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DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

SAP- DRS-III of UGC (2015-2020)

**University of North Bengal**
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PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS
JOURNAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

उत्तर बङ्ग

विश्वविद्यालय

समानो मन्त्रः समितिः समानी

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL
ACCREDITED BY NAAC WITH GRADE A

The present volume is dedicated to the precious memories and invaluable contributions of our loved colleagues who have left us in recent past.

Pabitra Kumar Roy (22.09.1980—07.08.2001)

The Philosopher was well versed in every field of philosophy, Indian and Western, and will always be remembered for his exceptional style of delivering.

Usharanjan Chakraborty (16.08.1982—30.11.2000)

The moralist was deeply rooted in tradition and never taught what he did not believe.

Ranjan Ghosh (17.03.1986—04.12.1995)

The aesthetician was himself an artist and a teacher in whom students used to find a friend and guide too.

[The dates in brackets are in relation to their services in the Department of Philosophy]

CONTENTS

EDITORIAL NOTE

The Department of Philosophy, University of North Bengal, functioning under the UGC-SAP scheme since 2002 in its 3 phases of DRS-I, DRS-II & DRS-III has so far published successfully 17 volumes of UGC-CARE enlisted annual journal *Philosophical Papers: Journal of The Department of Philosophy* with variously rich contents and this endeavour has been highly appreciated in the Philosophy community at large.

As a continuation of the rich tradition, the department has made an honest and sincere attempt to publish the 18th volume of the journal this year, with valuable and well-knit essays. The department hopes and believes that this volume also will not fail to satisfy the enthusiastic readers in the philosophical circle and also the general readers.

We take this opportunity to thank all our valuable and respected contributors. We express our sincere gratitude to all the esteemed members of the editorial board. We are also thankful to all the colleagues in our department for their all round guidance and also their valuable and thoughtful suggestions in publishing this journal. We express our warm regards and indebtedness to our most beloved honorable Vice-Chancellor. Last, but not the least, our special thanks are due to the Registrar(Officiating), Finance Officer, and the University Press whose constant support has made the publication possible.

Philosophy is the mother of all disciplines because it gave birth to and nurtured every other discipline that exists today. Since every single idea is built upon a quest for the truth, Philosophy is considered mother of all disciplines. Philosophy, as a mother, gives birth to a field through asking questions and nurtures through study that field until it is mature enough to live on its own and leave the nest of Philosophy.

The famous Philosopher A.C. Grayling observes in his book '*Philosophy*', a recent study of intellectual history where one can see Philosophy as giving birth in the seventeenth century to Natural Science, in the eighteenth century to Psychology, and in the nineteenth century to Sociology and Linguistics; while in the twentieth century it has played a large part in the development of Computer Science, Cognitive Science and research into Artificial Intelligence. No doubt it oversimplifies the role of philosophical reflection, but it does not much exaggerate it, because in effect Philosophy consists in enquiry into something not yet well understood to constitute a self-standing branch of knowledge. When the right questions and the right methods for answering them have been identified, the field of enquiry in question becomes an independent pursuit. The journal makes an attempt to present such initiatives of philosophical exercises in dynamic ways through different papers. Brief outlines of those have been presented here.

Raghunath Ghosh in his paper, 'Some Ethical Issues Of Jurisprudence: An Indian Approach' observes that the main purpose of the Indian Judicial System is to provide

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justice to the people who are deprived of the same. This motto of the legal system is symbolized through the idol of a lady with a balancing rod in hand and having eyes closed with black tape in front of the Judges, picture of Gandhi in the court premise and a line behind it quoted from Indian tradition - *Satyameva Jayate*. Prof. Ghosh makes an attempt to find out what is presumed from the above set-up in the court premise. He argues that if justice is to be taken in the sense of balance where there is no partiality and no favoritism and if this view is taken as true in the field of jurisprudence, it gives rise to much philosophical questions. He analyses all these in detail in his paper.

Md. Sirajul Islam, in his paper, 'Possibility and relevance of Universal Religion: as Envisaged by Swami Vivekananda' has tried to establish that Swami Vivekananda's universalistic approach of religion is beyond any sectarian division. He feels that his quest for truth and unsurpassed love towards humanity is to be considered an inherent propensity of human being that elevates a man from beastly stage to the stage of humanity and ultimately of the state of Divinity.

The concept of *ānvikṣiki vidyā* is noticed in many pieces of ancient Indian literature while its exact nature is not specified clearly by its proponents. As such many scholars are of the opinion that enquiry into the nature of this *vidyā* is worth pursuing. Jyotish Chandra Basak in his paper, '*Ānvikṣiki vidyā* : An Enquiry Into Its Nature And Development' has tried to state the views of some scholars' about the nature and development of this *vidyā* as well as his own analysis in this respect.

Nirmal Kumar Roy in his paper," Some Aspects Of *Niṣkāmakarma*: A Critical Study." addresses some of the important problems regarding *Niṣkāmakarma* along with the logical solution to them. Through critical and skillful analysis, he ultimately finds replies to all the questions raised in respect of *Niṣkāmakarma* and comes to the conclusion that all those questions and problems raised are mainly due to lack of proper understanding of the same.

Prashant Shukla in his article "A Critical Exposition Of 'Human Nature' In Kant's Perpetual Peace", has tried to explain lucidly how 'Human Nature' has been exposed in Immanuel Kant's 200 years old essay 'Perpetual Peace'. A detailed description of the grand vision for 'World Peace' has been presented in that essay. Due credit is attributed to this seminal work on account of the lasting impact it made on Peace Studies, the conception of the United Nations and the realization of a new world-order based on everlasting peace. He stresses that the temporary conclusion is not about 'What will be?' or 'How it can be realized?', rather about 'What ought to be?'. The paper proposes to have a closer look on the notion that Nature, standing in for a divine providence, employs the very inclination that push people to make war, and guide them further towards eventual peace.

The issues and problems surrounding Descartes' Cogito have fascinated humans for many centuries. It has influenced all kinds of modern philosophy, as well as literature, art, social science, and religion. It was first introduced by Descartes, in his *Discourse on Method* which was published in French as *Je pense, donc je suis* (1637). The paper of Akoijam Thoibisana on "Re-Reading Descartes' Cogito: A Study " seeks to bring out the most complicated debates of Descartes' cogito which otherwise is taken to be very simple, clear and distinct.

Anureema Bhattacharyya in her paper "The Unique Status of Meta-ethical Emotivism in Stevenson" makes an attempt to exhibit a comprehensive meta-ethical study in the tone of a non-cognitivist through establishing the entire pursuit in the most pragmatic setting of human social existence where exactly Ethics finds its expression. Hence, the uniqueness of such version of meta-ethical emotivism is thoroughly analyzed and justified in the paper.

Ngaleknao Ramthing's article "Morality As Categorical Imperative" attempts to foreground morality as a categorical imperative. For Kant the categorical imperative is the fundamental principle of morality grounded on the idea of autonomy. Kant believed that an action can only be morally worthy if it is performed in accordance with the categorical imperative, meaning, that it is performed out of a sense of duty to the moral law. The categorical imperative must be universally applicable to all autonomous beings. The author agrees with Kant that a principle which applies to all autonomous beings must be a categorical imperative based on universal law.

A Nobel Laureate, Nationalist, and Idealist, Rabindranath Tagore's literature portrayed female characters like Charulata, Kalyani, Binodini, Mrinal, Giribala etc. with spitfire personalities. In her paper "Progressive Females By Tagore: A Psycho-Philosophical Analysis", Gitanjali Roy presents psychological hermeneutic perspectives of these characters for understanding the similarity and difference in the portrayal of females now and decades ago.

Among the Indian Philosophical systems, *Sāṁkhya* philosophy represents one of the oldest traditions. Like the other orthodox schools of Indian Philosophy, the *Sāṁkhya* system too considers liberation to be the highest goal of human life. According to the *Sāṁkhya* Philosophers, though liberation is nothing but the absolute cessation of the three-fold sufferings, yet it can only be attained through the realization of the discriminatory knowledge (*vivekajñāna*) between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*. Swagata Ghosh, in her paper "The Notion Of Bondage And Liberation In *Sāṁkhya* Philosophy : A Critical Study" has presented lucidly her observations through critical study of the subject.

Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, the renowned academician and intellectual figure earned reputation not only in India but also globally. In her paper, "The Conception Of Philosophy and the East West Synthesis in S.Radhakrishnan: An Exploration", Baishali Majumder has made an attempt to explore the various aspects of Radhakrishnan's concept of Philosophy and the East-West synthesis.

Amit Mondal in his paper, "Meanings and Development of The Idea of Compromise: A Political And Philosophical Discourse" attempts to demonstrate the different meanings of compromise and its connection with contractarianism and representationism. Keeping in mind the differences in the meanings of compromise across the ages and the differences in representation, he has tried to explain compromise in a comprehensive way. The paper also focuses on how the classical sense of 'compromise' had undergone a sudden change from the early decades of the sixteenth century, and how the change persisted till the eighteenth century in European political and philosophical discourse

The article "An Assessment Of Radical, Liberal, And Contractarian Views On Sex Work" of Ankita Paul provides a comprehensive overview of the philosophical perspectives of radical, liberal, and contractarian views that try to address the phenomenon of sex work from a theoretical and context-sensitive approach. In her paper she demonstrates through discussions of these perspectives how sex workers are qualified as real workers and show that they also have control over their working life and, most importantly, are not always passive victims of patriarchy without voices.

The main contention of Avhijit Ghosh's paper "Mysticism: Wittgenstein And *Advaita Vedānta*." is to explain the concept of mysticism with special reference to Wittgenstein and *Advaita Vedānta*. Thus in a sense, it is a comparative study in nature between Wittgenstein and *Advaita Vedānta*. The concept of mysticism is a tricky philosophical concept which leads to different philosophical interpretations. Mysticism occupies significant philosophical areas both in Wittgenstein as well as in *Advaita Vedānta*. Therefore, a contrast and comparison between Wittgenstein and *Advaita Vedānta* are worthy in philosophy. The paper makes a conscious effort to find the meeting point based on mystical aspects of Wittgenstein and *Advaita Vedānta*.

B. Ananda Sagar in his paper, "On Phenomenalism: A Critical Analysis" aims to analyze the theory of Phenomenalism and its basic assumptions in the philosophies of Berkeley, Russel and Ayer. He has also analyzed the way Phenomenalism and its sense-datum theory has been opposed by Austin and Strawson. His main argument is that Phenomenalism as a theory of reduction of the objects to sense-data can never be sustained because no such reduction is possible and we can never give up the conceptual system in which the material bodies and persons are primary particulars.

The article of Beauty Das, "Dynamics Of Reason: Its History and Development" is based on the idea that the Dynamics Of Reason can be illustrated employing a Historical analysis of the conception of reason. The article clearly shows the development of the conception by analyzing the viewpoints of different philosophers regarding this notion. It also spreads light on what role does a reason play to constitute human nature as well as to understand the nature of the world.

The Philosophy of Free Will is an old debate which like anything longstanding, has rehabilitated over time. Dr. Rajan's paper, "Free Will Debate: From Illusionism To Compatibilism." aims at understanding the above very fact with three objectives: a) to introduce the Free Will problem as it exists in recent philosophical debates, (b) to explain how the idea of Free Will may be an illusion in the first place and (c) to speculate that critical conjectures on the same issue may help us to feel the matter to a great extent. With the above objectives, we are free to take the decisions in life in order to feel that human existence may worn out the existential nihilism, and subsequently may embrace meaningfulness.

The *Bhagavadgītā* occupies the central place in the ethical history of Indian Philosophy. It is the quintessence of Hindu culture and the sum and substance of Indian philosophical theory and practice, metaphysics and ethics, religion, mysticism, tradition etc. For millions of people it is the gospel of truth, the message of divine life and an inspiring and stimulating ideal for the conduct of life. Anyone, in any social status, sex, religion or society, can desire practical guidance from it. Krishna Paul, in his article, "The Status Of The Ethical Theory Of *Srimadbhagavadgītā*: A Critical Analysis" has discussed about the status of the ethical theory of *Srimadbhagavadgītā*.

Sanchayaita Sen in her paper, "Nature Of Self-Awareness: Privacy And Beyond" has made an attempt to discuss whether the privacy of self-awareness is admissible or not, The paper contains two main sections. In section 1 she has discussed some plausible accounts about the nature of self-awareness where different layers of self are being accepted. In section 2 she has tried to discuss that there is a fragmentation in the structure of self-awareness.

Phenomenology which started as a movement is mostly identified with the name of Edmond Gustav Albrecht Husserl. Great thinkers like Martin Heidegger, Jean Paul Sartre, Maurice, Merleau-Ponty, Jacques Derrida, Paul Ricoeur and others were influenced by Husserl's thoughts. In one of Husserl's many books, named 'Crisis', Husserl elaborates on the concept of the life-world. The main goal of Subhajit Dutta's article "The Notion Of Life-World In Husserl's Crisis: An Overview" is to comprehend the Husserlian interpretation of the notion of the life-world and its connectedness with the transcendental phenomenological project. This paper aims at particular focus to the life-world, the epoche of objective science and transcendental reduction.

In Indian Philosophy, we come across a long-standing burning controversy among the different philosophical schools regarding the supreme end of human life. All the philosophical schools excepting *Cārvāka* consider *Mokṣa* as the ultimate or supreme end of human life but the *Cārvāka* school recognizes *Kāma* or pleasure as the ultimate end of us. Sujan Mondal in his paper, "The Supreme End Of Human Life According To *Cārvāka* School: A Critical Study." addresses this issue with utmost logical analysis and ultimately substantiates the *Cārvāka* view.

ANUREEMA BHATTACHARYYA
KOUSHIK JOARDAR
ANIRBAN MUKHERJEE

SOME ETHICAL ISSUES OF JURISPRUDENCE: AN INDIAN APPROACH

RAGHUNATH GHOSH

The main purpose of the Indian judicial system is to provide justice to the people who are deprived of the same. This motto of the legal system is symbolized through idol of a lady with a balancing rod in hand and having eyes closed with black tape in front of the judges, picture of Gandhi in the court premise and a line behind it quoted from Indian tradition- satyameva jayate. From the above it is presumed that justice is to be taken in the sense of balance where there is no partiality and no favoritism. If the above-mentioned view is taken as true in the field of jurisprudence, it gives rise to much philosophical questions which are as follows. First, is truth objective or subjective? If objective then it is transparent provable with the witness and evidences automatically without taking the help of a legal professional. If truth is determined by a legal professional then it is purely subjective. If truth is taken as subjective then an individual is said to be denied of justice. Secondly, it is a common belief of the people that an expert of legal professional can save his client though in actual case he has committed wrong actions like murder, stealing or any other crimes. If lawyer can save him then it is to be taken for granted that truth can be falsified. Sometimes false case may be proved as true. If false is turned to be true, what would be the value of truth? Thirdly, it is the normal saying –'justice delayed, justice denied'. In modern time no case is cleared within limited period of time, but takes a prolonged time losing the merit of the case. Can it not be taken as a darker side of our legal system? Fourthly, why are the legal language, its clause or bye-clause very much interpreter-dependent? Can there be no simpler language so that non-legal person can come forward to defend someone or the client can defend his own case? Lastly, can legality work without the help of morality? Legality can be active if it is in consonance with morality. Legality finds an immoral outlet if it is not well-guarded by morality.

Indian theory of justice is called *nyāya*, *satya* and *ṛta*. The main purpose of the Indian judicial system is to provide justice to the people who are deprived of the same. This motto of the legal system is symbolized through idol of a lady with a balancing rod in hand and having eyes closed with black tape in front of the judges, picture of Gandhi in the court premise and a line behind it quoted from Indian tradition- *satyameva jayate*. From the above it is presumed that justice is to be taken in the sense of balance where there is no partiality and no favoritism. No one, as Plato observes, is 'self-sufficing';[1] there are many things, which we want for our lives. Hence there arises the question of exchange. It is possible if 'one gives and another receives under the idea that the exchange will be for their good'. From this it implies that, when a man discharges his duties, other person can exert his right. Plato's observation that no one is self-sufficing and there arises the question of exchange reminds me the derivative meaning of the term 'ought' used to convey the sense of duty, which comes from the verb 'owe'. In old English the past tense form of the verb 'owe' is 'ought', which implies that

the sense of 'ought' may come in one's mind if one thinks that one owes *(ṛṇa)* something from others. In other words, one will have a sense of duty if one has a feeling of gratitude to others for their free exercise of rights. Hence the term *ṛṇa* may be taken as the sense of obligation to them who have performed their duties to them. From this it can be decided that the sense of morality denoted by the term 'ought' cannot be imposed on an individual, rather it comes from within when he thinks himself *ṛṇī* or obliged to others[2]. Someone can exercise his right and duty if he feels a sense of obligation to others. That is why; another name of justice is balance in the society. It reminds us the sense of balance in the society prevails in the society if there is justice to all which is of two types- justice done in the court and justice done among the social beings. The idol of a lady whose eyes are closed signifies the fact that there is no room for personal weakness leading to favoritism. The weight machine found in hand of the idol is in perfect balance, which metaphorically points to the fact in the field of jurisprudence there is no questions of imbalance, favoritism, partiality etc. but to judge the case as per law. The closing eyes of the idol also signify that law will proceed in its own course in which our favoritism etc have no room at all.

If the above-mentioned view is taken as true in the field of jurisprudence, it gives rise to much philosophical questions which are as follows. First, is truth objective or subjective? If objective then it is transparent provable with the witness and evidences automatically without taking the help of a legal professional. If truth is determined by a legal professional then it is purely subjective. If truth is taken as subjective then an individual is said to be denied of justice. For, the truth is said to be transparent or as it is. Under such case an individual having no financial ability will be deprived of justice. For such persons- *'vicārervāṇinīrabenibhṛtekānde'* (the judgment concerning justice goes on lamenting in a lone and solitary place).

Secondly, it is a common belief of the people that an expert of legal professional can save his client though in actual case he has committed wrong actions like murder, stealing or any other crimes. If lawyer can save him then it is to be taken for granted that truth can be falsified. Sometimes false case may be proved as true. If false is turned to be true, what would be the value of truth? Justice under such cases would be tools in the hands of legal personnel. Does morality permit to argue against the true incident to save the real criminal? If someone is really

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criminal or does not depend on the reasoning and argumentation by a lawyer, the truth would be taken as purely subjective. If truth is subjective then its nature may vary from lawyer to lawyer or court to court.

Thirdly, it is the normal saying –'justice delayed, justice denied'. In modern time no case is cleared within limited period of time, but takes a prolonged time losing the merit of the case. Can it not be taken as a darker side of our legal system? Moreover, there is a provision to appeal to the higher court if one is not satisfied with the judgment given in the lower court, which is again a time-consuming matter.

Fourthly, why are the legal language, its clause or bye-clause very much interpreter-dependent? Can there be no simpler language so that non-legal person can come forward to defend someone or the client can defend his own case? Most of the persons associated with the legal profession are found more busy with interpreting clauses or bye-clauses of a code than to see the merit of a case.

Lastly, can legality work without the help of morality? Legality can be active if it is in consonance with morality. Legality finds an immoral outlet if it is not well-guarded by morality.

In fact, legality backed by morality has been admitted in modern jurisprudence. Considering this moral aspect of legal profession ethical dimensions like duties to the client, respect for client's autonomy, conduct of lawyers, judges, legislators, judicial temperament, judicial wisdom, justice etc have been highlighted. That is why, law is called *dharma*(another name of morality) and those who are dealing with it called *dharmāvatāra* or embodiment of justice. They do not have any freedom of their own, because they are bound with the panel codes just as the prisoners are bound in the prison as endorsed by Rabindranath- '*bandio jemanbaddhavicaraka o temnibaddha'*. From this subjectivity criterion of truth is ruled out. This moral factor in judicial system had been accepted in our ancient Hindu Law.

The Justice in ancient time was normally handled by the king who was called king-seer *(rājarṣi)* having four-fold knowledge like logic (*anvīkṣikī*) for the development of reasoning faculty, three Vedas for moral development (*trayī),* agriculture, animal husbandry and commerce *(vārtā)* for economic stability and

law (*daṇḍanīti)*for maintaining law and order. Any person is not entitled to be a judge, but a man who is saintly in nature is an ideal judge cum ruler as drawn by the coinage of the term '*rājarṣi'* having four-fold knowledge viz, logic *(ānvīkṣikī), trayī* (three Vedas as a basis of spirituality), *vārtā* (agriculture, animal-rearing and commerce) and penal codes (*daṇḍanīti*)[3]. A ruler in the form of judge having such qualifications can do justice to the subjects. The *Ânvīkṣikī* is meant for development of logical faculty which is essential for the ruler because in case of justice towards subjects logic will work, but not any favoritism, blind faith and superstition. The study of the three Vedas *(trayī)*[4] is prescribed only have moral development of the ruler which is the basis of justice. If a ruler does not have any sense of righteousness or non-righteousness, he is not capable of doing justice to others. The knowledge of penal codes (*dandanīti*) can help a ruler to judge a particular case and provides punishment as per the volume of crime, which brings harmony in society after removing *mātsya-nyāya.* It is mentioned in the Manusmṛti that had there been no punishment in the kingdom, the weaker section would have been tortured by the stronger ones, just as the stronger people forcibly put the fishes in the cutting machine (*'Śūlematsyānivāpakṣandurbalānbalavattarā*")[5].The famous commentator Medhātithi observes that the stronger persons may exploit others or may torture the weaker section of people in many ways, viz, sometimes snatching their properties, sometimes engaging them in a job which requires bodily labour, or sometimes abducting their wives (*dhana-śarīra-dārā-haraṇādinā*)[6].Moreover, if the literature on penal codes is perfectly known by the ruler judge, he is not in a position to provide light punishment for heavy crime and heavy punishment to the light crime, which is the other name of justice ("*Tīkṣṇadaṇḍo hi bhūtānāmudvejanīyah. Mṛdudaṇḍoparibhūyate. Yathārthadaṇḍaḥpūjyaḥ*")[7]. If punishment is given according to the crime of the subjects, the ruler and the ruled are conjoined with righteousness, prosperity and desire. If the case is otherwise, they are ruined totally with the discontentment arising out of desire and anger (*"suvijñātapraṇīto hi daṇḍaḥprajāḥdharmārthakāmairyojayati. Duṣpraṇītaḥkāmakrodhābhyāmajñānāt ...kopayati."*)[8].The learning of *vārtā* which is the technical name of agriculture, animal husbandry and commerce is needed for the ruler only to do justice to his own employees and to control the enemies. The judge cum ruler's own people as well others do not always remain under control with money and punishment(*Tayāsvapakṣaṁparapakṣaṁ*

ca vaśīkarotikoṣadaṇḍābhyām)[9]. A considerate judge should resort to punishment at the end if he fails to bring the criminals under control by sweet words *(sāma),* necessary gift (*dāna),* principle of division (*bheda).*It gives us a useful methodology in the judicial procedure. Punishment is the last resort for bringing enemies or criminals under control. Before taking recourse to it the judge should use sweet and convincing words to rectify the criminals, failing which he offers some practical facilities like donations in cash or kind, other social facilities etc. In case of failure to other two methods the judge may take the help of the third one which is nothing but intentional creation of division among the group of criminals. This method is more political or diplomatic in handling the persons committing crimes. Even in case of failure in this method the last resort is prescribing punishment after considering the volume of crime. If the situation demands, the judge may think giving capital punishment to the criminals. It is said in the *KāmandakīyaNītisāra* that the judge should banish those people who maintain their livelihood after taking bribe from others and stealing others properties. Such criminals should be punished immediately without any delay after killing them secretly (*upāngśubadha* or *upāngśudaṇḍa*).[10]

Moreover, a ruler-judge is not morally eligible to rule others if he is addicted to hunting (*mṛgayā*), dice-playing (*akṣa-krīḍā),* women (*striya).* A question may be raised that customarily a ruler is found attached to these. Hence one point of caution is given to the ruler-judge that it is addiction which is prohibited but not little inclination *(atyantāsaktirniṣidhyate, natuīṣadāsevanam)[11]*.

If the legal professionals have got such morality along with sensitive minds, they can do justice in a proper manner towards the offenders. National Knowledge Commission of India emphasizes the fact that one should provide a human touch to his fellow officers, subordinate staff and others associated to his enterprise. To speak frankly, legality without morality cannot save our society. We see there are a lot of legal prohibitive acts against child labour, torture over women, dowry system, pre-natal sex-determination, environmental protection, deforestation etc. yet illegal acts like pre-natal sex determination, use of children as labour, torture over women like trafficking, witch-killing, bride burning etc are going on in the society without caring the legal prohibitions. From this it is clear that legality cannot do wellbeing of the society if it does not join hands with morality. Morality comes from within spontaneously and hence no police force or legal

force can make us moral. Laws are there to prevent such unwanted incidents, but one should see so that these are implemented properly. The statutory warnings like-'Pre-natal sex determination is a punishable offence', 'Cigarette smoking is injurious to health' etc. are normally written in a very small font which is very much difficult even to read. From this one may gather an impression that as if the statutory things are as per law but they have nothing to do with practical life.

It is to be borne in mind that the term 'justice' has been originated from the word 'just', which signifies that an incident should be proved as it is but not otherwise. That is why, our legal system is supposed to be embedded in liberty, equality and justice and hence it is the tie that binds to bring all in one Nation. In a society it is crucial that judges render decisions which are not arbitrary but 'just' or reflective of our shared understanding. If too many legal decisions begin to seem unconvincing, unreasonable or less than fully fair, the society shall become unglued and lack of sense of community.

Considering the present hazards of the society the legal studies have extended the scope of study of environmental jurisprudence under Environmental Protection Act 1986, the Water Prevention and Control of Pollution Act 1974, Air Act under article 253, Forest Conservation Act, Green Bench etc. These acts will hardly be effective if the people are not aware of moral implication of environmental pollution, deforestation etc. On account of this legality and morality should go together. Law in isolation cannot do justice to the people.

In our Indian tradition there is only one word '*adhikāra*' denoting both right and duty. When we talk about human right, animal right, legal right, is it free from duty? An individual cannot exert his own right if others do not perform their duties. Animals are not capable of exerting their right if the human beings do not have certain duty to protect them. Hence right and duty are the two sides of the same coin. I have right to have good quality education. I can exert my right of getting quality education if the teachers or school authority perform their duties perfectly.

In present day society we find the erosion of human values from every sphere of our life. Human beings are becoming too much professional day by day and hence they are more formal to their clients. The legal profession is not an exception to this. Hence some sensitization programmes need to be arranged to train the people

regarding revival human values in every profession so that there should be the treatment of clients with human touch. In legal profession when the criminals are given hard punishment, the judge will have same feeling of sorrow as the criminals are getting themselves due to having the same sensitivity of heart-"*Danditersāthedandadātākāndejabesamānāghātesarvaśreṣṭha se vicār*" (Rabindranath).Such is the case of ideal justice or justice per excellence due to having the club legality with morality.

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** This paper is the revised version of the paper presented in The Department of Philosophy, Tripura University two years back in ICPR-sponsored seminar.
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3. *Arthaśāstra* of Kautilya-1.2
4. Ibid-1.3.
5. *Manusamhitā*-7.20.
6. *Medhātithi* on verse no.7.20.
7. *Arthaśastra* of Kautilya, *Vinayādhikaraṇa*, 4th chapter.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid, Vidyāsamuddeśa, 4th Chapter.
10.'*Duṣyānupāṅgśudaṇdena hanyād rājāvilambitam/Adṛśyam vā prakāśam vā lokavidveṣamāgatān/Kāmandakīya Nītisāra*- 6.10.
11. *Manusamhitā* with *Medhātithi* on verse no.7.47.

POSSIBILITY AND RELEVANCE OF UNIVERSAL RELIGION: AS ENVISAGED BY SWAMI VIVEKANANDA

SIRAJUL ISLAM

In India, religion has a pivotal role to shape the humanity and society as well. Indian cultural milieu is unique in character and pluralistic in nature. Basically it is a land of spirituality and cross fertilization. Here religion is not merely a weekly congregation rather; it is an inevitable part of human daily life. Hence, it can be considered as the code of life which motivated people to acquire divine felicity.

Swami Vivekananda, the champion of Hindu revivalism preached for the pragmatic utility of religion which is essential to construct both human life and society as well. His universalistic approach of religion is beyond any sectarian division. His quest for Truth and unsurpassed love towards humanity is to be considered as an inherent propensity of human being that elevated a man from beastly stage to the stage of humanity and ultimately in the state of Divinity. He was not only considered it in his faith but he practiced it deliberately throughout in his life. Therefore, his religious teachings are familiar as Practical Vedanta or Neo-Vedanta which is not merely confined to metaphysical or mythological contents but also the practicality of human life and that he disseminated towards all and sundry without any distinction of caste, creed and religion.

This universalistic approach of Swami Vivekananda is the crying need of the society to provide them peace and solace in their lives. Here lies the relevancy of his universalistic approach.

Key Words: Indian ethos and culture, Swami Vivekananda's notion of religion, spirituality, morality, humanity and universalistic approach.

India is a country; where multiple religions, languages and cultures are exist from time immemorial. Therefore, Indian society is unlike the other societies of the world, here diversity is quite obvious and that exhibits in its various spheres in life and society. Hence, diversity is the outstanding feature of this country and its culture is mainly of composite in character.[1] It is a country, which has an inherent ability of absorption and agglomeration of other thoughts and cultures. Historically it is evident that India is a laboratory of cross-fertilization of various thoughts, ideas, religions cultures and civilizations. It proclaims for global relationship with all parts of the world as *"vasudhaiva kutumbakam",* i.e. it consider oneself as a global citizen and adorn one nationality in the eternal truth. Its other innate capacity is to move with all together as its own, hence its motto is *"sam gachchadham, sam bodhodham, sam vo manamsi janatam"* i.e. let's moves together, let's talk together and, let's know other as our own. This notion was persists from the very beginning of its civilization. History attests that India has

absorbed with various traditions, cultures and faiths, like, the Aryans, the Kushans, the Huns, the Pathans, the Greek, the British, the Muslims and so on. This unique capacity of absorption and agglomeration has helped in the fusion of divergent ideologies with Indian society, culture and civilization, because its eternal voice is- *"om na bhadra kratava yantu visvatah"* i.e. let noble thought come to us from every corner or direction. Therefore, it disparaged bureaucratic tendency and embraced all and sundry with the global/universal vision of mankind. Its eternally seeks to find a unity with the heterogeneous elements, which makes up its totality. But due to the advancement of material prosperity the unity and integrity between one people to another or one country to another are slackening day by day. Due to the advancement of our technology, peoples are able to reach in the various planets; however, we cannot claim that we are in peace. Various nations are menaced by fratricidal wars, terrorism is increasing day by day, and as a result different barbaric activities are occurring in the society with high bellicosity. We have seen, in the ancient period various clans were engaged in the severe struggle with one another for attaining bodily satiation. Their society was full of antagonism and frequent atrocities hence blood shedding became their normal incident. It was happened due to the lack of their mutual tolerance and proper knowledge. But why the people of this advanced age are engaged in fighting? Religion and politics are the most vital causes of this fighting. Because, the parameter of intolerance is going up day by day, and social equilibrium is disrupted simultaneously. Social confrontations between one community to another become a normal incident. The barbaric activities are not confined to society only in religion and politics even barbarism in added to science and technology and that motivating people for accumulating atomic/ molecular weapons. The moral value is degrading; individual respect and safe guard of collective rights are in the diminishing order, on the other self interests are getting much more priority in the society that are to be considered as an important cause of social, national and international unrest and conflict. Each and every moment we are in the phobia of ever imminent nuclear war and feeling nerve tension that violates our psychological tranquility as well as social solidarity. Though we are living in this ultra modern world and enjoying facilities of the new inventions and discoveries of science, however, science is unable to invent an instrument/ any remote by which we can regulate all human minds. Therefore, every people whether he is a sage, savant, philosopher, scientist or

religious leader are paying serious attention for establishing world peace. Notwithstanding the much vaunted covenants, pacts, pledges' and the sanction of UNO, the celebrated religious leaders and good will personalities have expressed their views for prevention of war and establishing peace in the society. Now the question may be emerged how the peace is to be achieved? How can we eliminate social evils, political unrests, and molecular / atomic wars from the society? The answer is not so easy. Peace is not a commodity; hence, it is not possible to purchase peace from the market. The seed of war and evil activities are in the mind of human being, therefore, we will have to eradicate their seeds first from the mind of the people through the process of universal religion, fortunately or unfortunately that is our last hope and that was started by Swami Vivekananda in the 19th century A.D.

 What is religion?

There are numerous religions in the world and all are talking about peace as well as universal brotherhood. Each and every religion possesses some common characteristics as well as differences. Broadly, I mean in every great and recognised religion has three basic characteristics. First, there is the *philosophy* which presents the whole scope of that religion, setting forth its basic principles, the goal and the means of reaching it. The second is *mythology*, which is philosophy made concrete. It consists of legends relating to the lives of men, or of supernatural beings, and so forth. It is the abstractions of philosophy concretised in the more or less imaginary lives of men and supernatural beings. The third part is the *ritual.* This is still more concrete and is made up of forms and ceremonies, various physical attitudes, flowers and incense, and many other things, that appeal to the senses. In these consists the ritual. You will find that all recognised religions have these three elements. Some lay more stress on one and some on another. Let us now take into consideration the first part, philosophy. Is there one universal philosophy? Not yet. Each religion brings out its own doctrines and insists upon them as being the only true ones. And not only does it do that, but it thinks that he who does not believe in them must go to some horrible place. Some will even draw the sword to compel others to believe as they do. This is not through wickedness, but through a particular disease of the human brain called fanaticism. Thus, anger is stirred up, nerves are strung high, and human beings become barbarous like tigers. Is there any mythological similarity, is there any

mythological harmony, any universal mythology accepted by all religions? The answer is negative. All religions have their own mythology, only each of them says, "My stories are not mere myths." It is a kind of superstition. Now come to the rituals. One sect has one particular form of ritual and thinks that is holy, while the rituals of another sect are simply arrant superstition. So even in rituals there is no universal symbol, which can command general recognition and acceptance. Where then is any universality? How is it possible then to have a universal form of religion? The answer is positive. The differences which exhibit in different religions are basically related to external paraphernalia of religion, the inner import of all religions are almost same and that already exists. Swami Vivekananda as an egalitarian Indian monk first apprehended this universality in religion and according to him it has already to every religion. Let us see what it is.

In Indian context Religion is called *Dharma* and it has very deep connotation. Indian dharma never been used in institutionalized form rather it is deeply associated with the mundane daily life as well as the life hereafter of human being. Here *Dharma* specially is an ethical principle which leads the people toward right direction to perform *duties* which are accompanied by a set of cardinal *values* and *virtues* that ultimately swiped away his animal propensities and elevate him in the stage of divinity.[2] Thus Vivekananda said- *"religion is the manifestation of divinity already in man"*.[3] In broader aspect dharma is a natural impulse (*svabhāva*), like the *svabhāva* of water, it going downward always and the *svabhāva* of fire is to flow upward. Here a question may very legitimately emerge, why human being is diverted from his *svabhāva*? The answer is not so easy. However, it is quite evident that Human being is the most complex animal of the world, where the admixture of animal, rational and spiritual faculties are resides together and always there is the tussle between them to preponderate one over others. Generally, concerning worldly affairs animal propensity is most viable that motivate human being towards more consumption, more comforts, more power and physical gratification. Thus, people are trying to fulfil their thirst (*trishnā*) and desire (*kamanā*) in any way which steeped him towards vices. This is basically the motive of animal spirit and that can be eradicated by the process of universal religion.

What do we mean by Universal Religion?

The entire glove is maintaining universal order and harmony. Universe is a vivid sign of perfect toleration and harmony. There is also the perfect co-ordination and harmony in human physiology. But disharmony is in the mind of him. Universal religion is a process to integrate various human minds, it instigate for harmony and toleration. Thus, Universal Religion is not a separate religion or caste or culture rather it is an ideology which can work jointly without hampering any individual religious identity. It can be achieved through the mutual co-existence, rational outlook on religious matters, and exchange of hearts. It is an initiative where people will rationally find out the commonalities of different religions and judge them rationally and at the same time they will practice religious values/teachings for the benefit of entire globe. This is not the extinction of any religion or culture. Theist and atheist can act together for its establishment and both can be benefitted by it. Hence, its relevancy is that it is a process of mutual assimilation, toleration and fraternal relationship to work for well being of all without any sectarian prejudice. The people of entire globe are looking for this unity and harmony and that is the basic motto of all religions so that we can get rid from our sufferings and miseries. Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Buddhists, Jainas, Politicians, Technocrats, Monks, Savages, Kings, Beggars even babies are very much anxious for achieving it.

Since universal religion is a process of human unity. Thus, its meaning is incomparably wider and profounder than external paraphernalia of religions. The sense inherent in the words in their widest tenor or purport is the *Spiritual unity and brotherhood of all Beings*; particularly, the doctrine implies that all human beings are inseparably linked together, not merely by the bonds of emotional thought or feeling, but by the very fabric of the universe itself, all men, as well as all beings, both high and low and intermediate, spring forth from the inner and spiritual power of the universe. We will have to apprehend that we all come from the one source, that spiritual power and are all builders of the same life-atoms on all the various planes. It is this interior unity of being and of consciousness, as well as the exterior union of us all, which enables us to grasp intellectually and spiritually the mysteries of the universe; because not merely ourselves and our own fellow human beings, but also all other beings. We are all rooted in the same cosmic Essence, whence we all proceed in the beginning of the primordial periods

of world-evolution, and towards which we are all journeying back. This interlocking and interblending of the numberless hierarchies of beings forming the universe itself extends everywhere, in the invisible worlds as well as in the worlds which are visible. Finally, it is upon this fact of the spiritual unity of all beings and all things that reposes the basis and foundation of human ethics when the essence of all religions is properly to be understood.

Swami Vivekananda and Universal Religion:

We have already stated that this world is moving very fast and everybody is engaged in constant competition that mainly divided human beings and motivated them towards the malicious activities in the society. Beside this, the variegated nature of human beings, castes, culture and shallow knowledge/ ignorance about religion motivated them in misusing religious sentiment and as a result people are living isolated; they do not mix up with one another freely. Thus, there is no mutual love and sympathy, hence no reciprocal respect generated in the society. Lack of respect breeds distrust which ultimately culminates in hatred and consequent violence all around, alienating man from man. Loss of love and absence of true religious knowledge are, therefore, the root cause of shocking crash of human values and eventually erupts into the form of tension, discord and suffering. We notice shocking crash in human values both vertically and horizontally. One is bewildered as to what is going to become of the world. Swami Vivekananda (1863-1902) and Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941) both are the ardent representatives of modern India those who were first realized the necessity of universal unity in national as well as international levels. Rabindranath Tagore was two years elder than Swami Vivekananda who was also realized the spiritual awakening for universal unity and both were highly influenced by Upanisadic teachings of universality.

Spirituality for Rabindranath Tagore is the dynamic principle that touches every aspect of life and is the guiding principle that "leads human existence from partiality to fullness."[4] He characterizes his spirituality as that of an artist. This implies a change in one's attitude to the world; one should move away from an egoistic appropriation of the world, which results in experiences of the world as a source of suffering and happiness, to an artistic experience of the world, where it is the source of unconditional joy (*ānanda*).[5] Thus, in many of his writings Tagore stressed the need to respond to the call from within, from "the man of the heart." [6]

The relationship between the man of the heart and the individual is very intimate both in Tagore's and Vivekananda's philosophy. To them, the intimacy is often described as the relationship of the lover and the beloved. It is this inner intimacy that also enables one to experience unity with the external world. As admirers of Raja Rammohun Roy Tagore and Vivekananda both have their full faith in the strength of free citizen in a free society. No blind faith and belief, no ancestral habit they allowed in obscuring their vision of such a *free individual man*. As the champions of human understanding they always said for the superiority of man over the other aspects of creatures of the universe. The notion of freedom also lies in the concept of universal religion as depicted by Swami Vivekananda before Rabindranath Tagore.Thus he said- "If you want to know India, study Vivekananda**.** In him everything is positive and nothing negative".[7]

In Indian context religion is the necessity of life just like other essential commodities of our daily lives, like- food, clothing, shelter etc. It is quite evident that only the physical things are not sufficient to achieve perfection in human life. Human being in the midst of comfort and luxury craves for something higher and perpetual. This craving is basically a religious craving. Nobody can aloof from it. Even an atheist or non believer of any religion is also religious too because in avoiding religious fanaticism he leads pious and ethical life which are the essential parts of all religions.

According to Swami Vivekananda, religion is not just a talk or doctrines, theories. It is a relation between soul and God. He also said, religion does not consist in erecting temples or building churches or attaining public worship. Religion consists of realization. Different people can realize it in different ways. Further, more he asserted that man and his true nature is already divine. But the divinity is hidden. Therefore, the realization of the divinity is the purpose of life, which is the essence of religion. Swami Vivekananda, an Indian monk who realized the necessity of religion and in his eyes religion is the most potent and viable phenomenon of the world, thus he said- "of all the forces that have worked and are still working to mould the destiny of human race, none certainly is more potent than that, the manifestation of which we call religion".[8] Another important feature of religion is that it is the highest plane of human thought and life, and therein we find that the workings of two opposite forces. Religion had given humanity both *"the intense love and the most diabolical hatred"*.[9] Finding the

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incidents from world history he says- "Nothing makes us as cruel as religion and nothing make us as tender as religion. Nothing has made more for peace and love than religion; nothing has engendered fiercer hatred than religion. Nothing has made the brotherhood of man more tangible than religion; nothing has bred more bitter enmity between men than religion. Nothing has built more charitable institutions, more hospitals for men, and even for animals than religion; nothing has deluged the world with more blood than religion."[10] Therefore, Swami Vivekananda was a personality of India who first apprehended the necessity of universal religion so that evils can be eliminated from the world.

Universal religion as recommended by Swami Vivekananda does not preach uniformity rather he spoke about unity because; unity in variety is obvious in the universe. This unity in variety is our beauty of the world like the different flowers of a garden. Variety is obvious everywhere in the world even in human beings. We are all human beings but we are not all equal. Differentiation actually helps us enormously to become unified but it is the clashes of thought, narrow-mindedness and lack of knowledge concerning religious matters engender problems. 'The differentiations of thoughts that awake thought... whirls and eddies occur only in a rushing living stream. There are no whirlpools in stagnant, dead water.'[11] This differentiation is the very essence of our progress that widens our soul and thought too.

What then is the ideal of universal Religion? Swamiji has given a nice example that 'various are our faces: I see no two alike, yet we are all human beings. I know, there is an abstract humanity which is common to all. I may not find it when I try to grasp it, to sense it and to actualize it, yet I know for certain that it is there.[12] Swamiji said- Just as we have recognize variation in the unity by our very nature, similarly, we must also recognize variation in the context of religion. We must learn that truth may be expressed in a thousand ways and that each way is true as far as it goes.[13] 'It is quite logical that same thing can be viewed from a hundred different standpoints, and yet be the same thing. Each religion is adding to the rich variety that religion is capable of generating and it is also adding something new for the development of our religion and society as well.' Thus it is quite apparent that varieties of religions are not antagonistic rather complementary and they do not affect the inner vitality or the core essence of religion.

Vivekananda opined that universal religion is not a new thing, it runs through all the various religions of the world in the form of God: it must and does exist through eternity. In this context he opined very honestly that "I am the thread that runs through all these pearls, and each pearl is a religion or even a sect thereof. Such are the different pearls, and the Lord is the thread that runs through all of them: only the majority of mankind are entirely unconscious of it".[14] He also maintained that ' through high philosophy or low, through the most exalted mythology or the grossest, through the most refined ritualism or arrant fetishism, every sect, every soul, every nation, every religion, consciously or unconsciously, is struggling upward, towards God; every vision of truth that man has, is a vision of Him and of none else. Thus, the universal religion is already exists though most of us are not aware of it.'

Therefore, universal religion, according to Vivekananda is an acceptance of varieties in mundane level as the diversified approach of religious objects. The acceptance of the existence of God or a unifying force of our vision leads us to the unseen thread binding the entire world of religion as one big family. In this regard the Upanishad states- *"yatra visvam bhabatyeka nidam"*, i.e. where ever you go there is my home.

There is no conflict in the universe related to natural phenomenon, one object is different from another, in human body one neuron is different from another, one cell is different from another, and however, there is a perfect coordination and mutual performance. Similarly in one family, one member of the family is different from the other but they all belong to the same family, but at the same time the family will need to develop a vision in which each individual finds personal freedom without taking away the freedom of joy of others in the family. Further each family in the new world order will promote a value of belonging to the whole creation. The value will enhance the character of individuals to consider the impact of their actions on the surroundings, both in their near vicinity and in far off distances. Thus, the one watch ward for universal religion, in Vivekananda's view is an *acceptance*. Here acceptance is not mere tolerance because tolerance is negative in its import which indicates that something is allowed to be, at any point, he said wrong, Vivekananda prescribed for positive acceptance that binds everybody together in a single knot.

Secondly, Vivekananda asked mankind to recognize the maxim of "do not destroy". Indian motto is- *live and let live others.* He urged the people to build instead of pulling anything down. So he opined- "help if you can, if you cannot fold your hands and stand by and see things go on. Do not injure, if you cannot render help." Thus he said- "take a man where he stands and from there give him a lift".[15]

"If it be true that God is the centre of all religions, and that each of us is moving towards Him then it is certain that all of us must reach that centre… None can make a spiritual man out of you… your growth must come from inside".[16]

This notion of universal religion can only be accepted by all rational mankind. It can satisfy the largest possible proportion of human urges. Among billions of people on the earth there appear to be of four major types: people dispose to constant activity, those who are driven by some inner urge to achieve something in life. The second group of people is capable of high emotions. These are the people who love sublime and beautiful aspects of life, nature and God. There is a third type of people who tend to analyze the working of their minds and how to works with their minds. The fourth type of people wants to weigh everything with reason. The problem with the current religious groups lies in their suitability to deal with only one of the four types. The people who have accepted the particular religious method are unable to see the inner needs of a person with a different disposition of mind. Furthermore, this group tend to humiliate, reject or even destroy those who do not meet the criteria of their belief systems.

Religion will have to supply food for all these various types of minds; it must be equally philosophic, equally emotional, equally mystic and equally conducive to action. This combination will be the ideal of the nearest approach to a universal religion. In the eyes of Swamiji Yoga is a very conducive method to reach the goal of universal religion. According to him, Yoga means ***"union" or realization of Oneness***. It can unite the finite and the Infinite, devotee and the Divinity, worshipper and the worshipped. Yoga helps to control the senses and mind (citta *vritti nirodha*).[17] Vivekananda, one of the central features of Hindu religion is its emphasis on "direct experience" of the ultimate Reality. According to him, Religion is to be realized, not simply to be heard or repetition of hymns (mantras) likes a parrot, and there is a diversity of spiritual paths to direct, personal experience of the ultimate Reality… On the theme of diversity of

religions, Vivekananda holds the view that all religions are true and meaningful since they are diverse expressions of the same Reality and appropriations of one Ultimate Truth. The goal of all religions, Vivekananda points out, is a "final unitive experience," which for him is highlighted in the Hindu philosophical school of Advaita Vedanta. Thus, for Swami Vivekananda, the advaitic experience (non-dualistic experience) is the final goal toward which all religions are progressing, representing different points along the journey, a "staircase model" by which he is able to advocate tolerance, reject claims of exclusivism, and affirm the relative importance of various religious traditions of the world. The important contribution of Vivekananda is that in the face of the Christian exclusivism of his times, he affirmed that Hinduism included a variety of independent ways of liberation, and that Hindu spirituality, especially in its Advaitic form, had global significance and relevance.

It is quite apparent that the world is full of varieties in all cases. The plurality in language, culture, society, politics, economics etc. are quite vivid and which may be considered as the basic causes of difference in religious theories. On synthesizing all religious faiths a conclusion is drawn that religion is nothing but a way of satisfy the thirst for liberation from mundane miseries and sufferings. If this is the only aim of particular religion then people of all groups are directly or indirectly associated in it. Swami Vivekananda said, "He felt the necessity of religious pluralism. To realize something, man should have to practice four Yogas (Karma yoga, Jnāna yoga, Raja yoga and Bhakti yoga)."[18] Those are the yoga of knowledge, control of mind, selfless work and love of God and universal brotherhood.

In recognizing universal religion Vivekananda underscored the equal status of all the religions and felt the necessity of religious plurality. He discarded the supremacy of any particular religion. According to him, if one religion is only true, automatically the rest religions become false, it is unjust to them. He hold, all religions are not really contradictory rather complementary to one another. One religion only, like one set of six fingers in the world, would be unnatural. We see therefore that, if one religion is true, all others must be true. Hence, Vivekananda's ideal was "Many Lamps but one Light".

Vivekananda's argument on differences of religions is-*"if someone takes photography of one building from different angles, we can see different faces of*

the same object. But those differences cannot be called contradictions, but only shows the many sides of a single unique entity. Therefore, we are viewing truth, getting as much of its circumstances will permit, colouring the truth with our own intellect and grasping it with our own mind. We can only know as much as truth as it related to us, as much of it as we are able to receive. This occasion sometimes even contradictory ideas; yet they all belong to the same universal truth." [19]

Each religion has particular ideals that are needed to the society. Thus he gave equal importance to all religions in the world. About Islam he said "the followers of Islam are considered to be equal. This is the particular excellence of that religion. It preaches to the world is the brotherhood of all belongings to their faith. Therefore, the ideal may effectively be used to develop social harmony.

Vivekananda again says- *"spirit must be divine and not made by any man"*. There may be different types of people in the world with different mentality, with different habits, rituals and beliefs. Each and everyone have one's own place in the society. All these various minds and various types of people are needed to the society. That can be considered as the fundamental assumption of universal religion. Thus he advised the people to practice universal religion in life and uttered- *"Our watch ward, there will be acceptance and not exclusion, not only toleration but acceptance. I accept all religions that wee in the past and worship them all; I worship God with every one of them, in whatever form they worship Him. I shall go to the mosque of Mohammedans, I shall enter in the Christian church and knell before the crucifix; I shall enter the Buddhist temple where I shall take refuge in the Buddha and in the law. I shall go into the forest and sit down in the meditation with the Hindu who is trying to see the light that enlightens the heart of every one".* [20]

The ultimate One, according to him, is very perfection of existence, the ideal reality. He said: If you go below the surface, you find that unity between man and man, between races and races, high and low, rich and poor, god and men, men and animals. If you go deep enough all will be seen as only variations of the One, and he who has attained to this conception of Oneness has no more delusion. What can delude him? He knows the reality of everything, the secret of everything. Where is there any more misery for him?

He finds the Unity of everything, and that is Eternal Existence, Eternal Knowledge, and Eternal Bliss.[21]

The basic relevance of Vivekananda's concept of universal religion is the concept of universal equality of humankind. It is an idea which is very important and necessary for modern global era. Its relevance for the modern cosmopolitan city life cannot be overestimated.

Conclusion:

During the past 150 years we have discussed the philosophical importance of the concept of universal religion. Now it is clear that in this new millennium we have to implement this concept to modern society rather than discussing it again. Following Swami Vivekananda we may conclude that we have only one option to save this scientific world is to adhere to the concept of one universal religion through the process of discharging love and brotherhood by accepting the concept of religious pluralism. It is the essence of Swami Vivekananda's vision to the world. This universal ideal can be practiced not only by believers of different religions but equally by non-believers for it is founded on the ideal of oneness of humanity.

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ĀNVĪKṢIKĪ VIDYĀ: AN ENQUIRY INTO ITS NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT

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In many pieces of ancient Indian literature, we come across the concept of ānvīkṣikī vidyā. As exact nature of this vidyā was not clearly specified by its proponents, many scholars thought that enquiry into its nature is worth pursuing. In this article I tried to state some scholars' views about the nature and development of this vidyā and with an analysis of mine.

Some Key words: *ānvīkṣikī, vidyā, vijigīṣu, daṇḍanīti, darśana, Lokāyata, Parāvidyā, rājarṣi, saptānga, Ātma-vidyā, tarka, jalpa, vitndā, dharmaprabartaka.*

Kauṭilya in his *Arthśāstra* while talking about the training of a prince prescribed four types of *vidyās*. In the second *adhyāya* of *Prakraṇa* one entitled *"विद्यासमुद्देशः आन्वीक्षिकीस्थापना"* (*Vidyāsamuddeśa*: *Ānvīkṣikīsthāpanā*) he mentions four *vidyās* and says:

"आन्वीक्षिकी त्रयी वार्त्ता दण्डनीतिश्चेति विद्याः।"[i]

From this statement, we can say that *ānvīkṣikī, trayī, vārtā* and *daṇḍanīti* are the four *vidyās* admitted by him. He was well aware that other lawmakers before him were not unanimous about the number of *vidyās*. Hence, in the next three *ślokas* he mentions the view of Manu, Bṛhaspati and Uśanas and clearly enunciates his disagreement with them. For example, Manu recognized only three *vidyās* barring *ānvīkṣikī*. Bṛhaspati accepted only two—*vārtā* and *daṇḍanīti*. Uśanas admitted only one *vidyā, i. e. daṇḍanīti* as for him it is from *daṇḍanīti* that all other sciences originate and wind-up. The sequence in which he puts these *vidyās* and some other statements of him makes us feel that he gives primacy to the first *vidyā*, i. e. *ānvīkṣikī*. Not only this further in order to convey its essentiality he firmly asserts that four and only four *vidyās* are there. It will be neither more, nor less. His statement *"चतस्र एव विद्या इति कौटिल्यः।"* ताभिर्धर्मार्थौ यद् विद्यात्तद् विद्यानां विद्यात्वम् ।[ii] makes it clear that *four and only four* are the sciences acceptable to him. This assertion is full of implications. For example, to him, the number of *vidyās* can neither be less nor be more. Kauṭilya in fact in repudiating his predecessors' view about the requirement of *vidyās* for a would-be king conveyed a number of

messages. First, he emphatically said that *ānvīkṣikī* is an independent branch and not a sub-branch of any other *vidyā* that someone might argue. In order to qualify a branch as *vidyā*, it needs to impart the knowledge of *dharma* (righteousness) and *artha* (wealth). That is why knowledge of grammar, astronomy etc. did not qualify as independent branches of *vidyā* as they did not fulfil these requirements. Deviating from Manu (for Manu considered it a section of Vedas), Kauṭilya not only accorded *ānvīkṣikī* the status of an independent branch, rather he considered it as a prerequisite for making other *vidyās* meaningful. Moreover, teachers who taught *Vedas* were not qualified to teach *ānvīkṣikī*. Thus, he took every care to grant it an autonomous status. Again, to place it at its rightful position he described it as a lamp that illumines the other three *vidyās*. It is the *upāya*, i. e. means, for all activities and *āśraya* for all *dharmas*.

In the present venture, I intend to explore what is meant by *ānvīkṣikī*, why it is considered as central and how the concept has evolved at later period. The concept of *trayī* and *vārtā* are not very problematic as Kauṭily has mentioned what falls under these rubrics.

Before we come to discuss what is meant by *ānvīkṣikī* we need to know why a prince or a would-be ruler needs *vidyās* of the above sorts. A naïve answer may be like this. In a monarchical system, and it was the order in Kauṭily's system, a king occupies the central position around which everything turns. The idea of separation of powers was alien in his system. Being so, i. e. being the central figure in the entire ruling dispensation, the king needs to be an extraordinary person having supernormal capabilities. He is supposed to have certain qualities which are unparallel with ordinary subjects in every respect. His king is almost all-powerful in his territory. Moreover, his conceived king is a *vijīgisu* ruler, i. e. he is not supposed to remain content with what he has at the time of enthronement. He needs to preserve it very carefully, augment it and distribute it among the deserving subjects. Again, as he is the dispenser of *daṇḍanīti,* he should have insight and wisdom for using *daṇḍa* following fitting *nīti*. Kauṭilya's view about the application of *daṇḍanīti* is very rigid as it should neither be more nor be less; in other words, it should never be disproportionate. This prescription is a key point as on it depends so many things or to say the entire justice system from which stems many other things. In other words, *daṇḍa* is required to be administered only after precise reasoning. Such rigorous reasoning assures the rise in central human needs such as *artha*, *dharma* and

kāma. However, the moot question is: How this skill in reasoning is to be attained? Herein lies the relevance of *ānvīkṣikī*.

We find a number of accounts of what constitutes *ānvīkṣikī*. It is translated as dialectic, philosophy, critical inquiry, logic etc. In the *Arthśāstra* Kauṭilya brings under this the philosophical systems of Sāṅkhya, Yoga and the materialist school known as the *Lokāyata*. Hence, there is a proneness to translate it as 'philosophy' or 'logical reasoning' etc. However, such transliteration is fraught with risks as any attempt to understand Indian philosophy, whose exact phraseology is '*darśana*', by analogues used in the West is bound to mislead or convey a wrong sense. In spite of this vulnerableness, many scholars used these terms interchangeably. Wilhelm Halbfass in his *India and Europe: An Essay in Philosophical Understanding* elaborately shows the distinction between *darśana*, philosophy and *ānvīkṣikī* about which we shall talk later. Another issue is that some scholars issued conjunctions like 'or', 'and' etc. without much caution. For example, Hanna Hnatovska in his 'The image of Philosophy in Indian Culture: Etymology and Untranslatability of Terms'[iii] used *ānvīkṣikī* and philosophy and sometimes *ānvīkṣikī* **or** philosophy. Such use of conjunctive words is susceptible to various interpretations.

Moreover, *darśana*' refers to a study that has some fundamental differences with the Western concept of philosophy. *Darśana* comes from tradition. Its source is what has been taught in the past by the *seers*. We have inherited it as our ethos and is related to our religious practice. But the Western concept of philosophy is secular in nature and an open-ended process. By application of reason, any question may be raised there. It has methodological implications whereas methodology is not so important in *darśana* as such though later on some methodology has crept into it.

The inclusion of *Lokāyata* in the list of *ānvīkṣikī* prompted the scholar to find the rationale behind this. There might be a proneness to think that it is due to the materialistic tendency of the *Lokāyata* thinkers that Kauṭilya included it in the list as he also gave central importance to *artha puruṣārtha*. However, the context makes it clear that Kauṭilya did not intend this. Actually, materialism was attached with Cārvākas, the epithet which was evolved at a later period, and chronologically *Lokāyatas* preceded them (i. e. Cārvākas). There are scholars (e. g. T. W. Rhys Davids) who hold that rendering *Lokāyata* as materialism does not

match the context in the Pali sources. Rudolf Otto Franke rendered *Lokāyatam* as a "logically proven explanation of nature."[iv] R. Bhattacharya holds that in the olden days '*lokāyata*' signified logic or more precisely 'the art of disputation.' It did not denote something anti-Vedic. *Lokāyata* "was studied as a *secular* subject, on a par with two other systems of philosophy, viz. Saṃkhya and Yoga…" He supports his contention quoting from Paul Haker who held that "*ānvīkṣikī* consists in examining by reason, i. e. reasoning and refelxion … and is practiced in all sciences… the future king requires instruction in logical thinking and he can find it principally in each of three systems."[v] After long deliberation, Bhattacharya concludes that inclusion of *Lokāyata* in the *ānvīkṣikī vidyā* by Kauṭilya actually meant a philosophical system founded on logic which is antithetical to those philosophical systems which are merely grounded on scriptures. N. C. Bandopadhyaya in discussing the reason for the inclusion of *Lokāyata* under *ānvīkṣikī* held that Kauṭilya "was a believer in material joys and aspirations, yet he did not go to extremes. His ideal was a compromise or a moderate synthesis of the two extreme views of life and its aims."[vi] P. V. Kane too subscribes to the view that the meaning of *lokāyata* may have changed with the passage of time.

Another problem with the *vidyā* under discussion is that sometimes the terminology *ānvīkṣikī* seems to be consisting of a single unit and sometimes it seems to be the conjunction of two components—'*anu*' and '*īkṣaṇa*'. The explanation that it is a combination of two words was given in the *Nyāya-bhāsya*. Monier-Williams, a professor of Sanskrit at Oxford University, in his *Sanskrit English Dictionary* gave a long list of the meaning of '*anu*' enumerating its four sorts of use. These are: when used as a prefix to a verb or noun it means 'after, along, alongside, lengthwise, near to, under, subordinate to, with';[vii] when it is affixed before a noun and mainly before adverbial compounds it means 'according to, severally, each by each, orderly, methodically, one after another, repeatedly';[viii] when used as a preposition with accusative it means 'after, along, over, near to, through, to, towards, at, according to, in order, agreeably to, in regard to, inferior to'[ix] and as a separable adverb it means 'after, afterwards, thereupon, again, further, then, next.'[x] He also renders '*īkṣaṇa*' thus: 'a look, view, aspect, sight, regarding, looking after, caring for.'[xi]

Vātsyāna, the commentator of *Nyāyasūtra*, identified *nyāyavidyā* with *ānvīkṣikī*. By *nyāyavidyā*, he meant the technique or the art of argument. Karl

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Potter translates the term as 'investigation.' We have seen previously that sometimes it has been translated as 'philosophy'. Interestingly Hanna Hnatovska shows beautifully the problem of translating some of the key terms used in Indian philosophy. Out of these terms, *ānvīkṣikī* is one such a term.

Thus, it becomes clear that *ānvīkṣikī vidyā* has been a matter of discussion since ancient time and the investigation into its nature is very intriguing and is still on in the present philosophical discussion. What is more interesting is that the inclusion of *Sāṅkhya*, *Yoga* and *Lokāyata* within its ambit generated more curiosity as they belong to different poles. It is so as *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* are orthodox systems and espouse a type of philosophy which is completely different from *Lokāyata* which is a heterodox system and known for its extreme espousal of materialism, empiricism, hedonism and of course a strong believer in *Vāda*. A thorough scrutiny of Kauṭilya's view in his entire *Śāstra* make us feel that his endeavour was to accommodate both of these lines of thinking. To put it differently, we can say that on the one hand, he wanted to give due importance to Vedic thinking and on the other he was eager to make room for argument and counter-arguments thus not leaving everything to fate but rather bringing reason and human endeavour at the centre of every venture. Thus, we find him asking his king to follow the *varṇāśrama dharma* and on the other, he was very rigid against the adoption of the renunciatory view of Buddhism for common citizens. Again, his king, on the one hand, was *rājarṣi* and, on the other, *vijigīṣu*. We need to remember that Kauṭilya was struggling hard to retain and strengthen a kingdom that he so assiduously had established. For making his king *Cakrabartīn* he needed to make him sagacious. Many scholars are of the opinion that all the pieces of training prescribed by Kauṭilya are means for becoming a good king. A thriving governance does not result solely from the regular working of state machinery. It depends "to a great extent on the specific initiatives undertaken by the king, on his ability to see these initiatives successfully completed, and on his success in effectively policing his officials and subjects."[xii] Kauṭilya's king has been instructed to ensure the physical, spiritual and emotional well-being of his subjects. In order to go beyond realpolitik; his prescribed teaching arms him to take care of the all-round wellness of his subjects.

From the rendering of Monier-Williams, which we have stated above, and from other related entries it is reasonable to posit that *ānvīkṣikī* is somehow

related to *seeing*. It has a special type of semantical import. A king is required to have some extraordinary qualities. He is required to have sound knowledge of sacred literature; he needs to examine the case he perceived and then apply his reason while making a judgement so that it is well-reasoned as well as supported by well-established custom. Making such judicious judgement is important as it provides the foundational structure of other activities.

We can support our affirmation also from his *saptāṅga* theory where he placed King in first and foremost position and this central position was required as all other *aṅgas* revolve around him. A king without extraordinary wisdom and practical knowledge is unlikely to succeed and hence wisdom of Indian philosophical systems will equip him to discharge such onerous responsibility.

Mahāmahopādhyaya Satis Chandra Vidyabhusan in his *A History of Indian Logic* gives an elaborate account of its (*ānvīkṣikī vidyā*'s) origin. Translating it as 'the science of enquiry' he traces its origin sometime around 650 B. C. Having surveyed ancient literature, he shows how this *vidyā* gradually grew into an art of debate. The development of the notion of soul in *Upaniṣadas* is a turning point and knowledge required for its knowledge has been called *Ātma-vidyā*. This knowledge of *Ātma-vidyā* at a subsequent stage came to be known as *ānvīkṣikī*. We get support of this view in *Manu Saṁhitā* and Kamandaka's *Nītisāra*. However, Mahāmahopādhyaya finds a subtle distinction between *Ātma-vidyā* and *ānvīkṣikī*. "The distinction between *Ātma-vidyā* and *ānvīkṣikī* lay in this, that while the former embodied certain dogmatic assertions about the nature of the soul, the latter contained reasons supporting those assertions. *Ānvīkṣikī* dealt in fact with two subjects, viz *ātmā*, soul, and *hetu*, theory of reasons."[xiii] From this view, it becomes clear that it is the process of ratiocination that distinguishes *ānvīkṣikī vidyā* from sheer *Ātma-vidyā*. This process of ratiocination has been in use in each system that Kauṭilya mentioned in his *ānvīkṣikī vidyā*— Sāṅkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata. It might arise in our mind how these diametrically opposing schools applied this process. It might have happened that each of these systems supported their stand with rational arguments not merely invoking authoritative sources. M. V. Krishna Rao is of the opinion that as, for Kauṭilya, all the systems mentioned under *ānvīkṣikī* and the *vidyā* itself were appertained to religion and law as he stated in chapter one of Book III, he wanted to found the secular body of law based "partly on custom and partly on authority of the various

texts…. Secular law existed side by side with sacred law."[xiv] V. Nagrajan, taking clues from the *Arthśāstra*, analyses the reason of inclusion of three systems under *ānvīkṣikī* thus: "Sāṅkhya provides the necessary training in the logical and analytical approaches required to cull what is *dharma* and *adharma*, according to the Vedas, *artha* and *anartha*, according to Vārta, *nāya* and *anāya*, *bala* and *abala* according to *Daṇḍanīti*. Yoga provides the training needed to maintain equipoise in weal and woe alike… *Lokāyata* gives proficiency in awareness (*prajñā*), speech or utterance (*vākya*) and action (*kriyā*). Understood so, Lokāyata is not materialism. It is training in social awareness and socialisation. The three subjects included in *Ānvīkṣikī* have each a purpose and role to serve in mastering the other three disciplines and in regulating of life itself."[xv] Some other scholars explained it in a bit different way. Whatever intention Kauṭilya might have, it is true that gradually this process of ratiocination talked about under *ānvīkṣikī*, began to take some well-defined shape and thus emerged as a distinct branch. We may also assume that with this the methodology of *tarka*, *vāda* etc. started to come into being. Thus we find *Ātma-vidyā* gently making room for *hetu-vidyā*.

Out of the two components of *ānvīkṣikī vidyā* (i. e. *Ātma-vidyā* and *hetu vidyā*), *Ātma-vidyā*, the science of knowing soul, gradually evolved into *Darśana* sometime around 1st century B. C. However, independent reasoning gave shape to a branch called logic or *ānvīkṣikī vidyā* and Mahāmahopādhyaya attributes this credit largely to Medhātithi Gautama who did it circa 550 B. C. If this timeline is presumed to be true, it is evident that Kauṭilya came at a much later period. Being engaged with university teaching he was well-versed with *ānvīkṣikī vidyā* and thought this *vidyā* imperative for a ruler. For Vidyabhusan the *Arthśāstrkāra* "characterized the *ānvīkṣikī* (evidently logic) as a highly useful science which furnished people with reasons for the estimation of their strength and weaknesses, kept their intellect unperturbed in prosperity and adversity, and infused into their intelligence, speech and action, subtlety and power."[xvi] This capability equipped the ruler with the much-required ability in the art of debate/discussion which in turn enabled him to handle judiciously social and political issues.

Among the prominent teachers of *ānvīkṣikī vidyā*, as Mahāmahopādhyaya mentions, were Lokāyatas, Kapil, Dattātreya, a sage called Punarvasu Ātreya, a women ascetic named Sulabhā, a fierce debator Aṣṭāvakra, Medhātithi Gautama, etc. They addressed different sides of the *ānvīkṣikī vidyā*—some developed the

science of *Ātma-vidyā* which gradually came to be known as *Darśana* and some gave shape to *hetu-vidyā* or *tarka-vidyā*, i. e. the logical side of *ānvīkṣikī*. There were also successive generations that facilitated the development of this into a full-fledged *vidyā*. Hence, we get its reference in the *Manusaṁhitā*, in the *Mahābharata*, in the *Rāmāyaṇa* and many other works of literature of that time. However, it was Medhātithi Gautama (whose timing, as we have stated, was tentatively circa 550 B. C.) who developed and gave a shape to the science of reasoning. This methodology of reasoning facilitated debates of learned persons in councils that existed under various names such as *sabhā*, *samiti* etc. We have reasons to believe that it is during such debates that technical terms were coined and given special senses to facilitate healthy and meaningful debate. In order to distinguish between meaningful debate and mere wrangling terminologies such as *tarka*, *vāda*, *jalpa*, *vitaṇḍā* etc. were coined.

The art of reasoning thus developed was known to Kauṭily. He in the *Arthaśāstra*'s last chapter under the heading *Tantra-yukti* (in the fifteenth *Adhikaraṇa*) enumerated thirty-two terms which, to his mind, will be helpful in determining the fuller meaning of *Arthaśāstra*.

As the Medhātithi Gautama's writing is not available we need to rely on some other sources such as *Carak-saṁhitā* for chief tenets of *ānvīkṣikī*. *Carak-saṁhitā* mentions three chief tenets of *ānvīkṣikī*. These, as Mahāmahopādhyaya Satis Chandra Vidyabhusan mentioned, are[xvii]:

- *Kāryābhinivrtti*
- *Parīksā*
- *Vāda-vidhi*

The first tenet refers to the "aggregate of resources for the accomplishment of an action", the second one lays down the criterion of examination and the third one stipulated the procedure of debate. There is debate about the existence and necessity of the first two tenets of the *ānvīkṣikī*. It has been argued by some scholars that *Kāryābhinivrtti* was not part of the *ānvīkṣikī* of the Medhātithi Gautama. The second one has also been considered as otiose. It is the third component, i. e. v*āda-vidhi* that has been considered as most important. However, a study of the components *kāryābhinivrtti* and *parīksā* make us feel that we should not overlook the importance of these two tenets. A study of the components given in the *Carak-saṁhitā* and listed by Mahāmahopādhyaya

Vidyabhusan makes us feel that when Kauṭily prescribed this *ānvīkṣikī vidyā* for a prince he had in his mind all the components of these three canons. Hence, he placed it at the first position describing it as the lamp of all *vidyās* 'the resources of all actions and the shelter of all virtues.'

The science of reasoning (i. e. *ānvīkṣikī*) has utility in practical life besides in the domain of knowledge as it helps to sharpen, refine the arguments and rectify the misbelieves. Reasoning or debate may be congenial or hostile. It is the former one that has been hailed. Engaging in the hostile debate was discouraged as it did not serve any meaningful purpose. Thus, *ānvīkṣikī* became an established procedure to test the validity of Vedic injunctions or prohibitions. However, we come across instances who did not like this *ānvīkṣikī vidyā*. For example, Manu gave primacy to Vedic and such other teachings and admonished those who using *ānvīkṣikī* challenged those teachings. On the other hand, there were teachers who held this procedure in high esteem as, for them, it was an effective tool for ascertaining truths. As an instance, we can cite the example of Gautam-dharma-sǔtra. There he recommended knowledge of *ānvīkṣikī* for a king as it had immense efficacy for administering justice. Thus, we find that in spite of doubt and opposition to *ānvīkṣikī* still its utility in administration was recognized by the *Arthśāstrakāra*.

Before we go for further explanation of some other scholars' views it is interesting to note that such conception of training of a king is found in ancient Greece in Plato's system too. Plato in his *The Republic* also conceives of a state which will be ruled by a king who has certain unique qualities and is specially trained. His king is popularly known as philosopher-king. As we do not have an exact record of timings of either Plato or Kauṭilya, we cannot ascertain from any record whether they have influenced each other or is it a mere coincidental factor that some prevailing situations of their time have compelled both these great thinkers to espouse a type of kingship which in certain respects is akin. A careful study of the writings of both these thinkers though points to certain similarities we should not overlook dissimilarities too. Plato's ideal society never arrived at the stage of implementation and even some contemporary thinkers, e. g. Sir Karl Popper raised questions about its implementabiltiy. In spite of such criticisms, we can say that it has shown the path to philosophers to think in a way that ushered the path of political philosophy. Kauṭilya bore different mettle. As a staunch political realist, as he is sometimes described, he could foresee what is viable and

what is not. Hence, he prescribed a political system very realistically and while doing that he very craftily infused in the system its ideological basis so that the system becomes durable. Most probably it is this foresight of him that prompted him to consider the necessity of training a prince.

Turning back to the concept of *Ānvīkṣikī* we may say, as many scholars are quick to point out, that it has methodological implications whereas philosophy may not have this implication. In spite of this clear difference, some scholars have rendered *ānvīkṣikī* as philosophy. There is a long and interesting debate between scholars whether the western practice of divorcing theology from philosophy be applied to Indian systems. Paul Haker, whose writing on this issue has attracted wide attention, was against equating *ānvīkṣikī* with philosophy. *Arthśāstrakāra* merely saying that "सांख्यं योगो लोकायतं चेत्यान्वीक्षिकी।"[xviii] (*"sāṃkhyaṃ yogo lokāyataṃ ca-ity ānvīkṣikī"*) included under this rubric three systems of thought that we have mentioned previously. However, his two brief accounts thereafter help us to draw some conclusions:

धर्माधर्मौ त्रय्यामर्थानर्थौ वार्त्तायां नयापनयौ दण्डनीत्यां बलाबले चैतासां हेतुभिरन्वीक्षमाणा
लोकस्योपकरोति व्यसनेः अभ्युदये च बुद्धिमवस्थापयति प्रज्ञावाक्यक्रियावैशारद्यं च करोति ।[xix]

Dharmādharmautrayyām arthānarthau vārttāyām nayānayau daṇḍanītyām balābale caetāsām hetubhir anvīkṣamāṇā[xx]

Śāmaśāstri translated this statement in his own way but Paul Haker's rendering makes the issue clearer. He says: "The investigative science *investigates with reasons* what is right and wrong in the field of Vedic knowledge, what is advantageous and disadvantageous in the science of material acquisitions, and appropriate or inappropriate in the science of government, and moreover, the strength and weaknesses of these (three science) …"[xxi] This italicized part, i. e., 'investigates with reason' forms the core.

Ganeri renders it thus: "Investigating by means of reason, good and evil in the Vedic religion, profit and loss in the field of trade and agriculture, and prudent and imprudent policy in political administration, as well as their relative strengths and weaknesses, the study of critical inquiry (*ānvīkṣikī*) confers benefit on people, keeps their minds steady in adversity and in prosperity, and produces adeptness of understanding, speech and action."[xxii]

A careful study of the statement we have quoted from the *Arthśāstra* make us feel that, for Kauṭilya, *ānvīkṣikī* is like the thread of a garland where other

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vidyās are adorned as flowers. Without it, all other *vidyās* will lose their shines. Hence, it forms the central core. It is this paramountcy that prompted him to write

प्रदीपः सर्वविद्यानामुपायः सर्वकर्मणाम् ।

आश्रयः सर्वधर्माणां शाश्वदान्वीक्षिकी मता [xxiii]

(*pradīpaḥ sarvavidyānām, upāyaḥ sarvakarmaṇām/*

āśrayaḥ sarvadharmāṇāṃ śaśvad ānvīkṣikī matā)

which Haker construed as this "investigative science has always been considered as a source of light for all sciences, and instrument for all activities, a foundation for all religious and social duties."[xxiv]

These two excerpts give us some inkling about the *vidyā* in question. All the *vidyās* mentioned by the *Arthśāstrakāra* are not to be placed horizontally but rather vertically thereby giving supreme importance to *ānvīkṣikī* as this *vidyā* imparts glory to other *vidyās* and make all work purposeful or meaningful. We can say that it supplies methodology to other *vidyās* for their *right* use. Lack of knowledge of *ānvīkṣikī* will take away worth from *trayī*, *vārtā* and *daṇḍanīti*.

Later on, Vātsyāyana and other Naiyāyikas developed this science which gave proper place to reason as well as to Vedic-Upaniṣadic tradition. In order to differentiate Nyāya from other systems, Naiyāyikas hold that their system reassesses what has been comprehended from tradition as well as sense impressions. This process involves reasoning and logical argument. And this is definitely a methodological issue. However, reasoning and logical argument though definitely an advancement from tradition it had limits too as it was not unrestrained. It had to pay attention to what has been received from impressions and traditions. The prefix '*anu*' means, according to Monier-Williams, after, along, alongside' lengthwise, near to, under, subordinate to, with, etc. Adopting this series of meanings, we can well draw the conclusion that the reflector had a choice in reasoning, but it was not unlimited. It needs to be compatible with impressions and traditions or at least it required that the investigator should be neutral-minded. Even *manana* which follows *śrabana* implies that methodology of reflection or reevaluation is an important component. But we get the impression that *Arthśāstrakāra* paid the least attention to this compatibility.

Halbfass similarly holds that Kauṭilya "focuses on the 'neutral' methodological aspect of the 'investigative science,' on the applicability and usefulness of *ānvīkṣikī* for other sciences which play a role in the education of the

prince and in the successful conduct of government and administration. …
Kauṭilya is not interested in discussing the soteriological relevance of *ānvīkṣikī*, or
its compatibility with the Vedic *ātmavidyā*. His primary concern with
methodology is also illustrated by his list of schools of thought in which he finds
ānvīkṣikī exemplified."[xxv] *Sāṅkhya* system was compatible with the Vedic system
but it also systematized it with reasoning. What is interesting about Kauṭilya's
mentioning of yoga is that some scholars, for example, Halbfass, are of the
opinion that it does not represent Pataňjali's Yoga order. Rather it hints at Nyāya
and Vaiśeṣka. Halbfass supports his argument by taking the root '*yuj-*' which
"accounts for the word *yukti*, 'reasoning'." Therefore, he argues that yoga
sometimes alluded to the application of reasoning. In order to substantiate his
claim, he takes the help of commentator Vātsyāyana's view and from sources of
the Jainas. G. C. Pandey taking a clue from Phanibhusan Tarkavāgīsa's Bengali
translation of *Nyāyasŭtras* also held an opinion that deviates from common
understanding. He writes: "*Yoga* could have meant the Yoga philosophy or any
spiritual philosophy stressing the action (*Kriyāvāda*) or a philosophy like the
Vaiśeṣika seeking to explain the universe as compounded out of simpler original
elements."[xxvi] We can distinguish between Yoga as a school of thought and yoga
as a tradition. Pataňjali was the founder of the former one but who was the
founder of the later one is not known as we do not have recorded historical dates
and get a number of opinions. We can well surmise that the term 'yoga' denoted
practising resolute self-disciplining. Whereas *Sāṅkhya* puts a premium on a
precise understanding of the fundamental principles underlying behind apparent
reality, to achieve that one needed rigorous disciplining. From some ancient
sources, we come to know that Hiraṇygarbha was the original exponent of Yoga
philosophy and he taught this systematic procedure to some Ṛṣis who in turn
taught it to later generations. Who is Hiraṇygarbha is then an inquisitive mind will
be eager to know. In some source, it is held that the omnipresent creator is
Hiraṇygarbha and some source tells us that Ṛṣi Kapil was Hiraṇygarbha. As what
is meant by Yoga is an unsettled issue, we can attempt from a different route to
understand Kauṭilya's intent. He had some definite idea about the requirement of
some qualities of a king. In order to attain these qualities, a king had to exercise
restraint and also perhaps modifications of the mind. It was to be done not for any
personal gain but for a greater objective of his subjects and his kingdom with a
spirit of renunciation. Whatever Kauṭilya meant by Yoga, we can well surmise

that he had this supernormal capacity of a prince in mind. *Lokāyata*'s methodology was out and out reasoning. They were non-conformists in nature and hence tried to convince people by means of their sharp reasoning that only human endeavour can change our life. Hence instead of relying on fate only, we need to pin our hopes on the reason primarily.

The process of ratiocination or application of reason thus developed began to face a constant challenge from different quarters. Some appreciated this process of reasoning some deprecated it. In this battle, we find the development of many terms such as *tarka*, *jalpa*, *vitndā*, etc. to distinguish between valid reasoning and mere wrangling or what has been termed *suṣktarka*. The concept of *ānvīkṣikī* and effort to determine its very nature definitely helped in this development. Not that only orthodox systems contributed to this development. Even heterodox systems such as Jainas and Buddhists helped, on the one hand, to extricate reasoning from the Vedic line of thinking, on the other hand, prescribed for its limited use. This investigative tendency facilitated the secularization of thinking and created a balance between this-worldly and other-worldly desires and debates. This also did not allow to develop reasoning as an independent autonomous as well as an unchecked zone. The greatest challenges posed to this development was Bhartṛhari, Śaṅkara, Śrīharṣa. Jonardan Ganeri puts it succinctly thus: "Reason is the instrument of all philosophers, but conceptions of the nature and function of reason vary along with varying ideas about the work for which reason is properly employed…. Reason unchecked was seen as a threat to the stability of Brahminical social order, as the tool of heretics and troublemakers. But the epic horror of pure reason was a disdain not for reason itself, but only for its capricious use, to undermine the belief rather than to support it, to criticize and not to defend it. Philosophy in India … flourished in the space this distinction affords."[xxvii]

We need to remember that *Arthśāstra* is not a manual that furnishes us a readymade solution to any particular set of problem and perhaps no *śāstra* can do this. Rather it intends to supply us method so that it can be applied to any problem that a king may encounter in running his administration. The method of *ānvīkṣikī* equips the ruler for a dispassionate analysis of the problem and find out its best possible available solution. Thus, *ānvīkṣikī* arms the king for right analysis of a situation which helps him to combat the problem productively. However, it has also been pointed out that mastering *ānvīkṣikī* is a time-consuming matter as it has been

opined by some that it takes twelve years. Therefore, the method has been subjected to criticism in *Hitopadeśa* and *Pañcatantra*. It has been held that if someone takes recourse to *nīti* of *Nītiśāstras*, which is an alternative method, it will take only six months. Therefore, it is a shorter route.

But we need to remember that *Nītiśāstras* were later development and hence the importance of the science of reasoning as given in the *Arthśāstra* is not diminished by the alternative views of *Nītiśāstras*. *Ānvīkṣikī* works as an aid in the accomplishment of all actions and discharging king's duties. As it is the case, knowledge of *ānvīkṣikī* plays a vital role in political actions and commitments. It is interesting to note that Śukrāchārya in his *Nītisāra* includes logic and Vedānta[xxviii] in *ānvīkṣikī vidyā* though we don't find reference of Vedānta in *Arthśāstra* under *ānvīkṣikī*. In fact, acceptance of methodology of *manan* may be a reason for its (Vedanta's) inclusion under *ānvīkṣikī* by the *Nītiśāstrakāra*.

One related debate about which many scholars paid a fair amount of attention is that though Kauṭilya espoused strong political realism (and even Roger Boesche called him "the first great political realist"[xxix]) but his view about *ānvīkṣikī* gave rise to deliberation as to, for him, politics is an end to itself or it has some transcendent purpose. The prominent place he accorded to Sāṅkhya and Yoga in his *ānvīkṣikī vidyā* and also a careful reading of the *Arthśāstra* (e. g., when he says that army be motivated by the assurance that fighting in battle with courage will take them in heaven) force us to think that, for Kauṭilya, politics has other-worldly aim too. The rationale behind such a view is that both these schools believed in liberation. Acceptance of their teachings entails that a king cannot ignore this goal. V. P. Varma also supports such a view.[xxx] Our stand gets support from Somedeva Suri's *Nītivākyamitram* too.

We can look at the issue from a different angle. Indian systems by and large agreed that knowledge of truth is the key for securing Mokṣa. For achieving this state and also to comprehend the nature of this world and the mystery behind all, the reasoning is an effective tool. If we fail to grasp the intricacies of the material aspect of reality, we will not be moral beings. It can be grasped by the application of our reasoning capacity. Thus, reasoning or logic is the foundation of the understanding material world which in turn helps us to attain *Parāvidyā*, what we previously called *Atmajñāna*. Perhaps it is for this reason that logic has been termed the science of all other sciences. In the *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha*

Madhava Ācārya underscoring the imperative of this science holds that *ānvīkṣikī* has a number of components and taken together it works as the lamp for all other sciences, "the means of aiding all actions," and also the ultimate tribunal for the performance of any religious duty.

Another necessity of *ānvīkṣikī vidyā*, as it becomes evident from Kauṭilya's *śāstra*, is that exercising self-control by a king is the leitmotif in Kauṭilya's system and it forms the chief aim of all branches of knowledge that a prince is required to master. In order to become *rājarṣi*, who is a king but as wise as sage, he needs to abandon six temptations. These temptations are enemy-like and have the potentiality to destroy the kingdom. These are lust, anger, greed, conceit, arrogance and impetuousness. M. V. Krishna Rao supporting this view holds that the chief aim of a king's "education was to control of the organs of sense…and who has not his organs of sense under control will soon perish, although he possesses the whole earth…"[xxxi] Kauṭilya foresaw that ignorance and indiscipline on the part of a king are twin sources of maladies for a state. Hence in order to remove these twin causes, he prescribed four types of teaching out of which he considered *ānvīkṣikī* is the "foundation of all sciences, for it sharpens the mind and makes it fit for thinking, speaking and acting correctly and properly in all conditions of life. Philosophy helps the prince to discern according to the *Veda* what is right or wrong, what is useful and what is useless in economics, and what are right and false methods in politics."[xxxii] In Book III he even goes on to assert that when sacred laws are not in agreement with rational laws, there will prevail rational law. He writes

शास्त्रं विप्रतिपद्येत धर्मे न्यायेन केनचित् ।
न्यायस्तत्र प्रमाणं स्यात्तत्र पाठो हि नश्यति ।[xxxiii]

Thus, we find the *ānvīkṣikī vidyā* was idealised and exalted. *Ānvīkṣikī vidyā* along with other three vidyās when mastered properly make the Kauṭilya's king enlightened and he acquires some supernormal qualities —*ābhigāmik guṇa*, *prajñā guṇa*, *utsāha guṇa* and *ātmasampat*— that a king is required to have. Such qualities prepare the king to become *dharmaprabartaka*, *vijigīṣu*, and *chakrabartīn*.The deliberation of the contemporary scholars brought enough clarity about these *vidyās* in general and the *ānvīkṣikī vidyā* in particular. Further deliberation, we can hope, will add shine to it.

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SOME ASPECTS OF *NIṢKĀMAKARMA*: A CRITICAL STUDY

NIRMAL KUMAR ROY

The objective of the paper entitled <u>Some Aspects of Niṣkāmakarma: A Critical Study</u> is to address some of the important problems regarding <u>Niṣkāmakarma</u> along with the logical solution to them. The questions which are often raised about <u>Niṣkāmakarma</u> are the following:
(i) Is <u>Niṣkāmakarma</u> , i.e. Karma without desire at all possible?
(ii) What s the importance of <u>Niṣkāmakarma</u>?
(iii) In which sense are we slave (<u>dāsa</u>) of God?
(iv) How can a <u>dāsa</u> who does not have any freedom of will be a moral agent?
This paper is a sincere attempt to reply to all these questions as logically as possible. This shows that all the questions and problems on Niṣkāmakarma mentioned above arise due to the lack of proper understanding of the same. Quoting the relevant slokes from Srimadbhagavadgītā a logical and consisted analysis has been carried out and there by all problems shown above have been resolved.

Śrīmadbhagavadgītā is one of the fundamental and popular Hindu religious texts. Day by day its popularity is growing up all over the world. Though we come across the discussion of *niṣkāmakarma* in different religious texts but the discussion of the same found in *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā* is profound and unparallel. The concept of *niṣkāmakarma* draws our special attention on different important issues, e.g., what does exactly *niṣkāmakarma* mean? Is *niṣkāmakarma* at all possible? If the answer is positive then in which sense it is possible? Is the *niṣkāmakarma* at all the subject of moral judgment? If it is so then in which sense it is the subject of moral judgment? This paper is a sincere attempt to address these issues.

At the very outset I like to draw the kind attention of the readers regarding the importance of *niṣkāmakarma*. No one can deny the fact that our society has been turned into a hell. All conscious individuals are deeply concerned with the different types of evils we come across in and around our society. But we all know that nothing can be taken place without cause. What is the cause of it? Obviously, the members of our society themselves are the cause of it. More precisely to say the *sakāmakarmas*, i.e., the *karmas* for the satisfaction of our personal interest, performed by us have turned our society into a hell. But why are we getting motivated to perform the *sakāmakarmas* only? The only reasonable answer is that it is our present education system. The present education system makes us giant positively, but a selfish one. There is no room for others in the world of us. We are tightly engaged in different types of activities throughout the

day, but it is a pity that all our activities are exclusively centered in and around our individual interest. Unless and until we come out from the small boundary of our personal interest and thereby enter into the vast kingdom of impersonal and universal interest the problems prevailing in our society cannot be solved. But what is the way out? As far as my observation is concerned the only way out for the same is the proper teaching and implementation of the ideology of the *niṣkāmakarma* as it is depicted in the *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā*. In the course of our discussion, we shall see how the proper teaching and implementation of the same in our society will lead to the solution of our social problems.

It is worthy to note that the role and importance of *niṣkāmakarma* is far-reaching. The role of *niṣkāmakarma* is at least two-fold. The first one has already been pointed out. The second one is the attainment of *mokṣa*, the supreme goal as it is suggested by our *Śāstras*. The Hindu *Śāstras* prescribe for four *puruṣārthas*, viz, *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa*. Among them *mokṣa* is considered as the supreme *puruṣārtha*. For the attainment of *mokṣa* generally four means, which are otherwise known as *mārgas*, have been suggested by the Hindu *Śāstras*. The *niṣkāmakarma* or *karmayoga* is one of them. It is worthy to note that this *yoga* has been considered to be the most superior by the *Gītā*. It says-

"*Tapasvibhyo'dhiko yogī jñānibhyo'pi mato'dhikaḥ|*

Karmibhyaścādhiko yogī tasmād yogī bhavārjuna||"[1]

Now let us go to the first question mentioned above-what is meant by *niṣkāmakarma*? In reply to this question, it can simply be said that *niṣkāmakarma* is a *karma* which is done without having any desire for the enjoyment of its fruit or result. But this answer is nothing but a naive answer. So, it is better to go to the *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā* itself if we are to seek for the exact and appropriate answer. It is already mentioned that *niṣkāmakarma* is otherwise called *karmayoga*. In *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā* we come across the answer in chapter two. It runs as "*Yogaḥkarmasukauśalam...*"[2]. *Yoga* is a technique for work. But what type of technique does it refer to? The answer to this question is not available within a single *śloka* of the *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā*. Careful enquiry shows that the answer to the same is available in different *ślokas* throughout different chapters of the *Gītā*. The same question has been answered in different ways in different *ślokas*. It starts with the 47th *śloka* of the second chapter-

"*Karmaṇyevādhikāraste mā phaleṣu kadācana||*

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[1] *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā*: 6/46
[2] Ibid. 2/50

Mā karmaphalaheturbhūrmā te saṁgo'stvakarmaṇi//[3]

Śrīkṛṣṇa says to Arjuna that he has no right upon the fruit of his action; he has the right upon the action alone. Then he proceeds to the next *śloka* and says,

"*Yogasthaḥ kuru karmāṇi saṁgaṁ tyakttvā dhanañjaya/*
Sidhyāsidhyayoḥ samo bhūtvā samatvaṁ yoga ucyate//"[4]

So in both of the *ślokas*, i.e., *śloka* no 47 and 48 one teaching is common that we have to perform our action leaving the desire for the enjoyment of the fruit of it. But in *śloka* no 48 we come across a new lesion that we have to treat our success and failure equally. It is also stated that this equal treatment is called *yoga*.

Śrīkṛṣṇa says to Arjuna that a person who performs his actions following the guidelines stated above then this person can be known in various ways like *yogī*, *sthitaprajña* or *muni*. Arjuna here gets little bit confused and in order to remove his confusion he asks to Śrīkṛṣṇa

"*Sthitaprajñasya kā bhāṣā samādhisthasya keśava/*
Sthitadhīḥ kiṁ prabhāṣeta kimāsīta brajeta kim//"[5]

The answer to this question has been immediately given by Śrīkṛṣṇa in next *śloka*,

"*Prajahāti yadā kāmān sarvān pārtha manogatān/*
Ātmanyevātmanā tuṣṭaḥ sthitaprajñastadocyate//"[6]

Here in this answer, we find a new aspect of a *sthitaprajña* or *yogī* that his mind must be devoid of all desires and he will remain content with soul alone. It implies that though he lives in the material world he cannot have any attraction for the material things. Now Śrīkṛṣṇa thinks that Arjuna is yet to be completely free from his confusion. Therefore, he proceeds further to reply the same. He says,

"*Duḥkheṣvanudvignamanāḥ sukheṣu vigataspṛhaḥ/*
Vītarāgabhayakrodhaḥ sthitadhīrmunirucyate//"[7]

One who is indifferent of both sufferings and pleasures, and devoid of all sorts of attachment, fear and anger, is called a *muni*. Śrīkṛṣṇa continues to reply to the same question in the rest of the several *ślokas* of the second chapter in different ways. The essence of this teaching is that a true *yogī* must control his senses and thereby transcend the boundary of the world of desire and attachment. Perhaps

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[3] Ibid. 2/47
[4] *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā*:2/48
[5] Ibid. 2/54
[6] Ibid. 2/55
[7] Ibid. 2/56

Śrīkṛṣṇa understands by seeing the face of Arjuna that the cloud of doubt and confusion from his mind is yet to be removed and therefore in the third chapter Śrīkṛṣṇa continues to reply to the same in various ways. In a nutshell what Śrīkṛṣṇa teaches here, in this chapter, is that he must turn his action into sacrifice (*yajña*). We come across a very straight forward answer to the same question in the sixth chapter. Here in the very first *śloka* of this chapter Śrīkṛṣṇa says,

"*Anāśritaḥ karmaphalaṁ kāryaṁ karma karoti yaḥ/*
Sa sannyāsi ca yogī ca na niragnirna cākriyaḥ//"[8]

Here so far as the first part of this *śloka* is concerned the teaching is nothing new since it says that a *yogī* must perform his action by giving up the desire for enjoyment of fruit. But so far as the second part of this *śloka* is concerned it gives an information which is not given so far. I think this information is highly essential for understanding *niṣkāmakarma* in the true sense. We come across some of the views which teach that the Vedic ritualistic activities called *yajña* are inseparably associated with some sorts of desire, and from this one may wrongly conclude that when the *Gītā* advises us to perform *niṣkāmakarma* then thereby it teaches us to be abstaining from doing these ritualistic activities. Again, some persons, particularly the *jñānavādins*, have some misconception that a true *yogī* or a *muni* should not perform any action and hence, he should avoid all sorts of activities. Here an attempt has been made by Śrīkṛṣṇa to make us aware about these misconceptions. Śrīkṛṣṇa categorically says that one who is abstained from performing Vedic ritualistic activities or abstained from doing all sorts of activities is not a true *yogī*. It clearly implies that a true *yogī* will perform all sorts of activities but he will do so without having any desire for enjoyment of the fruits of these actions.

The whole teaching of *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā* on *Karmayoga* and *Karmayogī* or *sthitaprajña* or *muni* dealt with so far can be summarized as follows:

1) A *Karmayogī* must perform his actions without having any desire for enjoyment of fruit.
2) A *Karmayogī* will consider success and failure as equal.
3) He will be independent of pleasure and pain.
4) He will control his senses.
5) He cannot have any attraction towards material world or material gain.
6) He will never think of the satisfaction of his personal interest.
7) He will remain content with the soul alone.

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[8] *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā*:6/1

8) He will turn all his actions into *yajña*.

Now the question is – why does Śrīkrṣṇa advise Arjuna to perform *niṣkāmakarma*? It is already stated that the ultimate goal of us is to attain *mokṣa*, the supreme *puruṣārtha*. But *mokṣa* can be attained through *niṣkāmakarma*; it cannot be attained through *sakāmakarma*. There is a contradiction between *sakāmakarma* and *mokṣa*. *Mokṣa* implies absolute cessation of rebirth, but *sakāmakarma* necessarily brings about rebirth. *Mokṣa* is a state which is absolutely devoid of sufferings and pains. But no such state can be achieved as long as we continue to take our birth. Birth means assuming a body. A body must be the subject of sufferings like disease, hunger, old age, death and so on. This clearly shows that attainment of *mokṣa*, a state completely devoid of pain and sufferings is impossible as long as we shall continue to take rebirth and thereby assume body. But our rebirth is a necessary and inevitable corollary of our *sakāmakarma*. The same can be explained in a better way with the theory of *karma* as it is explained in our *Śāstra*. As per the theory of *karma* an action positively produces its effect or result and one must enjoy the result of one's own *karma*. The result of the action done by one person cannot be consumed by another person. But it is worthy to note that the fruits of all the actions done in a particular life cannot be exhausted in that life, some of the fruits must be stored to be enjoyed in the next life. So, he has to take birth for the next time to consume the stored fruit of the actions done in his previous life. But in the next birth one must perform actions like the previous birth and at least some of the fruits of these actions must be stored. Therefore, to enjoy the same he must take his birth for the third time. Thus, the process of rebirth continues without any end. Consequently, attainment of *mokṣa* cannot be possible through *karma*.

But the theory of *karma* and rebirth is applicable only for the *sakāmakarma*, it is not applicable for the *niṣkāmakarma*. In fact, the contradiction is not between *karma* and *mokṣa*, contradiction is between the desire for the enjoyment of the fruit of action and *mokṣa*; since *niṣkāmakarma* is devoid of the desire it cannot be contradictory to *mokṣa*, rather it turns into the helping condition, *mārga*, for the attainment of *mokṣa*. It is a well-known fact that if a snake bite one then he will die, if proper treatment is not given in due time. But the same poison of snake which takes our life can be turned into a medicine which saves us from death. Milk is a cause of indigestion. But if the same milk is turned into curd, then it becomes a helping condition for digestion.

Likewise, as long as our *karma* remains *sakāma,* it continues to produce our next birth and thereby turns into an obstacle for the attainment of *mokṣa*. But if the same *karma* turns into *niṣkāma* one then it becomes a helping condition, i.e., a *mārga* for the attainment of *mokṣa*. If *sakāmakarma* stands for the poison of snake or milk then *niṣkāmakarma* stands for medicine produced from poison of snake or curd. In fact, *niṣkāmakarma*, as it is stated by *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā*, serves two-fold purpose at the same time – (a) it leads to the attainment of *mokṣa*, and (b) establishes the *lokasaṁgraha* or wellbeing of the whole society (*ātmamokṣārthaṁjagathitāya ca*). This two-fold purpose served by *niṣkāmakarma* has been beautifully and clearly depicted in the following *śloka*,

"*Karmaṇaiva hi saṁsidhvimāsthitā janakādayaḥ/*
Lokasaṁgrahamevāpi saṁpaśyan karttumaharsi//"[9]

So far as our discussion is concerned, I think, it becomes clear why performance of *niṣkāmakarma* has been proposed by *Śrimadbhagavatgītā*.

Now let us address the next question – is *niṣkāmakarma* possible at all? Our day-to-day experience clearly shows that all our activities, without exception, necessarily presupposes some desire. No action without desire is possible. How can then *niṣkāmakarma* possible? No doubt, the question is very sound. But our close analysis of the *Gītā* shows that here the term *karma* in *niṣkāmakarma* has been used in a technical sense. Any type of desire has not been attributed as *kāma*. Some of our desires are called *kāma* and some of our desires are described as *prema*. Only the former one is undermined and blamed but the latter one is praise worthy and therefore encouraged to do. But what type of desire belongs to the first category and what type of desire belongs to the second category? I think we come across a beautiful answer to this question in *Caitanyacaritāmṛta*,

"*Ātmendrīya prītivāncā tāre vali kāma/*
Kṛṣṇendriya prīti icchā dhare prema nāma//"[10]

The desire for the satisfaction of personal interest is called *kāma* but the desire for the satisfaction or pleasure of the God is called *prema*. I think '*prema'* here includes the desire for the satisfaction of the interest of the whole society as well (*vahujanahitāya vahujanasukhāya*); otherwise, the incorporation of the term'*lokasaṁgraha'* in the *śloka* no. 20 of chapter three quoted above cannot be accounted for. So, *niṣkāmakarma* is not devoid of all sorts of desire. It is devoid of only that particular type of desire known as *kāma* which is undermined and

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[9]*Śrīmadbhagavadgītā*: 3/20
[10]*Caitanyacaritāmṛta:* 4/165

blamed. But *niṣkāmakarma* is not devoid of the desire called *prema* which is praise-worthy. So, the objection raised that *niṣkāmakarma* is not possible since it is devoid of desire, does not hold good. Here one may raise another objection – both of the desires are desires, why then some of them are attributed as *kāma* and some as *prema*? And again, why the former one is undermined and blamed and suggested to give up, and the latter one, on the other, is described as *prema* and considered as praise -worthy? The answer, I think, is simple. If one asks – is a knife good or bad? The wise answer to this question is – nothing can be said independently of its use. If the knife is used for cutting vegetables and fruits for our daily use then it is good, but if the same knife is used for cutting the belly of a person, then it (knife) may be bad. It is worthy to note that here the terms 'may be' have been used. This is so because the act of cutting the belly of a person independently of its purpose again can be said neither good nor bad. Whether this act is good or bad purely depends upon its purpose. If the purpose is good then the act is good, but if the purpose is bad then the act is bad. If one cuts one's belly by a knife with the purpose of killing him then the act may be bad, but if one doctor cuts one's belly by knife with the purpose of curing him from disease then the act is good. Here again in the former case the terms 'may be' have been used, because even the act of killing one may be good or bad depending on its purpose. If a soldier kills his enemy for the sake of his country, then even the act of killing is good, but if a murderer kills one for money, then it is bad. Likewise, a desire in itself is neither good nor bad, it neither be blamed nor be praised. So, whether it will be good or bad purely depends upon the purpose of it. If the purpose of the desire is fulfillment of one's individual and limited interest then the desire is bad, but if the purpose of the desire is the satisfaction of the pleasure of the God or ensuring the well-being of the society as a whole or both of them, then the desire is good and praise- worthy. In fact, *sakāmakarma* is the root of all the problems of our society and *niṣkāmakarma* is the solution to it. *Sakāmakarma* turns our society into a hell and *niṣkāmakarma*, on the other, turns it into a heaven. This is the reason why one desire is blamed and attributed as *kāma* and another desire is considered as praise- worthy and attributed as *prema*. Following *Kaṭhaponiṣad* it can be said that the object of *sakāmakarma* is *preya*, but the object of *niṣkāmakarma* is *śreya*.

Here *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā* through the lesion of *niṣkāmakarma* teaches us that the object of our desire has to be replaced. The desire for the fulfillment of our personal interest should be replaced by the desire for the satisfaction of the pleasure of the God. But how can it be logically justified? If I am an agent of any

action then it is quite natural and logical that I shall do it for the sake of my own, why shall I do the same for the sake of the God or for the sake of others (*lokasaṁgraha*). The reply to this question needs a long elaboration. Śrīkṛṣṇa says that in the true sense we are not a real agent of the actions we perform. If I am not a real agent of any action then I cannot deserve the fruit of it, more clearly to say I cannot and should not have any desire for the satisfaction of my personal interest. But who is the agent of the action I do? Śrīkṛṣṇa says,

"*Prakṛteḥ kriyamāṇāni guṇaiḥ karmāṇi sarvaśaḥ/*
Ahaṁkāravimūḍhātmā kartāhamiti manyate//"[11]

Śrīkṛṣṇa says that the agent of all actions is the *prakṛti* and its *guṇas-sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. But people due to their ignorance wrongly consider themselves as the agent of actions. In fact, at the initial stage the philosophy of *Śrimadbhagavatgītā* has a great similarity with *Sāṁkhya* Philosophy. We know that according to *Sāṁkhya* Philosophy *Prakṛti* is active but *Purūṣa*, the self, is inactive. So, no action can be done by *Purūṣa* who is inactive; all actions are performed by *Prakṛti* which is considered to be active. Thus, it is clearly shown that we, the souls, cannot be any real agent of any action, and therefore cannot deserve the fruit of it.

Here another problem crops up. It is stated that *Prakṛti* is the agent of all actions. But *Prakṛti*, in fact, stands for our body. So, to say *Prakṛti* is agent of an action amounts to say that our body itself is that agent and consequently, our body deserves the fruits of the same. In our day-to-day life we, in fact, offer the fruit of all sorts of actions to our body. In most of the cases whatever we do, we do so for the sake of our body. What is the problem then? But this is not sanctioned by the *Gītā*. According to *Śrīmadbhagavatgītā,* God alone deserves the fruits of all actions. Śrīkṛṣṇa says,

"*Yat karoṣi yadśnāsi yajjuhoṣi dadāsi yat/*
Yat tapasyasi kounteya tat kurūṣvamadarpaṇam//"[12]

How can it be justified then?

I think, for this, first of all we have to understand the metaphysics of the *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā*. In our foregoing discussion it is already pointed out that the philosophy, particularly the metaphysics of *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā,* has a great similarity with that of the Sāṁkhya philosophy. In both of them *prakṛti* and

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[11] *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā*: 3/27

[12] Ibid. 9/27

Purūṣa have been admitted, and *prakṛti* has been considered active but unconscious and *Purūṣa*, on the other, as conscious but inactive. But it is worthy to note that the metaphysics of the *Śrimadbhagavatgītā* is also different from that of the *Sāṁkhya* School to a great extent. There is no room for God in the latter but God (*Puruṣottama*) occupies the central position in the former. The *Purūṣa* and *prakṛti* of *Sāṁkhya* School are autonomous, but the same in *Śrimadbhagavatgītā* are not autonomous, they are dependent upon and controlled by God, the *Puruṣottama*. We know that *prakṛti* stands for *māyā*, and *māyā* is always under the control of God. This is the reason that God is called *māyādhīśa*. So, *māyā* stands for *prakṛti*, and *prakṛti* here stands for our body. This clearly implies that since the *māyā* or *prakṛti* is controlled by God, our body is also controlled by God. So, our body is nothing but an instrument (doll) in the hands of God. If our body is a car then God is the driver of that car. So, the real agent of all actions is God Himself. If one stands first in a car-race then the credit and prize are given to the driver, not to the car, since the real agent of this act called car-race is the driver, not the car, though the race is carried out through the car. In the same way, though actions are done by *māyā* or *prakṛti* or body, it is not real agent, real agent is God. This is the reason why *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā* advises Arjuna to offer fruits of all actions to God (*Yat karoṣi yadśnāsi yajjuhoṣi dadāsi yat/ Yat tapasyasi kounteya tat kurūṣvamadarpaṇam//*). *Kenoponiṣad* also says the same,

> "*Śrotrasya śrotraṁ manaso mano yadvāco ha vācaṁsa u prāṇasyaprāṇaḥ/Cakṣuṣaścakṣuratimucya dhīrāḥ pretyāsmāllokādamṛtā bhavanti//*"[13]

Kenopaniṣada says that God or *Puruṣottama* is the ear of the ears, mind of the minds, mouth of the mouths, life of the lives, eye of the eyes. It implies that our sense organs and body are inactive without the help of the God. Our sense organs and body are controlled and directed by the God. Our body is something like the fan. The fan is moved by the electric power. Our body stands for the fan and God stands for the electric power. In that sense, the real agent of all the actions performed by our body/*prakṛti*/*māyā* is God. That is why God alone deserves the fruits of all actions done by our body.

The spirit of the metaphysics of *Upaniṣad* must correspond to that of the metaphysics of *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā*, since the latter is the essence of the former. Due to this reason *Śrimadbhagavatgītā* is also called *Upaniṣad*as. It is mentioned

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[13]*Kenopaniṣad:*1/2

at the end of every chapter, '*Śrīmadbhagavadgītāsūpaniṣatsu brahmavidyāyāṁ yogaśāstre*'...

Thus, the metaphysics of *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā* clearly shows why we should not have any desire for enjoyment of the fruit of actions, which turn all our actions into *niṣkāma*. In fact, our sense of ego or agent ship is the root cause of all the problems, individual as well as social. It is our sense of ego or agent ship which makes our actions *sakāma*. I cannot expect the fruits of the actions done by you. But I except the fruits of the actions done by me since I believe that I am the real agent of the same. But the moment I can understand the whole metaphysics of *Śrīmadbhagavatgītā* I cannot consider myself to be the agent of any action any more, which will positively turn all my actions into *niṣkāma* and thereby all problems will be solved. Thus, it is seen that our ego is the problem and therefore, the solution consists in the destruction of our ego. Keeping this in view Rāmakṛṣṇa beautifully says, '*Āmi mole ghucive janjāla*'. Tagore says, 'Religion is the self-denial for self-realization'. But Rāmakṛṣṇa cites a problem. He says that in fact our sense of ego, sense of 'I' and agent ship cannot be destroyed. It may appear today that my sense of ego is destroyed but tomorrow 'I' can see the same in a stronger form. It is something like the immature banana-tree. We all know that if an immature banana-tree is cut today then just tomorrow we come across a new germination from the very cutting root of the same. More or less the same holds good with our ego. What is the way out then? Rāmakṛṣṇa has offered a beautiful solution to this problem. He says that our master ego has to be turned into a slave ego. We have to consider ourselves as slaves of God. The same view is seen to be substantiated by the *Vaiṣṇava* philosophy in *Caitanyacaritāmṛta*. *Caitanyacaritāmṛta* says,

> "*Jīvera svarupa hoy kṛṣṇer nityadāsa/*
> *Kṛṣṇer taṭsthā śakti bhedābheda prakāśa//*"[14]

Śrīmadbhagavadgītā also says the same through the following *ślokas*-

> "*Mamaivāṁśo jīvaloke jīvabhūtaḥ sanātanaḥ/*
> *Manaḥṣaṣṭhānīndriyāṇi prakṛsthāni karṣati//*"[15]
> "*Mayādhyakṣeṇa prakṛtiḥ sūyate sacarācaram/*
> *Hetunānena kounteya jagadviparivartate//*"[16]
> "*Gatirbhartā prabhuḥ sākṣī nivāsaḥ śaraṇaṁ suhṛt/*

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[14] *Caitanyacaritāmṛta, madhyalīlā, viṁśapariccheda.*
[15] *Śrī0madbhagavadgītā:* 15/7
[16] Ibid*:9/10*

Prabhavaḥ pralayaḥ sthānaṁ nidhānaṁ vījamavyayam//"[17]

The above *ślokas* categorically say that we are nothing but the slaves of God. The whole world is created by God; and we are living in this world. We live on food, water and air, and all of them have been created by God. As a slave lives on the kindness of his master, so we live on the grace and kindness of God. The master 'I' is harmful, but a slave 'I' is not harmful at all. The former 'I' is selfish, but the latter 'I' is selfless. The first 'I' has the desire for the fruit of his action; therefore, his actions are *sakāma*. But the second 'I' does not have any desire for the fruit of his action, consequently, his actions are *niṣkāma*. The master 'I' is *asura* but the slave 'I' is *sura*. The former 'I' makes our society a hell but the latter 'I' turns our society into a heaven. The master 'I' is *tāmasika*, but the slave 'I' is *sāttvika*. If the master 'I' is poison then the slave 'I' is nectar. The master 'I' is Ratnākara, but the slave 'I' is Vālmīki. Former 'I' lives exclusively for himself, but the latter 'I' lives exclusively for others, for God and the society as a whole. The former lives for *bhoga*, but the latter lives for *tyāga*. The master 'I' considers himself as the real agent of an action. He thinks that he is doing his work himself. But the slave 'I' thinks that he is not a real doer or agent of any action he performs. He considers himself as an instrument at the hands of God, *Puruṣottama*. His feeling will be like the feeling of Rāmaprasāda and Rāmakṛṣṇadeva, '*sakali tomāri icchā, icchāmayī tārā tumi / tomāra karma tumi karo mā, loke vole kari āmi…*'. So, if we can perform all our actions considering ourselves as slaves (*dāsa*) of God, then all our actions will turn into *niṣkāmakarma* which will lead to the attainment of *mokṣa* and establishment of well-being of whole society. Our master 'I' stands for a wooden log which drawn us into the river called *Vaitaraṇī* but our slave 'I' stands for a boat made up of the same wooden log which helps us to cross the same and thereby leads us to our ultimate destination.

Now let us deal with another important problem. We know that freedom of will is one of the important and necessary presuppositions for moral judgment. All actions are not the subject of moral judgment. Only those actions which are done through the exercise of freedom of will are the subject of moral judgement. But a number of scholars particularly of the Western Philosophy raise an objection against the Indian school of morality and religion that in Indian school of morality and religion there is no room for freedom of will. It has already been stated that all actions of us are determined by God.

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[17] Ibid. 9/18

So far as our foregoing discussion is concerned it is seen that all our actions are ultimately determined by God. In this situation we should be praised or blamed for whatever we do. We should not deserve the fruits of our actions, since we are not the real agent. God is the real agent, therefore, only God deserves the fruits of all actions. This implies that our actions cannot be the subject of moral judgement. If this is true then virtue, sin, attainment of *mokṣa* etc. cannot be accounted for. But I think so far as the philosophy of *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā* is concerned this problem can be solved. In our previous discussion we have seen that the metaphysics of *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā* is similar to the metaphysics of *Sāṁkhya* School to some extent. In both of them *Purūṣa* is considered as conscious but inactive and *prakṛti* is regarded as active but unconscious. The world is produced through the process of evolution. But evolution is taken place when both *Purūṣa* and *Prakṛti* come in contact. *Prakṛti* alone is not capable of creating the world. From this it can be concluded that no action can be performed by *prakṛti* or our body alone, it can be done by both *prakṛti* / body and *Purūṣa* / soul. This fact has been reflected by the well- known story of the blind man and the lame man of the *Sāṁkhya* Philosophy. Neither the lame man nor the blind man alone is able to come out from the jungle, since the lame man could see but could not walk, the blind man, the other, could walk but could not see. But when the lame man sat on the shoulder of the blind man and gave the direction of path and accordingly the blind man walked following that direction they came out from the jungle. Here both of them have got equal contribution towards the fulfillment of their mission. In that sense both of them should be considered as agents of the same action. I think the truth of the same can be testified by our day-to-day experience. Suppose one likes to go from one place to another on foot. No one can deny the fact that the act of walking is taken place by our body. But it is also true that unless and until our soul gives direction to our body to do the same our body cannot walk. Thus, it is seen that both our body and soul are agents of one and the same activity.

The hints of the fact that in one sense *Purūṣa*/soul is *kartā*, is available in the thirteenth chapter. Here it is stated by Śrīkṛṣṇa to Arjuna-

"Idaṁ śarīraṁ kounteya kṣetramityabhidhīyate/

Etad yo vetti taṁ prāhuḥ kṣetrajña iti tadvidaḥ//"[18]

This body is considered as the field of crop (*kṣetras*), and the knower of the field, soul, is regarded as the *kṣetrajña*. We know that in the field crops are cultivated,

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[18]*Śrīmadbhagavadgītā:13/2*

but it is cultivated by the farmer. In that sense the farmer is the agent or *kartā*. Likewise, the soul here stands for the farmer who cultivates our body. Keeping this in view Rāmaprasāda says *'Mon re kṛṣi kāja jānonā/ Emon mānava jamin roilo patīta/ Āvād korle pholto sonā//'*. The truth of this observation cannot be ignored. Apparently, we may think that our body/ *prakṛti* is the source of all types of problem. But this is not the fact. The body has nothing to do with good or bad. Whether our body will be harmful or beneficial it purely depends upon its use. If it is used in the good purpose then it is good, but if the same body is used in the bad purpose, then it is bad. One killer uses his body for killing someone, but the same body was used by mother Teresa for nursing the patient. Through the same mouth one utters slangs, but another chants the name of God or tells the story of *Rāmāyana* or *Mahābhārata*. Through the ear one likes to hear slangs, but another likes to hear different religious talks. One person is interested to see the naked pictures through his eyes, but another person, on the other, is interested to see the pictures of God, or the natural beauty through his eyes. One goes to prostitution on his feet, but another goes to the temple on his same feet. Through mind one thinks of harming others, but through the same mind other thinks of serving the society or worshiping God. So far as our discussion goes it is seen that our body cannot be an agent in true sense. It is actually nothing but the instrument at the hands of our soul. If this is true then why does the *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā* claim that the agent is our body/ *prakṛti* (27/3)? I think the answer to the same needs some clarification. Here in the *Gītā* our body is considered as agent of action in a specific sense. Though our foregoing discussion shows that we are the real agent, our body is an instrument at our hand, it works at our will, but in most of the cases it is otherwise. In most of the cases our body is not controlled by us, rather we are controlled by our body, i.e., *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. In fact, we are controlled by our *ṣaḍaripus*, i.e., *kāma*, *krodha*, *lobha*, *moha*, *mada* and *mātsarya*. All these *ṣaḍaripus* are nothing but the properties of the *prakṛti* or *triguṇas*. So, we are controlled by the *ṣaḍaripus*, it implies that we are, in fact, controlled by the *prakṛti*/body. In this case our body is not the instrument at our hands, rather we are the instrument at the hands of our body. Thus, the above statement of the *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā* that *prakṛti*/ our body is the agent of the action we perform, is justified. Our day-to-day experience also substantiates this truth. In most of the cases we cannot control our greed, anger, and so on, rather we ourselves are controlled by them, and thereby turns to be the dolls at the hands of them. In this context Arjuna asks the question,

"*Atha kena prayukto'yaṁ pāpaṁ carati Pūruṣaḥ/*

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Anicchannapi varṣñeya valādiva niyojitaḥ//"[19]

Arjuna says that one knows very well that what he is going to do is not morally right but in spite of that he cannot resist himself from doing the same. As if someone is pushing him from backside to do the same. He wants to know from Śrīkṛṣṇa, the Lord, who is pushing him to be engaged in doing the immoral activities?

Śrīkṛṣṇa in answering the same beautifully says-

"*Kāma eṣa krodha eṣa rajoguṇasamudbhavaḥ/*
Mahāśano mahāpāpmā viddhyenamiha vairiṇam//"[20]

In reply the Lord Śrīkṛṣṇa says that it is the desire and the anger which motivates and influences one to perform immoral activities against his will. This desire and anger is our real enemy.

It is also worthy to note here what is said by Duryodhana in this context '*Jānāmidharmaṁna ca me pravṛttiḥ, jānāmi adharma na ca me nivṛttiḥ*'. Duryadhana openly confesses that he knows very well what is right and what is wrong, but he does not have any inclination to do what is right and cannot restrain himself from doing what is wrong. But if this is taken to be true then the same problem mentioned above comes back. In this case one cannot be taken as responsible for whatever he does, since he is not the real agent, the real agent is the body/*prakṛti*. I think if we are to solve this problem then we have to put our attention to the advice of Śrīkṛṣṇa. In the *Gītā* Śrīkṛṣṇa repeatedly advises us to be a *yogī*, *muni*, *sthitaprajña*. Only a common man, a man of ignorance, is controlled by our body/ *prakṛti*, i.e., *ṣaḍaripus*. But a real *yogī*, man of knowledge, controls the same instead of being controlled by it. Our body or *ṣaḍaripus* are under the control of a true *yogī*, this is why a *yogī* is called *jitendriya*. A real *yogī* or *sthitaprajña* is indifferent of the pleasure as well as pain, he is devoid of all sorts of material attachment, fear and anger. Śrīkṛṣṇa says-

"*Duḥkheṣvanudvignamanāḥ sukheṣu vigataspṛhaḥ/*
Vītarāgabhayakrodhaḥ sthitadhīrmunirucyate//"[21]

He further says-

"*jñānavijñānatṛptātmā kuṭastho vijitendriyaḥ/*
Yukta ityucyate yogī samaloṣṭāśmakāncanaḥ//"[22]

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[19]*Śrīmadbhagavadgītā:* 3/36
[20] Ibid: 3/37
[21] *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā*: 2/56
[22] Ibid: 6/8

A real *yogī* is satisfied only with knowledge. His senses are under his control. Iron and gold are equal to him. Friend and enemy, criticism and praise are equal to him. In this context the *Gītā* says-

"*Samaḥśatrou ca mitre ca tathā mānāpamānayoḥ//*"[23]

Thus, it is seen that a *yogī* is not under the control of our body/ *prakṛti*, rather the body /*prakṛti* itself is the control of him. So, he is a real agent, he enjoys the freedom of his will. Whatever he does he does so with his own will. Such a person is responsible for his work. So far as our discussion is concerned, it is seen that only a *yogī* enjoys the freedom of his will, but an ordinary man, a man of ignorance, does not have any freedom of will. He is nothing but an instrument at the hands of his body/ *prakṛti*. If so then he, the man of ignorance should not be punished for what he is doing. But according to our *Śāstra* such a person is punished. He is sent to hell. How can it be accounted for then? The answer is simple. Here the person himself is responsible for his present condition. He did not try to overcome from this condition. A person who has turned into a *yogī* has done so at his own will. Likewise, an ordinary man, a man of ignorance, also would turn himself into a *yogī* if he could try his best. As he did not do so, he is worthy of being punished.

Now let us deal with another problem. So far as our discussion goes, we have seen that we are the real agent of our actions. If this is true, how can then the observation of Rāmaprasāda, Śrīrāmakṛṣṇadeva, *Caitanyacaritāmṛta* and *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā* that we are the instruments at the hands of God be accounted for? If we are the car or chariot and God is the driver or charioteer then God should be responsible if any accident is taken place. Here the car or the chariot does not have any freedom of will. The same holds good with us, the human being. The murderer should not be punished since he does not have any freedom of will. No doubt this objection appears to be sound. But our careful reflection shows us a beautiful solution. The car or the chariot itself may be responsible to some extent for any accident. If on the way the break gets fail then in that case the responsibility of the car or the chariot cannot be denied. Besides this, the human being is not unconscious like the car or the chariot, it is very much conscious. By the very definition a conscious being enjoys freedom, otherwise it cannot be a conscious being. A triangle by the very definition must have three angles, otherwise it cannot be a triangle. The matter by the very definition must have some extension. Likewise, a human being must have some freedom of will, since

[23]Ibid: 12/18

he is conscious. Here the comparison of human being with car or chariot has been made in a special sense. In fact, in Indian Ethics there is indeterminism within the boundary of determinism. There is no room for absolute freedom. We enjoy our limited freedom. I think the whole concept can be made clear with an example. In an industry there are a number of workers of different grades. All of them enjoy certain amount of freedom within their respective area. All of them perform their respective duty through the proper exercise of their own freedom. Accordingly, they are either rewarded with promotion or punished with demotion. But it is worthy to note that the freedom they enjoy is not unlimited. All of them are controlled by their higher authority, manager of the industry. In the same manner the manager also enjoys a lot of freedom. But his freedom again is not unlimited, since he is also controlled by the person who is the owner of that industry. Here we, our souls, stand for the manager, our bodies stand for the other workers and God stands for the owner of the industry. Another instance may be cited. In a football game all players enjoy freedom, but their freedom again is not unlimited. The freedom of them is limited by some rules exercised by the referee concerned. But though the freedom of the football players becomes limited by the referee, yet no one can say that they do not enjoy any freedom. Here one player passes the ball to any person he likes. Whether he himself will carry the ball up to the goal-keeper of the opponent party or he will pass the same to any person of his choice will be fully decided by himself. The rule or the referee has nothing to do. Our whole life is like a game. We are like the football players, and God is like the referee. As the football players are controlled by the referee, so we are controlled by the God. But in spite of being controlled by God we enjoy freedom like the football players. Third instance may be cited. We are like a cow tied with a rope in a field. Here the cow does not have unlimited freedom. Its freedom is limited by the rope. But yet it does not mean that the cow does not enjoy any freedom. Within the boundary of the rope the cow may exercise its freedom of choice. It may walk or run or sit down within the boundary of the rope. Likewise, we are also tied up by the rope of God. Here the 'rope of God 'stands for the *vidhis* and *niṣedhas* laid down by the *Śāstras*. But in spite of that we enjoy our freedom of will like the cow.

Here one may raise an objection: Determined or limited freedom is not freedom at all. By the very definition, freedom cannot be limited or determined. Determined freedom is something contradictory like the son of a barren mother. No doubt, this objection seems to be sound. But our careful logical analysis shows that this

objection does not hold good. Our day-to-day experience shows that unlimited freedom is not a real freedom. Unlimited freedom turns into autocracy. True freedom must be determined. One at his home has the freedom to play his sound box with as high volume as he likes. But the son of his neighbor appearing at the H.S. examination has equal right and freedom to study without being disturbed by others. Here the enjoyment of unlimited freedom by the former robs the right and freedom of the latter, and thus it turns into autocracy in the name of freedom. A river gets the taste of the freedom of the flow of its water within the boundary of its banks. Had there been no boundary of banks a river could not have been a river. Water remains water as long as it is within the boundary of the temperature of certain degree. The moment it transcends this boundary the water will remain no more water, it will turn into vapor. Similarly, a man is a man so far as he lives within the boundary of the *vidhi* and *niṣedha* laid down by the *Śāstras*. The moment one transcends this boundary he will turn into a beast. Keeping this in view our *Śāstra* says-

"*Dharmeṇā hīnaḥ paśubhiḥ samānāḥ/*"[24]

In fact, each and every state becomes meaningful due to its corresponding opposite state. Day is day because of the night. Pleasure is pleasure since there is pain and sufferings. Likewise, freedom is freedom because of bondage. Indeterminism is meaningful within the boundary of determinism. Thus, it is seen that the two objections mentioned above that there is no room for freedom of will in Indian Ethics, and indeterminism within the boundary of determinism is meaningless, do not hold good. It is worthy to note that if we are to construct an ideal society then the members of that society must enjoy limited freedom as it is suggested by our *Śāstras*. The moment one crosses the *lakṣmanrekhā* drawn by our *Śāstras* the society will turn into a hell. A true yogi, a *niṣkāmakarmī*, always works within the boundary of *lakṣmanrekhā*, he never crosses the same. Therefore, two-fold purpose is served by them -

(a) the wellbeing of the whole society (*lokasaṁgraha*) is established and (b) *Mokṣa* is attained.

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[24] *Suktisudha*

A CRITICAL EXPOSITION OF 'HUMAN NATURE' IN KANT'S
PERPETUAL PEACE

PRASHANT SHUKLA

A detailed description of the grand vision for 'world peace' has been presented in Immanuel Kant's 200 year old essay Perpetual Peace. Due credit is attributed to this seminal work on account of the lasting impact it made on peace studies, the conception of the United Nations and the realization of a new world-order based on everlasting peace. It is, however, to be noted here that the temporary conclusion is not about 'what will be' and 'how it can be realized', rather about 'what ought to be'. This objective is tentatively, though not conclusively, made in the very First Supplement of this work. Kant, here, doesn't give a description of the preconditions for acquisition of everlasting peace, but gets engaged in the issues pertaining the underlying rationale and justification of the entire enterprise.
With this context, the present paper proposes to have a closer look at the following questions: the notion, pervasive throughout Perpetual Peace, that 'human nature is necessarily evil' (the state of nature is the state of war); the notion that 'Nature, standing in for a divine Providence, employs the very inclinations that push people to make war guides them further towards eventual peace; and the possibility and desirability of going beyond a loose league of nations and achieve and integrated 'world republic'.

Throughout his essay (and some of his other writings), Kant builds on this assumption that human nature is evil or 'dissolute', a significant exodus from Rousseau's position . Experts presume that Kant borrowed this pessimistic view from Hobbes and it is an undeniable fact that this position recalls his English predecessor's state of nature as a 'war of all against all' (bellum omnium contra omnes, Leviathan, 1651). It is also true that Kant mentions Hobbes occasionally, but not necessarily in an approving way. If Kant rejects Hobbes' suggested solution of 'coercive rights' (of the sovereign) unduly brutal, it is first of all because his understanding of the state of things is fundamentally different. Kant's exposition of the 'fallen human nature' in his Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason is indispensable to be read if one is to comprehend how he believes that a decisive step can be taken toward a 'state of peace'. Here, he clearly conveys his belief in human beings' implicit proclivity to do evil, while at the same time being conscious of the categorical imperative to do what is right. In Religion as well as in Perpetual Peace, Kant's declarations are very close to the Biblical verses.

A detailed description of the grand vision for 'world peace' has been presented in Immanuel Kant's 200 year old essay *Perpetual Peace.* Due credit is attributed to this seminal work on account of the lasting impact it made on peace studies, the conception of the United Nations and the realization of a new world-order based on everlasting peace. It seems apt at this point to draw attention to the fact that the tentative conclusion reached here is not about 'what will be' and 'how it can be realized', rather about 'what ought to be'. This objective is tentatively, though not conclusively, asserted in the *First Supplement* of *Perpetual Peace*. Kant, here, doesn't give a description of the 'preconditions' for acquisition of everlasting

peace, but gets engaged in the issues pertaining the 'underlying rationale and justification of the entire enterprise'.

With this context, the present paper proposes to have a finer understanding of the following issue: the idea, persistent throughout *Perpetual Peace*, is that 'human nature is essentially evil' (the state of nature is nothing but the state of war); the notion that 'Nature, standing in for a divine Providence, employs the very inclinations that push people to make war guides them further towards eventual peace; and the possibility and desirability of going beyond a loose league of nations and achieve and integrated 'world republic'.

Throughout his essay (and some of his other writings), Kant builds on this presumption that human nature is evil or 'dissolute', a significant exodus from Rousseau's position[1]. However, some expert commentators are of the opinion that Kant's exposition bears indubitable inkling towards both Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In fact, Geismann clearly mentions:

> "…standing on the high shoulder of Hobbes and Rousseau, Kant… was able to look into a limitless land of liberty and peace."[2]

It is worth-mentioning here that Rousseau's Judgment on a *Plan for Perpetual Peace* was published in 1761 and Bentham's *A Plan for a Universal and Perpetual Peace* was published in 1786 (approximately): the two valuable theses caught Kant's attention and thereby, generated high regard both for Rousseau and Bentham.[3] However, as against the two mentioned thinkers, the underlying tone of Kant's work is repeatedly redolent of Voltairian humor (without its sarcasm), but the intention is quite somber.

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[1] Kant was really far from sharing the often apparent forms of 18[th]c. optimism. Despite his appreciation for Rousseau, Kant did not share with him the belief that humans are born naturally good. Neither did he believe, with the popular philosophers, that progress was possible at the hands of enlightened cultural pioneers. He, quite contrarily, shared Voltaire's rather pessimistic estimation of civilization as something significant that, nevertheless, gave little reason to hope for a radical improvement in human nature.

[2] Georg Geismann, "Why Kant's teachings on peace are of practical use and why those of Fichte, Hegel, and Marx are already wrong in theory", *Kritisches Jahrbuch der Philosophie*, 1 (1996) pp.no. 37-51.

[3] Published posthumously as part of *The Principles of International Law* (Though Bentham's life and work as a whole chronologically follow rather than precede Kant's, this particular work was thus written a few years prior to Kant's *Perpetual Peace).*

Experts presume that Kant borrowed this pessimistic view from Hobbes and it is an undeniable fact that this position recalls his English predecessor's state of nature as a 'war of all against all' (*bellum omnium contra omnes, Leviathan*, 1651). It is also true that Kant mentions Hobbes occasionally, but not necessarily in an approving way. If Kant rejects Hobbes' suggested solution of 'coercive rights' (of the sovereign) as overly vicious, it is first of all because his basic understanding of the state of things is fundamentally distinct.

Kant's exposition of the 'fallen human nature' in his *Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason* is indispensable to be read if one is to comprehend how he believes that a crucial move can be taken toward the 'state of peace'. Here, he clearly conveys his belief in human beings' implicit proclivity to do evil, while at the same time being conscious of the categorical imperative to do what is right.[4]

Kant, with a natural leaning in favor of the abstract speculation, suggests that the thesis he proposes in *Perpetual Peace* is no threat to the authority, rather he aspires for something else: In the *Second Supplement* of *Perpetual Peace* ("*Secret Article for Perpetual Peace*"), Kant actually prescribes that rulers and princes should seek the guidance and suggestions of the philosophers, who can thus be understood to be 'prophets of reason'.[5]

Kant's essay has two decisive advantages that give it long-lasting value:

1) It is very precise and definitive, rather than vaguely utopian and,
2) It proposes a realistic solution to a rather political problem[6]

When Kant authored *Perpetual Peace* in 1795, the incidents of the French Revolution had already been unfolding for quite a few years. It is worth mentioning here that just two years before, in 1793, Kant had also authored his clearly theological work, the frequently criticized *Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason* within the boundaries of reason alone. This work has been assailed and criticized by Christians as anti-religious text garbed as a rational religion, an atrocity as per their view. It has equally been assailed by the 'enlightened

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[4] In *Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason* as well as in *Perpetual Peace*, Kant's declarations seem really close to the Biblical verses.
[5] It is to be noted that Kant absolutely rejects Plato's idea of the 'philosopher king'. See *Perpetual Peace*, p.no. 34
[6] As noted by A.C.F. Beales, it "lifts the discussion of war and peace far above the level of politics" and makes it a timeless question of ethics and conscience "The Evolution of Theories on War and Peace." In: *The History of Peace* (London: G. Bell & Sons Ltd., 1931).

thinkers' such as Johann Wolfgang von Goethe who saw in it a testimony that Kant had finally surrendered to the lures of communicating in the conventional-religious terminology of 'sin', 'evil' and 'redemption' to soothe the Christian enterprise.[7] The fact is that in his *Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason,* Kant employs biblical/religious language in such a way which he has not done in any of his other works, though here also, he never leaves the typical stance of a rationalist (quite expected from him).

Recent commentators have persuasively made known that this work was neither an exodus from critical philosophy nor the concluding testimony of profaneness and agnostic inclinations. In fact, it is commonly presumed (with a considerable consensus) that, in his *First Critique*, Kant had blown up the very idea of a theoretical understanding about ultimate entities (including God). In his *Second Critique*, he persisted on the predominance of duty (i.e. the categorical imperative) irrespective of its penalties and plunders. Of course, Kant does reflect on the upcoming effects of our conducts in his contentious moral evidence for the existence of God and everlasting life, but that concern is quite otherworldly in nature. However, it is precisely the *Third Critique* that suggests something unique with its proposal of a teleological rationalization to this world's existence and nature.

His *Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason* characterizes a prolongation of the *Critique of Judgment* and is proposed to illustrate the unavoidable necessity of religion in addition to ethics. Kant reiterates that moral action is self-sufficient and has no need for a purpose to make use of itself. But, at the same time, he adds that the idea of purpose cannot be overlooked either, because "reason cannot possibly remain indifferent to the question of the outcome of our right action."[8] In spite of the otherworldly accent in the work, one would anticipate finding something explicitly dedicated to the theme of religion; Kant discusses that 'outcome of our right action' in definitely this-worldly terms. That is why, in the third part of the *Religion* comes to the following finish:

> "Unnoticed by human eyes, the good principle is constantly at work… to establish a government and a kingdom representing a

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[7] Goethe-Briefe, (ed.) Stein, Berlin 1924, p.no. 37. In the beginning, Schiller shared Goethe's critical opinion but, after re-reading the work cautiously, he changed his position.

[8] Kant, Immanuel, *Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason*, (*Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft,* 1793), Akademie-Ausgabe VI, De Gruyter, 1968, p.no.5.

victory over the evil principle. Under its sovereignty, the world should be guaranteed eternal (perpetual) peace."[9]

The above illustration makes clear the connection between the *Religion's* 'Kingdom of God' and the secular counterpart of *Perpetual Peace*. Though it might not seem a good idea to a political philosopher, the religious heredity of Kant's conceptualization of *Perpetual Peace* conducive to a 'league of nations' is a fact and therefore, could not be overlooked.

As asserted in the very beginning of this paper, Kant throughout his essay *Perpetual Peace* (as well as some of his other writings), builds on the presumption that human nature is evil or 'dissolute', expert commentators have presumed that Kant borrowed this pessimistic stance from Hobbes and it is incontestable idea that Kant's position brings forth the possibility (no matter how feeble) that his 'league of nation' might be replaced by the negative substitute of a lasting, ever-escalating federation' that would, however, always be at the mercy of a change of mind. Therefore, there is a progressive as well as a retrogressive notion of a well-intentioned, yet limited 'League of Nations' and the grand dream of 'one Unified Nation'.

Kant unmistakably asserts his conviction in human beings' natural inclination to do evil, but at the same time, he acknowledges the role of categorical imperative to act as per 'what is right'. In Religion, his assertions to this effect hold proximity to the biblical verses. It is interesting to mention here that at several occasions, we find that he deliberately adjusts his text along with biblical excerpts: a rather exceptional incidence in his philosophical endeavors. Therefore, Kant could not be established as typical eighteenth century optimistic thinkers. Despite his high regard for Rousseau, he does not seem to approve Rousseau's emphasis on 'inherent goodness' of human nature being corrupted by the society itself. Quite surprisingly, he also denies the possibility of such leaders who are enlightened and thereby apt to lead the society and its culture. He, rather, looks inclined towards the 'pessimistic appraisal of civilization' presented by Voltaire as a noteworthy exposition, which provides enough reason to look forward towards progress of the human situation.

Broadly speaking, Kant is of the opinion that though it is human nature that it is inclined towards evil (original sin), but then, it is their conscience which

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[9] Kant, Immanuel, *Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason*, etc., p.no.124.

categorically enlightens them that the only possible action that is rationally approvable would be the one which is right: now this is the thing which the humans cannot do unconditionally on account of their nature. He mentions in Religion that 'it is quite rational to believe that there must be a Supreme Being that gives us the necessary support once we set out to do good and mean it seriously'. It may be rightly said, therefore, that Kantian approach is essentially a Christian approach manifested in his rationalistic language. These Christian postulates are professed in a purely formal manner, which was quite strange to new-age reader. The theory of duty implying to do what is good is itself rational: It is the only conduct that would be sensible in a broad sense. Also, to do evil is not merely a wrong thing to do, but it is also unreasonable. The reason for such explanation is that no one can expect every other person to act in this manner and yet expect the world to become as we want it to be. This is precisely what forms the basic understanding of *Perpetual Peace*.

This kind of understanding helps us to comprehend Kant's position as he talks about the slyness of Nature (in his First Supplement of *Perpetual Peace*):

> "The guarantee of *Perpetual Peace* is nothing less than that great artist, nature (*natura daedala rerum*). In her mechanical course, we see that her aim is to produce a harmony among men, against their will and indeed through their discord. As a necessity working according to laws we do not know, we call it destiny. But, considering its design in world history, we call it 'providence', in as much as we discern in it the profound wisdom of a higher cause which predetermines the course of nature and directs it to the objective final end of the human race."[10]

He, further, adds that:

> "The use of the word 'nature' is more fitting to the limits of human reason and more modest than an expression indicating providence unknown to us. This is especially true when we are dealing with questions of theory and not of religion, as at present, for human

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[10] Kant, Immanuel, *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*, Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill, 1984 (*Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf*, 1795) p.no. 24.

reason in questions of the relation of effects to their causes must remain within the limits of possible experience."[11]

Kant's hint towards the divine destiny as an unflinching ground for *Perpetual Peace* is rarely observed by the readers: the only sensible explanation might be that the people sincerely interested in *Perpetual Peace* are those having a firm background as well as training in political philosophy, with little or no inclination towards theological conjectures. This divine thesis, in its subtle form, might be seen as a linkage to Aristotelian *telos* which maintains synchronization in the relationships of humans as well as the states. It is also worth noting, here, that Kant's enthrallment by the notion of a purpose in nature corresponding to the purpose of human actions, is also present in his *Critique of Judgment*: The beauty and purposiveness of nature's design leads Kant to regurgitate the notion of divine providence. It is thus not surprising at all that he affirms:

> "In a morally practical point of view, however, which is directed exclusively to the supersensuous, the concept of the divine concursus is quite suitable and even necessary. We find this, for instance, in the belief that God will compensate for our own lack of justice, provided our intention was genuine; that He will do so by means that are inconceivable to us, and that therefore we should not relent in our endeavor after the good."[12]

Kant's broad moral idea, in context of his personal ethics as well as in context of international relations, is that whatever we are given as a moral duty must, by definition, be attainable ('Ought implies Can'). As always, his rationalization is not based on the supposition that an always uncertain good will might perform the designated job for us, but on the contrary, it also does not eliminate the possibility of that good will. We thus have a three-layer assurance that *Perpetual Peace* will be attained:

- First, it does not depend on charity/compassion/generosity, but on sheer reason.
- Second, since reason is the guiding force for our moral behavior (I should not exempt myself from putting the whole community first, just because it is my nature), such behavior must be achievable in reality.

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[11] Kant, Immanuel, *Perpetual Peace*, etc., p.no. 26.
[12] Kant, Immanuel, *Perpetual Peace*, etc., p.no. 25-26.

- Third, since an obvious though mysterious deficiency forbids most of us from attaining that goal completely, we can and we ought expect some guidance from divine providence, to which Kant refers in a sophisticated manner as the 'working of nature'.

But it is not difficult to see that this three-layered guarantee is nonetheless just 'a limited assurance'. Kant's most influencing and practical argument is that the spirit of trade, 'sooner or later gains the upper hand in every state', is 'incompatible with war', and thus assures the acquisition of peace 'sufficiently from a practical viewpoint' even though a theoretical certainty remains obscure. Here, as we see, Kant replicates his classic distinction between theoretical security and practical assurance- one of the kinds of 'Is-Ought dichotomy'.

RE-READING DESCARTES' COGITO: A STUDY

AKOIJAM THOIBISANA

The issues and problems surrounding the Cogito have fascinated humans for many centuries. It has influenced all kinds of modern philosophy, as well as literature, art, social science, and religion. It was introduced first by Descartes in his Discourse on Method which was published in French as Je pense, donc je suis (1637) and later appeared in Latin as Cogito, Ergo Sum in his Principles of Philosophy. (1644) Husserl took up Descartes' Cogito to give the form of transcendental; Heidegger directly assaulted it as an isolated subject that even fail to address the metaphysical question of subject itself; Sartre's existential philosophy however was founded on a different version of Cogito whose certainty was never clear and distinct; Lacan's, on the other hand, gave an obsessional psychoanalytical reading of modern subject in terms of the truth of Descartes' Cogito. There is also the (in)famous debate between Foucault and Derrida on the idea of Cogito and Madness, at the end of the twentieth century, that drifted apart the two thinkers. The Cogito has also been a topic of interest among other thinkers like Ryle, Wittgenstein, Russell, Willaims, and many more. The paper seeks to bring out the most complicated debates of Descartes' Cogito, which otherwise is also taken to be very simple, clear, and distinct. It is divided into three sections. First, is the preamble to the 'Cogito' in terms of 'a thinking thing'. Second, seeks to re-read Descartes' Cogito as opening the era of the modern subject, or the Cartesian subject. Third, is an attempt to give some insight on the contemporary debate centering around the same. The crux of the paper is to give an appraisal of the various readings of Descartes' Cogito.

* All quotations on Descartes' are from *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*. Trans. Cottingham. J. Stoothoff. R and Murdoch .D. Cambridge University Press. The work is abbreviated as PWD.

I

Preamble to Descartes' Cogito

After going through the rigorous process of doubting everything Descartes was left with nothing. He asked if there is anything that can be known to be true, and that can survive the process of doubt. It is here that he conceived that whereas there was nothing in all the world, no heaven, no earth, no minds, nor any bodies; I myself did exist since I persuaded myself of something, or merely because I thought of something. And, whereas there can be some deceiver or other, who is very powerful and very cunning, and who even employs his ingenuity in deceiving me, I still exist without doubt, if he deceives me. So, Descartes in his *Meditation II* writes,

"..let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. (WDP: 17)

This reflection brings the doubt to a halt for the first time. He thus discovered that there was one thing that could never be doubted, namely the fact that he was doubting or thinking. And 'I exist' as something who is doubting or thinking so much so that it can be said that 'in order to doubt, one must exist.'

Descartes also added,

" that this proposition, *I am, I exist*, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind." (WDP:17)

In the *Discourse*, Descartes already conceived that the 'I' is not a body but a substance whose essence or nature is 'to think.' This 'I 'for Descartes is the 'soul', the existence of which does not need any place, nor does it depend on many material things. In his *Discourse*, Descartes writes,

"this 'I'-that is, the soul by which I am what I am - is entirely distinct from the body, and indeed is easier to know than the body, and would not fail to be whatever it is, even if the body did not exist." (WDP: 127)

Descartes also noted that the 'I' even though it assures him of having made a true assertion, 'I think, therefore I am,' was nevertheless not quite perfect. He argues that the 'I' lacks perfection because 'the I know some perfection which I did not possess.' To quote Descartes,

"..that since I knew of some perfection that I did not possess, I was not the only being which existed, but there had of necessity to be some other, more perfect being on which I depended and from which I had acquired all that I possessed." (WDP: 128)

Descartes admitted that 'I' is imperfect and went on to prove the existence of the perfect Being, which was God, in his *Third* and *Fifth Meditation*. However, it was only in the *Second Meditation* that the formulation of the Cogito as the necessary truth to the claim that 'I am, I exist,' was most implicitly set out. The *Meditation* (especially *II*) was a claim that adds to the more familiar formulation of the Cogito as given in the *Discourse*. So, whereas in the *Discourse*, the Cogito is offered as something of which he is certain and also the ground that assures his existence; in the *Meditation*s, Descartes moves towards the ontological aim of doubt. Here the focus of attention was not on the Cogito as something of which he is certain. In the *Meditation* Descartes also dropped the copula 'therefore' and instead writes, 'I am, I exist' (although it is implicit that the 'I am' is connected to

'I doubt' or 'I think'). So, Ricoeur in his essay, *The Crisis of the 'Cogito,'* asserts that the statement must be read as "in order to doubt, one must exist." (1996: 60)

Again, Bernard Williams in his work *Descartes The Project of Pure Enquiry* argued that the focus of Descartes' attention in the *Meditation* was primarily to express the nature of the Cogito. He claims that Descartes was more concerned with displaying the accurate meaning of the Cogito itself. Hence, the question that Descartes raises after the certainty of Cogito's existence in 'I am, I exist,' is about 'what I am.' Now, this question of 'what I am' is also the question of whereas I am conscious that I exist, the I who knows that I exist, inquire into 'what I am'. And, Descartes writes,

"But I do not yet have a sufficient understanding of what this 'I' is, that now necessarily exists." (WDP: 17)

It is observed that here Descartes makes a shift from the question 'who is the Cogito,' to the 'what is the Cogito.' It is also a shift from the absolute use of the term Cogito as, 'I am, I exist,' to the predicative use of the same as 'I am something.'

But what something? The first reply that Descartes gave was 'to be a man.' He further asked "But what is a man?" (WDP: 17)) He refuses to go with the Aristotelian answer of a 'reasonable animal' for this demands furthermore inquire about other questions like 'what is an animal,' and 'what is reasonable,' and so on. In other words, Descartes refuses to designate the 'I' to the nature of the body, but to the 'thoughts' (*cogitatio*) that spring up in his mind/ soul. 'Thought' according to Descartes is an attribute that belongs to the thinker. To quote him,

"thought; this alone is inseparable from me. I am, I exist- that is certain. But for how long? For as long as I am thinking. For it could be that were I totally to cease from thinking, I should totally cease to exist." (WDP: 18)

He continues,

"I am not admitting anything except what is necessarily true. I am, then, in the strict sense only a thing that thinks; that is I am a mind, or intelligence, or intellect, or reason- words whose meaning I have been ignorant of until now." (WDP: 18)

He concluded that,

" But for all that I am a thing which is real and which truly exists. But what kind of a thing? As I have just said- a thinking thing." (WDP: 18)

Hence, the 'I' receives the status of a thinking thing. So, the next question is, what then is [this] thinking thing? In other words, what is a thing which thinks? To this Descartes replies,

" A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions." (WDP:19)

Since it is my being the 'I' who is now doubting everything, who also understands certain things, and who affirms as well as denies things, and who also desires, and imagines many things, who is averse from being deceived, and sometimes despite his will, and who also perceives many likewise, etc., even in sleep and thought; Descartes, argued that it is 'I' who imagines, even if none of the things that I imagine is true, the 'I' still has the power of imagination. And this power of imagination really exists and forms part of my thought. Hence, it is the 'I' who has sensations, and who is also aware of objects as though by the senses, since indeed it is the same I, who feels and perceives certain things. As Descartes writes,

"Lastly, it is also the same 'I; who has sensory perceptions, or is aware of bodily things as it were through the sense." For example, I am now seeing light, hearing a noise, feeling heat." (WDP: 19)

But since, all these phenomena can be false, as in dreams, (I see light, I hear noise, and I feel heat even in dreams) they are *cogitation* (or act of thinking) in so far as Descartes identifies them as the purely mental element of the experience. In the *Principles,* Descartes reduces all forms of consciousness or conscious experience into two general kinds namely one of cognition (*perceptio*), and the other is volition. The former is the operation of the intellect; the latter is the operation of the will. Descartes in his *Principles*, Part I, also noted that sensation, imagination, and pure intellect are just various forms of cognition; and desires, aversion, assertion, denial, doubt, are various forms of volition.

In other words, all these are a variety of mental operations that are actually inseparable from the 'I', who experience them. Taken this way, the Cogito as a 'thinking thing' (*res cogitans*) is not different from *cogitatio* (my thoughts). Here,

it may be noted that the *cogitatio* (in Latin, from the verb *cogitare*) and *pensée* (the French verb *penser*) have a wider significance than the English translation, *think* and *thought*. Whereas in English such terms are connected only with cognitive process, for Descartes it includes any sort of conscious state or activity whatsoever. As Bernard William noted that 'it is also a sensation in its purely psychological aspects' or 'an act of will, as judgment or belief or intellectual questioning.' (2005:62)

It follows that, what Descartes has doubted earlier, specific propositions that presuppose the existence of the body and the physical world, like, 'I am denying that I have a body', or 'it seems to me as though I can feel heat' and others that are ruled out by the doubt, are now accepted as types of *cogitatio* in so far as these are experiences that exist merely as a mental phenomenon. All these kinds of *cogitatio*, (although they are referred to, only after Descartes proved his own existence) are bound up with the 'thinking thing' of the Cogito. Hence, these *cogitationes* argue William is part of Descartes' Cogito that is considered as certain and self-evident, whenever he says that the existence of his thought is also certain and self-evident. (2005: 64)

This enumeration of the Cogito as 'I am thinking,' and also 'I feel cheerful,' or ' I believe what you say,' and so on, that is, in short Descartes' Cogito with the 'I' as the first person starting point, posits the question of the subject in modern philosophy. Following is an account of reading Descartes' Cogito in terms of the modern subject.

II

[Reading] Descartes' Cogito and the Question of Cartesian Subject

Modern philosophy has postulated Cogito as a Cartesian subject that is capable of making free and rational decisions. It addresses the position of the philosopher who is going through his hypothesis and doubts. It is a philosophical subject that remains constant in the statement, whoever occupies that place. The 'I' in Descartes' 'I think' does not work the moment it is replaced by 'Descartes thinks, therefore he is.' That is, whereas the writing of Descartes' *Meditations* is autobiographical, they are purely fictional because the 'I' occupies the slot of demonstration. That is, the Cogito is the Cartesian subject of demonstrative 'I' which is nonetheless difficult to define. This idea of the Cogito in terms of the demonstrative 'I' was also discussed by A.J. Ayer in his essay, *Cogito, Ergo Sum* published in 1953.

Descartes resorted to the example of wax argument to answer the nature of 'I' which he referred to as 'something I know not what,' but that which does not fall under imagination. After examining a piece of wax, he exclaimed,

"for if I judge that wax exists from the fact that I see it, clearly this same fact entails much more evidently that I myself also exist." (WDP: 22)

Thereafter Descartes postulates the Cogito as a subject of the thinking thing, imbibed with soul and capable of thought and rational deliberation. It is a non-material substance that is without any material existence. It is a thinking substance, that is, the *res cogitans* (thinking thing) that is different from the *res extensa* (extended thing). The latter comprises the material part of the body. Descartes considered animals to be automata, composed completely of *res extensa* and operating only on the basis of automatic reflexes. It follows that the Cartesian Cogito are also humans or rather human subjects who are endowed with the *res cogitans*, the immaterial substance which is commonly referred to as the 'I'.

Following Descartes' line of inquiry, it is observed that Descartes never actually questioned the existence of a metaphysical substratum for consciousness, or the elusive 'self'. The grammatical use of the term 'I' was never put into the spectrum of metaphysical 'I'. In fact, it was Hume who first questioned the existence of the metaphysical, self-conscious self. Hume argues that the state of consciousness is not indicative of its metaphysical substratum. In his *A Treatise of Human Nature*, (1739-40) Hume noted that conscious states exist separately from each other and have no need of a substratum. Hume rejected the existence of a metaphysical self and defined 'self' as nothing but a collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations. He assumes that we only *feel* a connection between different conscious states, that are always about thoughts in the past. This is because, for Hume, I cannot, no matter how hard I try, think of something and, at one and the same time, think that I am thinking of that something. For Hume, it is only the present conscious state that we are aware of, and it is only in this present state that we are also aware of past conscious states which are relegated to memory. Hence, it is not a series of conscious states that is aware of itself, but a present conscious state, also known as 'memory state.' Hume concluded that it is this experience of the memory that gives the feeling of 'self'. Hence, the demonstrative 'I' of Cartesian Cogito or Descartes' metaphysical subject of consciousness 'I' is devoid of descriptive content. It is used merely for

grammatical convenience. This is because the 'self' cannot have a logical construct. Ayer in his *Metaphysics and Common Sense* also revised the Cogito proposition to 'there is a thought now'. This has its own epistemological problems. (1971:166-8)

The Cartesian Cogito and its nature of self or 'I' was also challenged by the German philosopher Kant. The Cartesian 'I' according to Kant is not a 'thing' in the world either as material or immaterial. Kant explains it as that aspect of experiences that combines a diverse range of sensory inputs into a point of time. That is, the thinking subject, (in the capacity of a subject as the 'I', 'ego', or 'self') creates a meaningful world of experience by unifying all its perceptions according to the categories of human understanding. The 'I' then is not a potential object of experience, it can be known only as it appears to human observation (as a phenomenon), and not as it is in itself; that is, it is a presupposition of experience, that is a structural feature of our consciousness. It is what he called the *Transcendental Unity of Apperception*.

Now, Hegel took over the idea of 'I' as a structural feature of the mind's operation. He however added that it is constituted by the process of reflectively mediating itself with itself. In his preface to *Phenomenology of Spirit,* (1809) Hegel argues that the 'I' or self is a subject that is derived from the Aristotelian physics of 'the unmoved which is also self-moving.' That is, the subject has a *prima facie* case for subjectivity, that which is not moved by an outside force, but which propels itself. Hegel further identifies this power to move, this subject as pure negativity. This subjective self-motion comes not from any pure or simple kernel of authentic individuality, but from what Hegel calls the bifurcation of the simple; the doubling which sets up the opposition, and then again, the negation of this indifferent diversity and of its anti-thesis. Hence, the subject for Hegel is modus *operandi*, that, which cuts, splits, and introduces distinctions by injecting negation into the flow of sense-perceptions. Following this, subjectivity is a kind of structural effect of diffusion and refraction that occurs around a field of negativity. In this sense, it is a second-order effect, that is, 'the negation of the negation.' The subject experiences itself as a unity only by purposively negating the very diversity it itself had produced.

However, it was the phenomenology of the twentieth century that gave a radical turn to the Cartesian Cogito. Husserl in his aim to achieve knowledge of 'apodictic certainty' through his phenomenological method, criticizes Descartes

for his failure to make the transcendental turn. He asserts that far from being pure, the Cartesian Cogito is none other than a psychological apperception with an empirical component that still needs phenomenological reduction. Husserl in his book *Cartesian Mediation* noted in the first meditation that Descartes stands on the threshold of the greatest of all discoveries; yet he does not grasp its proper sense; the sense namely of transcendental subjectivity.

Following Husserl's orientation towards the question of origin, Heidegger readdresses the question of Cartesian Cogito. Heidegger interpreted the subject of Cartesian Cogito as the 'ego,' the 'I' or '*res cogitans'* that is beyond doubt. According to Heidegger, the Cartesian Cogito is a thing, where doubts begin, but that which itself cannot be doubted. It is the thinking substance that can doubt anything but cannot be doubted itself. It can doubt anything, but not its own thinking. That is, the Cogito with its thoughts is the Cogito with its own cognitive images, with its own contents (of the worldly things) that are beyond doubt. Here, the 'ego' as a subject has its predicates in a cognizing way, such that the 'I' know about the predicates that the ' I have,' in a way that I know myself. It is the first true being, that also has priority over all other beings. It is the knower, who knows the object as it is represented in the mind/soul. Hence, Heidegger in his work, *The Basic Problem of Phenomenology*, noted that the Cogito's as '*res cogitans*' also means '*cogitat se cogitare*." (1982: 126) So, whereas Descartes has liberated philosophy from theology when he grounded his notion of subject, (the ego, the I, *res cogitans*) and subjectivity on his epistemology; Heidegger argues that the subject who thinks, represents, perceives, judges, agree, loves, hates, strives, etc. is a *res cogitans* whose realities are always representations. (1982: 126)

The phenomenological analysis of *Dasein* in Heidegger's *Being and Time* (1927) raises the question of Being, who must be disclosed in its Being. It also raises the question of the primordial sense of Being that is different from all other beings. The latter is the Cartesian model of the 'idea of man' or things that can be understood in terms of the concept '*res extensa'*. That is, in terms of its physical and mechanical dimensions of being. Heidegger reformulated the fundamental problem of ontology (from the ontological constitution of the ego, subject in terms of self-consciousness) to the *Dasein* modes of being in terms of its authentic existence. He argues that *Dasein* as 'Being-in-the-world,' is always involved in a world in such a way that 'I' or the subject in the everyday interpretation of the self has a tendency to understand itself in terms of the world

with which it is concerned. Following this, what is significant in the question of subject (of Being) is the *Dasein modes of existence*, instead of *subject as self-consciousness*. Heidegger maintains that the self or the subject is an understanding determined by mood and not pure consciousness. With the point of departure from pure consciousness, the self or subject in Heidegger lies in *Dasein's* 'facticity' which is given in the unity of 'thrownness' and 'projection,' and in moodiness and understanding. Hence, Heidegger redefined the Cartesian sense of subject or *subjectum* in terms of the primordial, existential, and ontological basis of *Dasein*. In other words, the essence of *Dasein* lies in its existence. Hence, the I-hood and selfhood of *Dasein* is always given existentially and understood existentially and ontologically, rather than existentially and ontically in its own Being as Being-in-the-world. Heidegger thereby concluded that the Cartesian understating of the notion of the 'ego' or the 'self' or the 'Cogito' is a mere epistemological principle that has failed to address the most primordial question of Being. And insofar as the Cartesian Cogito is *res cognitans* or a representation or a substance, that is always given as present-at-hand, it has remained an isolated subject.

This notion of the Cogito as an isolated Cartesian subject is as good as saying that the Cogito is not a subject. A similar viewpoint could be retrieved when Spinoza relegates in his *Ethics*, (1677) that the discourse of infinite substance alone deserves to be a foundation. The Cogito if it is separated from the consciousness of God makes a clean break from the order of reason, and losses the value of a foundation. It also denatured the image of the self. And, in so far as the true Cogito is the Cogito attached to God, either it has the value of a foundation, or it is founded on its finite condition of the idea of perfection. As Ricoeur writes,

" A cogito seems open to us here: either the Cogito has the value of a foundation, but then it is a sterile truth which can not be pursued without a break in the order of reasons; or it is founded on its finite condition of the idea of perfection and the first truth loses its halo of first foundation." (1996: 65)

Ricoeur thereby noted that going by the Spinozian account of the transmutation of the Cogito from the *Second* to the *Third Meditation*, it is observed that the Cartesian Cogito is no more than an abstract, truncated truth, that is stripped of all its prestige. (1996:66)

The academic line of Western philosophy has succeeded to a large extent in decentering the status quo of the Cartesian Cogito. It has decentralized the subject

of Cartesian Cogito. Freud's discovery of unconsciousness as the subject of the self plays havoc with the rational account of Descartes' philosophy. And there is the structuralist de Saussure's account of subjectivity that is embedded not in our language and cultural system. Whereas thinkers like Ricoeur strive to retrieve the destruction of Cartesian Cogito in terms of the hermeneutic description of the ' I am'; there are other thinkers like Lacan who have put forwarded arguments to rehabilitate the Cartesian Cogito. What follows is an attempt to map Descartes' cogito and the notion of the modern subject from a somewhat different trajectory in the history of modern philosophy.

III

De-Centering Descartes' Cogito and the Modern Subject

The story of Descartes' Cogito is instituted as the origin of a sense that holds a privileged position and presents itself as a coherent legacy of unity and legitimate narratives. It became the new site of the production of meaning. It is the point of orientation, a fixed position, a geometric zero point. It is the only principle to withstand the assaults of the devil, arises in the division between sense and non-sense, at the exclusion of nonsense, which has become to be designated as among other things, madness. In the *First Meditation*, Descartes asked whether only a madman is capable of doubting the facts of our everyday existence. He writes,

" ..how could it be denied that these hands or this whole body are mine? Unless perhaps I were to liken myself to madmen, whose brains are so damaged by the persistent vapours of melancholia that they firmly maintain they are kings when they are paupers…..But such people are insane, and I would be thought equally mad if I took anything from them as a model for myself ." (WDP: 13)

Foucault and Derrida have extensively debated over Cartesian 'madness' and attempts to advance both sides have been made over the years. In a nutshell, whereas Foucault marks from the above passage the ascendancy of reason in the designation of madness as unreason, and the exclusion of madness as an avenue of rational philosophical doubting; Derrida did not find any effective exclusion of madness. Derrida in his essay *Cogito and the History of madness* (1963) writes,

"my point of departure might appear slight and artificial. In this 673-page book, Michel Foucault devotes three pages….to a certain passage from the first pf Descartes' meditations. In this passage madness, folly, dementia, insanity seem, I emphasis seem, dismissed, excluded and ostracized from the circle of philosophical dignity, denied entry to the philosopher's city, denied the right to

philosophical consideration, ordered away from the bench as soon as summoned to it by Descartes- this last tribunal of a Cogito that, by its essence, *could not possibly* be mad." (2016:30)

He also argues that,

" ….to repeat once more, on the site of this division between reason and madness of which Foucault speaks so well, the meaning, a meaning of the Cogito or (plural) Cogitos (for the Cogito of the Cartesian variety is neither the first nor the last form of Cogito)." (2016:31)

He continues that,

" ..to determine that what is in question here is an experience which, at its furthest reaches, us perhaps no less adventurous, perilous, nocturnal and pathetic than the experience, and is, I believe, much less adverse to and accusatory of madness, that is, accusative and objectifying of it, than Foucault seems to think." (2016 : 31)

The point of argument is that whereas Foucault exemplified the disqualification of madness, from the realm of rationality, Derrida suggests that this exclusion is only apparent, and it prepares the way for a total madness, in the form of the evil genius into the realm of the Cogito. That is, the Cartesian madness argues Derrida is part and parcel of Descartes' rational movement. Foucault finds the position of Derrida absurd. Foucault argues (against Derrida) that the Cogito is established in perfect safety since the evil genius is admitted only after the effective exclusion of madness and is a simulacrum of madness, that is a controlled exercise for a subject that is already firmly rational.

The phenomena of madness in Descartes' Cogito is best reconstituted by psychoanalyst Lacan in his *Seminars*. Lacan has remarkably worked on the Cogito and even writes that " I think that it would not be superfluous to call for a return to Descartes.' (2006:133) According to Lacan, one needs to re-consider the Cartesian madness in the context of the latter's relation to the question of truth and belief, as it is experienced by the subject. That is, whereas the subject of madness stands in delusional belief who fails to recognize the production of one's own thoughts, Lacan argues that the point is to figure out what he knows about himself without recognizing himself in it. In other words, Lacan draws our

attention to the point that 'madness is experienced entirely within the register of meaning.' (2006:135) According to Lacan, the madman is personally targeted by his delusional beliefs that ' they split him, talk back to him, echo him, and read in him, just as he identifies them, questions them, provokes them and deciphers them.' (2006: 135) He continues that 'when all means of experiencing them fail him, his perplexity still manifests to us a questioning gap in him.' (2006: 135)

Following Freud's psychoanalytic model of the subject as unconscious, and Saussure linguistic insight of the algorithm of the signifier (S) and signified (s), Lacan built upon the constitution of the 'split-subject' that is double bind. In his essay, *The Mirror Stage* Lacan states that the experience that is conceptualized in the mirror stage and its bearing upon the 'I' function, 'sets us at odds with any philosophy directly stemming from the *cogito*.' (2006: 75) Lacan also worked on the reformulation or subversion of the Cartesian Cogito. He was critical of the idea of the subject as an autonomous ego that has the essence of consciousness. Lacan also seeks to retain the concept of subject and worked extensively for the extension for the Cogito. Lacan argued that the Cogito contains within itself the seeds of its own subversion. It does so, by putting forward a concept of subjectivity that undermines the modern concept of the ego. Lacan refers to this concept of subjectivity as 'the subject of science', that is a subject who is denied all intuitive access to knowledge and is thus left with 'reason' as the only path to knowledge. Lacan thereafter proposes that the subject of the Cartesian Cogito is the same as the subject of the unconscious. The only difference is that, whereas the Cartesian method advances from doubt to certainty, Lacan's psychoanalysis starts from affirming 'it thinks' and not from the statement ' I think.' Lacan even went on to rewrite Descartes's phrase like ' I think where I am not, therefore I am where I do not think.' That is, for Lacan, ' I am thinking where I am not, therefore I am where I am not thinking.' So, Lacan claims that only by ceasing to think can I glimpse that I am. It is this line of thought that Lacan explores extensively at a later stage. In *Seminar II*, one could for instance, even find Lacan's de-centered subject in the margin of the fundamental Cartesian intuition of 'I think therefore I am', with Descartes deceiving god. So, whereas Descartes' dialectic was governed by the aim of demonstrating the existence of God, Lacan claims that it is in arbitrarily isolating the Cogito that gives it a fundamental, existential, decisive, value. And whereas phenomenologists and existentialist thinkers grasp consciousness by a through itself, Lacan insists that there is no privileged status in

the subject's apprehension of itself. This is because, for Lacan, the true subject is to be found in the unconscious.

Lacan observes that Descartes' 'I think' is a mere point of fading, because he saw in this point the beginning of knowledge rather than its annihilation, and proceeded to rebuild the field of knowledge through 'the subject supposed to know', namely, God. (1977: 224) Whereas in Descartes, the subject immediately coincides with itself in and for the duration of the reflective act, the psychoanalytic experience of Lacan's split subject, must go in search of itself if it is to return home to the unconscious. Lacan revealed the vel of alienation in the constituents of the dialectic of the subject. The Lacanian Cogito is not the modern subject that is caught in the structure of alienation. It cannot find its being in its thought. It is rather found in the repressed part of thought (the unconsciousness) that comes constantly to haunt and dislocate it. And it is maintained only through this repression. In *Seminar XII*, Lacan marked the beginning of a radical revaluation of Descartes' Cogito, centered upon the Heideggerian issue of the 'question of Being.' He reformulated the Cogito as "*je pense: donc je suis*", "*je suis celui qui pense : denc je suis*" (I am, therefore I think). This formulation indicates the split between the 'Je suis' (of meaning sense) and then '*je suis* (of being), a split which poses, the problem of truth. The split here is between the 'I' of enunciation and the 'I' of the enunciated. In *Seminar XI*, Lacan emphasized that the Cartesian subject is constituted in the search for certainty. He also states that Descartes' Cogito has not given an essential institution of being. The subject is what is missing in knowledge.

Again, in *Seminar XIV*, Lacan brings yet another revision to the Cogito. He states that the best translation of the Cogito is, 'either I am not thinking or I am not', 'is a point of crystallization for the subject of the unconsciousness.' Descartes' Cogito thereby serves as the 'pivot' around which Lacan will make the necessary return to the origin of the subject. Lacan emphasizes the origins of the Cogito in *desire*. Lacan reduces the Cartesian subject to be the presuppositions of Freudian unconsciousness, thus a foundation for psychoanalysis. Hence, the Cartesian Cogito replaces the philosophical question surrounding the relation between thinking and being to the being of the 'I', which for Lacan and Heidegger also involves a refusal of the question of being.' Lacan emphasizes that what is at issue in the Cogito is not epistemological but metaphysical. In other words, Lacan developed the Cogito in terms of a linguistic act. He argues that the point is not to

know whether 'I speak of myself' in a way that I conform to 'what I am,' but rather to know whether when 'I speak of myself' 'I am' the same as the self of which I speak. That is, if I resolve to be only what I am, how can I escape here from the obvious fact that I am in this very act?' And, if I seek to become what I am, how can I doubt that even if I lose myself there, I am still there? Lacan reduces this riddle to the linguistic question which can be put as: is the place I occupy as subject of the signifier concentric or eccentric in relation to the place I occupy as subject of the signified?

Conclusion:

Keeping in view the above discussion it may be concluded that the logic and the grammar of the Cogito demands a continued reading and rewriting of the Cogito that does not nevertheless enact a subversion of the same. It could be reverted first and foremost as a grammatical construction, the product of an inertially persistent system of syntax, that even questioned this system, but reaffirms it in the initial moments of its self-reflection. It is an arrangement of inscriptions tied together to produce a certain sense, that also raises the possibility of nonsense, only to exclude such a possibility. (Melehy: 1997:141) Hence, the fundamental axioms involved in the inscription of the Cogito, started by raising hypothetical doubts would not have been different from those of a madman (that they are laughable) until the hyperbolic doubt, where the philosopher allows a certain madness into the core of his own thought that disrupt his own ostensibly contained and unified subject. (1997: 141) That is, Descartes' hyperbolic doubt invokes his excessive attempt to completely disrupt the signification (in order to ensure the system's form grounding). There are two extreme readings that have come out of this. One is the phenomenologist Husserl who has always noted that Descartes has started rightly by putting everything into doubt but committed a mistake in confusing his Cogito with pure I. The other is the psychoanalyst Lacan who has reverted Descartes' Cogito, from 'I think, I am' to 'I am, I think.' Others include Heidegger and Sartre, and even in analytic trends like Ryle, Wittgenstein, etc. So, drawing our attention to the various examination of Descartes' Cogito, it would not be an exaggeration to conclude that, it is possible if not easily actualized, to say that the cogito is discovered in the limit between the two realms, the realm of madness and the realm of rationality, such that it is not a unified subject anymore. In other words, the Cartesian text may be read in an aspect that unravels the system in which the *oeuvre* is produced. (1997: 142) As Melehy writes, "such

reading does not betray Descartes, but rather participates in the cogito as the cogito is presented: a pure explosion of possibilities of signification- whose very force is nonetheless directed to foreclose on these possibilities." (1997: 142)

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THE UNIQUE STATUS OF META-ETHICAL EMOTIVISM IN STEVENSON

ANUREEMA BHATTACHARYYA

The basic understanding of morality undoubtedly revolves round the situational aspects of the moral agents who form the subject of discussion. There cannot be any question about ethicality where the human agents are not involved. Now, concepts of 'good' or 'bad' are necessary to understand for the sake of answering normative queries; but, they are never appropriately comprehended from a non-subjective standpoint, as it is nothing without the subject which can be absolutely relevant in understanding the judgements passed by them. The physical world is a party to the discussion only because the moral agents sustain their existence through interacting with them, and thereby having a common interaction also with the environment of which they both form an indispensable part.

Now, the question is- why are ethical questions asked or ethical judgements passed? It is precisely to express our attitude towards something thereby contributing in affecting the thoughts of others, or else in resolving disputes /disagreements rising out of differences in belief or attitudes. This purpose is effectively served only when the situational factors are understood in relation to the subject/subjects involved – i.e. in understanding the totality of the emergence of such contexts. Hence, comes the justification of introducing meta-ethics in the form of a comprehensive understanding of ethical language along with an understanding of the psychology behind use of the language, the background behind the use of such language, and hence the social role played by use of such language. This way of exercising ethics stands in sharp contrast to the normative approach of knowing what is 'good', 'bad' on the basis of some objectively set standards. Morality is subject-oriented, and because the existential situations of humans/subjects evolve in its domain, any bit of discussion on ethics is rendered pointless when dealt with in absolute objectivity. The focus of my paper is thus to study after C.L.Stevenson the purpose of doing metaethics as a wholesome study addressing the justification and practicality of the very existence of the discipline called Ethics.

I

The meta-ethical theory of emotivism as propounded by Ayer and later on by Stevenson is typically understood as a theory of moral language according to which ethical terms are used in a tone of imperatives ('Be kind') in order to express a speaker's affective, noncognitive psychological states, such as approval or disapproval, rather than to describe some action, person, institution, etc. Stevenson's emotivism, however, was more than a theory of moral language. It was a full-blown ethical theory, grounded in moral and linguistic psychology. His intention was to clarify the nature and structure of a whole range of normative problems common to everyday life—ethical, aesthetic, economic, legal, political, etc., as well as the methods typically used to resolve them. He had always concentrated on the complexity of human experience and the power of signs and sounds to move a person emotionally and behaviourally. Accordingly, he disregards the simplistic answers to complex problems by way of postulating entities unverifiable by scientific methods (e.g., non-naturalistic moral properties).

He clearly rejects the question of exception less "first principles" of explanation and justification that can be known with certainty.

II

Charles Leslie Stevenson sets out for an intense study of ethical questions like "Is so and so good?" in his article "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms" published in the 46th volume of the journal 'Mind' in 1937. He says that the primary task for understanding ethical questions is to thoroughly understand the meaning of ethical terms included in it. Meaning here refers to the definition of the term which will be referring to its essence.

Stevenson observes that in this context, it is necessary to clarify what makes the essence of an ethical term. He says that whatever be it, it has to be relevant.[1] Relevance should be the mark of its essence/meaning/definition. Therefore we are here set out to find a relevant meaning of an ethical term say 'good'.

Philosophers have attempted to give several relevant meanings for 'good' which may be generalised as 'interest theories' following Prof. R.B.Perry , a naturalist philosopher. When 'good' is defined as 'desirable', it definitely hints at some interest either of the speaker or the hearer, or when it is defined as 'approved by all', it shows the interest of the hearer and the speaker. Hence, the subjective versions of the naturalist theories talk of natural interests when defining the attribute 'good'.

Some philosophers point out that the interest theories are not relevant to the vital sense of 'good'. They argue that the vital sense of good has to be something which appeals to our common-sensical understanding of 'good'. In whichever way I define 'good', some features certainly follow. Firstly, it should be always possible that I agree or disagree on commenting something as 'good'. If two persons agree and disagree respectively about calling something 'good', they are supposed to oppose each other. Now, if 'good' is defined as 'desirable', and two persons agree and disagree respectively in desiring a thing, that is only a matter of their choice as per their sentiment, they do not oppose each other for that matter. Hence, there is no scope of disagreement in values when 'good' is defined in terms of interest. Secondly, 'vital' sense of 'good' involves an attribute of magnetism, in the sense that people should have a strong tendency or feeling of inclination or attraction attached to the thing which they consider 'good'.[2] Hence, it is approved by many which for that matter also includes the speaker. The third important feature of 'good' is that it cannot be verified solely by the scientific

method. If I try to verify the goodness of a thing empirically, I have to verify its natural feature which defines the goodness, say its desirability or its being pleasurable or its approvability etc. This verification is empirically not possible.

All the natural interest theories fail because, a thing which is desired or approved or which gives pleasure, may not be necessarily good. Moreover, the fact that majority approves of a thing, may simply follow from the democratic set-up of the society instead of the spontaneity in the feeling. Again, G.E.Moore's objection to the naturalist theories on the basis of open-question argument is also not avoidable, as he says that however we define 'good' in terms of natural interests or inclinations, it is always open to a very valid question of whether all cases of good are accompanied by the specific interest which defines it.

III

Stevenson thus goes to analyse the nature of ethical judgements in terms of its intention in order to find a suitable meaning for ethical terms in accordance with its vital sense. He said that the traditional interest theories failed to give a proper definition of an ethical term because they considered them simply as being descriptions of existing states of interests. According to such theories, ethical terms only state facts about our interests, their emphasis being primarily on the descriptions. But this does not speak of the entirety of an ethical term complying with its relevance.[3]

An ethical term is used in a judgement not only to describe a fact, but also to influence the hearer. Such influence may be sought by a hidden accent of suggestion, request or even a command. For example, when I say 'You should not steal', it is an ethical judgement which clearly has an imperative force with the intention of creating influence on the hearer. It intends to create a feeling of disapproval in the hearer rather than simply express the disapproval of the speaker. In order to create this influence the agent or the speaker has to give arguments to show the consequences of such action, he has also to support his point by citing instances. These all may be considered reasons which facilitate his influencing.

Thus ethical terms facilitate the process of social influence on people from the same community. We can generally observe that people from the same community have similar moral attitudes while those from different communities differ in their moral attitudes. This is because they are subject to different social

influence. People are socially influenced when they are affected by the words of other people in the same society. Such words may be words of appraisal or condemn which may either encourage or discourage a person. In such a context ethical terms play a role in facilitating the influence. They have a suggestive tone which directs a person to act in a particular way. For instance, by the ethical judgement 'This is good' the speaker may suggest another person to approve of the particular thing. Hence, he gets influenced and in turn makes the same ethical judgement which then influences some other person and this continues. So, the influence of ethical judgements spreads among persons of the same community and develops similar attitudes in them.[4]

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IV

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It is at this point relevant to discuss the essence of an ethical term which leads to its social influence and also whether that essence matches with the vital sense of 'good' as previously discussed. In order to understand what constitutes the essence/meaning of an ethical term, we should first discuss what do we understand by the meaning of a term. Meaning of a term is related to its use. We use a term either for describing a matter or for expressing our feelings. Hence, a term may have either a 'descriptive' use or a 'dynamic' use. Accordingly, a term may have either a descriptive meaning or a dynamic meaning or both depending on the purpose with which it is used. For example, when the speaker says, 'Hydrogen is the lightest gas', his purpose is merely to describe a thing. But, when he says 'Shit!', his intention is not to report or describe anything, but simply to express his attitude towards a thing which leads to a corresponding action. There are, however, certain cases where words have both descriptive and dynamic uses, say, 'I want you to do this work'. Here the speaker has two purposes in his use of the words – to report what he wants, and also to ask the hearer to fulfil his want. Hence the words are here used both descriptively and dynamically.

Now that we have known that a word may have either of the two uses, we need to understand how these uses are related to the essence/meaning of a term, specifically an ethical term, as is the context here. Any meaning, as it is commonly understood, is a tendency with which the word is generally connected with. It does not generally take into account the dynamic use of a word. However as words are often used dynamically, there should be a specific type of meaning related to the dynamic use of a word. Stevenson points out that it is the emotive meaning of a term which is generally associated with the dynamic use of a term. Stevenson says that "The emotive meaning of a word is a tendency of a word,

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arising through the history of its usage, to produce (result from) affective responses in people. It is the immediate aura of feeling which hovers about a word. Such tendencies to produce affective responses cling to words very tenaciously. It would be difficult, for instance, to express merriment by using the interjection 'alas'. Because of the persistence of such affective tendencies (among other reasons), it becomes feasible to classify them as 'meanings'."[5]

How is the emotive meaning of a term related to its dynamic use? There are certain words which have a dynamic use because of their emotive meaning. In fact, the meaning is so attached to the word, that the dynamic use which follows the emotive meaning seems absolutely obvious and best suited for it. For example- if a man refers to a woman as an 'old maid', she may definitely take it as an insult of her, and it may also act as a comment which will influence the other hearers to dislike her. This is because the term 'old maid' may have a tendency to arouse a sort of contempt for a person which results from the history of its usage. This satisfies the definition of emotive meaning of a term as stated previously. On the contrary, if the same word is used in a purely descriptive way, say as an 'elderly spinster', it does not evoke any feeling or attitude in the hearer, but merely describes. Therefore, for every term with an emotive meaning, a dynamic purpose is attached. But, the dynamic purpose is not to be identified generally with the meaning of the term.[6]

Ethical terms are terms which contain emotive meanings, thus arousing a feeling or attitude in a person to act in a particular way. For example, 'This is good', includes the ethical term 'good' which may mean 'liked by all'. The meaning of an ethical term must not be taken in the descriptive sense but only in the emotive sense, as it always has a tendency of suggestion to the hearer for approval/disapproval of the thing referred. But, as the case lies, when we use an ethical term, we are more focussed in its dynamic use of influencing others, rather than concentrating on the root of such a use, i.e. its emotive meaning. Neglecting the emotive meaning of a term leads to endless confusions. So, it is essential that we highlight on the emotive meaning when defining an ethical term like 'good'. This consideration of the emotive meaning of 'good' will in turn automatically justify its dynamic usage.

V

The emotive meaning, therefore, is significant in the context of understanding the vital sense of 'good' and covers the restrictions attached therewith. Let us now clarify how the restrictions are met with the emotive meaning taken into account. The first restriction, as had been mentioned was that, there should be provision in the meaning of 'good' for both agreement and disagreement as regards the value (say, goodness) of an object/action. To explain: the meaning given for 'good' should be such that we can both agree and disagree about goodness with respect to different objects/actions. The disagreement expected can be either of belief or of interest. If there is a disagreement in belief about a thing p between two persons A and B, it must be related to a description. Now, if 'good' is defined in terms of certain interests like 'happiness', 'pleasure', 'being approved by many', 'capable of being liked', etc., these are not descriptions which one person may believe and another disbelieve with respect to a thing; and may thus end up in contradicting one another regarding the aesthetic/ethical value of the object. In that case, it is actually possible that the two persons may disagree in their interests towards the object, though not disagreeing in belief about the thing. Hence, an ethical term, say 'good' cannot be disagreed about a thing if it is taken in the descriptive sense of the term. But, if the emotive meaning of 'good' is considered, which hints at the interest created by an object in a person, it is possible that two persons may agree or disagree in their interest towards the object. Hence, disagreement in interest is possible with respect to ethical terms, though not disagreement in belief. It may, however, be disagreement in belief about interests which is to be distinguished from disagreement in interest. Disagreement in belief about interests is something difficult to conceive, what therefore exists is actually disagreement in interest.[7]

The second restriction about the vital sense of 'good' was that the meaning should have an element of magnetism. Thus it hints at the dynamicity of goodness influencing people to approve of the action/object evaluated. Stevenson clarifies that the traditional interest theories while defining 'good' considers only the interest of the hearer, and ignores the interest of the speaker. If the speaker's interest is not reflected in the meaning of 'good', the dynamicity of the term also is suppressed, it becomes a mere description. Whereas, if we consider that 'good' has an emotive meaning, it definitely expresses the interest of the speaker which in turn influences the hearers.

Stevenson then discusses the third restriction about the vital sense of 'good', which says that goodness is not solely verifiable by scientific method. The justification for this may be given with the help of a moral disagreement. If two persons morally disagree on some issue, and they both try to justify their point with empirical proof, employing the method to its fullest scope, there is no certainty that the disagreement gets resolved. It may be solved, or it may not be. Even if the disagreement gets resolved, the way the ethical judgement is related to the empirical proof is quite unconventional. What each person does is that, they give reasons in favour of their view and try utmost to convince the opposing party in that. These reasons are from the empirical sources which they strongly believe. Therefore the disagreement in their interests is basically due to the disagreement in their beliefs and by giving sufficient empirical reasons which support his belief, a person may succeed in convincing his opponent and thus resolving the disagreement in their interests. Stevenson comments significantly that, "Thus the empirical method is relevant to ethics simply because our knowledge of the world is a determining factor to our interests."[8]

It is however to be kept in mind that the empirical facts which rationalise a particular interest are not to be considered as the ground or foundation for such interest.. It only plays a role to resolve disagreements in interest if those arise from disagreements in belief. But all disagreements in interest are not due to differences in belief, they may be due to differences in mentality or attitude of persons or even due to the social circumstances. The empirical facts are therefore not totally sufficient to resolve an ethical disagreement. In cases where disagreements arise out of attitude-differences or differences in backgrounds, they cannot be resolved by empirical methods, but by a different way, i.e by way of persuasion which is beyond any experience or reason. This persuasive method actually happens to be the most effective method for resolving moral disputes. Stevenson says, ".....it is only by such means that our personalities are able to grow, through our contact with others."[9] Hence, what we want to emphasise here is that empirical method is only partly responsible for resolving ethical disagreements, it is therefore not sufficient for an ethical understanding.

What we have reached till now is the realisation that the traditional interest theories failed to consider the emotive meaning of ethical terms responsible for their dynamic uses, and therefore failed to connect the disagreements following from such uses. Stevenson's account of the emotive theory of 'good' in terms of interest, distinctly different from the traditional ones, talks of the influence factor,

the role of persuasion along with reason, thereby asserting a vital role of ethical statements as social instruments. He describes ethics as a cooperative enterprise in which we adjust ourselves with the interest of others. This peculiar way of doing philosophy connects and establishes the study as a pragmatic and relevant enterprise.

VI

Stevenson published two more articles in 'Mind' exhibiting the emotive theory of morals as distinct from the traditional views. In the article 'Ethical Judgements and Avoidability', he wanted to highlight the fact that it is only for avoidable actions that the ethical judgements are passed.[10] This is because ethical judgements are passed mainly to influence an action. Hence, if the actions on which such judgements are passed are not avoidable, there does not remain a free chance of getting influenced either positively or negatively. Apart from this, ethical judgements may also form impressions in the minds of hearers irrespective of their opinion about the agent.

Mary Warnock in her book 'Ethics since 1900' pointed out that Stevenson failed to convincingly present the central idea that, it is because of the specific role played by the ethical terms that they cannot be used in any instance whatsoever, except in cases where we refer to avoidable actions. He made it clear that it is only part of the meaning of ethical terms that they are emotive, that they have a role to influence the hearer and where necessary to avoid such action. The other role however, lies in their being descriptions of or expressions of emotions. But he has not shown the reason why ethical terms, even being partially descriptive, are not applicable to non-avoidable actions. We can notice very well that though Stevenson had discussed on the two aspects of the meaning of an ethical term - the descriptive and the emotive, he emphasised particularly on the emotive meaning and had a tendency to ignore the descriptive part. This, however, is very natural of an ethical term, because if they are emotive, they are primarily productive (of actions), rather than being merely expressive of emotions.

VII

Stevenson wrote a third article named 'Persuasive Definitions' which was published in the journal 'Mind' in 1938. He started the article with the definition of persuasive definition. He says that it is a new conceptual meaning to a familiar word, without substantially changing its emotive meaning. Persuasive definition is used with the conscious or unconscious purpose of changing the direction of

people's interests.[11] Generally words which have a relatively vague conceptual meaning and a very strong emotive meaning have a scope for persuasive definition. This is because when the concept is not clear, people may interpret it according to their choices. As Mary Warnock remarked of a persuasive definition that "They steal, as it were, the good will(or bad will) which belongs to the word, and use it for their own ends." [12] For example- Aristotle's use of the Greek word for happiness, which somehow or other is associated with pleasure, though the conceptual meaning is quite vague. All these contexts of persuasive definition arose in Stevenson's article because, persuasive definition is one of the ways in which people may be influenced and their interests may be changed. Such definitions are used mainly in philosophical contexts. Now, for ethical contexts specifically, Stevenson said that the ethical disputes are of nature which easily connect to the nature of a persuasive definition for matters of resolve. Therefore, in order to understand the circumstances leading to ethical disputes or the means which may be employed to solve them, it is relevant to understand persuasive definition. Stevenson cites the example of an ethical dispute to illustrate this point. He says that two persons may disagree on the meaning of 'just', one saying that an action is just if consequences A and B follow from it, and the other saying that it is just if consequences B and C follow from it. They may agree in accepting a law as just when at least B follows from it, but still there remains the disagreement between them as regards their interest, because one person has interest in a specific law as being just while the other person has interest in a different law as being just. Hence this disagreement rests on the subjective interests of the parties involved and is not empirically verifiable. It is just a disagreement in their preferences and conceptually speaking they have no point of disagreement at all. The meaning of words involved in such disagreement are therefore sought with the help of persuasive definition only.

VIII

The main intention of Stevenson's moral philosophy becomes clear in the distinction he draws between those ethical terms which he thought had practically no factual or conceptual content, and those which he thought had at least some. He also stressed more on the emotive function of an ethical term rather than its expressive function. Moreover, Stevenson brings in the concept of persuasive definition to reject the naturalistic definition of ethical terms. Stevenson, like Moore and Ayer, was against ethical naturalism, but his argument differed from them. He said that ethical terms cannot be defined in factual or naturalistic terms

because, they have both descriptive and emotive contents. Therefore, while criticising naturalism, when Moore pointed towards naturalistic fallacy, Stevenson pointed to the case of 'persuasive definition'. As Mary Warnock pointed out in her book 'Ethics since 1900' a keyword to the emotive theory, "This insistence that ethics cannot be translated into non-ethical language, that every attempt to do so is a cheat, is the most fundamental principle of the emotive theory."[13]

Stevenson published the book 'Ethics and Language' in 1945 which mostly incorporated the ideas expressed in his previously published articles, just making them more interesting.

IX

Stevenson was greatly influenced by Wittgenstein, the logical positivists, and also few American philosophers like James Dewey and Ralph Barton Perry. Dewey was apragmatist American philosopherwho's major contribution to the field of moral philosophy is the manner of distinction he madebetween ethical and non-ethical terms. In the book named 'The Quest for Certainty', published in 1929, he presented the distinction as statements which serve to give mere reports, and statements which serve to make judgements concerning the importance of bringing a fact into existence; or if it is already there, of sustaining it's existence. The basic implication of his utterance was that there is a prediction involved in both types of statements, but the difference lies in the object of prediction. The two types of statements concentrate upon two different aspects of the future in their predictions. While scientific or non-ethical statementsgive the prediction that a thing will continue to behave in a particular way and we shall reach the truth about the object if we describe it in a particular way, ethical statements predict that the thing in question will become an end, and will therefore direct human activity in the future. Good ethical statements, therefore, are made for actions which have useful consequences and are therefore appraised. In 'The Quest for Certainty', Dewey says that, "Men like some of the consequences and dislike others. Henceforth....attaining or averting similar consequences are aims or ends. These consequences constitute the meaning and value of an activity as it comes under deliberation."[14] Therefore, it is not that ethical statements have a sort of prediction only, they also include an assessment. This highlights the emotive as well as the descriptive meaning of an ethical term which Dewey pointed out. Stevenson, however, criticises Dewey by saying that he is more concerned with descriptions and analysis of situations which one might choose. On the contrary, Stevenson prefers to be primarily concerned with solving ethical disagreements

between two people and in analysing how each of them will judge a particular situation. Hence, they are different in their approaches of doing moral philosophy.

Another American philosopher who had an influence on Stevenson was Ralph Bertrand Perry. In his book 'General Theory of Value' Perry says that a thing is good if majority of people have a favourable attitude/interest towards it.[15] He defines 'good' as 'approved of by everyone' and therefore his theory is a version of naturalism in ethics. Stevenson criticises Perry for his attempt to give a naturalistic definition of 'good'. He says that such definitions are bound to be persuasive ones, hence, not based on solid evidences; rather, on respective interests and interpretations. Perry presents his theory such that if 'good' is defined as 'approved of by everyone', then 'better' should be defined by 'approved of by more people'. Likewise, if 'bad' is defined as 'disliked by everyone', 'worse' should be defined as 'disliked by more people'. So, Perry apprehends a complicated hedonistic calculus which is never easy to grasp. He talks of degrees of intensity in likings and dislikings for judging between different things. It is noteworthy at this juncture that, Perry's theory is distinct from a utilitarian theory in the sense that he is more concerned with the type of interest (liking or disliking) associated with a thing or an action rather than the consequences (pleasure or pain) which follow or result from it. This is exactly where Perry's theory has an influence on the emotivists like Stevenson, though his presentation of 'interests' to describe morality is significantly different from that of the emotivists, the former being a cognitivist theory while the latter a form of non-cognitivism.

The emotivists like Stevenson were greatly influenced by later Wittgenstein, and much of the development of such a version of morality was due to this influence. The revolutionary thought which was the hallmark of the later Wittgensteinian philosophy was that, it is not enough to understand a concept without knowing about its actual and possible occurrences/uses either in thought or in language. This idea is relevant in the context that every philosophical problem is centred round a concept, and hence the possibility of successfully solving the problem depends largely on knowing about the actual or possible usages of the concept. Such considerations reveal the misconceptions giving rise to the problems addressed at. Having been influenced by such an idea, the emotivists attempted to analyse the cases of ethical disputes with reference to the contexts/situations in which the ethical terms were used. The purpose of use of such terms clarified the

ethical disagreements/disputes. This shows the prominent reflection of the later Wittgensteinian theory in the emotivist theory.

X

Stevenson clearly had a hint in his articles that ethical terms like 'good' refers to basically a complex concept , and it is hence necessary to observe the use of such words in order to understand it.For Stevenson, the pursuit of studying ethics is justified only in the study of the context and purpose of its use. This is his peculiar style of doing meta-ethics, i.e. in doing ethics on a meta level where he clarifies the irrelevance of connecting ethical questions/statements with universal standards, and focusses primarily to effectively practise ethics in a social set-up, thus making it a meaningful discourse for matters of existence. His way of treating ethics on a meta level is unique as he never confines or identifies meta-ethics exclusively with either understanding of ethical terms, or with exclusive analysis of the psychology behind passing ethical judgements, or with only a consideration of the ontic status of value terms complying with its existence. Rather, he confirms that if the practice of ethics is to be justified through the study of meta-ethics, the approach to do meta-ethics should be through cross-connecting and inter-connecting the use of ethical language with its subject-oriented meaning, and the society-oriented execution or implementation of the ethical judgements. Hence, meta-ethics, inspite of being an analytic exercise stands concrete in its significance to the reality.

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[2] Field G.C., Moral Theory, Methuen and Co., London, 1921 p.52,56,57
[3] C.L.Stevenson, The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms,*Mind,* Vol. 46, No. 181 , Oxford University Press ,1937,p.18
[4] Ibid,p.20
[5] C.L.Stevenson,*Ethics and Language*, New Haven and London,1944,p.59,33
[6] Warnock, M., *Ethics Since 1900,* Oxford University Press, London, 1966 p.96
[7] Ibid, p.97
[8] C.L.Stevenson, The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms,*Mind,* Vol. 46, No. 181 , Oxford University Press ,1937,p.28
[9] Ibid,p.29
[10] Warnock, M., *Ethics Since 1900,* Oxford University Press, London, 1966, p.98
[11] Ibid,p.101
[12] Ibid,p.101
[13] Ibid,p.106
[14] Ibid,p.110, quoted from "The Quest for Certainty", John Dewey, Gifford Lectures, 1929,London.
[15] Ibid, p.114

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MORALITY AS CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE

N. RAMTHING

This article attempts to foreground morality as categorical imperative. For Kant the categorical imperative is the fundamental principle of morality grounded on the idea of autonomy. He argues that an exclusive empirical philosophy can have nothing to say about morality, it can only urge us to be guided by our emotions or at the best by an enlightened self-love, at the very time when the abyss between unregulated impulse or undiluted self-interest and moral principles has been so tragically displace in practice. Kant believed that an action can only be morally worthy if it is performed in accordance with the categorical imperative, meaning that it is performed out of a sense of duty to the moral law. The categorical imperative must be universally applicable to all autonomous beings. And I agree with Kant that a principle which applies to all autonomous beings must be categorical imperative based on universal law. Morality, for Kant is fundamentally a matter of following the categorical imperative and such is a matter of acting from duty and not simply outwardly conforming to a rule because for Kant conformity to the moral duty is the practical necessity of a possible action as necessary of itself without reference to another end.

The categorical imperative is the moral principle formulated by Kant in his book entitled: "*Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*". He was a philosopher who aimed to establish an absolute system of morality emphasizing on the necessity of basing morality on a priori principles grounded upon reason. Kant believes that our moral duties come immediately from human reason sans any consideration of the tangible effects of our actions and the categorical imperative is a method of directly accessing the commands of our reason. He argues that an exclusive empirical philosophy can have nothing to say about morality, it can only urge us to be guided by our emotions or at the best by an enlightened self-love, at the very time when the abyss between unregulated impulse or undiluted self-interest and moral principles has been so tragically displace in practice. It should be obvious that from experience of what men in fact do we are unable to prove what they ought to do; for we must admit that they often do what they ought not to do-provided we allow that there is such a thing as a moral 'ought' or a moral duty. Hence if there are moral principles in accordance with which we ought to act, knowledge of these principles must be a priori knowledge; it cannot be based on sensuous experience.[1]

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[1] Kant, I., (1948) *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Moral*, p. 4

Kant diversified two types of imperative, namely, categorical and hypothetical imperative. All imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. According to Kant imperatives are expressed by ought. Imperative expressed by "ought" in moral sense is categorical and imperative expressed by "ought" in nonmoral sense is hypothetical. All imperatives always express some kinds of practical propositions because they enjoin what ought to or ought not to. An imperative is something that a will ought or shall do because the will is obligated to act in the manner in which it conforms to moral law. The categorical imperative is an obligation by the will to act so that the action can be considered as a universal law. Kant holds that morality is fundamentally a matter of following the categorical imperative and such is a matter of acting from duty and not simply outwardly conforming to a rule.

It is intriguing to delve into how Kant offers justification of the categorical imperative in his book *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*. The categorical imperative is extracted from the concepts of goodness, will and obligation. The conception of an objective principle which is obligatory for a will, is called a command, and the formula of the command is called an Imperative. He distinguishes "perfectly rational agents" from "non-perfectly rational agents" and uses the distinction in order to define the term "imperative". After explicating an imperative, he then proceeds to the possibility of the categorical imperative by way of questioning as to how imperatives are possible. In order to discern this possibility it is important to peruse again the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions; and a priori and a posterior proposition which he had given in the introduction to the first *Critique*. According to Kant, analytic propositions are a priori propositions since they are independent of experience. In an analytic proposition, the predicate merely repeats and does not add any new information to whatever is contained in the subject. As a result it does not pose much problem. However, Kant uses a priori concept in a wider sense. According to him, all analytic propositions are a priori propositions but all a priori propositions are not analytic propositions, for example, synthetic a priori propositions. Propositions or judgments can be either analytic or synthetic. Synthetic a priori expresses a necessary connection between two distinct concepts: synthetic and a priori. In the analytic propositions, the connection of the predicate with the subject is cogitated through identity[2] because the former merely repeats what is already contained in the subject and the validity of analytic judgment entails that it is necessarily true,

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[2]Kant, I., (2008) *Kant's Critiques*, A&D Publishing, Radford VA 23243-3005, p. 29

for example, "who wills the end, wills the means" is analytic proposition; whereas, in synthetic propositions or judgments, the predicate does not merely repeat but adds new information to the subject. All hypothetical imperatives are analytic practical propositions as they assert analytic means-end relationship. All categorical imperatives are synthetic a priori propositions. They are called synthetic propositions because they assert synthetic means-end relationship. They are called a priori because their validity is independent of experience. Kant introduces two types of end: subjective and objective. The subjective ends are those whose values are conditional and relative. The objective ends are those whose values are unconditional and absolute. An imperative that represents actions as means to the attainment of objective ends is objectively valid for all persons in the same way. The categorical imperatives are such kind of imperatives. Kant states in his first message that "Hypothetical imperatives are no problem because they are analytic judgments a priori of practical reason. But categorical imperatives require a transcendental deduction because they are synthetic judgment a priori of practical reason."[3] Then, in the second message, which is of the same conclusion, Kant states: "Hypothetical imperatives are no problem because we can demonstrate their possibility by appeal to experience. But categorical imperatives require a transcendental deduction because no experience could suffice to demonstrate their possibility."[4] The intricacy of finding possibility of categorical imperatives leads to the question: How is a synthetic a priori proposition possible? In the *Groundwork* Kant claims that the categorical imperative is a synthetic a priori proposition but he admits the difficulty of justifying the same. However, he believes that unless we succeed in justifying it morality remains perhaps a mere "phantom of the brain"[5]. Kant claims the fundamental moral truths are synthetic a priori because moral truths are categorical imperative. Kant held that the categorical imperative is not analytic, because although Kant thought the applicability of the categorical imperative to any given individual is deducible from the assumption that the individual is rational, the concept of the categorical imperative is not contained in the concept of a rational being. Kant thought the categorical imperative must be discovered a priori—through reason—because, as a fundamental moral law applying to all rational beings, it cannot be discovered through mere experience: one cannot learn

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[3]Wolff, P. R., (1973) *Autonomy of Reason: A Commentary on Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 143
[4]Ibid.,
[5] Kant, I., (1964) *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Moral*,

how one should act from how people do act.[6] The prescriptive content of moral claims coupled with necessity and universality directed Kant to believe we know moral truths only a priori. Kant holds that the law that an autonomous agent pursue to perform a moral action, the maxim the agent acts on must be one that the agent can consistently will to govern everyone, regardless of their goals, as a necessary law. For Kant there is only a single categorical imperative: "Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law"[7].

Kant says that the principle of morality is a synthetic proposition, namely: "An absolutely good will is one whose maxim can always have as its content itself considered as a universal law"; for we cannot discover this characteristic of its maxim by analyzing the concept of an absolutely good will[8]. It is not worthless to make a brief foray into the analysis of will. Kant introduces two kinds of will: holy will and human will. For Kant, a holy will is absolutely a good will which necessarily accords with the law of autonomy. It is not conditioned by any obligations because "Obligation can have no reference to a holy being" and only god has the holy will. Whereas human wills are conditional and are subject to obligations. There are two types of human will: rational will and irrational will. A rational will is will moved by the idea of good or law. The goodness of moral action consists in the goodness of will.

It will be quite important and intriguing, simultaneously, to unearth Kant's different formulations in order to grasp better understanding of his ethical theory. In the first formulation of his ethical theory, namely, the Formula of Universal Law, Kant states the first formula in the negative way: "I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law."[9] In *Groundwork II* he gives the same formula in a positive way: "Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law"."[10] Kant also gives a subsidiary formulation of the formula of universal law in terms of the concept of a law of nature. He states: "Act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law

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[9] Wolff, P.R., (1973) *Autonomy of Reason: A Commentary on Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, p. 88
[10] Kant, I., (1964) *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Moral*, translated and analyzed, p. 88

of nature."[11] Kant's first formula of universal law requires an individual to obey a maxim which can, without contradiction, be willed to be a rule for everyone. That is to say in other words, that the essence of morality lies in acting on the basis of an impersonal principle which is valid for everyone, including oneself. Thus, Kant insists that a moral rule be consistently universalized because for him the moral rules command categorically and not hypothetically. The former is a command that is necessarily binding to all rational agents whereas the latter is an imperative that tells us what if we desire a particular result. The moral laws are commands that need no consideration of subjective desire. Take, for example, 'speaking the truth'. There is no situation where truth speaking is not relevant. This means that the principle of action should be applied consistently. The first formulation is based upon the principle of non-contradiction. Kant believed that the maxim (or principle) upon which one acts should be without contradiction. I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law. In the second formulation Kant explicates in terms of the idea of humanity as an end in itself. It states: "Act only in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same as the end."[12] This formulation requires that persons should be treated as end themselves and not as means. Actions should not be used as means to subjective ends. And to say this does not mean that the second formulation of the categorical imperative presents actions as end in themselves. It does relate actions to persons and prescribes that they ought to be treated as objective ends. When Kant says that actions ought to be done for the sake of action, it does not mean that persons do not constitute the objects of morality or persons do not figure in the centre of moral consideration. If it were so, he would not have said that persons ought to be treated as end in themselves, which he says. He suggested if there were objective ends given to us by reason, ends which in all circumstances, a fully rational agent would necessarily pursue an absolute and unconditioned value. They would also be ends which an imperfectly rational agent ought to pursue if he were irrational enough to be tempted to do otherwise.[13] Only rational agents can be ends in themselves according to Kant, because they alone can have an unconditioned and absolute value and therefore, it is wrong to use them simply as means to an end. Kant's doctrine of end-in-itself follows from the very essence of the categorical

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[11]Ibid., p.89
[12]Ibid., p. 27
[13]Ibid., p. 28

imperative. As rational beings would act inconsistently if they did not treat every human being the way they themselves would want to be treated. If the categorical imperative was the end in mind when actions were performed, then only those who wish to achieve the categorical imperative would be obligated to act morally. Therefore, he argued that the basis of the categorical imperative must be an objective end, which Kant referred to as an "ends in itself". This formulation requires of us to respect all human beings impartially and avoid exploiting none. The third formulation of the categorical imperative explains in terms of self-legislation or giving oneself rule which he calls the autonomy of will. He states: "So act that your will can regard itself at the same time as making universal law through its maxim."[14] To Kant, the formula of autonomy is the most important maxim of morality since it leads straight to the idea of freedom. According to him, freedom constitutes the foundation of morality. The third formulation expresses the idea that it is a rational will which obliges an agent to act from the categorical imperative, rather than any other outside influence. Autonomy of the will for Kant is entirely self-legislating: The moral obligations by which it is perfectly bound are those which it has imposed upon itself while simultaneously regarding them as binding upon everyone else by virtue of their common possession of the same rational faculties. All genuinely moral actions, Kant believes, spring from the freely chosen dictates of an autonomous will. Kant thought that any moral law which was based on fulfilling some other interests would deny the categorical imperative, leading him to argue that moral law must only arise from a rational will. This principle requires us to recognize and respect the right of others to act autonomously as moral laws must be universalizable, what is required of a person is required of all. We are subject to the moral law only because it is the necessary expression of our own nature as rational agents. Moral obligations and moral responsibilities always presuppose freedom of the agent. Rational beings are evaluated in terms of good and bad because they are believed to be having the faculty of reason and thus freedom consists in the exercising of one's own reason in self-legislating and auctioning accordingly. In the fourth formulation, Kant emphasizes on the concept of Kingdom of ends which he thinks alone can render the kingdom of ends possible. There is another sub-formula of the kingdom of ends which springs directly from the formula of autonomy: "So act as if you were through your maxims a law-making member of a kingdom of end."[15] The Formulation of the Kingdom of Ends suggests that

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[14] Ibid., p. 34
[15] Ibid., p. 35

moral agents should act as if their maxims will set the laws in a 'Kingdom of Ends'. What does Kant mean by the Kingdom of ends"? Kant says "I understand by a 'kingdom' a systematic union of different rational beings under common law". "For rational beings all stand under the law that each of them should treat himself and all others, never merely as a means, but always at the same time as an end in himself. But by so doing there arises a systematic union of rational beings under common objective laws- that is, a kingdom. Since these laws are directed precisely to the relation of such beings to one another as ends and means, this kingdom can be called a Kingdom of ends (which is admittedly only an Ideal)"[16]. It is understood from the passages that objective ends differ from that of a kingdom of end. Persons and persons along are objective end. Objective laws are means to the realization of the kingdom of ends since they are directed precisely to the relation of human beings to one another. Hence action performed in accordance with them should be treated as a means and analysis of categorical imperative as prescribing means to objective ends must not be discarded.[17]

Kant's categorical imperative cannot be stated as if the theory is devoid of criticisms; there are critical views against his categorical imperative. One such wide-ranging critique comes from Schopenhauer in his book *On the Basis of Morality*[18] where he opens up his view alleging the categorical imperative as not pure as it can only be explained as something which relies on empirical ends and thus believes these empirical ends reduces morality to a species of egoism. Kant was also criticized for failing to embrace the role of compassion in his ethics which he thinks plays an important role in guiding human conduct as human conduct is guided sometimes by compassion for other people and other times by selfish or egoistic concerns for oneself. Schopenhauer's his own moral system is premised on the notion of compassion and hence he argues that moral conduct must be sympathetic. Hegel, on the other hand, criticizes Kant's categorical imperative because he believes that the Formula of the Law of Nature is reduced to empty formalism, and has converted into mere rhetoric about duty for duty's sake." According to Hegel, Kant's categorical imperative does not offer a clear guideline for assessing moral conduct nor does it provide us with any specific

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[16] Kant, I., (1972) *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Moral*, translated and analyzed by H.J. Paton, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, pp. 74-75

[17] Jagat Pal (April-June 1986) "Morality as Categorical Imperative", *The North-Eastern Hill University Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities*, Vol. IV, No. 2, p. 33

[18] Schopenhauer, Arthur (1995) *On the Basis of Morality*, translated by E.F.J. Payne: Berghahn Books, Oxford

moral duties that we can follow. Mill argues that the categorical imperative does not succeed as a purely rational source of obligation. Instead, he says, it is actually a disguised version of the utilitarian principle which is the very last thing that Kant thought his principle was: According to Mill, the categorical imperative fails to reveal any such contradiction, and the only thing it does reveal is that the consequences of universalizing a maxim involve more unhappiness than happiness. Kant may rejects a specific notion of sympathy as alleged by Schopenhauer however a generalized notion of sympathy emerges in the Formula of the End in Itself, which foregrounds us to respect the inherent value of all people as ends in themselves and thus his view is not devoid of sympathizing humans race. Kant would probably agree that universalized lying would have bad effects on society but what Kant is saying is that harmful effects do not make actions immoral but it is the intention because there is something inherently wrong with the actions themselves because they conflict with our rational intuitions about moral duty.

Morality, according to Kant does not emanate from conformity to hypothetical imperatives but rather conformity to the Categorical imperative. Kant shows that the form of morality must be deontological, universal, and unconditional and thus argues that the categorical imperative is the only principle that can satisfy the concept of a moral imperative. Morality should provide us with a framework of rational principles that guide and restraint action independent of personal intentions and desires and such principles would ground on a rational will which is regarded as autonomous and this self-legislating autonomous reason offers overriding grounds for viewing each moral person as having equal worth and respect. And I agree with Kant that there is no possibility of thinking of anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be regarded as good without qualification, except a good will. And the only motive that can endow an act with moral value, he argues, is one that arises from universal principles discovered by reason and that is, goodwill. For Kant morality is fundamentally a matter of following the categorical imperative and following as such is a matter of acting from duty and not simply outwardly conforming to a rule because conforming to the moral duty is the practical necessity of a possible action as necessary of itself without reference to another end.

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PROGRESSIVE FEMALES BY TAGORE: A PSYCHO-PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS

GITANJALI ROY

A Nobel laureate, Nationalist, and Idealist, Rabindranath Tagore's literature portrayed female characters with spitfire personalities. Charulata, Kalyani, Binodini, Mrinal, and Giribala are a few such characters who have gained popularity in Bengali literature and media. His female characters are anything but submissive muses to the patriarchal society. Secondary literature and media projected them as independent, shrewd, intuitive thinkers, fearless, stubborn, selfish, assertive, and intelligent. The pool of characteristics veils the true interpretation of their personalities and hence the Hermeneutic method of research is adopted in this paper. A critical review of Tagore's Bengali literature, the primary source of information, provided a new set of information. This new information has changed the context of the female characters in terms of the personality traits of Tagore's female characters. The paper presents psychological hermeneutic perspectives of these characters for understanding the similarity and differences in the portrayal of females now and decades ago.

The idea of progressive women brings us to think of struggles and campaigns set out in the Western world during the 19h century. In Indian culture, ancient scriptures like *Manusmriti* and other *purana*-s made clarity in duties of both genders. After the invasion of the British in India, the society went through turmoil and scriptural knowledge. Its teachings became obtuse. There were swadeshi *andolan*, freedom struggles, formal education installation over traditional *gurukula*, and much more. In this mist of mayhem, Bengal (both east and west) saw an upsurge of literature via the writing of Rabindranath Tagore. His opinion and perspectives were far ahead of then social situations. The first Indian, a non-European to be embellished with the Nobel prize in Literature, an avid reader, philosopher across generations, and a visionary. Rabindranath Tagore needs no introduction and his line of work cannot be dated. He is considered to be a feminist and a keen observer of personality in society. He has givenbirth to varied ideas both imperishable and suitable to every society over decades. His list of writings includes plays, poems, novels, short stories, and magazine articles. His novels have been widely cast into plays and movies to depict the multiple shades of a character. It is hard to imagine that Tagore framed such powerful characters in an era where the society was undermining females by scoring them as objects rather than humans, and Bengal was witnessing turmoil of partition. Tagore stories are based on the culture, language, geography, and people communities of east and west Bengal. They depict minute details of culture and the intertwined role of each character in it, such as the clothing of women, food habits, etc. To modern society, it might seem orthodox and nearly tribal but a deeper analysis

reveals girth, innocence, and a strong socio-political message valid in the face of modern society. Tagore has always portrayed female characters in varied shades of personality as strong, independent, and nurturing. His authored novels showcase women with characteristics that can be sectioned as progressive women. From Tagore's perspective, the society was regressive but women had progressive personalities much earlier than the Western world revolution. Tagore became one of the pioneers of feminism in India (Banerjee, 2017, 274). P.K.Dutta aptly support the previous statement- "Rabindranath's most of the stories dealt with women as individual subjects engaged in negotiating with a problematic relationship in their marriages and with their household, but also women who created alternate life, some of which involved being single (Dutta, 2004, 9) .

Today in the 20th century we see women in India struggling to find their place in a patriarchal society. Tagore's stories have been an effort to change the face of society in every era. His efforts to display this variation give the reader opportunities to interpret and get close to the characters. Everyone can relate to some character or a few aspects of these characters. The women portrayed in Tagore's stories are both liked and criticized by society but their personalities are magnetic and flamboyant to leave an impression. Why Tagore? His short stories deal with the human mind and behavior, especially women's psychology (Banerjee, 2017, 271).

The purpose of this paper is to articulate Tagore's features of female protagonists in his novels using Gadamer's hermeneutic method. Hermeneutics is the art of interpretation and once the author overcomes self-biases by reflexivity, this art is sharpened. Gadamer's hermeneutics is his ontological focus (Being) and capacity to not only interpret human understanding but misunderstanding as a mechanism for effective communication (Regan, 2012, 288). The hermeneutic is textual interpretation because humans experience the world through language for better understanding and knowledge (Byrne, 2001, 968).The characteristic features of the Gadamerian method are- pre-supposition, inter-subjectivity, authenticity, tradition, and history to interpret the words of the text (Regan, 2012, 287). Regan (2012, 301) has explained the concepts of pre-supposition, inter-subjectivity, authenticity, temporality, tradition, and history in relation to reading, understanding, and interpretation. These concepts are here explained in relation to the personalities of the female protagonists mentioned in the paper.

Research plan

Gadamer's hermeneutics focused on understanding, interpretation, and application (Austgard, 2012, 829) using pre-supposition (bias), inter-subjectivity, authenticity (reflexivity), temporality (time affecting understanding/emotion), tradition, and history (culture) to interpret the words of the text (Regan, 2012, 287).The pre-supposition or bias arises from the lack of the interpreter's self-awareness and pre-conceptions that lead to false projection of the meaning of the text. In order to prevent clouding in judgment, the author identified and listed the expectations about the phrases depicting the personality characteristics of the female protagonist. Once this list was prepared, re-visiting the texts and developinga fresh understanding by eliminating listed expectations prevented self-imposed bias; thus, delivering an objective understanding of the text.

Inter-subjectivity occurs when understanding of a context is limited to self and hence one should discuss and seek others' advice, feedback and ideas. This process enhances one's learning about prejudice(s) in self-judgment/understanding of the context. For this step, the author reached out to two expert professors- one from psychology and the other from philosophy. These experts were selected as their interests and research areas wereclosely related to the article. So, with the triangulation of ideas (important criteria in qualitative research) as a result of brainstorming among the author and two experts. Triangulation raised the good cause of disagreement and agreement and finally distillation of true elements of personality with respect to each female protagonist.

Authenticity or reflexivity refers to asking fundamental questions of self-understandingto search for proper meaning and interpretation about values, beliefs, and ideologies (Regan, 2012, 395).Reflexivity provides opportunities for revisiting the method and making required changes in the process. The authorused this step to revisit the texts, again and again, to develop an objective interpretation of the content. The objectivity here means being free from self-biases, pre-conceived ideas, and available study findings. The interpretation extracted from the first time reading of the texts mentioned in this study when compared to the fourth time reading of the text (following the elimination of biases, inter-subjectivity, and reflexivity) brought out objective and psycho-philosophically myopic perspective of personalities.

History and tradition are profound concepts that require an understanding within the context of temporality. An individual is born in this world and history; traditions and temporality affect him constantly. The essence of existence can be enhanced by knowing these three concepts. It prevents self-biases and naïve self-representation. The traditional background of the author is similar to the background represented in the texts mentioned in this paper. The author conducted a deep analysis of tradition before indulging in the interpretation of texts. It included collecting information about social relationships, community, language, and traditions from senior members in the family and reading historical texts highlighting Bengali culture. Due to the similarity in the background, the understanding of language tradition, customs, and cultural factors were easy to interpret and understand. The frame of reference of the author, although was dipped into the pre-conceived cultural, traditional, and historical ideas but proper measures (as cited above) were taken to keep objectivity intact. Temporality plays an important role in the modification of tradition and culture, hence the collection of information from senior members of the family and reading historical texts helped in resonating with the author's temporal understanding of tradition, culture, and history with that mentioned in Tagore's texts.

The author used the above-mentioned concepts of Gadamer's hermeneutic approach to drawing a framework for a research plan. To understand the personalities of female protagonists, the author made a critical read of the novels and watched stories directed by Anurag Basu named 'Stories by Tagore'. The interpretation of each character with story content and context was made in lines with Tagore's perspective while sketching them. The understanding and interpretation of the personalities lead to the application for profiling progressive women's pictures.

Understanding the personalities

Gadamer's idea of understanding is through the study of communication taking place between the characters (Regan, 2012, 288). The language used by the female protagonists provides cognizance. This allowed the author to get familiar with the characters' perspectives of perceiving their world. For this reason, negotiations between the female protagonists and their significant others were studied for understanding the matter of agreement and profiling personality. Starting with Binodini of *Choker Bali,* one of the most reckoned novels featured as movies and television series gained popularity over her charismatic and

dynamic personality. In the times when India was under the rule of the British and females were not promoted for education or appreciated for an intuitive mind, Binodini was educated, well versed with literature, and multilingual. She was trained in music, piano, and other forms of art. Her communication with other female and male protagonists shows clarity in thoughts and intentions. He felt jealous towards another married female and she clearly blamed society for her conditions as a widow. Tagore has portrayed the pain and agony of young widows as a shout for change. Through Binodini, he reflects the suppression of the widowed, her call for freedom, and her desperate urge to satisfy her basic needs. When she narrates about her despair over being a complete woman still a widow, she questions the unfair treatment of the almighty and society. She acts under the influence of egoism when she enchanted a married man (who refused to marry her and chose a less qualified woman according to Binodini). Afterward, her actions and words drifted towards guilt and penance. She donned the consequences of her actions and decided to surrender herself in self-discovery. Tagore portrayed Binodini as a role model for women in adversity due to personal loss but refused to surrender herself, her needs, and desires for the sake of social dogmas. He made an attempt to spike our thinking about vengeance and punishment whether imposed by society or self. Tagore, through the dialogues of Binodini, claims that women have the right to decide about their fate irrespective of their social or marital conditions.

On her arrival to Puri (a city in Orissa), Mrinal writes a letter to her husband. She narrates her experiences being his wife and a young bride to her in-laws. She expressed her disappointment playing these roles, sabotaging her being that is more than these roles. The epistolary format of *Strir Patra* unfolds her agony and dissatisfaction towards her husband, married life, and his household. Mrinal was chosen as a bride in an aristocratic family because of her beauty. Unlike her elder sister-in-law, Mrinal refused to surrender to the family norms of subjecting herself to insults, remained confined to the kitchen, and did not voice her opinions. She well communicated to her husband about the unjust behavior of her in-laws, their wrongful expectation, and biased rules for a woman. In her letter, she clearly stated that she was more than just being a younger bride- she was a poet, had her opinion on personal and social matters, and was a forward thinker not afraid of orthodox customs. At one instance she says by the end of her pregnancy, she was shifted to an unhygienic dark corner of the house because she will become impure after giving birth. She objects to this by raising the question- How can a woman

raise to the status of a mother (such a pure and pious role) and be impure at the same time? How is this rule justified as it hampers the self-esteem of women? She was feeling suffocated due to gender biases and in her search for self-esteem and confidence, she always stood for a young girl (her elder sister-in-law's sister who came for shelter) during her stay and was falsely married. She said that she wanted to keep this young girl under her wing until she came to know about her death (suicide). Mrinal was shaken to the core by this young girl's actions and said it made her realize that nothing is worth one's self-esteem. Hence, she took a drastic step of moving out of her marital house but not returning in the future. She made it clear to her husband that she regretted losing her self-worth, realized her value, and would no longer be ready to compromise. Tagore has beautifully wrapped Mrinal's story in a letter where he recited the no-freedom situation of women in the patriarchal society. He suggests through the character that only women have to take that step where she seeks a place in such society. She has to be a self-advocate, not let go of her personality and identity for social acceptance. She needs to find her way to self-development and voice her concerns in any way possible.

Kalyani in *Aparichita* talks about her discovery of identity beyond marriage after her marriage was called off due to the greed of the groom's family. She narrates that the insult she and her father had to bear in the hands of the groom's maternal uncle led to the cancellation of the marriage. But after, she found her true calling- looking after the orphaned girls. Her interactions with British government officers showed that she is fearless in the face of truth. This was a significant difference between Kalyani and the groom; he was kind and gentle but chose to not speak even when he witnessed the wrongdoing of his uncle. Kalyani was contacted by the groom to rethink the marriage proposal as he was impressed by her personality and guilt-ridden by his cowardly actions. To this, Kalyani humbly refused and suggested that he move on with his life as she had with her social work. According to her, marriage is not the ultimate goal of life for a girl. There can be other goals to define herself and she has to make her choices. Refusing a marriage proposal in times when females did not have many opportunities in society shows her mental clarity and strong will-power. She chose to be a spinster, independent, guardian to orphaned girls, and a woman with the willpower to lead her life on her terms.

Giribala, the female protagonist of the short story '*Giribala*(1895)' protested against the misbehaviors, physical assault, and infidelity of her husband. She is married to a wealthy man who has a lustful interest in a theater artist. He likes to spend nights with his mistress rather than his wife, as he is enchanted by her beauty and personality. Giribala was beautiful and took care of her husband, despite his negligence. She starts visiting the theater and gets refuted over her husband's indecent behavior towards the actress. She decides to enchant him with the same dramatic skill and starts copying the actress. She even refuses to give locker keys to her husband for spending on the actress and as a result, she got beaten up and abused by him. He snatches all her jewelry and runs away with the actress. Giribala decided to break the tradition of housewife, not sobbing for her loss and taking revenge on her husband by joining the theatre. Tagore, through Giribala, sought the solution for women's oppression i.e., giving back what people make you go through (Banerjee, 2017, 275). She is liberated, self-dependent, popular, and spreads an awakening for women.

Interpretation of each character

The status of women in the 20th century is contrary to women portrayed in Tagore stories. He created a space for them to find and establish an identity for themselves. He put them beyond the household to a freedom fighter, education, musician, actress, etc.

Binodini, a young widow, refused to shy away from her emotional and physical desires. She questioned the social rules of marriage at an early age and the restrictions on widows. She displayed the power of education to bring in societal change in the perception of men and women both.

Mrinal recalls her conjugal marriage and regrets losing her self-esteem for the sake of others who do not recognize her as a person. She displays those women need to make their own choices and take charge of their lives. They have to struggle for their self-worth and only then society will look up to them.

In *Aparichita*, Tagore suggested an initiation from the bride's family to stop social evils like dowry. The story depicts the revolutionary and proactive thinking of a father for the welfare of her daughter (Banerjee, 2017, 273). Traditionally, marriage included men making decisions and women dreaming and praying for a

suitor. But here, Kalyani's character reflected an emerging modern woman of India who was bold, courageous, and assertive.

Giribala, deserted by her husband, refused to surrender her identity in the darkness of her house. She became self-reliant, earned a social status, and earned back her pride in society.

Application for profiling

The word 'progressive' is defined in Merriam-Webster dictionary as moving forward or developing gradually especially social improvement, interested in new or modern ideas or opportunities, characterized by progress and state in progress at the time of speaking. These definitions align well with the characteristics of female protagonists. If pooled together, the characteristics are well-educated, intelligent, willing to the social improvement of females, invites new ideas with respect to their time, strong-willed, and divination. These characteristics and the definition of progressive, with a closer view, provide similarities.

They all chose to face the hardship with grace and hold their heads up through their struggles. Their stories were short but the impact is long-lasting. Through the stories, we can understand the social problems faced by women. Such issues have no specific timeline, women before this era and after had gone through such struggles but, Tagore's stories iterate them for sensitivity in the society and bring open-mindedness among the community to acknowledge these problems and seek a solution. He portrayed females as insightful and capable to speak their minds, unlike the general social norm where females are required to keep quiet, follow social norms and not have an opinion. With respect to the above definition of progressive,we are required to put a philosophical lens and judge that it's not a modern term or a modern-day need. Women for centuries had to take steps and break the social rules and stereotypes to find their identity. Why does she have to struggle to speak her mind? Why she is expected to adhere to social norms solely? Despite being the other half of the population, she is made the weaker sex who needs protection or support for upliftment? In Indian Ethos and mythological stories, women are represented as powerful with multiple arms and energy to destroy evil when all the power of gods failed. Society praises idols of goddesses without a pint of hesitation, but the attitude differs for the women as human beings. Indian ethos and mythologies are full of stories where women display strength, be it Savitri who fights for her husband's life, or Gargi who is a scholar

of Vedas and Upanishads among the male sages. Samkhya Darshana, one of the Indian philosophical schools has presented the concept of Prakriti and Purusha responsible for the evolution of every element in this world. The term 'Prakriti' is often used as an analogy to the female who is responsible for the existence of all the creatures, mother of all. Shiva and Parvati (God and Goddess in Hindu religion) are called Purusha and Prakriti respectively and their interaction leads to the evolution of the world. Female scholars in ancient Indian philosophy like Gargi, Lopamudra, Maitreyi were insightful and challenged the gender gap in the academic and philosophical sphere. Often these mythological stories are categorized as mystical and religious and the role of the female is muraled as Goddess; without giving it an opportunity to taper down in human life. To bridge this gap between mythology, ethos, and reality, literature plays an important role due to its simplicity and approachability to the common man. Literature helps the common man to think and rationalize withevidence and experiences. "Rabindranath's successas a writer was actually ensured by his essentially lyrical temperament since there is a close affinity between short stories and lyrics (Bandyopadhyay, 2004). Women have to believe that they are progressive and need to take certain steps as discussed above and in Tagore's literature. Their behavior is like poetry that needs to inspire society for bringing immense change and energy for sustainability.

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THE NOTION OF BONDAGE AND LIBERATION IN SĀṀKHYA PHILOSOPHY:A CRITICAL STUDY

SWAGATA GHOSH

Among the Indian philosophical system, Sāṁkhya philosophy represents one of the oldest traditions. Like the other orthodox schools of Indian philosophy, the Sāṁkhya system too considers liberation to be the highest goal of human life. According to the Sāṁkhya philosophers, though liberation is nothing but the absolute cessation of the three-fold sufferings, yet it can only be attained through the realisation of the discriminatory knowledge (vivekajñāna) between the puruṣa and the prakṛti.

We know that the relation of mere contiguity (sannidhāna) between the puruṣa and the prakṛti, as admitted in Sāṁkhya philosophy, leads to the accomplishment of the bhoga and the kaivalya of puruṣa (being or embodied consciousness) in the apparent state of migration (saṁsāra). In the process of the phenomenal enjoyment and liberation through transcendence of the empirical, the assistance of the evolutes of prakṛti is required; hence their manifestation. In Sāṁkhya philosophy, we know that the puruṣa conceives of the modes of the antaḥkaraṇa to be its own, and accordingly the I-usages of the embodied consciousness occur. However, the Sāṁkhya śāstra being essentially an esoteric study of liberation, the focal issue lies in the ascertainment of the nature and the possibility of liberation of puruṣa through the attainment of the discriminatory cognition between itself and the prakṛti.

In Sāṁkhya philosophy, puruṣa is essentially and eternally free (nityamukta). Evidently, the issue arises that how can we consider the possibility of liberation of the ever-liberated puruṣa? Further, how at all can the question of bondage arise in case of the unbound, immutable, unrelated puruṣa? Moreover, if at all any such bondages are to be admitted due to the apparent related-ness between the puruṣa and the prakṛti due to their proximity, what could be the nature of such bondages?Such critical issues and the related concerns regarding the emancipation from such bondages are the moot points of discussion and analysis in the current research paper. We now enter into the detailed critical analysis and exposition of the issues stated above following the respective Sāṁkhyakārikās. In this context various arguments from the position of the Neo-Sāṁkhya tradition as well as from Yoga and Buddhist philosophies, have been put forward wherever those have been found to be relevant.

I

Among the Indian philosophical system, Sāṁkhya philosophy represents one of the oldest traditions. Like the other orthodox schools of Indian philosophy, the Sāṁkhya system too considers liberation to be the highest goal of human life. According to the Sāṁkhya philosophers, though liberation is nothing but the absolute cessation of the three-fold sufferings, yet it can only be attained through the realisation of the discriminatory knowledge (*vivekajñāna*) between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*.

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consciousness) in the apparent state of migration (*saṁsāra*). In the process of the phenomenal enjoyment and liberation through transcendence of the empirical, the assistance of the evolutes of *prakṛti* is required; hence their manifestation. In Sāṁkhya philosophy, we know that the *puruṣa* conceives of the modes of the *antaḥkaraṇa* to be its own, and accordingly the I-usages of the embodied consciousness occur. However, the Sāṁkhya *śāstra* being essentially an esoteric study of liberation, the focal issue lies in the ascertainment of the nature and the possibility of liberation of *puruṣa* through the attainment of the discriminatory cognition between itself and the *prakṛti*.

II

We know that according to Sāṁkhya philosophy, *puruṣa* is essentially and eternally free (*nityamukta*). Evidently, the issue arises that how can we consider the possibility of liberation of the ever-liberated *puruṣa*? Further, how at all can the question of bondage arise in case of the unbound, immutable, unrelated *puruṣa*? Moreover, if at all any such bondages are to be admitted due to the apparent related-ness between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* due to their proximity, what could be the nature of such bondages? This has been expressed by Vācaspati Miśra in his commentary as follows – '*puruṣaścedaguṇo'apariṇāmī, kathamasya mokṣaḥ? mucerbandhanaviśleṣārthatvāt, savāsanakleśakarmāśayānāṅca bandhanasamākhyānaṁ puruṣe'apariṇāminyasambhavāt/ ataevāsya na saṁsāraḥ pretyabhāvāparanāmā'asti niṣkriyatvāt/ tasmāt 'puruṣavimokṣārtham' iti riktaṁ vacaḥ*'.[1] These pivotal issues and the related concerns regarding the emancipation from such bondages are the moot points of discussion and analysis in the current research paper. We now enter into the detailed critical analysis and exposition of the issues stated above following the respective *Sāṁkhyakārikā*s. In this context various arguments from the position of the Neo-Sāṁkhya tradition as well as from Yoga and Buddhist philosophies, have been put forward wherever those have been found to be relevant.

III

In the sixty-second *kārikā*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa explicates the notion of the bondage and that of the liberation in the context of the essentially unbound *puruṣa*. The *kārikā* is as follows – '*tasmānna badhyate'addhā na mucyate nā'api saṁsarati kaścit/ saṁsarati badhyate mucyate ca nānāśrayā prakṛtiḥ//*'[2]. Here the main contention is that, that the *prakṛti* serves the purpose of the enjoyment and the liberation of *puruṣa*, is not exactly an appropriate manner of stating the essence of

the Sāṁkhya *śāstra*. The term '*mokṣa*' is only applicable to those who are actually bound. The *puruṣa*, however, being essentially unbound, immutable and devoid of the three *guṇa*s, - the question of its bondage and that of its volition towards liberation does not hold at all. Thus, the notions of bondage and liberation in Sāṁkhya philosophy occupies a unique character. In order to explicate the thesis that why at all the *puruṣa* cannot be bound, Vācaspati Miśra states the nature of bondage as follows – '*savāsanakleśakarmāśayānāṁ bandhanasamākhyānām*'[3]*etc*. The term '*vāsanā*' means *saṁskāra*. '*Kleśa*' means *avidyā*, *asmitā*, *rāga*, *dveṣa*, *abhiniveśa*. '*Karma*' refers to *dharma* and *adharma*. '*Āśaya*' means the *citta*. When *kleśa*, *karma*, *āśayaetc*. are associated with the previous impressions (*saṁskāra*) then bondage (*bandhana*) takes place. Now the issue arises that if we consider the above sense of bondage, then the *puruṣa* can never be bound at all. The *puruṣa* being immutable, non-related *etc*. it cannot have any sort of association with *kleśa*, *karma*, *āśaya* or *saṁskāra*. Thus, the *puruṣa* never migrates nor is it ever bound. Migration (*saṁsāra*) is also understood as the cycle of birth, death and rebirth (*pretyabhāva*). The *puruṣa*, however, does not have any relation to birth or death. Thus, its question of migration does not occur. Now the question arises that the *puruṣa* being essentially non-related, indifferent, inactive, immutable, devoid of the *guṇa*s *etc*. and accordingly being unbound and non-migratory, then the very tendency of *puruṣa* towards the attainment of liberation becomes meaningless. In apprehension of such objections from the opponents, Īśvarakṛṣṇa puts forward the sixty-second *kārikā* where he distinctly clarifies the notions of bondage, migration and liberation with respect to*puruṣa* and*prakṛti*.

The term '*addhā*' in the *kārikā* means in actuality or in reality. That is, in actuality or in essence, '*na kaścit puruṣaḥ badhyate*'[4] – that is, no *puruṣa* is bound in its true essence. So it does not migrate either. Consequently, it cannot have any possibility of attaining liberation. However, so far we have seen that the *prakṛti* becomes creative in order to serve the purpose of enjoyment and liberation of *puruṣa*. Such a notion is only apparent from the phenomenal point of view, which is not essentially or theoretically valid. Rather the actual thesis is that the *puruṣa* being unbound and non-migratory, all such empirical phenomena are located in *prakṛti*. The *prakṛti* evolving in various forms in relation to the different beings undergo migration, bondage and eventually liberation. Thus, in essence bondage, migration and liberation are all none but the modes of the *prakṛti* itself. Bondage is the result of the transformation of the three *guṇa*s.

Hence, that which is actually a mode of *prakṛti* appears to be there in the *puruṣa* due to the non-discrimination between the consciousness and the *buddhi* or *prakṛti*. So bondage *etc.* appear to be that of the *puruṣa*. However, such phenomenal bondage never touches or permeates the pure consciousness. It is merely a linguistic and cognitive mis-usage of the attributes of *prakṛti* to be that of the *puruṣa*, due to the non-apprehension of the discriminatory cognition between them.

This is further clarified by an analogy as follows – '*jayaparājayau bhṛtyagatāvapi svāminyupacaryete, tadāśrayeṇa bhṛtyānāstadbhāgitvāt, tatphalasya ca śokalābhādeḥ svāmini sambhavāt*'[5]. That is, in a battlefield it is the soldiers who actually experience the victory or the defeat, yet it is the king of the country who is attributed to be the victorious or the defeated one. The soldiers being in the relation of the server and the served with the ruler, though the result of the war actually belongs to them, yet it is imposed on or attributed to the ruler her/himself. Accordingly, the king enjoys the victory or aggrieves the defeat. Similarly, in case of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, though migration, bondage and liberation are actually there in *prakṛti*, yet due to its proximity with *puruṣa* and due to the resulting non-apprehension of the discrimination between them, all that is there in *prakṛti* appears to be housed in the *puruṣa*. The cognition and other modes of the *antaḥkaraṇa* which act as the causes of bondage are used as attributes of the *puruṣa*. Hence, empirically *puruṣa* is referred to as bound or liberated. Thus, Vācaspati Miśra, in his commentary, states that – '*bhogāpavargoyaśca prakṛtigatayorapi vivekāgrahāt puruṣasambandha upapādita iti sarvaṁ puṣkalam*'[6]. The phrase '*sarvaṁ puṣkalam*' means that whatever has been established that is consistent and there is no contradiction in it. Now referring to the original issue of impossibility of the liberation of *puruṣa* due to its essential inert, unrelated nature, it can be asserted that these issues are not actually contradictory to the philosophical system concerned; rather they strengthen the position through further clarification. The bondage, migration and liberation are not the attributes of *puruṣa*, rather they are imposed on the consciousness at the empirical level; and most strikingly, the *prakṛti* becomes creative to serve the purpose of such imposed tendencies of *puruṣa* at the phenomenal level. Thus, the concept of liberation of *puruṣa* here means that the liberation of the consciousness from the imposed bondages and the imposed migratory qualities or attributes, while the *prakṛti* attains fulfilment by serving the above.

IV

As discussed so far, bondage, migration and liberation that are imposed or reflected on the consciousness, is considered to be owned by the *puruṣa*, whereas in reality these are nothing but the modes of *prakṛti*. In this context, the opponents might argue that – '*prakṛtigatā bandhanasaṁsārāpavargāḥ puruṣeṣu upacaryante*'[7]. That is, though it is clear that the bondage *etc.* of the *prakṛti* is imposed on the *puruṣa*, yet the question arises that why or how the *prakṛti* experiences bondage *etc.*?

In response to the above, it is mentioned in the *kārikā* that – '*rūpaiḥ saptabhireva tu badhnātyātmānamātmanā prakṛtiḥ/ saiva ca puruṣārthamprati vimocayatyekarūpeṇa//*'[8].*Dharma, adharma, jñāna, ajñāna, vairāgya, avairāgya, aiśvarya* and *anaiśvarya* are the eight modes of *buddhi* or *mahattattva*. These modes act as instruments for the enjoyment and liberation of *puruṣa* by controlling the subtle body (*liṅgaśarīra*). The eight modes of the *buddhi* include upward movement, downward motion, bondage *etc.* which are responsible for the enjoyment of *puruṣa*; then *vivekakhyāti* leads to the attainment of liberation. Thus, by serving the purpose of bondage and liberation of the *puruṣa*, the eight modes of *buddhi* attain fulfilment. The above *kārikā* states that among the eight modes of *buddhi*, apart from *tattvajñāna* or *vivekakhyāti*, the other seven forms of the intellect, namely, *dharma, adharma, ajñāna, vairāgya, avairāgya, aiśvarya* and *anaiśvarya* act as instruments towards the bondage and migration of the *prakṛti* itself. However, the *tattvajñāna* or the *vivekakhyāti* is distinct from the other seven modes of the *buddhi*, and hence, attributed as – '*ekarūpeṇa*'.On attainment of such distinctive cognition, the *prakṛti* eventually alleviates itself from both the bondage and the liberation, that is, relieves itself from serving the purpose of *puruṣa*. Further, once the discriminatory cognition (*vivekakhyāti*) is obtained, the *prakṛti* does not have the tendency of serving the purpose of *puruṣa* anymore. Thus, the bondage *etc.* of the *prakṛti* is due to *dharma, adharmaetc.* It is because of the non-apprehension of the discrimination (*bhedāgraha*) between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* that such bondage *etc.* are imposed on *puruṣa*. Furthermore, due to the production of the *vivekakhyāti*, *puruṣa* is relieved of the imposed bondages. Thus, by the seven modes of *buddhi*, *prakṛti* finds itself in bondage to fulfil the imposed experience of bondage of *puruṣa*. And on the other hand, with the help of *jñāna*, that is, discriminatory cognition, *prakṛti* leads the

puruṣa towards liberation by destroying the cognition of the apparent non-discrimination between itself and *puruṣa*.

It is to be noted here that the term '*prakṛti*' refers to *buddhi*. This is because the intellect (*buddhi*) being the first product of *prakṛti*, *dharma*, *adharmaetc.* are all situated in *buddhi*. The sense of non-discrimination or oneness actually occurs between the *puruṣa* and the intellect. Thus, here the term '*prakṛti*' in the *kārikā* specifically refers to *buddhi*. Moreover, in Sāṁkhya philosophy, we do not differentiate between the cause and the effect in essence. It is, thus, perfectly consistent to refer to *buddhi* as *prakṛti*. Hence, it is established that theoretically there cannot be any bondage, migration or liberation of *puruṣa*. Rather all these are situated in, and are modes of the *prakṛti*, that is, that of the *buddhi* itself.

V

Further, one might ask that let us consider for argument's sake that the above form of the distinctive cognition is attained. But then how does that lead to the attainment of liberation? In response, the following *kārikā* has been put forward to clarify the above, as follows – '*evaṁ tattvābhyāsānnā'asmi na me nā'ahamityapariśeṣam/ aviparyayādviśuddhaṁ kaivalyamutpadyate jñānam//*'[9]. The term '*tattva*' in the above *kārikā* is indicative of the prime contention of Sāṁkhya philosophy. The main thesis of Sāṁkhya *śāstra* is the ascertainment of the discriminatory cognition between the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa*. However, the mere distinction between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* (*prakṛtipuruṣaviveka*) cannot act as the means towards liberation. Hence, by the admission of implication (*lakṣaṇā*) in the term '*tattva*' the intended meaning is to be understood. Here the term '*tattva*' refers to '*tattvajñāna*', that is, the cognition of the distinction between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. It is held that when such discriminatory cognition is attained, then pure cognitions like 'I am conscious', 'I am not transmutable', 'I do not migrate', 'I am forever inactive', 'I do not possess agency of any action', 'I am not the possessor', 'I am not the agent' *etc.* are produced which are indicative of the essential solitary or non-related nature of the *puruṣa* or consciousness. It is important to note here that the above cognitions are indubitable and free from error. However, it is to be kept in mind that the mere production of the above discriminatory cognition (*sattvānyatākhyāti*) between the *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, would not situate it as an immediate and stable state of cognition. Rather the perfection of such cognition as the absolute means towards emancipation is to be achieved through practice. Further, if the practice is not performed with proper

care and devotion, and if it only continues for a short while, then the purpose of liberation would not be served. Thus, even if the discriminatory cognition is attained, it has to be practised and meditated upon with utmost devotion over ages and without any disruptions in-between. It is then that the cognition gets situated in its purest and most perfect form and hence, produces immediate perceptual cognition of the distinction between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. Thus, through practice one can truly attain the discriminatory cognition between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* which is instrumental towards the ultimate liberation.

VI

It has already been stated that the '*tattva*' in case of *tattvajñāna*, as referred to above, indicates *prakṛtipuruṣavivekakhyāti*. The cognition of such form which thus arises through devoted practice over ages is pure (*viśuddha*). In order to emphasise on the fact that such cognition is pure, that is, veridical, the term '*aviparyayāt*' has been included in the *kārikā*. It is due to fallacies (*viparyaya*) and uncertainties (*saṁśaya*) that a cognition becomes non-veridical. Hence, the inclusion of the term '*aviparyayāt*' in the *kārikā* is extremely significant in order to emphasise the veracity or the authenticity of the *tattvajñāna*. *Tattvajñāna* is essentially free from fallacies and uncertainties, and that establishes its purity or veracity (*viśuddhi*). Īśvarakṛṣṇa, however, does not mention about *saṁśaya* in the *kārikā*, but Vācaspati Miśra clarifies the notion of *viśuddhi* in case of *tattvajñāna* by ruling out the possibility of *saṁśaya* too apart from *viparyaya*. He states that – '*niyatam aniyatatayā gṛhnan saṁśayo'api viparyayaḥ*'.[10] That is, though in the *kārikā* it has only been mentioned that *aviparyaya*, which stands for infallibility or authenticity, yet the same is to be understood as the indicator of certainty too. In clearer terms, the term '*aviparyaya*' refers to both certainty and infallibility. One might ask that how can the same term '*aviparyaya*' refer to the absence of uncertainty and that of fallibility? To clarify, Vācaspati Miśra states that – '*niyatam aniyatatayā*'. That is, though it is true that *viparyaya* stands for '*tadabhāvati tatprakāraka niścaya*', yet the very phrase '*niyatam aniyatatayā*' indicates that when an object is apprehended in a form or in a sense which does not pertain to it and there is no certainty regarding that apprehension either, then those cases represent the instances of dubious cognition. So if we interpret *viparyaya* as '*tadabhāvati tatprakāraka jñāna*' instead of '*tadabhāvati tatprakāraka niścaya*', then the cases of dubious cognitions too could be accounted for by the term '*viparyaya*'. Thus, here the term '*aviparyaya*' in the

kārikā could be considered to stand for *saṁśaya-viparyaya-śūnyatva*, that is, a cognition which is free from fallacies and uncertainties. *Tattvajñāna* being such that it represents the object of cognition as it is, and hence, it is devoid of any sort of errors or doubts. Accordingly, *tattvajñāna* is pure and veridical.

VII

In the above context, a question might be raised that in spite of attaining the perfect distinctive cognition by practising through ages, how could it be possible to eradicate the empirical migratory state (*saṁsāra*)? It is apprehended that false cognitions (*mithyājñāna*), produced out of illusory impressions (*mithyā saṁskāra*), are beginning-less (*anādi*) and infinite in number. Hence, the false impressions would continue to produce false cognitions, and consequently, migratory states (*saṁsāra*) in an unending procession. Thus, as long as the flow of illusory cognitions would continue, the transmigration of beings would also be unimpeded. Now the illusory impressions are positive entities. We know that if a positive entity is beginning-less, then it is devoid of destruction too. If the false cognitions arising out of beginning-less false impressions become indestructible, then even if the discriminatory cognition is produced, due to the prevalence of the illusory cognitions, transmigration will continue in its course. This would render the hard-earned discriminatory cognition to be inefficacious, and consequently, there would not be any volition towards its attainment. Emancipation is nothing but the eradication of transmigration forever. However, if the procession of transmigration due to false cognitions continue to exist, then the attainment of liberation would be impossible. In response to the above apprehension, Īśvarakṛṣṇa assures us that such a position never arises. This is because even though the illusory perceptions are beginning-less, yet when the pure and perfect discriminatory cognition, as admitted by the Sāṁkhya philosophers, is produced then the false perceptions are rendered powerless. The Sāṁkhya philosophical system does not admit *dhvaṁsābhāva*, that is, the absence of an object after its destruction. So it is not possible for them to admit the destruction of the illusory cognitions. However, with the production of the genuine isolatory cognition (*kevalajñāna*), the false impressions cannot produce illusory cognitions any further. Moreover, it is due to this reason that the absolute discriminatory cognition is held as solitary (*kevala*) cognition at this stage, as it is devoid of any relation to fallacies, uncertainties and falsities of cognition then.

At this point there might again be an apprehension that the false impressions being beginning-less, they are strongly deep-rooted. However, it is to be kept in mind that the Sāṁkhya philosophers being *akhyātivādin*s, do not admit falsity of cognitions, they only consider falsity of usages (*mithyāvyavahāra*). Now the discriminatory cognition attained through devoted practice over ages may be extremely strong or powerful, but it might not be deeply situated as it is produced through practice. To clarify it might be said that whereas the false impressions or illusory usages having their impact on beings are in a way innate, due to their beginning-less-ness, the attained *tattvajñāna* might not be that impactful on beings as it is learned through practise or is something which is acquired. Thus, the question arises that how or whether at all the discriminatory cognition would be able to eradicate the false impressions. The false impressions are infinite in number and the discriminatory cognition is one. So naturally the question arises that how will the *tattvajñāna* destroy the illusory perceptions and attain its solitary state. Vācaspati Miśra himself raises the above opposition and responds to it as follows – '*yadyapi anādiḥ viṣayavāsanā*'[11]*etc*. That is, the state of transmigration (*saṁsāra*) is there from time unknown or in other words, it is beginning-less. It is impossible to determine from when did the consciousness start considering the pleasure, pain *etc*. as its own, which are actually there in the intellect or are modes of the intellect. The consideration of pleasure, pain, agency, enjoyer-ship *etc*. as one's own is referred to by the term '*saṁskāra*'. However, it is never possible to determine the time period of such apparent sense of identification between the consciousness and the intellect. This being the root cause of transmigration, it is consequently, beginning-less. Further, the imposition or ascription of one's property on another is called incongruity (*viparyaya*). Though the ascription of the properties of *prakṛti* on *puruṣa* is incongruent and improper, yet such apparent imposition is to be admitted which leads to the notion of migration. Now such false ascriptions and illusory impressions are equivalent in Sāṁkhya system. Here the Sāṁkhya philosophers hold that though the false perceptions or impositions are beginning-less, yet the acquired discriminatory cognition is so powerful that it can eradicate those completely. This is because the discriminatory cognition is nothing but the purest and most perfect immediate perception of the essential nature of reality. Thus, it is potent enough to overpower the effects of the beginning-less imperfect cognitions. We know that if a cognition is infiltrated with fallacies, however, deep-rooted that notion might be, it is inevitably refutable (*bādhita*), and that is only a matter of time. A couple of instances would again help to explicate the matter more clearly. Say, there has been impermeable

darkness in a cave for thousands of years at a stretch, yet if someday a person enters the cave with a lamp lit in her/his hand, immediately, the cave is lit up and the age-old darkness is eradicated. Similarly, the effect of the invincible *tattvajñāna* uproots the illusory impressions produced due to the endless stream of *mithyāsaṁskāra*. Further another instance could be stated as follows – a person standing in her/his balcony perceives the bank of a nearby river. However, due to the glitter of the bright sunlight, the sands on the bank of the river appear to be shimmery. Hence, the person cannot discern it to be the bank of the river, and considers it to be the river water itself. Now such a notion might continue for days and months together. However, if one day the person comes down to the river bank and perceives on one's own that the shiny appearance is that of the sands of the bank of the river, and it is not the river water itself, then immediately, the previously held wrong notion is eradicated. Thus, it is evident that whenever a cognition is inherently false, irrespective of its source or duration, it is bound to be refuted by the correct knowledge sooner or later. Accordingly, the impact of the *tattvajñāna* eradicates the erroneous cognitions or usages produced due to the innumerable age-old *mithyāsaṁskāra*.

VIII

We know that the intellect or cognition is essentially transparent in nature due to the predominance of *sattva guṇa* in it. The cognitions of the principles are results of the specialised actions of the intellect, that is, '*tattvavastupakṣapātohi dhiyāṁ svabhāvaḥ*'.[12] If the actual principle becomes the subject matter of the cognition, then such cognition is never produced further. The illusory perceptions and the false impressions do not possess the actual principles as their subject matter, rather they acquire their contradictory properties, and hence, even if such cognitions are extremely deep-rooted, they cannot stand resilient before the perfect immediate perception of the actual principles and their reality. Thus, once the absolute discriminatory cognition is attained and is well-situated over practise, then one could eventually be freed from migration. Hence, it is clear that the above apprehension of the acquired absolute cognition not being able to eradicate the beginning-less illusory impressions, does not hold anymore and it is aptly clarified.

Illusory perceptions are also referred to as fallacious, contradictory, invalid cognitions *etc.* because such cognitions are deviant in nature (*pracyutasvabhāva*). The reason for such deviations in cognition is the presence

of fallacies. When a cognition is free from fallacies, it expresses the true nature of an object, that is, the object as it is. Once such correct cognition is produced which expresses the object or reality as it is, then it is bound to eradicate all sorts of false impressions. The above position is evidently admitted by the orthodox schools of philosophy, since they hold that the *vedavākya*s, be it unauthored (*apauruṣeya*) or created by *Īśvara*, are of the above unquestionably veridical nature.However, it is interesting to note here that the above view point is not only admitted by the orthodox schools of philosophy, rather it is also accepted by the externalists (*bāhyavādins*). Now in response to the question that why the fallacious cognitions cannot impede the correct cognition of reality, Dharmakīrti in his text *Pramāṇavārttika* mentions that – '*nirupadravabhūtārthasvabhāvasya viparyayaiḥ/ na bādhoyatnavattve'api buddhestatpakṣapātataḥ//*'[13]. Here the term '*upadrava*' indicates fallacies. It is due to fallacies that a cognition loses its veracity or authenticity. If a cognition is free from *upadrava*, that is, fallacies, then it represents the object as it is or in its true essence. Once such pure cognition is produced, then the endless stream of age-old illusory impressions is ripped off its functionality. Accordingly, the pure cognition can never be refuted. The term '*buddhestatpakṣapātataḥ*' as stated above, puts forward the above stand.

The cognition or the intellect is always capable of acquiring the actual nature of object. Its tendency is to express the object as it is. Thus, fallacies cannot affect that potency of a cognition. To emphasise on this point Dharmakīrti has stated this view twice in his text, - once in the *pramāṇasiddhi prakaraṇa* and again in the *svārthānumāna prakaraṇa*. This establishes the fact that through utmost devotion and practice over ages, once the pure and perfect immediate perception of the reality is attained, none of the fallacies or false impressions could be functional anymore; they are removed forever. Then the false impressions too are rendered dysfunctional and cannot lead to the production of false cognitions or usages anymore. The discriminatory cognition thus produced, is essentially non-related to any fallacies *etc.*, and hence, it is never the case that the stream of the *tattvajñāna* and that of false cognitions continue parallel to each other. Rather once the *sattvapuruṣānyatākhyāti* is produced, only that cognition and its flow exist; this is why, the absolute cognition is referred to as solitary (*kevala*) cognition in the *kārikā* and moreover because of its non-related-ness to any sort of doubts or fallacies.

It is thus clear that the absolute discriminatory perception (*sattvapuruṣānyatāsākṣātkārātmakajñāna*) is such that it pertains to the actual nature of the reality (*tattvaviṣayaka*), and is to be attained through devoted practice over ages and births. It is devoid of all sorts of fallacies, doubts *etc.* and hence, can never be refuted. Further it being of such pure nature, it leads to the eradication of the endless procession of the illusory impressions and its consequent erroneous usages. Thus, once such cognition is attained by an individual, one can never be affected by the illusory or erroneous perceptions any further. The individual being then perceives the reality in its true essence. The actual nature of the discriminatory perception thus attained is expressed in the *kārikā* as '*nāsmi*', '*na me*' and '*nāham*'. The term '*nāsmi*' stands for the essential inactive nature of the self. This further shows that in Sāṁkhya philosophy, activity could only be a property of the insentient. Let us now explain how such a position is being proved. The term '*asmi*' literally (as an *avyaya*) stands for the self(*aham*). Again if the term '*asmi*' is used as a verb, then it being related with the root '*as*', indicates an action. Now to explain how the phrase '*na asmi*' refers to inactivity of the self, Vācaspati Miśra refers to the grammarians and states that the root verbs like, *kṛ*, *bhū* and *as* stand for actions. Thus, the root '*as*' as applied in case of '*na asmi*' clearly indicates the absence of any activity. Hence, the above phrase is to be interpreted as that which prevents the admission of any sort of activity, - internal or external, in connection to the self.

IX

In Sāṁkhya philosophy, we find that external activities like communicating, receiving *etc.* and internal activities like *adhyavasāya*, *abhimāna*, *saṁkalpa* and *ālocana* are the functions of the *buddhi*, *ahaṁkāra*, *manas* and *indriya* respectively. These transformations occurring inside the body are referred to as internal. Though Vācaspati Miśra has not clearly stated what is being referred to by the external activities, yet it could be held that the functions of the *karmendriya* could be considered as external. Now we know that these transformations are non-related to the self. However, agency cannot be accepted as devoid of all such relations. Thus, the self being devoid of all such relations can never be considered to be the agent. Hence, the structure of such cognition is '*nāham*'. The phrase is to be completed as '*aham iti kartṛpadam*'[14], because the term '*aham*' does not stand for the subject (*kartṛpada*). Thus, we have to reformulate it as – '*aham iti kartṛbodhakaṁ padam*'. Now the term '*aham*'

clearly stands for the subject or the agent (*kartṛbodhaka*), as is evident from our frequent usages. For instance, everyday parlances like, '*ahaṁ jānāmi*', '*ahaṁjuhomi*', '*ahaṁ dade*', meaning that 'I know', 'I perform sacrifices', 'I donate' respectively, represent the above sense of *aham* as the subject or the agent. It is thus evident that if the term '*ahaṁ*' stands for subject-hood or agency, then clearly '*nāhaṁ*' means the absence of agency. Further it follows that inactivity (*niṣkriyatva*) *etc.* being the markers of non-agency (*kartṛtvābhāva*), the phrase '*nāsmi*' prevents any sort of activity or functionality on the part of the self, and consequently the non-agency of the self is established.

According to the above notion of non-agency of the self, as discussed above, now the structure of the cognition that entails, is of the form '*na me*'. The assertion '*na me*' indicates the non-related-ness and indifference (*nirlepatva* or *asaṅgitva*) of the self. However, it might be argued that in spite of being the non-agent, the self could be related to the pleasure, pain *etc.* of others. In such cases then though there is absence of agency, yet due to the presence of enjoyer-ship (*bhoktṛtva*), how would liberation be possible? It is because of such apprehension, it has been stated that the cognition of non-agency is not the ultimate; it should be followed by cognition of the form '*na me*' or '*matsambandhi na kiñcit*'. That is, 'due to the absence of agency, nothing is related to me' and 'I am not related to anything'. Since, the sense of ownership is due to the sense of agency, then in absence of any sort of agency, one would be devoid of any sense of ownership too. An individual who has attained the *tattvajñāna* conceives of oneself as the non-agent. S/he does not consider the pleasure, pain *etc.* located in the *antaḥkaraṇa* to be one's own any further. The being then realises oneself to be indifferent and isolated, that is, *asaṅga* and *nirlipta*. Thus, in the *kārikā* we find that '*nāsmi*' stands for 'I am inactive', '*na me*' means that 'there is nothing which is related to me' and '*nāhaṁ*' states that 'I am non-agent'.

Vācaspati Miśra, however, explains the above cognition in a different sequence because he holds that *puruṣa* initially considers itself as inactive. Then due to its inactivity realises its non-agency, and finally attains the cognition that due to its non-agency, it does not possess any ownership, that is, there is no object which is related to it, because only the agent can be the owner. He himself again provides another explanation to the above sequence in his commentary, as follows – '*athavā "nā'asmi" iti, "puruṣo'asmi, na prasavadharmā"/ aprasavadharmitvāccākartṛtvamāha – "nāham" iti/ akartṛtvācca na svāmitetyāha*

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– "*na me*" *iti*.[15] It may be argued that the cognition of the form '*nāsmi*' does not only indicate inactivity on the part of the *puruṣa*, rather it denotes non-agency too. Thus, the subsequent cognition of the form '*nāham*' becomes futile, as it is a mere repetition of the sense of non-agency of the *puruṣa*. Thus, Vācaspati Miśra reinterprets the terms through a different sort of terminological analysis. Earlier the term '*nāsmi*' has been considered as '*na + asmi*', but Vācaspati Miśra analyses it as '*nā + asmi*'. The term '*nṛ*' in the singular tense of the first case ending stands for '*nā*'. On attaining the *tattvajñāna*, the self realises itself as '*nāasmi*', that is, '*ahaṁ nā-puruṣaḥ*'.[16] The phrase '*nāsmi*' stands for '*puruṣaḥ asmi*'. That is, the cognition that arises is of the form, - 'I am *puruṣa*, but not creative'. Here the intended meaning is that once the self realises itself as the *puruṣa*, then it immediately it realises itself as the indifferent, solitary consciousness (*kūṭastha caitanya*) too. Further the cognitions of the form, 'since I am the *puruṣa*, hence, I am neither immutable nor creative', entails from the former realisation. The fact that an entity is immutable or non-creative entails the fact that it is a non-agent too. Thus, the following cognition '*nāham*' establishes such. Furthermore, the realisation of the non-agency of the self leads to the consequent realisation of its non-relatedness (*sambandhaśūnyatā*) with anything as such, and accordingly, its sense of being the non-possessor (*asvāmitva*) arises. Thus, according to the above sequence, we find that the self on attaining the *tattvajñāna*, that is, *sattvapuruṣānyatāsākṣātkāra*, realises itself as the inactive, non-agent, isolated consciousness. This is the fundamental essence of *puruṣa*, and accordingly, the realisation of such is nothing but the attainment of liberation.

X

In the above context, in *Yogasūtra* we find that – '*tadā draṣṭuḥ svarūpe avasthānam*'.[17] The term '*draṣṭu*' refers to the immutable passive onlooker or seer within the being, that is the pure consciousness. According to Patañjali, the realisation of the true essence of the core consciousness as distinct from the *citta* is the ultimate aim of our existence. It is then that we attain enlightenment, and consequently liberation. It is because of this reason that the *sattvapuruṣānyatāsākṣātkāra* is considered to be the pivotal cause of the liberation. Patañjali holds that each of our perceptions being veiled by the modes of the *citta*, we cannot attain the perfect cognition of the true nature of consciousness in the course of our empirical existence. For instance, if we wear a glass with a spot on it, then whatever we perceive would be tainted with that spot.

However, at the same time just as we need the pair of glasses for seeing the objects of the world, similarly, we need the assistance of the *citta* to perceive the *draṣṭu* in its true essence. Just as the spot on our glasses disturbs our vision of the empirical objects, the modes (*vṛtti*) of the *citta* too distorts our perception of the *draṣṭu*, but in spite of that the assistance of the *cittavṛtti* is necessary for the perception of the pure indifferent consciousness. In this regard, Patañjali puts forward a beautiful metaphor to explain the function of the *citta* in attaining the perfect cognition of the *draṣṭu*. He states that the *cittavṛtti* is like the waves in the water of an ocean, whereas the *draṣṭu* is like the ocean-bed. Just as one has to move through the waves of the water in an ocean to reach the ocean bed and see the aquatic life underneath, similarly the being has to go through the various forms of the *cittavṛtti* in order to eventually attain the clear and distinct perception of the core consciousness, that is, the *draṣṭu*.

Such form of the pure perception is held by the Sāṁkhya philosophers as *sattvapuruṣānyatāsākṣātkāra*, and it is this form of realisation that is instrumental to the attainment of liberation on the part of the being. In Sāṁkhya philosophy this has been referred to as the direct perception of the discrimination between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* (*sattvapuruṣānyatāsākṣātkāra*). This ultimate cognition has been attributed with three qualifiers in the *kārikā* – '*viśuddham*', '*kevalam*' and '*apariśeṣam*'. The first two qualifiers have already been discussed above. Now let us take a look at the third one. In order to bring out the significance of the third qualifier '*apariśeṣam*', Vācaspati Miśra raises an objection, - '*nanu etāvatsu jñāteṣvapi kaścit kadācidajñāto viṣayo'asti, tadjñānaṁ jantun bandhayiṣyati*'.[18] That is, one might argue that even after attaining the cognition of almost all the objects by practising the ultimate cognition, there might be some object which remains unknown. So there might remain ignorance about at least one object, and until and unless all the objects are known and the respective ignorance is destroyed how could liberation be possible? In response to such possible objections, the term '*apariśeṣam*' has been added as a mark of the ultimate cognition. It is held that once such absolute cognition is attained, nothing remains unknown. The root cause of all the products that constitute the world, - the *prakṛti*, and the one contradictory in essence to it, - the *puruṣa*, when known in their original essences and their absolute contradiction is perceived, everything that is there naturally falls under the purview of such overpowering cognition, and hence, nothing remains unknown, which could further create any sort of bondage. In this context, it has been mentioned in *Sāṁkhyasūtra* – '*tattvābhyāsānneti netīti*

tyāgādivivekasiddhiḥ'[19]. In the commentary (*vṛtti*) to the said *sūtra*, Aniruddha states that – '*vivekaśca kathaṁ syādityatrāha – tattvābhyāsā/ aspaṣṭam/ śrutiśca "sa eṣa neti netyātmā'agṛhyo nahi gṛhyate, aśīryo nahi śīryate"*'[20]. Further in the commentary (*vṛttisāra*) to the above *vṛtti*, Vedānti Mahādeva states that – '*vivekaḥ kathaṁ syātyatrāha – tattvābhyāsāditi/ netinetīti tattvābhyāsāddehendriyādivailakṣaṇyainātmanaḥ punaḥ punaścintanāt tyāgāt saṁnyāsācca vivekasiddhiḥ vivekasākṣātkāraḥ/ tathā ca śrutiḥ - "athāta ādeśo neti netīti"*[21] *"tyāgenaike amṛtatvamānaśuḥ"*[22] *iti ca*'.[23]

XI

It might further be asked that, - '*kiṁ punaḥ īdṛśena sākṣātkāreṇa sidhyati?*'[24] That is, how does the absolute discriminatory cognition, eulogized so far, help to serve the purpose of the *puruṣa*? In response Īśvarakṛṣṇa states that – '*tena nivṛttaprasavāmarthavaśāt saptarūpavinivṛttām/ prakṛtiṁ paśyati puruṣaḥ prekṣakavadavasthitaḥ svacchaḥ//*'[25]. The *triguṇātmikāprakṛti* is continually in the process of transformation (*niyatapariṇāmaśīlā*). It constitutes the very essence of the *prakṛti*. The transformation is of two types – *sarūpapariṇāma* and *virūpapariṇāma*. Here the term '*prasava*' stands for *virūpapariṇāma*. The transformation (*prasava*) of *prakṛti* serves the purpose of enjoyment and liberation of *puruṣa* which finally leads to the *vivekasākṣātkāra*. From time immemorial, the *prakṛti* has evolved as the *mahatetc*. till the gross elements are produced in a definite sequence. These products help to serve the enjoyment of *puruṣa*. Now that *prakṛti* itself leads to the production of the discriminatory cognition between itself and the *puruṣa* (*sattvapuruṣānyatākhyāti* or *vivekasākṣātkāra*) when such cognition is meditated upon and practised with great care over ages. Thus, the *prakṛti* serves the purpose of liberation of *puruṣa*. The *prakṛti* does not have any more functionality other than these two, that is, serving the purpose of enjoyment (*bhoga*) and liberation (*apavarga*) of *puruṣa*. The term '*prasava*' denotes the creativity (*kārya*) of *prakṛti*. The *prakṛti* maintains its creativity over ages in the course of the evolutionary manifestation of the world, and thus serves the purpose of enjoyment of *puruṣa* from time immemorial. With the attainment of the *sattvapuruṣānyatākhyāti* or *vivekasākṣātkāra*, the *puruṣa* realises its freedom from any necessity of enjoyment, and continues to exist in its solitary (*kevala*) essence. Thus, the *prakṛti* then helps in accomplishing the second purpose of the *puruṣa*, that is, its liberation. We know that the *prakṛti* has two major purposes, - one is to produce the evolutes in order to serve the purpose

of enjoyment of *puruṣa*, and the other is to help in the production of *tattvajñāna* in order to help the *puruṣa* attain *vivekasākṣātkāra* that would eventually lead to its liberation. With the attainment of the *tattvasākṣātkāra* both the functions of the *prakṛti* are fulfilled. Thus, the *prakṛti* too is freed from its incessant functionalities. It then reverts to its primordial state, that is, its state of *sarūpapariṇāma*, and does not become creative anymore, since its purposeful functions have been fulfilled, and accordingly there remains nothing for it to create any further.

It is to be noted that as long as the discriminatory cognition is not attained, the *prakṛti* does not cease to transform. The attainment of the immediate perception which ceases the transformations of the *prakṛti* is of the form – '*tena tattvasākṣātkāreṇa prakṛtiḥ nivṛttaprasavābhavati*'[26]. The discriminatory cognition leads to the cessation of the seven modifications of *prakṛti*, namely, *dharma*, *adharma*, *ajñāna*, *vairāgya*, *avairāgya*, *aiśvarya* and *anaiśvarya*. These seven transformations being prior to *tattvajñāna*, continue to be modified until and unless *tattvajñāna* is produced. However, with the production of the discriminatory cognition (*tattvajñāna*), modifications of the *prakṛti* into the above seven forms cease. Thus, the ultimate cognition, that is, *sattvapuruṣānyatākhyāti* or *vivekasākṣātkāra*, acts as the cause of cessation of the seven other transformations of *prakṛti*. This is precisely expressed by the term '*arthavaśāt*' in the *kārikā*, that is, due to the power of the ultimate cognition the *prakṛti* ceases to transform into any other forms further.

XII

In accordance with the above discussion, an objection might be raised that among the above-mentioned seven forms of *prakṛti*, *vairāgya* acts as the cause of *tattvajñāna*. Hence, it is inappropriate to say that *vairāgya* acts as a cause of bondage or an impediment towards liberation. However, the *vairāgya* admitted by the Tauṣṭikas is considered as *atattvajñānapūrvaka*. The schools which admit either of the primordial *prakṛti*, *ahaṁkāra*, *indriya* or *mahābhūta* as the self (*ātman*) are referred to as the Tauṣṭikas. *Tattvajñāna* helps to destroy all that is against its nature, and hence, due to the eradication of the modes of *prakṛti* that are counter to *tattvajñāna* by the overpowering effect of the *tattvajñāna*, the *prakṛti* ceases to transform into *dharmaetc.* Thus, owing to the cessation of the cause, the effect is no longer produced.

When the *puruṣa* attains *sattvapuruṣānyatākhyāti*, *prakṛti* no longer evolves as the *mahatetc.* and consequently, transformations into the form of *dharmaetc.* also cease. It is at this moment, the inactive, pure *puruṣa* perceives the *prakṛti* in its almost primordial form as a mere witness or a detached observer. The term '*svaccha*' in the *kārikā* significantly denotes the detached perception of *puruṣa*, which is free from all sorts of non-discriminatory cognition (*abhedābhimānaśūnya*). When we refer to the *puruṣa* as *svaccha*, it denotes the unrelated-ness of the *puruṣa* with the three *guṇa*s. The term '*svaccha*' means the non-relatedness of the *puruṣa* with those states of the *buddhi* which are permeated by the modes of the *raja* and the *tamaguṇa*s. Thus, at this moment the *puruṣa* perceives the *buddhi* in its essence, that is, in its predominantly *sāttvika* form. Accordingly, the *prakṛti* is perceived as devoid of all modes of transformation of the *raja* and *tamaguṇa*, and hence, there does not remain any sense of non-discrimination between the *buddhi* and the *caitanya*. Thus, the *puruṣa* attains its essentially pure (*svaccha*) existence. However, it is interesting to note here that though the term '*svaccha*' indicates the non-relation or the attainment of the discrimination between the consciousness and the intellect, yet there remains an identity of the *puruṣa* with the transformation of *sattva guṇa* for a momentary period (*manāk*). Most importantly, it is due to this non-discrimination between the *puruṣa* and the *sattvaguṇavṛtti* that the *puruṣa* can perceive the *prakṛti* as devoid of or free from its seven other modes of transformation. That is why, the ultimate cognition is called *sattvapuruṣānyatākhyāti*, that is, the final discriminatory cognition between the self and the *sattvaguṇavṛtti*. The term '*manāk*' in the statement '*manāksambhedaḥ asti eva*'[27] has got two senses. That is, the sense of non-discrimination between the *puruṣa* and the *sāttvikībuddhi* is existent only for a very short while, and such non-discrimination does not give rise to any further *saṃskāra*. Thus, the said non-discriminatory state is characterized by the above two features. Such non-discrimination between the *puruṣa* and the *sāttvikī buddhi* is instrumental for the perception of the discrimination (*bhedasākṣātkāra*) between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. Liberation is attained by *puruṣa* on attaining the discriminatory perception, and hence, the above non-discriminatory state dissolves, and does not give rise to any *saṃskāra* either.

XIII

In the following *kārikā*, Īsvarakṛṣṇa further states that – '*dṛṣṭā mayetyupekṣaka eko dṛṣṭā'ahamityuparamatyanyā/ sati saṃyoge'api tayoḥ*

prayojanaṁ nāsti sargasya//'[28]. In introducing the commentary to the above *kārikā*, Vācaspati Miśra shows some inconsistency in the previous contentions. In the previous *kārikā*, it has been mentioned that *prakṛti* is always in the state of transformation in order to serve the purpose of enjoyment and liberation of *puruṣa*. Once the *puruṣa* attains the discriminatory cognition, the *prakṛti* ceases to transform. However, it cannot be claimed that the *prakṛti* ceases to transform immediately on the attainment of the *tattvajñāna* by the *puruṣa*, that is, '*nivṛttaprasavām iti na mṛṣyāmahe*'.[29] If *vivekakhyāti* would have been the preventive towards the cause of transformation, then the above claim could have been accepted. However, in reality it is not so. *Vivekakhyāti* cannot act as an impediment towards the cause of transformation. This is because the cause of the evolution of *prakṛti* is the contact (*vilakṣaṇasaṁyoga*), that is, the proximity relation between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*.

It is clear so far that the said contact between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*, and the *vivekakhyāti* are not opposed to each other. Then naturally the question arises that the proximity of the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* being eternal, the cause of the transformation of *prakṛti* is also eternal, then how can the *prakṛti* cease to transform at all? Such transformation, further, is the natural potential of *prakṛti*, so it cannot be prevented by *vivekakhyāti*. Moreover, the relation of contact or proximity is there in both the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*. Consequently, the enjoyer-ship of *puruṣa* and the enjoyable-ness of *prakṛti* are also retained, as these are the natural potentials of the consciousness and that of the matter respectively. Now even if the *tattvajñāna* is meditated upon and practised continuously with utmost sincerity, yet the properties of enjoyer-ship and that of enjoyable-ness can never be eradicated, as they are eternal in *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* respectively. So the relation between these capabilities being retained, there cannot be any reason for the *prakṛti* to cease transforming. Furthermore, if it is claimed that generating the objects of enjoyment and the ultimate discriminatory cognition being the two tasks of *prakṛti*, once these are accomplished, the *prakṛti* having no other purpose, ceases to evolve, even then that is not a very strong argument to establish the reason behind the cessation of the transformation of *prakṛti*. This is because there is no such claim that the task once performed by *prakṛti* could not be repeated by itself again. The intended claim is that whatever has been accomplished once, similar instances could be accomplished time and again. Thus, the question remains that, since the relation between the natural potentials of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* remains intact, and that relation being considered as the instrumental cause

of the evolution of *prakṛti*, why will there not be the production of other enjoyable commodities (*bhogāntara*) and even more strikingly, can it not produce other discriminatory cognitions (*bhedasākṣātkārāntara*) similar to the initial one?

To explicate it could further be stated that even on attainment of *vivekakhyāti* and its foundation through devoted practice, the innate potency of *bhoktṛtva* of *puruṣa* and that of the *bhogyatva* of the *prakṛti* cannot be denied. Moreover, both the principles being eternal, their potencies are eternal too. Hence, simply stating that since the purposes of fulfilling the enjoyment and liberation of *puruṣa* have been accomplished by the *prakṛti*, the latter rests from its creativity, is not sufficient to explain the issue. It is true that fulfilling the purposes of enjoyment and liberation of the *puruṣa* are the two objectives of *prakṛti*, and nothing else, yet it does not sanction the fact that the *prakṛti* cannot perform the repetitive acts of creation in future. An action which has been performed once, can always be performed again, or at least actions similar to it. For instance, in our daily lives we find that after a pot has been produced, thousands of pots similar to it are repeatedly produced. Also, human beings after enjoying a particular piece of beauty or anything as such, enjoy things alike repeatedly. Hence, there cannot be any definite sanction that the creativity of the *prakṛti* cannot be staged again after the attainment of *vivekakhyāti*. Since the innate potencies of enjoyer-ship and being the enjoyable on the part of the consciousness and the matter respectively continue to exist, so by virtue of their relation of contiguity, it is only natural that the stream of *bhoga* and *bhedasākṣātkāra* would continue till eternity.

XIV

In response to the above stances and apprehensions, Īśvarakṛṣṇa maintains that '*dṛṣṭā mayā*' *etc.* That *prakṛti* which has not yet produced *vivekakhyāti*, can produce enjoyable commodities again and again, and it is perfectly acceptable. However, once the *prakṛti* has produced *vivekakhyāti*, it can no longer produce the enjoyable commodities nor can it be in the state of migration experiencing the enjoyable commodities. Thus, as the non-discriminatory cognition acts as the cause of the enjoyment, in the absence of such cognition, there cannot be any reason to propel enjoyment. Just as in the absence of a seed, the sapling cannot be grown, similarly in the absence of non-discriminatory cognition, there cannot be any question of enjoyment. Enjoyable commodities like, sound *etc.* are essentially of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion, as these are nothing but the products

of *prakṛti*. Due to the sense of non-discrimination with the *prakṛti*, the *puruṣa* considers these enjoyable commodities as its own objects of enjoyment, - '*iyaṁ madarthā*'. Such enjoyer-ship continues due to the prevalent sense of non-discrimination, and as long as such cognition persists, the *prakṛti* continues to evolve as the enjoyable. Now as apprehended above, it is important to note over here that, the discriminatory cognition (*vivekakhyāti* or *bhedasākṣātkāra*) too could be generated time and again, if due to persisting sense of non-discrimination, the *puruṣa* considers the *prakṛti* as related to it or the *vivekakhyāti* thus generated to be of its own use or to be serving its own purpose. Then it is to be understood that the discriminatory cognition is not perfectly attained. However, in essence once *vivekakhyāti* is produced, all sorts of ignorance in the form of apparent non-discrimination *etc.* are eradicated. The self perceives the *prakṛti* as absolutely non-related to it, and hence, the tendency to experience the enjoyable commodities dissolve. The self, perceiving itself as absolutely distinct from the *prakṛti*, cannot consider the cognition of discrimination as its own either.

It is true that the enjoyable commodities and the discriminatory cognition, both are the products of *prakṛti*. However, that does not mean that the *prakṛti* would continue to produce them forever. The *prakṛti* becomes and remains creative as long as it serves the purposes (*puruṣārtha*s) of *puruṣa*. The *puruṣārtha*s in turn remain or are sought for, as long as there exists the sense of non-discrimination (*aviveka*). Once the *aviveka* is destroyed due to the discriminatory cognition, neither enjoyment nor liberation is considered to be an end (*puruṣārtha*). Thus, the *prakṛti* is no more induced to be creative. This has been expressed by Īśvarakṛṣṇa in the previous *kārikā*s too, where he states that '*prayojanaṁ nāsti sargasya*'. Here the term '*prayojana*' indicates the volition of *prakṛti* to be creative. Enjoyment and liberation both constitute the purpose (*prayojana*). However, when the *puruṣa* attains *vivekakhyāti*, neither enjoyment nor liberation poses to be its end any more, and accordingly, the *prakṛti* too does not have any volition to be creative, as it is no longer required. Attaining the cognition of the form, 'I am perceiving the *prakṛti* as absolutely distinct from myself', the *puruṣa* realises its essential indifferent (*udāsīna*) state of existence. This is further endorsed by the term '*eka*' in the *kārikā* which stands for *puruṣa*. On the other hand, '*anyā*', that is, the *prakṛti* ceases to be creative due to its transformation of the form, 'I have been perceived by the spirit (*puruṣa*)'. Consequently, in spite of the existence of the contact or the relation of proximity

between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* no further creation takes place, due to the absence of the cause, that is, the sense of non-discrimination (*aviveka*).

XV

In the *kārikā* 'tena nivṛttaprasavām', *etc.* it has been stated that the pure, inactive *puruṣa* perceives the *prakṛti* devoid of its seven modes of transformation (*saptarūparahitā*). However, the question arises that how does the *puruṣa* perceive the *prakṛti* at that time? This is because the *puruṣa* then has already achieved its end by attaining the discriminatory cognition. Now one who acquires such cognition and perceives itself as distinct from *prakṛti* and also perceives the *prakṛti* as absolutely distinct from itself, immediately attains absolute liberation. Further, when one is liberated, that *puruṣa* is devoid of a body. So the question comes up that how can the *puruṣa* perceive the *prakṛti* without possessing a body. Perception is dependent on the sense organs, and thus, in turn, it requires a body. Liberated *puruṣa*s are devoid of bodies. However, the *puruṣa* who has attained the *tattvajñāna* is not liberated yet, since there might be residual sufferings in the form of *prārabdha karma* which have to be waned away through one's empirical existence and experiences, for it to be it destroyed forever. This necessarily presupposes the sustenance of a body even in case of a *tattvajñānī*.However, once the *vivekakhyāti* is obtained, the indiscernibility between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* is eradicated. Hence, the ignorance (*avidyā*) or the *aviveka* is destroyed. Creation takes place due to the contiguity of the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* associated with the *avidyā* and its subsequent illusory impressions. Now once the *vivekakhyāti* is obtained, the ignorance of the form of *aviveka* along with its subsequent illusory impressions are eradicated. Accordingly, neither creation, nor all that is created can exist. On that logic, the body too being an object created out of the material principle can no longer exist. We know that '*nimittāpāye naimittikasyāpi apāyaḥ*', that is, the absence of the instrumental cause leads to the absence of the effect. That is, due to the eradication of the ignorance (*aviveka*), the objects created due to the assistance of the ignorance cannot exist either. So the absence of bodies in case of the liberated *puruṣa*s continues to be an issue, and hence, the entire contention discussed so far comes to a question mark, as in neither of the cases, it is possible for the *puruṣa* to perceive the *prakṛti*.

In the above context it might be argued that '*tattvajñāne api na mucyate*'[30], that is, even after the attainment of *tattvajñāna*, *puruṣa* would not be completely liberated since, it has not yet experienced the results of all its previous actions.

Though *tattvajñāna* acts as the instrumental and final cause of liberation, yet the existing results of actions (*prārabdha karmaphala*) act as impediments towards liberation. Thus, an individual does not become liberated the moment after attaining *tattvajñāna*. Liberation is actually attained after the waning away of the results of the previous actions through experiences. The *tattvajñāna* cannot destroy all actions. So the natural question is that then how would the waning away of actions and their results be possible. Actions and their results could only be destroyed through sufferings and enjoyment, that is, through experiences (*bhoga*) only. Thus, even after attainment of *vivekajñāna*, if the results of previous actions await to be experienced, then one can attain liberation only after the destruction of those fruits of actions through experiences. In view of the above, the opponents might claim that the *tattvajñāna* then cannot be considered to be the instrument of liberation at all. It is mentioned in the *śāstra*s that, '*nābhuktaṁ kṣīyate karma kalpakoṭiśatairapi*'[31]. That is, even if one acquires thousands of bodies over repeated births, the fruits of the actions that are already in store cannot be destroyed, until and unless they are waned away through sufferings and enjoyment. Now if such a view is admitted, then it is to be accepted that '*tattvajñānaṁna mokṣasādhanam*'[32]. Further such admission would lead to the falsification of the claim previously made by the Sāṁkhya philosophers that the distinctive cognition of the products of *prakṛti* (*vyakta*), primordial *prakṛti* (*avyakta*) and consciousness (*jña*) act as the instrument of liberation.

An individual acquires the cognitions of *vyakta*, *avyakta* and *jña*, and with tremendous effort and practise also acquires the distinctive knowledge between them. Even then, however, the person cannot attain liberation, since her/his previous actions and their results are still in store for the person to go through that and experience those. When all the stored actions (*karma*) and its results (*phala*) are waned away through experience, then only one can attain liberation. Now such a state-of-affairs reduces the idea of attainment of liberation to nothing but utopia. The amount of actions and their impressions (*karmāśaya*) that have accumulated over ages, are impossible to be determined and eradicated. The term '*āśaya*' means impressions (*saṁskāra*). The impressions acquired due to actions are *dharma* and *adharma*. It is also impossible to determine when those actions would yield their fruits. So if it is held that after the destruction of such insurmountable amount of actions and impressions only one can attain liberation, then the attainment of such end appears to be practically impossible. Moreover,

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which impression (*karmāśaya*) would fructify at what time, that is, whether in the present life or in the next life or in some other life after hundreds of years, there is no regulation to that. Thus, considering the above scenario, liberation not only seems to be an indefinitely far off end, rather it is reduced to a fiction. The individual would continue to perform actions and accordingly, there would not be any end to the impressions gathered due to the current actions along with the previously acquired ones. Hence, the stream of impressions being unending, liberation would never be attainable. An even more significant point is that there is no definite time-frame to determine which *karmāśaya* would produce the intended state of existence. Certain impressions might start bearing fruits from the current birth itself, whereas the other impressions might start fruition from the next birth, while others may even remain dormant for ages at a stretch and then be ready to produce the intended results of the actions performed perhaps hundreds of births ago. Thus, a person would be undergoing numerous rebirths to experience the fruits of the previous actions and along with that continue to perform further actions which in turn would again produce the respective impressions. Thus, along with the heap of impressions previously acquired, enormous amount of impressions would continue to add up to those. Consequently, the waning away of the entire impressions would never be possible and the hard-earned discriminatory cognition (*tattvajñāna*) would be rendered meaningless.

XVI

In response to the above criticisms, Īśvarakṛṣṇa puts forward the following *kārikā*-'*samyagjñānādhigamāt dharmādināmakāraṇaprāptau/ tiṣṭhatisaṁskāravaśātcakrabhramivaddhṛtaśarīraḥ//*'[33]. He states that one must have a clear knowledge of the nature of *tattvajñāna* first, before proceeding to raise objections. If one actually realises the nature and the power of *tattvajñāna*, the objections raised would simply dissolve. It is true that there are innumerable actions and their impressions stored over ages, and there is no definite regulation regarding their fructification, yet the power of the discriminatory cognition (*tattvajñāna*) is such that after its production it renders all the past impressions ineffective. They cannot further lead to fructification. Due to the strength of the ultimate cognition, the previous impressions are reduced to dysfunctional states just like a burnt seed which can never produce a sapling. The sense of non-discrimination or ignorance is the root cause of the fructification of the impressions. However, with the production of the perfect cognition

(*vivekakhyāti*), all sorts of ignorance are eradicated. Consequently, no new impressions are produced, the actions that are performed then are free from ignorance and hence, does not further add to the impressions, and accordingly, the previously acquired impressions of actions start to wane away. Due to the effect of *tattvajñāna*, the age-old impressions of actions are burnt out, which then lose their capacity to produce further impressions or to fructify into results. Thus, the tremendous power of the perfect knowledge renders all the impressions, generated due to ignorance, ineffective, however immense and deep-rooted they might be.

In the above context Vācaspati Miśra refers to the analogy of the burnt seed and explicates how the discriminatory cognition eradicates the beginning-less and unending stream of ignorant impressions. We know that seeds are sown on the ground after the ground is drenched by water. If the seed is intact, then on sowing it produces a sapling after some time. Now if the seed is burnt, then even sowing it on a fertile ground would not lead to the production of the sapling. Here the impressions (*karmāśaya*) are equivalent to the seeds. The intellect (*buddhi*) or the internal sense organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) as such is equivalent to the ground or the field. The *pañcakleśa* namely, *avidyā*, *asmitā*, *rāga*, *dveṣa* and *abhiniveśa* are like the water that is used to drench the ground. The intellect becomes active in the presence of these five *kleśa*s, which in turn help the impressions to fructify. Those five modes (*kleśa*) being intact in the intellect from time immemorial, the impressions have continued to produce the fruits of enjoyment and sufferings in the intellect. However, when the *tattvajñāna* is produced, the intellect no longer remains active due to the eradication or burning down of the five *kleśa*s by the perfect cognition. The intellect then exists as an infertile ground and the impressions can longer produce the fruits of actions leading to bondages of the individual.

Now in the first part of the *kārikā* it has been stated that due to the effect of the ultimate perfect cognition, the impressions no longer remain the causes of sufferings and enjoyment. The term '*karmāśaya*' stands for *dharmādharma*. Such *karmāśaya* has been compared to the seeds. When the *tattvajñāna* reduces the *karmāśaya* to a state like that of a burnt seed, it can no longer lead to fructification. Again Vācaspati Miśra holds that the *tattvajñāna* makes the intellect turn into a barren ground by burning out the *pañcakleśa* and hence, the intellect being free from ignorance, *dharmādharma* cannot fructify further. Apparently there seems to be an inconsistency in the above two explanations held

by Vācaspati Miśra in the context of the analogy of the burnt seed. Initially, it has been mentioned that the impressions become ineffective like the burnt seed, and hence, cannot fructify anymore. Again it has been stated that the intellect is reduced to an infertile ground by the *tattvajñāna*, and hence, the impressions cannot fructify any further. Now if the first explanation is admitted, then it is to be understood that in spite of the presence of the fertile or active intellect due to the *pañcakleśa*, the impressions themselves being like the burnt seeds, cannot fructify anymore and if the second interpretation is considered, then it is to be noted that the impressions in spite of remaining intact, cannot fructify. This is because the *tattvajñāna* turns the intellect into a dry land which is devoid of the *pañcakleśa* and hence, cannot remain active anymore. However, both the above positions have been admitted by Vācaspati Miśra himself. Thus, in order to remove the apparent inconsistency, it could be said that we have to clearly understand the phenomenon of the impressions being reduced to a state like that of a burnt seed. The term '*dāha*', which generally means burning, here refers to the act of eradication of all that is associated with ignorance. Thus, when it is referred to as burnt impressions *etc.*, it actually means that though the impressions are capable of fructification, yet due to the eradication of the associates of ignorance, which help in fructification, the impressions are rendered dysfunctional forever. Thus, the admission of the above interpretation of the analogy frees it from the apparent inconsistency referred to above. Hence, it can be claimed that due to the attainment of the perfect discriminatory cognition the impressions of the form of *dharmādharma* lose their functionality and thus, the attainment of liberation of the knowledgeable individual (*tattvajñānī*) becomes possible.

XVII

In the present context, it is important to mention the views of Vijñānabhikṣu in *Sāṃkhyasūtra* and the commentary (*vṛtti*) of Aniruddha on the *sūtra*. Vijñānabhikṣu states that – '*niyatakāraṇāt taducchittirdhvāntavat//*'[34]. Aniruddha states in his *vṛtti* to the above *sūtra* – '*bhavatvavivekād bandhaḥ/ tathāpyavivekanāśārthaṃ dharmāṅgokaraṇāt tulyatvam/ anyathā sarvadā bandhaḥ syāt, ityat āha – niyata/ anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ yasya tat kāraṇabhavagataṃ tadvyabhicāre sarvato'anāśvāsaḥ/ yathā dhvāntanāśāya prakāśaḥ, tathātrāpi vivekādavivekānāśaḥ/*'. Thus, they both hold that ignorance (*aviveka*) itself is the bondage, that is, sufferings. To eradicate such ignorance, *dharmaetc.* have been referred to. Otherwise the bondage would have continued to exist forever. The destruction of ignorance and its consequent bondage is

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considered to be causally connected. Any sort of causal connection is established by the positive and negative concomitance (*anvayavyatireka*). In the above case too, that is to be done. For example, just as the rays of light destroy the darkness immediately, *vivekajñāna* too annihilates the ignorance immediately on its production.

Further, in the next *Sāṁkhyasūtra* too, - '*pradhānavivekādanyāvivekasya taddhāne hānam//*'[35], it has been mentioned that due to the non-discrimination (*aviveka*) between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* there arises the sense of bondage (*bandha*). If the ignorance (*aviveka*) is destroyed, then all sorts of bondage due to the ignorance would also be destroyed. Since, *prakṛti* or *pradhāna* is the primordial cause, if the discriminatory cognition with that is attained, then the distinctive cognition with all other products of *prakṛti* will automatically be produced. This is because if there be no non-discrimination with the cause, then obviously there would not be any non-discrimination with its effects either.In the *vṛtti* to the above *sūtra* Aniruddha states that – '*vivekānmuktirityuktam/ ghaṭapaṭādīnāṁ viveko'asmadādīnāmapyastīti sarvamuktiprasaṅga ityatrāha – pradhānā/ sarveṣāṁ mūlaṁ pradhānam, tasyāvivekādanyāvivekasya sambhavaḥ/ padārthānāmanyo'anyaṁ bhavatvaviveko viveko vā, na tena bandhamokṣau, kintu pradhānavivekāvivekābhyām/ atastaddhāne pradhānāvivekahāne sarvavivekahānam//*'.

Now an important thing is to be kept in mind that liberation is not attained immediately on attaining the *tattvajñāna*, because due to the remaining impressions of the *prārabdha karma*, that is, the fruits of actions which are already being experienced, the individual qualified with the *tattvajñāna* continues to exist with the given body. In the current context, it may be mentioned that there are three types of actions (*karma*) - *sañcita*, *kriyamāṇa* and *prārabdha*. The actions which have already been performed at time immemorial are termed as *sañcitakarma*, meaning those which are in store or which have already been accumulated. The actions that are being performed now while experiencing the fruits of the *prārabdha karma*, are called *kriyamāṇakarma*, that is, actions which are in the act of being performed. However, if the current actions (*kriyamāṇakarma*) be something outstanding or something incredulously harmful, then its results might be experienced along with the results of the *prārabdha karma*; otherwise they are stored along with the other *sañcitakarma*. Among the *sañcitakarma* those actions which are ready to fructify are considered as

prārabdha karma and to enjoy or suffer the results of those actions, the current body of the individual is created and acquired. Now with the attainment of the *tattvajñāna*, the *kriyamāṇakarma* are not produced. Though the knowledgeable individual (*tattvajñānī*) continues to perform her/his own actions, yet those actions do not lead to the production of impressions or the consequent bondages anymore. This is because the actions of the *tattvajñānī* are no longer associated with the ignorance or its elements anymore. Thus, those activities are not really actions (*karma*) at all. More importantly, the previously accumulated actions (*anādisañcitakarma*) though capable of yielding results, will not do so ever again because the *tattvajñāna* have rendered all of them dysfunctional like a burnt seed. However, there is no way of avoiding the results of the *prārabdha karma* from being enjoyed or suffered. It is held that, '*prārabdha karmānāṁbhogād eva kṣayaḥ*'[36], that is, *prārabdha karma* or the action which have already started fruition, cannot be waned away other than by enjoying or suffering the fruits. Thus, the *tattvajñānī*s too have to maintain their bodies for a certain period until and unless all the fruits of their *prārabdha karma* are waned away through experience (*bhoga*).

The above notion has been explicated by Īśvarakṛṣṇa with the help of an analogy of the potter's wheel, as stated in the *kārikā* as – '*tiṣṭhati saṁskāravaśāt cakrabhramivaddhṛtaśarīraḥ*'. A potter in order to create a jar turns the wheel with the help of a stick by means of her/his own volition and effort. This produces the spinning of the wheel, but even after the potter stops turning the wheel, it continues to spin for a while on its own due to the inertia of motion. Eventually when the inertia recedes, the spinning drops and finally the wheel stops. Similarly, in case of the *tattvajñānī*, due to the remnants of the impressions in the form of *dharmādharma*, the fruits of the *prārabdha karma* have to be experienced till their waning, with the help of the current body. Thus, even on attaining *tattvajñāna* the embodied self has to exist for a while till all the *prārabdha karma* are destroyed. This is because, once the actions have started their fruition, they cannot be stopped any more until they get completely spent up through experiences. Such contention is proved by the *Brahmasūtra*s and *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. The *Brahmasūtra*, '*bhogena tu itare kṣapayitvā atha sampadyate*'[37], states that all those *dharmādharma* and the respective sufferings (*pāpa*) and enjoyment (*puṇya*) which have already started to fruition, can only be eradicated through experiences (*bhoga*) and then only the *tattvajñānī* can attain liberation. Again the *Chāndogyamantra* states that '*tasya tāvat eva ciraṁ yāvat na vimokṣye*

artha sampatsye'[38]. That is, the attainment of liberation for a *tattvajñānī* is only that much distant as much time as s/he requires to wane away her/his *prārabdha karmaphala*. When the impressions and fruitions of all such actions are destroyed, the individual is freed from the body and attains absolute liberation (*videhakaivalya*). The *sañcita* and *kriyamāṇakarma* of the individual qualified with absolute knowledge (*tattvajñānī*) have already been destroyed by the effect of the absolute discriminatory cognition, and the remaining *prārabdha karma* is spent up by the experiences (*bhoga*) of sufferings and enjoyment. Thus, all sorts of *karma* and its impressions being destroyed or spent up, there remains no necessity of the body, and hence, the absolute knower (*tattvajñānī*) is freed from the body too. However, during the period of maintaining the body and experiencing the fruits of the *prārabdha*, the absolute knower becomes capable of perceiving the *prakṛti* in its almost primordial essence, that is, devoid of the modes of transformation, and thus the spirit or the consciousness exists as a mere detached witness. In this context Vedānti Mahādeva in his *vṛttisāra* of the *Sāṁkhyasūtra* 1/57 states that – '*nanu prakṛtipuruṣāviveka eva cet prakṛtisaṁyogadvārābandhahetuḥ, tayorviveka eva cenmokṣahetustarhi dehādyabhimānasattve'api mokṣaḥ syāt, sa ca śrutyādiviruddhastatrāha – pradhāneti/ puruṣe pradhānāvivekāt kāraṇādyo'anyāviveko buddhidehādyaviveko jāyate kāryāvivekasya kāryatayā anādikāraṇāvivekamūlakatvāt tasya pradhānāvivekahāne satyavaśyamityarthaḥ/*'.[39]

XVIII

Finally, in order to clarify all sorts of objections and inconsistencies raised so far, and to conclude his contention of the entire Sāṁkhya *śāstra* in an organised manner, Īśvarakṛṣṇa asserts that - '*prāpte śarīrabhede caritārthatvāt pradhānavinivṛttau/ aikāntikamātyantikamubhayaṁ kaivalyamāpnoti//*'[40]. The apprehension was that if the absolute knower has to maintain his bodily existence in order to experience the remnants of the previous impressions then how would the individual attain absolute liberation? That is, *kadā tasya mokṣa bhaviṣyati*? One cannot be considered as liberated in the actual sense of the term, as long as the self is embodied. The final freedom from the body (*videhamukti*) is termed as absolute liberation. The absolute knower may be referred to as the *jīvanamukta*, as long as s/he maintains the body for the experience of the *prārabdha*.

Here the obvious question that comes up is that when will the absolute knower attain the absolute liberation. In response, Īśvarakṛṣṇa states that '*prāpte*

śarīrabhede' *etc.* in the *kārikā*. The impressions of the previously accumulated actions (*anādisañcitakarma*) which have not yet fructified in this birth, have all been rendered ineffective like a burnt seed due to the effect of the absolute discriminatory cognition. The actions which had started to fructify, that is the *prārabdha*, are being experienced, that is, suffered or enjoyed through. Hence, they all are being spent up. Once all of that is destroyed through experiences, the body attains distinction from that. That is, the body too gets destroyed. The body gets destroyed immediately after the moment the *prārabdha* is completely spent up. Thus, the two purposes of *prakṛti*, namely, enjoyment or suffering, that is, *bhoga* and discriminatory cognition (*vivekakhyāti*) both are fulfilled. The distinctive cognition between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* has been attained and the residual experiences of *prārabdha* have been spent up, thus, there remains nothing else for the *prakṛti* to serve. Hence, it attains its fulfilment. All purposes being achieved, there remains no further volition in the *prakṛti* to serve the *puruṣa*. Thus, the *prakṛti* ceases to evolve, that is, it becomes *nivṛttaprasavā*. Consequently, the *puruṣa* attains the absolute (*aikāntika*) and irreversible (*ātyantika*) freedom (*kaivalya*) from the trifold sufferings. Also in *Sāṁkhyasūtra* - '*tatra prāptavivekasyānāvṛttiśrutiḥ//*'[41], it has been stated that due to the discriminatory cognition, inevitable and absolute cessation of sufferings is obtained. In the *vṛtti* of the above *sūtra* Aniruddha states that – '*puruṣārthatvaṁ darśayati – tatra/ tatra - prakṛtipuruṣayoḥ prāptavivekasya vivekajñānādanāvṛtti śrutiḥ "na sa punarāvarttate"*[42] *iti//*'.

In conclusion, it may be stated that in *Sāṁkhyatattvavivecana* of Kṣemendra, we find that the Sāṁkhya philosophers are *abhāvamokṣavādin*s. That is, liberation for them is not qualified by any other state of feelings like pleasure *etc.* The absolute cessation of sufferings is considered as liberation to the Sāṁkhya philosophers. There are some philosophical schools who consider liberation to be not only the cessation of sufferings, but the state of realisation of eternal pleasure (*nityasukhaupalabdhi*). They are known as the *sukhamokṣavādin*s. However, according to Sāṁkhya philosophy, the realisation of pleasure, be it eternal (*nitya*) or fleeting (*anitya*), the realisation (*upalabdhi*) itself is always non-eternal (*anitya*). Hence, liberation is not a state of realisation of eternal pleasure, rather it is the state of absolute cessation of the trifold sufferings. This has been expressed as –'*darśanaśaktirahitasya kriyāśaktimataḥ pradhānasyāpi puruṣeṇa saṁyogaḥ mokṣārtha puruṣasya bhinnatvena vyaktāvyaktapuruṣajñāne jāte pradhānasya mokṣo bhavati/*

nityasukhopalabdhirmokṣa iti cedupalabdherapi nityānitya vivekagrastatvādasāram/ na ca nityasukhagocarasyāvidyādiyatkiñcidāvaraṇabhaṅga eva puruṣārthe/ vācyaḥ sukhānubhavasyaiva puruṣārthatvāccaitanyanityatvenāvaraṇasyāpi asambhavācca/ mokṣe paramānandaśrutismṛtayastu-mokṣaśāstraparibhāṣāmātrā/ duḥkhamevāsti na sukhaṁ yasmāt tadupalabhyate/ duḥkhārtasya pratīkāre sukhaṁsajñā vidhīyate// duḥkhaṁ kāmasukhāpekṣā sukhaṁduḥkhātyayaḥ smṛtaḥ/ ityādismṛtibhirduḥkhanivṛttireva sukhatvena paribhāṣitā/'.43

References:

1.Miśra, Vācaspati, 1406 (Bengali year), *Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṁkhyakārikā*, p. 343
2.Sāṁkhyakārikā 62
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THE CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE EAST WEST SYNTHESIS IN S. RADHAKRISHNAN: AN EXPLORATION

BAISHALI MAJUMDAR

SarvepalliRadhakrishnan was a renowned academician, intellectual figure who was achieved a reputation not only in India but also around the globe. He defines philosophy as a "logical enquiry into the nature of reality."[1]If we widely explain his conception of philosophy it should include a systematic study of almost every aspect of life in the Universe. For him, the Absolute or the Ultimate reality should be such that everything could be resolved in it but it will not be resolved into anything else. He advocated an idealistic kind of philosophy i.e., also can be known as Monistic Idealism. He synthesises AdvaitaVedânta and the Philosophy of Absolute Idealism. He was well-versed as the great bridge builder between the east and the west. In describing the relationship between philosophy and religion he suggests that we should make religion philosophical as far as possible rather than to make philosophy, religious. The present paper proposes to explain the nature of philosophy which was propounded by S. Radhakrishnan; secondly, examine the relationship between philosophy and religion; thirdly, what is his opinion about the Spirit following him; fourthly, what is he said about religious experience and intuitive apprehension and lastly, how was he known as a bridge builder between the east and the west.

Key Words: Monistic Idealism, Spirit, religious experience, intuitive apprehension, bridge builder.

Dr.Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1888-1975) was an influential philosopher, academician, statesman, and a renowned Indian thinker in the academic circle of the 20th century. His basic philosophical credo is that he acknowledges the monistic kind of reality. He emphasises the monistic character of *AdvaitaVedânta*, and combines it with the important aspect of*Absolute Idealism*. Likein *Vedânta*, he too maintainsthat the reality is one, and like in *Absolute Idealism*, he regards that everything is a necessary aspect of the one. So, his philosophy could be broadly described as a philosophy of Monistic Idealism.[2]As he conceived reality as one, it is called 'monistic', and his philosophy is metaphysical. Therefore, it is called an 'idealistic kind of philosophy'. He has faith in that the reality is mental or spiritual and there is a spiritual ideal towards which the entire world-process is progressing. According to him, an idealist can also be called a 'teleologist' because he believes in the ultimate meaning and purpose of the universe. The ultimate nature of the universe is generally regarded to be spiritual, and individuals are expected to reawaken the spiritual sense in their lives to ensure that their lives should not become chaotic, full of anguish, and influenced by evil.

From time to time philosophy should make itself adaptable to the recent challenges of modern scientific and rationalistic approaches and re-evaluate its

tasks and methods according to the demands of the time. Radhakrishnan himself writes,

> "It is the task of Philosophy not merely to reflect the spirit of the age in which we live, But also to lead it forward. Its function is creative, to state the values, to set the goals, to point the direction and to lead to new paths. It must inspire us with the faith to sustain the new world, to produce men who subordinate national, racial and religious divisions to the idea of humanity. Philosophy is nothing, if not universal in its scope and spirit".[3]

Philosophy, as per the philosopher, should be made more universal and ready to adopt the beliefs of the people belonging to different caste, creed and the nations, that can bring a better unity, understanding and oneness of the spirit.

Philosophy is always associated and linked with religion from ancient times. There was no conflict between religion and philosophy from Indian perspective. However, as per the Western standpoint, Christian theology and philosophy combined in the medieval period in the preachings of, for example, like St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas. At the beginning of the modern period – through the thoughts of Rene Descartes and Francis Bacon – Philosophy became independent from the general Christian religion.

Radhakrishnan was familiar with this welcome separation. He maintained that though the common aim of searching the ultimate reality brings philosophy and religion closer to each other, their method for achieving their goals are usually different. The achievement of truth is the end or the ambition of philosophy, and the liberation of the soul is the ultimate goal of religion. The questions which are raised for ultimate reality can be answered by logical method in philosophy while in case of religion it is answered through its beliefs (faith) based on the authority of scripture. Radhakrishnan observes theharmony between philosophy and religion in spite of their distinct characters. Reality, according to him, "reveals itself in two different forms to the mystic and to the thinker and ultimately the two should harmonise with each other. Unity and harmony ought to make the relation of true religion to genuine reason."[4]

For Radhakrishnan, there is no conflict between true philosophy and true religion as like there is no contradiction between faith and reason. He said, "Philosophy itself, will be religious and Religion in its deepest aspects will be philosophical."[5]

According to him, Religion can be true only when it is Philosophical. He asserts that individuals should make religion philosophical as far as possible, instead of attempting to make philosophy religious. Radhakrishnan defended this by saying, "My endeavour has been to expound a philosophy not to state a dogmatic theology, a philosophy which offers an interpretation of the Universe, which is at once rational and spiritual, which depends on logical reflection and not on acts of faith."[6] He attempted to convince the West that Indian Philosophy is Philosophy rather than theology or religion. He wrote *Indian Philosophy* that have two volumes which represent different schools and systems of Indian thought and religion, and this was called "Indian Philosophy" even in the Western sense of the term.

The ultimate Reality that is the central or the core concept of Philosophy as well as Religion. But, what is the real nature of the so called *Ultimate Reality* as described by S. Radhakrishnan? The *Ultimate Reality* is such that anything can be resolved in it, however it cannot be resolved into anything. This is the essence of idealism. Spirit is the central concept of Hegelian idealism. While describing the spirit, Hegel said that Spirit is alone Reality. He maintains that it is the inner being of the world, that which essentially is and *is per se* it assumes objective, determinate form and enters into relations with itself – it is externality (otherness) and exists for itself, yet in this determination and in its otherness it is still one with itself-it is self-contained and self-complete, in itself and for itself at once. Its substance is spiritual.[7]*AdvaitaVedânta* seems to have inspired Hegel through its maintenance that Brahman is the ultimate reality.

Deeply studied in both *Vedanta* and Hegel, Radhakrishnan referred to 'Brahman' and 'Absolute' as being essentially one. In his opinion, "The same Absolute reveals itself in all these but differently in each. The ultimate reality sleeps in the stone, breaths in the plants, feels in the animals, and awakens to self-consciousness in man."[8] He apprehends Absolute as "pure consciousness and pure freedom and infinite possibility."[9] The first two characters were more or less same as the *Vedantic* manner and the third character has been explained from Hegelian perspective of Absolute Idealism. Here he synthesises the eastern concept of Brahman and western concept of Spirit or Absolute. There is no internal differentiation (the *svagata-bheda*) in Absolute or Brahman which is free, infinite, complete-in-itself, changeless, spiritual, self-dependent, eternal, the whole of perfection. However, through our limited scope of language we cannot fully describe the very nature of Absolute or the Brahman.

According to Radhakrishnan, "The spirit is the Absolute. It has many possibilities present to it. The one actual manifestation of it is the world. Other aspects of the absolute are God and souls."[10]The Divine spirit is being manifested differently in the Absolute, God, World and Self. Radhakrishnan describes the spirit as one which is felt everywhere, but cannot be seen anywhere. One which can be known but cannot be explained. It is not body, mind or will but it sustains all of them.[11]The Spirit as the Ultimate Reality helps as the inherent cause for the evolution of the world process. This is the process of evolution from the material world to the spiritual world.

Reality has been defined by Radhakrishnan as 'a logical enquiry into the nature of Reality'. By the logical process to search for the Reality is the ultimate goal and from the primitive age the philosophers and the saints of religions have concerned to attain the knowledge of the spirit or the Ultimate Reality or God. Some of the people thinks that it is impossible to obtain the knowledge of the Absolute Reality through our limited human mind in the phenomenal world. However, some others believe that as because the knowledge of Reality or God is an impossibility, so God himself reveals to mankind through the prophets to convey the message to the people. This knowledge can be called the Revelation of God.

There are some of the people who believe that knowledge of God can be felt within ourselves through an experience. However, this experience can be achieved by the method of purification of mind, body and soul. After achieving this experience, the lives of the men will completely be changed. The mystics, saints and sages are the men of the experiences. They will be *Upanisadic*sages, the saints of Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Judaism etc. are some of the examples.

There are some sources through which people can attain the knowledge of Reality. From ancient times to modern period, from the Eastern to the Western saints and sages, prophets and philosophers belonging to every period of time. Some of the main sources of the knowledge of Reality are:

(1) Scripture, *srūti* or revelation or word of God – Radhakrishnan rejected the authority of the scripture. He said, "The old days when the scriptures were accepted on trust that God was their author are no more. There is a new approach today. We do not accept scriptural documents apart from other books, unquestionable in their accuracy and advice. The view that they are inherent word

of God, does not carry conviction."[12] The scriptures can be considered as the eternal records of the experiences of the seers. In this respect, Radhakrishnan departs himself from the traditional acceptability of the scripture.

(2) Reasoning-inferential or mediativeknowledge – Radhakrishnan was not fully ascertained the demonstrability of the existence of Brahman or God through the various logical proofs. These are all approximations because the rational arguments only prove the validity of those who have direct experience of the Divine.

(3) Religious or Spiritual experience – According to Radhakrishnan, this is the all comprehensive source to know the Reality. This is the immediate knowledge. Man has the ability and power to stand out of his existence and acquire the knowledge of the truth. Through the immediate or direct experience man can obtain the knowledge of the Reality and this is the Religious or Spiritual experience. It is an apprehension of the real tied with enjoyment. It is an inner satisfaction. According to Radhakrishnan, Religious Experience is as old as our smiling and weeping, loving and forgiving, the sense of God is induced within us in several ways, through communion with nature, through worship of goodness even through natural events like sunset and death.

The metaphysical discussion of Radhakrishnan demands a faith in his epistemological standpoint. According to him, the human mind possesses three kinds of knowledge. They are: (1) Sensory or Perceptual Knowledge, (2) Intellectual Cognition and (3) Intuitive Apprehension. The Eastern philosophy has given priority to intuition and the Western philosophical thought revolve around the intellectual cognition. Radhakrishnan also has given priority to intuition than the intellectual knowledge.

Now, we can elaborate these concepts one by one. We know the sensible qualities of a particular object through sense-experience. It is somehow or other similar with sense-perceiving as described in psychology. Sense-experience gather impressions from the physical objects and it provides materials for every kind of study and thought. The knowledge that is received from sense-experience is not infallible, it sometimes deceives us. The two sense-apprehension of a same object are not totally alike. So, according to Radhakrishnan, although sense-experience is useful in our practical life or day-to-day experience but it is not sufficient for acquiring the knowledge of reality.

The second one is intellectual cognition which is constructed through the process of analysis and synthesis. The senses collect the data from the outer world and it is through the intellect analysed and synthesised. This knowledge is indirect as well as symbolic because it is depended on the senses and it receives only signs or symbols. It relates different entities with each other, so it is related with relation. As because Reality is one, so it cannot give the knowledge of the Reality. Like Sense-experience, this is also useful in our practical life. Radhakrishnan thinks that this intellectual cognition is limited in itself and also defective, so it is not able to comprehend the reality properly. However, he holds that intellect is not totally opposing to intuition, because intuition requires intellect for the expression, elaboration and justification of its results.

The third one is intuitive Apprehension. Radhakrishnan develops the third sources of knowledge because it is the intuitive apprehension which is only capable of giving the knowledge of Reality. It is the direct realisation of object. There is no space of signs or symbols. There is no duality between the knower and the known in case of intuitive apprehension. It is in a sense of knowing by becoming. For example, to know the emotion of love properly, one has to become a lover. In intuitive apprehension,Radhakrishnan defines that here we become one with the truth or the object of knowledge. It is the source of infallible knowledge because it is direct and immediate and it introduces the knowledge of the whole, so it can be considered as primary source of knowledge. This is self-evident.

The knowledge of the self is also can be known through intuitive apprehension. This is the self-knowledge, *anubhava* or integral experience is the highest kind of knowledge, according to Radhakrishnan. He had identified some synonymous concepts in his writings such as – insight, vision of truth, intuitive insight, enlightenment, perfect knowledge, integral experience or spiritual or religious experience. Radhakrishnan approved that throughintuitive apprehension we can reach to the Ultimate Reality, we are to be one with the Absolute or in other words we are knowing by becoming. There is no duality or differentiation between I and *thou*(the Ultimate Reality).

He was also known as the bridge-builder between the east and the west. He has constructed a comprehensive philosophy of the best elements chosen from the Indian and the Western systems of thought. He was familiar with the eastern and western culture because he was born in Hindu family and completed his education in missionaries Schools and Colleges.

Radhakrishnan describes his philosophy as well as religion in his own pattern of thinking. He synthesises the western humanism and the eastern spirituality, the western concept of God or Absolute with the Indian *Upanisadic*concept of Brahman and he established his philosophy of Monistic Idealism.

Describing the nature of philosophy, Radhakrishnan opts for:

> "A philosophy which will combine the best of European humanism and Asiatic Religion, a philosophy more profound and more living than either, endowed with greater spiritual and ethical force which will conquer the hearts of men."[13]

The world is culturally divided into two opposites – the East and the West. The East is known as orient and the West is known as occident, and the two parts of the world are separate, distant, unbridgeable. The West is characterised as modern, objective, rational, individualistic, realistic, logical, dynamic (activism) etc. On the other pole, the East is ancient, subjective, intuitive, idealistic, mystical, passive etc. The relationship between the east and the west are incompatible with each other. Many of the writers and thinkers tried reconcile or synthesise the West to the East. Albert Schweitzer, for example, wanted to contrast the East and the West as life-negating and life-affirming, and he Westernised the East as a solution of former's life-denying character. Rabindranath Tagore was advocated the building of one world for the East and the West. The Eastern mysticism is to be reconciled with Western rationalism or the social service of West can be combined with the Eastern spiritual love. He wanted to establish humanity and universal brotherhood and spread it to every corner of the world.

The life, thought and also the philosophy of Radhakrishnan clearly indicates the meeting of the East and West and enriches the experiences of the man of the 20th century. His art of synthesising sometime contrasted with the renowned philosopher Kant, who has reconciled the rationalism with empiricism. Sometime with Hegel's dialectic method of thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis as a technique. Radhakrishnan's philosophy is a comprehensive one because it combines the eastern and western philosophy and also transcends them and constructed a World Philosophy. In his opinion, "Even as our political problem is to bring East and West together in a common brotherhood which transcends racial differences, so in the World of Philosophy we have to bring about a cross fertilization of ideas."[14]In this regard, D.M. Dutta says that Radhakrishnan has opted for constructive synthesis, the idealistic point of view. Emphasising the basic unity between the

idealistic traditions of India and the West, he has conceived a reconciliation between the two.[15] As per the philosopher's belief, the basic differences between the East and the West which are due to nationalities, races, languages and historical circumstances, are restricting to develop the true human community of one World. To achieve the ideal goal, however it will take time but we have to strive to realise such unity or the goal because it brings change and progress in mankind. In this regard Radhakrishnan said, "If we are to find a solution for the differences which divide races and nations today, it must be through the recognition of the essential oneness of the Modern World, spirituality and socially, economically and philosophically."[16]

As we have already known that Indian Philosophy is the assimilation of Philosophy and Religion, theory and practice. For attaining the ultimate goal each and every Indian philosophical system combine itself with religious aspects follows the applied methods suggested by it. However, in Western Philosophy, Religion is separated from Philosophy. Belonging to Indian traditional background Radhakrishnan assimilated true religion with true philosophy and recognized that there is no conflict between faith and reason. Among the various theories Radhakrishnan attracted with Absolute Idealism that is also known as Monistic Idealism and this is the true Philosophy according to him. For him, in modern age philosophy should be dynamic, creative, practical and universal in scope. The modern men are facing different problems not merely the spiritual or philosophical but also economic, social, political problems are there. He wanted to perceive philosophy as synthetic that can be accepted by different cultures, different community and also different countries. So, it will construct a spirit of oneness among us. We have found in his Philosophy the spiritualism as well as idealism, realism, rationalism, monism and above all the humanism which makes his Philosophy flavoured with reformative as well as innovative in nature.

According to the above discussion, we can conclude that Radhakrishnan can be considered a World Philosopher. However, there are so many opinions about that is Radhakrishnan an original thinker or not. In this regard, H.N. Singh said that the originality of Radhakrishnan was denied by his countrymen because he has reinterpreted the ancient ideas in the modern perspective. Singh identified that if the Western Philosopher Kant and Hegel were famous for their ideas and doctrines and considered to be as an original thinker, although their doctrines are based on Platonic Idealism. However, the Westerners have given the honour of original thinker to Kant and Hegel. From the same ground, Radhakrishnan also to

be considered as an original thinker for an innovative ideas and thinking sharing with us.

Sankara's*AdvaitaVedânta*and Radhakrishnan's Philosophy are not same or identical; rather, they are independent from each other. Though their concepts derived from the *Upanisads*, their interpretations are not similar. Sankara was inspired by Indian tradition for constructing his Philosophy, whereas Radhakrishnan was influenced by Indian as well as Western tradition and Philosophy. These aspects make their ideas and thoughts separate from one another. In a nutshell, Radhakrishnan has constructed a Philosophy that gives the perfect inner satisfaction and realises the feeling of oneness to everything that leads us to the perfection, or the ultimate goal – termed*Sarvamukti*by Radhakrishnan himself.

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MEANINGSAND DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA OF COMPROMISE: A POLITICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE

AMIT MONDAL

The word compromise means a reciprocal promise to solve a dispute by the decision of an impartial third party. The meaning of compromise has developed with its different forms across the ages—from the classical meaning of compromise to its modern understanding. Philosophers such as Aristotle, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, John Morley, and AvishaiMargalit have often discussed and commented on the idea of compromise and the ethics of compromise in their political and philosophical discourse. Meaning of compromise has developed in the different periods primarily on the basis of its different usages: as a tool, a virtue, and a principle.

This paper attempts to demonstrate the different meanings of compromise and its connection with contractarianism and representation. Keeping in mind the differences in the meanings of compromise across the ages and the differences in representation I have tried to explain compromise in a comprehensive way. It is so because the political and philosophical history of compromise shows differences as well as similarities regarding the meaning and understanding of the word, especially while looking into the ethical aspects of it. The paper also focuses on how the classical sense of 'compromise' had undergone a sudden change from the early decades of the sixteenth century, and how the change persisted till the late eighteenth century in European political and philosophical discourse.

I

Compromise is a word of Roman origin, meaning a reciprocal promise to solve a dispute by the decision of an impartial third party, *compromissarius*.[1] The meaning of the word *compromissarius* was understood to be an arbitrator who mediated between the parties or communities involved in a dispute. The *compromissarius* was always superior to or above the parties involved in dispute. In the classical understanding of the concept the *compromissarius* was not the compromiser. A *compromissarius* just arbitrated a compromise; neither did it compromise, nor was it a part of a compromise. Compromise was indeed exclusively a verbal contract meant for avoiding the formalized legal system of court justice during that time, if there was any dispute between different parties. It was one of the reasons for which it acquired a popular meaning during the medieval period.

In the early Middle Ages, a *compromissarius* was chosen by the people, and he played the role of a representative of the parties involved in the disputes, especially in the selection of members of the church authority through an electoral method. Religion and legislation were indeed the two main subjects with which the idea of compromise was mainly associated during the Medieval Ages. Much of the existing literature of the Middle Ages discusses about the concept of compromise primarily in its association with Church and Legislative system.

Interestingly, during the early Middle Ages the word 'compromise' was still not available, but there was the practice of the concept. In this respect, the third party, that is, the *compromissarius* or an arbitrator would play a major role in resolving the dispute of the parties involved. And on that matter, the interests and opinions of the parties were not considered worthy in resolving the dispute. The fact was that the solution to any problem or any sort of conflict had to be resolved only by the *compromissarius*, resulting in the full acceptance and agreement of the parties concerned. The arbitrator was trusted to be 'in between' or 'above' the interest of the parties. However, in the late Latin the word c*ompromissum* was available which meant a joint promise made by two or more persons in the presence of an arbitrator.Itwas also used in the sense of consent to arbitration.

Here, I would address two questions: First, why would a medieval man wholeheartedly accept the decision of the arbitrator when there was a chance of his own conscience getting hurt? And the second, why was the medieval man not afraid to compromise? To understand this I will focus on the now forgotten dialectic between *forum internum* and *forum externum.*[2] In an article entitled "Lost in Translation: Centripetal Individualism and the Classical Concept of Descending Representation," Alin Fumurescu argues that *forum internum* was a subject to conscience, authenticity and freedom of an individual, and it was a subject to nobody else. In this forum one could be punished by no one except God. On the other hand, *forum externum* was a forum in which an individual could identify himself and was identified through his belonging to a particular group or community (156-176)). So, these two forums were very important in the matter of representation of an individual in society. If we take the matter of representation of a medieval man into consideration, it can be argued that a medieval man would reveal himself only as a member of a group or community, and the kind of identity he had would always depend on the identity of the group or the community he belonged to. It goes without saying that the medieval man was never ready to compromise his *forum internum*, at any cost. He indeed did not need to compromise his *forum internum*. It was so because in his *forum internum* he was unique and an individual self, whereas in *forum externum* he shared a membership with the other members of the community which he belonged to. Therefore, he was a private, and at the same time public person in *forum externum*. This is how the medieval man seems to maintain a balance between the two 'forums' that definitely point towards the compromise issue. In case there was a situation in which no other option was available, the medieval

man would compromise, and that compromise would involve only his *forum externum*. As a matter of fact, his *forum internum* was not threaten or violated under any circumstances. The medieval man, thus, was not afraid to compromise. For him compromise was nothing more than just a tool among others.

It is difficult to find an appropriate word for compromise. In the Middle Ages it was basically understood in the sense of 'bargain', 'contract', 'accommodation' and also 'consensus'. These are a few of the accepted meanings of compromise. In the most recently updated online *Middle English Dictionary*, four forms of the word are mentioned: *compromis* (noun), *compromisen* (verb), *compromission* (noun) and *compromitten* (verb).[3] It is very important to note that all of these forms bear a sense of mutual agreement, co-promise, or arbitration. All these forms of compromise had been represented and used as a means of avoiding hassle in the court justice, so far as the dispute between the parties was concerned. It was not only meant for resolving disputes, adhering to different parties or public affairs by delegating men's power to the *compromissarius*, but also was exclusively meant for world affairs such as political tussle, foreign policies, and in few cases disputes between rival countries.

II

Prior to the sixteenth century, there was the usage of a French word *compromis*, denoting a subjective and mutual understanding for the resolution of disputes. Fumurescu claims in his book, *Compromise: A Political and Philosophical History* that since early fifteenth century the classical meaning of compromise was also in practice in France during the Middle Ages; the first mention of *compromis* was found in a poem of Christine de Pizan (1364 – c. 1430) in which Pizan said "*Et dessusvousensontencompromis/Les parties d'un debate playdoye*" ("And above you there are in compromise/The self-pleading parties of a debate").[4] Pizan mentioned the word *compromise* mainly in a political context in order to celebrate the wisdom of an arbitrator. Like all other authors of that period, Pizan believed that politics was something that was interrelated to philosophy; it could not be separated from the philosophical wisdom. However, from the sixteenth century onwards, many other French philosophers and writers have shown their concern about the idea of compromise. Pierre Charron and Michael de Montaigne, for examples, are very important figures who were concerned about the French usage of the word, although they were afraid to compromise their conscience. This concern was also shared by many French

writers of later generations such as Rene Descartes, Pierre Corneille and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. To each of them compromise was a dangerous word to practice in life.However, since the early decades of the sixteenth century compromise as arbitration persisted as a very significant concept across the continental Europe.

The discrepancy in meaning of compromise was found after the sixteenth century both in England and France, and it went all the way through the end of the eighteenth century. Discrepancy was noticeable in the usages and understanding of compromise. Since then, there was another thing to be noticed and that was the change in the role of the impartial arbitrator in a dispute. Unlike the arbitrator who had a direct participation in the medieval ages, there was found no such active participation of the arbitrator in the post-medieval ages. It was so because instead of depending on the arbitrator people established a mutual understanding or agreed upon mutual contract among themselves in order to resolve their disputes. However, it should not be forgotten that not only England and France, I assume, the understanding of compromise might also be pertinent in Germany, Italy, and some other European countries through the ages.

From the sixteenth century onwards, there was a tendency among Frenchmen to become more crucial about the idea of compromise. The idea was that compromise should not be done under any circumstances in the French context because it was considered a bad thing. This French understanding can best be understood in Chiara Lepora's analysis of the idea of compromise. In an essay "On Compromise and Being Compromised" Lepora talks about the negative connotations of compromise and argues that by choosing compromise one cannot avoid the feeling of being morally compromised because it affects one's identity and authenticity. Even in case of intellectual productivity, compromise with anything or anyone could be unethical for one's dignity and identity.In other words, I would say that the only ethical aspect for Frenchman was not to compromise with his dignity, identity or patriotic emotions. Most importantly, there are two conditions that demonstrate when and why one should not compromise or not turn to 'being compromised'. Firstly, if the opposite party or person is not equal for that matter, there should be no question of compromise. It is so because compromising with their inferior oppositions was a matter of self-humiliation to Frenchmen. And secondly, if there was any doubt that compromise might be hurting one's honour and virtues. The reason was that the Frenchman believed that compromise with one's honour and virtue was absolutely against the

dimensions and codes of ethics and morality. The idea was clear that Frenchmen held a subjective concern about the idea of compromise during that period. Self-identification was a matter of priority, to be sure. Indeed, French understanding of compromise bears a resemblance with that of the Medieval Ages, so far as the matter of representation of an individual, by protecting his 'self,' was concerned. French authors suchas Alain-Rene Lesage, Pierre de Marivaux, Antoine Francois Prevost and Rousseau had used the word with negative connotations. Rousseau's novel *Julie* (1761), for example, mentions the usage of the word compromise many times with negative connotations. Meanwhile, its British counterpart was very much positive about the idea of compromise. Like British politicians, sociologists, philosophers, and anthropologists, British authors also embraced it as a virtue. The first British and French dictionaries from the seventeenth century confirm this discrepancy.[5] Apart from dictionaries, there are many online sources available on internet that demonstrate an astonishing consistency in the practice of compromise as a virtue in Britain, and as a vice in its French counterpart, even if there has been a continuous process of homogenization between England and France in terms of culture, language, intellectual productions, and so on. Even today, such discrepancies are discernible.

To illustrate the English context of compromise, I find that England has a distinct development in contrast to France, so far as the matter of individual representation was concerned. It is henceforth important to note why England has a distinct development. The fact is that England is distinctive because of the peculiarities in its law, spirit, culture, history and intellectual competition against continental Europe. Unlike the rise of administrative centralisation and political absolutism in France in the second half of sixteenth century, Englishmen were introducing a new intellectual as well as political system in their own country with the purpose of deviating England from the European influence; this continued till the end of the eighteenth century. A common law was established in England in opposition to the Roman law, while most of the European countries were still under the influence of Roman and canon law. The purpose of establishing the common law was to primarily make a connection among all Englishmen in order to respond to the needs of each other. As a result of it, an important English distinction can be found in the feudal system of eighteenth-century France as well as England. During that time the French monarchy system represented a very strong side in the world in terms of the imposition of its law and regulations. It was so because an absence of alliances was found between

French barons, courtiers and common men. Barons and courtiers were the only people in the French monarchy system who were the decision makers regarding all matters, either domestic or foreign. As a matter of fact, they enjoyed absolute freedom, whereas common men were deprived of it. Indeed, there was no chance for the common people to make alliances with these feudal lords. The freedom enjoyed by those barons and courtiers prevented that alliances, so to say. While common Frenchmen were disconnected from the monarchical system, on the contrary in England common people had enjoyed their freedom that connected them with the English administrative system. Unlike French, English common men could take part in the selection process of their representatives, and admitted them to the parliament as representatives of the whole nation. In this respect, Jean Louis DeLolme's observation about the relationship among common men, representatives, and royal power is noteworthy. In *The Constitution of England; or An Account of the English Government*, DeLolme observes that with the implementation of the common law "The lord, the vassal, the inferior vassal, all united. They even implored the assistance of the peasants and cottagers"; and "The people…. instructed by the examples of their leaders…insisted that, for the future, every individual should be entitled to the protection of law, and thus did those rights with which the lords had strengthened themselves, in order to oppose the tyranny of the crown, become a bulwark which was, in time, to restrain their own" (32-33). It was an important observation about the functions of Englishmen in the proceedings of common law, and this way they indirectly represented themselves in the law and order. They started representing themselves exclusively in terms of the wills and the office. It is a peculiar sort of representation on the part of English men. But it should also be clear that while delegating their rights to the hands of a group or person, individuals paved the way to indirectly creating arbitrators. Here, the representatives chosen by the Englishmen function as arbitrators, even if there was the consent of the individuals.

In contradiction to the classical understanding of the role of arbitrator, I argue that there was no arbitrator directly present in a dispute under the common law; rather those chosen representatives functioned as the 'artificial' arbitrator in the dispute. Despite the absence of the arbitrator, it can also be argued that there was a sense of equality among the individuals across the country; Englishmen were also very aware of their functions in society. In addition, the sense of equality was offered in the proceedings of the common law. Under the common law a man's decision or opinion was granted by the agreement of others, during

that time. However, in such democratic sort of system the English common law triumphed over the Roman canon law, and thus England emerged as a distinct nation in the continental Europe. As a result of it, there was an increase in the role of the parliament. It was the common law that represented all Englishmen in terms of equality, so far as the question of the individual representation was concerned. Fumurescu addresses this kind of individualism as 'centrifugal individualism'. Undoubtedly, this peculiar form of individualism was directly connected with the idea of compromise. In England, from sixteenth to eighteenth century, this form of individualism developed the idea of the commonwealth that would most importantly require the consents of the parties involved. If there was any dispute, the requirement of equal status of the parties was very essential to arbitrate a compromise. Needless to say, under such common law every man is considered equal to every other man.

III

If one wants to know about the English version of compromise popular in the seventeenth century, one cannot avoid considering, even if briefly, theories of social contract as proposed by Hobbes and Locke. It was so because since the seventeenth century and all the way up to the eighteenth century compromise was considered a social contract in England, so to say. Hobbes and Locke were the two most important authors of the seventeenth century who have been more discussed, commented on and criticised than any authors during that time. The impact of these two authors was such that even many key literary texts of the writers of the later generations have often been read and reviewed in their philosophical frameworks, such as Swift's *Gulliver's Travels*, Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe*, Fielding' *Tom Jones*, and so on.

Of the seventeenth-century philosophers Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) was one of the predecessors and founders of modern political philosophy who had immense contribution to the development of the idea of compromise. In Hobbes's theory of social contract, as discussed in *Leviathan* (1651), the sovereign power of king functions as a mediator which is over all present as an arbitrator to resolve conflicts between two individuals, although the king is not physically present as an arbitrator as we find in the classical understanding of it. In Hobbes's theory, conflict which is an integral part of compromise can be traced on his explanation of the equal state of human nature. If Hobbes's theory of social contract is compared and contrasted with the classical meaning of compromise, then in both

the cases there is a presence of the *compromissarius* or arbitrator, balancing the dispute between the opposite parties. Alongside, the difference lies in the idea that in Hobbes's interpretation the arbitrator is not the third party directly present there in contrast to the classical one. It is more important to note that in social contract theory the dispute is between men, whereas in the classical understanding of compromise the dispute is between different parties. So far as the English sense of compromise is concerned, Hobbes is truly an English man for his approach towards the theory of social contract. Now, the question is: Can we consider the term 'contract' as an appropriate term for compromise? By the end of the seventeenth century English men already understood the term 'contract' as a generalised compromise. Hobbes's contemporary Gilbert Burnet, for example, had also shown a positive outlook on contract as compromise. While talking about the importance of compromise Burnetsays:

The true and original notion of civil society and government, is, that is a compromise made by such a body of men, by which they resign up the right of demanding reparations, either in the way of justice against one another, or in the way of war, against their neighbours; to such a single person, or to such a body of men as they think fit to trust with it. (qtd. inFumurescu 265)

It was not only about civil society; even family relationships also came to be dominated by 'contractarianism', during that time. William Fleetwood's account on the family relations, for instance, envisages that the relations between husband and wives, parents and children or masters and servants came to be accepted on the basis of contract. Contract was indeed the basis of all kinds of relations. Fleetwood writes that "there is no Relation in the World, either Natural, or Civil and agreed upon, but there is a reciprocal duty obliging each party" (*The Relative* 68). Even, before Fleetwood, John Locke had laid down the absolute proposition that "conjugal society is made by a voluntary compact between man and woman" (*Two treatises* 319); and indeed Locke's proposition was very true to his contemporary English society.

In Hobbes's analysis the state of nature is the root of compromise, while his follower John Locke also finds the root of compromise in human state of nature. But Locke believes that human beings are peaceful by nature, not like Hobbes's state of war. And in order to maintain peace they keep a positive outlook towards compromise. Contradictory to Hobbes's sovereign-governed society, Locke was the author who talked about civil society. Therefore, we

should turn to Locke to further understand the idea of compromise. Like Hobbes, Locke also begins his book *Two Treatises of Government* with the consideration of the state of nature. Locke too believes that every man is free and equal to every other man by the state of nature (by the state of nature he means the state of human beings prior to the establishment of civil society or political community or earthly sovereign). Unlike Hobbes's state of war, Locke considers the state of natureas a state of "Peace, goodwill, mutual assistance, and self-preservation" (280) where people are governed by the "law of nature." He says that "all men are naturally in that state, and remain so, till by their own consents they make themselves members of some politic society" (278). Although Locke is more optimistic than Hobbes, his consideration of the state of nature cannot avoid the question of conflicts because it is conflicts that ultimately lead people towards compromise. In spite of having a state of peace, goodwill and mutual assistance, the situation turns conflictual here also. And it happens in the absence of a judge or a law enforcer, as everyone is equal to other. As a matter of fact, everyone becomes his own judge, and everyone his own law enforcer. Locke's view on the state of nature therefore becomes problematic, so far as the question of self-preservation and the preservation of individual's property is concerned. It is therefore important to note that what is agreement or compromise in Hobbes's social contract theory is consent in Locke's understanding. Needless to say, during Locke's time people understood'consent' by associating it with the idea of compromise. Interestingly, in Hobbes's consideration there is always a possibility of coercion in achieving consent; the reason is that the absolute power is enjoyed by the sovereign who can do whatever he wants to do. For Locke, however, the initial consent must be unanimous without the possibility of coercion. For example, a man can always renounce his consent by migrating to other country. He can also withdraw his consent going into the wilderness to live in the state of nature. But in order to live in civil society one must be a member of that society. Otherwise, it is very difficult for a man to live in the state of nature being absolutely separated from others. This can be more exemplified with Edmund Burke's assertion that "…indeed every human benefit and enjoyment, every virtue and every prudent act—is founded on compromise and barter. We balance inconveniences; we give and take; we remit some rights that we may enjoy others; and we choose rather to be happy citizens than subtle disputants" (qtd. in O'Gorman78). By 'barter' Burke probably means the policy of giving and taking. It was Burke's reaction to the imperial problem of America. Although this assertion was made on March 22, 1775 in a political context in order bring peace,

specifically in the context of England's conciliation with America, it concerns the issue of compromise less as a matter of politics and more as a matter of personal strategy. Personal strategy obviously points towards giving one's individual wills to the contract and taking benefits out of it. Hence, it can be said that the implication of the idea of compromise is directly connected with Locke's social contact theory. Like Locke, Burke was also a philosopher and defender of compromise of the eighteenth century.

However, Locke's argument had been very influential among people who had ceased to believe in the state of nature. Locke plausibly presents the state of nature and its importance to maintain a contractual relation among people in society. This is obvious that English people always want to represent themselves as the members of a group or a community. Therefore, the question of contract becomes very significant, since living in contract indirectly means living in community on the whole. In Locke's civil society everything is contractual; every action by the government is performed on consent. But the principle way in which Locke's civil society differs from Hobbes's sovereign is thatthe governors in civil society are themselves parties to the initial contract,unlike Hobbes's sovereign. They hold power on trust and consent of the people. If they fail to enforce the law of nature or violate natural rights people can overthrow them from the power.

Although theories of Hobbes and Locke present different perspectives, similarities can also be noticeable. They both believed in the contracts of individual wills in order to create any form of government, be it monarchy or civil society. To talk about the role of arbitrator, Locke's social contract theory presents an arbitrator not as an individual directly present in dispute. In Locke's analysis the power given to the government by people is indeed present overall as arbitrator. Locke is very much expressive and optimistic about the fact that the establishment of human society has always been based on compromise, since compromise is taken to be the other form of contract or consent. On the other hand, the sovereign power functions as an arbitrator that is indirectly present in the disputes in society.Hobbes's explanation to contractarianism is, therefore,very influential because this moved the people of his contemporary period towards compromise.This must be one of many other reasons for the acceptance and development of the idea in English society in a welcoming manner.

Therefore, I find no reason to deny the fact that it was English people who for the first time could enjoy individual rights and had the sense of liberty. An English

man had always shown his willingness for protecting his individual self by representing himself as a member of a community in the late Medieval Age, and later this medieval representation of man was changed into the different forms of contractarianism. In other words, here I will argue, English people have always managed to keep the positive aspect about the usages of compromise. So, there is truth in the fact that from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century compromise has always been considered a virtue in England.

IV

By the nineteenth century John Morley observed that compromise was raised from a method to the status of a principle. Yet, one should not confuse method with principle. Method is generally a procedure of getting one thing into other, and it does not concern what is being gotten into what. In other words, it can be said that method is a neutral position towards different ideologies, and it is eminently practical. To give an example, it dates back to the Medieval period when compromise represented a method; the medieval man basically used it for practical solutions. Morley thinks that method cannot be exclusive and final. While defining principle Carrie Menkel-Meadow in her essay "Ethics of Compromise" argues that "Principles are philosophically more "higher" and valued than pragmatic decisions to forego something of value in order to agree to accomplish something else" (2). In context of compromise Meadow also argues that "compromise as a concept assumes that one is "conceding" something to someone else, usually in order to achieve some goal—any agreement (e.g., contract, treaty, legislation, policy, or decision of more than one person) or simply to end a conflict or dispute…" (2). What Meadow wants to point out is very simple. According to Meadow, compromise is possible when one gives up one's principles to some extent in order to end conflicts or bring peace. In addition, Martin Benjamin has also shown a similar interest in the connection between compromise and principle. In *Splitting the Difference* Benjamin argues that compromise means "giving up" of pure principles and commitment to rights and truth.

However, the primary requirement of the ethics of compromise is the consideration of when it is good and ethical to compromise, and when it might be wrong or unethical to compromise. For this, I will give two instances that will clarify these two opposite aspects of compromise. Firstly, Machiavelli in his best known book *The Prince* (1532) has suggested that great leaders are always

required to compromise their own principles to govern many because compromising their own principles make them great leaders, even if their own principles might be different from other's. Truly, Machiavelli had positive approach towards compromise. His suggestion on compromise therefore becomes more significant in modern understanding of the idea, although it does not necessarily concern modern men to be great leaders, so to say. Machiavellian compromise therefore suggests that if a man gives away his principles to compromiseto some extent,his act might be considered ethical. This is how the great leaders become great, says Machiavelli. And secondly, I refer to Sir Thomas More who did stick to his own principles in the matter of compromise. He did not compromise with his own principles, and instead herefused to swear an oath to Henry VIII and the church of England, even though he was forced to swear. In More's view giving away his principles would not be a proper way. If I consider a modern man by putting him in both these contexts, then the man seems to be following the Machiavellian suggestion of compromising his own principles. Yet, with reference to the second example I argue that in the modern sensecompromise is not a compromise which is done by force, coerce or illegitimate way. It is so because compromise is a very personal matter in the modern context; it involves a person's own emotion and reason. No external influences can hurt one's own principles. Besides these ethical aspects of compromise,Benjamin, Meadow and many other critics have talked about the unethical aspects of compromise as well. They agree with the idea that if a compromise involves personal interests of the compromiser, or if it meets the needs of people, then this compromise is obviously immoral, unethical and wrong. AvishaiMargalit hasrightly concentrated on these two aspects of compromise and has tried to give a sort of theoretical explanation to the idea that makes modern compromise more comprehending.

Margalit, a renowned professor emeritus of philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, has explained the idea of compromise in his well-known book, *On Compromise and Rotten Compromises*. He defines compromise as an ambivalent term because it has two implications—positive and negative. He says that "It is regarded on some occasions as an expression of goodwill, and on other occasions as being wishy-washy" (6). As 'compromise' is considered an ambivalent term it is both good and bad. To exemplify the positive aspect first, if we consider that in a war one party makes certain compromises and that lead to peace or a poor man refuses the offer of a good amount of money for killing a rich man. Secondly, the negative aspect of compromise implies immoral and unethical actions. For

instance, if both the parties in war stick to their own ideologies without bothering about values of human lives or the poor man kills the rich person against his own wills, even if he knows that money can reduce his poverty. But this sort of compromises with one's wills or the wills of a group turn to be unethical, to be sure. However, Margalit has divided compromise into two different categories: 'compromise' and 'rotten compromises'. By 'compromise' he means an agreement between two forces or individuals, and it always has a positive notion signalling something better for a larger community that is good for man. The 'rotten compromises', in contrast to the previous one, favour cruelty and humiliation. Rotten compromises, according to Margalit, must be avoided under any circumstances. He further claims that in most of the cases what we have today in human society is the outcome of our compromises, in terms of cultures, politics, religions, languages, habits, social customs and so on. As a matter of fact, man's identity in regard to all these terms can be traced on the compromises reached under different circumstances. Margalit finds evidence of it in his study of the religious and political affairs of the world. In the book *Compromise* he says:

After all we very rarely attain what is first on our list of priorities, either as individuals or as collectives. We are forced by circumstances to settle for much less than what we aspire too. We compromise. We should, I believe, be judged by our compromises more than our ideals and our norms. Ideals may tell us something important about what we would like to be. But compromises tell us who we are. (5)

Although Margalit has talked about compromise from the aspects of politics and religion, it has been very significant through every aspect of life. Like other English philosophers and writers, he is also very much positive about compromise. His assumptions on human wills for compromise are plausible, so to say. He assumes that we do compromises mainly in two types of situations: 1. if there is a socio-political concern, and 2. if it is a question of survival. In the second situation, we are ready to compromise even with the worst or unacceptable by denying any sort of religious or social norms. Hence, it raises the question whether compromise is a luxury or a necessity that remains unexplained by Margalit. But if we give a closer look into this matter, we find that compromises differ from one person to another in accordance with the situations, depending on a person's abilities and capabilities of handling the concerned situations, even if it is the case of survival. So, from his observations it can be argued that the

assessments of the ethics of compromise are variable, contextual, and situational. It is therefore important to understand the matter of representation of modern man on the basis of compromise.

Obviously, the modern sense of compromise presents a deviation from the already established meaning of it that remained dominant from the sixteenth to the eighteenth-century in England. One may find the deviation in the relationship between the representatives and individuals. I have discussed earlier that the representatives of people have always functioned as the *compromissarius* in disputes, and in any sort of compromise individuals have depended on the decisions of their representatives, either directly or indirectly. Undoubtedly, individuals were the compromisers who were subject to the decisions of the *compromissarius* in dispute. But the change that we find in modern period is that here individuals are not basically found as the compromisers, rather they themselves seem to play the roles of the *compromissarius*. It is so because the unity and strength of being in a group or in a particular party is hardly found in modern times. Instead, one can feel a social, political as well as cultural distance among individuals. The modern man indeed seems to be engaged in resolving his own personal conflicts and disputes by himself. Just like a *compromissarius* he has to choose between what to do and what not to do, between what to think and what not to think. I argue that modern compromise is a kind of mixture of two elements or two different choices, and this mixture gives a new definition to compromise. But this sense of compromise as a mixture of two different sides is not very new, because this is somehow connected with the ancient meaning of the concept. Henceforth, in order to understand the modern understanding of compromise we need to focus on its ancient meaning, specifically Aristotle's idea of *mesotes*. The *mesotes* was a Greek term, and it was generally used to mean 'middle' in ancient philosophy. It was indeed the central concept in Aristotle's ethical and political theory. Aristotle used the term in the sense of 'mean.' It mainly refers to a position of virtue between two vices—one can be of excess and other of deficiency. Many scholars agree that *mesotes* was understood as a compromise in the ancient philosophy. In an essay "Justice, Compromise and Constitutional Rules in Aristotle's Politics" David Resnick has interpreted Aristotle's *mesotes* as a compromise. Resnick argues that "A compromise for Aristotle is a mixture, a resultant that combines elements from each particular to yield a new compound having elements of both" (75). By calling compromise a mixture, Resnick argues, Aristotle does not mean that compromise can be reached by balancing the two

extreme positions to meet halfway in quantitative fashion, but it is a middle position, different from the nature of the two extreme positions. For example, in our society there are three sections of people—rich, poor and middle class; people are rich and poor for some certain conditions, but middle class is a position that is devoid of the arrogance of the rich and the servility and mean-spiritedness of the poor (76).So, it can be argued that in Aristotelian compromise or *mesotes*, compromise is reached by excluding the qualities of the two different opposite elements, while at the same time staying in a middle position. Aristotelian mean or compromise is not an extreme position quantitatively as well as qualitatively.

Although Aristotelian 'mixture' may appear to be similar to the modern sense of compromise, they are not exactly same. Here, I argue that modern compromise is reached, on contrary to the Aristotelian compromise, by equally balancing the two opposite elements in quantitative fashion, and also sharing the nature of the two. It is also true that the ancient compromise was reached to get justice, whereas modern compromise is reached only to avoid violence and greatest evils regarding individual matters. These are the two main points on which ancient and modern compromise are different from one another. Yet, one cannot avoid considering Aristotelian *mesotes* to understand the present-day compromise.

The presence of arbitrator who had a major role to play in the classical sense of compromise is no more found in modern compromise because in the modern sense compromise is basically reached by the man who himself is involved in his own disputes. Hence, there is no need of a third party to settle the disputes. In that sense, it can be argued that modern compromise is very different from the classical understanding of the concept. I also argue that even if people in the present time are connected in a social contract relation they are not there in it in the truest sense of the contract theory as proposed by Hobbes and Locke. Indeed, the serious interest in the social contract theory declines in the twentieth-century. It is so because a modern man does not seem to trust another man; instead, they seem to be selfish and self-centred about their own interest and benefits. James Fieser has truly analysed the nature of modern man and his behaviour in human relation that can be well connected with the modern sense of compromise. Fieser in his book, *Moral Philosophy through the Ages*, has discussed a few important aspects of social contract. He sees men in a hypothetical environment in which human interact to each other, and this environment involves the account of the limits of human rationality, the risk of a

man in taking decisions, and also the way a modern man keeps balance between short-term and long-term interests. He also talks about the conflicts of a modern man of handling the matter of self-regarding and the regards for other. Fieser calls this a hypothetical environment. In view of this hypothetical environment, conflicts inevitably arise. What Fieser wants to point out here is that conflicts are based on what way man rationally calculates his own interests. The rationally calculative mind of a modern man does not take much time to do compromise, although his rational calculations motivate him to pursue the best deal for him (105-106).Therefore, compromise, indeed, is a very important part of human enterprise which is undergoing certain changes in its meaning and interpretation over the time periods.

Reference

[1]It is a Latin word accepted as arbitrator by both parties in a dispute. In the medieval period any conflict between different parties was resolved by the decision of the impartial *compromissarius* which basically referred to a male judge whose decision was above the interest of the parties involved. See Glare, P.G.W., editor. *Oxford Latin Dictionary*. 2nd ed., Oxford UP, 2012.

[2]It is a dialectic which was formalised at the beginning of the twelfth century. Through this dialectic a medieval man used to represent himself and the other, before the split of meaning of compromise in the sixteenth century. In his book *Compromise* Alin Fumurescu claims that for more than a thousand years this dialectic provided the foundation for individualism across the western world.

[3]The online *Middle English Compendium* contains these forms of compromise. All these forms are available at https://quod.lib.umich.edu/m/middle-english-dictionary/dictionary.

[4]Fumurescu has quoted these lines in his book *Compromise: A Political and Philosophical History,*and the translation of these lines is also quoted here.

[5]For examples, Pierre Richelet's *Dictionnaire de la langue francoiseancienne et moderne* (1680) mentions "an honest man should not compromise himself with rascals," while in Antoine Furetiere's *Dictionnaaireuniverselle* from 1690 it is mentioned that "one should not put oneself in compromise with those who are inferior, that is to say have words or quarrels with them." These examples in English translation are quoted in Fumurescu's book, *Compromise: A Political and Philosophical History*, p.79.

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AN ASSESSMENT OF RADICAL, LIBERAL AND CONTRACTARIAN VIEWS ON SEX WORK

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The theoretical framework of the philosophical study of sex work is an extensively debated area of research among academic scholars.Two main standpoints emerge from this debate -- (a) sex work is a form of exploitation, and (b) sex work is a form of work. The first standpoint condemns sex work because it involves the sale of sex that is deeply emotional and personal. The second group tries to counter the above allegations and establish sex work as legitimate work.This article provides a comprehensive overview of the philosophical perspectivesof radical, liberal, and contractarian views that try to address the phenomenon of sex workfrom a theoretical and context-sensitive approach.Here, I demonstrate through discussion of these perspectives how sex workers are qualified as real workers and show that they also have control over their working life and, most importantly, are not always passive victims of patriarchy without voices.

Introduction

The research on prostitution or sex work has been done from different perspectives. Prostitution or sex work has been seen either as a form of oppression or as a form of empowerment. In recent decades, the second opinion is more popular than the first. The term 'sex worker' and 'sex work' was first used by sex workers themselves during prostitutes' rights movements. In 'sex work', the addition of the word 'work' with 'sex' is an attempt to recognize the efforts of sex workers and is also a clear announcement that sex work also falls under the sphere of labour. I focus only on voluntary sex work and will use 'prostitution' and 'sex work' interchangeably. Here, I will discuss the popular approaches to the study of sex work viz. radical feminism, liberal feminism, and the contractarian view.

Radical Feminism

According to contemporary radical feminists, prostitution is a quintessential relationship of women to men. They reckon that almost every encounter between men and women has sexual overtones. These encounters are typically designed to amplify the sexual dominance and power of men over women. Radical feminists argue that, as a matter of fact, prostitution isused to satisfy the physical desires of men, but they consider this only as a subsidiary function. Primarily, they think,

Prostitution exists to meet the desire of men to degrade women. Studies made by men reveal that very few even pretend they frequent prostitutes primarily for sexual gratification. Young boys admit they go to achieve a sense of male camaraderie and freedom. They usually go in groups and gossip about it at length afterward in a way that is good for their egos. Other men have expressed the prime motive as the desire to reaffirm the basic 'filth' of all women; or to clearly separate 'good' from 'bad' women in their minds, or for the opportunity to treat another person completely according to personal whim (Alison M. Jaggar, Prostitution in *Living With Contradictions*,p.107).

According to radical feminists, in prostitution, the victims are women. They are exploited, degraded, and outcasted by all the men who directly or indirectly take and enjoy the benefits of prostitution. The basic radical feminist objection is based on economic coercion as leading to prostitution:

> Sex is a fine thing when it is the free choice of the individuals involved – free of economic coercion. No one should be dependent on selling herself for support; all love should be free love (*Ibid*. p. 107).

In prostitution, women's sexuality is expressed in a manner to please men that contributes to the basic feminist objection of prostitution. Radical feminists want the complete eradication of prostitution. For this, they point out that, first, it requires a total insight shifting of men's attitude towards women. It also requires the immersion of conventional myths of male sexuality that men's biological appetite for sex is much stronger than women's. Radical feminists think that men do not demand prostitutes if masculinity is no longer attached to heterosexual performance. They point outthat the demand for prostitution is not a biological necessity. Radical feminists always argue that prostitution is a result of women's inferior status in society. Emma Goldman noted:

> Nowhere is women treated according to the merit of her work but rather as a sex. It is therefore almost inevitable that she should pay for her right to sex, to keep a position in whatever line, with sex favors. Thus it is merely a question of degree whether she sells herself to one man, in or out of marriage, or to many men. Whether our reformers admit it or not, the economic and social inferiority of woman is responsible for prostitution (p.122).

Secondly, the eradication of prostitution requires the annulment of men's monopoly of economic power. It also requires the change of perspective that women are sex objects. For radical feminists, as long as these two interdependent conditions exist, almost all man-woman encounters are a form of prostitution.

According to radical feminism, when women enter into prostitution, they do not exercise any kind of free choice. Here, the choice is implicit coercion that leaves no actual options for women. This problem of choice is not limited only to sex work, but also applicable to those women who work in factories, or as domestic servants or waitresses. However, minimal education and an unstable job market are two basic factors that may limit someone's choice to work in a certain occupation. Radical feminists argue that consent is impossible in prostitution. Sex is not a neutral activity. It is a process to show male power. From this point of view, rape and sex work are indistinguishable. Each situation involves male dominance which promotes women's objectification through their sexuality. This attitude allows men to think that women's sexuality is something that pertains to them or they have the right to buy or take if it is not freely given. Therefore, sex workers are regarded as victims of male desires. This victimization outlook reminds us that all women are commodified through their sexuality and they are available to men for a price.

According to Catharine A. MacKinnon, sexuality defines through the eroticization of domination and submission. Prostitution and pornography are primary to this system. This power divergence between men and women is sexually and socially constructed, and it is so extensive that it is usually unnoticeable. MacKinnon noted that, The perspective from the male standpoint enforces woman's definition, encircles her body, circumlocutes her speech, and describes her life. The male perspective is systemic and hegemonic(p.636).

For MacKinnon, society does not value the female and feminine attributes or only recognizes them as objects, while male and masculine attributes are considered worthier. MacKinnon argues that it is impossible to construct alternative female sexuality until men keep their feet on women's necks. MacKinnon also raises the question of whether women have an autonomous self at all.If women are socially defined such that female sexuality cannot be lived or spoken or felt or even somatically sensed apart from its enforced definition so that it is its own lack, then there is no such thing as a woman as such, there are only walking embodiments of

men's projected needs. For feminism, asking whether there is socially, a female sexuality is the same as asking whether women exist(p.534).

MacKinnon's argument is based on the presumption of coercion. Her argument is: if women have no self, then it is difficult to give consent to anything. The presumption of coercion forces women to encounter the fact that women's ability to give consent is always socially confined. MacKinnon uses the law of rape to illustrate the illusion of consent:

> The law of rape presents consent as free exercise of sexual choice under conditions of equality of power without exposing the underlying structure of constraint and disparity. Fundamentally, desirability to men is supposed a woman's form of power because she can both arouse it and deny its fulfillment. To woman is attributed both the cause of man's initiative and the denial of his satisfaction. This rationalizes force.Consent in this model becomes more a metaphysical quality of a woman's being than a choice she makes and communicates. Exercise of women's so-called power presupposes more fundamental social powerlessness (*Toward a Feminist Theory of State*, p. 175).

Women do not participate in the definition of their sexuality. Their sexuality is defined from the male perspective and it exclusively serves male purposes. Women are treated as sexual objects and victims. Male violence forces them to depend on some men for protection. This observation leads someone to believe that the social definition of women's sexuality is inauthentic. For this reason, the possibility for women to make a real choice is limited. For MacKinnon, Consent is supposed to be women's form of control over intercourse, different from but equal to the custom of male initiative. Man proposes, woman disposes. Even the ideal is not mutual. Apart from the disparate consequences of refusal, this model does not envision a situation the woman controls being placed in, or choices she frames. (*Toward a Feminist Theory of The State*, p.174). However, MacKinnon's theory about women's choice is criticized by many scholars. Jody Freeman is one of them. I put Freeman's view in her own words:

In my view, the notion that consent is relative and socially contingent makes sense within a feminist framework. It fits well with the value feminists place on subjectivity and community, but MacKinnon seems not to acknowledge the possibility of consent in a world where women's sexuality is not their own. This

refusal to acknowledge the possibility of consent is ironic since her vision of a truly 'female' sexuality (implied by her critique of the male colonization of female sexuality) depends, in my view on a fluid notion of consent. (pp. 96-97).

Kathleen Barry is a well-known radical feminist critic of prostitution. The foundational statement of her critic of prostitution is that prostitution represents women's subordination and establishes patriarchal male domination:

> …while pornographic media are the means of sexually saturating society, while rape is paradigmatic of sexual exploitation, prostitution, with or without a woman's consent, is the institutional, economic, and sexual model for women's oppression. (*Prostitution of Sexuality*,p.24)

C. Heike Schotten has some objections against Barry's claim. For Schotten, Barry defines prostitution as sexual exploitation which continues over time, though she cannot well explain "what constitutes exploitation." (p.215). Schotten notes:

> She is unable to provide an adequate account of the conditions of power, freedom, and agency under which she believes desire and consent are produced, and that therefore govern women's and men's lives to the extent that prostitution cannot be defined as anything other than sexual exploitation (p.215).

The most fruitful elaboration of Barry's theoretical critique of prostitution is to be found in MacKinnon's work. MacKinnon's theory of gender and sexuality helps to clarify radical feminist critique of prostitution. The starting premise of MacKinnon's theory is that there is no such thing as "just sex". It means sex is not somehow precultural or presocial. Here, sex denotes sexuality, which includes any type of sexual activity. Sex also refers to gender. For MacKinnon, it is impossible to differentiate between sex/gender/sexuality. These are the result of power relations. How sex/gender/sexuality is connected with this power relation is portrayed by MacKinnon in the following way: power constructs gender (here gender simply refers to either biology or social identity). Gender comprises and determines sexuality that eventually bifurcates bodies and behaviors into masculine and feminine. In this way, MacKinnon tries to establish that there is no "just sex" that is pre-established or presocial or precultural because there is no such thing as before. It also means that all sexual relations along with prostitution are not a presentation of natural sexual desire. Barrry agrees with MacKinnon on this point and notes:

There are no biological givens about sex that are not social and political constructions. In that sense society precedes biology (p.22).

MacKinnon argues that sexual relations which we observe and participate in are different imperatives of male power. Thus sex, sexuality, and gender are various phenomena of male constructions. In this way, women's sexuality becomes meaningless. Women could never find a separate sphere that is outside and also independent of male power. The rules of sexual relations are made by men. Men also limit the options that are available to women, and to choose any option among them is not on any account of women's own choice. MacKinnon brings all forms of oppressive behaviors against women into one dynamic manifestation named male power and, for her, pornography and prostitution, both are "crystallized form of male domination" (p. 216).

It is not clear whether Barry supports this type of totalizing understanding of male power or not. Barry does not offer any large description of male domination. However, we have some hint that eventually implies that Barry must support MacKinnon's understanding of male domination, when she notes:

> *Can women choose to do prostitution?* As much as they can choose any other context of sexual objectification and dehumanization of the self. Following from distancing, disengagement invokes harm, harm that takes the form of forcing distinctions between what are essentially nonchoices. This is how *women actually do not consent to prostitutio*n or any other condition of sexual exploitation – in rape, in marriage, in the office, in the factory, and so on (p.33).

Though Barry and MacKinnon both do not illustrate how and why women's choices have become so restricted, both concur on the same point that under male domination, women's choice is just a meaningless concept. The analysis of why and how women's sexual exploitation happens is the major contribution of MacKinnon's theory of feminism. According to MacKinnon, male power is clearly sexual. It creates the categories of sex – men and women, though it does not create them equally. It means that the establishment of men/women differences is also the establishment of other kinds of differences such as active/passive, subject/object, dominant/submissive, strong/weak into genders. MacKinnon argues that this classification must be present in any kind of sexual relation. Therefore, by extension, it can be easily said that prostitution as an industry is a pure example of male domination. Prostitution is such an industry

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where women are paid for being subordinate to male sexual demands. MacKinnon expresses this idea in the following way:

> Possession and use of women through the sexualization of intimate intrusion and access to them is a central feature of women's social definition as inferior and feminine (*Toward A Feminist Theory of The State*, 1989, p. 195).

This phrase is used by MacKinnon for pornography, though it is also applicable for the dynamic of prostitution.

For MacKinnon, prostitution is problematic because "it perpetuates the mystification of gendered, hierarchical imperatives of power" (Schotten, p. 218). Here MacKinnon adopts a structuralist Marxist analysis in order to demonstrate gender relations. Prostitution is a clear example of male domination. In prostitution, men are constructing women as subordinate and sexually available to men. This construction as an act of power seems invisible through several modes/forms of naturalization. Here, MacKinnon neatly applies Marx's critique of ideology and mystification to her theory of gender inequality and oppression. Under this structuralist framework, prostitution seems inevitable and totally natural and, in this way, "male domination has succeeded in essentializing its imperatives, thereby rendering women's oppression invisible and masking its own productive power" (Schotten, p. 218).

Unlike MacKinnon, Barry does not support such amoral understanding. Barry has adopted an idea of selfhood that is also sustained human's, or more precisely, women's integrity and capability of agency. She is offering a human rights perspective that conveys that prostitution is wrong because of its sexual exploitation, "it harms the human self and destroys through sex, dehumanizing women" (Barry, 1995, p. 71). Barry takes objectification and violation as synonymous – to treat a person as a body and to treat a person, not as a human being are the same thing. Barry writes:

When the human being is reduced to a body, objectified to sexually service another, whether or not there is consent, violation of the human being has taken place. The human being is the bodied self that human rights are meant to protect and human development is intended to support…In the fullness of human experience, when women are reduced to their bodies, and in the case of sexual exploitation to sexed bodies, they are treated as lesser, as other, and thereby

subordinated. This is sexual exploitation and it violates women's human rights to dignity and equality (pp. 23-24).

That self is degraded or violated through the practice of prostitution is a very common argument and the bedrock claim for anti-prostitution feminism. Although Schotten notes that such a claim leads to a significant problem that the self on which the feminist critic of prostitution is based that seems inexplicable. She notes:

> … it is unclear what else human beings are besides bodies, which would thereby make it illegitimate to treat them as only bodies (or "objects") (Schotten, p. 220).

They have no clear explanation about what human beings are meant without bodies. They also have no clear idea about what self exactly means and thereby it is also unclear what the main problem in treating someone as a mere body or object is. Elaborating on this problem,Schotten adds:

> … we have no account of the self, we can have no idea why objectification is a problematic way of treating someone. If feminist critics do not present an independent account of a self that somehow exceeds or is distinct from the body, the force of their argument remains tautological, not normative – objectification is bad because it has already been defined as violation (Schotten, p. 220).

Here, male domination is defined as a hegemonic gendered discourse. Under this discourse, to be a woman is to be an object. It is quite impossible to consider prostitution not as sexual exploitation of women. Male power creates and determines sexuality and its social meanings. These social meanings are not dependent on individual acknowledgment. Men, women, all kinds of sexual practices are governed by the hegemony discourse of male power. If sex/sexuality/gender is as radically constructed as Barry and MacKinnon propose, then not only women, but men are also constructed by the hegemonic discourse of male power. Even though it is true that men can access more physical, economic, and political power than women, they are not totally excluded from the coercive structure of masculine power. Under male domination, women are subjected to an image that is submissive, violable, passive, and so on. Masculine power may project prostitution as a job for women and also claim female sexual purity, but it also regulates the image of men and projects the idea that male sexual needs are

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more powerful, more urgent than those of women and men are suited to show bodily strength, courage, and sexual aggression. These masculine identifications try to perpetuate the image of men as the clients of prostitutes. Hence, it is important to remember that such characteristics of masculinity that look oppressive by nature are not so natural or intrinsic to men's identity just as being passive, submissive or violable are not so intrinsic or natural to women's identity.

Liberal Feminism

The liberal feminist theory is based on the traditional liberal ideology. According to this ideology, all individuals are autonomous and it also claims minimal state intervention in the private sphere. These ideas help liberal feminism make its ideologies and theories about sex work are dependent. The sex workers have the right and freedom to choose sex work among various options - it is the quintessential component of the liberal feminist theory about sex work. In the case of sex work, sex workers would be free to use their bodies in a way that gives both money and sexual satisfaction. For liberal feminists, sex work is not degradation of women or the male domination over women; rather it is a positive way to empower women personally and economically. Recognition of sex work as empowering and liberating allows them to forsake those social barriers that try to restrict the expression of their sexuality and build a new definition of self that reflects their sexuality.

In contrast to other theories, liberal feminism does not make assumptions about why some women enter into sex work. They argue that women should be free to choose sex work as a career option and society should respect their work. The proponents of liberal feminism argue that sex work could be individually liberating for those women who choose it as a career. Sex work provides both sexual and personally liberating experiences to sex workers.

Liberal feminism presents its argument in the following way:

Throughout history, sex is used to control women. Women's sexuality is repressed. Sex work allows women to reclaim their sexuality. They are free to choose with whom they share their bodies and how they can use their bodies. Some liberal feminists even argue that this awakening experience of sexuality allows women to find out the sensuality and pleasures of their bodies. Sex worker, Veronica Monet claimed,

> [s]ex work has been empowering and liberating for me … I have been able to reclaim my sexuality by becoming aware of my bisexuality and becoming multiply orgasmic (I use [sic] to be nonorgasmic)(Sedition, in*Whores and Other Feminists*, p.221).

Liberal feminists claim that sex work allows women to keep a distinguishable division between love/sex, public/private, or fantasy/reality. These divisions allowwomen to 'enjoy erotic pleasures without the emotional restrictions most women wrestle with' (Teri Goodson, A Prostitute Joins NOW, in *Whores and Other Feminists,*p.251). Most cultures promote a double standard view about sexuality --- on the one hand, this ideology simply denies women avenues to freely express their sexuality, while on the other hand, inducing men to enjoy and explore as much as possible all aspects of their sexuality. This double standard ideology will continue if sex workers, feminists, and pro-prostitute organizations do not firmly organize and demand the privilege of women's sexuality.

Another liberal feminist argument claims that sex work provides economic independence to women. This financial stability has given women a chance to come out of poverty. Sex workers manage to give a sustainable life to themselves and their families. Liberal feminists also argue that economic need is not the sole reason for continuing the sex industry. They notice that women's labor is depreciated altogether, but sex work gives a chance to enjoy financial freedom. Simone de Beauvoir writes,In a world where misery and unemployment prevail, there will be people to enter any profession that is open… It is often asked: why does she choose it [prostitution]? The question is, rather: why has she not chosen it?(*The Second Sex*,p. 530).

Liberal feminism demands laws that allow sex work, but also recognizes that some legal restrictions are necessary. The choice of entering into sex work should not be legally regulated; the laws should regulate or control the act of sex work only where it can cause harm. The laws that are used to control violence, harm, threat, or coercion would be acceptable. As such, liberal feminists promote consensual sex between individuals until no one gets harmed in the act.

As a whole, the liberal feminist approach is the most acceptable approach to sex work. Belinda Cooper applauds the ideology that tries to empower women economically, sexually, personally, and independently. She notes that when society recognizes sex work as work, then much of the stigma associated with it will be removed. However, she does not blindly assert that all women who engage

in sex work encounter the liberating effect of sex work. The author notes that freedom of choice is a fundamental element of individual autonomy. But the author also acknowledges that the concept of choice is not as clear as it seems. In choice-making, many outside factors such as social condition, economic status, education, and personal history may have an influence. If we acknowledge a woman's choice to say no to sex, then we should also acknowledge a woman's choice to say yes to sex. In a larger context, the support for sex workers also conveys the support of choices and rights that all women, in general, make outside the realm of sex work. These rights and choices include the choice or right to have an abortion, the choice or right to be married, etc. To illustrate the importance of this view, pro-prostitute activists wear T-shirts, hold signs with the slogan 'a choice for the prostitute is a choice for all women'.

Contractarian Approach

Lars Ericsson in his article 'Charges against Prostitution: An Attempt at Philosophical Assessment' states that a prostitution contract is a form of employment contract like any other. In this article, he wants to show why a prostitution contract is considered as a legitimate form of employment contract and how a prostitution contract empowers women. In order to establish his view, Ericsson counters the seven most common arguments used against prostitution. These seven arguments are the conventional argument, the sentimentalist argument, the paternalistic argument, the Marxist argument, the commercialisation argument, the argument that prostitutes have a disturbed emotional life, and the feminist argument.

The first charge which Ericsson counters is the conventional moralist claim against prostitution. According to this claim, prostitutes are victims, they choose prostitution only for survival, they are equivalent to sex slaves and they do not get any benefit from prostitution. According to this claim, prostitution is only beneficial for male clients. These claims are mainly made from an anthropological perspective which states that sexual relations are important if they are related to procreation, and sexual relations for pleasure and gratification are regarded as unnecessary. For Ericsson, this claim is outdated because it is based on a pre-modern understanding of human sexuality. According to this understanding, human sexuality only serves the community through procreation and not for individual gratification. Ericsson states that "if two adults voluntarily consent to an economic arrangement concerning sexual activity and this activity takes place

in private, it seems plainly absurd to maintain that there is something intrinsically wrong with it"(p. 338). The same view is also proposed by liberal feminists who state that if prostitution is voluntary and not coerced, then there is nothing morally wrong with it.

The second charge which Ericsson counters is the sentimentalist argument. The sentimentalist argument claims that sex is the physical expression of love and love enhances the quality of sex. According to the sentimentalist perspective, the sex which takes place in prostitution is not of a high standard, and prostitution is considered impoverished, immoral, and impersonal because there is no emotional attachment in the prostitute-client relationship. Ericsson condemns the sentimentalist charge against prostitution. The quality of the sex which takes place between a prostitute and her client is not important. The main concern of the prostitution contract is the mutual benefit to both the parties i.e. the prostitute and the client. As per this contract, the prostitute provides all sexual needs to her client and receives some form of remuneration. According to Ericsson, the best prostitution sex is better than the average marital sex.

The third charge which Ericsson counters is the paternalistic argument. The paternalistic argument states that prostitution is immoral because it creates both physical and mental hazards for prostitutes. Many prostitutes face violence and social stigmatization which are psychologically damaging. Paternalists argue that prostitution is not the best option as a profession and they try to prevent people from becoming prostitutes.Ericsson questions this argument. He says that prostitution cannot be considered immoral because it is considered by others as hazardous. To explain this, Ericsson uses the example of a miner. Like prostitutes, miners face dangerous situations in their workplaces. However, their profession is not condemned by others because of those dangers; instead, their profession is seen as socially valuable and every possible step is taken for minimizing the risk. According to Ericsson, prostitution is not seen as a socially valuable form of work and this leads to a situation where prostitutes face physical harm and social exploitation. For Ericsson, if it is considered that prostitutes are providing a socially valuable service, then society will try to minimize the risks as much as possible.

The fourth charge which Ericsson counters is the Marxist argument against prostitution. The main concern of the Marxist argument is not prostitution, rather it is mainly the institution of wage labour. The Marxist argument states that both

prostitution and wage labour are inhuman and degrading. Prostitutes are more degraded and exploited than wage labourers because prostitutes are selling sex which should not be a part of the capitalist market. Ericsson condemns the Marxist argument and states that the existence of prostitution is not a result of capitalism. Prostitution is a phenomenon that existed even before the emergence of capitalism. Also, prostitution is not a result of capitalism, as it also exists in non-capitalist societies. For this reason, prostitutes cannot be regarded as victims of class. According to Ericsson, women choose prostitution as the best available option from a limited list of options. Ericsson also rejects the view that prostitutes are desperate women who choose prostitution only for economic survival. He focuses on prostitutes' relative agency and argues that prostitution is the most lucrative option available to prostitutes and it might offer them a good standard of income, some sort of autonomy, flexible working hours, etc. For Ericsson, people freely enter into this industry and rationally calculate their benefits.

The fifth charge which Ericsson counters is the commercialisation argument. According to the commercialisation argument, prostitution is strengthening the commercialisation of society because it sells sex that is not available as a commodity.For Ericsson, prostitution is a minor commercial phenomenon in commercial societies. Ericsson argues that there is no causal connection between prostitution and commercialisation. Capitalism is the cause of commercialisation, not prostitution. In order to reduce the commercialisation of society, it is necessary to regulate and break the system of capitalism.

Ericsson's sixth claim counters the argument that prostitutes have a disturbed emotional life. According to this argument, prostitution damages a woman's mental and emotional well-being. Many prostitutes suffer from mental illnesses such as depression, compulsive disorders, self-degradation, and self-destructive tendencies. Therefore, prostitution should be eradicated for the benefit of those women who are involved in this industry. Ericsson argues that the mental and emotional illnesses that prostitutes face are a result of the social stigma against prostitution. These problems are not unique because people from other fields also experience some work-related stress, but these forms of work are not condemned for creating emotional and mental hazards to their workers. Ericsson also states that many prostitutes do not experience emotional problems due to their profession. That is why prostitution should not be criminalized on the ground that it is harmful to workers' emotional well-being.

In the seventh claim, Ericsson counters the feminist charge against prostitution. One of the most important feminist charges against prostitution is that sex and sexuality are closely connected to one's sense of self and when a prostitute sells her sex, she also sells her sense of self and identity. In Ericsson's understanding, a prostitute does not sell herself. She is able to separate her body from her sense of self; it is not the self, but only her body that is involved in the prostitution act. She actually gets paid for her time and skills. Another feminist claim against prostitution is that prostitutes are objectified by their clients. However, Ericsson argues that the prostitute and the client both use each other as a means. The client uses the prostitute for getting sexual pleasure and the prostitute also uses the client for receiving some kind of benefits.Individuals have the right to decide the benefits for themselves. According to the contractarian viewpoint, prostitution is a free choice. For Ericsson, a prostitution contract is a reciprocal contract where both parties freely enter and get some mutual benefits.

Conclusion:

I have shown three contemporary opinions that deal with sex work. Sex work should be decriminalized or legalized. Here, liberal feminism and the Contractarian approach is the most acceptable approach to sex work. Even if sex work is decriminalized and run under the control of women instead of patriarchy, the image of a woman as a sex worker will not change very soon. However, decriminalization or legalization makes sex work less abusive. It is not risk-free work. It has its own unique risks, and legalization or decriminalization of sex work is a step in the right direction to protect sex workers from such harm. It provides more protection, visibility, legal accessibility, and better legal representation to sex workers without imposing any moral parameters. Decriminalization or legalization offers a better situation where sex workers are empowered and get proper recognition for their social and economic contributions. Hopefully, this empowerment will help sex workers to break the patriarchy-created image of women in sex work.

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MYSTICISM: WITTGENSTEIN AND ADVAITA VEDANTA

AVIJIT GHOSH

The main contention of this paper is to explain the concept of mysticism with special reference to Wittgenstein and Advaita Vedanta. Thus in a sense, it is a comparātive study in nature between Wittgenstein and Advaita Vedanta. The concept of mysticism is a tricky philosophical concept of which there we find different philosophical interpretations. Many would say that mysticism is a bogus philosophical issue and it has no point of justification in the realm of philosophy. Some others would say that mysticism is philosophically worthy and the meaning of life as well as the value of the world is actually associated with the mystical nature of thinking. Mysticism occupies significant philosophical areas both in Wittgenstein as well as in Advaita Vedanta. Therefore, a contrast and comparison between Wittgenstein and Advaita Vedanta is worthy in philosophy. Simultaneously, it would be a stupendous task to find the meeting point between Wittgenstein and Advaita Vedanta. Therefore, the task at hand is very challenging. In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein clearly asserts that what is mystical is inexpressible because it cannot be put into language. Accordingly, it can be said after Wittgenstein that what cannot be put into language would be treated as mystical. This does not make sense to say that p implies q entails q implies p. To make this point clear one has to know what does Wittgenstein actually mean. The term 'language' plays a vital role here. Wittgenstein had a different nature of language altogether. Here one has to understand language as 'my language'. Having said if we go beyond 'my language', then, of course, p implies q may not entail q implies p. So there is no point of saying that the logical principle of Transposition is vitiated here. Accordingly, ethics, religion, aesthetics, and in short what lies outside 'my language' is mystical for Wittgenstein. In Advaita Vedanta, what is mystical is Brahman. Brahman is unqualified. The very nature of Brahman is sat-cit-ananda svarupa. It is not the quality of Brahman; rather it is the very nature of Brahman. The paper makes a conscious effort to find the meeting point based on mystical aspects of Wittgenstein and Advaita Vedanta. Keywords: mysticism, the meaning of life, sat, cit, ananda, value, Brahman, world

The prologue

The term *mysticism* comes from the Greek word '*μύω múō*', which means "to close" or "to conceal". It has different historical meanings and has Ancient Greek origins. In early and medieval Christianity the term mysticism was used to refer to different dimensions such as spiritual, biblical, liturgical, etc. If we look at the early modern period then we will see that the definition of mysticism includes an ample range of beliefs and ideologies and these beliefs and ideologies were related to extraordinary or unnatural experiences and states of mind. During modern times, mysticism was used *to mean the union with the Infinite, Absolute, or God*. Therefore, it can be said that the realization of the Absolute, Infinite, or God is recognized as mystical experience i.e. *the key element of mysticism*. This mystical experience is certainly different from our ordinary experience which is based on this mundane world. If we take the

term mysticism in its broad sense then it can be said that in all religious traditions mysticism must be there; because without mysticism no religion is possible. In other words, all religions are ultimately based on mysticism. Say for example, in indigenous religions and folk religions, in organized religions such as Abrahamic faiths and Indian religions even in modern spirituality, etc. During the thirteenth century, the term mysticism (*unio mystica*) was used to mean the sublimation or rapture, spiritual marriage i.e. the understanding or realization of the prayer. With the view of Romanticism, in the nineteenth century, this 'union' came to be known as a religious experience that provides firm conviction that something is the case i.e. the God or a transcendental reality. William James was a proponent of such type of understanding, who said that in mystic states we both become one with the Absolute and we become aware of our oneness. This is called a religious experience according to William James. In the sixteen and seventeenth centuries, the term mysticism was used as a substantive that was new discourse by which science and religion were separated. By the middle of the 17th century, the term 'mystical' was used to separate religion from natural philosophy as the two distinct enterprises aiming to discover the hidden meaning of the universe. The traditional writings of different saints or the writings of the lives of saints became denominated as 'mystical', moving from the virtues and miracles to extraordinary feelings or experiences, states of mind and as an upshot of this, created a newly coined 'mystical tradition'. A new appreciation had emerged of the Divine within the human beings, an essence beyond the diversity of religious appearances or expressions. There are various definitions of mysticism. St. Thomas Aquinas defines mysticism "as *cognition deo experimentalis* as the knowledge of God through experience."[i] Distinguishing two aspects of mysticism-theoretical and practical, William Ernest Hocking says, "The term 'mysticism' has come to mean two distinct things in the occident-a theory of reality and a doctrine regarding how the human individual may gain union with reality.[ii]

Wittgenstein on Mysticism

Wittgenstein's notion of *nonsense* or mysticism belongs to the other side of the world. Wittgenstein had a particular dream to fulfil and that is why he made his articulated world. He gave its name 'My Language and My World'. Now, what does Wittgenstein mean by my language and my world? According to Wittgenstein, *my language and my world* is called the sense of the world or meaningful world which he determines in terms of the proposition. Now the question what about the other side of the world? For Wittgenstein what lies on the other side of my language and my world is called the *nonsensical world*

which is opposite to the sensible world. According to Wittgenstein, what lies outside the world cannot be put into words. As it cannot be put into words, it is mystical. In this regard, Wittgenstein in his book *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* says *"it is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists."*[iii] But the question is how does it exist? How do we come to know that it exists? It is difficult to answer because what is mystical is inexpressible and cannot be put into words. For Wittgenstein, mysticism arises when the world is conceived as a limited whole. He then says, "Feeling the world as a limited whole-it is this that is mystical."[iv] Therefore, no question can be raised about what is mystical and no answer can be given against the question about mysticism because neither the question nor the answer can be put into words. That is why Wittgenstein remarks in *Tractatus* "what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence."[v]

Vedanta on Mysticism

Advaita Vedanta is a philosophy that can be taken as an Indian way of life and Advaita philosophy also leaves to every human being a wide spectrum of real usefulness. There is no other such type of philosophical school in Indian philosophy like that of Advaita Vedanta i.e. *so alive and resonant*. Vedanta philosophy has been playing an important role since *Upanisadic* times by providing the right direction or approach of the worldview of Indians. Advaita Vedanta is a philosophy that is ultimately based on mysticism. The utmost aim of an Advaitin is to attain *brahmanubhava*, which is nothing but the culmination of mystical experience. This is called "pure or authentic experience" that is also known as "the nature of *Brahman*," i.e. the ultimate reality. *Brahamanubhava* characterized as pure consciousness is free from all kinds of differences and distinctions. It is also considered timeless and uncaused and hence it is the nature of *Brahman*. *Brahmanubhava* does not bring into existence any change anywhere. That means reality remains the same before and after it is realized, only the experience of it changes or differs. Before its realization, one can see the difference and hence undergo from bondage and suffering.

According to Advaita Vedanta, '*Brahman*' is the only Reality. It is considered absolutely indeterminate and non-dual in nature. *Brahman* is beyond our speech and mind. It is inexpressible because no description of Brahman can be complete. The best possible description of it can be given through the negative formula of '*neti neti'* or 'not this, not this. Although *Brahman* cannot be an abyss of non-entity, it is considered as the supreme self and stands self-revealed as the background of all affirmations and negation. The moment we

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try to grasp this *Brahman* in the categories of our intellect or when we try to make this ultimate subject as an object of our thought then we slip the essential or indispensable nature of Brahman. Then we cannot consider it as unconditioned consciousness, rather it becomes conditioned as it were. This Brahman reflected in or conditioned through *maya,* is called *Ishvara* or God. Therefore God is the personal aspect or a particular part of the impersonal Brahman. For Advaita Vedanta this is the most celebrated distinction between God or *Ishvara* and the Absolute which Sankara made following the *Upanisads.* According to Advaita Vedanta, *Ishvara* is also known as *Apara Brahman* or lower *Brahman* as contradicted with the unconditioned *Brahman* known as *Para Brahman* or Higher *Brahman*. In the Advaitic scheme of things, so long as we are the members of the workaday or practical world, we are not at all released from complying with the practicalities. Therefore the world is real enough and that is the result of *maya* which tries to make all our efforts and actions meaningful. In this regard, R. Balasubramanian has rightly observed, "The Advaitin is second to none in emphasizing the value and significance of the empirical realm (*vyavaharika*) in all aspects of our business of life – economic and social, culture and spiritual."[vi] Hence, *Brahman* is pure consciousness. Brahman like mystical is self-luminous that shows itself. It is the Unqualified Absolute like mystical. Thus Advaita represents the culmination of mysticism.

Meeting points between Wittgenstein and Advaita Vedanta

After analyzing the nature of mysticism in the light of Wittgenstein and Advaita Vedanta respectively, I sense that their views are a bit less similar in nature about mysticism. That is why it is said that from the mysterious nature of the mystical, the conception of mysticism arises. It is observed, "Wittgenstein's philosophical vision has been influenced by Vedanta thanks to his close affinity with Schopenhauer."[vii] As we know that Wittgenstein was an Austrian linguistic philosopher whereas Advaita Vedanta is an Indian philosophical school. So their concept of philosophy must be different from each other. Therefore, it would be a stupendous task to find the meeting points between Wittgenstein and Advaita Vedanta. Hence, the task at hand is very challenging. Although there are considerable differences in their philosophical views as reflected after analyzing their philosophical views, still I foresee some meeting points which are as follows:

According to Wittgenstein, "The very existence of the world, is mystical."[viii] The secret of the mystical lies in the way of our look at the world. Wittgenstein calls it "to view the world *sub specie aeterni.*"[ix] This means

seeing the world as a form of eternal reality. Similarly, as we have already seen above the notion of seeing things *sub specie aeternitatis* has been essential to the Advatic way of looking at things. It is shown that this notion plays an important role in Sankara's view of the self and the world. For Wittgenstein, the final answer to the problems of life is god, who is identified with the meaning of life and also of the world. Wittgenstein subscribes that the meaning of life is entwined with the metaphysical subject. Even a full-length treatment of the world in speech and writing cannot capture the essence of it all. Such a subject is essentially beyond the world of facts. All this is mystical i.e. beyond the reach of *reason and science*. What is mystical cannot be put into words. Like Wittgenstein, it seems nowadays from an Indian disciple of Ayer. He believed in the existence of the supersensible reality- the other world and God-but he maintained that it cannot be expressed in language. Wittgenstein's view is that the urge to the mystical comes when science fails to satisfy our wishes. Similar is the story about science in Advaita Vedanta. Vedantins are also of the view that science cannot fully satisfy our life or cannot solve the problem of life. The meaning of life cannot be fulfilled by science. This can only be satisfied or fulfilled by the realization of the mystical or Brahman. In this regard, S. Radhakrishnan remarks, "Man's incapacity to be satisfied with what is merely relative and remains permanently within the boundaries of the finite and empirical reality cannot be denied. Mans stands before the shrine of his own mystery. He enters it the moment he becomes aware of his own eternity."[x]

Like an Advaitin, Wittgenstein also speaks of the scientific worldview as an illusion. According to him, the whole modern conception of the world is the creation of an illusion. If we look at Vedanta we will see that the world is created by *maya* and it is nothing but an illusion. For Advaita Vedanta, it is neither *sat* like Brahman, nor *asat* like sky flower. It is called *maya* or illusion. In this sense, the world is an illusion because it is the creation of *maya*. For Wittgenstein, "...the illusion is that the so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena."[xi] This means that "people today stop at the laws of nature, treating them as something inviolable... the modern system tries to make it look as if everything were explained."[xii] But the view of the ancients is clearer in so far as they have a clear and acknowledge terminus. This also shows that Wittgenstein has a leaning towards the world view of the ancients rather than that of the moderns. Wittgenstein has suggested that a real explanation of the world is not possible within the confines of factually or natural laws or scientific laws. Hence, Wittgenstein remarks, "The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time."[xiii] In the same

way, Vedanta thinks that only the knowledge of the Brahman or mystical is the solution to the riddle of life which lies outside space and time.

For Wittgenstein, the problems of life are very different from the problems of science. He says, "We feel even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched."[xiv] The distinction between the problem of science and the problems of life parallels with the *Upanisadic* distinction between *para vidya* and *apara vidya*. "In the *Upanisadic* tradition of India the distinction between a wisdom which is only of the world, of "all this", and a quest which is concerned with insight into a higher dimension has been made since the historical beginning of Indian thought."[xv] *Mundaka Upanisad* makes this distinction very clearly. It says that there are two kinds of knowledge to be acquired, as indeed the knower of Brahman declares the higher *(para)* and the lower (*apara)*. *Para vidya* has the ultimate reality as its content, whereas the content of *apara vidya* is the phenomenal world.[xvi] Similarly, as an Indian, Wittgensteinian of repute has pointed out, "Wittgenstein declares that science represents the lower level of the intellectual life of man because it only attempts at a mere description of things. It cannot go beyond the phenomenal world in search of the ultimate meaning of the world."[xvii] So in that sense science must be regarded as *apara vidya* which cannot go beyond the phenomenal world in search of the ultimate meaning of the world i.e. mystical which must be considered as *para vidya* that is the ultimate reality.

Wittgenstein's conception of mystical is intimately related to his idea of God. Wittgenstein remarks: "How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher. God does not reveal himself in the world."[xviii] It seems to mean that Wittgenstein's God does not express himself in terms of any fact whatever. But, he is revealed in the "feeling the world as a limited whole"[xix] which is surely not a fact at all. A great deal of what Wittgenstein wrote about God in the *Notebooks* and the *Tractatus* indicates "a radical departure from the Christian concept of God."[xx] Wittgenstein's God is not a personal one, almost in the Spinozistic manner.[xxi] If God were personal, he would have been contingent like any other fact of the world. God like Brahman is the ultimate reality and the supreme value *(sat-cit-ananda)* and so he belongs to what is higher. So according to Wittgenstein, the meaning of life i.e. the meaning of the world we can call God, and pray is to think about the meaning of life. Thus Wittgenstein's God is very close to Advaitic *Brahman* in many ways. Another important point that should mention here is that "the transcendence of God" of Wittgenstein's early philosophy can be easily understood in terms of the difference in perspective (*drstibheda*) as

propounded in Advaita Vedanta. From the standpoint of the enlightened (*paramarthika drsti*), Wittgenstein's conception of God can be understood as the transcendental *Brahman*. According to *Chandogya Upanisad* from the transcendental standpoint, this whole world in substance is nothing but Brahman.

Further, for Advaita Vedanta, *Brahman* is *anirvacaniya*. Similarly, Wittgenstein's mystical is "inexpressible". For Wittgenstein, we cannot put into words anything about mystical, and any attempt to say anything about them leads into the result of non-sense. Regarding this non-sense Wittgenstein remarks, "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence."[xxii] It seems to mean that both try to talk of the ineffable. Now, "it is clear," as puts an Indian disciple of Ayer, "that he believed in the existence of the super sensible reality-the other world and God-but he maintained that it cannot be expressed in language."[xxiii] Similarly, in the words of William James, "the handiest of the marks by which we can characterize a mystical experience that it defies expression that no adequate report of its content can be given in words."[xxiv]

According to Wittgenstein, "mystical" shows itself and Advaitin speaks of *Brahman* as *svayam-prakasavan*. So, both of them can be characterized as self-luminous. Hence, Wittgenstein said that what cannot be said can be shown. In this regard, Wittgenstein remarks in his book *Tractatus*, "There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical."[xxv] In this regard K.S. Murty has rightly observed: "while no description is possible of *Brahman*, the task of Vedanta is to teach about it and so logically speaking, it is an impropriety, but only in this way can the Vedanta emphasizes the mystery of *Brahman*, which eludes all objective language; and yet it can be dealt with only in the way if *Brahman* has to be talked about intelligibly."[xxvi] Another important meeting point that should mention here is that Wittgenstein's mystical and Advaitic *Brahman* can be described as "the ladder". It seems to mean that Wittgenstein's concept of nonsensical is neither true nor false, yet it is illuminating. It is like "the ladder", which helps one to "see the world aright". Similarly, according to Y. Mashi, the whole of Advaitic philosophy has been likened to a ladder that helps one to achieve the goal of *Brahman* realization. ...Here all kinds of philosophical reasoning, are for attaining the highest end.[xxvii] They are like crutches used by a lame man or a staircase for taking one to a certain destination.

Here, Brain McGuinness's paper on Wittgenstein's "mysticism" is extensively useful. He maintains: "Wittgenstein holds that there is a feeling which may be called *das Mystiche*, an inexpressible feeling to have had, which to have solved the problem of life: those who have had it feel that they know something but cannot put it into words (*Tractatus* 6.522)."[xxviii] Similarly, the *Brahman* of Advaita Vedanta is inexpressible (*anirvacanīya*). From the worldly point of view, *brahmanubhava* is known as liberation (*moksa*). It is the solution to all bondage and suffering. McGuinness adds further, "...the second was the mystic's conviction of the unity and indivisibility of reality, which is surely parallel with the Wittgenstein's description of mysticism as 'viewing or feeling the world as a limited whole.'"[xxix] This is nothing but what Vedanta calls *advaitanubhava*, the experience of oneness with reality or the unity of all existence. In this regard, Wittgenstein says, "The honest religious thinker is a tight-rope walker. It almost looks as though he were walking nothing but air. His support is the slenderest imaginable. And yet it really is possible to walk."[xxx] Here, Wittgenstein's philosophy surely shows strong affinities with Advaita Vedanta.

From the aforesaid discussion i.e. *advaitanubhava* or also called one world soul according to Wittgenstein, the notion of self comes into existence. Wittgenstein in his books *Tractatus* and *Notebooks* mentioned about two types of self - *The metaphysical self* or *Philosophical I* and the *Psychological self* or *Empirical self.* These two types of self play an important role in his early philosophy. The notion of metaphysical self comes into existence in his early philosophy through the notion of solipsism. Hence Wittgenstein says, "What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that 'the world is my world.'"[xxxi] Regarding the notion of the metaphysical self, Wittgenstein again remarks, "The subject does not belong to the world: rather it is a limit of the world."[xxxii] Now the question what does Wittgenstein mean by the term 'limit' concerning the metaphysical self? By the term, 'limit' Wittgenstein intends to convey that this 'limit' is the condition of the world. It is a condition because it helps one to see the world aright way. In other words, it is the 'limit' because it tries to capture the notion of totality or totality of all possible thoughts. We cannot go beyond it and that is the limit. In this regard, Wittgenstein says that the self is the boundary (not a part) of the world. In this way, metaphysical subject or self differs from the empirical self and it is concerned with psychology. The empirical self, according to Wittgenstein, is understood as a complex collection of thoughts and this is a feature of all empirical understanding of the self, including those of human beings, the human body, and the human soul with which psychology deals. Therefore, the psychological self only expresses

worldly states of affairs which are also called the world of *maya* according to Advaita Vedanta.

Similarly in the philosophy of Advaita Vedanta, we find the same distinction between *atman* and *jiva* which is very much similar to the distinction between two types of self cited above by Wittgenstein. The *Mundaka Upanisad* tells us about the two bards dwelling in the same tree of which one is eating the sweet fruit and the other is looking on without eating (III. i.1). As S. Radhakrishnan has said, "the former is the empirical self and the latter transcendental self." The "personality," which we take "to be our most intimate and deepest possession," is nothing but "a sort of psychological being that answers to our name, is reflected in the looking-glass (*nama-rupa*)."[xxxiii] Thus the Wittgensteinian distinction between the "metaphysical self" and the "empirical self" is reminiscent of the similar distinction made in Advaita Vedanta between *atman* and *jiva.* Like a *Upanisadic* seer, Wittgenstein says, "the philosophical I is not the human being, not the human body or the human soul with the psychological properties, but the boundary (not a part) of the world. The human body, however, my body, in particular, is a part of the world among others, stones, etc."[xxxiv] Here Wittgenstein gives an important insight that is very much akin to the Vedantik way: "whoever realizes this will not want to procure a pre-eminent place for his body or the human body. He will regard humans and animals quite naively as objects which are similar and which belong together."[xxxv] This is very close to the vision of a *pure seer*. As *Gita* says that one who sees Me in everything and sees all things in Me-I do not go out of my vision, and he also is not lost to My vision (BG, 6.30). Similarly in the words of Sankara: That man of realization does not get to Me, to *Vasudeva*, because of the identity between him and Me, for that which is called one's own self is surely dear to one, and since it is I alone who am the seer of the unity of the self in all (BGSB, 6.30). It can be said that Wittgenstein's approach is not different from Advaitins view of life and the world. As Brain McGuinness remarked, "One who has this insight does not identify himself with the physiological or psychological properties and life of a particular human being. The higher or metaphysical self is identical with the whole world."[xxxvi]

Another important parallel between Wittgenstein and Advaita Vedanta concerning self is that Wittgenstein's metaphysical self is very much akin to Advaitic conception of *saksin* (witness). According to Advaita Vedanta, *saksin* as the ultimate witness has an intermediary role between *Brahman* or *atman* and *jiva*. Though it is pure consciousness like the mystical of Wittgenstein, it maintains the unity among various experiences of the subject. As the *saksin*

plays the role of the pure witness of Advaita Vedanta, in the same way, the metaphysical self of Wittgenstein plays the role of ultimate witness. It can never be an object of experience. Here Wittgenstein's point is that our object of experience is a part of the world but the subject never belongs to the world. Therefore, it cannot be an object of our knowledge. That is why Wittgenstein said, "The I is not an object. I objectively confront every object. But not the I."[xxxvii] Further, Wittgenstein said in his *Notebooks* that the status of self concerning the world of experience is like the case of the eye and the visual field. Therefore, here we find close affinities between them.

There is yet another even later remark of Wittgenstein that conspicuously brings us back to the " mystical" of the *Notebooks* and the *Tractatus*: For a human being eternal, the consequential is often hidden behind the impenetrable veil. He knows: "there is something under there, but he cannot see it; the veil reflects the daylight."[xxxviii] Here Wittgenstein wanted to convey that a veil often hides the eternal from the sight of the human by reflecting the light and this clearly presents the method and substance of Advaita Vedanta. In Vedantic terminology, *the veil* is similar to *maya*, which not only hides (*avarana*) the eternal (*Brahman*) from the sight of a human being (*jiva*), but it also reflects the daylight and presents the eternal reality as a phenomenal world.

Concluding Remarks

Thus it seems to me that there are some hidden similarities between Wittgenstein and Advaita Vedanta. To me, Wittgenstein distinguishes material culture from spiritual culture. He then explicitly expresses his sympathy for the latter. Here Wittgenstein said that the foundation of spiritual culture was eternal values that constitute the core of the spiritual culture of mankind and can lead mankind in the right direction. This is in consonance with the spirit of Indian philosophy. Spiritual culture is the hallmark of Indian philosophy in general and Advaita Vedanta philosophy in particular. This brings Wittgenstein naturally near Advaita Vedanta. I have also seen that both Wittgenstein and Vedanta are not against science as such, but they are only against scientism. They opposed the scientific mentality which claims that science can explain everything and this is the decline of culture. Religion is faith-based on admission and it cannot be proved by science or scientific mentality. There is no relevance of religious epistemology in religion. Wittgenstein wanted to keep religion free from science but at the same time, he did not give any religious color to science. He did not accept any intrusion of science into religion but for him intrusion of religion into science was

welcome. According to Wittgenstein, religion is manifested through the belief and practices of the religious people.

Another important point I should mention here is that when Wittgenstein was talking about culture, he defined culture as a big organization that assigns each of its members a place where he can work in the spirit of the whole. It seems to mean that Wittgenstein has his concern for the welfare of mankind or he had an enormous influence across humanities. Similarly, Advaita Vedanta is not so much teaching (philosophy) as it is practice (experiential knowledge). It concerns the life of a human being and humankind as it is. Therefore, both of them giving emphasize on humanitarian worldview. Wittgenstein was a religious person from this perspective, but not from a conventional sense. Regarding this humanitarian worldview of both these philosophers, B. Kar said: "The man is viewed in essence as not different from Brahman. The expressions like *ekatmabodha* and *sarvabhutantaratma,* seem to have a clear suggestion that Advaita Vedanta is never set at the background of transcending socio-empiric human predicament. It is vitally rooted in human concerns and its primary and sole aim is to attain the welfare of the human society without any division or discrimination (*santa mahanto nivasanti santo vasantavallokahitam carantah, Vivekacudamani,* 1.39)."[xxxix]

Moreover, Wittgenstein asserts that what is mystical is inexpressible; likewise Advaita Vedanta asserts that what is *Brahma* (mystical) is ineffable *(anirvacaniya)*. For Wittgenstein, scientism cannot give us the true picture of the real world, very similar way Advaita Vedanta says what science asserts, it asserts something in the world of *maya* in the real sense of the term. Thus, it can be concluded by saying after Wittgenstein and Advaita Vedanta that 'the solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time'. Therefore from the meeting points between Wittgenstein and Advaita Vedanta, it can be said that these philosophers aim to attain the meaning of life i.e. the realization of Brahman or Mystical. Now the question: what is the way to achieve this meaning of life? What does happy life mean? Here happiness does not indicate any hedonistic doctrines rather living happily means 'doing the will of god'. That is why Wittgenstein said to live happily I must agree with the world and that is what 'being happy' means. Hence, Wittgenstein remarks, "I am then, so to speak, in agreement with that alien will on which I appear dependent. That is to say: I am doing the will of God."[xl] Therefore living happily is very much akin to stoicism. It seems to mean that the recipe for living happily is to accept the world and whatever ills it may throw at us; not to rage against our sufferings and our pains but to acquiesce in them. This kind of living a happy life is also akin to the life of s*thith prajn*a, *bodhisattva,*

jivan- mukta in Advaita Vedanta. Therefore in living such kind of happy life Mystical or Brahman will appear itself. That is why Wittgenstein said they make themselves manifest. They are what is called mystical. So the meaning of life cannot be expressed, it is what Wittgenstein calls 'a mystical feeling' which can also be considered as the aesthetic feeling. That is why Wittgenstein remarks, "the work of art is the object seen *sub specie aeternitatis*," and "the good life is the world seen *sub specie aeternitatis*"[xli] And once this feeling is achieved, one will understand the "only one world soul"[xlii] This is nothing but what Vedanta calls *advaitanubhava*, the experience of oneness with reality or the unity of all existence.

Therefore, it can be concluded by saying that what is mystical is completely devoid of factual sense or no factual content can be ascribed to a mystical experience. It is quite impossible to grasp the mystical or its expression within language. Any attempt to capture them in language leads to the result of Non-sense according to Wittgenstein. That is why Wittgenstein said what cannot be said can be shown within the existence of world or existence of a form of life or in a language game because any kind of spiritual activity indicates spiritual practice and any kind of practice is taken place within the forms of life by using ordinary language. So when we are doing spiritual practice, we are doing it within the religious form of life by religious language game. So according to me, if we interpret Sankara by Wittgenstein or vice versa then there is nothing wrong. From the aforesaid discussion one may raise a question was Wittgenstein influenced by Advaita Vedanta? In reply to this question, it can be said that so far as I know, Wittgenstein was not influenced by Advaita Vedanta. He has never gone through or read any Vedantic literature. We have no evidence of direct reference of Wittgenstein by Advaita Vedanta. In this regard, G.H. Von Wright remarks, "One can look for similarities which need have nothing to do with "influence but which may nevertheless illuminate the objects of comparison."[xliii] It seems that Wittgenstein's philosophy has some important similarities with Advaita Vedanta, which cannot escape from our attention. As an Indian Wittgensteinian has observed, "Wittgenstein's philosophical vision has been influenced by Vedanta thanks to his close affinity with Schopenhauer."[xliv] Therefore it can be concluded by following Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* that there are similarities, dissimilarities, criss-cross, overlapping, sometimes overall similarities between the philosophy of Wittgenstein and Advaita Vedanta. In other words, the kinship is just as undeniable as the difference. Of course, one thing should not forget that Wittgenstein has been regarded as a linguistic philosopher and has attempted

to cognize everything from the point of language. He takes language as a philosophical method. This position is completely foreign to the philosophy of Advaita Vedanta.

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ON   PHENOMENALISM: A CRITICAL ANLYSIS

B. ANANDA SAGAR

In this paper, my aim is to analyze the theory of phenomenalism and its basic assumptions in the philosophies of Berkeley, Russell and Ayer. I will also analyze the way phenomenalism and its sense-datum theory has been opposed by Austin and Strawson. My main argument is that phenomenalism as a theory of reduction of the objects to sense-data can never be sustained because no such reduction is possible and that we can never give up the conceptual system in which the material bodies and persons are primary particulars.

Keywords: Phenomenalism, Sense-data, Skepticism, Knowledge, Certainty, Reductionism.

I

Phenomenalism is the philosophical theory which reduces reality to phenomena. There is no reality over and above the reality of phenomena. There is, therefore, no distinction between appearance *and* reality. Appearances are numerically identical with reality. Phenomenon is what appears. Sense-data are phenomenal entities: they are constitutive of phenomena. Berkeley without his God is supposed to be a phenomenalist. Russell too would be a phenomenalist, if he gives up his view about the public physical reality. Moore and Price would be phenomenalists if they gave up their views concerning the *physical* occupants. Other than the Vienna circle philosophers, Ayer is the only important philosopher of the English-speaking world who is committed to phenomenalism.

Consider Berkeley's case. Berkeley remarked that "the table I write on, I say, exists; that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study, I should say it existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it."[1] In this passage Berkeley explains the existence of the table in terms of his perceptions, his seeing and feeling. He further explains the existence of an unperceived table in terms of his possible perceptions and the possible perceptions of other persons like him. So, Berkeley has reduced the existence of a material table to the existence of actual and possible perceptions. Consider now his second remark, "The question whether the earth moves or not amounts in reality to no more than this, to wit, whether we have reason to conclude…that if we were placed in… such or such a position and distance, both from the earth and sun, we should perceive the former to move among the choir of the planets…"[2] Not only the physical bodies but also their movement, i.e., the occurrence of their movement, depends on our perceptions. Berkeley reduces the existence of

physical reality to the reality of the self' and its actual and possible perceptions. Of course, in Berkeley's philosophy, God plays a major role. In the absence of the human perception Berkeley makes an appeal to God's perception. We have quoted from Berkeley by avoiding his God. But we could not avoid the use of 'I', i.e., the owner of perceptions. Berkeley's use of 'idea' for perceptions makes essential the existence of the *owner* of ideas. The invention of sense-datum in place of 'idea' has this superiority that it requires no owner. While criticizing Descartes, Russell pointed out that 'I' is superfluous in reporting about the existence of a sense-datum. Saying 'there is a colour-patch' would do where Berkeley would have said; 'I see a colour-patch'. Superiority of 'sense-datum' over 'idea' consists in the fact that ideas require the existence of those who have them. But sense-data are neutral. They require neither the physical objects nor the spiritual perceivers. A consistent phenomenalist would reject everything that lies behind the phenomenon, be it a human self or a material not-self. As Mundle points out, "All types of entities other than sense-data are dismissed as 'fiction' or 'logical constructions'. Phenomenalists could, and perhaps should, retain minds to be aware of, and to interpret, sense-data; but usually they have deemed minds to be a theoretical luxury, talk about which is to be analyzed, like talk about tables, in terms of talk about sense-data."[3] So a phenomenalist rejects the commonsense view that distinguishes us from tomatoes and cigarette cases. We are supposed to have a self--whatever its interpretation--which is lacking in the case of a tomato or a cigarette case. And when it is said that a tomato or a cigarette case does not possess a self what is meant is merely our ordinary commonsense view. It is not denied that a philosopher may come to discover a self even in a tomato or a cigarette case. For Leibniz a tomato shared in having a self with a human being. A phenomenalist stands on the other pole. For him a human being is not very unlike a tomato. Both lack self. According to Ayer a self is a "logical construct out of sense-experience."[4] And Ayer explains the nature of sense-experiences in terms of 'sense-contents'. The term 'sense-content' stands for what is commonly known as 'sense-datum'. This becomes clear from Ayer's remarks on Berkeley's use of the term 'idea'. He writes, " we replace the word 'idea' in this usage by the neutral word 'sense-content' which we shall use to refer to the immediate data not merely of 'outer' but also of 'introspective sensation', and say that what Berkeley discovered was that material things must be definable in terms of sense-contents."[5] So Ayer's analysis of self involves three other terms for explanation, viz, 'self-content', 'sense-experience' and 'logical construction'. Concerning the relationship between the former two terms, if a sense-content is not taken as a part of a sense-experience, it has to

be taken as an object of the latter. And to accept the former as an object of the latter is to accept the legitimacy of the act-object analysis of sense-experiences.

According to Ayer, such an analysis cannot be legitimate, for it involves the metaphysical assumption of *acts* of experience. Such an assumption could be granted, with suitable formulation, if sense-experiences failed to be explained without it. But sense-experiences can be successfully explained without it, and hence this assumption has to be rejected. Now, if a sense-content is a part of a sense-experience, then the relation of the former to the latter is that which holds between a part and the corresponding whole. This relation cannot be the same as the relation of the former to a logical construction. As Ayer says, "….When we refer to an object as a logical construction out of certain sense-contents, we are not saying … that the sense-contents are in any way parts of it."[6] So Ayer means that when certain sense-contents enter as *parts* into the construction of an object, the object is a non-logical construction out of them, whereas when they do not enter as parts into the construction of an object-though in some sense, they are able to construct the object in question, then the object is a logical construction out of them. This implies that sense-contents have two different relations to their objects. Their relation to an experience is different from their relation to a logical construction. Let us describe these relations as 'being the parts of' and 'being the elements of'. Thus sense-contents are *parts* of an experience but *elements* of a logical construction. This is supposed to imply that the notion of 'logical construction' is not applicable either to a sense-content or to a sense-experience. As Ayer says, "…. one cannot significantly speak of a sense-experience, which is a whole composed of sense-contents, or of a sense-content itself as if it were a logical construction out of sense-contents."[7] A sense-experience, therefore, can be described as a non-logical construction out of certain sense-contents.

Ayer wishes to remain Humean with a difference. For Hume the human self is as much a fiction as a physical tomato, he therefore reduces both of them into the occurrences of experiences. The only difference is that the human self involves in its construction certain experiences which are not involved in the construction of tomatoes and cigarette cases. For example, pleasure and pain are not ascribed to tomatoes and cigarette cases. They are ascribed only to the human self. Ayer wishes to give the sense content analysis to both human selves and tomatoes, yet also wishes to distinguish them. If tomatoes and cigarette cases are the logical constructs out of sense-contents, then the human self too should be the logical construction out of sense-contents. Consistency

demands it. Like Hume, Ayer considers self as a logical construction out of sense-experiences. And a sense-experience for him is a non-logical construct out of sense-contents. Sense-contents are parts of sense-experiences. One would feel that if self is a logical construction out of sense-experiences, it would mean the same as saying it is a logical construction out of sense-contents. Ayer has introduced a qualitative difference between sense-contents. The sense-contents which are parts of sense-experiences have to be distinguished from these sense-contents which are no such parts. Sense-contents which create the fictions of tomatoes and cigarette cases are not parts of experiences. If they are parts of experiences, then tomatoes and cigarette cases would become conscious. It is only in the case of the human self that sense-contents are parts of experiences. But in making them such parts the neutrality of sense -content is given up. To retain their neutrality, the sense-experiences themselves would become neutral, thereby converting the human self into a tomato or a cigarette-case. If a human self is not like a tomato or a cigarette case, then the neutrality of sense-content has to be given up. They would become subjective.

Though Ayer does not accept that sense experiences are logical constructions, for the sake of consistency he would very well have accepted that sense experiences are logical constructions out of sense-contents. Logical constructions can be arranged in a hierarchical order--primary logical constructions, secondary logical constructions and so on. Sense-contents may be taken as the elements of a primary logical construction. And by saying that an object is a primary logical construction it is meant that its elements themselves are not logical constructions. Following this convention one can define a sense-content as simple, in the sense that it cannot be analyzed further. It can be taken as the basic epistemological unit. And if a logical construction is a complex---if it can be analyzed further--then the sense-contents would be excluded from being logical constructions. To be logical constructions, sense-contents are required to be complex, which they are not. But none of these assumptions is applicable to the case of a sense-experience, for a sense-experience is complex because it is a whole 'composed of sense-contents'. It is possible to maintain that a self is a higher order logical construction of which the elements, i.e., experiences, themselves are logical constructions out of sense-contents. Self can be analyzed in terms of experiences, and experiences themselves can be analyzed in terms of sense-contents.

The immediate elements of a logical construction may themselves be logical constructions, as is the case of the object denoted by the word 'army'. An army is a logical construction out of this and that soldier, and a soldier is a logical construction out of this and that sense-content. There are several other objects which are higher-order logical constructions. An army, a nation, a club and a gang are higher-order logical-constructions. So, it is not essential that the immediate elements of a logical construction have gotto be sense-contents. However, it is essential that the ultimate analysis of all logical constructions must reveal sense-contents as their elements. "If we analyze a secondary logical construction, we arrive at the elements which are primary logical constructions. And if we go further, we arrive at the sense-contents which cannot be analyzed any further."[8]

The relevant question is about the qualitative difference between different logical constructions. If the self is a logical construction, the question arises (as expressed in the traditional terminology) how is the self-distinguished from the not-self, i.e., how is a person distinguished from, say, a tomato? In a sense there is no fundamental distinction between the two; the distinction is of secondary importance, for both of them are logical constructions. The distinction of one logical construction from another has been explained by Ayer in terms of sense-contents which are elements of these constructions. One logical construction is distinguished from the other, because at least some of the elements of one logical construction are different from the elements of the other, or, in case the elements are the same, the elements of one logical construction are related differently from those of the other. As Ayer says, "what differentiates one such logical construction from another is the fact that it is constituted by different sense-contents or by sense-contents differently related."[9] And concerning the nature of sense-contents he says that they are neither mental nor physical. "...The distinction between mind and matter applies only to logical constructions."[10] Ayer's explanation of the meanings of 'logical construction' and 'sense-contents' implies that the difference between the self and a tomato is as if merely a difference as to the sense-contents involved and the relations between these sense-contents. So, a self is not very different from a tomato. If the tomato's *physical occupancy* is a fiction, so is the self's *spiritual occupancy* a fiction.

II

The difference between Berkeley and the recent phenomenalists is that phenomenalism has been given a linguistic twist by our philosophers. A phenomenalist is not interested in the existential questions. His concern is not

to show that sense-data exist when a common man says that a material object exists. As Austin points out, the phenomenalists "are concerned with logical relations obtaining between two different *languages*, the 'sense-datum language' and 'material object language', and are not to be taken literally as concerned with the *existence* of anything."[11] Phenomenalists of our time claim that a statement about a material object is translatable in terms of statements about sense-data. Such a translation is possible if the statement about a material object *entails*, as we have already pointed out while discussing Austin, sense-data statements.

For a singular material object statement, one requires many sense-data statements. No definite number of sense-data statements is possible. We have already seen while discussing Ayer that an empirical proposition that is not a basic proposition is only weakly verifiable. And it is weakly verifiable because the process of verification does not terminate; non-termination of the process implies that the sense-data statements which verify a given material object statement do not have a definite number. This means that a material object statement entails an indefinite number of sense-data statements. How then can a material object statement be equivalent to the sense-data statements? The equivalence presupposes definite numbers. Suppose a material object statement is 'this is a table'. To translate this statement in terms of sense-data statements one says things such as 'this is hard', 'this is coloured'…and so on. The expression 'so on' signifies that the translation requires an indefinite number of sense-data statements. But if someone requires an indefinite number of steps to achieve something, then it is recognition on his part that the goal cannot be achieved. If the translation of a material object statement in terms of sense-data statements requires an indefinite number of sense-data statements, then it is recognized that no such translation is possible. If a material object statement would genuinely entail sense-data statements, then the number of sense-data statements must be definite. So also, it is not possible to establish the equivalence of a material object statement with the sense-data statements because of the indefinite character of sense-data statements. This shows that the material object language is precise and the sense-datum language is imprecise. How can a precise language be translated into an imprecise language?

Statements about sense-data which are supposed to be entailed by a material object statement refer to both actual and possible sense-data. Talking about possible sense-data is talking in terms of hypothetical statements, so the translation in question would include both categorical and hypothetical statements. The categorical statements assert the existence of sense-data,

whereas the hypothetical statements only entertain their possibility. As Ayer remarks, "the inclusion of possible as well as actual sense-data among the elements of the material things must be taken only to imply a recognition that some of these statements about sense-data will have to be hypothetical."[12] Consider the material object statement 'this is a table'. This would be translated in terms of such sense-data statements as 'this is brown', 'this is hard' etc. The existence of the table has been described in terms of the occurrence of sense-data. Suppose I make a statement about the existence of an unperceived table, a statement such as 'there is a table next door'. The logical nature of this statement is not at all different from the earlier statement about the table. The expression 'there is' performs the function of 'this is', both are categorical statements and both refer to the existence of a table. The only difference is that one of them asserts the existence of a perceived table and the other asserts the existence of an unperceived table. If 'there is a table next door' has to be translated in terms of sense-data statements, then those statements have to be hypothetical. One would be saying something like this: if someone opens the next door, then he would obtain sense-data connected with a table.

The difficulty is that a categorical statement cannot be equivalent to a hypothetical statement. A hypothetical statement is not meant for an unconditioned assertion of existence. Isaiah Berlin opposed the reduction of a categorical statement about the existence of a physical object in terms of the hypothetical statements about sense-data. As he points out, "Existential propositions expressed categorically--in indicative sentences--tend, as it were, to ''point'' towards their ''objects''; and demonstratives which appear in existential propositions, like, "this is", "there is", "here we have", often function as substitutes for such acts of pointing to things or persons or processes. The characteristic force of the categorical mode of expression is often exactly this--that it acts in lieu of a gesture, of an 'act of ostension', "Here is the book", I say to someone looking for it, or I could point to it and say "the book", and convey roughly the same information by both methods. But hypotheticals normally do the opposite of this. Hypotheticals, whatever they describe or mean, whatever they entail or convey or evince, in whatever way they are verified, or fail to be verified, do *not* as a general rule, directly assert that something has been, is being, or will be occurring, or existing, or being characterized in some way: this is precisely the force of the conditional mood."[13] Berlin means to say that reference to something that is occurring now cannot be reduced to something that would possibly occur if certain conditions were satisfied. Thus, the difficulty is not only that the number of sense-data statements is indefinite. There is an added difficulty created by the

possible sense-data. Corresponding to actual and possible sense-data are categorical and hypothetical statements. A categorical statement about a material object cannot be equivalent to hypothetical statements about sense-data. The linguistic turn that phenomenalism took has increased the difficulties in accepting phenomenalism.

III

We have shown above that most of the sense-datum philosophers give secondary importance to persons and material bodies. They consider them as some kind of fiction generated by the non-fictitious entities called sense-data. Sense-data have been given primary importance, material objects and persons secondary importance. Strawson succeeds in giving primary importance to those objects which were given no respect by the sense-datum philosophers. Strawson opposes the sense-data philosophers by focusing his attention on material objects and persons, showing that they are the primary or basic particulars, which have to be identified in order to identify anything else in the world. How can the priority of sense-data over material objects be accepted? Reference to sense-data presupposes reference to material objects. Price introduced sense-data with the help of a tomato. Similarly, Moore uses his right hand and Ayer his cigarette case. The 'tomato', the 'right hand' and the 'cigarette case' are the physical object expressions. So, they were already known before sense-data were known. This clearly shows that the existence of sense-data depends on the existence of material bodies, that material bodies are primary particulars and sense-data are the secondary particularism. So, the objects that are given secondary importance by the sense-datum philosophers have been given primary importance by Strawson, and those which have been given primary importance by sense-datum philosophers have been given secondary importance by Strawson. There is a clash of two metaphysical systems.

Strawson describes his metaphysics as descriptive metaphysics, whose function is to make explicit the structural features of human understanding. The kind of metaphysics with which he is involved is the kind of metaphysics that was done by Kant and Aristotle. He distinguishes his kind of metaphysics from the other kinds that he calls reversionary metaphysics. Sense-datum philosophy would appear as propounding reversionary metaphysics. One may object that sense-data philosophy is not involved in any metaphysics whatsoever. It is to eliminate metaphysics that Ayer evolved the verification principle, and Ayer is a sense-datum philosopher. But phenomenalism, to which sense-data philosophers are committed, itself is a metaphysical system.

Reducing everything to what is given in immediate experience is certainly a very attractive metaphysical move. An immediate experience is what is occurring here and now. If a sense-datum reports an immediate experience, then this would lead to momentary phenomenalism. So, a revision was made and the possible sense-data were introduced to make phenomenalism more enduring. The metaphysics of phenomenalism comes directly in conflict with Plato, for whom momentary objects have hardly any significance. Strawson constructs his metaphysical system by rejecting both Plato and phenomenalism. If Plato is committed to permanence, phenomenalism is committed to change. Both extremes are to be rejected. Strawson starts with the four-dimensional spatio-temporal structure, one temporal and three spatial dimensions. Material bodies and persons, who own material bodies, completely fit into this spatio-temporal frame. For a material body accommodates itself in all the three dimensions of space. And since it is found in this or that place, at this or that moment, the dimension of time is also satisfied. This would have created a difficulty if the persons were not owners of bodies.

Just as Russell makes sense-data the objects of acquaintance, Strawson makes material bodies objects of acquaintance. Of course, he does not use the expression acquaintance, he invents his own idiom. He does not say we are acquainted with material bodies. He says that we *identify* material bodies directly. Just as Russell uses demonstratives like 'this' and 'that' for exhibiting his acquaintance with sense-data, Strawson uses these demonstratives for identifying material bodies. However, one's reference to material bodies cannot always be in terms of demonstrative identification. Demonstrative identification is possible only in the presence of the object. But we also refer to objects which lie outside our experience. As Strawson says, "But now consider the case where demonstrative identification, in the sense I have given to this phrase, is not possible, because the particular to be identified is not within the range of those sensibly present. What linguistic means of identification are available to us? …. it may seem, in the non-demonstrative identification of particulars, we depend ultimately on description in general terms alone."[14] These remarks echo Russell's distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Where acquaintance fails, we have only knowledge by description. For Strawson, where demonstrative identification fails, we have to resort to descriptions. And just as Russell connects knowledge by description to knowledge by acquaintance, Strawson maintains, "The situation of non-demonstrative identification may be linked with the situation of demonstrative identification."[15] Russell too links descriptive knowledge to knowledge by

acquaintance. In this connection we must remember that Russell considered 'names' as disguised descriptions. So, using a name is as good as using a description. Strawson exhibits Russell's influence on his thought also when he says, "A name is worthless without the backing of descriptions."[16]

The only significant difference between Russell's view and Strawson's is that Russell accepts sense-data as primary particulars whereas Strawson accepts material bodies as primary particulars. By using demonstratives 'this' and 'that' Russell succeeds in picking out only sense-data. But by using the same demonstratives Strawson succeeds in picking out material bodies. Consider the following analogy: a hunter is in search of a tiger. He observes a striped colour-patch, he aims his gun at that colour-patch, and fires. The tiger is dead. This means that the hunter knows very well that the colour-patch is identical with the skin of the tiger. So, firing at the colour-patch would lead to the killing of the tiger. Would the Strawsonian hunter do anything else? Would he be observing the tiger directly in order to aim at it and consequently to kill it. If he wishes to fire after ascertaining whether the striped colour-patch does or does not belong to the tiger, then he may not get a chance to kill the tiger.

There is every likelihood that the tiger may kill the hunter when he is busy in ascertaining whether the striped colour-patch does or does not belong to the tiger. Russell's hunter is far more intelligent than the Strawsonian hunter. Even if we ultimately succeed in identifying material bodies, we cannot escape the prior identification of colour-patches, noises, smells etc.

Strawson succeeds in eliminating sense-data by introducing the condition of re-identification of a particular which was identified earlier. Unless a particular is re-identified it cannot function as a primary or a basic particular. Re-identification presupposes the continued existence of an object, even if we do not perceive it. Since a sense-datum cannot be re-identified, it cannot be sensed twice, it cannot be considered as a primary particular. Only material objects and persons can satisfy the condition of re-identification. Therefore, only they can function as primary or basic particulars in Strawson's ontology. To ensure that sense-data never acquire the honor that is given to the material bodies and persons, Strawson introduces the distinction between independent identification and dependent identification. If a given particular 'x' depends for its identification on the particular 'y', then 'y' is a primary particular and 'x' is a secondary particular. According to Strawson, sense-data are the particulars of the dependent type, hence they can never become primary particulars. He says, "The dependent type is the class of what might be called 'private particulars'-- comprising the perhaps overlapping groups of

sensations, mental events and, in one common acceptance of this term, sense-data. The type on which it is dependent is the class of persons."[17] Strawson has clearly converted sense-data into private particulars, i.e., they are particulars which occur to a given person and are restricted to that person. All this follows from the definition of a sense-datum. Strawson is aware of the fact that sense-data are primary particulars according to sense-datum philosophers. He turns the tables against the sense-datum philosophers. As he remarks, "On other criteria than the present, private experiences have often been the most favored candidates for the status of 'basic' particulars; on the present criteria, they are the most obviously inadmissible.

IV

The principles of individuation of such experiences essentially turn on the identities of the persons to whose histories they belong. A twinge of toothache or a private impression of red cannot in general be identified in our common language except as the twinge which such-and-such an identified person suffered or is suffering, the impression which such-and-such identified person had or is having. Identifying references to 'private particulars' depend on identifying references to particulars of an altogether different type, namely persons."[18] Strawson is sufficiently clear. Since identification of sense-data depends on the person to whom they appear, the sense-datum philosophers are wrong in considering sense-data as basic particulars. They are particulars of the dependent type.

It is through introduction of the concept of re-identification that Strawson has tried to meet Hume's skepticism. For Hume, the objects that occur in one observational stretch are numerically different from the objects that occur in the succeeding observational stretch. Each stretch of observation would have its own spatial system. Strawson shows that Humean doubt is self-refuting. As Strawson remarks, "Each new system would be wholly independent of every other. There would be no question of *doubt* about the identity of an item in one system with an item in another. For such a doubt makes sense only if the two systems are not independent, if they are parts, in some way related, of a single system which includes them both." [19]

So Humean doubt makes sense only in a unitary spatial system. But his doubt is aimed at the production of multiple spatial systems. As Strawson argues against Hume that "his doubts are unreal, not simply because they are logically irresoluble doubts, but because they amount to the rejection of the whole conceptual scheme within which alone such doubts make sense."[20] Thus Strawson succeeds in refuting skepticism.

Though Russell and Moore were responsible for introducing sense-data for the first time, they did not give up material objects. More attention was paid by Price for trying to see whether sense-data coincide with the surfaces of material objects. It is only at the stage of Ayer that sense-data became quite independent and self-sustaining. Material objects were converted into pure fiction. Austin subjected Ayer's views to exhaustive criticism. But he had no metaphysical system of his own.

He took the help of language analysis. Strawson builds up his own metaphysical system to counter the metaphysics to which sense-datum philosophers were committed. He attempted to show that the Humean doubts are self-refuting. For the 20th century philosophers Hume stands as the only skeptic worth considering. So refuting Hume is considered as refuting skepticism. Strawson refutes Hume to enable us to discover external reality.

To conclude: the sense-datum theory has failed to account for its validity because it failed provide reductions of the objects to sense-data. The material objects and the persons or selves havereasserted theirprimacy inour conceptual system as Strawsonhas amply proved. Phenomenalism as a metaphysics is too revisionary to be accepted at all.

References:

[1] Berkeley, *Berkeley's Philosophical Writings*, ed. David M. Armstrong, Collier Macmillan Publishers,
    London, 1974, p. 62.
[2]Ibid., p. 84.
[3]*Perceptions*: *Facts and Theories*, p. 68.
[4]*Language,Truth and Logic*, (second edition) p. 130.
[5]Ibid., p.39.
[6]Ibid., p.131.
[7]Ibid., p. 130.
[8] See Urmson's, "The Impossibility of Reductive Analysis" in *Philosophical Analysis*, Chapter 10. Pp. 147 – 162.
[9]*Language, Truth and Logic*, (second edition) p.. 130.
[10]Ibid. p. 131.
[11]*Sense and Sensibilia*, p.107.
[12] A.J. Ayer, *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge*, Macmillan & Co, London, 1962, p. 232.
[13] Isaiah Berlin, "Empirical Propositions and Hypothetical Statements", in *Mind*, New Series, Vol. 50, No:235
1950, p. 299.
[14] P.F. Strawson, *Individual --an essay in Descriptive Metaphysics*, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London,
1999, p. 20.
[15]Ibid. p., 21.
[16]Ibid., p. 20.
[17]Ibid., p. 41.
[18]Ibid., p. 41.

[19]Ibid., p. 35.
[20]Ibid., p. 35.

DYNAMICS OF REASON: ITS HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT

BEAUTY DAS

This outline of the Dynamics of Reason: Its History and Development is based on theidea that this can be illustrated employing a historical analysis of the conception of reason.Though the term "reason"has been used in different contexts but through this paper, my main aim is to find out the nature of reason by illustrating the conception of reason as the faculty of the human mind and its effects on human life. This article clearly shows the development of the conception of Reason by analyzing the viewpoints of different philosophers (from the ancient Greek period to the enlightenment epoch) regarding this notion. It also spreads light on what kind of key role reason plays to constitute human nature as well as to understand the nature of the world.

Keywords

Reason, rationality, logos, Mind, Soul, Knowledge.

Prelude

In Western Philosophy the concept of reason is one of the most debatable issues since ancient times, and critique of reason has also been a persistent theme in philosophy. The discussion about the reason that began in the ancient period is continuing without a let-up. Rather the discussion centering around it is gaining more attention in the modern period to excavate its various facets. In philosophy, there is a popular debate regarding the recognition of the concept of reason, and from this debate, two popular groups emerge, viz., Empiricists and Rationalists. This distinction has become more accentuated in modern European philosophy when several prominent philosophers began philosophizing under one rubric or the other one. It is a well-known issue that for Rationalist philosophers, reason or intellect helps us to acquire knowledge about substantive truths through some form of intellectual intuition.[1] Whereas, on the other hand, Empiricist philosophers emphasize sense experience or sensuous data to know about the external world around us and renounce the importance of reason, in the case of acquiring knowledge about the external world. But beyond this argumentation about the recognition of reason, there remains a kind of eagerness to know about the origin, application, and nature of reason. The aim of this article is not to give any explanation regarding the debate between empiricism or rationalism, but rather what I intend to show here is the development of the concept of reason or

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[1]Schafer, K. "A Brief History of Rationality: Reason, Reasonableness, Rationality and Reasons",*Manuscrito*,Vol. 41, 2018, pp. 505.

the dynamics behind this notion from classical philosophy to the enlightenment epoch.

On the Meaning of Reason

To know about the journey of the notion of reason, let us look at its semantical root. The English term "reason" is originally derived from the Greek term "*Logos*" (*Logos→Ratio→Raison→Reason*). It is also well known that the term "Reason" has many meanings. For example, logic, ratio, calculation, account, explanation, argument, reason, reasoning, thinking, reckoning, etc. And all these words are interchangeable with each other.[2] As it said, according to the meaning of the Greek word *"logos"*, the concept of reason is related to the concept of language in the sense that, reason, rationality, and logic all are associated with the capacity of the human mind to calculate everything about the external world around us in the form of judgment. So, in this way, different philosophers use different words to illuminate the concept of reason. Now a question may arise in our curious mind: what is the definition of reason? To answer this I can say that, there is no particular definition of reason. It has been explained by different philosophers in different ways. Despite this, I can say that reason is something that makes human beings as they are in themselves, that is, it constitutes human nature. Human beings are possessed of the capacity of reason and this special capacity helps them to weigh "our beliefs, motives, desires, values, and goals on the scales of the Balance of Reason".[3] Now as I said before, in this article I shall try to show the development of the notion of reason, and that is why I have to discuss the historical reference of the conception of reason, and hence in the next section, I would like to illustrate the status of reason by following classical Greek philosophy.

History of Reason

As we know human beings are endowed with the power of reason, and this special capacity separates them from other living creatures, though nowadays philosophical as well as scientific experiments claim that other non-human living creatures also possess some sort of lowest degree of reasoning power. Reason is

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[2] Moss, J. "Right Reason in Plato and Aristotle: On the Meaning of Logos",*Phronesis*, Vol. 59, No. 3, 2014, pp. 181-230.
[3] Dascal, M. "The Balance of Reason", Vanderveken, D. (Edt.), *Logic, Thought and Action*, 2005, Dordrecht: Springer Publisher, pp. 27.

the capacity of the human mind that helps them to survive in this world. The next section will show us how the Heraclitean conception of reason makes a connection between human beings and the cosmos around them.

Heraclitean concept of Reason

In ancient Greek philosophy, most probably Heraclitus (535–475 BC.) was the first philosopher who talked about the rational structure of the cosmos by using the term *"logos"* (English: reason). We can know about his philosophical viewpoints from his subsequent philosophers because the book that he wrote i.e., *On Nature,* is lost. According to his subsequent philosophers, he believed that there remains a rational order in nature that controls the entire universe. He also holds the view that *logos* is a kind of"unifier in nature" that arranges everything of the universe. Though he talks about the cosmological order of the universe, but his main concern is about the human condition, i.e., the condition through which they can comprehend the *logos.*

To illustrate the importance of *logos* and also to discover the nature of the world Heraclitus gives a metaphor of the unknowability of certain language, for example, I do not know the French language and if someone came and started to talk with me in French then it seems like a kind of noise for me. Similarly, people who fail to know or comprehend the *logos*are ignorant about the external world, and he ridicules this kind of peopleand compared them withthe "barbarian".[4] So, it is necessary to understand *logos*to get access to the real objective world. That is why he claimed, we can acquire knowledge of the external world by comprehending logos, which is the universal principle through which all the events come to pass. He also noted that everything has its opposites (e.g., day and night, good and evil, etc.), and *"logos"* is the principle that helps us to comprehend the basic connection between opposites. So, by understanding logos, we can know about the rational structure of the world, and to acquire knowledge about the real objective world we have to understand how the particular things or opposites of the external world are related to each other through the thread of logos. But for him, it is not very easy to understand logos or acquire knowledge about the nature of the world because every sensible object in this world is in constant flux, and he depicts it through his famous contention that "you could not

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[4] Kahn, C. H., *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus: An Edition of the Fragments with Translation and Commentary*, 1979,pp. 21-22, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

step twice into the same river" (Plato, *Cratylus*, 402a=A6), which denotes nothing but the fact that in this world everything is subject to change, and that is why it is difficult for people to attain certainand trueknowledge. He maintains the view that knowledge and understanding both are different and understanding plays a very important role in the case of knowing something, because he believes that most people obtain knowledge about the world by sense perception without understanding it, and from this view, it is clear that he believes sense perception is necessary but not sufficient for knowledge, and the people who want to understand the world must have the capacity to arrangethe information from the manifold of complex sensedata and to make them understandable. So according to Heraclitus, it is very clear that only through sense perception the proper knowledge (i.e., knowledge with understanding) is not possible, and the capacity to make things understandable that he talks about, to my mind, is nothing but the capacity of reason which helps people to know everything in its true sense, though he did not mention clearly that the capacity to make things understandable is the capacity of reason.

Moreover, for Heraclitus, logos is a *"single divine law"* through which the world is ordered, guided, and unified by a rational structure. He also talks about two kinds of logos, viz., *"private logos"* (i.e., human mind), and *"divine logos"* (i.e., the mind of God). For him, we can access the *divine logos* through the *private logos* and it opens up the possibility of human knowledge. Here he actually attempts to bridge the gap between divine and human knowledge through the thread of *logos*.[5]Hence, Heraclitus intends to show us that, in nature, there always remains a rational order by *divine logos* which makes a connection between every opposite and particular thing in this world, and enables *private logos* i.e., the capacity of reason in human beings to acquire proper knowledge about the real objective world.

Platonic Reason

The famous Greek philosopher Plato (most probably 424-348 BC) and Heraclitus both were contemporary to each other, and that is why we find out famous contentions of Heraclitus in Plato's writings and it also seems that Plato

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[5]Curd, P., McKirahan, Richard D. *A Presocratic Reader: Selected Fragments and Testimonia*, 2011, pp. 39-54, Indianapolis/ Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

was very much influenced by Heraclitus. The view of Heraclitus that everything in this world is in constant flux might have compelled Plato to think about the certainty of knowledge. Plato thought that if everything is subject to change then how can we attain true and certain knowledge? In this regard, Plato introduces his famous conception of *"ideas"* or *"forms"* which paves the way to the subsequent philosophers who give their reasonable statements regarding this notion. However, according to Plato, reality comprises two worlds, viz., the physical world, which we can access through our sense experience, and just because this world is always in a state of change, we cannot have true knowledge about this world. So, for Plato, it is clear that what we know through our sense experience is not true knowledge. And another one is a non–physical, changeless, and eternal world which we can access through our power or capacity of reason, which helps us to acquire true knowledge.[6] This non–physical, eternal world is called by Plato the world of *Ideas* or *Forms*.

He uses the term *"ideas"* or *"forms"* in two senses. In one sense, the *forms* are perfect conceptual models of every existing thing of the physical world, and these *forms*areexisting solely in the eternal world, accessed by reason alone. For example, through our capacity of reason, we can access the *form* of the pen, and thus we can know the ideal template of that pen as well as we can understand the essence of the pen, and after that, we can use this understanding to make judgments about all physical pen.[7] For Plato, the *ideas* or *forms* which we accessed through reason are more real than the knowledge of the objects which

we acquire through our sense experience.In another sense, he treats *forms* as universals. For example, each human being is a particular instance of universal manhood. Here manhood is the *idea* or *form*. So, for him, all particular things exist in the non–eternal physical world, whereas universals reside in the perfect eternal world, and we can discover these universals or *ideas* or *forms* (these terms are interchangeable with each other) of each physical thing through the capacity of reason.

He also talks about another kind of activity of reason. Plato believes in *"innate ideas"* and for him, all the innate ideas about universals, etc., are already present in our mind at birth, and it points toward his belief about the immortality

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[6] Vaughn, L. *Living Philosophy: A Historical Introduction to Philosophical Ideas*, 2017, pp.76 – 103, New York:Oxford University Press.
[7] Ibid.

of the soul. For him, the knowledge of the *ideas* is inscribed in our mind in a previous existence, and by using our capacity of reason we can recall all these *ideas*.[8] So from his conception of immortality of the soul, we can say that Plato was a dualist because he believes that human beings are made of two substances: material body and immaterial soul or mind.

Moreover, in his famous books *Republic* and *Phaedrus*, Plato talks about his conception of the *"tripartite soul"*, and according to him, our soul is divided into three parts, viz., *reason* or *"logos"*, *Spirit* or *"thymos"*, and *Appetite* or *"eros"*, and Plato shows us that *reason* or mind is the highest thinking part of the soul (located in the head), it fulfills our thirst for knowledge and truth. This rational part of the soul also regulates the other two parts of the soul. After that, he talks about the *Spirited* part of the soul (located near the chest), and it causes our emotion, passion, etc., and he also called this part *"high spirit"*. And finally, the *Appetitive* part of the soul (located in the stomach), which is the rootcause of all kinds of desires that we have. In this regard, he intends to show us that, due to different parts of the soul, there always remains an *'inner conflict'* within us just because our desires, emotions, passions all are governed by the rules of reason, and our reason and passions both are by their nature contrary to each other.[9] Plato through this conception of the *"tripartite soul"*(mentioned in the book*Republic*)and also with the *"chariot allegory"*(mentioned in the book*Phaedrus*), intends to show a connection between the three parts of the soul and the three classes of a society where *reason* denotes the rulers (i.e., guardians), *spirit* denotes the military (i.e., auxiliaries or soldiers), and *appetite* denotes the ordinary citizens or working class (i.e., producers like craftsmen, farmers, etc.). Simply for Plato, we can define the just society with the characteristics ofthe just individual because, in a just individual the rational part of the soul rules the other parts, the spirited part of the soul supports the rules given by the rational part, and the appetitive part of the soul follows the rules under the governance of reason, i.e., the entire soul of the just individual obeys the rules of reason, similarly, in the just society, the entire community obeys the rules of the ruler.[10] So by this analogy, Plato intends to show us the importance of reason in making a just individual as well as a just society.

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[8]Ibid.

[9]Klosko, G."The 'Rule' of Reason in Plato's Psychology", *History of Philosophy Quarterly,* Vol. 5, No. 4, 1988, pp. 342, University of Illinois Press.

[10]Plato, Jowett, B., *The Republic of Plato*, 1991,pp. 335-364, Vintage Classics Publication.

Thus, from Plato's conception of reason, it becomes clear that through the capacity of reason we can discover the *Innate Ideas* and also acquire knowledge about the essence of physical objects as well as we get access to the eternal world. Moreover, by considering reason as the highest part of the soul he also shows us that it has another role to play, i.e., we can use our capacity of reason to discover truth and knowledge. Besides this, it also can rule over other parts of the soul to make the just individuals, and by being just individual human beings can live a virtuous life and can deal with the external world rationally. In this way, we can consider him as a rationalist philosopher because he gives more emphasis on reason than sense experience and holds the view that we can acquire true knowledge and also understand reality through the capacity of reason. But despite all these, there is some confusion about his conception of reason. For example, if through the capacity of reason, we can get access to the changeless eternal world that exists beyond our sense experience then why don't we use this capacity in case of obtaining true knowledge about the physical world? This confusion paved the way for the subsequent philosophers (like his pupil Aristotle) to shed more light on this issue.

Aristotle on Reason

In this section, I want to illustrate the concept of reason following Aristotle (384-322 BC). From Aristotle's philosophical conceptions,it is clear that he differs from Plato's in many ways. In the previous section, we see that Plato's *ideas* or *forms* are residing in the non–physical eternal world and we can acquire knowledge about particular things of the physical world just because, through our capacity of reason we can get access to the eternal world of *forms*, and can know the essence or *form*of each particular thing. For example, we can know the colour blue just because we have knowledge about its essence i.e., the blueness by our capacity of reason. Whereas by rejecting this view of Plato, Aristotle argues that, all the *ideas* or *forms* are residing only in the particulars, and they do not reside in any non–physical eternal world. He claimed that we can acquire knowledge about the *ideas* such as blueness, through particular instances (i.e., by observing each blue thing). So, Aristotle emphasized the importance of observing the external world or particulars around us, and that is why he introduces his conception of the *"formed matter"*,i.e., everything in this world is a composition of form and matter. For him, just like matter without *form* is impossible, similarly, *form* without matter is also impossible (except the *unmoved mover*). So, he rejects Plato's belief about independently existing *forms* and shows us that we can

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discover the essence or *form* of particulars from the physical things through our capacity of reason, and for this, we do not have to go beyond the physical realm.

Moreover, Aristotle in his book*De Anima* (*On the Soul*) undermines Plato's dualist view about the human soul that it is an immaterial substance and can exist apart from the body (i.e., material substance) after death. Because he has a different kind of opinion about the soul or mind and for him, the soul (*psyche)* is not something like substance but rather it is a "principle or form of life".[11]In this context, Aristotleby applying his conception of *formed matter* opined that the soul is nothing but a *form* of a living thing, though it is not the same as Platonic *form*.[12] He also holds the view that the soul is something that makes difference between living and non–living things. According to him, like human beings, non–humans as well as plants, also have souls. He talks about three kinds of souls. Firstly, the *"nutritive soul"* or *"vegetative soul"*, which is possessed by all living things and causes bodily health and growth. Secondly, *"sensitive soul"*, which is possessed by humans and non–humans and they differ from plants by having this kind of soul, and it causes the capacityto perceive through senses and also causes the movements, emotions, passions, pleasure, and pain, etc.[13] And the third one is the *"rational soul"* through which human beings differ from other non–humans. This kind of soul, as Aristotle shows us, has the capacity for cognition and governs our ability to think and make judgments about everything in this world and also makes human beings unique.So, for Aristotle, we should understand the human soul not as a substance but as a "cluster of faculties" labelled as reason.[14] For him, rationality is the special kind of capacity possessed by human beings and reason is the characteristic of human nature that constitutes a good life. But there is one thing that creates very much confusion that Aristotle in the book*De Anima*holdsthe view that the soul is mortal but a part called the "active intellect" or the "active mind" is immortal and eternal.[15] This interpretation given by him makes us confused and that is why some questions crop up in my mind: What did he mean by "active mind" or "active intellect" (since, he uses the words "soul", "mind", "psyche" interchangeably in his writings)? Does he mean by the "active

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[11] Stevenson, L. Haberman, D. L. Wright, P.M. Witt, C. *Thirteen Theories of Human Nature*. 2017, pp. 103, New York: Oxford University Press.
[12]Ibid.
[13] Stainton, T. "Reason and Value: The Thought of Plato and Aristotle and the Construction of Intellectual Disability", *Mental Retardation*, Vol. 39, No. 6, 2001, pp. 452–460.
[14]Stevenson, L. Haberman, D. L. Wright, P.M. Witt, C. *Thirteen Theories of Human Nature*. 2017, pp. 104, New York: Oxford University Press.
[15]Aristotle, *De Anima*, 2008, Hicks, R. D. (Trans.), pp. 88, Cosimo, Inc. Publisher.

mind" or "active intellect" as the mind or intellect of the *unmoved mover*? If so, then did he consider the human mind as passive? And if it is then also a problem arises, that is, if the human mind is passive then how can it help human beings to obtain knowledge, and also how can it govern their ability to think? On the other hand, if the human mind is active then it points toward the immortality of the soul because he claimed that the "active mind" is immortal just because he uses the term "*mind*" and "*soul*" as synonymous. So, the status of mind or soul in his viewpoints is very much obscure just because he did not illustrate it clearly in his book *De Anima*, and all these questions compelled us to think again and again about the nature of the human mind or soul that he intends to show us.

Moreover, in his book*Nicomachean Ethics* (Book I) heshows us that happiness or "*Eudaimonia*" is the highest end of human life. For him, human beings are rational by their nature and besides this, by being happy we can live a good life, so for our happiness, it is required that we have to live according to our nature, i.e., a good life or happy life requires living according to reason.[16] Hence,for Aristotle, everything has some purpose. So, human life also has the purpose to develop our rational soul by practicing our capacity of reason, and the practice of the capacity of reason leads human beings toward a virtuous life, just like a dancer can be a good dancer by practicing his or her skill again and again. So, we have to live our life completely under the governance of reason to achieve the highest human well-being.

The Age of Reason

After Aristotle, in the 4th century, the rise of Christianity and in the 5th century the decline of the Roman Empire denoted the turning point of the history of the world as well as the history of philosophy. Philosophers of that time were mostly churchmen and they started to bind up their philosophical ideas with doctrines of Christianity (although the jurisdiction of philosophy and theology both are distinct from one another, as philosophy deals with truths of reason and theology deals with truths of faith).[17] And as a result of this intermingling of philosophy and theology in the medieval epoch, philosophers of that time considered reason and faith as complementary to each other. They hold that

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[16] Stainton, T. "Reason and Value: The Thought of Plato and Aristotle and the Construction of Intellectual Disability", *Mental Retardation*, Vol. 39, No. 6, 2001, pp. 452–460.
[17]Joaquin, J.J. "An Introduction to Medieval Christian Philosophy". Leni Garcia, edt., *Exploring the Philosophical Terrain*, 2013, Manila: C&E Publishing.

reason and faith both are genuine sources of wisdom and knowledge. They tried to make a connection between faith and reason so that faith would not seem unreasonable or arbitrary.[18] However, in this period it seems that they gave very much emphasis on faith rather than reason, and I think the capacity of reason is somehow dominated by the capacity of faith at that time, though they never claimed that reason could be reduced to faith or vice-versa.

Nevertheless, after the classical period, it is more than a thousand years later, that is the rise of the enlightenment period also known as the "age of reason" (mainly 17th to 18th centuries), was an intellectual and philosophical movement that had an immense impact on different ideologies and brought the notion of reason and its role in our knowledge at the center-point of discussion. Under the umbrella of rationalism, the so-called Rationalist philosophers like Rene Descartes (1596-1650), Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) gave special importance to the notion of reason and laid the foundation of their philosophy. And as we know that Descartes through his method-based philosophy laid the foundation for rational thinking, andIn his famous book *Discourse on the Method* (1637),he intends to show us that the information that we receive through our sense intuitions are not necessarily accurate, and that is why he throws out everything that is subject to doubt. To illustrate the unreliability of sense perception he gave an example that a straight stick protruding from the water always looks bent, even we cannot find out the actual size of a distant object (e.g., the sun) through our sense perception.[19] So, in this way, he holds the view that we cannot obtain true knowledge through sense perception and it is our capacity of reason that corrects our sensuous data and makes true knowledge possible in terms of clearness and distinctness.

Similarly, the notion of reason shaped the philosophical ideas of Spinoza and also shaped his place in the history of philosophy as well as in the enlightenment period. Spinoza through his famous works such as *Theological Political Treatise* (1670) and *Ethics* (1677) intends to show us different kinds of roles that reason plays to constitute human nature as well as the nature of the world. To set his metaphysical viewpoint he illustrates reason as the cause and contends that there is a reason behind the existence of everything in this world.

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[18]Koterski, J.W. "Faith and Reason",*An Introduction to Medieval Philosophy: Basic Concepts*, 2011, pp. 09-36, John Wiley & Sons Publisher.
[19]Loeb, L.E. "The Priority of Reason in Descartes", *The Philosophical Review,* Vol. XCIX, No.1, 1990, pp. 3-43, Duke University Press.

Through his epistemological viewpoints, he describes reason as the powerful capacity and the only source of our knowledge of objects through experience. For him, everything has its respective properties and knowledge is possible only when the knower and the knowable share their respective properties with each other. For instance, I can know about a pen just because the pen and I share the property of being extended to each other. He by his ethical theories introduces another kind of role that reason plays that is the dictator of rules. He believes that reason prescribes some rules that how we ought to live, how we ought to treat other fellow beings or other creatures, what ends we ought to pursue etc., and when we consider that these rules are dictated by reason then it inspires us to follow the rules. So, by prescribing rules reason guides our actions.[20] So, in this way, he spread light on different kinds of roles that reason plays in human life. Later, Leibniz also considered that "nothing is without a reason (*Nihil sine ratione*)". In his book *Monadology* (1714) he contends thatour reasoning is based on two great principles: the "Law of Non-Contradiction" (i.e., whatever involves contradiction must be false), and the "Law of Sufficient Reason" (i.e., nothing happens without a reason), and he considered these principles as the "Principle of Reason", through which we can evaluate or judge every state of affairs of every possible world. Hence, in the enlightenment period, all the rationalist philosophers intended to highlight the importance of reason which dimmed in the medieval epoch.

Without whom the discussion of the notion of reason would remain incomplete is the great German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), who by defining enlightenment holds that the enlightenment is nothing but man's emergence from their immaturity or their inability to use one's understanding without any guidance of others.[21] Through this definition, he intends to show us that enlightenment is possible only when human beings use their capacity of reason without any influence and keep practicing to use this power for better improvement, and this opinion of him points to the fact that he laid the foundation of his entire philosophy based on the notion of reason. The notion of reason is the central theme in his philosophy. Before Kant, all the empiricists hold the view thatexperience is the only means to acquire knowledge. Even rationalist philosophers hold the opinion that theoretical knowledge is the only means for

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[20]LeBuffe, M. (2017), *Spinoza on Reason*. Oxford University Press.
[21]Kant, Immanuel. (1784). "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?", Ted Humphrey (Trans.). (1983). *Immanuel Kant Perpetual Peace and Other Essays.* Cambridge: Hackett Publication, (pp. 41-48).

possible knowledge, but Kant added something new to the history of reason. Kant emphasized both experience and reason in the case of obtaining knowledge. He contends that human beings possessed the capacity of reasonto synthesize different concepts of understanding given by sense intuition through *a priori* principles. For him, the theoretical reason is the condition for our understanding, as well as it points to the limitation of our knowledge, that is, through theoretical reason, we cannot go beyond the physical realm.[22] That is why he introduces the practical part of reason through which we can get accessto those kinds of knowledge which we cannot obtain through theoretical reason.

Conclusion:

From the scrutiny of the status of reason in different epochs, it is clear that the notion of reason is the most important issue in philosophy as well as in human life. In this article, I wanted to illuminate the explanation of the concept of reason by following classical Greek philosophy and the Enlightenment period. Through these explanations, it is clear that there remains a kind of dynamic or transformation behind the notion of reason, i.e., we can see the development of the notion of reason from the rational structure of nature to the rational faculty of the human mind. Here the development of the conception of reason through the Heraclitean logos to the age of reason paves the way to the subsequent philosophers for their active participation in the discussion and the discussion about the status of reason is still alive.

Moreover, it seems that there always remains a contradiction between reason and passion, and in philosophy, there are different viewpoints regarding the relationship between reason and passion by philosophers of different hues. For example, according to David Hume, "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions".[23] That is, for him, in human beings reason only plays a purely instrumental function, and it helps us to satisfy our passions and nothing else. But some contrary views denote that all emotions, passions are the elements of the soul that are possessed by human beings and whenever we lead our life under the guidance of our passions there always remains a chance of error, but it does not indicate that our emotions, passions are meaningless. In this regard, I can say that

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[22]O'Neill, Onora., "Kant on Reason and Religion", Grethe B. Peterson (Edited). *The Tanner Lecture on Human Values,* 1997,(Volume: XVIII), (PP. 267-308). Utah: University of Utah Press.

[23]Hume, D. Selby – Bigge, L.A. (edited). *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book II, 3.3, 1888, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 415.

we have to exercise or practice our capacity of reason so that we can control our emotions, passions and do not fall into any trap of error.

Thus, in this way, different philosophers illustrate the conception of reason in different ways. It also opens up the possibility for different illustrations by subsequent philosophers in this field. Since behind this notion of reason, there always remains a kind of transformation that develops this notion and also illuminates the key role that reason plays in our day-to-day life. The main aim of this paper is to find out the nature of reason by analysing the history of the conception of reason. The scrutiny of the available history of the notion of reason makes it clear that the nature of reason is nothing but an ability possessed by human beings that has a mechanism to calculate, to judge, to evaluate, to weigh every aspect of life for survival as well as every state of affair of the possible world.

FREE WILL DEBATE: FROM ILLUSIONISM TO COMPATIBILISM

RAJAN

The philosophy of free will is an old one. Like anything longstanding, it has been rehabilitated over time. Understanding this very fact; the present paper has three objectives, accordingly: to introduce the free will problem as it exists in recent philosophical debates; to explain how the idea of free will may be an illusion in the first place; and to speculate that critical conjecture on the same issue may help us to feel that to a great extent, we are free to take the free decision in life in order to feel that human existence may worn out the existential nihilism, and subsequently, may embrace meaningfulness. In short, we aim to explicate the contesting debate on free will and illustrate the metamorphoses in argumentive locations of illusionism and Compatibilism. Whether we believe it or not, the role of free will is a prerequisite in all courses of human ideas and action. In addition, it is also the reason that many thinkers have attributed it with the notion of 'postulate' without which human existence, values, and action loses their significance. In order to make this debate adventures, we aim to set a perfect balance between illusionism and indeterminism via the compatibilist position of free will. This deliberation will help us gain two results; on the one hand, it will defuse the temporary binaries available in the free will positions, and on the other hand, it will provide the philosophical locus on whether we are truly free or live under the canopy of fate.

Introduction:

What if we get to know that all our actions and choices are predetermined by any external or internal forces? What if we get persuaded, based on the consequential argument that will to power, will to life and will to love are the only chief motivations of all our actions and desires? For an instance, we may position the desires for status, fame, wealth accumulation etc. in the will to a power category; food, water, sleeping and sex in the will to life cataloguing; and all our social and ethical choices and activities in the will to love classification. Now the question arises can we still be called free? What if natural laws and causation determine the limit of humankind? What if both dominated as well as the controller, behave under certain structure under unstructured power?[1]Most probably, this would present a great existential crisis in front of the whole of humanity or to say in Albert Camus terminology, it would be an absurdist position. Actually, the question of free choices and freedom becomes quite multifaceted at the human level. We find three classifications in this respect: deterministic, indeterministic and soft-deterministic (compatibilistic). Each classification providesits own position

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[1] Power, which is not an apparent or structured phenomenon as per Paul-Michel Foucault, makes us all behave differently whether we dominate others or vice-versa since the structure of power is hidden. Now question arises, if we all acts differently after an entrance of power can we still be called free? Isn't a dilemma which require careful contemplation? See-Foucault, M. (1980). Power/knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977. United Kingdom: Pantheon Books.

about human freedom and choices. The present paper also aims to examine the above questions and classifications. Throughout the composition, we will also find a common thread and critique of questions such as: what is the meaning of choice and free choice? How far can we resist the compression whether external or internal? Is absolute freedom possible? How far freedom is important for a meaningful life? Further, the paper aims to conclude that the oldest debate of determinism and free will in philosophy isn't beyond answering. We just have to answer it more personally and practically, with more of a sense of what we need to believe in to be calmer and more fulfilled.

(I)

The history of philosophy has been full of contending arguments around the ideas and classical dichotomy of Free Will and Determinism. Simply identified, the issue hangs on whether human beings should be thought of as fundamentally free to choose their actions and transform their lives or whether they should be reckoned as being at the heart determined by forces beyond their control, be it fate, natural law, personal imprisonments, politics or class or whatever. The debate has been long-running and immenselysignificant. It originated with Indian and Greco-Romans love of wisdom and wonder, dominated Christian philosophy and reverberates on to this day among philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists. Historical analysis also shows that the discussion over 'fate' and ''freedom'' or 'human limit' and ''human potently' 'is as long as the notion to pursue a good and meaningful life. This debate again becomes essential when lots of new factors, particularly the scientific one has been safeguarding a very good place to examine the paradigms of free will. And it is essential since reality is not the monopoly of mere speculation only; sometimes it should be handover to empirical observations as well. As Eddy Nahmias put it:

> Questions about free will and responsibility have long been considered the purview of philosophers. If philosophers paid attention to any science, it was physics since physics might tell us about whether or not the traditional threat of determinism is true. This is changing, though too slowly. Philosophers considering human autonomy and responsibility need to pay more attention to the relevance of the sciences that study humans, partly because neuroscientists and psychologists are

increasingly discussing free will, usually to argue that their research shows that it is an illusion.[2](Miller, 2008)

The debate over free will and determinism, as noted above, always have been critical in a variety of ways. There are at least four very strong arguments to prove that human beings are not free at all which hardcore indeterminists take for granted. The first argument follows that since human beings primarily are bodily beings, and both our body and mind including the whole neural network is completely determined second by microsecond by causal laws of nature. Therefore, it is really hard to imagine the idea of free will. Of course, we can't be certain about what exactly causes what. However, there is a law to be exposed, and if anybody has perfect knowledge of all the causes and effects,then they may have the power to challenge the very idea of having free will. As the Buddha also inhabited that given the preconditions of our past (*Pratītyasamutpāda*) whatever happens in the present is completely determinable and not free at all. In short, it is not up to us. That's the first argument why there is no freedom if you believe in Science and Buddha's philosophy of *Pratītyasamutpāda*.And there is also another reason which is based on psychological determinism. Bhagavad-Gita and Stoics school of thought tells us about this sort of determinism. It tells us that if we don't understand what are our attachments and addictions, then no one can sojourn us to be completely the slaves of our past karmas and desires as it becomes an automatic chain which we have to break to be at least on the path of compatibilist. As Bhagavad-Gita sequentially mentioned the chain of captivity (a form of psychological determinism):

dhyāyato viṣayān puṁso sangasteṣūpajāyate

sangāt sañjāyate kāmah kāmāt krodho' bhijaayate// 2.62 //

When a man thinks of objects, attachment for them arises; from attachment,
desire is born; from desire arises anger.

krodhaad bhavati sammohah sammohaatsmritivibhramah

smritibhramshaad buddhinaashobuddhinaashaatpranashyati // 2.63 //

From anger comes delusion, from delusion the loss of memory, from the loss of memory the destruction of intelligence; from the destruction of intelligence he perishes.[3](Prabhupada, 2001)

Perhaps, we may use Jean-Jacques Rousseau's political principle i.e. ''Man is born free and everywhere he is in chains'' as an analogy to embrace the personal position of being in the deterministic position. It might be a bad analogy to use Rousseau's expression in the sense of the present composition

because he used such expressions to represent the public and natural state of humans. But to be clear, we have used it intentionally to show that man is not only doomed to be subjugated to external circumstances (as Rousseau presupposed), but also of an internal one. For an instance, we can be enchained to our passions and bonding, as Bhagavad-Gita and stoics also proclaim, which may directly contradict the very notion of freedom of individual choice. As Hume deliberately proposed ''…reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them''[4](Hume, 1888) or as William Shakespeare dares '…Give me that man that is not passion's slave, and I will wear him in my heart's core, in my heart of heart, as I do thee''[5](Shakespeare, 1881) or as Fyodor Dostoyevsky, echoed '...The reason is a slave to passion'. Such expressions show how both internal as well as external enslavement are possible. Rousseau's philosophy, on the one hand, examines how man surrendered his state of autonomy to the modern condition, largely subjugated by inequality, dependency, violence and unhappiness, and Hume, Shakespeare, and Dostoyevsky and many more, contrariwise, asks to find ways to compromise with our limits in one way or other. In short, if we lose the very essence of being free i.e. being intelligent of our self, then we are lost forever. And such things happen all the time to most of us in some way. That's psychological determinism. Adding to the psychological determinism, those who confine humans to the dominant category of pain and pleasure also presents a great challenge to the free will advocators. Utilitarianism (including hedonist theory) and most of the Indian philosophical schools seem to depict morality and human nature in this manner.[6]Certainly, it leads to another philosophical problem of psychologismas it confines humans into the mere category of 'pain' and 'pleasure'. Prof. Dayakrishana beautifully raises this problem when questioning the whole Indian philosophical tradition which begins with the problem of suffering and ends with a permanent solution of it

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[4] Hume, D. (1888). *A Treatise of Human Nature*. United Kingdom: Clarendon Press.p.48
[5] Wright, W. A., Hart, J. S., Clark, W. G., Shakespeare, W. (1881). *The Complete Dramatic and Poetical Works of William Shekespeare*. United States: E. Claxton & Company.p.680
[6]The ideas of pleasure *(sukha)* and pain *(duhkha)* play central roles in the framework of the Indian moral system. Pleasure is often defined as that which is desired for its own sake *(svatahicchavisyah)* and pain is defined as what is hated for its own sake *(svatahdvesavisayah).* Another way of defining pleasure is: whatever is favourably regarded by all *(sarvesämanukülavedaniyam);* the opposite being the case with pain. So that these definitions of "pleasure" do not extend to "absence of pain" (or "decrease of pain"), which is also desired for its own sake and favourably regarded by all, it may be necessary to add the clause "whatever is a positive entity (i.e., not a mere negation)" to the definitions.See-Mohanty, J. N. (2000). *Classical Indian Philosophy: An Introductory Text*. United States: Rowman& Littlefield Publishers.p.110

either through *Moksha* or whatever.[7](Krishna, 1997) In other words, it seriously raises a great concern whether humans are just the finger-puppets to face the waves of pain and pleasure. For that reason, it further leads to the problem of free will. As Bentham put it:

> Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand, the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it.[8] (Bentham, 1879)

The third reason to prove that we are not completely free comprises the fact that what will happen tomorrow has already been fixed based on mathematical laws. Newtonian Determinism, for an instance, says that the universe is a clock that's convoluted up at the beginning of time and has been ticking ever since laws of motion. So whatever you're up to five years from now has already been fixed. It's already known using Newton's laws of motion. Einstein firmly believed in that. Does that mean that a morally evil person isn't really guilty of his works because he was already preordained billions of years ago? Einstein would say, well naturally, in some sense that's true that even every wrong act in history was predetermined. However, it would still be a crime, at least, from a law and practical point of view. Returning to the main argument, we may have two options — one suggests that anything that will happen tomorrow can be prophesied based on the actions we take in the present. Further, it also can't be changed. Past, as we know, is totally beyond of control. We cannot change the past. It's only in science fiction that you can have a time machine and go change the branching. But in reality, we cannot go back and change something that we did in past. So past is outside our control.

Now we are left with the idea of the present. We say something like the present is in our control. But what is the present? If we closely examine the idea of the present and slice it, then we don't find anything present at all. In Indian philosophy, particularly in Buddhism, there is nothing called as 'the present'. The argument is almost like a conventional physics argument. This is

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[7]Krishna, D. (1997). *Indian Philosophy: A New Approach*. India: Sri Satguru Publications.p.39
[8]Bentham, J. (1879). *The Principles of Morals and Legislation*. United Kingdom: Clarendon Press.p. 23

beautifully presented by *Gautama* (founder of Nyaya school of thought). He asks us to imagine that from the branch of a tree a fruit falls, and in its trajectory, if you call the part it has fallen 'the past' and the part it will fall now or the rest of it 'the future', and between the two there is no gap; so everything divides into past and future, there is no present at all. In short, the moment I say present, it has gone. So the present doesn't exist, the past is gone and can't be changed. Now one is left with the hope that the future is in our hands. At least, we can do something about that. But is it relay the case? The very famous children's book *Panchatantra*tells us that what is going to happen we may not know.[9] At a minimum, we cannot be sure. We think either this will happen or not happen. In logic, this is called as the law of excluded middle which suggest that either something will happen or not happen. So past and future cannot be changed and there's nothing called present; and since these are the only dimensions of time, therefore, there is no way to say we are completely free.

In fact, those who try to defend the existence of God based on the thesis of free will make one serious mistake i.e. on the one hand they accept god as omnipotent whopresides within every heart and contrariwise give clearance to the available problem of evil in the world by proclaiming that it is not the god is who is responsible rather our own free will that has been misused. It canfurther be presented as a good argument to theist people who have long justified the great evil and suffering in the world based on the contradictory notion of having free will and the existence of an omnipotent god. Thus, the question is am I truly free if God is making me do everything (theological determinism)? Should I be considered responsible for all my wrongdoing? Anyway, we do not need to describe how thoughtful the problem of evil presents a challenge in front of theists who believe in the heart seated omnipotent god. In Mahabharata, one serious incident occurs which opens our eyes regarding free will while being a theist. *Duryodhana* tells *Bhisma*when discussing the subject matter of morality that he knows what dharma is but doesn't get the courage to embrace that, and he also knows what *Adharma*is but doesn't get rid of that. In other words, if Krishna is the god who presides in everyone heart; then it is he who should be responsible for all my doings including the wrong ones. As *Duryodhana* critically echoed:

> jānāmidharmaṃnaca me pravṛttirjānāmipāpaṃnaca me nivṛttiḥ ǀ
>
> kenāpidevenahṛdisthitenayathāniyukto'smitathākaromi ǁ 57 ǁ
>
> That is, as noted above, I know what is good and moral but I am not willing to run through it; I also have knowledge of

[9] See- Parasuraman, S. (2015). *The Panchatantra*. India: Jaico Publishing House. p.93

immoralitybut always feel vulnerable. I feel that some mysterious power govern my choice who is always seated in my heart.[10] (Sukthankar, 1998).

In short, theistic philosophy also makes us feel a little confused with regards to the free will problem. Speculatively speaking, it is a different thing that some may consider the aforementioned limits as a limit of life (birthplace, death, time and space etc.) i.e. 'existential givenness', various may consider it as a power of the eternal or omnipotent (theological determinism), and some even associate it with sole chance only, which is totally out of control and have got its own existence and the like. Fate, intention, necessity, causation, and human calculations and action etc. notions are the typical part of philosophical as well as scientific thinking, and perhaps their relationship is essential to be speculated for the pursuit of any meaningful goal. Discussion over 'fate' is worth noting, especially with the question of 'meaning of life'. The whole philosophy of life, morality, virtue and meaning of life and so on – have been driven by the notion of freedom of will and choice. In other words, the way moral world can't function without freedom of choice, so though the meaning of life requires free –will (sense of being free in choices).[11]

We all may come to an understanding that it the fate (things outside of our power) or a deterministic world that any of us would like to duck to know our actual worth and place in the unknown world.[12] However, it takes great effort and experience to come up to this stage. As so many humans beings live and die without facing any philosophical crisis of freedom and choices, for them, such discussion would be nothing more than nit-picking. Anyway, our responsibility is to examine whether such a crisis exists or we essentially make some sort of rational bluffing. So the question ascends — are we truly free? We mean, on the one hand, most of us have a clear sense that we are free. We feel that our choices are thoroughly governed by ourselves. And all of sudden, on the other hand, find ourselves in a deep sense of existential crisis when get to know that there are varieties of factors (internal and external) which determine our choices and way of life. The later approach presents a daunted challenge in front of us to know whether we are that much powerful to

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[10]Sukthankar, V. S. (1998). *On the Meaning of the Mahabharata*. India: Motilal Banarsidass.p.62

[11]Free will is often considered as the ability to choose between different possible courses of action unimpeded. See- Omoregie, J. (2015). *Freewill: The degree of freedom within*. UK: Author House .p.77

[12]German philosopher Martin Heidegger once echoed that we have been thrown in this world. With such expression, Heidegger aimedto describe humans' individual existences as being 'thrown' into the world. To some extent , the question of free choices also applies to *Heideggerian* ontological quest to know whether we are truly and absolutely free …

encounter any external forces and events so that we can present ourselves as the sole authority of our life.

Traditional arguments for incompatibilism (hard-determinism) and fatalism, as précised above, are based on an "intuition pump", which put forward that if a person is like other mechanical things that are determined in their behaviour such as a robot, then people can't have free will. Another argument for hard-determinism is that of the "causal chain". Most hard – determinists reject the idea that freedom of action consists simply of "voluntary" behaviour. They contend, rather, that free will means that someone must be the "ultimate" or "originating" cause of his actions. Being responsible for one's choices (self-caused) is the first foundation of those choices, where the first cause means that there is no antecedent cause of that cause. The argument, then, is that if a person has free will, then they are the ultimate cause of their actions. If determinism is true, then all of a person's choices are caused by events and facts outside their control. So, if anything someone does is caused by events and facts outside their control, then they cannot be the ultimate cause of their actions. Therefore, they cannot have free will.

(II)

As a result, the aforementioned existential crisis appealto us to ponder upon the question: do we have control over our actions, and if so, what sort of control, and to what extent?One pragmatic loss of not understanding such existential demand has been well consumed by the modern technologist. With the help of behavioural psychologists,modern technologists to gain profit by controlling the desires and wishes of an individual have sharply presented a challenge in front of us. Aldous Huxley's position, which can help us to grasp the modern freedom and free will crisis, in his dystopian masterpiece ''Brave New World'' had been the same. Huxley argues that earlier our freedom was snatched from us with force, but now with the help of technology and drugs, we offer it own our own as if it seems a burden to us.[13] We mean conditioning of the human mind has become quite easy which presents a sharp challenge to freedom of choice and to the feeling that life has meaning with which modem man seems to be more susceptible. In other words, the moment we lose or vanishes the sense of being in dichotomies or dilemmas of choices, we should be instantly cautious whether we are choosing feely or else.

To a very large extent, we may accept the crisis put forward by external determinism in the form of anything whether force or compulsion or whatever since still we have the power to respond and assert the situation in

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[13]Huxley, A. (2008). Brave New World. United Kingdom: Random House.p.31

our way.[14] As a stoic philosopher, Epictetus famously echoed: "Man, what are you talking about? Me in chains? You may fetter my leg but my will, not even Zeus himself can overpower."[15](Epictetus, 1890) But the real problem occurs when we ourselves contradict the philosophy of free will by being slaves to our desires, instincts and so on.[16] One may say that it is our choice and way of life to be whatever we wish to be, then where are we lacking the freedom of choice? It is, in fact, an argument based on ignorance that miscues the facts that freedom comprises in rational choices (harmony between choice and action), and since any sort of conditioning (desires and instincts slavery) contradicts it, then we are fundamentally hypnotized than being truly free. We forget the very distinction between need and conditioning (compulsion). To overcome this ignorance, we need to ask – isn't a reasoned contradiction to have a dichotomy in our choice and action?

Richard Rorty's famous dictum ''*Take care of freedom and truth will take care itself*''[17]may also convey lots of connotations in a very few words which suggest that man is all about freedom and freedom only, and all the other things come later. Of course, it is a complex phenomenon that inculcates lots of things in a prima-facie manner. Freedom, in other words, doesn't mean that we are allowed to do all the things which don't make any sense with reasoning, responsibility and social structure and so on. In fact, the idea of Freedom, without any doubt, is essentially a primary conjecture to all of the moral human activity and to make them meaningful too. And it is also the foundation of ethics that guides our public as well as private life and consequently formulate practical ethics. When Kant echoed freedom to be one of the essential components (pre-postulate) of being a moral agent, he means that between the old age dichotomy of good and pleasant, reason and instinct; it is the reason and the good that must be given the primacy over its counterpart. Therefore, all the life-related questions such as — what is meaning in life? Does anything really matter? How can life achieve lasting significance? How can we explain the human propensity to struggle for ideals? How is meaning related to contentment, happiness, joy? Is meaning something we discover, or do we create it? What is the nature of value, and what are its sources in human experience? Can there be a meaning in life without religious

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[14] Typically, we have three classification of determinism. It is causal, logical and theological determinism…

[15]*The Discourses of Epictetus: With the Enchiridion* and Fragments. (1890). United Kingdom: G. Bell and sons.p.6

[16]Sartre Calls It The Condition of '*Bad Faith'*. See-Sartre, J., Barnes, H. E. (2003). *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*. United Kingdom: Routledge.

[17] Rorty, P. o. C. L. R. (2006). *Take Care of Freedom and Truth Will Take Care of Itself: Interviews with Richard Rorty*. United Kingdom: Stanford University Press.

faith? What is the meaning of death? Is life worth living? What would enable us to have a love of life?, and the like, principally concern or presuppose freedom in one way or other. As Gazzaniga put it:

> Each of us feels as if we have a storyline for our lives. That narrative suggests to us that we are agents acting of our own free will and can make our very own choices, whether those choices are good or bad, right or wrong. The impression that the narrative — a psychological centre, a self, a control room — exists is an incredibly powerful one, which has even the most strident determinists, at the personal psychological level, questioning the proposition that we are all simply pawns in the brain's elaborate chess game.[18] (Armstrong, 2014)

So how the lack of freedom does affect an individual and social life? The answer is simple following the fact that any doctrine of fate and overpoweringphenomena deprives an individual of meaning and responsibility for their choices. Subsequently, this event makes everything pointless. We neither can be blamed nor praised for anything. Even the praise has to be surrender to fate or to the entity (state, god, chance or whatever) which control it. As we noted above that Free will is closely linked to the concepts of moral responsibility, praise, guilt, sin, and other judgments which apply only to actions that are freely chosen. It is also connected with the concepts of advice, persuasion, deliberation, and prohibition. Traditionally, only freely willed actions are seen as deserving credit or blame. And surprisingly, any argument in the favor of this doctrine that 'if fate exists, we can't be responsible for anything' get clearance. All we have to do is to echo – 'don't blame us for anything; it is all about Fate! But Part of the reason why the question seems so hard to find a conclusive answer is that it is always framed in objective terms as if we might discovereither Free Will or Determinism could be an advisable interpretation for human beings in general.

But, in truth, the debate becomes more interesting and more relevant if we change the parameters of the question – and ask simply: is an idea of Free Will or of Determinism more or less relevant to me? All of us will have different needs in this area depending on our contrasting levels of two psychological qualities: Fatalism, on the one hand, Aspiration on the other. We have discussed the former one above. Now let's focus on aspiration which is also an integral part of any meaningful life. But it doesn't mean that this

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[18]Armstrong. Walter Sinnott (2014). . *Moral Psychology, Volume 4: Free Will and Moral Responsibility.* United States: MIT Press. p.59

philosophy of aspiration is free from lacunas. The difficulty with the philosophy of ambition is that it focuses on the overly exaggerated notions of Free Will. Those who practice it estimate that everything about their lives is capable of change. They will declare that they can achieve all things simply through an exercise of will. Their career and income, their relationships and prospects are all, apparently, subject to dramatic change. It's an inspiring philosophy, but one that reliably also leads – when things don't work out, as they never do in all areas – to bitterness and rage. Therefore, each of us needs to decide for ourselves whether we should have greater faith in Determinism or in Free Will. We should ask how much of the suffering in our lives can be traced back to a defeatist attitude and how much might be traced back to reckless aspiration. In other words, some of us need to subscribe to absolute Free Will, while others may need more of a mature acceptance of a Deterministic worldview. As Plato writes ''…We must accept what happens as we would accept the fall of dice, and then arrange our affairs in whatever way reason best determines.''[19] (Plato, 1992)

So when we have largely invaded with free will and determinism debate, what is the wisest way to circumnavigate the argument between the two? How can we find the calming response to the question ''am I free to choose,''? Perhaps the stoics' and existentialists compatibilist position or Aristotelian and Buddhist golden mean path can be the best way to find some calming position. Stoics, for an instance, proposed that we should always try to balance between a Free and a determined state through proper understanding of what is in our control and what's not. This virtue (balance in life) has been the part of philosophers, saints and sages thinking toaccustom us to life and its limit. Reason and virtue enable us to meditate with considerable accuracy about the path of destiny, which offers us a chance, distinctive among living beings, to increase our sense of autonomy by ensuring a good solution to the old age dichotomy of 'good' and 'pleasant'. Virtue allows us to calculate when our wishes are in irreversible conflict with reality and then bids us to submit ourselves willingly, rather than angrily or bitterly, to necessities. We may be powerless to alter certain events, but we remain free to choose our attitude towards them, and it is in an unprotecting acceptance of what is truly necessary then we can find a distinctive serenity and freedom. The argument is simple, if everything happens by fate, then nothing is 'up to us'. But as we

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[19]Plato, Grube, G.M.A. Reeve, C.D.C. (1992).*Republic (Grube Edition)*. Hackett Publishing Company. p 275

know there are lots of things which we can control. So, everything doesn't happen by fate.[20]

But how would we know what is virtue? Or what is rational[?] Or what is in our control and what is not? Or what are our limits? In this regard, the stoic position seems quite solid and practical as well. Their notion of virtue helps us to determine what is in our control and what is not. In other words, the stoics' notion of virtue simply scrutinizes what is our own action and what is not.My action implies that which is determined by my own reason and will, and except for such actions, all our actions are outside of control and should be left to fate to live a good life. Those who have a sharp understanding of such rational demands also knows the ways to complement determinism and free will. We may grasp the above question answer in the following Epictetus expression: "Some things are up to us and some are not up to us. Our opinions are up to us, and our impulses, desires, aversions – in short, whatever is our own doing. Our bodies are not up to us, nor are our possessions, our reputations, or our public offices — in short, whatever is not our doing…"[21] *(Epictetus, 1890)* If we rope our happiness to things, not within our control, be it wealth, beauty, social status or even our health, we will suffer unnecessarily. For chance, limits, luck, randomness, or whatever one wishes to call it, plays a considerable role in each person's life. We can easily lose the external goods or great compliment on which, in ignorance, we base our happiness, or even fail to attain them in the first place. As Cicero put the beautiful question in this regard:

> …If there were no such word at all as fate, no such thing, no such force, and if either most things or all things took place by mere casual accident, would the course of events be different from what it is now? What is the point then of harping on fate, when everything can be explained by reference to nature and fortune without bringing fate in?[22] (Cicero, 2014)

Thus It becomes worth noting fact that acceptance of aforesaid does not have to lead to fatalistic resignation in the assumption that because some things are out of our control, so too is our well-being. As Epictetus explained,

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[20] Sartre existentialist argument also affirm this approach that obviously there are lots of things which limits us and are out of control , but still the ultimate shot of choice requires an individual response which he /she can't escape except through 'Bad –faith' (cheating) .

[21]Epictetus. (1890). *the Discourses of Epictetus: With the Encheiridion and Fragments*. United Kingdom: G. Bell and sons.p.11

[22] Cicero, M.T. (2014). *Delphi Complete Works of Cicero (Illustrated).* Delphi Classics.p.2799

"it is not things that trouble us, but our judgments about things"[23]*(Epictetus, 1890)* in other words, because we can control our judgments, the quality of our life is also within our control. To sum up, we may formulate that to live a 'good life', we must develop a reasoned and virtuous tendency to decide what is in our power and what is not. What we should pursue and what should be left untouched? And let these things be decided by reason, virtue and universal reason and so on. It was the things that Indian sages, Nietzsche, Sartre and Camus indicated and stoics empathically proposed i.e. follow the philosophy of *Amor fati* (love of fate).[24]As Nietzscheechoed :

> I want to learn more and more to see as beautiful what is necessary for things; then I shall be one of those who make things beautiful. *Amor fati*: let that be my love henceforth! I do not want to wage war against what is ugly. I do not want to accuse; I do not even want to accuse those who accuse. Looking away shall be my only negation. And all in all and on the whole: someday I wish to be only a Yes-sayer…[25](Nietzsche, 1999)

In other words, there are certain laws in nature or in the human world that cannot be rehabilitated, and so, ought to be acknowledged to live life in serenity. For an instance, the law of causation in nature or any other law and the place of society, culture and individual genetics have to be accepted in one way or another. Such things are like the thrown dice that we have to arrange reasonably and virtuously as it is the wisest option one can have. Those who do the task with wisdom and ease lives life in serenity, otherwise, self-invited calamity is foreseeable. Philosophically we know this theory as soft-determinism or Compatibilism. This theory is based on the notion that free will and determinism are mutually compatible, and that it is certainly possible to believe in both without being logically inconsistent. In short, to live a good life with our limits and strength, we need to segregate between 'free will' and 'desiring omnipotence' because power is often misconceived with having free will. Those who have the understating of this do not have to struggle with life perplexityies as they know (capable) how to arrange all the affairs of it. So with the present composition, we looked into the matter of having free choice while discussing the varieties of concerning notions such as choice, freedom, action, external or internal force, the meaning of life and so on. We also

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[23] Ibidem

[24] It is worth noting thing that this philosophy of '*amorfati*' is quite different form fatalists' way of life. Former stands for life affirmation since it provide space for actions and courage; while the later one is life negating, leaving everything up to the unknown.

[25]Golomb, Jacob. Lehrer Ronald, Santaniello Weaver. *Nietzsche and Depth Psychology*. (1999). United States: State University of New York Press.p.61

concluded that the oldest debate of determinism and free will in philosophy isn't beyond answering, and there are lots of ways to harmonies them, Compatibilism is one of them. The presentation of the argument in favour of determinism is not to promote nihilism rather hopes and ways. In a nutshell, becoming aware of the questions, philosophy and arguments-counterarguments of freewill can actually make our existence a little more autonomous and meaningful too.

THE STATUS OF THE ETHICAL THEORY OF ŚRIMADBHAGAVADGĪTĀ: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

KRISHNA PAUL

The Bhagavadgītā occupies the central place in the ethical history of Indian philosophy. It is the quintessence of Hindu culture and the sum and substance of Indian philosophical theory and practice, metaphysics and ethics, religion, mysticism, tradition etc. For millions of people it is the gospel of truth, the message of divine life and an inspiring and stimulating ideal for the conduct of life. Anyone, in any social status, sex, religion or society, can derive practical guidance from it. Hence I would like to discuss about the status of the ethical theory of Śrimadbhagavadgītā.

Mainly this article is an attempt to show that ethical theory advocated in Śrimadbhagavadgītā is not deontological as rather it is an amalgamation of ethical egoism, ethical universalism which is popularly known as utilitarianism and also virtue ethics. It starts with ethical egoism and passes through virtue ethics and ultimately reaches at utilitarianism.

Keywords: *Śrimadbhagavadgītā, niṣkāma karma,* virtue ethics, ethical egoism, utilitarianism, *Lokasaṁgraha.*

There is a long controversy regarding whether *niṣkāma karma* is teleological or deontological or something else. The popular notion describes *niṣkāma karma* as deontological. This notion also proposes to identify *niṣkāma karma* with the deontological theory of Kant '*duty for duty's sake*'. I think so long as the verse no 47; chapter II of *Śrimadbhagavadgītā* goes the observation of the above mentioned popular notion is quite justified. This verse runs as

Karmaṇy evā dhikāras te mā phaleṣu kadācana/
mā karmaphalahetur bhūr mā te saṅgo stv akarmaṇi// 2/47

To action alone hast thou a right and never at all to its fruits; let not the fruits of action be thy motive; neither let there be in thee any attachment to inaction.[1] That is, we have the right to perform the action only if we do not have the right to desire the fruit of the action because obtaining or not obtaining the fruit of the action is not in our control and we must not perform the action expecting the fruit of the action, i.e., our fruit of the action must not be the cause of the performing action and that is why we must not give up the action, since we have no hope of fruit.

 This verse clearly says that one has his right upon his act only and not upon the fruits or consequences of one's activity. So, there is no room for ambiguity that *niṣkāma karma* is deontological. But I cannot agree with this view. This popular view is the result of misunderstanding of the real sense of the above verse. This view sees the above verse in isolation from the context.

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[1] Radhakrishnan S. *The Bhagavadgītā*, George Allen & unwin Ltd., 1963, p. 119

But we know that the real sense of any statement can be understood only when it is seen in the light of the context in which it is used. We see that the verse no 47 mentioned above is preceded and succeeded by so many verses where *Kṛṣṇa* repeatedly assures *Arjuna,* the representative of all people living in society, of reaping the consequences of his activity. In the beginning of the second chapter Lord *Kṛṣṇa* describes *ātmatattva,* the real nature of soul. Subsequently, he advises Arjuna to engage in fighting. *Kṛṣṇa* describes the battle of *Kurukṣetra* as *dharmayuddha.* *Kṛṣṇa* reminds *Arjuna* of his *sadharma.* As he is *kṣatriya* his *varṇa – dharma* i.e. *sadharma* is the discharge of the duty of fighting in the battle field. Nothing can be more beneficial to him other than performing his *svadharma.* (*Sadharme nidhanaṁ śreyaḥ paradharma bhayāvaḥ* 3/35). In this context *Kṛṣṇa* takes the help of the verses 33-40 to convince *Arjuna* how he can be benefited if he discharges his noble duty meant for his own *varṇa,* i.e. *Kṣatriya.* These verses are given below:

Atha cettvamimaṁ dharmyaṁ saṁgrāmaṁ na kariṣyasi/
Tataḥ svadharmaṁ kīrtiṁ ca hitvā pāpamvāpsyasi// 2/33

But if thou doest not this lawful battle, then thou wilt fail thy duty and glory and will incur sin.[2] It means if you abstain from fighting you will gain sin and lose your fame and *sadharma.*

Akīrtiñcāpi bhūtāni kathayiṣyanti tehavyayān/
Saṁbhāvitasya cākīrtīrmaraṇādatiricyate// 2/34

Besides, men will ever recount thy ill-fame and for one who has been honored, ill-fame is worse than death.[3] People will blame and criticize you. Death is superior to infame.

Bhayādraṇāduparataṁ maṁsyante tvāṁ mahārathāḥ/
Yesāñca tvaṁ vahumato bhūtvā yāsyasi laghavan// 2/35

The great warriors will think that thou hast abstained from battle through fear and they by whom thou waste highly esteemed will make light of thee.[4] The heroes, great fighters, will think that you are abstaining from fighting due to fear. So, you lose your respect from those who show deep respect to you today.

Avācyavādāṁśca vahūn vadiṣyanti tavāhitāḥ/
Nindantastava sāmarthyaṁ tato duḥkhataraṁ nu kin// 2/36

Many unseemly words will be uttered by thy enemies, slandering thy strength. Could anything be sadder than that?[5] Your enemies also will pass so

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[2] Ibid., p. 112
[3] Ibid., p. 113
[4] Ibid., p.113
[5] Ibid., p. 113

many heinous comments regarding you. What may be more suffering than this?

Hato vā prāpsyasi svargaṁ jitvā vā bhokṣyase mahīn/
Tasmāduttiṣṭa kounteya yuddyāya kṛtaniścayaḥ// 2/37

Either slain thou shalt go to heaven; or victcrious thou shalt enjoy the earth; therefore arise, O Son of *Kunti* (*Arjuna*), resolved on battle.[6] If you die in battle then you will go to heaven but if you win the same then you will enjoy the world. So, stand up and keep engage in fighting.

Sukhaduḥkhe same kṛtvā lābhālābhau jayājau/
Tata yudhyāya yujyasya naivaṁ pāpamavāpsyasi// 2/38

Treating alike pleasure and pain, gain and loss, victory and defeat, then get ready for battle. Thus thou shall not incur sin.[7] If you fight the battle thinking pleasure and pain, loss and gain, wining and defeat alike then you will no more be the subject of sin.

This verse is contradictory. Here one is advised to consider pleasure and pain, profit and loss etc. alike. But it is also said that if one does so then he will no more be the subject of sin. Abstaining from being the subject of sin is obviously a case of profit. So there is a sharp contradiction in this verse. If one has already in his mind the thinking of the profit of being free from sin then how can he consider the profit and loss alike?

Eṣā tehabhihitā sāṁkhye budhiryoge tvimāṁ śṛṇū/
Budhyā yukto yayā pārtha karmavandhaṁ prahāsyasi// 2/39

This is the wisdom of the *Sāṁkhya* given to thee, O Partha (*Arjuna*). Listen now to the wisdom of the Yoga. If your intelligence accepts it, thou shalt cast away the bondage of works.[8] I have dealt with the knowledge of *Sāṁkhya* so far and now I am going to deal with the knowledge of Yoga. If you ascertain the same you can make free yourself from the bindings of your *karma*.

Nehābhikramanāsahasti pratyavāya na vidyate/
Svalpampasya dharmasya trāyate mahato bhayāt// 2/40

In this path, no effort is ever lost and no obstacle prevails; even a little of this righteousness (dharma) saves from great fear.[9] ..... even if someone follows this religious code to a little extend he will be free from great fear.

All the verses mentioned above clearly imply that the ethical theory underlying *Gītā* at least up to verse 40 of chapter-II is teleological but not deontological at all. It is worthy to note that this teleological theory belongs to

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[6] Radhakrishnan S. The Bhagavadgītā, George Allen & unwin Ltd., 1963, p. 113
[7] Ibid., p. 114
[8] Ibid., p. 114
[9] Ibid., p. 116

the category called ethical egoism simply because all above mentioned verses advise *Arjuna* to discharge his *svadharma* since it will promote his own greatest good. Here in order to substantiate our view we can cite what is said by W.K. Frankena *"Teleologists differ on the question of whose good it is that one ought to try to promote. Ethical egoism holds that one is always to do what will promote his own greatest good."*[10]

Thus it is seen that the verses mentioned above advise *Arjuna* to perform *karma* for the sake of consequences of some sort or other. In verse no. 47 *Kṛṣṇa* advises *Arjuna* to discharge *niṣkāma karma*, *"Karmaṇye vādhikāraste mā phaleṣu kadācana. Mā karmaphalaheturbhūrmā te saṁgahastvakarmani"*(2/47). This verse goes up and transcends the desire of consequence. In the subsequent verses *Kṛṣṇa* advises *Arjuna* to uplift himself at the state of *Sthitaprajña* and thereby the ethical teaching of *Gītā* turns into virtue ethics. In this context *Gītā* beautifully explains what should be the real properties of a person who is *sthitaprajña*. *Gītā* explains the same particularly in verse no 55 and 56. They run as follows:

Prajahāti yadā kāmān sarvān pārtha monagatān/
Ātmanyevātmanā tuṣṭaḥ sthitaprajñastadocyate// 2/55

When a man puts away all the desires of his mind, O *Partha* (*Arjuna*), and when his spirit is content in itself, then he is called stable in intelligence.[11] If a person gives up all sorts of desire and remains content in himself then that person is called *Sthitaprajña*.

Duḥkheṣvanudvignamanāḥ sukheṣu vigatasprihaḥ/
Vītarāgabhayakrodhaḥ sthitadhīrmunirucyate// 2/56

He whose mind is untroubled in the midst of sorrows and is free from eager desire amid pleasures, he from whom passion, fear, and rage have passed away, he is called a sage of settled intelligence.[12] The person who remains calm, quite, restless and indifferent both in pain and pleasure, who gets rid of self interest, fear and anger is known as *Sthitaprajña*.

Thus it is seen that two verses advise *Arjuna* to be virtuous. Here someone may think that this type of observation cannot be accepted. How can one and the same *Gītā* propose two rival theories of utilitarianism and virtue ethics? But our close examination shows that in fact there is no contradiction between them, both of them can go hand in hand. They are complementary to each other. How can one perform good work without being good? Again one becomes good gradually through the performance of good work. Perhaps

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[10] W.K. Frankena, *Ethics*, 2nd Edition, Prentice – Hall of India Private Limited, New Delhi – 110001, 1993, P. 15
[11] Radhakrishnan S. *The Bhagavadgītā*, George Allen & unwin Ltd., 1963, p. 123
[12] Ibid., p. 123

keeping this in view *Gītā* advises *Arjuna* to perform *niṣkāma karma* (good work) and to be a good and virtuous person otherwise called *Sthitaprajña*. Here one may think that so far as verses 47, 55 and 56 are concerned the ethical theory of the *Śrimadbhagavadgītā* can be considered as deontological. But I think problem comes when we come across verse no. 19, 20 and 25 of chapter – III. In verse no. 19 *Kṛṣṇa* says

Tasmādsaktaḥ satataṁ kāryaṁ karma samācara/
Asakto hyācaran karma paramāpnati pūruṣaḥ// 3/19

Therefore, without attachment, perform always the work that has to be done, for man attains to the highest by doing work without attachment.[13] *Kṛṣṇa* advises *Arjuna* to perform his action being detached from the desire of fruits and if he does so he will attain his ultimate goal.

Again *Kṛṣṇa* says of *lokasaṁgraha*, in verse 20 of third chapter

karmaṇaiva hi saṁsiddhimāsthitā janakādyaḥ/
Lokasaṁgrahamevāpi saṁpaśyan kartumarhasi// 3/20

It was even by works that *Janaka* and others attained to perfection. Thou shouldest do works also with a view to the maintenance of the world.[14] And also verse 25 of third chapter *Kṛṣṇa* explain the concept of *Lokasaṁgraha.*

Saktāḥ karmaṇy avidvāṁso yathā kurvanti bhārata/
kuryād vidvāṁs tathā 'saktaś cikīrṣur lokasaṁgraham// 3/25

As the unlearned act from attachment to their work, so should the learned also act, O *Bharata* (*Arjuna*), but without any attachment, with the desire to maintain the world-order.[15]

Here *Kṛṣṇa* advises *Arjuna* to perform his action for the sake of promoting the wellbeing of society and thereby the ethical theory of the *Gītā* which was *niṣkāma* turns into ethical universalism which is popularly known as utilitarianism. To substantiate our view the definition of utilitarianism given by W.K.Frankena may be referred to. "*Ethical universalism, or what is usually called utilitarianism, takes the position that the ultimate end is the greatest general good that an act or rule of action is right if and only if it is, or probably is, conducive to at least as great a balance of good over evil in the universe as a whole as any alternative would be, wrong if it is not, and obligatory if it is or probably is conducive to the greatest possible balance of good over evil in the universe.*"[16] So, as long as this definition of utilitarianism

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[13] Radhakrishnan S. *The Bhagavadgītā*, George Allen & unwin Ltd., 1963, p. 138
[14] Ibid., p. 139
[15] Ibid., p. 141
[16] W.K. Frankena, *Ethics*, 2nd Edition, Prentice – Hall of India Private Limited, New Delhi – 110001, 1993, pp. 15-16

goes it is very clear that *niṣkāma karma* suggested by the *Gītā* is a case of utilitarianism.

Conclusion:

So far as our discussion is concerned it is established that the ethical teaching of *Śrimadbhagavadgītā* is not deontological at all; rather it is teleological. It starts with ethical egoism, passes through virtue it ethics and ultimately reaches at ethical universalism which is popularly known as utilitarianism.

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NATURE OF SELF -AWARENESS : PRIVACY AND BEYOND

SANCHAYAITA SEN

*In this paper I have made an attempt to discuss whether the privacy of self-awareness is admissible or not. The paper contains two main sections. In **Section 1**, Ihave discussed some plausible accounts about the nature of self-awareness where different layers of self are being accepted. I have specifically discussed two views. At first, I have put forward the general viewpoint of the phenomenologists showcasing how they differentiate between pre-reflective and reflective self-awareness. In the context of discussing the differences between these two kinds of self-awareness, I have also tried to briefly discuss about the notion of immediacy of self-awareness. After that I have discussed how Kristina Musholt claims that self-awareness has two stages, namely implicit and explicit. In order to establish her view, Musholt has used some arguments from cognitive science, which I have tried to briefly state here. Then I have tried to establish that we can accept two different layers of self-awareness. The first layer is named pre-reflective self-awareness by the phenomenologists and implicit self-awareness byMusholt. Although pre-reflective self-awareness and implicit self-awareness are not identical by nature but I believe that these two share the common sort of privacy. And then, we can admit another layer of self-awareness that is called reflective self-awareness by the phenomenologists. And if we go by Musholt's view it is called explicit self-awareness. I think both, reflective self-awareness and explicit self-awareness have the same kind of lack of privacy, meaning, they both are communicable. On the basis of these two viewpoints, in **Section2** I have tried to discuss that there is a fragmentation in the structure of self-awareness. On one hand, there is a fundamental part of self-awareness that is private and only accessible to the subject, hence we should not completely abandon the notion of privacy of self-awareness, and on the other hand there is another complex layer of self-awareness which is not private. And in the last part of the Section 2, I have tried to provide an answer to these two questions: Why do we still need to retain the private self-awareness? Why do we need to admit another kind of self-awareness that is not private and comparatively more meaty than the other form of self-awareness?*

Nature of Self - Awareness : Privacy and Beyond

Self and self-awareness are probably two of the most familiar phenomena to us. They are treated as the hallmark of our mental lives. Self-awareness is also very often characterised by privacy because traditionally it is believed that what is presented to a subject in self-awareness is accessible to the subject only. But, is self-awareness really as private as it seems? Can we explain the nature of self-awareness without accepting a communication with other subjects? Can there at all be an explicit and distinct self-knowledge if an individual is absolutely detached from any sort of social interaction? A bit of reflection would suggest a negative answer to these questions. Even before getting into any deep philosophical analysis, at least from a common man's perspective we can say that social interactions and communication do play a very important role in how we see ourselves. In this article, I would endorse

the same point of view along with some philosophical arguments. But, the discussion does not end here. If we admit that complex social interactions constitute our self-awareness, then another very important question arises that is, does this account of self-knowledge completely lambast the traditional Cartesian theory of a private self? And, if it does, then can that be done on a solid logical ground? In other words, the question can be put like this: Can we completely dismiss Cartesian theory of a private self and still provide both philosophically and pragmatically sound theory of self and self-awareness? I assume that it is not very easy to completely abandon the notion of privacy in our understanding of self. So, a better way to deal with this problem is to admit different kinds of self-awareness, and claim that there is one minimal layer of self-awareness that is and will always be private in every sense. However, the privacy factor does not exhaust the nature of self and self-knowledge. There is another layer of self-awareness which is way more complex and it is a product of public communication, social interaction and is recognition of perspectival differences. So, the second kind of self-awareness is not private.[1]

In this article I will try to articulate some arguments from both the perspectives of phenomenology and cognitive science, to establish that it is philosophically and pragmatically convenient for us to accept two sorts of, rather two layers of self-awareness. One is similar to the notion of Cartesian ego, and the other is a more meaty self-awareness which is not essentially private in the strict sense of the term, because it is built up by means of social interaction, consequentially it is going be publically accessible as well.

SECTION 1

A. Different ways of looking at Self-awareness :
The term 'self-awareness' can be little ambiguous, as there can be more than one way of getting acquainted with the self. Most phenomenologists will agree that there are two layers of self-awareness, namely, pre-reflective and reflective (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008). The former is a minimal form of self-awareness that is known to be the basic structural feature of conscious experiences. Experiences happen for the subject in the most immediate way. Now, one might ask, what is this immediacy? What is it constituted of? Do we call it immediate because we have a private access to this experience? Or, it is immediate because we have authority over it? Or, this immediacy just refers to a peculiar access to the experience. I believe that the incorrigible nature of self-

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[1] However, there are views where philosophers have accepted more than two layers of self-awareness.

awareness stems from the immediacy of self-awareness. The immediacy provides an authority to the owner of the experience and I think that it is the authoritativeness of self-awareness which brings in the incorrigibility factor and not the peculiar access associated with self-awareness. It is a well-known philosophical conviction that due to this immediacy, those experiences are marked as my own experience. This immediate self-awareness has a first personal givenness. This is usually named as 'pre-reflective' self-awareness. In contrast to this, we can admit a second type of self-awareness that is reflective and second order consciousness. Pre reflective self-awareness is not a second order mental state. It is to be understood as the most primary and basic form of consciousness, and it is the most intrinsic feature of consciousness. It is not thematic, subjects are not attentive towards it, and neither can they voluntarily bring about this intrinsic form of consciousness. It is unspoken, non-observational, non-propositional, non-objectifying. It is never directed towards anything. And, most importantly we should not confuse it with any introspective awareness of ourselves. If I voluntarily wish to become aware of it or want to reflect upon it, I can, but this awareness was, is and always will be there prior to any necessary reflection upon it. Thus, it is called 'Pre reflective self-awareness'. It has a non-relational dimension as it is not apprehended in relation to any object.

In contrast to pre reflective self-awareness, reflective self-awareness is explicit, conceptual, propositional, clearly stated and relational. This sort of self-awareness has directedness, and it also takes lower order consciousness as its theme for attention. I can at any time be cognitively aware of this self-awareness, and turn my experience as an object of my consciousness. This form of consciousness is relational in the sense that it occurs with conscious temporal dimension. It also involves self fission[2] on the basis of the variety of experiences. In reflective self-awareness we can distinguish between our reflective awareness and the experience reflected on. So, there is a possible dichotomy between the reflecting experience and the experience reflected on. The reflecting experience takes the experience that is reflected uponas its object of reflection. [3]

Now, one might wonder that if the pre-reflective self-awareness is non-observational, non-relational and non-intentional, moreover subjects are never naturally attentive towards it; then where does this 'mine-ness' of the pre-

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[2] Fission refers to a kind of division of the self.
[3] The whole distinction has been elaborately discussed by Shaun Gallagher an Dan Zahavi in their book *The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive science*

reflective awareness come from? How is this pre-reflective awareness marked as someone's own experience? For, as per the definition of pre-reflective awareness, to hold the mine-ness of experiences or to be aware that a particular experience is mine, a subject needs to reach a second order conscious state where he becomes aware that he is the experiencer. Hence, it might seem more convenient for us to claim that the reflective self-awareness is infallibly marked as mine. But, how can we say that the pre-reflective self- awareness is also marked as 'mine'? One plausible answer to this can be that, the mine-ness of pre-reflective consciousness cannot be proven experientially but it can be proven logically. The logic behind it is very simple, i.e, if an experience is taking place there must be someone who is experiencing it, and in case of pre-reflective awareness, there is no other subject relevant and related to the context who can be possibly held to be the subject of that experience other than the subject himself. On a similar note, it can also be said that an experience can be immediately presented to only one subject and that has to be the same person whose experience is being presented. Another subject cannot get an immediate access to somebody else's pre-reflective awareness. Hence, although the sense of 'I' or the mine-ness of the pre-reflective self-awareness may not be present experientially in a substantial way, but there can be provided a credible logical alternative for accepting the mine-ness of pre-reflective awareness. The pre-reflective self-awareness admitted by the phenomenologists is first-personal and private. But the reflective awareness on the contrary is linguistically presentable. It is not completely first personal and egocentric as it occasions an inner pluralization in the sense that it involves self-distantiaition. Husserl (1973) has suggested that the reflective self-awareness is accentuated as it discloses, disentangles, explicates and articulates all the components and structures of our lived experiences which were otherwise implicitly contained in us. Reflective self-awareness offers us conceptual articulation of our experiences. The phenomenologists also claim that every conscious experience entails a minimal, pre-reflective self-consciousness (e.g. Zahavi 2005). So, they have distinguished between reflective and pre-reflective self-awareness.

While talking about these two kinds of self-awareness let me discuss Jose Luis Bermudez's take on self-awareness. Bermudez explains in his text called *The Paradox of self-consciousness*(2017) that when an individual is cognitively competent enough to have self-conscious thoughts and she is using the first person pronoun 'I' to refer to those thoughts as her own, there must be a set of capacities which is common to both the competencies, i.e, forming self-conscious thoughts and using self-referential language. Now the question

arises, how is this ability to think 'I'-thoughts to be explained? 'I'-thoughts are said to be dependent on a specific kind of evidence base, namely on information about the subject that is immediately accessible to the subject. These types of information include information about occurring mental and bodily states. For example, perception and proprioception, both of which provide the subject with non-conceptual, first-personal content. Perceptionis defined as something that provides the perceiver not just with information about the environment, but necessarily, also with the information about the perceiving subject. Proprioception provides the organism with information regarding the state of the body, such as its position in space, or its balance. Hence, it is argued that the content of perception and proprioception provides the subject with information that is about itself. In addition to that, this information is thought to be immune to error through misidentification. And, according to Bermudez, both perception and proprioception can be treated as the most basic and non-conceptual form of self-awareness and 'I'-thoughts.

Moving on to Kristina Musholt's discussion of self-awareness where we must note in the beginning that she has significantly differed with Bermudez's view in her opinion on this topic. Musholt preferred to distinguish consciousness from self-consciousness. We should not misinterpret that what is pre-reflective consciousness for the phenomenologists must be consciousness for Musholt, as she has clearly mentioned that she has no intention of rephrasing the pre-reflecting awareness as 'consciousness'. Musholt further distinguishes between implicit self related information and explicit self related information. She upholds that, both perception and proprioception provide the organism with implicit self-related information. She also claims that only the explicit self related information can provide the subject with thoughts that are known by the subject to be about itself. Hence, only the explicit self related information qualifies as self-awareness. In the context of discussing the notion of implicit and explicit self related information she brings in the notion of 'fact' and, following Dienes and Perner (1999), she quotes in her article named "Self-awareness and intersubjectivity".

> "fact is explicitly represented if there is an expression
> (mental or otherwise) whose meaning is just that fact; in
> other words, there is an internal state whose function is to
> indicate that fact". (Dienes and Perner 1999)

This means that a fact is represented explicitly when the mental state contains an element that directly refers to the fact in question. In contrast, a fact or state of affairs will be called implicit when the mental state in question does not embrace an element that directly refers to this fact, but this fact is

conveyed only as a part of the related function of the mental state. Now, Musholt upholds that, Bermudez is correct in pointing out that perception always takes place from a specific egocentric perspective and hence it is necessarily self-related. He has also correctly pointed out that proprioception gives the subject some information regarding its bodily states. However, this does not necessarily imply that the information is also explicitly represented as being about the subject. Rather, because perception always occurs from a unique ego-centric perspective, and because proprioception always gives information about a subject's bodily states, in these two cases self is in fact not explicitly represented. For, there is no need for the organism to keep track of the subject of its perceptual and proprioceptive states. These states can take place even without referring to the subject in question, explicitly. Musholt has argued elsewhere that the self should be understood as an 'unarticulated constituent' (Perry, 2000) of perception and proprioception. These states can occur and be unrecorded. The information that is given by perception and proprioception is implicitly self-related only because it is a part of the function of perception and proprioception to provide information that is related to the subject. That information can be used for the guidance of intentional action. But this must be differentiated from explicit self-representation where the information is explicitly represented as being about the subject. In other words, we need to distinguish between being in a particular perceptual or bodily state and explicitly ascribing this state to a subject. It is one thing to be conscious and another thing to be self-conscious, the former is implicitly done but the latter is essentially explicit. The explicit representation of the subject of my perception, i.e, myself, comes into play when I compare my own perception and my egocentric perspective with that of another subject. For example, I can see a my phone on the table beside my laptop, but someone else cannot, because his visual access to my phone is blocked by some other object that is located between my phone and the person. Now, once I realize that this is the case, I might come to the explicit thought that I can see the phone and she cannot. This at once provides me with an understanding of a certain mental state being mine and not anybody else's. Here is when my self-representation becomes explicit and qualifies as self-awareness. Hence, according to Musholt, explicit self-representation or the real self-awareness comes into play when the organism is aware of the fact that there are other individuals with mental and bodily states similar to ours, and when it begins to contrast them with its own. I think that there is a simple insight that comes out here, that is,if there is only one subject in the entire world then there is no need for the subject to recognise her awareness as 'her awareness'.

Now, more interestingly Musholt has talked about different stages of building self-awareness, and tried to show that the self-awareness gradually grows from implicit to explicit forms, through different stages. She says that if I want to recognise that other beings have bodily and mental states like me, and I must contrast these with my own, at first I need to be in a position to recognize the similarity between me and others. I must have the ability to match the information I receive about others, from a third person perspective, with the information I receive about myself, from the first person ego-centric perspective (Barresi & Moore 1996). A first requirement for this recognition is that conspecifics must be recognized as such. According to an empirical survey, in human beings, there are a number of inborn mechanisms that certify that infants identify members of their own species. For instance, neonates attend to stimuli with face-like arrangements of elements (Johnson & Morton 1991). Moreover, already at the time of birth, infants can favourably attend to human speech over other auditory input. By 4 days they are able to discriminate components of their mother tongue from those of other languages (Mehler, 1988). Also, infants can distinguish animate from inanimate movement and young children use potential movements as the basis for discriminating between photos of animates and in-animates (Massey &Gelman 1988). This shows us that humans have innate attentional preferential factors that cause them to treat conspecifics as individual subjects and not as inanimate objects. Empirical evidence also suggests that in humans some such matching mechanism do exist in very early stages, and might even be innate, such that

> "infants, even newborns, are capable of apprehending the equivalence between body transformations they see and the ones they feel themselves perform" (Meltzoff 1990).

However, Musholt says that at very early stages of social interaction, infants does not have an explicit representation of a self-other matching, or a self-other binary distinction. The content of representations at these stages is definitely non-conceptual and implicit, and it does not need any explicit distinction between self and other, neither any explicit depiction of an intentional relation. In this stage, there is no differentiation between self and other whatsoever. Studies of early infant imitation are similar to the phenomenon of emotional contact, where the perception of an emotional expression by another subject causes the experience of that same emotion in oneself, and thus there is no differentiation between the other's emotion and one's own. Because there is no self-other distinction at this level and hence no awareness of other subjects as such. Social interactions and the

representations allied with infants get to a new quality from about the age of 9 to 12 months. At this age, infants enter into situations of shared attention and intentionality. Within the developmental literature, these are called forms of "secondary inter-subjectivity", in contrast to the so-called forms of "primary inter-subjectivity" (Trevarthen 1979). At this stage, infants start synchronizing their object-directed behaviour with their person-directed behaviour, that is, they move from purely dyadic forms of interaction to triadic forms of interaction. In other words, they begin to engage in shared intentional relations. For instance, they will follow the gaze or the specific gestures of another person to an object of interest, and exhibit "shared attention" towards that object (Tomasello et al. 2005). This also proposes an implicit understanding of others as perceivers. Moreover, infants at this age will start developing social referencing, such as receiving emotional information from their caregivers to control their own behaviour in situations that are perceived as intimidating (e.g. Feinman 1982). Children at this age will also begin to display communicative signals, such as pointing gestures (Bates 1979). However, neither shared attention, nor social referencing, nor the ability to pointing imply the explicit attribution of mental states to others, for they do not require the distinction between propositional attitudes and propositional contents. That is to say that children at this age do not understand mental representations as such, so they are not able to understand, for instance, that mental states can misrepresent.

According to Musholt when children pass the famous false belief tasks, which is usually the case at around 4 years of age, at this stage, they become able to explicitly represent belief states as states they are able to differentiate other people's beliefs from one's own beliefs. At this level, children possess a theory of mind that is explicitly represented. This is further supported by the strong connection between linguistic abilities and the understanding of beliefs and folk psychology (P. A. de Villiers 2005; Zlatev 2008). Once the child has acquired the appropriate linguistic skills that facilitate explicit theory-of-mind reasoning, it can also begin to engage in inner speech. It is believed that inner speech plays an important role for explicit self-awareness, in the sense of explicit self-reflection. According to Morin, inner speech initiates socially caused practice of talking and reflection upon oneself into an inner experience. As Morin points out, this idea was already expressed by Mead (1912/1964), who argued that inner speech in early childhood serves to make young speakers aware of themselves and their separate existence through an internalization of others' perspectives on oneself. So, inner speech would replicate social feedback and changes in perspectives, thereby internalizing it. Moreover, inner speech is thought to facilitate the conceptualization and

labelling of self-related aspects, thus interpreting these aspects more differentiated (Morin 2005). The relation between language acquisition and the development of self-concept is also emphasized by Baker. (Baker 2012)

As we can see, a number of social cognitive skills and forms of inter-subjective are undoubtedly in place before the beginning of linguistic abilities, and are arguably necessary requirements for the development of language. Nonetheless, linguistic abilities seem to be necessary to develop a full-fledged theory of mind as well.

The model Musholt proposed, assumes that the more basic forms of social cognition are retained, such that social cognitive skills become gradually enriched and more complex as implicit information is re-described into a more explicit format. In other words, we have various ways of understanding and interacting with others, some of which are based on implicit information about the mental states of others, others based on explicit representation.

B. <u>Different Layers of Self-Awareness from various perspectives</u>

So, we can see that self-awareness involves a kind of division or fragmentation within it. There are different layers of self-knowledge.

According Musholt's proposed model, one type of self-awareness is implicit the other one is explicit. Here the former does not involve substantial perspectival differentiation where the explicit self-awareness has it. The explicit self-awareness is comparatively a lot more substantial and complex as it requires social interaction (which by nature cognitively complex), awareness of other minds and other subjects. But implicit self-awareness does not involve any of these features, because it is the simplest form of self-awareness as it does not involve any awareness of other minds or any perspectival differentiation.

On a similar note, we have seen phenomenologists talking about two sorts of self-awareness, namely, pre-reflective and reflective self-awareness. And, we have already known how they have differentiated between these two. On the basis of those differences in the phenomenological view also, we are getting to know about two different layers of self-awareness, one is basic and intrinsic and the other is thematic and relational and evaluative. I feel that this whole discussion of different layers of self hints upon that one part of the self is exclusively constituted for the subject, and it is only get represented to the subject. It is not propositional, so it cannot get expressed linguistically. It is intrinsic and rudimentary. It is private in the sense that the subject cannot

express it through complex linguistic tool because it is not something to be articulated by language. Rather it is something to be felt. This self-awareness is equivalent to the mode being of the subject. It is the implicit conscious mode of being that can only be experienced by the subject himself. But, on contrary to this there is another form of self-awareness. That self-awareness is conceptual, explicit. It is that self-awareness which gets constituted involving third person perspective. Here I evaluate myself, I try to understand what I am and how I am for others. The concepts that I apply in this sort of self-awareness are not only constituted within the subject, there are mostly constructed socially. And this is the self-awareness that is not only accessible by the subject only, it is also expressible through language. The information that constitute this self-awareness, are the information about me that other subjects can also have an access to. Things that I know and believe about myself in my explicit self-awareness can also be known by other people as those information are conceptual and propositional.

SECTION 2

A. Discussion of Privacy and Beyond

If we solely subscribe to the Cartesian notion of self, and claim that the self or the soul is the inner most private entity, then mental contents like our thoughts, feelings, emotions, ideas become extremely concealed. They can only be known through introspection, which is again a method to be used only by own self. Then subjectivity is said to be something in which no external elements like public language, third person perspective can have any contribution to in revealing it. In other words, in Cartesian philosophy subjectivity of an individual is impossible to be communicated with other people. Even if we try to express it through interpersonal communication, there is no dependable and definite way of doing it. Whether the subjectivity is being expressed correctly or not cannot be verified in any way. The truest state of mind of that subject remains inside him. But the questions arise:

- Can we admit this amount of privacy of self and self-awareness on logical grounds? Do we still need to retain the private self-awareness?
- Can we not admit another form of self-awareness which is probably not private, rather both constituted and accessible within the repertoire of other individuals? Why do we need the more meaty self-awareness?

Musholt has argued that explicit self-representation which she thinks is the self-awareness in the strict sense of the term, requires the awareness of other subjects and of their similarity to oneself. In this kind of self-awareness one can contrast one's own bodily and mental states with those of others. This awareness develops over the course of an increasingly complex perspectival differentiation and inter-subjective interaction, where I believe language plays an important role. In this explicit self-knowledge, information about self and other which is implicit in early forms of social interaction gets quaified into an explicit format. Hence, there is a gradual transition from implicit to explicit forms of self- and other-representation that leads to an increasingly complex array of social cognitive abilities and, consequently to a development of a clear and distinct self-concept. We can now see how we move from the implicit self-related information in perception and bodily forms of self-awareness to an explicit representation of oneself as a subject among other subjects. In the transition from implicit self-knowledge to explicit self-knowledge there is a crucial role of the embodied inter-subjectivity, which sets a mechanism that allows the matching of first and third person information. I think from Musholt's account we can assume that there is a clear function of communication with other subjects that come into play when an individual tries to constitute an explicit form of self-awareness.

Let me now go to the discussion of the reflective self-awareness admitted vastly in the discourses of phenomenology. Reflective self-awareness has been defined as explicit, conceptual, propositional, clearly stated and relational. It has directedness, and it also takes lower order consciousness as its theme for attention. I can at any time be cognitively aware of this self-awareness. This form of consciousness is taken to be relational in the sense that it occurs with conscious temporal dimension, a dimension where other subjects have very important role to play when the change of perspectives is taking place. Now, I would also like to bring the notion of agency in this context. The sense of agency may be seen as a second order reflective self-knowledge. Agency is dependent on an individual's reflective consciousness, and on an individual's capacity to see himself as responsible for an action from a third person perspective. The kind of conscious knowledge is involved in the sense of agency is very high order, and I would like to say that Musholt's explicit self-representation would incorporate the factor of agency as well. Especially in the attribution sense of agency where I am asked to provide reason behind my actions, the self-knowledge involved in there is an explicit sort of self-knowledge. (Zahavi and Gallagher 2008). Now, Both Musholt's notion of explicit self-awareness and reflective higher order self-awareness involving

agency are apprehended in terms of third person perspectives or alter egos. Moreover, in the constitution of the explicit self-representation and the reflective self-awareness as agent, communication, interaction with other subjects and complex cognitive and linguistic processes are taken to be crucial elements. In other words, they are both constituted in a process where embodied inter-subjective is involved, and they are also expressed and developed in the course of time through embodied inter-subjective interaction. So, at least the higher order explicit self-knowledge does not happen to be a private cocooned self as described in the Cartesian theory. But, I think we cannot claim the same in case of minimal, implicit, pre-reflective self-knowledge. At least, the views that are discussed in this article indicate that the pre-reflective, also the implicit self-representation do not necessarily involve embodied inter-subjective communication. Hence, I think, the Cartesian notion of self that is extremely private and only accessible to the subject himself is admissible only in the context where we are talking about the pre-reflective level of self-awareness. As Musholt has denied to call it pre-reflective awareness, and preferred to call it just 'being conscious', I would say that what she is naming the minimal, implicit, basic form of consciousness can be seen as a self-representation that is private and non-sharable. So, the implicit self-representation about which we get to know in Musholt's view is something that fits into the Cartesian account of self-awareness.

B. Answering the previously mentioned questions in context of what has been said in this paper

Q. Do we still need to retain the concept of private self-awareness?

Yes. We cannot completely dismiss Cartesian theory of a private self as it will not be a credible theory of self-awareness neither philosophically nor pragmatically. We can definitely accept another form of self-awareness that is not private. We can think of a notion of subjectivity whose components are communicable, socially construed. In fact that communicable subjectivity is something with which other individuals get acquainted with. For others, that subject is a person's social identity. But, we must admit that the subject that gets showcased in the society and gets revealed does exhaust our subjectivity. There are lots of other elements in mental repertoire which only gets revealed to one's own self only. That part of the subject remains private. The individual will always have an authoritativeness over it. It does not imply any incorrigibility of self-knowledge. What I know about myself may be wrong, but I do have an authority over it and peculiar access to it. I as an individual may intentionally keep certain part of myself hidden from the public eye. And,

the same privacy can come to pass involuntarily as well. But, the possibility of a privacy of the self remains intact. So, the Cartesian notion of private self is not to be given up completely, neither to be accepted entirely. The Cartesian notion of privacy of self is applicable only to one part of the self or rather to a layer of the self. When an individual experiences something, it may be about herself or about the world, we must admit that there is a subjective character of that experience. And that subjective aspect represents the state of affair exclusively as appeared to the agent engaged with the experience. This aspect reveals what it is like for her to experience it. Here the point of view of the agent is of cardinal importance which is not shared by anyone else. This aspect of self-awareness remains private as the Cartesians uphold.

Q. Why do we need to admit a different kind of self-awareness that is more meaty than the other kind?

Just as the private, non-sharable, non-communicable self-awareness is not to be abandoned completely, a sharable and communicable notion of self-awareness also should not be abandoned completely. We need to accept a meaty version of self-awareness. This form of self-awareness is the one which basically forms our social identity. This self-awareness is not private. People get to know me by this part of the self. This part of self-awareness makes me what I am to other people. With the help of this, we explain the notion of agency. This self-awareness is relational, it is not one – dimensional as it does not only involves the subject but also involves other people both in the constituting aspect and in expressional aspect. This is that substantial self-awareness that introduces me to other's perspective as a specific individual. This layer of self-awareness is not private and it is accessible. It is that identity of the self which keeps evolving over the years. A fundamental component of this self-awareness is how others see me as an individual. And, this is how I would like to subscribe to the view of two layers of self-awareness.

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THE NOTION OF LIFE-WORLD IN HUSSERL'S *CRISIS*: AN OVERVIEW

SUBHAJIT DUTTA

Phenomenology, which started as a movement is mostly identified with the name of Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl. Many famous thinkers were influenced by Husserl's thoughts. These thinkers are Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jacques Derrida, Paul Ricœur and others. Husserl's books, Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy and Cartesian Meditations, are both subtitled 'An introduction to phenomenology'. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology is one of the most complicated works of Husserl. The book Crisis also serves as an introduction to phenomenology. However, Husserl's final significant book, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology is unquestionably a different introduction to his phenomenology. One of the fundamental notions in Husserl's phenomenology is known as the concept of 'Lebenswelt', which means 'life-world'. In his book Crisis, Husserl elaborates on the concept of the life-world. The main goal of this paper is to comprehend the Husserlian interpretation of the notion of the life-world and its connectedness with the transcendental phenomenological project. This paper affords particular focus to the life-world, the epochē of objective science and transcendental reduction. This paper also offers a systematic interpretation of the relationship between the epochē of objective science and transcendental reduction. Husserl's phenomenology's major themes include - the structure of intentionality, natural world thesis, method of reduction, transcendental subjectivity, empathy, embodiment, time-consciousness, the notion of historicity, and intersubjectivity. In general, one does not provide a comprehensive interpretation of the idea of the life-world and its relationship with the transcendental project. This is why the main question we would like to answer in this paper is: Is life-world phenomenology compatible with transcendental phenomenology?

Keywords: Life-world**,** Pre-scientific World, Mathematization of Nature, Epochē, Transcendental Reduction, Transcendental Consciousness, Transcendental Subjectivity, Transcendental Intersubjectivity.

Husserl's New Concept of the World: The Life-world

Husserl initially developed the idea of the world in *Ideas I* and *Idea*s *II*. But in his later works, Husserl promoted a new concept of the world. In the *Crisis* text, for example, he came up with a new way to think about the world, which he calls the 'life-world.' Husserl wished to firmly establish the concept of life-world on the philosophical map. As a result, he realized that his former version of the naturalistic conception of the world needed to be replaced with a more basic concept of the life-world. The notion of the life-world is different from *Ideas I*'s version of the world. When phenomenology was developed in *Ideas I*, the emphasis was on the natural attitude and the natural world thesis. We have also seen that his book *Ideas I* introduced the method of epochē and reduction, and through these methods, we can access transcendental phenomenology. It is true

that the phrase 'life-world' has been used in earlier investigations. But his *Crisis* text presents the novelty of the theory of the life-world. In his book, *Crisis*, Husserl popularized the idea of the life-world as a contrast to the scientific world. Husserl addresses the notion of the life-world in his *Crisis* from a consideration of science. Now let us examine how new the notion of the life-world is. In *Ideas* I, Husserl provided an account of the naturally experienced world as it is perceived by the human consciousness and he also defines 'world' as a 'collective scope of potential inquiries'. However, in the early nineteen-thirties, he began to ground his phenomenology on the life-world to keep room for human communities, cultural dimensions, cultural establishments, transcendental inter-subjectivity, environing-world, living things, and renewal of humanity.

A crude and rudimentary version of the concept of the life-world was already there in 1913's *Ideas I*. In this context, the phrase 'natural world' employed there should not be confused with the notion of 'life-world' as described in the '*Crisis*' text. It has been pointed by David Carr,

> "The strange fact about the Kant-critique in the *Crisis* is that while Husserl takes Kant to task for not recognizing the significance of the liveworld, this is the first time, in Husserl's own writings, that the life-world is accorded this significance. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Husserl's Kant-critique is really a Husserl-critique in disguise, that the inadequate concept of transcendental philosophy that is criticized here is not Kant's but that of the earlier Husserl. It is true that Husserl had not made the mistake of identifying the world with the entities of natural science alone."[1]

It goes without saying that Husserl's criticism of Kant is, in reality, a critique of his own prior views on the subject, which is what he was attempting to demonstrate in Part-III A of the *Crisis* text. First of all, Husserl criticizes Kant for assuming that the world is a scientific world. And secondly, Kant did not distinguish between the world of science and the life-world. Husserl argued that Kant failed to make a clear distinction between Newtonian science's geometrical and mathematical constructions and the everyday life-world. Kant identified the world of ordinary experience with the Newtonian world. As a result, Kant had

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[1] David Carr, *Interpreting Husserl: Critical and Comparative Studies*, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), 88.

neglected and overlooked the importance of the life-world. Moreover, Kant ignored the historical, intersubjective level of the constitution in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. Thirdly, Kant does not have any conception of the structure of the life-world. Kant only focused on the *a priori* of scientific discovery. In his book *Crisis*, Husserl proposes a new distinction that is not found in any of his other publications. This book introduces the distinction between objective-logical *a priori* and the *a priori* of the life-world. According to Husserl, the life-world has its own *a priori* structure. The *a priori* of the life-world includes pre-mathematical, subjective-relative, pre-scientific, pre-theoretical, pre-logical, causality, lived-space, lived-time, horizontal character, etc. On the other hand, objective-logical *a priori* includes gravity, force, motion, resistance, etc. The *a priori* of the life-world is the ultimate basis of meaning for any other *a priori* in the objective sciences. The idealization of the life-world produces the objective-logical *a priori*.

In his work, *Crisis*, Husserl uses many terms to describe the life-world, including 'pre-given surrounding world', 'a realm of subjective phenomena', 'pre-scientific world', 'pre-theoretical world', 'world of everyday experience, 'historical world', 'cultural world', 'the intuitively given surrounding world', 'universal life-world *a priori*', 'pre-scientific experimental life', pre-reflective experience', 'inter-subjective world', 'lived experience', and so forth. Commentators claim that many ambiguities may be found in the notion of the life-world. If we follow Husserl's *Crisis* text and investigate what he says there, we will realize that he has meant several things by the word 'life-world.' As Dermot Moran writes,

> "The term 'life-world' is introduced to supplement—or indeed sometimes replace-- other conceptions, including the 'natural world' (*die natürliche Welt*), 'the intuitively given surrounding world' (*die anschauliche Umwelt*, *Crisis* § 9a; § 59), the 'straightforwardly intuited world' (*Crisis* § 33), the 'taken-for-granted, pregiven world of experience, the world of natural life' (C 204; K 208), the 'environment' (*Umgebung*), the 'world of experience' (*Erfahrungswelt*, *Erlebniswelt*), the world of culture (*Kulturwelt*, Hua IX 113), 'world-life' (*Weltleben*), the 'human world', and so on. The primary meaning of the life-world is, for Husserl, the 'world of everyday

experience' (*Alltagswelt*) or the 'pregiven' surrounding world (C 47; K 47)."[2]

To say the truth Husserl reconstructed the concept of the world in his *Crisis*. According to Husserl, real explanations of the life-world are essentially designed to contrast with the scientist's mathematized world. We can argue that his analysis of the life-world is concerned with the historicity of scientific ideas in a way that goes beyond his previous investigations of the world. In other words, Husserl's depiction of the life-world asserts an interest in the historicity of scientific ideas that extends beyond his previous investigations of the world. In his earlier works, namely, *Ideas I*, *Cartesian Meditations*, and *Formal and Transcendental Logic* Husserl did not develop the ontology of the life-world or mundane phenomenology of the world. The ontology of the life-world should not be confused with Husserl's earlier concept of the world. In his book *Crisis*, Husserl speaks repeatedly of the phenomenon of the 'pre-theoretical' of the life-world. Moreover, in his *Crisis* Husserl distinguished between the world of science and the pre-scientific life-world. Husserl also distinguished between life-world *a priori* and objective-logical *a priori*. Thus, we find that the life-world theme goes beyond his earlier concept of the world.

The World of Sciences and the Life-World:

In his *Crisis of European Sciences,* Husserl presents the life-world as the forgotten meaning foundation of natural sciences. As a result, Husserl wants to return to the world of the pre-scientific and pre-theoretical experience. The life-world is often regarded as the basis for all sciences, as a source of meaning-giving foundation for all sciences. This life-world has been forgotten by modern science because of its formalized character. The return to the life-world is a return to the pre-scientific experience. Scientific thoughts seek to conceal this world. The life-world is pre-given to all scientific theories. It is the field of all human acts. All science legitimizes its logical meaning by its explicit relation to the life-world. Sciences are in crisis because they have lost all connection with their roots and with their fundamental purpose. The practices of sciences are also rooted in the life-world. As a consequence of scientific ideas being imposed on the life-world,

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[2] Dermot Moran, *Husserl's Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction*, (Cambridge: The Cambridge University Press, 2012), 226-226-227.

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we have lost sight of the concept of the life-world. It is essential to note, however, that Husserl is not condemning science. Then, just which element of science does Husserl want to denounce? These points are of course not unrelated. Needless to say, the sciences perform a process of abstract objectivization and pure technicalization, and as a result, they apply these methods to the life-world and mathematicalize the very essence of the life-world.

The concept of the life-world refers to the pre-theoretical world. In other words, the life-world is pre-scientific and pre-mathematical. Life-world is the world that is always given in advance and we do not question its evidence in our daily lives. The life-world is the opposite pole of the 'objective world' of the sciences. The life-world, according to Husserl, is the ultimate framework and horizon of human experience, which also encompasses the scientific conception of the world. The life-world also includes the historical, cultural, and social aspects. It is a dynamic historical horizon for human activity. Life-world is a realm of subjective phenomena. The 'life-world refers to the world that is open to everyone, the world that is fundamentally communal, the world for others. According to Husserl, the life-world is the immediately perceived world. Life-world is "the constant ground of validity"[3], "the source of self-evidence"[4] "the original ground of all theoretical and practical activities"[5], and that which "constantly exists for us"[6]. From what has been discussed so far, it has already emerged that Husserl has both a 'narrow' and 'broad' conception of the life-world. The narrow sense of the life-world excludes the scientific world of ideal objects. On the other hand, the broad sense of the life-world encompasses the scientific world of ideal objects. Life-world is an umbrella term that encompasses the pre-scientific world as well as the social and cultural worlds. Thus, we find that the word 'life-world' has several meanings. Now we have to face some important and puzzling features of Husserl's notion of the life-world. For example:

- Life-world is pre-scientific, but it also includes the theories of sciences as cultural facts.[7]

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[3] Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy,* Trans. David Carr, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 122.
[4] Ibid.,127.
[5] Ibid.,49.
[6] Ibid.,113.
[7] Ibid.,130.

- Life-world is pre-theoretical, but it also includes all theoretical and practical activity. [8]
- Life-world is the theme of a non-transcendental ontology or a mundane phenomenology[9], but it is also a theme of transcendental phenomenology.[10]
- Although Husserl talks of different life-worlds for different historical groups, he also maintains that the concept of plurality does not make sense when applied to it.[11]

In this regard, it is necessary to mention here that Husserl's conception of the life-world performs three distinct tasks. First of all, it provides the grounding function to the natural sciences. The life-world should be regarded as opposed to objective sciences. In this sense, the life-world is the pre-scientific, pre-logical, and pre-theoretical world. Secondly, the life-world provides the guiding function to transcendental phenomenology. In other words, it serves as the royal road into transcendental phenomenology or the notion of life-world provides a new way into the transcendental phenomenology. And thirdly, the notion of the life-world also provides the uniting function. To put it simply, the life-world encompasses different historical worlds. In this regard, the life-world is conceived as a universal field.

The book *Crisis* by Edmund Husserl takes a new approach to transcendental phenomenology. The *Crisis* is a significant departure from earlier introductions to phenomenology. Unlike earlier introductions to phenomenology, which started with a description of the transcendental phenomenological methods without any historical analysis, Husserl's *Crisis* does not start with these methods. The significance of Husserl's *Crisis* text is that Husserl's so-called 'turn' to history can be found explicitly in this book. Husserl's *Crisis* text gives a long analysis of modern Galilean science and modern philosophy. What relevance does this new historical reflection have? It is worth noting that the book *Crisis* differs from Husserl's previous writings in that it includes historical and critical reflections that are integral to the study of phenomenology itself. In his book, *Crisis* Husserl demonstrates that the emergence of scientific objectivism marked the starting of the crisis of European sciences. Through the process of historical reflection,

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[8] Ibid.,130.
[9] Ibid.,142.
[10] Ibid.,148.
[11] Ibid.,143.

Husserl demonstrates that positivist sciences have forgotten their ground. These sciences do not question the foundations of their methodical activities. We may analyze the origins of the crisis of sciences by looking at Husserl's remarkable description of modern contemporary science and Galileo's involvement in it. It goes without saying that the emergence of the concept of the life-world in the *Crisis* demands the requirement of historical reflections. Galileo, according to Husserl, is a key person in the process of the mathematization of nature. According to Galileo, the world is a mathematical manifold. To put it simply, life-world is a book expressed in mathematical symbols. Through the process of idealization, technicalization, and mathematization objective science dresses up the whole life-world. In this way, natural science changes the very conception of the life-world. We saw that Galileo contributed to the sciences of motion, astronomy, etc. But for Husserl, at the same time, he also hides our subjective contributions and focused only on objectivism. Galileo was so preoccupied with the concepts of technicalization, idealization, and mathematization that he forgot about the concept of the life-world. The life-world is the ground on which Galileo carried out the operation of mathematical idealization. Through the historical-teleological analyses, we understand that how Galileo mathematized our human nature and this mathematical method is used in a very technical way. As a result, the sciences consciously have lost their meaning for human life. Science, without a doubt, transcends the life-world. As a consequence, the connection between the life-world and the scientific world has remained largely unnoticed.

Epochē of Objective Science:

Disconnection of scientific interests is a fundamental aspect of the 'epochē of objective science.' Husserl meticulously articulated the fact that scientific praxis evolves in the life-world. There is a notable difference between the *Crisis* and the earlier works. In *Ideas*, *I*, for example, Husserl proposes to phenomenological epochē the natural world. With this phenomenological epochē, we hold in abeyance the question concerning the existence of the world. But in his *Crisis*, he proposes to epochē the world of sciences, which he called the 'epochē of objective science.' Instead of bracketing the whole world, he holds in abeyance the questions concerning the real determination of the abstract world of science as a means to unearth the life-world. This indicates a new aspect of Husserl's *Crisis* text. Under the epochē of objective science, we refrain from following the theoretical guidance of science; we suspend the theories of science and take them

out of action. All kinds of scientific induction find their base in the life-world via the process of the 'epochē of objective science.' With the help of this first step we can grasp the life-world as it is, and we are also able to experience our historical-cultural reality. If we want to view the life-world, then we need to get rid of the objectivist bias of the sciences. As Husserl points out in the *Crisis*, this first reduction must apply to the field of objective natural sciences and their methods. This first, step lies in "an epochē in regard to all objective theoretical interests, all aims and activities belonging to us as objective scientists or even simply as [ordinary] people desirous of [this kind of] knowledge."[12]

While performing the first step we set aside the objective-scientific opinions and cognition. The phenomenologist can only confront the life-world after completing the epochē of the objective science. As a result, the world will not be understood as a conglomerate of entities reducible to atomic or subatomic particles, arrays of chemical elements and molecules, point or distributed masses with coordinates in a three-dimensional Cartesian plane, and so on. First and foremost, the notion that objectivistic, formal, and mathematical science is the only valid discourse should be set aside. For too long, we have taken science for granted. We can only evaluate a world without science through the epochē of objective science. The scientific world threatens to hide the life-world. The scientific world conceals the life-world. It is only after performing the epochē of objective science we can evaluate the life-world. As a result, returning to the life-world may assist in the process of disabling the objectivistic inclination of sciences to some level. The fact that we have put a bracket around the concept of objective science does not imply that we desire to live in a world where there is no objective science. In other words, bracketing the notion of objective science does not indicate that we want to live in a world without objective science. In this regard Husserl writes in the *Crisis*: "Within this epochē, however, neither the sciences nor the scientists have disappeared for us who practice the epochē."[13] As a cultural fact of the life-world objective science continues to exist in the life-world. We have no intention of abandoning our conceptions of objective sciences. However, the foregoing interpretations may give the mistaken impression that Husserl does not believe in the validity of science and that he is developing a Lebensphilosophie. As we have seen, Husserl's concern with the European crisis was what prompted him to begin his investigation into the nature of the life-world. Nevertheless, as we will see, his

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[12] Ibid.,135
[13] Ibid.,136.

ultimate purpose was not to dwell in such an analysis, but rather to carry it out and then return to its foundation and source. To say the truth, Husserl had seen the legitimacy of the life-world from the standpoint of transcendental reduction.

Transcendental Reduction:

As we have seen in the previous section, the epochē of objective science is not enough to understand the goal of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, because this does not tell us the true meaning of the achievements of positive science. Rather, it only re-discovers or re-establishes the proper notion of science. Husserl's commentators have significantly divergent views on the nature of the life-world. Merleau-Ponty and other existentialist thinkers hold that Husserl renounced his transcendental project in favour of the life-world. Here, we will show that such an explanation is a little too simplistic. In this regard David Carr writes that: "Those who claim that in the *Crisis* Husserl makes a conscious and explicit break with the idealistic or transcendental aspects of his phenomenology have surely not read the *Crisis* carefully and are probably basing their opinion on certain remarks by Merleau-Ponty."[14] Husserl's ultimate stance was that the life-world is a result of the transcendental constitution. Husserl clearly indicates that the life-world is not instantly accessible since everyone is shaped by his or her cultural context. Moreover, the scientific interpretation of the world fascinates the western person. In other words, the scientific understanding of the world has a strong impact on Western man in particular. Consequently, historical reflection and the epochē of objective science are required to unveil the life-world. After we have completed these processes, we will be in a position to investigate the ontology of the life-world. We might clarify "the a priori of the life-world"[15] and develop "the ontology of the life-world"[16] after performing the life-worldly reduction. According to Husserl, this is also a kind of phenomenology. Husserl refers to this kind of phenomenology as mundane phenomenology. As he neared the end of his life, Husserl came to feel that mundane phenomenology of the life-world is a crucial preparatory step for transcendental phenomenology. Dermot Moran writes, "The aim of transcendental phenomenology is, as Husserl always

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[14] David Carr, *Phenomenology and the Problem of History: A Study of Husserl's Transcendental Philosophy* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), xxii.
[15] Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy,* Trans. David Carr, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 137.
[16] Ibid., 173.

insists, to disrupt the natural flow of our spontaneous living in the world with all its habitualities, beliefs, acceptances, and to experience what that brings to light; namely, the interwoven character of our constituting activities through which we give 'sense and being' (Sinn und Sein) to our world and everything in it."[17]

Husserl believed that it is only after the investigations of 'mundane' phenomenology have been carried out that the transcendental reduction may be given a good foundation and an appropriate guideline. As a result, the path Husserl undertakes in the *Crisis* text may be characterized as follows. By way of historical reflection and epochē of objective science, we must first return from the world of culture and science to the original life-world. The life-worldly reduction is the process of returning to the life-world and completing the epochē of the objective sciences. Husserl is not just interested in mundane phenomenology or life-world phenomenology. Moreover, Husserl is also interested in discovering the constituting achievements that make possible the life-world. There's no other way to achieve it except by using the method of transcendental reduction. We must perform the transcendental reduction to trace back the constituting achievements that enable the life-world. The transcendental reduction will take us further back from the structures of the life-world to the transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity. In other words, we get transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity as the 'ultimate ground' that constitutes the life-world if we enquire back from the pre-given life-world to its constituting accomplishments via transcendental reduction. The epochē of objective science, according to Husserl, is the first step toward transcendental reduction. In this way, we find that Husserl had posited the necessity of operating a transcendental reduction. Husserl did not have any doubts about the role of transcendental reduction, even though there has been a lot of attention paid to the notion of the life-world. Transcendental reduction gives a 'total change of the natural attitude of life' (*Crisis* § 39). After transcendental reduction is complete, it is possible to see that "the life-world is something derivative that has its constitutive origin in the transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity."[18] This reduction allows for "the discovery and

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[17] Dermot Moran, "Everydayness, Historicity and the World of Science: Husserl's Life-World Reconsidered", in *The Phenomenological Critique of Mathematisation and the Question of Responsibility: Formalisation and the Life-World,* (Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V. 2015), 120.

[18] Lee Nam-in, "Husserl's Phenomenology and Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception" in *Phenomenology 2010, Volume 1: Selected Essays from Asia and Pacific. Phenomenology in Dialogue with East Asian Tradition,* ed. YU Chung-Chi, (Zeta Books, 2010), 168.

examination of the transcendental correlation between world and world-consciousness."[19] We are using the terms transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity because, in the earlier works, Husserl initiates the transcendental reduction inwardly, that is, transcendental reduction leads only to transcendental subjectivity. But in the *Crisis* he initially focuses the transcendental reduction outwardly, that is, transcendental reduction leads not only to transcendental subjectivity but also to transcendental intersubjectivity. To quote Dan Zahavi: "Husserl's recurrent point is that a sufficiently radical carrying out of the transcendental reduction leads not only to subjectivity, but also to intersubjectivity."[20] As a consequence, the original idea of transcendental subjectivity has been enlarged into two primary dimensions: transcendental subjectivity and transcendental intersubjectivity.

Conclusion:

In his book *Crisis*, Husserl had used terminology such as *Dasein*, *Existenz*, the pre-scientific world, the meaning or meaninglessness of the whole of human existence, everyday life-world, the surrounding world of ordinary life, philosophy of existence, and so on. The combination of all of these terms may create the impression that Husserl is advancing towards existential phenomenology. It is well known that Nazism was gaining prominence at the time when Husserl wrote his book *Crisis*. Moreover, Husserl wrote his book *Crisis* just prior to the Second World War. Nazi ideologues insulted, attacked, and mocked him for his 'Jewish Religion.' Some scholars are of the opinion that, Husserlian phenomenology, especially in its final phases of development, was based on the catastrophic reality of the Nazis, and as a result, Husserl based his phenomenology on an understanding of the existentialism of the life-world. This type of interpretation reflects only a partial reading of Husserl's *Crisis* text. Husserl's life-world phenomenology does not allow for the conclusion that it is only an attempt to respond to a particular historical circumstance. Life-world ontology is an idea that

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[19] Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy,* Trans. David Carr, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970). 151.

[20] Dan Zahavi, "Husserl's Intersubjective Transformation of Transcendental Philosophy", *Journal of the British* Society for Phenomenology 27, no. 3 (1996): 235.

Husserl develops in the *Crisis* text. Although Husserl devotes much of his *Crisis* text to the idea of an ontology of the life-world, it is not correct to believe that he is only formulating the notion of an ontology of the life-world in his *Crisis* text. Husserl, on the other hand, has a different intention in mind. As a result, any assertion that Husserl's investigation of the life-world represents a split with his transcendental project is incorrect. The goal of *Crisis*, like with a lot of his previous works, is to offer us with an introduction to transcendental phenomenology. The life-world is regarded as a universal basis of all entities in the transcendental attitude, and it is something constituted by transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity. According to Husserl, the life-world is co-constituted by transcendental subjectivity and transcendental intersubjectivity. In the transcendental attitude, the life-world is unimaginable unless it is considered in connection to the transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity. The life-world is constituted by transcendental subjectivities or transcendentally working consciousness. Husserl saw that our life-world is clothed up by objectivism, in other words, life in the life-world has been covered up by objectivism or naturalism. Our natural attitude is naturalistic because it is so much influenced by the sciences. So there is a real need to rediscover the life-world. This mundane phenomenology acts as a stepping stone to transcendental phenomenology. Husserlian so-called transcendental phenomenology aims to make the life-world intelligible. Two things are made possible by the epochē of objective science and transcendental reduction: first, through the epochē of objective science, we gain access to the pre-scientific life-world; and second, through transcendental reduction, we grasp transcendental consciousness as the ground of the life-world. For Husserl, transcendental consciousness is the constitutional ground of all worldly experience. So, it could be remarked that historical reflection, epochē of objective science, and transcendental reduction provide the basis for transcendental phenomenology.

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THE SUPREME END OF HUMAN LIFE ACCORDING TO CĀRVĀKA SCHOOL: A CRITICAL STUDY

SUJAN MANDAL

In Indian philosophy, we come across along standing burning controversy among the different philosophical schools regarding the supreme end of human life. All the philosophical schools excepting Cārvākaconsider Mokṣaas the ultimate or supreme end of human life but the Cārvāka School recognises Kāma or pleasure as the ultimate end of us. This paper will address this issue with utmost logical analysis and ultimately substantiate the Cārvākaview.

Key word:*Lokāyata*, Materialism, *Kāma*, *Svabhāva-vāda*, *Ānvīkṣikī*.

Indian Philosophy is essentially goal oriented. All Indian philosophical discussion is mainly centred around the ultimate goal of our life. They principally address the two questions – (i) what should be the ultimate goal of our life, and (ii) how can this goal be attained? We come across a sharp contradiction between the view of the *Cārvāka* School and the view of the rest so far as the answers to these questions are concerned.

The *Cārvākas* think that if liberation meanscessation from all kinds of sufferings, then that is possible only through death. So according to them "death alone is liberation *(maraṇamevāpavargaḥ)*"[1]. We can find a summary of the philosophy of *Cārvāka* School through *Sarva-Darśana-Saṁgraha* which is written by Madhavacharya (14th century A. D). But it should be noted that as the original writings of this school are lost, *Sarva- Darśana-Saṁgraha* only collects the views which are claimed to be the views of the *Cārvāka* School by the other philosophical schools. But it is worthy to note that all other schools point out the view of the *Cārvāka* School in the course of their criticism keeping this school as *pūrvapakṣī*. So there is every possibility that the view of the *Cārvāka* School has been misrepresented by them to substantiate their respective position. Quite naturally the true picture of the view of *Cārvāka* School has not been depicted so far. So we have only a caricature rather than a true picture of the *Cārvāka* view.

First of all, we have to focus on the term '*Cārvāka*', because through which we may find some basic idea about *Cārvāka* school concerning the nature of ultimate goal of human life. In Indian Philosophy *Cārvākas* are generally known as materialists and Bṛhaspati is considered as the founder of this philosophical school. If we look to *Sarva-Darsana-Saṁgraha*it seems that *'Lokāyata'*is another synonym of *Cārvāka* which can be etymologically analysed as ''prevalent in the world''[2]. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya in his book '*Lokāyata: A Study in Ancient Indian Materialism*', has argued that

Lokāyata meant not only the philosophy of the people but also the philosophy of this-worldliness or materialism''[3]. In this book, Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya has pointed out many other observations about them. We come across one view that is the term *Cārvāka* itself is a proper name and who is also the founder of that philosophical system. According to another view, the term *Cārvāka* is not a proper name rather it is a common name for those persons who believe in the principle 'eat drink and be merry'.

The *Hindu* religious texts along with the other Indian philosophical school propose for four *Puruṣārtha* in our life. These are *Dharma*, *Artha*, *Kāma*, *Mokṣa*. The philosophical school like Advaita Vedānta, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, Sāṁkhya etc. consider *Mokṣa* as the supreme *Puruṣārtha* and the rest ones are the helping condition for the attainment of *Mokṣa*. But the *Cārvākas* School reject *Mokṣa* and *Dharma* altogether and accept *Kāma* and *Artha*. Between the two *Kāma* has been taken as the supreme *Puruṣārtha* and *Artha* as the helping condition to the satisfaction of *Kāma*. But it is worthy to note that the ethical theory of the *Cārvāka School* is diametrically opposed to that of the Advaita Vedānta, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas* and so on because the metaphysics of *Cārvāka* School is completely different from that of the latter school. In fact, the *Cārvāka* ethical theory is inevitable corollary of the *Cārvāka* metaphysics. According to the *Cārvāka* metaphysics matter is the only ultimate reality. There is no soul independent of and other than the matter. The so-called soul in fact is nothing but consciousness produced out of the combination of the four material elements in a particular proportion. So, at the time of death when that particular proportion gets dissolved the consciousness or soul also is destroyed. This *Cārvāka* philosophical view implies two things- there is no room for *Mokṣa* in our life and secondly, enjoyment of life should be the only motto of us.

Many other schools believe that the so-called liberation or *Mokṣa* is the supreme *Puruṣārtha* of human life. Accordingly, to them this *Mokṣa* or *Mukti* is of two kinds –*Videhamukti and Jīvanmukti*. Here both of them directly refer to absolute cessation from sufferings. The former one can be achieved only after death and the latter one can be achieved within this life. But *Cārvākas* reject both of these views. According to *Cārvākas* 'perception' is the only valid source of knowledge. They admit that the existence of consciousness should be proved by perception. It is produced when the elements such as earth, water, fire and air are combined in a particular proportion. ''Consciousness is the result of an emergent and dialectical evolution. It is an epi-phenomenon, a by-product of matter. Given the four elements and their particular combination, consciousness manifests itself in

the living body. ''[4] That is why, we can say that the so-called soul is nothing but the conscious living body which has been called"*caitanya-viśiṣṭa-dehaeva ātmā*"[5]. Now if conscious living body itself is soul, then it clearly implies that after the death of this body there can be no soul. So, the concept of *Videhamukti* as it is observed by some thinkers cannot be accepted. Again, on the other hand if liberation means absolute freedom from sufferings in this very life, it is also not possible to accept, because our worldly life is essentially a mixture of happiness as well as suffering. So, we can only try to reduce our suffering and enjoy as much happiness as possible. An intelligent person takes fish in spite of its bone, he does not reject the same for fear of pain,so, in our worldly life we can only minimise those pain or suffering but can't vanish it altogether. Thus, it seems that the so-called observation of the concept of *Jīvanmukti* cannot be accepted. The main slogan of *Cārvāka* materialism is follows—

"*yāvajjīvetsukhaṃjīvedṛṇaṃkṛtvāghṛtaṁpivet*
Bhasmībhūtasyadehasyapunarāgamanaṃ kutaḥ". [6]

'While life remains, that a man live happily let him feed on ghee even though he runs into debt; when once the body becomes ashes how can it ever return again?'

In the above *Śloka*(verse), the second half directly refers to the denial of eternal soul or rebirth but the first half refers to the main dictum of human life suggested by *Cārvāka*, that we should live joyously. That is why *Cārvākas* view is known as *Sukhavāda* (hedonism). Here I think a number of objections may be raised against this *Cārvāka* principle of '.... *ṛṇaṃkritvagṛtaṁpived*'. One may argue that so far as the ethical constitution of the *Cārvāka School* is concerned there is only the rule of taking debt but there is no rule of repaying the same. The concept of repaying the debt goes against their principle. If someone repay the debt taken by him then he has to repay the same with interest which positively leads to the unhappiness. But the ultimate goal of human life as taught by the *Cārvāka School* is the enjoyment of happiness. Now the question is – in this situation who will pay the debt? Obviously,none, because if someone pays the debt when surely, he will not get back the same that will make him unhappy. If no one pays the debt then there is no point of taking the same. Thus, it can be shown that the above slogan of *Cārvāka School* is futile.

No doubt the above objection is really well grounded and un-answerable. But I think this type of view is not the original view of the *Cārvāka School*. Even if this view is taken to be the view of this school, surely this view is opined

only the sub-section of this school called *DhūrtaCārvāka*, but not by the *Suśikṣita Cārvākas*.

The *Suśikṣita Cārvākas* somehow accept the significance of morality as a human conduct and believe that ''the pleasure of the pig is certainly not the same as the pleasure of the philosopher''[7]. There is a qualitative difference between *Dhūrta* and *Suśikṣita Cārvākas*. That is why *Suśikṣita Cārvākas may* be called refined materialists. Without moral value human life can never be a human life rather it can be called animal life. Sensual pleasure is not true pleasure to human being.

Actually, *Suśikṣita Cārvākas* want to make an ideal society where a man can make his life beautiful through his own capability. What is important to note is that according to them, in order to make our life beautiful, invisible power *(aḍṛṣṭa)*, sacrificial rite or worshipping God are not essential. We all are acquainted with a famous saying 'self-help is the best help'. But believing in God makes one mentally weak and unfit for leading a good life and constructing an ideal society. On the otherhand, if those are done for the purpose of attainment of perfection, it cannot be acceptable to an enlightened person because our human life is very limited. So, we should not throw away our opportunities of enjoying this very life, in the uncertain hope of enjoyment hereafter. That is why for an enlightened person, it is better a pigeon today than a peacock tomorrow, a sure shell much more superior to an uncertain golden coin. Therefore, the aim of human being is to attain the maximum amount of happiness in this life and avoid suffering as far as possible. A good action always leads to a balance of pleasure over pain and bad action always brings more pain than pleasure.

Here an objection may be raised that if God is not recognised, then how can the existence of the world be explained? We all know that every event must have a cause, so there must be an efficient causelike Godby whom the world has been created. This has been replied by *Cārvākas* following *Svabhāva-vāda*. According to this theory, all material elements of this world themselves have got its fixed nature *(Svabhāva)*: for Example, in the case of a peacock, its looks so beautiful but its sound is unmelodious. Therefore, it is nothing but the natures and laws already inherent in the elements that give birth to this world without taking the help of any conscious agent like God.

Cārvākas argue if liberation means absolutedestruction of all sufferings, it can be possible only by death. Our life is the combination of enjoyment and sufferings so it is not that due to the fear of suffering we have

to reject the pleasure. If we follow the principle of other schools then in that case we must reject grain because of itshusk, never eating fish because it has bones, never grow crops because animal can destroy them, never making their food because it is possible that a beggar might ask them for a share. Therefore,*Cārvāka* Philosophy teaches us how a person can live properly in our society. Because we have already seen that all *Cārvākas* do not believe gross enjoyment as our ultimate goal. Those who believe in the same they are not compatible with social discipline or cultural society. As a social human being, life in a society is not possible if a person does not contribute or share his minimum pleasure for others.

The satisfaction of the sense enjoyment is also necessary for the existence of human body because non-satisfaction of the same might lead to diseases like *Unmāda* (insanity). But it is important to note that these sense enjoyments must be controlledand disciplined, being educated and cultured. Here *Vātsyāyana*, the author of *'Kāma-sūtra'*, beautifully mentioned that our pleasure and enjoyment must be controlled by culture and discipline. That is why some *Cārvākas* regard the king as God. It implies that the king should properly maintain the society. Now the prominent question is that what would be the true characteristic of a king?Here if we go through *Kautilya's'Arthaśāstra'*, at the very beginning of the same,he mentioned that *Arthaśāstra* is meant ''for the acquisition and protection of the world *(pṛthivyālābhepālane ca),* i. e. , it teaches the king how to acquire and protect a kingdom''[8]. He also talked about three *Vargas* such as *Dharma, Artha, Kāma,* where all are mutually connected with each other, although he considers *'Artha'* as superior toothers. He said that a king must follow the principal of *Lokāyata-śāstra*. Now the question is why did he think that this type of study is fit for the king?He saidfour types of *Vidyā* such as *Ānvīkṣikī, Trayī, Vārtā* and *Daṇḍaniti*. Here *Trayī* refers to *Ṛk, Sāma* and *Yajuḥ* the three *Vedas, Vārtā* means animal husbandry, agriculture and commerce or economics and *Daṇḍanīti* simply means the management of the state of politics. *Kautilya* mentioned that the vital and the superior one is *Ānvīkṣikī*, because according to him, *Ānvīkṣikī* is a lamp of all *Vidyās* (learning). The meaning of the same is generally known as *'Tarkavidyā'* or'science of logic' but he mentioned*Sāṃkhya, Yoga* along with *Lokāyata-śāstra* as *Ānvīkṣikī*. Here *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* refers to Patañjali's *Yoga-sūtra* and *Lokāyata* refers to*Cārvāka's*materialism. There are some controversies among the scholars about *Kautilya's* use of the term *'Lokāyata'*. ''The two earlier commentaries,*'Jayamaṅgalā'* and *'Nītinirnīti'*, however, clearly identify *Lokāyata* with *Nāstika* Philosophy expounded by Bṛhaspati.''[6] Thus it is seen

that *Lokāyata* or *Cārvākas* clearly suggest that how can an ideal society be made.

Therefore, our life like a coin has two sides, one is pleasure and another is suffering. So, we should not waste our time. We should enjoy our life, but that enjoyment must be guided by and grounded upon culture and discipline, because these are the symbol of a true ideal man. The life of an ideal person would be successful only when he has a contribution to the society. Thus, we can say that it is the inner message of *Suśikṣita Cārvākas* which is highly significant in our present-day society.

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