were expected to explain and popularise the views of the government to groups and individuals with whom they came into contact, who would in turn disseminate these views to the wider community. The government hoped to communicate with all the significant elements in the society in this way. The élite were also expected to inform the government of the various currents of opinion within the society.

The system worked fairly well as long as the government chose people who were representative of the various significant sections of society. It began to break down when nationalist sentiment crystallised around leaders other than those who occupied positions of honour conferred by the government. This is one of the major themes of the rise of nationalism in India. Its significance lies in the fact that the government found no alternative means to accomplish the same ends. They perpetuated the old system, even though it declined in value, and began to rely more upon C.I.D. reports for information about public opinion. But this system worked only one way since there was no group which could effectively communicate the policy of the government to the community.

The darbar which existed under Mogul rule as a court assemblage was taken over by the British and became the

apex of their system of social patronage. Whenever there was an official occasion, or function of state, there was a strict order of precedence in the seating arrangements. The first Indians to be seated were the darbaris. These were classified in the Punjab as either provincial or divisional. The provincial darbaris were considered people of eminence throughout the province, while divisional darbaris were considered important only within their division. There were always more divisional than provincial darbaris. By the twentieth century the position had become inheritable. The wealthiest families which supported the government or those which performed some outstanding service for the state (for example, famine relief, heroic deeds during the Mutiny of 1857, or government service in a high rank) were appointed. When the eldest member of the family died, the new head of the family applied for the distinction of his predecessor and was very rarely refused.

The system underwent a change in Delhi after 1911. The provincial and divisional distinctions were retained but the numbers in each became equal and were kept at eight. This was quite a change from 1906 when there were 26 divisional darbaris.¹ Entry became possible only when a darbari died without any sons in Delhi, and the position lapsed from the family. It also became a usual practice to promote divisional darbaris to the position of

1

RDDA, Foreign File 6 (b) Part B 1920, 'Recommendation of Certain Persons in Delhi for Divisional Darbaris.' 17 of the 26 had either died with no sons or had moved out of the District. In either case no new appointments were made to the list in their place.

provincial darbari and then promote the most eminent title holder to divisional darbari. This meant that while there were only three or four darbaris who held titles in 1911, by 1920 all darbaris were title holders. The smaller numbers and the closed system meant that fewer people were rewarded; but those who received rewards could count on climbing ever slowly toward the apex.

There were a large number of Indian title holders in Delhi in 1911. The highest distinction conferred upon an Indian was Companion of the Indian Empire (C.I.E.). Lala Sheo Pershad, a Khatri, was an honorary magistrate and banker of Delhi. He received the title of rai sahib in 1908 as a leading citizen who was noted for his 'generosity and loyalty'. He received a C.I.E. in 1911 for his conspicuous wealth and position in Delhi. He was then appointed a provincial darbari for his wealth, position, generosity, and titles. There was one other C.I.E. in Delhi, Rai Bahadur Lala Nanak Chand, a Bania, who received his title for service in Indore State.¹

Below the title of C.I.E., the names of the titles were different for Hindus and Muslims. In descending order the Hindus were rai bahadur, mahamahapadhyaya and rai sahib. The Muslims were khan bahadur, khan sahib, shams-ul-ulema, hazik-ul-mulk and shifa-ul-mulk.² The

¹ RDDA, Foreign File 26 Part B 1913, 'List of Provincial and Divisional Darbaris, Kurshi Nashins and Titleholders of the Delhi Province.'

² The title of kurshi nashin [those who could sit in the presence of civil officers] occupied the bottom run of the ladder of distinction below the District Board. It was strictly limited to 35.

names themselves were not important as they just marked the passage of people up the ladder of government esteem. They were, however, greatly valued and much sought after by distinguished citizens of Delhi.

There were 22 Hindus and 15 Muslims who held titles in Delhi in 1912. The titles were not heritable, but it became the practice to confer a title on the son of a title-holder. If the family was very outstanding the son might receive the same title which meant he would climb higher up the ladder in his life time. If the family did not possess large resources of wealth, status, or power, the son started from lower down the ladder and he might or might not exceed his father. The numbers were not as static as was the case with the darbaris. People looked forward to two times a year, New Year's Day and the King's Birthday, when one or two citizens of Delhi would receive a title. Government servants, municipal commissioners, honorary magistrates, and very wealthy families could all aspire to a title and not be disappointed.

The Municipal Committee was the only elected body in the Delhi urban area. The status of its members was fairly low since a municipal commissioner ranked only above a member of the District Board, but they did control a certain amount of power. Very few men of the Committee held a title, but continuous membership on the Committee usually ensured some type of honorary recognition. Membership was generally continuous since incumbent commissioners rarely had to contest an election.

The Municipal Committee had 11 members who were elected triennially, eight appointed members, and five official members.¹ This gave the Administration and its appointees a majority. The elected seats were usually divided between six Muslims and five Hindus. This was always counterbalanced by the appointment of one Muslim and two Hindus. The appointed members represented various interests in the city, most of which were thought to be very important politically and which would not be represented by an elected member. The most important of these were the Punjab Chamber of Commerce, the European community, the Shias, the Sikhs and the Jains. The president of the Committee was always the Deputy Commissioner. The senior vice president was always a Hindu and the junior vice president was always a Muslim.²

1

The electors had to be male, 21 years of age, and either the owner of premises the tax on which was at least Rs. 1/8/- per year, or the renter of a house the tax on which was Rs. 4/-/-. The candidates had to be male, 21 years of age, and either the owner of a house the tax on which was Rs 13/5/- per year, or the payer of not less than Rs 35/-/- in income tax. RDDA, Education File 16 Part B 1914, 'Proceedings of the Meetings of the Delhi Municipal Committee.'

2

The Municipal Committee had nine standing sub-committees which covered the respective areas of income, expenditure, and control:

Sanitation	Hackney carriage and veterinary
Municipal Works	Building
Octroi	Finance
Direct tax and <u>nazul</u>	Lighting
Education	

III

There were two systems of education in the city of Delhi in 1911. Students attended schools which were governmentally operated or they attended private institutions. Private institutions, in turn, were of three types: schools to which the government contributed a grant-in-aid, schools which the government recognised but which they did not aid, and schools which the Government neither aided nor recognised.¹ The unaided and unrecognised private schools, and the primary schools of the Municipal Committee and District Board were the poorest of the lot. They invariably provided untrained teachers, unsuitable physical facilities, and impecunious students, the majority of whom manifested no ability. Both systems contained a

1

RDDA, Education File 8 Part A 1917, 'Quinquennial Report on the Progress of Education in the Delhi Province for the Period Ending 31 March 1917'; Education File 3 (66) Part B 1922, 'Quinquennial Report on Education in Delhi Province for 1917-22'.

large number of vernacular schools and a small number of anglo-vernacular schools.¹

The schools which the students attended provided only the minimum facilities for an education. Of the 110 primary schools in Delhi in 1916, only 36 had their own buildings. The middle schools and high schools fared no better. Most of the schools rented quarters which were overcrowded, poorly ventilated, and inadequately lighted. There were few facilities for science courses, few good text books which the students could afford, and few trained teachers. Out of the 540 teachers in 1916, only 141 (26 per cent) were trained, the majority of whom taught in the government high schools.

1

The relevant figures for education in Delhi are as follows:

	<u>1912</u>	<u>1916</u>	<u>1921</u>
Students in primary schools	3,687	6,064	5,439
Students in secondary schools	2,335	2,935	6,332
Students in tertiary schools	185	538	875
Students in girls schools	988	2,003	2,744
Students in private schools	3,697	2,965	4,539
(Muslim students in all schools)	<u>n.a.</u>	<u>(3,788)</u>	<u>(5,795)</u>
Total students:	<u>10,892</u>	<u>14,505</u>	<u>19,525</u>
Number of primary schools (Male)	69	96	132
(Female)	9	14	21
Number of secondary schools (Male)	8	12	33
(Female)	3	8	10
Number of tertiary institutions	2	3	5
Number of private schools	<u>100</u>	<u>87</u>	<u>96</u>
Total number of schools:	<u>191</u>	<u>220</u>	<u>296</u>

[N.B. Totals for 1921 do not include students in national schools] RDDA, Education File 8 Part A 1917; Education File 3 (66) Part B 1922.

The number of students who attended school in proportion to the number of children of school age [participation rate] was fairly substantial. It was, however, highly imbalanced in favour of males.¹ The participation rate tended to fluctuate during the War especially in the vernacular middle schools. The parents of students in these schools were usually of the lower middle class who put some value in education, but who were hardest hit when wartime inflation began. The education of their children was one of their more expendable items.²

The students themselves did not fare well in the educational system in Delhi. Those who came from wealthy families, or those who lived in hostels, suffered few problems; but the vast majority of students

1

The participation rate for students was as follows:

	<u>1912</u>	<u>1921</u>
Total males aged 5-15	26,838	34,841
Total male students	9,904	16,781
Participation rate	36.4	48.1
Total females aged 5-15	21,863	27,503
Total female students	988	2,744
Participation	4.5	9.9
Total participation rate	22.3	31.3
Participation rate Muslim males	n.a.	37.7
Participation rate Muslim females	n.a.	3.0
Participation rate non-Muslim males	n.a.	55.5
Participation rate non-Muslim females	n.a.	15.3

RDDA, Education File 8 Part A 1917; Education File 3 (66) Part B 1922.

2

RDDA, Education File 8 Part A 1917.

who lived at home suffered educationally and physically. The headmasters of the local high schools unanimously agreed that:

...the health of school-boys is decidedly inferior to that of boys who do not attend school and our experience leads us to attribute this inferiority to several causes: (1) the confinement of boys in class rooms not generally suited to the purpose; (2) the close application to study in the home where rooms are badly lighted and ventilated; (3) the lack of nourishing food either in quality or in quantity in the case of the poor who make great sacrifices in order to educate their sons; and (4) the strain of studying through the medium of a foreign language at a time when there is a drain on the strength owing to the growth of the body.¹

Girls faced the additional problem of absenteeism because they had to assist in the 'innumerable festivals in their houses.'²

1

RDDA, Education File 2 Part A 1918, 'Alleged Deterioration in the Health of Students Caused by the Present System of Examination.' Headmaster, Government School, Delhi, to Chief Commissioner, Delhi, 11 January 1918. The Chief Commissioner agreed with this description when he stated: '...the comparative...poorness of the physique of students (which is certainly a noticeable fact in the case of Delhi)...[is] deep-seated. The whole system of education involves a great strain on boys who are, for the most part, strangers to the idea that physical culture is almost as important as mental; and it must be remembered that many students are, very badly nurtured, and work at home in conditions which militate against health. They are, moreover, many of them subject to the unusual strain involved by an early puberty and by the commencement of their married life before completing their education.' Chief Commissioner, Delhi, to Secretary, Department of Education, Government of India, 17 January 1918.

2

RDDA, Education File 3 (66) Part B 1922.

Most of the religious communities in Delhi supported one or more private aided schools through which they sought to inculcate religious values and a religious identity among the young members of the community.¹ These schools maintained fairly high standards and received strong financial support from their communities.² It was rare for a member of one religious community to attend a private school which another community supported, except for the Christian mission schools which members from all the religious communities attended.³

¹ RDDA, Education File 228 Part B 1915, 'Annual Report on the State of Education in Delhi Province for 1914-5.'

² The aided and recognised schools run by the various religious groups in Delhi were as follows in 1914:

<u>S.P.G. Mission</u>		<u>Baptist Mission</u>	
1 College		3 Primary schools for boys	
1 High school		3 Primary schools for girls	
15 Primary schools for boys			
4 Primary schools for girls			
<u>Muslims</u>		<u>Hindus</u>	
1 High school		1 College	
12 Primary schools for boys		2 High schools	
		2 Primary schools for boys	
		4 Primary schools for girls	
<u>Bengalis</u>			
1 High school			

RDDA, Education File 228 Part B 1915.

³ All the religious communities felt quite safe in sending their children to Christian mission schools for several reasons. No student who attended a mission school had ever been converted to Christianity, and the higher standard of instruction and facilities were attractive to many parents who were interested in a good education for their children. Some even thought that the moral effect of compulsory religious training at the mission schools was most desirable as was the insistence on discipline and the regularity of conduct at the schools. RDDA, Confidential File 105 (1916), 'Introduction of a Conscience Clause in Aided Schools.'

There were two noticeable trends in private education in Delhi between 1911 and 1921. The first trend was that the unaided denominational schools of the Hindus received less and less support. The efforts of the Hindu community concentrated instead on fewer schools but better schools and most new schools applied for a grant-in-aid. The second trend noticeable in private education was that the Muslim community took increasing pride in its ability to provide sectarian education on modern lines for its students. The Quinquennial Report for 1917-21 commented upon these trends:

Indigenous and special schools require little comment. They are ceasing to exist. Mohammadans have accepted the value of modern education. This does not imply any yielding of their appreciation of the predominant claims of religion. On the contrary, the combination of religious and secular education is producing in the Anglo-Arabic High School a communal life, with laws on a common ethical basis, that approaches the English public school society more closely than is possible in the mixed community of a government school, and which is not attained in other denominational schools.¹

The Muslims developed their sectarian educational system to the extent that the Inspector of Schools could report in 1920 that the Muslim community had provided a school for every mohalla.²

Various groups within the Hindu community supported the establishment of new schools. Rai Kidar Nath led a

¹ RDDA, Education File 3 (66) Part B 1922.

² RDDA, Education File 149 Part B 1920, 'Pressures for Improving Mohamman Education in Delhi.'

most important group which was composed of professionals, well-placed civilians, and wealthy merchants who had all received a 'liberal' western education. He was a retired district judge with a substantial amount of personal wealth. He had supported the Hindu College when it faced financial difficulties during the War; he helped establish the Ramjas High School and subsequently supported the establishment of a second Ramjas High School.¹ He was also active in the foundation in 1917 of the third college in Delhi, Ramjas College, an institution which was designed to cater for 'advanced' Hindus who were neither sanatani [orthodox] nor Arya Samajist.² The sanatanis followed the lead of Rai Bahadur Amba Pershad, a large grain contractor, who provided a large part of the funds for the new building into which the Anglo-Sanskrit High School moved in 1920.³ The Arya Samajists opened two high schools in 1919: the Dayanand Anglo-Vernacular High School and the Dayanand Residential High School. All of these schools received grants-in-aid from the government.

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Rai Kidar Nath was a rai sahib, and was appointed to the Provisional Executive Council of Delhi University in 1922.

2

RDDA, Education File 100 Part B 1917, 'Question of the Affiliation of, and Grant of a Maintenance Grant-in-Aid to, the Ram Jas College, Delhi.' The other two colleges were St. Stephen's Mission College and the Hindu College. There was in addition a commercial college and a college which taught Ayurvedic and Unani systems of medicine.

3

RDDA, Education File 3 (66) Part B 1922. Amba Pershad was the president of the Kerana Committee discussed below.

The 39 per cent increase in the number of schools in Delhi and the increase in the number of high schools and colleges had a salubrious effect upon education in Delhi. The total number of students increased by 35 per cent between 1916 and 1921 during which period Muslim students increased by 52 per cent and non-Muslim students by 28 per cent. The most notable increase among non-Muslims was a 40 per cent increase in the number of female students as the education of females became a pressing concern for the Hindu community.¹

The emphasis upon education in both Muslim and Hindu society had an effect upon the rate of literacy in the city. The number of Muslims who were literate rose by 3,482 (76 per cent) between 1901 and 1911 and by 6,084 (76 per cent) between 1911 and 1921. The number of Hindus who were literate in Delhi increased by 4,790 (47 per cent) between 1901 and 1911 and by 5,789 (38 per cent) between 1911 and 1921. The rate of literacy among Muslims climbed from 5 per cent in 1901 to 8 per cent in 1911 and to 12 per cent in 1921. The rate of literacy among Hindus climbed from 9 per cent in 1901 to 12 per cent in 1911 and remained unchanged in 1921.² It is

¹ RDDA, Education File 6 Part A 1916, 'Female Education in India.'

²

Census of India, 1901, XII (Punjab and North-West Frontier Provinces), Part II (Tables); Census of India, 1911, XIV, Pt. II; Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II. The number of people who were literate were as follows:

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Hindus</u>	<u>Muslims</u>
1901	17,744	10,285	4,564
1911	27,354	15,075	8,046
1921	43,842	20,864	14,130

quite apparent that the Muslims of Delhi had finally awakened to the value of education and literacy and that they were implementing this lesson.

IV

Delhi was a city of great commercial and industrial importance in northern India. It had been one of the outstanding commercial centres of upper India during the Mogul era, and during the few decades prior to 1911 it began to rival Cawnpore and Amritsar as an industrial centre.¹ The central position of the city in relation to the three major ports and the fact that six railway lines met there, were largely responsible for its complete dominance over the south-east Punjab, western United Provinces and northern Rajputana, and for its relative importance throughout these three provinces. The presence of an enterprising and affluent commercial class reinforced the advantages provided by geography and tradition.

Delhi in 1911 relied more upon its commerce than upon its industry for its economic well-being. The Personal Assistant to the Chief Commissioner outlined the position of commerce in the city to the Indian Industrial Commission.² He stated that when the Province was created in 1912, Delhi was well known as a large distribution centre for imported goods, among the most important of which were cotton piece-goods, cheap glass, umbrellas, haberdashery and hardware. The Province was

¹ Punjab District Gazetteers, V (Delhi District), 1912, Part A, p. 161.

² RDDA, Commerce File 5 Part A 1916, 'Preliminary Note on Industries at Delhi for the Indian Industrial Commission.'

the centre par excellence in northern India for trade in precious stones due to the presence of a number of expert jewellers and stone cutters. The Province exported some luxury articles which were remnants of the Mogul past; these included gold embroidery, ivory carving and miniature painting. It also possessed a considerable trade in ironware, sugarcane mills, country shoes, and Delhi caps. Hides, skins, and cotton were the only products of raw material that the Province exported. The Province also provided considerable financial resources, with the existence of the branches of eight banks under European managers, a number of 'so-called Indian banks', and an even larger number of firms which extended 'financial facilities'.

The value in rupees of commerce to Delhi can be seen from the value of exports from the city which according to the Secretary of the Punjab Chamber of Commerce, was Rs. 4,09,30,100.¹ The single most important commodity was apparel, which included drapery, haberdashery, millinery, uniforms, accoutrements, boots, and shoes. The five other most important products were

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R.J. Denning compiled the report for Delhi Province for the Indian Industrial Commission. RDDA, Commerce File 77 Part B 1916, 'Appointment of an Industrial Commission to Enquire about Expansion & Development of Indian Manufactures and Industries.' He listed 119 commodities from which he obtained the value of total exports from Delhi. RDDA, Commerce File 5 Part A 1916.

jute, hides, raw cotton, skins, and drugs.¹ These six commodities represented 50 per cent of the total value of exports from Delhi.

There were five major organisations representing the important commercial activities in the city.² These associations drew upon western models with a secular spirit, but their membership came primarily from the Hindu Community which dominated commerce in Delhi. Each association had less resources of wealth, status, and power than the preceding one; each association had less cohesion than the preceding one; and each association suffered from a decreasing ability to mobilise its resources.

The Punjab Chamber of Commerce was the most influential and most exclusive commercial organisation

1

The imports and exports of the six most important redistributive products in 1914 were as follows:

	<u>Imports</u> (maunds)	<u>Exports</u> (maunds)	<u>Value of</u> <u>Exports</u> (Rs.)
Apparel	11,696	36,040	89,87,475
Jute bags and cloth	2,08,020	2,25,627	35,35,998
Raw cow hides	76,280	86,998	31,33,287
Raw cotton	79,944	76,947	19,09,247
Raw sheep skins	75,765	51,557	17,50,521
Drugs	25,989	31,477	<u>11,45,960</u>
Total:			<u>2,04,62,488</u>

RDDA, Commerce File 5 Part A 1916.

2

Table 3-A contains a list of the number of traders in the various commodities.

in Delhi. Its membership included the eight European banks, the six railways, most of the trade and industry under European ownership and control, and the largest and most important indigenous concerns. Its membership totalled almost 50 business enterprises, some of which were located in Amritsar and Lahore.¹ The Chamber had the right to nominate one member for the Punjab Legislative Council and one member for the Delhi Municipal Committee. The latter perquisite was enlarged to two in 1922 to enable the Chamber to nominate one European and one Indian from its membership. The nominations previous to 1922 were usually European. The Chamber always had a European president and a full-time European secretary. This secretary also served as the secretary of the Delhi Piece Goods Association. The Chamber commanded the greatest resources of wealth, status, and power of all the organisations in the city and its members were unequalled in prestige and influence.

The second most important economic organisation in Delhi was the Delhi Piece Goods Association. Its members were the Europeans and Indians who dealt with imported cloth. It had an estimated 100 members, some of whom were located in Amritsar and Cawnpore. The Association computed that the imports with which its members dealt contributed up to 25 per cent of the tax revenue of the Municipal Committee.² Some of its members were also members of the Punjab Chamber of Commerce. The majority

1

RDDA, Education File 4 Part A 1922, 'Reconstitution of the Delhi Municipal Committee.'

2

Ibid.

of the members were retailers for the Delhi market and wholesalers for cloth merchants in the small towns and villages throughout the hinterland. The economic power of the members over this area was almost absolute.¹ The Association itself and most of its members could not draw upon as much wealth, status and power as the Punjab Chamber of Commerce, but it certainly drew upon more prestige and influence than any of the other associations in the city.² It received recognition of this fact in 1922 when it achieved the right to nominate one member to the Municipal Committee.

The Delhi Piece Goods Association exhibited a certain amount of cohesiveness, but it could succumb to dissension on occasion. In 1914 a group of Indian members petitioned government that the leaders of the organisation did not respond to the wishes of the members.³

¹ During the Rowlatt Satyagraha in 1919 these merchants were accused of using their monopoly to enforce hartals in surrounding towns. This charge was proven false, but no one questioned the fact that the merchants had the ability to bring such pressure to bear. (Many of the charges were produced by cloth merchants in the outlying towns and villages because of resentment, which is indicative of the relations that some members of this organisation had with their clients.) RDDA, Confidential File 262 (1919), 'The Disorders Inquiry Committee.'

2

At one point in 1922, the members of the Association estimated their inventory at £4 million in piece goods. NAI, Home Poll 1922/18. 'Report on the Political Situation in India during the Month of July and the First Fortnight of August 1922,' Chief Commissioner, Delhi, to S.P. O'Donnell, 17 July 1922.

3

NAI, Home Poll 4 Deposit, December 1914, 'Petition of the Choudhris of the Delhi Piece Goods Market.'

And again in 1922 another division occurred. When the Municipal Committee was reconstituted the D.P.G.A. was allowed to nominate one member. A special committee of six met and nominated the Chairman, Mr J.C. Roberts, with two of the six members dissenting. The Indian members of the Association then petitioned the Chief Commissioner to invalidate the nomination and to call a general meeting of the entire membership at which an Indian member could be nominated.¹ There was friction within the Association over whose views were to predominate, the minority of European members, or the majority of Indian members. The Indian members undoubtedly wanted the Europeans as members because of the prestige and influence their membership gave the organisation, but they did not want the Europeans to exercise a decisive voice. The Europeans, on the other hand, did not mind contributing their prestige and influence to the organisation on the condition that they had a decisive influence over its policy. The nomination of a European to represent the Association on the Municipal Committee indicated which group had the most influential voice.

The Delhi Hindustani Mercantile Association was another significant commercial organisation in Delhi. The important difference between it and the D.P.G.A.

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RDDA, Education File 4 Part A 1922. The petitioners were refused. The disagreement did not lead to open conflict, however, as one of the outstanding Indian members of the Association was elected to the Municipal Committee for Ward II (Chandni Chauk) against the Congress candidate.

was that the latter dealt primarily with imported cloth while the D.H.M.A. dealt with indigenous products. It had an estimated membership of 450, all of whom were Indian.¹ The resources of wealth, status, and power that the D.H.M.A. or its individual members could draw upon were more limited than those of the Punjab Chamber of Commerce and also more limited than those of the D.P.G.A. Its petition to nominate a member for the Municipal Committee was refused in 1922. The wider range of commodities with which its members dealt, the large number of members, and the heterogeneity of its membership in terms of the diverse social, religious, financial, and educational characteristics and achievements, restricted the cohesiveness of the organisation.

The Kirana Committee in Delhi faced many of the problems which plagued the D.H.M.A. The Kirana Committee was a loosely organised group of small grocers who used the organisation to settle disputes among themselves. The Committee computed that its members (along with the grain, sugar, and ghee merchants) paid 50 per cent of the tax revenue of the Municipal Committee. The resources of wealth, status, and power that the Committee or any of its members could draw upon, however, were quite limited for a number of reasons. The Committee found it almost impossible to mobilise its members on any issue mainly because of its size and lack of cohesion. The range of social, religious, financial, and educational characteristics and achievements of the members were so diverse that only a minimal amount of

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RDDA, Education File 4 Part A 1922.

cohesion was possible and the large membership presented a problem of organisation.¹ The organisation also faced the problem that the members who traded in grain, sugar, and ghee had separate panchayats which fulfilled the same function as the Kirana Committee. And finally the organisation lacked strong leadership. The Committee was quite content to follow the lead of Rai Sahib Amba Pershad, even though he generally acted in his own individual interests. All of these reasons led the Chief Commissioner to dismiss with impunity the petition of the Committee for a representative on the Municipal Committee.

The Indian Bankers' Association was the fifth most important commercial organisation in Delhi. Those money lenders who had incorporated themselves as banks and other important money lenders belonged to this Association. Rai Bahadur Sri Kishan Das was the president of the Association whose individual members had quite large resources of wealth, status and power. The Association had little influence, however, because the traditional inclinations of the Indian money lenders prevented them from participating in an organisation that had more than the most tenuous control over its members. The Association also suffered for want of influence because of the straightened economic circumstances of the Indian

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The exact membership of the Kirana Committee was not stated, but it was confidently estimated as larger than the Delhi Hindustani Mercantile Association. A petition to the Municipal Committee contained the signatures of 167 members. RDDA, Education File 4 Part A 1922. There were 2,463 people involved in such trade in 1911 and 7,601 in 1921. See Table 3-A.

banker and money lender. The number of people employed in this endeavour declined between 1911 and 1921 by 1,578 or 60 per cent, a decline which came about mainly through the banking crash of 1913-14.¹ The Chief Commissioner dismissed the application of the Indian Bankers' Association for representation on the Municipal Committee.²

There were, in addition to the foregoing commercial organisations, a number of professional organisations in the city, the most important of which were the Bar Association and the Sub-Assistant Surgeons' Association.³ They had a small number of European and a large number of Indian members. They obviously had less wealth than the commercial organisations but their prestige and influence were just as important. And even though the members came from different religions, communities and castes, the homogeneity of their education, income, and status resulted in a cohesiveness that was absent in most other organisations in the city. These organisations had the greatest ability to mobilise their resources, but only rarely did so, and certainly never for political agitation.

In 1918 two other professional groups organised themselves into associations. The accountants formed the Indraprasth Karmachari Mandal with a membership of 300.⁴

¹ See Table 3-A.

² RDDA, Education File 4 Part A 1922.

³ Table 3-B contains a list of the various professions in Delhi.

⁴ RDDA, Confidential File 227 (1918), 'List of Political, Quasi-Political and Religious Societies, Sabhas and Anjumans in Delhi Province for the Year Ending the 30th June 1918.'

They, like the members of the other two professional organisations, had diverse social origins. But they also derived a high degree of cohesiveness from similar education, income, and status. Their individual and collective resources of wealth, status, and power, however, were much more limited. They did not mobilise their members for political agitation. The other professional group which organised itself in 1918 was the Indraprasth Vaid Sabha with a membership of 100.¹ The members of this organisation were much more traditionally oriented and tended to remain most loyal to their caste and community. Members of the organisation had limited resources of wealth, status, and power.

It is possible to conclude that those commercial and professional organisations in Delhi, which were modelled on Western institutions, had achieved some amount of cohesion despite the diverse social origins of the members. The Punjab Chamber of Commerce, the Delhi Piece Goods Association, the Bar Association, the Sub-Assistant Surgeons' Association, and the Indraprasth Karmachari Mandal all displayed a degree of cohesiveness due to the nature of their financial and professional interests. Those commercial and professional groups that formed Western-style organisations, but remained essentially traditional in inspiration, were less cohesive and appeared to have little ability to effectively mobilise the organisations' more limited resources of wealth, status, and power. The members of

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Ibid.

the Delhi Hindustani Mercantile Association, Kirana Committee, Indian Bankers Association, and Indraprasth Vaid Sabha were much more traditionally oriented in their financial and professional interests and retained their primary loyalty to caste and community. Even though many individual members had substantial resources of wealth, status, and power, they were unwilling to lend them fully to the support of the organisation, a factor which weakened the prestige and influence of this type of organisation.

The organisations in Delhi which were modelled on Western institutions and whose members pursued modern financial and professional interests, were firm supporters of the government. This was unavoidable as a result of strong ties with foreign markets and western education. The ties were reinforced by the fact that the government recognised the value of these bonds of loyalty and conferred special privileges upon the organisations and their members. The members of these organisations welcomed their privileges and in turn repaid the government by remaining staunchly loyal to it.

The organisations which were modelled on Western institutions, but whose members pursued traditional or indigenous interests were not tied to the government by any special bonds of loyalty. In terms of financial affairs, education, and lack of privileges, the members of these organisations were keenly aware of the indifference, if not contempt, with which the government treated them. They were, therefore, more receptive to the issues raised by swaraj and swadeshi which drew more directly from their traditional world.

The total value of exports from industry in Delhi totalled approximately Rs.1 crore.¹ The three most important commodities of manufacture were wheat flour, hardware and cotton yarn.² These three commodities represented 50 per cent of the value of manufactures in Delhi. The industries which produced exports for Delhi, consisted of two cotton spinning mills, the Delhi Biscuit Company, and two flour mills. The rest of the petty industry in the Province 'ran on unenterprising slothful and traditional lines.'³ The

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Punjab District Gazetteers, V, 1912, A, pp. 160-1. Denning did not separate the value of the exports of commerce from those of industry. The estimate of the Deputy Commissioner in the Gazetteer has been arbitrarily imposed on Denning's estimates.

2 The imports and exports of the three most important manufactured products in 1914 were as follows:

	<u>Imports</u> (maunds)	<u>Exports</u> (maunds)	<u>Value of</u> <u>Exports</u> (Rs.)
Wheat flour	1,12,600	6,62,333	24,27,965
Iron manufactures	63,853	60,647	16,56,225
Cotton (twist & yarn)	7,134	32,786	<u>10,33,785</u>
Total:			<u>51,17,975</u>

RDDA, Commerce File 5 Part A 1916.

3

RDDA, Commerce File 5 Part A 1916. The census of 1911 listed 43 factories in Delhi. These factories, each of which employed at least 20 operatives and utilised some form of power together employed about 4,300. (The Gazetteer listed four cotton mills, two cotton presses and three ginning factories, four flour mills, two biscuit factories, 'several' iron workshops, four ice factories, an oil and soap mill, and a malt works which employed about 2,630.) The census of 1921 listed 38 factories, each of which employed over 20 operatives and utilised some power, and employed altogether 5,300. Census of India, 1911, XIV, Pt. II; Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II; Punjab District Gazetteers, V, 1912, A, pp. 160-1.

failure of a large number of swadeshi industries and firms in the banking crash of 1913-14 in the Punjab dissuaded most financiers with available capital from investing in other nascent industries in Delhi.¹ Shortages of material during the war and competition from abroad before and after the war also limited the opportunities for investment.² The erection of the new capital did not provide as much industry for Delhi as would have been expected, either. A civilian observed that:

It is significant that although the building of the new capital offers a good many opportunities, few of the contracts for building, supply of material, fittings, or furniture have been secured by men belonging to Delhi.³

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There were 16 companies that failed in Delhi in 1913-4. RDDA, Commerce File 4 Part A 1916. 'Note on the Effect of the Provincial Insolvency Act of 1907 and of the Companies Act of 1913 on Indian Industries.' For a detailed discussion of this crash see H.K. Trevaskis, The Punjab of Today: An Economic Survey of the Punjab in Recent Years, 1890-1925 (Lahore, 1932).

2

There were 31 swadeshi industries in Delhi in 1911. They employed about 2,625 operatives. Only three of these were still classified as factories in 1921. The other 28 had either liquidated or no longer employed more than 20 operatives. In 1921 there were 17 new swadeshi industries which employed around 2,000 operatives. Those that closed down or no longer employed over 20 were 13 cotton factories, four iron workshops, four flour mills and one each of a cane factory, a lock works, a bakery, a biscuit factory, a button factory, a coach building factory, and a gold thread factory. Census of India, 1911, XIV, Pt. II; Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.

3

RDDA, Commerce File 5 Part A 1916.

Industry, then, served as the poor step-brother to commerce in Delhi. In many cases it provided an outlet for investment capital. But only rarely did an industrial concern wholly take up the energies of any of the wealthy families of the city.

The 'industry' described above concerned highly localised and fairly sophisticated establishments. Delhi also had a large number of petty industries which employed a small number of operatives, used a limited amount of machinery, and depended upon a small output. One example of such a petty industry was the large number of concerns which imported paper in order to make bahis [a native account book]. The turnover in this commodity was estimated at Rs. 10 lakhs per year.¹ The factory type of industry described above employed 4,300 in 1911 and 5,300 in 1921. Petty industry employed 400 in 1911 and 5,500 in 1921.² For the same years commerce employed 19,700 and 28,600.

The wage and salary earners in Delhi in 1911 were not organised like members of the commercial and the liberal professions. There were no trade unions among

¹ Punjab District Gazetteers, V, 1912, A, p. 163.

²

These figures, as shown in Table 3-C, are based on the two censuses after the figures for handicrafts in Table 3-D have been taken out of the classification 'industry'. The figures do not include labourers who worked in the construction industry, nor do they include the unspecified labourers. Those who were employed in services in Table 3-E and those who were employed by the government in Table 2-B are also excluded.

those who worked in factories, nor among those who worked in petty industry. The clerical professions also lacked any occupational organisation. These circumstances changed through the decade following 1911, however, when the clerical profession formed a trade union and the syces formed a union which agitated for higher wages. There was some attempt to organise the domestic servants, and a serious attempt to organise the industrial workers, all of which came to a head in 1920 when there were six strikes.¹

The wages of men employed in industry in Delhi varied immensely. An engineer could receive from Rs. 65 to Rs. 150 per month. A woman working on a cotton gin received around Rs. 6 per month.² The workers usually put in a 72 hour week, but some government industries worked 56 hours. Throughout the following decade there were several attempts to reduce the long hours. The Delhi Administration opposed these attempts on the grounds that the labourers were uneducated and would have nothing to do if not kept fully employed.³

Female 'industrial' labourers, especially in the textile mills, came from the Muslim community, probably

¹ The strikes of 1920 are discussed below in Chapter Seven.

²

RDDA, Commerce File 56 Part B 1914, 'Report on the Working of the Indian Factories Act During the Year 1913'. Table 4-A contains several lists of wages in Delhi.

³

RDDA, Commerce File 83 Part B 1919, 'Labour Questions'.

from the karkhandar group. Most did piece work and came and went as they pleased. Their dismally low wage constituted a supplement to the family income rather than the sole means of support.

Working conditions varied enormously and the inspection of factories could guarantee only a certain amount of safety for the small number of factories that came under the Indian Factories Act. The uninspected petty industries probably had worse conditions, but with very few operatives it was easy to maintain low wages, long hours, and poor conditions through the threat of dismissal. As industry expanded and work began on the new capital a labour shortage developed, but this shortage was counterbalanced by an influx of immigrants.¹

A large number of immigrants came into Delhi to work as labourers either in the new imperial capital,

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The Deputy Commissioner observed: 'Owing to the growth of factories the labourers have come in large numbers from neighbouring districts and other places with the result that Teliwara, Sabzimandi and other suburbs of Delhi show a large increase in population.' Punjab District Gazetteers, V, 1912, A, p. 161.

in factories, or petty industry.¹ They came from the same areas from which Delhi traditionally drew its immigrants.² The immigrants who came into Delhi between 1911 and 1921 were predominantly Hindu, they were illiterate, they were either unmarried, or married but unaccompanied by their wives and children, and they were mostly between the ages of 20 and 35.³ They were usually brought in by a jobber who was himself not born in Delhi; who paid for the immigrants' transportation to Delhi; who

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It is difficult to ascertain the number of people who immigrated into Delhi Municipality between 1911 and 1921. An estimate can be derived by calculating how many of the non-Delhi born residents of Delhi Municipality in 1911 would have survived if they had all remained in Delhi until 1921 and had a survival ratio of 20 per mille. Of the 84,160 non-Delhi born residents in Delhi Municipality in 1911, 68,765 would have been alive in 1921. This number of old immigrants can be subtracted from the total number of non-Delhi born who were resident in the Delhi urban area in 1921 (137,058) which means that 68,293 new immigrants entered the Delhi urban area between 1911 and 1921. (Using the same procedure it was 39,820 for the decade 1901-11). Assuming that all the people who were enumerated in Delhi City in 1921 were immigrants, since very few people lived there before 1911, it is possible to subtract the number of residents in Delhi city from the total of new immigrants, which leaves 12,132 as new immigrants into Delhi Municipality between 1911 and 1921. This figure tends to be confirmed by the fact that the Hindu community in Delhi Municipality increased by 15,649 between 1911 and 1921 in absolute numbers, while the Muslim community increased by only 476. Census of India, 1911, XIV, Pt. II; Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.

2

Table 4-B lists the places from which immigrants came, and in what numbers.

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This is evident from even a superficial glance at each of these classifications in the two censal reports. Census of India, 1911, XIV, Pt. II; Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.

paid in advance on their wages until they were able to support themselves; and who found them accommodation with the rest of his gang either at the work site or in the abundantly cheap housing in the four suburbs without the walled city.¹ They managed to live cheaply enough to either save money or send it back to their families. They were quite fortunate in having an outlet for unemployment as they invariably returned to the place from which they emigrated. Their living conditions, the fact that they were either unmarried or unaccompanied, their illiteracy, and the lack of institutional ties with the city combined to make them one of the more 'turbulent' groups in the city.² They did not respond to the issues raised by the political agitator in any significant numbers, but they did become involved in the industrial unrest of 1920.

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RDDA, Home File 187 Part B 1917, 'Working of the Workmen's Breach of Contract Act, 1859, in Delhi Province'; Home File 215 Part B 1921, 'Details of the Results of Prosecutions under the Workmen's Breach of Contract Act'; Home File 40 Part B 1922, 'Administration of the Workmen's Breach of Contract Act.'

2

The annual police reports reiterate yearly that the increase in the number of criminals in the city is due to the 'influx of population of a humble type who have been attracted by the demand for work' which led to 'such a large floating population whom the police cannot get to know.' RDDA, Home File 248 Part B 1913. And again in 1916 'the population is largely a floating one particularly in the suburbs' which led to an increase in crime in those areas and a lack of public assistance in the detection of crime. RDDA, Home File 181 Part B 1917. The crime was usually not serious, just petty thieving and minor fighting.

The conditions that the salary and wage earners of Delhi faced varied a good deal. The Deputy Commissioner concluded that the labourer who earned Rs. 15 per month was much better off materially than the clerks and others who had greater expenses because they were in a higher social scale.¹ He elaborated upon this point in the following manner:

Probably in no Punjab district will be found such a contrast of wealth and poverty as is found in Delhi. In the city are many wealthy merchants and property owners living in great comfort and luxury: some keep motor cars and all keep horses and carriages of which many are of a high grade. The Lalaji's fast trotter and gig are quite a feature of the place. The upper middle class consists of professional lawyers or shopkeepers who have been successful in business: some come of good stock but in this class the majority are men who by their own abilities have come to the front to an extent which would have been well-nigh impossible under oriental rule. A middle class clerk whose salary will be anything from Rs. 50 to Rs. 100 lives a somewhat dull life: paying a high rent and having to appear in clean respectable clothes does not leave any great margin for luxuries, after the family have been fed and clothed. His sons are probably being educated to a higher extent than the father, and although the early stages of education are cheap, provision has to be made for the high education by which alone examinations qualifying for State or professional service can be passed. The petty tradesmen do no more than eke out a humble existence, but a livelihood is certain as they deal in such necessaries as always command a sale. Amongst the artisans and depressed classes, there is seldom distress: true, their incomes are small but then their wants are few: the squalor of their surroundings is due far more to ignorance and want of civilisation than to want of means.²

¹ Punjab District Gazetteer, V, 1912, A, p. 161.

² Ibid., p. 138-9.

The observations of the Deputy Commissioner, Colonel Beadon, about the Lalaji and the middle class of Delhi were quite valid. But below that level his perspicacity becomes more questionable. An Indian clerk earning Rs. 100 per month was certainly better off than his European counterpart who earned the same amount.¹ The salary of Rs. 50 per month may have been somewhat low in the face of a high rent, and a number of dependents who would not work.² The people in the lower classes received a much smaller wage, but more of their dependents worked.³

The lower classes did, however, face a serious problem of wages and costs. If a basic unit of consumption was composed of an adult male, an adult female, and an older child, and a younger child, their

1

A European shorthand clerk in the Chief Commissioner's office received Rs. 100/-/- per month. RDDA, Home File 211 Part B 1913, 'Transfer of Bishen Das to the Finance Department and Appointment of Mr W. Bailey as Shorthand Writer in the Chief Commissioner's Office Delhi.'

2

The Deputy Commissioner stated that 'quite humble tenements are let for Rs. 10 per mensem' in the Municipality while in the Civil Lines and cantonments the rent was Rs. 50 to Rs. 120 per month. Punjab District Gazetteers, V, 1912, A, p. 134.

3

In a work on C.F. Andrews, the authors commented upon the relative well-being of labourers in northern India: 'The wages of unskilled labour in North India had risen, and the men were not likely to be attracted by the promise of twelve annas a day in Fiji when they could get as much by carrying earth for the foundations of New Delhi.' Benarsidas Chaturvedi and Marjorie Sykes, Charles Freer Andrews: A Narrative (London, 1949), p. 113.

annual consumption of grain could be $18\frac{1}{2}$ maunds.¹ This would be the same as 2.03 seers per day.² Assuming that the usual proportion was three parts wheat to one part coarse grain, the cost for this household per day for grain would be 3 annas on the prices of 1913.³ The average cost of cooking oil was 5 annas per seer; assuming a seer per week this would amount to 20 annas per month. The average rent for a kaccha dwelling inside the walled city was 32 annas per month.⁴ These three basic commodities amounted to Rs. 10/12 per month. Added to this was the cost of spices, salt, sugar, pulses, vegetables, and clothes. But these were only essentials and weddings, funerals, festivals, sickness, and times of unemployment also counted heavily. It would be legitimate to argue, therefore, that even Rs. 30/- per month would be a tenuous position to confront and maintain. And since

1

An adult male consumed seven maunds per annum, an adult female five maunds, an older child four maunds, and a younger child $2\frac{1}{2}$ maunds. RDDA, Revenue File 117 (b) Part B 1914, 'The War in Europe - Proposal to Open Cheap Grain Shops.'

2

This would be divided into .77 seers for an adult male per day, .55 seers for an adult female, .44 for an older child, and .27 seers for a younger child. This estimate is confirmed separately in RDDA, Home File 238 Part B 1921, 'Petitions in Respect of the High Rents Demanded by Landlords in Delhi.'

3

Wheat cost 10.25 seers per Rupee and jowar and bajra averaged 14.5 seers per Rupee. RDDA, Commerce File 121 (e) Part B 1914, 'The War in Europe - Rise in the Price of Wheat Ordinary IX of 1914. Wheat Conference.'

4

RDDA, Home File 238 Part B 1921.

the majority of the population were in this position it would follow that a rise in prices would seriously affect them.

Prices rose dramatically from 1914 to 1922, while wages tended to remain static or to improve only in certain sectors of the economy.¹ It was this gap between prices and wages that provided the grounds for discontent among the lower income groups in Delhi. The nationalist agitators provided the rationale for direct action through the issues they raised, but the constraint of circumstances provided the major impetus for the release of some of the economic discontent that arose during the decade.

1

Table 4-C contains three lists of relative prices for selected commodities in Delhi.

TABLE 1-A
NATALITY AND MORTALITY RATES FOR DELHI, 1913-21

		1913	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918	1919	1920	1921
Births per mille	Total	44.8	48.9	47.9	49.4	52.8	47.9	45.8	47.4	40.6
Infant mortality per 1,000 births (Age 0-1)	Male	283.5	292.0	228.9	227.2	228.8	327.3	249.4	217.7	225.6
	Female	264.1	281.8	212.4	218.8	220.6	307.9	245.4	206.2	208.1
Deaths per mille in Delhi	Total	39.9	37.9	28.9	32.9	32.7	93.5	42.0	35.5	31.2
	Male	36.9	34.6	26.9	29.9	29.5	80.2	38.1	32.9	27.3
	Female	43.9	42.2	31.6	36.7	36.7	110.2	96.9	38.8	35.7
Deaths per mille in Delhi	Urban	44.2	42.1	34.2	38.9	36.4	73.9	46.4	37.6	35.7
	Rural	35.1	32.5	22.9	25.9	28.1	117.4	36.7	33.1	26.3

* Source: Government of India, Commercial Intelligence Department, Statistical Abstract for British India from 1912-13 to 1921-22 (Calcutta, 1924) pp. 327, 329, 337.

TABLE 1-B
POPULATION OF DELHI

	Total population Delhi Municipality				Total population Delhi City	Total population Delhi Province	
	1901	1911	1921	1931	1921	1911	1921
Total	208,575	232,837	248,259	347,539	56,161	[180,610]	183,768
Hindu	114,417	121,735	137,384	178,737	36,919		151,248
Muslim	88,460	102,476	102,952	158,287	11,752		27,054
Jain	3,266	3,531	3,856	4,238	6		836
Christian	2,164	3,075	3,021	3,008	5,770		4,531
Indigenous	1,575	2,464	3,021	-	1,000		4,531
European	589	611	-	-	4,370*		-
Sikh	229	1,939	975	3,169	1,694		95

* Source: Census of India, 1901, XII, Part II; Census of India 1911, XIV, Part II; Census of India, 1921, XV, Part II; Census of India 1931, XVI, Part II.

* Does not include 417 Eurasians.

TABLE 2-A*

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DELHI ADMINISTRATION AND THE
MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, 1913

Delhi Administration (1,844)
Chief Commissioner's Establishment (14)
1 Chief Commissioner
1 Personal Assistant to the Chief Commissioner
12 Clerical staff
Deputy Commissioner's Establishment (290)
1 Deputy Commissioner
5 Superior staff
113 Urban staff
171 Rural staff
Police Establishment (1223)
7 Gazetted officers
63 Upper subordinates
1153 Lower subordinates
District Judge and Munsif Court Establishment (82)
Judge, Small Causes Court Establishment (30)
Public Works Department Establishment (9)
Medical, Civil Police Hospital, Plague Establishment (12)
District Jail Establishment (65)
Government High School Establishment (34)
Ecclesiastical Establishment (5)
Government Gardens Establishment (53)
Encamping Grounds and Historical Buildings Establishment (21)
Veterinary Establishment (6)
Municipal Committee (1,839)
Secretary's Establishment (363)
Octroi
128 illiterate peons
106 other staff
General
33 illiterate peons
96 other staff
Health Department Establishment (1,319)
690 sweepers
629 other staff
Engineering Establishment (157)

* Sources: RDDA, Home File 29 Part A 1913;
Education File 16 Part B 1914.

TABLE 2-B*

GOVERNMENT SERVANTS, DELHI URBAN AREA, 1911, 1921

Product	Total Workers & Dependents	Total Actual Workers	Total Workers & Dependents	Total Workers & Dependents (Hindu)	Total Workers & Dependents (Muslim)	Total Workers & Dependents (Sikh)	Total Workers & Dependents (Jain)	Total Workers & Dependents (Christian)	Total Actual Workers
	1911	1911	1921	1921	1921	1921	1921	1921	1921
Canals & streams	{367}	{55}	506	329	82	71	8	16	184
Labourers	{ }	{ }	40	40	-	-	-	-	20
Roads & bridges	{4,662}	{2,564}	73	70	-	3	-	-	47
Labourers	{ }	{ }	34	32	-	2	-	-	22
Rail	{4,601}	{1,691}	6,881	5,780	565	63	106	359	3,359
Labourers, coolies, porters	{ }	{ }	4,650	2,830	1,783	6	28	3	2,866
Post office, telegraph, telephone	1,604	556	1,689	943	599	31	27	89	667
Army (Imperial)	3,836	2,924	6,318	1,179	677	432	45	3,982	4,313
Army (native states)	10	2	201	172	29	-	-	-	86
Police	2,122	827	1,795	777	933	32	10	43	1,094
Watchmen	41	22	101	51	50	-	-	-	71
State service	1,891	722	5,523	3,950	716	39	67	743	3,080
Service (native states)	97	6	16	2	12	2	-	-	11
Municipal	1,010	231	2,226	1,422	637	109	12	46	1,356
Other local officials	83	28	559	65	493	-	1	-	350
Total:	20,324	9,628	30,612	17,642	6,576	790	304	5,281	17,526

* Source: Census of India, 1911, XIV, Part II;
Census of India, 1921, XV, Part II.

TABLE 2-C*

POLICE FORCE IN THE DELHI URBAN AREA

	1912		1913		1916	
	Literate	Illiterate	Literate	Illiterate	Literate	Illiterate
Inspectors	6	-	7	-	8	-
Sergeants	15	-	15	-	6	-
Sub-Inspectors	24	1	24	1	26	-
Head Constables	96	31	106	37	103	50
Constables	304	840	293	834	415	742
	Hindus	Muslims	Hindus	Muslims	Hindus	Muslims
Inspectors	1	3	1	3	1	4
Sub-Inspectors	13	12	13	12	12	14
Head Constables	36	86	39	104	50	103
Constables	525	603	529	598	549	608

* Source: RDDA, Home File 248 Part B 1913;
Home File 223 Part B 1914;
Home File 181 Part B 1917.

TABLE 2-D*

CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND CIVIL JUSTICE, DELHICriminal Justice

	<u>1912</u>	<u>1913</u>	<u>1914</u>
No. persons brought to trial	n.a.	6,900	5,976
No. witnesses	7,061	9,088	9,680
No. convicted	n.a.	3,323	n.a.
No. discharged	n.a.	1,076	n.a.
No. acquitted	n.a.	2,501	1,658
Per cent convicted	32	48	n.a.

Civil Justice

No. of original suits for money and moveable property		5,092	5,472
No. of original suits for title and other suits		756	719
Value and Cost of Suits for Money and Moveable Property			
Up to Rs. 500		4,686	4,989
500 to 1,000		172	229
1,000 to 5,000		215	246
5,000 to 10,000		16	6
10,000 to 100,000		3	2
over 100,000	
Total value of suits	Rs. 11,90,643	12,68,172	
Duration of trials (Days)			
contested		51	73
uncontested		22	24

* Sources: RDDA, Home File 317 Part B 1914;
Home File 297 Part B 1915;
Home File 304 Part B 1915.

TABLE 3-A
MERCHANTS, DELHI URBAN AREA, 1911, 1921

Product	Total Workers & Dependents	Total Actual Workers	Total Workers & Dependents	Total Workers & Dependents (Hindu)	Total Workers & Dependents (Muslim)	Total Workers & Dependents (Sikh)	Total Workers & Dependents (Jain)	Total Workers & Dependents (Christian)	Total Actual Workers
	1911	1911	1921	1921	1921	1921	1921	1921	1921
Owners, manager, theatres, etc.	25	6	52	5	42	2	-	3	13
Bank, insurance, money lenders, brokers	4,682	2,445	4,117	3,786	34	8	264	23	967
Commission agents, warehouse	1,226	888	1,671	1,347	242	-	82	-	954
Textiles	8,132	2,876	12,085	9,820	2,001	42	216	2	5,772
Skins, fur, horn	787	268	718	406	306	-	-	6	331
Wood (not firewood)	23	3	737	212	508	8	-	9	326
Metals, tools, machinery	496	159	624	179	438	-	4	3	417
Pottery, bricks, tiles	3	3	361	24	337	-	-	-	217
Chemical products	1,699	452	2,015	608	1,272	-	151	-	932
Vendors (wines & spirits)	633	212	507	335	165	5	-	2	275
Hotels, cookshops, etc.	128	72	138	-	132	-	-	6	82
Fish	-	-	16	-	16	-	-	-	5
Vegetable oils, salt, condiments	877	241	9,109	5,260	3,279	88	447	35	3,482
Milk, butter, ghee, poultry	1,299	475	2,087	880	1,146	1	60	-	943
Sweetmeats, sugar, gur	456	296	1,104	254	174	3	673	-	628
Vegetables, cardamon, betel, fruits	3,903	1,451	5,898	2,986	2,836	6	67	3	2,538
Grains and pulses	2,314	1,051	1,648	1,448	99	1	100	-	803
Tobacco, opium, ganja	301	61	657	91	566	-	-	-	376
Hay, grass, fodder	1,043	440	586	563	12	-	-	11	173
Ready-made clothes, hats, shoes	6,108	2,509	6,842	1,333	5,323	30	156	-	2,913
Furniture, carpets, bedding	353	50	238	101	137	-	-	-	154
Hardware, cooking, gardening	129	12	989	731	237	-	21	-	353
Building materials	77	26	2,617	2,252	354	6	-	-	1,853
Dealers & hirers, animal transport	104	68	629	46	582	1	-	-	423
Dealers & hirers, mechanical transport	-	-	73	43	17	1	12	-	36
Fuel	488	142	298	75	188	1	28	6	142
Jewellery, clocks, optical	2,688	1,128	729	261	171	-	297	-	318
Bangles, beads, toys	641	54	1,356	172	1,184	-	-	-	486
Publishers, booksellers, stationers	345	149	1,052	381	506	19	108	38	472
Dealers in rags, stable refuse	9	8	21	21	-	-	-	-	19
General shopkeepers	10,017	3,385	3,383	2,713	578	11	26	45	1,424
Itinerant peddlers & traders	104	23	1,677	1,435	183	-	59	-	3
Other traders, farmers of tolls	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
unspecified	429	392	92	40	16	-	36	-	52
Manufacturers, businessmen	593	386	1,449	686	544	165	31	23	757
Total:	50,082	19,739	65,575	38,294	23,645	398	2,838	215	28,639

* Source: Census of India, 1911, XIV Part II;
Census of India, 1921, XV, Part II.

Product	Total Workers & Dependents	Total WActual Workers	Total Workers & Dependents	Total Workers & Dependents (Hindu)	Total Workers & Dependents (Muslim)	Total Workers & Dependents (Sikh)	Total Workers & Dependents (Jain)	Total Workers & Dependents (Christian)	Total Actual Workers
	1911	1911	1921	1921	1921	1921	1921	1921	1921
TABLE 3-B* PROFESSIONS, DELHI URBAN AREA, 1911, 1921									
Priests, ministers	4,202	1,659	2,646	731	1,880	-	-	35	649
Religious mendicants	114	51	1,189	1,189	-	-	-	-	42
Catechists, readers	116	82	47	-	29	6	-	-	34
Temple, burial, burning, circumcisers	502	174	1,862	1,686	152	24	-	12	1,051
Lawyers of all kinds	418	126	569	525	-	33	6	2	134
Lawyers clerks, petition writers	667	233	380	323	31	-	26	-	193
Medical, all kinds	898	255	1,289	540	570	23	19	137	600
Midwives, vaccinators	492	322	1,358	646	399	40	30	243	695
Teachers, all kinds,	(1,054)	(424)	1,644	850	579	3	33	175	678
Teachers' clerks	(195)	(82)	986	960	-	5	11	10	307
Scribes, stenographers	378	143	143	130	10	-	2	-	65
Architects, surveyors, engineers	103	42	464	243	187	18	7	1	189
Authors, artists, photographers	1,499	836	1,211	785	426	-	-	-	606
Musicians, actors	225	111	2	-	2	-	-	-	2
Conjurers, acrobats	3,233	536	2,245	1,949	176	45	19	47	1,414
Cashiers, bookkeepers, clerks									
Total:	14,096	4,684	16,156	10,576	4,564	197	172	669	6,723
TABLE 3-C* LABOURERS, DELHI URBAN AREA, 1911, 1921									
Cotton, ginning, cleaning	382	76	574	192	374	-	-	6	266
Cotton spinning	(3,694)	(1,388)	2,613	1,240	1,372	-	1	-	681
Cotton sizing & weaving	-	-	4,936	3,634	1,295	-	6	1	2,006
Jute spinning, weaving	2	-	137	70	67	-	-	-	91
Furriers & brush makers	-	-	567	147	420	-	-	-	311
Sawyers	(2,549)	(1,509)	86	12	74	-	-	-	13
Carpenters, joiners	-	-	3,812	1,889	1,744	174	1	4	1,728
Iron forging, rolling	-	-	340	-	329	11	-	-	229
Arms	-	-	151	-	142	9	-	-	107
Other iron, etc.	1,483	637	4,372	929	3,244	196	3	-	1,091
Other metal	506	158	611	-	611	-	-	-	339
Porcelain & crockery	-	-	127	-	127	-	-	-	63
Brick & tile makers	531	176	2,227	933	1,280	9	2	3	1,376
Other ceramics, alabaster, mosaic	-	-	10	-	10	-	-	-	10
Matches & explosives	-	-	107	7	100	-	-	-	64
Aerated water & ice	89	-	467	32	430	3	-	1	264
Dyes, print, ink	-	-	16	9	7	-	-	-	13
Paper mache, cardboard	-	-	278	19	259	-	-	-	131
Butter, cheese, ghee	-	-	100	-	100	-	-	-	46
Brewers & Distillers	-	-	238	17	221	-	-	-	103
Tobacco, opium, ganja	-	-	473	113	356	-	-	4	258
Upholsterers, tents	-	-	22	21	-	1	-	-	10
Stone cutters, dressers	(17,266)	(3,035)	154	35	119	-	-	-	97
Bricklayers & masons	-	-	11,543	7,994	3,471	28	39	11	5,120
Other builders, painters	1,807	939	4,866	4,508	356	2	-	-	2,895
Repairing motor vehicles	-	-	203	23	131	20	-	29	97
Ship & boat builders	-	-	42	-	42	-	-	-	24
Gas & electric	148	30	1,327	625	569	103	6	24	794
Printers	226	53	712	508	172	-	2	30	362
Labourers, unspecified	4,899	2,180	14,360	12,442	1,828	73	-	17	9,478
Total:	23,582	10,181	55,471	35,399	19,250	629	60	130	28,067

* Source: Census of India, 1911, XIV, Part II;
Census of India, 1921, XV, Part II.

Product	Total Workers & Dependents	Total Actual Workers	Total Workers & Dependents	Total Workers & Dependents (Hindu)	Total Workers & Dependents (Muslim)	Total Workers & Dependents (Sikh)	Total Workers & Dependents (Jain)	Total Workers & Dependents (Christian)	Total Actual Workers
	1911	1911	1921	1921	1921	1921	1921	1921	1921
TABLE 3-D ARTISANS, DELHI URBAN AREA, 1911, 1921									
Rope	156	91	248	100	148	-	-	-	111
Wool (Blanket)	(22)	(17)	100	-	100	-	-	-	1
(Carpet)	()	()	88	61	27	-	-	-	59
Silk (spinners)	(850)	(319)	402	-	400	-	2	-	115
(weavers)	()	()	14	-	-	-	14	-	1
Dyeing, bleaching, printing	92	42	429	9	419	1	-	-	286
Lace, embroidery	18,382	5,242	4,162	561	3,601	-	-	-	1,452
Tanning	409	42	655	557	98	-	-	-	274
Leather articles	1,584	619	1,491	427	1,064	-	-	-	268
Bone, ivory, horn	26	14	245	78	167	-	-	-	123
Basket weavers, thatchers	1,233	658	910	753	157	-	-	-	638
Brass, copper	5,256	1,454	2,541	998	1,543	-	-	-	1,019
Minters, die sinkers	427	186	37	-	37	-	-	-	-
Glass, crystal	88	42	289	-	289	-	-	-	120
Potters	1,676	1,040	2,852	1,898	950	4	-	-	830
Vegetable oils	681	279	1,508	625	883	-	-	-	475
Soap, perfume	441	243	1,116	33	1,083	-	-	-	458
Rice pounders, millers	2,393	1,760	971	570	363	7	12	19	496
Bakers, biscuit makers	322	144	880	192	607	6	75	-	164
Grain parchers	241	77	220	205	15	-	-	-	93
Butchers	731	470	596	22	574	-	-	-	193
Sugar, molasses, gur	61	-	30	-	18	-	-	-	8
Sweetmeats, jams, condiments	2,566	779	2,229	1,929	292	4	4	-	842
Hat, cap, turban	920	209	649	28	619	1	1	-	189
Tailors, embroidery on linen	3,737	2,084	5,881	1,116	4,595	51	20	99	1,477
Shoe, boot, sandals	6,948	2,407	14,835	12,015	1,629	2	-	1,189	5,611
Gloves, socks, buttons	347	50	1,338	130	1,184	24	-	-	519
Cabinet makers, carriage painters	1,354	556	886	247	639	-	-	-	425
Lime burners, cement workers	146	18	344	14	330	-	-	-	176
Cart, carriage, paliki	136	109	118	18	90	-	-	10	43
Saddles, harness	329	102	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bookbinders, envelope makers	164	57	565	8	547	-	9	1	213
Musical instruments	148	68	108	17	91	-	-	-	75
Watches, optical	504	324	335	42	292	-	1	-	180
Precious stones, metals	12,449	4,508	7,582	2,102	5,456	-	10	14	2,525
Bangles, beads	1,143	451	966	6	960	-	-	-	322
Toys, kites, taxidermy, fishing tackle	435	230	2,405	105	2,299	-	-	1	673
Total:	66,387	24,691	58,025	24,878	31,566	96	148	1,333	20,374
TABLE 3-E SERVICES, DELHI URBAN AREA, 1911, 1921									
Washing, cleaning, dyeing	2,284	1,194	4,230	1,867	2,359	1	3	-	1,685
Barbers	2,058	1,196	2,371	1,155	1,213	-	-	3	979
Sweepers	3,645	2,081	6,653	6,403	98	16	-	136	3,642
Boat owners, boatman, townmen	19	11	45	45	45	-	-	-	18
Motor vehicles, owners, drivers	-	-	160	85	52	4	1	-	94
Other vehicles, owners, drivers	2,282	828	5,378	2,502	2,869	6	-	1	2,316
Paliki bearers	1,693	875	1,881	1,564	316	-	-	-	877
Animal vehicles, owners, drivers	400	220	1,348	447	901	-	-	-	815
Porters & messengers	3,675	2,442	1,840	884	945	3	1	7	1,043
Cooks, water carriers	12,125	7,080	18,470	11,082	6,430	126	61	746	10,403
Private grooms, dog boys	2,163	760	3,037	2,433	326	136	2	140	2,190
Motor drivers	-	-	99	18	66	4	-	-	11
Beggars & vagrants	(3,121)	(1,741)	2,851	1,519	1,278	8	8	38	1,512
Prostitutes	()	()	267	79	188	-	-	-	162
Total:	33,425	18,428	48,630	30,038	17,076	304	76	1,100	25,798

* Source: Census of India, 1911, XIV, Part II;
Census of India, 1921, XV, Part II.

TABLE 4 - A*
MONTHLY WAGES FOR SELECTED OCCUPATIONS, DELHI

	1912 - 4 1	1912 2	1912 - 4 3	1912 - 4 4	1919 - 21 5	1922 - 4 6
BANGLES (LAC)	-	-	-	7/8 to 15/-	-	-
BEARER	-	20	-	-	-	-
BHISTI	-	9	-	-	-	-
BLACKSMITH	27	-	20 to 28	-	46/8	41
BLEACHER	-	-	-	-	-	19/8
BOILERMAN	-	-	14 to 20	-	-	-
BRICKLAYER	-	-	20 to 26	-	-	-
CARPENTER	30	-	20 to 27	-	58	48
CARVER (WOOD & IVORY)	30	-	-	20 to 50	50	36/8
CHAUKIDAR [GUARD]	-	7	7 to 8	-	-	-
CLERKS	-	50 to 100	-	-	-	-
COOLIE	13/14	9/6	9 to 12	-	22/12	17
COOLIE (WOMEN)	9/8	-	-	-	15/3	13/14
COOLIE (MINOR)	5/12	-	-	-	7/9	5/12
DARZI (TAILOR)	-	20	-	-	-	-
DHOBI	-	10	-	-	-	-
DRAWER	-	-	-	-	26/8	20/8
DRIVER (ENGINE)	30/8	-	18 to 30	-	47	42/8
DYER	-	-	-	-	-	25
ENGINEER	-	-	65 to 100	-	-	-
EMBROIDERER	20	-	-	9/6 to 13/2	30/8	25/8
FIREMEN	20	-	-	-	32	27
FITTER	35	-	35 to 55	20 to 30	52	46/8
FOLDER	-	-	-	-	25/8	20
GINNER (WOMAN)	-	-	6	-	-	-
JEWELLER (SUPERIOR)	-	-	-	100	-	-
JEWELLER (MEDIUM)	-	-	-	25 to 30	-	-
JEWELLER (APPRENTICE)	-	-	-	15 to 20	-	-
KHANSAMAH [COOK]	-	18	-	-	-	-
KHIDMUGAR [WAITER]	-	12	-	-	-	-
LABOURER (SKILLED)	-	9/6 to 15	-	-	-	-
LABOURER (INDUSTRIAL)	-	15	-	-	-	-
MALI [GARDENER]	-	9	-	-	-	-
MASON	30	-	-	-	47	40
MESSENGER	-	-	9 to 11	-	-	-
MILLMAN (FLOUR)	-	-	20	-	-	-
MISTRI	45	20	-	-	68	60
MOCHI [SHOEMAKER]	-	-	-	7/8 to 18/8	25/8	22
MOULDER	21/8	-	-	-	37/8	33
OILMAN	16	-	12 to 13	-	22	18
PAINTER	16/8	-	30	-	25	21/8
POTTER	-	-	-	-	-	33/8
PRESS COMPOSITER	25	-	44	-	35	26/8
PRESS DISTRIBUTOR	20	-	-	-	27	21/8
PRINTER (COTTON)	-	-	-	15 to 18/8	-	-
REELER	-	-	-	-	22	18
SILVERWARE	-	-	-	45	-	-
SIZER	-	-	-	-	40	34/8
SPINNER	-	-	25	-	34	29/8
SYCE	-	9	-	-	-	-
SWEEPER	-	8	-	-	-	-
TANNER	-	-	-	11/4	34	30/8
THREAD BALLER	-	-	-	-	-	19
TIN WORKER	-	-	-	30 to 45	-	-
TURNER	20	-	-	-	-	-
WAREHOUSEMAN	-	-	20	-	-	-
WARDER	-	-	-	-	40/8	36
WEAVER	-	-	26	-	63	56/8
WEAVER (GOTA)	-	-	-	2	-	-

* SOURCES: Columns 1, 5, 6 Census of India, 1921, XVI (Delhi)
Part I (Report);
Column 2 Punjab District Gazetteers, V, 1912,
A, pp. 134-51
" 3 RDDA, Commerce File 56 Part 3, 1914;
" 4 RDDA, Commerce File 5 Part A, 1916.

TABLE 4 - B*
NUMBER OF RESIDENTS IN THE DELHI URBAN AREA NOT BORN IN DELHI

	Total			% of Total Population			% of Non-Delhi Born			
	1901	1911	1921	1901	1911	1921	1901	1911	1921	
	4	5	6	7	8	9				
Total Population	208,575	232,837	304,420							
Total Non-Delhi Born	59,174 ⁺	84,160 ⁺	137,058	28.37	36.15	45.02				
Place of Birth	Punjab & Punjab N.S.	15,433 [†]	23,913	38,123	7.40	10.27	12.52	26.08	28.41	27.81
	Punjab	†	21,174	34,790	†	9.09	11.04	†	25.15	25.38
	U.P. & U.P.N.S.	27,424	34,817	56,634	13.15	14.95	18.60	46.34	41.37	41.32
	United Provinces	...	34,303	55,714	...	14.73	18.30	...	40.71	40.64
	Bengal	1,052 [‡]	1,102 ⁺⁺	2,594	0.51	0.47	0.85	1.78	1.31	1.89
	Rajputana Agency	12,316	19,510	31,050	5.95	8.37	10.20	20.81	23.18	22.65
	United Kingdom	577	569	2,829	0.28	0.24	0.92	0.98	0.67	2.06
	Central India Agency	1,105	1,103	276	0.53	0.47	0.01	1.87	1.31	0.20
	N.-W.F.P.	†	1,044	580	†	0.45	0.02	†	1.24	0.42
	Total:	57,907	82,058	132,086	27.82	35.22	43.12	97.86	97.49	96.35

* Sources: Census of India, 1901, XII - A, Pt. II;
Census of India, 1911, XIV, Pt. II;
Census of India, 1921, Pt. II.

+ The total Non-Delhi born figures were derived from the difference between the total population and the persons born in Delhi District. The figures for 1901 and 1911, therefore, are not based upon the same land area as the figures for 1921.

† The Non-Delhi born figures for the Punjab for 1901 include: Punjab Province, North-West Frontier Province, and the Punjab Native States.

‡ The Non-Delhi born figures for Bengal for 1901 include Bengal and Assam.

++ The Non-Delhi born figures for Bengal for 1911 include: Bengal, Bengal Native States, and Eastern Bengal and Assam.

	1912	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923
TABLE 4-C(1)* RELATIVE PRICE INDEX FOR SELECTED COMMODITIES, DELHI												
Wheat			100	128	110	112	143	176	153	169	164	117
Rice			100	100	110	101	119	165	186	165	147	129
Jowar			100	120	100	100	193	203	143	216	150	103
Bajra			100	121	98	98	172	221	154	221	154	115
Barley			100	113	113	110	134	179	154	179	141	89
Gram			100	117	113	110	137	217	193	231	175	103
Salt			100	100	122	138	194	155	166	155	150	194
Sugar			100	64	98	117	50	129	147	239	237	156
House rent			100	100	100	140	140	150	150	150	130	120
Social functions			100	100	120	125	130	150	150	150	145	140
Cotton piece goods			100	80	150	175	200	250	250	200	175	155
Average			100	104	112	120	149	182	167	188	164	130
* Source: <u>Census of India, 1931</u> , XVI, Part I.												
TABLE 4-C(2)* AVERAGE RETAIL PRICES CURRENT OF FOOD GRAINS, DELHI												
Salt	(Rs/md.)	-	1.8	1.8	1.8	2.2	2.5	3.5	2.8	3.0	2.8	2.7
Rice	"	6.5	6.9	6.9	6.7	7.4	6.8	8.0	11.1	12.5	11.1	9.9
Wheat	"	3.5	3.8	4.4	5.0	4.3	4.4	5.6	6.9	6.0	7.6	6.4
Jowar (great millet)	"	2.8	2.6	3.6	3.6	3.0	3.0	5.8	6.1	4.3	6.5	4.5
Bajra (spiked millet)	"	3.2	2.9	3.9	4.0	3.2	3.0	5.7	7.3	5.1	7.3	5.1
Gram	"	2.3	2.7	3.7	3.4	3.3	3.2	4.0	6.3	5.6	6.7	5.1
Barley	"	2.7	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.9	5.2	4.4	5.2	4.1
TABLE 4-C(3)* VARIATIONS IN RETAIL PRICES												
Rice	1873 = 100	203	216	216	209	231	212	250	347	391	347	309
Wheat	"	67	181	210	238	205	210	267	329	286	362	305
Jowar	"	187	173	240	240	200	200	387	407	287	433	300
Bajra	"	178	161	217	222	178	167	317	406	283	406	283
Gram	"	144	169	231	212	206	200	250	394	350	419	319
Barley	"	193	193	236	236	236	229	279	371	314	371	293
* Source: <u>Government of India Commercial Intelligence Department, Statistical Abstract from 1912-13 to 1921-22</u> , pp. 559-579.												

Chapter Two

THE MAJORITY RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY IN DELHI

I

Hindu Castes

II

Hindu Sects

The Hindu community constituted an absolute majority in Delhi. Out of a total population of 488,188 in Delhi in 1921, Hindus formed 71 per cent with a numerical strength of 325,551. The Hindu community constituted 82 per cent of the rural population and 57 per cent of the urban population with 151,248 persons living in Delhi Province and 174,303 persons living in the Delhi urban area.

The Hindus who resided in the Delhi urban area lived either in the new administrative units of Delhi City which had formed since 1911 or in the Delhi Municipality. Of the 174,303 Hindus who lived in the Delhi urban area, 37,000 lived in the New Imperial Area, the New Cantonment, and the Civil Lines. The overwhelming majority of the Hindus who lived in these new areas were immigrants, most of whom were government servants and labourers. There was a gross imbalance in favour of males who constituted 24,700 as compared with 12,200 females.

The Hindus who lived in the Delhi Municipality totalled 121,735 in 1911 which represented 52 per cent of the population. Between 1911 and 1921 the Hindu population in Delhi Municipality increased by 15,649 and totalled 137,384 which represented 55 per cent of the total population in that unit. It is most likely that the increase of Hindus in the Delhi Municipality

between 1911 and 1921 was due primarily to immigration for the 9,600 males and for the 6,000 females.¹

The Hindus of Delhi were characterised by a heterogeneous social structure and were further divided into sectarian religious groups. The loyalties to caste and sect illustrate the traditional nature of Hindu society and provide the milieu with which the political leaders were confronted. As the process of politicisation encompassed ever larger numbers of individuals and new social groups from 1911 onwards, it became apparent that in the cities occupation was an equally significant force for fashioning social ties and for moulding political attitudes. Those castes which exhibited a high degree of occupational diversity usually displayed a lower degree of social, economic, and political cohesiveness. Those castes which exhibited a significant amount of consistency of caste, sect, and occupation, displayed a higher degree of cohesion in their political attitudes and in their social loyalties.

¹ Between 1901 and 1911 the number of females born in Delhi decreased by 4,519. The number of females resident in Delhi who were born outside Delhi increased by 9,732. This seems to indicate that Delhi-born girls emigrated from Delhi while females from surrounding districts immigrated into Delhi. The most obvious explanation for this movement is that it was the custom of the area for men to marry wives from the east. The number of females resident in Delhi who were born in the United Provinces was twice that of either the Punjab or Rajputana, the other two major areas from which immigrants came. Census of India, 1901, XII (Punjab and North-West Frontier Provinces); Census of India, 1911, XIV (Punjab); Census of India, 1921, XV (Punjab and Delhi).

I

The Brahman community in Delhi was the third largest after the Jat and Chamar communities.¹ It encompassed Brahman castes from the Punjab, Hariana, United Provinces, Maharashtra, Bengal, Tamilnad, and Kerala.² The Gaur Brahmans from Hariana were the most numerous while the Sarswat Brahmans from the hills of the Punjab were the second largest caste.³

The Gaur Brahmans were described by Ibbetson as very strict in their observance of caste rules. They were strict vegetarians and looked down upon - and refused to eat and smoke with - Brahmans who ate flesh (for example, Sarswat Brahmans). They were also reputed to be quarrelsome and grasping. The Sarswat Brahmans on the other hand were less strict. They ate flesh and would eat and smoke with most of the stricter Hindu castes

¹ This Chapter is based upon a very large number of Files in the Record Department, Delhi Administration, from which only isolated references have been taken.

²

There was also a group of Muslim Brahmans peculiar to Delhi District called Huseni Brahmans. There were about 3,500 of these in 1881, and they appeared to administer to the spiritual needs of both Hindus and Muslims. Denzil Ibbetson, Panjab Castes (Lahore, 1916), p. 218.

³

Of the 60,984 Brahmans in Delhi District in 1881, 58,650 were Gaur Brahmans and 1,250 were Sarswat. The number of Brahmans increased to 61,299 in 1891 and to 62,176 in 1901. Of the 62,176 Brahmans in Delhi District in 1901, 25,672 were in Delhi Tahsil. The number of Brahmans in Delhi in 1921 was 37,141. Ibbetson, Panjab Castes, p. 219; Punjab District Gazetteers, V (Delhi District), 1904, B, xiv; Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II (Tables).

(for example, Baniyas, Khatris, Kayasths, and Suds). They also lacked the quarrelsome and grasping nature of the Gaur.¹

All the Brahman castes had panchayats to settle social questions of a minor nature. In addition to these, three Brahman organisations were created as a reaction to reforming movements like the Arya Samaj, of which more later. The oldest was the Chaurasia Brahman Sabha (or Chaurasia Prem Parkashni Sabha) which was founded in 1906 with the object of strengthening orthodox sentiment and promoting Sanatana [orthodox] religion through the recitation of bhajans [hymns] and the Ramayana. It met weekly on Mondays. Its membership slowly decreased and it finally fell inactive in 1918. In 1910 the Gaur Brahmans founded a second organisation whose inspiration was social reform. This organisation, the Gaur Brahman Zamindari Association, which was oriented towards both rural and urban Brahmans, met every three months in the Sat Narain Mandar, Dariba Kalan, and continued actively through the decade.

There were two other organisations in existence in 1911 that concerned Brahmans. The oldest was the Khatri Updeshak Sabha founded in 1889 as an organisation of social reform. It depended primarily upon Khatris for support but the school it founded in 1895 educated both Khatri and Brahman boys. It also supported Sud Brahman widows. The other organisation, the Brahman Sabha, was founded in 1911 to promote Sanatana Dharma [orthodox religion]. It began with 100 members and soon gained an

¹

Ibbetson, Panjab Castes, p. 220.

additional 200 within five years, most of whom were considered 'influential'. It was located at the Sat Narain Mandar in Dariba Kalan, met three times per year, and took special pains to perform the upnayana [Brahmanic thread] ceremony for poor Brahman boys.

Yet another Brahman organisation came into existence after 1911. It was the Brahman Hitkarak Mahamandal Sabha which was founded in 1914. It began with 30 members, and was located in Jagiwara where it maintained a school for the religious education of Brahmans. The two most active officers of the organisation (the manager and secretary) were both members of other sanatani organisations which were anti-Arya Samaj in tone. This organisation showed very little life and after abolishing its school in 1916, became inactive in 1918.¹

A representative of the Brahman community who spoke for traditional feeling and conservative sentiment was Pandit Banke Rai. He was born in 1853 and died in 1923. His achievements as a Sanskrit scholar by 1906 earned him the titles of divisional darbari and mahamahapadayaya, a title which included a stipend of Rs. 100 per year from the Government. He owned one garden of 18 bighas of land in addition to his house in Katra Nil. He was president simultaneously of seven bhajan mandalis, which had a total membership of around 570, the main function of which was to promote Sanatana Dharma by the recital of the Ramayana and hymns. He took an active part in the education of

1

RDDA, Confidential File 70 (1915): 'List of Political, Quasi-Political, and Religious Societies, Sabhas, and Anjumans in Delhi Province for the Year Ending 30 June 1914.'

Brahman children, but did not participate in Hindu organisations which actively opposed the Arya Samajists or Muslims. His contributions to the War effort were of such an order that the government presented him with a Sanad for General War Work. It is interesting to note that Deputy Commissioner Bolster of Delhi recommended him for the honour of provincial darbari in 1920. Bolster thought that the recognised head of the Brahman community, which was showing a loyal disposition in that 'critical' year, should receive such recognition. Chief Commissioner Barron refused on the ground that the list should remain small and there was therefore no room for his elevation.¹ The Pandit had no son and upon his death the seat of divisional darbari lapsed from the family.

The Brahman community in Delhi contained a high degree of occupational diversity. There were 38,000 Brahmans in Delhi in 1921 of whom 16,900 were actual workers. The community included 8,700 who were literate and of this number 2,400 were literate in English.

1

RDDA, Foreign File 6 (a) Part B 1920: 'Recommendation of Certain Persons in Delhi for Provincial Darbaris,' Note by Deputy Commissioner dated 24 November 1920.

Table I lists the numbers of actual workers in the various occupations.

TABLE I¹

OCCUPATIONS OF THE BRAHMAN COMMUNITY IN DELHI, 1921

Trade	3,300	
Priests	2,000	
Government servants	1,550	
Contractors, clerks, cashiers	700	
Professions	700	
Living on incomes and pensions	250	
Income from Agricultural lands	120	
Transport (owners, managers, officers)	<u>100</u>	8,720
Cultivators of all kinds	3,700	
Labourers of all kinds	1,700	
Domestic servants	1,400	
Artisans and industrial workers	<u>1,200</u>	8,000
		<u>16,720</u>

The most important characteristic about this occupational structure is that the Brahman community was the only high caste community with such a large number of manual workers. The second characteristic is that almost all the non-manual workers filled occupations for which some degree of literacy was necessary. These two facts meant that the manual and non-manual division was reinforced by the division between those who were literate and those who were illiterate. The division between those literate in Hindi and those literate in English was not as important except where it highlighted the division between modernised and traditional Brahmans.

¹

Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.

The Brahman community in Delhi, with some exceptions, did not have large resources of wealth, status, and power. Even though members of the community were involved in trade, they did not tend to be the wealthiest or most successful merchants. They did excel in the professions and government service, and they did own land (eight per cent in Delhi District in 1910).¹ But few Brahman families could match the wealth of the more outstanding Bania, Khatri, and Kayasth families in Delhi.

The Brahman community of Delhi did have a certain amount of status. This came in the first instance from its traditional position in the varna structure as the guardian and transmitter of the sacred texts of Hinduism. This status tended to accrue only to those Brahmans who were actually priests and to the few Sanskrit scholars in the city. The status which accrued to the Brahman community came, in the second instance, from a style of life which other sections of Hindu society sought to emulate. And the high status of the Brahman community came, in the third instance, from the large number of positions its members held in the professions and government service which in turn stemmed from its emphasis upon education.

While the Brahman community in Delhi was not devoid of status, it lacked any significant or visible manifestations of power. There were no Brahmans on the Municipal Committee, there were few Brahmans who were title holders, honorary magistrates or darbaris and no Brahmans held positions of importance in the mercantile

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Punjab District Gazetteers, V (Delhi District), 1912, A, 62.

and commercial organisations of the city. But if the community lacked political and economic power, it does not follow that it did not have social, religious, and cultural influence. This influence, which derived primarily from the status of the community, was evident from the fact that many of the leaders of the Arya Samaj and the nationalist movement came from this group. The lack of cohesion within the community, however, meant that even though it supplied leaders, it did not respond as a community to political agitation.

The Bania community was the fourth largest social group in Delhi. It encompassed Bania castes such as the Aggarwal, the Oswal [Marwari], the Maheshri, the Saraogi, the Sahai and so forth.¹ Ibbetson described Banias as strict Hindus of pure Vaisya descent who wore the janeo [sacred thread], who had long periods of purification, who would not practice karewa [widow-marriage] and who would not eat or drink at the hands of lower castes - or higher castes - which ate flesh. He added that they had great commercial expertise and business acumen, and that the dealings of some of the great Bania houses of Delhi, Bikaner, and Marwar were of the most extensive nature. In the Punjab, Banias were found in great numbers only in the Delhi and Hissar divisions, and in the central states of the eastern plains. This was easily understandable in terms of the tradition that the Aggarwals originated at Agraha in

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The Aggarwals constituted 25,600, the Oswals 400, and another 1,000 were unspecified. There were also 3,800 Jain Aggarwals. Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.

the Hissar District.¹ The Aggarwals were almost entirely Hindus (except for some Jains and a few Sikhs), and invariably Vaishnava.

The Banias of Delhi had only two exclusively Bania organisations in 1911. The oldest was the Vesh Young Men's Association. Founded in 1892, its object was to improve the moral and intellectual stature of the Vesh and Bania communities. It had a reading room where young men were supposed to discuss moral and social questions. It maintained a membership of 40 which met at the house of the president, Lala Sri Ram, Bar-at-Law, in Imli Mohalla. The members were not necessarily those members of the Bania group who had the largest resources of wealth, status and power, but they carried some prestige and influence. It is significant that this organisation became the parent organisation for the Indraprasth Sewak Mandli, which was a Hindu volunteer association, founded in 1917, to support Home Rule.

The second Bania organisation in Delhi was the Rohtgi Dharm Rakhshari Sabha. It was founded in 1911 with the ostensible purpose of promoting Sanatana Dharma. Its real object was to save sanatanis from being converted to the Arya Samaj. It had 75 members who exercised 'some influence'. This was obviously a response to the activities of the Arya Samaj that came to a head before the War.

A third organisation came into being in 1914. It was the Marwari Association. It began with - and

¹ This was the capital of the Vaisya Raja, Agar Sen. The Aggarwals were said to have spread after the capture of the city by Shalib-ud-din Ghorī in 1115. Ibbetson, Panjab Castes, pp. 242-4.

maintained - a membership of 15. It supported a library and a reading room on Chandni Chauk. Its ostensible purpose was social reform, but its real objective was to promote the Arya Samaj among Marwaris. The Arya Samajists in this organisation did not take active parts in other Arya Samaj groups. The Marwari Arya Samajists maintained a school called the Marwari Vidayala.¹

The Bania community, like the Brahman community, did not attempt to establish any western style organisations to protect its interests. Also like the Brahman community, it relied upon traditional institutions to regulate social and religious activities. Unlike the Brahman community, however, its outstanding interest in economic affairs found ample protection in the western-style organisations in the city in which it was predominantly represented. It contributed the largest numbers to the Punjab Chamber of Commerce, the Delhi Piece-Goods Association, and the Delhi Hindustani Mercantile Association. It predominated in banking, cloth, and grain, the three major commodities of Delhi commerce.

The Bania community's predominance in the political and official affairs of Delhi was as marked as its predominance in the economic affairs of the city. The Bania community had the most representatives on the Municipal Committee, the largest number of title holders, darbaris, and honorary magistrates. The Bania community in Delhi had a certain amount of status derived from its traditional position in Hindu society and more especially from its orthodox religious observances. But in the

¹

RDDA, Confidential File 70 (1915).

cities, where occupation was as important as role, the community's large resources of wealth contributed to a large extent to its high status and extensive power. The Bania community in Delhi, then, displayed a high degree of consistency of wealth, status, and power.

The career of Lala Mina Mal Somani illustrates the way in which a Bania with wealth also achieved status and power. He was born in 1880 and, after a vernacular education, entered the family firm of Dhuliawala. The firm had extensive interests in banking, cotton milling, iron forging, and investing. In 1912 he was elected to the Municipal Committee from Ward VII (Bazar Sita Ram), a minor commercial area with a large population of indigent Muslims and low caste Hindus. Between 1912 and 1919 he obtained the titles of kursi nashin because he was a 'well-to-do banker, house proprietor, and liberal subscriber to private charities', rai sahib and honorary magistrate (second class). He subscribed Rs. 65,000 to the Second Indian War Loan Fund and became a member of the Delhi Committee for the Third Indian War Loan Fund. He capped this career when he became a divisional darbari in 1924. He also became the first president and dharma alankar of the Indraprasth Sanatan Dharm Mandal in 1916, and built dharmasalas and piaos.

From all indications the Bania community had a high degree of consistency of wealth, status, and power. There was also a high degree of consistency of caste, sect, and occupation. The Bania community was overwhelmingly orthodox in its social and religious values. It gave financial support to traditional educational institutions, to the Prinja Pol, and to temples. Its members visited

the sacred shrines of India and attended all the religious melas. It contributed lavishly to the Ram Lila and Krishna Lila pageants in the city, and regarded caste as the bed rock of society. Most Bania concerns were family enterprises and kinship played a predominant role in their social and commercial activities. This concentration on orthodox religion was matched by a concentration on commercial occupations.

The Aggarwal caste had 25,600 members in Delhi in 1921. There were 9,900 actual workers and 8,500 persons who were literate, of whom 1,500 were literate in English. The occupations of the actual workers of the caste are shown in Table II.

TABLE II¹

OCCUPATIONS OF THE AGGARWAL CASTE IN DELHI, 1921

Trade	7,636	
Government servants	197	
Contractors, clerks, cashiers	191	
Professions	187	
Transport (owners, managers, officers)	171	
Living on incomes and pensions	167	
Income from agricultural lands	24	
Industrial owners, managers	<u>27</u>	8,600
Artisans and industrial workers	612	
Labourers of all kinds	334	
Domestic servants	237	
Cultivators of all kinds	<u>91</u>	<u>1,274</u>
		<u>9,874</u>

It is interesting to note both the relative and absolute dominance in trade of the Bania community. Banias

¹ Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.

comprised about 25 per cent of those involved in trade of all kinds (28,654). The next closest groups in numbers were Brahmans and then Rajputs who together did not equal half the Banias. But their relative dominance was equally important. Banias controlled many or most of the large financial concerns in indigenous banking, cloth and grain. Both in numbers and in resources the Banias were the merchants par excellence of Delhi.

The Bania community, then, had a high degree of literacy, large resources of wealth, status, and power, a significant concentration in one type of occupation, a predominant influence in the economic organisations in the city, and a very traditional attitude towards the social and religious values of Hindu society. This consistency was matched only by the Jat community and like the Jat community, the cohesiveness of the Bania community enabled it to respond more as a community to various political issues in Delhi from 1917 onwards.

The Khatri and Kayasth castes did not occupy any rigorous position in the order of varna nor were they related to each other in any formal sense. Yet they shared many characteristics. The traditional origins of both communities was somewhat 'low', a state of affairs which they both sought to rectify by claiming Kshatriya status. They both founded organisations in Delhi to further this end. Other characteristics which they shared were the same strength in members, a high rate of literacy, and a high standard of living, which resulted from the pursuit of commerce and the professions as occupations. They both emphasised caste mobility and they both contributed significant numbers of leaders and

followers to the Arya Samaj and the nationalist movement. They differed in that the Khattris originated in the Punjab and the Kayasth originated in Bihar and Bengal, and the Khattris had more members in trade while the Kayasths had more members in the clerical and liberal professions. There is very little information about the Kayasths in Delhi, but Ibbetson described the Khattris in the following manner:

Trade is their main occupation; but in fact they have broader and more distinguishing features. Besides monopolising the trade of the Panjab and the greater part of Afghanistan, and doing a good deal beyond those limits, they are in the Panjab the chief civil administrators, and have almost all literate work in their hands. So far as the Sikhs have a priesthood, they are, moreover, the priests or gurus of the Sikhs. Both Nanak and Govind were, and the Sodis and Bedis of the present day are, Khattris. Thus then they are in fact in the Panjab, so far as a more energetic race will permit them, all that Mahratta Brahmins are in the Mahratta country, besides engrossing the trade which the Mahratta Brahmins have not. They are not usually military in their character, but are quite capable of using the sword when necessary. Diwan Sawan Mal, Governor of Multan, and his notorious successor Mulray, and very many of Ranjit Singh's chief functionaries, were Khattris. Even under Mahomedan rulers in the west, they have risen to high administrative posts. There is a record of a Khatri Dewan of Badakshan or Kunduz; and I believe, of a Khatri Governor of Peshawar under the Afghans. The Emperor Akbar's famous minister, Todur Mal, was a Khatri; and a relative of that man of undoubted energy, the great Commissariat Contractor of Agra, Joti Parshad, lately informed me that he also is a Khatri. Altogether there can be no doubt that these Khattris are one of the most acute, energetic and remarkable races in India, though in fact, except locally in the Panjab, they are not much known to Europeans. The Khattris are staunch Hindus;

and it is somewhat singular that, while giving a religion and priests to the Sikhs, they themselves are comparatively seldom Sikhs. The Khatriis are a very fine, fair, handsome race. And as may be gathered from what I have already said, they are very generally educated.¹

Their toughness and energy, their high rate of literacy, and their business acumen gave them moderate resources of wealth, status and power.

There were 9,000 Khatriis in Delhi in 1921. Of these, 2,250 were actual workers and 2,800 were literate. More than half were occupied in trade (1,300) with a few in government service (125) and the professions (125). There were close to 550 occupied as agriculturalists, industrial workers and artisans, labourers, and domestic servants. The Khatriis had only one organisation, the Khatri Updeshak Sabha. It was founded in 1889 with the object of social reform. It initiated a school in 1895 to educate Khatri and Brahman boys. The organisation also supported Sud Brahman and Khatri widows.²

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Ibbetson, Panjab Castes, p. 247. A most remarkable description of the Khatri caste in a north Indian city can be found in Prakash Tandon, Punjabi Century: 1857-1947 (London, 1961). Various references to the Kayasth caste can be found in Charles H. Heimsath, Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform (Princeton, 1964), pp. 281-4; John H. Hutton, Caste in India: Its Nature, Function, and Origins (fourth edition; London, 1963), passim; B.B. Misra, The Indian Middle Class: Their Growth in Modern Times (London, 1961), passim.

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Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II; RDDA, Confidential File 70 (1915).

Lala Gurpershad Kapur was a fitting representative of the Khatri community. He was born in 1883 and became a cloth merchant of some renown. He was appointed municipal commissioner in 1918 and 1921 and was elected to the Municipal Committee in 1922 for Ward II (Chandni Chauk) against the Congress Party nominee. He received a War Loan Sanad for subscribing over Rs. 2,000 to the Second Indian War Fund and was vice-president of the Indraprasth Sanatan Dharm Mandal. He was honorary secretary of the Kshatriya Upakaraka Sabha, which sought to have the Khatri caste upgraded to Kshatriya status in the census of 1921 and he was honorary secretary of the Delhi Piece Goods Association.

The Kayasths of Delhi had two organisations. One was the Kayasth Self-Advancement Society founded in 1892 with social reform as its object. It was hardly functioning in 1911 and became completely inactive by 1917. The other organisation began in 1912. The Chatar Gupat Sabha began with 125 influential members who lived on and around Bazar Sita Ram. Its objects were social reform, the education of children, and the extension of support to widows and orphans. It held several meetings during the year, an annual meeting in March, and maintained a library and a widow fund.¹

Munshi Rup Narain represented the Kayasth community. He was a member of the Bar in Delhi and was elected municipal commissioner for Ward IV (Malewara) in 1915. He was an honorary magistrate (first class) and received

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There were 7,300 Kayasths in Delhi in 1921. Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II; RDDA, Confidential File 70 (1915).

a War Loan Sanad for subscribing over Rs. 2,000 to the Second Indian War Loan Fund. He was also a vice-president of the Indraprasth Sanatan Dharm Mandal.

Several interesting points emerge from a comparison of the three groups discussed above. The first is that the number of persons who were literate in proportion to the actual workers of the community was 52 per cent for the Brahman community, 86 per cent for the Aggarwal caste, and 124 per cent for the Khatri caste. This is a direct comment upon the number of manual workers in the Brahman community and the high degree of education among the dependents in the Khatri caste. It probably meant also that even the manual workers among the Khatriis were literate.

The second point of note is the comparison of dependents per actual worker in the three groups. This ratio was 1.2 dependents per actual worker for the Brahman community; 1.6 for the Aggarwal; and 3.0 for the Khatri. These ratios reveal two facts. The first is that there were more women who worked in the Brahman community than in the Aggarwal and Khatri castes.¹ The Brahman women who worked came from those sections of the community whose occupation was manual, while those Khatriis who performed manual labour maintained a stricter seclusion for their women. This implies that upwardly mobile castes emulated traditional values to a greater extent than those who were no longer mobile. These

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In the Brahman community, the proportion of actual workers who were females was ten per cent. It was five per cent for the Aggarwal and Khatri castes. Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.

figures also reinforce other evidence that of the three groups, the standard of living among the members of the Khatri and Kayasth castes was sufficiently high for most of their children to survive infancy into adulthood.¹

There was a noticeable gulf between the higher castes - the Brahmans, Banias, Khatris, and Kayasths - and the rest of Hindu society in Delhi. The higher castes had large or moderate resources of wealth, status, and power; high rates of literacy; and a majority of members who pursued non-manual occupations. The rest of Hindu society reflected the converse of these characteristics. A community which occupied a middle position between these two sections of Hindu society, however, was the Rajput community.

The Rajput community was divided into sub-units called clans, tribes, or castes. The largest clan was the Bhatti. The second largest was the Gaura clan, which although it practised karewa retained the high status of the Rajput community. Members of this group were noisy and quarrelsome, and clannish in disposition. The next largest group were the Chauhans, who also practised karewa, but who were unable to retain their high status in the eyes of the rest of the Rajputs. They were consigned from the Kshatriya status to the Sudra level with the Jats (who also practised karewa). They were the best Rajput cultivators in Delhi District and were characterised as well behaved and orderly. They considered themselves to have a higher status than the

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Census of India, 1931, XVI (Delhi), Pt. I (Report).

Jats however,¹ The Rajput clans did not form western-type organisations. They relied instead upon powerful panchayats to regulate clan affairs.

The Rajput community occupied a middle position in Delhi because it had a rate of literacy which, though lower than the ratio for the top groups, was higher than that of any of the remaining groups in Delhi. It also had a larger number of non-manual workers than the lower groups of the society. There were 20,700 Rajputs in Delhi in 1921. There were 9,900 actual workers and 2,300 who were literate. The diversity of occupation of actual workers is shown in Table III.

TABLE III²

OCCUPATIONS OF THE RAJPUT COMMUNITY IN DELHI, 1921

Trade	1,200	
Government servants	800	
Contractors, clerks, cashiers	200	
Professions	130	
Income from Agricultural lands	60	
Living on incomes and pensions	<u>50</u>	2,440
Cultivators of all kinds	2,600	
Artisans and industrial workers	2,800	
Labourers of all kinds	1,300	
Domestic servants	<u>600</u>	<u>7,300</u>
		<u>9,740</u>

The Rajputs of Delhi possessed limited resources of wealth, status, and power. Some Rajputs possessed significant amounts of wealth as rural and urban landlords, and as traders. But these were few and the community as

¹ Ibbetson, Panjab Castes, pp. 132-5

² Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.

a whole, with its high proportion of manual workers, was not wealthy. The community possessed a substantial degree of status which stemmed from its traditional position in Hindu society. This status was jealously guarded and zealously maintained. Yet the community was unable to translate its status into power. There were no Rajputs on the Municipal Committee, very few who were title holders, and none who were darbaris or honorary magistrates. The Rajput traders belonged to merchant organisations but they did not exercise any influence over the direction of such organisations.

The Rajput community in Delhi as a whole displayed little consistency of caste, sect, and occupation. There was no single large clan or caste to give the community any great amount of cohesion, while the division between the Chauhan and other Rajputs was naturally unbridgeable. The Rajputs were undoubtedly orthodox with the exception of the Chauhans, whose practice of karewa encouraged them to join the Arya Samaj. There was probably some consistency of caste, sect, and occupation among the Chauhan clan which was agriculturalist and among the Bhatti clan which had large numbers of artisans and labourers. It is difficult to discover, however, how many Chauhans and Bhattis were in non-manual occupations, or how many members of the Gauras and Kicchis, the other two important clans, were literate or worked in manual occupations.

The Jat community was the largest single group in Hindu society in Delhi in 1921. This is understandable because the Jat community was the largest single

community in the Punjab and in the western United Provinces. It belonged to the Sudra varna and had the highest status of the communities which practised karewa. According to Ibbetson, members of the Jat community would eat and smoke with the Ahir and Gujjar castes which were also Sudra, but they were deadly enemies of the Rajputs.¹

Ibbetson describes the Jat as the farmer and revenue-payer par excellence in the Punjab. He was honest, industrious, sturdy, and independent. He was impatient of tribal or communal control, and asserted the freedom of the individual. These values and characteristics gave him a special propensity to join the Arya Samaj. He was peaceably inclined if left to himself, but he was turbulent and not easily pacified once aroused.

There were two major groups in the Jat community.² The Dhe had their ancestral origins in the north and west. The Hele or Haulania came from the south, more specifically from Bharatpur. These two groups came from the same area originally but the Dhe migrated across the Indus plains and settled in the area between the Indus and Ganges river. A large number of those who settled between the Indus and the Sutlej were converted to Islam;

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The Ahirs numbered 11,357 and the Gujjars 13,041 in Delhi in 1921. They both practised karewa and were both overwhelmingly rural. They had a very low rate of literacy and no wealth, status, or power. Ibbetson, Panjab Castes, pp. 97-104, 126-131; Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.

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For a further discussion on the migration of Jats see A.B. Mukerji, 'Jats, A Study in Human Geography,' Geographical Review of India (June 1954); and A.B. Mukerji, 'The Migration of the Jats: A Study in Historical Geography,' Indian Geographer, VI (August 1961), 41-53.

a large number of those who settled in the modern state of Punjab were converted to Sikhism; and a large number of those who settled in Hariana and in western United Provinces remained Hindu. The Hele also migrated from the trans-Indus area, but they went south through Rajputana and eventually large numbers concentrated at Bharatpur. They then migrated into Hariana and western United Provinces. There was little animosity between the two groups, but they strictly refrained from intermarriage. These two major subgroups were again subdivided into tribes. The largest tribes were the Dehia, the Khatri, the Dagar, the Dhillon, the Ithwal and the Ghatwal.¹ The Dhe formed the majority in the province.

There were 46,100 Jats in Delhi in 1921. Of these 15,600 were actual workers and there were 1,600 members of the community who were literate. The occupations of the actual workers are listed in Table IV.

The Jat community had mixed resources of wealth, status, and power. The members of the Jat community in the rural areas owned the largest amount of land and were the lambardars in the majority of the 314 villages

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Ibbetson is unclear about the Khatri, the Dagar, the Dhillon, and the Ithwal tribes in Delhi. He had no information on the first two and the second two were located primarily in the Sikh tract and the Eastern Sub-Montane respectively with an unusually large concentration in Delhi District. The Dhe formed the majority and the Hele the minority in the District with the Dehia and the Ghatwal tribes respectively the major tribes of these two sub-groups.

TABLE IV¹OCCUPATIONS OF THE JAT COMMUNITY IN DELHI, 1921

Government servants	722	
Trade	223	
Living on incomes and pensions	60	
Professions	40	
Contractors, clerks, cashiers	<u>41</u>	1,086
Cultivators of all kinds	13,788	
Artisans and industrial workers	263	
Labourers of all kinds	259	
Domestic servants	<u>72</u>	<u>14,382</u>
		<u>15,468</u>

in the Province.² This significant form of wealth added to their status which was somewhat higher than that conferred by tradition. They were also eagerly recruited for the army. They made a virtue of manual labour and tended to look down upon the non-manual occupations as a means of acquiring wealth and status. Their power in the rural area was also quite high since their community paid the greatest proportion of the land revenue, they constituted the lambardars, and they had a significant representation on the electoral roll.

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Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.

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For a description of a Jat village in Delhi Province, see Oscar Lewis and Harvant Singh Dhillon, Group Dynamics in a North Indian Village: A Study of Factions (New Delhi, 1954); and Oscar Lewis, Village Life in Northern India: Studies in a Delhi Village (Urbana, 1958); for a more general discussion of Jat villages see A.B. Mukerji, 'Jat Settlements and Habitations.' Indian Geographical Journal, XXXI (1956), 102-15, and XXXII (1957), 13-28.

The Jats who lived in the urban area, who were literate, and who pursued non-manual occupations, seemed to have a somewhat higher status than tradition conferred also, and they had a reasonable amount of wealth and power. Many of the wealthy urban Jats were landlords who preferred to live in the city. Two examples of such Jats were Chaudhri Ragnath Singh and Chaudhri Risal Singh. Chaudhri Ragnath Singh who was a divisional darbari, had received the title rai bahadur in 1892 at the age of 34. He was a Jat who was an 'enlightened agriculturist of influence and service to Government' and who owned 105 bighas of land. Chaudhri Risal Singh won the election for the Municipal Committee for Ward XI (Sadr Bazaar) in 1922 against the Congress Party nominee. At the age of 50 he was a landlord of some repute.

The urban members of the Jat community did not form any western-style organisation to further their interests, but they did join other organisations with religious, social, political, or economic goals. Representatives of the Jat community joined the Arya Samaj in large numbers; they subscribed to the Ramjas College Committee; and a Jat was elected to the Municipal Committee in 1922. They belonged to the economic or professional organisations of the city, but their voice was usually not the most significant one heard in these organisations. The prestige and influence of the urban Jat community was, therefore, somewhat less than that of their rural brothers, but it would seem to have been slightly higher than that of the Rajputs.

The Jat community in Delhi Province, both urban and rural, displayed a moderately high degree of consistency

of wealth, status, and power. This was also true of caste, sect, and occupation which made them comparable to the Bania community. The majority of the Jats belonged to the Dhe group. All Jats practised karewa and there was, therefore, no distinction between those Jats who joined the Arya Samaj and those who did not, while the values and goals of the Samaj were peculiarly amenable to the Jat personality. And the majority of the Jats pursued agriculture and owned agricultural land. The study of politics in Delhi shows that the members of only two groups of Hindu society react as members of a community. These were the urban Banias and the rural Jats. Otherwise people in Delhi participated in politics as members of occupational groups or as members of a religious community.

The rest of Hindu society in Delhi came from that portion of the community referred to variously as depressed classes, harijans, outcastes, or panchamas. This portion of the community was divided into those castes whose traditional occupation did not carry any stigma and those whose occupation rendered them untouchable. The largest castes of the former were the Jhiwar [water carrier], the Julaha [weaver], and the Kumhar [potter]. The largest castes of the latter were the Chamar [leather] and the Chuhra [sweeper]. None of these castes had any resources of wealth, status, and power; they were almost entirely illiterate, they pursued manual occupations, and in only a few instances did they display any consistency in caste,

sect, and occupation.¹ They relied completely upon the traditional organisation of the panchayat and they had no representation in any of the organisations of the city. The pertinent details of these castes are given in Table V.

TABLE V²
FIVE SELECTED CASTES OF DELHI, 1921

	<u>Total</u> <u>Persons</u>	<u>Actual</u> <u>Workers</u>	<u>Number</u> <u>Literate</u>	<u>%</u> <u>Actual Workers</u> <u>in Traditional</u> <u>Occupation</u>
Jhiwar	10,983	5,922	288	15.4
Julaha	9,342	4,327	62	29.1
Kumhar	9,141	3,561	65	43.3
Chamar	45,046	21,944	182	27.6
Chuhra	14,375	7,354	67	81.6

1

There is a very good discussion of a Chamar caste in Agra which has a high degree of consistency of caste, sect, occupation, and residence in Owen M. Lynch, 'Rural Cities in India: Continuities and Discontinuities,' in India and Ceylon: Unity and Diversity, Philip Mason, ed. (London, 1967), pp. 142-58. He also discusses the impact of enfranchisement upon the caste and the growth of literacy. There were five other artisan groups in Delhi that showed a high consistency of caste, sect, and occupation. They were:

	<u>Number of</u> <u>Actual Workers</u>	<u>%</u> <u>in Traditional</u> <u>Occupation</u>
Dhobi	1,189	82
Lohar	630	63
Nai	2,030	75
Sunar	501	91
Tarkhan	1,193	70

Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.

2

Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.

The Chamars and Chuhras suffered certain disabilities. They could not draw water from community wells and their presence in Hindu or Muslim private schools was prevented as was their attempts to acquire land for agricultural or residential purposes in certain localities.

The material condition of the majority of the members of the depressed classes, was not, however, the worst in the Hindu community. There was a steady demand for sweepers and both touchables and untouchables could easily find work as day labourers. The fact that their women and children worked placed them in a fairly advantageous position as wage earners. The Chief Commissioner summarised their position (and his attitude toward them) as follows:

As I have said, neither class suffers from lack of employment; they have already fair facilities for education, and in many ways are probably in less pressing need of special attention than some other classes, such as weavers, potters, wire workers and followers of similar trades. Where a class enjoys a fair amount of material prosperity and is not subjected to any actual oppression by its neighbours, it seems not unreasonable to leave it to work out its future by its own resources and by such facilities as private enterprise is prepared to extend to it.¹

The condition of those members of the depressed classes who remained in their traditional occupations, except the Chuhras, was much worse than that of the rest of the Hindu community. The potters and the weavers were the exceptions to the lack of congruence in caste, sect, and occupation mentioned above. These two groups displayed

¹ RDDA, Home File 169 Part B 1916: 'Measures for the Amelioration of the Moral, Material and Educational Condition of the Depressed Classes.'

a high degree of consistency and their condition of economic hardship, exacerbated by the War, was largely responsible for their response during the Rowlatt Satyagraha of April 1919 discussed in Chapter Six. The cohesiveness of the leather workers that emanated from the congruence of caste, sect, and occupation was actively played upon by missionaries with a parochial intent.

The depressed classes received considerable attention from the three missionary religious groups which were active in Delhi. The Christian missionaries were interested primarily in social welfare while the Arya Samaj and the Muslim missionaries were more interested in proselytization. The Christian missions maintained the largest number of schools for them. In 1916 the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel maintained eight and the Baptist Mission three primary schools. The Hindus maintained a primary school for Reghar Chamars. It is reported that in Delhi there were 831 students from depressed classes who were under instruction in 1916. Only 15 of these were untouchables.¹

The process of proselytization was the more important of the two types of missionary effort. The process of amelioration pursued by the Christian missionaries did not engender much parochial enmity because of the small size of the Christian community and because far greater numbers of people benefited from an improvement in conditions than were converted. The process of proselytization pursued by the Arya Samaj and

¹ RDDA, Home File 169 Part B 1916.

the Muslim missionaries caused considerable tension in the city. The proselytization by Muslim missionaries threatened to upset the imbalance in numbers between the two major communities and such conversion attacked the traditional organisation of Hindu society. The Chief Commissioner commented that:

It must be noted that there is also a fairly continuous process of conversion of Chumars to Mohammadanism, and it is by no means rare to find that the first step of a prosperous Chumar is to secure his social status by conversion to Islam (c.f. Punjab Census Report, 1911, Volume I page 173). The extent of the recent conversion of both Chuhras and Chumars to Christianity, Arya Samajism or Islam is indeed a matter of very considerable concern to certain classes of the population. The orthodox Hindu resents it on religious grounds; while the dweller in the villages or town suburbs finds in it a decay in the traditional bases by which the village community maintains its existence and a positive inconvenience so far as it reduces the available supply of the lowest menial labour.¹

A concerted attempt to mobilise the Chamar leather workers against the Muslims which is discussed in chapters Four and Five, were two examples of the result of the parochial attitude of the missionaries in Delhi.

II

Those Hindus who held to the orthodox beliefs of Hinduism were called sanatanis. The diverse path that they followed was called the Sanatana Dharma. In Delhi the sanatanis constituted the overwhelming majority of the Hindu population and were predominantly Vaishnava.

¹ Ibid.

The sanatanis of Delhi were undergoing a process of change. This change resulted from numerous threats to their orthodox way of life. Most sanatanis had accommodated to the process of urbanisation and were able to maintain a rigid attitude toward marriage, caste, and religious practices. Untouchables no longer announced their passage, but they still lived in demarcated areas and still performed many of their traditional functions, such as sweeping, for the higher castes. But the process of urbanisation had forced many compromises upon the orthodox Hindu. The observances that rural Hindus maintained toward commensality and drinking water were impossible in a thriving city. However, these and many other compromises had been made and accepted.

The compromises demanded by modernisation were of a much different order. Modern systems of transportation, changes in education, and increased emphasis upon merit and occupation to the detriment of role and traditional status, a bureaucracy that was an active agent for change, new political institutions, and so forth, demanded compromises of a much more serious nature than the process of urbanisation. These compromises, again, were made and accepted with the strong reservation that marriage, caste, and religious practices remain inviolate. It was in just these three areas, however, that the reformers began to work in the firm belief that traditional or orthodox practices were an impediment to the process of modernisation. The first of these reform movements, the Brahmo Samaj, had found little sympathy and engendered little support. Its challenge was contemptuously ignored.

The Arya Samaj, on the other hand, with its subtle combination of the traditional and the modern was a challenge which the sanatanis found hard to ignore. And, in fact, the sanatanis of Delhi did not ignore the challenge.

The sanatanis of Delhi responded to the process of modernisation by establishing 23 formal organisations before 1911. The oldest of these organisations were the bhajan mandalis, which were composed of a group of lay Hindus led by a preacher who was well versed in sacerdotal lore and who recited the epics and sacred hymns in the belief that such recitation provided for the moral and spiritual welfare of the participants.¹ There were 12 bhajan mandalis in Delhi of which seven met annually, three met monthly and one met weekly. Although the membership of these mandalis varied, the president and secretary were the same for the majority of them, namely, Pandit Banke Rai and Pandit Joti Pershad. The festival of Ram Naumi was the occasion for most of the annual congregations. Ten of these organisations were founded before the conflict between the Arya Samaj and the sanatanis began in earnest, and it is presumed that they carried on passively the bhakti tradition of orthodox Hinduism after the conflict began.

The second type of organisation was composed of sanatani organisations created in direct response to the challenge of the Arya Samaj. The first such

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For a detailed description of the bhajan mandali see Milton Singer, ed., Krishna: Myths, Rites, and Attitudes (Honolulu, 1966), pp. 90-138.

organisation was founded in June 1904. Another five followed between 1908 and 1911. The anti-Samaj activities usually took the form of inviting renowned sadhus and sanyases from Benares or Hardwar to give public lectures in order to refute Arya Samaj teachings. The Parsons Hindu Anathalya was the exception to this activity. It was an orphanage founded in October 1905 (it took its name from Colonel Parsons, then deputy commissioner of Delhi) whose object was to house orphans in order to bring them up as good sanatanis rather than let the Arya Samajists, the Christians, or the Muslims take them, which the latter three were only too willing to do. This organisation had 200 members and was 'popular with well-to-do Hindus.' It housed 22 orphans in 1914 and 35 in 1918.

The third type of sanatani organisation was devoted to the education of women. There were only three schools of this type, but this type of activity did show that the sanatanis were aware of some need in this regard. The motivation for their awareness probably came from the rapid strides that the Arya Samajists and other reformers were making in this field.

The fourth type of sanatani organisation had only one example. It was the Gaurakhsha Sabha (or Prinja Pol), which was an organisation to provide an asylum for old and infirm cattle, and to oppose kine-killing. It was founded in 1894 and had roughly 500 'influential' and 'well-off' members. It collected about Rs. 20,000 annually to keep the 1,000 cattle it maintained in two pastures at Jhansa in Gurgaon District. Its president, Lala Sheo Parshad, held the title of C.I.E.¹

¹ RDDA, Confidential File 70 (1915).

Between 1911 and 1918 ten more sanatani organisations were founded. They had various objectives and showed a more positive attitude toward modern conditions. One had a membership of 75, but the rest had close to 20. Three were founded to promote Sanatana Dharma; two were bhajan mandalis; one was formed to prevent kine-killing; one was anti-Arya Samaj; and one was a temple managing committee. The remaining three were somewhat peculiar to sanatani groups as they were founded for 'social reform'. This seems a contradiction in terms, since sanatanis were per se against reform. But the largest, the Saraswati Sabha with a membership of 75, was organised to promote 'social reform and the principles of sanitation'.¹

All sanatani organisations drew their support from the higher castes of the Hindu community. The majority of the officers of these organisations had large resources of wealth, status, and power and were usually composed of successful men in business or in the professions. Brahmans of high social status also figured prominently. The membership of the organisations was more diverse, but still came from those castes and communities that had resources of wealth, status and power, namely, the Brahman, Bania, Rajput and Jat communities, and the Khatri and Kayasth castes. The Banias, Khattris and Kayasths, however, supplied the more significant amounts of monetary support. One measure of this support is that only one sanatani organisation fell

¹ RDDA, Confidential File 227 (1918): 'List of Political, Quasi-Political and Religious Societies, Sabhas and Anjumans in the Delhi Province for the Year Ending the 30th June 1918.'

inactive by 1918, in comparison to the large number of Arya Samaj organisations which fell inactive over a corresponding period.

The Sanatana Dharma lacked any idea of formal congregation, as a body of people collected together for religious worship. It depended, instead, upon a consensus that covered both the social and the religious precepts of the community. These precepts were inculcated through the religious texts, through puja, and through religious festivals. Most Hindu children learned about their religion and community from the mother, who, with varying degrees of ability and accuracy, recited the more popular texts. They were also exposed to the oral recitation of religious texts at temples. The use of images both in the home and in the temples and dharmasalas reinforced the oral tradition as did puja where it was practised either in the home or in the temple. There was no corporate act, however, only the knowledge that other people were performing puja in a similar way. It was this knowledge that sustained the consensus. The consensus of the Hindu community found public expression and was reinforced by the religious festivals that occurred with remarkable frequency throughout the year. There were 12 festivals recognised by the Government through

the year with the largest crowds attracted by the Dusehra or Ram Lila festival.¹

The Sanatana Dharma encompassed many practices. The higher castes practised vegetarianism or ate flesh, they kept their women secluded, did not permit widows to remarry, and maintained a strict code of personal cleanliness. They might also keep cows, feed Brahmans, and build dharmasalas and piaos for merit. The lower castes tended to eat flesh, allow their women to work, and allow widows to remarry. The dieties they worshipped were manifold in number with some groups worshipping saints and forming sects such as the Kabir Panthi (9,400 in Delhi in 1921), the Rai Dasia (12,700), and the Lal Begi (12,700).²

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Oscar Lewis refers to this as the 'Festival Cycle' which began in the month of Cait [March-April] with Basora and ended with Holi-Dulhendi in Phagun [February-March]. He lists and explains 19 festivals in the Province. Village Life in Northern India, pp. 197-246. The Delhi Administration recognised only eight north Indian festivals and four local festivals. These were, from January to December 1915:

<u>Basant Panchmi</u>	<u>Solono</u>
<u>Sheoratri</u>	<u>Janam Ashtami</u>
<u>Holi</u>	<u>Dusehra</u>
<u>Durga Ashtami</u> (local)	<u>Dewali</u>
<u>Baisakhi</u>	<u>Jam Dutia</u> (local)
<u>Nirjala Ikadshi</u> (local)	<u>Ganga Ashnan</u> (local)

RDDA, Home File 187 Part B 1914: 'Public Holidays to be Observed in Delhi Province.' There were, however, a total of 31 recognised and unrecognised festive occasions in Delhi listed in RDDA, Home File 181 Part B 1917: 'Annual Police Report of Delhi Province for 1916.'

² Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. I (Report). A good general outline of the religious sects of the Sanatana Dharma can be found in J.N. Farquhar, Modern Religious Movements in India (Delhi, 1967).

The diversity of Sanatana Dharma, which in turn reflected and reinforced the heterogeneity of the social structure exercised a profound influence upon the members of the community. The visible manifestations of the religion could lead the observer to look upon Hindu society in Delhi as fragmentary and incohesive. But it was just this fragmentation that both divided and united the society. The syncretic nature of Hinduism assigned every individual to a group on the one hand, and it regulated the role and status of each of these groups in relation to the other on the other hand. It provided an immense amount of security for each individual as a member of some group, and it gave each individual's group a definite position in an ordered hierarchy. The sense of security, then, emanated from a consensus which accepted the precepts of the system. Many an astute political leader realised this fact and sought to mobilise the community with the cry that the basic precepts of the system were being questioned. And people responded, not because they felt that their caste or sect would suffer, but because they thought that their security would be undermined. Caste and sect only became important when specific grievances and discontents could be tied to larger issues. But more often than not, it was a general issue, such as cow-killing or regulation of marriages, that engendered the greater degree of response.

The most significant Hindu sect in Delhi outside the Sanatana Dharma was the Arya Samaj. It was not significant in terms of numbers, since it only had 650 formal members and several thousand informal converts

in 1911. (The growth of the sect to 12,000 in 1921 and to 50,000 in 1931 meant, however, that it eventually did become significant in terms of the numbers of followers.) The Arya Samaj was most significant in terms of its ethic, the people who joined it, their activities, and the effect of all this upon the wider community in Delhi.

The Arya Samaj, founded in 1875, was a neo-traditionalist group which sought to defend Hinduism against Christianity and Islam.¹ It had a split personality which, on the one hand tied it to the orthodoxy of the Vedas, and on the other brought it into conflict with the sanatanis because of its radical views on social questions. The Arya Samaj was monotheistic and iconoclastic, against child marriages and for karewa, against caste and for varna by merit rather than birth, against the extremes of the joint family and for individualism. It introduced an ethic of social service because its founder believed that individual happiness or misery depended upon the happy or miserable state of the society of which the individual was a part. It also introduced the concept of a congregation and held weekly services on Sunday morning.

The ideas of individualism, merit, social service, and congregation were some of the more significant values propagated by the Arya Samaj. These ideas gave the non-Brahman groups in Hindu society a sense of social dynamism and provided them with a social status commensurate with their growing wealth and power. They

¹ For a good general discussion of the Arya Samaj see C. Heimsath, Indian Nationalism, pp. 113-30, 294-308, and the works referred to therein.

also enabled such groups to absorb Western values, education and technology without sacrificing their cultural heritage. All of this is vividly illustrated by a description of an Arya Samaj meeting in a north Indian city in 1912:

The place of meeting is a large oblong hall without seats, with a platform at one end and a high narrow gallery at the other. In the floor, in front of the platform, there is a square pit, measuring perhaps two feet each way. This is the altar. On one side of the hall a small platform for singers and a harmonium had been placed. When we entered, there was only one man in the hall, and he was laying some pieces of wood in order at the bottom of the square pit. When that was done, he set up a stick of incense on end on the floor at each corner of the pit. Some' packets of aromatic herbs and several sacrificial vessels lay on the floor. Men came dropping in, and squatted in front and on the two sides of the altar. When there were perhaps twenty present, those next the altar began to intone some Sanskrit verses, amongst which we could distinguish some of the verses of Rigveda, X, 129. The fire and the incense sticks were then lighted; the aromatic leaves were shed on the fire; and ghi (melted butter) was rubbed on the outer edges of the altar. Other verses were now chanted, while the flames rose nearly two feet above the level of the floor. This is the havana, which Aryas are recommended to perform every morning, at the time of their devotions, for the purification of the air.

The second part of the service then began. It consisted of the singing of hymns, the repetition of texts (one of them the Gayatri), prayer and a sermon, all in Hindi except a few texts which were in Sanskrit. It was just like a Protestant service, and totally unlike any Vedic observance.¹

¹ J.N. Farquhar, Modern Religious Movements, pp. 123-4 (italics added).

The combination of the modern and the traditional in the Arya Samaj gave rise to a conflict within the movement as to which aspect should receive the greatest emphasis. One group supported western education and the eating of meat as a rejection of orthodox values. The other group supported a traditional education in the vernacular and demanded a strict vegetarian diet. The two groups managed to coexist until the Arya Samaj founded its first affiliated college at Lahore in 1888. The foundation of the college brought the conflict into the open and resulted in a formal split of the two groups in 1892. Those who supported the Dayanand Anglo-Vedic College with its emphasis upon Western science and literature along with study of the Vedas, were called the 'college' or 'cultured' group.

The dissident group established a traditional educational institution at Hardwar, the Gurukula Mahavidyalaya, which students entered at age eight and from which they were not allowed to depart until they were 25. Their rigorous, monastic form of instruction with Hindi as the sole medium, was designed to instill Vedic values, discipline, and vigour. The supporters of this group were called the 'vegetarian' or 'mahatma' or 'gurukul' group. The practical effect of the rival forms of education was for the 'college' group to produce significant numbers of graduates who entered commerce, the professions, or government service. The Gurukula Mahavidyalaya did not produce any graduates until just before the War, and they were ill-suited to do anything but teach, preach and proselytize. The gurukul, in effect, was a seminary for religious training which

attracted a different type of student altogether from the college.

There was an additional difference between the supporters (and graduates) of the two groups. The 'college' group became very active in politics as described by a British officer in August 1909:

The samaj, I know, contains many men of forward views politically, and this is inevitable. But to brand all Aryas as extremists is absurd. There are hundreds who have joined the body in order to obtain freedom from caste and other trammels in their private lives. All said and done, the Arya Samaj is the direct product of British teaching. For years we have preached against caste and child marriage and have taught patriotism and self-help. It is unreasonable to complain when the fruits of our teaching appear. There is a national feeling now in India: ideals of patriotism are in the air and the young men are being stirred. It is idle not to recognise and encourage this; and to brand all who are answering to the call as disloyal and seditious. And this we almost must do if we are hostile to the Arya Samaj. It is the only organisation which expresses the new ideas, half social and half political as they are. The Brahmo Samaj has no life. It is a purely philosophic system.¹

The 'gurukul' group strictly eschewed politics and increasingly attacked the 'college' group from 1900 onwards when that group became quite active in the provincial branch of the National Congress.² The

¹ NAI, Home Poll 154-156 Part A, October 1909: 'Political Situation in the Punjab,' M.W. Fenton to the Secretary, Government of India, Home Department, dated Simla, 11 August 1909.

² For a good discussion of the politics of the Arya Samaj in the Punjab see Norman G. Barrier, 'The Arya Samaj and Congress Politics in the Punjab, 1894-1908,' Journal of Asian Studies, XXVI (May 1967), 363-79.

The deportation of Lala Lajpat Rai, the political leader of the Arya Samaj in the Punjab, in 1907 caused a large number of the 'college' group to withdraw from politics.¹ But Mahatma Munshi Ram, the principal of the Gurukula Mahavidyalaya and the leader of the 'gurukul' group still felt constrained to argue against any political involvement in his The Arya Samaj, A Political Body in 1909. It is significant, however, that the anti-British tone of the nationalist movement from 1917 onwards drew several outstanding members of the 'gurukul' group including its leader into politics. This was a result of their much more militant stance and the intense process of revivalism in which they participated.

There were two types of Arya Samajist who belonged to the 'college' group in Delhi. There were those who

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It is interesting to note that the Arya Samaj was not as politically active in the United Provinces as in the Punjab. C.J. Stevenson-Moore, the Officiating Director, Criminal Intelligence, in a note of 23 December 1909 commented that: 'In the United Provinces the political aspect was never so strong as it was in the Punjab and this distinction has been maintained. In the hundreds of regular meetings of the Samaj held in the towns of the United Provinces in the last two years the speakers have generally confined themselves to religious questions, and in some cases they have gone out of their way to praise the British Government for its religious tolerance. In the Punjab members of the Arya Samaj are still the most prominent leaders of political agitation...The Society is the most advanced body in the [Punjab] Province in matters of social, educational, and religious reform, and it is not surprising therefore that its members should take a somewhat advanced position in regard to political matters also.' NAI, Home Poll 4 Deposit, April 1912: 'Note on the Arya Samaj.'

enrolled as regular members of organisations and who paid a subscription fee. And there were those who attended the Sunday services at the Arya Samaj mandir but who did not enroll formally in any organisation. Little is known of the latter group in Delhi.

The formally organised part of the 'college' group of the Arya Samaj in Delhi in 1911 had 15 branches. The oldest was the Chowri Bazaar branch which had 191 members who were quite influential.¹ It was subordinate to the Lahore Arya Pratinidi Sabha [the provincial representative body] and acted as the local representative of that body in south-east Punjab. It maintained a girls school and a library. Its officers in 1914 consisted of a deputy collector in the Canal Department, a Bania of Mahrauli, a school headmaster, two cloth merchants, a contractor, and three pandits. A second branch of the Arya Samaj was founded in 1894 at Sabzimandi with 18 members. Its officers consisted of a Mali, a Rajput, a Khatri, and a pandit.

The 15 Arya Samaj organisations formed between 1882 and 1911 exhibited several interesting characteristics.

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Dayanand Saraswati, the founder of the Arya Samaj, visited Delhi in 1877 to attend the Imperial Darbar. He then travelled throughout the Punjab for a period of 18 months. It was during this period that the first branch of the Arya Samaj was formed in Delhi. Farquhar, Modern Religious Movements, pp. 101-29. According to Diwan Chand in The Arya Samaj, What It Is and What It Stands for (Lahore; [1942?]), p. 28, this event occurred on 9 October 1879. The oldest branch of the Arya Samaj in Delhi in 1911 traced its foundation from 1882. RDDA, Confidential File 70 (1915).

There were four rural branches (and one at Mahrauli), three of which fell inactive by 1917. There were ten urban organisations, four of which fell inactive and two of which became independent of the Arya Pratinidi Sabha. Those that remained active received substantial support from Banias, Khatris, Kayasths, and Jats, and the majority of them were active in education.¹

Between 1912 and 1918, the 'college' group of the Arya Samaj founded 14 more branches with a combined formal membership of 455. Of these five became inactive. These newer branches followed the same pattern as those of earlier foundation. All four of the rural branches fell inactive because they did not have education as an object. Only one urban branch fell inactive mainly because it did not draw enough support from more well-to-do samajists.²

Thus by 1918 there was a total of 14 active branches of the 'college' group with a combined formal membership of 625. The overwhelming majority of these were involved in education and maintained 12 schools. In 1919, the 'college' group founded the Dayanand Anglo-Vedic School with lower middle, upper middle, and high school branches in Darygunj. Its affiliation with the D.A.V. College in Lahore gave the 'college' group in Delhi their own formal, recognised, educational apparatus.

One of the more outstanding Arya Samajists of the 'college' group in Delhi was Lala Bulaqi Das. He was an Aggarwal Bania who was born in 1869. He was the

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RDDA, Confidential File 70 (1915).

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RDDA, Confidential File 227 (1918).

proprietor of the firm of Gulab Singh Bulaqi Das, a wholesale cloth and lace establishment. He occupied the position of vice-president of the Chowri Bazaar branch of the Arya Samaj for over a decade and acted as president of the new branch of the Samaj which was founded in Shahdara in 1916. He was a member of the Board of Trustees of Hindu College, became a member of the Managing Committee of Ramjas College in 1917 and, inspired by his intense interest in education, overcame any feelings he may have had toward the 'gurukul' group to become president of the Dayanand Residential High School (of which more later) in 1919. The Lalaji became interested in political activity also, and in 1917 joined the Hindu Association, an organisation founded to reinforce the intense parochial sentiment engendered by the Ram Lila affair.¹ He was an active supporter of the local branch of the National Congress and became their nominee for Ward IX (Faiz Bazaar) in the election of the Municipal Committee in 1922.² He was one of the rising Banias in Delhi who sought to translate wealth into prestige and influence. In this endeavour Lala Bulaqi Das was most successful.

Before 1911 there was little activity in Delhi by the 'gurukul' group, but after 1911 this group became quite active in the city. Between 1911 and 1920 the 'gurukul' group founded four organisations with a combined membership of 85.³ These organisations which were

¹ This incident is discussed below in Chapter Five.

² This election is discussed below in Chapter Eight.

³ RDDA, Confidential File 227 (1918).

formed in 1914, 1916, 1918, and 1919, were all active in education of the gurukul variety for both males and females, although the branch formed in 1916 fell inactive in 1917. The 'gurukul' group succeeded in 1919 in its attempt to establish the Dayanand Residential High School. It petitioned the Government for recognition and requested a grant-in-aid, a most unusual step for the 'gurukul' group which rejected the government system of education altogether.¹ The successful establishment of this institution guaranteed the group's viability, as it then had a continuous, formally recognised educational apparatus.

Two individuals who belonged to the 'gurukul' group illustrate the type of person who supported the more traditional wing of the Arya Samaj in Delhi. Lala Ram Saran Das was a Lahiry [the Sudra caste of blacksmith] who was born in 1862. He became the proprietor of Lahiry Brothers and New Employment, a notable firm of ironmongers. He received the title of kursi nashin as a reward for his position as the 'local head of a highly respectable family.'² He became the joint-secretary of

¹ RDDA, Education File 130 Part B 1920: 'Recognition of the Dayanand Anglo-Vedic High School and Dayanand Residential High School, Delhi'; Education File 14 Part B 1921: 'Withdrawal of Recognition from the Dayanand Residential High School, Delhi.' The petition for recognition and grant-in-aid was more than likely instigated by Lala Bulaqi Das whose 'cultured' values revealed no conflict between indigenous education and government support. The High School disaffiliated during the non-co-operation movement discussed in Chapter Eight.

² RDDA, Foreign File 26 Part B 1913: 'List of Provincial and Divisional Durbaris, Kurshi Nashins and Titleholders of the Delhi Province.'

the Managing Committee of the Dayanand Residential High School in 1919. The other individual, Seth Raghu Mal Lohia, was also a Lahiry and was also an ironmonger. He was a Trustee of the Ramjas College and contributed Rs. 1,00,000 toward the foundation of the Kanya Gurukula [a gurukul institution for females in Delhi] in 1918. He was the general secretary and a founding member of the Khandaewal Vesh Mahasabha whose object was social reform, and, like Bulaqi Das, he overcame any feelings he may have had for the other wing of the Arya Samaj, and became a member of the Managing Committee of the Dayanand Anglo-Vedic High School. Both of these men and several other wealthy ironmongers, illustrate the type of wealthy merchant who possessed large resources of wealth and who sought to translate this into prestige and influence. The Arya Samaj provided a base for their aspirations which was totally denied to them by the more orthodox tone which regulated the Sanatana Dharma.

There was little difference in the resources of wealth, status, and power between those who supported the 'college' group and those who supported the 'gurukul' group in Delhi.¹ But the latter group was smaller than the former. They both drew upon Banias, Khattris, Kayasths

¹ There is no indication that there was any intense conflict between the two groups, but there was enough feeling for them to form separate organisations. The loyalty of the two groups to the general principles of the Arya Samaj was strong enough for members of both groups to contribute financial support to each others' educational institutions which is very well illustrated in the respective lists of the boards of trustees. RDDA, Education File 130 Part B 1920.

and Jats and they both succeeded in their attempts to found their own type of educational institution. And they both became involved in politics in 1919.¹

There was a significant difference, however, between those who supported the Sanatana Dharma and those who supported the Arya Samaj. The sanatanis had much greater resources of wealth, status, and power than the Arya Samajists. The sanatanis formed the greatest majority of the municipal commissioners, the titleholders, the darbaris, and the honorary magistrates. They also formed the officers of - and the most significant Indians in - the Punjab Chamber of Commerce, the Delhi Piece Goods Association, the Delhi Hindustani Mercantile Association, the Indian Bankers Association, the Kirana Committee, the panchayats of grain, sugar and ghee merchants, and the Indraprasth Vaid Sabha. The Arya Samajists too had representatives in these organisations, but they did not have as much prestige or influence as the sanatanis. Those Arya Samajists who belonged to the Bar Association, the Sub-Assistant Surgeon's Association, and the Indraprasth Karmachari Sabha [accountants], on the other hand, did have as much wealth and status as their sanatani colleagues but the overwhelmingly conservative political attitudes of these organisations restricted the amount of power the Samajists could exercise if they had been inclined to do so. But while the sanatanis possessed large resources of wealth, status, and power, their religious and social tradition

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The activities of the Arya Samaj during the Rowlatt Satyagraha is discussed below in Chapter Six.

diffused their ability to mobilise these resources to support or reject the tide of the nationalist movement. The Arya Samajists' values of individualism and social mobility reinforced the cohesiveness of the members of the sect through the congregation and gave its more limited numbers and resources of wealth, status, and power a large significance in the ensuing political life of the city.

Chapter Three

THE MINORITY RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN DELHI

I

Muslim Society

II

Muslim Sects

III

The Jain Community

IV

The Christian Community

V

The European Community

VI

The Sikh Community

There were five minority religious communities in Delhi in 1911 and throughout the succeeding decade. The largest of these was the Muslim community, followed in turn respectively by the Jain, Christian, European, and Sikh communities.¹ The Muslim community was by far the most important of these communities, representing 44 per cent of the total population in Delhi Municipality in 1911 and 41.5 per cent in 1921. (The Muslim community was also the largest minority in Delhi City [20.9 per cent in 1921] and in Delhi Province [14.7 per cent in 1921]). The most interesting feature of the Muslim community in Delhi Municipality was that even though it increased by 14,016 between 1901 and 1911, it only increased by 476 between 1911 and 1921. There was an increase of 11,752 Muslims in Delhi City between 1911 and 1921, but whether this increase stemmed from migrants from Delhi Municipality, or migrants from outside Delhi, or permanent residents, it had little effect upon the social, religious, economic and political activities of the Muslims of Delhi Municipality. These two groups, therefore, elicit little consideration in this study which focuses upon the social and religious organisation of 102,000 Muslims who lived in Delhi Municipality in both 1911 and 1921.²

The Hindu community as described in the previous chapter was characterised by a heterogeneous social

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Table 1-B, Chapter One, contains the numbers in each community.

² Census of India, 1921, XV (Punjab and Delhi), Part II (Tables).

structure and a sectarian religious community. The fragmentation of society into relatively homogeneous units and the lack of any concept of congregation militated against the ability of the community to mobilise its resources effectively, with the Arya Samaj as the major exception. It was observed, however, that even though the members of a caste community shared certain values, the caste decreased in homogeneity when the sub-castes were numerous and strong, and when the occupational structure was diversified. It was also observed that the Bania and Jat caste communities displayed the greatest consistency, on the one hand, of wealth, status, and power, and on the other, of caste, sect, and occupation. And, with the possible exception of these two and a few other low caste groups, it was concluded that individuals in the Hindu community were as likely to respond to political agitation as members of occupational groups or as members of a religious community, as they were likely to respond as members of a caste or a sect, again with the exception of the Arya Samaj.

The Muslim community in Delhi displayed several characteristics in common with the Hindu community. It, too, was characterised by a heterogeneous social structure and a sectarian religious community with groups that shared similar values and acted in a similar manner. The Muslim community also had a corpus of religious knowledge that offered guidelines for the social, religious, economic, and political life of the individual members. Again like Hindu society, the Muslim community faced the problem of modernisation.

But where Hindu society was founded upon a consensus which legitimised the social inequality of the members of the community, Muslim society was founded upon a community of the faithful (institutionalised through the mosque, the ulema, and the congregation), which proclaimed a basic equality of all its members. Both of the communities responded to the religious idiom of political agitation, however, in a bid to preserve the identity and the integrity of their members.

I

The only unifying factor among Indian Muslims was a common allegiance to Islam.¹

The Muslims of Delhi in 1911 had two outstanding reminders of their cultural heritage. The first and most obvious reminder was the architectural remains of the many Muslim rulers who had made Delhi their capital.² From the Qutb Minar in the south to the Red Fort within the walled city, they could trace the rise and splendour

¹ M. Mujeeb, The Indian Muslims (London, 1967), p. 25.

² There are numerous descriptions of the monumental remains of Delhi of which some of the more copious are: Stephen Carr, Archaeology and Monumental Remains of Delhi (Allahabad, 1967); D.D. Mathur, Historical Monuments of Delhi and Their Cultural Significance (Delhi, 1947); J.A. Page, ed., List of Muhammedan and Hindu Monuments, Delhi Province, 4 volumes (Calcutta, 1913); and S.N. Sen, Delhi and Its Monuments (Calcutta, 1948). There are two popular books with very good photographs: Gavin Hambly, Cities of Mughal India: Delhi, Agra, and Fatehpuri Sikri (London, 1968); and Martin Huerlimann, ed., Delhi, Agra, Fatehpuri Sikri (London, 1965).

of Muslim power in India from the twelfth century onwards. The monuments were an aesthetic heritage which also reminded contemporary Muslims of the splendour and the rich culture that had accompanied that power. Other monuments, on the other hand, reminded Delhi Muslims of the violent eclipse of the last Muslim ruler in India. The memorials to the British soldiers who fought gallantly in the Mutiny of 1857 during the seige of Delhi covered the Ridge and Kashmiri Gate area. And the Khuni Darwaza emphasised the harsh treatment meted out to the Muslims, particularly the imperial house of the Moguls, in the city during the tumultuous events of 1857.

The second reminder of the cultural heritage of the Muslims of Delhi was the Urdu language. Urdu in Delhi achieved its first golden age during the reign of Muhammad Shah (1719-1748). After Muhammad Shah's death the poets who wrote in Urdu left Delhi for Lucknow, Aurangabad, Hyderabad, and other centres of culture. The second golden age of Urdu in Delhi dawned under the last Mogul Emperor Bahadur Shah II (1837-1858), who was a considerable poet and a patron of the arts. The period was best known for the poetry of Ghalib who became a resident in Delhi in 1812 and lived there until his death in 1869. Delhi was also known for an outstanding educational institution, namely, the Delhi College, where Sir Syed Ahmad Khan had studied. But this heritage, like the Mutiny memorials, was a reminder of the waning golden age of Muslim rule

in India, epitomised by the last and the greatest poem of Bahadur Shah II written in a prison in Rangoon.¹

Muslim society was not organised into caste groups like Hindu society. The census lists groups and calls them castes, the most numerically significant of which were the Arain, Faqir, Machhi, Meo, Mogul, Pathan, Qureshi, Rajput, Sayid, Sheikh, and Teli. But these appellations carried a different meaning in Muslim society. Some of the names were of castes of Hindus who were converted to Islam. Others were the names of groups who were immigrants. The major problem for the social historian is that there was no exclusiveness of name connected with these groups. There was no process of legitimisation of caste status like the phenomenon of sanskritisation in Hindu society.

In Muslim society a person could call himself whatever he liked. He could call himself a Sayid or a Qureshi, the two most highly regarded social groups in Muslim society, and no one would object. Neither would anyone accept it and hence no status accrued to the name without the fact. For example, in Delhi, 20 per cent of the people who claimed to be Sayid in the Census of 1921 returned their occupation as trade. A Sayid never

¹ A large number of couplets have been woven into a novel by Ahmad Ali, Twilight in Delhi (Bombay, 1966). A useful discussion of Urdu literature can be found in T. Grahame Bailey, A History of Urdu Literature (London, 1932), with more recent comments by Khwaja Ahmad Faruqi in Sahitya Akademi, Contemporary Indian Literature: A Symposium (New Delhi, 1957), pp. 264-81.

indulged in trade since he would lose his social status if he did so. This was obviously a case of people, who were not really Sayids, who claimed a status that none but themselves would accept. (Or they could be Sayids of fallen status, which would then negate the idea of looking upon caste as a cohesive factor in the society as there would be no cohesion between these two parts of the same caste.)

The difficulty of using caste as a unit of social organisation is especially noticeable in regard to the Sheikhs. Everyone who did not call himself something else, called himself a Sheikh. This was the largest single appellation in the list of castes (both Hindu and Muslim) in Delhi.¹ But it is absurd to assume that the term conveyed even the vaguest meaning to these individuals, since some members of all the groups discussed below called themselves Sheikhs. It is clear, therefore, that caste was by no means the most important social grouping in Muslim society.

There were several groups in Muslim society that shared certain values and whose members tended to act in a similar fashion. The basic and most important division in Muslim society in Delhi was between the sharif [the 'well-born'] and the non-sharif. The distinction of the sharif depended upon birth, marriage, and occupation. There was some social consensus to support the distinction, but it was most assiduously maintained by the sharif themselves. The consensus which existed in support of the system resulted from the fact that there was no invidious function or role thrust upon the non-sharif;

¹ There were 79,874 Sheikhs in Delhi in 1921. Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.

the sharif mixed quite freely with the non-sharif; and there were three methods to gain status and recognition which the non-sharif could pursue, which are discussed below.

The sharif who represented between one-tenth and one-eighth of the Muslim population generally displayed a high degree of consistency of wealth, status, and power.¹ Their wealth usually came from inheritance, income from pensions or agricultural land, or from success in the professions. They could under only one circumstance pursue trade as an occupation; that

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It is possible to derive some idea of the number of Muslims who were sharif by assuming that the majority of Muslims who were in occupations that the sharif normally pursued were in fact sharif. In 1921 the number of Muslims who pursued such occupations were as follows:

Government servants	6,576
Professions	4,564
Booksellers	506
Incomes and pensions	1,858
Agricultural rents	<u>1,800</u>
	<u>15,304</u>

[N.B. The number for the professions is low because there were no lawyers or teachers' clerks listed in the census for the Muslim community. It is most likely that these two groups participated in the Non-co-operation movement as there were, beyond any doubt, Muslims in both these professions.] This figure represents 13.3 per cent of the total Muslim population living in the Delhi urban area in 1921. Given that some non-sharif may have been represented and that the figures for two professions are not available, it is highly probable that the sharif represented from 10 to 12 per cent of the Muslim population. Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.

exception was the profession of bookseller.¹ Most of the wealth in the hands of the sharif in Delhi was a carry over from pre-British days when Delhi was the seat of the Mogul Empire. Many of the landowners survived the severe dislocation in Muslim fortune caused by the Mutiny in 1857 and maintained their positions as land owners, or accepted pensions from the new government as compensation.

Mirza Suraya Jah was the sharif pensioner par excellence in Delhi. His grandfather Mirza Ilahi Bakhsh rendered 'valuable service' to the British during the Mutiny. For this he was suitably rewarded and was recognised as the chief representative of the Moguls. He and his family received the grant of a hereditary pension aggregating to Rs. 22,830 per annum and Rs. 1,21,000 as compensation for loss of property incurred during the siege of Delhi. In 1872 he borrowed Rs. 45,000 from the government, more than half of which they remitted as an act of favour. The assumption of Queen Victoria to the title of Empress in 1877 was the occasion for an increment of Rs. 2250 to the pension. Mirza Ilahi Bakhsh died in 1878, and his son, Mirza Sulaman

¹ It is significant to note that the sharif were under-represented in the professions and government service. The Muslim community constituted 38 per cent of the total population in the Delhi urban area, but the sharif only constituted 28 per cent of all those in the professions and 21 per cent of those in government service. The sharif who were professionals and government servants also represented a smaller proportion of their own community than did the Hindus. Muslim professionals and government servants constituted 11 per cent of the total Muslim population while those Hindus who were in the professions and government service represented 17 per cent of the total Hindu population.

Shah succeeded him. He in turn died in 1890 and his son, Mirza Suraya Jah then became the chief representative of the Moguls in Delhi. The Mirza from that point onward until his death in 1913 headed the list of divisional darbaris. He was exempt from personal appearance in the civil courts, he was also a member of the Jama Masjid Committee, the Fatehpuri Mosque Committee, and of the Anglo-Arabic School Committee of which more later. When the Delhi College ceased to exist in 1877, the Mirza attempted to re-establish the institution.¹ The Government granted the Mirza a loan in 1910 and received repayment through withdrawals of Rs. 8,000 per annum from his pension.²

The status of the sharif derived in the first instance from who their parents were, who they married, and from an observation of the prohibition against trade as an occupation. It derived in the second instance from a high degree of status crystallisation of income, occupation, and education, with all three relatively high, especially education. The status of the sharif derived in the third instance from the fact that they had many representatives who were darbaris and title holders; and it derived in the fourth instance from their 'style of life'.

¹ The Mirza secured promises of subscriptions totalling Rs. 72,000, but his exertions met with little success. He subsequently founded the Shahzada High School in 1899. In spite of his generosity in cash and the free loan of a building, the school lapsed into a moribund state.

²

Punjab District Gazetteers, V, 1912, A, pp. 71-2.

The 'style of life' of the sharif of Delhi could be characterised as 'aristocratic'. They perpetuated the cultural norms established at the Mogul court (for example, of food, dress, retinue, residence, and language); they put a very high premium on education and invariably sent their children first to the Anglo-Arabic School in Delhi, and then to the Muslim Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh or to England. They were highly urbanised; they were very cosmopolitan; they were liberal with both their time and money; they were generally conservative in their political outlook; and they tended to be enlightened in their religious attitudes.

There were of course, a much larger number of sharif who did not have the wealth to maintain an 'aristocratic' style of life. They differed from the aristocrats in that they did not live up to the cultural norms of the Mogul court; they as often as not had to send their children to St Stephen's Mission College in Delhi as to the M.A.O. College at Aligarh; and they tended not to be so overwhelmingly conservative in their political outlook. The gulf between the aristocratic and the ordinary sharif was significantly narrower than the gulf between the sharif and non-sharif. There was a good deal of mobility into and out of the aristocracy with the major vehicle for social advancement being the purchase of rural land. There was also a good deal of downward mobility among the aristocrats as it was very difficult to follow their way of life and escape impoverishment.

One downwardly mobile group of the Muslim aristocracy in Delhi was the Moguls. In 1920, 53 Moguls applied for pensions from the government. These were in addition to the 125 who already held pensions.¹ Their average age was 32 years, with the youngest 10 and the eldest 75. Of the 53, 20 were dependent upon relatives for maintenance, 12 lived off the meagre income of their needlework, four were tailors, four were patwas, two were copyists in the Vernacular Office of the District Court, two were butlers, two worked with dabkai [tinsel] and two with karchob [wood]. And there was one each of the following: miscellaneous labourer, postman, peon in a school, shikari [hunting guide], chaukidar [guard], and an art painter. Of the 21 relatives mentioned in the list, there were 15 pensioners, three in the courts, two at needlework, and one cloth merchant.² All 199 of these Moguls were literate.

One of the traits displayed by the sharif in Delhi - and especially by the aristocracy - was significant for the political activity of the Muslim community. They found public polemic most distasteful and avoided it at

¹ RDDA, Foreign File 4 Part B 1921, 'Charitable Pensions Drawn by the Ex-Royal Family of Delhi.'

² The ex-royal family did suffer from a great deal of penury, but they also received some special privileges. The Islamia Girls School catered especially for them and there was also an Ex-Royal Family Scholarship from the government which supported nine girls and two boys in 1914-5, and 18 girls and four boys in 1917-8. RDDA, Education File 153 Part B 1918, 'Education of the Dependents of the Ex-Royal Family of Delhi and Oudh.'

all times. If they disagreed with the point of view of a person or a group, they would withdraw until a more auspicious climate of opinion dawned. During the pan-Islamic movement before the War, and the Khilafat movement after the War, if they were asked to speak at a political or religious meeting, rather than refuse outright, or to attend to express their position, they would agree to participate and then just not appear. Or they would be, as Hakim Ajmal Khan often was, unavoidably absent. This characteristic made them a weak reed upon which to lean when the government sought their intervention to counteract the influence of the nationalist leaders and agitators who came from their ranks.

The sharif of Delhi controlled a substantial amount of power. This power derived in the first instance from the fact that they were regarded as the 'natural' leaders of the Muslim community. They derived a certain amount of power from the fact that they were the teachers, journalists, doctors, and lawyers of the society. And finally, they derived their power from the fact that they served as members of the Municipal Committee as members of the managing committees of the Jama Masjid, the Fatehpuri Mosque, and the Anglo-Arabic School, and as honorary magistrates.

Two individuals illustrate the characteristics and values of the sharif in Delhi. Abdul Ahad was one of the more active sharif. He was a municipal commissioner from 1912 to 1915; a member of the Anglo-Arabic School Committee throughout the period 1913-1920 and its honorary secretary from 1918 until his death in 1920. He also occupied the honorary secretaryship of the Anjuman-i-Moiyad-ul-Islam,

the local Haj Committee, and the Managing Committee of the proposed Islamia College. He was a member of the Hardinge Library Committee and proprietor of the Mujtabai Press. He was a trustee of the M.A.O. College at Aligarh and held the successive titles of khan sahib and khan bahadur. Upon his death his wife and sons sought permission to erect a musafarkhana [rest house for travellers] in his memory at Ajmere Gate to the value of the Rs. 50,000 which he had invested in War Bonds.

Pirzada Muhammad Hussain was born in 1859 and after securing an M.A. joined government service. He retired as a divisional judge and devoted the rest of his life to community service. He received the title of khan bahadur and was an appointed member to the Municipal Committee from 1918 through 1925. He was one of three Muslims on the Special Sub-Committee on Local Self-Government to which he wrote long and dissenting memoranda. He was a member of the Managing Committee of the Anglo-Arabic School Committee from 1914 onwards and was a member of the special Recruiting Committee for Delhi City formed in 1918. He was a member of the Managing Committee of the proposed Islamia College and a member of the Provisional Executive Council of Delhi University founded in 1922. He was a member of the Mela Committee for the Prince of Wales' visit to Delhi in 1921; a member of the Joint Committee for the Muslim cemetery at Fironzshah Kotla; and a member of the Anjuman-i-Muhafiz Auqaf.

The non-sharif Muslims in Delhi were divided into merchants, karkhandars, and artisans. Those who depended upon trade for a livelihood numbered 23,645 in the Delhi urban area in 1921 (or 21 per cent of the total Muslim population in the Delhi urban area). The karkhandars numbered approximately 20,000 (representing 17 per cent), and the artisans numbered approximately 31,550 (representing 27.5 per cent of the total Muslim population in the urban area of Delhi in 1921).¹

The Muslim traders in Delhi occupied the role of a middling class between the sharif and the non-sharif, and provided mobility within the Muslim community, since anyone could gain entry into the merchant community. The traders shared with the sharif a contempt for the illiterate, ill-washed, ill-fed, ill-housed and poverty-stricken masses. They were highly urbanised, they valued education, they were philanthropic, and they also shared a distaste for public polemic. The traders differed from the sharif in that their education was generally vernacular and traditional except for those who attended the Anglo-Arabic School, and that they displayed a very conservative religious attitude in addition to their conservative political outlook. The traders also invested in urban property rather than rural land since

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These figures leave out those Muslims listed in Service in Table 3-E, Chapter One. These Muslims were both karkhandars and artisans as well as impoverished sharif and merchants. There is no way to separate these groups.

the latter could not increase their status and the former could increase their wealth.

The merchant community mediated between the sharif and the non-sharif because it could amass large resources, of wealth, status, and power. The merchants amassed large resources of wealth, of course, from their commercial enterprises, and in many instances individual merchants were vastly more wealthy than the members of the sharif.¹ Abdul Rahim, a Muslim hide merchant, was reputed to be one of the wealthiest men in Delhi.²

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Out of the 34 categories of trade in the census of 1921, listed in Table 3-A of Chapter One, Muslims predominated significantly in 15. These were wood, fuel, metals, pottery, chemicals, hotels and restaurants, theatres, fish, milk and poultry, tobacco and opium, ready-made clothing, furniture and bedding, bangles and beads, and books and stationery. Taken together, the number of Muslims in these 15 commodities constituted 52 per cent of those Muslims who were in trade. The largest categories of Muslim trade were ready-made clothing, chemicals, bangles, and milk and poultry in that order. The Muslims also constituted a significant proportion of the traders in vegetable oils and condiments, in cardamom and vegetables, and in piece-goods in that order. Taken together, the number of Muslims in these latter three commodities constituted a further 34 per cent of total Muslims in trade. In comparative terms, there were as many people dependent upon trade in the Muslim community (21 per cent) as there were in the Hindu community (22 per cent). And they also fared well in terms of total population, since Muslim traders represented 36 per cent of all people dependent upon trade in the Delhi urban area in 1921, while the Muslims represented 38 per cent of the total population in the same area. Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.

2

RDDA, Confidential File 90 (1915), 'Influx of Baluchis to the Nomania School in Delhi and Enquiries in Connection therewith.'

The merchants could attain a high status in Muslim society by pursuing traditional practices which gained recognition from the rest of Muslim society, both sharif and non-sharif. The most important of these was philanthropy. The Muslim merchants of Delhi tended to contribute large subscriptions to mosques, madrassahs, makhtabs [traditional Muslim educational institutions usually located in a mosque], and orphanages. They were quite rigorous in their observances of the fast of Ramadan and the sacrifice of Bakr-Id. And they participated in the haj in larger numbers than any other group. Haji and hafiz [displaying an ability to memorise the Koran] before the name of a merchant was a highly valued distinction. The Muslim merchants of Delhi also derived status from the fact that they represented a large number of the darbaris and title-holders of the community.

The Muslim merchants in Delhi were able to acquire power in a commensurate proportion to their wealth and status. They served as municipal commissioners and honorary magistrates. They were also highly represented on the managing committees of the Jama Masjid, the Fatehpuri Mosque, and the Anglo-Arabic School.

Haji Shaikh Azizuddin was an example of the affluent trader who displayed a high degree of consistency of wealth, status, and power. He was a khan sahib and an honorary magistrate (second class). He received a War Loan Sanad for contributing over Rs. 2,000 to the Second Indian War Loan Fund and was a member of the Third Indian War Loan Fund Committee. He was a Trustee of the proposed Islamia College, a member of the Joint Committee for the cemetery at Firozshah Kotla, and a member of the Anjuman-i-Muhafiz Auqaf.

The Muslim merchants did not tend to establish western-style economic organisations to promote their interests. They joined the economic organisations already in existence, such as the Delhi Piece Goods Association, the Delhi Hindustani Mercantile Association, the Kirana Committee and so forth. But they tended to rely more upon traditional panchayats to regulate their relations with their fellows.

There was one group of especially affluent men, however, who did establish a special organisation. They established the Anjuman-i-Vakil-i-Qaum-i-Panjabian in 1900, in Sardar Bazaar, with 30 members. Its objectives were the religious and temporal progress of the Delhiwal Panjabian community. It is interesting to note that all the officers of the organisation carried the appellation haji or hafiz. The organisation assisted widows and orphans and maintained a school on the Qutb Road where religious and technical subjects were taught. Haji Abdul Ghani was appointed honorary magistrate in 1913 mainly because he was the outstanding representative of the community.¹ The Panjabians also had a cemetery that was used generally to bury their own group.²

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RDDA, Home File 427 Part B 1913, 'Appointment of Haji Abdul Ghani and S. Nathu Ram as Honorary Magistrates Delhi'; Confidential File 70 (1915), 'List of Societies and Anjumans in Delhi.'

2

RDDA, Revenue File 118 Part B 1916, 'Provision of a Muhammadan Cemetery in Karaul Bagh.'

The karkhandars formed a distinct social group in Muslim society.¹ The group included the casual labourer, the industrial worker, and the factory owner organised into a recognised brotherhood with a panchayat. The karkhandars, who owned the petty industrial shops which this group tended to establish, had moderate resources of wealth, but they had no status and no power. The karkhandars who were labourers were, by and large, much better off economically than the Muslim artisans, since their wages tended to be both higher and more regular and since the occupations they pursued were expanding rapidly while the market for the wares of the artisan was continually contracting.

The karkhandars displayed several noticeable characteristics. They looked upon education as useless and adamantly refused to send their children to schools. There was little inclination to equate social with economic status since the more wealthy karkhandars were only marginally more cultured than the poorer ones. The males squandered as much as possible on the entertainment of themselves and their friends, which meant that their

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It is difficult to estimate the number of karkhandars in Delhi. It can be hesitantly assumed that those Muslims who were classified as 'labourers' were karkhandars. The hesitancy arises over (1) the number of artisans who became labourers, and (2) the number of karkhandars who were in other types of occupations, such as services. Assuming that labourers were karkhandars, it is possible to derive an estimate of 19,250 workers and dependents in the Delhi urban area in 1921. This was 17 per cent of the total Muslim population which supports the impressionistic estimates of 20 to 33 per cent by contemporary Muslims. Interview Shri M. Mujeeb, September 1967.

wives had to scheme, manoeuvre and manipulate to get what little money they could. Their major concern in life seemed to centre on the riotous good times of the tamasha. The karkhandars tended to be apolitical and were not observed as being particularly rigorous in their religious observances. They were, however, capable of a high degree of religious frenzy on the spur of the moment.

The artisans are the last distinct social group in Muslim society which shared certain values and acted in a similar fashion.¹ Their resources of wealth were much smaller than those of the karkhandars, but they had a similar low status and a similar lack of power. The artisans differed from the karkhandars in that they did not constitute one large homogeneous group; instead, they formed a number of smaller and homogeneous units. These units gained some homogeneity from the fact that all artisans who dealt with one commodity tended to live in one area, were organised into a brotherhood under panchayat which regulated their social and professional relationships, married within the craft, and attended the same mosque. The artisans

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It is interesting to note the absolute dominance of Muslims in the artisan handicrafts. Muslims represented 38 per cent of the total population in the Delhi urban area, and constituted 54 per cent of all artisans. Artisans were also the single largest occupational group in the Muslim community, constituting 28 per cent of all Muslims. The artisans who were Hindu constituted only 14 per cent of the total Hindu community, on the other hand. See Table 3-D, Chapter One.

were similar to the karkhandars in that they lacked any serious political consciousness, but they differed from the latter in that they tended to have conservative religious attitudes. The violent nature and anarchic attitudes of the karkhandars found no parallel among the artisans who were highly amenable to the dictates of their choudhris and the ulema.

The more wealthy artisans usually owned retail outlets for their wares and employed the less fortunate members of their community. These more wealthy shop-owners, who were generally the leaders of the community, were as often as not literate or semi-literate and acted as the vehicles of communication of news from the world of the printed word. (Otherwise bazaar gossip circulated among the wives and workers who thronged the narrow galis which became work areas during the day.)

The relationship between the retailer and the artisan was not always a relationship between super-ordinate and subordinate craftsmen. A different relationship existed especially when the craftsmen belonged to one religion and the retailers to another. In the sphere of luxury goods, the relationship was generally between Hindu merchants and Muslim craftsmen. The Muslim artisans in these cases usually worked in their houses rather than on the retailers' premises, which meant that they had in their possession quantities of costly materials. Since he was usually very poor and could not afford such a deposit, the artisan had to accept a loan from the shopkeeper which was in turn taken back as security. The interest on the whole loan

was the normal rate charged in India and ranged between 33 per cent and 200 per cent per annum.¹

The artisan was never able to pay the interest, let alone the principal, and in effect entered into a kind of bondage which neither he nor his children were able to break. The relationship had certain advantages as well as certain disadvantages. It enabled the artisan to borrow as long as he could work, since the shopkeeper was assured of his income. The disadvantages lay in that the artisan received decreasingly smaller returns for his work. An object might return a very handsome profit for the shopkeeper, but the artisan received only a pittance. In the area of conspicuous consumption the artisan's way of life became even more perilous during times of depression or inflation since his remuneration was the first to drop and the last to rise.

Two examples of artisan brotherhoods illustrate the nature of such communities in Delhi. The butchers of Delhi were unique among artisan brotherhoods in that they established a western-style organisation. The Anjuman-i-Muin-ul-Talim was founded in 1910 with the twin objects of promoting education and safeguarding communal interests.² The entire community of butchers (most of whom resided at Pahari Dhiraj, Sadar Bazaar) were members of the Anjuman, and they all subscribed to the school that was

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RDDA, Home File 305 Part B 1915, 'Use of the Civil Courts as an Agency for the Realisation of Usurious Demands of Money-Lenders.'

2

It was founded in response to the communal tension evident in Delhi in July 1910. RDDA, Confidential File 70 (1915).

founded at their mosque.¹ It is interesting to note that no butchers were officers of the organisation. The officers were a pleader, a cloth merchant, a skin merchant, and a proprietor of a printing press. These leaders and other influences discussed later converted this group of cohesive apolitical, illiterate, obstreperous, and fanatic Muslims into a powerful political weapon.²

The second example of artisan organisation, albeit of a more traditional type, was the brotherhood of tailors. The tailors lived in Bara Hindu Rao in Sadar Bazaar. They all attended the Mosque Bara Hindu Rao Darzian and supported the Madrasah Rahimia Islamia Arabia which was connected to it. In this case, as in most instances, the same sect, occupation, residence, maulvi, school, and kinship provided a high degree of cohesion.

Those factors which contributed to cohesion within the artisan brotherhoods also brought about alienation when a person left the craft for new employment. It is interesting to note that those occupational categories

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The total number of butchers and dependents decreased from 731 to 596 between 1911 and 1921, but the number of actual workers decreased from 470 to 193, representing decreases of 18.5 to 56.5 per cent respectively. See Table 3-D, Chapter One.

2

The Deputy Commissioner described the butchers, who were most responsible for violent crime in Delhi in 1913, as the 'most quarrelsome and turbulent of the populace.' RDDA, Home File 223 Part B 1914, 'Annual Police Administration Report of Delhi Province for 1913.'

in which Muslims predominated declined in numbers between 1911 and 1921 by 42.8 per cent. (The non-Muslim categories, on the other hand, increased at the rate of 49.0 per cent.) The most notable decline took place among the textile workers of lace, crepe and embroidery, which declined from 18,000 to 4,000; brass and copper smiths from 5,000 to 2,000; rice and flour grinders from 2,000 to 900; cabinet makers from 1,300 to 800; and workers in precious metals and stones from 12,000 to 7,000.¹ Since the organisation of the artisan centred around the craft, this meant an increasing disintegration of social loyalties as new employment usually entailed new horizons.

II

Indian Islam is a necklace of racial, cultural and political pearls strung on the thread of Islam.²

The Shariah was to the Muslim community what the Sanatana Dharma was to the Hindu community. It was the 'path' or 'road' from which all Muslims drew inspiration

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Census of India, 1911, XIV (Punjab), Part II (Tables); Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.

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Percival Spear, 'The Position of the Muslims, Before and After Partition,' India and Ceylon: Unity and Diversity, Philip Mason, ed. (London, 1967), p. 31.

and guidance.¹ Through a corpus of written knowledge it supplied guidelines for all thought and action of

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The Shariah was divided into two parts, namely, kalam and fiqh. Kalam ['dogmatic and scholastic theology'] supplied endless exegeses upon the teachings of Islam, and fiqh [jurisprudence] sought to provide a method by which it was possible to reconcile teaching with practice.

There were four systems of fiqh; the Indian Muslims in Delhi followed one of them the Hanafi school. All four of the systems of fiqh used the same four 'roots', namely ijma [consensus of Muslim learned opinion], qiyas [argument by analogy], hadith [reports of the Prophet's sunna (his course of conduct, doings, and sayings)], and the Koran. The Koran was the point of the inverted pyramid, that upon which everything rested. The hadiths with the greatest amount of validity were those reports attributed to the first four Khalifs. The qiyas with analogues in the Koran were stronger than those with analogues in the hadiths, and those with analogues in the hadiths of the first four Khalifs were stronger than those with analogues in hadiths that were attributed to less distinguished observers. In the attempt to reconcile teaching with practice the founders of the four systems of fiqh used the four 'roots' to advise people how to ascertain what was wajib [required], mahzur [forbidden], mandub [recommended], makruh [disapproved], or mubah [merely permitted]. See Reuben Levy, The Social Structure of Islam (Cambridge, 1962), Chapter IV.

the members of the community.¹ As an ideal, it propounded a theory of social equality which encouraged a host of responsibilities towards kinsmen and co-religionists. It stressed the accountability of the individual to the community and set standards of 'public behaviour and collective sacrifice.'²

The Muslims of Delhi did not rely exclusively upon the Shariah to inform their religious, social, and political activities. The motivation for many of these

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A summary of the different aspects of Islam by M. Mujeeb is as follows: 'This allegiance [to Islam] created the sentiment of belonging to a community, and this sentiment has been the point at which religion, the instinct for self-preservation, political interest and social traditions can be said to meet. This sentiment can remain latent or dormant for generations, but it can also be roused to fever pitch within an incredibly short time. It has brought the joy of release from normal social restraints and inhibitions. It has supported movements for reform. Under normal conditions, its most characteristic expression is the emotional response to a stranger introducing himself as a Muslim, and the realisation that comes with it of all the Muslims of the world being one vast brotherhood. This sentiment has not generally overcome sectarian prejudices or material interests. It has not been a generally active political force. But if we have to define the Indian Muslims, we can only say that they are Indians who call themselves Muslims, who believe in the unity and fraternity of the Muslims as a religious and social community, and are capable of showing in practice that they act in accordance with this belief, however they might differ in doctrine and observances.' The Indian Muslims, p. 23.

2

Ali Mazrui, 'Islam, Political Leadership and Economic Radicalism in Africa,' Comparative Studies in Society and History, IX (April, 1967), 274-91.

activities sprang from factionalism, sectarianism and parochialism as well as from a commitment to values derived from the Shariah. For example, there was a great deal of factionalism among the Sunnis; to a lesser degree, a manifestation of sectarianism among Muslims in general; and a spirit of parochialism exhibited toward the Hindu and Christian communities. And yet despite the factionalism, sectarianism, and parochialism (or maybe because of it) much of the response of Muslims in Delhi to the process of politicisation was informed by the traditional values of Islam, such as, the sentiment of pan-Islam or the attitude toward the Khilafat.

The Sunnis were Muslims who accepted the sunna [conduct, doings, and sayings] of the Prophet, as well as the Koran as providing a guide for Muslim precept and practice. They were the largest Muslim sect in Delhi, representing 90 to 95 per cent of the Muslim population.¹ The Sunni sect succumbed to heterogeneity in its social organisation since it encompassed all the social groups discussed above. It also succumbed to factionalism.

The presence of factions within the Sunni sect in Delhi resulted from differing responses to the process of modernisation, a process which gave rise to a controversy over the definition of orthodoxy. The process presented a serious dilemma to a faction of Muslims who were 'traditionalist' since they were

¹ Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. I (Report).

highly suspicious of change and usually prohibited everything that was not specifically permitted in the written corpus of the Shariah. This, of course, led to serious dilemmas because many of the problems which arose from the process of modernisation could not possibly have been foreseen in earlier centuries, and because there were so many contradictions in the corpus. The traditionalists argued that it was better to hold onto what was known, however, than to advance uncertainly into the unknown. This attitude, which was supported by large numbers of merchants and artisans, also led to a spirit of intense parochialism when Muslim leaders and maulvis, or the Hindu community, or the government, questioned tradition on any point.

The faction of Muslims who were the 'liberals', did not encounter the problem which faced the traditionalists, or at least to the same extent. They permitted most things that were not specifically prohibited in the Shariah and in addition tended to ignore some of the more anachronistic prohibitions. This attitude, which was supported in a large measure by the sharif, some merchants and some artisans, reinforced the more cosmopolitan values with Muslim society.

The factionalism in the Sunni sect in Delhi tended to coalesce around individual maulvis whose attitudes and values stemmed to a large degree from where they were trained. Most of the maulvis in Delhi came from the Dar-al-Ulum at Deoband in the United Provinces, an

institution which trained traditionalist maulvis.¹ A smaller number came from the Majlis-i-Nadwah-al-Ulama at Firangi Mahal in Lucknow, which was slightly less traditionalist.² (It was, however, much more traditionalist than the Muslim Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh which, as a highly westernised institution, did not train maulvis.) A smaller number of maulvis were trained in the local madrassahs of Delhi, most of which were known to be more traditional than liberal.

The differences within the world of orthodoxy were institutionalised in the two dominant mosques in Delhi. Both of these, namely, the Jama Masjid and the Fatehpuri Mosque, were confiscated as royal property after the Mutiny of 1857. The Jama Masjid was reopened in 1862 under a Managing Committee that was appointed by - and responsible to - the government, with the deputy commissioner as ex-officio president. The ten members of the Committee were eminent Sunni Muslims with large resources of wealth, status, and power. The re-establishment of the Jama Masjid aroused some

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M. Mujeeb, The Indian Muslims, p. 409, places the Dar-al-Ulum which was founded in 1867, in a theological context. The Mazahir-al-Ulum at Saharanpur and the Qasim-al-Ulum at Muradabad, both of which were founded later, looked to the Dar-al-Ulum for inspiration and guidance. For a longer discussion see Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi, The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan (Bombay, 1963).

2

The Nadwah-al-Ulama was founded in 1892. Abdul Bari became one of the most famous teachers there after the death of Shibli Nomani. See M. Mujeeb, The Indian Muslims, p. 409.

controversy since the more rigorously traditionalist group did not want to restore some relics which had been removed.¹ A compromise was reached but the traditionalist faction did not gain satisfaction until the Fatehpuri Mosque was reopened in 1877. The Fatehpuri Mosque also had a Managing Committee of ten members with large resources of wealth, status, and power who were appointed by - and responsible to - the government with the deputy commissioner again as ex-officio president.² The Fatehpuri Mosque was the more conservative of the two institutions.

The factionalism evident in the Sunni sect also tended to manifest itself in the types of organisations that were established in Delhi. In 1888 the somewhat more liberal members of the Jama Masjid, led by Hakim Ajmal Khan and Sayed Ahmad (Imam of the Jama Masjid) founded the Anjuman-i-Moiyad-ul-Islam. It was designed to support and educate destitute children, but by the turn of the century it also maintained several old mosques and buried all Muslims who had no one to attend to them (for which it received Rs. 3/12 per burial from the Municipal Committee). It had a substantial income (larger than either the Jama Masjid or the Fatehpuri Mosque) of Rs. 2,150 per year from the rent of houses, subscriptions and a donation of Rs. 300 per year from

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The mosque had been purchased by a Hindu who proposed to demolish it and erect new buildings on the site. The government intervened, compensated the owner, and turned the mosque over to the Muslim community as a sign of favour during the Imperial Darbar of 1877.

the Nizam of Hyderabad. The orphanage had 55 boys and eight girls in 1914. It had a very good reputation and all Muslims appreciated it.¹

The leader of the Anjuman-i-Moiyad-ul-Islam, Hakim Ajmal Khan (1865-1927), was also the leader of a liberal group of established Muslims in Delhi. He lived in a grand house on the corner of Ballimaran and Chandni Chauk, and came from a very wealthy and aristocratic family which had accompanied Babur in 1526. The family was represented at the court of each succeeding Mogul and held jaghirs in two Patna districts valued at Rs. 3,000. They also received eight villages in jaghir in Panipat and Sonapat, but these were resumed by the Government of India and the family granted a pension. Hakim Ajmal Khan's eldest brother established the Madrassah Tibbiya which the Hakim expanded into a college for Ayurvedic and Unani medicine with the addition of a Zenana school for midwifery and a pharmacy. The Hakim Sahib became the head of his family in 1903 by which time he had established a large practice in Delhi in addition to a large princely clientele like the Nawab of Rampur who gave him Rs. 600 per month. He was a hafiz, an outstanding scholar in Persian and Arabic and a trustee of the M.A.O. College at Aligarh. In 1908 he was granted the title hazik-ul-mulk for his loyalty and for the influence which he exercised in the interest of law and order.²

¹ RDDA, Confidential File 70 (1915).

² Punjab District Gazetteers, V, 1912, A, 72-3. Hakim Hafiz Muhammad Ajmal Khan, Haziq-ul-Mulk, later became a leader of the nationalist movement in Delhi and northern India. He was elected the president of the annual session of the All-India Moslem League at Amritsar in 1919, and the president of the annual session of the All-India National Congress at Ahmedabad in 1921.

The more traditionalist Sunnis did not establish an organisation until 1906. The parochial tendencies of their religious outlook resulted in the foundation of the Anjuman-i-Hidayat-ul-Islam, the object of which was the prevention of Muslims from embracing other faiths in response to the proselytizing activities of the Arya Samaj. It was supported by the Panjabian merchant community and by a large number of maulvis. It had an income of Rs. 350 of which Rs. 100 was donated by the Begum of Bhopal, which it spent on the 14 schools it supported within and without Delhi, and on preachers who were sent to various parts of the country to lecture against the Arya Samaj.¹

The president of the Anjuman-i-Hidayat-ul-Islam was Maulvi Abu Muhammad Abdul Haq Haqqani who was born in 1850 and who lived in Kucha Ballimaran, near Hakim

1

RDDA, Confidential File 70 (1915). Two examples of preachers of the Anjuman-i-Hidayat-ul-Islam visiting other districts occurred on 19 February 1909 and 25 November 1909. At the former, several maulvis lectured at a fair in the Bulandshahr District of the United Provinces. They stressed the need for better education and distributed a violent anti-Arya Samaj pamphlet written by Muhammad Rafat-ullah who was secretary of the Society in Delhi. At the second meeting which lasted two days, the preachers of the Society and especially Maulvi Nizamuddin, sought to persuade the Muslim Jats to establish educational institutions and exclude the Hindu and Arya Jats. Nothing constructive resulted from the meeting, while it did stir up a good deal of bad blood between the two groups of Jats in a small village in the Meerut District. NAI, Home Poll 103-110 Part B, April 1909, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 13 March 1909; Home Poll 120-127 Part B, February 1910, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 18 December 1909.

Ajmal Khan. He owned four houses in Delhi and 500 bighas of land in Karnal District. He was an author of considerable distinction and received the title shams-ul-ulema in June 1912 (which carried a pension of Rs. 100 per annum). He later became president of the Anjuman-i-Muhafiz-i-Mazarat which was established to protect Muslim cemeteries. In May 1909 he issued a fatwa which called upon Muslims to join with the Christians to fight against the Hindus in general and the Aryas in particular.¹

Both the traditionalists and the more liberal Sunnis did not show any consistency between their religious outlook and their political attitudes. Many religious conservatives were willing to press the government for political reform, and conversely many religious liberals staunchly supported the government. Those who were willing to question government motives and actions, and press for political reform, united in the local branch of the Muslim League. The branch was founded in 1909, in time to host the annual sessions of the Muslim League in both 1909 and January 1910. The local branch included religious conservatives as well as religious liberals, both of whom were very Moderate in their political attitudes. It had 150 members of the sharif and merchant sections of the community.²

The confusion in religious and political attitudes was also illustrated in the newspapers in Delhi. There were 22 newspapers in Delhi in 1911, 16 of which were

¹ NAI, Home Pol 115-124 Part B, June 1909, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 8 May 1909.

² RDDA, Confidential File 70 (1915).

in Urdu and six of which were in English. Of the 22 editors, one was English, one was Eurasian and one was a Hindu; the rest were all Muslims. The Urdu weekly Curzon Gazette with a circulation of 4,825 was the largest single journal. It was edited by Umrao Mirza who consistently opposed the Moderates in 'Ajmal Khan's party' and just as consistently supported a small clique of religious liberals who were also political Extremists. The Curzon Gazette was opposed by the Delhi Gazette which had a weekly circulation of 700. It was edited by Sajjad Hussain, a religious conservative and political Moderate who supported 'Hakim Ajmal Khan's party' until the latter stopped its pecuniary aid, after which it fell inactive.¹

The traditionalist faction within the Sunni sect sheltered yet another sub-group of the most vigorous 'fundamentalists'. This sub-group relied mostly upon the Koran and the hadiths for its inspiration and guidance and tended to look upon fiqh as irrelevant. These people were called ghair-maqallids [people who did not follow any of the four schools of jurisprudence] of which there was a goodly number in Delhi. They were very 'puritanical' in their social conduct, very

1

NAI, Home Poll 2-3 Part B, October 1912, 'Report on Newspapers Published in the Punjab for the Year 1911.'

parochial in their religious outlook, and fanatically dedicated to their way of life.¹

A number of ghair-maqallids organised the All-India Ahl-i-Hadis Conference in Delhi in 1912. The Conference began with 20 members but it soon attracted ever increasing numbers until it had reached a strength of 300 by 1918.² The faction was not as important in numbers, however, as it was in terms of its ethic, and also in terms of the sort of person who supported it.

The ethic of the Ahl-i-Hadis was of the greatest importance to the individuals and to the group since they vigorously guided their lives by it. One Muslim scholar described the attitudes of the group in the following manner:

1

One example which illustrates vividly the lengths to which the fanaticism of the ghair-maqallid could go, occurred during the Khilafat movement in 1921. A large group of 'frontier- and trans-border talib-ul-ilms' and a ghair-maqallid had a religious argument in front of the Jama Masjid on a Friday evening. A large mob of people quickly gathered in time to witness this Kashmiri Muslim run 'amok' with a large knife. Before he could be subdued he had killed four people (including one of his own friends) and wounded five others. The incident was described as 'purely an outburst of fanaticism.' NAI, Home Poll 42 Deposit, April 1921, 'Fortnightly Reports for the 2nd Half of January 1921,' C.A. Barron to S.P. O'Donnell, 31 January 1921.

2

RDDA, Confidential File 70 (1915)

Piety consists in sincerity, truthfulness, and honesty of intent, in following the Qur'an and the sunna, in exemplary life which might be a beacon to others, in quest of knowledge and scholarship (especially in the science of hadis), in associating with and deference for the 'ulama', in impeccable conformity to the minutiae of all prescribed ritual, including the jiḥad, and in conformity to an exemplary pattern of peaceful domestic life.¹

These values led the Ahl-i-Hadis to maintain a strict personal code of behaviour. It led them to establish and maintain 19 madrassahs throughout northern India of which three were located in Delhi.² The result of their 'neo-traditionalist' and militant attitude was a high degree of parochialism and, as their activities during the pan-Islamic and Khilafat movements revealed, a high degree of commitment to religious values.³

1

Aziz Ahmad, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857-1964 (London, 1967), p. 116.

2

They were the Madrassah Ali Jan, Madrassah Abdul Wahab, and Madrassah Mahomedia.

3

Their most noticeable attitude can be summarised as follows: 'With all their horror of fitna, chaos and uprising, with all their passionate attachment to quietism, the pacifism of the Ahl-i-Hadis was not entirely non-violent. They accepted jiḥad in certain circumstances, not only as a fact of life but as an act of piety. Unlike the modernists they offer no apologetics to explain it as a defensive institution. The purity of purpose in jiḥad lies only in the principle that it should be waged 'for the sake of God' and not in quest of booty. It can only be waged in absolute obedience to the reigning caliph.' Aziz Ahmad, Islamic Modernism, p. 119.

The Ahl-i-Hadis received most of its support from the Panjabian merchant community and from some artisan groups. Those who combined a parochial outlook with a high degree of religious sincerity were particularly susceptible to the neo-traditionalism of this group. But the appeal of the movement was also indicative of a basic problem confronting Muslim society. This problem was how to deal with modernisation. The artisans who faced a severe economic depression as a result of modernisation, turned to religion for solace and developed sincere, fundamental and parochial attitudes. They sought to reinforce their religious values in order to secure stability in a rapidly changing world. The Panjabian were better informed about the problems of modern life, but they too reacted irrationally to a situation they could not accept. A large number of sharif, on the other hand, with their cosmopolitan attitudes and their high level of sophistication accepted the process of modernisation and even the process of westernisation.

The difference in outlook between the conservative and parochial Panjabian and the modernised, westernised sharif can be illustrated through their contrasting attitudes towards the institution of purdah. The Panjabian maintained the strictest attitude towards the seclusion of women. Dr Ansari's daughter, on the other hand, was permitted an immense amount of personal freedom, described as follows:

She appeared at meals, though only when certain people were present; but she went about freely in her sari, drove a car as daring as any American girl, and took a keen interest in the affairs of her country, cultural, social, and political.¹

¹ Halide Edibe, Inside India (London, 1937), p. 32.

This is not to argue that all the sharif abandoned purdah since even Dr Ansari's wife strictly maintained the institution and was willing to see only Mahatma Gandhi, but it was certainly indicative of a change of mood.

Modernisation affected only a small elite in the half century after the Mutiny. But it was a problem that could no longer be ignored when such questions as the education and seclusion of females, or participation in politics were raised. The questions of what to change and at what pace raised by liberal leaders and by maulvis created insecurity and instability in the minds of many. And when such questions as the reduction of cow slaughter to gain the goodwill of the Hindus were raised, the process became acute. Some people accepted change and adjusted themselves to the new situation. Others rejected change and found security in the Shariah. The process of modernisation broadened many people's horizons, but the reaction to it also deepened the parochialism of those people who possessed insufficient cultural and intellectual resources to withstand the demise of a traditional order. A large number of people were willing to compromise (as the small number of kine killed in 1920 revealed), but the attempt of the Ahl-i-Hadis to stop the movement also revealed that such compromise was unacceptable to them.¹ The response of the fundamentalists and traditionalists to the pan-Islamism of Mohamed Ali and to the Khilafat movement, however, reflected and reaffirmed their faith in religious values.

¹ This incident is discussed below in Chapter Seven.

The Shias were Muslims who followed the Shariah but who only accepted the hadith attributed to the fourth Khalif of Islam, namely, Ali. They numbered 2,725 in 1921 and looked to Lucknow as the centre of the sect in India.¹

The Shias had moderate resources of wealth, substantial status, and power commensurate to the size of the community. They had only moderate resources of wealth because they were not large landowners since most of the Mogul emperors had been Sunni. They could not pursue trade, which was the only other avenue of acquiring wealth in Delhi, since they were all sharif. This left them with the professions and the artisan crafts, both of which they pursued in large numbers.

The Shias had a high status because they were all sharif; they believed firmly in education; they included a large number of professionals; and they had members who were darbaris and title-holders. And they had a large degree of power since they always had a representative on the Municipal Committee and a member who was an honorary magistrate.

The Shias of Delhi tended to be firm supporters of the government, and only occasionally joined even the Moderate nationalists. The political outlook of the leader of the community was summarised as follows:

1

Census of India, 1921, XV, Part I.

The one point which I particularly beg to refer is the attitude of the Shiah sect towards the reigning government on several trying occasions of the history of British India. It was mainly through religious influences that the large section of the Shiah Community residing in Delhi, Lucknow, and other places remained aloof and refused to join the rebels during the Sepoy Mutiny. The leaders of the Shiah Community were again active and successfully exerted themselves in keeping back the Indian Muhammadan from joining the combined Pathan clans during the Pathan revolt of 1907. Also during the present Balkan troubles the Shiah leaders have done their best to show that the war with Turkey is only a temporal and not a religious war. Similarly on the occasion of the Russo-Persian disturbances the Shiah sect remained unmoved and refused to give the Persians that form of sympathy which animated the members of the other community. Thus not only myself but every Shiah in India looks upon his aloofness as a great blessing derived solely through his religious influences. The anxiety of this Community [is] to preserve in every respect the integrity of their forms and practices which lead ultimately to higher and better results....¹

In 1910 the Delhi Shias founded the Anjuman-i-Shiah-ul-Safa. It was a local branch of the All-India Shiah Society of Lucknow whose purpose was to safeguard the rights of the Shia community and spread the tenets of their faith. All the members of the Shia community joined in the first instance. The Delhi Shia community acted as host to the All-India Shiah Conference in 1914 when 1,000 people served on the Reception Committee.

1

RDDA, Confidential File 7 (1913), 'Election of Members of the Anglo-Arabic School Committee, Delhi,' Aqai Saiyid Umrao Mirza Rizawi to W.M. Hailey, 7 June 1913.

The élan for a separate Shia political group diminished gradually. By 1917 the Anjuman-i-Shiah-ul-Safa disappeared. The sect's only organisation in Delhi was the Shia College Committee which had 12 members with no influence in the community and 'no practical work'.¹ They did, however, have a newspaper, the Isna-i-Ashari, which was founded in 1908. In 1911 it had a circulation of 850 copies weekly and was published by Saghir Hussain. The paper was concerned with religious matters only and was very popular among the Shias.²

The head of the Shia community in Delhi was Aqai Saiyed Umrao Mirza Rizawi. His father had been head of the community and a divisional darbari. He was appointed member of the Municipal Committee from 1915 to 1922. He was an honorary magistrate and a sub-registrar. He was a member of the Mela Committee for the Prince of Wales' visit in 1921 and the only Muslim member of the Provincial Council of the Delhi Boy Scout Association.

1

RDDA, Confidential File 227 (1918), 'List of Political, Qasi-Political and Religious Societies, Sabhas and Anjumans in the Delhi Province for the Year Ending the 30th June 1918.'

2

NAI, Home Poll 2-3 Part B, October 1912. It is interesting to note that the newspaper did become active in politics during the Khilafat movement. The classification of the Isna-i-Ashari changed from 'religious paper' to 'liberal' denoting support of government policies to 'radical' denoting opposition to the government and support of the Khilafat Committee. RDDA, Home File 25 Part B 1922, 'Quarterly Lists of Newspapers Published in the Delhi Province.'

The Muslim community of Delhi, even though it did contain a large number of fanatics,¹ experienced little outright violence between any of the sects such as was experienced in Lucknow.² A major reason for this relative serenity was the fact that there were at least two institutions, one at the élite level, and the other at the mass level, which on most occasions could blur sectarian differences.

The institution which operated at the élite level was education. Shias attended the same schools as the Sunnis and co-operated in the management of the Anglo-Arabic School. The Managing Committee of the Anglo-Arabic School, which was composed of six Shias and six

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The Superintendent of Police in Delhi was most reluctant to employ Afridis who inhabited the North-West Frontier Province because the characteristics that made them unemployable on the frontier, that is 'their religious fanaticism which renders them unreliable when employed on the frontier, or against their co-religionists' also applied to Delhi, 'which also has its Mullahs; many of them with perverse views and political tendencies.' RDDA, Home File 62 Part B 1921, 'Question of Employment of Afridis in the Delhi Police.' Another group which was only slightly less fanatical were the Ahmadis who were violently opposed to both Christians and Hindus. An Ahmadi, Kasim Ali, was the editor of the Al Haq in Delhi. For a general discussion of the Ahmadis see M. Mujeeb, Indian Muslims, pp. 543-4; J.N. Farquhar, Modern Religious Movements in India (Delhi, 1967), pp. 137-48; and NAI, Home Poll 46-47 Part A, November 1912, 'Position of Ahmadis in India.'

2

NAI, Home Poll 67 Part B, August 1911, 'History of the Shia-Sunni Controversy at Lucknow Subsequent to 7 January 1909.'

Sunnis and the deputy commissioner as the ex-officio president, was founded in 1872 to run the School which had been endowed by the Itmad-ud-Dowla Fund.¹ They represented the more eminent Sunnis and Shias who had large resources of wealth, status, or power.² A large number of Shias attended the School and also attended the M.A.O. College at Aligarh.

The institution of education could also exacerbate sectarian tendencies. The attempt of the Shias in the United Provinces to form their own college in February 1916 aroused the ire of many Sunnis who were afraid such a college would draw the Shias out of Aligarh and thus damage the movement to establish a Muslim university which began in December 1915.³ However, the

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RDDA, Education File 3 Part A 1917, 'Origin of the Itimad-ud-Daula Fund.'

2

RDDA, Education File 160 Part B 1913, 'Report on the Anglo-Arabic School Delhi for the Year Ending 31 March 1913'; Education File 193 Part B 1913, 'Application for a Building Grant for the Anglo-Arabic High School Delhi'; Education File 26 Part B 1914, 'Accounts of the Itmad-ud-Doula Fund'; Education File 140 Part B 1914, 'Constitution of the Anglo-Arabic School Committee Delhi'; Education File 76 Part B 1915, 'Constitution of the Anglo-Arabic School Committee Delhi'; and Education File 84 Part B 1917, 'Constitution of the Anglo-Arabic School Committee Delhi.'

3

NAI, Home Poll 49 Deposit, March 1916, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation in Special Reference to the War, Received from all the Provinces for the First Fortnight of February 1916.'

fact that only 12 people joined the movement in Delhi proved that the flame of sectarianism burned low.

The institution which obviated sectarian tendencies at the mass level was the Muslim 'festival cycle'. All sects and factions participated in the nine Muslim festivals that occurred during the year.¹ The participation of all Muslims in the festivals reflected, and reinforced, the spirit of egalitarianism and cohesiveness at all social levels. Here again, there was some possibility of an institution providing a source of enmity between sects since the Shias had two festivals of their own: Moharram and Id-ul-Ghadir. But more low class Sunnis than Shias participated in the procession of tarzis since many of the more subtle theological and sectarian differences were lost upon them anyway. What could have been divisive in fact tended to unite the Shias and Sunnis of Delhi. This was especially true during the Moharram of 1917.²

The festival cycle of the Muslims like the festival cycle of the Hindus could act as a divisive force in Indian society. This resulted as much from other tensions as from enmity over the specific practices that were observed during such festivals as Holi and

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The Muslim 'festival cycle' was as follows:

Moharram (Shia)	<u>Jamat-ul-Vida</u>
<u>Id-Milad-ul-Nabi</u>	<u>Id-ul-Fitr</u>
<u>Mairaj-Alam</u>	<u>Id-ul-Zuha</u> (<u>Bakr-Id</u>)
<u>Shab-i-Barat</u>	<u>Id-ul-Ghadir</u> (Shia)
<u>Shab-i-Qadar</u> (Shia celebrate different day)	

2

The incident that occurred at Moharram in 1917 is discussed below in Chapter Five.

Bakr-Id. But in times when tempers were cool, it was usual for low class Muslims to celebrate a Hindu tamasha such as Solono and Ganga Ashnan and low class Hindus to join in Moharram or the Urs Nizamuddin.¹ The occurrence of secular festivals such as the Mahrauli Fair and the Proclamation Parade reinforced the spirit of gaiety which could witness Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Jains, and Christians participating in the Guru Granth Sahib or the Mahavir procession. And even though there was a tradition of Hindu-Muslim tension in Delhi, the lack of religious hostility among the lower classes was the most significant reason for the lack of communal violence in the half-century after the Mutiny (with the exception of 1886). It was this spirit which reasserted itself during the Rowlatt Satyagraha when a Hindu sanyasi was

1

The Urs Nizamuddin celebrated the famous Sufi pir [saint] Shaikh Nizamuddin (d. 1325), who was buried in the village of Nizamuddin, south of Delhi. Sufism had a large following in Delhi. The two main leaders, Hasan Nizami, a pir in his own right who lived in Nizamuddin, and Sayid Irtiza Wahidi, who was the proprietor of the Dervesh Press in Kucha Chelan, founded the Halqa-i-Nizam-ul-Mashaikh. The organisation, which had a membership of 500 in 1918, was established in 1908 in order to unite the 14 different schools of Sufism in India. The organisation published a newspaper, the Nizam-ul-Mashaikh, which had a circulation of 1,000 in 1921. There were a fair number of pirs in Delhi who had a large number of murids [followers]. All the murids of the same pir were bound to aid and abet each other. There is some indication that the pirs who supported pan-Islamism influenced their murids to also lend support. This was especially true of Hasan Nizami, whose journal the Tauhid was prohibited in 1913. RDDA, Education File 1 (10) Part B 1922, 'Application of one Khwaja Hasan Nizami to Found a Library in the Monastery of Nizamuddin Auliya at Humayun's Tomb,' W.M. Hailey to C.A. Barron, 8 March 1922. For a short summary of the place of Sufism in the Muslim community see M. Mujeeb, Indian Muslims, p. 113 and passim.

invited to speak from the pulpit of the Jama Masjid.¹ The process of politicisation that Delhi underwent from 1911 onwards heightened the religious consciousness of all the communities in Delhi. The heightened identity of each community that stemmed from the religious idiom of political agitation led to the five communal riots that occurred in Delhi in 1924, 1925, 1927, and 1928.²

III

The Jain community in Delhi in 1911 numbered 3,500. By 1921 the Jains had increased to 3,800 of which 75 per cent were traders and another 13 per cent were in the professions and government service. They

1

Discussed below in Chapter Six.

2

A communal riot occurred on Bakr-Id in July 1924 in Pahari Dhiraj where most of the butchers lived. A riot also occurred the following day at the funerals for those who were killed. A communal riot occurred on Municipal election day in 1925; on the day that Shradhanand's assassin was hanged in 1927; and at Bakr-Id in Jangpura in 1928.

formed a stable and affluent élite in the city.¹ They had a high degree of cohesion since they all belonged to the Aggarwal caste, and they generally attended the same temple at the corner of Chandni Chauk and Lothian Road. They also had the second highest rate of literacy in 1911, namely, 39 per cent.²

A distinguished member of the Jain community in Delhi was Lala Sultan Singh. He was a very wealthy landlord with substantial interests in banking and

1

The population figures for the Jain Community in the Delhi urban area by age is as follows:

<u>1911</u>				<u>1921</u>			
<u>Age</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Males</u>	<u>Females</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Males</u>	<u>Females</u>
0-5	269	147	122	Under 1	112	62	50
5-10	279	143	136	1-4	315	148	167
10-15	358	216	142	5-9	411	209	202
15-20	356	197	159	10-14	353	235	118
20-40	1,346	782	564	15-19	358	197	161
40-60	735	422	313	20-29	833	467	366
60+	188	101	87	30-39	547	316	231
				40-49	455	274	181
				50-59	292	176	123
				60+	179	104	75
	<u>3,531</u>	<u>2,008</u>	<u>1,523</u>		<u>3,862</u>	<u>2,188</u>	<u>1,674</u>

Census of India, 1911, XIV, Pt. II; Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II. The community increased in number between 1901 and 1911 by eight per cent and by nine per cent between 1911 and 1921, most of whom lived in Delhi Municipality. See Table 1-B, Chapter One.

2

The rate of literacy in the Jain Community increased to 44 per cent in 1921.

industry. He was a director of the Delhi Biscuit Company, a director of the Delhi Cloth and General Mills, and the Managing Agent of the Delhi Flour Mills. As the head of the well-known banking family of Sheo Singh Rai Nihal Singh he was 'probably the richest man in Delhi'.¹

In 1912 at the age of 35, he was a rai bahadur, a divisional durbari, and a nominated member of the Punjab Legislative Council. He had travelled extensively in Europe and was actively concerned with education in general and female education in particular. He was the honorary secretary of the Indraprastha Hindu Girls School, a member of the Managing Committee of Hindu College, and he became a member of the Provisional Executive Council of Delhi University in 1922. After he withdrew from the Punjab Legislative Council, when Delhi became a separate province, Sultan Singh turned to local affairs. He was elected to the Municipal Committee in 1912 and remained a member throughout the decade. He did not stand for election in 1922 but the Chief Commissioner reappointed him to the Committee. He was an honorary magistrate (second class) and he became a provincial darbari in 1924.

The Rai Bahadur also became involved in nationalist politics. He was a personal acquaintance of Mahatma Gandhi and joined the Provincial Congress Committee and

1

Punjab District Gazetteers, V, 1912, A, p. 77; 'Evidence Taken before the Indian Industrial Commission, 1916-1918,' Volume I (Delhi, Bihar and Orissa), Parliamentary Papers, 1919, XVII [234].

the Indian Association in 1917. He was a vice-president of the Reception Committee of the All-India National Congress which met for its annual session at Delhi in December 1918. He was also chairman of the Delhi Swadeshi Co-operative Stores which Gandhi opened on 20 April 1918. The Rai Bahadur did not, however, support the Hindu-Muslim unity of many of his colleagues. Sultan Singh joined the Hindu Mahasabha when it was formed in 1915 and subsequently became a member of its Executive Council. He was the chairman of a meeting of 200 Hindus who met on 21 March 1916 to protest against the construction of a new slaughter house for the Muslim butchers. He also joined the local Hindu Association at the height of Hindu-Muslim tension over the Ram Lila affair. He refused to join the Home Rule League, and somewhat surprisingly, he was not an active member of any of the Jain organisations in the city.

The Jains of Delhi did participate in various activities in the city. Since they were involved primarily in trade and the professions, they took an active role in the various organisations and panchayats

that controlled them.¹ There were important and influential Jains in the Punjab Chamber of Commerce, the Delhi Piece Goods Association, the Hindustani Mercantile Association, the Indian Bankers Association, the Delhi Bar Association, and the panchayats that controlled the commodities of grain, sugar, and ghee.

The Jain community in Delhi also had their own communal organisations.² The community supported two

1

The following table shows the number of Jains in the more important categories of trade:

<u>Sweetmeats, sugar, gur</u>	673	
Vegetable oils, salt, condiments	447	
<u>Jewellery, clocks, optical</u>	297	{-}
Bank, insurance, money lenders	264	{-}
Textiles	216	
Ready-made clothes, hats, shoes	156	
Chemical products	151	
Publishers, booksellers, stationers	108	
Grains, pulses	100	
	<hr/>	
Total:	2,412	
	<hr/>	

[N.B. The two categories underlined were articles of trade in which Jains were the single largest group. The two categories with minuses were articles of trade in which the number of people concerned declined between 1911 and 1921. All figures are for workers and dependents.]
Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.

2

The only example of communal conflict in the previous decade which concerned the Jain community occurred in 1901. The Arya Samajists had conducted a widow marriage and Master Amir Chand then led the procession down a Jain street. They all sang the song, 'Hae roti hai bidwah bechari,' which caused enough ill-feeling that the Deputy Commissioner warned both sects. RDDA, Confidential File 70 (1915).

primary schools and also supported any indigent widows and orphans. The major event of the year was the Mahavir procession which the Sri Jain Dharm Pancharni Sabha organised. Some members of the community became involved in the general political enthusiasm which accompanied the Home Rule League movement. The Hindu Model Library Committee and the Jain Seva Samiti were direct products of this.¹

The Jains had large resources of wealth, status, and power, and a high degree of consistency of caste, sect, and occupation. Their wealth came from trade, commerce, and the professions. Their status derived from their highly sanskritised religious ethics and practices, and from the fact that they had representatives who were darbaris and title-holders. They derived power from the fact that they had an important voice in the economic organisations of which they were a part, and from the fact that they were represented on the Municipal Committee and as honorary magistrates.

IV

The community of indigenous Christians in Delhi was very small in 1911. It represented one per cent of the total population and numbered about 2,500.² A large number of the indigenous Christians had been converted from the depressed classes, while a few came from higher

1

RDDA, Confidential File 227 (1918).

2

Census of India, 1911, XIV, Pt. II. See Table 1-B, Chapter One.

socio-economic groups. The community depended upon the foreign missionaries for leadership, monetary assistance, social service programmes, and educational facilities. It was the practice for Christians to live in segregated communities because their parent communities had nothing to do with them and because the missionaries found it easier to keep converts from backsliding if they lived in the proximity of other Christians; a fact which alleviated some of the problems of ostracism. It also allowed the community to work upon the moral values of the new convert. The indigenous Christians did not all live in one suburb but occupied small enclaves throughout the city.

An Indian from the depressed classes normally raised his status when he became a Christian, at least in his own eyes and the eyes of his fellow Christians. He received a certain amount of attention from the missionaries and from the more established Christians. He could eat and worship without distinction and he could mix socially with other Christians. He was also in a favourable position to ensure the education of his children and gain assistance in time of sickness.

The life of a convert, however, was most trying. Many of his old taboos were no longer taboos and a new set of values had to be followed. Denominational differences were a source of considerable confusion. It was difficult for the new convert to understand why Roman Catholics did not associate with Methodists, and why Baptists had little to do with Lutherans. The new convert usually retained his former occupation and was just as despised by Hindus and Muslims as previously,

if not more so, for deserting his religion. He found that a few wealthy middle-class Indians exploited the church to reinforce their social status and that bitter factionalism existed within the same denomination. He also found that there was a definite hierarchy of status within the Indian Christian Community based upon the longevity of conversion. A person whose father had been a Christian considered himself superior to a recent convert. He also found that indigenous Christians tended to marry within the same caste and inter-caste marriages, although not formally prohibited, were rare in practice.

The indigenous Christian Community in Delhi in 1921 numbered 8,500.¹ The largest number of these were sweepers and scavengers; artisans who made shoes, boots

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The figures for the various sects were not given in 1911. In 1921 they were as follows for Delhi:

Total Christians (Indian)	8,533
Methodist	2,927
Anglican	2,256
Roman Catholic	1,170
Baptist	1,168
Other sects	1,012

(Lutheran, Presbyterian, Salvationist, American Church of God Mission, Brethren in Christ Mission, Church of Christ Mission, Church of India, Mennonite Mission, Seventh Day Advent, and Unspecified.)

Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.

and sandals; charcoal burners; field labourers; and other artisans.¹ An Indian Christian Association sprang up, with a European president. Even with these numbers the Indian Christians remained a small, insular group. They were not unlike other minority groups whose primary concern was for their own social, financial and moral welfare and whose only concern with the city was for habitation and vocation. The Indian Christians differed with other minority groups in that they depended upon foreign leadership and monetary assistance which made them significantly different. The foreign leaders were concerned with the welfare of their flock (and all factors that contributed thereto), a goal which did not encompass

1

The major occupations of Christians in Delhi in 1921 were as follows. Unfortunately it is impossible to ascertain how many Indian Christians there were in the professions, public service, etc.

Sweepers, scavengers, etc.	2,429
Shoe, boot, and sandal makers	1,776
Domestic servants	961
Trade in fuel	201
Midwives, compounders, vaccinators	246
(Professors and teachers of all kinds)	(228)
Field Labourers	552
Ordinary cultivators	244
Other artisans and labourers	604
(Medical Practitioners)	(137)

The professions in parenthesis must have been more Indian Christian than European Christian. All figures are for workers and dependents. The remaining Indian Christians (Approximately 1,500 depending on how many are in the parenthetical occupations) were scattered through the government service and other professions. Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.

political activity as a means or an end except in the negative sense that 'loyalty' to the British government was more profitable than loyalty to nationalism.¹

V

The Europeans in Delhi numbered 611 in 1911. Of these, 569 were from the United Kingdom, and the other 42 came from Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Portugal, Russia, Switzerland, the United States, and Australasia.² All the Europeans participated in one of three types of activities: commercial, governmental, and missionary. The ten females from the United States were missionaries as were the three people from Australasia. The other 29 Europeans were involved in commercial activity.

The Europeans from the United Kingdom participated in government service, in commercial activity, and in missionary projects in that order. Of those in government service, the Europeans in the Army numbered

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James Alter and Herbert Jai Singh, The Church in Delhi (Nagpur, 1964).

2

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>
Born in Europe 1911	611	480	131
Born in Europe 1921	2,899	2,469	430
Europeans 1921	4,370	3,452	918
Born in the			
United Kingdom 1911	569	447	122
" " 1921	2,829	2,423	406

The number of Eurasians in Delhi, not included in the above figures, were 236 in 1911 and 417 in 1921. Census of India, 1911, XIV, Pt. II; Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.

the highest before the Europeans in the Government of India outnumbered them. There was no cohesive organisation outside the administrative system and the hierarchy of status was intricate and complicated.¹ During the months of summer the chief commissioner was the most important European in Delhi. In the winter the viceroy and the members of his Executive Council were more important with the infinite gradings of status between the personal secretary to the viceroy, the secretaries of the departments, the members of the Army and so forth extruding an almost prohibitive rigidity of social intercourse. The European president of the Punjab Chamber of Commerce was obviously more important than an assistant secretary in the Home Department. But the sessions judge was more important than the head of the Cambridge Brotherhood. This tangled web of rank and status manifested itself in a very complex and very formal code of behaviour.

Those Europeans from the United Kingdom who were involved in commercial activity managed banks, factories, and business concerns. The majority of their business establishments were north of the railway lines in Ward I, though the European banks and cloth shops were located in Chandni Chauk. They

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A shorthand clerk in the chief commissioner's office, W. Bailey, received Rs. 100 per month. The Personal Assistant to the Chief Commissioner received Rs. 1,500 and the Chief Commissioner received Rs. 3,000 per month. RDDA, Home File 211 Part B 1913, 'Transfer of Bishen Das to the Finance Department and Appointment of Mr W. Bailey as Shorthand Writer in the Chief Commissioner's Office Delhi.'

institutionalised their commercial activity through the Punjab Chamber of Commerce which always had a European president and secretary, and through the Delhi Piece Goods Association which involved those concerned with imported cloth. Both organisations had the same European as secretary and though the latter association had more Indian members than Europeans, the Europeans were powerful enough to effectively control its policies. The Punjab Chamber of Commerce nominated one member for the Punjab Legislative Council and it also had the right to elect one of its members to the Delhi Municipal Committee. When the Municipal Committee was reconstituted in 1922, this right was expanded to one European and one Indian member. The Delhi Piece Goods Association was also allowed one representative on the Committee in 1922; he was also a European.

The missionaries from the United Kingdom in Delhi were mainly connected with the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel and the Cambridge Brotherhood. They concentrated on education and on social service. The Cambridge Brotherhood ran the St Stephens Mission which included primary and secondary schools and St Stephens College, the most distinguished educational institutions in the city. The S.P.G. also ran primary schools for depressed classes. When the war began the St John's Ambulance Corps became very active.

The Europeans lived primarily in the Civil Lines in sizeable houses in well-kept grounds.¹ They focussed their social life on Ludlow Castle. There was a European Association to look after their interests and a Station School to educate their children. There was also a newspaper, the Morning Post whose Eurasian editor was 'liberal' in outlook, 'loyal' in politics, and 'responsible' in criticism.

VI

The Sikh community in Delhi was smaller than the Jain community and the indigenous Christian community in 1911. It had increased from 229 members in 1901 to 1,939 members in 1911. But this increase was mainly the result of large influx of male workers who worked

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Sidney Low described the Civil Lines as follows: 'Beyond the city on that side are leafy glades and avenues, with white bungalows and spreading suburban parks.' Sidney Low, A Vision of India (London, 1911), p. 168. The average European compound was set on a $2\frac{1}{2}$ acre plot which was valued at more than Rs. 2,000 per acre in 1911. There were normally three Europeans, 20 Indians, a couple of horses and a carriage or a motor car in each compound. RDDA, Education File 265 Part B 1915, 'Annual Report on the Working of the Municipal Committee Delhi'; Home File 9 Part B 1916, 'Judgment in the Case of Ram Chand versus the Secretary of State.'

on the Imperial Darbar.¹ These Sikhs remained in Delhi, but moved out of the municipality to work on the new imperial city. The Sikh community increased by 135 men and by 595 women between 1911 and 1921. The Sikh community had the highest rate of literacy of any community in Delhi City. There were 1,087 Sikhs literate in 1911 (56 per cent) and 1,256 in 1921 (47 per cent). The decline in the rate was probably due to the immigration of illiterate females.

The Sikhs worked as contractors and skilled labourers in the construction industry. They were quite noticeable in transport and were especially noticeable in the Army. They served as municipal public servants and were sprinkled throughout the professions.

¹

The population figures for the Sikh community in the Delhi urban area by age is as follows:

<u>1911</u>				<u>1921</u>			
<u>Age</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Males</u>	<u>Females</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Males</u>	<u>Females</u>
0-5	48	31	17	Under 1	67	34	33
5-10	38	29	9	1-4	170	83	85
10-15	36	21	15	5-9	226	129	102
15-20	177	162	15	10-14	194	127	67
20-40	1,457	1,367	90	15-19	256	180	76
40-60	163	136	27	20-29	869	666	203
60+	20	18	2	30-39	486	385	101
				40-49	235	177	58
				50-59	100	75	25
				60+	66	46	20
	<u>1,939</u>	<u>1,764</u>	<u>175</u>		<u>2,669</u>	<u>1,899</u>	<u>776</u>

Census of India, 1911, XIV, Pt. II; Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II. More Sikhs lived in Delhi City. See Table 1-B, Chapter One.

Equal numbers were garden farmers and traders and yet others worked for the iron and electric industries. By and large their economic condition was quite satisfactory.¹

The institutional life of the community centred upon the gurdwara [temple]. The main Sikh temple in Delhi was the Sisgunj Gurdwara in Chandni Chauk, which commemorated the spot where Guru Tej Bahadur, the ninth Guru, was decapitated by Aurangzeb in 1675. The Rakabgunj Gurdwara, which was located in the village of Raisina south of the city, commemorated the spot at which the body of the martyr was cremated. The Sisgunj Gurdwara adequately served the Sikhs of Delhi in 1901. It became quite burdened in the succeeding 20 years and sought to expand. Its numerous appeals for land from the civil authorities had to be denied as it was tightly hemmed in by the main Kotwal [police station] in the city.

The gurdwara served the panth as a whole. Within the panth there were various factions and divisions. The most important of these in 1911 were the Sri Guru Singh Sabha which was affiliated with the Chief Khalsa Diwan in Amritsar; the Delhi Khalsa Sangat which was also affiliated with the Chief Khalsa Dewan, and the Delhi Sikh Panchayat. Rai Bahadur Boota Singh, C.I.E., was president of the Panchayat. Rai Bahadur Narain Singh was president and Sardar Subha Singh was treasurer of the Khalsa Sangat, and Hari Singh was the secretary

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For the occupation pursued by Sikhs see Tables 2-B and 3-A through 3-E, Chapter One.

of the Singh Sabha. The Khalsa Sangat was the most important of the factions. It had 150 members and centred on the Sisgunj Gurdwara.

Sardar Subha Singh was an eminent and fitting representative of the Sikh community in Delhi. He was born in 1889 and at the age of 26 was an aspiring contractor who had moved to the city. He received an appointment to the Municipal Committee in 1915 as the representative of the Sikh Community and he accepted reappointment at three-year intervals for the following decade. He became a trustee of the Ramjas College when it was founded in 1917 and was appointed honorary magistrate (second class) in 1922. Even though his primary concern was with his business as a contractor he soon branched out into other interests. He led the syndicate that bought the Jumna Cotton Mill and made it into the Khalsa Mills. As deputy chairman of this enterprise Sardar Subha Singh became a member of the Punjab Chamber of Commerce.

A major agitation affected the Sikh Community in the Punjab in the last half of 1913 and the first half of 1914. The complete lack of response among the Sikhs of Delhi reflected more than any other incident the passive attitude of the community towards politics. The agitation centred around the demolition of the wall that surrounded the Rakabgunj Gurdwara at Raisina. The Gurdwara, which had been built in the late nineteenth century, was located quite close to the Secretariat of the new imperial capital. The engineers decided to remove the unsightly wall that surrounded the irregularly shaped grounds and to allow the Gurdwara to

stand. Harchand Singh, a schoolmaster in the Punjab district of Lyallpur, immediately raised a wave of protest. He took the view that the location of the Gurdwara was sacred (although there was no historical reference to prove the exact spot) and that the wall was part of a gurdwara and hence sacred and inviolable. Most people accused him of stirring an agitation on the lines of the Cawnpore mosque affair.¹ The little support that he enjoyed came from his own and a few surrounding districts, and mostly from Singh Sabhas that were not affiliated with the Chief Khalsa Dewan.² The vehement stance adopted by the militants forced the Chief Khalsa Dewan in Amritsar to adopt a moderate attitude. They became the spokesmen for the Panth and Sadar Daljit Singh, additional member of the Imperial Legislative Council (from Kapurthala), acted as the mediator between them and the Chief Commissioner. On 26 January 1914 Partab Singh, Granthi of the Chief Khalsa Dewan, delivered katha in the Sisgunj Gurdwara and asked them not to agitate because the government was kindly disposed and a satisfactory settlement was expected. Hailey had faced a similar situation on three occasions in 1913 and he handled this situation as well.

1

RDDA, Home File 81 Part B 1914, 'Papers Regarding Gurdwara-Rakabganj.' The Cawnpore mosque affair is discussed below in Chapter Four.

2

For a discussion of the militancy of the Singh Sabhas see Kenneth W. Jones, 'Communalism in the Punjab: The Arya Samaj Contribution,' Journal of Asian Studies, XXVIII (November 1968), 39-54.

The significance of the whole episode is that the Delhi Sikhs did not agitate. They accepted the Chief Khalsa Dewan as the spokesman for the Panth and did very little to interfere during the agitation. On 9 December 1913, 106 Sikhs signed a letter to Hailey stating that they would not arouse public concern and would consider the decision between government and the Chief Khalsa Dewan as final. And on 7 June 1914 a public meeting of the Singh Sabha of Delhi made no mention of the incident while it was passing a resolution protesting against the treatment of Sikhs in the ship Koma Gata Maru which had been detained off the coast of Canada. They even went so far as to protest strongly against a meeting held at Lahore on 30 March 1914 which was the zenith of Harchand Singh's agitation on the anniversary celebration of the fifth Guru.

The only point at which Delhi Sikhs showed any discomfiture was over the agreement reached. The government condescended to allow a 'Khalsa Gurdwaras Committee' to be formed to look after the improvement of gurdwaras in Delhi. The committee was to have seven members, four of which were to be elected by the Delhi Khalsa Sangat. The other three were to come from the Panth outside Delhi. The local Singh Sabha voiced its disapproval at being left out of the committee but never resorted to direct action.

It is possible to conclude from this incident that the leading Sikhs in Delhi were either conservative or moderate and had enough influence over the rest of the community to encourage their abstinence from extremist politics. The leaders maintained their control over

the community when in the following year a militant Sikh editor in Delhi sought to revive the agitation over the Gurdwara.¹ The moderate Sikhs also responded to the activities of the more militant Sikhs during the Home Rule League movement. The extremist Sikhs founded the Khalsa Percharak Jatha in 1917. The Sikhs who were government servants responded and founded the Sikh Servants' Club. The process was repeated in November 1920 when the extremists founded the Sikh Provincial League and the Sikh Volunteer Corps, and the moderates replied two days later with the Sikh Young Men's Association and the Sikh Seva Samiti, the latter two of which were larger and received the support of the majority of the community.² The crucial test of the control of the moderates and conservative over the

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Sardul Singh Cavasieur founded the Sikh Review in Delhi in 1914. He took a very antagonistic line toward the Christians and the Arya Samajists. In the course of this campaign he used the demolition of the wall around the Gurdwara as an example of the anti-Sikh attitude of the Christians and he campaigned for the restoration of the wall. The security for his press and newspaper was eventually raised to the maximum of Rs. 2,000 in July 1915, after which the campaign subsided. RDDA, Home File 317 Part B 1916, 'Orders as to the Action Taken under the Indian Press Act against Newspapers and Presses in Delhi Province.'

2

RDDA, Confidential File 227 (1918). NAI, Home Poll 67 Deposit, April 1921, 'Activities of the Volunteer Associations in Delhi.'

community came in March 1921 over the Nankana Sahib affair.¹ The extremists in Delhi, led by Gurbakhsh Singh, again found it impossible to organise any Sikhs for a jatha to the Guru-ka-Bagh in September 1922.²

1

NAI, Home Poll 282-315 Part A, May 1921, 'Fight at Nankana Sahib in Sheikhpura District between Mahant's Party and Sikh Reformers Resulting in Loss of Life.'

2

NAI, Home Poll 1922/18 (September), 'Reports on the Internal Political Situation in India During the Month of September 1922,' C.A. Barron to S.P. O'Donnell, 15 September 1922.

PART TWO

NATIONALISM AND PAROCHIALISM

Politics in the New Imperial Capital of India

'The superstitious...regard the transfer of the capital as of evil omen to the stability of British rule, as Delhi has proved to be the grave of many dynasties.'

Director
Criminal Intelligence
18 January 1912

Chapter Four

THE BIRTH OF NATIONAL POLITICS

1911 - 1915

I

Provincialism and Parochialism

II

Revolutionary Nationalism

III

Pan-Islamism

IV

Appendices

The style of politics in Delhi before it became the imperial capital of India was 'provincial' and 'parochial'. The political style was provincial at least to some extent because only a small élite participated. This small élite was divided into those who supported some form of nationalism and a larger number of those who supported the government. Both groups in this élite focussed their attention on Lahore and thus effectively narrowed their geographic perspective.

The revolutionary nationalists sought to break the provincialism of the inhabitants of Delhi and to broaden their intellectual horizons. They found little support for their ideas and none for their methods. An attempt to assassinate the Viceroy, in fact, had the opposite effect and caused a revulsion against political violence. The arrest and trial, imprisonment and execution of a few Delhi residents in the Delhi-Lahore Conspiracy case and the conspiracy case at Benares engendered some sympathy but occasioned no response.

The pan-Islamists also sought to break the provincial outlook of the residents of Delhi. The involvement of Muslims in the activities of the Ali brothers and of Dr M.A. Ansari, widened the horizons of a significant number of their followers. In their campaign to radicalise the political values of Muslims in the city - and north India generally - they used the press, organisations such as the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba, institutions such as the mosque, and incidents such as the Cawnpore mosque affair. They had politicised enough Muslims by May 1915 that 7,000

members of the community gathered to show their support for the Ali brothers when they were interned and the entire community participated in a half-day hartal.

Neither attack on provincialism achieved any significant diminution in the degree of parochialism in the city. The revolutionary nationalists did not intend to be entirely Hindu in character, but the religious overtones of Bengali nationalism which inspired the movement, and the fact that no Muslims joined the movement, gave the agitation an entirely Hindu character. The pan-Islamists were not specifically interested in the diminution of parochialism because, in fact, their appeal was founded upon religious values.

I

His Honour the Lieutenant Governor is well aware of the tension and ill-feeling that exists at present between certain classes of the community in Delhi. Without in any way adopting a too pessimistic view of the case, I agree with the Deputy Commissioner that it is quite possible that a disturbance may break out which in view of the turbulent and lawless character of a portion of the population of the city, the local police would be unable to check.

Commissioner
Delhi Division
11 July 1910

The inhabitants of Delhi witnessed a mass meeting of Muslims at the Idgah on 3 July 1910. The 10,000 Muslims who represented every shade of religious and political opinion, and economic condition, reacted to

an attack upon their religion by the Arya Samaj, and met to endorse a petition to the Deputy Commissioner. This meeting, which knew no parallel in the rest of Punjab, was the first vague stirring of a parochial political consciousness within that community.

The meeting of July 1910 stemmed directly from the collapse of the nationalist movement in Delhi which began in 1905. The Anjuman-i-Taraqqi-i-Sanat-o-Hirfat was formed in 1905 as a branch of the Punjab Swadeshi Association. Its object was to promote the manufacture and sale of Indian goods.¹ Its leaders were Shankar Nath, a pleader, Amir Chand, an ex-Headmaster of St Stephen's High School, Rup Ram, a pleader, Lala Chandu Lal, a chawalwala, Ram Chand Peshwaria, Manzur Ali, and Saiyid Haider Raza.² There were several other members of St Stephen's connected with the Sanat-o-Hirfat, more than likely as a result

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For a very good summary of politics in the Punjab see Norman G. Barrier, 'The Arya Samaj and Congress Politics in the Punjab, 1894-1908,' Journal of Asian Studies, XXVI (May 1967), 365-79.

2

RDDA, Confidential File 1 (1907), 'Agitation at Delhi'; Confidential File 2 (1907), 'The Anjuman-i-Sanat-o-Hirfat, Delhi'; Confidential File 3 (1909), 'Agitation at Delhi'; Confidential File 4 (1909), 'The Anjuman-i-Sanat-o-Hirfat, Delhi'; Confidential File 5 (1910), 'Amir Chand Master St Stephen's College, Delhi, Agitator.'

of the influence of C.F. Andrews who taught at the College from 1904 to 1907.¹

Shankar Nath, who was the leader of Extremist politics in Delhi, died in 1906, after which a struggle developed for the leadership of the movement. Amir Chand, who was later to be executed for his part in the Delhi-Lahore Conspiracy Case, led a group of Arya Samajists who slowly took control of politics in the city. Since the attendance at any type of political meeting was very limited, he and his followers concentrated on an intense propaganda effort. They used the Imperial Book Depot, of which Amir Chand was the proprietor, as an outlet for swadeshi and boycott tracts. They used the Imperial Book Depot Press to publish the tracts and a number of devoted volunteers to distribute them. Amir Chand also established a library for 'dissident' nationalists to meet and study.²

The rival of Amir Chand for the leadership of Extremist politics in Delhi was Haidar Raza. He had a very small personal following and depended upon the virulence of his journalistic endeavours in the Aftab of which he was the editor. A fine of Rs. 200 early in

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Benarsidas Chaturvedi and Marjorie Sykes, Charles Freer Andrews: A Narrative (London, 1949); RDDA, Confidential File 12 (1913), 'Police Surveillance of L. Raghbir Dyal, Professor of the St Stephen's College, Delhi'; Confidential File 38 (1914), 'Delhi Conspiracy Case, Question of the Grant of St Stephen's College, Delhi.'

2

NAI, Home Poll 110-117 Part B, October 1909, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 25 September 1909.

1908 for a series of nationalist articles which appealed for the overthrow of the government effectively curtailed his efforts as a propagandist.¹ His activities were then confined to public meetings and political organisations. He finally abandoned the role of political agitator and departed for England in January 1909 in the company of Asaf Ali.²

The year 1908 saw the formation of two organisations as subsidiaries to the Sanat-o-Hirfat. The organisation of less significance was the Bal Sabha which functioned as an organisation for youths who were interested in nationalist politics. Its leaders were Lachmi Narain, a Brahman who was convicted in the Benares Conspiracy Case in 1915, Sant Lal, and Bishan Sarup, a Bania by caste who acted as a minor leader during the Home Rule League agitation and the Rowlatt Satyagraha. The more significant organisation, which was founded on 9 August 1908, was the District Association.

There was no difference in the leadership and membership between the Sanat-o-Hirfat and the District Association. Both organisations had a large number of Extremists who were members of the liberal professions (a number of whom had been educated in England), members

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NAI, Home Poll 32-34 Part A, October 1908, 'Proposed Prosecution of the Aftab Newspaper, Per under the Newspapers (Incitements to Offences), Act, 1908.'

2

NAI, Home Poll 2-11 Part B, February 1909, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' weekly report on the state of political agitations in the Punjab for the week ending 4 January 1909.

of the clerical profession who had received some type of western-oriented education or training, a number of Bengalis who had migrated to the city for business purposes or government service, the sons of wealthy merchants who had received some type of western-oriented education, Arya Samajists who had received an education at the D.A.V. College in Lahore, students at St Stephen's and Hindu colleges and a number of representatives of the 'New Muslim Party' who also had received a western-type education.¹ As a group the Extremists shared several characteristics in common. They had limited resources of wealth, status, and power and they were never the most eminent or successful men in their various professions. They all came from castes and families that had a high degree of social status, but they themselves suffered from a lack of prestige and influence. It is probable that many, though ideologically quite sincere, participated in nationalist politics in an attempt to gain recognition for talents and abilities that attracted little reward from traditional society with which they were irrevocably bound by ties of marriage and kinship. And finally, the Extremists of Delhi all spoke English. This is not to say that the medium of propaganda was English. Even though the speeches at meetings were invariably English the newspapers and pamphlets were predominantly in vernacular. The familiarity with English that the Extremists shared reflected instead their élite position

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This summary is based upon those people who were specifically mentioned in all the preceding notes to this Chapter.

in the society and provided a source of cohesion among members who came from various castes and communities. Among the more articulate it also provided the means through which western political ideas permeated the movement.

The formal membership of the three organisations was limited, but the organisations were able to attract audiences of between 300 and 400. The Sanat-o-Hirfat held a meeting in May 1907 to protest against the deportation of Lajpat Rai.¹ The 300 to 400 who attended were approximately the same audience which attended the annual meeting of the organisation in December 1907.² A 'swadeshi' meeting on 5 July 1908 attracted only 100, most of whom were students with 30 or 40 Muslims, while a much larger audience of 700 to 1,500 gathered on 26 July 1908 to protest the conviction of B.G. Tilak. Undoubtedly the meeting of 26 July had a larger proportion of traditionally minded followers of the Hindu nationalist leader than the previous meetings of the smaller westernised élite. The more

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There was a note of parochialism at the meeting as a large number of Muslim boys stood at the door and attempted to persuade Muslims not to attend the meeting because Lajpat Rai was an Arya Samajist and such a meeting was against the interests of the Muslims. These Muslim boys were under the direction of the Anjuman-i-Hidayat-ul-Islam and came from several of the local madrassahs. RDDA, Confidential File 3 (1907).

2

RDDA, Confidential File 1 (1907). Of the 300 to 400 who attended the meeting, approximately 50 to 75 were Muslims. Confidential File 2 (1907).

traditionally minded dropped out very quickly though. The first public meetings of the District Association one month later, on 14 August 1908, attracted the usual audience of 400 of whom 70 were Muslim.¹

Other groups attempted to attract followers, but met with very little success. The Citizens' Union, which was founded in 1902 to protest against newly imposed house and land taxes, held a meeting on 12 July 1908 to protest against a proposed law on the registration of partnerships. Jagdish Rai, jeweller, Rup Ram, pleader, Jagan Nath, and Chandu Lal spoke to an audience of 80 people. They attempted to give their protest a political flavour by coupling this local grievance to the general destruction of Indian trade by the British.² In the same week the Muslim Panjabian community held a meeting to protest against a proposed Municipal tax on European goods, but only 30 persons attended. And finally a meeting to mourn the execution

1

NAI, Home Poll 1-8 Part B, August 1908. 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 20 July 1908; Home Poll 49-58 Part B, September 1908, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 15 August 1908.

2

NAI, Home Poll 1-8 Part B, August 1908, for the week ending 27 July 1908. Of the 80 persons who attended, 30 were Muslim, most likely from the Panjabian community.

of Khudi Ram Bose was held early in August 1908; it was confined to a small portion of the Bengali community.¹

The parochial influences that were noticeable in the Punjab from the middle of 1908 onwards also manifested themselves in Delhi. The meeting to protest against the conviction of Tilak on 26 July 1908 was some indication that political styles drawing upon religious sentiment could provide an issue which was more likely to draw people to meetings. By April 1909 Lala Moti Sagar and Wazir Singh, both of whom were pleaders, were able to convene a meeting of 500 Hindus to protest against the principle of separate electorates.² (Following the annual session of the Indian National Congress at Lahore in December 1909, this group of Extremists who were primarily sanatani organised a local branch of the Hindu Sabha.) On 6 April the Hindu Shuddhi Sabha which was composed of Arya Samaj Extremists convened a meeting of 200 at which Ram Chand Peshwaria, editor of the Akash, and Pandit Bal Kishan,

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NAI, Home Poll 49-58 Part B, September 1908, for the week ending 17 August 1908. The Bengalis also observed the day as a day of fasting. There were approximately 1,000 Bengalis in the city in 1911. Census of India, 1911, XIV (Punjab), Part II (Tables). Khudi Ram Bose was a Bengali who had thrown a bomb into the carriage of Mrs and Miss Kennedy at Muzaffurpur on 30 April 1908, killing them both.

2

NAI, Home Poll 108-114 Part B, June 1909, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 10 April 1909.

Kashmiri, gave speeches on the drain of wealth from the country.¹ A local branch of the Moslem League sprang up under the direction of Hakim Ajmal Khan and Shaikh Ataullah who was a pleader. The Muslims of Delhi then played host to the annual sessions of the Moslem League in both 1909 and 1910.

While politics became more parochial in Delhi from mid 1908 onwards, with the split of the Hindu Extremists into the Hindu Sabha and the Hindu Shuddi Sabha, and with the Moderates in control of the District Association, communal tension also became increasingly exacerbated. The sanatanis founded two organisations, the Bengalis one, the Arya Samajists two, and the Ahmadia Muslims one.² The Arya Samaj and the Anjuman-i-Hidayat-ul-Islam confronted each other on every possible occasion and individual street preachers of all the sects attacked one another freely.³ Communal tension was

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Ibid.

2

RDDA, Confidential File 70 (1915), 'List of Societies and Anjumans in Delhi.' In 1910 the number of sectarian organisations increased by 11.

3

NAI, Home Poll 100-107 Part B, June 1909, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 22 February 1909; Home Poll 115-124 Part B, June 1909, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 8 May 1909; Home Poll 47-54 Part B, September 1909, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the weeks ending 7 August 1909 and 28 August 1909; Home Poll 4 Deposit, April 1912, 'Note on the Arya Samaj'; and see also note 1, page 29 of Chapter Three.

further increased in 1910 by Patiala Case against some Arya Samajists in February;¹ The Hindu boycott of Muslim traders in the Punjab in March;² the Peshwar riots between Hindus and Muslims in April; and the declaration of Rohtak District under the Seditious Meetings Act in June.³ Communal feeling was so intense in Delhi that a crowd of Muslims attacked a Hindu who was arguing over the price of shoes with a Muslim shopkeeper.⁴

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This case concerned the State of Patiala versus B. Jwala Prasada and others. It raised a great deal of bitterness because it was looked upon by everyone as an open attack of the State upon the Arya Samaj. This was welcomed by the Samaj's detractors and resented by its supporters. NAI, Home Poll 69-70 Part B, April 1910, 'Resolutions Passed by the Arya Pratinidi Sabha, Meerut, Disclaiming any Connection of the Arya Samaj with the Seditious Movement.'

2

NAI, Home Poll 666-68 Part B, August 1910, 'Alleged Increasing Racial Bitterness in the Punjab Caused by the Hindu Boycott of Muhammadan Traders.'

3

NAI, Home Poll 114-121 Part A, July 1910, 'Declaration of the Rohtak District to Be a Proclaimed Area under the Prevention of Seditious Meetings Act, 1907'; Home Poll 10-17 Part B, August 1910, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the weeks ending 11 June 1910 and 25 June 1910; Home Poll 18-25 Part B, August 1910, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 26 July 1910; and Home Poll 118 Part B, August 1910, 'Parliamentary Questions and Answers Regarding the Proclamation of the Rohtak District, Punjab, Under the S.M. Act.'

4

NAI, Home Poll 34-36 Part B, March 1911, 'Tension and Ill-Feeling between the Hindus and Muhammadans at Delhi.' The main impetus behind the attack was the fact that a Hindu had opened a shoe shop. This brought cries from the Muslims, who had traditionally been the shoe merchants in Delhi, that the Hindus were trying to drive the Muslims out of business.

The final blow came with the publication of Afshai Raz which attacked the Prophet. Meetings were held in Delhi during the week which began on 26 June 1910 with Maulvi Kasim Ali (an Ahmadi) and Ahmad Masih (a blind native Christian preacher from the Cambridge Mission who although a Christian convert still agitated for the Muslims) voicing the strongest opposition. A 'monster meeting' was held at the Idgah on Sunday, 3 July 1910 with Sayed Ahmad, the Imam of the Jama Masjid, in the chair. He advised the Muslims to lay bare their hearts to the government with the greatest confidence of success. Haji Abdul Ghani, Haji Abdul Ghaffar and Syed Faiz-ul-Hussain were elected to write the memorial in protest against Arya literature. Estimates of the attendance ranged from 8,000 to 30,000 with a moderate estimate at 10,000 to 12,000.¹ Maulvi Kasim Ali spoke vehemently against the Aryas and the butchers supported him with an immediate call for jihad.

The reaction in Delhi and throughout the Punjab to the meeting of the Muslims was quite significant. It was the only meeting of its kind in the Punjab and drew

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NAI, Home Poll 34-36 Part B, March 1911, Confidential Diary of the Superintendent of Police, 3 July 1910.

comments from all the Hindu press.¹ The Deputy Commissioner of Delhi judged the situation so perilous that he requested on 4 July that the usual winter exercises of the English garrison be postponed or that the garrison be replaced. Once the Muslims had expressed their indignation, however, their enthusiasm waned and a meeting the following week at Hauz Muzaffar Khan drew only 200.² The religious passion which was displayed in July slowly cooled and by the end of 1910 calm prevailed.³ C.R. Cleveland noted that while he

¹ The Jhang Sial (Jhang) said the purpose of the meeting was to inflame the Muslims as the Afghani had done in Peshwar so that Muslims could loot their Hindu neighbours. The Hindustan (Lahore) thought that the government should have reprimanded the 'foul-mouthed and insolent members of the Muslim press,' i.e., the editors of the Haq and the Hidayat of Delhi. The Muslim press of the Punjab defended the Muslims of Delhi. The Paisa Akhbar (Lahore) for example, stated that even though a group of Aryas had waited upon the Deputy Commissioner of Delhi to present a counter-memorial, nothing could weaken the unity and resolve of the Muslim community to resist attacks on their religion.

² Ahmad Masih, Maulvi Abdul Subhan, Hafiz Mohammad Said, Mohammad Yahya, and Kasim Ali, all of whom were Ahl-i-Hadis or Ahmadis with the exception of Ahmad Masih, advocated the boycott of Hindu traders at this meeting. The audience supported them, but the Muslim merchants would not even consider the idea.

³ Some apprehension was shown in August when Vivekanand and Ram Chand, both Arya Samaj preachers, held a meeting of Arya Samajists in Najafgarh to the west of Delhi. The meeting had to be stopped because their intemperate language threatened to spur the Muslims in the village into a riot. The Ram Lila Committee was also somewhat hesitant about holding their annual procession in September, but when the festival passed off without incident, the entire city seemed to breathe a sigh of relief.

was in Delhi in December 1910, serious riots occurred at Calcutta and these did not even 'ruffle the surface.'¹

Parochialism waned but did not disappear. It became an especially pressing problem again in 1912 as a result of pressure from two sources, the sanatanis and the Arya Samajists. The pressure from the sanatanis resulted from the Hindu-Muslim riots at Ajodhya at Bakr-Id in 1912.²

¹ NAI, Home Poll 34-36 Part B, March 1911.

² There had not been any important riots in north India over kine-killing since 1893. In 1911 the Muslims of Ajodhya applied for a licence to slaughter kine for general consumption. The Municipal Committee refused and the Muslims sacrificed kine at Bakr-Id in retaliation. The Hindus then petitioned the District Magistrate to order that no sacrifices should take place at Bakr-Id in 1912. A junior officer officiating as district magistrate ordered that there should be no kine sacrifices at Ajodhya because it was such a sacred place for Hindus and because sacrifices had not been allowed there before. The Muslims appealed in Court and the order was overruled. Much of the enmity engendered during this period was exacerbated by the conflict over separate representation for Muslims on Municipal Committees that was an integral part of the Reforms of 1909. A large number of irregularities resulted in most cases with Hindu registrars attempting to disenfranchise Muslims. The levy of gaushala or a cess on business transactions for the payment of the maintenance of cattle. The upshot of the case was that on the morning of 20 November 1912, the Muslims attempted to sacrifice cattle to establish their right to do so as directed by the High Court. The local bairagis, inflamed by other Hindus, attacked the Muslims and troops had to be called in to restore order with some loss of life to both communities. NAI, Home Poll 100-118 Part A, October 1913, 'Riot at Cawnpore in Connection with the Demolition of a Mosque in Machli Bazaar.' R. Burn, Chief Secretary to Government of United Provinces, to the Secretary, Government of India, Home Department, dated Naini Tal, 17 September 1913; see also Home Poll 109-114 Part B, April 1913, 'Report on the Riot Which Occurred between Hindus and Muhammadans at Ajodhya in the Fyzabad District on the Occasion of the Bakr-Id'; Home Poll 52 Deposit, November 1916, 'Note on the Anti-Cow Killing Agitation in the United Provinces.'

Letters which emanated in ever widening circles from the temples and religious associations at Ajodhya, called upon good Hindus to prevent the slaughter of cows, to boycott Muslims as far as possible, to refrain from charity to Muslim beggars, and to forbid the use of wells and the services of menials.

The second source which intensified the pressure of parochialism in Delhi came from the Arya Samajists. The Arya Pratinidi Sabha issued a general circular which recognised from the census of 1911 that the Muslims were growing in numbers faster than Hindus. They thought that this resulted from the conversion of lower class Hindus. The local Samajists were advised henceforth not to confine their efforts only to touchable castes, namely weavers and dhobis, but to 'Hinduise' Chamars and Chuhras also.¹

The result of both these pressures was an undertaking, signed by the Chaudhri of the Chamar brotherhood, that henceforth Chamars would not eat beef, or food cooked by Muslims, or deal in bones of dead animals. Ahmad Masih, during one of his public sermons, commented that as a result of the action taken by the Chamars Muslims were even looked down upon by untouchables and that the boycott was really part of a plot to drive Muslims out of the leather market.² The situation became very tense when the Hindu wholesale

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RDDA, Confidential File 25 (1914), 'Miscellaneous Confidential Papers,' Note by G.F. deMontmorency, Personal Assistant to the Chief Commissioner, 25 November 1912.

² RDDA, Confidential File 25 (1914), Weekly Diary No. 11 of the Superintendent of Police, for the week ending 23 November 1912.

merchants threatened to raise the gaushala tax from three pies per rupee on goods sold to six pies. There was also an incident during Dusehra when a Marwari woman put cow dung in a well in Kucha Natwan to consecrate it. The Muslims who used the well were incensed and considered the well unclean and filed a complaint in court. The Hindus then put a board on the well and claimed it as the sole property of the Hindus.¹ The incident resolved itself quietly, however.

Parochialism waned somewhat during 1913. Pan-Islamism became a more important religious concern and the activities of street preachers were severely curtailed by threat of action from the police. The situation became inflammable again in December of 1913 with the arrival in Delhi of Abdul Kabir who immediately attacked the Arya Samajist Preacher Bhai Ramchandra Verma.² The verbal battle resulted in a meeting of 300 Muslims 'including several influential persons' on 25 June 1914 in Sadar Bazaar.³ The meeting was remarkably

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RDDA, Confidential File 25 (1914), Daily Diary of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, C.I.D., 14 November 1912.

2

RDDA, Confidential File 73 (1915), 'Complaints against Certain Preachers Regarding Objectionable Preaching.'

3

Ibid., Delhi Police Secret Abstract No. 14 dated 14 July 1914. The influential persons were Shaikh Nur Ilahi the president of the meeting, and Haji Abdul Samad. Others who spoke at the meeting were Zahur Ahmad, Muhammad Subhan Ali, Muhammad Abdul Karim, Maulvi Abdul Kabir, and Hafiz Rahimuddin. This list is remarkably free from those persons who were active during the July 1910 controversy. The majority were Ahl-i-Hadis.

smaller than the several thousand who gathered to hear Mohamed Ali on 24 July 1914 at the Jama Masjid.¹ The parochial leaders petitioned the government for redress and the police again threatened to arrest any preachers guilty of inflammable language. It became quite evident, however, that pan-Islamism and the War had temporarily curtailed interest in activities which drew upon parochial sentiment.

II

....the representative...of the Sovereign... has been struck down in the foulest manner with his wife sitting beside him. It is little short of a miracle that they were not both blown to atoms.

The Honourable Member
for Finance²
27 December 1912

Revolutionary nationalism failed to excite any great interest in Delhi. The ardent revolutionary, Rash Behari Bosh, attempted to break the rigid wall of provincialism which he encountered in the United Provinces and the Punjab. But in terms of the support upon which he drew, and the response he received, he failed completely. Revolutionary nationalism did have

¹ This meeting is discussed below.

² Commenting on the same incident one month later, the Honourable Member observed: 'I think the thrower must have been a cricketer. It was a wonderfully good shot.' NAI, Home Poll 11 Deposit, December 1914, 'Attempt to Assassinate His Excellency the Viceroy on the 23rd December 1912,' Note of 3 February 1913.

an important effect though. It convinced the government that all political agitation must lead to violence. The connection that they saw between revolutionary nationalism and the more vehement Muslim panegyric which advocated jihad supplied a large measure of the justification for the internment of the Ali brothers.

Rash Behari Bose took a job in the Imperial Forest Institute in Dehra Dun and began around 1908 to establish a revolutionary party in the United Provinces and the Punjab.¹ He made active contact with the revolutionaries who had gathered around Har Dyal before the latter's departure to Europe and America.² He then spent a period

¹ This account is extracted from the various reports of D. Petrie of the Imperial Criminal Investigation Department, and especially from Report Number 16 dated 8 November 1914 contained in NAI, Home Poll 11 Deposit, December 1914. Uma Mukherjee in Two Great Indian Revolutionaries: Rash Behari Bose & Jyotindra Nath Mukherjee (Calcutta, 1966), pp. 105-11 does not appear to have used this report. She differs slightly on points of detail.

² Har Dyal was born in Delhi of Kayasth parents. He was educated at St Stephen's Mission High School and College and then went to Lahore where he received a Masters degree. He won a scholarship to Oxford for which he departed in 1905. He became disgusted with the government's educational policies, gave up his scholarship and returned to India (to Lahore) late in 1906. He then departed with his wife to Europe and returned early in 1908 to Lahore once again. He departed for the last time in August 1908 and after a short stay in Europe and England, he arrived in America where he taught Philosophy at Stanford from which he disseminated revolutionary literature and fomented the Ghadar conspiracy in 1915. Lajpat Rai, Young India: An Interpretation and a History of the Nationalist Movement from within (4th Reprint; Lahore, 1927), pp. 205-11; Uma Mukherjee, Two Great Indian Revolutionaries, pp. 101-2; Kali Charan Ghosh, The Roll of Honour: Anecdotes of Indian Martyrs (Calcutta, 1965), p. 59ff. Sedition Committee, 1918, Report (Calcutta, 1918), pp. 143-5; Khushwant Singh and Satindra Singh, Ghadar 1915: India's First Armed Revolution (New Delhi, 1966), pp. 16ff.

of preparation which entailed the indoctrination of a small group of conspirators who were to use the instrument of revolutionary terror, not to drive the British from India, but to articulate the protest of Indians against the suppression of nationalism. The group was purposely kept small but students were actively recruited through Arjun Lal Sethi in Ajmere, Amir Chand in Delhi, and Awad Behari in Lahore, who also became the co-ordinator of all the work in western United Provinces, Punjab, and Rajputana.

The first effort of this group was undertaken by Rash Behari himself. He and a young Bengali who was also a relation called Basant Kumar Biswas threw a bomb at the Viceroy and the Vicereine as they went in procession down Chandni Chauk in Delhi. The newly appointed Viceroy was riding an elephant on the occasion of a State Entry into the new imperial capital of India on 23 December 1912. Rash Behari and Basant Kumar threw the bomb from the roof of the Punjab National Bank and escaped into the crowd. Lady Hardinge recorded the effect of the explosion as follows:

Passing down the Chandney Chowk where the cheering was on all sides, I suddenly felt an upheaval and was thrown forward. When I recovered my place I felt rather dazed and most decidedly deaf with loud singing in the head. The Viceroy turned to me and said, 'I am afraid, that was a bomb.'

I then began noticing more details; for instance that the howdah-back had gone and the Viceroy looked pale. I said, 'Are you sure you are not hurt?'

He answered, 'I am not sure. I had a great shock, but I think I can go on.'

I looked round again and noticed the legs of a man who was hanging backwards and dead.

Then I quietly said, 'Do let me stop the procession as I fear the man behind is dead.' ('We have [sic] moved on 150 yards')

He said, 'Of course we cannot go on under these circumstances.'¹

The Viceroy, suffering from wounds in his neck, shoulders, and hip, consented to leave the howdah and he and Lady Hardinge departed in a motor car in which the Chief Commissioner had arrived after being hurriedly summoned from the Fort. The Procession then continued on to the Fort leaving behind two dead and 20 wounded.²

The attempt on the life of the Viceroy sparked off a wave of revulsion against political violence in the city. A huge audience met at the Town Hall in the evening and collected Rs. 8,000 for a reward and many people in the city feared some form of reprisal from

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Quoted from a letter read in a meeting at the Town Hall, Bombay, on 8 January 1913, in Kali Charan Ghosh, The Roll of Honour, pp. 231-2.

² The jamedar in the howdah, Mahabir Singh of Balrampur State, died instantly as the bomb exploded in his lap. The other person who was killed was a 16 year old Jain, Suraj Bahn, who was sitting in the centre of the avenue between the two carriage ways. He received a wound in the head from one of the carding needles with which the bomb had been wrapped to improve its destructive capacity. His widow applied for a pension. RDDA, Home File 23 Part B 1913, 'Gifts Awarded to Widow of Suraj Bahn, Spectator Killed in Crowd of State Entry Bomb Explosion.' The others who were wounded also received cuts from the carding needles.

the government.¹ Another large audience attended a 'mass meeting' at the Queen's Gardens the following day. The Maharaja of Kashmir presided and Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, Pandit Har Narain Shastri, and Lala Hari Ram of Multan addressed the citizens of Delhi. The Muslims met separately at the Jama Masjid where Rs. 15,000 was collected. All the various religious organisations met and conducted prayers for the recovery of the Viceroy,²

¹ There was good reason for the citizens of Delhi to fear some form of reprisal. Guy Fleetwood Wilson, the Finance Member on the Viceroy's Executive Council, was the most vociferous in his attempts to ensure that the city should not go unpunished. On 27 December he noted: 'Are we to do nothing in the case of a city wherein the representative - I may almost say, the alter ego - of the Sovereign, a man who has endeared himself to every single Indian, has been struck down....' NAI, Home Poll 96-116 Part A, March 1913, 'Attempt to Assassinate His Excellency the Viceroy on the Occasion of the State Entry into Delhi on 23 December 1912.'

² The following committees and organisations held meetings on 24 December to express sympathy for the Viceroy: Municipal Committee; Mandir Sri Apa Gangadhor, Parade Ground; Temple Sri Jagannath Ji, Parade Ground; Temple Sri Sat Narain Ji, Parade Ground; Temple Sri Ram Chandar Ji, Parade Ground; Temple Sri Narsingh Ji, Parade Ground; Temple Lala Omrao Singh, Parade Ground; Temple Sri Hanumanji, Paharganj; Temple Sri Ghanteshwrji, Katra Nil; Temple Rai Bahadur Lala Sheopershad, C.I.E., Katra Nil; Temple Lala Ambapershad, Naya Bans; Temple Gurwala, Maliwara; Temple Lala Ramchand, Maliwara; Temple Sri Jain Temple, Urdu Bazaar; Sri Jamnaji Temple of Hanumanji, Nigambod Gate; Aryavartya Sawdeshek Aryapratinidi Sabha; Anjuman-i-Vakil-Qaum-i-Panjabian; Jama Masjid; Sikh Prayer Committee. NAI, Home Poll 3-25 Part B, April 1913, 'Messages of Sympathy and Offer of Rewards from the Public, Native Chiefs, Etc., Subsequent to the Attempt to Assassinate His Excellency the Viceroy on the Occasion of the State Entry into Delhi.'

while all the shopkeepers observed a hartal from noon onwards on the same day.¹ The Chief Commissioner accepted offers of money for a reward and also published a notice in which the government would pay Rs. 10,000 for information leading to the arrest of those responsible.² On Friday 27 December the Muslims held another mass meeting at the Jama Masjid after the Juma Prayers, and a general meeting took place at the Queen's Gardens on Sunday afternoon the 29th. Activities in the city quietened thereafter in the face of a thorough investigation which lasted until March 1913.

The investigation into the attempt on the life of the Viceroy revealed three things. It revealed in the first instance that the populace was unwilling to cooperate with the police, even in such an important matter as this.³ It revealed in the second instance

¹ There was little doubt that the hartal resulted from an official suggestion. NAI, Home Poll 96-116 Part A, March 1913, Note by G.F. Wilson, 27 December 1912.

² The first notice of a reward was for Rs. 10,000, offered by the Chief Commissioner on 23 December. This was raised to Rs. 15,000 on 27 December and then to Rs. 50,000 on the 30th. The Home Member suggested that the reward should be Rs. 1,00,000 on 11 January 1913, to which it was raised. NAI, Home Poll 3-25 Part B, April 1913.

³ Most of the inhabitants of the city adopted a truculent mood and no one was willing to volunteer any information. It took four months and the most indirect means to obtain the statements of the women on the roof of the bank as to what they had seen. The endemic dislike of the police became so noticeable that the Chief Commissioner organised a committee of citizens to tour the city and obtain information. The committee returned empty-handed and gave up.

that the enmity between Hindus and Muslims was still alive and that both communities sought to throw the blame for the outrage onto the other community.¹

And it revealed in the third instance that none of the inhabitants of Delhi were connected with the crime, rather that the inspiration for the Delhi outrage came from Bengal.²

While the plot to assassinate the Viceroy did not involve any citizens of Delhi, the Delhi-Lahore Conspiracy Case of 1914 revealed that there was an organised party of revolutionary nationalists in

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One example of the spread of such rumours was a report to the Chief Commissioner by Makhan Lal, a Tahsildar of Mandi who 'did not intend to indicate anything more than that Mahammadans might have been the authors of the bomb outrage.' RDDA, Confidential File 25 (1914), W.M. Hailey to H.C. Beadon, 23 January 1913.

2

There was an exact similarity between the Dalhousie Square bomb (2 March 1911), the Midnapore bomb (13 December 1912), the Delhi bomb, and then with bombs exploded at Maulvi Bazaar (27 March 1913), Ranigarj (April 1913), Lahore (17 May 1913), Mymensingh (30 September 1913), and Bhadreswar (31 December 1913).

the city.¹ The conspiracy case at Benares in the following year revealed four more residents of the city who were also involved in revolutionary

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The Delhi-Lahore Conspiracy Case revolved around the fact that Basant Kumar Biswas had planted a bomb in the Lawrence Gardens in Lahore on 17 May 1913 with the intention of killing a European. Unfortunately he planted it on a path that Europeans seldom used and the chaprassi who ran over it with his bicycle was killed instead. Abad Behari and Rash Behari Bose were intimately connected with the murder and with the distribution of seditious literature. The conspiracy then, consisted of those people who had associated with Basant Kumar Biswas, Abad Behari, and Rash Behari Bose and who had distributed seditious literature. 14 people were originally charged with the conspiracy. Rash Behari absconded, Dina Nath turned approver and received a pardon as did Sultan Chand. Charan Das confessed, but was committed to trial. The trial lasted from 21 May until 1 September 1914 and sentence was passed on 5 October. Three were sentenced to death, three to transportation for life and five acquitted. The High Court of the Punjab delivered its judgment on the appeal on 10 February 1915. The three death sentences were upheld; the three men were Amir Chand, Abad Bihari and Balmokand. The sentence of transportation for life for Basant Kumar Biswas was changed to one of death. Charan Das who had been acquitted, was sentenced to transportation for life. And Bal Raj and Hanwant Sahai who had been sentenced to transportation for life were sentenced to transportation for seven years. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council rejected the appeal and three of the men were executed on 8 May 1915. The fourth was executed on 11 May 1915. NAI, Home Poll 1-2 Part A, July 1914, 'Reports by Messrs D. Petrie and C. Stead on the Delhi-Lahore Conspiracy Case'; Home Poll 134-137 Part A, January 1915, Judgments Delivered by Mr M. Harrison, Temporary Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, in the Delhi-Lahore Conspiracy Case'; Home Poll 12-21 Part A, May 1915, 'Judgment of the Punjab Chief Court on the Appeals in the Delhi-Lahore Conspiracy Case'; Kali Charan Ghosh, The Roll of Honour, pp. 230-9; Sedition Committee, 1918, Report, pp. 143-6.

politics.¹ There was little public support in Delhi, however, for these men or for their politics.² They were considered misguided intellectuals whose solution for the political problems of India was irrelevant.

The nine men from Delhi who were involved in revolutionary nationalism shared several characteristics.³

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NAI, Home Poll 49 Deposit, May 1915, 'Fortnightly Reports on the internal Political Situation in Special Reference to the War for the Second Fortnight of April 1915,' W.M. Hailey to H. Wheeler, 30 April 1915; RDDA, Home File 226 Part B 1915, 'Internment of Lachmi Narain and Ganeshi Lal Khasta of Delhi'; Kali Charan Ghosh, Roll of Honour, pp. 254-94; Khushwant Singh and Satindra Singh, Ghadar 1915; Sediton Committee, 1918, Report, pp. 145-61.

2

There was an article in the St Stephen's Mission News which espoused a personal support of Amir Chand in April 1914 before the trial began. NAI, Home Poll 142-145 Part B, June 1914, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 26 May 1914; RDDA, Confidential File 38 (1914). The warmest support for the accused came from an article in the New Age. NAI, Home Poll 254 Part A, July 1915, 'Objectionable Article Entitled "Indian Loyalty" in the Newspaper Called the New Age Published in England, Dated 22 October 1914.' There was, however, no one in the court room on 5 October 1914 when the verdict was delivered, neither was there any opinion expressed in the local press. NAI, Home Poll 30 Deposit, December 1914, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation in Special Reference to the War for the First Fortnight of October 1914,' W.M. Hailey to H. Wheeler, 17 October 1914.

3

The nine men were:

Delhi-Lahore Conspiracy Case	Benares Conspiracy Case
Amir Chand, Bania	Ram Nath
Sultan Chand, Bania	Shankar Lal, Kayasth
Abad Behari, Kayasth	Lachmi Narain,
Manu Lal	Brahman
Hanwant Sahai, Kayasth	Ganeshi Lal, Kayasth

They were all between the ages of 15 and 30 (with the exception of Amir Chand who was over 45). They were all university students or university graduates; and they were all from high castes, namely, the Brahman, Bania, Khatri, and Kayasth castes. Most of the nine were either Arya Samajists or social reformers, though none were sanatanis.¹ And finally, all nine had limited resources of wealth, status, and power.

Although the two instances of revolutionary nationalism in Delhi received no support from the populace and had little influence over the inhabitants, the movement did have several effects. It impressed the minds of some people and became the outlet for idiosyncratic behaviour. Gokal Chand of Sonapat exploded a bomb in the compound of the Delhi Club on 10 February 1915, the day on which the Punjab High Court announced its judgment in the Delhi-Lahore Conspiracy Case.² A Sadhu boy from Jubbulpore jammed the firing mechanism of six guns in the Red Fort on

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The prosecution during the trial made much of the fact that Rash Behari Bose in his teachings, leaned heavily upon traditional concepts of yoga, karma, and dharma. These did not, however, influence the revolutionaries in Delhi as much as the writings of the European nationalists such as Mazzini.

2

The authorities originally thought there was some connection between the two incidents. At his trial they discovered that he had detonated the bomb to provide substance to a rumour which he had originally spread, that another bomb outrage was imminent at Delhi. It was all part of his attempt to obtain employment as a police informer. NAI, Home Poll 777-780 Part B, February 1915, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the weeks ending 9 February and 16 February 1915.

30 June 1915.¹ And a merchant from Dehra Dun had two bombs made and sent to the Railway Station at Delhi on 3 December 1915 in an attempt to incriminate a resident of Delhi as part of a commercial feud.² There were also numerous leaflets distributed in Delhi which

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NAI, Home Poll 516-519 Part B, July 1915, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the weeks ending 13 July and 20 July 1915.

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NAI, Home Poll 709-711 Part B, December 1915, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 14 December 1915.

contained revolutionary themes,¹ and there was an

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The most popular of the revolutionary leaflets were those entitled 'Liberty Leaflets', which appeared in seven editions in May, July, and November 1913, January and June 1914, January 1915 (which was found affixed to the door of the office of the Delhi C.I.D.) and October 1915 respectively. The fifth edition of June 1914 read as follows: 'The subject we have to put before you is meant to aware [sic] you of your duty. We should free our country from the hands of these western tyrants, who have taken our India by treacherous and wicked means. The faithless and selfish policy of these dogs leads us to treat them in the same manner. Now we are practically seeing that our infants are starving and these dogs are enjoying our delicious food. When we threaten them with our staff, they bark at us and often bite us to death. Should we, then, sit quiet, afraid of these barking and let them spoil our things? Never; not at all. Time has come, arise, awake and stop not till the goal is reached. To get rid of them keep "Liberty" as your motto and bombs as your weapon and you are to succeed at last. Throw bombs at every white head and fear not of death. One killing a single Briton is sure to enjoy heaven. Die yourself, sacrifice your wealth and children, but free mother Bharata from destruction. Do not be afraid of Jails; a man striving for justice never fails. We hope to see you a murderer of a Briton soon.' NAI, Home Poll 259-262 Part B, August 1914, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 21 July 1914. Two other well-known leaflets which found wide circulation in Delhi were 'Ana Leila' which invited Hindus and Muslims to 'Rise for the sake of your honour, your self respect, your country, your orphans, and your dear freedom, and smash into pieces the curtains of ignorance and disunion. Drive out from your country the tyrannical, selfish, faithless, oppressive, and blood-shedding dacoits of Europe,' and 'Shabash'. RDDA, Home File 3 Part B 1915, 'Declaration of Pamphlets to Be Forefeited to H.M. under the Press Act'; Confidential File 75 (1915), 'Translation of the Proscribed Pamphlet Shabash.'

occasional seditious speech.¹ The major problem, however, and the major effect of revolutionary nationalism, was the connection that the authorities saw between it and the Muslim agitation during the same period, of which more later.

The Viceroy and his government became firmly convinced after 23 December 1912, that agitation of any sort led inevitably to violence. The first speech of the Viceroy after the bomb outrage contained this sentiment. In an address to the Imperial Legislative Council at Delhi on 27 January 1913 (the first to meet in the new imperial capital) Lord Hardinge emphasised the fact:

....that such crimes cannot be dismissed as the isolated acts of irresponsible fanatics, and that they are in most cases the outcome of organised conspiracies in which the actual agent of the crime is not always the most responsible. The atmosphere which breeds the political murderer is more easily created than dispelled. It can only be entirely and for ever dispelled by the display and enforcement of public opinion in a determination not to tolerate the perpetration of such crimes and to treat as enemies of society, not only those who commit crimes, but also those who offer any incentives to crime. Amongst such incentives to crime should be included every intemperance of political language and methods which are likely to influence ill-balanced minds and lead them by insidious stages to hideous crimes.²

¹ A sikh returning from Hong Kong made a seditious speech on 14 November 1914 in Delhi, and two more Sikhs also returning from Hong Kong made speeches on 1 December 1914. NAI, Home Poll 223-226 Part B, December 1914, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 24 November 1914; Home Poll 227-9 Part B, December 1914, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 8 December 1914.

² Speeches by Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, 3 volumes (Calcutta, 1913-6), I, 457.

The Officiating Secretary of the Home Department observed that past experience had shown that when 'seditious activity' underwent a temporary lull due to repressive measures, a period of toleration was induced because of the moderation of journalists and speakers. During this period of toleration and moderation those writers and speakers who were not 'well affected' to British rule grew bolder and increasingly less restrained.¹ The Secretary concluded that even though 'anarchist outrages' had little direct connection with ordinary political agitation, it was just such agitation which prepared the ground and created the atmosphere for the indoctrination of 'especially young and impressionable minds.' It was incumbent upon all local governments not to indulge any excesses that could lead to 'morbid growths' and 'atrocious crimes.'

The Government of India had been confronted with revolutionary nationalism from 1905 onwards while it resided in Calcutta. The Viceroy and his government cherished the hope that the transfer of the imperial capital to Delhi would remove them from the more extreme

¹ 'So insidious is the advance of this boldness [he continued] from slightly increased acrimony and slightly greater perverseness of criticism to seditious innuendo and veiled sedition, that the steps by which carping criticisms gradually evolve themselves into dangerous writing and inflammatory talk are scarcely perceptible until the government once again finds itself confronted with a campaign against the ebullition of seditious unrest.' NAI, Home Poll 9-13 Part A, May 1913, 'Proposed Action to Be Taken to Strengthen the Hands of the Executive in Dealing with Sedition,' W.S. Marris to all chief commissioners and chief secretaries, 8 April 1913.

excesses of Bengali nationalism which should have quietened anyway after the annulment of the Partition. But they arrived in a euphoria of enthusiasm only to be confronted with continual evidence that anarchical conspirators still inhabited their very doorstep. Their first few years in Delhi, however, were to be most vexed by the pan-Islamic movement, which the government constantly feared would go underground, rather than by a lunatic fringe which adopted anarchical methods for personal ends.

III

We must, I think, recognise that Mohamed Ali and Shaukat Ali and their associates will do everything possible to rouse Muhammadan feeling against us. It is very unfortunate that, although distrusted and disliked by many educated Indian Muhammadans, these people are popular heroes with many of the lower classes....

Director of
Criminal Intelligence
12 January 1915

Pan-Islamism, which is an integral part of Muslim consciousness at all times, assumed a more sharply etched image in the minds of Muslims in Delhi when the city became the new imperial capital of India. One of the main causes for this was the arrival in Delhi in September 1912 of a young Muslim agitator named Mohamed Ali, who brought along with him his English-language

weekly newspaper, the Comrade. The appeals to pan-Islamic sentiment in the Urdu languages weeklies that found considerable circulation in the city, namely, the Zamindar (Lahore) which Zafar Ali Khan edited, and the Al-Hilal (Calcutta) which Abdul Kalam Azad edited, also contributed to a heightened awareness of larger issues. But neither of these two journals, nor the Hamdard, which was an Urdu language daily published in Delhi by Mohamed Ali from May 1913, matched the Comrade in the quality of polemical journalism or in circulation. Pan-Islamism also received a fillip from the arrival in May 1913 of Shaukat Ali (who directed the activities of the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba), and from the return of Dr Ansari and the Red Crescent Medical Mission in July 1913.

There was a certain amount of disquiet in the Muslim community even before Mohamed Ali arrived in Delhi. Italy's invasion of Tripoli caused a great stir,¹ but the

¹'...reports from Delhi, Lahore, Amritsar and other large towns show that the Punjab Muhammadans are becoming very excited over the Tripoli affair. From Delhi it is reported that the war is now the one topic of conversation amongst Muhammadans, who are daily growing more and more excited over the wrongs suffered by Turkey. Passengers in the Durbar Railway trains also are seen eagerly reading and discussing the latest newspaper War Supplements, and even khansamahs and other Muhammadan servants employed in the various camps are said to be taking an extraordinary interest in the war news. The sober treatment of the subject that first characterised the utterances of leading Muslim journals is fast disappearing, and is giving way to denunciation of European Christian Powers in general and of Italy in particular.' NAI, Home Poll 121-123 Part B, January 1912, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 7 December 1911.

announcement of the King-Emperor on 12 December 1911 that the partition of Bengal was to be annulled caused even more concern in the months that followed.¹ The Mussulman (Calcutta) of 12 January summarised the opinion of the Extremist Muslims or the so-called 'New Muslim Party' as follows:

The Government of Lord Curzon, in order to dissuade the Muhammadans of Eastern Bengal from joining the anti-Partition agitation gave them certain pledges; these pledges have not been fulfilled and the manner in which the modification has been carried out by the Government of Lord Hardinge goes to show that the Government of India cares a fig for the feelings and sentiments of the Muhammadans of Eastern Bengal. His Excellency Lord Hardinge has not yet shown any sympathy towards Muhammadan aspirations, rather His Excellency has snubbed the Muhammadans whenever he had got an opportunity to do so. Under the circumstances it has become necessary for the Mussalmans to turn out agitators, to try to stand on their own legs and demand the satisfaction of their claims as a matter of right. The present Government of India has taught the Muhammadans the lesson - 'No agitation, no concession.' It is accordingly incumbent upon our co-religionists to change their policy and to tread in the footsteps of their Hindu fellow-countrymen. If they be unable to make their position felt, their claims will continue to be trampled underfoot and their rights totally ignored.²

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A Muslim police inspector from the United Provinces joined a group of Muslims in Delhi on the evening of 12 December. He reported that the conversationalists considered the repeal of partition as a 'great triumph for the Hindus of Bengal and for agitation.' NAI, Home Poll 65-68 Part B, February 1912, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 11 January 1912.

² NAI, Home Poll 65-68 Part B, February 1912, for the week ending 23 January 1912.

Zafar Ali Khan reiterated these sentiments in the Zamindar and hinted that they were another example of the hostility towards Islam that was evident in the efforts of Russia and England to overthrow Persia.¹ Mohamed Ali also looked upon the repeal of partition as an attack upon the Muslim community. He proposed a resolution at the sixth annual session of the All-India Moslem League in the first week of March 1912 which read as follows:

That the All-India Moslem League places on record its deep sense of regret and disappointment at the annulment of the partition of Bengal in utter disregard of Muslim feeling, and trusts that government will take early steps to safeguard Muslim interests in the Presidency of Bengal.²

He launched this resolution with the observation that the Muslims of India learned the lesson of unity from the Hindus who made the question of Bengal an all-India one. He added that such unity proved that government's action could no longer be considered a 'settled fact' since it could be unsettled if 'agitation against it were persisted in.'³

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Ibid.

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NAI, Home Poll 149 Part B, November 1913, 'Supply to the India Office of the History Sheet of Mohamed Ali.' Although he had declared in the Comrade after the announcement that 'in our judgement the Muslims should accept the decision of the government.' Select Writings and Speeches of Maulana Mohamed Ali, Afzal Iqbal, comp. (Lahore, 1944), p. 261.

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NAI, Home Poll 149 Part B, November 1913.

A series of incidents occurred in 1912 which served to reinforce the opinion of the Muslim agitators that the British Government and the Government of India were hostile towards Muslims. The Government of the Punjab demanded a security of Rs. 2,000 from the Zamindar in February 1912 for its articles on the repeal of partition and Britain's motives in Persia. This was seen as the first step towards a general attempt to throttle the Muslim press in India under the Press Act of 1910. Mohamed Ali publicly proclaimed that he had contributed Rs. 100 to 'stiff-necked and law-despising magistrates... [who expose] before the whole country what precious knowledge of vernacular they have acquired in their intercourse with syces and ayahs.'¹ In April Edwin Montagu, the Under Secretary of State for India, observed during the second reading of the Government of India Bill that it was impossible to consider the Muslims of India as a homogeneous nationality. The Moslem League of the Punjab at a well attended meeting on 5 May protested vigorously against this statement as an 'unjustifiable reflection' on the solidarity of the Indian Muslims, especially since such solidarity was a foremost doctrine of Islam and a basic principle of Muslim society. The statement was also regarded as 'opposed to actual facts'

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Article in the Comrade of 6 April 1912 contained in *ibid.*

and a departure from an 'oft-recognised principle' that looked upon all Muslims as one community.¹

The stir caused by Montagu's remark was followed by an incident which had a far reaching significance for India. This was the impact of the debate between Lord Curzon and Lord Crewe, the Secretary of State for India, on 24 June and 20 July in the House of Lords over the meaning of paragraph three of the Delhi Despatch of 25 August 1911.² Mohamed Ali commented in the Comrade of 19 June 1912, that Lord Crew's statement had turned the vague hopes of colonial self-government into a sharp and clearly articulated desire for political autonomy. The

¹ NAI, Home Poll 37-40 Part B, June 1912, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 14 May 1912. A Muslim government servant then drew up a report which was thought to verify the truth of Montagu's statement. Home Poll 85 Part B, September 1912, 'Note relating to the Remarks Made by Mr. Montagu about the Muhammadans of India Being a Homogeneous Nationality.'

² The Delhi Despatch can be found in NAI, Home Delhi 8-11 Part A, December 1911, 'Transfer of the Seat of the Government of India from Calcutta to Delhi and the Constitutional Changes in the Bengals.' The Despatch itself has been printed in 'Announcements Made by and on Behalf of H.M. The King-Emperor at the Coronation Durbar Held at Delhi on 12 December 1911, with Correspondence Relating thereto,' Parliamentary Papers, 1911, LV [5979]. Paragraph three is reprinted in C.H. Phillips, ed., The Evolution of India and Pakistan, 1858 to 1947: Select Documents (London, 1962), pp. 90-1. The debate between Lord Curzon and Lord Crewe also appears in Phillips, pp. 91-5. It is interesting to note the reaction of the Government of India in Home Poll 7 Deposit, September 1912, 'Considerations Arising from the Interpretation of Paragraph 3 of the Government of India Despatch, Dated the 25th August 1911.'

Secretary of State had in effect sown the seed for an agitation that was likely to spring up in the immediate future and grow to become 'as unpleasant as any the country has seen.'¹ The effect of Lord Crew's statement was obvious by December 1912 when the Central Committee of the All-India Moslem League met and drafted changes for the constitution which included the attainment of a system of self-government 'suitable to India' under the aegis of the British Crown, and co-operation with other communities to achieve its goals.² The repeal of partition had initiated this response, and Lord Crewe's statement provided the final raison d'être for the League and Congress to join forces. The battle with the Agha Khan for leadership of the League followed, and found reflection in the victory of the 'New Muslim Party' under the Raja of Mahmudabad, Marzhar-ul-Haque, and Wazir Hussain when the proposed changes were adopted at Lucknow in March 1913.³

¹ NAI, Home Poll 149 Part B, November 1913.

² NAI, Home Poll 85-86 Part A, February 1913, 'Revised Constitution and Rules of the All-India Moslem League.'

³ The Member for Education reassured his colleagues on the Council that there was no immediate cause for worry as it was 'quite impossible for the Hindus and Muhammadans of the Punjab and west of the United Provinces to join hands at present.' He did not hesitate to say that the Muslims of northern India were more concerned with separate representation on district boards and municipal committees than with self-government, which was incompatible with a coalition with Hindu Extremists, even though individuals might combine. NAI, Home Poll 85-86 Part A, February 1913, Note by S.H. Butler, 19 February 1913.

The debate over self-government, significant though it was for the political future of India, influenced only a small and articulate élite. The announcement of the decision of Lord Crewe over the Muslim university in July 1912, on the other hand, had the effect of antagonising a much larger portion of the Muslim community.¹ The Secretary of State decided that it was possible to establish both a Muslim university and a Hindu university, but that both of these institutions must bear the name of the city in which they were located, namely, Aligarh and Benares respectively. He also decided that neither university should have the power to affiliate colleges. The Comrade reacted adversely to these decisions and accused the Government of India of bad faith. Mohamed Ali argued that the government had known of Crewe's decision, but had waited until after the Imperial Darbar, and the consequent excitement, before it had made the decision public.² What was more surprising, however, was the reaction of the Muslim press which was usually loyal. The two exceedingly moderate Muslim journals in Lahore reacted with considerable vehemence, certainly more than they exhibited during the Turco-Italian War. The Observer of 24 August 1912 stated:

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There is a very good summary of the Muslim university movement in Abdul Latif, 'The Moslem University Movement,' Indian Review, XVII (May 1916), 332-5. It is interesting to note that while the Central Committee of the All-India Moslem League was meeting at Christmas 1912 and recommending a change in the constitution of the League, the Moslem University Foundation Committee met at Lucknow at the same time to begin definite steps to establish an independent Muslim university.

² NAI, Home Poll 7-10 Part B, October 1912, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 17 September 1912.

Muhammadans, if they were wise, should welcome the decision of the Secretary of State to limit the benefits of our proposed Muhammadan University to Aligarh, and to name it only the University of Aligarh. So much the better. It will give the greater pleasure to make the Secretary of State modify his orders. The decision is final. So much the better. It will be a greater triumph for us to make him rescind his decision. They now know how to rescind decisions. Nothing is 'settled,' and they have taught us the way to achieve success. So let us welcome this decision. They are trying our mettle. Let us show them that it is not easy to dictate ideals. We committed the initial mistake of begging for the University as a matter of favour. We should have demanded it as a matter of right. We grovelled in the dust when we did the former and our wishes were not accepted. Let us do the latter and we shall be respected. It is now a trial of moral strength, and whoever yields is not of us. Better poverty with honour than riches with slavery. This is our final word.¹

The Paisa Akhbar was equally indignant with the government and exasperated with the Hindus who were willing to accept the decision: 'You should do this, you who are past masters in the art of agitation, and who with reference to the Partition of Bengal brought in the aid of sedition and of anarchist crimes.'²

Finally, the continued propaganda of the Comrade and the Zamindar during the months of June, July and August, over the Turco-Italian War contributed substantially to the growth of pan-Islamic sentiment in the city and in

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NAI, Home Poll 21-24 Part B, September 1912, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 28 August 1912.

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NAI, Home Poll 7-10 Part B, October 1912, for the week ending 17 September 1912.

north India prior to Mohamed Ali's arrival in Delhi. An officer in the Home Department noted on 10 June 1912 that 'the tendency to pan-Islamism seems to be growing in India and has perhaps been accentuated by the Turco-Italian War and the alleged aggressions of Russia and England in Persia. The Comrade and Zamindar rather voice this feeling.'¹ The growth of this pan-Islamic sentiment was especially noticeable at Aligarh College. The Director of Criminal Intelligence reported that the growth of an anti-Christian spirit was stimulated by the writings of the Islamic press on political developments in Tripoli, Morocco, and Persia. He noted that students who went home for the vacation circulated bitter charges to the effect that the British Government conspired with the other Christian powers of Europe to ruin Islam.² The Director received reports from 'several classes of educated and well-to-do Muhammadans in the north of India' that young, educated Muslims favoured a combination with the Congress party. As regarded the lower classes he was told that:

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NAI, Home Poll 16 Deposit, July 1912, 'Questions Asked by the Army-in-India Committee,' the Secretary of the Home Department, H. Wheeler, noted on 18 June, however, that 'we have evidence that the subject [the Turco-Italian War] is frequently referred to in the Muhammadan Press, noticeably in the Comrade and Zamindar and a certain number of resolutions on the subject have been forwarded to Government by Muhammadan bodies. There is no evidence of any general anti-British feeling having been caused by the War.'

2

NAI, Home Poll 7-10 Part B, October 1912, for the week ending 24 September 1912.

...the danger to Muhammadan religion, represented by the betrayal of Turkey in Europe and by the encroachments of Russia in Persia, has been of late the constant theme of discourse by religious Muhammadans in the mosques, and that their cry that the Muhammadan religion is in danger and under no sufficient protection from the British Government is meeting with considerable response from the uneducated Muhammadan public.¹

Thus the scene was set in Delhi for the arrival of Mohamed Ali in the new imperial capital of India.

Mohamed Ali, a Pathan, was born in Rampur State in 1878, the son of a wealthy zamindar. He graduated from Aligarh in 1898 and from Oxford in 1902. He returned to India and joined the Rampur Darbar and then the Baroda Darbar during which time he campaigned vigorously for the newly formed Moslem League and was elected a trustee of the M.A.O. College at Aligarh for a period

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NAI, Home Poll 26-30 Part B, August 1912, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 16 July 1912. On 7 August 1912 the Home Department called for reports from all local governments on the state of Muslim feeling. The replies are contained in Home Poll 45-55 Part A, March 1913, 'State of Muhammadan Feeling in India.' Delhi received no special mention.

of five years from 1910.¹ He resigned from the Baroda Darbar in January 1911 to commence a journalistic career with the Comrade. In just seven months Mohamed Ali revealed his extraordinary ability as a journalist and elevated the Comrade into the 'most reputable and important among the Muslim newspapers,' with a circulation of 1,200.² This earned him one of the seven invitations offered to the 'native' press in Bengal for the Imperial Darbar at Delhi in December 1911. The paper doubled its circulation by May 1912 to 2,500 and was still considered 'a popular paper, although occasionally disfigured by the cheekiness of youth.'³ Mohamed Ali applied to have his

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There is a great deal of eulogistic and polemic literature about Mohamed Ali. A short balanced biographical sketch appears in M. Mujeeb, The Indian Muslims (London, 1967), pp. 536-9. Afzal Iqbal has edited an autobiographical manuscript entitled My Life a Fragment: An Autobiographical Sketch of Maulana Mohamed Ali (Lahore, 1942) and the Select Writings and Speeches of Maulana Mohamed Ali (republished in 1963 in two volumes). The speeches of the Ali brothers after their release from their first internment appear in For India and Islam (Calcutta, 1922) while the record of their trial in Karachi appears in R.V. Thadani, The Historic State Trial of the Ali Brothers and Five Others (Karachi, 1922). Short biographical sketches appear in Syed Abul Khair, Short Life of Mohamed Ali (n.p., 1935); Al Kafir, Pillars of the Nation, A Psycho-Political Study of Indian Leaders (Delhi, 1928), I, 43-64; and Zin Sharif al-Mujahid, 'Maulana Muhammad Ali: A Political Study,' Pakistan Quarterly, V (Winter 1955), 54-9. None of these latter sketches is satisfactory.

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NAI, Home Poll 21-52 Part B, November 1911, 'Issue of Invitation to Representatives of the Indian Press for the Delhi Durbar,' C.J. Stevenson-Moore to Secretary, Government of India, Home Department, 4 August 1911.

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NAI, Home Poll 149 Part B, November 1913; Home Poll 37-40 Part B, June 1912, for the week ending 21 May 1912.

newspaper registered at Delhi on 9 October 1912 and to be excused from furnishing security. The District Magistrate, H.C. Beadon, ordered that no security was necessary because the editor 'had passed through a trial of two years in Calcutta during which time he had kept out of trouble.'¹

With his arrival in Delhi and the outbreak shortly afterwards of the Greco-Turkish War, Mohamed Ali launched a vigorous campaign in support of the Red Crescent Medical Mission.² He immediately encountered active opposition from the wealthy, influential, and established leadership among the sharif and merchant community in the city and the Moderates in the local Moslem League. He appealed instead to the petty bourgeoisie and the artisans, and received support from the 'New Muslim Party'. Mohamed Ali

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NAI, Home Poll 142-149 Part A, October 1913, 'Demand of Security, Under Section 3 (1) of the Indian Press Act, 1910 (I of 1910), From the Keepers of the Comrade and the Baitul Sharaf Press, Delhi, For the publication of objectionable writings in the Comrade and Rafiq Newspapers, Respectively,' quoted in the order of the District Magistrate dated 8 August 1913. Mohamed Ali contended that he had to see several high officials before he was exempted from security. He also describes the other vicissitudes of his journalistic career in Delhi in My Life a Fragment, pp. 71-85.

2

The idea for the Mission originated with Dr M.A. Ansari who was to lead it when it departed from India in December 1912. It was designed to make up for the deficiencies of the German Red Cross Hospital, the British Red Crescent Hospital (sent by Ameer Ali) and the French Red Cross Hospital all of whose doctors through lack of skill or interest 'deliberately maimed and dismembered the patients when a conservative treatment would have saved the lives and limbs of many....' NAI, Home Poll 149 Part B, November 1913.

published articles in the Comrade highlighting acts of sacrifice by contributors to the Red Crescent Society,¹ and made a public appeal to 18 of his fellow trustees at the M.A.O. College to support the transfer of funds from the Moslem University Fund to the Red Crescent Medical Mission.²

The rival Turkish Relief Fund received support from the leading maulvis of the city, from Hakim Ajmal Khan, the Panjabian community, the Anglo-Arabic School Committee and the managing committees of the Fatehpuri Mosque and the Jama Masjid. This group, plus the Moderates in the Moslem League which had successfully controlled the religious enthusiasm of July 1910, arranged to have all the skins of the animals which were sacrificed at Bakr-Id collected at the Jama Masjid as a contribution to the Turkish Relief Fund.³ Haji Abdul Ghaffur distributed free sweets when the city received the news on 10 November that the Balkan Confederation had

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RDDA, Confidential File 25 (1914), weekly Diary of the Superintendent of Police, No. 11, 23 November 1912. An old man of Chela Lane was asked by a deputation from the Delhi Red Crescent Society to contribute. He offered them a small box that contained Rs. 1,000 in sovereigns and notes. The man was obviously of limited means and the sum represented his entire savings, for which Mohamed Ali kissed his hands. Another instance concerned a Sayid woman. She gave her mehar [marriage portion] which her 'poor' husband had settled on her.

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NAI, Home Poll 88-91 Part B, December 1912, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 12 November 1912.

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RDDA, Confidential File 25 (1914), weekly diary of the Superintendent of Police No. 11, 23 November 1912. They collected over 1,100 hides and skins.

been defeated at Adrianople; and Syed Ahmad, Imam of the Jama Masjid, Maulvi Ibrahim of Masjid Hussania, Maulvi Muhammad Said, and Nawab Bashiruddin Ahmad urged an audience of 5,000 people at the Jama Masjid after the Juma Prayers on Friday 22 November to contribute to the Fund.¹

The supporters of the Turkish Relief Fund had the added advantage of support from some members of the Hindu community. The Raja of Darbhanga had visited Delhi at the beginning of October and advised his fellow Hindus to find some way to reduce the number of cows killed at Id. The Hindus offered to contribute liberally to the Fund in return for a promise that conscientious efforts would be made to reduce the number of kine killed. These contributions, plus collections, plus the sale of skins and hides from Bakr-Id enabled the sponsors of the Fund to despatch Rs. 37,000 to Turkey.²

The results of the agitation for the Red Crescent Medical Mission and the Turkish Relief Fund were obvious to some observers. The Director of Criminal Intelligence wrote to Hailey that he had received independent reports

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RDDA, Confidential File 25 (1914), daily diary of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, D.I.D., 12 November 1912, and weekly diary of the Superintendent of Police No. 11, 23 November 1912. Before the usual evening prayers, 2,000 men held a meeting in support of the Turkish Relief Fund.

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RDDA, Confidential File 25 (1914), daily diary of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, C.I.D., 10 November 1912. The move to reduce kine-killing received the warmest support of Hakim Ajmal Khan.

that 'there was a good deal of excitement among Muhammadans in Delhi who were becoming anti-British in their feelings.'¹ The Chief Commissioner observed that although Mohamed Ali had whipped up a remarkable amount of enthusiasm 'among men of the young barrister type and students,' the older men opposed him and the supporters of the Turkish Relief Fund would have nothing to do with the Medical Mission.² Mohamed Ali and Dr Ansari did succeed, however, in obtaining the necessary funds for the Medical Mission and it duly departed from Bombay on 15 December 1912.

It would seem, then, that there were at least two types of pan-Islamism manifest in Delhi in late 1912. The older, established and responsible Muslims tended to look upon the plight of Turkey as worthy of support. They were quite willing to contribute to the Turkish Relief Fund; but such contributions were in no way designed to be an expression of anti-British sentiment. For the conservative Muslims there was no conflict of loyalties between support of the government and support of the Fund. Their response to the attempt to assassinate Lord Hardinge, namely, the collection of Rs. 15,000 on 24 December 1912 at the Jama Masjid, underscored their loyalty to the British Government in a most convincing manner. The pan-Islamism of the 'New Muslim Party', which was involved in Extremist politics, looked upon the Red Crescent Society as a direct expression of hostility towards the Christians in general and towards the British Government in particular.

¹ RDDA, Confidential File 25 (1914), C.R. Cleveland to W.M. Hailey, 2 December 1912.

² NAI, Home Poll 149 Part B, November 1913.

Mohamed Ali looked upon the despatch of the Red Crescent Medical Mission as a sign of support for, and a vindication of, his anti-Christian views. The Turco-Italian and the Greco-Turkish Wars had convinced him that there was a Christian conspiracy afoot against the Muslims, and the annulment of the partition of Bengal plus the decision over the Muslim university drove him to the conclusion that a policy of loyalty to the British Government would convey no rewards at all. He became very active from 1913 onwards in an attempt to disseminate his views to the petty merchants, the lower classes such as artisans and labourers, and the students in the Muslim community. The support that he derived from the Extremists was helpful, but it was limited, and he therefore launched a campaign to generate a popular movement which would wrest concessions from the government.¹ His passion for

¹ Compare for instance the moderation of a statement in the Comrade on the Balkan War on 20 July 1912: 'It is a matter of common knowledge that all the stages of the war are being most closely followed in every home in Moslem India. The least suspicion that the British Government after its declaration of neutrality was siding with Italy, when there seemed to be no chance of an Italian triumph, would spread like wildfire among the Moslem community, and may lead to most serious consequences,' with a speech he made at Lahore after the departure of the Red Crescent Medical Mission (28 January 1913): 'At first the British Government declared a policy of neutrality, but that policy was soon changed and at the funeral of this false declaration Mr Asquith was the chief mourner. Do not think that your cries have had no effect on British foreign policy. The English will either have to abandon their claim of republicanism and declare that they will rule us tyrannically with stick and sword, or the voice of seven crores of Muhammadans will surely have its effect. Otherwise we will break the heads of the English with the same stick of republicanism which they themselves have shown us.' NAI, Home Poll 149 Part B, November 1913.

pan-Islamism provided the idiom for his appeal and almost all the issues he raised stemmed from his concern for the international unity of Islam.

The first attempt by Mohamed Ali to popularise his views took the form of the publication of a pamphlet from Turkey entitled 'Come over into Macedonia and Help Us,' which vividly illustrated Christian atrocities in the Greco-Turkish War. He republished the pamphlet in four instalments in the Comrade from 17 May to 7 June 1913. This act eventually led to the forfeiture of the Comrade for those issues and the imposition of a maximum security of Rs. 2,000 on 8 August 1913. His appeal to the High Court in Calcutta, however, cleansed him from any stigma and he successfully retained his character as a journalist of position and repute.¹

The Hamdard, an Urdu-language daily, was designed to communicate Mohamed Ali's views to a wider audience

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NAI, Home Poll 71-76 Part A, July 1913, 'Proscription under Section 12 of the Indian Press Act, 1910, of a Pamphlet Entitled "Come over into Macedonia and Help Us"'; Home Poll 40-41 Part A, August 1913, 'Forfeiture of the Copies of the Comrade and Hamdard Newspapers Containing Reprints of the Pamphlet "Come over into Macedonia and Help Us"'; Home Poll 1-3 Part A, October 1913, 'Institution by Mr Mohamed Ali, Editor of the Comrade, of an Appeal before the High Court, Calcutta, Regarding the Forfeiture of the Pamphlet Entitled "Come over into Macedonia and Help Us."' The Comrade of 17, 24 and 31 May, and 7 June and the Hamdard of 6, 7, 8, 14, 17, 19, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28 June were forfeited on 17 August 1913.

than the English-educated audience of the Comrade.¹ It was planned in May 1912 to give a 'thorough grounding in Sociology and Economics, with a view to bring them [the Muslims] into line even with the advanced communities of Europe.'² The Hamdard finally commenced operation on 16 May 1913, when one of its first duties was to publish the rules for the newly organised Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba [Society of the Servants of the Kaaba].

The Society of Servants was designed to give organised support to the widely developing sentiment of pan-Islamism. The idea of a society had first been mooted by Mushir Husain Kidwai in January, but it was not firmly established until 6 May 1913 at Lucknow. The Society immediately established headquarters in Delhi with Shaukat Ali,

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Mohamed Ali stated that: 'The Hamdard was intended to educate the people whereas the Comrade had to be their spokesman as well, and to act as a medium between them and their rulers, and I was anxious to exclude from the former all exciting topics such as could not be avoided from the latter in the heat of advocacy....I was adamant and the readers of the Hamdard were not permitted to overhear what passed between the Comrade and the Government in England.' My Life: A Fragment, p. 83. The circulation of the Hamdard was 3,500, the Zamindar 4,000, and the Al-Hilal 1,000. NAI, Home Poll 33-38 Part A, November 1914: 'Request made by Sir Valentine Chirol to His Excellency the Viceroy for Information on the Subject of the Muhammadan Situation in India.'

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NAI, Home Poll 37-40 Part B, June 1912, for the week ending 21 May 1912.

Mohamed Ali's brother, as secretary.¹ The two brothers then began a recruiting campaign for the organisation and in addition to the publication of the rules in the Hamdard, addressed an audience of 5,000 at the Jama Masjid in Delhi on 23 May outlining the purpose of the Society. The brothers called upon the audience to fulfil their duty under Islamic law to protect the sacred shrine of the Prophet and then invited everyone (including the C.I.D.) to visit the premises of the Society in Delhi to satisfy themselves about the legitimacy of its activities.² Mohamed Ali followed this speech with articles in the Comrade of 31 May and 7 June (which also carried the third and fourth

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The idea for the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba did not receive much popularity when it was first mooted. Kidwai sent the proposal to Abdul Kalam Azad, the editor of the Al-Hilal (Calcutta), but nothing further was done. Shaukat Ali then called for the formation of such a society in a speech at Amritsar on 31 March. Abdul Kalam subsequently published the scheme on 23 April and the meeting of six men at Abdul Bari's residence on 6 May resulted from that. The six men were Abdul Bari, M.H. Kidwai, Shaukat Ali, Mohamed Ali, Hakim Abdul Wali of Lucknow and Dr Naziruddin Hassan, Barrister, Lucknow. Abdul Bari was elected the Khadim-ul-Khuddam, Kidwai and Shaukat Ali were the secretaries and the other three were Muṭamidin Khidim-ul-Khuddam. NAI, Home Poll 7 Deposit, July 1913, 'Formation in the United Provinces of a New Society Called the "Khuddam-i-Ka'aba" or Servants of the Ka'aba'; Home Poll 46 Part A, May 1914, 'Reports Regarding the Society Started in the United Provinces Called the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba, or "Society of the Servants of the Kaaba"'. The rules for the Society appear in Appendix A of this Chapter.

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RDDA, Confidential File 25 (1914), confidential diary of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, C.I.D., for the week ending 30 May 1913.

instalments of the pamphlet 'Come Over into Macedonia and Help Us').¹ He stated that:

Russia is openly casting greedy eyes over Armenia. France is fomenting disturbances in Syria and rousing the Arabs against the Turks, just as Russia is encouraging Armenians to entice the Kurds into acts of violence in order to make the excuse of intervention plausible. Trouble is also brewing in Baghdad and Basra, and one may be sure that every effort will be made to make the differences of Arabs and Turks in the Hedjaz and Yemen as dangerously acute as possible. The future of Turkey is, therefore, no less dark and gloomy than her recent past.

With the realisation of all these depressing facts, can the Moslems of the world seek solace in indolence and indifference to the fate of their holy places? Can they sit with folded hands, ruminating over the past or fretting against the stern and inexorable decrees of fate? No, Mr Asquith is right; 'things can never be as they were;' and if those Moslems who have hitherto formed part of the ruling races of mankind cannot safeguard the effective sovereignty of some Moslem

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Mohamed Ali used this opportunity to express his anti-British sentiments as is evident in the following quotation: 'We who are living today have witnessed perhaps one of the most decisive wars of any period in history. Mr Asquith announced even before the war was over that "things can never be again as they were," that "the victors are not to be robbed of the fruits which cost them so dear", and that "the map of Eastern Europe has to be recast." Those who foretold a future for the Turk only in Asia have occasion to rejoice as the true prophets of evil. But even some of them, such as His Highness the Agha Khan, who could not but feel distressed at this result, cannot foretell with anything like the same certainty whether Turkey's control over her Asiatic empire would be allowed to remain adequate and effective. Her robe of power is indeed in rags and tatters, and even these are being pulled at and torn by grasping hands on every side.' NAI, Home Poll 49 Part A, May 1914.

State over the holy places of Islam, the hundreds of millions of Musalmans, who are numbered amongst the subject races, must now make up their minds to do so.

To the Mussalmans of India we have just one word to say. You know well enough that the protection of the holy places of Islam is a religious duty which is as much yours as that of the Turks, and you also know that it is a duty more sacred than any other.¹

These appeals to Muslim sentiment and the rules of the Society tended to arouse more suspicion than support. The suspicion which Muslim leaders exhibited toward Abdul Bari and Shaukat Ali on their visits to Bareilly, Badaun, Delhi, Ajmere, and Deoband from 2 June onwards led the organisers of the Society to reframe its rules so that the 'oath' became a 'promise' and the words 'sacrifice their lives and property' became 'give all possible help,' changes which were published on 9 July 1913.²

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NAI, Home Poll 46 Part A, May 1914, report of F. Isemonger, Assistant Director of Criminal Intelligence, dated Delhi, 20 February 1914.

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The Viceroy noted on 26 June 1913 as follows: 'I gather from Mr Mazar-ul-Haque that the Society is one of no importance and will soon fizzle out. It should however be watched to see that it does not become a disloyal organisation.' NAI, Home Poll 7 Deposit, July 1913. He made this observation even though Mohamed Ali had specifically stated in the Comrade on 7 June that 'nothing is farther from the minds of the organisers of this movement than to identify themselves with lovers of secret societies, and the only revolution that this organisation aims at creating is a revolution which would convert millions of illiterate, indifferent, indolent and unproductive Moslem units into a united and well regulated society of productive workers, true to themselves and therefore false to none.' Home Poll 46 Part A, May 1914.

Mohamed Ali was further able to gain a great deal of popular support, and the grudging support of the more wealthy members of the community, when he protested vigorously against the demolition of a mosque in the new imperial area of Delhi. The mosque of Maulana Abdul Haq (the famous traditionalist of the eighteenth century), which was located at Okla, was in such a bad state of disrepair that the engineer in charge ordered it to be demolished for a new road. Mohamed Ali immediately seized upon this desecration and began to whip up public protest to have it restored. The Chief Commissioner handled the situation very judiciously and agreed to restore the damaged portion and to avoid the demolition of any other mosques in the area. The Comrade of 24 June published the successful outcome of the incident.¹

The next issue but one of the journal on 5 July carried a report about the demolition of a mosque at Cawnpore. It also published the correspondence which Mohamed Ali had had with the Lieutenant-Governor, Sir

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RDDA, Revenue File 39 Part B 1915, 'Demolition and Restoration of Maulana Abdul Haq's Mosque Near Okla.' All of the temples, mosques, tombs, and graveyards in the area of the new imperial capital were surveyed and classified into a three-fold system as shown in RDDA, Revenue File 47 (10) Part B 1914, 'Lists of Religious Buildings Which Should (A) Be Preserved; (B) Not Be Destroyed Unless Destruction Is Imperative; and (C) Not Be Preserved.' The Chief Commissioner received an enormous number of petitions which requested the preservation of this and that sacred building or monument. Hailey's policy was not to destroy any of these if there was any possible alternative available. New Delhi today still reflects many of the compromises reached in those early years.

James Meston, and bemoaned the fact that the Governor had refused to act sagaciously in the matter. Mohamed Ali then began a campaign to have the mosque restored. This campaign received a tremendous fillip from the return of Dr Ansari from Turkey.

Dr Ansari was an active leader of the Extremists of the 'New Muslim Party', even though he had only arrived in India in 1910 after ten years in England. He was born in 1880 and spent his youth at Yusafpur in Gazipur District in the United Provinces. He was educated at Benares, Allahabad, Hyderabad, and Madras, and received his M.D., M.S. in 1901 in London where he became the house surgeon at Charing Cross Hospital. He returned to India in 1910, set up practice in Delhi, and immediately became involved in the Moslem League. As a member of the 'New Muslim Party' he was the first to suggest the idea of the Red Crescent Medical Mission. He was described by one observer as follows:

Dr Ansari was the head of the Mission and to me, the most representative Indian Muslem. Externally he has not changed much. The same small moustache, the brooding mouth with the delicate design which one associated with the Hindu, very black energetic eyebrows stretched over his deepset eyes. They were purposeful eyes, nay kind in spite of the unwavering determination in their depths. His

clothes had that masculine elegance which one associated with London. He talked very little, but always to the point....¹

Dr Ansari had written letters back to India from Macedonia, some of which were published in the Comrade. He criticised the German Red Cross Hospital, the British Red Crescent Hospital sent by Ameer Ali, and the French Red Cross Hospital, and praised the Ottoman Croissant Rouge. A letter by Dr Ansari which appeared in the Indian Daily Telegraph of 29 June 1913 claimed that the British Red Crescent Medical Mission had a death to admission ratio of 18 per cent while the All-India Mission's ratio was only 0.5 per cent.² The newspaper articles kept people informed about the activities of the Mission and gave the inhabitants of Delhi a special interest in the war and in Turkey.

Dr Ansari and the Medical Mission arrived at Delhi Station on 10 July 1913. They were greeted by several thousand enthusiastic supporters who completely overran the premises.³ The following day, Friday the 11th, he

¹ Halide' Edibe, Inside India (London, 1937), p. 17. It is interesting to note other comments she made about Dr Ansari. 'Among Muslims he is a rare example of a doctor who has adopted the modern method; for in India the old school of medicine dominates. Dr Ansari may be considered as bridging the Muslim outlook and Western science. His conception of citizenship is based on equality and co-operation among Indians of conflicting sects and ideas.'

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NAI, Home Poll 100-118 Part A, October 1913, R. Burn to Secretary, Government of India, Home Department, 17 September 1913.

³ RDDA, Confidential File 10 (1913), 'Inadvisability of Allowing the Delhi Railway Station to Become a Scene of Political Agitation.'

spoke to about 5,000 people in the Jama Masjid after the Jama prayers. His speech was passionately pan-Islamic and anti-Christian. He said the Turks had to fight not only the actual belligerents but also the European countries who covertly assisted them. He saw towns and cities (which had been captured by the Christians) in which the Muslim quarters were brutally destroyed while the Christian quarters went untouched. He advised his audience not to forget these atrocities when they dealt with Christians who were determined to wipe Islam 'off the face of the earth.' Mohamed Ali, who was present on the occasion and dressed in the uniform of the Mission, also spoke and read a poem by Maulvi Shibli Naumani of Lucknow which expressed unequivocal anti-British sentiments.¹

Mohamed Ali launched his campaign against the sacrilege at Cawnpore in earnest on 12 July 1913.² He stated his reluctance to deal with the case, even though

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NAI, Home Poll 149 Part B, November 1913; RDDA, Confidential File 16 (1913), 'Terms under Which the Jama Masjid Was Made over by Government to the Muhammadan Community of Delhi.'

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The Cawnpore mosque affair is a very long and detailed episode which is primarily outside the scope of this thesis. Only a small portion of the affair is given in order to illustrate Mohamed Ali's views. It is based upon NAI, Home Poll 100-118 Part A, October 1913 and Home Poll 142-149 Part A, October 1913, 'Demand of Security, Under Section 3(1) of the Indian Press Act 1910 (I of 1910), From the Keepers of the Comrade and Baitul Sharaf Press, Delhi, For the Publication of Objectionable Writings in the Comrade and Rafique Newspapers, Respectively.'

his 'Urdu contemporaries' had been exercising themselves over it for some weeks, because of the passions which could be aroused so easily over such an issue.¹ But he rued the fact that he had tried to negotiate privately and had not led a public agitation to stop the 'sacrilege'. He foresaw a danger in the whole affair:

Sir James's courtesy has been unable, even if it has ever attempted, to disguise his firm beliefs that what the officials say must be unreservedly accepted, that what officials desire to do must receive the backing of the head of the Indian Civil Service in the province, and that the best policy to deal with Moslem feelings is to teach the Mussalmans their proper place in an official

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The Municipal Committee of Cawnpore in 1909 decided to carry out certain improvements in the city to facilitate future expansion and transportation. One such improvement was the realignment of the road that ran through Machli Bazaar. The Improvement Trust indicated that certain temples and mosques would suffer partial or total demolition for which compensation would be paid. As this had occurred elsewhere in the Province on other occasions and no special objection was raised, the owners of the temples were notified and asked to remove their images. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Province visited the city in November 1912 and upon special representation that one was particularly historic and architecturally significant he accepted the suggestion that the road be made a dual carriageway which could straddle the temple. Local Muslims then began to question why the mosque at Machli Bazaar should lose its dalan and instituted petitions to the Municipal Committee from February to May 1913 to stop the demolition. The attempts to stop the demolition through the Municipal Committee or through appeals to the Lieutenant-Governor failed and contact was made with leading journalists and Moslem League officials. Mohamed Ali was one of the first outsiders to petition Meston, an acquaintance for some years, to reverse the decision. The Raja of Mahmudabad also contacted Meston to which Meston replied that the decision was final and irrevocable.

cosmology wherein the Anglo-Indian at one time refused to occupy any place but the first, and after the sagacious and cheerful acceptance of the inevitable by the New statesmanship equally persistently refuses to occupy any place lower than second. Evidently the Moslem 'nuisance' was discussed in the highest circles recently and Sir James's view prevailed. The Cawnpore sacrilege may, therefore, be taken to be the first of a series of lessons which the undisciplined Moslem is to be taught....¹

Mohamed Ali hinted at the official irregularities which preceded the demolition (irregularities on which Lord Hardinge noted 'I hope that these irregularities will not become known').² And he fully alluded to the demolition on which the local collector had set his heart as an accomplished fact which could be presented to the Muslim as one more 'final' decision, and concluded that such government action proved that they desired to unite Hindus and Muslims.

The Comrade of 25 July delivered a tour de force on the affair. In a very long article, Mohamed Ali refuted all the official announcements on the subject which had appeared since February 1913. He especially took issue with the charge that agitators from outside Cawnpore were the first to take any notice of the situation, and that after a Hindu temple in the vicinity of the mosque had been spared.³ He reiterated the accusation of the

¹ NAI, Home Poll 149 Part B, November 1913.

² NAI, Home Poll 100-118 Part A, October 1913, note by Lord Hardinge, 12 September 1913.

³ The government later revealed maps to show that this was untrue.

Muslims of Cawnpore that the local government decided to demolish the dalan because the temple had been spared. And finally he pilloried the ineptitude and authoritarianism of the local European officials.

The main punch of the article of the 25th, however, was delivered upon the 'supreme issue'. Mohamed Ali was emphatic that the dalan was an integral part of the mosque and, as such, sacrosanct. He pointed to the fact that five maulvis had signed a fatwa which declared that no mutawalla could accept compensation for the demolition of a sacred portion of a mosque.¹ Mohamed Ali concluded that the integrity of the government could only be restored if the dalan were rebuilt, and that this was the absolute minimum that the Muslim community expected of the authorities. He further maintained that the incident seriously undermined the government's claim that it looked upon the different religious communities with an impartial eye, and demanded that, 'the Government of India and even the British Parliament if need be, shall have to enunciate once more the principle of British religious neutrality to enforce its rigid application.'² Mohamed Ali then advised the Muslims of Cawnpore not to put their trust in Sir James Meston because he had become

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The government was in a particularly weak position. It remarked time and again that it had taken the advice of several outstanding Muslims about the sanctity of the dalan, and had been reassured that it did not form part of the sacred area of the Mosque. They could not, however, reveal the names of those who had given their advice since those persons would bear the brunt of what was becoming a vicious public debate.

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NAI, Home Poll 149 Part B, November 1913.

'unhinged' as a result of the intensity of Muslim feeling which was displayed over the Balkan War. The Muslims of India, and especially those in Cawnpore according to Mohamed Ali could only have faith in their God and act with vigour.

A large number of Muslim agitators among whom were Mohamed Ali, Shaukat Ali and Abdul Kalam Azad, visited the scene of the sacrilege in the last week of July and delivered several inflammatory speeches. It was no surprise, therefore, that a crowd should gather at the Mosque on 3 August after attending a meeting at the Idgah where Azad Subhani delivered an especially inflammatory speech and attempt to rebuild the portion which had been demolished with the rubble which had not been removed since 1 July. The police attempted to interfere and the Muslim industrial workers of Cawnpore who formed a substantial portion of the crowd, took the opportunity and the availability of brickbats to resist the police. The incident snowballed as latent passions came to the surface and eventually a large force of police dispersed the crowd after killing 18 rioters (and one of their colleagues), wounding 27, and arresting 189 men and boys. In reply to the 41 police who were wounded the Administration could point to 522 expended cartridges. A great deal was to be said about this ugly tragedy in the ensuing weeks and months.¹

¹ The formal petitions of complaint against the demolition of the mosques at Delhi and Cawnpore and against the riot at Cawnpore appear in NAI, Home Poll 1-36 Part B, November 1913, 'Petitions Complaining against the Destruction of a Portion of the Machli Bazaar Mosque at Cawnpore.' The comments of the members of Council appear in Appendix B of this Chapter.

Mohamed Ali had been ordered on 8 August to deposit a security of Rs. 2,000; but this did not dissuade him from publishing a long article about the riot in the first issue of the Comrade to appear after the riot on 11 or 12 August. He described a meeting at the Idgah in Delhi on the 10th of 5,000 Muslims who, peacefully but forcefully voiced their indignation over the riot. (This meeting marked the coalition of the two Muslim parties that had existed late in 1912, of which more later.) The president of the meeting was Hafiz Abdul Aziz, a pleader by profession. He was a member of the Anglo-Arabic School Committee, secretary of the Managing Committee of the Fatehpuri Mosque, secretary of the local branch of the Moslem League, and president of the Anjuman-i-Muin-ul-Talim [the butchers]. Two other conveners of the meeting were Zikur Rahman, also a pleader and Mumtazuddin, who was the owner of a printing press.

The issue of the Comrade which appeared on 11 August carried several inflammatory articles. Mohamed Ali accused the District Magistrate of provoking a riot to justify his arbitrary actions and to 'teach the Mussalmans another lesson.' He revelled in lurid scenes of 'children mangled to death or crying in agony, venerable old men hunted out of the places of hiding in the mosque and gored with spears.'¹ He raised the question whether the Magistrate had ordered the police to shoot in order to disperse a crowd or to kill people. If the former was the case, then it was strange that so many of the injured had received wounds in their backs.²

¹ NAI, Home Pol1 142-149 Part A, October 1913.

² NAI, Home Pol1 149 Part B, November 1913.

The following issue, dated 16 August (but published on 21 or 22 August), carried an article entitled 'The Battle of Nauknagar (From our Special Military Correspondent).' It was a satirical account of the riot and included the characters 'Little Simian,' 'Tileria,' and 'Field Marshall D'Odd' which corresponded to Sim, Tyler, and Dodd, the superintendent of police, the district magistrate and the deputy superintendent of police. In reply to reports of humane treatment of the wounded, Mohamed Ali wrote the following:

Too high praise cannot be given to the Moltke and the Napoleon of this great battle. And yet they made of war something even more tender than peace. When under their orders and their very eyes the vital thread of old men were severed, it was done with all the unctuous tenderness of a Moslem performing the qurbani. When young lads were shot at, they were potted with the utmost care and at the shortest possible range so that the struggle for nirvana may be of the mildest. When the boys of ten and twelve had to be passed on from this life to the life eternal, the journey was made as soft and easy for them as that of the Scotland Express from Euston. From life's glad history to death's dark mystery they were hurled without an interval of painful suspense or superfluous ceremony. The young were handled so lovingly and the old so kid-glovingly that it won frank admiration from the bazaar men and women.¹

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NAI, Home Poll 144-149 Part A, October 1913.

The article despaired that any justice could result from the case against the 106 men who were to be tried.¹

Mohamed Ali departed for England on 6 September in the company of Wazir Hasan. The trip had a dual purpose; to protest to the British Government about the Cawnpore mosque affair, and to protest against the activities of the Balkan allies in Macedonia. The two leaders were absent from India for over six months, during which time a second meeting to protest the Cawnpore mosque affair was organised in Delhi on 19 September and the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba began its activities once again.

The meetings of 10 August and 19 September were the first real test of Mohamed Ali's popularity in Delhi. He had spoken to audiences of 5,000 at the Jama Masjid on several preceding occasions, but these were audiences of curious, if not indifferent, citizens rather than warm supporters. The protest over the Delhi mosque, the return of Dr Ansari, the Cawnpore mosque affair and the imposition of a security of Rs. 2,000 on Mohamed Ali's

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Of the original 189 males arrested on 3 August, 55 were released unconditionally on account of their youth and 28 others were released because the 'circumstances of their arrest left some doubt as to their being concerned in the riot.' The case was scheduled to begin on 18 October 1913, but Lord Hardinge intervened personally on 14 October when he visited Cawnpore and pardoned the entire group. He also promised that the dalan should be rebuilt in the original position but as a raised arcade so that traffic could pass below. NAI, Home Poll 100-118 Part A, October 1913, R. Burn to Secretary, Government of India, Home Department, 30 September 1913; Speeches by Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, II, 29-33.

newspaper combined to impose a religious idiom upon political agitation.¹ In this way Mohamed Ali was able to develop a certain amount of religious enthusiasm among some of the traditionalists and fundamentalists who looked upon religion as a stronger motive for political loyalty than support for a government which took for granted the loyalty of the Muslim community. The annulment of partition and the decision over the Muslim university also started to have effect on some of the more wealthy merchants.

The main support for Mohamed Ali and for pan-Islamism in Delhi came from the hide merchants, the shoe merchants, the butchers and the artisans who worked with leather. The principal reasons for their support were economic and parochial. The artisans who worked

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The following report from the Commissioner of the Agra Division in the United Provinces dated 2 September 1913, is one of many illustrations of the type of readership that the Comrade reached. 'There is a village called Muhammadabad, near Itimadpur, where there are two Muhammadan Zamindars, Hasan Ali and Umrao Ali. Their house serves for a meeting place for the following: Muhammad Abbas Khan, Tahsildar of Itimadpur; Abdul Majid, sub-inspector of Tundla (who is a cousin of the Tahsildar of Itimadpur); Ahsan-ud-din, railway police sub-inspector at Tundla; Kifayat Husain, a railway guard; and Maqsud Ali, son of Hafiz Ali, an Aligarh student and a relation of Hasan Ali's. This coterie generally hold their meetings on Saturdays and Sundays, Maqsud Ali bringing papers including the Zamindar and...the Comrade Mr Welby himself saw Abdul Majid and the Tahsildar of Itimadpur on the Tundla platform on the evening of the 28th August talking to Muhammad Ali, the editor of the Comrade, who was a passenger by the mail train. Ali Husain is a friend of Muhammad Ali's and all that lot. When Dr Ansari passed through here on his return from Turkey, he was one of the people who went in deputation to greet him. NAI, Home Poll 100-118 Part A, October 1913.

with leather (excluding those who made shoes, boots, and sandals who were mainly Hindu), declined by 57 per cent between 1911 and 1921, a figure not dissimilar to the previous decade. Likewise, the butchers declined by 57 per cent between 1911 and 1921.¹ The decline in numbers was a definite indication that both groups suffered from economic hardship, yet their response was not solely a consequence of economic hardship, since other artisans who were faced with a declining industry did not, from all indications, respond in significant numbers. They responded also because of all the groups in Muslim society, they were the first to react to communal tension involving the Hindus. One reason was that Hindus held these groups in as low esteem as they did the Chamars, from which caste most likely they had been converted. Another reason was that the butchers were the actual slaughterers of cattle, over which issue rising tension was noticeable from the riots at Ajodhya onward.² A third reason was that the leather workers were completely dependant upon the Chamars for their raw materials, and when the Arya Samaj was successful in its campaign to make the Chamars anti-Muslim, the tension increased immeasurably. The shoe merchants also suffered in this regard as they were completely dependant upon one

¹ See Table 3-D, Chapter One.

² There were always isolated occurrences adding fuel to the communal fire. For example the publication of a picture which showed the killer of cows as a swine-headed monster, while not causing an immediate response or protest, obviously had some effect which could become a latent cause for some later activity. RDDA, Confidential File 76 (1913), 'Proposed Proscription of the Picture Entitled "The Cow Containing 84 Gods."'

group of Hindu artisans, namely the Chamars, for the marketing of their product. They looked upon the opening of a shoe shop by a Hindu in 1910 as an attempt to penetrate a trade over which there existed a Muslim monopoly. The anti-Muslim campaign of the Chamars was regarded as an attempt to drive Muslims out of the leather trade. The butchers were also the object of a campaign by the Municipal Committee, a campaign which sought to stop the activities of hawkers who walked the galis to sell meat and to restrict butchers' shops to certain areas. The butchers petitioned against the bye-laws and refused to use a completely new market erected for them by the Municipal Committee. The agitation of Hindus over the construction of the new slaughterhouse which was located near a Hindu Temple did little to convince the butchers that the only object of civic interest in the butchers was sanitation.¹ The hide merchants were less directly affected in economic terms before the War, but they were certainly affected by the religious sentiment that was centred upon the leather industry. It is most significant that Abdul Rahim, the leader of the butchers, was a hide merchant who was considered one of the wealthiest men in Delhi and that

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RDDA, Education File 16 Part A 1913, 'Review of the Report on the Working of the Delhi Municipality for the Year 1912-13'; Education File 23 Part B 1913, 'Proceedings of the Ordinary Meetings of the Delhi Municipal Committee'; Education File 16 Part B 1914, 'Proceedings of the Meetings of the Delhi Municipal Committee'; Education File 262 Part B 1914, 'Proposed Construction of a New Slaughter House in Delhi.'

he became closely associated with the Ali brothers and the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba.¹

The Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba began its activities once again in October 1913, after refusing to have anything to do with the Cawnpore mosque affair. It held its first meeting at Delhi on Sunday 26 October. At this 'well attended' meeting the two shaidars [votaries], Syed Ayub Ahmad of Shajahanpur, and Syed Manzur Ali of Delhi, described the history and spoke of the glory of the birth-place and home of the Prophet. And though they did not dwell upon any actual danger to the holy places, they stated that it was the duty of every Muslim to unite against an impending attack. The Central Committee published a report on 31 October in which it claimed a membership of 3,431.² There was, as yet, no local branch in the city.

The Society began to gather increased support as the result of a meeting of the Central Committee at Delhi on 15 February 1914. The Committee decided to apply for formal recognition from the government so that no doubt should exist about its aims. Abdul Bari

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Chaudhri Abdul Rahim, who was the contractor that supplied meat to the northern army, was characterised as superstitious and gullible, though he knew the price of a commissariat contractor. 'Like many of the butchers he is a bigot; but I think money plays a very important part in his outlook and his leanings toward making a position are probably pretty strong.' RDDA, Confidential File 90 (1915), 'Influx of Baluchis to the Nomana School in Delhi and Enquiries in Connection therewith,' note by G.F. deMontmorency, 20 October 1915.

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NAI, Home Poll 46 Part A, May 1914.

proceeded to carry out this resolution, although the Society was disappointed at the Viceroy's response which was completely neutral.¹ A series of meetings then took place at Delhi on 19 April, 4 May, 21 May, and 1 June. The main speakers were Maulana Shibli, Mohamed Ali, Shaukat Ali, and Azad Subhani (of Cawnpore mosque fame).² The meetings, which were 'well attended', were the venue of such comments as what degree of civilisation could be claimed by a nation which considered that white men were entitled to every privilege and that black men were only fit for subjection; or that the Christian nations had combined to wipe Islam off the face of the earth; or that real progress meant the growth of a spiritual fervour which imbued the Muslims of old with a desire for independence and self-sacrifice. The meetings, however, did not draw as large audiences as the Friday meetings in the mosque.

Mohamed Ali supported the series of meetings held by the Society of Servants with another attack on the government. He wrote three articles between 30 May to 13 June 1913 in the Comrade entitled 'The Press Act and Proselytization.' In these articles he commented on the

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NAI, Home Poll 7 Deposit, July 1914, 'Correspondence between the Private Secretary to His Excellency the Viceroy and Maulvi Abdul Bari, President, Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-K'aba (The Servants of the K'aba Society) Regarding the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-K'aba (The Servants of the K'aba Society).'

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NAI, Home Poll 142-145 Part B, June 1914, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the weeks ending 5 May and 19 May 1914; Home Poll 124-128 Part B, July 1914, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the weeks ending 2 June, 16 June and 30 June 1914.

irresponsibility of the Government of Punjab which forfeited the Badr (Qadian) of 30 October 1913 and which demanded a maximum security of Rs. 2,000.¹ The Badr was an Ahmadia Muslim vernacular journal which indulged in a scurrilous religious debate with an Indian Christian. Mohamed Ali discussed the articles at great length in a leader in which he questioned the veracity of the Christian belief in immaculate conception and several other basic tenets of the Christian faith. The Government of India decided to order the forfeiture of the journal's security but had to rescind this decision because the original action in the Punjab had been based on excerpts of the Badr and not a full translation. It was decided that the questionable nature of the Punjab proceedings jeopardised any action that the Government of India might take against the Comrade. Mohamed Ali was thus let off with a warning, which was a victory, since he had been warned previously for his articles on the Cawnpore riots and the government did not warn critical editors twice.

Despite government suspicion, however, the Society of Servants gained a certain amount of popularity. The total membership was put at over 9,000 by June 1914.²

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NAI, Home Poll 12 Deposit, August 1914, 'Proposal to Forfeit under Section 4(2) of the Indian Press Act, 1910 (I of 1910), The Security of Rs. 2,000 Deposited by the Keeper of the Comrade and Hamdard Press in Respect of an Article Which Appeared in the Comrade Newspaper of 6 June 1914 Entitled "The Press Act and Proselytization"; Home Poll 180-182 Part A, January 1915, 'Objectionable Articles Published in the Comrade and Hamdard Newspapers. Warning Given to the Editor, Mr Mohamed Ali.'

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NAI, Home Poll 124-128 Part B, July 1914, for the week ending 30 June 1914.

The local branch in Delhi had a membership of 2,000, by any measure an extraordinary achievement.¹ Mohamed Ali, Shaukat Ali and Dr Ansari succeeded in their attempt to formalise the coalition between some of the established leaders of Delhi and the 'New Muslim Party'. The president of the local branch was Sayid Muhammad, the Imam of the Idgah; the secretaries were Haji Muhammad Saddiq, the proprietor of the Cecil Hotel and Hafiz Abdul Rahim, the hide merchant who had supported the Turkish Relief Fund and who was also the secretary (then president) of the Anjuman-i-Muin-ul-Talim. One of the more important members was Shaikh Ataullah, a pleader, and the leader of the Moslem League. It also included such men as Maulvi Ahmad Said, Haji Abdul Ghaffar who was joint-secretary of the local Ahl-i-Hadis Conference, and Shaikh Surajuddin, a member of the junior branch of the Loharu family.

Mohamed Ali advertised a meeting to be held on Friday 24 July 1914 after the khutba presumably in pursuance of the Society's aim of assisting in the haj. The meeting was called to discuss the proposed haj regulation and attracted between 1,000 and 2,000.² Mohamed Ali spoke to the audience on the same lines as he had written in the Comrade in the past weeks. He scoffed at the idea that Indian pilgrims were so destitute that they were unable to pay their return fare.

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RDDA, Confidential File 70 (1415).

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This account is taken from NAI, Home Poll 259-262 Part B, August 1914, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 28 July 1914.

It was a simple case, he thought, of accepting a free journey when it was offered, the one time that the government had paid the return passages. He looked upon the tonnage restrictions as an attempt to drive the two Muslim ship companies out of the pilgrim market and an attempt to give a monopoly to an English firm. He was eloquent in pointing out that the Government of India was willing to contribute one lakh of rupees of public money for the haj when it was impossible for it to infringe its principle of religious neutrality and contribute to the reconstruction costs of the Cawnpore mosque. After he had compared the old and new regulations, he asked if the audience would accept any infringement of their religious duties. He received a resoundingly negative reply. He then asked if people were aware of the existence of a local Haj Committee. He received the same reply and stated that it was only by accident that he had found out about it. Shaikh Aziz-uddin interrupted him at this point to confirm that there was such a committee. Mohamed Ali promptly responded that the committee had no more utility than a newborn child of unknown parentage.

The meeting decided to despatch a telegram to the Chief Commissioner and the Viceroy to express their disapproval of the proposed rules. While the telegram was being written, Abdul Majid suggested that the Imam should be asked to lead prayers for the Cawnpore martyrs. The Imam consented and led the prayers to cries of 'hypocrite' and 'sycophant' with tears in his eyes. When asked to sign the telegram he refused to do so, even after it was pointed out to him that he had signed a congratulatory message to the Shah of Persia a few days

earlier. The Imam was then denounced as a creature of the authorities because he had allegedly sided with the government in the Cawnpore mosque dispute.¹

It is interesting to speculate on the rapprochement between the 'New Muslim Party' and the established leaders, in view of the fact that Mohamed Ali did not know about the Haj Committee.² It is possible that the Committee was moribund and that there was no occasion for Mohamed Ali to learn of its existence since he was absent from Delhi when the second meeting took place. But Mohamed Ali stated that there was a calculated

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He had in fact given his opinion to Sir James Meston that the dalan was not a sacred part of the Mosque. NAI, Home Poll 100-118 Part A, October 1913, Minute of Sir James Meston, 21 August 1913.

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The local Haj Committee had its first meeting on 3 June 1913, and consisted of the ten members of the Managing Committee of the Jama Masjid as ex-officio members, plus five other leading Muslims, with Hakim Ajmal Khan as president. It included Haji Abdul Ghaffar and Haji Mohamad Saddiq, both of whom became members of the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba. The meeting refused to come to any conclusion because the members did not want to become party to a decision that was certain to injure the religious susceptibilities of their co-religionists. The Chief Commissioner decided that the Committee was too large and directed that it should be reconstituted and meet again. A smaller committee met on 7 September 1913 and again refused to make any recommendation because of the intense feeling over the Cawnpore mosque affair. It does not appear to have met officially after this. RDDA, Education File 6 Part A 1913, 'Proposed Formation of a Haj Committee in Delhi for the Relief of Indigent Pilgrims'; Education File 7 Part A 1913, 'Proposals in Connection with the Help of Indigent Indian Pilgrims in the Hadjaz'; Education File 72 Part B 1914, 'Formation of a Haj Committee of Delhi Province'; Education File 120 Part B 1916, 'Conduct of the Haj Pilgrim Traffic.'

attempt to keep him ignorant about the existence of the Committee. If this be so, it is probable that the leading Muslims did not want the matter of the haj to become a political issue. By making it into a political issue Mohamed Ali probably strained what was at best a tenuous relationship. The relationship was subjected to further strains in the course of the next year with detrimental effects.

The tenuous alliance between a few Moderates of the Moslem League, a few wealthy merchant and professional families, and Extremists who composed the 'New Muslim Party,' the students, the petty bourgeoisie, and finally those Muslim artisans connected with leather suffered from increasing strains throughout the remainder of 1914 and the first few months of 1915. One source of considerable tension was the increasing vehemence of the pan-Islamists. At a meeting of the Society of Servants in Delhi on 4 September, Abdul Majid (who was a teacher at the Madrasah Nomania of which his father was the manager) made a violent speech which he then repeated at the Urs Nizamuddin on 10 September.¹ He was officially a member of the central branch and the local committee was unable to control his activities.

Another source of tension in the alliance between different sections of Muslim society in Delhi stemmed

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NAI, Home Poll 32 Deposit, November 1914, 'Objectionable Speeches Made by One Abdul Majid, A Notorious Firebrand of Delhi'; Home Poll 216-217 Part B, December 1914, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 15 September 1914.

from Mohamed Ali's fourth attack upon the government, an attack which was fatal for the Comrade.¹ The Times (London) ran a leading article on 29 August 1914 entitled 'The Choice of the Turks.' Mohamed Ali wrote a leader on 26 September 1914 bearing the same title to rebutt that editorial. The government seized the opportunity to attack the journalist, and declared Mohamed Ali's security forfeit and proscribed the Comrade of 26 September 1914. Ironically enough, the notification of forfeiture was announced on 2 November, one day after the Allies declared War on Turkey. A sum of Rs. 10,000 was demanded as further security in the event Mohamed Ali wished to continue his newspapers. Mohamed Ali reacted immediately to the forfeiture and appealed for subscriptions to pay the enhanced security. He instituted a house to house canvas 'among butchers and low class Muslims' of Delhi (who could not read the Comrade) and collected Rs. 4,000

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NAI, Home Poll 76-97 Part A, January 1915, 'Forfeiture under Section 4(i) of the Indian Press Act, 1910 (I of 1910), Of the Security of Rs. 2,000 Deposited in Respect of the Comrade and Hamdard Press and of All Copies of the Newspaper Called the Comrade Bearing the Date 26 September 1914'; Home Poll 265-292 Part A, February 1915, 'Appeal by M. Farooq Ali, Keeper of the Comrade and Hamdard Press, Delhi, Under Section 17 of the Indian Press Act, 1910, Against the Order of the Government of India under Section 4, Forfeiting the Security of Rs. 2,000 Deposited in Respect of the Comrade and Hamdard Press, Delhi, And All Copies of the Comrade Newspaper, Dated 26 September 1914'; Home Poll 3-8 Part A, May 1915, 'Dismissal by the Chief Court of the Punjab of the Application Made under Section 17 of the Indian Press Act, 1910, by M. Farooq Ali, Keeper of the Comrade and Hamdard Press.'

within a fortnight.¹ He did collect the entire Rs. 10,000 but decided to reissue only the Hamdard from the press of Mumtazuddin for which he only had to deposit Rs. 2,000. It appeared on 29 December 1914.

The outbreak of War with Turkey imposed an even greater burden upon the alliance between the Muslim establishment and the pan-Islamists of Delhi. Mohamed Ali and the Extremists sought to avert an open break and became signatories of a manifesto, along with 69 eminent Muslim leaders in the city, to the effect that Turkey's declaration of belligerency was a political rather than a religious decision.² This compromise was negated the following month, however, when the first edition of the Hamdard to appear after the security was forfeited carried the Sultan's message from the throne pronouncing a jihad, and Enver Pasha's message to the Muslim soldiers of India.

Many of the established leaders of Muslim society in Delhi now began to look for excuses to resign from the Society of Servants without earning the approbation of their co-religionists. As a pretext they seized upon the rumour that Shaukat Ali was illegally forwarding money from the Society to Turkey despite Turkish

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NAI, Home Poll 31 Deposit, December 1914, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation in Special Reference to the European War, For the First Fortnight of November 1914,' W.M. Hailey to H. Wheeler, 21 November 1914.

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NAI, Home Poll 256-370 Part A, December 1914, 'Assurances of Loyalty from Muhammadan Public Bodies and Individuals in Connection with the War with Turkey,' forwarded in W.M. Hailey to H. Wheeler, 22 November 1914.

participation in the War on the side of Germany. The local branch publicly accused the central branch of the malversation of funds and demanded a report of expenditure. Shaukat Ali ignored the challenge but the less eminent members of the central committee indulged in a good deal of acrimonious debate. The situation reached a climax on 12 February when the officers of the local branch disbanded the Society. This seemed to signalise the breakdown of the rapprochement, but it did little else. The Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba retained a membership of 1,400 under new officers.¹ The Society had, however, lost most of its members who had any significant resources of wealth, status, and power. The dissident leaders held a meeting on 15 May 1914 under the presidency of Shaikh Ataullah, a pleader, at which an audience of 400 condemned the central committee for its disregard of the wishes of the branches.² Several days later Ayub Ali distributed leaflets which contained a record of the

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NAI, Home Poll 55 Deposit, March 1915, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation with Special Reference to the War for the First Fortnight of February 1915,' W.M. Hailey to H. Wheeler, 18 February 1915; Home Poll 412-415 Part B, April 1915, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 9 March 1915; Home Poll 416-419 Part B, April 1915, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 20 April 1915; RDDA, Confidential File 134 (1916), 'List of Societies and Anjumans in Delhi Province.'

2

NAI, Home Poll 855-858 Part B, May 1915, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 25 May 1915.

proceedings of the meeting and had vitriol thrown in his face by Abdul Majid.¹

The rapprochement between the pan-Islamists and the established interests in Muslim society ended on 12 February 1915. Thereafter, Mohamed Ali continued to draw support from the lower classes which had initially been drawn to his banner. These groups had a greater incentive to follow him after the outbreak of war than before. This incentive was a drastic increase in prices for which they vociferously blamed the government.

Those concerned with leather and slaughtering were generally affected by the outbreak of hostilities. All trade with Germany and Austria was stopped by the War, which meant that the market which took most of the hides and skins was closed and the price of hides dropped by 50 per cent.² Both the butchers and hide merchants suffered because the sale of hides was the most remunerative aspect

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NAI, Home Poll 549-552 Part B, June 1915, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 15 June 1915. The grant-in-aid from the government to the Madrasah Nomania was stopped because the school refused to stop the political activities of Abdul Majid. Home Poll 25 Deposit, December 1915, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation Received from the Several Provinces in Special Reference to the War for the First Fortnight of November 1915,' W.M. Hailey to H. Wheeler, 19 November 1915.

2

RDDA, Home File 368 Part B 1914, 'Question of the Increase of Prices of Articles of Food in Delhi,' report by Deputy Commissioner, 15 August 1914.

of the business.¹ The butchers and the artisans also suffered acutely from the rise in prices that accompanied the outbreak of the War. It was estimated that the prices of different commodities rose from six per cent to 50 per cent.² The Government of India became concerned when it saw wheat selling at 'famine prices' and issued an ordinance on 27 November 1914 which enabled

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In a report to the Indian Industrial Commission, it was stated that before the War the volume of the hide trade was an estimated Rs. 50,00,000. In two years it shrunk to Rs. 10,00,000. Hides from animals which died were worth Rs. 6 or 7 a piece; hides from slaughtered animals properly treated were worth Rs. 150 to Rs. 210 per 20 hides; and buffalo hides were worth Rs. 60 to Rs. 80 per maund. These fell by half after the outbreak of the War. All the merchants, agents, collectors, and dealers were Muslims. All the actual physical labour was performed by Chamars. RDDA, Commerce File 5 Part A 1916, 'Preliminary Note on Industries at Delhi Prepared for the Indian Industrial Commission.' The butchers raised the price of meat from 4 annas per seer to 6 annas per seer in small compensation for their loss. Home File 368 Part B 1914.

2

The price changes for a few selected items were as follows (quoted in seers per rupee):

wheat flour	10 to 8	peas	16 to 10
wheat	10 $\frac{1}{4}$ 9	lentils	14 8
gram	17 11	maize	16 10
pulses	7 5 $\frac{1}{2}$	barley	16 11
<u>bajra</u>	16 10	<u>shakur</u>	9 5
<u>fuel</u>	30 24		

RDDA, Home File 368 Part B 1914. Wheat dropped to 7 seers per rupee in November. Revenue File 117(b) Part B 1914, 'The War in Europe - Proposal to Open Cheap Grain Shops'; NAI, Home Poll 31 Deposit, December 1914, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation in Special Reference to the War for the First Fortnight of November 1914,' W.M. Hailey to H. Wheeler, 21 November 1914.

local governments to take possession of all stocks of commodities which were 'unreasonably withheld from the market.' It also discouraged the export of wheat from India.¹ Prices eased in January as wheat climbed back to $9\frac{1}{2}$ seers per rupee from a low of 7 in November, but fell again in February.² The 'poorer Muslims' who watched their economic condition rapidly deteriorate blamed the government for the fall in prices. They felt that the government must be responsible since it had passed an ordinance to control prices.³ The price of wheat fell to $6\frac{1}{2}$ seers per rupee at the end of March, but rose to 9 again by mid-April.⁴ The price situation eased somewhat and remained steady, but the anxiety persisted among the lower classes that further price changes would take place.

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RDDA, Commerce File 121 (e) Part B 1914, 'The War in Europe - Rise in the Price of Wheat,' Secretary, Government of India, Department of Commerce and Industry, to Secretary, Karachi Chamber of Commerce, 27 November 1914.

2

NAI, Home Poll 54 Deposit, March 1915, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation with Special Reference to the War for the Second Fortnight of January 1915,' W.M. Hailey to H. Wheeler, 1 February 1915; Home Poll 55 Deposit, March 1915, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation with Special Reference to the War for the First Fortnight of February 1915,' W.M. Hailey to H. Wheeler, 18 February 1915.

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NAI, Home Poll 55 Deposit, March 1915.

4

NAI, Home Poll 39 Deposit, April 1915, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the Second Fortnight of March 1915,' W.M. Hailey to H. Wheeler, 8 April 1915; Home Poll 49 Deposit, May 1915, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation in Special Reference to the War for the Second Fortnight of April 1915,' W.M. Hailey to H. Wheeler, 30 April 1915.

It is possible to conclude that the national and international appeal of the pan-Islamic leaders provided a focus, and an outlet, for latent grievances and discontents within Muslim society. It was the particular combination of parochial and economic grievances that caused Muslim artisans and merchants dealing with hides and leather as a commodity to respond to the pan-Islamism of the Ali brothers, the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba, and Dr Ansari in fairly large numbers at meetings, and specifically when the Comrade was proscribed.

It seems likely that pan-Islamism in Delhi also drew substantial support from Muslim students whose motive for participation was ideological. A number of these students came from the Anglo-Arabic school.¹ The number of such students was probably not large because in the first place the school was very closely connected with the government and the Muslim establishment in the city (which continually refused to come to terms with Mohamed Ali). In the second place, the headmaster, Fazluddin, opposed overt political activity and discouraged students whose zeal became apparent. And in the third place, the majority of the students were the sons of the established or nouveaux riche Muslim families which had large resources of wealth, status, and power. The heads of such families were usually successful in their attempts to discourage activities by their sons which might jeopardise their relations with the government or with other nouveaux riche and loyalist families. . . Nevertheless, some

¹ The Anglo-Arabic High School had an enrolment of 285 in 1913. RDDA, Education File 160 Part B 1913, 'Report on the Anglo-Arabic School Delhi for the Year Ending 31 March 1913.'

students were deeply moved by the slogan of pan-Islam, and if they were fortunate enough to have parents who were of like mind, they could participate.

It seems highly likely that the students hailing from families which were once wealthy and powerful, but which had been impoverished for one reason or another, participated in pan-Islamic activity. Such students, however, would have had to possess a strong sense of independence, if they were to disregard the approbation of a family, whose main goal was to hang on to every vestige of respectability resting on the values of a past generation. If the family slipped too far, as was true for a large number of Mogul families, there was little approbation (unless they held a pension) or authority to stop a son who saw participation in pan-Islamic activities as a means to improve his own position in society. Generally the poverty of their situation was more conducive to passivity than to political activity.

It is difficult to generalise about the political values of the Muslim petty bourgeoisie or their sons who attended government schools. There does not seem to have been any discernible crystallisation of values, and little cohesion reflected in the group, which could leave the question of participation an open one. Any response from this group, students or adults, probably depended upon individual proclivities. Perhaps a clue to their proclivities lies in the fact that the majority of the Muslim students of the colleges in Delhi came from the petty bourgeoisie. (The wealthy sent their sons to Aligarh or England.) The majority of the Muslim students in colleges in Delhi participated in the pan-Islamic

activities of the Ali brothers, the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba and Dr Ansari. They helped with the Red Crescent Medical Mission, attended meetings, canvassed for subscriptions for the Mission, and canvassed for members and subscriptions for the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba. And they supported Mohamed Ali when the Comrade was proscribed and forfeited.

The Muslim students in the madrassahs also participated in large numbers in the politics of pan-Islamism. The lead was supplied by Abdul Majid of the Madrassah Nomania, Ahmad Said of the Madrassah Aminia, Abdul Rashid of the Madrassah Mahomedia, and Abdul Wahab of Madrassah Wahab (the latter two of which were Ahl-i-Hadis madrassahs which depended upon the Panjaban community for subscriptions and which had close contact with the Hindustani Fanatics in Afghanistan and Baluchistan).¹ Many other teachers in madrassahs made their discontent known over the Cawnpore mosque affair by signing a fatwa which condemned the destruction of the baoli [ablution tank] of two mosques in Delhi in August 1913 as part of the construction of the new capital. Seven teachers from Madrassah Fatehpuri, three teachers from Madrassah Husainia, two teachers from Madrassah Dar-ul-Huda, and five others signed the fatwa.² The large number of foreign students in the madrassahs was further inducement to pan-Islamic activity.

The 'New Muslim Party' supplied the main leaders for pan-Islamism in Delhi. These leaders were drawn from

¹ RDDA, Confidential File 90 (1915); Confidential File 227 (1918), 'List of Political, Quasi-Political and Religious Societies, Sabhas and Anjumans in the Delhi Province for the Year ending the 30th June 1918.'

² RDDA, Home File 18 Part B 1916, 'Preservation of the Mosque and Baoli in Block 20 in the New Capital Area.'

all social groups and classes and were distinguishable only by their political opinions. This group was quite small during the closing years of the first decade. It subscribed to the view that Sir Syed Ahmad Khan's policy was outdated and that Muslims ought, therefore, to set up a political party to gain concessions from the government. It also subscribed to the view that Muslims should unite with Hindus in order to make the case for constitutional reform more effective. After the annulment of partition and Lord Crew's reply of 24 June 1912, the group gained more support and new adherents. The group finally became the dominant wing in the Moslem League, it changed the constitution of the League in 1913, it organised a joint meeting of the League and Congress at Bombay in 1915, and finally it negotiated the Lucknow Pact of 1916. These people looked upon pan-Islamism as a double edged sword which would, on the one hand, bestir the Muslim population in India from its political apathy, and on the other, reveal to the Government of India that Muslims who were normally passively loyal, would support the demands for constitutional reform. They were regarded with suspicion by both political conservatives and religious extremists. The former feared any manifestation of disloyalty and the latter feared any concessions to the Hindus. Pan-Islamism, however, was an issue on which some members of all three groups could agree as long as the fanaticism of the religious extremists and the political extremists could be controlled. The Cawnpore mosque affair tended to strengthen this coalition, but the outbreak of War, and even more so, Turkey's entry into the War on the side of Germany, seriously weakened it. In order to retain

the support of the politically conservative, the leading members of the 'New Muslim Party' and the pan-Islamists in Delhi signed the manifesto of November 1914 which uncategorically stated that Turkey's entry into the War was a political decision which did not affect the religious loyalties of Indian Muslims.

There is little doubt that a number of wealthy and influential members of the Muslim community in Delhi supported pan-Islamic activities in the city. The meetings which condemned the Cawnpore mosque riot on 10 August and 19 September revealed that a coalition had come about between such Muslims and the lower classes. These people were also willing to join the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba. It is important to note, however, that even though these people were members of the Anglo-Arabic School Committee, the managing committees of the Jama Masjid and Fatehpuri Mosque, the Panjabian community and the small Ahl-i-Hadis community, they were not able or willing to influence the majority of the members of these various groups to support such activities. It was more a matter of individual preference. They became frightened at the outbreak of the War, at the forfeiture of the Comrade for a disloyal article, and at Turkey's entry into the War. They were slightly mollified by the manifesto, but the strain which the pan-Islamists put upon the coalition proved too much. The publication of the Sultan's message from the throne that he had pronounced jihad and Enver Pasha's message to Muslim soldiers in the first issue of the Hamdard after the forfeiture on 29 December

was one thing.¹ The continued illegal transfer of funds collected by the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba and forwarded by Shaukat Ali to Turkey provided the opportunity for this group to dissociate itself, which it did on 12 February 1915.

The government began to view the activities of the pan-Islamists with suspicion in 1914. They were disturbed by the return of Mohamed Ali from England and the increasing importance of the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba. The Honourable Member for the Home Department observed in March 1914 that the pan-Islamists in general and the Society of Servants in particular:

...must either collapse altogether, or keep themselves going by religious agitation on local events which will at once assume a political tinge; and they will speedily take to secret methods, secret preaching and so forth, and no amount of encouraging or guiding by Abdul Bari can affect the question.²

The Member for the Education Department noted:

I do not know how we can discourage it without giving it a notoriety which it is not desirable to give. But I would certainly not stand in the way of the local governments discouraging it....³

¹ NAI, Home Poll 278-282 Part B, January 1915, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 5 January 1915; Home Poll 53 Deposit, March 1915, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation with Special Reference to the War for the First Fortnight of January 1915,' W.M. Hailey to H. Wheeler, 16 January 1915.

² NAI, Home Poll 46 Part A, May 1914, note by R. Craddock, 28 March 1914.

³ NAI, Home Poll 46 Part A, May 1914, note by S.H. Butler, 27 April 1914.

The Director of Criminal Intelligence concluded:

I therefore look upon the society as dangerous and I, personally, find it impossible to believe that the founders and organisers do not intend it to be dangerous. In any case the society is necessarily an object for study at the hands of the Provincial and Imperial Criminal Investigation Departments and that this should be the case for a Moslem organisation in India is regretted by nobody more than by myself.¹

The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab observed that there was only one branch in the Punjab, at Lyallpur, and that those in Lahore who joined were 'clerks in offices.' Otherwise only a few pleaders, barristers and maulvis and all the members of the local branches of the Turkish Committee of Union and Progress had joined. He definitely looked upon it as 'susceptible of deterioration into a secret society similar to the seditionists and anarchial societies among the so-called Hindu patriots.'²

The government thought it had solved the problem of how to control the pan-Islamists when it successfully interned Zafar Ali Khan in his native village in the Punjab on 17 October 1914 and when it decided to act against the Comrade. Silencing the Comrade, however, did not necessarily silence Mohamed Ali and the Council decided to deal with the ardent pan-Islamist under the

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NAI, Home Poll 46 Part A, May 1914, note by C.R. Cleveland, 20 March 1914.

2

NAI, Home Poll 46 Part A, May 1914, A.B. Kettlewell to H. Wheeler, 15 April 1914.

Foreigners Act of 1864.¹ To their chagrin, they found out that it was most impractical to use this act against Mohamed Ali or any other Indian born in a native state.

The anxiety of the government was further increased by the appearance of revolutionary pamphlets which invited Muslims to participate in the jihad announced by the Sultan in December 1914. A jihad leaflet in Urdu was widely distributed from Delhi in January 1915; it was translated and summarised as follows:

The present war is a holy war. Those who die for it will enter paradise, those who refuse to recognise it will live forever in hell. The Sultan of Turkey and Haji Muhammad William, Kaiser of Germany, may his Empire ever live, have announced that they desire all the Muhammadans in the world to unite and regain the lost glory of Islam. Shame on those slaves and hirelings of the English who say that this is not a holy war. Shall the world of these sellers of their faith prevail against the voice of God? What have the English done to deserve loyalty? They have broken every promise made to Muhammadans. They sold the Jama Masjid of Delhi, and now want to auction the Taj Mahal. They demolished the mosque at Cawnpore and shot 5,300 Muhammadans. They insulted the Prophet of God in a bioscope show at Karachi. They treat Indians worse than dogs. Lord Hardinge has declared that the sacred places will be respected, but the English newspaper, which is secretly circulated to the authorities, states that Jeddah and Jaffa have been bombarded. What reliance can be placed on the word of the faithless English? The time has come to punish them for their transgressions. It is our bounden duty to declare

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NAI, Home Poll 365-369 Part A, October 1914, 'Question Whether Muhammad Ali, Editor of the Comrade Newspaper of Delhi, Can Be Dealt with under the Foreigners Act, 1864 (III of 1864).' The question evidently originated in Council.

jihad against them and to obtain perpetual salvation by killing them. Be not hypocrites, but openly declare that you are Muhammadans and will sacrifice yourselves for the glory of Islam. Rise up and show your valour. O dwellers in India, soldiers, policemen, and learned men, rise up and destroy the English.¹

Pamphlets, such as the one quoted immediately above and others, such as 'Ana Leila' and '786 Bismillah', proved to the government that revolutionary nationalism among Hindus had found a Muslim counterpart in the advocacy of jihad in India. And even though the majority of the pan-Islamists had nothing to do with the religious fanatics who advocated jihad, the government thought it was only a question of time before Muslim anarchists made their appearance.

The popular acclaim that Mohamed Ali continued to receive in the early months of 1915 reinforced the fears of the government that religious enthusiasm would become uncontrollable. Mohamed Ali's use of the High Court of the Punjab as a forum for his sentiments had a far-reaching effect upon the lower classes of north India and Delhi. The Chief Secretary of the Government of the United Provinces commented that the liberty which the Punjab High Court allowed Mohamed Ali in defence of the Comrade enabled him to enhance his reputation as 'patriot and hero.' His arguments were acclaimed to show that he went to England 'not only to impress his views on the British Ministry regarding the Cawnpore Mosque affair,

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NAI, Home Poll 278-282 Part B, January 1915, for the week ending 26 January 1915.

but also to win back Adrianople for the Turks.'¹ His successful efforts to utilise the Hamdard as another forum to disseminate his pan-Islamic values finally convinced the government that he and his brother who aided him in this campaign must be effectively silenced.² The Defence of India Act which had become law in March 1915 supplied the means by which the two most popular pan-Islamists in India could be interned.³

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NAI, Home Poll 21 Deposit, April 1915, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation in Special Reference to the War for the First Fortnight of March 1915,' R. Burn to H. Wheeler, 21 March 1915.

2

The Chief Commissioner commented on the activities of the Hamdard during March, April, and May as follows: 'Briefly, it may be said, that while maintaining its general Pan-Islamic attitude involving a continuous appeal to the importance of the Ottoman power, together with a total inability to recognise the difference between the temporal and spiritual aspects of Islam the Hamdard has now adopted a line of greater caution in the weapons it employs. It no longer permits itself violent diatribes against the opponents of the Islamic powers; but it reproduces whenever possible such information, or items of news, as will be likely to convey to the reader the impression that the attacks on Turkey are not justified; that they are doomed to failure; and that the reports of Entente successes generally are exaggerated, if not entirely untrue. The campaign is conducted with much skill. The sources from which news is taken are somewhat carefully chosen....' NAI, Home Poll 34-36 Part A, July 1915; 'Objectionable Articles in the Hamdard Newspaper and Orders Issued under the Defence of India Act for the Precensorship of the Paper before It is Published,' W.M. Hailey to H. Wheeler, 3 June 1915.

3

The United Provinces and Punjab governments were especially desirous that the Hamdard should stop publishing its well-chosen selections as the Hamdard was copied by the pan-Islamic press in both provinces. NAI, Home Poll 53 Deposit, March 1915; Home Poll 54 Deposit, March 1915.

The Ali brothers received official notification that they were to be interned on 10 May 1913.¹ On Tuesday the 11th there was a protest meeting of 'thousands' against the order. Hafiz Abdul Aziz was chairman of the meeting and Dr Ansari addressed the audience.² The Hamdard continued publishing articles on the War and commented especially on the landing at Gallipoli.³ And finally on 19 May it contained an article which condemned their internment and included a very long letter by Mohamed Ali which bewailed the fate of Muslim leaders in India.⁴ On Thursday the 20th 'thousands' of Muslims of Delhi met to protest against the internment order which was to take effect the following day. On Friday the 21st the brothers attended the Juma prayers at the Jama Masjid and afterwards participated in a mass meeting of 7,000. There were no political speeches, and the audience, which was made up mainly of 'butchers, shoe traders and similar classes' mobbed the brothers as they departed by motor car for Mehrauli.⁵ They were not to be released until 25 December 1919. The entire Muslim community observed a

1

NAI, Home Poll 36 Deposit, May 1915, 'Internment of Muhammad Ali and Shaukat Ali at Mehrauli in the Province of Delhi, and Proposal to Prohibit Abdul Kalam from Visiting Delhi'; Home Poll 30-33 Part A, July 1915, 'Internment of Muhammad Ali and Shaukat Ali under the Defence of India Act.'

2

NAI, Home Poll 855-858 Part B, May 1915, report for the week ending 25 May 1915.

3

NAI, Home Poll 34-36 Part A, July 1915.

4

NAI, Home Poll 855-858 Part B, May 1915, report for the week ending 25 May 1915.

5

Ibid.

hartal on the 21st. Soon thereafter all special prayers and observances for the safety and welfare of the Sultan of Turkey were discontinued at the request of the Government of India.¹ This challenge to Muslim religious sentiment was not seriously questioned. The triumph of the Government of India over pan-Islamism was complete.

This does not explain, however, why the entire Muslim merchant community observed a half day hartal on 21 May on the day the Ali brothers were interned. One explanation is that it was quite easy to extend the usual half-day closure of shops on Friday into a full day hartal. A more cynical explanation is that the established leaders had nothing to lose by such a hartal as the Ali brothers would be safely interned with no fear of further activity from that quarter and they could always make it look as if they had bowed to popular pressure. A third explanation, and probably the more correct one, was that the pan-Islamic activities of the Ali brothers had drawn a large amount of latent support from the Muslim petty bourgeoisie. They probably did not originate the idea of a hartal, but they must have given it their fullest support. It seems far more likely that the petty shopkeepers, who were facing some economic difficulties, and who were encouraged by public displays of popular support

1

NAI, Home Poll 549-552 Part B, June 1915, report for the week ending 15 June 1915; Home Poll 20 Deposit, December 1916, 'Discussion in Connection with the Allegiance of Mohammadan to the Sultan of Turkey, And the Possibility of Introducing a Prayer for the King-Emperor into the Friday Service'; RDDA, Confidential File 65 (1915), 'Note by the C.I.D. Regarding the Inclusion of the Name of the Sultan of Turkey in Prayers Offered in Mosques on Friday.'

on 11 May and 20 May, forcefully encouraged the more important merchants not to object. The alternative, that the leading Muslim traders, only a few of whom had ever supported the Ali brothers, could force a hartal onto the small traders, is most unlikely. That the leading traders responded on the grounds of religious sentiment is equally unlikely since they had not participated at a time when such a response would have had less political overtones. Mohamed Ali and pan-Islamism, then had a significant effect upon the Muslims of Delhi. Theirs was a successful attack on provincialism but the resentment that Muslims felt at the refusal of the Hindus to join in the hartal showed that they had not successfully attacked parochialism.

It is quite obvious that the pan-Islamic movement in Delhi was a movement of considerable significance. It was significant in terms of the number of persons involved, the type of persons involved, and the political values it disseminated in the community. The meeting of 7,000 at the Jama Masjid on 21 May 1915 was the largest crowd of Muslims to assemble for Mohamed Ali (and his brother) on any single occasion. There were several instances when he was able to attract audiences of 5,000, but for the majority of occasions, an audience of 1,000 to 2,000 was usual. A meeting in the Jama Masjid on Friday attracted the larger while a meeting on Sunday attracted the smaller audience. The specifically advertised meeting of Friday 24 July 1914 attracted only between 1,000 and 2,000 which would seem to point to the fact that whereas large numbers of people were willing

to listen to his speeches, his faithful followers were fewer in numbers. The membership of the local branch of the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba, even after the notables had split, remained at 1,400. The response to Mohamed Ali varied from five per cent to 11 per cent of the available male Muslim population of Delhi. The circulation figures of the Hamdard confirm these figures, if the sale of the paper outside Delhi is subtracted from the total circulation of 3,000. Here again more persons were willing to listen to Mohamed Ali than were willing to become actively involved in politics. The fact that he was able to raise enough money to finance the Red Crescent Medical Mission (around Rs. 50,000) in the face of stiff opposition and the fact that he was able to raise Rs. 10,000 when he forfeited the security of the Comrade and Hamdard press are other indications of the support he enjoyed in Delhi. It is legitimate to conclude, therefore, that Mohamed Ali and pan-Islamism made a significant impact upon the intellectual horizons of the Muslims of Delhi. Perhaps even more significant, however, was the latent effect of this movement upon the tumultuous events of 1919 with which we shall deal later.

APPENDIX A

Rules Framed for the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba,
6 May 1913*

1. As the safety of the Kaaba and the respect of our Haram** appears to be at stake, and as we have not the same assurance for the welfare of our shrines as we had before, it therefore seems desirable to organise a special Anjuman of Muhammadans for the safety and upkeep of the Kaaba, which will be hereafter known as Anjuman Khuddam-i-Kaaba.

2. The chief aim of this Anjuman will be to maintain the honour of the Kaaba, and to do every service to the house of God, which was built by the prophet Ibrahim, and is the very first centre of unity in the world. To care for and protect other sacred places in the same way will be considered to be equivalent to service rendered to the Kaaba itself. In order to effect its aims the Anjuman should adopt the following measures:-

- (a) To form an association of lovers of the Kaaba and of unity, the members of which will be at all times quite ready to sacrifice their lives, property, honour, and comfort for the safety of the Kaaba.
- (b) To inspire such feelings among Muhammadans as may result in producing such lovers in every town, and to promote the true faith of Islam in every heart.
- (c) To spread Islam, which is the true service to the Kaaba, and to send Muhammadans to every land to instruct people in the Kalima.

* Reprinted in a large number of vernacular newspapers in May and June. This translation is contained in NAI, Home Poll 46 Part A, May 1914: 'Reports Regarding the Society Started in the United Provinces Called the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba, or "Society of the Servants of the Kaaba"'.

** Probably haramain, an Arabic dual word meaning 'the two sacred places'.

- (d) To establish Muhammadan schools and orphanages at different places to assist in the propagation of Islam and to prepare the orphans for the true service of the Kaaba.
- (e) To improve the existing relations between Muslims and the Bait-Ullah Sharif, and to render every facility for the voyage (Haj).
- (f) To safeguard the Kaaba from every marauding Power and to devise and carry into execution the best measures for the up-keep and safety of Haram. To devise plans to save the Kaaba from any dangers which may arise from time to time.

3. All the professors of the Kalima, whether they be male or female, can become members of this Anjuman, and the procedure of making a member will be celebrated with great solemnity. Every Khadim will have to repeat the following oath before two Muhammadans, placing his hand on the Qoran:-

"I, son of being in the presence of God, after repentance for my past sins, with the Kalima on my lips and facing the Kaaba (pointing towards the Kaaba with his finger) solemnly affirm that I shall try with my whole heart to maintain the respect of the Kaaba, and shall sacrifice my life and property against non-Muslim aggressors. I shall fully carry out the orders of the Anjuman Khuddam-i-Kaaba given to me."

Every member who thus joins the Anjuman will be called Khadim-i-Kaaba.

4. Of these associates those who will be ready to sacrifice their lives, property, and honour at the direction of God and in the interests of the Kaaba, and would like to become volunteers, will have to take the following solemn affirmation:-

"I, son of with my face turned towards the Kaaba, being thereby in the presence of God, hereby solemnly affirm that I have given up my life for the service of God. I now must serve the Kaaba only and maintain the respect of the Kaaba. The orders of the Anjuman Khuddam-i-Kaaba will be

my most responsible duty, which I shall be always ready to carry out with my heart and soul, and without any objection or delay. I will, without objection or delay, start for any destination to which I may be ordered to go: no difficulty will keep me back. With this solemn promise I enter into the Society of Shaidaian-i-Kaaba, swearing for a second time by my God and my Prophet, the Qoran, my religion, and my honour to remain faithful to the above promise."

5. It will be possible for some members of this society to hold office as Shaidai Kaaba for a limited time under the same solemn affirmation.

6. The Anjuman Khuddam-i-Kaaba will be responsible for meeting the requirements of a Shaidai and his family according to his social position, and the Anjuman will bear all expense incurred by Shaidaian in performing the duties entrusted to them. Every effort will be made that their status as Shaidaian may be an improvement on their position prior to employment. A Shaidai Kaaba entering the association for a limited time will have the right of enjoying all privileges as long as he is a Shaidai.

7. It will be required that all Khuddam should exhibit in some prominent place on their dress a yellow crescent having Khadim Kaaba embroidered in black in the centre. Whenever they join any gathering of the Society, or are employed on the work of the Anjuman, they must wear this badge.

Shaidaian-i-Kaaba will always wear a green aba, and a similar crescent embroidered with Shaidai-Kaaba instead of Khadim Kaaba.

8. All the affairs of this Anjuman will be under the control of a central Anjuman composed of selected Khuddam which will be known as the Asal Anjuman Khuddam-i-Kaaba. For the present Delhi has been selected to be the head-quarters of this Anjuman. The orders of this Anjuman will be final and binding on all. Subordinate Anjumans will be organised in all provinces, in independent Muhammadan States, in Mecca, in Medina, in Baghdad, and in any Hindu States where the Asal Anjuman will deem proper to establish them. These Anjumans will be called Anjuman Alia Khuddam-i-Kaaba of the

Province. These Anjumans will be authorised to organise other Anjumans in each district subordinate to it. These Anjumans will be known in each district as district Anjuman Khuddam-i-Kaaba.

The district Anjumans will be authorised to organise Anjumans in towns and villages to be named after the village or town.

9. Each town and village Anjuman will nominate a Shaidai from amongst them as their representative to the District Anjuman (Anjuman Khuddam-i-Kaaba). The district Anjuman will similarly nominate a representative for the provincial Anjuman (Anjuman-i-Alia) and the provincial Anjuman for the Central Anjuman (Asal Anjuman). This will ensure the proper organisation of the Anjumans. Thus the district Anjuman will be made of the selected Shaidais of towns and villages. The district nominees will make up the provincial, and the provincial nominees will help to form the Central Anjuman.

The District Anjumans shall be subordinate to the provincial Anjumans, and the provincial Anjumans to the Central Anjuman.

10. In every Anjuman only such men will be selected as office bearers, as have already been taken into the Anjuman as a Shaidai according to section 4.

11. At present representatives for the Anjuman will be selected from the following places:-

- (a) Abroad.- Mecca, Medina, Baghdad (only that portion which is in connection with Karbala-i-Mualla, Najaf Ashraf Kazmen and the Mausoleum of Hazrat Gaus-ul-Azam). From these places only those men will be selected who are really Indians, but have gone to live there. They will also be selected according to the prescribed rules.
- (b) According to provinces.- Eastern and Western Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, the Punjab, North-West Frontier, Sind, Bombay, Madras, Central India, Berar, Rajputana, Northern India and Burma.
- (c) Muslim States.- Hyderabad, Bhopal, Rampur, Junagarh, Bhawalpur, Khairpur, Sind, and Tonk.

(d) Other Indian States.- Kashmir and Mysore.

In all these there are twenty-six circles, which will send in their representatives to form the Central Anjuman.

12. Efforts will be made to organise branches of this Anjuman in all towns and villages where there is a sufficiency of Muhammadans. In small places, the mosque will be made the meeting place of the Anjuman. Possibly all the Imams and Muazzans of mosques will be made members of the Anjuman.

13. All the Anjumans, whether central or subordinate, shall hold a committee for the election of office bearers every two years.

14. Every Anjuman will select a member as a President or Secretary. He shall be responsible for the whole work of that Anjuman and will be called the Khadim-ul-Khuddam (Servant of Servants). He will be helped by two assistants who will be known as Mutamiddin Khadim-ul-Khuddam.

15. The ordinary members of the Anjuman will have to obey the orders of the Khadim-ul-Khuddam, without any objection or delay. Any member violating this section will be regarded as committing a very heinous offence.

16. Every member of the Anjuman, whether Khadim or Shaidai will have to pay an annual subscription of one and only one rupee. However rich a man may be, nothing more than a rupee will be taken from him, so that the equality of Islam may be held supreme.

17. The sum thus subscribed will be divided into three equal shares and will be spent in the following way: -

- (a) One-third of this sum will be given to that Muhammadan empire which will have the duty of looking after the Khana Kaaba. It will be spent in the service of the Kaaba in any way that the respect, dignity or the safety of that sacred place demands.
- (b) One-third of the sum will be given to different orphanages, and schools which are likely to

produce Shaidais of Islam. The sum subscribed from each province and district will be spent in the cause of that province or district from which the sum has been collected.

- (c) One-third of the sum will be reserved, so that it may be advantageously spent in time of need. This sum may be devoted to any undertaking which may be for the good of the Kaaba and other holy shrines, as, for example, to purchase Vessels in which pilgrims may be conveyed easily and comfortably and cheaply to the holy places of Islam; any other works which may seem equally advantageous may be undertaken.

18. Every Provincial Anjuman shall nominate a legal adviser (mashir) from amongst the ordinary Khadim to act as its representative on the Central Anjuman, in addition to the Shaidai nominated by it. This legal adviser will not be required to reside at head-quarters but must attend meeting of his Anjuman.

19. The following gentlemen have been elected office bearers and members for one year. They can increase their number. It shall be their duty to begin the work of the Anjuman Khuddam-i-Kaaba in the whole country, and, after establishing Anjumans (Alia, District and Aslia) in different districts, they may resign:-

- (1) Maulana Maulvi Abdul Bari, Faranghi Mahal, Lucknow, Khadim-ul-Khuddam (Servant of Servants).
- (2) Hakim Abdul Wali Sahib of Lucknow.
- (3) Dr. Nazir-uddin Hasan, Barrister-at-Law, Lucknow.
- (4) Mr. Mohamed Ali Sahib, editor of the Comrade and Hamdard, Delhi.
- (5) Mr. Mushir Husain Kidwai, Barrister-at-Law, Lucknow.
- (6) Mr. Shaukat Ali Sahib, B.A., of Rampur.

The latter are the two Secretaries.

APPENDIX B

Notes on the Cawnpore Mosque Affair Recorded
by the Honourable Members of the Council of the
Governor-General of India, between 1 September
and 8 September 1913*

It is impossible to record any opinion. It is an
unfortunate case the merits of which have ceased to be of
much practical interest. The really important question
now is - how far the agitation will spread.

It seems to me unwise to run in 100 accused. In the
last Cawnpore riots, which were more serious, 23 were run
in and 18 convicted if I remember right.

Sd/- H.B [UTLER], 1.9.13

This unfortunate case has greater potentiality for
trouble than any since 1857. It is uniting all sections
of the Muhammadan community of India into a common belief
that their "Deen" is in danger. Apart altogether from
the merits of the question whether or not the acquisition
and subsequent demolition of a part of the Machli Bazar
Mosque was legal or otherwise, the religious passions of
the Mussalmans have been roused and a fire has been
kindled that is spreading fast. In times of excitement
people do not pause to consider whether they have reason
on their side. This is exactly the position in which
the Muhammadans stand in relation to the Cawnpore
"tragedy" of the 3rd of August last. More often than not
it is the unreasonable that appeals to the imagination.
Once a silly story of greased cartridges plunged the
country into appalling and untold misery. Another silly
story that the British Government has au fond departed
from its traditional policy of non-interference with the
religions of the people is receiving currency. It is to
be hoped that this is only a passing phase. I for one
do not think it is so with the Muhammadans unless some

* NAI, Home Poll 100-118 Part A, October 1913, 'Riot at
Cawnpore in Connection with the Demolition of a Mosque
in Machli Bazaar.'

immediate action is taken to dissipate this erroneous impression under which they are labouring. Right or wrong, the Mussalman community of India believes that from start to finish official proceedings with reference to this mosque are marked with high-handedness and that the disastrous results that have followed were preventable without shedding Muslim blood on consecrated and hallowed ground. An appreciable loss of life, including the old, the young and the child, has stirred Muhammadan sentiment to its deepest depths. The literate and the illiterate, the orthodox and the heterodox, the men of the new school and those of the old - have all been equally affected. My latest information is that the idea of "the sacrilege" and "the martyrdom" has entered into the zenanas, and the influence of the women is on the side of the ill-considered but popular grievance. In my humble opinion a deeply resentful and morbid state of mind of an emotional people like the Muhammadans of India should not be permitted to grow and expand in the best interests of good government. We may be strong enough to repress, but surely we shall be stronger if we remove the very call for repression. It is impossible not to sympathise with the difficult position in which Sir James Meston finds himself. Obviously he and his officers could not have anticipated the turn affairs have taken. It was probably thought that expeditious acquisition proceedings and a prompt demolition would close the subject without much noise or excitement. Perhaps nine men out of ten would have done exactly what the United Provinces Government did. But as is very well known, it is the unexpected that always happens, and we are face to face with a situation which if not perilous yet, threatens to be so, if remedial measures are postponed or unduly delayed. Much of course depends on Sir James Meston himself. I do not fail to see how much he stands in need of our support, but I doubt very much if in that alone any remedy lies. The matter has already emerged from provincial concern into an All-India political problem. It was fortunate that the deputation he received was only a provincial one, and that although his reply has in some degree fettered his hands, there is still room to re-consider the position, were he disposed to receive an All-India Muhammadan deputation which might clearly and emphatically express its disapproval of defiance of Law and Order, and frankly throw itself on his generosity to restore the demolished portion of the mosque without prejudice to the Cawnpore trials that are dragging their slow course. My

own view is that those alone who incited the disturbance should be proceeded against, and that the ignorant fanatics who were misguided and misled by agitators should be given a general pardon after conviction before the Sessions Judge who is about to try them. As far as I have been able to gauge Muhammadans feeling nothing short of the restoration of the demolished part of the mosque will restore confidence and peace of mind. It will be deplorable if Sir James Meston overlooks the importance of conferring upon the Muhammadans of India as a gift what the future may transform into a demand, irresistible and uncompromising. I have not the slightest intention to appear to be an alarmist. I am actuated by the sole desire to nip in the bud, and at its very inception, an agitation which has in it the worst elements of fanaticism and bigotry. I do not believe in keeping the sword of the Sircar always out of the scabbard, as I have faith in the vigorous and active use of it once it is out. Sir James Meston's reply to the deputation was tempered with sympathy and reconciliation, though he was firm in his refusal as regards the restoration. He has only to carry the spirit of sympathy a little further and save Muhammadan loyalty from permanent estrangement, for, I fear, a refusal to reconsider his decision will end in nothing else.

Sd/- S.A. I [MAM], 2.9.13

The Hon'ble the Law Member [S.A. Imam] speaks with special knowledge of Muhammadan sentiment, but I cannot help the conviction that to accept his conclusion would lead us into a very serious error of policy. Everything indicates that the case was to be a test trial of strength of agitation against Government. Local feeling had died down and was with difficulty worked up again from the outside. It seems to me that Sir James Meston's position would become very nearly untenable if he went back on his firm and dignified reply to the deputation of August 16th while, whatever reasons were given for the change of policy, the party of agitation would be able to brush them aside and to claim a notable triumph for their methods.

Sd/- H.W. C [LARK], 2.9.13

I think that every precaution must be taken to avoid aggravating the present excitement among Muhammadans: but that it would be a mistake to rebuild the dalan.

As regards our treatment of the accused in the Criminal case, we must clearly await the result of that case before deciding anything.

Sd/- E.D. M[ACLAGAN], 3.9.13

I cannot help thinking that there has been regrettable want of judgment on the part of the local Government in dealing with this matter. Sir James Meston must have been well aware - indeed the concluding portion of his minute shows that he was so - that Muhammadan feeling is at present in a state of excitable and unhealthy tension owing to events in the Balkans and elsewhere, and that unscrupulous agitators were endeavouring to exploit this feeling to the utmost for their own ends. Why then give them a handle to make further mischief by the demolition of this mosque appurtenance? There was no hurry about it: so far as I can judge, the matter could perfectly well have been allowed to lie over till the general Muhammadan feeling had relapsed into a normal state. Sir James...argues that he wished to get the matter over speedily because opposition was being engineered from outside, and he apprehended that delay might lead us into difficulties in Delhi. This latter motive was chivalrous, but as a matter of fact what has occurred, and the consequent exacerbation of Muhammadan feeling is infinitely more embarrassing to us than the Fabian policy would have been.

On the other hand, I cannot agree with Mr. Ali Imam that Muhammadan feeling should now be conciliated by restoring the demolished portion of the mosque premises. After what has occurred, such a course would inevitably be attributed to fear. We should get no gratitude. On the contrary, the unscrupulous agitators who are at the back of the present movement would try a further attack on the Government as soon as a pretext suggested itself. Firmness and refusal to yield to open or veiled threats is, I hold, our best policy. We have got, if need be, to show discontented and intriguing Muhammadans that we are stronger than they, and should not take any action which would lead to the impression that we are weaker. In this

connection I think it most important that prompt action should be taken against newspaper articles or pamphlets which constitute incitements to further ill-feeling or active mischief.

3. Nor can I agree with Mr. Ali Imam that, when there has been a very serious riot resulting in loss of life those who have taken part in it should, if convicted by a competent Court, be immediately pardoned on the ground that they were ignorant fanatics misled from outside. Such a course is in my opinion calculated to put a premium on rioting elsewhere, or in Cawnpore itself hereafter.

4. The question of the legality of the steps taken under the Land Acquisition Act was mentioned in Council yesterday, and I understand that Sir Reginald Craddock was to write privately to Sir James Meston on the subject. For the present therefore, all I need say is that, if there have been grave irregularities, we should no doubt have to reconsider our position in regard to giving support to the action of the local Government. This would, however, land us in a very unpleasant quandary, since the action taken would probably be attributed to fear rather than to strict justice. But the matters mentioned in paragraph 10 of the Lieutenant-Governor's minute seem to me points of minor importance which a sensible court would not consider as of sufficient weight to invalidate the proceedings.

Sd/- W.S. M[EYER], 6.9.13

I am not prepared to record any opinion on the action of the local Government at present.

I believe we must give them our support and I agree with paragraph 2 of the Hon'ble Finance Member's [W.S. Meyer] note above - in my view any other action would be disastrous.

I agree with the Hon'ble Law Member [S.A. Imam] that "in my humble opinion a deeply resentful and morbid state of mind of an emotional people like the Muhammadans of India should not be permitted to grow and spread."

This state of mind was originated in the seditious press which is now engaged in spreading it. The immediate

action which should in my opinion be taken is to prevent this action of the press. If it be not done the state of affairs will get worse before it is better.

Sd/- O'M. C[REAGH], 6.9.13

I am much impressed by Sir James Meston's able minute.

Small modifications in mosque buildings with the ready consent of their managers and of the leading members of the local community have been quite common features in land acquisition proceedings; and if any such modification of temple or mosque were to be vetoed for all time, most of our urban improvement schemes will come to an end; since the deflection of a road to avoid one of these buildings will almost certainly invade another somewhere else.

The whole agitation, as I am assured from independent Delhi sources, was engineered from Delhi, in order to embarrass us with contemplated Delhi improvements.

In deciding in regard to such a modification as that in the Cawnpore case, we must deal with some recognised authorities like the trustees of the building. We cannot deal with the whole Muhammadan population of India every time that it is sought to make structural alterations in a mosque or with the whole Hindu population every time that a corner of a temple yard stands in the way of a public improvement. Reasonable compromise, such as that duly arrived at in this present case, must be the basis of all such arrangements, compromise arrived at with the persons locally interested.

Whether the forcible demolition of this little annexe to the mosque was wise at the particular juncture or not is a matter on which [it] is easier to pronounce an opinion after the events than before.

Ordinarily speaking the building up of the new washing place superior to the old one should have been the preliminary to the demolition of the latter. This is what the local authorities contemplated; but the mutwallies of the mosque were no longer free agents. They

could not do what they wanted to do, i.e., to carry out their own agreement without being put by the Press in a public pillory as being unfaithful to their religion.

Had the matter been brought to Sir James Meston's notice when he was on the spot in November last, he might perhaps have arranged to exclude both mosque and temple entirely from the improvement scheme, though 12 feet off a road-way is a serious matter, and might have compelled a re-alignment undoing three years' acquisition work and rendering a lot of it nugatory.

Possibly a Fabian policy such as my Hon'ble Colleague, Sir William Meyer, has suggested, might have secured the eventual compromise; but I doubt it, once the Delhi agitators had come on the scene. However, whether the action taken or a Fabian policy would have been the better is now of purely academic interest.

The question is what is to be done? I can see no merit in yielding before mob violence or factitious agitation.

No sensible Muhammadan believes for a moment that we are departing from our attitude of strict neutrality and protection of all religions. It seems an impossible proposition that we should do something which no reasonable Muhammadan believes to be really necessary, and thereby practically admit:-

- (i) that Sir James Meston was wrong; and
- (ii) that no trustees of any religious building shall ever hereafter be competent to consent to the disturbance of a single stone in the enclosure of a temple or mosque.

On the contrary, if the Muhammadan leaders will agree to accept a new and better wazu Khana as the gift of the Government on the north side of the mosque, we might at once agree to the most lenient treatment of all concerned in the unfortunate riot, and thus allow the incidents to be buried in oblivion. But if they will not agree, then the Muhammadan leaders will stand condemned in the eyes of all right thinking men; and if any evil consequences ensue, they will recoil on them and not on Government.

As to the present agitation, it will subside as other agitations have subsided in the past; men cannot keep at white heat for long together.

It looks as if the direct negotiations between Bulgaria and Turkey will end in a solution soothing to Muhammadan pride, and this alone should allay much of the Muhammadan excitement.

In the meantime, I have written to Sir James Meston about the acquisition proceedings; but on again perusing the minute I cannot think that there have been any such irregularities as could possibly be held by any court to vitiate the proceedings. But if there were such irregularities, I would much prefer the spectacle of a Government yielding to the proceedings of civil courts rather than to any violence or factitious clamour.

Sd/- R.H. C[RADDOCK], 7.9.13

My own opinion is that the demolition of the out-building of the mosque at a moment when Sir J. Meston and everybody else knew that the nerves of the Muhammadans were on edge was a stupid blunder and one that has had, and may still have, grave consequences. I really see nothing to justify the action taken on July 1. If the local authorities had only built the new building to take the place of the old, and given Rs. 100 to the mutawalli, we should not have had all this trouble. The mere fact that Mr. Tyler went with armed police to pull down the building shows that he at least anticipated serious trouble, and he in fact provoked it. That there was no trouble at the time is no answer.

I have no patience with such shortsightedness. I cannot find any indication anywhere that the matter was urgent, or that the demolition could not have been deferred till some months later.

I do not think that Sir J. Meston ever realised the gravity of the general situation, since I wrote to him on the 16th July, when I saw signs of the coming storm, urging him to publish a communique in the Press in the hope that this might bring calm, and hearing nothing from him I telegraphed to him on the 23rd July

and again urged him to make a communique to the press, or to hold an independent inquiry on which the Muhammadans would be represented in strength. He then issued his communique on the 24th. As we know, this did no good. The riot followed. Sir J. Meston went to Cawnpore and inquired into the matter, his visit was undoubtedly a calming local influence, and has since retired to Naini Tal after receiving a Muhammadan Deputation when he absolutely declined to listen to any compromise. In the meantime the Muhammadan community are sulky and unfavourably disposed toward Government and I shudder to think of the trouble we might have if some other official were to be so short-sighted as to act elsewhere in the same manner as Mr Tyler [Deputy Commissioner of Cawnpore] on July 1st. I know it to be the shibboleth of the Government of India that the local Government, when it gets into trouble or makes a mistake, has to be supported. It is a principle that I neither accept nor believe in, since a Government, like a private individual, ought always to be ready to admit a mistake when one has been made. I have supported Sir J. Meston in this affair, although I regard it as a stupid and unnecessary blunder, but I do think that the local Government, and the Government of India, will expose themselves to justifiable censure if they fail to seize the very first opening that presents itself for a solution which may be a compromise, and which even now may prevent the alienation of the sympathy and support of the most loyal section of the community. I do not regard the actual situation with the same complacency as some of my Honourable Colleagues.

Sd/- H[ARDINGE], 8.9.13

Chapter Five

THE TRIUMPH OF NATIONALISM: I

The Groundswell, 1915-1918

I

The Home Rule League

II

The Ram Lila Affair

III

Preparation for the Annual Sessions of the All-India National Congress and All-India Moslem League

IV

Appendix

The campaign launched by Mohamed Ali in Delhi to politicise Muslim society in the city met with considerable success. He was unable to win over the sharif, but he did develop a political consciousness among the non-sharif Muslims of Delhi, particularly the students, the small shopkeepers, and the artisans. This success was achieved at some cost, however, because even though Mohamed Ali widened the political horizons of new classes in Muslim society, his appeal to religious sentiment effectively reinforced their parochial attitudes.

Before 1917 the Hindus of Delhi had no counterpart to Mohamed Ali. They had no agitator who could capture the imagination and loyalty of the illiterate and poor. Their political movement, which had begun as early as 1905, depended entirely upon a highly politicised sub-élite which was relatively homogeneous in terms of educational, social, and economic status. The Delhi branch of the Home Rule League, which was founded early in 1917, was completely dependant upon this sub-élite. The issues they raised, however, did not attract the Arya Samaj, or the Hindu Extremists, both of whom had been active in the nationalist movement before 1911. Political meetings which attracted very small numbers and the inability of the agitators to arouse any sentiment over the internment of Mrs Besant, persuaded the Hindu leaders to change their idiom and to attempt to inculcate political values into a larger, heterogeneous community. This idiom, which was also religious in tone, aroused the greatest response during the Ram Lila festival in 1917; but although the political leaders effectively widened the horizons of many Hindus,

the incident also reinforced strong parochial attitudes within the Hindu community.

The extent to which Mohamed Ali and the Delhi Home Rule League had widened the political horizons of the inhabitants of Delhi was reflected in the Rowlatt Satyagraha. The extent to which the events of the ten years preceding non-co-operation reinforced parochial attitudes was reflected in the non-co-operation movement.

I

The Extremists have abandoned their revolutionary work for the present and are attempting to obtain their own ends with the borrowed weapons of the Moderates.

Director of
Criminal Intelligence
16 January 1917

There were few events of consequence in the latter half of 1915 and in 1916. The political leaders raised few issues, and there was almost no response from the inhabitants of the city. The apathy and indifference of the citizens of Delhi was as conspicuous during this period as it was in any year preceding 1910.

Members of the Hindu community held meetings on three different occasions. A meeting was called by Rai Bahadur Sultan Singh on 21 March 1916 to protest the construction of the new slaughter house near a Hindu temple at Jhandewal, at which 200 people were present.¹

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RDDA, Education File 101 Part B 1915, 'Compulsory Acquisition of Land by the Municipality for a Slaughter House.'

The second meeting on 18 April 1916, was called by the Chamar brotherhood of shoemakers and sandal makers. Over 800 Chamars met at Lachman Chaudhri's house in Shahganj to protest against deductions which the Muslim merchants made to finance an industrial school.¹ And finally, a meeting of 400 Hindus was convened by the Indraprasth Sanatan Dharam Mahamandal on 24 September 1916 to protest against Muslim dancing girls portraying Hindu gods and goddesses.²

Members of the Muslim community also held only three meetings of note. The Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba held meetings on October 1915 and March 1916 both of which attracted 100 persons.³

¹ RDDA, Confidential File 129 (1916), 'Fortnightly Reports,' Delhi Police Secret Abstract No. 17, 22 April 1916.

² NAI, Home Poll 29 Deposit, October 1916, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation in Special Reference to the War Received from All the Provinces for the Second Fortnight of September 1916,' H.C. Beadon to S.R. Hignell, 30 September 1916; RDDA, Confidential File 129 (1916), Delhi Police Secret Abstract No. 40, 30 September 1916. The men under whose signature the poster calling for the meeting was issued were: Rai Bahadur Ghania Lal; Rai Sahib Wazir Singh; Lachmi Narain, vaid; Ram Chand Kure Mal, ironmonger; Pandit Banke Rai, mahamahapadayaya; Rai Sahib Irshi Pershad; Pandit Kanshi Nath; Lala Mina Mal, honorary magistrate; Rai Bahadur Gaur Shankar; Pandit Harnarain, mahamahapadayaya; Lala Amba Pershad, honorary magistrate; Lala Basheshar Nath, Goenka, pleader; Rai Sahib Kidar Nath; Lala Bishambar Nath.

³ NAI, Home Poll 9 Deposit, November 1915, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation in Special Reference to the War for the Second Fortnight of October 1915,' W.M. Hailey to H. Wheeler, 2 November 1915; Home Poll 19 Deposit, April 1916, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation Received from all the Provinces for the Second Fortnight of March 1916,' W.M. Hailey to H. Wheeler, 4 April 1916; RDDA, Confidential File 87 (1915), 'Fortnightly Reports,' Delhi Police Secret Abstract No. 41, 23 October 1915; Confidential File 129 (1916), Delhi Police Secret Abstract No. 21, 20 May 1916.

There was little enthusiasm for pan-Islamism, however, and the Society quickly languished. The indifference of the community toward pan-Islamism was convincingly displayed at a meeting on 6 July 1916 to protest against the revolt of the Sharif of Mecca from the Sultan of Turkey. Only 1,500 Muslims gathered at the Queen's Gardens on that Sunday to pass a mild resolution under the guidance of the Imam of the Jama Masjid.¹

Economic distress was evident during the year and a half. The price of wheat which had reached a low of $9\frac{1}{2}$ seers per rupee (still one seer per rupee less than normal) in July began to rise in September as it climbed to eight seers per rupee in November where it remained until March 1916 after which it dropped to $10\frac{1}{2}$. Prices continued steadily until November 1916 when there was a rise to nine seers with a more drastic rise to $7\frac{1}{2}$ in December. The price of salt rose from Rs. 2/4/- per maund in October to Rs. 4/8/- per maund in mid-December. The Municipal Committee was forced once again to open cheap grain shops and salt depots which alleviated some of the distress until a release of new stocks of grain brought the price down to $10\frac{1}{2}$ seers per rupee in April

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NAI, Home Poll 26 Deposit, July 1916, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation in Special Reference to the War Received from all the Provinces for the Second Fortnight of June 1916,' W.M. Hailey to H. Wheeler, 1 July 1916; Home Poll 24 Deposit, August 1916, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation in Special Reference to the War Received from the Several Provinces for the First Fortnight of July 1916,' W.M. Hailey to S.R. Hignell, 21 July 1916; RDDA, Confidential File 129 (1916), Delhi Police Secret Abstract No. 28, 8 July 1916.

1917. There were, however, no political issues upon which to focus the economic distress and the period passed without serious incident.¹

There was a general recrudescence of parochial feeling in 1917. The Chief Commissioner observed:

The strained relations of Hindus and Mahomedans generally...show little change for the better. On two occasions lately trouble has arisen in regard to marriage processions and the like, and though the leaders of the two communities have been persuaded to compromise the cases, there would seem for the time being to be unusually strong feeling between less responsible members. Curiously enough there is at the same time much

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NAI, Home Poll 2 Deposit, August 1915, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation in Special Reference to the European War for the First Fortnight of July 1915,' W.M. Hailey to H. Wheeler, 23 July 1915; Home Poll 58 Deposit, September 1915, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation in Special Reference to the War for the First Fortnight of September 1915,' W.M. Hailey to S.R. Hignell, 21 September 1915; Home Poll 24 Deposit, February 1916, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation in Special Reference to the War, Received from the Several Provinces for the Second Fortnight of January 1916,' W.M. Hailey to H. Wheeler, 3 February 1916; Home Poll 18 Deposit, April 1916, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation Received from All the Provinces for the First Fortnight of March 1916,' W.M. Hailey to H. Wheeler, 16 March 1916; Home Poll 2 Deposit, January 1917, 'Report on the Internal Political Situation in the Delhi Province for the Fortnight Ending the 30th November 1916,' W.M. Hailey to J. DuBoulay, 1 December 1916; Home Poll 44 Deposit, January 1917, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation in Special Reference to the War Received from All the Provinces for the First Fortnight of December 1916,' W.M. Hailey to J. DuBoulay, 17 December 1916; Home Poll 70 Deposit, May 1917, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation, In Special Reference to the War, Received from All the Provinces for the Second Fortnight of April 1917,' W.M. Hailey to J. Duboulay, 2 May 1917.

display of feeling within the communities themselves. There has been a good deal of trouble between the Hanafis and Wahabis, and some bickering between the sections of the Arya Samaj.¹

This parochialism and factionalism were largely the result of irritating but minor incidents within and between the two communities and did not form the basis for any notable incidents. The marginal recrudescence of parochialism in 1917 combined with the agitation of the Home Rule League, however, to produce an incident of considerable significance.

The idea for a local branch of the Home Rule League in Delhi was first mooted by Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya. He used his visit to testify before the Indian Industrial Commission in November 1916 at Delhi as an occasion to urge Delhi to establish a branch of the League.¹ A

¹ NAI, Home Poll 3 Deposit, August 1917, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation, For the Second Half of July 1917,' W.M. Hailey to J. DuBoulay, 31 July 1917. The Secretary to the Government of Punjab Province noted that: 'The newspapers of the Ahmediyya and Ahl-i-Hadis sects among Muhammadans, and of the Arya Samaj and Dev Samaj sects among Hindus, denounce one another's beliefs; and the language controversy - Urdu versus Hindi - is being continued on the usual racial lines.' L. French to J.H. DuBoulay, dated Simla, 31 July 1917. Delhi also had its Hindi protagonists who founded the Hindi Sanchalni Sabha in 1917. But it had only 15 members, most of whom were quite insignificant. RDDA, Confidential File 182 (1917), 'List of Political Societies and Anjumans etc. in Delhi Province.'

² NAI, Home Poll 42 Deposit, January 1917, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation in Special Reference to the War Received from All the Provinces for the First Fortnight of November 1916,' W.M. Hailey to J. DuBoulay, 15 November 1916. He refused to make a public speech, however.

branch eventually came into existence on 19 February 1917.¹ It had 16 members, the two most active of whom were Miss L. Gmeiner and Dhamraj Singh. Miss Gmeiner, who was the headmistress of the Indraprasth Hindu Girls' School, was an Australian of German extraction. She was an active Theosophist and an ardent admirer of Annie Besant. Dhamraj Singh was a university graduate who taught at Ramjas High School.

The Delhi Home Rule League established a reading room at the Khuni Darwaza in Chandni Chauk. The reading room, which did double duty as a meeting room, contained a library which included all the political pamphlets of Annie Besant plus the leading Extremist newspapers.² Two local Hindi newspapers, the Al-Hind and the Hindi Samachar (with Hindu editors), supported the new organisation.³

The local Home Rule League immediately came into conflict with the Administration. The Chief Commissioner

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C.F. Andrews was in Delhi when the branch was established. He probably took an active part in its inception. NAI, Home Poll 625-628 Part B, March 1917, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 3 March 1917.

2

The newspapers that were subscribed to were New India (Madras), Amrita Bazaar Patrika (Calcutta), Bombay Chronicle (Bombay), Bengali (Calcutta), Leader (Allahabad), and Punjabi (Lahore). RDDA, Confidential File 167 (1917), 'Fortnightly Reports,' Delhi Police Secret Abstract No. 9, 3 March 1917.

3

NAI, Home Poll 4 Deposit, June 1917, 'Objectionable Article in the Delhi Gazette of 25 February 1917 - Summarised in Para 11 of the Selections from Indian Newspapers Published in the Delhi Province for the Week Ending 10 March 1917 - On the Subject of the State of Agriculture in India.'

called Miss Gmeiner in for an interview at the beginning of March and asked her to desist in view of her responsible position in an aided school. Miss Gmeiner released the full details of the interview to the local press which also appeared in the New India (Madras) of 17 March. The Chief Commissioner then attempted to bring pressure on the Managing Committee of the school to dismiss her. Sultan Singh, who was the honorary secretary of the Committee, apologised to Hailey for Miss Gmeiner's attitude and for the fact that she had released details of the interview with the Chief Commissioner. He promised that if she continued to defy the Administration he would ask her to leave the school.¹ Miss Gmeiner refused to compromise, that is, desist from political activity or resign, but the Managing Committee refused to support Sultan Singh. The Chief Commissioner stopped the school's grant-in-aid and it was then disaffiliated on 29 April.²

The Delhi Home Rule League soon embarked upon a programme of political activism in the city. The first significant meeting took place on 24 March when Mohandas Gandhi arrived in Delhi in connection with his campaign against indentured labour. He lectured to a closed audience at St Stephen's College, but his broken Hindustani rendered him almost unintelligible.³ He then

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RDDA, Confidential File 167 (1917), Sultan Singh to Chief Commissioner, Delhi, 11 March 1917.

2

RDDA, Education File 118 Part B 1917, 'Withdrawal of Recognition and the Suspension of the Grants to the Indraprastha Girls' School Delhi.'

3

Interview with Shri S. Sanghal, 17 April 1967.

proceeded to the Krishna Theatre, where an audience of 5,000 awaited him to join with an outstanding group of Indian political leaders.¹ Hakim Ajmal Khan was voted to the chair where he declared that the object of the meeting was to express their public gratitude to the Viceroy for abolishing the indentured labour system. The general tenor of the speeches at the meeting was that the government had bowed to public agitation and that Indians had gained some measure of self-respect through the assertion of their opinions and the cessation of this particularly iniquitous system. An overwhelming applause broke out as each speaker was introduced and as they concluded; this was especially true for Gandhi, Andrews and Mrs Naidu.² The League was not to attract such support again from either the inhabitants or the leaders of the city until September.

Mrs Naidu remained in the city for almost a month, but even her presence could not arouse any enthusiasm for the movement. Mr H.S.L. Polak gave a lecture on Home

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Those on the platform included the honourables Mr Shastri, Mr Sharma, Mr Iyengar, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr Ansari, Hamid Ali Khan (Bar-at-Law, Lucknow), Hasan Nizami, C.F. Andrews, Mrs Naidu, Lady Tata, Mrs Petit, and Miss Gmeiner.

2

NAI, Home Poll 625-628 Part B, March 1917, for the week ending 31 March 1917; Home Poll 61 Deposit, April 1917, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation, In Special Reference to the War, Received from All the Provinces for the Second Fortnight of March 1917,' W.M. Hailey to J. DuBoulay, 31 March 1917; RDDA, Confidential File 167 (1917), Delhi Police Secret Abstract No. 13, 31 March 1917.

Rule on 15 April, a meeting which was poorly attended.¹ Somewhat more support was shown when the knowledge of the disaffiliation of the Girls' School became known in May. The local press and the Bombay Chronicle, through its special correspondent in Delhi, Asaf Ali, aroused sufficient public support over the issue so that the income for the School was met by subscription.²

The League drew active support from the foundation of the Indraprasth Sewak Mandli. This group of young volunteers was affiliated with the Vesh Young Men's Association and comprised about 150 members, all of whom were Hindus and the majority of whom were students. The volunteer organisation had no direct connection with the League, but its leaders, Bishamber Nath, Sri Ram (Bar-at-Law), Jaggan Nath Singh, and Bishan Sarup were sympathetic to the goals and ideals of swaraj. (It was very active during the Ram Lila affair.) The League also drew some support by becoming the centre of opposition to

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NAI, Home Poll 700-703 Part B, April 1917, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 21 April 1917; Home Poll 69 Deposit, May 1917, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation, In Special Reference to the War, Received from All the Provinces for the First Fortnight of April 1917,' W.M. Hailey to J. DuBoulay, 14 April 1917.

2

NAI, Home Poll 69 Deposit, June 1917, 'Reports on the Internal Political Situation Received from All the Provinces for the Second Half of May, 1917,' W.M. Hailey to J. DuBoulay, 1 June 1917; Home Poll 17 Deposit, September 1918, 'Censure Passed on Lieut-Col. H.C. Beadon, I.A., In View of Certain Instructions Which Were Issued by Him to the Assistant District Magistrate Who Was to Try the Cases of Muhammad Asaf Ali and Neki Ram Sharma of Delhi.'

the removal during May of the trees that lined Chandni Chauk.¹

The internment of Annie Besant, Wadia, and Arundal by the Government of Madras in June 1917 provided a desperately needed public issue. The Delhi League planned meetings of public protest for 1 July with Asaf Ali and Pearey Lal (motorwalla) in the forefront. (This meeting, and successive meetings planned for the 2nd, 3rd, and 7th, were all prohibited by the Chief Commissioner.²)

The Delhi League then held a closed meeting of members on 2 July, but postponed it because only five

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NAI, Home Poll 17 Deposit, September 1918; RDDA, Confidential File 182 (1918), 'List of Political Societies and Anjumans. Deputy Commissioner Beadon decided in 1913 as a result of the assassination attempt on the Viceroy, that the trees on Chandni Chauk should be removed to afford better police protection for processions. A very submissive Municipal Committee agreed with him. Education File 23 Part B 1913, 'Proceedings of the Ordinary Meetings of the Delhi Municipal Committee.'

2

The Chief Commissioner justified his action, which was the subject of a question in the Imperial Legislative Council, as follows: 'I held that it would injure the interests of recruiting if we allowed in areas such as Delhi the growth of a campaign which involved an open approval of the violent attacks on government which characterised the agitation carried on by Mrs Besant in Madras.' RDDA, Confidential File 179 (1917): 'Internment of Mrs Besant.' The Chief Commissioner laid himself open to criticism since he had partially justified his action in the withdrawal of aid from the Indraprasth Girls' School on the grounds that similar action had been taken elsewhere in India, and yet his was the only administration which prohibited a meeting to protest the internment order of Mrs Besant. He pleaded the special circumstances of Delhi, but even the arch-conservative Sir Michael O'Dwyer did not perceive any danger in the meetings, although he prohibited publication of their resolutions in the Punjab.

members attended. The following day Asaf Ali's article in the Bombay Chronicle criticised the inactivity at Delhi: 'The country must be wondering at Imperial Delhi's enigmatic reticence at this juncture, and thinking that the Delhi Sphinx has imparted much of his mysterious silence to the Delhites....'¹ This was the first time that any public notice was given that Delhi, because of its position as the imperial capital, should offer a lead to the rest of the country, or that it should manifest some response to the political currents in the country. This was also the first time that anyone stated explicitly or implicitly that Delhi's political horizons should be national rather than provincial.

On the 5th, Dr Ansari, Dr Abdul Rahman, Shaikh Ataullah (pleader), Dr A.C. Sen, Ram Krishan Das, and Asaf Ali wrote to the Chief Commissioner protesting his prohibition of the meetings and pleading the constitutional nature of the protest and the fact that similar meetings were held throughout India. The Delhi League finally held a closed meeting of 11 members on the 9th at Dr Ansari's house after which a telegram was despatched to the Prime Minister of Britain. The regular members of the League also wanted to announce that Dr Ansari had joined, but he thought it better to wait for a public meeting.²

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RDDA, Confidential File 167 (1917).

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RDDA, Confidential File 167 (1917), Delhi Police Secret Abstract No. 27.

The Delhi League did not hold any public meetings during July or August and much of the movement's potential élan withered. The Chief Commissioner wrote a circular letter to the headmasters and principals of all the high schools and colleges in Delhi to keep students from joining the Home Rule League movement.¹ Hasan Nizami, a Sufi leader of Delhi, who had supported the pan-Islamism of Mohamed Ali, openly opposed the Home Rule League.² The vociferous support of the Hindi Samachar was the only bright spot in an otherwise dismal picture. To make the picture even more dismal, only four people attended the regular meeting of the Delhi League on 4 August 1917. Nationalism in Delhi had reached its nadir.

The announcement by the Secretary of State for India, Edwin S. Montagu, on 20 August 1917, that India was to undergo the 'progressive realisation of responsible government' received a joyous welcome in India. The Home Rulers were satisfied because they looked upon the statement as the vindication of their stand. They also

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RDDA, Confidential File 181 (1917), 'Home Rule Agitation'.

² NAI, Home Poll 5 Deposit, September 1917, 'Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the First Half of August, 1917,' W.M. Hailey to J. DuBoulay, 18 August 1917.

looked upon the subsequent release of Besant, Wadia, and Arundale as a victory for their agitation.¹

The Delhi Home Rule League shared the general enthusiasm that resulted from the announcements of the Secretary of State, an enthusiasm which was noticeable throughout the country. By early September they had persuaded the local branch of the Moslem League to hoist the Home Rule flag over their premises as a first step in passive resistance.² The local Home Rulers held four meetings between the 8th and 19th, with attendances of between 20 and 60, and established the Home Rule League Volunteer Corp on the 11th. The most noticeable trend in the speeches of Pandit Shiv Dutt Sharma, Pandit Lachmi Narain Shastri, Pandit Shiv Narain Haksar, Shambhu Nath Chopra and Asaf Ali was the increasing vehemence of their language, which succeeded in drawing larger audiences. The presence of Dr Ansari, Dr Abdul Rahman, Shankar Lal, and Lala Pearey Lal (motorwalla), on the other hand, added enough prestige to the organisation that a large group of Gujrati shopkeepers from Chaori Bazaar attended the meeting which was on the 19th.

¹ NAI, Home Poll 239-243 Part B, September 1917, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 15 September 1917; Home Poll 6 Deposit, November 1917, 'Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the First Half of September, 1917,' W.M. Hailey to J. DuBoulay, 13 September 1917. The statement of the Secretary of State can be found in C.M. Philips, ed., The Evolution of India and Pakistan, 1858-1947: Selected Documents (London, 1962), p. 264.

²

RDDA, Confidential File 167 (1917), Delhi Police Secret Abstract No. 37, 15 September 1917.

The Home Rulers in Delhi reached a zenith of success on 26 September, the night of the League's first public meeting. Dr Ansari convened the meeting at the Town Hall but the audience grew so large that everyone moved out into the Queen's Gardens. The audience, which numbered over 4,000, then passed five resolutions, one of which called for the release of the Muslim internees, and another which condemned the cessation of aid to the Indraprasth Girls' School. Hakim Ajmal Khan chaired the meeting, which heard 13 people speaking in favour of the resolutions.¹

The meeting attracted a rather narrow range of persons, almost all of whom were literate. Among several recognisable and noticeable groups were a large number of students; the 'New Muslim Party'; a large number of petty shopkeepers and a smaller number of substantial and influential merchants, most probably Arya Samajists from the Khatri and Kayasth castes (with a few Aggarwals); some members of the liberal professions with a somewhat larger number from the clerical professions. There was also a fringe group of camp-followers and hangers-on. The meeting was remarkably well attended, though, for a Wednesday night.

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The speakers at the meeting were: Abdul Aziz (pleader), Khaliq, Tassaduq Ahmad Khan Sherwani (Bar-at-Law, Aligarh), G.S. Bhargava, Brahm Dutt Brahmacharia of the gurukul at Kangri, Shiv Narain (pleader), Rangaswami Ayenger (editor of the Advocate of Allahabad), Pandit Harde Nath Kunzru of Allahabad, Asaf Ali, Abdul Majid, Pandit Shiv Narain Haksar, Dr Abdul Rahman, Ram Kishan Das. RDDA, Confidential File 181 (1917), Delhi Police Secret Abstract No. 39, 29 September 1917.

There was one disturbing feature of the meeting on the 26th. This was the distribution by Sayid Sharifuddin and Abdul Qayum outside the Town Hall, of handbills which ridiculed the idea of unity between Hindus and Muslims, and which also denounced Dr Ansari as chairman of the meeting. Hakim Ajmal Khan took note of the enmity that existed between Hindus and Muslims and during the meeting he appealed for better understanding between the two communities. He requested Muslims not to believe the rumour that Home Rule could only bring harm to their community.

The Home Rule League in Delhi was equally successful the following Wednesday, 3 October. Sardha Ram (pleader) was in the chair at a meeting in Queen's Gardens. The audience which numbered 2,000 at the beginning, and slowly swelled to 4,000, heard Mrs Naidu speak on the greatness of the Moguls and their toleration towards Hindus. She stressed the need for Hindu-Muslim unity and paused for a very long time to allow the call to prayers at the nearby mosque to be heard without hindrance. She was very critical of British rule and the education system. The lecture was translated by Asaf Ali for the audience and was followed in turn by G.S. Bhargava. His speech was so vehement that the chairman stopped him and Hakim Ajmal Khan closed the meeting. The Home Rulers then selected six delegates to attend the meeting at Allahabad on 6 October and at a tea party for Mrs Naidu hoisted a new Home Rule flag.¹

¹ RDDA, Confidential File 167 (1917), Delhi Police Secret Abstract No. 40, 6 October 1917. The six delegates were Dr Ansari, Pearey Lal (motorwalla), Shankar Lal, Asaf Ali, Shambhu Nath Chopra, and G.S. Bhargava.

The following Wednesday, 10 October, the Home Rule League held a third public meeting. Again they attracted almost 4,000 people. Mrs Naidu spoke, but the main speakers were Mr and Mrs Wood, who were Theosophists.¹

The meetings on three successive Wednesday nights revealed that significant sections of the community in Delhi were interested in broader political issues. The fact that the Home Rulers could draw 4,000 revealed that there was a good deal of latent support for the movement, and that even though most people were unwilling to become formal members of the Home Rule League, larger numbers than ever before were willing to attend meetings which were sponsored by the organisation. This was a significant comment upon the degree of politicisation which the inhabitants of the city had undergone. The petty bourgeoisie of the city was willing to attend meetings on Wednesday nights which offered no appeal to religious passions and only secondary appeals to racial animosity. It is also interesting to note that even though many speakers were vehement in condemnation of British rule, the moderate Extremists still controlled the movement and could effectively channel the energies of their more radical colleagues. This was not to remain true for long, however, as factionalism and parochialism soon established their hold over the tone of nationalist politics in Delhi.

¹ NAI, Home Poll 29 Deposit, November 1917, 'Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the First Half of October 1917,' W.M. Hailey to J. DuBoulay, 16 October 1917.

II

The Home Rule League...is strongly Hindu...

Chief Commissioner, Delhi
30 November 1917

Factionalism arose over who was to represent the political interests of the Indian body politic before the Secretary of State for India. Edwin S. Montagu who came to India to hear the representatives of different political interests before deciding upon a reform scheme, witnessed the unedifying disunity of the Moderates and Extremists in both the National Congress and the Moslem League, each of whom sought to impose their views on each other. The Extremists had control of the machinery of both the national organisations, but the issue was far from clear at the local level. In Delhi the Moderates had control of both local branches of the Congress and League while the Extremists could only claim to control the Home Rule League. The situation in Delhi became confused, however, when some people who were ostensibly Extremists supported the Moderates' plan for responsible government.

The split came about at Allahabad on 5 and 6 October when the national committees of both the Congress and League met to confirm a Congress-League scheme for self-government. The Extremists in the Moslem League elected Mohamed Ali as president to which the Moderates, led by Mohamed Ali Jinnah, reacted and eventually subscribed to a scheme proposed by a combination of Moderates and

conservatives who formed the Muslim Defence Association at Aligarh.¹

The split between Moderates and Extremists did not take the same form in Delhi as it did in the United Provinces. Hakim Ajmal Khan, who attended the meeting at Allahabad in October, disagreed with the Moslem League's draft to the Secretary of State.² He then returned to Delhi and founded the Indian Association to present the views of Moderates, both Hindu and Muslim, in Delhi to Montagu.³ The Association held its first meeting on 13 October at the Lachmi Narain Dharmasala. An audience of 600 listened to the temperate views of Rai Sahib Pearey Lal (pleader) who was chairman, S.N. Bose (pleader), Abdul Aziz (pleader), Raj Jai Narain (pleader), Prag Narain Sehgal, and Raj Narain (Bar-at-Law). Asaf Ali and Bishen Sarup attended but did not speak.⁴ This was the extent to which factionalism had advanced when parochialism took over and further divided the nationalists into even smaller groups.

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NAI, Home Poll 1 Deposit, January 1918, 'Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the First Half of November 1917,' S.P. O'Donnell to S.R. Hignell, 17 November 1917.

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NAI, Home Poll 29 Deposit, November 1917.

3

RDDA, Confidential File 227 (1918), 'List of Political, Qasi-Political and Religious Societies, Sabhas and Anjumans in the Delhi Province for the Year Ending the 30th June 1918.'

4

RDDA, Confidential File 167 (1917), Delhi Police Secret Abstract No. 42, 20 October 1917.

Parochialism affected Delhi and north India on 28 September with considerable strength. In Delhi parochialism expressed itself in the form of frustration over the announcement that the government had refused to release any of the Muslim agitators who were interned.¹ This led to an immense amount of bitterness on the part of Muslims. Somewhat irrationally, most of the Muslims who had opposed any political activity looked upon those few Muslim politicians who had participated in the agitation to release the Home Rulers of Madras as a Muslim contribution to a Hindu cause. They took it as an insult to their community that the Hindus were unwilling to return the favour once the Hindu leaders had been released.

The inhabitants of Delhi reacted in several ways to the announcement that the Ali brothers were not to be released. On the day of the announcement, Dr Ansari met and spoke with large numbers of Muslims as they left the Idgah after the service for Id-ul-Zuha.² He also set in motion a train of events which crystallised into the Central Bureau for the Release of Muslim Internees which

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Chief Commissioner Hailey had strongly advised against the grant of an amnesty to the Ali brothers in August. NAI, Home Poll 305-332 Part A, September 1917, 'Question of the Grant of a General Amnesty to Political Offenders,' W.M. Hailey to J. DuBoulay, 20 August 1917.

2

NAI, Home Poll 7 Deposit, November 1917, 'Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the Second Half of September, 1917,' W.M. Hailey to J. DuBoulay, 1 October 1917.

was originally founded in Allahabad, but which moved to Delhi. The Bureau had a membership of 22 and was run by the followers of the Doctor Sahib.¹

A more significant effect of parochialism on the inhabitants of north India and of Delhi came from the riots of Bakr-Id on 28 September. The most violent riots occurred in the Shahbad and Gaya districts in Bihar, with smaller riots in the Jaunpur, Meerut, Moradabad, and Allahabad districts in the United Provinces. The startling fact about these riots was that they were all triggered off by massed groups of Hindus who sought to prevent the qarbani [sacrifice of cows]. The knowledge of these riots created considerable resentment against the Hindus among the lower class Muslims.² These were the first massive communal riots since the clash in Ajodhya in 1912. (This was the beginning of a period which saw a major communal riot every year and which entailed a high cost in lives and mutual distrust.)

The parochial feeling, which was aroused by the continued internment of Muslim leaders and the Shahbad riots, struck Delhi in a significant manner when the local Home Rulers sought to use a religious idiom for political agitation. It became apparent as early as

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NAI, Home Poll 59 Deposit, January 1918, 'Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the First Half of December 1917,' W.M. Hailey to S.R. Hignell, 17 December 1917. The officers of the Central Bureau were Raja of Mahmudabad, president; Dr Ansari and Dr Abdul Rahman, secretaries; Abdul Rahman (pleader), treasurer. RDDA, Confidential File 227 (1918).

2

NAI, Home Poll 29 Deposit, November 1917.

August that trouble was in store for the Ram Lila procession which was due on 24 October 1917. The difficulty lay in that the Ram Lila procession and the Moharram procession occurred on the same day for the first time in 30 years. The Administration was fully aware of the possibilities of communal conflict that were thrown open by such a concurrence. In order to avert trouble the Administration undertook, in 1915, to alter the route of the Ram Lila procession so that it would not enter Chaori Bazaar when the Moharram procession was in progress.¹ The change in routes was accepted by the Hindu community, since the route was not sacrosanct, and the Ram Lila processions of 1915 and 1916 followed routes different from the traditional one with no ill-feeling. In the crucial year of 1917, the Ram Lila Committee, which was composed of self-appointed local leaders, once again accepted the changed route for the third year, but it was unable to arouse any support for the change in the Hindu community as a majority of Hindus wanted the traditional route followed and the Moharram route changed. The situation became ominous when the Home Rulers invaded the Committee and sought, with the aid of the Indraprasth Sevak Samiti and the Home Rule League Volunteer Corps, to canvass support for their efforts to reinstall the traditional route. The communal tension which slowly built up through September became alarming after the Shahbad riots. Two

¹ RDDA, Confidential File 71 (1915), 'Maintenance of Note Books by District Officers Showing What Action Should Be Taken When Hindu and Muhammadan Festivals Synchronise.'

weeks of continuous negotiations ensued between the Deputy Commissioner, who refused to change the Moharram procession, the Home Rulers, who refused to compromise, and the Moderate and loyal Hindu leaders, who vacillated miserably. Finally, after the Indian Association meeting on 13 October, the Moderates worked out the details of a public meeting to discuss the problem.

The mass public meeting to discuss the route of the Ram Lila procession took place on 15 October. Lala Girdhari Lal was the chairman of an audience of 6,000 Hindus who met in the Queen's Gardens. The Moderate Hindu politicians counselled calm, and Asaf Ali, who attended the meeting, claimed that the Shias were willing to compromise and change their route.¹ The Shias, however, refused to yield a position which was supported by the Administration and an impasse then confronted all parties.

The Hindu agitators decided, after the Shias had refused to compromise, to apply for a licence for a procession which would follow the traditional route. The Deputy Commissioner refused to issue such a licence, and the leaders then held a meeting on the 16th at which Pearey Lal (motorwalla), Ram Lal (choudhri of the cloth merchants), and Sri Ram (Bar-at-Law) decided to organise a hartal. They used the Indraprasth Sevak Mandli and most of the Hindu students of St Stephen's and Hindu colleges to contact the merchants in the city. It was too late to begin on the 17th, the first day of the Ram Lila festival, but on Thursday the 18th all the Hindu shops and services in the city ceased to function.

¹ RDDA, Confidential File 167 (1917), Delhi Police Secret Abstract No. 42, 20 October 1917.

The relations between Hindus and Muslims became very strained after 18 October. The Muslim merchants and students refused to join the Hindu merchants and students in the hartal for the reason that the Hindus had not observed a hartal when Mohamed Ali was interned. The Hindus then embarked upon a campaign to starve out the Muslims and keep them from obtaining food. Small incidents, such as the presence of filth in a mosque, and the attempt to abduct the sister of Muhammad Abdul Rahman (pleader), exacerbated feelings to a considerable extent. Sentiments were even more aroused when rumours of the Hindu-Muslim riots at Arrah on the 24th spread through the city.¹ The tension resulted in a full display of support for the Mendhi procession on the 25th, a procession which was supported even by Sunni maulvis who had expressed public disapproval of the practice in earlier years. Huge bands of Pathan labourers from Raisina, and butchers from Pahari Dhiraj filled the mosques and accompanied the procession, prepared to resist any attack from the Hindus. There was no violence, however, nor were there any incidents on the 27th for the Tazia processions which were attended by the entire Muslim community. On both occasions few Hindus were to be seen on the streets.²

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NAI, Home Poll 30 Deposit, November 1917, 'Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the Second Half of October 1917,' W.M. Hailey to S.R. Hignell, 31 October 1917; Home Poll 1 Deposit, January 1918.

2

RDDA, Confidential File 167 (1917), Delhi Police Secret Abstract No. 43, 3 November 1917; Home File 320 Part B 1917, 'Memorial from the Members of the Ram Lila Committee, Delhi.'

The hartal broke on Monday the 22nd, after which date the support that the Hindu community gave to the hartal and the support that the Sunnis displayed for the Shia festival released a vast store of bitterness and enmity. The Hindu cloth merchants immediately proposed to boycott the Muslim piece-goods dealers who had remained open during the hartal and prepared plans to renew the hartal at the Dewali festival in November. Another result of the hartal was that the Moderate Hindu politicians who were rigid sanatanis broke away from the Indian Association and founded the Hindu Association. A small group of 17 men held a meeting at the house of Ram Kishan Das of the Mercantile Bank on 25 October, the day of the Mendhi procession. A second meeting was held on the 26th and finally on the 28th the new organisation could claim a membership of 75. Among these 75 were some of the most eminent sanatanis of the city.¹

The parochial attitudes displayed by both communities, at all levels of society, inevitably

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The officers of the Hindu Association were Shiv Narain (pleader), president; Rai Bahadur Sultan Singh, vice-president; Rai Sahib Pearey Lal (pleader), vice-president; Bulaqui Das (Gorewala), vice-president; Pearey Lal (motorwalla), vice-president; Madho Ram Khanna, vice-president; Seth Ram Lal (choudhri of the cloth merchants), vice-president; Sri Ram (Bar-at-Law), general secretary; Beni Pershad (cloth merchant), joint secretary; Hargobind Pershad Nigam, joint secretary; R.B. Sen, joint secretary; M.K. Acharya (editor of the Indraprasth), joint secretary; Suraj Pershad, joint secretary; Ram Kishan Das (of the Mercantile Bank), treasurer; and Lala Bansi Dhar, auditor. RDDA, Confidential File 227 (1918).

rebounded upon the Home Rule League. The Moderates, Hindu and Muslim, dissociated themselves from the movement, while the Hindu Moderates were further split between the Indian Association and the Hindu Association. The Home Rulers held a closed meeting on 3 November, but it was poorly attended and the tone of the speeches was very mild. They held a public meeting on the 9th but were able to attract only 1,000, a large number in itself, but only a quarter as large as those of September. The Muslims replied in kind and held two anti-Home Rule League meetings on the 12th and the 19th. The 100 Muslims who attended, most of whom were wealthy businessmen, departed dramatically from their traditional attitude of manifesting no opposition to opinions with which they disagreed. Their meetings were broken up, however, by the presence of over 300 Hindu members of the Home Rule League Volunteer Corps.

The healing balm of time and the efforts of several eminent leaders who firmly believed in Hindu-Muslim unity, such as Dr Ansari and Hakim Ajmal Khan, would have restored calm and muted the parochial conflict between the two committees. But the activities of some individuals kept the fires of communalism aglow. Abdul Bari and a majority of the ulema of Firangi Mahal issued a fatwa in November which declared that if any permissive religious right were opposed, it became compulsory. A large number of leading orthodox Sunnis in Delhi then applied for permission to perform the garbani (a practice which was strictly limited to only a few areas in the city) in

their homes.¹ The lower classes of both communities also showed signs of restiveness as a result of the hartal, the riots at Arrah, and the rains and floods which had wiped out the kharif crop and driven the prices of wheat 'dangerously high'.²

It appeared that the Home Rulers of Delhi were in complete disarray. They had meddled in the affairs of the Ram Lila Committee in response to the League's activities in the United Provinces, but their only claim to success was that Delhi had not experienced a riot and was the one city in India to hold a hartal on that occasion. The Home Rulers managed to derive sufficient élan from the arrival of the Secretary of State on 10 November however, to regain the support of a large number of Hindu and Muslim Extremists in the city.

1

The Muslims of the city displayed their disgust of Hakim Ajmal Khan by accepting invitations for, and then refusing to attend, a banquet at his house. The lavish arrangements for over 1,000 people overwhelmed the 200 people who attended the reception for the national leaders who arrived in Delhi to present petitions to the Secretary of State. The Muslim community was most unhappy at the Hakim Sahib's support of Hindu-Muslim unity and the Home Rulers were equally dissatisfied with his support of the views of the Moderates. RDDA, Confidential File 167 (1917), undated and unsigned note entitled 'Fortnightly Report', most of which appeared in NAI, Home Poll 2 Deposit, January 1918, 'Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the Second Half of November 1917,' W.M. Hailey to S.R. Hitnell, 30 November 1917.

2

NAI, Home Poll 2 Deposit, January 1918; Home Poll 59 Deposit, January 1918. The price of salt was 'prohibitive' and fuel was unobtainable. The Municipal Committee had to open cheap grain shops and salt depots for the third time during the War, and some relief was experienced.

The arrival of Edwin S. Montagu at the Delhi Station was the occasion for a great deal of excitement. Large crowds gathered around the Station and in the Queen's Gardens to witness his arrival and others lined the procession route from the Railway Station to Government House. Popular enthusiasm received a greater fillip from the continuous arrival of national leaders who came to Delhi to present petitions. The arrival of B.G. Tilak was the most momentous, as a huge throng surrounded the noted Hindu leader and in the enthusiasm of the moment elected him president of his own reception committee.¹ Tilak and Mrs Besant (who was also present in the city) did not give any public lectures but their lack of public oratory was more than compensated for by other leaders who came to Delhi. Over 8,000 Hindus enthusiastically responded to the ten lecturers who spoke at a meeting on 26 November.² This meeting, which was twice as large as any of the previous Home Rule meetings, was as large as the meeting of Muslims on 21 May 1915. And like that meeting, the audience of 26 November reflected a higher degree of politicisation than was generally evident during the earlier days of the movement.

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Interview of Sri Ram Sharma, 22 April 1967, by the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.

2

RDDA, Confidential File 167 (1917), Delhi Police Secret Abstract No. 47, 1 December 1917. The speakers were S.R. Bannerji, B.B.N. Iyer, G.S. Khaparde, Asaf Ali, Rangaswami Aiyangar, T.B. Sapru, Pandit Gopi Nath Mitra, Pandit Gokarnath Misra, Jumna Das Dwarka Das, and Neki Ram Sharma.

III

Whether any solid advantages will result from the flood of oratory thus let loose upon Delhi [at the annual sessions of the Congress and League] may be questionable. It will be interesting to see whether future developments will prove that the safety valve for the letting off of anti-Brisith steam has been opened too wide or not.

Chief Commissioner, Delhi
7 January 1919

There were two significant trends observable in the year 1918, both of which raised the temperature of politics in Delhi. The first of these trends was a steady deterioration in economic conditions in the city, which increased the misery and heightened the discontent of the inhabitants of the city. The second trend was the increased activity of the nationalists, who consciously sought to politicise the citizens of Delhi to a degree which would make the annual sessions of the Congress and League a success.

After the panic which had occurred at the beginning of the War had quietened, the more substantial interests in the city probably benefited as much as they suffered from wartime conditions. The iron mongers reaped large profits from government contracts, as did two of the biscuit factories and two of the flour mills. Others benefited from the fact that they no longer faced stiff competition from foreign goods. The cloth merchants were able to procure supplies and only in 1916 were they forced to sell at a loss when they were unable to despatch

orders from Delhi to smaller trading centres. By 1918, however, all classes of persons were beginning to suffer from the dislocation caused by the War. A trade depression developed in January 1918 when a shortage of railway cars meant that no goods could be despatched from Delhi. For the first time since the War began, the cloth merchants refused to order goods from England. It was also noticeable that continuously rising prices, which had all along weighed heavily upon the lower classes, were beginning to push on the petty bourgeoisie.¹

The substantial economic interests in the city suffered more problems in the first six months of 1918. Their traditional immunity from income tax was invaded by a new income tax which came into effect on 1 April 1918, and which exacerbated the impact of the super tax that had been imposed in April 1917.² On top of this apparent attack from the government, those who aspired to join the Punjab Chamber of Commerce were refused entry.³

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NAI, Home Poll 38 Deposit, March 1918, 'Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the First Half of January 1918', W.M. Hailey to S.R. Hignell, 17 January 1918.

2

The new income tax was thought to be especially iniquitous because people paying the tax were required to fill out a form which violated the traditional proclivity for Banias toward secrecy in financial matters. The new tax also upset people because there were provisions for the reassessment of income which had not been assessed formerly, and of income which had been underassessed.

3

NAI, Home Poll 64 Deposit, May 1918, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation in India for the First Half of April, 1918,' W.M. Hailey to S.R. Hignell, 17 April 1918.

And finally, the lack of a silver coinage imposed hardship on all groups as paper currency no longer received the support and confidence of those who had commercial interests.

The lack of a silver coinage was a pressing problem since it affected all types of monetary transactions. Merchants would no longer accept hundis [bills of exchange] in payment for goods, but demanded silver instead. The process rebounded on the merchants who also were unable to buy goods and many grain carts were seen leaving the city full with their loads unsold. The shortage of silver forced the currency exchange to close, which in turn restricted the amount of notes in circulation and further increased suspicion of paper money. The lack of silver began to affect the industry and construction activity since labourers became increasingly reluctant to accept paper currency. And since contractors could not pay in silver, they began to lose their labourers with no hope of finding more. The general suspicion of paper currency in any form put a premium on commodities with an intrinsic value and led to a massive urge to acquire urban property. This trend exacerbated the problem of silver shortage since large sums changed hands and then were hoarded.¹

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NAI, Home Poll 491-494 Part B, June 1918, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence', for the week ending 15 June 1918; Home Poll 28 Deposit, August 1918, 'Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the 1st-half of May, 1918', W.M. Hailey to S.R. Hignell, 21 May 1918; Home Poll 29 Deposit, August 1918, 'Report on the Internal Political Situation for the Second Half of May 1918', 4 June 1918; Home Poll 30 Deposit, August 1918, 'Report on the Internal Political Situation for the 1st Half of June, 1918', W.M. Hailey to S.R. Hignell, 19 June 1918.

But the most pressing problem of all was the rise in prices. Kerosene oil reached such a high price and was so scarce in supply that the Municipal Committee had to open depots. Wheat prices continued to rise despite a good rabi crop and climbed to $8\frac{1}{2}$ seers per rupee at the beginning of July and then to $7\frac{1}{2}$ at the end of the month. By August it had climbed to 7 seers and atta to 6 seers.¹

The parochial fervour which was so noticeable in October and November 1917 began to dissipate by the end of the year. This was primarily due to the euphoria which surrounded the arrival of Montagu and the efforts of the nationalists to heal the divisions which were so woefully evident as a result of their attempt to use a religious festival for political ends. The Home Rulers reasserted themselves, overwhelmed the Moderates in the Indian Association in December, and decided to use the Indian Association to contest the Municipal elections of 1918.²

¹ NAI, Home Poll 31 Deposit, August 1918, 'Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the 2nd Half of June, 1918', W.M. Hailey to S.R. Hignell, 3 July 1918; Home Poll 20 Deposit, September 1918, 'Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the 2nd Half of July 1918', H.C. Beadon to S.R. Hignell, 1 August 1918; Home Poll 40 Deposit, September 1918, 'Reports on the Internal Political Situation in India for the First half of August 1918', H.C. Beadon to S.R. Hignell, 17 August 1918.

²

NAI, Home Poll 59 Deposit, January 1918. The only contest for a seat in the Municipal Committee occurred in the previous election of 1915 at which the incumbent won. RDDA, Education File 83 Part B 1915, 'Election of the Members of the Municipal Committee, Delhi.'

The major activity of the nationalists in Delhi in 1918 was a propaganda campaign to politicise the inhabitants of the city. The Extremists wanted to heighten the political consciousness of the citizens of Delhi in order to ensure the success of the annual sessions of the Congress and the League which were to be held in Delhi in December 1918.¹ They initiated their campaign in January with a public meeting which was sponsored by the Home Rule League and at which Horniman spoke.² This was followed by two public meetings on 16 and 17 February to celebrate the anniversary of the Delhi Home Rule League.³ These meetings revealed that the Home Rule League had doubled its membership from 150 to 300, but the public meetings could only attract audiences of 2,000, which included a number of Muslims. The Honourable Mr Khaparde spoke and asked the audience to pray every day for the success of the deputation of Tilak and himself, who were departing for England to fight for self-government.

¹ NAI, Home Poll 214-217 Part B, February 1918., 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence,' for the week ending 9 February 1918. For the first time in memory the annual session of the All-India National Congress which met at Calcutta in December 1917, did not decide on the venue of its next annual session. Sultan Singh invited the Congress in January 1918 to hold their 33rd annual session at Delhi in December 1918.

² NAI, Home Poll 38 Deposit, March 1918. Mrs Besant and Mrs Naidu were present, but declined to speak.

³ NAI, Home Poll 41 Deposit, March 1918, 'Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the Second Half of February 1918,' W.M. Hailey to J. DuBoulay, 2 March 1918; RDDA, Confidential File 204 (1918), 'Fortnightly Reports', Delhi Police Secret Abstract No. 8, 23 February 1918.

Dr Ansari and Sayid Shabbir Hussain, the brother of Wazir Hussain of Lucknow, also made speeches; but it was the more vehement speeches of Pandit Shiv Narain Haksar, Shankar Lal, and Dr Abdul Rahman which gained enthusiastic responses from the audience.¹

The Extremists began planning for the December sessions with a meeting on 16 February at Sultan Singh's house. They had found that the local District Association (which was controlled by the Moderates) could not be used for their purposes, so they created a Provincial Congress Committee which included Ajmere-Marwara. The meeting of 200 at Sultan Singh's house elected Hakim Ajmal Khan to preside and immediately removed Asaf Ali from the secretaryship of the Committee. The main task of the Committee, however, was to elect a president of the Reception Committee. Dr Ansari proposed Hakim Ajmal Khan whose nomination was seconded by Rai Bahadur Kanhya Lal. Dr A.C. Sen then proposed Sultan Singh and the debate developed into a struggle between Hindus and Muslims with the members of each community supporting their co-religionist. Rather than risk an open break the Hakim Sahib intervened and deferred the election until February when representatives from Ajmere would be present.²

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The Honourable Mr Sharma who was also there spoke, but Mrs Besant and M.K. Gandhi who were in Delhi to attend the All-India Congress Committee meeting of 23 February did not make an appearance.

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RDDA, Confidential File 204 (1918), Delhi Police Secret Abstract No. 8, 23 February 1918.

The campaign of public meetings continued apace. The anniversary meeting of the Chaori Bazaar Arya Samaj on 24 February became the venue for a speech for Home Rule. This was, in fact, a most remarkable meeting for several reasons. The first reason was that the audience contained 3,000 even though there were only 200 members of the organisation. The second reason was the fact that the speaker was Mahatma Munshi Ram or Shradhanand as he now styled himself. The audience had obviously gathered to hear the Mahatma who was the leader of the 'gurukul' group of the Arya Samaj and who, more importantly, was one of the most outstanding Hindu religious leaders of north India. He had resigned as principal of the Gurukula Mahavidyalaya at Kangri and had taken the vows of a sanyasi (hence his change of name). He also announced that his political views were not the views of the Arya Samaj, but the fact that he became involved in politics at all was most extraordinary in view of his attitude in 1910, that the Arya Samaj was not a political organisation. He delivered a passionate lecture on Dayanand's views on swaraj and then launched into a dissertation of swadeshi. He stated that the Brahmachari School was far superior to the American and English schools which turned out students who suffered from all types of venereal diseases. He remarked that Home Rule would be obtained when Indians attained unity in language, style of living and refused to imitate Western manners and customs. He concluded that the members of the audience should reform their own characters and should take as their model Mahatma Gandhi.¹

¹ RDDA, Confidential File 204 (1918), Delhi Police Secret Abstract No. 9, 2 March 1918.

The Home Rule League finally showed signs of creating enthusiasm for their campaign. Their campaign for the Municipal Committee elections was in full swing and at a meeting of 3 March they drew an audience of 6,000. Dr Ansari presided over the meeting and both he and the main speaker, Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru of Allahabad, emphasised Hindu-Muslim unity.¹ The emphasis on Hindu-Muslim unity, however, did not seem to awaken much of a response since on the following Sunday, 10 March, Mazhur-ul-Haq, the president of the All-India Moslem League, and Abdul Kasim, a member of Bengal Legislative Council, could only attract an audience of 1,500. The Home Rulers were somewhat more successful the following week when on Tuesday the 19th they drew an audience of 3,500 to hear the honourable members M.A. Jinnah and T.B. Saprú, and Abdul Kasim. The first two were quite moderate in their orations, but Abdul Kasim delivered a violent polemic against the police.²

Enthusiasm for the campaign waned quickly, however. None of the Extremists won election to the Municipal Committee and both Gandhi and Abdul Bari refused to make public speeches while they were in the city in March. In fact, the Chief Commissioner observed that:

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RDDA, Confidential File 204 (1918), Delhi Police Secret Abstract No. 10, 9 March 1918.

2

RDDA, Confidential File 204 (1918), Delhi Police Secret Abstract No. 11, 16 March 1918.

Generally speaking, the public speeches delivered a [sic] Delhi by the visitors to the Secretary of State, and by the members of the Legislative Council, have been moderate in tone. They have on more than one occasion proved disappointing to the local Home Rulers, who have looked for something even more potent than the stuff served out to them by local fire-eaters.¹

The lack of response to National Education Week which was held the first week of April confirmed the fact that the citizens of Delhi had lost interest in a campaign which used members of the Imperial Legislative Council who were unwilling to use strong words.²

The effort to politicise the citizens of Delhi was at best only a qualified success during the first three months of 1918. The largest audience was around 6,000 and drew upon the same classes and communities which had supported the Home Rule League in September 1917. And even though some of the most significant leaders were Muslim, the only Muslims who supported the movement were the Extremists of the 'New Muslim Party'. The Hindu character of the movement was most evident in the wrangle over the choice of a president for the Reception Committee of the Congress. The people who gathered on 28 February to make final selection failed to come to any decision and resolve whether a Hindu or a Muslim was the more acceptable. A meeting of 150 at Sultan Singh's house on 21 April finally decided upon Hakim Ajmal Khan, after

¹ NAI, Home Poll 22 Deposit, May 1918, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the Second Half of March, 1918,' W.M. Hailey to S.R. Hignell, 5 April 1918.

² NAI, Home Poll 64 Deposit, May 1918.

a 'long and disorderly meeting'. But the election of a Muslim drove the most enthusiastic Hindus out of the Provincial Congress Committee.¹

With the problem of election out of the way, the local Extremists could resume their propaganda activities. The Extremists, who now controlled the Home Rule League, the Provincial Congress Committee, the Indian Association, and the Moslem League, held meetings on the 26th, 27th, 28th and 30th April. The speakers were G.S. Khaparde, Dr Abdul Rahman, B.P. Bomanji (from Bombay), Asaf Ali, and Shankar Lal. The meeting of the 28th held special significance for the Home Rulers and a large number of the politically conscious in the city who attended the opening of a swadeshi store in Delhi by Mahatma Gandhi. Although the Mahatma said very little, the entire project received the enthusiastic support of the students and petty bourgeoisie. To many it was a spiritual and material reaffirmation of Indian virtues and values. And to an even larger proportion of the population there was now a visible symbol of the abstract political values that the articulate in the society sought to disseminate.²

The opening of the swadeshi store, which attracted thousands, was the only bright spot in the Home Rule

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RDDA, Confidential File 204 (1918), Delhi Police Secret Abstract No. 8, 23 February 1918. There were 37 persons elected to the Executive Committee of the Reception Committee, of which four were Muslims (Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr Ansari, Hafiz Abdul Aziz, pleader, and Asaf Ali).

2

RDDA, Confidential File 204 (1918), Delhi Police Secret Abstract No. 17, 4 May 1918. Shankar Lal became the manager of the store.

movement for many months. There were meetings on the 10th, 13th, 15th, 16th, and 24th June, but these usually drew 1,000 and rarely 2,000 persons. The Extremists, mainly Asaf Ali and Neki Ram Sharma, made successively more vitriolic speeches, but were unable to sustain sufficient élan among significant sections of the city. The majority of their supporters were students and Extremists as the rest of the community saw little reason to attend meetings at the height of a stifling Indian summer.¹ The movement also suffered from the fact that the more respected leaders were in the hill resorts. It was significant, however, that no meeting reached the same nadir of 4 August 1917 and that there was a significant amount of politicisation evident. The fact that a political meeting, which was held during the week, could draw between 1,000 and 2,000 persons, the majority of whom were not literate in English, revealed that some progress had been made over the conditions which existed before 1911. It also revealed that the concepts of Home Rule, swadeshi and swaraj had become meaningful concepts for significant sections of the community. It was still a small group, however, since the majority were literate and pursued non-manual occupations. In addition to the growth of the number of people who had been politicised, there was a change in the political idiom. The people who supported political activity before 1911 had some vague notions of social reform which would either result in political change or which political change would bring about. The new idiom reaffirmed traditional values and was couched

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RDDA, Confidential File 212 (1918), 'Home Rule Agitation'.

in a language which could serve as a focus for a much wider range of grievances, economic, religious, or social. This, in fact, became the means by which the nationalist leaders politicised ever larger groups in the society, as the agitators became more successful in their attempt to focus limited grievances onto larger political issues.

The nationalist agitators in Delhi seized upon two local grievances to raise political issues in June, July, and August. The first was the arrest and trial of Neki Ram Sharma and Asaf Ali. These two had been served with orders on 12 June not to address any public meetings under the Defence of India Act. The Chief Commissioner decided that the meeting they addressed on 24 June contravened the order and had the pair arrested on 6 July. The Home Rule League held a meeting of protest at which a large subscription was collected for their defence. The trial commenced on the 17 July before a packed court room which was similarly filled each day throughout the proceedings. The popular imagination immediately seized upon this issue as another symbol of the Home Rule movement which was eloquently expressed by a mass meeting to celebrate the acquittal of these two whom the Administration had made into intrepid heroes.¹ This meeting was immeasurably larger than the meeting of

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NAI, Home Poll 41 Deposit, September 1918, 'Report on the Internal Political Situation in India for the Second Half of August 1918,' H.C. Beadon to S.R. Hignell, 31 August 1918. Interview with Sri Ram Sharma, 22 April 1967, by the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.

18 August which was held to protest the report of the Montagu-Chelmsford reform scheme.¹

The second local issue which the agitators used to capture the public imagination was somewhat more parochial. The Extremist Muslims formed the Central Bureau for the Release of Muslim Internees which then began to publish a series of pamphlets. The first pamphlet contained the correspondence between the mother of Mohamed Ali and Mrs Besant; the second pamphlet offered a selection of Mohamed Ali's poetry; while a third contained questions about the internment of Mahmud-ul-Hasan; all of these appeared in June.² They were followed in July by a campaign inaugurated on Jamat-ul-Vida in the mosques to raise subscriptions for the internees and their families. The agitators persuaded several prominent Muslim citizens in almost every mosque to carry subscription boxes which bore the inscription:

....the nation delights to honour those whom Government submits to disgrace, since this is the only reply that a subject race can give to the tyranny of its rulers.³

The same practice was repeated on Fitr-Id with equal success and with the addition of a leaflet from the Calcutta branch of the Bureau which sought to demonstrate that there was an organised conspiracy afoot to destroy

¹ RDDA, Confidential File 204 (1918), Delhi Police Secret Abstract No. 33, 24 August 1918.

² RDDA, Confidential File 214 (1918), 'Inquiry about the Publication of a Pamphlet about M. Muhammad Hasan.'

³ NAI, Home Poll 31 Deposit, August 1918.

Islam. This group was most vociferous, however, with the publication of the Report of the Sedition Committee which accepted the guilt of Mahmud-ul-Hassan. Religious sentiment permeated the entire community and it appeared that the Bureau would ride an upswell of support in its efforts to get the Muslim internees released. This effort was severely curtailed by the spread of an influenza epidemic which struck with such tenacity that it lasted for three months and which struck with such ferocity that it killed 7,000 people in the city and an additional 16,000 outside the city.

The last four months of 1918 combined issues of national significance with those of local importance. The events of national significance heightened the tone of political opinion in the city. The Muslim community raised its voice to protest against the Rowlatt Report's condemnation of Mahmud-ul-Hasan, while the orthodox Hindu community were equally vociferous against the government which allowed the introduction of the Hindu Marriage Validity Bill (the Patel Intercaste Marriage Bill) into the Imperial Legislative Council in September. Shortly thereafter the Indian Daily News, an English-language journal published by an Anglo-Indian in Calcutta, issued an article which was thought to have 'grossly insulted'

the Prophet.¹ A meeting of protest was advertised in Calcutta at the Nakoda Mosque with the hope of drawing speakers from all over India. The meeting was prohibited and a riot took place on 9 September with many Muslim casualties. The riot at Calcutta was closely followed by riots during the Bakr-Id celebration at Karturpur in the United Provinces, where Hindus attacked Muslims and burned 30 of them, many of whom were still alive, in their homes.²

While events of a national significance attracted the attention of the politicised segments of the community in Delhi internal conditions took a disquieting turn in the city. A serious influenza epidemic broke out in the Punjab and the United Provinces during September, October,

1

NAI, Home Poll 164-201 Part A, November 1918, 'Report of the Recent Mohamedan Disturbances in Calcutta.' The phrase was 'not far away the wayfarer decries an Arab with clear cut features and a world of mysticism in his eyes looking as reverently into a gutter as if it was his Prophet's tomb.' The general reasons given for the riot were the competition between loyalty to the British Empire and sympathy with Turkey; the rise in the cost of necessities; and the 'bitter memories' of the Shahbad riots in Behar during Bakr-Id in 1917 when Hindus attacked Muslims.

There was a small meeting in Delhi to protest the article in the Indian Daily News, but the Calcutta riot drew no immediate response. NAI, Home Poll 31 Deposit, October 1918, 'Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the First Half of September 1918,' H.C. Beadon to S.R. Hignell, 18 September, 1918.

2

There were 30 Muslims killed in the riot. NAI, Home Poll 43 Deposit, October 1919, 'Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the First Half of August 1919.' This riot drew no immediate response from Muslims in Delhi.

and November, with the worst-hit areas in the region of the Jumna River. The districts of Gurgaon and Rohtak in the Punjab had the highest death rates, and Delhi, being close by, did not escape.¹ The epidemic was exacerbated in turn by the high cost of necessities.² The price of atta (flour) was less than five seers per rupee, which were extreme famine prices.³ The price of salt was four times what it had been in 1914 and kerosene oil was almost unobtainable. The Municipal Committee had to open cheap grain shops and salt depots to alleviate the economic distress of the poorer classes in the city.⁴

Events of local and national significance impinged jointly upon Delhi in December 1918. The city became the venue of 31 national organisations, prominent among which were the All-India National Congress and the All-

1

RDDA, Home File 33 (a) Part B 1919, 'Report and Investigations in Connection with the Influenza Epidemic.' The rural areas suffered most from the lack of convenient medical facilities. The epidemic was so bad at its height that the Recruiting Committee used the plea that it was safer in the Army than in the home. RDDA, Foreign File 10 Part B 1919, 'Celebration of the Peace at Delhi.'

² NAI, Home Poll 24 Deposit, November 1918, 'Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the Second Half of October 1918.' Chief Commissioner Hailey stated that the high cost of essential food stuffs over a long period had brought on malnutrition which left large portions of the populace too weak to withstand the disease.

³ NAI, Home Poll 32 Deposit, October 1918, 'Report on the Internal Political Situation for the Second Half of September 1918,' H.C. Beadon to S.R. Hignell, 2 October 1918.

⁴ RDDA, Revenue File 61 Part B 1919, 'Orders Regarding the Development and Control of Goodgrains in Delhi.'

India Moslem League. The Chairman of the Reception Committee of the Congress was Hakim Ajmal Khan, one of the most eminent of the traditional leaders in the city. The Chairman of the Reception Committee of the Moslem League was Dr M.A. Ansari.¹ Pandit Malaviya and Fazl-ul-Haq were the respective presidents. There were 6,000 observers at the Congress sessions in addition to 5,700 delegates.²

The initial address to the Congress came from Hakim Ajmal Khan, whose speech, delivered in English, dealt mainly with the inadequacy of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reform Scheme. The speaker also discussed the attitude of the Muslims towards Turkey, the Holy Places and the

1

NAI, Home Poll 42 Deposit, January 1919, 'Report on the Internal Political Situation for the Second Half of December 1918.' There was a great deal of dissension among the members of both reception committees and between them and groups in the city. The Congress Reception Committee was refused permission to stage a procession through the city because of the attitude of the Muslims as a result of the Karturpur riots. (These Muslims met at the Jama Masjid on 20 December to protest the Hindu-Muslim unity which the Congress and the League were advocating.) The Extremist congressites detained Malaviya at Ghaziabad on 25 December and had him arrive in Delhi on a later train so that instead of the eight persons waiting to welcome him at 9.00 a.m., there were 8,000 waiting for him at noon. Hakim Ajmal Khan succeeded in whisking him away to his house before they could lead Malaviya on an illegal procession.

2

NAI, Home Poll 160-163 Part B, January 1919 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Central Intelligence,' for the week ending 11 January 1919. The Extremists had paid the fees for 700 peasants from the surrounding districts to give the Congress the appearance of having a mass base.

Khilafat. He concluded with a plea for Hindu-Muslim unity and asked all the political leaders to exert their influence to prevent any further 'painful incidents', such as the communal riots at Karturpur.¹

The annual session of the Moslem League followed the general pattern of the Congress session.² The star performance of both sessions, however, was the opening speech of Dr Ansari, which was delivered in Urdu and had four basic themes.³ The first theme posited that the

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NAI, Home Poll 160-163 Part B, January 1919, 'Report for weekend 11 January 1919.'

2

The League also desired to have a mass base. But instead of recruiting peasants, they invited the ulema to the session. If the ulema had responded the influence of the League over the masses of Indian Muslims would have been infinitely greater than if peasants had been recruited to attend. Only ten maulvis responded, however, and little was achieved even though the Shams-ul-Ulama of Deoband did send a letter of support for the League's resolution on the Khilafat and the Holy Places. It is interesting to note that two of the ten maulvis who did attend were from Delhi. They were Ahmad Said and Kifayatullah who read out a resolution passed at a meeting of maulvis at the Fatehpuri Mosque and added that the ulema did not consider politics and religion two separate things. He added that no doubt the ulema had left politics to the League in the past, but when the call went out, they were only too glad to join the political body.

3

NAI, Home Poll 160-163 Part B, January 1919, 'Report for the week ending 11 January 1919.' Choudhary Khaliqzaman in Pathway to Pakistan (Lahore, 1961), states that Abdul Rahman, Mohammad Shuaib, and himself helped to write Ansari's speech, p. 43. C.R. Cleveland thought it had been written by Abdul Ghaffar, who was formerly editor of the Jamhur and who was expelled from Calcutta after the riots there.

pending dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, which was attributable to the dislike of the Muslims and the avarice and greed 'of the chancellories of Europe', denied the Khalifa control over the Holy Places.¹ The second part of the speech accused the British of being prejudiced against the Muslims. The third section of the speech, which dealt with Hindu-Muslim unity, reiterated Dr Ansari's belief in the vitality of the Lucknow Pact and his disbelief that pan-Islamism was inimical to Indian nationalism. The final topic of the speech concerned self-determination. Dr Ansari ended on the note that the exclusion of India from the application of Wilson's Fourteen Points was inexcusable in the light of India's contributions and sacrifices during the War.

The impact of Dr Ansari's speech on the session, on the city, and on Muslims in north India was quite startling.

There is no doubt that the masses were grieved to hear of the Sultan's defeat [stated a Muslim officer in the Central Intelligence Department], but beyond that, there was no feeling. Now Dr Ansari's address with its quotations from the Qoran and the support of the ulemas is producing anger and hate among them. The address has been widely read and by now every Musulman knows that the Holy places are going out of the hands of the Musulman sovereign and that the English are responsible.²

¹ The entire text of Dr Ansari's speech to the eleventh annual session of the All-India Moslem League appears in the Appendix to this Chapter.

² NAI, Home Poll 160-163 Part B, January 1919, 'Report for the week ending 25 January 1919.'

The speech was, in fact, a passionate resumé of the fears and frustrations of the entire Muslim community in India in general and in Delhi in particular.

APPENDIX

Speech Delivered by Dr. M.A. Ansari, Chairman,
Reception Committee, All-India Muslim League
11th Sessions, Delhi, 30th December 1918.*

[Quotation in Urdu omitted]

Members of the All-India Muslim League, Ladies and
Gentlemen, -

I have been entrusted with the duty of welcoming you, on behalf of the Muslim citizens of Delhi, to this ancient city, which was once the seat of Muslim power and glory and the home of Muslim civilization and culture; and which has, alas! also seen their gradual decline and decay. This assembly of Mussalmans, from all parts of India, awakens in one's imagination the memory of many a brilliant gathering which, in the palmy days of its Muslim Rulers, Delhi must have witnessed. It was this city from where such great saints as Khwaja Qutbuddin Bakhtiar Kaki, Sultan Nizam-uddin Aulia, Khwaja Baqi-Billah, Shah Kalimullah Jahanabadi and famous divines as Sheikh Abdul Haqq Muhaddis Dehlavi, Shah Fakhr-ud-din, Shah Abdul Aziz (may the blessings of God be upon them all) sent forth the light of Muslim religion, Muslim theology and Islamic philosophy, not only to the four corners of India but beyond its geographical limits, to Bokhara and Samarkand, to Persia and Baghdad and even to Mecca and Medina. It was Delhi that gave to India that beautiful language which is the offspring of all that is sweet in Arabic, Persian and Turkish on one side and Sanskrit and Prakrit on the other. From the mere lingua of the camp followers it rose to the eminence of being designated the Urdu-i-Maulla [sic] of the Red Palace and gradually it became the acknowledged literary, economic and political language of the country. It was Delhi again which blended the Indian with the highly polished Persian Art, and gave to the world that eminent poet [sic], Sufi and genius, Amir

* Disorders Inquiry Committee, 1919-1920, Minutes of Evidence, Volume I (Delhi), contained in the written evidence of C.A. Barron.

Khusru, and the great philosopher-poet Assadullah Khan Ghalib. Delhi, under its Muslim name Shahjahanabad, with its Jama Masjid, the Diwan-i-Aam and the Diwan-i-Khas, shall always give to India the highest place in the world of architecture, as much as that lofty monument, the Qutub Minar, holds high the mighty power of the Faith to which it was consecrated as one of the towers of the Masjid-i-Quwwat-ul-Islam. Time has not yet effaced the landmarks of Islam in the history of this country nor has the dust of centuries buried the footprints of our ancestors. Gentlemen, I welcome you to the cradle of Islamic civilization in India and to the city of Muslim memories.

Our departed friends.

Since we met last at Calcutta, we have lost some of our leading men and sincere and zealous workers. The death of Nawab Haji Muhammad Ishaq Khan at this most momentous period of the history of our country, has removed from amongst us not only a true patriot but also a great champion of the rights of progressive Muslim India. He had a courage which did not fail at the critical time and his support one could rely upon even during the most adverse circumstances. The late Justice Khan Bahadur Mian Muhammad Shah Din leaves a gap in our society which it will be difficult to fill. As a great lawyer and scholar he was held in high esteem in our community. Another and a still more painful loss has been that of Sheikh Wilayat Ali, Qidwai, of Barabanki, who was snatched away, in the prime of life, from a most fruitful literary career. As a humourist Bambooque was unequalled. His numerous sketches in The Comrade and The New Era form classics that will always keep his memory fresh and green. Last of all, we mourn the death of that silent worker, great thinker and philosopher, Dr. Abdur Rahman, Bijnori, who, in his simplicity and modesty coupled with great learning, reminded one of the scholars and masters of early Islamic days. The Muslim University, whenever it comes into existence, will bear the impress of his mind for always. The Sultania College, a child of his imagination, will not receive his fostering care and Muslim education in India will be the poorer in the loss of its best champion. He was devoted to the service of Urdu and at the time of his sad death, at the beginning of a promising career, he was engaged in writing a learned

introduction to the Diwani-i-Ghalib, shortly to be published by the Anjuman-i-Taraqq-i-Urdu. May Almighty Allah give their souls eternal rest and peace. Amen!

Muslim world situation: Temporal Power of Islam

Gentlemen, we are meeting to-day at a very critical period in the history of the world. The Great War, in which the nations of the East and West were engaged, has come to an end and bloodshed and carnage have ceased. But, although the war is over, our anxieties have only begun. Momentous issues hang in the balance and the entire course of human history is to be determined, at least for a very long time to come, by the decisions of the Peace Conference. It is an anxious moment for every nation, but for the Musalmans it is especially so. Never in their varied history of over 1,300 years have they been faced with a situation as it is to-day.

Gentlemen, the British Government, in its international engagements and relations, has always claimed, as a matter of right, the attention of the world because the King of England rules over the largest number of Muslim subjects. But it must be remembered that every right has a corresponding duty and responsibility, which a Government, howsoever strong, cannot afford to ignore. The time has now come when the Musalman subjects of His Majesty demand that the Ministers of the Crown, who are in charge of the destinies of the British Empire, shall do their duty by the Musalmans of India.

We all know how Islam has suffered in its temporal power since the latter half of the nineteenth century. Each succeeding generation has witnessed the gradual disruption of the House of Islam. Divers reasons have been brought forth and plausible explanations have not been wanting; lofty political doctrines have been invented to screen aggressive designs and humanitarian principles have been advanced to justify the acts of robbery done to Islamic Kingdoms. The white man's burden too has been paraded before an innocent and all-believing world. But bereft of all the verbiage of innocent-looking doctrines and high-sounding principles, this tragedy can be traced to the common dislike of the Muslim or the avarice and greed of the chancelleries of Europe.

That belt of Muslim States which once extended from the shores of the Atlantic to the confines of the Chinese Empire has, bit by bit, shrunk to a mere shadow. In Europe, the Northern littoral of the Black Sea, Wallachia, Reumelia, Greece and Macedonia have been lost, one after the other, in quick succession. In Africa, Morocco, Algeria, Tunis, Tripoli and Egypt are gone. Caucasia and the Khanates of Central Asia shared the same fate, and the integrity and independence of Persia, after the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, is a huge political joke. Even the bedouin of the African and Arabian deserts is being seduced to give up his nomadic life and take to the refinements of cafes chantants. Turkey, which has fought the battles of Islam for many centuries, is in imminent and grave danger of being parcelled out into small States to the great detriment of the Muslim world.

The Khilafat.

It is an acknowledged fact of history that in 918 A.H. (1518 A.C. [sic]) the last Khalifa of the house of Abbas, Muhammad Abbasi of Egypt, transferred, with the consent and concurrence of the Musalman people, the office and dignity of the Khilafat and the spiritual sovereignty of Islam along with the symbols of this exalted office, the sword, the standard and the cloak of the Prophet, to the Osmanli Sultan Salim, the Great. The Sultan, accompanied by Muhammad Abbasi, took these holy relics to Istambol. It is from this day that the Sultans of the house of Osman have received the honoured appellations of Khalifat-ul-Muslimin, Sultan-ul-Islam and Khadim-ul-Haramain-ish-Sharifain and the Musalmans of the world have recognised them as their spiritual Imams and the successors of the Messenger of God. Not only in the harams of Mecca and Medina but throughout the wide expanse where the religion of Islam is practised, prayers for their success and glory are offered every Friday and on the occasions of the two Ids.

Sharif Barakat of Mecca, on getting a firman from Sultan Salim, acknowledged him as Khalifa and ordered the name of the Turkish Sultan to be introduced in the prayers. No Sharif has, since then, questioned the authority of the rulers of Turkey and even Sharif Husain recognised the Sultan as the lawful Khalifa and submitted to his spiritual overlording.

During the course of the present war, actuated by personal ambitions and selfish interests, Sharif Husain raised the standard of revolt against the unquestioned Khalifa of Islam, whom he himself had recognised as such. By this action of his he not only disregarded a rule of political morality, but, according to Muslim belief and religious teaching, broke an explicit and clear commandment of God and His Prophet. It has been distinctly ordered in the Holy Qur'an that:-

[Quotation in Urdu omitted]

"If one party become disloyal to the other (which is in power), fight against the one that has become disloyal until it return to the bidding of God." [Ch. 26; S. 49; V. 9]

and the Prophet has said that:-

[Quotation in Urdu omitted]

"Various dissensions shall take place after me. If any one attempts to divide the unity of my people, kill him with the sword, whosoever he be." [SAHIH MUSLIM.]

The scholars and divines of Islam in commenting upon this hadis have said that:-

[Quotation in Urdu omitted]

"Behead the person who revolts against the Imam even if he be superior and more exalted (than the Imam himself) and even if you also consider him to be in the right and more exalted."

The Prophet has further said that:-

[Quotation in Urdu omitted]

"If allegiance is demanded for two Khalifas, kill the latter among them." [SAHIH MUSLIM.]

These are the definite and conclusive injunctions which leave no room for doubt, and, therefore, on religious grounds, the revolt of the Sharif transgresses the law of Islam and consequently is totally HARAM (forbidden and sinful).

The Holy Places

The most important duty of the Khalifa is to keep the Holy Places under Muslim protection. This protection means nothing less than the complete and unquestioned sovereignty of the Sultan over them and their immunity from interference on the part of non-Muslims. It must not be lost sight of that every age has its special needs and requirements and with the change of times these needs and requirements also change. No sovereign to-day can discharge this great religious duty, satisfactorily and faithfully, unless the essentials of modern civilization are within his reach. He should, in the first place, command the sympathies and support of the people whose holy places he guards and protects. The economic and natural resources at his disposal should be adequate and effective to enable him to defend these places. His councillors and ministers should be well-versed in modern arts and sciences and they should possess sound experience of modern diplomacy and statecraft. He should be well-equipped with all the latest weapons of war. For the last four hundred years, in the opinion of the Musalmans, no Muslim sovereign has satisfied the above conditions better than the Sultans of the Turkish Empire. It is the firm conviction and deliberate judgment of the Muslim world that, from the time of Sultan Salim down to the present day, the house of Osman has discharged its duties in respect of the holy places, to its entire satisfaction. Therefore, His Imperial Majesty Sultan Wahid-ud din Muhammad VI is the one and the only Musalman who is and can be the rightful Commander of the Faithful and the Khalifat-ur-Rasul, capable of protecting the two harams along with the other Holy Places of Islam and of successfully combating against the intrigues and secret machinations of non-Muslim Governments.

That the opinion of the Musalmans alone is the determining factor in this matter was officially acknowledged by Lord Robert Cecil, on behalf of His Majesty's Government on November the 29th, 1917.

"Mr. King asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, since the outbreak of War, Russia had any communications with this country relative to the proposals that the Sultan of Turkey should no longer be recognised as Khalifa; if so, what

attitude was then assumed on behalf of this country; and whether he will now declare that the Khalifate is a question for Islam alone to decide?

LORD R. CECIL: The answer to the first part of the Hon. Member's question is in the affirmative, but His Majesty's Government have never departed from the attitude that the question of the Khalifate is one for Muslim opinion alone to decide."

[Parliamentary Debates: Commons:
Vol. XCIX. page 2192.]

We demand that this decision of the Government be put into practice and be not relegated to the domain of pious hopes and broken promises.

Jazirat-ul-Arab.

What are the Holy Places of Islam? The greatest authority that a Musalman can quote in proof of his contention, next to the Qur'an, is that of the ahadees. It is reported that the Prophet once said:-

[Quotation in Urdu omitted]

"Remove the non-Muslims from the Jazirat-ul-Arab."

[SAHIH BOKHARI AND SAHIH MUSLIM.]

The same tradition is reported by Hazrat Ibn-i-Abbas in the following words:-

[Quotation in Urdu omitted]

"The Prophet, may the blessings and peace of God be upon him, had left three things as legacy, one out of which was 'remove the non-Muslims from the Jazirat-ul-Arab.'"

[SAHIH BOKHARI AND SAHIH MUSLIM.]

The question naturally arises as to what is meant by Jazirat-ul-Arab? No explanations could carry greater weight than those given by Arabian scholars and Arabic lexicons.

[Quotation in Urdu omitted]

"That which is surrounded by the Indian Ocean and the Sea of Sham (Syria) and also by the Tigris and Euphrates."

[QAMUS.]

Then again it is said that:-

[Quotation in Urdu omitted]

"Jazirat-ul-Arab extends from Aden to the mountains of Sham in length; and in breadth from Jeddah and the Sea Coast to the agricultural lowlands of Iraq (Mesopotamia)."

[LISAN-UL-ARAB.]

Further, the reason for its being called the "Island of Arabia" has been explained thus:-

[Quotation in Urdu omitted]

"All these lands are called Jazirat-ul-Arab because they are surrounded by the Sea of Fars (Persian Gulf) and the Sea of Abyssinia and the Tigris and Euphrates.

[LISAN-UL-ARAB.]

The injunction, that non-Muslims should not rule over the smallest portion of the Jazirat-ul-Arab, was given because in this portion of the world are situated the cities consecrated by the religion, history and traditions of the Musalmans. In it are buried all the prophets, imams and divines of Islam and from the midst of its desert started that world-force which has not yet exhausted itself and which according to the faith of the Musalmans, will endure till the Day of Judgment.

Mecca.

In the Jazirat-ul-Arab is situated the Holy City of Mecca which contains the Baitullah, the first house of God, built by Abraham and reconstructed by the last of the prophets, towards which the Musalmans of all climes and countries turn their faces five times a day. It is

the birthplace of the Prophet and it was to Mecca that he addressed the words:-

"O land of Mecca, I love thee better than any other portion of God's earth and if my people had not driven me out I would never have forsaken thee."

Surrounded by Mina, Arafat and numerous other places, a visit to which is an essential part of the Haj every inch of Mecca and the land around it is sacred territory, where, never since the days of Abraham, has a bird been shot or a tree felled. For, has not Allah himself said:-

[Quotation in Urdu omitted]

"Do they not behold that We have made Mecca a sanctuary."

[Ch. 21; S. 29; V. 67.]

Medina.

Yasrib, where the Prophet found safety and a home after his migration from the city of his birth, became renowned as the Madinat-un-Nabi or "the city of the Prophet." God named it Taiba or Taba (holy) as the Prophet once said:-

[Quotation in Urdu omitted]

"God has named it the holy city." [SAHIH MUSLIM.]

Medina was raised to the high dignity of a haram (sanctuary) by the Prophet who said:-

[Quotation in Urdu omitted]

"Abraham made Mecca a haram and I declare Medina to be one...." [SAHIH MUSLIM.]

'It is of this city that the Prophet declared:-

[Quotation in Urdu omitted]

"He who comes with the intention of seeing me will be near me on the Day of Judgment; I shall be his witness and intercede on his behalf on the Day of Judgment who adopts Medina as his home and bears its hardships with patience while he who dies within the holy precincts of Mecca or Medina will be immune from punishment on the Day of Judgment."

[MISHKAT: BAIHAQI.]

A major portion of the Divine Book was revealed in Medina and from there were issued the orders and instructions which gave final shape and form to the constitution and organization of the Islamic Theocracy. Medina again was the centre from which radiated the resplendent rays of the Light of Islam and it was here that the mortal remains of the Prophet were entrusted to the earth.

Mecca with its Baitullah and Medina with its Rauza-i-athar are together called the Haramain-ish-Sharifain and in the words of the Holy Qur'an:-

[Quotation in Urdu omitted]

"Those who join others with God are unclean, so let them not come near the Sacred Mosque after this their year."

[Ch. 10; S. 9; V. 28]

non-Muslims are forbidden to enter them.

Jerusalem and Palestine.

Bait-ul-Muqaddis, "city of the Holy House," is also held sacred by the Musalmans. This was the city towards which, not only all the prophets of Beni Israel turned their faces in prayers, but it was also the qibla of the Prophet of Islam and his followers for full 14 years. After the Kaaba, the Masjid-il-Aqsa of Jerusalem is the first house of God in Islam. It has been referred to in the Qur'an in connection with the Mi'raj where it is said:-

[Quotation in Urdu omitted]

"Glory be to Him Who took His servant a journey by night from Masjid-il-Haram to Masjid-il-Aqsa whose precincts we have blessed."

[Ch. 15; S. 17; V. 1.]

Allah ordered Moses to remove his shoes in its vicinity in the words:-

[Quotation in Urdu omitted]

"Thou art in the holy valley Tuwa."

[Ch. 16; S. 20; V. 12.]

Just as President Wilson would refuse to hand over the government of the United States to the head of some forgotten Red Indian tribe or just as the whites in the European colonies would decline to withdraw in favour of the native aboriginals or even just as we ourselves would oppose a revival of the Bhil and Gond Empire in India, Palestine cannot be handed over to the Zionists, whose sole claim to that land is, that centuries before the birth of Christ, the ancestors of the wandering sons of Israel had once lived in it. The achievements of Salah-ud-din Ayyubi and the blood of millions of Mujahidin did not flow, in the days of the Crusades, to lose it to a people who cannot put forward any recognisable claim to it. The Muslim rulers of Palestine have, as acknowledged by Christians and Jews themselves, always kept the door open to all. It has given no amount of pain and much resentment has been created, among the Musalmans of India, to see that the attitude of their own Government, in connection with this matter, has been diametrically opposed to their wishes and sentiments.

"Mr. King asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (on the 19th November 1917) whether the desire of the Government to see established a Jewish [sic] Zionist nationality in Palestine has been communicated to the Allied Powers, especially to France, Russia, Italy [sic] and the other Allied States; and whether it is one of the Allied war aims, or only a British war aim, to set up a Zionist community in the Holy Land?"

Mr. Balfour: No official communication has been made to the Allies on the subject, but His Majesty's Government believe that the declaration referred to would meet with their approval. His Majesty's Government hope that the establishment in Palestine of a national home of the Jewish people will result from the present war."

[Parliamentary Debates: Commons;
Vol. XCIX, page 838.]

This decision on the part of the Cabinet was served out to us here, in India, by Reuter and the Official Censor with the following addition:-

"(His Majesty's Government) will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being understood that nothing will be done to prejudice the civil and religious rights of the non-Jewish communities, in Palestine or the rights and political status of the Jews in any other country."

Nedjeff and Karbala.

Nujaf-i-Ashraf contains the sacred remains of Ali, the Lion of Allah and Khalifa of Islam. He is regarded as the fountain-head of the different schools of spiritualism by the Sufis.

In Karbala-i-Mualla is buried the greater martyr of Islam, Husain-ibn-i-Ali, who gave his life to uphold right against wrong.

Baghdad.

Baghdad with its mausoleum of Shaikh Abdul Qadir Jilani is the centre of the Qadiria school of Sufis which claims millions of votaries among the Musalmans all the world over. The names of Maruf-i-Karkhi, Ibn-i-Jauzi, Imam Ghazzali and that greatest of Muslim jurists Imam Abu Hanifa endear the city of Baghdad to the heart of every Muslim.

His Majesty's Declaration.

The Government of India published on behalf of His Majesty's Government on behalf of the Governments of France and Russia, a declaration on the 2nd November 1914 which says:-

"In view of the outbreak of war between Great Britain and Turkey, which to the regret of Great Britain has been brought about by the ill-advised, unprovoked and deliberate action of the Ottoman Government, His Excellency the Viceroy is authorised by His Majesty's Government to make the following public announcement in regard to the Holy Places of Arabia including the Holy Shrines of Mesopotamia and the port of Jedda, in order that there may be no misunderstanding on the part of His Majesty's Government most loyal Muslim subjects as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government in this war in which no question of a religious character is involved. These Holy Places and Jedda will be immune from attack or molestation by the British Naval and Military Forces so long as there is no interference with pilgrims from India to the Holy Places and Shrines in question. At the request of His Majesty's Government, the Governments of France and Russia have given them similar assurances."

I leave it to you, Gentlemen, to judge how far even this most carefully worded proclamation, has been carried into effect.

Muslim States.

Essential though they are to the Musalmans, these are not the only questions they desire to see settled to their satisfaction. There is another question of vital importance to the peaceful evolution of the human race which awaits our immediate and careful attention. This war, Gentlemen, has demonstrated, if any demonstration were needed, the instability of the present order of the world. It was the logical outcome of the policy of selfish aggrandisement and exclusive national ambitions pursued by the nations of the West who placed their national interests above the liberty and freedom of other nations. This general holocaust of the best and the

choicest of the human race would have taken place for nothing if we did not realize this fact and reconstruct the world on principles which would for ever preclude any chance of the domination of one portion of humanity by another and would give equal and fair chance to all nations to contribute to the efforts of MAN to realize himself. I have already reviewed the painful history of the fate of Muslim peoples before you. As men and as Musalmans we cannot be indifferent to the fate of 400 millions of our co-religionists in the world. We are deeply interested in their future and demand that not only the integrity and independence of the present Muslim States be maintained intact but the wrong done to the Arabs of North Africa and the Tartars and Turks of Central Asia be redressed and all these peoples be given a free chance of determining their own form of government. In this connection, Gentlemen, I feel it my bounden duty to offer, on your behalf and mine, our grateful thanks to that acknowledged intrepid leader of India, Mr. M. K. Gandhi, who is never afraid to speak out the truth and who has, by his noble actions, endeared himself as much to the Musalmans as to the Hindus. In his famous letter of the 29th April 1918, addressed to His Excellency the Viceroy, he has laid down the correct definition of Indian Nationalism and explained the attitude that should be adopted by Indian politicians towards Muslim sentiments.

Musalmans in India.

Looking back to the last four years of war through which we have passed, one can only characterise this period, so far as the relations of the officials and the Musalmans are concerned, as one varying from bias against them to that of antipathy, suspicion, mistrust and even dislike. The apparent cause of this attitude seems to be the entry of Turkey in this war against England and her Allies. In this choice of the Turks the Musalmans of India had no hand. Indeed, it can be authoritatively stated to the contrary that what little influence they possessed in this matter was used to dissuade the Turks from pursuing the course which they did. Neither did the Musalmans fail in their duty to urge their own Government to adopt a policy of reconciliation and not coerce the Turks to join its enemies. Our sympathies for the Turks are well-known and patent. The Musalmans, however,

exercised admirable self-control over their feelings, and, in spite of innumerable provocations, proved successful under the severest tests. As if the anxieties and agonies of the war were not sufficient, nearer home in India, we were being subjected to a treatment which no self-respecting people would have tolerated. Had it not been that our rulers were engaged in a struggle of life and death the Musalmans would have taken such constitutional measures as would have compelled attention.

Muslim Internment.

Eminent Muslim divines and acknowledged political leaders have been deprived of their freedom and liberty on the flimsiest pretexts. Those of us who have been fortunate enough to receive the attentions of the all-powerful C.I.D. know full well how its secret machinery works. No wonder if the authors of the Arabian Nights, Tilism-i-Hoshruha, and Qissa-i-Halim-Tai jump out of their graves to pay homage to the great masters of the C.I.D. for their creative imaginations and inventive faculties. To give to their fabrications the sorely needed touches of reality and truth, it has now become common practice to appoint official commissions and committees of inquiry which invariably put their seal of approbation and finality on them. While the Musalmans are keenly feeling the absence of men like Maulana Mahmud Hasan, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Mr. Shaukat Ali and his brilliant brother, Mr. Muhammad Ali, and host of others, a greater tragedy has been and is being enacted in the marshy and malarial lowlands of Bengal, where the youth and intellect of that unhappy province has been imprisoned and put in shackles.

Muslim Press.

Gentlemen, you are all aware of the methods adopted by the bureaucracy to strangle the Muslim Press and to destroy the organs of Muslim public opinion one by one, so much so, that in the whole of India not a single free Muslim newspaper exists to-day. Our voice has been silenced and we have been prevented from carrying our views to the public, the Government and the British Democracy. Where the omnivorous Press Act could not catch its prey, the Defence of India Act was brought to

assist it in devouring, one after another, the Zamindar, the Muslim Gazette, the Comrade, the Hamdard, the Tauhid, the Tarjuman, the Sadaqat, Al-Hilal, Al-Balagh, the New Era, Jamhur and many others.

Muslim Meetings.

The lack of sympathy for Muslim views and grievances has been further evidenced by the repressive policy adopted in the stopping of the meeting at Calcutta in September last. The objects of this meeting were not only perfectly lawful but involved a question vitally connected with the religious sentiments of the Musalmans, who were justified in their wish to give expression to their natural resentment at the insulting and vile references made to the Holy Prophet's tomb. The action of the Bengal Government in this matter was highly unjust, partial and one-sided and the responsibility for the loss of life and property rests entirely on its shoulders.

Gentlemen, you will thus observe that the two avenues of ventilating their grievances, a free press and the right of association, have been closed to them.

Separate Muslim Representation.

As a further evidence of the changed "angle of vision" on the part of the Government to the detriment of the rights of our community, I would refer you to the adverse and unfavourable remarks made by Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford on the question of separate electorates and communal representation, which is the life and soul of all our political activities of the present day. In view of the solemn pledges given to us by the Government and in view of the understanding arrived at between our Hindu brethren and ourselves and in our own interests, we cannot "release" the Government of its pledges and promises. The absence of any representative of the Musalmans of India from the deliberations of the Imperial Conference has added to this feeling of neglect, which has been further intensified by their non-representation at the War Cabinet and still more at the Peace Conference, where questions affecting the very existence of the Musalmans are to form subjects of discussion. No non-Muslim, however sympathetic or friendly he may be, can

claim to speak on Muslim questions with authority nor can he put the Muslim case in so forcible and convincing a manner as would be expected from a Musalman.

Religious Liberty.

Finally, there is a growing feeling among the Musalmans that attempts have been made to interfere with the religious liberty guaranteed to them under the Proclamation of 1858, which is the fundamental basis of their allegiance to the Crown. The indirect influence brought to bear upon the managers of mosques to remove the name of the Khalifat-ur-Rasul from the Friday prayers and the peregrinations of certain persons in search of signatures on the fatwa purporting to declare the rebel Sharif of Mecca as the future Khalifa of the Musalmans, are matters which cannot be ignored. The continuance of the cruel and unjust incarceration of Mr. Shaukat Ali and his brother Mr. Muhammad Ali, because they prefixed a few important sentences, regarding their allegiance to God and their adherence to the faith of Islam, to the undertaking sent them by the Director of the Criminal Intelligence Department, gives an added credence to this feeling. It is our duty, as law-abiding citizens, to beg the Government not to allow this feeling to take root in the minds of the people.

Hindu-Muslim Unity.

So far, Gentlemen, I have discussed topics which affected the Musalmans alone. But that does not mean that I am not keenly interested in the problems of our motherland. I have heard it said that the extra-territorial patriotism of the Indian Musalman is opposed to Indian Nationalism and that he would be prepared "to sacrifice the whole of India for an inch of land in Gallipoli." This is a travesty of truth not sanctioned by facts. The Musalmans have fought the battles of India shoulder to shoulder with their Hindu brethren, their political programme has come in line with that of the Hindus, the Hindu-Muslim rapprochement entered into at Lucknow has, year after year, gained strength and vitality and I believe that as time goes on we shall understand each other better and any causes of friction

that remain, shall cease to exist. It is my firm conviction that a true Musalman is always a good Nationalist. If we sympathise with the Musalmans of Turkey and Persia, we have also proved that we are second to none in our sincere advocacy of the rights of our countrymen in foreign lands and it was left to an Indian Musalman - Ahmad Muhammad Kachalia - to fight the battles of India in South Africa and fill the place vacated by that dauntless champion of our rights, Mr. Gandhi. But while anxious to fight for the common rights of the two communities, the Musalman is determined to maintain his position in this country and will jealously guard all his legitimate rights. It has pained me beyond expression to read the harrowing details of the barbarous treatment meted out by the Hindus of Katarpur to the unoffending and innocent Musalmans of that place. It is impossible to put into words the feelings of indignation and anger that are present in the hearts of every one of us here. Incidents like these embitter the relations between the two communities and strike at the very root of the entente cordiale. I appeal to my Hindu brethren to take effective measures to prevent any recurrence of such deplorable incidents. If it is necessary for the Musalmans to co-operate with the Hindus to realize their political ideals, the Hindus too cannot fulfil their national destiny by excluding the Musalmans. Accommodation, not retaliation, should be the motto of both of us.

Self-Determination.

It would be impossible to conclude my remarks without clearly putting before you the situation which this world war has created. Out of the welter and blood of the Armageddon have emerged certain definite principles on which will be based the foundations of a new and better world.

These principles were enunciated by the President of the American Republic and accepted by the statesmen of the leading nations of the world. They have been repeated, explained and amplified, time after time, until no doubt has been left in the minds of men that their application will be universal and not confined to the geographical limits of a country or continent, nor will they be circumscribed by the prejudices of race, colour or creed. To my mind there is but one single doctrine in which is

focussed the entire thought of the whole human race. This doctrine, Gentlemen, is the doctrine of self-determination. If every nation, small or large, weak or strong, free or under subjugation, is given the chance to realize itself and to determine its own destiny, without any outside intervention, it will develop its own form of government, its own national culture and its own peculiar civilization. It is only on such lines that free nationalities could expand and develop and it is only under such conditions that the world could be made fit to live in. The phrase "subject nationality" would then be obsolete and there would be no such thing as national greed or aggression. The world would then consist of a sisterhood of free and trusting States, each helping the other for the common good of mankind.

It was to facilitate the establishment of this happy order that India contributed so lavishly in men and money, and in the final reconstruction of the world she cannot be left out. The blood of her sons has not flowed on the continents of Europe, Asia and Africa to win freedom and liberty for other nations and perpetuate her own bondage. The tradition and history of the Hindus and Musalmans support her claims to recognition. The Hindus possessed a civilization which preceded even those of Greece and Rome and long before the modern Western world had emerged out of its darkness she possessed democratic institutions in her village panchayats. Her guilds of artisans and traders and the constitutional limits placed on the powers exercised by her rulers, as we find them described in her ancient books, leave no doubt in our mind that she had attained, at that early period of the world's history, a standard of liberty which would entitle her to be recognized as a leader of democracy in our own day.

Democracy is the very essence and life-breath of Islam. The world cannot show a spectacle of such absolute equality and fraternity as the assemblage in the plains of Arafat, during the Haj, of millions of Musalmans dressed in white unsewn garb with shaved heads and bare feet obliterating all distinction between the rich and the poor, the king and the subject, the master and the slave. Can the world preach equality in a clearer and more effective manner than when Allah made His Messenger declare:-

[Quotation in Urdu omitted]

"Say, I too am a human being like unto you."

[Ch. 16; S. 18; V. 110.]

Apart from this perfect equality in matters of religion the same spirit permeates all the social and political institutions of Islam. Students of history are fully aware how, in the reign of that greatest of Muslim Khalifas Umar-ibn-ul-Khattab, the poorest of Musalmans criticised, most freely and fearlessly, the actions of the Khalifa. How on one occasion when Umar asked his hearers at the congregation as to what they would do if he did not rule them according to the law of the Sheriat, a wild bedouin, imbued with the true spirit of Islam, unsheathing his sabre retorted, that he would bring the Khalifa to the right path at the point of the sword. This is not an isolated instance. Muslim history abounds in them. The vicissitudes of time might have somewhat suppressed the latent instincts inherent in the two great peoples inhabiting India, but given full opportunities of development, they are bound to regain their former splendour and greatness.

If Ireland, in spite of her hostile attitude even during the war, can bring forward her interesting doctrine of "suppressed sovereignty" and compel English ministers to grant her Home Rule, if England and her Allies can champion the cause of Poland, the Czecho-Slavs and the patched up and degenerate nationalities of the Balkans, if it is proposed to breathe new political life into the dead remains of the Armenian kingdom and if the scattered sons of Israel are to be once more gathered into the folds of Judla [sic], equity and justice, political honesty and loyalty to the principles, accepted and preached by the statesmen of Europe and America, demand that India shall not be deprived of her innate right to determine her future and control her destinies.

If the claims of India are not satisfied, from the point of view of the Indians, the Great War shall have been fought in vain.

Chapter Six

THE TRIUMPH OF NATIONALISM: II

The Rowlatt Satyagraha, 1919

I

The Lull

II

The Storm

III

The Reaction

The citizens of Delhi had participated in several parochial agitations and demonstrations by the end of 1918. These included the meeting of a substantial section of the Muslim community at the Idgah on 3 July 1910; the meeting in support of the Ali brothers on 21 May 1915, and the half-day hartal which followed it; and finally the six-day hartal by the Hindu community which began on 17 October 1917. Each of these crises registered a protest, but more importantly each had a startling effect upon the two respective communities. By raising parochial issues and indirectly attacking provincial attitudes, the local leaders of Delhi were able to politicise significantly larger sections of these communities. The degree to which the inhabitants had become politicised as a result of these crises, and as a result of other nationalist and parochial issues which the leaders also raised, was reflected in the extraordinary interest invoked by the political movement known to posterity as the Rowlatt Satyagraha. Never before the Rowlatt Satyagraha had the citizens of Delhi shown a willingness to confront the armed might of the Raj as they were between 30 March and 18 April. Never before this event had so many people consistently attended political meetings as they did during those 21 days. And never again was parochialism to be so completely submerged in an India-wide movement as it was when a Hindu sanyasi spoke to an enormous congregation of Hindus and Muslims from the pulpit of the Jama Masjid.

I

Delhi has been resting after the orgy of oratory in which it indulged during the holidays....

Chief Commissioner, Delhi
16 January 1919

The public interest which had been aroused in Delhi by December 1918 in political, economic, social, and religious problems was not allowed to dissipate in the succeeding months. A new vernacular press, public meetings, and volunteer organisations provided continual excitement during the three months that preceded the Rowlatt Satyagraha.

There were five vernacular newspapers in Delhi which started publishing between November 1918 and February 1919. These journals, whose primary goal was political agitation, were the Qaum and the Inqilab, which were published in the Urdu language and oriented toward a Muslim public; and the Vijaya, Congress, and Hindi Samachar, which were published in Hindi and oriented toward a Hindu public. Their combined circulation was impressive in itself; but the issues which they debated gained an even wider dissemination from being read aloud and discussed in halwai shops,

tea stalls and other popular gathering places.¹ Some measure of their success was apparent to G.S. Khaparde, a Chitpavan Brahman who was the representative from Berar to the Imperial Legislative Council, when he noted on 6 March 1919 that the city was buzzing with rumours about the Rowlatt Bills and that even an illiterate Muslim rickshawallah could complain bitterly about the ill effects that would follow their enactment.²

The public meetings held in Delhi between January and March 1919 reiterated the issues that had been heralded in the press. The main topics of discussion and protest at these meetings, of which there were nine, were the Rowlatt Bills, the Excess Profits Tax Bill and

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In 1911 Delhi had 22 newspapers with a circulation of about 12,000-13,000. In 1921 Delhi had 22 newspapers with a circulation of about 14,000. During these years there had always been an 'extremist' or 'radical' newspaper with a fairly large circulation. The Curzon Gazette had a circulation of 4,800 in 1911; the Comrade had a circulation of 8,500 and the Hamdard had one of 3,000. NAI, Home Poll 2-3 Part B, October 1912, 'Report of Newspapers in the Punjab, 1911'; RDDA, Home File 25 Part B 1922, 'Quarterly List of Newspapers Published in Delhi Province.' The Vijaya claimed a circulation of 13,000 at its peak. NAI, Home Poll 373 Part B, February 1920, 'Secret Memoranda put before the Disorders Inquiry Committee by the Hon'ble J.P. Thompson C.S.I., When He Gave Evidence as Chief Secretary to that Government.'

2

NAI, G.S. Khaparde Diary Manuscript, entry for 6 March 1919.

the Patel Marriage Bill.¹ The largest of these meetings was held on 7 March. The presence of Gandhi gave a special significance to this meeting, which was attended by about 6,000 persons, mostly students, Hindu merchants,

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These nine meetings were as follows:

- 26 Jan - Meeting of Delhi Muslims at a garden party. Resolutions on provincial autonomy and the Congress-League scheme for central government.
- 28 Jan - Malaviya lectured at a 'well-attended' meeting. He advocated a Congress Committee in every mohalla.
- 3 Feb - Meeting in Delhi to discuss Rowlatt Bills and Excess Profits Tax Bill. Poor attendance.
- 14 Feb - Meeting of the Moslem League in Delhi. Protest against Dr Ansari's speech to the Moslem League in December being proscribed by the Government of Punjab.
- 7 Mar - Meeting of 6,000, Gandhi present.
- 14 Mar - Students of St Stephen's and Hindu colleges met to protest against a Calcutta schoolmaster throwing an image of Saraswati into a dust bin. A Muslim student introduced the resolution.
- 24 Mar - Satyagraha Sabha held meeting of 2,000. Ansari, showed that satyagraha was used by the Prophet. Pandit Ram Chand (Arya Samaj) showed that passive resistance was in Vedas. Shradhanand revealed that the C.I.D. was committing dacoities and blaming soldiers so that the government could pass the Rowlatt Bills. Mohammad Shuaib, K.A. Desai, Dr Nair and Shankar Lal also spoke.
- 27 Mar - Satyagraha Sabha held meeting of 5,000 (mostly students and a few Muslims). Shradhanand, Pandit Ram Chand, K.A. Desai, Indra (son of Shradhanand), and Subhadra Devi (wife of Indra) spoke.
- 29 Mar - Satyagraha Sabha held meeting of 5,000, same as on March 27. Programme for the hartal of the following day proposed. Ahmad Said gave an emotional speech to the Muslims.

members of the liberal professions and pan-Islamists. The Satyagraha Sabha was founded and 15 people took the satyagraha vow.¹ An appeal was made to religious susceptibilities by pan-Islamic agitators and Arya Samajists to the majority of the meetings. The most passionate of these was the appeal of Ahmad Said at a meeting on 29 March. He upbraided the Muslims for not being prepared to die for their Holy Places and their Khalifa and waxed eloquent on the way in which the Europeans had oppressed Islam.² Other speeches were

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For the text of Gandhi's speech see Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, XV (New Delhi, 1965), 126-127. The more important of these who took the vow were: Dr Ansari (president), Shradhanand (became president after 26 March), Hasrat Mohani, Dr Abdul Rahman, Shankar Lal (treasurer), Shiv Narain Haksar, Miss Gmeiner, Mohammad Shuaib, Indra, Subradha Devi, and K.A. Desai. D.I.C., I, written evidence of C.A. Barron. Choudhry Khalliquzzaman says that Hakim Ajmal Khan joined the Satyagraha Sabha at Bombay on 24 February 1919. Pathway to Pakistan (Lahore, 1961), p. 46. Hugh Owen states that he joined 'later', i.e., after 7 March 1919. 'The Leadership of the Indian National Movement, 1914-1920' (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Australian National University, Canberra, 1964), p. 394. In none of the evidence does any official say implicitly or explicitly that Hakim Ajmal Khan joined the Sabha. Shradhanand stated that when he and Ajmal Khan moved through the city on 31 March to open the shops that it was the first time he had ever met the man. This would seem to indicate that he did not join before 31 March. It is highly unlikely that he would join after the 31st since he objected to the Sabha on the grounds that it could only lead to violence, which it did. It is interesting to note that the legal fraternity held aloof from the Sabha and refused to condone it in any manner. The Sabha had approximately 120 signatures on the Satyagraha Vow by 30 March 1919. D.I.C., I, passim.

2

D.I.C., I, written evidence of R.C. Jeffries. It is interesting to note that while the audience in Delhi was 5,000 on 29 March, a meeting of 30,000 was being held in Amritsar on the same date.

heard by impromptu crowds, the subject matter of which was somewhat different. An observer was able to conclude: '...inflammatory speeches about the decisions of the Peace Conference with regard to Constantinople and Arabia continue to be delivered almost daily in Delhi and the agitation on the subject is increasing.'¹

The activities of the volunteer organisations in the city added yet another facet to political agitation in Delhi. There were six organisations that were overtly political and seven more that were created for social service.² Most took an active part in organising and attending meetings during this period and then became very closely connected with the Satyagraha Sabha during the Rowlatt Satyagraha. They were significant for providing a focus for student protest and they were responsible for achieving a large turnout of students at most of the meetings.

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NAI, Home Poll 148-152 Part B, April 1919, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Central Intelligence.'

2

RDDA, Confidential File 227 (1918), 'List of Political, Qasi-Political and Religious Societies, Sabhas and Anjumans in the Delhi Province for the Year Ending 30 June 1918.' The six political volunteer organisations were: Indraprastha Sewak Mandli, founded May 1917 (its parent organisation was the Vesh Young Men's Association); Home Rule League Volunteer Corps, founded September 1917; Moslem League Volunteer Corps, founded November 1918; Tibbia College Corps, founded November 1918; Congress Volunteer Corps, founded November 1918; Delhi Volunteer Corps, founded February 1919. The seven social service groups were: Arya Sewak Mandli; Bharat Sewak Samiti; Hindu Sewa Samiti (Hindu College); Hindu Young Men's Association; Jain Sewa Samiti; Jiv Rakshni Sabha; and St Stephen's Mission College Social Service League.

II

It was at Delhi - the Capital of India and from its historical and commercial importance a determining factor of considerable weight in the attitude of the rest of Northern India - that disturbances first occurred on the 30th March.

Hunter Committee, Report

The agitation against the Rowlatt Act in Delhi lasted for 20 days from 30 March to 18 April and it can be divided into three distinct phases. The first phase extended from 30 March to 31 March and revolved around the organisation of the hartal on those two days and the initial reaction to police repression. The second phase extended from 1 April till 9 April. It was a phase in which the established leaders of Delhi lost control over the Satyagraha to an extent where they were unable to prevent a second hartal on 6 April. The third phase of the movement extended from 10 April to 18 April. It was sparked off by the news of Gandhi's arrest on the 9th and it lasted for a full nine days.

The men who led the Rowlatt Satyagraha in Delhi can be divided into primary leaders and secondary leaders. The primary leaders had established positions in Delhi - as the heads of traditional families, as wealthy men, and as highly respected professionals. These leaders had close ties with Gandhi and combined a keen appreciation of national politics with a thorough knowledge of local issues. They divided, however, over the establishment of the Satyagraha Sabha. There were three men of this type who did join the Sabha. The most eminent of these three

was Dr M.A. Ansari, who was encountered earlier as the leader of the Red Crescent Medical Mission to Turkey in 1912. Upon his return in July 1913 he had joined the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba, become a trustee of the M.A.O. College at Aligarh, and a member of the Municipal Committee of Delhi. He resigned from the Municipal Committee and became active in all of the local political organisations. His interest in national politics led him to the presidency of the annual session of the Moslem League at Nagpur in 1920 and the annual session of the Indian National Congress at Madras in 1927. Dr Abdul Rahman, who was less active than Dr Ansari, was also a prominent figure in Delhi. He had accompanied Dr Ansari on the Red Crescent Medical Mission and he was also a general secretary of the Central Bureau for the Relief of Muslim Internees. Muhammad Abdur Rahman, who was a pleader and another leader of the Muslim community in Delhi, was a member of the Reception Committee of the Second All-India Social Service Conference (which met in Delhi in December 1918) and the treasurer of the Central Bureau for the Relief of Muslim Internees. These men were active in the organisation of the Satyagraha Sabha, but they quickly changed their views after the riots of 30 March. Because of the violence on the 30th they concluded that the masses had not understood the principles of satyagraha. Thereafter they acted in unison with leaders who did not join the Sabha and tried to stop the hartals that occurred on 6 April and between 10 and 18 April.

There were several influential men in Delhi who identified themselves with the national movement but who did not join the Satyagraha Sabha. A short list of the

more important of these would include Rai Sahib Pearey Lal who was a Sarogi Bania by caste and a pleader by profession. He was the senior vice-president of the Municipal Committee and the president of the Delhi Bar Association. He was active in all the local political organisations and he became the representative from Delhi Province to the Imperial Legislative Assembly in 1923. Lala Shiv Narain was a Kayasth by caste and a pleader by profession. He was also a member of the Municipal Committee and active in all the local political organisations. Rai Bahadur Sultan Singh was an Aggarwal Jain and a banker, industrialist, and landlord by profession. He was a divisional darbari and a member of the Municipal Committee and because of his deep interest in education became a member of the Provisional Executive Council of Delhi University when it was established in 1922. He, too, was active in all the local political organisations. The last in this list of men who had high social and economic status, and who also exercised considerable political influence, was Hakim Hafiz Muhammad Ajmal Khan, Hazik-ul-Mulk, who was encountered earlier as a traditional leader of the city. He was involved in the Home Rule League agitation and he became the president of the annual session of the Moslem League at Amritsar in 1919 and the president of the annual session of the Indian National Congress at Ahmadabad in 1921. All the men listed above were officials of the Reception Committee of the Congress in December 1918. They abhorred the violence of the Rowlatt Satyagraha and were tireless in their efforts to maintain peace and order, and to stop the hartal of 6 April and the hartal which lasted from 10 to 18 April.

The primary leaders of Delhi failed to control the Rowlatt Satyagraha because of the activities of the secondary leaders of the city. The secondary leaders were members of the petty bourgeoisie who had no recognised position in the city and who played an insignificant role in national politics. They sought to acquire the role of leadership during Satyagraha by identifying themselves with the grievances of the under-privileged sections of the city and by articulating their protest. They succeeded in doing so through their continual agitation in the press and on the public platform. Their activities and police repression combined to shape the course of the Rowlatt Satyagraha in Delhi.

K.A. Desai was one of the more important secondary leaders among the Hindus. He was a Gujarati of recent arrival in Delhi and had formerly been an important lieutenant of B.G. Tilak in Bombay. He was the manager of the Birla cotton mills in Delhi and the secretary of the local Satyagraha Sabha. Shiv Narain Haksar was a Kashmiri Brahman and the editor of the Hindi Samachar. Indra was the son of Shradhanand, of whom more later, and the editor of the Vijaya. Shankar Lal was the manager of the Swadeshi Co-operative Store; the treasurer of the local Home Rule League; and the treasurer of the Satyagraha Sabha. And finally Neki Ram Sharma, who had been tried for a seditious speech to the local Home Rule League in 1918, was another in the group of important Hindu secondary leaders. Asaf Ali, who was a pleader and who had been tried for a seditious speech to the local Home Rule League in 1918, was one of the more

important Muslim secondary leaders. Arif Hussain Haswi was the editor of the Congress and the Inqilab. Qazi Abbas Hussain was the editor of the Qaum, which was considered to be the most rabid of the vernacular journals. Abdul Majid was a young firebrand of some note in Delhi. Ahmad Said was a maulvi, and a teacher at the Madrassah Aminia. And finally Tajuddin, who had been a temporary secretary of the Reception Committee for the Moslem League and the temporary superintendent of the Central Bureau for the Relief of Muslim Internees, was another of a group of important Muslim secondary leaders. These secondary leaders were convinced that the primary leaders supported their actions, but lacked the necessary courage to act in a similar fashion themselves.¹

One of the leaders of Delhi occupied a unique position in the capital; a position which entitled him to the sobriquet of the 'uncrowned king' of the city.² Mahatma Munshi Ram, or Swami Shradhanand as he became in 1918, was a religious figure of outstanding distinction in northern India. He was still the leader of the conservative wing of the Arya Samaj, even though he had resigned as principal of the Gurukula Mahavidyalaya.³ He had been

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Interview with K.A. Desai, 7 April 1967.

² NA1, Home Poll 268-273 Part B, May 1919, 'Proposal to Intern Munshi Ram alias Swami Shradhanand and Dr. Ansari.'

³ Shradhanand's eldest son, Harish Chandar, had been the first graduate from the gurukul at Kangri in 1912 and had become the Acharya of a new gurukul at Thanesar in the Karnal District in the same year. The second son, Indra, had graduated with his brother, and had appeared in Delhi to become well established by the time his father arrived in Delhi in November 1918. From the time Shradhanand resigned as the Acharya of the gurukul at Kangri in 1917 until he was assassinated by a Muslim in 1926, the Swami was very active in politics.

a violently passionate and highly sensual person before the call to religion brought about a dramatic change in his life. But even after he had become a 'mahatma' and then a 'sanyasi', Shradhanand's passionate nature was tamed rather than quenched. Over the citizens of Delhi, more particularly, over the Hindu petty bourgeoisie and the Jats who had migrated to the capital, the Swami exercised an influence which could not have been exercised by a 'secular' leader. Gandhi's success in persuading Shradhanand to join the Satyagraha Sabha of Delhi on 7 March was a triumph of the first magnitude, for the Swami was able to draw considerable sections of the Hindu community of Delhi into the Rowlatt Satyagraha. Indeed, Shradhanand's role during the heroic days of April 1919 was of crucial importance in ensuring popular support in the capital of India for Gandhi's movement of protest.

All the secondary leaders of Delhi met at the office of the Home Rule League on the morning of 30 March. They despatched members of the different volunteer corps to maintain peace and to ensure that no one was forced to close his shop against his will. These leaders then set out to make a final request to all the merchants, except those dealing in drugs and foodstuffs, to close their shops.¹ They succeeded by midmorning in effecting a complete hartal in the city. Dr Ansari was

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They had made the rounds of the city on 28 and 29 March requesting all the merchants to close their shops.

absent from Delhi as was the Deputy Commissioner, H.C. Beadon, and Shradhanand preached the morning service at the mandir of the Arya Samaj.

The Hindu merchants¹ of Delhi led the city in the observation of the hartal. They accepted the call for a hartal for a number of reasons, prominent among which were economic grievances. Indeed, it is probable that the cloth merchants engineered the hartal² because of a disastrous slump in their business immediately after the War. The fact that the major opposition to the hartal came from the cloth merchants lent credence to this view. Choudhri Ram Lal, a cloth merchant who had successfully organised the hartal of Hindu merchants in 1917, was

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The Hindu merchant community in Delhi was composed of the following castes in 1921. The figures for the Kayasth community were not available. These were probably not dissimilar to the Khatri community.

<u>Caste</u>	<u>Total workers & dep.</u>	<u>Total workers</u>	<u>Number literate</u>	<u>Number of workers in trade</u>
Aggarwal	25,637	9,891	8,528	7,636
Brahman	37,141	16,932	8,720	3,265
Jat	46,064	15,551	1,544	223
Khatri	7,254	22,236	2,763	1,302
Rajput	20,655	9,850	2,315	1,222
Ahir	11,117	4,387	280	258
Chamar	45,046	21,944	182	383
Jhiwar	10,855	5,922	288	867
Julaha	8,907	4,327	62	119
Kumbar	8,991	3,561	65	117
Mali	7,456	3,379	203	471

Census of India, 1921, XV (Punjab and Delhi), Part II (Tables).

2

D.I.C., I, written evidence of C.A. Barron

mainly responsible for the cloth merchants joining the hartal that occurred on 30 March.¹

The merchants of Delhi were also unhappy over the Excess Profits Tax Bill. They were told that the Bill would enable the government to tax away all profits and to seize goods in payment.² The merchants felt especially unhappy over this Bill because it was the third extraordinary tax in three years. A super tax had come into effect on 1 April 1917 with the intention of putting an extra tax burden on large incomes. A new income tax had come into effect on 1 April 1918 with many new regulations, a new system of returns, and less chance of evasion with an apparent inequable assessment.³ The taxes were looked upon as a sign of bad faith on the part of the government in view of the substantial subscriptions that the merchant community had donated to the War effort. In addition to these taxes, the merchant community was

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RDDA, Confidential File 262 (1919), 'The Disorders Inquiry Committee', Intelligence Summary for the Week Ending 21 June 1919.

2

NAI, Home Poll 16 Deposit, March 1919, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation in India for the First Half of February 1919.' The Bill was passed on 19 March 1919 and came into effect on 1 April 1919. The purpose of the act was to obtain half of the excess profits which accrued during 1918 in excess of profits of a more normal period.

3

NAI, Home Poll 373 Part B, February 1920. Home Poll 133-135 Part A, December 1920, 'Question of the Recovery of the Cost of Additional Police and of the Amounts Awarded as Compensation under Sections 15 and 15-A of the Police Act in Connection with the Disturbances in April 1919 at Delhi.'

very unhappy at the amounts of compensation paid for land acquired for the new capital and for improvement schemes in the old city.¹

The decline in the number of traders in certain important commodities, too, reflected some disquiet in commercial circles. Those who were involved in banking, insurance, money lending and brokerage declined by 1,478 (or 61 per cent) between 1911 and 1921. Those involved in grain and pulses declined by 24 per cent, leaving only 803 workers in 1921. Those involved in hay, grass, and fodder declined by 61 per cent; and those involved in precious stones, jewellery, clocks, and optical equipment declined by 71 per cent, although these commodities were dominated by Jains and Hindus equally. General storekeepers and shopkeepers declined by 58 per cent and the farmers of pounds, tolls, and markets declined by 87 per cent.² The fact that there was a decline in the number of people who dealt with the above commodities is a fairly good indication that those who remained in such businesses were facing economic difficulties as well. These difficulties arose as a result of the banking crash in the Punjab in 1913-1914 and from the effect of shortages during the War.

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D.I.C., I, written evidence of Raj Narayan, Government Pleader.

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Census of India, 1911, XIV (Punjab), Part II (Tables); Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II. The farmers of pounds, tolls, and markets dropped in number because of a change from the octroi tax system to the terminal tax system in 1916.

The absence of opportunities for investment was a less well-defined economic grievance. Delhi had not escaped the banking crash of 1913-1914 in the Punjab when sixteen companies had failed in the city.¹ The crash also adversely affected the swadeshi industries in Delhi and completely ruined the confidence of prospective investors in such endeavours. This meant that the only safe commodity in Delhi was urban property which was extremely expensive and difficult to obtain.²

The economic grievances of the Hindu merchants provided one of the main motives for their participation in politics. There were other, more amorphous, discontents that supplied equally fertile soil for the political demagogue. There was a considerable amount of resentment over the Patel Marriage Bill which the

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RDDA, Commerce File 4 Part A 1916, 'Note on the Effect of the Provincial Insolvency Act of 1917 and the Companies Act of 1913 on Indian Industries.'

2

There were 31 swadeshi factories in Delhi in 1911, employing about 2,625. Only three of these 31 were still in existence in 1921, the rest having liquidated. In 1921 there were 17 new swadeshi firms employing 2,000. See p. 50, note 2 above.

sanatanis looked upon as inimical to their faith.¹ This was especially true of the Brahman, Bania, Khatri, Kayasth, and Rajput castes which were highly committed to conservative social and religious values. Hindu sentiment was also aroused over the prosecution of Hindus in the Karturpur riots of 1918 and over the Ram Lila affair in Delhi in 1917.²

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D.I.C., I, written evidence of C.A. Barron; RDDA, Home File 162 Part B 1921, 'Bill to Further Amend the Special Marriage Act, 1872.' An Indian correspondent was quoted in the following manner on the subject: 'The Hindu Marriage Bill which Mr. Patel of Bombay was permitted to introduce during the last Simla Session of the Supreme Legislative Council has excited very considerable opposition amongst Hindus of all classes in the country. The Social Reform party and here and there Hindu individuals of advanced views in matters social, support the measure, but the general feeling of the community is against it. It is interesting to note that the bitterest opponents of the measure are among the Home Rulers and other political extremists in the Deccan and in the Madras Presidency. They maintain that their opposition will go a long way to strengthen their claim that they are the guardians of the religious, political and the general interests of the Hindus.' NAI, Home Poll 160-163 Part B, January 1919, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Central Intelligence,' for the week ending 4 January 1919.

2

'The Karturpur riot case is also receiving a good deal of attention, the accounts of it published in one Hindu paper being so obviously false that action may have to be taken in the matter.' NAI, Home Poll 41 Deposit, January 1919, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the First Half of December 1918,' C.A. Barron to J. DuBoulay, 16 December 1918. And similarly in the Punjab, 'The Karturpur riot continues to exercise the minds of Hindus and there is little doubt that their attitude towards the case tends to widen the breach between themselves and the Muhammadans. Mr Roshan Lal, a Lahore Barrister, has been deputed to assist in the defence of the accused, and the Hindus have been busy collecting subscriptions for the same purpose.' Home Poll 42 Deposit, January 1919, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the Second Half of December 1918,' [report for the Punjab], 31 December 1918.

Despite all these grievances, however, the Hindu merchants of Delhi would not have observed a hartal on 30 March without a strong feeling of resentment against the Rowlatt Act and without the charisma of Mahatma Gandhi. Gandhi's unique insight into the political realities of India led him to concentrate on a very dramatic issue, namely the Rowlatt Bills. He knew that the discontent engendered over these Bills would act as a touchstone for a variety of grievances that would otherwise have remained quiescent. But Gandhi's ingenuity was not confined to the location of a dramatic issue, it was also expressed in his choice of the manner in which the protest against the Rowlatt Act was to be articulated. The means of protest against the Rowlatt Act that Gandhi proposed was a hartal by the business community. Other sections of the society were required to support the merchants and observe a day of mourning against the immorality of the government which had imposed the Rowlatt Act upon India. Constitutional means had failed since the Imperial Legislative Council had passed the Act over the unanimous opposition of the Indian members of the Council, but it was not proposed to coerce the government to change its mind. It was proposed that the government should witness an act of love, which was the basic attitude of the satyagrahi, and the government's feeling of shame would cause it to repeal the Act. The combination of politics and religion in Gandhi's speeches; the asceticism of his style of life and his regard for the values and institutions of Hindu society endeared Gandhi to the Hindu merchants. But above all, his emphasis on the superiority of moral

over material power struck the most respondent chord in the hearts of the business community.

The Muslim merchants, too, joined the hartal, but they probably did so with some reluctance.¹ The Muslim merchants were unhappy at the prospect of a mass agitation; they had a minimum of economic grievances and nationalism had little appeal for them; their primary motive was to obey the state as long as it was not proven dar-ul-harab; and they felt that the only hope for the Muslim community in India was to negotiate for a fair share of power with the British. It is more than likely that they joined the hartal because it was easier to do so than to oppose the appeal. They had opposed the call for a hartal in 1917 when the Hindu traders had observed their hartal. But in March 1919 there was more of a sentiment of protest in the Muslim community as a whole and the merchants could only acquiesce and hope that the main current of political agitation would pass by them.

The tonga drivers, rickshawwallahs, porters (excluding railway porters), and palki bearers and others involved in local transport also joined the hartal. But they participated in the Satyagraha through moral coercion rather than voluntarily. Anyone riding in a vehicle for hire was asked to step down and walk. This meant that the vehicles stopped plying as much for want of business as from a half-hearted support of the hartal.

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D.I.C., I, Written evidence of C.A. Barron. Barron stated that there was no certainty on 29 March that the Muslim merchants would join the hartal.

Such, then, was the pattern of support for the hartal that occurred on Sunday 30 March 1919 in Delhi. Huge crowds surged up and down the bazaars to ensure that all shops were closed. A local police officer described them in the following words:

As Additional Superintendent of Police my duty was to visit all kotwals [police stations] and also to assess the feeling of the city. I left at 9:45 for Kashmir Gate Station, then proceeded to the main kotwal, planning to go hence to Sadr Bazaar, Faiz Bazaar and Haus Qazi.

The first crowd I met was about 100 yards west of the Clock Tower. At the kotwali station I met a European on foot who informed me that he had been told to get out of his tonga by a crowd that was collected at the western end of Chandni Chauk. He said that the crowd though peaceful had been so insistent that he had no hesitation in complying.

About a hundred yards west of the Clock Tower I saw this crowd of 500 or 600 persons loosely filling up the whole of the roadway of the Chauk. As we [the City Inspector and himself] approached, a number of individuals ran towards us holding up their hands and shouting at us to stop. They did not actually interfere with us and we drove on amid repeated cries of 'shame' and 'Gandhi ki jai' [victory to Gandhi].

The majority ran away and the City Inspector called out loudly that quiet and order should be maintained. The crowd immediately reassembled and loudly called out after us. The crowd was composed for the greater part of quite young boys of the lower classes. I saw no well-dressed men.¹

The crowds of demonstrators, such as the group of 500 or 600 'young boys of the lower classes' described above were somewhat rowdy but not inclined to violence. These

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D.I.C., I, written evidence of R.C. Jeffries.

crowds had stopped the trams and tongas quite early and had then meandered harmlessly in loose groups up and down the main bazaars, now growing, now diminishing in numbers as followers joined or departed. The whole city throbbed with the spirit of a tamasha rather than with the purposefulness of a political agitation. Huge throngs continually converged on Chandni Chauk, always the centre of interest and activity within the walled city. The lack of organised activity there did not dampen the gaiety of the crowds, however, as they moved off again in search of some action or mischief to enliven what had every promise to be an uneventful day.

The organisational activities of the Satyagraha Sabha had achieved a good deal, but the spontaneous response from many different quarters added to their success in drawing the citizens of Delhi into the Rowlatt Satyagraha. The manner in which crowds collected, as observed by an officer in the Army, illustrates the extent to which much of the response to the Satyagraha was independent of the efforts of the leaders. The officer reported his observations in the following manner: 'They went around to all the poorest of the bazaars saying, "Come with us, the rais log will give you all the nourishment and clothing you require." I saw food being given away.' These bazaaris then collected together and marched in 'military fashion' armed with sticks. They struck at tramcars and telegraph posts because they were government property. They even turned people out of tramcars and took away their cigarettes saying, "Now it is our day, away with everything that reminds us of British rule." They said

that they were fed up with the Bill and that, in the event of any trouble, the Army would assist them and refuse to obey their officers.'¹

One itinerant group of satyagrahis discovered around noon that the sweetmeat sellers at the Railway Station had not observed the call for a hartal. It immediately sought to redress this sorry state of affairs. The sweetmeat sellers took umbrage at such interference and complained to the railway authorities. Several members of the Railway Police appeared and took two members of the group into custody. News of the incident spread in the walled city and the crowd at the Station grew apace. Within two hours the whole paraphernalia of government appeared at the Railway Station in the form of railway officials, police, a magistrate, and regular English troops. The self-styled leaders of the crowd demanded the release of those who had been arrested. The officials were equally adamant that no one had been arrested. The mood of the crowd changed from one of interest and curiosity to one of concern and outrage. The feeling grew that the iniquity of the Rowlatt Bills confronted them physically. The leaders fanned the flames of this feeling so successfully that a section of the 'crowd', which was by now transformed into a 'mob', threw brickbats at the troops and officials. Their accuracy and the general hysteria of the moment impelled one of the officials to order the troops and police to open fire. Seven persons collapsed

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D.I.C., I, written evidence of Subedar Major Hamid Khan, 2-55th Coke's Rifles.

from the four gunshot and buckshot volleys. Chaos and confusion reigned supreme as the terrified mob fled in every direction. The more obstinate and indignant fled in the direction of the Clock Tower and joined a second crowd that had formed in front of the Town Hall. The news of the firing transformed this crowd, too, into a mob and once again brickbats flew. Hysteria and indecision wrought their influence and again the troops and police who were stationed there fired. The fortuitous congestion of Chandni Chauk at that point raised the number of those who were injured by twelve.

The crowd that gathered at the Railway Station consisted predominantly of Hindus. Since there was an interval of two hours between the time it began to congregate and the firing, there was time for people to come from some distance to the Railway Station. Such was the case for a small group of very minor leaders who were having tea on Chandni Chauk. They were all educated men from high castes and they were all active in the Congress, the Home Rule League, the Indian Association and the Hindu Association. They were Debi Pershad, Chhote Lal, Bishan Sarup, Jugal Kishore, Sewa Ram, Kali Charan, and Chhidami Lal. These men argued vociferously with the officials at the Railway Station and were arrested afterwards for inciting a riot. They were all acquitted, however (except Debi Pershad), as there was no evidence that they had actually encouraged the crowd to throw brickbats. Four of these seven men had been wounded (Chhidami Lal, Chhote Lal, Debi Pershad and Sewa Ram) because they were at the front of the crowd when the firing took place. There were five other

casualties from the firing, one of whom was a Muslim baker, another a Kahar and yet another a Brahman. The last two of those arrested were Muslims, one of whom was a barber.

The crowd at the Railway Station was drawn mostly by curiosity and was composed largely of members of the higher castes. The members of the crowd were dressed in clean white clothes which meant that they were all respectable members of the community.¹ The crowd at the Clock Tower was almost a mob from its inception since it received the volatile elements from the Railway Station and larger numbers of lower class elements loitering in Chandni Chauk. They also had a focus of excitement since they knew of the shooting at the Station. There were 12 casualties from the riot at the Clock Tower, eight of whom were Hindu and four of whom were Muslim. No apparent leaders emerge.²

The mob at the Clock Tower dispersed at 4.30 and almost immediately an audience began to gather at Pipal Park at the other end of Chandni Chauk. A meeting had been advertised for 5.00 p.m. with Shradhanand, Muhammad Shuaib, and Dr Abdul Rahman as the principal speakers. The authorities grew uneasy at this collection of 25,000 to 40,000 people and C.A. Barron,

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D.I.C., I, written evidence of H.H. Yule, District Traffic Superintendent of the East Indian Railway; Judgement in the Railway Station Riot Case contained in the written evidence of C.A. Barron.

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D.I.C., I, Inquest by H.C. Beadon; written evidence of Lt.-Col. C.H. James, Chief Medical Officer, Delhi.

the Chief Commissioner, arrived at the head of a large force to disperse it. Shradhanand assured Barron that the crowd would disperse peacefully at 6.30 p.m. Barron accepted this and took the troops away. The speakers then lectured to the audience on the non-violent principles of satyagraha and the evils of the Rowlatt Act.

It is possible to show that certain groups in the city predominated in the audience at Pipal Park and in audiences that collected on succeeding days. These groups were the Hindu merchants and their employees, those involved in local transport, students, artisans, and karkhandars.¹ Hindu merchants and their employees participated in this audience for the same reasons that they had joined the hartal. Those involved in local transport participated to a lesser extent because of their half-hearted support of the hartal. Those that did attend the meeting were probably drawn by the Arya Samajist and pan-Islamic speakers at the meeting.

There is little doubt that students attended the meeting at Pipal Park in large numbers. They formed a

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Hindu merchants and employees	16,500
Those involved in local transport	5,000
Students	3,500
Artisans	23,750
<u>Karkhandars</u>	<u>6,700</u>
	<u>55,450</u>

Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.

N.B. Figures are for male workers. Students are males over 15 years of age.

significant portion of the audiences at Home Rule League meetings from 1917 onwards. They also provided the majority of the members in the various volunteer corps. Their western education, their ideological proclivities, and their desire to involve themselves in the social and political problems of the nation found an outlet in the Rowlatt Satyagraha. They were present in audiences, and active in the volunteer corps whose purpose it was to keep order on 30 March, 6 and 16 April.¹ The Muslim students of the madrassahs also participated in volunteer corps and attended the meeting in large numbers.² They responded to the Satyagraha because of the activities and pan-Islamic speeches of Dr Ansari and Ahmad Said. Their main grievance was over the Khilafat and the Holy Places.

The Hindu and Muslim artisans of Delhi also participated in the Rowlatt Satyagraha. They contributed large numbers of people to the crowds which gathered in

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S.K. Rudra, Principal of St Stephen's Mission College testified that student behaviour during the Satyagraha was 'generally satisfactory'. They listened to their teachers who counselled moderation and college work continued 'almost uninterrupted'. There was no evidence, he concluded, that students had participated in any of the disorderly proceedings. D.I.C., I, written evidence of S.K. Rudra.

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There is no reliable estimate of their numbers. There were 168 students from the North-West Frontier Province, Afghanistan, and Baluchistan in May 1919. There were an additional 182 students and teachers from Bengal. NAI, Home Poll 48 Deposit, July 1919, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the First Half of May 1919,' C.A. Barron to J. DuBoulay, 16 May 1919.

the streets on 30 March and on succeeding days. They also contributed large numbers of people to the audience which gathered at Pipal Park and to the audiences which gathered at subsequent meetings. The main impetus to their participation was the declining state of their occupation and the growing anxiety which they felt for the traditional organisation of their community. A large number of artisan crafts declined between 1911 and 1921 in the number of individuals who depended upon them for their livelihood.¹ Those who left the declining crafts either became labourers, an occupation for which there was an expanding need in the city, or joined other crafts. Those who joined other crafts too contributed to the disorientation that affected the handicraft industry in Delhi. The departure of ever-increasing numbers of men from their traditional craft, usually the younger sons who did not adopt the skills of their fathers, led to a gradual disintegration of the social organisation of the artisan communities. A feeling of helplessness and frustration arose in those who remained because of their inability to halt the process.

The Hindu and Muslim artisans also harboured more immediate grievances. They had suffered more than anyone else from the influenza epidemic of September,

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The most notable of these were the textile workers of lace, crepe and embroidery which declined from 18,000 to 4,000; brass and copper smiths from 5,000 to 2,000; rice and flour grinders from 2,000 to 900; cabinet makers from 1,300 to 800; and workers in precious metals and stones from 12,000 to 7,000. These figures are for workers and dependents. Census of India, 1911, XIV, Pt. II.

October, and November 1918. Those who survived suffered even more so from the skyrocketting prices of necessities and high rents since the end of the War. The political leadership, in the persons of the pan-Islamic agitators and the Arya Samajist preachers, cleverly exploited these frustrations. The Muslim artisan community, which constituted 52 per cent of all artisans in the city (while the Muslim community constituted only 36 per cent of the total population) responded very readily to the religious appeal of the Khilafat and the Holy Places. The Hindu artisans joined their Muslim brothers in sympathy for the Delhi martyrs and in response to the inspiration provided by the bravery and oratory of Shradhanand.

The karkhandars responded to the Rowlatt Satyagraha almost entirely on religious grounds. They joined the crowds that roamed the streets and attended the meeting at Pipal Park in considerable numbers. Their first impulse was not to miss any of the fun. And on this occasion when religious sentiment and the issue of police repression were raised, they became sincerely outraged for a short period of time.

These were the classes and communities that flocked to the meeting which took place at 5.00 p.m. on Sunday 30 March. The gathering dispersed on schedule at 6.30 p.m. Shradhanand led a large group from Pipal Park up Chandni Chauk towards the Clock Tower, and encountered a troop of Gurkhas on their way to the main kotwal from

the opposite direction.¹ The Gurkhas stepped onto the footpath and made ready to load their rifles in case of trouble. In the process a shot was fired into the air. Shradhanand immediately confronted his 'attackers' and asked them why they had fired at the satyagrahis. The Gurkhas replied by levelling their bayonets at the Swami, whereupon Shradhanand bared his breast and invited them to charge. What could have been a serious situation was obviated by the timely arrival of P.L. Orde, the senior superintendent of police, who ordered the Gurkhas to lower their bayonets and to disengage themselves from the demonstrators. News of this incident, which the Chief Commissioner considered too trivial to report to the Government of India, spread throughout the city and established Shradhanand as a popular hero who had dared to face the brutal might of the oppressor armed only with his moral and spiritual superiority. The rest of India, too, learned of Shradhanand's confrontation with the Raj through the columns of the Mahratta (Bombay) on 6 April, and this news established the sanyasi's position as the outstanding leader of Delhi through the rest of the Rowlatt Satyagraha.

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NAI, Home Poll 20 Deposit, May 1919, 'Enquiry from the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, in Regard to an Article in the Mahratta of 6 April 1919, Reporting - in Connection with the Delhi Riots - an Incident of Munshi Ram's Encounter with the Gurkhas.' The Gurkhas had been detained at the Railway Station just prior to the riot there. They were pressed into emergency service even though they did not understand any Hindustani and little English. Most of the tension that arose during the confrontation with Shradhanand resulted from their failure to communicate.

Public reaction to the events of 30 March varied as between different classes and communities, but most people agreed on the issue of police repression. An officer of the Central Intelligence Department summed up popular sentiment in his report of an interview with his cousin and nephew, who were residents of Delhi, in the following manner:

Notwithstanding the knowledge of my position and responsibility, and my connection with the Police Department, these boys did not conceal their feelings of resentment against the police and the horror of people being killed recklessly. They told me, people in the town and the student community were equally angry and horror stricken, and that the man in the street was told by the agitators that the Emergency Act made the police supreme in all matters and that the latter could search the house of, and arrest the people at, their pleasure. They did not, however, believe it, but that this was the general conception of what the new legislation had in store for the people. It would have been better said they that shooting should have been avoided and that if at all this was necessary should have been done below the knees.¹

The complete hartal continued on the following day, Monday 31 March. The men who had died the previous day were buried. The funerals for the two Muslims attracted 15,000 people and the funerals for the three Hindus drew around 30,000. The primary leaders attended and counselled calm and an end to the hartal.

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NAI, Home Poll 141-147 Part B, May 1919, 'Reports on the Recent Riots in Delhi and of the Extent to Which 'Satyagraha Day of Humiliation' Was Kept Throughout the Provinces.'

The five men who died and the 14 who were injured during the riots of the 30th became known throughout India as the martyrs of Delhi. Gandhi proposed that the hartal of 6 April should be as much in honour of - and in mourning for - those fallen heroes, as in protest against the Rowlatt Act. The events of the following 19 days in Delhi added 14 more martyrs to the cause of a political agitation the like of which had never been seen in the imperial capital of India.

Overt political activity remained at a minimum from 1 April until the 9th. A non-official commission of inquiry of six members began hearing witnesses at the Congress office on the 2nd.¹ The Satyagraha Sabha met on the same day and decided against a hartal for 6 April because Gandhi had requested the citizens of Delhi not to participate in the demonstration against the Rowlatt Act in view of what had happened on the 30th.

Shradhanand became the focus of attention once again on 3 April. One of the persons who had been wounded on 30 March, Ram Sarup, died and Shradhanand led the funeral procession down Chandni Chauk. He stopped the procession in front of the Sisgunj Gurdwara and harangued the crowd of mourners and spectators for

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The six men were: Hakim Ajmal Khan, R.S. Pearey Lal, L. Shiv Narain, R.B. Sultan Singh, Dr S.P. Shroff, and Muhammad Abdur Rahman. NAI, Home Poll 268-273 Part B, May 1919; Home Poll 141-147 Part B, May 1919; D.I.C., I, written evidence of Muhammad Abdur Rahman.

15 minutes. He compared the innocent victim with the Sikh martyr Guru Tej Bahadur and reiterated the nobility of Satyagraha.¹ The procession continued to the burning ghat where Shradhanand urged the crowd to boycott trams and all foreign goods. He was followed by Ahmad Said who gave an emotive speech which ended on the note that just as a gardener watered a weak tree with the blood of a goat, so did the tree of independence require the blood of many more than the martyrs of 30 March.²

The newspapers of Delhi printed lurid accounts of the events of the 30th. The Vijaya and Congress devoted almost their entire issues to the riots and police firings. The Vijaya, in issues of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd, revelled in the bloody scene of Delhi and the 'murders' that had been committed there. It accused British soldiers of fighting Indians with greater enthusiasm than they had fought against the Germans, and called British rule 'Nadirshahi'.³ It also gave a 'heart rending' account of the funeral of the 3rd, and stated that the majority of the dead and wounded had been children under 12; and that a woman, too, had been a victim of the machine gun that was alleged to have been used. The Congress instituted a Martyrdom Series and proclaimed that:

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NAI, Home Poll 268-273 Part B, May 1919.

2

D.I.C., I, Note by R.C. Jeffries.

3

The rule of terror established by the Persian conqueror, Nadir Shah, when he captured Delhi in 1739.

Though the Indians stand in no way better than brutes in the eyes of the government, yet India can never forget the sacrifices of her sons. The heartless cruelty and the merciless butchery shown to the Indians on 30 March will be remembered in India forever.¹

The Vijaya had toned down by 4 April and retracted its charge that a machine gun had been used on the 30th. But Indra countered this admission by stating that the police were to be severely punished for not treating the crowds more harshly. The Congress, which continued its Martyrdom Series, editorialised at length on 4 April on the meanness of the Indians and the greatness and superiority of the British. It queried why when a bomb had been thrown in Delhi very few had suffered, yet when only stones were thrown many had to die. Arif Hussain, the editor, recalled the Cawnpore mosque affair in 1913 when 600 cartridges had been fired, and the Mutiny of 1857 and the severity it had visited upon Delhi. He concluded that Indians, who were brutes and uncivilised slaves, were destined to be killed by their rulers.²

Friday 4 April began with a meeting at the Town Hall. The Deputy Commissioner had convened this meeting of the rais, the title holders, the honorary magistrates, and the municipal commissioners of the city in an effort to reassert his control over the city through the time-honoured device of consulting the traditional leadership.

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NAI, Home Poll 34 Deposit, October 1919, 'Detailed Reports on the Recent Riots in Delhi.'

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NAI, Home Poll 34 Deposit, October 1919.

At the end of the meeting he issued a statement that the hartal of the 30th was foolish and that those who had caused the riot at the Railway Station were 'badmashes' (bad characters).¹

The events of the 30th, the funeral oratory of the 3rd, and the propaganda campaign conducted by the press combined to produce one of the most dramatic episodes of the Rowlatt Satyagraha in Delhi on the 4th. The Muslims of Delhi threw an open invitation to the Hindus to attend the Friday khutba at the Jama Masjid. The sentiment of Hindu-Muslim unity was at a peak as a result of the fact that both Hindus and Muslims had been 'martyred' on the 30th. Shradhanand was hurriedly summoned by a deputation of Muslims and upon entering the Jama Masjid, which was packed with a Hindu and Muslim congregation, the sanyasi mounted the pulpit and delivered a moving sermon. He inveighed against the tyranny perpetrated toward innocent women and children

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The text of his announcement was, in part, as follows: 'Those who had determined to close their shops took the law into their own hands and prevented other shopkeepers by threats from opening their shops. The result was that the bazaar was closed and many people were idle and a crowd of badmashes created a disturbance at the railway station. The so-called Passive Resistance turned at once into active rioting, which the Sirkar cannot allow. Those who created the strike are entirely to blame for creating the situation which they could not control. ...The shopkeeper who closes his shop injures himself; probably he will often injure innocent persons also, but the government does not suffer....I therefore propose asking the raises of Delhi to raise a subscription for the dependants and the wounded.' D.I.C., I, included in the written evidence of Muhammad Abdur Rahman.

and stated that even if half of the population of Delhi had been killed instead of 40 or 50 people, the satyagrahis should still have no fear. He then applauded the congregation at the Mosque as a demonstration of Hindu-Muslim unity that would be remembered for many generations.¹ When he emerged from the mosque Hindus and Muslims alike flocked around him and kissed his hands and feet as though he were a saint dear to both the religious communities.²

There was a complete hartal in Delhi on the 6th despite the appeals to the contrary by the Satyagraha Sabha and the primary leaders. Shradhanand was asked to speak at the 8.00 a.m. prayers at the Fatehpuri Mosque. He stood before the crowd of Hindus and Muslims and prayed:

...Grant us power that we may not be afraid of worldly strength; that we may regard military force as worthless and may recognise the piety of the martyrs. May we be prepared to sacrifice ourselves for the freedom and progress of our country. Grant power unto us Asiatics. Give thirty-two crores of Asiatics the strength of sixty-four crores that we may oppose the power of all materialists and bring forth the reign of peace and tranquility.³

The Satyagraha leaders had met earlier in the morning at Dr Ansari's consulting rooms at Fatehpuri and scheduled lectures to keep people from collecting on

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NAI, Home Poll 268-273 Part B, May 1919.

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Interview with Sri Ram Sharma, recorded by the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, on 22 April 1967.

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NAI, Home Poll 268-273 Part B, May 1919.

Chandni Chauk, and the volunteer corps had again dispersed to maintain order. Shradhanand and the other leaders lectured on swadeshi and satyagraha to an audience of 15,000 to 20,000 at King Edward Park at noon. There was a series of eight similar meetings at Darygunj (at Dr Ansari's compound) in the early evening at which an estimated one lakh of people gathered. The satyagrahis looked upon the absence of violence on the 6th as conclusive proof of the fact that the firing on 30 March was unnecessary and the fault of the government.

Those who flocked to the meetings on the evening of 6 April represented the overwhelming majority of the citizens of Delhi.¹ A complete cross-section of the population - social, religious, economic and educational - attended. It is not possible to assess their motives except to say that those groups which were only mildly enthusiastic about the Rowlatt Satyagraha could have attended out of curiosity or as a gesture of protest against police repression.

Business resumed as normal on the morning of 7 April. Another victim of the riots that had occurred

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Total population of the Delhi urban area in 1921	304,400
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Minus the following:

females	122,300	
males (under 14)	51,000	
males (over 60)	7,000	
Army and Police	5,500	
Europeans (males)	3,450	
Government of India (at Simla)	n.a.	189,250
		<u>115,150</u>

Census of India, 1921, XV, Pt. II.

on the 30th died and there was yet another funeral procession led by Shradhanand. In a passionate voice he described how Ram Kishan, aged 22, had enlisted not once, but twice in the Army. He asked what greater tragedy could occur than that a true patriot should die at the hands of his former colleagues?

The Chief Commissioner of Delhi, C.A. Barron, was unhappy that the influence Shradhanand had with the populace was directed more towards the evocation of passion rather than the persuasion towards prudence. He admitted that Shradhanand professed a genuine desire to calm matters, but it was evident that the Swami lost all control over himself the moment he mounted a public platform. Barron decided on 8 April to extern Shradhanand and his son Indra. But he was unsuccessful because neither the United Provinces nor the Punjab would accept the responsibility for him. Both the governments considered him more popular than Gandhi with the masses of north India, and each thought the consequences of externment would be disastrous. No one knew what would happen if the 'King of Delhi' was silenced.¹

Shradhanand and 30 or 40 others waited for the train upon which Gandhi was riding to arrive in Delhi on the evening of 9 April. It came in late, and without Gandhi, who had been detained on Barron's order prohibiting his entry into the province of Delhi. This

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NAI, Home Poll 268-273 Part B, May 1919.

was Gandhi's first act of civil disobedience in India. The news of the arrest circulated throughout the city with remarkable rapidity and a complete hartal followed on 10 April. The hartal continued until 18 April during which time there were two riots and the police withdrew from the city for one night. During this period a conscious effort was made by the more radical satyagrahis to enlist all those who had not already joined the hartal.

At 9.00 a.m. on the morning of the 10th, 20,000 people flocked to the banks of the River Jumna to hear Shradhanand read the message which Gandhi had written to the people of India prior to his arrest. Shradhanand addressed the audience and urged everyone to be ready to follow Gandhi's example and go to jail. He announced a meeting that evening at Dr Ansari's residence at which forms for vows of swadeshism and Hindu-Muslim unity would be distributed. An estimated one lakh of people attended the meeting that evening at which Muhammad Abdur Rahman presided. Shradhanand introduced one resolution asking for the release of Gandhi and another asking every Indian to follow Gandhi's example until the Rowlatt Act was repealed. He requested the people to follow Gandhi's injunction against violence, and asked them to open their shops the following day. Dr Ansari concluded the meeting by alluding to the fact that the Viceroy had smiled when Gandhi had asserted that the spiritual force of India would influence the government.¹

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NAI, Home Poll 141-147 Part B, May 1919; Home Poll 268-273 Part B, May 1919.

The shops remained closed on Friday the 11th. A huge congregation of Muslims gathered at the Jama Masjid to hear the khutba, in which Ahmad Said, Abdul Majid and others forced the Imam to include the name of the Sultan of Turkey as Khalifa, a practice that had been discontinued since 1915. Abdul Majid then took up an incident which he had first broached on 4 April when he had accused the Imam of eating bacon at the Deputy Commissioner's house. The Imam was a notorious supporter of the Raj and the popular leaders sought to humiliate him by making him swear on a Koran that the story was untrue. Hakim Ajmal Khan intervened and saved the Imam by having the issue referred to a committee of the alim.¹ That evening, at a meeting at Pataudi House, Shradhanand urged the audience not to give evidence to the official enquiry into the riots that had occurred on 30 March which the Deputy Commissioner was to begin the following day. Shradhanand attacked the C.I.D. for spreading false rumours which kept the shops closed. He advised them to boycott the law courts and urged them to end the hartal the following day.²

The Inqilab of 12 April carried the suggestion of Asaf Ali that the place in front of the Town Hall should be called the Khuni Chauraha (Bloody Crossing of Four Roads). This would perpetuate the memory of the riots of 30 March just as the Khuni Darwaza (Bloody Gate) perpetuated the memory of the Mutiny of 1857.³ No

¹ NAI, Home Poll 5 Deposit, May 1919, 'Detailed Reports on the Situation in Delhi in Connection with the Satyagraha Movement.'

² NAI, Home Poll 268-273 Part B, May 1919.

³ NAI, Home Poll 34 Deposit, October 1919.

meetings were held that day and the hartal continued despite the pleas of the primary leaders and despite the news that Gandhi had been released. The boycott of the hearing at the Town Hall was complete.

The hartal continued on Sunday the 13th even though the ostensible reason for it had vanished. This was largely due to the secondary leaders who exercised a precarious control over the movement by riding through the city each morning in a tonga with a vertical whip, which was a sign to all and sundry that the hartal was to continue.¹ The success of the secondary leaders with the shopkeepers led them to approach other occupational groups that had not stopped work. One such group was the railway employees.

More than a week before the 13th several secondary leaders (namely, Indra, Shankar Lal and Abdul Majid) contacted active members of the Arya Samaj who were on the staff of the North Western Railway. This secret meeting was designed to encourage the traffic and signals branches of this railway to strike in support of the hartal; a local strike which could in turn have led to a general strike involving the North Western Railway and the five other railway systems that converged on Delhi. The railway agitators attempted to

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Interview with K.A. Desai, 7 April 1967; RDDA, Confidential File 262, in a report on enquiries into the Delhi disturbances for the week ending 16 May 1919 the following statement is made: 'With regard to the continuance of the hartal during the days when the leaders were apparently making every endeavour to end it, I am told that those responsible included Rauf Ali, Bar-at-Law, Abdul Majid, Shankar Lal and Bishan Sarup.

persuade their colleagues to strike. They accused their fellow-workmen of being unpatriotic, to which many of them replied that due to inflationary conditions they had no savings to support themselves during a period of unemployment. The organisers then took those who seemed interested in striking a blow at their British masters to Seth Raghu Mal Lohia, a wealthy iron merchant and Arya Samajist of Delhi. The Seth promised to finance them during the strike and he further promised to help those who might be dismissed.¹ The success that followed these negotiations heartened the railway organisers and encouraged them to call a meeting of all railway workers in Delhi for the 13th.

The employees of the six railways met at Delhi on the morning of 13 April to discuss the possibility of a general strike. The Arya Samajists from the North Western Railway were the most vociferous and the most inclined to favour the proposal. The employees of the other lines were reluctant, mainly because they had all been promised a rise in wages.² Those who attended the meeting failed to reach a decision and it appeared that all had been in vain. That evening, however, several agitators at the Shakurpur Goods Station on the North Western Railway in Delhi Province decided to act. They

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NAI, Home Poll 398-420 Part B, October 1919, 'Judgement in the Shakurpur Wire-Cutting and Railway Strike Case.'

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Another of the reasons for the hesitation was that Yule, the district traffic superintendent for the East Indian Railway, distributed food at cost during the hartal of 10-18 April and he distributed vegetables free.

cut the telegraph wires and forced the Lahore Mail Train to return to Delhi. They also commandeered a freight train and backed it into Delhi where the strikers attempted to get the Delhi workers to join them. But at the crucial moment the railwaymen of Delhi refused to join their fellows from Shakurpur. The whole movement ended in a fiasco and within seven hours everything was back to normal.

Monday morning, 14 April, saw the continuation of the hartal. The near success that the secondary leaders had had with the railway employees spurred them on to encourage other groups to join the hartal. They approached the lawyers, domestic servants of Europeans, government servants, and bank clerks. The lawyers, domestic servants, and government servants were ridiculed and maligned for refusing to join the hartal. The Vijaya suggested that the inhabitants of Delhi should refuse to call them Indians for their unpatriotic attitude. Stronger means were also applied to these groups, such as social pressure and the refusal to supply them with food, but to no avail.¹ The agitators, however, did succeed with the bank clerks. One English bank reported that its clerks refused to work. The Chief Commissioner then declared a bank holiday which lasted for four days until 17 April.

The Vijaya, in its issue of 14 April, contributed to the unsettled mood in the city with an article on the

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D.I.C., I, written evidence of C.A. Barron; written evidence of H.H. Yule. There was also a serious attempt to persuade the dhobis to join the hartal. RDDA, Confidential File 262.

official enquiry into the riots of 30 March which the Deputy Commissioner had held on 12 April. Indra registered a strong protest over the enquiry and applauded the residents of the city in their refusal to give evidence. He thought that an enquiry by British officers was meaningless because it was they who had committed the murders and it was their clothes that were stained with the blood of the martyrs. He concluded the article with an especially emotional paragraph which was translated as follows:

The enquiry is to be held in the Town Hall near which the blood of innocent children was shed, and into which their corpses were dragged like the carcasses of dogs. The floor of this building is still stained with the blood of martyrs. Those under whose orders guns were fired and bayonets used will act as judge of this outrage.¹

The acquiescence of the bank clerks in the hartal, the vituperative language of the vernacular press, and the railway strike at Shakurpur made the authorities apprehensive that the situation was getting out of hand. Gandhi, after all, had been released and there was no apparent reason for the hartal to continue. The Chief Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, the Officer Commanding the Delhi Brigade, and the Superintendent of Police met the primary leaders of the city, among whom were Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr Ansari, Sultan Singh, and Pearey Lal. The primary leaders expressed the view that the hartal would remain peaceful; they also stated that

¹ D.I.C., I, contained in the written evidence of C.A. Barron.

if they were given time, and if the police did not interfere, they could bring it to an end. The Chief Commissioner agreed and the meeting closed.

The primary leaders of Delhi were, no doubt, sincere in their desire for peace. But the extent to which they misjudged the popular mood became apparent as they emerged from the Town Hall. Gathered in front of the building was a huge crowd of 15,000 men, many of whom were Jats from the neighbouring villages and men from the lower classes in the city. They all carried lathis and their mood became increasingly pugnacious as the meeting inside progressed. They were quite literally prepared to invade the Town Hall and liberate the leaders by force if necessary. They had ample grounds to suspect the authorities since they knew that the leaders of Amritsar, Satyapal and Kitchlew, had been arrested under similar circumstances on the 10th. The absence of Shradhanand among those who emerged from the meeting enraged the demonstrators, and they refused to allow anyone to depart until some of them had checked at Shradhanand's house (which was nearby) and returned to assure the rest that he had not in fact been arrested.

The appearance of lathis on the 14th was indicative of the changed mood of the city. This was the first time that a large crowd had gathered with weapons of this sort, and it indicated an aggressive mood in which the crowd was willing to defy the authorities. It also indicated the involvement in the demonstration of a large number of Jats who were particularly adept at wielding the lathi. These Jats with their lathis were seen coming into the city from the countryside on the

trains in the morning. They returned to their villages each night and then journeyed into the city again on the 15th and the succeeding days to the 19th.¹

A meeting, which had been advertised by means of crude posters, took place around 5.00 p.m. at King Edward Park on the 14th. A sadhu boy read a poem with Gandhi as the main theme.² He was followed by a speaker whom no one seemed to know and who spoke such nonsense that he was hooted down. Abdul Majid then mounted the plinth. He made a vituperative speech against the Rowlatt Bills comparing them to a cup of poison; he also compared the Press Act of 1910 to a sword. He then pointed to a person taking notes and launched into an invective against the C.I.D. The people around the note-taker attacked him until someone said that he was a student. Then the real C.I.D. reporter was pointed

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NAI, Home Poll 144-162 Part A, June 1919, 'Extension of the Seditious Meetings Act of 1911 to the Province of Delhi. Decision that Martial Law Should Not be Proclaimed in Delhi for the Present.'

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The Sadhus' name was Saraswati Dev. He is another example of the initiative which individuals took during the Rowlatt Satyagraha quite independently of the organisation of the leaders. Saraswati Dev was at the Railway Station during the riot of the 30th. He was also present at the Clock Tower. Although his motives were unclear, it was evident that he was spreading rumours and encouraging the crowd to act. He rode in a motor car with Hakim Ajmal Khan and Shradhanand and evidently took Shradhanand as his mentor. He took a prominent part in the riot at Edward Park on the 14th for which he was later sentenced to flogging. He then went to Rohtak District and attempted to whip up support there for a hartal. NAI, Home Poll 16 Deposit, July 1919. 'Result of the Enquiries Made Regarding the Sadhu Boy Saraswati Dev, Who Was Connected with the Delhi Disturbances and Was Arrested at Rewari.'

out and the mob ripped the notes from him and hounded him out of the park. He made good his escape in a tonga to the Alliance Bank. The mob then spotted a head constable and attacked him for being a member of the C.I.D., which he was not. They took his revolver, ammunition and pants and belaboured him severely with lathis. They then held the articles up for the mob to see, burnt the notes and marched off triumphantly to Dr Ansari's house with their trophies. These were immediately turned over to the police.

The participants in the riot at King Edward Park were mostly Muslim, as would be expected of an event that took place in a predominantly Muslim locale. There were 19 men arrested for taking part in the riot, 12 of whom were Muslim. The meeting had attracted a large number of members of the lower classes. They were mainly artisans and karkhandars. Some of their occupations were tinsmith, chauffeur, panwallah and there were two brothers who made penny whistles in Kishanganj as piece work.¹

On the morning of the 15th Hakim Ajmal Khan and Shradhanand attempted to persuade the shopkeepers to resume business. They first visited the butchers and then gradually worked through the rest of the city. By 10.00 a.m., some shops had opened. Barron called a meeting of the primary leaders once again. They expressed their helplessness, and suggested a meeting of the leading traders with the officials. Ajmal Khan

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D.I.C., I, Judgement of the King Edward Park Riot Case, contained in written evidence of C.A. Barron.

and others continued their attempts to get the shops open, and succeeded with the butchers, who agreed to slaughter a few animals in order to end the hartal.

The leading traders and primary leaders (including Shradhanand) met the officials in the Town Hall on the afternoon of the 15th. The traders stated that they were reluctant to open their shops in response to the pleas of the primary leaders, because that would imply that they had closed their shops at the insistence of the leaders of Delhi rather than in protest against the Rowlatt Act, police repression, and the arrest of Gandhi. The traders thought that these leaders would be liable to arrest if it could be proven that the leaders were responsible for the continuance of the hartal. The merchants wanted it clearly understood that they had continued with the hartal on their own responsibility, and that they would end it only on the condition that no action would be taken against the leaders. The Chief Commissioner immediately agreed to issue a notification not to arrest any of the leaders; he also promised to convey the dissatisfaction of the merchants over the Rowlatt Act to the Viceroy. The traders then agreed to break the hartal on the 16th over the strong opposition of Choudhri Ram Lal, the leader of the cloth merchants.

During the meeting of the 15th a huge crowd of 20,000 gathered outside the Town Hall. The heat of the day and the excitement of the Satyagraha fostered a mounting tension that focussed once again upon the question whether the leaders inside had been arrested. The close-packed crowd of lathiwallahs, which was similar to the crowd at the Town Hall on the 14th, murmured and

grumbled about the rumour of a massacre at Amritsar on the 13th and the use of aeroplanes to quell disturbances in the Punjab. They felt themselves more than a match for the authorities; and their anger practically touched a danger point with the appearance of an aeroplane overhead. The unemployed coolies and the rural Jats in the crowd found common cause in their determination to liberate the leaders, especially the intrepid Shradhanand. Barron's quick action in meeting the objections of the traders, however, ended the meeting inside and eased the situation outside as the leaders emerged triumphant from the building to a voluminous, swelling roar of greeting. Shradhanand then led the crowd to Dr Ansari's compound.

The shops opened on the morning of the 16th, but a spirit of truculence reasserted itself when Beadon and Hare-Scott, the Superintendent of Police, paraded through the city at the head of a strong guard in a flamboyant bid to reassure the 'law-abiding elements' of the city. This ostentatious display of authority merely provoked the merchants of Delhi into closing their shops, because they would not allow the man who had called them badmashes to say that he had ended the hartal. The leaders could only give up in the face of such a misplaced faith in the efficacy of force. Later that afternoon the leaders and the merchants held a meeting at the Delhi Mercantile Association at which it was again agreed to break the hartal. While the meeting was in progress the participants received the news that the entire police and military force had withdrawn from the city. The authorities feared an

attack on the Civil Lines during the night and had regrouped their forces to deal with it. The leaders did not know the reason for the withdrawal, but they proceeded to station volunteers from the various corps at the positions of the night guard.

The butchers of Delhi resumed slaughtering on the 17th. The banks and most of the shops also resumed business on the same day. The withdrawn guard was very much in evidence on its return in the morning. Towards noon the police arrested Gauri Shankar, a young man of no significance in the city, who attempted to persuade shopkeepers to close their shops. Three men in a tonga then rode down Chandni Chauk, shouting that three men had been arrested, bayoneted, and thrown into the Queen's Gardens. A crowd collected on Chandni Chauk and moved down to the Town Hall. Hakim Ajmal Khan was there and asked Beadon to allow him to take the boy out to show that he was unharmed. Beadon thought that the prestige of the Sirkar would suffer if he complied, and he refused. The crowd, now turned mob, then returned in the direction of Ballimaran Street. They attacked a solitary constable and then accosted a police picket of 14 men. They wrenched the rifle from one man before the police were order to fire at will. The police killed two and wounded 18. The shops closed immediately and most of them remained closed the following day.

The participants of the riot of Ballimaran Street mirrored the type of people who happened to be in Chandni Chauk at the time. Three leaders emerged. They were Mohammad Din, Chhote Lal and Ganga Saran. These three men had been at the Railway Station on the 30th,

but had not assumed an active role there. They all had some education and were active in the various political organisations in the city. There were 12 people killed or wounded who were examined by the Chief Medical Officer. Two of these were Muslims and ten were Hindus. There were ten other people arrested, among whom there were six Muslims and four Hindus. Some of the occupations represented were a chakkiworker, a confectioner, a cook, a Kahar, two labourers, and four petty shopkeepers.¹

The authorities decided that severe measures were necessary. They proclaimed Delhi under the Seditious Meetings Act and Beadon appointed 14 citizens as special police officers.² This angered the populace once again. They could not accept that there was an insufficiency of policemen with so many military around. The fact that they were not compelled to wear uniforms did not alleviate their indignation, more particularly because most of these men had already tried to end the hartal. The complete loss of control, the violence, and the actions of the government combined to convince the members of the Satyagraha Sabha that their goals were unobtainable. The Sabha, consequently, burned its membership list on 17 April and disbanded.

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D.I.C., I, written evidence of Lt.-Col. C.H. James.

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The 14 men were: R.S. Pearey Lal, R.B. Sultan Singh, L. Pearey Lal (motorwalla), L. Shiv Narain, Muhammad Abdur Rahman, Dr Abdul Rahman, Choudhri Ram Lal, L. Madan Mohan, Asaf Ali, Hafiz Abdul Aziz (pleader), L. Har Bogind Pershad, Mian Fakhr-ud-din (butcher), L. Jagdish Rai (jeweller), Mohammad Siddiq.

There was a general feeling in the city that things had gone too far when mobs attacked police pickets with no provocation. The subject received a thorough airing among small groups of the more substantial citizens who met informally to discuss the matter. They began to doubt the validity of supporting mass agitation because such agitations invariably led to violence. They attributed the riot to the ignorance and wild passions of the masses, who resorted to violence at the least provocation. The informal alliance between the middle classes and the lower classes began to dissolve as unobtrusively as it had formed.

The hartal of the 18th was supported by the Muslim merchants because it was Friday, a day on which they usually closed for half a day anyway. The Hindu merchants too kept their shops closed; some in mourning for the two who had died the previous day; others in response to the orders of the secondary leaders; and yet others in response to their own leaders who were most concerned with the maintenance of an outward display of unity. The shops in Sardar Bazaar and Sabzimandi were generally open; as much to signify their owners' independence from the merchants inside the walled city as for any other reason. The funeral for one of those who had died in the riot of the 17th attracted 50,000 at the burning ghat. There were very few Hindu merchants in attendance and no Muslim merchants. The sentiment of communal harmony that had prevailed at previous meetings was conspicuous by its absence. There were no violent speeches and no issues were raised. The audience was a collection of curious and interested bystanders who had

no personal concern in the matter. There was in fact a certain amount of disillusionment on the part of the majority of the audience. They felt that the merchants and leaders had led them on, and had then disengaged themselves when the situation got out of hand. They saw it as another example of the traditional cowardice of the Bania. The old divisions and antagonisms among the residents of Delhi reasserted themselves as the city reverted to its normal state on the 19th.

The Rowlatt Satyagraha in Delhi stemmed from Gandhi's call for a hartal in protest against the Rowlatt Act. But the Rowlatt Act only provided the catalyst and Gandhi the spark for the ventilation of the long standing grievances of the different classes and communities of Delhi. Some of the events that occurred between 1911 and 1919 revealed these grievances in either latent or active form. The pan-Islamic propaganda of Mohamed Ali and the hartal in response to his internment; the agitation of the Home Rule League and the hartal in response to the Ram Lila affair; the annual sessions of the National Congress and the Moslem League; the public meetings that were held between January and March 1919 and the rapid expansion of the vernacular press illustrate such events. The frustrations that these events expressed were religious, economic, and political, and the leadership of the movement sought to draw upon them for their own purposes. They had to raise different issues before different groups because of the variety of loyalties operative in the community. The leaders

were confronted by sanatani, Arya Samajist, and reformist Hindus; by liberal and orthodox Muslims; by the educated and the illiterate; and finally by the affluent and the deprived. They succeeded in the first instance when they obtained a complete hartal; and over and above a complete hartal a public responsive to the spirit of the Rowlatt Satyagraha. But from the 30th onwards the focus of popular attention switched from the Rowlatt Act to police repression which became the catalyst for the events of the following 19 days.

The classes and communities which supported the Rowlatt Satyagraha in Delhi changed somewhat after the first day. While none of the communities which supported the Satyagraha on the first day dropped out, the infusion of the rural Jats with their lathis into the situation from the 14th onward coincided with a remarkable change of mood in the city. The mood in the city had been fairly peaceful on the 30th and very constrained on the 6th. But the people of Delhi showed signs of becoming more aggressive from Gandhi's arrest onwards, and the appearance of the Jats at the Town Hall on the 14th and 15th tipped the scale of the balance. Although the Jats did not participate in the riots of the 14th and the 17th, their truculent attitude communicated itself to the more violent elements in the city, who, once they had received their cue, restrained themselves no longer in the manner of true satyagrahis. At that point, the alliance between the petty bourgeoisie on the one hand, and the lower classes, on the other, broke down as the former realised that things had gone too far, and the latter realised that they had

been encouraged to participate and had then been blamed for the results.

Gandhi had not foreseen that the people would join in such numbers in his protest against the Rowlatt Act. He confessed his confusion and chagrin over the results when he stated: 'Who knows how it all came about?' It all came about, so far as Delhi was concerned, as the result of a combination of nationalist appeals, local grievances, and police repression. It all came about because the inhabitants of Delhi found a common grievance where previously their interests had been diffuse, dissimilar, and even contradictory. The primary significance of the Rowlatt Satyagraha in Delhi was, that given an appropriate issue, it was possible to transform a heterogeneous political community into a homogeneous political society. This more than anything must explain the unique alliance between the Hindu Banias and the Muslim artisans of Delhi, just as it must also explain the fact that a Hindu sanyasi spoke to a Hindu and Muslim congregation from the pulpit of the Jama Masjid.

III

In the cities and among the urban population the people abuse their educated fellow-countrymen in filthy terms and accuse them of having led them astray. Nowhere is there any sympathy for the political agitator, and the general opinion is that he is responsible for all that has occurred and for all the sufferings and loss that the people have suffered and are suffering.

Indian Correspondent
Central Intelligence Department
5 May 1919

The reaction to the Rowlatt Satyagraha in Delhi became apparent at a meeting on 13 May to display support for the government against the Amir of Afghanistan who had attacked India on 8 May.¹ The meeting was convened by 23 prominent Hindus and Muslims and was attended by

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The war with Afghanistan had almost no effect on Delhi and is therefore not dealt with in the text. The Muslims of Delhi felt that the attempt of the Amir was suicidal if he stood alone and some Marwaris and Banias buried their jewellery in fear of an invasion. The number of foreign students in the madrassahs in Delhi were reported and any suspicious behaviour noted. An increased number of Pathans and Afghans passing through Delhi on the way north were also noted. NAI, Home Poll 93-113 Part A, June 1919, 'Intimation by the Local Governments of the Manner in Which the News of the Outbreak of Hostilities with the Amir of Afghanistan Has Been Received by Hindu and Muhammadan Opinion in India'; Home Poll 48 Deposit, July 1919.

five or six hundred persons.¹ Khan Bahadur Nawab Ahmad Said-ud-din Khan, the local leader of the Loharu family, took the chair. The proceedings began with Rai Sahib Pearey Lal reading a letter from Dr Ansari who was unable to attend.² The Rai Sahib then criticised the

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The following men were some of the more prominent citizens who attended: Sayid Ahmad, Imam of the Jama Masjid, Khan Sahib Bashiruddin Hassan, Rai Bahadur Sultan Singh, Rai Sahib Pearey Lal, Khan Bahadur Nawab Ahmad Said-ud-din Khan, Hafiz Abdul Aziz, Pandit Banke Rai, Pandit Har Narain Shastri, Muhammad Abdur Rahman (pleader), Islamullah Khan, Haji Abdul Ghani, Pearey Lal (motorwalla), Muhammad Abdul Ahmad. NAI, Home Poll 144-162 Part A, June 1919.

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Dr Ansari was called to Rampur. Hakim Ajmal Khan was also absent from the city. The text of Dr Ansari's letter was as follows: 'My dear Babu Piarey Lal, I came back last night to Delhi. This evening I learnt that there is going to be a public meeting tomorrow afternoon regarding the present situation. I would have liked to express my ideas personally but an urgent professional engagement prevents me from remaining in town tomorrow.

I have given the subject my earnest thought and have discussed the matter with friends. What I am writing is, therefore my considered opinion. At a time when there is danger of a foreign invasion on our motherland, it is the imperative duty of all true and patriotic Indians whether Hindus or Musalmans to sink all their differences with Government and give it their whole-hearted support. Even if we put aside all the higher patriotic and ethical considerations, our self-interest demands that we should make common cause with our rulers at this juncture. For, we must bear in mind that "Home Rule", "Responsible Government" and all our highly cherished ideals of constitutional rights and personal liberties could be gained only when there is perfect tranquility inside the country and no apprehension of an attack from outside.

I appeal to all my countrymen to heartily support the government at this critical period.

I hope you would be good enough to read this letter at the public meeting.' NAI, Home Poll 144-162 Part A, June 1919.

people who had exceeded the law during the agitation and the government which had suppressed it with unnecessary vigour. Khan Sahib Bashir-ud-din followed with a strong condemnation of the promoters of the agitation and stated that it was a duty to be loyal to government at all times and not just at times of danger. The sentiments in the speech of the Khan Sahib found support from Pandits Banke Rai and Har Narain Shastri, and from Raj Narain (pleader). Haji Abdul Ghani and Khan Bahadur Abdul Ahad. This was followed by a 'most loyal speech' from Muhammad Abdur Rahman (pleader). The chairman concluded with a strong speech which emphasised that loyalty was not a favour, but a duty incumbent upon all, at all times.

The speeches at the meeting of 13 May voiced the apprehension of many in the city that the arousal of the masses could only result in violence. They hoped that the events that occurred during the Rowlatt Satyagraha were sufficient warning against similar action in the future. Shradhanand's withdrawal of his support for Gandhi on 2 May¹ and Dr Ansari's letter which had been read at the meeting, appeared to all to be a general statement of dissatisfaction with mass politics. In addition the presence of Rai Sahib Pearey Lal, Pearey Lal (motorwalla), Rai Bahadur Sultan Singh and Muhammad Abdur Rahman (pleader) at the meeting to express loyalty

¹ NAI, Home Poll 49 Deposit, July 1919, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the Second Half of May 1919,' C.A. Barron to W.S. Marris, 4 June 1919. The letter from Shradhanand to Gandhi was published in the Independent (Allahabad) on 28 May 1919. It stated that Shradhanand was convinced that passive resistance and non-co-operation under conditions then existing could only produce upheaval among the masses.

to the government, even though they had counselled the government to change its attitude to win the hearts of the people, gave support to the traditional leaders who argued against nationalist politics.¹ Dr Ansari reiterated this point of view three days after the meeting of supporters of the government on 13 May when he interviewed the Chief Commissioner:

In a long conversation I had with Ansari...he told me that though he had been the first person in Delhi to sign Gandhi's vow, his views regarding the practicability of the passive resistance movement, as he had understood it had changed when he saw the excesses to which it led.²

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An Indian correspondent summarised this state of affairs as follows: 'The unfortunate turn which political agitation in some parts of India took by the misdirection of politicians in April last has set men's minds thinking as to the future of political agitation in this country. There are many men who have begun to deprecate political agitation altogether and say that it can only do harm. These people are of the opinion that all political agitation and particularly all anti-government political agitation should be avoided in the future. They add that such agitation whilst it does no good to the country it does incalculable harm by embittering the relations between Europeans and IndiansRecent events in India have made even the most incorrigible Congress politicians pause and say that a great blunder was committed when efforts were made to induce the masses, particularly the illiterate classes, to take part in political agitation. The politicians all over India are coming to the conclusion that political agitation should in future be confined to the educated classes and among those people who can trust each other.' NAI, Home Poll 315-319 Part B, August 1919, 'Report of the Director of Central Intelligence,' for the week ending 7 July 1919.

2

NAI, Home Poll 49 Deposit, July 1919.

This attitude continued to receive support and especially so when Gandhi indefinitely postponed the introduction of non-co-operation which he had planned to initiate on 1 July 1919.

An even greater effect of the 'excesses' of the Rowlatt Satyagraha was the gradual breakdown of Hindu-Muslim unity which had reached an apogee during the agitation. One of the causes of this dissolution was the upswell of feeling among orthodox Hindus and Muslims against the use of temples and mosques for political purposes.¹ This was aggravated by the general disenchantment that Arya Samajists felt with Shradhanand, who had represented the epitome of Hindu-Muslim unity

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NAI, Home Poll 47 Deposit, July 1919, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the Second Half of April 1919,' C.A. Barron to W.S. Marris, 3 May 1919. The reports from every province comment on the reaction of orthodox Hindus and Muslims against the use of temples and mosques for political speeches.

when he spoke from the pulpit of the Jama Masjid.¹ Such feelings were further exacerbated by a renewal of an agitation against kine-killing in the United Provinces,² and a general reaction by both orthodox Hindus and Muslims against the public negotiation between Gandhi and Abdul Bari to limit the number of cow sacrifices.³ The disenchantment took a political turn by July when Gandhi replied to the Commissioner of Police in Bombay that the Muslims had instigated the Hindus during the disturbances. If it had not been for the distress of the Muslims over the position of the Khilafat the Hindus would have been able to enforce calm and no violence would have

¹ NAI, Home Poll 701-704 Part B, June 1919, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Central Intelligence,' for week ending 23 June 1919. One correspondent commented on Shradhanand as follows: 'Swami Shradhanand, well known in the Punjab as Mahatma Munshi Ram, has lost much in the estimation of his co-religionists. The latter say that he did the Arya Samaj much harm by throwing himself headlong into extremist or anti-Government politics without consulting the leading men in the Arya Samaj. The general opinion is that he is a most unsafe and unreliable person as a leader. In the estimation of politicians he has also fallen because he wrote in his recent letter to Mr. Gandhi that politics were a matter which concerned only Government. The politicians say that the Swami is insincere and has changed his opinions in order to save his skin. The Leader of Allahabad took the Swami to task only the other day and advised him not to meddle with politics any more. It is quite clear that on the whole Swami Shradhanand had lost more than he has gained by his recent excursion into anti-Government politics. Those in the Arya Samaj who are anxious that the Samaj should keep aloof from politics - and their number is considerable - are of opinion that the Swami cannot be trusted as a leader of the Samaj and that he should either withdraw from the Samaj or give up politics altogether.'

² NAI, Home Poll 47 Deposit, July 1919.

³ NAI, Home Poll 48 Deposit, July 1919.

resulted.¹ Muslims then began to feel that they had been made a 'catspaw' and, after having been drawn into supporting the Rowlatt Satyagraha, were left holding the blame.²

The concern and caution of the Indian population was equally matched by their European rulers. They saw two problems: the place of Delhi as a centre for political agitation and the place of political agitation in the good government of the country. The question arose primarily because both the Punjab and the United Provinces made repeated allegations that emissaries were emanating from Delhi and encouraging the people in the surrounding districts to join the hartals during the Rowlatt Satyagraha.³ Both provinces further alleged that the merchants of Delhi used their commercial

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NAI, Home Poll 261-272 Part A, August 1919, 'Reports Regarding Mr M.K. Gandhi's Further Activities and His Proposal to Renew Civil Disobedience.'

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NAI, Home Poll 54 Deposit, August 1919, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the 1st Half of July 1919,' [report on the Punjab] for the fortnight ending 15 July 1919.

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A report from the Punjab charged that: '...there is the strongest evidence to prove that Delhi had been from the beginning, and is still, endeavouring to seduce the loyalty of the Southern Punjab. Emissaries and Lecturers have been constantly coming and going and without the pressure exerted by Delhi merchants the hartal and its accompanying disturbances would have been a complete failure.' NAI, Home Poll 47 Deposit, July 1919, [report for the Punjab], 30 April 1919.

control of the area to enforce hartals.¹ The complaints were compounded by a bureaucratic control that channelled information about incidents in contiguous districts to the respective provincial government and thence through the Government of India to the Delhi Administration.² The Government of Punjab and the Government of United Provinces both looked upon Delhi as the centre of an evil influence which if done away with, would allow their provinces to prosper in peace and tranquility. The Delhi Administration replied by painting a picture of idyllic serenity which prevailed before the arrival of the Government of India which completely upset the local equilibrium. The Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, made the following comment on the situation:

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The Government of United Provinces complained in the following vein, 'Meetings connected with the present situation have been held sporadically during the last fortnight at various towns in the province; in many cases they were addressed by emissaries from Delhi. At a few places which did not observe hartal on the 6th and 13th April, shops were closed on other dates during the fortnight under report. In many instances this was done under pressure from the wholesale dealers of Delhi who refused to do business with the smaller trades people in the towns of this province, especially in the western districts, if they did not join the movement.' NAI, Home Poll 47 Deposit, July 1919, A.C. Chatterjee to W. Marris, 2 May 1919.

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The C.I.D. in Delhi investigated 35 reports of emissaries from Delhi who were alleged to have fomented discontent in the Punjab and United Provinces. None could be proven satisfactorily, even by the local officials. The C.I.D. also investigated 37 reports of merchants who were alleged to have used commercial pressure to enforce a hartal. Again, none could be proven. RDDA, Confidential File 262 (1919).

The District Magistrate and Chief Commissioner have drawn an idyllic picture of Delhi as it was before the serpent in the shape of the Government of India entered into it, which may be a reply to the Punjab picture of modern Delhi as the source of all political poison. But even if its ancient innocence is overdrawn it is clearly true that Delhi as the winter seat of the Government and Legislature of India will always lure the agitator and the reptile journalist. They naturally come there in the hope of creating agitation and so impressing Government; they will come more than ever under the new regime of larger councils and longer sessions; intrigue and caballing will abound; there is a hostile element always to be found in the city, if not indeed in Delhi City more than most places; and it is probably quite true that the District Magistrate and the Chief Commissioner will have a very difficult task in handling the situations which will arise, and that the Government of India will be embarrassed by appeals to them to interfere. They escaped a similar embarrassment about Bengal affairs when they left Calcutta, but they are even more likely to be involved in Delhi because of the difference between a Chief Commissioner and a Lieutenant-Governor in Council.¹

The conditions which the Home Secretary noted were of such concern that it was decided that Colonel Beadon was not the ideal district magistrate for Delhi 'under modern conditions' and that he was to be replaced by 'an officer of different type.'²

It seems, however, that two points had been recognised. The first was that there was a certain

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NAI, Home Poll 452-453 Part A, August 1919, 'Report from the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, On the Recent Disturbances in Delhi City,' note by W.S. Marris, 13 June 1919.

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Ibid.

amount of propensity for political agitation that was indigenous to the city of Delhi and the second point was that the transfer of the capital to Delhi had exacerbated this propensity because the capital attracted agitators and the presence of the Government of India provided an additional avenue of protest to the agitators, both indigenous and alien to the city.

What had not been recognised was the fact that the enhanced importance of Delhi as a centre for political agitation gave the indigenous agitator a new status. As we shall see men such as Asaf Ali, Neki Ram Sharma, and Shankar Lal soon assumed an increasing importance in national radical politics which they had not heretofore held.

The matters above concerned Delhi as a centre for nationalist politics. Another reaction to the Rowlatt Satyagraha went beyond Delhi and questioned the basic principles of government in India. The Home Secretary again summed up the problem in the following manner:

Is agitation conducted in the name of constitutional liberty which is likely to lead to disorder to be permitted up to the point at which disorder actually occurs; and if not, can we do anything to stop it beyond what we do now? We have the Press Act, the Seditious Meetings Act, and so forth; but the trouble is that they are all rather a denial of our own principles; we use them intermittently and reluctantly, and they are weapons too big and clumsy to deal with ninety-ninths of the actual mischief. It [the problem] strikes right at the continuance of our administration. Since we cannot rule by machine guns, can we acquiesce in a campaign which must from time to time bring the machine guns on the scene? Last year the Secretary of State assented in conversation to the proposition that if

after reforms dangerous agitation continued means must be found for stopping it. But inasmuch as reforms are themselves a half-way measure, such agitation there is bound to be; and yet under reforms repression will be harder than ever.¹

The future held a great deal in store for the Government of India and the Delhi Administration. But nothing in that future offered any solution to the dilemma posed by the Home Secretary.

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Ibid.

Chapter Seven

THE ASCENDANCE OF PAROCHIALISM: I

The Non-co-operation Movement, 1919-1920

I

Sentiment Aroused over the Khilafat Issue

II

The Khilafat Agitation

III

The Inauguration of Non-co-operation

IV

Non-co-operation Intensified

V

Appendix

The Rowlatt Satyagraha was the most remarkable event in the political life of Delhi after the Mutiny of 1857. It reflected the degree to which the inhabitants of the city had been politicised by the preceding ten years of agitation. It also reflected the extent to which their political horizons had expanded from provincial issues to nationalist ideals. And finally it reflected the extent to which both the élite and the lower classes of Delhi became involved in political agitations and demonstrations.

The events which occurred during the Rowlatt Satyagraha had a remarkable effect upon the citizens of Delhi. The Satyagraha effectively contributed to the politicisation of a significantly larger number of individuals and groups than had been involved previously. The events of April 1919 also led to a gradual recrudescence of parochial attitudes among the classes and communities that were drawn into the agitation. The Hindu merchants and professionals who had participated in the Home Rule League from 1917 onwards and who organised the Rowlatt Satyagraha reacted to the violence of those tumultuous 21 days by withdrawing from overt political activity. The riotous behaviour of the lower classes taught them the lesson that mass involvement in political movements entailed more violence than they were willing to condone or support. The events which occurred during the Rowlatt Satyagraha also made the Hindus suspicious of the religious motives of the Muslim politicians, especially when these politicians encouraged the support of the most ardent fanatics and the ulema.

The recrudescence of parochialism, which resulted from the Rowlatt Satyagraha, affected the quality of the non-co-operation movement. Instead of consolidating and building upon the gains of the Satyagraha, this movement became an anti-climax with limited participation. The participants were drawn mainly from the Muslim community, which responded in a most aggressive manner to the prevailing economic distress and the uncertainty surrounding the fate of the Khilafat.

The continuous appeal to religious sentiment by Muslim agitators affected the nature of Muslim participation in the first non-co-operation movement. The sharif withdrew from political activity since such appeals violated their cosmopolitan values and loyal attitudes. The appeal to religious sentiment had a remarkable effect upon the merchants, the lower classes, and those sharif who were political Extremists. These groups gave their wholehearted support to the non-co-operation movement because it was so inextricably linked with the issue of the Khilafat. The most radical of this group continually sought to increase the pace of politicisation in an effort to demonstrate mass support for their political and religious grievances. These two groups, organised into the Khilafat Committee and the Khilafat Workers' Association respectively, continually manoeuvred for control of the movement. But the control and influence which the sharif in the Khilafat Committee exercised, invariably drew the merchants to their side and effectively restrained the political excesses of the predominantly non-sharif Khilafat Workers.

I

Sensible Hindus and Muhammadans are of opinion that political agitators may be successful for a time with the help of misrepresentation in raising a Hindu-Muhammadan combination against Government and in influencing Indian racial passions against European, but they cannot succeed in making the mutual relations of Hindus and Muhammadans cordial.

Indian Correspondent to
Central Intelligence Department
8 September 1919

The citizens of Delhi observed a hartal on Sunday 17 October 1919. The hartal which was called Khilafat Day, was universal in Delhi except for those who dealt in foodstuffs, sweetmeats, drugs, and public transport and who had been exempted in order to prevent any possibility of a disturbance resulting from coercion. The hartal was organised by the Muslim nationalists as a protest against the delay in the publication of the peace terms with Turkey and against the supposed terms which would be imposed upon Turkey when they were published. It was also a protest against the activities of the Greeks in Turkey. The success of the hartal depended mainly upon the state of public opinion in the Muslim community.

The sentiments of radical Muslims in India on the Khilafat question were articulated by Dr Ansari in his speech to the Moslem League in December 1918. This was followed by an attempt on the part of Abdul Bari of Firangi Mahal, Lucknow, to circulate an istifta

[interrogatory] to the ulema of north India. His object was to obtain an authoritative pronouncement from Muslim theologians in support of the views expressed by Dr Ansari.¹ His hope to circulate a fatwa with the answers to the istifta never reached fruition as none of the ulema, except those of Firangi Mahal, would sign the fatwa. Abdul Bari then began circulating extracts from the Chehal Hadis to the ulema. They contained such lines as:

...one who approaches an oppressive ruler and advises (literally, commands) him to do good and prevents him from doing evil (deeds), and is killed for it (is the best of martyrs).

The Prophet also said: 'The best jihad is truth which is spoken before a tyrant king.'²

Abdul Bari's attempts to persuade the ulema failed. They were not ready at this point to become involved in politics which were based on religious issues.

Abdul Bari failed in his appeal to religious sentiment on the Khilafat issue because the dominant feeling among leading Muslims was one of caution. This attitude, wrought mainly as a reaction to the violence

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NAI, Home Poll 181-184 Part B, February 1919, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Central Intelligence,' for the week ending 15 February 1919; Home Poll 13 Deposit, March 1919, 'Religious Interrogation issued by the Ulemas of Ferringhi Mahal, Lucknow, On the Question of the Caliphate, The Holy Places, And the Position of the King of Hadjaz'; Home Poll 16 Deposit, March 1919, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation in India for the First Half of February 1919,' S.P. O'Donnell to J. DuBoulay, 19 February 1919.

2

NAI, Home Poll 494-497 Part B, June 1919, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Central Intelligence,' for the week ending 19 May 1919.

of the Rowlatt Satyagraha, was capitalised upon by the Government of India. On 3 May the Home Secretary circulated a letter to all local governments advising them of the likely terms which would be offered to Turkey. The letter requested that local governments advise local Muslim leaders in order to anticipate what was expected to be a sharp blow when the terms were officially announced.¹ The Chief Commissioner of Delhi

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NAI, Home Poll 363-368 Part A, May 1919, 'Issue of Instructions to Local Governments and Administrations on the Question of the Effect upon Muhammadan Opinion in this Country of the Forthcoming Announcement of the Terms of Peace in Relation to Turkey.' The Home Secretary, W.S. Marris, made the following notes on the state of Muslim opinion in India on 1 May 1919: 'The internal danger proceeds from the pan-Islamists, who are largely identified with the young Muhammadans. If they start a great agitation the maulvis may follow, and the masses be drawn in. The young Muhammadans are also largely the pro-Hindus (though logically they ought to be nothing of the kind) and in the present temper of the country we may easily have a rising of both communities. But fortunately the pan-Islamists are for the most part known and localised. They are to be found in cities - Lucknow, Delhi, Calcutta, Bombay, Patna, Aligarh. If we can deal with them or isolate them, or take the wind out of their sails, they may be unable to do much harm. The conservative Muhammadans dislike them and the idea of temporal loyalty is still striving and the divisions of sect and school will also help to check a united movement.

We have had crises with the Muhammadan before: Cawnpore 1913, which was probably the effect of the Balkan War; November 1914 and June 1916. But the present situation far surpasses all its predecessors in gravity.

The next question seems to be whether we should instruct local governments, on the old lines, to send for the sober leaders and let them know as gently as may be what the terms will be and also to let anticipations of the terms appear gradually in the press. I have not much faith in these methods. The work is done evenly, the process gets known and creates suspicion, and the loyalists are timid and likely to fail us as soon as an outcry begins.'

called the local Muslim leaders for a conference on 8 May and impressed the point of view of government upon them.¹ The Chief Commissioner also elicited a promise from Hakim Ajmal Khan to counsel the maulvis to refrain from agitation over the peace terms.²

While the Muslims were being subjected to pressure from government, they also faced other propoganda efforts, the main aim of which was to inflame public opinion. The fatwa of the Amir of Afghanistan was circulated freely in the city despite the fact that it had been prohibited.

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NAI, Home Poll 524-532 Part A, May 1919, 'Question of the Effect upon Muhammadan Opinion in This Country of the Forthcoming Announcement of the Terms of Peace in Relation to Turkey.' In the letter from C.A. Barron to the Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, dated 10 May 1919, the Chief Commissioner commented on the meeting as follows: '...the meeting...was very fairly representative of the sober minded and substantial residents of the community in Delhi.

The announcement was I thought received surprisingly well. My announcement of Thursday has, I am told, been widely discussed, but no excitement has so far been reported among the lower classes. The usual Friday prayers at the Jama Masjid passed off yesterday entirely without incident, and no reference is reported to have been made to either the Turkish peace terms or the Frontier trouble.

One very remarkable feature of our meeting on Thursday afternoon was that, after a very few questions, both the Turkish peace terms and the Frontier trouble were dismissed from further discussion, which then turned to the much more burning questions of the discount being charged by bannias on currency notes and the recent rise in the prices of wheat and cloth!

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NAI, Home Poll 50 Deposit, August 1919, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the First Half of June 1919,' C.A. Barron to W.S. Marris, 16 June 1919.

Other pieces of propaganda were also circulated, such as a jihad leaflet by an anonymous author which contained statements such as the following:

And the Prophet is said to have said that the man who commits murder in the name of God becomes entitled to go to heaven during the short time of milking a female camel. The man who has received a wound in a crusade, for the sake, of God, or has been distressed, will be lifted up on the day of judgement....

Muhammadans! a religious war is a duty... when the Muhammadan religion and the Muhammadans are weak and they are prevented from performing their duties, their religious customs being insulted. We are in such a state at present. The English have caused our mosques to be demolished in our presence. They are abusing our Prophet... and when we venture to say something we are shot down. The English had promised us that our Caliph would not be dethroned during the time of war, the territories under him would not be snatched away from him, and the sacred places would remain under his guardianship. But has any one of these promises been fulfilled? You yourself can answer the question. How long, O Muhammadans, will you continue to lead a shameless life? How long are you going to tolerate these accursed sights detrimental to your faith?¹

Leaflets, such as the one described above, and a letter from the Ali brothers (who were interned at Chhindwara) to the Viceroy, the contents of which became known very

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NAI, Home Pol1 494-497 Part B, June 1919, for the week ending 19 May 1919.

widely and very quickly, inflamed the pan-Islamic attitudes of the Muslim body politic.¹

Pan-Islamic opinion became inflamed with such occurrences as the events in Egypt and the suggestion that St Sophia should be converted into a church.² But despite the government, the issue of the Khilafat gradually changed from one of pan-Islamic outrage to one of general discontent among all Muslims. The major factor in this change was the inordinate delay in the

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NAI, Home Poll 363-368 Part A, May 1919, Mohamed and Shaukat Ali to His Excellency the Viceroy, 24 April 1919. There were 5,000 copies of the letter printed in Bombay by 16 May 1919. Home Poll 48 Deposit, July 1919, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the First Half of May 1919,' J. Crerar to W.S. Marris, 19 May 1919. The support which the Ali brothers won for making such a courageous announcement of their views soon changed to consternation when the brothers came out in support for the Amir of Afghanistan. They regained much of this support, however, when they were interned in the jail at Betul in June 1919.

² NAI, Home Poll 48 Deposit, July 1919, C.A. Barron to W.S. Marris, 16 May 1919.

publication of the terms of peace.¹ The concern that arose from this delay acted as a touchstone for other grievances and discontents. The more important of these were the excruciating heat, the delay in the monsoons, the high prices of essential food stuffs,² the trials of those who were connected with the riots in Delhi during the Rowlatt Satyagraha, the imposition of sentences on those who had been tried in the Karturpur riot case, the admission of appeals to the

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NAI, Home Poll 27 Deposit, September 1919, 'Extract Sent by the Director, Central Intelligence, from the Leader Regarding the Delay in Publishing the Turkish Peace Terms Resulting in Anxiety and Agitation among Muhammadans.' Tassaduq Hussain of the C.I.D. made the following observations on 8 September 1919: 'The diverse news cabled by Reuters is causing great pain to the Muslim public. It is believed by a majority of the thinking Musalman public that the fate of Turkey was decided by the Peace Conference but merely to cool down the excitement of the Musalman feelings the British Government has kept back the decision from being made public, and Reuters telegrams are only to prepare them for the worst, so that the decision may not come to them with a shock. The semi-literate and illiterate Musalmans still believe that Turkey will not cease to exist as a ruling nation, but the different telegrams which are filtering down now every day are sure to create painful feelings among them as well. Another rumour that only the American Missionary Society is preparing 2,000 missionaries to overrun the conquered Muslim countries is giving cause to the public to believe that the missionaries in Europe and America know the fate of these countries and are taking steps accordingly.

² NAI, Home Poll 49 Deposit, July 1919, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the Second Half of May 1919,' C.A. Barron to W.S. Marris, 4 June 1919; Home Poll 15 Deposit, November 1919, 'Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the Second Half of September 1919,' C.A. Barron to W.S. Marris, 30 September 1919.

Privy Council of cases that resulted from the disturbances in the Punjab during the Rowlatt Satyagraha, and finally, the propaganda of the agitators.¹

The agitators in Delhi had lost the means with which to raise issues before the inhabitants of the city with the cessation of public meetings under the

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The political agitators of Delhi were very quiet during May and June, but they began to reassert themselves in July. Their major effort was a meeting of 25 July 1919. Hakim Ajmal Khan, Sultan Singh, Dr Ansari, K.A. Desai and Shradhanand convened a meeting of 1,000 to 2,000 to express their thanks to C.A. Barron for the manner in which he handled the Rowlatt Satyagraha. The following resolution was introduced: 'That we citizens of Delhi, assembled in a public meeting, held under the auspices of the Indian Association, Delhi, desire to place on record our thankful appreciation of the wise and sympathetic policy of the Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner of Delhi in handling a most embarrassing situation created in Delhi after the unfortunate and exceedingly painful occurrence of 30 March last.' Arif Hussain Haswi then introduced an amendment on behalf of Asaf Ali who could not address a public assembly due to a restriction on him under the Defence of India Act. The amendment, which was ruled out of order by Hakim Ajmal Khan, was carried overwhelmingly against the objections of the chairman. It added the words 'the real nature of which events we shall take some other opportunity to review.' As the meeting dispersed, Shankar Lal arrived. He had just been acquitted in the Edward Park Riot case; he was garlanded and cheered. NAI, Home Poll 55 Deposit, August 1919, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the Second Half of July 1919,' C.A. Barron to W.S. Marrks, 1 August 1919; Home Poll 300-305 Part B, November 1919, 'Resolutions in Council by the Hon'ble Mr. Kamini Kumar Chanda Regarding the Appointment of Mixed Committees to Investigate the Causes of the Recent Disorders in Delhi and the Circumstances of the Firing upon the Crowds in Calcutta in April Last,' extract from the Independent (Allahabad), 27 July 1919.

Seditious Meetings Act and the demise of the new vernacular press under strict precensorship. The situation did not improve until the end of the summer when the Congress began republishing in September and the Vijaya in October. The pan-Islamic Muslims and Extremist Hindus continued to find a common cause by combining the issues of Punjab and Turkey.¹ A manifestation of this combination was an effort on the part of the politicians to reduce the number of cows to be sacrificed at Bakr-Id. Hakim Ajmal Khan and Dr Ansari, both protagonists of Hindu-Muslim unity, gave their support to the move. The movement failed in Delhi, however, due to the high prices of sheep and goats, as people who might have used the latter animals had to sacrifice cows.²

Such, then, was the climate of opinion in Delhi and in North India when the Leader (Allahabad) made a call on 17 September 1919 for a meeting to discuss the

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NAI, Home Poll 59 Deposit, October 1919, 'Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the First Half of September 1919,' C.A. Barron to W.S. Marris, 15 September 1919. The impetus for the move to combine the issues came from Bombay and Lucknow according to the Government of Punjab.

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NAI, Home Poll 44 Deposit, October 1919, 'Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the Second Half of August 1919,' C.A. Barron to W.S. Marris, 1 September 1919; Home Poll 59 Deposit, October 1919. The Marwaris in Calcutta served refreshments at local mosques and Abdul Bari kept his promise not to sacrifice cows in Firangi Mahal. Home Poll 454-457 Part B, September 1919, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Central Intelligence,' for the week ending 29 September 1919.

Khilafat.¹ The meeting of the All-India Muslim Conference duly took place at Lucknow on 21 September 1919. It was attended by between 300 and 400 delegates including most of the politically important Muslims in India and a large number of representatives of Muslim organisations. A 'fair number' of prominent Muslims of Delhi attended but did not take a 'very conspicuous part in the proceedings.'² A noticeable split occurred between those who supported Abdul Bari and those who supported the more moderate Raja of Mahmudabad. The major resolution which passed stated that the spiritual dignity of the Sultan as Khalifa was indissolvably bound up with his temporal power and that the balkanisation of the Turkish Empire, with non-Muslim powers as mandatories, was an intolerable affront to the Khilafat. In general, feeling ran high at the meeting and one observer noted:

But the greatest insult felt by the Muhammadans is about Smyrna being given to the Greeks. This heart burning among the Moslems is daily on the increase and is gaining in volume, spreading among the lower classes also.³

¹ The article was signed by 36 well-known Muslim leaders, among whom were Hakim Ajmal Khan and Dr Ansari. Abdul Majid of the Central Intelligence Department was of the opinion that the renewal of agitation was a direct result of a suggestion from the Muslims in London (the Agha Khan, Syed Ameer Ali, and Marmaduke Pickthall) who thought it was still not too late to influence a decision and that public sentiment in India should be aroused. NAI, Home Poll 27 Deposit, September 1919.

² NAI, Home Poll 15 Deposit, November 1919.

³ NAI, Home Poll 360-363 Part B, October 1919, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Central Intelligence,' for the week ending 13 October 1919.

The most important decision taken at the meeting was one that recommended a day of fasting and prayer and a hartal for Friday 17 October 1919.

The Central Khilafat Committee in Bombay took the lead in the organisation of the hartal. There were many attempts, mainly from the Bombay, Delhi,¹ and the Calcutta Extremists, to push the moderate members of the Committee into a radical position. Others took an even more active step; thus, Hasrat Mohani, Tajuddin of Delhi (who was editing the Taj of Jubbalpore), and Arif Hussain Haswi (who was editor of the Congress in Delhi) all went to Bombay with posters and news bulletins which had been drafted by Abdul Bari. The wording of the posters was considered too radical by the president of the Committee, Sir Fazulbhky Currimbhoy, and they were published without his signature. Tajuddin and Arif Hussain then sent telegrams to the principal Muslim journals and organisations in India advising them that Muslims should suspend all business on Khilafat Day. They concluded the message with the statement,

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NAI, Home Poll 14 Deposit, November 1919, 'Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the First Half of October 1919,' J. Crerar to W.S. Marris, 16 October 1919. Shankar Lal of Delhi sent a telegram to the Central Committee urging them to threaten the Government with a graduated boycott of British goods and institutions if they signed a treaty of peace that dismembered the Turkish Empire.

Mahatma Gandhi advises that it is absolutely incumbent upon Hindus to signify their sympathy with their Muhammadan brethren by joining with them in observing the 17th of October as a Day of Prayer and Protest by closing their shops and suspending their business.¹

The hartal that took place on Khilafat Day, 17 October 1919, was confined to the cities of India. These were Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Delhi and 15 other urban centres² none of which was in the Punjab.³ The

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NAI, Home Poll 14 Deposit, November 1919.

2

NAI, Home Poll 16 Deposit, November 1919, 'Report on the Internal Situation in India during the Second Half of October 1919.' The other cities that were specifically mentioned as holding hartals were:

Ahmedabad	Cawnpore	Gaya
Godhra	Allahabad	Bhagalpur
Ahmednagar	Agra	Monghyr
Hyderabad (Sind)	Darbhanga	Secunderabad
Lucknow	Patna	Bangalore

3

NAI, Home Poll 360-363 Part B, October 1919. 'The agitation about the Khaliphate Day observances fell flat so far as the Punjab was concerned. In no place in the Province was the day observed either as a holiday or as a day of humiliation and prayer. Nobody fasted and there was no hartal or even cessation of business. Ordinary congregation prayers for Friday were held and except in one or two places there were no crowds in the mosques. In Lahore and Amritsar those Muhammadans who ordinarily close their shops or places of business for holiday on Fridays kept open the whole day on the 17th for fear of being misunderstood. The students too who are made to do much mischief in matters of this kind were absolutely quiet. They did not literally stir their little finger and did not go out even to see if the Badshai Mosque contained a crowd of Muhammadans. Pan-Islamic influences are largely restricted to urban areas, but in this instance the agitation was a failure even in cities and towns. In rural areas it was altogether unknown.'

hartal in Delhi was completely effective, with the exceptions noted above, a most extraordinary achievement in view of the reaction to the Rowlatt Satyagraha.¹ The crowds which demonstrated in the bazaars of Delhi were considerably smaller than those of 30 March 1919; they were also more subdued. Barron gave Dr Ansari permission to hold a meeting in Queen's Gardens in the evening which was attended by 10,000 to 12,000 persons of which 3,000 were Hindus. The Hindus left the meeting after the speeches and before the Muslims began their prayers.²

There were several significant differences between the hartal of 30 March 1919 and that of 17 October 1920. The sense of involvement and the enthusiasm evident on 30 March were completely lacking on 17 October. The attempt to achieve a mass following by means of propaganda through the vernacular press and public meetings was lacking even though the Congress and Vijaya did raise similar issues on both occasions. Above all, the campaign for the hartal on 17 October was aimed at completely different sections of the community than

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It was quite evident to the Chief Commissioner of Delhi on 16 October that the hartal would take place the following day. He asked for permission to extend the Seditious Meetings Act for another six months, a request which was granted. NAI, Home Poll 394-397 Part A, October 1919, 'Grant of Authority to the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, To Issue a Notification under Section 2 (1) of the Seditious Meetings Act, 1911, Declaring the Delhi Province to Be a Proclaimed Area for a Further Period of Three Months.'

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NAI, Home Poll 16 Deposit, November 1917.

those of 30 March. The politicians were much more interested in obtaining the support of the merchant and the professional classes and they sought, with few exceptions, to restrain all attempts to appeal to draw the lower classes into the movement.

Another significant difference between the hartals of 30 March and 17 October was the regional orientation of politics in Delhi. The Hindus of the city had been inclined to follow the general pattern of politics that held for the Punjab, and for Lahore and Amritsar in particular. After the Rowlatt Satyagraha, however, the Muslims of Delhi who took control of nationalist politics in the city, looked to Abdul Bari in Lucknow for inspiration. More importantly, the politicians in Delhi conceived of their role as one of active leadership in nationalist politics for the rest of India, an aspiration which found fulfilment in 1920.

Yet another difference between 30 March and 17 October was the reversed role of the Hindu and Muslim merchants. On Khilafat Day the Muslim merchants took the lead in organising the hartal and convinced the Hindu merchants that it was in their interests to participate. The Hindu merchants had been in the forefront of nationalist politics in Delhi since 1917 and the foundation of the Home Rule League. They looked upon the Rowlatt Satyagraha as the culmination of their efforts and were exceedingly reluctant to 'burn their fingers' a second time. The Muslims had to hold out the promise of a reduction in the number of cows to be sacrificed at Bakr-Id and the promise that if the Hindus supported the Muslims over the Khilafat, the Muslims

would support the Hindus with non-co-operation and the issue which arose from the atrocities in the Punjab. During the two succeeding years, the reluctance of the Hindu merchants, due mainly to the increased passion with which the Khilafat issue was handled, became more and more manifest to the point where hartals were more a matter of ridicule than of serious protest.

Mahatma Gandhi capitalised upon the resolutions passed on Khilafat Day at Bombay and Belgaum, resolutions which stated that because of the uncertainty over the position of the Khilafat Muslims would be unable to participate in the peace celebrations, to call for an all-India boycott of government-sponsored festivities. Gandhi pointed out that in any case the sufferings of the Punjab debarred the citizens of India from participating in the celebrations. A conference of the All-India Khilafat Committee was called for at Delhi for 23 November 1919, to be followed the next day by a Hindu-Muhammadan Conference to lay the ground work for the boycott.¹

The tremendous enthusiasm in Delhi for a boycott of the peace celebrations became evident during the first week of November. This enthusiasm stemmed in a

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NAI, Home Poll 5 Deposit, December 1919, 'Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the First Half of November 1919,' C.A. Barron to W. Marris, 17 November 1919. The motive behind the meeting was as much to transfer the control of the Central Khilafat Committee from Bombay to Lucknow or Delhi, as it was to decide on the boycott of the peace celebrations.

large measure from a reaction to the testimony given before the Disorders Inquiry Committee which began hearings in Delhi on 31 October and stretched to 10 November.¹ The greatest response resulted from the testimony of General Drake-Brockman (Officer Commanding the Delhi Brigade), who stated that the amount of physical force used during the Rowlatt Satyagraha was insufficient and added: 'If more firing had been resorted to it would have had a more salutary effect.'²

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D.I.C., I. The Committee heard 35 witnesses give oral testimony and received written evidence from 33 of them. Deputy Commissioner Beadon was absent from the city and did not give any testimony. The case for the Congress, which was organised by Shradhanand, was conducted by C.R. Das, Pandit M.M. Malaviya, and Asaf Ali. The hearings were well-attended, with the Home Rulers and the students the most noticeable. NAI, Home Poll 5 Deposit, December 1919.

2

NAI, Home Poll 24 Deposit, December 1919, 'Question of the Action to Be Taken to Stop Unfair Journalistic Comments on Evidence before the Hunter Committee.' Asaf Ali commented in the Bombay Chronicle of 7 November 1919 that: 'It is this hideous doctrine of "frightfulness", which has to be condemned and buried for the safety of freedom and civilisation in India. We thought that Englishmen were above indulging in the Teutonic fancy that civilised subjects of the King should be treated with extra firing for "salutary effects".' A good deal of resentment was engendered by the statement of Hare-Scott, the superintendent of police, who stated that the enrolment of the 14 special constables did not entail any special onus since they were not required to wear uniforms, to which Lord Hunter replied that he was a special constable himself and had to wear a uniform. Both of these statements completely overlooked the enormous enmity with which the police were regarded by all segments of the population. The Amrita Bazar Patrika (Calcutta) of 9 November carried a leader on this issue.

This statement had a startling effect upon the agitators who were able to communicate their natural revulsion to a wide section of the community. The statement did not, however, have as noticeable an effect upon the wealthier inhabitants of the city, who may have disliked the racial overtones of Drake-Brockman's comments, but who agreed with his conclusion that the restrained handling of the Rowlatt Satyagraha in Delhi had in effect encouraged the more violent elements of the city.

The excitement aroused by the statements of Drake-Brockman was carried to a new pitch by the meeting of the All-India Khilafat Committee at Delhi on 23 November. A large number of Muslim and Hindu leaders converged on the city, as did a significant number of maulvis who were becoming more active in the Khilafat agitation. The meetings of 23 and 24 November resolved to boycott the peace celebrations and to boycott British goods.¹

The secondary leaders carried on a vigorous campaign through leaflets, posters, letters, telegrams and public meetings in support of the boycott.² They toured in the neighbouring districts of the United Provinces, Punjab, and Rajasthan, and they subjected the Municipal Committee

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NAI, Home Poll 5 Deposit, January 1920, 'Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the Second Half of November 1919,' C.A. Barron to W. Marris, 2 December 1919. The All-India Khilafat Committee failed in its attempt to transfer the control of the Central Khilafat Committee from the moderate control of the Bombay Muslims to the more radical leaders of Lucknow or Delhi.

2

Dr Ansari and Hakim Ajmal Khan dissociated themselves from the campaign and were generally absent from the city.

to pressure to cancel its appropriation for the festivities, an attempt which succeeded mainly through the good offices of Dr S.P. Shroff, a European on the Municipal Committee.

The secondary leaders scored a success in their attempt to encourage the citizens of Delhi to boycott the peace celebrations. There was no tamasha in Delhi Municipality and no decorations, either civic or private. Indeed, few people attended the 'Thanksgiving Service' which was held in the Civil Lines and New Cantonment on 14 December, or the 'Grand Military Sports Tournament' which was held on the 16th. The agitators held meetings on the 15th and 16th which attracted a large number of the lower class Muslims of the city. These leaders were less successful with the merchants, however. They issued a general call for a hartal to last from 5.00 p.m. onward each day. Only a few Muslim shops on Chandni Chauk observed even this.¹

The boycott was thus a mixed success. The agitators had cowed the Municipal Committee, but they had failed to carry the merchants. However, their consternation at this lukewarm support from the more established citizens for their radical programme soon changed to elation with the triumphal entry of the Ali brothers into the city on 4 January 1920.

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NAI, Home Poll 44 Deposit, January 1920, 'Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the 1st Fortnight in December 1919,' C.A. Barron to H. McPherson, 17 December 1919.

II

Delhi threatens to become the centre of a very virulent form of politics.

Correspondent to
Central Intelligence Department
12 January 1920

The organisers of the successful boycott of the peace celebrations in December 1919 saw another opportunity for political agitation in the expected arrival in Delhi of the Ali brothers.¹ The brothers were brought by motor car from Ghaziabad on 4 January to a Delhi which was covered with extravagant decorations and jammed with people eagerly awaiting their arrival. The volunteer corps, which used this triumphal entry as their first opportunity for 'mass

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The Ali brothers were released from jail under the Royal Amnesty of 23 December 1919. They passed through Delhi on 29 December 1919 on their way to Amritsar where the annual sessions of the Congress and League were in progress. When the annual sessions ended, the brothers began a general tour of north India, with Delhi one of the first stops.

operations', paraded along in front of the guests of honour.¹

These large crowds also attended the meeting which the brothers held in the evening at which they thanked the Hindus for their co-operation and emphasised that the Muslims were 'well-wishers' of the government. The crowds, the organisers and the brothers were all suitably impressed with the 'considerable sum' of money that had been collected for the decorations and for a purse fund for the brothers. A measure of the enthusiasm and size of the crowds was that all Europeans were warned not to enter the city during the two days of processions.

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The Khilafat Volunteer Corps and the Askar-i-Islamia were founded at the beginning of January 1920. They added to the number of volunteers already organised in the Home Rule League Volunteer Corps, the Delhi Volunteer Corps, and the Moslem League Volunteer Corps. They all consisted almost entirely of students. The group of volunteers who escorted the Ali brothers consisted of 250 persons, of which 40 were on horses. They took charge of Chandni Chauk and attempted to control the assembled crowds. The enthusiasm of the crowds, however, was so great that they pushed through the volunteers and also through the police who were stationed there, with impunity. NAI, Home Poll 118-120 Part A, December 1920, 'Application of Part II of the Indian Criminal Amendment Act of 1908 to the Province of Delhi'; Home Poll 67 Deposit, April 1921, 'Activities of the Volunteer Associations in Delhi,' a note on political agitation in Delhi with special reference to the activities of volunteer corps.

Those who did go had to be guided through the crowds by the volunteers.¹

Hindu-Muslim unity received something of a blow in the weeks that followed the triumphal entry of the Ali brothers. Shankar Lal attempted to hold a meeting on 18 January on behalf of the Martyrs' Memorial and received no co-operation from the Muslim community and very little co-operation from the Hindu community. The Hindu community responded more readily to a meeting on 22 January which Shankar Lal and Shradhanand organised on behalf of the four Hindus who were to be executed on 21 February for their part in the Karturpur Riot. The Hindu leaders suffered an even greater disillusionment on 23 February. Shankar Lal worked extremely hard to make the festivities connected with the entry of Lajpat Rai into the city a success. He obtained permission for a procession and canvassed for subscriptions for decorations. The subscriptions were so niggardly that no decorations were put up and when only 1,000 Hindus met the train the procession had to be abandoned.² The unwillingness of Muslims to support

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NAI, Home Poll 78 Deposit, January 1920, 'Reports on the Internal Political Situation in India for the First Half of January 1920,' C.A. Barron to H. McPherson, 15 January 1920; Home Poll 37-38 Part B, April 1920, 'Question and Answer in Parliament Regarding the Outraging of European Women and Other Matters in Connection with the Disturbances at Lyallpur and Delhi.'

2

NAI, Home Poll 89 Deposit, March 1920, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Central Intelligence,' for the week ending 1 March 1920. The only bright spot in what had every appearance of a political fiasco was a meeting of 5,000 Hindus on 24 February which Lajpat Rai addressed on the theme of self-help which was contrasted to the beggarly acceptance of gifts.

Hindu political activities had the effect of converting the reluctance of the Hindus for political activity into a general passivity.

It became quite obvious to the agitators that public enthusiasm for the Khilafat agitation was on the wane. The Muslim agitators desperately needed an issue to enliven their campaign. It came in the form of a campaign in England against the presence of the Turkish Government in Constantinople.¹ The intention of holding another Khilafat Day on 19 March was immediately proposed and an agitation begun to make it a success. The agitation received some impetus from the meeting of Khilafat leaders in Delhi on 16 January² and the subsequent deputation to the Viceroy; from the All-India Khilafat Committee Meeting in Bombay on 15 February;

¹ NAI, Home Poll 89 Deposit, March 1920, for the week ending 8 March 1920.

² At the meeting in Delhi on 16 January Mohamed Ali urged Muslims to sacrifice their health, wealth, and life in the name of God and that the Muslims should decide their own course of action as they pleased (sentiments which were much more consistent with his earlier attitude, than the statements in Delhi on 4 January made during his triumphal entry). Abdul Kalam Azad said that the deputation to the Viceroy had no requests; it would simply inform him of the nature of Islamic obligation to the Khalif. Said-ud-din Kitchlew observed that the loyalty of Muslims to a non-Muslim authority was only conditional. NAI, Home Poll, 67 Deposit, April 1921. Even though this meeting was closed to the public, reports of the proceedings spread throughout the city.

and from the Calcutta Resolutions of 28 February.¹

The agitation for Khilafat Day moved along at a muted pitch.² Hakim Ajmal Khan surrendered his title and decoration of Hazik-ul-Mulk and Kaiser-i-Hind, while a meeting of 5,000 Muslims on 14 March approved the resolutions adopted at Calcutta. The lack of Hindus at the meeting was indicative of a general mood to the Chief Commissioner who commented:

There were no Hindu leaders present at yesterday's meeting [i.e., the 14th] and very few Hindus in the audience....In fact the Hindus generally seem rather disturbed at the length to which the Calcutta proceedings went. This and quarrels among the staff of certain vernacular papers are wearing Hindu-Muslim unity thin.³

¹ NAI, Home Poll 30 Deposit, March 1920, 'Note by Mr Manley on the Khilafat Conference Held in Bombay.' The Calcutta resolutions arose from a meeting at Calcutta of the Bengal Khilafat Committee which wanted to force the pace of agitation at a greater rate than the Central Khilafat Committee in Bombay was willing to accept.

² The Delhi Provincial Khilafat Committee held a meeting on 22 February. Sadar Patel presided over a large meeting which heard Hakim Amjal Khan, Dr Ansari, Asaf Ali, Shankar Lal and G.S. Khaparde speak. The speeches were moderate in tone, with the only spark supplied by the suggestion that the leaders of Delhi should demand two seats in the Imperial Legislative Assembly and refuse to pay taxes if the request was refused. NAI, Home Poll 67 Deposit, April 1921. The meeting broke up and recovened at the Town Hall to protest against the general rise in rents in the city. RDDA, Home File 238 Part B 1921, 'Petitions in Respect of the High Rents Demanded by Landlords in Delhi.'

³ NAI, Home Poll 90 Deposit, July 1920, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the 1st Half of March 1920,' C.A. Barron to H. McPherson, 15 March 1920.

This was certainly a far cry from the support the agitators received in 1919.

The Khilafat Committee of Delhi organised the hartal for Khilafat Day. They wrote to Gandhi and instructed him to recommend that Hindus should co-operate. They also bargained with the local Hindu leaders to participate in the Khilafat Day hartal in return for Muslim participation in the hartal planned for 30 March in memory of the Rowlatt Satyagraha.¹ The Muslim volunteer corps also called on leading Muslims of the city and asked them to sign a declaration which stated that the expulsion of the Turks from Constantinople would cause them 'acute personal sorrow.' The price of refusal was an aggressive social boycott.

A complete hartal was held on Friday 19 March. Muslims of the volunteer corps and other Muslims were posted in every bazaar to prevent violence. They were most aggressive in ensuring that not even the smallest crowd gathered. A special prayer composed by Kifayatullah was read at all the mosques. It called on Allah to annihilate the infidels and the enemies of Islam.² A similar prayer that was printed in Lucknow for the occasion and circulated throughout north India contained lines such as the following:

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NAI, Home Poll 9 Deposit, April 1920, 'Confidential Reports from the U.P.C.I.D. Regarding the Hartal Held on March 19, 1920.' Indra, Pandit Shiv Narayan, Qutbuddin, and Ahmad Said also made speeches in the neighbouring districts of the United Provinces in support of the hartal.

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NAI, Home Poll 9 Deposit, April 1920.

O Thou, kind and merciful we have allowed ourselves to be overawed by worldly power and material strength and have been guilty of many acts of obedience. We have beheld your prayer houses being demolished but have remained inactive. Non-Muslims have insulted Thy Prophet but our lips have remained sealed. Thy Quran has been defiled but we remained silent. Thy respected servants were killed but we did not open our mouths. O God we are immersed in the ocean of sin, accept our penitence. O Thou great concealer of shortcomings and forgiver of sins, very many gardens of Thy faith have been trampled upon but we did not yet realise our duty. Andulusia was laid waste, Hungary was yet devastated, Bulkania was burned, India was plundered, Africa was destroyed, Egypt was trampled upon, Aden was seized, Persia was ruined, but we always ignored Thy commands.

O God of the Worlds, Thy faith is beset by enemies, save it. Thy holy prayer houses are enveloped in the darkness of heathenism, purify them, non-Muslims are encroaching upon Thy Khilafat, protect it. The Ottoman Empire, the standard bearer of Thy religion, is being sundered to pieces, keep it whole and safe. Grant us strength that we may in obedience to Thy commands come into the field against the enemies of the faith with our lives and property.

O God, help those who are helping the faith of the Prophet and make us followers of His Teachings and shame those who are fighting against His faith and let us not be one of them.¹

The effect of such appeals on those who attended the mosques on that Friday became apparent at a large meeting in the evening at which resolutions advocating conditional loyalty and other decisions taken at the Calcutta Conference were endorsed by public acclaim.

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RDDA, Home File 9 Part B 1920, 'Declaration of Pamphlets to Be Forfeited to His Majesty under the Indian Press Act, 1910.'

The city was pervaded with an aura of success. The hartal had been complete and there had been no violence. The following day Tilak arrived to the accompaniment of a small demonstration at the Railway Station. The rest of the nationalist leaders of India arrived the following day and began a joint meeting of Hindu and Muslim leaders on the 22nd.¹

The most extraordinary event in this week, however, was the foundation of an organisation called the Khilafat Workers' Association. It was formed by the secondary leaders of Delhi as a direct protest at being excluded from the meeting of the leaders on the 22nd. It was also a reaction to the repeated refusals of Hakim Ajmal Khan and Dr Ansari to attend political meetings, and a vague protest against the loss of the preeminence which the secondary leaders had acquired during the boycott of the peace celebrations. They looked upon the Association as a means of elevating their position in the Khilafat agitation. To further these objectives they announced a meeting of an All-India Khilafat Workers' Conference at Delhi on 18 April. They began organising for that immediately, but turned their attention first to the hartal planned for 30 March.

There seems little doubt that the success of the hartal on 30 March was largely due to the efforts

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NAI, Home Poll 4 Deposit, April 1920, 'Report on a Meeting of the Hindu and Muhammadan Leaders of India, Held at Delhi on 22 March 1920.' There were no Hindu representatives from Delhi, while four out of the 15 Muslims who attended were leaders in the city. The four Muslims were Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr Ansari, Asaf Ali, and Tofazzud Hussain.

of the Khilafat Workers. They circulated posters and leaflets and engendered sufficient enthusiasm in the city for the businessmen to hold a second hartal in 11 days. They also succeeded in redeeming the promise of the Muslim merchants to participate in the hartal of 30 March as the price for participation by the Hindu merchants in the hartal on Khilafat Day. Thus, while the members of the Khilafat Committee and the Provincial Congress Committee were in Ajmere, the Khilafat Workers organised the hartal. As in previous hartals, those who dealt in transport, drugs and foodstuffs were exempt. Ahmad Said delivered an 'objectionable' speech to Muslims in the morning and a 'virulent' speech to Hindus at the burning ghats in the evening.¹

A clash between the Khilafat Committee and the Khilafat Workers became imminent during 'National Week (6 April to 13 April) which was called by Gandhi to commemorate the martyrs of 1919. The local businessmen in Delhi completely rejected the idea of another hartal and the organisers had to settle for meetings on the 6th, 9th and 13th. A meeting on the 6th was very poorly attended, and the speeches were dull. It was an altogether miserable beginning for the week.² The Khilafat

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NAI, Home Poll 67 Deposit, April 1921.

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NAI, Home Poll 28 Deposit, December 1920, 'Supply to the India Office of a Set of Communications Issued by the Govt. of India Indicating Their Policy in Regard to the Suppression of Seditious Propaganda among Troops, The Khilafat Movement, Tempering with the Police in the Execution of Their Duties, And the National Volunteer Movement.'

Committee in the persons of Dr Ansari and Asaf Ali responded to the taunts of the Khilafat Workers and spoke at the meeting on the 9th. Dr Ansari emphasised the need for the practical work of observing a commercial boycott and non-co-operation with the government. Asaf Ali spoke on the danger of infuriating Indian Muslims and Shankar Lal promised Hindu support. Enthusiasm had waned to such an extent, however, that only bazaar riff raff attended the meeting on the 13th. The agitators saved face only by attracting a large audience of businessmen, professionals and students, mostly Muslim, to a meeting on the 14th. The main speaker, Abdul Majid of Badaun, was introduced by Hakim Ajmal Khan and launched into a wild speech on the following lines:

The sword of Mustapha Kemal Pasha and the weapon of Enver Pasha will brighten the Muslim glory. Are you waiting to see the Union Jack flying over Mecca and the keys of the Holy Places in Christian hands? A Muslim who is loyal to the government curses God. Liquor is freely sold in Mecca under British rule which makes pilgrimage of no avail.¹

This speech, which preceded the Khilafat Workers' Conference by four days, sparked interest in the Conference and gave a boost to public opinion which even though it did not express itself in political activity, was a latent source upon which the agitators could draw.

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NAI, Home Poll 67 Deposit, April 1921.

The organisation of the Khilafat Workers on 24 March and the convocation of the Khilafat Workers' Conference on 18 April reflected a significant trend in the Khilafat agitation. These events represented the first major break away from the control which the sharif in the persons of Hakim Ajmal Khan and Dr Ansari exercised over the Khilafat movement. The group that engineered this break consisted of the non-sharif and of members of the ulema who found the moderate influence exercised by the sharif on the Khilafat Committee intolerable. The Khilafat Workers were united in their desire to adopt more radical solutions to the problems that surrounded the Khalif and the holy places. The events of 24 March and 18 April also reflected the degree to which parochial sentiment had activated broad sections of the non-sharif and the ulema. All of the Khilafat Workers were literate in the vernacular and the majority had been educated in traditional schools rather than in western-oriented institutions. They were, in effect, a sub-élite which had limited resources of wealth, status and power, and which sought to utilise political agitation as a means to obtain recognition. They were also a group of highly motivated religious enthusiasts who sincerely wished to alleviate the difficulties which impeded the settlement of the Khilafat question. And finally, the success of the Khilafat Workers between 24 March and 18 April reflected and reinforced the degree to which parochial issues had affected the Muslim merchants and orthodox Muslims in general. Those who formed the Khilafat Workers' Association had attempted to invoke a hartal as a protest against the peace

celebrations in December 1919, but the complete disassociation of the sharif in the Delhi Khilafat Committee foredoomed their efforts to failure. The absence of these same men from Delhi on 30 March 1920 to attend the Delhi-Ajmere-Marwara Political Conference at Ajmere, however, did not in the slightest deter the Muslim merchants from responding to the issues raised by the Workers. The failure of 'National Week' also reflected this attitude since there was almost no parochial sentiment in the issues upon which that week was supposed to focus.

The Khilafat Workers' Conference, therefore, represented a climax in the growth of parochial sentiment among a highly politicised sub-élite, namely, the Muslim merchants, and the more traditional Muslims of Delhi and of north India. The Conference, which began on 18 April, attracted 525 delegates, of which 87 were from the Punjab and 220 from the United Provinces.¹ The Khilafat Workers from Delhi who were prominent in the conference were Abdulla Churiwala (who was to figure prominently in events later in the year),

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This account of the Khilafat Workers' Conference comes from the following documents: NAI, Home Poll 103 Deposit, April 1920, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Central Intelligence'; Home Poll 12 Deposit, May 1920, 'Account of the Public Meetings of the "Khilafat Workers" Conference Held at Delhi on 19 April 1920'; Home Poll 78 Deposit, June 1920, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Central Intelligence'; Home Poll 94 Deposit, July 1920, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the 1st Half of May 1920,' H.P. Tollinton to H. McPherson, 15 May 1920; Home Poll 104 Deposit, July 1920, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Central Intelligence'; Home Poll 106 Deposit, July 1920, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the 2nd Half of July 1920.'

Qazi Abbas Hussain, Kifayatullah, Tajuddin, Ahmad Said, Arif Hussain Haswi, and Qutbuddin. The most notable workers from outside Delhi were Maulvi Muhammad Daud Ghaznavi and Maulvi Ataullah, both eminent Ahl-i-Hadis leaders from Amritsar who took a prominent part in the Rowlatt Satyagraha in that city.

The Conference itself consisted of private meetings on the 18th and of three public meetings on the 19th. The public meetings were the most important from the point of view of the issues raised and the size of the audiences. Ahmad Said's speech was the first on the 19th and the most noteworthy. He favoured a boycott of English goods and recommended the use of swadeshi goods both of which decisions the Punjabi merchants of Delhi had already agreed to endorse. (They did not do so, however, at the meeting.) He continued with a condemnation of the Central Khilafat Committee which had not declared either jihad or hijrat. He was prepared to spread the doctrine among the troops and government servants even if he had to go to jail. He informed the assemblage that those who gave up government employment would go to heaven. Other means of gaining a heavenly reward, so Ahmad Said pointed out, were to follow jihad and hijrat when told to do so; to refuse to pay taxes; to give up titles; to take an oath to further the swadeshi movement; and to boycott English goods. His emphasis on government titles led the audience to cry out against the Imam of the Jama Masjid, the direct result of which was that the Imam came under attack the following day (the 20th). Muhammad Daud Ghaznavi and Attalluh of Amritsar also made violent speeches but had

little to add to what had already been said by Ahmad Said.¹ Shankar Lal spoke and was followed by Shanti Sarup, an Arya Samajist of Farukhabad. The latter stated that:

he considered that Turkey though she had lost her possessions was the real victor in the War in as much as she had endeared all Hindus and Muhammadans to her through the Khalifa who had therefore become the Khalifa of kings.

He was quite prepared to go to jail rather than give up working in the cause of justice. When Kifayatullah rose to speak he was greeted with shouts of Allah ho Akbar, which was a sign of the high regard in which he was held by the congregation. The agitators managed to outdo any previous meeting in their radical approach to the Khilafat issue. The Home Secretary for the Government of India admitted that, 'the violence of the language used in the Delhi proceedings of the 19th instant, exceeds anything that has been previously reported....'²

The aftermath of the Khilafat Workers' Conference in Delhi was most remarkable. The day after the

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Muhammad Daud Ghaznavi stated that the Czar of Russia had learned his lesson and the British Government would soon meet the same fate. Ataulah said that domestic servants to Europeans should practice a boycott of their masters. He concluded the sessions with the statement that unless a few Europeans were murdered they would not get any satisfaction from government. He was personally against murder, however, and the only avenue of protest open to him was hijrat.

2

NAI, Home Poll 12 Deposit, May 1920, H. McPherson to C.A. Barron, Simla, 23 April 1920.

conference had ended, 20 April, Ghulam Muhammad Aziz of Amritsar opened a hijrat office in Delhi. He maintained this office at Delhi throughout the rest of the year and lectured and toured extensively in support of it. He reportedly obtained 50 names, most of which were later discovered to be pseudonymous.¹

The most extraordinary event that occurred in the wake of the conference, however, was the attack upon the Imam of the Jama Masjid. There were continual demands during the conference that the Imam should surrender his title (like Hakim Ajmal Khan), and that it was irreligious to participate in a prayer led by a title holder. The Khilafat Workers interfered with the Imam's prayers on the 20th and 21st. The Imam then sent his son rather than court this public nuisance. But even this led to outright violence on the 23rd.² A meeting was held the following Wednesday, 28 April, with the object of electing a new Imam. At this point the Khilafat Committee attempted to regain the control of the movement. Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr Ansari and Asaf Ali succeeded in their attempt to give the Imam another

1

NAI, Home Poll 67 Deposit, April 1920.

2

The Imam's son was prevented from leading the prayer, as was the Imam's brother when huge crowds of the Workers gathered around the mukkaba and refused to allow their ascension. Another maulvi then led the prayers while the son and brother of the Imam were hidden away in an ante-chamber. When the prayers ended and the two relatives of the Imam emerged, a shoe was thrown, striking the brother of the Imam on the cheek. They were then violently jostled by the crowd until the police picket which had been stationed there specifically to prevent just such violence, cordoned off the two men and led them home.

chance if he would resign his titles. Dr Ansari led the deputation the following day and secured the Imam's resignation, after a meeting of three hours, from the titles of shams-ul-ulema, provincial durbari and khan sahib.

The violence of the Khilafat Workers' Conference and the attack on the Imam of the Jama Masjid resulted in two significant events. The Chief Commissioner reinvoked the Seditious Meetings Act on 29 April.¹ This had the indirect effect of discrediting the Khilafat Workers because they had boasted that they would begin non-co-operation if the Act were enforced and hold illegal meetings. They did not fulfil this pledge which made it impossible for them to expect anyone to attend a meeting for which permission had been obtained or for a meeting outside the province. The government had decided upon a strict policy of non-interference in the hope that if it did not arrest any of the agitators, the violence of the movement would bring discredit upon the leaders. The policy had justified itself in Delhi.²

Another result flowed from the violence of the Khilafat Workers. The Provincial Khilafat Committee

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NAI, Home Poll 264 Part A, July 1920, 'Delegation of Powers to the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, To Issue a Notification under the Prevention of Seditious Meetings Act, 1911, Declaring the Province of Delhi to Be a Proclaimed Area for a Period of Three Months with Effect from 27 July 1920. In Order to Cope with the Situation Created by the Khilafat Agitation.'

2

See especially the article by D.A. Low, 'The Government of India and the First Non-Co-operation Movement, 1920-1922,' Journal of Asian Studies, XXV (February 1965).

reasserted its more moderate control over the movement on 28 April and resumed absolute control on 8 May. On the latter date Shaukat Ali made a quick visit to the city and held a series of private meetings with the Khilafat Committee and the Khilafat Workers. He upbraided the latter severely for being responsible for the invocation of the Seditious Meetings Act. He made it very plain to the Khilafat Workers that they were to do nothing else to antagonise the government before the All-India Ulemas Conference scheduled for Delhi on 21 August 1920.

The Khilafat Workers heeded the warning of the Shaukat Ali and toned down the language of their propaganda. They continued their activities, however, through the press¹ and through the use of religious meetings.² Ghulam Muhammad Aziz continued to agitate on behalf of his hijrat office and the Khilafat Workers attended a meeting of domestic servants at Raisina.³

1

The Khilafat and the Hurryat (the latter of which began just two weeks before the Workers' Conference as a spokesman for the Workers), took up the campaign for non-co-operation. The Khilafat appealed to government servants and the Hurryat distributed allegiance forms for swadeshism, boycott, and non-co-operation. NAI, Home Poll 78 Deposit, June 1920; Home Poll 112 Deposit, June 1920, 'Extract from the Weekly Letter of the Commissioner of Police, Bombay, Dated 17-18 May 1920, Regarding the Khilafat Situation.'

2

The Workers organised a female melad sharif [religious reading] on 13 May at which they passed out the allegiance forms distributed by the Hurryat. Neki Ram Sharma organised a similar readings on 16, 17 and 18 May for male Hindus.

3

The Workers informed the servants that they would be restricted to their quarters after 9.00 p.m. during the time which Martial Law would be imposed which was to occur at any moment according to a host of rumours in the city.

Some measure of their reticence is revealed, however, by the fact that they did not protest against either the Turkish Peace Terms which were published on 18 May or the publication of the Report of the Hunter Committee on 28 May. Far more surprisingly when the protest meeting against the Report of the Hunter Committee was held on 22 June, it was organised under the aegis of the Provincial Khilafat Committee with Dr Ansari and Asaf Ali responsible for obtaining permission from the Chief Commissioner for holding the meeting under the Seditious Meetings Act.¹

The Khilafat Workers suffered an ignominious demise after a short-lived ascendancy in April 1920. The continual friction that resulted from the conflict between their more radical approach to the Khilafat agitation and the more restrained tactics ordained by the Provincial Khilafat Committee found some resolution. The friction was resolved when the moderate leaders reasserted their control over the movement in Delhi, and even more so when the Central Khilafat Committee in Bombay accepted non-co-operation on 28 May and the Joint and Central Khilafat Committees Conference at Allahabad on 1 June ratified that decision for all Muslim organisations in India. The conflict between the moderate and radical Extremists submerged rather than disappeared during the following months.

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NAI, Home Poll 97 Deposit, July 1920, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the 2nd Half of June 1920,' H.P. Tollinton to H. McPherson, 30 June 1920.

III

In God's name put utmost effort to save Islam
from dishonour. Make 1st August success.
Avoid friction.

Telegram from Shaukat Ali and
Saiduddin Kitchlew
30 July 1920

The month of August 1920 saw the inauguration of non-co-operation in Delhi with a hartal on Sunday the 1st of August. The month witnessed two more hartals, the boycott of the Festival of Flowers at Mahrauli and the reduction in the numbers of cattle sacrificed on Bakr-Id.

The Khilafat Workers fought valiantly to get the non-co-operation movement off the ground during June and July. They found the task most difficult, as testified to by Shankar Lal, in a letter opened by the censor, in which he complained bitterly to the Central Khilafat Committee about the apathy and indifference of the general public in Delhi. He found it especially difficult to raise funds in the face of a general suspicion that the funds already collected were used for the personal gain of the individuals concerned.¹

Non-co-operation did not find the responsive public for which the Khilafat Workers would have wished. Their

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NAI, Home Poll 105 Deposit, July 1920, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the 1st Half of July 1920,' H.P. Tollinton to H. McPherson, 15 July 1920.

usual response in such situations was to heighten the frenzy of their campaign. The opportunity came with the announcement that the Seditious Meetings Act was to be extended for another three months from 28 July.¹ The Khilafat Workers immediately proposed that the Act should be defied as another part of non-co-operation. The Provincial Khilafat Committee refused thereby forcing the Khilafat Workers to appeal to Gandhi for permission. Gandhi specifically forbade them to perform any act of defiance.² The feud between the Khilafat Workers and the Committee, which had remained submerged from June, re-emerged with increased bitterness on the part of the Khilafat Workers who resented the moderate stand of the Committee. The feud became so heated that Shaukat Ali paid a flying visit to Delhi in a bid to heal the breach between the two factions. As on 8 May he was successful enough to gain an assurance that there would be no violence on 1 August.³

Public sentiment had not reached the point it had earlier on the eve of previous hartals. The organisation for the hartal on Sunday 1 August did not encompass any mass meetings. It followed, rather, from the efforts of the volunteer corps which canvassed the city quietly in

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NAI, Home Poll 264 Part A, July 1920.

2

N.R. Phatak, Source Material for a History of the Freedom Movement in India, III, Part I (Bombay, 1965), 292. Gandhi wired the following to the Workers in Delhi from Karachi on 27 July: 'You should not break law breach harmful.'

3

NAI, Home Poll 106 Deposit, July 1920.

an attempt to obtain a hartal with no violence. The corps circulated a poster with the programme for the inauguration of non-co-operation which was also called the Third Khilafat Day.¹

Sunday, 1 August 1920 dawned in Delhi with a hartal.² Members of the volunteer corps spread throughout the city and kept crowds from collecting and protected anyone who did not wish to close his shop. Their vigilance in this regard created a subdued mood of the city. Manual labourers, domestic servants, and transport workers did not observe the hartal and were not interfered with. The merchants in the main bazaars, both Hindu and Muslim, did observe the hartal. The hartal on the smaller bazaars was slight, and it was non-existent in the galis.

By August 1920 the merchants of Delhi had held hartals on six occasions. Hartals no longer represented an equivocal response to vague feelings of discontent which had characterised their earlier introduction. From 1 August onward, it is possible to say that the hartal had become a finely tuned political instrument. The Hindus who participated in it were highly politicised

1

RDDA, Home File 9 Part B 1920. A translation of the poster appears in the Appendix to this Chapter.

2

The account of the hartal on 1 August 1920 is drawn from the following documents: NAI, Home Poll 106 Deposit, July 1920; Home Poll 111 Deposit, August 1920, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation in India During the First Half of August 1920,' H.P. Tollinton to H. McPherson, 15 August 1920; Home Poll 338-367 Part B, August 1920, 'Policy of Non-Interference Advocated by the Lieutenant-Governor, United Provinces, In Connection with the Non-co-operation Movement'; Home Poll 118-120 Part A, December 1920.

and were quite conscious of the ideals which underlay the nationalist movement, a conclusion which is confirmed by the lack of response on 2 August to Tilak's death. The participation of Hindu merchants in hartal, therefore, depended only marginally upon economic, religious, or social discontents and grievances. The Muslim merchants on the other hand, responded primarily from a religious grievance centred upon the Khilafat question. The parochial overtones of this issue affected more Muslim merchants, than the nationalist overtones of the Punjab atrocities affected Hindus, but even so, the Muslims recognised that they participated in a political process of protest.

The political leaders held a meeting at Hajipur in the Meerut District of the United Provinces in the afternoon of 1 August. Hajipur had been chosen to escape the application of the Seditious Meetings Act. The 4,000 people who attended the meeting, mostly students and Hindu and Muslim traders, heard speeches from Dr Ansari (who presided), Kifayatullah, Ahmad Said, Qazi Abdul Ghaffar, Shankar Lal, Taffazzal Hussain, Qutbuddin, and Asaf Ali.¹ The meeting passed resolutions which adopted non-co-operation; condemned the Seditious Meetings Act and the special tax for the Rowlatt Satyagraha; deplored the division in the House of Lords in the Dyer debate; and subtly called for the withdrawal of Indian troops from Egypt, Turkey and Mesopotamia. Asaf Ali then announced that he was withdrawing from co-operation with the government as a barrister. As the

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Hakim Ajmal Khan was unavoidably absent from the city.

crowd returned to Delhi the Khilafat Workers reopened the feud with the Khilafat Committee and held an illegal meeting of protest inside Delhi Province at Abdullapur. That evening news of Tilak's death arrived and a hartal similar to the one on the 1st followed on the 2nd.

The hartal in Delhi on Monday the 2nd was supported by the Hindu and Muslim merchants in the main bazaars. The Muslims observed the hartal in response to an appeal from the Hindus who regarded Muslim support as the price for Hindu support on the previous day. The small shopkeepers, both Hindu and Muslim, on the side streets regarded the hartal very lightly and those in the galis not at all. It would have been natural for the Hindus, at least, to respond to the charisma of the political leader of orthodox Hindus in India. They did not respond, however, and they adhered to the policy of non-participation. There was an ironical twist in the occasion, in that those who would have liked to show some sign of regret for Tilak's death were constrained by Tilak's opposition to non-co-operation, and thus they did not participate in the hartal which was a political weapon of the non-co-operators. But the overwhelming majority of the Hindu petty bourgeoisie had withdrawn from politics and neither local grievances nor the charisma of B.G. Tilak could arouse a parochial or political response.

The parochial overtones of the hartal on the 2nd led to an extraordinary event. The moderate Hindus of Delhi applied for permission to hold a meeting in Queen's Gardens on the evening of the 2nd. The Chief Commissioner gave his permission for the meeting whose

object was to eulogise the deceased Colossus of Indian politics. The Khilafat Workers saw this meeting as a direct affront to their principles of non-co-operation, principles which forbade any political meetings in Delhi while the Seditious Meetings Act was in force. Abdulla Churiwalla, Aziz Hussain Naqashbandi, and members of the Khilafat Volunteer Corps raided the meeting and dispersed it. This was a blow to the Hindu-Muslim unity exhibited on the previous day and further aggravated the feud between the Khilafat Workers and the Khilafat Committee. In an effort to reaffirm Hindu-Muslim unity, the next raid on a meeting of trade union of clerks on Sunday the 8th was led by Shankar Lal and the Home Rule League Volunteer Corps. (The clerks met at the Lachmi Narain Dharmasala to commiserate the death of Tilak who had lectured to them on 23 March 1920, and to protest the rise in house rents in the city.) This time, however, the raiders were ejected and suffered a defeat. The demise of the agitators was nearly complete when on the following day, i.e. the 9th, they organised a procession and a meeting to coincide with the hartal (again in memory of B.G. Tilak). The hartal was again confined to only the main bazaars and the illegal procession which finished at the Jumna Ghat only drew 400.

The lack of support for the hartals and the meetings held in connection with them reflected the general feeling in the city against non-co-operation. The meeting at Hajipur of 4,000 people was the first and the largest. The non-co-operators were unable to attract as many again in the following week when they held meetings at Ghaziabad on the 2nd and the 10th and

at Delhi on the 9th. The difference in the sizes of the audience at Hajipur on the 1st and Delhi on the 9th also shows that proximity was not the determining factor in the response. The populace seemed inclined to leave politics to the activists and adopted a stance of passivity. From this point onward in the non-co-operation movement, politics became the purview of the volunteers, the nationalists, and the Khilafatists.

The Khilafat Workers openly broke with the Khilafat Committee when they resorted to force on 2 and 8 August and when they held an illegal meeting on the 9th. Their failures on 8 and 9 August spurred them on to reassert their leadership over the non-co-operation movement. The opportunity arose on 19 August during the Phool Walon ki Sair at Mahrauli. The Festival of Flowers was an annual event at Jehaz Mahal in Mehrauli, a large village ten miles south of Delhi near the Qutb Minar. All the members of the volunteer corps picketed the roads which led out of Delhi and stopped the carriages which were on the way to Mahrauli. The volunteers, who were in uniform, informed the occupants that they were boycotting the fair as a measure of non-co-operation. Those who insisted on attending were subjected to 'gross insults' with threats of social boycott at a later date. The volunteers also bluntly informed those who planned to set up booths along the road that they would loot any stalls set up in defiance of non-co-operation. At Jehaz Mahal, a large group of volunteers and 'a hooting crowd of loafers' obstructed the procession which carried the punkhas and were 'with difficulty persuaded

to stand aside.'¹ The result of the 'boycott' of the Mahrauli Festival of Flowers was a victory for the non-co-operators as few people attended the festivities there. It was a success, however, only because the inhabitants of the city, who looked upon a tamasha as one of the major forms of recreation, were intimidated by the specter of unpleasantness that faced them if they disregarded the volunteers. It is not known what the volunteers told the illiterate masses that usually flocked to the fair every year but they also probably responded in a negative sense.

The use of force and propaganda combined to produce a most startling occurrence at the Bakr-Id at the end of August. The Khilafat Workers and the volunteers combined a propaganda campaign and a boycott backed by physical force and succeeded in their attempt to reduce the number of cattle that were sacrificed. They had more active support in this campaign because Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr Ansari and the rest of the Provincial Khilafat Committee were most enthusiastic over the success of such a project. The leading Hindu politicians also hoped for its success which would act as an impetus to Hindu-Muslim unity expressed at the popular level.

In pursuance of the campaign to reduce the number of cattle sacrificed at Bakr-Id the Muslim members of the volunteer corps persuaded the butchers not to sacrifice cattle, and led by Tajuddin, Qutbuddin, Aziz

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NAI, Home Poll 112 Deposit, August 1920, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation in India for the Second Half of August 1920,' H.P. Tollinton to H. McPherson, 1 September 1920.

Hussain and Abdulla Churiwala, they picketed all the approaches to the slaughter house. Other parties picketed roads leading into Delhi to discourage cowherds from driving their cattle into the city to sell, since as they said, the sacrifice of cattle had been forbidden. The Khilafat Workers issued posters and leaflets which declared that those who sacrificed cattle were enemies of the Khilafat and traitors to their faith. The Muslim public responded to the appeal and brought few cattle for sacrifice. Those who did bring cattle faced the prospect of having cattle forcibly turned loose, or 'bought' by Abdulla Churiwalla who then demanded the return of the money as a subscription to the Khilafat Committee. Those few who did manage to sacrifice cows were subjected to a strong social boycott which lasted until the Ahl-i-Hadis and other orthodox Muslims instituted a stronger counter-boycott. The volunteers successfully picketed the slaughter house until the arrival of the police who stopped the activities of the volunteers and who refused to be intimidated by Abdulla. This so infuriated the latter that he vowed to establish a volunteer corps that would 'deal once and for all with such rascals.' He founded the Khuddam-i-Watan volunteer corps early in September out of a group of 'selected hooligans' who had a strong predilection for violence.

The volunteers were immensely successful in their attempt to reduce the number of cattle sacrificed on Bakr-Id. The Muslims of Delhi had sacrificed 130 cattle at Bakr-Id in 1918 and 250 in 1919. The jump in the latter figure was due to the stringent economic conditions at the time. At Bakr-Id in 1920 there were

only 29 cattle sacrificed. The reduction was quite remarkable and became another milestone in Hindu-Muslim unity.

The success of the Provincial Khilafat Committee, the Khilafat Workers, and the volunteer corps at the Bakr-Id festival reflected a general upsurge of enthusiasm for the Khilafat agitation. A correspondent wrote to the government that 'the movement is spreading to the masses and that the Maulvis are coming in,'¹ in western United Provinces, and south-eastern Punjab of which Delhi was the centre. But if the Khilafat campaign brought success, it also brought sorrow. A Muslim fanatic, fired by the propaganda of the Khilafatists, murdered the Deputy Commissioner of Kheri District in the United Provinces, an Englishman by the name of Mr Willoughby.

The Khilafat Workers looked upon the activities of August 1920 as a vindication of their efforts to increase the pace of political agitation in Delhi. They drew attention to the fact that only one meeting had been held legally under the Seditious Meetings Act; that they had enforced a successful boycott of the Festival of Flowers at Mahrauli; and that the number of cattle sacrificed at Bakr-Id had been reduced. This claim overlooked the fact, however, that the hartals of the 1st, 2nd and 9th were only partially successful; that their meetings drew smaller audiences than the Home Rule movement at its height; and that there was little

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NAI, Home Poll 112 Deposit, August 1920, M. Keane to H. McPherson, 1 September 1920.

support for their activities from the inhabitants of the city who succumbed to the pressure of the volunteers in order to avoid their wrath. Nothing of note occurred during September and October to alter public opinion towards the non-co-operation movement.

The only significant change which occurred in the second and third months of the non-co-operation movement involved the volunteer corps. Asaf Ali sought to use the corps to submerge the parochial attitudes inherent in the groups which were organised on a communal basis. At a meeting of the Delhi Provincial Congress Committee convened to consider the details of non-co-operation on 7 October, he announced a scheme for national courts and a national administration.¹ The volunteers were to conduct the national administration and enforce it by means of an intensive social, economic, and religious boycott of any opponent. The Khilafat Volunteer Corps and the Askar-i-Islamia were to serve summonses for the national court which he had set up at the Khilafat office. The Provincial Congress Committee agreed and ordered the volunteers to agitate for a boycott of the census and the Imperial Legislative Assembly elections.²

¹ Asaf Ali had first announced this plan in a letter to the Special Congress at Calcutta on 4 September. NAI, Home Poll 70 Deposit, September 1920, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation in India for the First Half of September 1920,' H.P. Tollinton to H. McPherson, 15 September 1920.

² NAI, Home Poll 59 Deposit, December 1920, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation in India for the 1st Half of October 1920,' H.P. Tollinton to H. McPherson, 16 October 1920; Home Poll 84 Deposit, December 1920, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the 2nd Half of September 1920,' C.A. Barron to H. McPherson, 1 October 1920.

More importantly, Asaf Ali attempted to unite all of the volunteers under his own Askar-i-Islamia in an effort to appropriate to himself police functions over Delhi. But the foundation of the Muslim based Khuddam-i-Watan (under Abdulla Churiwala) and of a Hindu volunteer corps, the Pahari Dhiraj Seva Samiti, marked the failure of his aspirations.

The foundation of the two new corps marked a significant trend in the volunteer movement in Delhi. All of the corps expanded their membership during August, September, and October. The increase in the number of corps and in the number of volunteers reflected the fact that new social groups had been drawn into the movement. Initially the corps had depended almost entirely upon students, both Hindu and Muslim, who had received both vernacular and English education. Their motives were primarily ideological, but the prestige which accrued to the movement also made the corps attractive. The expansion of the corps drew upon the semi-educated, the illiterate, and those with very little social status. Among the Muslims in particular the sons of artisans and petty shopkeepers joined the movement in increasing numbers, as much from parochial sentiment as from an attempt to acquire a heightened social stature. The Hindu corps, on the other hand, still drew most of their support from the literate or semi-literate petty bourgeoisie. The new social element in the volunteer corps introduced a note of boisterousness and intolerance

into the movement.¹ The leaders sought to control these tendencies by issuing uniforms, parading the corps in formations and teaching them infantry drill. The leaders could not maintain complete control of their followers for long since they were willing to submit to discipline only for limited periods at a time and only under the promise of some purposeful activity in the not too distant future. This probably explains the increasing use of force by the volunteers and their greater proclivity to resort to physical violence.

The volunteer corps seized two opportunities to supplant the police after the inauguration of non-co-operation. The first opportunity occurred at Moharram when the police followed the wise policy of making the fullest possible use of the volunteer corps in controlling the processions.² This policy worked to the satisfaction of all concerned and was acclaimed as a victory for non-co-operation and the volunteers. The second opportunity arose at Ram Lila which began on 14 October and lasted until 23 October 1920.

During the Ram Lila festival of 1920, a strong parochial spirit manifested itself, just as a parochial spirit had manifested itself in October 1917. The

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The 'lawlessness' of the volunteer corps in Delhi came to the notice of the Government of India in September 1920 when they were informed that the corps were arming themselves with swords. The Government of India then decided to demand licences for the possession of such weapons in Delhi. NAI, Home Poll 67 Deposit, April 1920.

2

NAI, Home Poll 84 Deposit, December 1920.

major problem arose when the leaders of the Hindu community objected to the presence of Muslim volunteers inside the mandal. The Muslim volunteers remained outside the mandal on the 14th and only 20 entered on the 15th as a sign of Hindu-Muslim unity.¹ By the 18th, however, the more radical Khilafat Workers were unwilling to accept their exclusion. Ahmad Said gave a wais at the Katra Hindu Mosque in which he justified the presence of the Khilafat Volunteer Corps at the Ram Lila celebrations. Abdulla Churiwala also announced that if the Ram Lila Committee did not invite his Khuddam-i-Watan into the enclosure, they would make their way in by brute force. He made good his promise the next day when 119 Muslim volunteers invaded the enclosure and prevented the Committee from garlanding

1

NAI, Home Poll 67 Deposit, April 1921. The following chart shows the numbers of volunteers from each corps over the ten days.

	October									
	<u>14</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>23</u> (Sat.)
<u>Indraprastha Sewak Mandli</u>	70	50	90	65	58	64	80	51	55	35
<u>Hanuman Sewak Mandli</u>	20	20	15	20	20	25	20	20	20	20
<u>Bharat Sewak Mandli</u>	..	20	..	25	25	25	30	30	35	25
<u>Arya Sain Sewak Mandli</u>	10	10	16
Moslem League V.C.	..	20	15	10	25
<u>Askar-i-Islamia</u>	26	45	40	55	79	50	..	57
<u>Khilafat V.C.</u>	18	38	30	33	..	20	..	25
<u>Muslim Razakars</u>	11	..	13	20	..
<u>Khuddam-i-Watan</u>	20	18	..	20	15
Home Rule League V.C.	7	20	35	9	50	..
Unidentified men on horse	29
	<hr/>									
	90	110	164	193	180	263	282	209	200	231
	<hr/>									

the officials of the city who were present. The sanatani Hindus reacted strongly to this invasion and on the 20th 140 Hindu volunteers kept the 100 Muslim volunteers at bay outside the enclosure. The Muslims invaded the enclosure again on the 21st and each succeeding day as opposition to their activities grew apace. By the 24th, they had become so unruly, and so unpopular, that a large mob broke through their ranks at the Clock Tower on the last day of the festival, the 24th, and completely dispersed the 150 volunteers in uniform. The Khilafat Workers' claim that they had successfully supplanted the police during the Ram Lila only exacerbated the rising tide of Hindu-Muslim enmity which had reached a nadir when the Muslim had restricted the number of cattle which were sacrificed at Bakr-Id. But the events of the Ram Lila of 1920, because of Bakr-Id, did not give rise to the extreme feelings of parochialism so evident in 1917.

IV

There is no doubt that Delhi is one of the centers of sedition, and that it is more prevalent here than anywhere else.

Viceroy to Secretary of State
22 December 1920

The non-co-operation movement assumed a new significance in Delhi after 28 October 1920. On that day the Seditious Meetings Act lapsed in the city and the agitators took advantage of a prerogative which had been denied to them during the preceding six months. The radical Khilafat Workers obtained the support of

the Khilafat Committee and successfully raised the issue of non-co-operation before a wide segment of the non-sharif sections of Muslim society. As these radical agitators assumed ever more responsibility for the movement, their language became more vehement and their activities became more violent, both of which culminated in the excesses of the first week of December.

The tempo of political agitation immediately accelerated. Asaf Ali, Abdulla Churiwala, Nur Muhammad, an ex-drawing master at the Anglo-Arabic High School, and six uniformed volunteers made an 'attack' on the Anglo-Arabic High School on Saturday, the 30th. The 'attack' itself was inconclusive since the 'attackers' were refused permission to enter, and the two leaders could only entice a small number of boys to come out on strike.¹ The long term effect of the 'attack', however, was much more serious. The school closed for seven days during which time the agitators sought to coerce the students and parents into a boycott of the school. In this the agitators were much more successful, for when the school reopened on Saturday 6 November, only two-thirds of the students returned.²

On the afternoon of 30 October the agitators held a meeting at the Lachmi Narain Dharmshala. A.T. Gidwani,

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NAI, Home Poll 66 Deposit, December 1920, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation in India for the 2nd Half of October 1920,' C.A. Barron to H. McPherson, 2 November 1920.

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NAI, Home Poll 74 Deposit, December 1920, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the 1st Half of November 1920,' C.A. Barron to H. McPherson, 15 November 1920.

the principal of Ramjas College, who had resigned as a non-co-operator on the 29th, stated that he had declared war on the government and that he wanted to enlist schoolboys as sepoy. Asaf Ali appeared in uniform as the Colonel of the Askar-i-Islamia and dramatised his success at the Anglo-Arabic High School. Dr Ansari then urged all schoolboys to imitate the students at Aligarh who had struck in response to Gandhi and Mohamed Ali.¹ Shankar Lal closed the meeting with a call for the city of Delhi to recapture the lead in nationalist politics that it had held when it had contributed the first martyrs in 1919.²

Sunday 31 October witnessed a high point in the propaganda campaign for non-co-operation. Asaf Ali and Nur Muhammad convened a meeting at Fatehpuri mosque in the morning after the 8.00 a.m. prayers. Asaf Ali recommended the use of mosque schools to replace schools which received grants-in-aid. Nur Muhammad read a fatwa of Kifayatullah which justified the boycott of schools. He read another fatwa, one which Ahmad Said had issued, which justified non-co-operation and even resistance to the extent of jihad. Gidwani and Asaf Ali convened a meeting at the Lachmi Narain Dharmasala in the afternoon. They both urged a large group of Hindu students to 'worry' title-holders and lawyers into non-co-operation, in which appeal they were unsuccessful.

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NAI, Home Poll 81 Deposit, October 1920, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of the Intelligence Bureau,' for the week ending 25 October 1920.

2

NAI, Home Poll 66 Deposit, December 1920; Home Poll 118-120 Part A, December 1920.

In the evening a large audience met at Pataudi House. Asaf Ali and Pandit Shiv Dutt Sharma voiced their sympathy with the methods and aims of the Sinn Fein; Shankar Lal followed with a review of agitational activities that succeeded despite the Seditious Meetings Act, namely, the submission of the Municipal Committee; the prevention of the Ram Lila Committee from garlanding the officials of the city; and the persuasion of all nationalist candidates to boycott the Assembly elections. He looked upon the successful attack on the schools as a fitting triumph to their efforts and asked the inhabitants of the city to boycott the celebrations in connection with the visit of the Duke of Connaught. Hakim Ajmal Khan then rose and condemned the treachery of the Trustees of Aligarh in which he was supported by Qazi Abdul Ghaffar, and Qutbuddin and Gidwani spoke on the courage of the students who refused to go back to the college. Dr Ansari asked students to abandon their books as had been done in England during the war. Rai Sahib Pearey Lal climaxed the meeting and protested against the arrest of such Khilafat supporters as Zafar Ali Khan. He promised to bring about a strike at Ramjas College and also to resign his title (which he did the next day). Another highlight of the day was the announcement that the All-India Ulemas' Conference, which had been postponed indefinitely from August due to the Seditious Meetings Act, would convene on 19 November.¹

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NAI, Home Poll 66 Deposit, December 1920; Home Poll 74 Deposit, December 1920; Home Poll 118-120 Part A, December 1920; Home Poll 67 Deposit, April 1921.

It is legitimate to draw attention to two features of the meetings of the 31 October. The first was that the meeting in the evening was probably not much bigger than the one that occurred on 1 August. The 4,000 people were also composed for the most part of students, a sprinkling of professionals, some merchants (both Hindu and Muslim), pan-Islamists, and supporters of Gandhi. The most important thing about the meeting in the evening, however, was the presence of moderate Extremists, and the radicals on the same platform and the support the former gave to the programme of the latter. The second feature of note that occurred on 31 October was the nature of the appeals voiced by the speakers. The agitators began to go outside the narrow limits of their supporters, i.e., the volunteer corps, the merchants and professionals and the pan-Islamists. Asaf Ali and Nur Muhammad appealed to a general congregation at the Fatehpuri Mosque. This speech, along with the weekly wais of Ahmad Said, represented a definite attempt to bring the issue of non-co-operation before the Muslim masses. The activation of the masses was something which the agitators had assiduously avoided since the Rowlatt Satyagraha in April 1919 because of the violence that erupted during that agitation. The agitators also sought to expand their influence among the students, when Asaf Ali and Abdulla Churiwalla made their direct appeal to the students at the Anglo-Arabic High School on 30 October, and Asaf Ali and Gidwani addressed the Hindu students at the Lachmi Narain Dharmasala. This appeared as a direct attempt to circumvent the volunteer corps which had previously concerned itself with the recruitment of students.

The month of November witnessed a sharp rise in the temper of politics in Delhi. There were 13 public meetings,¹ the foundation of a national school,² the organisation of two volunteer corps,³ two conferences, one industrial strike, and one hartal. The issues which were raised by the two conferences, the industrial strike, and the hartal, and the response to each, were the most important events of the month. The second All-India Ulemas' Conference met at the Bara Hindu Rao in

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The 13 meetings occurred on the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 9th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st (three), and the 25th of November. No meetings occurred between the 5th and 8th and the 10th and 16th because the leaders did not want to give the Administration any cause for reimposing the Seditious Meetings Act which would prevent the ulema from holding their conference in Delhi on the 19th.

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Mohamed Ali had begun a new national college at Aligarh during the first week of November. Asaf Ali probably emulated his lead when he established his national school at Delhi.

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One of the volunteer corps founded in November was the Bhojla Pahari Volunteer Corps. It was a Muslim counterpart to the Pahari Dhiraj Seva Samiti which was an Arya Samaj volunteer corps founded in September. It is more than probable that the members of the Bhojla Pahari were butchers as this was the area in which most of them resided and they had been a highly volatile and active group since 1910.

Sardar Bazaar on 19 and 20 November.¹ The sessions on these two days were closed to the public, while the final session, which was held on Sunday the 21st at the Lachmi Narain Dharmasala, was open to the public, 4,000 of whom attended. Conservative estimates put the number of delegates at 250, while more optimistic accounts went as high as 375, which was considerably smaller than the Khilafat Workers' Conference of April. Maulana Mahmud-ul-Hasan presided over the Conference which was attended by a stellar constellation of leading Muslim divines.

The meetings of the 19th and 20th were milestones in the non-co-operation movement for two reasons. In the first instance, the conference witnessed the cementing of a coalition between those leaders who had opposed the Khilafat Workers' Conference in April, and those who had attended the Conference: Mohamed and Shaukat Ali, Said-ud-din Kitchlew, Abdul Kalam Azad, Abdul Majid Badauni, Hakim Ajmal Khan, and Abdul Bari mixed freely with Azad Subhani (Cawnpore), Hasrat Mohani (Aligarh), Muhammad Daud Ghaznavi (Amritsar), Aqilul Rahman (Saharanpur), and Agha Safdar (Sialkot) to name a few.

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This account of the Ulemas' Conference is drawn from the following documents: NAI, Home Poll 62 Deposit, December 1920, 'Summary of the Results of the Ulemas Conference Held at Delhi'; Home Poll 86 Deposit, December 1920, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Central Intelligence,' for the week ending 29 November 1920; Home Poll 118-120 Part A, December 1920; Home Poll 33 Deposit, January 1921, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Provincial Political Situation for the 2nd-Half of November 1920,' C.A. Barron to H. McPherson, 1 December 1920; Home Poll 67 Deposit, April 1921; N.R. Phatak, Source Material, III, Pt. I, 359.

The meetings on the 19th and 20th were important in the second instance for the resolution that was passed in endorsement of the following fatwa:

1. It is not permissible to -
 - (a) become a member of government councils,
 - (b) plead as a vakil before the British courts,
 - (c) read in government or semi-government schools,
 - (d) keep honorary magistracies, other honorary posts, and titles conferred by government; and
2. all government services by which government is helped are haram (forbidden), especially serving in the Police and the Army is a great sin because they have to fire on their brethren. God says (in a quotation from the Koran), "One who kills a Musalman deliberately will be subjected to the eternal hell fire." The Prophet said, "Who ever takes up arms against Muslims, he ceases to be a Muslim."¹

This fatwa was regarded as a notable success by the more radical of the ulema in view of the divisions that emerged at the Conference. The lack of unanimity on such points as Hindu-Muslim unity and the sacrifices to be made to secure it; the propriety of manipulating the words of the Koran to furnish quotations for political purposes; and the general desirability of non-co-operation stung Azad Subhani to remark that the Conference was not asked to concern itself with details. It was the duty of the Conference, he concluded, only to draw a broad line which would enable Muslims to distinguish between the faithful and the infidel. In an attempt to overcome the reluctance of the moderates, Maulvi Shabbir Ahmad read a detailed review on the non-co-operation movement (Tark-i-muvalat par Mofassal Tabsera). He first appealed to religious passions and

stated that the countries which had massacred thousands of Muslims and which had taken possession of the holiest mosques in the world, had established a rebel government over Mecca and Medina with the result that the sacred temple of God was desecrated and its worshippers arrested. He went on to state that a nation could be powerful only in one of two ways. It must possess material strength or it must cultivate spiritual power. He looked upon non-co-operation as the most effective means to cultivate spiritual power, if the whole nation worked at it unitedly. To accomplish this he advised the ulema to remove cowardice, disunion, and pride from their followers and to settle their differences among themselves. He concluded with the point that if Hindus obtained swaraj the Muslims would also profit. They would profit because a free India would make it difficult for the British to enslave other Islamic countries and it would also mean that future Indian armies would not have to fight against Muslims. With the expression of such sentiments, the ulema ended the closed sessions.

The third day of the Conference was marked by speeches of a more passionate nature. Gandhi started the meeting at the Lachmi Narain Dharmasala by advocating swadeshi and the boycott of foreign cloth. The audience of 4,000 then heard Maulvi Sultan Hassan of Ajmere wistfully speak of jihad while Asaf Ali stated that the English had come as guests and had remained as vampires. Shaukat Ali stated that the government was the worst enemy of the people and Agha Safdar declared that the presence of the Union Jack in India was intolerable. Aqilul Rahman brought the meeting to a close when he

attempted to incite the audience to attack the C.I.D. reporter.

The Second All-India Ulemas' Conference was a considerable success. Those with radical political attitudes pointed with pride to the fatwa on non-co-operation. The Moderates and Extremists thought that the Conference was a success because the tone of the speeches was not as violent as it had been at the Workers' Conference in April. Those pan-Islamists with conservative religious attitudes were less satisfied with the Conference, but they could at least rest assured that Muslim orthodoxy had not been endangered. But the most significant 'success' of the Conference was the effect it had upon the inhabitants of Delhi and the rest of India. The effect of the Conference on the Muslims of Delhi, an effect which was more latent than active, was that the Conference implanted the idea that a large number of the ulema supported non-co-operation and participation in political activity. It was only left to the political agitators to transform this latent feeling into active participation.

The Second All-India Ulemas' Conference ended on 21 November and was followed immediately by the Delhi-Ajmere-Marwara Political Conference at Delhi on the 23rd and 24th. The two Conferences were split, however, by an industrial dispute at the Delhi Biscuit Company which became a strike on 20 November.¹ The strikers, 65 men,

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NAI, Home Poll 264 Part B, November 1920, 'Summary of Reports on Strikes Prepared by the Board of Industries and Munitions'; Home Poll 291 Part B, December 1920, 'Report on Strikes in the Various Provinces.'

followed the same pattern as previous strikers.¹ They were unhappy with their living conditions and wanted higher wages. But they had no formulated demands, nor could they agree on what course of action to take once they had struck. And once again they accepted the offer of Asaf Ali to mediate the dispute. Asaf Ali made extravagant demands, while the company, which was owned by Sultan Singh, offered much less which the strikers accepted and went back to work on 3 December. This incident revealed that the agitators were unable to utilise economic distress as an issue upon which to focus political activity. The strike caught the politicians unawares, and more importantly, the strikers went back to work before the agitation reached its peak on 6 December. There were three more strikes in mid-December; for which the same can be said. It seemed that those who were affected by economic distress were more willing to look to industrial strikes rather than political action for the resolution of their problems.

The Delhi-Ajmere-Marwara Political Conference lasted for two days, 23 and 24 November.² Mohamed Ali presided over the meetings of both days and set the tone for the Conference when he quipped 'with apparent glee' over the innuendo in the Sinn Fein recruiting poster that transformed the phrase 'join the Army and see the world' into 'join the R.I.C. and see the next world.'

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Strikes occurred in Delhi on 17 July (Government Press), 19 July (Birla Mills), and 15 October (imperial works).

² This account is taken from NAI, Home Poll 74 Deposit, December 1920; Home Poll 118-120 Part A, December 1920; Home Poll 33 Deposit, January 1921; Home Poll 67 Deposit, April 1921.

Asaf Ali expressed his admiration for the methods and goals of the Sinn Fein and Dr Ansari tried 'without much success' to justify Mahatma Gandhi's extensive use of the railways and the Post Office in relation to perfect non-co-operation. The Mahatma spoke on the 24th, when he offered a mild rebuke to the citizens of Delhi for the paucity of their subscriptions. Shaukat Ali followed Gandhi and 'lost his temper' when he spoke on the subject of subscriptions. The conclusion that the authorities drew from the Conference was that it 'was an admitted failure and aroused no interest or enthusiasm.' It was not an 'admitted' failure, but it did fail to draw the amount of public support which the public session which the same Conference had drawn the previous year at Ajmere where it coincided with a religious Urs.

Mahatma Gandhi was quite active in Delhi during his one day stay on 24 November. He attended the second session of the Delhi-Ajmere-Marwara Political Conference. He officially opened the National School which Asaf Ali had founded at the beginning of the month and he paid a visit to St Stephen's College where he lectured to a joint meeting of the students of St Stephen's, Hindu, and Ramjas colleges. At this lecture Gandhi presented all the students with the choice of following his lead or turning their backs upon their country in its hour of need. S.K. Rudra, the principal of St Stephen's, N.V. Thadani, the principal of Hindu College, and Kidar Nath, the Chairman of the Ramjas College Committee, all counselled calm and moderation. They advised their students not to make any decision until they had consulted their parents. But Gandhi was adamant that

the students should walk out of the schools and colleges. Thadani countered with the statement that the Mahatma set a high standard of conduct that was difficult for others to follow. One of the students asked if Gandhi believed in diplomacy. Gandhi replied 'Yes, I believe it to be a sin.'¹ The marginal results of Gandhi's lecture were evident the following day. The three colleges resumed their work as usual. The only response came from 15 students at the Hindu College who foresook their education to work for the cause of nationalism. The predominantly Hindu students of Delhi had failed to respond to Gandhi's appeal where several hundred Muslim students had responded to the sentiment aroused by the Khilafat issue.

The last week of the month passed at a fairly low pitch. The agitators held daily meetings to ensure the boycott of the elections scheduled for 6 December. On Tuesday, 30 November, Mahmud-ul-Hassan died at Dr Ansari's house and the entire city observed a hartal.² All the Muslim volunteers marched solemnly at the head of a huge procession which escorted the body of the ex-Shaikh-ul-Islam to the Railway Station. There was an exceptionally noticeable difference between the hartal of the 30th and those on 2 and 9 August for B.G. Tilak.

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NAI, Home Poll 33 Deposit, January 1921; interview with Shri Ram Sharma, 22 April 1967, by the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.

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NAI, Home Poll 118-120 Part A, December 1920; Home Poll 67 Deposit, April 1921.

The first week of December 1920 highlighted several of the trends noted earlier in the non-co-operation movement. There was an increase in public support for the issues which the agitators raised, and a notable propensity towards violence.

On Thursday 2 December, Khan Bahadur Abdul Ahad, who has been described earlier as a conservative leader of Delhi, died. The family of the deceased planned to take the body to the Jama Masjid for the usual obsequies on Friday and thence to the cemetery. The family was warned by the Khilafat Workers not to take the body to the mosque, with which warning they complied. When the procession started from the house on the 3rd, a band of obstreperous volunteers in uniform led by Abdulla Churiwalla of the Khuddam-i-Watan, Muhammad Isaq of the Askar-i-Islamia, Arif Hussain Haswi and Aziz Hussain Naqshbandi, obstructed its progress. A large crowd of Muslims quickly gathered and the family retired into the house in despair. The volunteers were supported by the Muslims of Delhi because Abdul Ahad, who as a trustee of the M.A.O. College at Aligarh, had voted against non-co-operation. He was also on the Managing Committee of the Anglo-Arabic School which refused to adopt non-co-operation, and finally he was a title holder. The Deputy Commissioner and the Senior Superintendent of Police arrived at the head of 50 armed policemen, determined to make short shrift of the demonstration. The family hesitated to bury the Khan Bahadur by force for fear that the volunteers would make good their threat to desecrate the grave at some future

date. Eventually the family announced that the Maulvi had renounced his titles on his deathbed and that he had become a full supporter of non-co-operation. The volunteers and the crowd jubilantly led the funeral procession to the cemetery.¹

The volunteers were jubilant over their success over the family of Abdul Ahad. On 4 December a small party visited Rai Sahib Amba Pershad and asked him to return his title. He was very reasonable, but refused to act until other prominent Hindu leaders complied with the request. On 5 December the rumour spread that Rai Bahadur Lala Sheo Pershad, C.I.E., who had been ill for some months, had died. Shankar Lal led a group of volunteers to the house on Chandni Chauk and created a massive disturbance. A huge crowd collected and refused to disperse when told that the Lalji was still alive, and even persisted in the face of three attempts of the police to clear the street. The volunteers also threatened Khan Bahadur Haji Bakhsh Ilahi, C.I.E., who had suffered from paralysis for some time.

The campaign against the election for the Imperial Legislative Assembly in Delhi was the high point of the

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NAI, Home Poll 87 Deposit, December 1920, 'Weekly Reports of the Director of Central Intelligence,' for the week ending 13 December 1920; Home Poll 118-120 Part A, December 1920, C.A. Barron to Secretary, Government of India, Home Department, 6 December 1920; Home Poll 35 Deposit, February 1921, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the First Half of December 1920,' C.A. Barron to H. McPherson, 16 December 1920; Home Poll 67 Deposit, April 1921.

non-co-operation movement in the city.¹ The Provincial Khilafat Committee, the Provincial Congress Committee, the local Home Rule League, the Khilafat Workers' Association and the volunteer corps all co-operated to a remarkable extent to foil the election. They put up two nonentities for candidates. Abdul Hamid, alias Sheikh Abdul Majid, was an illiterate halwai and was nominated as the person who was to receive the votes of the non-co-operators. Mirza Agha Jan, who was a petty contractor, was nominated as the 'second string' of the non-co-operators. There were five polling booths each of which was picketed by volunteer groups. Muhammad Ishaq and 14 volunteers from the Home Rule League Volunteer Corps picketed the Town Hall booth carrying two flags.² Shiv Narain Haksar, Aziz Hassain

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The following account of the campaign against the elections for the Imperial Legislative Assembly is based on NAI, Home Poll 118-120 Part A, December 1920; Home Poll 61-69 Part A, January 1921, 'Election of Unsuitable Candidates to the New Councils'; Home Poll 67 Deposit, April 1921; Home Poll 408-410 Part A, April 1921, 'Conduct of the Elections at Delhi; RDDA, Home File 130 Part B 1920, 'Orders Effecting the Delhi Province in Connection with the Reforms Scheme'; Home File 53 Part B 1921, 'Delhi Elections'; Legislative File 5 Part B 1922, 'Delhi Elections.'

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The volunteers of Delhi first used flags as banners for propaganda purposes at Bhiwani in October 1920 during the Ambala Division Political Conference. At that Conference the Khilafat Volunteer Corps of Delhi had a green flag marked with a crescent that bore a verse written by Muhammad Iqbal. It read: 'We have grown under the shade of swords; it is not easy to efface our names.' NAI, Home Poll 183-186 Part A, December 1920, 'Request to the Government of the Punjab for a Full Report of the Speeches Delivered by Leaders of the Non-co-operation Movement During Their Tour in the Province in October.'

Naqshbandi, Sahak Beg and 23 volunteers picketed Polling Station No. 2 at Edward Park. Raruq Abdul Ghani, Maulvi Ahmad Said and 20 volunteers, two of whom rode horses and carried flags, picketed Polling Station No. 3 at the Tis Hazari Maidan. Arif Hussain Haswi led 13 volunteers from the Khuddam-i-Watan which had one flag at the Polling Station at the Lahori Gate. And Gurbakhsh Singh, a Sikh non-co-operator, led a dozen volunteers at the Sardar Bazaar Polling Station. Both of the non-co-operating candidates also had an agent or a sub-agent at each polling station. There was complete co-ordination between the agents inside the polling stations and the volunteers outside. The agent was able to tell who a person voted for by his name when a voter presented himself at a polling station. This information was noted for the social boycott that was to follow. What was more important was that the non-co-operators wished to ensure two votes for their candidate for every one vote for the other candidates. At regular intervals Abdulla Churiwalla, Dr Abdul Rahman, and Shankar Lal would motor to each station to ascertain how many people had voted. Within a short period of time twice that number of people would appear to vote for Abdul Majid. There was some difficulty in communication with the rural areas which led the non-co-operators to ensure enough votes to compensate for any unexpected events there and ensure the win for Abdul Majid. The final results were 288 votes for Abdul Majid, seven votes for Mirza Agha Jan, and 40 votes for the other three 'respectable' candidates. The 335 votes were divided between 181 votes from Muslim electors and 154 votes from non-Muslim electors, 25 of which were European votes. There were 863 Muslim

electors and 2,441 non-Muslim electors in Delhi city. This meant that 20.9 per cent of the eligible Muslims and 6.3 per cent of the eligible non-Muslims voted. It is not possible to discover from which group the 40 votes for the 'respectable' candidates came, but it seems valid to conclude that the non-co-operators relied heavily upon the active support of the Muslim community in Delhi. This would also seem to indicate that there was more popular support for non-co-operation among the Muslim community than among the Hindu community. These tentative conclusions receive a distinct verification in the elections for the Municipal Committee in 1922 which appears in the following chapter.

The day following the boycott of the elections the police arrested the four volunteers who had led the crowd against the burial of Abdul Ahad. Large audiences packed the courtroom to attend the trial which lasted through the rest of December. All the events leading up to 6 December decided the authorities that the Seditious Meetings Act should be reimposed on Delhi. The Act was reimposed on 9 December and the same day the Chief Commissioner declared four of the volunteer corps as unlawful under the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1908. The Askar-i-Islamia, the Khilafat Volunteers, the Muslim League Volunteer Corps and the Khuddam-i-Watan had to disband. The following day, 10 December, the volunteer corps reasserted themselves and attacked the Imam of the Jama Masjid in a demonstration at the Mosque. They also prevented the marriage of the daughter of Nur Ahmad until the barrister had publicly apologised to Hakim Ajmal Khan.

The Home Rule League Volunteer Corps continued the agitation. On 13 December Shankar Lal and 30 volunteers invaded a railway octroi post to resolve a dispute between an official and a clerk from the Swadeshi Store. The following day the same Corps, swelled in number by members from the disbanded corps, took complete control of the Sikh procession, the Guru Granth Sahib.

The political agitation quietened somewhat during the middle of the month while economic matters assumed importance. A strike of 500 men against the Delhi Electric and Tramway Company began on the 14th and lasted until the 20th. An additional 250 men working on a new concrete factory went on strike on the 15th as did most of the operatives at the Delhi Cloth and General Mills. The cloth merchants also exhibited signs of extreme anxiety over the fall in exchange rates. They contemplated a mass refusal of orders on British firms until the exchange rate rose to the comfortable level it had achieved in the summer when many merchants indulged in 'excessive speculation.'¹

The force of the agitation slackened as public interest slowly began to wane. The agitators failed miserably to gather any sizeable audience at Ghaziabad to protest against the death of an Indian girl at the

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NAI, Home Poll 35 Deposit, February 1921; Home Poll 77 Deposit, February 1921, 'Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Political Situation for the Second Half of December 1920,' C.A. Barron to S.P. O'Donnell, 3 January 1921; RDDA, Commerce File 26 (A) Part B 1921, 'Reports on Labour Strikes Etc. in the Delhi Province.'

hands of an I.C.S. officer who was hunting.¹ The family had already accepted compensation for the accident and there was little over which to agitate. The leaders of the Provincial Khilafat Committee thought that the agitation had become too violent which was a sign that they were losing control of the movement. Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr Ansari and Asaf Ali forced the volunteers who were responsible for the demonstration against the Imam of the Jama Masjid on 10 December, to publicly apologise on the 17th for their behaviour. The leaders then departed for Nagpur where Dr Ansari assumed the presidency of the annual session of the Moslem League. The agitators took advantage of the absence of the leaders to recover their wounded pride. The volunteers of the Home Rule League Volunteer Corps forced the leaders of the Jain Community to agree to turn over the direction of the Mahavir procession to the Corps. The procession on 28 December followed in the wake of the momentarily triumphant volunteers.

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RDDA, Home File 24 Part B 1920, 'Report in the Case of the Accidental Shooting of an Indian Girl by Mr. A.N.L. Cater, I.C.S.'

APPENDIX^{*}

A Hartal Programme Leaflet for 1 August 1920
entitled: "Respond to the Call of Duty."

I. On this date Musalmans will assemble in the morning in their mosques and will say their morning prayer. After the prayer they will recite the Koran and then beseech God the Saviour to free Islam and the Calipha from danger. The Hindus will offer prayer in their temples or in any other convenient places.

II. Rest at Mid-day.

III. After the Mid-day prayer, that is after 1 pm, Hindus, Musalmans, Jains and Buddhists will all assemble in some suitable place and will hold a meeting. In this meeting a discussion will take place as to the unjust and oppressive treatment which the Allied Powers - the English and the French - have meted out to the Sultan of Turkey, the revered Calipha of the Moslem world. The disrespect which the Allies have shown towards Islam and the disappearance of religious freedom of the Indian will also be discussed.

IV. The subject of non-co-operation especially should be explained to the general public. Non-co-operation will begin from that auspicious day, the 1st August (16th Sraban). Khan Bahadurs, Khan Sahebs, Rai Sahebs etc. will renounce their titles. At this meeting honorary magistrates, members of Councils and others will also proclaim the renunciation of their honorary offices.

V. The Public will be enlightened as to the necessity for boycotting the new Councils which are coming into being as a result of the Reforms Scheme. Selected voters will not vote for any one in the New Councils and nobody should stand as a member for the same.

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RDDA, Home File 9 Part B 1920.

VI. Nobody will give loans to the Government and nobody will enlist as a soldier of the Government. Nobody should go to Basra, Mesopotamia and other places to work as a soldier or a sailor.

VII. Those who assemble at the meeting must take a vow that they will neither buy nor sell British goods. As far as possible they will use and purchase only swadeshi goods. (British goods which have already been bought by them should not be destroyed).

VIII. Able-bodied Musalmans will fast on 1 August and able-bodied Hindus should do likewise.

IX. On this day all should close their shops and places of business.

X. The proceedings of the meeting with the signature of the Press should be sent to the local newspapers.

N.B. The speeches should not be violent in tone. Collision with the Police should be avoided for this will but destroy our aims. Everything should be done in a peaceful and regular fashion.

Chapter Eight

THE ASCENDANCE OF PAROCHIALISM: II

The Non-co-operation Movement, 1921-1922

I

The Expansion of Hindu Support for Non-co-operation
January-August 1921

II

The Appeal to Muslim Religious Sentiment
August-November 1921

III

The Final Act of the First Non-co-operation Movement
November 1921-March 1922

The agitation of 1919 in Delhi over the territorial integrity of the Khalif and over the Rowlatt Bills relied heavily upon those classes and communities which had experienced a political awakening in the previous decade. This movement, which climaxed in the Rowlatt Satyagraha, relied even more heavily upon the new social groups which it drew into political agitation immediately before and during the Satyagraha. In the subsequent Khilafat agitation, which emerged into the non-co-operation movement in August 1920, the agitators of Delhi attempted to retain a broad social base of support, hoping that the newly politicised citizens of Delhi would continue to follow the highly politicised élites in Delhi in attending political meetings, observing hartals, and joining the various volunteer corps. By concentrating upon a single religious issue, however, they failed to retain the support of the highly politicised sharif, although they did succeed in acquiring the loyalties and support of most of the non-sharif. More significantly in politicising the non-sharif, they awakened and heightened the religious consciousness of the community and thereby deepened the gulf between the Hindus and Muslims of Delhi.

The agitators in Delhi were not successful in their attempt to achieve a broad social base for political activity within the Hindu community. The paucity of significant and unifying issues caused them to lose the allegiance of the newly politicised groups which had

supported them during the Rowlatt Satyagraha. The results of their attempt to gain the loyalties of a heterogeneous political society had frightened the Hindu bourgeoisie, namely, the high caste Hindus who were the most highly politicised members of the community. The continued reliance upon the Muslim community for support during the non-co-operation movement, the appeal to Muslim religious sentiment, and the increasing heterogeneity of Muslim political society, did little to reassure them. Their response to the movement, therefore, was reluctant and equivocal.

The suspicion which the Hindu bourgeoisie displayed towards a heterogeneous political society was shared by the Muslim sharif. Both groups watched with trepidation the efforts of the newly politicised groups to gain status and recognition through participation in the movement. They were aghast when members of these groups combined religious fanaticism with a political desire to increase the pace of agitation. They were relieved when the sharif who controlled the Khilafat Committee reasserted their control in May 1920, but the sporadic eruptions in July, August, October, and December of that year confirmed their fears that once aroused, these new groups were no longer amenable to control. The continual attempts of the Hindu bourgeoisie and the Muslim sharif to restrain the radicalism of the agitators and the activities of their supporters, resulted in the uncontrollable outbursts which they sought to avoid, and more importantly, led to a gradual disenchantment with the movement by everyone.

The pattern of the non-co-operation movement in Delhi did not change significantly in 1921. The Muslim community still provided the bulk of the non-co-operators who left the schools and who were arrested as volunteers. The gradual decline of the movement continued with only temporary interruptions. These interruptions were important, however, for they revealed varying responses to the movement; but more significantly, they increased the general disenchantment of all the groups in the city, a disenchantment which heightened the parochial attitudes and communal tension in the city.

I

...Delhi is a place which contains many violent professional agitators and where the more extreme forms of non-co-operation have found a favourable soil.

Secretary, Home Department
2 June 1921

The non-co-operation movement suffered somewhat of a setback at the hands of the more violent advocates of political agitation in 1920. Both the Sikh and Jain communities resented the fact that they had to submit to the highhandedness of the volunteers in December. More significantly, the industrial workers who stopped work during December, and who received no practical aid from the agitators, were also suspicious of the benefits which non-co-operators claimed they could confer. The Hindu bourgeoisie was reluctant to oppose the agitators, but their distaste for such acts as the boycott of the festival at Mahrauli in August and the burial of Abdul

Ahad in December dampened what little enthusiasm they had for the movement. They were frightened that the lower classes would become violent again as in April 1919. And they only had the charisma of Gandhi and the Punjab atrocities upon which to focus their political consciousness. They were attracted by the issues of swaraj, swadeshi, and boycott, but something more intelligible was needed to inject new life into the movement. The Muslim sharif opposed the movement since they saw little hope of bringing sufficient pressure to bear upon the British Government to make it change its attitude over the Khilafat, an issue which did not directly impinge upon the more cosmopolitan attitudes anyway. The Muslim merchants, students, and artisans were the only groups which were intimately concerned with the question of the Khilafat and the holy places, and it was these groups which gave the most vocal support to the non-co-operation movement.

The lack of Hindu support for the non-co-operation movement was most noticeable on 1 January 1921, when huge throngs of Hindus, Jains, Sikhs and Christians lined the route of the Proclamation Parade. The volunteers attempted to persuade these people to go home, but with little success.¹

The parochial attitudes which inspired the Muslims to support the non-co-operation movement in 1920 began

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NAI, Home Poll 41 Deposit, April 1921, 'Fortnightly Reports for the First Half of January 1921,' C.A. Barron to S.P. O'Donnell, 18 January 1921.

to find a counterpart in the Hindu community in 1921. The Hindus in the Provincial Congress Committee returned from Nagpur imbued with enthusiasm for non-co-operation. They accused the Muslims of misappropriating the Khilafat Fund and the Provincial Congress Committee passed a resolution which demanded that the control of the National Court should be vested in the P.C.C. When the Khilafat Committee relinquished control of the Court, the P.C.C. appointed a Hindu judge.¹

The Hindus of the Provincial Congress Committee were able to arouse a good deal of support for the non-co-operation movement in the first half of 1921. They laid plans for a hartal and boycott during the visit of the Duke of Connaught in February to inaugurate the opening of the new Imperial Legislative Assembly and Council. They also encouraged the merchants of the Delhi Hindustani Mercantile Association to adopt the Congress resolution advocating the repudiation of foreign contracts due to the depreciation of the rupee. The Association adopted the resolution and not only joined in the plans for a hartal on 9 February, but agreed to bring pressure on the dealers in the Delhi Piece Goods Association.²

The boycott and hartals against the Duke of Connaught were a complete success. The Municipal Committee had been coerced into refusing an address to Duke and also refusing to sanction any expenditure on

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Ibid.

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NAI, Home Poll 42 Deposit, April 1921, 'Fortnightly Reports for the 2nd Half of January 1921,' C.A. Barron to S.P. O'Donnell, 31 January 1921.

the occasion. And there was a hartal on Wednesday 9 February when the Duke opened the Assembly. Again the people who were concerned with food, drugs, and transport were exempt, and again none of the industrial labourers, construction workers, domestic servants, students, or government servants observed the hartal.¹ And just as in all the hartals in Delhi after April 1919, the volunteers were out in strength in the streets to ensure that no crowds gathered and that no shop was forcibly closed. Their second goal was to discourage anyone from lining the procession routes that the Duke would take, a goal in which they succeeded with equal measures of force and persuasion.² The Seditious Meetings Act was in force and no public meeting was held. This was even more remarkable since the public meeting was a device upon which the leaders relied to focus public excitement and prevent unruly behaviour. The fact that no meeting was held revealed the supreme confidence of the leaders that they could control the disruptive

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This was not because there was a lack of economic distress in the city. The Tramway workers who had struck in December, struck again on 1 March for 17 days in a bid to raise the wage increase given to them in January by another 25 per cent. NAI, Home Poll 63 Deposit, June 1921, 'Report on the Political Situation in India during the Fortnight Ending 15 May 1921,' C.A. Barron to S.P. O'Donnell, 16 May 1921.

2

Huge crowds lined the route which Mahatma Gandhi took when he arrived in the city on 12 February and again on the 13th when he officially opened Hakim Ajmal Khan's Tibbia College as a counter demonstration to the official functions of the Duke of Connaught. NAI, Home Poll 12 Deposit, June 1921, 'Report on the Political Situation in India During the Fortnight Ending 14 February 1921,' C.A. Barron to S.P. O'Donnell, 17 February 1921.

elements of the city. It was also significant that both Hindus and Muslims observed the hartal and boycott. The Muslims observed the hartal in the first instance as a sign of protest against the attitude of the British Government toward the Khilafat and in the second instance because the Hindu merchants had observed the hartal with the Muslim community on 30 November 1920 to mourn the death of Mahmud-ul-Hasan.¹

The arousal of parochial attitudes to win support for the non-co-operation movement ensured the success of the hartal and boycott of early February. It began to pay a different kind of dividend, however, toward the end of February. The Sikh Extremists, of whom there were very few, attempted to initiate a hartal when news of the tragedy at Nankana Sahib reached the city.² The Muslims adamantly refused, a refusal which embittered relations between the two groups of agitators. The refusal also exacerbated an already tense relationship between the Hindu and Muslim agitators, a tension which followed from the advice of the Muslim agitators to the non-co-operating member from Delhi to the Imperial Legislative Assembly to take his seat.³ The situation was further complicated on 1 March when, in response to

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NAI, Home Poll 12 Deposit, June 1921.

2

NAI, Home Poll 282-315 Part A, May 1921, 'Fight at Nankana Sahib in Sheikhpura District between Mahant's Party and Sikh Reformers Resulting in Loss of Life.'

3

NAI, Home Poll 43 Deposit, April 1921, 'Fortnightly Reports for the 2nd Half of February 1921,' C.A. Barron to S.P. O'Donnell, 2 March 1921.

the verdict in the trial against the four Muslim volunteer leaders, the Muslim community attempted to initiate a hartal as a sign of support for Abdulla Churiwalla, a hartal which the Hindus would not join. This refusal reinforced Muslim public opinion that their community was bearing more than its share of the burden of non-co-operation since only 28 college students (mostly Muslim) and 317 high school students (242 of whom had left the Anglo-Arabic High School) had responded to the call to quit government institutions.¹ The gradual estrangement of the two communities, which became even more obvious through the rest of the non-co-operation movement, was primarily responsible for the disregard by the Muslim petty merchants of the call for a hartal on Wednesday 30 March to commemorate the martyrs of 1919. It was also evident on Wednesday 13 April when the Hindu community observed a hartal to commemorate the

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NAI, Home Poll 65 Deposit, June 1921, 'Report on the Political Situation in India during the First Half of March 1921,' C.A. Barron to S.P. O'Donnell, 16 March 1921; RDDA, Education File 14 Part B 1921, 'Withdrawal of Recognition from the Dayanand Residential High School'; Educational File 70 Part B 1921, 'Recognition Accorded to the Indraprastha Girls' School'; Education File 78 Part B 1921, 'Recognition Accorded to the V.S. Jat Anglo-Vernacular Middle School, Kaera Garhi, Delhi'; Education File 174 Part B 1921, 'Non-co-operation Movement in Educational Institutions'; Education File 3 (66) Part B 1922, 'Quinquennial Report on Education in Delhi Province for 1917-22.' The only Hindu students who joined the national school which was established were the 90 orphans in the Arya Samaj orphanage under the care of Master Lakshman.

Jallianwallabagh massacre which the Hindus fully supported since it coincided with the Baisakhai festival.¹

The Hindu non-co-operators were able to gain the support of the Hindu bourgeoisie for hartals, but the fact that Hindu students would not observe the hartal, nor leave the schools, provided ample evidence that the leaders could no longer rely upon a homogeneous political community. The fact that not one Extremist candidate won a seat on the Municipal Committee in the elections of April reinforced the conclusion that they did not enjoy the support of the Hindu bourgeoisie of Delhi.² The Hindu agitators led by Shankar Lal, Shiv Narain Haksar and supported by those who had formed the Hindu Association in 1917 and the Executive Committee of the Reception Committee of the Congress, then made a successful bid to induce illiterate outcastes to join the non-co-operation movement. At successive meetings of the Dhobis, Jhiwars, and Chuhras during April, each caste passed resolutions which prohibited members of the brotherhood from drinking alcoholic beverages.³

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NAI, Home Poll 51 Deposit, June 1921, 'Report on the Political Situation in India during the Fortnight Ending 15th April 1921,' C.A. Barron to S.P. O'Donnell, 16 April 1921.

2

NAI, Home Poll 44-45 Part A, June 1921, 'Rejection of the Proposed Extension of the Seditious Meetings Act in the Province of Delhi for a Further Period of Six Months from 8th June 1921.'

3

NAI, Home Poll 13 Deposit, June 1921, 'Report on the Political Situation in India during the Fortnight Ending the 30th April 1921,' C.A. Barron to S.P. O'Donnell, 30 April 1921.

The passage of the resolutions by the outcaste brotherhoods in April 1921 was the most significant incident of the non-co-operation movement in Delhi in 1921, and reflected several significant trends within the nationalist movement in the city. The first tendency already noted above was that the Hindu political agitator for the first time turned from a homogeneous political society which was literate, high-caste in status, and non-manual in occupation, to a heterogeneous political society which was both literate and illiterate, high and low caste, manual and non-manual in occupation, and sectarian in religious outlook. The leaders also realised that those social groups which displayed a high degree of consistency of caste, sect, and occupation were much more cohesive and thus much easier to convert to a new idea once the more important leaders were convinced. There is no evidence to show that the political leaders did, in fact, persuade the choudhris of these three brotherhoods, but no other hypothesis sufficiently explains the overwhelming support from their members. The agitators, then, decided to politicise those traditional social groups whose cohesion had not been undermined by modernisation.¹

There were four likely reasons for the success of Congress in their attempt to broaden the social base of nationalism. The first was the charisma of Gandhi and the religious idiom which he had injected into politics.

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That is, those members of a caste who remained in their traditional occupation; who remained within the brotherhood; and who still supported the panchayat and the choudhri.

It was this charisma which had first attracted the bourgeoisie and other social groups in Hindu society and which continued to act as a touchstone for political support. The second was the simplicity with which the issue was raised. These groups were told that a boycott of alcoholic beverages (itself a highly sanskritised value) would reform their living habits and this would in turn bring swaraj for the individual and for the country. The third reason was that the Indian community had consistently confronted the government for five years, a fact of which these outcaste groups could not but be aware. And finally, these outcaste groups probably supported the Congress as a result of stringent economic conditions which approximated those of 1919.¹ If the outcaste groups did follow the lead of Congress as a result of economic discontent, then the political agitation of 1921 effectively focussed discontent onto less violent and more organised activity, and represented a higher degree of politicisation - than similar attempts in April 1919.

The second general tendency that the effort to politicise the outcastes of Delhi represented was, in effect, a direct assault upon those groups (the merchants) who had previously supported the political activity of the nationalists. The boycott of alcoholic beverages developed into the picketing of spirit shops, just as the boycott of foreign cloth later on in August developed into the picketing of cloth merchants. The activities

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See Table 4-C, Chapter One.

of the nationalists stated boldly that those who did not support the non-co-operation movement did not belong to the new heterogeneous political community and were thus the object of the same opprobrium as the government. This attitude attracted many since it enabled them to display their feelings against title holders and other government supporters and also against the wealthiest members of the community, most of whom looked askance at the movement. For many their political activity served the same function as modernisation since both tended to erode the rigid practices of deference within traditional society.

The membership of the Congress Committee grew by leaps and bounds. The new attitude toward heterogeneous groups and the new subscription fee of one anna raised the number of formal members over 10,000 by June 1921. The elections for a 'National Parliament' increased the enthusiasm in the city for the movement also. The Committee divided the city into elective wards, which were the same as those already in existence, and enfranchised individuals and groups who had never voted before. A campaign was conducted over eight days in the last week of June during which 15 meetings were held.¹ Every Congress member had a vote in addition to a vote for special representatives for women, Sikhs, Christians, Chuhras, Jhiwars, Nais, Darzis, transport workers, and so forth. Most of the special interest groups became so enthusiastic over the process that they rejected the

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The Seditious Meetings Act expired on 8 June 1921.

candidate nominated by the caucus of the Congress and elected a candidate of their own.¹

The movement halted abruptly at the end of June. The volunteers who were picketing the liquor stores encountered outright physical opposition and immediately dropped the boycott. And on top of a hot Indian summer, a cholera epidemic hit the city and panic soon spread. The incidence was light due to effective precautions and only 114 cases (of which 43 were deaths) were reported in the city.²

The Congress remained quiescent during July, but renewed their campaign on 1 August, the first anniversary of non-co-operation. The leaders initiated a boycott campaign against the purchase of foreign cloth. A 'fair proportion' of the inhabitants of the city wore some article of swadeshi cloth on that day.³ They also initiated local committees in each ward of the city; asked the Darzis, Julahas, and Dhobis to charge an increased rate for foreign cloth; and persuaded officers of the Delhi Hindustani Mercantile Association into asking its members not to order any foreign cloth until the end of 1921, a request with which they were all too

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NAI, Home Poll 1 Deposit, July 1921, 'Report on the Political Situation in India during the Fortnight Ending 30th June 1921,' C.A. Barron to H.D. Craik, 1 July 1921.

2

Ibid. There were 266 more cases in the rural areas with 144 of those resulting in death.

3

NAI, Home Poll 1921/18, 'Report on the Political Situation in India,' for the month of August 1921, C.A. Barron to H.D. Craik, 16 August 1921.

happy to comply in view of the economic distress in the city.

There were two factors which effectively restricted the success of the Congress in August. The first factor was a second outbreak of cholera which only affected 29 people (of whom 13 died) but which created another mild panic. The second factor caught everyone by surprise, especially the Congress leaders. On 19 August the Chamar brotherhood held a meeting and passed a unanimous resolution which denounced the tyranny of higher castes; which stated that swaraj would increase this tyranny and that, therefore, the goals of the Congress were not in the best interests of the Chamars; and which finally announced the unqualified support of the brotherhood for the government. This was the first open and unofficial opposition which the Congress encountered, an opposition to which there was no reply since the organisation was faced with a fait accompli. The opposition also caused other outcaste groups to become hesitant to join the non-co-operators.¹

The opposition of the Chamar brotherhood to the goals of the National Congress was a step of deep significance. The Chamars had borne the brunt of bitter sectarian strife between the sanatanis, Muslims, Christians and the Arya Samajists. Each group had suggested a course which the Chamars should follow in their own interests. The sanatanis wished them to retain their traditional place in Hindu society. The Muslims too wished them to perform their traditional

¹ NAI, Home Poll 1921/18, for the month of August 1921, C.A. Barron to H.D. Craik, 1 September 1921.

tasks either as Muslims or as Hindus (preferably the former) since the Muslim leather merchants relied upon them entirely for their economic well-being. The Christians wished to ameliorate their conditions and add to the number of converts. And the Arya Samajists wished to ameliorate their conditions and keep them from being converted to either Islam or Christianity. This conflict assumed political and parochial overtones, since it was an integral part of the political upheaval that occurred after 1905 and since each group sought to prejudice the Chamars against the other groups. The result was that by 1921 the Chamars had become the most highly politicised group in the illiterate portion of Hindu society. Their decision of 19 August 1921 represented the epitome of a process of politicisation which depended upon a religious idiom. The decision obviously stemmed from the fact that it was quite evident to the Chamars that their caste fellows who took to new occupations benefited more than those who had been converted to other religions. Their decision, then, rested upon a keen appreciation of the process of modernisation brought about by the Raj. It followed that their material advancement did not rest upon the upper caste Hindus who dominated the nationalist movement, but upon the continued maintenance of the British Government.

II

...even moderate Mahomedans are fanatics...
they are being swept aside by the tide of
fanaticism. They can do nothing to stem it.

Wali Mahomed Hassan Ali
Member, Legislative Assembly
25 October 1921

The Muslim community had remained fairly quiescent during the first eight months of 1921. But by Bakr-Id on 15 August, the leading Muslim agitators began to revive their campaign for non-co-operation in protest over the Khilafat issue. As a contribution to the campaign for unity between the Hindus and Muslims, the Muslim leaders achieved a signal victory when they persuaded the entire Muslim community to sacrifice only 25 cattle, which was a reduction of four over the previous year. The limitation on the qarbani was made even more significant by the fact that economic distress had resulted in the sacrifice of 250 cattle in 1919, and yet in August 1921, when the price of wheat was four seers per rupee, the lowest it had ever been in modern times, the Muslim community only sacrificed a token number of cattle. Undoubtedly a large portion of the community simply abstained from one of their permissive religious obligations, an abstention which reflected the depth of feeling in the community over the Khilafat issue.¹

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NAI, Home Poll 1921/18, for the month of August.

The display of support at Bakr-Id for non-co-operation was further buttressed by a factor which successfully aroused the entire non-sharif section of the community and the leaders and students from the sharif. This was a raid by the Delhi C.I.D. on the office of the Jamait-ul-Ulema-i-Hind in the second week of August, a raid during which over 800 copies of the fatwa passed by the All-India Ulemas' Conference in November 1920 were confiscated. The agitation now had an issue upon which to focus discontent, an issue which electrified the community as few issues had before. The agitators immediately sent a message to Gandhi, asking for permission to initiate civil disobedience to meet 'this direct attack on the Muhammadan religion.' To their disappointment, however, Gandhi equivocated and replied that they should do nothing in a hurry. For a short time thereafter Delhi became the focus of Muslim politics in India. Large numbers of maulvis, who displayed a high degree of religious enthusiasm, descended upon the city to deliver inflammatory speeches and to suggest possible courses of action by the Muslim community. They finally decided to call a meeting at Delhi on 14 September of all the members of the Jamait. They also planned to print thousands of copies of the fatwa and distribute them on a given day in the hope that the Administration would arrest their possessors. The religious implications of such an act were overwhelming. Not even the Cawnpore mosque affair had presented such a clear-cut issue, since the prohibition and confiscation of the fatwa was an unequivocal contravention of the principle of religious neutrality

which the government monotonously avowed. Mass meetings were held in the city on the 23rd and 26th during which the fanatic maulvis castigated the government, their main contention being that a fatwa was the next most sacred object after the Koran.¹

The public furore died down temporarily while everyone awaited the outcome of the meeting of 14 September. Meanwhile the estrangement between Hindus and Muslims increased. On 6 September the Hindu members of the Municipal Committee voted with the official members to present a loyal address to His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales on his visit to Delhi. They also appropriated Rs. 20,000 for a casket and decorations. The Congress boycotts began to bear fruit as the Hindu bourgeoisie showed its disenchantment with the non-cooperators. A large meeting was called on 9 September, to protest against the decision of the Municipal Committee. The meeting was attended primarily by Muslims of the 'lower classes'. The small number of Hindus at the meeting and at the meetings of the 23rd and 26th of August caused the Muslims to wonder what had happened to their vaunted enthusiasm for the Congress and non-co-operation. This attitude was exacerbated by public taunts from Shankar Lal and Pandit Balwant Singh that the Muslims were enduring the attack on their religion in a most shameful manner. The Moplah rebellion gave the Hindus, in turn, a concrete reason to resent the Muslims.² The high cost of wheat at $4\frac{1}{2}$ seers per rupee, a situation which caused grain riots in Meerut,

¹ Ibid.

² There was no public disturbance in Delhi in response to the Moplah outbreak.

added economic distress to the parochial feelings already so evident. The Moharram festival passed peacefully, however, in the face of another cholera epidemic which affected 291 people of whom 133 died in the first fortnight with a further 102 cases (and 46 deaths) in the second fortnight.¹

The Jamait-ul-Ulema-i-Hind and the All-India Khilafat Committee met in Delhi on the 21st through the 24th, instead of on the 14th of September, as originally planned. The Khilafat Committee met first to decide on a course of action vis-a-vis the confiscation of the fatwa and on the arrest of the Ali brothers at Karachi.² The agitators, who were led by Abdul Kalam Azad and who advocated the immediate inauguration of civil disobedience, encountered stiff opposition. A large number of lawyers and maulvis, who were Extremists, but who did not support the radical programmes of the more fanatical agitators, were reluctant to initiate a movement based upon a parochial issue which had within it the seeds of a violent agitation. After a long and bitter struggle the Khilafat Committee refused to come to any decision and left it to the Jamait to recommend an appropriate course of action. The Jamait, which met subsequently, soft-pedalled the whole issue and resolved to change the wording of the fatwa so that it was no longer qattai

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NAI, Home Poll 1921/18, for the month of August, C.A. Barron to H.D. Craik, 16 September 1921.

2

The Ali brothers gave a speech to the Khilafat Conference in Karachi on 28 July 1921. They were arrested for that speech on 14 September, tried on 26 September, and sentenced on 1 November 1921.

haram [a heresy and a sin] for a Muslim to join the police or army, but only haram [unlawful].¹

The disenchantment of the Muslim public in Delhi with the sharif leaders of the Khilafat movement and the moderate maulvis in the Jamait was evident at public meetings which were held nightly in the city. It was especially evident at the meetings on the 27th, 29th, and 30th of September. Visiting maulvis and agitators were very eloquent on the subject, but their vehemence could not match that of Ahmad Said, who was proceeded against by the Administration for inciting religious passions. Also at these meetings thousands of copies of the fatwa were distributed to the audiences of 'lower class Muslims' who accepted them as a protest, rather than because they could read them. The police wisely abstained from interfering and instead prosecuted the printer of what eventually became 11 separate publications of the fatwa.²

The tension between the sharif members of the Khilafat Committee and the non-sharif behind the Khilafat Workers reappeared at the end of September 1921. The leaders of the Khilafat Workers held a 'monster rally and procession' on the 30th, when they marched through the city at the head of a huge and enthusiastic crowd of swadeshites, who eventually wound up on the Champ de Mars in front of the Jama Masjid and constructed a

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NAI, Home Poll 1921/18, for the month of September, C.A. Barron to H.D. Craik, 1 October, 1921.

2

Ibid.

massive bonfire of foreign cloth. The enthusiasm of the crowd, the size of the crowd, and the amount of cloth were in sharp contrast to the meek affair of the Congress on 1 August. Before the Khilafat Workers could seize complete control of the movement, however, Dr Ansari, who had returned from a deputation to England, announced that there would be no further meetings in October; the month was to be devoted to real swadeshi work. The Khilafat Workers did not oppose Dr Ansari, but the enthusiasm which they engendered was so strong that those who regularly attended the Akab Kalam Mosque, a typical mosque in the city, issued thousands of copies of a proclamation which contained a summary of the fatwa.¹

The non-co-operation movement thereafter became the purview of the volunteers once again. About 60 Hindu and Muslim volunteers picketed cloth shops on Chandni Chauk while the Hindu volunteers completely took over the Ram Lila festival, with the permission of the organisers. The police were followed about remorselessly and taunted relentlessly by groups of volunteers. The spirit of October 1920 was again evident in 1921. There was little enthusiasm in the Hindu community for non-co-operation. There was more enthusiasm among lower class Muslims, but there was no focus provided for this and it began to languish. The

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This same proclamation was widely distributed in Bombay in late October. NAI, Home Poll 1921/18, for the month of October, J. Crerar to S.P. O'Donnell, 4 November 1921.

volunteers of both communities sought to keep the movement alive with decreasing success.¹

The agitators became increasingly distressed with the low pitch of the campaign and were most pleased with Gandhi's arrival at the beginning of November. Gandhi, who was in Delhi on 4 November to attend an All-India Congress Committee meeting,² spoke to an audience of hundreds of cloth merchants of the city, only ten of whom agreed to boycott foreign cloth. The resolutions on civil disobedience passed at the A.I.C.C. and the plans to hold a hartal on 17 November 1921, the day on which the Prince of Wales was due to arrive in India, imparted somewhat more enthusiasm for the movement. The merchants were again persuaded to hold a hartal, although they apparently agreed more in a spirit of resignation than one of whole-hearted support.³

Thursday 17 November dawned with a fairly complete hartal. Those who dealt in food, drugs, and transport, the industrial and construction labourers, and the students, domestic servants, and government servants continued their normal activities unmolested. The shops in the Kashmeri Gate area also remained open. Otherwise the shops in the city were closed and the volunteers

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NAI, Home Poll 1921/18, for the month of October, C.A. Barron to S.P. O'Donnell, 17 October 1921.

2

See the Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, XXI, 396-7, 411-4.

3

NAI, Home Poll 1921/18 for the month of October, C.A. Barron to S.P. O'Donnell, 1 November 1921; for the month of November, C.A. Barron to S.P. O'Donnell, 1 December 1921.

patrolled as vigorously as on previous occasions. The Muslims displayed their enthusiasm for the hartal by flocking in great numbers to the 15 meetings which were held in every ward and then to a mass meeting at Pataudi House in the evening. They also used the occasion to protest the sentence of two years imprisonment on the Ali brothers, a sentence which had been delivered on 1 November 1921. There were no incidents and the sharif leaders maintained absolute control.¹

III

For the benefit of the City generally I have arranged with the General Officer Commanding, Delhi Brigade, for a route march of a considerable body of troops through the main bazaars to take place at an early date. With a little heartening of this nature it is hoped that private citizens will pluck up courage to refuse to submit to intimidation and abuse....

Chief Commissioner, Delhi
1 December 1921

The first non-co-operation movement entered its final stage on 18 November 1921.² On that day the Delhi Provincial Congress Committee held a second election for the 'National Parliament'. The Committee carried

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NAI, Home Poll 1921/18, for the month of November.

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For a very good account of the government's reaction to the civil disobedience campaign see D.A. Low, 'The Government of India and the First Non-co-operation Movement, 1920-1922,' Journal of Asian Studies, XXV (February 1966).

out a strenuous propaganda campaign in which it drew upon the resolutions of the All-India Congress Committee of 4 November and what élan had been engendered by the hartal of the previous day. It looked upon the elections as a reaffirmation of the support it had received from February to June, but which it thereafter seemed to lose. The Committee also wished to show the Muslims that it had been responsible for the hartal on the 17th; that it commanded the loyalty of a significant portion of the Hindu community; and that the Hindus were pulling their weight in the campaign. The elections were a disaster in view of these objectives. Where they had encountered enthusiasm in June among the lower classes who could vote for special interests, they now found little recognition, a meagre vote, and limited attendance at meetings in the wards. They found an equal lack of interest among the bourgeoisie who refused to vote for the radical candidates put forward by the caucus of the Committee or to nominate their own. The Committee found it doubly difficult to explain the results in view of its loud claims for such a large membership.¹

On the evidence available, there is some reason to believe that the Congress should have reaped the benefits it expected. Everyone knew that the non-co-operation movement had entered a crucial stage which was to fulfil the promise of swaraj by the end of the year. It had a goal which supplied a focus for popular support. The fact that wheat was selling for five seers per rupee

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NAI, Home Poll 1921/18, for the month of November.

also supplied a measure of discontent which could have found an outlet in political agitation. But the lower classes did not respond.

Prominent among the lower class Hindus who had given the most loyal support to the Congress were the members of those low castes who had remained in their traditional occupations. It must be explained, then, why their enthusiasm languished. The single most important reason must be the open opposition to swaraj by the Chamars. There was very little support shown for non-co-operation after the resolutions passed by the Chamar brotherhood on 19 August 1921. In fact the Congress ward committees established in August failed miserably and were effectively disbanded in October. The high degree of politicisation which the members of the brotherhood had achieved worked effectively against the Congress when the Chamars mounted their own campaign against swaraj from November through January.¹ The radicals in the Congress Committee had opted for a heterogeneous political society and had lost. The Hindu bourgeoisie (most of which was Moderate) was not unaware of the fact that the radicals had hoped to increase the pace of agitation by appealing to the illiterate and impressionable section of the community. And with the lesson of 1919 firmly in mind, they refused to support such a move.

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NAI, Home Poll 1922/18, 'Reports on the Internal Political Situation in India,' for the month of January, C.A. Barron to S.P. O'Donnell, 17 January, 1922.

The Khilafat Committee went ahead with Gandhi's programme to intensify the non-co-operation movement. They began picketting cloth shops on the 21st. The Administration held back until the 23rd when it acted in response to a general directive from the Government of India to crack down on the Extremists. Chief Commissioner Barron, who had been the chief commissioner since 6 November 1918, prepared for the non-co-operators in a heavy-handed fashion, a manner quite different from the restraint he had shown in April 1919. He applied for - and received sanction for 200 additional police reserves; he applied for - and received - permission to reimpose the Seditious Meetings Act at his own discretion; he had orders prepared under section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code to restrain the eight leaders of the volunteer corps; and he had orders prepared under the Indian Criminal Amendment Act which declared volunteer corps as unlawful associations. All of these were brought into force on the 23rd. In order to enforce them he had the military move a squadron of cavalry into the Queen's Gardens, and position reserve forces of regular European infantry in the Red Fort, with a subsidiary force of Indian infantry in the Police Lines. The 50 or so volunteers who had been active up to that point decided not to confront the troops and police directly, but to whip up popular enthusiasm against the show of force which had turned Delhi into an armed camp. The eight leaders issued a manifesto stating that they maintained the right of Indians to form associations and to carry on political activities in a non-violent manner. At this crucial stage,

Dr Ansari and Hakim Ajmal Khan were in Bombay.¹ Shankar Lal and Hanwant Sahai² then issued a recruiting poster which called the inhabitants of the city to join the Swarajya Saina. The two were arrested on 9 December and sentenced to three years and to four months rigorous imprisonment respectively. These were the first two men to be arrested and imprisoned in the civil disobedience campaign in Delhi.

The volunteers decided that they must push the civil disobedience campaign or completely lose what status and recognition they had achieved through the previous three years. Asaf Ali then sent a letter to the Deputy Commissioner on 11 December informing him that 'in the cause of men's rights' he and 50 volunteers in uniform would parade through the streets on Monday the 12th. On the 12th, a large police force awaited the volunteers to exit from the Jama Masjid in which the volunteers marched ceremoniously prior to issuing forth onto the streets. The 50 Muslim volunteers marched out and were all arrested. Asaf Ali was imprisoned for 18 months and the rest for terms up to six months. The police then arrested the remainder of the signatories of the manifesto. Muhammad Taqi, vakil, Dr Abdul Rahman, Abdulla Churiwalla, Deshbandhu, Shiv Narain Haksar, and Nanak Singh were all sentenced to a year of simple imprisonment. The tempo of the

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NAI, Home Poll 1921/18, for the month of November, 1921.

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He had been sentenced to seven years transportation in 1915 for his part in the Delhi-Lahore Conspiracy Case. He was released in 1920 under the Royal Amnesty of 23 December 1919.

campaign immediately accelerated. On the 13th, 30 volunteers appeared in Queen's Gardens and then fled from the police into the Fatehpuri Mosque where they doffed their uniforms and mingled into the crowd which was leaving the midday prayers. This effort was not quite in keeping with the civil disobedience campaign, but it caught the enthusiasm of the young Muslims who had consistently supported the non-cooperation movement. Later in the afternoon a larger group of volunteers succeeded in the same manoeuvre, and still later, a large band of 300 youths rushed the length of Chandni Chauk with the police in hot pursuit, successfully disappearing into the galis around Fatehpuri Mosque. The troops were brought back on the 14th to the positions they had occupied on 24 November, but the police were able to ensnare 21 volunteers (of whom 19 were imprisoned) without any assistance. The following day, Sundar Singh, a tailor who lived in the Police Lines, led a force of 29 Muslim, five Hindu and three Sikh volunteers to demonstrate before the Kashmiri Gate kotwal. They were all arrested.

The climax of the civil disobedience campaign came on Friday 16 December. The congregation at the Fatehpuri Mosque remained after the midday prayers and prepared to accompany a group of 30 volunteers in procession through the city while the congregation from the Jama Masjid proceeded to the main kotwal on Chandni Chauk. Over 5,000 Muslims jammed Chandni Chauk to watch the expected encounter between the police and the procession from the other end of the Chauk. The police,

supported by three Hindu honorary magistrates, ordered the crowd in front of the kotwal to disperse only to be met by hoots of derision and violent abuse. The police reserve of 200 men then mounted a lathi charge and sent the mob fleeing in all directions. The police arrested Mahomed Ishaq (a topiwala) who had been active in the burial incident in December 1920. The members of the congregation at the Fatehpuri Mosque, upon hearing of the violence at the kotwal, disbanded and quietly went their way.¹

The burst of popular support for the non-co-operators waned quickly in the face of the show of force by Barron. The following days saw small bands of volunteers, numbering 25 to 30, selling khaddar and spinning wheels. They were all taken into custody but only four minor leaders were arrested. The campaign, up to the end of December, contributed 215 volunteers who were taken into custody, of which 128 were arrested and imprisoned. A further 105 volunteers were taken into custody on 2 January when they were discovered successfully campaigning for a boycott of the Proclamation Parade; 59 were imprisoned. There were no further arrests of volunteers in the civil disobedience campaign in Delhi.²

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NAI, Home Poll 1921/18, for the month of December, C.A. Barron to S.P. O'Donnell, 17 December 1921. C.A. Barron to S.P. O'Donnell, 4 January 1922.

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NAI, Home Poll 1922/18, 'Reports on the Internal Political Situation in India,' for the month of January, C.A. Barron to S.P. O'Donnell, 17 January 1922.

The support for the civil disobedience campaign in Delhi came primarily from the Muslim community. Of the 189 volunteers who were imprisoned, over 90 per cent were Muslims who came from low class and illiterate families. Members from these same families gathered outside the kotwal on 16 December and also gathered in the Fatehpuri Mosque and prepared to go in procession through the city behind the volunteers. Barron's use of force ended their support temporarily, but his use of force did result in a general boycott of the Proclamation Parade on 2 January by most of the lower classes of Delhi.

The civil disobedience campaign in Delhi in December 1921 reflected a heightened political consciousness on the part of the non-sharif in the Muslim community. But the process of politicisation, like the process of modernisation, also reinforced the parochial attitudes of this group. The non-cooperation campaign languished as the non-sharif waited for the Hindus to participate. They waited in vain and at a rising cost of bitterness and enmity. This bitterness was in no way alleviated when the Hindu bourgeoisie, who were reassured that Muslim support for the campaign had been withdrawn and that a heterogeneous political society was impossible within the Hindu community, supported a hartal on 14 February 1922, on the occasion of the arrival of the Prince of Wales. The Muslims were disenchanted with the movement, but their bitterness reached new depths when Gandhi called off the campaign after the violent events which occurred at Chauri Chaura on 4 February. A significant proportion of the ulema had enjoined the community to

support non-co-operation as a moral obligation. How, they asked, could Gandhi call off the campaign on the grounds of political expediency?¹

The first non-co-operation movement effectively ended with the Bardoli resolution and its corollary, the Delhi amendment of 25 February. The non-co-operators who had been arrested began a massive defection on 7 March by signing agreements that if released they would abstain from political activity for one year. By the 9th, all those who were serving terms of rigorous imprisonment had signed. Gandhi's arrest on the 18th caused no public reaction whatever, a remarkable change from 9 April 1919.

The final verdict of the community on non-co-operation was a mixed one. The Municipal elections, which were held on 24 March, offered the limited electorate an opportunity to express its opinion. The elections were an especially good opportunity for the public to express its opinion because the Municipal Committee had been completely reorganised. Acting upon the recommendations of a Special Sub-committee which had begun in 1918, the Administration changed the Committee so that it comprised 36 members, 24 elected, six appointed and six official. The 24 elected members were divided equally between 12 Hindu and 12 Muslim members. The number of electoral wards was expanded from 11 to 12 and each ward was to elect one Hindu and one Muslim with each elector having only one vote

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NAI, Home Poll 1922/18, for the month of February, C.A. Barron to S.P. O'Donnell, 18 February 1922, C.A. Barron to S.P. O'Donnell, 1 March 1922.

(which effectively ensured that Hindu electors would vote for Hindu candidates). The Provincial Congress Committee submitted a full slate of 12 Hindu candidates to contest against self-nominated Moderates or conservatives. Dr Ansari and Hakim Ajmal Khan hand-picked 12 Muslim candidates. The results of the election revealed that all of the Muslim candidates selected by the Hakim Sahib, who had just served as president of the annual session of the National Congress at Ahmedabad, won. The issue of the Khilafat still weighed heavily upon the Muslim bourgeois non-sharif.

Only six of the Congress candidates won seats in the Municipal Committee, however, as six wards rejected their Congress candidates. Each of the three wards outside the walled city returned a non-Congress candidate. This was easily understandable since the Congress had never enjoyed any support from the bourgeois groups in the suburbs. Within the walls, they lost the wards in which the Banias predominated. Non-Congress candidates were elected from Ward II, Chandni Chauk, which included all of the area between Queen's Road and Chandni Chauk and Khairi Baoli; Ward IV, Malewara, which was the area bounded by Egerton Road, Chaori Bazaar, Golden Mosque and Chandni Chauk; and Ward V, Gali Qasim Jan, which was bounded by Ballimaran, Chaori Bazaar and Egerton Road. The other six wards contained other high-caste Hindus, most of whom were not as affluent as the Banias,

and a number of whom were Arya Samajists.¹ This municipal election epitomised the degree to which the Hindu bourgeoisie was disenchanted with non-co-operation and its sequel, the civil disobedience campaign.

The corollary to the campaign should not be lost sight of, however. For the first time, Extremists were elected as members of the Municipal Committee. This success, more than any other event, reflected the degree to which nationalism had incorporated the desires and discontents of the Hindu petty bourgeoisie. It also reflected the fact that the Hindu petty bourgeoisie had accepted the process of politicisation as a means to reap some of the benefits of modernisation.

The Muslim bourgeoisie, even though it was disenchanted with the non-co-operation movement, revealed that it was still deeply disturbed over the Khilafat issue. The fact that the candidates whom they elected were substantial businessmen made the process

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RDDA, Education File 10 Part A 1921, 'Reconstitution of the Delhi Municipal Committee'; Education File 4 Part A 1922, 'Reconstitution of the Delhi Municipal Committee.' The six Congress candidates who were elected were Lala Pearey Lal (pleader) who was elected to the seat for the Imperial Legislative Assembly from Delhi in 1923 aged 65; Lala Manohar Lal Bhargava who was a merchant aged 34; Sri Ram, Bar-at-Law aged 40; Lala Madan Mohan Lal, who was a Vaish banker and landlord aged 57; Lala Bulaqi Das who was an Aggarwal merchant and an Arya Samajist aged 54; and Lala Pearey Lal (motorwalla) aged 50.

palatable to them, however.¹ The process of politicisation which the Muslim bourgeoisie underwent during the non-co-operation movement also reinforced the strong parochial attitudes of this group. They expressed these attitudes during Bakr-Id when they sacrificed 149 cattle, an increase of 124 over the previous year.

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The Muslim candidates who won were Mir Mohammed Hussain, merchant, aged 36; Munshi Abdul Khaliq, merchant, aged 48; Mir Laiq Ali, merchant; Muhammad Abdur Rahman, pleader, aged 34; Hafiz Abdur Razaq, landlord, aged 50; Rauf Ali, Bar-at-Law, aged 34; Munshi Muntaz Hassan Khan, Pathan landlord and zamindar, aged 28; Munshi Tamizuddin Khan, Pathan merchant, aged 48; Shaikh Rashid Ahmad, merchant, aged 36; Hafiz Abdul Aziz, pleader, aged 43; Hakim Mohammad Zafar Khan, teacher at Tibbia College, aged 34. RDDA, Education File 4 Part A 1922. The twelfth candidate immediately resigned and was replaced by a non-Congress Muslim, Shaikh Muhammad Abdulla, import agent, aged 32, who won a bye-election in Ward VI, Farashknana, against Dr Ataullah Khan (another nominee of Hakim Ajmal Khan) by seven votes.

CONCLUSION

The growth of nationalism in the city of Delhi between 1911 and 1922 poses several interesting questions for the social historian. What was the tone and temper of society in Delhi and how did it influence the political attitudes of the inhabitants of the city? Who were the leaders of the nationalist movement and what were their motives? What issues did the leaders raise before the citizens of Delhi in their attempt to mobilise them in support of political demonstrations of one sort or another? Which classes and communities responded to the issues raised by the leaders and why did they do so? And finally, what were the consequences of the growth of a nationalist movement in the new imperial capital of India?

I

The urban scene in the city of Delhi in 1911 and 1922 reflected and reinforced many of the divisive and cohesive tendencies of society in the city. The new residents who migrated to the city tended to reside without the walled city while the inhabitants within the walled city tended to be residents of established tenure. This lent a certain amount of stability to society within the walls, a stability which was reinforced by strong institutional ties. The society without the walls was unstable because of the transitory nature of residence, a transience which

militated against institutional ties of any sort. It was also unstable because of the squalor and deprivation to which many of the inhabitants were prey. One manifestation of this distinction was the high crime rate in the suburbs. Another was the predominance of kaccha houses in the suburbs.

The distinction between the suburbs and the walled city was also reflected in bourgeois society. Those inhabitants of Delhi who had the largest resources of wealth, status, and power lived within the walls while the inhabitants of the suburbs tended to belong to the petty bourgeoisie. (The Muslim Panjabian community which lived in Sardar Bazaar was the major exception to this trend.) A further distinction existed between the petty bourgeoisie who lived in the suburbs and those petty bourgeoisie who lived within the walls. Those who lived within the walled city were particularly well equipped to derive economic and social benefits from the process of modernisation, and indeed, they displayed great drive and energy in this direction, while their less fortunate fellows without the walls had neither the resources nor the initiative to perform a comparable feat. The fact that the Arya Samaj was numerically stronger and relatively more important within the walls was one manifestation of this distinction. Another manifestation was the enormous increase in the number and type of petty industrial establishments between 1911 and 1922 within the walls. And yet a third manifestation was the increase in the number of educational institutions within the walls.

The distinction between the suburbs and the walled city had a significant effect upon the growth of

nationalism in the two areas. The lack of any institutional ties among inhabitants of the suburbs provided few means by which the political agitator could contact or mobilise the inhabitants of these areas. The plethora of social, religious, educational and occupational institutions within the walled city, however, provided a variety of means for the agitator to raise political issues before the citizens of the city. The more traditional and conservative nature of those who resided in the suburbs also acted as a brake upon participation in political activities, while the process of politicisation within the walls assumed an important role for those who were intimately involved in the process of modernisation, of which more later. The growth of the imperial area, the New Cantonment, and the Civil Lines between 1911 and 1922 heightened these distinctions rather than diminished them.

The urban scene within the old walled city of Delhi reflected and reinforced many of the divisive and cohesive tendencies of that society in 1911. Those inhabitants with the largest resources of wealth, status, and power lived on the main bazaars with successive gradations down to the residents of the galis. The wards which bordered on Chandni Chauk (plus Kashmiri Gate) tended to be literate, bourgeois, commercial, and Hindu, while the wards south of Fatehpuri Mosque, Chaori Bazaar and the Jama Masjid tended to be illiterate, lower class, handicraft and petty industrial, with a slight Muslim predominance. In most instances the differences in education, income, occupation, religion, and residence divided the society into constituent parts, while these same factors, on

the other hand, bound the members of these constituent parts into cohesive units. These cohesive units were organised by traditional society into a hierarchy of role and function.

This then was the traditional environment of the city of Delhi in 1911, an environment which had seen few compromises for the sake of urbanisation. The higher castes, the sharif, and wealthy Muslim merchants controlled the largest resources of wealth, status, and power; they predominated in the educational institutions; they monopolised non-manual occupations; and they resided in the larger houses and on the healthier streets in the city. They maintained the traditions of marriage, religious observances, and commensality inviolate. And they retained the strongest practices of deference which lower groups in the hierarchy showed toward higher groups.

This traditional urban environment conditioned the political attitudes of the inhabitants of Delhi to a large extent. Those groups which controlled the largest resources of wealth, status, and power provided individuals for membership on the Municipal Committee and the Punjab Legislative Council (before 1912). These individuals, and the groups they represented, looked upon politics as an effective means of reinforcing their dominance over the commercial and professional life of the city and as a way of inaugurating their first steps up the ladder of government preferment. Their only political interest outside the city was limited to the provincial capital at Lahore and then only when the action of some

governmental agency impinged upon their prerogatives and practices.

The traditional urban environment also conditioned the political attitudes of those who participated in nationalist politics in the city. These participants also came from the same classes and communities which controlled the largest resources of wealth, status, and power. They were however, the less eminent members of the *élite* and the majority had some training in Western-oriented education. With the exception of a small number in the professions they found it difficult to gain status or recognition from the traditional society to which they were irrevocably bound by ties of kinship and residence. Where the traditional *élite* used politics to reinforce their dominance, the Western-educated sub-*élite* used nationalist politics to circumvent that dominance. But like the traditional *élite*, the sub-*élite* rarely looked beyond Lahore for inspiration and guidance. Politics in Delhi before 1911, therefore, were provincial in two respects; the participants were members of a small *élite* and they focussed their attention on the provincial capital of Lahore.

The urban scene in Delhi reflected and reinforced the divisive tendencies in the city and to that extent the traditional urban environment crystallised the parochial attitudes of the inhabitants. These parochial attitudes stemmed primarily from religious sentiment. But the parochial attitudes of the Banias, the sharif and other groups such as the Muslim Panjabian community depended equally upon social values. These parochial

attitudes, in effect, delineated one group from every other group and emphasised the qualities and characteristics that made one group different from another. It was this parochialism which provided security to the members of the group and it was this parochialism which inspired a vigorous defense against any attack upon the security of the group.

II

The leaders of the nationalist movement in the city of Delhi came from the traditionally dominant élite. They were Moderates and Extremists and participated in the movement almost entirely from ideological motives. Men such as Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr Ansari, Dr Abdul Rahman, Muhammad Abdur Rahman and Hafiz Abdul Aziz (the latter two of whom were pleaders) were all sharif. They came from the most eminent families in the city and their influence over the Muslim inhabitants of the city was considerable. Men such as Rai Sahib Pearey Lal one of the most outstanding lawyers in the city, Rai Bahadur Sultan Singh, one of the wealthiest men in the city, Lala Shiv Narain (pleader), and Seth Ram Lal, the choudhri of the cloth merchants, were equally as eminent in the city and exercised considerable influence over the Hindu inhabitants. These leaders maintained close personal ties with Mahatma Gandhi after his rise to predominance from 1917 onwards. These men firmly believed that India should progress toward some form of government in which Indians would exercise a

predominate influence. These leaders divided as Moderates and Extremists over whether the goal should be some form of responsible government which accepted the continued presence of the British in India, or some form of self-government which rejected any British presence. Dr Ansari and Seth Ram Lal were the only two leaders who consistently supported the Extremist position while the rest of the leaders vacillated between the Moderate and Extremist stance in response to the particular political agitation then in progress. These leaders institutionalised their leadership through control of the Provincial Congress Committee, the Moslem League, the Home Rule League, and the Provincial Khilafat Committee.

By and large the Moderates supported some form of responsible government because of a firm belief in the value of a homogeneous political society which effectively excluded the illiterate portions of society. The Extremists recognised the obstacle to participation in politics presented by a high rate of illiteracy, but they believed that self-government should precede social reform, otherwise it might be delayed indefinitely.

The defection of all the Hindu leaders into the Hindu Association in October 1917 was a severe blow to the nationalist movement in the city. In some ways it revealed that the cosmopolitan values and liberal religious attitudes of the Muslim leaders had overcome the tendency toward parochialism that was obvious in the actions of the Hindu leaders. It was primarily through the tireless efforts of the Muslim leaders who wholeheartedly believed in Hindu-Muslim unity that

harmony was restored to the movement. And it was the concessions that these leaders made to Hindu sentiment in the reduction of garbani in 1920 and 1921 that made the Hindu-Muslim alliance a viable one. The refusal of the Hindu leaders to campaign for a cessation in the playing of music before mosques did little to foster an alliance that existed despite the actions of the Hindu leaders, rather than because of them. The election of Hakim Ajmal Khan as chairman of the Reception Committee of the National Congress was the major exception.

There were two major leaders in Delhi who did not come from eminent families but who nevertheless exercised a considerable influence over the inhabitants of the city. These were Mohamed Ali who resided in the city between 1912 and 1915; and Mahatma Munshi Ram or Swami Shradhanand who resided in the city for short periods during 1918 and 1919. Both men came from families which experienced little material deprivation; both were passionate orators who could move their listeners; both relied upon religious sentiment to arouse their audiences; both sought support from the illiterate lower classes; and finally, both were anti-British, Mohamed Ali because of his pan-Islamic beliefs and Shradhanand because of his belief in the superiority of the Vedic culture of India.

The secondary leaders of the nationalist movement in Delhi were legion in number. They ranged from the important lieutenants of the primary leaders down to the insignificant self-styled agitator who had no following whatever. The more important Hindu lieutenants were K.A. Desai, a Gujrati who was the

manager of a cotton mill; Pearey Lal (motorwalla); Shankar Lal, who was connected with the Benares Conspiracy Case in 1915 and who became the manager of the Swadeshi Co-operative Store; Shiv Narain Haksar, a Kashmiri Brahman and a journalist; Indra, the son of Shradhanand and a journalist; and Neki Ram Sharma, a Gaur Grahman from Rohtak. K.A. Desai, Indra, and Neki Ram Sharma left the city by 1920 and did not participate in the non-co-operation movement. The more important Muslim lieutenants were Asaf Ali who returned from England in 1915 and became a barrister; Ahmad Said, a maulvi and a teacher at the Madrassah Aminia; Kifayatullah, a maulvi and a teacher at Madrassah Aminia (later to become the Mufti of Delhi); and Arif Hussain Haswi, a journalist.

All of these lieutenants came from high-caste or sharif families (except Kifayatullah). They all supported the Extremist position and in fact tended to be quite radical in their political views. They constantly sought to increase the pace of political agitation and invariably clashed with the primary leaders. Such collisions occurred during the Rowlatt Satyagraha of April 1919 and consistently from March 1920 onwards after the foundation by these lieutenants of the Khilafat Workers' Association in opposition to the leaders who controlled the Provincial Congress Committee and the Provincial Khilafat Committee.

The lieutenants who emerged as a result of the growth of nationalism in Delhi had three motives. They were similar to the nationalists who led the movement before 1911 in that they had a sincere ideological

commitment to the movement. They were also similar to the earlier leaders in that they had all received a Western-oriented education (except Ahmad Said and Kifayatullah) and used political activity as a means to gain status and recognition from the traditional elements in the society and from their own leaders. And finally these lieutenants adopted a radical position on the issue of political change in order to retain the support of the minor leaders and followers of the movement, the only group which accorded them the status and recognition which they felt their due.

The minor leaders and agitators in Delhi were legion in number. Such men as Shambhu Nath Chopra, A.C. Acharaya, Qazi Abbas Hussain and Tajuddin, who were all journalists, or Bishan Sarup and Abdulla Churiwalla had very little following in the city, and only created a position among the agitators by progressively advocating ever more radical programmes and delivering more violent speeches. They joined the Khilafat Workers' Association, but more importantly, they acted as the leaders of the volunteer associations in the city along with Qutbuddin, Muhammad Ishaq, Aziz Hussain Naqshbandi, Sahak Beg, Rarup Abdul Ghani, Gurbakhsh Singh, a Sikh agitator, and Pandit Balwant Singh. The foundation of the volunteer associations suited these minor leaders perfectly because as their leaders, they received an amount of status and recognition which they desired. In fact, their participation in active political agitation gave them increased status in their own eyes since they were the people who confronted the police in the streets and not the leaders who remained aloof in their houses.

These very minor leaders came from the petty bourgeois sections of society. The majority had received a traditional education and spoke very little (if any) English. As the nationalist movement gathered momentum, ever increasing numbers became involved. These minor leaders represented the thin end of a wedge in the society that responded to the issues raised by the more important leaders. These minor leaders in effect, represented the epitome of the process of politicisation in the city, a process which the majority of the petty bourgeoisie supported for reasons to be discussed below.

III

The leaders of the nationalist movement in Delhi made definite attempts to mobilise the inhabitants of the city in support of their campaign to wrest concessions from the British. The revolutionary nationalists were the first to attempt this. The number of actual revolutionaries was confined to a small coterie, but they hoped by showing that the government was vulnerable and by spreading innumerable pamphlets that they could create the will to resist. The use of assassination as a political weapon found little support among the general populace, however, while the overtones of Bengali Hindu nationalism which sustained the movement erected an effective barrier to Muslim participation.

The attempt of Mohamed Ali to mobilise support for his campaign to alleviate the distress of the

Ottoman Empire during the Balkan crises was considerably more successful. Mohamed Ali encountered stiff opposition from the sharif to his campaign and he was forced instead to turn to the non-sharif elements in the city. He gained the support of the shoe, leather, and hide merchants, the butchers, the artisans who worked with leather, and the students in the schools, colleges, and madrassahs. He utilised his extraordinary ability as an orator and a journalist, institutions such as the mosque, organisations such as the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba, and incidents such as the Cawnpore mosque affair to convince a wider audience that the British, who were also Christians, were hostile to Islam and that the government, therefore, did not deserve the support of the Muslim community in India. He forged a temporary alliance with a substantial number of the Muslim bourgeoisie but was able to gain the support of only a few members of the sharif, all of whom were Extremists. The Cawnpore mosque affair cemented the alliance with the bourgeoisie, but the entry of Turkey into the War on the side of Germany exposed the reluctance of the wealthier merchants to support Mohamed Ali's brand of pan-Islamism and it finally collapsed. Mohamed Ali's success in mobilising support for his campaign among the low classes was revealed when his newspaper was confiscated on 2 November 1914 and when he was interned on 21 May 1915. On both occasions the low class groups to which he pinned his hopes responded with an overwhelming display of support. In the first instance he collected Rs. 10,000 to reopen his newspaper and in the second an audience of 7,000 congregated at the Jama Masjid after the Juma prayers

and then the entire Muslim community observed a half-day hartal.

The Muslim lower-classes, and especially those connected with leather, responded to the campaign of Mohamed Ali basically for three reasons. The Muslim artisans of Delhi were faced with chronic economic distress. The distress was partially the result of foreign competition and partially the result of a change in the pattern of consumption. Another reason for the response of the Muslim lower classes to Mohamed Ali was the fact that the lower classes of Muslim society had a strong bias in favour of the traditional values of Islam. Mohamed Ali played on this bias when he raised the issue which postulated that the pan-Islamic world had to unite in view of the Christian conspiracy against the Muslims. It was a romantic appeal, but it was made to groups which were exceptionally responsive to such sentiments. And yet another reason for the response of the Muslim lower classes to Mohamed Ali arose out of Hindu-Muslim enmity prevalent at the time. The conflict between the Muslim community and the Arya Samaj had resulted in a meeting of 10,000 Muslims at the Idgah on 3 July 1910. This was followed by an attempt on the part of orthodox Hindu, Arya Samajist, and Christian missionaries to influence the Chamars (the Hindu caste which traditionally dealt with leather). This campaign resulted in the Chamars becoming anti-Muslim, a state of affairs which endangered the economic well-being of the Muslim shoe merchants, hide merchants, butchers, and those Muslim artisans who made leather articles, a group which totalled approximately 9,000 in 1921. The estrangement

had social overtones as well because a large number of these Muslims had been converted from the Chamar caste originally and the new Muslims reacted to being looked down upon by a group to which they considered themselves superior.

The student community and the petty bourgeois sections of Muslim society responded to Mohamed Ali for two reasons. Both these groups were amenable to the romantic sentiment embodied in the issue of pan-Islamism. But more importantly, these two groups reflected the greatest amount of social mobility in Muslim society. Both groups had the most to gain from the social and economic opportunities offered by modernisation and both groups looked upon political activity as a means to consolidate the advantages gained therefrom. They also looked upon political activity as another means to circumvent the traditional patterns of deference and patronage so evident among the most established members of Muslim society. And finally, participation in political activities provided a means to gain status and recognition.

A third attempt to mobilise the inhabitants of Delhi in support of a political agitation occurred during the Home Rule League campaign which began in 1917. A small coterie of nationalists formed a branch of the League in Delhi in February 1917, but were unable to inspire any public enthusiasms for the movement until they organised a public meeting on 26 September 1917 and attracted an audience of 4,000. Those who attended this meeting were overwhelmingly Hindu and overwhelmingly bourgeois, with students,

petty merchants and clerks forming the bulk of the audience while members of the liberal professions and representatives of the more substantial merchants attended in smaller numbers. An even greater response from the public of Delhi came during the Ram Lila festival when the Home Rulers invaded the Ram Lila Committee and refused to compromise with the Administration over a change in route of a procession that coincided with the Moharram festival of the Shias. The Hindu merchants of Delhi then responded to a call for a hartal which lasted six days from 17 October 1917. The public support displayed for the hartal and the arrival of Edwin S. Montagu, Secretary for State for India, who arrived in Delhi to begin consultations on a reforms scheme resulted in a political meeting with an audience of over 8,000 on 26 November 1917. This meeting, like the meeting of 7,000 Muslims on 21 May 1915, reflected the degree to which many of the inhabitants of the city had been politicised. The crucial difference between the two meetings, however, was the fact that the Muslim lower classes predominated at the latter meeting while the Hindu bourgeoisie predominated at the former meeting.

The Hindu bourgeoisie participated in the hartal of 17 October and public meeting of 26 November for several reasons. They participated in the hartal because that form of protest was peculiar to the Indian merchant community and reflected and reinforced the solidarity of those involved in this traditional calling. The fact that the merchants were amenable to this form of protest does not explain, however, why

they used it. The religious idiom, which the Home Rulers used in their conflict with the Administration and with the Shias, struck deep roots of religious sentiment in a community which was particularly concerned with the manifestations of religion. The sanatani and the Arya Samajist saw the hartal as a reaffirmation of the moral strength of Hinduism against the Administration and against the Muslim community, both of whom had trampled upon their religious susceptibilities. The most enthusiastic response, however, came from the petty bourgeois merchants. The members of the Delhi Hindustani Mercantile Association, the Kirana Committee, the Indian Bankers Association and the panchayats of the grain, sugar, and ghee merchants looked upon the hartal as a chance to assert their will over the merchants in the Punjab Chamber of Commerce and the Delhi Piece Goods Association, the members of which controlled the largest resources of wealth, status and power in the city. The hartal, in fact, reflected the attempt of the non-Bania castes (those castes which contributed the majority of the petty bourgeois merchants and the majority of the Arya Samajists in the city) to consolidate and reinforce the advantages they had seized from the social and economic opportunities thrown open by the currents of modernisation and industrialisation. It was also an opportunity to attack the rigid lines of deference that were an integral part of traditional Hindu society. And finally, the petty bourgeois merchants supported the hartal because they were beginning to feel the economic strain of three years of war.

The fourth attempt to mobilise public support for political agitation in Delhi was the most successful. The leaders who supported Gandhi's campaign against the Rowlatt Bills and who formed the Satyagraha Sabha engendered enough enthusiasm in the city for all the merchants to observe a hartal on 30 March 1919. Two riots also occurred on that day which saw five people killed and 14 wounded at the hands of the police and troops who were called in to quell the disturbance. The inhabitants of the city then united against police repression and the following 19 days witnessed two hartals (a one-day hartal on 6 April and a nine-day hartal from the 10th to the 18th); two riots which added two more deaths and 12 more casualties to the martyrs of the 30th; 12 public meetings with audiences which ranged from 25,000 to 50,000; two public meetings which attracted 100,000 persons which included almost the entire available population of the city; and two occasions when Swami Shradhanand was invited to speak to the congregations at the two main mosques in the city. The extent of public consensus was reflected in the fact that on one of the occasions the Swami spoke to a huge audience of Hindus and Muslims in the Jama Masjid; and more importantly, he spoke from the pulpit, an act which, though forbidden by Islamic law, was supported by public acclaim.

The issues which were responsible for the overwhelming support shown during the Rowlatt Satyagraha were varied. The ostensible and immediate cause was the enactment of the Emergency Powers Bill on 19 March 1919. But this Bill only acted as a focus for other

grievances and discontents shared by the inhabitants of the city of Delhi. Foremost among these was the acute economic distress suffered by all sections of society in the city. The distress was compounded by the fact that an influenza epidemic had carried off 7,000 inhabitants in the city between September and November 1918; by the fact that prices were higher in the first three months of 1919 than they had been in 1918 (a fact which most of the lower classes found incomprehensible once the War had ended); and because the Administration had opened cheap grain shops and kerosene and salt depots during the War to alleviate distress but refused to do so once the War was over. The Muslim student community and the lower classes were aroused over the stigma placed upon the ex-Shaikh-ul-Islam, Mahmud-ul-Hasan, by the Rowlatt Committee; over the continued incarceration of the Muslim internees; over the uncertainty that hung over the future integrity of the Khilafat and the holy places; and over the proscription of Dr Ansari's speech to the annual session of the All-India Moslem League of December 1918 by the governments of the Punjab and the United Provinces. The Hindu bourgeoisie was aroused over the three extraordinary taxes imposed by the government on 1 April 1917, 1918, and 1919; over the catastrophic depression which hit the piece goods market after the unbounded speculation late in 1918; over the introduction of an intercaste marriage bill into the Imperial Legislative Council; and over the arrest and trial of a large number of Hindus for their part in the death of 30 Muslims during the riot at Karturpur in the United Provinces in September 1918.

The Hindu petty bourgeoisie led the campaign for a hartal on 30 March 1919 just as they had on 17 October 1917. In many ways they felt that their entry into politics in 1917 had been successful and in March 1919 they had the additional charisma of Mahatma Gandhi to lead them on. The riots and the repression by the police on the 30th gave the inhabitants of the city a sense of involvement which had been lacking in all the political demonstrations which preceded this one. The result was that the movement for which the leaders and their lieutenants had worked and canvassed, took on a life of its own. From the 31 March onward the leaders worked hard to restrain the movement while the lieutenants and minor leaders seized the opportunity to ride the crest of the wave of popular enthusiasm. The merchants observed a hartal on 6 April in opposition to the Satyagraha Sabha, that body which had been responsible for organising the hartal on 30 March. Just as the Hindu petty bourgeois merchants used this opportunity to assert themselves at the expense of their more eminent colleagues, the secondary leaders likewise became the spokesmen for the popular movement at the expense of the primary leaders of the city. The smaller fry, who also wanted to gain recognition and status urged the populace to more daring expressions of their discontent which led to the riots on 14 and 17 April.

The events which occurred between April 1919 and March 1922 resulted from two influences. The reaction of the Hindu petty bourgeoisie to the Rowlatt Satyagraha was one of horror. They had been enthusiastic over participation in the hartal which began on 10 April but

they had not counted on the excesses which followed upon mass participation. This violence deprived them of a feeling of victory because it gave the authorities the opportunity to show that Indians were not prepared to participate responsibly in political processes. From April 1919 onward the Hindu petty bourgeoisie strictly eschewed participation in any political demonstrations which depended upon the support of the illiterate sections of the community. They supported many hartals during the non-co-operation movement but they would not support the boycott and swadeshi campaign. They did not allow their children to leave the schools; they did not support the national court; they limited the amount of funds they were willing to donate; and they withdrew their support from the volunteer associations.

This was even more true between February and June 1921 when the Hindu leaders attempted to achieve a mass following by raising the issues of boycott, swadeshi and swaraj before the traditional outcaste groups of the city. The bourgeoisie heaved a sigh of relief when the Chamars unanimously rejected swaraj, a decision which effectively ended any participation by lower class Hindus.

Yet another influence on the events between April 1919 and March 1922 was the issue raised over the integrity of the Khilafat and the holy places. The religious sentiment engendered by this issue drew the Muslim bourgeoisie into an alliance with the Muslim lower classes and from the first Khilafat Day on 17 October 1919 until the end of the abortive civil

disobedience campaign in 1922, these two groups provided the leadership and the support for the non-co-operation movement. The Muslim merchants, led by the Panjabian and Ahl-i-Hadis communities (the wealthiest Muslim merchants and the most orthodox Muslims respectively) were in the vanguard during hartals, political and religious meetings, and the boycott campaign which reduced the number of Muslim students in the Anglo-Arabic High School by one-third, and turned the elections for the new Imperial Legislative Assembly into a victory for the non-co-operators. They also agreed to a compromise in the practice of qarbani which saw the reduction of cattle sacrificed at Bakr-Id from 250 in 1919 to 25 in 1921, an extraordinary performance by any measure. The Muslim lower classes supported the non-co-operation movement by attending political and religious meetings, but more importantly, by swelling the ranks of the volunteer associations.

The non-co-operation movement, in fact became a religious movement and therein lay the seeds of its demise. The supporters of the movement were gradually led by primary leaders to believe that support of the non-co-operation movement was a moral and political obligation. The lieutenants and minor leaders whipped up a good deal more support by convincing the same supporters that non-co-operation was a religious duty. The primary leaders were constantly forced to restrain the enthusiasm of their followers who were impelled by their own propaganda and supporters to take ever more intransigent positions. The climax came when the government confiscated the fatwa which prohibited Muslims

from joining the police or the army. The lack of any lead from the leaders and their success in restraining the secondary leaders from any response revealed that in the final analysis the secondary leaders could not oppose the dictates of the sharif leaders. The Muslim community became disenchanted with non-co-operation and its corollary, civil disobedience, because of the restraint of the sharif leaders, and also because of the total lack of support from the Hindu community. The Muslim bourgeoisie supported its leaders, however, during the Municipal elections on 24 March 1922, and elected their candidates because they were still aroused over the Khilafat and because they saw local elections, as a means to consolidate and reinforce their entry into politics. The Banias, on the other hand, did not support the nationalists in this election, nor did the Hindu petty bourgeoisie outside the walls. Both these groups elected their own candidate, men who would serve as staunch supporters of established economic interests and indirectly staunch supporters of the government. The petty bourgeoisie within the walls, however, once again used this opportunity to assert their support for a process which particularly manifested their rise to prominence in the city.

IV

There were several consequences of the development of a nationalist movement in the new imperial capital of India. The inhabitants of the city became aware of the fact that national issues affected local events. It

is almost impossible to conclude that Delhi's selection as the capital was most responsible for a change in the provincial attitude which took small notice of anything beyond local interest. The constant comings and goings of the nationalist leaders of India, of the members of the Imperial Legislative Council (and then Assembly), and of the members of the Government of India must have had some effect. The reiteration from 1917 onwards of the theme that imperial Delhi had a special responsibility to provide a lead for the rest of the country also must have had some effect. But without a contemporary study for comparison, it is impossible to say that the issues raised by the nationalist leaders in the city were not equally important. Regardless of the cause, the inhabitants of Delhi were interested in, and affected by, national issues.

The development of a nationalist movement in the new imperial capital of India also resulted in the politicisation of social groups which, because of the disadvantages of their economic and social position, had previously been excluded from participation in local politics. Nationalist politics created a new arena in which these groups could operate. Nationalist politics provided status and recognition for the participants, and it afforded immense opportunities for those groups in society who wished to become mobile. In this sense, nationalist politics benefited the petty bourgeoisie most because they enabled them to utilise politics to consolidate and reinforce the social and economic advantages they derived from

participating in the process of modernisation. But the nationalist movement, by raising issues which were germane to all segments of the society, became a focus of interest for the lower classes in the society. And to the extent that they participated in meetings and volunteer associations in Delhi, they acquired a new political consciousness. This new consciousness had to await the franchise before politics could become a constructive focus of grievances and discontent.

The most significant consequence of the nationalist movement in Delhi was the effect it had upon parochial attitudes. The nationalist movement in Delhi was responsible for awakening a political consciousness among all classes and communities in the city. It was also responsible for heightening parochial attitudes among the inhabitants. By making people politically conscious of nationalist issues, the leaders raised the question - Why do Indians want swaraj? The answer, that swaraj was necessary for Indians to rule themselves, raised the more basic question - How will Indians rule themselves? This was the crucial question because once the neutral umpire had been removed from the scene, who would protect the interests of different sections of society, particularly the minorities. This was one reason why parochial attitudes were reinforced. Another reason was because the leaders had resorted to a religious idiom in order to gain mass support for their movement. In this sense political consciousness and religious consciousness proceeded apace.

Yet another reason for the rigid parochial attitudes which resulted from the first non-co-operation movement

was the disenchantment of the Muslims for the Hindus after their first attempt to bury their differences and act in harmony for a political goal. The Muslims had joined the non-co-operation movement on the promise from Gandhi and others that the united support of Hindus and Muslims would bring enough pressure to bear upon the government to redress the grievances of both communities. And yet the Muslims had supported the movement far out of proportion to their numbers. More significantly, the Muslims had supported non-co-operation as a religious duty, and then Gandhi had suspended the movement on grounds of political expediency. A leader who could violate a religious duty for political expediency in one instance could do the same in others and was not to be trusted. The sacrifice of 149 cattle on Bakr-Id 1922 was the Muslim answer to their 'betrayal' at the hands of Gandhi and the Hindus who followed his lead in the first non-co-operation movement. In the future the Muslims of Delhi, indeed, the Muslims of India as a whole, were to exact an even more fearful price for their 'betrayal' at the hands of the Hindus of India.

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- A. National Archives of India
- B. Record Department, Delhi Administration
- C. Interviews

II. Published works

- A. Government publications
 - 1. Province of Delhi
 - 2. Great Britain
 - 3. Government of India
 - 4. Punjab Province
- B. Selected secondary authorities

I. Unpublished sources

This thesis is based primarily upon the documents in the custody of the National Archives of India, New Delhi, and the Record Department, Delhi Administration, Delhi. The records which were consulted at the National Archives all came from the same series, namely, the Political Branch of the Home Department. These records were invaluable for the detailed information they gave on political events in the city and on subsidiary social, religious, and economic influences which affected

those events. These records were especially valuable because Delhi's unique position, vis-a-vis the Government of India, resulted in a heightened concern on the part of imperial officials to know what was going on, and in a demand for explanations of the most important events. These records contributed most to the study of politics in the city. The documents located at the Record Department, Delhi Administration, on the other hand, were invaluable for the study of society in the city. It would be impossible to list all of the records which have been cited, let alone those which have been consulted. The practice was adopted, therefore, of giving the title for each document the first time it was cited in each chapter.

This study of society and politics in the new imperial capital of India between 1911 and 1922 was also based upon several informative interviews. These are listed below:

1. Shri K.A. Desai, 7 April 1967.
2. Shri Muhammad Mujeeb, September to December 1967.
3. Shri Zubair Quraishi, July to October 1967.
4. Shri S. Sanghal, 17 April 1967.

In addition to these interviews, I was given access to an interview with Shri Sri Ram Sharma, an interview which was recorded by the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library on 22 April 1967.

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