



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
 HEADQUARTERS, COMBINED JOINT FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND  
 OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE  
 UNION III, BAGHDAD, IRAQ  
 APO AE 09348

IRIZ-DCA

8 May 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, Combined Joint Forces Land Component  
 Command—Operation Inherent Resolve, Union III, Baghdad, Iraq, APO AE 09548

SUBJECT: Executive Summary of Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation of the Alleged  
 Civilian Mass Casualty Incident in the al Jadidah District, City of Mosul, Ninewah  
 Governate, on or about 17 March 2017

1. Conclusion. At 0824 on 17 March 2017, Coalition aircraft conducted an airstrike against two ISIS snipers engaging the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service (CTS). Coalition Forces conducted the strike in accordance with the applicable Rules of Engagement and the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Coalition aircraft employed a single GBU-38 precision-guided munition. The weapon appropriately balanced the military necessity of neutralizing the snipers with the potential for collateral damage. The GBU-38 entered the roof and detonated in the second floor of the structure.

a. The GBU-38's detonation ignited ISIS explosive materials that ISIS had previously emplaced in the structure. The secondary explosion triggered a rapid failure of the structure, killing the two ISIS snipers and 101 civilians sheltered in the bottom floors of the structure. An additional four civilians were killed in the neighboring structure to the west.

b. Eye witnesses and media outlets reported that an additional 36 civilians may have been at the building; however, there is insufficient evidence to determine their status or whereabouts at this time.

c. The Target Engagement Authority (TEA) was unaware of and could not have predicted the presence of civilians in the structure prior to the engagement.

2. Operational Context. At the time of the strike, CTS forces were engaged in offensive maneuver to seize the sector from 35–40 ISIS fighters controlling the area. On 17 March 2017, CTS had been postured along the same Forward Line of Troops (FLOT) for three days. That day was also the first day of the planned CTS advance into a new sector of the al Jadidah district. CTS Soldiers had continuous over-watch of the sector during this period, including direct visual observation (VISOBS) of the structure.

3. Enemy Activity. Coalition Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and CTS forces observed ISIS fighters forcibly evict civilian families from the area, build defensive fighting positions, stage vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDS), emplace improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and engage CTS forces with



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direct and indirect fire. Coalition and Iraqi human intelligence as well as Coalition multi-source intelligence overwhelmingly classified the district as ISIS-controlled and specifically prepared to deny the CTS advance north.

a. In the days prior to 17 March 2017, ISIS fighters conducted complex attacks against the CTS FLOT. CTS had defended against ISIS VBIEDS and suicide bombers on multiple occasions each day. During this period, CTS forces, with Coalition support, conducted a combined-arms defense to protect CTS Soldiers.

b. The testimony of multiple residents confirms that ISIS fighters knocked holes into the walls. The "wormholes" allowed ISIS to move fighters, weapons, and equipment between buildings without being detected by Coalition ISR or CTS visual observers.

4. Civilians. Coalition ISR observed, and civilian testimony confirmed, that ISIS fighters forcibly expelled families from their homes in the district. The displaced civilians were invited by a well-known neighbor to seek refuge in his home. It is estimated that between 101 and 137 civilians voluntarily sought refuge in the lower two floors of the structure.

a. Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) VISOBs and Coalition intelligence assets did not observe the civilians enter or use the structure. Neither Coalition nor CTS forces knew that civilians were sheltered within.

b. The ISIS fighters, however, knew of the civilians' presence within the structure, and interacted with the civilians. According to the next-door neighbor's testimony, ISIS fighters had issued a warning to him that his family was in danger. ISIS fighters advised him to evacuate his family from their residence and move north by the morning of 17 March 2017. ISIS warned him that, if the family remained, what would happen to them was not ISIS' fault.

5. Strike. CTS forces initiated their assault to seize and clear of the sector at approximately 0700L on the morning of 17 March 2017. CTS visual observers did not identify any civilians within the sector prior to the strike.

a. During their assault, CTS visual observers identified two ISIS snipers effectively engaging CTS soldiers from a Defensive Fighting Position (DFP) in the southwest corner of the second story of the structure. Iraqi CTS Battalion and Brigade commanders approved the observer request for a Coalition strike on the DFP and coordinated with an Iraqi Forward Air Controller (IFAC) to prepare a strike request. The IFAC coordinated with Coalition Advisors to plan the strike.



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b. After receiving the strike request, the Coalition Strike Cell in Erbil, a joint fires and control center under the command of a Coalition Target Engagement Authority (TEA), evaluated intelligence on enemy activities and forces in the area surrounding the DFP location. The Strike Cell staff also evaluated the location of the target with regard to historical civilian population reporting and the location's proximity of friendly forces. Weaponeering experts analyzed available weapons and selected a weapon and fusing option that would achieved the necessary effect and minimize collateral damage.

c. The TEA positively identified the ISIS snipers and determined that the engagement was authorized under the Rules of Engagement (ROE). As a weaponeering solution, the TEA selected a GBU-38 with a delayed fuse.

d. The TEA approved the engagement on the ISIS snipers. The engagement was the sixth of 81 weapons engagements that Coalition forces conducted in support of the CTS operations that day. After the weapon detonated, CTS visual observers reported that the DFP was destroyed.

6. Law of Armed Conflict. The TEA approved the strike in accordance with all provisions of the applicable ROE and Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).

a. Distinction. The Coalition attacked a valid military target which consisted of two snipers effectively engaging Iraqi CTS soldiers from a DFP.

b. Proportionality. The TEA selected a weapon that balanced the military necessity of neutralizing the two snipers with the potential for collateral damage to civilians and civilian structures.

(1) The TEA selected a GBU-38, a 500-pound class precision guided munition containing 192lbs of explosive material. The GBU-38's steel case was strong enough to penetrate the roof of the DFP and had sufficient explosive material to neutralize the snipers engaging the CTS soldiers from their DFP in the second floor. The TEA selected a fuse-setting that would neutralize the threat to CTS, while also minimizing risk to collateral structures. The TEA expected the weapons effects for the GBU-38 to be localized to the second floor of the building. Subsequent engineering and weapons analysis indicates that the GBU-38 should have resulted in no more than 16–20% damage to the structure, localized to the front of the second floor or the structure.

(2) The TEA did not know civilians were in the structure or that ISIS had deliberately staged a significant amount of secondary explosive materials in the structure. Based on the information reasonably available, the TEA could not have



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predicted the compounded effects of the secondary explosives emplaced by ISIS fighters.

c. Military Necessity. CTS commanders and the TEA determined that it was a military necessity to neutralize the ISIS snipers in order for CTS to achieve its maneuver objective of seizing the sector from ISIS. If the ISIS snipers were left to continue to engage CTS forces, CTS would incur unacceptable levels of casualties in the seizure of the sector. The seizure of the sector was necessary for CTS to complete the clearance and liberation of Mosul from ISIS.

7. Damage Resulting from the Engagement. The GBU-38 entered the northern portion of the roof at the front/north of the structure at a near-vertical angle. The GBU-38 detonated while penetrating the roof above the second floor of the structure. The GBU-38 sparked a secondary detonation of a large amount of explosive material that ISIS had previously emplaced in the structure. The secondary explosion produced a powerful blast and overpressure that triggered a rapid progressive failure of the structure. These events killed the two ISIS snipers, 101 civilians sheltered in the bottom floors of the structure, and four civilians in the neighboring structure to the west. Eye witnesses and media reported that an additional 36 individuals may have been located within the structure at the time of the engagement. However, the status of these individuals is undetermined at this time.

8. Post-Blast Analysis. Post-blast analysis conducted by a Coalition Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team identified explosive residues not consistent with the explosive content of a GBU-38 from several sample locations around the site, including Pentaerythritol Tetranitrate (PETN) and nitroglycerin.

a. The senior EOD officer concluded that the PETN was associated with improvised explosive devices or detonator cord (known as "DetCord"), a common explosive component which ISIS uses to link together larger explosive devices for simultaneous detonation. Furthermore, nitroglycerin residue also indicated the presence of secondary explosive devices, and was likely used by ISIS to sensitize the secondary explosive devices to detonate more easily. Finally, post-blast analysis conducted by EOD and expert weapons teams concluded that the structural damage and crater at the rear/south of the structure were not caused by the relatively low explosive weight of a single GBU-38.

b. The location of the structural damage and the crater at the rear/south of the structure were displaced from the site of the GBU-38 entry and blast, and far in excess to what could have been caused by the GBU-38's net explosive weight. Instead, the structural damage and crater were likely caused by a large amount of ISIS-emplaced




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explosive material located in the second story of the rear of the structure. This ISIS-emplaced explosive material conservatively contained more than four times the net explosive weight of the GBU-38. The sympathetic detonation of this secondary ISIS-emplaced explosive, activated by the GBU-38 impact, collapsed the structure, resulting in the vast majority of the 101 civilian casualties, and impacted the neighboring structure which resulted in four additional civilian casualties.

9. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at

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MATTHEW C. ISLER  
Brigadier General, U.S. Air Force  
Investigating Officer

Approved for Release





DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
HEADQUARTERS, COMBINED JOINT FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND  
OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE & 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION  
UNION III, BAGHDAD, IRAQ  
APO AE 09348

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6 May 2017

(U//~~FOUO~~) MEMORANDUM FOR MG Joseph M. Martin, Commander, Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command – Operation Inherent Resolve

(U//~~FOUO~~) SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations, Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation of the Alleged Civilian Mass Casualty Incident in the al Jadidah District, City of Mosul, Ninewah Governate, on or about 17 March 2017





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2. (U//~~FOUO~~) Background:

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) Pursuant to Army Regulation (AR) 15-6, I was appointed as the investigating officer for this investigation on 31 March 2017. I had previously been appointed to conduct a civilian casualty credibility assessment on this incident. As the IO, I was charged with determining the facts and circumstances surrounding allegations of a civilian casualty (CIVCAS) incident occurring on or about 17 March 2017 in the Al Izdihar al Awwal district (hereinafter referred to as the al Jadidah district).

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) The original source of the CIVCAS allegation was (b)(6) a correspondent for the Rudaw Media Network.

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) The incident in question occurred at approximately 0824c, on or about 17 March 2017 in vicinity of 38S LF 29048 22188 located in the al Jadidah district of West Mosul.

3. (U//~~FOUO~~) Facts:

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) On the morning of 17 March 2017, elements of CTS conducted an attack north into the al Jadidah district of West Mosul. CTS had maintained static positions south of the al Jadidah district for two days (15-16 March 2017) due to inclement weather. During this time, CTS did not observe any indicators of civilian patterns of life (CIVPOL) in the al Jadidah district (Exhibit C1). Prior to the 17 March 2017 attack, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) had established a series of defensive positions within the residential structures of al Jadidah district and its environs (Exhibit C5). During the advance, CTS Soldiers reported two ISIS fighters placing effective precision small arms fire (PSAF) from the second floor of BLDG 4250.10, a former residential structure, located in vicinity of 38S LF 29048 22188.

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) CTS subsequently requested Coalition fire support to eliminate the threat in the structure in question. The CTS Task Force - 2 (TF-2) Commander, Staff Major General (SMG) Ma'an, approved the request and coordinated joint fires with the Coalition Advise & Assist (A&A) team (Exhibit B12). The Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command - Operation Inherent Resolve (CJFLCC-OIR) CJOC-E processed the fire request. The CJOC-E TEA, BG John Richardson, approved the engagement, which Coalition aircraft executed at approximately 0824c on 17 March 2017 with a single 500-lb precision guided munition (Exhibit B12). After the munition impacted the target, BLDG 4250.10 collapsed.

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) Personnel from Iraqi Civil Defense (CD) and Mosul CD (the regional unit under the national Iraq CD) immediately responded to the location and attempted



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to locate and recover civilians trapped in the collapsed structure. However, ISIS activity, including indirect and small arms fire that continued to target the al Jadidah district, thwarted Iraqi CD's response efforts. Iraqi CD personnel were unable to return to the scene of the strike until 22 March 2017 (Exhibits B5 & B6).

d. (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] (b)(6) a correspondent for the Rudaw Media Group who was covering the CTS advance, visited the site of the engagement on 17, 19, and 22 March 2017. During this period of time he observed and documented civilian casualties in the al Jadidah district as well as the excavation of BLDG 4250.10 by Iraqi CD. In his 23 March 2017 report published on the Rudaw English website, [redacted] (b)(6) stated that at least 200 civilians had been killed by Coalition airstrikes in al Jadidah district, with approximately 130 deaths occurring in a single house (Exhibits A1 & A4).

4. (U//~~FOUO~~) Findings: Pursuant to the AR 15-6 appointment memorandum, I was directed to answer 13 questions related to the subject CIVCAS incident. The answers provided in this memorandum are in summary form; additional details are enclosed in supplementary material (Enclosures A-M). All findings are supported by the preponderance of evidence gathered during the course of the investigation, which are included as exhibits to this investigation.

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) *How many civilian deaths are estimated? What is the source(s) of those estimated CIVCAS numbers?*

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) As of the date of this memorandum, Iraqi CD confirmed 105 civilian casualties (CIVCAS) associated with the engagement that struck BLDG 4250.10 (Exhibits B5 & B6). Iraqi CD recovered a total of 101 CIVCAS from BLDG 4250.10 over the period spanning 17-28 March 2017 (Exhibit B5). Human Rights Watch and [redacted] (b)(6) identified four additional CIVCAS in the civilian structure located immediately to the west of BLDG 4250.10 in vicinity of 38S LF 29034 22187 (Exhibits B7 & B8).

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] (b)(6) stated that Iraqi CD told her that 137 people were in BLDG 4250.10 at the time of the collapse. Based on the Iraqi CD's confirmation of 101 deceased, an additional 36 individuals (including two alleged survivors) may have been in BLDG 4250.10 when the structure collapsed. However, no other remains have been found and no additional persons have been reported as missing (Exhibit B4).

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] (b)(6) of the Mosul Civil Defense, stated that the bodies of two ISIS fighters were also found on the street in front of BLDG 4250.10 (Exhibit B5).



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(4) (U//~~FOUO~~) The sources of the CIVCAS estimates are as follows:

(a) (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] (b)(6) a Rudaw correspondent, was present during the recovery of bodies from BLDG 4250.10. During his interview, [redacted] (b)(6) stated that residents of the al Jadidah district had informed him that 137 individuals had been trapped when BLDG 4250.10 collapsed. This estimate formed the basis of his 23 March 2017 report concerning West Mosul civilian casualties (Exhibit A1).

(b) (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] (b)(6) a resident of West Mosul, was an occupant of BLDG 4250.10. [redacted] (b)(6) stated that he, along with several family members, took shelter in BLDG 4250.10 from 13–15 March 2017. He stated that on the night of his departure (on or about 15 March 2017 at 1900c) there were approximately 140 men, women, and children occupying BLDG 4250.10. The women and children were located in the half basement and the men were located on the first floor (Exhibit B3).

(c) (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] (b)(6) provided sanctuary to 16 people on the morning of 17 March 2017. The detonation events that destroyed BLDG 4250.10 also caused significant damage to his residence, resulting in four of the 105 confirmed CIVCAS. The remaining 12 individuals survived the engagement and were accounted for afterward (Exhibit B8).

(5) (U//~~FOUO~~) Multiple media reports estimated the total number of civilian casualties within the al Jadidah district to be in excess of 200 (Exhibit A8). Based on interviews with Mosul CD, the National Director of Iraqi CD, CTS, media, neighbors, and local leaders, I assess that the figures of "at least 200" (Exhibit A8; Rudaw, 25 March 2017) or "as many as 200" (Exhibit A8; New York Times, 25 March 2017; LA Times, 29 March 2017) represent an aggregation of weeks of multiple excavations of damaged structures across West Mosul, including the 17 March 2017 effects on BLDG 4250.10 and its neighboring structures (sMG Kadum Bohan, Mosul CD; Exhibit B6). This investigation focused on the events of 17 March 2017 in the al Jadidah district. Beyond BLDG 4250.10 and its adjacent structures, this investigation found no further links to civilian casualties within the al Jadidah district during the period proximate to 17 March 2017. Furthermore, the events that resulted in the other reported excavations may be due to ISIS or ISF engagements. As discussed more fully in paragraph 6c, I recommend that CENTCOM conduct an expanded, bottom-up preliminary inquiry that overlays Iraqi CD excavations across West Mosul with Coalition strike data to look for linkages.



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b. (U//~~FOUO~~) *How many of those deaths are attributable to US/Coalition strikes, ISF, and/or ISIS? What was the cause of those deaths?*

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) Of the 105 total civilian casualties, only a small portion are likely attributed to the damage caused by the Coalition GBU-38. A preponderance of evidence supports that ISIS is responsible for the vast majority of the deaths, as ISIS emplaced a large quantity of explosives atop a known gathering of civilians, and staged attacks against CTS to draw Coalition fire on the structure and trigger a much larger secondary explosion (Exhibit C19 & Enclosure B). First, ISIS knew that BLDG 4250.10 was crowded with civilians. ISIS fighters interacted with the civilians, and kept several fighters staged near the residence (Exhibits B3, B8, B9, & C5). Second, ISIS deliberately emplaced a large quantity of unknown bulk explosives (UBE) in the second floor of BLDG 4250.10, which served as the secondary explosion and the primary cause of the structure's collapse (Exhibit C19 & Enclosure J). Third, ISIS deliberately established a defensive fighting position on the second floor of the building, proximate to the UBE, to draw Coalition fire to trigger the secondary blast (C19-21, & D3). Finally, ISIS engaged CTS soldiers from the building, knowing that, in all likelihood, the Coalition or Iraqi Security Forces would target the building. When, the GBU-38 struck the building, it is assessed with high confidence that the explosion initiated a secondary detonation of ISIS-emplaced UBE (Exhibits C19 & C21). This chain of events resulted in the rapid onset and progressive collapse of BLDG 4250.10 (Exhibits C19-21). The civilian deaths were caused by blast injuries, blunt force trauma, and asphyxiation.

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) The preponderance of evidence, including weaponing analysis, structural damage modalities, and post-blast explosive assessment, shows that ISIS fighters are responsible for deliberately setting the conditions for an explosive chain reaction by emplacing a large quantity of UBE in BLDG 4250.10 (Exhibits C19, C21, D2, & D3).

(a) (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) The Coalition conducted engagement RC4250.10 on 17 March 2017 at 0824c with a single GBU-38 using a fuse set for a 5-millisecond delay (Exhibits B12, C1, & C15). The blast effects for this weapon and fuse setting would have structurally damaged no more than 16 to 20% of the overall structure of BLDG 4250.10, and this damage would have been localized to the second floor of the northern portion of the structure (Exhibits C19, D2, D3, & Enclosure B). However, the structural damage observed in vicinity of the engagement far exceeds that of a single GBU-38 fused with a 5-millisecond delay. Both the U.S. Air Force Joint Munition Effectiveness Manual (JMEM) battle damage assessment and a Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) in-depth stochastic modeling of the engagement predicted the structure would suffer no more than 16 to 20% damage (Exhibits C18-20, D3 & Enclosure B). The similar results of the models corroborate the range of predicted



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damage. Likewise, the models predicted that the damage would be primarily contained to the roof and second floor of the northern portion of the structure (Exhibits C19-21 & D3).

(b) (U//~~FOUO~~) Multiple models, supported by onsite post-blast analysis, demonstrate that only multiple detonations would be sufficient to achieve the total structural failure seen at the blast site (Exhibits C20 & C21). Based on the cratering evidence and damage to surrounding structures, ISIS most likely emplaced the explosives in the south/back portion of BLDG 4250.10, on the second floor of the structure (Exhibits B18 & C21).

(c) (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) The DTRA in-depth stochastic modeling of the engagement returned a similar assessment (Exhibit C18). A secondary detonation of a large quantity of UBE was required to destroy BLDG 4250.10 and damage surrounding structures (Exhibit C20). The preponderance of evidence shows that ISIS emplaced the explosive material (Exhibits C17-C21 & Enclosure B).

(d) (U//~~FOUO~~) A Department of Defense (DoD) lab tested multiple samples collected from different locations within the site of BLDG 4250.10. In addition to detecting traces of explosives found in a GBU-38, namely trinitrotoluene (TNT) and RDX, the results also showed traces of Pentaerythritol Tetranitrate and Nitroglycerin (PETN). These explosive components are not attributable to a GBU-38, but are common to ISIS-emplaced explosive accelerants, detonating cord and person-borne IEDs (Exhibit C21).

(e) (U//~~FOUO~~) The explosive residue analysis did not detect any additional homemade explosive (HME) residue typically found in bulk quantity in ISIS-emplaced explosive devices. However, due to the significant delay in sampling after the incident, the high water solubility of common HME precursors such as ammonium nitrate, and the amount of rain and high humidity post incident (Exhibit B14), the absence of ammonium nitrate residue in the samples taken 25 days after the incident does not rule out the distinct possibility of the presence of bulk HME sympathetically detonating in the structure with the GBU-38 (Exhibits C19-21).

(f) (U//~~FOUO~~) All of the explosives, engineering, and weaponizing experts consulted during this investigation conclude that the single detonation of a GBU-38 would not have caused the building to collapse or to damage to surrounding structures. (Exhibits A6, B3, B18, B20, C19-21, & D3).

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) Based on statements of individuals who were involved in the recovery of CIVCAS from the rubble (i.e., members of the Iraqi CD; (b)(6)) the



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President of the Mosul District Council; media personnel; and local residents) I assess that a majority of the civilian deaths were the result of blast injuries, blunt force trauma, asphyxiation, and possible burns resulting from the detonation of UBE and collapse of BLDG 4250.10 (Exhibits A7, A8, & B4). However, the assessment of the causes of death is not based on scientific, forensic, or medical data from the bodies. Coalition medical examiners did not have an opportunity to examine any of the civilian casualties recovered from BLDG 4250.10 due to the immediate burial of corpses in accordance with local cultural and religious practices. Additionally, no photographs were taken of casualties (Exhibits A1 & A8).

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) What ISIS tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are responsible for (or factored into) the CIVCAS? Are these new TTPs?

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) ISIS' use of civilians as human shields is well documented, and has evolved during the course of the counter-ISIS campaign (Exhibits B18, B20, & C5). In this case, ISIS fighters knew BLDG 4250.10 was being used as a civilian shelter. They interacted with the civilians in the building and told the owner of the adjacent home to depart the area the night prior to the CTS attack (Exhibit B8). ISIS fighters in a defensive fighting position (DFP) within the structure staged a large secondary device and intentionally drew ISF and Coalition fires onto BLDG 4250.10 with the objective of endangering civilians (Exhibit B18). This specific TTP is hereafter referred to as "CIVCAS entrapment" (Exhibit C22).

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6)



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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

d. (U//~~FOUO~~) How many U.S./Coalition engagements took place on the date in question? What were the locations of those engagements?

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) Coalition forces conducted 81 engagements, consisting of 171 air-to-ground and surface-to-surface munitions in West Mosul on 17 March 2017. Of the 81 engagements, 34 were within 1 km of BLDG 4250.10, 12 occurred in vicinity of the al Jadidah district (Exhibits B10 & C9). Of the 12 engagements in the al Jadidah district, one engagement, RC4250.10, resulted in an allegation of civilian casualties (BLDG 4250.10).

(b)(1)1.4a

e. (U//~~FOUO~~) What was the target of those engagements? The target of the Coalition engagements conducted on 17 March 2017 in the al Jadidah district were ISIS fighters, ISIS snipers, ISIS DFPs, and mortar positions. More specifically, the strike in question targeted ISIS snipers engaging CTS from BLDG 4250.10 (Exhibit B10).

f. (U//~~FOUO~~) Who requested the engagements?

(b)(1)1.4a



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g. (U//~~FOUO~~) *Who authorized the engagements, both for the U.S. and for the Government of Iraq?* The CTS TF-2 Commander and one of the CJOC-E TEAs authorized all 17 March 2017 engagements in the al Jadidah district (Exhibits B1 & C1). For the strike of BLDG 4250.10, BG Richardson approved the engagement.



h. (U//~~FOUO~~) *What facts were known by CJOC-E and the Target Engagement Authority at the time of the engagement?*

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) At the time of the engagement, the Coalition TEA understood that CTS was requesting Coalition fires in defense of on-scene CTS soldiers. The TEA knew that ISIS maintained a platoon-sized element in vicinity of the al Jadidah district (Exhibits C1 & C5). The CTS request stated that ISF elements were being engaged by precision small arms fire from a DFP located in BLDG 4250.10 and had sustained casualties. The request further stated that CTS, through direct line-of-sight observation, maintained PID of two ISIS fighters within the structure, and that no CIVPOL had been observed on the premises (Exhibits B12, C1, C2, & C9).



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(b)(1)1.4a

i. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ *What was the basis for positive identification (PID)?*

(1) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ The CJOC-E TEA's basis for PID was operational intelligence (OPINT) supported by well-developed human intelligence (HUMINT). CTS met significant ISIS resistance immediately upon commencing their attack on the morning of 17 March 2017. During the engagement, CTS identified a legitimate military target—two ISIS fighters engaging CTS personnel from a DFP—and subsequently maintained line-of-sight VISOBs with the target. The TEA's operational context was further supported by overwhelming HUMINT of ISIS fighters and positions in the immediate area (Exhibits C1 & C5).

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c



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j. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Under what provision of the rules of engagement (ROE) were the fires conducted?

(1) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ The engagement that struck BLDG 4250.10 was carried out under the USCENTCOM ROE provision authorizing collective self-defense of a partner force (Exhibit B21). The engagement was justified under the collective self-defense provision in response to a hostile act. The method of engagement was deemed a proportionate and reasonable response. The engagement complied with all applicable provisions of the USCENTCOM ROE and the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).





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SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation of the Alleged Civilian Mass Casualty Incident in the al Jadidah District, City of Mosul, Ninewah Governate, on or about 17 March 2017



k. (U//~~FOUO~~) *What was the battle damage assessment (BDA) and/or collateral damage, if any? Please note whether full motion video (FMV) is available to Coalition Forces at the time of the strike(s).*

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) CTS Battle Damage Assessment (BDA). CTS reported a BDA of two enemy killed in action (EKIA), and two DFPs destroyed following engagement RC 4250.10 (Exhibits B1, B12, & C9). CTS personnel did not specify that BLDG 4250.10 collapsed during or following the engagement. There is no full motion video of this engagement due to cloud cover over the engagement area (Exhibits B14 & B15).

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) Collateral Damage. The engagement of BLDG 4250.10 likely detonated a large amount of ISIS-emplaced UBE, initiating a sequence of events



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SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation of the Alleged Civilian Mass Casualty Incident in the al Jadidan District, City of Mosul, Ninewah Governate, on or about 17 March 2017

resulting in significant collateral damage to BLDG 4250.10 and surrounding structures; BLDG 4250.10 was completely destroyed following the sequence of events (Exhibits C18-C20).

(a) (U//~~FOUO~~) Based on the projected effects of single GBU-38 containing 192 lbs. of explosives, this damage was extremely excessive. The anticipated structural damage to the building was estimated to be limited and localized to the upper floor; however, the secondary detonation that followed the initial impact caused significant damage to the rear of the structure, which caused the entire building to collapse.

(b) (U//~~FOUO~~) The buildings to the south and west of BLDG 4250.10 were also heavily damaged during the engagement. The residence to the immediate west suffered significant damage to its eastern wall, interior rooms, and roof, along with four additional civilian casualties (Exhibits B8 & C20). The residence to the immediate south experienced a partial collapse of its northern wall and sustained interior damage (Exhibit C20). The 30-inch thick composite concrete wall in the rear of BLDG 4250.10 experienced a significant blast wave, evidenced by a large arc of damage nearly 30 feet wide, which pushed the concrete back 2 to 3 inches and in the center completely pulverized the concrete wall. The buildings to the north and east of BLDG 4250.10 sustained cosmetic damage (e.g. broken windows, damaged façade, debris on the property, etc.) but were left intact (Exhibit C17 & C20).

I. (U//~~FOUO~~) *Did any changes to the ROE or the CJTF-OIR Tactical Directive #1 factor into this incident? If so, what was the impact?*

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) Neither changes to the ROE nor CJTF-OIR Tactical Directive #1 factored into the execution of Strike RC4250, Engagement 10, on BLDG 4250.10.

ibX11.4a



IRIZ-DCA

SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation of the Alleged Civilian Mass Casualty Incident in the al Jadidah District, City of Mosul, Ninewah Governate, on or about 17 March 2017

(b)(1)1.4a

5. (U//~~FOUO~~) Additional Information.

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) Remain-in-Place Order. Iraqi political and operational leaders assessed that risk to mission and civilians was lessened if civilians sheltered in place rather than evacuate Mosul. While a decision to evacuate civilians from the city may have reduced the risk of an event like this happening, it would have not eliminated the risk. Overall the Government of Iraq's shelter-in-place decision was not causally related to the CIVCAS outcome.

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) Structural analysis of BLDG 4250.10. A structural analysis of BLDG 4250.10 was conducted by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC) in support of this investigation.

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) BLDG 4250.10 was a 20m x 10m, multi-floor, mixed material structure typical of other residences in the al Jadidah neighborhood. The BLDG 4250.10 vertical super-structure consisted of 30-in thick load bearing walls comprised of both concrete masonry blocks or stone and mortar. Its horizontal super-structure was supported by 12-in square reinforced concrete beams and 6-in thick reinforced concrete slabs that formed the floors and roof. BLDG 4250.10 was constructed with an open-air courtyard in the north end of the building that extended from the ground floor to the roof. A small room was built on top of the roof, which was offset to the west side of the building (Exhibits B9 & C20).

(b)(1)1.4a



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SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation of the Alleged Civilian Mass Casualty Incident in the al Jadidah District, City of Mosul, Ninewah Governate, on or about 17 March 2017

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

d. (U//~~FOUO~~) Direct-observation options. Coalition forces have three methods of direct-observation to assess civilian pattern of life: (1) direct observation by a Coalition



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observer; (2) direct observation by Coalition FMV; and (3) direct observation by partner force observer. Due to the urban layout of sector B.19, where streets run east-west and parallel to the FLOT, direct observation of the street in front of BLDG 4250.10 was impossible from the position of the FLOT on 15-16 March 2017. To see CIVPOL within the east-west streets among the multi-story homes, direct-observation would have required CTS observers to be staged forward of the FLOT (Exhibit C14).

(1) (~~U//FOUO~~) Direct Observation by a Coalition Observer. Due to appropriate risk-management decisions made by commanders IAW Tactical Directive #1, Coalition observers were not positioned ahead of the FLOT.

(2) (~~U//FOUO~~) Direct Observation by Coalition FMV. Weather precluded Coalition FMV/ISR from executing normal battlefield characterization required to identify and track CIVPOL for two full days prior to CTS attack into sector B.19.

(3) (~~U//FOUO~~) Direct Observation by Partner Force Observer. Partner forces used VISOBs from observation positions along the FLOT to characterize the area prior to the attack (Exhibit B1). Partner force visual observers did not conduct reconnaissance north of the FLOT (Exhibit B1), which left the observers blind to the movement of civilian traffic along the east-west portions of the street at ranges greater than 50m north of the FLOT (Exhibit C14). While CTS could observe much of the neighborhood for a general characterization of the area's CIVPOL, the limitations mentioned above precluded CTS from fully observing civilian movement on the ground near the structure. Meanwhile, Coalition advisors helped partner forces prepare an overall fires plan that depended on Coalition airstrikes that ultimately were conducted based on CTS VISOBs without Coalition force FMV observation (Exhibits B1, B14, & B15).

(b)(1)1.4g

6. (~~U//FOUO~~) Recommendations: The evidence collected as part of this investigation shows that CJFLCC-OIR, and specifically the CJOC-E strike cell and TEA, took every available precaution to avoid civilian casualties as part of the subject engagement.

IRIZ-DCA

SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation of the Alleged Civilian Mass Casualty Incident in the al Jadidah District, City of Mosul, Ninewah Governate, on or about 17 March 2017


However, the TEA was unaware that over 100 civilians were in the structure. Had the TEA known of the large number of civilians, his proportionality assessment would have been drastically different, and he would not have approved the engagement. Given what we now know about ISIS' propensity to employ CIVCAS entrapment, I recommend CJFLCC-OIR consider the following changes in TTPs to reduce risk of civilian casualties during planned partner-force offensive operations. These recommendations, if enacted across the CJFLCC-OIR joint area of operations, will provide Coalition and partner-force leaders improved situational awareness on CIVPOL, allowing leaders to make the most informed decisions possible regarding the proportionality of weapons effects.

(b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4g

7. (U//FOUO) The point of contact for this memorandum is Brigadier General Matthew Isler at: @mail.mil.

13 Encl  
A thru M

  
MATTHEW C. ISLER  
Brigadier General, USAF  
Investigating Officer





DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
HEADQUARTERS, COMBINED JOINT FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND  
OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE & 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION  
UNION III, BAGHDAD, IRAQ  
APO AE 09348

IRIZ-CO

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Attachment to DA Form 1574-1, Section VII, Action by the Approving Authority, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation into the Alleged Mass Civilian Casualty (CIVCAS) Incident in al Jadidah District, Mosul, on 17 March 2017

1. (~~U//FOUO~~) I reviewed the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer (IO), and I approve the IO's findings as submitted.
2. (~~S//REL TO USA, MESH~~) I make the following additional findings:

Approved for Release


(b)(1) 4a

IRIZ-CO

SUBJECT: Attachment to DA Form 1574-1, Section VII, Action by the Approving Authority, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation into the Alleged Mass Civilian Casualty (CIVCAS) Incident in al Jadidah District, Mosul, on 17 March 2017

c. ~~(S//REL TO USA, MESH)~~ I intend to recommend to the CJTF-OIR and CENTCOM commanders that the current ROE remain in effect.

4. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ The point of contact for this memorandum is the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, CJFLCC-OIR & 1ID, at DSN (b)(6)



JOSEPH M. MARTIN  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Commanding

Approved for Release



Approved for Release

**ARMY REGULATION 15-6 INVESTIGATION**  
Alleged Civilian Mass Casualty Incident  
at Jadidah District, Mosul, Iraq  
17 March 2017

Overall Classification of the Investigation:

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

All ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ documents are contained in Binder D.

Overall Classification of this Binder:

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~





DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
 HEADQUARTERS, COMBINED JOINT FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND –  
 OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE & 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION  
 UNION III, BAGHDAD, IRAQ  
 APO AE 09348

IRIZ-CO

Date: 31 MAR 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR Brigadier General Matthew C. Isler, Deputy Commanding General – Air, Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJFLCC-OIR), Baghdad, Iraq, APO AE 09348

SUBJECT: Appointment as an Army Regulation 15-6 Investigating Officer

1. **Appointment.** On 28 March 2017, I appointed you, pursuant to the Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) Standard Operating Procedure [for] Civilian Casualty Reporting and Response Procedures, to conduct a civilian casualty (CIVCAS) assessment into the facts and circumstances surrounding allegations of a CIVCAS incident on or about 17 March 2017 in the vicinity of the vicinity of MGRS 38 SLF 29048 22188, Al Izdihar al Awwal neighborhood, Mosul, Iraq. You are now appointed as an Investigating Officer (IO) pursuant to Army Regulation (AR) 15-6, *Procedures for Administrative Investigations and Boards of Officers*, to conduct an administrative investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the same incident. **You have 20 days from the date of this appointment to conduct this investigation.** Coordinate any requests for extensions through your legal advisor.

2. **General Instructions.**

a. The purpose of an AR 15-6 administrative investigation is to elicit facts. You are directed to conduct an investigation into the matters set forth in paragraph 3, below. Your investigation should explore any issues or deficiencies with policy, procedures, resources, doctrine, training, and leadership that might have contributed to this incident. Upon collection of this investigation, you will complete a report of investigation that conforms to the requirements in paragraph 5 of this memorandum and AR 15-6.

b. If, at any time in the conduct of your investigation, something happens that could cause me to consider enlarging, restricting, or terminating your investigation, or otherwise modifying any instruction in this memorandum of appointment, immediately report this situation to me, together with your recommendation as to the action I should take in response.

3. **Scope of Investigation/Specific Instructions.**

a. You are hereby directed to conduct an investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding allegations of a civilian casualty (CIVCAS) incident on or

IRIZ-CO

SUBJECT: Appointment as an Army Regulation 15-6 Investigating Officer

about 17 March 2017 in the vicinity of MGRS 38 SLF 29048 22188, Al Izdihar al Awwal neighborhood, Mosul, Iraq.

b. During your investigation you will, at a minimum, determine the following:

(1) How many civilian deaths are estimated? What is the source(s) of those estimated CIVCAS numbers?

(2) How many of those deaths are attributable to U.S./Coalition strikes, CTS (or other Iraq Security Forces unit), and/or ISIS? What was the cause of those deaths (e.g., one Coalition strike, multiple Coalition strikes, a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), an ISIS house-borne IED, etc.)?

(3) What ISIS tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are responsible for (or factored into) the CIVCAS? Are these new TTPs? What is the impact of these ISIS TTPs?

(4) How many U.S./Coalition strikes took place on the date in question? What were the locations of those strikes?

(5) What was the target of those strikes?

(6) Who requested the strikes?

(7) Who authorized the strikes, both for the U.S. and for the Government of Iraq?

(8) What facts were known by CJOC-E and the Target Engagement Authority at the time of the strike?

(9) What was the basis for positive identification (PID) of the target to a reasonable certainty IAW the Rules of Engagement existing at the time of the engagement?

(10) Under what provision of the rules of engagement (ROE) were the fires conducted?

(11) What was the battle damage assessment (BDA) and/or collateral damage, if any? Please note whether full motion video (FMV) is available to Coalition Forces at the time of the strike(s).

(12) Did any changes to the ROE or the CJTF-OIR Tactical Directive #1 factor into this incident? If so, what was the impact?



IRIZ-CO

SUBJECT: Appointment as an Army Regulation 15-6 Investigating Officer

**4. Conduct of the Investigation.**

a. (b)(3), (b)(6) is your legal advisor. You will consult with your legal advisor before making substantive efforts regarding your investigation. You may request that additional individuals or subject matter experts be appointed in writing, to accompany you and assist you in your investigation. Coordinate such requests with your legal advisor.

b. You will review, at a minimum, targeting procedures, Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) compliance, and any other mitigations measures employed.

c. Evidence Collection.

(1) You are to conduct this investigation using the procedures outlined in Chapter 5, and the general guidance in Chapter 3, AR 15-6. No individuals have been named as respondents at this time.

(2) To the extent possible, witness statements will be written and sworn. You should record witness statements on a DA Form 2823 (*Sworn Statement*). If it is impracticable to obtain a written and/or sworn statement from a particular witness, you will attest to the accuracy of any transcription or summary of such witness testimony in whatever form it appears within your report of investigation. In accordance with AR 340-21, provide a Privacy Act statement to any witness whose statement is not taken on DA Form 2823. No U.S. military or civilian or Federal Government civilian employee can be ordered to provide information that may incriminate him or herself. You may order a military or Federal Government civilian employee witness to provide a statement if you believe that they have relevant information that would not incriminate themselves. If, in the course of your investigation you come to suspect a person may have engaged in criminal conduct, you will consult with your legal advisor. Under no circumstances should you attempt to elicit any information from a suspect without first advising that person of his/her rights under Article 31, UCMJ, or the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, as appropriate. Document your rights advisement and waivers on DA Form 3881 (*Rights Warning Procedure/Waiver Certificate*).

(3) Where a civilian employee is a member of a bargaining unit and reasonably believes that the inquiry could lead to disciplinary action against him or her, the employee may have a representative from the bargaining unit present during questioning. You will consult your legal advisor if you have any questions regarding these procedures.

(4) Should you determine in the context of your status that a Soldier's status has changed from favorable to unfavorable, as defined in AR 600-8-2, *Suspension of*

IRIZ-CO

SUBJECT: Appointment as an Army Regulation 15-6 Investigating Officer

*Favorable Personnel actions*, you must consult your legal advisor immediately, to ensure that a flag is initiated against that Soldier.

#### 5. Report of Investigation.

a. General. Your report of investigation will be written. Use DA Form 1574-1, *Report of Proceedings by Investigating Officer*, and attach all required enclosures and exhibits.

b. Assembly. Your completed investigation will include the following:

- (1) This memorandum of appointment;
- (2) A completed DA Form 1574-1, *Report of Proceedings by Investigating Officer*;
- (3) A detailed chronology of the daily actions you took during the investigation;
- (4) An index of all attached exhibits;
- (5) All exhibits, labeled and numbered;
- (6) A list of the witnesses you interviewed;
- (7) If applicable, proper classification markings for each paragraph, page, and exhibit included within your report of investigation;
- (8) A copy of the full motion video (FMV) from the strike (if available); and
- (9) A memorandum with your findings and recommendations.

c. Findings. You will reach your findings by a preponderance of the evidence that you gather. A finding is a clear and concise statement of facts that can be readily deduced from evidence in the record. In your report, develop specific findings and cite the evidence that supports your findings. If evidence conflicts (e.g., conflicting witness statements), make a finding as to which evidence is more credible and why you believe it to be more credible.

(1) If you find that there were civilian casualties and that this incident was a CIVGAS incident, you will identify lessons learned, if any, and provide appropriate recommendations.



IRIZ-CO

SUBJECT: Appointment as an Army Regulation 15-6 Investigating Officer


(2) If you find that a non-U.S. Coalition Force nations were involved in the strikes that likely cause CIVCAS, you should immediately report that to me and to the CJTF-OIR CIVCAS OIC through the CJFLCC-OIR Staff Judge Advocate.

d. Recommendations. Based on your findings, make recommendations as to what changes if any, are needed in terms of policy, procedures, resources, doctrine, training, and leadership to avoid incidents of this nature in the future, as well as recommendations consistent with your findings as to which evidence is more credible and why you believe it to be more credible.

e. Submission. Submit your final report of investigation in hard copy for legal review. Do not use page protectors or staple/secure documents to one another. Place the investigation in a binder and use dividers or tabs to identify exhibits and enclosures. You may not release any information related to this investigation to anyone, other than your legal advisor, without prior approval.

6. The POC for this memorandum is the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate at SVOIP

(b)(5)



JOSEPH M. MARTIN  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Commanding

**ARMY REGULATION 15-6 INVESTIGATION**  
Alleged Civilian Mass Casualty Incident  
at Jadidah District, Mosul, Iraq  
17 March 2017

Overall Classification of the Investigation:

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

All ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ documents are contained in Binder D.

Overall Classification of this Binder:

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~





DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
 HEADQUARTERS, COMBINED JOINT FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND –  
 OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE & 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION  
 UNION III, BAGHDAD, IRAQ  
 APO AE 09348

IRIZ-CO

Date: 28 MAR 17

MEMORANDUM FOR Brigadier General Matthew C. Isler, Deputy Commanding General – Air, Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJFLCC-OIR), Baghdad, Iraq, APO AE 09348

SUBJECT: Appointment as a Civilian Casualty (CIVCAS) Credibility Assessment Investigating Officer

1. **Appointment.** You are hereby appointed as an Investigating Officer (IO) pursuant to the Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) Standard Operating Procedure [for] Civilian Casualty Reporting and Response Procedures to conduct an assessment into the facts and circumstances surrounding allegations of a civilian casualty (CIVCAS) incident on or about 17 March 2017 in the vicinity of the vicinity of MGRS 38 SLF 29048 22188, Al Izdihar al Awwal neighborhood, Mosul, Iraq. **You have 20 days from the date of this appointment to complete your assessment.** Coordinate any requests for extensions through your legal advisor.

2. **General Instructions.**

a. The purpose of this assessment is to elicit facts. You are directed to conduct an assessment into the matters set forth in paragraph 3, below. Your assessment should determine whether it is more likely than not that Coalition Forces operations, on or about 17 March 2017, caused the death of any civilian noncombatants in the vicinity of MGRS 38 SLF 29048 22188, Al Izdihar al Awwal neighborhood, Mosul, Iraq. Additionally, please note any lesson that Coalition Forces can learn from this incident that may allow this organization to minimize CIVCAS in the future. Upon collection of this investigation, you will complete a report of investigation that conforms to the requirements in paragraph 4 of this memorandum.

b. This assessment is your primary duty and takes precedence over all other duties that are or may be assigned to you.

3. **Scope of Assessment/Specific Instructions.** During your assessment you will, at a minimum, determine the following:

a. How many civilian deaths are estimated? What is the source(s) of those estimated CIVCAS numbers?



IRIZ-CO

SUBJECT: Appointment as a Civilian Casualty (CIVCAS) Credibility Assessment Investigating Officer

b. How many of those deaths are attributable to U.S./Coalition strikes, CTS (or other Iraq Security Forces unit), and/or ISIS? What was the cause of those deaths (e.g., one Coalition strike, multiple Coalition strikes, a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), an ISIS house-borne IED, etc.)?

c. What ISIS tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are responsible for (or factored into) the CIVCAS? Are these new TTPs?

d. How many U.S./Coalition strikes took place on the date in question? What were the locations of those strikes?

e. What was the target of those strikes?

f. Who requested the strikes?

g. Who authorized the strikes, both for the U.S. and for the Government of Iraq?

h. What facts were known by CJOC-E and the Target Engagement Authority at the time of the strike?

i. What was the basis for positive identification (PID)?

j. Under what provision of the rules of engagement (ROE) were the fires conducted?

k. What was the battle damage assessment (BDA) and/or collateral damage, if any? Please note whether full motion video (FMV) is available to Coalition Forces at the time of the strike(s).

#### 4. Conduct of the Assessment.

a. (b)(3), (b)(6) is your legal advisor. You will consult with your legal advisor before making substantive efforts regarding your assessment.

b. You are to conduct this assessment using the CJTF-OIR CIVCAS SOP and AR 15-6 procedures as a guide. You will collect all relevant evidence related to the subject CIVCAS allegation prior to submitting a written report of investigation. You will provide a description of the facts and circumstances surrounding the CIVCAS allegation. You will review, at a minimum, targeting procedures, Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) compliance, and any other mitigation measures. If you find that there were civilian casualties and that this incident was a CIVCAS incident, you will identify lessons learned, if any, and provide appropriate recommendations



IRIZ-CO

SUBJECT: Appointment as a Civilian Casualty (CIVCAS) Credibility Assessment Investigating Officer

c. You will reach your findings by a preponderance of the evidence that you gather. A finding is a clear and concise statement of facts that can be readily deduced from evidence in the record. In your report, develop specific findings and cite the evidence that supports your findings. If evidence conflicts (e.g., conflicting witness statements), make a finding as to which evidence is more credible and why you believe it to be more credible.

d. If you find that non-U.S. Coalition Force nations were involved in the strikes that likely cause CIVCAS, you should immediately report that to me and to the CTJF-OIR CIVCAS OIC through the CJFLCC-OIR Staff Judge Advocate.

e. You are not required to make recommendations, but you may if you determine that your assessment reveals ways to mitigate future CIVCAS or ISIS tactics/TTPs that will aid commanders in the field.

f. Your report, along with all enclosures and exhibits, must be delivered to the Office Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA), CJFLCC-OIR, for a legal review prior to my review. You may not release any information related to this assessment to anyone, other than your legal advisor, without prior approval.

5. The POC for this memorandum is the OSJA at SVOIP (b)(6)

  
JOSEPH M. MARTIN  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Commanding

**ARMY REGULATION 15-6 INVESTIGATION**

Alleged Civilian Mass Casualty Incident  
at Jadidah District, Mosul, Iraq  
17 March 2017

Overall Classification of the Investigation:

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

All ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ documents are contained in Binder D.

Overall Classification of this Binder:

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~





DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
COMBINED JOINT FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND  
OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE  
UNION III, BAGHDAD, IRAQ  
APO AE 09348

IRIZ-DCA

25 April 2017

(U//~~FOUO~~) MEMORANDUM FOR MG Joseph M. Martin, Commander, Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command – Operation Inherent Resolve

(U//~~FOUO~~) SUBJECT: Investigation Chronology for Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation of the Alleged Civilian Mass Casualty Incident in the al Jadidah District, City of Mosul, Ninewah Governate, on or about 17 March 2017

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) Chronology. The following activities were conducted during the course of the investigation IAW Army Regulation 15-6.

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) 28 March 2017:

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) Brig Gen (BG) Isler notified of appointment as Investigating Officer to conduct a comprehensive Civilian Casualty Assessment Review re: the allegations of civilian casualties on or about 17 March 2017.

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) Initial Meeting for Investigation Team

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) BG Isler receives initial legal briefing

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) 29 March 2017:

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) BLDG 4250.10 initial post blast site exploitation [Mosul].

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) Investigation Team Meeting

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) 30 March 2017:

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) BG Isler notified that he would continue the investigation in accordance with Army Regulation (AR) 15-6.

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) Investigative Team Chief of Staff receives guidance from MG Martin and LTG Townsend.

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) IO interviews United States Special Operations Forces (USSOF), Coalition Special Operations Forces, and Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) Counterterrorism Service (CTS) personnel [WYVERN]

(4) (U//~~FOUO~~) Investigation Team Meeting

IRIZ-DCA

SUBJECT: Investigation Chronology for Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation of the Alleged Civilian Mass Casualty Incident in the al Jadidah District, City of Mosul, Ninewah Governate, on or about 17 March 2017

d. (U//~~FOUO~~) 31 March 2017:

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) MG Martin signs the appointment order directing BG Isler to conduct the investigation in accordance with AR 15-6.

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of BG Richardson

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [redacted]

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(4) (U//~~FOUO~~) Interview of [redacted]

(5) (U//~~FOUO~~) Investigation Team Meeting

e. (U//~~FOUO~~) 1 April 2017:

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) Investigation Team Meeting

f. (U//~~FOUO~~) 2 April 2017:

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) Investigation Team Meeting

g. (U//~~FOUO~~) 3 April 2017:

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) Telephonic interview with [redacted] (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) Investigation Team Meeting

h. (U//~~FOUO~~) 4 April 2017:

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) Telephonic interview with [redacted] (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) Investigation Team Meeting

i. (U//~~FOUO~~) 5 April 2017:



IRIZ-DCA

SUBJECT: Investigation Chronology for Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation of the Alleged Civilian Mass Casualty Incident in the al Jadidah District, City of Mosul, Ninewah Governate, on or about 17 March 2017

- (1) (~~U//FOUO~~) Telephonic interview with [redacted] (b)(6)
- (2) (~~U//FOUO~~) Telephonic interview with [redacted] (b)(6)
- (3) (~~U//FOUO~~) Investigation Team Meeting
- j. (~~U//FOUO~~) 6 April 2017:
  - (1) (~~U//FOUO~~) Investigation Team Meeting
- k. (~~U//FOUO~~) 7 April 2017:
  - (1) (~~U//FOUO~~) Investigation Team Meeting
- l. (~~U//FOUO~~) 8 April 2017:
  - (1) (~~U//FOUO~~) IO requests information concerning Iraqi Forward Air Controllers from United States Special Operations Forces (USSOF), Coalition Special Operations Forces
  - (2) (~~U//FOUO~~) Investigation Team Meeting
- m. (~~U//FOUO~~) 9 April 2017:
  - (2) (~~U//FOUO~~) Investigation Team Meeting
- n. (~~U//FOUO~~) 10 April 2017:
  - (1) (~~U//FOUO~~) Second post-blast site exploitation of BLDG 4250.10 [Mosul]
  - (2) (~~U//FOUO~~) Investigation Team Meeting
- o. (~~U//FOUO~~) 11 April 2017:
  - (1) (~~U//FOUO~~) Telephonic interview with Supervisor [redacted] (b)(6)
  - (2) (~~U//FOUO~~) Investigation Team Meeting
- p. (~~U//FOUO~~) 12 April 2017:
  - (1) (~~U//FOUO~~) Investigation Team Meeting

IRIZ-DCA

SUBJECT: Investigation Chronology for Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation of the Alleged Civilian Mass Casualty Incident in the al Jadidah District, City of Mosul, Ninewah Governate, on or about 17 March 2017

q. (U//~~FOUO~~) 13 April 2017:

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) Telephonic interview with [redacted] (b)(6)

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) Telephonic interview with [redacted] (b)(6)

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) Investigation Team Meeting

r. (U//~~FOUO~~) 14 April 2017:

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) Investigation Team Meeting

s. (U//~~FOUO~~) 15 April 2017:

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) Investigation Team Meeting

t. (U//~~FOUO~~) 16 April 2017:

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) Investigation Team Meeting

u. (U//~~FOUO~~) 19 April 2017:

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) Investigation Team Meeting

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) Investigation Complete

2. (U//~~FOUO~~) The point of contact for this memorandum is Brigadier General Matthew Isler at: [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

  
MATTHEW C. ISLER  
Brigadier General, USA  
Investigating Officer



**ARMY REGULATION 15-6 INVESTIGATION**  
Alleged Civilian Mass Casualty Incident  
at Jadidah District, Mosul, Iraq  
17 March 2017

Overall Classification of the Investigation:

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

All ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ documents are contained in Binder D.

Overall Classification of this Binder:

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

List of ~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~ Enclosures

- A. How many civilian deaths are estimated? What is the source of those estimated CIVCAS numbers?
- B. How many deaths are attributed to US/CF strikes, CTS, or ISIS? What was the cause of death?
- C. What ISIS tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are responsible for (or factored into) the CIVCAS? Are these new TTPs?
- D. How many U.S./Coalition strikes took place on the date in question? What were the locations of those strikes?
- E. What was the target of those strikes?
- F. Who requested the strikes?
- G. Who authorized the engagements, both for the U.S. and for the Government of Iraq?
- H. What facts were known by Command Joint Operations Center-Erbil (CJOC-E) and the Target Engagement Authority (TEA) at the time of the strike?
- I. What was the basis for positive identification (PID)?
- J. Under what provision of the rules of engagement (ROE) were the fires conducted?
- K. What was the battle damage assessment (BDA) and/or collateral damage, if any? Please note whether full motion video (FMV) is available to Coalition Forces at the time of the strike(s)?
- L. Did any changes to the Rules of Engagement (ROE) or the Combined Joint Task Force-Operations Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) Tactical Directive #1 factor into this incident? If so what was the impact?
- M. Al Jadidah CIVCAS Investigation Brief

List of Unclassified Exhibits

Interview:

A1: Interview of (b)(6)

Engineering Reports:

A2: BLDG 4250, 10 Floor Plan

A3: Initial Engineer Estimate of BLDG 4250, 10



**Media Reporting:**

- A4: 23 March 2017 Rudaw Article
- A5: 28 March 2017 Human Rights Watch Article
- A6: 30 March 2017 Rudaw Article
- A7: CIVCAS Social Media Reporting
- A8: al Jadidah District CIVCAS Articles

**Index of ~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~ Exhibits**

**Interviews:**

- B1: Interview with TF CTS Coalition Advise & Assist Ground Force Commander
- B2: Request for Information on Iraqi Forward Air Controllers
- B3: Interview of [redacted] (b)(6)
- B4: Interview of [redacted] (b)(6)
- B5: Interview with [redacted] (b)(6)
- B6: Interview with [redacted] (b)(6)
- B7: Interview with [redacted] (b)(6)
- B8: Interview with [redacted] (b)(6) – Survivor of 17 March Engagement
- B9: Interview with [redacted] (b)(6)

**Reports & Strike Cell Products:**

- B10: Danger X-Ray Strike Brief
- B11: CJOC-Erbil Strike Game Plan
- B12: CJOC-Erbil OSJA Strike Log
- B13: 17 March 2017 Operation EAGLE STRIKE ISF Scheme of Maneuver
- B14: Weather Report 14 – 26 March 2017
- B15: FMV Battlefield Characterization 12 – 17 March 2017
- B16: BLDG 4250.10 Post-Strike Imagery
- B17: TF Falcon CMO Update; 29 March 2017
- B18: Story Board: ISIS TTP to lure air strikes on civilians

**B19:** al Jadidah Investigation Common Operating Picture – Compact Disc

**Legal Documents:**

**B20:** LOAC Violation Report 29 March 2017

**B21:** USCENTCOM Rules of Engagement

**B22:** MOD 1 to Tactical Directive #1-Enabling Coalition Support to Partner Forces

**Index of ~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~ Exhibits**

**Sworn Statements:**

**C1:** BG Richardson Sworn Statement; 5 April 2017

**C1a:** BG Richardson Sworn Statement; 27 April 2017

**C2:** (b)(3), (b)(6) Sworn Statement; 16 April 2017

**C3:** (b)(3), (b)(6) Sworn Statement; 3 April 2017

**Reports and Strike Cell Products:**

**C4:** (b)(3), (b)(6) – 17 March 2017 TF FALCON SITREP

**C5:** CJFLCC-OIR Human Intelligence Reports

**C6:** 7 March 2017 Strike Video – ISIS Civilian Herding TTP (compact disc)

**C7:** 16 March 2017 Enemy SITEMP

**C8:** West Mosul Call for Fire Zones

**C9:** West Mosul Engagements with mlRC Logs

**C10:** Scheme of Maneuver with Strikes timeline\_17 March 2017

**C11:** Pre-strike Imagery of BLDG 4250.10 (Created Post incident)

**C12:** MFR for BLDG 4250.10 Line of Sight Analysis

**C13:** mlRC Logs – Op EAGLE VALLEY, Op RAIDER, TF Falcon, 1712 Fires Coord

**Post Incident Reports & Assessments:**

**C14:** BLDG 4250.10 Line of Sight Analysis & compact disc

**C15:** Engagement 4250.10 Display Readout & compact disc

**C16:** Engagement 4250.10 Mission Report

**C17:** 30 March 2017 BLDG 4250.10 Post-Blast Site Exploitation



- C18: ATO FX Engagement 4250.10 Attack Analysis
- C19: JTCG/ME Mosul; 17 March 2017 CIVCAS Incident Refined Analysis
- C20: USACE ERDC Assessment of 17 March 2017 Engagement Damage
- C21: Post-blast Chemical Analysis\_16 April 2017 EOD Assessment
- C22: ISIS Exploitation of Human Capital
- C23: 18 April 2017 End of Mission Report\_02 May 2017
- C24: Structural Assessment of BLDG 4250.10 with Imagery

Index of ~~S//REL NOFORN~~ and ~~S//REL TO USA, ACGU~~ Exhibits

- D1: (~~S//NOFORN~~) E-Mail, Implementation of CDE Delayed-Fuse Cratering; 27 April 2017
- D2: (~~S//REL TO USA, ACGU~~) JTCGME Report – Mitigation Analysis for Buried GBU-31 and GBU-38 Weapons; 17 February 2017
- D3: (~~S//REL TO USA, ACGU~~) Weaponneering Analysis; 14 April 2017
- D4: (~~S//REL TO USA, ACGU~~) Precision Guided Munitions Mitigation Table

***\*\*Disclaimer: any reference to Collateral Damage Estimation (CDE) or Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology (CDEM) in these Exhibits is for investigative purposes only. No formal CDEM was required, nor was one conducted, as part of Engagement 4250.10.\*\****

**ARMY REGULATION 15-6 INVESTIGATION**

Alleged Civilian Mass Casualty Incident  
at Jadidah District, Mosul, Iraq  
17 March 2017

Overall Classification of the Investigation:

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

All ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ documents are contained in Binder D.

Overall Classification of this Binder:

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~



(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)  
(b)(5)

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## REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS BY INVESTIGATING OFFICER

Note. Completed forms may contain personally identifiable information and require handling as set forth in AR 340-21.  
For use of II is form, see AR 15-6; the proper agency is OI JAG.

IF MORE SPACE IS REQUIRED IN FILLING OUT ANY PORTION OF THIS FORM, ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS

### SECTION I - APPOINTMENT

Appointed by MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPH M. MARTIN, COMMANDING GENERAL, CJFLCC OIR & HD  
(Appointing authority)

on 20170328 (Date) (Attach enclosure 1: Letter of appointment or summary of oral appointment data.) (See para 3-15, AR 15-6)

### SECTION II - TIMELINE

1. The (investigation) commenced at UNION III, BAGHDAD, IRAQ at 2000  
(Place) (Time)  
on 20170328  
(Date)

2. The (investigating officer) finished gathering/hearing evidence at 2000 on 20170413 and completed  
(Time) (Date)  
findings and recommendations at 1820 on 20170506  
(Time) (Date)

### SECTION III - CHECKLIST FOR PROCEEDINGS

#### A. COMPLETE IN ALL CASES

|  | YES                                 | NO <sup>1)</sup>         | NA <sup>2)</sup>                    |
|--|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 1. Enclosures (para 3-13, AR 15-6)<br>Are the following enclosed and numbered consecutively with Roman numerals: (Attached in order listed)  |                                     |                          |                                     |
| a. The memorandum of appointment?  | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| b. All other written communications to or from the appointing authority?   | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| c. Privacy Act Statements (Certificate, if statement provided orally)?   | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| d. Explanation by the investigating officer of any unusual delays, difficulties, irregularities, or other problems encountered (e.g., absence of material witnesses)?                | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| e. Any other significant papers (other than evidence) relating to administrative aspects of the investigation?   | <input type="checkbox"/>            | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| f. An Executive Summary, Index of Exhibits, Chronology of the Investigation and lists of all persons interviewed and evidence gathered (Complex, serious and/or high profile cases)? | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| 2. Exhibits (para 3-14, AR 15-6)   |                                     |                          |                                     |
| a. Are all items offered (whether or not received) or considered as evidence individually numbered or ordered as exhibits and attached to this report?                               | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| b. Is an index of all exhibits offered to or considered by investigating officer attached before the first exhibit?  | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| c. Has the testimony/statement of each witness been recorded verbatim or been reduced to written form and attached as an exhibit?  | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| d. Are copies, descriptions, or depictions (if substituted for real or documentary evidence) properly authenticated and is the location of the original evidence indicated?          | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| e. Are descriptions or diagrams included of locations visited by the investigating officer (Appendix C-3, AR 15-6)?  | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| f. Is each written stipulation attached as an exhibit and is each oral stipulation either reduced to writing and made an exhibit or recorded?  | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/>            |

FOOTNOTES: <sup>1)</sup> Explain all negative answers on an attached sheet.

<sup>2)</sup> Use of the N/A column constitutes a positive representation that the circumstances described in the question did not occur in this investigation.



SECTION IV - FINDINGS (para 3-10, AR 15-6)

The (investigating officer), having carefully considered the evidence, finds: *[Each paragraph should be one conclusion based on the evidence gathered during the investigation. These findings should provide answers to each question posed by the appointing authority in the appointment memorandum. The evidence that supports each finding must be cited.]*

SEE ATTACHED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS MEMORANDUM, DATED 6 MAY 2017.

Approved for Release

SECTION V - RECOMMENDATIONS (para 3-11, AP 15-6)

In view of the above findings, the (investigating officer) recommends: [Each paragraph should be one recommendation based on the findings in Section IV. Address what actions, if any, should be taken with regard to the individuals involved, the unit leadership, and any steps that can be taken to prevent the occurrence in the future. Recommendations do not need to be adverse or punitive. For example, the investigation results can be used as a training tool.]

SEE ATTACHED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS MEMORANDUM, DATED 6 MAY 2017.

Approved for Release



SECTION VI - AUTHENTICATION (para 3-15, AR 15-6)

THIS REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS IS COMPLETE AND ACCURATE.

Y.C.V.

MATTHEW C. ISLER, BRIG. GEN., U.S. AIR FORCE  
(Investigating Officer)

SECTION VII - ACTION BY APPROVING AUTHORITY (para 2-8, AR 15-6)

The findings and recommendations of the (investigating officer) are:

a) Approved.

b) Approved with the following modifications: SEE ATTACHED MEMO.

(1) The following findings of fact are added/deleted:

(2) The following findings of fact are modified as follows:

(3) The following recommendations are added/deleted:

(4) The following recommendations are modified as follows:

(5) The action recommended in recommendation \_\_\_\_\_ has been accomplished by \_\_\_\_\_

(6) Recommendation(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is not appropriate for action by this command; however, a copy of this investigation is being furnished to \_\_\_\_\_ for such action as deemed appropriate.

c) Disapproved.

d) The report is (incomplete), (ambiguous), (erroneous) and/or (specify deficiency) with respect to \_\_\_\_\_

It is, therefore, hereby returned to the IO for corrective action as follows \_\_\_\_\_



JOSEPH M. MARTIN  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Commanding

MAY 07 2017



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
HEADQUARTERS, COMBINED JOINT FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND  
OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE & 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION  
UNION III, BAGHDAD, IRAQ  
APO AE 09348

IRIZ-CO

Date: MAY 07 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Attachment to DA Form 1574-1, Section VII, Action by the Approving Authority, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation into the Alleged Mass Civilian Casualty (CIVCAS) Incident in al Jadidah District, Mosul, on 17 March 2017

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) I reviewed the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer (IO), and I approve the IO's findings as submitted.
2. (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) I make the following additional findings:

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(b)(1)1.4a




IRIZ-CO

SUBJECT: Attachment to DA Form 1574-1, Section VII, Action by the Approving Authority, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation into the Alleged Mass Civilian Casualty (CIVCAS) Incident in al Jadidah District, Mosul, on 17 March 2017

c. (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) I intend to recommend to the CJTF-OIR and CENTCOM commanders that the current ROE remain in effect.

4. (~~U//FOUO~~) The point of contact for this memorandum is the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, CJFLCC-OIR & IID, at DSN (b)(6)



JOSEPH M. MARTIN  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Commanding

Approved for Release



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
HEADQUARTERS, COMBINED JOINT FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND –  
OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE & 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION  
UNION III, BAGHDAD, IRAQ  
APO AE 09348

IRIZ-CO

Date: MAY 07 2017

MEMORANDUM THRU Commander, Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, APO AE 09306

FOR Commander, United States Central Command, 7115 South Boundary Boulevard, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida 33621-5101

(U) SUBJECT: Request for Assistance to Establish a Civilian Casualty Assessment Task Force

1. ~~(S//MESH)~~ Purpose. To request assistance to establish a dedicated civilian casualty (CIVCAS) task force to assess potential CIVCAS from Coalition force strikes during the West Mosul offensive.

2. ~~(S//MESH)~~ Request. I request manpower and other necessary resources to stand up a dedicated civilian casualty assessment team for the purpose of reviewing and assessing outstanding, current, and future CIVCAS allegations against Coalition Forces resulting from the West Mosul Offensive.

3. ~~(S//MESH)~~ Justification.

a. ~~(S//MESH)~~ The investigating officer of the Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into the 17 March 2017 mass civilian casualty allegation recommended a dedicated team to conduct an expanded bottom-up preliminary inquiry overlaying civilian remains recovered by the Iraqi Civil Defense force with Coalition Force strike data. During the course of his investigation, the IO learned that the Mosul Civil Defense unit had conducted many civilian casualty excavations in West Mosul. The head of the Civil Defense could not say which force caused the civilian casualties.

b. ~~(S//MESH)~~ Given our commitment to be transparent about Coalition Force-caused CIVCAS and the high number of engagements conducted on behalf of our Iraqi partners, I believe the IO's recommendation has significant merit. This task force could also be directed to assess current and future Mosul CIVCAS allegations arising from social media reporting.

c. ~~(S//MESH)~~ The CJFLCC-OIR is currently resourced to fight the current fight. Though the number of confirmed CIVCAS in proportion to the total Coalition engagements is low, the allegations and potential for CIVCAS warrant a full time team to assess the credibility of CIVCAS allegations from the West Mosul offensive. The



IRIZ-CO


SUBJECT: Request for Assistance to Establish a Civilian Casualty Assessment Task Force

CJFLCC-OIR does not have the resources to adequately conduct this mission while remaining focused on the counter-ISIS fight.

4. ~~(S//MESF)~~ Summary. Based on the above, I request CENTCOM's assistance in resourcing a dedicated CIVCAS assessment response team.

5. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ The point of contact for this memorandum is the Staff Judge Advocate at

(b)(3), (b)(6)



JOSEPH M. MARTIN  
Major General, US Army  
Commanding

Approved for Release

**ARMY REGULATION 15-6 INVESTIGATION**  
Alleged Civilian Mass Casualty Incident  
at Jadidah District, Mosul, Iraq  
17 March 2017

Overall Classification of the Investigation:

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

All ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ documents are contained in Binder D.

Overall Classification of this Binder:

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~



Approved for Release

**ARMY REGULATION 15-6 INVESTIGATION**  
Alleged Civilian Mass Casualty Incident  
at Jadidah District, Mosul, Iraq  
17 March 2017

Overall Classification of the Investigation:

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

All ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ documents are contained in Binder D.

Overall Classification of this Binder:

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~



**ARMY REGULATION 15-6 INVESTIGATION**

Alleged Civilian Mass Casualty Incident

al Jadidah District, Mosul, Iraq

17 March 2017

**List of Enclosures**

- A. How many civilian deaths are estimated? What is the source of those estimated CIVCAS numbers?
- B. How many deaths are attributed to US/CF strikes, CTS, or ISIS? What was the cause of death?
- C. What ISIS tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are responsible for (or factored into) the CIVCAS? Are these new TTPs?
- D. How many U.S./Coalition strikes took place on the date in question? What were the locations of those strikes?
- E. What was the target of those strikes?
- F. Who requested the strikes?
- G. Who authorized the engagements, both for the U.S. and for the Government of Iraq?
- H. What facts were known by Command Joint Operations Center-Erbil (CJOC-E) and the Target Engagement Authority (TEA) at the time of the strike?
- I. What was the basis for positive identification (PID)?
- J. Under what provision of the rules of engagement (ROE) were the fires conducted?
- K. What was the battle damage assessment (BDA) and/or collateral damage, if any? Please note whether full motion video (FMV) is available to Coalition Forces at the time of the strike(s)?
- L. Did any changes to the Rules of Engagement (ROE) or the Combined Joint Task Force-Operations Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) Tactical Directive #1 factor into this incident? If so what was the impact?
- M. Al Jadidah CIVCAS Investigation Brief

Enclosure A

IRIZ-DCA  
19 April 2017

(U//~~FOUO~~) QUESTION A: How many civilian deaths are estimated? What is the source of those estimated CIVCAS numbers?

(b)(1)1.4a

2. (U//~~FOUO~~) Findings. A preponderance of the evidence gathered during the course of the investigation supports the following:

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) Media Reporting. While initial media reporting indicated upwards of 200 civilian casualties, more accurate follow-on reporting estimates between 101 and 137 civilian casualties were sustained as a result of engagement that struck BLDG 4250.10 (Exhibits A6, A7, & A8).

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) The first open source article published by Rudaw on 23 March 2017 stated that at least 200 people were killed in the Mosul al Jadidah district (Exhibit A4). The article estimates that approximately 130 were in one house and 100 in another (Exhibit A4).

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) An article from Human Rights Watch, an international humanitarian organization, indicated that international outlets originally reported 200 casualties (Exhibit A5). However, when Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command-Operation Inherent Resolve Public Affairs Office (CJFLCC-OIR PAO) and I interviewed [REDACTED] (b)(6), she confirmed that follow-on reports indicated that there were 140 people in the house, with 36 people unaccounted for, and four killed in the adjacent house. (Exhibit A5)

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) CJFLCC-OIR PAO reviewed over 50 articles and compiled details on reported casualty numbers and tactics used (Exhibits A7 & A8). The range for casualties is 101–137 (Exhibits A2, B5, & B8). There were 11 outlier reports that contain higher estimates ranging between 200–278 civilian casualties (Exhibit A7).



Enclosure A

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) Iraqi Civil Defense Site Excavation.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) Other Witness Testimony.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a

Enclosure B

IRIZ-DCA  
25 April 2017

(U//~~FOUO~~) Question B: How many deaths are attributed to US/CF strikes, CTS, or ISIS? What was the cause of death?

(b)(1)1.4a, (c)(1)1.4g

2. (U//~~FOUO~~) Analysis. A preponderance of the evidence gathered during the course of the investigation supports the following:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(c)(1)1.4g



Enclosure B

(b)(1)1.4g

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) This assessment is supported by an on-scene explosives post-blast assessment, which identified significant cratering and arc damage to the rear of the structure. This cratering and arc damage was too large to be attributed solely to the coalition munition. Furthermore, testing of solvent samples of explosive residue from multiple areas at the site identified explosive residue not attributable to the Coalition munition (Exhibit C5).

(a) (U//~~FOUO~~) Significant blast effects to the rear of the structure are evidenced by a large arc of damage nearly 30 feet wide, visible in the 30-inch thick composite concrete wall in the south of BLDG 4250.10. This wall experienced a significant blast wave, which pushed the concrete back two to three inches, and in the center completely pulverized the concrete wall (Exhibits C19–21). The USACE analysis confirmed the explosives in the GBU-38 alone were not enough to have caused such damage. Additionally, the shape and location of the arc damage supports a blast epicenter in the rear, centerline of BLDG 4250.10 at an approximate elevation of the second floor (Exhibits C19–21). This arc damage and causal epicenter is significantly displaced from

Enclosure B

the estimated detonation location of the GBU-38 in the roof of the northern portion of BLDG 4250.10.





- (b)(1)1.4a
- (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6)
- (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)

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Enclosure C

IRIZ-DCA  
19 April 2017

(U//~~FOUO~~) Question 3: What ISIS tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are responsible for (or factored into) the CIVCAS? Are these new TTPs?

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) BLUF. Historical reporting indicates that ISIS has used civilians in West Mosul as human shields to deter airstrikes. More recently, ISIS has started forcing civilians into structures before engaging Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) from the same building in order to provoke Coalition Force (CF) airstrikes. ISIS has adopted this tactic, "CIVCAS entrapment," to cause civilian casualties and discredit CF and ISF.

2. (U//~~FOUO~~) Facts.

a. The intelligence reports below outline current ISIS TTPs in regards to the use of CIVCAS entrapment (Exhibit C6) to discredit the Coalition. These intelligence reports were collected in February and March 2017:





Enclosure C

(b)(1)1.4c

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) ISIS fighters knew BLDG 4250.10 was being used as a civilian shelter (Exhibit B13). They interacted with its inhabitants, and told the owner of the adjacent home to depart the area the night prior to the CTS attack (Exhibit B8).

(b)(1)1.4c

3. (U//~~FOUO~~) Analysis. A preponderance of the evidence gathered during the course of the investigation indicates that ISIS's TTPs and treatment of the civilian population illustrate a steady evolution in brutality.

(b)(1)1.4c

-----  
(b)(1)1.4c

Approved for Release



Enclosure D

IRIZ-DCA  
19 April 2017

(U//~~FOUO~~) Question D: How many U.S./Coalition strikes took place on the date in question? What were the locations of those strikes?

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) Conclusion. Coalition forces, operating out of the Combined Joint Operations Center – Erbil (CJOC-E), conducted four strikes consisting of 81 engagements in and around West Mosul on 17 March 2017. Twelve of the 81 engagements, to include Strike RC4250, Engagement 10 (RC4250.10), occurred on the eastern side of Sector B.19 in the al Jadidah district.
2. (U//~~FOUO~~) Findings. A preponderance of the evidence collected during the course of the investigation supports the following:



Enclosure E

IRIZ-DCA  
19 April 2017

(U//~~FOUO~~) Question E: What was the target of those engagements?


1. (U//~~FOUO~~) Conclusion. The Combined Joint Operations Center – Erbil (CJOC-E) engagements conducted on 17 March 2017 targeted ISIS fighters, ISIS defensive fighting positions (DFPs), and ISIS mortar positions. The Coalition also provided defensive fires in support of the scheme of maneuver of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) on 17 March 2017. Strike RC4520, Engagement 10 (RC4250.10), targeted two ISIS snipers located on the second story of a residential structure being used as a defensive fighting position.

2. (U//~~FOUO~~) Facts. A preponderance of the evidence gathered during the course of the investigation supports the following:





Enclosure E



(b)(1)1.4a

Approved for Release

Enclosure F

IRIZ-DCA  
19 April 2017

(U//~~FOUO~~) Question F: Who requested the engagements?

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) Conclusion. Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) personnel requested all 12 engagements conducted within in the al Jadidah district on 17 March 2017. CTS on-scene personnel, with direct line-of-sight observation of two ISIS fighters occupying a defensive fighting position (DFP), requested Strike RC4250, Engagement 10 (RC4250.10). The request was appropriately routed through the CTS Battalion Commander to the CTS Task Force (TF) Commander. The CTS Task Force 2 (TF-2) Commander then requested, through the Coalition TF CTS Advise and Assist (A&A) Liaison Officer (LNO), that the Combined Joint Operations Center – Erbil (CJOC-E) execute the strike request.

2. (U//~~FOUO~~) Findings. A preponderance of the evidence collected during the course of the investigation supports the following:

(b)(1)1.4a



-----  
(b)(1)1.4a

Approved for Release

Enclosure G

IRIZ-DCA  
19 April 2017

(U//~~FOUO~~) Question G: Who authorized the engagements, both for the U.S. and for the Government of Iraq?

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) BLUF. A U.S./Coalition Target Engagement Authority (TEA) and a Government of Iraq (GoI) Official authorized each engagement prosecuted through the Combined Joint Operations Center – Erbil (CJOC-E) on 17 March 2017. Brigadier General John Richardson and [REDACTED] (b)(6) authorized Strike RC4250, Engagement 10 (RC4250.10).

2. (U) Findings. A preponderance of the evidence gathered during the course of the investigation supports the following:

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)(1.4a), (b)(3), (b)(6)

Enclosure H

IRIZ-DCA  
19 April 2017

(U//~~FOUO~~) Question H: What facts were known by Combined Joint Operations Center – Erbil (CJOC-E) and the Target Engagement Authority (TEA) at the time of the strike?

(b)(1)1.4a


2. (U//~~FOUO~~) Findings. A preponderance of the evidence collected during the course of the investigation supports the following:

(b)(1)1.4a

Approved for Release



Enclosure H



Approved for Release

Enclosure I

IRIZ-DCA  
19 April 2017

(U//~~FOUO~~) Question I: What was the basis for positive identification (PID)?

(b)(1)1.4a

2. (U) Facts.

(b)(1)1.4a

Approved for Release

-----  
(b)(1)1.4a

Approved for Release



Enclosure I



(b)(1)1.4a

Approved for Release

Enclosure J

IRIZ-DCA  
25 April 2017

(U//~~FOUO~~) Question J: Under what provision of the rules of engagement (ROE) were the fires conducted?



a. (U//~~FOUO~~) LOAC Principles. The ROE requires that, "commanders will ensure that military operations are conducted in accordance with the law of war, or law of armed conflict (LOAC), principles of military necessity proportionality, distinction and unnecessary suffering" (Exhibit B21).

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) Military Necessity. Military necessity requires that offensive military action is directed only toward military objectives. A military objective is defined as an object which, by its nature, location, use or purpose, makes an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization would offer a definite military advantage (See Protocol (I) Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, Article 52(2)).

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) Proportionality. The principle of proportionality requires that anticipated collateral damage is not excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage gained. The principle of proportionality requires that combatants must take feasible precautions in planning and conducting attacks to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and other protected persons and objects protected from being made the object

Enclosure J

of attack. (See generally, *Department of Defense Law of War Manual*, June 2015 (Updated December 2016) sections 5.10.2.1-3).

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) Distinction. The principle of distinction requires that military personnel distinguish between civilian objects, which are protected and may not be subjected to attack, and military objectives, which may be attacked in accordance with other LOAC provisions.

(4) (U//~~FOUO~~) Unnecessary Suffering. This principle requires military forces to avoid inflicting gratuitous violence on the enemy.

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) USCENTCOM ROE.

(b)(1) 4a



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

Approved for Release

Enclosure K

IRIZ-DCA  
19 April 2017

(U//~~FOUO~~) Question K: What was the battle damage assessment (BDA) and/or collateral damage, if any? Please note whether full motion video (FMV) is available to Coalition Forces at the time of the strike(s)?

(b)(1)1.4a

2. (U//~~FOUO~~) Findings. A preponderance of the evidence gathered during the course of the investigation supports the following.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

Approved for Release



Enclosure L

IRIZ-DCA  
17 April 2017

(U//~~FOUO~~) Question L: Did any changes to the Rules of Engagement (ROE) or the Combined Joint Task Force-Operations Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) Tactical Directive #1 factor into this incident? If so what was the impact?





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
COMBINED JOINT FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND  
OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE  
CAMP UNION III, BAGHDAD, IRAQ  
APO, AE 09346

IRIZ-DCG-A

01 April 2017

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Al-Jadida Investigation

To

Combined Joint Force Land Component Command – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJFLCC-OIR) is currently undertaking an investigation into the events of Mar 17, 2017 in the Al-Jadida neighborhood of West Mosul.

As part of the ongoing investigation, we are seeking information from credible sources regarding the incident, including eye witness testimonies, notes taken and imagery either shot or filmed. Any information that you have in these matters is greatly encouraged as it will help us in establishing the facts of the incident.

If you have any information to assist this investigation, please contact the CJFLCC Public Affairs Office at:

Yours Sincerely,

*70.7*  
MATTHEW C. ISLER  
Brigadier General, USA  
Deputy Commanding Air



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
COMBINED JOINT FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND  
OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE  
CAMP UNION III, BAGHDAD, IRAQ  
APO, AE 09348

IRIZ-DCG-A

03 April 2017

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Al-Jadida Investigation

To [REDACTED] (b)(6)

Combined Joint Force Land Component Command – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJFLCC-OIR) is currently undertaking an investigation into the events of Mar 17, 2017 in the Al-Jadida neighborhood of West Mosul.


As part of the ongoing investigation, we are seeking information from credible sources regarding the incident, including eye witness testimonies, notes taken and imagery either shot or filmed. Any information that you have in these matters is greatly encouraged as it will help us in establishing the facts of the incident.

If you have any information to assist this investigation, please contact the CJFLCC Directorate of Civil-Military Affairs Office at: [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) or mobile

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

Yours Sincerely,

Approved for Release

  
MATTHEW C. ISLER  
Brigadier General, USA  
Deputy Commanding Air





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
COMBINED JOINT FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND  
OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE  
CAMP UNION III, BAGHDAD, IRAQ  
APO, AE 09348

IRIZ-DCG-A

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
COMBINED JOINT FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND  
OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE  
CAMP UNION III, BAGHDAD, IRAQ  
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IRIZ-DCG-A

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Yours Sincerely,

  
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
COMBINED JOINT FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND  
OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE  
CAMP UNION III, BAGHDAD, IRAQ  
APO, AE 09348

IRIZ-DCG-A

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
COMBINED JOINT FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND  
OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE  
CAMP UNION III, BAGHDAD, IRAQ  
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IRIZ-DCG-A

01 April 2017

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Approved for Release

  
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Deputy Commanding Air



**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
COMBINED JOINT FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND  
OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE  
CAMP UNION III, BAGHDAD, IRAQ  
APO, AE 09348

IRIZ-DCG-A

01 April 2017

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
COMBINED JOINT FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND  
OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE  
CAMP UNION III, BAGHDAD, IRAQ  
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IRIZ-DCG-A

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Approved for Release

  
MATTHEW C. ISLER  
Brigadier General, USA  
Deputy Commanding Air





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
COMBINED JOINT FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND  
OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE  
CAMP UNION III, BAGHDAD, IRAQ  
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IRIZ-DCG-A

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If you have any information to assist this investigation, please contact the CJFLCC Public Affairs Office at:

Yours Sincerely,

  
MATTHEW C. ISLER  
Brigadier General, USA  
Deputy Commanding Air

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 11, 2017 2:04 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Al-Jadida Investigation (UNCLASSIFIED)  
**Attachments:** (b)(6)

**Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6)

I am writing to you in regards to a story we believe you were involved in, detailing the events of Mar 17, 2017 in the Al-Jadida neighbourhood of Mosul, Iraq. I have attempted to get in touch via The Times however had had no reply. I have attached a letter from Brig Gen Isler outlining a formal request for information for the Al-Jadida Investigation and would greatly appreciate your participation, however I fully understand if you do not wish to do this.

Regards,

(b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

Approved for Release

MOBILE PHONE CONVERSATION  
- 13 APR 17  
- EVIDENCE AS PER TIMES ARTICLE

(b)(3)

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Sunday, April 09, 2017 9:28 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: Al Jadida Investigation (UNCLASSIFIED)  
**Attachments:** (b)(6)

**Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6)

I am reaching out to you on behalf of Brig. Gen. Matthew Isler (USAF) a further time to please request if you can help with the Al Jadida, Mosul, Iraq Investigation by either providing information any information about the incidents of March 17. All information, including requests such as these, will be documented for evidence and we would greatly appreciate if you could aid us in establishing the facts of the incident.

Regards,

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Saturday, April 01, 2017 10:32 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Al Jadida Investigation (UNCLASSIFIED)

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6)

I am writing to you in story you were covering on behalf of the Associated Press on Mar 23, detailing the events of Mar 17, 2017. I have attached a letter from Brig Gen Isler outlining a formal request for information for the Al-Jadida Investigation and would greatly appreciate your participation, however I fully understand if you do not wish to do this.

Regards,

(b)(6)



(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 05, 2017 1:59 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** [Non-DoD Source] Re: Al-Jadida Investigation (UNCLASSIFIED)

(b)(6)

Would be happy to speak. What is your time frame. I am travelling until next Tuesday. If you need to speak before then, let me know. Otherwise, anytime next week after then would be fine. I am based in New York.

Best,

(b)(6)

On Apr 1, 2017 3:15 PM, (b)(6) wrote:

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6)

I am writing to you in connecting with the article you wrote for Airwars.org on Mar 28, detailing the events of Mar 17, 2017. I have attached a letter from Brig Gen Isler outlining a formal request for information for the Al-Jadida Investigation and would greatly appreciate your participation, however I fully understand if you do not wish to do this.

Regards,

(b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Sunday, April 02, 2017 4:21 PM  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** [Non-DoD Source] Re: Al Jadida Investigation (UNCLASSIFIED)

Hello (b)(6)

I've received your email and I will respond in time.

Regards,

(b)(6)

Approved for Release

(b)(6)

On Sun, Apr 2, 2017 at 2:19 PM, (b)(6)  
<mailto:(b)(6)> wrote:

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6)

I am writing to you in connecting with the article you wrote for Rudaw on Mar 23, detailing the events of Mar 17, 2017. I have attached a letter from Brig Gen Isler outlining a formal request for information for the Al-Jadida Investigation and would greatly appreciate your participation, however I fully understand if you do not wish to do this.

Regards,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

Approved for Release



(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 06, 2017 2:39 AM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** [Non-DoD Source] Re: Al Jadida Investigation (UNCLASSIFIED)

Hi (b)(6)

Thank you for contacting me, but as a news photographer for the Los Angeles Times, I am unable to participate in your investigation. Our published work contains our reporting on the incident. If you have any questions, you may contact Times Deputy Managing Editor (b)(6)

Respectfully,

(b)(6)

Sent on the run, please excuse any typos.

On Apr 2, 2017, at 10:13 AM, (b)(6)  
<mailto:(b)(6)> wrote:

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6)

I am writing to you in connection with a story you were covering detailing the events of Mar 17, 2017. I have attached a letter from Brig Gen Isler outlining a formal request for information for the Al-Jadida Investigation and would greatly appreciate your participation, however I fully understand if you do not wish to do this.

Regards,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Saturday, April 01, 2017 11:41 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** [Non-DoD Source] Re: Al Jadida Investigation (UNCLASSIFIED)

Hi (b)(6)

I'm afraid the Post's policy forbids us from assisting in investigations relating to our newsgathering and reporting so I can't really help on this.

Best,

(b)(6)

Sent from my iPhone

> On 1 Apr 2017, at 22:18, (b)(6) wrote:

>

> CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

>

(b)(6)

>

> I am writing to you in connecting with a story you were covering for the Washington Post on Mar 25, detailing the events of Mar 17, 2017. I have attached a letter from Brig Gen Isler outlining a formal request for information for the Al-Jadida Investigation and would greatly appreciate your participation, however I fully understand if you do not wish to do this.

>

> Regards,

>

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**From:** Isler, Matthew C Brig Gen USAF (US) (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 13, 2017 10:47 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Investigation of 17 March Strike (UNCLASSIFIED)

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

A good engagement by (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 13, 2017 9:31 AM  
**To:** Isler, Matthew C Brig Gen USAF (US) (b)(6)  
(US) (b)(6)  
**Subject:** [Non-DoD Source] Re: Investigation of 17 March Strike (UNCLASSIFIED)

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

Greetings. I would like to speak with Brig. Gen. Isler about the situation in Iraq (I had been looking forward to meeting him in Baghdad). But I can't speak about information related to the articles we have published, beyond what was published. Everything I can say about what I learned during reporting is contained in the articles. I'd love to have a discussion, but it can't be about how I did my reporting, what I learned and or how I learned it. Everything I can disclose I already have - in the articles.

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 11:10 PM (b)(6)

wrote:

> CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

>

(b)(5)

>

> I'm reaching out to you on behalf of Brig Gen Matthew Isler, the investigating officer for the March 17 incident which alleges that a Coalition strike caused civilian casualties. I noted your story alleges a large number--around 300, and in the stories cites a number of sources, but in particular Civil Defense (b)(6) and apparent patients who were in the



hospital after they say they were injured by Coalition strikes. It was unclear to me from your story if these injuries were sustained March 17th or some other time.

>

> We would appreciate your help in contacting these potential witnesses if you remain in touch with some or all of them. The reason for this is that the numbers reflected by (b)(6) in your story are higher than the estimates we are obtaining from the witnesses USAF Brig Gen Isler met with. We are trying to make sure that the investigation into the March 17th incident is as comprehensive as possible, and that we are not missing evidence that you have observed. My understanding is that Brig Gen Isler had reached out to you via email, but I'm following up in case you missed his notes.

>

> I look forward to speaking with you.

>

> Best regards,

>

(b)(6)

>

>

> CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

Approved for Release

(b)(6)

**From:** Isler, Matthew C Brig Gen USAF (US)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 11, 2017 6:09 PM  
**To:**  
**Subject:** FW: Outreach (UNCLASSIFIED)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

Try #3

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Isler, Matthew C Brig Gen USAF (US)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 11, 2017 11:48 AM  
**To:**  
**Subject:** Outreach (UNCLASSIFIED)

(b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6)

Brig Gen Matt Isler, Investigating Officer for Coalition Force investigation into the CIVCAS allegations surrounding 17 Mar in Al Jedida neighborhood in Mosul, reaching out to you directly for a phone call for assistance. I've tried reaching out via our Public Affairs channels twice, but have not been successful in establishing contact. I'm sorry to have missed you during your visit to Baghdad, and know that you had a good visit with

(b)(6)

I'm interested in better understanding the LA Times reported assessment on the total numbers of casualties in the area associated with 17 May, and links to some testimony that we've not been able to independently assess. I would like to discuss the breakdown of the "Nearly 300" number in particular.

I'm very grateful for your consideration, and will set up a time that meets your schedule. VR, Matt

MATTHEW C. ISLER, Brig Gen, USAF  
Investigating Officer  
Baghdad, Iraq

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED  
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, April 03, 2017 5:24 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** [Non-DoD Source] Re: Al Jadida Investigation (UNCLASSIFIED)

Greetings. I will have to decline. Any information I have to share is in the stories I have written.

(b)(6)

On Apr 2, 2017 12:16 AM, (b)(6)

(b)(6) wrote:

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6)

I am writing to you in connecting with the article you wrote for the LA Times on Mar 24, detailing the events of Mar 17, 2017. I have attached a letter from Brig Gen Isler outlining a formal request for information for the Al-Jadida Investigation and would greatly appreciate your participation, however I fully understand if you do not wish to do this.

Regards,

(b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED





~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~



# Al Jadida District Civilian Casualty 15-6 Investigation Executive Summary

082200c May 2017

*(Enclosure M)*

**Type of Brief:**  Information  Decision  Mission  Staff

**Purpose:** Provide Commander with the facts and findings from the Al Jadida District civilian casualty investigation, specifically regarding engagement RC4250, Engagement 10.

**Overall classification of this brief is:  
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY**

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Pages 134 through 150 redacted for the following reasons:

- (b)(1) 4a
- (b)(1) 4a, (b)(1) 4c
- (b)(1) 4a, (b)(1) 4c, (b)(6)
- (b)(1) 4a, (b)(1) 4g
- (b)(1) 4a, (b)(5)

Approved for Release



~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~



# Backup slides

Approved for Release

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~



Page 152 redacted for the following reason:

-----  
(b)(1) 4g

Approved for Release

**ARMY REGULATION 15-6 INVESTIGATION**  
Alleged Civilian Mass Casualty Incident  
at Jadidah District, Mosul, Iraq  
17 March 2017

Overall Classification of the Investigation:

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

All ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ documents are contained in Binder D.

Overall Classification of this Binder:

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

ACRONYM LIST

A&A: Advise and Assist  
AR: Army Regulation  
AWT: Air Weapons Team  
BDA: Battle Damage Assessment  
BG: Brigadier General  
BPC: Build Partner Capacity  
CAS: Close Air Support  
CD: Civil Defense  
CDE: Collateral Damage Estimate  
CDEM: Collateral Damage Estimate Methodology  
CF: Coalition Forces  
CIVCAS: Civilian Casualty  
CIVPOL: Civilian Pattern of Life  
CJFLCC-OIR: Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command-Operation Inherent Resolve  
CJOC-E: Combined Joint Operations Center-Erbil  
CJSOTF-I: Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Iraq  
CJTf-OIR: Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve  
CTS: Counter Terrorism Service  
DFP: Defensive Fighting Position  
DMPI: Desired Mean Point of Impact  
DOD: Department of Defense  
DTRA: Defense Threat Reduction Agency  
EKIA: Enemy Killed in Action  
ERDC: Engineer Research and Development Center  
FLOT: Forward Line of Troops  
FMV: Full Motion Video  
FOUO: For Official Use Only  
FVEY: Five Eyes  
GBU: Guided Bomb Unit  
GEOINT: Geographical Intelligence  
GFC: Ground Force Commander  
Gol: Government of Iraq  
GRG: Grid Reference Guide  
HUMINT: Human Intelligence  
I&IO: Inform and Influence Operations  
IED: Improvised Explosive Device  
IFAC: Iraqi Forward Air Controller  
IMINT: Imagery Intelligence  
IRKS: Inherent Resolve Kinetic Strike  
ISF: Iraqi Security Forces  
ISIS: Islamic State of Iraq and ash Sham  
ISR: Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance  
JTAC: Joint Tactical Air Controller  
LNO: Liason Officer  
LOAC: Law of Armed Conflict  
MESF: Middle Eastern Security Forces  
MGRS: Military Grid Reference System



ACRONYM LIST

mIRC: Internet Relay Chat  
MOD: Ministry of Defense  
OPINT: Operational Intelligence  
OPORD: Operations Order  
OSC: On-Scene Commander  
PAO: Public Affairs Office  
PETN: Pentaerythritol Tetranitrate  
PID: Positive Identification  
POI: Program of Instruction  
PSAF: Precision Small Arms Fire  
PSSOF:  
ROE: Rules of Engagement  
SIGINT: Signal Intelligence  
sLTG: Staff Lieutenant General  
sMG: Staff Major General  
SOTF-W: Special Operations Task Force-West  
SROE: Standing Rules of Engagement  
TD1: Tactical Directive #1  
TEA: Target Engagement Authority  
TF2: Task Force 2  
TTP: Tactic Techniques and Procedures  
UBE: Unknown Bulk Explosives  
USACE: United States Army Corps of Engineers  
USCENTCOM: United States Central Command

VBIED: Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Device  
VISOB: Visual Observation

## **Exhibits A1—A8**

**ARMY REGULATION 15-6 INVESTIGATION**  
Alleged Civilian Mass Casualty Incident  
at Jadidah District, Mosul, Iraq  
17 March 2017

Overall Classification:

**UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~**

List of Unclassified Exhibits

Interview:

A1: Interview of (b)(7)

Engineering Reports:

A2: BLDG 4250.10 Floor Plan

A3: Initial Engineer Estimate of BLDG 4250.10

Media Reporting:

A4: 23 March 2017 Rudaw Article

A5: 28 March 2017 Human Rights Watch Article

A6: 30 March 2017 Rudaw Article

A7: CIVCAS Social Media Reporting

A8: al Jadidah District CIVCAS Articles

Approved for Release





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
COMBINED JOINT FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND  
OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE  
CAMP UNION III, BAGHDAD, IRAQ  
APO, AE 09348

IRIZ-DCG-A

06 April 2017

MEMORANDUM OF RECORD

SUBJECT: Al-Jadida Investigation – [REDACTED] Interview 5 Apr 17

1. (U) Individuals Present:

Brig. Gen. Matt Isler – DCG Air CJFLCC-OIR

[REDACTED]  
(b)(6)

2. (U) [REDACTED] covered 3 neighborhoods in West Mosul, initially working with FEDPOL forces. After witnessing much devastation and destruction, he switched to reporting on the Golden Division (CTS).

(U) On the 17<sup>th</sup> Mar he was in Al-Jadida covering the CTS advance and civilians fleeing the fighting. When speaking to the fleeing civilians, he was told of a series of large explosions where civilians had been trapped – he was not aware of the size of the incident at this point and did not investigate that day due to ongoing fighting.

(U) On the 19<sup>th</sup> Mar he returned to the scene, however the Golden Division did not want to allow him into the area. He bribed a local to sneak him to the location of Building 4250.10. There was a strong smell of dead bodies in the area [REDACTED] clarified no smell of fuel or explosives] and many civilians had arrived with notebooks looking for missing family members. He was led to 3 homes on the same block where the majority of the casualties had occurred. He stopped at the biggest of the 3 houses [Building 4250.10] which was destroyed with no bodies visible. Locals in the vicinity told him they had seen a rocket/missile hit the biggest house. [REDACTED] stated that Iraqi Forces often called in airstrikes for a single ISIS fighter [Clarified as own personal observation, not local residents]

(U) Many people gathered around the site and explained their account of the incident. An ISIS VBIED had exploded nearby on another street [clarified as one block north at the crossroads], and after the airstrike the house had collapsed in on itself, with very little rubble on the street. Residents who arrived said there were no ISIS militants in the house on that day. Children and women had been separated from men [REDACTED] said this could either be because of ISIS or the fact that the neighborhood was very conservative].

(U) It is alleged that one man survived, badly injured and burnt and was taken away for treatment. He later returned to find his family, however all locals were forced away from the site by Iraqi troops. [REDACTED] had taken pictures and a video of the incident,

however members of the Golden Division forced him to delete this evidence and he was asked not to cover the story that day, prompting him to leave the area. Local residents had also stated that people were still crying out under the rubble 2-3 days after the incident.

(U) (b)(6) noted the Golden Division had a much more safety conscious approach to the lives of civilians than the FEDPOL he had previously worked with, however also explained he felt the Iraqi forces were competing to claim the most territory [*His own observations*]. The Golden Division also remarked to (b)(6) that if the information of this incident were leaked to the wider public, the Americans would not support the Iraqi forces with air strikes. He stated that his poster was now at Iraqi Forces checkpoints with orders that he was not to be let into West Mosul.

(U) The Civil Defence arrived 4-5 days later and began excavating the scene with a single Jackhammer. (b)(6) arrived on 22 Mar for his final report on the incident. His first sight of the scene was of a single child, its arm hanging out of the rubble. Once a concrete slab was removed, he remarked four men were laying, doubled up in the fetal position very close together. None of the bodies he saw had burn marks or charring. He did not notice any bodies outside the rubble [*in contrast to the Civil Defence Report which stated charred ISIS fighter bodies were present*]. Residents stated that the families had taken cover in the building because of its good structure, however ISF on the scene stated ISIS had forced them into the building. The house was a two story house and seemed to be two separate structures, both of solid build but constructed at different times.

(U) At this point the house was confirmed as Building 4250.10 through a hand drawn map of the location [*corroborated by our pictures of the site*]. The owner was named as (b)(6) was uncertain about (b)(6), known as a good protector and provider with no links to ISIS.

(U) When asked about casualty figures, (b)(6) stated when he left that 61 bodies had been removed from the bigger structure with more under the rubble. He commented that locals had said there were 137 people trapped inside and that this did not include children [*This was clarified three times as it is in contrast to all credible casualty figures*]. Upon being asked if there were any ISIS bodies present, he replied he had not seen any but that ISIS remove their dead during the night. Locals stated ISIS fighters in the area were dressed in Khandahari [*Afghan*] clothing [*indicating possible foreign fighters*].

(U) (b)(6) said the Iraqi Forces had told him there were snipers on the house, but that the house did not have field of vision over where the Iraqi forces were [*Note (b)(6) (b)(6) has no military training or experience nor had seen the vertical extent of the house prior to the strike*]. He also commented that during his time with the Golden Division, they were careful about civilian casualties, did not deliberately give wrong coordinates but were struggling with the exact location of snipers.


(U) (b)(6) commented on an incident further North on the main street to the West of the house, where an ISIS VBIED had detonated earlier in the morning – at least 12 bodies were removed by families and locals stated more still had to be found (b)(6)

(b)(6) clarified the area had sustained heavy fighting, which had also contributed to civilian casualties – this corroborates with the War Media Cell statement]. The intense fighting was taking place at the crossroads. (b)(6) showed us a video [Available on Rudaw online] of the fighting in the area, however none was of Building 4250.10.

(U) His last comments were on FEDPOL and ERD's indiscriminate self-made rocket attacks against certain areas and their setting fire to entire buildings [He showed us pictures of fire-gutted buildings]. He claimed the main part of Mosul has been destroyed by militia police. He stated that where the Golden Division had fought there was hope for life to return as in East Mosul – however the area was very dangerous for civilians at the moment.

3. (U) The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at

(b)(6)


  
MATTHEW C. ISLER  
Brigadier General, U.S. Air Force  
Investigating Officer



BUILDING 4250.10 FLOOR PLAN

1. Summary: In a follow-on phone call, (b)(6) provided the floor plans for building 4250.10. This provided the construction of each floor and the dimensions of rooms.


Approved for Release



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
Ground floor

first floor



2nd floor  
 or  
 First Floor






الطابق الثاني

سطح الـ بيت










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


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
Basement








2<sup>nd</sup> Floor



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Roof



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~





DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
HEADQUARTERS, COMBINED JOINT FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND  
OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE & 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION  
UNION III, BAGHDAD, IRAQ  
APO AE 09348

IRIZ-DCA

6 May 2017

(U//~~FOUO~~) MEMORANDUM FOR MG Joseph M. Martin, Commander, Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command – Operation Inherent Resolve

(U//~~FOUO~~) SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendations, Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation of the Alleged Civilian Mass Casualty Incident in the al Jadidah District, City of Mosul, Ninewah Governate, on or about 17 March 2017

1. (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) EXSUM: Coalition forces conducted Strike (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a under U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) Rules of Engagement (ROE). (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a Coalition forces and the Coalition Target Engagement Authority (TEA) complied with all applicable provisions of the ROE and the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).

a. (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) On 17 March 2017, two snipers engaged CTS soldiers from a defensive fighting position in a residential building in the vicinity of (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a in the Jadidah district of West Mosul. The TEA considered all evidence reasonably available to him and authorized fire support to neutralize the threat. Unbeknownst to the TEA and the Combined Joint Operations Center – Erbil (CJOC-E), over 100 civilians were in the building (BLDG 4250.10). The strike killed the two snipers and destroyed the defensive firing position.

b. (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) The evidence overwhelmingly shows that ISIS emplaced a large amount of explosives in the structure which sympathetically detonated. Weaponizing analysis, engineering analysis, and post-blast explosives assessment concluded that the Coalition munition alone did not have the trajectory, fusing, or explosive content required to cause the resulting structural damage. Additionally, the on-scene explosives post-blast assessment identified significant cratering and arc damage to the rear of the structure too large to be attributed to the Coalition munition, and explosive residue not attributable to the Coalition munition at several areas around the site. The analysis of blast effects, structural damage, weaponizing, and explosive residues provide overwhelming evidence in the existence of additional ISIS-emplaced explosives, which ultimately caused the building to rapidly collapse. As a result, 105 civilians were killed—101 in BLDG 4250.10, and four in an adjacent house.



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2. (U//~~FOUO~~) Background:

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) Pursuant to Army Regulation (AR) 15-6, I was appointed as the investigating officer for this investigation on 31 March 2017. I had previously been appointed to conduct a civilian casualty credibility assessment on this incident. As the IO, I was charged with determining the facts and circumstances surrounding allegations of a civilian casualty (CIVCAS) incident occurring on or about 17 March 2017 in the Al Izdihar al Awwal district (hereinafter referred to as the al Jadidah district).

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) The original source of the CIVCAS allegation was (b)(6) a correspondent for the Rudaw Media Network.

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) The incident in question occurred at approximately (b)(1)1.4c, on or about 17 March 2017 in vicinity of (b)(1)1.4a located in the al Jadidah district of West Mosul.

3. (U//~~FOUO~~) Facts:

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) On the morning of 17 March 2017, elements of CTS conducted an attack north into the al Jadidah district of West Mosul. CTS had maintained static positions south of the al Jadidah district for two days (15–16 March 2017) due to inclement weather. During this time, CTS did not observe any indicators of civilian patterns of life (CIVPOL) in the al Jadidah district (Exhibit C1). Prior to the 17 March 2017 attack, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) had established a series of defensive positions within the residential structures of al Jadidah district and its environs (Exhibit C5). During the advance, CTS Soldiers reported two ISIS fighters placing effective precision small arms fire (PSAF) from the second floor of BLDG 4250.10, a former residential structure, located in vicinity of (b)(1)1.4a

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) CTS subsequently requested Coalition fire support to eliminate the threat in the structure in question. The CTS Task Force – (b)(1)1.4d Commander, (b)(6) (b)(6) approved the request and coordinated joint fires with the Coalition Advise & Assist (A&A) team (Exhibit B12). The Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJFLCC-OIR) CJOC-E processed the fire request. The CJOC-E TEA, BG John Richardson, approved the engagement, which Coalition aircraft executed at approximately (b)(1)1.4c on 17 March 2017 with a (b)(1)1.4a (Exhibit B12). After the munition impacted the target, BLDG 4250.10 collapsed.

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) Personnel from Iraqi Civil Defense (CD) and Mosul CD (the regional unit under the national Iraqi CD) immediately responded to the location and attempted



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to locate and recover civilians trapped in the collapsed structure. However, ISIS activity, including indirect and small arms fire that continued to target the al Jadidah district, thwarted Iraqi CD's response efforts. Iraqi CD personnel were unable to return to the scene of the strike until 22 March 2017 (Exhibits B5 & B6).

d. (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] (b)(6) a correspondent for the Rudaw Media Group who was covering the CTS advance, visited the site of the engagement on 17, 19, and 22 March 2017. During this period of time he observed and documented civilian casualties in the al Jadidah district as well as the excavation of BLDG 4250.10 by Iraqi CD. In his 23 March 2017 report published on the Rudaw English website, [redacted] (b)(6) stated that at least 200 civilians had been killed by Coalition airstrikes in al Jadidah district, with approximately 130 deaths occurring in a single house (Exhibits A1 & A4).

4. (U//~~FOUO~~) Findings: Pursuant to the AR 15-6 appointment memorandum, I was directed to answer 13 questions related to the subject CIVCAS incident. The answers provided in this memorandum are in summary form; additional details are enclosed in supplementary material (Enclosures A–M). All findings are supported by the preponderance of evidence gathered during the course of the investigation, which are included as exhibits to this investigation.

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) *How many civilian deaths are estimated? What is the source(s) of those estimated CIVCAS numbers?*

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) As of the date of this memorandum, Iraqi CD confirmed 105 civilian casualties (CIVCAS) associated with the engagement that struck BLDG 4250.10 (Exhibits B5 & B6). Iraqi CD recovered a total of 101 CIVCAS from BLDG 4250.10 over the period spanning 17–28 March 2017 (Exhibit B5). Human Rights Watch and [redacted] (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(6) identified four additional CIVCAS in the civilian structure located immediately to the west of BLDG 4250.10 in vicinity of [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a (Exhibits B7 & B8).

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] (b)(6) stated that Iraqi CD told her that 137 people were in BLDG 4250.10 at the time of the collapse. Based on the Iraqi CD's confirmation of 101 deceased, an additional 36 individuals (including two alleged survivors) may have been in BLDG 4250.10 when the structure collapsed. However, no other remains have been found and no additional persons have been reported as missing (Exhibit B4).

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) Brigadier General (BG) Muhammad al-Jawari, Supervisor of the Mosul Civil Defense, stated that the bodies of two ISIS fighters were also found on the street in front of BLDG 4250.10 (Exhibit B5).



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(4) (U//~~FOUO~~) The sources of the CIVCAS estimates are as follows:

(a) (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted (b)(6)] a Rudaw correspondent, was present during the recovery of bodies from BLDG 4250.10. During his interview, [redacted (b)(6)] stated that residents of the al Jadidah district had informed him that 137 individuals had been trapped when BLDG 4250.10 collapsed. This estimate formed the basis of his 23 March 2017 report concerning West Mosul civilian casualties (Exhibit A1).

(b) (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted (b)(6)] a resident of West Mosul, was an occupant of BLDG 4250.10. [redacted (b)(6)] stated that he, along with several family members, took shelter in BLDG 4250.10 from 13–15 March 2017. He stated that on the night of his departure (on or about 15 March 2017 at 1900c) there were approximately 140 men, women, and children occupying BLDG 4250.10. The women and children were located in the half basement and the men were located on the first floor (Exhibit B3).

(c) (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted (b)(6)] [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)] provided sanctuary to 16 people on the morning of 17 March 2017. The detonation events that destroyed BLDG 4250.10 also caused significant damage to his residence, resulting in four of the 105 confirmed CIVCAS. The remaining 12 individuals survived the engagement and were accounted for afterward (Exhibit B8).

(5) (U//~~FOUO~~) Multiple media reports estimated the total number of civilian casualties within the al Jadidah district to be in excess of 200 (Exhibit A8). Based on interviews with Mosul CD, the National Director of Iraqi CD, CTS, media, neighbors, and local leaders, I assess that the figures of "at least 200" (Exhibit A8; Rudaw, 25 March 2017) or "as many as 200" (Exhibit A8; New York Times, 25 March 2017; LA Times, 29 March 2017) represent an aggregation of weeks of multiple excavations of damaged structures across West Mosul, including the 17 March 2017 effects on BLDG 4250.10 and its neighboring structures [redacted (b)(6)] Mosul CD; Exhibit B6). This investigation focused on the events of 17 March 2017 in the al Jadidah district. Beyond BLDG 4250.10 and its adjacent structures, this investigation found no further links to civilian casualties within the al Jadidah district during the period proximate to 17 March 2017. Furthermore, the events that resulted in the other reported excavations may be due to ISIS or ISF engagements. As discussed more fully in paragraph 6c. I

recommend [redacted (b)(5)]  
[redacted (b)(5)]  
[redacted (b)(5)]



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b. (U//~~FOUO~~) How many of those deaths are attributable to US/Coalition strikes, ISF, and/or ISIS? What was the cause of those deaths?

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) Of the 105 total civilian casualties, only a small portion are likely attributed to the damage caused by the Coalition (b)(1)1.4a. A preponderance of evidence supports that ISIS is responsible for the vast majority of the deaths, as ISIS emplaced a large quantity of explosives atop a known gathering of civilians, and staged attacks against CTS to draw Coalition fire on the structure and trigger a much larger secondary explosion (Exhibit C19 & Enclosure B). First, ISIS knew that BLDG 4250.10 was crowded with civilians. ISIS fighters interacted with the civilians, and kept several fighters staged near the residence (Exhibits B3, B8, B9, & C5). Second, ISIS deliberately emplaced a large quantity of unknown bulk explosives (UBE) in the second floor of BLDG 4250.10, which served as the secondary explosion and the primary cause of the structure's collapse (Exhibit C19 & Enclosure J). Third, ISIS deliberately established a defensive fighting position on the second floor of the building, proximate to the UBE, to draw Coalition fire to trigger the secondary blast (C19-21, & D3). Finally, ISIS engaged CTS soldiers from the building, knowing that, in all likelihood, the Coalition or Iraqi Security Forces would target the building. When, the (b)(1)1.4a struck the building, it is assessed with high confidence that the explosion initiated a secondary detonation of ISIS-emplaced UBE (Exhibits C19 & C21). This chain of events resulted in the rapid onset and progressive collapse of BLDG 4250.10 (Exhibits C19-21). The civilian deaths were caused by blast injuries, blunt force trauma, and asphyxiation.

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) The preponderance of evidence, including weaponeering analysis, structural damage modalities, and post-blast explosive assessment, shows that ISIS fighters are responsible for deliberately setting the conditions for an explosive chain reaction by emplacing a large quantity of UBE in BLDG 4250.10 (Exhibits C19, C21, D2, & D3).

(a) (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) The Coalition conducted engagement (b)(1)1.4a on 17 March 2017 at (b)(1)1.4a with a (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a (Exhibits B12, C1, & C15). The blast effects for this weapon and fuse setting would have structurally damaged no more than 16 to 20% of the overall structure of BLDG 4250.10, and this damage would have been localized to the second floor of the northern portion of the structure (Exhibits C19, D2, D3, & Enclosure B). However, the structural damage observed in vicinity of the engagement far exceeds that of a (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a. Both the U.S. Air Force Joint Munition Effectiveness Manual (JMEM) battle damage assessment and a Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) in-depth stochastic modeling of the engagement predicted the structure would suffer no more than 16 to 20% damage (Exhibits C18-20, D3 & Enclosure B). The similar results of the models corroborate the range of predicted



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damage. Likewise, the models predicted that the damage would be primarily contained to the roof and second floor of the northern portion of the structure (Exhibits C19-21 & D3).

(b) (~~U//FOUO~~) Multiple models, supported by onsite post-blast analysis, demonstrate that only multiple detonations would be sufficient to achieve the total structural failure seen at the blast site (Exhibits C20 & C21). Based on the cratering evidence and damage to surrounding structures, ISIS most likely emplaced the explosives in the south/back portion of BLDG 4250.10, on the second floor of the structure (Exhibits B18 & C21).

(c) (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) The DTRA in-depth stochastic modeling of the engagement returned a similar assessment (Exhibit C18). A secondary detonation of a large quantity of UBE was required to destroy BLDG 4250.10 and damage surrounding structures (Exhibit C20). The preponderance of evidence shows that ISIS emplaced the explosive material (Exhibits C17-C21 & Enclosure B).

(d) (~~U//FOUO~~) A Department of Defense (DoD) lab tested multiple samples collected from different locations within the site of BLDG 4250.10. In addition to detecting traces of explosives found in a (b)(1)1.4a namely trinitrotoluene (TNT) and RDX, the results also showed traces of Pentaerythritol Tetranitrate and Nitroglycerin (PETN). These explosive components are not attributable to a (b)(1)1.4a but are common to ISIS-emplaced explosive accelerants, detonating cord and person-borne IEDs (Exhibit C21).

(e) (~~U//FOUO~~) The explosive residue analysis did not detect any additional homemade explosive (HME) residue typically found in bulk quantity in ISIS-emplaced explosive devices. However, due to the significant delay in sampling after the incident, the high water solubility of common HME precursors such as ammonium nitrate, and the amount of rain and high humidity post incident (Exhibit B14), the absence of ammonium nitrate residue in the samples taken 25 days after the incident does not rule out the distinct possibility of the presence of bulk HME sympathetically detonating in the structure with the (b)(1)1.4a (Exhibits C19-21).

(f) (~~U//FOUO~~) All of the explosives, engineering, and weaponizing experts consulted during this investigation conclude that the single detonation of a (b)(1)1.4a would not have caused the building to collapse or to damage to surrounding structures. (Exhibits A6, B3, B18, B20, C19-21, & D3).

(3) (~~U//FOUO~~) Based on statements of individuals who were involved in the recovery of CIVCAS from the rubble (i.e., members of the Iraqi CD; Basma Basim, the



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President of the Mosul District Council; media personnel; and local residents) I assess that a majority of the civilian deaths were the result of blast injuries, blunt force trauma, asphyxiation, and possible burns resulting from the detonation of UBE and collapse of BLDG 4250.10 (Exhibits A7, A8, & B4). However, the assessment of the causes of death is not based on scientific, forensic, or medical data from the bodies. Coalition medical examiners did not have an opportunity to examine any of the civilian casualties recovered from BLDG 4250.10 due to the immediate burial of corpses in accordance with local cultural and religious practices. Additionally, no photographs were taken of casualties (Exhibits A1 & A8).

c. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ What ISIS tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are responsible for (or factored into) the CIVCAS? Are these new TTPs?

(1) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ ISIS' use of civilians as human shields is well documented, and has evolved during the course of the counter-ISIS campaign (Exhibits B18, B20, & C5). In this case, ISIS fighters knew BLDG 4250.10 was being used as a civilian shelter. They interacted with the civilians in the building and told the owner of the adjacent home to depart the area the night prior to the CTS attack (Exhibit B8). ISIS fighters in a defensive fighting position (DFP) within the structure staged a large secondary device and intentionally drew ISF and Coalition fires onto BLDG 4250.10 with the objective of endangering civilians (Exhibit B18). This specific TTP is hereafter referred to as "CIVCAS entrapment" (Exhibit C22).

(2) ~~(S//REL TO USA, MESF)~~ Local residents confirmed a common TTP which ISIS employs to avoid detection/observation by Coalition intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. Both [redacted] (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(6)

(b)(6) stated that ISIS created and used 'worm holes'—holes ISIS created in walls—to facilitate unobserved movement in vicinity of BLDG 4250.10. Additionally these witnesses stated that four ISIS fighters utilized these worm holes in the days preceding the 17 March 2017 engagement (Exhibits B8 & B9).

(3) ~~(S//REL TO USA, MESF)~~ ISIS habitually employs human shields to deter airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, including West Mosul (Exhibits B5, B18, B20, & C5). ISIS' use of human capital has evolved from using human shields to protect fighters and infrastructure, to using CIVCAS entrapment to discredit and delegitimize the ISF and counter-ISIS Coalition. Intelligence reports received in the latter half of March 2017 indicate that ISIS fighters are attempting to intentionally draw Coalition fires onto structures containing civilians (Exhibit C5). ISIS fighters are also emplacing large improvised explosive devises (IED) in structures containing civilians to provoke a mass casualty event. Media coverage that links these casualty events with Coalition and ISF



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activities reinforces ISIS messaging, benefits ISIS influence and information operations, and has detrimental tactical and cognitive effects on Coalition operations, leaders, and personnel. On three occasions (7 March 2017, 29 March 2017, and 18 April 2017), Coalition forces observed, by full motion video (FMV), this ISIS TTP in West Mosul. However, the significance of the 7 March 2017 event was not realized at the time because the TTP had not been recognized before and no civilians were killed. Additionally, the ISF have discovered multiple instances of ISIS staging CIVCAS entrapment events (i.e., forcing civilians into buildings and establishing DFPs within those same buildings), reported the event, and rescued the civilians (Exhibits B18, C6, & C23).

d. (~~U//FOUO~~) *How many U.S./Coalition engagements took place on the date in question? What were the locations of those engagements?*

(1) (~~U//FOUO~~) Coalition forces conducted 81 engagements, consisting of 171 air-to-ground and surface-to-surface munitions in West Mosul on 17 March 2017. Of the 81 engagements, 34 were within 1 km of BLDG 4250.10, 12 occurred in vicinity of the al Jadidah district (Exhibits B10 & C9). Of the 12 engagements in the al Jadidah district, one engagement, (b)(1)1.4a resulted in an allegation of civilian casualties (BLDG 4250.10).

(2) (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) Two of the aforementioned 12 engagements in al Jadidah district targeted military objectives within 120 meters of BLDG 4250.10. However, only one Coalition airstrike targeted the ISIS DFP in BLDG 4250.10 (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a. Coalition aircraft dropped a single (b)(1)1.4a munition during strike (b)(1)1.4a (Exhibit B10).

e. (~~U//FOUO~~) *What was the target of those engagements?* The target of the Coalition engagements conducted on 17 March 2017 in the al Jadidah district were ISIS fighters, ISIS snipers, ISIS DFPs, and mortar positions. More specifically, the strike in question targeted ISIS snipers engaging CTS from BLDG 4250.10 (Exhibit B10).

f. (~~U//FOUO~~) *Who requested the engagements?*

(1) (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) The CTS commanders requested all of the engagements conducted in the al Jadidah district on 17 March 2017. With regards to the strike in question, CTS soldiers, with direct line-of-sight observation of two ISIS fighters engaging CTS forces from a DFP, requested the engagement that struck BLDG 4250.10. This request for Joint/Coalition fire support was routed through the CTS Battalion Commander to the CTS (b)(1)1.4 Commander, who requested fire support from the Coalition A&A element (Exhibits B1, C1, & C9).



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(2) (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) Soldiers from the CTS [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d who were attacking north into sector B.19, requested engagement [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a. CTS soldiers had obtained visual observation (VISOBs) of two ISIS fighters engaging CTS soldiers from a DFP at a range of 60 to 100 meters. CTS platoon-level leadership requested Joint/Coalition fire support through the CTS Battalion Commander to the CTS [redacted] (b)(1)1.4 Commander, [redacted] (b)(6) directed his Iraqi Forward Air Controller (IFAC) to develop the strike request for Coalition joint fires, and the IFAC prepared the request with the Coalition Task Force (TF) CTS A&A element. [redacted] (b)(6) approved the strike request, and the Coalition TF CTS A&A element submitted the request via internet relay chat (mIRC) to the CJOC-E strike cell (Exhibits B12, C1, & C9).

g. (~~U//FOUO~~) *Who authorized the engagements, both for the U.S. and for the Government of Iraq?* The CTS [redacted] (b)(1)1.4 Commander and one of the CJOC-E TEAs authorized all 17 March 2017 engagements in the al Jadidah district (Exhibits B1 & C1). For the strike of BLDG 4250.10, BG Richardson approved the engagement.

(1) (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) ISF Approval. The CTS [redacted] (b)(1)1.4 Commander, [redacted] (b)(6) approved engagement [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a under Iraqi Ground Force Commander Authorities, delegated to him by [redacted] (b)(6). For Coalition strike procedures, [redacted] (b)(6) approval constituted MOD approval of the engagement (Exhibit C1).

(2) (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) Coalition Force Approval. The Coalition target engagement authorities approving engagements in Mosul on 17 March 2017 were: BG John Richardson (JBR), [redacted] (b)(3) 10 USC 130b; (b)(6). As stated above, BG Richardson approved engagement [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a as the CJOC-E strike cell TEA (Exhibits B12 & C1).

h. (~~U//FOUO~~) *What facts were known by CJOC-E and the Target Engagement Authority at the time of the engagement?*

(1) (~~U//FOUO~~) At the time of the engagement, the Coalition TEA understood that CTS was requesting Coalition fires in defense of on-scene CTS soldiers. The TEA knew that ISIS maintained a platoon-sized element in vicinity of the al Jadidah district (Exhibits C1 & C5). The CTS request stated that ISF elements were being engaged by precision small arms fire from a DFP located in BLDG 4250.10 and had sustained casualties. The request further stated that CTS, through direct line-of-sight observation, maintained PID of two ISIS fighters within the structure, and that no CIVPOL had been observed on the premises (Exhibits B12, C1, C2, & C9).



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(2) (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) The Coalition TF CTS A&A team's ground force commander (GFC), through his Coalition Joint Tactical Air Controller (JTAC), requested engagement (b)(1)1.4a via mlRC on 17 March 2017 at approximately (b)(1)1.4c (Exhibits B12 & C9). The request stated that CTS (b)(1)1.4c personnel were being engaged by two ISIS fighters from the south-west corner of the second story of the structure located in vicinity of (b)(1)1.4a. The Coalition CTS A&A advisors conveyed that (b)(6) (b)(6) personally approved the request for engagement (b)(1)1.4a in defense of ISF personnel (Exhibits C1 & C9).

i. (U//FOUO) *What was the basis for positive identification (PID)?*

(1) (U//FOUO) The CJOC-E TEA's basis for PID was (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4c supported by well-developed (b)(1)1.4c. CTS met significant ISIS resistance immediately upon commencing their attack on the morning of 17 March 2017. During the engagement, CTS identified a legitimate military target—two ISIS fighters engaging CTS personnel from a DFP—and subsequently maintained line-of-sight VISOBs with the target. The TEA's operational context was further supported by overwhelming (b)(1)1.4c of ISIS fighters and positions in the immediate area (Exhibits C1 & C5).

(2) (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) Operational Context Supporting PID. The CTS forward line of troops (FLOT) had remained static for 48 hours prior to the 17 March 2017 attack. CJOC-E supported CTS operations with close air support (CAS), air weapons teams (AWT), and armed/unarmed ISR. During this same time, ISIS conducted several attacks against CTS along the FLOT. (b)(1)1.4c indicated that 35 – 40 ISIS fighters controlled sector B.19. Finally, during breaks in the weather, CJOC-E had observed ISIS fighters preparing for the pending CTS attack (Exhibits C1 & C5).

(3) (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) Confidence in CTS Visual Observation (VISOB). The TEA (BG Richardson), the CJOC-E Strike Cell Director, and the Coalition TF CTS A&A GFC all expressed confidence in the veracity of CTS VISOBs (Exhibits C1, C1a, C2, and B1). This confidence was based on their personal experiences supporting CTS in counter-ISIS operations in West Mosul. IAW CJOC-E strike cell standard practice, when weather permitted FMV observation, BG Richardson used Coalition FMV to confirm the accuracy of CTS VISOBs (Exhibits C1 and C2). The CJOC-E strike cell director observed that CTS would update VISOBs reports as conditions such as dynamic target location and CIVPOL changed during the strike coordination process (Exhibit C2). Based on this demonstrated record of accurate observation and reinforced by CTS's long history of partnership and training with Coalition forces, BG Richardson considered CTS VISOBs reports to be accurate, reliable, and credible (Exhibit C1).



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j. (~~U//FOUO~~) Under what provision of the rules of engagement (ROE) were the fires conducted?

(1) (~~U//FOUO~~) The engagement that struck BLDG 4250.10 was carried out under the USCENTCOM ROE provision (b)(1)1.4a (Exhibit B21). The engagement was justified (b)(1)1.4a in response to a hostile act. The method of engagement was deemed a proportionate and reasonable response. The engagement complied with all applicable provisions of the USCENTCOM ROE and the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).

(2) (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) Coalition forces executed engagement (b)(1)1.4a under USCENTCOM ROE. (b)(1)1.4a  
(b)(1)1.4a

(3) (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) The TEA positively identified the two ISIS snipers engaging CTS as a military objective, established through VISOBs by the CTS forces on the ground. The TEA correctly determined the engagement could be conducted under (b)(1)1.4a. The ISIS act of engaging CTS with direct fire is (b)(1)1.4a.  
(b)(1)1.4a

(4) (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) Engagement (b)(1)1.4a was a proportionate and reasonable response. The TEA accurately conducted a proportionality assessment to weigh the military advantage of the required effects with the potential for collateral damage.

(a) (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) Military Advantage. CTS reported taking effective sniper fire from the DFP, which was approximately 65 meters from CTS soldiers, and reported taking casualties. Eliminating the hostile act of ISIS snipers engaging CTS from the DFP would preserve CTS combat power and allow CTS to continue seizing B.19. CTS needed to seize B.19 to continue the liberation of Mosul (Exhibits B12 & C9).

(b) (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) Weapons Selection. The TEA selected a (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a based on military necessity. First, the TEA and strike cell assessed that either (b)(1)1.4a or (b)(1)1.4a would be required to achieve the required effect to neutralize the DFP in BLDG 4250.10. Second, the TEA retained only (b)(1)1.4a on CAS assets



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overhead, which he anticipated he would need that day to protect CTS from ISIS fighters conducting attacks from [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a. Attacking partner forces from [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a is a common ISIS TTP (Exhibits C1, C2, C3, & C15).

(c) (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) Potential for Collateral Damage. The TEA considered the potential for collateral damage to the structure based on his experience with similar structures and munitions in West Mosul operations. The TEA was the primary Coalition TEA for West Mosul, and had been since the start of West Mosul operations. He had extensive experience in estimating and observing munitions effects in the operating environment. The TEA also accurately assessed that the weapons effects of the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a would be localized to the second floor of the structure, where the ISIS snipers were located (Exhibits B1, B12, C1, C1a, C9, C19, & Enclosure J). The TEA also considered that CTS reported that there was no CIVPOL present by direct line-of-sight observation, and that no CIVPOL had been observed in the vicinity (Exhibits B1, C1, C1a, & C9). Furthermore, [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4c [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4c provided atmospheric observations of CIVPOL activities and movements in sectors surrounding B.19 indicated to the TEA that civilians in the area had moved away from the FLOT (Exhibits C1, C1a, & C5). Due to CTS requesting the strike while under attack and taking casualties, CJOC-E did not conduct formal CDE, which, in accordance with the [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a ROE is not required (Exhibit C1a). The TEA assessed that collateral damage would not be excessive in relation the anticipated military advantage (Exhibits C1 & C1a).

(d) (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) Proportionality Assessment. The TEA weighed the military advantage with the potential for collateral damage, and concluded that the anticipated collateral damage to the structure and non-combatants caused by a [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a would not be excessive in relation the anticipated military advantage (Exhibits C1 & C1a).

k. (U//FOUO) *What was the battle damage assessment (BDA) and/or collateral damage, if any? Please note whether full motion video (FMV) is available to Coalition Forces at the time of the strike(s).*

(1) (U//FOUO) CTS Battle Damage Assessment (BDA). CTS reported a BDA of two enemy killed in action (EKIA), and two DFPs destroyed following engagement [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4a 4250.10 (Exhibits B1, B12, & C9). CTS personnel did not specify that BLDG 4250.10 collapsed during or following the engagement. There is no full motion video of this engagement due to [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4g [REDACTED] (b)(1)1.4g.

(2) (U//FOUO) Collateral Damage. The engagement of BLDG 4250.10 likely detonated a large amount of ISIS-emplaced UBE, initiating a sequence of events



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resulting in significant collateral damage to BLDG 4250.10 and surrounding structures; BLDG 4250.10 was completely destroyed following the sequence of events (Exhibits C18-C20).

(a) (~~U//FOUO~~) Based on the projected effects of (b)(1)1.4a containing (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a of explosives, this damage was extremely excessive. The anticipated structural damage to the building was estimated to be limited and localized to the upper floor; however, the secondary detonation that followed the initial impact caused significant damage to the rear of the structure, which caused the entire building to collapse.

(b) (~~U//FOUO~~) The buildings to the south and west of BLDG 4250.10 were also heavily damaged during the engagement. The residence to the immediate west suffered significant damage to its eastern wall, interior rooms, and roof, along with four additional civilian casualties (Exhibits B8 & C20). The residence to the immediate south experienced a partial collapse of its northern wall and sustained interior damage (Exhibit C20). The 30-inch thick composite concrete wall in the rear of BLDG 4250.10 experienced a significant blast wave, evidenced by a large arc of damage nearly 30 feet wide, which pushed the concrete back 2 to 3 inches and in the center completely pulverized the concrete wall. The buildings to the north and east of BLDG 4250.10 sustained cosmetic damage (e.g. broken windows, damaged façade, debris on the property, etc.) but were left intact (Exhibit C17 & C20).

1. (~~U//FOUO~~) Did any changes to the ROE or the CJTF-OIR Tactical Directive #1 factor into this incident? If so, what was the impact?

(1) (~~U//FOUO~~) Neither changes to the ROE nor CJTF-OIR Tactical Directive #1 factored into the execution of (b)(1)1.4a on BLDG 4250.10.

(2) (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) The USCENTCOM ROE provisions applicable to this incident are outlined in Enclosure K. Although the USCENTCOM ROE was modified on 12 December 2016 with the publication of (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a the changes did not substantively affect this engagement. In fact, the applicable provisions from USCENTCOM ROE (b)(1)1.4a are substantially similar to the provisions in the two previous USCENTCOM ROE (b)(1)1.4a. Therefore, no changes to the USCENTCOM ROE factored into this engagement (Exhibit B21).

(3) (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) Likewise, the CJTF-OIR Tactical Directive #1 was not a factor in this engagement. The purpose of publishing Tactical Directive #1 was to

(b)(1)1.4a



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(b)(1)1.4a  
(b)(1)1.4a. In this case, BG Richardson, the O-7 TEA in the CJOC-E, authorized the engagement. While a GFC/OSC was involved by forwarding the CTS support request to the CJOC-E, the GFC/OSC was not the approval authority for the engagement (Exhibit B22).

5. (U//~~FOUO~~) Additional Information.

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) Remain-in-Place Order. Iraqi political and operational leaders assessed that risk to mission and civilians was lessened if civilians sheltered in place rather than evacuate Mosul. While a decision to evacuate civilians from the city may have reduced the risk of an event like this happening, it would have not eliminated the risk. Overall the Government of Iraq's shelter-in-place decision was not causally related to the CIVCAS outcome.

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) Structural analysis of BLDG 4250.10. A structural analysis of BLDG 4250.10 was conducted by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC) in support of this investigation.

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) BLDG 4250.10 was a 20m x 10m, multi-floor, mixed material structure typical of other residences in the al Jadidah neighborhood. The BLDG 4250.10 vertical super-structure consisted of 30-in thick load bearing walls comprised of both concrete masonry blocks or stone and mortar. Its horizontal super-structure was supported by 12-in square reinforced concrete beams and 6-in thick reinforced concrete slabs that formed the floors and roof. BLDG 4250.10 was constructed with an open-air courtyard in the north end of the building that extended from the ground floor to the roof. A small room was built on top of the roof, which was offset to the west side of the building (Exhibits B9 & C20).

(2) (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) Given the building's construction and the fusing of the weapon system, collateral damage analysis predicted the (b)(1)1.4a blast effects would be contained to the upper floor and roof of BLDG 4250.10. The (b)(1)1.4a struck the north-east quadrant of the roof, and achieved partial penetration of the roof into the top floor of the structure prior to detonation. Damage from this weapon based on the fuse setting should have been contained in the top floor of the building. The collapse of BLDG 4250.10 and extensive collateral damage to surrounding structures was significantly disproportionate to the net explosive effects of a (b)(1)1.4a of explosive. The concrete walls of the basement in the south side of BLDG 4250.10 showed breaching and significant deformity caused by blast effects, which is evidence that a large secondary device, comprised of UBE, was located in the southern portion of BLDG 4250.10 (Exhibit C21). Additionally, the presence of nitroglycerin and PETN



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residue also clearly show that ISIS emplaced explosives within the structure. Initial modeling conducted by the US Army Corps of Engineers indicates that a bulk explosive in excess of 1,000 lbs. was required to achieve the damage actually sustained. As the [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] of explosives, the modeling shows that it was incapable of achieving that level of destruction by itself (Exhibit C20). Thus, the subsequent detonation of ISIS-emplaced UBE was the primary causal factor of the 105 CIVCAS identified in vicinity of the engagement area (Exhibits C18, C20, & C21).

c. (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) Assessment of lack of intelligence concerning presence of CIVPOL in BLDG 4250.10. The TEA lacked the intelligence of CIVPOL in BLDG 4250.10 for three primary reasons. First, [redacted (b)(1)1.4g] precluded ISR VISOBs of sector B.19 during the two preceding days (Exhibit B14). Second, ground force VISOBs of the areas was affected by the urban layout of sector B.19 (Exhibit C14). Third, the inherent fog of war and nature of human movements inside structures makes observation difficult, [redacted (b)(1)1.4a]

[redacted (b)(1)1.4a]  
(1) (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) [redacted (b)(1)1.4g]  
[redacted (b)(1)1.4g]  
[redacted (b)(1)1.4g]

(2) (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) The location of CTS observation positions along the FLOT allowed CTS observers to directly observe sniper positions. However, urban terrain prevented CTS VISOBs of CIVPOL in east-west running streets at ranges greater than 50m north of the FLOT (Exhibit C14). As a result, CTS observers along the FLOT were unable to view or confirm civilian movements along the east-west streets of the district.

(3) (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) [redacted (b)(1)1.4c] provided atmospheric of CIVPOL activities and movements in sectors surrounding B.19 which indicated that civilians were moving through the area away from the FLOT, but there was no reporting specifically identifying BLDG 4250.10 as a sanctuary for approximately 137 individuals (Exhibits C3 & C5).

(4) (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) As a result of [redacted (b)(1)1.4g] ISR observation and blind zones in CTS VISOBs in east-west running streets at ranges greater than 50m north of the FLOT, Coalition forces had a degraded ability to identify CIVPOL in areas immediately north of the CTS FLOT (Exhibits B14 & B15).

d. (~~U//FOUO~~) Direct-observation options. Coalition forces have three methods of direct-observation to assess civilian pattern of life: (1) direct observation by a Coalition



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observer; (2) direct observation by Coalition FMV; and (3) direct observation by partner force observer. Due to the urban layout of sector B.19, where streets run east-west and parallel to the FLOT, direct observation of the street in front of BLDG 4250.10 was impossible from the position of the FLOT on 15–16 March 2017. To see CIVPOL within the east-west streets among the multi-story homes, direct-observation would have required CTS observers to be staged forward of the FLOT (Exhibit C14).

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) Direct Observation by a Coalition Observer. Due to appropriate risk-management decisions made by commanders IAW Tactical Directive #1, Coalition observers were not positioned ahead of the FLOT.

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) Direct Observation by Coalition FMV. (b)(1)1.4g precluded Coalition FMV/ISR from executing normal battlefield characterization required to identify and track CIVPOL for (b)(1)1.4a prior to CTS attack into sector B.19.

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) Direct Observation by Partner Force Observer. Partner forces used VISOBs from observation positions along the FLOT to characterize the area prior to the attack (Exhibit B1). Partner force visual observers did not conduct reconnaissance north of the FLOT (Exhibit B1), which left the observers blind to the movement of civilian traffic along the east-west portions of the street at ranges greater than 50m north of the FLOT (Exhibit C14). While CTS could observe much of the neighborhood for a general characterization of the area's CIVPOL, the limitations mentioned above precluded CTS from fully observing civilian movement on the ground near the structure. Meanwhile, Coalition advisors helped partner forces prepare an overall fires plan that depended on Coalition airstrikes that ultimately were conducted based on CTS VISOBs without Coalition force FMV observation (Exhibits B1, B14, & B15).

f. (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) Impact of (b)(1)1.4g  
(b)(1)1.4g preceded CTS offensive operations. During this period (b)(1)1.4g  
(b)(1)1.4g  
(b)(1)1.4g Risk to the civilian population increased from (b)(1)1.4a  
(b)(1)1.4a due to unobserved civilian movements in ISIS-controlled areas.

Simultaneously, CTS reconnaissance and VISOB TTPs prevented observers from being in a position to observe CIVPOL in vicinity of BLDG 4250.10. The net effect of non-observation of the area resulted in an accumulation of risk, which was not mitigated prior to the attack.

6. (U//~~FOUO~~) Recommendations: The evidence collected as part of this investigation shows that CJFLCC-OIR, and specifically the CJOC-E strike cell and TEA, took every available precaution to avoid civilian casualties as part of the subject engagement.

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However, the TEA was unaware that over 100 civilians were in the structure. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5) I recommend

CJFLCC-OIR consider the following changes in TTPs to reduce risk of civilian casualties during planned partner-force offensive operations. These recommendations, if enacted across the CJFLCC-OIR joint area of operations, will provide Coalition and partner-force leaders improved situational awareness on CIVPOL, allowing leaders to make the most informed decisions possible regarding the proportionality of weapons effects.

a. (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) Coalition Force Risk Mitigation TTPs to support partner force offensive operations. Recommend requiring (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5) The amount of observation required will vary with the tactical situation, according to the commander's assessment of risk.

b. (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) Coalition ISR TTPs. Recommend CJFLCC-DCME

(b)(5)

(b)(5)


c. (~~S//REL TO USA, MESF~~) Additional CIVCAS Inquiry. Recommend that

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7. (~~U//FOUO~~) The point of contact for this memorandum is Brigadier General Matthew Isler at: (b)(3) 10 USC 130b; (b)(6)

13 Encl  
A thru M

  
MATTHEW C. ISLER  
Brigadier General, USAF  
Investigating Officer



**CIVCAS TRACKER**

**Classification:** ~~SECRET~~ **Releasability:** ~~REL TO USA, FVEY~~

**ALLEGATION**

**Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED **Releasability:** ~~FOUO~~  
**Allegation Number:** 394 **Allegation Status:** Closed  
**Incident Date:** 17-Mar-2017 00:00 **Country:** IRAQ  
**Opened Date:** 23-Mar-2017 00:00 **Location Of Incident:** Jadida neighborhood  
 IVO (MGRS): (b)(1)1.4a  
 Mosul  
**MGRS:** (b)(1)1.4a **Nearest Major City:** Mosul  
**Coords Unknown:** No

**Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED **Releasability:** ~~FOUO~~  
**Allegation Date:** 23 Mar 2017 00:00  
**Source:** WebOps **Source Type:** Social Media

**Description:** Claims of CIVCAS from CF Airstrikes on Homes in Western Mosul. Social media users circulated reports and photos from regional media outlets, including Orient News, Rudaw, Al-Jazeera, and Almaq circulated reports via Twitter that CF airstrikes targeted three homes in the New Mosul district of western Mosul. Reports in circulation alleged that the airstrikes caused in excess of 230 CIVCAS, primarily women and children. Some reports suggested that many of the casualties were buried under the rubble of one of the homes that had been used as bomb shelter. Some pro-GoI users argued that ISIS shelled the homes as revenge against the people of Mosul, while the anti-GoI Association of Muslim Scholars in Iraq (@muslim2day) issued an official statement (#1242) condemning the attacks referring to them as part of ongoing aggression against the residents of Mosul. This topic trended and resonated at a high level in the Arabic IE.

**Initial Assessment**

**Classification:** ~~SECRET~~ **Releasability:** ~~REL TO USA, FVEY~~  
**Initial Date:** Not Reported  
**Initial Assessment:** Not Reported

**Assessment Details**

**Assessment**

**Classification:** ~~SECRET~~ **Releasability:** ~~REL TO USA, FVEY~~  
**Assessment Unit:** CJTFCC-OIR **Assessment Task Date:** 25-Mar-2017 15:13  
**Non-US Coalition Nation:** Not Reported



**Assessment Response:**

SUBJECT: Executive Summary of Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation of the Alleged Civilian Mass Casualty Incident in the al Jadidah District, City of Mosul, Ninewah Governorate, on or about 17 March 2017

1. Conclusion. At 0624 on 17 March 2017, Coalition ai

**Assessment CIVCAS:**

Yes

**Further Actions Directed:**

Not Reported

**Lesson Learned/Root Cause:**

Not Reported

**Assessment Killed:**

105

**Assessment Injured:**

0

**Status**

**Classification:**

UNCLASSIFIED

**Releasability:**

FOUO

**Investigation Status:**

CLOSED

**Closed Date:**

30 May 2017 00:00

**US Investigation Report Date:**

30 May 2017 15:13

**Closed At:**

Investigation

**Ex Gratia:**

No

**CIVCAS:**

YES

**Comments:**

Not Reported

**Killed:**

105

**Injured:**

0

**PAO Release Date:**

02 Jun 2017 00:00

**NA:**

No

**Reason For No Release:**

Not Reported

Approved for Release



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
 HEADQUARTERS, COMBINED JOINT FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND  
 OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE  
 UNION III, BAGHDAD, IRAQ  
 APO AE 09348

IRIZ-DCA

8 May 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, Combined Joint Forces Land Component  
 Command—Operation Inherent Resolve, Union III, Baghdad, Iraq, APO AE 09548

SUBJECT: Executive Summary of Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation of the Alleged  
 Civilian Mass Casualty Incident in the al Jadidah District, City of Mosul, Ninewah  
 Governate, on or about 17 March 2017

1. Conclusion. At 0824 on 17 March 2017, Coalition aircraft conducted an airstrike against two ISIS snipers engaging the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service (CTS). Coalition Forces conducted the strike in accordance with the applicable Rules of Engagement and the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Coalition aircraft employed a single GBU-38 precision-guided munition. The weapon appropriately balanced the military necessity of neutralizing the snipers with the potential for collateral damage. The GBU-38 entered the roof and detonated in the second floor of the structure.

a. The GBU-38's detonation ignited ISIS explosive materials that ISIS had previously emplaced in the structure. The secondary explosion triggered a rapid failure of the structure, killing the two ISIS snipers and 101 civilians sheltered in the bottom floors of the structure. An additional four civilians were killed in the neighboring structure to the west.

b. Eye witnesses and media outlets reported that an additional 36 civilians may have been at the building; however, there is insufficient evidence to determine their status or whereabouts at this time.

c. The Target Engagement Authority (TEA) was unaware of and could not have predicted the presence of civilians in the structure prior to the engagement.

2. Operational Context. At the time of the strike, CTS forces were engaged in offensive maneuver to seize the sector from 35–40 ISIS fighters controlling the area. On 17 March 2017, CTS had been postured along the same Forward Line of Troops (FLOT) for three days. That day was also the first day of the planned CTS advance into a new sector of the al Jadidah district. CTS Soldiers had continuous over-watch of the sector during this period, including direct visual observation (VISOBS) of the structure.

3. Enemy Activity. Coalition Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and CTS forces observed ISIS fighters forcibly evict civilian families from the area, build defensive fighting positions, stage vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDS), emplace improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and engage CTS forces with



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direct and indirect fire. Coalition and Iraqi human intelligence as well as Coalition multi-source intelligence overwhelmingly classified the district as ISIS-controlled and specifically prepared to deny the CTS advance north.

a. In the days prior to 17 March 2017, ISIS fighters conducted complex attacks against the CTS FLOT. CTS had defended against ISIS VBIEDS and suicide bombers on multiple occasions each day. During this period, CTS forces, with Coalition support, conducted a combined-arms defense to protect CTS Soldiers.

b. The testimony of multiple residents confirms that ISIS fighters knocked holes into the walls. The "wormholes" allowed ISIS to move fighters, weapons, and equipment between buildings without being detected by Coalition ISR or CTS visual observers.

4. Civilians. Coalition ISR observed, and civilian testimony confirmed, that ISIS fighters forcibly expelled families from their homes in the district. The displaced civilians were invited by a well-known neighbor to seek refuge in his home. It is estimated that between 101 and 137 civilians voluntarily sought refuge in the lower two floors of the structure.

a. Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) VISOBs and Coalition intelligence assets did not observe the civilians enter or use the structure. Neither Coalition nor CTS forces knew that civilians were sheltered within.

b. The ISIS fighters, however, knew of the civilians' presence within the structure, and interacted with the civilians. According to the next-door neighbor's testimony, ISIS fighters had issued a warning to him that his family was in danger. ISIS fighters advised him to evacuate his family from their residence and move north by the morning of 17 March 2017. ISIS warned him that, if the family remained, what would happen to them was not ISIS' fault.

5. Strike. CTS forces initiated their assault to seize and clear of the sector at approximately 0700L on the morning of 17 March 2017. CTS visual observers did not identify any civilians within the sector prior to the strike.

a. During their assault, CTS visual observers identified two ISIS snipers effectively engaging CTS soldiers from a Defensive Fighting Position (DFP) in the southwest corner of the second story of the structure. Iraqi CTS Battalion and Brigade commanders approved the observer request for a Coalition strike on the DFP and coordinated with an Iraqi Forward Air Controller (IFAC) to prepare a strike request. The IFAC coordinated with Coalition Advisors to plan the strike.



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b. After receiving the strike request, the Coalition Strike Cell in Erbil, a joint fires and control center under the command of a Coalition Target Engagement Authority (TEA), evaluated intelligence on enemy activities and forces in the area surrounding the DFP location. The Strike Cell staff also evaluated the location of the target with regard to historical civilian population reporting and the location's proximity of friendly forces. Weaponeering experts analyzed available weapons and selected a weapon and fusing option that would achieved the necessary effect and minimize collateral damage.

c. The TEA positively identified the ISIS snipers and determined that the engagement was authorized under the Rules of Engagement (ROE). As a weaponeering solution, the TEA selected a GBU-38 with a delayed fuse.

d. The TEA approved the engagement on the ISIS snipers. The engagement was the sixth of 81 weapons engagements that Coalition forces conducted in support of the CTS operations that day. After the weapon detonated, CTS visual observers reported that the DFP was destroyed.

6. Law of Armed Conflict. The TEA approved the strike in accordance with all provisions of the applicable ROE and Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).

a. Distinction. The Coalition attacked a valid military target which consisted of two snipers effectively engaging Iraqi CTS soldiers from a DFP.

b. Proportionality. The TEA selected a weapon that balanced the military necessity of neutralizing the two snipers with the potential for collateral damage to civilians and civilian structures.

(1) The TEA selected a GBU-38, a 500-pound class precision guided munition containing 192lbs of explosive material. The GBU-38's steel case was strong enough to penetrate the roof of the DFP and had sufficient explosive material to neutralize the snipers engaging the CTS soldiers from their DFP in the second floor. The TEA selected a fuse-setting that would neutralize the threat to CTS, while also minimizing risk to collateral structures. The TEA expected the weapons effects for the GBU-38 to be localized to the second floor of the building. Subsequent engineering and weapons analysis indicates that the GBU-38 should have resulted in no more than 16–20% damage to the structure, localized to the front of the second floor or the structure.

(2) The TEA did not know civilians were in the structure or that ISIS had deliberately staged a significant amount of secondary explosive materials in the structure. Based on the information reasonably available, the TEA could not have



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predicted the compounded effects of the secondary explosives emplaced by ISIS fighters.

c. Military Necessity. CTS commanders and the TEA determined that it was a military necessity to neutralize the ISIS snipers in order for CTS to achieve its maneuver objective of seizing the sector from ISIS. If the ISIS snipers were left to continue to engage CTS forces, CTS would incur unacceptable levels of casualties in the seizure of the sector. The seizure of the sector was necessary for CTS to complete the clearance and liberation of Mosul from ISIS.

7. Damage Resulting from the Engagement. The GBU-38 entered the northern portion of the roof at the front/north of the structure at a near-vertical angle. The GBU-38 detonated while penetrating the roof above the second floor of the structure. The GBU-38 sparked a secondary detonation of a large amount of explosive material that ISIS had previously emplaced in the structure. The secondary explosion produced a powerful blast and overpressure that triggered a rapid progressive failure of the structure. These events killed the two ISIS snipers, 101 civilians sheltered in the bottom floors of the structure, and four civilians in the neighboring structure to the west. Eye witnesses and media reported that an additional 36 individuals may have been located within the structure at the time of the engagement. However, the status of these individuals is undetermined at this time.

8. Post-Blast Analysis. Post-blast analysis conducted by a Coalition Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team identified explosive residues not consistent with the explosive content of a GBU-38 from several sample locations around the site, including Pentaerythritol Tetranitrate (PETN) and nitroglycerin.

a. The senior EOD officer concluded that the PETN was associated with improvised explosive devices or detonator cord (known as "DetCord"), a common explosive component which ISIS uses to link together larger explosive devices for simultaneous detonation. Furthermore, nitroglycerin residue also indicated the presence of secondary explosive devices, and was likely used by ISIS to sensitize the secondary explosive devices to detonate more easily. Finally, post-blast analysis conducted by EOD and expert weapons teams concluded that the structural damage and crater at the rear/south of the structure were not caused by the relatively low explosive weight of a single GBU-38.

b. The location of the structural damage and the crater at the rear/south of the structure were displaced from the site of the GBU-38 entry and blast, and far in excess to what could have been caused by the GBU-38's net explosive weight. Instead, the structural damage and crater were likely caused by a large amount of ISIS-emplaced


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explosive material located in the second story of the rear of the structure. This ISIS-emplaced explosive material conservatively contained more than four times the net explosive weight of the GBU-38. The sympathetic detonation of this secondary ISIS-emplaced explosive, activated by the GBU-38 impact, collapsed the structure, resulting in the vast majority of the 101 civilian casualties, and impacted the neighboring structure which resulted in four additional civilian casualties.

9. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at

(b)(3) 10 USC 130b; (b)(6)

  
MATTHEW C. ISLER  
Brigadier General, U.S. Air Force  
Investigating Officer